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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2013

Comparing system-marginal-price versus pay-as-bid auctions in a realistic electricity market scenario

Résumé

A realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between system-marginal-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the system-marginal-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers' endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels
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Dates et versions

halshs-00871081 , version 1 (08-10-2013)

Identifiants

Citer

Eric Guerci, Mohammad Ali Rastegar. Comparing system-marginal-price versus pay-as-bid auctions in a realistic electricity market scenario. Artificial Economics 2012, Sep 2012, Castellon, Spain. pp.141-153, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-31301-1_12⟩. ⟨halshs-00871081⟩
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