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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2023

Security Assessment of NTRU Against Non-Profiled SCA

Résumé

NTRU was first introduced by J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher and J.H Silverman in 1998. Its security, efficiency and compactness properties have been carefully studied for more than two decades. A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) version was even submitted to the NIST standardization competition and made it to the final round. Even though it has not been chosen to be a new standard, NTRU remains a relevant, practical and trustful post-quantum cryptographic primitive. In this paper, we investigate the side-channel resistance of the NTRU Decrypt procedure. In contrast with previous works about side-channel analysis on NTRU, we consider a weak attacker model and we focus on an implementation that incorporates some side-channel countermeasures. The attacker is assumed to be unable to mount powerful attacks by using templates or by forging malicious ciphertexts for instance. In this context, we show how a non-profiled side-channel analysis can be done against a core operation of NTRU decryption. Despite the considered countermeasures and the weak attacker model, our experiments show that the secret key can be fully retrieved with a few tens of traces.
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Dates et versions

hal-03950393 , version 1 (21-01-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Luk Bettale, Julien Eynard, Simon Montoya, Guénaël Renault, Rémi Strullu. Security Assessment of NTRU Against Non-Profiled SCA. CARDIS 2022 - 21st Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference, Nov 2022, Birmingham, United Kingdom. pp.248-268, ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-25319-5_13⟩. ⟨hal-03950393⟩
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