Trakun, Politics and the Thai State

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TRAKUN, POLITICS AND THE THAI STATE

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Abstract in English

Political *trakun* are patrilineages that have distinguished themselves through engaging in politics over several generations by filling key positions of the state, such as the cabinet and parliament. The study of political *trakun* though has not yet been given academic attention. Despite most accounts of Thai political history being simultaneously the accounts of the royal and other elite families, little research has aimed to understand the entanglement of families and the state. The literature on Thailand after 1932 offers even less insight into Thai kinship politics. Political *trakun*, if they are mentioned at all, generally appear in footnotes, as anecdotes or as part of biographies. In this thesis I will address this gap.

This thesis will show what political *trakun* are and how they are established. Their evolvement over the course of history and the way they adapted to changing political circumstances will also be examined. It will be explained how political *trakun* have been able to become entwined with the Thai state. This will be demonstrated through the analysis of the case studies of five political *trakun* in the larger context of Thai society and politics. Particular events from these *trakun*'s lives and careers, such as marriages, election campaigns and funerals, will function as lenses through which to critically reassess the intersection of seemingly disparate strands: the *trakun* and the state.

This study will argue that political *trakun* have taken crucial positions in the Thai state over decades. In this way they have control of the state and amass resources which they can transform into economic and symbolic capital. This capital is used to win elections and to maintain the influential position of political *trakun*. Capital is reproduced through socialization from one generation to the next. Strategic marriages create alliances or strengthen cooperation in the *trakun*. Upon the death of one member of the *trakun*, the funeral mediates the possible loss of symbolic capital in all its forms. Hereby, the traditional funeral rituals are utilized and reinvented for the proliferation of the *trakun*'s symbolic capital.

The role of political *trakun* shows that the Thai state is an abstract concept of an institution exercising sovereignty over a given territory, relating fundamentally to the maintenance of order within its territory and to the business of government. This has given rise to the image of an organizational structure, which is recognized as the state. The praxis of government, however, is performed by an entangled mass of interlocking relationships between individuals and groups of individuals. One type of such relationships that is integral to the Thai state is kinship relationships, which are manifest in the political *trakun*.

Abstract in Danish

Politiske *trakun* er patrilineære slægtsgrupper der har udmærket sig gennem engagement i politik igennem adskillige generationer ved at udfylde nøglepositioner i staten, såsom i kabinettet og parlamentet. De er endnu ikke blevet viet akademisk opmærksomhed. På trods af at de fleste redegørelser for Thailands politiske historie samtidig er beretninger om kongefamilien og andre elitefamilier, findes der ikke megen forskning der har søgt at forstå hvordan familierne og staten smelter sammen. Litteraturen om Thailand efter 1932 giver endnu mindre indsigt i slægtskabsrelateret politik i Thailand. Hvis de overhovedet nævnes optræder politiske *trakun* generelt i fodnoter, som anekdoter eller dele af biografier. I denne afhandling vil jeg behandle dette hul i litteraturen.

Denne afhandling vil vise hvad politiske *trakun* er og hvordan de er blevet grundlagt. Ydermere vil deres udvikling gennem historien samt måden hvorpå de har tilpasset sig skiftende politiske omstændigheder blive undersøgt. Der vil blive givet en forklaring på hvordan politiske *trakun* har været i stand til at smelte sammen med den thailandske stat. Dette vil blive demonstreret gennem analyse af beretningerne om fem politiske *trakun* set i forhold til den bredere kontekst der udgøres af det thailandske samfund og af politik i Thailand. Specifikke begivenheder fra disse *trakuns* liv og karrierer, såsom ægteskaber, valgkampagner og begravelser fungerer som linser der skaber en optik som muliggør en kritisk gentænkning af krydsfeltet mellem tilsyneladende separate størrelser: *trakun* og staten.

Dette studie vil argumentere for at politiske *trakun* har indtaget nøglestillinger i den thailandske stat gennem årtier. På denne måde kontrollerer de staten og samler ressourcer som de kan transformere til økonomisk og symbolsk kapital. Denne kapital bruges til at vinde valg og til at fastehold de politiske *trakun*s indflydelsesrige positioner. Kapital reproduceres gennem socialisering fra en generation til den næste. Strategiske ægteskabspagter skaber alliancer eller styrker samarbejdet i en *trakun*. Når et medlem af en *trakun* dør medierer begravelsen det mulige tab af symbolsk kapital i alle dets fremtrædelsesformer. Herved bliver traditionelle begravelsesritualer benyttet og genfortolket for at tjene til udbredelsen af *trakun*s symbolske kapital.

Den rolle politiske *trakun* spiller viser at den thailandske stat er en abstrakt forestilling om en institution der udøver sin suverænitet over et givent territorium, og relaterer grundlæggende til opretholdelsen af orden indenfor dens territorium og til regeringsudøvelsen. Dette har frembragt et billede af en organisationsstruktur, der anerkendes som staten. Regeringspraksissen udføres af en sammenfiltret masse af relationer mellem individer og grupper af individer. En af disse typer af relationer, som er en uadskillelig del af en thailandske stat, er slægtskabsrelationer, som er åbenbare i de politiske *trakun*.

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Note on Translations, Transliteration and the Usage of Names

All translations of quotations from Thai-language texts and interviews were done by the author. Some nuances of the Thai language, however, cannot sufficiently be translated into English. Therefore, I included the original Thai text in Appendix 1.

For the transliteration, I use a slightly modified version of the Royal Thai General System of Transcription for the Romanization of Thai into English. However, Thai-language transliterations often cannot convey the Thai original and can make it difficult to identify the original Thai term. To avoid misunderstanding, on the first usage of a term I have included the original Thai language term in brackets.

The usage of names in this thesis applies the common Thai practice. Upon first introduction of a person the given name and the surname will be stated. Thereafter, the given name alone will be used. Only when the context requires it, the surname will be restated. For individuals who have an official title, this title will be stated upon first introduction. Royal titles will be added before the given name in form of the prefixes M.R. for *Mom Ratchawong* (หม่อมราชวงศ์) and M.L. for *Mom Luang* (หม่อมหลวง).

To ensure that all persons named in this thesis can be clearly identified, I have included a list of all important individuals, their transliterated names and the Thai original in Appendix 4. I will not include the Thai original of names in the main body of the thesis.

The name of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (จอมพล แปลก พิบูลสงคราม) and its usage in this thesis deserve special mentioning, because it has often been misused in English-language writings. In English-language writings, he is customarily referred to as Field Marshal Phibun or Phibul Songkhram. This is an incorrect usage. When Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram was born in 1897, he was given the name Plaek. Surnames were introduced to Thailand in 1913 and Plaek's family adopted the surname Khittasangkha. Thus, he became Plaek Khittasangkha. He was later given the title Luang Phibunsongkhram (หลวงพิบูลสงคราม). This official title he subsequently adopted as surname. Thus, his name was Plaek Phibunsongkhram. His full title and name in the Thai original is very long, prompting Thais to use an abbreviated

form in both informal speech and formal (but not official) writing. He is, thus, best known as Field Marshal P. (จอมพล ป.) As the English transliteration is equally long, I will adopt the same practice when generally referring to him. In historic accounts, however, I will use his name as appropriate to the time period discussed.

Chapter 1

Introduction

On 8 August 2012, Yingluck Shinawatra was endorsed as Thailand's first female prime minister after a landslide victory of the Pheu Thai Party for which she had run as the number one candidate a month earlier. A day later, the article announcing Yingluck's endorsement as prime minister in the *Bangkok Post* was full of references to her family. The article restated the widely known fact that she is the younger sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is now living in self-imposed exile. Several of her family members were present at her inauguration; amongst them were her sister Yaowapha Wongsawat, an influential politician who has repeatedly served as a member of parliament (MP), and Yingluck's brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat, who served as prime minister for a few months in 2008. Apart from mentioning the large number of the new prime minister's family members present at the inauguration, the article also implied that these family members were involved in the expected cabinet line-up (*Bangkok Post*, 9 August 2011 Pp. 1).

The achievements of the Shinawatras and Wongsawats are remarkable; they are, however, only one of the most recent examples of families' engagement in politics and their occupation of offices of the state. The Shinwatras and Wongsawats have provided the country with 10% of their prime ministers - 3 out of 28. This is unprecedented in Thai history. Yet when looking back at all of the prime ministers since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, one also encounters the brothers M.R. Seni and M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, who have both held the position. The more one looks, the more it becomes apparent that Thailand has seen numerous families active in politics occupying seats in the parliament, cabinet, senate and the prime ministership as well as high ranking military and civilian positions in the bureaucracy. Thais refer to families engaged in politics as political *trakun* (ตระกูลการเมือง or ตระกูลนักการเมือง). A political *trakun* should be understood as a patrilineage, recognizable through a shared surname, which has distinguished itself by the means of political activity over a minimum of two generations.

Kinship and Politics: Positioning this Study

Kinship has been an integral part of social organization and, thus politics, for centuries. This is particularly pronounced in stateless societies, where a descent kinship system reduces the administrative burden of the society to a minimum. This is achieved because in a descent system, conflicts and obligation are regulated internally. A quarrel between members of two lineages is a matter only of the two lineages involved. Thus, the parties engaged in any one conflict are limited to a certain number of people. In stateless societies, kinship terms and obligations generally become part of the system of law and order. There are no officeholders, only representatives of groups (Eriksen 2010: 121-122, 170-172). Accordingly, justice and cultural and territorial stability are, in effect, maintained through the extended family organization and the norms of kinship behavior. This makes the formation of bureaucracy and states unnecessary. Similar systems have been and are widespread in Africa (cf., Evans-Pritchard 1940, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940, Carlston 1968, Smith 1969, Amoah 1988).

However, while the notion of kinship as a social and political organization factor in stateless societies is widely accepted, it appears to be in contrast to the modern institutionalized state. The organization of society in stateless societies is based on kinship principles. The family or lineage is the foremost focus of loyalty. In the modern state, loyalty belongs to the state, and preferential treatments for one's family are depicted as amoral. Ideally, the state and its officials should treat every member of the state and society alike. The establishment of political families or favoritism of one's family is seen as a threat to the state, as it could overthrow the underlying principles of the concept. Kinship has no place in the modern state of today; it has been relocated to other spheres of society (Eriksen 2010: 128).

Despite the argument that kinship has no place in the modern state, engagement of entire families in politics can be found all over the world. In the United Kingdom, both *chambers* of parliament were dominated by a limited number of families at least up to the Second World War (Wasson 2000). The Americas, both north and south, can boast of a sizable number of families which are engaged in politics. The Kennedys, Roosevelts and Bushes are just a few examples. Japan and Korea are well known for the involvement of influential families in both politics and business. In Southeast Asia, the study of kinship politics has mainly focused on the Philippines (McCoy 2009 [1993], Hutchcroft 1998, Roces 1998) and less prominently on

Indonesia (Robinson and Vedi 2004) and Singapore (Barr 2008). Here I will discuss the literature on kinship politics in the Philippine case, as it is one of the most well studied in Asia.

Kinship Politics in the Philippines

Philippine kinship politics have been made possible by what was interpreted as a weak postcolonial or patrimonial state. Political families were further solidified by the character of the national economy, decreasing control of the government in the provinces and the privatization of public resources (McCoy 2009 [1993]: 10). According to McCoy's (2009 [1993]: 19) introductory article to his edited volume, *An Anarchy of Families*, political families often engage in warlordism and use violence to protect their businesses and political influence. The issues of weak state, warlordism and violence are further discussed by the other articles in the volume (cf., Beckett 2009 [1993], Bentley 2009 [1993], Cullinane 2009 [1993], Fegan 2009 [1993], Paredes 2009 [1993], Sidel 2009 [1993]). Moreover, Mojares (2009 [1993]) demonstrates how the Osmeñas[1] use the idioms of electoral politics. He shows that the Osmeñas are not purely rent-seeking, relying on violence and economic coercion, but rather use ideological appeals and the electoral venue to achieve power.

Hutchcroft (1998) argues that the patrimonial state has hindered the development of the Phillipines and created an abundance of corruption. By focusing on the Philippine banking sector, he shows how elite families have used family-owned banks to extract funds from the state to enrich themselves. These elite families control the insufficiently developed patrimonial state, resulting in inconsistent economic policies and arbitrary control over banks, which allow elite families to channel government funds into their own conglomerates instead of ensuring national development. When Marcos declared martial law, he pledged to uproot the old oligarchy and to lead the country to a new society. This was initially perceived to change the fate of politics in the Philippines and it awakened hopes for a strengthening of the state. The state indeed became stronger; however, it did not lose its patrimonial nature. Marcos and his associates enriched themselves at unprecedented levels and became the example par excellence of "booty capitalism" (Hutchcroft 1998: 110-143). Hutchcroft (1998: 240) concludes that political change and repeated banking reforms have only marginally changed the relationship between the state

[1] The Osmeñas are a Philippine family with great political influence originating in Cebu City. Among their members are several mayors, senators and one president.

and leading families. These families enriched themselves under Marcos' authoritarian regime as they do today under a democratic one. Only a non-patrimonial state or at least a state with a well-developed bureaucracy to counterweigh the oligarchy could overcome "booty capitalism" and ensure economic development.

The study of kinship politics in the Philippines suffers on the theoretical level and also leaves the inner workings of political families underexplored. The theoretical arguments set out in McCoy's (2009 [1993]: 1-33) introductory article are not taken up by the other contributers, leaving them largely untested. The majority of articles included in the volume do not discuss families but rather are political biographies of one male politician. In the case of Sidel (2009 [1993]), this is particularly pronounced, as he studies a failed attempt to establish a political family. The relationship between families and the state remains unexplained and is little discussed in the articles of the volume. The articles also lack in the discussion of the relationship between the state and families, as well as between families themselves. Further, the dynamics within families that are crucial to understanding their workings in politics are not touched upon. Hutchcroft (1998) applies Weber's concept of the patrimonial state on the Philippines. Weber's models, however, were primarily based on European case studies, and Hutchcroft (1988: 44) himself admits that the transplanting of such a concept is not always possible. Had he refrained from putting himself into such a framework, he might have been able to explain kinship politics. To achieve such a goal he would, however, have had to collect more primary data on the Philippine oligarchy. How many families are involved in which and how many businesses? How do these families gain power? How do they interact and intermarry? It further remains to question the idea that the Philippine oligarchy and the Philippine state are competing with each other. How can they be in competition if the Philippine oligarchy provides much of the most central personnel of the Philippine state?

It has, further, been found that Philippine women also wield a considerable amount of power in postwar Philippine politics (Roces 1998). Accordingly, Philippine politics are not male-dominated but rather gendered, and women wield power in four forms: unofficially, officially, morally and rebelliously. Unofficial power is carried through kinship ties with politicians in positions of official power, such as senators or presidents. In their capacity as men's wives, sisters or mothers, women have influenced Philippine politics and often facilitated their male relatives' political careers. Official power, in the form of official positions in local and

national politics, has been gained by more and more Filipino women. This form of power, however, is limited, as it confines women to a male-dominated field with a glass ceiling. The boundaries between unofficial and official power are blurred, as some politicians' wives have won political offices of their own. In such cases, women exercise both unofficial and official power simultaneously. Roces (1998: 191) sees this combination of powers as most efficient. Moral power is similar to unofficial power, as it is traditional and does not challenge the male official power. It is used behind the scenes and is not invested in official positions. However, moral power differs from unofficial power, as it is not based on kinship politics. It is mainly used by Christian nuns, who found their power as moral figures "representing modern notions of virtuousness" (1998: 191). Rebel power is connected with rebel movements, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Social Democrats or even human rights movements. Women active in such movements abstain from taking unofficial power, as they oppose traditional kinship politics. At the same time, these movements, which are often male-dominated, do not allow women to take on official power. Thus, women using rebel power are the least powerful.

Roces' (1998) study of female power and kinship politics in the Philippines is an important contribution; however, many questions remain unanswered. She has succeeded in adding women into the discussion of kinship politics in the Philippines. This makes it clear that politics consists not only of the official arena; the unofficial politics of politicians' wives and female relatives is just as significant. This is commendable and an achievement, as hitherto women had been excluded from the discussion, and unofficial power is an issue which is very difficult to research. However, when one concentrates solely on women, the dynamics of kinship politics loses its complexity. A family consists of both men and women; thus, they should be discussed together.

Thai History and Political *Trakun*

While kinship politics in the Philippines have been studied by a number of scholars (cf., Hutchcroft 1988, McCoy 2009 [1993], Roces 1998), the Thai case has not yet been given academic attention. Despite most accounts of Thai political history being simultaneously the accounts of the royal and other elite families, little research has aimed to understand the entanglement of families and the state. It has been taken for granted that under a monarchy, the

royal family was automatically the primary political actor, almost synonymous with the state. Only a limited number of studies has challenged this picture and tried to explore the role of elite families in Thailand before 1932. The literature on Thailand after 1932 offers even less insight into Thai kinship politics. Political *trakun*, if they are mentioned at all, generally appear in footnotes, as anecdotes or as part of biographies. I will now first discuss how political *trakun* have been covered by historians. Then, studies of modern Thailand that include mentioning and discussions of political *tarkun* will be examined.

The Bunnag family's name features on the pages of Thai history books no less than that of the royal family itself, and it has been found that their clever marriage strategies were one major reason for them establishing a dominance in Thai politics. Wyatt (1968) studied the "origin and growth of one-family dominance in nineteenth century Thai politics" (Wyatt 1968: 208). His study revealed how the Bunnags married their daughters to the Thai kings or their own parallel cousins. In this fashion, the Bunnags could place their own offspring in the royal page corps, from which they could advance into higher ranks of the administration. Thus, the Bunnags were able to fill some of the most important offices of their time. Additionally, their intermarriage with the royal family advanced this. Their obligations to other families were minimal, as they had limited marriages outside the existing kin group. Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977) studied the political role of ministers from the Bunnag *trakun*. He gives a detailed account of the political influence yielded by the family over more than a century. Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977: 265-278) arrives at much the same conclusion as Wyatt and sees the success of the Bunnag family in (1) closeness to the royal family, (2) marriage strategies, (3) the holding of important offices for a long time and (4) opportunism.

Neither Wyatt (1968) nor Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977) link their studies of the Bunnag family to a discussion of the Thai state. Both explain how one family could establish itself but do not seek to question in how far the dominance of a family over politics was due to the nature of the Thai state. Neither scholar attempts to show the wider implications of the dominance of one family on Thai politics or the Thai state. Had they done so, we might have gained invaluable knowledge about the workings of the Thai state under the absolute monarchy.

However, not only the royal family and the Bunnag family are of importance for Thai history; other families, like the Na Ranong family, have also played a crucial role. Cushman (1991) examined the story of the Na Ranong family, which is a family of Chinese origin that

settled in Ranong, a province in South Thailand, and in Penang, an island in North Malaysia. Cushman shows how the Na Ranong family interacted with the royal family, which during the absolute monarchy was synonymous with the state. They were in a relationship of mutual interdependence and reciprocity. The Na Ranong family supplied the central government with revenue due to their positions as tax-farmers for the tin monopoly in Ranong. For their loyalty and reliability, they received official titles and positions as governors, which further increased their economic advancement. With the appointment as governors, the Na Ranongs also provided the state with another service, namely, the preservation of order in a region very distant from the political center in Bangkok. Despite an increasing need for greater revenue and centralization under King Chulalongkorn, the state left the Na Ranong family in place in order to prevent the advance of British influence in the region. When, in 1909, a treaty with Britain about the territorial rights in the South was signed, the fear of losing sovereignty in the region was relieved, and the state no longer had to rely on the Na Ranong family. The positions of governors and superintendents were now gradually filled with men from Bangkok, and the family could no longer rely on their cooperation with the state to further their fortune.

The account of the relationship of the Na Ranong family and the state shows the important of kinship politics in Thailand, but it also shows how this importance decreased with the modernization of the political system (Cushman 1991). The study of one family and its political significance shows that not only the Bunnag family was an actor on the political stage of Thailand under the absolute monarchy. The state, which at that time was the royal family, had a relationship with other families, in the capital as well as in the provinces. These relationships had a reciprocal nature. However, with increasing modernization and centralization of the state and its administration, these relationships gradually diminished in importance. The families who had traditionally been appointed as governors in the provinces were replaced by centrally appointed officials with no connection in the area of their appointment. Families like the Na Ranong family were rendered politically obsolete.

The apparent decrease in the political significance of provincial elite families in Thailand caused by increasing modernization and centralization is refuted by a study of the transformation of the regional elites during the reforms. Vickery (1970) studied how regional elite families adapted to the changes in the administrative system and increasing centralization. As no marked resistance from elite families, such as local royalty or hereditary governors,

against the reforms of the administrative systems was recorded, he worked with the assumption that the regional elites had been absorbed into the new system, either by appointment as governors or by equivalent positions in the capital. Vickery (1970: 877-878) was able to identify a number of regional elite families which had taken on high offices in their regions or in the central administration. The families from the North and South were most successful in this. Families from the Northeast did not adapt as well and were able to secure only middle-ranking positions in the provinces or capital. After the implementation of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, regional elite families continued to adapt and became members of parliament, the most prominent example is former Prime Minister Khuang Aphaiwong, a descendent of the family that provided the governors to Battambang for several generations (Vickery 1970: 878-879).[2]

Vickery (1970) provides us with valuable empirical data showing that elite families remained politically influential after 1932; he did not, however, link them to a discussion of politics and the Thai state in general. In his paper, Vickery (1970) showed that elite families adapted to the reform of the late 19th century. Many families were able to be appointed to high positions in the bureaucracy and after 1932 also entered the parliament. Vickery does not offer us any explanation to this adaptability of elite families. He also does not attempt to explore the overall function of kinship politics in the contemporary Thai state.

The Modern Thai State and Political *Trakun*

Studies of Thai politics and the Thai state after 1932 have not focused on kinship politics but rather put other relationships, such as that of politicians and businessmen, into the center of examination. Fred Riggs' (1966) study of the bureaucratic polity has been highly influential. The study itself can be divided into three parts: a comparison of the historical developments in Thailand and Burma, a detailed examination of the organization of the Thai state before and after reformations in the mid-nineteenth century and an in-depth study of contemporary Thai politics, including a detailed account of political cliques. I will here focus only on the third part, as it is most relevant to my own research. Riggs (1966: 242-311) argues that in the bureaucratic polity all policy decisions are made by career bureaucrats and military officials, which provided Thailand with stability in its policies despite frequent changes in the top political positions. This

[2] Khaung Aphaiwong served as prime minister four times: 1 August 1944 - 31 August 1945, 21 January 1946 - 18 March 1946, 10 November 1947 - 6 February 1948 and 21 February 1948 - 8 April 1948.

dominance of the bureaucrats and military is founded on the lack of development of other actors. Politicians are not in politics to make policy decisions but to enrich themselves through often multiple board memberships. This also includes an extensive exploration of the membership of factions on company boards. However, he concludes that board membership did not facilitate the cohesion of factions, as members of different factions frequently sat on the same boards. Sweeping statements about oligarchies and relationships between some of the politicians in his study leave no doubt that he must have been at least aware of some of the kinship politics taking place during his period of research.

Riggs (1966) has been criticized on many accounts but most prominently for not doing justice to rising extra-bureaucratic forces in Thai politics. Indeed, only seven years after his study was published, the student movement in 1973 showed that groups outside the bureaucracy and military could not only be interested in politics but also fundamentally change the political status quo. Riggs' views on Thai politics were consequently challenged in an array of studies (cf., Nelson 1998, Pasuk 1999, Arghiros 2001). Yoshifumi (2008: 3-4) has further argued that his correlation of military or bureaucratic positions with a lack of democratic values is irrational. The mere membership in the military does not necessarily mean a person lacks in democratic values and, thus, he proposed to use the share of elected members of cabinet as an indicator for democracy instead of military or official ranks. I agree with these studies in so much that other elements of society than the bureaucracy and military can have major political influence. Further, I will not use military or official ranks as indicators for democracy. Rather I will use them to determine the backgrounds of the families under discussion. My major concern with Riggs' (1966) study is, however, his negligence of political *trakun*. While he appears to have been aware of their existence, he does not include them as an analytical category in his study. Had he used kinship relations instead of board membership as an indicator for cohesion in the factions, he would likely have found that factions cohere according to ties of blood and marriage.

The Thai scholar (Naraniti/**นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]) wrote an account of the Ratchakru Group, which is the most extensive academic work on this topic that can be found to date. The Ratchakru Group comprises several political *trakun,* one of which are the Choonhavans. Naraniti (**นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]) uses the Choonhavans and their in-laws to explore how coup groups attempted to recreate themselves as political parties. He succeeded in giving a detailed

chronological account of the main male protagonists of the political *trakun* associated with the Ratchakru Group. In a chronological fashion, he describes their entering the political stage in 1947, the downfall of the group in 1957, the return to politics in the 1970s and the final downfall in the early 1990s. He also includes valuable details about the foundation of political parties by the Ratchakru Group and how they have used their political influence to increase their profits from business ventures.

Despite the focus on the Ratchakru Group, which consists of political *trakun*, Naraniti (**นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]) does not explain the workings of kinship politics. Indeed, his study is not about political *trakun*, it is about male politicians who happened to be related by blood or marriage. He does not lavish any attention on the female members of the families or the workings of kinship. Kinship links appear to be more a coincidence, a mere fact, than anything of importance.

Kinship politics in Thailand have been argued to have increased in intensity and extent from the 1960s to the 2000s. Chatrat's (**ชาตรัตน์** 2007) comparison of the Thanom Kittikachorn regime (1963 to 1973) and that of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001 to 2006) has shown that both politicians were involved in kinship politics. Under Thanom Kittikachorn, close relatives of the prime minister enriched themselves by taking commissions from every government contract. However they did not manipulate the overall economic policies. This practice was limited to a small group of elite politicians including Thanom and his right hand man Praphat Jarusathien, as well as Thanom's son Narong Kittikachorn and Praphat's son-in-law. Under Thaksin Shinawatra, the number of people engaged in crony capitalism increased and involved more than the most direct relatives. Business men now also became politicians. These business men tailored economic policies that would specifically fulfill the needs of their own businesses, often putting others at a disadvantage. This greatly affected the overall economy (Chatrat/**ชาตรัตน์** 2007: 292-310).

Despites Chatarat's (2007) focus on political *trakun*, she fails to explain their workings on an empirical and theoretical level. Her account is largely empirical; however, she limits herself to only one aspect of political *trakun*, which is the relationships between politicians, their families and the economy. Chatarat does not go beyond the official arenas, such as the parliament, the cabinet or board rooms to show us the family's internal mechanisms.

Further, she does not get involved in any theoretical discussion, which would make the study more insightful.

In studies publications in the English, political *trakun* are mentioned anecdotally or in passing in studies about Thai politics. Ockey (2004) provides an extensive study of the politics with a special view on democracy. Thai democracy, he argues, is based on a relationship between indigenous and foreign values. While democracy appeared to have been imported from the West, Ockey (2004: 3) points out that participatory politics had always been part of village life. In his study, much emphasis is put on leadership culture and its development over the past decades. While discussing leadership styles, Much attention is given to women in politics. It is shown how women from various backgrounds have managed to overcome barriers posed by stereotypes of leadership and gender roles, albeit not being able to abandon such barriers completely. Ockey (2004: 61-62) also mentions that politicians' wives have been found to fulfill significant political roles, which have not yet been given the academic attention they deserve.

Biographies of politicians, like Pasuk and Baker's (2005, 2009) study of the life of Thaksin Shinawatra, also feature political *trakun*. The account starts with a narration of the Shinawatras' arrival in Thailand and their commercial success and the political engagement of Thaksin's father, who was an MP. Then, they vividly describe his emergence as a multi-billionaire in just four years in the early 1990s and his campaign and election to prime minister in 2001. This is followed by an in-depth account of Thaksin's populist policies. In the second edition, they add a discussion of Thaksin's downfall and his attempts to regain political power. The whole study contains details of how Thaksin has utilized his family in his business and political endeavors. Thaksin made an advantageous marriage to the daughter of an influential police general. His business success was partly achieved by the utilization of these family connections. Once in power, he transferred most of his shares in his business to his wife and children. His policies benefited his own and his family's business ventures disproportionally, and he positioned relatives in key positions of the military and police.

Political *trakun* were mentioned on the sidelines by Askew (2008). He set out to identify the reason for the electoral dominance of the Democrat Party in Thailand's South. His anthropological study is based on extensive participant observation and interviews. Askew (2008) successfully shows that the electoral success of the Democrat Party is founded on a delicate balance of *realpolitik* and ideology. The Democrat Party has built up the image of the

righteous, democratic party that is more moral than its counterpart, the Thai Rak Thai Party, who only succeeds due to vote buying and corruption. On the other hand, the Democrat Party masterfully navigates the needs and aspirations of local supporters and their followers. It is in this respect that the detailed accounts of election campaigns and canvassing include numerous details of the involvement of political *trakun*. He even includes a short discussion of political *trakun* in his book (Askew 2008: 308-313). Therein he states that the Democrat Party takes the sons and daughters of their former MPs into special consideration when nominating candidates for election. They are, in almost every case, appointed in their parents' constituencies. He further states that family affiliation ranks transcend any other kind of affiliation.

The accounts of kinship politics in Ockey (2004), Pasuk and Baker (2005, 2009) and Askew (2008) remain descriptive and are only side narratives to the main story. Ockey's (2004) otherwise convincing study of Thai politics and leadership styles could have gained if he had given more attention to politicians' wives and political *trakun*. The largely male leadership styles he has studied have rightfully been seen as an obstacle for women's political representation. However, as he has himself acknowledged, women, such as politicians' wives, play political roles outside the formal political system. Pasuk and Baker (2005, 2009) provide us with details about Thaksin's life and family that cannot be found in any other English language account. Apart from the discussion of how Thaksin's family business benefited from his politics, the account remains descriptive and does not engage in theoretical consideration of the implications of such practices on Thai politics and the state in general. Further, it appears to be a unique phenomenon that has not before been experienced by Thai politics. Askew's awareness of and attention to political *trakun* is remarkable. It shows his perceptiveness to what happens in the field. Due to the focus of his research, however, his observations regarding *trakun* do not go very far and do not provide theoretical insights. How do husband and wife work together in politics? How are family loyalties created and enforced? How do political *trakun* work?

The Argument

Studies of the importance of families in Thai politics prior to 1932 treat kinship politics empirically and imply that with increasing modernization families lose political importance. Wyatt (1968) and Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977) give us accounts of the Bunnag family that explain the

establishment of this family's dominance over Thai politics and the scope of that influence. Cushman (1991) acknowledges the existence of other important elite families and also provides us with a better understanding of the relationship between these families and the state. However, she implies that the importance of kinship politics decreased for the state in the early 20th century. This is opposed by Vickery's (1970) study, which shows that elite families were able to adapt to a changing political framework and kinship politics remain relevant. His study has not resulted in further studies of kinship politics in Thailand. In this thesis, I will take up this challenge. I will show how elite families have wielded political influence in Thai politics from the onset of the constitutional period in 1932. While the elite families studied by Vickery did adapt to the new system, I will argue that they were joined and later partly replaced by families from other backgrounds.

In this study, I will show that families engage in Thai politics. Thereby, I will focus on the period since the onset of the constitutional period in 1932. Political families have played an integral role in Thai politics and, thus, deserve academic attention that so far has been lacking. I will also explore the inner workings of political families. How are marriages made? How do these families position themselves and their offspring to be able to remain on the political stage? What roles do individual members of the families have to perform? This thesis will show that families in politics can only be understood when considering both men and women. It is the negotiations that go on between male and female, old and young, formal politics and informal politics that should be seen as the linchpin of these families. In order to understand the workings of political *trakun*, this thesis focuses on four central research questions:

- What are political *trakun*? How were they established?
- How have political *trakun* evolved over the course of history? How have they adapted to changing political circumstances?
- How have political *trakun* been able to maintain their representation in the institutions of the state?
- How do the *trakun* and the state relate to each other? What does this mean for our understanding of the state as an institution?

These questions will be answered by analyzing the stories of five political *trakun* in the larger context of Thai society and politics. Particular events from these *trakun*'s lives and careers, such as marriages, election campaigns and funerals, will function as lenses through which to critically

reassess the intersection of seemingly disparate strands: the *trakun* and the state. Their stories were studied applying a multi-method research strategy including interviews, observation, analysis of written documents and quantitative methods. Field research for this thesis was carried out from February 2010 to August 2010 and from May 2011 to August 2011.

Five *trakun*, representing different types of families politically active during the past century, will be employed as case studies for this thesis. They are the Choonhavans, the Kittikachorns, the Shinawatras, the Techaphaybuns and the Suwanchawees. The Choonhavans together with their in-laws, also known as the Ratchakru Group, dominated Thai politics from 1947 to 1957 and again during the late 1980s to early 2000s. The Kittikachorns were influential from 1957 to 1973 but represent an unsuccessful political *trakun*. The Shinawatras first entered politics in the 1970s but have established themselves as the most successful political *trakun* since the early 2000s. The Techaphaybuns are a well-known business *trakun* which expanded into politics in the 1980s. The Suwanchawees are a political *trakun* grown out of local politics that entered the national arena in the 1990s.

This study will argue that the state is an abstract concept of an institution exercising sovereignty over a given territory, relating fundamentally to the maintenance of order within its territory and to the business of government. This abstract concept has given rise to the image of an organizational structure. This organizational structure is recognized as the state by the individuals living in the territory it governs, as well as by other institutions of its kind. The praxis of government, however, is performed by an entangled mass of interlocking relationships between individuals and groups of individuals. One type of relationship that is integral to the Thai state is the kinship relationship.

Political *trakun* are a prime example of the entanglement of human relationships and the state. They have taken crucial positions in the Thai state over decades. Political *trakun* have positioned themselves and their relatives in a way that have made it possible for them to make policies that benefit their own families. In this way they have controlled the state and often also parts of the economy. By controlling the state and economy, political *trakun* amass resources which they can transform into economic and symbolic capital.

The influential position of political *trakun* is maintained by the means of symbolic capitalism. Symbolic capitalism is a concept that I shall be using as an analytical tool throughout this thesis, and one which has been inspired by the notion of symbolic capital introduced by

Bourdieu (2010 [1984]). He argued that economic capital alone cannot explain the function of society and, thus, added other forms of capital that are symbolic in nature, such as cultural, educational, social and political. The political influence of political *trakun* is interlinked with their success in elections, which are won by means of economic and symbolic capital in all its forms. Political capital is of special importance in this. Through long-standing representation in the parliament, cabinet and senate, political *trakun* continuously increase the amount of political capital they possess. Apart from the increase in political capital, political *trakun* also accumulate a high amount of other forms of capital. Capital is then given to allied politicians, local politicians and voters. This can take the form of financial contributions or other services, like job placement or support in law cases. These gifts are later reciprocated in the form of services or votes in elections. In this way one type of capital is exchanged for another, often with an increase in the overall sum of capital. This capital is inherited and reproduced through socialization from one generation to the next. Strategic marriages create alliance or strengthen the cooperation in the *trakun*. Upon the death of one member of the *trakun*, the funeral mediates the possible loss of symbolic capital in all its forms. Hereby, the traditional funeral rituals are utilized and reinvented for the proliferation of the *trakun*'s symbolic capital.

Thesis Outline

Chapter Two - Data Collection. In this chapter I will show how political *trakun* can be studied despite the often private nature of the data collected. Much of what is portrayed in this thesis took place offstage in personal homes, over a nice meal or during a game of golf. Few of such offstage events are recorded in writing or in any other form. This called for a multi-method research strategy. This research draws upon both quantitative and qualitative methods and the data included in the analysis ranged from written and oral sources to observation. In this chapter, I will further introduce the political *trakun* that will be used as case studies in this thesis, namely, the Choonhavans, the Kittikachorns, the Techaphaybuns, the Shinawatras and the Suwanchawees.

Chapter Three - The Trakun. A study of political *trakun* necessitates a definition of the term. In Chapter Three I will define the *trakun*. It will be shown that the *trakun*, an often overlooked phenomenon in the Thai kinship system, is a patrilineage that is distinguished from the majority

of families and often part of the upper classes. Therefore, the concept of class in Thai society will also be discussed. This discussion will be a prerequisite for the theoretical argument of this thesis.

Chapter Four - Capital and State. This chapter will establish the conceptual framework of this thesis. I will discuss the different forms of symbolic capital and their maintenance. This will explain how symbolic capitalism is to be understood. The discussion on symbolic capital will be concluded by a short analysis of the relevance of symbolic capital to win elections and nomination to political offices. This will lead us to a discussion of the state and its relationship with kinship politics. This will show that a redefinition of the state is necessary to allow for the existence of political *trakun* as one of its parts and to truly understand the workings of the Thai state.

Chapter Five - A Record of Political Trakun. This chapter deals with the historic development of political *trakun*. A sketch of Thai political history with a particular focus on the importance of political *trakun* will be made. Additionally, political families and political *trakun* will be analyzed quantitatively to show continuities and changes over time. This will show that political families and political *trakun* have played a crucial part in Thai politics since before the implementation of the constitutional period. They continue to fill the institutions of the state, such as the parliament, the senate and the cabinet. The apparent continuity of the existence of political *trakun*, however, veils the dynamics of such *trakun*. While some *trakun* were able to adapt to changing political circumstances, others were not and thus became politically insignificant. New families continuously appeared on the political stage and became political *trakun*. Despite the changes in particular political *trakun*, the continued involvement of *trakun* in the state evidences that the state as an abstract concept is brought to life by an entangled mass of interlocking relationships between individuals and groups of individuals, for which political *trakun* are a prime example.

Chapter Six - Marriage-Forming Alliances. The persistence or downfall of political *trakun* is chiefly brought about by the success with which they negotiate their family affairs. Thereby, marriages have to be given special attention. I will scrutinize the marriages of several generations of the five political *trakun* that are used as case studies in this thesis. This will show that marriages in political *trakun* fulfill several important functions, such as the acquisition of capital, the creation of new alliances, the reinforcement of existing alliances and, thus, the

solidarity of the group but also the securing of promising sons-in-law as heirs. However, these functions are not only fulfilled by marriages but also by adoption.

Chapter Seven - Trakun at Work: Relationships of Reciprocity. This chapter will unveil the workings of political *trakun* by examining the function of a politician's home, the role each family member plays in the *trakun*'s political endeavor, in particular during election campaigns, the education of the next generation as well as how loyalty in the group is enforced. Relationships of reciprocity will be a focus of the discussion. This will show that political *trakun* take on positions in the state which enable them to amass resources which can be transformed into economic and symbolic capital. These resources are then maintained and increased by means of symbolic capitalism. The capital thus gained is given to other politicians and voters but also to one's own children and relatives to ensure their services and loyalty.

Chapter Eight – Funeral: Signs of Capital. Here, I will analyze the funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee, the head of the Suwanchawee *trakun*, who passed away in May 2011. Further, I will discuss the importance of cremation volumes to the political *trakun* and the preservation of symbolic capital after the death of a member of a political *trakun*. This will reveal how political *trakun* utilize traditional funeral rituals for their political purposes. Signs of capital and rank are employed to showcase the importance of the deceased and the *trakun* as a whole. This transfers much of the deceased's symbolic capital to the next generation. The funeral is further useful in the recreation of political networks with other politicians and voters alike. Hereby the exchange of gifts is crucial. One such gift is the cremation volume that is distributed on the occasion. Apart from helping to recreate networks, these volumes are also significant in defining the official membership of the *trakun* and eternalizing the deceased and his connections.

Chapter Nine – Conclusion. In this final chapter, I conclude the thesis by summarizing its main results regarding political *trakun* and the state. This will demonstrate that political *trakun* are part of the Thai state. They have achieved their position through symbolic capitalism and careful management of their personal lives. However, I will suggest that the success of a political *trakun* also depends on the personal character of each of its members. I will further point out the direction future research on political *trakun* could take.

Chapter 2

Data Collection

The study of political *trakun* is complicated, because much of what is portrayed in this study is considered to be of a private rather than public nature. Weddings and funerals are seldom portrayed as political, yet they are crucial defining moments for political *trakun*. Many of the activities of political *trakun* take place offstage in personal homes, at diner, during wedding reception and other occasions. As many of the activities of political *trakun* happen in private spaces, they are not documented and often not seen as political. In this chapter I will show how I have approached the study of political *trakun* in order to overcome the difficulties of finding data.

I have drawn data from a broad range of source materials and employed a multi-method research strategy that supported the nature of the study. To construct a comprehensive picture of political *trakun,* this thesis has brought together quantitative data, oral and written sources and participant observation. Quantitative data was used to establish the overall number of political *trakun*, their statistical development over the time period under consideration and the social backgrounds of these *trakun*. Qualitative data, gained from interviews, written sources and participant observation, allowed me to explore the workings of political *trakun* in politics as well as the family dynamics. The practicalities of collecting these diverse data along with the challenges that had to be overcome will be discussed in this chapter. Further, I will discuss how in the success of this study, the researcher is an integral part. Therefore, I will introduce the reader to my own academic and personal background that has enabled me to conduct this study. Finally, a short description of the various political *trakun* discussed in this study conclude the chapter.

Before I start with the discussion on data collection, a few words about the general circumstances of the field work need to be said, as this has influenced every aspect of it. The data collection took place during two stretches of field work. The first period in the field was from February to August 2010 and the second from May to August 2011. The reader who is familiar with Thailand and its politics will know that this was a particularly troubled time for the country. In April and May 2010, over 90 people lost their lives when anti-government protesters

clashed with the military in a violent crackdown on demonstrations. Almost exactly a year later a less violent but not less significant event took place. In May 2011 parliament was dissolved, and elections took place on 3 July 2011. Both of these events, however, are only the tip of the iceberg for a political crisis that started in late 2005 and the end of which is not yet in sight. The chronology of this crisis will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. At this point, it shall be noted that the political crisis has polarized Thai politicians and the Thai people. One of these poles is the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, with his popularist politics and his often rural followers who are joined by anti-royalists. The other pole is a conglomerate of the military, the royal establishment and the urban middle class. In this chapter I will discuss how the political circumstances have influenced the data collection.

Talking to Political Families

Interviews were one major source of data for this study, as the question of political families and their workings is rarely recorded in writing. I had interviews with 62 former or current MPs. I conducted all interviews personally in Thai. The length of interviews varied in time between fifteen minutes and two hours depending on the MP's schedule, eagerness to talk and the conduciveness of the environment. Some MPs would only give me general information about their family background and their entrance into politics. Others enjoyed the opportunity to talk about issues they were not normally asked about or liked to get most out of the opportunity to be seen with a foreigner, which gave the impression that they were fluent in English.[3] The majority of interviews with MPs took place in the House of Parliament, some at their private homes or offices and a few at party headquarters. It shall be noted that many of the MPs interviewed were the children, nephews, nieces, or the spouses of (former) MPs. Apart from MPs, I also interviewed one prime minister, one wife of a former prime minister, two former ministers, nine wives of MPs and three children of MPs. These interviews took place at private homes or at restaurants. All interviews were taped and some transcribed, totaling 35.5 hours of recorded interview material. The interviews were mostly conducted between February and August 2010, with a few additional interviews between May and August 2011. Participant observation gave

[3] It was widely assumed that foreigners can only speak English. Thus, on the first instance many MPs refused to give me interviews because they feared that they would have to speak English. When, however, they realized that I could speak Thai, they were all too eager to spare me some of their time.

further opportunity for informal conversations, which gave me further insights into the workings of political families. These interviews were not taped, however; I recorded them in my field notes when I went home at the end of the day.

All of the interviews were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are flexible and can be compared to conversations in style. They allow the informant to tell their story in their own words. Semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to explore issues as they arise, whilst providing an initial framework for areas of discussion. They also facilitate an immediate response to a question, allow both parties to explore the meaning of the questions and answers and resolve any ambiguities.

One major challenge of my research was to set up interviews. My original research question concerned the role of the politician's wife. Thus, I tried to make interview appointments with MPs' wives. This was not very successful. Many of them did not want to talk, were inconvenienced or outrightly said that they did not think they had anything to contribute to academic research. Thus, I had to change strategy. I was now contacting MPs. Official inquiries by mail usually remained unanswered; thus, I started to contact MPs over the telephone. If the call was answered by the MP directly, meetings for interviews were quickly set up, often in a matter of hours. If, however, the MP's staff answered the phone, meetings were almost never realized. The MP's staff seemed to perceive themselves as guards of their employer. As they perceived their employers as very important and powerful figures, they would not let anyone come close and often instantly denied access. This was amplified by the heightened political tension during the time of research. This method resulted in only a few interviews; therefore, I decided to contact MPs directly at the National Assembly.

The National Assembly is a public building and, thus, should be open to the public. However, as Habermas (1990 [1962]: 54) pointed out, public buildings are not per se open to the public. The Thai national assembly is no exception. The visitors are classified according to a prescribed set of criteria that will deny or allow admittance to a varying degree. This will be symbolized by a card that has to be openly worn by everybody entering the compound. The lowest card in this hierarchy is the card for the National Assembly Library that is given to any member of the public. This card highly restricts the freedom of movement inside the compound and does not allow entrance into the actual parliament building. At the top of the hierarchy stands the gold card that is given only to MPs and in a slightly modified version to

senators.[4] For the common public (with the exception of the press), entrance into the parliament is only possible on formal request or by invitation. Formal requests are made, for example, by school classes that want to have guided tours in the parliament. This seems to happen not very frequently but mainly on special occasions, such as Children's Day.[5] Invitations can be made by an MP, a senator or any committee meeting in the compound. Upon invitation by an MP, one would normally be given a card allowing access only to the first floor of the parliament.

In order to get appointments and conduct interviews in the National Assembly, I had to gain access to the building. I had not received an invitation from an MP to enter the assembly. From former visits to the parliament's library, however, I knew that it was possible to enter the compound relatively easily. I requested entry permission to the compound claiming to go to the library. Instead of going to the library, however, I positioned myself at the entrance of the assembly building and approached MPs directly.[6] In a short time, I had set up appointments for the next day and was given an invitation to return. From there on, I had made one appointment for each day in the parliament in order to get permission into the building and set up additional interviews on the spot.

Once I had gained access to the National Assembly, interviews were secured without difficulties. MPs welcomed the opportunity to break with the often boring and strenuous daily routine at the parliament and willingly gave me interviews. Interviews took place in MPs' offices, committee offices or the reception (coffee) rooms. Often, these interviews snowballed, when they introduced me to other MPs. It also proved very helpful to befriend a security guard named Tuk. She was usually positioned at the entrance to the MPs' office space and after a while, she started to organize my interviews. Through my friendship with Tuk, I also engaged in very lively and often entertaining discussions, occasionally with MPs' assistants and other staff of the parliament, which provided me with additional data about the activities of politicians and their families.

Another issue of concern was the interpretation of the informants' stories. Researchers such as Bevir and Rhodes (2010) have articulated concerns with the openness of ministers to talk and whether or not covert methods and spying would be necessary in order to learn about the "truth". However, they rightfully concluded that the problem should not be

[4] The card used by MPs is of pure golden color. Senators use a golden card with a dark green stripe at the top.
[5] Children's Day is a national holiday, which is celebrated on the second Saturday of January
[6] I did only move in areas I was permited access to and did not enter any restricted areas.

overrated. Just as Bevir and Rhodes (2010) noted, informants were relaxed during interviews and often even showed eagerness or desire to talk. Their informants were willing to speak, and they did not need to resort to spy-like methods. Even if the need had arisen, it probably would not have been very successful. When informants are powerful members of society, they can decide what information to disclose or conceal. In the case of my research, I soon realized that truth is not of the essence. For the most part, my informants openly discussed a wide range of topics. When it came to more sensitive issues, such as corruption and vote-buying, they would acknowledge their existence and often even go into the details about methods and function. However, in formal interviews they would never admit to being involved in such practices. They would speak in general terms without naming anyone involved. Only once in an informal conversation did an informant implicitly acknowledge having done vote-buying. Politicians will tell their story in order to maximize their benefit. They build up an image of themselves. I will not attempt to verify or falsify their stories and images. In this study I am concerned with the image they project and it is my goal to analyze why they have chosen a particular image.

Observing Political Families

As part of this research project I was able to observe the workings of political families in three different settings: (1) in the National Assembly, (2) during election campaigns, and (3) at weddings and funerals. While conducting the bulk of my interviews in 2010, I spent several days in the House of Parliament. Time between interviews was used to observe the MPs and the staff at the National Assembly. This added valuable insights to my study. During the 2011 general election (21 May - 2 July 2011), I collected most of my data via the method of observation.[7] I accompanied four parliamentary candidates, as shown in Table 1, totaling some 159 hours. The observation consisted of shadowing the candidates during their campaign, listening to their speeches and observing their interaction with voters and their own staff. Thus, I was able to witness both on- and offstage practices. I prioritized the number of candidates I followed over the length of the observation with each of the candidates, because I wanted to see if there were differences between the varying geographical settings, parties and genders of the candidates.

[7] Though I would have preferred to use the method of participant observation, my participation in the election campaign would have been illegal, as I am not a Thai national. Foreign citizens are by law forbidden to participate in election campaigning in any capacity.

Further, I witnessed both a wedding and a funeral organized by the Suwanchawee family in May 2011. The wedding took place on 14 May and the funeral was held from 16 to 23 May 2011.[8] In addition to these two events, I observed three other funerals of politicians or their relatives that took place during the period of April to August 2011. During the wedding and funerals, I also had informal conversations with numerous participants. This helped me to gain a deeper understanding into the ritual and how it is perceived by participants. It also gave me access to valuable background information and rumors. The observation of the wedding and funerals totaled to some 80 hours. The observation took place between May and August 2011.

Table 1: Candidates observed during the 2011 election campaign

Name	Party	Province
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai	Democrat Party	Chiang Mai
Yingluck Shinawatra	Pheu Thai Party	Udom Ratchathani
Joemmat Juenglertsiri	Democrat Party	Bangkok
Surachat Thienthong	Pheu Thai Party	Bangkok

Obtaining permission to accompany candidates on their campaigns was a challenge. Candidates were hesitant to allow me on their campaign trails for various reasons. Especially candidates outside of the Bangkok Metropolitan area had logistical concerns. Constituencies cover a wide area, of which some is difficult to access, making overnight stays necessary. Therefore, in order to follow such candidates, I would have to organize or be provided with transportation and accommodation. Many candidates were not willing to take on this added logistical issue. Apart from these logistical concerns, legal issues made many apprehensive. According to the election law, anybody involved in election campaigning must have Thai nationality. Infringement can lead to disqualification at best and the resolution of the whole party at worst. Thus, my presence during campaigning posed a very real threat. Those candidates who agreed to take me on campaign always ensured that nobody would misunderstand. Finally, politicians might have been concerned about the upkeep of their public image. The presence of the observer, who in this case is essentially an outsider, opens up private moments to public scrutiny. Campaigning involves both on- and offstage moments. Everything happens at an enormous speed and sometimes the situation becomes difficult to control. It is those

[8] The wedding was planned first. Unfortunately, the father of the groom passed away on 7 May 2011. As the bride's family believed that no wedding can be held during the period of mourning, which lasts three years and starts from the day on which the funeral rites take place, the wedding was organized nonetheless.

uncontrollable moments that potentially threaten the image a politician wants to preserve. Not to forget that electoral candidates are potentially involved in illegal activities, such as vote-buying, which they do not want to be witnessed by outside observers.

Given all these reasons for candidates not to take on a foreign researcher for observation, I had to rely on connections and networks established long before the field work took place. I was referred to Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai by a friend and former teacher of mine, Romyen Kosayanonth. Romyen is Dueantemduang's cousin. Additionally, Dueantemduang was a case study I had already used for my Master's thesis (Rangsivek 2007).[9] Therefore, it was easy to arrange my observation of her campaign. I accompanied her even to the remotest areas. She provided transportation and accommodation. Joemmat Juenglertsiri was also a case study for my Master's project. I had first met and interviewed her in 2006. At that time, I had been referred to her by a friend, Pasita, whom I had met during an internship at a non-profit organization. She was an assistant to Dr. Kriengsak Chareonwongsak, who at that time was a MP for the Democrat Party but has since left the party. When I tried to set up observations of the election campaign, I simply gave Joemmat a call and could go for observation the very next day. My observations of Yingluck Shinawatra and Surachat Thienthong were organized by Jarupan Kunadilok. Jarupan is a long-time friend, dating back to her days as a student in Berlin in the early 2000s, where I grew up and completed my undergraduate education. Today, she is a party list MP for the Pheu Thai Party and an active member of the red-shirt movement. Her father, a police general, is also a party list MP for the Pheu Thai Party. During the campaign, Jarupan was responsible for looking after foreign correspondence. Therefore, it was relatively easy for me to follow Yingluck's campaign. At first I was seated in the van allocated to foreign correspondence; soon, however, I switched vans and was seated with influential figures in the Pheu Thai Party. This gave me the opportunity for informal conversations with them.

Written Sources on Political Families

Written sources about political families are rare and difficult to locate; I was, however, able to use cremation volumes, autobiographies, novels and newspaper reports. Newspaper articles of

[9] My master's thesis discussed the role of women in Thai politics. It focused on the election campaigns of female politicians and how they engaged with their feminity as political advantage or disadvantage.

newer date (after the year 2000) have been retrieved from the online databases of the respective newspapers, while older publications have been viewed at the National Library and the National Archives. Cremation volumes were more difficult to obtain. The National Library has an extensive collection of cremation volumes which is problematic, as it is categorized using an old-fashioned card index listing all volumes in alphabetical order according to first name with cross-references to official titles. To view a volume, one has to employ the help of a librarian who will unlock the bookshelf and find the requested volumes. Some volumes have, nevertheless, been displaced or have disappeared. Some volumes are scattered over the rest of the library's collection. This makes it very difficult to locate a specific volume. The Wat Bovornives Vihara has, according to Olson (1992), an extensive collection. The building housing this collection was undergoing renovation during my field work. The cremation volumes had been put into boxes and locked away. Thus, I could not access the collection. University libraries, like Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, also have some cremation volumes. However, they have a tendency to disappear after a certain period of time. While the disappearance of cremation volumes could be due to displacement, I believe it is more likely due to thievery. Cremation volumes are sought after collector's items and were probably taken out of the library to be kept in private collections or sold on the rare book market.[10] Another method to locate cremation volumes is to look at the stock of rare bookstores. Such bookstores increasingly advertise their stocks online. During the course of my research I realized that, when looking for a specific volume, it is useful to spread the news about what you are looking for, and sellers will start to contact you. Sometimes, it is possible to ask for a copy of a cremation volume from the family of the deceased directly, as well. However, this is only possible if the cremation is not too long ago.[11]

The Researcher

As the above discussion has already implied, the accessibility of data depends partly on the person of the researcher; therefore, the researcher is crucial to the outcome of the study. I would

[10] Prices for cremation volumes can become very high and vary between 100 and 20 000 Baht. Therefore, taking cremation volumes out of libraries to sell them on can be very profitable.

[11] I received a cremation volume of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn from his family. Field Marshal Thanom had been cremated in 2005. I was given the volume in 2010.

like to include a few words about myself and how I came to do this research. I was born in 1983 into a middle-class family in Berlin, Germany. My interest in Thailand was firmly established in 2000 when I spent a year as an exchange student at a local school living with a Thai host family, in Chumporn province. During that year, I learned a lot about the country and its people. I was able to acquire reasonable skills in the language. While I had learned much, I realized that the knowledge I had gained was still limited opposed to the things I did not know. Consequently, I decided to keep on learning. I enrolled at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany. My major was Southeast Asian Studies, while my minors were Political Science and Sinology. During my studies I focused on political history and developed an interest in the study of women in Southeast Asia. To further pursue my interest, I enrolled as a guest student at Chiang Mai University in the Women's Studies program. When I graduated in 2007, I joined a non-profit organization in Bangkok where I worked for two years before starting work on my Ph.D. in 2009. During my time as a student and at the non-profit organization, I was able to build up connections with a wide range of people, who were my friends, fellow students, teachers and co-workers. Some of these connections have proven invaluable during my research. Last but not least, I could rely on the networks of my husband, who is a Thai. My language skills and understanding of the Thai culture have also greatly facilitated my research.

The political tension during which the bulk of this research was carried out influenced me and the way I collected data. During interviews, politicians tried to sway me for either side. Thus, my data is full of their perspective on current events, through which I had to navigate to find the data relevant for this study. I conducted interviews with people from both sides of the conflict, so I had to navigate through their very different claims of who was right and who was wrong. I attempted to remain neutral, so I often found myself nodding to things to which I did not necessarily adhere. Sometimes I tried to confront the informants with the opposing side's opinions or double check rumors I had heard. In this way, I was sometimes inevitably involved in the process of spreading them. This situation posed psychological stress on me. To be the object of persuasions and to be continuously careful of (not) expressing opinions is difficult and taxing. This was necessary to enable me to collect data from both sides of the conflict, which greatly enhanced my understanding of political families. I was happy that I had the opportunity to have several stretches of field work rather than one continuous one. This allowed me time to mentally recover and make a fresh start at the next occasion.

The political tension at the time put the flexibility and adaptability of the researcher to the test. The political tension made the research process more unpredictable than otherwise would have been the case. While this unpredictability sometimes posed challenges, it often also made the research more exciting and produced valuable data. Changes in the daily currents of the conflict resulted in refusal or cancellation of interviews. In May 2010 the curfew that was declared together with the state of emergency limited my mobility. However, the conflict also opened many opportunities to collect data. I frequently visited the protests sites to see how politics played out on the street and if political families were active there, too.

Identifying Political Families

Although the main means of data collection in this study was of a qualitative nature, it was important to use a more quantitative approach to put political *trakun* into context. Interviews and observation did provide insights on the inner workings of political *trakun*; however, interviews did not provide data on how widespread political families and *trakun* are. Apart from their own families, informants would usually name only the largest and already well-known political *trakun* as examples. They often would not state how many generations of these *trakun* had been involved in politics or how many members they had. Informants tended to generalize, especially on more sensitive issues such as corruption and vote buying. In any case, it was very rare for informants to give concrete factual information or names. Other documents, like writings of politicians or newspaper articles, could likewise not reveal the number of political families in Thailand. Therefore, I employed a more quantitative approach to identify political families and their members. A quantitative method enabled me to establish how many families had engaged in politics during the period of 1932 – present. It was also possible to determine how many members each political family had.

I collected data on the cabinet and members of the parliament, as well as the constitution drafting assemblies and senate, during the period under consideration, 1932 – 2012, which posed some challenges. The total number of individuals included in my database was 7,152, as shown in Table 2. The collection of quantitative data posed some difficulties during the process of this study. The first challenge I encountered was obtaining the primary data. Originally, I was looking for a complete data set that would include information such as the

MP's name, surname, date and place of birth, education, marital status, (military or royal) rank, constituency and number of legislative periods. The Secretary of the House of Parliament, who is responsible for collection of such data, was not willing to provide me the needed information. She argued that in the past it had led to problems when such information leaked and was made public.[12] Subsequently, I went to the Assembly's archive to try to obtain the necessary information there. The staff there was very helpful and provided me with a gargantuan volume, which contained all MPs from 1932 to 1999 (Secretariat of The House of Representatives/ **สำนักงานเลขาธิการสภาผู้แทนราษฎร** 1999). This book contained the information I needed with the exception of date and place of birth, education and marital status. Data on the parliaments from 2001 up to today is available online (Secretariat of The House of Representatives/**สำนักงานเลขาธิการสภาผู้แทนราษฎร** 2012), as is the data for all cabinet members (Secretariat of the House of The Cabinet/**สำนักงานเลขาธิการคณะรัฐมนตรี** 2012) and the senate (The Senate/**วุฒิสภา** 2012). Data on royally bestowed surnames was gained using a database of the Ministry of Interior (Khon Thai 2012).[13]

The data was computerized and analyzed using SPSS. The computerization of such a large data set is very time-consuming work and made it inevitable to employ the help of a research assistant. My assistant was a young Thai woman, who is currently pursuing undergraduate studies at Ramkampheang University. She was responsible for the digitization of the data of MPs, while I computerized the data of senators and ministers. I had prepared a table in Microsoft Excel, into which she had to type amongst other data the MPs' names, surnames, number of legislative periods, rank and title. When I double-checked my assistant's work, it became apparent that many mistakes were made. After I had spent weeks double-checking each entry, I decided to find another assistant to make the corrections. The second assistant was a middle-aged Thai man, who had a degree in engineering. He spent six weeks cleaning up the mistakes of the first assistant. His work was meticulous and when I randomly double-checked, no mistakes were to be found. After the computerization of data was completed, I ran a semi-automatic search identifying people with the same surname. If two or more people carried the

[12] She referred in particular to cases in which the educational status of politicians became an issue. In order to qualify for passive voting rights, a university education is required. When some former MPs appeared to lack such credentials, they were excluded from elections until they could provide proof of their education.

[13] This database is intended for people who wish to change their surnames. It allows any surname to be entered. The program will then search in the various registries for surnames and reveal if and in which registry the name exists. Thus, royally bestowed surnames will be shown as registered in the royally bestowed surname registry.

same surname, they were assumed to be part of the same family. A family which had at least two members sitting in the parliament, cabinet and/or senate was classified as a political family. The data, thus gained, was analyzed using SPSS 14.0 and put into historical context. The results are discussed in Chapter 5.

Table 2: Number of people and positions included in the dataset

Position	No. of people
Prime Ministers	28
Ministers	882
Members of Parliament	4370
Senators	1872
Total	**7152**[14]

Surnames have been used to identify political families, because they are the most reliable indicator available. Before the Royal Act of Family Names was passed in 1913, surnames had not been in use in Thailand. The law based the application of surnames on the model of a nuclear family. Surnames were to be chosen by the male head of household and given to the wife and children. People who shared blood ties now shared a surname, irrespective of residential patterns. The surname is passed down the male line and women, upon marriage, traditionally take on their husband's surname. Further, each surname was to be unique to each family (*The Government Gazette/ ราชกิจจานุเบกษา* 30 March 1912). With some adaptation, in particular about the surname of married women, the law remains in use until the present day. While double registration of the same surname occurred, it should be seen as an exception and not the rule. Therefore, while there is a possibility that people with the same surname are not actually related by blood or marriage, the probability is to be considered low. Further, Thai people generally believe that a shared surname does indicate shared blood. The alternative to using surnames would be to research each MP's personal background and retrace their family history. Considering that there are 4370 MPs alone, this is a massive undertaking. Not only would it take years, if not decades, to complete, but one would inevitably hit dead ends. Documentation of MPs' personal histories, especially in the early stages of the constitutional monarchy, is often patchy. Information about their families is often not available at all. This

[14] Some politicians have been minister, member of parliament and/or senator, thus the total number of individuals is slightly overstated.

would make it nearly impossible to identify political families by researching each individual MP. The disadvantage of using shared surnames as an indicator is that it will not uncover relationships based on marriage or members of the same family having different surnames.[15] Nonetheless, using a shared surname as an indicator of membership in the same family is the most accurate method of identification available.

A political family was defined to include a minimum of two politicians, in order to account for political families that have recently emerged. If the number had been set higher than two, a number of political families would have been overlooked. This applies especially to newer political families that have recently been established. It could also apply to political families that focus on local politics. Those families put most of their members into local positions, such as members of the provincial parliament, and delegate only few members into parliament. Further, not all political families are able to establish themselves over a long period. However, neglecting those families would lead us to misunderstand the dynamics of political families. Not all families are able to delegate a large number of their members into politics and often it takes decades to establish a political *trakun*. These dynamics only become visible if we include smaller political families and *trakun* who have only two members in this study.

Research Sample

To show how political families and political *trakun* work, five political *trakun* were chosen to serve as main examples. The five *trakun* chosen all represent different stages within the life cycle or different types of political *trakun*, as shown in Table 3. They are examples of recurring patterns within political *trakun* and will be used as case studies throughout the discussion in this thesis. When relevant, other *trakun* and families will be used as complementary examples. The chosen *trakun* stand out for the wealth of data available. As the majority of these *trakun* are well established, they appear in written accounts, such as newspaper articles, cremation volumes, anniversary volumes, popular history books (sometimes even written by members of the *trakun*) and, in the case of the Choonhavan *trakun*, a novel. To give the reader a better understanding of

[15] While the law stipulates that surnames are based on blood relationships, not all people related by blood carry the same surname. This can happen for a variety of reasons. The most likely reason is that a member of the family has changed his or her surname. Changing names and surnames is a common practice in Thailand and is often done out of astrological reasons or for a desire to switch to a more fashionable name. A change of surname does not necessarily mean a breach with the natal family.

why these particular families have been chosen, I will now shortly discuss each of the *trakun* covered in this work. This will also be a useful background for the reader to comprehend the following chapters.

Table 3: Political *trakun* used as case study

Name	Period	Generational Depth	MPs	Ministers	Prime Ministers	No. of related families
Choonhavan	1947 - 1957, 1980 - present	3	3	2	1	3
Kittikachorn	1957 - 1973	2	3	2	1	1
Shinawatra	1980 - present	2	5	2	2	1
Techaphaybun	1980 - present	2	5	2	-	2
Suwanchawee	1980 - present	2	2	2	-	1

The Choonhavans

The Choonhavans' (ชุณหะวัณ) engagement in politics goes back to 1947 and stretches into the 1990s. The first member of the family to enter politics was Phin Choonhavan. He was born on 14 October 1891 and came from a rural background. His family did not hold any official title or possess a royally bestowed surname. They engaged in orchard farming and traditional medicine (Phin 1970, 1973). Thus, economic capital was likewise limited, yet the family was not poor. It is highly likely that the family originated from Chinese immigrants.[16] Phin's educational opportunities were limited by his family background. In order to gain an education he became ordained as a novice and even spent some time at a prestigious temple in Bangkok. However, his education did not proceed as it should and was interrupted several times because he had to change schools or accompany a senior monk upcountry. On one of these interruptions he went home to visit his family. There he was informed that he had to perform compulsory military service. Instead, he opted to enter the Military Staff College (โรงเรียนนายสิบทหาร) and, thus, became a regular solider. There he rapidly finished the training program and graduated top of his class. This qualified him to enter the Military Academy (โรงเรียนนายร้อย).

[16] I have not found any direct statement about the family's Chinese origins. Thus, it is not possible to determine if Phin's parents were immigrants or the children or grandchildren of immigrants. However, it is clear that the family must have some Chinese origins, as at Chatchai Choonhavan's funeral, Chinese rituals were performed.

Upon graduation, he was assigned to a unit in Ratchaburi, where by 1929 he had risen to the rank of major. While stationed in Ratchaburi he was bestowed the official title of Luang Chamnanyutthasat (หลวงชำนาญยุทธศาสตร์), practically joining the lower ranks of nobility.

With the change in governmental system from absolute to constitutional monarchy in 1932, Phin's military career became endangered. His collegial relations with his commander, who was a member of the royal family, were reported to the new leadership. As a result, he was suspected to be a royalist opposing the change in the governmental system. This suspicion was fueled by the fact that his superior had ordered him to enter Bangkok on the day of change in governmental system in a covert mission to estimate the situation and any possible danger to the members of the royal family. He escaped dismissal from the military only upon intervention of Lieutenant Colonel P. Phibunsongkhram (title at that time), who, being Phin's classmate at the military academy, knew him well and vouched for his character and general loyalty to anyone who would be his superior irrespective of that person's membership in the royalty. Nevertheless, Phin was sent into a reeducation facility.

Shortly afterwards, Phin's fate changed again, when he became involved in P. Phibunsongkhram's successful abatement of the Bowaradet rebellion (กบฏบวรเดช).[17] When P. Phibunsongkhram needed a leader for the operation in the field, he decided to enlist the service of Phin, whom he trusted. The suppression of the rebellion consolidated P. Phibunsongkhram's position and he soon emerged as political leader. He became prime minister a few years later in 1936. The relationship between the two men remained close and Phin advanced in the military hierarchy. During, the Secound World War he became the commander of the 3rd Army Region and later the military governor of the Shan States. In 1943, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.

With the abatement of the Bowaradet rebellion, Phin's and P. Phibunsongkhram's political destinies became entangled with each other. This became especially obvious when P. Phibunsongkhram was ousted from the prime ministership in 1944. Shortly after that, Phin was retired from the military service.[18] He reclined into county life and orchard farming. Three years later, though, in 1947, he orchestrated a coup d'état, which brought him and P. Phibunsongkhram

[17] The Boworadet Rebellion was a rebellion let by the royalist Prince Boworadet to topple the newly established constitutional system in 1933.

[18] In a strategy meeting with other high ranking military officials and the new prime minister, Khuang Aphaiwong, Phin opposed Khuang's decision on how to deal with war veterans. A few days later he received a letter putting him into paid retirement.

back into politics. It was only after that coup that Phin reached his zenith of political power and rose to the highest possible honors in the military but also to a leading force in the government, as did his son and sons-in-law. This was the beginning of the Choonhavan family as a political *trakun*.

The Choonhavan family and five other related families are known as the Ratchakru Group. The Ratchakru Group is named after the street in which most of the members of the Group resided: Soi Ratchakru: (Phahon Yothin 5 (Soi Ari 1), Phaya Thai, Bangkok 10400). The Group consists of six families that are linked by marriage and includes four generations. It was most influential from 1947 to 1957 and again during the late 1980s to 1990s. It can boast of a prime minister, several deputy prime ministers and numerous ministers. In 1991, Chatchai Choonhavan was ousted as prime minster and the Group has never been able to recover from that setback. Today two of its members remain in parliament but the Group's influence has declined drastically. Despite its decreasing influence, the Ratchakru Group comprises the biggest and most influential political *trakun* in Thailand. It is this conglomerate that, until the 2011 elections, was most often named by informants as an example of a political *trakun*.

The Kittikachorns

The Kittikachorns (กิตติขจร) entered politics at the same time as the Choonhavan family and were especially influential from 1957 to 1973. Thanom Kittikachorn was part of the 1947 coup group. Little is known about the family before the coup. Thanom's father had a *Khun* title and was, thus, part of the bureaucracy. Thanom himself joined the military at a very young age and later taught at the military academy, where he was Chatchai Choonhavan's teacher (Chatchai/ชาติชาย 1998). Thus, Thanom had a good and close relationship with the Choonhavan family.

The fortune of the Kittikachorn family was at its height after the 1957 coup under Sarit Thanarath until the student uprising in 1973. During that period, Thanom served as prime minister four times spanning a period of almost ten years. During that time, the Kittikachorn family was the leading political *trakun*. They are also related to other political families and were part of the Si Sao Thewet Group. This group was named after the residence of the leader, Sarit

Thanarath. It refers to the first army command headquarters at Si Sao Thewet.[19] When on 14 October 1973, hundreds of thousands of students and other protesters took to the streets to press for the release of arrested students and a new constitution, it came to violent clashes between the protestors and the military. The king intervened and Thanom and his son had to leave the country to live in exile until 1976.[20] Their properties were confiscated and never returned.[21] Even though Narong did serve as MP in the 1980s, the family was never able to restore their political influence. Thus, the Kittikachorns are a good example for a failed attempt to establish a political *trakun*. They were a very successful political family for a short period of time. However, they were neither able to sustain their political influence over a political crisis nor over several generations. It is also significant to include the Kittikachorns in this study because they have close links with the Choonhavans.

The Shinawatras

The Shinawatras (ชินวัตร) originated in China and immigrated to Thailand, where they established a successful business. Saeng Ku, who became the founding ancestor of the Shinawatras, arrived in Thailand in approximately 1860. Upon arrival in Thailand, Saeng made a living as a general laborer, until he had saved some money and became a tax farmer.[22] He now collected gambling and alcohol taxes in Jantahburi province. He married a Thai woman named Thondi and had nine children with her, the oldest of whom was born in 1891 and was named Chieng. The family first moved to Bangkok before settling in Chiang Mai in 1904. Once settled in Chiang Mai, Saeng Ku and his oldest son Chieng engaged in cattle trading between Burma and Chiang Mai. At the same time, they also bought silk in Burma and imported it into Thailand. Silk would later become the family's major business (Thanawat/ธนวัฒน์ 2011: 31-44, Pasuk and Baker 2009: 27-34).

[19] The term Si Sao Theweth now applies to General Prem and his followers. This is a different group that has no connection to the group around Sarit, which had the same name. They are named alike after the residence of the leader of the fraction. As high ranking military officers, both Sarit and Prem live(d) at the headquarters of the 1st army division at Si Sao Theweth.

[20] In 1976, Thanom returned to Thailand after having been ordained as a monk in Singapore. Consequently, student protests were triggered. These protests ended with a massacre of students at Thammasat University on October 6th.

[21] The family contested the confiscation of their properties for a long time but were only partially successful. They were finally allowed to rent their houses back from the government.

[22] Up to the late 19th century, the Thai state transfers the right of collection of various taxes to private individuals called tax farmers in exchange for a certain fee. A Monopoly of a tax far would usually but not necessarily go to the highest bidder. The system was described in detail by Hong (1983, 1984).

In 1938 the family adopted the surname Shinawatra. Before adopting the Shinawatra surname, the family had been using their Chinese clan name Ku. This clearly identified their ethnicity. During the first Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram government, which was in power from 1936 to 1944, anti-Chinese sentiments were at their height and even became implemented into the legal framework (Skinner 1962: 261-297). Thus, the surname was probably changed to avoid association with the Chinese origins of the family. It was most likely Senior Colonel Sak Shinawatra who initiated the change of surname. This would have been necessary to facilitate his career in the military (Thanawat/ธนวัฒน์ 2011: 39-40). The remaining members of the family will then have successfully adopted the new surname, too.

It was not until the second generation born in Thailand that the Shinawatra family entered politics. The first member of the family to enter politics was Lert Shinawatra, Thaksin Shinawatra's father. In 1967, Lert became a member of the provincial parliament and later also held the position of chairman. Two years later, in 1969, he entered politics on the national level and became an MP. He was also a founding member of the Isara Party and became its deputy leader. Lert was re-elected in 1975. He retired from politics in 1976 and supported his younger brother Suraphan Shinawatra's campaign for MP instead. Suraphan was successful and rose to the position of Deputy Minister of Communication under the Chatchai Choonhavan government (1988 to 1991). Additionally, another of the brothers, Sujet, became a municipal councilor of the city of Chiang Mai. Thus, three members of the second Thailand-born generation of the Shinawatra family were politically active on the local and national levels.

The political ambition of the family was further followed by the third Thailand-born generation. Five of Lert's ten children are or have been involved in politics on the local or national level. The oldest son, Thaksin Shinawatra, was prime minister from 2001 to 2006, when he was ousted in a military coup. Today he is living in exile. The eldest daughter, the late Yaowaluck, was the first female mayor of the city of Chiang Mai. Another of Lert's daughters, Yaowaret, has not held any electoral positions but plays a role in the Pheu Thai Party. She is responsible for the southern region. Amongst the better known members of the family is Yaowapha. She has been an MP but is also the leader of a political faction known as the Wang Bua Ban Group. She has been banned from politics but remains important in the administration of the Pheu Thai Party, where she oversees the northern region. Yaowapha's husband, Somchai Wongsawat was prime minister for a short time in 2008. He was banned from politics in 2008.

One of their daughters, Chinnicha Wongsawat is currently an MP. Payat Shinawatra was an MP from 2005 to 2006. Currently he is responsible for the northeastern region. The youngest of the siblings, Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected the first female prime minister in 2011.

The economic base of the family has also changed from the silk trade to telecommunications. Thaksin Shinawatra founded a telecommunication based concern, which covered mobile phone concessions, satellites and television stations. The concern was sold to the investment arm of the Singaporean government in 2006. The income from the business ventures has played a crucial part in the political success of the family.

The Techaphaybuns

The Techaphaybun (เตชะไพบูลย์) family originated from China. Their ancestor made a fortune out of trading with Southeast Asia and also held some office in the Chinese administration. Due to disputes over inheritance in the late 19th century, however, one branch of the family became poverty-stricken. One member of that branch was Tae Jubiang (แต้จือปิง or 鄭子彬), who was born in 1884. Making a living in agriculture, he struggled to gain an education in order to participate in the governmental examinations. Before he had the chance to compete, the examinations were terminated, leaving him as a teacher at a small local school. To evade poverty, he immigrated to Thailand in 1902.

In Thailand, the family was able to establish a successful business. Tae Jubiang's education gave him a head start over other Chinese immigrants. He started as a clerk at a pawn shop and as private tutor in Chinese. After several years of hard work, saving and networking, Jubiang was able to open a business of his own: a small alcohol shop, which he later sold to enlarge his business. He then owned and ran a pawn shop, as well as an opium den. When his business ventures were going well, he was able to travel back to his homeland on several occasions. It was there that he got married, and his first son was born in 1913. The boy was called Tae Honglao, later known as Utain Techaphaybun. Utain was educated in Thailand and gained a bachelor's degree from a Thai university. He founded several major business ventures, such as Srinakorn Bank and Suramahakhun Co. Ltd., the producer of Mekong Whisky. [23] Thus

[23] Government concessions for the licore business were lost in 1959 but the family was able to venture into new businesses..

Utain became known as one of the wealthiest man in Thailand and the Techaphaybun *trakun* became established as a business *trakun*.

The Techaphaybuns entered politics to support their business ventures. Like many other businesses, the Techaphaybun *trakun* had initially cooperated with politicians and military leaders. This cooperation proved unsatisfying, as the Techaphaybuns felt that they were being taken advantage of by the military leaders. To ensure political patronage for their businesses, the Techaphaybuns delegated some members of the *trakun* into politics. This happened in the late 1980s. The Techaphaybuns have six of their members in politics, but are more commonly referred to as a business *trakun* (ตระกูลธุรกิจ). Thus, they are a good example how business *trakun* can enter politics.

The Suwanchawees

The Suwanchawees (สุวรรณฉวี) consist of the nuclear family of the late Pairot Suwanchawee, a bureaucrat-turned-politician. He was born in 1951 in Bangkok and graduated from Thammasat University, one of Thailand's most prestigious educational institutions. Then he joined the civil service. He was posted in Nakon Ratchsima, where he was first the assistant to the governor, who later became his father-in-law and an MP for the province. Subsequently, Pairot became district head in several districts in the area. Pairot became an MP in his own right, taking over the constituency after his father-in-law passed away. His political career was successful and he became Deputy Minister of Commerce in 1995. In 2007, Pairot was banned from politics for five years, as he was an executive member of the Chat Thai Party, which was dissolved because of election fraud. Pairot then maneuvered his wife and son into politics. With the recent death of the family's head, their political ambitions are endangered. This serves as an example for a political family seeking to establish itself as political *trakun*.

Chapter 3

Trakun

The dearth of research into *trakun* in general and political *trakun* in particular, has left the term *trakun* without a clear definition. As a basis for the discussions in this thesis, it necessary to begin with a definition of *trakun* in this chapter. An important foundation for a deeper understanding of the term *trakun* can only be gained by first examining the Thai term for 'family' and how the Thai family has been studied. I will show that family and *trakun*, while overlapping, do not denote the same social phenomenon. *Trakun* and family differ in practices of kinship and in terms of class and social status. The family will be shown to be a group of people related bilaterally by known blood and affinal ties, ideally living in the same house, while the *trakun* is a patrilineage; the members of a *trakun* trace their relationship to a common male and factual ancestor, signified by a shared surname. *Trakun* are members of royalty and nobility or have distinguished themselves in business and politics. Therefore, *trakun* are often part of the upper classes. Thus, the *trakun* is entwined in issues of kinship, social class and status.

The Thai Family

The Thai word for family is '*krobkrua*' (ครอบครัว). *The Royal Institute Dictionary* (1999: 290) explains *krobkrua* as the "basic institution of society comprising a husband and wife and their children".[24] The actual use of the term is, however, more flexible and can accommodate a wider group of people than the nuclear family described by the dictionary. Who is included in the word can differ from speaker to speaker as well as from occasion to occasion. It often refers to the family unit living together in one house, the nuclear family plus live-in-parents or other dependents. The term can also refer to a more extended family coming together for special occasions or living close by. The extent of what is included in '*krobkrua*' is very much dependent on the individual's definition.

[24] For Thai original see Appendix 1.1.

Thai people often associate the family with the house and the people living in it; however, scholars of the Thai family have not yet applied the concept of house society to Thailand. In a house society, the house is at the focus of social organization (cf., Izikowitz and Sørensen 1982, Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995, Carsten 2004). Kinship is created by living together in the same house and eating food cooked on the same hearth. Carstens (2004) argues that the consumption of rice cooked over the same hearth becomes the white blood – the white blood becomes breast milk – and milk creates kinship. The concept has been used extensively in Insular Southeast Asia (cf., Izikowitz and Sørensen 1982, Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995, Sparkes and Howell 2003, Carsten 2004). In Thailand and Mainland Southeast Asia commensality in general and especially breast feeding are of high significance in the creation of kinship. Here, however, commensality is not linked to the hearth, and the shared consumption of food, including breast feeding as well as communal gatherings, create bonds, kinship and a feeling of belonging (Van Esterik 2011).

The Thai family bears some resemblance to the concept of house society, which can be seen from the terms used to refer to it in the Thai language. The term '*krobkrua*' has been interpreted as 'covering the kitchen' by Prince Damrong (Thanes 2008: 30) and Sparkes (2005: 23). Janjira (จันจิรา 2003: 192), however, claims that the word is a loanword from the Khmer language. While the word *krobkrua* may be from the Khmer language origin, the word *ban* (บ้าน)[25] is indisputably of Thai origin. It is until today used to refer to the family, with a slight emphasis on the spatial aspects of the term. My informants occasionally used the word to refer to their family and upon my asking, they stated that they believed it to be the original and 'older' Thai term for *krobkrua*.

The practice of family also bears resemblance to the concept of house society. Even people not related by blood ties living in the same house can become like family. A live-in maid, for example, can become like a family member if she stays with the same family over a long period of time. However, there will often be some means of distinguishing her from the rest of the family, be it only the monthly salaries. If the live-in dependent has an actual blood-tie with

[25] *Ban* can be translated as house but also as village and home. Depending on the context, it is occasionally used to refer to a region or the whole country, if for example an individual is living in a foreign country. Then the meaning, however, is closely associated with home.

the family, the situation becomes more ambiguous.[26] Despite these resemblances with the house society, Sparkes (2003) argues that the house might have been relevant to Thailand in the past but, with the increasing complexity of society, has lost the main organizational function. Therefore, my working definition of the term family, for the purpose of this study, is: Family is a set of people that are related by blood or affine ties who, ideally, should have lived in the same house over a significant amount of time.[27] When I, henceforth, use the word family, this is what I mean.

Our understanding of the Thai family has been influenced by Potter's (1977) *Family Life in a Northern Thai Village*. Since Potter, the study of the Thai family has largely rested.[28] In her work, she portrays the Thai family as a matrilocal extended family living in a household compound. Landed property passes down the female line but is administered by the male head of the household. Thus, inheritance of land rights goes from the father-in-law to the son-in-law.[29] There is some positive discrimination towards the youngest daughter, who usually inherits the parents' house. This, however, makes her the caretaker of her elderly parents. Any departure from this pattern is portrayed as a breach with the ideal and seen as an unhappy situation. It is this pattern that is most often referred to as the Thai family system by both foreign and local scholars (cf., Sumalee 1995, Van Esterik 1996, Bhassorn 2000, Blackburn 2002).

Potter's (1977) work leaves many questions unanswered and does not allow for alternative forms of family. This is due partly to the geographical location of her study. The matrilocal kinship pattern as reported by Potter has also been observed by other scholars of the North and Northeastern region of Thailand (cf., Tambiah 1970, Jack Potter 1976, Keyes 1975). The same observations have, however, not been made in other regions of Thailand (Sparkes 2003: 151). Thus, Potter's (1977) study should be seen as what it is: a study on the Northern Thai family. In addition to the geographical and ethnic bias of the study, she also does not sufficiently account for discrepancies from the pattern that can be found in her own study. While insisting on

[26] This is based on my observation; in-depth studies to support this observation of the Thai family are, however, lacking and represent a crucial void in the academic literature on Thai society. Filling this gap though is beyond the scope of this study.
[27] Reality does not always live up to the ideal. Therefore, children may spend a considerable part of their lives away from home, often starting at a very young age. They would, nevertheless, be considered as constituting of part the family.
[28] For a review of the work on Thai kinship done before her, please see Potter (1977: 4-22).
[29] This differs from other matrilineal societies, where the administration of the land is inherited from the mother's brother to the sister's son (Fox 1967 [1977]: 103-106, Sorensen 1993: 100-103).

the ideal of matrilocality, she related the story of 'her family' which deviates from the ideal quite significantly. Of the seven daughters in the family, one was married and lived matrilocally in a shared house or in the same compound. A second married daughter had lived patrilocally before she died in childbirth. It was further understood that, of the five unmarried daughters, only the youngest would remain in the parents' house while the rest would have to live patri- or neolocally. She explains that this is because everybody knew that the land could not support any additional people (Potter 1977: 63). However, if the ideal for matrilocality was really that strong, should there not have been more effort made to fulfill it? Further, Potter (1977: 100) notes that surnames are passed down the male line but does not discuss this fact at all. A detailed study of genealogies might have been useful to resolve the seeming contradiction between surnames that are passed down the male line and the matrilocal ideal.

Potter (1977) does not give any consideration to patterns in the rest of the village or society, which would allow us to put her study into a larger context. It is her husband, Jack Potter (1976: 124), who provides us with that information.[30] He observed that of 206 households, 129 are nuclear households, 8 are nuclear households with matrilineal relatives, 43 are matrilineal extended families of three generations and 10 are patrilineal extended families of three generations. While these statistics give the impression that nuclear families in neolocal households seem to outweigh matrilineal extended families, Potter (1976: 124-125) quickly explains that of these nuclear families, many are still dependent on the wife's parents' household. This dependence might vary from dependence in terms of food production or merely the formal ownership of land. He states that "[h]ousehold[s] (a living and property owning unit) and families (a jural unit which organizes labor and sometimes shares rice) do not coincide" (Potter 1976: 124). Neither Jack Potter nor his wife provides us with any knowledge about families and households that deviate from the matrilineal ideal.

Apart from the immediate family, bilateral relatives are important; these are called '*yat*' (ญาติ). According to the *Royal Institute Dictionary* (1999: 475) '*yat*' refers to "a person in the family of whom the descent from either the father's or the mother's line is still known".[31] This definition obviously includes members of the immediate family. However, it usually refers to relatives outside the nuclear family, and again the definition varies individually and according

[30] The Potters carried out their fieldwork together and worked together. Their final publications, however, should be seen as independent works.
[31] For Thai original see Appendix 1.2.

to the occasion. Thus, for one person, an uncle could be a member of the family, and for another person, he is a relative. A relative in day-to-day life could be regarded as a member of the family on special occasions, like weddings and funerals. The main difference between family and relatives are the residence patterns. Relatives usually do not live in the same house, though they might live close to each other in a compound or village.[32] Relatives include both maternal and paternal relatives. However, the closeness to each of these relatives is often determined by the pattern of residence. Thus, relatives who live close to each other will have more regular interaction and closer relationships (Potter 1976: 124). Family and relatives are two groups with permeable borders. For the purpose of this study, the working definition for relatives is: Persons having known blood or affine ties with each other, usually not residing in the same house.

The *Trakun*

The academic focus on matrilineal family in Thailand has led to a dearth of research in patrilineal tendencies in Thai society. Scholars tend to study rural villages in the North or Northeast of Thailand, where matrilineal practices predominate (cf., Tambiah 1970, Keyes 1975, Potter 1976, Sparkes 2005, Walker 2012). This limited interpretation of the Thai family is challenged by the kinship practice in more urban areas, as well as upper-class practices. Here various ethnic groups and the different classes practice kinship in more diverse patterns than portrayed by Potter (1977). Legal regulations have long had a male-bias if not outwardly supported the patrilineage, as the case of surnames shows. It should also not be overlooked that the Thai elite, including the royal family, has intermarried with people of Chinese ethnicity (Skinner 1962: 52). As Chinese families are patrilineal, the Thai elite who had intermarried with Chinese might have adapted the Chinese practice of kinship.

The traditional family law of Thailand did not reflect the matrilocal traditions studied by the Potters (1976, 1977). It had a strong male, if not patrilineal, bias. This becomes clear when analyzing the Three Seals Law, which was codified in 1805 and was in use up to

[32] Traditionally, and to a certain extent today, people living in the same village are related to each other by blood and marriage. Therefore, the term house can refer to the family as a nuclear family unit but also to the family as including the whole village.

1935.[33] Women's place in society was entirely dependent on men, first on her father and after marriage on her husband (Terwiel 2005: 24). This makes it clear that there was a male-bias in the legal framework. The same male-bias was carried on into the present. When surnames were introduced and made mandatory by law in 1913, they were to pass down the male line and wives had to carry their husband's surname (Royal Act of Family Names/**บัญญัติพระราชชนานนามสกุล** 1913). It was not until 2005 that women were allowed to maintain their maiden names after marriage if they so chose (Royal Act of Personal Names (3rd Issue) /**พระราชบัญญัติชื่อบุคคล (ฉบับที่** 3) 2005).

This male-bias of the legal code most probably derived from kinship patterns within elite families. The pattern of marriage and residence amongst the elite departed from the matrilocal pattern discussed above. Historically, elite families practiced polygyny and, thus, patrilocal residence, with a high emphasis on the control of female sexuality (Hong 1999, Loos 2005). Assuming that it was the elites who wrote the law both in the past and today, it appears reasonable that their understanding of family would dominate the law. Therefore, a patrilineal bias in the law must have seemed the logical choice for elite law-makers.

One phenomenon of the Thai family system which has been overlooked is the *trakun* (**ตระกูล**). According to McFarland (1941: 342) *trakun* is translated into English as clan or lineage but also as pedigree. This translation does not do justice to the theoretical differences that the terms clan and lineage carry. A lineage is a group of people that unilaterally trace their relationship to a known ancestor. A clan is a group of people who might not be able to trace this real existing relationship to an ancestor. They might carry the same surname and, thus, believe to be related; often, however, they are not (Sorensen 1993: 120). Askew (2008) uses *trakun* synonymously with the word family. This misinterpretation is understandable, as family and *trakun* often seem to overlap. However, there is a crucial difference. The *trakun* is highly associated with a surname, which is given down the male line. Thus, the *trakun* should be understood as patrilineages: *a trakun consists of the direct paternal descendents of a known ancestor*. Women remain members of their natal *trakun*, even after marriage and change of

[33] Few official documents survived the burning of Ayutthaya in 1767 (Napat and Gordon 1999). Thus, the information we can gain from documents such as the Three Seals Law must suffice. The law was based on old Ayutthayan law but was designed to meet the desires of the Bangkok kings rather than to reconstruct the Ayutthayan law (Wyatt 1994). At the end of the 19th century, the Three Seals Law was gradually replaced by a modern law code modeled after the West. However, the section concerning the family and marriage remained in use until 1935.

surname.[34] Family and *trakun* also differ because not everybody has a *trakun*. To belong to a *trakun* is the privilege of the upper class.

The *trakun* can be compared to the Balinese *dadia*, which was studied by Hildred and Clifford Geertz (1975). The *dadia* is a corporate organized kingroup, which can be divided into gentry and commoner *dadia*. The gentry *dadia* with the king as its most senior member and head of the *dadia* has traditionally be an integral part of the Balinese state. The commoner *dadia* is established by a group of houseyards, who build a *dadia* temple on public land. According to Geertz and Geertz (1975: 62 emphasis in original), "a *dadia* does not *necessarily* emerge when kingroups are large or long-standing enough". They also emphasize that "not every Balinese family, especially of the commoner statum, is incorporated into a large organized kinship unit" (Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 62). The establishment of a *dadia* demonstrates both wealth and power.

In contrast to the *dadia*, the *trakun* cannot establish itself, but is defined by outsiders. The *dadia* emerges if a kingroup erects a temple on public land. However, there is no foundation act for a *trakun*. The *trakun* cannot classify its own status. Some *trakun* are clearly identifiable as such because of their relationship to the royal family. Apart from these *trakun* there is no material marker of their status as such. The bestowal of a royal surname might be one way of recognizing an important *trakun*. However, in contemporary Thailand it is more often the public in the form of newspapers or rumors that sets the status of the *trakun* (cf., *Thairath*/ไทยรัฐ 26 November 2007, *Bangkok Biz News Online*/กรุงเทพธุรกิจออนไลน์ 20 November 2011, *Thairath*/ ไทยรัฐ 9 August 2011). There is a tacit agreement of the characteristics a *trakun* should possess. In discussions about these *trakun* and their members, it is expressed that a *trakun* is seen as an influential and noteworthy family, often engaged in business or politics. Furthermore, a *trakun* is one that works together in a corporate manner for no less than two generations. Usually, one ancestor is identified as *ton trakun* (ต้นตระกูล), the founding father of the *trakun*. The term *trakun* also implies a distinction from the majority of families. *Trakun* play a leading role in society and, thus, are often part of the upper classes. At this point it is crucial to discuss the concepts of class and status, as these concepts are crucial for the understanding of the *trakun*.

[34] While women upon marriage do not become members of their husband's *trakun*, they do become members of their husband's family.

Class and Status

The concept of social class derived from Marx's (1867, 1872, 1890) analysis of the industrialized society of England is focused on the ownership of economic resources. Marx (1890: 1031-1032) differentiates three major classes in 19th century England: wage-laborers, capitalists and land-owners. Wage-laborers do not have any ownership of the means of production or capital. Their income relies exclusively on their wages, which they earn in exchange for their labor. Wage-laborers are also referred to as the proletariat. The capitalists are the owners of the means of production. They own the factories, the machines and the capital to produce commodities. Their income relies on the profit that is realized by their capital. The land-owners, as the term already implies, own land from which they receive their income in the form of rent. Marx (1890: 1031-1032) acknowledges the existence of "middle and intermediate strata" that "obliterate lines of demarcation". However, in his forecast for the development of the classes, these intermediate strata would ultimately become part of one of the major classes.

Marx's (1867, 1872, 1890) prognosis regarding the development of the classes has proven to be inaccurate. The intermediary classes, or the middle classes, have not disappeared but have rather increased both in number of people and in complexity. Wage earners in modern capitalist societies include management level employees, professionals, technicians and office clerks. An increasing number of people are not engaged in the process of production at all but are employed in the service sector. The boundaries of these middle classes are difficult to make out and categorization is hindered by high social mobility in these classes. King (2008: 98) states that in non-Western countries the situation is often even more complex because "newly-emerging classes generated by Western invention, and established, indigenous classes which have emerged from local circumstances are interrelated in complex ways". Such western inventions include amongst others modern bureaucratic systems of government, industrialization and the capitalist market economy. In Thailand, all these have had lasting impact on the Thai class structure, as will be discussed below.

In an attempt to draw a more nuanced picture of social inequality, Max Weber (2006 [1921]) introduced the dimension of status. King (2008: 98) summarized that status represents the social aspect of inequality and is expressed by honor, prestige and estimation. Further studies into status in different societies have shown that it can be ascribed by birth or

inheritance. This includes noble and royal titles but also includes status based upon sex, age, race ethnic group and family background. Some societies attach certain signs to ascribed status, which can include specific clothing, hairstyle or titles. Alternatively, status can be achieved during an individual's lifetime. Achieved status can be based on education, ability, skill and occupation. An individual of high class does not necessarily also possess high status. In traditional Chinese society for example, the scholar would have a high status, despite often having very low economic means. A wealthy merchant, on the other hand, would have a low status (Evans 1995: 200-212).

The concept of class and status was further developed by Bourdieu (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]). In his works the concept remains, however, often vague and can even be contradictive. Swartz (1997: 47)[35] has helped to clearly articulate Bourdieu's notion class as "an ensemble of pertinent stratification factors that constitute social classes rather than any single determination factor". His class differs from that of both Marx and Weber. Bourdieu does not define social class primarily in terms of location in the social relations of production. He sees class as a group of individuals who "share similar conditions of existence and their corresponding sets of dispositions" (Swartz 1997: 154). These conditions of existence and their corresponding sets of dispositions are determined by the volume and structure of various forms of capital as well as the way that this capital develops over time. Bourdieu (1986: 47) argues that it is not economic capital alone that makes the class structure possible. He states that to fully understand "the structure and functioning of the social world" it is necessary to refine our understanding of "capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory" (Bourdieu 1986: 47).

Bourdieu (1986) defines two types of capital, namely economic and symbolic capital. Hereby, economic capital refers to all forms of financial resources, such as cash savings and regular income, shares in the stock market, properties and any other kind of economic assets. Symbolic capital is not manifested in bank accounts and often consists of intangibilities, such as knowledge, accents, tastes, and behavior. This makes it invisible; it becomes "unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence" (Bourdieu 1986: 49). As a result, the privileged position that the owners of symbolic capital hold in society cannot be related to its origin, rather it is understood that this position has been attained due to skills, knowledge, and

[35] Swartz (cf., 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010) has commented extensively on Bourdieu's work.

cultural refinement. Symbolic capital can be divided into three forms: cultural, social, and political capital. I will discuss the various forms of capital in more detail in Chapter 4; at this point it shall be noted that much of what Weber (2006 [1921]) refers to as status is encompassed in symbolic capital. As a result of this magnitude of defining factors, Bourdieu's (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of class is much more complex than that of Marx (1874) or Weber (1922 [1999]). Despite its complexity, Bourdieu's (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) concept of class is more easily applied to differing economic, social and historical circumstances, as it not rooted in a particular setting, as Marx's (1874) class system is. Thus, in this thesis I will apply Bourdieu's (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of class: a class is a group of people who share conditions of existence that are characterized by economic and symbolic capital.

While the concept of status seems to be absorbed in the definition of class applied here, it should be noted that this is not invariably the case. Status, which is honor, prestige and estimation, is highly dependent on circumstances. Thus, a person might have a high status in one group of society and a low one in another. This is irrespective of economic capital and class. Bourdieu (1984, Swartz 1997: 117-118) acknowledges this, when he notes that symbolic capital is only advantageous to a person if it is relevant to the field in which it is used. A person with a high amount of political capital will not benefit from it if he, for example, wants to become a musician. There, another type of symbolic capital is needed. Consequently, status remains a valuable concept and is here understood as: symbolic capital that translates into honor, prestige and estimation in a particular setting.

Class and Status in Thailand

Class is crucial as a defining trait of individuals, but at the same time social mobility is a constant feature in Thai society. It has argued that the concept of class is not applicable to Thailand. Accordingly, class in Thailand exists only as a conceptual principle and does not influence the social interaction between individuals (Hanks 1962: 1252). Hanks explains that this is due to the high social mobility in Thai society in which no one is inevitably ascribed to a certain class. While individuals are born into certain circumstances of existence, their position is not fixed. A king can become a slave and a slave can rise in the social hierarchy. One reaches one's position in life through merit (both in a religious and a worldly sense). In society, one is

judged according to one's own position in life and the merit represented in the position. As every individual in society constantly rises or falls, no fixed groups or classes can exist. I agree with Hanks that in Thailand an individual can indeed change his or her position in life. Through education, skills or other merit, an individual can work his or her way up in society. However, Hanks overestimates the social mobility in Thailand under the absolute monarchy. He presents an ideal picture in which everyone, not withstanding his or her origins, can become a noble. To further evaluate this, it is necessary to briefly discuss the social stratification in Thailand.

The Thai society before 1855 could not be more different to the industrialized society of England which Marx was studying at the same time. Traditional Thai society categorized people into four major groups: royals (*jao*/เจ้า),[36] nobles (*khun nang*/ขุนนาง),[37] commoners (*samanchon*/สามัญชน or *phray*/ไพร่)[38] and slaves (*that*/ทาส). People were allocated into these groups by birth but could change their position in the social hierarchy during their life. The position of an individual in society and to which group one belonged was determined through two major indicators: *sakdina* rank and titles. The *sakdina* system included the entire Thai population, with the exception of the king himself. Titles are mainly held by royalty and nobles.

The origin and development of the *sakdina* system remains unclear, as records dating back before 1767 were largely destroyed when the Burmese seized the Thai capital of Ayutthaya. What is known today is a reconstruction gained from later materials; thus, much remains in the dark (Wyatt 1994: 157-158). However, Terwiel (2005: 12-26) suggests that the *sakdina* system originated from a feudal system in which the king allotted pieces of land, including the inhabitants, to chief advisors, who would then be responsible for the land but also enjoy the service of its inhabitants. This system of allotting land later developed into the *sakdina* system. One reason for changes in the *sakdina* system might have been of geographical nature. Thailand, and Southeast Asia in general, was scarcely populated and thus land was available in abundance, while manpower was scarce. Consequently, manpower was a much more important resource. Thus, Akin (1969: 79-84) claims that the *sakdina* rank indicated the amount of manpower under a person's control.

[36] The word *jao* is commonly transliterated as *chao* (cf. Akin 1969)
[37] The *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2011) defines noble as "belonging by rank, title, or birth to the aristocracy". The same definition applies in Thailand. However, in the Thai case, the emphasis is on rank and title rather than on birth.
[38] The word *phray* is commonly transliterated as *phrai* (cf. Akin 1969)

Irrespective of the origin of the *sakdina* system, it was used to identify each individual's position in society. The lowest *sakdina* rank of 5 was given to beggars, slaves and descendents of slaves. Commoners would have a *sakdina* of 15. A person with a *sakdina* of 400 and above was considered part of the elite and, thus, a noble. The highest possible *sakdina* was 100,000. Every individual was given a *sakdina* rank upon birth. This rank would be in accordance with the father's rank. The *sakdina* rank changed when a person was assigned a position in the administration. The *sakdina* rank of women depended in almost all cases on men. Before marriage, it reflected the father's rank and after marriage that of the husband. Only when a woman held an official office in the inner palace was she given a *sakdina* rank independent of any male relatives (Terwiel 2005: 24).

Titles can be categorized into two groups: hereditary royal titles and achieved noble titles. Members of the royal family are given a title at birth.[39] These titles are hereditary and depend on the rank of the mother and the person's genealogical distance from the ruling king. The child of the king with a queen of royal origin would be given the title *Somdet Chao Fa*, while the child of a non-royal mother would be given the title *Phra Ong Chao*; the king's grandchildren are *Mom Chao* and his great grandchildren *Mom Ratchawong*. With each generation, the title given to royalty would decrease until after five generations, royalty became commoners. Royal titles remain the same over a person's life time and only in rare cases changed due to extraordinary achievements. Titles also changed with the ascent to the throne of a new king. Then he would be the head of a new line of descendants and his offspring would be titled acordingly. A person born to non-royal parents could under no circumstances gain a royal title. Titles of the nobility were awarded with the appointment to an administrative office or for special achievements. Together with the appointment to a middle or high office in the bureaucracy, an individual was given a title and a *sakdina* rank which transformed them into nobility (Haas 1953: 585). Today, the descendents of former royalty are recognizable only by their surnames, which identify them as relatives to the royal family.[40]

Nobility in Thai society, in theory, was not hereditary. Sons and daughters of noble men did not automatically become nobles themselves. Nobility was to be earned with the

[39] For royalty six titles were possible: *Upparat*, *Chao Fa*, *Phra Ong Chao*, *Mom Chao*, *Mom Ratchawong* and *Mom Luang*.
[40] Not all holders of official titles are part of the nobility. Holders of the *Khun* title only partly belonged to the nobility. The holders of the titles *Muen* and *Phan* did not belong to the nobility at all.

appointment to positions in the administrative or military hierarchy. Thus, a son of a noble had to prove his capability before he became appointed to higher office and, thus, to noble status. It is this theoretical concept of social mobility that Hanks (1962: 1252-1253) refers to. The practice, however, deviated from the theory. Sons of nobles often became their father's apprentices and gained the skills to fulfill official duties. In this fashion, sons of nobles became an obvious choice when the father's position became vacant. Thus, in practice, official positions and, with them, the nobility became hereditary. Consequently, commoners very rarely rose to the ranks of nobility. As a result, the number of nobility remained low and became a rather stable social class (Akin 1969: 155-170).

The royal and nobles did not only hold high status but also possessed considerable economic capital. They were involved in intra-Asia trade. Thailand, as a tributary state of China, sent gifts to the Chinese court every three years. These tributary missions to China were accompanied by trade vessels. Indeed, the trade with China was so successful that missions were sent far more frequently than required (Suehiro 1996 [1989]: 17). The king, other royals and nobles took part in this trade, often monopolizing goods in demand. Thus, the royals and nobles did not only have a high status in society but also high economic capital. They were the ruling class in every aspect.

From the mid-nineteenth century, Thailand became increasingly integrated into the global capitalist economy. With the 1855 signing of the Bowring Treaty,[41] Thailand had to open itself to Western traders and to give up a number of trading monopolies. That led to marked changes in the country's society. With the increase in international trade, a small local capitalist class as well as wage-laborers, in the Marxian sense, emerged. The local capitalists, who were often of Chinese ethnicity, joined forces with the traditional royal and noble elite. Together, they invested in land, industry, commerce and banking. The Thai bourgeois emerged out of this group (Hewison 1985: 271).

Following the economic opening in the mid-19th century and changes in the Thai bureaucracy, a middle class emerged. Thailand reformed its administration and developed a modern bureaucracy. This modern bureaucracy was initially supplied by royal and nobles. When these traditional elite did not suffice to fill newly created ministries, commoners were

[41] The Bowring Treaty is an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand) that liberalized foreign trade in Siam. For more details on the Bowring Treaty and its consequences see Hong (1984).

increasingly accepted into the middle ranks of the bureaucracy. These were highly educated young men, who in many cases had attended higher educational institutions in the West (King 2008: 121). Some of these young men were given official titles, yet they did not become part of the ruling class and also lacked economic capital. They can be considered as Thailand's first middle class. It was a group out of this middle class that was instrumental in the 1932 installation of the constitutional monarchy.

The establishment of the constitutional monarchy triggered substantial changes in the Thai class structure. Members of the royalty lost their positions in the state apparatus and often retired abroad. Officials of noble origin fared better, as they could preserve their positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, the ruling class was reduced to the nobles. However, the practice of giving noble titles to men was discontinued after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy (Haas 1953: 586). Thus, the nobility, which in Thailand is not inherited, gradually became extinct as a social class. They were replaced by those elements of the middle class that had brought about the change of governmental system. High level government officials from the civil and military services became the new ruling elite and thus, part of the bourgeois. This also raised the status of governmental officials in general.

It should be noted here that while the nobility as a social class disappeared, titles for women are still awarded. The reasons for the preservation of female noble titles are unknown. Women can be given two noble titles: '*Khunying*' (คุณหญิง) and '*Than Phuying*' (ท่านผู้หญิง). Both titles are translated into English as 'Lady' (Domnern and Sathienpong 2006: 100, 242) but the title of '*Than Phuying*' is higher than the title '*Khunying*'. Under the absolute monarchy the title 'Lady' was given to a woman at the same time as her husband was given the title of "*Phra*". With the discontinuation of noble titles for males, the title 'Lady' had to be given on a different basis. According to my informants, the title is given to ladies-in-waiting for longstanding loyal service to the queen, for generous donations to the royal foundations[42] and to acknowledge the woman's husband.[43] When a woman is given the title 'Lady' in acknowledgement of her husband, this resembles the practice under absolute monarchy. Despite

[42] It is generally believed that a woman needs to donate several million *baht* to the royal donation in order to be given the title of 'Lady'.
[43] The wives of high ranking government officials often carry the title 'Lady'. Almost all the wives of former prime ministers also carry the title.

this reminiscence to the absolute monarchy, these women do not constitute a social class. The title, however, is a sign of status.

The Thai class structure was once again altered when, under military rule, Thailand increasingly became industrialized. The regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath (1957 to 1963) put a lot of emphasis on the development of Thailand and also utilized the Thai monarchy for this development ideology. During that period much of the country's infrastructure was built. More importantly, the regime introduced a market oriented economic policy that advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production which led to steady and rapid economic expansion in the 1960s. Despite regime changes and economic problems, the economic growth continued until the financial crisis in 1997. During this period, a Thai capitalist class emerged. This class was partly made up of Chinese immigrants and their descendents but also from the offspring of noble families. In the same period, the royals also experienced a comeback. They not only profited from the economic growth but were also restored to their former status and gained political influence (King 2008: 122-124).

Trakun and Class

Hanks' (1962: 1252-1253) notion that an individual is judged solely on his or her own achievements or, as he terms it, merit, is not correct. The background of an individual's family will influence the way people see him or her. Individuals are judged as having or not having a *trakun*, thus, implying class in the sense of Bourdieu (2010 [1984]). To have a *trakun* means one was born in upper class circumstances. It also means one possesses the cultural knowledge and the manners to interact in an upper class setting. This is what Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) would refer to as symbolic capital and, thus, part of his definition of class.

Trakun are usually part of the upper classes; class affiliation is not always uncomplicated. Five types of *trakun* can be observed, of which two are distinctively part of the upper classes and three have a less clear class affiliation. The five types are:

1. *ratchasakun* (royal *trakun* or ราชสกุล) who are direct lineages from a king;
2. *ratchinikun* (queen's *trakun* or ราชินิกุล) who have given their daughters to the kings of the Chakri dynasty in marriage;

3. *trakun kao* (old *trakun* or ตระกูลเก่า) who are descendents of local royalty (*chao muang*/เจ้าเมือง) or nobles;

4. *trakun thurakit* (business *trakun* or ตระกูลธุรกิจ) who have been engaged in (leading) business enterprises over generations and often are descendents of Chinese tax-farmers or *chao sua;*[44]

5. *trakun kanmuang* (political *trakun* or ตระกูลการเมือง) who have engaged in politics over several generations.

I will now shortly discuss the class affiliation of the six types of *trakun*.

The first and most prominent type of *trakun* are the *ratchasakun* (ราชสกุล). A *ratchasakun* consists of direct descendents of a king, but the founder of it is usually a prince. There are 18 from King Taksin (1767 to 1782) and 84 *ratchasakun* descending from the Chakri kings (1782 to present) (Tamrongsak/ธำรงศักดิ์ 2001).[45] These *trakun* have meticulously recorded their ancestry over centuries. *Ratchasakun* are the prototype for the *trakun* in general. Second are the *ratchinikun* (ราชินิกุล), which are not of royal descent. The *ratchinikun* are *trakun* which have given their daughters to the kings of the Chakri dynasty in marriage. Thus, they are related by marriage to the royal house but do not have royal blood themselves. These *ratchinikun* have been members of the nobility and some of them have had huge political influence. However, not all families who have given their daughters into the palace have been classified as *ratchinikun*. It has been reserved for high ranking wives, favorite wives, wives that have given birth to children and daughters of influential families. Much like the *ratchasakun*, *ratchinikun* keep detailed records of their ancestors, often going back centuries and sometimes organizing themselves in lineage clubs or societies.[46] Most of these *trakun* have a royally bestowed surname.

Ratchasakun and ratchinikun are distinctively upper class. These *trakun* have over centuries supplied Thailand with its kings, queens, king consorts, ministers and high-level bureaucrats and are continuing to do so today. Some members of these *trakun* have also entered

[44] Up to the early 20th century, not all taxes were directly collected by state officials. The state gave the right to collect a certain tax in a specified area to the highest bidder. This system was called tax-farming and was extensively described by Hong (1983, 1984). *Chao Sua* refers to Chinese immigrants who made their fortunes through trading.

[45] Eight *ratchasakun* are descendents of Rama I, 20 of Rama II, 13 of Rama III, 27 of Rama IV, 15 of Rama V and one of Rama VII.

[46] Lineage clubs or societies in Thailand have no uniform organizational structure or purpose. Often, however, they are registered clubs with a board of trustees. They actively promote the cohesion of the *trakun* by recording its history and genealogy and by organizing regular family gatherings. In many cases, they maintain websites on the Internet (cf., The Bunnag Lineage Club 2010, The Na Ranong Association 2011).

politics. However, these *trakun* have a huge number of members, who naturally cannot all occupy the top positions in society. This has led to the decline of some of these *trakun* in financial as well as in professional terms. The decline of factions or a whole *trakun* though has not led to a decline in prestige and, thus, status. To be a member of a *ratchasakun* or *ratchinikun* is still highly prestigious today.

The remaining three categories of *trakun* are not easily defined by their relationship to the royal family and are, thus, more ambiguous. The third, old *trakun* (ตระกูลเก่าแก่), who are descendents of local royalty (*chao muang*/เจ้าเมือง), nobles, governors or high ranking bureaucrats, usually have a royally bestowed surname, which signalizes them as being close to the royal house. With the exception of local royalty, they usually cannot remember their ancestors far beyond the one person who was given the royally bestowed surname and is known as the foundation ancestor of that *trakun*. Thus, these *trakun* are relatively young in comparison with the *ratchasakun and ratchinikun*. Fourth are business *trakun* (ตระกูลธุรกิจ), who often are descendents of Chinese tax-farmers or *chao sua*. They are at the core of Thailand's business elite, or capitalists, and possess family cooperations, such as the Central Group or the Bangkok Bank.[47] Their descendents are actively involved in the management of these companies. These *trakun* often can trace their ancestry back to the Chinese homeland, some only to a certain village, while others know their actual Chinese relatives. These business *trakun* express their ethnic background in various ways, for example, in the maintenance of *trakun* graveyards. Finally, political *trakun* (ตระกูลการเมือง) have engaged in politics over several generations and can count several holders of political office among their relatives. These *trakun* are comparatively new in the Thai elite. Some of them are able to trace their ancestors back to some lower nobility or bureaucrats during the time of the absolute monarchy, but often they will not have royally bestowed surnames or elaborate ancestor charts to present. Thus, usually they cannot remember more than two generations of their ancestors.

The class affiliation of old, business and political *trakun* is difficult to define, as it is much more fluid and subject to variation over time. Old *trakun* retain their royally bestowed surnames; these carry some amount of prestige. However, only a small group of royally

[47] The Central Group of Companies (เครือเซ็นทรัล) is a family-owned conglomerate holding company founded in 1947 by the Chirathiva (จิราธิวัฒน์) *trakun*. The Group is involved in retailing, real estate, hotels and restaurants. The Bangkok Bank is a commercial bank established in 1944 by the Sophonpanich (โสภณพนิช) *trakun*.

bestowed surnames will be readily recognizable as such by the wider public.[48] Apart from a few well known royal surnames, only the prefix 'na', which resembles the German 'von' or the Dutch 'van', will clearly indentify a surname as royally bestowed, as it is legally reserved (*The Government Gazette/ราชกิจจานุเบกษา* 30 March 1912). Many families with royally bestowed surnames are no longer part of the elite. Once I even encountered a taxi driver with a royally bestowed surname, who was a descendant of a governor of a province in the Northeast of Thailand. For business and political *trakun,* it is even more difficult to maintain their status as *trakun* over several generations, as they do not have any sign of this status. Here, the funerals and cremations of members of these *trakun* play an important role in manifesting social status, as will be shown in Chapter 8.

Despite the close association of *trakun* with the upper classes, it should be noted that by no definition of class would political *trakun* present one coherent class or even class faction. Political *trakun* can exist at all levels of society. Political *trakun* can be found in all parts of the country. They can be active in local and national politics alike. While political *trakun* who are active in national politics tend to be part of the upper classes, those involved in local politics are not necessarily so. Furthermore, political *trakun* are socially mobile and constantly struggle to advance to a higher strata of society.

Trakun Defined

In this chapter, the *trakun* has been shown to be a patrilineage, which consists of the direct descendents of a known paternal ancestor. The membership in a *trakun* is signified by a shared surname. Married women, however, remain part of their natal *trakun* despite a change of their surname. *Trakun* is closely related to issues of class, as most *trakun* are members of the upper classes. The archetype of *trakun* is the royal family and the *ratchasakun* that emerged out of it. Closely related to these are the *bawonratchasakun.* Of slightly lower status are the *ratchinikun* and the old *trakun*, who historically have been part of the nobility. The only *trakun* that are not part of royalty or nobility are the business and the political *trakun*. These *trakun* have, in a process of social mobility, established themselves mainly during the twentieth century. They are

[48] The Ministry of Interior (กระทรวงมหาดไทย) provides an online database where one can look up whether a surname is royally bestowed or not.

a product of economic and political changes that started in the mid-nineteenth century and were able to gain upper class status through success in business or politics. They, however, are more vulnerable, as they lack clear signs of status. Thus, to maintain their position in society and politics they have to struggle to maintain and increase their economic and symbolic capital. How this is done will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Capital and State

Political *trakun* only emerged with fundamental changes in the Thai economy and political system. As a result they lack some of the prestige of the *ratchasakun*, *ratchinikun* and old *trakun*. Thailand has historically been dominated by *ratchasakun*, *ratchinikun* and old *trakun*. From these, the kings, queens and high ranking officials in the capital and provinces were recruited. These *trakun* have traditionally been royalty and nobility. This former status is today signified by their surnames, which were often royally bestowed and identify them as members of the upper classes. Political *trakun*, however, first emerged with the establishment of the constitutional monarchy 1932. Thus, in many cases they do not have any visible signs of their status, such as a royally bestowed surname. Thus, their status as *trakun* is much more vulnerable than that of *ratchasakun*, *ratchinikun* and old *trakun*. To maintain their status, they have to struggle to distinguish themselves from ordinary families.

In this chapter, I will discuss how political *trakun* sustain their status and merge with the Thai state. A process that I call symbolic capitalism is one crucial element of the maintenance of status by political *trakun*. Thereby, symbolic capital is not only maintained and reproduced, as argued by Bourdieu (1986, 1999, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]), but it is actively increased from one generation to the next. The increase of symbolic capital is necessary to win electoral positions, through which political *trakun* become embedded in the Thai state. This challenges the Weberian definition of the state as abstract and impersonal; thus, I will argue that the state, as a theoretical concept, needs redefinition. The state should be seen an entangled mass of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals, of which political *trakun* are one example.

Forms of Capital

Bourdieu (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) adapted the Marxist theory of capital by introducing symbolic capital. He argues that economic capital alone does not allow us to completely understand "the structure and function of the social world" (Bourdieu 1986: 46). This notion of capital is a useful tool for understanding the workings of political *trakun* and their ability to prevail amid changing political circumstances, as will be shown in this thesis. Symbolic capital can be divided into three forms: cultural, social, and political capital.

Cultural capital exists in three states: the embodied, the objectified and the institutional. Embodied cultural capital is what is often referred to as cultivation (Bourdieu 1986: 47-49). As Bourdieu (2010 [1984]: 5) puts it, cultural capital is the "cultivated disposition and cultural competence that are revealed in the nature of the cultural goods consumed and in the way they are consumed". In effect, cultural capital spans an area as wide as knowledge of music and composers, the ability to play an instrument, knowledge of movie directors, clothing and make-up style, preferences for food and sports, and polite speech and manners. It also includes the knowledge of traditions and the ability to interpret signs of status and rank. In its objectified form, cultural capital comprises all artistic goods, such as paintings, books, music instruments, and antique furniture. Institutionalized cultural capital is made up of the academic qualifications a person achieves. Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) frequently calls this form of capital education capital. The acquisition of educational capital is, however, dependent on the amount of cultural capital already gained at home. A higher amount of cultural capital ensures more success in the educational system and, thus, access to higher educational capital. The acquisition of cultural and, thus, educational capital is dependent on the economic capital one possesses. Cultural capital "can only be acquired by means of withdrawal from economic necessity" (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]: 46). To gain cultural capital one needs the time and money that is necessary to learn an instrument, go to concerts, taste food. If a person is, however, not financially secure and needs to put all available resources into survival, such as wage-laboring to earn a living, this person is unlikely to be free to gain cultural capital. Therefore, those strata of society who command more economic capital are often better positioned to gain cultural capital.

Social capital refers to social networks, connections and group membership. As Bourdieu (1986: 51) puts it:

> Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of durable networks of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, the membership in a group – which provides each member with the backing of the collective capital.

These groups and their membership can be signified by a common name, such as the surname, school or club. Social capital is not a given and requires continuous investment. Exchange (of gifts, words and women) between groups or agents in the groups is essential to maintaining social capital. The amount of social capital a person has depends on the number of connections he or she can effectively mobilize and the amount of capital each of these connections individually possesses (Bourdieu 1986: 51). For political *trakun*, social capital is one of the most important forms of capital, as it encompasses alliances they make with other political actors as well as their voter base.

Bourdieu's (2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of political capital encompasses knowledge about politics and the skills necessary for a politician's success. This idea of political capital has developed over time. In *Distinction*, Bourdieu (2010 [1984]: 398-467) only considered the political capital of non-politicians. Political capital was the knowledge of political matters and parties which expressed itself in the ability to voice political opinions. It depended much on the educational and cultural capital of the individual. Accordingly, only individuals with a considerable amount of educational capital voice political opinions confidently. In *Language and Symbolic Power*, Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 171-202) elaborates on political capital and now includes active politicians in his discussion. Political capital consists of in-depth knowledge about politics, political strategies, political ideologies and the type of voters to whom they appeal. Political capital also includes a set of skills in negotiation and public speaking. A politician needs to know how to appeal to a wide range of people in public speaking and have the ability to debate with fellow politicians. These skills, according to Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 177) are gained in specific educational institutions and through apprenticeship in political parties.

The content of cultural, social and political capital overlaps, and some forms of symbolic capital cannot readily be placed into any of the categories. Symbolic capital is loosely defined as the resources or services an individual has access to on the basis of prestige, honor and recognition (Barfield 1999 [1998]: 401). Prestige, honor and recognition mark and partly constitute an individual's status in society. How status is made up varies from society to society, as was discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of Thai society, one important indicator of

status is recognition by the royal house by the means of titles, medals of honor and royally bestowed honors, such as royally bestowed surnames, royally bestowed wedding rituals, mortuary urns and cremations, amongst others. Membership in a *trakun* also indicates status, in particular if that *trakun* is a *ratchasakun*, *ratchinikun* or a well-known old *trakun*. Other factors that can be considered as symbolic capital are popularity, uniforms, beauty, official or military ranks and decorations, as well as a good reputation (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]).

Maintenance of Symbolic Capital: The Thai Regime of Images

Symbolic capital needs to be maintained over time, as it would otherwise, like economic capital, decrease in value. Cultural capital has to be renewed in the sense that one has to continuously acquire knowledge of new emerging artists or musicians, as well as other changes in what is seen as cultured. Educational capital can be seen to diminish with an increasing number of graduates from universities, requiring one to strive for an ever higher educational qualification (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]: 151). Symbolic capital in the form of prestige and reputation is also vulnerable. Members of prestigious families have to behave in accordance with social expectations in order to keep up the high status and symbolic capital of the family. In the Thai case, symbolic capital is often maintained by following the Thai regime of images.

The concept of the "Thai regime of images" was introduced into the discussion of Thai studies by Peter A. Jackson (2004: 181):

> The regime of images is an internally differentiated form of power that exerts systematically different types of policing and control over actions and discourse in the private and public spheres, respectively. Under this regime, actions performed and statements uttered in the public domain are more stringently monitored than identical actions and utterances restricted to domains that may be no less visible but which are culturally labeled as private. When statements or representations do not conform with idealized forms … then both formal (legal) and informal (cultural) modes of power may be mobilized to expel the unwanted representations from the public domain. This regime of power/knowledge has epistemological implications, determining what can and cannot be articulated as public knowledge in Thailand.

The regime persists because “intrusive, inquisitorial concerns with "saving souls" or ensuring the inner purity of a person's "spiritual essence" [is] alien to Thai religious culture” (Jackson 2004: 201). Therefore norms need not be enforced in the private realm. Only when certain behaviors come out in public and might be seen by others, potentially foreigners, must an image be constructed; this is achieved through the denial of such practices by official sources that assert where such activities should take place: in private. This is based on an “epistemological multiplicity, which should not be equated with duplicity” (Jackson 2004: 201). In other words: the Western notion that outward appearance should reflect the inner being is not shared by Thai people. The disparity between public and private is resolved by the creation of “separately contextualized ‘time and space’ domains of operation to the different public and private cultural logics” (Jackson 2004: 202). One adapts one’s behavior to the contexts of each time and place; this is an idea Jackson has borrowed from Van Esterik (2000). Jackson states that this results in a “high degree of internal differentiation and contextualization of Thai culture. This means that different representations of ‘reality’ may coexist, with the Thai episteme providing for multiple forms of ‘truth’” (Jackson 2004: 202). Thus, an individual who successfully adapts his or her behavior to the contextualization of time and space will maintain his or her symbolic capital.

The public and private in Jackson’s (2004) interpretation vary according to context. First, the public is identified as the international audience, while the private are the Thai people. Jackson (2004) alludes to a 1974 banning of the movie ‘The Male Prostitute’ to elaborate on this. Based on newspaper reports of male prostitutes catering to an upper-class female clientele, two movies were produced in 1974: ‘Rented Husband’ and ‘The Male Prostitute’. The content of both movies was rather similar. However, only the ‘Rented Husband’ was allowed to be screened. ‘The Male Prostitute’ was banned on the grounds that it harmed the image of the country. This was the result of an aggressive advertising campaign for the movie, which included large advertisement boards visible to foreign visitors when they came from the airport. This was perceived to have tarnished the image of the country and, thus, had to be controlled. This case makes clear that it was acceptable for Thai people to go to such movies and know of the existence of male prostitutes, but it was not acceptable for foreigners to know of these practices. The image of Thailand as a sexually prudent country had to be protected (Jackson 2004: 196-200). Second, the public can be understood as the Thai public itself. Prostitution is one example of this. While prostitution is widely practiced, official agencies have repeatedly denied its

existence. Another instance is the monogamous family, the image of which is upheld by the shift from one household with multiple wives to multiple households with one wife. This example demonstrates nicely that the maintenance of images also affects the action, implying that the "regime of images" works in both directions, a fact Jackson (2004) does not seem to realize.

The strict separation of the public and private by Jackson (2004) is a weak point in his argumentation concerning the regime of images. The two contexts of the public discussed above already make clear that lines are difficult to draw. The public denial of the existence of prostitution could apply to both the international and local public. I would like to add a third category which makes the fluidity even clearer. In this third type, the private consists only of the individuals involved in a certain activity, while the public is everyone else, including the individuals' own families. The example of multiple households with one wife, which Jackson (2004: 195) gives, can be used for this category as well. In many cases, the husband will keep up the image of a monogamous relationship before each of his families, who often cannot more than suspect that he has one or more other households.[49] These three categories of public and private are not static, as one and the same phenomenon could fall into any of these categories. The fluidity of the concept of public and private becomes especially apparent when considering the political *trakun* studied in this thesis. It will be shown that private spaces, such as the home of a politician, can become public. Private affairs like personal relationships and marriages can affect politics. In effect, this separation of private and public so emphasized by Jackson (2004) is in itself an image, which becomes clear when one questions the origin of the regime of images.

The regime of images is a useful concept but falls short of explaining its own origins. If we accept the idea of multiple truths, one man can be both monogamous and polygamous at once. How is that possible? How can such antithetical concepts persist in the same society or even the same person? Jackson (2004) does not attempt to resolve these questions. In fact, he does not even pose them. Penny van Esterik (2000), however, upon whose work amongst others Jackson's (2004) concept was based, made an attempt to explain the time-place domains. She refers to the layer of meaning that underlies the regime of images as palimpsests. A palimpsest is "a manuscript or piece of writing material on which later writing has been superimposed on effaced earlier writing, something reused or altered but still bearing

[49] If the husband involved is a prominent figure, it will be impossible for him to preserve the image of a monogamous marriage to all his wives. In such a case, the secondary household(s) would know of the existence of the primary household, because this would be widely known. The opposite is not necessarily the case.

visible traces of its earlier writing" (*Oxford Dictionary of English* 2011). Van Esterik (2000: 41) nicely illustrates this with the example of "parchment or slate from which old writing has been erased to make room for new writing". Thus, the new writings or concepts would always bear visible traces of the older notions. The concept of palimpsests, however, is also not sufficient to explain the regime of images. Traces of the old might always be visible on a palimpsest but, nevertheless, it is one more or less consistent piece of work. Out of a dialog of old and new, one new concept would arise. The traces of the old do not necessarily make sense on their own, just as the new cannot stand alone. This does not allow for the multiple truths of the regime of images, because only one norm would emerge.

The dilemma is solved when we assume that the regime of images is based on a superimposition of concepts and norms, not a palimpsest. A superimposition is a layering of things, usually in a fashion that things remain (partly) visible. I like to think of a superimposition as a piece of glass that has a picture on it on which another piece of glass with a different picture is placed. Both pieces and their pictures construct a new picture. However, the old pieces are still intact and can be used according to the circumstances. The pieces are in a discourse with each other but do not merge into one.

Jackson (2004) describes the regime of images as a power in itself, deciding which actions to police and which not. This argument is not supported by this thesis. This becomes clear in the way in which political *trakun* use the regime of images to their advantage by protecting their own image and destroying that of their rivals. The regime of images cannot be a power in itself but is rather a tool of the powerful. Political *trakun* struggle to preserve their reputations by presenting the perfect image of monogamous families, which is a crucial political resource. At the same time, they deliberately spread rumors about their rivals' sexual promiscuity or professional incompetence to undermine their image and symbolic capital.

Acquisition and Reproduction of Symbolic Capital

Political *trakun* need not only to maintain their symbolic capital, but also to foster symbolic capital in the next generation. It is only limitedly possible to inherit symbolic capital in the same fashion as economic capital. Economic capital can be inherited by the means of legal provisions or a will. Cultural capital in its objectified form can be inherited in the same fashion. However, it

is only the legal ownership of the object that is inherited, not the embodied cultural capital that is required to appreciate or use the object. In other words, a violin can be inherited but not the skills needed to play it (Bourdieu 1986: 48). Cultural capital is bound to the biological capacity of its bearer. That means a person can only have as much cultural capital as he or she is capable of acquiring and remembering. When an individual looses his or her mental capabilities, cultural capital is also lost. It also means that embodied cultural capital cannot be inherited; it can only be reproduced through the socialization of the next generation (Bourdieu 1986: 49). The same is true for the other forms of symbolic capital. Educational capital can only be held by the person who first gained it. A university degree cannot be transferred to someone else or be inherited. Social capital functions likewise. The relationship between two people will always be unique to those two people. However, parents can introduce their children to their friends and thus help them to build up their social capital. The more formalized forms of social capital, like the surname or memberships in a club, can be more easily passed down.

The various forms of symbolic capital are gained through the socialization process at home or in educational institutions (Bourdieu 2010 [1984], 1986, 1999, 2011 [1991]). Cultural and social capital are passed from the parents to the children. Parents transmit their own knowledge of culture, taste and social connections to their children. These prerequisites enable the children to enter first class educational institutions and secure their academic success. This further increases the children's cultural and social capital and also gives them educational capital. Children from families with no or low cultural capital are less likely to succeed academically and, thus, less likely gain educational capital (Bourdieu 1986: 47-48). Political capital, on the other hand, is, according to Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 176-177), not connected with the socialization in the family. It can only be gained in the context of educational institutions and political parties.

I will argue that, in the Thai case, political capital is generally transmitted through the socialization process at home, and not through formal institutions. Political capital in Thailand is not embedded in the educational system, and the party system is weak (Ockey 1994). Thus, acquisition has to take place outside of formal institutions. In political *trakun*, political capital is reproduced and transmitted from one generation to the next. It is transmitted by the means of dinner table conversations; observing parents' interactions with other politicians, bureaucrats and voters; accompanying parents or relatives on their election campaigns and other

political events. This means that children who grow up in political *trakun* start acquiring political capital very early in life. Thus, it can be assumed that members of political *trakun* possess more political capital than non-members.

Political *trakun* do not focus solely on the acquisition and reproduction of political capital; they actively manage and increase all forms of capital. They invest their capital in order to increase it. This is achieved in very much the same way as Marx (1974 [1867]: 212) has described economic capital and its increase:

> The first distinction we notice between money that is money only, and money that is capital, is nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation. The simplest form of circulation of commodities is C – M – C, the transformation of commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into commodities; or selling in order to buy. But alongside of this form we find another specifically different form: M – C – M, the transformation of money into commodities, and the change of the commodities back again into money; or buying in order to sell. Money that circulates in the latter manner is thereby transformed into, becomes capital, and is already potential capital.

To further illustrate this statement Marx gives us the example of a farmer who sells his crops and takes the money to buy clothes. The transaction is concluded with the purchase of the clothes, and money is not returned to the farmer. The farmer did not have the intention to increase the amount of money he had and, thus, transform money into capital. If, however, the farmer takes the money he has earned by selling his crops and uses it to purchase a pig, which he then he sells to his neighbor in order to increase the amount of money he owns, this transaction falls into the category of money as capital. Hereby, it is not important if the amount of money is actually increased. It is the intention, the purpose, that matters. Further, it is important to note that one has to invest one's capital in order to increase it. This functions not only with money but also with the different forms of capital defined by Bourdieu (1986). Economic capital can be invested to attain cultural capital. Cultural capital ensures the success of an individual in the social world and thus, will likely lead to a return of the economic capital, often with an increase. Political *trakun* actively engage in this – what we might call – symbolic capitalism. They invest in their children's education; manage their children's marriages and their professional careers, in order to increase the *trakun*'s overall capital.

All strategies to increase the *trakun*'s capital are dependent on the individual choices, character and capabilities of family members. While parents might make ambitious plans for their children's future, these plans will only be as successful as the children are inclined

or able to fulfill them. Not all children feel a leaning to follow in their parents' footsteps. They might take a totally different direction, which could lead to the end of the political *trakun*. Others might get involved in scandals, effectively damaging the family's reputation and, thus, diminish the family's symbolic capital. Again others could have opposing political ideas to their parents, which would make working together difficult. Sometimes a *trakun* can evade their political demise by the means of marriage and adoption. A talented in-law or adoptee, in exchange for the benefits an association with a *trakun* would bring, can further the political ambition. If, however, the children of political *trakun* follow in their parents' footsteps, the *trakun* grows in strength, which leads to winning elections and potentially controlling key institutions and positions in the state.

Symbolic Capital and Achieving Political Representation

It is a misperception that political *trakun* secure political offices in a hereditary fashion. Positions do not automatically go from one member of the family to the next, as most positions are filled by means of general elections. Unlike business *trakun*, who can simply appoint their relatives to managing positions or seats on the board, political *trakun* cannot appoint their sons and daughters to a seat in parliament. All members of political *trakun* have to undergo the process of elections. Securing a seat in the House of Representatives is, however, a task which only very few people are able to accomplish. In this venture, members of political *trakun* of both sexes have a better chance of gaining political office because they are more likely to possess the capital necessary to win elections. This is facilitated by the way voters decide on making their votes as well as the electoral system.

Andrew Walker (2008: 88) pinpoints three concepts as vital for electoral choices of the population of a rural Northern Thai village: localism, support and administration. Localism in Walker's (2008) understanding "does not seek to resist the state but to draw it into a socially and culturally legible frame of meaning". This translates into a preference for local candidates over non-local candidates. These local candidates are expected to mediate relations with the state in favor of their communities. Localism is closely linked to the second concept:

support. Support here means that the allocation of externally derived resources to the locality is facilitated by the representative. This might mean financial support for local initiatives and projects but can also refer to the building of local infrastructure. Beyond this, political representatives are strongly expected to support their constituency financially. Walker (2008: 90) has noted that such financial support can extend to: "personal loans; donations to temples; support for household rituals; payment of (appropriately inflated) expenses for attendance at meetings; payment of children's education expenses; provision of low cost transport services; and support for budgetary shortfalls in local development projects". Surprisingly, he fails to note that support is not only of a financial nature but also extends to non-material support, such as participation in household rituals and local festivals, getting children placed into (good) schools, arranging employment and assisting in legal cases. The third concept, administration, is in contrast and even conflict with the first two concepts. When talking about administration, Walker (2008) refers to the voters' emphasis on administrative skills. This translates into educational qualifications of candidates, which is in conflict with localist values, as many local candidates do not possess higher degrees. Apart from educational background, other skills are considered, such as skill as public speakers, decisiveness, effective budgeting, effective representation of the locality with high level figures and, perhaps most important of all, transparency.

Localism, support and administration can be translated into the terms of symbolic capital. Localism and support are closely related and both should be predominantly understood as social capital. Voters elect a local candidate because they know that person. He or she has been living in their midst and has been part of their networks for a long time. However, as Walker (2008) clearly shows, this social capital is founded not only on a fellow membership in a community but heavily relies on relationships of reciprocity. The candidate provides the voters with an array of services and gifts, which are later reciprocated by the voters in the act of electing that candidate. The vote is given in the anticipation of future gifts by the candidate who has now become the representative. Administration is best understood as cultural, educational and political capital. The voters choose a candidate who possesses educational credentials and political skills.

Though the electoral values described by Walker (2008) do not exclusively apply to the rural population but have been observed in urban settings as well, he claims that localism,

support and administration are values of rural voters only. He goes as far as to call these values the 'rural constitution' and, thus, denies urban voters a similar motivation in choosing their representatives. Perhaps he was influenced by writings like '*A Tale of Two Democracies*' (Anek 1996), which allocates fundamentally different value sets to urban and rural voters. Askew (2008: 16), on the other hand, has observed similar approaches by voters and politicians, rural and urban alike, in elections in Thailand's south. In my own research, I have come to the same conclusion as Askew. Politicians in rural and urban areas alike cater to localism, support and administration. Though each politician might have a different emphasis on one or the other of these concepts, the varying emphasis seems to be caused by the politician's background rather than by the location of his constituency. Walker's (2008) concept, therefore, is applicable to Thailand in general and not merely to rural areas.

The voters' focus on the person of the candidate is further enforced by the Thai electoral system. Thailand applies a mixed electoral system in which 80% of the MPs are elected in a majoritarian and 20% in a proportional system.[50] The emphasis lies on the majoritarian system, which can clearly be seen from the number of seats elected through it. In the majoritarian system, representatives are elected in constituencies on a single or multiple-member basis. Thus, a simple majority is enough for a candidate to be elected in a constituency. In the majoritarian system, the person of the candidate is more important than the party and its policies (Zimmerman 1994: 10). When the individual candidate is in the focus of the voters' choice, the candidate's symbolic capital becomes crucial for the electoral win. Only a candidate who possesses the necessary social connections and the skills to win over voters will succeed in elections. Members of political *trakun* have an advantage over other candidates, because their family has been establishing and maintaining social capital in a particular constituency over a long period of time. At the same time, members of political *trakun* often possess more economic and symbolic, in particular political, capital, than other candidates.

Members of political *trakun* are also likely to be nominated for party-list positions. In the proportional system, representatives are elected on the basis of a party list. Seats are allocated proportionally according to the number of votes received by each party. Candidates are nominated for the party list according to their qualifications for political positions rather than

[50] The same proportion applies to both the 1997 and 2007 constitution, even though the concrete number of MPs has been reduced from 500 down to a total of 400 MPs.

for their chances of being elected (Norris 2000: 2). During election campaigns, competition is between the parties rather than the candidates. In Thailand, the candidates at the top positions are the party leaders and potential ministers who are longstanding politicians with a great amount of political or professional experience (Iwanaga 2005). Many of these experienced politicians are members of political *trakun*. Apart from veteran politicians, other members of political *trakun* also have high potential to be nominated as party-list candidates. They often have an outstanding education and professional background, which legitimates their nomination. It should also not be forgotten that the party-list nomination can also be achieved by the direct influence of high ranking politicians who might want to position more members of their family in parliament.

The State

By means of symbolic capitalism, political *trakun* can play an integral part in Thai politics and the state. Political *trakun* are well positioned to win elections, appointments to the cabinet or other central institutions of the state, such as the bureaucracy and the military. This is not an automatic hereditary process but is made possible by the high amount of capital, both economic and symbolic, that is accumulated by the members of political *trakun* individually and as a group. Their positions in the state make political *trakun* a part of it. It also allows political *trakun* to further increase their capital. To better understand this process, it is necessary to define what the state is and how it will be understood in this thesis.

The most influential definition of the state is that by Max Weber (2006 [1921]). According to Max Weber (2006 [1921]: 168, my translation), "a political institution shall be called a state when and insofar as its administration successfully makes use of the monopoly of physical coercion for the implementation of orderliness". As characteristics of the contemporary state, which he calls the modern state, he names an administrative and legal order, which is amendable by bylaws. This order functions as guidelines not only for the administrative apparatus but also for all members of the collective, which includes not only members by the right of birth but all individuals and their actions within the territory under control. There are, however, limits to legitimate coercion. Legitimate coercion only reaches as far as the state order allows. As an example he names the right of corporal punishment, which resides with the head of

the household (Weber 2006 [1921]). For him, the bureaucracy is the gamete of the modern Western state.[51]

Weber's (2006 [1921]) definition of the state has built the basis for many works on the state. It has, however, been refined. One such refined definition has been made by English and Townshend (1999: 6):

> [The state is] an independent political society (within a system of other societies), recognized as exercising sovereignty over a given territory, and vindicating that sovereignty in the face of external and internal challenges; a political entity with the power to regulate individuals and organizations within its territory, successfully claiming a monopoly on legitimate force and recognized by its population as legitimate; an organization (or co-ordinated and relatively centralized set of organizations) with military, legislative, administrative, judicial and governmental functions; and a political entity relating fundamentally to the maintenance of order within its territory and to the business of government, with the later role involving institutions marked by their public and impersonal quality.

This definition of the state is not only widespread within academic discourse but is the one many of my informants implicitly subscribe to.

The definition of the state in the Weberian fashion is narrow, and has been challenged by research on Southeast Asia. Based on a study of Southeast Asian state formation, it was argued that defining the state in the Weberian sense detaches it from society and culture, thus neglecting the true nature of the state was made by Tony Day (2002). It is, instead, the "agency of human beings" that forms states, which in itself is a "cultural process that is never complete" (Day 2002: 34). Thus he derives the following working definition of the state:

> The state is a complex agent that acts through culturally constructed repertoires of potent, rational, authoritative, magical, symbolic, and illusory practices, institutions and concepts. The state is distinct from yet interactive with societal forces, in ways that vary according to time and place. The state regulates power and morality and organizes space, time and identity in the face of resistance to its authority to do so (Day 2002: 34).

[51] The reach of the state has since Weber's time increased and now also encompasses certain aspects of the household, such as the right of corporal punishment.

It is here that Day's (2002) contribution to the study of the state lies. He sees the state as something that is alive and is constantly negotiated by human action, which again is based on culture.

Day's (2002) emphasis on human action and relationships allowed him to bring kinship into the study of the state. He argues that kinship relations played a crucial role in state formation before and since colonization. The importance of marriage links in pre-colonial Southeast Asia is particularly emphasized. Marriages, however, are not only important in practical political strategizing but also are a ritual performance of the souvereigns power. The significance of kinship links in post-colonial Southeast Asia is more difficult to follow. Citing the importance of women and mothers in Indonesian state ideology, he tries to make the point that kinship links remain valid. However, this applies rather to the nation than the state. It remains to wonder why he does not use Fillipino or Indonesian oligarchies as an example to make his case.

Day's (2002) definition of the state makes it difficult to follow his argument and takes away the meaningfulness of the state as an analytical category. The melting of the theoretical concepts of state and nation in particular is critical. Few of his examples are from the realm of politics and government, but rather come from literature, myth, ritual and other areas. Although the terms nation and state are frequently used interchangeably in both academic and popular discussions, they constitute two distinct concepts. The state can be understood as the infrastructural frame for the nation. The state consists of territory, institutions, apparatuses and rules. The nation, however, is much less tangible. It consists of historical narratives, beliefs, traditions, and identity (Reynolds 2006a). The nation does not necessarily need a territory. States and nations can exist independently. That means a state can consist of more than one nation and a nation does not necessarily need a state to exist. Thus, the state and nation should be seen as separate (if closely connected) concepts that should be studied independently. Nevertheless, Day's notion that the state should be seen as consisting of the actions of human beings and their relationships with each other is useful and will be applied in this study.

Two political scientists, Bevir and Rhodes (2010), propose a notion similar to Day's (2002) understanding of the state. By observing the daily workings at Westminster, they concluded that policies and politics are not made by an abstract state, but by human beings and their actions. These can be a day-to-day political exchange over a cup of tea or a matter of

protocol at a public formal event. These actions are based in history, traditions and personal beliefs. Accordingly, each individual is a performer acting their part and, thus, creating the state. Consequently, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) propose to fundamentally change the idea of the state. They argue that:

> The state is merely an aggregate descriptive term for a vast array of meaningful actions that coalesce into contingent, shifting, and contested practices. The state is stateless, therefore, in that it has no essence, no structural quality, and no power to determine the actions of which it consists. These actions are explained instead by the beliefs actors inherit from traditions and then change for reasons of their own (Bevir and Rhodes 2010: 198).

Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) also support a similar stance. They declare that the Thai state should be seen "not as an institution but as an entangled mass of interlocking relationships, alliances, and struggles between and among many centres of power often in competition with one another" (Reynolds et al. 2012). The relationships between these institutions and individuals determine the workings of the Thai state, as is expressed in policies and their implementation. These institutions and actors work independently of each other and are connected through the giving, receiving and reciprocating of (1) money (in form of donations, gifts boons, payments, fees and material incentives to get things done), (2) information, (3) interactions (for example orders, demands, formal and informal contracts, favors and paperwork) and (4) relationships (by blood or marriage, ties based on school, university, academy class or army unit cohorts; friendships, comradeships and loyalties forged in all walks of life and work). Reynolds et al. (2012) call this phenomenon the Thai Un-state.

The ideas of Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) expand on McCargo's (2005) concept of network monarchy. McCargo (2005: 499) argues that "Thai politics are best understood in terms of political networks". Hereby, he perceives the monarchy as the most influential network in the period from 1973 to 2001. The network monarchy is characterized by "active interventions in the political process by the Thai King and his proxies" (McCargo 2005: 499). While the network yielded considerable influence, it did not achieve domination of the whole political system. The network monarchy worked with other political institutions such as the parliament. Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) suggest that the monarchy is merely one of many networks which determine the workings of the Thai state. They name other networks, such as the network of former Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, the network of the First Army Region, the network

of the Special Branch Police and the network Charoen Pokphand Conglomerate, which is a leading business empire in Thailand.

Reynolds et. al. (2012), Bevir and Rhodes (2010) and Day (2002) see the state not as an abstract institution but as relationships between human beings and networks. I agree with them that the state should not be seen in an abstract Weberian fashion and needs to be redefined to acknowledge the importance of personal relationships. This study aims to contribute to such a redefinition. I will show how the personal relationships of blood, marriage and friendships that define the political *trakun* influence politics and are an integral part of the Thai state.

The terms "stateless state" and "un-state", however, are highly contradictory and call for further consideration. By dubbing the state stateless, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) are negating their own object of study. If the state is stateless, what is it they are studying? The state as defined by Bevir and Rhodes (2010) does not fit into the Weberian definition of a state, as it relies on individuals and their relationships and interactions with each other. Yet while not fitting into hitherto used definitions of the state, it does not cease to be a state. The state is not stateless. It merely does not fit into known concepts.

Reynolds et. al. (2012) gave the term un-state preference over non-state. Non-state would lead to associations with a term like non-state actors and, thus, to confusion. Moreover, the "non-state" on a similar line as the "stateless state" negates the state. Reynolds et. al. (2012), however, realized this and argued that, as the state remains in existence, such a term would be inappropriate. By choosing the prefix 'un' they wanted to make a discussion of the state possible. At the same time they wanted to acknowledge that some characteristics of the Weberian state, such as the territory, remain in place. However, they have fallen into the trap of what they have precisely tried to avoid. According to the *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2012), 'un' when added to a noun refers to the lack of something, in this case the state. Thus, un-state is the lack of state. While I agree with both groups of scholars that the state needs to be redefined, and further in-depth study of its workings is needed, I will not apply either of their terms. The state as a concept and an institution remains relevant. It has not vanished or been replaced by something else. Thus, I will refer to it as the state.

This study will argue that the state is an abstract concept that projects an image of an impersonal administrative structure involved with the business of government. This image of the abstract state conceals the performance of the praxis of government by a mass of interlocking

relationships between individual and groups of individuals. Political *trakun* are one prime example for such relationships. They have placed themselves in key positions in the organs of the state, such as the cabinet, parliament and senate but also the bureaucracy and the military. These positions in the state have been used to make policies benefiting them and their in-laws, thus enabling them to dominate the state and parts of the economy.

Political *trakun* have maintained central positions within the state by engaging in symbolic capitalism. Symbolic capitalism is a process in which political *trakun* continuously aim to increase their overall value of capital in all its forms. Strategic marriages create important alliances and relationships of reciprocity that increase the *trakun*'s social capital. The politician's home is a central place for his interaction with voters and other politicians. Here, relationships of reciprocity are lived out. Especially during election campaigning, these relationships are crucial. Political *trakun* put great effort into raising the next generation, in order to ensure that they will have a similar or possibly higher volume of capital than their parents. This is achieved by careful planning of the educational and professional careers of the children in political *trakun* but also by involving them in the *trakun*'s political activities at early stages of their lives. The next generation can claim ownership of some of their predecessors' symbolic capital, whereby the utilization of traditions at a deceased's funeral is a crucial instrument in presenting and reproducing symbolic capital, ultimately ensuring the inheritance for the next generation. The following four chapters will show the interwovenness of political *trakun* and the state, as well as how symbolic capitalism works.

Chapter 5

A Record of Political Families and *Trakun*

> The family as an institution has been central to the organization of the Thai state (Cushman 1991: 122).

This insightful citation will be the *leitmotive* of this chapter. To achieve this, the political history of Thailand, from the 19th century up to the present, will be traced for the role political *trakun* played in it. This will provide the reader with a basic understanding of the nature of kinship politics before 1932 and the extent of the representation of political *trakun* in the cabinet, parliament and senate. Furthermore, the political *trakun* will be characterized according to their social background and time of establishment as a political *trakun*. This will reveal the dynamics of kinship politics in Thailand. The character of families involved in politics and the Thai state is not static; only few *trakun* have achieved continuity. *Trakun* had to adapt to constantly changing political circumstances. Families unable to adapt to new circumstances became politically obsolete and were replaced by newcomers. Families of noble background were replaced by those who had earned their positions in the military or the business world. The case studies used in this thesis represent this change well.

Political Families and Political *Trakun*

Political families and political *trakun* can be observed since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1932. They vary in size from two to up to 33 members, as shown in Table 4. A total of 748 families have been represented in the cabinet, parliament and senate during the time period of 1932 – 2012. These families comprised a total of 1,977 individuals. As is shown in Figure 1, political families have demonstrated a strong presence in the cabinet, parliament and senate from 1932 onwards. The percentage of positions held by members of political families presence increases with the importance of the office. 39.5% of all members of the cabinet, 36.7% of all members of the parliament and 31.8% of all members of the senate have been supplied by political families. A remarkable 67.9% of all Thai prime ministers have

established or come from political families. 21.5% of MPs stemming from a political family background have become ministers. In contrast, only 11.2% of MPs who are not members of a political family have achieved this.

Members of political families have remained in parliament longer than other MPs. As shown in Table 5, MPs who have been in parliament for over 15 years are more likely to be members of political families. On average, members of political families hold a seat in parliament for five years and nine months, whereas MPs who are not members of a political family retain their seat for an average of only four years and eight months. Two reasons account for why MPs from political families last longer in office. First, political families facilitate election campaigns and, thus, help to ensure electoral success. Second, a longstanding MP, due to more experience and the possession of a higher amount of the various types of capital, has a better opportunity to establish a political family. He might do this by recruiting members of his family into politics. An MP with a short term in office will not have the opportunity to do so.

Table 4: Political families and *trakun*

Number of Members	Families
2	509
3	131
4	52
5	27
6	18
7	1
8	6
9	3
33	1
Total	748

Table 5: Length of time in office of members and non-members of political families

Years in Parliament	**Members of Political Families**		**Non-Members**	
	Absolute No.	**In %**	**Absolute No.**	**In %**
1	199	49.87	200	50.13
1-5	828	32.51	1719	67.49
5-10	259	37.81	426	62.19
10-15	133	42.49	180	57.51
15-20	70	47.95	76	52.05
20-25	22	59.46	15	40.54
>25	10	66.67	5	33.33
Total	**1521**	**36.72**	**2621**	**63.28**



Figure 1: Members of political *trakun* in the of cabinet, parliament and senate (in %)

Political families did not suddenly emerge with the creation of the constitutional monarchy. As is shown in Figure 1, political families existed right from the outset of the constitutional period. This suggests that political families existed already under absolute monarchy, which is supported by Vickery (1970). Indeed families and marriage networks have played an important role in the Thai state since before the establishment of the constitutional monarchy. Thus, to fully understand the emergence of political families after 1932, it is necessary to first understand the role families played in politics under the absolute monarchy.

The Role of Families in the Thai Political System before 1932

The Thai state was not institutionalized until the political reforms during the end of the 19th century. In fact, in the Weberian sense it was not even a state, as it lacked one crucial characteristic: a defined territory. The political structure rested on a "patchwork of often overlapping mandalas" (Wolters 1999: 27). The mandala is a pattern of diffuse political power distributed among principalities in early Southeast Asian history, which forms around an exemplary center. The polity was defined by its center and had fluid and overlapping boundaries. It was only in the late 19th century that the concept of boundaries was introduced into Thai thinking (Thongchai 1994: 78-80). Although the system included the payment of tributes, subordinate states preserved a high degree of independence and were not integrated into the central administration. The system was non-exclusive and every subordinate state could pay tribute to several powers (Tambiah 1976: 73-102, Wolters 1999: 27-40).

The mandala system was a relationship between people, and not between abstract states. The tributary ruler was subordinate to the overlord ruler, not the state. Therefore, a strong ruler would result in an increase of the strength of relationships and the number of tributaries. A weak ruler would struggle to maintain his tributaries. This explains the sudden expansion of the Sukhothai kingdom under King Ramkahmhaeng and the equally sudden decline after his death (Wyatt 2003 [1983]). Geertz (1980) has shown that the performance of state rituals has played an integral part in the maintenance of the power of a ruler and his polity. This is the direct opposite

case to the British monarchy, whose court rituals only started to prosper in the late Victorian era when the monarchy had lost most of its political power (Cannadine 2012 [1989]: 121).

The personal relationship between rulers was strengthened by the means of marriage. The Thai kings (and elite in general) practiced polygamous marriage. Polygamous marriage functioned as a form of political integration, as it bound rulers of tributary states and the provincial elite, as well as noble families, to the king. As Loos (2006: 111) puts it:

> Polygamy differed from other forms of political networking because it, as marriage, was a relationship in process rather than a singular event: it enabled political alliance that could be negotiated, altered, and deepened (or dissolved) over time.

The women in the inner palace were an important link between their families and the king.[52] In their position as wives and consorts, they could lobby for their relatives and negotiate for them. Wyatt (1968) has shown that in the case of the Bunnag family, marriage into the royal family was essential for their political success. The king could likewise use these marriage ties to assert his will on the relatives of his wives (Koizumi 2000: 259, footnote 34).

Polygamous marriage ensured the succession to the throne and, thus, the stability of the royal family. Thai kings tended to have numerous children, as in polygamous marriages the possibilities to have offspring multiply by the number of wives. This secures a pool of possible heirs out of which the most suitable could be chosen. Thus, succession by capable men could be ensured. In the Thai political system, the king holds a paramount position and was expected to fulfill the highest moral standards that could only be fulfilled by an extraordinary individual (Terwiel 2005: 27). In contrast to European states, where primogeniture dominated royal succession, in Siam the succession was much more complex. In theory, the most senior son was to inherit the throne. The seniority of a prince was determined not only by the age and order of birth but also by the rank and origin of the mother. Hence theoretically, the eldest son of the king's wife with the highest rank (most likely herself of royal blood) would be the next ruler (Wales 1965). However, other factors, such as experience and connections to influential families were also of great importance. Thus, in practice, sons of lesser rank could also be elevated to be king. Rama III, for example, was elevated to the throne even though he was of lesser rank than

[52] The women we find among the wives and consorts of the kings come mainly from five different backgrounds: (1) female royalty, (2) relatives of the nobility holding high administrative ranks in the capital and the provinces (3) relatives of tributary rulers (4) relatives of wealthy (Chinese) tax-farmers and (5) members of families related to women already in the inner court (**พรศิริ**/Pornsiri 2009: 51-70).

his half brother Prince Mongkut, who was to become Rama IV. However, Rama III had, at the time of his father's death, already distinguished himself as an able statesman with good connections to foreign diplomats, while Prince Mongkut was still young and inexperienced. To avoid conflict between the brothers, Prince Mongkut was ordained as a monk, making way for his brother's ascension to the throne (Terwiel 2005: 107).

Traditional rules of succession were broken in 1868. King Chulalongkorn was installed on the throne at the age of only fifteen, which was unprecedented. In earlier periods of Thai history, he would have had little hope to rise to the throne. At the time of his coronation, however, the presence of Western colonial powers surrounding Thailand was felt by the elite of the country. In the eyes of the European powers, Chulalongkorn, who was the late King Mongkut's oldest son by Queen Thepsirintara, was predestined to become the next king. The installation of anyone else other than Chulalongkorn could have been used by the colonial powers as a pretext to subordinate the country. Thus, the deviation from traditional rules of succession served to preserve Thailand's independence (Terwiel 2005: 171-172). Later in his reign, King Chulalongkorn introduced a new succession law. Henceforth the king appointed a crown prince as heir to the throne while he was still alive (Anderson 2006 [1983]: 21).

Polygamous marriage of the Thai elite enforced the social hierarchy of the country. In Chapter 3, I have already discussed that nobility was practically hereditary. While sons and daughters of noble men did not automatically become nobles themselves, the reproduction of symbolic capital practically resulted in the inheritance of royal appointments. As long as the bureaucracy was small and positions limited, it was possible to fill those positions with the sons of nobles alone. This was reinforced by the high number of offspring from polygamous marriage. Thus, there would always be a capable son to entrust the business of state to. Consequently, commoners very rarely rose to the ranks of nobility, and the social hierarchy was safeguarded (Loos 2006: 113 - 114).

Polygamy was also an important part of Siamese political culture. It was a sign of masculinity, virility and the ability to lead, and thus increased a man's authority and *barami*.[53] This was expressed through the number of wives, the production of numerous offspring and the

[53] *Barami* is the earthly manifestation of the accumulated merit of a person from his or her past and present lives. A high *barami* of a person would legitimize the high position of this person in society, as well as the power, wealth, health and beauty such a person has. A lack of *barami* can lead to the loss of all this or to a low position in society. In several dictionaries it is also translated as prestige.

capacity of the man to control the sexuality of the women under his protection. A man without a wife was seen as incapable of leading. Leadership in general and political leadership in particular was thus highly masculine (Loos 2006: 114-116). In contrast to men, women with more than one husband were seen in a very negative light. Women, especially those from elite families, were supposed to be loyal to their husbands. Thus a woman's close relationship with more than one man could be used against her. This becomes evident in court cases in which women's testimony was contested on grounds of their sexual history. The fact that a woman had more than one partner was seen as evidence for her unreliability and untrustworthiness. Such arguments were used even in cases of thievery which lacked any connection to sexual crime (Hong 1998). Polygamy was thus a truly male source of political capital.

The Thai state fundamentally changed when the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 1855 opened Siam's economy to the Western world. This led to significant economic, social, cultural, and political changes. These changes are clearly manifested in reforms that changed the political structure of the country. King Chulalongkorn changed the administration to an increasingly centralized form of government, westernized the administrative structure and separated military from civilian offices. The local administration was now – due to salaries and regular transfers – increasingly dependent on the central government (Tej 1977, Wyatt 2003 [1983]: 166-209, Terwiel 2005: 203-206). This centralization also integrated formerly largely independent tributary states into the central administration and thus created the country in its modern shape.

The reformation of the administration and increased centralization of the government appeared to have delimited the function of marriage relations in Thai politics. It seemed that it was no longer necessary to depend on marriage relations created through polygamous marriages. Polygamy further lost importance, as the administration had become too large to be filled solely with the offspring of the noble and royal families. Part of this modernization was a change in the rules of succession to the throne. Polygamy, and with it marriage relationships, seemed to have lost some of their political importance. Yet, while the political importance of kinship relations in the form of diplomatic alliances might have decreased, it was revitalized in a different form. The king heavily depended on his brothers and a few families closely related to him to fill important positions in the government. This pattern would be continued by King Chulalongkorn's successors (Wyatt 2003 [1983]: 205, 223).

The king's reliance on family and marriage networks helped trigger the change of governmental system in 1932. A group of largely young, Western educated commoners became frustrated by the limitations which the dominance of members of the royal family in the administration posed to their career prospects. They were inspired by liberal traditions and the idea of democracy, which they encountered during their studies abroad. They later called themselves the *Khana Rasadorn* (คณะราษฎร) or the People's Party. After years of secret discussions, they seized power in a bloodless operation and ended the absolute monarchy. A constitutional government with the king as head of state was formed (Baker and Pasuk 2005: 116-120, Terwiel 2005: 261-262). The People's Party installed a constitutional system and hoped that the introduction of democracy would help the country prosper. One goal of the installation of a parliament system was to break the dominance of the royal and noble families and to increase the influence of capable commoners over the affairs of the state (Wright 1991: 51, Terwiel 2005: 261).

Ironically, the origination of the People's Party itself relied on family networks as well. The People's Party was not a homogenous group but consisted of several factions. The major division was between civilian and military officers. The military officers were further sub-divided into the young and the old members. The civilian faction was headed by Pridi Phanomyong who had studied law in France. The leader of the military faction was Plaek Kittasangka, who became later known under the name Plaek Phibunsongkhram.[54] Plaek had studied in France at the same time as Pridi. Pridi and Plaek were surrounded by a small group of followers during their student time in France. The rather small core group recruited further additions upon their return to Thailand. However, the following was not large enough and did not occupy important enough positions to effect real change to the regime. In order to reach their goal, they had to gain the support of more senior members of the military. Here, Prayoon Phamornmontri, who was another member of the People's Party, was able to use his family networks to the advantage of the group. Prayoon had been born in Berlin to a Thai father and a German mother. Later, upon his return to Thailand, he and his twin brother served as pages to

[54] Plaek Kittasangka was his birth name. When he was appointed to military office, he was given the title Luang Phibunsongkhram. Subsequently, he transformed this title into his surname and retained only the initial P. of his given name. It is also common to call him only Field Marshal P.

King Prajatipok, who at that time was still a prince.[55] Prayoon's mother had integrated well into Thai society. She ran a successful export-import business and also practiced medicine in the inner palace, a trade she had learned from her father. She taught German to Phot Phahonyothin,[56] who was to become the first member of the senior military officers to join the undertaking. Prayoon's mother cautiously recruited Phot (Stowe 1991: 13-14, Wright 1991: 53-54). This crucial recruitment could be made without risking discovery through the utilization of Prayoon's family's social capital. However, family networks could also lead to the exclusion from membership in the People's Party, as the case of Khuang Aphaiwong shows. Khuang, who studied in Paris at the same time as Pridi and Plaek Phibunsongkram, was denied access to the People's Party because of his relationship with the royal family. He was a member of a well established noble family, who were the governors of the province of Battambang.[57] Additionally, his sister was married to a member of the royal family who was posted as a diplomat in France. It was only when he had returned to Thailand that Khuang was finally allowed to join the People's Party (Stowe 1991: 16).

Persistence of Family Politics from 1932 to 1947

Kinship politics were directly carried over into the constitutional period, as they were deeply rooted in the Thai political system and had helped to facilitate the change of governmental system. Figure 1 shows the percentage of political families that have been represented in the Thai parliament and cabinet from the onset of the constitutional regime. 51.8% and 63.6% of the Members of Parliament (MP) and ministers, respectively, came from political families. These were some of the highest percentages of political families during the entire period from 1932 to 2012. It is likely that so soon after the end of the absolute monarchy, potential candidates for the cabinet and parliament were scarce and, thus, individuals from well established families were appointed.[58] Many of the first MPs later founded political families, some of which developed into political *trakun*. The extent to which political families have been predominant varied slightly

[55] Prayoon's daughter has reported that the king was very fond of Prayoon and his brother because they, as Eurasians, were perceived as extremely handsome and also because they looked identical.
[56] His official title was Colonel Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena (พลเอกพระยาพหลพลพยุหเสนา). Later he was promoted to the rank of General. He is also known as Phraya Phahon.
[57] At the time of Khuang's birth Battambang belonged to Thailand, but it now lies in Cambodia.
[58] The first parliament was appointed. It was called an interim parliament. The second legislative period featured both appointed and elected MPs.

and has somewhat decreased since 1932. Nevertheless, political families remain strong in cabinet, parliament and senate.

The relative consistency in the representation of political families masks the demise of some political families as well as the emergence of new political families. As the percentage of members of political families in the parliament and cabinet does not alter significantly over time, one is tempted to assume that the same families have been ruling Thailand from the outset of the constitutional period. A closer scrutiny of the point in time when the political families first entered parliament, however, will reveal the contrary. New political families have made their appearance on the stage of politics throughout the whole period. Table 6 illustrates when the first and second member of each political family sat in parliament for the first time.

This shows that with each legislative period, new families made their appearance. However, the figure also illustrates that there are certain periods in which more political families sat in parliament for the first time. It can be seen that four phases have a higher rate of political families appearing. The first phase is from 1932 until 1945, in which 137 families, comprising 20.3% of all political families, made their first appearance. The next phase is between 1951 and 1957, during which time 48 families first sat in parliament. That amounts to 7.2% of all political families in parliament. This phase was followed by a decline of political families making their first appearance. In 1959, however, a new wave of first appearances of political families arose and lasted until 1976. During this time 170 families, making up 25.2% of all families, first entered the parliament. I will, however, here discuss the time from 1959 to 1973 and from 1973 to 1976 separately, as marked political changes happened and the families in these two periods have vastly different backgrounds. Another 68 families, amounting to 10.1% of all political families, appeared between 1979 and 1988.

From 1932 to 1945, two types of families entered parliament: noble families and families who had members in the People's Party. When looking at the families who entered parliament during this period, it becomes quite clear that those families were part of the Thai elite. During the first legislative period, 137 political families held seats in parliament. Their names read like the 'who is who' of the time and included five *ratchasakun*, 53 noble families, of which three were *ratchinikun*[59], and 23 others were members of the People's Party. Only eight

[59] The *ratchasakun*, noble families and *ratchinikun* are shown under the category "Royalty/Nobility" in Table 7.

Table 6: Entrance into parliament of first and second member of political families

Legislative Period	1st		2nd	
	absolute number	in %	absolute number	in %
28 Jun 1932 - 9 Dec 1933	39	5.8	4	0.7
9 Dec 1933 - 8 Dec 1937	40	5.9	7	1.2
7 Nov 1937 - 11 Sep 1938	29	4.3	5	0.9
12 Nov 1938 - 15 Oct 1945	29	4.3	16	2.8
6 Jan 1946 - 8 Nov 1947	12	1.8	3	0.5
29 Jan 1948 - 29 Nov 1951	16	2.4	7	1.2
30 Nov 1951 - 25 Feb 1957	48	7.1	13	2.3
26 Feb 1957 - 16 Sep 1957	14	2.1	12	2.1
18 Sep 1957 - 20 Oct 1958	22	3.3	13	2.3
3 Feb 1959 - 20 Jun 1968	30	4.5	11	1.9
10 Feb 1969 -17 Oct 1971	37	5.5	18	3.1
16 Dec 1972 - 16 Dec 1973	32	4.7	21	3.7
23 Dec 1973 - 25 Jan 1975	37	5.5	30	5.2
26 Jan 1975 - 12 Jan 1976	34	5.0	9	1.6
4 Apr 1976 - 6 Oct 1976	24	3.6	18	3.1
22 Nov 1976 -20 Nov 1976	2	0.3	3	0.5
20 Nov 1976 - 21 Oct 1977	19	2.8	30	5.2
15 Nov 1977-21 Apr 1979	11	1.6	14	2.4
22 Apr 1979 - 19 Mar 1983	25	3.7	17	3.0
18 Apr 1983 - 1 May 1986	23	3.4	18	3.1
24 Jul 1986 - 29 Apr 1988	20	3.0	21	3.7
24 Jul 1988 - 23 Feb 1991	13	1.9	17	3.0
15 Mar 1991 - 22 Mar 1992	17	2.5	39	6.8
22 Mar 1992 - 30 Jun 1992	14	2.1	13	2.3
13 Sep 1992 - 19 May 1995	18	2.7	8	1.4
2 Jun 1995 - 28 Sep 1996	16	2.4	9	1.6
17 May 1996 - 6 Jan 2001	9	1.3	10	1.7
6 Jan 2001 -5 Jan 2005	21	3.1	34	5.9
6 Feb 2005 - 2 Apr 2006	6	0.9	27	4.7
11 Oct 2006 - 22 Dec 2007	9	1.3	36	6.3
23 Dec 2007 - 6 May 2011	5	0.7	47	8.2
1 Aug 2011 – present	3	0.4	42	7.3

families had a background in the military and of those, six were also members of the People's Party. Amongst the noble families, was the well established and politically influential Bunnag family. The Bunnag family is a *ratchinikun* with Persian origins, which can trace its genealogy back by several centuries. They engaged in strategic marriages with the royal family as well as with other influential families. Members of the family held important positions in the Thai

administration before and after the change in governmental system (Wyatt 2003 [1983]). Families like the Na Songkhla family and the Aphaiwong family, which have served as governors in Nakhorn Srithamarath in the South and Battambang in the East, respectively, are also represented. The backgrounds of families entering politics are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Background of the political families (*n* = absolute numbers)

Background	**1932-1945**		**1951-1957**		**1959-1973**		**1973-1976**		**1979-1988**	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Royality/Nobility	61	44.5	8	16.7	6	6.1	1	1.1	0	4.4
Military	8	5.8	22	45.8	43	43.4	6	6.3	3	4.4
Police	1	0.7	3	6.3	3	3.0	2	2.1	3	0.0
Unknown	67	48.9	15	31.3	47	47.5	86	90.5	62	91.2
Total	137	100.0	48	100.00	99	100.0	95	100.0	68	100.0

The high percentage of nobility amongst the political families during this early phase of the Thai parliament represents a general trend. Figure 2 shows the percentage of holders of official and royal titles in the cabinet, and Figure 3 illustrates the numbers of holders of royally bestowed surnames in the cabinet and the parliament. During the first phase of the constitutional period, in parliament and in particular in the cabinet, the nobility made up a large portion. Indeed, between June 1933 and December 1938, all ministers had an official title. Amongst them were five *Chao Phraya*, 22 *Phraya*, seven *Phra*, eleven *Luang* and one *Khun*. These numbers represent a good portion of the holders of the highest titles and a miniscule fraction of Thai society at large. During the whole Bangkok Period (1782 to 1932), only 130 men were raised to the title of *Chao Phraya*. In 1932 it is unlikely that more than 56 people with this title were still alive.[60] After 1932, the practice of awarding royal titles was discontinued, as it was seen as not compatible with the democratic system. The last *Chao Phraya* died in 1976, aged 91 years. When the constitutional monarchy was established, the nobility had remained neutral, securing many of their members a role in the constitutional government. The nobility was a prestigious group and many of their members had an outstanding education and extensive administrative experience (Sorasak 2010: 63-69). This made their appointment to official positions inside the government an obvious choice. This is well illustrated by the sheer numbers of ministers from noble backgrounds who held portfolios in the initial stage of the constitutional period.

[60] Of the 130 men who were raised to the title of *Chao Phraya*, 56 were raised during the reign of King Chulalongkorn or later. It is unlikely that the people who were awarded the title before that time were still alive in 1932.



Figure 2: Holders of royal and noble titles in the cabinet, parliament, and senate (in %)



Figure 3: Holders of royally bestowed surnames in the cabinet, parliament, and senate (in %)

The political families that were established during the first phase of the constitutional period have not, in most cases, remained in politics until today. As is shown in Table 8, of the 137 families that engaged in politics between 1932 and 1945, only 18 were still active in 1975. Their number further decreased to five in 2011. This decrease in the earliest political families was partly due to the decline of members of the nobility within the parliament and cabinet. Only one *trakun*, the Bunnag, has managed to be represented during most of the constitutional period. However, the Bunnag *trakun* represents a special case. The Bunnag family was established as a member of the Thai elite very early and, thus, has kept extensive genealogies. They practiced polygamous marriages, resulting in a very large number of individuals who are members of the Bunnag *trakun*. Not all members of the *trakun* know each other personally; thus, it is not necessarily the case that the Bunnag have pursued political ambitions as a family effort. Their continuous representation is rather a sign of the high prestige the family name still carries today. This family name equips members of the *trakun* to gain seats in parliament and the cabinet. Further, it should be noted that my informants do not understand the Bunnag family as a political *trakun*. They understand them as an old *trakun* or a *ratchinikun*.

It is notable that some families which were established in the early constitutional period vanished from parliament for some period of time and later reappeared (see Figure 4). This is not an uncommon phenomenon and can be observed throughout the constitutional period. Reasons for this can be manifold. One example is the Phamornmontri family. As has already been mentioned above, Prayoon Phamornmontri played an integral part in the change of governmental system and was part of the original group of students that met in Paris. He remained an active politician until the late 1950s and then retired. None of his relatives entered politics until the year 2005, when finally his son, Yuranant Phamornmontri, entered politics. Yuranant, also known as Sam, is Prayoon's son from his second marriage with a former Miss Thailand. When Yuranant was born in 1963, his father was already 51 years old and retired from politics. Naturally, Yuranant needed some time to reach the legal age to enter politics. This break from politics for the family was prolonged by a detour of Yuranant into the entertainment sector. He had a successful career as a leading actor in telenovellas, when he was approached by Thaksin Shinawatra to enter politics. Initially, he was an assistant to an MP and successfully ran for parliament himself in 2005. Following his time in parliament, he became a spokesperson for

Table 8: Political families in parliament (*n* = absolute numbers)

Legislative Period	1932-1945		1951-1957		1959-1973		1973-1976		1979-1988	
	n	in %	*n*	in %	*n*	in %	*n*	in %	*n*	in %
28 Jun 1932 - 9 Dec 1933	39	28.5								
9 Dec 1933 - 8 Dec 1937	60	43.8								
7 Nov 1937 - 11 Sep 1938	46	33.6								
12 Nov 1938 - 15 Oct 1945	39	28.5								
6 Jan 1946 - 8 Nov 1947	28	20.4								
29 Jan 1948 - 29 Nov 1951	13	9.5								
30 Nov 1951 - 25 Feb 1957	23	16.8	48	100.0						
26 Feb 1957 - 16 Sep 1957	23	16.8	15	31.3						
18 Sep 1957 - 20 Oct 1958	23	16.8	26	54.2						
3 Feb 1959 - 20 Jun 1968	25	18.2	14	29.2	30	30.3				
10 Feb 1969 -17 Oct 1971	17	12.4	5	10.4	38	38.4				
16 Dec 1972 - 16 Dec 1973	15	10.9	8	16.7	51	51.5				
23 Dec 1973 - 25 Jan 1975	18	13.1	3	6.3	32	32.3	37	38.9		
26 Jan 1975 - 12 Jan 1976	17	12.4	7	14.6	15	15.2	39	41.1		
4 Apr 1976 - 6 Oct 1976	11	8.0	8	16.7	21	21.2	49	51.6		
22 Nov 1976 -20 Nov 1976	10	7.3	2	4.2	8	8.1	4	4.2		
20 Nov 1976 - 21 Oct 1977	2	1.5	7	14.6	23	23.2	15	15.8		
15 Nov 1977-21 Apr 1979	18	13.1	10	20.8	26	26.3	11	11.6		
22 Apr 1979 - 19 Mar 1983	23	16.8	7	14.6	17	17.2	29	30.5	25	36.8
18 Apr 1983 - 1 May 1986	10	7.3	5	10.4	21	21.2	28	29.5	40	58.8
24 Jul 1986 - 29 Apr 1988	18	13.1	8	16.7	16	16.2	32	33.7	46	67.6
24 Jul 1988 - 23 Feb 1991	12	8.8	6	12.5	20	20.2	33	34.7	44	64.7
15 Mar 1991 - 22 Mar 1992	15	10.9	9	18.8	14	14.1	13	13.7	10	14.7
22 Mar 1992 - 30 Jun 1992	18	13.1	2	4.2	11	11.1	34	35.8	36	52.9
13 Sep 1992 - 19 May 1995	11	8.0	3	6.3	14	14.1	37	38.9	41	60.3
2 Jun 1995 - 28 Sep 1996	12	8.8	4	8.3	15	15.2	28	29.5	44	64.7
17 May 1996 - 6 Jan 2001	8	5.8	4	8.3	17	17.2	27	28.4	44	64.7
6 Jan 2001 -5 Jan 2005	8	5.8	3	6.3	11	11.1	32	33.7	30	44.1
6 Feb 2005 - 2 Apr 2006	11	8.0	2	4.2	14	14.1	34	35.8	33	48.5
11 Oct 2006 - 22 Dec 2007	13	9.5	4	8.3	10	10.1	9	9.5	3	4.4
23 Dec 2007 - 6 May 2011	6	4.4	4	8.3	8	8.1	20	21.1	30	44.1
1 Aug 2011 - present	5	3.6	3	6.3	11	11.1	27	28.4	32	47.1



Figure 4: Families that entered parliament between 1932-1945

the Thai Rak Thai Party. He is sitting in the current parliament as a party list MP. Yuranant explains:

> I always knew that I would enter politics. But my mother, who was a Miss Thailand, worked in the entertainment branch, so I wanted to try that first. It took a bit longer than I thought (Yuranunt Phamornmontri, informal conversation 15 June 2011).[61]

This shows that political families do not necessarily have an uninterrupted presence in the parliament and politics. They are able to return after periods of absence, due to the political capital that is installed in each generation. In Chapter 7, I will further explore how political capital is reproduced.

This first phase of the constitutional period was characterized by factional conflicts amongst members of the new ruling coalition. Four factions competed for power. Three of them were factions of the People's Party: the senior military faction led by Phot Phahonyothin (Phraya Phahon), the junior military faction led by Plaek Phibunsongkhram and the civilian faction led by Pridi Phanomyong. The fourth faction was made up of older conservative civilians who had been brought in to legitimize the new regime. Many of their members were part of the nobility under the leadership of Kon Hutasingha (Phraya Manopakorn Nitithada) who was prime minister from 1932 to 1933. These factions clashed in 1933 when Pridi proposed his ambitious economic plan in parliament. His plan included the nationalization of key resources, including large areas of farmland, as well as of parts of the industry. He also demanded the modernization and growth of the educational sector in order to prepare the youth for a democratic regime and allow a greater part of society an opportunity to enter the civil service. The plan was perceived as communist and met with great opposition. In particular the conservative faction, which had the most to lose if the plan was to be implemented, was alarmed. The debate escalated into a cabinet crisis. Plaek Phibunsongkhram used this opportunity to stage a coup that toppled the Kon Hutasingha government (Terwiel 2005: 263).

A new government under Phot Phahonyothin was installed, and the conservative faction was hence excluded from the cabinet, and its supporters were retired or posted to insignificant positions (Terwiel 2005: 264). The new government was put to the test in October 1933, when royalists arranged an armed revolt against the new government and the constitutional system. The revolt was led by Prince Bovoradej, a member of the royal family and a Minister of

[61] For Thai original see Appendix 1.3.

Defense under absolute monarchy. He marched into Bangkok with provincial troops loyal to the old system. They quickly captured Don Muang Airport at the outskirts of the capital and the northern suburbs. The rebellion sent an ultimatum to the government, threatening to enter Bangkok by force if the government did not resign. Meanwhile, the navy declared itself neutral and the troops stationed in Bangkok remained loyal to the government. Plaek Phibunsongkhram decisively commanded the defense of the capital. To implement his commands, Plaek Phibunsongkhram asked his former classmate, Phin Choonhavan, to head the operation in the field (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 63-64). They eventually forced the rebel troops to retreat. Prince Bovoradej left for exile in Indochina. The events of October 1933 resulted in a diminishing of the king's prestige. Shortly after, the king left for medical treatment in the United Kingdom and abdicated in March 1935. The young Prince Ananda Mahidol was chosen to be the new king. At the time of his installation, he was only 10 years old and in school in Switzerland (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 121, Terwiel 2005: 267).

With most members of the royalty retired or in exile and a boy-king on the throne, the People's Party had now monopolized the power of the state. Under Phot Phahonyothin as prime minister, the young military faction and the civilians worked together relatively harmoniously, until Plaek Phibunsongkhram became prime minister in December 1938. Thereafter, the military faction became dominating in politics and the cooperation with the civilian faction broke down. Plaek Phibunsongkhram had now risen to the rank of Field Marshal; therefore I shall from now on refer to him as Field Marshal P., which is in line with common practice in the Thai language. The regime under Field Marshal P. soon became nationalistic and even developed some fascist characteristics. The nationalist movement was actively supported by Field Marshal P.'s wife Laiad Phibunsongkhram (Laiad 1984). In the wake of this nationalistic turn, in 1939 the country's name was changed from Siam to Prathet Thai, or Thailand (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 132).

During the Second World War, Thailand joined the axis powers. In December 1941, Japan invaded the country. After initial resistance, the Japanese were allowed to pass through Thai territory in order to attack Burma and invade Malaya (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 135-137). Convinced that the Japanese would win the war, the Field Marshal P. government formed a military alliance with the Japanese. In return, Thailand was allowed to invade and annex the Shan States and Kayah State in northern Burma. These developments also benefited Field

Marshal P.'s friend, Phin, who became military governor of the Shan States (Phin 1970, 1973). Thailand also regained sovereignty over the sultanates of northern Malaya. In the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, these sultanates had previously been ceded to the British. In January 1942, Field Marshal P. declared war on Britain and the United States.

While the government of Field Marshal P. declared war, a resistance movement inside and outside Thailand emerged. The movement, commonly known as the Seri Thai, or Free Thai, movement opposed the Japanese occupation and had high ranking members from within the government and the opposition. The movement denounced the Field Marshal's regime as illegal and resisted it both abroad and in the country. In Washington the movement was under the leadership of M.R. Seni Pramoj, who was at that time the Thai Ambassador in the United States. He refused to deliver the declaration of war to the United States, which, thus, was not delivered to the State Department. In the United Kingdom the movement was supported by Queen Rambai Barni, who was the late King Prajadhipok's wife. Pridi Phanomyong led the resistance movement inside Thailand. Secretly, training camps and airfields were established in the Northeastern region of the country (Somyot 2004).

When, in 1944, the imminent defeat of the Japanese became undeniable; the government of Field Marshal P. became increasingly unpopular. In July of the same year, Field Marshal P. was ousted from government by members of the Seri Thai. Subsequently, Khuang Aphaiwong was appointed prime minister. In August 1945, Khuang resigned and made way for Seni Pramoj. Due to the ratification of a new party law under Seni Pramoj, political parties became legal, and democratic elections were held for the first time in January 1946. Pridi's People's Party won the most seats. A coalition was formed and Pridi became Siam's first democratically elected prime minister. In order to be admitted into the United Nations, to avoid paying reparations and to receive American aid, the Pridi government reestablished the Thai borders to their prewar status (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 140-144, Terwiel 2005: 279-281).

A Military Coup as a Family Affair: The Arrival of the Choonhavan Family

The end of the civilian government under Pridi was triggered by the death of the young King Ananda Mahidol. The king had returned to Thailand in December 1945. Only a few months later, in June 1946, he was found shot dead in his bed. The circumstances were mysterious and the case has still not been completely resolved today. Investigations were made and it was concluded that the king had committed suicide. However, the investigation and the resulting conclusion of the case have left many dissatisfied. The king was succeeded by his younger brother Bhumibol Adulyadej. In August, Pridi was forced to resign amid suspicion that he had been involved in the death of the king. With Pridi's departure, the civilian elements in the government had lost their leader and the military came back to the forefront. These circumstances led to a military coup in November 1947 (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 140-144, Terwiel 2005: 279-281).

The coup announced the arrival of the Choonhavans and Kittikachorns on the political stage. The coup was led by Lieutenant General Phin Choonhavan, who was a classmate and close associate of Field Marshal P. Amongst the members of the coup group were also Phao Sriyanond, Colonel Praman Adireksan, Colonel Kard Kardsongkhram, Colonel Sarit Thanarath, Colonel Thanom Kittikachorn, Lieutenant Colonel Praphat Jarusathien and Captain Chatchai Choonhavan. Phao Sriyanond was the son-in-law of Phin and former aid-de-camps of Field Marshal P. Colonel Praman Adireksan was also a son-in-law of Phin, and Captain Chatchai was Phin's son. The members of this coup group would become leading figures in Thai politics in the decades that were to come, as will be discussed below.

The coup was legitimized by rhetoric about the well-being of the Thai people. In a speech on 8 November 1947, Phin announced his reasons for the coup. He claimed that the people were suffering due to the inability of the government to reduce the cost of living and the shortage of goods. Further, they grieved over the lack of morals amongst the government. Thus, their removal of the government was just. To enforce the legitimacy of the coup, Khuang Aphaiwong, who was at that time the leader of the opposition, was invited to become prime minister. Phin stated that he wanted only a position in the military for a year in order to protect

himself (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]:34). The parliament was dissolved and the constitution was replaced. A general election followed in January 1948. The election confirmed the Democrat Party as majority and Khuang as prime minister. However, only a few months later in April, Khuang was forced to resign and Field Marshal P. became prime minister for the second time. Nearly a year after the coup, Phin, who was now a Field Marshal, became deputy prime minister and Minister of Agriculture (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 36-37)

Following the coup, the Choonhavans and related families, also known as the Ratchakru Group, became highly influential. Apart from Phin, his two sons-in-law Phao and Praman were most significant. Phao Sriyanond was one of the most important members of the Ratchakru Group during this period. Following the coup, Phao switched from the army to the police and became Assistant Director of the Police. This created a huge scandal. The Minister of Interior under the Khuang government refused Phao's entrance into the police. This was widely discussed in the newspapers. Eventually, Prime Minister Khuang himself appointed Phao Police Lieutenant General and Assistant Director of the Police. The Minister of Interior consequently resigned from his post. Phao became Director of the Police in 1951, following a failed coup attempt by a rivaling group (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 49-52). In his capacity as Director of Police he became known for his ruthless persecution of political opponents and extra-judicial killings performed by a group of followers commonly known as "knights" (อัศวิน) (Thak 2007 [1989]: 59-62). Many of his knights were recruited amongst Chatchai Choonhavan's classmates (Phut/พุฒ 1988: 45). Phao Sriyanond started out his political career as secretary to the prime minister, who by that time was Field Marshal P. After having, thus, received training as a politician, he was appointed MP. In 1951 he became a minister without portfolio, and was then made Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1952. In 1954, he was additionally appointed as Deputy Minister of Finance. Besides political positions, he also held positions within the bureaucracy, including the position of Director of the Royal Property Bureau. This position was later filled by Chaloem Chieowsakun, another of Field Marshal Phin's sons-in-law. Two of Phao's brothers were also politically active (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 49-52).

Praman Adireksan was born on 31 December 1913 in Saraburi. He was ordained as a novice and was educated at Thepsirin Temple School before he entered the military and attended the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. In 1951 he became Deputy Minister and was initially assigned to the Ministry of Transport. A year later, Praman changed to the Ministry

of Interior. In 1953, he switched ministries again; this time he became Minister of Industry. He left the government shortly after. In February 1957, he was elected Member of Parliament and was again appointed Minister of Industry (Naraniti/**นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]: 52-56).

The Ratchakru Group was quick to transform their newly gained political power into economic capital. While the Choonhavan family was in power, they founded and took over several companies, as shown in Table 9. Apart from banking and commercial enterprises, the majority of the companies associated with the Choonhavans and their relatives were in the agricultural sector. Therefore, Phin's position as Minister of Agriculture put him in a position to use his political influence and the connections in the industry gained through his positions to increase the success of these companies (Chai-Anan 1982: 14-22, Akira 1989: 135-150, Naraniti/ **นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]). While the engagement of politicians and military officials in the economy was nothing new in Thailand, it reached an unprecedented height (Akira 1989: 135-150, Chai-Anan 1982: 14-22). Riggs (1966: 255) has shown that between 1932 and 1957, 61 out of the 237 men who held ministerial posts were members of boards of 107 business and industrial cooperations. Members of the Ratchakru Group held no less than 91 board positions and were involved in 37 companies. This involvement of the military helped to transform the professional army into a political-economic interest group (Akira 1989: 135-150, Chai-Anan 1982: 14-22).

In particular, the National Economic Development Company founded in 1954 stands out as an example of the utilization of political influence to forward business interests. The company was founded with aid money borrowed from American and French aid funds. The credit was guaranteed by the Thai government. It is unlikely that the capital to found this company would have been available without the political positions of the family leaders (Naraniti/**นรนิติ** 2011 [1999]: 38-40). The National Economic Development Company is not only remarkable because it used aid money for its foundation but also because of the wide range of economic influence it exercised. It virtually monopolized sugar and paper mills. Investments in five other state enterprises were also made. Thus, the National Economic Development Company "served as an institutional instrument for the Phin group in dominating major state-sponsored companies" (Akira 1989: 148).

The Ratchakru Group established the Sriemnangsila Party (**พรรคเสรีมนังคศิลา**) on 29 September 1955 to legitimize their rule and to maintain the image of the state. The government was dominated by the Choonhavans and their in-laws. The political involvement of the *trakun*

was glossed over by the party membership and official political positions. Field Marshal P. was the party leader, while Field Marshal Phin was the deputy party leader. Other deputy party leaders were Sarit Thanarath and Praphat Jarusathien, who had also participated in the 1947 coup. Phao Sriyanond was the general secretary and one of the most influential members of the party. The political party, thus, lent the *trakun* the image of being democratic and acting in accordance with the standards required by an impersonal state. Other members of the Ratchakru Group joined the party and ran for elections in February 1957. In the 1957 election, the Sriemnangsila Party secured 83 of 160 seats (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 59-86). Before a new government could be installed, the military coup of 1957 occurred. This put an end to the political dominance of the Ratchakru Group. It would take fifteen years before the Choonhavans and their in-laws would return to the pinnacle of power.

Table 9: Companies owned or controlled by the Ratchakru Group (Source: Chai-Anan 1982: 16)

Banking and Finance Sector	Industrial Sector	Commercial Sector
1. Bangkok Bank Co. Ltd. (1944)	1. Thai Fisheries Co. Ltd. (1940)	1. Phituk Samakkee Co. Ltd. (1950)
2. Bank of Ayutthaya Ltd. (1949)	2. Thai Maritime Navigation Co. Ltd. (1940)	2. Thaharn Co-operation Wood Dealer Co. Ltd. (1951)
3. Thai Commercial Bank Ltd. (1906)	3. Thai Navigation Co. Ltd. (1940)	3. Sri Ayutthaya Trading Co. Ltd. (1953)
4. Thai Prasit Insurance and Warehouse Co. Ltd. (1947)	4. Thai Hong Co. Ltd. (1948)	4. Thaharn Co-operation Livestock Co. Ltd. (1953)
5. Asia Trust Co. Ltd. (1949)	5. Thai Jute Mill. Co. Ltd. (1951)	5. Export Thaharn Co-operation Co. Ltd. (1954)
6. Agriculture Bank. Co. Ltd. (1950)	6. Samakkee Constuction Co. Ltd. (1952)	6. Krungdhop Saha Korn Sura Co. Ltd. (1954)
7. The Ayutthaya Insurance Co. Ltd. (1950)	7. Thailand Fibre Corporation Co. Ltd. (1952)	7. Export Livestock Co. Ltd. (1954)
8. Wilson Insurance Co. Ltd. (1950)	8. North East Jute Mill Co. Ltd. (1953)	
9. The Ayutthaya Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (1951)	9. Thailand Sugar Corporation Co. Ltd. (1953)	
10. Oriental Life Assurance Ltd. (1951)	10. Thai Jute (1954)	
	11. National Economic Development Co. Ltd. (1954)	
	12. Thailand Jute Development Corporation Co. Ltd. (1954)	
	13. Chonburi Sugar Corporation Co. Ltd. (1956)	
	14. Thai Marble Corporation Co. Ltd. (1956)	
	15. Arphorn Bhanich Co. Ltd. (1954)	

The families of the Ratchakru Group were not the only families which established themselves in the period between 1951 and 1957. In this period, 48 families first appeared in parliament. This equals 7.2% of all political families. Of these 48 families, 22 came from a

military background, and three from a police background. Seven families had members who were part of the former nobility. One family was a *ratchasakun*. Five of the families had engaged in the military coup, as was discussed above. The political families established in this period are characterized by a decline in noble families and high number of families with military backgrounds.

Fifteen years after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, the nobility had declined considerably. This is illustrated by the lower number of families with noble background but also by the decreased rank of the noble families represented. In the period between 1932 and 1938, the nobility to be found in cabinet and parliament predominantly were holders of the higher official titles of *Chao Phraya*, *Phraya* and to a lesser extent *Phra*. The nobility represented between 1951 and 1957, however, predominantly came from lower rank. Of the 11 noble families represented in the parliament, six had the rank of *Luang* and two the rank of *Khun*.[62] There were also two *Phraya* and two *Phra*. Noble families that had not firmly established themselves as political families during the first few years after the change of governmental system were unlikely to do so anymore. The participation gradually declined. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, there was a gradual decline in holders of official titles and royally bestowed surnames in the parliament, senate and cabinet. This decline in holders of noble titles in the cabinet and parliament can be explained by the fact that the bestowal of official titles was discontinued after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy. Therefore, individuals with official titles by now were in their seventies or older and, thus, not necessarily capable of holding political office anymore. The decline of nobility in the cabinet and parliament is also illustrated in the decline in holders of royally bestowed surnames. Royally bestowed surnames were in most cases given to people close to the royal family, and, thus, in many cases to nobility. Figure 3 shows that the percentage of holders of royally bestowed surnames decreased significantly between 1932 and 1946. After 1951, holders of royally bestowed surnames in the cabinet and parliament experienced a revival. A similar revival can be observed for the periods after 1976, 1992 and 2006; each time when the king directly or indirectly intervened in Thai politics, the number of holders of royally bestowed surnames increased significantly. There seems to be a relationship between these families and the royal family until today. This is an phenomenon that deserves in-depth study. Such a study is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis

[62] Not all holders of the *Khun* title are part of the nobility, as mentioned above.



Figure 5: Holders of military rank in the cabinet, parliameent and senate (in %)

The high percentage of military officers amongst the political families during this phase of the Thai parliament represents a general trend. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The military has now replaced the nobility as the ruling elite of the country. This led Riggs (1966: 311-367) to argue that Thailand is a bureaucratic polity, in which all political activity and decision making power lies with bureaucrats, in particular the military. The representation of the military in the cabinet and parliament was highest between 1949 and 1973 and again between 1976 and 1979. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of the political families established during 1951 to 1957 had a military background. The same pattern can be observed for political families who established themselves between 1959 and 1973.

In a pattern similar to the families established during the 1930s, few families established between 1951 and 1957 are represented until today. As is shown in Table 7, of the 48 families that engaged in politics between 1951 and 1957 only ten were still active in 1979. Their number further decreased to three in 2011. This downturn is analogous to the decrease in members of the military within the parliament and cabinet have experienced.

The Rise and Fall of the Kittikachorn Family

The military power of the members of the Ratchakru Group drastically declined after 1955. Field Marshal Phin, who had until then been the commander of the army, relinquished his position due to increasing age and also in order to concentrate on his business affairs. Though he had asked Field Marshal P. to take over in his place, the position was given to Sarit Thanarath (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 135). Sarit Thanarath was a young military officer who had participated in the 1947 coup but had no marriage ties with the rest of the coup group. Indeed, he might even have developed negative feelings against the Ratchakru Group, due to his rivalry with Phao.[63] By 1955, Chatchai Choonhavan was the only member of the Ratchakru Group who had command over troops. Thus, the Ratchakru Group had lost most of its military power to Sarit and his followers, who were known as the Si Sao Thewet Group (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]).

In September 1957, a new military coup ended the rule of the Ratchakru Group. Unsatisfied with his position in the regime, Sarit staged a coup. Field Marshal P. was

[63] The origin of this sometimes fierce rivalry is not entirely clear. One of my informants, as assistant of Field Marshal P., however, has related to me that the rivalry of the two might go back to their time in the military academy. Sarit and Phao attended the military academy at the same time. Originally, they were in the same class. However, when Phao failed his exam, he had to repeat a year while his classmate advanced. This might have let to unfriendly feelings between the men.

called on the morning of the coup by a woman warning him of the upcoming events. Field Marshal P.'s assistant suggests that this woman could have been Sarit's wife (Tawin Satwinyawibun, interview 8 August 2011). Thus, prepared, Field Marshal P. mounted a jeep and left for Cambodia. This ended his political career, and he died as an exile in Japan in 1963. The Ratchakru Group had to adapt to the new circumstances. Phin retired from politics. Phao went into exile in Switzerland where he died in 1960. Chatchai was sent into *de facto* exile as ambassador to Argentina and later Switzerland. Praman temporarily retired from politics and focused on business. He was the first of the group to revitalize his political career a few years later (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]). When Sarit had to receive medical treatment abroad, Thanom Kittikachorn became prime minister until 1958. Then Sarit returned to Thailand and became prime minister. When Sarit died in 1963, Thanom again took the top position (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 152).

Among the new holders of power, families remained an important feature of politics. The most prominent figures engaged in kinship politics during this period were Thanom Kittikachorn, his son Narong, and Praphat Jarusathien. Thanom and his deputy Praphat reinforced their alliance by the marriage of their children. In 1957, Thanom's son Narong married Praphat's daughter, Supaporn. Thus, in the same year in which they ascended to the top of Thai politics, Thanom and Praphat became in-laws. I will now shortly outline the role of each of them.

Thanom Kittikachorn was born on 11 August 1911 in Tak Province. His father held a *Khun* title. Not much is known about Thanom's early life. After having gained primary education, he entered the military academy. He was one of the first leaders of the Thai government who never studied abroad. In 1947, he was part of the coup group under Field Marshal Phin's leadership. After the coup, his military career gradually advanced. His political engagement also started after the coup. He became an appointed MP in 1951. In 1953, he became commander of the 1st Army Region which is located in Bangkok and, thus, carries high strategic importance. He gained his first cabinet post in 1955, when he became Deputy Minister of Cooperative. In 1957 he took part in the military coup under the leadership of Sarit and subsequently became prime minister, Minister of Defense and Army Commander in Chief. By that time he had risen to the rank of general. After Sarit's return to Thailand, Thanom was appointed deputy prime minister, Minister of Defense, and Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander. Thanom was appointed prime minister again in 1963, after Sarit had passed away. Subsequently he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the

Army. In 1964, he rose to the rank of Field Marshal. He remained in the position of prime minister until 1973 (Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007).[64]

Praphat Jarusathien rose to the top of Thai politics at the same time as Thanom. Born in 1912, he chose to enter the military academy. Like Thanom, he did not study abroad. He became Sarit's protégé and, as a member of the 1947 coup group, he quickly advanced in the military ranks. After the 1957 coup, he was appointed Minister of the Interior, a position in which he served until 1973. After Sarit's death in 1963, Praphat additionally became deputy prime minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. During this time, Praphat was the strong man in the background who pulled the strings in the Thanom government. He was known for obscure financial transactions and political intrigues (Leifer 1995: 271).

Narong Kittikachorn, the oldest son of Thanom, chose a military career like his father. Unlike his father though, he graduated from a military academy abroad, in the United Kingdom. He took part in the military coup of 1971, which Thanom staged against his own government in order to abandon the constitution. He was seen as the successor to his father's possition. The circumstances of his marriage to Supaporn Jarusathien, Praphat's daughter, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

Between 1957 and 1973, the close connection between politics, military and economics remained intact. Just as the Ratchakru Group did before, the leading politicians and military figures during this period remained engaged in business. It was partly due to business interests that the Ratchakru Group and Si Sao Thewet Group broke with each other. Sarit, Thanom and Praphat controlled a number of businesses, as is shown in Table 10. After the death of Sarit, Praphat became the leader in the group's business ventures. He sat on the boards of 44 companies. His wife sat on another 19 company boards. Narong Kittikachorn also sat on 41 boards. The regime became known for excessive corruption.[65] The amount of corruption and the handling of corruption claims contributed to the eventual demise of the regime (Chai-Anan 1982: 18-19).

The military rule from the end of the 1950s onwards propagated a development policy under which every democratization attempt was dismissed on behalf of

[64] Thanom reappointed himself prime minister in February 1969 after general elections had been completed. Then, in November 1971, he staged a coup against his own government, citing the need to suppress communist infiltration. He dissolved Parliament and appointed himself Chairman of the National Executive Council, and served as a caretaker government for one year. He appointed himself prime minister a fourth time in December 1972, while also serving as Defense and Foreign Ministers.

[65] Corruption is not necessarily limited to the receiving of bribes but also includes the utilization of government funds for investment and for personal enrichment.

national security and economic growth. The latter goal were achieved as Thailand witnessed a two-digit economic growth rate for several years. Together with the economic development came an increase in the educational sector which had a lasting impact on politics. The primary, secondary and tertiary education increased significantly, from the end of the 1950s. From 1961 to 1972, the number of university students rose from only 18,000 to 100,000 and thus reached a number which could no longer be absorbed by the bureaucracy (Darling 1974: 6-7). Extended education opportunities resulted in the slow development of an urban middle class. The members of this middle class were partly extracted from second and third generation Chinese and from young people from the provinces who used education to achieve social mobility. Consequently, this group was more aware of the rural/urban gap that started to widen as a result of economic growth and other social changes (Darling 1974: 10). This resulted in their opposition to the authoritarian government which left no freedom for political participation.

In an attempt to legitimize their rule, the military leaders under Thanom installed a new constitution in 1968 and called for elections. This coincided with a rising polarization of the student movement that articulated its dissatisfaction with the government's handling of social and economic problems. In 1971, realizing its diminished power, the government staged a coup against itself and reinstalled a military leadership without a constitution and banned political parties, unions and other political groupings. The student movement was, however, not affected by this ban. Initially, the protest was focused on nationalistic themes, such as opposing Japanese imperialism. Due to this nationalistic color of the protest, the student movement gained great public support. The protests grew stronger when on 6 October 1973, ten students and activists were arrested for having circulated a petition for a new constitution. Large demonstrations followed, demanding initially the release of the arrested, and later the drafting of a new constitution. The crowd grew to include several hundred thousand demonstrators (Keyes 1987: 156, Bartak 1993: 15). With the increasing number of demonstrators and length of the protest, communication within the leading group became more complicated, so that important information failed to reach them and the masses became uncontrollable. On the morning of 14 October 1973, violence broke out, and after two days of chaos in the city of Bangkok the Thanom-Praphat regime found a surprising end, when the king asked them to leave the country (Bartak 1993: 21).

Table 10: Companies owned or controlled by the Si Sao Thewet Group (Source: Chai-Anan 1982: 17)

Banking and Finance Sector	Industrial Sector	Commercial Sector
1. Bank of Asia for International Commerce (1939) 2. Provincial Bank (1941) 3. Thai Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (1942) 4. Thai Framers Bank (1945) 5. Menam Warehouse Insurance Co. Ltd. (1948) 6. Loem Thong Bank Ltd. (1948) 7. Thai Domu Bank (1948) 8. Capital Insurance Company of Thailand Ltd. (1949) 9. Union Bank of Bangkok Ltd. (1949) 10. Dhipaya Insurance Co. Ltd. (1951) 11. Thai Military Bank (1957) **12.** Thai Saving Trust Co. Ltd. (1957)	1. Thai Hong Co. Ltd. (1948) 2. Vichitra Construction Co. Ltd. (1950) 3. Rajata Sila Co. Ltd. (1951) 4. Bangkok Shipping and Trading Co. Ltd. (1951) 5. Thai Shale and Oil Co. Ltd. (1953) 6. Seansuratana Co. Ltd. (1953) 7. Dhana Publishing Co. Ltd. (1953) 8. Jalaprathan Cement Co. Ltd. (1954) 9. United River Transport Co. Ltd. (1954) 10. Livestock Trading Co-operation Co. (1955) 11. Thai Line Co-operation Ltd. (1956) 12. Eastern Mining Development Co. Ltd. (1956) 13. Thailand Steel Co. Ltd. (1956) 14. Loha Pas Pomich Co. Ltd. (1960) 15. Bangkok Thai Silk Co. Ltd. (1960)	1. Menam Warehouse Co. Ltd. (1946) 2. Chamru Ltd. (1946) 3. Eastern International Development Corporation Ltd. (1949) 4. U-Thong Thai Co. Ltd. (1949) 5. Taharn Ayutthaya Co. Ltd. (1951) 6. Bha Duong Sin Phamich Co. Ltd. (1951) 7. Thanya Thai Co. Ltd. (1952) 8. Bangkok International Trading Co. Ltd. (1952) 9. Union Trading Corporation Ltd. (1956) 10. Trade Union Co-operation Ltd. (1957)

The Return of the Choonhavans

The October 14th incident was followed by a short three year period in which the democratic nature of the government allowed for a wide range of political activities but also for political polarization. Elections in 1975 and 1976 failed to produce a stable majority in parliament, causing the government to change frequently. The two brothers Seni and Kukrit Pramoj alternated as prime minister. Rising oil prices led to inflation and weakened the government. The Communist Party of Thailand gradually became more active in the countryside. The student movement had become increasingly left, but not outright communist. By 1976, a large part of the moderate middle class had distanced themselves from the students. Simultaneously, right wing organizations often associated with the army, like the Village Scouts and the Red Gaurs, disseminated propaganda against student liberalism by accusing student activists of being antiroyalists and communists (Keyes 1987: 99).

After the October 14th incidents, a number of families entered politics for the first time; these families had a very different background from those in the previous periods. From 1973 to 1976, 95 families entered politics for the first time. Amongst them are the family of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the Lamsams, who are a renowned business *trakun*. Of the 95 families that made their first appearance during this phase, only one had a noble background, six had a military background and another two had a police background. The remaining 86 families are from unknown backgrounds, possibly business, academia and bureaucracy.

The October 14th incident also made it possible for the Ratchakru Group to return to the political stage. Chatchai Choonhavan, who had spent 16 years abroad, returned to Thailand. Together with his brother-in-law, Praman, he founded the Chat Thai Party on 21 November 1974. Praman was the party leader, while Chatchai became secretary general. The party had considerable success and won the second largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections in 1975 and 1976. Consequently the party joined the governmental coalition. Praman was appointed as deputy prime minister and Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Chatchai became Minister of Industry. The party was given six other portfolios. During his time as Minister of Industry, Chatchai brought his nephew, Korn Thapparansi, into politics. He was appointed Secretary to the Minister of Industry (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 143).

When in late 1976, Thanom returned to Thailand to enter a monastery, the tension took a violent turn. Opposing Thanom's return and the killing of activists, students occupied Thammasat University campus. As part of their protest, they staged a mock hanging. Photography of the mock hanging was published in Thai newspapers the following day. In the picture, which was likely manipulated, the hanged person bore a resemblance to the crown prince. Thus, the students were seen as hostile to the monarchy and the nation. On 6 October 1976, paramilitary organizations applied violent means to suppress the students, leading to one of the cruelest massacres Thailand has seen. Dozens of students were killed, several hundred were arrested and subsequently several thousand students and other activists fled into the jungle and joined the communist movement (Wyatt 2003 (1983): 287-292).[66]

The October 6th incident remains a sensitive topic today. The question of guilt and responsibility has never been answered (Thongchai 2002). It is possible that the Ratchakru Group had some involvement in the incident. Praman Adireksan and his wife,

[66] Most of the students were released within days after the massacre. However, 18 students, later known as the Bangkok 18, remained in jail for two years.

Jeroen, were strong supporters of the Village Scout movement, which was instrumental in the massacre. Further, M.R. Seni Pramoj later suggested that Praman could have been involved in the incident and the coup that followed. However, no evidence for Praman's involvement is available (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 144-145).

The incident led to the return of the military. After the massacres, the military staged a coup. Thanin Kraivichien, an ultra-conservative former judge, was installed as prime minister. Only a year later, in October 1977, as Thanin's policies turned out to be more rightist than the military liked, he was ousted by a military coup. General Kriangsak Chamanan became the new prime minister. Kriangsak stepped down in February 1980. He was succeeded by the army commander-in-chief, General Prem Tinsulanonda. Prem had been chosen for this position partly because he was unmarried, which presumably made him less prone to corruption (Chai-Anan 1982: 34, 37). The Chat Thai Party became part of the government coalition.

In the parliamentary election of April 1983 the Chat Thai Party won more seats in parliament than any other party. Praman, thus, tried to set up a government. The remaining parties, however, supported Prem. Prem was elected prime minister with 317 votes. This gave Prem not only the majority in parliament but also the appearance of a democratically elected prime minister. McCargo (2005) states that Prem's success was only possible with the support of the palace. It is during this time that the rift between Praman and Chatchai over the position of party leader first became apparent. Thus, the Chat Thai party missed out on becoming part of the government (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]). It was not until 1986 after the next general elections that the Chat Thai Party got the opportunity to join the government coalition. Chatchai, by now party leader, became deputy prime minster. Finally, in 1988, Prem dissolved the parliament and announced his retirement from politics. The Chat Thai Party emerged successful in the subsequent elections and Chatchai Choonhavan became prime minister.

By the time Chatchai became prime minister, Thai politics had changed tremendously. The military and bureaucrats had been gradually pushed out of politics and now only made up a minority in parliament and cabinet. They had been replaced by business people from the capital as well as from the provinces. The most renowned of these provincial business people is Banharn Silpa-archa, who joined the Chat Thai Party two years after its foundation and was prime minister in 1995 to 1996. Provincial business people like him utilize their local influence to secure seats in parliaments and became patrons, supporting the

voters by making contributions for funeral costs or supporting local development projects. It is this group of people who established the political families that entered parliament from 1979 to 1988. Of the 68 families that first appeared in parliament during this time, only three had a background in the military and three in the police. It is also noteworthy that a large portion of the families established during this period are still represented in parliament today.

One of the families that entered politics between 1979 and 1988 were the Techaphaybuns. The Techaphaybuns had made their fortune in various businesses. Their entrance into politics is explained by Pornthep Techaphaybun:

> In the past we used to work together with politicians, but they sometimes cheated us. So my father decided that my generation had to enter politics; in this way we could not be cheated. He said: I will make the money; you go into politics. (Informal conversation 22 June 2011).[67]

It seems plausible that other business owners came to a similar conclusion and delegated family members into politics.

The cabinet under Chatchai reflected that change. Ministerial posts were filled by elected MPs instead of military officers and bureaucrats. The making of policies was also taken out of their hands and given to a think tank, called Ban Phitsanulok. The think-tank was headed by Chatchai's son, Kraisak Choonhavan, an academic and activist. The other members of the Ban Phitsanulok were also academics (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 240-243, Politicalbase 2012). This gave elected politicians more power over the budget than they had had in any earlier period of Thai history, and the military budget was decreased. The power over the budget, however, also made corruption easier. The military used increased charges of corruption as an excuse to stage a military coup. On 23 February 1991, Chatchai was ousted out of power and the military returned (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 243).

The coup group tried to maintain the image of rightful intervention to preserve democracy. They appointed a civilian prime minister, Anand Panyarachun. The new prime minister acted swiftly to tackle corruption and also implemented several other reforms. Amongst the 13 politicians found to be "unusually wealthy" were two members of the Ratchakru Group: Chatchai and Praman. Korn Thapparansi was cleared of all charges (Murray 1996: 61). Their assets, along with those of their wives, were frozen. The coup group also founded a political party to advance their political ambitions in electoral politics. However, they could not disguise their desire for personal enrichment. They tried to increase the military budget and to use the situation to their personal benefit, much in the same way as

[67] For Thai original see Appendix 1.4.

the ‘unusually wealthy’ had done before the coup. This aroused criticism among the media and the urban middle class (Murray 1996: 9). This criticism increased further when the new constitution permitted a non-elected individual to become prime minister. In 1992, elections were held and won by the Samakhitham Party of the coup group. The winning coalition appointed coup leader Suchinda Kraprayoon prime minister. By accepting this position, Suchinda had broken his promise not to become prime minister. This confirmed the fears of the urban middle class that the new government was going to be a military regime in disguise. Hundreds of thousands of people joined one of the largest demonstrations ever seen in Bangkok. An attempt to control the demonstrations by force brought chaos over the cities. The army shot into the crowds of demonstrators; buildings and busses were set on fire. During the three days of chaos, over 50 protestors died (McCargo 1997: 260).[68] Finally, the king intervened and summoned Suchinda and the representative of the protestors into the palace. In an audience which was televised to the country, the king urged the two sides to find a peaceful solution. The king re-appointed royalist Anand as interim prime minister until elections could be held in September 1992.

The crisis of 1992 was followed by a period of reform. Governments changed frequently in an electoral fashion. At the core of the process was the drafting of a new constitution. This constitution stipulated the creation of independent bodies to control elections and to curb corruption. After a long process, the new constitution was ratified in 1997. An independent television station was also founded. On the other hand, politicians who had been accused of corruption by the coup group in 1992 returned to the political stage. Chatchai participated in election in 1992, even before his assets had been returned to him. In 1993, the court finally decided that the seizure of assets had been unconstitutional (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]: 186). This finally secured the return of the Ratchakru Group to politics. Now they no longer remained united in one political party and appeared to have ceased their cooperation. After their split-up, none of the members of the Ratchakru Group could regain political influence close to the group’s former glories.

In 1997, Thailand was hit by the Asian financial crisis. This crisis changed Thai economics and resulted in a restructuring of business ownership. Many local businesses went bankrupt and were taken over by foreign investors. This led to widespread social distress. Consequently, the public demanded fundamental changes in the political system which had led to the crisis. The newly founded Thai Rak Thai Party, with Thaksin as its

[68] McCargo (1997: 260) reported that the officially confirmed number of deaths was over 50. However, rumors have it that the actual death toll exceeded one thousand.

leader, promised to deliver these changes. Thaksin campaigned with the slogan: "Think new, do new".[69] He promised to curb corruption, organized crime and drugs and most importantly, to bring economic prosperity back to the country. This he tried to achieve with his businesslike approach to governance. These promises appealed to a wide electorate. In January 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party won an unprecedented 49.6% or 248 seats in parliament (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 89).

Thaksin had made a fortune in business ventures before entering politics. While his family had gained their status with silk trading, Thaksin also independently engaged in business. His first ventures were in real estate and in leasing computers to the police. These ventures were not profitable. His success as a business man started with the establishment of a company called Advance Info Service in 1989. This was the first mobile phone provider in Thailand. It operated under a monopoly, which resulted into rapid growth. The wealth gained through his business ventures made his entrance into politics possible. Again, his political engagement enabled his company to grow steadily, as it was dependent on government contracts.

Thaksin's populist politics secured him the support of voters. He implemented policies like the 30-*baht* healthcare program and the Village Fund. While these programs were plagued with problems, they were highly popular and distinguished him from his predecessors (Hewison 2010). These policies gained him the support of the rural poor, especially in the populous Northeast. This secured him reelection in 2005, making him the first democratically elected prime minister to serve a full term.

Thaksin used his political influence to increase the profits of his business corporations. According to the 1997 constitution, a politician was not allowed to hold shares in companies. To avoid this clause, he had transferred his shares in Shin Corp, a leading communication company in Thailand, to employees and later to his children. This jeopardized his prime ministership and could have had him banned from politics for 5 years were he to be found guilty. However, the constitutional court, in a highly criticized decision, cleared him of the charges, possibly under the influence of the monarchy (McCargo 2005). Once confirmed as prime minister, he managed to use his position to increase the profit of his family's businesses. He did this by passing laws and policies that would, in a competition, favor his companies over others to triple the values of his investments (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 197-224).

[69] For Thai original see Appendix 1.5.

Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party was reelected with a landslide victory in January 2005. Though loved and admired by many, Thaksin had also been the target of severe criticism since assuming power. Amongst the issues he was criticized for were an alleged conflict of interest due to his family's holdings in Shin Corporation, his populist policies, the war against drugs and his handling of the insurgency in the Deep South. In 2005, one of Thaksin's supporters, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media magnate, became more and more critical of Thaksin and used his media platform to disseminate this criticism. When, in late 2005, Sondhi's channel was temporarily ordered to stop broadcasting due to a contract dispute, he and his followers continued their protest first in Lumpini Park and later on the street (Pasuk and Baker 2009).

The protest grew in strength in January 2006. Only days after the Thai Telecommunication Act was passed, Thaksin's family sold all stakes in Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings, the investment arm of the Singaporean government, with tax liability exemption.[70] Following the sale of Shin Corporation, Thaksin was labeled a traitor to the nation, who sold a national asset to a foreign government agency. Consequently, he faced growing pressure to resign. On 14 January 2006, the yellow shirts stormed into Government House at half past midnight, overwhelming security forces and occupied the building for twenty minutes before continuing their protest outside (Pasuk and Baker 2009).

In February 2006, Thaksin dissolved parliament and called a general legislative election for the House of Representatives in April 2006. Led by the Democrat Party, most major opposition parties boycotted the election. The election was later invalidated due to wrong positioning of voting booths. New elections were scheduled for 15 October 2006. This time, the opposition announced it was contesting the election, and numerous newly founded parties actively campaigned. The election never took place, because on 19 September 2006 a military coup ousted the Thaksin government, when Thaksin was in New York to attend a United Nations summit (Pasuk and Baker 2009).

The coup was followed by the nullification of the constitution and legal proceedings against all major political parties for accusation of election fraud, resulting in the dissolution of five parties and the banning of 263 politicians from politics for 5 years. New parties were founded immediately. Banned politicians in many cases recruited their spouses or other relatives to replace them in parliament and even in the cabinet. As illustrated in Table 8, a significantly high number of second members of a political family have entered

[70] The company was sold for 73 billion THB (about US$1.88 billion). Thaksin's family was exempted from tax, due to a regulation that individuals are not liable for capital gain tax when shares are sold on the stock exchange.

parliament since 2005. This shows that the trend of recruiting relatives into parliament had started before the dissolution and political bans made it considered necessary. While the dissolution of parties has certainly contributed to the number of second members to enter parliament, it is not the only factor. Many of the families who have recruited a second member into parliament since 2005 were first established in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Therefore, the first member of these families had now engaged in politics for several decades. They have gained experience and political capital but they have also grown older. The thought of retirement will have crossed their minds, and it just seemed a natural time to pass the political position on to the next generation.

After the drafting and ratification of a new constitution, elections were held in December 2007. The election was won by the People's Power Party, the reincarnation of the Thai Rak Thai Party. A coalition government under Samak Sundaravej and the People's Power Party was created. The new government announced plans to amend the 2007 constitution shortly after the election. This caused the yellow shirts to resume protests. When the amendment plan was suspended, protesters demanded the resignation of Samak Sundaravej, whom they perceived as Thaksin's nominee. The tension escalated when the Government House was seized for several weeks (Pasuk and Baker 2009).

Samak was forced to resign in September 2008 after the Constitutional Court found him guilty of being hired and paid by a cooking television program after he became prime minister. He was replaced by Somchai Wongsawat, brother-in-law of Thaksin. This change prompted a continuation of yellow-shirt protests, leading to violent clashes between the police and protesters on 7 October 2008. As a result, the protest relocated and seized Don Muang Airport and Suvarnabhumi Airport. The siege ended in December 2008 due to the verdict of the Constitutional Court, which dissolved the People's Power Party and banned its executive board from political office after finding it guilty of election fraud. Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat and the executive members of the dissolved People's Power Party were banned from politics (Pasuk and Baker 2009).

Consequently, former coalition parties changed fronts and joined a new coalition government under the Democrat Party, with Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister.[71] This led to protests from the newly formed Pheu Thai Party and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the red shirts. They opposed Abhisit's rise to power and dubbed it undemocratic. In April 2009, the protests escalated. The red shirts

[71] The installation of Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister allegedly happened with considerable involvement of the army.

took the Government House under siege and blocked main roads around the Victory monument, which can be understood as the heart of Bangkok's traffic. Busses were set on fire and property was destroyed. Simultaneously, the red shirts also protested in Pattaya, a beach-town 150 km southeast of Bangkok. The town was host to the ASEAN Summit. When protesters stormed the hotel, the ASEAN leaders of state were evacuated by helicopter. The prime minister left the site by car and was attacked by protesters. He barely escaped. Consequently, a state of emergency was declared (Pasuk und Baker 2009: 348-350). This did not, however, lead to an end to the protests. Protests reoccurred on several occasions.

In early 2010, a series of events occurred in which the situation escalated. On 26 February, assets worth 46 billion Thai *baht* were seized from former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This led to heightened tension. In April a violent confrontation between the red shirts and government forces led to several casualties. The demonstration, consequently, relocated to the Ratchaprason intersection in the heart of Bangkok's business district. The intersection was closed, which greatly affected local businesses. On 3 May 2010, Abhisit announced that he would hold elections on 14 November in exchange for a termination of protests. The offer was initially accepted but eventually turned down. On 14 May, the government started an operation to remove the protesters from the occupied parts of Bangkok. The confrontation between protesters and government resulted in several days of chaos and left over 90 dead and many more injured.[72] The red-shirt leaders all either surrendered or tried to escape. Riots raged across Bangkok as red shirts were forced to leave their position. Arson attacks caused major damage. No major clashes have happened since May 2010, but the conflict is all but over and tensions remain high. This was especially true during the 2011 electoral campaign. The 2011 election was won by Thaksin's younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra. She has now started a process to pass the so-called 'Reconciliation Act', which would bring her brother back into the country and possibly into formal power.

Political *Trakun* in Thailand's Political History

This chapter has shown that political *trakun* have always been an integral part of Thailand's politics and, thus, have formed history. The percentage of members of the cabinet, parliament and senate that were from political *trakun* is consistently high. It varies between 18-68%.

[72] Reports about a third party involved in the conflict were widespread. They are called the men in black or black shirts. It is not certain who they are. The government argued the black shirts were employed by the red shirts to kill protesters. The red shirts, on the other hand, claim the black shirts were from the military and, thus, belonged to the government.

Even the lowest percentage, however, is to be considered high when considering that only 748 political families and *trakun* were active from 1932 until today, which represent only a minuscule fraction of the entire Thai population. The backgrounds of political families and *trakun* reflected the time of their entry into politics. Under the absolute monarchy, political *trakun* in form of the royal and noble family controlled the country, as has already been studied by scholars like Wyatt (1968), Vickery (1970) and Cushmann (1991). After the change of governmental system in 1932, the influence of the noble families remained intact. 44.5% of all political *trakun* that were established between 1932 and 1945 belonged to the nobility. The noble families were also joined by families that had a background in the military. By the 1950s noble families had taken a backseat and were replaced by families with a background in the military. From 1951 to 1957, 45.8% of the families first entering politics came from the military. This percentage was, with 43.4%, slightly lower between 1959 to 1973. From 1973 onwards, political families seldom came from noble or military backgrounds. A new group of people began to form political *trakun*; these were, amongst others, business *trakun* who were tired of an unsatisfactory alliance with politicians.

The *trakun* which are used as case studies in this thesis each represent a different phase in historical developments. The Choonhavans have their background in the military and rose to power together with Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram. They used their military power to venture into politics and later extend their business interests. As a *trakun* they were very successful in overcoming setbacks and adapting to changing political circumstances. The Kittikachorns likewise had their roots in the military and rose to power together with the Choonhavans but were more closely allied with Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath. They only prospered under the rule of the military and were unsuccessful in adapting to new political circumstances. The Shinawatras were a business *trakun* in the provinces and ventured into politics after the country had undergone a process of democratic opening, which gave people from different backgrounds the opportunity to enter politics. The same applies to the Techaphaybuns, who entered politics in the 1980s because they were looking for an alternative to relying on alliances with politicians to politically support their businesses. The success and failure of political *trakun* to adapt to political changes in many respects depended on the way they managed their family affairs, such as marriages, the raising of children, election campaigns and funerals. These will the topics of the following three chapters.

Chapter 6

Marriage: Forming Alliances

Marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman that is socially recognized and has the purpose to create legitimate offspring, often connected with the establishment of a nuclear family and a new household (Barfield 1999 [1998]: 304). It is a widespread if not ubiquitous feature of kinship and social organization, which in general is explained by competing theories, namely the descent theory and the alliance theory. The descent theory conceives the shared descent or lineage solidarity as the elemental fact of kinship. Spearheaded by Evans-Pritchard's (1940) study of the Nuer, the theory argues that groups with a shared unilateral ancestry, factual or fictive, acted cohesively and could be politically or otherwise mobilized. In the case of the Nuer, this had great impact on their political organization, in particular in times of conflict. In general, the kinship unit often becomes a corporate group with collective rights on its members and their properties.

The alliance theory, formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]), considers marriage as a method of fostering alliances between people and their affines in order to create relations of support. The theory is based on the incest taboo, which creates a distinction between marriageable and tabooed women. Depending on the society, such rules could be negative, as in the taboo to marry members of one's own nuclear family, or positive, as in strong preferences to marry a person from a particular group. Whether expressed in positive or negative rules, the incest taboo made it necessary for an individual to look for a partner outside one's own kin group. This results in the exchange of women, either directly or in the following generation. The exchange of women creates a debtor/creditor relationship between the wife taker and the wife giver. Such relationships can be used strategically to achieve political goals.

In this chapter I will discuss the marriage patterns of political *trakun*, whereby the forging of alliances through marriages is integral. Marriages can ensure the continuance and advancement of a political *trakun*. Political *trakun* have used marriages to (1) create alliances that facilitate the ambitions of a family, (2) increase their economic and symbolic capital, (3) prevent conflict between influential politicians and (4) secure talented successors. I will argue that political *trakun* do not only rely on a single marriage in a monogamous fashion to achieve these goals. A sketch of the historical development of the institution of

marriage in Thailand will make clear that the polygamous marriage of the past has lost its legal endorsement but is still a vital part in the attempt of political *trakun* to create alliances and increase capital. The main focus of the chapter lies, however, on the official marriages of political *trakun*. The official marriages of political *trakun* are particularly important, as these are the marriages that are known to the public and, thus, define the *trakun* and who is a member of the descent group. I will discuss the marriages of first, second and third generation members of political *trakun*. This is not chronological, as the first generation of one *trakun*, for example the Choonhavan, married several decades before the first generation of another *trakun*, the Suwanchawees. This will show that marriage patterns change from generation to generation, in regard to the generational depth of the political *trakun* and not to overall social changes over time. In addition to marriage, I will also discuss adoption as a strategy for building alliances and creating kinship. It will be shown that adoption can be seen as an alternative to marriages as it functions to build alliances.

Marriage should not only be seen as a means of creating alliances; it can also be utilized to increase intergroup stability and to maintain capital in the same family. Marriages of political *trakun* are not always exogamous. Some political *trakun* have chosen to intermarry with families to which they already had existing affinal ties. When families that are already affined intermarry, they are usually already well acquainted with each other. This limits the risk of making an unfavorable match. It also increases the trust within the group. Thus, endogamous marriages ensure intergroup cooperation and stability. Such marriages also allow the capital of both families to remain in the same group instead of making it available for outsiders (Stone: 1997: 202).

A discussion on weddings and how they are used to create symbolic capital will conclude the chapter. Weddings in themselves showcase much of the status and economic capital of the parties involved, the showcasing of which helps to portray this status in society and, thus, further manifests it. In addition, weddings offer the opportunity to create new connections and reinforce existing ones through socialization.

Polygamous Marriages, Social Capital and Class

The Three Seals law, which was in use in Thailand until 1935, defined three types of wife: 1) the *mia klang mueng* (เมียกลางเมือง) or major wife, (2) the *mia klang nok* (เมียกลางนอก) or

minor wife and (3) the *mia klang that* (เมียกลางทาสี) or slave wife. The major wife was arranged by the groom's parents and involved the payment of an engagement gift, a bride price and a wedding ceremony. Minor wives were married with a lower bride price and less elaborate. It is a marriage arranged by the groom. The salve wife is a wife who was a slave before the marriage (Koizumi 2000: 156, Loos 2006: 135-139). Apart from these official marriages, cohabitation, an ongoing sexual relationship and elopements were also legally recognized as marriages. Thus, in cases where the permission of the parents was not given or the groom could not afford the bride price, couples could elope. Sumalee (1995: 43) states that such elopements were quite common for couples in the lower classes at the beginning of the 20th century. However, the parents of the bride had to acknowledge the marriage after the elopement or the sexual intercourse. If the parents did not give their permission or the parents of the bride had already died, only the birth of a child could legalize the marriage (Sumalee 1995: 43).

Marriage and parental authority in mate choice were dependent on class. Commoners practiced serial monogamous marriages following any of the above mentioned patterns, including cohabitation and elopement. It can be speculated how much freedom of choice by the couple was involved. In 1865, King Mongkut in an amendment to the Three Seals law gave commoner women over the age of 20 years the right to choose their husbands independently. The changes were implemented after the king had become aware of the case of a young woman, Muan, who had been forced into a marriage as the minor wife to a wealthy man. Her parents had agreed to the match because they owed money to the man. King Mongkut, thus, legitimized the amendment of the law with his concern for the daughters of lower class families who could be exploited after having been sold into marriage by their parents. Though we do not know if Muan's case was a singular incident or a widespread practice, it shows that parents until 1865 had an enormous amount of influence on the marriage decision in commoner families (Koizumi 2000: 263). It can be assumed that the judicial changes did not promptly affect actual marriage practices. Accordingly, Sparkes (2005: 58) states that until the 1960s, women were expected to follow their parents' choice. The parents' influence on the choice of partner has since then gradually decreased. Regrettably, Sparkes (2005) does not discuss different forms of ceremonies, minor wives or the involvement of the groom in the decision-making process.

Based on the existing literature on marriages among the elite (Batson 1986; Hong 1998, 1999; Loos 2004, 2005, 2006), it can be assumed that parental control within noble families was much higher than that in commoner families, especially for women. King

Mongkut's 1865 amendment to the Three Seals Law explicitly did not include daughters of noble families, because those families were perceived to be naturally concerned about the loss of honor that could occur if their daughters chose a man of lower rank, implying that women from elite families would always marry men of higher rank (Koizumi 2000: 167). For the same reason, the sexuality of noble women was strongly restricted (Hong 1998). Recent studies, such as those of Hong (1998, 1999), Loos (2005, 2006) and Woodhouse (2009), have brought us considerable knowledge about women's place in society and their role in the marriage system. Nonetheless, there is still a lack of information about the groom's role in marriages. Could the groom influence his parents' choice for his wife, or maybe even initiate the process? Was he free to choose minor wives or were there certain restrictions by the parents or society in general? While my data does not allow me to speak about the groom's role in the 19th century or before, I am able to elaborate on the groom's role in marriage since the early 20th century. I will show in my discussion that the groom had a major part in the arrangement of marriages. A good marriage for an ambitious young man was the first stage of establishing a political *trakun*.

The institution of marriage changed drastically with the reforms of King Chulalongkorn that created a modern bureaucracy system. From the late 19th century onwards, local administration was increasingly dependent on the central government, ultimately absorbing tributary states into the central governent (Wyatt 1969; Tej 1977; Thongchai 1994; Pasuk and Baker 2005; Terwiel 2005). This gradually eliminated the necessity to create alliances with tributary kingdoms through polygamous marriages. Furthermore, the implementation of new inheritance laws made the production of a high number of offspring unnecessary to guarantee the security of succession. With the loss in political importance, polygamy became a constant topic of discussion. It was criticized by both Thai and foreign commentators alike. This controversy about the advantages and disadvantages of polygyny extended over several decades, preventing the adoption of a modern family law. Finally, in 1935, a modern family law was ratified by the parliament (Barmé 2002, Loos 2006, Reynolds 2006b). Monogamy was installed as the legal form of marriage.

Despite monogamy being the legal form of marriage, polygamy remains a recurring phenomenon in Thai society today. Polygamous marriages that took place before 1935 remained legal. Moreover, there was no punishment for the registration of more than one wife to one man. Multiple registrations are possible because often the officials fail to verify if the groom has already been registered or not. One example for multiple registrations

is General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the 2006 coup d'etat, who has two legally registered wives (*Thairath* 28 November 2010).[73] Such multiple registrations can only be dissolved when the first wife who had been registered with the man appeals in court. If such an appeal were found valid, then any marriage registration made with other women would become void. There is no punishment, fine or imprisonment of any kind, thus making multiple registrations practically free of risk (Falk 2007: 36). In addition to the possibility of multiple registrations, men can also marry women in common law ceremonies or establish long-time marriage-like relationships with them, effectively making them into their minor wives. Just like the modern state and bureaucratic system have been superimposed on the traditional polity, monogamy has been superimposed on polygamy. Monogamy should be understood as the image that is performed by the political *trakun*, while polygamy is the practice that is engaged in.

When monogamy became the official legal form of marriage, the status of (minor) wives changed drastically, and it is now very difficult to determine a woman's status. Today, wives can have three distinct statuses: major wife, minor wife or mistress. The defining factor of a major wife's superior status in relation to other wives lies in the husband's esteem of her, which makes for some difficulties in confirming a woman's status as wife. According to the *Royal Institute Dictionary* (1999: 875), "a major wife (เมียหลวง) is respected as the superior wife".[74] Outward signs for the high esteem a man has for his wife are the formal registration of the marriage, a public wedding ceremony and the appearance of the wife at official and public events. The importance of the public image of being married is far more important than the legal registration, as the cases of Chuan Leekpai or Yingluck Shinawatra show. Both have been married in a ceremony, lived together with their spouse for a long period of time and have had children with them but have never officially registered their marriages. Their partners, however, are known to the public as their spouse. A term has been created for this phenomenon: wife or husband outside of marriage (ภรรยานอกสมรส or สามีนอกสมรส) (*Komchatluek* 16 August 2009). Thus, the lack of a marriage certificate does not necessarily mean that a couple is not married. As long as a woman or man is presented publicly as the wife or husband and some form of wedding ceremony has taken place, the couple will be considered married. This also means that a wife who has been legally married but is not publicly presented as such is not a major wife.

[73] A third wife had not been legally registered. However, given that Sonthi is a Muslim, he might have been given special treatment by the officials when registering more than one marriage.
[74] For Thai original see Appendix 1.6.

A minor wife (เมียน้อย), according to the *Royal Institute Dictionary* (1999: 875), is "a woman who is supported like a wife by a man", but who does not "have the same prestige as a major wife or is not legally registered".[75] The issue of minor wives is not discussed publicly and, thus, minor wives are not displayed to the public. Therefore, it is difficult and often impossible to deliver proof that a woman is a man's minor wife. Having given birth to a child is the one definite proof of being a minor wife that cannot be disputed. The status of a mistress is most vulnerable, as the man has no long-term commitment to her. The *Royal Thai Institute Dictionary* (1999: 574) defines a mistress (นางบำเรอ) as a "woman who pampers only one man sexually but is not in the status of a wife".[76] She is a partner in sexual intercourse but the man has no commitment or responsibility towards her. The categories of wife, minor wife and mistress, however, are very fluid. Defining these categories is complex and based on various criteria, such as the length of the relationship and commitment of the union as shown in official registrations, public appearances, financial support and the birth and acceptance of children. It should also be noted that a woman's status can change from being a mistress to a minor wife, as well as from a minor wife to a major wife.

It is generally accepted and even expected that politicians have many women and wives. One informant related to me that politicians are catered to with women wherever they go and sometimes, when they start to like one of these women, she will become his minor wife. In a private and informal conversation about the issue of minor wives with one of my informants, who is a Peau Thai Party party list MP, he told me the following story that involved Thaksin Shinawatra:

> Once he [Thaksin] invited a group of party politicians to a hotel to have a meeting. At the same time he invited their wives and asked them to wait in the hotel rooms. After the meeting was concluded, each of the men was given a key and they anticipated a beautiful young women and left for their rooms. However, the men did not know that Thaksin had also invited their wives. When they opened their room the politicians were surprised to find their wives instead of a young beauty. One of them came down and asked Thaksin "Master, why did you bring our wives here?" Thus questioned, he answered, "I wanted to give you a change of atmosphere" (informal conversation with anonymous, 16 June 2011).[77]

The company of many beautiful young women other than their major wives belongs to a politician's everyday life, as stories like this suggest. However, such sporadic encounters do

[75] For Thai original see Appendix 1.7.
[76] For Thai original see Appendix 1.8.
[77] For Thai original see Appendix 1.9.

not yet seem to qualify these women as minor wives; rather they are mistresses with no strings attached. When these encounters become more frequent, the women are given a house or apartment and become financially more dependent on the man. The relationship slowly evolves and at some point, the woman is likely to be seen as the man's minor wife.

Minor wives are used to create lasting links between politicians, imitating the polygamous marriages of the Thai elite in the time of the absolute monarchy. Politicians keep an eye out for good looking women whom they think will appeal to a certain other politician. These women will then be presented to a politician of higher rank.[78] This creates an alliance, which resembles that of an actual marriage alliance. Even if the woman becoming the minor wife of the politician is not a daughter or niece of the giver, it still creates a strong sense in the politician who is the recipient to reciprocate the 'wife giver'. This relationship between the wife giver and the recipient politician is not likely to end as long as his relationship with the woman goes on. The same kind of feeling is also instated in the woman, as she is grateful for the social advancement that she and potentially her family gained out of the connection with the politician. This recalls the custom of high ranking noble families or wealthy Chinese business men to present their daughters as consorts to the Thai kings in the hope of social advancement (Loos 2006, Pornsiri/พรศิริ 2009, Wyatt 1994b). One well known example of this is Raphiphan Lueangaramrat, better known under her nickname Jingrit, the minor wife of Chatchai Choonhavan. Another example is Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram, who also acquired one of his minor wives in this fashion. Thus, giving a wife to a politician is a very powerful way of creating political alliance.

Marriage Patterns of Political *Trakun*

It has been observed that corporate families use their marriages strategically to build alliances and networks or to secure a qualified succession (Suehiro 1992: 45, Suehiro 1996: 120, Pramuan et al. forthcoming).[79] In the case of political *trakun* in Thailand, both strategies have been adopted, depending on the circumstances as well as on how well established a political *trakun* is. A well-established *trakun* is more likely to be anxious about suitable successors, while relatively new *trakun* tend to place emphasis on the building of alliances. A marriage

[78] This superior-subordinate relationship is also reflected in the words my informants used to refer to that process. The informants used words such as *pama* (พามา) or *thaway* (ถวาย) to describe the process of presenting women to a politician. *Pama* means to bring and is rather neutral. *Thaway*, however, means to offer or to present and is usually used when giving something to a high status person, such as royalty or a monk.
[79] Pramuan et al.'s (forthcoming) article has been made public on the internet.

can reflect both strategies in operation. While an established *trakun* could be looking for a talented son-in-law as successor, an ambitious young politician would appreciate the network such a marriage can offer. Marriages increase the economic and symbolic capital of both parties and make the pool of resources of one party available to the other. Thus, a political family aims to marry into a family who possesses the form of capital that the political family itself lacks.

I will now examine the marriages within the five *trakun* from the case studies of this thesis: the Choonhavans, the Kittikachorns, the Shinawatras, the Techaphaybuns and the Suwanchawees. Marriages will be analyzed neither chronologically nor according to their membership in one of these *trakun*. I will examine the marriages of the founders of political *trakun* first. This will be followed by the analysis of the marriages of the second and third generation of political *trakun*, respectively. This will show that there are recurrent patterns in first, second and third generation members when it comes to marriages. These marriage patterns are only marginally influenced by changes of the Thai society in general.

The First Generation

The majority of first generation marriages discussed in this thesis took place in the early twentieth century, a time in which courtship did not take place openly. Sumalee (1995: 137-142) shows that the courtship from 1900 until 1930 was a clandestine courtship and future partners were often not intimately acquainted before marriage. Women and men largely socialized and moved in separate circles. They might have met at public gatherings but even there, the sexes remained largely separated. It was, therefore, not unusual that future spouses did not speak to each other before marriage, and the couple had little knowledge of each other. If courtship took place, it was usually done secretly and would soon develop into an engagement.

How the process of getting acquainted and getting married could work was described by Lady Laiad Phibunsongkhram, who recounts to her children how she met her husband:

> Your father had to train the new soldiers and had to pass in front of the school every day. My house was at the civilian quarters. Your father lived at the soldier's quarters. He had to lead the soldiers to the civilians' square every day. Your father saw me every day. My friends made jokes every day that this or that soldier was hers. My friends teased me and I[80] teased them. Two-three

[80] Laiad uses the term 'mother' as pronoun.

> months later, your father entrusted one of his students to bring me a letter. When I saw that the letter was from Plaek I was startled. I started to perspire. I was totally frightened. To read the letter, I opened it. It started with 'my darling'.[81] [When I read this] I immediately closed the letter and gave it to your grandfather to read. Every time I received a letter, I gave them all to your grandfather. Sometimes I read them, sometimes not. When I read the sweet words I became scared and afraid. I did not answer a single letter. Your father pressured me to answer. The letters were written very sweetly: "If I could take out my heart, I would do it and show it to you", "I love you over everything", "If I do not see your face I cannot eat" or "If I could only see the roof of your house every day" (Laiad 1984).[82]

The letters remained unanswered, but Field Marshal Plaek arranged for a go-between to ask for Laiad's hand in marriage, which was granted. For somebody who is familiar with Thai literature, this episode might resemble the scene from M.R. Kukrit Pramoj's novel *Four Reigns*, where Prem, the male protagonist, arranges for a go-between to officially propose to the heroine of the novel based on observation without having spoken to her. This resemblance is probably intentional because it showcases the woman's virtue; in this case that of Lady Laiad. When we, however, look past these demonstrations of female modesty and decency, be it true or not, we can see some patterns that will recur. Young people could meet and view each other (with or without parental initiative); interaction would, however, remain at a minimum if the couple were not already considered relatives. This could happen in a daily life situation and was often based on proximity of residences. However, a certain amount of parental supervision was always involved.

The first generation marriages of political *trakun* are characterized by young men who in their struggle for upward mobility seek to increase their capital by marriage to women of higher social strata. In most cases, the first generation of political families comes from a humble or middle class background. Marriage is one way for these young men to accumulate various forms of capital to advance in society. Apart from the social capital, i.e. networks, gained through marriage, the economic and symbolic capital of the wife's family also become available for the new husband. This allows him to advance in his career and in politics. Phin Choonhavan, Thanom Kittikachorn and Pairot Suwanchawee are examples that amply show this pattern, despite their considerable differences in age. I will now discuss the marriage of each of these men.

[81] The address used in the letter would literally be translated as "my darling (younger) sister". It is a common practice amongst Thai lovers to address each other with sibling terms.
[82] For Thai original see Appendix 1.10.

Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan

Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan was born in humble circumstances in 1891 as the son of orchid farmers in Samut Songkram Province. Quite little is known about his early life and his family. He is the only person of the Field Marshal rank who has worked his way through the ranks from sergeant to the highest military honors possible. The young Phin received his primary education at the local temple school and was subsequently ordained for 3 years to receive further education. At the age of 16, he entered the military. From 1908 onwards, he attended Military Staff College (โรงเรียนนายสิบทหาร) in Ratchaburi. Here he excelled and was consequently admitted into the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy where he attended the same class as Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and other promoters of the 1932 change of governmental system.

While attending the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Phin boarded with a family in Bangkok. This family appeared to have had modest wealth and Chinese origins. He was referred to this family by a benefactor who had helped him to enter the military. The family and Phin's patron seemed to be relatives (Phin 1970, 1973). During his time in Bangkok, Phin had supervised encounters with his host's daughter Chim, who would later change her name to Wibunluck. In 1912, her parents approached him and a marriage was arranged (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009). Through Phin did not possess much economic and only limited symbolic capital, he could boast much diligence and talent. He had worked his way up from an up-county child through the military ranks and was a reasonably good student at the military academy. His future, thus, appeared promising and this made him a good choice of son-in-law. He certainly married up, as far as family circumstances are concerned.

Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn

Twenty years Phin's junior, Thanom Kittikachorn was born in 1911 in Tak. Little is known about his early life and family. However, his father Ampan Kittikachorn held the official title *Khun Sopitbanarak* (ขุนโสภิตบรรณารักษ์). Bearing a *Khun* title, he might or might not have been part of the lower nobility. He probably had some official income as well. However, there is no evidence that Thanom's father came from an influential family; thus, it is likely that he was part of the emerging middle class created by the reforms of King Chulalongkorn. This can be considered a reasonably good family background.

When it came to marriage, Thanom did not comply with his parents' choice of a mate and made his own selection. He married Jongkon Krabuanyuth; the daughter of a

major from Ayutthaya province. They appear to have met at an early point of their lives; upon meeting again years later, they got married in 1929 (Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007). Thanom's son-in-law, Suwit Yodmani, related the story as follows:

> Lady Jongkon is the daughter of a military officer, a major. At that time … generals were very rare. A major already had a lot of power. Juab Krabuanyuth was Lady Jongkon's father. He had been Field Marshal Thanom's commanding officer before. They had served together and got to know each other. But the two people [Lady Jongkon and Field Marshal Thanom] fell in love by themselves. The parents did not object, even though the father and, especially, the mother of Field Marshal Thanom had already chosen a woman. […] Field Marshal Thanom loved whom he loved. Nobody was able to say anything. […] Therefore, they really loved each other. They loved each other for over 70 years – were married for over 70 years (Suwit Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).[83]

Two things could be learned from this narration. First, parents did have a part in the mate selection of Thai men, and their choice seems to have had some weight. Possibly the role of the parents in mate selection increased with increasing social standing, as was suggested for women of the upper class (Koizumi 2000; Loos 2005, 2006). This is also supported by the fact that no parental involvement from Phin's parents, who had a lower social standing, could be observed. Second, there was room for personal choice and love.

Love is a recurring theme within Thai political *trakun;* all marriages are portrayed as matches of love overshadowing prudence. In most cases, however, the marriages generated political advantages or an increase in capital. The same is certainly the case in Field Marshal Thanom's marriage. He made a very good choice in his wife. Lady Jongkon was her father's only surviving child and, thus, the heir to his considerable fortune. This fortune was earned through trading enterprises and not by means of a career in the military. Thus, it can be concluded that Field Marshal Thanom and Lady Jongkon had a comparable social standing, but she had much more economic capital. Again, Field Marshal Thanom was an attractive son-in-law because of his career prospects.

Pairot Suwanchawee

The final example of a first generation marriage is Pairot Suwanchawee. He was born in 1951 in Bangkok. Therefore, in comparison to Phin and Thanom, he is much younger and his marriage took place after society had markedly changed. Nevertheless, there are many similarities. Pairot graduated from Thammasat University, one of Thailand's most prestigious educational institutions, and then joined the civil service. He was posted in Nakon Ratchsima

[83] For Thai original see Appendix 1.11.

where he was first the assistant to the governor, who later became an MP for the province. Subsequently, Pairot became district head in several districts in the area. While employed as the governor's assistant, he developed a close relationship to his supervisor as well as to his daughter, whom he eventually married. It seemed obvious why a young politically ambitious man would marry the daughter of a governor-turned-politician. He could benefit from his father-in-law's social and political standing. Moreover, his wife had grown up in a political environment and had, thus, gained political capital in her own right, which was favorable for Pairot's own political ambitions. As in the cases of Field Marshal Phin and Thanom, the factors that made Pairot most attractive as a son-in-law were his talents. He had a good education and showed fine career prospects. His character could have been scrutinized while he was working as the governor's assistant. Further, he carried a royally bestowed surname, suggesting some symbolic if not economic capital. It can be concluded that Pairot married up on the merit of his career prospects and talents.

The examples of first generation marriages span over half a century, yet the same pattern recurs: An ambitious and talented man marries a woman of higher social or financial standing. The perception that women tend to marry up to create new alliances with influential families cannot be confirmed using the examples of first generation marriages of the political *trakun* presented here. Men with ambition marry up. They marry women of high social standing, with money and connections. These men use their marriages to create alliances and networks that will help to drive their (political) careers and to gain acceptance in higher strata of society. Why do these women marry down? This appears especially puzzling when we remember that in Thai elite circles, marriage downwards meant a real degradation in society. However, we should not forget that the attainment of rank in Thai society was never totally static and hereditary. Talent mattered. Rank and standing were attained through official appointment in the bureaucracy. Thus, a *trakun* that wanted to keep its status needed to ensure that there were enough capable men in the next generation to fill high official positions. This was enforced by the practice of polygamous marriages which produced a number of male offspring from which the more talented ones could be trained by their father to later inherit official appointments. Another option was to recruit talented sons-in-law: to marry a daughter to a promising young man who will benefit from the already established connections of his in-laws and their practical and financial support. These young men will then be so indebted to their in-laws that they will promote their interests. Sons-in-law are carefully recruited and are under long-term surveillance.

The Second Generation

The marriage of the second generation differs from that of the first generation in the sense that both spouses usually come from comparable social strata but bring different forms of capital into the marriage. The Choonhavan and Kittikachorn families had five and six children respectively. All of the Choonhavan and Kittikachorn children got married; thus, there were too many marriages to discuss them all in detail. I will, therefore, focus mainly on Phin's children Udom, Prom and Chatchai Choonhavan as well as on Thanom's son Narong Kittikachorn. I will conclude this discussion with a short comparison of the different marriage strategies of these two families.

The marriages of most of the second generation members took place under changed social circumstances; parental influence on marriage had generally declined and courtship increasingly became public. As a general trend in society, young people had more freedom to choose their partners. Love had become a valid reason for marriage. This made it necessary for young people to get to know each other better before they got married. Therefore, more intermingling of the sexes in public became possible. Young couples started to go out together. They were, however, supervised by a chaperone, who could be a female friend or a sister (Sumalee 1995: 143-146). This might have prolonged the period of courtship, as was seen in Chatchai's case.

In political *trakun*, the general trend to more freedom of mate choice for young people is not as strong. While none of the second generation members seemed to have been forced into marriage, courtship took place under supervision of the parents. Love might have been the reason most commonly portrayed, but economic and symbolic capital were just as important for the mate choice as mutual attraction. Parents also resorted to arranging a marriage if the child did not find a suitable partner at an appropriate time. The experience of getting married as the second generation has practiced was summarized by Dr. Suwit Yodmani; he, however, also addresses a generational change:

> Marriage. One gets married like this: They look at standing.[84] They advise their children to fall in love with their friends' children, because they can be trusted, isn't it so? They are all friends, but there is more to it. In Thai society both past and present, they try to mean well with their children and try to advise them to socialize … which is perfect. Also they will have a view on which family is desirable. Imagine a family has three children they want this and that family [in marriage]. Or they might have a little bigger goal but their feeling is: first *kwam mangmi* (ความมั่งมี) or wealth, second *kiet* (เกียรติ) or

[84] The Thai word used is ฐานะ and refers to social and financial situation as well as general living condition.

> honor. Wealth is vision, business that success [sic]. Honor is being of royalty: *Mom Chao* (หม่อมเจ้า), *Mon Rachawongse* (หม่อมราชวงศ์), *Mom Luang* (หม่อมหลวง). This is what honor is. Honor, wealth or power: these three things [are what they look for in a marriage]. Power here means: it could be a soldier, a policeman, someone from a senior family in this or that area, which has rent and protégé power or power. Many families think like this, but my family is different there. Families that are like this will succeed because of their network. […] What I have talked about so generally, some families do more than that, which is that the father and mother arrange it [the marriage]. They really do! But not like a blind marriage.[85] They will introduce their children and let them socialize. Then they encourage them. Both sets of parents will cheer. This happened to my children as well. We thought our friend is a good person. He is good. Therefore, his child is probably also good. So we encouraged them, but we did not succeed. We have three sons; with all three of them we had no success. They did not listen. Therefore, this is a trend that in the future we will not support our children in this way. […] I think in the future the son will court whomever he is satisfied with. My three sons were not concerned with how the [bride's] parents are. Sometimes they did not even know them very well but got married. Not to know how her [the bride's] parents are is a risk. But we are lucky that our three children are all boys. The bride's parents are all good. In Thai society we try to protect our children so that it is convenient to do this and that. That does not mean it is power [that we are using over our children]. I think in the future it will be like this (Suwit Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).[86]

Suwit refers to one key element of marriage, which is the importance of family. In a marriage not only two people, but two families, are joined. Thus, the parents play an integral part in the process of getting married. They introduce potential partners and then, as Suwit puts it, cheer their children into the relationship. As has been shown above, the involvement of the parents can go as far as the arrangement of a marriage. He also provides us with a detailed list of the criteria families would be looking for in other families, which are status and power. During the interview, he also mentioned economic capital as a criterion. However, it is notable that symbolic capital, such as honor and power, is clearly valued more than economic capital. This is because symbolic capital will ultimately be transformed to economic capital.

The Choonhavan Children

Field Marshal Phin and his wife Wibunluck had five children (pictured in Figure 6) whom were all married as follows:

[85] Blind marriage is an arranged marriage in which the bride and groom do not meet and know each other before the wedding arranged by the parents or other senior relatives.
[86] For Thai original see Appendix 1.12.

1. Udom (later Udomluck) [87] born in 1914. She was given the title Lady later in life.[88] Udomluck married Phao Sriyanond, son of Phra Plapirakseseni, who was a lieutenant when the couple got married. He later transferred to the police and became Director of Police. Phao also held the office of Deputy Minister of Interior and Deputy Minister of Finance. He was the counterpart to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath and had to go into Swiss exile after the military coup of 1957.
2. Prom, born in 1916. She married Arun Thapparansi, who made a career in the civil service. Arun came from a well-established noble family, and his father had the official title of *Phraya*.
3. Jaroen, born in 1918. She married Police General Praman Adireksan. He established a longstanding career as a politician and held several posts as minister and deputy prime minister. Jaroen was given the title of Lady, due to her husband's position as deputy prime minister.
4. Sombun (later Chatchai), born in 1921, married Lady Bunruen. Lady Bunruen is a relative of the late Princess Srinagarindra (the princess mother) to whom she acted as lady-in-waiting before marriage.
5. Punsuk (later Pornsom), born in 1923, married Chaloem Chieowsakun. Chaloem was a distant relative of Pornsom. He is a business man and Director of the Royal Property Bureau (Naraniti/นรนิติ 2011 [1999]).

Udom(luck) Choonhavan

An account of the marriage of Udom and Phao is given in a novel by Pongphon Adireksan (ปองพล 2009). Pongphon is a nephew of the couple in question and, thus, a grandson of Field Marshal Phin. In the novel, he has combined the memoirs of his grandfather with stories handed down orally within the family. Thus, he calls the book a "novel based on truth" (**นวนิยายอิงความจริง**). I will cite here from the novel, because by crosschecking with other sources, the accounts of the novel seem to be accurate. Further, as it is a novel, it is not a plain record of the truth but also mirrors the image that the author would like the outsider to see of his family. It shows us how things should have been as well as how they were. Thus,

[87] It is not clear when the name change took place. However, it must have been after her marriage to Phao and possibly during Secound World War. It is likely that she changed her name to accommodate the fashion for longer names, as well as to increase her symbolic capital, as longer names imply higher social status.

[88] It is not clear why and when Udomluck was given the title of Lady. The title could have been given to her because of her husband's high position in the government, which would have happened between 1951 and 1957. She could also have earned the title by her own effort in charity work.

we can gain knowledge about facts as well as about the image and the values connected to marriage from this account.

Figure 6: Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan with his family

(Source: Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 250)

Top row: Field Marshal Phin and his wife, Wibunluck Choonhavan,
Second row from the top: Udomluck Sriyanond with her husband, Phao Sriyanond and their only daughter Pongluch Sriyanond.
Third row from the top: Prom and her husband Arun Thapparansi and their oldest son Kamol Thapparansi, who was sent to school by his uncle Chatchai.
Bottom row: Jarien and Praman Adireksan and their oldest son Pongphon.
Sitting at the right of the stairs: Chatchai Choonhavan.
Standing at the left of the stairs: Pornsom Choonhavan

Udom and Phao met at the 3rd Army Regiment where Field Marshal Phin was the commander; Phao had just been transferred. They indulged in leisure activities together with other young people in the military base and, thus, their courtship was under continuous supervision. This becomes obvious when reading a conversation between Field Marshal Phin and his wife while they were sitting on their veranda and watching the young people play badminton:[89]

[89] The conversation might not have taken place like this. It seems to have been an artistic way of the author to relate all relevant information to us. He certainly succeeded in that and unknowingly gave us even more information than he thought.

> "Who is Udom playing with?" asked Chim, her eyes resting on the young man, who was well built and had fair skin. He looked dignified and brave. "I have seen him once or twice, but I still do not know his name. How old might he be?"
>
> "Ah, Lieutenant Phao Sriyanond", said Phin. "He just moved here and is in the infantry. He is a relative of Neung. As for his age, he should be around 25 to 26 years old, I think. He looks good, and in the future he will rise in the military ranks a lot." The Neung whom Phin was talking about was no other than the wife of Captain Phot Choonhavan, Phin's own younger brother.
>
> "Oh, so he is the one whom Prom said Udom is closer to than to any other of the officers", said Chim, "They often go horse riding together. He seems courageous and upright. Also he is handsome and has sex appeal", she was watching Udom and Phao laughing as they scored a point and asked further: "Whose child is he?"
>
> "He is the oldest son of Phra Plapirakseseni, who is living in Thewet Soi 2 in Bangkok," Phin answered, smiling.
>
> "You even know who his parents are and where his home is, that shows that you are also interested in Lieutenant Phao," said Chim and looked knowingly at her husband's face.
>
> "Our child Udom is now already 21 years old. She keeps the household excellently. Also she has already hosted and arranged several important celebrations for the soldiers in her parents' place. Just a while ago she organized offerings to several hundred monks. Even the monk complimented me that we have raised our daughter well," answered Phin with love for his eldest daughter, to whom he was very close. "Therefore, if our child Udom should have a partner, I will have to find a worthy man. To give her to a man who is not excellent would be like giving a jewel to a chicken," said Phin, followed by a happy laugh (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 91-93).[90]

Shortly after, Lieutenant Phao approached Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram to act as a go-between, to ask for Udom's hand in marriage. The news of this was leaked to Field Marshal Phin through his sister-in-law who was Phibunsongkhram's neighbor. It is possible that the news was intentionally leaked to give the bride's parents opportunity make their sentiments known, as a refusal of the proposal would have led to great embarrassment on all sides. Shortly after, the couple got married.

In this marriage, the main negotiation partners were the bride's father and the groom's elders. The father has a careful eye on his daughter and when it became clear that there was increasing affection between his daughter and a young subordinate, he secretly acquired information about the candidate. If this information had not been satisfactory, it is quite likely that he would have intervened in one way or another to end the relationship. However, as the young candidate proved to be of good career prospects and family background, a distant relative at that, the father simply reclined and let events take their

[90] For Thai original see Appendix 1.13.

course. It should be noted that, though the father seems to carry the main weight of the decision on his children's marriage, he always consults with the mother and seeks her opinion.

The bride takes a passive position and is apparently not aware of the groom's intentions. This is a motive that is continued from the earlier example of Lady Laiad. Again it is uncertain if the bride was really as ignorant as claimed. Given that the couple had ample opportunity to be together alone, if only in public, it is quite likely that the bride would know of her suitor's feelings. He might even have made some suggestion of the seriousness of his intentions. If that was the case, it did not fit the image that the author wanted to portray. Thus, it can be understood that the bride was supposed to play a passive role when finding a marriage partner. It was rather the elders' decision than the bride's.

Further, it is interesting to note the criteria under which a potential candidate in marriage is analyzed: first he is assessed as an individual and then in context of his family. The first question Chim asked and the first comments she made were purely about the young Phao as an individual. She complimented him on his age, appealing bodily features and demeanor. Only then did she ask about his family background. This background was not only his own nuclear family but also his already existing relationship to the Choonhavans and the physical location of his home. The location of the home is important in two aspects. First, it can give hints about the socioeconomic background of a person. Is it an expensive or inexpensive area to purchase properties and to maintain a living? Does the area suggest something about the ethnic or cultural background? Second, the reference to the home and house of the candidate relates to the importance of the house in the Thai kinship system. Though the actual function of the house as the center of the family and kinship network has decreased in importance in a more complex and urbanized setting, it retains its reference value.

Udom's experience indicates that there seems to be a certain marriageable age for women. When we compare this case to those of the first generation we will see that Udom, aged 21, was older than the other brides. Her mother got married aged 15. Lady Jongkon, who is close in age to Udom, got married when she was 15. Lady Laiad married at 14. Only Pairot's wife must have been at least 21 upon marriage, but possibly older.[91] This wedding, however, took place in the 1970s under different social circumstances. Thus, it can be concluded that for the earlier decades of the 20th century, the marriageable age probably

91 Pairot's wife had completed a nursing education before getting married. Thus, she needed to complete a tertiary education, which is generally achieved at age 21.

started at puberty up to the low 20s.[92] This is also indicated by Udom's sister, whose case I will discuss below.

Udom's case also shows that to get married, a woman needs considerable cultural capital, which consists of skills, such as managing a household, organizing large events and playing sports. Her mastery of various household chores and her ability to supervise a household show that she is ready to get married. Moreover her ability as a hostess, especially for large occasions is not only a sign of readiness for marriage but also an asset that makes her special. It is this skill that is elevated over the usual abilities of a housewife. As will be shown in the next chapter, wives of high ranking men, such as politicians, often have to take on the role of hostess. Thus, it is only logical for a man with ambition to choose a woman who has proven herself in that art of hosting. What was not mentioned in the above cited passage is that Udom also excelled in sports, especially badminton and horse riding. Udom was also a local beauty: "The star of Korat [Nakhorn Ratchasrima]" (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 93). She impressed with her slim figure, large eyes and cheerful aura. Thus, she was sought after by many men, military and civilian alike. Such potential could be valued by an exceptional man; thus, the parents' efforts in raising her would not be wasted (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009).

Prom and the Younger Choonhavan Girls

Prom's experience of getting married was a very different one than her sister's. She had reached the age of 22 without any serious marriage prospects, so her parents moved forward to arrange a marriage with a young civil servant. The choice fell upon Arun Thapparansi, the eldest son of *Chao Phraya* Narathornhirunraj (เจ้าพระยา นราธรหิรัญรัฐ).[93] Arun, at the age of 26, had already made a successful career in the civil service. Further, the two families were closely acquainted, and one of Field Marshal Phin's nieces was married into that family. Prom and Arun got married in 1937 without meeting before the wedding. In fact even her parents did not meet the groom before the wedding took place. This marriage shows that the bride's age was very important. When a woman had reached a certain age, parents could take the initiative and arrange the marriage for her.

Both Udom's and Prom's marriages show that family background was very important. They married into families that had already established affinal relations with the Choonhavans. The importance of the family background is also apparent in the marriages of

[92] This age range probably shifted in the later part of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, as cases of the third generation will show later.
[93] It is not sure if it was a *Phraya* or a *Chao Phraya* title. Both have been found in sources.

the one of the remaining sisters, Pornsom. She was the youngest of the five siblings and married her cousin,[94] who was a business man. According to Pongphon's (2009) novel, the marriage was encouraged by Phao, who was bothered by the many suitors regularly coming to the family's compound. Phao felt that a marriage between Pornsom and Chaloem would be a good match because Chloem was good looking and of good character: He was well educated and had a stable job. After having sensed Pornsom's approval, Phao invited her future husband to regularly come to their home. It was not long before he announced that a formal proposal was to be made very soon. The wedding took place in 1945. Such marriages reinforced existing alliances and, thus, strengthened the families as a group. It also increased the likelihood that capital would remain with the same families.

The only daughter who did not marry a close relative was Jarien, the third daughter. However, this does not mean that in her case, family background was unimportant. Her husband, Lieutenant Praman Adireksan, while stationed in Lopburi, was living at the house opposite the house of Neung Choonhavan, the already mentioned sister-in-law of Phin and, thus, Jeroen's aunt. Another close neighbor was none other than Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram. While residing in this setting, Praman's mother came to visit often and regularly socialized with Neung. As the two women liked each other, Neung encouraged Praman to get to know Jarien. The two met and liked each other (Praman 2010). Thus, the aunt had functioned as a matchmaker on the basis of liking the family.

The marriages of Field Marshal Phin's two youngest daughters have shown that not only the bride's father could play the leading role in marrying off the daughter. Other relatives, such as the aunt or even the brother-in-law, could play an integral role in the screening and selection of partners. It can, however, be assumed that the final decision will always be with the parents, as the official proposal would be made to them.

All but one of the Choonhavan daughters got married at a comparably late age and there were married men whose families were closely related to theirs. They married in their early twenties, which was approximately five years later than their mother's generation. Two explanations are possible for this. First, there might have been a shift in the marriage age of girls with the change of generation. Second, the girls' marriages could have been delayed. Given that Lady Jongkon, was born at approximately the same time as the Choonhavan girls but married in her mid-teens, the second reason seems to be more likely. One reason for the delay of the girls' marriages could be that their father, being in the military, was transferred

[94] Her husband was her grandmother's sister's son, thus technically her cousin once removed. Before the marriage, she addressed him as uncle (น้า).

several times and had to participate in warfare repeatedly. Thus, he could not take care of personal matters as swiftly as normally required. Another reason could be that the marriage was strategically delayed in order to wait for better social circumstances, for example higher rank of the father, and, thus, make it possible for the girls to find a match from a higher strata of society. This latter reason would be in line with the above noted sentiment that an accomplished woman should not be wasted on an undeserving man.

The Choonhavan girls married upwards. Three of the four fathers-in-law had a royally appointed title of *Phra* or above and, thus, were of higher title than Field Marshal Phin, who carried a *Luang* title. The high official titles also give reason to believe that these men came from influential and noble families. Sorasak (2010: 55) has shown that out of 128 upper-class members of the Seri Thai movement who had a title of *Phra* or higher, half could produce prestigious family trees with royal or noble ancestry. [95] It can be assumed that the in-laws had made successful careers in the government before 1932. Due to the lack of information on the in-laws, we do not know what fortunes they took after the change of governmental system. However, apart from the highest ranks, most of the government officials kept their positions and received considerable incomes. Even if they might have lost some of their symbolic capital, it is safe to say that they still would have had the prestige of their titles. Field Marshal Phin's position at the time of the girls' weddings was that of a regional commander, which was prestigious, but he had yet to rise to the heights of his career. Therefore, at the point of their weddings, the girls made socially upward marriages.

Chatchai Choonhavan

The only son of Field Marshal Phin, Chatchai Choonhavan, got married in 1944. His chosen bride was Boonruean Sopot. She is a maternal relative to the king. [96] Boonruean was a lady-in-waiting to the princess mother and spent a considerable amount of time in the Sirphatum Palace. From 1933 to 1938, she accompanied the royal family to Switzerland, where she received an education in child care. Upon her return to Thailand, she worked at a local kindergarten and sometime in 1940, she was introduced to Chatchai by a friend of the family (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 265-268). Obviously she had made an impression on Chatchai, as he now volunteered to take his nephew to school, who conveniently attended the kindergarten

[95] The Seri Thai movement (also Free Thai movement) was an underground opposition against the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. For more information about the movement see, for example, Haseman 2002 and Reynolds 2005.

[96] Her father and the princess mother were first cousins. Hence, Boonruean and the king are second cousins.

that employed Boonruean. Their son, Kraisak Choonhavan commented on his parents' courtship:

> Politicians must pick out a wife [carefully]. If they make the right choice, they can go far.[…] My father was a military officer before he became a politician. I think it is a matter of the partner's class. One has to marry a family with not too big of a difference. So he chose my mother as wife. My mother is a relative of the king. The princess mother is from my mother's side. My mother knows many people. That was helpful for my father. It helped in the society: face in the society. […] They [Chatchai and Boonruean] courted when my mother was a kindergarten teacher. My father was a military officer. That is: the school in which my mother taught was the school to which my father had to bring [pointing at one of the little boys sitting in the picture above] so he met my mother. It was somehow like that. It was arranged. The society was narrow (Kraisak Choohavan, interview 21 May 2010).[97]

According to Pongphon's (ปองพล 2009) novel and Kraisak's narration, Chatchai's marriage shows that outwards influence from relatives was not enough to lead to an agreement; courtship was involved. It appeared that the couple was introduced by an elder, in this case a relative on the woman's side. This was, however, not enough to lead to marriage. Chatchai, probably both pleased by the outward appearance of Boonruean and the potential of such a match, had to show his dedication by courtship. The courtship was considerably longer than that of his sisters' and took years, whereas his sisters' courtships had taken only a few months. This shows that Chatchai must have put some endurance and effort into succeeding. Considering the value such a match had in increasing his prestige in society as well as adding to his social capital, this effort was well placed. Considering that his wife was a relative to the king, this marriage could be called an upwards marriage on Chatchai's side; it brought him and his *trakun* a lot of added social capital.[98]

The Kittikachorn Children

Field Marshal Thanom and his wife Jongkon had six children who survived infancy.[99] Five of these can be seen in Figure 7. All of them got married as follows:

1. Nongnat, born in 1931, married Chamnan Penchat. Chamnan Penchat was a successful banker and business man (Manager Magazine/**นิตยสารผู้จัดการ** November 1987)

[97] For Thai original see Appendix 1.14.

[98] The case is not as clear cut as it might appear. The Princess Mother came from rather humble circumstances and advanced her own standing through the benefits of a royal scholarship to the United States of America and her marriage to the Prince Mahidol. Thus, Boonruean's birth family probably was of humble background. However, as she had benefited from royal patronage from a young age, it seems reasonable to call this an upward marriage on Chatchai's part.

[99] Thanom and Jongkon Kittikachorn had two additional sons who died in childhood.

2. Narong, born in 1933, married Supaporn Jarusathien, daughter of Field Marshal Praphat Jarusathien, who was Field Marshal Thanom's deputy prime minister.
3. Nongnut, born in 1943, married General Euam Jirapongse, who was the commander of the 9th Infantry Division from 1971 to 1973 (9th Infantry Division/**กองพลทหารราบที่ 9** 2012). She was given the title Lady.
4. Yuthapong, born in 1944, married Tipaya, daughter of Prayoon Phamornmontri (Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007).[100] Prayoon Phamornmontri was a member of the People's Party that led to the change of government system in 1932. One of his sons is an actor-turned-politician and a currently prominent party list MP for the Pheu Thai Party.
5. Trongsuda, born in 1946, married Dr. Suwit Yodmani, who attended the military academy but then became a technocrat and finally became Minister for Sport and Tourism under the General Surayud Chulanont government (Thai Armed Forces/ กองทัพไทย 2007, Suwit Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).
6. Trongsamon, born in 1948, married Admiral Supha Gajaseni, who was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (ผู้บัญชาการทหารสูงสุด) from 1986 to 1987 (Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters/กองบัญชาการกองทัพไทย 2012).

Figure 7: Five of Field Marschal Thanom Kittikachorn' six children
From left: Narong Kittikachorn, Yuthapong Kittikachorn, Nongnat Penchat, Nongnut Jirapongse, Trongsamon Gajaseni at the wedding of Ausana Mahakitsiri to Kamolsut Thapparansi, 4 October 2012 (Source: **แนวหน้า**/ Naewna 4 October 2012)

[100] It appears that she was the daughter of a minor wife.

Of all of Thanom's children, the marriage between Narong Kittikachorn and Supaporn Jarusathien has struck observers the most, as it represented the joining of two of the most influential political *trakun* of their time. The marriage took place in 1957 shortly after the military coup that put Sarit Thanarath and his clique at the pinnacle of power. The runners up in power were Thanom and Praphat Jarusathien, whereby, Thanom appeared to have the upper hand. The marriage of their children shortly after the take-over of their clique let the two become in-laws and, thus, transformed a situation of possible competition into concurrence. Thus, the marriage appeared to be very strategic in order to prevent conflict and to centralize power. This is, however, disputed by Air Chief Marshal Yuthapong Kittikachorn, who explained why this marriage should not come as any surprise:

> His [Narong's] wife is the same age as me, or one year younger than me. Our families are very close, because my father and Field Marshal Praphat are also close in age and rose in the ranks together; therefore the two families are close and often visit each other. Field Marshal Praphat's children came to play [at our home] regularly. The daughter [of Field Marshal Praphat], who married my brother, also came regularly. She was a good looking woman and [we] were close. Therefore my brother and his wife knew each other from childhood onwards. When they grew up to become adults, they liked each other. Therefore, there was no making these two families affined in order to give everybody political benefit. […]. It was a coincidence, which most outsiders do not know and makes them unsatisfied (Air Chief Marshal Yuthapong Kittikachorn, interview 22 May 2010).[101]

Suwit Yodmani recalled the same process:

> The family did not *object* to anything. At that time the family rather liked it. Then the two people knew each other and fell in love with each other [without parental intervention]. Therefore, they really loved each other (Suwit Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).[102]

These narrations of the process of getting married match with those of the Field Marshal Phin's children. The children of two families that knew each other well and frequently socialized got married. The couple came from very similar family backgrounds, thus it can be called an equal marriage. The bride aged 18 and the groom 25 were not at an unusual age to get married. Also the age difference between the couple was common. There was nothing for the families to object to but rather much reason for them to favor such a match. It appears to be a marriage that was formed like so many others within these social circles. There is no hint, apart from the timing issue, that would suggest that this was an arranged marriage. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the marriage probably was very much welcomed by the

[101] For Thai original see Appendix 1.15.
[102] For Thai original see Appendix 1.16.

families involved, as the advantages must have been clear. This is also shown by the citations above.

Marriage Strategies of the Choonhavans and Kittikachorns Compared

In comparing the marriages of Field Marshal Phin's and Field Marshal Thanom's children, it becomes apparent that Field Marshal Phin has a much more diversified group of sons-in-law than Field Marshal Thanom. Three out of four of Thanom's sons-in-law graduated from the military academy, two of whom made a subsequent military career. Only one of his sons-in-law, a business man, came from a non-military background. One of his sons also married a woman from a military background, while the other married a woman whose father was a military-official-turned-politician. Thus, four out of six children-in-law have a military background. Field Marshal Phin's in-laws are less homogeneous. Only two out of five children-in-law were from a military background. One was a business man, one a civil officer and one a relative of the royal family.

This diversification gave the Choonhavans an advantage over military-based kinship networks when political circumstances changed. Through these marriages, their pre-existing networks were reinforced by renewing already existing affiliations to families they had close connections to. However, important new connections were also made. This gave the family access to networks in the military, civil service, business and royalty. Through their marriages, they gained an advantage over families like the Kittikachorns, who concentrated on the military, in two ways. Firstly, it secured their survival in times of political setbacks. Secondly, it enabled them to become active in a very changed political atmosphere in the 1980s and 1990s. When Field Marshal Phin and Phao lost power in 1957, the remaining family members could recline into political passiveness and engage in business. Subsequently, they could return to the political stage and flourish after the downfall of the Field Marshals Thanom and Praphat.

The concept of diversification is a sign of greater foresight of the Choonhavans and possibly also greater involvement of the parents in the process of finding marriage partners. The marriages of the Choonhavan children took place in the 1930s and 1940s. Due to the important role which the military played during the Boworadet Rebellion in 1933 and the hyper-nationalist atmosphere before and during the Second World War, the military at this time appeared to be a major driving force in Thailand at that time and the foreseeable future. The strong influence the (civil) bureaucracy would play in Thai politics, as well as the return of the monarchy to a position of influence was not likely to be easily

anticipated. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan included all these areas in his networks. Pongphon (ปองพล 2009) suggests that this was intentional. In the novel it is written that Phin says, "Soldiers and civil officers are both equally important for the development of the nation" (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 108). However, we do not know if these words were actually uttered by Phin or if Pongphon (ปองพล 2009) wanted to appeal to a modern audience. If Phin did indeed hold such an opinion, it made sense to include them both equally in his networks. That this inclusion of both military and civil officers in sons-in-law was intentional can be seen in the fact that the marriage with the civil servant was actually an arranged marriage. The Kittikachorns have not shown much effort to include civil servants within their kinship network. Most of their children married within the military circles. This bears witness to either a lack of foresight, not acknowledging the potential of the civil services, or to a greater leeway they gave their children in choosing a partner. Given that Field Marshal Thanom was heading a military regime for over a decade, it seems reasonable that he would have seen more potential in candidates from the military. Additionally, as his children were growing up in military camps and attended military schools, it seems plausible that his children would be closer to people from military circles than to civilians. Accordingly, if they had the freedom to choose their own partners, it is very likely that they would choose from the pool of the military circles, as this was where they socialized. Thus, both explanations are possible.

The Third Generation

The process of getting married has undergone marked changes, making marriages of the third generation different from those of the first and second generations. Children no longer take their parents' advice as seriously as they used to do; as Suwit (interview 26 May 2010) put it in the citation on page 143 "they do not listen". This is part of a greater trend that the parents have lost importance in the marriage process. Couples meet, as in the case of Suwit's sons, while studying in the same institution or at work. They date and get to know each other. The decision on marriage is made based on the prospective partner and not based on their family background. Where the second generation tended to marry within a very narrow circle of already well-acquainted families, this generation did not entertain close contacts with their in-laws before marriage. The case of Danuporn Punnakanta demonstrates this.

Danuporn Punnakanta

The marriage between Danuporn Punnakanta and Suvananth Kongying is a good example for a groom choosing his bride without consideration of family background or his own parents' approval. Danuporn is the grandson of Poth Punnakanta, a former minister under Field Marshal Thanom. As brother-in-law of Praman Adireksan, he was a member of the Ratchakru Group. Danuporn first started a successful career as an actor and later entered politics as an MP. In late 2008, news spread that he would finally wed his long-time girlfriend Suvananth, a well-known actress. However, it soon became apparent that Danuporn's mother did not approve of this match. Her reasons for disapproval were many. She probably had envisioned a daughter-in-law from a more prestigious family rather than the daughter of a high school teacher and a humble government employee. Moreover, Suvananth had been the minor wife of a friend of the Punnakanta family, which was definitely not appreciated by Danuporn's mother. Finally and most importantly, Suvananth and her future mother-in-law had had an argument in which Suvananth behaved disrespectfully After much gossip if the wedding was going to take place, the couple apologized for any offences to the mother and married in January 2009 (anonymous, interview 5 August 2011).

Though the marriage of Danuporn Punnakanta and Suvananth Kongying clearly shows that young people today are given or have more freedom in their choice of partner, this is not only a characteristic of contemporary marriages but also of the generational depth of the political *trakun* these couples are part of. Punnakanta and Kongying are a third generation couple, as are the sons of Suwit Yodmani. Kraisak Choonhavan, Chatchai's son, followed a similar pattern in marrying women who clearly suited himself more than his family.[103] However, born in 1947, he can hardly be called a product of contemporary society. The marriage of Polapee Sawanchawee also supports this argument. While his wedding took place at the same time as many of the third generation marriages, he, as the oldest son of Pairot Sawanchawee, is a member of the second generation of the Sawanchawee political *trakun*. In May 2011, he married the daughter of his parents' friends, whom he had known since an early age. His marriage fits well into the pattern for the other cases of the second generation, as discussed above, although the weddings took place half a century apart.

103 Kraisak Choonhavan married twice. Both marriages ended in divorce.

The increasingly independent choices of members of the third generation are likely to be caused by the decreased need for social upward mobility and the creation of networks. At the point when a political *trakun* has survived to the third generation, they have acquired a reasonable amount of social standing on their own and do not necessarily have to increase their prestige by marrying into families positioned even higher than themselves. Further, political *trakun* that have been in politics for so many decades already have their networks intact, and marriage is no longer a necessity for building new alliances. These political *trakun*, rather, become the object of aspiration for newcomer families, who want to gain prestige and networks by marrying into these families. Thus, members of the third generation are more likely to marry down than up, as the first and second generations did.

The Wedding

After this rather lengthy discussion of the topic of mate choice, I will now briefly discuss weddings, the moment when the kinship network is actually knittled. This particular moment is important in the way it contributes to the building and reinforcement of networks, beyond the actual marriage it creates. The procedures and ritual arrangement will only be discussed if these are important for networking and making kin. Another issue that will be explored is the wedding as symbolic capital. How is capital expressed by the location, food and guests? How is the status of the guests shown in the arrangement of the wedding? The discussion will focus on two weddings that took place recently: (1) the wedding of Polapee Suwanchawee on 14 May 2011 and (2) Pintongtha Shinawatra's wedding on the 12 December 2011.

A ceremony consists of two different events: the engagement (**งานหมั้น**) and the wedding (**งานแต่งงาน** or **งานมงคลสมรส**). The engagement, which mostly takes place in the morning, actually resembles a traditional Thai marriage ceremony as described by Sathirakoses (**เสฐียรโกเศศ** 2008: 416-427);[104] it should, however, be understood as the official agreement to get married. The wedding usually takes place during the evening and is an adaptation of a Western wedding. It can be understood as a dinner party, with toasting, cutting the cake and throwing the bouquet. The bride will usually wear a white wedding gown after Western models. The two events might or might not take place on the same day. However, today it is common that not much time elapses after the engagement takes place. This melting of two originally separate ceremonies into more or less one event seems to be a

[104] For a similar description in English see also Anuman 1988.

recent development. This becomes clear when comparing the Suwanchawee and Shinawatra weddings to the wedding of the Choonhavan family. While the contemporary time between engagements was 2 days and one month for the Suwanchawee and the Shinawatra wedding, respectively, between Chatchai's engagement and wedding three years passed.

The engagement is an important event that not only announces the upcoming wedding to the public but more importantly defines the inner circles of the kinship network. In contrast to the wedding, the engagement takes place in a small, select circle, only including the family and close friends; thus, receiving an invitation to this event means, in theory, being considered as part of the family. In practice not all guests at an engagement are actually related by blood or marriage, which becomes clear when considering that for the Shinawatra engagement, 300 guests were invited (*Matichon Online*, 12 November 2011). However, an invitation conveys the meaning that the host considers the person invited to be part of his family or a person he or she wants to honor.

The wedding reception finalizes the marriage and makes it public. Weddings, thus, tend to be much bigger than engagements. For the Shinawatra wedding 2,500 guests were invited, and I was told by one of the relatives of the bride at the Suwanchawee wedding that 3,000 invitation cards had been printed and distributed. Most certainly a much lower number of guests actually attended. In addition to having a large number of guests, significant weddings are announced in the newspapers.[105] The standard announcement is a picture of the couple, their two sets of parents and the chairperson of the wedding, which is accompanied by a simple line naming the day and location of the wedding, as well as the people shown in the picture. A wedding like the Shinawatra wedding can get a much higher amount of coverage.

The attendance and contribution to weddings is carefully recorded in order to allow reciprocity. The guests will usually write their congratulations and their names in a book in the reception area. The envelopes of the invitation cards, bearing the name of the guests, will be used to put in money as a gift to the couple. These are later used to make detailed lists of guests and their contributions. This will later be reciprocated with an appropriate amount on the next occasion. However, how the reciprocity works is a rather complicated issue. Firstly, not to attend a wedding of someone who has been at one's own or one's children's wedding is considered impolite. When it comes to the financial contribution, it has to be in relation to the participant's and host's social status, the closeness of the

[105] The Thairath newspaper is known for printing wedding announcements daily. However, other newspapers also regularly publish such announcements for more prominent weddings.

relationship, contributions received in the past and the approximated costs of the reception. The contribution is meant as financial support for the wedding arrangement, not as start-up money or a present for the couple.

A wedding gives people an opportunity to interact under relaxed circumstances, which provides opportunities to strengthen old relationships and to create new ones. Participants at weddings are of all ages. Little children are brought to the receptions and left to play with each other. Thus, weddings can be seen as an opportunity for children from the same social circles to build up relationships at an early age. Of course, not only children socialize at weddings, adults likewise use the opportunity. Weddings often become a chance to reconnect with various people, such as friends from school, university and professional life.

The chairperson of a wedding plays a very important role, as he or she is formally the head of the event and signalizes the social capital of the couple. He or she is the one named as the host of a wedding. The chairperson is usually close to the couple or their parents and can be a senior friend of the parents, an employer, or any other person of high status to whom the parents of the couple feel close enough. In the case of the Shinawatra wedding it was Yingluck Shinawatra, the current prime minister, and for the Suwanchawee wedding a privy council took over this role (see Figure 8). The chairperson proceeds over the wedding and is, thus, evidence of the extent of the newlywed couple's network. The higher up in the social hierarchy the chairperson is, the higher up are the connections of the couple. It thus conveys the social status of the couple.

The status of the bride and groom is expressed in an array of things, such as the venue, the food and the wedding gown. The venue of the wedding is an important feature, representing the economic and cultural capital of the couple. While the Choonhavans celebrated their weddings at home, today it is common to use hotels as the venue. Hotels of good name in the prime locations of Bangkok symbolize financial capacity and, thus, status. Amongst the first addresses are the Plaza Athene, the Oriental Hotel and international brands such as the Sheraton and Kempinski. Both of the weddings described here took place at one of these addresses. Not only is the venue an important indicator but also the number of guests. A wedding of several hundred guests is relatively common and as we can see in political circles, having over 1,000 guests is not unusual. In the case of the Shinawatra wedding, one of my informants said: "They had to close down Plaza Athene for that

wedding". It is statements like this that are intended to show an extraordinary amount of economic capital.

Figure 8: The bridal couple and the chairman on stage at the Suwanchawee wedding

The choice of food arrangement gives us further hints about the couple's capital. There are different ways of arranging the wedding reception, one of which is called cocktail-style and a more traditional one is the 'Chinese table'.[106] The choice of a style depends on an array of considerations. The cocktail-style wedding is more economical as it is cheaper and allows a larger number of people in a smaller space, as no tables are required and less food is served. Given that the guests are standing, the cocktail reception allows for people to move around easily and, thus, facilitates the interaction with a higher number of people. It also has a fresh and modern touch of easiness and allows a variety of different and creative foods. This is the version which was chosen by the Suwanchawee wedding (see Figures 9 and 10). On the other hand, the 'Chinese table' is more formal and traditional. Guests remain seated at their places and enjoy the company of the same people over the evening. This limits the interaction with other guests to a certain extent, especially if the seating is arranged by the host. However, as the 'Chinese table' is more costly, it also is more prestigious. The Shinawatra wedding chose this style.

[106] A 'Chinese table' is a large round table that can seat around ten people. The name also refers to the food that is served, which is a set menu of Chinese dishes.

Figure 9: The Suwanchawee wedding buffet

Figure 10: Cocktail reception at the Suwanchawee wedding

Apart from rather obvious criteria, such as choice of venue and food, there are other more subtle statements to be made. What kind of dress is the bride wearing? Is it a designer label? The US$14,000 Vera Wang wedding gown worn by Pintongtha Shinawatra, imported from Singapore, definitely made a statement (*Matichon Online*, 13 December 2011). This is especially true if we consider that one could finance an entire wedding in a good Bangkokian hotel with that amount. Finally, the souvenirs given to the guests should not be overlooked. The standard souvenirs are fans, chopsticks and key chains, but the

Shinawatra wedding used a silver-colored tea sieve in the shape of a house, as shown in Figure 11 (*Kapook* 12 December 2011). This was an elegant and extraordinary choice that was surely much more costly than the standard.

Figure 11: The Sovenirs Handed out at the Wedding of Pintongtha Shinawatra
(Source: *Kapook* 12 December 2011**).**)

Adoption

In cases where marriage is not an available option to create alliances, adoption can be one method to create kinship links. Adoption could, however, have different levels of impact. While some adoptions take place when the adoptee was still a child, others happen in adulthood. In the first case, the adoptee would take over the adoptive family's surname and would be raised by that family. Probably, the most prominent example for this is Lady Potjaman Na Pombejra's adopted brother Banphot Damapong. As in this case, these children get absorbed into their adopted family, and it is very difficult to even find information about their birth parents.

When people are adopted in adulthood, the adoptee keeps his or her own surname. The adoption often is not made official and, thus, is not legally binding. How such an adoption can take place is nicely demonstrated by the case of Lady Jongkon Kittikachorn, who was adopted by Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan. In a letter of Memorial for Lady Udomluck Sriyanondth, she explains her relationship to Lady Udomluck and the Choonhavan family.

> Sister, you will remember that since we met in 1947 when Brother Phao, your husband, convinced my husband to participate in the coup together,

> we have known and loved each other deeply. The relationship of our families during that time was stable and sincere without comparison.
>
> Especially when my father ceded me to be adopted by father Field Marshal Phin, you gave me even more love and adoration. Up to this day I have never forgotten the kindness you have given me.
>
> You once told me that somebody came to ask you why my father had to give me up for adoption. You answered this question according to the truth: My father had three children of whom 2 died. Only I was left. My father was worried [to lose me too] and went to consult a monk. The monk advised him to give me away to a person with merit. My father and your father were born in the same year, but your father had raised children easily. None was lost and all were good. My father knew that we had loved each other for a long time. Thus, he gave me away to be another of father Field Marshal Phin's children. I have always tried to return father Field Marshal Phin's kindness.[107]

The two women already knew each other for some time before the adoption took place. As they met for the first time in 1947, it must have happened after that date. In 1947, Lady Jongkon was 32 years old, and had been married to Thanom Kittikachorn for over ten years and was the mother of six children. The reason for the adoption, as stated in the letter, is also confirmed by Air Chief Marshal Yuthapong Kittikachorn, who remembers that his mother at that time was suffering from a serious illness thus prompting his grandfather to ask for a monk's advice. However, it is not so much the cause for adoption but the choice of adoptive father that is interesting here. Thanom Kittikachorn participated in the 1947 coup in which Field Marshal Phin was the coup leader. At the time of the coup Field Marshal Phin was one of the most powerful men, and a kinship relationship with him or his family must have seemed promising. However, given that Field Marshal Thanom and Field Marshal Phin's children were already married, an adoption was the only way to create a kinship link. For the side of Field Marshal Phin, the connection was also promising, because it offered an opportunity to include a new promising son-in-law to his family. It turned out that the relationship was more of use for the Choonhavan side as Field Marshal Thanom protected Chatchai from Field Marshal Sarit's anger after the 1957 coup. Sarit had planned to dismiss him from the armed forces or have him assassinated after Sarit's takeover of power. Thanom arranged for a far-away posting as diplomat to Argentina instead. Hence adoption, especially in adulthood, should be seen as an effective way of creating kinship.

[107] For Thai original see Appendix 1.17.

Alliance and Descent

Marriages are an issue of great importance for political *trakun*, as the survival of the political influence can depend on them. Via marriages, political *trakun* are able to increase their economic and symbolic capital. Hereby, social capital is most apparant. A marriage joins two people, but it also joins two families. The capital of both families can now be mutually utilized. Political *trakun* engage in polygamous marriages and also resort to adoptions to increase the opportunity to gain capital. The choice of a marriage partner is crucial. The necessity of choosing well decreases in urgency when the *trakun* is already well established. A well-established *trakun* has a high amount of both economic and symbolic capital, and, thus, does not need to rely on adding capital though marriage. This allows the second and, in particular, the third generation members of political *trakun* more freedom in the choice of a mate. A marriage can also prevent conflict between influential politicians. As the case of Narong Kittikachorn has shown, his father and father-in-law did not pose a threat to each other as they had become intimately connected. Further, a well-made match can provide a political *trakun* with a talented successor, who can advance the political interest of the family. This is particularly important if the children of the *trakun* have not shown much talent for or interest in politics. Thus, for political *trakun*, marriage is an instrument to create alliances. In this chapter, the alliance theory clearly has dominated the discussion about kinship in political *trakun*. However, descent is also a crucial concept in these *trakun*. This will become clear in the following chapter, which will discuss the workings of political *trakun* and the upbringing of children.

Chapter 7

Trakun at Work: Relationships of Reciprocity

In Thailand patron-client relationships have traditionally been a part of the political game. These relationships are based on an asymmetrical relationship of exchange between two individuals of differing social standing. Such relationships can be between politicians and business men, bureaucrats and voters or between politicians themselves. The patron is of a higher social level and can access higher amounts of capital and provide more services than the client. As such he offers the client protection, benefits and access to his connections. The client, often dependent on the patron's services, will reciprocate by rendering services and by becoming part of the patron's entourage. A large entourage allows the patron to extend his political and economic resources (Landé 1973, 1977: xx-xxvii; Hanks 1975). The relationship is asymmetric, because the patron's support for the client is often deemed more valuable than that provided by the client. Thus, the client is at a disadvantage and depends on the patron. Nevertheless, patron-client relationships are voluntary and can be ended if either of the parties is not satisfied. This often happens when a patron becomes too demanding, loses his power base or when too many clients become attached to the same patron. In both cases the patron is not able to provide the client with enough protection and benefits, which will lead to desertion (Landé 1977: xiv-xix). Ockey (1994) has shown this phenomenon with Thai political parties. Accordingly, political parties fall apart once they have too many MPs competing for available benefits.

Patron-client relationships are loaded with the moral obligation to reciprocate a gift which facilitates in continuity of the relationship. Despite the voluntary nature, patron-client relationships are enforced by moral

y a monetary transaction. In this chapter I will, however, show that electoral candidates attempt to infuse these moral obligations back into the relationship. They follow this aim by implying metaphors of kinship with their voters.

Relationships of reciprocity are not only found amongst politicians and their voters but also between members of a *trakun*; here the exchange leads to the establishment of long-lasting bonds of trust. The gift parents make to their children is of great magnitude. They give them life; they feed them; they dress them; they educate them. By doing so, they create a debt of gratitude that the children can hardly ever repay fully. Children, if they do not

want to be seen as ungrateful, have to attempt to repay their parents with loyalty and services. Thus, the relationship between parents and children is not only one of blood (descents) but also one of reciprocity, thus leading to very strong bonds between them. Such bonds can be used to establish trust networks.

Networks are widespread and can be found in all circumstances of society; everyone is part of one or several networks. Such networks can be based on living in the same neighborhood, attending the same school, receiving a certain newspaper or going to a fitness center. The patron-client relationships discussed above also often form networks. One client is the patron of another, who again might be a patron for someone else. In this way, networks are established. Trust networks differ from such networks. Tilly (2005: 44) argues that trust networks are more intimate and the relationships last longer. Trust networks are more rigid. That means they are less likely to recruit new members or shift positions of members in the network. They are less flexible in their organization, size and major activities. Such major activities often rely on specific knowledge and involve long-term planning and high risk. It is noteworthy that trust networks are often based on kinship links. However, such kinship links are usually unilateral. Unilateral kinship has clear defined boundaries of membership, while bilateral kinship does not. This makes the emergence of trust networks in unilateral kinship systems much more likely.

In this chapter I will analyze relationships of reciprocity of political *trakun*. This includes the relationships within the *trakun*, such as between parents and children or between spouses, as well as beyond, such as between the *trakun* and voters. Many political activities take place at a politician's home, establishing a relationship between the voters and the people living in the politician's home. This encourages the involvement of relatives in politics, which makes the emergence of a political family possible and ensures the reproduction of political capital. Amongst the members of a political family, it is often the politician's wife who plays a crucial role in interacting with voters, lobbying, providing support in election campaigns and a wide range of other activities. Out of this informal political engagement of the wife, the institution of *lang ban* has materialized. It will further be shown that the raising of children is essential to the reproduction of symbolic capital in all forms. Children are imprinted with a strong sense of loyalty towards the family, which ensures that the capital of the children is utilized to the benefit of the whole family. The combined effort of the political family is most visible during election campaigning, in which family members support each other. Election campaigning also offers an opportunity to reproduce political capital and to select a potential political successor. The efforts of a

political *trakun* to increase and reproduce their capital can, however, be undermined by means of rumors.

The Politician's Home

In Thailand, political capital is more effectively acquired outside the formal institutions of education and political parties. It is not impossible for a person coming from a family which is not involved in politics to acquire political capital. One can enter educational institutions and political parties in order to gain political capital in formal institutions, as discussed by Bourdieu (1999). However, the institutionalized road to political capital is only open to a person who has fulfilled certain conditions; for example, one has to have entered university and be of electoral age. Further, unlike in France, Thailand has no university particularly specialized in politics.[108] Children in political *trakun* start the process of acquiring political capital much earlier. They start their apprenticeship in early childhood at home.

In order to understand how children of political *trakun* acquire political capital at home, it is nessesary to understand the functions of the politician's house. The Thai word *ban* (บ้าน) or house carries multifold meanings, as has already been discussed in Chapter 3. Here, however, it refers to the house and the family occupying it. The politician's house is often not only the place where he and his family live. The house of a politician is a meeting place for voters or other politicians and, during election campaigns, it often functions as campaign headquarters. Thus, the private home becomes a public place closely interlinked with the politician's career.

It is possible that this pattern of overlapping private and public spaces goes back to the Thai political system before 1932. Traditionally, governors or other high ranking officials would have their administration in their personal homes. There all public matters would be settled. This practice originated out of a lack of government-owned facilities, the practice to nominate locally influential people as governors and the overall decentralized fashion of government. When the government increasingly became centralized and bureaucratized under King Chulalongkorn, it was decreed that the governors were to be appointed by the king, offices should not be hereditary and governors should not hold office from their private homes. The implementation of these decrees, however, was not stringent and the practice remained in place (Vickery 1970). It is possible that the quasi hereditary

[108] The closest match to the specialized institutions in France is probably the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University.

fashion of Thai politics today is founded in these practices. It is an old pattern that is superimposed by the image of the impersonal state.

Politicians find different ways to incorporate the public functions in their homes. The Jiraphanwanit house in Lopburi province is the home of Kamon Jiraphanwanit, who was a longstanding MP for that province until he was banned from politics in 2006, and Malika Jiraphanwanit, who has taken over his seat in parliament since. The house is an old two-story shop house, which accommodates the family's retail business on the ground floor and the living quarters on the second floor. The spacious and shady backyard is used to welcome voters. The gate to the backyard is open to allow guests to enter easily:

> One should not become crazy for power. Power is not sustainable. Do you know *Phra Deth Phra Khun*? *Phra Deth* is power. *Phra Khun* is generosity. I help where I can help. I am not tense. One or two o'clock in the morning, the door is open. The door has a short circuit. People ask [me] why I do not close the door. I do not dare to tell them […] so I say that I am too lazy to open and close it all the time. Let it be open. I have to take care [of you]. Here we give them everything (Kamon Jiraphanwanit, interview 12 April 2010).[109]

Though the gate is left open due to technical problems, Kamon implies that this openness and the generosity that comes with it is more efficient than the use of power and force when it comes to the maintenance of a voter base. It is the giving of gifts and favors that morally binds the voters to the politician. Other politicians have found other ways to accommodate voters and politicians within their houses. Dr. Adisorn Phiangket, former MP and a leader of the red-shirt movement, has built a meeting pavilion within the compound of his Khon Khaen house. Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai, parliamentary candidate for the Democrat Party and former mayor of Chiang Mai, has a small building that functions as a campaign office on the compound of her parents' Chiang Mai home. Joemmat Juenglertsiri, an MP, has repurposed an old shop house close to where her family lives into a party branch offering overnight quarters. Other spaces to receive voters and other guests can be the study or a formal sitting room.

The multiple functionality of the politician's house draws the remaining members of a politician's family into politics as well. This is well expressed by Duangke Anuphon, an MP for Khon Khaen, who states that:

> It is normal for politicians in our country, that when one person is a politician all [in the family] are politicians. […] To be a politician in Thailand, the whole family needs to be ready. Everybody has to support: the children, the nieces

[109] For Thai original see Appendix 1.18.

> and nephews, the relatives and siblings (Duangke Anuphon, interview 15 June 2010).[110]

Everyone who is living in the house is constantly in contact with either voters or other politicians. This gives them the opportunity to observe and learn. They learn how to interact, how to speak the political language, and they are introduced to how to perform. Members of the family can partake in insider knowledge not otherwise obtainable. They are, however, also given responsibilities in hosting visitors, which again gives them the opportunity to learn. Through these constant learning possibilities, children and other relatives of politicians can acquire political capital much more effectively than a person who follows the institutional path. This translates into a much higher amount of political capital than that of non-members of political families.

Among all the members of the family, the role of the politician's wife is most outstanding. Though all members of the family are involved in politics or learn the political game, in one way or another, the politicians' wife is given the most attention by my informants as well as in the Thai media. The politician's wife is commonly called *lang ban* or the back of the house. The following section seeks to explore the term and the function of the *lang ban* in more detail.

Lang Ban: The Politician's Wife

Lang ban (หลังบ้าน) is a compound noun, consisting of the nouns '*lang*' (หลัง) and '*ban*' (บ้าน). '*Lang*' (หลัง) can be used both as preposition and as noun, whereby the preposition refers to behind or after and the noun to the back. '*Ban*' (บ้าน) refers to the house. Thus, *lang ban* means the back of the house. It is occasionally also translated as the backyard (McFarland 1941: 920). However, the translation as back of the house seems to be more appropriate, as I will show now.

Lang ban can be used in combination with two verbs: *yu* (อยู่) and *pen* (เป็น).[111] Both verbs are translated as the English 'be'. However, these verbs have a different grammatical function and meaning. '*Yu*' is the full verb with the meaning, among other things, of exist (in a place). Thus to *yu lang ban* (อยู่หลังบ้าน) means to be behind the house or at the back of the house. In this case *lang* (หลัง) could be both a preposition or a noun, without

[110] For Thai original see Appendix 1.19.

[111] Another verb that is used in connection with the term *lang ban* is *kue* (คือ). It has the same meaning and function as *pen*. However, *pen* is used much more frequently.

alteration of the meaning. The phrase would thus refer to the location of a person. An example from my interviews demonstrates that.

> The wife of the current prime minister seems to seldom appear.[112] She is more in the back of the house (Samat Phiriyapanyatorn, interview 24 June 2010).[113]

This statement refers to the actual location of the prime minister's wife (Pimpen Vejjajiva) who relatively seldom took part in public occasions, referred to as 'to come out' and 'to appear'. She was in the back of the house, which is the part of the house that remains unseen and private. This private nature of the back of the house also implies that this is a less formal space than the front part of the house. Carsten (2004: 42) has observed a similar custom with the Malay community where the entrance at the back of the house was only used by members of the family or other frequent visitors with a close relationship to the inhabitants. The front part of the house was reserved for more formal occasions.

The term '*lang ban'* is interlinked with its spatiality, as was clearly expressed by Paraton Prisananantkun, an MP of Angthong province, when he explained the term, as follows:

> *Lang ban* is…suppose the husband is a politician, then *lang ban* is the housewife (literally: mother of the house) – the wife. That means that in Thailand the stairs to the house are in the front of the house; the kitchen is in the back. The kitchen is the place where the women prepare the meals. So who does not enter the house in the front, secretly goes to talk in the back of the house. That is to say, to go talk to the housewife, because it is the housewife who prepares the food in the kitchen. That is why she is called *lang ban* (Pandon Phrisananantkun, interview 25 June 2010).[114]

Accordingly, *lang ban* refers to a politician's wife.[115] She is named after the part of the house that is associated with female activities, which is also the informal and private part of the house. This use of the term is signified be the verb '*pen*', which is used as a copular verb. Thus, the politician's wife is the *lang ban*. She is the embodiment of a place.

Such an embodiment of places is common in the Thai understanding of space. As has been shown by O'Connor (1992), places in colloquial understanding do not refer to a certain location on a map or a piece of land but to a certain community. The same can be observed in Thai politics, where political factions, which could be equated with a political community, are often named after the residence of the faction leader. One well known case of

[112] At the time of the interview Abhisit Vejjajiva was prime minister.
[113] For Thai original see Appendix 1.20.
[114] For Thai original see Appendix 1.21.
[115] This translation of the term can also be found in the official dictionary of the The Royal Institute/ **ราชบัณฑิตยสถาน** (1999: 1272).

such praxis is the Ratchakru Group. When we consider the house as a unit of a community, it becomes logical that the owner of the house might be identified with it and vice versa.

Lang ban is, however, only one part of a complete house and a couple. To make the house complete, the front of the house is needed, which is the '*na ban*' (หน้าบ้าน) – the husband. The *na ban* represents the couple to the public. It is the openly active part of the couple. While the *na ban* is often associated with the husband, just as the *lang ban* is associated with the wife, this gender division is not static. The *na ban* should rather be understood as active and public and the *lang ban* as passive and private. Thus, a reversal of roles is possible if, for example, the wife is the politician.

There is no discourse on the meaning of *lang ban*, and a remarkable agreement exists within my group of informants. When asked what they understood to be *lang ban*, all informants replied that the term refers to the wife of a politician. However, *lang ban* is seldom used in a neutral way but is seen as either positive or negative, depending on the diverse functions and roles the informants ascribe to the *lang ban*. The interplay of positive and negative notions is nicely represented by the following explanation by a male MP:

> In the Thai society, *lang ban* is of great significance no matter if it is that of a politician or government official, such as commissioners or governors. Sometimes a governor or commissioner might be a loyal and incorruptible person, but if he has a demanding wife - a wife that is looking for wealth [sic]. At times when business men want to lobby for privileges in official bidding for service or procurement, they will know not to approach the commissioner, because the commissioner does not involve himself in such business and is honest. The business man will then approach the wife instead and propose her money if she can convince her husband that he should win an official bidding to build a street. So, the wife goes to talk to her husband. Now it depends if the husband and wife have the same character, they are straightforward and loyal, and then this system does not arise. But if the wife has a 'demand' and the husband is afraid of his wife, then the wife can guide her husband to do such things. This is why there is the *lang ban* system. […] They say that if one wants to be successful as a politician, *lang ban*, or the wife, is very important. She is an important 'promoter' – an important component. When we look at this from the 'positive' side: an MP who has a wife that the people do not like, will not become MP [again]. But if an MP has a wife whom the people like, a wife who goes to social occasions in his place, who helps and cares for the people on her husband's behalf, this MP will always be elected as representative. Therefore, from the positive side, *lang ban*, or the wife, is an important component in a politician's life. Looking at it from a different angle, the 'negative' side: several politicians who climbed up the ladder of administrative positions until they became minister, if they cannot cover their wife or are afraid of their wife, thus, the wrong thing becomes a big problem.

> […] Therefore, I here would like to say that *lang ban* can be *positive* and *negative* (Suparp Kleekhajai, interview 26 March 2010).[116]

This description of the *lang ban* defines the different functions of a politician's wife. The functions of the *lang ban* cover a wide area. However, what is most apparent in this statement is that the relationship between husband and wife determines if the *lang ban* can be seen as positive or negative. If a woman is demanding and is not controlled by her husband, she makes him afraid of her. This leads to a *lang ban* in the negative sense. The woman accepts bribes or lobbies for her husband's advancement (behind his back). The woman corrupts her husband. This can ultimately lead to the man's political demise. On the other hand, a wife can also be an important supporter, 'promoter', of her husband. In this more positive version of the *lang ban*, the woman is the supporter and under the husband's control. In reality, the *lang ban* is much more complex. While the informant states that it is generally the wife who corrupts the husband, the opposite can also be true. In some cases it is also perceivable that both partners were aiming for financial gains. The function the *lang ban* fulfills depends on many factors, such as the age and education and the personal character of both partners.

The functions of the *lang ban* can be manifold. The *lang ban* is traditionally responsible for domestic chores, such as taking care of the family and raising the children. Politicians' wives are also crucial in the securing of financial means by employment or independent business ventures. They also can take a more active part in their husband's career, such as networking with other politicians and their wives, lobbying, or giving advice. The *lang ban* is also crucial in maintaining the voter base, especially during election campaigns or other representational activities, such as participation in charity events. Not to forget is the part the *lang ban* takes in corruption. It should be noted that not all politicians' wives are involved in all these functions. How much a woman takes part in her husband's political career depends on the individual and can also vary within the lifespan of a woman. Thus, the different functions here will be described in general terms and should be understood as a set of building blocks from which each *lang ban* can choose to build her own approach.

The *lang ban* has traditionally taken care of all domestic affairs. Children have to be born and raised. Children are raised mainly by the women of the political family, as the men are often absent. Indeed, many of the politicians' wives I interviewed stated that they had to be both mother and father to their children. One politician's wife states:

[116] For Thai original see Appendix 1.22.

> We divided the responsibilities clearly. My duty is being a mother, raising the children, because my husband has not much time he can spend with the family (Nanthana Thipsuwan, interview 10 April 2010).[117]

The raising of children is especially important when we consider the importance children have for the present and future of political families. If children turn out to be difficult and frequently get into trouble, this diminishes the parents' electoral prospects and symbolic capital. However, if the children turn out well, they might have accumulated political capital of their own. Thus, children can support the parents in their work with the voters and potentially establish the next generation of a political family.

Many of the politicians interviewed stressed the importance of a good home maker. They stressed that only if they can be at peace at home will they then be able to concentrate on their political career. One should not underestimate the moral support that a stable family situation can give a politician. While many of my informants acknowledge the importance of a strong emotional backup, seldom is a statement as clear as that of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva:

> The night of 10 April [2010] was the night that I suffered the most since becoming prime minister. Today [...] I must confess that I cried that night for a very long time. In my political life, I never want to see the loss of lives […] But it happened when I am the prime minister. […] I knew from that night onwards no matter what I decided, my life could never be as before. No matter how I decide, I have to tell you, that I was thinking it over and over but could not make up my mind on what I should do. It was my wife who brought me to consciousness. She also knew that her life and that of our children would never be the same. I felt guilty, because I was the one who volunteered for politics, not her. She did not have to enter politics with me, but we are necessarily tied together. That day, she told me only one thing. We are sure that we did not want the incident to happen. We were not the reason for it to happen. Thus, the only way to take responsibility is carry the burden and solve the problem. Don't run away from the problem. Face the crisis and resolve it (Abhisit Vejjajiva, public speech 23 June 2011).[118]

Abhisit was speaking about the incident on 10 April 2010, in which anti-government protestors and government forces clashed violently, resulting in the death of several people. In this statement it is clear that he did not see himself as the cause of the clashes and the lives lost.[119] His position to the incident in itself is worthy of discussion; however, this will not be done in this thesis. What is more important here is how he claims that his wife was able to

[117] For Thai original see Appendix 1.23.
[118] For Thai original see Appendix 1.24.
[119] This is not a universally accepted truth; see for example (Montesano, Pavin and Aekapol 2012).

motivate him to further his political work. Many politicians make statements in a similar line and the wife is generally portrayed to be a major supporter of the husband.

The *lang ban* is also often responsible for the securing of economic capital. While the politician is occupied with acquiring political, social and other forms of symbolic capital, he or she often has limited time and energy to acquire economic capital as well. The acquisition of economic capital is further limited by the legal framework, which does not allow a politician to hold shares in companies that have state contracts. However, economic capital is crucial for any political career. It is here that the *lang ban* steps in. This can take various forms. The *lang ban* could have a regular income from employment in government service or the economy. She could also be in charge of small and medium-size businesses, often somehow related to retailing.[120] One politician, for example, reported that his wife had once also been in local politics. After a short time the family enterprise, a construction material store, required her to return and give up politics. Such cases of financial support through the *lang ban* are important for the political career of a politician.

The financial support of the *lang ban* can easily become intertwined with issues of corruption and conflict of interest. One former parliamentarian, for example, told me:

> I have never embezzled. Corruption…to build a short road costs ten million [*baht*]. They give 10% for one road, right. I tell them: give it to me. There is a road that is not good. I give you one hundred thousand [*baht*]. I pave [the street] till the village square (anonymous, interview 1 May 2010).[121]

This comment reveals how politicians utilize money on several levels. The MP takes pains to wash his hands clean of corruption. However, maybe due to some miscalculation, it appears that he takes financial incentives from construction companies.[122] To legitimize taking the money, he then confers that he is using it not for his own benefits, but for the good of the people by building them a road. He implies that this is selfless behavior. However, at the same time, his wife owns and manages a company selling construction material. It is likely that it is this company which will supply the material needed to build the road. Thus, he benefits in many ways. The construction of the road is used to clean the money. Simultaneously, the MP improves his image and patronizes his voters with the bribes. This

[120] While those businesses most likely profit from the political engagemtn of the families, they were not set up exclusively for this reason. Many families had retail business prior to their entrance into politics. It is a sign of their embership in the middle and upper class.
[121] For Thai original see Appendix 1.25.
[122] He states that a short road cost ten million *baht* of which he is offered 10 %, which equals 1 million *baht*. He is using one hundred thousand to build a road for the voters. This would leave him with nine hundred thousand *baht* at his own disposal.

shows that business enterprises by political families support their relatives in ways that imply a misappropriation. Therefore, the *lang ban* also has a reputation to be involved in corruption. This has become clear from the definitions of *lang ban* quoted above. Other well known cases of such alleged embezzlement and conflict of interest are the Kittikachorn family, the Choonhavans and the Shinawatras, as discussed in Chapter 5. Corruption is closely interlinked with a political system that is based on patron-client relationships, as has been observed by Hutchcroft (2000) in the Philippines.

Politicians' wives play an important role in maintaining a relationship with the voters and, thus, the social capital of the family. Politicians need to remain present and in reach of the electorate and they try to achieve this in various ways. As mentioned earlier, politicians receive voters at home. Voters approach them with various concerns ranging from legal advice over securing employment to school placement for their children. Attending funerals and weddings remains high on the priority list, as do religious or local festivals. These are important opportunities to maintain and expand a politician's network. When the MP is away in the capital city to attend parliamentary sessions or otherwise not available, such responsibilities are frequently taken over by the wife or other family members. The wife can further enhance her husband's efforts by engaging in charity events in which they often take great pride. One former MP's wife related to me that she felt that female voters would feel more comfortable to speak to her than to her husband. She remarked that many women came to her to get advice on solving problems in the family and for child rearing. In this way, the politician's wife takes the position of an elder relative of the voters. She is also a representative of her husband, which prompted former MP and leader of the red-shirt movement, Adisorn Phiangket, to say: "The husband is the Member of Parliament but the wife is the representative" (interview 5 May 2010).[123]

Apart from these supporting activities, the *lang ban* also becomes an active lobbyist and advisor to her husband. Lady Potjaman Na Pombejra, Thaksin Shinawatra's (former) wife is particularly known for such activities.[124] She is well informed about the political events and the people with whom her husband works. Wisanu (วิษณุ 2011), former secretary of the cabinet from 1993 to 2000 and deputy prime minister 2002 to 2006, tells of how Lady Potjaman was well informed and had asked him on occasion to come to the Shinawatra home to talk about politics. He also relates that during the time of Thaksin's

[123] For Thai original see Appendix 1.26.
[124] The couple is has been legally divorced since 2008 (*Bangkok Post* 15 November 2008). However, it is widely assumed that this separation is only *de jure*. Following the divorce, Potjaman took on her mother's maiden name.

prime ministership many ministerial posts were allocated by her and politicians who wanted a certain post would approach her rather than her husband. Accordingly, Wisanu (2011: 468) states:

> I do not know what the lady does, but I have to admit that this lady is very intelligent, brave and decisive. During conversation she will only ask: "How is it going? …What happened?" She never advises or gives answers. Thus, the listener is comfortable in talking to her and does not feel that he is being led. But when it comes to decisions, I think she can make them better than Prime Minister Thaksin.[125]

The discussion above focused on the wife of a politician, because traditionally, they have been associated with the *lang ban*. However, the functions of the *lang ban* can be fulfilled by other relatives as well. During election campaigns, the husbands of the female politicians Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai and Joemmat Juenglertsiri fulfilled the duties usually ascribed to the *lang ban*. In the case of Yingluck, it is her brother who fulfills many of the functions. Amongst my informants, various relatives have been named as the *lang ban*. Amongst them were the mother, the father and the uncle. Roces (1998: 51) states that in the case of the Philippines, the backup role was always filled by a woman. Even in cases in which the MP was a woman, it would be another female relative who would take over the backstage role rather than the husband. This is not the case in Thailand. The functions of the *lang ban* can be performed by both men and women. The decision on who fulfills these obligations is not determined by gender but by the ability and availability of the relatives. The same applies to the selection of possible future politicians amongst the offspring of a political family.

This involvement of a politician's spouse or other relative sets the precondition for the establishment of a political family or political *trakun*. The politician's spouse or other relative gains a considerable amount of political capital during their informal political work as *lang ban*. This political capital can then be activated when needed. This could be when the politician in incapacitated by sickness or death, or simply when the wish arises to expand the family's political influence. The *lang ban* in many cases has been able to amass enough political capital to succeed in election in their own right. Once this has happened, the family becomes a political family. The acquisition of political capital by more than one person in the family further increases the likelihood of transfer of this capital onto the next generation. This is especially the case if the *lang ban* is the politician's wife and,

[125] For Thai original see Appendix 1.27.

thus, the mother of the next generation. As she is likely to be in charge of the care for her children, she can socialize them with an eye to the acquisition of political capital. This ensures that the next generation is equipped with the needed skills and capital to enter politics upon reaching adulthood. This facilitates the emergence of the family into a political *trakun*. The following section will explore the raising of children and the acquisition of capital within political families more closely.

Raising Children: Raising Capital

How do political *trakun* raise their children? What are their priorities and goals? I will examine selected samples from the case studies used in this thesis to answer these questions. It will be shown that the raising of children is an integral part of the symbolic capitalism in which the amount of capital is increased with each generation. Children are given the best education possible and then initiated in a political career. At the same time, a feeling of loyalty to the *trakun* is instilled in the children as well as a feeling of gratitude towards their parents, who have given them life, education and occupation.

Political families invest much in the raising of their children. They invest economically by sending their children to expensive schools in Thailand and often abroad. They also invest a lot of their time and their cultural and social capital to help their children gain a head start in life. One example that stands representative of *trakun*'s efforts in raising their children is that of Praman Adireksan and his wife Lady Jaroen. They decided how they wanted to raise their children. In the cremation volume for Praman (2010), the goals they wanted for their children were set:

1. Not to be disliked by society – able to socialize.
2. To have up-to-date knowledge
3. To have an honest profession
4. To know how to be grateful – know their standing
5. To be generous and kind
6. To be a successor to the *trakun* (Praman 2010)[126]

These goals are followed by a detailed list of intermediate goals for each life stage of the children. The efforts and achievements as parents, which were based on these set goals, were recognized with an award as outstanding parents, which the couple received on 11 April 1997 at the Government House (Praman 2010).

[126] For Thai original see Appendix 1.28.

This mission statement made by the couple reveals several interesting points. When looking at the six points which indicate how the parents want their children to be, the very first point refers to the ability of the children to enter society. This implies on one level that they wish their children to be people who are accepted in society, due to proper moral conduct, respectable occupations and general standing. On another level, it also means that their children should be able to maneuver their way in society by the help of appropriate etiquette, polite speech, and appropriate attire. Further it implies that they will need social connections that allow them to succeed in society. Point one is reinforced by points four and five. Here, the children are desired to be grateful, to know their social position and to be kind to others. All this relates to their negotiating in society as superior to some and subordinate to others. In a later part of the document, it is also mentioned that the parents want to teach their children to speak politely. This indicates the use of the proper vocabulary on the right speech level as well as a soft and pleasing voice. This clearly indicates the parents wish for their children to have both social and cultural capital.

Point number two reveals the parents' wish that their children may gain an education. In addition to the overall goals cited above, the parents had a detailed discussion about the different stages in the children's education. They had decided that their children receive their undergraduate and graduate education abroad. This is an indicator that the education outside of Thailand is perceived to be of better quality and also have higher status ascribed to it. However, the parents do not limit the acquisition of knowledge to school alone. Traveling is named as one source of knowledge. Knowledge is also transferred from the parents, in particular the father, to the child. This makes clear that cultural and educational capital are seen as valuable, but their acquisition is not limited to formal educational institutions. This point encompasses cultural capital and symbolic capital, in addition to educational capital.

Korn Thapparansi's education is a good example of the kind of education a member of a political *trakun* might receive. He started his education in La-onutit Kindergarten. His education was then continued at the prestigious St. Gabriel's College in Bangkok. From there he went on to the secondary school Samphran Preparation School. To prepare him for undergraduate studies abroad, he attended the Wilbraham Academy near Springfield, Massachusetts in the United States. Finally, he entered Clark University at Worcester, also in the state of Massachusetts. After graduation, he spent two years in the United States to gain "experience" (Korn 2012). Of what nature this experience was remains, however, unclear. The vagueness of this term, "experience", leaves room for speculation.

Korn could have gained professional experience in the United States. However, the fact that it is not explicitly stated poses questions. If he had found employment in a respectable position, it is likely that he would have told us so. Hence, it is possible that if he found employment it was probably as a waiter or otherwise less prestigious position. It is also possible that he spent the year traveling or idly doing nothing worth reporting. However, when giving this time spent the label as 'gaining experience' and the fact that it happened in America, these two years become symbolic capital. It lends Korn the appearance of a man of the world. The image is more important than the substance. Another example for children's education is Akanat Promphan, son of Pornthep Techaphaybun, former Deputy Minister of Industry.[127] Akanat attended high school in Australia and graduated from Oxford University (Akanat Promphan, interview 8 August 2011).

The sixth and final point of the parents' mission statement is for their children to be successors of the *trakun*. In the case under observation, all the children were male. It remains open if such a clause would have been included if there had been any female children as well. The parents wish that the surname and all that is carried with it is preserved. Often this includes the succession to the family business, which in the case of political *trakun* is politics. It also means that one should not do anything that could harm the reputation of the family name and the *trakun*. The succession of the *trakun* is enforced by point four, which implies the children to be grateful. To show gratitude to one's parents is expected behavior for Thai children. Further, it is emphasized at another point in the text that the siblings should love and support each other. Thus, a strong sense of belonging and mutual support of the *trakun* is fostered.

Family Loyalties

Children are invested with the ideal of close cooperation in the process of growing up. This is based on the ideal that families should support the individual members of the family, as expressed by Duang Anupon, an MP from Khon Khaen:

> Thai society is a society in which everyone in the family supports each other. One cannot differentiate: This is not my business. That is not possible. When in the family someone needs support, one has to help as well as one can. This

[127] After his parents' divorce, his mother remarried Suthep Thaugsuban, former deputy prime minister from 2008 to 2011. Hence he is Suthep's stepson.

> is Thai society. We have been doing things this way since ancient times, and we still continue to do so (Duang Anupon, interview 15 June 2010).[128]

This support can be resorted to while engaging in politics. The family and kinship network differs from other kinds of networks. Further, families tend to spend a considerable amount of time together. Siblings and cousins grow up together. Links to the family are difficult to sever. Thus, kinship links are more enduring and easier to rely on than other kinds of networks. This was frequently emphasized by my informants, who said that family is more trustworthy, and an investment in other family members is less risky than one in outsiders.[129] One informant related to me in an informal conversation that politicians often build up other politicians, by financially and otherwise supporting their political career and election campaigns. Many times these protégés later turn their back on their benefactors and betray (หักหลัง) them. If the protégé is a member of the family or otherwise in the benefactor's kinship network, the risk of betrayal is greatly reduced.

Loyalty to one's own family is not purely ideological; it is also a wise choice politically. The importance of family is recognized throughout Thai society by both politicians and voters alike. As one MP states, the politician's family is one component that can influence voters' decisions for or against a candidate.

> [The family is] important, because it is a fundamental value in the Thai society. People think that a person who is responsible towards the family is the best. That means that this person is a good leader, who can look after the people (Samat Phitiyapanyaton, interview 17 June 2010).[130]

Given the importance that a well functioning and warm family has in defining a politician's image, politicians aim to maintain that image. This is also one reason why marriages are often described as marriages of love, even when political advantages might also have played an integral part in making the match.

Despite the high values attached to the family and family loyalties, no one lives under the illusion that families are conflict-free. While conflicts and discrepancies exist, it is the family which helps in negotiating these conflicts effectively. Conflicts within the family can also be found within some of the case studies of this study. The Ratchakru Group presents two striking examples. The first is an intergenerational conflict between Chatchai Choonhavan and his son Kraisak. Informants describe the relationship between father and son as strained. Kraisak is portrayed as the rebel, always disagreeing with his father and opposing

[128] For Thai original see Appendix 1.29.
[129] The word "outsider" (คนนอก) was used by my informants to refer to people outside the family and outside the more extended kinship network.
[130] For Thai original see Appendix 1.30.

him in every respect. Yet Kraisak was appointed into a think-tank under his father's government, effectively making him his father's advisor. This shows that differences in family members' opinions do not necessarily lead to the exclusion of that member from the family's efforts.

Conflict is not limited to intergenerational differences but can also emerge within one generation. Chatchai Choonhavan and Praman Adireksan the two brothers-in-law of the Ratchakru Group, are a good example for such a conflict. Praman, the older of the two, had more political experience and had been involved in politics since the emergence of the Ratchakru Group on the political stage. Thus, he expected to be appointed prime minister before his younger brother-in-law. However, it was Chatchai who rose to the top position in 1988. Praman was not happy about this development. During Chatchai's prime ministership, the brothers-in-law were continually involved in arguments. It was only due to the intervention of Praman's wife and Chatchai's sister, Lady Jeroen, that the two men managed to cooperate and set aside their differences for the greater good of the Ratchakru Group (Wisanu/วิษณุ 2011).

The break between the in-laws, however, became too great to mend when Chatchai was ousted from power in 1991. The military coup deprived Chatchai and the remaining members of the Ratchakru Group of their positions and powers. The lost of the ability to allocate ministerial posts, financial resources and political positions that went hand in hand with the loss of the prime ministership weakened Chatchai's position within the family considerably. This is, in particular, due to the fact that all the assets of the family had been frozen. Additionally, the relationship between Chatchai and Praman was not helped by the circumstances under which the coup took place. Praman, who was Minister of Interior at the time, was notified of the impending coup. His position would have given him the opportunity and manpower to attempt to prevent the execution of the coup (Praman 2004: 13-14). One is left to wonder if it was not Praman's dissatisfaction at losing the prime ministership to his brother-in-law that caused him not to attempt to prevent a coup against his brother-in-law. Effectively, the Ratchkru Group was dissolved after the military coup of 1991. Afterwards, the various *trakun* of the group acted independently of each other and dispersed over several political parties. Today they still appear together for family occasions, such as the public release of Phin Choonhavan's memoirs in 2010. As Kraisak

puts it, “We socialize together, but to cooperate woud be difficult” (Kraisak Choonhavan, interview 20 May 2010).[131]

When raising the next generation, political families instill into their children a deep sense of loyalty to the family and also ensure that they will have more symbolic capital than their parents. The second generation is typically better educated than the first. They also have more economic, cultural and symbolic capital at their disposal. This gives them an advantage against many other potential competitors. However, their most outstanding advantage is the amount of political capital they possess. This is what really differentiates second or third generation members of political *trakun* from any other politician. Their political capital is gained at home, in election campaigning and through appointment to political offices early in life. This investment in the next generation is secured by the strong sense of unity and loyalty that is instilled into children. They are taught to hold together as a family and to support each other. Thus, the capital of the members of a *trakun* will be used not only to the advantage of individual members but to the advantage of the *trakun* in general. When, however, the relationships of reciprocity within the *trakun* are disrupted or one member of the family feels disadvantaged, the *trakun* can break up.

Election Campaigning

The collective effort of the whole family becomes particularly visible during election campaigning. Election campaigning is a very complex matter. It not only involves issues such as the financing and organization of the campaign, decisions on the type of activities and campaign message but also vote buying (Anek 1996, Schafferer 2006, Walker 2008, Hai and Ming 2006, Teechankee 2006, Scott 1972). In this study, however, I focus only on the involvement of the politician’s family in the campaign. During election campaigns, the family and kinship in an extended sense become apparent and are utilized in various ways. Involvement of the family during election campaigns is not only directed at the immediate goal of winning the elections but also at initiating a long-lasting relationship with the voters and identifying as well as training members of the family who could be potential future candidates. Kinship becomes apparent during elections campaigns in a real and in a metaphorical sense.

[131] For Thai original see Appendix 1.31.

To examine the involvement of political *trakun* in election campaigning, I will use the election campaigns of four politicians for the 2011 general elections as case studies. The politicians whom I will discuss are Yingluck Shinawatra, Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai, Joemmat Juenglertsiri, and Surachat Thienthong. Yingluck Shinawatra ran as party list candidate number 1, and, thus, as candidate for the prime ministership for the Pheu Thai Party. She is the younger sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai ran for the Democrat Party in Chiang Mai constituency 7. She is the daughter of former MP Kingkan Na Chiang Mai and former deputy minister Thawatwong Na Chiang Mai. Joemmat Juenglertsiri ran for the Democrat Party in a Bangkok constituency. She is the wife of long-time local politician Ek Juenglertsiri. The Juenglertsiri are not yet a political *trakun*, as they have not yet been involved in politics for more than one generation. They, however, hope that one of their daughters will continue their political efforts. Surachat Thienthong ran for the Pheu Thai Party in a Bangkok constituency. Surachat is the son of Sanoh Thienthong, who is an influential politician, faction leader and former minister, and his second (minor) wife.[132]

I will examine the election campaigns of these four politicians to show how the family is involved in their campaign. There are three ways in which the family becomes apparent during election campaigns. First, family members actively engage in the campaign, which can be enforced by the location of the campaign headquarters close to or at the personal home of the candidate. The involvement of one or more members of the family in the campaign increases the investment the political family makes into the winning of a seat in parliament. This increase of investment is manifested not only in the time each member of the family spends on the campaign but also in each member's economic and symbolic capital. An increase in investment raises the possibility of winning the election. Second, candidates of the second generation refer to their parents or other relatives in politics. This is an attempt to tap into their parent's symbolic capital. Finally, the candidates try to establish a relationship with the voters by symbolically becoming part of their communities and families. This is essential to increasing a candidate's social and political capital, which translates into votes. I will now show how these three strategies are employed by each of the politicians observed.

[132] The status of Surachat's mother is not clear. She was clearly the second women to get married to his father. It is not clear if their marriage has been registered. Informants call her a minor wife or a co-wife.

Families Campaigning

During election campaigns, family members support the candidates. This support can be through mere presence or active participation. The amount of participation of each family depends on many factors. The location of the constituency can determine how feasible it is for a family to work together. In rural and rather distant constituencies, due to the conditions of transport and weather, the voters can be difficult to reach. On the other hand, in such a constituency, the participation of several members of one family in election campaigning is advantageous, as more ground can be covered by delegating the participation in community events to the wife, the parents, siblings and other relatives. Whether the politician's children participate in the campaigning often depends on their age, interest and the parent's approach to child rearing. Further, it appears that female candidates tend to encourage children's participation more than male candidates. This allows them more time to spend with their children and, thus, avoid accusations of being a bad mother who abandons her child to the care of others. The participation of family members also depends on the type of occupation they choose. As government officials are not allowed to pursue political activities during the week, they often do so on the weekend or help to promote the family member by other means. Business owners might be under fewer constraints and be able to allocate their time more freely. However, they often prefer to supervise their businesses personally, especially if family enterprises are concerned. Finally, the personal character and preferences of each member of the family are determining factors for the nature and intensity of participation in electoral campaigning.

When Yingluck Shinawatra was running the campaign for the 2011 general election, family members accompanied her on her visits outside of the capital city. During the three days of campaigning that I observed, her brother Payap Shinawatra, himself a former MP, was present. He was visually present and appeared on stage, as shown in Figure 12, but did not give speeches himself. Her sister Yawapa also took part in the tour. Yawapa had been banned from politics in 2007 and, thus, her presence was in a juristic grey-area if not outright illegal. Consequently, she did not appear in public. It was only by chance that I spotted her sitting in Yingluck's car. Other members of the family who supported Yingluck, were her brother Thaskin, who supported her from exile, and his three children, who took part in publicity events together with their aunt or independently. Last but not least, Yingluck's husband and son made several public appearances to demonstrate their support; one of these

appearances was during a visit in Yingluck's home province of Chiang Mai (*Matichon Online* 21 May 2011).

Figure 12: Yingluck (left) and her brother Payap (right) on a campaign stage

Yingluck was supported by members of other political *trakun* as well. At least two other members of political *trakun*, Yuranant Phamornmontri and Suntari Chawiratna, took part in Yingluck's campaign, as shown in Figure 13.[133] Yuranant Phamornmontri is the son of Prayoon Phamornmontri, who was a member of the People's Party and played an essential part in initiating the change of governmental system in 1932. The former played a vital role in the campaign as speaker because of his immense popularity amongst middle-aged women who remember him from his time as a leading actor. Suntari Chawiratna is a former MP of Chayaphum Province, the same province her father had represented before her.[134] She was formerly a MP representing a constituency but during the 2011 election moved onto the party list and appeared to be part of Yingluck's inner circle. When I ask her why she moved to the party list, she related to me that the party wanted to place more women

[133] I personally observed these two persons' involvement in Yingluck's campaign. There are, however, several political families associated with the Pheu Thai Party and, thus, potentially more than these two supported her on other campaign stretches that I could not take part in.

[134] This is a noteworthy case. When her father passed away, she had not reached the legal age for active electoral rights. Therefore, an outsider won the seat in her father's constituency. By the time of the next election, she was of legal age and was promptly approached by the party to fill her father's seat.

around Yingluck to help her.[135] This is exactly the role she performed during the campaign. She remained close to Yingluck and assisted logistically.

Figure 13: Yingluck (right) with two Pheu Thai Party list candidates
Yuranant Phamornmontri (left) and Suntari Chawiratna (middle**)**

The support of Yingluck by the members of other political families should not be seen as altruistic. In the above two cases only one member of their respective family remained involved in formal politics. Indeed both Yuranant Phamornmontri's and Suntari Chawiratna's fathers have long passed away. The influence of other family members is, thus, limited, and support of Yingluck was probably their independent decision. However, their support of Yingluck is very much an effort to secure their own success. As party list candidates, they depend on the success of Yingluck and the party. Therefore, the support of Yingluck should be seen in the light of their affiliation with the Pheu Thai Party and not necessarily as support for the person or *trakun*. The success of the party would directly translate into their own election.

Dueantemdueang Na Chiang Mai was running for parliament in Chiang Mai Province, constituency 7 for the Democrat Party and was actively supported by her mother Kingkan Na Chiang Mai. The constituency consisted of two districts, Mae Rim and Mae Deang and one sub-district, Sanphisuea. The two districts are adjoining to the city of Chiang Mai and the sub-district is part of the city. Despite the proximity to the city of Chiang Mai,

[135] This shows that the party was strategically using women to create an image. How exactly this gender focus was implemented and how it influenced the election result, as well as the positions of women in politics, is an important interesting question. However, this question cannot be further pursued in this work.

the constituency is largely rural and partly very remote. It was in the same constituency which Kingkan Na Chiang Mai had represented from 1995 to 2001. Thus, her knowledge of the community and her connections could advance Dueantemduang's election campaign. Some of her former supporters and vote canvassers could be reactivated. Kingkan also attended many of the events during her daughter's election campaign. When Dueantemduang took part in funerals, temple festivals or other special occasions, her mother would often be present as well, as can be seen in Figures 14 and 15. The latter would use these opportunities to talk to the influential locals and would try to persuade them to support her daughter. Her knowledge of the community was significant, as she was well informed about important events in the community and the relevant people. Kingkan would also participate at such events independently, in particular funerals. This allowed the family to cover a larger area and to attend more events than would be possible for only one person. Kingkan also participated at public speaking events in the evening. Here she would give a warm-up speech before her daughter addressed the audience (see Figure 16). She would further engage in conversations with local leaders right after the speeches, mostly over dinner.

Figure 14: Kingkan and Dueantemduang attend a ceremony at a local temple

Figure 15: Kingkan and Dueantemduang presiding over a cremation

Figure 16: Kingkan giving a warm-up speech

The food for these dinners was prepared under Kingkan's supervision. The food would always be typical Northern Thai food. One example of the food selection is shown in Figure 17. It is a Northern Thai dipping sauce (Nam Prik Ong or น้ำพริกอ่อง) with boiled vegetables and fried chicken. Two sorts of rice were always available: the steamed glutinous rice traditional to the area and boiled jasmine rice. With these choices of rice, the Na Chiang Mai family especially appeals to people local to the region, who often prefer

sticky rice. Kingkan explained that "this is the rice we Northerners eat" (Kingkan Na Chiang Mai, informal conversation 8 June 2011).[136] At the same time, people who have moved to the region from other parts of the kingdom and might prefer boiled jasmine rice are not excluded from the family's generosity and, thus, their networks. The giving and shared consumption of food is a special way of giving that creates a feeling of belonging and in a sense resembles the eating of food by families.[137] Kingkan would bring the food with her when she arrived for the evening activities, as she was not participating much in vote canvassing, which involves going from house to house and is very tiring.

Figure 17: Homemade food for dinner

Kingkan did not take part in the canvassing for several reasons. Firstly, she seemed not particularly keen on that aspect of campaigning and preferred to stay with her grandchild. Second, the grandchild, Dueantemduang's eight-month-old son needed a caretaker, as he was too young to accompany his mother. Third, canvassing under tropical conditions and at enormous speed is indeed very stressful and tiring. Therefore, health concerns will also have played into Kingkan's decision to refrain from participating in this part of the activities.

The mother was the main supporter, because Dueantemduang's campaign took place in an area for which she had formerly sat in parliament. Both of Dueantemduang's

[136] For Thai original see Appendix 1.32.

[137] Kinship in Southeast Asia is not based on birth alone but is created through the act of feeding certain kinds of food. Thus, food and share consumption of it is an integral part in the building of kinship ties. See Janowski and Kerlogue (2007) for detailed studies.

parents previously sat in parliament. As her father was the more prominent politician, having held the seat of a deputy minister between 1995 and 2000,[138] he might be expected to be the one to support his daughter's election campaign. However, he did not run in the area of today's constituency 7. His constituency was located in the city of Chiang Mai. His wife, however, had sat in the area in which Dueantemduang was running. Therefore, Kingkan had better connections in the area and was better known to the voters. Thus, she was the one mainly supporting her daughter during the campaign. When Dueantemduang ran for election as mayor of Chiang Mai in 2007 and 2009, it was her father who mainly supported her campaign. Thus, it is the member of the family who has the largest amount of social and symbolic capital in the constituency in question who will support the candidate.

Apart from her mother's involvement in the election campaign, Dueantemduang received support from her husband, Colonel Jitanat Punnothok. He is the son of a general and himself in the military stationed at the Office of the Army Secretary in Bangkok. Therefore, he could only spare the weekends to participate in election campaigning. His activities ranged from organizational tasks, like keeping note of the schedule and budget, to canvassing and protection. During the whole time he accompanied Dueantemduang, he would keep record of every activity and the money spent on it.[139] It should be noted that much of the money spent during his presence came from his pocket. He further followed his wife during the canvassing. On the day in question the area campaigned was relatively urban, enabling the team to walk from house to house or to use motorcycles. While Dueantemduang was talking to the voters, he was standing or sitting close by, occasionally joining in the conversation, as can be seen in Figures 18 and 19. He remained rather passive and sometimes distant. However, when the canvassing was continued into the local military camp, he became much more talkative and led the conversation. Using his knowledge about the military life and his connection to fellow soldiers by talking about mutual acquaintances, he helped to win over the voters in uniform. Apart from participating in the campaign, he also took security precautions and had armed himself with two handguns and ammunition.[140] This measure is understandable as Thai elections can become very violent (Anderson 1990). In addition to the violent tendencies of Thai elections in general,

[138] He was Deputy Minister of Finance, Deputy Minister of Public Health (13 July 1995 – 24 November 1996) and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives (25 November 1996 – 8 November 1997).
[139] Money was spent on transportation and staff.
[140] The guns remained in the car.

Dueantemduang and her team were alerted to possible resentment of her which became visible in the destruction of a large number of her campaign posters.[141]

Figure 18: Dueantemduang talks to a voter in his house while her husband waits outside

Figure 19: Dueantemduang and her husband talk to voters

Family participation during election campaigns has potential for conflicts; during the days of election campaigning on which I followed Dueantemduang, two incidences showed that clearly. The first incident happened with her mother on the very first

[141] Candidates of the Democrat Party suffered the same fate in most of the Pheu Thai dominated North and Northeastern region on the country.

day of my observation. The team had gone to a remote village to hold an election speech for a group of approximately 50 to 100 voters. Kingkan was giving a warm-up speech. The speech was no longer than 10 minutes. She opened the speech by talking about the merits which her term in office and her husband had brought to the area, amongst them the asphalted street which we had just used to reach the venue. Then she continued by praising her daughter's dedication to the voters and advertising the amount of her political experience. However, she included a sentence saying that if Dueantemduang would not live up to these standards there were still herself and her husband left to help Dueantemduang and the voters. The next day in the car to an event, Kingkan was not present. Dueantemduang complained to a team member how inappropriate she had felt this sentence was. She felt that her mother had questioned her ability in front of the voters. Thus, she felt that her mother had damaged her image and diminished her political capital. Again by complaining about her mother's action, Dueantemduang questioned her mother's skills as a speaker, her ability to judge appropriate behavior and ultimately her political capital.

The second incident that indicated the potential for conflict arose a few days later with Dueantemduang's husband. The team wanted to take part in a religious ceremony which would commence early in the morning at a remote village temple. In order to be at the temple in time for the ritual, Dueantemduang decided for the team and her to spend the night at a nearby house. The house and its owners belonged to a hill tribe village. There happened to be a wake for a recently deceased neighbor. The team, including Dueantemduang and her husband, went to the wake to give their condolences. While Dueantemduang was actively talking with the villagers, her husband remained passive. Given the late hour, he fell asleep. This was noted by some voters, members of the team and Dueantemduang but was ignored. Dueantemduang later commented to one of her team members that this is not the best way to present oneself to the voters. Thus, she was commenting on her husband's lack of ability to communicate with the voters, a lack of political capital.

Joemmat Juenglertsiri, who was running for election in central Bangkok, was mainly supported by her husband. Joemmat and her husband had been working as a team from the onset of Joemmat's political career. Her husband, Ek Juenglertsiri, has been a well-established local politician for years. He had helped to promote several MPs and decided that it was time to stop working for others. He lacked the educational requirements to qualify as an MP, so he persuaded his wife to run for a seat in parliament. She did so successfully. Since then, she has represented the family in parliament and in higher level politics, and he was responsible for much of the groundwork. During the election campaign, Ek remained in the

background, yet he had an integral part in the canvassing. The team around Joemmat was working with a refined technique of canvassing. Several of the team members were equipped with walky-talkies. One or two members of the team would always be ahead of Joemmat to announce her coming but also to locate possible conflicts. These advance guards would then report to Joemmat's husband, who again would tell her which way was safe to go. They would also make sure that the entire area was covered.

Joemmat's four daughters also participated in the election campaign. Two of her daughters have already graduated from university and were in their early twenties. They have not, however, reached the legal age for passive voting rights, which is 25. The two younger daughters are still in high school; one of them is mentally disabled. Three of the four daughters accompanied their mother when I was observing the election campaign (see Figure 20). They were not given clear duties to fulfill, and it was left to the girls to decide how to help. It became quickly apparent that the three had very different attitudes to election campaigning and political engagement in general. The oldest of the three, who had studied political science at Chulalongkorn University, did not show much enthusiasm for the canvassing. She occasionally handed out leaflets or talked with voters. In general she remained passive. The second of the daughters, who had a degree in education, was very engaged. She followed her mother's every step, carrying a supply of leaflets. The two were rarely apart, and most of the time remained within two meters of each other (see Figure 21). The second daughter genuinely enjoyed the canvassing, skipping well earned breaks. The third daughter, who is mentally disabled, was brought along to allow her some change in her daily routine. However, it also showcased Joemmat as a mother who unconditionally loved her children and, thus, increased her symbolic capital. The fourth daughter was in school and could only participate during the weekends.

Figure 20: Three of Joemmat's daughters on election campaign

Figure 21: One of the daughters assisted her mother and rarely left her side

Election campaigns give political families the opportunity to determine which of their children has the potential to become a politician. Children are taken to election campaigns irrespective of their interest in politics. During campaigns they are then exposed to politics directly. Those children who are more interested in politics will be more active during campaigns. They will help their parents. They gradually learn how to interact with voters. They may ask their parents to be allowed to come along more often. In this process, children gain skills and knowledge. They gain political capital. The way the children engage

during campaigning also shows which child is interested in a political career. More importantly, it proves to the parents which of the children successfully accumulates and uses political capital. This shows the parents who might become their political successor. In the case of Joemmat, it is clearly the second daughter, and both parents have expressed their hopes that she might one day step into her parents' footsteps and become a politician.

Surachat was the only candidate I observed that was not supported by a member of his family. As son of influential politician Sanoh Thienthong, he is a member of one of the largest political families currently active. However, Surachat is the only one of this family who is not running for election in the family's home province of Sakaeo. He was running in Bangkok instead. Therefore, it is outside of his family's sphere of influence. Just as was the case with Dueantemduang, Surachat's father did not come to support him outside his own territory. Another reason for a lack of support could be that Surachat is the son of a minor wife, or as his assistant told me, a co-wife. This was meant to imply that both wives have equal status and the relations in the family are good. However, it could still be a possible reason for the lack of support. Surachat, however, explains the lack of family involvement differently. He had chosen to run in Bangkok and not in Sakaeo in order to show that he was a politician in his own right, that he did not need to depend on his father's influence to be elected.

Surachat was, however, supported by another politician and his wife. Surachat had only shortly before the election been assigned to the Laksi constituency, in the northern part of Bangkok. The constituency was formally represented by Karun Hosakun, who was now running in an adjoining constituency. Karun had to run his own election campaign and, thus, had little time to spare for supporting Surachat in his effort. Therefore, his wife supported both Surachat and her husband. Karun's wife had become a local politician when her husband moved up the national level. Therefore, her obligation to support Surachat was also based on the fact that she was an influential local politician and the two had the same party affiliation. She had to divide her time and effort between helping Surachat, in her territory, and her husband. Later in the evening, Karun also appeared to support Surachat's canvassing. Thus, political families can join to help members of other political families. However, as noted above in the case of Yingluck, that often occurs in combination with shared party affiliation.

Reference to the Family

During election campaigns, references to family members are a common practice. Political families are not only a support when they are actually participating in the campaign. Second generation members of political families often extensively refer to their more prominent relatives. Such references make it clear to the voters that a relationship between the newcomer and the well-established politician exists. It helps to put the name of candidates into a context. However, it is also an effort of the candidates to rely on the political capital of their relatives. By creating the association between the candidate and well-known politicians, the candidate can increase their own political capital by tapping into that of their elders.

Yingluck made numerous references to her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was prime minister from 2001 to 2006, during the election campaign. The first time I saw her on a stage in Udom Ratchasrima during her election campaign on 15 June 2011, she said:

> Hallo. I am Pu[142], the younger sister of Prime Minister Thaksin. […] The trust that you have once given to my brother, can you now give it to his younger sister? (Yingluck Shinawatra, campaign speech 15 June 2011)[143]

She not only tells the voters who she is and about her relationship with her brother. She directly asks them to trust her because they have trusted him, to vote for her because they have voted for him. This logic is often implicitly formulated by members of other political families. Members of political families are more likely to state that they have been trained by their parents and, thus, deserve the political position they are applying for. This request clearly shows that Yingluck is tapping into her brother's symbolic capital.

References to a candidate's parents can be made in various ways. Surachat Thienthong had little active support from his family. As noted above, he tried to downplay that he was part of the Thienthong family. This distancing from his family was rationalized by him in stating that he wanted to prove his own ability as a politician. He wanted to be seen as a politician of the new generation: highly skilled, modern, decisive and, above all, incorruptible. His father had been part of the Chatchai cabinet, which was renowned for the high level of corruption. Thus, Surachat disassociated himself from such practices. However, he could not entirely neglect his relationship to his father. In his campaign leaflet, he gives a clear account of how he grew up in a political family and how that influenced him to go into politics as well. Another reason for Surachat to talk about his family is that he is not the son of Sanoh's major wife. Therefore, he has to reinstate the image of the happy family by

[142] Pu (ปู) is her nickname. It means crab.
[143] For Thai original see Appendix 1.33.

recounting the warm relationship within the family and between the five children of two mothers. How important it was for him to address the issue of his status in the Thienthong family became clear to me when I had lunch at a small restaurant close to his campaign office. While I was eating, I chatted with the owner of the restaurant. We talked about the elections. Hence I asked her what she thought about Surachat. She commented that she did not like him. When I asked her if he was Sanoh Thienthong's son, she quickly replied, "He is a minor wife's child". His status in the Thienthong family was widely known; this greatly diminished his symbolic capital. Thus Surachat's case is precarious. On the one hand, his association with his father could hurt his image as a modern and transparent politician and, thus, diminish his symbolic capital. On the other hand, he has to refer to his family in order to clarify his personal life and his actual status in the family, in order to increase his symbolic capital.

Political *trakun* engage in making donations which leave abundant references to this *trakun* in their constituency. One prominent example for this praxis is former Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, and his patronage of Suphanburi. There his and his wife's names can be found on hospital wings and schools. This creates a relationship between the politician and the voters. The frequent reappearance of the name serves to remind the voters about their indebtedness (Nishizaki 2011). Even on a smaller scale, such donations and development projects can be a very useful tool in election campaigns. During the period I spent with Dueantemduang, we twice encountered reminders of her mother's terms as MP. The first time was at a small funeral in a hill tribe village where glasses bore her name. The second time was at a temple fair where a tent and cooking equipment had been donated by Kingkan, as can be seen in Figure 22. Each time when Dueantemduang encountered her mother's contributions to the area, she utilized them in the election campaign in a joking manner. Remarks were made that the current MP was not able to give them new pots and glasses even after ten years in office. The voters took these comments with the same humor and told Dueantemduang that she should give them some when she got elected. Thus, Dueantemduang could exploit the artifacts of her mother's engagement in the area to tap into her mother's social and symbolic capital. At the same time, the current MP of the constituency was discredited, as he had not provided the community with new cooking utensils and glasses, despite his occupancy of the seat for almost ten years.

Figure 22: Dueantemduang with the housewife group at a temple fair
(The tent and big pot had been donated to the group by Kingkan Na Chiang Mai and bears her name)

Dueantemduang made direct references to her parents as well. The back of her campaign leaflet figures a short resume. The very first point of this resume is the names of both her parents. While her last name alone will have been recognized by the voters, the explicit identification of her parents made it very clear that she had a relationship with these politicians. She further refers to her parents in a recording, which is played by a pick-up truck driving around in the constituency (see Figure 23). The recording says:

> I[144] grew up in a family of politicians, have seen and known service to the people all along. I have seen my father, Nui, and my mother, Daeng Kingkan, being close to the people, wholeheartedly helping them, happy to see their work being successfully completed. When problems are resolved, the area develops and the people smile. That is the happiness, the pride and the motivation that makes them work further. Father, mother, brother and sister,[145] I will step into my father's footsteps. I will further my mother's work. I will coordinate with the state. I guarantee our village will be developed in every aspect. I will use my knowledge, my experience and my skills as much as possible. I will coordinate to let our home thrive with direction. Please use me. Please elect me. I will prove it to you. On 3 July enter the voting booth and make an 'x' for me: No. 10.[146]

[144] She uses her nickname, 'Phaeng', in place of the pronoun here. This gives her speech an informal and familiar touch.
[145] This is an address to the audience and can be equated to 'Ladies and Gentlemen'.
[146] For Thai original see Appendix 1.34.

This recording is interesting on several levels. First, it should be noted that the recording was made by Dueantemduang herself. She speaks in a toned down Northern Thai dialect.[147] The overall tone is casual. All names used are nicknames, with the one exception of her mother's name to which the official name was added. This is a common practice to clearly identify the person. When considering the kinship aspects in this recording, one clearly sees that she creates an association between herself and her parents. This association goes beyond pure identification of the parent-child relationship. She states that she has been watching her parents work her whole life, and learning from them. She says she will follow in their footsteps and continue their work. Thus, she claims that the voter can expect the same from her as they have received from her parents. This statement is based on much the same understanding as Yingluck's request to the voters to vote for her on the grounds of her brother's achievement, but it differed, as Dueantemduang states that her parents' work has trained her and made her a capable politician. This is further emphasized in the last part of the spot where she highlights her educational and professional experience. Kinship also becomes apparent when she addressed the voters as father, mother, brother and sister. Though this is a common way to address an audience, it still metaphorically makes the listeners her family.

Apart from references to her immediate family, Dueantemduang also made references to the Shinawatra's. The Na Chiang Mais and the Shinawatras are linked by marriage. Thaksin Shinawatra's mother's maternal grandfather was a member of Na Chiang Mai *trakun*. Chiang Mai province has many followers of Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party. Thus, to convince the voters to give their vote to a candidate from the Democrat Party, she made them aware of the relationship between the two *trakun*. She told the voters that they could vote for the Pheu Thai Party and then with their second vote for her. She said that this would not mean a betrayal to Thaksin and she added, "Thaksin's mother was also a Na Chiang Mai" (observed 8 June 2011).[148] While the relationship between the Na Chiang Mais and the Shinawatras is rather distant, Dueantemduang sees that it is a valuable one and uses it as symbolic capital.

[147] By toned down, I mean that it is clearly recognizable as Northern Thai but still comprehensible for a person who is not accustomed to listening to the dialect.
[148] For Thai original see Appendix 1.35.

Figure 23: Pick-up truck with loudspeakers and a large poster

Creating a Family

Many activities during election campaigning are aimed at creating an imagined family. The politician participates in events in the community and the family. They enter the voters' houses and try to get involved with their personal lives. However, they also let the voters come into their homes and take part in their lives. Through such activities, families can be formed metaphorically. Participation in temple festivals and merit making shows the generosity of a candidate and integrates him or her into the local community. The importance of religious activities in Thai politics has been frequently reported. However, besides the positive effect on the politician's image and the establishing of a patronage, such activities also offer the opportunity to interact with the community. As shown in Figures 24 and 25, the religious part of merit making is only one aspect of the event. After the candidate has made the offerings and attempted to sway the monks to endorse him or her, the candidate can converse with the local people. In Dueantemduang's case, this is facilitated by the gender of the candidate, as most of the participants at the daily alms giving were women. Dueantemduang, who is experienced in speaking to voters, conversed with them easily. The topics of their conversation frequently circle around the household or their children. She also used the opportunity to introduce the voters to her party's policies. However, this would usually happen after the candidate and the voters have conversed on non-political issues for a while.

Figure 24: Dueantemduang taking part at a merit making ceremony

Figure 25: Talking to the women of the village after the ceremony

Funerals and weddings present politicians with the opportunity to create imagined families and incorporate the politician into the community (see Figures 26-28). As Fishel (2005: 143) reports, the participation at funerals helps enormously to integrate a person into the community. Again, beyond the formal part of such occasions, in which the politician presides over a cremation or provides a blessing, there is an interpersonal level. The politician talks to the family of the deceased and other participants and, thus, learns about their

problems, needs and joys. If this relationship is continued after the election, the politician is likely to assist voters in their life challenges and thus becomes an integral part of the community and the imagined family of the voter. It should also be noted that politicians use these opportunities to become a patron. During temple festivals, funerals and weddings, monetary contributions are customary. Politicians make such contributions and, thus, initiate or maintain relationships of reciprocity.

Figure 26: Dueantemduang talking to the bereaved at a funeral

Figure 27: Dueantemduang talking to guests at a funeral

Figure 28: Dueantemduang congratulating a couple on their wedding

This building of an imagined family is also achieved in less formal ways. During the whole course of an election campaign, a candidate visits the houses of voters, sitting down for a short chat with some of them (see Figures 29 and 30). The conversation almost always starts off with personal matters of the family of the respective voter. How many children? How old? Is everyone well? Who looks after the grandmother? But the politicians may also talk about their own families. Dueantemduang, for example, frequently talked about her then eight-month-old son and how much she adores him (see Figure 31). In this fashion, the politician gives the voters the feeling of being close to him or her. They become imagined families. Another way to build family is that of Surachat. He frankly told his voters, "I want to be your son, too."

The creation of imagined families is carried over from election campaigning to the period in office. Politicians and their families continuously attend funerals and weddings, temple festivals and numerous other events. With each opportunity to participate in such occasions, the relationship with the voters deepens and the likelihood of being reelected rises. However, such occasions also give the next generation of political families the opportunity to interact with voters and to observe their father and mother. This helps them to gain social capital, which is manifested in relationships of reciprocity.

Figure 29: Dueantemduang talking to voters in their homes

Figure 30: Surachat talking to voters in their homes

Figure 31: Duangdeamduang talking to women about her own son

From One Generation to the Next

Political families try to encourage those of their children who are genuinely interested in politics to become politicians. While cases of children being forced into politics exist, that is not the norm. Generally, parents consider their children's disposition. This is partly out of parental concern and partly out of self-interest. Someone who is forced into politics will not last there long. A person who lacks interest in politics will neglect the accumulation of political capital. Once such a person is exposed to the struggles of being a politician, they are very likely to fail. This is especially the case if the support of more experienced politicians, i.e. parents or other relatives should be discontinued due to sickness or death. Therefore, political families do well to focus on those of their offspring who are genuinely interested in politics.

Before children take over their parents' role in politics, they ideally undergo a long period of apprenticeship. Children start to contribute to election campaigns and maintain relations with the voters from a young age. They listen to conversations about politics in their parents' house. They gain knowledge about politics in an intimate way. They are often also given junior positions to learn on the job. MPs frequently appoint their spouses, younger siblings or children as their official assistants. If the older relative is a minister, he or she may appoint offspring or a relative as secretary. In the capacity as an assistant or secretary, they start to take over tasks for the older relative. They learn how to manage these tasks. They also

get acquainted with parliament and how it works. They get the opportunity to build up their own social network. Children of MPs occupy such positions at a much younger age than any other person could hope. Again, a good example for this practice is Korn Thapparansi, who occupied his first political position in 1974, when he became Secretary of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time was none other than his uncle Chatchai Choonhavan. Korn was only 29 years old. Korn was given two other secretarial posts and advisory position before he became MP in his own right in 1983. Members of political families have access to such political positions at a much younger age than a person without a background in a political family, giving them the opportunity to acquire more political capital more quickly than outsiders.

The reasons for the second generation to enter politics can be various. The younger generation can be pulled into politics in order to train them for future positions ideally in the cabinet. Often they are in politics parallel to their parents' generation for some time until the older generation finally retires. In other cases, the second generation enters politics at the same time as the older generation retires. It is also possible that more unpredictable reasons make the entrance of a family necessary. Such reason can be sickness, a ban from politics or death. Sickness and a ban from politics are limited to a certain period of time, and the politician temporarily inconvenienced can later return to politics.

Members of political *trakun* are better positioned to be nominated as candidates for elections. Members of political families have acquired a large amount of political capital since their childhood. In combination with other forms of capital, such as economic, educational, cultural, and symbolic, of which they often also have a considerable amount, this makes them very attractive to political parties as prospective candidates. Therefore, it is not surprising that members of political families are frequently approached by political parties to become candidates. In cases in which the members of political families approach the party to be given a candidacy, they are also likely to be granted their wish.

When running for election, members of political families and *trakun* have better chances of winning. This is especially the case if some of their family members are still holding seats in parliament or can actively support their election campaign. If the older generation of the political family is not in office anymore, the election of the younger generation becomes more difficult. However, even in that case, the members of political families are often better positioned to win the election than another candidate who has entered formal politics at the same time. This is due to the abundance of political capital that members of political *trakun* possess, which is often superior to that of non-members. One

important tool here is the surname, which helps voters to identify the candidate with the rest of the family.

Despite the better possibility of a member of a political family to become elected, this is far from being automatic. Members of political *trakun* frequently fail to be elected. In the 2011 election, several examples of this could be observed. In Chatchoengsao, Jutima Chaisaeng lost the election after her family had dominated the area for decades. She is the latest member of the Chaisaeng family; two of their members have been banned from politics. She claims her election was lost due to the opposing candidate's extensive use of vote buying (*Matichon Online* 13 July 2011). While the influence of vote buying cannot be excluded, it is very likely that other factors played a role as well. After members of the family had been banned from politics, the family had to repeatedly come up with replacements. With each replacement they had to choose a less attractive candidate, likely to be younger and with less political capital. Thus, they have diminished the chances for the family to be elected. The same seems to apply to Porapol Adireksan, who lost his seat to another new emerging local political family. Another example is Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai, who lost the election. She was running for the Democrat Party in a Pheu Thai dominated region. While she had by far the best results for the Democrat Party in Chiang Mai, it was not enough to win. In the end, the voters' commitment to the Pheu Thai Party was stronger than their relationship to the Na Chiang Mai family. Ranongrak Suwanchawee and Phiraporn Suwanchawee also lost in the 2011 election. The mother, who was on the party list, lost because her party did not win enough votes. The son lost probably because he did not yet have enough political capital to stand on his own, and the father, Pairot Suwanchawee, had just recently passed away.

When elections are lost, political families struggle to keep their influence alive. Most importantly they try to keep the relationship with the voters alive. They often do that by continuing their engagement in the area much in the same fashion as if they were actually in office. In the case of Ranongrak, she even went for local election and is now the head of the provincial parliament. Apart from the work with the voters, they also try to secure positions as spokespersons or advisors. They have to remain visible and try to further acquire political capital despite their loss. For some families such a loss in elections can mean the end; for some it is just a break.

Rumors and Scandals: Capital Undermined

Rumors can be a potent way of damaging a politician, as they can effectively diminish his or her symbolic capital. The use of rumors as a political tool has a long history. In 1881 to 1882, a rumor of Queen Victoria adopting the Lanna Princess Chao Dara Rasami caused anxieties about this union with a colonial power at the Thai court. This rumor contributed to the eventual marriage of Chao Dara Rasami to the Thai King Chulalongkorn himself (Woodhouse 2009: 73-77). One of the earliest cases of rumors during the constitutional period that I have been able to trace concerned the newly founded Democrat Party and its founder Khuang Aphaiwong. Following the foundation in 1946, the Democrat Party did not have a party headquarters. Therefore, Khuang asked for permission to use Ban Khunthawi in Rueanrit Garden as headquarters. It was no coincidence that this was also the home of his minor wife Thawin. As a result, the party became commonly known as the 'minor wife party' (**พรรคเมียน้อย**). The political rival wanted to discredit the party and create conflict between Khuang and his (major) wife, apparently without success (Sala/**สละ** 1978: 39). Another example of a rumor about a politician having a minor wife is that about Phao Sriyanond. In 1951, newspapers spread rumors about Phao's love life in Swiss exile. It was reported that he had left his wife, Lady Udomluck, to tour Europe with two minor wives (*Sareri* 25 August 1959). These rumors were later denied by Lady Udomluck's narration of romantic walks around the Geneva Lake (Phao 1970, Udomluck 1981). This shows that rumors have been present in Thai politics from as early as the late 1940s. To damage the family loyalty and the image of political *trakun*, rumors about a politician's personal life are employed. However, rumors can also cause frictions within a family. Such frictions could lead to a diminished ability of a politician to succeed in his career.

A rumor that can be both dangerous and beneficial for a politician is that of having a minor wife. As has already been mentioned above, a happy and well-functioning family is crucial to a politician's image. When rumors about a politician having minor wives surface, this can tarnish his image. He is no longer fulfilling the ideal. Traditionally, however, men had many wives, and that was seen as a sign of potency and leadership skills (Loos 2006: 114-116). Therefore, a rumor of a politician having several wives can also be beneficial, as it can boost his image as a capable leader. As already noted above, rumors about Khuang's and Phao's minor wives were the earliest rumors about politicians that I could find. Especially in the case of Phao, it is likely that these rumors were launched to further discredit his character after his loss of power. Such rumors tend to be ignored by the

men involved. The case of Chatchai Choonhavan is, however, noteworthy. His minor wife, Raphiphan Lueangaramrat, was well known to the public. He did not deny the relationship; however, he made it known that it was a pure and platonic relationship that was not polluted by sexual desire (*Thairat* 7 May 1998: 5). Hence, while acknowledging the relationship, Chatchai tried to clean it from all unmoral connotations that might harm him.

The most notorious case of a politician having minor wives was that of Sarit Thanarath; it well illustrates the ambiguousness of the issues of minor wives. The military strongman had been surrounded by beauty queens. As Thak (2007 [1989]: 224) put it, "his unsatisfiable sexual appetite has been an open secret". This unquestionably had increased his potency in the eyes of the public. When shortly after Sarit's death, however, the whole magnitude of his potency became public, the public was shocked. A minimum of 83 women claimed to be his wife or minor wife and 7 offspring surfaced (Chanchaisri/ชาญชัยศรี 1964). The shock was in particular great because Sarit's private life became entangled with issues of alleged corruption. Many of his proclaimed or actual wives made claims to his inheritance, which had amounted to 2,874,009,794 *baht*. Longsome investigation into the origin of his fortune and the ways it was used showed that Sarit had used official funds for private businesses and much of the benefits ended up in the land, houses and cars of his minor wives. While in the end not much remained for the minor wives to fight about, it is very likely that the Sarit case has helped to establish the notion of a correlation between greedy wives and corruption.[149] Thus, having many wives proves a man's masculinity but at the same time makes him vulnerable to these wives' demands and ultimately corrupt.

Rumors about minor wives can endanger the alliances between political families. In November 2008, a video clip of then Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat became public.[150] It showed him with two young women on two separate occasions. On one occasion, Somchai took a young woman out for lunch. The second incident shown in the clip involves Somchai and another woman. They are shown to enter a hotel, have lunch and go shopping together. While no sexual promiscuity is depicted in the clip, little imagination is needed to guess what happened in the hotel. Somchai later admitted that the man in the clip was him. However, he also claimed that the clip had been manipulated to discredit him. While he claimed to know who was behind the clip, he did not want to pursue any legal

[149] The issue of a relationship between wives and a man's corrupt behavior is commonly mentioned by informants. In how far the Sarit case has played into this notion will however remain for further research to determine.

[150] The clip can be watched on YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbOYrETm720, accessed 27 November 2011.

options (ASTV ผู้จัดการออนไลน์ 10 November 2008). Thus, while he gave the appearance of being honest, he frankly denied having a minor wife. It is up to the listener to decide what to believe. The clip most certainly damaged Somchai's image. However, another possible goal of the person making and releasing the clip was to weaken the relationship between Somchai and his in-laws. Somchai, Thaksin Shinawatra's brother-in-law, had just become Thailand's prime minister in order to secure the Shinawatra family's political interest, when the clip was released. Originally, the clip was taken in March 2006; thus, it existed long before the release. If the purpose was merely to harm Somchai's image, the clip could have been released much earlier. However, the person who released the clip waited for a moment when it would have the biggest possible impact. By releasing the clip after Somchai became prime minister, the damage to his image was only a side effect. It was his relationship with the Shinawatras that was more likely to have been the target. It remains unknown if this attack was effective or not, as Somchai a month later lost his seat as prime minister and was banned from politics, and, thus, the effects of the attack could not be seen.

Apart from rumors about minor wives, rumors about male politicians being homosexual are widespread. The most prominent politician who has been rumored to be homosexual is General Prem Tinsulanonda, prime minister from 1980 to 1988 and now president of the Privy Council. These accusations are founded on the fact that he has never been married and is surrounded by often much younger male officers. Other interesting evidence to support the claim that is brought up is the color of the bedroom in the Ban Phitsanulok, which is the official residence of the prime minister. The house was renovated while Prem was prime minister and the master bedroom was painted in pink. It is argued only homosexual men would chose pink, which is see as feminine, as the color for their bedroom. However, these rumors do not take into account that the bedroom was originally painted in pink when the house was built in 1900 to 1925. The reason for this color choice had nothing to do with sexual preferences but with the original owner's birthday. The original owner was born on a Tuesday, to which the color pink is traditionally ascribed (Panni/ปารณีย์ 2010: 34). Other people who have been rumored to be homosexual are the former prime ministers Abhisit Vejjajiva (in office from 2009 to 2011) and Chuan Leekpai (in office from 1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2001), as well as members of the extended royal family and Governor of Bangkok MR Sukhumbhand Paribatra.

It should hereby be noted that politicians are more likely to be called 'gay' than '*kratoey*'. A *kratoey* is understood to be a "psychological woman born inside a man's

body" (Jackson 1999: 238), that is to say, transgender. They strive to be women and dress, speak and behave like women. Some, but not all, undergo gender re-assignment surgery. They are somewhat accepted in Thai society but often are the subject of jokes. As they are perceived as women, their sexual desire for men is not seen as homosexual but rather as their natural heterosexuality. A man having sex with a *kratoey* is likewise not homosexual. Gay men (เกย์ a loanword from English is used) are the genuine homosexuals. As long as their sexual preferences are not made known by a coming out, that is to say, visually displaying it in public, they do not face criticism. However, once they have made their homosexuality publicly known, they are highly criticized, more so than the *kratoey*. As Jackson (1999: 238) puts it,

> The gay man […] is more likely to be considered foreign, strange, potentially dangerous, or even criminal, and a perverted form of manhood. The greater criticism leveled at gay men may derive from the fact that only they are considered to be genuinely homosexual. [...] The gay man … is genuinely "perverted" because he is a man in both body and mind who desires another "man," breaching the masculine-feminine binarism that is strongly endorsed as the acceptable form of erotic relationship in Thailand.

A rumor can cause the same effects. When it is believed to be true, the reaction of the listener will be no different than if the subject of the rumor had a coming out. Even if the rumor is not entirely believed, it will still bring some doubt of the sexual orientation of the subject to the listener and, thus, discredit the subject. Of the politicians mentioned, Abhisit, Chuan and MR Sukumpan have been accused of being gay, not *kratoey*. Only Prem Tinsulanonda has been called either gay or *kratoey*.

When the rumors refer to the politician as gay, it deprives the listener of any possibility to falsify the rumor. Being gay as a sexual preference is not necessarily openly displayed. It is something that happens behind closed doors and often is not talked about. Someone who is listening to the rumor, often not knowing the subject of the gossip in person, has no way of knowing if it is true or false. When a rumor is not outwardly falsified, there will remain a chance it could be true. If the rumor were to state that the politician is *kratoey*, falsification would be nearly instant. None of the above named men has ever been seen in women's clothing, wearing make-up or behaving outwardly feminine. Therefore, the rumor would have a much shorter life expectancy if it were about politicians being *kratoey*. Further, Jackson (1999) has shown that gay are seen as more perverted, abnormal and dangerous. Thus a rumor about being gay would not only live longer but also cause more damage more than a rumor about being *kratoey*.

Women are affected by rumors and scandals as well. When Yingluck, the present prime minister of Thailand, was nominated candidate for the Pheu Thai party, rumors about her private life started to circulate. The matter of discussion was how many men she had slept with. It was also claimed that her son's father was unknown (because she had had intercourse with too many men to keep track of). Her husband was then said to have been found by her family to take responsibility and marry her. However, when considering that Yingluck was married in 1995 but her son is only 10 years old, it becomes clear that is not a likely scenario. More recently another rumor concerning Yingluck's sexual conduct has surfaced. She was seen entering a hotel room together with a business man. In this case the opposition party even demanded an official explanation for her behavior (*Voice TV* 19 February 2012). Yingluck denied the accusation a few days later, claiming that she was having a meeting with representatives of the business society (*Voice TV* 23 February 2012). Nevertheless, for some people such rumors have an impact and most certainly can damage the image of a female politician severely.

Just how great the impact of a rumor of sexual imprudence can be on a female politician became clear in the case of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai. In 2009, a sex video of Dueantemduang was made public. CDs with the clip were handed out in front of Chiang Mai Zoo and the clip was shown live in front of her home. The man shown in the video was her then boyfriend. They have since gotten married and have a son. The clip was shot for private pleasure and accidentally leaked. The clip raised questions about Dueantemduang's moral standards and suitability as a politician. Ultimately, it cost her the re-election as Chiang Mai mayor. The Dueantemduang case is particularly significant, because its timing made clear that the scandal was used strategically to prevent her from running and winning the mayoral elections.

Rumors and scandals are vital in diminishing a political family's symbolic and social capital but can also undermine family loyalties. To have or at least to keep up the image of a warm and functioning family is crucial for a Thai politician. The intact family is not only part of his or her reputation but also an indicator of leadership skills. Thus, it is crucial symbolic capital for a politician. Therefore rumors are often launched to challenge or even destroy the image of a politician's warm family. Such rumors could be about the politician's sexual orientation or his having a minor wife. Apart from diminishing a politician's symbolic capital, rumors also attempt to destroy family loyalties. Rumors about minor wives and homosexuality have the potential to upset the relationships within a family.

Thus, the working relationship can become endangered, and the political family can fail to achieve their goals or even fall apart.

Rejuvenating Capital

The political *trakun* needs to constantly rejuvenate and reproduce its political capital. In order to keep a political family alive and possibly transform it into a political *trakun*, each stage of the life of a *trakun* is crucial. The life of a political *trakun* potentially starts with one politician who has managed to enter politics. This politician's family could get informally engaged in politics, as much political action happens at home. A political family emerges when the politician recruits a member of the family to formally enter politics. This can be the *lang ban* or another relative. Children are raised with an eye to the acquisition of both economic and symbolic capital. If the raising of children and their marriages go favorably, the family has the potential to become a political *trakun*. A *trakun* is finally established when a member of the second generation enters politics. The reasons for a member of the second generation to enter politics can be various and include retirement, sickness, or death but can also derive from a strong desire of the younger generation to enter politics. When the second generation member is successfully established as a politician, the process starts anew. Each stage can lead to the success or failure of a *trakun*.

Public opinion, as expressed in newspapers, is highly negative towards political families. When political families are discussed in the media the overall tone is very critical. These families are perceived to have monopolized the parliamentary seats in their region. Election of second generation members of political *trakun* is often seen as undemocratic, and the new MPs are perceived to be unqualified for the position (cf., *Bangkok Post* 31 July 2011, *Matichon Online* 8 August 2011).

Members of political families react to these claims and strive to maintain the image of the impersonal state. They legitimize the dominance of political families by referring to the educational and political capital of the second generation members. As has been discussed above, political *trakun* make great investments in their children's education and professional training as politicians. Therefore, second generation members usually have an educational and professional background superior to most non-members. It is emphasized that all members of political *trakun* have to win elections and cannot merely be appointed. These references to the democratic system are further used to argue that everyone, member of

the political *trakun* or not, has the right to run for election. Therefore, the second generation members are merely using their constitutional right and win elections due to their greater competencies and skills, economic capital and symbolic capital. The large amount of political capital that is concentrated in political families is used to legitimize their strong presence in the state.[151] The engagement of the whole family in politics becomes particularly visible during election campaigning.

The importance of family loyalties and reputation is acknowledged by all Thai politicians. As has been noted above, family loyalty is important in two different aspects. First, it allows a family to not lose the investments it made in the next generation. The capital that was acquired by the second and third generation members of political *trakun* will be used for the benefit of that *trakun* and not be wasted on outsiders. Thus, family loyalty is an insurance policy. However, family loyalty or in its absence, the image of it, is also crucial political capital. An intact family is seen as a sign of leadership and, thus, is vital for a politician. This is widely acknowledged in Thai politics. Accordingly, reputation is an important factor in maintaining symbolic capital. Rumors are aimed to destroy the reputation of a politician and, thus, decrease their symbolic capital.

One of the most important events in the life of a political family is the funeral of its leading member. The death of the leading member of a political family can spell the end of the family's political influence or the beginning of it becoming a political *trakun*. For a political *trakun*, the death of its leading member can mean the death of the *trakun* or its survival into the next generation. Whatever the outcome will be, the funeral of the deceased is fundamentally important, as it mediates the moment of loss. At the funeral, the social and symbolic capital of the deceased can be transferred to the next generation and, thus, the survival of the political *trakun* can be achieved. Chapter 8 will analyze the role of the funeral of a leading member in the life of a political *trakun*.

[151] Political families also legitimize their dominance in the state by referring to similar patterns in the Western world. Comparisons with Western countries, in particular the United States of America, are made. The Kennedys and Bushes are named as well-known examples of political families. The argumentation is that the United States of America is widely acknowledged as a democratic regime, yet in their political system, political families still exist. Therefore, if America can be democratic despite having political families, Thailand can, too.

Chapter 8

Funeral: Signs of Capital

Symbolic and social capital can be transferred from one generation to the next. Bourdieu (1986) has stated that only economic capital can be inherited, while all symbolic capital is limited by the biological capacity of its owner. Thus, symbolic capital is lost when a person dies. In this chapter, I will argue that that is not the case. Symbolic capital can be transferred to the next generation. This transfer is not automatic and involves the active labor of the bereaved. The transfer of capital is facilitated by the funeral and cremation of the deceased. If this transfer of capital should be unsuccessful, the whole political *trakun* could be in danger of collapse.

This chapter will explore the functions of the funeral of a member of a political *trakun*. First, the funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee will be described in detail. Although the funeral lasted seven days, only the first and the last day will be described. These days are of special importance, as they mark the beginning and the end of the event. The days in-between were a repetition of a condensed version of the first and the last day and, thus, do not need to be described in detail. The funeral will be used as a case study to explore how symbolic capital is created and transferred from one generation to the next. It will also be argued that the funerals of high-ranking people, like politicians, reinstate them as nobility, further adding to their and their children's symbolic capital. Social capital is transferred through the extensive networking activities that take place during the funeral. Finally, cremation volumes will be examined to show their function, which is crucial to the transfer of capital and the creation of a political *trakun*.[152]

During the funeral, signs are used to demonstrate the deceased's symbolic capital and to allow the next generation to claim this capital as their own. According to Leach (1976: 14), a sign is when A and B have "an intrinsic prior relationship because they belong to the same cultural context". As a befitting example he gives the crown, which having been used by kings is a sign for sovereignty. Many such signs are used during the funeral of a high ranking member of Thai society. During the funerals of Thai politicians, these signs are used

[152] Cremation volumes are books of varying size that contain biographical data of and eulogies on the deceased. These books are distributed to the attendance of cremations.

and interpreted in various ways to increase the deceased's rank and transfer his symbolic capital to the next generation.

The funeral not only mediates the transfer of capital, it also helps to create the *trakun* itself. The death of a member of the political family or political *trakun* can mean not only the end of one life but could also be the end of the political aspiration of the whole family. However, it can also be the beginning of the political career of another member, which will eventually manifest a political family as a political *trakun*. Using the medium of cremation volumes, books that commemorate the life of the deceased, the membership in a political *trakun* is defined. Therefore, the funeral and cremation as events are a turning point of crucial importance.

The Funeral

Pairot Suwanchawee was a district chief officer (นายอำเภอ) in Nakhon Ratchasima, Phetchaburi and Saraburi provinces. Later he entered politics and was elected as a representative of Nakhon Ratchasima six times in the constituency in which his father-in-law had been MP before him. Pairot was an executive member of the Chat Thai Party and was among the politicians whose political rights were suspended for five years in 2006. Later he became a key Pheua Phaendin Party[153] supporter and, in 2007, his candidates won six of the 16 House seats available in Nakhon Ratchasima (*Matichon Online* 11 May 2011). After he was banned from politics, his wife and eldest son furthered his political ambitions. His wife, Ranongrak, first became a deputy minister and then Minister of Telecommunication; while the son, Polapee, became an MP. In early 2011, Pairot became one of the founding members of the Chat Thai Pattana Puea Phaendin Party. On 7 May 2011 Pairot passed away. He had been suffering from cancer for over two years and finally died of blood poisoning caused by the cancer treatment. His death was not made public until days later, on 11 May (*Matichon Online* 11 May 2011). His funeral was held from 16 May to 23 May 2011. The date for the cremation, up to the time of submission of this thesis, is still not set.

[153] Pheua Phaendin Party (พรรคเพื่อแผ่นดิน) was a Thai political party founded on 11 September 2007. It merged with the Chat Pattana Party to form the Chat Pattana Puea Phaendin Party, shortly before the general elections in 2011.

Preparation of the Funeral

The preparations for Pairot Suwanchawee's funeral started immediately after his death.[154] His family prepared an offering dish with floral decorations, a candle, and an incense stick.[155] They also prepared a letter of taking leave (หนังสือกราบบังคมทูลลา or หนังสือลาตาย). This letter informs the king of the death of his official and leaves it to the king to determine how to proceed further. According to the Bureau of Royal Household (2007), the letter does not need to be signed. My informants, however, believed that the letter should ideally be written and signed by the deceased just before passing. In cases where it is not possible for the dying to write the letter, at least a fingerprint should be made instead of a signature. The relatives then take the flowers, the letter and documentation of the deceased's official rank and medals of honor to the Bureau of the Royal Household (hereafter referred to as the Bureau). [156] Here officials will take the family's request and decide on the royally bestowed honors the deceased shall be given.

There are clear regulations about royally bestowed funerals and cremations, which leave little room for special treatment. The Bureau has published a detailed list which provides the information about which honors every holder of a certain official rank or medal of honor is given. Officials at the Bureau make their decision according to these regulations and inform the deceased's family in writing. The King is not involved in this process and generally does not intervene.

The Bureau of the Royal Household is responsible for preparing all of the honorary decorations needed for a royally bestowed funeral. The Bureau prepares the royal water. The royal water is used on the first day of the funeral. My informants were uncertain about what differentiated the royal water from holy water used in Buddhist ceremonies. However, they ascertained that it was prepared in the palace and, thus, was special. Some also mentioned that it was likely to be scented with flowers. Most visible during the funeral will be the mortuary urn and the tiered umbrellas, which are also provided by the Bureau. When not in use, the urns are stored at the Bureau. They are not accessible for the public. When needed, the urn is transported to and from the venue by the Bureau. It is not possible to

[154] This part is reconstructed using information given by the Bureau of the Royal Household and through interviews with the faily of the deceased and other informants. I did not witness the preparation of the funeral.
[155] A traditional offering dish is used in various ceremonies in which subordinates pay their respects to superiors, mostly within the family but also from subjects to the king or other royals. The dish itself remotely resembles a cake stand. It is a dish with an attached stand. The offering dish can be silver, gold or an imitation of either. Flowers and leaves are arranged in an intricate structure that hold the candle and incense stick.
[156] Medals of honor are awarded to both civilians and military personnel. Often they are given together with a position in the bureaucracy or military.

get a mortuary urn without passing the Bureau. The cost for all these preparations is carried by the Bureau.

The relatives of the deceased have to take care of all arrangements apart from the honorary decoration. This includes arranging the venue and organizing the flower decoration and the catering for the guests. In some cases, flowers and catering are sponsored by organizations or persons with whom the deceased had a relationship while still alive. In Pairot's case, the flower arrangements were provided by the local high school and the catering was provided by various sponsors. However, even with this support, funerals can be very costly.

The Timing of the Funeral

The timing of a funeral is crucial to ensure that the occasion will help to transfer symbolic capital from one generation to the next. Death is not something that can be scheduled, and there is not much space to move around the date of a funeral. It is Thai custom to hold the funeral as soon as possible following the death of a person (Sathirakoses/เสฐียรโกเศศ 2008: 203).[157] If a deceased or his family, however, wishes to be granted permission to use a mortuary urn and to have royally bestowed water for the bathing ceremony, as well as other royally bestowed honors, they have to secure the permission of the Bureau, as mentioned above. This can slow down the process. The family has to apply for permission from the palace and even though the Bureau is open every day, the logistics of transporting the signs of rank, such as the mortuary urn, will take a day or two, especially if the funeral takes place outside of Bangkok.[158] Close connection to the royal family can shorten this time, as was shown by the funeral of Chalermphan Srivikorn,[159] whose family was able to arrange for the commencement of the funeral within 24 hours after his death.

Pairot Suwanchawee's funeral was delayed by a week, due to personal and political reasons. He passed away on 7 May 2011. His death was officially announced on 11 May 2011. The family explained the delay was due to Pairot's son's approaching wedding,

[157] There are various reasons for this custom. Firstly, in the tropical climate a corpse will quickly start to decay. Secondly, a swift funeral and subsequent cremation will ensure the easy rebirth of the deceased and limit the danger of him or her becoming a haunting spirit.

[158] The request of the family has to be processed bureaucratically, which takes some time. Then the urn, which is of considerable size and age, has to be moved from the Bureau of the Royal Household to the venue. This requires care and, thus, time. The start of a funeral can be further delayed if no urn of the required rank is available. There is a limited number of urns and when an urn is in use, the new applicant has to wait.

[159] Chalermphan Srivikorn was a leading business man and head of the Srivikorn *trakun*, which is a business *trakun*. In life, he served as deputy prime minister, industry minister and chairman of the board of President Hotel and Tower Co. Ltd. Calermphan passed away on 20 May 2011 in Bumrungrad Hospital, Bangkok.

which was planned for 14 May. Pairot's wife, Rarongrak, related to the press that this was Pairot's dying wish. He wanted his son's event to happen before his own (*Daily News Online*, 11 May 2011). Indeed, an earlier announcement of the death and an immediate arrangement of the funeral could have put the wedding at risk. As the bride's family believed that a wedding must not take place within three years after a funeral in the family; such a long postponement might have endangered the whole venture. However, besides these personal reasons, it is possible that political considerations also delayed the release of the news. As the leader of the Puea Pandin Party, his death might have endangered the recent merger with the Ruam Chart Pattana Party, as well as the pending announcement of electoral candidates for the upcoming election. At a press conference on 11 May 2011 such rumors were rejected and it was confirmed that the newly merged Chat Pattana Puea Phaendin Party would keep its Puea Phaendin element and that the Suwanchawees would stay with the party as Pairot wanted his two sons to inherit his political role.

The Location of the Funeral

Funerals can take place in either the home of the deceased or a temple. Funerals at the temple, which were a privilege of the rich in the past, have now become available to the masses, and a funeral at home has turned into a sign of wealth. Funerals at home face certain restrictions. First, it is custom to hold a funeral at home only when the deceased passed away there.[160] Other constraints are of a more practical nature. A funeral at home is more expensive than one at the temple, as costs for the food and other necessities are higher. Also, especially in urban areas, homes that are spacious enough to accommodate big events, like funerals, are increasingly rare. Finally, it is considerably difficult to organize or employ enough manpower. Thus, people have increasingly used the service of temples, which have developed into funeral staging businesses (Panya/ปัญญา 2005). It is notable, however, that many funerals of prime ministers take place at their homes. This shows that prime ministers possess abundant economic capital, which manifests in large homes and the ability to compensate for the higher costs of the event. However, it also shows that they have the social and symbolic capital to mobilize the needed organization and manpower. In the case of Pairot, a funeral at home would have been impossible, because his home not could

[160] This custom is not always followed closely. The original assumption was that if somebody did pass away outside the home it must have been an untimely or violent death, for example in an accident. Before hospitals became widespread, it was likely that natural death would occur at home. Today, natural deaths could take place in a hospital. In such cases the corpse is sometimes relocated to the home, and the funeral is performed there.

accommodate the number of people who participated in his funeral. It would also have inconvenienced guests coming from Bangkok, as Pairot's house is situated in an remote area and is more difficult to access than the town of Nakhorn Ratchasrima.

The funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee took place at Suthjinda Temple (วัดสุทธจินดา), in Nakhorn Ratchasrima. The temple is one of the biggest and most prestigious temples in the province where his constituency was located. This is a combination of political convenience and the Suwanchawees' need to create symbolic capital. Allthrough Pairot was born and raised in Bangkok, his political life centered in Nakhorn Ratchasrima. Also, his current home was located there, so to opt for a funeral in Nakhorn Ratchasrima seemed logical. However, neither his voters nor his house are close to the temple. His constituency, being rural, did not provide a temple big enough with the needed facilities and an appropriate level of prestige. Thus, the family chose one of the province's main temples located in the town of Nakhorn Ratchasrima. This temple would cater to the needs of the high level guests as well as to the voters from the village, who could come in by car.

On the occasion of Pairot Suwanchawee's funeral, the Suthjinda Temple was organized in the following way. The temple has two large areas. The first one has a great pavilion, which is used for merit making rituals, the monks living quarters and a monastic education facility. The second part, which is the area we are concerned with here, is dedicated to funerals and cremations. Figure 32 shows the layout of this part of the temple. The *meru* (เมรุ)[161] used for the cremation was situated in middle of this area. There are five pavilions of different sizes, which are used for funerals. The funeral of Pairot took place in the largest pavilion. After the funeral was completed, the coffin with his body was placed at a smaller pavilion in the back of the temple. Both of the pavilions used during the funeral were repainted by the family prior to the event. The deceased's wife said that it was done because: "He [Pairot] liked beautiful things" (Informal Conversation with Rarongrak Suwanchawee, 20 May 2011). However, newly painted pavilions for the funeral must also have been crucial in order to increase the prestige and, thus, the symbolic capital that could be gained by using this location. Thus, economic capital was invested to increase the family's symbolic capital. Simultaneously, the painting of the pavilions was an act of making merit, as well as a sign of patronage to the temple.

[161] The *meru* is a building used for the cremation. Traditionally, it was a temporary wooden construction that was built for each individual cremation. This was very costly and took a long time. It was reserved for the elite of Thai society. Today, temporary *meru* are only constructed for close relatives of the king. More common now is the cremation at a permanent *meru*. This is available for large portions of society **(**Panya/ปัญญา 2005**).**



Figure 32: Plan of the temple (drawn based on field notes)

Key:

1. Entrance
2. *Meru*
3. Pavilion 1
4. Mortuary urn and coffin
5. Provisional tents for higher ranking guests
6. Provisional tents for lower ranking guests
7. Food preparation
8. Eating area for lower ranking guests
9. Pavilion 5; the corpse is stored here

The pavilion used during the funeral was not large enough to hold all the guests. Provisional tents were erected to create more space and accommodate as many people as possible. The guests of the highest ranks were accommodated in the pavilion itself. The mortuary urn was displayed there. It was the only place cooled down by an air conditioning system and offering comfortable seating. Guests with a somewhat lower, but still high rank, often coming from Bangkok, sat in the provisional tents just outside the pavilion. Guests of lower rank were hosted in provisional tents opposite the pavilion. Large flat screen televisions were used to transmit the events in the pavilion to those seated in the tents. Guests in the pavilion and the provisional tents adjoining it were catered to with food prepared in the provisional tents. They were served by an army of local students. Guests in the remaining tents had to use the service of a makeshift eating space in the back of the temple. They were not served and had to get their food themselves.

The Event

On 16 May 2011, the funeral began at noon with the reception of the corpse, which was transferred from a Bangkok Hospital to Nakon Ratchasrima. This corpse was yet to be placed in a coffin and, thus, was visible for the mourners who had already assembled in the hundreds at the Suthjinda Temple. There, guards of honor, consisting of local government officials,

attired in their white dress uniforms, received the corpse. The corpse was brought into the largest pavilion on the temple ground, in which high ranking military and civilian officials, MPs, ministers, former prime ministers and privy councilors were already seated. The corpse, attired in his dress uniform, was laid down on a table and was partly covered with a decorative blanket. He appeared to be merely sleeping. The pavilion had been decorated, as shown in Figure 33, with his medals of honor, the mortuary urn, which – until approximately half a century ago – would have contained his remains, and four five-tiered umbrellas. The meaning of each of these items will be examined in more detail below.

Figure 33: The large pavilion with the mortuary urn at Pairot's funeral

Key: 1: Mortuary Urn, 2: Tiered Umbrellas, 3: Medals of Honor, 4: Coffin

The next stage of the event commences: the washing of the corpse (อาบน้ำศพ). Traditionally, this ritual would prepare the corpse for the funeral. The whole body was cleaned by the relatives, who wanted to give the deceased this last honor. However, today the body is cleaned by professionals before the ritual begins. Thus, the family and guests only symbolically pour scented water over the hand of the deceased (Sathirakoses/เสฐียรโกเศศ

2008:). The deceased's family, consisting of his wife and three sons, were the first to perform the ceremony, then positioning themselves beside the corpse. They prepared to receive condolences from the guests. First, the relatives and the guests of higher rank queued to perform the washing of the corpse. They were graciously greeted by the family. In the meantime, more guests arrived, of whom the high ranking and well-known were announced to the family and attendance by the editor of the local newspaper who had worked closely with the family for decades.

At approximately four o'clock a group of high ranking local officials arranged a guard of honor. They were awaiting the officials of the Bureau to bring the royally bestowed water for the next part of the ceremony.[162] As time passed it became apparent that they were becoming more and more anxious to leave the hot afternoon sun. Finally, palace officials with royal water for the next part of the ceremony, the bathing ceremony, arrived. Passing through the guard of honor, the official went straight into the pavilion where the bathing ceremony was performed. The Bureau describes the ritual as follows:

> The officiant in representation of the king faces in the direction in which the king resides to pay respects and then starts the ritual. He lifts the head of the corpse. The officiant in representation of the king pours the royally bestowed water onto the corpse's chest as if he was bathing it. Then he pours turmeric scented water and perfume. After he is finished he pays respects in the same direction as before. The ritual is completed (Bureau 2008).[163]

The ceremony took only a few minutes, and the palace officials quickly returned to Bangkok.

When the bathing ceremony was completed, the washing of the corpse proceeded in the same order as the seating arrangements. First, the ones seated in the pavilion had their turn followed by those seated in the tents just outside the pavilion. After all the officials and politicians seated in the first two areas had poured the water, it was the villagers' turn. I was sitting with a group of villagers and accompanied them. We were orchestrated by announcements through loudspeakers; the villagers, tent by tent, queued under the hot afternoon sun. To avoid the sun, the group of villagers I had joined waited patiently for some time. However, as time passed, the orderly lines start to dissolve and the people chaotically pressed forwards as everybody wanted to go first. Now, there was no holding back and I was pushed in the direction of the pavilion. Finally, everybody was given the opportunity to pour water, but the graceful orderliness in which the higher ranks had proceeded had disappeared.

[162] Usually the washing of the corpse commences with royally bestowed water; however, in the case of Pairot that was not logistically possible.
[163] For Thai original see Appendix 1.36.

While some of the guests stayed on, the group of villagers I had joined excused themselves and started their journey home.

Figure 34: Palace officials arrive with the royal water for the ceremony

Figure 35: Bathing veremony
(Source: *Thairath Online* 16 May 2011)

After the washing of the corpse was concluded, the deceased's family said their tearful goodbyes, and the corpse was finally placed in a coffin. The coffin was placed behind the mortuary urn and the decoration and was then barely visible, creating the illusion that the corpse had actually been placed in the urn. By now the high ranking officials and politicians, as well as most of the villagers had departed on their journey home and a short break was made in the proceedings. At half past seven in the evening of the same day, four

monks arrived and held the customary Buddhist funeral chanting.[164] During the chanting, the guests, sitting in the pavilion and in the tents just outside it, were served drinks and rice congee. After the chanting concluded, guests went into the pavilion to talk to the family and presented them with envelopes containing a monetary contribution as well as to take a picture in front of the mortuary urn. These pictures were taken as a last picture with the deceased, as a type of souvenir. However, it could also serve as proof of who had attended the funeral.

All following days of the funeral started at around ten o'clock in the morning when villagers from the deceased's former constituency started to arrive. They came in larger groups of four to seven pick-ups, which were each carrying approximately ten to twenty people, as shown in Figure 36. Villagerswho had just arrived were offered cold drinks and food in an area set apart for that purpose. [165] The food served was a simple curry on rice. When they had eaten, the villagers sat down in the provisional tents and were shown a short biographical film of Pairot, which was continuously repeated on the television screens. The villagers sitting close to me were not attentive and spent most of the time chatting to each other. While the villagers were waiting, Pairot's son, who was about to run in his father's former constituency for the second time just after the funeral ended, intermingled with the villagers together with his wife, as shown in Figure 38. They were accompanied by the editor of the local newspaper, who announced over the loudspeaker that Ponlapee Suwanchawee was welcoming and thanking all brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, grandfathers and grandmothers. The editor urged the villagers to have pity on Ponlapee, as he had just lost his father. He also asked the villagers to vote for Ponlapee. While going from tent to tent, Ponlapee leaned in to talk to some of the villagers more closely. An elderly women sitting close to me burst into tears. Ponlapee bent down, almost hugging her, and said: "Granny, don't cry, or I will start, too." Ponlapee finished his round and, together with his entourage, returned to the large pavilion where food offerings were made to the monks. The villagers showed no interest in the offering to the monks.

[164] Initially, no one could answer my question: why at funerals is always the case that four (or a multitude of four) monks chant. Finally, I received my answer from a well studied monk. He explained that for auspicious events an even number of monks is required, while inauspicious events need an uneven number. Thus, for funerals, four monks plus the statue of the Buddha, totaling five, are customary.

[165] When I use the term 'villager' I refer to the Thai term *chao ban* (ชาวบ้าน). This term has a different connotation than the English term 'villager'. It refers more to class than geographical origin. A *chao ban* is usually someone of the lower social classes. This often coincides with people living in villages but is not limited to them. In the particular case described here, however, the majority of *chao ban* actually came from villages.

Figure 36: Villagers in pick-up truck

Figure 37: Villagers in provisional tents

The villagers again queued up to enter the large pavilion and prostrate themselves in front of the mortuary urn in order to bid farewell to the deceased. Just as I did the day before, I joined a group of villagers. We were directed by the now familiar voice of the editor over the loudspeaker. However, the villagers made their own calculations about the estimated waiting time in the burning midday sun or the duration of the journey home. When they had finally decided to join the line, they were anxious to reach the pavilion fast. The

villagers entered the pavilion in groups of approximately twenty people. Usually people would be allowed to pay their respects to the deceased silently, but not in this case. A woman, who was Pairot's assistant, dictated over a microphone what we should say. We should express our gratitude for all his sacrifice and helpfulness to the people. In return we promised to vote for his son during the upcoming election. We silently prostrated ourselves and left the pavilion. The villagers departed for their home villages immediately; it was nearly two o'clock.

Figure 38: Ponlapee Suwanchawee making his round amongst the participating villagers

Starting from the first and up to the last day, people would send funeral wreaths to the temple, as can be seen in Figure 39. Every arriving wreath was carefully registered and counted by assistants of the family. Each of them carried a large sign with the name of the giver. The wreaths were hung up to decorate the venue. When a wreath wilted, it was replaced by a newly arrived one. A selection of the name signs was kept and hung up on a wall. On the final day of the funeral, I counted 195 name signs accumulated on the wall. This, however, represented only a fraction of the number of wreaths that had been sent, as on the first day alone over two hundred wreaths had arrived. These wreaths exhibit the social connections of the deceased and his family. Wreaths of influential people, such as former prime ministers or privy councilors, are showcased where they can be seen by everyone participating in the funeral. Thus, the wreaths can also convey symbolic capital.

Every evening at seven o'clock the funeral chanting started. The funeral chanting always had a host. On the first day, the family of the deceased and some other close families or organizations were the hosts. Subsequent evenings were hosted by high ranking

figures, such as the former prime ministers Banharn Silapa-archa and Chuan Leekpai, ministers or organizations of which the deceased had been a member or sponsor. The host would be responsible for the cost of that day's chanting. This included the food and beverages for the guests as well as the offerings to the monks. The hosts of each day were announced on large white boards, as shown in Figure 40. The practice of sponsoring a funeral is a way of transferring the social capital from one generation to the next. People or organizations who had dealt with the deceased while they were still alive, now initiate a relationship with the bereaved. They enter into a relationship of reciprocity that can later be used as social capital.

Figure 39: Funeral wreath with the name of the givers

Guests of higher rank did participate in the evening chanting but not in the day chanting. The whole atmosphere was a very different one. While in the daytime the villagers participated with a sense of lightness and disinterest, the people attending in the evening had a serious demeanor and followed the chanting attentively. They were served food and beverages by students from the local secondary school and technical college. While ordinary guests might stay on for a chat with some of the other guests, the host of the event, especially those of highest rank, would depart as soon as possible after the chanting was concluded. The chanting on the final day of the funeral was followed by a short ceremony in which the coffin was placed in a smaller pavilion at the back of the temple grounds, where it remained until the cremation. The procession with the coffin was led by the sons of the deceased and accompanied by guards of honor. The corpse is still lying there today, awaiting cremation.

Figure 40: Sign announcing the sponsor of a particular day of the funeral

Figure 41: The coffin is carried to the smaller pavilion on the last day of the funeral

The Delay of the Cremation

The Suwanchawees postponed not only the funeral but also the cremation. The cremation usually takes place on the third, seventh, fiftieth or hundredth day after the death or the start of the funeral. The most common days are the third and the seventh day after the death (Fishel 2005: 144). The family can, however, choose to postpone the cremation in order to allow relatives and friends who live far away or have other urgent business to participate in

the cremation. To postpone the cremation beyond the 100 days, as happened in the case of Pairot Suwanchawee, is uncommon. The reason for this postponement is that the family applied for a royally bestowed cremation fire with the presence of a member of the royal family. Though royally bestowed cremation fire is comparably easily granted, the presence of member of the royal family is not, and long waiting times are involved. The presence of a member of the royal family is a clear indicator of status, as only the very top of society can hope for such honor. As opposed to those of commoners, royalty's cremations always took place a long time after the death. Princes and princesses were kept until a number of corpses had accumulated, and then a joint ceremony with honors according to the individual ranks was performed. This would mean that the 100 day rites had passed for months and sometimes over a year before cremation took place. Kings always had individual cremations, which took place long after the 100 day rites: often a year or more later. Only Rama VI had a relatively short period of waiting between death and cremation. He was cremated only four months after he passed away, which is approximately one month after the 100 day rites. This was on special order by the king who wished to save the resources a lavish funeral would have necessitated (Wales 1931: 138). Thus, a politician postponing his cremation and putting it off to match the time frame of royal cremations makes a statement. It makes a comparison with royalty.

The postponement of the cremation also gives the deceased's family continued opportunities to rebuild their networks and to transfer the deceased's social capital to the living. The time between funeral and cremation is not wasted with idle waiting. Every Saturday, a merit making ceremony is arranged, which is an opportunity for the family to reconnect with their network. During this weekly merit making, local politicians, village leaders, officials and other people of influence come to participate. After the monks have been fed, the participants and the family sit down to eat. During the eating, people continued to come to the widow to report on developments on the ground. They came with requests for help but also ensuring their continued support. These moments were certainly important to secure a seat in parliament for the eldest son in the 2011 election. It also was very important to reinforce the relationships with these people and to reassure them that this family is still capable of acting as their patron. At the same time, by giving assistance as requested, the family gets the opportunity to reintegrate these people into a relationship of reciprocity, which fundamentally starts with the consumption of food together. The shared consumption of food and drinks is of great importance for the creation of a feeling of belonging, the

belonging to a community or a family (Carsten 1997, Janowski and Kerlogue 2007), as mentioned in Chapter 3 and 7.

Various Functions of the Attendance at Funerals

The funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee was attended by a large number of people from all levels of society. The attendance can be divided into four categories: (1) the villagers who are Pairot's direct or indirect clients, (2) local officials and politicians who are Pairot's direct clients, (3) peers and (4) superiors who are Pairot's direct or indirect patrons or had either a personal or working relationship with him. Each of these groups has an important role to play. When people of all levels were asked why it is important to attend funerals, they said that this is the social norm. For people on a higher level the attendance at the funeral is also political. In Thai politics, friends can become enemies and enemies friends. Thus, it is important to not insult anybody in a way that would make future cooperation impossible. Not going to a funeral would be such an insult. A common saying in Thailand is, "Too angry to burn the ghost".[166] Thus, not attending the funeral or the cremation means that one is extremely angry with each other. It in practice means one does not want to maintain any relationship with the deceased person or the bereaved.

Villagers attended in high numbers. Voters in Pairot's constituency would often express that they felt it to be their duty to attend. Others said that giving him the last honor would be the only way they could repay his kindness and their debt of gratitude. This notion is not only shared by the people who knew him personally but also by those that had never met him. Thousands of voters that live in Pairot's constituency and beyond paid their respects to their MP during the funeral. The exact number of voters that attended the seven day funeral is, however, difficult to estimate. The space in the provisional tents amounted to 1313 seats, however, occasionally not every seat was filled or more seats were added to accommodate more participants. I would make a conservative estimate that around ten thousand people participated during the seven day funeral rites. The family of the bereaved, however, claims a numbers of several thousand for the first day alone.

The moral obligation to attend funerals is high but the actual participation is ensured by the politician's family. In the case of Pairot's funeral, it was arranged by the family of the bereaved and their staff that villagers from different villages would come on different days, resulting in most villagers going only once. They are mobilized by community

[166] For Thai original see Appendix 1.37.

leaders, including village heads and other local politicians. Transportation was organized in the form of pick-ups, of which each could carry 15 to 20 people, as shown in Figure 36. Usually five to seven pick-ups would come from one village, amounting to a group of 75 to140 people. The cost for transportation is carried by the host of the funeral; every group leader receives money. This financial contribution to the villagers is called fuel money (ค่าน้ำมัน) and is supposed to merely cover the cost of fuel. Villagers acknowledge that they received money but refrain from giving numbers. It is possible that the amount of money given exceeded the actual cost of transport. Many of the villagers would not have been able to go on their own and thus felt thankful towards the organizer that they were able to fulfill their obligation. Thus, the host was not only able to ensure and increase the number of people participating but also to build up or strengthen the bond between the voters and Pairot's successors. Thus, the social capital of the father is transferred to the surviving members of the family, in particular to his wife and son, who played the most significant role in the funeral.

The ability to mobilize a high number of villagers to participate at the funeral demonstrates the *barami* of the politician. The high number of villagers who participate at the funeral demonstrates that he will be able to gain a high number of votes and, thus, has the potential to be re-elected. It also shows that he has enough *barami* to attract these people into his networks. Thus, the villagers function as important extras in the performance for peers and superior guests at the funeral. The same is true for community leaders, who have a strong motivation to bring as many people as possible to the funeral, as this will translate into bargaining power. A high number of people organized by the community leaders, who often double as vote canvassers, shows of their ability to mobilize a following and, thus, votes. Every politician is well advised to take a community leader with a large following seriously and treat him with due respect. This can translate into material or other benefits which will again enable the local leader to accumulate even more followers. The ability to mobilize a large following has been an essential part of a leader's power and authority for centuries (Geertz 1980: 116).

Community leaders, who are often also the vote canvassers, are of special importance, as they can determine if the *trakun* will remain in politics or not. Upon Pairot's death, these community leaders had to decide if they wanted to remain loyal to the Suwanchawee family or change their allegiance to a more promising candidate. Thus, the community leaders were given special attention by the Suwanchawees. They are paid due respect and are especially warmly welcomed by the family. Local officials helped the family to identify community leaders participating at the funeral. When local officials spotted a local

leader they would notify a member of the Suwanchawee family, who would then instantly hurry to greet the community leader. To ignore one of these leaders could result in a change of allegiance to another politician.

Local officials played a very important role. Both low and higher level government officials attended the first day of the funeral. Officials of lower rank were dressed in their working uniform,[167] while those of higher rank wore their dress uniform, which is reserved for special occasions. The lower level officials did not carry out any special duties during the funeral and were treated not much differently than the villagers. The higher level officials did carry an important duty during the ceremony. They welcomed the palace officer who brought the royal water for the bathing ceremony. As guards of honor, they stood waiting under the hot afternoon sun for the palace officer to arrive. This gave the whole occasion a very formal atmosphere and made it resemble a state ceremony. As a result, the rank of the deceased and the occasion was raised. It should be noted that the officials had no formal or legal obligation to participate in this ritual. When asked why they participated, they related that they wanted to do it for their *nai* (นาย).[168] It was with the same devotion that they received guests and led them to the family of the deceased to avoid the embarrassment that would be caused if important and influential people were overlooked.

Errington (1989: 159) describes how a high ranking person's honor would be protected by his entourage, which would ensure appropriate treatment; this works slightly differently in the context of Thai funerals. Errington observed that the large number of followers gathered around a high ranking individual functioned as a shield for the leader, both from physical assault and from a lack of deference. The high number of followers in itself was already an indicator of the leader's rank and, thus, prompted appropriate treatment. Beyond that, the followers were attentive of the treatment that the leader received and would protest any misbehavior. The leader could then exhibit his own potency by calming down his followers. In the Thai context, the appropriate treatment is likewise very important. However, it is a joint effort of many parties to ensure this treatment. High-ranking guests would usually arrange for someone from their entourage to call in beforehand to announce their pending

[167] This might have been a coincidence as government officials usually wear their working uniform on Mondays and the funeral commenced on a Monday.

[168] *Nai* can be translated as master or boss; however, the word carries a slightly different meaning than these translations. The German word *Meister* is closer to the Thai term than the English master. A *nai* is a superior who is treated with the utmost respect of his subordinates, prompting the subordinates to fulfill the *nai*'s requests. The *nai* and his subordinate are connected by a relationship of reciprocity in which the *nai* provides the subordinate with protection and often financial benefits. The subordinate returns this with his respect and services as required by the *nai*. The relationship is voluntary and can be broken up if not satisfactory to either side.

arrival. At the funeral then one member of the family would always stand close to the entryway to the main pavilion to spot high-ranking or otherwise important guests. This member of the family would also be approached by local officials, who would guide important local leaders to them. In the pavilion itself, the editor of the local newspaper, who had broad knowledge and who recognized both local people of rank and those from Bangkok, would make the appropriate announcement whenever a noteworthy person had arrived. This gave the opportunity for proper welcoming gestures from the Suwanchawee family as well as other people present.

High ranking officials from the national level participated in the funeral to re-establish their networks and demonstrate their patronage. Politicians at all levels of society regularly take part in funerals of people of all ranks. However, the funeral of a fellow politician is certainly more important, as they have to repair the loss of a link in their network and build up a relationship with the deceased's successor, who could potentially become a politician.

Royally Bestowed Honors

The palace awards honors on the occasion of a funeral and cremation to people of a certain rank. These honors stretch from the bestowal of royal water for the bathing rite, decorations appropriate to the rank of the deceased and a royal fire for the cremation.[169] Every government officer, both military and civil, ranking three, division chief, or above has the right to apply to the Bureau for the awarding of appropriate honors upon their death. A rank three official is comparatively low in governmental rank, as the scale goes up to 11. However, a holder of this rank in the civil service must be a university graduate. Thus, the group of people who are eligible for the awarding of honors is relatively small. Further, these lower officials receive only a minimum of honors, like the royal water for the bathing rite and a royal fire for the cremation. They are not eligible for any other decoration.

The most outstanding honor that can be awarded is a mortuary urn with the corresponding umbrellas and insignias. This honor has traditionally been reserved for royalty and high nobility only. Today it has been extended to privy councilors, prime ministers, ministers, heads of organizations defined in the constitution and people who have been decorated with high medals of honor. There are only a very limited number of people holding

[169] For funerals of ethnic Chinese, royally bestowed soil is also available. Chinese are given soil, instead of fire, because they are buried and not cremated.

an order high enough to entitle them to a mortuary urn. One order that entitles for such honor is the Most Illustrious Order of *Chula Chom Klao* (เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์อันเป็นมงคลยิ่งราชมิตราภรณ์) of the first and second degree. The number of medals of honor of this type given out at any one time is limited by law; thus, we know that no more than 650 people hold such an order. This is not the only medal of honor entitling the holder to a mortuary urn; however, the total number of people who are not royalty receiving an urn does not exceed a few thousand people. This is a small fraction of the whole population and, thus, the awarding of a mortuary urn should be considered as a very rare honor.

The king has no or little influence on the awarding of decorations in life and death. Medals of honor are awarded to governmental officials according to their official positions. There are detailed ministerial guidelines from the Office of the Prime Minister. It is clearly prescribed which position equals which medals of honor and how much time has to elapse before one can get a higher order. There is a fixed number of medals of honor and one has to return an order when a higher order of the same category is awarded or upon death.[170] The king cannot refuse the awarding of most medals of honor. He only has the right to decide on the awarding of the *Ratana Varabhorn* Order of Merit (เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์รัตนวราภรณ์) which is awarded for personal service to the king. It is awarded at his discretion only. The king also has no right to decline the request of a deceased's family for the honors befitting the rank of the person who has passed away. On rare occasions when a renowned person who did not have any official position or medals of honor, like an artist or writer, passes away, the palace can award honors as a 'special case' (กรณีพิเศษ). The palace also tends to award honors as a special case to people who have been generous donors to the royal foundation. This effectively means that one could buy such honors by donating a large amount of money to the royal foundation. However, such special cases are not awarded mortuary urns. They receive a royal fire and are occasionally awarded with a coffin provided by the palace.[171]

The decorations awarded by the palace are genuinely limited to those who are eligible for it. As opposed to other ceremonies like the ordination ceremony, which imitate court rituals (Van Esterik and Van Esterik 1980), the decorations used at royally bestowed funerals and cremations cannot be reproduced. The mortuary urn is composed of two urns, an inner and an outer urn. The inner urn would historically contain the corpse of the deceased. It

[170] The family has the opportunity to redeem the order by a payment of money. Depending on the rank, an order can cost between two hundred and two million *baht*. The medals of honor that entitle one to a mortuary urn cost between ten thousand and two million *baht*.
[171] These coffins have to be returned after the funeral and are kept in the palace.

would be cremated together with the corpse. The outer urn would be kept and reused.[172] The urns are antiques and were made between 1782 and 1908 (Prince Damrong and Prince Narisara/สมเด็จพระเจ้าบรมวงศ์เธอ พระองค์เจ้าดิศวรกุมาร กรมพระยาดำรงราชานุภาพ และสมเด็จเจ้าฟ้าฯ กรมพระยานริศรานุวัดติวงศ์ 1991: 148, 161). The urns are kept in the palace and sent to the location of the funeral when needed. After the funeral is concluded, the urn is immediately sent back to the palace. Therefore, it is not possible to use an urn without the permission of the palace. A reproduction of an urn is also unlikely, as the necessary skills are rare and expensive. Therefore, a funeral with a mortuary urn is limited to a very exclusive group of people.

There are mortuary urns of different rank. Depending on the rank of the deceased, different mortuary urns are used. The urns are listed in Appendix 3. The highest four urns are exclusively used for royalty. Prime ministers are awarded an urn of middle rank. Most officials, including MPs, are given one of the lower three urns. It should be noted that not all MPs are entitled to a mortuary urn.

The comprehension of the mortuary urn depends on social class. The villagers whom I asked had little comprehension of the mortuary urn. When asked, they often did not know what it was. Some said it is what the "big people" (คนใหญ่ คนโต) would be using. Again others said it would be used to keep the ash and bones left over after the cremation. This shows that they had not had the opportunity to see a mortuary urn and, thus, compared it to something with which they were familiar. An urn used to keep the ashes has, in principle, the same shape and look as a mortuary urn. However, it is much smaller and is only between 10 and 20 centimeters high. Participants at the funeral who were of higher strata of society, and sitting in the pavilion or the tents just outside it, could relate to the mortuary urn. They have had the opportunity to see some of these mortuary urns and some of their relatives had been awarded an mortuary urn. These groups of people could also differentiate between the various ranks of mortuary urns, to a certain degree. For them, the presence of the urn was of much greater importance than the rank of it.

The different ranks of mortuary urns are difficult for the unschooled eye to distinguish. I would like to relate my own learning process in terms of mortuary urns, so that the reader can better appreciate what is required to translate these signs of rank appropriately. During my interviews with both politicians and their wives, they always emphasized the

[172] The oldest urn was built in the Thonburi or early Bangkok Period. Most urns were built during the reigns of Rama IV and Rama V, likely because the existing number of urns was not sufficient for the increasing number of royalty and nobles who were entitled to a mortuary urn.

importance of funerals. Therefore, I decided to go and observe funerals in order to understand their importance to politicians.

The first funeral I attended was that of Damrong Krairiksh, who was a high government official and father of a senator. The funeral took place at Wat Thep Sirintharawat (วัดเทพศิรินทราวาส), which is one of the most prestigious addresses for funerals in the upper-class and a temple under royal sponsorship. Upon entering the pavilion, I saw the beautifully arranged mortuary urn and wreaths. This was the first time I had seen a mortuary urn and I was genuinely impressed. At that time, I was not able to recognize the different ranks of urns and could not estimate that the urn I had seen at this very first funeral was the lowest rank possible. When comparing the mortuary urn of Damrong in Figure 42 to those in Figures 33 and 44, it becomes clear which is of a higher rank. However, as I continued to go to funerals and repeatedly encountered mortuary urns, I started to be able to differentiate between the various ranks of urn. This recognition was more by instinct than by knowledge. From my conversations with other participants at funerals, I discovered that their learning process was similar to mine. Those who were younger and had not yet attended many funerals did not realize that there were different ranks of mortuary urns. Those who had attended more funerals started to recognize differences. One of the participants told me that when a mortuary urn has the form of an octagon, then you know that the deceased was of really high rank.[173] This shows that people tried to make sense of the various ranks of urns, but this involved a learning process.

Figure 42: The mortuary urn of Damrong Krairiksh
(Wat Thep Sirintharawat from 9 to 15 May 2011)

[173] The Octagon Mortuary Urn is, in fact, the second lowest in rank. However, commoners are very rarely awarded a higher ranked urn. Thus, the Octagon Mortuary Urn appears to be of high rank.

The importance of the identification of various ranks of mortuary urn is ambiguous. I did not encounter anyone who could precisely name the urn or tell me which rank it had. At the Pairot funeral, his staff was not able to tell me what urn had been awarded. Even when I told them it looked like an Octagon Mortuary Urn, they were not able to confirm or disconfirm. Finally, becoming annoyed, they told me that it did not really matter which mortuary urn it was as long as it was a mortuary urn. This was showing off the high status of the deceased in superfluity. However, the rank of urn is not as irrelevant as suggested by Pairot's staff. This becomes obvious when looking at cremation volumes, which are distributed to the attendance of cremations. The majority of cremation volumes explicitly note the rank of the urn by reproducing the written correspondence from the Bureau awarding the urn and decorations of rank. It is rare to not find a note on the rank of the urn. Also, newspaper coverage of funerals of former prime ministers always notes the rank of urn awarded to the deceased. Thus, though during the funeral the rank of the urn might not be of overreaching importance, as most of the participants cannot identify or differentiate the ranks, it becomes crucial when presenting the funeral to a wider public.

The mortuary urn is an important piece of symbolic capital, not only because it is a decoration awarded by royalty, but because it is truly a distinction. Apart from the urn being an extremely rare honor, the way the body used to be placed in the urn is completely out of the ordinary. Today usually a corpse is placed supine in a coffin, in a position which the informants refer to as "lying comfortably" (นอนสบาย). In a mortuary urn, the corpse traditionally sat in an embryonic position, as shown in Figure 43. Informants repeatedly related to that fact by stating that "in death, anybody can lay down".[174] It is not clear why the corpse is sitting, instead of lying. It might be that it was an attempt to facilitate a speedy rebirth, as the pose in the urn resembles that of an embryo in the mother's womb. It could also date back to pre-historic culture, when babies, who appeared to have been highly esteemed, were buried in urn-like ceramic pots (Van Esterik 2011: 26-27). One reason is certainly very practical, as the placement in the urn leads to the draining of most of the body fluids and, thus, made it possible to keep the corpse over an extended period of time, despite the tropic climate. These speculations, however, will have to be the topic of future research into Thai funerals and cremations and are beyond the scope of this study.

The embryonic pose in the urn differs markedly from the majority of people who are lying in coffins and is crucial as a sign of symbolic capital. The actual practice of

[174] For Thai original see Appendix 1.38.

putting the corpse in the urn has decreased drastically and has probably nearly totally disappeared over the last century. A lady-in-waiting to the queen related to me that there is nobody who still knows how to put a corpse into a mortuary urn and that the practice was abandoned as early as the funeral of Rama VI. According to Wales (1931: 140), however, Rama VI was still placed into the urn. The same seems to be the case for the corpse of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath. The detailed account of the corpse in the urn presented in the newspapers suggests that the corpse was actually placed in the urn. If not, this is a creation of the image of a proper mortuary urn funeral. All mortuary urn funerals until today aspire to keep up the image of the corpse placed in the urn. The coffin is hidden behind the urn and elaborate floral decoration, so it can barely be seen. For some funerals, the coffin disappears behind a curtain. In the case of royal funerals, a coffin is nowhere to be seen, thus, presenting the perfect upkeep of the image. This leads many people to believe that commoners have abandoned the practice but the royal family still continues it. The emphasis which is put on the different pose of the corpse between common people as opposed to nobility and royalty shows that this plays a major part in setting apart the deceased from the ordinary. The mortuary urn was traditionally reserved for high nobility and royalty. By continuing the practice, high government officials, including politicians, are reinvented as nobility, setting them apart from the rest of society as a social class.

Figure 43: Position of the body in the mortuary urn
(Drawn According to Wales' Account)

This reinvention as nobility is reinforced by the writing of a letter to resign to die (หนังสือกราบบังคมทูลลา or หนังสือลาตาย). This letter is much like a letter of resignation, only that the person is resigning into death, maybe even asking for permission to die. This might be a reference to the king being the 'lord of life' (เจ้าชีวิต). These letters are today still written by high ranking officials, including politicians.

The five tiered umbrella is another marker of symbolic capital. The five tiered umbrella, also used in royal ceremonies, is a sign of regal authority (Wales 1931: 93).[175] Therefore, it performs a similar function to that of the mortuary urn. It signifies the high rank of the deceased as well as indicating that he had possessed political power. The umbrellas do not, however, take a central role in the arrangement.

Figure 44: Mortuary urn of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
Decorations are draped in the foreground, and royal funeral wreaths are on the left and right of the urn.
(Source: Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007)

The king and the royal family can enhance the status of the deceased by bestowing a royal funeral wreath.[176] As has been stated above, the king cannot influence the decision on the mortuary urn awarded, but he can communicate his respect for the deceased by presenting the deceased with a funeral wreath. Any other member of the royal family can do the same. Each member of the royal family has a distinct design or funeral wreath featuring their personal royal coat of arms, their color and the contemporary fashion.[177] Figure 44 shows the mortuary urn and a complete set of royal funeral wreaths at the funeral for Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. Very seldom is a person awarded so many royal funeral wreaths. This is most likely to be observed at the funeral of a prime minister, deputy prime minister, privy councilor or somebody with personal ties to the royal family. Pairot

[175] Wales (1931: 1931) states that a five-tiered umbrella was used for the Front Palace (the heir apparant). However, the umbrella he refers to is white, and the umbrellas featured at funerals are colored and with embroidered with gold thread. There is a void of knowledge regarding these signs of rank, and further research should be undertaken to fill it.
[176] The bestowal of a royal funeral wreath is not dependent on the deceased's entitlement to a mortuary urn.
[177] The color is dependent on the day of the week the particular member of the royal family was born, as in Thai culture, each day of the week has been allocated a color. The funeral wreath, also, has changed over time to accommodate changing fashions and tastes. These changes are, however, made to all royal funeral wreaths and do not depend on the personal taste of any of the members of the royal family.

Suwanchawee was not awarded a royal funeral wreath.[178] The importance of royal funeral wreaths became especially clear to me when a participant at Pairot's funeral took out her mobile phone and showed me a picture of her father's funeral showing the mortuary urn but focusing on a royal funeral wreath bestowed by the king. She emphasized that she was particularly proud about this royal wreath and made it understood that this is very special, effectively ranking her father, who had been supreme commander of the royal armed forces, over Pairot. Royal funeral wreaths represent a close connection with the royal house; therefore, it is very prestigious for a family if one of their deceased has been bestowed with one.

The whole arrangement of the funeral supports the thesis that politicians and other high government officials, with the help of the palace, reinvent a noble class. Panya/ ปัญญา (2005) has noted a shift of preferences in funerals over time. The traditional Thai society emphasizes the display of noble title and rank, which is demonstrated by the location of the funeral and cremation, as well as royally bestowed decorations and honors, which demonstrate closeness to the royal house. The modern capitalist class has little access to such honors and, thus, concentrates on the showcasing of financial wealth. Politicians and other high level officials subscribe to both preferences. The feudal traditions and royal rituals are continued and superimposed by trends of the contemporary capitalist class, who try to compensate for the lack of symbolic capital by the display of economic capital.

The Cremation Volume

Cremation volumes are a literary genre unique to Thailand. According to Olsen (1992: 281-282), it is speculated that the distribution of small volumes on the occasion of cremations goes back to the late 19th or early 20th century and represents an extension of the Thai custom of gift giving. Over the years the custom has spread. Due to the extraordinary amount of resources, both financial and in manpower, that flow into their production, however, cremation volumes are very much a sign of status and wealth. The format and size of cremation volumes vary greatly and, thus, are an indicator of wealth. Each book usually consists of a short biography of the deceased, including the mentioning of his or her family, eulogies and a reprint of literary or religious texts (Olson 1992).

[178] He was, however, sent a funeral wreath by the chairman of the privy council, General Prem Tinsulanonda.

Within this genre of the cremation volume, that of the politician stands out as a subtype. The reprints of literary or religious texts that make up the majority of the general cremation volume are often absent. Instead, it consists of an often extended biography including detailed reports of the deceased's achievements, the family history, a kinship record sometimes in the form of a chart, a photographic account of the obsequies and an extended collection of eulogies. These letters are organized according to seniority in age or official position of the writer and generally divided into two sections: (1) non-relatives and (2) relatives.

Also opposed to the general practice, prominent politicians often have more than just one volume. Usually, cremation volumes are prepared within a short period of time. This is between the death and the cremation, which can be between three and 100 days. The preparation is done or supervised by the family of the deceased, and then one single volume is distributed for free amongst the attendants of the cremation. This does not apply to politicians. For politicians the period between death and cremation is often more than the cunstumary three, five seven or even 100 days. The cremation for politician is often postponed and takes place more than a year after the death. This allows much more care and effort to go into the production of the volumes. It also allows other parties to produce their own volumes. Thus, high ranking politicians often have more than one large volume. It is difficult to determine how many volumes were dedicated to one politician. This is because they are not systematically registered, collected or stored. During my search for cremation volumes, I have encountered three volumes dedicated to Sarit Thanarath,[179] four to Chatchai Choonhavan, and seven to Sanya Thamasak and his wife, who were cremated on the same day. I believe, however, that even more exist.

The distribution of cremation volumes for politicians also functions differently. In addition to the volume distributed directly on the day of the cremation, some volumes are produced after the cremation. These volumes include a photographic report of the cremation day in addition to the usual features. These volumes are given to the attendants of the cremation. They can also be given away to interested people or even distributed by the political party with which the deceased was affiliated. The postponed distribution of the volumes gives the persons involved the opportunity of interaction after the death of a person and thus allows them to foster their relationships and renegotiate their networks after an important alteration. This is a important part of the transfer of social capital to the survivors.

[179] I have, however, not yet found the main one.

The cremation volume is crucial in determining how a person is represented to posterity. Cremation volumes of politicians often feature extended biographies of the deceased, which frequently put his or her sacrifice for the country at the core. The average biography in cremation volumes of non-politicians is a resumé of the deceased in the form of a personal data sheet between two and ten pages in length. In the case of politicians, this resumé is often followed by detailed biographies that can take up between twenty and a few hundred pages. In some cases, writings of the deceased are included, often historic documents or a collection of speeches which document their lives. In this fashion, a cremation volume aims to recreate a politician as somebody who has lived his or occasionally her life in the service of the country, a person who deserves to be honored and deserves to have been in power (Hanks 1962). The cremation volume is the first place to look up information about a deceased person. Often it is here that one can find the most detailed accounts of a person's life. This makes cremation volumes not only collectables, but also references for journalists, authors and academics. Volumes are collected and read by many people. Accordingly, much care is put into their production.

Eulogies in the cremation volumes of politicians help to uphold the social capital of his family. Olsen (1992: 284) states that eulogies describe the deceased's character by applying a profession-specific vocabulary. In eulogies to politicians the descriptions of their character are generally quite standard. They are usually described as hard working, honest and dedicated to their service to the nation. When comparing the eulogies of two politicians to each other, it would indeed become quite difficult to realize that a different person is being described. In eulogies to politicians, it is not the character of the deceased person that is the focus but the kind of relationship the deceased had with the writer of the eulogies. The majority of the eulogy is taken up with a narration on how they met and how close their relationship was. Subordinates will usually end their eulogy with a statement of gratitude. Thus, eulogies function to reveal and maintain a politician's network. The eulogies let us know who had what kind of relationship with the deceased and more importantly preserve it for future generations.

The cremation volumes indicate the deceased's closeness to the royal family, which is an indicator of both symbolic and social capital. One of the first things to be included in the cremation volume are pictures of the royally bestowed funeral wreath (พวงมาลา) presented to the deceased, accompanied by a letter of gratitude to the royal giver, which is written by the deceased's family. This represents the connections of the deceased with the royal family. The wreath can be presented by the royal in person or by a representative. A

personal presentation of the wreath to the deceased is, of course, of higher prestige than that by a representative. The rank of the representative indicates the status of the deceased and his closeness to the royal family. This is all manifested in the cremation volume. This shows how much social capital a person had. Any connection with the royal family, which remains the symbolic center of Thailand, is symbolic capital.

The *Trakun* Eternalized in the Cremation Volume

A cremation volume plays an important part in eternalizing a *trakun* for future generations and, thus, is crucial in creating the *trakun*. Kinship reports take a central place in cremation volumes. Kinship reports can differ in length and depth. The minimum length of these reports is three generations: (1) the parents, (2) the deceased and often his or her siblings and (3) the deceased's children with or without their spouses. Often, however, the report includes more generations. There is no uniform way of making these kinship reports. The editor of the cremation volume can choose to include certain generations or individuals and exclude others. The kinship report that is finally published in the cremation volume will become the authority on membership in a *trakun*. As the volumes may survive for hundreds of years, this authority will be higher than an account by any living human being.

Kinship reports of people from prominent families tend to focus on the ancestor generations. Only few reports offer extensive family histories and go several generations deep into the past. One such report is that of Khuang Abhaiwongse, four-time prime minister and founder of the Democrat Party. Khuang comes from an old noble family, whose connection to the royal house goes back into the Thonburi Period. It is notable, though, that members of the royal family often do not give detailed accounts of their ancestry. Their kinship reports tend to be very short and are not the focal point of the volume. This is probably because their connection to the royal house is well known and already indicated by their royal title, whereas people like Khuang feel that they have to showcase their ancestry in order to make it known. They, thus, build up their kinship relations to the royal house or other prominent families to increase their symbolic capital.

More prominent among the cremation volumes of politicians is the focus of kinship reports on the nuclear families of the deceased. These are the family of his birth: his parents and siblings, as well as his own family: the married couple and their children. It is this part of the report that is most detailed and complete. Sometimes information on the date of birth and profession are given, however, that is not the general rule. It is notable that the

deceased's siblings are named in most cases but their children (the deceased's nieces and nephews) are almost never reported. Grandchildren and great grandchildren are also often included in kinship reports. Figures 45 demonstrate which relations are reported in cremation volumes.



Figure 45: Kinship Report for Male (left) and Female (right) Deceased

The kinship reports in cremation volumes are unilateral. Within these reports it is always the line of the deceased which is reported. However, ancestors are given patrilineally. Usually, the paternal grandparents are reported. Only under very rare circumstances are female lines incorporated into the report. Not one of the cremation volumes of a politician employed in this work gives an example of such a case. However, I found one example in a Bunnag kinship chart in which the relationship to a female ancestor was highlighted because this created a relation to the royal house. Further, the spouses of the deceased are usually named; also, if applicable, their maiden names are given. The parents of the spouse, however, are not usually mentioned. This only happens in cases where the spouse's parents were prominent and would increase the symbolic capital of the deceased. One such example is the cremation volume of Praman Adireksan, which even includes a short biography of his father-in-law. This unilateral reporting of ancestors and links by marriage, combined with a focus on nuclear families, means that the networks created by marriage are not chronicled for future generations. The links created by marriage exist as long as the children of the people involved are still alive but are likely to increasingly fall into oblivion thereafter. Alliances are selectively emphasized and preserved, with special attention paid the younger generations.

Minor wives are not included in the kinship report. Kinship reports generally mention only the major wives of the deceased. In most cases that is one woman; in case of

remarriage after a wife's death, however, a second wife might be mentioned. If that is the case, the details given about that second woman will be less than those of the first wife. I have found only one case in which more than one woman was noted simultaneously as the wife. In Utain Techaphaybun's cremation volume, three women are named as wife. All are called wife (ภรรยา), an expression usually reserved for major wives. These three wives appear to be equal.[180] In this case it should be noted that Utain was born in China and represents the group of immigrants who came to Thailand with little to nothing and made riches in their new home country. The Chinese origin and the maintenance of contacts with the place of origin are highly emphasized throughout the whole volume. When asking my informant about the mentioning of several wives, they did not seem to be surprised and said that this is normal for Chinese men. Thus, having several major wives simultaneously was seen as a trait common to the Chinese ethnicity. Further, it is notable that according one of my informants Utain had not only three but six wives. Therefore, there had been some selection about which wives were acceptable and which were not.

Children of minor wives are equally excluded from kinship reports. The kinship reports only name the major wives and their offspring. One very interesting case is that of Poth Adireksan. According to his surname he was a member of the Adireksan family. However, he was not named in the kinship report of Praman Adireksan. There are different explanations as to why he was not in the report. Maybe he was a member of a different line of the family. This is not likely to be the case, as the Praman report is unusually detailed and includes his uncles, aunts and cousins. He could also have been member of a generation which was not included in the report. The report, however, goes down two generations to the grandchildren. Given Poth's age, he would have to have belonged to at least the grandchildren's generation. To get more information I searched through the pages of the cremation volume and found the eulogy which Poth had written to Praman. It was part of the eulogy written by relatives and Poth addresses Praman as father. The address was made in the same fashion a biological child would make and no adoption was mentioned. Furthermore, the father-son relationship was characterized as close. Poth claimed to have been present at Praman's deathbed. His presence at the deathbed and the publishing of his eulogy together with that of other relatives' shows that he was accepted as a member of the family. Thus Poth is likely to be Praman's biological son. However, he is missing from the kinship report.

[180] The first wife might be exception as she is called the big grandmother, showing that she had a higher status.

Therefore, the only conclusion possible is that he is the son of a minor wife.[181] The Poth case demonstrates the ambiguous position of children of minor wives. They are accepted as members of the family. Often this acceptance is made in public. However, the concealment of minor wives' children for the kinship report represents an exclusion from the *trakun*. This will make it difficult for future generations to prove their relationship to the main branch of the lineage. The kinship reports in cremation volumes create the *trakun*. It is here that it is decided who is included and who is excluded. Not being part of the *trakun* here will lead to a disappearance of all traceable connection after only a few generations and, thus, effectively end the status of being relatives.

Minor wives and their children are not included in the cremation volumes, because they could diminish the deceased's symbolic capital. As discussed in Chapter 7, in Thai society, an intact nuclear family has been highly idealized. It is almost a prerequisite for a politician to maintain the image of a monogamous lifestyle in order to appeal to the electorate. This image has to be maintained even after his death. Therefore, minor wives are under no circumstances included in cremation volumes. Even in cases such as Chatchai Choonhavan and P. Phibunsongkram, where it was publicly known that minor wives existed, they were not included in the volumes. The case of Utain Techaphaybun is an exception, because he is seen not as a full member of the Thai society and his having several wives is seen as a normative behavior for his ethnic background.

Transfer of Symbolic Capital

The funeral enables the transfer of symbolic capital from one generation to the next. Despite Bourdieu's (1986: 48) claims that symbolic capital is lost with the biological capacity of their owner, I have shown in this chapter that it can be transferred to the next generation. The funeral of a deceased member of a political family gives the survivors the opportunity to transfer his or her capital to themselves.

The funeral is accompanied by the ostentation of symbolic capital which gives the survivors the ability to claim then as their own. During the funeral, the symbolic capital of the deceased becomes visible as at no time during their life. Official ranks become tangible in the form of the mortuary urn. A relationship to the royal family is observable by the participation of members of the royal family in the funeral or by a royal funeral wreath. High

[181] No information about the mother is given at all.

ranking members of society participate at the funeral of politicians, which again shows the social capital of the deceased. Villagers are mobilized to participate in the funeral; their mere presence shows the social capital of the political family. Most of the symbolic capital showcased at the funeral belonged to the deceased. However, the display of this capital has been achieved by the survivors. It is a joint effort by the political family. Thus, the family has shown that they can still command the capital of their deceased member. By doing so, they claim the capital of the dead and it becomes transferred onto the living.

The transfer of social capital is further facilitated by the numerous networking activities that accompany funerals. As has been discussed in this chapter, the social pressure to participate in the funeral of a person with whom one has worked or whom one has known for a long time is very strong. This pressure translates into a high number of people participating in the funeral of a politician. These people include representatives of the palace, such as members of the royal family or privy councilors and high ranking politicians, such as (former) prime ministers and ministers. Apart from these high level personalities, funerals are attended by peers, local politicians, vote canvassers and community leaders. Last but not least, voters come to the funeral. All these participants, by attending the funeral, become immersed in a relationship of reciprocity with the host. This relationship is characterized by the exchange of gifts, such as envelopes with money given to the host, sponsorship of parts of the funeral, the cremation volume and other mementos of the funeral as well as the food offered to the guests. The relationship between the participants and the host is further enforced by the sharing of food during the funeral. The postponement of the cremation prolongs the period in which such interaction can be repeated. This gives the survivors ample opportunity to create a relationship with the attendees of the funeral and, thus, to transfer the social capital from the deceased to the living.

The cremation volume is a tool to mediate and record the transfer of symbolic capital. The cremation volume minutely captures every display of symbolic capital, in word and picture. It further adds to the symbolic capital already exhibited, by narrating the life story of the deceased, making him or her into a selfless servant of the country with the highest moral standards. The social capital of the deceased is likewise eternalized, as an extensive collection of eulogies is incorporated into the volume. These eulogies make it possible to reconstruct with whom the deceased had what kind of relationship. The cremation volume also includes a kinship report, which creates the *trakun* as it will be known future generations. This practically limits the transfer of symbolic and social capital to the descendents who have been included into the kinship report of the cremation volume.

The quality of the transfer of symbolic and social capital and, thus, the future of a political family depends on the success of the funeral and cremation. The funeral and cremation are the main tools that can ensure the transfer of capital from one generation to the next. The success of the transfer depends on how well the next generation manages to claim the deceased's capital. The bereaved have to organize the funeral in a way that is conducive to the transfer of capital. Their ability to do this in turn depends on their own capital, in particular cultural, social and political capital. Do they know how to initiate the royal honors, so crucial to the transfer of symbolic capital? Do they correctly perform all of the rituals involved? Do they choose an appropriate venue? How do they manage the different sponsors? Can they behave appropriately towards the various participants at the funeral? The answers to all these questions will determine the success of the funeral, the amount of capital transferred to the next generation and ultimately the survival of the political *trakun*.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This thesis has investigated political *trakun* and their engagement in the Thai state. It was shown that the *trakun* have hitherto been a phenomenon of the Thai kinship system that has been overlooked. It is a patrilineage that is distinguished from the majority of families and often part of the upper classes. Political *trakun* are one form of *trakun*. They have distinguished themselves through engaging in politics over several generations. Such political *trakun* played a crucial part in Thai politics under the absolute monarchy. Politics were dominated by the royal family, noble families and families of local influence, such as local royalty and governors. The dominance of these *trakun* was continuously reframed by modern institutions of the state, such as various ministries. After the beginning of the constitutional period, political *trakun* remained crucial and filled the institutions of the state, such as the cabinet, the parliament and the senate.

By filling the key positions of the state, political *trakun* are a crucial part of the Thai state throughout the constitutional period, yet there is considerable movement amongst these political *trakun*. Political circumstances have changed dramatically during the period from 1932 to 2012, from outright authoritarian regimes to more or less functioning democracies. Not all political *trakun* have been able to adapt to changing political circumstances, and some have become politically insignificant. Simultaneously, new families continuously established themselves as political *trakun*. The background of new emerging *trakun* mirrored the political currents of the time. The first political *trakun* to establish themselves were of noble background, followed by families from a military background; most recently families with a business background have emerged as poltical *trakun*. Some political *trakun*, however, were able to adapt to changing political and social circumstances and endured over an extended period of time. Of these, the Choonhavans are a good example. They entered politics as early as 1947 and remained influential over the greater part of the second half of the 20th century. Their final demise from politics happened only very recently, in the late 1990s, and is more owing to a failure to produce politically potent heirs than to changes in political circumstances.

The political *trakun* works together closely to succeed politically, and every member of the *trakun* contributes. A focal point of political *trakun* is their home. It functions

as a political center of their activities. Here voters can reach them, and discussions with other politicians can be made. The home can also become a campaign headquarters during elections. There is a continous interation between the political *trakun*, voters and politicians at their home. This interaction often includes the giving of gifts. These gifts can be financial contributions or other services, like job placement or support in law cases. These gifts are later reciprocated in the form of services or votes in elections. To ensure the continuity of these activities even when the formal politician is not present, members of their family take over many functions. In particular the *lang ban* is of importance. The *lang ban* takes over several functions, such as voter maintenance, networking, charity work, moral support and attendance at festivals and funerals, as well as lobbying. The role of *lang ban* is most often performed by the politician's spouse but could be any other relative. The working together of the political *trakun* becomes most visible during election campaigns when arrays of family members become active in the campaigning process. Even those members of the *trakun* that are not actively involved in the political effort are important. Their behavior can greatly improve or tarnish the politician's image and reputation. Thus, their behavior is crucial to allow the politician's success.

The prominent position in the state is transformed into economic benefits. The prime examples for this are the Choonhavans, Kittikachorns and the Shinawatras, who have all enriched themselves during their time in politics. Further, the *lang ban* in general is also associated with the economic activities of political *trakun*. This is often associated with conflict of interest or outright corruption. As this issue, however, has been discussed to a certain extent in the existing body of literature, it has not been a focus in this thesis.

The economic capital gained through political positions is only one factor that ensures a *trakun*'s position and ongoing political success; symbolic capital has been shown to be of as much if not greater importance to that end. Symbolic capitalism is practiced to ensure the political success of the *trakun* and is also crucial in maintaining the image of the impersonal state. Through symbolic capitalism, political *trakun* ensure that their offspring have more capital than other politicians who are not members of a political *trakun*: (1) better education, (2) professional experience in the managing level of large companies, (3) political experience as assistants to their parents and (4) social and political skills. This higher amount of capital makes them attractive to voters and qualifies them for high positions in the state. Their political success becomes legitimized by their capital. The rationale is that they win elections or are appointed to the cabinet not because they are members of political *trakun*, but because they are qualified to do so. Political *trakun* are aware of this fact and articulate it

openly. The same argument also functions on a theoretical level and has helped to veil the importance of political *trakun* in the Thai state. If a person is qualified, irrespective of his or her family background, they should become MPs or ministers. Thus, as long as political *trakun* can maintain and increase their capital to a level that is higher than that of the majority of their contenders, they will remain a crucial part of the state, without sacrificing it as an abstract concept.

In the process of symbolic capitalism, marriage strategies have played an integral role. Marriages in political *trakun* fulfill several important functions, such as the acquisition of capital, the making of new alliances and reinforcing of existing alliances and, thus, the group solidarity but also the securing of promising sons-in-law as heirs. However, it has to be noted that the strategies for marriages change with the generational depth of the political *trakun* in question. The founders of political *trakun*, such as Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Pairot Suwanchawee, tend to marry into families that are better established and financially better situated than themselves. Members of the second generation of political *trakun* marry on more equal terms and often into families to which they already have a close relationship, either by marriage or by long-standing social intercourse. However, these marriages also serve to increase the symbolic capital of the *trakun* or to add a form of capital that is still lacking. The third generation is the most free in their choice of partners and personal preferences play a greater role than strategical considerations.

The education and socialization of the children born into political families is also a crucial part of symbolic capitalism; it enables them to take over their parents' political role. Children not only receive a top-level education in formal education institutions in Thailand and abroad but receive political knowledge and skills through their socialization. From an early age, children of political *trakun* are in contact with voters and politicians of all levels and participate in election campaigning. In this way they can observe their parents and learn to be a politician. When they become older they start to participate more and more in the political activities of their families and may become assigned as one of their parent's assistants. Eventually, they may have obtained enough symbolic capital in their own right to run for elections. In this process, the symbolic capital is increased by each generation. The first generation may have been locally educated and entered politics middle-aged. The second generation will then be educated abroad and start with a political career as early as their mid-twenties. This increase of capital is central, because it allows the political *trakun* to maintain

their position in the state and it enables them to succeed over other contenders for these positions, who do not have a background in political families.

Symbolic capitalism involves a high investment of economic capital; investments made in members of the family are considered more secure. Whether they are educated in the leading schools in Thailand or sent to study abroad, the education of the children of political *trakun* is expensive. The cost of socializing is likewise high. In particular, the cost of election campaigns should not be underestimated. These kinds of investments are only made if the profit is likely to be secure. Thus, while politicians have frequently supported candidates for election who are not their relatives, they really prefer to invest in their own children or relatives. The children are bound to their parents by blood ties and by a deep debt of gratitude. The children have a strong moral obligation to reciprocate their parents' gifts of life, education and profession. Thus, they are much less likely to betray their parents, and the investments made by the *trakun* are more secure. Sons who have dutifully attempted to repay their debt to their parents are Chatchai Choonhavan, Pongphon Adireksan, Narong Kittikachorn and Polapee Suwanchawee. Not all these attempts were as successful as they and their parents might have hoped, but their loyalty to their *trakun* is obvious. The high emphasis put on family loyalty does not always prevent conflict in the *trakun*. This was amply shown by the conflicts between Chatchai and Kraisak Choonhavan. Despite such rare cases of betrayal of trust, political *trakun* can be understood as trust networks that try to secure the economic investment into symbolic capital within the *trakun*.

Symbolic capital is not only gained through socialization but can also be directly transferred from one generation to the next; for this, the funeral is crucial in facilitating the transfer. I have shown that embodied symbolic capital can partly be inherited. During the funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee, the head of the Suwanchawee *trakun*, who passed away in May 2011, this was clearly visible. Signs of capital and rank are employed to showcase the importance of the deceased and the *trakun* as a whole. This transfers much of the deceased's symbolic capital to the next generation. The funeral is further useful in the recreation of political networks, with other politicians and voters alike. Here, the exchange of gifts is crucial. Of such gifts, the cremation volume stands out. It has an added function. These volumes capture the networks of the deceased and help to rebuild them. They also define the official membership of the *trakun*.

By studying political *trakun* in Thailand I have addressed a gap in the study of Thai politics. In this study, I have focused on five case studies of political *trakun* on the national level. Each of these *trakun* has been shown to have its own trajectory. The

Choonhavans have been one of the most successful political *trakun*. They have overcome several changes of political circumstances. The Choonhavans' final decrease in political significance is explained by their failure to produce a capable and reliable new generation. They have attempted to rectify this by the promotion of Korn Thapparansi, a child of other *trakun* of the Ratchakru Group. The Kittikachorns, on the other hand, have not readily adapted to political change. Their investment in the next generation did not result in the fruits they had hoped for. Ultimately, they have failed to establish an enduring political *trakun*. The differing trajectories of the Choonhavans as opposed to the Kittikachorns show that the political success of a *trakun* is in many aspects dependent on decisions that are made in private spaces. Personal relationships can determine the working of the Thai state. This study has set the stage to challenge the predominant view on Thai politics and make other researchers want to explore hitherto unknown aspects.

This study has shown that political *trakun* put a high emphasis on their relationships with voters. Voters and *trakun* interact in various ways, for example at the politician's home, during election campaigns and at funerals. One important aspect of these relationships is reciprocity, and both sides try to manipulate this relationship to their own benefit. This thesis has given valuable insights into the mechanisms of these relationships that are fundamental for the establishment and maintainance of alliances.

Another issue in Thai society and politics that has shown a significant lack of research is the use of signs, such as the mortuary urn, in social stratification. I have addressed this issue. Many of these signs seem to have originated before 1932, but they also seem to have been newly interpreted. Mortuary urns were used for royalty and high ranking nobility under the absolute monarchy. The origin of the custom is still unclear but could potentially reach back to pre-historic urn-like ceramic pots. Today, mortuary urns are also used for high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians. As signs of symbolic capital, mortuary urns have become an important tool of the transfer of capital from one generation to the next. This has been shown to have implications on social stratification. Political *trakun* are conscious of the impact such signs can have and utilize them to solidify their position in politics and the Thai state.

Appendix 1: Thai Original of Citations

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1. สถาบันพื้นฐานของสังคมที่ประกอบด้วยสามีภรรยา และหมายความรวมถึงลูกด้วย

2. คนในวงศ์วานที่ยังนับรู้กันได้ทางเชื้อสาย ฝ่ายพ่อหรือฝ่ายแม่

3. ผมรู้มาตลอดว่า วันหนึ่งผมจะต้องเข้าการเมือง แต่แม่ผมเป็นนางสาวไทย เขาทำงานในวงการบันเทิง ผมก็เลยลองเป็นนักแสดงดู แต่ก็ใช้เวลานานกว่าที่ผมคิด

4. แต่ก่อนเราทำงานร่วมกับนักการเมือง แต่พวกเขาแกล้งเรา ดังนั้นพ่อผมตัดสินใจว่ารุ่นของผมควรจะเข้าสู่การเมืองเอง พวกเขาจะได้ไม่แกล้ง พ่อผมบอกว่าอั้วจะหาเงินให้ลื้อไปเล่นการเมือง

5. คิดใหม่ ทำใหม่

6. เมียที่ยกย่องว่าเป็นใหญ่

7. หญิงที่ชายเลี้ยงดูอย่างภรรยา แต่ไม่มีศักดิ์ศรีเท่าเมียหลวง หรือไม่ได้จดทะเบียน

8. หญิงที่ปรนเปรอเฉพาะชายคนใดคนหนึ่งในทางกามารมณ์ โดยมิได้อยู่ในฐานะภรรยา.

9. ครั้งหนึ่งท่าน [ทักษิณ] ชวนพวกนักการเมืองในพรรคไปที่โรงแรมเพื่อประชุม ในเวลาเดียวกันท่านชวนพวกภรรยาให้รอบนห้อง หลังจากการประชุมท่านมอบกุญแจให้นักการเมืองแต่ละคน พวกเขาคิดว่ามีสาวสวยรออยู่ พวกเขาไม่รู้ว่าท่านทักษิณชวนพวกภรรยามาด้วย เมื่อพวกเขาเปิดห้องพวกเขาก็แปลกใจที่พบภรรยาของพวกเขาแทนสาวสวย มีคนหนึ่งลงมาถามท่าน นายทำไมท่านพาภรรยาของเรามาที่นี่ ท่านตอบว่า อยากจะให้เปลี่ยนบรรยากาศ

10. พ่อไปฝึกทหารใหม่ ต้องเดินผ่านหน้าโรงเรียนไป บ้านแม่อยู่ทางฝ่ายพลเรือน พ่ออยู่ทางโรงทหาร พ่อต้องพาทหารใหม่ไปสนามพลเรือน เห็นแม่ทุกวัน เพื่อนๆก็ล้อกัน คนนั้นเป็นของเธอ คนโน้นเป็นของเธอ เพื่อนล้อแม่ แม่ก็ล้อเพื่อน ต่อมา 2-3 เดือนพ่อฝากจดหมายลูกศิษย์คนหนึ่งมาให้ แม่พอเห็นว่าเป็นจดหมายของคุณแปลก ตกใจเหงื่อแตกใจหายหมด แม่เปิดอ่าน ขึ้นต้นว่าน้องยอดรัก แม่เลยปิดจดหมาย อ่านไม่ได้ แล้วเอาจดหมายไปให้คุณตาอ่านพอได้จดหมายทุกฉบับ แม่เอาไปให้คุณตาหมด แม่อ่านมั่งไม่อ่านมั่ง พอเห็นคำหวานๆ ใจคอมันหาย กลัว แล้วไม่ตอบเลย พ่อก็เร่งรัดให้ตอบ ในจดหมายเขียนหวานมาก ถ้าควักหัวใจมาได้จะควักมาให้ดู รักเหลือเกิน ถ้าไม่เห็นหน้ากินข้าวไม่ลง หรือขอให้เห็นหลังคาบ้านทุกๆวัน

11. คุณหญิงจอมพลเป็นลูกของนายทหารเป็นพันตรี ซึ่งขณะนั้นเป็นพันตรีสมัยก่อนนั้นตอนนั้นไม่มีนายพลนะครับ นายพลหายากมากพันตรีก็ถือว่ามีอำนาจมากแล้วก็คุณหนูจวบ กระบวนยุทธนี้นะครับเป็นบิดาเป็นพ่อของท่านผู้หญิงจอมพลนะครับ เป็นผู้บังคับบัญชาเก่าของจอมพลถนอมแล้วก็เคยรับราชการก็คือสัมผัสกัน แต่ว่าสองคนไปชอบกันเอง สองคนเขาชอบกันเองโดยที่พ่อแม่เขาไม่ได้ Object อะไร ถึงแม้ว่าคุณ

พ่อโดยเฉพาะคุณแม่ของท่านจอมพลถนอมได้จัดเตรียมผู้หญิงไว้ให้คนหนึ่ง [...] ถึงจอมพลถนอมท่านก็รักของท่านใครจะมาว่าอะไรก็ไม่ได้ [...] เพราะฉะนั้นเขารักกันจริง ๆ ก็อยู่กันไปครองรักกันมา 70 กว่าปี แต่งงานกัน 70 กว่าปี

12. การแต่งงาน แต่งการอย่างนี้นะ เขาจะดูฐานะ เขาก็จะแนะนำให้ลูกไปชอบกับลูกของเพื่อนเพราะว่าไว้ใจกันได้ใช่ไหมครับ เป็นเพื่อนกันหมด แต่มันมีมากกว่านั้นนะในสังคมไทยทั้งอดีตและปัจจุบันก็คือพยายามจะหวังดีกับลูกก็พยายามที่จะแนะนำให้ไปคบค้าสมาคมซึ่งอันนี้มัน perfect และที่เขาจะมองว่าจะได้ครอบครัวนี้ๆ สมมติว่ามีลูกสามคนอยากได้ครอบครัวนี้ ๆ นะ สามครอบครัวหรืออาจจะมีเป้าที่กว้างไปกว่านั้นนิดหนึ่งแต่ว่า fell ของเขาก็คืออันที่หนึ่งความมั่งมี wealth อันที่สองคือเกียรติ honor wealth นี้ก็คือ vision business ที่ success เกียรติก็คือเจ้านาย หม่อมเจ้า หม่อมราชวงศ์ หม่อมหลวง อันนี้ก็คือว่าเป็นเกียรตินะครับ honor wealth หรือ power สามอันนี้นะครับ power ในที่นี้ก็หมายความว่าอาจจะเป็นทหาร ตำรวจ ครอบครัวที่เป็น seniors ในด้านนั้น หรือมี rent แล้วก็มี protégé power หรือมี power ก็ครอบครัวต่าง ๆ ก็จะมองแบบนั้น แต่ตรงนี้ครอบครัวผมก็ไม่ได้เป็นอย่างนั้นนะครับ [...] ผมพูดถึง แต่หลาย ๆ ครอบครัวเป็นได้มากกว่านี้อีกคือว่าพ่อแม่จัดให้เลยมีนะ แต่ไม่ได้คลุมถุงชนนะ อันนี้เขาพยายามจะให้รู้จักกันคบค้าสมาคมแล้วเขาก็จะเชียร์ พ่อแม่ก็จะเชียร์ซึ่งกันและกัน อันนี้เคยเกิดขึ้นกับลูกผมหรอก เราก็เลยคิดว่าเพื่อนเราคนนี้ก็เขาดีนะ เขาดีเพราะฉะนั้นลูกก็คงดีนะ ก็เชียร์นะ แต่ก็ไม่ Success มีลูกชายสามคน ไม่ Success หมดเลยเขาไม่ฟังเพราะฉะนั้นอันนี้เป็นเทรนที่ว่าต่อไปนี้เราจะไม่สนับสนุนเด็ก ๆ อย่าง [...] ผมคิดว่าเทรนต่อไปลูกชายจะไปจีบใครก็ขึ้นอยู่กับว่าเขาพอใจหรือเปล่า ลูกทั้งสามคนเขาไม่ได้ดูเลยว่าพ่อแม่เป็นอย่างไง บางทีเขายังไม่ได้รู้จักคุ้นเคยเท่าไหร่เขาก็จะแต่งงาน ซึ่งก็จะเป็นการเสี่ยงที่เขาไม่รู้ว่าพ่อแม่เขาเป็นอย่างไร แต่ว่าเราโชคดีที่ลูกทั้งสามคนเป็นผู้ชาย พ่อแม่ของเจ้าสาวเขาดีหมดเลย แต่อันนี้ก็สังคมไทยก็พยายามจะ protect ลูกเรา เพื่อความสะดวกในการทำอะไรต่ออะไร มันไม่ได้หมายความว่าเป็น Power ผมคิดว่าต่อไปมันจะเป็นอย่างนี้

13. "อุดมเล่นคู่กับใครน่ะ?" ชิมถาม สายตาจับจ้องอยู่ที่ชายหนุ่มร่างใหญ่ผิวขาว ท่าทางผึ่งผายห้าวหาญ เคยเห็นสองสามครั้งแต่ยังไม่รู้จักชื่อ อายุอานามสักเท่าไรนะ?"
"อ๋อ ร้อยโทเผ่า ศรียานนท์" ผินตอบ "เพิ่งย้ายมา อยู่กองพันทหารราบ เป็นญาติกับคุณเนื่อง คงอายุราว ๆ 25-26 ปี ละกระมัง ดูหน่วยก้านจะก้าวหน้าในราชการทหารต่อไปมาก" คุณเนื่องที่ผินพูดถึงนั้นคือภรรยาของร้อยเอกพจน์ ชุณหะวัณน้องชายของผินนั่นเอง
"อ๋อ คนนี้นี่เอง ที่พร้อมเล่าว่าอุดมสนิทสนมกว่านายทหารคนอื่น ๆ" ชิมบอก "ไปขี่ม้าเล่นด้วยกันบ่อย ๆ ท่าทางองอาจผึ่งผายดี หน้าตาก็ดีด้วย คงจะเนื้อหอมเหมือนกัน" เธอจ้องดูอุดมกับเผ่าหัวเราะให้กันเมื่อทำแต้มได้ และถามอีกว่า "เขาเป็นลูกเต้าเหล่ากอใคร?"
"เป็นลูกชายคนโตของพระพลาภิรักษ์เสนีย์ อยู่เทเวศร์ซอยสองที่กรุงเทพ" ผินตอบยิ้ม ๆ
"นี่แสดงว่าคุณป้าก็สนใจผู้หมวดเผ่านี่เหมือนกันถึงขนาดรู้ว่าเป็นลูกใคร อยู่บ้านที่ไหน" ชิมบอกพร้อมกับจ้องหน้าสามีอย่างรู้ทัน
"ลูกดมน่ะอายุ 21 แล้วนะ แล้วก็เก่งการบ้านการเรือน เป็นแม่งานจัดเลี้ยงทหารครั้งสำคัญ ๆ ให้พ่อแม่หลายครั้งแล้ว เมื่อวันก่อนจัดเลี้ยงพระหลายร้อยรูป พระท่านยังชมกับป้าเลยว่าเลี้ยงลูกสาวเก่ง" ผินตอบอย่างชื่นชมรักใคร่ในบุตรสาวคนโตซึ่งผินรักและสนิทสนมด้วยเป็นอย่างมาก "ฉะนั้นหากลูกดมจะมีคู่ครอง ป้าก็จะต้องหาคู่ที่คู่ควรให้ ผู้ชายที่ไม่เก่งและไม่ดีพอ ได้ลูกดมไปก็จะเหมือนไก่ได้พลอย" พูดแล้วผินก็หัวเราะเบา ๆ อย่างสุขใจ

14. นักการเมืองต้องเลือกภรรยา ถ้าเลือกถูกก็ไปได้ไกลด้วย [...] พ่อผมเป็นนายทหารอันนี้ก่อนเป็นนักการเมืองนะ คิดว่าเป็นเรื่องของชนชั้นคู่ครอง ก็ต้องแต่งกับครอบครัวที่ไม่แตกต่างกันนัก ก็เลือกแม่ผมมาเป็นเมีย แม่ผมก็เป็นญาติกับในหลวง แต่ท่านสมเด็จย่าคือว่าทางแม่ผมเองนะครับ [...] แม่ก็รู้จักคนเยอะมากก็ช่วยพ่อด้วย ช่วยในด้านสังคม หน้าตาในด้านสังคม [...] จีบกันตอนแม่เป็นครูสอนอนุบาล พ่อเป็นนายทหาร คือโรงเรียนที่แม่สอนมันก็เป็นโรงเรียนคือพ่อเขาต้องไปสอง [หลานที่โรงเรียนนั่น] ก็เลยไปเจอแม่ ก็ทำนองนั้นนะ ก็มีการจัดกัน สังคมมันแคบ

15. ภรรยาของเขาก็รุ่นราวคราวเดียวกับผมหรืออ่อนกว่าผมปีหนึ่ง ความที่ครอบครัวเราสองคนใกล้ชิดกันมากเพราะคุณพ่อกับจอมพลประภาสก็รุ่นไล่ ๆ กัน การทำงานก็เติบโตกันใกล้ ๆ กัน ดังนั้นครอบครัวสองครอบครัวก็มีความสนิทสนมกันก็มีการไปมาหาสู่ พวกลูก ๆ ของจอมพลประภาสก็จะมาเล่นมาเที่ยวที่บ้านประจำแล้วก็ลูกสาวคนที่แต่งงานกับพี่ชายผมเขาก็มาที่บ้านประจำ ก็เป็นผู้หญิงที่หน้าตาดีนะ แล้วก็มีความใกล้ชิดกันเพราะฉะนั้นพี่ชายผมกับภรรยาเขานี้ก็เห็นกันมาตั้งแต่เด็ก แล้วพอโตขึ้นมาเป็นผู้ใหญ่ก็ชอบพอกัน เพราะฉะนั้นก็ไม่ได้มีการให้สองครอบครัวต้องการแล้วทำให้ใคร ๆ ก็มีผลทางการเมืองหรือใด ๆ [...] เป็นเรื่องบังเอิญซึ่งคนภายนอกก็ไม่รู้ ก็ไม่ค่อยพอใจ

16. แล้วที่นี้ถึงครอบครัวจะไม่ object อะไร ตอนนั้นครอบครัวเขาค่อนข้างจะมีใจ แล้วสองคนเขาไปรู้จักกันแล้วเขาไปชอบกันเอง [...] สิ่งนี้คือเขารักกันจริง ๆ

17. พี่คงจำได้นะคะว่า ตั้งแต่ พศ 2490 พี่กับน้องได้รู้จักกันและรักกันมาก เพราะพี่เผ่าสามีของพี่หนอมสามีของน้องได้ร่วมกันทำการรัฐประหารมาด้วยกัน ความผูกพันด้านครอบครัวสมัยนั้น มั่นคงและมีความจริงใจอย่างหาที่เปรียบมิได้
ยิ่งตอนที่คุณป้าของน้องยกน้องให้เป็นลูกบุญธรรมของคุณป้าจอมพลผิน พี่ก็ยิ่งให้ความรักความเอ็นดูต่อน้องมากขึ้น พระคุณที่พี่ให้กับน้องนั้น น้องไม่เคยลืมเลยจนทุกวันนี้
พี่เคยเล่าให้น้องฟังว่า มีคนเคยถามพี่ว่าทำไม คุณป้าน้องจึงต้องยกน้องให้เป็นลูกคุณป้าของพี่ ซึ่งพี่ก็ได้ตอบไปด้วยความเป็นจริงทุกอย่างว่า คุณป้าน้องมีลูก ๓ คน ตายเสีย ๒ คน เหลือน้องคนเดียว คุณป้าน้องก็เป็นห่วง จึงได้ไปหาพระ ซึ่งพระท่านก็แนะนำให้ยกให้ผู้ที่มีบุญเสีย คุณป้าของน้องท่านเกิดปีเดียวกับคุณป้าจอมพลผิน แต่คุณป้าของพี่เลี้ยงลูกง่าย ไม่ตกหล่นเลย และลูกก็ดีทุกคน และเห็นว่าน้องกับพี่ดมรักกันมานาน คุณป้าของน้องก็เลยยกน้องให้เป็นลูกคุณป้าผินอีกคน ซึ่งพระคุณอันนี้ น้องก็ได้พยายามตอบแทนพระคุณของคุณป้าจอมพลผินท่านตลอดมา

18. คนเราอย่าไปบ้าอำนาจ อำนาจมันไม่ได้ยั่งยืน พระเดช พระคุณ รู้จักไหม พระเดชคืออำนาจ พระคุณคือเอื้ออาทรให้กันช่วยได้ช่วยไปเลยจะยั่งยืน ผมไม่เคร่ง บ้านผมตีหนึ่งตีสอง ประตูมันเปิด ประตูมันชื๊อต คนถามป้ามลทำไมไม่ผิดประตูล่ะ เราไม่กล้าพูด เราบอกว่า [...] ขี้เกียจเปิดเข้าเปิดออก เปิดเอาไว้อย่างนั้นแหละ ฉันต้องมาดูแลให้นะ ที่นี้อะไร เราก็ให้เขา

19. อย่างธรรมดา นักการเมืองในส่วนของประเทศเรา ก็คือถ้าเป็นคนหนึ่ง ก็จะเป็นกันหมด [...] คือการเป็นนักการเมืองของเมืองไทยจะต้องพร้อมทั้งครอบครัว ก็คือสนับสนุนหมดทั้งลูกเต้า ทั้งลูกหลาน ทั้งญาติพี่น้อง

20. ปัจจุบัน ภรรยานายกรัฐมนตรี เขาดูท่าทางก็ไม่ค่อยออกมาปรากฏตัวมากมายนะครับ อยู่หลังบ้านซะมากกว่า

21. หลังบ้านก็คือสมมติว่าสามีเป็นนักการเมืองหลังบ้านก็คือแม่บ้านภรรยาหมายความว่า

ส่วนใหญ่คนไทยบันไดขึ้นบ้านเขาจะอยู่หน้าบ้านว่าตรงจุดสุดท้ายของบ้านจะเป็นครัว ครัวก็คือเป็นที่ปรุงอาหารของผู้หญิงที่นี่คนไม่ขึ้นทางหน้าบ้านแอบไปคุยหลังบ้านก็คือไปคุยกับแม่บ้านเพราะแม่บ้านเขาจะเป็นฝ่ายหุงหาอาหารในครัวก็เลยใช้คำว่าหลังบ้าน

22. ในสังคมไทยหลังบ้านมีความหมายมากไม่ว่าจะเป็นนักการเมืองหรือข้าราชการ ข้าราชการหมายถึง เช่น อธิบดีหรือผู้ว่าราชการจังหวัด บางทีผู้ว่าราชการจังหวัดอธิบดีเป็นคนที่ซื่อสัตย์สุจริต แต่ว่าถ้าเขาได้เมียที่เป็นคนต้องการ เมียที่ต้องการทรัพย์สินเวลานักธุรกิจจะวิ่งเต้น เพื่อให้ได้สิทธิประโยชน์ เพื่อให้ได้ประโยชน์ในการประมูลงาน ก็ดี ในการประมูลขายของให้ข้าราชการก็ดี เขาก็รู้วาเขาไปวิ่งมาหาอธิบดี อธิบดีไม่ยุ่ง อธิบดีเป็นคนซื่อสัตย์เขาอาจจะวิ่งไปหาเมีย ภรรยา ไปเสนอผลประโยชน์ให้ว่าถ้าเขาได้ประมูลถนนสายนี้เขาจะเอาเงินมาให้ แต่ภรรยาต้องไปพูดกับสามีนะ ภรรยาก็พูดให้ อันนี้แล้วแต่ถ้าสามีเป็นคนที่ตรงไปตรงมา แล้วภรรยาก็มีนิสัยเหมือนสามี ระบบนี้ก็ไม่เกิด แต่ถ้าภรรยามี Demand มีความต้องการและสามีเกรงใจภรรยา กลัวภรรยา ภรรยาก็สามารถชี้นำให้สามีทำสิ่งนั้น มันก็เลยมีระบบหลังบ้าน เป็นหลังบ้านนักการเมือง เป็นทั้งแวดวงข้าราชการ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นเมียของรัฐมนตรี เมียของอธิบดีกรม สำคัญ ๆ ก็จะมีบ้างแบบนี้ ในสังคมไทยก็มีปัญหานี้อยู่ [...] มีคนเขาบอกว่าคนที่จะประสบความสำเร็จในอาชีพนักการเมือง หลังบ้านหรือภรรยามีความสำคัญมากเป็น Promoter สำคัญ เป็นองค์ประกอบสำคัญ ถ้ามองในแง่ดีก็คือว่า ถ้า ส.ส. คนไหน ภรรยาเป็นคนที่ประชาชนไม่ชอบ ไม่ได้เป็น ส.ส .แต่ถ้า ส.ส .คนไหนมีภรรยาที่ประชาชนชอบ ไปงานแทน คอยช่วยเหลือ คอยดูแลประชาชนแทนสามี ส.ส .คนนี้ก็จะได้รับเลือกเป็นผู้แทนฯ อยู่ตลอด ฉะนั้นมองในแง่ดี หลังบ้านหรือภรรยาเป็นองค์ประกอบสำคัญในอาชีพนักการเมือง มองไปอีกมุมหนึ่ง ในแง่ Negative นักการเมืองหลายคนที่ได้ไต่เต้าขึ้นมาในระดับบริหาร เป็นรัฐมนตรี ถ้าไม่สามารถควบคุมภรรยา หรือเกรงใจภรรยา ทำในสิ่งที่ไม่ถูกต้องก็มีปัญหามาก [...] ฉะนั้นหลังบ้านในที่นี้บอกว่ามีทั้ง Positive และ Negative

23. คือแบ่งหน้าที่ชัดเจน พี่ก็มีหน้าที่เหมือนเป็นแม่ด้วย ดูแลลูก เพราะว่าสามีก็จะไม่มีเวลาให้ครอบครัวเท่าไหร่ ก็เข้าใจ ก็จะดูแลลูกอะไรอย่างนี้

24. คืนวันที่ 10 เมษา คือคืนที่ผมทุกข์ที่สุด ตั้งแต่เป็นนายกรัฐมนตรี มาจนถึงวันนี้ [...] ผมต้องสารภาพ คืนนั้นเป็นคืนที่ผมร้องไห้อยู่นานมากครับ ในชีวิตการเมืองของผม ผมไม่เคยต้องการจะเห็นความสูญเสียกับพี่น้องประชาชนคนไทย [...] แต่มาเกิดขึ้นในยุคที่ผมเป็นนายกรัฐมนตรี [...] แต่ผมรู้ว่าตั้งแต่คืนนั้นแหละครับ ไม่ว่าผมจะตัดสินใจอย่างไร ชีวิตผมไม่มีทางเหมือนเดิม [...] ไม่ว่าผมจะตัดสินใจอะไรก็ตาม ผมขออนุญาตที่จะบอกว่า ผมคิดหลายตลบ คิดไม่ตกผลึกครับ ว่าจะต้องทำอย่างไร แต่คนที่ให้สติผมคือ ภรรยาผมครับ เขาก็รู้ ว่าชีวิตของเขาและลูก ๆ ของเราก็ไม่มีวันเหมือนเดิม ผมรู้สึกผิด เพราะผมนะอาสาตัวเข้ามาสู่การเมือง แต่เขาไม่ได้เป็นคนที่อาสา เขาไม่ได้เป็นคนที่ต้องมาอยู่การเมืองกับผม แต่ก็ผูกติดกันอย่างหลีกเลี่ยงไม่ได้วันนั้น เขาบอกกับผมอย่างเดียวครับว่า เหตุการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้น ถ้าในเมื่อเรามั่นใจว่าเราไม่ได้เป็นคนที่ต้องการให้เกิดขึ้น ไม่ได้เป็นเงื่อนไขที่ทำให้เกิดขึ้น ทางเดียวที่จะเป็นความรับผิดชอบคือต้องแบกรับปัญหาและแก้ปัญหานั้นให้สำเร็จลุล่วงต่อไป ห้ามหนี ห้ามทิ้งปัญหา เผชิญหน้า และแก้วิกฤติให้สำเร็จลุล่วงให้ได้

25. ผมไม่เคยไปโกงกิน คอร์รัปชั่น ทำถนนเส้นนี้สิบล้าน เขาให้ 10% หนึ่งแสนใช่ไหม ผมบอกเอา เอามา มีถนนที่ไม่ดี เอาหนึ่งแสนไป ผมลาดยางไปถึงเล้าหมูบ้านเขาเลย

26. สามีเป็นสมาชิกรัฐสภา แต่ภรรยาที่เป็นตัวแทน

27. คุณหญิงจะทำอะไรอย่างไรผมไม่ทราบ แต่ต้องยอมรับว่าผู้หญิงคนนี้มีความเฉลียว

ฉลาดและกล้าหาญเด็ดเดี่ยวยิ่งนัก ในการสนทนาท่านจะมีแต่คำถามว่าเป็นอย่างไร เกิดอะไรขึ้น โดยไม่เคยแนะนำหรือให้คำตอบ คนฟังจึงสบายใจที่จะเล่าและไม่รู้สึกว่าถูกชี้นำ แต่บทจะต้องตัดสินใจทางเลือกทั้งหลายแล้ว ผมว่าคุณหญิงทำได้ดีกว่านายกทักษิน

28. ๑ ไม่เป็นที่รังเกียจของสังคม เข้าสังคมได้
๒ มีความรู้ทันสมัย
๓ มีอาชีพสุจริต
๔ รู้จักบุญคุณ รู้จักที่ต่ำที่สูง
๕โอบอ้อมอารี
๖เป็นผู้สืบตระกูล

29. ก็คือว่าในระบบสังคมไทย เป็นสังคมที่คือทุกคนในครอบครัวช่วยเหลือกันอยู่แล้ว ต้องดูมันไม่สามารถที่จะแบ่งแยกได้ว่า อันนี้ไม่ใช่งานของฉัน มันแบ่งแยกไม่ได้ เราคือว่าในครอบครัวเรามีอะไรช่วยเหลือกัน พี่น้องกันต้องช่วยกัน ในส่วนที่สามารถจะช่วยได้มันก็เป็นระบบสังคมไทย ซึ่งเราปฏิบัติอย่างนี้มาตั้งแต่โบราณ เราก็ปฏิบัติอย่างนี้มาเรื่อย ๆ

30. สำคัญเพราะว่าเป็นค่านิยมพื้นฐานของสังคมไทยที่เขามองว่าคนที่รับผิดชอบต่อครอบครัวเป็นที่หนึ่งก็คือผู้นำที่ดีที่จะดูแลประชาชนได้

31. สังสรรค์กันได้ [...] แต่ว่าไปร่วมมือกันจะลำบาก

32. คนเหนือกินแบบนี้

33. สวัสดี ดิค่ะ ดิฉันชื่อปู น้องสาวนายกทักษิณ ความไว้วางใจ [...]ที่เคยให้พี่ชาย ให้น้องสาวได้มาย

34. แป้งเติบใหญ่มาในครอบครัวของนักกำนเมือง ฮู้หันกำนทำงานบริกำนประชาชน คนบ้านเฮามาตลอด แป้งหั้นป้อหนุ่ยกับแม่แดงกิ่งกาญจน์ ใกล้ชิดดูแลท้องถิ่นจ่วยเหลือหมู่เฮาอย่างทุ่มเท แลกกับความสุขตี้หันงานลุล่วงสำเร็จเสร็จดี เมื่อปัญหาได้ฮับการเยียวยาแก้ไข ท้องถิ่นพัฒนา หมู่เฮามีรอยยิ้ม ก็เป็นความสุข ความภาคภูมิใจ และเป็นกำลังใจ หื้อทำงานต่อ ป้อแม่ปี่น้องเจ้า แป้งจะโตยฮอยป้อ จะสานต่องานแม่ จะแผ่ขยายกำนทำงาน จะประสานภาครัฐ รับรองว่าหมู่บ้านเฮาจะได้ฮับกำนพัฒนาในทุกๆด้าน แป้งจะใช้วิชาความรู้ ประสบกำน ความสามารถอย่างเต็มกำลัง ประสานผลักดันหื้อบ้านเฮาเจริญก้าวไกล อย่างมีทิศทาง ขอหื้อใจ๋แป้ง เลือกแป้ง แป้งจะทำหื้อหั้นสามกรกฎา เข้าคูหา กำแป้ง เบอร์สิบเน้อเจ้า

35. แม่ทักษิณเป็น ณ เชียงใหม่เหมือนกัน

36. ปู่ประกอบพิธีในฐานะแทนพระองค์ หันหน้าไปทางทิศที่พระบาทสมเด็จพระเจ้าอยู่หัวประทับถวายความเคารพ แล้วจึงประกอบพิธี เจ้าหน้าที่จะประคองศีรษะศพขึ้น ปู่ประกอบพิธีในฐานะแทนพระองค์รดน้ำหลวงอาบศพพระราชทานดรงบริเวณทรวงอกศพเสมือนอาบน้ำ แล้วจึงรดน้ำขมิ้นกับน้ำอบไทย เสร็จแล้วถวายความเคารพในทิศทางเดิม เป็นเสร็จพิธี

37. โกรธไม่เผาผี

38. ใคร ๆ ก็นอนตายได้

Appendix 2: Kinship Charts



Figure 46: The Choonhavans and the Ratchakrugroup

*were married more than one, principal spouse named



Figure 47: The Kittikachorns



Figure 48: The Shinawatras



Figure 49: The Utain Branch of the Techapaybuns



Figure 50: The Suet Branch of the Techapaybuns



Figure 51: The Suwanchawees

Appendix 3: Mortuary Urns

Rank	Name	Picture	Used for
1	Large Golden Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศทองใหญ่** (left) Deputy Golden Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศทองรองทรง** (right)		· King · Regent Queen · Queen · Crown Prince/Princess · Princess Mother · Prince/Princess of the *Chao Fah* rank
2	Little Golden Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศทองเล็ก**		· Not in use
3	Small Golden Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศทองน้อย**		· Member of the royal family (**สมเด็จพระเจ้าบรมวงศ์** and **พระเจ้าบรมวงศ์เธอ**) · Supreme Patriarch who is of royal blood
4	Large Gem Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศกุดั่นใหญ่**		· Not in use

5	Small Gem Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศกุดั่นน้อย**			· Supreme Patriarch · Representative of the king who passed away while holding the position (**ผู้สำเร็จราชการแทนพระองค์**) · A person decorated with the Ancient and Auspicious Order of the Nine Gems **(เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์อันเป็นโบราณมงคลนพรัตนราชวราภรณ์)**
6	Large Pavilion Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศมณฑปใหญ่** Small Pavilion Royal Mortuary Urn (pictured) **พระโกศมณฑปน้อย**			· Member of the royal family (**พระเจ้าบรมวงศ์เธอ**) · Member of the royal family who is a daughter-in-law of the king and has been decorated with the Most Illustrious Order of *Chula Chom Klao* 2nd Degree **(เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์ทุติยจุลจอมเกล้าวิเศษ)** · Chairman and members of the Privy Council who passed away while in office
7	Twelve Timber Royal Mortuary Urn **พระโกศไม้สิบสอง**			· Supreme Patriarch · Prime Minister · Chairman of the Parliament and Senate · Chairman of the Supreme Court and other organizations manifested in the constitution · Minister who passed away while still in office
8	*Phra Ong Chao* Royal Mortuary Urn (Sri Lanka Royal Mortuary Urn) **พระโกศพระองค์เจ้า (โกศลังกา)**	Not available		· Member of the royal family (**พระวรวงศ์เธอ**) · *Mon Chao* who has been decorated with the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand 1st Degree (**เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์อันมีเกียรติยศยิ่งมงกุฎไทย ชั้นที่** 1) or the Most Illustrious Order of *Chula Chom Klao* 2st Degree **(เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์ ทุติยจุลจอมเกล้าวิเศษ)** or higher
9	Armour Mortuary Urn **โกศเกราะ**			· Not in use

10	Octagon Mortuary Urn **โกศเปดเหลี่ยม**		· *Somdet Phra Ratchakhana Chao Khana Rong* (**สมเด็จพระราชาคณะชันเจ้าคณะรอง**) · A person who has be decorated with the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant of the 1st degree of higher **(เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์อันเป็นที่เชิดชูยิ่งช้างเผือก)** · A person who has be decorated with the Most Illustrious Order of *Chula Chom Klao* 2nd Degree **(เครื่องราชอิสริยาภรณ์ทุติยจุลจอมเกล้าวิเศษ)**
11	Jar Urn **โกศโถ**		· *Phra Ratchakhana Chan Tham* (**พระราชาคณะชั้นธรรม**) · A person who has be decorated with the Most Illustrious Order of Chula Chom Klao 2nd Degree (**ตราทุติยจุลจอมเกล้า**), if this person is from a *Ratchinikun* then he/she will be bestowed a *Ratchinikun* Mortuary Urn
12	*Ratchinikun* Mortuary Urn **โกศราชินิกุล**		· A person from a *ratchinikun* who has be decorated with the Most Illustrious Order of *Chula Chom Klao* 2nd Degree (**ตราทุติยจุลจอมเกล้า**)

Appendix 4: List of Names

The glossary below is a list of persons mentioned in the thesis in alphabetical order. This will help the reader to clearly identify the individuals and to position them in the larger context of this thesis.

The transliteration of personal names is a particular challenge. Given that there is not one standard transliteration style, the name of one and the same person can be spelled in various different ways in English. This can make recognition impossible. I have the adopted transliteration used by the person in question, when known. In cases where I was not aware of how the person in question spells their own name in English, I use a slightly modified version of the Royal Thai General System of Transcription for the Romanization.

Abhisit Vejjajiva **อภิสิทธิ์ เวชชาชีวะ**	Thai politician: prime minister from 2008-2011, current leader of the Democrat Party, current opposition leader
Akanat Promphan **เอกนัฏ พร้อมพันธุ์**	Thai politician: MP for Bangkok municipality Family relations: son of Pornthep Techaphaybun, stepson of Suthep Thaugsuban
Ampan Kittikachorn **อำพัน กิตติขจร**	Official title: Khun Sopitbanarak (**ขุนโสภิตบรรณารักษ์**) Family relations: father of Thanom Kittikachorn
Anand Panyarachun **อานันท์ ปันยารชุน**	Thai business man and politician: prime minister from 1991-1992, second term as prime minister in 1992
Arun Thapparansi **อรุณ ทัพพะรังสี**	Thai bureaucrat: husband of Prom Thapparansi , née Choonhavan, father of Korn Thapparansi
Banharn Silpa-archa **บรรหาร ศิลปอาชา**	Thai politician: former leader of the Chat Thai Party, prime minister in 1995, banned from politics for 5 years in 2007
Banphot Damapong **บรรณพจน์ ดามาพงศ์**	Family relations: adopted brother of Potjaman Na Pombejra
Boonruean Choonhavan, neé Sopot **บุญเรือน โสพจน์**	Family relations: wife of Chatchai Choonhavan, relative of the reigning King of Thailand
Chaloem Chieowsakun **เฉลิม เชี่ยวสกุล**	Former director of the Royal Property Bureau Family relations: husband of Pornsom Chieowsakun , née Choonhavan

Chamlong Srimuang **จำลอง ศรีเมือง**	Thai military officer (retired), activist, and politician: founder of the Palang Tham Party, Governor of Bangkok from 1985-1992, prominent in the protest against the military government in 1992, leading member of the yellow-shirt movement
Chamnan Penchat **ชำนาญ เพ็ญชาติ**	Banker and business man Family relations: husband of Nongnat Penchat, née Kittikachorn
Chatchai Choonhavan **ชาติชาย ชุณหะวัณ**	Thai military officer (retired), diplomat and politician: co-founder of the Chat Thai Party and Chat Thai Pattana Party, prime minister from 1988-1991 Family relations: son of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, husband of Lady Boonruean Choonhavan, née Sopot
Chinnicha Wongsawat **ชินณิชา วงศ์สวัสดิ์**	Thai politician: former MP for Chiang Mai Province Family relations: daughter of former Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat and Yaowapha Wongsawat, niece of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra
Chuan Leekpai **ชวน หลีกภัย**	Thai politician: former leader of the Democrat Party, prime minister from 20 September 1992 to 19 May 1995 and again from 9 November 1997 to 9 February 2001
Danuporn Punnakanta **ดนุพร ปุณณกันต์**	Actor and politician: MP for the Pheu Thai Party
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai **เดือนเต็มดวง ณ เชียงใหม่**	Thai politician: former mayor of Chiang Mai City, member of the Democratic Party Family relations: daughter of Thawatwong Na Chiang Mai and Kingkan Na Chiang Mai (both former MPs for Chiang Mai Province)
Ek Juenglertsiri **เอก จึงเลิศศิริ**	Local politician: Member of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council Family relations: husband of Joemmat Juenglertsiri
Euam Jirapongse **เอื้อม จิรพงศ์**	Military officer: commander of the 9th Infantry division from 1971-1973 Family relations: husband of Nongnut Jirapongse , née Kittikachorn
Jarupan Kunadilok **จารย์จารุพรรณ กุลดิลก**	Thai activist and politician: MP for the Pheu Thai Party list
Jeroen Adireksan, neé Choonhavan **ท่านผู้หญิงเจริญ อดิเรกสาร**	Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, sister of Chatchai Choonhavan, wife of Praman Adireksan

Joemmat Juenglertsiri **เจิมมาศ จึงเลิศศิริ**	Thai politician: MP for Bangkok Municipality Family relations: wife of Ek Juenglertsiri
Jitanat Punnothok **จิตนาถ ปุณโณทก**	Family relations: husband of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai
Jongkon Kittikachorn, née Krabuanyuth **จงกล กิตติขจร**	Family relations: wife of Thanom Kittikachorn
Jutima Chaisaeng **ฐิติมา ฉายแสง**	Thai politicians: former MP for Chachoengsao Province, spokesperson for the office of the prime minister
Karun Hosakun **การุณ โหสกุล**	Thai politician and activist: MP for Bangkok Municipality, member of the red-shirt movement
Khuang Aphaiwong **ควง อภัยวงศ์**	Thai politician: co-founder of the Democrat Party, prime minister from 1 August 1944 - 31 August 1945, 21 January 1946 - 18 March 1946, 10 November 1947 - 6 February 1948 and 21 February 1948 - 8 April 1948
King Bhumibol Adulyadej **พระบาทสมเด็จพระปรมินทรมหาภูมิพลอดุลยเดช**	Reigning King of Thailand and head of state
Kingkan Na Chiang Mai **กิ่งกาญจน์ ณ เชียงใหม่**	Thai politician: former MP for Chiang Mai Province Family relations: wife of Thawatwong Na Chiang Mai, mother of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai
Kon Hutasingha **ก้อน หุตะสิงห์**	Official title: Phraya Manopakorn Nitithada (**พระยามโนปกรณ์นิติธาดา**) Thai politician: prime minister from 1932-1933
Korn Thapparansi **กร ทัพพะรังสี**	Thai politician: Chat Thai Party leader from 1998-2003, deputy prime minister and minister in several cabinets Family relations: grandson of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, nephew of Chatchai Choonhavan
Kraisak Choonhavan **ไกรศักดิ์ ชุณหะวัณ**	Thai politician: former senator and MP Family relations: son of Chatchai Choonhavan
Kriangsak Chamanan **เกรียงศักดิ์ ชมะนันทน์**	Thai politician: prime minister from 1977-1980
Krit Srivara **กฤษณ์ สีวะรา**	Thai military officer: Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army during the violent crackdown on democracy protesters on 14 October 1973

Kukrit Pramoj **หม่อมราชวงศ์คึกฤทธิ์ ปราโมช**	Official title: Mom Ratchawong Kukrit Pramoj (**หม่อมราชวงศ์คึกฤทธิ์ ปราโมช**) Thai politician: prime minister from 1973-1974
Laiad Phibunsongkhram **ท่านผู้หญิงละเอียด พิบูลสงคราม**	Family relations: wife of Plaek Phibunsongkhram
Lert Shinawatra **เลิศ ชินวัตร**	Thai politician: former MP Family relations: father of Thaksin Yingluck Shinawatra
Narong Kittikachorn **ณรงค์ กิตติขจร**	Thai politician: MP in the 1980s Family relations: son of Thanom Kittikachorn
Nongnat Penchat, née Kittikachorn **นงนาถ เพ็ญชาติ**	Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn
Nongnut Jirapongse, née Kittikachorn **คุณหญิงนงนุช จิรพงศ์**	Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife of Euam Jirapongse
Neung Choonhavan **หนึ่อง ชุณหะวัณ**	Family relations: sister-in-law of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan
Pairot Suwanchawee **ไพโรจน์ สุวรรณฉวี**	Thai politician: former MP, Deputy Minister of Commerce in 1991, banned from politics for five years in 2007 Passed away in May 2011
Payap Shinawatra **พายัพ ชินวัตร**	Thai politician: MP from 2005-2006, manages the Northeastern region for the Pheu Thai Party Family relations: brother of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra
Phao Sriyanond **เผ่า ศรียานนท์**	Director General of the Thai police Thai politician: MP, several times deputy minister Family relations: husband of Udomluck Sriyanond née Choonhavan, fled the country in 1957 and died in exile
Phin Choonhavan **ผิน ชุณหะวัณ**	Official title: Luang Chamnanyutthasat (**หลวงชำนาญยุทธศาสตร์**) Thai military leader and politician: leader of the military coup in 1947, minister and deputy prime minister for several cabinets between 1951-57
Phiraporn Suwanchawee **พีรพร สุวรรณฉวี**	Ran unsuccessful for a seat as MP in the 2011 general election Family relations: son of Pairot Suwanchawee

Phot Adireksan **พศ อดิเรกสาร**	Thai politician: member of the Pheu Thai Party Family relations: son of Pongphon Adireksan
Phot Phahonyothin **พจน์ พหลโยธิน**	Official title: Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena (**พลเอกพระยาพหลพลพยุหเสนา**) Thai military leader and politician: member of the People's Party, prime minister from 1933-1938
Pimpen Vejjajiva **พิมพ์เพ็ญ เวชชาชีวะ**	lecturer at Chulalongkorn University Family relations: wife of prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva
Pintongtha Shinawatra **พินทองทา คุณากรวงศ์**	Family relations: daughter of Thaksin Shinawatra.
Plaek Phibunsongkhram **แปลก พิบูลสงคราม**	Official title: Luang Phibunsongkhram (**หลวงพิบูลสงคราม**) Also known as: Plaek Khittasangkha (**แปลก ขีดตะสังคะ**), Field Marshal P. (**จอมพล ป.**) Thai military officer and politician: Leader of the People's Party, MP, minister, prime minister from 1938-1944 and from 1948-1957
Polapee Suwanchawee **พลพีร์ สุวรรณฉวี**	Thai politician: MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province Family relations: son of Pairot and Ranongrak Suwanchawee
Pong Punnakanta **พงษ์ ปุณณกันต์**	Thai politician: former MP and minister Family relations: brother-in-law of Praman Adireksan.
Pongphon Adireksan **ปองพล อดิเรกสาร**	Thai politician: former member of the Thai Rak Thai Party, banned from politics for 5 years in 2007 Family relations: son of Praman Adireksan, published several novels in Thai and English under the pen name Paul Adirex
Pornthep Techaphaybun **พรเทพ เตชะไพบูลย์**	Thai politician: former deputy minister of industry and former deputy governor of Bangkok Family relations: father of Akanat Promphan
Pornsom Chieowsakun, neé Choonhavan **พรสม ชุณหะวัณ**	Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, wife of Chaloem Chieowsakun
Potjaman Na Pombejra, née Damapong **พจมาน ณ ป้อมเพชร**	Family relations: former wife of Thaksin Shinawatra, *de jure* divorced in 2008, used her mother's maiden name after divorce

Praman Adireksan **ประมาณ อดิเรกสาร**	Thai politician: former MP and former deputy prime minster Family relations: husband of Jeroen Adireksan, née Choonhavan
Praphat Jarusathien **ประภาส จารุเสถียร**	Thai military officer and politician: Minister of Interior several times under Sarit Thanarath and Thanom Kittikachorn
Prayoon Phamornmontri **ประยูร ภมรมนตรี**	Thai military officer and politician: member of the People's Party, MP and minister
Prem Tinsulanonda **เปรม ติณสูลานนท์**	Thai military officer and politician: prime minister from 1980-1988, chairman of the privy council
Pridi Phanomyong **ปรีดี พนมยงค์**	Thai politician: leader of the People's Party, MP, prime minister in 1946
Prom Thapparansi, neé Choonhavan **พร้อม ทัพพะรังสี**	Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, wife of Arun Thapparansi, mother of Korn Thapparansi
Ranongrak Suwanchawee **ระนองรักษ์ สุวรรณฉวี**	Thai politician: former senator, MP and minister, currently President of Provincial Administration Organization in Nakhorn Ratchasima Family relations: wife of Pairot Suwanchawee, mother of Polapee and Phiraporn Suwanchawee
Raphiphan Lueangaramrat **ระพีพรรณ เหลืองอร่ามรัตน์**	host of a cooking show better known under her nickname Jingrit Family relations: minor wife of Chatchai Choonhavan
Samak Sundaravej **สมัคร สุนทรเวช**	Thai politician: prime minister in 2008
Sanoh Thienthong **เสนาะ เทียนทอง**	Thai politician: former minister, MP for the Pheu Thai Party list
Sarit Thanarath **สฤษดิ์ ธนะรัชต์**	Thai military officer and politician: prime minister from 1959-1963
Seni Pramoj **หม่อมราชวงศ์เสนีย์ ปราโมช**	Official title: Mom Ratchawong Seni Pramoj **(หม่อมราชวงศ์เสนีย์ ปราโมช)** Thai politician: co-founder of the Democrat Party, He served three time as prime minister from 1945-1946, in 1975 and in 1976
Sondhi Limthongkul **สนธิ ลิ้มทองกุล**	Journalist and owner of several media outlets Thai politician: leading member of the yellow-shirt movement, co-founder of the New Politics Party

Somchai Wongsawat **สมชาย วงศ์สวัสดิ์**	Thai politician: MP, prime minister in 2008, banned from politics for 5 years in 2008 Family relations: husband of Yaowapha Wongsawat née Shinawatra
Sonthi Boonyaratglin **สนธิ บุญยรัตกลิน**	Former Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. leader of the military coup in 2006, deputy prime minister in 2007
Suchinda Kraprayoon **สุจินดา คราประยูร**	Military officer: Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, leader of the military coup in 1991, prime minister in 1992
Sukhumbhand Paribatra **สุขุมพันธุ์ บริพัตร**	Thai politician: MP several times, currently the Governor of Bangkok, member of the Democrat Party
Supha Gajaseni **สุภา คชเสนี**	Military officer: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces from 1986-1987 Family relations: husband of Trongsamon Gajaseni, née Kittikachorn
Supaporn Kittikachorn, née Jarusathien **สุภาพร กิตติขจร**	Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Praphat Jarusathien, wife of Narong Kittikachorn
Surachat Thienthong **สุรชาติ เทียนทอง**	Thai politician: MP for Bangkok Municipality Family relations: son of Sanoh Thienthong
Surayud Chulanont **สุรยุทธ์ จุลานนท์**	Military officer and politician: Army Commander, Supreme Commander prime minister from 2006-2008, Privy Councilor
Suthep Thaugsuban **สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ**	Thai politician: MP for Surat Thani Province, former deputy prime minister
Suvananth Punnakanta, née Kongying **สุวนันท์ ปุณณกันต์**	Actress Family relations: wife of Danuporn Punnakanta
Suwit Yodmani **สุวิทย์ ยอดมณี**	Thai politician: Minister for Sport and Tourism from 2006-2007 Family relations: husband of Trongsuda Yodmani, née Kittikachorn
Thanin Kraivichien **ธานินทร์ กรัยวิเชียร**	Thai politician: prime minister from 1976-1977
Thanom Kittikachorn **ถนอม กิตติขจร**	Military officer and politician: military leader and prime minister from 1963-1973, forced to step down when mass protests were violently put down on 14 October 1973

Thaksin Shinawatra **ทักษิณ ชินวัตร**	Thai business man and politician: prime minister from 2001-2006, ousted by a military coup in September 2006, stays in self-imposed exile
Tipaya Kittikachorn, née Phamornmontri **ทิพยา กิตติขจร**	Family relations: daughter of Prayoon Phamornmontri, wife of Yuthapong Kittikachorn
Trongsamon Gajaseni, née Kittikachorn **คุณหญิงทรงสมร คชเสนี**	Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife of Supha Gajaseni
Trongsuda Yodmani, née Kittikachorn **คุณหญิงทรงสุดา ยอดมณี**	Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife of Suwit Yodmani
Udomluck Sriyanond, neé Choonhavan **คุณหญิงอุดมลักษณ์ ศรียานนท์**	Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, wife of Police General Phao Sriyanond
Utain Techaphaybun **อุเทน เตชะไพบูลย์**	Thai business man, also known under his Chinese name of Honglao Tae
Wibunluck Choonhavan **คุณหญิงวิบุลลักสม์ ชุณหะวัณ**	Family relations: wife of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan.
Yaowaluck Khlongkhamnuankan, neé Shinawatra **เยาวลักษณ์ คล่องคำนวณการ**	Thai politician: mayor of the city of Chiang Mai Family relations: sister of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra
Yaowapha Wongsawat, née Shinawatra **เยาวภา วงศ์สวัสดิ์**	Thai Politician: former MP, executive member of the Thai Rak Thai Party, banned from politics for 5 years in 2007. Family relations: wife of Somchai Wongsawat, sister of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra
Yingluck Shinawatra **ยิ่งลักษณ์ ชินวัตร**	Current prime minister Family relations: sister of Thaskin Shinawatra
Yuranant Phamornmontri **ยุรนันท์ ภมรมนตรี**	Thai Actor and Politician: MP, spokesperson for the Pheu Thai Party Family relations: son of Prayoon Phamornmontri
Yuthapong Kittikachorn **ยุทธพงศ์ กิตติขจร**	Family relations: son of Thanom Kittikachorn

Appendix 5: List of Informants

The glossary below is a list of individuals who took part in formal interviews with me. Not all of them have been cited in the thesis. The statements of those that do not appear in the thesis, however, are no less important than those that I chose to directly quote. They have been highly valuable and build the foundation for much of this thesis. Not included in the list are individuals who asked for anonymity as well as the numerous people with whom I have talked during participant observations.

Name	**Position (as of August 2011)**	**Date of Interview**
Adisorn Phiengket อดิศร เพียงเกษ	Former MP for Khon Kaen Province, a leading member of the red-shirt movement	7 May 2010
Adisorn Wongsorasak อดิศร วงศ์ศรศักดิ์	Political Journalist, Neowna Newspaper	7 May 2010
Akanat Promphan เอกนัฏ พร้อมพันธุ์	MP for Bangkok Municipality	5 August 2011
Anlongket Manikat อลงกต มณีกาศ	MP for Nakhon Phanom Province	1 June 2010
Anwar Salaeh อันวาร์ สาและ	MP for Pattani Province	1 June 2010
Apiwat Ngienmuen อภิวัฒน์ เงินหมื่น	MP for Amnat Charoen Province	6 July 2010
Aree Roekrai อารีย์ ฤกษ์หร่าย	Wife of Parinya Roekrai, an MP for Kamphaeng Phet Province	6 July 2010
Aronporn Ponbutn อรรถพร พลบุตร	MP Petchaburi Province	27 May 2010
Asawin Wiphusiri อัศวิน วิภูศิริ	MP for the Chat Thai Pattana Party list	27 May 2010
Atthapon Phothiphiphit อัฏฐพล โพธิพิพิธ	MP for Kanchanaburi Province	7 May 2010
Banatay Srirak ปานหทัย เสรีรักษ์	MP for Phae Province	1 June 2010
Branom Photikam ประนอม โพธิ์คำ	MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province	1 June 2010
Bunlerd Kudkontot บุญเลิศ ครุฑขุนทด	MP for the Pheu Thai Party list	1 June 2010

Name	Position (as of August 2011)	Date of Interview
Boonruen Srithares บุญรื่น สรีธเรศ	MP for Kalasin Province	6 July 2010
Bunying Nitikanjana บุญยิ่ง นิติกาญจนา	MP for Ratchaburi Province, wife of former MP	25 March 2010
Chawat Pongolaeow ชัยวัฒน์ ทรัพย์รวงทอง	MP for Pheu Thai Party list	26 May 2010
Chovit Pitakpornpunlob ชูวิทย์ พิทักษ์พรพัลภ	MP for Ubon Ratchathani Province	6 July 2010
Duangke Anuporn ดวงแข อรรณนพพร	MP for Khon Kaen Province, former senator, leading member of the red-shirt movement, wife of MP	8 March 2010
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai เดือนเต็มดวง ณ เชียงใหม่	Former mayor of Chiang Mai City	7 May 2010
Ek Juenglertsiri เอก จึงเลิศศิริ	Member of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council	18 June 2011
Gamon Jirapanwanit กมล จิระพันธุ์วาณิช	Former MP for Lopburi Province	31 May 2010
Guthep Seikrajang กุเทพ ใสกระจ่าง	Former executive member of the Thai Rak Thai Party banned from politics for 5 years in 2007, passed away September 2012	18 March 2010
Isamaaen Benibrohim อิสมาแอล เบญอิบรอฮิม	MP for Pattani Province	31 May 2010
Jarupan Kunadilok จารย์จารุพรรณ กุลดิลก	MP for the Pheu Thai Party list	26 May 2010
Jitanat Punnothok จิตนาถ ปุณโณทก	Husband of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai	26 May 2010
Joemmat Juenglertsiri เจิมมาศ จึงเลิศศิริ	MP for Bangkok Municipality, wife of Ek Juenglertsiri	7 May 2010
Jongkon Kittikachorn จงกล กิตติขจร	Wife of Thanom Kittikachorn, passed away in July 2011	26 May 2010
Karun Hosakun การุณ โหสกุล	MP for Bangkok Municipality, member of the red-shirt movement	31 May 2010
Kayan Wipornmachay ขัยน วิพรหมชาย	MP for Lamphun Province	6 July 2010
Khongkarat Hongwilay คงกฤช หงษ์วิไล	MP for Prachinburi Province	27 May 2010

Name	Position (as of August 2011)	Date of Interview
Kingkan Na Chiang Mai กิ่งกาญจน์ ณ เชียงใหม่	Former MP for Chiang Mai Province, wife of Thawatwong Na Chiang Mai, mother of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai	27 May 2010
Kobchay Khiwawiyanu กอบชัย ชีววิญญู	Assistant to MP Yotsak Khiwawiyanu	31 May 2010
Kraisak Choonhavan ไกรศักดิ์ ชุณหะวัณ	Former senator, former MP for the Democrat Party list, son of Chatchai Choonhavan	31 May 2010
Kusumanwadi Sirikomut กุสุมาลวดี สิริโกมุท	MP Maha Sarakham Province	22 March 2010
Laong Tiapeirat ละออง ติยไพรัช	MP for Chiang Mai Province	29 March 2010
Manit Pawasuk มานิตย์ ภาวสุทธิ์	MP for Chonburi Province	7 July 2010
Marut Bunmi มารุต บุญมี	MP for Nakhon Pathom Province	7 June 2010
Nanthana Thimsuwan นันทนา ทิมสุวรรณ	MP for Loei Province, wife of Thanathep Thimsuwan, an MP for the Pheu Thai Party list.	10 April 2010
Naremon Thantamrong นฤมล ธารดำรงค์	MP for Samut Prakan Province	25 May 2010
Narong Jaritanadit ณรงค์ จันทนดิษฐ	MP for Nonthaburi Province	26 May 2010
Nathapol Wangchoocherdkul ณัฐพล หวังชูเชิดกุล	Political assistant to MP Porapol Adireksan	6 July 2010
Nathi Suthinphueag นที สุนทินเผือก	MP for Samut Prakan Province	25 May 2010
Nipha Pringsunka นิภา พริ้งศุลกะ	MP for Surat Thani Province	15 December 2007
Niphitat Inthornsombat นิพิฏฐ์ อินทรสมบัติ	Former Minister of Culture	3 May 2010
Niphon Chittangthammakul นิพนธ์ จิตตั้งธรรมกุล	Member of the Bangkok Metropolitan Council	25 May 2010
Nongnat Penchat นงนาถ เพ็ญชาติ	Oldest daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn	25 May 2010
Nongnut Jirapongse คุณหญิงนงนุช จิรพงศ์	Second daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife of Euam Jirapongse	26 May 2010

Name	Position (as of August 2011)	Date of Interview
Nutchapol Tanchareon ณัชพล ตันเจริญ	MP for Chachoengsao Province	6 July 2010
Pakin Prissananantakul ภคิน ปริศนานันทกุล	MP Ang Thong Province	25 May 2010
Paraton Prisananantkun ภราดร ปริศนานันทกุล	MP Ang Thong Province, son of Somsak Prisananantkun, former Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives	7 June 2010
Parinya Roekrai ปริญญา ฤกษ์หร่าย	MP for Kamphaeng Phet Province	1 June 2010
Payap Shinawatra พายัพ ชินวัตร	Former MP, brother of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, brother of current prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra.	15 June 2011
Peeradej Siriwansant พีระเดช ศิริวันสาณฑ์	MP for Nakhon Sawan Province	27 May 2010
Pensupa Gajaseni เพ็ญสุภา คชเสนี	Granddaughter of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn	7 May 2010
Perayot Rahimmula พีรยศ ราฮิมมูลา	MP for Pattani Province	27 May 2010
Phalwut Lertsilathong พลาวุฒิ เลิศศิลาทอง	Deputy speaker of the ministry of science and technology	1 June 2010
Phayong Jiraphanwanit พยงค์ จิระพันธุ์วาณิช	wife of Kamon Jiraphanwanit a former MP for Lopburi Province	1 June 2010
Phiraporn Suwanchawee พีรพร สุวรรณฉวี	Second son of Pairot Suwanchawee	7 June 2010
Phirayot Rahimmula พีรยศ ราฮิมมูลา	MP for Pattani Province	26 May 2010
Phongvet Vejjajiva พงศ์เวช เวชชาชีวะ	MP for Chanthaburi Province	1 June 2010
Piyarat Muensean ปิยะรัช หมื่นแสน	MP for Roi Et Province	27 May 2010
Polapee Suwanchawee พลพีร์ สุวรรณฉวี	MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province	1 June 2010
Porapol Adireksarn ปรพล อดิเรกสาร	MP for Saraburi Province	18 March 2010
Pornthep Techaphaybun พรเทพ เตชะไพบูลย์	Former deputy minister of industry, deputy governor of Bangkok Municipality, father of Akanat Promphan	18 June 2011

Name	Position (as of August 2011)	Date of Interview
Pramual Aimpia ประมวล เอมเปีย	MP for Chonburi Province	18 March 2010
Pramuan Eampia ประมวล เอมเปีย	MP for Chonburi Province	18 March 2010
Prapon Ninwathanawai ประพนธ์ นิลวัชรมณี	MP for Surat Thani Province	31 May 2010
Ranongrak Suwanchawee ระนองรักษ์ สุวรรณฉวี	Former senator, MP and minister	8 July 2010
Renu Aimpia เรณู เอมเปีย	Daughter of Pramual Aimpia a M P for Chonburi Province	6 July 2010
Samai Chareonchang สมัย เจริญช่าง	MP for Bangkok Municipality	6 July 2010
Samart Phitiyabanyaporn สามารถ พิริยะปัญญาพร	MP for Ratchaburi Province	7 July 2010
Samphan Tanggenjapon สัมพันธ์ ตั้งเบญจผล	MP for Sukhothai Province	6 July 2010
Sanguan Pongmanee สงวน พงษ์มณี	MP for Lamphun Province	27 May 2010
Sasiwan Seikrajang ศศิวรรณ ใสกระจ่าง	Wife of Guthep Seikrajang	18 March 2010
Suchai Srisurapol สุชาย ศรีสุรพล	MP for Khon Kaen Province	8 July 2010
Sompote Saithep สมโภช สายเทพ	MP for Lambang Province	6 July 2010
Somsak Prisananantkun สมศักดิ์ ปริศนานันทกุล	Former minister of agriculture and cooperatives	19 June 2010
Soravuth Neangjunong สรวุฒิ เนื่องจำนงค์	MP for Chonburi Province	8 July 2010
Sukhumbhand Paribatra สุขุมพันธุ์ บริพัตร	Governor of Bangkok Municipality	18 June 2011
Sukvitcharn Musikul สุขวิชชาญ มุสิกุล	MP for Kamphaeng Phet Province	7 May 2010
Supachai Srisang ศุภชัย ศรีหลัง	MP for Ubon Ratchathani Province	31 May 2010
Suparp Kleekhaijai สุภาพ คลี่ขจาย	Former MP	26 March 2010
Surachat Thienthong สุรชาติ เทียนทอง	MP for Bangkok Municipality	20 June 2011

Name	Position (as of August 2011)	Date of Interview
Surajitr Yontrakul สุรจิตร ยนต์ตระกูล	MP for Maha Sarakham Province	8 July 2010
Surathin Phichan สุรทิน พิจารณ์	Leader of the Democracy Party (not the Democrat Party)	27 May 2010
Suwit Yodmani สุวิทย์ ยอดมณี	Former minister of sport and tourism, son-in-law of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachon	26 May 2010
Tarradon Piamphongsant ธราดล เปี่ยมพงส์สานต์	Deputy secretary-general to the prime minister for political affairs	18 March 2010
Tawin Satwinyawibun ถวิล สัตยวิบูลย์	Aid-de-camps of Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram at the time of the 1957 coup	8 August 2011
Tipaya Kittikachorn ทิพยา กิตติขจร	Wife of Yuthapong Kittikachorn	27 March 2010
Tosaporn Tephabutra ทศพร เทพบุตร	MP for Phuket Province	6 July 2010
Wutipong Nambut วุฒิพงษ์ นามบุตร	MP for Ubon Ratchathani Procince	14 May 2010
Yaowanit Phiengket เยาวนิตย์ เพียงเกษ	Wife of Adisorn Phiengket	6 July 2010
Yingluck Shinawatra ยิ่งลักษณ์ ชินวัตร	Current Thai prime minister, sister of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra	16 June 2011
Yuranant Phamornmontri ยุรนันท์ ภมรมนตรี	MP for the Pheu Thai Party list	16 June 2011
Yuthapong Kittikachon ยุทธพงษ์ กิตติขจร	Son of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn	22 May 2010

Appendix 6: Bibliography of Cremation Volumes

The glossary below is a list of cremation volumes which have informed my conclusions but have not been cited in the thesis itself.

Ana Romyanon. 1980. *Cremation Volume for Ana Romyanon*. Bangkok: State Railway of Thailand Printing. (อะนะ รมยานนท์. 2523. *อนุสรณ์ในการรับพระราชทานเพลิงศพนายอะนะ รมยานนท์.* กรุงเทพฯ: โรงพิมพ์การรถไฟ.).

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