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Jeux dynamiques relatifs au changement climatique

Abstract : The world we are in : dynamic games relative to climate change. In these games the setting up of a carbon tax has Pigouvian grounds (to take into account the damage resulting of the accumulation of Green House Gas in the atmosphere due to the consumption of fossil energy) but it has also other aims that are strategic. For fossil energy consuming countries, indeed, a carbon tax can be a way to "eat" a part of the producing countries' rent. Then the resulting carbon tax has a Pigouvian part but also a strategic part. The literature developed during the last twenty years in this field is all about non cooperative games between an area of cartelized consuming countries and an area of cartelized producing countries. In the introduction, we lay out the economic framework of this type of games, their analytical framework (differential games) and the theoretical literature. Then the three original games that make up the bulk of the present work are introduced. Each of the three following chapters is devoted to one of these three games. The first one is a non-cooperative game between an area of consuming countries and an area of producing countries but with an upper limit of atmospheric carbon concentration as the main environmental constraint. This new type of constraint changes the classical results of this type of game. The second one is also a non-cooperative game between an area of consuming countries (here the old rich countries) and an area of producing countries but there is also another area of consuming countries (poor and emergent countries) that does not play the game while it sets up the tax resulting of the game. The setting up of such a tax in this area is the consequence of a transfer from the other consuming area. The conclusion is that under specific conditions this area (but also the financing area) wins some welfare in this framework versus a passive behavior in front of the producers. In the last game, there are also two consuming areas but now they play a non-cooperative game between themselves, while the producing area is passive. In consequence there is not a worldwide carbon tax but two regional carbon taxes. However, under some specific conditions, this framework is better for the two consuming areas than the passive attitude in front of the producers. The main conclusion of the three games is that in some circumstances the consuming countries can get some extra welfare from a strategic stance when setting up a carbon tax.
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Rémy Dullieux. Jeux dynamiques relatifs au changement climatique. Economies et finances. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2013. Français. ⟨NNT : 2013PA010039⟩. ⟨tel-00984266⟩



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