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Vulnerability, interdependencies and risk analysis of coupled infrastructures: power distribution network and ICT

José Libardo Sanchez Torres

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THÈSE

Pour obtenir le grade de

DOCTEUR DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE GRENOBLE

Spécialité : Génie Electrique

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Présentée par

José Libardo / SANCHEZ TORRES

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Co-encadré par **Raphaël/CAIRE**

préparée au sein du **Laboratoire G2ELAB**
dans l'École Doctorale **Electronique, Electrotechnique, Automatique,**
Télécommunication et Traitement du Signal

Vulnérabilité, Interdépendance et Analyse des Risques des Postes Sources et des Modes d'Exploitation décentralisés des Réseaux Electriques

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This dissertation is dedicated to my family, my dad Libardo, my mom Marcela, my sister Paloma, my little brother Rodrigo and my better half Marianita.

CARPE DIEM

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“Gracias a la vida, que me ha dado tanto, me ha dado el sonido y el abecedario, con él, las palabras que pienso y declaro: Madre, amigo, hermano y luz alumbrando, la ruta del alma de la que estoy amando” – Mercedes Sosa

3 years, 4 summers, 3 winters, 1218 days, 174 weeks... it is a long time, isn't it? It is not possible to succeed alone in research for a long time; discussions, movies, people, news and friends inspire a new ideas emerge. Therefore, many people were involved either directly or indirectly on this dissertation. Even many people might not understand why I would like to thank them. I believe that if we live without thinking about rewards and we just do what we feel, what comes from the heart, we will maximize the happiness in the world, we will not be worried about little things and we will enjoy the fact that we are alive and that we can help other people. For this reason, it is a pleasure for me to thank those who made this thesis possible.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABM	Agent-Based Modeling
AC	Alternating Current
AGC	Automatic Generation Control
AMI	Advanced Metering Infrastructures
ANR	Agence Nationale de la Recherche
ANSSI	Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
BN	Bayesian Network
BDMP	Boolean logic Driven Markov Process
BMS	Business Management System
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CN	Complex Network
CT	Current Transformer
DC	Direct Current
DCS	Distributed Control System
DDoS	Distributed Denial-of-Service
DER	Distributed Energy Resources
DG	Distributed Generation
DMS	Distribution Management Systems
DoS	Denial-of-Service
EMS	Energy Management System
EPS	Electric Power Systems
FMCE	Failure mode and effects analysis

G2ELAB	Grenoble Electrical Engineering Laboratory
HMI	Human Machine Interface
ICS	Information and Communication Systems
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IED	Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
GPS	Global Positioning System
LAN	Local Area Network
LN	Logical Node
LV	Low Voltage
MTU	Master Terminal Unit
NCC	National Control Center
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
PN	Petri Network
PURPA	Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
RCC	Regional Control Center
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit
SAS	Substation Automation System
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SINARI	Sécurité des Infrastructures et Analyse de Risques
SoS	System-of-Systems
SoSE	System-of-Systems Engineering
UPS	Uninterrupted Power System
VT	Voltage Transformer

LIST OF NOTATIONS

ΔE	Drop of Global Efficiency
σ_{hj}	Geodesic path between node h and j
λ	Eigenvalues
\mathcal{A}	Adjacency Matrix
a_{jh}	Adjacency matrix entry
$b(l)$	Node Betweenness Centrality
$b(e)$	Edge Betweenness Centrality
b_{global}	Global Betweenness Centrality
b_c	ICT Betweenness Centrality
b_e	Electric Betweenness Centrality
\mathcal{D}	Diagonal matrix of degrees
D	Distances matrix
d_{hj}	Distance between h and j
\mathcal{E}	Set of Edges
E	Efficiency
E_c	Efficiency for ICT nodes
E_e	Efficiency for Electrical nodes
e_m	m th edge in \mathcal{E}
\mathcal{H}	Hermitian Matrix
k_h	Node Degree
k_h^{in}	Node In-Degree
k_h^{out}	Node Out-Degree
k_{eh}	Electrical node degree
k_{ch}	ICT node degree
\mathcal{L}	Laplacian matrix

m	Number of edges in the Graph
n	Number of nodes in the Graph
$P(k)$	Degree distribution
$P(k_{in})$	In-degree distribution
$P(k_{out})$	Out-degree distribution
\mathcal{V}	Set of vertices
\mathcal{V}_c	Set of ICT vertices
\mathcal{V}_e	Set of Electric vertices
v_n	n th vertex in \mathcal{V}
\mathcal{W}	Weights matrix
x	Eigenvectors matrix

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Crazy people are not crazy if one accepts their reasoning
Gabriel Garcia Marquez

In 2003, the Midwest and Northwest of the United States and Ontario in Canada suffered one of the most catastrophic blackouts in the history. It was caused by a line fault that in normal conditions trips an alarm in the control center. However, operators were unaware of this condition and react too late because the alarm system failed few minutes before the electrical failure. This caused a cascade phenomenon that cost between US\$7 and 10 billion (US-Canada Power System Outage task force 2004) and affected almost 50 million customers. Today, 10 years later, a study conducted by Ventyx (Franko and Fahey 2013) showed that in the United States the electric utilities spend an average of 16500€ per year on devices and station equipment per mile of transmission line, which shows the great investment on technologies to make the system stronger and more resilient.

Moreover, not only hidden failures on ICT can affect power systems, but targeted attacks against power systems can also lead to catastrophic outages. According to the ICS-CERT, in the first half of fiscal year 2013 (October 1, 2012 – May 2013) the energy sector suffered 53% of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures (ICS-CERT April/May/June 2013), i.e. infrastructures that play an important and vital role in all main functions of modern societies, including: government facilities, energy systems, hospitals and banks (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001). These examples show a high impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on the performance of power systems.

Last decades have been marked by a wide and pervasive deployment of Information and Communication Technologies in many sectors. As technologies become cheaper and more powerful, new ideas are emerging, new projects are sponsored and new intelligent devices can be found in the market, all of them promise to improve the efficiency, reliability and availability of infrastructures, characterizing this digital age. Furthermore, these technologies pretend to prepare current power systems to the new challenges. Some of these challenges are large distributed generation deployment, systems operating limits, demand rising and the liberalized market.

Nevertheless, the interaction and interdependencies of infrastructures are creating a highly interconnected complex System-of-Systems, where failure(s) in one infrastructure can have a catastrophic impact on other infrastructures.

This problem has been addressed by the US Homeland Security Department and the European Commission (European Commission 2011), and new policies are being created in order to ensure the

service continuity of Critical Infrastructures. As a result, many projects have been initiated in order to understand the behavior of coupled infrastructures, one of these projects is the SINARI Project, sponsored by the *ANR (Agence Nationale de la Recherche)*-France. This project treats the impact of ICTs failures on the secure operation of the electrical distribution network. The present thesis was developed as a part of this project.

Although various researchers have studied the vulnerability of power systems (mostly for Transmission Power Systems) and ICT infrastructures, those studies are still in an early stage and many questions remain unanswered. Some of these unanswered questions revolve around the mutual behavior of coupled infrastructures. This gap highlights the need of new innovative methods to understand the interdependencies among and within critical infrastructures and consequently to improve the analysis of power systems security. This dissertation is focused on the particular case of distribution systems as they are experiencing tremendous changes with a wide deployment of ICTs.

Therefore, the main problem that this dissertation addresses is the lack of methods to analyze and study coupled critical infrastructures, specifically to identify their interdependencies and vulnerabilities in the context of wide deployment of ICTs. The solution of this problem may provide a better vision of system-of-systems that will support reliability, security and risk analysis and should help to make power systems more secure.

The main scientific and technical obstacles (or challenges) that this dissertation has to tackle are:

- The need of a flexible model to be used for many heterogeneous infrastructures. Nowadays there is a growing interest within the scientific community to find a model that helps to describe the behavior of multiple interconnected infrastructures for a global system-of-systems vision and it is well known that such model does not exist yet.
- New methods have to reflect the interactions among and within infrastructures. They have to consider several types of interdependencies and they have to be easy and simple to use.
- Because the main problem of this dissertation covers three large domains: Power distribution systems, Communication networks and automation and control of power systems. It is needed to study each domain and understand their interdependencies.

A review of the literature has resulted in identifying the most common and promising methods to model interdependent infrastructures, including: Agent-based modeling (Casalicchio, Galli and Tucci 2007), Petri Networks (Beccuti, et al. 2012), Combined Simulation (Rozel, et al. 2008) and Complex Networks Theory (Zio and Sansavini 2011). After comparing these methods with respect to the scientific objectives and challenges of this dissertation, it has been decided to focus specifically on the *Complex Networks Theory* for developing an integrated model for coupled power and ICT infrastructures.

Complex Networks enables the modeling of large systems as graphs. In addition, these networks have been extensively used to model, analyze, and understand large systems with non-trivial topologies and hidden interdependences. What is more, this approach allows systems topology characteristics and connectivity properties to be known, as well as, fault and cascading phenomena analysis to be performed. This latter aspect is indeed important because these properties allow the role and the importance of each component in the whole interconnected system to be identified.

Therefore, in order to elaborate a single and integrated model, this dissertation proposes to adapt the theory of Complex Numbers to the theory of Complex Networks. The result of this symbiosis is a two-dimensional model, which allows inherent vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures to be under-

stood and identified. Some of the main properties of Complex Networks are analyzed in order to identify the most critical or most central elements in the system with respect to topology-driven analyses.

The research is guided by the following propositions:

- There is a close relationship between the structure of coupled infrastructures and its dynamics, therefore, studying the systems' topology will ultimately allow the unknown key-properties to be found;
- Asymmetrical communication patterns on multi-infrastructure systems can be represented by bi-directional edges on complex networks;
- The global behavior of coupled infrastructures may reveal emergent unknown phenomena as a result of their interactions.

This dissertation is organized in five Chapters and three appendices. CHAPTER I presents an overview of many concepts that involve the studied problem. Some of these concepts include: Critical Infrastructures, Interdependencies, Power Systems control and monitoring, and vulnerability of coupled infrastructures.

CHAPTER II presents a State-of-the-art on last modeling methods that address the problem of coupled infrastructures interdependencies.

CHAPTER III proposes two approaches to model coupled infrastructures.

CHAPTER IV applies the approaches chosen to a typical French Distribution Network.

CHAPTER V analyses the problem from a System-of-Systems point of view. Evaluating the interaction of different actors involved in the interconnected system. Additionally, it proposes a new methodology to model the interdependencies within Smart Grids.

Appendix A presents a larger explanation on Complex Networks and presents some of the algorithms and codes developed throughout this research project.

Appendix B summarizes main outages and cyber-attacks on Power System facilities. These examples show that Power Systems are vulnerable to failures in the ICT infrastructure.

Appendix C outlines the evolution of policies and projects over the last decade with regard to the interconnections between Power Systems and ICTs.

Appendix D summarizes the publications arising from this dissertation.

CHAPTER I

Context and Definitions

What we do in life echoes in eternity.
Maximus

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Abstract

The material in this chapter is intended to serve as a brief account of the context and the problem that revolve around this thesis. Power Systems and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are studied as Critical Infrastructures. These infrastructures are highly interconnected and are interdependent. Failures in one infrastructure can reach the other infrastructure originating cascades, common cause or emerging failures. Threats on ICTs, as lack of integrity, availability, confidentiality, authenticity and traceability, can affect the Power System behavior. As well, power system blackouts and auxiliary systems' failures can critically affect the ICTs that control and monitor the power system through sensors and communication means.

I.1 Introduction

In the 18th century, scientists dedicated most of their attention to the study of electricity. In the early 1750's, Benjamin Franklin had the famous anecdote about the metal key at the bottom of a kite string during a storm. After that, Alessandro Volta, André Ampère, Michael Faraday, George Ohm, James Maxwell, Nikola Tesla, Thomas Edison and other researchers developed different branches of electromagnetism physics that have allowed humanity to progress and to change its lifestyle. Today, we live in a world where industrial facilities, homes, schools, universities, hospitals, banks and other infrastructures depend on electricity, a world where an outage for a few minutes can have a devastating impact on nation's economy and security (Halpin, et al. 2006).

Nowadays, infrastructures that are vital for nations' welfare and security are considered as "Critical Infrastructures" (CIs). Energy Infrastructure is one of them, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power. Additionally, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are considered as a critical infrastructure. Although ICTs have only existed for a relatively short time, they have become so essential to the society that their incapacity would have a negative impact in many other infrastructures, including public health, defense systems and banking.

Power Systems are not an exception of the influence of ICTs, since these technologies have been progressively deployed in power systems and nowadays they are a vital part of the remote control, protection and supervision systems, helping to increase the reliability, availability and safety of Power Systems. Moreover, future power networks will have a higher dependency on ICT networks, 'Smart Grids' will exchange communication flows with control centers, electric wholesale market, transmission network, end-users, distributed storage and distributed generation; and internal communication flows between control, measure and protection components, e.g. Remote Terminal Units. Figure I:1 shows the main communication flows in Distribution Systems, including Internal and External Communications (NIST 2012).

However, the wide integration of ICTs within Power Systems adds complexity to an already complex field, as in the case of Power Systems. Recent events showed that failures in one infrastructure affect other infrastructures. For instance, the US 2003 blackout (US-Canada Power System Outage task force 2004) taught us that the electrical grids are vulnerable and that a failure in the ICT system can have catastrophic consequences on power systems. Another example is the Stuxnet worm (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). It showed that cyber events can actually target specific energy infrastructures and that the level of securityⁱ awareness in Power Systems is questionable. These and

ⁱ Defined by the NERC as: "The ability of the power system to withstand sudden disturbances such electric




Figure I:1 Distribution Domain (NIST 2012)

other cyber-physical events are summarized in Appendix B.

In response to these events, diverse research centers and Universities addressed this issue in numerous ways, e.g. the SINARI French project “Infrastructures Security and Risk Analysis.”ⁱⁱ These studies are based on the idea that it is difficult to protect an infrastructure without identifying and understanding its interdependent vulnerabilities. As well, several standards have been developed in order to ensure the interoperability and security of coupled heterogeneous infrastructures, e.g. Standard IEEE 2030-2011 “Guide for the Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology Operation with the Electric Power System, End-Use applications and loads.”

The Critical Infrastructures Interdependencies have been addressed in the Grenoble Institute of Technologyⁱⁱⁱ/G2ELAB (Grenoble Electrical Engineering Laboratory)^{iv} as early as late 90s through various research works, industry partnerships and European projects (GRID^v (GRID 2007), SYS-GEEN-ICT^{vi}). Among the PhDs works dealing with this subject, Dr. Rozel has compared different methods to model and study Critical Infrastructures Interdependencies (B. Rozel 2009) and Dr. Tranchita has studied the phenomenon of terrorism and developed a risk assessment for power systems security with regards to targeted events (Tranchita 2008). Currently, Critical Infrastructures studies are one of the main research axes at Grenoble Institute of Technology/G2ELAB.

One of the main problems when it comes to evaluating and identifying vulnerabilities of ICTs and Power Systems is the modeling of their interdependencies. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, it is important to understand how Power Systems and Information and Communications Systems are interconnected. Specifically, in the context of this dissertation, it is important to understand the role of RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) or even IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) as part of the Power Systems – ICT interface, the SCADA System as the nervous system and Control Centers (CC) as the brain of this interconnected complex system.

short-circuits or non-anticipated loss of system components.”

ⁱⁱ In French *Sécurité des Infrastructures et Analyse de Risques* (<http://www.sinari.org>)

ⁱⁱⁱ In French *Grenoble - Institut Nationale Polytechnique* (<http://www.grenoble-inp.fr>)

^{iv} In French *Grenoble Génie Electrique Laboratoire* (<http://www.g2elab.grenoble-inp.fr>)

^v <http://grid.jrc.it>

^{vi} <http://seesgen-ict.rse-web.it/>

This Chapter is structured in the following sections:

- Section I.2 offers a general overview of CIs and their interdependencies.
- Section I.3 presents a brief introduction to Power Systems and the new paradigm of Liberalized Power Systems.
- Section I.4 addresses the control systems on electric power systems.
- Section I.5 presents the interdependencies and threats between Power Systems and ICTs.
- Section I.6 presents a summary and concludes with the key objectives of the dissertation.

I.2 Critical Infrastructures (CIs)

I.2.1 Definitions

The term “Critical Infrastructure” (CI) is evolving, as indicated in (O'Rourke 2007). In the 1980's, it appeared in many policy debates. However, it was in 1996 that the term CI was used by the first time in terms of National Security (President of the US 1996). Currently, there are several definitions of Critical Infrastructures.

The Commission of the European Communities (European Union 2008) is defining a Critical infrastructure as: *“an asset, system of part thereof located in Member States which are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.”*

European critical infrastructures classification includes (Commission of the European Communities 2004):

- Energy installations and networks;
- Communications and information technologies;
- Finance (banking, securities and investment);
- Health care;
- Food;
- Water (dams, storage, treatment and networks);
- Transport (airports, ports, intermodal facilities, railway and mass transit networks and traffic control systems);
- Production, storage and transport of dangerous goods (e.g. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials);
- Government (e.g. critical services, facilities, information networks, assets and key national sites and monuments).

Likewise, the US Department of Homeland Security identified 18 Critical Infrastructure Sectors, showed in Table I:1, and defined CIs as *“assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof”* (US Department of Homeland Security 2009).

Despite the different concepts of CIs, it is clear that CIs play an essential role in all main functions of modern societies and it is important to understand their interactions and interdependencies to prevent catastrophic events caused by unknown vulnerabilities. Thereby, (Rinaldi, et al., 2001)

Table I:1 Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the United States

Food and Agriculture	Banking and Finance	Chemical
Commercial Facilities	Communications	Critical Manufacturing
Dams	Defense Industrial Base	Emergency Services
Energy	Government Facilities	Healthcare and Public Health
Information Technology	National Monuments and icons	Nuclear Reactors, materials and waste
Postal and Shipping	Transportation systems	Water

proposed different dimensions for describing infrastructure’s interdependencies – see Figure I:2 – including coupling and response behavior, types of failures, infrastructure characteristics, state of operation, types of interdependencies and environment. This dissertation is engaged particularly to the study of the types of interdependencies and the types of failures, both subjects are described in Sections I.2.2 and I.2.3 respectively.

I.2.2 Types of Interdependencies

At first glance every infrastructure operates separately. However, there are linkages between them, either tangibles or intangibles that build a complex coupled System-of-Systems (SoS) (Gorod, Sauser and Boardman 2008). A SoS is characterized by highly automated networks with multiple complex interdependencies. For that, (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001) identified four types of interdependencies on critical infrastructures:

- *Physical*: Represented by a physical linkage between the inputs and outputs of two agents in




Figure I:2 Dimensions of CIs interdependencies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001)

different infrastructures, e.g. power systems supply power to oil infrastructures for pump stations and control systems.

- *Cyber*: connects the state of one infrastructure to others, depending on information transmitted through the communications infrastructure, e.g. water facilities depend on ICT to supervise and monitor the water pumping and cooling. (Kröger and Zio 2011) proposed to call it “Informational,” in order to include hardware and software.
- *Geographic*: Infrastructures geographically located at the same place, where a single event can negatively affect them, e.g. in power substations when a transformer explodes and the fire burns communication cables, affecting the information and communication system. (Kröger and Zio 2011) proposed to call it “geospatial.”
- *Logical*: When the state of one infrastructure depends on the state of another infrastructure via a connection that is not physical, cyber nor geographic, e.g. the European outage in 2006, despite it was a 30 minutes outage, French relief centers were inundated with calls (UCTE 2007). (D. Watts 2004) describes this type of interdependency in many areas besides critical infrastructures.

(De Porcellinis, et al. 2008) proposes a fifth interdependency called ‘*Social*’, when the functioning of the whole system relies on the human behavior and activities, e.g. when a worker’s strike blocks off train rails.

I.2.3 Types of Failures

Since CIs are interdependent, a failure on one infrastructure can have a catastrophic impact against other infrastructures in the System-of-Systems. Three types of failures are identified (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly 2001):

- *Common mode*: Occurs when two or more infrastructures are affected simultaneously because of an external and common cause, e.g. tornado and earthquake.
- *Cascading*: Occurs when a failure in one infrastructure causes a failure in a second infrastructure.
- *Escalating*: Occurs when a failure, resulting from the interaction between two infrastructures, exacerbates another failure.

Table I:2 presents which CIs originated an event and which CIs are affected by the event. Data are from a database containing recordings of 2515 CI’s failures in multiple CIs around the world. The energy infrastructure has the higher number of incidents affecting other infrastructures. As well, industry, telecom and water infrastructures have an impact on the energy infrastructure, illustrating the need to understand the causes of these incidents and how these infrastructures are linked. A complete analysis is presented in (Luijff, et al. 2009).

Therefore, as mentioned in (Kröger 2008), it is needed to create new conceptual approaches and extended analytical tools to knowledge the critical linkages between CIs in order to prevent critical failures and to improve the Power Systems resilience.

Table I:2 Events categorized by initiating and affected sector (# of events) (Luijff, et al. 2009)

CI Sector	Initiating Sector											
	No Sector	Energy	Financial Services	Government	Health	Industry	Internet	Postal Services	Telecom	Transport	Water	TOTAL
Education	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4
Energy	515	65	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	1	3	589
Financial	34	5	3	-	-	-	3	-	15	-	-	60
Food	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	8
Government	27	17	-	1	1	1	4	-	14	1	1	67
Health	23	11	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	1	39
Industry	12	12	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	27
Internet	109	14	-	-	-	-	10	-	27	-	-	160
Postal Serv.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Telecom	170	62	-	-	-	-	1	-	57	5	-	295
Transport	294	98	-	1	-	3	-	1	5	15	5	422
Water	58	14	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	76
Total	1248	302	3	2	3	11	18	1	122	24	15	1749

Both issues, interdependencies and failures of CIs, are analyzed in Section I.4 for Power Systems and ICT infrastructures.

I.3 Electric Power Systems (EPS)

The main objective of Electric Power Systems, as we know them today, is to supply electrical energy to clients on wide territories. In order to achieve this objective, Power Systems are structurally divided into generating stations, transmission and distribution networks, and end-users. This division was developed mainly for economic reasons resulting in traditional and historical descendent power flows, from generating units to end-users.

Nevertheless, Power Systems are taking a new direction that is characterized by the reorganization of the electrical system to create conditions for open competition between different players, which has been called: the *Liberalized World*. The new conditions are incentives for consumers to install local generation means and the use of renewable sources. But this new paradigm introduced new problems and challenges (Hadjsaid, Canard and Dumas 1999). In order to understand the new challenges and why ICTs are increasingly becoming an essential part of power systems, this section briefly presents and introduction to the EPS structure, the Distributed Generation integration and the liberalized world.

I.3.1 Structure of Electric Power Systems

Traditionally, Electric Power Systems comprise:

- *Generation*: Electric power is generated by 50/60 Hz synchronous rotating machines, converting mechanic energy into electrical power. In France, in 2012, electrical energy was generated as follows: 74.8% from Nuclear Plants, 11.8% from hydroelectric plants, 8.8% from coal plants, and the remaining 4.6% from gas, wind generators, solar energy, and other renewable energies (RTE 2013).
- *Transmission*: In this level, generated electric power is transmitted from generation plants to distribution networks. Many components are involved in the transmission networks, e.g. transmission lines, substations, transformers, control and protection systems, transmission towers, etc. Some industrial customers are supplied directly at this level.
- *Distribution*: Distribution networks deliver the power directly to all consumers.

Power flows in this typical structure are directed from generation plants to consumers. In order




Figure I:3 Typical structure of Electric Power Systems

to reduce the energy lost in the large electric grid, there exist different power levels and thus different voltage levels, from 1200 kV (in Chinese transmission networks) to 110 V (residential voltage-level in some countries). A typical structure of power systems is depicted in Figure I:3. Table I:3 shows the voltage levels in France.

In order to ensure the transmission of electricity, elementary components are included in the system (Hewitson, Brown and Balakrishnan 2005), some of them are:

- Lines: Transmission lines and distribution lines either overhead or underground cable type.
- Buses: are the substations of the power system, internally they are composed of several bus-bars and/or transformers and serves to connect lines with different or same voltage levels.
- Transmission towers/pylons: Structures that supports power lines.
- Transformers: Interconnection and Distribution transformers. Used to raise or decrease the voltage or current of the original source.
- Circuit breakers: Equipment used to switch and control electrical power. Their main purpose is to clear faulty currents.
- Measurement transformers (CT – VT): They are instrument transformers designed to transform currents or voltages from high value to a value easy to handle for relays and instruments.

A description of Electric Power Systems can be found in (Hadjsaid and Sabonnadière 2009), (Grigsby 2007) and (W.-K. Chen 2005), which may help to better understand the work presented in this dissertation.

Table I:3 Voltage levels in France according to NF C15-11 and NF C13-200

Voltage Level		Nominal AC Voltage	Standard Voltages
HTB3	High Voltage B 3	$350 \text{ kV} < U_n \leq 500 \text{ kV}$	400 kV
HTB2	High Voltage B 2	$130 \text{ kV} < U_n \leq 350 \text{ kV}$	150, 225 kV
HTB1	High Voltage B 1	$50 \text{ kV} < U_n \leq 130 \text{ kV}$	63, 90 kV
HTA2	High Voltage A 2	$40 \text{ kV} < U_n \leq 50 \text{ kV}$	40.5 kV
HTA1	High Voltage A 1	$1 \text{ kV} < U_n \leq 40 \text{ kV}$	5.5, 6.6, 10, 15, 20, 33 kV
BTB	Low Voltage B	$500 \text{ V} < U_n \leq 1000 \text{ V}$	690 V
BTA	Low Voltage A	$50 \text{ V} < U_n \leq 500 \text{ V}$	230, 400 V
TBT	Extra-low Voltage	$U_n \leq 50 \text{ V}$	12, 24, 48 V

I.3.2 The Liberalized World and the Distributed Generation (DG)

Back in 1978, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) was presented in the United States; this act determined the beginning of the deregulation process (first free-market approach) and promoted the research on novel and sustainable technologies, to produce electricity from renewable sources such as water, wind or solar power.

Firstly, the deregulation process pursued to create conditions for free competition between different actors. This model is called the *New Paradigm* (Hadjsaid and Sabonnadière 2009). In this new model it appeared that sharing data among actors for economic reasons as well as for reliability reasons is critical. It can only be guaranteed by an available, reliable and secured communication network.

Secondly, research on environmental-friendly technologies tried to change the paradigm of generation plants with large-scale equipment, to produce on-site and in small-scale electricity, what was called *Distributed Generation (DG)*. Some of the main advantages of DG small-scale equipment are: they can be built in a really short time and these generating units are mostly located at the distribution level close to the customer or at the customer site (it then should reduce the need to transport electricity hundreds of kilometers). Among the advantages seen for DGs are: improved grid security due to the reduction of terrorist targets, reduced CO2 emissions with widespread use of DG technologies based on renewable sources, increased efficiency through the development of cogeneration technologies (reuse of energy that would be wasted, e.g. thermal energy) and local management of energy, contribution to security of supply, etc. Figure I:4 shows the new Electrical Power System including DG.

Nevertheless, DG technologies have social and technical disadvantages. On the one hand, the development of new green-technologies is expensive, which deters people from investing without appropriate government subsidies. On the other hand, DGs are more difficult to monitor, interconnect, and –in some cases– to maintain. Furthermore, they introduce new technical and economic challenges to the distribution system grids as they were not originally designed to integrate these local generation units at large scales.




Figure I:4 New Electric Power System

I.4 ICTs for Power Systems

Markets liberalization and distributed generation deployment led to profound modifications in the structure of the electric power system. That is, from ‘quasi-monopoly’ system to an open access offering market conditions to companies.

Market competition requires transparency and symmetry of information. Therefore, it is mandatory to share real-time information and to ensure a controlled, protected and monitored system. For this reason, many Information and Communication Technologies were distributed in the electric power grids; these technologies are able to acquire, store, process system measures and commands (PSERC 2012).

Some of the main applications of ICTs on power grids, control strategies for distribution power systems, control assets and critical threats to ICT and power systems are presented in this section.

I.4.1 Control assets of EPS

Supply of high quality electricity, in constrained power system, is difficult to achieve without a continuous knowledge of the state of the electric power system. For this reason, on-field instrumentation and communication technologies are used to acquire and send measurements via a telecommunications infrastructure to a control center. Control centers process the data and find the appropriate commands to maintain the electrical parameters within an acceptable range. Some of these assets comprise: Remote Terminal Units, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), Human Machine Interface (HMI), and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition SCADA System (Knapp 2011), (Galloway and Hancke 2012), (Gönen 2008).

I.4.1.1 Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)

RTUs are data collectors that provide connectivity (on the slave side) to the SCADA network (on the master side), since RTUs acquire field digital and analog parameters and transmit them back to a Distributed Control System^{vii} (DCS) or SCADA system in a control center. RTUs are considered as the interface of the network buses in the physical layer with the cyber layers (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012).

RTUs include remote communications capabilities such as wire modem, cellular data connection, radio, and/or other wide area communication capabilities. As well, RTUs use industrial network protocols, mostly defined by the Standard IEEE 60870-5-104. They are microprocessor powered and use a set of analog and digital input/output channels. These channels can be implemented through various physical media such as parallel-resonant circuit on power lines carriers, telephone wires, optic fibers, radio wave and satellite communications.

Since RTUs are typically located in substations or in a remote location, they are extremely durable and reliable in order to withstand harsh field conditions. The RTUs power supply is provided by a DC/DC converter and includes a battery and charger circuitry to continue operation in an event of long power outage.

^{vii} Distributed Control Systems used to monitor and control distributed equipment.

1.4.1.2 Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

PLCs automate functions on EPS. They are specialized computers with multiple analogical or numerical inputs/outputs. PLCs rely on blocks of logic code allowing them to automatically operate to specific signals, e.g. from a relay or a sensor. They are programmed using specialized software (e.g. Simatic Step 7, Unity Pro) on personal computers. PLCs include built-in communication ports such as series RS-232 or Ethernet, using Modbus, DF1 protocols among others, thus they can be connected to a computer running SCADA. They are more intelligent than RTUs and have the ability to issue controls without taking direction from a Master Unit.

1.4.1.3 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)

An IED is any device from the RTU family with signal processing as well as control and communication abilities that is equipped with a small microprocessor and is able to receive or send data/control from/to an external source. IEDs use fieldbus protocols and include functions and features such as self-check, diagnostics and historical data store.

1.4.1.4 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

One of the multiple definitions of SCADA is: “*SCADA is the equipment and procedures for controlling one or more remote stations from a master control station. It includes the digital control equipment, sensing and telemetry equipment, and two-way communications to and from the master stations and the remotely controlled stations*” (Gönen 2008, 216)

However, there are disagreements among experts. For instance, it can be found definitions like: “*A SCADA system is a purely software layer, normally applied a level above control hardware within the hierarchy of an industrial network.*” In fact, there is still a discussion between control engineers about the definition of Industrial Control System (ICS) and SCADA System (Byres 2012).

The definition of the SCADA retained in this thesis is an information system that allows the transfer of remote commands, annunciation and telemetry signals necessary to the monitoring and control of the electric power system.

Master Terminal Units are known as the heart of the SCADA system. MTUs are located at the operator’s control center facility. The data from all RTUs in remote sites are sent to the MTU to be processed and stored.

HMIs are the interface between the Operator (Human) and the electric power system (machine). They play a vital role for systems’ automation since they allow important tasks such as control, monitoring, diagnosis and managing of EPS to be processed. Through HMIs, operators open and close circuit breakers, visualize current operational parameters on screens (voltages, current, and state of switchgears), adjust system values and other functions, etc. Usually, HMIs are connected to one or more PLC and RTUs. HMIs show information on text displays, graphical panels, touchscreens or web-based interfaces.

1.4.2 Automation of Electric Power Systems

In the context of automation, Electrical Power Systems are generally divided into five hierarchical levels as shown in Figure I:5. Three levels are for Substation Automation Systems: Process level, bay level and station level. The other two levels are: the regional control center (RCC) level and the national control center level (NCC).

Substation Automation Systems operate, protect and monitor the substation using dedicated technologies, such as sensors, actuators or relays, and communication links that create interfaces to exchange control and protection data. Substations are divided into levels to discriminate its main functions (IEC 61850 2003), (Zima and Bockarjova 2007), these levels are: process level, bay level and station level.

Process level is the lowest level and its devices are sensors and actuators; sensors report the status of switchgears, measure the voltage and currents through Voltage Transformers (VT) and Current transformers (CT); and actuators are used to perform the control actions, e.g. switchgears or breakers. Process level exchanges CT and VT data and control-data with Bay Level.

Bay level is composed of control and protection units. Usually each unit is implemented in a different panel board. Each cubicle can have a CPU that interprets the data, storing devices for real-time computations, filters, AC/DC converters to transform analog measures into digital data, an HMI, a power supply module, an interface to exchange inter-bays' information, an interface to process level, and an interface to station level. Bay level exchanges protection-data with external remote protection units, and control and protection data with station level.

Station level consists of a station computer with a database, the operator's workplace, interfaces for remote control, and peripheral devices, e.g. alarm and event printers, a GPS master. Station level can exchange information with Regional Control Centers (RCC) and the National Control Center (NCC).

In the *RCC level*, operators supervise in real time the transmission network status, identify line faults, decide actions to recover the functionality of the transmission network and manage congestions in the network. Since EPS have many economic and security constraints, RCC exchanges data from control and protection devices with the Station level to adjust voltages at buses and current over lines.

The *NCC level* is the most important because it is considered as the brain of the system (Wu, Moslehi and Bose 2005). The NCC supervises the whole network state, including system frequency, grid voltages, powers and currents among others; as well, coordinates actions during large disturbances to restore the network. Both control centers are equipped with Energy Management Systems (EMSS).

EMS is an operators' decision support tool to monitor, control, coordinate and optimize the performance of the system. EMSs have several supporting software applications, including on-line power flow, optimal power flow, voltage profile, state estimation, generation scheduling, load prediction and




Figure I:5 Hierarchical conceptual levels of EPS (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010)

security analysis. EMSs have two main classes, one to manage the transmission network, the other one, the Automatic Generation Control (AGC), used to adjust the power generated on power plants to match the load (Hadjsaid 2008), (Knight 2001).

EMS is considered as the heart of a control center, since it controls the flow of electricity through the system according to economic and security constraints. Economic constraints are defined by the Business Management System (BMS) that exchanges scheduled prices and settlements information with the EMS to fulfill electricity market rules (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010).

Figure I:6 presents the electric power system structure, including its control network, their applications and the typical communication interfaces.

Control and protection data exchanged among levels include (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012):

- ⇒ bus voltage at every substation,
- ⇒ bus frequency,
- ⇒ active and reactive powers in lines and bus,
- ⇒ positions of switchgears at every busbar,
- ⇒ position of tap changers,
- ⇒ perturbations signals and alarms,
- ⇒ regulation and parameters state,
- ⇒ load frequency control and automatic voltage regulation set point,
- ⇒ remote commands,
- ⇒ load shedding remote command,
- ⇒ power generation reduction command.
- ⇒ ...

These data are transmitted either periodically or by request and must be handled under strict




Figure I:6 Electric power system and Control Network

rules of confidentiality, acquisition, coordination and usage. Security issues handling this data and main vulnerabilities on power systems and ICT are discussed in the next section.

I.5 ICT and EPS Interdependencies

I.5.1 ICT Threats on Power Systems

As shown above, Electric Power Systems operators rely on Information and Communication Technologies to monitor and control the network. Nevertheless, there is still a critical question: Is the ICT infrastructure improving or endangering the security, the reliability and the resilience of Power Systems? Recent events (see Appendix B) revealed several facts. *i*) Failures in ICT infrastructure can actually affect Power Systems. *ii*) There is a tendency to perform targeted cyber and physical attacks. *iii*) Isolation from the internet is not an effective defense, and all power systems that are controlled by software are vulnerable to cyber threats. *iv*) Terrorists and war fighters recognized that it is more effective to attack ICT infrastructures directly, than to physically attack their targets (Chen and Saeed 2011), (Trevorrow, et al. 2006).

Therefore, in order to study the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of Power Systems, it is important to identify the main threats for ICT and how they can affect the Power System.

In the ICT domain, information security is the process of defending information from unauthorized access, use, and modification. Its main objectives, according to the ANSSI^{viii} are (ANSSI 2010):

- Ensure the *availability* of data and information systems, i.e. information is available when it is needed;
- Guarantee the *integrity* of information systems, i.e. originally sent information must stay unaltered;
- Make sure that the data remains *confidential*, i.e. only authorized persons have access to the information;
- Create practices to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate users, i.e. *Authenticity*;
- Control the changes effectuated on information and trace the person that did the changes, i.e. *Traceability*.

These objectives can be applied as well for Power Systems. Four cases show the criticality of these properties:

- **Availability:** The regional control center requests load information to feed the state estimator, but this information is unavailable due to a Trojan that attacked the EMS (Santamarta 2011).
- **Integrity:** An intruder changes the values of currents on power lines (virtually). Operators read on HMIs that the main transmission lines are overloaded, thus they decide to start the load shedding procedure, affecting the normal network condition (Liu, et al. 2012).
- **Confidentiality:** A terrorist group steals sensitive documents from energy companies to plan a massive attack (Karpersky Laboratory 2012).

^{viii} French Network and Information Security Agency (*Agence nationale de sécurité des systèmes d'information*).

- **Authenticity:** An intruder, using social engineering^{ix}, obtains operators' IDs and passwords needed for substation HMI remote desktop connection (Liu, et al. 2012).

These are just some examples; however, many threats can affect the control system and consequently the electrical power system. There are two types of threats: internal and externals.

For instance, an internal threat can be an employee that for some reasons decides to attack the SCADA System, e.g. an employee from the Australian sewage system release million liters of water into parks of Australia (Smith 2001). Similarly, a contractor that has a temporary access to the system can attack it. These internal threats can be either an intentional attack or an accident (human error).

External threats may lack of specific origin or source. For instance, when a random malware arrives to the operator computers, e.g. the Nimda worm affected an EMS/SCADA system in 2001 (CERT 2001). Or it could have a specific source, natural disasters and electric phenomena on power lines can damage the control system functioning, e.g. electromagnetic interferences, noise on power lines. Finally, the most dangerous are the targeted attacks developed by terrorist, by other nations or by hackers, these attackers have special knowledge and a clear objective, Stuxnet worm is a well-known example (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The most common threats for ICT are: autonomous worms, terrorists, viruses, Trojan horses, human errors, accidents, noise on power lines, and improper application of software patches (Kruz 2006).

ICT on Power Systems are vulnerable because, at the beginning, off-the-shelves technologies that were used in control centers and ICT for power systems lacked of information security as it was an insignificant requirement 30 years ago (Masera, Fovino and Vamanu 2011).

External and internal threats can exploit different unsecured attack points, among them: Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connection, connections between SCADA systems and other Local Area Networks (LANs), corporate Web servers, email servers, internet gateways, open computer ports, poor configured firewalls, and weak authentication protocols (Sridhar and Govindarasu 2012). Authors in (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012) classify these vulnerabilities into four categories:

- SCADA system weaknesses:* they are mainly protocol weaknesses, e.g. unauthorized command execution, SCADA denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, and worm attacks. These attacks can have negative consequences on the industrial operation and by cascading on other infrastructures.
- Process network weaknesses:* they allow the control of the SCADA server to be taken, interrupting communication flows or sending unauthorized commands.
- Control center weaknesses:* they include virus infections and attacks with false authentication on computers, mainly for HMI purposes.
- Network layer weaknesses:* they cover routing attack or intentional disconnection of the communication network.

ICTs threats are growing for all infrastructures particularly for the energy sector. According to McAfee, 60 million malware programs are written every year. In only one year cyberattacks against federal networks have increased about 40% (Motorola 2012). According to the ICS-CERT, 41.4% of the cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures where against the Energy Sector, Figure I:7 shows the results of the study (ICS-CERT 2012).

^{ix} Social engineering is the use of cultural ploys and psychological manipulation to get confidential information to illegally intrude on computer systems or networks (Abraham and Chergalur-Smith 2010).




Figure I:7 Incidents by Sector – 198 Total in Fiscal Year 2012 (ICS-CERT 2012)

As such, the Power Systems Engineering Research Center (PSERC) identified new research challenges in order to secure the future Electric Power Systems; these challenges cover (PSERC, 2012):

- cyber-attack risk modeling and risk mitigation;
- attack-resilient monitoring, protection and control algorithms;
- defense against coordinated cyber-attacks;
- AMI infrastructure security;
- trust management and attack attributions;
- simulation models, data sets, testbed evaluations.

Furthermore, many researchers study the consequences of ICT attacks on Power Systems. (Bompard, et al., 2012) discussed the importance to study and to improve (even to develop) defensive and protective strategies in the cyber and physical layers in order to reduce the vulnerability levels. (Bompard, Gao, et al. 2009) proposed a method to assess the risk of malicious attacks against power systems. (Leszczyna, Fovino and Masera 2010) presented an approach to develop security assessment of critical infrastructures information systems. (Khelil, Germanus and Suri 2012) discussed new techniques to secure SCADA communications.

The following documents are strongly recommended, as they provide deeper information:

- “ICT aspects of power systems and their security” (Masera, Fovino and Vamanu 2011). It is a scientific and technical report from the Joint Research Center – European Commission. This report delineates ICT threats and vulnerabilities of power systems, proposes countermeasures and presents four cyber-attack scenarios, including PLC corruption, SCADA protocol-based Denial-of-Service and SCADA protocol-based coordinated attack. This report highlights the need to develop solid and rigorous theoretical and practical cyber-security studies.
- “Cyber-physical Systems Security for Smart Grid” (PSERC 2012). A white paper written by the Power Systems Engineering Research Center. This document presents the cyber-security challenges for future power grids (Smart Grids), discusses the main threats and possible solutions. Equally, it emphasizes the need of research efforts to explore new methods and studies to reduce the impact from a successful attack.
- “Cyber vulnerability in power systems operation and control” (Bompard, Cuccia, et al. 2012).

This document, which is in line with previous sections, introduces the problem of cyber vulnerability in power systems, exploring the control strategies, information exchanged among control centers, the potential cyber-attacks and countermeasures. Finally, it concludes that governmental policies and industry actions are needed, as well as effective coordination among actors to guarantee success of countermeasures.

- “Vulnerable systems” (Kröger and Zio 2011). This book presents a state-of-the-art in vulnerability studies of complex infrastructures. In addition, it analyses several methods to study the interdependencies within infrastructures, some of these methods are discussed in this document in CHAPTER II.

I.5.2 Power System threats on ICT

It is uncommon to find publications addressing the power systems threats against ICT, for that reason, in this section it will be shown the most common ways to supply electric energy to the ICT network, which are the electrical weaknesses of ICTs.

The substation auxiliary system supplies electric energy to auxiliary equipment, e.g. control panel boards, operators’ computers, PLCs, relays, and printers. This system has two main back-up systems in a case of an occurrence of a blackout: storage batteries and back-up diesel generators. Nevertheless, these backups are configured to supply only essential devices and their autonomy is just a few hours (8-10). In control centers, it is common to find Uninterruptible Power Supply systems (UPS) to feed operators’ computer systems and computer peripherals that require AC power. Since most of the control devices operate on DC, auxiliary systems have AC/DC converters. Figure I:8 shows a typical auxiliary system. In order to show the weakness of batteries, diesel plants and UPS, Table I:4 shows the world most critical blackouts. It is likely that neither batteries nor diesel plants can completely ensure a continuous power supply in these extreme cases.




Figure I:8 Auxiliary systems power supply

Table I:4 Longest blackouts

Country	Date	Worst Duration Case	Population involved
New Zealand	20.02.1998	>1 week	70 000
Brazil	11.03.1999	5 hours	97 000 000
United States	14.08.2003	> 1 day	55 000 000
Italy	28.09.2003	18 hours	56 000 000
Indonesia	18.08.2005	> 5 hours	100 000 000
Brazil	04.02.2011	>7 hours	53 000 000
India	30.07.2012	> 6 hours	670 000 000

I.6 Summary

Power systems have faced several changes over their history while improving their reliability and availability. The end of the XXth century was marked by a massive deployment of information and communication technologies, including computers, satellites, fiber optics, among others. Recently, power systems have experienced two significant changes: energy market liberalization and insertion of decentralized/distributed generation. Both changes require a secure, optimal, fast and bi-directional communication among players, these players can be at the same time consumers and producers: ‘Prosumers.’

Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been a very positive improvement for power systems because they support not only the supervision and control of power systems, but also the operation decisions, policy making and markets regulation.

However, deployment of ICTs in power systems added a new complexity to study the reliability and resilience of power systems. This new complexity is divided into multiple layers, charactering the different types of interdependencies within coupled infrastructures. Therefore, it is important to define a micro and macro vision of the interdependencies between these infrastructures, having the power system at the center of other infrastructures as their power supply.

Similarly, ICT’s are vulnerable to several threats. Virus, malwares, Denial-of-service attacks are some of the attacks that can affect the normal operation of ICT’s and, consequently, power systems. Furthermore, power systems blackouts can affect ICT.

Since Power Systems and Information and Communication Technologies are considered as vital for the society, they are included as Critical Infrastructures by the US-Government and the European Commission. Consequently, it is of high importance to study their interactions and how to protect them from attacks.

The specific objectives of this dissertation are:

- To compare the different approaches to model coupled infrastructures and to identify the main advantages and disadvantages.
- To analyze the different properties of Complex Networks in order to identify those that will allow us to model the coupled infrastructures.
- To propose different approaches that enable the study of coupled infrastructures, including the different interdependencies layers.
- To compare and analyze the main advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approaches.
- To explore the feasibility of using the proposed approaches at different levels, according to the most recent architectures proposed for Smart Grids.

CHAPTER II

Modeling Critical Infrastructures: State-of-the-art

The need to be right is the sign of a vulgar mind.

Albert Camus

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Abstract

Critical infrastructures’ modeling needs a multidisciplinary approach in order to study and understand their interdependencies and vulnerabilities in a complex interconnected world. This Chapter presents a state-of-the-art on modeling methods for identifying and understanding the interdependencies among Critical Infrastructures, including: Complex Networks, Agent-based models, Bayesian Networks, Boolean Logic Driven Markov processes and Petri networks. Different approaches are described and a summary of main advantages, disadvantages and limitations are then discussed. Finally, this Chapter presents a comparison of these methods, considering the usability, the ability to handle large complex systems, the scalability, among others.

II.1 Introduction

CHAPTER I reveals that power systems and ICT infrastructures are highly interdependent and failures in one infrastructure can affect the other infrastructure. In order to tackle this difficult problem, it is important to develop modeling methods to identify possible common defaults, consequences of cascading failures and vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures.

Therefore, research efforts were addressed to study the interdependencies of coupled infrastructures. In the past, computer processing capacity restricted the development of theories and methods to analyze complex interdependent critical infrastructures. However, after the boost of computational power, computer evolution has significantly supported the development of new theories and methodologies. Thus, the set of theories that were formulated at the beginning of the XXth century have rapidly progressed.

Nevertheless, classical methods, such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), fault trees, Monte Carlo or lifetime assessment (Benbow and Broome 2009), did not provide the information and the tools required to understand complex coupled infrastructure. Therefore, many non-classical methods have arisen to explain and to help the understanding of coupled infrastructures, including: Agents-based modeling and simulation, Bayesian Networks, Boolean Logic Driven Markov Processes, Complex Networks, Combined Simulation, Petri Networks, Supply/Demand graphs and others.

This Chapter presents some approaches based on the non-classical methods, followed by a discussion about the main advantages, disadvantages and limitations of each method. At the end of the Chapter, these methods are compared taking into account the CPU consumption, the usability, the ability to model large and complex systems, the scalability, the ability to perform dynamic simulations and the availability of robust tools to compute them.

II.2 Complex Networks

A Network can be defined as a set of items with connections between them. A Graph is the network mathematical representation. Networks are present in almost every aspect of life, e.g. traveling, calling by cell-phone, finding a job, chatting, etc. For this reason, mathematicians and experts in many domains have tried to find the best way to model real systems, considering the relations and dependencies between their components. The theory that was born from this research has been called “Graph Theory.” Nowadays, the application of Graph theory to study large and complex systems is called Complex Networks theory. This theory studies the systems’ topology and how this topology influences the vulnerabilities of every infrastructure.

This section reviews four approaches of Complex Networks to study coupled infrastructures interdependencies.

II.2.1 Initiating event and cascade-safe operating margins

A first application models the relations among infrastructures and the consequences of failure propagation (Zio and Sansavini 2011). A result of this approach was the origin of the term “Initiating Event,” that is the event that initiates cascade failures. This approach models cascading failures in order to represent the interdependencies among two similar infrastructures (as shown in Figure II:1).

The cascading phenomenon was modeled as a load transfer between components over the interdependency links upon a component failure. These links were randomly distributed among the networks using a Monte Carlo simulation.

The main advantage of this approach is that it identifies cascade-safe regions, considering bi-directional links with respect to the flow of information between the coupled infrastructures. Nevertheless, only two infrastructures can be modeled using this method.

Additionally, this approach is far from real systems behavior, which is one of its limitations. For instance, the cascade process is supposed to model the transfer of load in the system; however, it does not discriminate the type of connection or interdependency between coupled infrastructures. Another limitation is that this study is not dynamical. Thus, this approach only evaluates the different states in the cascade process, as in a discrete time simulation.

II.2.2 Global vulnerability of interdependent infrastructures

A Global analysis of coupled infrastructures was developed using Complex Networks. More




Figure II:1 Tested topological system (Zio and Sansavini 2011)




Figure II:2 Power Grid and Water Network in China (Wang, Hong and Chen 2012)

specifically, this model uses the clustering coefficient, the node degree and the betweenness centrality indices to identify the most vulnerable nodes in the coupled system (Wang, Hong and Chen 2012). The results were validated using the Efficiency index. This approach was created to study the interdependencies between the power grid and the water system of a major city in China (see Figure II:2).

Despite this approach computes the common indices of complex networks, the mathematical representation of the interdependencies is not clear and is limited to two infrastructures. In addition, this approach lacks of dynamical simulations to validate the cascading.

The main originality of this approach is that it creates some indices to identify critical infrastructures in a coupled system, based on the input/output relationships, i.e. the nodes in one infrastructure that depends upon another infrastructure.

II.2.3 Interdependent technical infrastructures modeling

This approach aimed at capturing the functional and geographical interdependencies among several infrastructures e.g. electrical system, auxiliary power system, and railway systems, among others (Johansson and Hassel 2010), (Johansson 2010). The functional interdependencies were classified into: physical, cyber and logical (see Section I.2.2). In this approach, each infrastructure was rep-




Figure II:3 Infrastructures Interdependencies (Johansson and Hassel 2010)

resented in terms of a network model and a functional model, the former to characterize their interdependencies and the latter to simulate their behavior. Each infrastructure was modeled in a different dimension and their interdependencies connected the different dimensions (see Figure II:3).

Its originality consists in incorporating more than two heterogeneous infrastructures in a single model. Additionally, this approach computes the consequences for each infrastructure after removing random nodes in every infrastructure.

II.2.4 Rule-based complex networks

Rule-based complex networks were developed to study coupled infrastructures (B. Rozel 2009) The Complex Network was divided into two dimensions, one for the electric infrastructure, the other for the ICT infrastructure (see Figure II:4). The electric system graph and the ICT graph were linked by interdependency rules. In addition, every node contained its own properties, including: a state variable (true if the node is working, false if there is a failure), geographical positioning reference, its load and its maximum allowed load. The methodology took into account the topological condition of each system and its physical functioning (simulations in Python and Matlab). Overloaded transmission lines and communication links were identified and eliminated in order to evaluate the gravity of failures.

The main advantage of this approach is that it can be extended to model n -infrastructures; however, the limitation is that for large complex systems it may be difficult to assign the rules for every link in the coupled system.

II.2.5 Advantages – Disadvantages

Complex Networks are able to capture the topological features of complex systems. These features can be used to identify the weaknesses of coupled infrastructures. As well, most of the algorithms to study complex networks are based on the shortest-paths. Finding shortest paths between two nodes is a very common task, therefore, there exists several methods to reduce the algorithm complexity, fasten the computation time and reduce the memory consumption (Cohen and Havlin 2010).

Moreover, complex networks are easy to design thanks to the graph representation. However, they are unable to model/simulate complicated behaviors of infrastructures and sometimes results are too abstract to be understood.

Although complex networks are used in many different sciences for many applications, there is no dedicated software to model complex networks. However, there exists many toolboxes for several programming languages (Python - NetworkX, Matlab – MatlabBGL, R – igraph, C++ - SNAP), that contain efficient algorithms to compute the basic properties of complex networks. In addition, the open-source software Gephi proposes a visualization platform to explore basic networks.




Figure II:4 Interdependencies Complex Network (B. Rozel 2009)

According to the literature, there are no methods to study the dynamic aspects of coupled infrastructures. Nevertheless, there exist many algorithms to study dynamic systems in many other sciences. For instance, SIR¹⁰ and SIS¹¹ models to study the progress of an epidemic in a population (Barrat, Barthélemy and Vespignani 2012) or the information spreading in human communications (Wang, et al. 2011), (Cohen and Havlin 2010).

The main advantage of Complex Networks is that they were conceived specifically to model large complex systems. Therefore, it is a powerful tool able to model networks of millions of nodes with complex interactions.

Due to the nature of graphs, this method is suitable for modeling scalable systems. For this reason, it is used in vulnerability studies to evaluate the impact of removing nodes and links in the network.

The lack of functional features is one of the main limitations of Complex Networks. That is the reason why many researchers have integrated this method with other more realistic (Hines, Cotilla-Sanchez and Blumsack 2010).

Despite many studies have shown the effectiveness of complex networks to study infrastructures vulnerabilities, up to now, this method has not been completely exploited for multiple infrastructures analysis.

II.3 Agent-Based Model (ABM)

Agent-Based Model (AMB) is a modular technique that allows the behavior of a complex system agents to be modeled. Nowadays this technique is commonly used in biology and social sciences (Bonabeau 2002). An *agent* is an autonomous system located in a large-scale system with complex behavior patterns. This technique is considered as easy-to-use and aims at replicating the behavior of real-world systems. One of its main characteristics is that it is bottom-up oriented, i.e. the model start from the smallest components.

In the ABM, each agent incorporates its own model. Thus, each agent individually assesses its situation and makes locally its own decisions on the basis of a set of rules previously defined; additionally agents are able to communicate between them. Therefore, ABM provides information about the dynamics of interacting rule-based agents. Moreover, ABM is useful when an individual behavior is governed by nonlinearities and can be described by thresholds (if-then rules). Similarly, ABM observes aggregated activities for a population of agents. Some of the most common software tools to model Agent-Based Systems are: Comm-Aspen, EMCAS (Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System), JADE (Java Agent Development Environment), JACK (Java Applet Correctness Kit), LAMPS (Language for Agent-based Simulation of Processes and Scenarios).

Our research has led us to three different approaches. The first one is a hybrid modeling approach that integrates different methods with ABM to study the dynamics of coupled infrastructures. The second one integrates the ABM with Input-Output Interoperability models to illustrate the dynamics of resources in multiple infrastructures. The last one integrates ABM with Federated simulations.

¹⁰ SIR : Susceptible, Infectious and Removed. It is a dynamic model for infectious diseases.

¹¹ SIS: Susceptible, Infectious and Susceptible.

II.3.1 Object-Oriented Hybrid Modeling Approach

Object-oriented hybrid modeling approach has combined agent-based modeling techniques with classical methods. For instance, (Schläpfer, Kessler and Kröger 2008) combined the ABM techniques with Monte Carlo Simulation. This approach integrated the highly non-linear and time-dependent effects, and non-technical factors to develop a probabilistic reliability assessment that allowed the impact of load increase, and the non-supplied energy due to the operator response time to react to emergency events to be quantified. Each agent was modeled by its attributes and rules of behavior. Some of these agents included: loads, generators, transmission line objects and grid operator.

Another approach integrated network analyses (graph theory) for screening analysis¹². In addition, object-oriented methods detailed the operational dynamics modeling (Eusgeld, et al. 2009). Network analyses were used to identify hidden and obvious interdependencies. For this purpose, this approach used traditional indices as: path length, clustering coefficient, shortest paths, local and remote reliability efficiency.

Finally, a methodology that applies the Object-oriented hybrid modeling approach to study vulnerabilities between SCADA system and the Systems under controls was proposed in (Nan, Eusgeld and Kröger 2013). This methodology is composed of five major steps in order to investigate and analyze comprehensively the vulnerabilities due to interdependencies between two infrastructures. The steps are: *i*) preparatory phase: describe the systems, study the different methods, and approach models; *ii*) Screening analysis: identify vulnerabilities from topological analysis and empirical investigations using networks; *iii*) In-depth analysis: modeling SCADA and human operator errors with high-level architecture (HLA¹³) models, and in-depth experiments: substation, small network and whole network worse case levels are experimented. The main results for this step are the impact degree and the average service availability indices; *iv*) results assessment: interpretation of indices; *v*) Potential




Figure II:5 Overall SCADA model (Nan, Eusgeld and Kröger 2013)

¹² Screening Analysis: It means to screen the whole system searching for vulnerable, critical or important components to the system's security.

¹³ HLA: High level architecture from the IEEE Standard 1516.

technical improvements: propose several strategies to prevent the propagation of cascading failures due to interdependencies. Figure II:5 presents an overview of the SCADA model structure.

The main advantage of hybrid modeling is that this approach exploits the potential of AMBs and integrates its results with other powerful methods, enabling many other analyses to be done, including dynamical aspects. As well, many other infrastructures can be modeled, therefore it is not limited for power systems or ICT networks, but it can also model the human behavior.

However, ABMs have complex computational workloads, which are a well-known disadvantage of this approach that in this case also integrates other methods, particularly simulations. Thus, this is a major disadvantage to model large complex systems. Additionally, the model resulting from these approaches is only useful for the purpose for which it was built, therefore, this approach lacks of flexibility.

It is important to note that this approach highlights the need to study the topology of complex systems as a first step to identify critical vulnerabilities.

II.3.2 Agent-based input-output interdependency model

Agent-based input-output interdependency model is an integration of Input-Output Interoperability models (IIM)¹⁴ (Haimes and Jiang 2001) and ABMs (Oliva, Panzieri and Setola 2010). This approach is composed of two formulations:

- i)* The first formulation is a static agent-based IIM where each element interacts with other elements via the production, exchange and consumption of resources without directly exchanging interoperability. The result of this method is an AB-IIM dependency index that represents the cumulative effect of the resources received by each element on its operativeness.
- ii)* The second formulation is a dynamic agent-based IIM that engages the production, consumption and transmission/transportation of different resources.

This approach considers the production, consumption and transmission of resources (goods or services), therefore it can be used for a large number of infrastructures, including power systems, communication networks, oil distribution, among others.

Its main advantage is that this approach quantifies the impact of infrastructures unavailability in the operativeness of the other infrastructures. However, this method is difficult to apply because it requires a large amount of data that sometimes can be confidential. That is the reason why this approach relies on experts or stakeholders experience. Additionally, this approach does not evaluate the dynamical behavior of infrastructures.

II.3.3 Federated Agent-Based model

Federated Agent-Based model (FedABMS) is an integration of Agents-based modeling and Federated simulation (Casalicchio, Galli and Tucci 2007). The latter is a simulation technique that distributes the execution of the simulation model over a set of nodes.

ABM simulations give a high level infrastructures description, and the Federated simulations detail the infrastructures models. This environment allows the faults and congestions in the communi-

¹⁴ Input-output interoperability model (IIM) is a mechanism that aims at analyzing the cascading effects in critical infrastructures (Setola, de Porcellinis and Sforza 2009).

cation network to be simulated. The main indices obtained from the simulation were: time needed to resolve the crisis, time to rescue a wounded agent, number of rescued wounded agents, number of dead wounded agents, among others.

Further approaches included macro and micro agent-based modeling and simulation (Casalicchio, Galli and Tucci 2010).

- *The macro agent-based modeling and simulation:* represents each system as a single agent that offers and consumes services. Each system was simulated in a specific sector simulator. Each simulator shared the status and the services that it was providing or it needed. This architecture was implemented using FedABMS.
- *The micro agent-based modeling and simulation:* considers every single component or asset in each infrastructure to simulate the behavior of the whole system. In this simulation, every component was an agent.

These simulations were used to study transportation systems. But it enables as well the study of catastrophic scenarios in power systems and communication networks.

The main disadvantage of this approach is that more than a modeling approach, it is a simulation tool that uses Agent-based modeling. Therefore, many parameters are needed to each infrastructure and parallel simulations are needed to cope with the study of multiple coupled infrastructures.

However, these simulation approaches describe the dynamic of coupled infrastructures and are able to handle more than 3 infrastructures at the same time.

II.3.4 Advantages - Disadvantages

Agent-based models have been extensively used to model coupled infrastructures, as shown in this section. Particularly, this model has been used to complement other methods, such as Federated models, Monte Carlo simulations or functional simulations.

The main disadvantage of ABM is that requires parallel processing in order to model large and complex systems and to reduce the computational time needed to study these systems. However, this method has many advantages that highlight its usefulness.

ABM is able to model many different heterogeneous infrastructures and can include different factors such as natural hazards, institutional weaknesses, human behavior, physical laws, or security related issues. As well, it can include reliability aspects for Electric Power Systems and ICTs.

Because ABM has been widely used, there exist many robust platforms in multiples programming languages to visualize and analyze ABMs. Moreover, ABMs include time-dependent nonlinear phenomena into the simulation. As a result of this, ABMs demonstrates a close adherence to the reality of the coupled processes involved in simulations

The bottom-up oriented modeling allows large complex systems to be modeled, including many parameters from the smallest component to the whole system behavior. However, sometimes it could be difficult to model large complex systems, because the model may require a large number of parameters to improve the models accuracy.

The presented approaches reveal that ABM needs to be complemented with other methods in order to consider the whole behavior of coupled infrastructures. One of these proposed methods was the ‘Complex Network theory’, which can improve the screening analysis to identify weaknesses in coupled heterogeneous infrastructures.

II.4 Bayesian Networks (BN)

A Bayesian Network is a compact graphical representation that supports systems modeling, including random events, and it is based on the Bayes theorem (allows calculating the *a posteriori* probability as a function of *a priori* probabilities) (Biolini 2007).

Bayesian Network's nodes represent the propositional variables, and links represent the causal dependencies among the nodes, these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities (Pearl and Russell 2003).

Two main methods were identified in the literature, the first one evaluates the cause-effect interdependencies and the second one models the dynamics in coupled infrastructures.

II.4.1 Cause-Effect interdependencies

The structure of Bayesian Networks was used to illustrate the cause-effect interactions between ICT infrastructure and Power Systems (Tranchita, Hadjsaid, et al. 2010). This method mimicked causality and inference presented in both infrastructures in order to assess the power system risk as a result of cyber terrorism. The model was divided into four main phases (Tranchita 2008):

- *Identify the ICT attacking motivation*: Determine whether the attack is due to a political or religious situation, or to a terrorist activity. The motivation was divided into High, Medium and Low level.
- *Identify vulnerable resources*: It is important to detect the type of perpetrator, which could be either: an insider employee, an insider service provider, an outsider former-insider, an outsider professional hacker, or an outsider cybercriminal. The information availability was divided into: enough, regular or low, this variable is important since a terrorist with enough information to attack is more dangerous for critical infrastructures.
- *Quantify assets' vulnerability*: It was evaluated according to the geographical situation and to the physical protection of assets. This phase studied software, hardware and configuration vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities were divided into: Highly, averagely and lowly vulnerable. This phase was supported by a power flow analysis to study the system response to N-1 contingencies.
- *Determine the consequences for the power system operation*: The Power system damage was evaluated and classified in different levels of severity: low, medium, high and catastrophic. The possible functions executed to attack the infrastructures were evaluated, including: protection, control, monitoring, measurements and management.

This approach can be used to study power transmission and distribution systems with different attack scenario without considering the dynamic aspects. It can be used to quantify the consequences of targeted attacks to certain assets and to classify these consequences in different gravity levels.

Even if the application of this approach is easy, taking into account the diversity of tools available, this method relies on information that is not always available and most of the times have to be obtained from experts and operators experience and knowledge.

On the other hand, usually, the computing time needed to compute this method is very short even if it is dealing with multiple infrastructures. Additionally, this approach can consider the impact of many different heterogeneous infrastructures in the risk analysis of power systems; however, it depends on probabilistic information that is not always reliable and the results will be focused in only

one infrastructure.

II.4.2 Dynamic Bayesian Networks

The Dynamic Bayesian Network formalism was used to model critical infrastructures (Di Giorgio and Liberati 2012). The analysis was divided into three levels: atomic event level, propagation level and services level. Atomic level is related to the association of random variables to possible adverse events. Propagation level models the interdependencies among and within infrastructures, some of the subsystems involved are: electric transmission network, SCADA feeder, and SCADA system. Services level involves the operators and control centers. A graphical representation of the Dynamic Bayesian Network is presented in Figure II:6.

The proposed methodology was divided into the following steps:

- Identification of relevant services.
- Identification of main devices and functions needed to deliver the services to the end-user.
- Identification of common devices among different services.
- Localization of devices in the grid topology to study the geographical interdependencies.
- Identification of random variables of possible events in the atomic level and evaluation of possible effects on propagation level.
- Study of temporal interdependencies in the Dynamic Bayesian Network.

Three different analyses can be performed based on this approach: reliability study, adverse event spreading and forecasting. Nevertheless, the main advantage of this method is that it is able to model different failure modes and allows the impact of those failures to be quantified, taking into account dynamic simulations. Additionally, this approach can be scalable to larger infrastructures. However, the dynamic simulations are not continuous, but static model assessments in discrete time steps.

Another disadvantage of this approach is that it relies on data from literature, historical events or domain-experts opinion. Therefore, the accuracy of results depends on the parameters that it uses, which may not be very reliable. In fact, in order to improve the accuracy, this approach needs a large number of parameters, but these parameters can increase the computational complexity.




Figure II:6 Overall Dynamic Bayesian Network (Di Giorgio and Liberati 2012)

II.4.3 Advantages - Disadvantages

Based on the studied approaches, it can be seen that Bayesian Networks are used mostly to quantify the consequences and the impact of failures in coupled heterogeneous infrastructures. However, one limitation is the increased computation complexity when n -infrastructures are added in the model and many other parameters are taken into account. But at the same time, BN can be used for scalable and dynamic systems.

BN are easy-to-use and there exists many user-friendly platforms to model Bayes Networks, from toolboxes (BayesNET for Matlab, blearn for R, SMILE for C++) to dedicated software (Hugin, Netica or Elvira). Nevertheless, BN requires input data that most of the times is difficult to obtain due to either very restraint policies of confidentiality or lack of historical data. In such cases, only the data from experts opinions can be used, which affects the accuracy of results.

II.5 Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes

Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) is a formalism that integrates the main advantages of fault-trees and markov models (Bouissou and Bon 2003). It, thus, allows dynamic complex systems to be modeled. Its objective is to solve the problem of combinatorial explosion in the classic methods for complex systems modeling. Therefore, this method adds a new kind of links that include sequences and dependencies modeling by activating sub-fault trees. In addition, the fault-tree's leaves are modeled as markov processes. Figure II:7 shows a representation of BDMP for a system with cascading standby redundancies.

BDMP enables different attack scenarios to be modeled, e.g. an attack to take the ownership of a Remote Access Server connected to a dial-in modem (Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou 2010). The detail level of the model can be chosen. In addition, due to the dynamic property of markov models, many indices can be assessed. For instance, “mean time to attack step realization,” “mean time to breach,” “mean effort to security failure,” “unavailability rate,” and “unavailability/year,” among others.




Figure II:7 BDMP Representation (Bouissou n.d.)

This approach allows three fundamental aspects to be simulated: *i)* power systems safety; *ii)* systems security facing attack scenarios; and *iii)* interactions between safety and security, thus many accidental and intentional attacks can be modeled (Piètre-Cambacédès 2010).

The main advantage of this approach is that it is able to model targeted attacks on power systems taking into account dynamic aspects. For instance, BDMP was used to model the Stuxnet Attack (Kriaa, Bouissou and Piètre-Cambacédès 2012). This approach was implemented by EDF and the resulting platform is called KB3, which is a robust platform that can deal with a large number of parameters. Additionally, it is largely used for industrial usage.

However, it is not able to model the loss of elements during the simulation and presents difficulties to model cyclic behaviors. In addition, there exists only one platform able to simulate the BDMP, therefore there is a lack of availability of tools to develop this approach.

II.6 Combined Simulators

Several simulation tools for power systems, communication networks, and circuits can be found in the market, including PSCAD, DigSILENT, PSAT, Eurostag, OMNET++ and NS3. Nevertheless, due to infrastructure interdependencies there is a need of more realistic simulation platforms. As a result, new platforms integrate power system's behavior, control center commands, communication networks, information technologies and likely cyber-physical critical events. This is possible after integrating dedicated software tools that simulate in parallel different infrastructures. Some of these combined simulators are summarized in this section. Only their main properties and advantages will be discussed in this section, because these simulators are not open-access and in these conditions it is difficult to provide a deep comparison.

II.6.1 Cosimulator for Transport and Distribution systems

A combined simulator was proposed by (Rozel, et al. 2008) and developed by Grenoble Institute of Technology/G2ELAB - France. The combined simulator is composed of three dedicated software tools and it is used to dynamically demonstrate the effect of failures among infrastructures, taking into account their interdependencies and interplays. Each software tool simulates the behavior of each infrastructure (electrical, telecommunication and information).

Figure II:8 shows the architecture of the co-simulator for transport systems. It is composed of three main parts: the electrical infrastructure simulator, telecommunication infrastructure simulator and control center simulator (Merdassi, et al. 2012).




Figure II:8 Combined Simulator (Rozel, et al. 2008)




Figure II:9 Cosimulator Architecture

The Electrical infrastructure is simulated using PSAT, which is a Matlab Toolbox for electrical networks analysis. The software tool simulates the power systems' dynamic behavior, including power flow, optimal power flow, power compensation, dynamic stability and automatic under-frequency load shedding, among others.

Telecommunication infrastructure is simulated using Simpy/Python. It sends measures data from the RTUs in substations and power plants to the control centers. In addition, it ensures the control data delivery from control center to RTUs and actuators. This model includes routers, links, bandwidths, routing tables, latency characteristics, and error rates.

The Control Center is simulated using the numerical framework of Matlab. This control center provides commands according to the state of the system and likely failure events. In addition, it receives voltage alarms from the measurement system and sends commands to RTUs and other actuators.

This simulator is able to simulate the impact of failures on power systems and telecommunication infrastructures. For instance, (B. Rozel 2009) used this co-simulator to develop three scenarios: *i*) normal state system; *ii*) N-1 contingency case in the electrical infrastructure; *iii*) an N-1 electric contingency caused by a telecommunication failure.

During the SINARI Project, the Cosimulator for Distribution Systems was developed, the resulting architecture is detailed in Figure II:9, this simulator integrates Matlab (for the power system), NS2 (for the communications network) and the control center is modeled in Java (Caire, Sanchez and Hadjsaid 2013). This co-simulator is able to perform the simulation of remote commands, load-shedding commands from the control center and studies of short-circuit event (including localization, islanding and restoration) (Caire, Sanchez and Hadjsaid 2013).

The main advantage of these cosimulators is that they were developed using general purpose programming languages in standard software. Therefore, users are capable of modifying easily the simulation and components parameters.

II.6.2 Real-time Cosimulator

This cosimulator models the real-time interactions of ICT systems with power grid and the transmission operator (Stefanov and Liu 2012). In addition, this simulator considers cyber-attacks at




Figure II:10 Cyber-physical power system architecture (Stefanov and Liu 2012)

the cyber layer and quantifies the impact on the power system layer. The simulator integrates dedicated software, according to the infrastructure, including: DIgSILENT Power Factory, Matlab Simulink (SimEvents toolbox) and Matrikon OPC Server.

Their modeling is divided into three steps (see Figure II:10):

- Power grid simulation using DIgSILENT.
- ICT system simulation for the SCADA system: It combines Matlab/Simulink with OPC and SimEvents toolboxes to model the SCADA system, including IEDs, RTUS, HMIs, and other control assets using the queuing theory. The power layer is simulated as a continuous time system and the cyber layer as a discrete time system. The transmission operator is implemented with industrial software.
- Enable the communication among layers: the exchange of information among layers is simulated using Matrikon OPC Server.

Different attack scenarios were simulated using this co-simulator (Liu, et al. 2012). The first case simulated an attack by an intruder that opens a circuit breaker in two substations. The second case simulated the intrusion and data integrity attack.

The main advantage of this simulator is that it takes into account a large number of parameters and integrates industrial software for its real-time simulations. In addition, substation and power transmission systems can be modeled with its corresponding ICT networks.

II.6.3 Federate-based Simulator

A hybrid simulator for power systems and ICT is a modular cosimulator that reflects the real-time performance of power systems taking into account the different operation power system levels (bay, station and RCC) (Müller, et al. 2012).

The Bay Level is simulated using DIgSILENT Power Factory and the OPC server using Matrikon OPC Server; the Substation level and control center are simulated High Level Architecture (HLA) federates on JAVA and their models are based on IEC 61850. The entire communication network is simulated with OPNET and based on IEC 61850.




Figure II:11 Hybrid simulator components (Müller, et al. 2012)

The originality of this cosimulator is that it performs the simulation at different levels, according to the IEC 61850, i.e. simulation at bay level, substation level. This discrimination of levels allows the smart-grids applications to be analyzed and studied through real-time simulations.

An advantage of using HLA Federates is that this simulator can be easily adaptable to other models (software), for instance, to model the behavior of electric cars.

II.6.4 Agent-based simulation tool: EPOCHS

The **E**lectric **P**ower and **C**ommunication **s**ynch**R**onizing **S**imulator integrates three simulators: PSCAD/EMTDC an electromagnetic simulator, PSLF and electromechanical transient simulator, and NS2 a communication simulator (Hopkinson, et al. 2006). However, their goal is not to develop real-time simulations, but to build a simulator that predicts the likely behavior of power grids.

This agent-based simulator contains five main components (see Figure II:12): a PSCAD/EMTDC to simulate power scenarios in continuous time with a graphical interface. A PSLF or Positive Sequence Load Flow software is used to simulate large electromechanical systems. NS2 used to simulate communication protocols under stress conditions. AgentHQ is a unified environment




Figure II:12 EPOCHS components (Hopkinson, et al. 2006)

to help components interaction. An RTI is used to control the simulation synchronization and the routing of communication between EPOCHS components.

This simulator allows different scenarios to be tested in the power system and the communication system. In the case of power system, the tripping lines, transient instability, back-up protection, remote load shedding are tested. On the other hand, for the communication network the network traffic and the delay in routers can be simulated.

Nevertheless, this simulator does not run real-time simulations and it could have several errors because NS2 is a discrete event simulator, and PSCAD is a continuous time simulator, so its accuracy may be affected by the selection of the time steps and the synchronization.

II.6.5 Advantages - Disadvantages

Cosimulator is the most accurate method to model the dynamic events on coupled infrastructures in real-time. However, it has several limitations due to interoperability challenges among dedicated software. For that reason, several co-simulators are Agents-based, in order to manage the interoperability and the events synchronization.

Cosimulators can be used as a validation mean of new vulnerability methods of coupled infrastructures, such as Agent-Based modeling, Bayesian Networks or Complex Networks modeling.

Most of the presented approaches use off-the-shelf software that is not always available or are very uncommon. For that reason, several research laboratories are developing their own cosimulators according to their own objectives.

Scalability, accessibility to tools and usability are closely linked to the dedicated software for each approach.

II.7 Petri Networks (PN)

Petri Network (PN) is a tool developed by Carl Adam Petri in 1962 (Petri 1962). PNs were developed to study concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, non-deterministic, and/or stochastic systems (Murata 1989). PNs are widely used to model production plants, power systems (Ramos, et al. 2010) and computer networks (Intech 2010). A PN is a bipartite graph that comprises nodes and arcs. Nodes are divided into places and transitions, whereas the first represents the states, the latter simulates the events that allow moving from one state to another. Arcs connect places with transitions and vice-versa. Tokens show graphically the availability of places, they are represented by dots inside the places. Firing a transition consists in moving the token from one place to another. There exist several tools to model PNs, such as PetriNet Tool box for Matlab, CPN Tools, Artifex, among others.

This section presents four different approaches developed to model coupled infrastructures based on Petri Networks.



Figure II:13 Petri Net Representation

II.7.1 Attack/Defense modeling

Cyber-net model integrates the attack/defense systems of cyber and power system in order to study the impact of a cyber-attack (directed or intelligent¹⁵) on SCADA systems (Ten, Liu and Manimaran 2008). This approach modeled the access points to SCADA Systems and the intrusions on SCADA systems.

Three indices were assessed: scenario vulnerability whether the substation has or has not a load and generation; access point vulnerability composed of a firewall model and a password model; and the impact factor evaluation based on the loss of load assessment. The cyber-net based on substation with load and generation is presented in Figure II:14.

The major originality of this approach is the inclusion of cyberattacks probabilities. These probabilities depend on the communications network architecture in substations. In addition, it can quantify the impact of these attacks. Some of the main indices used to quantify the attacks are: loss of load (LOL), loss of information, economic loss and equipment damage.

However, this approach has many disadvantages. First, computation times can easily increase when incorporating several substations (n -infrastructures). Consequently, this approach is not able to handle a large amount of data. Secondly, it studies the impact of communication networks failures on power systems, and not the impact of power systems failures on ICT networks. Third, this approach is dependent on the scenario and events evaluated. Thus, for every different scenario a whole new model has to be built.

Additionally, in order to evaluate correctly the cyberattacks, it needs complete statistical data that does not exist yet. Finally, this approach does not include dynamic aspects.




Figure II:14 Cyber-net of Substation (Ten, Liu and Manimaran 2008)

¹⁵ Directed Attacks are attacks with short term effects; intelligent attacks are well-planned and can trigger cascading effects.

II.7.2 “High-level” and “Low-level” Petri Nets

This approach proposed a construction method to study cyber-physical attacks on Smart Grids. It divides the petri net modeling in two levels: “Low level” and “High level” Petri Nets (Chen, Sanchez Aarnoutse and Buford 2011). The “low level” corresponds to detailed single models for specific types of attacks, e.g. physical attacks on smart meters or cyber-attacks on substations. The “high level” is a high level abstraction of the system.

The first step to construct the Petri Net is to create a “low level” Petri Net for each type of attack; in this step the experts’ opinion in the domain is needed. The second step consists in building the “High level” Petri Net, but only the places, ignoring the transitions. These transitions are defined in the third step. The identical places are matched between the “low level” and the “high level.” Finally, the fifth step uses the results from the fourth step to expand the “high-level” petri net. Figure II:15 illustrates some of the main steps for a Substation case.

The main originality is to create special transitions, i.e. a cyber-transition, physical transition and cyber/physical transition. In addition, due to the separation of levels, this model could handle large and complex systems. However, the model relies on data supplied by experts, which may have an important impact on the results.

Unfortunately, this methodology has not been applied yet. Therefore, there are no proofs that indicate that this approach is indeed fast, reliable or accurate.

II.7.3 SWN and SAN integration

This model divides the functioning of power systems and information infrastructures into two models, one dedicated to the structure of the power system and the other one concentrates on the behavior of the control system (Beccuti, et al. 2012).

Stochastic Well-formed net (SWN) is a high level Stochastic Petri Net formalism (Chiola, et al. 1993). The tokens may have colors and the transitions could be triggered either immediately or after a delay. It was used to model several types of attacks, e.g. Denial-of-Service attack.

Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) is another high level Petri Net formalism (Sanders and Meyer 2001). It is formed by places, activities, input gates and output gates. It was used to model the impact of attacks on Power Systems, e.g. the account of an electrical component loss.




Figure II:15 “Hierarchical” Petri Nets (Chen, Sanchez Aarnoutse and Buford 2011)

Different performance indices that describe the impact of critical attacks can be created from the integration of both methods. Some of these indices are “Unsatisfied Demand” and “Percentage of Unsatisfied demand.” In addition, many failures can be considered, mainly DoS attacks.

The originality of this method lies in the integration of two high-level formalisms for Petri Nets. This integration allows the consequences of cyberattacks to be quantified using performance indices and taking into account the randomness of failure events in coupled infrastructures. A wide variety of scenarios can be analyzed with this approach, which is agent-based.

The scope of this approach is the study of DoS attacks, including the spread speed and the quantification of the dynamic consequences. However, the dynamic aspects are only addressed in discrete time simulations and a combinatorial explosion could limit the ability to model large complex system.

II.7.4 Intrusion detection on Cyber Physical Systems

This approach studies the effect of intrusion detection systems on the reliability of cyber physical systems, e.g. sensors, actuators and control units, in a context wherein energy replenishment is not possible (Mitchell and Chen 2013). This approach is based on stochastic petri nets, which models semi-Markov processes with a state representation.

The main originality is that in this approach, the system’s nodes are modeled as tokens, and not as places. This approach is specialized in intrusion detection and response systems and allows the mean time to failure (MTTF) to be computed, taking into account the cyber-vulnerabilities at different layers.

However it does not take into account the power system dynamics. In fact, it is mostly a communication networks security analysis than a multi-infrastructure analysis. In addition, this modeling is exposed to the state explosion problem due to the quantity of tokens needed for large systems.

Also, this method can be used maximum for two coupled infrastructures where one of them is the Communications Network.

II.7.5 Advantages - Disadvantages

Petri Networks are a powerful method to model complex sequential processes. However, many applications and developments have arisen in order to model complex dynamic systems, such as Power Systems and Computer networks.

However, PN were not created to model large systems and its main limitation is the state explosion, making it very difficult to use them to model complex coupled heterogeneous infrastructures.

The main advantage of PN is that it can model discrete and continuous time systems, considering stochastic and timed transitions. In addition, thanks to the last developments, petri networks can be used as modules. Nevertheless, the level of maturity for these purposes is still very low.

II.8 Comparison and Conclusion

This chapter provides a comprehensive state-of-the art of modeling approaches and methods to solve the emerging challenges of interdependent coupled infrastructures. As the reader may notice, most of the explored literature is recent. When starting the SINARI project, the State-of-the-art that was prepared and published at that time was very different from the one presented in this chapter (see (Merdassi, et al. 2012)).

Agent-Based models can model dynamically multiple interacting systems with complex behaviors. ABMs have a high-level flexibility and describe the system from its components' perspective. However this model lacks efficiency for large systems due to long computation times (sometimes more than 50 hours). In addition, ABMs are difficult to code, which make them difficult to use.

Bayesian Networks model random events, which allow measuring the gravity and the consequences of attacks, and the spreading of adverse events. They also offer a graphical representation of the modeled system. However, this model relies on accurate probability data from experts, which sometimes is difficult to find.

The BDMP allows modeling attack scenarios and creating several indices to rank the attacks. It is mostly dedicated to perform risk analysis. In addition, it performs several combinations of failures in order to study the role of each component in the failure. However, BDMP presents some difficulties when modeling cyclic behaviors.

The combined simulator allows modeling dynamic events on integrated infrastructures; it is the closest model to real systems. In fact, it could serve as a reference model to compare the other methods since it is easy-to-use due to the module property. However, it is highly resource demanding which should be limited to verify results and most of the studied cosimulators do not simulate in real-time.

The Petri Networks allow modeling cascades in dynamic systems and measuring the impact of the cascading events on critical infrastructures. However this model shows a lack of flexibility for large systems and each scenario demands a different model configuration.

Complex Networks showed that they are capable and suitable to model and to reflect the topological properties of large complex systems; however they have not been completely exploited to study interdependent critical infrastructures. In the next chapters, we will introduce a novel approach, using Complex Networks, to model critical interdependent infrastructures.

In summary, these methods have mainly focused on dynamic events assuming attack scenarios. However, it is needed to select the most critical components that could start a cascading or an emergent failure that could damage the critical infrastructure, i.e. a better approximation to the screening




Figure II:16 Methods comparison

methods. Moreover, the most critical component and weakest elements in the system may emerge from the interface of critical infrastructures. Another disadvantage is that these methods are unsuitable to manage large systems to overcome the state explosion problem and there are still some processing capacity limitations.

A method comparison is not completely possible, due to the unlike objectives of each model. Furthermore, there is not a global model that covers the complex world of interdependencies and vulnerabilities of Critical infrastructures. Figure II:16 plots a comparative diagram, taking into account six aspects:

- CPU time: This aspect describes the computation complexity, the memory and process requirement. A grade from 1 to 5, where 1 represents an expensive and slow performance and 5 represents a fast process.
- Usability: This aspect joints different characteristics, including the easiness to model and the flexibility to model heterogeneous systems. 1 for a difficult to apply method and 5 for an easy-to-use method.
- Tools Accessibility: It evaluates the availability of tools that can compute or simulate heterogeneous coupled infrastructures. 1 if there are no available tools and 5 if there are many options.
- Dynamic simulations: This aspects gives a grade of 1 if this method is not able to model dynamic aspects (or it have not been applied yet), and 5 if it already considers dynamic events.
- Large systems modeling: This aspect reports a grade of 1 if the method is not able to handle large complex systems and 5 if it is completely developed to handle these systems.
- Scalability: It considers the ability to change in size or scale, it means, a model can be easily expanded to include other components or parameters without requiring a complete change of the model. A grade of 1 is assigned if it is not possible and a grade of 5 if the model is scalable across a large range of changes.

The grades were assigned taking into consideration the exposed approaches and several state-of-the-art found in the literature, including (Merdassi, et al. 2012), (Kröger and Zio 2011), (Galli 2010), (Ouyang 2013), (Cheminod, Durante and Valenzano 2013).

CHAPTER III

Vulnerability and Interdependencies: Modeling

*We live in a society exquisitely dependent on science and technology,
in which hardly anyone knows anything about science and technology*

Carl Sagan

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Abstract

Power systems and ICTs interdependencies request innovative and revolutionary methods, built on new ideas that aim at identifying weaknesses and critical components that can fail and create many other failures either by cascading, common-mode or escalating. One possible approach to understand critical infrastructures' vulnerabilities is to study their topologies and to quantify their physical and cyber interdependencies. This chapter presents an introduction to Complex Networks and proposes two approaches to model coupled infrastructures' interdependencies: a topologic-driven approach and an eigensystem analysis. The former evaluates complex-weighted graphs to assess the main topological indices. The latter, evaluates the adjacency matrix as a Hermitian Matrix in the Hilbert Space to study the Eigenspectral of the coupled system. Few simple examples are shown to exemplify its use.

III.1 Introduction

Electric Power Systems (EPS) and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) reveal strong interdependencies among their components as explored in CHAPTER I. For that reason, many methods and algorithms have been developed to study these interdependencies and to ensure high levels of reliability, availability and security of critical infrastructures. Some of these methods are summarized in the state-of-the-art presented in CHAPTER II. One of the main outcomes in CHAPTER II is that there is either a need for a strong improvement and upgrade of these methods or a need for a new one. This Chapter aims at solving this challenge using 'Complex Networks Theory', considering that a major and critical objective is to identify failure initiating events on interdependent coupled infrastructures, i.e. the identification of components that are very likely to initiate a failure.

'Complex Networks' (or graph theory) is a very promising method according to different publications (Merdassi, et al. 2012), (Kröger and Zio 2011). In this dissertation, it is strongly believed that the topology of coupled infrastructures influences on their behavior of the whole system. Therefore, the study of the structure of coupled infrastructures may help to understand the way each component affects the function of the whole coupled system. These beliefs are supported by several studies in different sciences. For instance, the study of the WWW topology (Albert, Jeong and Barabasi 2000), the Internet (Yook, Jeong and Barabasi 2002), the cellular networks (Jeong, et al. 2000), among others (Albert and Barabasi 2002).

The final objective of this Chapter is to answer the question: How to construct a common-model for coupled infrastructures, taking into account their topological characteristics, enabling to differentiate their own communication patterns (the modes of communication), but at the same time being flexible in the way it could be used to study n -infrastructures' interdependencies.

Power Systems are known to be very robust; the origin of this robustness was identified thanks to the use of complex networks theory. (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003) discovered that most of the complex systems have a scale-free characteristic that increase their robustness against random attacks or random failures. However, the Achilles' heel of complex systems is that most of them rely on few nodes (called *Hubs*), it has already been demonstrated that the removal of key hubs generates a general failure of the system (Wang and Guanrong 2003). In the case of Electric Power Systems, it has already been demonstrated that the breakdown of a single targeted components is sufficient to collapse the

entire system (Crucitti, Latora and Marchiori 2004).

This Chapter proposes and analyzes two main approaches: a topologic-driven analysis and an Eigenspectral Analysis. The former modifies the main properties of ‘Complex Networks’ to study the structure of coupled infrastructures. The latter applies the theory of Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert Space to study the spectrum of multi-level ‘Complex Networks.’ The basis of the proposed approaches will be explained in detail throughout this Chapter and the application of the proposed approaches is presented in CHAPTER IV. These approaches are considered as “High level” description models, CHAPTER V will present the “Low level” description model.

This Chapter is organized as follows:

- Section III.2 briefly introduces the Complex Networks and their relations with graph theory.
- Section III.3 presents some notions on complex networks that support the proposed approaches. It includes the definition of terms such as: node-degree, betweenness centrality, efficiency, Graph Spectra, Hilbert spaces and Hermitian matrices.
- Section III.4 introduces the topologic and spectral approaches developed in order to evaluate the interdependencies of coupled infrastructures.
- Section III.5 presents a summary of the Chapter, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approaches.

III.2 From Graph Theory to Complex Networks

It is common to misuse the terms **Graph Theory** and **Complex Networks**. Even if the term *Network* exists in graph theory, *Network* is referred as any real system that can be described by means of graphs. Thus, the term *Graph* is used whenever talking about mathematical properties. *Graph Theory* is the body of principles and theorems that revolve around graphs. *Complex Networks* is the field that describes, using the Graph Theory, the networks whose structure is irregular, complex, and dynamically evolving in time, e.g. Social and biological Networks (Caldarelli 2007).

The history of Complex Networks (and Graph Theory) begins in the 18th century, when Leonhard Euler solved the enigmatic seven bridges of Königsberg problem using what is called the ‘foundations of the Graph Theory’ (Euler 1741). The problem was born in the capital of East Prussia: Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia), where people wondered if all seven bridges connecting the town could be traversed, without passing any of them twice. In order to solve this problem, Euler emphasizes the topological structure importance, he realized that this problem could be represented and simplified into a graph, with nodes (parts of the town) and arcs (the bridges), as in Figure III:1. It was the




Figure III:1 The 7 bridges of Königsberg

first time that a scientist introduced the notions of Graphs.

Since its origin, the Graph Theory has been evolving thanks to the computerization of data acquisition and the availability of high computing power. Figure III:2 shows the Evolution of Complex Networks and the Evolution of Computers, it can be seen that it was until the computing power was developed, the Graph theory evolved significantly.

In 1959, the Hungarian Mathematicians Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi developed the *Random Graphs Theory* (Erdős and Rényi 1959). Nevertheless, at this time the Computer Science was unable to develop complex simulations and to verify their hypothesis. They endeavored to find the typical systems structure at a given stage of evolution (Erdős and Rényi 1960), so they suggested that such networks could be modeled by connecting their nodes with random distributed links. Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi found that, in this *random graph*, the node-degree followed a Poisson distribution with a bell shape (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003). However, this theory fails to describe many real-world networks, such as Internet, Power Grids, and Social communication networks. Even Erdős and Rényi remarked the following:

“...Of course, if one aims at describing such a real situation, one should replace the hypothesis of equiprobability of all connection by some more realistic hypothesis.”

– (Erdős and Rényi 1960)




Figure III:2 From Graph Theory to Complex Networks vs. Computers Timeline

Nevertheless, their studies motivated a great amount of work on the field. One of them made by Watts and Strogatz; they introduced the *Small-World Network* concept (Watts and Strogatz 1998). In order to understand this concept, it is important to be acquainted with the Milgram Experiment, developed in 1967 by the American psychologist Stanley Milgram, who aims at answering the question: “Starting with any two people in the world, what is the probability that they will know each other?” In order to solve it, he sent hundreds of letters to people in Nebraska asking them to forward the correspondence to acquaintances that might be able to shepherd it closer to a target recipient: a stockbroker in Boston. The result of this experiment was that there is a mean distance of six people between the first person in Nebraska and the stockbroker in Boston, i.e. six degrees (Milgram 1967). This experiment corroborates the original idea of Frigyes Karinthy, a Hungarian author who mentioned this hypothesis in one of his stories: *Chains* (Láncszemek) and called it: ‘Six-degrees of Separation.’

Another concept was created at the end of the XXth century by Albert-Lazlo Barabási and Reka Albert: the *scale-free networks* (Barabási and Albert 1999). These networks are characterized by having few nodes that have many connections (hubs) and many nodes have very few link connections (Wang and Guanrong 2003). For instance, Erdős is one of the largest hubs in the mathematics community, especially in the networks science community. In fact, the well-known Erdős Number was created to describe the distance between any person and Erdős, measured by papers’ authorship.


Therefore, one of the main characteristics of scale-free networks is its robustness against accidental failures but, at the same time, a significant vulnerability to coordinated attacks (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003). For instance, Figure III:3 shows three different cases. Firstly, a random network where there is a random failure, the connectivity in this case is not affected. The second figure shows a scale-free graph where a random attack does not impact the whole system. However, the third case shows a targeted (and successful attack) where the system is divided in two sub-systems.

Additionally, Scale-free networks have another property: the *preferential attachment* characteristic, which means that new nodes are more likely to create a link with the hubs in the network. In social networks this preferential attachment is influenced by the reputation or by the popularity. A person with high reputation is more likely to have an influence in the network.


Nowadays, ‘Complex Networks’ are used in many areas and deeper investigations have led to many more questions about the nature of complex systems and the use of ‘Complex Networks’ to model large systems. Consequently, many laboratories are dedicated to study their properties and how to effectively model complex systems. Some of these laboratories are:

- Barabasilab - USA: www.barabasilab.com
- ISI Foundation – Italy: www.isi.it
- Réseau National des Systèmes Complexes – France: <http://www.rnsc.fr>
- Complex Systems and Networks lab - Spain : <http://cosnet.bifi.es>

Random Network, Accidental Node Failure



Scale-Free Network, Accidental Node Failure



Scale-Free Network, Attack on Hubs




Figure III.3 Robustness of Random and Scale Free Networks (Barabási and Bonabeu 2003)

III.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This section summarizes the ‘Complex Networks’ theory needed to understand the proposed approaches, including definitions, algorithms and usages. Extra-information is provided in Appendix A. Additionally, the networks in Figure III:4-i and Figure III:4-ii will be used in order to illustrate this theory.



Figure III:4 Demonstration graphs

III.3.1 Notations of Complex Networks

Complex Networks are composed of *vertices* (or nodes) and *edges* (or links). The former represents system’s elements such as buses, routers, airports or people. The latter represents the connections, dependencies or relations between vertices; these connections can be physical, logical or functional. Some common edges include: power lines, optical fibers, flight itineraries and friendship.

A graph \mathcal{G} is a pair of sets $(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$. Let $\mathcal{V} \equiv \{v_1, v_2, v_3, \dots, v_n\}$ be the set of vertices and n the number of vertices. While $\mathcal{E} \equiv \{e_1, e_2, e_3, \dots, e_m\}$ is the set of edges between the vertices and m is the number of edges.

A graph can be directed or undirected. If edges have an associated direction, the graph is called *directed graph*, otherwise the graph is called *undirected graph*. Additionally, both graphs are assumed to lack of self-loops and multiple parallel edges (see Figure III:5).

III.3.1.1 Adjacency Matrix

A graph can be represented by an $n \times n$ matrix \mathcal{A} , called adjacency (or connectivity) matrix; where every row and column represents a vertex in the graph. For undirected graphs, its entry a_{hj} is 1 if there exists an edge between the h th and j th vertices and 0 otherwise, in this case the \mathcal{A} matrix is symmetrical ($a_{hj}=a_{jh}$). For directed graphs the entry a_{hj} is 1 if there exists an edge from h to j , and 0 otherwise, in this case, the \mathcal{A} matrix is asymmetrical.

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_{nj} & \dots & a_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.1})$$

For the case of the graph in Figure III:4-i the adjacency matrix is presented in (III.2).

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.2})$$




Figure III.5 Undirected and Directed graphs

Also, for the case of the graph in Figure III.4-ii, the adjacency matrix is presented in (III.3).

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.3})$$

III.3.1.2 Weight Matrix

There is also a so-called $n \times n$ Weight matrix \mathcal{W} , whose entry w_{hj} is the weight associated to the edge connecting nodes h and j . This weight represents the capacity, the influence, the importance or the intensity of the connections. For instance, for Electric Power Systems this weight could be associated to the admittance of each line, or for transportation systems the weight could be the transport capacity. It is largely used to solve NP-complete or NP-hard problems in Operations Research discipline (Chvatal 1983). In graph theory, it is used to assess the shortest paths or the optimal paths.

$$\mathcal{W} = \begin{bmatrix} w_{1j} & \cdots & w_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ w_{nj} & \cdots & w_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.4})$$

III.3.1.3 Path length, Geodesic and Diameter

Path length is the number of hops or the distance between two nodes. A *geodesic path* (σ_{hj}) is defined as the shortest or optimal path between two vertices and depends on whether the graph is weighted or not. The geodesic is assessed using the \mathcal{W} matrix if the graph is weighted and its shortest path is called the *optimal path*; otherwise, the geodesic is calculated using the \mathcal{A} matrix. Many algorithms were developed to find the geodesic paths, including Dijkstra and Bellman, among others (Cormen, et al. 2001). The path length is considered the base of the graph theory and the linear programming transport problems.

The *diameter* is the maximum value of $\sigma_{hj} \forall h, j \in \mathcal{V}$. It characterizes the system and could quan-

tify the vulnerability of the system. For instance, a power grid that has the source and the load far from each other is more vulnerable than one with the source close to the loads, as analyzed in Section I.3.2. For the case of the graph in Figure III:4-i, the diameter is 3. Also, the diameter is 3 for the graph in Figure III:4-ii.

III.3.1.4 Node Degree

The node importance (or prestige for Social Networks) is characterized by the *node degree* (or connectivity) that is the number of inbound and outbound connections. The degree k_h of a node h is defined in terms of the adjacency matrix \mathcal{A} , for undirected graphs, as shown in (III.5) (Boccaletti, et al. 2006). Node degrees for the undirected graph presented in Figure III:4-i are shown in Table III:1.

$$k_h = \sum_{j \in V} a_{hj} \quad (III.5)$$

For directed graphs, the node degree has two components: *In-degree* (k_h^{in}) and *Out-degree* (k_h^{out}). The former is the number of ingoing links. The latter is the number of outgoing links. Mathematically these degrees are assessed using (III.6) and (III.7), respectively. In the case of the graph in Figure III:4-ii, results are shown in Table III:2.

$$k_h^{in} = \sum_{j \in V} a_{hj} \quad (III.6)$$

$$k_h^{out} = \sum_{j \in V} a_{jh} \quad (III.7)$$

The degree distribution $P(k)$ exposes the network statistical properties, the structure of the graph and the probability that a node has a degree k or the fraction of nodes having degree k . For directed graphs there are two distributions, one for each component $P(k^{in})$ and $P(k^{out})$.

III.3.1.5 Betweenness Centrality

The network nature influences the importance of the edges and/or vertices in the network. Such nature is influenced by the topological position of each component in the network with reference to its connectivity. Centrality indices quantify this importance (Cohen and Havlin 2010). One of these indices is the *Betweenness Centrality*, given by (III.8). This index is used in urban growth, resilience, sociology and other studies; in addition, it recognizes bottlenecks and important edges/vertices in a network (Freeman 1977).

Table III:1 Node degrees undirected graph

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
k_h	1	3	2	1	3	2

Table III:2 Node degrees directed graph

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
k_h^{in}	0	1	1	1	2	1
k_h^{out}	1	2	1	0	1	1

Table III:3 Node Betweenness Centrality

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
$b(l)$ (Undir)	0	10	2	0	10	2
$b(l)$ (Dir)	0	4	2	0	4	2

Table III:4 Edge Betweenness Centrality

Edge	1-2	2-3	3-6	2-5	5-4	6-5
$b(e)$ (Undir)	10	8	6	12	10	8
$b(e)$ (Dir)	5	4	3	4	5	4

$$b(l) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{hj}(l)}{\sigma_{hj}} \quad (\text{III.8})$$

σ_{hj} is the total number of shortest paths between h and j , and $\sigma_{hj}(l)$ is the number of shortest paths between h and j that passes through the node l .

In comparison with the node degree, the betweenness Centrality not only assigns a high importance level to hubs, but also identifies critical interconnecting nodes and edges. For instance, according to the node degree the nodes 5 and 7 are the most important nodes in the graph presented in Figure III:6. However, it is clear that node 6 is vital for the communication of the two clusters. Thus, after assessing the Betweenness Centrality, node 6 is almost as important as nodes 5 and 7. In Figure III:6 the node size represents the Betweenness Centrality value.

In addition, there exists the Edge Betweenness Centrality, defined in (III.9). Let $\sigma_{hj}(e)$ be the number of geodesics between h and j that passes through the edge e .

$$b(e) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{hj}(e)}{\sigma_{hj}} \quad (\text{III.9})$$

This index is important since it emphasizes the importance and the centrality of each node/edge in the system according to its topological position.




Figure III:6 Betweenness Centrality example

III.3.1.6 Efficiency

For this dissertation, the *Efficiency* is an index that aims at identifying important nodes. The concept of Efficiency was introduced in (Latora and Marchiori 2001). It is used to evaluate and measure how efficiently a node exchanges information with other nodes. This index assumes that the efficiency is inversely proportional to the shortest distance, its mathematical representation is presented in (III.10). Let d_{hj} be the shortest path length between h and j , and n the number of nodes in the system.

$$E = \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{1}{d_{hj}} \quad (\text{III.10})$$

The methodology presented in Figure III:7 is used in order to assess the impact according to the drop of global efficiency $\Delta E(Y)$ (according to (III.11)) after removing each node (or edge). Afterwards, the nodes that caused the highest impact are considered as important and critical for the system.

$$\Delta E(Y) = \frac{E(Y) - E(Y-1)}{E(Y)} \quad (\text{III.11})$$

$E(Y-1)$ represents the global efficiency after removal of a node (Bompard, Wu and Xue 2011). In addition, this index can be used to assess the impact on the system after removing edges.

Figure III:8 presents the results for the proposed demonstration system. It can be seen that the Efficiency of the system drops after removing the nodes. Specifically for the case of node 2 and 5 there is a significant lower, which highlights then the most central nodes. The nodes with a lower impact are the nodes 1 and 4, these nodes are not central and do not affect the interconnectivity in the system. This analysis can be developed to study the impact on the system after removing edges.







Figure III:7 Efficiency assessment methodology




(i) Normal state - Efficiency: 0.33




(ii) Remove Node 1 - Efficiency: 0.24




(iii) Remove Node 2 - Efficiency: 0.14




(iv) Remove Node 3 - Efficiency: 0.19



(v) Remove Node 4 - Efficiency: 0.24



(vi) Remove Node 5 - Efficiency: 0.14



(vii) Remove Node 6 - Efficiency: 0.19

Figure III:8 Efficiency for the test System

III.3.2 Eigenspectral Analysis

Eigenspectral analysis is the study of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of system's representative matrices. It has been largely used to study the topology and dynamic of complex systems (Van Mieghem 2011), in this section a brief introduction of this method will be presented. In addition, the Hilbert Space and Hermitian Matrices are introduced to reinforce and justify the proposed approaches.

III.3.2.1 Spectral Analysis

As seen before, graphs can be represented by a matrix (Adjacency Matrix \mathcal{A}). This matrix can be represented by points in the space that define a vector, which is directed from an origin to an end. This vector can be transformed to other vectors in the same space after a rotation, an escalation or a translation. The resulting vectors are called *eigenvectors* and the proportionality strengths or escalating factors are called *eigenvalues*. Therefore, the *eigensystem* (set of eigenvectors and eigenvalues) characterizes the graph and is called the *spectrum* of the matrix or *eigenspectrum*.

The determination of the eigenvalues λ and eigenvectors x of the Adjacency matrix \mathcal{A} is done using (III.12).

$$\mathcal{A}x = \lambda x \quad (\text{III.12})$$

Therefore,

$$\mathcal{A}x - \lambda x = (\mathcal{A} - \lambda I)x = 0 \quad (\text{III.13})$$

$x=0$ is a trivial solution to the eigenvalue equation. Thus, to find a non-zero solution for the homogeneous linear system, the matrix $\mathcal{A}-\lambda I$ has to be singular¹⁶ (III.14).

$$\det(\mathcal{A} - \lambda I) = 0 \quad (\text{III.14})$$

The matrix spectrum theory has been largely studied in many sciences. Particularly in graph theory, it has been used to develop the partitioning theory or spectral bisection. (Fiedler 1793) found that the second smallest eigenvalue of the graph's *Laplacian matrix* \mathcal{L} is a measure of the graph's connectivity. The Laplacian matrix is defined in (III.15). Let \mathcal{D} be a diagonal matrix of degrees. (Rozel, Caire, et al. 2009) applied this theory to study the potential cuts of large interconnected networks.

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{D} - \mathcal{A} \quad (\text{III.15})$$

In addition, the spectrum of the matrix can provide topological information about the system.

III.3.2.2 Hilbert Space

Hilbert Space is defined as a complete, normed and inner product vector space (Hoser 2005). The following properties have to be followed in a vector space \mathcal{V} , where x and y are vectors. These properties will be used to justify the use of Hermitian Matrices in next section.

$$x + y \in \mathcal{V} \quad \forall x, y \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.16})$$

$$(x + y) + z = x + (y + z) \quad \forall x, y, z \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.17})$$

$$x + y = y + x \quad \forall x, y \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.18})$$

$$\exists 0 \rightarrow x + 0 = x \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.19})$$

$$\exists 1 \rightarrow 1x = x \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.20})$$

$$\exists(-1) \rightarrow x + (-x) = 0 \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.21})$$

$$ax \in \mathcal{V} \quad \forall a \in \mathbb{C}, x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.22})$$

$$(ab)x = a(bx) \quad \forall a, b \in \mathbb{C}, x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.23})$$

$$a(x + y) = ax + ay \quad \forall a \in \mathbb{C}, x, y \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.24})$$

$$(a + b)x = ax + bx \quad \forall a, b \in \mathbb{C}, x \in \mathcal{V} \quad (\text{III.25})$$

The inner product is defined in (III.26).

$$\sqrt{\langle x|x \rangle} = \|x\| \quad (\text{III.26})$$

And the following equations have to be hold in a Hilbert Space:

$$\langle x|x \rangle \geq 0 \text{ with } \langle x|x \rangle = 0 \text{ if and only if } x = 0 \quad (\text{III.27})$$

¹⁶ A Matrix is singular if its determinant is zero.

$$\langle ax|y\rangle = \bar{a}\langle x|y\rangle \quad a \in \mathbb{C} \quad (\text{III.28})$$

$$\langle x|ay\rangle = a\langle x|y\rangle \quad a \in \mathbb{C} \quad (\text{III.29})$$

III.3.2.3 Hermitian Matrices

A matrix is defined as a Hermitian Matrix if and only if accomplishes the equation (III.30)¹⁷.

$$\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}^* \quad (\text{III.30})$$

Where,

$$h_{kl} = \bar{h}_{lk} \quad (\text{III.31})$$

The main interest on Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert Space is that their Eigenvalues, assessed with (III.32), are all reals ($\lambda_k \in \mathfrak{R} \forall k$). This property enables the important or more prestigious nodes to be classified and ranked.

$$\mathcal{H}x = \lambda x \quad (\text{III.32})$$

An example of a Hermitian matrix is shown in (III.33).

$$\mathcal{H} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2+3i & 4 & 8i \\ 2-3i & 6 & 9i & -i \\ 4 & -9i & 5 & 1-5i \\ -8i & i & 1+5i & 7 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.33})$$

The eigenvalues from this matrix are presented in (III.34), it can be seen that they are real values and the eigenvectors, in (III.35), are complex numbers.

$$\lambda = [-10.668 \quad 2.172 \quad 10.879 \quad 16.617] \quad (\text{III.34})$$

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} -0.03 + 0.60i & 0.01 - 0.53i & 0.09 - 0.54i & -0.93 - 0.22i \\ -0.38 - 0.18i & -0.58 - 0.11i & 0.35 + 0.13i & -0.57 - 0.10i \\ 0.13 - 0.51i & 0.21 - 0.42i & 0.15 - 0.35i & -0.15 + 0.58i \\ -0.43 & 0.38 & -0.65 & -0.50 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.35})$$

Proof of $\lambda_k \in \mathfrak{R} \forall k$ (Hoser 2005):

- a. $\mathcal{H}x = \lambda x$
- b. $\langle \mathcal{H}x|x\rangle = \langle \lambda x|x\rangle = \bar{\lambda}\langle x|x\rangle$ from (III.28)
- c. $\langle x|\mathcal{H}x\rangle = \langle x|\lambda x\rangle = \lambda\langle x|x\rangle$ from (III.29)
- d. Since $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}^*$, then $\langle x|\mathcal{H}x\rangle = \langle \mathcal{H}x|x\rangle$
- e. $\lambda\langle x|x\rangle = \bar{\lambda}\langle x|x\rangle$
- f. $\lambda = \bar{\lambda} \Rightarrow \lambda \in \mathfrak{R}$

¹⁷ \mathcal{H} is the conjugate transpose of \mathcal{H} .

III.4 Vulnerability and criticality analysis

Multi-infrastructures modeling has been shown in CHAPTER II. Many challenges were discovered, such as the need of a better screening method for multi-infrastructure studies and a better exploitation of Complex Networks to the study of vulnerability and interdependencies of multiple critical infrastructures.

This section presents the use of complex networks' properties to study the vulnerability of Electric Power Systems (Section III.4.1). Afterwards, it proposes different approaches to model interdependent coupled infrastructures.

The first approach aims at expanding the complex networks theory from one-dimension analysis to two-dimension analysis (Section III.4.2). This expansion adds flexibility in two degrees: Firstly, it allows the ICT and Power system infrastructures to be modeled in a single model, thus conserving their own characteristics. Secondly, this model can be used not only for these infrastructures, but can be used to model the interdependencies of other critical infrastructures as well.

The second approach (Section III.4.3.3) is inspired on sociology methods and algorithms that allow the modeling of different interdependency layers among multiple infrastructures and also, the incorporation of symmetric communication patterns analysis among heterogeneous infrastructures.

III.4.1 Electricity infrastructure topology analysis

Many topological indices from the graph theory have been used to study the vulnerability of power systems. For instance, the node degree has been used as the first step in the assessment of the vulnerability of critical infrastructures. The node with the higher degree (the largest connected component) is the most important in the system. Then, an important node is highly vulnerable to a coordinated attack and/or to a random failure, according to scale-free networks' properties.

The betweenness centrality is used to understand how connected the components are in a system, i.e. to identify the most used components. Finally, the efficiency is used to assess the impact of node or edge removal in the global system behavior.

In order to illustrate these indices, Table III:5 shows the main characteristics of several known test power systems and their corresponding direct graphs¹⁸ are shown from Figure III:9 to Figure III:18. The size of the nodes depends on their Betweenness Centrality value and their color on the degree. It is important to note that the G2ELAB 14-Bus system is a radial distribution grid, which is the reason why its average path length is smaller than for the mesh networks. This system will be presented in more detail in the next sections.

Table III:5 Graph properties for several systems

System	N. Nodes	N. Edges	Av. Total Degree	Diameter	Av. Path Length
G2ELAB 14-Bus	14	13	1.86	7	2.95
IEEE 9-Bus	9	9	2.00	2	1.40
IEEE 14-Bus	14	20	2.86	4	1.96
IEEE 24-Bus	24	34	2.83	6	2.81
IEEE 39-Bus	39	46	2.36	7	2.66
IEEE 118-Bus	118	179	3.03	10	2.94

¹⁸ The edge direction is selected according to the power flow direction.

Transmission power systems are characterized by having few hubs. For instance, Figure III:21 shows the degree distribution for the IEEE 118-bus (see Figure III:20). The degree distribution provides topological information such as if the system is vulnerable to random or targeted attacks, and if the system is a radial or loop network. In this case, most of the nodes have a in-degree and out-degree of 1, and only a few ones have a degree higher than 6 (those are the hubs). In Figure III:19 these hubs have a bigger-size node.

There are other obvious observations, such as, the larger the system is, the larger the average path length and diameter are. That is the reason why many researchers used these indices to quantify component failure impact in the system, according to the diameter variation.

The topology or structure of transmission power systems is more robust than distribution systems, since nodes are more interconnected and closer. This characteristic is similar to the properties of Scale-free networks as shown before in Figure III:3.




Figure III:9 G2ELAB 14-Bus Graph




Figure III:10 G2ELAB 14-Bus System




Figure III:11 IEEE 14-Bus Graph




Figure III:12 IEEE 14-Bus System




Figure III:13 IEEE 9-Bus Graph




Figure III:14 IEEE 9-Bus System




Figure III:15 IEEE 24-Bus Graph




Figure III:16 IEEE 24-Bus System




Figure III:17 IEEE 39-Bus Graph




Figure III:18 IEEE 39-Bus System




Figure III:19 IEEE 118-Bus Graph




Figure III:20 IEEE 118-Bus System




Figure III:21 Nodes Degree Distribution, IEEE 118-bus

For the case of distribution networks, as the system in Figure III:10, the node degree and betweenness centrality were computed (results presented in Table III:6). They show that the node 2 is the most important. Thus, in order to verify this result, this node was removed from the grid and the power flows were computed. However, the simulation finished without convergence due to the loss of connectivity in the system. The betweenness centrality shows as well that the node 2 is the most important in the system. Additionally, the node 1 is important according to the Betweenness Centrality index and the node degree, which is expected since this node represents the main source in the system.

Table III:6 Graph properties

Node	Degree	Betweenness Centrality
01	3	50
02	4	53
03	2	12
04	2	30
05	1	0
06	2	22
07	1	0
08	1	0
09	2	12
10	2	12
11	2	22
12	2	12
13	1	0
14	1	0

III.4.2 The topology-driven Approach

The study of the structural complexity of critical infrastructures' topology allows the pattern of interactions among these infrastructures to be described. Consequently, the nature of connections and the complex behaviors can be understood. The first approach aims at describing the interactions between power systems and ICT systems, using complex-weighted graphs.

In order to evaluate the physical and cyber interdependencies within the coupled system, it is important to classify the interdependencies for both infrastructures (EPS and ICT). These interdependencies or connections (edges or links) are classified into four types:

- *Type 1*: From an electrical node to another. This edge represents the normal power flow in the Power System.
- *Type 2*: From an ICT node to another. This edge represents the normal data flow from one router to another.
- *Type 3*: From an electrical node to an ICT node. Basically, it is the energy supply for an ICT infrastructure.
- *Type 4*: From an ICT node to an electrical node. This edge is used to send commands or to request information to/from the electrical component.

These edges can be modeled and represented in the Adjacency Matrix \mathcal{A} by assigning a different value for each type of connection. In order to preserve the characteristics of each infrastructure, complex values have been assigned to the edges, where the real component represents the Electrical edges and the imaginary component represents the ICT edges. Thus, the complex-valued adjacency matrix is built according to (III.36), for undirected graphs. Type 3 and 4 are in the same group because this group represents the mutual interdependencies among both infrastructures.

$$a_{hj} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if link } (h, j) \text{ is type1} \\ li & \text{if link } (h, j) \text{ is type2} \\ 1 + li & \text{if link } (h, j) \text{ is type3 or 4} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{III.36})$$

Additionally, direct graphs are used to take into account the direction of the information and electricity flow in the model. In fact, directed graphs support the representation of the relation between the source (operators) and the load (end-users), where the first is offering a service to the second. Entry a_{hj} is defined as in (III.37). This definition allows creating a Mixed Graph with some edges with a double direction to represent the energy supply from the Power Distribution Networks and the data from the ICT.

$$a_{hj} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if link } (h, j) \text{ is type1 or 3} \\ li & \text{if link } (h, j) \text{ is type2 or 4} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{III.37})$$

This representation emerges after evaluating multiple possible solutions, e.g. the use of negative complex numbers and hypercomplex numbers. However, the proposed model allows the main complex networks' indices to be assessed, e.g. node-degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency. The properties of complex-weighted graphs are analyzed in the next sections.




Figure III:22 Test system

The graphs presented in Figure III:22 will be used to exemplify the elaboration of the adjacency matrices.

In the case of Figure III:22-i the edges $e1$ and $e2$ are type 1, edges $e5$ and $e6$ are type 2, and vertices $e3$ and $e4$ are type 3 and 4. For the Figure III:23-ii the edges $e3$ and $e4$ are type 3 and vertices $e7$ and $e8$ are type 4. Therefore, the corresponding adjacency matrices according to (III.36) and (III.37), for the undirected and directed graph respectively are shown in (III.38) and (III.39).

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1+i & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+i \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & i & 0 \\ 0 & 1+i & 0 & i & 0 & i \\ 0 & 0 & 1+i & 0 & i & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (III.38)$$

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & i & 0 \\ 0 & i & 0 & 0 & 0 & i \\ 0 & 0 & i & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (III.39)$$

III.4.2.1 Complex-valued Node Degree

In order to identify the vulnerabilities of coupled infrastructures, this thesis attempts to identify the most important nodes in the system, the term ‘importance’ is intended to qualify the role that the presence and location of the node plays with respect to the average global and local properties of the whole network, as in (Kröger and Zio 2011). The Node Degree is one of the most common characteristics of Complex Networks used to identify the node role in the Network. In this case, it is divided into two components: 1) the *Electrical Node Degree* (k_{eh}), which is the number of electrical edges incident with the node; and 2) the *ICT Node Degree* (k_{ch}) which is the number of ICT edges incident with the node (III.40).

These components help to measure the influence of each infrastructure on other infrastructures. For instance, a node h having $k_{eh} > k_{ch}$ has a higher influence in the Electric Power System than in the ICT Infrastructure. It is also expected that Electric nodes have a higher Electrical node degree than ICT node degree.

$$k_h = \sum_{j \in I'} a_{hj} = k_{eh} + i \cdot k_{ch} \quad (III.40)$$

Degree indices, in-degree (III.6) and out-degree (III.7), are composed of an electrical component and an ICT component, see (III.41) and (III.42), respectively. This division helps to clarify the dependencies among infrastructures, that is, to acquaint whether it is supplying or is supplied by the node h .

$$k_h^{in} = \sum_{j \in V} a_{hj} = k_{e_h}^{in} + i \cdot k_{c_h}^{in} \quad (III.41)$$

$$k_h^{out} = \sum_{j \in V} a_{jh} = k_{e_h}^{out} + i \cdot k_{c_h}^{out} \quad (III.42)$$

In order to exemplify the use of these equations, the matrix (III.39) is used to assess the in-degree and out-degree of the graph Figure III:22-ii.

Table III:7 Node out-degree

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
k_h^{out}	1	2	1	1i	2i	1i
$k_{e_h}^{out}$	1	2	1	0	0	0
$k_{c_h}^{out}$	0	0	0	1	2	1

Table III:8 Node out-degree

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
k_h^{in}	0	1+1i	1+1i	0	1+1i	1+1i
$k_{e_h}^{in}$	0	1	1	0	1	1
$k_{c_h}^{in}$	0	1	1	0	1	1

III.4.2.2 Betweenness Centrality for multi-infrastructures

The betweenness centrality index can give insights about the interplays among infrastructures, showing the most used nodes and edges for the communication between and within infrastructures. The shortest paths are calculated for each infrastructure based on the edges types, which is similar to an analysis of two layers, as in Figure III:23.

$$b_e(l) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{e,hj}(l)}{\sigma_{e,hj}} \quad (III.43)$$

$$b_c(l) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{c,hj}(l)}{\sigma_{c,hj}} \quad (III.44)$$

Electrical betweenness centrality and ICT betweenness centrality quantify the centrality of every node in each infrastructure. That is, a measure of electrical and communication interactions of each node in the interdependent system, it can be interpreted as an index to identify bottlenecks in the system as well.

The global Betweenness Centrality describes the total use of nodes in order to create a common index for both infrastructures, taking into account the influence of each node in each infrastructure.




Figure III:23 Demonstration graph

$$b_{global}(l) = \sqrt{b_e^2(l) + b_c^2(l)} \quad (III.45)$$

The Edge Betweenness Centrality can be divided into electrical and ICT indices as well. These indices highlight the centrality of each edge in the system according to its topological position.

$$b_e(e) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{e,hl}(e)}{\sigma_{e,hl}} \quad (III.46)$$

$$b_c(e) = \sum_{h,j \in V, h \neq j} \frac{\sigma_{c,hl}(e)}{\sigma_{c,hl}} \quad (III.47)$$

In the case of the graph in Figure III:22-ii, the betweenness Centrality indices for the nodes are presented in Table III:9. These results highlight the nodes 2 and 3 for the Electric Power System and the nodes 5 and 6 for the ICT infrastructure.

Table III:9 Betweenness Centrality Results

Node	1	2	3	4	5	6
$b_e(l)$	0	3	2	0	0	0
$b_c(l)$	0	0	0	0	3	2
$b_{global}(l)$	0	3	2	0	3	2

III.4.2.3 Electrical and ICT Efficiency

Efficiency index gives some insights about the impact of removing a node (either from the ICT or from the EPS), topologically speaking. Equations (III.48) and (III.49) allow assessing the efficiency for both infrastructures where n_e is the number of electrical nodes, and n_c the number of ICT nodes.

$$E_c = \frac{1}{n_e n_c} \sum_{h \in V_c, j \in V_e, h \neq j} \frac{1}{d_{hj}} \quad (III.48)$$

$$E_e = \frac{1}{n_e n_c} \sum_{h \in V_e, j \in V_c, h \neq j} \frac{1}{d_{hj}} \quad (III.49)$$

A low index means that d_{hj} is higher; it means that the system is less efficient and therefore the removed node plays an important or critical role for the system behavior.

As a mode of example, the graph in Figure III:22 can be divided in two layers as in Figure III:23, and two distance matrices can be assessed, one for the electric paths and one for the communication paths, these matrices are shown in (III.50) and (III.51), the entries of these matrices are the distances between two nodes, i.e. d_{hj} .

$$D_e = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 2 & \infty & 2 & 3 \\ \infty & 0 & 1 & \infty & 1 & 2 \\ \infty & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ \infty & \infty & \infty & 0 & \infty & \infty \\ \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty & 0 & \infty \\ \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (III.50)$$

$$D_c = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty \\ \infty & 0 & \infty & \infty & \infty & \infty \\ \infty & \infty & 0 & \infty & \infty & \infty \\ \infty & 2 & 3 & 0 & 1 & 2 \\ \infty & 1 & 2 & \infty & 0 & 1 \\ \infty & \infty & 1 & \infty & \infty & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (III.51)$$

In this case, $n_e = 3$ and $n_c = 3$. Therefore, $E_e = 0.37$ and $E_c = 0.37$ for the base-case, the Table III:10 presents the results after applying the algorithm presented in Figure III:7. It can be seen that the node 2 is the most critical for the electric system and the node 5 for the Communication system.

Table III:10 Efficiency Results

Node	Base	1	2	3	4	5	6
E_e	0.37	0.277	0.11	0.17	0.37	0.204	0.17
E_c	0.37	0.37	0.204	0.17	0.277	0.111	0.17

III.4.2.4 Partial Conclusions

This approach presents a first insight about the structural properties of the interconnected system, in such way that the node degrees, betweenness centrality and efficiency can be assessed.

Additionally, the use of complex numbers improves the modeling of coupled infrastructures, because it takes into account the different infrastructures in the same model, but at the same time, several indices for each infrastructure can be assessed.

However, one of the main disadvantages of the topological approach is that it does not consider the bi-directional communications. For instance, for ICT infrastructures it is important to send and to receive acknowledge signals, destination confirmation, which in graphs should be a bi-directional edge.

The Eigenspectral analysis improves this representation by describing the bi-directional communication pattern in ICT networks and the mono-directional communication pattern for Power Systems.

III.4.3 Eigenspectral Analysis

It is clear that Power Systems and ICT infrastructures have asymmetric patterns, that is, both infrastructures differ in the way they share information. This sort of communication patterns is found in social networks where people interact according to some social rules and use different communication channels, such as computers or smartphones. This section applies Eigenspectral analysis to study the structure of asymmetric directed weighted graphs to reveal the vulnerabilities among and within Electric Power Systems and ICT networks.

(Hoser 2005) proposed a method to evaluate asymmetric patterns in computer mediated communications, using linear operators in the Hilbert Space and Hermitian matrices, this method is explained in Section III.4.3.3. This section proposes to use this theory to the study of coupled infrastructures. As a first step, it is proposed to distinguish the system's layers, where each level represents a different interdependency, as in Figure III:24. In this way, the proposed approaches can be used to study the different layers included for in the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012), which will be presented and analyzed in Section V.4.




Figure III:24 Four-layer analysis

III.4.3.1 Complex-weighted Adjacency Matrix

The matrix \mathcal{A} can be constructed, for each layer, according to (III.52). Let w be the number of outbound links from node h to node j , and x the number of inbound links from node h to node j . The graph $\mathcal{G}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ represents the coupled system, where $\mathcal{V} = \{\mathcal{V}_e, \mathcal{V}_c\}$, the electric and ICT nodes, respectively.

Thus,

$$a_{hj} = w + i \cdot x \quad (III.52)$$

Figure III:25 presents a demonstration graph in order to illustrate how to build the Adjacency Matrix \mathcal{A} , the resulting matrix is shown in (III.53).




Figure III:25 Demonstration graph for Spectral Analysis

This formulation allows assessing the node degree, but most importantly creating the spectral system of the Adjacency Matrix, as in Section III.4.3.3.

$$\mathcal{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1i & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1+1i & 0 \\ 0 & 1i & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+1i \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1i & 0 \\ 0 & 1+1i & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1i \\ 0 & 0 & 1+1i & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{III.53})$$

III.4.3.2 Complex-valued node degree

The degree \hat{k}_h is a complex number (III.54) where y is the out-degree and z the in-degree.

$$k_h = \sum_{j \in V} a_{hj} = y + i \cdot z \quad (\text{III.54})$$

As for the first approach, this degree allows the dependency of each node to be quantified. That is, a node h can know how many nodes depend on it (number of links that depart from this node) and in how many nodes the node h depends on (the number of links that are pointed towards the node h).

Table III:11 Complex-valued node degree

Node	v1	v2	v3	v4	v5	v6
k	1	2+2i	1+2i	1i	2+2i	2+1i

The higher the node degree is, the more nodes depend on it / or it depends on many other nodes.

Therefore, a ranking of the higher node degrees can be done and the first nodes are the most critical for the coupled system.

Table III:11 presents the complex-valued node degrees for the graph in Figure III:25. From this table, it can be seen, for instance, the node $v6$ that have 2 out-going links (to nodes $v3$ and $v5$) and 1 in-going link (from node $v3$). In addition, nodes $v2$ and $v5$ are the most important, based on the node-degree.

III.4.3.3 Eigenspectral Centrality

Eigenspectral analysis allows identifying the weakest connections in the interconnected system. As discussed before, the Eigenspectral analysis on complex-valued adjacency matrices can be devel-

oped thanks to the use of Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert space.

Therefore, the Adjacency matrix has to be a Hermitian Matrix in the Hilbert Space. Since the adjacency matrix has the characteristic presented in (III.55), the Hermitian matrix can be constructed according to (III.56).

$$a_{hj} = i\bar{a}_{jh} \quad (III.55)$$

$$\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{A} \cdot e^{-i\frac{\pi}{4}} \quad (III.56)$$

Proof (Hoser 2005):

- a. $a_{hj} = x + iy = re^{i\phi}$, $r = \sqrt{x^2 + y^2}$, $\phi = a \tan\left(\frac{y}{x}\right)$
- b. $a_{jh} = i\bar{a}_{hj} = ire^{-i\phi}$
- c. $a_{jj} = 0$
- d. $h_{hj} = a_{hj}e^{i\psi} = re^{i\phi}e^{i\psi} = re^{i(\phi+\psi)}$
- e. $h_{lk} = a_{jh}e^{i\psi} = re^{-i\phi}e^{i\psi} = re^{i(\psi-\phi)}$
- f. According to (III.31), $re^{i(\psi+\phi)} = re^{-i\left(\frac{\pi}{2}+\psi-\phi\right)}$
- g. $\psi + \phi = -\frac{\pi}{2} - \psi + \phi$
- h. $\psi = -\frac{\pi}{4}$

As an example, using the Adjacency Matrix presented in (III.53), its corresponding Hermitian Matrix is presented in (III.57).

$$\mathcal{H} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.7-0.7i & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.7+0.7i & 0 & 0.7-0.7i & 0 & 1.4 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.7+0.7i & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1.4 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.7+0.7i & 0 \\ 0 & 1.4 & 0 & 0.7+0.7i & 0 & 0.7+0.7i \\ 0 & 0 & 1.4 & 0 & 0.7-0.7i & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (III.57)$$

Finally, the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the Hermitian matrices are computed according to (III.32) for each interdependency adjacency matrix. The most important node in the system is identified according to the highest absolute value in the eigenvector under inspection.

Continuing with the example, the eigenvalues are presented in (III.58), which are all real-values, as expected.

$$\lambda = [2.47 \quad -2.47 \quad 1.32 \quad 0.44 \quad -0.44 \quad -1.32] \quad (III.58)$$

In this case, the highest eigenvalue is 2.47, its corresponding eigenvector is presented in Table III:12. According to these results, the node v2 and v5 are the most critical in this system, since they have the highest absolute value ($|X|=0.535$).

Table III:12 Demonstration graph eigenvectors

Node	v1	v2	v3	v4	v5	v6
$ X $	0.217	0.535	0.409	0.217	0.535	0.401
φ	-1.026	-0.240	0.409	0.785	0	0.409

Next Chapter presents the application of these approaches in a real test distribution system and many other results interpretations will be presented.

III.5 Summary

This Chapter proposes new approaches to study the interdependencies among critical infrastructures based on Complex networks theory.

A topology-driven analysis was proposed as a first approach. It uses the main properties of graphs, applying complex-weighted Adjacency Matrices. The use of complex numbers is adopted in order to expand the classical real-weighted adjacency matrices to a two-dimensional matrix that reflects the double interdependencies among infrastructures (ICT link and Power System supply). The assessed properties are: Node degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency, all supported by the shortest path calculation.

The main advantage of the first approach is the identification of bottlenecks in the system as well as the identification of critical edges and vertices to the efficiency of the system. However, it fails to reproduce the asymmetrical communication pattern presented in the interplays among and within infrastructures.

Eigenspectral analysis aims at reproducing those asymmetrical patterns using Hermitian Matrices in the Hilbert Space, which allows real-value eigenvalues to be obtained using complex adjacency matrices. This new index for critical infrastructures detects the most central component in the system. The central component is considered as the most important and the most critical one in the coupled infrastructure. The main disadvantage of this method is the lack of dynamical analysis and/or cascading failure simulations.

The proposed approaches will be applied on a typical French distribution network in the next chapter. Additionally, it will be explained how to elaborate the model for a real system, how to obtain the results and how to interpret them.

CHAPTER IV

Vulnerability and Interdependencies: Application

The perplexity of life arises from there being too many interesting things in it for us to be interested properly in any of them

Gilbert Keith Chesterton

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Abstract

This chapter applies the mathematical approaches proposed in the previous chapter on a typical French distribution system, including the topology-driven analysis and the Eigenspectral analysis. The results obtained from these approaches allow the identification of components and connections that have an important topological role in the coupled system. In addition, the approaches provide important indices that are used as a quantification of weaknesses in the system. Finally, results from both approaches are compared and analyzed.

In the previous chapters we have presented a real problematic that emerge from the interactions and interplays among critical infrastructures, including Power Systems and ICT systems. The state-of-the-art in CHAPTER II reveals the need for new tools to study interdependencies and vulnerabilities among critical infrastructures. In response to these problems, two approaches are proposed in CHAPTER III, using complex networks theory and several indices and methodologies are proposed. This Chapter focuses on the application of the proposed approaches in order to exemplify their utilization

on power distribution networks.

This Chapter is organized as follows:

- Section IV.1 presents the chosen test system.
- Section IV.2 applies the topology-driven analysis approach.
- Section IV.3 applies the Eigenspectral analysis approach.

IV.1 Test System

The test system is a micro distribution network. The Power Grid has 14 power buses, 17 lines, 7 distributed generation sources, 9 loads, and 3 transformers HV/MV, as shown in Figure IV:1.

Aside from this network, there is a considerable supporting ICT infrastructure, 1 Wimax BS and 5 multiplexers, 23 links including ADSL, PSTN/ISDN, Optic Fiber and Ethernet technologies. There is also a private LAN-Giga Ethernet connecting the electrical buses 2, 3 and 4 (represented by node 23). This communication network (benchmark) was developed during the SINARI Project, it can be either a private or a public network.

This system has already been presented in several papers (McDonald, et al. 2013), (Sanchez, Caire and Hadjsaid 2013), thesis (B. Rozel 2009) and European Projects (Integral (Stahl, et al. 2010)). It is also the system emulated within the PREDIS experimental platform (Caire, Sanchez and Hadjsaid 2013). This system can be reconfigured by tripping the circuit breakers.




Figure IV:1 Complete 14-Bus Tests System

IV.2 Topological Approach Results

In this Section, the Complex-valued degree, the betweenness centrality index and the efficiency index results for the test system are presented. The assessment was completely developed using MATLAB scripts.

In order to create the graph for the test system, power system's buses and routers are modeled as nodes and, power lines and communication links are modeled as edges. Figure IV:2 presents the undirected graph; green nodes are the power system buses and violet nodes the routers. Similarly green edges represent the power lines, red edges the ICT links and blue edges the interdependency communication/electricity supply among power and ICT nodes.

Figure IV:3 shows the directed graph, in addition to the red (type 2) and the green (type 1) edges, the blue edges represent the electricity supply to ICT nodes (type 3), and orange edges represent the communication links to power system's nodes (type 4). The directions of green edges were chosen according to the flow of the real-power in the power system (power flow computation).




Figure IV:2 Undirected Graph for the 14-bus Test system




Figure IV:3 Directed Graph for the 14-bus Test system

IV.2.1 Adjacency Matrix

The adjacency matrices for undirected and directed graphs are presented in Figure IV:4 and Figure IV:5. These figures show four different sections, one for each type of connection (see §III.4.2).

This representation describes the coupled system in many ways. For instance, how sparse it is, the number of total connections and the topological interdependencies. It is important to note that the undirected graph takes into account the bi-directional flow of connection in the ICT infrastructures. However, the directed graph is better suited for the Electric system, since it takes into account the real power flow direction.




Figure IV:4 Adjacency Matrix – Undirected Network




Figure IV:5 Adjacency Matrix – Directed Network

IV.2.2 Complex-valued Node Degree

The node degree values calculated according to equation (III.40), for undirected graphs, are presented in Table IV:1. These results highlight the importance of nodes 2, 3, 4, 12 and 20 for the Electric infrastructure, and the 16 and 20 for the ICT infrastructure. In this specific test case, node 20 has a high connectivity with both infrastructures.

This index does not highlight the importance of node 1 (the base of the functioning of the entire system). But it highlights the importance of node 20 which is a central router. This results show that the use of undirected graphs is more appropriate for ICT communications.

Figure IV:6 shows that most of the nodes have a node-degree of 2 or 3. Furthermore, it can be seen that there are nodes with no-dependency of first degree, e.g. node 1 and 19. Figure IV:7 highlights the important Hubs in the system, nodes with 5, 6 or even 7 connections. The histogram presented in Figure IV:8, shows that most of the nodes that have a low ICT degree are distributed in every electric node-degree. There is a peak in $k_e=6$ and $k_e=7$, it corresponds to node 20, which is clearly a hub for both systems.

Table IV:1 Node Degree – Undirected Graph

Node	k_h	k_{eh}	k_{ch}
1	3	3	0
2	$6 + 2i$	6	2
3	$4 + 2i$	4	2
4	$4 + 2i$	4	2
5	$2 + 1i$	2	1
6	$3 + 1i$	3	1
7	$1 + 1i$	1	1
8	$2 + 1i$	2	1
9	$3 + 1i$	3	1
10	$2 + 1i$	2	1
11	$3 + 1i$	3	1
12	$4 + 2i$	4	2
13	$3 + 2i$	3	2
14	$3 + 2i$	3	2
15	$1 + 2i$	1	2
16	$3 + 5i$	3	5
17	$1 + 2i$	1	2
18	$1 + 2i$	1	2
19	$4i$	0	4
20	$5 + 7i$	5	7
21	$2 + 4i$	2	4
22	$3 + 4i$	3	4
23	$3 + 3i$	3	3




Figure IV:6 Probability Degree Distribution




Figure IV:7 Cumulative Degree Distribution




Figure IV:8 Multiple infrastructure Degree distribution

The node-degrees according to equations (III.41) and (III.42), for directed graphs, are presented in Table IV:2. In-degree presents how dependent are the nodes to each infrastructure. The Out-degree shows the importance of each node for each infrastructure. In this case, nodes 2 and 14 are highlighted as the most important electric nodes, and nodes 20 and 16 as the most important for the ICT infrastructure. On the other hand, node 19 is the most dependent node in the ICT infrastructure. However, node 2 has dependencies in both infrastructures. For that reason it is considered as the most critical node for the ICT and Electric Infrastructure.

Figure IV:9 shows that there are no-critical hubs since the highest in-degree is 3 for the ICT infrastructure and 2 for the Electric Infrastructure. In addition, according to Figure IV:10, most of the nodes have a degree 1. In fact, Figure IV:11 shows that most of the nodes have only one connection with the electric and the ICT infrastructure.

Figure IV:12 and Figure IV:13 show that in the ICT infrastructure there are important hubs, having out-degrees of 5 and 6. On the contrary, Electric system has a clear tendency to have only one connection. It is due to the topological properties of Distribution Power Systems.

Figure IV:14 helps to understand the dependencies among and within infrastructures, for instance, there is a local maximum for the out-degree 6, but this node has a 0 electric out-degree.

Table IV:2 Node Degree – Directed Graph

Node	k_h^{in}	k_{eh}^{in}	k_{ch}^{in}	k_h^{out}	k_{eh}^{out}	k_{ch}^{out}
1	2	2	0	1	1	0
2	2 + 2 i	2	2	3	3	0
3	1 + 2 i	1	2	1	1	0
4	1 + 2 i	1	2	1	1	0
5	1 + 1 i	1	1	1	1	0
6	1 + 1 i	1	1	1	1	0
7	1 i	0	1	1	1	0
8	1 + 1 i	1	1	2	2	0
9	1 + 1 i	1	1	1	1	0
10	1 i	0	1	2	2	0
11	1 + 1 i	1	1	1	1	0
12	1 + 2 i	1	2	1	1	0
13	2 i	0	2	1	1	0
14	2 i	0	2	3	3	0
15	1	1	1	2 i	0	2
16	1 + 1 i	1	1	4 i	0	4
17	1	1	1	2 i	0	2
18	1	1	1	2 i	0	2
19	1 + 3 i	1	3	1 i	0	1
20	1 + 1 i	1	1	6 i	0	6
21	1 + 1 i	1	1	3 i	0	3
22	1 + 1 i	1	1	3 i	0	3
23	0	0	0	3 i	0	3




Figure IV:9 Probability Distribution – IN Degree




Figure IV:10 Cumulative Distribution – IN Degree




Figure IV:11 Multi-infrastructure Distribution – IN Degree




Figure IV:12 Probability Distribution – OUT Degree




Figure IV:13 Cumulative Distribution – OUT Degree




Figure IV:14 Multi-infrastructure Distribution – OUT Degree

IV.2.3 Betweenness Centrality Analysis

Table IV:3 presents the nodes' Betweenness Centrality for undirected and directed graphs. As expected before, the nodes 1 and 2 are highlighted as important nodes for the electric infrastructure. This is because of its centrality in the electric infrastructure, as it was previously mentioned. However, there is a very important node in the ICT infrastructure, node 19, which has an important role for the information communication. In the whole system, nodes 3 and 4 are identified as important for both infrastructures due to their interdependencies within the Electric infrastructure and with the ICT infrastructure. Finally, as for the node degree, the node 16 is identified as important for the ICT infrastructure.

There are clear differences between the undirected and directed graph results. For instance, nodes 5, 7, 10 and 13 have a betweenness centrality index of 0 for the undirected graph, that is, they are end-users. However in the directed graph node 5 becomes a supply node. On the other hand, nodes 15, 17, 18, 22 and 23 are end users in the directed graph, but they have a role in the undirected graph. It highlights the relevance of analyzing electric infrastructures as directed graphs and ICT infrastructures as undirected graphs.

Table IV:3 Node Betweenness Centrality – Undirected and Directed Graph

Node	Undirect Graph			Direct Graph		
	b_e	b_c	b_{global}	b_e	b_c	b_{global}
1	144	0.0	144.0	48	0	48
2	130	16.7	131.1	63	0	63
3	72	38.3	81.6	9	0	9
4	72	23.0	75.6	27	0	27
5	0	0.0	0.0	10	0	10
6	28	0.0	28.0	8	0	8
7	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0
8	28	0.0	28.0	22	0	22
9	52	0.0	52.0	30	0	30
10	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0
11	52	0.0	52.0	20	0	20
12	28	0.0	28.0	11	0	11
13	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0
14	54	0.0	54.0	0	0	0
15	0	20.0	20.0	0	0	0
16	0	133.3	133.3	0	14	14
17	0	38.0	38.0	0	0	0
18	0	38.0	38.0	0	0	0
19	0	210.7	210.7	0	35	35
20	0	158.0	158.0	0	36	36
21	0	178.0	178.0	0	20	20
22	0	1.0	1.0	0	0	0
23	0	45.0	45.0	0	0	0

Figure IV:15 presents the edges Betweenness Centrality for the Undirected Graph. This figure shows the symmetry of the undirected graph and the most critical edges in the coupled system. In this specific case, the most critical nodes are within the ICT infrastructure (edges 16-21, 19-20 and 19-21).

The betweenness in the interconnection -edges up-right and bottom-left side- does not highlight specifically any edge, in comparison with the within each system. Figure IV:16 shows the results for the Directed Graph, which identifies critical edges within the electrical infrastructure and the ICT infrastructure, but not specifically for the interconnection of edges.




Figure IV:15 Edges Betweenness Centrality – Undirected Graph




Figure IV:16 Edge Betweenness Centrality – Directed Graph

IV.2.4 Efficiency

Table IV:4 presents the efficiency results after removing each node in the coupled test system. The nodes 1, 2, and 20 are identified as critical nodes within their own infrastructures. However, nodes 15 and 19 are recognized as important nodes for both infrastructures, having an impact in the efficiency of both infrastructures. Figure IV:17 and Figure IV:18 show the same results for a better interpretation.

The highest impact for the undirected graph is 60% (node 2) and 57% for the directed graph (node 2 as well). That means that even in the case N-1, there are still topological paths to ensure the continuity of service. This does not mean that physically the system will continue to work, but that there are options to reconfigure the system. Nodes 8, 9 and 14 are identified, for the first time, as critical within the Electric infrastructure.

Table IV:4 Vertices efficiency Undirected and Directed Graph

Node	UNDIRECTED GRAPH				DIRECTED GRAPH			
	Electric Efficiency		ICT Efficiency		Electric Efficiency		ICT Efficiency	
	E_e	ΔE_e	E_c	ΔE_c	E_e	ΔE_e	E_c	ΔE_c
<i>Normal State</i>	0.2327		0.4062		0.1473		0.2533	
1	0.1384	41%	0.4062	0%	0.0991	33%	0.2533	0%
2	0.0927	60%	0.3729	8%	0.0635	57%	0.2374	6%
3	0.1717	26%	0.3639	10%	0.1333	10%	0.2220	12%
4	0.1919	18%	0.3688	9%	0.1237	16%	0.2308	9%
5	0.1862	20%	0.3792	7%	0.1185	20%	0.2454	3%
6	0.1864	20%	0.3782	7%	0.1289	12%	0.2414	5%
7	0.2247	3%	0.3751	8%	0.1394	5%	0.2388	6%
8	0.1637	30%	0.3792	7%	0.0912	38%	0.2454	3%
9	0.1678	28%	0.3762	7%	0.1071	27%	0.2299	9%
10	0.1922	17%	0.3782	7%	0.1316	11%	0.2414	5%
11	0.2053	12%	0.3782	7%	0.1315	11%	0.2414	5%
12	0.2160	7%	0.3722	8%	0.1377	7%	0.2220	12%
13	0.2250	3%	0.3722	8%	0.1429	3%	0.2220	12%
14	0.1652	29%	0.3722	8%	0.1252	15%	0.2220	12%
15	0.1914	18%	0.3669	10%	0.1166	21%	0.2202	13%
16	0.2026	13%	0.2943	28%	0.1394	5%	0.1865	26%
17	0.1993	14%	0.3505	14%	0.1185	20%	0.2321	8%
18	0.2026	13%	0.3505	14%	0.1193	19%	0.2321	8%
19	0.2026	13%	0.2664	34%	0.1193	19%	0.1759	31%
20	0.2027	13%	0.2481	39%	0.1394	5%	0.1362	46%
21	0.2247	3%	0.3087	24%	0.1394	5%	0.1931	24%
22	0.2027	13%	0.3598	11%	0.1394	5%	0.2295	9%
23	0.2327	0%	0.3573	12%	0.1473	0%	0.2295	9%

Even if the results for undirected and directed graphs differ in scale, the same nodes are identified as important for each infrastructure.

Table IV:5 and Table IV:6 present the edges electric and ICT efficiency, respectively, for the undirected and directed graphs. These results highlight the edges around nodes 1 (1-2, 3-1, 4-1), 2 (1-2, 2-5, 2-9 and 2-15) and 20 (20-14, 20-3, 20-12 and 20-13). This is coherent with the results of node efficiency. Figure IV:19 and Figure IV:20 show the same results for a better understanding.

The interface among both infrastructures has critical edges, as for the Electric Efficiency edges 8-18, 8-19, 2-15 and for the ICT efficiency edges 16-10, 21-4, 20-3, 20-9 and 16-6. However they have a lower impact in the coupled system.




Figure IV:17 Vertex Electric Efficiency




Figure IV:18 Vertex ICT Efficiency

IV.2.5 Results Analysis

The different indices proposed for the undirected and undirected graphs, using complex-valued weights, serve to identify critical nodes and edges in multi-infrastructures systems from a topological point of view.

The three indices (node degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency) give consistent results, identifying as critical nodes the main buses in the Power System and the main routers in the ICT infrastructure. But in addition, they identify critical edges that serve in the interface between both infrastructures and that should be an object of study.

This approach gives a “High level” description of coupled infrastructures and should serve as a first step to identify the hidden interdependencies.

A conclusion from these results is that it is important to take into account the flow direction (communication flows and electrical flows) and that a more flexible model should be required to incorporate both heterogeneous communication patterns.

Table IV:5 Edges Electric Efficiency – Undirected and Directed Graphs

		UNDIRECTED GRAPH		DIRECTED GRAPH	
From	To	E_e	ΔE_e	E_e	ΔE_e
<i>Base Case</i>		0.2327		0.1473	
1	2	0.1291	45%	0.0807	45%
3	1	0.1509	35%	0.1097	26%
4	1	0.1509	35%	0.1097	26%
2	5	0.1151	51%	0.0635	57%
6	2	0.1291	45%	0.0807	45%
2	9	0.1151	51%	0.0635	57%
9	8	0.1796	23%	0.1071	27%
10	6	0.1922	17%	0.1316	11%
14	3	0.1652	29%	0.1252	15%
11	4	0.2053	12%	0.1315	11%
12	11	0.2160	7%	0.1377	7%
13	12	0.2250	3%	0.1429	3%
7	21	0.2247	3%	0.1394	5%
10	16	0.1922	17%	0.1316	11%
5	17	0.1993	14%	0.1185	20%
8	18	0.1726	26%	0.0912	38%
8	19	0.1726	26%	0.0912	38%
14	20	0.1652	29%	0.1252	15%
2	15	0.1151	51%	0.0635	57%
14	22	0.1652	29%	0.1252	15%

Table IV:6 Edges ICT Efficiency – Undirected and Directed Graphs

From	To	UNDIRECTED GRAPH		DIRECTED GRAPH	
		E_c	ΔE_c	E_c	ΔE_c
<i>Base Case</i>		0.4062		0.2533	
15	16	0.3669	10%	0.2202	13%
15	2	0.3446	15%	0.2123	16%
20	14	0.2599	36%	0.1283	49%
21	7	0.3327	18%	0.1931	24%
16	10	0.3109	23%	0.1865	26%
17	5	0.3505	14%	0.2321	8%
18	8	0.3505	14%	0.2321	8%
16	21	0.3109	23%	0.1865	26%
16	11	0.3109	23%	0.1865	26%
21	19	0.2623	35%	0.1667	34%
21	4	0.3088	24%	0.1852	27%
23	2	0.3347	18%	0.2216	13%
23	3	0.3299	19%	0.2061	19%
23	4	0.3288	19%	0.2149	15%
17	19	0.2870	29%	0.1878	26%
18	19	0.2870	29%	0.1878	26%
19	20	0.3625	11%	0.1759	31%
20	3	0.2459	39%	0.1283	49%
20	12	0.2599	36%	0.1283	49%
20	13	0.2599	36%	0.1283	49%
20	22	0.2679	34%	0.1362	46%
22	14	0.3643	10%	0.2061	19%
22	13	0.3643	10%	0.2061	19%
22	12	0.3643	10%	0.2061	19%
20	9	0.2679	34%	0.1362	46%
16	6	0.3109	23%	0.1865	26%




Figure IV:19 Edges Electric Efficiency




Figure IV:20 Edges ICT Efficiency

IV.3 Eigenspectral Approach Results

The second approach is applied using the same test system than the one used in section IV.1, the resulting graph is presented in Figure IV:21, which gives a “High level” description of the 14-bus Distribution test system. In this case, the system is composed of two layers, one for the electrical interdependencies and another one for the cyber interdependencies. A different adjacency matrix \mathcal{A} is computed for each layer, using equation (III.52). In this case, the model for the Power System takes advantage of the directed graph method and the ICT infrastructure is modeled as a bi-directional infrastructure in order to highlight the inner properties of communication networks and to emphasize the asymmetric pattern presented in the multi-infrastructure systems, as mention in previous section.

In this section, the complex-valued degree results are presented again in order to compare the results with those obtained from the last section. Afterwards, the Eigenspectral analysis of the Adjacency matrices and its corresponding results interpretations are presented. Results should be similar than those obtained in the first approach.

CHAPTER V includes more levels, according to the interdependency types (see section I.2.2), in order to study other interdependencies on Smart Grids.

As it can be seen, this approach is significantly different to other multi-dimensional approaches (Johansson and Hassel 2010), (B. Rozel 2009) in the sense that the physical components are at the same level, and the layers describe the interdependencies (see Figure II:3). The advantage of this description is that in the worst case this model will have maximum 5 Adjacency matrices (physical, cyber, logical, geographic and social interdependencies). In addition, each layer can exploit the capability of Complex Networks to connect a large number of nodes.




Figure IV:21 Two layers graph

IV.3.1 Complex-valued Node Degree

Table IV:7 presents the node-degree results. These are the same results than those obtained in the Table IV:2, but they are more understandable since the complex numbers are representing the double dependency of each node (see equation (III.54)). Basically, nodes 2 and 14 are highlighted for the power system and the nodes 16 and 20 for the ICT network.

It can be seen that the results are more symmetric for the ICT system than for the Electric System, which is because the bi-directional communication among nodes in the ICT system are modeled. On the contrary, since power systems are unidirectional, this pattern is maintained in the model.

A main advantage of this method is its flexibility. For instance, for future networks or the so-called ‘Smart-grids,’ where consumers may play producers (prosumers) role as well, distribution grids will exhibit a bi-directional behavior (as in the case of ICT networks). Thus, the proposed approach can be easily adapted to these new networks, which is the main disadvantage of classic methods that relies on power flow computations.

Table IV:7 Complex-Valued Node Degree

Node	k_{he}	k_{hc}
1	$2 + 1 i$	0
2	$2 + 3 i$	$2 + 2i$
3	$1 + 1 i$	$2 + 2i$
4	$1 + 1 i$	$2 + 2i$
5	$1 + 1 i$	$1 + 1i$
6	$1 + 1 i$	$1 + 1i$
7	$1 i$	$1 + 1i$
8	$1 + 2i$	$1 + 1i$
9	$1 + 1i$	$1 + 1i$
10	$2 i$	$1 + 1i$
11	$1 + 1i$	$1 + 1i$
12	$1 + 1i$	$2 + 2i$
13	$1 i$	$2 + 2i$
14	$2 i$	$1 + 1i$
15	1	$2 + 2i$
16	1	$5 + 5i$
17	1	$2 + 2i$
18	1	$2 + 2i$
19	1	$4 + 4i$
20	1	$6 + 6i$
21	1	$4 + 4i$
22	0	$4 + 4i$
23	0	$3 + 3i$

IV.3.2 Prestige Analysis

Prestige analysis (for social networks) or eigenvector centrality should provide important information about the relative importance of components and communication means, represented by nodes and links, in the coupled system.

After calculating the Hermitian Matrix, using Equation (III.56), the eigensystem is calculated using Equation (III.32). The eigenvalues are presented in Figure IV:22 and Figure IV:23. These figures show the symmetry in the spectrum. Eigenvalues are organized from the higher to the lower values.

The main differences between both figures are the number of nodes having their eigenvalue equal to zero or close to zero. It highlights the disassociation of nodes in the system due to the linear independence of eigenvectors.




Figure IV:22 Eigenspectrum of the Electric connections matrix




Figure IV:23 Eigenspectrum of the ICT connections matrix

Table IV:8 presents the highest eigenvalues from the Adjacency matrix for the Electric interdependencies. It can be seen that there are two eigenvalues ($\lambda=2.52$) of the same absolute value but with different sign. This is the characteristic of the adjacency matrix of a star graph, i.e. a network with a single hub and several nodes connected to it.

The node 2, which has the highest absolute value in the eigenvector, is the most important for the network. Note that this value has no shift in phase between eigenvector 1 and 2. This is the most central and prestigious member in the system. This result is coherent with the outcomes from the first approach.

Node 1 has the second highest value in the eigenvector 1. This result is important, because as it was said in Section IV.2.2, node 1 is the base of the functioning of the whole system.

Also, nodes that have a zero-value in the eigenvector are distinguished. That is the case of nodes 7, 20, 21, 22. It can be seen in Figure IV:21 that those nodes are separated of the whole coupled system. This technique can lead to the identification of sub-systems in the coupled system.

Table IV:8 Highest Eigenvalues Electric System

ID	ID : 1		ID : 2		ID : 3		ID : 9		ID : 10	
	$ \chi $	φ	$ \chi $	φ	$ \chi $	φ	$ \chi $	φ	$ \chi $	φ
	$\lambda = -2.52$		$\lambda = 2.52$		$\lambda = -1.82$		$\lambda = 1.82$		$\lambda = 1.63$	
1	0.39	2.36	0.39	-0.79	0.32	-2.36	0.32	0.79	0.02	-2.36
2	0.60	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.11	-1.57	0.11	-1.57	0.17	1.57
3	0.19	-1.57	0.19	-1.57	0.31	0.00	0.31	0.00	0.04	3.14
4	0.19	-1.57	0.19	-1.57	0.38	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.18	-3.14
5	0.28	-2.36	0.28	0.79	0.09	2.36	0.09	-0.79	0.17	2.36
6	0.29	2.36	0.29	-0.79	0.11	0.79	0.11	-2.36	0.26	0.79
7	0.00	-1.07	0.00	-2.96	0.00	-2.95	0.00	1.95	0.00	1.98
8	0.18	1.57	0.18	1.57	0.37	0.00	0.37	0.00	0.54	0.00
9	0.31	-2.36	0.31	0.79	0.26	2.36	0.26	-0.79	0.23	-0.79
10	0.14	-1.57	0.14	-1.57	0.08	3.14	0.08	3.14	0.25	0.00
11	0.09	0.79	0.09	-2.36	0.37	2.36	0.37	-0.79	0.26	2.36
12	0.04	3.14	0.04	3.14	0.29	-1.57	0.29	-1.57	0.26	1.57
13	0.02	-0.79	0.02	2.36	0.16	0.79	0.16	-2.36	0.16	0.79
14	0.09	0.79	0.09	-2.36	0.25	2.36	0.25	-0.79	0.03	2.36
15	0.24	-2.36	0.24	0.79	0.06	2.36	0.06	-0.79	0.11	2.36
16	0.05	2.36	0.05	-0.79	0.05	0.79	0.05	-2.36	0.15	0.79
17	0.11	1.57	0.11	1.57	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.10	-3.14
18	0.07	-0.79	0.07	2.36	0.20	-2.36	0.20	0.79	0.33	0.79
19	0.07	-0.79	0.07	2.36	0.20	-2.36	0.20	0.79	0.33	0.79
20	0.04	-1.57	0.04	-1.57	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.02	3.14
21	0.00	1.79	0.00	-3.07	0.00	-0.13	0.00	-0.61	0.00	-2.68
22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

The results in Table IV:9 present a different behavior between both types of structures, in comparison with Table IV:8. This difference is characterized by the existence or not of pairs of eigenvalues with the same absolute value and different signs. This mathematical difference reveals the structure of the network. For instance, the power system has many pairs of eigenvalues, which is a characteristic of radial networks.

In this case, the node with the highest value in the eigenvector is the node 20, which is a central router, as mentioned in Section IV.2.2 for the first approach.

Additionally, the only node with a zero-value in the eigenvector is the node 1, which has no ICT –connection in the test system. The lowest values, after zero, are for the nodes 6 and 10, which are the less central nodes in the system. This information can be confirmed thanks to the Efficiency index calculated and presented in Table IV:4, where nodes 6 and 10 have a minimal impact on the system efficient from a topological point of view.

Table IV:9 Highest Eigenvalues ICT System

ID	ID : 1		ID : 3		ID : 2		ID : 6		ID : 4	
	$\lambda = 4.43$		$\lambda = -3.91$		$\lambda = 3.58$		$\lambda = -3.2$		$\lambda = 2.63$	
ID	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ
1	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
2	0.054	0.000	0.141	0.000	0.173	0.000	0.123	0.000	0.234	-3.142
3	0.218	0.000	0.216	0.000	0.002	3.142	0.204	3.142	0.109	3.142
4	0.096	0.000	0.226	0.000	0.236	0.000	0.089	0.000	0.009	0.000
5	0.035	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.055	-3.142	0.200	0.000
6	0.034	0.000	0.128	-3.142	0.209	0.000	0.221	3.142	0.131	3.142
7	0.058	0.000	0.150	0.000	0.173	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.105	0.000
8	0.035	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.055	-3.142	0.200	0.000
9	0.180	0.000	0.140	0.000	0.065	3.142	0.205	-3.142	0.012	3.142
10	0.034	0.000	0.128	3.142	0.209	0.000	0.221	3.142	0.131	3.142
11	0.034	0.000	0.128	3.142	0.209	0.000	0.221	3.142	0.131	-3.142
12	0.316	0.000	0.117	0.000	0.152	3.142	0.180	3.142	0.113	3.142
13	0.316	0.000	0.117	0.000	0.152	3.142	0.180	3.142	0.113	3.142
14	0.136	0.000	0.023	-3.142	0.086	3.142	0.026	0.000	0.101	3.142
15	0.052	0.000	0.179	3.142	0.278	0.000	0.275	3.142	0.257	-3.142
16	0.108	0.000	0.353	0.000	0.530	0.000	0.500	0.000	0.243	3.142
17	0.110	0.000	0.172	-3.142	0.080	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.373	0.000
18	0.110	0.000	0.172	-3.142	0.080	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.373	0.000
19	0.309	0.000	0.414	0.000	0.171	0.000	0.229	3.142	0.494	0.000
20	0.564	0.000	0.386	-3.142	0.165	3.142	0.465	0.000	0.023	3.142
21	0.182	0.000	0.413	-3.142	0.438	0.000	0.197	-3.142	0.196	0.000
22	0.426	0.000	0.064	0.000	0.219	3.142	0.058	3.142	0.188	3.142
23	0.117	0.000	0.211	3.142	0.161	0.000	0.003	3.142	0.180	3.142

IV.4 Conclusions

This Chapter presented the application of the approaches proposed in CHAPTER III to model coupled infrastructures, in this case a Distribution Network with its surrounding Communication network.

The first approach studies the topology of the system supported by a modification of the classical properties of graph theory, such as node-degree, betweenness centrality and efficiency. The modification consisted in the application of complex-weighted adjacency matrices and two-layer analysis, according to the interdependencies. These indices served to identify critical nodes and edges in multi-infrastructures systems from a topological point of view.

Results give coherent results, identifying as critical nodes the main buses in the Power System and the main Routers in the ICT infrastructure. But in addition, they reveal critical edges that serve in the interface between both infrastructures. In addition, these results highlight the importance to model coupled systems as undirected and directed graphs, in order to evaluate the heterogeneous communication patterns in each infrastructure.

The second approach, analyzes the Eigensystem of the complex-weighted adjacency matrix that represent the coupled infrastructures. In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, the complex-weighted adjacency matrix is transformed to the Hilbert Space using Hermitian matrices. As a result, eigenvalues from this system are all real-values, where the eigenvectors from the highest eigenvalue is interpreted as an index of importance and relevance of the node in the coupled system.

This approach improves some weaknesses of the first approach, such as the bi-directional communication in each infrastructure. Therefore, both systems can include bi-directional edges, which should serve to study different types of infrastructures.

Some of the main advantages of the proposed approaches are:

- The application of complex numbers added flexibility to the classical definitions and properties of complex networks. Therefore, new indices can be developed to perform vulnerability assessment and interdependencies modeling of coupled infrastructures, despite their inherent differences.
- These approaches can be applied to a wide range of coupled heterogeneous systems.
- Even if this Chapter depicts and analysis taking into account physical and cyber interdependencies, many other interdependencies types can be applied, which will be explored in CHAPTER V.
- Due to the availability of fast algorithms to study Complex Networks, the CPU Time required to model large coupled infrastructures is very low.
- Scalability is possible using complex networks and generally it will not affect the computational processing time.

CHAPTER V

System-of-Systems vision of Coupled Infrastructures

The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious

Marcus Aurelius

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Abstract

System-of-Systems approach aims at studying as a whole the different components of multiple infrastructure systems. This has been called as well: Global Vision of Systems. This analysis is very relevant in order to understand the behavior of complex systems, particularly, future power distribution systems or ‘Smart Grids’. SGAM is a standardized model proposed by Siemens and standardized by CENELEC and the European Com-

mission in order to set a common vision of these grids. This chapter proposes a “Low level” system description analysis and an integration with “High level” system description analysis in order to create a methodology for modeling Smart-Grids, based on the SGAM reference.

V.1 Introduction

System of Systems (SoS) Engineering is a discipline that focuses on multiple integrated complex systems (Keating, et al. 2003), including cross-system interdependencies. In other words, this discipline studies the Big Picture of Critical Infrastructures. It is believed that it was originated from the System thinking theory (Boardman and Sauser 2008) and evolved due to the rapidly increasing complexity of coupled infrastructures (Gorod, Sauser and Boardman 2008).

Nowadays, this theory has evolved to a Global Systems Science (Jaeger, et al. 2013) that defines the complex systems as: Systems that are composed of different heterogeneous parts that include hierarchies, their different parts are coupled and their parts represent different space scales and evolve at different time scales.

It is important to differentiate Systems-of-Subsystems and Systems-of-Systems. On the one hand, in a System-of-Subsystems there is a centralized control, the connectivity is platform-centric, i.e. high connectivity within subsystems and low connectivity among subsystems, and its different parts are homogeneous and have a hierarchy. On the other hand, System-of-Systems is composed of heterogeneous, autonomous and independent systems, with a decentralized control, and most of the behaviors are not foreseen (Sauser, Boardman and Gorod 2008).

Critical Infrastructures are seen as a large System-of-Systems, where security issues demands a study of their interdependencies in its entirety (Zolesio 2010). CHAPTER III and CHAPTER IV presented an analysis of two layers physical and cyber of a distribution network, this analysis is called “High level” system description analysis since it describes the system as a whole. However, in that approach some nodes represented a whole system, e.g. a substation. Therefore, in order to expand the proposed approach and to include a “Low level analysis,” this Chapter demonstrates the application of “Low level” system description analysis and applies the Eigenspectral analysis to study the substation interdependencies as an example.

Finally, in order to have the big picture of the whole coupled system; it is proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids, based in the SGAM reference (Smart Grid Architecture Model). SGAM was developed in 2012 to define the different layers that compose a Smart Grid and to describe their interplays (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012). The proposed methodology in this dissertation integrates several interdependency types. As a result, a new model to study the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of power systems, including substations and distributed energy resources is obtained.

The main body of this chapter is divided into four parts; Section V.2 presents the “Low Level” system description analysis as an approach to the System-of-Systems Engineering view of Distribution Networks. In this section the PREDIS Platform is presented as a test system. Section V.3 describes de integration of “Low level” system description and “High-level” system description. Section V.4 introduces the SGAM definition and the resulting methodology to model the interdependencies of Smart Grids. Finally, Section V.5 summarizes and concludes.




Figure V:1 "Low Level" & "High Level" description

V.2 "Low-level" System Description Analysis

Previous Chapters showed several approaches to model and identify weaknesses of coupled infrastructures using Complex Networks in a "High Level" system description. However, some of the nodes are complex systems, composed of different heterogeneous components with multiples interdependencies. Therefore, this sections aims at describing the individual components, that is, to model in detail the nodes as presented in Figure V:1. The definition of "High level" system description and "Low level" system description reveals the scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches to analyze power systems at different levels.

Substations are key components of Power Distribution and Transmission systems. Previous Chapters assumed these substations as a single bus and consequently a single node in the Complex Networks approach. However, they are autonomous systems composed of multiple devices with multiple connections as described in (IEC 61850 2003). For that reason and according to the System-of-Systems Engineering, substations are modeled as complex networks and the Eigenspectral approach is used to identify critical components within the substation.

V.2.1 Test system – HV/MV Substation

The 14-bus distribution test system from CHAPTER IV is used in this section to exemplify the analysis. This test system is part of the PREDIS platform, which is a center of innovation and education for Smart grids, particularly for distributed energy located at G2ELAB/Grenoble INP. It provides a demonstration tool for smart energy management with a physical power grid complying with industry standards. It particularly allows different energy sources to be connected to different users through a reconfigurable physical grid and a supervisory control system. This testbed allowed different studies to be performed, including Self-healing on distribution networks with distributed generators (Le-Thanh, et al. 2009), to test fault location algorithms and different means for improving resilience in an coupled system (Stahl, et al. 2010) and to test high level functions relied on advanced ICT systems (Hadjsaid, Le-Thanh, et al. 2010).

During the SINARI Project (McDonald, et al. 2013) this platform was improved and an emulation of a Control Center and a Substation were included, with the corresponding SCADA system and the Communication Network.




Figure V:2 Complete 14-Bus Tests System

According to the results presented in CHAPTER IV, the bus 2 is the most important and critical in the 14-bus test system (see Figure V:2); however, this bus is a substation, the architecture of this substation is presented in Figure V:3. Figure V:4 shows the Communication Network and Figure V:5 presents the possible supply system for auxiliary systems, such as relays, router, HMI, and printers. The auxiliary system was included in this dissertation and is not a part of the original Platform. SINARI Project used the standard IEC 61850 to define the communication protocols between devices within the substation.




Figure V:3 Substation diagram including Control devices

The control system has a protection Schneider S40, 3 protections Schneider S80. In this dissertation another relay S80 was included in order to exemplify the impact of auxiliary systems,. These protections have several functions, including overvoltage, under voltage, and breaker failure, among others.

The communication network is an Ethernet-based system, relays are with IEC 61850 protocol. Additionally, it includes a local controller, a network printer (not included in the PREDIS platform) and a gateway to communicate with other substations.

Auxiliary system is composed of Back-up diesel generator and battery storage. Relays are DC loads and computers, printers and routers are AC loads.




Figure V:4 Substation Communication Network




Figure V:5 Auxiliary Control supply system

V.2.2 Complex-networks modeling methodology

The methodology to design the graph is the same than in CHAPTER IV. But in this case, not only the bus-bars are modeled as nodes, but as well the circuit breakers, bay protection relays, transformers and controller computers. The resulting graph of the substation is detailed in Figure V:6.

Links within the communication network (ICT and Control) are bidirectional according to the nature of communications in this network. On the other hand, for the power supply, links are unidirectional. However, for further applications (Smart grids and future networks) these links can be modeled as well as bi-directional connections.

This network clearly has four clusters, each one with a central hub (nodes 5, 18, 21 and 24). Therefore, it is expected that the Eigenspectral analysis will highlight these nodes as important, but most importantly, that it will quantify their importance in the network.

Even if this level is called “Low level” system description, it is important to mention that there are “lower levels” (and “higher levels”), and it depends on the user the level degree at with the coupled system will be modeled.

Additionally, the resulting substation model can be used as a generic model of substations. That is, as a black-box with inputs and outputs that can be connected in the “high level” system description model in order to integrate both levels and obtain a SoS vision of coupled infrastructures.




Figure V:6 Substation graph

V.2.3 Results “Low level” description

Table V:1 and Table V:2 list the highest eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors. For the power system, the results suggest that nodes 21, 19 and 18 are the most critical in the system. These nodes correspond to the loads bus-bar in the auxiliary system and the AC/DC converter. These results highlight the importance of the auxiliary system in power grids.

At first glance, these results are showing an uncommon vulnerability. However, it is clear that in the coupled system, auxiliary systems are in the interface of the power systems and the ICT system. Moreover, without node 21, all communication components will be disconnected and the consequences might be catastrophic.

Table V:1 Eigenanalysis Substation System - A_e

	ID 1		ID 2		ID 3		ID 4		ID 5	
	$\lambda = 3.079$		$\lambda = 2.676$		$\lambda = 2.459$		$\lambda = -3.074$		$\lambda = -2.626$	
	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ
1	0.000	-1.772	0.005	-0.231	0.031	3.142	0.000	-1.237	0.005	0.431
2	0.001	-0.987	0.013	0.555	0.077	-2.356	0.000	2.690	0.013	-1.925
3	0.002	-0.202	0.031	1.340	0.159	-1.571	0.001	0.333	0.029	2.002
4	0.006	0.584	0.069	2.125	0.313	-0.785	0.003	-2.023	0.062	-0.354
5	0.016	1.369	0.153	2.911	0.610	0.000	0.009	1.904	0.135	-2.711
6	0.026	2.155	0.142	-2.587	0.296	0.785	0.015	-0.452	0.112	1.216
7	0.006	2.155	0.067	-2.587	0.297	0.785	0.003	-0.452	0.060	1.216
8	0.006	2.155	0.067	-2.587	0.297	0.785	0.003	-0.452	0.060	1.216
9	0.006	2.155	0.067	-2.587	0.297	0.785	0.003	-0.452	0.060	1.216
10	0.002	2.940	0.025	-1.802	0.121	1.571	0.001	-2.808	0.023	-1.140
11	0.002	2.940	0.025	-1.802	0.121	1.571	0.001	-2.808	0.023	-1.140
12	0.002	2.940	0.025	-1.802	0.121	1.571	0.001	-2.808	0.023	-1.140
13	0.064	2.940	0.226	-1.802	0.117	1.571	0.037	-2.808	0.158	-1.140
14	0.056	-2.914	0.182	-1.282	0.031	3.076	0.031	2.733	0.102	-2.275
15	0.116	-2.321	0.275	-0.715	0.078	-0.686	0.103	0.747	0.261	2.259
16	0.119	-2.391	0.292	-0.852	0.037	-0.210	0.105	0.823	0.286	2.445
17	0.098	-2.356	0.209	-0.785	0.081	-0.535	0.094	0.785	0.230	2.356
18	0.303	-1.571	0.559	0.000	0.200	0.251	0.289	-1.571	0.603	0.000
19	0.304	-0.785	0.095	0.785	0.054	1.036	0.303	2.356	0.121	-2.356
20	0.206	-0.785	0.114	-2.356	0.027	-2.105	0.209	2.356	0.109	0.785
21	0.634	0.000	0.304	-1.571	0.068	-1.320	0.644	0.000	0.286	-1.571
22	0.098	-0.785	0.209	0.785	0.081	1.036	0.094	2.356	0.230	-2.356
23	0.098	-0.785	0.209	0.785	0.081	1.036	0.094	2.356	0.230	-2.356
24	0.098	-0.785	0.209	0.785	0.081	1.036	0.094	2.356	0.230	-2.356
25	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
26	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
27	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
28	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
29	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
30	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356
31	0.206	0.785	0.114	-0.785	0.027	-0.535	0.209	-2.356	0.109	2.356

For the ICT system, there is an unequivocal evidence that node 24 is the most central and important node in the coupled system. In this case, the result was very clear before the computation of the eigensystem, because of the structure of the communication network.

Additionally, results evidence a star-network topology, as mentioned before in CHAPTER IV. It is well known that this type of topologies has several advantages, including a high-performance, easiness to create larger networks, adding a new host (new component) to the network, does not mean that the hosts already connected will get a bad performance (Peterson and Davie 2003). Nevertheless, this topology is highly dependent on the central hub, which is the case of this network.

Table V:2 Eigenanalysis Substation System - A_c

	ID 1		ID 2		ID 5		ID 6	
	$\lambda = 4.402$		$\lambda = -4.402$		$\lambda = 1.414$		$\lambda = -1.414$	
	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ	$ x $	φ
1	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
2	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.037	-3.142	0.475	3.142
3	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
4	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.101	-3.142	0.160	3.142
5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
6	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.137	3.142	0.020	0.000
7	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.633	0.000	0.161	0.000
8	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.229	3.142	0.471	0.000
9	0.078	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.130	3.142	0.018	-3.142
10	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
11	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
12	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
13	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
14	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
15	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
16	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
17	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
18	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
19	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
20	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
21	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
22	0.219	0.000	0.219	3.142	0.000	0.000	0.000	-3.142
23	0.219	0.000	0.219	3.142	0.000	0.000	0.000	-3.142
24	0.681	0.000	0.681	0.000	0.000	-3.142	0.000	0.000
25	0.244	0.000	0.244	-3.142	0.101	-3.142	0.160	0.000
26	0.244	0.000	0.244	-3.142	0.137	3.142	0.020	3.142
27	0.244	0.000	0.244	3.142	0.633	0.000	0.161	3.142
28	0.244	0.000	0.244	-3.142	0.229	3.142	0.471	-3.142
29	0.244	0.000	0.244	-3.142	0.130	3.142	0.018	0.000
30	0.244	0.000	0.244	-3.142	0.037	-3.142	0.475	0.000
31	0.219	0.000	0.219	3.142	0.000	0.000	0.000	-3.142

V.3 Integration of “Low level” and “High level” system description

CHAPTER III and Section V.2 presented a methodology to model coupled infrastructures in a “High level” and a “Low level” system description. Both descriptions can be integrated in a single model, which is a SoS vision of coupled infrastructures. In this section, the “Low level” system description is added to the “High level” system description. As a result, it is obtained a model that involves all components of coupled infrastructures, as displayed in Figure V:7.




Figure V:7 Integration of “Low level” and “High level” description

V.3.1 Methodology

In order to create a standardized model to describe coupled infrastructures, taking into account the “High level” and the “Low level” system descriptions, this Chapter proposes a 3-steps methodology, as detailed in Figure V:8.

- *Step 1:* Build the “High Level” System Description, black-boxes interdependencies.
 - Define the main systems involved in the coupled infrastructures.
 - Define the interdependency types to be modeled.
 - Define the systems’ interconnections and relationships.
- *Step 2:* Build the “Low Level” System Description, description of black-boxes.
 - Description of every system involved in the “High Level” system description, taking into account the same interdependency types.
 - Definition of inputs & outputs that interface the system with other systems.
- *Step 3:* Integration, SoS vision of coupled infrastructures.
 - Interconnect the systems according to the architecture built in the “High level” system description and the input & output configurations from “Low level” system description.
 - Resulting model can be used to identify the critical components after applying the approaches proposed in CHAPTER III.




Figure V:8 Methodology to elaborate the SoS Model

V.3.2 Test case

In order to demonstrate how to build the SoS model, the graph obtained in CHAPTER IV (see Figure IV:21) will be used for the Step 1. The substation model from Figure V:6 describes the “Low level” of substations, i.e. nodes 2 (substation 1), 3 (substation 3) and 4 (substation 2). It is taken as a general purpose substation; it means that the same model will be taken for all substations. Table V:3 presents the nodes correspondence between “High level” model and “Low level” model. For instance, the node 10 (Substation Bay 1) corresponds to the node 6 in the “High level” graph (see Figure V:2) for the Substation 1.

After integrating both levels, the resulting model has two layers, one for the electric interdependencies (Figure V:9) and one for the ICT interdependencies (Figure V:10).

Table V:3 Nodes correspondence between “High level” and “Low Level” system description

General Substation model	Substation 1 Correspondence	Substation 2 Correspondence	Substation 3 Correspondence
1	1	1	1
10	6	11	14
11	5	-	-
12	9	-	-
24	15	23	23




Figure V:9 Graph Electric Interdependencies Global model

The resulting two-layer model can be used to compute the two approaches proposed in CHAPTER III. For instance, for the Eigenspectral analysis the main results are shown in Table V:4 for the electric layer and in Table V:5 for the ICT layer.

Table V:4 Results Eigenspectrum Electric Interdependencies

ID 4 - $\lambda = 3.12$				
Node	Correspondence	Zone	$ \chi $	φ
68	21	Substation 1	0.399	0.000
97	21	Substation 2	0.399	0.000
65	18	Substation 1	0.293	-1.571
94	18	Substation 2	0.293	-1.571
66	19	Substation 1	0.222	-0.785
95	19	Substation 2	0.222	-0.785

Table V:5 Results Eigenspectrum ICT Interdependencies

ID 2 - $\lambda = 6.3$				
Node	Correspondence	Zone	$ \chi $	φ
23	-	Distribution	0.690	0
49	31	Substation 1	0.172	0
103	28	Substation 3	0.163	0
71	25	Substation 2	0.163	0
72	26	Substation 2	0.163	0
73	27	Substation 2	0.163	0
74	28	Substation 2	0.163	0
75	29	Substation 2	0.163	0
76	30	Substation 2	0.163	0
77	31	Substation 2	0.163	0
100	25	Substation 3	0.163	0
101	26	Substation 3	0.163	0
102	27	Substation 3	0.163	0
104	29	Substation 3	0.163	0
105	30	Substation 3	0.163	0
106	31	Substation 3	0.163	0

It was expected beforehand that substations play an important role in the coupled infrastructure. Table V:4 and Table V:5 reveal that the most critical nodes of the coupled infrastructure are located at substations 1, 2 and 3. In fact, the most critical nodes are components of the auxiliary system. This result is evident since the auxiliary system supply the electricity to the control and monitoring system, that is, the auxiliary system is located at the interface of both systems, as mentioned in previous sections.

In addition, the Ethernet network (represented by node 23) is identified as the most important ICT component for the coupled system. This result is consistent with the results obtained in CHAPTER IV.

This model has revealed the weakest components in a system-of-systems, which allows the development of defense strategies either for the coupled system or for every system.

V.4 Smart-Grids: A SGAM-based System-of-Systems vision

One of the objectives of this dissertation is to explore the feasibility of using the proposed approaches at different levels, according to the most recent architectures proposed for Smart Grids. Previous Chapters and sections proposed different methods (or a vision) to model coupled infrastructures, from a “high level description” and from a “low level description.” This Section aims at describing the Smart Grids Architecture model (SGAM) and proposes a general methodology to model Smart Grids’ interdependencies.

In order to better understand the SGAM, it is important to define a Smart Grid. According to the European Commission “*a Smart grid is an electricity network that can integrate in a cost efficient manner the behavior and actions of all users connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do both - in order to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high levels of quality and security of supply and safety*” (EU Commission Task Force for Smart Grids 2010)

However, even if there is an official definition of Smart Grid, apparently each enterprise and research center is developing its own Smart Grid model and definition. There are some researchers that call it the “Smarter Grid,” signaling that current grids are smart as well, but in a lower level (ABB Inc 2009).

Therefore, in order to fulfill the tasks of mandate M/490 (see Appendix C) and to create a consensus on Smart Grids Architectures, the SGAM was created (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012).

V.4.1 Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM)

(CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012) identified three major problems in the development of Smart Grids today.

- How to compare the different Smart Grids Architectures proposed?
- How to choose a Smart Grid Standard? Taking into account that there are several standards




Figure V:11 SGAM Framework (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012)

with many limitations, gaps and overlaps.

- How to migrate to Smart Grid from an architectural point of view?

According to them, a Smart Grid is a “*complex system of systems for which a common understanding of its major building and how they interrelate must be broadly shared.*” For that reason, in order to create a standardized architecture model, three main aspects were evaluated: domains, zones and interoperability layers. These aspects are described in next subsections.

V.4.1.1 SGAM: Domains

“Domains” describe the energy conversion chain, that is, a description of main actors in the Smart grid. These domains were selected according to the NIST Smart Grid Standard (NIST 2012). Additionally, the DER (Distributed Energy Resources) Domain was included. Therefore, the main domains of Smart Grids are:

- Generation: The bulk generation, e.g. fossil, nuclear, large scale solar power plants, hydro power plants and off-shore wind farms.
- Transmission: The infrastructure that transports electricity over long distances.
- Distribution: The infrastructure that distributes electricity to customers.
- DER: Small-scale power generation, from 3kW to 10MW.
- Customer: End-users (consumers), but they have the possibility to produce electricity, i.e. prosumers.

V.4.1.2 SGAM: Zones

“Smart Grids” are divided into six zones:

- Process: This zone includes all types of energy transformation, e.g. physical, chemical or spatial. In addition, it includes the physical equipment.
- Field: It contains all the equipment used to control, protect and monitor the processes within the Smart Grid.
- Station: This zone includes the aggregators of all fields’ equipment.
- Operation: It hosts the power system control operation, including DMS, EMS, and others.
- Enterprise: It covers all the commercial and organizational processes, services and infrastructures for enterprises.
- Market: It reflects the market operations possible in the energy conversion chain.

V.4.1.3 SGAM: Interoperability Layers

The interoperability layers cover the different interdependencies between domains in many zones. This is very close to the vision proposed in CHAPTER 3 (see Figure III:23 and Figure III:24). SGAM proposes five layers:

- Component: It represents the physical layer, including all participating components in the Smart Grids. For instance, power systems equipment, protection/control devices or network infrastructure.
- Function: It describes the functions and services including their relationships.

- Information: It contains all the information that is used and exchanged between functions, services and components.
- Communication: It describes the protocols and mechanisms used to exchange the information.
- Business: It represents all business capabilities and processes to support business executives in decision making processes.

V.4.1.4 SGAM: Architecture

The resulting architecture that puts all the domains, zones and layers together is detailed in Figure V:11. This representation enables the understanding of the relationships in the Smart Grid. In addition, this architecture can be used to describe the interoperability between two (or more) systems, taking into account the component, communication, information, function and business layers, which are called the “cross-cutting issues.”

V.4.2 Complex Networks modeling

This section proposes a standardized methodology in order to model Smart Grids, based in the Smart Grid Reference Architecture and the integration of “High level” and “Low level” descriptions.

Following the methodology detailed in Figure V:8, the three steps are described in the following subsections.

V.4.2.1 Step 1: High level system Description

- Define the main systems involved in the coupled infrastructures.

At this step, 8 systems are identified: Markets, Operations, Service provider, Transmission network, Distribution Network, Customer, Bulk generation and Distributed Energy Resources.

- Define the interdependency types to be modeled.

Considering the interdependencies types presented in Section I.2.2 (physical, cyber, geographic and logical) and taking into account the interoperability layers, four interdependency levels were defined: *physical level* is composed of electrical interdependencies between components of SGAM Component level. *Cyber level* is composed of communication interdependencies between components at the SGAM Component level. This layer can be supported as well by the Information layer. *Geographic level* according to the zones proposed in the SGAM framework. *Logical level* composed of function relationships, from the function layer in the SGAM framework.

- Define the systems interconnections and relationships.

The NIST model (NIST 2012) and the SGAM Reference architecture (CEN-CENELEC-ETSI 2012) presented the interconnections between the actors (or domains) in the Smart Grid. Figure V:12 presents the interconnections between these domains and their interdependency levels. Dotted lines were added in order to take into account the electrical dependency of markets, operation and service provider.

V.4.2.2 Step 2: Low Level system Description

- Description of every system involved in the “High Level” description, taking into account the same interdependency levels.




Figure V:12 Smart Grid “High level” description

The components of each system are described for all zones (process, field, station and operation). In addition, the interdependencies within the system are modeled using the same procedure than for the distribution system in CHAPTER IV.

V.4.2.3 Step 3: SoS vision of Smart Grids.

- Interconnect the systems according to the architecture built in the “High level” description and the input & output configurations from “Low level” description.

The final step integrates both levels, as presented in Section V.3. It is important to make clear that thanks to the integration of description levels, each system can be modeled as detailed as needed. For instance, the distribution system model can be described as in the CHAPTER III, or it can include as well the model of substation and lines, among others.

The proposed methodology should serve to model Smart Grid interdependencies and to identify the weakest connections and components within the System-of-systems.

V.5 Summary

This chapter proposed a “Low level” system description analysis of power systems and as a test case it was used a substation system developed during the SINARI Project and emulated in the PRE-DIS platform. Later, it proposes an integration methodology of “High level” and “Low level” system descriptions, in order to analyze the whole System-of-systems interdependencies. Finally, based on the Smart Grid Architecture Reference Model, it was proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids and to identify the weakest components in a SOS vision of coupled infrastructures.

The definition of “High level” description and “Low level” system description reveals the scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches to analyze power systems (and in general Critical

infrastructures) at different levels taking into account multiple interdependencies.

The main result of this Chapter is a methodology that aims at identifying the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of power systems facing the wide deployment of Information and Communication technologies, including substations and distributed energy resources.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

There is no real ending. It's just the place where you stop the story.

Frank Herbert

Power Distribution Systems demand a continuous research to ensure high levels of reliability, availability and security. As a consequence, new equipment has been created to support the supervision, control and protection of Power Distribution Systems. This new equipment relies on fast, secure and efficient communication networks.

However, last years have been marked by high deployment of Information and Telecommunication Technologies on many infrastructures, making a whole complex network of coupled heterogeneous infrastructures, creating a huge System-of-Systems.

As well, power systems face other challenges, such as the beginning of a liberalized market and the insertion of decentralized generation. Yet these two challenges highly rely on ICT networks.

Generally speaking, ICT deployment has been very positive and has improved the supervision and control, supported the operation decision making process, policy making and markets regulation. Nevertheless, recent events have shown that there are new vulnerabilities that emerge from the interactions and interplays among Critical infrastructures, e.g. Stuxnet worm, Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear plant attack or the 2003 US – Canada Blackout.

This dissertation described some of the main interplays and interdependencies among critical infrastructures. Particularly, it investigated and described the interdependencies among power distribution networks, information and communication infrastructure and the different control and supervision hierarchical levels, to better understand the studied problem.

Among the multiple interdependencies between infrastructures, this dissertation explored those that are capable of creating cascading effects from one infrastructure to the other.

In this context, the US Homeland Security Department and the European Commission have addressed this problem, and new policies are being created in order to ensure the continuity of service of Critical Infrastructures. As well, many projects have been developed in order to understand these complex interactions, one of them: the SINARI Project, sponsored by the ANR-France. This thesis was developed as part of this project.

This context opened a new research direction with new challenges and goals. One of them is the

need of new tools and methods to understand, to identify and to quantify the interdependencies and vulnerabilities that can emerge from the interconnection of critical infrastructures from micro and macro visions. The study of several methods to model critical infrastructures show the many aspects covered by researchers around the world to understand complex systems.

This dissertation reviews many popular methods, including Agent-Based models, Bayesian Networks, Boolean Logic driven Bayesian Networks, Combined Simulators, Petri Networks and Complex Networks. However, these methods have unlike objectives, making impossible to compare their results. Instead, a sum of these methods can help to understand the dynamics on critical infrastructures, to design adequate protections and to plan adequate emergency actions against attacks and failures.

Among these methods, Complex Networks showed that they are capable and suitable to model and to reflect the topological properties of large complex systems. This dissertation is based on the idea that Power Systems are one of the most complex modern networks and there is little understanding of their structure and properties. Thus, to understand this complex system it is needed to map out its interactions and interdependencies in a network-based model.

Two “High-level” models (or macro-vision models) were proposed, these models aim at describing the asymmetrical communication patterns that can be found in heterogeneous infrastructures. In order to create these models, the classic theory of complex networks was modified and a new mathematical dimension was introduced in the characteristic adjacency matrix. As well, this adjacency matrix was transported to the Hilbert Space using Hermitian Matrices to obtain the Eigen-system that characterizes the interdependent infrastructures.

The significance and originality of this dissertation lays in its ability to bridge two infrastructures in a single model, conserving their own characteristics and highlighting the interconnections among them. As well, because of the flexibility and scalability of the model, it is not limited to the type of infrastructure to model; moreover n -infrastructures can be studied in a multi-dimensional model.

Therefore, the proposed methods tailor the complex networks to the study of critical infrastructures vulnerabilities, developing a networks-based representation of the interacting infrastructures that allows treating the interdependencies problem in a more unified fashion.

Throughout the course of this dissertation many difficulties (or challenges) were found, including the little understanding of power distribution systems, information and communication networks and control systems working as a whole coupled system. Since each infrastructure represents a large complex domain, it is complicated to assemble a set of definitions, procedures and component of heterogeneous systems. But at the same time, this notoriously difficult problem highlights the novelty of this dissertation, because it shows a slight headway in the field of modeling of interdependent infrastructures. Another major difficulty was the lack of data and tools to validate the models.

The main disadvantage of the presented approaches is that they are purely topological. However, this study can be considered as the foundation of further work dealing with vulnerability studies of interdependent infrastructures. As well, some indexes reflect somehow the flow of data and electricity within the networks, e.g. Betweenness Centrality and Efficiency metrics.

A “Low level” (or micro-vision) model is proposed to identify the vulnerabilities in a deeper level. This model was integrated with the “High level” model in order to have a complete analysis of coupled infrastructures and as result of this integration, a 3-steps methodology was obtained to analyze coupled infrastructures at different description levels.

Finally, this dissertation proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids, based in the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM). This methodology exploits the “High level” and “Low level” system description in order to create a model that considers all the domains, zones and interdependencies between components in a Smart Grid. However, it is clear than on a complex system like a Smart Grid, it is not possible to consider all aspects that define their interdependencies. Although it is true, the proposed methodology should serve as a first step to identify weaknesses in Smart Grids and should inspire future work.

Therefore, further work should be focused on dynamic networks that will represent the dynamical behavior of infrastructures. However, it is a very complex endeavor and since deeper investigations lead to more questions, further work has to be realized by a multi-disciplinary team including not only electrical and systems engineers, but also mathematicians, sociologists and economist in order to represent the real behavior of coupled heterogeneous infrastructures.

Some of the proposed research challenges include:

- **Continue the modeling of coupled infrastructures using Complex-weighted complex networks.** As it was mention, the proposed approaches are a first step to model multi-dimensional interdependencies between critical infrastructures. This work could be extended in order to consider many other infrastructures’ interdependencies. Then, it is possible to integrate cross disciplinary interdependencies. For instance, gas and water transport interdependencies with the generation units in the “Low level” description.
- **Smart Grids modeling.** Last Chapter proposed a methodology to model Smart Grids and to identify weaknesses that emerge from the integration of multiple components located at different domains and zones. This methodology should serve to compare different architectures and to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- **Develop (reinforce) self-healing algorithms using complex networks.** Thanks to the scalability and flexibility of proposed approaches. They can be used to evaluate optimal configuration after a failure, from a topological viewpoint. It could either reduce the number of options (new architectures) or propose new architectures that might not be evident using other methods.
- **Create a test case of interdependent critical infrastructures.** One of the main limitations during this research was the lack of complete test cases. Therefore, an important and critical research line is the development of test cases in order to validate new methods and models that include coupled infrastructures. Some of this research is already being developed at G2ELAB.
- **Development of failure detection/prediction algorithms.** Since topology-driven analysis reveals several weaknesses of coupled infrastructures, this analysis can be used to reinforce or to develop new failure detection/prediction algorithms.
- **System-of-Systems Engineering & Global vision of Systems.** As a short-term research line, many “Low-level” general purpose models can be created in order to identify optimal architectures. For instance, create black-boxes for all types of substation configuration that can be easily included in the “High-level” model.
- **Multiple infrastructure planning:** It includes the development of tools to address multiple heterogeneous infrastructures in the planning process.

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Appendix A

COMPLEX NETWORKS: ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATION

Whereas the twentieth century was seen as the century of physics, the twenty-first is often predicted to be the century of biology. A decade ago it would have been tempting to call it the century of the gene. Few people would dare say that any longer about the century we have just entered. It will most likely be a century of complexity.

Albert Barabasi

This Appendix aims at unifying definitions, algorithms and codes to allow other researcher to repeat the algorithms and work in this area of research. For the sake of this dissertation, three main references were used: [1], [2] and [3].

A.1. Toolbox definition

All codes developed during this dissertation were done in Matlab. In order to compute the complex-weighted complex networks, a Toolbox was developed using object-oriented codes.

1. Graph, Nodes and Links

The Graph is defined as a class and its properties are:

properties

```
edges = [];%Vector of Edges class elements
vertices = [];%Vector of Vertices class elements
nedges = 0; %Total number of edges
type = 0; %Type of Graph 0->Undirected, 1->Directed
nvertices = 0; %Total number of Vertices
idxvertices = []; %Vector used to find vertices
valvertices = []; %Vector used to find vertices
diameter = 0; %Graph Diameter
distances = []; %Matrix containing the distances among nodes
avdistance = 0; %Graph Average Distance
avclustering = 0; %Graph Average Clustering
avdegree = 0; %Average Degree (in-degree for Directed graphs)
avdegreeout = 0; %Out-Degree
density = 0; %Graph Density
A = []; %Adjacency Matrix
C = []; %Cost matrix
```

```

Cim = []; %Cost matrix imaginaire
AdjList = [];%Adjacency List
ShortestPaths = {}; %List of shortest paths
UnitShortestPaths = {};
NShortestPaths = 0;
end

```

GRAPH CLASS
edges (vector of Edges) vertices (vector of Vertices) nedges type nvertices idxvertices valvertices diameter distances avdistance avclustering avdegree avdegreeout density A C Cim AdjList ShortestPath UnitShrortestPaths NShortestPaths
addEdges (from, to, n_lines) addEdge(from, to) addVertices(bus, n_bus) addVertex(bus) addWeight(bus, Weight) modifyWeightVertex(bus, newWeight) createAdjacency() createAvDistance() createBetweennessCentrality() MaxFlowFulkerson(from, to, type) createDegree() createDensity() createDiameter() createDistances createNeighbor() createShortestPaths() createStats() updateIdxvertices() getAdjList() getAdjMatrix() getCostMatrix() getDegree() getEdgeCapacity() getEnds() getNeighbors() getNeighborLevel(edge, level) getShortestPaths() getUnconnected() getVertexCapacity(node) isVertex(node) isEdge(from, to) findEdge(from, to) findEdgeIdx(from, to, type) getAntennas() getDegreeDistribution() getDistanceNodes(node1, node2) getDistances() getNetworkDiameter() getAverageDegree() getBetweennessCentrality(node)

EDGES CLASS
name from to betweenness centrality capacity coordx coordy
getBetweenness getName getFrom getTo getCentrality getCapacity getCoordinates

VERTICES CLASS
name degree degreeout betweenness closeness neighbor clustering capacity tempVariable
gettempVariable getBetweenness getCapacity getCloseness getClustering getDegree getDegreeout getName getNeighbors addAuxiliary addBetweenness addCapacity addCloseness addClustering addDegree addDegreeout addName addNeighbor

2. Shortest Path : Dijkstra

Shortest path or geodesic path is the shortest path from one node to another. The methodology used to compute the shortest path was developed by Dijkstra, and the optimal algorithm was taken from [4]. Which is:

Dijkstra (G, w, s)

```
1:   for each vertex  $w \in \mathcal{V}[G]$ 
2:       do  $d[w] \leftarrow \infty$ 
3:            $\pi[w] \leftarrow \text{NIL}$ 
4:    $d[s] \leftarrow 0$ 
5:    $S \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
6:    $\mathcal{Q} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}[G]$ 
7:   while  $\mathcal{Q} \neq \emptyset$ 
8:       do  $u \leftarrow \text{Extract-Min}(\mathcal{Q})$ 
9:            $S \leftarrow S \cup \{u\}$ 
10:      for each vertex  $v \in \text{Adj}[u]$ 
11:          if  $d[u] > d[u] + w(u,v)$ 
12:              then  $d[v] \leftarrow d[u] + w(u,v)$ 
13:                   $\pi[v] \leftarrow u$ 
```

Personal application in Matlab:

```
function [D PI] = Dijkstra(V,E,Adj,W);
[nE temp] = size(E);
nV = length(V);

w = zeros(length(V));
for i = 1:nE
    w(E(i,1),E(i,2))=W(i);
end
D=[];PI=[];
for s = 1:nV
    d = zeros(1,length(V));
    pi = zeros(1,length(V));
    [d pi]= init_source(V,s,d,pi);
    S = [];
    Q = V;
    while ~isempty(Q)
        [u Q] = extractMin(s,Q,S,d);
        S = [S u];
        nAdj = length(Adj(u).adj);
        tempAdj = Adj(u).adj;
        for j = 1:nAdj
            v = tempAdj(j);
            [d pi]= relax(u,v,w,d,pi);
        end
    end
    D = [D;d];
    PI = [PI;pi];
```

```

    end
end

function [d pi]= init_source(V,s,d,pi)
    nV = length(V);
    for i = 1:nV
        d(i)=inf;
        pi(i)= -1;
    end
    d(s)=0;
end

function [d pi]= relax(u,v,w,d,pi)
    if d(v) > d(u)+ w(u,v);
        d(v) = d(u) + w(u,v);
        pi(v) = u;
    end
end

function [u Q] = extractMin(s,Q,S,d)
    if isempty(S)
        u = s;
        Q(s)=[];
    else
        [minD minIDX]=min(d(Q));
        u = Q(minIDX);
        Q(minIDX)=[];
    end
end
end

```

A.2. Centrality Indexes

1. Betweenness Centrality

This index aims at answering the question: “What is your importance in the Network?” [1]. This index was widely used in this dissertation. Even if the equation presented in Section III.3.1.5 is simple, it is not so evident to compute. Authors in [5] proposed an optimal algorithm called “A Faster algorithm for betweenness centrality,” which was used by the developers of GEPHI¹⁹ software and the library “matlab_bgl”²⁰, the two tools used for the purpose of this dissertation.

2. Spectral Centrality

The Spectral Centrality was computed in Matlab, using the follow code:

```

function [VecELEC, ValELEC, VecICT, ValICT, kinelec, koutelec, kinict, koutict,
ELECVectores, ICTVectores]=Spectral_Prestige(dataElec, dataICT)
    clc
    disp('SPECTRAL ANALYSIS - CHAPTER 3')
    nodes = (1:23)';
    nnodes = 23;

```

¹⁹ Gephi is an interactive visualization and exploration platform for all kinds of graphs. More information: <https://gephi.org/>

²⁰ MATLAB_BLG is a library for Matlab that provides a set of algorithms to work with graphs, was developed by David Gleich. More information: <http://goo.gl/77Obn>

```

[nlineElec temp]=size(dataElec);
[nlineICT temp]=size(dataICT);
outcomes = zeros(nnodes,3);
outcomes(:,1) = (1:nnodes)';
elecNodes = (1:14)';
commNodes = (15:23)';
test = 0;

%% CALCUL
disp('ELECTRIC NETWORK')
From = dataElec(:,1);
To = dataElec(:,2);
Weights = diag(ones(nlineElec));
Aelec = adjacencyMatrixELEC(From, To,nnodes,nlineElec,Weights);

kinelec = sum(Aelec,1);
koutelec = sum(Aelec,2);

%WE ROTATE A BY MULTIPLYING A WITH  $e^{-i\pi/4}$ 
Helec = Aelec * exp(-1i*pi()/4);

%EIGENSPECTRAL ANALYSIS
[VecELEC, ValELEC] = eig(Helec);
ValELEC = diag(ValELEC)
[THETAelec,RHOelec] = cart2pol(real(VecELEC),imag(VecELEC))

ELECVectoros = [];
for i = 1:23
    ELECVectoros = [ELECVectoros RHOelec(:,i) THETAelec(:,i)];
end

valores = sort(real(ValELEC),'descend');
plot(valores, '*')

disp('ICT NETWORK')
From = dataICT(:,1);
To = dataICT(:,2);
Weights = diag(ones(nlineICT));
Aict = adjacencyMatrixICT(From, To,nnodes,nlineICT,Weights);

kinict = sum(Aict,1);
koutict = sum(Aict,2);

%WE ROTATE A BY MULTIPLYING A WITH  $e^{-i\pi/4}$ 
Hict = Aict * exp(-1i*pi()/4);

%EIGENSPECTRAL ANALYSIS
[VecICT, ValICT] = eig(Hict);
ValICT = diag(ValICT)

[THETAaict,RHOaict] = cart2pol(real(VecICT),imag(VecICT));
ICTVectoros = [];
for i = 1:23
    ICTVectoros = [ICTVectoros RHOaict(:,i) THETAaict(:,i)];
end
figure()
valores2 = sort(real(ValICT),'descend');

```

```

plot(valores2, '*')

res1 = [ValeLEC';VecELEC];
res2 = [ValICT';VecICT];
end

function A = adjacencyMatrixELEC(From, To, nnodes, nline, Weights)
A = zeros(nnodes);
for i = 1:nline
A(From(i),To(i))=A(From(i),To(i))+Weights(i);
A(To(i),From(i))=A(To(i),From(i))+(Weights(i)*1i);
end
end

function A = adjacencyMatrixICT(From, To, nnodes, nline, Weights)
A = zeros(nnodes);
for i = 1:nline
A(From(i),To(i))=A(From(i),To(i))+Weights(i)+(Weights(i)*1i);
A(To(i),From(i))=A(To(i),From(i))+Weights(i)+(Weights(i)*1i);
end
end

```

A.3. More information

Many more information about small-world [6], scale-free networks [7] can be found in the literature. This information is important, since it allows knowing other properties of complex systems, about their structure and topology. M. Newman published a Survey con Complex Systems [8], which emphasizes the papers with the highest impact in this subject.

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Appendix B

RECENT ATTACKS AND ICTS FAILURES

Quis custodiet ipsos custodiet

Decimus Iunius Iuvenalis

Every day it is likely to find sensationalist headlines as: “.S. Power and water utilities face daily cyber-attacks” (in Homeland Security News Wire, Published on 6 April 2012), “Russia says many states arming for cyber warfare” (in Reuters, Published on 25 April 2012), “Hacker could take over traffic and rail-road control systems using back-door” (in Magazine “Info-Security,” Published on 26 April 2012). But, does this news show a reality or just a paranoia state? This appendix summarizes the main and recent attacks to Power System facilities worldwide, as well as, some failures on information and communication systems that have been remembered as historical events due to their great impact on the life of hundreds of citizens.

B.1. Recent Attacks against industrial control systems

1. Flame – 2012

Flame malware (also known as Flamer or sKyWIper) was discovered in 2012 by the MAHER Center of Iranian National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [1], Karspersky Lab [2] and CrySys [3]. The origin of this malware is unknown, but it has been used for targeted cyber espionage in Middle Eastern countries.

This malware attacks computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system (including Windows XP, Vista and 7), and its main objective is to impact on SCADA Security Systems [4]. It performs network sniffing, collects a list of vulnerable passwords, transfers saved data on control servers, and it has the ability to record audio, screen-shots, keyboard activity and network traffic. It is transferred over a local network (LAN) via USB stick or via file sharing.

2. Worm W32.Duqu – 2011

On 1st September 2011, the computer worm Duqu was discovered by the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySys) in Hungary. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland, the Worm Duqu is an information-gathering threat that targeted specific organizations, including industrial control systems (ICSs) manufacturers [5]. According to the reports, the code appears to look

for information such as design documents that could be used to launch a future attack against a facility under the control of an ICS -including electric generation, water/wastewaters treatment, oil and gas production/distribution/refining, chemical/petrochemical processing, transportation systems, and building automation systems.

3. Stuxnet – 2010

It is a computer sophisticated worm discovered in July 2010 in Iran [6] and has been recognized as one of the most complex threat ever found. It was primarily written to target industrial control systems which have the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC/Step 7 controller software installed, and its final goal was to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) by modifying the code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to make them work in a very specific manner, the attacker intended to hide those changes from the operator of the equipment. Most of the victims were located in Iran, Indonesia, and India, it was reported 14 power plants infected (among them the Bushehr Nuclear Power plant in Iran) and more than 50000 Windows computers. However, there is no record of mortal consequences.

The worm exploited unknown windows vulnerabilities that allowed it to spread from computer to computer via USB stick and thus infect computers and networks that are not normally connected to the Internet. It had two specific characteristics, it get more complex over time (it has four zero-day exploits) and it has a deadline on 24th June 2012, date when it will stop spreading and delete itself [7], [8]. According to several publications, USA and Israel are the most common suspects, however it remains highly speculative and it will remain a mystery [9], [10]. Authors in [11] study how Stuxnet infects and propagates using a typical (but hypothetical) security model.

4. The Night Dragon – 2009

Since November 2009, hackers have stolen confidential data to companies from the energy sector in the United States, this series of attacks was called “The Night Dragon” since it was originated from several locations in China [12].

This coordinated attack was conducted against global oil, energy and petrochemical companies, and against individual and executives of such enterprises. Each attack was divided into five steps, according to McAffe:

1. Attack through SQL-injection on extranet web servers to allow remote command execution.
2. Gained access to sensitive internal desktops and servers.
3. Accessed additional usernames and passwords.
4. Enabled direct communication from infected machines to the Internet.
5. Exfiltrated email archives and other highly sensitive documents.

Attackers used a “mix of hacking techniques” including SQL-injection and spear-phishing that compromised corporate VNP accounts. Despite this kind of attacks are common in Computer Networks; it is the first time this kind of attacks was focused against the Energy Sector [13].

5. Daimler-Chrysler plants - Zotob Worm – 2005

In August 2005, 13 assembly lines of Daimler-Chrysler US auto manufacturing plants (located at Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Delaware and Michigan) went offline for almost one hour due to several PC outages caused by the infection of Zotob, RBot and IRCBot worms. These viruses exploited a hole in the PnP (Plug-and-play) of computers running Windows 2000 [14]. The estimated cost impact was US\$14 million [15].

6. Ohio Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant – 2003

On January 25, 2003 the worm MS SQL Server 2000 attacked several computers in the Ohio Davis-Besse Nuclear plant. This computer blackout caused data overload in the site network and therefore the computers were unable to communicate with each other. Fortunately the plant control and protection functions were not affected [16]. However, the safety monitoring system was offline for 5 hours.

Even if the plant network is well protected by a firewall, the worm by-passed the access controls through a T1 Connection line used by a consultant.

7. Nimda worm – 2001

The Nimda worm, widely spread in the world in 2001, reached in September 2001 the internal network of a major EMS/SCADA vendor and then attacked the EMS/SCADA networks of all its customers via the support network [17].

This worm affected mainly system running Microsoft Windows 95/98, ME, NT and 2000 and propagated through email arriving as a multipart/alternative message. In the host computer, the Nimda worm caused denial-of-service conditions on networks affecting the internal network [18].

8. Code Red II Worm – 2001

Code Red II Worm was released on August 4 2001, this worm created a back-door to allow attacks on vulnerable systems. It exploited a security hole in Microsoft web server software. This worm affected the internal network of a company that provides services to numerous electric utility companies. Although the infected networks were protected and not exposed to the Internet, the worm used the private frame relay network connected to the service company [18].

9. Australian Sewage System – 2000

On February-April 2000, Vitek Boden realized a series of electronic attack on the sewage control system in Queensland – Australia, causing millions of liters of raw sewage to spill out into local parks and rivers [19]. He is an expert on SCADA systems and radio-controlled sewage equipment, and at that time he was applying for a job at the sewage control system, but his application was rejected, the reason why he revenged against the enterprise.

In the Australian Sewage System, each pumping station is able to receive commands from a Control Center by means of dedicated analog two-way radio system, using different frequencies. Vitek Boden installed some of these communication systems at the Australian Sewage System and the day he was captured in his car, police found in his laptop specialized software for accessing and controlling sewage management systems, as well as radio-equipment compatible with those used at the sewage system [20].

At the control center, engineers recognized that they were under attack after the detection of an increased radio traffic, that pumps were not responding under demand, some alarms were not reporting to the control center and the loss of communication between the control center and several pumping stations [21].

This attack demonstrated that intentional and targeted attacks by a knowledgeable person are real and may be catastrophic. As well, that this was just one attack by one person against a single system, therefore terrorist or even enemy nations can attack vulnerable infrastructures easily and in a much higher scale.

B.2. Information and Communication system failures leading to blackouts

10. Power Distribution in Rome – 2004

In January 2004 a flooding of a Telecom Italia major telecommunication node (node Laurentina) occurred in Roma. As a consequence, part of the wired and wireless services fell down. The cause of the blackout was the failure of the air conditioner in the communication room, which caused the overheated of telecommunication devices. Many other infrastructures were affected, including the ACEA Power Distribution Network, which lost two communication links (main and reluctant) among the Flaminia Control Center and the Ostiense Control Center, these two control centers did not have the chance to exchange alarms, signals nor commands for more than one hour, i.e. a total loss of monitoring and controlling systems. However, the Power Distribution System did not need to exchange alarms nor signals [22].

Other involved infrastructures were: Fiumicino airport, ANSI print agency, post offices and banks, the communication network (GARR), connecting the main Italian research institutions.

11. U.S. and Canada Blackout – 2003

On August 14, 2003 the Midwest and Northwest of the United States and Ontario in Canada were affected by a historical blackout, impacting on an estimated 50 million people and 70000 MW of electric loads, which represented losses between US\$ 4 billion and 10 billion. The power was restored only after 4 days in some parts of the United States [23].

That day, at 14h14 (local hour) the control room operators lost the alarm function that provided visual and audible indications when an equipment is in a problematic condition. This was caused by an overflow in the alarm function. This created a loss of awareness of the system's conditions. Consequently, after a few minutes some remote EMS (Energy Management System) terminal ceased operation and this caused as well the loss of the primary server hosting the alarm processing and the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) function hosted in the servers.

However, it was not the initial incident of the blackout. It was at 14h27 that the Star-South Canton 345 kV line triggered and reclosed, but operators did not notice this event. After other lines triggered because of overgrowing trees, but the Control center operators did not take any action because




Figure B - 1Black-out phases [23]

they did not realize these events caused by the lack of alarms. This caused a cascade effect on many lines. It is important to mention that the control center lacked of alarm failure detection systems.

This blackout had a negative impact on the cellular communication network since at the backup power at the cellular sites the generators ran out of fuel.

Figure B - 1 presents the time line of the main phases of the Blackout. This figure shows that the blackout was originated by a combination of errors and failures in the power grid, the ICT network and the human behavior.

More information can be found in [24], [25] and [26].

12. Ertan Hydro Station – 2000

On October 13 2000, the control system of ERTAN hydro station in China received unexpected signals that almost cause the collapse of the Sichuan Power System [27].

13. Hydro-Quebec – 1988

A remote load-shedding system failed to operate due to a communication system's failure in the control center, which led to a sequence of line trips followed by line overloading, tripping of generating units, and the loss of dc interconnections.

B.3. Conclusions

Recent events reveal several facts:

- Failures in ICT infrastructure can actually affect Power Systems.
- There is a tendency to perform targeted cyber and physical attacks, and these advanced threats now can target people as well through social engineering, using fake emails and other manipulation methods. Therefore, it is needed to improve the users' education and awareness to succeed against external targeted threats.
- Isolation from the internet is not an effective defense and all power systems that are controlled by software are vulnerable to cyber threats because internal networks can be attacked via usb keys or service networks.
- Terrorists and war fighters recognized that it is more effective to attack ICT infrastructures directly, than to physically attack their targets.

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APPENDIX C

PROJECTS INCLUDING COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURES

We may brave human laws, but we cannot resist natural ones

Jules Verne

This appendix summarizes several projects that have worked on Critical Infrastructures analysis, including modeling and simulation. As well, some of the standards that present guidelines to build these complexes coupled systems.

C.1. Projects

1. SINARI Project

Name: Sécurité des Infrastructures et Analyse de Risques

Website: <http://www.sinari.org>

Dates: 2010 - 2013

Project type: French - ANR

Originalities: Creation of a test platform that integrates power system emulation, communication network and SCADA simulation and real automatisms.

Objectives: The SINARI Project objectives are: to identify the hazards and risks inherent in integrated infrastructures, to develop necessary ICT defenses, to test the most representative of these defenses and finally to evaluate their effectiveness [1]-[2].

2. SEESGEN-ICT

Name: Supporting Energy Efficiency in Smart GENeration grids through ICT”

Website: <http://seesgen-ict.rse-web.it>

Dates: 2009 - 2011

Project type: European

Originalities: Proposition of policy recommendations for the introduction of ICT into the smart distributed power generation grids.

Objectives: It proposed policy recommendations for policy makers, including the Commission, Energy regulators and standardization bodies. Their main findings include the detection of barriers, such as lack of agreement about smart metering, lack of commercialized smart appliances and lack of standards. Therefore, they proposed a Demand Side Service Platform (DSSP) as a operational tool for policy agents [3].

3. VIKING

Name: Vital Infrastructure networks information and control systems management project

Website: <http://www.vikingproject.eu>

Dates: 2008 - 2011

Project type: European

Originalities: Evaluation of the Social Cost of cyberattacks.

Objectives: Investigate the vulnerability of SCADA systems and assess the cost of cyberattacks and develop strategies to mitigate the vulnerabilities [4].

4. MICIE

Name:

Dates: 2008 - 2011

Project type: European

Originalities: Proposition of alerting systems to assist the CI operator to reduce risk of failure.

Objectives: “MICIE alerting system,” which is able to identify the level of possible threats on ICTs. Its main objective was to define the main priorities to effectively introduce ICT into the Smart Distributed Power Grids [5]-[6].

5. CRUTIAL

Name: Critical Utility Infrastructural Resilience

Website: <http://crutial.rse-web.it>

Dates: 2006 - 2009

Project type: European

Objectives: propose models and architectures that cope with the scenario of openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities infrastructures; analyze of critical scenarios in which faults in the information infrastructure provoke serious impacts on the controlled electric power infrastructure; investigate distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of the power grid [7].

6. IRRIS

Name: Integrated Risk Reduction of Information based Infrastructure Systems

Website: <http://www.irriis.org>

Dates: 2006 - 2009

Project type: European

Objectives: Determine security needs of ICTs, develop a communication platform for automat-

ed information sharing between critical infrastructures; build a simulation environment to study critical infrastructures interdependencies, disseminate novel and innovative concepts to other information-based infrastructures [8].

7. GRID

Name: A coordination action on ICT vulnerabilities of Power Systems and the relevant defense methodologies.

Project type: European

Originalities: Detection of main challenges in near, mid and long term,

Objectives: The main purpose of this project was to establish a consensus on the key issues involved in power systems vulnerabilities [9].

C.2. Standards

Some cyber security standards for Power Systems are presented in [10] and [11].

1. ANSI/ISA 99

“Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: Concepts, Terminology and models.”

Divided in 4 parts, this standard address the Industrial Automation and control systems, describes the elements of a cyber-security management system, guides the application of these elements and presents how to operate correctly a security program. Finally, compares the industrial automation and control systems with other information systems.

2. IEEE Std 2030/2011

“Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology operation with the Electric Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads.”

This standard takes into account the integration of communications, power systems and information technology architectures to define design frameworks and strategies. As well, describes the interfaces within these infrastructures on Smart Grids.

3. IEC 62443/2010

“Industrial communication networks – Network and system security.”

Presents security guidelines and processes that industrial operators must follow. As well, some requirements for data integrity and confidentiality.

4. IEC 61850/2006

“Communications networks and systems in substations.”

Standard IEC 61850 was created because before its application, specific proprietary communication protocols were developed by each manufacturer, this caused the need of complicated and expensive protocol converters in order to use IEDs from different vendors. Therefore, this standard was designed to unify and provide a single protocol for a complete substation, to facilitate object modeling of data requirement in the substation, to define the basic services required to transfer data using different communication protocols and to allow the interoperability between IEDs from different vendors [12]. This Standard is divided into 10 parts:

Part 1	Introduction and overview
Part 2	Glossary
Part 3	General requirements
Part 4	System and project management
Part 5	Communication requirements for functions and device models
Part 6	Configuration description language for communication in electrical substations related IEDs
Part 7	1. Principles and Models, 2. Abstract communication service interface, 3. Common data classes, 4. compatible logical node (LN) classes and data classes
Part 8	Mapping to MMS and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
Part 9	Sampled values over serial unidirectional multidrop point-to-point link and ISO 8802-3
Part 10	Conformance testing

5. IEEE Std 1686/2007

“IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities.”

Describes the requirements for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices to secure the local/remote access and thus secure the substation. As well, it proposes features to develop a defensive procedure.

6. Mandate 490 - 2011

“Standardization Mandate to European Standardisation Organisations to support European Smart Grid Deployment.”

The main objective of this mandate is to develop and/or update standards that deal with the integration of Information and Communication Technologies on Smart Grids.

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APPENDIX D

PUBLICATIONS

*Our virtues and our failings are inseparable,
like force and matter. When they separate, man is no more.*

Nikola Tesla

This appendix summarizes the publications arising from this thesis:

International Journals:

- [1] A. Merdassi, R. Caire, N. Hadjsaid, **J.L. Sanchez**, M. Kellil, N. Oualha, S. Machenaud, D. Georges, C. Bousba, N. Vignol, P. Carer, J. McDonald, "Modeling methods coupled electrical networks and ICT. An inventory" EJEE 2012, VOL 15/6, pp.557-585.

Conferences:

- [2] **J. L. Sánchez**, R. Caire and N. Hadjsaid. "ICT and Electric Power Systems Interdependencies Modeling," ETG- CRIS Conference, Berlin - Germany, 5-6 November 2013.
- [3] **J. L. Sánchez**, R. Caire and N. Hadjsaid. "Application of Hermitian Adjacency Matrices for the Vulnerability Analysis of Power Systems," IEEE PES ISGT Europe 2013, Copenhagen - Denmark.
- [4] R. Caire, **J. L. Sánchez** and N. Hadjsaid. "Vulnerability Analysis of Coupled Heterogeneous Critical Infrastructures: a Co-simulation Approach with a Testbed Validation," IEEE PES ISGT Europe 2013, Copenhagen - Denmark [Invited paper].
- [5] J. McDonald, H. Decroix, R. Caire, **J.L. Sánchez**, S. Chollet, N. Oualha, A. Puccetti, A. Hecker, C. Chaudet, H. Piat, D. Georges, F. Planchon, "The SINARI Project Security Analysis and Risk assessment applied to the Electrical Distribution Network," 22nd International Conference on Electricity Distribution CIRED, 10-13 June 2013, Stockholm – Sweden.
- [6] **J. L. Sánchez**, R. Caire and N. Hadjsaid. "ICT and Power Distribution Modeling using Complex Networks," IEEE Powertech Conference, Grenoble - France, 16-20 June 2013.

Workshops:

- [7] **J. L. Sánchez**, R. Caire and N. Hadjsaid. "Towards a Complex Networks Modeling of Interdependent Critical Infrastructures." WISG January 2013, Troyes - France.
- [8] H. Piat, D. Georges, A. Petrequin, N. Oualha, L. Correnson, N. Vignol, J. McDonald, F. Colin, F. Panchon, T. Braconnier, F. Costa, R. Caire, **J. L. Sánchez**, A. Labonne, A. Hecker, "Implementation of Interdependent Critical Infrastructures for Electricity Supply." WISG January 2013, Troyes - France.
- [9] A. Merdassi, R. Caire, N. Hadjsaid, **J. L. Sánchez**, M. Viziteu, M. Kellil, N. Oualha, S. Machenaud, D. Georges, C. Bousba, N. Vignol, P. Carer, J. McDonald, L. P. Cambacédès, C. Claude, A. Hecker, "Etat de l'art sur les méthodes de modélisation pour les infrastructures critiques interdépendantes". WISG January 2011, Troyes - France.

VULNERABILITE, INTERDEPENDANCE ET ANALYSE DES RISQUES DES POSTES SOURCES ET DES MODES D'EXPLOITATION DECENTRALISES DES RESEAUX ELECTRIQUES

Résumé — Au vu de l'utilisation croissante des technologies de l'information et de la communication dans les réseaux électriques, il est indispensable d'étudier l'étroite liaison entre ces infrastructures et d'avoir une vision intégrée du système couplé. Cette thèse porte ainsi sur la modélisation des systèmes multi-infrastructures. Cela inclut les interdépendances et les trajectoires de défaillances de type modes communs, aggravations et cascades. Il est en effet nécessaire d'identifier les points de faiblesse qui peuvent déclencher une ou de multiples défaillance(s), se succéder en cascade au travers de ces infrastructures liées et ainsi entraîner des défaillances inattendues et de plus en plus graves dans des autres infrastructures. Dans cette optique, différents modèles basés sur la théorie des Réseaux Complexes sont développés afin d'identifier les composants les plus importantes, et pourtant critiques, dans le système interconnecté. Un des principaux verrous scientifiques levé dans cette thèse est relatif au développement d'un modèle mathématique « unifié » afin de représenter les comportements des multiples infrastructures non-homogènes qui ont des interdépendances asymétriques.

Mots clés : Infrastructures critiques, Interdépendances, Réseau électrique, Réseau de communication, Réseaux complexes, Systèmes couplés, Technologies de l'information et de la communication, Vulnérabilités.

VULNERABILITY, INTERDEPENDENCIES AND RISK ANALYSIS OF COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURES: POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK AND ICT

Abstract — In view of the increasing use of Information and Communication Technologies in power systems, it is essential to study the interdependencies between these coupled heterogeneous systems. This thesis focuses on the modeling of multi- infrastructure systems. This includes interdependencies and the three major failures families: common mode, escalating and cascading. It is indeed necessary to identify the weaknesses that can trigger one or multiple failure(s) and cascade through these interdependent infrastructures, causing unexpected and increasingly more serious failures to other infrastructures. In this context, different approaches, based on the theory of Complex Networks, are developed to identify the most critical components in the coupled heterogeneous system. One of the major scientific barriers addressed in this thesis is the development of a unified mathematical model to represent the behavior of multiple heterogeneous systems with complex asymmetrical communication patterns.

Keywords: Critical infrastructures, Interdependence, Power grid, Secure operation, Vulnerability.



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