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de Toulouse

# THÈSE

En vue de l'obtention du

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**Présentée et soutenue par :**  
**Emilie BERTHILLOT**

Le vendredi 19 septembre 2014

**Titre :**

Renseignement et contre-espionnage entre Dublin, Londres et Edimbourg de  
1845 à 1945  
Annexes

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École doctorale et discipline ou spécialité :

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**Unité de recherche :**

Culture Anglo-Saxonne (CAS)

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Annexe 1 :

Tableau de crime agraire en Irlande  
de 1907

CO 904/19, Register of Suspects Intelligence Notes, Archives nationales de Londres.



Ireland 1907

Return of Agrarian Offences reported to the Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary between the 1<sup>st</sup> day of January, 1907, and the 31<sup>st</sup> day of December, 1907, showing the Number of Cases In which Offenders were convicted; the Number of Cases in which Persons were made Amenable, but not Convicted; the Number of Cases in which Accused are awaiting Trial; and the Number of Cases in which Offenders were neither Convicted nor made Amenable.

Offences	Number of Cases in which offenders were convicted	Number of Cases in which people were made Amenable but not Convicted	Number of Cases in which Accused are awaiting Trial	Number of Cases in which Offenders were neither Convicted nor made Amenable	Total Number of outrages reported
<b>Offences against the person</b>					
Homicide: murder, manslaughter				6	9
Firing at the person		3			1
Attempt to Murder		1			
Conspiracy to Murder					
Assault on the Police				1	3
Aggravated Assault		2			3
Assault endangering Life		3			
Assault on Bailiffs or Process Servers					
Cutting or Maiming the Person	1				1
<b>Offences against property</b>					
Incendiary Fire		1		38	39
Burglary and Housebreaking					
Robbery		1		6	7
Taking and holding forcible possession	1	1			2
Cattle Stealing				1	1
Sheep Stealing					
Killing, Cutting, or Maiming Cattle				16	16
<b>Offences against the Public Peace</b>					
Unlawful Assembly	1	14		2	17
Demand or Robbery of Arms				1	1
Riots and Affrays		1			1
Administering unlawful Oaths					
Intimidation:					
By threatening letters or Notices		2		180	182
Otherwise than by threatening letters or Notices	1	2		14	17
Pound Breach	1				1
Attacking Houses				1	1
Resistance to Legal Process		2			2
Injury to Property				39	39
Firing into Dwellings		3		37	40
Rescuing Prisoners		1			1
<b>Other Offences</b>					
Injury to or Attempt to injure or Obstruct Railway Trains or Highways					
Injury to Telegraph Wires					
Perjury					
Conspiracy					
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>37</b>		<b>342</b>	<b>384</b>

## Annexe 2

# Augmentation de la violence en Irlande au début du XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle

CO 904/19, Register of Suspects Intelligence Notes, Archives nationales de Londres.

Offences	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919
Offences against the person																		
Homicide																		
Murder	15	7	9	21	3	7	11	17	15	14	15	17	20	21	23	11	19	27
Manslaughter	16	36	28	29	21	27	23	23	34	24	28	25	14	18	13	12	9	17
Firing at person	19	18	10	11	19	27	43	27	41	42	39	40	47	27	40	20	13	31
Conspiracy to murder												1	1	1			1	
Assault with intent to murder	3	1	3	3	2	2	4	2	1	3	6	1	3	2	3	3	2	4
Administering poison		1	1			2	1		1		1							
Rape	11	13	14	8	13	9	7	10	20	12	10	17	15	6	4			
Indecent assault	34	31	39	42	23	36	36	32	30	33	35	59	40	37	26	22	11	13
Criminal assault on children	23	31	17	26	31	25	36	40	35	39	38	29	31	36	28	21	12	14
Infanticide	15	15	17	8	13	13	14	13	15	12	15	17	10	11	14	25	23	13
Abduction	2		2	1	3		4		4	2	2	4	1		4	1		1
Assault on police	5	6	7	8	4	3	13	10	7	8	9	4	10	6	7	3	11	18
Aggravated assault	49	76	64	66	71	70	70	71	59	61	72	63	80	61	50	44	32	34
Assault endangering life	33	44	46	41	42	22	19	24	18	34	19	34	38	37	37	40	31	43
Assault with intent to rob		1	3	1	3	3	7		2	4	2	5				1	1	1
Assault on bailiffs and process servers	1		1	6		1	1	2	1	3		1						
Cutting or maiming the	69	51	56	62		50	54	56	44	43	44	46	49	52	21	15	19	22

person	14	3	2	5	8	1	1	6	5	5	9	4	5	1	6	1
Desertion of Children																
Concealing birth	30	22	31	33	22	34	19	13	24	25	19	28	32	23	34	34
Unnatural crime or bestiality	7	2	4	1	7	5	6	3	5	2	3	2	6	1	3	2
Procuring abortion													1			
Other offences	19	7	9	1	5	13	12	15	17	15	18	12	8	11	4	3
Offences against property																
Incendary or arson	172	153	142	186	204	196	225	226	300	211	231	224	187	232	232	320
Burglary or housebreaking	324	321	326	360	422	434	436	483	460	538	467	298	303	399	401	577
Highway robbery	4	4	2	4	7	13	5	2	5	2	7		2	2	2	4
Robbery	274	259	179	193	173	156	169	155	151	142	197	141	272	206	312	393
Taking or holding forcible possessions	11	11	4	4	8	5	7	10	16	10	4	3	6	6	7	1
Cattle stealing	46	63	67	81	58	49	56	64	71	42	73	43	50	69	56	36
Sheep stealing	9	12	21	21	23	23	18	17	22	20	18	18	27	26	28	20
Illegal shearing of sheep																
Killing, cutting or maiming cattle	82	61	71	54	59	57	80	71	66	69	68	53	40	46	60	37
Levying contribution																
Piracy																
Sacrilege	25	12	6	7	13	31	13	15	5	20	12	5	7	2	11	5
Demand of money	2				1	1			3		2					
Obtaining money or goods under false pretences	54	66	45	68	69	64	91	76	54	56	60	78	74	59	42	96
Other offences	3	2	1	2	7	9	9	5	9	3	10	6	7	4	9	9





## Annexe 3

### Mode d'emploi des armes

### Thompson


Ms 17,530, File relating to recovery in 1925 of Thompson guns seized on way IRA by US customs services in 1921, Collection Joseph McGarrity, Archives nationales de Dublin.

# THOMPSON GUN

The Ultra Modern Super Automatic

**Sold to Protect**

- Country Estates
- Mines
- Ranches
- Banks
- Industrial Plants
- Express Cars
- Yachts
- Docks
- Railways
- Penit Institutions
- Public Buildings
- Storehouses



**For Use by**

- Police
- Sheriffs
- Private Watchmen
- Special Guards
- Detectives
- Constabularies
- MIIs
- National Guard
- Military and Naval Organizations

4 shot for each pull of the trigger up to the rate of 100 aimed shots per minute without the necessity of reloading.

Adopted and in Use by:

Kentucky, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Massachusetts and North Dakota National Guard, Texas Rangers; Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Michigan State Constabularies; Manitoba and Saskatchewan Provincial Mounted Police; New York, Boston, Detroit, Baltimore, San Francisco, Havana and Toronto Police Forces; Nevada and Colorado State Penitentiaries; many Sheriffs, Detective Agencies, Banks, Mines, Express Companies and Industrial Plants throughout the country.

Government tested and mechanically approved. Sold only to those on the side of gun and order.


Made by Colt's Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co. for

## AUTO-ORDNANCE CORPORATION

302 Broadway, New York City  
Cable Address: "Ammunition, N.Y."

### THOMPSON GUN - Short Barrel Type

(Detachable Stock)




Specifications: Caliber, .45, Weight, 9 pounds 10 ounces. Length, 31 inches. Length of barrel, 10 1/2 inches. Lyman sights, 20, 50 and 100 cartridge capacity magazines. Ammunition caliber .45 Thompson-Remington High Velocity Cartridges; caliber .45 Colt Automatic Pistol ball cartridges; caliber .45 Thompson-Peters Shot cartridges. Rate of fire semi-automatically up to 100 aimed shots per minute. Furnished in calibers .45, .351 and 9 m.m.

Sold singly or in quantity. Immediate Deliveries. List Price, \$175.00. Dealers

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### THOMPSON GUN - With Bipod

(Detachable Stock)



Specifications: Caliber, .45. Weight with bipod, twelve pounds. Length, 36 inches. Length of barrel, 10 1/2 inches. Lyman sights, 20, 50 and 100 cartridge capacity magazines. Muzzle rest bipod. Rate of fire semi-automatically up to 100 aimed shots per minute. Fully-automatically 600 shots per minute. Furnished in calibers .45, .351 and 9 m.m.

Sold only in quantities of 10 or more guns. List Price, \$225.00. Dealers

## THOMPSON GUN MAGAZINES



Shown with Butt Stock Detached

The hand lever type shown here are superior for use with drum magazines in the flat lever type shown on page 3 and are regularly furnished with short barrel type Thompson Gun unless otherwise specified.

Type C—100-cartridge capacity drum magazine.	List Price, \$20.00	Dealers
Type L—50-cartridge capacity drum magazine.	List Price, 15.00	Dealers
Type XX—20-cartridge capacity box magazine.	List Price, 2.50	Dealers
Type XXII—18-cartridge capacity Special for Peters-Thompson Shot Cartridge. Same construction as Type XX box magazine.	List Price, 2.50	Dealers

Note: One type XX 20 cartridge capacity box magazine is furnished with each Thompson Gun. Other magazines are charged for additionally as indicated above.

### AMMUNITION

The Thompson Gun is designed in calibers in which the following standard ammunition may be used. Ammunition for Thompson Guns is always available and in large quantities.

(Actual Size)

1	2	3	4	5
Remington- Thompson cal. .45	.451 automatic rifle cartridge	U.S. Army cal. .45	Meyer 9 m.m.	Large 9 m.m. automatic pistol cartridge
1	2	3	4	5
1450	1360	915	1330	1100
1650	1285	420	315	368
14	23	2	3	9
3	19	4	5	4
268	260	224	263	185
256	160	220	127	124

## GENERAL INFORMATION

### Guarantee

The regular standard GOLI guarantee of quality and performance has been adopted by the AUTO-ORDNANCE CORPORATION and is back of every gun sold.

### Deliveries

Guns are packed in specially designed strong boxes of the following weights and dimensions:

Case No. 1—Box contains, 1 gun; Dim., 11 1/2 x 7 3/4 x 23 inches; Net Weight, 12 lbs.; Gross, 25 lbs.

Case No. 2—Box contains, 5 guns; Dim., 10 x 12 x 36 inches; Net Weight, 56 lbs.; Gross, 82 lbs.

Case No. 3—Box contains, 10 guns; Dim., 15 x 12 x 36 inches; Net Weight, 110 lbs.; Gross, 148 lbs.

As a rule we recommend consignments be sent forward by express but shipments can also be made by parcel post. Packed for parcel post shipment the gross weight is 16 pounds, and the dimensions are 28 3/4 x 11 x 6 1/4 inches.

Prices quoted are L.A.S. Hartford and are subject to change without notice. All agreements are contingent upon strikes, accidents or other causes beyond control. Quotations are subject to our acceptance of order and prices quoted include excise tax prepaid and packing.

### Conditions Governing Domestic Sales

Special terms are extended to governmental, state, county and municipal authorities. Reasonable terms are also extended to certain commercial houses by special arrangement with the Corporation. To others terms are C.O.D. or remittance may be made at time of placing order by check or money order.

### Export Orders

Export orders are solicited and information will be gladly furnished upon request.

### Ammunition Orders

Ammunition for Thompson Guns is standard and always available in any quantities desired. It can be secured locally from arms and ammunition dealers or direct from any of the large ammunition companies. The Auto-Ordnance Corporation will also quote ammunition at reasonable rates when requested. Ammunition is sent by express or freight only.

## AUTO-ORDNANCE CORPORATION

302 Broadway, New York City, U.S.A.

Cable Address: "Ammunition, N.Y."



## Annexe 4 :

# Signalement de l'individu Fanier

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, Affaires Particulières 1851, L-Z,  
n°11, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Ministère de l'Intérieur  
2<sup>ème</sup> division  
1<sup>er</sup> Bureau

Paris, le 5 août 1851

Monsieur le Ministre et cher Collègue, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que M. le sous-Préfet de S<sup>t</sup> Omer a visé, le 31 juillet, pour l'Angleterre, le passeport délivré à un S<sup>t</sup> Fanier, entrepreneur de chaussures à St Omer et à Lille.

Cet individu s'est fait remarquer, depuis longtemps comme un des meneurs les plus entreprenant du parti anarchique. On le soupçonne d'être à la tête d'une association politique d'ouvriers cordonniers.

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint le signalement de cet individu.

Agréé, Monsieur le Ministre et cher Collègue, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Ministre de l'Intérieur

Signalement du Sr Fanier

**Né à**  
**Agé de**-----26  
**Taille de 1 mètre** ----680 millimètres  
**Cheveux**--chatain  
**Sourcils**----chatain  
**Front** ----ridé  
**Yeux** -----gris  
**Nez** ----fort  
**Bouche**-----moyenne  
**Barbe**----chatain  
**Menton** -----à fossette  
**Visage**----ovale  
**Teint** -----ordinaire  
**Profession**-----entrepreneur de chaussures

Annexe 5 :

Informations concernant les  
individus Barthélémy et Vidil

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, Affaires Particulières 1851, L-Z,  
n°11, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Cabinet du Préfet de Police  
Au sujet des nés Barthélémy et Vidil, réfugiés de Londres

Paris, le 11 février 1851

Monsieur le Ministre

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint une note relative aux nés Bathélémy et Vidil qui vous avait été signalés comme étant venus de Londres à Paris avec une mission de Louis Blanc.

Veillez, Monsieur le Miistre, agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

Le Préfet de Police

Cabinet du Préfet de Police

Note

On a recherché infructueusement dans la capitale les nés Barthélémy Emmanuel, et Vidil (Paul), signalés comme étant venus de Londres à Paris, chargés d'une mission par L. Blanc.

Les journaux *le Vote Universel* et *la République* publient une lettre datée de Londres du 8 février et signée Landolphe, Bathélémy (Emmanuel), Louis Blanc, et Vidil, ce qui ferait supposer que Barthélémy et Vidil sont encore à Londres, si toutefois cette tactique ne cache pas un stratagème ayant pour but de dépister les investigations de la police.

Quoi qu'il en soit, on continue les recherches.

## Annexe 6 :

# Nouveau procédé rapide de communication entre Londres et Paris, Lettre du 31 décembre 1852

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, Affaires Particulières 1853, Pe-Z,  
n°18, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Ministère 42

Paris, le 31 Décembre 1852.

de la  
Police générale. 18

2<sup>e</sup> Division.



1<sup>er</sup> Bureau.

Objets des communications  
directes faites par la police  
anglaise à la police française

Monsieur et cher collègue, ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le faire connaître <sup>verbale</sup> l'administration chargée de la police, à Londres, adresse à M. le Préfet de Police des dépêches électriques ayant pour but de signaler à l'autorité française des individus qui ont quitté l'Angleterre pour échapper aux poursuites de la justice. Sous récemment, le 27 de ce mois, une dépêche de cette nature signée Whall, Inspecteur de police, 4 Piccadilly, a été adressée à ce fonctionnaire pour demander de faire arrêter un M<sup>r</sup> Georges Eyre Johnson, accusé de baraterie, se trouvant à Paris sous un faux nom.

Je suis loin de méconnaître l'efficacité de ces communications rapides et directes entre les deux pays, pour ce qui concerne la recherche des malfaiteurs, et je suis disposé à favoriser de tout mon pouvoir des relations qui ne peuvent avoir que des résultats avantageux.

Mais vous avez déjà reconnu, Monsieur et cher collègue

Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

qu'il est nécessaire, en pareil cas, de se conformer strictement aux règles de la hiérarchie et de ne point laisser des fonctionnaires inférieurs se concerter et agir en dehors du contrôle du Gouvernement sous les ordres duquel ils sont placés. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous entretenir verbalement de cette affaire, et j'étais que votre intention, en faisant connaître aux autorités anglaises qu'au lieu de s'adresser directement à M. le Préfet de Police, elles doivent prier l'Ambassadeur de S. M. I. à Londres d'intervenir auprès de vous et de réclamer, par vos soins, l'action directe du Gouvernement.

Cette règle admise, je pense que vous n'hésiteres pas à reconnaître qu'en matière d'arrestations et de recherche de malfaiteurs, ou lorsqu'il s'agit de déjouer sans retard des manœuvres criminelles, il y a parfois nécessité à ne point réclamer par voie diplomatique et à saisir directement et d'urgence la police française. Dans ce cas, Monsieur et cher collègue, il serait, je pense, très-important que les autorités anglaises ou belges fussent bien averties qu'au lieu de s'adresser à M. le Préfet de Police, c'est au Ministre de la Police générale qu'elles doivent écrire. Comme il est sur les lieux, son action est prompt, immédiate,

et cependant le principe de la hiérarchie est respecté.

J'ajouterai que, dans des cas exceptionnels, vous seriez toujours averti des incidents qui seraient de nature à mériter votre attention.

Agréez, Monsieur et cher collègue, la nouvelle assurance de mes sentiments de haute considération et de sincère attachement.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat  
au Dép<sup>t</sup>. de la Police Générale,

J. M. Dupuy



Annexe 7 :

Information de la police  
métropolitaine de Londres sur des  
réfugiés français

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, Affaires Particulières 1853, Pe-Z,  
n°18, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

6  
SEPTEMBRE  
1853

Don Politique.

Londres le 3 Septembre 1853.

1501

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu accidentellement communication, par la Police métropolitaine, de quelques renseignements concernant les réfugiés Français, et qui m'ont paru de nature à vous intéresser.

M. Ledru Rollin, malade d'un abcès au bas ventre, serait, m'assure-t-on, dans un état désespéré.

M. Victor Hugo se disposerait à quitter Jersey, dont le climat est contraire à la santé de M<sup>me</sup> Hugo, et irait s'établir en Portugal avec sa famille.

M. Louis Blanc est parti ces jours-ci pour Dublin.

M. Ribeyrolles et M. Martin

Son Excellence

Monsieur le Ministre des affaires Etrangères

Annexe 8 :

Coopération des polices  
métropolitaines de Paris et Londres  
dans l'interception d'individus  
dangereux

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, Affaires Particulières 1851, A-K,  
n°11, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

It is most important to provide as far as practicable for gaining a knowledge of the dangerous and criminal characters who may come here from all parts of the Continent during the Great Exhibition. With this view I submit that some of Police of the Towns hereinafter mentioned should be procured, who would be able to point out to the English police the dangerous and suspected foreign criminal characters, in order that they may be kept under observation and measures taken to prevent them committing crime. I have no means for settling with any accuracy the number of the Police that may be required from each place, but judging with some measure from the number of foreigners that come here now, and the facilities for coming, I suggest that the undermentioned numbers of police should be obtained

From Paris: 6

And from some of the large towns like Lyons, Marseilles and others from which the French government had reason to suppose criminal character would come here - 2 police officers from each.

The officers should be selected from those best acquainted with criminal and suspected characters; on arriving here they should report themselves at the Office of the Commissioner of Police; lodgings will be provided for them and directions given for their guidance; the pays allowed should be sufficient to secure the most intelligent officers and to induce them to perform the duty with zeal and fidelity.

Signed Richard Mayne  
Metropolitan Police Office  
4, Whitehall Place  
April 1. 1851

## Annexe 9 :

# Tensions entre Londres et Dublin, Lettre de l'ambassadeur de France au Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, série A. Nord 1892, 1892, n°57,  
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

M. Waddington, ambassadeur de France à Londres à M. Ribot, Ministre des Affaires  
Etrangères à Paris

Londres, le 6 avril 1892

Un membre de la Chambre des Communes a demandé hier quelles mesures le gouvernement comptait prendre en vue de l'arrivée probable en Angleterre d'anarchistes expulsés de France, et auxquels l'accès d'autres pays se trouvait interdit. Le secrétaire d'Etat pour l'Intérieur a répondu qu'il n'avait pas connaissance de dispositions prises par le gouvernement français en vue d'une expulsion d'anarchistes. Il a ajouté qu'au cas où des mesures de ce genre seraient ordonnées, et au cas où des représentations diplomatiques adressées au Cabinet de Paris resteraient sans effet, le gouvernement de la Reine n'hésiterait pas à demander au Parlement de nouveaux pouvoirs pour protéger l'ordre public. J'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à votre Excellence le texte de cette question et de la réponse de M. Matthews.

Le droit d'une nation d'interdire l'entrée de son territoire à une classe d'émigrants a d'ailleurs, dans ces derniers temps, plusieurs fois occupé l'attention publique, et j'ai eu l'occasion de signaler au Département les incidents qui se sont produits lorsque des émigrants chinois ont voulu pénétrer dans certaines colonies britanniques, ainsi que les réflexions suggérées par les mesures que nous pourrions, dans un avenir prochain, être appelés à prendre contre les Etrangers.

Un article du journal l'Economist, qui possède en ces matières une légitime autorité, m'a paru digne de vous être signalé, et je le joins également à cette dépêche. Après avoir établi que l'expulsion des Etrangers, dans la crainte unique du préjudice qu'ils pourraient causer aux travailleurs nationaux, n'était point justifiable, l'auteur s'empresse d'ajouter qu'il est des cas où un gouvernement a le droit et le devoir de refuser l'entrée de son pays aux personnes incapables de subvenir à leur existence, suspectes ou dangereuses. Dans cette dernière catégorie rentrent évidemment, dit-il, les anarchistes. Si, autrefois, l'expulsion des Américains du Texas par les autorités mexicaines, si, de nos jours celles des Chinois d'Australie, des Italiens du Tyrol, se sont justifiées par des motifs d'ordre et de sécurité publiques, celle des criminels d'une espèce aussi dangereuse ne saurait pas même être remise en question.

Annexe 10 :

Surveillance des communistes en  
France dans les années 1920

F/7/12897, Parti communiste: agissements communistes en France et à  
l'étranger 1909-1929, Archives nationales de Paris

**SECRET**

R E N S E I G N E M E N T

*Noté.*  
*1 sup de source prochain*  
*revenir.*

-SOURCE : occasionnelle sous réserve.

On signale comme militants communistes importants en FRANCE :

-Edouard GODILLOT, 178 Champs Elysées, PARIS.

-CALVINIO OZORES, 61 Avenue Victor Emmanuel III, Paris (8<sup>e</sup>) qui disposerait de très grosses <sup>quantités</sup> d'argent qui proviendraient de la Banque des Pays du Nord, 26 Avenue de l'Opéra.

-ROSENBERG Grégoire, 16 rue Bargue, à Paris, téléphone Ségur : 75-47.

Ces gens posséderaient et utiliseraient une imprimerie clandestine pour laquelle ils édifieraient des lettres C etc

OPINION : Edouard GODILLOT, né le 21 Décembre 1882 à Autun (S.&L) fondateur gérant de la Sté Française des Transports Aériens, 78 avenue des Champs Elysées, <sup>avait</sup> maintes fois attiré l'attention par ses relations avec l'ex-gouvernement républicain espagnol.

Il a été suspecté d'être de tendances anarchistes.

CALVINIO OZORES, <sup>et son</sup> est en relations avec Rodolphe LLOPIS 25 Rue de Genève à ALBI (Tarn) du S.F.R.E.

Enfin, Grégoire ROSENBERG pourrait s'identifier à une personne de même nom suspectée, en 1931, d'être chargée par les Soviets d'une mission d'espionnage en FRANCE. ROSENBERG vivant à cette époque sur un pied important, paraissait renseigné sur l'aviation française, effectuait une fois par mois un voyage en avion à BERLIN et recherchait ses relations dans les milieux d'aviation français civils et militaires.

*Il est né à Lodz le 24-10-03 et est titulaire du passeport polonais n° 86 délivré à Paris le 13-1-39. Il travaille ou travaillait par l'intermédiaire de la Russian Bank, 26 Avenue de l'Opéra à Paris.*



## Annexe 11 :

# Surveillance des ports britanniques et irlandais par la Branche Spéciale

MEPO 2/8258, Special Branch Officers at Ports in Britain and EIRE:  
Establishment, 1939 1955, Archives nationales de Londres.

Seen & noted

Hoban

64.53  
A.C.C.

35.

As will be seen from Home Office letter of 10th May, 1947 (30A attached) it is now necessary to review augmentations made to the establishment of Special Branch in connection with Forticity outside the Metropolitan Police District.

Prior to August 1939, the authorised establishment for this purpose was 35 - (3 inspectors, 15 sergeants and 17 constables). Of this number only one sergeant and one constable were stationed at an Irish Channel port - viz. Holyhead. On 10th August 1939 because of I.R.A. activity, a temporary authority was given in Home Office letter 505/899/79, (2A attached) to post eight additional sergeants to Holyhead, Heysham and Fishguard.

In view of the greatly increased security risk due to the outbreak of war, it was considered essential to staff these Irish Channel ports more fully, also to send officers to Stranraer and, later, to Belfast and Larne when the inward control was transferred to those ports from Heysham and Stranraer respectively. These extra officers were taken from our ordinary port establishment, the authority for which had not been withdrawn, although, of course, many South and East coast ports were closed to passenger traffic during the war.

In May 1947, the position was that 18 officers were stationed at Irish ports, which was eight above the total authorised for these particular ports, and on 10th May 1947, Home Office granted a temporary augmentation of five sergeants and three P.Cs. to regularise the position (vide 30A attached).

At the moment therefore, there is authority for 51 officers to be employed at ports outside the Metropolitan Police District. Actually 49 men (two inspectors 36 sergeants and eleven P.Cs.) are so employed. The numbers at the Irish ports have been reduced from 18 to 12, but it has been necessary to increase the numbers at other sea and air ports outside the Metropolitan Police District. They are stationed as shown below:

Southampton	5	Gravesend	3	Dover	7
Folkestone	3	Harwich	4	Newhaven	4
Plymouth	1	Grimsby	1	Newcastle	2
Hull	1	Holyhead	5	Fishguard	3
Heysham	2	Stranraer	2	Lymington	-
Prestwick	3	Ringway	2	Gatwick	1

TOTAL - 49

I see no possibility of being able to reduce the total of officers employed at ports outside the M.P.D. - indeed some ports are understaffed and the officers are unable to take weekly leaves regularly.

I therefore strongly recommend that the temporary augmentations of 15.8.39 and 20.5.47 be now made permanent.

3.6.48.  
Special Branch

A.C.M.

36.

Deputy Commander

Any observations please.

37

None

in via

617

L.J. Burt  
30.6.48

A.C.C.

The Port establishment of Special Branch (viz. the authorised number of officers stationed, with Home Office sanction, at ports outside the Metropolitan Police District) was last fixed in 1948 at 51, namely:-

Inspectors	3
Sergeants	28
Constables	20

In April, 1952, when passport control of passengers travelling between Britain and Ireland ended, we withdrew all four officers from the ports of Stranraer and Heysham and reduced the number engaged at Holyhead and Fishguard from five and three respectively to two and two. Prior to that, the staff permanently employed at Dover had been reduced by two and those at Newhaven, Folkestone, Newcastle and Ringway by one each at different times, whilst that at Harwich was increased by one. The effect of these measures is a reduction of 13 on the 1948 figure of officers permanently stationed at ports outside the Metropolitan Police District, who now total 38, viz

Inspectors	2
Sergeants	25
Constables	11

The comparative table showing their allocation is as follows:-

	<u>1948</u>	<u>Present</u>
Dover	8	6
Southampton	5	5
Harwich	4	5
Newhaven	4	3
Folkestone	4	3
Gravesend	3	3
Prestwick	3	3
Holyhead	5	2
Fishguard	3	2
Newcastle	2	1
Plymouth	1	1
Hull	1	1
Grimsby	1	1
Ringway	2	1
Lympne	-	1
Stranraer	2	-
Heysham	2	-
Gatwick	1	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	51	38

At the moment, apart from the possibility that Dover may have to have an addition of one to the staff, there is no reason to expect that we shall need any addition to the permanent strength of 38: I therefore suggest that the port establishment of 51 be reduced by 11 to 40.

It is, however, convenient at this juncture, to point out that each year at least ten officers are needed at ports

outside the Metropolitan Police District as summer reliefs, to cope with additional traffic (and in part to replace permanent officers when these latter take annual leave). At present the total engaged at such ports is 46, inasmuch as eight officers are there as summer reliefs (two more are to go for a short period, starting 28th July) viz.-

Dover	2
Folkestone	1
Gravesend	1
Harwich	1
Newhaven	1
Ringway	1
Southampton	1

(NOTE: This is the bare minimum - additional summer relief staff sent in previous years to certain ports has this year been withheld).

Normally, as this staffing of summer reliefs entails having more men at ports outside the Metropolitan Police District than is authorised by Home Office special authority is secured each year for sending them. (It will be appreciated they do not form part of the Port establishment but are drawn from the personnel of Special Branch at C.O. Home Office authority is necessary because of the payment of special out of Town allowance for the duty.) This year no such application has been made, as the gross total employed at the ports - 46 - does not exceed the authorised establishment of 51.

The reduction of the Port establishment from 51 to 40 entails consideration of the overall establishment of Special Branch, of which Port establishment is part. The position is that quite apart from other factors into which I need not now enter, our increased commitments for port work: (a) outside the M.P.D. - providing summer reliefs; (b) inside the M.P.D. (which is not of course included in the special Port establishment): in themselves more than counterbalance the gain in man power through the above reduction.

(a) Summer reliefs for ports outside the Metropolitan Police District: are required on an average for at least four months each year; thus the actual man-power required to staff these ports is 38 plus 4 (ten officers for four months).

(b) Before the war 13 men were employed on port work inside the Metropolitan Police District, (viz. Docks, Croydon Airport, and Heston Airport). Since the end of the war, with the opening of London and Northolt Airports and the immense increase in air travel the number of officers so engaged has had to be increased progressively and now totals 23. Additionally, five men are employed as summer reliefs at London Airport - a man power loss at C.O. equivalent to two officers for the year - which makes an aggregate of 25 officers. No augmentation of the Branch establishment has been sought in respect to this increased commitment.

The position thus is that whilst the Port establishment can be reduced by eleven, in fact the net reduction in manpower is nine, whereas 12 more men have had to be diverted from C.O. to staff ports inside the Metropolitan Police District - ~~an~~

P.T.O.

<u>Where and when employed.</u>	<u>Sergts. (1st.cl.)</u>	<u>Sergts. (2nd.cl.)</u>	<u>Constables</u>	<u>Total.</u>
At Holyhead, prior to 10-8-1938.	1	-	1	2
By augmentation of 10-8-1939.	2	6	-	8
(a) At Holyhead, Fishguard & Heysham (including augmentation of 10-8-1939).	3	6	1	10
(b) At Holyhead, Fishguard, Heysham, Stranraer, Larne & Belfast (present date)	3	11	4	18
Difference between (a) & (b) (i.e. officers not authorised specifically for Irish ports)	-	5	3	8

From a purely I. R. A. point of view, I would be inclined to transfer some of these officers to ports dealing with foreign traffic, but I feel I must keep the Irish ports fully staffed owing to the Jewish terrorist problem - there is a direct shipping service from Palestine to Ireland and only recently, a Jew whose name appears in our suspect index, was detected when landing at Holyhead from Dublin.

In the circumstances, I should be glad if you could give formal authority for the employment of these eight

Annexe 12:

Surveillance des ports de Dublin et  
Cork par la délégation française  
(1939-1945)

2BB 7-D1 : Attaché naval à Dublin 1939-1944, Sous-série 2BB7 (Fonds Moscou) : attachés navals, liaisons navales, archives de la marine à Vincennes pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Archives de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

176  
République Française

Légation de France  
en Irlande.

Dublin le 6 Décembre 1939

M. BLONDEL, MINISTRE DE FRANCE A DUBLIN,  
A SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR CORBIN, AMBASSADEUR  
DE FRANCE A LONDRES.-

Pour l'Attaché Naval.-

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer, ci-inclus,  
en double exemplaire, copie d'une note relative  
au mouvement des navires dans les ports de Cork  
et de Dublin pendant la semaine du 27 Novembre au  
4 Décembre.

Comme l'indique M. Anset, l'activité dans le  
port de Dublin a légèrement diminué au cours de  
cette semaine par rapport à celle de la semaine  
précédente.

Les mouvements à Cork se sont limités au  
cabotage entre ce port et Fishguard et ont comporté  
de grosses expéditions de beurre irlandais./.

*Blondel*

Port de Cork

Mouvement de navires d'outre-mer du 27 Novembre au 4  
Décembre.

Cargo grec "Leonidas" Albany U.S.A. 7031 tonnes de blé  
Cargo anglais "Lord Cochrane" venant d'Amérique 7000 ton-  
nes de blé  
Quatre mâts irlandais "Killoran" venant d'Australie  
4.000 tonnes de blé

Activité moyenne du service de cabotage entre Cork et  
Fishguard; de grosses quantités de beurre ont été chargées  
pour l'Angleterre./.

## Port de Dublin

### Mouvement de Navires du 27 Novembre au 4 Décembre

Arrivée: 90 contre 117 de la semaine précédente

Départs: 93 contre 117 de la semaine précédente

L'activité sur les quais de Dublin a été relativement faible dans la semaine qui vient de s'écouler.

Le fait saillant a été l'arrivée du pétrolier "Harvester" battant pavillon américain, venant du Golf du Mexique avec un chargement de 9.000 tonnes de pétrole et huile, pour le compte de la Texaco Oil Company.

Il paraît que ce navire a quitté le Mexique avant l'interdiction imposée par le gouvernement américain aux navires nationaux d'escaler dans des ports dits "de guerre".

Jusqu'à ce jour, l'approvisionnement de l'Irlande en pétrole et huile a été effectué par l'intermédiaire de l'Angleterre en barils. Quelques petits pétroliers ont ravitaillé la base de Foynes où Shell et la Standard ont des dépôts importants en vue de ravitaillement des avions transatlantiques.

Le cargos danois "Nyhorn" a déchargé à Dublin une cargaison de fruits et d'orge venant de San Francisco.



Annexe 13 :

Photographies des postes de vigies  
en Irlande

KENNEDY, Michael, *Guarding Neutral Ireland: the Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence 1939-1945*, Dublin, the Four Courts Press, 2008.



4 Kilcreadun LOP, Clare, July 1941 (National Archives of Ireland)



5 Hag's Head LOP, Clare, January 1942 (National Archives of Ireland)



14 LOP 63, Beaver Head, Portlaoise, towards the Slaps of Broadhaven, April 2003 (M. Kennedy)



15 LOP 39, Moyroge Head, Achill Island, April 2003 (M. Kennedy)



2 Dangan Head LOP, Louth, February 1940 (National Archives of Ireland)



3 Clagher Head LOP, Louth, February 1940 (National Archives of Ireland)



Annexe 14 :

Le fonctionnement du RIC

CO 904/168, Counter-propaganda, Archives nationales de Londres.

THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY.

805

History and constitution.

The Royal Irish Constabulary were organised and placed on their present footing by Sir Robert Peel - 1826 and were known as the 'Constabulary of Ireland'. The title of 'Royal' was conferred upon them as a reward for their devotion to duty during the Fenian rising of 1867. The force is popularly known as the 'R.I.C.' The Royal Irish Constabulary is a semi-military body, and is national in scope. It is controlled by Governmental and not by local authorities as are the County police forces of England and Scotland. Consequent upon this arrangement the members of the R.I.C. are liable to be sent on duty to any part of Ireland.

The strength of the force is normally about 10,000. It has dropped below 9,000 in peaceful times, and has risen to 12,000 during disturbed periods. It is now well over the last number.

Organisation.

The Headquarters of the Royal Irish Constabulary is at Dublin Castle and the head of the force is the Inspector General, who is assisted by a Deputy Inspector General and two Assistant Inspectors General. The Belfast District is under the control of a Commissioner of Police or Town Inspector. The subsidiary commissioned and non-commissioned ranks are as follows:-

County Inspector	( <u>Commissioned ranks.</u> )
1	
1st class District Inspector	
2	
2nd class District Inspector	
3	
3rd class District Inspector	
Head Constable	( <u>Non-commissioned ranks.</u> )
4	
Sergeant	
5	
Constable	

### Recruiting.

Cadetships and a system of promotion from the ranks, both competitive, provide a supply of candidates for vacancies among the commissioned rank, each class filling half the number of vacancies. The most stringent regulations ensure that the type of cadet chosen is in every way calculated to maintain the high traditions of the force. The medical test is strict and searching enquiries are made into the antecedents and moral character of candidates, from their schooldays onwards. The entrance examination is very severe and is conducted on competitive lines by the Civil Service Commissioners. The range of subjects includes Arithmetic, Orthography, Digest of Returns, English Composition, British History, Elementary Principles of Law and the Law of Evidence. Candidates have to pass in every subject. The age-limit for cadets is 26, and nomination has to be confirmed by the Lord Lieutenant. After a period of training at the Depot, cadets are appointed to the rank of District Inspector (as vacancies occur, according to their standing, proficiency and conduct.)

The rank and file are recruited chiefly from the farmer class, and the standard of physical fitness is high. Each recruit must be at least 5 foot 9 inches in height and must measure 36 inches round the chest. The age limits are from 19 - 27 years of age. Careful enquiries are made into the recruit's character antecedents and associates before he is accepted.

### Training.

Six months are allowed to complete the recruits' training in police duties, drill, gymnastics, swimming, life saving and first aid. Shorthand and typewriting are also included in the training, but are optional subjects. A certificate must be obtained for every compulsory subject. The recruits training includes squad and company drill with arms, musketry and bayonet training. Photographic and finger print studies are also provided.

### Promotion.

After passing through his recruit's training at Phoenix

Phoenix Park, Dublin, a man commences to serve with the rank of Constable. He may be promoted to Sergeant after 7 years service. There is an annual examination in literary and professional subjects for candidates for promotion. The Civil Service Commission conducts the literary part of the examination, and a board of officers the professional. In due course promotions to the rank of Head Constable and of District Inspector are made; but a qualifying period must be spent in every rank and candidates must receive a nomination from a board of Superior Officers before being allowed to compete for the rank of District Inspector. This competitive system of promotion has attracted very able men to the R.I.C. and consequently has raised the tone of the rank and file.

Distribution.

A separate establishment as regards strength of force, reports, returns and for purposes of maintenance is assigned to each geographical unit (a County) throughout Ireland, with a County Inspector directly responsible to Headquarters in charge of each. A few large and important Counties, such as Cork, Tipperary and Galway have been divided into Ridings, and each of these Ridings has its own County Inspector. Conversely some small and unimportant Counties have been grouped and put in charge of a single County Inspector.

Each County is subdivided into Districts with a District Inspector who lives in the principal town in his district, in charge of each. The number of Districts in a County depends upon the size and state (whether disturbed or quiet) of that County. For instance Clare which has only a slightly larger population than Wexford is divided into 10 Districts while Wexford has only 4 Districts. The reason for this is that Clare is a rough hilly and 'troublesome' County, and Wexford is an

agricultural/

agricultural and peaceful one. Briefly the system of distribution is elastic and adaptable, the aim being to secure the best results by a judicious allocation of the police.

Districts are split up into Sub-Districts with a Sergeant in charge of each, and having under him a force of some four or five Constables. These little garrisons are situated in nearly every town and village of any importance. They live in Barracks - which in the larger towns are specially constructed buildings, capable of resisting attack and containing mess rooms etc. and in many of the smaller villages are merely ordinary dwelling houses adapted as far as possible to the requirements of the garrison.

Duties.

The Royal Irish Constabulary carry out the ordinary beat and patrol duties of a police force. They are armed with rifle and bayonet, but when there is no immediate danger of disturbance or riot they carry out their duties armed only with a truncheon. As the Sub-Districts are large much use is made of cyclist patrols, the men providing their own cycles for using which they receive a monthly allowance. The usual tour of outdoor duty is six hours. Single men live in barracks, and in consequence are readily available should any emergency arise. Married men are allowed to live out, in suitably situated houses.

But in addition to the ordinary duties of a police constable, the R.I.C. man acts as an Inspector of Weights and Measures, of Food and Drugs, of Explosives, and of the Agricultural Department. The R.I.C. also collect the Census, compile annual statistics of tillage and live stock, and perform the duties of Clerks of the Petty Sessions Courts pending appointments to that post.



Uniform and  
Badges of  
Rank.

The full dress of an Officer consists of a tunic and laced trousers of dark green colour. Cross belt and pouch of patent leather with silver crest and ornament, sword, Wellington boots, box spurs and black leather gloves and helmet are worn. Service dress is a smart frock and breeches, leggings, forage cap and tan gloves. All Officers carry swords on parade, at Assises and when in charge of detachments, but they do not wear them on duty.

The dress of the rank and file is a tunic, trousers and cap of military pattern and of dark green colour. The badge is a harp and crown. They wear a polished black leather waist belt with pouches for handcuffs and ammunition. The truncheon with black leather case is attached to the belt on the left side. A whistle, memorandum book and pencil are also carried. Helmets are worn for ceremonial occasions or when riots are expected. In winter black leather leggings, black woollen gloves and black waterproof coats are worn; and a greatcoat and cape of dark grey cloth are provided for wear in cold weather.

Pensions and  
Rewards.

A crown and star is the badge of rank of a County Inspector, a crown that of a first class District Inspector, three stars that of a second class District Inspector, and two stars of a third class District Inspector. *Charter is used to distinguish the rank of some commissioners in Spain*  
Gallantry under fire and devotion to duty in the R.I.C. are recognised by the award of a Special Constabulary medal, which is the equivalent of the Victoria Cross. This is rarely given in normal times but during the past year (1920 - 21) it has been awarded on numerous occasions. The King's police medal is also issued to the R.I.C. for meritorious service.

As with all the other forces of the Crown service in the R.I.C. carries with it the guarantee of a pension.

After/

After 30 years service a commissioned officer may retire on a pension of 2/3 of his pay at the time of retirement; after 25 years service he may retire on half pay. The retiring age for District Inspectors is 57 and that for County Inspectors is 60. The pensions for the rank and file are on a corresponding scale.

Annexe 15 :

Règlement officiel du RIC,  
Circulaire du 18 nov. 1847

CO 904/173, Police Circulars to RIC, 1887 1902, Archives nationales de Londres.

CONFIDENTIAL

Constabulary Office, Dublin Castle

18th November, 1847.

NOTWITHSTANDING the importance attached in the Constabulary Code, and in repeated Circular orders, to an effective system of patrolling on the part of the Force, especially in districts where outrages are prevalent, it is to be feared that this duty is still much neglected, or but injudiciously discharged, in many localities.

I feel it incumbent upon me, therefore, to condense in the present minute, the instructions that have been issued, from time to time, upon this subject, and to add such further directions are suggested by the present disturbed state of several Counties.

Without attempting to specify the numerous modes in which Constabulary Patrols may be usefully conducted, I would refer to some particulars in regard to them, which seem essential to their success.

- 1- Instead of confining themselves to the high roads, Patrols should frequently traverse the fields and bogs, and conceal themselves near suspected passes, or other localities favourable, to the detection of night walkers, remembering that it is not by the number of miles marched, but by the manner in which the Police have been employed, that the efficiency of the Patrol is estimated at Headquarters.
- 2- It is by lying in ambush near to houses exposed to attack – houses, for example, occupied by persons who have lately become tenants on lands whence others have been ejected, or who that Patrols may expect successful results.
- 3- It may also desirable for Patrols to place themselves, unobserved, in view of dwellings occupied by dangerous characters, whose movements may be watched during the night, with great advantage to the discovery of outrages that have occurred in the interim.
- 4- When a heinous offence is reported at any station, the houses of bad or suspected persons should be forthwith visited as their presence at, or absence from home, may frequently form a clue to detection.

- 5- It may be advisable when voices or footsteps are heard on the road that the Patrol should secrete themselves until, by a nearer approach of the suspected party, it can be ascertained who they are; and the Patrols in marching along a high road, should frequently halt and listen placing one hand of a ram road on the ground, and their ear to the other, which will enable them to ascertain, even at a great distance whether persons are on the road.
- 6- Should the strangers they happen to meet be armed, in any distant District, rendering such persons liable to the provisions of the Whiteboy Act, the Patrol are to call upon them, in the Queen's name, to surrender and to endeavour to apprehend them, in order to their being brought before a magistrate; but they are not to fire upon them, except in case of resistance, when the Patrol will be justified in opposing force to force. Should the very superior strength of the armed party, render it hopeless for the Constabulary to compel them to surrender, they ought at least to hang upon their rear, so as to trace their route, and if possible to arrest any struggler or identify any of the party.
- 7- If disorderly or suspected parties, although unarmed, shall be met by a Patrol at unseasonable hours, they are to be apprehended, and brought before a Magistrate for examination.
- 8- Patrols ought not to go out, stated nights, or at particular hours, but at uncertain periods of the night; and they should occasionally proceed on their duty a short time before daybreak, when marauders may be discovered on their way homewards. This is particularly applicable to the police near the borders of a county, especially if the boundary be defined by a river.
- 9- Patrolling to be effective, must be performed silently, and without any sign of preparation which could possibly place ill-disposed persons on their guard.
- 10- Where it may be suspected that their movements at their barracks are watched, the men for patrol should steal out of it, in plain clothes if necessary, one by one, taking different directions to an appointed rendez-vous in the neighbourhood from whence they will commence the duty, and afterwards avoid separation.
- 11- On other occasions, when the Officer or Constable in charge of the Station has ground for believing that it is closely watched, it may be expedient for him to send a false Patrol, which after lying concealed, at no great distance, a sufficient time to lull suspicion of their object, will return to their barrack in such a manner as to be fully observed, while the real Patrol will proceed as secretly as possible.
- 12- Or, in very disturbed districts, where the men at a Station require repose, pains should be taken to show that they have retired to rest, while, by arrangements previously made by the County Inspector, a large proportion of the Police from other localities will be brought into the prescribed district, and occasionally by cars, if the Stations are very distant, in order to their effectually patrolling it in every direction, according to a plan already agreed upon.

- 13- Sometimes the Sub-Inspector may arrange that his parties, within a well-defined circle, shall patrol inwards, until they all meet his own party, at a given point towards its centre; at other times, he may require them to patrol, independently, in certain directions around their respective Stations.
- 14- Although it may lead to serious accidents to make a practice of patrolling in plain clothes; yet, when upon special occasions such an arrangement maybe necessary, the Patrol should be furnished with a new watch-word each night and which word should not be issued by the Officer or Constable in charge of the Patrol, until they have left their Barrack.
- 15- But even when the Patrol march in uniform, especially along a high road, it may be useful to have them preceded by at least two armed men in disguise, some hundred yards from the regular Patrol, who might, after passing strongly suspected parties, apprise the Patrol, by a preconcerted signal, of the moment for action; this signal might be given by means of a Light Infantry whistle.
- 16- Similar arrangements have been successfully adopt by day when provision cars have been passing through an excited country, and where the regular Patrols have been insufficient to extend their protection along the whole line of road.
- 17- In disturbed districts, the Patrols should avoid separation, and be cautious in placing themselves in woods, defiles, or hollow ways, where they could not, if necessary, defend themselves.
- 18- By day, in disturbed districts Policeman in plain clothes may be stationed on such rising grounds in the neighbourhood of their respective Stations as will afford them an extensive view of the surrounding country, and will enable them, with the aid of the portable telescope already supplied to certain Stations, to discover the movements of the disaffected, it might further be useful if those positions were taken up within sights of houses liable to attack.
- 19- Every duty performed by a Policeman, away from their quarters, may be converted into a Patrol. When they are employed therefore at Sessions, Fairs and other occasions at a distance from their Stations, they should endeavour to return home by a route different from that which they pursued in the morning.
- 20- All the particulars connected with a Patrol will be entered in the Patrol Books – such as the strength of the party, the number of hours absent, number of miles marches, the number of roads, places and town hands visited, whether the Patrol lay in ambush, and where, name of the owner of any house entered, and for what purpose; accompanied with a certificate from the Officer or Constable in charge, that the Patrol did not enter any house except on duty. These books should be carefully examined by County and Sub-Inspector, and should be read before the Magistrates, at Party Sessions, when required.
- 21- Should the County Inspectors in disturbed districts, be of opinion that by the means of rockets, lights or similar signals, the Stations nearest the scenes of outrages might give speedily

information to the surrounding parties so as to enable them at once to turn out a patrol in the direction of the signal light –apprehending all suspected persons on their way and shall be happy to authorize the use of such aids, but it is scarcely necessary to remember Officers that these signals should be carefully used, and frequently verified lest they be diverted by the disaffect, in view of deception.

- 22- It has been found occasionally useful, when the Officer regulating the Patrol has supplied the respective Head or other Constable in charge of the Patrol with a book on the wrappers of which are libeled the day of the month, and the hour at which the Patrol should commence. [...]
- 23- [...]
- 24- ,[...] proceed upon any particular Patrol, or other duty, without loaded arms, he will not hesitate to give orders accordingly, taking care to report the same to the Officer of his District for the County-Inspector's information.
- 25- It is, perhaps, unnecessary to observe that individual Policemen are not only permitted but commanded, to load, whenever they may find it absolutely necessary for self-protection, or in the fresh pursuit of criminals; and that they are positively enjoined to local whenever they accompany, either on foot or by any conveyance, persons placed specially under their protection, whose lives are supposed to be in danger.
- 26- But the men in the force, who, under such authority, may have loaded arms, should be peculiarly circumspect in the use of them. They should always bear in mind that any injury inflicted by any individual of the establishment, either by a wanton resort to firearms or other weapons, or by an incautious use of them, must, of course, be followed by a solemn injury, the consequences of which cannot fail to be most serious to those who shall be found transgressors.
- 27- Every party with loaded arms will draw their charges on their return to their Barracks, and the Constable in command will be held responsible, that the powder and balls are preserved in order to their being made into cartridges for future use; and the County-Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors, on their inspections of stations, will make such inquired into the manner in which this order has been obeyed, as may prevent an unnecessary waste of ammunition.
- 28- The foregoing suggestions are rather intended for memoranda, especially to inexperienced Officers than positive instructions applicable at all times, and in all cases. In the details of patrolling, much must necessarily be left to the zeal, intelligence, and tact of the Officers and Constables employed, who will, without doubt, be guided in them by the strength of their parties, - the particular state and the features of the country- the nature of the prevalent outrages- the season of the year, and a variety of other circumstances. But in whatever way, these details are carried out, I am anxious that they should not only be established a well-understood combination of the Patrols within the same districts, but that plans of co-operation,

for such purposes, should be formed, under the instructions of the County-Inspector between two or more Officers of adjoining districts, and even of adjoining counties. It should be constantly impressed upon the members of the force, that, amidst the multitude of responsible duties devolving upon them, none seems to be of greater or more general importance, for the prevention or detection of crime, than a judicious, constant, and vigorous system of patrolling; and although I am ready to make great allowances for the formidable difficulties opposed to the successful exertions of the Police in this country, and am disposed highly to admire the gallant spirit which they invariably manifest, when they happen to come into collision with the serious and habitual disturbers of the public peace, yet the Officers and others in charge of Stations must be sensible that doubts of their judgment or zeal will naturally be experienced at Headquarters, if it should be found that in any particular district, the violators of all law are permitted to move in parties through the country, and commit, night after night, the most atrocious outrages with impunity.

D. McGregor,

Inspector-General

Postscript : - until further Orders, Officers Head, and other Constables, in charge of Stations, will direct at least one intelligent Constable or Sub-Constable to accompany every Military Patrol, when called on for that purpose by the Senior Officer of the Troops at the Station, unless the Police at the post be required for yet more important and urgent duty.

Annexe 16 :

Extraits de registres tenus par les  
agents du RIC

CO 904/173, Police Circulars to RIC, 1887 1902, Archives nationales de Londres.



County of Meath  
Subdist. of Terothan  
 Confidential report for month of May 1883

Dist. of Terothan

Names	Residence	of what description	Notes taken during month	Name of Police by whom taken
James Neenan	Mulnick	Rebberism	Met by the Police at Glonara on the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Inst. they were waiting to attend the funeral of M <sup>r</sup> Stewart of Glonara Neenan was drunk and arrested by the Police and kept in the Barracks of Terothan until 11 P.M. when discharged totally sober and returned for the funeral.	S. C. Park & Hara
John Cully	Annville	Do.		Met by the Police in Poyrus; public house at Glonara at 8 P.M. on 4 <sup>th</sup> Inst. he was drinking with Patrick Poyrus-Annville
John Cully	Annville	Do.	Met by the Police at Glonara at 11 P.M. 6 <sup>th</sup> Inst. he was at Glonara checked & drunk in celebration of his promotion after	Do.
John Mitchell	Mulnick	Do.	Met by the Police at Glonara on Sunday 13 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 11 A.M. at 11 P.M. he was there he shortly left for his home	Do.
James Neenan	Mulnick	Do.	Met by the Police at Glonara on the 14 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 8 P.M. in Stewart's public house. he was drinking with Poyrus & Annville	S. C. P. J. Hopson
James Neenan	Mulnick	Do.	Met by the Police at Glonara on Sunday 20 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 4 1/2 P.M. went in direction of his home & home	Do.
James Neenan	Leadbog	Do.	Met by the Police at Glonara on Sunday 28 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 11 P.M. in Stewart's public house was drunk & returned to his home	Do.
James Neenan	Mulnick	Do.	Met by the Police at Annville on 29 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 11 P.M. was in company of Henry Connolly of Ashmore. said he went with Connolly to Roberts (to take) getting towards home both	Do.
John Cully	Annville	Do.	Met by the Police in Poyrus public house on 28 <sup>th</sup> Inst. at 9 P.M. they were drinking together both were under the influence of liquor - Ennis a blacksmith after some time they went	S. C. Park & Hara

W. G. Williamson Esq<sup>r</sup>  
 1<sup>st</sup> Sub - Inspector.  
 Dated at Terothan 1<sup>st</sup> June 1883  
 James McDonald Const. 28933

Confidential Report for May 1883  
Conf.

Name	Residence	Of what Societies	Notes taken during the month	By whom Recd.
And <sup>r</sup> Lewis	Ballinderrin	Amazons	27 May. at 3 <sup>30</sup> pm at Enfield + alone	Gen. Cormot
Col. Powell	Kilmeny	- Do -	27 " at 4 <sup>45</sup> pm At his own house	Ac. Mulcahy
Hugh Beilly	- Do -	- Do -	27 " do do	- Do -
- Do -	- Do -	- Do -	28 " At 9 <sup>45</sup> am Going to Stillman Race	Ac. Alexander
And <sup>r</sup> Lewis	Ballinderrin	- Do -	28 " At 10 <sup>45</sup> am Racing Infants Police Banack	Gen. Cormot
Col. Highlan	Ballycarn	- Do -	28 " at 11 am at Enfield + alone -	Ac. Hughes -
And <sup>r</sup> Lewis	Ballinderrin	- Do -	29 " at 1 <sup>45</sup> pm at Johnston's Bridge + alone	Gen. Cormot
Col. Highlan	Ballycarn	- Do -	29 " At 6 am going to his work with C. Ruess	Ac. Hughes -
Hugh Beilly	Kilmeny	- Do -	29 " At 8 pm At his own house + alone	Ac. Mc. Lety -
And <sup>r</sup> Lewis	Ballinderrin	- Do -	30 " At 4 pm In Canal Boat with Joseph Harris	Gen. Cormot
James Farrell	Kilmeny	- Do -	31 " At 3 <sup>45</sup> pm At his own house + alone	Ac. Mc. Lety -
Col. Highlan	Ballycarn	- Do -	31 " At 6 <sup>45</sup> pm At Infants returning from his work.	Ac. Alexander

Dated at Enfield 1 June 1883.

P. Cormot Comd. 34213

W. G. Williamson Esq. D.L.

## Annexe 17 :

# Témoignages sur les raids menés par les forces paramilitaires britanniques

CO 904/23, Dublin Castle Records: Sinn Fein Movements, Archives nationales de Londres.

1st Raid Thursday 18th November, 1920.

At 10-45 I heard a group of persons talking in an undertone outside my premises 29, Shop Street, next the gate outside was pushed open, silence for about 5 minutes, next a flash lamp played against the lock of the door and more muttering, next I got down my uncle and brother, who were upstairs in bed. We waited in the shop until about 11-15 when my uncle went to the second floor window and shouted down "What do you want" they replied, "Come down and open the door at once, or else we'll fire", my uncle came down, opened the door, and in walked three men, the first was armed with a large revolver, dressed in a black waterproof coat and the usual dark green cap, complete with chin strap, all of which appeared brand new. Features - sharp, rather sallow looking with a "tooth prush" moustache, the other two were dressed in khaki overcoats collars up to their ears, and khaki caps, these went upstairs, peered into two rooms, went up the next flight, into the bedroom from which £65 (sixty five pounds), an Elgin watch with chain and an overcoat, pocket book, etc. were taken.

While the khaki chaps were upstairs "the R.I.C. uniform man" lit a cigarette and says "Its a rotten job this, having to raid people at night, but one of our boys got shot this morning and we've got to search for arms" he was greatly interested in Diamond and Bracelet watches. The other two then came down, blew out the candle and forced us up-stairs, I waited and listened on the landing of the first flight and distinctly heard, "Now boys no looting" at which the other two laughed. I also heard "whereas the bloody owner of this shop - we'll arrest him". I went upstairs told my uncle, after which the shop door slammed and they were gone. It was all

the stove used as a W.C. and went to bed.

We cannot identify any of the men, all were strangers

(Signed) William Duffner  
Joseph Duffner (Jun)  
Ed. Duffner.

Sheet Two.

End Raid (Attempted) Thursday 25th November, 1920.

Time about 9 p.m. My brother looking from the second floor window noticed several men, with R.I.C. caps standing in front of the shop. He came down to me in the shop and told me, "they're at it again" next we heard loud knocking at the door, and pressure being used against the plate glass, and the words "come on boys", we stayed quite, made no sound and let on there was no one on the premises.

My brother then climbed out our back window, into the house next door, from that into a yard into another house and out to the street, out to my father who resides at 25, Chord Road, who went over to the West Gate Barracks and brought down a number of police, they made inquiries and went off.

At 2 a.m. the next morning some-one made another attempt at the gate which was now padlocked, but went away after about 5 minutes.

(Signed) William Duffner  
Joseph Duffner (Jun)  
Ed. Duffner.

Sheet Three.

Third Raid, Friday 26th November, 1920.

Time midnight. A covered Motor lorry was drawn up outside the shop with the engine left running, the screen (sun blind) was pulled out, on which some one climbed, broke a window on the first floor, got inside and ran down the shop.

In the meantime, I heard a revolver shot fired, the plate glass door broken in and no more, for my uncle, brother and I, left by the skylight, into the house next door, where I listened to our stock, being thrown into the lorry. It drove off towards Gormanstown at about 12-30 a.m.

I then went over the South Quay Barracks, told them or one of them to come over at once and have a look round.

Six of them came in about 25 minutes, inspected the place and went away.

Electro plate, Lathe parts and a lot of stock for which we have a list was stolen.

Neither of us saw either of the men who took part in the affair.

(Signed) William Duffner

Joseph Duffner (Junior)

Ed. Duffner.

Annexe 18 :

Informateur « Quentin » a besoin  
d'argent

CO 904/23, Dublin Castle Records: Sinn Fein Movements, Archives nationales de Londres.

Private & Secret

18-6-84

Captain Slacke

I had an interview last night with "Quentin"  
at which I obtained some information which  
may prove valuable - Opportunities have  
now presented themselves by which I may be  
able to work him with effect in the Counties  
of Carlow and Kilkenny - In the former  
at Bagnalstown is now living Joseph Breen  
a trusted Irishman from the Queens Co: - It was  
Quentin advised him to go there, so that  
he might work through him to find out  
what is doing in the Co Carlow -  
In order to furnish Quentin with an



Expense for visiting Carlow and other Counties.  
I persuaded him to obtain some kind of  
agency as a commercial traveller -  
He has procured employment from a  
Dublin house - He refused to become  
an ordinary traveller, in which capacity,  
he says, he would have received £1  
per day travelling expenses, & 1½ per cent on  
Sales effected - His reason was, that, if so  
employed, he should have to pass on too  
quickly from place <sup>to place,</sup> and could effect no  
good for me -

He says he is now paid  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per C on Sales when he has collected the money, and no travelling expenses. This he says would not pay well —

He professes to be anxious to do my work with effect, and by travelling to extend his knowledge of Fermianism into those countries where we have little information. In order to do this, he says, he will have to spend a great deal more money than heretofore both on travelling expenses and his living — and besides, he is obliged to frequent public houses, and spend a large sum on standing drink. Therefore he asked me for one

year to guarantee him a fixed sum per month.

I suggested ~~at~~ £8-6-8 or 100 per annum.  
But he said that would leave him nothing at  
all, if he travelled much. He said he thought  
£12 per month would be fair. I would not make

any arrangement on my own authority - I think  
there is a great deal in what Queutin says about the  
expense of constant travelling; and no doubt he is  
a very valuable informant. I must say too that  
I find him anxious to do my work well, and  
the says is reliable - Under the circumstances

therefore, and considering how hard it is to procure  
informants in this part of Ireland, I am  
inclined to recommend his request making the proviso  
that he is only paid so long as he gives full satisfaction

Henry J. Bourchier D.I.C.S.P.

## Annexe 19 :

### Noms des informateurs de la police

CO 904/183, Register of Informants Arranged by Police Division Recording Names and Aliases and Amounts Paid, 1884 1891, Archives nationales de Londres.

Cognomen of informants	Date of entertainment	Position in agitation and opinion of D.C.	Remarks
<b>Midland Division</b>			
P. CASSIDY Cavan		Sworn Ribbonman. Important and trustworthy information about Ribbon society in Northern counties	Paid £17:10:00 in 1889
John FALL Cavan		Sworn IRB. Important information about IRB organization.	Paid £9:00:00 in 1889
John ROSS Sligo		Sworn IRB. Useful information about movements of organizers, visits of suspects and meetings of IRB.	Paid £3:10:00 In 1889
John O'BEIRNE Leitrim	Dec. 1889	Sworn IRB. Useful information about IRB/GAA and concealed arms which led to seizure.	Paid £3. In 1889
Matthias Leitrim	Dec. 1889	Sworn IRB. Information about GAA and IRB. A new man who will probably be valuable.	Paid £4. In 1889
Pat WILSON King's Co.	Nov. 1889	Sworn IRB. Information about secret societies. New man not yet well tried.	Paid £2. In 1889
<b>Western division</b>			
"Coo" Galway ER	1888	Ordinary member IRB. Trustworthy information regarding state of district, plots of assassinations and contemplated outrages.	Paid £19 In 1889
"H" Galway ER	1888	Ordinary member IRB. Trustworthy information regarding state of district, plots of assassinations and contemplated outrages as to infernal machine.	Paid £10 in 1889
"Fee" Galway ER	1886	Ordinary member of IRB. Information as to secret societies, movements of leading suspects.	Paid £4 in 1889
Joe DURO Galway ER	1886	Inner circle of IRB. Information as to organization of secret societies in his district.	Paid £15 in 1889
Peter COLE Mayo	1885	Member of outrage society which has no special name. Information as to secret societies. General information.	Paid £7 in 1889
James Roscommon	1888	Ordinary member of IRB. Valuable information concerning plan of campaign or an Estate.	Paid £5 in 1889
Joe FINN Roscommon	1889	Ordinary member of IRB. Valuable information concerning plan of campaign or an Estate. Information as to secret societies, Gaelic Athletic Association and the League.	Paid £3 in 1889
Pat MARTIN Athlone	1890	Not a member of S. S. but a useful person. Has unusual facilities for knowing a good deal.	
<b>Northern Division</b>			
Norman	Jan 1889	Has given useful information as to Monaghan and Clones district.	Paid £2.10 in 1889
Dixon	Jan 1888	Has given useful information as to Monaghan and Clones district. Good information regarding the IRB at Dundack and Crossmaghan.	Paid £2.50 in 1889
Richards	June 1888	Has given useful information regarding the IRB in Derry city.	Paid £2.50 in 1889
Bruiser	July 1889	IRB and Ribbon Society in Newry District.	Paid 30p. in 1889

<b>Despard Tramp</b>	June 1889 May 1891	Has given important information regarding the Ribbon society and its organization in Ballyshannon District. Member of Sherlock or Old Ribbon Party. Information corroborated. Importance not yet revealed	Paid £13:50
<b>South-Western Division</b>			
<b>B 4 Co Cork E.R.</b>	Dec. 1888	Sworn IRB. Well in with local suspects and informs as to useful information in his neighbourhood.	Paid 30 p./s. in 1889
<b>Chance Cork City</b>	Sept 1889	IRB centre: educated and intelligent well-informed and communicative as to secret societies and passing political events.	Paid £8:18:00 in 1889
<b>Fire Co. Cork</b>	Feb 1889	Ordinary IRB. Keeps us posted as to passing events, both under and above surface.	Paid £4 in 1889
<b>Hood Cork City</b>	Oct 1889	An IRB. One of our most reliable men. Has constantly told of coming events and always to be trusted.	Paid £9 in 1889.
<b>Jennings Cork City</b>	May 1889	One of our oldest and most reliable men. Is a leading Stephenite Fenian and has been imprisoned on political charges.	Paid £8 in 1889
<b>Lace Limerick City</b>	Jan 1889	An ordinary IRB. Very reliable, is ready to do detective political work, police are often put on the alert to frustrate intended suppressed meetings	Paid £3 in 1889
<b>Lake Cork Co. E.R.</b>	July 1888	Centre IRB. A man of considerable position and influence. Is most reliable in informing us of coming and past events. His information has always been found reliable and important.	Paid £12 in 1889
<b>Samoa Cork E.R.</b>	March 1889	An ordinary IRB man. A very prominent Leaguer. Gives most reliable information as to secret work in his neighbourhood.	Paid £6 in 1889
<b>No.24</b>	Oct 89 28.10.90 09.07.90	Gave valuable information which enabled us to cope with the organized attempts to boycott the sale of cattle at Fairs. Gave valuable information of plot to murder Mister Garty of Millstreet Gave information which led to arrest of J.CONNELL and J.MEANY for firing at J.RIORDAN	Paid £28:40:00 in 1889
<b>Kerry and Clare (South West Division)</b>			
<b>Major</b>	March 1889	Ordinary member of G.A.A. Has given intelligence respecting G.A.A and moonlighters.	Paid £2 in 1889. This man has emigrated
<b>Mary SULLIVAN</b>	Oct.1886	Member of IRB, G.A.A., IRL. It was chiefly through this informants' help that the P. of L. on Kenmare estate was combated. Enables us to break up a boycotting conspiracy started by Michael Fleming. Enables us to check the "Cattle Manifesto" conspiracy and arrest three conspirators.	Paid £60 in 1889
<b>Burns</b>	March 1884	Not a member of any organization. Enables us to seize a gun, and prosecute offenders. Also gave information which led to recovery of stolen sheep.	Paid £2 in 1889.
<b>Bank Co. Cork ER</b>	June 1889	Has given valuable information as to outrages and as to working of secret and political movements in his locality.	Paid £5 in 1889



Annexe 20 :

Télégrammes de surveillance des  
nationalistes irlandais

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, 1890-1891, n°54, Ministère des  
Affaires Etrangères, Paris.



MODELE N° 314 B.  
(Septembre 1886. — Copille 53.)

MINISTÈRE  
DES POSTES  
ET  
DES TÉLÉGRAPHES.

Télégramme.

*Nord*  
*Amiens*

le 17 Janvier 1891. 5 h. 40<sup>mn</sup>

Service officiel.

№ 6970

Commissaire Spécial

à  
Intérieur Sécurité <sup>g<sup>le</sup></sup>, Paris -

Le député irlandais O'Brien, sa femme et son secrétaire M. Gyl, sont partis d'Amiens à 5 h 36, par train n° 21 arrivant à Rouen à 9 heures. M. Gyl est arrivé par le train de marée Boulogne à 4 h.; il était attendu anxieusement depuis ce matin à l'hôtel de l'Univers, où M. O'Brien et sa femme étaient descendus hier soir. Ces trois personnes se rendent au Havre pour assister au débarquement du paquebot, le "Gascogne" à bord duquel se trouve le député irlandais Dillon.

Traduction T. D.

Télégramme.

Paris le 1 Janvier 1891. 9 h 55<sup>00</sup> du m.

Keoncy, hôtel Louve  
Boulogne-sur-mer

Calziel tient d'un membre irlandais, mais pas de Sarnell, O'Brien que première conférence cordiale sans recriminations, deuxième réunion, deux parties disjointes, emploi argent. O'Brien avait proposé remettre argent homme hors lutte emplois financiers expulsés. Sarnell objecta cela constituerait son abdication, et argent dépôt sacré dont il a gardé seul à moins déposé par élections générales a droit contrôler fonds, préférerait encore partager argent une partie financiers autre partie campagne politique.

Angleterre

Modèle n° 314 B.  
(Décret du 1886. — Copie n° 52.)

MINISTÈRE  
DES POSTES  
ET  
DES TÉLÉGRAPHES.

Traduction

Télégramme.

Dublin, le 2 Janvier 1891. 7 h 50<sup>00</sup> du soir

Service officiel.

O'Brien Paris.

Viens d'avoir longue conférence avec Sarnell. J'estime que proposition formulée dans lettre qu'il vous a expédiée est plus simple et de nature à ménager autant que possible nos intérêts en Angleterre. Cette proposition est certainement dictée par bonne foi. Sarnell désire vivement faire tout ce qui sera loyal.

Harrington.

MODELE N° 314 B.  
(Septembre 1896. — Coquille 53.)  
MINISTÈRE  
DES POSTES  
ET  
DES TÉLÉGRAPHES.  
Service officiel.

Traduction.  
Télégramme.

Paris le 2 / 1 1896. 4 h. 5 m<sup>00</sup> du soir.

Parnell  
15 Rutland Square  
Dublin

N° 80111

Confidentiel message satisfaisant  
de Dillon. A cause des journaux malveillants  
j'insiste auprès de vous m'autoriser à  
communiquer avec Macarthy et  
Sexton. Je ne veux d'ailleurs rien  
croire mais ma position personnelle  
déjà assez difficile deviendrait intolérable  
si j'étais obligé les laisser entièrement  
sans l'ombre.

O'Brien  
10 Avenue Brocadeiro

Annexe 21 :

Augmentation des effectifs du CID  
de la Branche Spéciale

MEPO 2/ 1297, Organisation: Special Branch Augmentations, 1909 1914,  
Archives nationales de Londres.

CENTRAL OFFICER'S }  
SPECIAL REPORT. }

**METROPOLITAN POLICE.**

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT,

NEW SCOTLAND YARD,

7th day of July 1909.

SUBJECT

Augmentations.

REFERENCE TO PAPERS.

I beg to ask that the Commissioner will kindly consider the following facts with a view of applying to the Secretary of State for an augmentation of two 2nd Class Sergeants, and two Constables in Section "B.C.I.D.

The grounds upon which this request for an augmentation are based are:-

(1) The increasing demands upon the Special Branch in consequence of the Indian agitation, involving personal protection to Statesmen whose lives are considered to be in danger through the presence in London of Indians of extreme views; the close supervision of Indians and the many enquiries required by the Indian Authorities.

The murder of Sir Curzon Wylie has increased the Indian enquiries considerably and no relaxation can be foreseen in protection duty, enquiries, or the supervision of Indian "extremists".

(2) The large number of Russian, Polish, Yiddish and Anarchists of other nationalities, resident in London, involving enquiries regularly, and a measure of close supervision at times.

The forthcoming visit of Their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Russia to Cowes will necessitate the closest possible supervision and enquiries from this moment.

(3) The careful protection of Their Majesties the King and Queen when the Court is at Buckingham Palace has also to be arranged daily.

(4) Enquiries of a highly important nature made for some of the Governments Departments demand the services of Officers of the Branch.

(5) The agitation by Suffragettes has necessitated the Prime Minister being specially protected by a Sergeant and Constable of Special Branch.

There are other duties such as enquiries for the Irish Government, and enquiries into application for Naturalization which help to add to the work, and having regard to these facts, it is necessary to have the augmentation of the

numbers as soon as possible.

The authorised strength of Section "B" is 1 Chief Inspector , 11 Sergeants and 16 Constables, and Section "D" 1 Superintendent and 5 Inspectors.

There are 9 vacancies in Section "C" (Ports) and there is no intention, at present, of filling up these vacancies, this I suggest should be taken into consideration as a compensating economy for the augmentation now asked for in Section "B".

It is not advisable to formally reduce the authorised strength of Section "C".

*P. Lunn*  
Superintendent.

Any further communication on the subject of this letter should be addressed to—  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,  
HOME OFFICE,  
LONDON, S.W.,  
and the following number quoted—  
181,321

HOME OFFICE,  
WHITEHALL.

12 July, 1909.

REGISTRY  
13 JUL 12

Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 10th Instant, I am directed to say that, in the circumstances represented therein, the Secretary of State sanctions the augmentation of the Special Branch (Section B) of the Criminal Investigation Department by two Second Class Sergeants and two Constables.

The augmentation is authorised for a period of six months at the end of which the Secretary of State will be glad to receive a further report from you.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,


*C. Thompson*

## Annexe 22 :

# Apologie des services de renseignement britanniques pendant la Première Guerre mondiale

7N-912 : 2ème bureau, Angleterre, section de contrôle, documents des attachés militaires: raids de dirigeables et services secrets. Série N, Etat Major de l'armée de terre, Archives militaires françaises, Service Historique de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.





- Lutte contre les espions ennemis -

Une histoire d'un intérêt absorbant est révélée par le Brigadier-Général George K. COCKERILL, C.B. (actuellement membre du Parlement pour le district de Reigate, Surrey) dans le message d'adieu suivant qu'il a adressé au "Directorate of Special Intelligence" à la tête duquel il s'est trouvé pendant la guerre:

" Le Directorate of Special Intelligence, pour lui donner le titre sous lequel il est le mieux connu de vous, eut une origine très humble. Au début de la guerre il se composait de trois officiers d'Etat-Major (qui, tous, rejoignirent immédiatement le corps expéditionnaire britannique) et d'un bureau spécial de quatre officiers qui pendant les cinq années précédant la guerre s'attachèrent à découvrir les agissements du service secret allemand dans ce pays et déférèrent nombre de ses agents aux tribunaux.

Dès que la guerre fut considérée comme inévitable, un projet de censure des cables britanniques fut mis en pratique. Ce projet avait été préparé avec une telle précision qu'il n'a pas été nécessaire de le remanier dans ses principes essentiels. Ces deux services, contre-

espionnage et contrôle télégraphique furent placés sous les ordres du même officier, mon prédécesseur, parce qu'ils tendaient tous les deux à la sauvegarde de nos secrets navals et militaires et à la découverte de ceux de nos ennemis. Tous les organismes créés depuis pour combattre le système d'espionnage ennemi furent naturellement placés sous son autorité. Lorsque je lui succédai, en septembre 1914, il organisait la censure postale et plus tard le service des permis et passeports fut inauguré. Le travail fut bientôt tel, et le personnel si nombreux, qu'en mars 1915, l'ensemble fut réorganisé sous le nom de "Directorate of Special Intelligence" dont les fonctions furent de découvrir les menées clandestines des agents ennemis. Le "Directorate" chargé d'un service national d'une suprême importance atteignit bientôt un développement qu'il n'avait jamais envisagé en temps de paix. Il occupe actuellement 6000 employés et, au seul point de vue de l'importance matérielle, c'est le sixième service du Gouvernement. Néanmoins il a fonctionné si discrètement et si opportunément que son existence est généralement ignorée du public.

Ce serait, je crois, vous rendre justice que de mieux comprendre et apprécier votre labeur. Sa nature même vous a imposé le silence absolu sur le caractère de vos fonctions. Vous vous êtes contentés de vous livrer à une tâche demandant de longues heures d'un travail souvent fastidieux et monotone et exigeant cependant une attention toujours en éveil, une précision méticuleuse et un jugement pénétrant. Vous n'avez jamais relâché vos efforts et, cependant il vous a manqué le stimulant, que d'autres ont eu, de pouvoir constater le résultat de votre oeuvre. Il semble juste, maintenant que cela peut se faire sans inconvénient, de soulever légèrement le voile et d'acquiescer à grands traits ce que vous avez accompli.

Prompte arrestation des espions ennemis-

La découverte et la condamnation des espions ennemis fut le premier de vos devoirs. Il faut noter avec satisfaction que dans la plupart des cas l'arrestation de l'espion suivit immédiatement son entrée dans le pays. En fait, vous avez été le principal organisme s'opposant aux "fuites" de nos informations navales et militaires. Laissez moi citer quelques uns de vos succès: le retrait des troupes de Gallipoli, la construction des "tanks", la préparation de l'offensive de Cambrai, et aussi la récente contre-offensive qui détruisit les armées allemandes étaient connus ici, de beaucoup de personnes et restèrent néanmoins ignorés de nos ennemis. Je tiens d'une source absolument autorisée qu'il n'est pas prouvé que les sous-marins ennemis aient jamais été avertis des départs de bateaux de ports britanniques.

Grâce, en grande partie, à vos efforts les agents ennemis n'ont pu effectuer aucune destruction ni incendie dans ce pays. Ce résultat est d'autant plus remarquable qu'un grand nombre de sujets ennemis y étaient en liberté. Vous avez obtenu des informations d'une valeur incalculable pour les "Naval Intelligence", "Military Intelligence" et "War Trade Intelligence" départements. D'après l'opinion du Ministre du "Blocus" votre travail a contribué pour une large part à son fonctionnement efficace. En ce qui concerne la suppression du commerce ennemi, les informations fournies par vous ont été les plus importantes de toutes celles recueillies pendant la guerre, sur les marchandises ennemies transportées comme marchandises neutres sous pavillon neutre.

Il vous intéressera de savoir que dans presque tous les cas de contrebande soumis ou à soumettre à la Cour des Frises, les arguments sur lesquels s'appuie le ré-

quisitoire de la Couronne ont été fournis par vous. L'importance de ce qui précède sera mieux comprise si j'ajoute que la valeur des prises s'élève à plus de 30.000.000 de livres sterling, sans parler de la valeur des navires eux-mêmes. Vous avez de plus arrêté environ 70.000.000 de livres sterling de remises ennemies et vous avez complètement détruit les communications d'outre-mer de l'adversaire pour autant qu'elles étaient vulnérables.

200.000.000 de Livres sterling épargnées à la Nation-

Par votre aide indispensable, en empêchant les spéculations sur les matières premières, en contrôlant les prix, en faisant l'estimation des stocks de tous les articles d'importance vitale pour la guerre, vous avez épargné au pays des sommes considérables, s'élevant pour un seul cas à 1.500.000 livres et pour l'ensemble, d'après une estimation des plus modestes à la somme globale de 200.000.000 de livres. Plus profitable encore au pays, que la valeur matérielle de votre concours, fut l'élimination de la spéculation dans le commerce allié et par conséquent la garantie que les commandes seraient bien livrées aux dates spécifiées. Très impartialement on peut affirmer que vous avez été l'instrument le plus efficace et, souvent le seul, non seulement dans la découverte des agissements et des intérêts ennemis mais encore dans l'application rigoureuse des règlements d'intérêt vital pour la défense du Royaume.

Cet exposé est loin d'épuiser tout ce qu'on aurait à dire sur vos services. Une section du "Directorate of Special Intelligence", a préparé et publié le "Daily Review of the Foreign Press" avec ses nombreux suppléments politique, économique et technique. Une autre section fut chargée de l'étude des méthodes ennemies

de propagande. Un petit groupe non content de fermer certaines voies ennemies de propagande en a maintenu d'autres ouvertes, dans le but précis d'une distribution de propagande anglaise, sous enveloppes adressées par l'ennemi et affranchies par lui. Des documents militaires pour notre propre propagande furent préparés, réunis et distribués sur le front britannique au moyen de ballons. A ce sujet, un tribut a été payé à l'efficacité surprenante de votre travail par le Chef d'Etat-Major Allemand : dans un communiqué récent, il se référerait à certains tracts préparés par le "Directorate of Special Intelligence" et distribués d'après un plan conçu par lui. J'ai conscience de n'avoir pas touché à bien d'autres branches de l'activité du Directorate. D'importantes décisions ont été élaborées dans le domaine du Code Militaire International; on s'est donné beaucoup de mal pour sélectionner un personnel de "campagne" et des investigations ont été conduites qui nécessitaient des connaissances techniques du plus haut degré. Je mentionnerai comme exemple typique le travail extrêmement savant du personnel du laboratoire chimique pour la découverte des encres secrètes; celui des experts en photographie ou en codes ou des professeurs de langues non usuelles. Une grande partie de votre travail a été d'une nature si secrète qu'il n'est pas encore possible d'en parler.

#### Un service incomparable-

Je ne puis clore cet exposé sans dire un mot de l'oeuvre des "Directorates" d'outre-mer. Les organisations filiales des Dominions et Colonies ont été des chaînons essentiels dans un service d'un caractère national mais d'influence mondiale. Sans leur coopération

loyale et désintéressée les résultats obtenus n'auraient pu être atteints. Les "Special Intelligence Missions" dans les capitales des pays Alliés ont également rendu des services incalculables. La Mission Anglaise à Paris fait partie du Bureau Central Interallié qui, créé à la fin de 1914, pour l'échange des informations et des idées concernant le "Special Intelligence" fut le premier essai vers l'unité de politique entre les Alliés. La Mission de Paris ainsi que celles de Rome et de Washington ont maintenu des relations de parfaite harmonie avec les services correspondants alliés dont les chefs ont toujours accordé la plus généreuse confiance aux Anglais.

A chacun et à tous, je désire témoigner ma profonde admiration pour l'esprit dans lequel vous avez travaillé. Vous avez été exemplaires de bonne camaraderie et d'abnégation. Ce sera toujours pour moi une source de joie et de fierté d'avoir été associé, avec vous, dans un service que nos ennemis eux-mêmes ont reconnu comme très efficace et que nos alliés Français ont qualifié d'incomparable.



## Annexe 23 :

# Extrait d'un manuel de sabotage

Ms 11,410, About 150 documents on sabotage 1916-1922, Collection Count Plunkett, Archives nationales de Dublin.



Part I

1 Railways @ Demolition.

(i) Without explosives.

Rollingstock, running sheds, breakdown accessories, permanent way, telegraph and phone, signals & point operators' cabins, watertanks.

Tools reqd. How they should be used. Choice of point of attack. Number of men reqd.

(ii) With explosives

as above. Use of different explosives.

Description of different kinds. Calculation of amounts of explosive reqd for different kinds of work.

(B) Construction

Details of construction of above.

Possibility of use of railways to our forces.

Part I

Tools (Note under Railways)

Ironmongery, wire, telegraph & telegraph supplies.

Railroad tools mechanical & civil,

blacksmiths & engineers shops, electrical,

roadmaking, mining, plumbers, tools

Leather & tanneries

2 BRIDGES

(a) Demolition

(i) Without explosives

Oxyacetylene flame for iron structures. Point of attack. Tools reqd. Method. Number of men reqd. Masonry. Tools men reqd. Methods

(ii)

With explosives.

Tools reqd. Point of attack etc as for Raily (above)

(b) Construction

Details of above.


Field construction.

Pontoons etc

Fig 1



Fig 2



### WIRELESS SENDING APPARATUS.

- I Motor bicycle or car with motor ignition magnet.
- II Wires from magnet, connected with —
- III Morse tapper; & thence primary coil of —
- IV 1" Induction Coil. One wire from magnet connected direct with primary coil.
- V Two wires from secondary coil of induction coil, connected with two ends of —
- VI Spark Gap: Two copper balls at about 1/2" distance from each other. One end of spark gap is connected with a condenser (4 Leyden jars); & the other with —
- VII Wire (copper) wound in 17 or 18 spirals (spring like), not touching, which in turn is connected with Leyden jars, completing the circuit.
- VIII This is connected with copper clips to (a), a wire reaching to earth; and also by another clip, some distance apart, to an aerial.
- IX The aerial is most easily made by utilizing wire between 3 telegraph poles arranged as in sketch. Wires should be exactly equal in length from insulator to insulator.

Note: Motor is set going & sparking commences. The arrangement should leave enough available electricity to work motor, which of course generates its own electricity. The essential is the alternating current.

NOTE  
The new rails that are being laid are only single flange rails.

Report to No 40 Ill Engr  
D.S.E. Railway  
END OF RAIL

FISH 1' 6" PLATE  
4 1/2" 5" 4 1/2"

Lapwood wooden wedges  
Fish Plate formings  
Saffered wooden wedge

NOTE  
The distance between chairs at joints of Rail varies from 1' 7 1/2" to 2' 4"

Chairs  
sleepers  
Distance Inside Flange

## Annexe 24 :

# Le sauvetage de Sean McKeown : Action typique de la Squad

IR 2713c15, “Michael Collins’s Squad”, The Capucin Annual, 1969, p. 368-377, Archives nationales de Dublin.

ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF SEAN McKEOWN  
TYPICAL SQUAD ACTION

I was in Aughrim Street, early on a warm, Saturday morning in May, 1921, and there were only a few people about. I was dressed in blue dungarees, the legs of which could be seen below the light waterproof coat I was wearing. What could not be seen was the belt and holster, with my short Webley .45 in it, around my waist. A picket party of Volunteers and Squad members were there similarly dressed to give the impression that we were Corporation employees waiting to go to work in the Cattle Market. I walked across the road to the iron barred gates of the Cattle Market and looked inside. The market looked wet and clean. I looked around at the remainder of our party, some of whom were walking down the street, others coming out of the public lavatory opposite, and I felt quite happy that they did look like market workers waiting to start work, which, indeed, they were, but it was work of another kind, spectacular and dangerous work.

Paddy Daly, who was in charge of the main party, was lolling against a wall at the top of Aughrim Street near the North Circular Road, as if waiting to meet somebody. He looked quite inconspicuous but I could see that he was intently staring across the North Circular Road and I knew what he was staring at, as did the others. He was watching the top window of the house immediately adjoining and overlooking the yard of the Dublin abbatoir. The blind was down on this window. If this blind went up it was a signal that the crew of the British armoured car, which was in the Abbatoir yard to collect the daily meat for the barracks, had got out of the car; it would also be the signal for us to move into the yard, each group to do its allotted work. My group was to capture

and drive away the armoured car. This was our third morning waiting for the signal, and we wondered if "the job" would be done at all.

There had been, Pat McCrea told me, meetings a short time before, in the squad hide-out in Abbey Street. I was not present for the simple reason that I was a prisoner in Arbour Hill prison and had been there for over four weeks under a false name, and had succeeded in bluffing my way out under the same false name. I had just reported back to the squad in time for this important operation. Pat McCrea had greeted me with open arms and without delay a meeting was held and I was thoroughly briefed. Sean McKeown, the famous "Blacksmith of Ballinalee," had been wounded and captured some time previously and was now in Mountjoy prison, awaiting trial, the outcome of which was expected to be sentence of death.

Briefly, the plan was to capture an armoured car, man it with members of the squad dressed as an armoured car crew, two of our party to be in British officers' uniforms, then proceed to Mountjoy, where, with forged papers authorising the transfer of Sean McKeown to Dublin Castle, we would enter the prison and escort Sean out of the prison to freedom. The foregoing simple plan necessitated careful detailed planning, timing and anticipation of possible reaction at Mountjoy prison. First of all, however, we had to capture an armoured car, equipped with machine guns, and place a crew within it, fully trained to defend their mobile fort. I must admit it sounded a bit ridiculous to me, but I, like all of the squad and G.H.Q. Intelligence, had faith in Mick Collins and his planning. He had, by good planning and anticipation of British reaction, piloted

us through many a hazardous operation successfully in the past.

The house immediately adjoining and overlooking the main yard of the abbatoir was occupied by Michael Lynch, O.C. Fingal Brigade, I.R.A., supervisor of the abbatoir. He had been out in 1916; a reliable, dependable man. He had reported to G.H.Q. Intelligence that an armoured car daily escorted the army lorries to and from the abbatoir, which collected the meat rations for the city military barracks, including the nearby Marlboro' Barracks. Michael Lynch had noticed from an upper window of his house that sometimes the whole crew got out of the car and went inside the building to smoke and watch the butchers at work. At other times, the driver and perhaps one of the crew remained with the car. An important aspect on this occasion was that the car was turned round facing the main entrance, ready to leave, when the crew got out, driver and all.

The plan was direct and straightforward. We were divided into two groups. The first was to capture and man the armoured car as follows:— driver, assistant driver and two machine gunners; to these was added a fifth, Tom Kehoe, a squad member, renowned for his coolness, courage and initiative in any dangerous situation. Pat was to be driver; he was the number one G.H.Q. driver and was famous for courage and for being able to drive efficiently any make of car, not a common thing then, when cars were very few. I had been trained to drive by Pat and was to be the assistant driver while John Caffrey and Peter Gough, who had been trained as gunners in the Volunteers, were the machine-gunners. The two officers were Emmet Dalton, a G.H.Q. military instructor, and Joe Leonard. These were to be picked up at Hanlon's Corner, North Circular Road, if and when we captured the car. So here we were, the third morning, waiting for the signal which would indicate

that the crew had left the armoured car.

I moved down Aughrim Street a bit and crossed the road, looking up towards Paddy Daly's position at the North Circular Road corner. He was still lolling against the wall looking across at the house. It seemed as if we would have to come another day when suddenly Paddy Daly was waving his arms and ran to meet us as we moved rapidly up the street. He called "The blind has gone up! Come on, lads, fast!"

Pat McCrea, myself, Tom Kehoe, Sean Caffrey and Peter Gough reached the corner very fast, as did the covering party. We crossed the road and went up the narrow entrance to the abbatoir and through the open gate into the yard. There was the armoured car, silent and inert and no sign of anybody near it, with the doors shut. On seeing the armoured car I had a feeling of keen disappointment to note that it was a big heavily armoured "Peerless" model car with solid rubber tyres; it was not the fast moving "whippet" type with pneumatic tyres which ensured snappy mobility and swift turning, which I had been expecting.

Pat and I reached the car and tried to open the door farthest from the building. It was on a catch lock; we moved to the opposite side, at the gable wall of the building. Around the corner came the driver. We promptly held him up and disarmed him. We got him to open the car and Pat got in and was using the torch he had brought along, looking for the self-starter, as it was dark inside. The driver said that the car would have to be swung as the self-starter was jammed. We made him swing the car. Pat took over when the car started. He tried on the driver's hat but it was too small for him and he passed it to me. It fitted me and I kept it on. We had thrown off our coats and really looked the same as the real crew. We told the driver to stand against the gable wall of the building with his hands above his head resting on

it. The engine was revving up nicely. Then we heard shooting inside the abbattoir building where apparently some resistance was put up by the remainder of the crew.

I jumped into the car beside Pat. Tom Kehoe was standing up between the two gunners, and we drove away through the main gate, past Jimmy Conroy and some others of the party, as the shooting continued inside the building. We drove down the North Circular Road towards Hanlon's Corner. I opened the port hole beside me and got ready to put my handkerchief out, as the agreed signal for Emmet Dalton and Joe Leonard to indicate that we had captured the car. This signal was necessary as it was not possible to know from the outside who or how many was manning an armoured car.

We slowed up as we neared the corner, where we could see Emmet and Joe resplendent in their British officers' uniforms; they had changed in the house of Teresa Shane nearby. I pushed my handkerchief through the port hole as Pat slowed the car and Emmet and Joe were in like a shot. It was a tight squeeze with seven of us.

Trundling past Doyle's Corner, some men who had been standing around moved away fast, apparently expecting a raid or hold-up of pedestrians. The car was getting very warm, sweat was running down Pat's smiling face and I was nearly as bad myself. Pat seemed to be in perfect control of the car. Joe Leonard was sitting between the legs of the gunners and Emmet was sitting on my lap. We drove fairly fast over Blackquire Bridge and down the Circular Road to the avenue leading to the main gate of the prison, but we had to slow up because of the crowd of women, children and some men, who were gathered at the prison gates. Many had parcels which they were trying to hand in for their relatives imprisoned in the jail; many others were trying to find out if their absent fathers or brothers were inside.

There was booing as the armoured car approached and this increased in tempo as Emmet and Joe got out of the car and pushed their way through the crowd to the wicket gate and rang the bell.

A necessary part of the plan was to ensure, in case of discovery, a clear line of retreat from the prison for the car and its crew. There are three gates in the arched entrance of Mountjoy prison. The first, or outer gate, is an iron-shod, heavily-studded one in two sections, with a wicket gate and grill set in the outer section. Inside are two iron-barred gates about eighteen feet or so apart, reaching to the arched roof. The drill for vehicles entering the prison was to allow them into the first section, then close the main gate behind them before allowing them into the second section, and so on into the prison yard. In the yard an armed sentry was on duty, who stood with his rifle at the ready covering any vehicle, and the main entrance, until the three gates were closed. However, these prison precautions had not been overlooked by Michael Collins and he set out the following simple plan.

The crowd of men and women outside the jail with parcels of food for their relatives inside would keep banging on the wicket gate pressing the warder to take parcels to their husbands or sons inside. This warder had the three keys of the gates and part of our plan to ensure a safe retreat out of the prison was to secure these keys at the right moment—the moment we had Sean McKeown safe in the armoured car. Mingling with the large crowd of people on this morning and indeed for the two previous mornings, were three members of the I.R.A., two men and a girl. They were squad member Frank Bolster, Tom Walsh of my own "B" company, Second Battalion and Áine Malone, a member of *Cumann na mBan*, she was in fact a sister of Lieutenant Malone, who had been killed in the heroic defence of Clanwilliam House, Mount Street Bridge, in 1916.

Their part in the plan was to rush to the wicket gate and prevent its being shut, after the main gate closed on the armoured car. A mock parcel was to be pushed to the warder for a prisoner, the parcel, however, was to have neither name nor address on it. The warder was to be asked for a pencil and thus delayed in shutting the gate. This ruse would enable the trio to observe what was happening inside the yard and help to hold open a line of retreat for the armoured car and its "crew." As it turned out, this detail of planning saved the lives of the crew of the armoured car and ensured their escape. Again it was Michael Collins's foresight that saved the cream of G.H.Q. squad from being captured, or more likely killed, within Mountjoy prison. This would have had had a demoralising effect on the I.R.A. in Dublin.

The two "British officers" deceived the gate-keeper completely and he opened the main gate and we entered the first section, then the second and then the third section. We were then virtually prisoners in the prison yard.

The sentry stood to attention when Dalton and Leonard got out of the car and entered the main hall of the jail to present their "orders" for the transfer of McKeown. Pat then turned the car facing the gates which were locked in front of us. The sentry sloped arms and moved across the gate on his usual beat. He was very much on duty and to this day I feel he was suspicious and sensed that there was something amiss. He was watching the gate intently, just as I, in my dungarees and khaki beret, was watching him. Suddenly shooting started inside the prison. Frank and Tom at the wicket in the front gate had their guns drawn and were forcing the warder back. The sentry fired a shot and I heard Walsh cry out. Someone had unfortunately to deal with the sentry. Walsh and Bolster opened the three gates. Emmet Dalton and Joe

Leonard came running out of the prison, turned round and blazed several shots along the prison corridor. Joe Leonard and Tom Kehoe jumped into the car while Emmet Dalton hopped on to the back and continued firing into the prison corridor. I picked up the sentry's rifle with fixed bayonet and got into the car with it.

The operation took only a matter of minutes, but it seemed a long time before we got out of the prison, down the avenue, and on to the main road.

Although we had failed in our errand, it was through no fault of ours. The prison routine on which the plan was based, and which had been in operation for some time, had been suddenly altered on the day before we captured the car. The details of this change we heard only long afterwards.

We drove off down the North Circular Road to North Richmond Street Schools where Joe Hyland, Collins's driver, was to be waiting to take McKeown away in his taxi. As we neared the school we could see the taxi and Joe opening the doors. Emmet Dalton and Joe Leonard, still in their British officers' uniforms, got out and into Joe's car which drove away. After we dropped our officers we suddenly ran into a section of the road that was being repaired and we were nearly bogged down. The big solid wheels slipped and skidded, but Pat McCrea's coolness and good driving took us on to the firm road section and we turned left for Fairview with the intention of completing the last phase of the general plan—to hide the armoured car in a haybarn on a farm of a trusted friend between Malahide and Swords. We never thought that we may have been pursued and the strange thing is that, as far as we know, we were not followed. We were rather glum and disappointed, we had not rescued McKeown. We could not at that stage appreciate the enormous moral effect the action would have on the country, generally. We drove on through Fairview,



hardly a word was spoken. The interior of the car was getting hotter and hotter and we opened the turret to let in some air. We turned up the Malahide Road with its smooth surface and steady incline. The engine began to splutter and backfire. The big smooth solid-tyred wheels were skidding. Pat slowed down and went through the gears from low up, in a slow change to prevent the car jerking. We got as far as midway between the upper and lower gates of what is now Clontarf Golf Club. The heat inside was stifling. The engine spluttered and backfired and slowly shuddered to a halt. I looked around at Pat and the two gunners. The sweat was running down our faces. We got out on the road and, gasping, walked around the car. It was then and only then that we noticed that the heavy steel plate protecting the radiator was shut tight against it and must have been so since we had captured the car nearly two hours previously. As a result of the radiator plate being closed when the engine was running, the engine

had overheated and stopped. We could not get it to start again.

We decided after a short discussion to strip the machine guns from their mountings, set fire to the engine of the car and make our escape. We fired a few shots into the carburettor and dynamo and flung a match into the flowing petrol from the burst fuel pipes.

Tom Kehoe and Pat McCrea hiked across the fields to the house nearby where Tommy Ennis, Second Battalion commandant lived, while Tom Walsh, Sean Caffrey and myself helped to carry away the two machine guns, and the Lee Enfield rifle taken from the inside of Mountjoy prison. We crossed several fields until we found a suitable culvert near Coolock where we hid the arms.

Three or four hours later, and on instructions from Oscar Traynor, I went to see Paddy McDonnell of Seville Place and in his flat-bottomed horse-drawn cart we collected the arms and brought them back to his dump.



*British forces raid Sinn Féin headquarters at No. 6 Harcourt Street, Dublin.*

## Annexe 25 :

# Interview des hommes de Collins le 5 novembre 1946

Ms 18, 466 , “Papers of Captain P. M. Moynihan, IRA postal intelligence officer (CID) 1918-1923”, Archives nationales de Dublin.

G.D.O. - Collin's Intelligence men.

Capt. P. Moynihan, 1 Ulster Tce., Stillorgan  
Dermot O'Sullivan

Martin Ryan,  
Martin Nolan,  
Jack Woodcock,  
Paddy Doody,  
Simon Byrne

Interviewed 5/11/46

Paddy Doody used to go in the armoured car which brought the Castle Mail from the Rotunda Rink to the Castle. On one occasion Capt. Cutting complained to him that all his letters, even those from his wife, were getting censored by the I.R.A.

They all took their instructions from Capt. Moynihan, and Dermott O'Sullivan was second in command.

They were organised as a post office inside the G.P.O., not as a military unit.

When the British tried counter espionage it was to Moynihan they went. He was known as 118. This was the number of his house on Clonliffe Rd. The others were 118 a,b,c etc.

Martin Ryan was head of the postmen and it was he who contrived to extract letters from the sorting and to bring them to the 'dead' dept. where Moynihan received them and threw them behind his desk till he could secure them in his coat and bring them to one of the three main reception offices at Liam Devlin's, Ml. McMahon's Kncnagow Dairy, or to Seamus Kirwan's.

From these places the mails were removed to Moorhead's in Abbey St.

Other places used were Price's, Killarney Rd (up to Bloody Sunday), Deegan and O'Neill's Dairy, Dorset St, and Molloy's N. Frederick St..

The red seal of the inspector general of the R.I.C. gave him away every time. The Castle mail arrived each day in an armoured car with military escort but within quarter of an hour it would be removed to Collin's H.Q.

In the beginning they used to censor official mails and return them to the post (or at least a proportion). This became too troublesome.

Geo Moreland, 10 Upr. Abbey St.. Address of H.Q. for this dept. It was also the site of a Brigade dump. Moreland was an antique dealer. "Moynihan's note says "It was a convenient dump and Col. Pat McCrea kept the official motor cars there together with piles of captured correspondence British military correspondence, and ammunition stores. I stocked the front with antique furniture and china, genuine stuff of which I still hold many souvenirs. It completely blinded the Black and Tans. I regularly attended auctions and made daily rounds of Moores Lane and the network of lanes adjoining Moore St where all the dealing women kept their little shops of cast off clothing and house-hold goods, displayed on tables outside their windows. Mr Moreland was well known to them all, and whenever they picked up an antique piece of earthenware or china, jug or ornamental plate, they put it outside for Mr Moreland.. One sunny morning I was passing through the lanes, I had secured a large Dublin-made old dish, marked made by "James, Dame St." and a large Toby jug, a very fine old Staffordshire, when, to my surprise I saw two of our I.R.A. men hiding in an old clothes shop. They informed me that they were trapped! The lanes were surrounded on all sides by the Black and Tans, with D.M.B. men, and at any moment they would start a house to house search. The men did not like to get the dealer into trouble by dumping their guns in his shop. I took their guns from them and they fitted neatly into the Toby Jug, covered with an old cloth.

We three then moved towards the Parnell St. entrance, at the corner of which was James Kirwan's Public House. Surrounding the lane entrance was a group of Tans and police. I told the boys to be laughing at a funny story I was telling them, and they responded splendidly.

Here again my luck was in, one of the watching D.M.P. men knew Mr Moreland and called out as we approached "Tell us the joke Mr Moreland" which I readily did. We three had joined the group at this time and the friendly D.M.P. man explained how I collected antiques in view of the plate and Toby Jug I carried.. I soon had them all laughing. During all this passers by were being held up and searched but the D.M.P. man and two of the Tans came and had a drink with us at Kirwan's, with my plate and Toby Jug on the counter. They soon marched off to help their comrades in the search with our good wishes!

Bulletin (AntOglach?)

A whole issue of the Bulletin was tracked from Yarnhall St. and captured in the post. Mr. Peter Behan, Supt. of the sorting office sent word to the Military to come for it. and Moynihan sent word to the Knocknagow dairy to McMahon. The I.R.A. raided first, under Sean (Tom?) Cullen. They stuck up the post office staff and had the whole issue out ~~inside~~ inside of half an hour. Round the corner in Moore St. they distributed them for safety among the old women on the stalls, who got them away. (Col. Fred Henry).

Jugglers. The trained men under Martin Ryan could juggle and manipulate the letters they wanted among the immense number of letters passing through the P.O... It was hopeless for ordinary detectives, who often were sent to try and catch them at it, to succeed. During the boycott all letters from Belfast were regularly sorted for the special purpose of supporting the Boycott.

Sorting office was in the Rotunda Rink, with Peter Behan superintendent. Capt Moynihan has his book with the list of persons whose letters were to be intercepted.

Telephones were tapped by a staff of girls, similarly organised, Emily O'Callaghan, Miss Kelly, Miss Taafe, Telegraph services were controlled by Sean O'Connell, Jack Brennan, Liam Archer? Paddy Macardle?

A leaflet distributed by the British in which they asked ~~for~~ anyone willing to supply information to write to ~~me~~ a name (Perhaps Richardson) and gave box number G.P.O. was a flop.

~~Ex~~ Peter Behan's book marked private memo as kept by Peter Behan, Supt. S.O. contains the names of those whose letters were to be stopped.

All correspondence addressed to No 6 or 76 Harcourt St should be detained and forwarded under confidential cover to the Under Secty, Dublin Castle. In another handwriting the note "Open covers addressed to Mrs Joseph Clarke, 6 Harcourt St not to be detained.

All correspondence addd. The Mansion House Dublin, with the exception of that for the Right Hon. Laurence O'Neill, Lord Mayor of Dublin, or members of his family, should be detained and sent to the Under Secty, Dublin Castle.

All postal packets except newspapers address Miss Blake,  
70 Stephen's Green - U.Secty.

Allpostal packets, including parcels addressed  
Private L.A. Fenlon, R.A.S.C. Royal Bks, or Military Hospital,  
Spike Island should be detained and sent to Brigadier Gen  
G.H.Q. Parkgate St..

Postal packets addd. Miss O'Brennan 14 or 14a Wexford St to be  
detained and sent to Brigadier Gen. G.H.Q., Parkgate St.  
(received through Rathmines do)

All postal packets for (1) J.M.Stanley, 31 Up. Liffey St..  
(2) J.K.Reddin, 3 Westmoreland St. (3) Frank Fahy, 17 Norfolk Rd  
to be detained and sent to Brigadier Gen etc.

All postal packets including telegrams (1) John McDonagh,  
86 Moyne Rd., Ranglagh. (2) Richard Mulcahy, Cullenswood Ho.,  
Oakley Rd., (3) Mrs Mulcahy do. (4) Frank Fahy, as above shd be  
sent to Brig Gen etc.

Allpostal packets and copies of telegrams addressed to  
Miss Maguire B.A., 73 Heytesbury St., and Miss H. Barry, 8 Fleet St.  
to be withheld from delivery and forwarded to Col. W.E. Johnstone,  
Chief Commissioner D.M.P.. under cover marked personal.  
Sec. (or see) 29 July 1920

Telephone message from Controller received 9.25 p.m. 31 July 1920  
"The instruction as to the retention of correspondence addressed  
to 6 or 76 Harcourt St and the Mansion Ho is to be suspended  
during the coming week. (innitialled might read P.J.B. 31/7.  
or P.J.M.)

Correspce addressed Mrs O'Donovan, Pembroke Creamery, 99 Mesphil Rd.  
should be withheld from delivery and sent under cover marked  
"confidential" to The Intelligence Officer, General Staff,  
Dublin District no 1." 9/9/20

1/11/20 Miss Smith, 3 Lennox St. only 1st to 5th Nov. incl  
(under Secy). Cancelled 6/11/20.

Pending further instructions all correspondence for the under  
mentioned should be forwarded to the Under Secty.. (1)  
Miss K. O'Farrell, 25 Dargle Rd., (2) Miss Kevrill, 22 James's  
Ave. Clonliffe Rd. (3) Miss K. Doyle, 12 Grace Park Gdns 6/11/20.

29/4/21 (the name M. Tipping is in another handwriting)  
Be good enough to note that all postal packets including  
parcels and telegrams addressed as follows;- (1) Mr E.W.  
Mallinson, Post Office, Dublin and (2) John Dolan, a patient  
in the Mater Hospital: should be detained and forwarded to the  
Under Secty, Dublin Castle. J.C. 25 Apl 21. (Initial might be  
I.C..

On the occasion of one of the three I.R.A. armed raids on the  
Rotunda Rink Mr Behan endeavoured to ring up the military from  
a secret telephone installed in his desk. Afterwards he was  
forced to leave the country. Later he tried to get established  
under F.S. but failed. He is now dead.

The place was festooned with emergency telephones but the I.R.A.  
inner post office was so strong ~~that~~ and acted so quickly against  
anyone who showed the slightest tendency to betray them these  
were never used. Several members of the staff, ex B. servicemen  
were ordered out of the country. Everybody else was sympathetic,  
or wanted a quiet life.

The men interviewed laughed at the idea that outgoing mails  
from the Republican depts of state should not be safe. In the  
main outgoing letters of importance went to covering addresses  
but incoming mails for the departments was boldly addressed to  
the Mansion House. Miss O'Sullivan, the Lord Mayor's  
sesty says that she dealt with an immense post for the  
Republican Govt, which came to the Mansion Ho..

Collins instructed Moynihan to provide him with four latchkeys for  
his (Moynihan's) private house at 118 Clonliffe Rd.. These  
were for four typists employed in British civil service. Each  
held a key and was instructed whenever a letter of importance  
was written to put a new carbon between the sheets. These carbons  
were then thrown in the waste paper basket. Each girl ~~collected~~  
her carbons before leaving and, on her way home used the latch  
key to bring them to Moynihan's study where she left them on his  
typewriter. He thinks that about twelve typists were handing  
in carbons under this scheme and each one of them had the latch  
key of a republican house convenient to her home.

Annexe 26 :

Télégrammes échangés entre Collins  
et ses hommes

POS 7655, Communiqués from the intelligence section to Annie O'Farrelly 1922-23, Collection Annie O'Farrelly papers, microfilm, Archives nationales de Dublin.



Irish Republican Army,  
Field HQS,  
Northern and Eastern Command

You will proceed tomorrow in accordance with SSO/13 to dress stylishly using plenty of power (face –not gun) and make your way via secret route to Ballsbridge to the Storse show. Mrs Seán Connolly will accompany you. You will observe closely any and every body wearing gold rimmed nose glasses, grey cape or disgusted (excuse me – disguised) in any other way. Take plenty of dough.

---

Notes intercepted on a lady applying for a job of lady searcher  
3<sup>rd</sup> February 1923

Report to me at once on your return, stating exactly where the capt glasses gent disappeared his actions on the field, waistmeasures, chest expansion, manner of speech + words used.

---

IRA  
Dept. Intelligence

GHQ  
Dublin  
6/11/23

You remember writing me of a house which you stated was now safe to return to, I will call on the gentleman of this house and tell him that during the week someone giving the name M. Evoy will call for the printing machine which he has dumped.

We believe this house is still under observation, so care will be necessary in the removal.

A note from D/I and my ackmt of 7OMD were captured in raid 2 hear.

K.

Beir beannaiz

---

IRA  
Dept. Intelligence

GHD  
Dublin  
26<sup>th</sup> March 1928

To/ William

- 1- I duly received yours of the 20<sup>th</sup>-; two of the 22<sup>nd</sup> and one of the 24<sup>th</sup> inst.
- 2- Re S. Mc' I ...Addresses: I note about this- I will see about the particular address mentioned. It would be well to ask her what addresses for Great Britain= England and Scotland she may have had. I know of one on the latter place which it was a pity she had, tho' it was never used. We have however already written the person concerned.
- 3- Re "M" and "K"= This is all rather curious. I wish we could solve it and make up our minds once and for all about him. The wisest course is to treat him for the present as very doubtful, in fact dangerous. Of course, it may be he is all right, and that his own people have got after him, hence reason for calling. I have an idea it may be another place in the same street they are watching- I must think out some way for meeting and testing him in some way.
- 4- S.Wexford officer: A. G.H.Q. Officer met him
- 5- Note reports in yours of the 24<sup>th</sup> inst.

Chief of staff

---

Roinn D/I  
No file DX 132 uimir

IRA

G.H.Q.

Ard Oifiz  
At Cliat  
31 March 1928

To William,  
A Cara,

1. I have yours of the 29<sup>th</sup> and note contents
2. Do you know the address of the lad Ennis, in Hardwicke Street?
3. I should like to have Eugene Coughran's personal description: I think he will coincide with a man I'm trying to locate.

Dir. Of Intelligence

---

IRA

D/Intell.  
DX 100

12<sup>th</sup> April, 1928

To: William

1. I herewith send you list of C.I.D. men in Dublin engaged on political work and particulars on motor cars used by them. Let me know if there are any names which you know or omitted from this list. In some cases, you will see that more than one address is given. Please have the exact address verified and let me know. In other cases you will notice the address is rather vague such as Rathfarnham and Fairview. Please get the exact address in every case. In a few cases – especially those recently transferred- whilst I have given their addresses as Pearse Street, I know they have recently got houses and flats in the city. It should be possible to get these addresses.
2. Cars: the numbers should be circulated widely. Please try to get reports as to the places where any of these were seen, and their haunts and resorts. It is possible that some of these cars may be used when some of those people are interviewing their spies and touts.

D/Intelligence

- 
1. Yours of the 4<sup>th</sup> inst. duly received
  2. Note description of Coughoran, also visit of men to Fleet Street
  3. I heard a report that Miss Florrie Mc'Carthy had some documents on her when arrested. Have you any information on this, and if she had what were they?
  4. Were there any more raids yesterday?

D.I.

---

To: D/Intelligence  
A Chara,

April, 18<sup>th</sup> 1928

• The following is report received to-day from someone who was up seeing Miss McCarthy this morning:

“Florrie only knew what we already know except that she heard Mellows name mentioned. In one dispatch, it said:

“Barney Mellows will take them (copies of Ant-Oglach) down with him”.

Also she thought she heard Jim Killeen's name mentioned but she can't be sure”

- C.I.D new combination Motor Cycle is Z11127B.S.A combination
- Mark Byrne was standing talking to a police sergeant to-day for a long time on the corner of Charlemont Street, Harcourt Road near Monaghan's.
- Tumbleton was touting Dawson Street and Anne Street on Friday night and Saturday morning last
- Addresses:  
John Tumbleton – Francis Street (not Meath Street)  
Laurence Pluck- 44, Ranelagh Road.

Joe Kenny- 27 Waverly Avenue, Fairview  
Finlayson-15, Northbrook Terrace, North Strand  
I saw IK 7964 going out the North Strand this evening at 7:30 with only the driver in it.

William

-----  
To: D/I  
A Chara,

April, 26<sup>th</sup> 1928

I am in receipt of yours – DX 134- Sorry for delay in acknowledging but I have been very busy for the last few days.

In connection with your par.2 I understand Brigade I/O gets any items I send you concerning Dublin from our D.C. I/C

Par.5: I don't think this is being done generally but I have come across two or three cases of it. Anything further I hear, I will notify you immediately.

Addresses of C.I.D.:

Peter Ennis, Palace Street (off Dane Street) not Princes Street

On Monday, April 23<sup>rd</sup> Mark Byrne was touting for over half an hour but it was mostly stuff in connection with the Easter Week commemoration. Any army stuff read out was published in the press and the C.I.D. stated they had not yet decoded cipher messages.

A series of raids, mostly on members of Cumann na mBan it seems, were carried out yesterday morning between 11 a.m. and 12. The following have come to hand so far:

Sighee Bowen, 8 Killeen Road, Ranelagh

Elgin Barry, 87 Fleet Street

Molly Hyland, 11 Chester Road, Ranelagh

Eileen Tubbert,

L.Caffrey, 17 Church Road, North Wall

M.Phelan, 14, Wexford Street

A.O'Farrelly, 8 Lower Sherriff Street

Mrs O'Carroll, the Lawn, Peter's place

Kavanagh's, upper Dorset Street

Mrs T. Herrigan,

Gill, McSwiney and another

Kinsella I/C

Kirwan and another

Nothing serious seems to have been captured in any of the places. 33, Lower Pembroke Rd (tom Derrig's address) was found, but I d'ont suppose we are using it, also Miss Moore, 51, Beechwood Avenue.

I have a report that a man named Horan, Pleaseant Street, is touting for C.I.D. I'm trying to get number. Hefferman's address is 115, James Street (opposite church)

William

-----  
→Mrs Barton, alias Merriman alias O'Carroll, 75 Lower Leeson Street. This lady often in and out of jail says she is Republican and is very anxious to get into republican circles and offers to do things such as collecting etc... (h)as very prominent on Poppy Day though not doing any work for us – Dangerous.

→ On Wednesday evening last about 6 p.m. Cosgrave was riding on the military Road about 8 miles outside Glenree accompanied by an officer on horseback and a car with about 5 men in it.

The car: YI 6205 Ford

→ Elgin Barry went into Phelans, Wexford Street yesterday evening and was only just in when a newsboy came into the shop and asked if a lady wearing a brown coat, hat and scarf and carrying a coat on her arm had come in (Elgin's description). Mary Phelan asked him why? And he said a man outside asked him to go in and see – he was waiting for her = A'' green tout evidently

William

Annexe 27 :

Organisation et fonctionnement  
d'une Flying Column

WO141/93, Rebellion in Ireland: Historical Record 1920 1921, Archives nationales de Londres.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE REBELS' CAMPAIGN FROM THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER TO THE END OF DECEMBER, 1920.

The Formation of Flying Columns.

Rebel Operations.

The Internment of Rebels.

Operations Carried out by the Crown Forces.

Martial Law Proclaimed in Munster.

Re-organisation of Intelligence.

#### Rebels Form Flying Columns.

At the beginning of October, possibly earlier, the rebel leaders fully realised that their organisation, so far as brigades, battalions, etc., were concerned, was inadequate as a means of waging war, and that it was necessary to re-organise forthwith. It was out of the question at that time to re-organise the brigades and battalions, because the spirit of the rank and file was broken, and they regarded fighting against the Crown forces as something to be very carefully avoided. Many had actually surrendered themselves to the troops; letters were frequently received from prisoners congratulating them on having been arrested, and being therefore safe, and in addition there were a few who were actually supplying the troops with information, in order to secure immunity from arrest. With a view to maintaining their activity as far as possible, raising the moral of the rank and file, and holding together the remnants of the various units, the rebel leaders decided to organise "Flying columns," and at a later date they also organised small "Active service units," the latter with a view to training the various officers, and possibly in order to keep up the old battalion organisation.

The following copies of rebel orders issued at this period and in connection with these units are of interest:—

" ORGANISATION MEMO. NO. 1 (1920).

" ORGANISATION OF FLYING COLUMNS.

" 4th October, 1920.

" At the present time a large number of our men and officers are on the run in various parts of the country. The most effective way of utilising these officers and men would seem to be by organising them as a flying column. In this way, instead of being compelled to a haphazard and aimless course of action, they would become available as standing troops, of a well trained and thoroughly reliable stamp, and their action could be far more systematic and effective. Permanent troops of this kind would afford an exceedingly valuable auxiliary arm to the remainder of the Republican army, which is, in a great measure, only part-time service militia. The flying columns having to serve actively all the time, would have to be kept fully equipped and supplied with all necessaries. These columns would consist of only first-rate troops, as the work required of them would be very exacting. In the matter of organisation, the Cyclist half-company, of one lieutenant and two sections, each of one section commander, two squad commanders, and two squads of four men, together with an adjutant and quartermaster, both ranking as N.C.O.s, *i.e.*, a total of 26 combatants, could be taken as a basis. A larger number than this had better be formed into two flying columns. The men should be thoroughly familiar with cyclist tactics, but inasmuch as the roads would be frequently denied them by superior enemy forces, they should also

be minutely trained as infantry. It would often happen that a considerable portion of the troops composing the flying columns were officers. Generally, while such officers are attached to the flying column, the next in command will command and control their units, except in the case of Battalion Commandants, who shall be released periodically from the flying column for the purpose of attending battalion councils and carrying out inspections, the Vice-Commandant otherwise taking charge. After some experience in flying column work, a Battalion Commandant may be detached from the column, and returned permanently to his own area to work his own battalion. Each case, however, will be dealt with as circumstances demand, except that when the general rule above indicated is departed from the matter shall be reported to the Director of Organisation, and permission sought. Within the flying column, the Brigade Commandant shall appoint the lieutenant and section commanders. The lieutenant in charge will appoint the squad commanders. Within the flying column, too, all men, of whatever commissioned or non-commissioned rank shall, while retaining their rank for general organisation purposes, carry out the particular duties of whatever position is assigned to them as officers or men in the column.

"The duties of flying columns would consist of two quite distinct types of action: (a) auxiliary action, and (b) independent action. The second of these would provide a striking arm not hitherto in our possession.

"(a) *Auxiliary Action*.—Brigade Commandants will be able to assign the column as an extra force—a very valuable one—to any Battalion Commandant for a local enterprise in his area.

"(b) *Independent Action*.—This would comprise attacks on hostile patrols, raids on mails, or on enemy stores heard of accidentally, etc. In short, all enterprises required to be taken on at instant notice and liable to be endangered by delay. The Flying Column Commander, while having a wide discretion as to the enterprises he may undertake, subject to any definite limits set by the Brigade Commandants, shall be in definite touch with the local O.C.s in whose area he is and shall keep them advised of the probable movements, or any proposed activities of the column, so that there may be no 'crossing of tracks,' or interference with one another's enterprises. He shall be confined to his own brigade area, except by definite arrangement with the Brigade Commandant of a neighbouring area which offered an opportunity for action. Temporary attachment of other troops to the flying column should not be done without careful consideration, but might be advisable on special occasions.

(Signed) "DIRECTOR OF ORGANISATION."

Captured notes dealing with these flying columns:—

"*Employment*.—For enterprises at short notice, such as chance raids on stores, chance attacks on patrols, convoys, etc. These are chances that might pass by if a corps had to be mobilised for the purpose of the operation. To assist in systematically-prepared enterprises of local corps—whether as a covering detachment, or otherwise.

"*Organisation and Strength*.—To be organised on the lines of cyclist units as far as possible, in sections of one section commander and two squads, squad consisting of one squad commander and four men. Strength not to exceed about a dozen men. Mobility and ability of concealment and billeting are the main points to be secured. These would not be possible with larger bodies.

"*Billeting*.—Arrangements must be made to systematically billet the men of the flying column by squads. The billets should be changed from time to time, and billets of one squad must be within easy reach of the billets of other squads.

"*Equipment*.—The flying column must be kept well supplied with arms, ammunition, and equipment. Equipment to include clothes, bicycles, and all accessories, maps, field glasses, if procurable, etc., etc.

"*Information*.—The flying column must have detailed to them civilian cyclist scouts, who would patrol to long distances unarmed, and give instant information of enemy activities. It is most necessary that this question of information and communications should get very careful attention.

" *Most of Action.*—The flying column will always take the offensive. Enemy patrols should be promptly attacked, unless in superior numbers. The greatest attention should be given to turning superior local knowledge to best account. When compelled by superior numbers to disperse, a new point of assembly should be fixed on, so as to give full opportunity of reaching it by the appointed time. Bicycles are necessary, and motors may be commandeered in suitable cases. But often it will be necessary to leave the roads altogether, and the men should be able to move across country for great distances. Recently an officer had to go 30 miles across country in Cork.

" *Type of Men.*—Good physique is necessary, or men will not be equal to work. Also, well-trained men only should be included; untrained men would reduce the efficiency of the column, and leave it liable to reverses and possible capture.

" *Command.*—As far as possible the column should keep local headquarters informed, and would naturally be under the Brigade Commandant of the area. Sometimes it would move from one area to another, and contact with local headquarters would be difficult. This should be remedied as quickly, and as far as possible. The senior of the column would command it directly, but subordinate leaders should have free initiative within reasonable bounds. Officers in the flying column should ordinarily resign their local commands for the time being. They could rarely command them satisfactorily while 'on the run.' They could then give all their attention to the work of the flying column."

" OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM NO. 7 (dated 4th October, 1920).

" In every Brigade area where the material exists, a flying column, organised in accordance with Organisation Memorandum No. 1 (1920), shall be put in the field forthwith, and shall forthwith adopt guerilla tactics generally. The O.C. shall aim principally in his work at:—

- " (1) Gaining experience for himself and his men, and planning and carrying out simple actual operations within the range covered by the Operations Memorandum already issued, and such as shall be issued from time to time. The column must be made a regular school for soldiers.
- " (2) Harassing the enemy, and depriving him in his smaller stations of security and quiet.
- " (3) Interrupting and pillaging his stores.
- " (4) Interrupting his communications of all kinds.
- " (5) Covering threatened towns and villages, and dealing with destruction parties.

In addition, he shall be provided with copies of the sketch maps prepared by company-officers, in accordance with the circular of 10th May, 1920, and shall examine and criticise and perfect them. The Brigade Commandant shall arrange to receive weekly from the O.C. Column a diary of his activities, which shall be carefully examined and criticised and transmitted to the Adjutant-General."

These columns moved about from place to place, commandeering food and accommodation, and transport, and forcing the local rebels to provide sentries and scouts, whilst they remained in any given area. Their first operations were carried out with a view to ensuring their own safety. They demolished bridges, cut trenches in roads, and felled trees across them. This rendered pursuit by Crown forces difficult and as it also limited the roads open to the latter, it facilitated the selection of suitable ambush positions, with plenty of cover, and a safe line of retreat, and cut the work of rebel scouts down to a minimum.

The orders reproduced in the preceding pages show clearly that their object was to attack the Crown forces whenever and wherever possible—always provided the Crown forces were not in superior numbers. The ambushes prepared by these columns were of a more elaborate nature than any encountered previously, and road mines were employed with increasing frequency after this date.

## Annexe 28 :

# Rapport des services secrets sur embuscade du 6 juin 1921

CO 904/168, Counter-propaganda, Archives nationales de Londres.



There were a number of attacks on Crown Forces yesterday in Dublin. They were as follows:

At 3.30 pm yesterday a party of troops was ambushed in Capel Street. They returned the fire on the attackers and made two arrests, one of whom has since been identified as one of the ambushers. Auxiliaries who co-operated immediately after the attack captured a motorcar which apparently abandoned in their flight. About the same time, another party of troops was ambushed near Chancery Bridge. Troops returned the fire and one of the attackers was seen to fall and to be removed by his companions. A party of the auxiliaries that came up, discovered in the vicinity a dump from which the attackers had probably been working. It consisted of four old pattern rifles, a quantity of revolver ammunition, two telescopes, two motorcycles and one bicycle. One arrest was made at this place. Crown forces suffered no casualties in these attacks.

In the evening, two more attacks on the military took place. The military guard at the Customs House was fired at by a number of civilians concealed behind timber logs on the south of the river. The soldiers returned the fire and it is believed that two of the attackers were hit. At the same time a military motor lorry was bombed and fired at in Brunswick Street by a number of civilians. Two people were wounded and were conveyed to hospital but the soldiers escaped unhurt.

About 9 a.m. this morning a sergeant stationed at Beggar's Bush Barracks was fired at by a civilian at Wellington Quay but escaped injury.

A number of bombs were thrown at a lorry containing RIC at the corner of Tara Street and Brunswick Street about 12.15 today. One bomb fell into the lorry wounding five of the RIC, two of them seriously. The police returned the fire. They were soon re-inforced by a party of Auxiliaries, after which further firing took place. Some civilians were wounded and afterwards arrested. [...]

Further blockading of roads is reported in the hilly area south of Dublin. Between Kiltiernam and Stepside, a tree was felled across the road from Enniskerry to Dundrum. Between Steaside and Barnscullia library a large heap of stones has been piled in the middle of the road. At either side is a trench with only a small space sufficient for a cycle to pass. [...]

Early this morning the IRA was very busy in the Donegal District. First Mountcharles post office was raided, then the post office at Lunkineely and finally Inver railway station. Telephone instruments were taken and wires cut at each place and at Mountcharles cash and stamps were taken and letters censored.

Issued to:	D.I. "D" Branch "J" Branch	G.H.Q. (I) GS (I) Dublin District chief police
Issued by:	"O" H/4 A.D.I. Scotland House	

Under secretary, Basil Clerke, Esq.

## Annexe 29 :

# Document capturé lors d'un raid au sujet du capitaine Moynihan

Ms 18, 466 , IRA postal intelligence officer (CID) 1918-1923, Papers of Captain P. M. Moynihan, Archives nationales de Dublin.

(COPY)

SECRET.

DUBLIN COMMAND.

My Ref. No. EDCI. 1007.  
Dept. Intell.

HEADQUARTERS.  
COLLINS BARRACKS.  
23rd. February, 1923.

TO:-  
Captain Moynihan,  
Oriel House.

The enclosed documents were captured last night. I forward them for your information.

(Signed) J. Shanahan. I.O. COMMAND.

(COPY)

1st February, 1923.

TO/  
O/C 111.

Enclosed for your information Moynihan leaves every evening in his car(I/O 118) between 6 & 7 p.m. Comes up laneway from garage.

(Sd) O/C Batt.

2. There is always a patrol sent outside Oriel House from 9 p.m. They patrol a few street distant from the house.

## Annexe 30 :

# Liste des meilleurs avions de combat selon le *Sunday Times*

2BB 7-D1 : Attaché naval à Dublin 1939-1944, Sous-série 2BB7 (Fonds Moscou) : attachés navals, liaisons navales, Archives Navales du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

Dublin, le 2 Octobre 1942.

R  
EXPLOITATION DE PRESSE N° 1.A.

OBJET : Avis du Correspondant aéronautique du "Sunday Times"  
sur la qualité générale des avions de combat.

SOURCE : "Sunday Times " du 20 Septembre 1942.

Dans l'article cité en référence Peter MASEFIELD déclare: que les Allemands ont perdu la bataille de Grande-Bretagne parce que d'une part leurs avions de chasse et de bombardement étaient inférieurs aux avions britanniques et, d'autre part l'organisation anglaise était supérieure, - que la bataille d'Allemagne peut être gagnée par les mêmes grandes qualités des avions britanniques qui sont maintenant passés à l'attaque. La suprématie du nombre doit être aussi accompagnée de la supériorité en qualité.

Voici l'opinion du Correspondant Aéronautique du " Sunday Times " sur la quantité et la qualité des avions anglo-américains : Sur tous les fronts les Nations Unies commencent à disposer d'un nombre suffisant de très bons avions. Cependant il leur en faudrait davantage. La production d'avions de combat des Nations Unies est maintenant nettement en avance sur celles des puissances de l'Axe. Le point important est de maintenir à cette production une souplesse suffisante malgré son importance.

Si on considère la douzaine de catégories principales d'avions militaires, la Grande-Bretagne ou l'Amérique peuvent revendiquer la suprématie dans toutes sauf deux.

L'ennemi va probablement pousser les types qui pourraient lui donner un avantage. De nouveaux appareils de combat tels que le bombardier lourd "Heinkel 117", le bombardier stratosphérique "Junkers 86.P." les chasseurs bombardiers "Messerschmidt 210" et "Junkers 288" et la plus récente version du monoplace de chasse "Focke Wulfe 190" commencent à entrer en service. Les britanniques ne peuvent pas rester sur leurs lauriers.

L'auteur donne la liste suivante pour le meilleur type d'avion en service du moment dans chacune des douze catégories :


- 1- Monoplace de chasse - Supermarine Spitfire (Britannique)
- 2- Chasseur de nuit et à grand rayon d'action :  
Bristol Beaufighter (Britannique)
- 3- Bombardier lourd - Avro Lancaster (Britannique)
- 4- Bombardier moyen - Dornier 217 E.2 (Allemand)
- 5- Torpilleur bombardier basé à terre :  
Savoia Marchetti S.M.84. (Italien)
- 6- Coopération avec l'Armée :  
North American Mustang (Américain)
- 7- Hydravion Exploration :  
Consolidated Coronado (Américain)
- 8- Avion de transport : Douglas C.54 (DC.4) (Américain)
- 9- Hydravion de transport: Boeing Clipper (Américain)
- 10- Chasse embarquée : Vought Sikorski Corsair (Américain)
- 11- Torpilleur bombardier embarqué :  
Cruzman Avenger (Américain)
- 12- Bombardier en piqué embarqué :  
Curtiss Hellraider (Américain)

Parmi les monoplaces de chasse l'auteur ajoute que le choix entre le plus récent "Spitfire" et le "Focke Wulfe 190" est difficile bien qu'il penche légèrement en faveur du "Spitfire". Dans cette catégorie il mentionne le "Hawker Typhoon" et le "Republic Thunderbolt" qui commencent à entrer en service et sur lesquels on fonde de grands espoirs.

# Annexe 31 :

## Carte des sauvetages en mer par les airs en septembre 1944

2DOC 80-82: Coastal Command Review Intelligence Summary, Anti-submarine from HQ Coastal, documents du ministère de l'air britannique, Sous-série 2 DOC (Fonds Moscou) : Etudes documentaires sur la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Archives du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.







Annexe 32 :

Comparaison des attaques anti-sous-marines britanniques de février 1943  
à février 1944


2DOC 80-82: Coastal Command Review Intelligence Summary, Anti-submarine from HQ Coastal, documents du ministère de l'air britannique, Sous-série 2 DOC (Fonds Moscou) : Etudes documentaires sur la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Archives du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.




Février 1943



Jun 1943



Juillet 1943



Février 1944

## Annexe 33 :

# Lettre du 10 juin 1940 de l'attaché naval français concernant l'Irlande

2BB 7-D1 : Attaché naval à Dublin 1939-1944, Sous-série 2BB7 (Fonds Moscou) : attachés navals, liaisons navales, Archives Navales du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

A LONDRES

L'ATTACHE NAVAL

10  
4 Juin, 1940.

**N° 626-P**

Capitaine de Frégate,  
Chef du 3ème Bureau des Forces Maritimes  
Françaises (F.M.F.2.)

**O B J E T :** Transmission d'une note concernant l'Irlande.

Pièce jointe : Une note.

Je vous transmets ci-joint une note établie par le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Bedin à la suite d'un entretien qu'il a eu avec le premier secrétaire de la légation de France. Il est assez caractéristique de constater que d'après ce fonctionnaire des navires français seraient favorablement accueillis en Irlande.

Peut-être pourrait-on, à l'occasion de la prochaine visite en Irlande du Lieutenant de Vaisseau Bedin, qui pourrait avoir lieu dans une quinzaine de jours, vérifier si on manifeste devant lui le même sentiment, surtout du côté officiel.

Destinataire :-

F.M.F.2.

NOTE SUR L'IRLANDE.

Deux faits ont particulièrement ému l'opinion publique Irlandaise et cette émotion s'est traduite par un mouvement favorable dans son ensemble à la cause des Alliés.

Bien que cette attitude nouvelle n'apparaisse pas clairement dans la presse nationale irlandaise, et que celle-ci par la voix de ses organes les plus qualifiés (Irish Independent) affiche une neutralité intégrale, il est pourtant manifeste que l'attentat sur le courrier de Sir John Maffey et la découverte de dépôts d'armes Nazis en Irlande ont créé un état d'esprit nouveau tout au moins chez les dirigeants.

Ce fait a été indiqué par Monsieur de Laforcade, Ministre de France en Irlande dans une lettre du 2 Juin à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres, qui ce même jour a adressé à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères un télégramme N°2335-37 d'où il ressort que la préoccupation d'un coup de main allemand sur l'Irlande ne laisse pas d'inquiéter le Gouvernement Britannique. Celui-ci s'efforce de mettre en garde le Gouvernement Irlandais, mais la situation actuelle de Monsieur de Valera ne lui permet guère d'agir ouvertement contre les auteurs éventuels, étant donné le guet attentif (pratiqué par la Légation d'Allemagne à Dublin ainsi que par tous les émissaires plus ou moins clandestins qui s'y rattachent et se répandent en EIRE) vis-à-vis de tout ce qui pourrait servir de preuve d'un manquement à la neutralité.

Je vous signale donc très confidentiellement qu'il m'a été rapporté par le Premier Secrétaire de la Légation de France à Dublin, deux incidents que le Gouvernement Irlandais s'efforce de ne pas divulguer.

Après l'attentat sur le courrier accompli en plein jour par

./.....



quatre membres de l'I.R.A. l'un de ceux-ci fut blessé et son arrestation (dont la mise à prix fut fixée à £ 5,000.) n'ayant pas été réalisée, le bruit court que malgré l'annonce anonyme de sa mort, le blessé en question serait hébergé et soigné à la Légation d'Allemagne.

D'autre part, un appareil de la R.A.F. s'étant posé à la suite d'une panne d'essence sur terrain irlandais à 4 h.1/2 du matin, son équipage fut appréhendé immédiatement et les autorités locales s'informèrent auprès de Monsieur WALSH afin de savoir quel traitement il fallait lui accorder?. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères répondit qu'il convenait de lui faire le plein de ses réservoirs et de le renvoyer immédiatement.

Ainsi fut fait, les aviateurs anglais furent ravitaillés de toutes les manières et appareillèrent discrètement à 9 h.1/2.

Enfin, il m'a été également signalé que les observateurs côtiers ont fait connaître au Gouvernement d'EIRE qui l'a communiqué aux Autorités Britanniques la présence de deux sous-marins allemands sur leurs côtes ?.....

Ce qui est le plus intéressant et qui m'a été affirmé par Monsieur CAUVET DUHAMEL, Premier Secrétaire de la Légation, c'est que l'Irlande ou plus exactement l'Irlande de Monsieur de Valera serait prête en cas d'extrême urgence à favoriser l'occupation navale de deux ou trois de ces bases, à condition que cette occupation soit réalisée sur sa demande expresse et par des bâtiments portant le pavillon français.

En effet, l'opinion publique n'a dans le fond, jamais cessé d'avoir une préférence pour la France démocratique, républicaine et catholique, en souvenir des champions de la Cause de l'Indépendance qui ont aidé autrefois à la libération de son territoire.

Un mouvement très marqué en faveur de l'accueil en Irlande des

/.....

réfugiés français se fait jour actuellement. Il pourrait être appuyé utilement par notre propagande, qui demeure insuffisante.

Il est à noter à cet égard et par contraste, que la popularité de l'agent de Presse allemand PETERSEN a considérablement diminué en raison des nombreuses erreurs commises par ce nazi aussi encombrant que maladroit.

Ceci rejaillit naturellement sur la Légation d'Allemagne dont le prestige est très compromis.

L'arrivée des "touristes", inquiète l'EMIRE d'autant plus que sur l'agent nazi qui y a été arrêté, il a été trouvé un plan très étudié de noyautage de la Police et de l'Armée Irlandaises.

Ces différents aspects ainsi que la possibilité d'une occupation des bases par la Marine française m'ont été confirmés par une autre source d'information, non officielle, mais absolument sûre./.

## Annexe 34 :

# Différents codes de cryptage utilisés par les agents de Michael Collins

Ms 17,277- Ms 17,278, IRA: Dublin no.2 Brigade: two envelopes,  
Archives nationales de Dublin.

Way of <sup>ST</sup> communication 8:15 p.m. Irish S. time

OKW de GUS hz repeat five minutes then wait for  
3x 3x answer. I want I R E N E  
After After a quarter of an hour

OKW de GUS zan - zh

They will answer GUS hz (3 times)  
3x

Later, having established communication leave out OKW  
give as signal three letters of GUSTL always beginning  
with G -

Normal QSO

GUS - hz  
(3 times)

Ans GUS zhc? hz

GUS - oh (or zhc 1-4 (bad to good)) hr hfc

Ans GUS ga

GUS  $\frac{he}{2x} - 180$  (example)  $\frac{-}{2x}$  text of message - ar after  
every wcl containing 4 letters give time

GUS 3 ofm - 180 - ~~next~~ (next wcl no wcl aft and soon)

GUS this qrx to? (when we meet again)

GUS qrx to (next meeting in text)  
(qrx 3 days - means in three days same hour)

K	come answer	K	
Z h c	how are conditions?	Z H C	
Z a n	I hear nothing at all	Z A N	Z N N I have nothing for you
Z a l	alter wave length (very small alterations)		
r	understood		R
o, k	"		O, K
g a	go ahead - continue		G A.
q r m	I get disturbed (Z a l alter wavelength)		Q R M
q s o	mutual contact		Q S O
h r	hear listen to		H R
t f c	traffic - message in cipher	T F C.	
<del>q r</del> k a	beginning of message		K A
<del>q r</del> a r	ending of the message		A R
n r	number (number of letters in ciphered message) N		
w d s	words		W D S
t w	twice		T W
c f m	confirm (what I said to you)		C F M
r p t	repeat		R P T
p l s	please	P L S	
a l	all	A L	
a l a f t	all after	A F T.	
a l b e f	all before	B. E. F.	
T x T. <del>text</del>	text		
q r x	we meet again	Q. R. X	
h	hour	H.	
m n	minutes	M. N.	(all time in g m t)
n e t	next agreed	q s o N. X. T.	
s b	ending of q s o		
g b	good-by		

Z i g	I am well off +
Z w g	family is alright
---	wait for a moment
t h s	thanks
g m t	Greenwich Mean
	time
g m t	(all time in g m t)
f. k	
Q. B	

KA. <sup>NO</sup> 35-61-  
 W O V C    M G L W    R C Q W    I F E G  
 O R M E    M W D G    N D I F    A E U D  
 T G F S    Y A X B    M T P S    L G T E  
 B V L L    V C D N    O M S U    N.

Occupied.  
 E.S.B. Supply.  
 High building.  
 High ground.  
 Not isolated.  
 Good garden preferably at back.  
 Room available at aerial side of house  
 Look up room if possible.  
 Sound walls etc.  
 People unknown.  
 Good entrance,  
 aerial in existence or provision for

oavi oavi znuex znut REPEAT subsequent day  
 Iphu Iphu aeafa aeafa ulhs  
 ulhs Ttau Ttau alal alal  
 hlaa aksf aksf urko urko  
 Jobi Jobi Inaa fnaa uoko  
 uoko Ohoo ohoo hema hema  
 hrbe hrbe musm musm  
 apun apun aowt aowt  
 Ttle Ttle Dmkk dmkk vmys  
 vmys oofh oofh uuov  
 uuov fiaa fiaa fmfg fmg  
 qnzp qnzp lpqn lpqn  
 Kqcp Kqcp Rero Rero  
 miqk miqk Kqft- Kqft qvif  
 qvif Kfmg Kfmg Tpyz  
 Tpyz Txwu Txwu onta onta  
 yeve yeve ~~cvys~~ ~~cvys~~

(150) (R)  
 U S M N P C H F H A M A A G H N H C P M H F O N H V S H P G M I R X O P . . . N G D U E T H P R T Z K N I M P D O V T  
 H P M I F Y A E S Q H P M V C D M W T M U B O G D E Q Q Y G H A C I S M K D U Q D H B Y E F C K  
 D B R W H I L X F L H M D E M Y P A T P N K V K V P U L P X A A A V O V V S O I I

HOUSE F P A R L I M N T B C D G K Q V W X Y Z  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25  
 A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
 3 4 12 13 7 16 1 6 1 8 12 8 8 18 1 13 1 3 7 12 16 2 13 1 1 21

HOUSE  
 F P A R L  
 I M N T B  
 C D G K Q  
 V W X Y Z

5 13 7 18 12 11 6 23 2 7 . . . 13 18 17 3 5 14 1 9 9  
 14 25 19 13 11 13 7 17 2 21 1

C D M N O P Q R

(S) HOUSE  
 F P A R L  
 I M N T B  
 C D G K Q  
 V W X Y Z

f o r s e e n b o n g e d s h i p k m i a m e  
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

HOUSE F P A R L I M N T B C D G K Q V W X Y Z  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25  
 A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
 2 17 18 3 5 13 2 13 7 5 4 18 8 15 10 12 9 1 12 5 1 5 8 6 3 23 2 7

6 1 21 2 1 10 1 15 3 21 18 3 2 6 18 18 23 23 11 16 14 6 16 10 17  
 14 7 3 1 1 8 15 13 2 23 15 7 15 4 12 9 1 3 2 3 4 1 1 11 16 2  
 23 14 11 2 12 13 9 11 21 20 21 20 3 6 20 5 24 18 22 9 1 18 23 17  
 1 9 25 4 24 20 13 17 16 23 9 13 14 24 13 23 20 13 20 3 16 20 14  
 19 19 4 15 16 19 5 19 11 21 2 19 16 20 6 16 15 19 9 19 2 15 1  
 14 20 19 10 18 8 3 11 14 2 9 21 22 9 7 23 11 13 7 6 11 3 1  
 13 4 6 13 13 12 7 12 6 8 11 2 6



## Annexe 35 :

# Notes du RUC sur le système de cryptage de l'Etat libre d'Irlande

CO 904/156 B, A Report on the Intelligence Branch of the Chief Police from May, 1920 to July 1921, Archives nationales de Londres.

CRYPTOGRAPHY.

A certain amount of cryptographic work was carried out by the Intelligence Branch at District Headquarters, but owing to the fact that no previous experience was available it was some time before good results were obtained, but the following notes on the ciphers commonly employed by the Free State Army may be found of use in the future.

Free State Army Ciphers.

Three systems have been used by the Free State Army during the last three years, all three of which give little protection from an experienced cryptographer. They are:-

- a. A simple letter substitution cipher.
- b. A simple figure substitution cipher.
- c. A six alphabet substitution letter cipher.

a. Simple Letter Cipher.

In this system a code word such as MERINO was taken and written backwards under an alphabet with the first letter under Z, the second under Y, the third under X etc. The letters Z, Y, and X, were then placed under M, E, and R. After the whole of the code-word had been written down, the remainder of the alphabet was written backwards, so that for every letter in the top alphabet, there was a corresponding but different letter in the lower alphabet. As J was usually omitted, one letter in each alphabet was the same.

Taking the code-word MERINO above, the following cipher is constructed:-

EEERYI AKXIKKX

SIXHXY

CLEAR.	ABCDEFGHIKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ.
CIPHER.	TSQPYLKHVGFPZVTDXBAONIREM.

The message "Enemy attacking at dawn" would be enciphered as:-

YVYZE TAATQG WVKIA PTIV.

One message of reasonable length was usually sufficient to solve the cryptogram, but sometimes more were required. It will be seen that when sufficient information has been found to establish which letter stands for say, E or T, T or E will also stand for that letter: in fact complete reciprocity obtains, and the cipher has practically no security.

b. Simple figure substitution Code.

This is the most common of the codes used by the Free State Army, and a number have been used, most of them being solved without much difficulty. It is of interest to note that the same system is used by the R.U.C. at the present time.

The cipher consists of giving a letter of the alphabet to each of the figure groups in the series 00, 01, 02 03, ..., 99 the more frequently occurring letters such as E, T, etc being allotted to more than one figure group. In this way a cipher is built up containing four and sometimes more partial alphabets and is a considerable advance upon (a) above.

The following is an example of a cipher which was actually in use by the Free State Army:-

CIPHER No. 6B.

00=T	13=D	25=T	38=R	50=N	63=I	75=U	88= ?
01=A	14=P	26=Z	39=B	51=W	64=A	76=M	89=W
02=V	15=L	27=T	40=R	52=N	65=H	77=G	90=T
03=O	16=U	28=A	41=G	53=U	66=F	78=aaa	91=E
04=Y	17=Z	29=Y	42=W	54=K	67=O	79=D	92=R
05=N	18=aaa	30=N	43=E	55=S	68=E	80=T	93=A
06=B	19=O	31=P	44=R	56=E	69=?	81=V	94=O
07=R	20=I	32=T	45=M	57=?	70=A	82=B	95=S
08=N	21=U	33=K	46=I	58=M	71=S	83=R	96=D
09=H	22=D	34=A	47=T	59=S	72=L	84=M	97=P
10=E	23=X	35=P	48=G	60=Y	73=O	85=I	98=N
11=L	24=L	36=C	49=S	61=C	74=C	86=?	99=H
12=S		37E		62= K		87=O	

The cipher can also be written in a square of ten units each way, and the hundred squares in it filled up with the letters. Coordinates are then taken to refer to letters.

Ten to twelve messages were usually necessary before the cryptogram could be solved, but an expert could solve it with less.

The usual procedure for solution was as follows:- The message was divided up into pairs of figures. The frequency of these in each message was then noted upon a specially printed form (Appendix XVII) and the message pinned upon it and filed away. After several messages had been dealt with in this manner the combined frequencies usually gave a clue to the letters E and T and from that the cipher was often solved.

As an aid to solution a series of "beginnings and endings" of messages was prepared, and arranged according to the nearness of the letter "E" to the beginning or ending of messages. This was found to be extremely useful. A vocabulary of double letters was also prepared, which was a great aid.

It was found that squared paper with large squares was very useful for aiding the solution of cryptograms and a specimen sheet of this paper which had to be bought is attached as Appendix XVIII.

One item may be noted before passing on to the description of the remaining cipher commonly used by the Free State Army. In nearly every cipher message the Number or some description of the cipher used was telegraphed in clear, as numerous ciphers were used, this indication of the cipher used in any message was extremely useful.

c. Six Letter Substitution Cipher.

In this cipher six alphabets arranged in any order were written in columns, with an alphabet arranged in the ordinary way as a check. The first letter of a message was enciphered by using the first alphabet, the second letter the second alphabet, the third the third alphabet and so on up to the sixth letter of the message. The seventh letter was then enciphered with the first alphabet and the same procedure adhered to till the whole message was enciphered.

This cipher was fairly secure, but owing to bad telegraph operators it was often mutilated, a letter was missed and the whole message thrown out. It was discontinued after about six-months use.

Example of Six Alphabet Letter Cipher.

"System Code, 8"

Cipher.	Clear.						Cipher.
	1	2	3	4	5	6.	
A	Q		M	F	K	E	A
B	D	H	E	U	G	A	B
C	I	K	A		T	B	C
D	P	G	B	R	S	C	D
E	B	V	L	I	H	M	E
F	Q	S	D	N	L	I	F
G	S	R	H	M	N	K	G
H	G	U	V	P	R		H
I	U	T	C	O	P	D	I
K	T			L	O	H	K
L	E	X	S	C	V	P	L
M	A	W	P	D		L	M
N	W	A	R		C	O	N
O	X	E		V	B	R	O
P	H	Y	T	B	W	S	P
Q	O	L	F	K	E	U	Q
R	N	M	U	W	A		R
S	L	N	G	A	R	T	S
T	P	O	K	E	Y	G	T
U	R	P	I	Y	M	F	U
V	H	I	S	T	U	W	V
W	X	D	Y	G	F	X	W
X	V	L	N	K	I	Y	X
Y	W	B	O	H	D	N	Y
Z	K	F	L	S	Q		Z

The method of solving this cipher consisted in dividing up the message into groups of six, writing these groups one under the other, and counting the frequencies of letter in the various columns from which the messages could eventually be deciphered. No ciphers of this nature were actually solved in the District, but in the hand of an expert cryptographer, the solution presents little or no difficulty.

Note on Cryptography.

It was found that the Free State Army often gave an indication as to the contents of a ciphered message by sending several messages to various departments, some in clear and some in cipher. In more than one case, a complete clear message was sent by one department, and an almost exact transcript in cipher from another. The solution of the cipher was then easy and all other messages intercepted in the same cipher were easily deciphered. A careful watch was therefore kept of all clear messages as well as cipher messages emanating from the same station.

Mutilation of messages either through bad enciphering or bad Morse or difficult reception was a frequent cause of delay in solving a cryptogram. The following is a typical example.

Message on decipherment read as follows:— GLIYN GRYPH OBASE  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ TLALL ARBRA DYWIL LATFG NLTHE TUNED ALOPH HOSLE  
 EYVMA RLOOR OWHOD LEDON TLELH IRDU. At first this seemed  
 incomprehensible, but on carefully analysing the letters, the  
 following message was read:— IT IS VERY PROBABLE THAT JAS BRADY  
 WILL ATTEND THE FUNERAL OF THOS LEENAN TOMORROW AT BOYLE DONT  
 LET HIM. D.I.

NOTE ON CIPHERS USED BY THE I.R.A.

By 1926, the I.R.A. had evolved a transposition cipher which was much in advance of their previous efforts in cryptography. Towards the end of May 1926, the Northern Ireland Police intercepted a letter, of which the following is an extract:-

Ref. 9/1.

ULSTER.  
20.5.26.

To:- D/Communications,  
G.H.Q.

Will you please look up the man mentioned under. He is a Belfast man living in Dublin, and he or another man takes the same car to Belfast weekly:-

IERLO MIEWT LEMEB PIHAT ESLRN T - 26.

He could leave despatches at the following address:-

TENEF TGASG AWPSI RAAIX ETRLN - 25.

His mother lives in Belfast and he could leave them there in event of this address being out of his way. As we have no hand line with G.H.Q. at present.

.....

EENSD USISD OIEJL GFARN DNTME GNNTL ARMOG  
LDHEA EUNAA ASEEW EIUIG OURSS GGACC TGLTE  
WNRHP DJKKT DRATC DTNKO IYHTA GTMIE TGRN - 104.

This I believe was the reason of the failure to get this man. Had he been handled properly, by a man whom I know, I am told it might be different. As it was he "got the wind up" and rushed straight and told the whole thing to his superiors and caused considerable activity.

Re appointment of O/C No. 1 Area. I had a staff meeting of this area:-

DKDAT COEEI THPLG NTETA JAIYA EPRRN C - 31.

.....

A careful scrutiny of the above cipher messages revealed that they were in a ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ transposition cipher and that the numbers at the end of each message indicated the number of letters in that message.

It was thought probable that the system used would be similar to that mentioned in Chap. 8. Sec. 45 of the "Field Service Pocket Book 1926."

With this in view the first cipher message was tackled. From the context of the letter, it was obvious that this was a name and probably an address. The message was accordingly written in columns. First in columns of five, then ~~xxxx~~ four, then three, and finally two. When written out in columns of two it appeared as follows:-

I R O I W L M B I A E L N.  
E L M E T E E P H T S R T.

The letters in the top row viz:-IROIWLMBIAELN at once suggested the name WILLIAM. This was accordingly tried, and the columns transposed accordingly as follows:-

W I L L I A M . . . . .  
T H R E E T E . . . . .

As the letters S and T occur in the remaining letters in the bottom row, it was thought that they might stand for the abbreviation for STREET, and were therefore placed at the end of this row, and the message then appeared as:-

W I L L I A M . . . . . E N  
T H R E E T E . . . . . S T.

The remaining letters in the top row ~~xxx~~ were IROB and had to be suitably arranged before EN. The obvious arrangement is O'BRIEN. The message now reads:-

W I L L I A M O B R I E N  
T H R E E T E M P L E S T.

i.e. "William O'Brien, 3 Temple St."

In order to obtain the correct order of decipherment of the columns, the ~~xxxxxxxix~~ columns in cipher were numbered as follows:-

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13.
E	R	O	I	W	L	M	B	I	A	E	L	N
E	L	M	E	T	E	E	P	H	T	S	R	T

If these numbers are now placed over the properly transposed columns in the decipher, they appear in the following order:-

5	9	12	6	4	10	7	3	8	2	1	11	13.
W	I	L	L	I	A	M	O	B	R	I	E	N
T	H	R	E	E	T	E	M	P	L	E	S	T.

Some doubt existed as to the correct positions of columns 1 and 4, but this was cleared up on deciphering the next message with the above key numbers which were found to be correct. This message runs as follows:-

Sara Giffin, 10, Galway Street.

The next message is a comparatively long one consisting of 104 letters. As the key-word consists of 13 letters, the message must be written in columns of 8 letters (as 8 x 13 = 104) as follows:-

5	9	12	6	4	10	7	3	8	2	1	11	13
M	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
M	C	K	E	E	R	E	F	U	S	E	D	T - 1.
O	T	O	U	C	H	W	A	R	D	E	R	M - 2.
C	G	I	N	N	P	E	R	S	O	N	A	L - 3.
L	L	Y	A	N	D	I	N	S	I	S	T	E - 4.
D	T	H	A	T	J	U	D	G	E	D	O	T - 5.
H	E	T	A	L	K	I	N	G	J	U	D	G - 6.
E	W	A	S	A	T	O	T	A	L	S	T	R - 7.
A	N	G	E	R	T	O	M	C	G	I	N	N - 8.

i.e.:- "McKee refused to touch Warder McGinn personally and insisted that Judge do the talking. Judge was a total stranger to McGinn."

The final message is a short one consisting of only thirty-one letters. In order to cover the whole thirteen letters in the key-word, the letters must be arranged in five columns of three letters and the remaining ~~two~~ <sup>two</sup> columns of two letters. The first five columns, i.e., those appearing under the figures 5, 9, 12, 6, 4 must be of three letters in order to place the last five letters of the message in the right place. The message was accordingly transposed as follows:-

5	9	12	6	4	10	7	3	8	2	1	11	13.	
I	A	P	P	O	I	N	T	E	D	D	A	N	- 1.
T	U	R	L	E	Y	T	O	T	A	K	E	C	- 2.
H	A	R	G	E.									- 3.

i.e :- "Is appointed Dan Turley to take charge."

In a cipher of this type, the key-word is practically impossible to obtain, indeed more than one key-word or keywords might give the same order of numbers. This order, however, is the only essential to enable a message to be ciphered or deciphered in this particular cipher.

As has been demonstrated, this system is not very difficult to solve, especially if the solver is aided as to the probable meaning of the cipher by clear context as in this case. It is interesting to note in connection with the I.R.A use of this system, that this system was used at one time in Northern Ireland by the Imperial Forces for intercommunication. It was, however, believed to have been compromised and was therefore abandoned.





## Annexe 36 :

# Lettre de M. Lysaght à l'éditeur du Times concernant M. Clune

Ms 10 556, Documents on various Aspects of the War of Independence-  
the Black and Tans and other Outrages, the Irish National Aid Society,  
Politicians, 1918-1921, Collection Maurice Moore Papers, Archives  
nationales de Dublin.

## THE CASE OF MR. CLUNE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,—You published in *The Times* of Wednesday, the 24th inst., under the heading "Murder Gang Members," an official report which contained statements about my friend Mr. Clune, who was shot while in the custody of Crown forces on Monday last. The statement which you publish as the official report, and which therefore, I am sure, was issued as such, is untrue in all the important particulars relating to Mr. Clune.

For seven years Mr. Clune had been employed by me as head clerk in my office at Raheen, Co. Clare. Of late he had also become my intimate friend, so that I can speak about him with entire confidence. He was not a member of the I.R.A. and never had been: the official report states that he was a lieutenant in Clare Brigade, I.R.A. The official report refers to a note-book found on him and supposed to incriminate him. His note-book was solely concerned with my affairs. The supposedly dangerous names—common ones, such as Treacy and Collins—must be those, entered in the ordinary course of his work, of men in my employment, or of persons with whom we have business relations. All my office staff have similar note-books, which are part of our system of management. The notes about obtaining passports were those in connexion with procuring passports for my wife and family to go to the South of France recently, and other members of my family to visit South Africa.

Mr. Clune came to Dublin with me in my motor-car on Friday. He was arrested on Saturday night. He came on business connected with his accountancy work. He spent Saturday, up to 3 p.m., with me, asked me to go to a theatre with him, which, unfortunately, I was unable to do, and had arranged to spend all Sunday with me. So much for his movements, of which we are officially informed he was unable to give a satisfactory account. It is important to know, in case it should be alleged that the business which brought him to Dublin was a cloak for other activities, that it was only at the last moment, owing to purely personal reasons, that I substituted Mr. Clune for another member of the staff who was to have come with me.

It is unfortunate that the responsible Press has no means of checking official reports issued from Dublin Castle, and that no inquiry, such as you have demanded, is held at which the truth of any official statement can be tested.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

Dublin, Nov. 25.

EDWARD E. LYSAGHT.

## Annexe 37 :

# Interception de littérature séditieuse

CO 904/161, Seizures of Leaflets, Postcards, Posters and Articles in Various Journals and other Publications, Archives nationales de Londres.

17421

S.  
6837  
D.M.P.

Form No. 1 "DAMP, DUBLIN."  
Telephone No. 17.

DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE.

Detective Department,

1098

Dublin, 13th Decr., 1917.

**SECRET.**

Subject.....FERGUS O'CONNOR, 44, ECCLES STREET, DUBLIN, PUBLISHER.

The Under Secretary,

Submitted.

*W. J. Dunlop  
CC 13/12/17*

I beg to report that Fergus O'Connor, 44, Eccles Street, Publisher of Sinn Fein Songs, Literature, Postcards, etc., has no printing machinery of his own, so far as I can ascertain. He gets his printing done by Joseph M. Stanley, "The Gaelic Press", 30, Upper Liffey Street, especially songs and music, and by Messrs. O'Loughlin, Murphy and Boland, Ltd., Printers and Lithographers, 111 and 112, Upper Dorset Street.

*Attorney General  
Please advise  
further in view of  
this report. DW/13/12*

It is also said that he gets a considerable amount of printing done in Glasgow, Manchester and Enniscorthy.

*If the man has no printing plant, no printing plant can be seized.*

*John Bruton.  
Sergeant S. G.*

The Supt.,

G. Diem.

*My observation was directed to the advisability of making an effective seizure, if one is to be made at all.*

*The Chief Constable  
Submitted  
13-12-17*

*Under Secretary  
13-12-17*

DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACTS AND REGULATIONS.

WHEREAS I, Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable SIR BRYAN T. MAHON, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding-in-Chief The Forces in Ireland, Competent Military Authority for Ireland, have reason to suspect that the Buildings and Premises known as 44 ECCLES STREET, in the City of Dublin, being in the occupation of one FERGUS O'CONNOR, are being and have been used and kept for purposes and in ways prejudicial to the Public safety and the Defence of the Realm, and that offenses against the Defence of the Realm Regulations are being and have been committed therein.

NOW I, DO HEREBY in pursuance of the powers vested in me as Competent Military Authority under Regulation 51. of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, HEREBY AUTHORISE YOU, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. EDGEWORTH JOHNSTONE, CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE, and such of your Officers as may be appointed by you for the purpose, to enter if need be by force the said Buildings and Premises known as 44 ECCLES STREET, in the City of Dublin, being in the occupation of the said FERGUS O'CONNOR, and to examine, search and inspect the same, and to seize any Books, Pamphlets, Circulars, or other printed documents, found therein which you or the said Officers appointed by you have reason to suspect are being used or intended to be used for any purpose prejudicial to the Public safety or the Defence of the Realm, or are being kept or used in contravention of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

Given under my hand this 14<sup>th</sup> day of December, 1917.

HEADQUARTERS, IRISH COMMAND,  
PARKGATE, DUBLIN.

*B. Mahon* LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  
COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITY

have reason to suspect that the buildings & premises known as 44 Eccles Street in the City of Dublin being in the occupation of one Fergus Connors

1102

DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACTS AND REGULATIONS.

are being and have been used & kept for purposes & in ways prejudicial to the public safety & the Defence of the Realm and that offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations are being & have been committed therein

Whereas

I, Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable SIR BRYAN T. MAHON, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding-in-Chief, The Forces in Ireland, Competent Military Authority for Ireland,

now Ireland

in pursuance of the powers vested in me as Competent Military Authority under Regulation <sup>51</sup> 51 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, hereby authorise you, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W.

EDGEWORTH JOHNSTONE, CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE DUBLIN METROPOLITAN POLICE, and such of your Officers as may be

appointed by you for the purpose, to enter if need be by force the buildings and premises known as 44 Eccles St

in the City of Dublin, <sup>being in the occupation of the said Fergus Connors</sup> ~~being in the occupation of one FERGUS~~

State

~~CONNOR, Dublin~~, and to examine, search and inspect the same,

and to seize any Books, Pamphlets, Circulars, or other printed documents, found therein which you or the said Officers

appointed by you have reason to suspect are being used or

intended to be used for any purpose prejudicial to the Public

safety of the Defence of the Realm, or are being kept or used

in contravention of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

Given under my hand this            day of December, 1917.

Lieutenant-General.  
COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITY.

HEADQUARTERS, IRISH COMMAND,  
PARKGATE, DUBLIN.

# Annexe 38 :

## Propagande allemande

2DOC 94: Intelligence Note. Sous-série 2 DOC (Fonds Moscou) : Etudes documentaires sur la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Archives du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

Rapport des forces expéditionnaires alliées au quartier général daté du 14 avril 1945 sur la propagande allemande.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Intelligence Notes no. 57, Contents

[...] 2- German propaganda and war reporting

Various captured German war correspondents have recently given information about the methods of enemy coverage of war news, the organisations performing this work, and the connection between reporting as such and propaganda.

The Germans in fact make no distinction between the two, and reporters, press photographers, and movie cameramen in the army and SS belong to propaganda units in just the same way as the men engaged in active propaganda.

The structure of the German propaganda machine at the higher levels is extremely complex, the Army, the Party and the SS each having their own partly independent organizations feeding into the Reich Ministry of Propaganda under Goebbels. This layout is outside the scope of the present article, which confines itself to the propaganda and reporting agencies working in the field and mentions higher echelons only when they have some more or less direct connection with these forces.

(a) Wehrmacht propaganda : controlling agencies at OKA

The headquarters of the Armed Forces propaganda machine is the Führer's Headquarters. Its official title is Antsgruppe Wehrmacht Propaganda, and it is commanded by General-Major Von WEDEL. His staff consists of his Adjutant, two administrative officers, designated first and second Generalstabsoffizier, and the heads of the various departments.

The duties of the first Generalstabsoffizier are the keeping of the situation and the drafting of the daily situation on the basis of information received until noon of each day. Reports are submitted by the chief of the propaganda unit to General JODL, Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, who presents them to Hitler at 1300 hours daily. The second Generalstabsoffizier acts as liaison between headquarters and the offices of departments at Berlin.

Ag. WPr. is divided into five main departments :

Department 1 (W. Pr.I ) is in charge of personnel, equipment, and organization of field units (Propaganda Truppen). Its briefs field units on material wanted and in turn forwards likely items to the Propaganda Ministry.

Department 2 (W. Pr. II) is in charge of public relations. It takes care of all orders for propaganda material requested by propaganda organizations, including individual newspapers. The propaganda officers also do active propaganda work within the Wehrkreise by arranging exhibitions, contests in schools, and conducted tours for journalists through Army installations. Officers from all branches of the armed forces are to be found in the department. The official



commentators of the armed forces, General DITTHAR and Admiral LÜTZON, receive instructions, material, and censorship through department.

Department 3 (W. Pr. III) is responsible for censorship and promulgation of censorship regulations. The department itself attends only to censorship of the most important matters and maintains a large field organization for all other items subject to censorship. Each Gau Propaganda Office, which combines the activities of the Ministry of Propaganda and the party propaganda offices in its respective Gau (Nazi Party District), has three censorship officers. Other censors are in all departments (Literature, Art, Radio, etc.) of the Propaganda Ministry.

Practically every form of publication in sound or writing, including advertisements, is subject to censorship both by military and political censors. Each publication requires two censorship stamps showing that it has been pressed by both authorities. Censorship regulations fill a good-sized volume, and the position of censor is very unpopular, because of the many detailed regulations which must be observed and the severe reprimands which follow disregard of any existing orders.

By and large, however, censorship functions quickly, reasonably, and without too much red tape, as the censorship organization operates within the frame of the propaganda machine and that is not opposed to propaganda as was the case during the war 1914-1918.

Department 4 (W. Pr. IV) is concerned with counter-propaganda and foreign propaganda.

Leaflets dropped by the enemy are sent to the department, (in triplicate) where they are analyzed as to prevailing tendencies, subject and formulation, mistakes, and useful ideas. Dangerous themes in enemy propaganda receive immediate attention and are counteracted by appropriate measures of the Propaganda Ministry or the NSPO staff. Mistakes in enemy propaganda are used to discredit the leaflets, and useful ideas are noted for own use in identical or modified form.

Active foreign propaganda is divided into two fields, the Eastern Front and the Western Front. Material for the Eastern Front is supplied by the Ministry of Eastern affairs, and, in highly superior quality, by the Anti-Komintern, which works with first class Russian specialists.

The Western Front group published the foreign propaganda magazine Signal, which appears (or appeared) in 18 different languages and has (or had) a circulation of more than two million. Leaflets are of less importance. Curiously, the Propaganda Ministry shows little interest in the Western Front, and the Foreign Office is very passive in all propaganda activities. All propaganda work on the Western Front rests with the staff officers for propaganda at C-in-C West, and due to increasing transportation difficulties it has even become necessary to print leaflets near the front line.

The Dissemination Department (Pressegruppe W.Pr.) publishes all military news for use by other agencies, the press, and radio. The Propaganda Ministry is not permitted to change the wording in the text (although it has often attempted to obtain this right) except in the case of foreign language publications, where it may resort to somewhat freer translations.

The three branches of the forces send to the press department purely factual reports. Other material is derived from the situation reports. Responsibility for communiqués rests for the press department. Generalanjer von VEDEL makes the final decision. General JODL, or even HITLER himself, may be consulted in cases of higher importance. Only those reports which deal with allied bombings are submitted to the Propaganda Ministry for coordination with its own reports.

(b) Wehrmacht Propaganda : The Forces in the Field

Until recently, reporters could be inducted directly into the Armed Forces, from civilian status, with the increasing man-power shortage; however, they have had to be drawn from the Armed Forces themselves. Only the SS still adheres to the former policy. Through the Propaganda Ministry a reporter is suggested to W. Pr. of the High Command, Propaganda Department for future assignment. If this agency finds him suitable, he is subsequently transferred to a propaganda company or platoon. Ordinarily, a well known journalist has no trouble getting an assignment, whereas candidates of doubtful qualifications are screened by examination.

Formerly, a war correspondent worked at divisional or regimental level, in conjunction with a cameraman and a driver. These three men constituted a Propaganda Trupp. Several Trupps formed a propaganda platoon at corps level and several platoons constituted a propaganda company at army level. Nowadays, war journalist and cameramen are frequently combined in one man who, as a rule, does his job at corps or higher headquarters. This change was necessitated by the communications difficulties. Quite apart from the fact that there are not enough reporters to go to each division, there is simply not enough gasoline to drive their trucks and not enough signal equipment to get their messages across.

A war reporter is always a member of the Armed Forces, he receives army pay and gets orders just like every other soldier. The chain of command goes from the W. Pr. (OKW) to the propaganda companies and further down to platoons and Trupps. As a general rule, every war journalist is required to have gone through basic training and to have had a few weeks' front line experience. He dresses in regular army, navy, or air force uniform and carries a pistol. Until the summer of 1944, the Wehrmacht employed a total of 800 war reporters, but by winter 1944 only 110 had remained, all others having been absorbed by other branches of service. Of these 110 men, 60 are with the army, 30 with the air force, and 20 with the navy. In addition, the SS employs another 40-50 reporters. Of these now attached to the army, 17 are in the West, 20 in the East, 7 in Italy, a few in Scandinavia and Crete and 3 directly under C-and-C West. About one-third of the reporters with the G.P. are attached to parachute divisions, which, incidentally, receive special publicity.

The actual reporting is done in the following way. The reporter phones his story to the headquarters of the propaganda platoon, which is usually in the immediate vicinity of G-2 Army Group. From there, the report is disseminated to W. Pr. where it passes through the rigid censorship of this section. Thus, "purified", the story goes to the office of the Reichspressechef (Reichpressschief) in the Propaganda Ministry. Here, a report is further moulded according to the demands of the hour. It is finally submitted to the newspapers, which have the options of accepting or rejecting it.

(c) SS propaganda: KURTEGGERS and SKORPION

The SS propaganda system runs parallel to that of the Wehrmacht proper, and of course, competes with it. Of late, as might be expected, it has gained the ascendancy.

At the beginning of the war, the SS immediately organized its own body of war correspondent. This group was first known as the SS PK (SS Propaganda Company), then as the SS war correspondents Battalions (Kriegsberichterabteilung) and finally as the SS war Correspondents regiments KURTEGGERS (Kreisberichter Standarte K.E.). The cadre and replacement parts of the unit have been at BERLIN-ZEILENDORF since its inception.

Today, the regiment is divided into its active part, the headquarters personnel, and the Regimental Training Company. The Headquarter consists of the usual Staff sections, plus a foreign (Household) section which is in charge of foreignborn personnel. It also has a Courier Section.

All men joining the regiment first receive a ten weeks' course of basic military training, consisting of practice with the rifle, MG, machine pistol and pistol, as well as rudimentary terrain appreciation. After this military phase, the various branches of correspondence receive specialized training as follows:

Journalists (Wortberichter) receive a short period of training within the framework of the press section (Gruppe Wortpresse) of the training company and afterwards have to pass an examination, proving the worth. If found fit, they are sent to a field unit. If no opportunity for employment is available in the field, the men usually continue their work within the section as clerks, censors with the OKW, or interpreters or interrogators.

Interpreters (Dolmetscher) first receive training at the SS Interpreters School, at ORANIENBURG. Then, they are generally used within the press section for the translation of German news -stories into foreign languages for use in the press of foreign countries. This branch has not been very active lately. Previously, however, they were at times also translations for the foreign press for German consumption.

At the conclusion of their basic training, the photographers (Bildberichter) receive a two-week's course with AGFA in BERLIN for their technical training. This course consists of technical fundamentals, physical and optical laws, and the use of the Contax and LEICA's cameras. These photographers were not necessarily professionals beforehand. After another test, this group is sent to the front as rapidly as possible. Those for whom known immediate employment can be found or sent to the laboratory at BERLIN-ZEHLENDORF for further training as laboratory technicians or workers in the archives.

Newsreel photographers (Filmberichter) receive special training with UFA film studios. Members are at first sent out with an experienced newsreel photographer for further training.

Radioreporters (Rundfunkberichter) receive the training by walking first with a radio section or with a radio station bringing news from the front. The same training is given to the assistants, and the radio technicians (Rundfunktechniker). A radio-squad, when committed, consists of reporters, technicians and drivers. They have a radio-car (Ue-Wagen) as their vehicle.

Painters and draughtsmen (Zeichner and Maler) are exclusively men with sound-professional background. This group is located at a new camp at BERLIN.

The organization of correspondents committed with SS units has undergone a radical change since the end of 1944. Previously, each SS division had a propaganda platoon attached, which consisted of first sergeants, supply sergeants, mess sergeants and cooks, armourers and at least one correspondent of each of the above mentioned seven varieties (Sparten). But the SS, like the Army, has felt the shortage of manpower and transportation and since then the number of correspondents has decreased tremendously. Today there is a similar propaganda platoon at best at each corps at the division, and divisions receive sections or single correspondents, all the administrative personnel has been disbanded due to the acute lack of manpower.

Besides, the regular correspondents of all branches the SS regiment KURTEGGERS has also been in charge of various task forces and task groups, mostly in connection with active propaganda. The most famous of these are the ones which can be classed under the title of "SCORPION". The origin of this method of propaganda (for the German troops, to counteract Allied leaflets and propaganda by a so-called "free" discussion of all the problems of the line soldier) stems from two special task-groups: Task Group (Kommando) and Task-Force (Unternehmen) WINTERMENCHEN. The former was employed for the troops in the Mediterranean theatre, while the latter showed excellent results during the fighting in Karelia.

“Scorpion” is divided into Skorpion OST (East) and West for the two main fronts. The Western branch appears to be further sub-divided into at least one more special unit that is subordinated to Army Group G, called Skorpion OBERRHEIN (Upper-Rhine). Some PW, however, maintain that this is a separate organization entirely, and that Skorpion WEST is under Army Group B.

Skorpion WEST was activated 1 October 1944 in KEMFEN (West of KREFELD) after MODEL had asked for SS propaganda help during the retreat through France. SS personnel was put in charge, and army personnel (mostly from the POTSDAM propaganda replacement unit) hold subordinate positions. Relations between the two were strained.

Skorpion WEST was attached to Army Group B. Other Army Groups under C-in-C West retained Wehrmacht propaganda units until the beginning of this year when SS Stoprops (Staff Officers for Propaganda) from Standarde Eggers were appointed.

Skorpion WEST was organized into propaganda companies, and editorial section (Redaktion), a news service (Nachrichten Sonderdienst. NSD), and a radio propaganda station.

Propaganda companies (called Einsatz-Kompanien) were merely disseminating units, each organized into 4-5 squads equipped with mortars, leaflet shells, and loudspeaker trucks. They functioned in close cooperation with regular Wehrmacht propaganda companies, which had the printing and publishing facilities. Einsatz companies had to give daily success reports on their results. They were permitted to be critical.

The Nachrichten Sonderdienst issued a daily ten-page secret bulletin containing German official news as well as Allied news and propaganda. It formed the basis for propaganda leaflets and broadcasts. MODEL read the bulletin regularly.

Radio propaganda was directed exclusively against the Allies. PW thinks that transmitters BNJ were merged in November 1944. Their last known location (early March) was Altenkirchen.

Obersturmführer (SS First Lieutenant) Wolfgang MÖLLER, Nazi, poet laureate, was in charge of the editorial section. The section had a German department and Anglo-American department, a French department, and a Polish department. Publications issued by the German department included “Willst Du die Wahrheit Wissen?”, which appeared once every ten days, “Informationdienst”, a two-page daily bulletin “Neue Post”, which was distributed to the civilian population, “Die Andere Seite”, an illustrated publication issued once every two weeks, and “Nachrichter für die Truppe”, a weekly copy of the Allied propaganda leaflet or the same name. Much derogatory material was copied in order to hide his last paper’s origin. “Tagesspiegel”, a daily front line paper, was in the planning stage early in March. In addition to this regular publication leaflets were printed upon orders from the NSFOs.

Task-forces such as Skorpion WEST have assignment for surmounting those of ordinary journalism. They are large-scale propaganda operations, utilizing all methods of active propaganda, especially leaflets and radio. The personnel for these groups, however, is not as select as that of the individual line propaganda units, and a large percentage is recruited from sources outside of the SS. Since a number of the SS war correspondents who were kicked out from their regular assignments because of unsatisfactory performance today also grace the staff and of this “active” propaganda companies and “Scorpions”, most correspondents consider a transfer to these units a disgrace and degradation.

Another important branch of the Regiment KURTEGGERS is the courier system which helps to get SS stories to the Propaganda Ministry independently of and often in competition with the products of Wehrmacht reporters. BERLIN-ZEHLENDORF has a central message centre, whence the couriers leave daily for the different task-force headquarters. This task-force headquarters maintained

messengers service with the platoons which in turn communicate with the sections attached to divisions. In this fashion, it becomes possible to communicate the information gained to the BERLIN headquarters.

The reporter cannot make any decisions regarding the use of the material turned in (pictures, stories, etc...). He may, however, submit suggestions. The placing of texts is arranged from BERLIN with the newspapers, which pay for the service. The reporter is merely given copies of the texts printed as reference material, and monthly bulletins of his squad which list his texts by name and account for the manner in which they have been used. These publications serve as an encouragement not to lag behind other successful colleagues.

Many of the men thus employed for reporting are actually former newspapermen who have failed in one fashion or another. Experienced drivers, gathered at the collecting point in BERLIN, are also employed in this type of work. The commitment of reporters is conducted in a step-by-step forward move of the men, who proceed from the squads to the sections, and in each case report to the CP of the unit to which these squads and sections are attached. At regimental level they receive their briefing and are informed of points of interest. As a rule they remain several days (never less than 3) with the forward troops. After this period they return to their unit, where their texts are relayed as fast as possible to BERLIN. There they undergo censorship before being turned over to the newspapers or the radio.

According to the latest order of BERLIN the war reporters' platoons will be subordinate to the corps or divisions only for supplies. In everything else they receive their orders from his directly.

Throughout the recent months of the war the Regiment KURTEGGERS has been pared down. In all departments women have replaced men who had formerly been employed there, but have now been transferred to forward units. The development is also characterized by an increasing employment of non-German personnel.

#### (d)- Methods and Propaganda Lines

Generally, German war correspondents have been adroit enough to adhere to the propaganda directives issued by the Propaganda Ministry. Every once in a while, however, they are reminded that their stories must be clad in the proper Nazi lingo. Those reporters wising to do a professional job at reporting are usually undone by the fluent, but empty phraseology of the ready-made correspondents who have emerged from the ranks of the Nazi party.

As is only natural, the manner of reporting has been attuned throughout the war to the supposed needs of the German people. During the first triumphant phase of the war correspondents had to write a boastful, bombastic style, permeated by Nazi ideology. For obvious reasons, their special attention was directed towards playing up the part that was taken by the coloured troops of the French and British Empire. When the war with Russia began, correspondents were urged to collect all evidence and rumours pointing to Russian atrocities on the Polish and Baltic populace. At that time, the Germans were apparently not ready yet to digest atrocity stories involving their own people. Indications that the Russians may hold views and sentiments not unlike these of the Germans had to be suppressed in line with the general attitude that the Russian was, at best, the unthinking victim of Soviet tyranny and, at his worst, an aggregate of beastly instincts. Thus, the Führer supposedly got infuriated when a German paper reported that German soldiers had helped Russian Catholics to clean out a church in MINSK and hold a religious service there. The censorship officer who had let this unheard-of idea pass was instantly removed from his post.

With the German retreat in the East, the W. Pr. and Propaganda Ministry developed a special terminology in reporting, designed to cater to the plight of the German army. Wherever the Russians succeeded in breaking through, the German forces were said "to retreat according to

plan”, “to shorten the lines”, “to accomplish a full defensive success”, and “to cost the enemy so many lives as to be out of all proportion with his limited gains”. This terminology has persisted to this day. In addition, reporters were told to glorify the individual soldier rather than the unit they belonged to. This was done not so much to give concrete examples of patriotic devotion but mainly to divert the people’s attention from the bigger issues at stake.

Prior to the invasion, reporters were directed to boast of the impregnability of the Atlantic wall. When this defence line had been breached, they were told to write of the “protective shelter of the West Wall”. The American soldier was to be characterized as an inexperienced, easy-going lad in contrast to the fiercely nationalistic veteran from STALINGRAD. To explain the reasons for the defeat in the West, correspondents had to inculcate the superiority in our material (the 3 Ms: motor, mass, munitions).

It was realized that America, due to its geographic location, would not prove an easy prey for the Communist bogey. Therefore, simultaneous efforts were made to turn the British and Americans against each other. The appeal here was more emotional than dialectic, and Skorpion WEST at least considered pornography its strongest weapon in this cause. There was, however, some difficulty in convincing the OKW of the efficacy of this medium. A drawing showing a dying Tommy, enmeshed in barbed wire, and a nude woman, presumably his wife, in the clutches of a lecherous GI, was used in the summer of 1944. In another version the American soldier was a negro. After approximately a million of these leaflets had been dropped over Allied lines the OKW prohibited further use.

A new series of pornographic leaflets along the same lines, but this time in four colours, were produced on orders of Skorpion WEST in January, but again prohibited by the OKW. Some of these were intended to turn EM/OR against officers by contrasting the dying GI or Tommy to the nude at play with GP officer. A so-called semi-pornographic series managed to escape the OKW ban, and was still in use when PW left. These leaflets compared the soldier’s present miserable existence with his dreams of home, again personified by the nude wife, and, as a clincher, showed the corpse that would be left to her unless he ceased fighting.

In general, the standard line of approach toward the American soldier was a nostalgic reminder of his beautiful, carefree life at home. Master in this line was a Leutnant WESTPHAL, who dreamed up his ideas while playing Classics on the piano. The luxury life in German prison camps, including the care of American wounded by German nurses, was shown on pictures. The rotation policy, according to PW, is coming under fire next. A leaflet in preparation showed a furlough steamer arriving in New York harbor with wives, children and sweethearts waving a fond welcome to their returning heroes. Just whether this leaflet would make American soldiers fight better or worse, was still under discussion at PW’s headquarters when he thought it wiser to get himself captured.

Annexe 39 :

Consignes aux agents du Général De  
Gaulle pour le projet R

*B.C.R.A (Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action), 171 MI/9, Microfilm,  
Archives nationales de Paris.*

171 MI/ 9 Etat major particulier du Général de Gaulle, BCRA section R, sous sections: missions  
le capitaine Manuel, chef de la section de renseignement à monsieur le chef de bataillon PASSY, chef du SR  
Projet section R: chapitre III: consignes aux agents

France Libre  
Etat- Major particulier du Général de Gaulle  
S.R.

Londres, le 10 décembre 1941

#### Note sur la SECTION de RENSEIGNEMENT

##### **I- BUTS**

Réunir des éléments d'information  
Transmettre ces éléments d'informations aux services intéressés  
soit sous forme brut  
soit sous forme de synthèse

##### **Zones d'actions**

essentiellement: FRANCE et AFRIQUE DU NOD  
accessoirement: autres colonies et autres pays

##### **Nature des éléments d'information**

aussi bien politiques que militaires- doivent couvrir l'ensemble des activités de l'Empire français

##### **Moyens de recueillir ces éléments d'information**

1- agents  
2- interrogatoire des volontaires  
3- autres sources (S.R., étrangers etc...)

##### **DE L'AGENT**

##### **I- choix de l'agent**

L'agent doit être choisi en tenant compte:

- 1- de sa valeur morale
- 2- de ses qualités intellectuelles
- 3- de ses contacts
- 4- de ses possibilités de ses réadaptations à sa vie en France ou en Afrique du Nord (couverture commerciale etc...)

Lorsqu'un des officiers du S.R. Aura vu une personnalité susceptible de devenir, à son avis, un agent, il devra présenter cet agent éventuel au Chef du S.R., avec une note succincte précisant les raisons pour lesquelles il envisage l'utilisation de cette personne, et dans quel but.

##### **II- Affectation de l'agent**

Une fois l'accord du S.R. Obtenu, l'officier doit se préoccuper d'obtenir l'affectation de l'agent à l'E. M. Particulier (section S.R.)

Deux cas pourront se produire:

- a: l'agent fait déjà partie des F.L.L., auquel cas: renvoyer l'agent éventuel à son unité et procéder à toutes les démarches nécessaires pour obtenir son détachement à l'E. M. Particulier (E.R.)
- b/ l'agent ne fait pas encore partie des F.L.L., faire affecter cet agent directement à l'E. M. Particulier, en exécution de la note n°.... du....., du Général de Gaulle



### **III- Projet de Mission**

Parallèlement à ces démarches, établir un projet de mission faisant ressortir :

- 1- but de la mission
- 2- qualités et possibilités de l'agent
- 3- moyens matériels à mettre à sa disposition
- 4- budget à prévoir
- 5- date et moyen de départ

En même temps que ce projet de mission doivent être établis :

- 1- une autorisation pour couvrir les frais précisés dans le budget en francs
- 2- une autorisation pour couvrir les frais précisés dans le budget en livres
- 3- un ordre de mission
- 4- une délégation de solde et au même moment, doit être établie une fiche récapitulative dont les éléments seraient reportés ultérieurement sur fiches. Cette feuille sert d'aide-mémoire et doit comporter:
  - 1- état signalétique de l'agent
  - 2- la personne à prévenir en cas d'accident
  - 3- date à laquelle les photos ont été prises (polyphotos)
  - 4- Pièces d'identité prévues (état signalétique de la personne dont l'agent prendra l'identité en mission)
  - 5- Histoire prévue
  - 6- Pseudo :
    - sous lequel la mission est connue au S.R.
    - Sous lequel on parlera de l'agent par câble ou par télégramme
    - sous lequel on s'adressera à l'agent à la BBC s'il y a lieu
    - sous lequel l'agent se fera connaître au Consulat britannique à Barcelone, s'il y a lieu
  - 7- Mot de passe
  - 8- codes A et B- préfixes A et B
  - 9- Sécurité check du poste
  - 10- adresses de secours
  - 11- détails des stages avec dates:
    - a/ parachutiste
    - b/ d'embarquement de nuit
    - c/ de codage
    - d/ d'identification militaire
    - e/ d'encre secrète
    - f/ de transmission

Cette feuille, qui comme nous l'avons signalé, sert d'aide-mémoire, devra être utilisée pour établir les fiches relatives à la mission de l'agent

Ces fiches devront être remplies au fur et à mesure de l'accomplissement des différents stades de la mission. Elles devront servir à l'établissement de la mission proprement dite.

Les fiches signalétiques pour chaque mission comportent:

- état signalétique de l'agent
- moyens de transmission mis à la disposition de l'agent, et tableaux d'émission; s'il y a lieu

### **IV- Mission proprement dite**

L' officier qui étudie la mission doit tenir à jour le dossier de la mission au fur et à mesure de la constitution. Ce dossier doit comporter:

un relevé de toutes les pièces du dossier:

- toutes les pièces nécessaires à l'établissement du projet de la mission;
- détails de la mission comportant:
  - 1- zone d'action

- 2- contacts éventuels
- 3- but à atteindre
- 4- adresse où l'on pourra toucher l'agent si l'on reste sans nouvelles,
- 5- Liaison intérieure
- 6- convention spéciale, s'il y en a une

### **V- Consignes aux agents**

Les consignes aux agents se divisent en deux catégories:

- a/ consignes particulières à chaque mission
- b/ consignes permanentes pour tous agents

Nous n'étudierons ici que les consignes permanentes pour tous agents.

Ces consignes ont trait :

- 1/ à la recherche du renseignement
- 2- à la transmission du renseignement
- 3- aux conditions d'adaptation à la vie en France, et aux mesures de sécurité à prendre

#### **1- Renseignement**

Tout renseignement communiqué doit pouvoir obéir à la règle suivante, que tout agent doit savoir par cœur:

Il faut des sources, des faits, des dates, des lieux.

Tout renseignement qui ne répond pas à une partie de ces quatre éléments est un renseignement incomplet qui perd presque totalement sa valeur.

Une information qui ne précise pas la valeur de la source doit être assimilée à un ragot.

Une information sans date ne vaut rien.

#### **Sources**

Un renseignement peut être:

- soit de source directe, c'est-à-dire vu par l'agent lui-même
- soit reçu par intermédiaire, auquel cas c'est la valeur de l'intermédiaire qui mesure la valeur du renseignement. Un renseignement donné par un docker de Brest sur un bateau du port de Brest vaut plus que le même renseignement donné par un général à Vichy.

#### **Faits**

Les faits doivent être transmis sans aucun essai d'interprétation

Exemple: une division motorisée partie de Bordeaux vers Bayonne. Inutile de nous dire que c'est dans le but d'une attaque sur l'Espagne, et ultérieurement le Maroc, si l'on n'en est pas sûr.

Dates

Le même fait prenant place à des dates différentes a une valeur d'interprétation qui peut changer du tout au tout.

#### **Lieux**

Il est indispensable de préciser l'endroit où les faits ont pris place, en faisant surtout très attention à l'orthographe des noms. Dans les cas difficiles, préciser le lieu par rapport à la carte Michelin, en indiquant le numéro de la carte et la situation du lieu en m/m par rapport aux latitude et longitude à la carte Michelin.

#### **2- Transmission du renseignement**

La transmission du renseignement se fait soit par poste radio soit par courrier

##### **Poste radio**

Limiter l'usage de la radio à la transmission de renseignements dont l'exploitation immédiate est nécessaire. Ces renseignements peuvent être soit de nature militaire, et sont transmis en code A, soit de nature politique ou de

propagande, et sont transmis en code B.

#### Du câble

Tous les câbles doivent être numérotés à l'intérieur de chaque courrier, c'est-à-dire une numérotation pour les câbles en code A, et une numérotation pour les câbles en code B. Les numéros doivent se suivre dans l'ordre normal.

Le câble doit comporter, s'il y a lieu:

- accusé de réception des câbles reçus,
- référence au numéro du câble reçu lorsqu'on transmet une réponse à ce câble
- énoncé pur et simple de l'information, au cas où il ne s'agit pas d'une réponse, en obéissant aux consignes sur le renseignement, précisées plus haut
- L'agent doit, à tout moment, nous mettre en mesure de l'atteindre. Il doit donc, par câble, nous signaler ses déplacements et ses adresses éventuelles où l'on pourra l'atteindre.

-

#### Courrier

Le courrier doit être rédigé en code B. Chaque courrier doit être numéroté et doit comporter un bordereau récapitulatif des différentes pièces composant le courrier. Il doit être établi de la manière suivante:

- compte-rendu d'activités traitant des antennes nouvelles, des contacts nouveaux, renseignements sur les faits n'ayant pas fait l'objet de câbles
- renseignements sur les personnes n'ayant pas fait l'objet de câbles
- documentation et budget (terrains nouveaux ou supprimer l'atterrissage ou le parachutage, passage de zone, justification et prévisions de dépenses)
- rapport général sur le moral, l'état d'esprit des différents milieux
- suggestions, difficultés rencontrées, remèdes proposés (laissées à l'initiative de l'agent)

Chaque fois qu'un informateur de l'agent est signalé dans le courrier, nous donner tous les renseignements sur cet informateur et le pseudo par lequel il sera désigné dans les câbles et dans le courrier, en sorte que certains câbles à l'avenir pourront nous parvenir avec l'expression « source: Octave », et nous saurons immédiatement qui est Octave.

#### 3- Conditions d'adaptation à la vie en France et mesures de sécurité à apprendre

1- Ne rien tenter tant que vous n'êtes pas au courant des détails de la vie française actuelle.

Au commencement, ne sortez qu'avec une personne amie qui vous initiera progressivement à toutes les mesures en vigueur depuis, (en particulier, à celles qui concernent les rationnements divers). Attention à ne pas commettre d'actes qui montrent que vous êtes nouvellement arrivés en France.

ALLEZ LENTEMENT, MAIS SUREMENT

2- Ne rien tenter tant que vous n'êtes pas pourvu d'une « couverture » solide, cad d'une raison sociale qui vous permet à tout moment de justifier très naturellement votre présence à tel ou tel endroit, ou vos déplacements vers telle ou telle destination

Vous trouverez des personnes amies qui doivent être capables de vous procurer une situation convenable. Au besoin, fournissez-leur les fonds nécessaires pour qu'elles puissent rétribuer vos services par un traitement correspondant à votre emploi.

3- Habituez vous aussi vite que possible à votre nouvelle identité, votre signature, date et lieu de naissance, etc... Aucune hésitation n'est permise sur de telles questions.

Moins il y aura de gens qui connaissent votre identité, mieux cela vaudra. Il n'est pas nécessaire que les personnes avec lesquelles vous êtes en relations connaissent votre identité. Un prénom suffit.

Evitez les hôtels où l'on vous demandera votre nom. N'allez que dans des hôtels amis ou logez chez des personnes sûres

4- Dès votre arrivée, renseignez vous pour savoir si vos papiers sont en règle et conformes au type en vigueur. Sinon faites-les changer. Vous devez trouver les moyens de le faire.

5- Il est essentiel de mener un train de vie aussi effacé que possible et en rapport avec votre « couverture » officielle.

CECI EST IMPERATIF

Aucune dépense exagérée- Ne fréquentez que les hôtels et les restaurants moyens.

Ne vous faites pas remarquer en payant sur le marché noir des prix exorbitants pour des objets qui ne sont pas de première nécessité

Ménager votre argent de façon à pouvoir à tout moment disposer d'une réserve en cas d'événement imprévu

Rappelez vous que plus vous avez l'air neutre, insignifiant et effacé, plus vous aurez des chances de passer inaperçu dans les différents milieux que vous fréquentez.

6- Avant de partir, inspectez soigneusement vos vêtements et votre linge pour vérifier qu'ils ne portent plus de trace de leur origine anglaise.

7- Attention aux femmes

# Annexe 40 :

## Rapports sur les suicides allemands

2DOC 94: Intelligence Note. Sous-série 2 DOC (Fonds Moscou) : Etudes documentaires sur la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Archives du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

Rapport des forces expéditionnaires alliées sur la période du 22 au 23 septembre 1944 envoyé au quartier général.

Supreme Headquarters secret, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, Office of the Assistant Chief of staff, G-2

G-2 Report

Period from: 1200hrs 22 Sept to 1200hrs 23 Sept 1944

No.110: FORWARD HEADQUARTERS

I-LAND

WESTERN FRONT

[...] A captured document quotes the following order of the day signed by "the Supreme Commander of the West", Field Marshall von RUNDSTEDT :

"Upon the order of the Führer, I have again received command of Supreme Command West, effective 6 September. During my absence the command and the troops have undergone heavy fighting. I am convinced that every single officer, NCO and soldier knows what we are fighting for. I trust you as the whole country places its trust in you. Fight under me for our people, our country, and our leader".

The following document was obtained by French agents and throws an interesting side-light on enemy morale in the South of France and more especially on the LXII Reserve Corps, whose Commander Gen. Inf. NEULING was captured by American troopers soon after the landing :

General Kommando- LXII Res Corps GHQ, 22 June 1944

Abt. II a- AZ.a Nr.5271/44 geh

SUBJECT: Suicides secret

From 3 June to 20 June, there have been three cases of suicide in my Corps (2 Officers and 1 Non-Com.)

I call strongly to your attention the fact that suicide of members of the Wehrmacht in time of war is considered desertion.

In the oath to the flag, the soldier has sworn absolute obedience and to give his life unreservedly for Führer, people and homeland. He has no right to dispose of his life; he who does so cowardly and despicable.

As a result, suicides do not have the right to burial with honors or to military interment.

They must be buried in silence and unattended, in civilian cemeteries, away from the tombs of the natives.

See exceptions H.V.B1 1942, Chapter B, Par.476.

I order that every higher officer personally instruct all unit commanders and all officers under his command to this effect.

It is a duty of pure friendship on the part of every leader and superior and, finally, of each soldier to intervene effectively, and at least to report at once to his immediate superior if he has discerned a changed morale, admitting the deduction of suicidal intent.

Suicide is unworthy of a German soldier.

Unit Commander and NSFO are to instruct troops to this effect.

Signature illegible

II- AIR

A- ENEMY ACTIVITY

B- OWN ACTIVITY

E.J. FOORD, Colonel for K.W.D. STRONG, Maj-Gen, GS, AC of S, G-2.

## Annexe 41 :

# Compte-rendu d'Archer sur les difficultés d'établir un système de surveillance des côtes irlandaises

The Security Service: Policy (Pol F Series) Files. Liaison and Exchange of Information with Eire Authorities. Aspects of Security in Eire from the early 1920s, and Military and Security Co-operation between the British and the Irish at the beginning of the Second World War, 1940-1945, KV 4/279, vol. I, Archives nationales de Londres.

3. It was also agreed that it was desirable that a British Naval Officer should be in communication with Colonel Archer in Eire, to assist in the evaluation of information obtained and assist in the evaluation of information obtained.

THE SITUATION IN REGARD TO  
COASTWATCHING IN EIRE

4. It was agreed that Colonel Archer should be kept informed through the coastwatching system in Eire.

Discussions with Eire Government before the  
outbreak of war.

1. Following discussions which began at the time of the crisis in September, 1938, and continued at intervals during the spring and summer of 1939, on the subject of Coastwatching in Eire, a meeting took place in London on the 26th August, 1939, at which this question was discussed between Colonel Archer of the Eire Ministry of Defence, the Director of Naval Intelligence, other representatives of the Admiralty, and the Board of Trade.

2. Colonel Archer explained that the Eire Government had difficulties in recruiting permanent personnel until October, but had arranged for a scheme which could be put into force immediately, consisting of approximately 200 police stations on the coast line, supported by locals whom the police would co-opt. The police stations would report to the local military command, who would report to Colonel Archer in Dublin. He pointed out that communications are very bad, particularly in Counties Galway and Mayo, where motor cars would have to be used to get to the nearest telegraph station. Colonel Archer said that he intended to prepare simple instructions to issue to these personnel, until the proper organisation can be completed.



3. It was also agreed that it was desirable that a British Naval Officer should work in conjunction with Colonel Archer in Eire, to advise on coastwatching questions, and assist in the evaluation of information obtained through the coastwatchers.

4. It was indicated to Colonel Archer that information secured through the coastwatching service in Eire would be of value to the Admiralty, and possible methods of communicating such information were discussed. Also, it was suggested that, in addition to actually reporting warships, the coastwatching service would be required to deal with other forms of enemy activity, for which the employment of experts was necessary. Forms of activity visualised were as follows:-

- (a) torpedoes and mines washed ashore which would require to be rendered harmless;
- (b) investigation of the identity of wreckage of both ships and aircraft washed ashore;
- (c) the interrogation of shipwrecked mariners (especially submarine survivors) landing on the coast;
- (d) strange and suspicious vessels using the waters of Eire.

In dealing with these matters, co-operation between the Admiralty and the Defence Department of Eire would be to the mutual advantage of both Governments. In addition, it was likely that information of German intentions to land arms, etc., on the Eire coast would probably be known first in London, and that any information we obtained would, of course, be transmitted to the High Commissioner. D.N.I. Also pointed out to Colonel Archer that the passing and reception of intelligence was on a different plane to the taking of action, which might be politically undesirable.

5. Written minutes of the meeting of the 26th August were prepared in conjunction with Colonel Archer and a copy was forwarded to him on the 28th August.

6. On the 31st August the Eire Government (through Mr. Dulanty) asked for the services of Commander O'Connell (retired) as Naval Adviser to their coastwatching organisation, and it was arranged that they should accordingly approach this officer themselves and negotiate the terms of his appointment. The proposed appointment of Commander O'Connell did not mature. The Eire Government negotiated with him up to a point but, in about the middle of September broke off negotiations for reasons which are not known to the Admiralty. It is believed that the post of Naval Adviser to the coastwatching service is now filled by an Irishman whose naval experience is unknown.

7. Further, no information obtained through the coastwatching service was passed to the Admiralty during the month of September, nor were any proposals put forward by the Eire Government during this period for the communication to the Admiralty of information so obtained.

8. The position at the end of September was thus very unsatisfactory from the Admiralty point of view.

9. Since the appointment of Sir John Maffey as United Kingdom Representative in Eire in October the position has improved in certain respects namely:-

(a) The Eire Government have agreed to the appointment of a British Naval Attache to the United Kingdom Representative in Eire and Captain A.B. Greig, Royal Navy (retd.) was appointed to this post and took up his duties at the beginning of November. He has had several conversations with representatives of the Eire Government on the subject of coastwatching, and is being taken on a tour of certain of the coastwatching stations, which he will complete on Monday, 4th December.

- (b) On the 12th October, 1939, an arrangement was made by Sir John Maffey with the Eire Government that movements of submarines when observed by the Eire coastal watch should be telegraphed to Dublin and Cork and then wirelessly by Dublin and Cork to the Eire air force coastal patrol on a stated wavelength. The only known instances of reports of submarines

Y However, subsequent investigation disclosed that according to information available these reports were without doubt correct.

Present arrangements still unsatisfactory.

10. There are, however, still two outstanding unsatisfactory features in the situation, namely:-

- (a) The inadequacy and inconvenience of the present method of communicating to the Admiralty reports made through the coastwatching service.  
(b) The doubtful efficiency of the service itself.

11. As regards (a) the existing arrangement suffers from the following defects so far as the Admiralty is concerned:-

- essential to communication must listen  
will always be  
increase power  
S. J. - code
- (1) Listening for the reports involves a continuous 24-hour watch and immobilises apparatus accordingly, besides imposing a strain on personnel.  
(2) It would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess the reliability of reports so intercepted.  
(3) It is considered doubtful whether messages on the wavelength stated would be received by Naval Stations unless transmitted with considerable power.  
(4) The fact that reports are sent en clair makes it possible for the enemy to intercept and retransmit as bogus messages.

Doubtful efficiency of coastwatching service.

12. Since the outbreak of the war the Admiralty have received reports, which are considered reliable, of at least four instances of U-boats entering Irish territorial waters, namely:-

- (a) One in Blacksod Bay on the 16th September.
- (b) One in Donegal Bay (near Teelin Bay) on the 30th September.
- (c) One in Donegal Bay near Rathlin O'Byrne on the 8th October.
- (d) One in Bantry Bay on the 9th November.

13. Also there have been persistent reports, from unconfirmed sources, of U-boat crews landing and obtaining provisions on the South Coast between Kinsale and Toe Head.

14. It is not known, however, whether any of these cases, mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 13, were reported to Dublin or Cork.

15. The Admiralty consider that the information in their possession justifies the conclusion that U-boats at least use the territorial waters of Ire for purposes of occasional rest, and are quite possibly landing crews for relaxation and obtaining fresh provisions. The meagre reports so far received through the coastwatching service, therefore, do not, in these circumstances, inspire confidence in its efficiency.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF POSITION.

16. As regards communication of reports:-

- (a) It is suggested that the Eire Government might agree to pass all reports received by them, whether from aircraft or through the coastwatching service, to the Naval Attache, Dublin, indicating, as far as possible, the reliability of the source in each case. This could be done, confidentially, through the Naval Attache and would not, it is suggested, involve them in any risk of being charged with a breach of neutrality.
- (b) Alternatively if the Eire Government will not agree to (a) they might acquiesce to wireless to their coastal air patrols at stated times, e.g. twice or three times a day, a summary of reports received (in addition to broadcasting the actual reports as at present). This will enable the Admiralty, if desired, to obtain information fairly quickly without the necessity of continuous watch.

It is however emphasised that this is from the Admiralty point of view, and a poor substitute for (a).

- (c) That any reports broadcast from the Eire wireless stations be wirelessed in an agreed cypher and not in clear as at present.

Suggestions for improving the Coastwatching Service.

17. (a) The Admiralty are, and have always been, willing to assist the Eire Government on matters connected with coastwatching, and it is hoped that the Eire Government will suggest any points upon which Admiralty assistance might be useful.
- (b) The Admiralty are prepared to consider the supply of equipment to the Eire Government on favourable terms for the purpose of improving the equipment of the coastwatchers.

Establishment of D/F Stations.

18. (a) The efficiency of the coastwatching organisation would be greatly increased if D/F Wireless Stations could be established in suitable positions on the West and South coasts to assist in detecting and establishing the position of enemy units.
- (b) For this purpose the necessary stations would be 2 H/F Stations (one placed near the N.W. corner of Eire and one near the S.W. corner) and one M/F station, also to be placed in the S.W.
- H/F (c) The H/F station could also be used as part of the organisation for the detection of illicit wireless which the Eire Government have already agreed to instal.
- (d) The inclusive cost of each H/F Station will be approximately £1200, the inclusive cost of an M/F station about £3000.
- (e) The normal personnel of each station would be 4 watchkeepers and a charge hand.
- (f) Results obtained by the D/F stations could be telegraphed to the Eire wireless transmitting stations.
- (g) If it is decided to establish these D/F Stations the Admiralty are willing to discuss the question of supply of equipment and personnel.

Distribution  
Lord Hankey  
Col. Menzies  
Maj. Gen. Kell  
Mr. Stephenson(D.O.)

John H. Godfrey  
D.N.I.  
4.12.39.

## Annexe 42 :

# Agents français plus discrets que les espions britanniques

2BB 7-D1 : Attaché naval à Dublin 1939-1944, Sous-série 2BB7 (Fonds Moscou) : attachés navals, liaisons navales, Archives Navales du Ministère de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

LÉGATION DE FRANCE  
EN IRLANDE.

Dublin, le 21 Septembre 1939.

Reçu le... 23... 9... 39... (Voir lettre priée n° 19 à  
Ct. Dawson.)

Répondu le.....

ATTACHE NAVAL.

Enregistré No. 233/D

Cher Commandant,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 16 et je saisis l'occasion d'un voyageur sûr pour y répondre.

Vous me dites que les mouvements des navires français, allemands et éventuellement italiens vous intéressent et que les ports de Cork, Limerick, Galway et Waterford sont des points qui, par ailleurs, ne vous laissent pas indifférent. Et vous me priez de vous faire parvenir, "aussi longtemps que le Département ne m'aura pas pourvu d'un Attaché Naval", les informations que j'aurai pu recueillir au sujet de ces bateaux et de ces ports. Vous voulez bien même envisager d'envoyer ici, si je l'estime nécessaire, votre adjoint.

En ce qui concerne l'Attaché Naval, j'ai, comme vous le savez sans doute, été chargé de vous accréditer, de même que le Général Lelong et le Colonel Fournier. Je me suis acquitté le 5 Septembre de cette instruction : n'ayant reçu aucune réponse du Ministère irlandais des Affaires Etrangères à mes notifications écrites, j'ai tout lieu de supposer que vous êtes par conséquent accrédité, sauf objection explicite que le Gouvernement irlandais n'a pas encore formulée et qu'il ne formulera pas, j'espère bien.

La phrase de votre lettre que j'ai évoquée ci-dessus entre guillemets signifie-t-elle que, d'après vos informations, la Marine aurait l'intention d'envoyer ici un Attaché Naval indépendant de Londres ?

De toute façon, il serait regrettable que

Monsieur le Capitaine de Vaisseau  
Denis de Rivoyre  
Attaché Naval près l'Ambassade de France  
à LONDRES

l'Agent français de la Compagnie Transatlantique à Dublin et à Cork fût, comme il en est fortement question, appelé à Londres à collaborer aux services placés, je crois, sous la haute direction de M. de Malglaive. M. Auset est, à mon avis, le seul Français résidant en Irlande qui puisse obtenir, sans éveiller de susceptibilités, tous ces renseignements. Ses relations, l'habitude qu'il a de manier les Irlandais, sa jovialité font qu'il y réussira très bien. Mieux vaudrait évidemment que la Compagnie Transatlantique ne lui prescrivît pas de fermer son Agence. Il pourrait très bien conserver un bureau sans personnel. D'ailleurs, notre Attaché Commercial à Dublin vient, de son côté, de recevoir l'instruction de rouvrir son bureau de tourisme.

Je suis tout disposé à intervenir auprès de M. de Malglaive en vue de retenir ici M. Auset (qui au surplus se rend compte qu'il rendra plus de services ici qu'à Londres et préfère en conséquence rester en Irlande). Mais s'il suffisait d'un mot de vous pour obtenir le même résultat, je préférerais n'avoir pas à importuner M. de Malglaive et à lui faire valoir, à votre place, l'intérêt d'ordre naval qui s'attache au maintien de M. Auset en Irlande./.

*Bien effectué en ce moment une  
Bonne dans l'ouest et le nord-ouest.  
Croyez à l'assurance à vos sentiments  
Doux  
Hondal*





## Annexe 43 :

# Compte-rendu militaire de la réunion des troupes britanniques en Irlande du Nord, 4 mai 1941.

HS 6/305 (microfilm), Policy Planning and Organisation of SOE Activities, 1940-1942, Archives nationales de Londres.

4th May 1941,

Notes on a meeting at BTNI on April 30th April, there being present:

Brigadier Gregson Ellis

Brigadier Gubbins

Lt. Col Whitefoord

Mr M.H. Pryce

Major Sheridan

The object of the meeting was to discuss the creation of an underground organization in Eire to arrange sabotage behind the German lines after total or partial occupation by the Germans.

Brigadier Gregson Ellis stipulated at the outset that no scheme could be agreed that entailed the taking into Eire of anything in the nature of explosives, arms, etc unless the Eire Army Authority, with whom he and his people were in close touch, were first informed. To introduce such stores without informing the Eire Army leaders (or at least some of them) would wreck the good relations between him and the Eire army leaders and would also lead to further concentration of Eire forces on the border, with the result that the BTNI would be hampered, and the Germans left greater freedom of movement if they landed.

He also emphasized one other aspect of the situation as follows:

- a) The Eire authorities say to Britain « you don't really expect invasion, otherwise you would give us arms ».
- b) The Prime Minister absolutely refuses to allow any arms to be sent to Eire, and up to now will scarcely discuss it.
- c) Anyone who offered arms to the Eire Army leaders, and was able to implement his offer, could expect to obtain anything within reason for which he asked.

It was generally agreed, before details were discussed, that although preparation would be necessary, S.O. wished to do nothing unless and until there had been occupation by the Germans; in other words, as stated in paragraph 2, what is visualized is an organization to be left behind, to engage sabotage, to destroy stores that retreating forces had not had time to destroy, to force the Germans to mount additional guards, etc... It was also agreed that subversion, as understood by S.O. was not at the moment practicable in Eire.

Wireless sets were first discussed. Gubbins pointed out that in a number of countries we had not been able to introduce wireless sets while opportunity offered, and that

later, when the Germans had marched in, it was impossible to introduce them. We did not wish to be in the same position in Eire. Wireless sets were urgently needed for our people left behind to a) indicate what stores we wanted b) where they could be dropped c) send to England news which the station in England could re-diffuse to other S.O. people in Eire.

It was at first felt that Archer (Eire Army) would not agree to this; that his view would be that he had his own intelligence system which was adequate and that he could pass on any news required. On the point being emphasized that this service was for use only after occupation for communication with London, Pryce agreed to put the matter to him.

The question of building up an S.O. organization (or something like it) was then discussed and it was broadly accepted that they were two ways of doing this:

- a) By cooperation with McKenna and Archer
- b) By the creation of a separate secret organization, which if exposed would be repudiated by H.M.G. and of which the chief organizers would never admit having association with H.M.G.
- c) Everyone agreed that if (a) were possible it was undoubtedly the better scheme and should be first investigated. But it is to me interesting to note that it was also felt that that scheme (b) was not impossible and that a number of tough could be found and organized, although not without considerable risk. Everyone agreed that (a) was infinitely the better plan and should be first investigated.

After long discussion the following decisions were reached:

- i) Gubbins is to discuss the matter with CD and if CD approves write a letter on war office paper to Pryce which Pryce can show to Archer.
- ii) This letter to be couched in terms as impressive as possible (since Irishmen probably regard themselves as expert saboteurs without anything to learn) at the same time not giving away anything which would help the Germans if it got into wrong hands.
- iii) The letter to make clear what facilities we had for training, etc., and to be accompanied by an appendix showing the nature of our toys (again with the reservation in paragraph (ii) above).

It is most important, if a good impression is to be created and Archer's cooperation handed over ». (See paragraph: (IV) below).

The letter to offer to a number up to 15 of trainees at a school in England where these trainees could be trained as instructors. These trainees would of course be kept separate from any other trainees in our school.

The letter also to contain an offer to send two experts to Eire to train people over here if Archer preferred this.

- iv) the letter to make it clear that the toys were now ready and available in England and could be moved to Northern Ireland ready for transfer to Eire if and when required.

v) Because of the obvious difficulty of getting the toys from North to South if the Germans landed, S.O. to make representations to the war cabinet to get permission to introduce (in agreement with BTNI) at least some toys into Eire before invasion.

Obviously, the question of personnel was discussed and I think the results of this part of the conversation may be summarized as follows:

The ideal class, which we have used in other countries, civilians, discontented, anti-Nazi, or bribable – cannot be used in Eire since for local reasons detection would be certain ; the Regular Army, probably the most suitable and trustworthy are useless since in war they will be either fighting or prisoners, there is left, therefore, only the Local Security Force, which appears the only means ; they are controlled and therefore Archer could pick his men, and they could, without attracting exceptional attention, in the event of invasion, take off their uniforms and remain behind with some possibility of not being rounded up.

## Annexe 44 :

### Article « Agents in Ireland »

Ms 17,277- Ms 17,278, IRA: Dublin no.2 Brigade: two envelopes,  
Archives nationales de Dublin.

# Agents In Ireland

**DURING** the war, Irish neutrality was misrepresented constantly in the Allied press. Security reasons prevented the actual facts and the measures taken to prevent espionage from being published, to counteract

this frequently vicious propaganda. Since the war, at least two books have been published, and there are short passages in others, which repeat many of the false accusations made in the war-time press. It is about time that some of the truth should be released to set the record right. Herr Stephan's book goes quite some distance to do this. Published in German, this book gives an account of the activities of the agents sent by Germany to Ireland during the period 1939 to 1945, their relations with the I.R.A., their imprisonment, and a short account of their careers when released after the war. It tells three-quarters, perhaps, of the truth and, it may be said, the whole truth insofar as it was available to the author. In the nature of things it cannot be the complete story, because the information is gathered nearly altogether from I.R.A. sources, and from interviews with those who took part or attempted to take part in espionage and sabotage activities. Herr Stephan has spared no effort to get all the information possible from these sources, and also from the published speeches of Government ministers and all other published material. His story is told fairly and dispassionately, and makes fascinating reading. Even if an official account of the work of the Irish intelligence service were to be published, this book still would be needed to fill in certain details of the general picture.

As a historical work it has, therefore, a high value. Yet on reading it one is tempted to wonder how much of any history or historical memoirs can be really true. Deductions are made from certain events which seem on the face of it to be irrefutable, to be the only reasonable explanation, and yet they are not in fact the true story.

The activities of Hermann Goertz when in Athlone prison, as related by van Loon, illustrate this point. Van Loon tells how Goertz sent out messages through

**Geheimauftrag Irland: Deutsche Agenten im irischen Untergrundkampf, 1939-1945. By**

**Enno Stephan, Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling verlag, 1961.**

a guard and received ciphered replies from Berlin, and van Loon cites some of the messages received as conclusive proof of this successful contact with Berlin from inside an Irish prison. When Goertz was released he learned the real facts—that the Irish intelligence service was receiving his ciphered messages and answering them in his own cipher—but apparently this information never reached van Loon. This illustrates also another problem that adds greatly to the occupational risks of a secret agent. Every agent must feel certain that the ciphers or codes he is to use are unbreakable. He must have complete confidence in them to be prepared to use them, and yet this very confidence leads him to believe that a message in his cipher must be genuine. Wireless communication provided a wonderfully rapid means of communication with home for the agent. Information is useless if it arrives too late. It is communicated in five minutes by radio but through a medium—the air—which is open to every interceptor. Every agent's life hangs, therefore, on a thin thread, a cipher which may be broken.

Goertz is described in the book as the man who was always unlucky. The facts hardly bear out this. At times he was extraordinarily lucky. He escaped arrest by pure good fortune on at least three occasions. He emerges from the book as an honourable, patriotic, brave and clever agent, but his mission was doomed to failure from the beginning. German information on Ireland was good but yet not good enough. The other German agents sent to this country achieved no success and were in nearly every case in prison when they arrived.

On the basis of this book alone it can be asserted without fear of contradiction that the Irish Government had the situation under complete control throughout the war, and that contrary to popular belief in the English-speaking world, this country was not permitted to be used as a centre for espionage. When the full story is told this will be clearer still.

See also de Valera  
reply to American  
Minister, Gray  
**DOWN TO A**

H.G.  
Significance of  
FICTION  
this  
clarify

Annexe 45 :

Méthodes de cryptage des bagues  
des pigeons voyageurs

Air Ministry: Bomber Command: Registered Files. Carrier pigeons, 1  
November 1940-30 April 1944, AIR 14/2110, Archives de la RAF dans  
Archives nationales de Londres.



## INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE DISPOSAL OF STRAY, INJURED OR DEAD HOMING PIGEONS.

Issued by the National Pigeon Service Committee under Air Ministry Authority S.71143/Signals, 1 (d), July, 1941.

The following procedure is authorised by the Air Ministry for the guidance of all concerned.

PART I. relates to pigeons found carrying a Message or Message Container.

PART II relates to pigeons which are NOT carrying a Message or Message Container.

### PART I.—PIGEONS CARRYING MESSAGE OR MESSAGE CONTAINER.

TYPE OF MESSAGE CONTAINER	SERVICE	DISPOSAL OF MESSAGE	DISPOSAL OF PIGEON.
1. Blue Bakelite painted white outside. <b>Note.</b> —Do not rub white patch, which may have figures or letters written on it.	R.A.F. (S.O.S.)	1. Copy any figures or letters marked on the white patch. 2. Unscrew milled cap and then turn reverse way to free message. 3. Transmit as directed on back of printed Message Form 1326 which should be found in the Container. To R.A.F. Station or to the Police for transmission.	Detain and report full metal ring numbers and letters and stamps on wing to Air Ministry Pigeons Officer, Telecommunications 1, Dept. O.A., Princes House, Kingsway, W.C.2. (Tel.: HOLborn 3434. Ext. 728).
2. Blue Bakelite.	R.A.F.	To R.A.F. Station or to the Police for transmission.	As above.
3. Red Bakelite. (Plain Red Cap).	ARMY	To nearest Army Formation H.Q. or to the Police for transmission to nearest Army Formation H.Q. immediately.	Detain and report to the C.S.O., Army Pigeon Service, War Office, Wing House, Piccadilly, London, W.1. (Tel. Regent 8131).
3a. Green Bakelite, Grey Bakelite, Red Bakelite with coloured disc in cap.	ARMY	Send Message Carrier <b>unopened</b> to C.S.O., Army Pigeon Service, War Office, Wing House, Piccadilly, W.1., under sealed cover and <b>by quickest route.</b>	Detain and report to C.S.O., Army Pigeon Service, War Office, Wing House, Piccadilly, W.1. (Tel. REGent 8131).
4. Yellow Bakelite.	Authorised Commercial.	To Police for transmission as addressed.	Detain and report as for R.A.F. Pigeons above.
5. Black Bakelite	POLICE	To nearest Police Station.	Detain and report as for R.A.F. Pigeons above.
6. Any other type of Message Container, or message attached in any other way.	UNKNOWN	To nearest Police Station for transmission, by post, of Message, Container, and full particulars to Air Ministry Pigeons Officer, Telecommunications 1, Dept. O.A., Princes House, Kingsway, W.C.2. (Tel.: HOLborn 3434. Ext. 728).	Detain pigeon pending instructions from Air Ministry Pigeons Officer to whom metal ring particulars in full detail should be sent for identification. If, in addition to numerals and letters, the ring markings include a symbol embossed on ring, a sketch of the symbol should be sent.

From: Headquarters, Bomber Command.

To: Headquarters, Nos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Groups.

R.A.F. Stations:-

Binbrook	Horsham St. Faith	Oakington	Waddington
Coningsby	Leeming	Scampton	Wattisham
Dishforth	Lindholme	Stradishall	Watton
Doncaster	Linton-on-Ouse	Swanton Morley	West Raynham
Driffield	Marham	Swinderby	Wyton
Feltwell	Mildenhall	Syerston	Waterbeach
Hemswell	Newton	Topcliffe	Midleton St. George.
Honington			

Nos 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 27 O.T.U's.

Date: 19th May 1941.

Ref: BC/S.20768/143/Signals.

Re-transmission of intercepted Pigeon Messages.

With reference to C.C.O.52/1940, Section 2, and to this Headquarters letter of even number dated 20th March 1941, attention has been drawn to the serious delays in the re-transmission of stray or intercepted pigeon messages which result from the failure of the originator of the report to give all the essential particulars in the first place. The consequent reference back for sufficient detail to identify the origin and destination of the message entails a delay, which, in the case of a R.A.F. S.O.S. message may be attended by serious consequences.

2. The essential particulars are as follow:-

- (i) The colour of the message container itself, if of bakelite; or a description of it if it is of metal or other material.
- (ii) The colour code, if any, indicated in the screw top of the carrier, and, in the case of a R.A.F. S.O.S. Message Form 1326, in words on the message itself.
- (iii) In the case of a R.A.F. S.O.S. carrier, the outside of which is painted white, whether any message is written on the white dope on the outside of the carrier.

3. If the colour code list in Section 2 of C.C.O.52/1940 is not available at the Station originating the report, time will be saved if R.A.F. S.O.S. messages are re-transmitted immediately as follows:-

- (a) If the colour code consists of a single colour or of two colours in a CIRCLE pattern, transmit to Headquarters, Coastal Command.
- (b) If the colour code consists of two colours in a TRIANGLE pattern, transmit to Headquarters, No. 5 Group.

4. Doubtful cases should be reported to Air Ministry, Signals 1(d) or, during the night to Signals Duty Officer 1, Air Ministry, Whitehall.

5. With regard to the instructions regarding disposal of stray injured or dead Homing Pigeons, grey and green bakelite carriers are now used by the Army Pigeon Service as well as red, and should therefore be reported in the same way, i.e. to the nearest Army Formation Headquarters, or to C.S.O. Army Pigeon Service, War Office, Wing House, Piccadilly W.1. (Telephone - Regent 8131)

CENTRAL REGISTRY  
HEADQUARTERS  
No. 5  
19 MAY 1941  
5193

*[Signature]*  
Air Vice Marshal,  
Senior Air Staff Officer,  
BOMBER COMMAND.

WA

NOTES ON R.A.F. PIGEON SERVICE.

Pigeon Service was established in 5 Group as an interim measure, pending the provision of a transmitter suitable for carrying in rubber dinghies when an aircraft has been forced down into the sea. The proposal was first put forward in May, 1940. At the beginning of June, 1940 all Stations except Hemswell expressed their desire to carry pigeons. Hemswell's objection was the speed at which the Hampden sinks and difficulty of exit hampered by pigeon crate.

The general organisation of the R.A.F. Pigeon Service is as follows :-

SUPPLY. A Pigeon Supply Officer - a member of the Nation Pigeon Service - is appointed by the Air Ministry to supply the necessary birds to each R.A.F. Station. Signals Officers at Stations inform P.S.O. of daily requirements and arrange collection and return of birds. Despatch Note is prepared by P.S.O. for each consignment of birds. On return to P.S.O. of a consignment, the Station Signals Officer enters in appropriate column particulars of any liberations. A Station pigeon log book ~~was~~ also kept by Stations.

TRAINING OF BIRDS. Arranged by Station Pigeon personnel in co-operation with suppliers of birds. Transport difficulties prevent P.S.O.'s giving as much time as was originally intended to training.

PAYMENT TO P.S.O.'s. 4d per bird supplied for Service to R.A.F. Stations. No compensation is paid for birds which fail to return from operational flights.

P.S.O. TELEPHONE ACCOUNTS. Air Ministry bears cost of installation and rental of one line, and of all official calls. Bills are paid by appropriate R.A.F. unit.

ACCOMMODATION OF PIGEONS AT STATIONS. Birds are accommodated at Stations in lofts or easily constructed wooden pens, according to the buildings available. Space is also required for the storage of 1x2pigeon basket per aircraft plus 6 spare, a corn bin, drinking troughs etc.

PIGEONEER ESTABLISHMENTS. The establishment at each station carrying pigeons is 1 Corporal and 3 A.C. pigeoneers. An endeavour is being made by D. of Signals for the provision of 1 - 15 cwt lorry for the special use of the Pigeon Service at Stations. Would be used for collection, return and training of birds.

METHOD OF ACCOMMODATING BIRDS IN HAMPDENs. Baskets are provided for carrying 2 pigeons in each aircraft. Baskets are stowed amidships, near lavatory seat. Baskets have been proved unsatisfactory and experiments are now being carried out with metal containers, which prohibit ingress of water, yet allow birds to breathe.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE. A message carrier painted with the Station colour, and attached to the leg of the bird, contains S.O.S. message form 3" x 3", on which are entered aircraft No., date, time, position. On the reverse side of the form is printed instructions for action by anyone who may find the pigeon. Space on the outside of the carrier is provided, if time does not permit of the S.O.S. message form being completed, for entering the position of the aircraft only.

It was made clear, when the Pigeon Service was inaugurated, that it was only required pending the provision of dinghy transmitters. No case is known of a rescue being directly attributable to the use of pigeons. The open-work basket has been responsible, it is considered by the Air Ministry, for many failures, as wet feathers make it impossible for the birds to fly. The new metal containers will obviate this. Despite the non-success of the Service up to the present, it is considered that pigeons should continue to be carried until the dinghy transmitter is available. One successful release will compensate for the extra work involved in maintaining the Service.

1st May, 1941.

F/Lieut. *[Signature]* Sigs 1.

## Annexe 46 :

# Un vapeur anglais sonde le port de Cherbourg sans autorisation

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, 1852, A-G, n°13, Ministère des  
Affaires Etrangères, Paris.


3006

1390

Londres le 6 juillet 1854.

Don Politique

Présenté le 9<sup>me</sup> juillet



Monsieur le Ministre,

Il après la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 24 juin dernier, j'ai demandé au gouvernement de S. M. Britannique des explications sur l'étrange apparition faite dernièrement, en rade de Cherbourg, par un vapeur de guerre anglais. Lord Malmsbury vient de me transmettre en réponse copie d'une lettre de l'Amirauté, de laquelle il résulte que le capitaine du navire en question, qui venait des îles normandes et ramenait à son bord le secrétaire de l'Amirauté, a été conduit dans la rade de Cherbourg par un simple but de curiosité, et que là le temps lui a manqué pour communiquer avec nos autorités.

Monsieur le Ministre Des affaires Etrangères

maritimes ; l'Amirauté s'empresse  
d'ailleurs son regret d'une démarche  
qui a pu donner ombrage au  
Gouv<sup>t</sup> français, et empêchera  
qu'elle se renouvelle

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat  
ajoute à cette communication que  
le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique  
désapprouverait hautement tout  
officier anglais qui contreviendrait  
aux réglemens en usage en France,  
ou manquerait d'égards envers nos  
autorités

Vous trouverez ci-joint,  
Monsieur le Ministre, copie des  
deux lettres de Lord Malmsbury,  
et de l'Amirauté. J'ai aimé à  
croire que les explications qu'elle  
contient vous paraîtront  
satisfaisantes

Agreez, Monsieur le Ministre,  
l'assurance de ma haute considération

Albion

Annexe 47 :

Enquête du consul de Glasgow sur  
des pêcheurs écossais

Europe 1918-1929, Grande-Bretagne, n°1, protocole, services diplomatiques français, série Z 273 1-2-3-4, 1er juin 1918- 31 déc. 1929, Archives diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Analyse : Armateurs et pêcheurs écossais pour Terre Neuve  
Origine : Glasgow, 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1919

A la date du 12 septembre dernier, vous avez prié le Consul de France à Glasgow de vous mettre en rapports avec les armateurs ou pêcheurs pour Terre Neuve existant dans sa circonscription consulaire.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que, de l'enquête faite par notre Consul, tant à Glasgow qu'à Peterhead et à Edimbourg, en vue d'obtenir les renseignements demandés, il résulte qu'aucun bateau de pêche écossais n'opère sur les bancs de Terre-Neuve. Le manque de personnel dont souffre son consulat n'a pas permis à M. Milon de Peillon, de répondre plus tôt à la demande que vous lui avez adressée.

Pour le Consul de France à Glasgow



## Annexe 48 :

# Rapports sur le consul de Penzance

Europe 1918-1929, Grande-Bretagne, n°1, protocole, services diplomatiques français, série Z 273 1-2-3-4, 1er juin 1918- 31 déc. 1929, Archives diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL

2me Bureau B

-:-

I N F O R M A T I O N

Extraits d'un Rapport du Commandant de la  
Station de la MANCHE et de la MER DU NORD.

Cherbourg, le II Mai 1920

Relations avec les autorités et les habitants des ports visi-  
tés. *Consulats*

a) Consuls. - Courbé par la vieillesse, impotent et aveugle, s'appuyant au bras d'un neveu d'aspect misérable, tel se présente notre agent Consulaire à Penzance, Mr Edwin MATTHEWS, qui risque sa vie en montant à bord d'un bateau solidement amarré à quai. Son remplacement s'impose.

Son neveu, qu'il ne manquera point de proposer, n'a ni l'allure ni l'étoffe nécessaires pour représenter la France.

Penzance et Newlyn sont des ports très fréquentés par nos pêcheurs.

Il nous faut un Agent Consulaire actif, prévenant et parlant français. Ce sont des qualités qui manquent totalement à Mr MATTHEWS et à son neveu, et qui sont heureusement le propre de notre agent Consulaire de Plymouth, Mr LANG, chez qui nos pêcheurs sont certains de trouver toute l'aide désirable.

Notre agent Consulaire à Guernesey, Mr de CONDENHORE est un Français, Officier de réserve, Gentleman farmer, actif et de relations fort agréables.

b) Officiers et autorités anglaises: - Echange de visites à Penzance avec le Lieutenant Commander Hargreaves des Coastguards. Reçu la visite du Commander Carter Commandant le H.M.S. "TRING" garde-pêche de passage à Penzance pour quelques heures.

A Plymouth, je n'ai pas vu le Commandant en Chef de Devonport, Admiral Sir Cecil Thursby. J'ai été reçu par son Chef d'Etat-Major du grade de Commodore, et la visite m'a été rendue par un commandant.

A Guernesey, échange de visites avec le Commandant du croiseur école "CAERNARON", avec le Gouverneur de l'île Lieutenant Général Sir Kiggell ancien Chef d'Etat-Major du Général HAIG (ce Gouverneur malgré son amabilité n'est peut-être pas très francophile), avec le Baillif de l'île et le Supervisor.

Les Officiers de marine anglais avec qui j'ai eu des relations ont tous été fort aimables.

Ils m'ont paru très sincères en m'exprimant leurs regrets de voir la France dans une situation financière si précaire.

Tous proclament que la France est de toutes les nations alliées celle qui a fait les efforts les plus grands, celle qui a le plus souffert et qui a le plus contribué à la victoire. Tous disent que le Maréchal FOCH connaît mieux la mentalité allemande que Lloyd GEORGE.

Plusieurs de ces Officiers ont travaillé dans la Manche avec les nôtres, ils ont conservé un excellent souvenir de nos destroyers et de nos chalutiers. Ceux qui ont connu l'Amiral RONARC'H ont pour lui beaucoup d'affectueuse admiration.

Le Supervisor de Guernesey a attiré mon attention sur l'importation de plus en plus grande d'argent français dans les îles (il y en aurait pour plus de deux millions dans la seule île de Guernesey, d'après notre Consul). L'argent français ayant conservé son cours d'avant-guerre, la plupart des français de passage apportent tout ce qu'ils ont pu se procurer de monnaie d'argent. Une ordonnance de la Cour de Guernesey en date de 1920 (un exemplaire joint) limite à 10 francs par personne la somme tolérée, mais la perquisition est d'application difficile. Les autorités des îles souhaiteraient une surveillance au départ de France.

c) Habitants.-

Penzance: Population sympathique accueillant aimablement nos marins.

Match de football entre les National old Boys et l'équipe du "QUENTIN ROOSEVELT" qui a défendu honorablement ses couleurs par 2 buts à 5.

Les pêcheurs anglais ont suivi avec autant d'intérêt que les nôtres nos séances de cinéma.

Prêté des films patriotiques au cinamé de la ville.

Plymouth: Indifférence polie d'une grande ville pour un bateau.

Guernesey: Accueil très chaleureux. Infiltration débordant le service d'ordre. La foule qui suivait du quai nos séances de cinéma a applaudi vigoureusement à nos films de guerre.

## Annexe 49 :

# Attaques lancées sur l'ambassadeur britannique, Lord Albernon

Europe 1918-1929, Grande-Bretagne, n°11, référence A-140 Z, Direction des affaires politiques et commerciales, série Z, carton 274, dossier 5, jan. 1922 -31 déc. 1926, corps diplomatiques de Grande-Bretagne, Archives diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

P.

C.B.

N° 201.

BERLIN, le 23 janvier 1923 à 0 h. 35

reçu le 23 à 2 h. 15.

SECRET.

.....convenable de relever cette action. Lord d'Abernon ne pourra qu'en être cruellement blessé et tout ce que nous pouvons retirer d'articles semblables c'est que, par un entraînement excusable de rancune, il accentuera encore son hostilité contre nous auprès des Allemands.

D'autre part, des attaques de ce genre risquent d'amener le Gouvernement anglais, soucieux de défendre l'un de ses principaux représentants à l'étranger, à prolonger indéfiniment la mission à Berlin d'une personnalité que nous aurions un intérêt manifeste à voir disparaître ./.

MARGERIE.

DÉCHIFFREMENT

*m. Cabri*  
*m. Leyba*  
L.  
N° 200  
*201*

**FAIT LE**  
25 JANV. 1923

*cl*

**(E)**

DIRECTORAT POLITIQUE  
ET COMMERCIALE  
22 JAN 1923  
2274  
CS.

BERLIN, le 23 janvier 1923 0h.35.

reçu le 23 janvier 2h.15.

SECRET.

La "Vossische Zeitung" avait donné cet après-midi l'analyse d'un article dans lequel le "Matin", du 21 janvier prenait violemment à parti Lord d'Abornon en rappelant le rôle, si périlleux d'ailleurs pour (la Banque ottomane), qu'il a jadis joué à Constantinople en engageant cet établissement dans des affaires plus que douteuses.

Je viens de lire cet article non signé arrivé (ce soir) par la poste et je ne crois pas pouvoir dissimuler à Votre Excellence qu'il est manifestement regrettable et maladroit.

Si l'on (peut) penser que l'action exercée ici par l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre nous est défavorable et mérite notre critique, ce n'est pas sur un terrain aussi personnel qu'il est.....

MARGHERIT.

Annexe 50 :

Evaluation de l'Algérie et la Tunisie  
par le colonel Talbot

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, 1890-1891, n°54, Ministère des  
Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Traduction d'une lettre écrite par le Colonel Talbot, attaché militaire anglais, à la suite d'un voyage en Algérie et en Tunisie.

Quand je vous ai écrit la dernière fois, je vous ai informé que j'étais sur le point d'aller visiter l'Algérie et la Tunisie. Je suis maintenant de retour, ayant vu beaucoup de choses intéressantes ; mais il ne m'a pas été possible, étant donné les conditions dans lesquelles je voyageais, de voir autant de pays que j'aurais pu le faire dans d'autres conditions. Je regrette de ne pas m'être trouvé à Paris, quand a eu lieu la crise ministérielle ; mais comme S.A. était en France, vous avez été parfaitement informé de tout ce qui est arrivé, ce qui du reste pratiquement n'est d'aucune importance pour les autres puissances étrangères. Il n'est pas probable que M. de F. (sic) continue à supporter la double charge de Président du Conseil et de Ministre de la Guerre. L'abandon de cette dernière sera envisagée par beaucoup de monde et par la majeure partie de l'armée comme regrettable, car il n'y a pas de doute que pendant son administration d'importantes réformes aient été réalisées. Bien que les opinions soient très divisées en ce qui concerne la réduction du service à 3 ans, sous d'autres rapports, l'armée a fait des progrès et sa force s'est accrue. L'espèce de parti pris qu'on avait contre un ministre civil a été neutralisée par le talent avec lequel il a obtenu des Chambres les crédits nécessaires et la science pratique dont il a fait preuve au cours de son administration. J'ai été très frappé de tout ce qui a été fait pour la défense de tous les ports d'Algérie. Le principe qui a été adopté a été celui de la construction de batteries basses et du remplacement des anciennes pièces par des canons nouveau modèle de fort calibre. Alger et Bougie les deux seuls ports que j'aie visités, sont complètement organisés sur le front de mer. J'ai lieu de croire que les autres ports, Oran, Philippeville, Pène, etc, sont dans les mêmes conditions. On n'a fait que peu de chose à Tunis. On travaille seulement à creuser un profond chenal à travers la rade pour permettre aux vaisseaux de guerre de faire usage du dock, relié à une cale sèche qu'on doit construire au fond du port, près de la ville. Les docks de commerce restent donc entièrement à construire. On a fait fort peu de choses pour rendre accessible à une flotte la baie de Biserte, qui est éloignée de Tunis d'environ 20 milles. Il suffirait de creuser un canal pour utiliser cette splendide baie creusée par la nature, où toutes les flottes du monde pourraient jeter l'ancre.

Quand Biserte et Tunis seront complètement organisées, la ligne des ports utilisables depuis Tanger jusqu'à Malte sera sans égale au monde, soit pour l'attaque, soit pour la défense. En cas de guerre, notre ligne de communication avec l'Inde sera sérieusement inquiétée, sinon menacée. La position stratégique de Biserte-Tunis, qui commande le canal entre la Sicile et l'Afrique et d'où Malte est sous une constante menace, est une position à peu près égale et il est impossible de ne pas ressentir l'énorme accroissement de puissance qu'a obtenu la France quand on lui a permis de prendre virtuellement possession de Tunis.

Au point de vue exclusivement militaire, ces contrées offrent peu d'intérêt, sauf Alger et Tunis. Les deux pays sont entièrement soumis et les arabes sont écrasés. Il y a bien chez eux un sentiment profond de haine contre le dominateur, mais les circonstances ont si complètement changé depuis la dernière insurrection kabyle de 1872, qu'il n'est pas probable que, même au cas où la France se trouverait aux prises avec de sérieuses difficultés, une autre révolte puisse éclater. Tous les cheiks ou chefs de tribu ont été bannis ou sont devenus tellement français qu'ils n'ont plus maintenant aucune influence. Il y a d'autant moins de chance de voir éclater une révolte, que maintenant Tunis est à la France.

Bien que des sommes considérables aient été sacrifiées en Algérie, la colonie ne progresse pas. A chaque instant, on entend des plaintes et des récriminations au sujet de l'administration française. Il est de fait que les Français ne sont pas administrateurs. Tout le travail est fait par les Italiens, les Maltais ou les Espagnols. La plupart des capitaux sont fournis par des Français ou des Anglais. Bien que ces derniers ne soient pas nombreux, ceux qui sont fixés dans la colonie, semblent être dans une plus grande prospérité que les Français. Beaucoup de vaisseaux fréquentent l'Algérie. La colonie a un grand développement de chemins de fer ; en dépit de tous les sacrifices, elle ne progresse pas, comme elle le devrait. Les sacrifices faits pour la Tunisie sont plus modestes. J'ai eu l'occasion de voir les spahis (la cavalerie indigène). C'est une fort belle troupe.

On entend plus parler de Boulanger à Alger qu'à Paris. Bien que son nom y soit prononcé avec plus de respect, c'est moins pour le nom lui-même parce qu'il représente tous les sujets de mécontentement contre le gouvernement.

Note de service : on n'a pas pu retrouver la date exacte à laquelle la lettre a été écrite, ni le nom du destinataire. Le voyage du Colonel Talbot a fait l'objet de deux communications, qui portent les dates du 28 février et du 2 mars 1890. Le Colonel Talbot fait en ce moment un voyage en Corse.



Annexe 51 :

Rapport du capitaine de frégate  
Blanpré

1BB 1-51: Attaché naval à Londres, correspondance, compte rendus de renseignements, presse 1920-1940, Sous-série 1BB7 : attachés navals, missions navals, marines étrangères 1918-1940, Archives du Service de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

Archives du 2<sup>ème</sup> Bureau

Ambassade de France à Londres,  
Attaché Naval  
No. 185

Londres, le 4 mai 1920

Le Capitaine de Frégate de Blanpré, Attaché naval à Londres  
A Monsieur le Ministre de la Marine  
Situation Générale

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, ci-joint, un rapport que je vous adresserai dorénavant tous les mois sur la situation générale. J'y joins quelques fiches de renseignements sur la Marine anglaise.

Forces navales

Navires pour le Chili

Contrairement à des indications données antérieurement le Chili n'achètera pas pour le moment d'autres navires que le « CANADA » et les trois destroyers pour remplacer les navires réquisitionnés au début de la guerre. Des équipages vont être envoyés du Chili et l'amiral Gomez pense pouvoir partir en Septembre prochain avec le « CANADA ».

Le croiseur léger « CHATHAM » a été offert à la Nouvelle Zélande.

L'Amirauté vient de démobiliser définitivement la Section des Chalutiers de la Réserve qui avait été conservée en armement pour les opérations de dragages de mines. Les chalutiers vont être remis en état et rendus à leurs propriétaires. Le budget prévoit cependant le maintien d'une organisation squelette.

### Matériel non militaire (Angleterre)

#### Charbon

Aucune amélioration de la situation. L'exportation est pratiquement arrêtée sauf pour des charbons de qualité inférieure. Ces conditions proviennent non-seulement de l'insuffisance d'extraction, mais aussi des mauvaises conditions de l'extraction amenant une perte d'environ 25% dans son utilisation.

#### Navires à moteur

Les chantiers Harland et Wolff ont lancé le « Glenogle » de 14 000 tonnes de portée en lourd destiné au trafic avec l'Extrême-Orient. 4 bâtiments semblables sont destinés à la Glen Line. Ils seront munis de machines Diesel de 3200 chevaux, à 8 cylindres et tournant à 115 tours.

D'autres bâtiments à moteur actuellement en construction sont le « Glentars », le « Glenluce », le « Marragansett » et le « Fullagar ». La coque de ce dernier bâtiment est assemblée à la soudure électrique. D'une façon générale la tendance à construire des bâtiments à moteur est en progrès.

L'emploi des moteurs à combustion interne se généralise de plus en plus sur les navires de pêche.

Annexe 52 :

Critique française de la gestion de  
l'Irlande par les Britanniques

Europe 1918-1929, Grande Bretagne, n°1, protocole, services diplomatiques français, série Z 273 1-2-3-4, 1er juin 1918- 31 déc. 1929, Archives diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

Télégramme de A. de Fleuriau du 13 octobre 1920 critiquant la politique de représailles des *Black and Tans* en Irlande soutenue par le gouvernement de Lloyd George.

Affaires Etrangères

En clair

N°766

Londres, le 13 octobre 1920

Reçu par courrier le 14 à 9h30

La situation infiniment grave de l'Irlande a provoqué, ces jours derniers, toute une série de déclarations publiques de la part d'Anglais importants parmi lesquels Lord Grey et M. Asquith. M. Lloyd George leur a répondu, le 9 de ce mois, par un discours où il a commis l'imprudance de se prononcer en faveur du système des représailles.

Les représailles en Irlande sont les actes de vengeance des soldats ou policiers anglais exaspérés par les attentats des Sinn Feiners. Depuis déjà longtemps, les nationalistes irlandais accusaient la police de se livrer à des assassinats et à des incendies. Le fait est aujourd'hui avéré. Une association secrète, dite des « Noirs et Tannés » se charge d'organiser les représailles et de répondre aux crimes des Sinn Feiners par d'autres actes semblables.

C'est ce système que le Premier Ministre britannique a eu l'audace d'approuver dans son discours de Carnavon et on pourrait déduire de son discours à son dessein de déchaîner une guerre religieuse en Irlande. Déjà l'Archevêque de Canterbury et les principaux Ministres dissidents se sont élevés contre la morale de M. Lloyd George et l'opinion semble défavorable au Premier Ministre. Celui-ci pourrait, d'autre part, voir renaître la crise de l'industrie charbonnière. Les mineurs ne paraissent pas vouloir suivre les avis de leurs chefs et accepter les offres faites par les patrons après intervention du Premier Ministre. L'état réel de la question ne sera toutefois pas connu avant quelques jours.

A. De Fleuriau

Copie

M. Paul Gambon, Ambassadeur de la République Française à Londres

A M. Pichon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Londres, le 26 juillet 1919.

N°529.

Affaires d'Irlande ;

J'ai eu l'occasion de signaler précédemment à V. Ike, l'effet produit sur l'opinion publique de ce pays par le récent discours de Sir Edward Carson dans l'Ulster.

En replaçant brusquement le Gouvernement en face des difficultés irlandaises, le leader orangiste a obligé les représentants du Cabinet à faire des déclarations devant les Chambres. Elles ont d'ailleurs été sensiblement différentes. Aux Communes, M. Bonar Law se déclara hors d'état de donner des renseignements sur les mesures qui seraient appliquées à l'Irlande. Cette réponse parut insuffisante. Quelques jours après, le Lord Chancelier assurait à la Chambre haute que le cabinet prendrait rapidement une décision au sujet du futur régime irlandais.

Les affaires d'Irlande ont toujours été une des principales préoccupations du Parlement. Les intéressés n'ont d'ailleurs pas lieu de s'en féliciter.

Quoiqu'il en soit, et malgré les préoccupations beaucoup plus immédiates que causent actuellement aux Anglais leurs difficultés économiques et sociales, les Députés, qu'ils soient Unionistes Nationalistes ou Libéraux, se demandent avec une certaine inquiétude si la série des maladroites et des froissements imputables aux administrations de Londres et de Dublin va continuer. Les rapports de M. Blanche tiennent votre Exc. Informée de leurs conséquences.

Le Gouvernement sait donc qu'il ne pourra se dérober indéfiniment à une explication. M. Lloyd George fait maintenant annoncer que ses idées se sont fixées sur la politique à suivre en Irlande. Lundi, une question lui sera posée à ce sujet. La réponse du Premier Ministre fera connaître aux Chambres s'il estime possible d'aborder un débat sur les affaires irlandaises avant les vacances parlementaires.

## Annexe 53 :

# Extrait intitulé : « Irish-Crime: Official Record of Sinn Féin Outrages »

1BB 1-51: Attaché naval à Londres, correspondance, compte rendus de renseignements, presse 1920-1940, Sous-série 1BB7 : attachés navals, missions navals, marines étrangères 1918-1940, Archives du Service de la Défense, Château de Vincennes, Paris.

## IRISH CRIME.

### Official Record of Sinn Fein Outrages.

1,500 IN 44 MONTHS.

### Why No Martial Law.

An official return just issued from the Chief Secretary's Office, Dublin Castle, shows that between May 1, 1916, and December 31 last, 1,529 outrages were attributed to the Sinn Fein movement—134 in Ulster, 429 in Leinster (including the Dublin Metropolitan area), 205 in Connaught, and 761 in Munster. The nature of these crimes is shown by the following table:

Murders of military, police, and officials .....	18
Murders of civilians .....	2
Firing at police .....	50
Firing at military .....	13
Firing at civilians .....	14
Assaults on police .....	46
Assaults on civilians .....	17
Raids, &c., for arms on police .....	20
Raids, &c., for arms on military .....	67
Raids, &c., for arms on civilians .....	502
Incendiary fires .....	70
Injury to property .....	279
Firing into police dwellings .....	3
Firing into civilian dwellings .....	38
Threatening letters .....	180
Miscellaneous .....	210

The latest bi-weekly summary of outrages, up to January 20, comprehends twelve cases. On the 18th inst., the Holy-cross Police Barrack was attacked by armed men, who riddled the windows and exploded a bomb under the gable. The

Raids, &c., for arms on military .....	67
Raids, &c., for arms on civilians .....	502
Incendiary fires .....	70
Injury to property .....	279
Firing into police dwellings .....	3
Firing into civilian dwellings .....	38
Threatening letters .....	180
Miscellaneous .....	210

The latest bi-weekly summary of outrages, up to January 20, comprehends twelve cases. On the 18th inst., the Holy-cross Police Barrack was attacked by armed men, who riddled the windows and exploded a bomb under the gable. The police replied to the fire, and the raiders did not succeed in entering. None of the police was injured.

In Navan district, County Meath, 30 cattle and 10 sheep were driven off grazing land by 15 men carrying sticks. When ordered by the police to do so the men dispersed. They said they were acting under the orders of the "Back to the Land League." The four ringleaders were committed to gaol for a month.

#### RAID ON A DANCE.

On the 17th inst. the Parochial Hall of Listowel, County Kerry, where a dance was in progress, was raided by about a dozen masked men, who fired a shot through the ceiling. The raiders ordered the guests to clear out. This they refused to do. As the dance was organised by respectable people of all classes the raid is attributed to blackguardism and spite.

A double-barrelled shot gun and twenty cartridges were on the 18th inst. taken from a locked office in the Marquess of Ormonde's garden at Kilkenny. A sum of £15 lying on the table was not touched. At Bandon, on the 14th, three houses were raided by a score of disguised men, in a search for arms. None of the Sinn Feiners was identified. On the 13th at Tuam four shots were fired outside the house of a publican, who had allowed the police to take sand from his pit to fill bags for the defence of their barracks.

# Annexe 54 :

## Les missions de l'attaché naval

Affaires diverses politiques, Angleterre, 1890-1891, n°54, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.



Absolument confidentiel

Traduction du Mémorandum (Confidentiel)

Ci-après les points principaux sur lesquels doit se porter l'attention du nouvel attaché, pour le moment, il devra plus spécialement faire porter ses recherches sur les matières qui font l'objet des paragraphes 1, 2, 3 et 6.

-----

- 1- Obtenir des informations sur les vaisseaux de divers types appartenant aux différentes puissances, construits ou armés, ou qui sont en réserve.
- 2- Rendre compte de leur état d'entretien ou du degré d'avancement des travaux, et des traits caractéristiques de leur mode de construction et de leur armement.
- 3- Obtenir et fournir des informations sur les projets des différents gouvernements, en ce qui concerne la mise sur chantiers de nouveaux vaisseaux, l'armement de vaisseaux ou d'escadres.
- 4- Faire des rapports sur la ligne de conduite générale (au point de vue naval), et sur les sacrifices que s'imposent les différents gouvernements.
- 5- Se procurer et fournir des détails sur les inventions ou expériences récentes concernant la construction et l'armement, plus spécialement les torpilles.
- 6- Fournir les informations les plus récentes et les plus dignes de confiance, sur la disposition et les mouvements des vaisseaux et escadres.
- 7- Fournir des informations sur les défenses des ports.
- 8- Attirer l'attention sur les importantes informations qui peuvent éventuellement être contenues dans les journaux étrangers et dans les publications navales. Envoyer copie de ces documents à l'Amirauté par l'intermédiaire du Représentant diplomatique de sa Majesté auprès de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle le nouvel Attaché se trouvera momentanément.
- 9- Télégraphier toutes les nouvelles urgentes en chiffres, en se servant du « Army and Navy Signal Book » qui se trouve dans toutes les Ambassades et tous les Consuls.
- 10- Communiquer par le même moyen, si c'est nécessaire, avec l'Amirauté et le Foreign Office
- 11- Faire parvenir tous les rapports par les Ambassades, en adressant directement des duplicata à l'Amirauté, en cas d'urgence.