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Migrations et diaspora : Expérience des Chrétiens palestiniens en Jordanie et aux États-Unis

JURY

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RESUME EN FRANCAIS

• Introduction

Pourquoi les Chrétiens migrent-ils de Palestine ? Peut-on considérer leur migration comme sectaire plutôt communautaire ? Est-elle la manifestation de sentiments patriotiques « fragiles », ou d'un détachement progressif de l'arabisme et de l'Orient ? Ces questions, entre autres, font de la migration des Chrétiens palestiniens un objet d'étude important des chercheurs ces dernières années. Pourtant il existe encore peu de travaux sur cette problématique.

La migration des Chrétiens palestiniens est liée à une composante fondamentale de la société palestinienne. Bien que la migration ait aidé les Chrétiens palestiniens à résoudre certains de leurs problèmes, en particulier sur le plan économique, elle a aussi accentué leur situation de minorité numérique, ce qui a fait que leur nombre diminue, et leur rôle dans leur pays d'origine est moindre. À l'appui de ces constats, cette étude tente de fournir une contribution géographique et sociologique au thème de la migration et de la diaspora des Chrétiens palestiniens.

Selon les statistiques démographiques, le total des Chrétiens palestiniens dans le monde s'élève à 20% (2 280 000 personnes) sur un total de 11 400 000 Palestiniens. Environ 200 000 Chrétiens palestiniens continuent de vivre en Palestine historique, tandis que les autres sont dans la diaspora. Parmi les pays de dispersion des Palestiniens dans le monde, la Jordanie et les États-Unis ont été identifiés pour cette étude. Le choix des deux pays repose sur des bases démographiques, géographiques et culturelles.

En Jordanie, les Palestiniens représentent environ 60% de la population totale en Jordanie, 70 à 80% d'entre eux sont concentrés dans le gouvernorat d'Amman et al-Zarqa et dans les banlieues. Quant aux Chrétiens, ils sont environ 239 003 personnes (3,68% de la population totale en Jordanie), dont environ 157 541 (65,71%) Chrétiens d'origine jordanienne et 81 962 (34,29%) Chrétiens d'origine palestinienne. La deuxième zone d'étude était les États-Unis, qui comptent de 200 000 à 250 000 Palestiniens dans tout le pays. La Californie est l'État qui en accueille le plus. Il compte environ 19 000 Palestiniens, principalement basés à Los Angeles et dans la baie de San Francisco.

En outre, les Chrétiens palestiniens partagent les mêmes croyances religieuses que l'Occident et la même culture et l'histoire que l'Est. D'autre part, les deux régions (la Jordanie et les États-Unis) ont des similitudes qui ont joué un rôle de premier plan dans le processus de sélection. Représentée par la capitale, Amman, la société jordanienne est une juxtaposition de groupes des migrants. Non seulement elle est composée de Jordaniens, mais également de Palestiniens, d'Irakiens, de Syriens et d'Égyptiens. Il en va de même pour la Californie, qui est une société essentiellement composée des migrants italiens, espagnols, mexicains, philippins et arabes. En outre, le statut juridique des Palestiniens dans les deux sociétés est semblable à celui de leur naturalisation.

Bien que cette étude soit géographique et sociologique, la nature du thème – la migration et la diaspora – nous a conduits à utiliser plusieurs méthodologies et outils de recherche ancrés en sciences humaines et sociales. Les méthodologies s'appuient sur l'analyse archives, mais aussi des entretiens, des questionnaires, des photographies et des observations sur le terrain.

Nous avons d'abord dépouillé des archives, en particulier des archives statistiques. Cette étape a été décisive car elle a permis de mettre en évidence l'importance du phénomène de migration des Chrétiens palestiniens, ce qui justifie ce choix comme sujet d'étude. De plus, les archives se sont révélées riches en documents publiés par des institutions, en particulier ecclésiastiques et nationales palestiniennes, auxquels il faut ajouter des bulletins et rapports publiés par les clubs de la diaspora.

Des entretiens ont été menés avec des personnes individuelles et des familles de la diaspora. Chaque entretien peut être divisé en deux parties. La première partie est narrative. La famille, surtout les parents, ont raconté leur histoire de migration. Ils ont mis en évidence les raisons et les mécanismes de la migration ainsi que les chemins qu'ils avaient suivis jusqu'à leur lieu de vie actuel. D'autres membres de la famille d'un migrant, comme les frères, les sœurs et les oncles, ont également été impliqués dans la narration. La deuxième partie de chaque entretien est cadré par un questionnaire pré-planifié. Les réponses sont données par le père et parfois par la mère (migrants de première génération). Dans certains cas, un migrant de deuxième génération a répondu aux questions. Le questionnaire se compose de trois sections : les réseaux, la diaspora et les identités.

Ainsi, l'échantillon de l'étude se devait d'être choisi et inclusif, correspondant à cent douze migrants à parts égales entre Amman et la baie de San Francisco. Nous avons aussi présenté différents cas de familles dans les deux pays. En outre, plus de cinquante entretiens ont été menés avec des universitaires, des clercs, des politiciens, des maires, des responsables d'associations et de clubs ou leurs représentants à San Francisco, Amman et dans les territoires palestiniens occupés.

Les données ont été analysées en utilisant plusieurs méthodes. Certaines données ont été présentées sous la forme de cartes conçues par les SIG, tandis que d'autres se présentaient sous la forme de tableaux statistiques et de formats (graphes) conçus par Excel et SPSS. Quelques pièces supplémentaires complètent ces données afin de présenter diverses expériences de diaspora. En outre, nous avons pris quelques photos pendant le travail sur le terrain à des fins de documentation et de crédibilité. Dans certains cas, nous avons utilisé des photos qui avaient été prises par des institutions.

Il est à noter que le travail de terrain s'est étalé sur six mois : deux mois (1 mars 2015 - 1er mai 2015) dans la baie de San Francisco, deux mois (1 juin 2015 - 1er août 2015) à Amman, et deux mois en Palestine.

- **Les différentes parties**

La première partie présente l'expérience de la migration des Chrétiens palestiniens en Jordanie (Amman) et aux États-Unis (Baie de San Francisco). Cette partie se concentre sur les causes, les voies et les mécanismes de la migration. Nous y présentons les différents motifs de migration, qui peuvent être politiques, économiques et sociaux. Nous analysons les changements de la migration palestinienne en général et le rôle des migrations transfrontalières, en particulier dans le changement du statut juridique des migrants palestiniens. En outre, le rôle des réseaux familiaux dans l'accroissement de la migration est étudié dans cette partie, dans la mesure où de nombreuses familles se sont concentrées dans la diaspora.

La deuxième partie porte sur le thème de la diaspora. Elle décrit les communautés que les migrants ont formées à la suite de leur migration dans la diaspora et aborde leurs transformations. Ensuite, nous traitons des familles de la diaspora et de la façon dont leur statut de diaspora était lié

à leur statut juridique et à leurs droits de citoyenneté. Sont également analysés la nature des relations entre les membres de la famille dans la diaspora et leur avenir, avec la présentation de quatre modèles de familles de diaspora. Enfin ce chapitre interroge le sens de la diaspora.

La partie trois aborde les réseaux des migrants dans les pays d'immigration, à savoir la Jordanie et les États-Unis. Il s'agit d'abord de montrer l'importance des réseaux sociaux, religieux, culturels, politiques et nationaux qui prennent la forme de clubs, d'associations, d'institutions et d'églises. Les migrants réalisent diverses activités destinées à maintenir un certain niveau de relations entre migrants d'une part et entre les migrants et leur pays d'origine d'autre part. Le chapitre présente également des réseaux économiques transnationaux qui ont été mis en place par certains hommes d'affaires de la diaspora pour le développement de leur pays d'origine. Il est nécessaire de souligner le thème du franchissement des frontières transnationales dans ce chapitre. En traversant les frontières transnationales, les migrants expriment leur loyauté sociale, familiale, économique et religieuse. La partie traite enfin du rôle de l'évolution technologique des médias sociaux dans la construction de liens entre les migrants et leur patrie.

La dernière partie porte sur l'identité. Compte tenu de la complexité de ce sujet, certains thèmes pertinents liés à l'identité des Palestiniens de la diaspora ont été sélectionnés pour l'étude. L'un de ces thèmes est l'endogamie des migrants palestiniens. L'étude tente d'explorer comment le mariage de migrants palestiniens, partageant la même origine et la même religion, est un moyen de préserver leur identité culturelle et leur patrimoine dans la diaspora. Le chapitre traite aussi du rôle des églises et des institutions religieuses dans la sauvegarde de l'identité religieuse et nationale aux niveaux local, régional et mondial. Il analyse l'identité politique des migrants, en soulignant comment ils participent à la vie politique dans les sociétés de la diaspora, et au même temps nourrissent un sentiment d'attachement à leur pays d'origine. Le dernier chapitre de cette partie présente les identités des migrants, en particulier comment cette identification est liée au degré d'intégration des migrants dans la diaspora.

• Principaux résultats

- Malgré l'expansion et le développement des migrations mondiales et transnationales, les Palestiniens sont toujours déplacés de force de leur pays d'origine. Les migrations palestiniennes

et les destinations migratoires ont été largement affectées par les événements politiques dans leur pays d'origine (et dans la région). Cela signifie que les migrants palestiniens ont vécu plus qu'une expérience des migrations forcées. Les résultats des entretiens montrent que 71,8% des familles se sont installées en Jordanie, et 20,6% aux États-Unis ont migré à la suite des guerres et des troubles politiques.

- Les traces de la migration forcée des migrants se manifestent par deux tendances. La première concerne les Palestiniens qui avaient été déplacés de force de leur ville natale à la suite des guerres de 1948 et de 1967. Ils se sont initialement installés en Cisjordanie ou en Jordanie à titre temporaire avant de migrer aux États-Unis. Leur migration a été facilitée par les réseaux familiaux américains. La deuxième tendance est liée aux Palestiniens qui sont partis (volontairement) dans les pays arabes voisins, comme le Liban, les pays du Golfe arabe, l'Arabie Saoudite et l'Irak. Au début, ils ont été forcés de migrer en Jordanie. Leur mobilité a été facilitée par deux facteurs : la disponibilité des réseaux familiaux à travers la Jordanie et l'obtention par les migrants de la citoyenneté jordanienne (ils ont pu s'installer légalement en Jordanie grâce à leur citoyenneté jordanienne acquise).

- En ce qui concerne les migrations économiques, les données obtenues auprès des migrants indiquent que 16,2% d'entre eux se sont installés en Jordanie et 12,5% aux États-Unis à la recherche de possibilités d'emploi. D'autre part, bien que les pays arabes du Golfe offrent du travail, la migration vers ces pays est temporaire. En effet, lorsque les contrats d'emploi des migrants expirent ou qu'ils atteignent l'âge de la retraite, ils ne peuvent pas rester dans le pays du Golfe (hôte) parce qu'ils n'ont aucun statut juridique (nationalité).

- L'Ouest reste une destination choisie pour l'enseignement supérieur et spécialisé. 17,3% des migrants palestiniens ont en effet voyagé aux États-Unis et 2,3% en Jordanie avec cet objectif. Il convient de noter que 11,6% des migrants ont atteint l'enseignement supérieur dans les pays arabes voisins, en particulier au Liban et en Irak, ce qui représente moins que les migrants de deuxième génération (nés en diaspora) qui ont également poursuivi l'enseignement supérieur dans les pays de migration.

- Après leurs études aux États-Unis, les migrants s'y sont installés et ont créé leurs entreprises. Ils sont devenus des centres de gravité qui ont encouragé l'immigration d'autres membres des mêmes familles et parents. Cela vaut également pour les migrants palestiniens qui ont poursuivi leurs études en Jordanie. En revanche, les Palestiniens qui ont poursuivi leurs études dans les pays arabes voisins sont pour la plupart revenus et se sont installés en Jordanie depuis qu'ils détiennent la nationalité jordanienne.

- les migrants pratiquent la culture de la migration, par des visites à leurs proches en diaspora et des contacts fréquents avec eux. Selon les données fournies par les migrants, 21,1% ont migré aux États-Unis en particulier pour se marier, 9,6% pour rejoindre des membres immigrés de leur famille et 7,6% en raison de la jalousie émise par d'autres migrants. En revanche, les migrants en Jordanie n'ont pas indiqué que leur migration était motivée par une de ces raisons.

- La marée intellectuelle et la politique de l'islamisation ont eu un impact évident sur la vie sociale dans le monde arabe. Ce phénomène s'est manifesté par la montée du mouvement des frères musulmans en Égypte, la révolution iranienne de l'ayatollah Khomeiny en 1979, la montée des partis salafistes et le wahhabisme en Arabie Saoudite ainsi que la montée du Mouvement du Hamas et du Jihad islamique dans la rive ouest et la bande de Gaza. Avec l'activisme accru de ces partis, certains Chrétiens se sont inquiétés de l'existence d'impacts négatifs sur leur existence dans leur pays d'origine. D'autres ont peut-être eu un sentiment de déception dans la mesure où ils percevaient un tel activisme comme une marginalisation de leur existence et de leur rôle. Ainsi, environ 2,3% des Chrétiens sont passés de la Cisjordanie vers les États-Unis et 9,3% de l'Arabie saoudite et du Koweït vers la Jordanie.

- La réalisation d'entretiens avec des familles palestiniennes immigrées en Jordanie montrent que les Chrétiens palestiniens vivaient plus fréquemment au sein de quartiers pauvres (bidonvilles) ressemblant à des camps de réfugiés mais n'étant pas officiellement reconnus comme tels. Ces zones étaient situées à proximité de couvents, d'églises ou d'institutions religieuses. Par exemple, ces zones se trouvaient à proximité de l'église catholique romaine de Jabal Misdar ainsi que de l'hôpital italien et de l'église grecque orthodoxe de Jabal al-Ashrafiya. De telles « zones de pauvreté » étaient également situées à proximité de la rue al-Mahatta, de la rue al-Mutran et de la rue Khirfan à Jabal Amman. En raison de leur naturalisation, de l'occupation israélienne de la

Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza, il est devenu évident pour les Palestiniens qu'il leur serait difficile de retourner vivre dans leur pays d'origine. Par conséquent, ils ont envisagé la construction de maisons afin de s'installer en Jordanie. Ces nouvelles zones ou quartiers prennent la forme de bâtiments et de villas. Non seulement les Palestiniens résident dans ces régions, mais les Jordaniens, les Irakiens et les migrants du Golfe y résident également : comme par exemple les quartiers de Shmeisani, Tlaa' El-'Ali, Sweifieh, al-'Abdali et Abdoun.

- En ce qui concerne la baie de San Francisco sur la côte ouest des États-Unis, les entretiens effectués avec des familles des migrants montrent que les premiers d'entre eux résidaient dès 1920 dans différents quartiers à travers le district de San Francisco. Il y avait des communautés des migrants arabes, comme la zone Tenderloin dans le quartier des affaires. Il y avait aussi des communautés des migrants palestiniens, établies notamment par des familles originaires de Ramallah, la plus importante étant dans le district de Sunset. Ces zones sont proches du quartier d'affaire de la ville. Entre 1934 et 1941, les migrants se sont installés dans la communauté de Daly City, à Westlake. De nos jours un grand nombre de migrants palestiniens sont installés dans cette communauté qui représente l'une des plus grandes communautés planifiées, où se trouvent des logements fédéraux. Vers 1960, les migrants ont également commencé à s'installer dans d'autres régions, surtout la zone autour de la rue Ocean de San Francisco, où se trouve le Club de Ramallah. Toutefois, ils ont ensuite déménagé dans d'autres villes, au sud de San Francisco, comme San Bruno, Millbrae, Foster City, Belmont, San José, San Mateo et Redwood City, car ces zones possèdent un climat agréable (vers le sud, un meilleur cadre de vie, et sont reconnues pour être plus calmes).

- Les entretiens réalisés avec les familles des migrants montrent que des différences existent dans la diaspora si l'on se réfère à leur date de migration et de l'expérience de chaque membre dans la diaspora. L'analyse des entretiens a fait émerger divers modèles familiaux dans la diaspora. À l'appui de ces modèles familiaux dispersés, on peut supposer que la nature des relations entre les membres de la famille des migrants, et les relations et les situations futures vont être difficile. Il est important de noter que la famille comprend les parents (père et mère) et les frères et sœurs (c'est-à-dire les migrants de première génération). Des familles étaient dans les pays étrangers de la diaspora en Amérique du Nord et en Amérique du Sud. D'autres étaient réparties dans trois

différents espaces : pays d'origine, États arabes et États étrangers (non- arabes). D'autres encore se répartissaient dans la diaspora et l'autre moitié des familles dans le pays d'origine. Enfin le reste des familles se localisaient dans les pays arabes.

- Le sens de la diaspora est sujet à plusieurs changements qui résultent de l'intégration d'un migrant dans une nouvelle société ainsi que des politiques d'absorption des migrants appliquées par les pays hôtes et les pays de la diaspora. On a demandé aux répondants migrants s'ils connaissaient un sentiment de dispersion. Les réponses recueillies sont les suivantes : 66,1% des migrants en Jordanie et 78,6% des migrants aux Etats-Unis ont répondu « Non », alors que 21,4% des migrants en Jordanie et 33% des migrants aux Etats-Unis ont répondu « Oui ». La géographie (c'est-à-dire la proximité ou l'éloignement du pays d'origine) n'a apparemment pas joué un rôle dans le maintien ou l'intensification du sens de la diaspora. Cela signifie que le sentiment de dispersion est lié à la confiance en la stabilité du pays hôte, confiance elle-même corrélée aux politiques de ces pays hôtes. Les Palestiniens ont obtenu la citoyenneté dans de tels pays, à savoir les États-Unis et la Jordanie.

- L'ensemble des relations a contribué à la création de structures de réseaux. Ce sont des structures de réseau familial, confessionnel, national et régional (ainsi que) de nombreuses institutions dédiées à la préservation de l'identité dans la diaspora palestinienne, telles que le club de Ramallah, l'association d'Al-Qudus (Jérusalem), l'Eglise orthodoxe de Saint George, l'association de la famille Al-Khoury - Aboud, l'Organisation palestinienne la jeunesse, ou encore les écoles orthodoxes nationales. En conséquence, il existe deux modèles de relation entre les Palestiniens de la diaspora et le pays d'origine : le modèle des États arabes (Jordanie) prenant la forme d'associations faibles mais de réseaux robustes et le modèle des États libéraux, prenant au contraire la forme d'associations robustes mais de réseaux faibles.

- Il est important de noter que 12,5% des hommes d'affaires palestiniens de l'échantillon de l'étude sont basés aux États-Unis et en Jordanie. En observant les modèles des investissements transnationaux palestiniens, on peut conclure que les cibles de l'investissement transnational sont diversifiées. Elle comprend des investissements commerciaux, industriels, de services et technologiques, mais les investissements restent faibles.

- Selon les résultats statistiques, 59% des Palestiniens en Jordanie sont des transmigrants actifs qui traversent les frontières nationales, contre 57% de citoyens américains d'origine palestinienne. En observant la fréquence du passage frontalier transnational par an, nous constatons que les Palestiniens jordaniens sont plus actifs, puisque 27% d'entre eux traversent les frontières au moins une fois par an, tandis que le pourcentage est de 19,6% pour leurs homologues américains. Les transmigrants peu fréquents - ceux qui ont traversé les frontières une fois au cours des dix dernières années ou une fois au cours des vingt dernières années - constituent 15,7% des Palestiniens en Jordanie et 14,2% des Palestiniens aux États-Unis. Ces migrants ont été poussés à traverser les frontières pour des questions prioritaires, comme des urgences familiales par exemple (type maladie ou décès). En outre, les migrants qui n'ont pas franchi les frontières depuis leur première migration, et les migrants revenus une seule fois au cours des trente ou quarante dernières années, représentent 25,2% des Palestiniens en Jordanie et 28,6% des Palestiniens aux États-Unis. Cette migration non active s'explique par plusieurs raisons, y compris les questions juridiques liées à la nationalité.

- Le mariage d'une migrante palestinienne avec un conjoint au même profil représente une stratégie qui leur permet de reconstruire leur famille dans la diaspora d'une part et de maintenir leur identité d'autre part. Selon les résultats des travaux sur le terrain, le mariage entre des Palestiniens ou des Jordaniens avec des racines palestiniennes (nés en Jordanie) concerne 94,6% des migrants de la première génération et 73,3% des migrants de la deuxième génération, alors que le mariage entre des Palestiniens ou des Américains avec des racines palestiniennes (nés aux États-Unis) s'élève à 92,3% pour la première génération et 63,8% pour le deuxième. Les mariages des migrants palestiniens avec des conjoints palestiniens ayant le même passé sont un moyen de préserver la culture et le patrimoine (autochtones) originaux en tant que piliers de l'identité palestinienne qui pourrait être transmis et enseigné à la génération des enfants.

- Les migrants des Chrétiens palestiniens en Jordanie appartenaient à des partis nationalistes tels que le Parti Socialiste Nassérite et le Parti Socialiste Ba'ath. En raison du Septembre Noir de 1970 et après le désengagement de la Jordanie de la Cisjordanie en 1988, les Palestiniens ont rejoint de nouveaux partis politiques. Ils émanaient de partis de gauche précédents, à savoir le Parti

démocratique populaire jordanien, le Parti démocratique populaire jordanien, le Parti communiste jordanien, le Parti de la réforme et du renouveau, le Parti Al-Resalah, et le Parti jordanien Al-Hayat. À la suite de la politique menée en Jordanie, en particulier après le désengagement de la Jordanie de la Cisjordanie, les Jordaniens d'origine palestinienne n'ont pas pu tenir un rôle politique de poids. Par exemple, ils ont été privés de postes clés tel que ceux de chef du service de sécurité publique, de chef du service de renseignement ou de tout autre poste stratégique dans l'armée ou dans les médias. En outre, le fait que les Chrétiens (les Palestiniens et les Jordaniens) de Jordanie reçoivent un faible nombre de sièges parlementaires montre qu'ils sont traités comme une minorité.

- les partis politiques palestiniens sont devenus actifs aux États-Unis. Par exemple, le PFLP et le DFLP ont établi des succursales aux États-Unis. Ils entretenaient des relations directes avec les partis homologues du pays d'origine, du Liban et de la Jordanie. Les Palestiniens ont connu un retard dans leur activité politique aux États-Unis. Ils se sont alliés avec des partis politiques soutenant la cause palestinienne, dont le premier était le Parti communiste dans les années 1980. Cependant, le parti communiste était effectivement faible par rapport aux grands partis républicain et démocrate. L'attaque terroriste du 11 septembre a eu un impact sur l'existence, les intérêts et les sentiments des migrants arabes et les a contraints à s'engager dans la politique américaine en votant et en se présentant aux élections. En ce qui concerne la participation arabe, palestinienne et chrétienne aux élections américaines, très peu de Palestiniens en général ont occupé des positions politiques élevées, que ce soit en tant que parlementaires ou maires, dans la société américaine. Néanmoins, l'engagement des Chrétiens arabes ou palestiniens dans la société et la politique américaines a été mieux accueilli par la société américaine que l'engagement de leurs homologues musulmans, quoique dans des proportions variables.

- On ne peut nier que les Églises arabes (les Églises qui ont été établies par les migrants arabes utilisent la langue arabe dans ses rites orientaux) ont été établies dans la diaspora afin de préserver l'identité chrétienne du Moyen-Orient et de relier les migrants les uns aux autres sur une base ethnique et linguistique. Cependant, dans les années 1980, particulièrement après la première insurrection populaire (intifada), les églises locales représentées par les églises de Jérusalem ont connu une «renaissance nationale». Cette renaissance a eu un impact direct sur l'identité des Églises

de la diaspora, ce qui a provoqué la création d'Églises qui appartiennent directement aux Églises de Jérusalem et dirigées par le clergé d'origine palestinienne (ou jordanienne) à travers les États-Unis. Cela implique que l'identité de l'Église dans la diaspora est une partie de l'identité de l'église locale dans le pays d'origine. On comprend que la connexion des migrants et des réfugiés aux lieux saints (Chrétiens), qui font partie de la Palestine historique, exprime la relation étroite entre l'identité religieuse et l'identité nationale. Ce statut est peut-être restreint au cas palestinien et n'a pas de cas similaire dans la diaspora.

- L'identité des Palestiniens dans la diaspora est un sujet sensible à bien des égards. Tout d'abord, l'identité évolue et varie constamment. Ensuite, l'identité des Palestiniens dans la diaspora est affectée par le degré d'intégration qu'ils vivent ou la souffrance qu'ils endurent dans les sociétés d'accueil. Enfin, l'identité palestinienne en particulier est une identité collective imaginée, qui n'a pas été formée dans un cadre politique, juridique et social existant, un cadre stable et souverain pour le peuple palestinien à l'intérieur de frontières géographiques, mais a été formé comme une extension culturelle à l'identité nationale arabe. Sur la base du travail de terrain, les interviewés ont répondu à une question claire et explicite : « Comment vous définissez-vous aujourd'hui ? » Les réponses ont varié : « Je suis palestinien », « Je suis chrétien » de Terre Sainte, « Je suis arabe », « Je suis palestinien-américain », et « Je suis jordanien avec des racines palestiniennes ».

• Conclusion

En conclusion, l'étude de la diaspora palestinienne et de la migration avec ses multiples réseaux et identités a permis de comprendre et d'analyser de nombreuses questions liées à la relation des Palestiniens avec leur pays d'origine et les pays de la diaspora. L'expérience des Chrétiens palestiniens est remarquable puisqu'elle concerne un certain groupe de Palestiniens, mais leurs expériences ont été diverses en raison de la différence du pays de la diaspora : la Jordanie comme un pays arabe, et les États-Unis comme un pays non arabe.

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Introduction

Why do Palestinian Christians emigrate abroad? Could their emigration be considered sectarian? Does it indicate that they display fragile patriotic sentiments (maintain fragile loyalty) toward their homeland, or are they gradually detaching themselves from Arabism and the East? In light of these questions, among others, the emigration of Palestinian Christians has recently become the focus of researchers' close attention.

Migration of Palestinian Christians is related to a fundamental component of the Palestinian society. Although migration has helped Palestinian Christians solve their own problems, especially on the economic level, it has aggravated their problem as a numerical minority, causing their number to further decline and undermining their role in their homeland. This begs the question as to whether their emigration has depleted their existence and undermined their role. It also begs the question as to whether Palestinian Christians are really attached to their homeland and if their emigration has any distinctive features. It also begs the question as to whether the migration of Palestinian Christians might be subject to external foreign plans or could be considered as other global migrations.

Despite all turbulences, Christians have persisted in Palestine, where Christianity was born and spread throughout the world. Notably, Palestinian Christians have interacted with and adapted to events and variable conditions in Palestine. As a result, they have become an integral part of Palestine's historical and cultural landscape. Palestine, with its land, history, and cultural components, has become an integral part of their internal setting and identity.

This has made Palestinian Christians a distinct group. They have gained visibility and have had an outstanding performance on the political, economic, and academic levels in Palestine and across the Diaspora, in exile, and in countries of refugee. Shining examples of such Palestinian Christians include Edward Said, George Habash, Kamal Nasser, Eugenie Katran, Michael Abdul-Massih, and Archbishop Hilarion Capucci.

Several scenarios have been proposed to analyse Christian emigrations, although the Christian migration in the beginning was a part of world migrations. Some people think that Christians living

side-by-side with Muslims have been exposed to some confusion and influences; some think that these events are the result of Western colonization policies. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore social factors and awareness that justifies committing these events. Some Christians feel contradictions between Arabism and Christianity. Another scenario suggests that Christian emigration from the East has been occurring due to the clash of civilizations theory proposed by Samuel Huntington after the collapse of the Soviet Union and social organization which clashed with capitalism. It has been proposed that world conflicts have been transformed from economic and political conflicts into religious conflicts, particularly between the West (Christians) and the East (Islam). Accordingly, Christian emigration from the East was due to these conflicts

First and foremost, one should acknowledge that it is not easy for the researcher to address this subject without tackling all Palestinians in the diaspora regardless the religion. Christians were sometimes included within this segment, and sometimes categorized outside of it. This highlights the role of the fragmentation and division policies Palestinians were subject to in certain historical periods. Such policies were imposed upon Palestinians largely by foreign and colonial actors or as a result of international policies and subsequent political divisions of the historic land of Palestine.

Accordingly, this study regards historical Palestine as a homeland for Palestinians everywhere as contained in the text of the Balfour Declaration for Palestine. However, it adopts the political divisions of historical Palestine as outlined in United Nations Resolution 242 of 1967. According to this resolution, historical Palestine is divided into Israel, which represents 78% of the land of historical Palestine, and the remaining 22% of historic Palestine (the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) that has been occupied by Israel since June 1967. These divisions are still internationally endorsed and have had a major impact on Palestinian migration and diaspora, including all transnational networks, investments and return migration. Taking this into consideration, the researcher decided to use these divisions. However, this does not mean that she advocates these divisions.

This study attempts to provide a systematic, geographic, and sociological contribution to the theme of migration, diaspora, and other relevant themes, most importantly identity and transnational networks. Accordingly, the study is based on four important axes.

The first axis addresses the causes of Palestinian Christians' migration. Initially, Palestinian Christians emigrated from their homeland as part of the global migratory movement that started in the middle of the nineteenth century. Later, their migration was a part of the broader Palestinian emigration that gained momentum in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli wars and Palestinian popular uprisings. This begs the question as to whether the migration of Palestinian Christians was voluntary or forced, and whether it was restricted to a certain religious community. This also begs the question as to how the migration of Palestinian Christians was distinct from the migration of Palestinian Muslims.

The second axis seeks to explore whether Palestinian communities in the diaspora are part of refugee camps, or centred upon religion, family, or hometown/village bases. In other words, it seeks to explore whether Palestinian Christian emigrant communities started as a part of Palestinian refugee camps, or were established in poor areas, or in the proximity of churches. It also seeks to explore the developments and transformations they have undergone. At the same time, this assumption begs the question as to whether the Palestinian Christian migrants' sense of diaspora is related to their geographical remoteness from their homeland, cultural differences, or the extent of their integration into the host societies.

The third axis addresses the connections between the communities of Palestinian Christians in the diaspora and the homeland. It seeks to explore whether these connections take the form of visits, investments, fundraising, marriages, volunteering, or repatriation. This supposes that migrants cross transnational borders in order to contact their families and conduct activities in their homeland. Thanks to communications and transportation advances, diaspora communities have established closer links with their original communities.

The fourth axis addresses the identities of migrants in the diaspora. It seeks to explore how these identities constantly change and evolve. The changing nature of migrants' identity was usually related to the migrants' legal, social and economic status, self-awareness, and the extent of their integration into the host societies. Stated another way, this assumption seeks to explore how migrants have managed to maintain their national, religious, and familial identities.

Chapter One

Structuring Study Framework

Section I: Christians in the Land of Christianity: A Review

Section II: Comprehensive Theoretical Framework

Section III: Study Area

Section IV: Hybrid Methodology

Section V: Study Chapters

1. Christians in the Land of Christianity: A Review

1.1 Introduction

Palestinians in Palestine have lived through difficult periods, related mainly to the nature of the regime. The fact that Palestine was subject to various colonial governments determined the identity, as well as the social and legal status of Palestinians in the society. This had an impact on inter-Christian relations, the relations among various Christian denominations and the government as well as relations among Christians, Muslims, and other groups. The legal status given to Christians implied the nature of the society and the Christian community.

Not only did adverse political, social, and economic conditions affect Palestinian Christians, but they also affected Palestinian Muslims who co-existed with Christians on the same land. Palestinian Christians and Muslims have been suffering from the same conditions. However, Christians were much more impacted by these conditions. On the one hand, Palestinian Christians are Arabs who share the same nationality with Muslims. On the other hand, they live as Christians in a society where Islamic culture prevails.

One who closely examines history and statistical archives can find out that as a result of the decline of their numbers starting in the late nineteenth century, Palestinian Christians have become a numerical minority, continues to decline over time in their homeland. This decline has coincided with the erosion of Palestinian Christians in certain cities and villages. One who closely examines history also finds out that in contrast to the gradual decline in the number of Palestinian Christians, there has been a significant increase in the number of Jewish newcomers.

Accordingly, it is vital to provide a historical presentation of the conditions of Christians in the context of five main periods in the modern history of Palestine, starting from the late Ottoman period until the current period. This includes the demographic statistics, geographic distributions and social and legal conditions of Christians. The presentation serves as the rationale and basis of this study. That is because it is impossible to discuss the experience of Palestinian Christian in the diaspora without highlighting their history. Without such historical information, the researcher could not elaborate on the main subject of this study and justify why she has decided to examine

this segment of the Palestinian society in particular rather than examining a sample representing all segments.

1.2 Christians as an autonomous nation at the late Ottoman period

There were many legal and social developments in relation to the status of Christians in particular during this period. On the one hand, these developments coincided with the beginning of global migrations to the Americas. On the other hand, they marked a turning point in the history and role of Arab and Palestinian Christians.

Series of reforms, known as the *Tanzimat*, promulgated by the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, since Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son, Ibrahim, rose to power in Egypt and the Levant (*Bilad al-Sham*). These reforms were marked by the issuance of laws such as *Khatti Kulkhaneh*¹ and *Khatti Humayon*² in 1839 and 1856 respectively, under which Christians lived political and religious freedom, allowing them the opportunity for growth and development beginning in the 1840s.³

Accordingly, the legal status of Christians became known as *Millet*,⁴ which comes from the Arabic word *milleh* and means nation, and were defined on a religious basis.⁵ The religious authorities of these millets acted both as representatives of the members of their millet and as

¹ Khatti Kulkhaneh was an attempt to reconstruct Ottoman policy in a form which would enable non-Muslims to participate on a level of equality which had been denied by Islamic practice and law.

² Khatti Humayon was intended to reform the position of the non-Muslims in their relationship with the state as well as in the internal situation of their communities.

³ Hanna Kildani, *Temporary Christianity in Jordan and Palestine* (Amman-Jordan, 1993). [In Arabic]. See also: Qais J Al-Azawi, *Ottoman state: new reading for decline factors* (Beirut: Arab House for Sciences, 2003), 78-88 & 218-291 [In Arabic].

⁴ Millet is a religious system used for the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman state. Non-Muslims were organized on a religious basis. Each denomination was called a "milleh" and the head of each millet was a religious hierarch or patriarch who practiced or enjoyed autonomy on religious issues. The Ottoman state recognized Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Judaism as the main millets. Following the opening of foreign consulates in the Ottoman state, a wider array of millets was recognized, including Latin (Roman Catholic), Assyrian, and Chaldean. Only Protestantism was not recognized as a millet.

⁵ The Ottoman state was beneficiary of the multiplicity of Christian communities in Palestine and differences between them on the ownership of the holy places or expanding them through offering a bribe for the governor or staff to make profits. Moreover, each pilgrim, monastery, and store of Sintuare has to pay an annual tax. See: Raouf S. Abu Jaber, *Christian existence in Jerusalem in the two centuries nineteen and twenty* (Beirut: Alwehdeh Studies Center, 2004). [In Arabic].

intermediaries between the latter and the State. In contrast, following the spread of Islam in the seventh century, Christians and Jews were known as *Ahl Al-Kitab*, an Arabic term from the Holy Quran which means "People of the Book." They were granted a number of rights, such as the right to receive state protection. In turn, they had to pay a special tax, *jizya* and *kharaj*, meaning "tribute."

These privileges were followed by the opening of foreign consulates in Jerusalem and the Levant, and the introduction of missionaries and churches.⁶ Together with schools and universities, they taught several foreign languages and portrayed the American and Western society as full of opportunities.⁷ At the same time, the fact that Christian holy sites are located in Palestine encouraged foreign pilgrims to visit Palestine. As a result of cultural exchanges with pilgrims, Christian translators and owners of souvenir shops enriched their information about Europe and the New World, making them enthusiastic about visiting these countries.⁸

European countries benefited from privileges and consulates system to help Jews to immigrate to Palestine. For example, the British consulate gave British passports to Jews to help them to come to Palestine. It also assumed responsibility for their trial period and exempted them from taxes. Moreover, Ottoman government demanded their protection under the pretext of "sacred journeys."⁹

⁶ The Franciscans were protectors of the Catholic sect, Russians to the Orthodox Church, and English to the Protestant denomination. This resulted in sectarian blocs, especially between the Catholics and Orthodox, culminating in the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. The Ottoman decree, known as *Status Quo*, was issued in 1852 regarding the protection of Christian holy places.

⁷ Such as: Church Missionary Society in 1799, London Society in 1809, Craft House, Catholic Sisters of Charity, Greek Orthodox Gross School in 1855, etc. Other examples include the Franciscan Fathers Press in 1847, Greek Orthodox Monastery Press in 1851, Armenian Monastery Press in 1860, and English Missionary Church Press in 1879. See: Henry Diad & Lars Wahlin, "The Geography of Education in Syria in 1882," *Geografiska Annular, Series B, Human Geography* 65, no. 2 (1983): 105-128.

⁸ Adnan Musallam, "The Formative Stages of Palestinian Immigration to the Americas from the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century to the Eve of the Nakba in 1948," in *Immigration* (Jerusalem: Al-Liqa Center for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, 1990), 35- 53. [In Arabic].

⁹ Naela Al-Waari, *The role of foreign consulates in Jewish migration and settlement in Palestine 1840-1914* (Amman: Alshorooq House, 2007), 137-138. [In Arabic].

The Jewish community was concentrated in four cities namely: Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad and Tiberius.¹⁰ They didn't have strong political ambition, but they cherished the dream of praying and dying in Palestine. A new type of Jewish colonists, who called themselves the Lovers of Zion, arrived in Palestine in 1881. They believed in Jewish nationalism, and sought to revive and organize a Jewish identity. This was embodied under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, who convened and chaired the First Zionist Congress in 1897. The congress sought to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law. The congress focused on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine based on "restoration of Jews." Zionist leaders sought to achieve this goal by several means, namely Jewish immigration to Palestine, the forced emigration of indigenous inhabitants, and the adoption of an economic strategy designed to acquire land for agricultural colonies, taking advantage of immigration into Palestinian,¹¹ and acquisitions Ottoman laws.¹² By 1914, Jews owned approximately 2% of the cultivable land, which was purchased mostly from absentee landowners by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), established in 1901. It should be noted here that Jewish immigration and land acquisition were purely a political issue.

¹⁰ Jews were considered citizens in the Ottoman Empire and they totalled 12,332 in 1912 according to relevant official records. They were called Middle Eastern Jews (Mizrahi Jews) since they maintained their Middle Eastern customs and practices.

¹¹ Regarding the Ottoman laws on immigration: The Ottomans passed a law in 1882 that denied the entry of Jewish people into Palestine "except in the case of pilgrimage and holy visitations for three months." After few years, Jewish pilgrims were allowed entry into Palestine "if their passports were stamped by Turkish embassies abroad and provided that they pay 50 Ottoman Lira in cash insurance as a guarantee they would leave Palestine within a month." Starting in 1900, instead of being requested to pay cash insurance as a guarantee for their return within a month, Jews had to "hand over their (official) papers upon entry into Palestine and receive a residence permit that would allow them to stay in Palestine for three months." The residence permit was known as the "red ticket" by the virtue of its colour. See: Hassan Hallaq, *The Ottoman state's attitude on the Zionist movement, 1897-1909* (Beirut: The Arab Renaissance Printing, Publication and Distribution House, 1999). [In Arabic].

¹² The establishment of the few first Jewish (communal) agricultural settlements, known as Kibbutzim, was not a source of concern for the Ottomans. Under the law of 1869, foreigners (whether individuals or companies) were allowed to own property outside or inside cities across the Ottoman state. However, following the expansion of land purchases and establishment of Jewish settlements, the Ottoman government was compelled to impose restriction on the selling of lands to Jews. Accordingly, the government issued a law that restricted land purchases by non-Ottoman Jews in Palestine in 1883. In 1892, the Ottoman government instructed the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Ibrahim Hajji Pasha, to halt the selling of state (Miri) land to Jews even if they were Ottoman subjects. In a statement issued in 1899, Sublime Porte asserted that it "does not wish to sell any part of the Arab land regardless on the quantity of gold that would be paid in return" and that they "maintain a firm position in this regard." See: Mim K.Oki, *Sultan Abdul-Hamid II between global Zionism and Palestinian question* (Al-Zahra for Arab Media, 1992), 70-75. [In Arabic].

As a result, a policy was adopted by the Ottoman Empire designed to turkify all ethnic minorities and imposed exorbitant taxes and forcible conscription of the Arabs, among others.¹³ This culminated in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the executions of many Arab citizens and opponents by Jamal Pascha in 1915/1916. Confronted with this reality, Arab Christians, including Palestinian Christians, took the first steps toward the consolidation of the modern state through the establishment of clandestine (underground) associations, organizations, and schools of thought.¹⁴ Until that point, Arab nationalists had not yet constituted any considerable popular movement, even in Greater Syria.¹⁵ The Arabs had mostly allegiance to religion, sect, tribe, or local governments that faced competition from Ottoman and Islamist movements. In contrast, Christians had a more liberal view than their Muslim counterparts on the nature of the modern. They avoided any confusion with Islam and constituted the intellectual bourgeoisie.¹⁶

Nevertheless, Christians began to immigrate to the Americas in this period, relative stability in the Christians percentage, noting they were concentrated in certain *sanjaks* and *aqdia* of Ottoman Palestine,¹⁷ as the map below illustrates:

¹³ Alexander Schölch, *Palestine in transformation, 1856-1882: Studies in social, economic and political development* (Washington, D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993).


¹⁴ The Pan-Arab Movement (Pan-Arabism) called for a revolt against the Ottoman government and adherence to the Islamic Arabic culture as a medium for Arab Christians. The Arab Socialism was designed to ensure equity for the poor in the absence of social justice. Pan-Arab Secularism called for democratic governance under sectarian diversity. See: Fadwa A. Nusseirat, *Arab Christians and the Idea of Pan-Arabism in the Levant (Bilad al-Sham) and Egypt (1840-1918)* (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2009). [In Arabic].

¹⁵ Greater Syria is a hypothetical united Fertile Crescent state, encompassing the Eastern Mediterranean or the Levant and Western Mesopotamia at the Arab Muslim civilization. The region of "Syria", was used by the Ottomans in the Syria Vilayet until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. After, the area was passed to French and British Mandates following World War I and divided into Greater Lebanon, various Syrian-mandate states, Mandatory Palestine and Transjordan.

¹⁶ Many Christian figures played a key role in raising political, nationalist and cultural awareness, warned about the danger of Zionism and called for Pan-Arabism through launching newspapers from 1909 to 1911. The most prominent of these figures were Jurji Hanania, who launched al-Quds newspaper; Bandali Mashhour, who launched al-Insaf newspaper; Hanna El-'Issa, who launched al-Asma'i newspaper; Iliya Zakka who launched al-Nafir al-Uthmani newspaper; Khalil Beidas, who launched An-Nafa'es newspaper; Issa El-Issa who launched Falastine newspaper; Wahbeh Tamari who launched Abu Shaduf magazine; and Najib Nassar who launched al-Karmel newspaper.

¹⁷ According to Ottoman Administrative divisions, Ottoman Palestine or Southern Syria was a part of Greater Syria that was divided into three Eyalets (states): Aleppo, Syria, and Beirut, each one was divided into smaller parts called Sanjaks (provinces), and each Sanajak was divided into smaller units called Aqdiya (districts). Ottoman Palestine entirely formed from three Sanjaks, namely: Acre Sanjak, Nablus Sanjak and Jerusalem Sanjak. In 1841, Sanjak of Jerusalem was linked directly with Constantinople, and was considered as an independent Mutasarrifate, due to the European states' increasing awareness of the importance of the city.

Map 1: Christians in Ottoman Palestine in 1881/1882




Source: Ottoman Census I in 1881/1882, accessed from: Justine McCarthy, *The population of Palestine: Population history and statistics of the late Ottoman period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies Series: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Christians were concentrated in the *aqdia* (plural of *qada*), a subdivision of the *sanjak*, where Christian holy sites were located. Examples of such *aqdia* were Nazareth, and Jerusalem including Bethlehem. The purpose was to obtain protection and ensure sectarian cohesion which enabled Christians to confront social challenges together. At the same time, Christians were also concentrated in coastal and northern areas, particularly Yaffa (Jaffa) and Haifa, where they largely worked in commerce and exporting. Christians worked in entrepreneurship, such as commerce and industry, since they were deprived from assuming senior official and government positions in the Ottoman state. This means the concentration of Christians in cities was higher than rural areas.

For illustration, some Ottoman numbers and statistics that appeared in McCarthy (1990) are below. The purpose was to monitor the development of Christians' demographics and to make a comparison, between religious groups, namely Muslims and Jews.

Chart 1: Proportion of Christians compared with other religious groups (1860-1918)



Source: Ottoman Statistics: Ottoman Census I 1881/82-1892 (official), Ottoman Census 1905/06 (not official), Ottoman Census 1914 (not official), Ottoman Estimations (selected: 1860/61, 1895/96, 1918). These numbers were quoted from: Justine McCarthy, *The population of Palestine: Population history and statistics of the late Ottoman period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies Series: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Despite the inaccuracy of Ottoman statistics,¹⁸ a relative stability of Christians' percentage over this period and two curves could be noticed. The first curve shows that the percentage of Christians rose over the period 1860-1914 as a result of the emigration of new and foreign Christian groups into Palestine.¹⁹ The second curve shows that the percentage of Christians was declining over World War I (1914-1918). Following the war, the number of Christians declined as a result of casualties, forced emigration and the 1915 locust plague.²⁰

1.3 Christians as a religious minority under the British Mandate

On 21 September 1922, Ottoman Palestine officially came under the British Mandate. However, Britain invaded and captured Palestine from the Ottomans in late 1917. In a letter dated 2 November 1917 to Baron Rothschild, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour expressed the British government's support for a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine. By benefiting from Ottoman laws, particularly laws pertaining to the Jewish immigration to Palestine and Jewish ownership of land, it substantially changed.²¹ The letter read:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this

¹⁸ The Ottoman statistics weren't generally accurate. Some statistics were based on the number of families, while others were based on the number of males who paid taxes and were eligible for forcible conscription. The number of non-Muslims was obtained from heads of their millets or hierarchs, who mostly did not provide the Ottomans with the real number since every non-Muslim subject had to pay head taxes. Besides, some subjects, like the Bedouins, were not recorded in the statistics because of the inability to reach and count them. Such transient populations were merely estimated. The first official Ottoman population census started in 1881/82 and was completed in 1889. See: Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman population records and the census of 1881/82-1893," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 9, no. 2 (1978): 237-274. Two other population censuses were conducted; the first was conducted in 1905/1906 and the other in 1914. However, they were not officially published.

¹⁹ According to the Ottoman statistics, during the years 1911-1913, there were 11 Chaldeans in Jerusalem, 270 Maronites in Jaffa and 4,379 Maronites in Sanjak of Acre. The Ottomans statistics of 1913 provide another indicator. They show that there were about 15,850 Christian non-Arabic speakers divided as follows: 2,767 Armenians, 4,962 English, 1,175 French, 2,214 German, 1,667 Greek, 702 Italian, and 606 Russian.

²⁰ During the years 1914-1918, Christians lost around 10,583 people (0.131%), Muslims lost around 38,849 person (0.059%), while Jews lost around 1,272 persons (0.021%). Jews sustained the lowest losses in terms of numbers and percentage because they continued to receive in-kind and financial aid from the West. In addition, Jewish immigrants were not interested in taking part in the war.

²¹ Israeli immigration laws: 1) *The 1920 Law*, which stipulated that the Arab emigrants who emigrated before this date were considered Turks. Therefore, most Palestinian emigrants who emigrated before the Ottoman period could not return to their homeland. 2) *The Wasteland Law of 1921*, which stipulated that "Who excavates or cultivate a wasteland without obtaining the land manager's (commissioner's) approval shall not be entitled to obtain a land deed for that plot of land. He shall also be liable to trial for infringement upon the land."

object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."²²

As Mandate articles provided, the treatment of the Christians as a religious minority by the British Mandate in Palestine represented the preservation and development of the Ottoman *millet* system, by guaranteeing both the rights of Christians as a religious minority and the existence of the holy places, sacred to the three great religions.²³ Despite being a majority, Muslims were treated in that time as a minority. Although they constituted a part of the larger Islamic (Ottoman) environment, they found themselves without communal status or institutions, and at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Christian and Jewish communities.²⁴ Thus, Muslims set up the position of the grand mufti in Jerusalem and established the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921.²⁵

According to Article 6 of the Balfour Declaration:

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."²⁶

Taking these British Mandate declarations and statements into consideration, one realizes that Christians did not live through a special situation, but suffered colonial conditions along with Muslims. Consequently, Christians and Muslims formed a joint national front. Noting that, in rare

²² Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917).

²³ Antony O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: religion, politics and society, 1800-1948," in *Palestinian Christians: religion, politics and society in the Holy Land*, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (London: St Edmundsbury Press, 1999), 32.

²⁴ Uri M. Kupferschmidt, *The supreme Muslim council: Islam under the British mandate for Palestine* (New York: Leiden, 1987), 1-16.

²⁵ Daphne Tsimhoni, "The status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine," *Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, no.4 (1984): 166-192.

²⁶ League of Nations Palestine Mandate (24 July 1922).

cases, incidents broke out between Muslims and Christians, believing that Christians were loyal of British Mandate.

The British Mandate divided Arabs and Jews on racial grounds. In businesses and professions, the Jewish economic sector focused on the development of modern industry and citrus cultivation in some areas. In contrast, the Arab economic sector was semi-urban, based on agriculture. It expanded in some industries such as construction, commerce, and citrus cultivation for the purpose of exporting.²⁷

As for the workers, Arab labourers were mostly rural who had little experience and limited skills in paid work. In contrast, Jewish labourers had acquired work experience as well as extensive expertise in political labour organizations. (They established Israel's Trade Union, the Histadrut). They used to gain high wages, thanks to support from global Zionist organizations for establishing the Jewish nation-state.²⁸

Meanwhile, many Christians held positions in the British Mandate government or church institutions, such as railway station officers, post officers and school teachers. They managed to hold such positions due to their high level of education.²⁹

In front of these Mandate practices, Christians were involved in the nationalist movement since "they regarded it as the opportunity to break the yoke of their marginality and to create an

²⁷ Deborah S. Bernstein, "Expanding the split labour market theory: Between and within sectors of the split labour market of Mandatory Palestine," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no.2 (1996): 243-266.

²⁸ Ibrahim R. Al-Jundi, *Economic policy of British mandate in Palestine 1922-1939* (Amman: Alkarmel House Publications, 1986), 160. [In Arabic]. In addition, the British Mandate weakened the Palestinian economy through excluding it from the Jewish economy which had the concentration of production means, the increase of customs duties on imports, retreated number of Palestinian economic projects from 925 to 350 between 1914-1939 compared with its increase for favour of the Jewish side from 300 to 6116 during the same period. See: Abraham Granovsky, *Land and Jewish reconstruction in Palestine* (Jerusalem: Palestine and Near East Publications, 1931), 55.

²⁹ Palestine experienced an illiteracy rate during the Mandate period of 98% among Muslims and 52% among Christians. The six secondary schools created by the Mandate authorities in the twenties and thirties were in cities of Jerusalem, Haifa, Nablus, Hebron and Gaza. See: Naji Alloush, *Arab resistance in Palestine: From end of Ottoman rule till end of British mandate 1918-1948* (Amman: Jordan Book Center, 1986), 8. [In Arabic]. Moreover, health services were not organized and distributed in a balanced manner in the country. They had been limited to hospitals in Jerusalem and Nablus, while the rest of the services had been provided by missionaries.

ideology and community sufficiently broad to encompass them as full and equal participants."³⁰ Since the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the Mandate for Palestine, Palestinians mobilized their forces in order to confront the British and their Jewish allies. During this period, some prominent men took centre stage. Among them was Melkite Catholic archbishop Gregory Hajjar, who was renowned for his eloquence. Addressing Sharif Hussein Bin Ali in 1924, he said:

"We, the Christians of Palestine, are Arabs who hold steadfast to and defend our land. We are the indigenous people of this land. We have lived with our Muslim brothers in a faithfulness and love throughout centuries. We want to continue to live together in order to struggle against conspiracies against our homeland."³¹

Following the intensification of Jewish emigration to Palestine and land purchases by Jews, the First Arab Orthodox Congress, convened in Jerusalem on 29 August 1934, declared that any Christian who sells land or acts as brokers to sell lands to Zionists shall be declared as a traitor to his homeland and religion, and shall not have any funeral service nor be buried in any Christian cemetery.

The Congress also declared resistance as a religious duty for each Arab.³² Upon its formation following the First Palestinian Arab Council in 1919, the Palestinian National Movement evenly comprised representatives of Christian and Muslim committees. In contrast, the Islamic wing of the Palestinian National Movement was closer to the local conservative and family nature of secularism and democracy. Thus, it was not an irony that Palestinian Christians joined the main wing of the Palestinian National Movement led by Hajj Amin al-Husseini.

The British Mandate government attempted to form a house of representatives on a religious basis. The legislature was supposed to be composed of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Druze members, and the Christian members were supposed to represent the Orthodox Church, the Latin (Roman Catholic) Church, and the Protestant denominations, which were not officially recognized

³⁰ Antony O'Mahony, "Palestinian Christians: religion, politics and society, 1800-1948," in *Palestinian Christians: religion, politics and society in the Holy Land*, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (London, St Edmundsbury Press, 1999), 41.

³¹ Rafiq Farah, *The History of Episcopal Church in Jerusalem Archdiocese 1841-1991* (Jerusalem, 1995), 199. [In Arabic].

³² Emil Al-Ghuri, *Palestine through sixty years* (Beirut: al-Nahar Publishing House, 1973), 173. [In Arabic].

at that time. The government planned to hold elections in 1923, but elections were boycotted by the Arabs—Muslims and Christians alike. The government planned once again to hold elections in 1929, but elections were not held as a result of the al-Buraq Revolt.³³


Having failed to form this legislature, the British Mandate government opted to form municipal councils. In the first municipal elections in 1927, Christians assumed mayoralty of 12 councils, including the predominantly Christian towns of Nazareth, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Beit Jala and Shafa 'Amr. They also were elected mayors in religiously-mixed cities, such as Jerusalem and Haifa. In 1934, the municipal election system was amended. As a result, Christians lost the mayoralty of some municipal councils, such as Haifa and Bisan. Furthermore, their representation in some municipal councils declined. For instance, Christian representation in Akka municipal council declined to one-third. Their representation in Nazareth municipal council declined from five to four seats and in Jerusalem, representation on the municipal council was reduced from three seats to two.³⁴

As a result of the discriminatory practices of the Mandate that favoured Jews, the demographic situation of the Arab population has been affected, with a decrease in the Christian population, and an increase in the Jewish population. This was the beginning of Christian's decline, as illustrated in this map:

³³ Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 4, (1984): 166-192.

³⁴ Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine," 1984, *Ibid*.

Map 2: Christians in Palestine under the British Mandate in 1931




Source: British Census 1931. Justine McCarthy, *The population of Palestine: Population history and Statistics of the late Ottoman period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies Series: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Christians remained concentrated in religious and coastal cities, as well as some central Palestinian cities, especially Ramallah. According to British Mandate population census of Palestine in 1931, the overwhelming majority of Christians worked in industry, trade, and professions, whereas a small proportion worked in intensive agriculture and fruit cultivation. Only 24% of Christians lived in rural areas, and none lived in Bedouin communities. This explains why Christians were concentrated in major cities.

However, Christian proportion declined as a result of Jewish immigration into Palestine and their [Jewish] concentration in some cities especially Jerusalem. The following chart outlines a comparison between the three main groups in specific years during the British Mandate.

Chart 2: Proportion of Christians compared with other religious groups (1922-1946)



Sources: British statistics: British Census 1922, British Census 1931, British estimations (selected years: 1936, 1939, and 1946). These statistics were quoted from: Justine McCarthy, *The population of Palestine: Population history and statistics of the late Ottoman period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies Series: Columbia University Press, 1990).

The chart above illustrates how the Christians' numbers and proportion had been declining since 1930s, concurrently with legislation that opened the door to Jewish immigration into Palestine. This legislation resulted in substantial changes in the numbers and proportions of the three groups.

With the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 (*Nakba*),³⁵ approximately 714,000 Palestinians, including 50,000 Christians,³⁶ became refugees across the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and neighbouring Arab countries. They were forbidden to return to their homes in approximately 418 villages they were forcibly displaced from. Some of these villages became inhabited by Jews, while other villages, especially borderline villages such as Eqret and Kufr Ber'em, were demolished, as a result of Jewish military activities, massacres and expulsion orders. The population of the villages mainly consisted of Christians. At this time, Jews controlled 77.4% of the land in Palestine.³⁷

Although the United Nations (UN) tried to negotiate their return, Israel refused to allow any Palestinian refugee back. The UN General Assembly considered Palestinian refugees to have inviolable fundamental rights. The UNGA adopted resolution 194 (III) in December 1948 resolving that:

"The refugees wishing to return to their homes to live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."³⁸

³⁵ War of 1948 (also referred to as the First Israeli-Arab War) broke out between Israeli forces and Arab armies, after the end of the British Mandate. The main reason for this war was the Zionist quest to establish a homeland in Palestine through spreading the notion that it was "a land without a people for a people without a land."

³⁶ Bernard Sabella, "A study about immigration among Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem districts," in *Immigration* (Jerusalem: Al-Liqa' Center for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, 1990), 79. [In Arabic].

³⁷ Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), *Dictionary of Palestinian Political Terms* (Jerusalem, 2004), 129.

³⁸ The UN General Assembly (11 December 1948): "Right of Return".

1.4 Christians in Islamic countries by norms, not by laws

In December 1948, Parliament of Transjordan convened and voted in favour of uniting the West Bank, which occupies an area of approximately 5,878 km², and Transjordan. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became composed of the east and west banks of the Jordan River. The Jordanian authorities took administrative steps to accommodate the West Bank and the Palestinian population. It replaced the military administration in 1949 and granted the Palestinian population Jordanian passports. Additionally, it eliminated tariffs between the two banks of the Jordan River and held general parliamentary elections in 1950. The West Bank and Palestinian population became a part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and were subsequently subject to Jordanian legislation. They held parliamentary seats and ministerial portfolios. They joined licensed political parties until political action was banned, which forced them to carry out their political action in a clandestine manner.³⁹

The Gaza Strip, which occupied an area of 360 km², was annexed to the Egyptian administration (control) under Item 6 of the General Armistice Agreement signed by Egypt and Israel in February 1948. Following All-Palestine Government's failure,⁴⁰ the Egyptian government issued the constitutional system in March 1962. The constitutional system provided for the formation of an elected legislative council, which remained functional for three years. During this period, the legislative council passed some laws, such as the Personal Status Law, the Tax Law and the Civil Government Law. The quasi-independent political entity looked like a state. There was also an independent judicial authority and an executive board. The legislative council remained functional until it was disbanded in the aftermath of the war in June 1967, which brought Egypt's control over the Gaza Strip to an end.

³⁹Mushsen Al-Khazendar, "Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization," *Donia al-Wattan* (Electronic Palestinian newspaper, 28 October 2009). Website: <https://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/articles/2009/10/28/178203.html>

⁴⁰ The High Commission, which acted as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, announced the formation of All-Palestine Government in Gaza in September 1948. It attempted to declare Palestine as an independent state during a conference attended by 85 members. However, the Egyptian authorities did not allow all the government to exercise its functions in Gaza and demanded that it relocate to Cairo and open offices there. As such, the Egyptian authorities assumed the responsibility for managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip, which together with the West Bank survived at that time Israeli occupation. Jordan sent a telegram, claiming that All-Palestine Government lacked confidence and did not represent the Palestinians.

Significant shifts occurred in the Palestinian society. The pre-Nakba Palestinian society of Gaza was composed of two main strata: semi-feudal large landowners and peasants. There was a small bourgeoisie that was composed of craftsmen, small merchants, and employees. The strata difference among the Palestinian society of Gaza was very harsh. In contrast, other Palestinian cities, such as Jaffa (Yaffa), Haifa, Akka, Jerusalem, and Nazareth experienced some social development, contributing to the regression of feudal relations. The components of subordinate capital relations resulted in the emergence of the agricultural and commercial bourgeoisie. The above-described situation of Palestinians deteriorated in the aftermath of the Nakba. The Nakba resulted in the creation of the "refugee community", complete collapse of the economic base of pre-1948 society,⁴¹ and the disruption of traditional social relations.

During the post-Nakba phase, West Bank economic sectors, particularly the banking and financial sectors, exhibited rapid growth rates. This growth was made possible through cash availability and the availability of human competency following the displacement of Palestinians from cities and villages occupied by Israel in 1948. Nevertheless, this growth failed to adequately absorb the large numbers of unemployed people. As for the Gaza Strip, agriculture was the main sector, achieving significant progress in terms of the utilization of modern technology. However, the contribution of agriculture to the GPD declined as a result of Israel's policies of land grab and control of available water, compelling many agricultural workers to abandon their profession.

Although Jordan and Egypt guaranteed the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, such guarantees were not provided in official laws. For instance, official Christian holidays were not designated, prompting Christian public servants or employees to take days off on religious festivals. Besides, such festivals were restricted to Christian residents in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, both cities that were (and still are) religiously significant to Christians. Despite the promise of religious rights for minorities in Egypt and Jordan, Christians were dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Shari'a.⁴²

⁴¹ Hussein Abu al-Naml, *Gaza Strip 1948-1967: Economic, political, social and military developments* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1979), 310. [In Arabic].

⁴² Daphne Tsimhoni, *Christian communities in Jerusalem and the West Bank since 1948. An historical, social and political study* (Westport: Praeger, 1993).

Nevertheless, Christian denominations were given the liberty to carry out maintenance and restoration works for churches and convents. The Jordanian government strengthened Islamic-Christian relations and promoted interfaith dialogue, holding many conferences to this end. These positive relations contributed to the development of the situation in Jerusalem, particularly on the tourist and demographic levels.⁴³

Jordan continued to exert efforts in order to safeguard the holy sites, particularly in Jerusalem. Since Palestinians and Arabs pledged allegiance to Hussein bin Ali and entrusted him with guardianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem in 1924, [the Hashemite Kingdom of] Jordan rejected any demand or attempt to compel it to abandon its role. It has continued to assume the role of the guardian of the holy places in Jerusalem.


Population movement between both banks of the Jordan River, as well as between the Gaza Strip and Egypt became very active, increasing overlap between the two populations. In 1961, according to Jordanian statistics, only 47% of Jordan's population lived in the West Bank, compared with 56% in 1952. More than 52% of those residents originated from the Jerusalem district, 27 % came from Nablus, and 21% from the Hebron district. A sizable majority 70% of residents from the West Bank moved to Amman, while 22.8 % went to Zarka.⁴⁴ It should be noted here that the Egyptian administration did not count the population of the Gaza Strip, accordingly, this study could not present any statistics and numbers of Palestinian Christians in this period.

During this period, there was a remarkable decrease in the number of Christians in the West Bank, as the following map illustrates:

⁴³ Ya'coub Al-'Odat, *A'lam al-Fikr wa al-Adab fi Filastin* (Leaders of Thought and Literature in Palestine) (Jerusalem: Dar Al-Esraa Printing & Publishing House, 1992), 590-591. [In Arabic].

⁴⁴ Jordan Department of Statistics, *Census of population and housing 1961*, vol.1. Amman, 1964.

Map 3: Christians in the West Bank during the Jordanian administration in 1961



Source: Jordanian Census 1961 of West Bank. Jordan Department of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing 1961*, Vol.1, Amman, 1964, 115. The total number of Christians in the West Bank: 45,855. Bethlehem: 7,246; Beit Jala: 4,530; Beit Sahour: 3,458; Hebron: 168; Jericho: 1,212; Jerusalem: 10,795; Ramallah: 8,745; Al-Bireh: 485; Ein Arik: 260; Jifna: 580; Birzeit: 1,424; Taybeh: 1,176; Aboud: 716; Tulkarem, Jenin, Zababdeh, Birquin, Deir Gazaleh, Kaferqod, Nablus, and Rafidia (combined): 3,069.

According to the Jordanian census, Christians were concentrated in the three districts: Jerusalem (10,795), Bethlehem (15,234) and Ramallah (15,371). This is the reason why the Jerusalem district have had a higher proportion of Christians in comparison to the two other districts, Nablus and Hebron.

1.5 Christians under the Israeli military rule, along with Muslims

In June 1967, Israel seized the rest of Palestine, Sinai from Egypt, and the Golan from Syria during the War of 1967 (also known as *June War* or *Six-Day War*). Many Palestinians fled or were expelled from villages or refugee camps. Some 355,000 Palestinians crossed to the East Bank (Jordan), including 210,000 Palestinians who had not been refugees and became to be described as "displaced." Only 15,000 Palestinians, constituting less than 5%, were allowed to return.⁴⁵ In November 1967, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 stated: "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security."⁴⁶

Israeli colonies have expanded across the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). The Palestinian population centres were turned into cantons or enclaves, separated one from another by settler-only bypass roads, which restricted Palestinian free movement and limited trade. This has increased unemployment and poverty rates among the Palestinian people and turned the Palestinian society into a consumer market.⁴⁷


A year after the war, Israel conducted a population census in the occupied Palestinian territories. The following map illustrates the limitation of Christian localities and a decreasing in their numbers due to the forced emigration.

⁴⁵ John Davies, *The Evasive peace* (London, 1970), 69.

⁴⁶ The UN Security Council (22 November 1967): "Resolution 242".

⁴⁷ Khaled Ayed, *Settlement during Likod epoch 1977-1985* (Nicosia: Palestinian Studies Institution, 1984), 17. [In Arabic].

Map 4: Christians in West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Israeli occupation in 1967



Source: Israeli Census in 1967. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing for West Bank & Gaza Strip*, Nos.19 and 40, 1968 and 1989. Christians in the West Bank: 40,241. Gaza Strip: 2,478. Bethlehem: 6,405; Beit Jala: 4,271; Beit Sahour: 3,730; Hebron: 200; Jericho: 539; Ramallah: 6,966; Jerusalem: 10,813; Ein Arik: 86; Jifna: 538; Birzeit: 1,351; Taybeh: 1,156; Aboud: 500; Nablus & Rafidia: 688; Zababdeh: 922; Jenin: 123; Tulkarem: 100; Salfit, Qalqilia, Tubas: 1,628.

In order to find out whether the number or proportion of Christians declined, there is a need to compare the Israeli population census of 1967 with the Jordanian population census of 1961. According to the Israeli census, the number of Christians across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip totalled about 40,241 and 2,478 respectively. In contrast, the Jordanian census of 1961 shows that the number of Christians totalled 45,855 in West Bank, with no census conducted in the Gaza Strip. Thus, it is evident that the number and proportion of Christians declined.

These Arabization movements were affected by the concept of Pan-Arabism embodied by Gamal Abdul Nasser following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1976. Following Abdul Nasser's defeat in the June 1967 War, however, many Palestinian Christians embraced communist philosophy in its Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist forms in line with the global rising tide of these movements in the mid-1960s.⁴⁸ The Israeli occupation of the dealt a cruel blow to Arab nationalist movements. The Israeli occupation lead to the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Palestinian Christians have formed an integral part of this national liberation movement (PLO). Beirut emerged as a centre for the PLO and Palestinian intelligentsia. The social base of the movement consisted of Palestinian refugee camps. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) managed to unite all Palestinians inside Historical Palestine and in the Diaspora in a single political entity.⁴⁹ However, the PLO was repeatedly drawn into conflict with the host countries and the West.

As the first *Intifada* (uprising) erupted,⁵⁰ the central focus of Palestinian national struggle shifted abroad and the PLO revived its political role. However, the PLO restricted national struggle

⁴⁸ Mitri Raheb, "Faith, steadfastness and creative resistance in the modern Palestinian Christian thinking," *Al-Quds daily newspaper*, (26 December 2016). [In Arabic].

⁴⁹ The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 with the purpose of the "liberation of Palestine" through armed struggle. It is recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" by over 100 states with which it holds diplomatic relations, and has enjoyed observer status at the United Nations since 1974. The PLO was considered by the United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991. In 1993, the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected "violence and terrorism." In response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

⁵⁰ *Intifada* (civil uprising) erupted in Gaza on 9 December 1987 after four Palestinians from Jabaliya camp were killed and nine other were injured when an Israeli truck collided with two vans carrying Palestinian workers. This compelled Palestinians in the camp to get to the streets and throw stones at Israeli occupation forces. Ensuing clashes spread rapidly to the rest of the Palestinian villages and cities. With the signing of the Oslo accords, the first *Intifada* came to an end. Casualties were high, with over 1,500 Palestinians dead, and tens of thousands injured.

within pre-1967 borders, also known as the Green Line. As a result of the first uprising, the "Question of Palestine" took top priority on the scale of Arab attention, pressuring international efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflict. The remarkable participation of Christians in the popular uprising was motivated by local hierarchs' awareness and ability to win the sympathy of Western churches. Besides, local churches and hierarchs adopted anti-occupation ideologies, a theme that will be further explored later.

1.6 Christians "Living Stones" under the Palestinian National Authority

The signing of the Oslo Accords⁵¹ provided a source of optimism and an outlet for the Palestinians in general, and Christians in particular. It recognized the Palestinian people's right to establish their autonomy. This compelled some Palestinian emigrants, including investors, to return to the occupied Palestinian territories, and to become known as "the returnees." At the same time, the Oslo Accords triggered a new and on-going conflict among Palestinians.

Some Palestinians, especially refugees, believed that the Oslo Accords would force them to abandon and compromise their principles underlying their struggle. Many Palestinians were dismayed to learn about Yasser Arafat's acceptance of the conditions and that negotiations conducive to the Accords were secret and undemocratic. They believed this step would not truly be conducive to an independent state.

Following the taking of official control of the occupied Palestinian territories and holding presidential and legislative elections for the first time in 1996, the Palestinian National Authority, represented by the late President Yasser Arafat, took a series of regulatory, administrative, and political steps that would directly impact Christians. The beginning of these steps was marked with drafting the constitution. Article 7 of the PA's draft constitution provides that:

"The principles of Islamic Shari'a are a major source for legislation. Civil and religious matters of the followers of monotheistic religions shall be organized in accordance with their religious

⁵¹ The Oslo Accords granted the Palestinians right to self-government on the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat was appointed head of the Palestinian Authority and a timetable for elections was laid out. The headquarters of the PLO were moved to Ramallah on the West Bank.

teachings and denominations within the framework of law, while preserving the unity and independence of the Palestinian people."⁵²

Although this draft constitution may be subject to additional revisions, the Shari'a will likely remain a central component regardless of any amendments. This has placed Palestinian Christians in a precarious legal situation, because according to the Shari'a, they are unequal to their Muslim counterparts.

This was followed by the division of the occupied Palestinian territories into administrative divisions. Palestinian refugee camps with Muslim majority became part of predominantly Christian districts, particularly Ramallah and Bethlehem, turning Palestinian Muslims into a majority.⁵³ These administrative divisions, including boundary adjustments, drastically altered the demographic balance and influenced local elections results.

In the meantime, Arafat issued a decree, which is still in effect, on the quota of Christians in local elections. The decree specified Christian and Muslim seats in some local councils and asserted that the heads of local councils must be from the Christian community. There are Christian communities in Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Zababdeh, Rafidya, Ramallah, Birzeit, Aboud, Taybeh, Jifna, and Ein Arik. The decree also specified the number of parliamentary seats to be held by Christians in the Palestinian Legislative Council. It specified a quota of five seats for Christians out of 132 seats. The issuance of this decree is a step that has preserved Christians' political right. However, it has established Christians as a minority that should be safeguarded.

Many Christians have assumed administrative positions in PA institutions. Examples include: Head of the Central Elections Commission Hanna Nasser, former Finance Minister Nabil Kassis, presidential spokesperson Nabil Abu Rudeineh, Minister of Tourism Roula Ma'ayah, former Minister of Tourism and current Palestinian ambassador to Germany, Kholoud De'ibis,

⁵² Permanent Constitution Draft (4 May 2003): "The Palestinian Basic Law."

⁵³ In 1948, the religious makeup of the city of Bethlehem was 85% Christian, and 13% Muslim. In the 1967 census, Muslim represented 53.9% of the population, while the Christians were 46.1%. In the PCBS's 1997 census, Bethlehem had a population of 21,670, including a total of 6,570 refugees who account for 30.3% of the city's population.

former Palestinian ambassador to France Hind Khoury, and lawmakers Hanan Ashrawi and Bernard Sabella.


The Palestinian Authority has operated several institutions that strive to strengthen Islamic-Christian relations and raise awareness about the protection of holy sites. The most important of these institutions are the Islamic-Christian Commission for Supporting Jerusalem and Holy Sites (which reports to the UNESCO), and the Higher Presidential Committee of Church Affairs. Members of the Islamic-Christian Commission include Secretary-General of the Commission, Hanna Issa, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Sebastia Atalla (Theodosius) Hanna and head of the Fatah movement's Christian World Department Father Manuel Musallam. On the other hand, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Higher Presidential Committee of Church Affairs follows up on several issues, such as: the allocation of equal budgets for Christian religious endowments and the introduction of amendments on Palestinian school curricula.

With Israel's continued control the occupied Palestinian territories, through the division of the West Bank into Area A, Area B, Area C,⁵⁴ and through the construction of the Apartheid Wall and colonies, which has had a serious economic, political, and social impact on the Palestinian population. Many Palestinians were forced to relocate from Jerusalem, reducing the number of Christians in Jerusalem in particular. Besides, most of the Christian community, especially in Bethlehem, had relied on the tourist trade to make a living and since the outset of the second *Intifada*,⁵⁵ they have lost their primary source of income, unable to find alternative job opportunities. These circumstances undoubtedly affected the districts with concentrated Christian populations. The number of Christians further declined in the aftermath of the second *Intifada* in 2000, as the map below illustrates:

⁵⁴ The Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions: Area A—which comprises 18% of the total West Bank—is administered by the Palestinian Authority exclusively. Area B—which comprises 22% of the total West Bank and houses some 2.8 million Palestinians—is administered by both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. In Area C there are 150,000 Palestinians in 532 residential areas and 389,250 Israelis in 135 settlements. It also houses 100 settlement outposts not officially recognized by the Israeli government. This area is administered by Israel.

⁵⁵ The second *Intifada* (or Al-Aqsa Intifada): It began on 28 September 2000 when Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque, with thousands of security forces deployed in and around the Old City. The incident soon sparked a widespread uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, inside Israel and the Arab World, and brought negotiations to a halt.

Map 5: Christians in the occupied Palestinian territories under the Palestinian National Authority in 2007



Source: Palestinian Census 2007. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Population, Housing and Establishment Census*, Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority, 2007. The total number of Christians is 42,565 people (1.12%), while their number was in 1997 was 40,055 people (1.54%). Noting that the census does not include the number of Christians in Jerusalem, the number is estimated to be 9,260 people as follows: 8,000 Christians in Jerusalem city; 550 Christians in Ezzariyyah; and 11 Christians in Qubebeh.

The previous map shows changes in the areas of Christian concentration. Whereas Bethlehem still had the highest Christian concentration, Beit Sahour and Beit Jala include the highest Christian concentration as cities. Noticeably, there are almost no Christians in the northern Palestinian districts, except for Zababdeh, Rafidya, and Nablus. This shows continual decline in the number of Christian population in the occupied Palestinian territories.

1.7 Christians and Muslims as Israeli Arabs (since 1948)

According to Israeli population census of 1949, approximately 160,000 Palestinians had remained inside what became Israel (since 1948). Among them were only 34,000 Christians, constituting less than 3% of the total population.⁵⁶ These Christians concentrated mainly in the Galilee and in the "Little Triangle," a strip of land running adjacent to the West Bank from Qalqilya to Umm al-Fahm. Israel imposed citizenship on Palestinians—Christians and Muslims alike—in 1952 when a law was passed to this effect. However, it denied citizenship to Palestinian refugees who had not been able to return to their homes.⁵⁷ In contrast, Jews may choose to live in Israel on national grounds under the Law of Return of 1950.

Israel never sought to assimilate or integrate its Palestinian citizens, excluding them from public life while practicing systematic discrimination in all fields. Successive Israeli governments have maintained tight control over the community, attempting to suppress Palestinian/Arab identity and to divide the community within itself. To that end, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship are not defined by the government of Israel as a national minority; rather they are referred to as "Israeli Arabs" or by religious affiliation. Arab-Palestinians remain under the threat of house demolition and are denied basic services such as education and health.⁵⁸

Until 1966, by announcing "law of emergency," Israel imposed military rule on Arab areas. It had the powers to restrict Palestinians freedom of movement, detain or expel Palestinian inhabitants, designate land as "closed areas" only for military or other purposes, and control travel

⁵⁶ Johnny Mansour (ed.), *Arab Christians in Israel. Facts, figures and trends* (Bethlehem: Diyar Publisher, 2012), 11.

⁵⁷ M Amara & Abd Al-Rahman Mar'I, "Language education policy: The Arab minority in Israel," *Language Policy, Series vol. 1*, 2002.

⁵⁸ Johnny Mansour (ed.), *Arab Christians in Israel. Facts, figures and trends* (Bethlehem: Diyar Publisher, 2012), 49-61.

permits, which are essential for Palestinians to obtain in order to work outside their villages. And by using "present absentee" law, Israel transferred most of the land to Jews and undermined Arab community economics. By 1966, the Arab-Palestinian community had lost over half of their land. The Israeli authorities also still massively confiscated land owned by Arab-Palestinians.⁵⁹

Many Arab Christians joined socialist, nationalist and secular political parties. However, the 1948 war and displacement of political leadership resulted in political vacuum that was later filled by some youth intellectuals, including Elias Kousa, who called for the formation of an Arab nationalist party. Besides, many Christian families were active in the political arena, such as the Habibi family, the Jaraysi family and the Tubi family. In 1958, a group of Christians, namely Yusef Haddad, Mansour Kardush and Habeeb Kahwaji, formed the Earth Party Movement. Later on, many Muslims joined this movement. Christians joined the Federation of Arab Academics and the Committee in Defense of Land. The most important Christians who joined them were Emile Tuma and Pastor Shehadeh Shehadeh. Many Christian Arabs/Christian Palestinian became lawmakers, most importantly Issam Makhoul, Emile Habibi and Azmi Bishara.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, it could be said that Palestinians maintained their sense of belonging to the Arab national identity and Palestinian people. They strengthened their sense of belonging following the 1967 War, known as the *Naksa*, and the first *Intifada* of 1987. They also created "Land Day,"⁶¹ the first act of mass resistance by Arab-Palestinians inside Israel against the Zionist policy of internal colonialization. These political events increased in voter participation among the Arab sector which increased the presence of Arab parties in the Knesset.

Arab-Palestinians have maintained a strong political action in Israel. There are today three Arab political parties: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (the Communist party), the National Democratic Assembly Party, and the Unified Arab List. Despite being disappointed by

⁵⁹ Middle East International, no. 551, (30 May 1997).


⁶⁰ Fuad Farah, *The Living Stones: The Christian Arabs in the Holy Land* (Nazareth: Private Publication. Paperback, 2003). [In Arabic].

⁶¹ In 1976, the Israeli government had announced a plan to expropriate thousands of dunams of land in the Galilee for the establishment of new Jewish settlements and military bases. The majority of the land slated for expropriation was Arab-Palestinian owned. In October 2000, during celebrating the Land Day, Israeli police shot dead 13 Palestinian citizens of Israel, using live ammunition and rubber-coated steel bullets, during street demonstrations which took place in tens of Palestinian towns and villages in Israel.

the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Palestinians with Israeli citizenship hoped they could be accepted as equals inside Israel. However, there is no indication that they would be granted equal political or cultural rights. They are concerned about the possibility that they be offered a form of autonomy that would formally exclude them from mainstream national life.


As a result of Israeli policies, Arab-Palestinians (Muslims and Christians) have been restricted to specific areas and cities. Therefore, there are all-Jewish areas, all-Arab areas and Jewish-Arab areas, as map 8 illustrates. The following chart outlines a comparison between the main population groups in selected years:

Chart 3: Proportion of Christians compared to other religious groups (1949-2011)



Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical abstract of Israel 2010, Population by religion, selected years. Noting that the statistics of 1990 and 2009 include non-Arab Christians.

Map 6: Christians in Israel (since 1948) in 2015



Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The numbers of Christians by districts are from statistics of 2008, with a total of 132,000. While their numbers in 2015, according to the main cities, total 135,000. (There is also approximately 25,000 non-Arab Christians not included here.) As for Jerusalem, their number in East and West Jerusalem was estimated to be around 15,000 in 2010.

The statistics indicate the proportion of Christians in Israel remains unstable. It is even declining due to the societal challenges that force them to emigrate, just as it is the case with Muslims. Christians remained concentrated in Galilee and coastal regions, while their proportion declined as a result of Jewish concentration in these cities, especially Jerusalem.

1.8 Conclusion

Ottoman, British, and Israeli systematic policies have displaced Palestinians and dispossessed them from their land and rights, culminating in the settlement of the worldwide Jewish case at the expense of Palestinians.

Although these colonial practices were inflicted upon all population groups, Christians were the most affected. The 1948 War resulted in the forced displacement of half of the Christian community to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and neighbouring Arab countries. Since most did not have relatives in Arab countries, forcefully displaced Christians emigrated to Europe and the U.S., increasing their Diaspora and exacerbating their suffering. Accordingly, Christians rarely emigrate as individuals, but as entire families leaving at once.

Highlighting tremendous damage caused to Christians, leading Christian businessmen lost the wealth they had accumulated as a result of the forced displacement and expulsions of the Palestinian population by Israeli military in the 1948 and June 1967 wars. As mentioned before, many bourgeois families in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Jerusalem (West Jerusalem) and other major cities were Christian. In the aftermath of the wars, these families largely became dispossessed and started from scratch in the Diaspora and refuge countries.⁶²

As a result of the geopolitical changes that had occurred in historical Palestine since the late Ottoman period along with subsequent occupation, the presence of Palestinian Christians has become concentrated in or restricted to certain districts and cities. Their presence is still arguably clearly visible in religiously significant cities, such as Nazareth, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. It is

⁶² Bernard Sabella, "Christian Presence in Palestine," *As-Safir newspaper* (October, 2011).

also clearly visible in villages and towns that were historically established by Arab Christian figures or tribes. Examples of such villages and towns are Taybeh, Ramallah, Birzeit and Aboud.

On the legal level, as a result of legal developments, Christians were occasionally referred to as "Ahl al-Kitāb" (People of the Book), sometimes as a "millet" then as a "minority". The difference of the legal title resulted from diversity of constitutions and laws over different historical periods. As a result of such laws, they have experienced an identity crisis as to whether they are Christians, Palestinians, or Arabs and whether they should maintain their top loyalty to their faith, homeland, or nationalism. These conditions have called into question, albeit simply, Christians' citizenship which does not make them not full-class citizens. These conditions have also questioned Christians' loyalty.

Based on the above, the 2014 population statistics show that Palestinian Christians worldwide total about 20% (2,280,000) of a total of 11,400,000 Palestinians worldwide.⁶³ Only around 200,000 Palestinian Christians continue to live in Historical Palestine, while the others are in the diaspora.

2. Comprehensive theoretical framework

One cannot talk about the diaspora without emigration and vice versa. The diaspora experience is a reflection of the migration experience that immigrants and refugees went through, with all the suffering, pain, and displacement involved. That is because Palestinian migrations were mostly forced or motivated by economic and social reasons. The diaspora experience could be followed by another cross-border experience.

The first theoretical part of the study is based on international migrations. In today's world, international migration has become a reality involving all inhabitants of the world. Due to modern transportation, it has become easier, cheaper, and faster for people of the world to travel than ever before. Meanwhile, people are compelled to migrate in search of future opportunities for themselves and their families as a result of inter alia conflicts, poverty, and inequality. The goals

⁶³ Omar Mahamid, *Eastern Christians* (Dubai: Al-Mesbar Studies & Research Centre, 2014).

of migrants intersect with international policies that support migration in order to achieve sustainable economic growth and development in original and host societies.

In the fields of geography and sociology, the theme of international migration is no longer restricted to exploring the distinction between the states of origin, transit states and states of destination, push and pull factors, or supply and demand. This theme has become concerned with exploring how emigration processes, trends, and tracks are re-conceptualized by societal transformations in the majority of states in the world, including economic, political, social, and even religious transformations. It has also become concerned with exploring how migration could be considered one of the essential features of societies, which plays a key role on the economic and political levels in the original and host societies.

Many scholars have analysed the term of "international migration" from different points of view. They concluded that international migration is no longer a personal experience or a decision taken by an emigrant's household and community (and is not only determined/influenced) by migratory networks and the political and economic contexts of the host countries. For Benedicte Michalon, international migration is connected to migratory changes caused by urbanization, while Luc Legoux analysed the connection between international migration and the current practices resulting from European asylum policy.⁶⁴ In other words, the migratory phenomenon is not merely restricted to a few countries "afflicted" by the emigration or the immigration of their population. In reality, it concerns the majority of countries, whatever their role or function in the worldwide migratory movement.⁶⁵ These political, societal, and urbanization developments, as well as the role of globalization and capitalism have all created the so-called transnational societies.⁶⁶

The transnational migration theory (Basch et al, 1994) was developed to understand the socio-spatial structure and the role of emigrant networks. It refers to the processes that transcend international borders and focuses on the transnational grassroots activities of international migrants

⁶⁴ Patrick Gonin, "Les migrations internationales: Connaître et comprendre," *Population* 62, no.4 (2007): 869-871. [In French].

⁶⁵ Gildas Simon, *Géodynamique de migrations internationales dans le monde* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995), 78. [In French].

⁶⁶ Alejandro Portes, "La mondialisation par le bas. L'émergence des communautés transnationales," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 129, no.1 (1999): 15-25. [In French].

as distinct activities. It also refers to the phenomena that occur within the limited social and geographical space or in regions and states.⁶⁷ Transnationalism is often used both more narrowly—to refer to migrants' durable ties across—and, more widely, to include not only communities, but all sorts of social formations, such as transnationally active networks, groups, and organizations.

Chadai Arab (2009: 13) argues that international migration presents a new perspective of the space built through human relationships and modes of territorialisation of these groups of individuals. In a sedentary world, space is made of continuity and homogeneity, but in the mobile context addressed in the study, space becomes discontinuous and disjointed.⁶⁸ Gildas Simon is considered as among the first scholars who addressed migratory tracks. He analysed the migration of Tunisians to Europe, particularly to France. Simon (2000: 101) states:

"In relation to the internal migratory field, generated or generated by the migration of a population within national borders, the approach to international migrants is situated in a transnational context or in function of the particular logic imposed by the crossing of borders. Policies for controlling flows, changing legal status, administrative management methods and state logics introduce so many particular constraints with which migrants have to cope and towards which they develop all sorts of strategies to achieve their ends."⁶⁹

On the other hand, Roger (1981: 191) believes that migratory tracks could be understood within a general or specific context:

"We were able to show that migratory channels dating back to the middle of the last century had not only projected the people of Aveyron into new living spaces of a national or even international dimension, but above all, led to the organization of a real human and relational space."⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Linda G. Basch, Nina G. Schiller, & Cristina S. Blanc, *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states* (London: Routledge 1994).

⁶⁸ Chadia Arab, *Les Aït Ayad. La circulation migratoire des Marocains, entre la France l'Espagne et l'Italie* (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009). [In French].

⁶⁹ Gildas Simon, "La mise en place et l'évolution du concept de champ migratoire," *Villes et géographie, innovations et perspectives* (Geoforum Aix-en-Provence, AFDG, 26-27 mai 2000), 99-103. [In French].

⁷⁰ Roger Beteille, "Une nouvelles approche géographique des faite migratoires : champs, relation, espaces relationnel," *L'espace géographique*, no. 3 (1981):189-197. [In French].

However, this begs the question as to whether the uprooting and forced displacement could be considered as part of international migrations. According to international law (1954:152), a refugee is a person who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality."⁷¹

Estimates issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) at the end of 2012 show that Palestinians in the diaspora totalled approximately 5,797,472 accounting for about 50.18% of the total number of Palestinians worldwide. They include 3,112,878 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees across Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and a total of 2,159,015 Palestinian refugees within the occupied Palestinian territories.⁷² This means that the majority of Palestinians in the diaspora are refugees.

As Kunz (1973: 130) stated, "It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterises all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrant."⁷³ Yet Kunz distinguished free migrants (voluntary) from refugee settlers (forced), by focusing on their movements. This was reinforced by Richmond (1993), who stressed that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is of doubtful validity, since all migration movements include different constraints (in various degrees and forms). In other words, refugees should be seen as a part of other migration theory in order to understand their integration processes in their host society.⁷⁴ This begs a question here: do transnational migrations is based on the social and economic stability of migrants in the Diaspora? Can we consider the forced emigration as transnational migrations?

⁷¹ United Nations, Convention relating to the status of refugees. *Treaty Series 189* (1954): 150-184.

⁷² Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook of Palestine*, 2013, 270.

⁷³ Egon F. Kunz, "The refugee in flight: Kinetic models and forms of displacement". *International Migration Review* 7, no.2 (1973): 25-146.

⁷⁴ Anthony H. Richmond, "Reactive migration: Sociological perspectives on refugee movements, " *Journal of Refugee Studies* 6, no.1 (1993): 7-24.

Very few modern studies have addressed changes and shifts in Palestinian refugee camps and refugee life. The study conducted by Doraï (2006) on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon introduced a new conception of camps. Doraï stated:

"The Palestinian refugee camps tend to evolve by becoming integrated into the economic activity and into their urban environment. Even if they are still marginalized and segregated areas they are now part of the major cities in the Middle East. Economic activities, daily mobility, the presence of new international migrants, and the strong political and cultural significance for the Palestinian refugees, are the different elements that characterize the contemporary Lebanese refugee camps as urban settlements."⁷⁵

This means an updated study on diaspora and refugee camps is required. Through such a study, one would be able to figure out the extent of shifts that took place in these populations. Refugees in the diaspora and refugee camps are not directly explored in this study, but many of them are indirectly addressed as part of cross-border migrations. As a result of obtaining Jordanian, Palestinian, or foreign citizenships, they managed to immigrate once again, which gives Palestinian immigration another feature.

One could notice also that Palestinian migrations were largely motivated by economic reasons. Suffering from a lack of employment opportunities, low wages, and high levels of unemployment, many Palestinians were compelled to immigrate to different states and regions. They initially opted to immigrate to the Americas. Then they opted to immigrate to Jordan and Egypt and then to the Arab Gulf countries.⁷⁶

According to the neo-classical economic theory explained by Massey et al. (1993), the flow of international migration starts as a result to the wage gap between sending and receiving countries, noting that the wage gap controls the size of labour demand and supply. Besides, labour effectiveness and organizational level is key to labour migration. This means wages are higher in

⁷⁵ Mohamad K. Doraï, "Les camps de réfugiés palestiniens d'Al Buss à Tyr: Ségrégation et précarité d'une installation durable," *Bulletin de l'Association de Géographes français* 38, no.1. (2006): 93-104. [In French].

⁷⁶ Ismail Lubbad, "Demographic profile of Palestinian migration," *Paper Prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa 23-25 October 2007* (Egypt: The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, the American University in Cairo, 2007).

countries with a labour shortage, while wages are lower in countries with a labour surplus. It is wrong to assume the impact of the wage gap as a reason of international migration is temporary. On the contrary, international migration persists as long as there is a wage gap.⁷⁷ Besides, remittances and return migration trigger inequality in the sending society, resulting in more immigration.

Hovdenak et al. (1997) found that when considering their limited options as a result of the political situation, Palestinian refugee labourers immigrated from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Arab Gulf countries as a strategy for improving their economic and social status. However, what distinguishes these migrations is that they involved refugees from all social strata, including physicians, teachers, craftsmen, and the unemployed who flocked to the Arab Gulf. This perhaps leads to the conclusion that economic migration is not restricted to the disadvantaged and unprivileged groups, but encompass all. They generate revenues for individual immigrants and their families as well as the original and host societies. This leads to raising the national income level as well as increasing investments and remittances.

The nature of migratory labour is consistent with the nature of the receiving country in accordance with the dual labour market theory. Receiving states adopt an intensive capital-based method of production, which requires highly skilled labour. In contrast, some states adopt an intensive method of production that requires low-skilled labour. Thus, migration flows toward capitalist industrial states.⁷⁸ In this case, as Stark and Bloom (1985) recognized, international migration has become based on a family decision instead of an individual decision in accordance with the new economics of labour migration theory. Families tend to be risk-avoidant when it involves income. One way of reducing the risk of insufficient income is labour migration of a family member. Migrant family members may send remittances.⁷⁹ This contributes to raising the economic standard of families and societies in sending countries.

⁷⁷ George J. Borjas, "Immigrant and emigrant earnings: A longitudinal study," *Economic Inquiry* 27, no.1 (1989): 21-37.

⁷⁸ Michael J. Piore, *Birds of passage: Migrant labour industrial societies* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1979).

⁷⁹ Oded Stark & David E. Bloom, "The new economics of labour migration," *The American Economic Review* 75, no.2 (1985): 173-178.

On the other hand, according to the relative deprivation theory, migrants send remittances to their family members in the sending country. This compels others in the sending country to become aware of their deprivation or inequality and leading them to also immigrate, which builds the momentum of migration.⁸⁰ In all of the above cases, migration is supposed to come to a halt in a certain stage. This applies in particular to the people of Ramallah. In 1882, when the Friends (Quakers) constructed their first building in Ramallah, they brought builders and craftsmen from Bethlehem and Beit Jala to work in Ramallah. The people from Bethlehem and Beit Jala talked about the success of their fellow townspeople in diaspora countries. So, Youssed Al-Debbiny from Ramallah got enthusiastic and immigrated to the US in 1895. Then 'Issa Ishaq 'Ideh and Hanna 'Azar Hishmeh immigrated to Brazil in 1898.⁸¹

According to Massey et al. (1993:449), the rapid growth in the volume of migration is strongly rooted in migrant networks as "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrant and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin."⁸² This explains migration as the outcome of social, political, economic, and cultural changes that take place in the sending and receiving (host) countries. This explains why many families hailing from Bethlehem and Beit Jala have immigrated to Honduras, El Salvador and Chili,⁸³ from Ramallah to California, and from Al-Beireh to Chicago.⁸⁴ The first nucleus of early emigrants to each of these countries has attracted other members of the same family and fellow townspeople.

However, a large number of Palestinians immigrated to the areas subjected to British rule, most notably Egypt. However, Ramallah and Al-Beireh people had immigrated by identities issued

⁸⁰ Oded Stark & Edward Taylor, "Relative deprivation and international migration," *Demography* 26, no.1 (1989): 1-14.

⁸¹ Aziz Shahin, *Unveiling the ancestors and genealogies in Ramallah City* (Birzeit University: Center of Documents and Research Publications, 1982), 19-21. [In Arabic].

⁸² Douglas S. Massey et al, "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19, no.3 (1993):431-466.

⁸³ Viola Raheb (ed.), *Latin Americans with Palestinian roots* (Bethlehem: Diyar Publisher, 2012).

⁸⁴ Saleem Tamari, "Patterns of Palestinian migration within its world perspectives," in *Immigration* (Jerusalem: Al-Ileqa Center for Religious and Inheritances Studies in Holy land, 1990), 21.

by the British government to the United States of America, while Nablus and the northern region's population have moved through Syria and Lebanon.⁸⁵

The question arises as to how Palestinian migration patterns are assessed. The question also arises as to whether Palestinian migrations have always been based on the theories of international migrations, including economic migrations and whether they have become transnational. These questions bring to light another question related to the patterns and shifts of Palestinian migrations. Stated another way, could Palestinian migrations be considered as part of international and transnational migrations? Are Palestinian migrations special? These questions represent one of the aspects that would be addressed by this study.

The second theoretical part of this study is based on the concept of diaspora. It seeks to understand the experiences and inconsistent forms of affiliation that shape emigration as well as other relevant themes. In his book titled *Global Diaspora*, Cohen states that: "diaspora" as a term is related to the "concepts of immigration and settlement". Diaspora as a term is more pessimistic and harsh for dispersed communities such as Armenians and Palestinian. That is because it expresses a "collective shock", "expulsion", "exile", and "exclusion", where they were forced to live in exile although they have the dream of living in their homeland.⁸⁶

James Clifford (1994: 305) identifies the main features of the diaspora as: "a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alternation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support for the homeland and a collective identity importantly defined by this relationship."⁸⁷ According to Hanafi (2005: 257), Diaspora is "a heterogeneous group of individuals and communities whose time and circumstances of dispersal range from *forced emigration* and exile to voluntary immigration and whose status in their host countries ranges from refugees and statelessness to full assimilation."⁸⁸ Furthermore, Kachig Tölölyan (1996) defines the

⁸⁵ Bernard Sabela, "Studies of migration of Christian Palestinians in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem areas," in *Immigration* (Jerusalem: Al-Leqa Center for Religious and Inheritance Studies in Holy land, 1990), 79.

⁸⁶ Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An introduction* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1997).

⁸⁷ James Clifford, "Diasporas, cultural anthropology," *American Anthropological Association* 9, no.3 (1994): 302-338.

⁸⁸ Sari Hanafi, "Reshaping geography: Palestinian community nets in Europe and the new media," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no.3 (2005): 581-598.

so-called historical Diasporas according to six criteria: forced dispersion, cultural unity, collective memory (text, history), boundaries, links between various hubs, and links with a historical centre of origin.⁸⁹

Emmanuel Ma Mung (1995) identifies two morphological characters that define the diaspora: the multi-polarity of migration and the inter-polarity of relations. These "multi-migrations" are carried out in the transnational space of the diaspora.⁹⁰ He defines the diaspora-space relationship as a special feature of these transnational formations which differentiates them from other migrant groups. Also Ma Mung links the creation of the Diasporas to the networking and migration practices of migrant groups, such as the settlement of migrants in host societies, increased migration, and the establishment of ethnic economies contribute to the creation of Diasporas.⁹¹

While according to Fossaert (1989), the role of transnational networks is not sufficient to define a diaspora, but its structural organization. Without wishing to assign to the Diasporas a compulsorily differentiated status vis-à-vis other organizations, one can nevertheless point out the relations between their organizational capacity and the collective representations that underlie the will to structure.⁹² Martine Hovanessian (1998) analysed the construction of Diasporas in terms of identity. According to him, Diasporas are no longer measured solely in terms of spatial dissemination and migratory mobilities, but in terms of identity projects.⁹³ So, Gabriel Scheffer (1993) highlights three features on diaspora: ethnic identity, high density of community links among transnational organizations, and diaspora contacts with the country of origin.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Khachig Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment," *Diaspora* 5 (1993): 3-36.

⁹⁰ Emmanuel Ma Mung, "Non-lieu et utopie : la diaspora chinoise et le territoire," in *Les diasporas, Reclus, (collection Espaces modes d'emploi)*, ed. Michel Bruneau, (MIGRINTER.1995), 163- 173. [In French].

⁹¹ Emmanuel Ma Mung, *La notion de diaspora et les nouvelles formes des migrations internationales* (Communication présentée au colloque international: Systèmes et dynamiques des migrations internationales ouest-africaines ORSTOM-IFEAD et MIGRINTER, Dakar 3-6 déc.1996). [In French].

⁹² Robert Fossaert, "Devenir et avenir des diasporas," in *Hérodote*, no. 53 (1989): 158-168. [In French].

⁹³ Martine Hovanessian, "Usages et champ sémantiques," *Journal des anthropologues : Nationaux, étrangers? Logiques d'Etat et enjeux quotidiens*, no.72-73 (1998): 11-30. [In French].

⁹⁴ Gabriel Scheffer, "Ethnic Diasporas: A Threat to Their Host?" in *International Migration and Security*, dir. M. Weiner (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 263- 285.

Alain Medam distinguishes between crystallized and fluid Diasporas (Medam, 1993). According to him, Diasporas are endowed with organized institutions that manage their activities. They often share power in the host country and their geographical mobility is reduced, settling permanently in their respective host countries. Fluid Diasporas, on the other hand, have not undergone the process of stabilization. They are still poorly organized and geographically stabilized. They are likely to change their host country suddenly, depending on the political uncertainties they face. The case of fluid Diasporas applies, for example, to Palestinians in Kuwait. Despite having settled down and integrating well into Kuwait long ago, Palestinians had to flee Kuwait after the Gulf War in 1991. Among the crystallized or floating Diasporas, dynamic Diasporas have transnational networks that are very efficient. The Chinese diaspora, for example, has financial institutions and ethnic entrepreneurship. Conversely, the networks of amorphous Diasporas are very inefficient.⁹⁵

Although the diaspora fundamentally characterize the understanding of phenomenon of the diaspora, they fall short to explain it. It is the networks connecting the different scattered communities that form the framework necessary to explain this phenomenon. Through this complex system, communities in diaspora are inscribed in space and geography. (Prévelakis, 1996).⁹⁶ While according to Martine Hovanessian, the spatial movement is invested with this social sense and that socializations are created in and by movement, becoming of [part of] these migrant groups.⁹⁷

As a result of the multiplicity definitions, it is difficult to determine whether or not a migrant population can be categorised as a diaspora. Isabelle Rigoni (1997) illustrates this difficulty through the examining the case of Turkish migration. According to Rigoni, Turkish migrants have developed "multiple forms of networks," including migratory, religious, and political networks. Attempting to explore which networks include many types of "interconnected organizations,"

⁹⁵ Alain Mndam, "Diaspora / Diasporas. Archétypes et typologie," *Revue Européenne des Migration Internationales* 9, no.1 (1993): 59-66. [In French].

⁹⁶ Georges Prevelakis, "Les espaces de la diaspora hellénique et le territoire de l'Etat grec," in *Les réseaux des diasporas*, dir. PREVELAKIS Georges (Nicosie: L'Harmattan, 1996), 53- 68. [In French].

⁹⁷ Martine Hovanessian, "Usages et champ sémantiques," *Journal des anthropologues : Nationaux, étrangers? Logiques d'Etat et enjeux quotidiens*, no. 72-73 (1998), 11-30. [In French].

Rigoni asks if it is enough for migrants to develop and maintain transnational networks to associate them with the Diaspora label.⁹⁸

Regarding the Palestinian case, Al-'Odat (1976) argues that Syrian Arab immigrants, including Palestinian immigrants, founded many cultural, political, social and charitable societies in the Americas in the beginning of the twentieth century.⁹⁹ These societies could be regarded as a body that organized the Arab and Palestinian community in the diaspora. They could be also regarded as cross-border networks owing to their activities intended to liberate their country of origin from the Ottoman rule and the British Mandate and reject the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, this underscores that the multiplicity of cross-border networks is related to the size of diaspora and the political situation in the country of origin which compels immigrants to take action abroad. This implies that networks connecting the countries of immigration to the country of origin (diaspora-homeland networks) are an evidence to the diaspora. However, it is the nature of such these networks that determines the diaspora.

This really applies to the case of Palestinians in the diaspora who suffered from the catastrophe of emigration and asylum. They were mostly uprooted in 1948 and 1967 and dispersed across many regions, including many who turned into refugees. Some argue that the Palestinian diaspora is not as old as the Armenian or Jewish diaspora for instance. Nevertheless, it could be historically traced back to pre-1948 period. The majority of Palestinians who voluntarily or forcibly emigrated in the mid-nineteenth century could not return to Palestine as a result of being designated as Turks.¹⁰⁰ Thus, both groups of Palestinians, Palestinian immigrants in pre-1948 period and Palestinians who were displaced in 1948 and 1967, are considered diaspora communities due to their inability to return to their homeland. The Palestinians who were forced out of Kuwait in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in 1990/1991 could also be designated as diaspora Palestinians.

⁹⁸ Isabelle Rigoni, "Les migrants de Turquie : Réseaux ou diaspora?" *l'Homme et la Société*, no. 125 (1997): 39-57. [In French].

⁹⁹ Al-Badawi, Al-Mullatham, *Speakers of the Arabic Language in South America* (Beirut: Rayhani Printing and Publication House, 1956).

¹⁰⁰ Adnan Musallam, "The formative stages of Palestinian Arab immigration to Latin America and immigrants' quest for return and for Palestinian citizenship in the early 1920s," In *Latin Americans with Palestinian roots*, ed. Voila Raheb (Bethlehem: Diyar Publisher, 2012), 15-24.

Palestinian people are dispersed across all continents. Palestinians in the diaspora outnumber their counterparts who are still living in their homeland—the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel (since 1948). Nevertheless, Palestinians in the diaspora formed closely related groups as a result of the calamities that befell them throughout history. Inspired by popular imagination and narrative, they maintain connections to a certain location, such as Jerusalem (the desired capital of a future Palestinian state), a certain hometown, or all of Historical Palestine, from which they derive and maintain their collective identity.¹⁰¹

According to Safran, a homeland underlies the collective memory of diaspora communities and creates racial, sectarian, and perhaps religious solidarity among their members. It imposes or determines the cultural, social, political and economic stereotypes that diaspora communities should live. Emigrants feel a strong sense of nostalgia for the life they had left behind in their homeland. This intensifies emigrants' sense of diaspora and expatriation as they are convinced that (1994: 83) "they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host society."¹⁰²

Accordingly, based on Clifford (1994:310), "the historical roots and destinies outside the time or space of the host nations"¹⁰³ mean that the diasporic communities have the desire to return to a homeland as part of an ongoing transnational solidarity. It is the strongest point of a diasporic community, even when the governments of host countries work (hardly) to integrate immigrants.¹⁰⁴

Despite the dream of returning to their homeland, in reality, many diasporic communities cannot return. Perhaps they no longer have any geographical homeland to which they can return. Perhaps their return is not welcome or their integration into the societies of diaspora has hindered their return. In the case of diaspora Palestinians, their return is impossible for two combinations of reasons. The first combination pertains to the policies of countries of immigration, diaspora and asylum. It is difficult for Palestinians to return as a result of being forcibly naturalized in countries

¹⁰¹ Yasemin N. Soysal, "Citizenship and identity: Living in Diasporas in Post War Europe," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no.1 (2000): 1-15.

¹⁰² William Safran, "Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no.1 (1991): 83-99.

¹⁰³ James Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no.3 (1994): 302-338.

¹⁰⁴ Myron Weiner, "Labour Migrations as incipient Diaspora," in *Modern Diasporas in international politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 43- 74.

such as Jordan and foreign countries, or by obtaining refugee cards in the majority of Arab countries, especially Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. The second combination pertains to the homeland being fragmented into Israel (since 1948) and occupied Palestinian territories.

This fragmentation implies that part of Palestinians in the diaspora are awaiting a return to a homeland to be established based on 1967 borders. Perhaps they can return to this homeland. The other part of Palestinians in the diaspora don't have any geographical homeland where they can return to. Their original hometowns have become home to another nation. Nevertheless, they cherish the memory and a hope to return to their homeland. According to Bruneau (2006), migrant in the diaspora, feels the need to return to his/her territory of origin, to the place where he/she was born and where his/her ancestors are buried, that is, his/her "homeland".¹⁰⁵

The dream of return makes Palestinian diaspora durable and distinctive. In other words, the homeland and the desire to return to it are constructed in such a way that reinforces diasporic life.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, living in dispersion depends on one's original identity through the "collective consciousness", which can help construct or re-construct the identity of dispersed people in the diaspora.¹⁰⁷ Besides, the restoration of one's homeland should not be taken only to mean the creation of a nation-state, or even the will to make a return a reality. The homeland may remain part of one's imagination. It doesn't necessarily indicate any direct political ambition or the return of the people in question. Collective memory according to Malkki (1992: 28) "is linked to the warm relation to place and geography."¹⁰⁸

There is a need to understand the diaspora and the dream of returning. Diaspora largely refers to the social, political, economic, and cultural relations and exchanges between migrants, the country of diaspora, and the homeland.¹⁰⁹ These relations and networks reflect the migrants'

¹⁰⁵ Michel Bruneau, "Les territoires de l'identité et la mémoire collective en diaspora," *L'Espace géographique* 4 (2006): 328-333. [In French].

¹⁰⁶ Dalia Abdelhady, "Representing the homeland: Lebanese diasporic notions of home and return in a global context," *Cultural Dynamics* 20, no.1 (2008): 53-72.

¹⁰⁷ Leif O. Manger & Munzoul A. Assal, *Diasporas within and without Africa: Dynamism, heterogeneity, variation* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2006).

¹⁰⁸ Liisa Malkki, "National Geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialisation of national identity among scholars and refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992): 24-44.

¹⁰⁹ Kim Butler, "Defining diaspora, refining a discourse," *Diaspora* 10, no.2 (2001): 189-218.

multiple loyalties to the host countries and their homeland. This intersection of relations makes both a migrant's host country and homeland one society which allows migrants to prosper and make achievements despite their conditions of dispersion.¹¹⁰ These networks might include other migrants. They are expanded and intensified by the dispersion of migrants, especially those belonging to the same family, across more than a country of diaspora. This means that migrants could have one nation-state or several nation-states at the same time.

This means that migrants could be simultaneously loyal to several nation-states or consider the world as one nation-state. This introduces a new concept of diaspora or a new way of living dispersion. Despite the changes in the concept and state of dispersion, the Palestinian dispersion is still subject to political limitations. The majority of Palestinians in the diaspora are refugees who are still waiting for the decision on their fate (self-determination), while the rest are still subject to the policies of countries of diaspora.

For some, such transnational networks stand against domination.¹¹¹ An immigrant is usually perceived as someone who has assimilated or is living as an expatriate in the host society. Nevertheless, some researchers argue that transnational networks have created the postmodern migrant. This begs the question as to whether there are prerequisites for the creation of such networks. In the case of Palestinian diaspora, Gonzalez conditioned that Palestinian migrants in Honduras obtain citizenships of their country of diaspora and country of origin in order to create transnational networks.¹¹²

In reality, this is a necessary condition for the case of Palestinian migrants. Without this condition, Palestinian migrants could not return to their homeland or participate in the political process (i.e. run for and vote in elections). On the other hand, many Palestinians in the diaspora, especially in Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, are experiencing harsh economic

¹¹⁰ Samdar Lavie & Ted Swedenburg, "Introduction: Displacement, diaspora, and geographies of identity," in *Displacement, Diasporas, and geographies of identity*, (eds.) Samdar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 1-25.

¹¹¹ Linda G. Basch, Nina G. Schiller, & Cristina S. Blanc, *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states* (London: Routledge, 1994).

¹¹² Nancie Gonzalez, *Dollar, dove and eagle: One hundred years of Palestinian migration to Honduras* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

condition in camps. As a result, they could not establish relations with their homeland, especially on the economic level. Thereby, the contribution of diaspora Palestinians remains minor on the economic, cultural, and social levels.

This means that Palestinian cross-border activities are still mostly cyber, which fails to fully realize the concepts of nation-state and transnational migration. In order for them to become active citizens, Palestinians need to obtain legal documents (i.e. a Palestinian or Israeli passport) and have a political body (i.e. an independent state) that enacts legislation on the role and recruitment of the diaspora. This conflicts with Paul (1997) that transnationalism focuses on both countries (home and host countries) as a single arena for migrants' social, economic and political action.¹¹³ This is demonstrated with continuous remittances, transnational marriages, investments, visits, return and civil society involvement in origin countries.

Furthermore, diaspora entails a variety of experiences. Fragmentation, homelessness, and displacement participate in the process of creation of diaspora identification through produce activities and expression by migrants. Accordingly, diaspora is a social form, a type of identification and a mode of cultural expression that not only involves the emigrant community, but also the host society and the homeland (country of origin). This allows reaching a better understanding of individuals or groups experiencing contradictory processes of assimilation as well as ethnic retention in the diaspora.

Assimilation is defined as an aspect of immigrants' integration into host societies. Through assimilation, immigrants are expected to abandon their own cultural features and social practices in order to become members of the new society.¹¹⁴ Pluralism is the paths adopted by host societies to help immigrants integrate. They are accepted as ethnic minorities with distinctive features, such as language, culture and social behaviour, in the broader multicultural society.¹¹⁵ Cultural pluralism stresses the importance of maintaining racial and sectarian solidarity within the minority. In the

¹¹³ Paul Stoller, "Globalizing method: The problems of doing ethnography in transnational spaces," *Anthropology and Humanism* 22, no.1 (1997): 81-94.

¹¹⁴ Stephen Castles, "Multicultural citizenship: A response to the dilemma of globalization and national Identity?" *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 18, no.1 (1997): 5-22.

¹¹⁵ Nathan Glazer & Daniel Moynihan, *Beyond the melting pot. The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York city* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970).

meantime, it focuses on unequal relations between a minority and the majority's culture. This could lead to the so-called identity crisis.

The current complex meanings of "identity" are mostly derived from Erik Erikson's work during the 1950s. By the 1970s, "identity" used in this sense had acquired a highly successful life of its own in ordinary language and many social science disciplines. Under the influence of postmodernism and debates on multiculturalism, historians, anthropologists, and most of all humanities scholars came to rely more heavily on "identity" as they explored the cultural politics of race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, citizenship, and other social categories in the late 1980s and 1990s. Whereas personal identity indicates one's characteristics, collective identity indicates the characteristics one shares with a group of people. One would classify himself or herself within categories or groups; a practice that is called self-identification and occasionally categorization. Thus, an individual can simultaneously possess one or more identities that mostly dominate his/her personal identity.

As for identity, many definitions are formulated to explain the concept of identity. According to Deng (1995: 1), "identity" can be used to describe "the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture."¹¹⁶ While Hogg and Abrams (1988: 2) state: "the identity is people's concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others."¹¹⁷ Jenkins defines identity similar to the last context (1996: 4), stating that identity "refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities."¹¹⁸ It can be concluded that "identity" means a social category and is defined based on membership rules, characteristics or expected behaviours. It could also mean a socially distinguishing feature that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable, but socially consequential, or both.

¹¹⁶ Francis M. Deng, *War of visions: Conflict of identities in the Sudan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995).

¹¹⁷ Michael Hogg & Dominic Abrams, *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes* (London: Routledge, 1988).

¹¹⁸ Richard Jenkins, *Social identity* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).

Relevant studies have mostly raised the issue of racial identity as a fundamental component of self-definition. Works by theorists such as William Cross on African American identity exemplify the approach to this form of categorization and identification. In this regard, Pope-Davis, Liu, Ledesma-Jones, and Nevitt (2000: 101) stated that "identification with one's racial and cultural group represents a complex process."¹¹⁹

Hence, Taylor (1992) called for the development of the policy of the recognition of the other. He just considered that cultural ethnicities, minorities and differences are "known".¹²⁰ It is sufficient that cultural ethnicities, minorities, and differences gain formal recognition, and positive policies are adopted in their favour. The preliminary conditions for implementing this policy entail various forms of democracy expansion, and the recognition of the other. The cultural pluralism trend could be considered an answer, albeit insufficient, to some of the problems encountering immigrants and minorities in host society.

Historically, pluralism has played a positive role as a method to deal with ethnic and cultural minorities in the United States. It has defied, albeit partly, the dominant culture. However, this attitude toward pluralism has shifted into a concept of political guidance that attempts to change the marginal status of minorities. In Canada, there are several methods that are applied for the definition of cultural pluralism. One form of cultural pluralism is integrative (integration-based). It means that there is no division between cultural issues and economic issues. Those who adopted such policies are not only interested in cultural difference, but also in economic practice. The experience of the United States has another form of cultural pluralism. The problem is no longer cultural recognition, but the action intended to address racial discrimination-based social gaps. Thus, cultural pluralism in the United States is restricted to the policies of acceptance toward immigrants and the creation of job opportunities.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ D. B Pope-Davis, W. M. Liu, S. Ledesma-Jones, & J. Nevitt, "African American acculturation and Black racial identity: A preliminary investigation," *Journal of Multicultural Counselling and Development* 28, no.2 (2000): 98–112.

¹²⁰ Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).

¹²¹ Nathan Glazer, *We are all multiculturalists now* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

On the other hand, many still believe that migrants' transnational practices frequently reflect the lack of understanding and the absence of racial pluralism in host societies. It should be noted that the diaspora has become a dominant or familiar situation of social behaviour in the globalisation era. This begs the question as to whether the integration practices designed to accommodate immigrants in each host society vary according to the nature of the host society's culture. It also begs the question as to whether an immigrant or refugee remains as such, irrespective of the migration and asylum destination.

Therefore, the framework of diaspora promises valuable contributions to such analyses, as it signifies the multiple loyalties and identities possessed by members of migrant communities. In an increasingly globalized world, we need to understand the effects of migration within a global space and orientation¹²² that move beyond national boundaries and cultures.¹²³ Thus the understanding of cultures and societies within a global framework has to address issues of identity, solidarity and culture within a multidimensional, unbounded, and transitory approach.

The final step here, in order to understand and analyse the relation between migrants, and between migrants and homeland, the network analysis is considered one of the most important approaches, which depends on social structure as a central component of sociological analysis. Social structure is considered one of the most important components of social theories developed by Durkheim, Parsons, Levi Strauss, Max Weber, and Martin among others.¹²⁴ Social networks are defined as a system that is based on inter-personal and inter-group social relations or ties. The generality of this broad definition falls under networks, i.e. formations or systems even if not institutionalized.

¹²² Linda G. Basch, Nina G. Schiller, &, Cristina S. Blanc, *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states* (London: Routledge, 1994).

¹²³ M. Kearney, "The local and the global: The anthropology of globalization and transnationalism," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 547–565.

¹²⁴ Karen Cook & Joseph M. Whitmeyer, "Two approaches to social structure: Exchange theory and network analysis," *Annual Journal of Sociology* 18 (1992): 109-127.

According to Barry Wellman, network analysis is not defined as a set of techniques, but as an analytical perspective that focuses on inter-personal and inter-group relations.¹²⁵ The most important characteristic of network analysis is that it does not examine the modelling of inter-personal relations, but it does examine that of inter-group relations as complex networks.

Network analysis utilizes one of two strategies: The first strategy focuses on direct and indirect links among actors, explaining some behaviours or developments through social ties. Within the context of this strategy, robust, dense, and relatively isolated social networks facilitate the development of uniform subcultures and robust collective identities. Weak ties can build bridges in structural holes, which are places where relations among network actors are lacking, which is an important component of the network structure and characteristics.

The second strategy focuses on the nature of actors' ties with a third party. This strategy suits some behaviours and developments within the context of the model of what an actor's relations defines in regards to other actors across a social system. Thus, positional analysis underlines the importance of joint relations that some actors could have with a third party, without necessarily having relations among these actors. This is called structural equivalence, which plays a significant role in the attempt to understand individual and collective behaviour.

In order to understand applications of the above discussion, one could refer to *Here and There: Toward Analyzing the Relation between the Diaspora and Palestinian Center*, a field study conducted by Sari Hanafi in 2001 based on the network analysis approach. The study focuses on the social structure of Palestinian economic elite or businessmen in the Diaspora, especially in Europe (England and France), UAE and Israel. It seeks to explore whether the nature of Palestinian entrepreneurship is a form of ethnic or individual economy. It attempts to understand the Diaspora-Palestinian centre relation through addressing the weak "pull factors" across the occupied Palestinian territories as well as exploring investment-hindering factors that are related to the diasporic Palestinian communities' nature, and identity formations in particular. The study attempts to do so because cross-national relations among businessmen have investment capabilities that are key to Palestinian entity building.

¹²⁵ Barry Wellman, "The community question: The intimate networks of East Yorkers," *American Journal of Sociology* 84, no.5 (1979): 1201-1231.

Accordingly, this research focuses on the experiences of diasporic communities whose members share an awareness of the community's historical existence around the world. Diaspora as a term is used as an analytical tool to describe the multi-layered and contradictory forms of expression experienced by migrants in the host countries and in the diaspora-homeland relations. Furthermore, this research examines how migrants' networks, practices, and identities are affected by the difference of the country of diaspora. In addition, the research seeks to explore how geography is an important factor in the status of the diaspora and the practices of diaspora communities (social networks, transnationalism, and expressing identities).

3. Study Area

As Palestinian Christians are dispersed in several countries, Jordan and the United States were selected for the purpose of this study. The selection of both countries was based on demographic, geographic, and perhaps cultural bases. This enabled the researcher to compare the status of dispersion (diaspora) in both countries.


In Jordan, Palestinians constitute approximately 60% of the total population,¹²⁶ 70-80% are concentrated in Amman and al-Zarqa governorate and its suburbs, while the others are distributed across all governorates, especially in Jerash and Irbid.¹²⁷ There are approximately 239,000 Christians (3.68% of the total population: 157,541 Christians (65.71 %) who hail from Jordanian origins and 81,962 Christians (34.29 %) who hail from Palestinian origins),¹²⁸ concentrated in Amman, Karak, Madaba, Fuhais, al-Salt and al-Zarqa. Map 7 shows the first study area in Jordan.

¹²⁶ Christina Zacharia, "Power in numbers: A call for a census of the Palestinian people," *al-Siyaṣa al-Filastiniyya [Palestinian Politics]* 3, no.2 (1996): 172-188. [In Arabic].

¹²⁷ Yazid Y. Sayegh, *Jordan and the Palestinians* (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1987), 35.

¹²⁸ Hanna Kildani, "A Population Study of Christians in Jordan," *Al-Rai Jordanian Newspaper* (4 July 2015).


Map 7: Amman Governorate -Jordan



The second study area is the United States. Despite being very far away from Palestine, the United States has 200,000-250,000 Palestinians across all states. California is ranked the highest

with about 19,000 Palestinians (7% of the total population of Palestinians in the US),¹²⁹ who are based mainly in Los Angeles and San Francisco Bay as outlined in Map 8.

Map 8: San Francisco Bay Area- the US



¹²⁹ Arab American Institute (AAI), The American Community Survey (ACS), 2012. These Data were based on the U.S. Census Bureau from 1980 and 2000. See the website: www.aaiusa.org.

The selection of these two countries is also based on cultural and religious factors. Palestinian Christians share the same religious beliefs with the West from the one hand and the same culture and history with the East from the other hand. Christian Arabs, including Palestinians, have played a role in the rationalization of extremism in both cultures and facilitated interaction despite all harsh conditions that befell them as a result of this role.

On the other hand, both regions (Jordan and the US) have some similarities that have played a prominent role in the selection process. Represented by the capital of Amman, Jordanian society is a collection of immigrant groups. Not only is it composed of Jordanians, but it is also composed of Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians, and Egyptians. The same applies to California, which is basically a society composed of Italian, Spanish, Mexican, Philippine and Arab immigrants. In both societies, the legal status of Palestinians is similar as they are naturalized.

This does not mean the existence of Palestinians, including Christians, is restricted to these two regions. The states of Latin America, especially Chile, is the region where the largest number of Palestinians, especially Christians, exist. Palestinians also have considerable presence in Lebanon, Syria, and the Arab Gulf states. However, it was impossible to reach out to Palestinians in these regions (states) due to the current political and security conditions.

4. Hybrid Methodology

Although the geographic and sociological nature of this study, the nature of the examined theme focusing on migration and diaspora compelled the researcher to utilize more than one methodology and research tool. Although these methodologies may appear to contradict one another, they actually complement one another. The methodologies are: reviewing demographics, conducting interviews, filling out questionnaires, taking photos, and making field observations.

The researcher first went to the archives, particularly statistical archives. She managed to obtain unpublished demographics. She had the opportunity to extract and calculate data and numbers that were not published in detail. This step was significant, as it underlined the study and provided a justification for the selection of the migration of Palestinian Christians as the study subject.

The array of statistics about numbers and percentages of Palestinian Christians starting in the late Ottoman period must be thoroughly examined and explored from the outset. In fact, it is very difficult to adopt statistics from the Ottoman period, given the array of statistics and estimates issued by some European demographers, such as Robinson (1970) and Gotteil (1979). Other statistics were extracted out of the archives of foreign consulates, such as the French Consulate's archive of 1847 and the German Consulate's archive of 1861. Other statistics were presented by some Middle East researchers, such as Scholch (1985) and Karpas (1978). As a result of being based on various statistical sources, these statistics are divergent and contradictory, particularly in terms of the numbers of Christians. They were issued in order to contest the accuracy of Ottoman statistics, but finally, the researcher insisted on the inclusion of the Ottoman statistics extracted from the official Ottoman census records. She accessed these records with difficulty because they are overall official, documented, and were issued by an impartial official census bureau. She also accessed statistics issued by the British Mandate, Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian census bureaus in several locations and sources. She has closely examined the numbers and percentages of Palestinian Christians from the late Ottoman period to the present in order to reveal the declining rate of Palestinian Christians' numbers and percentages in their homeland due to migration.

The second component was supporting archives. When the researcher went to supporting archives, she reviewed some documents that had been published by institutions, especially Palestinian ecclesiastical and national institutions. She also examined a special file containing the documents issued about Jerusalem by the Vatican. She figured out the nature of the relation developed by the church as a religious and national institution. She also figured out the Church's attitude on the Palestinian cause and its role supporting a Christian presence in Historical Palestine.

This step was followed by the development of a questionnaire with a focus on the main points underlying Christians' migration based on the study's questions. The questionnaire consists of three sections: networks between migrants in the diaspora and networks between the diaspora and the homeland; living in the diaspora; and identities that have been maintained or adopted by migrants. (See Appendix 1.)

Direct contact was established with several friends and families living in Palestine, as well as through some churches and Christian clergy. In addition, indirect contact was established with

emigrants via members and officials of emigrant organizations and associations living in Palestine. Contacts were maintained also with some emigrants in the diaspora via email and social media. These broad contacts were conducted over a period of about nine months. They helped the researcher create a preliminary sample of organizer migrants, families, and associations throughout the United States and Jordan as a prelude to commence fieldwork.

As a first step after she travelled to the first study area—the San Francisco Bay area—the researcher coordinated with organizer migrants using phone calls in order to organize the field work. She stayed two months (1 March – 1 May 2015) in San Francisco Bay, two months (1 June – 1 August 2015) in Amman, and another two months in Palestine.

The researcher started by introducing emigrant individuals and families to her Ph.D. draft study. To this end, she arranged meetings with as many migrants as possible in order to build trust and win their confidence. She held a preliminary meeting with a group of migrants at the Ramallah Club, the Latin (Roman Catholic) church and a women's group in San Francisco. In Jordan, she met a group of migrants with help of the Greek Orthodox Church in Sweifeih, the Latin (Roman Catholic) Church in Jabal Al-Weibdeh, and another group at the Orthodox Education Society. This process was how she established contact with the first group in the study sample.

Although the researcher made contact with prospective interviewees in preparation for interviews, it was not easy to conduct such interviews. The difficulty arose from the migrants' preoccupation with work, lack of free time, and the fact that their places of residence were very remote—especially in the US. In some cases, some migrants refused to be interviewed. Some of them considered this study as politically motivated, while others considered it as personal.

The date and place of interviews were set over phone, and were mostly conducted in the migrants' houses, while a small number of interviews were conducted in restaurants or migrants' workplaces. Each interview lasted three to four hours. It was conducted in Arabic in the case of migrants across Jordan and in both Arabic and English in the case of migrants across the US.

In terms of interview documentation, the researcher wrote down the answers to the interviews questions instead of recording them. That was because some of the interviewees would not consent to having their interviews be recorded, fearing that the recordings might later be used for non-

scientific purposes (especially the quotations that express their political positions). Therefore, the researcher opted to respect the interviewees' desire and only write answers down.

Each interview could be divided into two parts. Part one of each interview is narrative. The migrant's family, especially parents, have narrated their migration story. They have highlighted the reasons and mechanisms of migration, as well as the paths they had followed until reaching their current place of settlement. Other members of a migrant's family, such as migrant brothers, sisters and uncles, were also involved in the narration.

Oral narratives are considered a third type of archives. Through oral narratives, the researcher managed to access off-the-record information without being subject to the censorship of any institution or government authority. Stated another way, since the interviewees had the liberty to speak, the interviewees' narratives were very objective and reflected their personal experiences. Therefore, the researchers refrained from identifying the real names of interviewees, fearing that their legal and political security and safety would be at stake. So, she used initials instead.

Each interviewee migrant family is an individual case that presents a unique migration and diaspora experience. Despite the similarity of some narration details, scientifically and logically, these families constituted the study sample. Each migrant family was the area of focus of the study.

Part two of each interview is a controlled interview featuring the pre-planned questionnaire. The questions were answered by the father and occasionally by the mother (first-generation migrants). In some cases, a second-generation migrant answered the questions, which focused on the migrants' personal experience on the diaspora. The questions sought information on a migrant's concept and sense of identity as well as the extent of their contacts with the homeland.

Thus, the study sample was intended to be selective and inclusive. Information about sexes, ages, generations, families and place of origins were obtained utilizing the snow ball approach.

The diverse sample specifications, particularly regarding emigrant generations and migratory periods, gave the researcher the chance to compare between emigrants in terms of their trends and diverse diaspora, identity and networks experiences as well as their social, economic and political integration into the various diaspora societies.

It is worth mentioning that the size or total number of the population of Palestinian Christians was not identified in the surveyed areas, making it impossible for the researcher to interview all migrants. The researcher interviewed a sufficient number of migrants of one hundred and twelve, split evenly between Amman and San Francisco. She was also introduced different cases of migrant families in both areas. It is worth noting the study is not ultimately intended to make generalizations. (See Appendix 2.)

Moreover, more than fifty interviews were conducted with academics, clerics, politicians, mayors, officials of associations and clubs or their representatives in San Francisco, Amman, and Historic Palestine. In conclusion, the study was based on three samples, each of which served one of the study goals. Taken together, the samples served the main question of the study.

In light of the above, the study arguably conjoins quantitative and qualitative statistical approaches in interviews which are in-depth and similar to the interviews used for the psychology and anthropology case study approach. The interviews follow the narrative approach, which is used in recording oral history. This introduces a new hybrid approach of "group case study." Palestinian Christians are a religious group that share some general fundamental issues with other groups. They are treated as a single unit that is examined through reviewing literature and statistical records. The families comprising this group are cases that are examined through the narration of the migration story and subsequent events. Members of this group are considered individuals who are examined using the questionnaire and statistical approach.

The researcher analysed the data using several methods. Some data were presented in the form of GIS designed maps, while some in the form of Excel and SPSS-designed statistical tables and formats (graphs). Still some data were presented in the form of excerpts for the purpose of presenting various experiences of diaspora and refuge. The researcher also took photographs during the field work for documentation and credibility purposes. In some cases, she used photographs that had been taken by institutions.

5. Study Chapters

The study is divided into four main chapters. Chapter one presents Palestinian Christians' migration experience to Jordan (Amman) and the US (San Francisco Bay). It focuses on the causes, paths and mechanisms of their emigration from Palestine. This chapter presents different reasons of emigration, which could be normal political, economic, social, and family-related reasons. Most importantly, it presents the shifts of Palestinian migration in general and reviews the role of cross-border migrations in changing the legal status of Palestinian migrants in particular. This chapter also reviews the role of family networks in the accumulation of migration to the extent many families became concentrated in the diaspora. So, a certain level of the migration culture has arguably started to infiltrate the minds of individuals.

Chapter two focuses on the theme of diaspora. It describes the societies that migrants form in the diaspora and addresses their transformations. Subsequently, it addresses the different connotations of the diaspora. This chapter describes the early communities inhabited by migrants in the diaspora in terms of their bases. As a result of sharing the same migration experience, origin, religion, or being members of the same family, migrants were compelled to establish temporary emergency communities. Such communities were concentrated in poor areas, while the locations of others were determined by the migrants' work. Following the improvement of their economic conditions, many migrants relocated to other areas. It should be noted that such communities were not exclusive to Palestinians, but they were populated by a mix of people. Then, the chapter discusses families in the diaspora and how their diaspora status is related to their legal status and citizenship rights. It also discusses the nature of relations among members of families in the diaspora and their future, presenting four patterns of diaspora families. It also addresses the following questions: Is the sense of diaspora temporary or permanent? Is it only related to first-generation migrants? What is the relations between the sense of diaspora and the loss of one's homeland? Could this sense be remembered?

Chapter three addresses the migrants' networks in the countries of immigration, namely Jordan and the United States. The presentation starts with the social, religious, cultural, political, and national networks that taking the form of clubs, associations, institutions, and churches. They carry out various activities intended to maintain a certain level of relations among migrants from

the one hand and between migrants and their homeland from the other hand. The chapter also presents transnational economic networks that have been set up by some businessmen in the diaspora for the purpose of development in the homeland. It is necessary to highlight the theme of crossing transnational borders in this chapter. Through crossing transnational borders, migrants voice their social, familial, economic, and religious loyalties. The chapter also addresses the role of technological evolution in social media in establishing connections between migrants and their homeland.

Chapter four addresses the topic of identity. Given the complexity of this topic, some relevant themes related to the identity of Palestinians in the diaspora are selected for the study. One of these themes is the endogamy of Palestinian migrants. The study attempts to explore how Palestinian migrants' marry spouses who share the same background and religion as a means to maintain their cultural identity and heritage in the diaspora. It also attempts to explore how this type of marriage is passed down as a practice from generation to generation. The chapter also addresses the role of churches and religious institutions in safeguarding the religious and national identity on the local, regional, and global levels. It also addresses the political identity of migrants, highlighting how they participate in political life in the diaspora societies while at the same time, cherish a sense of patriotism to their homeland. The final part of this chapter presents the identities of migrants, highlighting how they identity themselves in the diaspora and how this identification is related to the degree of emigrants' integration in the diaspora.

Chapter Two

Re-Mapping Migration in Relation to Familial Networks

Section I: Forced Emigrations as a Result of Israeli-Arab Wars and Political Events in Neighbouring Arab States

Section II: Economic Migrations Lunched in Conjunction with Global Migration in the 19th Century

Section III: Seeking High and Specialized Education: A Chosen Opportunity to Migration

Section IV: The Family Life Saturated by the Culture of Migration

1. Forced emigrations as a result of Israeli-Arab wars and political events in neighbouring Arab states

1.1 Introduction

Refugees or forced emigrants are usually perceived as the outcome of waves of movements caused by a host of drivers. However, several recent studies have emphasized the role of international relations and government policies in the creation of such waves,¹³⁰ which also involves the dynamics generated by refugees and displaced people. As a result of the prolonged state of displacement and dispersion across different countries with divergent policies, refugees and displaced people have experienced diverse forms of such movements.

Although most forced emigrations occur within the contexts of socioeconomic and political forces, Castle & Miller (1993:8) considered them as "a systemic reaction of ephemeral geopolitical changes, a wide range of socioeconomic conditions such as: globalization, acceleration, differentiation lead to migration also."¹³¹

Migration is defined as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence, where a person can migrate many times, for varied durations, and across numerous territorial, regional, and international locations. Refugees and asylum seekers have limited choices about whether and how to relocate, or if they have the financial means to do so.¹³² Accordingly, migration, whether forced or voluntary, must be understood as collective processes that include key groups, institutions, agencies, and networks that affect relocation options.¹³³

¹³⁰ Gil Loescher, "Introduction: Refugee issue in international relation(s)," in *Refugees and international relation(s)*, eds., Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1-33.

¹³¹ Stephen Castles & Mark J. Miller, *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world* (New York: Guilford Press, 1993).

¹³² Robert Gardner, "Macro level influences on the migration decision process," in *Migration decision making*, eds. G. De Jong and R. Gardner (New York: Pergamum Press, 1981), 59- 89.

¹³³ Lynne Snowden, "Collective versus mass behaviour: A conceptual framework for temporary and permanent migration in Western Europe and the United States," *International Migration Review* 24 (1990): 577-590.

This section seeks to explore the relation between forced migrations and refugee status experienced by Palestinian Christians and familial networks developed in the countries of diaspora. In other words, this section attempts to answer the question as to whether familial networks could be considered one of the dynamics that altered the refugees and displaced people's status. At the outset of this section, one must theoretically address the refugees issue as they form a social system.

1.2 A comprehensive approach of Palestinian refugees and migrants case

More than sixty five years after the establishment of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), a significant number of Palestinians still live in camps, and others are forced to move again and again.

The concepts of refugee and refugee status have evolved so that the definition of a "Palestinian refugees" is not necessarily tied to living in a refugee camp. Its meaning varies from one refugee to another and from one state of refuge to another based on the political, legal, social, and economic conditions. Lissa Malkki (1995: 496) refers to this as following:

"The refugee do not constitute a naturally self-delimiting domain of anthropological knowledge. Forced population movements have extraordinarily diverse historical and political causes and involve people who, while all displaced, find themselves in qualitatively different situations and predicaments. Thus, it would seem that the term refugee has analytical usefulness not as a label for special, generalizable "kind" or "type" of person or situation, but only as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it a world of different socioeconomic statuses, personal histories, and psychological or spiritual situation. Involuntary or forced movements of people are always only one aspect of much larger constellations of socio-political and cultural processes and practices."¹³⁴

As transnational migration developed, refugees and displaced people have attempted to conduct transnational activities in order to adapt to the new setting. However, these activities have been subject to the policies of host and countries of immigration. They were also restricted by the

¹³⁴ Lissa H. Malkki, "Refugees and exile: from "Refugee Studies" to the national order of things," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495-523.

refugees' economic and social conditions. Thus, refugee status has remained as such in view of their ongoing quest for a safe place for settlement. Refugees maintain a distinctive relationship to their homeland since they were forcibly displaced from it, as well as a distinctive relationship with the host country which became their temporary homeland.

Seteney Shami refers to the difficulty of differentiation between forced and voluntary migration. She believes that "displacement mostly causes labour migration as a strategy of adaptation."¹³⁵ Palestinian displaced people and refugees initially lead a life of misery in refugee camps and slums across neighbouring host countries, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Many eventually became rich and obtained Arab (Jordanian) or foreign nationalities.

However, Palestinian refugees constitute the oldest refugee community who don't (legally) belong to any state. In contrast, Palestinian non-refugee emigrants have been granted citizenship in their countries of immigration. The majority of both Palestinian refugees and non-refugee emigrants cannot return to their homeland because they lack the citizenship of their homeland, whether Palestinian or Israeli. Accordingly, they have sustained or strengthened kinship networks as a center of social organization in the diaspora, thanks to their geographical concentration as well as legal and political status in the host countries. Thus, "kinship networks are one of the few means available for the refugees who have been deprived of their basic rights."¹³⁶

In a study about Palestinian refugee emigrants across Lebanon camps, Europe, the Arab Gulf countries, and Iraq, Dorai (2008) concludes not only are these emigrations forced, but they are also transnational, involving Palestinian communities across different regions. Migration networks have served as a source of solidarity among members of the same family in the diaspora or refugee camp. Palestinian refugees required such solidarity in order to circumvent the legal constraints they are

¹³⁵ Seteney Shami, "The social implications of population displacement and resettlement: An overview with a focus on the Arab Middle East," *International Migration Review* 27, no. 101 (1993): 4-33.

¹³⁶ Mohamad K. Dorai, "Les parcours migratoires des refugies vers la Suède et L'Europe du nord," *Revue d'études palestiniennes* 75, no. 23 (2000): 38-52. [In French].

subject to across refugee camps in Lebanon and to acquire a legal status. Thus, sources of kinship are sources of migration.¹³⁷

1.3 Tracks of transnational migration promoted by the legal conditions of refugees and emigrants

The section attempts to explore migratory tracks and driving forces of Palestinians' forced emigration to Jordan and the US. It attempts to answer the question whether migratory driving forces were political, familial, or geographic and whether the migratory track was direct or transitional. It also attempts to explore the differences between immigration to Jordan and immigration to the US in terms of migration routes.

According to interviews, despite the expansion and development of global and transnational migrations, Palestinians are still forcibly displaced from their hometowns since the late of Ottoman up to present. Thus, Palestinian migration, including Christian migration, is still mostly forced. Palestinian migration and migratory destinations have been largely affected by the political events in their homeland and the region. This means Palestinian migrants have gone through more than one forced emigration experience. Some have gone through once such experience, while others have gone through three or more such experiences, noting that the study explores the reasons of their most recent migration.

Results of interviews show that 71.8% of families immigrated to Jordan, whereas 20.6% immigrated to the US as a result of wars and political turmoil, as shown in the table below:

¹³⁷ Mohamad K. Dorai, "Itinéraires de réfugiés palestiniens. Emigration et les réseaux familiaux comme ressource," in *Orders and identities: Transnational ties of the Palestinians Diaspora*, ed. Sari Hanafi (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al Wahda al Arabiya, 2008), 151- 170. [In French].

Table1: Wars and political events forced Palestinian Christians to emigrate
towards Jordan and the US

Political event	The US	Jordan
Engage in political parties	3.8%	6.9%
Al-Nakba War 1948	-	27.9%
Al-Naksa War 1967	-	9.3%
Black September War 1970 ¹³⁸	3.8%	-
Lebanese Civil War 1975 ¹³⁹	1.9%	2.3%
US-Libyan turmoil 1980s	-	2.3%
First Intifada 1987	7.6%	2.3%
Gulf war 1990 ¹⁴⁰	3.8%	16.2%
Second Intifada 2000	-	2.3%
Iraq War 2003	-	2.3%
Total	20.6%	71.8%


The tracks of forced emigration are characterized by two trends, as the following map shows. The first trend is related to Palestinians who had been forcibly displaced from their hometowns following the 1948 and 1967 wars. They initially settled in the West Bank or Jordan on a temporary basis before immigrating to the US. Their immigration was facilitated by the role of US-based familial networks. The second trend is related to Palestinians who immigrated (mostly voluntarily) to neighbouring Arab countries, such as Lebanon, the Arab Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Initially, they were forced to immigrate to Jordan. Their immigration was facilitated by two factors: availability of familial networks across Jordan and immigrants' acquisition of Jordanian citizenship, which allowed them to settle legally in Jordan. Their optimal solution was to immigrate to a nearby country (Jordan) since they had not anticipated the political events or the direct impact on them.

¹³⁸ Black September in 1970 was an eruption of military confrontation between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas, and the subsequent expulsion of Palestinian resistance from Jordan.

¹³⁹ The civil Lebanese war broke out due to reasons, one of which was the growing division between those Lebanese who supported the right of the Palestinian resistance to stage operations against Israel from Lebanese soil, and those who opposed it. The biggest bone of contention regarding the outbreak of the war is the role of the Palestinian armed presence that destabilized the Lebanese state.

¹⁴⁰ Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 posed a dilemma for Palestinians. By 1992, there were 400,000 Palestinians in Kuwait and many villages were dependent on their remittances.

Map 9: Tracks of forced emigration of Palestinian Christians towards Jordan and the US



What is important in this part is to explore how familial networks were utilized to guide forced emigrations and how emigrants have managed to make use of familial networks to resettle in the nearby or remote diaspora.

1.3.1 Escaping from military conscription

Many members of Palestinian families were forced to emigrate to escape conscription in the Ottoman military. They were concerned they would be killed in battlefields and would not be able to return to their homes. For instance, three conscript soldiers, identified as Salah Abu Ni'meh from Birzeit, and Yousef Saqel and Awad Mansour from Taybeh, were dispatched to fight in Turkey, compelling other to flee. For example, Qustandi Nazzal and As'ad 'Araj immigrated from their hometown of Taybeh to Chile and Hanna Jaser immigrated to Argentina. Additionally, Ibrahim Rabee', Issa Hilweh, Saqer Kaileh and Ya'coub Samander all immigrated from their hometown of Birzeit to Connecticut in 1910. Others identified as Farid Mezyed, Ishaq Abdullah and Butrous Kassis also immigrated from Birzeit to Massachusetts, while Ishaq Jeryes al-'Atiq and Ayoub Burbar immigrated to South America. Some of them did, ultimately, return to their homeland.¹⁴¹

1.3.2 Uprooting

In the aftermath of the 1948 War (*Nakba*), 70,000 Palestinian families were displaced from their hometowns to Jordan under Israeli army force. They mostly made their journey on foot and very few made it aboard tractors or buses. Displaced Palestinians in Jordan totalled 150,000 in 1952.¹⁴² An additional 226,000 Palestinians were displaced to Arab countries, mainly Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt, not to mention those who were internally displaced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Recounting the story of their displacement, some Palestinians said they were told by Israeli soldiers to "go to Abdullah," referring to King Abdullah I of Jordan—indicating that the displacement of Palestinians to Jordan was systematic. Recounting the story of the displacement of his family, O. H. (whom uprooted from Lidd, resident in Jordan) said:

¹⁴¹ Moussa Alloush, *Expatriates* (Birzeit Library, 1991), 10. [In Arabic].

¹⁴² Hassan Saleh, "Demographic conditions of the Palestinian people," *Encyclopaedia of Palestine*, part 1, (Beirut: Editorial Board of the Encyclopaedia of Palestine, 1990), 3.

"When the [1948] war broke out, I was studying in Beirut. My family, consisting of my parents and six brothers and sisters, remained in Lidd. As soon as the war broke out, Israeli military ordered them out of their homes to al-Bayader locality with pajamas. They told them: "Now, go to Abdallah." My family headed from Jemzo, Adh-Dhahiriya, Ni'lin (where they stayed for a night) and proceeded to Aboud, Birzeit, and Jerusalem, where they temporarily remained in St. John's Monastery. They eventually settled in al-Salt [in Jordan]."

This scenario happened once again during the June 1967 War (*Naksa*). During the course of the war, many Palestinian families and individuals were forced out of their homeland. Approximately 150,000 internally displaced Palestinian refugees were displaced once again to Jordan, experiencing refugee status twice. They had been forcibly displaced to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1948. An additional 240,000 Palestinian refugees were displaced to Jordan.¹⁴³ Recounting the circumstances surrounding the displacement of his family in 1967, I. Kh. (who forced to emigrant from Taybeh to Jordan) said:

"My father was serving in the Jordanian army. We used to live in Taybeh. As soon as June 1967 War erupted, we left our hometown of Taybeh on foot. We slept in a cave. We boarded a military vehicle and directly travelled to al-Ashrafiyya neighbourhood in Amman, where my uncle was working as a police officer."

In addition, Israeli authorities expelled some Palestinian political activists. The activists who were married were expelled with their families since they did not have a choice. Recounting the expulsion of his family, I. K. (an emigrant from Ramallah, who based in Jordan) said:

"My father was patriot. Following the 1967 war, [Palestinian] residents, including my father and uncle, started a grassroots national [liberation] movement. So, my uncle was detained and expelled to Jordan, while my father remained. I remember perfectly the moment Israeli soldiers broke into my family's house. They pushed me aside and proceeded to ransack the house. They made several accusations against my father, including transfer of firearms and involvement in resistance. So, they detained him. After coming under global pressure, they expelled him to Jordan, where the Palestinian resistance was at its most powerful. However, during [Black] September [the military confrontation between the Jordanian army and the

¹⁴³ *Palestine Refugees Today*, no. 135 (1994): 19.

Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan in September 1970, we fled to Lebanon before returning and settling in Jordan."

The eruption of the first and second *Intifada* (uprisings) in 1987 and 2000 also contributed to Palestinian forced emigration. However, this time, the Palestinian emigrants' selection of countries for immigration was based on familial networks. Recounting the immigration of her family, S. Sh. (an emigrant from Jifna based in the US) said:

"My family emigrated as a whole in 1993. My brother had already immigrated to the US. He prepared and submitted immigration documents [migrant visas] to the US Consulate on behalf of us. We emigrated as a result of the dire political situation in the West Bank. The popular uprising that broke out in 1987 was an impediment. Israeli Occupation Forces detained my children several times and disrupted university studies. As we had a small shop, we were forced by Israeli armies to pay 8,000 [Jordanian Dinars] in taxes. My brother covered our travel expenses to the US. He prepared an apartment in which we stayed for 10 days."

1.3.3 From refugee status to immigration

Palestinians were forcibly displaced to the West Bank and Jordan in the wake of the 1948 War (*Nakba*) and to Jordan in the wake of the 1967 War (*Naksa*). Following their forced displacement, many utilized established familial networks in order to immigrate to the US and unite their families. A. H. (who descends from Ramallah based in the US) recounted the story of his family's forced displacement and immigration:

"When the [Zionist militias] stormed Lidd, we fled to the neighbouring city of Ramallah on foot. We were expelled by [Zionist militias], who ordered us to flee to Jordan. Instead, we fled to Bethlehem, where my sister used to live. We remained in Bethlehem for two years. Following the 1967 War, my son, F.A., applied for an immigrant visa at the US Consulate. He immigrated. He was later joined by his brother, B. A., who obtained a visitor's visa in 1969. My wife and I applied for immigrant visas to the US. The visa applications were submitted on our behalf by our sons. We arrived in the US in 1980. We stayed at one of my son's homes. My brother, G.A., who had immigrated with his wife and children, stayed at my other son's home."

1.3.4 From immigration to deportation (forced emigration)

Some Palestinians had immigrated to the Arab Gulf countries, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan mostly for economic reasons. They said they were forced to emigrate to Jordan or the US. It became impossible for them to stay (in their homeland or initial host countries) as a result of the host states' policies, eruption of wars, and state of insecurity, which turned Palestinians who were initially emigrants into refugees. A. J. (an immigrant who is based in Jordan from Jifna), recounted his family's experience. He said:

"My father had several temporary jobs in Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq. He got a job offer in Kuwait. So, he and his family immigrated to Kuwait in 1953. We remained in Kuwait until 1990. During this period, the rest of my brothers were born. In the wake of the first Gulf War, we were forced to immigrate to Jordan. So, my parents, sister and I headed to Marka, where some of our relatives used to live. We rented a home there."

1.3.5 From immigration to return migrant, then to forced emigration

After working in a neighbouring state for a specific period, some Palestinian migrants decided to return to their homeland. They took this decision for two reasons. First, the majority of the migrants' family members were still in the homeland. Second, migrants had initially immigrated in order to earn some money or study with plans to return to their homeland. However, they forced to emigrate once again in the aftermath of the 1967 War or the first *Intifada* in 1987. N. O. (a Jordanian born to Palestinian parents and continues to live in Jordan) recounted the story of her family's emigration:

"My father was serving in the Jordanian military. So, he settled in Amman. My mother was a member of an emigrant family who descended from Yaffa. My parents got married and lived in Jordan until 1966. Afterwards, we returned to the West Bank town of Jifna with the hope that we would settle down and find employment opportunities. My father got a job at the recently established military hospital in al-Bireh. However, in the wake of 1967 War, we forced to emigrate to Jordan, where we lived with my mother's family. We have been settled in Jordan since 1967."

1.3.6 Multiple forced emigrations

Some Palestinian migrated through several states within short periods of time. It was impossible for them to settle in any state mostly as a result of coercive political conditions. A. N. (an immigrant who descends from Birzeit and is based in Jordan) recounted his immigration experience:

"I first immigrated to Damascus in 1959. I worked as a journalist for a year. Afterwards, I enrolled at the American University in Cairo. However, following the disagreements between late Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser and the Baath party, Palestinian students were forced out of Egypt in 1963. Accordingly, I could not complete my university studies in Cairo. Afterwards, I was employed for a year in Saudi Arabia. I used my savings to enrol at a university in Beirut. Following the aggression into Lebanon in 1975, I was denied entry into Syria. So, I immigrated to Jordan and then to Beirut. Once again, I got a job offer in Saudi Arabia, where I worked until 1972. After I left the job, I travelled to Iraq, where I worked in radio and television over the period 1972 to 2003. In the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, I was compelled to emigrate to Jordan since I have the Jordanian nationality."

1.4 Family as a political official association

The foregoing presentation demonstrates how although their forced emigration was programmed and planned, Palestinians have managed to make use of their familial networks to enhance their emigrant status in a manner that would minimize any emigration-related harm. Therefore, familial networks have come to play new roles in the case of forced emigration. They have also played a main role in helping Palestinian emigrants adapt to the host countries.¹⁴⁴

1.4.1 Orientation of emigrants

Remarkably, as part of the migratory waves that accompanied the *Nakba* in particular, Palestinians could not directly immigrate to the US for two reasons. They could not do so as a result of the harsh conditions during war and the fact that many of them wanted to return to their

¹⁴⁴ Art Hansen, "Refugee dynamics: Angolans in Zambia, 1966 to 1972," *International Migration Review* 15, no. 1-2: (1981): 175-195.

homeland. The familial network theory could be reproached for its inability to offer an explanation to the refugees' immigration. However, network played a simple role in the case of Palestinian refugees, enabling them to immigrate. O. H. (an immigrant who is based in the US and uprooted from Yaffa) recounted the story of her family's immigration:

"When we left Yaffa in 1948, my sister's husband was a customs officer. So, he helped us obtain visas to Beirut. However, we could not make it to Beirut as a result of the crowdedness of people aboard the ship and tumultuous sea. Instead, we headed to Jifna, where we stayed for a year. Then, we immigrated to Amman and eventually made it to the US."

1.4.2 Protecting individuals

One's family remains the safest and secure option for an individual to take refuge when necessary. This is especially true during the times of wars, uprisings, and political insecurity. Under these circumstances, one's family plays the role of protector, offering individuals/members guidance on migratory destinations. G. A. (who descends from Beit Sahour and based in Jordan) remarked on the role of his family:

"Upon my graduation with a Ph.D. from a British university, I decided to return to my homeland. I have British citizenship, which I have passed on to my wife and children, besides to the Jordanian and Palestinian citizenships. However, the second *Intifada* in 2000 discouraged me from returning to my homeland. That was because the state of insecurity, lack of employment opportunities and low prospects of success in my homeland. My father and uncle had moved to Jordan in 1957 and started a business. Some other relatives had moved to Jordan, too. So, I decided to settle in Jordan. I became the manager of my father's business. I keep visiting my homeland. If I decide to leave Jordan, I would return to my homeland."

1.4.3 Obtaining legal status

Kinship networks have become the most important method that enables immigrants to obtain a legal resident status elsewhere, particularly in emergencies. I. S. (an immigrant who descends from Jifna and is based in the US) highlighted the importance of kinship networks:

"Following my marriage, I immigrated to Kuwait, where my husband worked. So, I got a job and our economic situation significantly improved. In the meantime, my eldest daughter had obtained a student visa to the US. During her studies, she settled in San Francisco, where her uncle (my brother) lived. In late 1989, my husband and I travelled to the US to visit our daughter and relatives. During our visit, the first Gulf war broke out. So, we were caught in the US and could not return to Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government expelled all Palestinians. So, we completely lost our compensations. Since my brother and daughter were in the US, my husband and I applied for immigrant visas and subsequently obtained citizenship."

One concludes that Palestinian forced emigrations were the result of political circumstances in general. These emigrations mostly involved families as a whole. Many Palestinian families were forcibly displaced from their hometowns. As a result of previous and current circumstances, these families, or at least some of their members, keep immigrating. They began as forced emigrants and became transmigrants or their migration started as forced and continued as such.

Palestinian refugees and emigrants have utilized familial networks in order to diminish the harsh impact of diaspora and refugee status and make sure that they obtain the legal resident status. When familial networks are distributed across more than a country, some have opted to immigrate to the safest country (i.e., the US) regardless of the huge geographical distance. Others have opted to immigrate to the most secure and nearest country where Palestinians can be granted citizenship (i.e., Jordan).

This means not all Palestinian migrations can be categorised as purely forced. This confirms that each forced emigration might turn to another type of migration that enables migrants to take action, get employment opportunities, receive education and unite with their families.

2. Economic Migrations Lunched in Conjunction with Global Migration in the 19th Century

2.1 Introduction

Economic migration is often analysed as the main motive of international migration, where the amount of human capital is the key factor in this process, thus their employment status and income level. In this perspective, Massey et al. (1993: 434) state:

In this scheme, individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, from movement. International migration is conceptualized as a form of investment in human capital.¹⁴⁵

This section presents the various patterns of Palestinian economic migration. It demonstrates the shifts in the nature, directions, and goals of economic migration. It also demonstrates the developments in the professions that migrants have practiced over time in the countries of migration. Professions have been commensurate with migrants' competencies and qualifications. This section also demonstrates women's participation in employment in a manner that is inseparable from the role of social capital in migration.

2.2 Social capital encourages labour migration

The network analysis of migration, which emerged during 1970s,¹⁴⁶ is an area that has been increasingly developing since early 1990s. In this regard, Faist indicates that the analysis of migration networks has a fundamental weakness. It does not address the emergence of migration networks. However, it considers social capital¹⁴⁷ as a factor that initially hinders freedom of

¹⁴⁵ Douglas Massey et al, "Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19, no.3 (1993): 431-466.

¹⁴⁶ James T. Fawcett, "Networks, linkages and migration system," *International Migration Review* 23, no.3 (1989): 671-680.

¹⁴⁷ Thomas Faist defines social capital as individual-group dealings that facilitate social action and the advantages of these mechanisms. He basically considers this capital as one of the local savings that could be transported trans-nationally under specific conditions.

movement, but as migration networks develop, it transforms into a driving force of emigration. This framework is important and relevant to the understanding of the Palestinian diaspora, particularly in the US and in Europe. The settlement of early migrants is a central factor that allows migrants who intensify social capital to develop migration networks. Thus, migration develops when social capital becomes functional on the local and international level.

The key characteristic of social capital is in its capacity to be translated into other forms of capital, notably financial,¹⁴⁸ or maintain their position in society.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the study of networks, particularly those linked to families and households, allows one to understand migration as "a social product—not as the sole result of individual decisions made by individual actors, not as the sole result of economic or political parameters, but rather as an outcome of all these factors in interaction."¹⁵⁰ (Boyd, 1989: 642). Portes (1995: 22) defined migration as "a network-creating process because it develops an increasingly dense web of contacts between places of origin and destination. Once established, such nets allow the migration process to become self-sustaining and impervious to short-term changes in economic incentives."¹⁵¹

With the use of social capital, the costs and risks associated with the act of migration are reduced and the prospects of migration are increased. The social capital theorists assume that individuals will instrumentally use their networks as a means for generating the highest returns on their investments in human capital. They help reduce living expenses and provide newcomer immigrants with financial assistance upon their arrival. Thus, the mechanism of the family networks contributes to increasing the number of immigrants in the diaspora. This might be the same reason that limits immigration in some families.

¹⁴⁸ Richard Harker, Cheleen Maher & Chris Wilkes, *An introduction to the work of Pierre Bourdieu: The practice of theory* (London: MacMillan, 1999).

¹⁴⁹ James S. Coleman, "Social capital in the creation of human capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95-120.

¹⁵⁰ Monica Boyd, "Family and personal networks in international migration: Recent developments and new agendas," *International Migration Review* 23, no.3 (1989): 638-670.

¹⁵¹ Alejandro Portes, "Economic sociology immigration: A conceptual overview," in *The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on networks, ethnicity and entrepreneurship*, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage Foundationm 1995), 1-41.

Many studies have focused on the role of social networks in the flows of labour migration, but the extent to which social networks are also important for explaining the continuation of migration is still unclear. This applies to the case of Algerian "economic" immigrants in France. In another study, Munshi (2003) finds that when Mexican immigrant communities in the United States were larger, this made migrants more likely to be employed.¹⁵² While Patacchini and Zenou (2008) study ethnic networks in the UK, they find that employment rates for immigrants from the same ethnic groups increase, when migrants are concentrated in the same geographical community.¹⁵³ Also, social networks played an important role in the recruitment of workers through personal connections of members of social networks to employers, as in the case of "guest workers" or Polish seasonal workers in Germany.¹⁵⁴

2.3 Supply and demand: Impact on the trends of economic migration


This part tackles the shifts of Palestinians' economic immigration to Jordan and the US. It attempts to answer the question as to whether this type of migration was male-restricted or involved females, too. Stated another way, it attempts to answer the question as to whether Palestinian economic migrations were individual or involved the whole family based on informed decisions. It also attempts to find out whether Palestinian migrants' professions or jobs developed or remained restricted to a specific field, and attempts to find out how familial networks helped sustain and guide such migrations, contributing to migrants' economic success. The following map shows the tracks of economic migration of Palestinian Christian.

¹⁵²Kaivan Munshi, "Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the US labour market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no.2 (2003): 549-599.

¹⁵³ Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, *Ethnic networks and employment outcomes* (Discussion Paper Series, no. 3331, IZADP, Institute for the Study of Labor, 2008).

¹⁵⁴ Czarina Wilpert, "The use of social networks in Turkish migration to Germany," in *International Migration Systems*, eds. Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim & Hania Zlotnik (London: Clarendon Press, 1992), 177- 189.

Map 10: Tracks of economic migration of Palestinian Christians towards Jordan and the US



Data obtained from immigrants indicate that 16.2% of them had immigrated to Jordan in search of employment opportunities, while 12.5% had immigrated to the US, suggesting that Palestinian immigrants still consider or perceive the US as the first source of employment opportunities and social action. On the other hand, although the Arab Gulf countries receive migrant labourers, migration in this case is temporary. When migrants' employment contracts expire or they reach retirement age, they cannot remain in the host Gulf country since they lack any legal status without employment. Some migrants indicated that they moved or immigrated to several states.

Remarkably, since the late Ottoman period, Palestinians have been prompted by economic conditions to emigrate from their homeland as outlined in Chapter One. Thus, the economic migration of Palestinians could be described as "impelled migration." Economic migrations have developed over successive historical stages in terms of their nature, goals, and direction and most importantly the professions practiced by migrants in the countries of migration. However, these migrations have been affected by political events in the homeland and neighbouring countries.

2.3.1 Peddlers in American streets

Some researchers believe the mid-nineteenth century was marked by the spread of liberal policies, contributing to unlimited global migrations. Thus, US society became a mixture of migrants as liberal policies ensured the free movement of goods, capital, labour and services between states and continents.

In her book, *Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience*, Naff states that since the mid-nineteenth century, Syrian immigration to the US primarily males who intended to earn money before returning to their homeland. Immigration to the US was driven by labour demands and high wages, which were made possible due to industrial development that involved means of transportation and communication. Migration was also driven by travel facilitations as immigrants were only requested to submit a certificate attesting that they were free from certain diseases in order to be allowed entry into the US. In contrast, the economic situation was deteriorating in Syria and high taxes were imposed on residents and farmers, making them lose

their land and work.¹⁵⁵ All of these factors facilitated Syrian immigration to the US. Thus, Palestinian Christian immigration could be explained on the basis of the supply/demand or push/pull theory¹⁵⁶ as they eventually experienced impelled economic migrations.

Naff also states that Palestinian immigration over this period was mostly composed of Christians from the Bethlehem District.¹⁵⁷ Christians immigrated to participate in industries fair in Philadelphia, Chicago and Saint Louis in 1876, 1893 and 1906 respectively. They brought olive wood and mother-of-pearl souvenirs.

The first Palestinian Christian immigrants were identified as three brothers from the "Handal" family from Bethlehem. They immigrated to the US in 1851 in order to attend the *Washington International Industries* exhibition.¹⁵⁸ In contrast, Palestinian Christians started to emigrate from Ramallah at the end of the nineteenth century for trade or commercial purposes. Joseph Aldbini was the first to immigrate from Ramallah to the US in 1895. He was followed by Issa Salah and Issa Khashan in 1901. Then, Salem Shtara, Hanna Daibes, Putrus Totah, Al-Abed Rakab, and Saliba Ajlouni among others immigrated to the US.¹⁵⁹ As for Birzeit, Palestinian Christians who emigrated before 1910 were identified as Hanna Musa Alloush, Hanna Azar Samandar, Saqer Issa Kileh, Issa Musalam Aranki, Nemah Salama Burbar and Yakoub Ibrahim Alkhouri among others.

Immigrants made a precarious sea journey to the US. Naff states that many travel companies and brokers had competed to attract immigrants, and there were translators who translated immigrants' official papers, which are often manipulated to ensure the success of the travel process.

¹⁵⁵ Alixa Naff, *Becoming American. The early Arab immigrant experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁶ Arthur W. Lewis, *Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour* (Manchester School, 1954).

¹⁵⁷ Since the beginning of immigration until 1922, there were 9,744 Christians from Palestine abroad, 1,352 of which were in the US. There were only 947 Muslim emigrants in the same period. See: Adel Samara, "Features of Palestinian Immigration," *Heritage and Society Journal* 1, no. 2 (1974): 6. [In Arabic]. According to Naff (1993), there were 2,800 Palestinians in the United State between 1909-1919, the majority of which Christians.

¹⁵⁸ Jawad Al-Hamad et al, *An Introduction to the question of Palestine* (Amman: Middle East Studies Center, 1997), 7. [In Arabic].

¹⁵⁹ Aziz Shahin, *Unveiling the ancestors and genealogies in Ramallah City* (Birzeit University: Center of Documents and Research Publications, 1982), 19-21. [In Arabic].

In many cases, travel took place without official papers.¹⁶⁰ Travelling via the coast of Egypt was the easiest as the route did not fall under Ottoman control. However, in case of being caught by Ottoman police, immigrants preferred to pay fines and bribes instead of going back.

Christian women immigrated mostly accompanied by their spouses in order to earn money or take care of their spouses. In contrast, Muslim women did not immigrate due to Muslim's conviction that it is "immoral" for women to immigrate to Christian territories as a result of the freedom of interreligious marriages.¹⁶¹

Palestinian and Syrian immigrants worked as peddlers, travelling through rural spaces across the southern, mid-western and western United States, and selling household staples like: sewing materials, soap, and linens. They also sold holy water from Jerusalem, rosaries, lace and silk to white American women and their daughters at home.¹⁶² Palestinian women also worked as peddlers or supported peddling from their homes. They benefited from the purchase of private property, marriage and reproduction, and the transition to small business-owner.¹⁶³ H. M. (an immigrant who descends from Ramallah) recounted the emigration story of the first member of her family. She said:

"My uncle, Saba, immigrated to Pennsylvania in 1917 without any official papers. He got married to a Lebanese woman. He used to work as a peddler and his wife opened a store. Most of the immigrants were poor and had little skills at that time. After eventually settling, my uncle submitted a visa on behalf of my father to the US Consulate. So, my father travelled to Pennsylvania in 1968."

¹⁶⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman emigration to America 1860-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no.2 (1985):175-209.

¹⁶¹ Alixa Naff, *Becoming American. The early Arab immigrant experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993).

¹⁶² Charlotte M. Albrecht, *Peddling an Arab American history: Race, gender, and sexuality in early Syrian American communities* (University of Minnesota, 2013).

¹⁶³ Alixa Naff, *Becoming American. The early Arab immigrant experience* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993).

2.3.2 Traders of caustic soda in the East Bank

People used to move freely between the two banks of the Jordan River in the nineteenth century. However, such movement were mostly not considered population migrations since the two banks were considered a single territory without any borders in between. Historically, immigrants undertook their migratory journeys from the east bank to the west bank of the Jordan River. Tribes across Transjordan used to invade Palestinian coastal villages as far as Galilee. They were attracted by the semi-urban nature of the Palestinian society in contrast to their own Bedouin nature. Nevertheless, some Palestinian families moved to the east bank. The most important families were the Qi'war family from Nazareth, the al-Bsharat family from Nablus, the Abu Jaber family from Nazareth, the al-Far family from Akka, the Qub'in family from Nazareth and many other families from Jerusalem. R. J. (a Jordanian born to Palestinian parents), recounted the history of his family in Jordan:

"Saleh Abu Jaber was my great grandfather. He relocated from Nazareth to Nablus in 1815. He used to work as a caustic soda merchant, noting that this material was used in the soap industry in Nablus. Caustic soda used to be extracted from Transjordan. As soon as it came to be produced as a chemical, the Abu Jaber family relocated to al-Salt in 1840. They used to grow wheat and live in a locality at Queen Alia International Airport Road. This locality became to be called as Khirbet Abu Jaber or al-Yaduda. Nowadays, the population of this locality totals approximately 200."

Migratory movement to the US in particular declined in the aftermath of World War I and the enactment of Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 in the US. Immigration to the US also declined as a result of the global economic decline over the period 1929-1933 and the eruption of World War II. This compelled Palestinians to immigrate to South America, noting that these emigrations became political.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Approximately 1,350 Palestinians emigrated between 1920-1930, then at least 2,000 Palestinians emigrated in 1938-39, most of them to United States of America. One of the sources mentioned that between the years 1920-1930 only 2933 migrants immigrated to America. See: Janet Abu-Lughod, "The demographic war for Palestine," *The Link* 9, no. 5 (1986): 1-16. According to Naff (1993) that the Palestinian emigration accelerated under the British Mandate. Between 1920-1923, around 1,471 person emigrated as a result of strikes after the First World War and the influx of Jewish immigration. In 1924, 1,351 people emigrated, then continued to enter the US at an annual average of 270 until the end of 1920s, and then at an average annual rate of 280 in the 1930s. The total number of Palestinians in the United

2.3.3 Open economic migration towards Jordan and Egypt

In the wake of the *Nakba* in 1948 and the imposition of Jordanian administrative rule in the West Bank, many Palestinians moved to Jordan for work, with the continued immigration of Christians in the West Bank to Europe and the Americas, where they had established family connections. Their movement into Jordan was easy as there were no barriers between the two banks of the Jordan River, noting that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip came under Jordanian and Egyptian administrative control respectively. Palestinians practiced a variety of professions, except those who transferred their capitals and set up new businesses. This theme will be further explored in another part of this study.

Palestinian who were forcibly displaced from their hometowns practiced difficult professions and played an instrumental role in the construction of Jordan as they were more educated than most Jordanians at the time. Although they were offered relief assistance and employment opportunities from UNRWA and the International Red Cross (IRC), Palestinian refugees were occasionally compelled to work in more than one job in order to make their living. For instance, some worked as vegetable peddlers, while others worked as construction workers and tobacco merchants. Still others worked in processing semolina or making halva. These jobs mostly did not offer money that were sufficient for a decent life.

Many Palestinians who moved to Jordan in search of employment opportunities did not obtain any certificates or study any specializations. They managed to assume senior economic and social positions through practice and expertise. Q. Kh. (a Jordanian resident who descends from Aboud), remarked:

"In 1960, I immigrated with my family to Jordan to make a living. As a result of our harsh living conditions, I could not pursue university studies. Nevertheless, I took accounting courses. And worked as an [accounting] officer at a company. After years of expertise, I studied auditing. I worked as an auditor at several companies for 33 years. Eventually, I got the rank [degree] of financial and administrative manager."

States between the years (1901-1939) was about 8,425, mostly Christians. As Palestinians sometimes chose to register themselves as Syrians or Turkish, however, these statistics on Palestinian migration are likely lacking in accuracy.

It must be noted that a new model of economic immigrants emerged, known as "transferred/relocated staff." Before their immigration, many worked with the British Mandate authorities, such as the rail station, while others served in the Jordanian Army and National Guard. They managed to keep the same work after their immigration to Jordan.

2.3.4 Towards the Arab Gulf states

Palestinians, especially the West Bank population,¹⁶⁵ re-immigrated to Kuwait in high numbers in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the difficulty of travel, they were attracted by the oil discovery and low travel expenses. The majority of Palestinian immigrants over this period were skilled and professional. An example for such a Palestinian immigrant is L. Gh. (US immigrant who descends from Taybeh), who remarked:

"I graduated from the Qalandia College for Vocational Training. I immigrated to Kuwait in 1966. I illicitly immigrated aboard a bus. I worked as an electricity contractor and an officer at the Electricity Ministry. I used to earn KWD 15 a month. As a result of urgent economic need, I opted to immigrate to the US in 1973. My sister had gotten married to an immigrant in the US. She helped me apply for an immigrant's visa. Upon my arrival to the US, I lived at my sister's house and worked in a liqueur store belonging to her husband. Afterwards, I opened my own store and found a job at a rail company. I used to work at the rail company in daytime and at my store in night-time. Afterwards, I helped my brother and sister immigrate to the US in 1978. I also helped my parents and the rest of my brothers in 1980."

In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Palestinians continued to immigrate to the Arab Gulf countries. Attracted by various fields of employment, many Palestinians immigrated from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.¹⁶⁶ Others continued to immigrate to the US and the West. In this case,

¹⁶⁵ The low net migration rates in the Gaza Strip are related to poor socio-economic conditions there. While this might have otherwise encouraged emigration, the mobility of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip has been constrained by a lack of funds and by low levels of education, which have restricted their ability to take part fully in the movement to the Arab Gulf states, where demand has concentrated on skilled manpower. That is, of course, in addition to the relative ease with which the population of the West Bank can move into Jordan and beyond (as nationals of Jordan) as compared with the population of the Gaza Strip, whose refugee status hinders their ability to migrate.

¹⁶⁶ Moussa Alloush, *Expatriates* (Birzeit Library, 1991), 24-26. [In Arabic].

immigration was based on a family decision, but not an individual decision.¹⁶⁷ Women immigrated with their families as they were (and are still) considered an essential factor of development. A.D. (an immigrant in Jordan who descends from Taybeh), remarked:

"I graduated from high school and my wife had a diploma in nursing. I used to work in several Jerusalem hotels. Our income was not sufficient for securing future needs. So, we considered working overseas. We got job offers overseas. I worked in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the period 1980-1985, while my wife worked in Saudi Arabia for seven years starting from 1980. We immigrated to the destination countries via Jordan. After our employment contracts ended, we returned to the West Bank in the hopes that we would settle down. However, we decided to immigrate to Jordan following the eruption of the first popular uprising."

2.3.5 Grocery stores make wealth

Being an immigrant in the US was not easy. A Palestinian immigrant family had to work day and night in more than a field in order to make sufficient financial gains and secure their future. Palestinian families owned grocery or liqueur stores during these times due to their considerable and speedy revenues. Some immigrants managed to simultaneously own more than a store. I. N. (an immigrant from Birzeit) highlighted the importance of this work. He said: "When a young man proposed to a young woman, he was asked by the woman's parents whether he had a grocery store. This means that owning a grocery store was more important than having a certificate at that time." J. T. (a Jordanian born to parents who descended from Lidd and is currently based in the US), talked about the life difficulties that an immigrant has to grapple with in order to earn money and achieve his goals. He said:

"Considering the lack of high and specialized education, I applied for an immigrant's visa to the US with assistance from my uncle and aunt, who had immigrated to San Francisco. My visa application was accepted and I got a visa in 1972. So, my father, brother, uncle and two of his sons and I together immigrated to the US. Upon arrival, we lived in my uncle's house for a month. I worked as an accountant at a sewing machine manufacturer in daytime and at a bar

¹⁶⁷ Michael P. Tadaró, "A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries," *American Economic Review* 59 (1969):138-148.

at night-time. I only used to get \$1.50 a day. I continued to work in these two jobs for three months. Afterwards, I worked at a petrol filling station and a liqueur store for seven months. I managed to collect \$1,000. Then, my cousins and I bought a store, while I continued my night-time job for other seven months. I managed to purchase the store. It came to belong to my brothers and me. Then, I pursued my academic studies. I got a job at Anthony School and had a part-time job at University State of California. So, I ended up having three jobs. I worked at the store at morning, the university at the afternoon and at the liqueur store in evening."

An immigrant woman helped her husband in his store, restaurant, or coffee shop. S. Sh. (an immigrant who is currently based in the US and descends from Jifna) said:

"After arrival at San Francisco in 1992, we didn't have any work. So, we all worked together in order to gain some money. My first son worked at a Burger King store, while the other worked as a taxi driver. I was entrusted with managing a dry clean and laundry service in cooperation with a Palestinian immigrant who descended from Ramallah. I continued to work at this service until 2005."

Sh. J. (an immigrant from Bethlehem to the US), highlighted women's participation in work. She said:

"My husband and I immigrated to the US in 1979. He managed to work at a bank, however, he used to earn \$1,000 (a month), which fell short to cover our expenses. Therefore, we set up a grocery store and subsequently a supermarket in proximity to the university in Berkeley. We kept the supermarket open for two years when the rent increased. In 1994, we purchased Daily and Cafe Shop in Oakland. We ran this business until we retired and closed it in 2004."

Palestinian immigrants in the US have recently received education and acquired skills and expertise, making them more specialized. Some immigrants work at banks, companies, hospitals and engineering firms among others. This also applies to second-generation immigrants.

2.4 Family as a financial institution

Family networks have expanded their rightful role. Not only do they provide employment opportunities for immigrants, but they also contribute to their economic success. Considering that wealth accumulation requires a great deal of time, work, and labour, members of the same family co-run several businesses that eventually help them accumulate wealth. What's more, immigrants rarely have enough money to set up their own future business upon their arrival. So, they need to enter into a partnership with other local family members in order to jointly set up the business. Family networks were also very instrumental in helping sustain their families still in the homeland.

The first immigrant member of a family served as a financial institution that offered reliable support to and helped other immigrant members find employment opportunities. N. S. (descends from Aboud and is based in the US), highlighted the importance of familial networks. She said:

"My brother had immigrated to the US in the mid-1940s. He had decided to immigrate in search of a better life as the economic situation in the homeland was poor. Following my husband's death, I became the primary breadwinner of my six daughters and sons. My brother decided to apply for an immigrant's visa to the US Consulate on behalf of me. So, I travelled together with two of my sons to Virginia during 1970s. My two sons were offered employment at my brother's hotel and restaurant. They lived at my brother's house and worked for him for seven years. In the meantime, a sister of mine got married to an immigrant who descended from Ramallah. They were based in San Francisco. It happened that one of my immigrant sons got introduced to my one of my sister's daughters (his cousin). They got married and settled in San Francisco. They managed to open their own business (restaurant). My other immigrant son also got married to his cousin. They initially settled in Virginia and relocated to Washington. After I helped my two immigrant sons settle down, I opted to return to my homeland in order to take care of the rest of my children. My two immigrant sons offered primary financial assistance to my children and me. Over time, one of my other sons and I immigrated together to the US in [the] late 1980s."

2.5 Economic migration for social mobility

Despite bearing the seeds of disasters and difficulties, catastrophes and wars create motivation for work and survival. Voluntary or forced migration offers several opportunities. For instance,

forced displacement to Jordan offered Palestinians the chance to co-build the Jordanian economy. They mostly worked in various economic sectors. They managed to develop professionally and improve their conditions with to their expertise and skills. On the other hand, immigration to the US helped Palestinian immigrants acquire language skills, work experience, and professional development. Still, Palestinian immigrants to the Arab Gulf countries managed to accumulate wealth that they invested in Jordan or the US. It should be noted here that many Palestinian immigrants could not withdraw their deposits from banks in Gulf countries, while others could not get their severance (end-of-service) payment in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990.

The analysis of economic migrations show that they are based on informed decisions with the purpose of gaining profits and facilitating social mobility. Countries of immigration' policies played a clear instrumental role in the case of immigration to Jordan. Given their Jordanian nationalities, the majority of immigrants were attracted to make investments in Jordan. On the other hand, familial networks helped immigrants in the US accumulate wealth. They managed to assume outstanding economic positions and some became businessmen. Many immigrant families, such as the al-Sayegh, Imseeh, Nuqul, Abu Jaber and Qi'war families in Jordan, have become renowned in the economy. The theme of Palestinian businessmen will be further explored in another chapter of this study.

3. Seeking high and specialized education: A chosen opportunity to migration

3.1 Introduction

While international migration is explained in the context of the pull and push theory, many researchers have considered the complexities of the migration phenomenon and the theory's failure to deal with it adequately. International migration could not be understood apart from economic globalization which plays a decisive role in promoting the transfer of money and the movement of goods and individuals. This means that migration is not supposed to be always forced (coercive). It is occasionally related to the free will of individuals who immigrate in search of better education and employment opportunities. It could be based on a collective family decision for social or economic reasons.

Migration motivated by the quest for higher education can be explained by neoclassical macroeconomics, as education is a main determinant of wages, both in the homeland and the host country. In principle, the decision to pursue education is often individual, but in many cases those who take this decision opt to immigrate later. The acquisition of skills and quest of education in the host country are crucial points for the future economic payoff of the migration decision. Furthermore, the pursuance of education abroad enables migrants to acquire language skills or learn particular production technologies.

This section is intended to address migration motivated by the quest of higher and specialized education as a form of international migration, noting that it does not imply the migration of intellectuals and skilled competent labour. The section analyses the contexts of situations that motivate migration motivated by the quest of education. Stated another way, it attempts to answer the question as to whether the motivations of pursuing education are purely individual or based on a family decision. It also attempts to answer the question as to whether education-motivated migrants have sought to achieve economic and social gains in later stages.

3.2 Seeking education: an individual decision

The West remains a destination for higher and specialized education. This is evidenced by the fact that 17.3% and 2.3% of immigrants travelled to the US and Jordan seeking education. It is worth noting that 11.6% of immigrants have attained higher education in neighbouring Arab countries, particularly Lebanon and Iraq, and their children have also pursued higher education in host countries.

3.2.1 A means to liberation

As a result of learning foreign languages in missionary schools, especially Catholic and Protestant schools, many intellectual Palestinians immigrated to Egypt, but the majority had immigrated to the US during the years 1876-1909. Examples of such Palestinian intellectuals are:

Shehadeh Salim, Khalil Totah, Farhat Zyada, Khalil Sakakini, and Magngm Maghnam among others.¹⁶⁸

These Palestinian intellectuals settled down and assumed high-profile academic positions in the US before returning to their homeland. For instance, Shehadeh Salim earned a Ph.D. degree in philosophy. Upon his return, he worked in the judiciary and the *Mirror of the East* newspaper. Furthermore, Fouad Shatara was a member of the American Surgical Association. Khalil Totah earned a Ph.D. in education and worked as the executive director of the Institute for Arab American Affairs. These Palestinian intellectuals and others are distinguished for the fact they struggled against the Ottoman rule and Turkification policy over their studies and careers through their publications in newspapers and political activities in cooperation with associations.

3.2.2 Desire for education

Encyclopaedia Britannica used to dispatch scientific expeditions to pursue higher education at its own expense. It also occasionally dispatched scientific expeditions to Egyptian and Lebanese universities in return for students' pledge that they teach in government schools for a couple of years following their graduation and return to their homeland. However, such expeditions were very few. In the last year of the British Mandate of Palestine, only ten Palestinian students were dispatched to UK universities.¹⁶⁹

Many students' were responsible for their decision to immigrate in quest of education. The primary motivation was a high personal value placed on pursuing their education, as well as their need and wish to do so. E. B. (an immigrant from Bethlehem based in the US) recounted the story of his immigration. He said:

"In 1945, I got a student's visa to the US. My friend's cousin had helped me obtain the visa. So, I travelled to New York via Lebanon and the Italian cities of Genoa, Napoli and Marseille. The journey took 40 days. Upon my arrival, I remained at the home of my friend's cousin for two

¹⁶⁸ Jamal Adawi, *Palestinian migration to America from the end of nineteenth century till 1945* (Nazareth: Popular Printing House, 1993), 152-174. [In Arabic].

¹⁶⁹ In the 1920s and 1930s during the British Mandate, there were six secondary schools across Palestine. The schools were located across Jerusalem, Haifa, Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza. Illiteracy rates among Muslims were 98% and 52% among Christians.

days before traveling to San Francisco aboard a bus. My journey to San Francisco took three days. I lived with an American family and enrolled at a university for some English courses. I earned my Bachelor's degree before working at a hospital laboratory in San Francisco. Now, I am retired."

In contrast, some Palestinians enrolled in Arab universities, mainly in Lebanon and Egypt. Lebanese and Egyptian universities were prestigious. The first Palestinian university was Birzeit University and the first university established in Jordan is the University of Jordan. They were established in 1974 and 1962 respectively. Students often returned to their homeland in order to visit their relatives and work and save some money necessary for covering educational costs. O.H. (an immigrant from Lidd now based in Jordan) recounted the story of his immigration:

"I enrolled in the Beirut Arab University in 1946. I used to travel from Jaffa to an-Naqura, passing through Haifa by land using my British-Palestinian passport. I used to get a visa from the French Consulate in Yaffa in order to enter Lebanon. Following my university studies, I returned to Jordan, to which my family were forcibly displaced in 1948. So, I was granted the Jordanian passport. Accidently, I was requested to teach at Birzeit College that has become known as Birzeit University. So, I taught for two years starting in 1952. After I finished working as a teacher, I returned to Jordan. I worked as a director at the UNRWA-run schools in Amman and Irbid before submitting my resignation. Afterwards, I worked as a director of the Orthodox School over the period 1966 to 1992. During this period (1977 to 1980), I earned a Ph.D. degree from the US. I worked as a lecturer at al-Isra University from 1992 to 1996. I then worked as a consultant for a school in Amman. Eventually, I quit teaching and became a charity activist."

3.2.3 Free-of-charge education

In the aftermath of the 1948 War (*Nakba*), Palestinian refugees' children were provided higher education through UNRWA, which covered their travel expenses abroad. However, Palestinian refugees inside Iraq were denied UNRWA services following Iraq's refusal, in contrast to the situation Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. Iraq sponsored Palestinian refugees, providing them with education and housing for free, as well as a stipend. However, these privileges were

cancelled following the Gulf war of 1990/1991.¹⁷⁰ Recounting his experience, A.H. (an immigrant from Nablus now based in Jordan) said:

"Following the 1967 War, I accompanied my sister, who wanted to join her husband in Kuwait. When I wished to return to my homeland, I was denied entry. I was about to start the last high school year, known as the *Tawjihi*. So, I opted to study *Tawjihi* in Jordan. I stayed at the house of my aunt, who was living in al-Zarqa. Upon the completion of high school, I enrolled at the Faculty of Engineering of Baghdad University in Iraq. I worked for a year in Iraq before finding another employment opportunity in Saudi Arabia. I returned to my hometown of Nablus in order to get married in 1978. After getting married, my wife and I travelled to Kuwait for work. We worked for 13 years until 1990. Following the expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait, we immigrated to Jordan without being able to take out money. I remained unemployed for two years."

3.2.4 A means to find a job

Some Palestinians opted to pursue their studies in Jordanian universities. They decided to settle and work in Jordan as they were encouraged by the engagement between Jordan and the West Bank. A. Sh. (an immigrant from Aboud and is based in Jordan) remarked about his immigration:

"I enrolled at the University of Jordan in 1972. I graduated with a bachelor's degree in chemistry. During my university studies, I lived in my uncle's home. In the meantime, I used to occasionally work in the West Bank in order to save some money for my university studies. Following my graduation, I got married and settled down in Jordan. I worked as a teacher at the Bishop's Schools. I became the director of the Orthodox School in 1995. I worked as the school director for 15 years. Since then, I have been working with charities."

Many Palestinian students immigrated to the remote diaspora in order to realize their academic ambitions. Y. M. (an immigrant from Birzeit and is based in the US) recounted his immigration story:

¹⁷⁰ Abbas Shiblak, *The status of Palestinian refugees in host Arab states* (Working paper 2011/3, Birzeit University: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, Forced Migration and Refugee Unit, 2011).

"Following my graduation from Birzeit College, I decided to pursue my higher education. My uncle, who was based in San Francisco, applied for a visa on my behalf. So, I immigrated to the US in 1975. I studied at San Francisco University, graduating with a bachelor's degree and master's degree in laboratory medicine. During my studies, I worked at the university hospital. Following my graduation, I worked as a lecturer at the university from 1984 to 1992. I was promoted to the position of a laboratory supervisor. Then, I worked as a laboratory inspector with the US government. In 2003, I assumed the position of head of the laboratory analysts department. Since 2014, I have been working as a lecturer at San Francisco University and the University of California, Berkeley."

3.2.5 Escape from political situation

Even the Palestinian educational aspect did not escape Israeli aggression. The Israeli army took over administration of the education sector, imprisoning, detaining, and exiling professors and students. They also ordered the closure of schools and universities. Birzeit University was closed down during the academic year 1981/1982 for six months, and An-Najah National University was closed down for a period of three months during the academic year 1983. Accordingly, the percentage of students who enrolled at universities was affected.¹⁷¹

A. A. (an immigrant based in the US whose family was displaced from Lidd in 1948) recounted his immigration story:

"I immigrated to the US to get away from the [first] *Intifada* that erupted in 1987. I was a student at the Friends School. So, I applied for a student visa through the US Consulate. I immigrated to the US in 1992. I completed my studies as an engineering manager. During my university studies, I lived in my uncle and grandfather's homes. Following my graduation, I got married and settled here. Nowadays, I work at a computers company."

S. Q. (an immigrant whose family was displaced from Lidd and who is based in the US) talked about the status of students who pursued their education in the US. He said:

¹⁷¹ Raja Shehade & Jonathan Kuttab, *West Bank and rule of law* (Beirut: Alkalima House for Publication, 1982), 18.

"As a result of some problems in Birzeit University, courses were taught in different locations in 1979. So, I applied for a student visa through the US Consulate. At that time, I was studying and working in the US. D.I. opened a store in partnership with my brothers. We were poor. We used to study at university in the daytime and work at the store in the night-time. We used to send remittances to our parents. Many Palestinian students usually worked at grocery stores during their university studies. Upon their graduation, they were compelled to continue their work at grocery stores if they lacked employment opportunities. This made it very difficult for them to find employment opportunities in their areas of specialization."

3.3 Seeking education: a chosen mobility

Education is a main determinant of wages, both in the homeland and the host country. In principle, the decision on to pursue higher education is made by the student alone, but in many cases it is a family decision, influenced by the possibility of additional family members immigrating later. The acquisition of skills and education in the host country is a crucial point for the future economic payoff of the migration decision. Furthermore, pursuing education abroad provides students with language skills or enable them to learn particular technologies, making them more productive.

Following their studies in the US, immigrants have settled down and set up their businesses. They have become focal points for other family members who immigrate from Palestine and join them in the US. This also applies to Palestinian immigrants who have pursued their education in Jordan. In contrast, Palestinians who pursued their education in neighbouring Arab countries have been transnational, moving between several states. However, they have mostly returned and settled down in Jordan since they hold Jordanian citizenship. The deterioration of the conditions at the homeland was perhaps one of the reasons that prevented their return.

4. Family life saturated by the "culture" of migration

4.1 Introduction

Even without any real reasons, family, consanguinity, and kinship ties make the idea of migration more acceptable to others. They impose this idea on others as a "family task" through

which a family could reunite or rebuild itself. The cases of diaspora-homeland marriages (endogamy) are forms of social migration.

This section seeks to explore the means through which migrants have managed to move their center of family from their homeland to their host countries and how a migrant's family members or kin have mostly become concentrated in one country.

4.2 Migration a "family practice"

Recently, two important factors have contributed to the continuation of migration. The culture of migration spreads across the community of the homeland (originating countries), increasing the prospects for more people to immigrate and the extensive economic experience gained by migrants in the host countries encourages additional migration.¹⁷² Following this mechanism, migrants make their first trip and earn money, but they also end up acquiring extensive experiences about consumer goods and lifestyles that are almost unattainable in their origin communities. After someone has migrated once, the odds of migrating again increase.¹⁷³

Therefore, migration becomes deeply ingrained in people's values, sentiments, and behaviours characteristic of migration spread widely inside the homeland.¹⁷⁴ Besides, it becomes a "rite of passage."¹⁷⁵ Moreover, migration tends to be more of a selective process for well-educated, skilful, productive, and highly motivated people who seek new opportunities away from sending communities. This is what makes the international migration cumulative.

Several social ways and means have compelled many members of the same family, especially brothers and sisters, to migrate, which means migrants practice the culture of migration, due to visiting and being in contact with their relatives in the diaspora. According to data provided by

¹⁷² Michael J. Poire, *Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

¹⁷³ Douglas S. Massey, "The settlement process among Mexican migrants to the United States" *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 670-685.

¹⁷⁴ Douglas S. Massey & Felipe G. Espafia, "The social process of international migration," *Science* 237 (1987): 733-738.

¹⁷⁵ Joshua S. Reichert, "Social stratification in a Mexican sending community: The effect of migration to the United States," *Social Problems* 29 (1982): 422-433.

Palestinian immigrants, 21.1% immigrated to the US for marriage (this issue will be explained in the fourth chapter), 9.6% immigrated to the US in order to join immigrant members of their families and 7.6% immigrated as a result of feeling jealousy from other immigrants. In contrast, immigrants to Jordan have not indicated that their immigration was motivated by any of these reasons. This will be further explained in chapter five.

4.2.1 "My sister lives abroad. So, I decided to join here"

It becomes possible for families to immigrate in order to join other migrant family members. Individual immigrants who have married other immigrants or immigrated in order to pursue their studies and remained abroad commonly facilitate the immigration of their brothers and sisters. They have done so through encouraging and convincing their brothers and sisters to immigrate, explaining the US would offer them more security, freedom, and employment opportunities, or through filling out and submitting visa applications on their behalf. It is worth noting that any economic or political reason of immigration was not convincing. N. Kh. (an immigrant whose family was displaced from Yaffa to Ramallah in 1948 and is based in the US), remarked about his immigration. He said:

"I studied at the Ramallah Friends School. Following my father's death, I assumed management of his four stores in Ramallah. My wife and I were encouraged by my wife's sister to immigrate. So, she helped us immigrate to the US in 1977. Upon our arrival, we were well-to-do. Afterwards, we sold our stores in Ramallah in return for a small amount of money."

In addition, G. H. (an immigrant from Bethlehem based in the US) recounted the story of his immigration:

"I had two sisters, including one who got married to a naturalized immigrant who descended from Ramallah. She and her two young boys visited us in 1974. Upon her return to the US, she asked me to accompany her, which I did. I remained in her house for three months. During this period, I worked with her husband at a grocery store. Afterwards, I opened my own grocery store, noting that I used to work in selling olive wood souvenirs at a souvenirs store and I was doing well economically. When my brother and father travelled to the US to visit us, I rented a small apartment, where we lived together. Afterwards, I travelled to Bethlehem for a visit and got married. Following the visit, I brought my wife to the US. Then I submitted immigrant

visas on behalf of my mother and young sisters. They immigrated to the US in 1978. We lived together in the same area until 1990."

4.2.2 "I was compelled to immigrate after feeling jealous migrant achievements"

Immigrants' material achievements have enticed and encouraged others to follow their lead. During their visits to their hometowns, immigrants recount stories about their well-being. Besides, they built fashionable homes and purchased land and other property in their homeland. As a result, others feel jealous toward immigrants and decide to immigrate despite the fact that they didn't have any real or convincing reason to do so. I. N. (an immigrant from Birzeit based in the US) recounted the story of his immigration:

"Feeling jealous towards emigrants who made summer visits to their hometown, I immigrated to the US in 1966. During his summer visit, my cousin, who had immigrated to the US in early 1950s, convinced me to immigrate. So, I was convinced to immigrate to the US in order to improve my financial status. I initially planned to work and save money only for five years before returning to the homeland. So, my wife and I immigrated to San Francisco, where my cousin lived. We lived in his home for five months. We settled down in the US and used to visit my hometown."

4.3 Migration, a tool to reunite family members

Palestinians in the diaspora, particularly those who could not return to their homeland, always dreamt about helping their family members reunite. They were aware of the fact that gathering a family in the same area would offer members social and economic support, enable them to overcome life's difficulties, and help the family revive. Each migrant family used to have a nucleus consisting of male or older members and frequently unmarried daughters in the diaspora. So, migrants submitted immigration documents (visas) on the behalf of their family members who remain in the homeland. They also covered the costs of tickets and provided housing and employment opportunities for new immigrants. Thus, members of families flocked to family in the diaspora, particularly the US. This helped families relocate their centres to the diaspora. W.S. (an immigrant from Birzeit based in the US) recounted the story of his immigration:

"It all started when I decided to pursue my education in Washington in 1952. So, I applied for a student visa. I completed my Bachelor's, Master's and Ph.D. studies before returning to my homeland in 1963. I worked in UNRWA-run and government schools as well as an academic translator. It happened later that my wife travelled to California in order to visit her immigrant family. She remained there. I joined her in 1969. As a result of harsh conditions in our homeland in the aftermath of June 1967 War (*Naksa*), my wife and I decided to stay in the US. Following the first *Intifada* and subsequent deterioration of the political, security, and economic situation in the homeland in the early 1990s, I managed to help the rest of my family members join me. I helped my two sisters along with their husbands and children immigrate to the US. I also helped my mother and my unmarried sister immigrate. I had a sister who immigrated to the US after getting married to a US immigrant who descended from Ramallah. Eventually, my family as a whole, including my sisters and brothers, managed to live together once again in the diaspora."

4.4 Centre gravity of families is in Diaspora

Despite their clear role in terms of the immigration of Palestinian Christians to the US or Jordan, the effectiveness of familial networks depends in part upon the host country, its policies and geographical remoteness from the homeland.

Familial networks have played a remarkable role in immigrations to the US, a country of immigration that requires immigrants to be familiar about the terms and laws of migration. It has not always been that prospective immigrants can familiarize themselves with the terms and laws of immigration via the internet as is now the practice; they are required to solicit help from their relatives in order to obtain legal documents and find employment opportunities and housing, especially if they lack proficiency in the language of the host country. Even for immigrants who obtained student visas, the majority utilized familial networks in order to arrange their affairs, such as employment and housing. This implies that the decision to immigrate to the US is based heavily on familial networks. Immigration is an informed decision taken by the family as it involves a sort of risk.

Jordan is not considered by many Palestinians nor by Jordanians as a country of immigration, but rather as a country has that hosted Palestinians. Yet it is still considered by others as their

country. Due to the close proximity of the West Bank to Jordan, many Palestinians are able to go back and forth, especially if they hold Jordanian and Palestinian citizenships. On the other hand, familial networks played a key role in the case of forced emigrations, such as the forced emigration of Palestinians from Kuwait in 1990, Iraq in 2003, Lebanon in 1975 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Since these politically motivated immigrations were urgent, familial networks had to play a key role in receiving immigrant families.

Thus, many Palestinian Christian families no longer maintained presence in their country of origin (homeland). Examples of such families include the Tarud, Abu Jarur, and Al-Jada' families, who descend from Bethlehem, as well as the Abu Khader, Abu Zibar, and Francis families, who descend from Tayybeh, a village to the east of Ramallah. Examples also include the Handal, Suleiman and Sallum families, who descend from Bethlehem and have immigrated to El Salvador, and the Karam, 'Aqel, Salti, and Zoghbi families, who have immigrated to Nicaragua.

Regarding Jordan, it was mentioned that some Palestinian families moved to Transjordan in the late Ottoman period for various reasons, including the search for employment opportunities. The most important of such families include the Qi'war family from Nazareth, al-Bsharat family from Nablus, the Abu Jaber family from Nazareth, al-Far family from Akka, the Qub'in family from Nazareth and many other families from other cities, particularly Jerusalem.

However, many Palestinian families—Christians and Muslims alike—were totally displaced to Jordan in the wake of the 1948 War and the June 1967 war. Examples of such families include the al-Ghawi, Abu Sahanb and Fashkho families who descend from Jaffa, the Kishek family who descend from Lidd as well as the Kaileh, al-Far, and al-Jada' families who descend from al-Ramleh. Some families were divided between the West Bank and Jordan, such as the al-Dalu, Habash families from Lidd, and the Khader, Khoury, and Ibrahim families from Rafidia- Nablus. The role of familial networks across Jordan was clear in the case of the influx of families who were expelled from Kuwait following the first Gulf War along with others from Saudi Arabia.

Whereas the concentration of Palestinian families in Jordan was the result of political events, the concentration of their counterparts in the US was motivated by family social and economic reasons. Palestinian Christian immigrants to the remote diaspora have greatly outnumbered

Muslims immigrants as a direct result of these family, social, and economic reasons. Palestinian Christians have immigrated to the remote diaspora in higher numbers and at an accelerated pace, also as a result of the emergence of immigrant family members as a nucleus in the diaspora. This confirmed by Stampini, Carletto and Davis (2008) that the access to family ties is associated with an increased likelihood of permanent migration. The presence abroad of one member and one other relative of the household head also increases the likelihood of permanent migration by about 50% from Albania.¹⁷⁶

4.5 Social-religious reasons of migration

The intellectual and political tide of Islamisation had a clear impact on social life. This tide manifested in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,¹⁷⁷ Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian revolution of 1979, the rise of Salafist parties and Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia,¹⁷⁸ as well as the rise of Hamas and Islamic Jihad¹⁷⁹ in the occupied Palestinian territories. With the increased activism of such parties, some Christians became concerned that there would be negative effects on their homeland. Others perhaps had a feeling of disappointment as a result of perceiving such activism as a marginalization of their existence and role. These immigrants embarked on their journey to more secure and free regions in order to escape from the region that experienced a rising tide of Islamisation and subsequent restricted intellectual freedoms. The US was the destination for

¹⁷⁶ Marco Stampini, Calogero Carletto & Benjamin Davis, "International migration from Albania: The role of family nets and previous experience," *Eastern European Economics* 46, no.2 (2008): 50-87.

¹⁷⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in the Egyptian city of al-Ismailia in 1928. It describes itself as calling for "comprehensive reform." It soon expanded to Cairo and all over Egypt as well as to large parts of the Arab and Islamic world. The Muslim Brotherhood went through several stages that curtailed its role and culminated in its disbanding under Gamal Abdul Nasser. Following Nasser's death, the Brotherhood started a new phase in the 1970s.

¹⁷⁸ The Salafi Movement is an ultra-conservative branch or movement within Sunni Islam's schools of thought. The movement seeks to "reform" political rule, the society and life based on Islamic religious law, known as Shari'a. Its first rule is to adhere to the Quran, Sunnah, and hadith as the sole sources of religious authority which involves doctrines, worship, ethics, and all aspects of life.

¹⁷⁹ Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) was founded in 1987, soon after the First *Intifada* broke out, as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Co-founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin stated in 1987—and the Hamas Charter affirmed in 1988—that Hamas was founded to liberate Palestine, including modern-day Israel, from Israeli occupation. In the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a plurality in the Palestinian Parliament, following the elections, the Quartet (the United States, Russia, United Nations, and European Union) made future foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority conditional upon the future government's commitment to non-violence, recognition of the State of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas rejected those changes. Since 2007, Hamas has been the governing authority of the Gaza Strip.

2.3% of Palestinian Christians who fled such conditions, whereas Jordan was the destination for 9.3% of such Palestinian Christian migrants. The majority of Christian immigrants had been employed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

F.J. (an immigrant from Bethlehem based in the US) discussed his immigration:

"I immigrated on my own to Kuwait in 1961. I got a job opportunity at the National Bank. I returned to my hometown of Bethlehem in order to get married. My wife immigrated to Kuwait in 1966. The rise of Khomeini resulted in a regional tide of Islamisation. So, my wife and I decided to immigrate to the US in 1979. My mother and youngest brother had immigrated to the US in early 1970s."

J. S. (an immigrant from Aboud and based in Jordan) recounted the story of his immigration:

"I graduated the commercial stream of the public secondary school. I got a high grade that made me eligible to enrol in the University of Jordan in the academic year 1975/76. Following my graduation, I got an employment opportunity in Saudi Arabia. So, I worked in Saudi Arabia from 1979 to 1999. During this period, I got married and started a family. However, my wife and I returned to Jordan due to the harsh social conditions and severe restrictions on intellectual and cultural life in Saudi Arabia. During our stay in Saudi Arabia, our children had to learn Islamic religion in schools. Following my immigration to Jordan, I have assumed a new job."

W. Q. (an immigrant whose family was displaced from Lidd, now based in the US) recounted the story of his immigration:

"I was forced by my parents to immigrate from Ramallah in 1989. They were concerned about the deterioration of the political conditions during the first *Intifada*, especially because I was politically active. What compelled me the most to immigrate to the US was the rise of Islamist parties, particularly Hamas. The rise of such parties marked an unordinary situation."

The change of the intellectual pattern certainly affect everyday life through disrupting the relations between the various groups in society, especially religious and political groups. This change serves as a push factors that compel some groups, especially numerical minorities, to immigrate.

4.6 Conclusion

Several social, cultural, and economic factors have influenced the dynamics and tracks of Palestinian Christian migration patterns, with political factors have had the greatest impact. Nevertheless, transnational migrations have turned the reasons for migration of Palestinian Christians from forced emigration to economic migration. The forced displacement and expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan in 1948 and 1967 were followed by other immigrations to the Gulf countries and the US. Migrants have sought to create a case of social action and relocate to a more secure place.¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of these migrations was the need to improve economic conditions and perhaps accumulate wealth. Starting from the late Ottoman period, migrants became centres of gravity in their host country, attracting more relatives to migrate and join them. Even those who immigrated to pursue their higher education were attracted to the location of their relatives who had already migrated. Thus, they settled in the receiving countries, where they started families and set up businesses. They also attracted and encouraged even more family members and relatives to immigrate.

Palestinians in general, and Palestinian Christians in particular arguably share a wider migratory movement from Palestine and the Arab region regardless of their reasons of migration. Paradoxically, it is important to note that the track of Palestinian immigrants to the US passed through Jordan, one of the neighbouring Arab receiving countries for Palestinians. Due to the specific geopolitical status between Jordan and Palestine, the idea of "imposed return" of Palestinians from the Gulf countries to Jordan is perceived as a form of alternative return.

Palestinians across Arab countries don't have the complete freedom to cross transnational borders, to travel or to return to their homeland since the majority hold Jordanian passports, except for Palestinian refugees who hold special documents in refugee camps, and the Palestinian passport is not recognized by all countries. Thus, they resorted to their families and relatives as a means to

¹⁸⁰ Van Hear, Nicholas, *Refugee in diaspora: From durable solutions to transnational relation, home and exile among refugee Diasporas* (New Issue in Refugee Research, Working Paper no. 83, Centre for Development Research Copenhagen Denmark, 2003), 9-10.

help them immigrate. This is evident as immigration was based on familial links, but not on legal bases. Nevertheless, Palestinians arguably immigrated to the Arab Gulf countries partly based on economic grounds.

Familial networks have managed to instil the culture of migration among their members. Accordingly, members of the same family are encouraged to immigrate not only to meet their economic needs, but also given the opportunities migration affords in terms of culture, education, money, friends, safety, and their future.

Chapter Three

Extrapolation the Diaspora: Communities, Family and Feelings in the Palestinian Case

Section I: Diasporic Communities as Dynamic Zones

Section II: Between Transnational and Diasporic: Various Cases of Families

Section III: Narrating Life of Dispersion

1. Diaspora communities as dynamic zones

1.1 Introduction

Based on the definition of the diaspora, William Safran (1991: 83-84) describes diaspora communities as:

"Expatriate minority communities that are dispersed from an indigenous center to at least two peripheral places and that maintain a memory, a vision or a myth about their indigenous homeland. He also describes them as expatriate communities that believe they are not— and perhaps cannot—be fully accepted by their host country; that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and of whose collective consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland."¹⁸¹

This means diaspora communities are "participatory" in the sense that migrants share the same culture, identity, and shock they have lived. Diaspora communities are based on this shared migrants' culture, identity, and shock, empowering their members to live the diaspora life as a group.

This section seeks to explore the nature of the communities that migrants created following their immigration to Jordan and the US as well as the new communities where they currently reside. It addresses the following questions: What are the bases that underlie such communities? Are they religious, familial, or nationalist? What are the shifts these communities have undergone? Could new communities be considered diaspora communities? Given the differences between Jordan and the US in terms of the nature of immigration and communities created by migrants and where they have lived in the diaspora, this part will discuss diaspora communities in these two countries separately.

¹⁸¹ William Safran, "Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. *Diaspora*," *A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no.1 (1991): 83-99.

1.2 Immigrant communities centred around Amman

One must first recall that according to the Jordanian historical archive and the al-Fahom Family archives, Khirbet Abu Jaber¹⁸² is considered the first urban building that was constructed in Jordan in the mid-nineteenth century. It belongs to the Abu Jaber family who immigrated from Palestine to Jordan and settled down in the al-Salt district village of al-Yadodeh, pictured below. At that time, Amman had not been inhabited (built) yet.

Photos 1: Al-Yadodeh and Abu Jaber's House in al-Salt, Jordan



Source: Dr. Rauf Abu Jaber's personal archive

¹⁸² In 1860, Saleh Abu Jaber commenced the construction of a large three-storey building. He chose al-Yadodeh as the site of construction. The building remained intact until 1964, when it became desolate and dilapidated. In the late 1980s, the owners of Khirbet Abu Jaber had the idea of transforming the building into a tourist centre that draws its inspiration from the old lifestyle. In 1989, the Amman Tourism Investment Company, established by some of the Abu Jaber family's grandchildren, renovated part of the site, while it maintained the main components, sections, and old building style of the site. The company used the stones of the original building.

This indicates Jordanians were Bedouin tribes who lived a basic life until this period. It also indicates that Palestinians served as a key factor in terms of the urbanization of Bedouin life. Before 1948, Transjordan's population reached 340,000; 160,000 people lived in the Bedouin areas and 180,000 lived in small rural areas that later transformed into major cities.¹⁸³

1.2.1 Emergency camp-like communities centred around convents and churches in the post-Nakba period


Considering that the majority of Palestinians in Jordan moved to Jordan after being forcefully displaced in the aftermath of the *Nakba* and *Naksa* wars, they lived in emergency communities that "lacked the elements of decent life." Many Palestinians lived in UNRWA-run refugee camps as well. This begs the question: did Christians reside in refugee camps or other different areas.

Palestinian Christian refugees did not live in refugee camps across Jordan for two main reasons. First, Palestinian Christian refugee families were provided with substantial aid and assistance from various Christian institutions, such as Caritas and the Pontifical Mission. It should be noted that Palestinian Muslim refugees were also provided with the same services from these institutions. Second, many Palestinian Christian refugees did not stay for long in Jordan; they utilized their family networks in order to immigrate to the US or Europe.

Interviews with Palestinian families across Jordan show that Palestinian Christians lived in poor areas (slums) more like refugee camps, but not inside refugee camps. Such areas were located in the proximity of convents, churches, or religious institutions. For example, such areas were located in the vicinity of the Latin (Roman Catholic) church in Jabal Misdar, as well as the Italian Hospital and the Greek Orthodox Church in Jabal al-Ashrafiya. Such poor areas were also located in the vicinity of al-Mahatta Street, al-Mutran Street and Khirfan Street in Jabal Amman as shown in the map below.

¹⁸³ Brand A. Laurie, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution building and the search of state* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1988).

Map 11: Diasporic communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in Amman- Jordan



Highlighting the nature of residence in such areas, M. S. (uprooted from Jerusalem and currently resides in Jordan) said: "Poor Christians lived in such areas. They formed emergency residential communities for a short period of time before they relocated. These residences were canvas tents or wooden sheds."

T. D. (a Jordanian born to a family from Lidd in Jordan and currently resides in Jordan) said:

"When they were forcefully displaced in 1948, my father and uncle were allowed to build wooden sheds on a plot of land belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church that was under construction in Jabal al-Ashrafiya. They later built homes instead of the sheds. The church did not attempt to demand compensation from them or reclaim the plot of land."

Palestinian emigrants and refugees did not continue to live in these places for long. They soon managed to co-rent rooms or small homes due to their harsh economic conditions but they remained in such rooms or homes only temporarily. A. A. (a Jordanian born to a family from Lidd in Jordan) remarked:

"My parents rented a room, where they lived for two years. My father used to work as a green grocer. In 1952, they relocated to Jabal al-Ashrafiya, close to the Italian Hospital. They chose to relocate to this area since the majority of Palestinian emigrants and refugees who lived here were Christians. They lived in shanties. Perhaps there was another reason for their relocation to this area in particular. There was a water spring that attracted people. Two years later, my parents relocated to Jabal al-Natheef in downtown Amman."

Moreover, F. Q. (who was displaced from Ramleh and currently resides in Jordan) recounted his story. He said:

"My parents, brothers, and I lived in the vicinity of the Italian Hospital in Jabal al-Ashrafiya. We used to live in one room. Afterwards, we relocated to Wadi al-Seer area, where we also lived in one room. My brother and I used to sleep on a mattress placed over vegetable plastic boxes. Then, we relocated to Jabal al-Hussein. The home was not hygienic and had high humidity."

It is worth noting that some Palestinian families wanted to live in areas close to their country of origin since they believed it would be possible for them to return to their hometowns. A. H. (uprooted from Lidd and currently resides in Jordan) recounted his experience:

"We settled down in al-Salt. Considering its proximity to the borders, my father chose to settle down in al-Salt in the hopes that we would return to our country of origin. We lived with al-Arabiyyat clan in a single spacious room. We used to sleep on the floor. The toilet we used was

separate and located outside the room. We lived there for five years before relocating to Jabal al-Ashrafiya in Amman."

Field research revealed that people descending from the same hometown lived on the same street. Recalling his experience, H. Sh. (who immigrated from Aboud and currently resides in Jordan) said: "When I immigrated, I lived in Khirfan Street, where most of the people descending from my hometown of Aboud used to live. Then, I relocated to al-Mutran Street." It is worth noting that both streets are located in Jabal Amman.

Photos 2: First communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in Amman- Jordan



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Winter 2015. Top: Jabal al-Ashrafiya. Lower left: Khirfan Street. Lower right: A Palestinian immigrant's house in Jabal Amman.

1.2.2 More bourgeoisie and prosperous communities

Palestinian refugees relocated to rented homes, but they did not go too far away from their first residential areas. They relocated primarily in Jabal Amman, Jabal al-Ashrafiyeh, and Jabal al-Hussein, because these three areas were (and still are) cheap for living and are believed to have been built by Palestinians. In contrast, Jordanians were concentrated in al-Kerak, Ma'an, Madaba, and Jarash. As mentioned before, families whose members served in the Jordanian military relocated to al-Zarqa. Some Palestinian emigrant and refugee families preferred to live in Christian cities or areas, such as al-Salt, Fuheis, al-Husn and Jabal al-Weibdeh, in order to preserve the Christian atmosphere to which they were accustomed.

As Palestinians started to ponder about their future in Jordan, they purchased plots of land in the 1960s and 1970s. This step was taken for the sake of investment, but not for settlement. The purchase of lands by Palestinians became an issue of concern for Jordanians. Th. D. (a Jordanian born to a family from Lidd and currently residing in Jordan) remarked:

"After they had money, Palestinians started to expand toward the outskirts at the expense of Jordanians. They tended to purchase plots of land (i.e. they owned a portion of Jordan's geography). This became an issue of concern for the Jordanians, who came to believe that Palestinians sought to take their property."


Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and culminating in Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank,¹⁸⁴ it became clear for Palestinians that it would be difficult for them to return to their country of origin. Therefore, they considered the construction of homes in order to settle down in Jordan. Aware of the current situation during their time, Palestinians were convinced that it was very difficult for them to return to their country of origin. They delayed this step - built their own homes - to the 1980s and 1990s.

¹⁸⁴ Following the 1967 War, Israeli occupation authorities conducted a population census. Palestinians outside the occupied Palestinian territories were not granted Israeli identity cards. Israeli identity cards were replaced by the Palestinian identity cards following the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1994. Following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, the Jordanian government recognized Palestinians inside Jordan (but living outside of refugee camps) as Jordanian citizens, while it considered Palestinians in the West Bank as non-Jordanians.

This also applied to Palestinians expelled from Kuwait in 1990. Upon their expulsion, they rented homes for a short period of time in Jordan before building their own homes. That was because they also could not make it back to their country of origin since they had Jordanian citizenships (where but not Palestinian citizenships).¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, there is a difference between these two groups. In contrast to the first group (i.e. Palestinians forcefully displaced from Palestine), Palestinians expelled from Kuwait managed to take their money out of the country. Thus, it did not take them very long to re-establish or resume their life in Jordan.

This brings up more questions about how Palestinians' developed their lives in Jordan: Where did Palestinians build their own new (current) homes? Are they still concentrated in Amman or have they relocated to other cities? Have they maintained a variety of distinct Palestinian communities, and a collective identity? The following chart illustrates the nature of areas to which Palestinian immigrants and refugees relocated.

Chart 4: Characterization of actual communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in Amman- Jordan



Emigrants relocated to more prosperous and urbanized areas. As a result of the influx of Palestinian and Iraqi emigrants and refugees, Amman has been witnessing an urbanization which attracted a large proportion of capitalists and investors. This urbanization resulted in the

¹⁸⁵ All Palestinians in the West Bank, and the Palestinians who emigrated or fled to Jordan, including the refugees in the camps, were granted Jordanian passports after the decision to unite the West Bank with Jordan in 1950. Palestinians have used these passports for traveling.

construction of many areas or neighbourhoods as well as an expansion in the provision of services and employment opportunities across Amman.

New areas or neighbourhoods stand out for their master-planned residences, which take the form of buildings and villas. Thus, they have become to be known for their "socially tranquillity." Palestinians are not the only group to reside in these areas; Jordanians, Iraqis and emigrants from the Gulf also reside there.

Palestinian emigrants or refugees resided in these areas for several reasons. Most importantly, many Palestinians purchased plots of lands at very cheap prices in these areas. The land prices were so cheap since these areas were remote, mountainous, and not populated at that time. When they decided to settle down, Palestinian landowners constructed new homes on their plots of land. Nowadays, these areas became a part of the new neighbourhoods of Amman as a result of the population growth and rapid urbanization. Examples for such neighbourhoods are Shmeisani, Tlaa' El-'Ali, Sweifieh, al-'Abdali, and 'Abdoun.

Photos 3: Modern (actual) communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in Amman- Jordan



Source: Photos by Hadeel Fawadleh, Winter 2015.
Left: An immigrant's house in Tlaa' El-'Ali. Right: A modern house in 'Abdoun.

Some Palestinian emigrants preferred to live in predominantly Christian areas, particularly Fuheis, a small city located on the midway between Amman and al-Salt, and Jabal al-Weibdeh,

one of Amman's districts. These areas stand out for their intensive Christian presence and solid social relations among families. Besides, they are less noisy than other areas, particularly in central Amman.

Despite the urban development of Jordan, a significant proportion of Palestinian emigrants have continued to live in the same areas since their forced dispersion after the *Nakba* and *Naksa* Wars. Examples of such areas are Jabal Amman, Jabal al-Misdar, and Jabal al-Ashrafiyeh. Although they have settled down in these areas, emigrants have constructed or purchased new homes. Emigrant families who opted to remain in these areas are among the least wealthy.

1.3 Immigrant communities in San Francisco Bay: from city center of San Francisco to the south

Naff (1993) said that the first communities established by Arab immigrants in the late nineteenth century were located in the eastern half of the US, particularly in New York, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Arab immigrants, including Palestinian immigrants, settled down in these areas for three main reasons. First, immigrants travelled by sea from Jaffa seaport to the eastern coast of the US. Second, they used to earn significant money from working as peddlers, attracting more friends and family to also immigrate. Third, the US Ford Motor Company was founded in Dearborn, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit, in 1903. This explains why the largest Arab community is currently based in Detroit. Lebanese and Maronite immigrants were the first to settle down in Detroit before other Arab immigrants followed. Accordingly, Detroit has become to be called the "capital of American Arabs." It has the Islamic Center of America, the largest mosque in North America, in addition to churches for various denominations and cultural institutions. The most notable of these cultural institutions is the Arab American Museum, which documents Arab migration to the US. Visitors in Dearborn feel as if they were walking down the street in an Arab city since the city is abound with Arab goods and stores.

1.3.1 Family and hometown-centred communities

Regarding the western coast of the US, i.e. San Francisco Bay, interviews with immigrant families show that early immigrants resided in different neighbourhoods across San Francisco

district about 1920. There were Arab immigrant communities, such as the Tenderloin area in the Financial District. There were also Palestinian immigrant communities, established particularly by families descending from Ramallah, most importantly the Sunset district. These areas are close to the city's central business district and it is a way by which immigrants keep the identity of the group.¹⁸⁶ The following map illustrate the main communities

Map 12: Diasporic communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in San Francisco Bay- the US



¹⁸⁶ Charles L. Swan & Leila B. Saba, "The migration of a minority," in *Arabic speaking communities in American cities*, ed. Barbra C. Aswad (New York: Center of Migration Studies, 1974), 85- 110.

Immigrants have dwelled in residences that fitted the nature of their employment and migration, (i.e. individual or family migration). For example, many individual immigrants rented rooms. They worked in many professions, such as tailors, photographers, and hair stylists. Recalling his experience, G. T. (whose father descends from Ramallah and who currently resides in the US) said:

"My father had a hairstyling boutique on Ocean Avenue for 35 years until his retirement at 65. He started as a barber in Ramallah and came here on a student visa to study hairstyling in 1952. Like most of the immigrants from Ramallah, the men first would come and live in SROs (single residence occupancy) rooms in the Tenderloin or in other parts of downtown to save money."

This was also affirmed by G. G. (an immigrant from Ramallah and currently resides in the US) who said:

"Before I immigrated, I used to work as a tailor in Ramallah. When I immigrated to the US in 1962, my brother-in-law and I co-opened a grocery, but we disagreed. So, I worked for a Greek tailor at the city centre. Due to the lack of money, I rented a room on the same street. I used to pay US\$2.50 for daily rent. I also worked as a tailor in Oakland and Berkley."

Immigrant families worked in liquor stores, grocery stores, deli and cafes. In the case of such businesses, family members could cooperate and work together to make more gains. Many immigrants managed to open more than a store at the same time. These families lived in less expensive neighbourhoods, such as Sunset District. Houses comprised two to four bedrooms with one bathroom, but many families remodelled their homes to expand the number of bedrooms and bathrooms over the years.

Between 1934 and 1941, federal housing were built, making single-family homes within reach for middle-income buyers for the first time. The Daly City community of Westlake, where a large number of Palestinian immigrants settle nowadays, was one of the largest planned community. Though built by the same developer, the retention of trees and green space in Westlake make for a much different feel than the Sunset District

Photos 4: First communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in San Francisco Bay- the US




Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Spring 2015. Sunset District, San Francisco.

1.3.2 Communities expanding toward the south

Around 1960, immigrants from Palestine started to relocate to other areas, most importantly the area around Ocean Street of San Francisco, where the Ramallah Club is located. So, it is anticipated that many immigrants from Ramallah have lived in the vicinity of this street. They later relocated to other cities south of San Francisco, such as San Bruno, Millbrae, Foster City, Belmont, San Jose, San Mateo, and Redwood City. They did so for three main reasons as shown in the following Chart.

Chart 5: Characterization of actual communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants south of San Francisco Bay - the US



In contrast to other areas such as New York and Chicago, California has a mild climate similar to the mild climate of the Mediterranean region. This attracted Arab and Palestinian immigrants. Upon their settlement, immigrants did not find much difference between California and their country of origin in terms of climate. Elderly or rather, first-generation immigrants in particular considered the mild climate as a special feature of California. It is evident that the further south one travels in the US, the more the climate becomes milder and tends to be warmer. The desire to live in milder climates is reflected in the prices of homes in these desired areas, which are as much as US\$2 million or more. One can recognize that relocation to the milder (and more expensive) areas of the US is indicative of immigrants' higher social status.

Photos 5: Actual communities of Palestinian Christian immigrants in San Francisco Bay- the US



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Spring 2015. Left: an immigrant house in Millbrae. Right: City of San Bruno, where some immigrants settle.

Palestinian communities were initially based in San Francisco since it was suitable for the nature of their jobs. However, careers in technology have emerged in Silicon Valley,¹⁸⁷ an area that has become a convener of second-generation immigrants who are more educated and specialized than their parents. Nevertheless, this has not adversely impacted the professions of parents, who

¹⁸⁷ Silicon Valley, which includes the southern portion of the San Francisco Bay Area, San Jose, and surrounding cities and towns, is the third largest high-tech centre in the United States, behind the New York and Washington metropolitan areas. The Bay Area as a whole, however, ranks first in high-tech jobs, and has the highest average high-tech salaries. Thousands of high technology companies are headquartered in Silicon Valley, including Adobe Systems, Oracle, Yahoo!, Facebook, and Google.

are still making gains. Some of them often work in more than one field, such as working as an employee in a company and also owning a grocery store.

Given the bustling life and the spread of crime and drugs in San Francisco, Palestinian immigrants were compelled to leave the city centre in search of less crowded and less socially dangerous areas. While many Palestinians are still working in San Francisco city, they commute from their homes in other areas.

Some Palestinian immigrants chose to settle down in this area in order to join their families, especially parents, brothers, and sisters. This offered immigrated families a social benefit in terms of the maintenance of social relations among individual immigrants and assistance in solving problems. It also offered them an economic benefit in terms of enabling members of the same family to work together in order to achieve larger gains. The role of family networks was explored in chapter two.

1.4 Religion, family, ethnicity: the foundation of Palestinian communities in diaspora

In order to explore the nature of communities built by Palestinian migrants in different Diaspora countries, the researcher deemed it appropriate to provide some examples she and other researchers had found to draw some conclusions.

First, examples from neighbouring Arab countries will be presented. According to Hilal (2007), despite sharing the same language and culture with the Arab countries, Palestinian immigrants established their own small communities for work-related purposes, just as it has been the case in the Gulf countries.¹⁸⁸ While Dorai (2002) states that Palestinian immigrants built their communities based on their indigenous village (hometowns) or family. This empowered them to build what they had lost (their country of origin) by gathering in one area and establishing the

¹⁸⁸ Jamil Hilal, *Relations between Palestinian diaspora (al-Shatat), Palestinians communities in the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip* (A paper prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa. The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, Egypt: The American University in Cairo, 2007).

family or village assembly place (Diwan).¹⁸⁹ This was also realized in the case of Palestinian Christian immigrants from Ramallah who immigrated to the US. They established a club called the Ramallah Club in each of their communities.

This was also confirmed by other immigrants whom the researcher met and who were compelled to leave Kuwait and move to Jordan in the aftermath of the Gulf War. A. A. (who was born in Kuwait and currently resides in Jordan) commented, "My family and I settled down in the Hawally district area of al-Nugra, where Palestinian and Lebanese immigrants resided. We used to call this area 'the West Bank.' There was another neighbourhood that we used to call 'Gaza.'"

In Saudi Arabia, Palestinian immigrants apparently built their communities or neighbourhoods on the basis of both origin/ethnicity and religion. R. A. (an immigrant from Aboud, has resided in Kuwait and is currently residing in Jordan) remarked, "During our period of residence in Saudi Arabia, my family and I settled down in a [Christian] Palestinian-Lebanese neighbourhood. Each time we used to meet at one of our homes to discuss religious issues and pray." Note that it is prohibited in Saudi Arabia to build churches and practice religious rites other than Islam.

Following the *Nakba*, the majority of Palestinian emigrants and refugees (including Christians), lived in refugee camps in Lebanon. These refugee camps were more specifically defined along identity lines than their counterparts in other countries. For example, Mar Elias Camp was founded to accommodate Palestinian Greek Orthodox Christians displaced from the Galilee. Jisr al-Basha Camp was established to accommodate Palestinian Catholic Christians who were forcefully displaced from Haifa, Jaffa, and Akka. It was later demolished by the Lebanese (Christian) Phalange militias and their allies. Dabaya Camp was established to accommodate Palestinian Christian Maronite who were forcefully displaced from their hometowns in northern Palestine, namely Eqrit, Kufr Birim, and al-Jish. The majority of these refugees are now based in the diaspora, mainly Denmark.

¹⁸⁹ Mohamad K Dorai, "The meaning of homeland for the Palestinian diaspora revival and transformation," in *New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home*, eds. Al-Ali, Nadjé Sadig and Koser, Khalid (London: Routledge, 2002), 87-95.

In Honduras, as the first of the non-Arab diaspora countries, the absence of a national oligarchy and a nascent merchant class helped to solidify Palestinian merchants and entrepreneurs' businesses. By the 1920s, Palestinian merchants dominated the urban commercial infrastructure of the country's north coast. They accumulated and concentrated economic capital within the community,¹⁹⁰ where the majority of immigrants were from Bethlehem and Beit Jala. As for Chile, the first-generation of Palestinian immigrants established their first community upon their arrival in Chile. They were concentrated in the Patronato district in Santiago. They constructed the first Orthodox Church, dedicated to St. George, in 1917 although Christians in Chile were Catholic.

Despite the nature of their host countries, Palestinian immigrants formed their own communities through which they stayed connected and preserved their identity. They built such communities around a centre based on differences between their country of origin and the country of immigration. For example, despite the cultural affinity they have with Arab host countries, Palestinians formed their communities on the basis of origin and religion. In contrast, Palestinian immigrants built their communities based on religion (Eastern Church), family, or hometown, when settling in non-Arab countries in diaspora.

2. Between transnational and diasporic: various models of families

2.1 Introduction

The term "diaspora" is inherently geographical, where the scattering of people over space and transnational connections between people and places could be understood and studied through geographical lens. Blunt (2003: 282) states that, "Geography clearly lies at the heart of diaspora both as a concept and as lived experience, encompassing the contested interplay of place, home, culture and identity through migration and resettlement."¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Nancie L. González, *Dollar, dove and eagle. One hundred years of Palestinian migration to Honduras* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

¹⁹¹ Alison Blunt, "Geographies of diaspora and mixed descent: Anglo-Indians in India and Britain," *Population, space and place* 9, no. 4 (2003): 281-294.

This indicates that the "diaspora", "crossing national borders", "settlement" and "migration" are geographic terms used to describe the situation of migrant groups. This does not necessarily mean that all emigrant groups share the same characteristics. They perhaps share some characteristics, but they are certainly different in many others. The experience of Palestinian diaspora has dispersed Palestinian families across more than one country and one continent, aggravating their suffering. The opposite is relatively true. Despite the harsh diaspora they experienced, particularly in 1948 and 1967, Palestinian families settled down in the same place (the same country, city, and sometimes the same neighbourhood or street), alleviating their suffering. This means the longer the distances between members of the same family, the larger is their diaspora experience.

Considering that the family remained the sole safety structure amidst displacement and instability, it has come to be called a "homeland" as an indication to its prominent role. Family networks played a role in terms of facilitating emigration and alleviating emigrants' suffering and refugee status as discussed in previous chapters. Families also played the most important role in relating stories through which they managed to reproduce the meanings of *Nakba* ("Catastrophe") and the image of homeland. Family is the most important institution in relation to the creation of a Palestinian identity in diaspora. Accordingly, homeland is the current place where one's family resides and the original place where members of the family were raised.¹⁹²

This section explores family diaspora as a miniature of the larger diaspora (the Palestinian diaspora). Palestinian families were dispersed within their homeland and abroad following Israeli-Arab wars. They were dispersed once again in the wake of wars and revolutions in neighbouring Arab countries. Meanwhile, members within family units managed to reunite in camps or the same home following wars. Nevertheless, cross-border migrations, including economic migrations, re-distributed and dispersed members of the same family (at least brothers and sisters) across several states and continents, exacerbating their geographic and social diaspora.

¹⁹² Helena S. Lindholm, *The reconstruction of Palestinian nationalism: Between revolution and statehood* (Manchester: Manchester University, 1999).

2.2 "The place where my family lives is my homeland."

Despite the various circumstances of diaspora, asylum and emigration, a Palestinian emigrant's family has remained the institution that certainly helped them survive and maintain their identity. Outside of families, there was no central body or effective organization on the local level that protected emigrants.

The 1948 War, known as the Catastrophe (*Nakba*), ripped apart the Palestinian society and families. However, the circumstances of diaspora and asylum helped Palestinians rebuild their families. Kana'ana believes that despite the *Nakba* undermining the economic production base of Palestinian extended families, depriving them of their property, and displacing them, the Palestinian people have survived in the aftermath of the *Nakba* thanks to the cohesion of Palestinian families and villages.¹⁹³

It is evident that each Palestinian refugee camp across Jordan is composed of several parts, and each part represents a gathering for the same villagers or members of the same family. This has helped Palestinians across Jordan maintain the unity of their families and identity. Palestinian families across Kuwait tended to rent the same residential building in order to share bills and rent. So, it is evident that Palestinian families across Kuwait managed to retain their cohesion thanks to the same economic crisis that had ripped them apart.¹⁹⁴

As their members, including siblings and parents, could not live in the same country for various reasons related to the diaspora and asylum conditions, Palestinian families forged wider and more solid relations. They expanded to include paternal and maternal relatives, adopting the Family Flexibility strategy.¹⁹⁵ The role of such "expanded" families is manifested during crises.

¹⁹³ Sharif Kana'ana, *Studies in culture, folklore and identity* (Ramallah: Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2011). [In Arabic].

¹⁹⁴ Shafeeq Ghabra, "Palestinians in Kuwait: The family and the politics of survival," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, no. 2 (1988): 62-83.

¹⁹⁵ Idris 'Azzam, "The impact of displacement on Palestinian family: A descriptive survey on a sample of Palestinian displaced persons residing," *Journal of Social Sciences* 14, no. 1 (1986): 177. [In Arabic].

They tend to expand the scope of relations among their members, so that they can utilize all available possibilities in order to face a problem.

Palestinian families also adopted the "Physical Remoteness for Spiritual Closeness"¹⁹⁶ strategy. Following the forceful displacement of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, Palestinian families realized that some of their members should immigrate in order to survive. Therefore, young members who were the most capable of enduring difficulties and suffering immigrated in search of work opportunities. They provided for the necessary requirements of their parents and younger siblings.

Displaced Palestinian families attempted to find various means to compensate for their financial and property losses. One of the most important of such means was education. Salim Tamari (1994: 22) states in this regard:


"The loss of land and property as a result of the war promoted the value of education and emigration as sources of social mobilization. The means of this mobilization was extended family that invested a lot in providing education for their youngest members, especially sons."¹⁹⁷

Immigrant respondents were asked the question follows as part of the questionnaire they filled out. The question is: Does the fact that you are living with your family and with most of your relatives in the same neighbourhood, city, and/or country make you feel that you're living in a miniature society, representing your homeland in the diaspora? Answers were diverse as illustrated in the following chart.

¹⁹⁶ Idris 'Azzam, *The impact of displacement on Palestinian family*, 1986, *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁷ Salim Tamari, *The Transformation of the Palestinian Society: Fragmentation and Occupation* (Institute of Palestine Studies, 1994), 17-30. [In Arabic].

Chart 6: Living in proximity to one's family vs. the sense of diaspora



Although members of the same family settled down in the same host country, this did not have significant impact on immigrants' feelings that they live the same atmosphere they had lived in their homeland, indigenous cities, or hometowns. Atmosphere here refers to cordial social atmosphere, including exchanging visits, maintaining intensive social relations, socializing, living in the same neighbourhood and discussing individual and group social affairs. In such an atmosphere, one knows and maintains intensive relations with the others. However, this does not necessarily cancel the important role played by family networks that was addressed in chapter two.

The fact that members of the same family live in the same area does not necessarily represent a small community and indicate that they maintain social relations as they did in their country of origin. Nevertheless, this does not mean any lack of communication between members of the same family. R. Gh. (an immigrant from Beit Jala and currently resides in Jordan) said: "While there is a social atmosphere in Beit Jala, there is not such an atmosphere here due to the rapid pace of modern life and being very busy." A.A. (uprooted from Lidd and currently resides in Jordan) said: "We lack the simple life we used to live in our country of origin." W. K. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in Jordan) said, "We used to have much more close social relations in Bethlehem. In contrast, family visits are very few here as everyone is busy working for a living and deems making family visits not worth traveling long distances." G. A. (who immigrated from Beit Sahour and currently resides in Jordan) justified this point, saying, "We travel to Beit Sahour in order to celebrate Christmas and Easter as well as to spend our summer vacation."

A. A. (uprooted from Lidd and currently resides in Jordan) provides this explanation: "We don't meet one another except on [special] occasions. So, we are living a constant state of expatriation." B. A. (born to a Palestinian family displaced from Tiberius in Lebanon and currently resides in Jordan) says, "When our grandparents were alive, we had a sense of stronger cohesion. However, following their death, we feel the sense of cohesion is weakening. One's grandfather and grandmother are a symbol for the country of origin." Z. N. (who was displaced from Jaffa and currently resides in Jordan) says, "This situation here is different. The habits and customs in Jordan are different from their counterparts in Jaffa. The city urbanization is certainly a factor that has impacted social relations." A. S. (who immigrated from Zababdeh and currently resides in Jordan) said: "My relatives are mostly based in Zababdeh. So, I occasionally travel to the West Bank in order to have the opportunity of better social relations. Here [in Jordan]), I feel like [I don't have] anyone in this world." Besides, M. K. (who was born to a family descending from Jifna in Jordan) believes: "Even if we live together here, the sense of expatriation would remain engraved in our memory."

In contrast, some have considered their larger Palestinian or Arab community in the diaspora as their real family. In this regard, S. K. (an immigrant from Ramallah and currently resides in the US) says, "We are living in the US the same way as if we were still living in Ramallah. We are surrounded by our relatives and friends. We participate in totally Arab and Palestinian activities organized by the church, as well as village and city clubs." N. S. (an immigrant from Birzeit and currently resides in the US) added, "I feel as if I were in Birzeit. My brothers are living close to me. I am surrounded by Arab families."

Offering a different perspective, A. D. (who immigrated from Taybeh and currently resides in Jordan) explained, "We do not feel we are foreigners. We have our own community. My children have developed relations with their classmates and I have developed relations with my work colleagues. So, we have not maintained relations with our relatives since they are busy." M. Kh. (who immigrated from Birzeit and currently resides in Jordan) cites another reason: "I was raised up in a city. So, I prefer to be a part of an urban society, but not a part of a family or clan-based community."

The lower percentage of immigrants have indicated they are still living as they used to in their country of origin. They exchange visits on a daily or at least weekly basis. They hold family night gatherings and banquets and gather on religious festivals and occasions. The members of such immigrant families arguably live in the same area. N. S. (who immigrated from Birzeit and currently resides in the US) says, "I feel as if I were still living in Birzeit. My brothers live close to me. We gather on religious feasts, namely Christmas, Easter and Thanksgiving. Each time we gather at the home of one of my brothers." There is something else remarkable about these families. One or both parents are still living in the homes of one of their grown sons, which maintains the social cohesion of members of the same family.

The family no longer holds the same meaning it did before immigration and displacement nor the meaning it maintained in the communities of diaspora, especially emergency camps and communities. Changes in life and employment circumstances, as well as large distances between members of the same family have re-conceptualized social relations. They have given rise to a new concept of family relations or the family itself. Some has considered the family as parents, brothers and sisters, while others considered "family" to mean the broader Arab or Palestinian community. Still others consider their "family" to be the group of friends and acquaintances formed through employment and kinship.

2.3 Families across the diaspora, a consequence of the causes of migration


Interviews with immigrated families show differences in terms of date of immigration, specific family members, and their experience in the diaspora. Upon examining the interviews, one infers various patterns of families in the diaspora. In light of these patterns, one can explain the nature of relationships among migrating family members and predict future relations and situations.

2.3.1 Half of the family in diaspora as a means to support the rest members in homeland

As a result of poor economic circumstances, members of some families were forced to emigrate in order to earn money and provide for the rest of their family members living in the country of origin. Such immigrations have mostly involved male adults who managed to immigrate and find work thanks to family networks. Accordingly, members of a family are divided between

the country of origin and the diaspora. The geographic distribution of the (A) family from Aboud is shown in the following map.

Map13: Geographic distribution of members of the family (A) from Aboud




2.3.2 A long-term presence in foreign (non-Arab) diaspora

Members of many urban families, especially from Bethlehem and Ramallah, started to immigrate to the Americas in the late nineteenth century. This early immigration experience has offered members of the same family the opportunity to immigrate and join their immigrated family members. It has offered them the opportunity to mostly concentrate in the same area or settle down in neighbouring areas. Such a distribution of immigrants was the outcome of social circumstances,

most importantly marriage as a reason for the immigration of young women and increased income as a reason for the immigration of males. The geographic distribution of immigrant members of the (B) family, from Bethlehem, is illustrated in the following map.

Map14: Geographic distribution of members of the family (B) from Bethlehem




The distribution of immigrating individuals and families across North America and South America could lead to family reunifications in one area. Trans-border migration has enabled some members of such families to change their places of residence, as they relocated from Chile to Nevada. Considering the fact that they immigrated a long time ago, members of such families have lost their legal right (Palestinian nationality) and social right (family relations with the hometown).

Despite the freedom of movement between the Americas, immigrant brothers and sisters only meet on religious feasts, special occasions and during vacations.

2.3.3 Families distributed across the homeland, Arab and non-Arab states

Members of some immigrated families have recognized that their immigration would help them and their children make economic, social, and academic gains. This does not mean that members of a family should all immigrate. The decision to immigrate was not a family-based decision as much as an individual decision. So, some members of such families are distributed across several countries of diaspora, while others remained in their country of origin. The (N) family from Birzeit provides an example of such families, as illustrated in the following map.

Map 15: Geographic distribution of members of the family (N) from Birzeit



In view of the different reasons of immigration, the diaspora countries are various. For instance, members of the Nasser family are distributed across three regions: the US, Jordan, and Birzeit (in oPt). However, upon the examination of immigration routes of individuals, one recognizes that immigrants who had settled down in an Arab country were compelled later on to immigrate to another country for economic or political reasons. They ended up immigrating to the US, making use of their family networks.

On the other hand, another member of the Nasser family, who continued to live in their hometown of Birzeit, does not consider emigrating to join his brothers in the US, although the option would be available in case of an emergency. Accordingly, diaspora in non-Arab countries is capable of attracting other family members and other emigrants in general. Despite being distributed across three main regions, the country of origin remains the most influential centre that attracts or brings together members of the same family. Nevertheless, the real convener (centre of attraction) is the US.

2.3.4 Forced emigration distributed families across the homeland and Arab states

This case is similar to the previous case in the sense that immigration was initially motivated by the search for employment opportunities. However, the immigration trend is different in this case as the Arab Gulf countries, especially Kuwait, is the migratory destination. This indicates that although members of the family did not intend to settle down in the diaspora, they ended up distributed across several Arab states, and some returned to their country of origin. Two main reasons determined the migration tracks of the members of this family: marriage (for female immigrants) and political events, namely the Gulf War. Following the Gulf War, members of this family were dispersed once again. The geographic distribution of the (T) family from Jifna is shown in the following map.

Map 15: Geographic distribution of members of the family (T) from Jifna



Geographically, immigrants were not dispersed very far away from their home country. However, their dispersion had a grave impact on them on legal and social levels. Members living abroad hold Jordanian passports and residency papers (in Kuwait and Syria). This makes it very difficult for them to meet in their country of origin, but they can do so in Jordan, Since the Palestinians living in the West Bank can travel to Jordan by Palestinian passport.

2.4 Have transnational migrations exacerbate or alleviate the dispersion of family members?

Although immigrant families live in one or more country of diaspora, they maintain certain aspects of their country of origin. They often seek to create relations with other communities, while maintaining connections with their relatives in the diaspora countries. These practices result in the multiplicity, rather than duality, of communication. Palestinian families are often separated; members of the same family could be living in the occupied Palestinian territories, Israel (since 1948), Jordan, Kuwait, and the US, for example. Accordingly, they are citizens in some states, temporary residents in others, while refugees in the rest. Van Hear (1991:5) defined the diaspora as "people who have multiple spatial (territorial) relations and loyalties,"¹⁹⁸ while Tololyan claims that diaspora communities serve as "a pattern of the communities of population mobility and crossing borders."¹⁹⁹ This means that members of one family or several families from the same household are very far away from one another, but this distance has inevitably resulted in cross-border (trans-boundary) relations among them. The nature of geographic distances between members of the same family and the nature of the states they are dispersed across have an impact on the extent of such relations.

In view of the growing phenomenon of transnational migration, members of these families, especially second-generation children, migrated once again. For example, second-generation members of the families forcefully displaced in 1948 and 1967 to Jordan or the occupied Palestinian territories have emigrated, while first-generation (parents) members remained. They have emigrated either to the US through family networks or to Arab Gulf countries through job offers. This has exacerbated the dispersion and distribution of members of the same family across more than one state or one continent.

Nevertheless, a meeting or crossing transnational borders by members of a family is a conditional action or a one-way crossing. Members living in non-Arab states can cross the borders

¹⁹⁸ Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus: Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities* (London: UCL Press, 1998).

¹⁹⁹ Kacking Tololyan, "The nation-state and its others: In lieu of a preface," *Diaspora 1*, no.1 (1991): 3-7.

of their country of origin, while members living in the country of origin could not cross the borders of non-Arab states except if they obtain entry visas. In sharp contrast, members of a family residing in Arab states could not enter their country of origin except when they obtain entry visas. In both cases, Jordan serves as an "alternative" or "temporary" place for all members of the family to gather.

3. Narrating Life of Dispersion

3.1 Introduction

One's country of origin is significant and remembered since it is a symbol for one's roots. It is normal for one to have an emotional affiliation to their country of origin (homeland). This is because one's country of origin represents one's affiliation to a certain place, time, and space.²⁰⁰ Genestier (1989: 54) confirmed that the roots of the homeland is "as an image of ancestors, the homeland earth of the deep roots complies with the ancestral model, the community, the hierarchy and repetition of attitudes, traditional habitus."²⁰¹ Thus, Choay (1992: 15) calls generations to take a sense of community or a social group, in order to make other generations keep (in mind) events, sacrifices, rites and beliefs.²⁰²

Official affiliation to a country of origin has become a pressing need, as it is important in terms of enabling someone to acquire legal documents that would prove they belong to a certain place, enabling them to move and travel. While someone might have emotional affiliation or loyalty to their country of origin, they might also hold legal documents of another country by the virtue of his residency.

One's sense of security is related to living in their country of origin (homeland). In contrast, immigrants lack the sense of real security experienced by the people who have not emigrated from

²⁰⁰ Helena S. Lindhom, "The Palestinian diaspora: Between nationalism and transnationalism," in *Palestinians in Europe: Problems of dual identity and adaptation*, ed. Abbas Shibliak (Refugee and Diaspora Studies, no. 2, Palestinian Refugee & Diaspora Center (SHAML) and Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2005), 19- 31.

²⁰¹ Phillip Genestier, "Sous les pavés les racines?" *Espaces Temps* 42, no.1 (1989): 50-57. [In French].

²⁰² Françoise Choay, *L'Allégorie du patrimoine* (Paris: Seuil. 1992). [In French].

their country of origin. Although they integrated into diaspora communities, immigrants are still living a sort of "obscurity" about their future as well as a sense of "expatriation." A people's country of origin (homeland) is valuable as it is able to provide its people with a place of security and comfort. They are not required to play roles in their country of origin.²⁰³ One's country of origin is naturally the place of stability, warmth, relaxation as well as a peaceful life.

On the contrary, the diaspora experience is substantially varied among emigrants and refugees in terms of living or sensing the diaspora in accordance to different settings. For example, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are remarkably marginalized in contrast to Palestinians who have integrated into the US or Europe with relative success.

Accordingly, this section outlines the experience of Palestinians with respect to living in exile, the diaspora, expulsion and forced displacement from their country of origin. It also outlines their experience in terms of living as expatriates and being discriminated against in host countries. It is necessary, however, to make a distinction between the sense of diaspora and living in the diaspora as a geo-political reality, a theme that was discussed in the previous two sections. The sense and experience of the diaspora are both based on the homeland's status as a key pillar.

3.2 Sense of the dispersion versus stability


It is not possible to talk about diaspora as an issue independent from one's homeland. The loss of one's homeland causes a shock that results in the diaspora. A homeland remains a legitimate right to the forcefully displaced. Palestinians in the diaspora maintain a persistent connection to their homeland. They can envisage and deal with several places as a homeland, that one can carry wherever s/he goes. In this regard, Suhier Hammad said, "The homeland lies inside me. I carry its specifications and what it represents whenever I go."²⁰⁴ A dimension of this definition is certainly the continuing importance of the Palestinian identity of the land. The image of one's homeland remains in their minds and never disappears.

²⁰³ Edward Ralph, *Place and placelessness* (London: Pion Press, 1976).

²⁰⁴ Suhier Hammad, *Born Palestinian, born Black* (New York & London: Harlem River Press, 1996).

This means that, one way or another, the sense of diaspora is subject to several changes resulting from the integration of an immigrant into a new society as well as the immigrant absorption policies applied by the host countries. Immigrant respondents were asked to answer the question whether they had a sense of dispersion as part of the questionnaire they filled in. the question is: Do you feel that you are living in the diaspora? The answers they provided are illustrated as follows:

Chart 7: Palestinian Christian immigrants' sense of diaspora



Geography (i.e. proximity to or remoteness from one's country of origin) apparently has not played a significant role in sustaining or intensifying the sense of diaspora as shown in the above chart. The percentages of Palestinians' sense of dispersion in Jordan is rather close to their counterparts in the US. Most importantly, the majority of Palestinian immigrants in both countries have indicated that they don't have a sense of dispersion.

There are a number of main indicators that alleviate a sense of dispersion. They are: settling down in a country, owning a home, having an employment opportunity, securing the future (especially for their children) and obtaining citizenship. A. A. (who immigrated from Ramallah and currently resides in the US) said, "Considering my stability, especially economic stability, I do not have a sense of dispersion here. I have gotten used to laws and regulations. I could return to my country of origin [as I have Palestinian papers]." G. H. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in the US) said, "I achieved my desires here. I have secured the future of my

children, who have completed their university studies and now have their jobs and assume high ranks in society." G. A. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in the US) highlighted the fact that he has not experienced any sense of dispersion as a result of the nature of his immigration:

"We don't have a sense of dispersion. We have voluntarily immigrated. We have offered our children education and built a home. We have been living here for 35 years. When we are here, we belong to here. When we are in our country of origin, we belong to there."

On the other hand, M. S. (who immigrated from Jerusalem and currently resides in Jordan) said:

"The majority of people in Amman are Palestinians. So, we do not have a sense of expatriation. In contrast, the situation is different in the At-Tafliah district, south of Amman. Nevertheless, I live as an expatriate within a larger diaspora community in the Jordanian society."

Cross-border nationalism has also played a role in the alleviation of dispersion. A. F. (who immigrated from Aboud and currently resides in Jordan) remarked: "Although I don't live in a state of dispersion, I don't feel totally comfortable here. The freedom of movement between both banks of the Jordan River cancels dispersion and makes the situation better." On the other hand, the nature of upbringing [education], mobility and travel have an impact on the sense of dispersion. Commenting on this impact, G.G. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in Jordan) said, "I got used to stability outside my home. I immigrated to Jordan at an early age. I moved to Saudi Arabia before returning here [to Jordan]. So, I do not have a sense of dispersion."

The issue of diaspora has figured prominently for those who consider cultural difference as a key factor in the alleviation of expatriation as well as the sense of diaspora in host societies. Commenting on this issue, S. K. (who immigrated from Ramallah and currently resides in the US) said:

"I am living a state of dispersion. That is because I am not belonging to here. I have been living here for 35 years. I also lived in Ramallah for 20 years. Although the US has offered me a lot, I could not have a sense of belonging to the [US] homeland, people, or flag."

S. B. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in the US) also commented on this issue:

"I have occasionally felt that I am different from Americans in terms of culture, customs and practices. When I used to go out with Americans, I could not totally get along with them. They were always drinking and taking drugs. I feel that being here is a treason to Palestine, but we are forced to be here."

This means the sense of dispersion was related to the extent of stability in the countries of diaspora. In turn, the sense of stability was mostly related to the policies in the countries of diaspora. Palestinians were granted citizenship in such countries, namely the US and Jordan. Thus, they secured equal civil rights and had the full opportunity to engage in their host societies on the social, economic and political levels, although at different rates. Yet cultural differences have played a role in producing the sense of dispersion or expatriation, particularly in the US. Significant cultural differences between immigrants and their host society proved to be an obstacle to the full integration of some immigrants, especially first-generation immigrants, into this culture. Such immigrants continued to have a sense of being outsiders. In the meantime, the settlement of Palestinian immigrants in multiracial and ethnic regions accelerated their integration into the host society and resulted in a lack of sense of dispersion. This diversity is characteristic of both Amman and San Francisco.

3.3 Loss of places and the experience of dispersion

Immigrants recalled their homeland through narrating their dispersion experience. As part of recounting this experience, they recalled how they were forcibly displaced from their homeland and described their homes and hometowns during displacement. The sense of dispersion, loss, and suffering are the components that make up an immigrant's identity. Immigrants' inability to forget their suffering exacerbates their sense of dispersion in host and countries of diaspora. According to Cohen, the cruel and forceful measures of displacement build a collective sense among displaced emigrants in the countries of diaspora, while they build an uncomfortable relation with the host society.²⁰⁵ The expression of the dispersion experience in the form of written and oral stories is an

²⁰⁵ Robin Cohen, *Global diaspora: An introduction* (London: University College, 1997).

evidence to the immigrants' persistent feeling of dispersion. Discussing this issue, M. I. (who was forcefully displaced from Jaffa and currently resides in the US) commented:

"We left Jaffa in 1948. It was risky. The Jews Zionist gangs stripped people of their clothes and jewellery. They shot my father's cousin, who was newly married, and stripped his wife of her jewellery. We were together with my father. We all travelled on foot from Jaffa to Lidd, Ramallah and eventually Jifna. On the way to Jifna, a boy was thirsty and could not find water. Locals in Jifna were looking at us. I heard a woman asking some comers: "Where is your grandfather?" They replied: "We don't know."

Z. N. (who was forcefully displaced from Jaffa and currently resides in Jordan) said: "My father was the *mukhtar* [mayor] of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jaffa. He died in 1953 as a result of being unable to tolerate the situation. We lost our luxurious life and high social status."

W. K. (who descends from Bethlehem and currently resides in Jordan) said:

"I was four years old when [my family and I] immigrated to Jordan. After a period, my grandfather sent us back to Bethlehem. On the way, we suffered a lot. It was winter time. Each of my sisters and I got in a different car. We got lost. So, my grandfather us found and brought us back to Bethlehem."

The dispersion experience with all its suffering and pain reflects the status of the homeland. In their homeland, forcefully displaced people lost all their lands, homes, tools and equipment. The dispersion experience also reflects oppression inflicted upon forcefully displaced people and a breach of their justice that should be restored in one way or another. The lost justice plays a role in building cross-border national identity of immigrants and refugees.

3.4 Memories and homesickness a source of the sense of dispersion

Immigrants cherish memories of certain places. They feel homesick for the places where they used to live, walk, and meet their friends. Such places evoke their memories about their homeland. This means that they maintain a strong sense of the place envisaged as an icon. Geographical landmarks and the landscape in the homeland represents a place that is etched in Palestinian immigrants' hearts and memories.

The homeland may remain a part of an imagination without indicating any direct political ambition behind it or the return of the people in question. Collective memory. N. S. (who emigrated from Birzeit and is currently residing in the US) said:

"The mountain and Khirbet Birzeit (the old town of Birzeit) remind me of my family and country. We used to gather at Khirbet Birzeit. We used to sit on floor mats and bring vegetables [tomatoes], pickled olive and taboon bread [flatbread]. We used to eat and stay together until midnight. Then, we would return to our homes late."

S. N. (who was forcefully displaced from Jaffa and currently resides in Jordan) provided another example. She recorded and published her memories about Jaffa in a booklet in 2006. She wrote:

"Jaffa glitters like a bride with stunning beauty. A land so giving, a fertile plateau. Orange trees spread and disseminate a perfumed breeze. How I remember the beach on whose sands I left my footprint. Our laughter resonated with splendour. Today all these laughs are not mentioned, but our love for Jaffa is ever after."

Y. G. (who emigrated from Taybeh and currently resides in the US) said, "I believe that technology has facilitated communication and travel, but I am eager to sit at my home's door [in Taybeh] and view my homeland. I have only lived there for a short period." The depiction or recollection of one's homeland through places is intended to indicate that any place in the world, whether a mountain, a sea, a house or a village, represents the larger homeland etched in immigrants' memories.

Rashid Khalidi (1997) argues that Christian and Muslim affiliations to what they deem as the Holy Land has played an instrumental role in the emergence of Palestinian nationalism at an early stage.²⁰⁶ Holy sites, especially in Jerusalem, are part of the land, homeland, and the intellect (i.e. faith). Accordingly, they are a key element of the issue of the Palestinian diaspora. These holy sites gain more importance when they become a part of the lost homeland or and occupied and targeted

²⁰⁶ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian identity: The construction of modern national consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 154.

homeland. They are inaccessible to most Palestinians since Palestinians cannot go to Jerusalem unless they obtain Israeli-issued entry permits.

This reality exacerbates Palestinian dispersion, adding to its harshness. G. H. (who emigrated from Bethlehem and currently resides in the US) commented, "I have a profound sense of Palestinian dispersion. I could not visit my Holy Land. Perhaps visiting the Holy Land would one day become [as easy as] visiting Petra."

The celebrations of religious feasts are unique in the country of origin. The social atmosphere among family members during religious feasts could be perceived as a type of cultural and religious identity. These celebrations also strengthen relationships among family members. This distinguishes religious celebrations in the country of origin from their counterparts in the Diaspora. Highlighting this point, F. A. (who are from Bethlehem and currently resides in the US) said:

"We live here. I have got acquainted to many immigrants [like me] here. In the US, I feel at home and as a stranger at the same time. Despite my stable family and social life, I have a sense of dispersion. I have a deeply internalized sense of dispersion during religious feasts and occasions. I am away from my parents and cannot make it to my country of origin."

This contradicts with Malkki's argument (1992: 33) that the migrants in diaspora represent unusual outsiders.²⁰⁷ This also contradicts with Douglas, who describes migrants as outsiders or irrelevant things.²⁰⁸ Immigrants' conceptions, feelings, and senses are all directed toward the homeland. Not only does the state of dispersion and displacement describe emigrants' status, but it also describes the status of the homeland, part of which were and are still immigrants through their thoughts, homesickness, and temporary activities.

3.5 "We are proud of our roots"

Children of immigrants have not experienced the diaspora as experienced by their parents and grandparents in 1948 and 1967. This does not mean that they deny their Palestinian origins.

²⁰⁷ Liisa Malkki, "National Geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialisation of national identity among scholars and refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (1992): 24-44.

²⁰⁸ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 1979).

Rather, they recognize that they have Palestinian origins and often seek to revive their origins through social, cultural, and sometimes political activities. However, they maintain a larger affiliation to the state where they were born and brought up. Highlighting this issue, N. H. (who was born in Jordan to a family descending from Bethlehem) said, "Homeland is the place where I was raised up. I was born, raised up here [in Jordan]. My children also grew here. So, I don't have a sense of diaspora."

A. Gh. (who was born to a Palestinian family descending from Jerusalem following the 1948 war in Jordan) said, "I have never been to Jerusalem, but I feel I am living in a Jordanian society with a Palestinian flavour. I am a member of Jerusalemite societies and mostly maintain relations with Jerusalemites."

Despite their differences and profundity, these two experiences reflect the same face of the homeland. A homeland is the place where they settle down, but one can establish friendships, relationships, and networks through which one feels that they live in a society that represents the country of origin in miniature.

R. A. (who was born to parents from Aboud in Kuwait and currently resides in Jordan) narrated a different experience: "I feel dispersion since I emigrated from Kuwait. I feel I am Kuwaiti because I was raised up in Kuwait. My childhood is all I remember about being in Kuwait."

This last case reflects the possibility of belonging to several homelands at the same time. However, this possibility does not invalidate Palestinian origins of emigrants. This was also affirmed by L. L. (born to a family that was forcibly displaced from Tiberius and now in Jordan). She said: "We were born and raised up here [Jordan]. We are not subject to any abuse from Jordanians. Palestinians have intermarried with local Jordanians. I feel that we are not different. However, I have a sense of homesickness to my parents' roots [where they were born and raised]." Even though they were not born in the country of origin nor have they ever visited it, children of emigrants express some homesick toward it due to the experience of diaspora which their parents went through. Despite their relative stability in host societies, children of emigrants have become more aware of the importance of the affiliation to their country of origin.

3.6 "Although I have been living here since a long time and obtained citizenship, I feel that I'm foreigner"

Palestinians are considered the most remarkable example of the duality of citizenship. Scattered across the globe in exile and diaspora, they have established social relations and dedicated much of their time advocating for the Palestinian cause in different rates and forms. In the meantime, they are building the economy in several countries, including Jordan, the US, and Chile. This means the concept of full citizenship could be perceived in some aspects of emigrants' life in their host country, especially on the economic and social levels. However, this concept could not be fully perceived in Palestinian immigrants' participation in political life. Despite immigrants' attempts of political integration in their host countries, they remain feeble in when compared to their success at economic integration. As a result, Palestinian immigrants still feel that they are strangers and not first-class citizens.

M. Kh. (who immigrated from Birzeit and currently resides in Jordan) tackled this point. He said: "Socially, I do not have a sense of being a stranger here [in Jordan]. My wife hails from al-Kerak. Politically, it is indisputable that we lack the opportunity to hold senior administrative, political, and ministerial positions."

Furthermore, I. Kh. (who immigrated from Taybeh and currently resides in Jordan) said:

"Despite our loyalty, we, as Palestinians, are viewed differently. When I go to official government institutions, I am asked: "Who are you?" I say my name. They reply: "Where are you from?" (i.e. my origin). I answer: "I originally come from the West Bank village of Taybeh."

A.B. (who immigrated from Aboud and currently resides in Jordan) reflected on this issue. He said: "Although I have been living here [in Jordan] for 30 years and adhering to Jordanian laws, I feel that I am a foreigner." A. Gh. (who was born to a Jerusalemite family in Jordan) said, "Were I a Muslim, I would be serving as the Prime Minister."

Expressing quite the opposite, A. N. (who immigrated from Birzeit and currently resides in the US) commented, "I do not feel that I am a foreigner in the US. The country has offered us a lot.

We have worked freely. I feel that I am a US citizen entitled to my rights as the rest of citizens. However, I still feel homesick to my country of origin."

Z. S. (who was born to a family originally coming from Aboud in Jordan) remarked: "Although I did not plan to obtain a Jordanian passport, I do not have any other alternative following my parents' emigration to Jordan. Nevertheless, I tell my children that we are Palestinians and they have to deal respectfully with Jordan." In another context, G. Kh. explained: "My father hails from Jaffa. I was born in Egypt. I have immigrated to Lebanon. I currently reside in Jordan. So, who I am? I am an Arab."

So, although many Palestinian immigrants have obtained citizenship elsewhere, they have not considered themselves as full citizens in host or diaspora countries due to discrimination as a result of being Palestinian or Arab. Nevertheless, considering the support they have received, they have expressed their affiliation to host and diaspora societies. However, their lack of sense of being full citizens or sense of being foreigners has exacerbated their sense of expatriation in these societies. So, they have been gripped by a sense of living in the diaspora.

This is in line with Edward Said (1984: 55) who described the diaspora is not a stable and sustained state resulting from abandoning one's indigenous homeland, but "a state of expatriation, constant travelling, a sense of insecurity and conceiving the indigenous homeland to which one feels a wave of nostalgia (homesickness).²⁰⁹"

3.7 Palestinian heritage symbolizes of homeland in the diaspora

Considering the historical events that Palestine has gone through, a collective identity for the Palestinian diaspora has taken shape. According to Kana'na (2005: 196-197), every group has a collective identity taking the form of symbols. The group members recognize these symbols that form the essence of their identity, and utilize them to express their consciousness. These symbols, laden with meanings and feelings, summarize the characteristics shared as well as history and

²⁰⁹ Edward Said, *The mind of winter: Reflections on life in exile* (Harper's Magazine, 1984), 49-55.

experiences lived by the group members as a single unit. When a group member has awareness about their collective identity's symbols and essence, this identity is realized.²¹⁰

These symbols might take the form of establishing city and village clubs (as previously discussed), holding festivals such as Palestine Cultural Day in San Francisco and al-Quds Festival for Art and Culture in Amman, both of which feature dancing (*dabka*) troupe performances and folkloric singing, which contribute to preserving and reviving Palestinian folklore. These activities feature national symbols, including traditional dress, the *kufiyah* (traditional scarf), and the Palestinian flag. They also display keys which symbolize Palestinian refugees' right of return.

3.8 Conclusion

Having analysed the main components of Palestinian diaspora, namely the diaspora communities, family, the diaspora experience, and collective memory, these concepts have undergone profound shifts over the course of migration and refugee status. Nevertheless, these shifts have not invalidated the state of diaspora experienced by Palestinians in host countries. In all cases, one cannot overlook the close link between the concept of diaspora and the lost homeland, whether as a whole or in part. This lost homeland encompasses the lost family (i.e. lost social relations). On the other hand, the transition from family, hometown and religious-centred communities, to multinational communities, reversing the fact that the identity of immigrants transferred from "group identity"²¹¹ and/or "ethnic village"²¹² to the "ethnic community"²¹³. Thus,

²¹⁰ Sharif Kana'ana, "Toward the preservation of Palestinian national identity," in *Palestinians in Europe: The Problems of Identity and Adaptation*, ed. Abbas Shibliak (Ramallah: The Palestinian Refugees and Diaspora Center (SHAML) and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2005), 108- 116.

²¹¹ Arnold Rose (1963: 648) used the term "group identity" to describe the Christian Palestinian community from Ramallah due to their experience as members of a minority group among Muslims, which produced a "sense of unity" that "involves not only a recognition that one [is] a member of a ... religious group because of one's ancestry, only a recognition that majority group defines one as belonging to the religion group." See: Arnold Rose, *Sociology: The study of human relations* (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1963).

²¹² "Ethnic village" is a neighbourhood in which the language of the ethnic home is spoken by most of the residents because most of the group do not or cannot use the language of the host country. Indeed the immigrants seek residence in these "villages" because they must depend upon their compatriots for the most the social, religious, and economic necessities of life. The ethnic village is not economically independent and many economic necessities originate from outside the village. See: Herbert J. Gans, *The urban villagers: Group and class in the life of Italian-Americans* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

²¹³ "Ethnic community" is used without precision in the social sciences. It may be applied to any social entity from the rural "enclave" to the nation state as a whole. Lenski (1970: 41) distinguished between "geographical communities" and "cultural communities." The former are "united primarily by ties of special proximity, and the latter by "ties of a

immigrants were able to live in the same atmosphere or sense of community like in their homeland, but on a larger scale.

Regardless of their centres, Palestinian communities have reflected a well-defined diaspora experience on the geographical or identity level. They have ultimately sought to be Palestinian immigrants and refugees together and maintain a certain level of the collective identity and memory, which is related to the homeland.

Nevertheless, these diaspora communities have obviously been impacted by social, economic, and political developments experienced by its members. Such developments sometimes compelled Palestinians to relocate to new societies. It could be affirmed that naturalization policies have resulted in the shifts which have taken place in these communities, allowed Palestinians to emigrate and then integrate into host and diaspora societies.

The different patterns of diaspora families reflect how new Palestinian communities are much more scattered on the geographic and social levels. In spite of this, cross-border migrations has played a key role for bringing members of families together. Such families have been reunited in places outside of Palestine, depending on the various citizenships held by the members.

The sense of diaspora experienced by Palestinians who have immigrated has been related to the extent of their stability and integration in host societies. Hence, immigrants have made a distinction between their social diaspora and "Diaspora based on legal issue", noting that the latter is related to immigrants' inability to return to their country of origin.

common cultural tradition." Ethnic communities are united by the ties of the specific ethnic heritage of an immigrant group. See: Gerhard Lenski, *Human societies* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970).

Chapter Four

Transnational Networks between Diaspora and Homeland

Section I: Operationalizing Social Networks through a Sample of Various associations

Section II: Gathering diaspora for development: Weak but Very Significant Economic Networks

Section III: Bringing Outsider in: Toward Cross National Borders

Section IV: Bridging Diaspora: Internet as a Tool of Studying Transnationalism

1. Operationalizing social networks through a various associations

1.1 Introduction

As a result of being affected by catastrophes and history, Palestinians in the diaspora are often seen as highly cohesive groups. Despite all difficulties, Palestinian communities in the diaspora still preserve their Palestinian identity and maintain cross-border and intercontinental communication. This implies that the diaspora consists of social structures that have a long history in original communities and host countries' societies. This situation is especially true and applicable to Palestinian Christians. As a result of being affected by immigration for many decades, Palestinian Christians have integrated deeply in host societies and maintained their deep historical roots in their original society. They share a common religion with the West and have the same language, culture, and history in common with the East, a combination that helped them establish closer relations with both host and original societies.

This section considers how every dispersion creates effective transnational networks. It shows that this concept is not necessarily true due to the fact that dispersion is affected by several factors. In order to understand Palestinian diaspora, it is inevitable to utilize the tools of network analysis that enable one to examine smaller units within Palestinian communities in the diaspora. This would help reach an understanding on the dynamics of centre-periphery relations. It is necessary, however, to examine the network analysis approach beforehand.

1.2 Dynamic dimension of social networks analysis

Network analysis is one of the most important approaches that depends on social structure as a central component of sociological analysis. Social structure is considered one of the most important components of social theories developed by Durkheim, Parsons, Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, Martin and Kuhlmann, among others.²¹⁴ While not a purely legal theory, network analysis provides a broad strategy for the examination of social structure through social networks.

²¹⁴ Karen Cook & Joseph M. Whitmeyer, "Two approaches to social structure: Exchange theory and network analysis," *Annual Journal of Sociology* 18 (1992): 109-127.

Social networks are defined as a system that is based on inter-personal and inter-group social relations or ties. The generality of this broad definition falls under networks (i.e. formations or systems) even if not institutionalized. It is sufficient to have a set of relations among individuals (common interests and joint objectives).

The network analysis approach is extremely important, especially historically, to social sciences. Network analysis and the exchange theory are two approaches adopted in the examination of social structures. Although both approaches attribute relations and ties to a reciprocal process (exchange), the network analysis approach tends to focus on the content of mutual relations and ties, such as kinship and friendship, at the group level and institutions level more than at the individual level. In contrast, the exchange theory approach focuses on interaction and diverse contents of inter-personal ties. Individuals exchange items of value whether those items are material, symbolic or informational.²¹⁵

Emirbayer and Goodwin refer to three implicit models in network analysis literatures.²¹⁶ The first implicit model they refer to is structuralist determinism. This model neglects the inherent negative role of actors' convictions, values, and standards. It also neglects the political and cultural concepts of history as well as the historical formations of the action that had patterned and transformed social structures. The second implicit model is the structuralist constructionism trend of network analysis. Studies about this trend have accepted actors' decisive social role on the stage of history, but have exaggerated the actors' activities in an opportunistic and constructionist manner. The network approach of social change has developed a structuralist constructionism trend which provocatively divides some of the historical developments of identity transformation. The most successful trend of network analysis approach is the theorization of the role of human agency as well as the hypothetical decisive role of standard affiliations and cultural symbols in social action.

²¹⁵ Jean-Pierre J. Cassarino, *The theories of ethnic entrepreneurship, and the alternative arguments of social action and network analysis* (Working paper, no. 1997/01, EUI SPS, Florence: European University Institute, 1997), 23.

²¹⁶ Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, "Networks analysis, culture, and the problem of agency," *American Journal of Sociology* 99, no. 4 (1994):1411-1454.

Applying all three models to this research highlights the importance of networks' role in terms of facilitating the immigrants' adaption to the host society on the short term, and their inerrability into societal institutions on the long term. These models also show how networks play an important role in terms of alleviating the perception of immigration through the information and sources they offer to existing and prospective members.

1.3 Complex relations between social networks created by the associations

This section explores some issues related to the network analysis of Palestinian social structures in the diaspora, and some of the issues related to the research question regarding the identity compositions of Palestinian diaspora. In this context, the chapter explores the factors that helped preserve the diasporic national Palestinian identity despite Palestinian immigrants' dispersion and long periods of migration. Thus, the chapter poses a number of questions: What are the factors that have undermined the intensity of the national Palestinian identity in the diaspora before other identities? What is the role of religious institutions in terms of linking the diaspora with the country of origin? Do nation-based networks intersect or contradict with religious, national, or familial networks? What are the most effective networks that still maintain close relations with homeland? What are the factors that influence these relations? Do these influences involve geographical distance between the country of immigration and the country of origin, the length of immigration, the community's room to manoeuvre in the host countries, the network's ethnicity, or good regulation? Have Palestinian Christians formed their own networks, or have they joined larger Palestinian networks regardless of religion?

Generally, the study of the Palestinian diaspora necessarily entails the examination of diverse official and unofficial diasporic networks. The set of relations that contribute to the creation of network structures, such as familial, denominational, national, and regional network structures. It should be noted that Christians constituted a large percentage of the total population of certain villages and cities, namely Ramallah, Birzeit, Taybeh, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Aboud and Jifna. Taking this into consideration, members of some social networks, particularly village and city societies, were totally Christians. In contrast, members of some other societies, such as the Jerusalem Society, the Lydd Society and the Yaffa Society, were composed of Christians and

Muslims. Members of the other political and cultural societies were Palestinians, regardless of their religion. There were also a number of societies that were joined by Arabs.

Below are the most important institutions dedicated to preserving identity in the Palestinian diaspora. The heads or representatives in the US, Jordan, and the occupied Palestinian territories were contacted via social media for this research.

Table 2: Key institutions founded by migrated Palestinians in the diaspora

Amman- Jordan			
Organization Name	Year	Nature	Website page / Facebook page
Al-Khoury Association – Aboud	1975	Familial	www.facebook.com/rabetaalkhoury.aboud?fref=ts
‘Ain Al Sayegh – Jaffa	2000	Familial	
Association of Dewan Zababda	1971	Regional	www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009466813503
Bethlehem Association for Charity	1987	Regional	
Beit Jala Association for Charity		Regional	
Beit Sahour Cooperative Association	1975	Regional	www.facebook.com/558429650875747-
Lidd Association for Charity	1966	Regional	al-lud.org www.facebook.com/JmytAlldAlkhyryhman
Ramleh Association for Charity	1971	Regional	www.facebook.com/JmytAlrmltAlkhyryt/timeline
Yaffa Social Development Society	1990	Regional	www.facebook.com/groups/yafa.society
Jerusalem Association	1987	Regional	www.jerusalemday.net
Jifna People Association	1979	Regional	www.facebook.com/1642559602657561-
Taybeh People Cooperative		Regional	www.facebook.com/871946629559256 -
Orthodox Club Amman	1952	Sports	www.orthodoxclub.com www.facebook.com/Orthodox-Club-Amman-312050508866898
National Orthodox Schools		Educational	oes.edu.jo www.facebook.com/NationalOrthodoxSchool
The Orthodox Educational Society		Cultural	oes.edu.jo
Palestine International Institution	2002	Cultural	www.pii-diaspora.org www.facebook.com/pii.diaspora/notes
Forum for Jordanian Democratic Thought	1989	Cultural	

The United States of America - San Francisco Bay Area			
Organization Name	Year	Nature	Website page/ Facebook page
General Union of Palestinian Students	1973	Political	www.facebook.com/GeneralUnionofPalestineStudents/timeline
Students for Justice in Palestine		Political	www.facebook.com/sjpal/timeline
Palestinian Youth Organization		Political	www.pal-youth.org www.facebook.com/Pal.Youth.Movement
Palestine Children's Relief Fund	1991	Medical	pcrf.net
American Federation of Ramallah	1952	Regional	afrp.org www.facebook.com/FederationRamallah/?fref=ts
Ramallah Club	1952	Regional	www.ramallahclubsf.com
Bethlehem Association	1985	Regional	Bethlehem association.org
Birzeit Association	1987	Regional	
Taybeh Association	1995	Regional	
Jifna Association		Regional	
Al-Sahel Association		Regional	
Al-Daytona Association	2013	Regional	www.zaytoonehclub.com
Beit Hanina Association		Regional	
Deir Dibwan Association	1979	Regional	
Arab Cultural Center	1973	National	www.arabculturalcenter.org
Arab Resource & Organizing Center	2007	National	araborganizing.org
Aswat Ensemble	2003	Cultural	zawaya.org
Palestinian Women's Association	1986	Feminist	
Palestinian American Women's Association	1984	Feminist	pawasca.org www.facebook.com/pawasca/info/?tab=page_info

1.3.1 Family Councils

First of all, it is necessary to explain the concept of family network. Not only does a family network consist of the parents, and their children (the nuclear family), but it also consists of second-degree relatives, including uncles, aunts and their children (the extended family). The relationships among these individuals are mostly personal and institutionalized just as it is the case of family councils.

Family councils are a very limited phenomenon which differs from one country of immigration to another. While the research did not find any family council in the US, they are noticeable across Jordan. Family councils have become a phenomenon in Jordan as a result of the close relations Palestinians in Jordan maintain with their relatives in their country of origin. The geographical proximity between Jordan and Historic Palestine and the Palestinians' ability to enter Jordanian territory without travel documents have also contributed to this phenomenon. Family councils serve as important venues for holding joys and sorrows and greetings. They also serve as safe venues for discussing issues related to daily life and reaching solutions to family problems. As part of these councils, some families have established funds for supporting needy members across Jordan. Thus, such family councils help revive the names of their respective families in the country of origin and serve as purely social institutions. Attendance at the activities held by family councils is typically restricted to first-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants continue to attend such activities in order to demonstrate their familial and social cohesion. Second- and third-generation immigrants (i.e. children and grandchildren) rarely attend such activities.

Photos 6: Social activities of Al-Khoury Association – Aboud in Amman- Jordan



Source: Al-Khoury archives on Facebook page. Left: Bingo party. Center: Celebrating Easter. Right: Logo outside of the association taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Summer 2015.

Given the lack of such family councils in the US, it is necessary to compare family councils across Jordan with those in Arab countries, such as Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. Hanafi (2001) provides an insight into family councils in these locations. According to Hanafi, Palestinian family councils across Lebanon are institutionally and politically framed. They serve as venues for

Palestinians in Lebanon to discuss the general political situation and the situation across Palestinian refugee camps. They also serve as venues where Palestinians run the camps' affairs by relying on dominant Palestinian factions. Despite their family-orientation, family councils and Palestinian factions are reciprocally interlinked.

As a result of lacking legitimacy, family councils are marginal in Syria. The Syrian law prohibits setting up charitable funds distributed to a single family and views any societies that fall outside the ruling party with suspicion. According to Hanafi (2001), there are two Palestinian councils in Syria: the Maw'id family council, primarily based in Yarmouk refugee camp, and the al-Asadi family council in Damascus. The phenomenon of family councils seemingly no longer exists in Egypt, as Palestinian families in Egypt come mostly from urban origins). Besides, this phenomenon no longer exists as a result of Egyptian State's tight control and the geographical dispersion of the Palestinian community across the large neighbourhoods in Alexandria.

1.3.2 City and village clubs

Palestinian immigrants have founded many of city and village clubs across the US and Jordan. Despite being recently founded across the US and other remote countries of immigration, such clubs are considered one of the most important structures that help bring together members of the Palestinian community. Although Palestinians in general and Palestinian Christians in particular have been immigrating to the US for long time, such councils have only been formed recently. That is because from the start of immigration to the independence of Arab countries (excluding occupied Palestine), Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese formed pan-Arab clubs, societies, and newspapers that brought together Arab immigrants (mostly from Syria) and called for the establishment of a united Arab country. However, following the colonialist divisions of Arab countries and the British Mandate of Palestine, Palestinians in the diaspora, including those based in the US, founded societies that focussed more narrowly on the Palestinian identity. Examples of such societies include the National Palestinian League and the Palestinian Awakening Association, established in 1921 and 1923, respectively. Following the 1948 *Nakba* and the 1967 *Naksa*, diaspora Palestinians realized the necessity of forming city and village clubs that, according to Hilal (2007), play an important role in terms of helping Palestinians gather on the basis of their shared spatial and temporal memory.

As for the clubs formed more recently, the Ramallah City Club is the oldest among city and village clubs, founded in 1959. Birzeit Club, Taybeh Club, Bethlehem Club, Deir Dibwan Club, Beit Hanina Club, Jifna Club, al-Sahel Coast Club (for coastal cities) and al-Zaytouna Club were all formed in 2012-13. Such clubs usually serve as social institutions that gather people descending from the same village, town, or city with the purpose of helping them revive the hometowns from which they emigrated or were expelled. Clubs have also become mobilization institutions. Each club convenes a general conference for Palestinians descending from the same town or village. Such conferences are also attended by Palestinian immigrants who originally come from other towns and cities as well as some US leaders. Despite taking the form of parties and festivals, such conferences feature political national activities. Not only do they feature folkloric dancing (*dabka*), singing, traditional dishes and sweets, but they also feature lectures delivered by prominent Palestinian politicians and authors, such as Hannan Ashrawi, Mona al-Farra, and Khalil Barhoum who present issues related to the Question of Palestine.

The proceeds of such conferences usually go to assist the hometown or city. For example, the Taybeh Club made a financial contribution to the construction of a post office and sewage infrastructure project in Birzeit. It has also donated US\$35,000 for the construction of a water reservoir. Some members of the club are shareholders in Birzeit Pharmaceutical Company.

Photos 7: Post office in Taybeh- the occupied Palestinian territories



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Summer 2015.

The Ramallah City Club is one of 20 chapters that make up the American Federation of Ramallah, which has about 54,000 to 56,000 members across the US. The federation conducts many activities, including sponsoring annual medical missions and donating to health care programs. It dispatches 18-20 doctors to give treatments and perform surgeries at Ramallah Public Hospital on a biannual basis. It is currently constructing a tele-medicine consultancy centre. It has also recently provided US\$30,000 in direct financial support for the construction of a wing at Ramallah Public Hospital to treat cleft lip. The club donated a large parcel of land for the construction of the hospital as it owns 26 dunums of the hospital's land.

Photos 8: Medical services at Ramallah Public Hospital by American Federation of Ramallah



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Summer 2015, except bottom-left image: Article [in Arabic] about the American Federation of Ramallah in "New Life" Newspaper (*Al Haya Al Gadida*), donates medical material.

The Federation also provides financial assistance for 50-60 undergraduate students in Ramallah. It provides US\$1,200 in direct annual support for each student. It also dispatches an American delegation of 20-25 second- and third-generation youth with Ramallah heritage to visit, acquaint themselves with and do voluntary work in their home city during summer. The club also dispatches a delegation of 50-100 immigrants and their decedents from Ramallah to attend Easter celebrations. It provides about US\$100,000-150,000 in direct financial support to the First

Ramallah Group, the Orthodox Ramallah City Club, and Ramallah Islamic Club, the top three clubs operating in Ramallah. It also provides financial support to Ramallah Friends School's Special Needs Program, Annahda Woman Association, St. Vincent DePaul Society, as well as many needy families. American Federation of Ramallah has also donated to several projects, including the restoration of ancient sites. It has recently funded the purchase of a funeral vehicle and the restoration of Ein Misbah, Ein Minjed, and Ein Ziryab springs.

Palestinians have founded several city and village societies across Jordan. Although Jordan-based city and village societies and their US-based counterparts were founded in 1970s and 1980s, the societies in Jordan are more complex. Following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 and the acquisition of Jordanian citizenship for West Bank Palestinians in early 1950s, Palestinians realized the necessity of forming such societies in order to maintain a sort of communication with their origin cities and villages and remind upcoming generations about their history and origin. Such societies were also intended to create social solidarity among members, especially the poor and needy.

Palestinians could not name such societies after their original city or village, such as saying the "Bethlehem Society" as they were required by Jordan's Ministry of Social Affairs to designate each society as "charitable" or "cooperative." As such, the association for people from Bethlehem, for example, was named Bethlehem Charitable/Cooperative Society. Perhaps the ministry's condition was intended to discourage these groups from pursuing a political, national, or regional purpose by staying in compliance with the Law of Charitable Societies No. 33 of 1966. Such societies conducted various social activities, such as social gatherings, dinner parties, religious festivals and other special occasions. They also conducted recreational activities and cultural activities, such as seminars and lectures. It is necessary to highlight hereinafter three associations that have played key roles among the Palestinian community in Jordan.

Lidd Charitable Society carries out a number of programs and activities that are intended to help and empower member refugees and immigrants to live in the new society. The society established a kindergarten in 1973 in order to provide members and Jordanians with education. The kindergarten developed into a school in 1981. The society also established an infirmary and a dental clinic in 1972 in order to provide members and Jordanians with health care services at nominal

prices. It established a girls' vocational training centre in 1973 with the purpose of teaching girls sewing and knitting to enable them to become productive.

The Jerusalem Day Society has conducted cultural, awareness-raising, and heritage-based activities. These activities have constituted the most important means that have helped the Palestinian community in Jordan resist and safeguard and instil the national culture in upcoming generations. The society has organized lectures, cultural seminars, exhibitions, drawings, orations, and writing contests. It has hosted musical troupes and organized the Jerusalem Seminar, an annual seminar featuring renowned Arab and cross-national researchers discussing issues related to Jerusalem. The session is usually concluded with a book fair and a charity dinner the proceeds from which go to support social institutions in Jerusalem.

Photos 9: Several activities of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Association in Amman- Jordan



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Summer 2015. Left: Logo of Jerusalem association and poster for donation campaign (one Jordanian dinar) for Jerusalem. Right: Brochure for main activities of the association.

The society has founded *Center for Jerusalem Studies*, which has recently published *Panoramic Jerusalem*. It has created *Hona al-Quds* ("Jerusalem is Here"), a social media website dedicated to support the Question of Palestine. It is worth noting that following Israeli occupation authorities' orders to transform the yards of Al-Aqsa Mosque compound into public parks, the society issued and circulated a statement to all ambassadors serving in Jordan in August 2012. The statement documented all explanatory notes on inalienable Arab rights in Jerusalem. The society has many members including Bait Al-Maqdis Forum, the Jordanian Popular Committee in Support

of Jerusalem and the Right to Return, Al-Quds al-Sharif (Jerusalem) Protection Society for Rebuilding Demolished Houses, Women for Jerusalem Society, and the Orthodox Society.

The other Jordan-based city and village clubs conduct activities ranging from parties to seminars, and hold periodical meetings with the purpose of bringing together Palestinians descending from the same original city or village and helping them maintain intercommunication. Given that the club goers are mostly first-generation Palestinians, these clubs attempt to transform their activities in order to attract second-generation Palestinians.

Finally, it is worth noting that similar to other humanitarian and social societies, Jordan-based city and village clubs co-provided in-kind assistance to Palestinians following the first *Intifada* (1987) and the second *Intifada* (2000). Additionally, US-based city and village clubs organized demonstrations across San Francisco condemning the 2014 Israeli onslaught on Gaza.

As a result of Bethlehem, Ramallah, Birzeit, and Taybeh originally being Christian communities, the US-based clubs of their emigrants and decedents also consist of Christians. In contrast, Deir Dibwan and Beit Hanina clubs consist of Muslim members in light of the Muslim origins of these two towns. At the same time, members of al-Zaytouna Club consist of both Christians and Muslims coming from a variety of areas. Regarding city and village clubs across Jordan: Yaffa, Lidd, Ramleh, and Jerusalem clubs consist of both Muslim and Christian members, whereas Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, Jifna, Aboud, al-Zababdeh, and Taybeh clubs consist of Christians only. This implies that Muslim emigrants from Yaffa, Lidd, Ramleh and Jerusalem flocked to Jordan and other Arab countries more than they did to non-Arab countries.

US-based Palestinian societies and clubs have taken a new step since about 2013. They have been organizing a special event for Palestine called the Annual Palestine Cultural Day. The event features various activities, including folkloric music, art galleries, history, and handicrafts. They serve a wide variety of great traditional foods and desserts that are made "just like home." The proceeds go to support the homeland. It has also funded al-Bayyara Public Parks, which feature green spaces and children play areas. It is evident that the US-based city and village councils are much more united than their Jordan-based counterparts. They adopt the same national, social, and cultural approach and strive to represent Palestinians and the Question of Palestine in all forums.

Photo 10: Program of Palestine Cultural Day 2016 of San Francisco Bay- the US



Source: The Facebook page: Palestine cultural day

1.3.3 Political Institutions

The establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 had a significant impact on the crystallization of the Palestinian identity outside Palestine. As a result of being founded in the diaspora, the PLO had the advantage of communicating easily with Palestinians in the diaspora and refugee camps. This spurred the formation of various Palestinian political organizations, starting from the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). These political organizations played a decisive role in framing Palestinian communities abroad within popular and party organizations.

For example, based on interviews and collected information, Palestinians in the US founded several political organizations that definitely reflected their counterparts in the country of origin. Some examples of such organizations include the (Fatah-affiliated) Palestinian Congress, the (PFLP-affiliated) Palestinian Women Society, the (Fatah-affiliated) Arab Fund, Democratic Youth Organization, and the (PFLP-affiliated) New Generation for Palestine Society, Palestinian Youth Organization and the General Union of Palestinian Students.

These organizations used to organize several national and political activities. However, following a dramatic shift in national activism, they felt disappointed and realized that all they did was to no avail. Stated another way, they realized that political action had become weak. This dramatic change occurred as a result of two major events: signing the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the September 11 attacks in New York in 2001.

The Oslo Accords caused the PLO's role to erode and resulted to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) that accepted an unarmed solution and negotiations to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was followed by the declaration of a Palestinian state defined by 1967 borders. Meanwhile, the September 11 attacks in New York in 2001 placed Arabs and Muslims, including Palestinians, under scrutiny and restricted their political national activism. Since these attacks, many organizations have been dissolved, while some others reduced or changed their activities from political into cultural and social. Simultaneously, one could not overlook the role of some national organizations, especially student organizations, for the benefit of the national Question of Palestine. Examples of such student organizations are Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM) and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS). The latter used to have over 60 branches which operated across the US until dissolution following the Oslo Accords (with the exception of the GUPS branch in San Francisco). Another example is Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). This organization has been operating in over a hundred universities across the US for 12 to 13 years. Its members include of Palestinian, Muslim, Arab and non-Arab activists.

These organizations have conducted many activities, the most recent of which was a call for boycotting Israeli products and academic institutions. On the economic level, these university students have been painstakingly working to raise awareness among university students about boycotting Israeli products. For example, PYM has recently launched a volunteering initiative with

the purpose of helping dockworkers at Port of Oakland for free provided that they refuse to unload Israeli cargo ships. On the academic level, PYM has been demanding that students enrolled in about a hundred universities be allowed to vote on a resolution to boycott Israeli academic institutions.

Despite their rivalries, especially during election campaigns, some PLO-affiliated political parties temporarily manage to attract Palestinian communities in Jordan and other Arab countries. Considering that they were originally grassroots political, social, and cultural organizations, these parties were based on the PLO's relationship with Arab regimes. For example, such parties no longer exist in Jordan following the 1970 Black September civil war. They dwindled in Syria and Lebanon after 1982 in the aftermath of the 1975 Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and the PLO's conflict with the Amal Movement. They also dwindled in Egypt after 1974 following accusations that the PLO murdered Yusuf al-Siba'I who was the editor of the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram and a confidant of Anwar Sada. But at the same time, such parties played a role in attracting Palestinian students and young men who were involved in fights that erupted between the PLO and Israeli military in Jordan and Lebanon. They also played a social role in terms of providing relief assistance for martyrs and refugees' families across camps. In short, the power of these organizations fluctuated from time to time as a result of being related to the fluctuations of PLO's relation with Arab regimes. This situation lasted until the formation of such organizations was outlawed in Jordan.

1.3.4 National (Arab) Institutes

National societies are considered one of the most significant structures that have prevented Palestinian communities in the diaspora from assimilation into host societies, especially in the Americas. Some organizations, such as the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee and the National Association of Arab-Americans, have been instrumental in pooling the Palestinian community's efforts to prevent discrimination and racism against them. These organizations help to preserve Arab heritage, namely language, history, and folklore. This ultimately helps promote the Arab culture among the immigrants' descendants and develop the Pan-Arab identity.

The Arab Cultural and Community Center (ACCC) is one of the institutions that has recently played a significant role. The centre was founded by a group of Arab immigrants and Americans in San Francisco in 1973. It conducts a wide variety of activities that bring together the Arab community, including Palestinians. Most importantly, ACCC holds musical parties and poetry recitations. It offers Arabic language courses, provides scholarships for Arab students, and hosts a group of intellectuals and academics from all over the Arab World. In 1995, ACCC hosted the *First Annual Arab Festival*. During the last ten years, ACCC expanded its activities to include social services, youth awareness-raising programs, lectures on confronting immigrant women's life difficulties, health awareness programs, domestic violence, and sexual violence. ACCC has made several achievements, most recently the development of the Civil was *Participation Program* in 2009. As part of this program, ACCC encouraged Arab-Americans to specifically write-in their Arab origin on the 2010 American Census form (which offered no "Arab" option in its list of identities). It is worth noting that those who primarily founded ACCC come from Palestinian origins.

Arab institutions in Jordan only have a cultural character, rather than a national character. It could perhaps be argued that the similarities between the Jordanian and Palestinian societies, including ethnic, linguistic, and religious similarities, did not provide a reason for the founding of such societies as in the US.

One should highlight here Palestine International Institute (PII) that was founded by a group of Palestinian intellectuals and businessmen in the diaspora. The institute has branches in Switzerland, Lebanon, Palestine, New York, and Jordan and seeks to create economic, cultural, and social ties between Palestinian communities in the diaspora and the country of origin. It carries out many activities, most importantly *Bridges to Roots Camp*. This activity is annually held in Nazareth and hosts 150 Palestinian children of immigrants in the diaspora, Palestinians who have Israeli citizenship and Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian territories. It is funded by al-Sayegh, a Palestinian family originating from Jaffa and currently based in Jordan. As part of this activity, each child visits his hometown or city. Additionally, financial prizes are awarded for national figures, including poets and authors.

1.3.5 Cultural associations

Palestinian Christian emigrants have set up another type of institutions, particularly in Jordan. Following their forced displacement from Jaffa in 1948, Palestinian Christians established the Orthodox Club in Amman, similar to the Orthodox Club in Jaffa. Membership to the club was initially restricted to Palestinian Christians hailing from Jaffa before it was open to all. The club provides diverse recreational and sport services. Most importantly, Palestinian Christians in Jordan established the National Orthodox School and the Orthodox Educational Society, which holds various educational and cultural activities

1.3.6 Humanitarian associations

Some societies have been established by Palestinians in Western states with the purpose of helping war-affected Palestinians on the material, psychological, medical, or economic level. One example is the US-based Palestine Children's Relief Fund (PCRF), which was established to provide free medical care to war-injured and disabled Palestinian children by arranging treatment for them abroad. PCRF has opened a branch for cancer-diagnosed children at Beit Jala Hospital.

1.3.7 Professional associations

Professional associations are networks that are based on the nature of the immigrants' work. Interviews reveal that some immigrants belong to professional associations, such as the Jordan Engineers Association, Jordan Writers Association, and Jordan Programmers Association. Through belonging to such associations, immigrants can expand their network within the same profession and share expertise and knowledge. This does not necessarily imply that such associations benefit the Palestinian society or communities.

1.4 Activity of social networks affected by the policies of countries of diaspora

The exchange theory pays attention to inter-personal relations, but not to inter-institutional relations because the existence of an institution does not indicate that members are connected through an effective network. Taking this into consideration, the size or number of members of an association are not always most relevant to network analysis. Stated another way, a network's

effectiveness mainly depends on individuals' effectiveness, the extent of involvement in the network, and the relationships with other individuals across the same network. Regarding Palestinian networks in the diaspora and their relation to the country of origin, one can talk about two models: the Arab states' model (Jordan's) taking the form of weak associations but robust networks and the liberal states' model (the United States') taking the form of robust associations but weak networks.

The Arab states' model shows that the dispersion of Palestinians is weak. Weak liberal heritage has made it difficult to create effective associations, and the cultural affinity and geographical proximity between Jordan and the country of origin has undermined the Palestinians' sense of dispersion and, as a result, negatively impacted the associations' effectiveness. Besides, the harsh and strict political situation across Jordan has undermined Palestinians' ability to create networks that are national or political. This situation has been especially true following 1970 Black September civil war and Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. Thus, Palestinian associations across Jordan mostly seek to achieve social and cultural goals that contribute to a shared sense of Palestinian patriotism.

The liberal states' model is prevalent in countries like the US. There is a plethora of national, religious, and cultural associations striving to advance the rights and interests of Arabs and Palestinians in such countries. However, their effectiveness has been limited, especially following the September 11 attacks in New York in 2001 which have fed the general hostile and contemptuous views of Arabs. Discrimination and prejudice against Arabs is more evident in some states, such as Texas and Ohio, compared to other more accepted state like as California. The US Government policies toward the Question of Palestine has also contributed to undermining Arab and Palestinian communities.

As previously stated, the large number of associations does not necessarily indicate effective networks among members. There are a lot of networks with significant structural gaps, such as severed relationships among association members. The increasing number of associations, in fact, could be indicative of increased fragmentation. Regional associations as indicated before provides an example. Palestinian immigrants in the US have founded the Coastal Cities Association, which consists of immigrants from Lidd (Lidd), Ramleh, Yaffa (Jaffa), Nazareth and

Haifa among others. They have also founded the Bethlehem Association, which consists of immigrants from Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, and Beit Jala. In contrast, Palestinians in Jordan have founded Yaffa Association, Lidd Association, Ramleh Association, Bethlehem Association, Beit Jala Association and Beit Sahour Association (i.e. bringing together Palestinians originating from each city) rather than founding an inclusive association.

Not only is the marginality of Arab and Palestinian communities, especially across the US, linked to the American society's hostile view of Arabs, Islam, and the Question of Palestine, but it is also linked to networks' weakness in the mobilization and organization of the communities. This weakness is perhaps linked to the lack of a political association that is inclusive and representative of all Palestinians or Arabs. For example, the PLO united Palestinian action across all the immigrants' groups and sectors. However, as a result of signing the Oslo Accords, the PLO's role has been undermined, while the PA's role, which has not gained the satisfaction of the majority of the public, has been promoted.

The same situation applies to Palestinians in Jordan. However, the reason for their marginality lies in Jordan's policy of maintaining a tight grip over the formation of purely national Palestinian associations. This policy has compelled Palestinians to reinforce familial networks and friendship at the expense of regional and national networks.

Regardless of its level and desired effect, the work of the aforementioned networks, particularly US-based networks, shouldn't be underestimated. These networks have ultimately managed to safeguard a certain level of identity and belonging. Religious, regional, national, and other networks were founded for the creation of a centre that unites Palestinians. City and village councils, Arab churches, national associations, student unions have helped safeguard the immigrants' various identities, which ultimately benefits safeguarding the Palestinian identity.


1.5 Participating in social network reflects identities to which immigrants belong

This study measures the effectiveness of individuals across networks in the countries of the diaspora. It shows the extent to which they are attached to their country of origin and maintain their

different identities through exploring how frequently they have met other immigrants, including immigrants originating from the same hometown. It also shows this through exploring the extent to which they are engaged in the various associations and networks.

Based on the questionnaire answered by migrants across the US and Jordan, the study concludes that Palestinian immigrants, particularly immigrant members of the same family, clan, or those originating from the same hometown, gather together during five types of occasions and in different locations. These occasions and their locations are: family occasions (house); happy and sad social occasions (halls or the city or village clubs' premises); city and village clubs' activities (club premises); conventions (a city or a state); and religious or ecclesial activities (church). The study notes that the frequency of immigrants' meetings or gatherings in Jordan differs from that in the US, as illustrated in the following chart.

Chart 8: Types of networks among Palestinian Christian immigrants in the diaspora



Note: The total percentages of all activities in each country of diaspora is not equal 100%, because immigrants meet together in more than one activity.


The chart demonstrates that immigrants meet one another on family and social occasions—to celebrate or to mourn—for a clan, friends, and neighbours across Jordan more frequently than they in the US. That is because family is still considered the prime institution that plays a key role in individuals' lives in Jordan, helping them build their networks. In contrast, although this type of network is still effective across the US, immigrants from the same family or clan maintain less consistent communication and interaction as a result of their geographic dispersion across various cities. Besides, the diversification of Palestinian and Arab organizations and associations in the American diaspora has provided immigrants the opportunity to diversify and distribute their networks at the expense of family networks.

Immigrants in the US gather on religious and ecclesial activities much more frequently than they do in Jordan. That is because the church is not only considered a centre for performing rituals and worshipping, but also a cultural, political, and national venue that addresses issues related to the Arab and Palestinian Christian community and explores the means to bring together and help immigrants maintain their Eastern religious and national identity.

The chart also shows that immigrants gather during the various activities carried out by city and village clubs in Jordan almost as frequently as their counterparts in the US. The participation does not exceed 50% in both cases. The majority of members of these networks are first-generation immigrants who still believe that such networks are necessary. In contrast, second-generation immigrants consider these networks to be old-fashioned with programs and goals that need to be revitalized. Thus, these networks have started to enhance the quality of their programs in order to attract second-generation immigrants.

Regarding conventions held by city and village clubs, Ramallah descendants in the US hold a biennial convention as do the descendants of Birzeit and Taybeh. Descendants of Ramallah, for example, in the US diaspora attend the convention and discuss projects and issues related to their country of origin. In contrast, no such conventions are held in Jordan. The following chart shows the frequency of immigrants' participation in the various associations and networks across the US and Jordan.

Chart 9: Associations in which Palestinian Christian immigrants participate in the diaspora




Note: The total percentages of all immigrants' participation in each country of diaspora is not equal 100%, because immigrants participate in more than one association.

The above chart shows that associations and networks in the US are much more diverse than their counterparts in Jordan. Immigrants have founded all types of associations, namely regional, cultural, student-based, professional, and friendship-based associations. This suggests that as a result of enjoying much more liberty than their counterparts do in other societies, immigrants in American society have found all forms of associations to express their opinions and their shared Palestinian identity. This also suggests the immigrants in American society effectively and actively attempt to develop as many associations as possible in order to safeguard their identity and intensify their activities in the diaspora. The 23% that indicated they are not involved in any type of association are mostly elderly and do not show any interest.

Consequently, the study identified differences between US-based immigrants and Jordan-based immigrants in terms of the frequency of their gatherings, based on four categories as illustrated in the following chart.

Chart 10: Categories of Palestinian Christian immigrants according to their participation in social networks in diaspora



Note: Highly effective: participate in all activities; Effective: participate in four activities per year; moderately effective: participate in association, church, and family activities; minimally effective: participate in association and family activities or church and family activities.

The above chart shows that immigrants in the US gather more frequently than their counterparts in Jordan do. Immigrants in the US are motivated by the sense that they live in the remote diaspora that is culturally different from their country of origin. In contrast, immigrants across Jordan gather simply to socialise. Relations among immigrants across Jordan are characteristic of other Arab societies.

1.5 Social networks serving as Palestinian political institution

The study presents Palestinian national, family, regional, Arab or religious Palestinian associations across the American and Arab diaspora and shows that they have effective networks, although the levels of effectiveness vary. The study found out that there are variant proportions of

relations among networks' members, prompting an exploration as to whether these networks played any role in terms of maintaining the Palestinian national identity in the diaspora, or constituted a factor of disintegration.

It should be reiterated here that the PLO, along with its institutions, protected the Palestinian identity in the diaspora from assimilation. However, Palestinian national and political associations that were at least effective in the American diaspora were affected by a number of factors, most importantly the Oslo Accords and Palestinian intra-faction conflicts. As a result, regional, religious, and other associations developed as an alternative to PLO's institutions. Despite not being founded as national, these associations served as an alternative to national institutions. Family associations, which united immigrant members of the same family, and regional associations, which united immigrants descending from the same hometown, sought to reinforce the national, Arab, Eastern religious, and family-based identity which ultimately also helped bolster the Palestinian national identity. Religious associations and churches that united Christian immigrants around the Eastern Church, student associations that promoted students and youths' sense of patriotism and united them for resisting the Israeli occupation, as well as Arab and national associations have also sought to achieve this goal.

What are the associations that have arguably replaced the PLO? Stated another way, which associations played the largest role in safeguarding identity and maintaining communication between the diaspora and the country of origin? There are two answers for this question: regional associations and religious associations. Regional associations brought together immigrants in the diaspora and helped them build cross-national relations with their country of origin. Religious associations arguably played a greater role in this regard. Not only did they bring together Christians and occasionally Muslims to maintain communication with the country of origin through different channels, but also they played a key role in representing and highlighting the Question of Palestine abroad to the extent that some foreign institutions and states sympathized with it.

2. Gathering diaspora for development: weak but very significant economic networks

2.1 Introduction

Social sciences and economics have mostly studied economic actions starting from an enterprise, whether it be a factory or a company. However, they have not attached enough importance to entrepreneur businessmen who take decisions pertaining to an enterprise's success or failure. Besides, they have studied an enterprise's structure, underlying system and relation with global competition, but they have not paid any attention to other indicators that are vital to the enterprise's success.

In this case, social sciences and economics have addressed businessmen not as individuals, but as social strata as manifested in Marxist studies. Attempting to modify the way businessmen are addressed, new economic theories consider that an immigrant's economic success is measured against the profits he makes, which may be affected by his academic degree and work experience among other factors. Thus, an immigrant businessman is viewed by new economic theories as an individual who has both human and social capital.

This section addresses transnational economic networks based on the concept of transnationalism and transnational economic networks. These networks include the economies of Palestinian businessmen in the diaspora and the country of origin, as well as financial assistance and gifts businessmen provide to families in the country of origin. The concept of transnationalism and transnational economic networks views immigrants not only from an economic perspective, but also as citizens in both the country of origin and the country of immigration in an attempt to understand the dynamics of centre-edge economic relation. Before exploring this, it is necessary to theoretically explore the relation between migration and society transformations, including transnational migration and economic networks.

2.2 The Palestinian Liberation Organization and its effect the growth of economic networks

In the time, it has been assumed that immigrants' integration in the host countries would necessarily lead to weakened connections with original countries, yet many immigrants maintain strong transnational ties over sustained periods.²¹⁷ Simultaneously, many immigrants' ties with the country of origin in late nineteenth and early twentieth century can be observed,²¹⁸ such as familial, religious, and trade networks.²¹⁹ Of course, the intensive industrialization, globalization, capitalism, and imperialism were the main factors that led to massive international migration as well as development projects conducted by some of these immigrants in nation-state building where there were relatively open borders.²²⁰

Since the inception of Palestinian immigration to the Americas in late nineteenth century, immigrants sent remittances to their families for building stylish roof-tiled houses, purchasing farmlands or building service centres among other purposes. This is evident for instance in Ramallah, a city whose architectural features have been constantly changing since early twentieth century. However, the situation changed and became harsher in the aftermath of the 1948 *Nakba* and the 1967 *Naksa*, and then under Israeli occupation. In addition, the majority of Palestinians across Arab countries, including Jordan, continue to live in refugee camps and poor neighbourhoods.

Following the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and setting up branches for the Palestine National Council across Jordan, the Gulf countries, Europe, and the US, a sort of connection has been noted between the Palestinian diaspora and the country of origin. It is worth noting that the PLO's recognition preceded signing the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment of the

²¹⁷ Luis Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes & William Haller, "Assimilation and transnationalism: Determinants of transnational political action among contemporary immigrants," *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 6 (2003): 1211-1248.

²¹⁸ Robert E. Park & H.A Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921).

²¹⁹ James D. Tracey (ed.) *The rise of merchant empires: Long-distance trade in the early modern world, 1350–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

²²⁰ John Bodnar, *The transplanted: A history of immigrants in urban America* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1985).

Palestinian National Authority (PA) in 1994. This has resulted in a political bridge that ensures legal connection between emigrants and their country of origin.

Some recent studies provide an initial overview about the economic connection between Palestinian diaspora and the country of origin. Remittances sent by Palestinians who have emigrated accounted for 8% and 7.1% percent of GDP in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively. Their GDP share jumped to 20.9% and 45.2% in the West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively in 1986.²²¹ In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PA, some returnee investors have formed transnational communities taking the form of small companies, such as Padico Holding and Palestine Trade Center (Pal Trade). A number of investors, such as the Shoman family, have also set up and run businesses abroad.

Hanafi's study, *Here and There: Toward Analysing the Relation between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Center* (2001) shows that investments made by Palestinian businessmen in the diaspora are still considered an underinvestment and will not witness any real financial return. The ties between Palestinian businessmen in the diaspora and the occupied Palestinian territories are hindered by many obstacles, most importantly the political and security situation.²²²

2.3 Examining the Palestinian economy in diaspora reflects various models of businessmen

This part addresses some issues related to the economies of Palestinian Christian businessmen in the diaspora. It only provides examples for transnational economic networks that basically reflect investors' sense of economic duty toward Palestine as their country of origin. How did those Palestinians manage to become businessmen in the diaspora? What are the factors that helped them become so? Do Palestinian economies in the diaspora have an ethnically economic nature in which national solidarity plays a decisive role? Or are they based on family networks? What do these economies look like? (Are they commercial, service-based, industrial economies or

²²¹ Jamil Hilal, *Relations between Palestinian Diaspora (al-shatat), Palestinian Communities in the West Bank, and Gaza Strip* (Paper Prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt: The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, The American University of Cairo, 2007).

²²² Sari Hanafi, *Here and there: Toward analysing the relation between the Palestinian diaspora and the center* (Ramallah: Muwatin the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2001).

something else?) How did businessmen in the diaspora manage to invest in their country of origin? In which cities are these transnational economies are concentrated? What is the role of these economies in supporting Palestinian economy?

The main purpose of this study is not to explore the economies of Palestinian Christians in the diaspora, but to uncover the nature of the patterns of economic connections between the Palestinian diaspora and the country of origin. They are regarded as a miniature of Palestinian economists in the diaspora.

This is important to note as the researcher had concluded from the study sample that 12.5% of prominent Palestinian businessmen are based in the US and Jordan. Before addressing Palestinian economies in the diaspora and transnational economic networks, it is essential to review the types of enterprises set up by respondent or interviewee Palestinians in Jordan, the US and the country of origin. The researcher met some of the founders and owners of such enterprises.

Table 3: A sample of businesses set up by Palestinian Christian businessmen in the diaspora and the homeland

Name of investment	Location	Type of investment
Arab Technical Group	Jordan	Commerce
Golden Crown Tours	Jordan	Tourist
Palestine Motors Co. Ltd	Jordan	Commerce
Delta Insurance Company	Jordan	Service
Nuqul Group	Jordan	Industrial
Sayeg Group	Jordan	Industrial
Abuaita Macaroni Company	Jordan	Industrial
Samir and Munir Imseeh Jewellery Store	Jordan	Industrial
Eilia Nimis & Partners Co.	Jordan	Industrial
Abu Jaber (& Sons Company)	Jordan	Industrial
Ramallah Plaza	The US	Commerce
Almanara Investments Inc.	The US	Commerce
Mixberry Media	oPt	Service
Arab Technical Group ATG	oPt	Commerce
Arab Company for Paints Products (APC Paints)	oPt	Industrial
Abu Khader Automotive Company	oPt	Commerce

2.3.1 Palestinian economic elites move their centres abroad

The Palestinian economy was flourishing in the mid-1940s. Increasing investments were made in the agriculture sector, especially in the cultivation of citrus. The industrial sector flourished to the extent that it covered the needs of the Arab population, as well as 80,000 British soldiers across Palestine. Surplus products were exported.²²³ It could be argued that two economic centres emerged in Palestine at this stage: the industrial centre concentrated in Nablus, Hebron and Jerusalem, and the agricultural centre, concentrated in the coastal cities of Haifa, Akka and Yaffa (Jaffa), depending on the Palestinian historian Beshara Doumani. This time of prosperity contributed to the emergence of many bourgeois families and members of the elite class.

The question arises as to whether members of the bourgeois class and capitalists just restricted their activities and networks inside Palestine or set up overseas networks. The answer to this question is related to the period before the outbreak of 1948 War (the *Nakba*). This leads to another question about the impact the *Nakba* and 1967 War (*Naksa*) made on these economies. Were the Palestinian elite able to move its economic centre to another location inside Palestine or abroad in the aftermath of both wars?

First and foremost, many studies stressed the importance of Palestinian economies as well as local, family, and regional networks for Palestinian traders and craftsmen. For instance, Doumani (1995) highlighted the importance of olive soap making in Nablus and cotton and textile trade in the late Ottoman period. He noted that they were primarily based on or conducted through family networks. A family's name served as a kind of capital resource, a source of trust and a type of guarantee for traders.²²⁴ On the regional level, trade networks expanded in neighbouring regions, especially across Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt, with the purpose of tapping into new markets thanks to Palestinian-Jordanian kinships. For example, the Egyptian market accommodated about three-fifths of the olive soap produced in Palestine in 1830.²²⁵

²²³ Nadine Picaudou, "La Bourgeoisie d'affaires Palestinienne: Trajectoires en diaspora," *Maghreb Machrek* 159 (1998): 28-38. [In French].

²²⁴ Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1995).

²²⁵ Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, 1995, *Ibid.*

Following the declaration of Transjordan in 1921 and subsequent emergence of a central authority and security, Palestinian trade networks flourished in Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron, and expanded toward Transjordan. The British Mandate Government played a role in facilitating trade across Transjordan due to political instability and revolts in Palestine. In other words, Transjordan became an attraction point for Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi traders who became rich for several factors, most notably the lack of commercial development across Transjordan.²²⁶

This implies that Palestinian economic, industrial, commercial, and coastal agricultural networks were regionally expanding across Transjordan, Egypt, and Syria. This helped them move their centres overseas in the aftermath of the 1948 War (*Nakba*). Besides, the spread of banks across Palestine before the *Nakba* had helped transfer financial capital abroad.²²⁷ This is also stressed by Lamia al-Radi (1997) in a study about how the family and its sources are utilized by the traditional elite with the purpose of relocating trade centres from the West Bank to Jordan. This also applies to the relocation of economic networks between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.²²⁸

This was confirmed in interviews with Palestinian businessmen in Jordan. Some businessmen said that before 1948 and 1967, their families, namely fathers, had made investments or set up branches of their enterprises across Transjordan. This made it easier for them to move the rest of their investments and money following the *Nakba* to Jordan. These enterprises developed in Jordan with the participation of the businessmen's children. M.S. (uprooted from Jaffa, resident in Jordan) says:

"My father used to own orange orchards in Jaffa and to export oranges to Europe. Simultaneously, he had a public transportation company, Al-Taquadum (the Progress) Bus Company, which had branches in Jordan. Following the *Nakba*, my father and his family were forcibly displaced to Jordan. After becoming desperate about returning to his hometown of Jaffa, my father decided to open a construction materials store and a car spare parts store."

²²⁶ Abla Amawi, *State and Class in Transjordan* (PhD Dissertation, Washington: Georgetown University, 1991).

²²⁷ Pamela Ann. Smith, "The Palestinian Diaspora 1948- 1985," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 15, no. 3 (1986): 90-108.

²²⁸ Lamia Al-Radi, "La famille comme mode de gestion et de contrôle du social chez les élites traditionnelles palestinienne," in *Palestine, palestiniens. Territoire national, espaces communautaires*, eds. Riccardo Bocco, Blandine Destremau & Jean Honnoyer (Amman: CERMOC, 1997).

Before the 1948 War and 1967 War, some Palestinian economic elite families didn't have any networks extensioned overseas and, as a result, their activity was restricted to Palestine. However, as soon as the wars erupted, they managed to move their economic centre to Jordan without any obstacles thanks to their money and relevant expertise. G. Kh. (uprooted from Jaffa, resident in Jordan) recalled:

"My father opened an auto spare parts shop in Jaffa in 1937. In 1947, he attempted to set up a business in Egypt. However, he was unable to do so following 1948 War. As a result of widespread looting and plundering of Palestinian property, he was forced to close his shop in Jaffa and flee together with his family to Jordan. Following his arrival in 1949, he re-opened the shop as he continued to own parts of his commodities. I later developed and transformed the shop into an auto dealership facility."

Following the restrictions placed by the Egyptian socialist revolution on the import of goods, Palestinian businessmen in the Gaza Strip played a key role in the import of goods from Lebanon and Syria and reselling them to Egypt. They managed to accumulate wealth and expand their activity to Cairo. Some of them were displaced to Cairo following 1967 War.²²⁹

One concludes that the majority of businessmen's businesses in Jordan were mainly a part of the Palestinian elite's economies. In the aftermath of the war, Palestinian elite expanded their commercial and industrial networks and moved their capital resources and economic centres to neighbouring Arab countries, but this option didn't apply to Palestinian businessmen in the remote diaspora. Thereby, some Palestinian Christian families, especially in Jordan, have maintained their economic status following their emigrations.

2.3.2 Education plays a key role to the emergence of individual entrepreneurs

Education is the most important means of fast social mobility among some Palestinian businessmen. Based on the findings of the field work, 28.57% of responding businessmen obtained a bachelor's degree and 28.57% obtained Master's or Ph.D. degrees. These degrees made it easier

²²⁹ Sari Hanafi, *Here and there: Toward analysing the relation between the Palestinian Diaspora and the center* (Ramallah: Muwatin the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2001), 109.

for them to gradually develop from employees to businessmen. Many Palestinian businessmen started their career as ordinary employees in companies. As they gained expertise over time, they managed to set up their own businesses and step into the realm of entrepreneurship that helped them earn higher income. Palestinian businessmen mostly set up enterprises that offered quality products. Examples of such enterprises include: software companies, auditing firms, insurance companies, and tourist companies. Thus, they managed to adopt a new entrepreneurship approach based on field of study and ties with major foreign companies, taking into consideration technological advancements. This type of investment is certainly noticeable among second-generation or new immigrants both in the US and Jordan. S.Q. (an immigrant from Ramallah, resident in the US) states:

"Following 1948 War, my family was forcibly displaced from Lidd (Lidd) to Ramallah, where they initially settled. However, following the closure of some Palestinian universities and disruption of studies by Israeli occupation authorities in late 1970s, I was forced to immigrate by myself to the US in order to pursue my education. I studied electronic engineering. After completing my studies, I settled and started a family in the US. I initially worked in several businesses, such as grocery stores, in order to earn some money. However, I managed to set up my own computer company in the late 1980s."

Some Palestinian businessmen took advantage of their education in order to develop the companies and factories their parents had set up. They attempted to enhance the quality of their products in line with state-of-the-art technologies. G.A. (an immigrant from Beit Sahour, resident in the Jordan) narrates:

"After earning a Ph.D. degree in economics from a British university, I considered returning to my homeland. Shortly afterwards, the second *Intifada* broke out in 2000. Therefore, I decided to settle in Jordan, especially because some of my family members were living there and my father had been operating a plastic plant since the 1950s. Frankly speaking, this provided me with the opportunity to settle in Jordan. I have assumed the position of the director-general of the plastic plant. Besides, I have set up a cardboard factory, utilizing my father's relevant expertise, my education and vision of the market."

Starting such businesses required taking the initiative, risks, and accepting challenges as the business success didn't depend on family networks, but on skills and market expertise. Joseph Schumpeterian, an entrepreneur, was considered innovative since he always offered new equations that connected technology to markets. He considered these equations as one of the decisive factors of economic dynamics in an industrial society. However, he did not take risks.²³⁰ In contrast, Makiland views an entrepreneur businessman as someone who is driven by individual motivations and takes risks without receiving any financial or material compensation from society.²³¹ Kinzer considers an entrepreneur businessman as an innovative discoverer who takes risks as a result of being confronted with a vague future.²³²

Thus, Palestinian businessmen are entrepreneurs when talking about this new type of investments. They are innovative entrepreneurs who take risks and don't evaluate the prospects of profits and loss as much as they attempt to explore the future. Early Palestinian immigrant businesses, which mostly involved setting up grocery stores, restaurants, auto spare parts shops and apartment dealership, depended on family networks in terms of marketing. In contrast, modern investments, such as computer programming companies, paint and cardboard factories and car showrooms, have succeeded thanks to professional and economic networks.

2.3.3 Started from scratch: Individual entrepreneurs

Many Palestinian businessmen started their careers from scratch. Some did not have any ties with the economic elite that dominated Palestine before 1948 and 1967 and to move their investments abroad. Yet others were not able to move their investments overseas due to the grave effects of war. They were ultimately compelled to start their businesses from scratch.

Hence, several modern Palestinian bourgeois classes in close and remote diaspora did not come originally from major cities where the traditional Palestinian bourgeois class emerged.

²³⁰ Mark Casson, *Enterprise and competitiveness: A system view of international business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 45.

²³¹ Ken'ichi Yasumuro, "Engineers as functional alternatives to entrepreneurs in Japanese industrialisation," in *Entrepreneurship, networks and modern business*, eds. Jonathan Brown & Mary B. Rose (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 76-101.

²³² Israel M. Kinzer, *Discovery, capitalism, and distributive justice* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1989).

Instead, they came from some small towns and villages. For instance, several businessmen came originally from Lidd, Ramleh, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Beit Sahour. They did not utilize their education as a basis for their future financial success. According to the study sample, approximately 50% of businessmen completed high school as their highest education level.

It could be argued that the diaspora undoubtedly gave rise to new economic classes. The proportion or size of Palestinian businessmen in Jordan was much higher than the proportion of their counterparts in the US due to the lack of commercial and industrial activities in Jordan. This lack contributed to Palestinian businessmen's remarkable success in commerce and industries. In contrast, it was extremely difficult for Palestinians who were displaced to Syria to find a niche in commerce, the most established sector in the Levant. The following are three examples of Palestinian entrepreneurships that started from scratch. They are followed by a commentary.

The first example was presented by S.A. (a Jordanian born, originally from Lidd, resident in Jordan) who says:

"My relatives and father were forcibly displaced from Lidd to Jordan in 1948. We all lived in poor areas. My father had different jobs, including as a vegetable dealer. However, my uncle became an apprentice to an Armenian goldsmith. Following several years, my uncle became a skilful goldsmith and employed us. After becoming skilful goldsmiths, we set up our own goldsmith's and jewellery shop."

Z.N. (uprooted from Jaffa, resident in the Jordan) has another example:

"I was forcibly displaced together with my family from Jaffa in 1948. Shortly afterwards, my father passed away as a result of suffering a lot from the new situation. I was forced to drop out of high school in order to work. I initially worked in an insurance company office. While I continued to work, I completed my high school studies. I worked in the insurance company for two years and gained considerable experience. I managed afterwards to set up my own big insurance company. I still assume the position of director-general of this company."

While G.G. (living in the US) says:

"I immigrated from Ramallah to San Francisco in 1960s for personal and family-related reasons. Among these reasons was my desire to join my sister and brother-in-law. Before I emigrated, I had worked as a tailor. So, I decided to look for similar employment opportunities in San Francisco. I managed to work at a number of globally famous tailor stores in San Francisco and Berkeley. I used my savings to co-open a grocery store in cooperation with my kin. Many years afterwards, we purchased and leased other stores and apartments. Thanks to the profit we managed to set up a real estate company in partnership with some immigrant acquaintances."

These three stories present different details, but there is overlap in their themes of seeking support from others people. The first two stories highlight the importance of cooperation among family members to set up such a type of investments. Family members provided the human and financial capital to make these investments successful. The third story is about making investments based on individual work experience and skill. Friends, not family play a role in the latter case.

2.4 Transnational economic networks: Giving precedence to national duty over economic benefits

The Palestinian diaspora can contribute to supporting the Palestinian national economy through several means. This section discusses only three means: investments, gifts, and family remittances.

2.4.1 Investments limited in certain part of homeland

The concept of investment should be made clear from the outset. Neither the houses immigrants have purchased in their country of origin in order for them to stay upon their return, nor are the plots of land they have inherited from parents considered a form of investment. Investments in this context are defined as: big companies and factories that provide employment opportunities for Palestinian workers, contributions to the provision of services to the Palestinian society, and support the Palestinian national economy.

The section provides different examples for such transnational investments, presenting them from investors' social and national perspective. M.S. continues by saying:

"Following my father's successful opening of an auto parts store, it occurred to my mind to set up a paint factory. My brothers and I forged partnerships with some global paint factories. This enabled us to expand our own factory and gain a foothold in global markets. Today, we have branches across Iran, the Gulf countries, UAE, and Tajikistan. Most importantly, we have set up a paint factory in the West Bank city of Nablus, besides, we own storehouses in Ramallah. We have set up such factories and business in the occupied Palestinian territories for a host of reasons, including competing against Israeli paint products."

And G.Kh. added the following:

"After obtaining a Palestinian identity card in 1990/91, I set up an adhesives factory in cooperation with two partners. However, I was forced to close the factory as a result of the volatile political situation and uprisings. Later, I directly got a franchise from Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, as well as a franchise from BMW Automobiles without the need to import vehicles via Israel. Despite the financial losses I sustained as a result of the uprisings, I kept the automobile companies in operation. I took risks in terms of keeping the companies in operation since I believed that should security and peace prevail; the [occupied] Palestinian territories would offer a future market. I took these risks also because I believed that Palestinian workforce were highly competent. I opted to invest in Ramallah since it was very difficult to do so in my hometown of Jaffa. Nevertheless, this would certainly not serve as a substitute for my wish to invest in Jaffa."

S.Q. also added:

"After I successfully started a computer company in the US, I have become a key investor in a company for global digital advertisement network that operates in Palestine, the Gulf countries and the US. I have invested in my country of origin, Palestine, in order to maintain connection with it. Returning to my country of origin is an inherent or unalienable right that I continue to pursue. My father was forcibly displaced from Lidd to Ramallah. He lost all his property in Lidd. That's why I am investing in Palestine. This company would benefit brilliant Palestinian youth. Salaries for computer engineers in Ramallah costs a quarter of the salaries in the US."

While B.F. (a Jordanian born, originally from Jerusalem, resident in Jordan) has had different experiences, explaining:

"After my father completed his university studies in Egypt in early 1950s, he was not able to make it back to Jerusalem, and instead returned to Jordan. It was harsh for him to return. He worked in a structural and civil engineering companies. Following his steps, I subsequently opted to study engineering. In late 1980s, I managed to set up a company in importing the latest heating and air conditioning systems. In early 2000, we set up and operated a number of businesses, including real estate companies. Despite being born in Jordan, Palestine and the Arab World is my chief concern. This compelled me to invest in my country of origin and set up a branch in Ramallah."

Having presented the models of transnational Palestinian investments, one can conclude that the scope of transnational investment was diversified. It included commercial, industrial, service and technological investments. They indicate a change in the approach to Palestinian investment, that Palestinian investment has become more attached to global economy.

Photos 11: Abu Khader Automotive Company in Ramallah- occupied Palestinian territories



Source: Photos were taken by Hadeel Fawadleh, Summer 2016.

The occupied Palestinian territories (especially Ramallah and Al-Bireh district) is ranked first as a transnational destination for Palestinian investors, and Nablus is ranked the second. Ramallah is the PA's de facto administrative centre, where the majority of the PA's ministries and international institutions are based. Nablus is considered the most industrial city. This means that investments in these two cities are either administratively or economically justified. In addition, it is very difficult for Palestinians in diaspora to conduct their investments in Israel (since 1948).

Nevertheless, this hasn't obstructed investors' attempts to invest in the Palestinian statehood building nor does it preclude their upholding of their right to return to their hometowns.

Despite the adverse political and security situation—coupled with lack of promising future prospects in the occupied Palestinian territories—these investors take risks when they decide to invest there. Their motivations are not purely economical, but national and individual. Investors' attachment to their country of origin does not only have a geographical aspect, but has also social and emotional aspects that remains deeply ingrained in their memories. They already know that the occupied Palestinian territories don't offer a suitable investment destination, but they decided to proceed with investing out of their sense of belonging and patriotism. Arab (2013) confirmed that the Moroccan migrant can be considered as a development actor for his/her village of origin; where sending remittances, investing, building houses and others are ways of connection with the home. It is also an important step in the structuring of a transnational community.²³³

2.4.2 Foreign (non -Arab) diaspora sent more remittances and grants

The fact that immigrants continue to send remittances to their families, especially parents, brothers and sisters (first-degree relatives) who remain in Palestine, obviously signals their constant connection with their families. Immigrants are considered by their families in the homeland as a reliable source of income as evidenced in their success and resilience in the diaspora. Immigrants send remittances to their families in order to cover the costs of living, university studies, medication, and weddings. This helps immigrants feel that they effectively contribute to their families' resilience in the country of origin.

Interviews with Palestinian immigrants show that the amount of direct remittances to their families wasn't significant due to the immigrants' limited economic conditions. Except for businessmen, Palestinians in Jordan could not send remittances to their families due to their poor economic conditions. The majority of them have experienced harsh living conditions and opted to live in poor areas in order to improve their children's economic conditions. Thus, the living

²³³ Chadia Arab, "Le troisième âge : le "migrant inutile", " *Hommes & migration, Diasporas marocaines*, no. 1303 (2013): 47-55. [In French].

conditions of Palestinians in Jordan are not better than their counterparts in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Regarding Palestinian immigrants in the US, 41% of interviewees said that they send annual remittances for their families in the country of origin either upon their visits or via friends and other relatives. This indicates that their economic conditions are much better and more stable than those of Palestinians in Jordan. Some Palestinian immigrants in the US said they also send remittances to their relatives in Jordan. The amount of remittances varied, with 19.64% reporting they send less than a \$1,000 to their families per year; 10.7% percent said that they send \$1,000-\$2,000 to their families per year; and 10.7% percent said that they send \$2,000- 3,000 their families per year.

The second factor explaining why the amount of remittances sent by Palestinian immigrants to their families was low is that a large percentage (23.2%) of the study sample descend from territories 1948 (what become Israel). All the members of their families were forcibly displaced from their hometowns in 1948 and no one is left. In some cases, all the members of some interviewees' families, including parents, grown children, and extended family have immigrated to the US.

As explained in the first part of this study, immigrants participate in various associations and clubs and join Arab ecclesiastical institutions and friendship societies in order to send financial assistance to their country of origin. This assistance is allocated to develop various institutions and help needy disadvantaged families.

Finally, some immigrants tend to offer annual financial gifts. These gifts are used to cover the tuition fees for undergraduate and school students as well as support humanitarian, community-based and ecclesiastical societies. Such immigrants are mostly affluent or businessmen. Some build centres with their own money, while others offer gifts for the renovation of buildings in cooperation with some acquaintances in the country of origin. For example, several faculties in Birzeit University, such as Nasib Aziz Shahin Graduate Studies Building, were built thanks to donations from immigrants. Many churches have been built or renovated thanks to such gifts.

3. Bring outsider in: towards crossing national borders

3.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that developments under globalization in the twenty-first century have stimulated international migration in all fields including business, communications, movement, advancement, and others, to a degree that nations or countries are no longer disconnected. This came along with the emergence of the concept of transnationalism through which immigrants were able to maintain a level of connectivity between "Here" and "There". Immigrants were able, through the means of communications and transportation, to connect their homeland with their host country, and to practice multiple migratory movements such as: return migration, repeat migration, circular migration and others.

The mobility of migrants across borders generates a massive flow of information, goods, and money moving back and forth across borders. But not all migrants represent this pattern, not because of social and economic factors, but due to limitations connecting to their legal or residential status that may preclude migrants from travelling home freely,²³⁴ in addition to the political and diplomatic relationships between countries that may restrict the ability of citizens from one nation from visiting another nation.

Migrants, who sustain connections between "Here" and "There", create a new category of businessmen and political activists who conduct cross-border activities on a frequent basis.²³⁵ As suggested by Levitt (2001), "transmigrants" are but one set of actors in the broader, transnational social field, where transnational practices vary greatly in frequency and intensity.²³⁶ That means transnational activities may be continuous, periodic, or just occasional.

²³⁴ Micheal Walzer, *Spheres of justice: A defence of pluralism and equality* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

²³⁵ Luis G. Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes & William Haller, "Assimilation and transnationalism: Determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants," *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no.6 (2003): 1211–1248.

²³⁶ Peggy Levitt, "Transnational migration: Taking stock and future directions. Global Networks," *A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 1, no. 3 (2001): 195–216.

Roger Waldinger (2008) found social, political, and historical differences among the Latin American migrants in the United States. He found that cross-border exchanges are most frequent among the Dominicans, and least common among the Cubans, despite travel to Cuba being cheap and easy. The difference is due to the relationships between sending and receiving states, both of which have consistently impeded to maintain connections across the Straits of Florida. Comparing transmigration with another group, Mexicans who have immigrated to the US have taken at least one trip home since their migration.

As fewer than one-half of Palestinian immigrants send remittances and almost 80% plan to stay in the United States for good—and half of *all* immigrants plan to stay for good—a proportion that steadily rises with years of residence in the United States, tracking a parallel decline in the fraction who maintains that their "real homeland" is their country of birth. Though many sending countries have opened up elections to non-resident voting, relatively few immigrants show much interest. Notwithstanding all the factors impeding participation in US politics, respondents reported that voting in U.S. elections is more important to them than voting in home country elections.²³⁷

This section sheds light on Palestinian transnational immigrants, reflecting how connected they are to their homeland, and the nature of transnational networks they are active in. This also applies to Muslim Palestinian emigrants. Palestinians in the diaspora and refuge countries are subject to the same Israeli occupation policies and international policies in terms of the possibility of returning to their homeland or crossing borders.


This section will focus on the volume of transnational border crossing of Palestinian immigrants, the objectives, and also the barriers. What is the real frequency of such crossing? What are the obstacles and barriers restricting access of Palestinian emigrants to their home country? What is the role of family in this process? Does the volume of transnational border crossing differ for Palestinian immigrants in Jordan and in the US? Finally, how does distance (proximity or remoteness) from homeland play a role?

²³⁷ Roger Waldinger, "Between "Here" and "There": Immigrant cross-border activities and loyalties," *International Migration Review* 42, no.1 (2008): 3-29

3.2 Active cross national borders looming on the horizon

There are four main motivating factors for Palestinian in diaspora to cross national borders and visit their homeland: Family, tourism, temporary jobs and investment. The fieldwork for this study, has demonstrated the obvious variances with respect to national borders crossing by Palestinians in Jordan and their counterparts in the US, as shown the following figure.

Chart 11: Cross national borders by Palestinian Christian immigrants in diaspora



Note: An active transmigrant is the one who crossed borders one time in the last five year or one time by year or more than one by year. An infrequent transmigrant who crossed borders one time in the last ten years or twenty years or forty years. A non-returner migrant is the one who never visited his/her homeland since his/her migration.

According to the statistical results 59% of Palestinians in Jordan were active transmigrants in crossing the national borders, in comparison to 57% US citizens of Palestinian origin. Upon observing the frequency of transnational border crossing per a year, we find that Jordanian Palestinians are more active, as 27% of them cross the borders at least once a year, while the percentage was 19.6% for their US counterparts. This could be probably ascribed to the proximity

between Jordan and the homeland, Palestine, as the primary incentive. Based on the sociological categories given to Palestinians in diaspora, this type of migrant falls under transmigration, as their legal status is often unstable and the majority has dual nationalities, one is Palestinian and the other is the nationality of the host country (in these cases, the American or Jordanian), which has thus enabled them to cross borders frequently. This does not mean they wish to return back to their home country; on the contrary, most of them have already settled abroad, and have established life for their children, but they still want to keep the option to stay or return.

While non-returning immigrants, those who have not crossed the borders since they first emigrated or were forcefully displaced. Such non-active migration may be ascribed to several reasons, including legal matters related to the (newer) nationality they hold, mainly a single nationality (without possessing Palestinian documents), or other issues related to their origins and the sending country. The most logical reason for such inactive crossing could be due to the long periods in the diaspora, which contributed to melting and fusing them in their new communities. Here the terms "melting" and "fusing" do not mean to abandon the sense and belonging of national identity, nor to abandon ones' own homeland, nor to consider these immigrants as being not Palestinians. Rather, the difficult living conditions they experienced have forced them to get engaged and perhaps fused within the cultures of their new communities. Migrants under this category shall not be described as transmigrants, instead they shall be described as fused or integrated migrants.

In addition, Infrequent transmigrants—those who crossed the borders once during the past ten years or once during the past twenty years—formed 35.4% for Palestinians in Jordan and 37.9% for the Palestinians in the US. These immigrants have been pushed to cross the borders for urgent matters; such as family emergencies.

3.3 Cross national borders attracted with overlapping nets

It is not certain whether crossing national borders by Palestinians in the diaspora is motivated by one factor only, since in many cases, multiple factors may converge that are inseparable. The field interviews found that there are three main reasons that motivates Palestinian

in the diaspora to cross national borders and visit their homeland: family ties, spatial networks, and professional-economic networks.

3.3.1 Family's big house still open

The presence of family, particularly first-degree relatives, is the greatest motivation for immigrants to visit their home country, as such visits also have other social, cultural and sometimes religious dimensions. About 58.5% of Palestinians in Jordan and 67.9% of Palestinians in the US have indicated that their main goal for crossing national borders is to visit their relatives still residing in their native country. However, these familial networks which still link those in diaspora to their homeland will be eventually end or be disconnected upon the death of their parents or the immigration of the rest of the brothers and sisters.

Many interviewees explained their reason for not visiting is the absence of relatives still living there: "We have no parents or relatives; we do not know anyone there. Why would we return?" This situation mainly uprooted in 1948, and those who have immigrated to the US a long time ago. These networks could be strengthened if immigrants would urge their children to get married and reside in the native country, which is rare and unlikely to happen.

Immigrants do not come to their homeland only to see their parents and relatives, but also to participate in some social occasions, especially weddings. Accordingly, most immigrants prefer to visit their native country in the summer, when special social events, trips, and family gatherings are more frequent, which thus enables them to communicate with the largest number of family members, fellow villagers, and friends.

The existence and persistence of some key symbols may significantly contribute in the sustainability of the familial networks. The family's big house is one and the most important of all, as it is the physical space where immigrants can gather with the rest of the family members to exchange social issues and to discuss problem and future plans, thus they feel and enjoy the sense of unity. The second important symbol is represented in the properties and assets passed down to emigrants from their relatives. Such properties do not often exceed plots of land with olive trees as well as the stakes in the family big house. Immigrants still feel connected to these properties, even when they are not worth much money. For them, the retention of the big family house and inherited

land parcels represents their adherence to the land, their right to return, and the continuity of networks.

Very few immigrants who did not inherit or had previous property end up purchasing land later. Additionally, the study found that many families who had immigrated long time ago also had no direct physical connection to the homeland because they had sold their property. Thus when any of the family members visit, they stay in a hotel. Such cases were reported by immigrants of Ramallah city origins, considering their antecedent immigration in the early twentieth century. Emigrants who were uprooted in 1948, their property and lands were confiscated by the Israeli occupation armies, leaving them with nothing to own.

3.3.2 Memory of place and essence of faith

Place has significance and memory in one's heart and soul. How would the case be when we talk about people who have immigrated, been displaced, or forced to depart from their home country, leaving behind houses, archaeological sites, landscapes, and religious places. Each narrates stories engraved in immigrant's memory and increasing his sense of alienation. Hence, visiting these places is just a revival of this memory, past, and history, and an emphasis to such adherence. Immigrants have kept networks and emotional ties which linked them to the landmarks and places that were part of their past history in their native country. This was confirmed through the research in which 43.4% of Palestinian in Jordan and 64.1% of Palestinians in the US report that their visit does not feel complete unless these landmarks in their native country have been visited. Z.N. (uprooted from Jaffa, resident in Jordan) recalls a story from after he had finally obtained a visa to visit his place of birth two years ago:

"I tried very hard to return to Jaffa, but this did not work, despite that I had the opportunity to see it twice, during these journeys. I visited Al-Khader Church where I used to pray, the Orthodox College where I studied, and my father's shop where he used to work.... Now I found our house but this time it consisted of two floors: as the Israeli-Jewish family residing therein had recently build a second floor ...a lot of change is made...eventually I took many photographs for this place and for the other sites in Jaffa, and used them to decorate my house in Jordan where I had a special corner called Jaffa."

Jerusalem and Bethlehem hold great value in the hearts of Palestinian Christian immigrants. Visiting the religious holy places there is considered a renewal of their Eastern Christian faith, which is accompanied by some common religious rituals and rites such as: lighting candles; purchasing rosaries, religious pictures, and holy oil; obtaining blessings for some special needs; and performing some vows. Palestinians in the diaspora increase the frequency of their visits to such places during holidays and religious occasions, and during summer (the preferable time to visit their native country). Such visits are planned either individually or through organizations. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Ramallah Club in San Francisco sends 25-30 emigrants back to Ramallah so they can participate in the celebrations of the Easter celebrations in Palestine to strengthen their sense of belonging and to share this occasion with family and friends. As for Palestinian Christians in Jordan, it is worth indicating that the Israeli government had tended, in the last ten years, to grant these Palestinians permits to visit their native country during the period of religious holidays, providing that these Palestinians should have to apply for such permission through their relatives in the native village/city. Yet this does not necessarily mean that all those who apply for such permits are allowed to obtain them.

3.3.3 Administrative and Functional Tasks

In the previous section, we discussed transnational economic networks established by Palestinian immigrants who ran them from abroad with few visits for inspection. The number of investments established by Palestinians in Jordan (5.7%) was greater than those established by Palestinians in the US (1.8%).

Other motives of cross national borders which relate to Palestinians of Jordan include: seeking temporary jobs and attending meetings and workshops. About 11% of these immigrants reported that they crossed the national borders in order to participate in conferences and workshops. The majority of these meetings were organized by religious institutions, such as the Orthodox Churches Council or the Middle East Council of Churches, to discuss the status of Christians in general, or the Palestinian Christian community in particular, in addition to other business related meetings for investors, who are obliged to attend meetings related to the company business and future.

With regard to obtaining temporary jobs, 3.77% of Palestinian in Jordan reported spending a few months in the mother country to finalize business issues related to their hiring companies, as some companies in Jordan have their branches there. These individuals were selected to perform these tasks by the company due to holding dual nationalities, which thus facilitates the process of crossing national borders. Furthermore, being a holder of such dual nationalities mean that these individuals still have the option move to Palestine and practice the same profession.

3.4 Policies or Politics? Obstacles impeding cross national borders

For Palestinians, crossing national borders is a process impeded by many obstacles and barriers, whether crossing occurs frequently or just once. These obstacles include both social and political impediments, as shall be discussed later in details.

3.4.1 The absence of a Familial Pulling Factor

We have stated previously that having family, parents, and relatives in the native country is the greatest pulling factor for immigrants to cross transnational borders and vice versa. According to the fieldwork, about 18.9% of Palestinians in Jordan and 21.5% of Palestinians in the US have indicated that the majority of their families and relatives are residing abroad, due to immigration or displacement, making it hard or impossible for them to return to their home country, because they know no one there, and feel like strangers. This is true considering the fact that 23.2% of these immigrants in this study, their hometowns transferred by force to Israel in 1948. 11.60% of which were born abroad. Furthermore, the other reason could be attributed to the effectiveness of family networks; which contributed in facilitating the immigration of the rest family members and relatives abroad where their security and economic situation is better. This applies to many emigrants from Bethlehem and Ramallah, who moved as entire families to the US and no family members remain in Palestine.

3.4.2 Travel burdens and procedures

Elderly immigrants (age 60 and older) constitute 67.9% of the study sample. Approximately 14% of these immigrants in the United States and 3.6% in Jordan have indicated that their old age had frequent negative impacts on their visit to their home country. The long hours of travel for

Palestinians coming from the United States, the high costs, as well as routine procedures at the Jordanian and Israeli airports and crossings became a real dilemma for them. Could they endure all this hardship? Knowing that many of them suffer from chronic diseases? The same conditions are also faced by Jordanian Palestinians, but the journey is much shorter and less expensive, considering the proximity of both countries.

3.4.3 International policies and Israeli practices

Upon signing the peace treaty by Jordan and Israel, in which Jordan has recognized Israel as a neighbouring state. Palestinians consequently became obliged to apply to the Israeli embassy in the Jordanian capital if they wish to get a visa to visit their homeland. Such procedures are merely applicable on Palestinians who hold the Jordanian nationality only (without a Palestinian identity card), who make up 80.4% of the study sample.

Furthermore, about 49% of these Palestinians indicated that they have applied for visa to their homeland (with durations ranging from one week to three months), but their applications were rejected for without a stated reason. Other Palestinians have not tried to enter their native country on principle, as they do refuse to seek permission from the Israeli embassy for permission to go home. For Palestinians of dual nationality (i.e. those holding Jordanian nationality as well as Palestinian identity card), and who form 16% of the study sample, applying for a visa is not required, as they can easily cross the borders. Finally, Palestinians of dual nationality of which one is Jordanian, must go through the visa process through and Israeli embassy as a Jordanian (they cannot enter on their non-Jordanian passport, that would not require such a process).

Approximately 44.6% of US citizens of Palestinian origin in this study, hold an American passport. They report that this passport is considered the best; as those holding it can travel almost anywhere without the need for obtaining a visa, and can cross national borders through the Israeli airport, too, although they do face mistreatment by Israeli officials at the airport. Israel, on one hand considers these visiting immigrants as tourists, hence, they are not allowed to exceed the duration specified for their visit. On the other hand, the Israeli security at the airports tends to ask many questions that are often intrusive, insulting, and exasperating, as if they eventually want to say: "Since you carry the American passport, why did you return back? Your place is not here."

In this context, it is necessary to narrate the story of a Palestinian immigrant in the US, who tried, forty years after his migration, to visit his native country to perform the holy pilgrimage in the summer of 2015. Mr. J.kh. (who emigrated from Jerusalem) said:

"Upon my arrival at the Israeli airport, coming from San Francisco, the Israeli security and intelligence services asked me many questions, which eventually lead to the conclusion that I will not be able to enter my native country. Some of my friends who were accompanying me on this journey spared no effort to resolve this issue, but eventually they decided that I must immediately return back to San Francisco."

Due to harassment and rejection at the Israeli airport, many Palestinian holding US citizenship or other foreign nationalities, prefer to enter their country by land via Jordan, to avoid such mistreatment and incidents, despite the high prices of visa through Jordan in comparison to costs when arriving through Israel. While Palestinians, holders of both American and Palestinian passports (about 25% of sample study) are forced to cross enter their homeland via Jordan instead of the Israeli airports.

For immigrants holding both US and Jordanian passports (28.6% of the study sample), obtaining the Jordanian passport had been before their departure from the country, indicating that many of these passports have expired. Under all the aforementioned cases, possessing Jordanian passport does not qualify the holder to obtain a Palestinian passport in the future. For example, many Palestinians, who were forcibly displaced from the Gulf States following the Gulf War in 1990/1991, were unable to return back to their native country. Instead they returned to Jordan since they hold the Jordanian citizenship only.

Is it possible for Palestinians in the diaspora who hold either Jordanian or American citizenship to also obtain the Palestinian citizenship? Many Palestinian families in the diaspora, in which one spouse or parents owned the Palestinian identity card, tend to apply for a so-called "reunion request" from the Israeli authorities in order to get a Palestinian identity card. The Israeli authority tends to grant approvals on some request in form of batches, yet the last batch was issued about ten years ago. Due to Israeli's freeze on issuing Palestinian identity cards, many Palestinian families were not given the opportunity to return permanently to their homeland or even visit. J.J. (an immigrant from Bethlehem, resident in the Jordan) holds the Jordanian citizenship only, and

his wife holds dual nationalities (Jordanian and Palestinian citizenship). The fact that his wife holds the Palestinian citizenship, allows her to pass on the nationality to their children so one of their daughters studied in Bethlehem University. Moreover, the wife had submitted an application for "family reunion request" on behalf of J.J., but such request was rejected. Consequently the family must stay in Jordan, as they are unable to move to Palestine since J.J. does not have permission to live there.

There are other stories, such as N.M (an immigrant from Ramallah, resident in Jordan) was living in Ramallah because she was married to a Palestinian with a Palestinian identity card. She had obtained a visit visa from the Israeli Embassy in Jordan in the 1990s, but overstayed her visa and remained in the native village, in order to apply later for a family reunion request, which she obtained after long period of time. Knowing that she was living in her homeland "illegally" according to Israeli policy, she was unable to leave the country or move among the Palestinian cities for fear of being caught at an Israeli checkpoint and deported.

3.5 Homeland and diaspora relations governed by policies

To establish a solid relationship between Palestinians in the diaspora and the homeland, or to have a highly effective transnational networks, and intensive transnational border crossings, the native country should be the centre of attraction for immigrants throughout all of the diaspora; Thus, there must be a geographical center or a political institution, where all Palestinian communities can meet.


With regard to Palestinians in the diaspora, a real problem impeding the achievement of establishing such a relationship with the native country – historical Palestine – is that it is fractured into several geopolitical areas: The occupied Palestinian territories and Israel (since 1948). Each is run by separate administrations and follows certain policies for crossing the transnational borders. The occupied Palestinian territories, internally, divided into Gaza Strip which is governed by the deposed Hamas government, and West Bank is partially administrated by the Palestinian National Authority. This means that there is not an independent Palestinian entity of defined geographical features. Politically, the Palestinian Liberation Organization had played this role; preserving identity and maintaining the sense of belonging among Palestinians in diaspora. But following the

Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority, the status of the PLO became feeble, and it became no longer able to attract Palestinians in the diaspora.

As for immigrants, the discrepant policies of countries in the diaspora regarding passports or residence documents have negatively and sometimes positively affected the efforts of crossing national borders, yet such policies have eventually weakened all transnational networks, including economic, national, social, and familial.

Immigrants who own passports from non-Arab countries, are permitted by the Israeli policy to access all occupied Palestinian territories with no need to obtain visa before arrival. In contrast, Palestinians who hold Jordanian passports are obliged to obtain a visa to be able to access all the occupied Palestinian territories. Furthermore, when emigrants of dual nationalities hold a Palestinian ID, they are permitted to enter only the West Bank; while emigrants from the Gaza Strip who hold Egyptian travel documents can only enter Gaza. Immigrants who were uprooted in 1948 do not have any Palestinian travel or residency documents, thus they must obtain a visa to cross the borders based on their host country's agreement with the Israel. Finally, it is known that refugees are prohibited from moving from place to another or from one country to another. The following figure below shows these relations.

Diagram1: The relationship between Palestinian immigrant' nationalities and cross national borders



- Regions which borders could be crossed through the Israeli or Jordanian airports ←————
- Regions which borders could be crossed with visa through Jericho passageway ←-----
- Regions which borders could not be crossed unless with special permission
such as the Erez passageway (Israeli checkpoint) ←·-·-·-·-
- Gazans can cross Gaza Strip borders through Rafah passageway ←·········
- Refugees cannot cross any region

The division of Historic Palestine into many geopolitical areas, as well as the various nationalities held by Palestinians in the diaspora and the local origins of Palestinians (the native village/city); have converged together to form the greatest factor which either facilitating or impeding the process of transnational border crossing. The weakness in crossing national borders is a result of a loss of the networks, which often lead in the fusion and integration with communities in the diaspora, and perhaps impact the identity and the sense of belonging.

4. Bridging diaspora: Internet as a tool of studying transnationalism

4.1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, there has been an upturn in the use of online social media which have become to serve as a tool of networking between Palestinians in the diaspora and their counterparts in the country of origin (homeland). This has revitalized the concepts of diaspora and nation-state. Online accounts have managed to overcome time and place constraints and introduce a new form of existence, mobilization and mobility.

Accordingly, the concept of diaspora has evolved, from the original "old diaspora" that concentrated around groups such as Jewish and Armenian on return to the "imagined" homeland,²³⁸ to "new diaspora" which focuses on transnational relationships between country of origin and host country.²³⁹ Khachig Tölölyan wrote, in a famous article, Rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational moment (1996), that "Where once were dispersions, there now is diaspora."

²³⁸ William Safran, "Deconstructing and comparing diasporas," in *identity, religion and diaspora*, eds. Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso (London: Routledge, 2004), 9-30.

²³⁹ V. Grassmuck, *Digital diaspora*, 2000. Web site: <http://mikro.org/Events/20001206.html>.

While Dana Diminescu (2012) conclude her article by saying that: "where once were diasporas, there now is the Web."²⁴⁰

Electronic diaspora (e-diaspora) is defined as a group of scattered emigrants who organize themselves through a web page, an online group or an electronic portal that has been set up in any country of emigration or the country of origin. This group of emigrants has a centre and periphery and its members stay in contact using words, chatting and photos. E-diaspora is also defined as an unstable group since new members could join the group, while other members could withdraw (unsubscribe) from it. So, the effectiveness of e-diaspora is based on members' online practices.²⁴¹

This section addresses internet tools as a means for creating networks among Palestinians in the diaspora and between the diaspora and the homeland. In other words, it examines how the internet applications (web sites, pages, Facebook) can rebuild one community of Palestinians in the diaspora and the homeland and how the internet can rebuild the national Palestinian identity of Palestinians all over the world.

This section raises these questions: What are the types of Diasporas formed by emigrants who get connected with one another? Could electronic networks intersect? Do the networks and online interactions of emigrants throughout the world reveal traditional or novel functions of Diasporas? Do e-diasporas form an extension of physical Diasporas or merely their mirror image? Do they serve as a source of new diaspora communities? Or are they instead an echo of globalization – of a society which is itself a diaspora in the making?

4.2 Accelerated growth in the use of internet


The internet facilitates communication among Palestinian immigrants; it has taken up a central function in many migrants' daily lives, and it can be stated also, most of Palestinian immigrants use the internet, just as others do, for recreation.

²⁴⁰ Dana Diminescu, "Introduction: Digital methods for the exploration, analysis and mapping of e-Diasporas," *Social Science Information* 51, no. 4 (2012): 451–458

²⁴¹ Dana Diminescu, "Introduction: Digital methods for the exploration, analysis and mapping of e-Diasporas," 2012, *Ibid.*

In this study, Palestinian immigrants mentioned that the central motivation for using the internet is to enable – and simplify – contact them with their families, relatives, and friends in the homeland, and gain reassurance about their living conditions (including: health, security and social occasions).

Chart 12: Internet versus phone in contacting families/relatives at homeland



It seems that despite the technological advancement which had generated the new social networks, telephone use has remained at the top regardless of the high cost of use, as it still the most convenient method for older family members who did not practice modern technology. In the United States, immigrants may purchase certain kinds of prepaid phone cards which offer reduced prices for international calls. Making phone calls from Jordan is less costly than calling from the US. Furthermore, many Palestinians possess mobile phones that carry Palestinian or Israeli phone plans through which they communicate with their families in the home country and at lower prices. This explains the small number of Palestinians in Jordan using modern social media for this purpose in comparison to their counterparts in the US. Furthermore, in cases of death and marriage, it is necessary for immigrants to offer condolences or congratulations to their families and relatives through phone calls, since offering the same in writing through Facebook or e-mail is not enough and is discouraged.

4.3 Internet establish connections despite huge distances

In this section, the researcher does not seek to explore how to build a digital atlas of the diaspora, a step that requires some software.²⁴² She just presents different examples of web-based networks that emigrants have set up or joined. Each web-based network provides a different example for e-diaspora. The researcher ultimately addresses whether these networks could be connected with one another or not.

4.3.1 Family websites reveal the large scale of dispersion

Serving as a tool and space, the internet plays an important role in terms of enabling members of the Palestinian society strengthen the links among them despite being “physically” far away from one another, subject to restrictions and concentrated in regions that prevent them for crossing national borders. "Chat, email and websites", according to Aouragh, (2011: 147) "provided accessible instruments and to some extent overcame the fragmented nature of the Palestinian diaspora."²⁴³

Few Palestinian families in the diaspora intended to create their own webpages or groups to communicate with other family members, especially these families which have immigrated long time ago, since their members are distributed among several countries, and the new generations born in the diaspora do not know each other. This significant diaspora status of these families was the major impetus to establish such groups or webpages. Based on the field research, only two examples of this type of communication was found among immigrants: the first was a webpage for the Saddeh Family from Birzeit, and the second was a Facebook group for Al-Bandak Family from Bethlehem.


Based on the Al-Saddeh Family webpage, it is clear that immigrants and their children who are distributed among many areas, including the occupied Palestinian territories, South America, the US, some Arab countries, and other countries. But what is most important here, is that we were

²⁴² Dana Diminescu, et al. *Digital Diasporas Atlas Exploration and Cartography of Diasporas in Digital Networks* (Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 2011).

²⁴³ Miryiam Aouragh, *Palestine Online: the Internet and the Construction of Identity* (I.B. Tauris, 2011).

able to determine the diaspora communities of immigrants from this family, therefore, the direction of the densest immigration.

Map 17: Electronic networks among Al- Saddeh Family members through Web site



Source: The Saddeh Family website: <http://saadeh.atwebpages.com>. This site contains the names of the families and their actual residence countries. Some calculations were done by the researcher Hadeel Fawadleh, in order to determine the trends and the density of relations between these families. Moreover, in order to create map shows the electronic net between the members of this web page.

In addition, from this webpage, immigrants are able to gain knowledge about the history of their hometown (Birzeit), as well as of individuals descending from the same family and their whereabouts. Additionally, the site also has written history, archives, and photographs of family members, as well as the prominent publications issued about any family member, the family, or the town of origin. Moreover, the website keeps family members in the diaspora updated about all the recent events and occasions related to the family, such as marriages, graduations, death, and births. Thus, websites like this are a communication tool among family members, it may not be regarded as an interactive tool, as the information flows in one direction and individuals are unable to engage in discussions, conversations, or the like.

As for the Facebook group established for the Al-Bandak Family "Bendecks United!" many members have become acquainted through this group, knowing that this family is one of the most well-known among Bethlehem families who migrated long time ago. One of the family members in San Francisco, S.B. stated, "The idea of establishing such a group came as an initiative by those in the diaspora, as most of us do not know each other, nor the areas or countries where our family members are distributed." Furthermore, regardless of their locations, the majority of subscribers were able to exchange dialogues, questions, photos and information, and share news and information about social issues concerning their city of Bethlehem, as well as other political issues concerning their homeland. This group is an interactive means which connects many of Al-Bandak family members. Each member is able to contact the others, with the ability share family information by posting on the group page.

Accordingly, in this context we may say that families' webpages or Facebook groups are able to overcome the barriers of place, therefore preserving a certain level of connection among family members. Immigrants feel that they are part of one united family despite the geographical distances separating them, which promotes family identity and belonging.

4.3.2 Villages and cities pages serve as media outlets

Facebook pages constitute a type of news, including social, cultural, and national media. Many village and town in the different countries of the diaspora and homeland have created special

Facebook pages of their own, through which they post all the activities to be held, and announce the results of the administrative bodies meetings, as well as the results of the board election.

Furthermore, these pages offer congratulations on marriages, births, and graduations as well as offer condolences to the families of the deceased. It also celebrates national and religious events, whether they happen in the home country or elsewhere, which consequently keeps the people for each town in touch and aware of the events taking place in their homeland and abroad. In addition, this means of communication enables subscribers to add comments, post, engage in chats, etc. It is worth mentioning that members of these web pages maintain communicate with one another mostly in Arabic. In another word, the communications remain confined between the city/village distributed in different countries of diaspora.

Photos12: Examples of announcements issued by some villages/cities' pages on Facebook



Source: Facebook pages. 1) Left: Welcome of visitors (Aboud). Right, Announcement of a trip (Zababdeh). 2) Left: Condolence (Jaffa). Right: Announcement of a sewing cycle (Lidd).

Another issue related here, many village and town clubs tend to issue periodical publications, in an attempt to maintain ties and connections among immigrants and fellow citizens residing in the home country. Recently, these printed publications become as important as electronic materials, in that they became attainable by all, and aim at documenting the club's activities as well as updating the news of Palestinian community of the native village/city.

The Federation of Ramallah is publishing a "Ramallah Directory," which list the names and contact information of people from Ramallah who immigrated to the US to facilitate the communication among them as well as with people from Ramallah in other parts of the world. In 2015, the Bethlehem Society in the US issued its first English-language online newsletter, "Al NejmeH." Through this newsletter, the society combines the news of the community in the US, along with that of Bethlehem and the occupied Palestinian territories.

4.3.3 Christian - Palestinian issues online

Many Palestinian Christians in the country of origin and the diaspora countries have set up many Christian online networks or subscribed to Arab, Middle Eastern or global Christian online networks. Such networks take the form of web pages, Facebook pages or Facebook groups. It is worth noting that main objective of these networks is not to carry out evangelizing work as much as it is to discuss some matters of faith and dogma, introduce and remind subscribers of religious feasts and address matters related to Christians in the country of origin. At the same time, these networks are intended to tackle local and national issues. Examples of such web pages include: "Palestinian Christians", Christians united for Palestine", " I'm a Palestinian Christian", "Christians of Palestine", "Christian of Orient", "Christians of the Middle East", and "Save Gaza Christian".

Occasionally, these pages share speeches delivered by Palestinian Christian clergy who are active in religious and national circles, such as Catholic priest Father Manuel Musallam, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Sebastia Theodosius (Atallah) Hanna and former Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Michel Sabbah. In their speeches, such clergy usually address many issues. Most importantly, they brief the Arab and global communities on the desecration of Christian holy sites by Israeli military and settlers and tackles Israeli military's enlistment of (Palestinian) Christians in Israel, a step designed to stock Christian-Muslim division. They also address the church's positions

on the policies adopted by western countries intended to attract Christian emigrants, most recently US President Donald Trump's remarks welcoming Christian emigrants and rejecting entry to Muslims. So, many non-Christians have subscribed to these web pages.

Photos 13: A sample of Christian -Palestinian issues on Web pages




Jewish radicals disrupt Greek Orthodox Pentecost prayer in Jerusalem, calling worshipers 'evil'...

Police were on hand to prevent confrontations as Christian worshipers held an annual Pentecost observance at the presumed site of the Room of the Last Supper, and...



VIDEO: Palestinian Christians dressed as Santa Claus march against Israeli occupation



'We Palestinian Christians say Allahu Akbar'

The only Palestinian Orthodox Christian bishop in the Holy Land speaking about the suffering of Palestinian Christians, their unity with Muslims in the Palestinian struggle, about Orthodox Christian martyrs, and Ukraine.


Source: Facebook pages: Palestinian Christians.

4.3.4 Web sites support the cause of Palestine

The analysis of Palestinian immigrants' use of the internet reveals some activities that serve the identity. Palestinian immigrants have created many political and national websites which extend to different countries around the world including the homeland, which differ in their activities but are centred around the same mission. The main mission for all these websites focuses on solidarity with Palestinian rights, and the boycott movement against Israel.

Recently in the United States, US Citizens of Palestinian origin organized a political and national website called "Electronic Intifada" is classified as a diaspora actor because it connects different Palestinian institutions one with another. Electronic Intifada is considered as an authoritative and active source providing news, opinion, and analysis about Palestine in the English language,²⁴⁴ as the diagram shows:

Diagram 2: Palestinian e-diaspora



Source: e-Diaspora Atlas <http://maps.e-diasporas.fr>

²⁴⁴ Anat Ben-David, *The Palestinian diaspora on the web between de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation (e-Diaspora Atlas*, Paris: Foundation Masion des science de l'homme, 2012), 8-9.

The above diagram illustrates two main points: connectivity among actors on the network as well as the quantity and quality of online information. It should be noted that this diagram does not reflect the geographic distribution of Palestinian diaspóra as the websites are mostly based in the US. According to Anat (2012), Electronic Intifada website is developed around two centres of gravity, namely the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian territories, which are not geographically demarcated. Most importantly, not only do members of these websites include Palestinians, but they also include advocates of the Palestinian cause.²⁴⁵

In her book titled *Palestine Online: The Internet and the Construction of Identity*, Miryam Aouragh explains how the internet played a key role in terms of connecting Palestinians across Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon one to another during the second Palestinian *intifada*, that erupted in 2000. The internet allowed them to exchange political information and ideas and analyse conditions on the ground. It also enabled them to publish narratives and video footages that managed to mobilize and win over international public opinion. This also applied to the role played by the internet during the 2014 Israeli onslaught on the besieged Gaza Strip. In contrast, internet did not play such a role during the first Palestinian *intifada* of 1987 due to the lack of its spread among Palestinians.

4.3.5 Transnational channels and radio stations

Technological advancement has been involved in all the field of telecommunication, including TV channels and radio stations. No longer are broadcast news and programs limited to just a local and regional or regional audience; instead they are offered online. They can be tracked and followed regardless of time and place. The majority of these channels and stations, including the Palestinian, Arab, and non-Arab media have their own Facebook pages and provide updated news in both Arabic and English. Many media sources make their all or some of their content available in both English and Arabic, including: Ajial Radio, Bethlehem Radio, and Ma'an News Agency; as well as Al-Jazeera, Al-Mayadeen, and Al-Arabiya TV channels; in addition to Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam newspapers, published in the occupied Palestinian territories. Through such online media, Palestinians in the diaspora are able to keep on touch with all the events and developments

²⁴⁵ Dana Diminescu, et al. *Digital Diasporas Atlas Exploration and Cartography of Diasporas in Digital Networks* (Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 2011).

taking place in their home country. Unfortunately such Palestinian and Arab media outlets still lack the elements of attraction and tactics, through which they could gain the attention of the Western media consumers, and introduce them to the challenges and hardships experienced by Palestinians and Arabs.

There are also various channels and radio stations operating under the auspices of Christian religious bodies, most importantly the websites of the Catholic Center for Studies and Media in Jordan, Tele Lumiere and Noursat channel in Lebanon, and Christian Media Center in Jerusalem. Although these channels and websites are broadcasted from different regions, they still convey to the world, using different languages, the message and news of the Eastern Christians. Knowing that this message is not limited only in religious media, but had also a significant role in conveying the truth about what is going on at the Eastern Countries and the hardship people undergo including Christians. The church has an audible and credible voice in the Western world, thus we could say that through its websites, radio stations, and channels, the church assumes a religious and national role.

Many TV channels and radio stations were established by Palestinians in the diaspora. An example is Arab Talk Radio, created in San Francisco, by Jamal Dajani and Jess Ghannam, through which they provide an analysis of the Palestinian and Middle East news from an Arab perspective, and host many Arab key figures in all the different fields. Another example is the TV channel "Ro'ya", which was founded in Jordan, by the businessman Michel Al-Sayagh, as a Jordanian channel concerned with various Jordanian community issues, yet the channel broadcast a program called "Helwa Ya Balady: Beautiful is my country," where in each episode a Palestinian city, village, or town is introduced along with an interview conducted with its residents.

4.4 Internet does not cancelled geography and diaspora

Aouragh stresses that: "transnational online communications here did not erode the meaning of a Palestinian state, but reconfirmed it." (2011: 126) So, "Palestine Online", does not reduce Palestinian nationalism, but rather strengthens a specific "anti-colonial nationalism online" (2011: 111).

Creating online networks does not end the actual geographical distance, rather it is a kind of reshaping of geographical barriers by linking diasporic Palestinian communities together, not only with the centre (the home country), but also with the peripheries. The dispersion and scattering which Palestinians have endured have contributed in the disintegration of the Palestinian identity, and the construction and reconstruction of the same. It's clear that such online networks have assumed a key role in creating social connections between Palestinians in the diaspora and those in the native country, despite the feebleness of the center (the occupied Palestinian territories), since most of those in the diaspora are unable to access it.

All of the TV channels, radio stations, and family sites online and native village/city pages online connect Palestinians throughout the diaspora. What's more online media have globalized the Question of Palestine with all its facets, which leads to an increase in activists and supporters.

Accordingly, the internet is considered an effective means to connect Palestinian communities in the diaspora without requiring direct access to the homeland, but it is characterized as both an exclusive and inclusive means at the same time. It is exclusive in that not all Palestinians in the diaspora have access to internet services yet or they are able to use it. It is inclusive through its many different networks, making it is possible to connect communities in the diaspora with the country of origin.

4.5 Conclusion

There are several kinds of networks connecting Palestinian diaspora to the country of origin. The oldest are the village and city clubs, which have connected diaspora emigrants descending from the same town and expanded to become transnational. Such clubs have played an obvious role through their activities on the identity, social or even economic level. Following intensive Palestinian political migration to Jordan over the period 1948-67, village and city clubs have expanded across a geographical area that is larger than its counterpart in the US. This means such clubs across Jordan outnumber their counterparts in the US. This large number could indicate the fragmentation of the Palestinian community in Jordan.

There are diverse institutions across the US, including cultural, women-centred and political institutions. Palestinian immigrants have engaged into such institutions and interacted with their programs. That is because they are allowed more freedom to express their opinions and practice their activities more than their counterparts in Jordan. In contrast, immigrants' activities in Jordan have been restricted to cultural institutions as well as city and village clubs. This indicates that social, familial, and tribal relations are still dominant in Jordan and continue to determine the relationships between the Palestinian community and the Jordanian society.

Meanwhile, electronic networks are the most advanced networks connecting the diaspora to the country of origin. They are accessible to nearly everyone and ever-expanding. Despite these advantages, electronic networks cannot cancel the diaspora status. Although the sense of diaspora has become mainly "physical" as a result of accessibility to the internet, it still remains "geographic."

Examining the form of investments—financial remittances and grants among others—economic networks are generally weak. However, the volume of investments made by Palestinians in Jordan was larger than investments in the US for two reasons. First, the economic relationship between Jordan and Palestine had started long before the *Nakba* and Palestinians' refugee status. Second, the close geographical proximity of Jordan, coupled with the territorial contiguity of both banks of the Jordan River encouraged such investments. In contrast, Palestinian immigrants in the US started to invest in their country of origin following the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has served as a political body for channelling investments. Such investments have been hindered by the long distance between the US and Palestine and the risks arising from the unstable political situation.

Palestinian immigrants cross transnational borders for social reasons, most importantly visiting their parents and relatives in their country of origin. This process was subject to policy reasons. As a result of being compelled to take Jordanian citizenship (forcibly naturalized), Palestinian refugees in Jordan are required to apply to the Israeli embassy to ask to visit their homeland. In contrast, Palestinian immigrants in the US can generally travel to their homeland, but some are denied entry due to Israeli security procedures at airports. Most importantly, as a result of the post-*Nakba* political changes in Palestine, a significant part of historical Palestine has been

appropriated (severed) to become a homeland for another people. This means that Palestinian immigrants and refugees who were forcibly displaced from this part no longer have a homeland in the political sense of the word.

Chapter Five

Cold Polices and Hot Identities: The Experience of Being Palestinian in the Diaspora

Section I: Inter-Palestinian Marriage as Strategy to Preserve Heritage and Cultural Identity

Section II: Engagement in Political Life in the Diaspora Influenced by the Palestinian Situation

Section III: Transition in the Action Approach of Churches

Section IV: "When I'm Here, I Belong to Here. When I'm There, I Belong to There." Migrants Express their Affiliations

1. Inter-Palestinian marriage as strategy to preserve heritage and cultural identity

1.1 Introduction

Life in the diaspora makes it incumbent upon migrants to re-shape their identities and build their individuals. This means the identity of migrants undergoes hybridization and alteration due to the fact that migrants live and interact with their new societies. The process of hybridization and alteration takes places in a manner that arguably impacts the methods and practices through which migrants express their identity. However, this process hardly can impact the roots of migrants' identity.

The formation of a migrant's identity is based on two types of relations: migrant's relations with the hosting society and their relations with members of his migrant community. A migrant maintains relations with the hosting society, and these relations are occasionally classified as taking the form of adaptation, integration, detachment, or assimilation. Furthermore, a migrant maintains relations with members of their migrant community living in proximity in the same country of immigration or in the country of origin.²⁴⁶ This means that the extent to which emigrants maintain or alter their identities depend on the degree of their interaction with the hosting society and the extent to which they maintain their cultural identity.²⁴⁷

The decision to leave the country of origin usually results in detachment from familial, social, and cultural practices due to an emigrant's separation from their family members and isolation from their homeland.²⁴⁸ This means a new process of acculturation and adaptation occurs in host countries. This process enables migrants to adopt new strategies in order to protect their identity in the host countries.

²⁴⁶ Linda Basch et al. *Nations unbound: Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and de-territorialized nation-states* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994).

²⁴⁷ John W. Berry, "Intercultural relations in plural societies," *Canadian Psychology* 40, no.1 (1999): 12-21.

²⁴⁸ C. Suárez-Orozco, J. Louie, & I. Todorova, "Making up for lost time: The experience of separation and reunification among immigrant families," *Family Process* 41, no.4 (2002): 625-643.

This section focuses on Palestinian immigrants marrying other Palestinian immigrants as a strategy to rebuild their families in the diaspora and maintain their identity. Having parents with the same background and race helps families in the diaspora eliminate conflicts with their children in relation to having a robust ethnic identity and the necessity of integration with the host society. It also helps them attain the highest level of adaptation and balance in the diaspora. Therefore, the so-called cultural adaptation (or acculturation) and its relation to identity should be first and foremost addressed.

1.2 Acculturation, a mean for integration and maintaining identities

Upon their arrival, immigrants begin their process of systematic, albeit difficult, adaptation to the host country. Through this process, they have to accept the ideals, values, and behaviours of the hosting culture. They also have to maintain the ideals, values, and beliefs of their original culture.²⁴⁹ This plunges immigrants into a state of internal and external conflict, resulting in changes in immigrants' culture and identity.²⁵⁰

Despite their focus on the past, an immigrant's identity and origin are a process that is never completed and logged in contingency²⁵¹ as a result to society-based developments as well as the changes induced by and impacts that globalization, technological revolution, and cross-border migration have. An individual's identity is the result of interplay among the historical, political, social and cultural events experienced by their community in a certain place. As such, an individual (immigrant) could simultaneously have more than one identity.

This runs in conformity with Erikson's conceptualization (1968). Erikson conceptualized that identity is the result of a dynamic interplay between the individual and context, particularly the historical context. In other words, identity is a synthesis of personal, social, and cultural self-

²⁴⁹ Jean S. Phinney et al, "Ethnic identity, immigration, and well-being: An interactional perspective," *Journal of Social Issues* 57, no. 3 (2001): 493–510.

²⁵⁰ Sunil Bhatia & Anjali Ram, "Rethinking acculturation in relation to diasporic cultures and postcolonial identities," *Human Development* 44, no. 1 (2001): 1–18.

²⁵¹ Sturat Hall, "Introduction: Who needs identity?" in *Questions of cultural identity*, eds. Sturat Hall & Paul Du Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 1-17.

conceptions.²⁵² In this regard, the changes (or lack thereof) in an immigrants' ideals, values, and behaviours during the adaptation process have clear consequences on how immigrants form, revise, and maintain their identity through limitation, recycling, or taking an average location between the two cultures.

While acculturation means gradual shifting from original (traditional) values, and beliefs toward modern (Western) ones,²⁵³ identity is "deep-rooted." Identity is used as a "collective" term to represent the "self."²⁵⁴ In contrast, culture is a template characterizing the stereotypical qualities of different groups of people,²⁵⁵ including ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical, regional, cultural and political qualities. This carries the similarity, unity, and belonging. Put simply, the identity of a nation or people is achieved through culture that they experience in their political, the economic, educational, and social lives. It helps them acquire a collective national or ethnic identity. The components of such a culture and identity are language, religion, history, and heritage.

Accordingly, immigrants face a problem in terms of acculturation in the host societies, especially when the cultural gap between immigrant groups and host society is wide. In such a case, according to Robert Merton,²⁵⁶ immigrant groups prefer to detach themselves from the host society, maintain their original culture and avoid marriage with spouses from other immigrant groups. Other sociologists argue that intermarriage with citizens from the host society is a means for immigrants to integrate more easily. Such an intermarriage would also help immigrants learn the systems, norms, and values of the host society.

In related study, Meng and Meurs found that 35% of French male immigrants and 33% of French female immigrants intermarry, while less than 6% of Turkish women and 9% of Turkish men intermarry, and around 20% of immigrants from Africa intermarry. This means European

²⁵² Seth J. Schwartz, "The evolution of Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: A review and integration," *Identity* 1, no. 1(2001): 7–58.

²⁵³ L. Hunt, S. Schneider, & B. Comer, "Should "acculturation" be a variable in health research? A critical review of research on US Hispanics," *Social Science and Medicine* 59 (2004): 973–986.

²⁵⁴ Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, "Beyond identity," *Theory and Society* 29 (2000):1-47.

²⁵⁵ Sunil Bhatia & Anjali Ram, "Rethinking acculturation in relation to diasporic cultures and postcolonial identities," *Human Development* 44, no.1 (2001): 1–18.

²⁵⁶ Robert K. Merton, "Intermarriage and social structure: Fact and theory," *Psychiatry* 4, no. 3 (1941): 361–374.

immigrants have the highest probability of intermarriage (46% for males and 50% for females).²⁵⁷ However, in another study, inter-ethnic couples in American society (black male and white female) suffer from residential segregation²⁵⁸ and hate speech, if not overt violence.²⁵⁹ Fukuyama (2006) mentions that in contrast to American society, Europeans are also more familiar with the difficult problem related to the integration of immigrants, who are mostly Muslim, in the host society.²⁶⁰ Cross-ethnic marriage in the countries of immigration depend on two factors: an emigrant's original culture and the culture of the host society.

1.3 Ethnic marriages: A comparison between the parents and the filial generation

Traditional (consanguineous) marriage is one of the strategies to maintain identity. Before 1948, social relations in the Palestinian society were generally rural. They came in response to the need to organize land production among members of the extended family (*hamula*), maintain inter-individual cohesion to preserve familial property, maintain the family's work and organize land inheritance. The prerequisite was that a woman must marry to her paternal cousin. However, these social determinants diminished in the aftermath of the forceful displacement of Palestinians in 1948 and living in refugee camps and diaspora, and the subsequent loss of land. The motives of ownership, authority, and production were replaced by sustenance and the preservation of the identity of displaced social units.²⁶¹

While the older generation suffered from the displacement and diaspora shock, the next generation was born and raised in the diaspora, creating is a difference between the two generations

²⁵⁷ Xin Meng & Dominique Meurs, "Intermarriage, language, and economic assimilation process: A case study of France," *International Journal of Manpower* 30, no.1/2 (2009):127-144. See also: Gil S. Epstein& Renana L. Pomerantz, *Assimilation through marriage (Discussion Paper: IZA DP, no. 6831*. Institute for the Study of Labor, 2012).

²⁵⁸ Elizabeth F. Emens, "Intimate discrimination: The state's role in the accidents of sex and love," *Harvard Law Review* 122, no.5 (2009):1308–1402.

²⁵⁹ J. Glaser, J. Dixit & D. Green, "Studying hate crimes with the internet: What makes racists advocate racial violence?" *Journal of Social Issues* 58, no.1 (2002):177–193.

²⁶⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "Identity, immigration and liberal democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006): 5-20.

²⁶¹ Rima Hamami, *Women in the Palestinian society* (Institute of Palestinian Studies, 1994), 319-351. [In Arabic].

in terms of their opinion on marriage and spouse selection criteria. The findings of field work reveal the differences between both generations.

Table 4: Ethnic origin of Palestinian Christian couples and their married descendants in diaspora

Jordan	Parents	Filial	the US	Parents	Filial
Inter-Palestinian marriage: Palestinian or Palestinian roots (Jordanian born)	94.6%	73.3%	Inter-Palestinian marriage: Palestinian or Palestinian roots (American born)	92.3%	63.8%
Inter-marriage with Arabs: Palestinian with Jordanian Palestinian with Arab	3.6% -	11.7% 8.3%	Inter-marriage with Arabs: Palestinian with Arab	5.6%	6.8%
Marriage with non-Arabs: Palestinian with non-Arab	1.8%	6.6%	Marriage with non-Arabs: Palestinian with non-Arab Palestinian with American	1.8% -	11% 19.4%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

1.3.1 Getting married to spouses with the same background: A continuous practice

Following in their parents' footsteps, Palestinians continued to intermarry with Palestinian spouses in the various countries of immigration, demonstrating strong social cohesion among Palestinians despite their state of dispersion in the diaspora. Starting new families in the diaspora could be considered an attempt by Palestinian immigrants to revive their original families or hometowns. It demonstrates more clearly an attempt to build a micro-society similar to the society that existed in Palestinian immigrants' hometowns before immigration or forceful displacement. At the same time, Palestinian immigrants' marriages to other Palestinians is a means to preserve their indigenous culture and heritage as the pillar of the Palestinian identity that could be passed down and taught to the next generation. M. A. (who immigrated with her family from Jifna to the US, is married to a Palestinian immigrant) remarks:

"I chose to marry a Palestinian man because it was always instilled in me by my parents that in order for our culture to continue, we must marry our own kind. They always said they would be reassured on the man if we knew his family and his background, and if I didn't marry a Palestinian Christian it would be hard for them to protect me. So it's always

been what I wanted because it's what I was taught was the "right" and "safe" way ... It's a beautifully rich culture that we have and I enjoy passing along what I can. Marrying a Palestinian man made it easy for me to continue to understand our culture, politics, values and what's important is speaking the same language."

M. Z. (who was uprooted from Lidd and raised in Jordan and then immigrated to the US, married a US-born Palestinian woman). He remarks: "We are very proud of our heritage. Marrying a woman that understands it makes it easy to pass it on to our children. The ability to speak the language and understanding the culture is the key."

The same applies to Palestinians across the Arab countries, especially Jordan. Despite sharing the same culture, especially language and religion with their host Arab countries, Palestinians continued to intermarry with one another. M.S. (an immigrant who originally from Jerusalem, is based in Jordan, and married a Palestinian immigrant spouse) remarks:

"Palestinians in Jordan mostly prefer to intermarry with Palestinian spouses for several reasons, including the preservation of their identity, but most importantly that the spouses achieve harmony with one another. Palestinian customs and customs are different from Jordan's and many Palestinian-Jordanian intermarriages have failed due to parents' intervention to help solve spousal disagreements."

F. O. (an immigrant based in Jordan who is from Aboud, married to a Palestinian who was born in Jordan), remarks:

"In my opinion, although Arab peoples are culturally, intellectually, and socially close, each Arabic people has a special nature. This is the result of the differences among Arab peoples in terms of history and conditions they experienced. Therefore, I selected my spouse based on our intellectual, social, and cultural similarities."

Z. Kh. (a Jordanian-born, comes originally from Aboud village, and his wife is Palestinian who was also born in Jordan), says in this regard:

"Getting married to a Palestinian girl might signal that a husband shares much more concepts and ideas with his wife or her parents. I believe that given the reality my children

and I live today and will continue to live, it is important to preserve of original [Palestinian] identity."

Some might explain this behaviour by the sense of belonging to a specific ethnic identity. Belonging to an ethnic category implies having a certain kind of person (personality) and embracing that basic identity. Though the naïve assumption that each tribe and people has maintained its culture through a bellicose ignorance of its neighbours is no longer entertained, the simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity persists, however anthropological studies confirm the existence of ethnic boundaries of each group.

It is clear that boundaries persist despite a flow of people across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories. Second, one finds that stable, persisting and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries and frequently precisely based on the dichotomized ethnic statuses. In other words, ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built. Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence.²⁶²

This makes it possible to understand one's final form of boundary maintenance whereby cultural units and boundaries persist. Ethnic boundary maintenance also entails situations of social contact between persons of different cultures: ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked difference in behaviour.²⁶³ Accordingly, interracial couples tend to marry because of four important facts: shared common interests, the attractiveness of the partner, shared similar entertainment interests, and socioeconomic similarity. Factors of racial selection tend to be less important in selecting an interracial partner for marriage than non-racial factors (Lewis, Yancey &

²⁶² Barth Fridrek, *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference* (Waveland Press, 1998).

²⁶³ Barth Fridrek, *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, 1998, *Ibid.*

Bletzer 1997). In other words, as it is the case with other couples, interracial married couples are typically attracted to each other based on similarities rather than differences.²⁶⁴

1.3.2 High divorce rate in interethnic marriages

Few first-generation immigrants have married non-Arabs. In contrast, more of their children have more opted to marry non-Arabs. However, the rates remain relatively small, despite the fact that unlike Muslims, who have reservations on such intermarriages; it is religiously allowed for Palestinian Christians to marry foreign nationals.

A total of eight intermarriages in this research ended in divorce due to several reasons, including spousal differences in terms of cultural origins. Of those eight divorces, the husbands were Palestinian, and the wife was not Palestinian, or was a Palestinian who was raised in the US diaspora. A. A. (an immigrant from Ramallah, lives in US) he remarks about his experience:

"My first marriage was with an American-born Palestinian. We had our differences and my marriage with her didn't work out. Some of the differences were cultural differences; I was born and raised in Palestine and she was born and raised in the US. I found it easier and closer for mutual understanding to marry from the same environment, so my [current] wife, now, was born and raised in Palestine."

Successful intermarriages in the US that were reported for this research involved Latino, Mexican, and Filipino male immigrants who married Palestinian women. It is believed that these intermarriages have succeeded because both spouses are immigrants who suffered discrimination, difficult integration and acculturation, albeit at different rates. Palestinian intermarriages in the Jordanian society involved a number of Palestinian women who relocated to Europe after getting married. The reason is that Palestinian women considered intermarriage an opportunity for them to change and find a way out of the restrictive Middle Eastern culture.

Palestinian families have taken clear position on such intermarriages. Despite their occasional encouragement, Palestinian families mostly intervened to prevent or discourage such

²⁶⁴ Lewis, R., Jr.; Yancey, G.; and Bletzer, S. S, "Racial and Non-racial Factors that Influence Spouse Choice in Black/White Marriages," *Journal of Black Studies* 28 (1997):60–78.

intermarriages, fearing future divorce. A. K. (an immigrant in the US, originally from Birzeit), remarks:

"My children were born in the US. They largely acquired the US culture and customs. However, when they grew to a marriageable age, I made it clear to them that intermarriages with foreign women might result in future problems. I recommended that they get marry to women with Palestinian or Arab origins. In the case of matrimonial problems and if the woman comes from an Arab or Palestinian descent [origin], we, the parents, can intervene and help solve the problems. In contrast, we, the parents, cannot intervene to solve matrimonial problems in the case of intermarriages with foreign nationals in line with the US and foreign culture. My son is married to a woman who comes from a Syrian origin."

Consequently, some of the difficulties experienced by interracial couples are unique and a direct result of interracial experience. The myths that surround interracial couples can also be stumbling blocks to a healthy marriage, as this was confirmed by Richard Watts and Richard Henriksen (1999) about the interracial marriages Caucasian females with black. It found that problems and difficulties are also experienced because of the mythical messages received from the Caucasian culture. The problems faced by couples involved in black-Caucasian unions are also experienced by those involved in other interracial unions. However, many couples state that the reasons they got married are not that much different than same-race couples.²⁶⁵

1.3.3 Intermarriages with Arabs promoted by shared culture (race)

Anna Y. Chan and Elaine Wethington (1998) identified several factors that could facilitate resilience in interracial marriages. First, interracial marriages tend to be more stable and involve fewer conflicts than other types of interracial relationships. Second, whereas interracial couples and families face unique challenges, they tend to develop advanced coping and conflict-resolution styles. Third, given that well- functioning interracial couples often have higher levels of education, they tend to have superior resources for coping with the problems they encounter. Finally,

²⁶⁵ Richard Watts & Richard Henriksen, "Perceptions of a White Female in an Interracial Marriage," *The Family Journal: Counselling and Therapy for Couples and Families* 7 (1999): 68–70.

interracial couples tend to build support networks of like-minded people and build strong bonds with each other as a means to overcome adversity.²⁶⁶

Accordingly, Some Palestinian first-generation immigrants or their children intermarried with other Arabs as they were motivated by their shared culture and language. It is noticeable that such intermarriages were restricted in the Arab region of Asia, particularly Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Arab countries in this region are more similar culturally than they are to African Arab countries. B. F. (Palestinian born in Jordan) remarks: "My marriage to a Jordanian woman had a minor impact on my Palestinian identity. However, I have always maintained with pride that I am Jordanian with Palestinian origin and my children feel and share with me the same pride."

1.4 Transnational marriage as an opportunity for women migration

Having presented the ethnic origins of spouses rebuilding Palestinian families in the Diaspora, it is necessary to address the four methods through which spouses have managed to start families in the Diaspora.

Table 5: Methods of Palestinian Christian immigrants' marriage

Method of creating the family in the Palestinian diaspora	Jordan	The US
husband, wife, and children immigrated together	3.5%	26.4%
husband immigrated, then his wife and children followed him	-	3.9%
man immigrated, returned to get married, immigrated with wife	18.2%	26.4%
man or woman got married in the diaspora	78.2%	43.3%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

The table shows that regardless of migration destinations, intermarriage is still the leading cause of Palestinian women's immigration. Palestinian women immigrated to a remote and culturally different country of immigration (the US) or a neighbouring and culturally close country

²⁶⁶ Anna Chan & Elaine Wethington, "Factors Promoting Marital Resilience among Interracial Couples," in *Resiliency in Ethnic Minority Families. Volume 1: Native and Immigrant American Families*, eds. H.I. McCubbin, E.A.Thompson, A.I. Thompson, & J.E. Fromer (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1998), 71- 87.

of immigration (Jordan) for the same reason. Consequently, the immigration of Palestinian women via marriage has caused the number of Palestinian women in the diaspora to increase.

Regarding cross-national-border marriage (represented in method three), women did not initially accept such intermarriages out of their individual choices. They did so due to the prospects that they would enjoy a better life abroad and help their families who remain in the country of origin. Palestinian woman chose to intermarry more recently did so because it provided them with the opportunity to fulfil their personal and career ambitions that they had not been able to fulfil in their country of origin.

S. S. (who immigrated from Aboud to Jordan to marry) responded to a question about the reason for her intermarriage:

"Intermarriage is a type of change. It provides an opportunity to find a way out of the prevailing harsh political, security, and economic conditions in the country of origin. Jordan is safe for living. It provides much more employment opportunities and a bright future for children."

As R. J. (an immigrated from Aboud to the US for the purpose of intermarriage) responded to a question about the reason for her immigration, she notes:

"After I got acquainted with my future spouse, I found out that in contrast to young men in the US, he has high morals. I have also found that his family is reputable and shares the same customs as we do. Had he not had high morals and his family had not been as such, I would not have accepted to get married to him."

In conclusion, male Palestinian immigrants' determination to marry Palestinian women, especially those who were raised in the country of origin and are familiar with Palestinian culture, is the most important pillar of building Palestinian families. Halim Barakat (1985: 157) argues that, "Family is the dominant institution through which persons and groups inherit religious, social class, and cultural identities."²⁶⁷ Barakat adds (1985: 157): "Marriage within the same lineage, sect,

²⁶⁷ Halim Barakat, "The Arab family and the challenges of social transformation," in *Women and the family in the Middle East*, ed. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (Austin: University of Texas, 1985), 27-48.

community, group, village, and/or neighbourhood"²⁶⁸ reflects a strong kinship solidarity. This corresponds with the Indian nationalist rhetoric, which consider the woman to be the pure representation of the nation, the domain of home, family, spirituality, and the genuine Indian, by preserving the culture and tradition.²⁶⁹

The selection of a future wife has been important as women play a greater role than husbands in raising children. This explains why many male Palestinian migrants choose to travel to the country of origin in order to get married to a Palestinian woman who is still in the homeland. This runs in line with a study conducted by Louise Cainkar (1988) about Muslim Palestinian women in Chicago. The study concludes women are the principal protectors and transmitters of Palestinian culture and are often deliberately kept apart from the American mainstream.²⁷⁰ In another study, Jardim (2008) found that the "coming and going" of Palestinian wives who reside or come from other localities to settle in the Brazilian city of Chui is part of an ideological debate about cultural integrity and authenticity in the post-colonial era, where women were converted into powerful identity symbols.²⁷¹ Accordingly, Palestinian woman could be considered the "preservers" of "Arab culture"²⁷² and "Eastern Christianity"²⁷³.

²⁶⁸ Halim Barakat, "The Arab family and the challenges of social transformation," 1985, *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Radhakrishnan Rajagopalan, "Nationalism, gender, and the narrative of identity" in *Nationalism and sexuality*, eds. Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger (New York: Routledge, 1992), 77-95.

²⁷⁰ Lousie Cainkar, *Palestinian women in the United States: Coping with tradition, change, and alienation* (Northwestern University, 1988).

²⁷¹ Denise F. Jardim, *Women fly with their husbands: Palestinian diaspora and gender relations*. (*Horiz. Antropol. vol.4 no.se Porto Alegre*, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul – Brazil, 2008).

²⁷² The Arab culture refers to the culture identity in terms of: music, film, poetry, language, food, family ties, and the closeness of people.

²⁷³ In general terms, Eastern Christianity can be described as comprising four families of churches: the Assyrian Church of the East, the Eastern Orthodox Churches, Oriental Orthodoxy, and the Eastern Catholic Churches. The Eastern churches each belong to one of several liturgical families: Alexandrian Rite, Antiochene Rite, West Syrian Rite, Armenian Rite, Byzantine Rite, and East Syrian Rite.

2. Engagement in political life in the Diaspora influenced by the Palestinian situation

2.1 Introduction

Naturalization is the first assimilation policy adopted by diaspora societies in order to integrate into the civil and political life of the larger society. Political integration enables ethnic and religious groups to take action, end their state of dispersion and isolation, and join government institutions, political parties, and lobbyists.

Many researchers focus on the fact that immigrants' understanding of the culture of the host country is the first requirement for their integration. In order for immigrants to have such an understanding, they should acquire the host country's language and mobilize on the social and economic levels. This culminates in their sense of belonging to the host country. However, there is still a lot of controversy over whether the assimilation of immigrants is more important than their integration, or the opposite. Brubaker (2001: 534) argues that:

"Although the concept of "assimilation" is "discredited" and "analytically disreputable," it remains useful to analyse neighbouring communities' enduring differences. Multiculturalists are more concerned about the space afforded for difference between neighbouring communities, and the ways that the local state and native population adapt to the presence and needs of newcomers." ²⁷⁴

This means that even though immigrants are integrated and assimilated into the host country, the criteria of integration and assimilation are complicated by the dynamics in the host country. An example for such a case is the Muslim community in European states. Taylor (1994: 25) states:

"Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others. And so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people

²⁷⁴ Rogers Brubaker, "The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24, no. 4 (2001): 531-548.

or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves."²⁷⁵

Palestinian immigrants have been naturalized by the US and other Western countries. In contrast, Palestinian immigrants and refugees have not been naturalized by any Arab country except for Jordan. Naturalization (i.e. granting immigrants citizenship) is a legal obligation that should be accepted by host countries. In contrast to Palestinians across Lebanon and Syria, naturalization has served as the primary entry point to the Palestinian immigrants' integration into the society in the US and other Western countries and enabled them to acquire full rights as citizens.

This section seeks to explore the extent of Palestinian Christian immigrants' political participation in the United States and Jordan, including participation in political parties, elections, and parliaments. This begs the following questions: Has naturalization allowed immigrants to fully practice their political rights? Are there levels of naturalization and, consequently, degrees of actual citizenship? Has the extent of immigrants' political participation been affected by their religion, the host country's policies, or the political situation in the homeland? What is the nature of political parties to which Palestinian immigrants have affiliated? Have immigrants felt that they have acquired total citizenship as a result of being granted citizenship? This section is based on interviews with Palestinian Journalists, political analysts, members in parliament, and political candidates in Jordan and the US.

2.2 Large participation in transnational political parties

National parties used to organize the Palestinian community. They used to organize the relationships between the Palestinian community and governments of the countries of immigration, the diaspora and refugees. The national parties have arguably preserved Palestinian immigrants and refugees' unity, maintaining and reinforcing their patriotism. However, they have failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of Palestinian immigrants' membership in other political parties in host societies. Thus, the role of national parties was restricted to one-single-issue people, distorting the nature of the relationship between the Palestinian community and government

²⁷⁵ Charles Taylor, "The politics of recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1994), 25-74.

systems in host societies. Furthermore, national parties were fragmented and divided and they were affected by the relationships among main political parties in the country of origin.

Following the unification of the west and east banks of the Jordan River, capitalist representatives of economic sectors, Muslims and Christians alike, opted to integrate into the Jordanian political system. The remaining capitalist representatives, particularly Christians, continued their political activism as part of the national movement that they had launched in the late nineteenth century and joined by their Muslim counterparts during the British Mandate. In this context, Prince El-Hassan bin Talal said:

"This respect has been renewed and extended thanks to An-Nahda, which is the basis of Hashemite political thinking. The Nahda movement is ... a tradition to which Christians not only in Jordan but in other parts of the Fertile Crescent view with much admiration. The Nahda movement was very much a sharing of Arab Muslim and Christian identities in expressing a vision. The Ba'th have taken the slogan of "a nation with an eternal message," but it was very much an Arab Nahda slogan in the first place."²⁷⁶

Palestinian political parties continued to operate clandestinely until they restored their identity. Palestinians, including Christians, belonged to nationalist parties such as the Nassirite Socialist Party²⁷⁷ and the Socialist Ba'ath Party.²⁷⁸ Palestinians in general, and Christians in particular, belonged to leftist parties due to the "selection and differentiation" policies²⁷⁹ they

²⁷⁶ Prince El-Hassan bin Talal. "Jordanian Christians are fully integrated," *Middle East Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (2001): 82-87.

²⁷⁷ The Nassiliturgy Socialist Party is an Arab nationalist movement that emerged under Gamal Abdul Nasser, the second president of Egypt, who served from 1956 until his death in 1970. The party, named after Nasser, remained intact following his death. It adopted the same ideas advocated by Nasser, namely liberty, socialism, and unity. These ideas were also adopted by other Arab leftist socialist parties. They were based on the concept of nationalism that emerged following the collapse of the Ottoman state. CONFIRM THE NAME OF THE PARTY; I find no mention of "Nassiliturgy" online.

²⁷⁸ The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party was a political party founded in Syria in 1947 by Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Din al-Bitar and associates of Zaki al-Arsuzi. The party espoused Ba'athism as an ideology mixing Arab nationalist, pan-Arabism, and Arab socialist and anti-imperialist interests. Ba'athism calls for unification of the Arab world into a single state. Its motto, "Unity, Liberty, Socialism," refers to Arab unity, and freedom from non-Arab control and interference. The (Arab) Socialist Ba'ath Party was the ruling party in Syria from 1963 onwards. It also governed Iraq from 1968 under the leadership of Saddam Hussein until the fall of Hussein's regime following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the American and British coalition forces.

²⁷⁹ Yazid Y. Sayegh, *The social and economic origins of monarchy in Jordan* (Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1978), 60. [In Arabic].

experienced in Jordan. Subject to these policies, they were compelled to intensely engage in movements opposed to the Jordanian regime that operated under a Jordanian banner, such as the Jordanian branch of the Arab Nationalists Movement, the Jordanian branch of the Ba'ath Party, and the Jordanian Socialist Party. It seems that Palestinians' decision to belong to opposition parties was not motivated by their quest for Palestinian identity, but as a means to streamline the Jordanian regime.²⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Palestinians in the diaspora, particularly in neighbouring Arab countries, formed leftist parties, most importantly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah),²⁸¹ the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)²⁸² and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).²⁸³ These parties set up branches in the diaspora, culminating in the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO enabled the Palestinian resistance to move to Jordan and consider itself the responsible party for Palestinians. This was obvious in the duality of authority in 1970, which led to Black September, the eruption of military confrontation between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas, and the subsequent expulsion of Palestinian resistance from Jordan.

O.R. (who is a political columnist and analyst in the Jordanian daily newspaper, *Addustor* ("The Constitution")), said in this regard:

²⁸⁰ Sgaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan. 1949-1967* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1978), 18-23.

²⁸¹ The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) is a secular Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It was founded mainly by Yasser Arafat and associates in 1959. Arafat helped found and lead the Palestine Students Federation at Cairo University. He also headed the Palestine Students Federation in Beirut with his associates Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, and Khaled Yashrut. The Fatah movement became the dominant force in Palestinian politics after the Six-Day War in 1967. It joined the PLO in 1967. It was immediately allocated 33 of 105 seats in the PLO Executive Committee.

²⁸² The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a secular Palestinian Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary socialist organization founded in 1967. It was established by the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), led by George Habash, a Palestinian Christian from Lidd, in 1953. The PFLP joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the umbrella organization of the Palestinian national movement, in 1968. It became the second-largest faction after Yasser Arafat's Fatah. It has rejected the Oslo Accords in favour of a bi-national solution.

²⁸³ The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) is a Marxist faction that is influenced by communism. It emerged as a result of the intellectual breakaway between Marxists and nationalists in the PFLP in 1969. Since establishment, DFLP has been led by Nayef Hawatmeh, a member of a Catholic Christian family. In contrast to PFLP, which still advocates the establishment of a Palestinian state on the complete land of historic Palestine where all people live as equal citizens, DFLP has accepted the idea of establishing the Palestinian state on any part of Palestine.

"As the battle of Karameh²⁸⁴ erupted, the Palestinian identity hysterically recovered its track and the aforementioned political parties joined the PLO. However, these parties lacked any ample opportunity to take action. In the aftermath of the Black September confrontation of 1970, they were restricted and compelled to integrate into the Jordanian society."

Following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank, which aimed to "Jordanize" Palestinians in Jordan in 1988, the Palestinian elite started to decline and felt lost. However, following the elections in 1989, Palestinians re-joined political parties. Despite having new names, these parties emanated from previous leftist parties, namely the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, Jordanian People's Democratic Party (HASHD) and Jordanian Communist Party. This resulted in the creation of centrist parties of Palestinian origins, including the Reform and Renewal Party (Hasad), Al-Resalah Party, and Al-Hayat Jordanian Party. These parties, among others, were subject to the Law on the Organization of Parties in Jordan. The law stipulated that each political party shall officially register with the Jordanian government. The law also stipulates that if any political party breaches certain terms, it shall be disbanded. Furthermore, the Jordanian government has frequently closed down Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters and disbanded some political parties that did not meet certain terms.

The United States used to accept immigrants in the late nineteenth century based on two conditions. First, immigrants had to have white skin colour. Second, they had to profess Christianity. Palestinian and Arab immigrants' had a skin colour that was classified as "ranging from"²⁸⁵ black to white. They met the second condition, which was implied, as they were mostly Christians. This implies that Palestinian immigrants fell within the "desired category." Nevertheless, Hitti (1923) indicated that the American political stream rejected the participation of Syrians in politics since it was not willing to accept their real assimilation.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ The battle of Karameh erupted on 21 March 1968. Israeli occupation forces (IOF) attempted to occupy the Jordan River for what Israel deemed as strategic reasons. IOF crossed the river and attacked from several bridges with an intensive air cover. They were confronted with the combined forces of the Jordanian army and Palestinian resistance fighters, known as Fedayeen, along the battlefield. They were engaged in a fierce fighting with the Jordanian army and Fedayeen and were eventually forced to completely withdraw from the battlefield, suffering casualties and losses.

²⁸⁵ Alixa Naff, *Becoming American: The early Arab immigrant experience* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1985).

²⁸⁶ Philip Hitti, *The Syrians in America* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923).

Palestinian and Syrian intellectuals established nationalist societies with the purpose of providing assistance to their families and people in their country of origin. For example, the National Palestinian League was formed in 1921. It had two branches in New York and Washington chaired by Fouad I. Shatara and Frank G. Sakran, respectively. However, it did not last long. The Palestine (Nationalist) Renaissance Society is a second example for such nationalist societies. It was the first Arab political society that aimed to defend Arab Palestine.²⁸⁷

In the aftermath of the wars in 1948 and 1967, Palestinian immigrants to the United States were more aware of and affected by the results of the Arab-Israeli wars, especially that the US played a negative role and did not stand by the Palestinian people's right to independence and self-determination. As a result of the role of the US in waging the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars, Arab and Palestinian immigrants were compelled to engage in US politics.²⁸⁸ Suleiman (1994) notes that "the 1967 Arab–Israeli war marked Arab immigrants' political engagement in the United States based on their involvement with issues related to their ethnic community and homelands."²⁸⁹ Accordingly, many of the immigrants were active in building community networks and organizing gatherings in order to celebrate and preserve national and religious events. Mosques and churches made efforts to teach the younger generations the Arabic language, the tenets of Islam for Muslims, and the Eastern rites for Christians.²⁹⁰ That has strengthened transnational ties in the Arab American community more so than any other event. The Palestinian cause became a central concern in the ideological and identity questions of Arabs and Arab Americans.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian political parties became active in the US. For example, PFLP and DFLP set up branches across the US. They maintained direct relationships with counterpart parties in Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan. During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Black September confrontation, some Palestinian political activists travelled from the US to Lebanon in order to take part in or closely monitor the war. This indicates that Palestinian

²⁸⁷ Jamal Adawi, *Palestinian migration to America from the end of nineteenth century until 1945* (Nazareth: Popular Printing House, 1994), 152-174. [In Arabic].

²⁸⁸ Gregory Orfalea, *The Arab Americans: A History* (Olive Branch Press, 2006).

²⁸⁹ Michael Suleiman, *The Arabs in the mind of America* (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1998).

²⁹⁰ Manzar Foroohar, "Palestinians in Central America: From temporary emigrants to a permanent diaspora," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 40, no.3 (2011): 6-22.

political activity remained connected to Palestinian political parties in the country of origin until signing the Oslo Accords in 1993.

Palestinians experienced delays in terms of their political activity as part of political parties in the US. They allied themselves with political parties supporting the Palestinian cause, the first of which was the Communist party. However, the Communist party was effectively weak in contrast to the major Republican and Democratic parties. In 1984, Jesse Jackson²⁹¹ was nominated the Democratic presidential candidate. He introduced the National Rainbow Coalition,²⁹² which supported the existence of minorities, including Arab and black minorities in the US. So, Palestinians and Arab immigrants engaged in the American policy during the period 1984-1988; however, their engagement was low. Their engagement became decreased further following the first *Intifada*, which diverted Palestinian immigrants' attention to their homeland.

The signing of the Oslo Accords was the first step that halted the activity of Palestinian political parties in the US. In this regard, S. B. (Al-Shabaka Policy Advisor, and co-editor of *Homeland: Oral History of Palestine and Palestinians*) remarked:

"The Oslo Accords were the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian community, dividing it into two parts. As a result of the Accords, Palestinian political parties lacked any vision of the future and their work was brought to a halt. Some of these parties thought the Accords would bring the Israeli occupation to an end and would serve as a serious step toward future Palestinian statehood. In contrast, other parties considered the Accords as an affliction since Palestinians gave up their land."

The September 11 attacks in 2001 in New York were the second blow that Palestinian political parties suffered. Following the attacks, the Arab and Palestinian community in the US was gripped with fear. The US war against Iraq in 2003 that gave rise to Islamophobia added insult to

²⁹¹ Jesse Jackson is an American civil rights activist, Baptist minister, and politician. He was a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984 and 1988. He served as senator for the District of Columbia from 1991 to 1997.

²⁹² National Rainbow Coalition was a political organization that grew out of Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign that aimed to demand social programs, voting rights, and affirmative action for all groups that had been neglected by Reaganomics. At the Democratic National Convention on 18 July 1984, in San Francisco, California, Jackson called for Arab Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, youth, disabled veterans, small farmers, lesbians and gays to join with African Americans and Jewish Americans for political purposes.

injury. Following the war, Arab clubs across the US became less active and were compelled to become socially active rather than politically active.

Despite being labelled as "terrorists" following the September 11th attacks, Arabs, including Palestinians, became more aware of the importance of affiliation to and real participation in the American society. The attacks affected Arab and Palestinian immigrants' existence, interests, and feelings, and compelled them to engage in US politics through voting and running for elections. They became more visible actors politically, and more interested in political participation,²⁹³ although anti-Arab racism and systematic discrimination followed.²⁹⁴ Cainkar (2003:1) describes that:

"The U.S. Government's domestic legislative, administrative, and judicial measures implemented after September 11th have included mass arrests, secret and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of "material witnesses," closed hearings and use of secret evidence, government eavesdropping on attorney client conversations, FBI home and work visits, wiretapping, seizures of property, removals of aliens with technical visa violations, and mandatory special registration."²⁹⁵

In addition, many humanitarian organizations, Muslim charities, and Arab or Muslim small businesses were threatened or shut down by the FBI.

2.3 Restrictions on voting, running for elections and membership in parliament

In the first Jordanian general elections in 1956, the parliament of Jordan took into consideration that all religious groups and political parties would be represented.²⁹⁶ King Hussein

²⁹³ Dalia Abdelhady, "Beyond home/host networks: Forms of solidarity among Lebanese immigrants in a global era," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 13, no.3 (2006): 427–453.

²⁹⁴ Nadine Naber, "Introduction: Arab Americans and U.S. racial formations," in *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From invisible citizens to visible subjects*, eds. A. Jamal & N. Naber (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 2008), 1–45.

²⁹⁵ Louise Cainkar, "Targeting Muslims, at Ashcroft's discretion," *Middle East report online* (14 March 2003). Retrieved from: <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031403>.

²⁹⁶ The Parliament of Jordan is the bicameral Jordanian national assembly. Established by Jordan's 1952 constitution, the legislature consists of two houses: the Senate (*Majlis Al-Aayan*) and the House of Representatives (*Majlis Al-*

(1952-1999) entrusted Suleiman al-Nabulsi, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, with the formation of the government. Yacoub Zaiadeen was the representative of Jerusalem to the parliament.²⁹⁷ However, a year later, the government was disbanded as a result of political conditions in the region.

Since the establishment of the Jordanian parliament, three Muslim Palestinians have assumed the position of the Prime Minister. They were Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda from Akka, and Ibrahim Hashem and Taher al-Masri, both from Nablus. On the ministerial level, many Palestinian Christians held ministerial portfolios, including some who did more than once. Examples of such Palestinian Christians are Emil Andoni al-Ghori from Jerusalem, Hanna Salim Odeh from Jifna, Anastas Hanania from Jerusalem, Moussa Nasser from Birzeit, Daoud Hanania from Jerusalem, Anton Atallah from Taybeh, Wadi Da'mas from Beit Jala, and Admon Rock from Jaffa.

Following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank,²⁹⁸ rules of the political game changed. Christians have come to be represented in nine parliamentary seats. However, the law does not require that Christian members of parliament have Palestinian origins. Accordingly, all Christian's ministers or members of parliament descended from Jordanian origins in some rounds of elections. For instance, Tariq Khoury and Odeh Qawwas, were Christian members in the House of Representatives. O. Q. (who was born in Jordan to a Palestinian family that immigrated from Jifna) shared his experience:

Nuwaab). Since the establishment of the parliament, various religious groups are represented in the House of Representatives. The law or electoral system specifies the number of seats reserved for each religious group. The number of seats reserved for Christians have ranged from four seats in 1947 to 11 seats in the parliament that represented the west and east banks of the Jordan River [during Jordan's annexation of the West Bank]; six seats were reserved for Christians in the East Bank and the others were reserved for Christians in the West Bank. Since 1989, a total of nine seats are reserved for Christians in the House of Representatives.

²⁹⁷ Zaiadeen from Karak Governorate. After completing his degree, Zaiadeen moved to Jerusalem where he worked as a surgeon. He was elected to the Jordanian House of Representatives for Jerusalem in 1956. He served as Secretary General of the Jordanian Communist Party.

²⁹⁸ In July 1988, King Hussein announced the cessation development program for the West Bank, explaining that the aim of this move is to allow the PLO to take more responsibility for these territories. He announced the severance of all legal and administrative ties with the West Bank, except for the Jordanian sponsorship of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. This decision was made with the goal of helping the Palestinian people establish their own independent state.

"In the first general elections following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1989,²⁹⁹ I was elected for the Christian seat of the second and third circles. I was the first Orthodox Christian to hold such a seat. I was re-elected in 2003. This time, I won many votes. During my term at the House of Representatives, I attempted to reach political consensus to establish a democratic party on social and cultural bases. Besides, I attempted to raise some issues, but I did not achieve a lot as a result of provisional laws."

In the recent general elections in September 2016, candidates organized partisan, tribal, independent, or coalition lists. Tariq Khoury won the Christian seat for Al-Zarqa constituency as part of Al-Aqsa list. He is the only Christian of Palestinian origin to win a parliamentary seat in this round of elections.

O. R. (who is a political columnist and analyst in the Jordanian daily newspaper, *Addustor* "The Constitution"), remarked on the percentage of participation in Jordanian elections:

"I believe that 90% of Jordanians in contrast to 15% of Palestinians cast their ballots. In many cases, a Jordanian candidate is elected to hold a Palestinian seat. This highlights the mentality of the search for a "guarantee," a person who would guarantee business processes of other people in official departments and ministries. This is indicative of the bad state-citizen relation. Accordingly, Palestinians' poor participation in elections is perceived as indicative of the fact that they lack a sense of full citizenship and subsequently largely fail to integrate into the Jordanian society."

An analysis of poor participation in elections show that political parties have poor representation in the parliament. This poor representation is the result of political parties' lack of credibility and effectiveness, citizens' reluctance to participate in elections, and the tribal nationalistic nature of voting among Jordanians.³⁰⁰ In addition, policies were noted on the individual and government institutional level that aimed to curtail the representation of Palestinian

²⁹⁹ Christians hold nine parliamentary seats representing the following constituencies: one seat for Amman, Al-Zarqa, Irbid, and Ajloun, and two seats for al-Salt constituency and al-Karak. If a Christian woman runs for elections, she should choose whether she wants to do so as a Christian or a woman. In contrast, a Muslim woman runs for elections and compete for general seats and women-reserved seats.

³⁰⁰ An opinion poll, *The status of democracy in Jordan* (The University of Jordan: Center for Strategic Studies, 2011). [In Arabic].

citizens and weaken their political presence. It is precisely for this reason that the representation of Jordanians hailing from Palestinian origins in the parliament of Jordan (the Senate "Majlias Al-Aayan" and the House of Representatives "Majlis Al-Nuwaab") ranged from 15%-20% from 1989 to 2010.³⁰¹

Regarding Arab, Palestinian, and Christian participation in US elections, very few Palestinians in general have assumed senior political positions, whether as congressmen or mayors, in the US society. This is related to several factors, including that Palestinian immigrants have belonged to Palestinian political parties much more than they belonged to US political parties, US society's discrimination against the Arab community as a whole, and the American government's position on the Palestinian cause in particular.

Nevertheless, the engagement of Arab or Palestinian Christians in US society and US politics has been more acceptable by the society than the engagement of their Muslim counterparts, albeit in varying proportions. Considering the fact that Lebanese immigration to the US is older than Palestinian immigration, Maronite Lebanese immigrants have managed to assume positions in the US Congress. Examples of such immigrants are Darrel Issa, Nick Rahall, and Charles Boustany.

As for Palestinian immigrants involved in politics, the list includes John Sununu, a member of a Palestinian Christian Jerusalemite family who emigrated to Lebanon, Havana, and eventually the US, served as the governor of New Hampshire (1983-1989) and later White House Chief of Staff under President George H. W. Bush. His son, John Sununu, Jr. has served as a senator. Recently, Justin Amash, the son of a Palestinian father and a Syrian mother, served as the U.S. representative for Michigan's third congressional district. Sam Rasoul, a democrat, is serving as a member of the Virginia House of Delegates from the 11th district.

Some candidates participated in this research, including M. A-Gh. (an immigrant who descends from Nablus). He highlighted his electoral experience, by saying:

³⁰¹ Oraib. Rantawi, "Palestinians in Jordan and the questions of "Citizenship" and "Nationality," *Assafir Newspaper*, (April 2011). [In Arabic].

"I nominated myself for San Mateo District in 2002. My contender was Jewish. He came originally from Hungary and advocated for the war against Iraq. In contrast, I did not advocate for the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. I launched promotional campaigns inside churches in order to explain my political program. However, churches were not allowed to intervene in politics since they did not pay taxes. Additionally, I visited many Palestinian families in the district. I held several fundraising parties and received support from Arabs. However, I failed since I lacked sufficient funds and basically and categorically did not have affiliation to the American society and the political game."

G. Kh. (who comes originally from Yaffa, nominated himself for San Jose District several times). He talked about his different experience:

"I focused on local issues. I tried to stay away from religion altogether. I highlighted my experience and finance. I discussed my ideas on fixing financial issues in the city. There were a few negative advertisements against me using my ethnicity as a Palestinian, but we appealed to the media to shame the groups responsible, and I won the elections."

During the latest U.S. presidential elections in November 2016, the majority of Arab and Palestinian immigrants in California (as an example) voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, Bernie Sanders.³⁰² They perceived him as the saviour of Arabs, Africans and minorities, just like Jesse Jackson was perceived. Sanders was supported (not on the financial level) for presidency by many Arab individuals and institutions using all forms of promotion. However, he eventually lost the elections.

³⁰² Bernie Sanders is a Jewish American politician who has been the junior United States Senator from Vermont since 2007. Sanders is the longest-serving independent in U.S. congressional history. He became the first Jewish American to win a Presidential primary contest when he defeated eventual nominee Hillary Clinton in New Hampshire on February 9, 2016. Since his election to the House in 1991, he has caucused with the Democratic Party, which has entitled him to committee assignments and at times given Democrats a majority. Sanders became the ranking minority member on the Senate Budget Committee in January 2015; he had previously served for two years as chair of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee. Many scholars consider his views to be more in line with social democracy and New Deal-era American progressivism than democratic socialism.

Photo 14: Arab-American leaders in San Francisco Bay: "Yalla": Let's vote for Bernie Sanders



Source: Archive of Ramallah Club.

One cannot fail to refer to the role of James Zoghby³⁰³ aimed to ensure that Americans of Arab origin have political influence in the US. With regard to the Question of Palestine, Zoghby played a direct role in terms of facilitating the Arab-Israeli peace process in 1991. In 1993, along with co-president former U.S. congressman Mel Levine, Zoghby became the co-president of Builders for Peace, a committee formed by the private sector in order to promote U.S. investments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Zoghby also chaired a forum on the Palestinian economy at the Casablanca Economic Summit in 1994. He was a member of the presidential delegation that accompanied former U.S. president Bill Clinton during his historic visit to the Gaza Strip in December 1998.

³⁰³ James Zoghbi is an American of a Lebanese origin. He is the founder and president of the American-Arab Institute (AAI). He is also a member of the Board of Directors of *Middle East Monitor*, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the National Forum on Migration and Council on Foreign Relations. Since 1992, he has been writing weekly newspaper articles on the U.S. policies in the most prominent Arab newspapers, such as the London-based *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, the Egyptian *Al-Ahram* newspaper, the Kuwaiti *al-Qabas* newspaper, the Jerusalem-based *al-Quds* newspaper, the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*.

2.4 Military service in relation to certain political events

Considering that many Arabs, including Palestinians, served in the US military during WWI, they started to be accepted into the American society during and following the war. In his book, *The Syrians in America*, Philip Hitti states this step reflected the Arab Syrian community's awareness, organization and cohesion in the US society. Gualtieri adds that this step was intended for the Americanization of Arabs.³⁰⁴ The Arab community joined the U.S. military in order to liberate their country from Turkish ruling and ensure the establishment of a united Arab state. About 7% of Syrian immigrants served in the U.S. military during the WWI.³⁰⁵

Saleh Khalil Sakran, who came to be also known as Frank Charles Sakran, is a Palestinian who was born in the Nazareth district and migrated to the US in 1914. He joined the U.S. military since he believed his military service would serve as a personal contribution to a crusade intended to save humanity from the scourge of war and liberate states from Turkish oppression and foreign rule. In return for his military service, he was granted US citizenship.³⁰⁶ Another example is Khalil Totah, who came originally from Ramallah, and joined the U.S. military during WWI but he returned to his country of origin after the war ended. Few historical sources have mentioned that Palestinians joined the U.S. military during WWII in order to liberate France from German occupation.

Recently, and especially following the September 11 attacks, Arab and Muslim immigrants have apparently experienced an inner conflict. Should they be completely open to the U.S. society or remain insular in regards to some issues? They have faced a number of issues, the most important of which is joining the U.S. military. According to *Arab American Service: A Bibliography for the Patriots & Peacemakers Exhibit*, some American journalists or soldiers of Arab origin wrote articles, revealing that they took part in wars in Iraq, the Gulf, and Afghanistan. They were

³⁰⁴ Sara Gualtieri, *Between Arab and White: Race and ethnicity in the early Syrian American Diaspora* (Berkeley: University of California, 2010).

³⁰⁵ Philip Hitti, *The Syrians in America* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923).

³⁰⁶ Jamal Adawi, *Palestinian migration to America from the end of nineteenth century until 1945* (Nazareth: Popular Printing House, 1994), 153. [In Arabic].

apparently second- and third-generation immigrants. Due to the sensitivity of this issue in particular, no one from the military participated in this research.

The context in Jordan is different than it in the US. Palestinians joined the Arab Jordanian military, especially when Jordanian and other Arab forces fought a war against Zionist forces in 1948. Following the war, Palestinian conscripts relocated to Jordan, especially in the Zarqa district.

The number of Palestinians who joined the Jordanian armed forces increased. Following the June 1967 War, Jordan took several steps in an attempt to rise again. Among these steps was the declaration of the Forced Conscription Act, which stipulated that all males ages 18-40 shall join the military. The act was repealed in 1992. Over this period, few Palestinians joined combat units as combatants, as the overwhelming majority of them joined the military as technicians, engineers, and doctors. However, they rarely assumed high-ranking positions in the Jordanian military. For instance, Karim Ohan held the rank of the director of Public Security and Daoud Hanania held the rank of director of the Royal Medical Services. It is worth mentioning the Jordanian regime discharged many Palestinians from the military and pursued other Palestinians who sympathized with Palestinian resistance.³⁰⁷

M. S. (a Palestinian Jerusalemite who resides in Jordan), talked about his military service experience:

"I served as a conscript soldier, holding the lowest rank in the military. I started my military service after I received necessary military training, which was usually restricted to military parades and simple information on arms. Later on, I served at the artillery despite the fact that I lacked relevant experience and did not handle any equipment or arms. I was tasked with setting up camps, where I remained with others for six months. Considering that I completed university studies and had a vehicle, I came to serve as an assistant to the chief of staff of the camp, going on personal or family errands for him. So, I left the camp. Military services is an unenviable experience. Military conscripts mostly join the military due to their limited financial means. They were offered a better life by military service.

³⁰⁷ Yazid Y. Sayegh, *Jordan and the Palestinians* (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1987), 48-49. [In Arabic].

They were offered better food, clothes, accommodation, and a monthly salary that they used to send to their families."

2.5 Naturalization has not offered full political integration

In contrast to Palestinian refugees across the rest of the Arab countries, Palestinian immigrants in Jordan have obtained citizenship and, consequently, have had advantages. As a result, they have managed to integrate into economic life and have high social positions. Economic integration is arguably the first step that has facilitated political integration, particularly for the segment of Palestinians who have managed to build a stable economic base. This is evident with regard to the economic class, including a large proportion of Christians, who are mostly loyal to the government. However, some say this relation existed before the unification of both banks of the Jordan River. This means the Palestinian bourgeoisie had politically integrated into the Jordanian regime before economically integrating into it. However, this assumption is not applicable to Palestinian businesses in the US.

In terms of their legal status in Jordan, Palestinians are divided into two main categories. The first category is comprised of Palestinians who hold Jordanian citizenship. Their estimated number exceeds 2 million. Some estimates place their number at 2.2 million. The second category is comprised of Palestinians who reside in Jordan, but do not hold Jordanian citizenship. It includes Palestinians from the Gaza Strip in addition to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians whose legal status was affected by Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988.³⁰⁸

Host countries have discriminated against Palestinian immigrants, prejudicing their full citizenship. As a result of the policy of Jordanizing institutions, especially following Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank, Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship have been prevented from holding sensitive positions. For example, they have been prevented from holding the position of head of the public security service, intelligence service, or holding any other sensitive position in the military or the media. Furthermore, the fact that Christians are assigned a number of parliamentary seats shows that they are treated as a minority. It is impossible for a Christian to hold

³⁰⁸ Oraib Rantawi, "Palestinians in Jordan and the questions of "Citizenship" and "Nationality," *Assafir Newspaper*, (April 2011). [In Arabic].

the position of the prime minister. This means that Palestinian Christians are subject to two forms of discrimination in political life: their origin and their faith. This compels them to vote for a Jordanian candidate rather than a Palestinian candidate in order to secure their future.

Similarly, Palestinians in the US are discriminated against due to their Arab origins. This is particularly evident in electoral campaigns as many Palestinian candidates were defeated by their contenders, who were mostly Jewish or pro-Israel. The defeat of Palestinian candidates in elections was caused by a number of other reasons, most importantly that Palestinian candidates lack sufficient funds for election campaigns and that the Arab and Palestinian community is spread out across various states and lacks a united representative body compared to the Jewish community. One cannot ignore the fact that religion has played a significant role in terms of facilitating Christian Arab immigrants' acceptance and assimilation into the US society more than Muslim Arabs.

Palestinian immigrants' activity in transnational Palestinian political parties have delayed their integration into political parties across the diaspora and host countries. This activity marginalized or excluded Palestinian immigrants from the political arena. This could not be separated from the course of events on the Palestinian-Israeli arena. In other words, it is almost impossible to be a Palestinian immigrant in the US without being engaged in politics, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. Meanwhile, Palestinian immigrants' engagement in US politics is low as it is the case with Americans in general.³⁰⁹ Meanwhile, Palestinians have perceived their membership in Jordanian political parties as a security to their future. Still others have cited the constant support Syria provides as a host country to the Palestinian cause as a justification to their low participation in the national movement. This is consistent with Brand's description on Palestinians in Syria.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ Kathleen Christison, "The American experience: Palestinians in the U.S.," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 4 (1989): 18-36.

³¹⁰ Laurie Brand, "Palestinians in Syria: The politics of integration," *Middle East Journal* 42, no.4 (1988): 621-637.

3. Transition in the action approach of churches

3.1 Introduction

The Brotherhood Way in San Francisco provides evidence to the diversity of cultures and identities in the US. Along this street are churches for different ethnicities, such as the Holy Trinity Greek Orthodox Church, Calvary Armenian Congregational Church, St. Thomas More Church and Lake Merced Church of Christ. There are also buildings for other faith communities such as the Congregation Beth Israel Judea and Columbia Brotherhood Lodge. Hence Brotherhood Way was named as such.

Regarding churches across the Jordanian society, Christian communities have long flourished there, notably in and around the provincial towns of Karak, Madaba, and Salt as well as Amman. Jordan is a part of the Holy Land as it houses many holy sites and shrines, most notably Mount Nebo, the Baptismal Site, and Madaba Church. This indicates that churches were founded across Jordan during the early days of Christianity. As one takes a closer look at Amman, it presents a rich and varied tapestry of cultures and faiths, by the numerous spires that stretch alongside minarets towards the skies of Amman.³¹¹

This section focuses on the role of the church as an institution in terms of the status of diaspora and identity as the church has acted as a catalyst in terms of immigrants' integration. It was credited for the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees. Considering the presence of the church in the countries of diaspora, it has played a significant role in preserving immigrants' unity and identity. However, what matters in this section is to present and analyse how the church has preserved immigrants' identity, to find out the type of immigrants' identity that the church has managed to preserve, and to explore whether immigrants' sense of identity has been built apart from or as a part of the identity of the local church in the country of origin.

³¹¹ Luisa Gandolfo, "The political and social identities of the Palestinian Christian community in Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 62, no.3 (2008): 437-455

This section is based on interviews with Christian clergy in the occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan, and the US, in addition to a review of some official ecclesial letters, published in the form of documents, memos or meetings reports.

3.2 Establishing churches as a means to preserve Eastern Christian and ethnic identity

In the US diaspora, many Islamic and Christian institutions are mostly formed on an ethnic basis. Examples of such Christian institutions are Armenian and Maronite churches. Examples of such Muslim institutions are mosques for Indian, Yamani, and Arab Muslims.

Arab Christians,³¹² including Palestinian Christians, have established their churches on congregational and ethnic bases. For example, St. Nicholas Antiochian Greek Orthodox Church, a part of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East in Syria, kick-started its religious activities in 1937. Besides, St. George Greek Orthodox Church, a part of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, was founded in 1993. It is noticeable that Arab Catholics organized themselves and founded St. Thomas More Church, a part of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, in 1992. It is also worth noting that there are ten Arab Lutheran churches run by Arab or Palestinian pastors across the US.

Christian Arabs, including Palestinians, started to organize through the establishment of Orthodox churches in order to demonstrate their connection to the Eastern Church (Christian belief roots). The Eastern rituals and habits, the Arabic language, and the adherence to spiritual, moral and familial values all constitute the essence of and distinguish Eastern Christianity from Western churches.

The question arises whether Palestinians in Jordan have built their own churches. Palestinian Christians didn't found their own churches across Jordan since they share the same language, culture, and religion with Jordanian Christians. Jordan is considered one of the Arab

³¹² The term "Arab Christians" refers to Middle East Christians who existed prior the advent of Islam, especially in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan. Before Islam, Christians used to speak their respective ethnic languages, such as Syriac and Aramaic, which were also used in the liturgy. However, they adopted Arabic as the language of practice after the spread of Islam.

states that have not enacted a law to limit or ban the construction of churches. In contrast to Egyptian Coptic Christians, Christians can construct churches in Jordan without any religious or political hindrances. On the occasion of Pope Francis' visit to the Holy Land in 2014, the Catholic Center for Studies and Media published a booklet detailing all of the Catholic Church institutions, particularly in Jordan. The booklet presented information on all churches, schools, clinics, hospitals, and elderly centres among others.

This indicates that Christians are given a large space for freedom in terms of the construction of their institutions in Jordan.³¹³ Christians of Palestinian origin have contributed to the development of existing churches and participated in the construction of new churches across Jordan. For example, the Imseeh family, who descends from Lidd, has constructed the Sacred Heart of Jesus Catholic Church in Amman at their own expense. Similarly, the Shnoodi family, who comes originally from Yaffa, has built St. Elijah Greek Orthodox Church in Amman at their own expense.

These churches conduct a wide variety of activities including religious gatherings for the faithful from different age groups; women activities such as patient visits, helping the poor and the needy, and Sunday school that offer kids religious education and, in the US, Arabic language basics. Therefore, Sundays offer the largest number of Arab Christians, including Palestinian Christians, the opportunity to come together at the church. They share news, especially about their country of origin, such as deaths, weddings, celebrations, and political events among others.

Arab churches in the US diaspora are confronted with some challenges that might hinder their ability to unite Christian families. Some of these challenges include Christians' accelerated assimilation into the US society and culture, and the lack of Arab Christian schools that teach Arabic and the basics of Eastern Christianity to new generations.

Although some of them were recently founded, these churches are among the first institutions that have brought together members of the Arab and Palestinian communities across the American society. Churches play a key role in terms of their mobilization potential. Each

³¹³ Catholic Center for Studies & Media, *The Catholic Church in Jordan* (On the occasion of Pope Francis' visit to Jordan, May 24-25, 2014).

church hold an annual festival that attracts a lot of people, including Americans and Muslims. According to Nancy Gonzalez,³¹⁴ churches have played a key role on the national and daily living levels. Their facilities have served as a venue for discussing many issues. It is worth noting that these churches were founded thanks to immigrants' financial support. The clergy come from Eastern origins, including Palestinian, Jordanian, and Syrian origins. They maintain a consultative relation with their respective patriarchs in their home countries.

With regards to inter-church relations, the *Council of Arab Clergy* serves as a venue for discussing religious, social and national issues. The latest activity organized by the council was a rally in protest of the kidnapping and beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts by ISIS in Libya. The rally was followed by a fundraiser for the families of the beheaded Copts. Additionally, the council held a charity dinner in 2014 whose proceeds were allocated to support the Palestinian families affected by the most recent Gaza onslaught.

Photo 15: The Arab American Christian Community in San Francisco:
"United for GAZA", Aug 23, 2014



Source: Archive of Saint Thomas More Latin Church in San Francisco.

³¹⁴ Nancie Gonzalez, *Dollar, dove & eagle. One hundred years of Palestinian migration to Honduras* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1992), 162-193.

On the other hand, Muslims feel that they are an ethnic and religious minority in the US. The discrepancy between Islamic and foreign cultures and the US society's view of Muslims in general have compelled Muslim emigrants and their descendants to maintain their affiliation to their culture, language, and religion. Despite they have more recently emigrated than their Christian counterparts, Muslims have managed to found many mosques as well as Islamic societies and schools that teach Arabic.

In Jordan, churches could not play any national or rather explicitly political role. That is because it is not permissible for religious institutions, Christian and Muslim alike, to assume such a role. Nevertheless, churches could express their solidarity with a political event through the issuance of statements, the provision of humanitarian assistance, or by organizing a meeting or lecture.

3.3 Palestinian churches assume a resistant role

Israeli occupation policies have changed the nature of the churches and Christian clergy's approach. Despite their multiplicity, churches have come to undertake activities that highlight their unity. This has been evident through Christian clergy's engagement in social and political issues and the promotion of coordination among church hierarchy with regards to how to deal with the Israeli occupation policies and politics in general. This major and obvious change in the church's approach has coincided with the "Palestinianization"³¹⁵ of the heads of "traditional"³¹⁶ churches

³¹⁵ Michel Sabbah is the first Palestinian to assume the position of the archbishop of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. He assumed this position in 1982. The first Palestinian archbishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Jordan and the Holy Land was Naim Nassar. He assumed this position in 1986. Additionally, the first Palestinian bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Jerusalem and the Middle East was Faeq Haddad. He held this position in 1976 and was succeeded by Samir Kafity. Lutfi Laham held the position of the archbishop of the Melkite Catholic Church in 1981. Meanwhile, the patriarchs of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem are still Greek. Other Christian clerics who played a prominent role in the defence of the Palestinian cause are Melkite Catholic bishop Hilarion Capucci, Greek Orthodox archbishop Atallah (Theodosius) Hanna, former priest of the (Latin) Roman Catholic Church in Gaza Manuel Musallam, Illia Khoury and pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Christmas Church in Bethlehem, Rev. Mitri Raheb.

³¹⁶ The "traditional" or "historic" churches are those that existed in Jerusalem prior to 1967. They include all the Eastern-liturgy churches: the Greek Orthodox Church, the Melkite Catholic Church, the Orthodox and Catholic Armenian churches, the Orthodox and Catholic Syrian churches, the Orthodox and Catholic Coptic churches, the Ethiopian church, the Maronite church, the (Latin) Roman Catholic church, the (Anglican) Evangelical Episcopal church and the Evangelical Lutheran church. The term does not include the more recent evangelical missionaries to Jerusalem associated with the International Christian Embassy, the Mormons, the Hebrew Christians or the Russian "Jewish" Christians.

and the development of the "liberation theology,"³¹⁷ which has imparted a national and religious dimension to the Palestinian cause and united the Christian community. The church has subsequently played political and national roles since it has believed that such roles are an inseparable part of its religious role. What's more, heads of the churches perhaps believed that it is better for them to live in predominantly Muslim countries than to live in a state run by Israelis.

Historically, we can evaluate the role of the church through two periods: Post-*Nakba* war in 1948 and after the first *Intifada* in 1987, which was the real turning point. In the aftermath of the *Nakba*, the Palestinian Christian role changed from individuals (academics or clerics and nationalists) through writing to an institutional role, where churches engaged in disaster relief. The most important of such church institutions were the Pontifical Mission, the World Lutheran Federation, and the World Council of Churches.³¹⁸

Before the June 1967 War ended, a group of Arab theologians, namely Rev. Jean Corbon, Rev. George Khodr, Rev. Albert Lahham, Rev. Samir Kafity and Gabriel Habib, met in Beirut to write *Theological Perspectives on the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, the first theological ecumenical document on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This group of theologians confronted the Zionist Christian thinking that perceived the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as a divine victory. In addition, The World Student Christian Federation issued *Justice and Peace in the Middle East*, the first theological document that recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).³¹⁹

During this period, the Middle East Council of Churches held scores of conferences that focused on the Palestinian cause, and many Catholic forums such as Committees of Justice and Peace and the Center of Cyril, and dozens of statements calling the justice of the Palestinian cause. Fr. Rafik Khoury and Archbishop Lutfi Lahham were the head of this movement, in addition to

³¹⁷ The Ecumenical grassroots liberation theology movement among Palestinian Christians encourages Christians from around the world to work for justice and to stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people. Based in Jerusalem, it was founded in 1989 by Palestinian Anglican priest Naim Ateek.

³¹⁸ Mitri Raheb, "Faith, steadfastness and creative resistance in the modern Palestinian Christian thinking," *Al-Quds Daily Newspaper* (26 December 2016). [In Arabic].

³¹⁹ Mitri Raheb, "Faith, steadfastness and creative resistance", 2016, *Ibid*.

Bishop Hillarion Capucci and Reverend Ibrahim Ayyad who took positions against Christian Zionism.³²⁰

As the first *Intifada* erupted in 1987, traditional churches re-assessed their relationship with Israel. The churches were initially obliged to deal with Israel as the occupying power since the Christian holy sites are located in Jerusalem. This re-assessment came as heads of the churches were pressured by laity to take an explicitly anti-occupation position. These pressures yielded an unprecedented result. The churches reinforced their coordination significantly and changed their attitude toward the occupation. This attitude was demonstrated through press statements, participation in strikes and boycott among others. The first aspect of this re-assessment is inter-church coordination. Over the period 1987 to 1989, Christmas celebrations were curtailed and public services suspended as a means of expressing solidarity with the Palestinian national movement and the suffering of the people.

The leadership of the churches have issued a common statement beginning with denunciation of Israel oppression on 27 April 1989. The occupation of St. John's Hospice by armed Jewish settlers on 23 April 1989 evoked strong condemnation by the heads of the churches in Jerusalem, who protested at the Israeli government's support of the violation.³²¹ In an unprecedented gesture, they declared that all the holy places in the Holy Land would be closed on Friday 27 April 1989 and that the Christian community in Jerusalem would gather in prayer on the following Sunday. The heads of the churches issued a statement on 14 January 1992 roundly condemning aggressive settlements activity and attacks against Christians and holy places in Jerusalem.

On 17 July 2000, heads of three churches—former Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Michel Sabbah, Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem Diodorus I and Armenian Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem Torkom Manougian II—sent a letter to leaders convening at Camp David. The letter was addressed to US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian

³²⁰ Mitri Raheb, "Faith, steadfastness and creative resistance", 2016, *Ibid*.

³²¹ In April 1990, some 150 members of the militant Israeli settler group entered the St. John's Hospice. The hospice incident was a defining moment in relations between the Israeli government and the established churches of Jerusalem, and a key factor in binding the historic churches together. The Greek Orthodox patriarch, Diodorus I, protested that this was illegal and led a demonstration to the hospice. Scuffles led to the patriarch being flung to the ground and Israeli police spraying the demonstrators with tear gas. See: Michael Dumper, "The Christian Churches of Jerusalem in the Post-Oslo Period," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 2 (2002): 51-65.

Authority's President, Yasser Arafat. The letter presented the churches' rejection of the Israeli proposal to isolate the Armenian quarter from the rest of East Jerusalem.³²²

Following two years of Palestinian people's suffering in the aftermath of the second *Intifada* and the siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem,³²³ the patriarchs of Jerusalem and the rest of the heads of churches in Jerusalem called upon world political leaders to immediately intervene to end the suffering of thousands of families, children and women.

Accordingly, the Vatican issued a stern warning to Israel to respect religious sites in line with its international obligations, following a gun battle around Bethlehem's besieged Church of the Nativity. The Pope, who has urged people to pray for peace in the Middle East, described the violence in the Holy Land as having reached "unimaginable and intolerable" levels.

The church has also played a role on the local and international levels in relation to Israel's construction of the apartheid wall in Bethlehem's Cremisan Valley.³²⁴ Following an Israeli decision to seize church lands belonging to the Cremisan Monastery, local churches addressed the local and international communities and stressed the importance of holding onto the Cremisan land. Heads of the Jerusalem churches sent letters to the European Union, US President Barack Obama and US Secretary of State John Kerry. On the local level, Christian clerics, local Christians, and some politicians rallied and held masses at the area threatened by the Israeli wall. After 8 years of legal proceedings, in April 2015, the Israeli High Court allowed the army to build the wall in the farming lands of Cremisan, and ruled in its decision that the route of the wall is to avoid the convent,

³²² The Old City of Jerusalem is a walled area within the eastern part of city of Jerusalem. Traditionally, the Old City has been divided into four main sections: Muslim Quarter, Christian Quarter, Armenian Quarter and Jewish Quarter. As it contains holy sites, it was added to the UNESCO World Heritage Site List in 1981.

³²³ The Siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem lasted from 2 April-10 May 2002 in Bethlehem. Israel forces attempted to capture Palestinian militants, who fled into the Church of the Nativity and sought refuge. After 39 days, an agreement was reached, according to which the militants turned themselves in to Israel and were exiled to Europe and the Gaza Strip.

³²⁴ The Cremisan Valley runs along the seam line between the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, extending from Beit Jala to the village of Al Wallajeh and the 1967 border. Within the Cremisan Valley lie numerous constituencies: part of the city of Beit Jala, part of the illegal Israeli settlement of Gilo, the two Salesian orders (comprised of a Monastery and a Convent), Cremisan Cellars (a winery run by the Monastery), and multiple private homes and properties are all situated in the area. Parts of Cremisan are located in an area under exclusive Israeli control classified as Area C. In 2006, the Israeli Ministry of Defence expressed its intention to build a separation wall along the length of the Cremisan valley.

monastery and their agricultural lands. Despite the fact that legal proceedings are still pending before the Israeli High Court, the Israeli army started uprooting ancient olive trees and bulldozing the lands. The operations of the Israeli army are still ongoing in the lands and mass protests are held daily in the field.³²⁵

Leaders of churches have also backed the Palestinian bid for membership in the United Nations (UN). A total of 100 Christian leaders signed a statement urging the European Union to support the Palestinian Authority's bid for membership in the UN. Palestine was accorded non-member observer status in the UN (as is the status for the Vatican). Palestine became a full member in the UNESCO and acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which would enable it to file lawsuits against Israeli occupation authorities' crimes. Finally, the *Comprehensive Agreement* was signed by the Holy See and the State of Palestine on 26 June 2015. It "regards essential aspects of the life and activity of the Church in Palestine, while at the same time reaffirming the support for a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict in the region."

These actions were supported by the issuance the Kairos Palestine Document by a number of Palestinian Christian academicians, politicians, clerics and laymen in 2009. The document addresses the world in general and Christians in particular in order to voice the grievances of Palestinians as well as the grievances of Palestinian Christians (including the Diaspora), in a theological, political, humane and inclusive sense.³²⁶

The document has played an instrumental role in terms of bringing the Palestinian cause, as well as the situation of Palestinian Christians to the attention of the outside world. It has also played such a role with regards to internationalizing the Palestinian cause from "the church perspective." Thus, it affirms that churches must take action with regards to the conflict and cannot remain silent

³²⁵ Society of St. Yves - Catholic Center for Human Right, *The last nail in Bethlehem's coffin. The annexation wall in Cremisan*, 2015.

³²⁶ Kairos Palestine, *A Moment of Truth: A Word of Faith, Hope and Love from the Heart of Palestinian Suffering*, 2009. The document was drafted by a group of Palestinian Christians including: academicians, clerics and laymen. It was modelled after "Kairos of South Africa", which was issued in 1985. MORE INFO NEEDED

while there is still suffering. Kairos Palestine addresses the Palestinian and Arab communities as well as the world. It states:

Our presence in this land, as Christian and Muslim Palestinians, is not accidental but rather deeply rooted in the history and geography of this land, resonant with the connectedness of any other people to the land it lives in. It was an injustice when we were driven out. The West sought to make amends for what Jews had endured in the countries of Europe, but it made amends on our account and in our land. They tried to correct an injustice and the result was a new injustice...The aggression against the Palestinian people which is the Israeli occupation, is an evil that must be resisted. It is an evil and a sin that must be resisted and removed. Primary responsibility for this rests with the Palestinians themselves suffering occupation."

3.4 The church, an actor in the internationalization of Palestinian and Christian cause

Many ecclesial assemblies have been established in Jerusalem, such as the Assembly of the Catholic Ordinaries of the Holy Land, Assembly of the (Catholic) Patriarchs of the Middle East and the Assembly of Heads of Churches of Jerusalem. These assemblies strive to promote cooperation among heads of local churches and serve as a liaison with Arab and foreign churches. Through these assemblies, several service, humanitarian, and solidarity networks have been recognized by the local church and Palestinians.

Mainline American Christian churches collectively represent the largest grassroots body in the US. Their potential for influencing government policies is substantial. Churches or major elements within them have united for political moral purposes during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the Vietnam War, and at other times. As a result, local churches have come to recognize the importance of strengthening networks with churches worldwide and believe that their participation in ecclesial assemblies would have an impact in terms of supporting their national and religious cause.

The World Council of Churches (WCC)³²⁷ has conducted projects in the Holy Land, such as the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)³²⁸, the Palestine Israel Ecumenical Forum (PIEF),³²⁹ and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement³³⁰. As a result, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) has adopted an investment screen that would require the church to divest from companies that profit from the Israeli occupation and others with records of human rights violations relating to the occupation.

Through the relationship between Assembly of the Catholic Ordinaries of the Holy Land and the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulcher of Jerusalem,³³¹ also called Knights of the Holy Sepulcher, many Christian clerics and heads of churches from around the world visit Palestinian cities and villages on an annual basis. They stay with local Palestinian Christians for a day or two, experience their life and learn about their problems. They also make contributions to support projects on the family, school, or church level. Such visits are much more important than tours.

The Middle East Council of Churches (MECC)³³² raises many regional issues and attempts to address them as much as possible. In the final statement of its last meeting on 6-8 September

³²⁷ The historical roots of the World Council of Churches began in Edinburgh at a world missionary conference in 1910, and an encyclical in 1920 from the (Orthodox) Synod of Constantinople suggesting a "fellowship of churches" similar to the League of Nations. When the WCC came into being at the First Assembly in 1948, there were 147 member churches. At the end of 2013, the membership stood at 345 churches.

³²⁸ The Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) is a program coordinated by the World Council of Churches, founded in response to a call from the local Heads of Churches in Jerusalem, which brings internationals to the West Bank. Since 2002, over 1,500 volunteers have made three-month commitments to travel to Palestine to serve as ecumenical companions.

³²⁹ The Palestine Israel Ecumenical Forum (PIEF), established in 2007, is an instrument to catalyse and coordinate new and existing church advocacy for peace, aimed at ending the illegal occupation in accordance with UN resolutions, and demonstrate its commitment to inter-religious action for peace and justice that serves all the peoples of the region.

³³⁰ The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement works to end international support for Israel's oppression of Palestinians and pressure Israel to comply with international law.

³³¹ The origins of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem date back to the First Crusade. In 1967, Pope Paul VI reorganized and revitalized the Order by adding more specific regulations to the Constitution with the intention of making the Order's activities more coordinated and more effective. In February 1996, Pope John Paul II enhanced the Order's status to become a Public Association of the Faithful with a legal canonical and public personality, constituted by the Holy See.

³³² The Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) was established in 1974 and is now headquartered in Beirut. It is a religious commission that includes the four families of Christian churches in the Middle East, the Eastern Orthodox churches, the Oriental Orthodox churches, the Evangelical churches and the Catholic churches. The Council aims to reinforce the spirit of unity among various churches in the region, defend human rights and advocate justice and equal citizenship.

2016 in Amman, MECC focused on the serious and decisive demographic transitions manifesting in the rising tide of conflict, violence, extremism, and displacement. This poses a threat to the very existence of states as well as the safety, the diverse fabric and life of members of societies, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. MECC also focused on the ongoing suffering and deprivation of the Palestinian people of their most basic human rights and the failure to achieve international resolutions pertaining to Palestinian statehood. Hence, MECC seeks to find ways to alleviate the suffering of affected peoples.

In previous sessions, particularly the third session in 1980, MECC focused on Christian emigration from Arab countries. MECC requested that Christian clerics deepen Christians' affiliation to their homelands. It highlighted the necessity of launching an inter-faith dialogue, especially a Christian-Muslim dialogue, which would have a great impact on the concept of immigration and coexistence.³³³

MECC gave rise to the Department of Service to Palestinian Refugees (DSPR),³³⁴ which has played a supportive role in terms of reinforcing Christian presence in the country of origin. It has also helped Christians reduce their sense of dispersion through offering them economic, academic, health, and national services.

In addition, societies and institutions concerned with reinforcing the steadfastness of Christians were founded in the Palestine, Jordan, the Middle East and the remote Diaspora. The Caritas³³⁵ and the Pontifical Mission (CNEWA)³³⁶ have played a supportive role in terms of

³³³ Gabriel Habib, "Report of the Secretary-General," in *Your Kingdom Come. Third General Assembly* (Middle East Council of Churches, Nicosia, Cyprus, 1980), 154- 158.

³³⁴ Established in 1952, the Department of Service to Palestinian Refugees is concerned with the provision of relief aid to Palestinians who were displaced from their homeland in 1948. Since early 1970s, the department has been indiscriminately providing services to people in numerous fields, namely health, education, vocational training, emergency assistance, rehabilitation, and society development. The department has been keen on building cooperation with other stakeholders.

³³⁵ Caritas is a humanitarian charity non-governmental organization that is affiliated with the Catholic Church. First Caritas was established in Freiburg, Germany in 1897, followed by other societies. Nowadays, Caritas is an international confederation with 164 members with its head offices at the Vatican. As a result of 1967 War, responding to the humanitarian needs that emerged from the displacement of the Palestinian people, two branches of Caritas were founded in Jerusalem and Jordan.

³³⁶ Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) was founded by Pope Pius XI in 1926. CNEWA works for, through, and with the Eastern Catholic churches. Out of his concern for the plight of Palestinian refugees, in 1949 Pope

reinforcing the Christian presence in Palestine and helped Christians reduce their sense of dispersion through offering them economic, academic, health, and national services. As a result of the Israeli-Arabs wars in 1948 and 1967, these institutions have been providing aid to an increasing number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories regardless to religion.

These institutions also provided such aid to Palestinians during the Israeli onslaught on Gaza in 2014. They provided a lot of aid to Palestinians who took refuge at UNRWA-run schools, the Greek Orthodox Church and the Latin (Roman Catholic) school in Gaza. Such financial and humanitarian aid arguably helped reinforce the steadfastness of Palestinians on their land. Churches have been recently required to serve as an economic and administrative institution that provides services to citizens.³³⁷

Concurrently, some Christian clerics abroad, particularly the US, have exerted efforts to set up societies that would connect the local church in the homeland to churches worldwide as well as connect Palestinians in the diaspora and homeland to other peoples around the world.

The Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation (HCEF)³³⁸ is one of the most important Christian institutions in the US. It implements several programs, including the Bethlehem Heart of Christmas, an economic program designed to support Christians in the country of origin, especially in Bethlehem. HCEF also implements Know Thy Heritage, a cultural program designed to empower Palestinian youths in the diaspora by strengthening their knowledge of their roots. It also implements the Pilgrimage Testimonies, a religious program designed to introduce pilgrims to the suffering of Palestinians in their country of origin.

Pius XII decided that the work of humanitarian and charitable assistance for Palestine and all those afflicted by war there was to be consolidated and formalized by the establishment of a special "Pontifical Mission for Palestine."

³³⁷ See: Michael C. King, *The Palestinians and the Churches: 1948-1956* (Commission on Inter-church Aid, Refugee and World Service, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981).

³³⁸ The Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation (HCEF) is non-profit organization founded by an ecumenical group of American Christians to preserve the Christian presence in the Holy Land. It began as a collaboration between Mr. Rateb Y. Rabie, a Palestinian-American Christian, and Father Emil Salayta, a Jordanian priest serving in Palestine. They believed that if American Christians were told of the desperate situation of the Christians in the Holy Land, American Christians would reach out to help.

In addition, Christian clerics have issued an internet journal, *Al-Bushra*, with the purpose of publicizing religious, political, and historical issues in relation to Palestine, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conditions of the Middle East in general and Christians in particular.³³⁹ The journal also features articles delivered in public spaces, such as the Ramallah Club.

Moreover, one cannot ignore the role of other cultural and religious institutions concerned with Christian diaspora and immigration in the country of origin. Concurrently, there are several other societies and institutions focusing on issues, namely Christian immigration and Islamic-Christian dialogue. The most important of them are al-Liqa Center for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, and Diyar Consortium.

Accordingly, new awareness of the situation of Palestinians and Christians was developed in the West due in part to fact-finding missions and formal Christian delegation from the Holy Land who visit the West. Moreover, many Christian visitors from the West had seen enough for themselves to be distressed by what was happening in the Holy Land, through institutional networks connecting local churches to global churches and other links between the local churches and diaspora churches.

3.5 Local church identity crosses borders

One cannot deny that Arab churches were established in the diaspora in order to preserve the Middle Eastern Christian identity,³⁴⁰ and connect immigrants on an ethnic and linguistic basis. According to Bosch (2000: 25), language "is the most salient symbol of ethnicity because it has held the past and expresses the current attitudes and aspirations."³⁴¹ Others argue that language is one of the main components that groups utilize as a symbol for their identity and cultural affiliation.

³³⁹ Al-Bushra was founded in 1997 by Labib Qubti, a Palestinian priest in the US. It has helped people explore the heritage, history, traditions, theology, and current events of the people in the Middle East. Al-Bushra continues to provide information about the stands taken by the Vatican, heads of Christian communities, and leaders of religious and human rights movements regarding issues in the Holy Land.

³⁴⁰ The Eastern Christian identity has diverse cultural, traditional and religious dimensions. Showing allegiance to this identity constitutes a national responsibility and duty that is critical for securing Christians' unity and continued existence in the Middle East. Therefore, Christians have to maintain a cultural allegiance and connection to all their Middle Eastern counterparts, as well as a national allegiance to their various countries and homelands.

³⁴¹ Barbara. Bosch, "Ethnicity markers in Afrikaans," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 144. No. 1(2000): 51-68.

Furthermore, language is recognized as a factor unifying a particular culture and a strong symbol of group identity.³⁴²

However, in the 1980s, especially following the first *Intifada*, the Christian community represented by the Jerusalem churches experienced a "national rebirth." This rebirth had a direct impact on the identity of churches in the diaspora, prompting the establishment of churches that are directly belonging to the Jerusalem churches and run by clergy of Palestinian (or Jordanian) origin across the US. The number of such churches has increased. There are currently about 20 Orthodox churches belonging to the (Greek) Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem across the US.

Importantly, the Church's social, religious, and national activities are now clearly focused on the Palestinian cause and the status of Arabs in the diaspora. This means the Church has reflected an Arab (Middle Eastern) identity before reflecting a Palestinian identity. This does not necessarily mean that the church had not embraced a Palestinian identity. The emergence of any type of identity is the outcome of political, ethnic, or religious events. This implies that the identity of the church in the diaspora is a part of the identity of the local church in the country of origin. This also implies that connecting immigrants and refugees to the (Christian) holy sites, which are a part of historical Palestine, expresses the close relation between religious identity and national identity. This status is perhaps restricted to the Palestinian case and does not have any similar case in the diaspora.

4. "When I'm here, I belong to here. When I'm there, I belong to there.": Migrants express their affiliations

4.1 Introduction

Like many other nations, the Palestinian people have sought to crystallize a distinct identity. They have sought to achieve this goal because identity is a key part in the process of self-building and protection and plays an instrumental role in terms of achieving unity and integration among various segments, such as political, social, and religious groups.

³⁴² Howard Giles, Richard Y. Bourhis & Donald M. Taylor, "Towards a theory of language in ethnic group relations," in *Language, ethnicity and in-group relations*, ed. Howard Giles (London: Academic Press, 1977), 307-348.

As for Palestinians in the diaspora, their identity has been affected by several factors, namely assimilation (integration), the coercive and exclusionary policies, Israeli-Palestinian wars, the first and second *Intifada*, the emergence of a new political status after the Oslo Accords, as well as the lack of an independent homeland.

This section addresses the identity of Palestinians in the diaspora as a thorny subject due to several considerations. First, identity is constantly evolving. Second, the identity of Palestinians in the diaspora is affected by the degree of integration they experience or the suffering they endure in the host societies. Third, Palestinian identity in particular is an imagined collective identity, which has not been formed within an existing political, legal, and social framework that is stable and sovereign over the Palestinian people within geographical borders. Rather, it was formed as a cultural extension of the Arab national identity. Therefore, it is important to address the historical-political context which illustrates the merits of the formation and development of the identity for the diasporic Palestinian people.

4.2 Palestinian Identity emerged of Arab national identity

Whereas the national identity of most nations has been formed in a form of states, as the case in modern nation-states which became independent after WWII, the Palestinian national identity has been formed as militant resistance in order to demonstrate Palestinian existence in the face of diaspora and exile. Thus, the Palestinian national identity has essentially become a militant political identity.

The Palestinian people formed a part of Arab nationalism, which rose as a reaction to Turkish nationalism that appeared before WWI on the eve of the fall of the Ottoman Empire.³⁴³ Meanwhile, the attempts to withstand Zionist colonial plans and the British Mandate have significantly contributed to the formation of the Palestinian identity alongside the national identity.

According to Rashid Al-Khalidi (1997: 154) the emergence of early nationalism could be ascribed to a combination of factors which preceded Zionism. Nationalism emerged as a result of

³⁴³ Awni Farsakh, *Minorities in Arab history: From the pre-Islamic time to present day* (Riad Al-Rayad Books & Publishing; London, 1994), 292-295. [In Arabic].

the "Christians' and Muslims' religious attachment to what they considered as the Holy Land, the concept of Palestine as an administrative entity in its own right, the fear of foreign interference and attachment to local patriotism."³⁴⁴

The expulsion of Palestinians from their own land in 1948 and loss of their land marked the beginning of building the imagined Palestinian identity. As a result of the collective memory and conscience generated from the refugee status and the diaspora, Palestinians have acquired a sense of allegiance and reinforced their steadfastness as expressed by Anderson.³⁴⁵ This memory has become a substitute for despoiled land,³⁴⁶ as land in the Palestinian culture is a concept of three-dimensions: geographical, economic, and social. In the Palestinian memory, according to Al-Qalqili and Abu Ghoush (2012: 30), it refers to "a complex concept consisting of people with all their relationships with the land and their interpersonal relationships."³⁴⁷ Additionally, it is perceived as the "melting pot" in the Palestinian consciousness as so called by Sari Hanafi. Accordingly, the concept of land and homeland are synonymous.

These facts have distinguished Palestinians from the rest of the Arab peoples. As a result of the loss of their national territory, collective memory of the past, and common heritage; Palestinians felt "painfully distinctive" from their Arab brothers. Nonetheless, one could not ignore that the Palestinian identity has become entrenched at least among Arab Palestinian intelligentsia in view of the spread of the Arab and Palestinian press at the end of the first decade of the British Mandate.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian identity: the construction of the modern national consciousness* (New York: Colombia University, 1997).

³⁴⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the rise and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

³⁴⁶ Ibrahim Abu Lughod, "The last day before the fall of Jaffa," *Al-Karmel Journal* 55, no. 6 (1998): 117-129. [In Arabic]

³⁴⁷ Abdul-Fattah Al-Qalqili & Ahmad Abu Ghoush, *The Palestinian national identity: The specificity of formation and regulatory framework (Working paper 13, Bethlehem, Palestine: the Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights –Badeel, 2012)*. [In Arabic].

³⁴⁸ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian identity: the construction of the modern national consciousness* (New York: Colombia University, 1997), 309.

The Palestinian identity has recently gone through a political crisis.³⁴⁹ While it was initially based on "despoiled land," that notion was automatically followed with refugees' right of return, following the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords the concept of land and right of return have become correlated to a specific part of the land. Consequently, Palestinians have divergent conceptions of the new identity: some Palestinians adhere to their conception of the collective imagined national identity that withstands assimilation, marginalization, and downsizing; others desire to dissolve it into the melting pot of the wider Islamic ideology. Still others want to narrow the identity down to weaken it, and undermined its components by limiting it to a specific political framework linked with the boundaries of a future Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

One may conclude that the formation of the Palestinian identity as imagined and collective has not necessarily required the existence of a sovereign state in advance. This is because objective historical and cultural facts have generated a political awareness, and political conflict has created a sense of allegiance to the identity. Meanwhile, the Palestinian identity is still not clear, especially for Palestinians in the diaspora—not in respect of its components, but rather due to the local, regional, and diasporic political conditions that affect these components.

4.3 "Being Palestinian changes you whole life"

The Palestinian identity in the diaspora has been articulated differently. It has gone through a state of weakness and insularity in some countries, while it has developed further in others. Palestinians have rejected and confronted the policies of forced integration in countries where they are subject to the policies of forced integration and naturalization. Arguably, these policies have unintentionally helped in the formation of modern Palestinian national identity on the level of consciousness and culture and through political crystallization.

In the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, where exclusion and marginalization policies were pursued, Palestinians started to develop their identity. As a result of these policies, they were compelled to develop self-consciousness and awareness of their common destiny and the necessity to change their reality and get end their suffering resulting from dispersion and refugee status. In contrast,

³⁴⁹ Ashraf Saqer Abu Nada, "The imagined Palestinian identity between development and crisis," *Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi (The Arab Future Magazine)* 423 (2014): 81-97. [In Arabic].

Palestinians in the countries which adopted integration and naturalization policies, such as Jordan, the West Bank, and Palestinians inside Israel were late in the development of their identity. That is because they did not have the chance to express their identity and cause since they were granted citizenship. As for Palestinians in remote parts of the diaspora such as Europe and the US, Palestinians enjoyed a level of freedom, through which they expressed their identity despite being subject to discrimination at that time. *The Palestinian Diaspora in Europe: Challenges of Dual Identity and Adaptation* provides one of the most important examples for the experiences of Palestinians in the European diaspora, including adaptation, assimilation, and isolation. It shows how this affects their identity. The theme of national identity and the political action of Palestinian diaspora will be discussed in detail in section four.

Regarding identity definition, a study conducted involving Palestinians with Israeli citizenship by Mark Tessler (1977) shows that, thirty years after the *Nakba*, 85% of the Arab youths (Muslims, Christians and Druze alike) in the country have confirmed that the term "Palestinian Arabs" refers to them and identifies them without any hesitation.³⁵⁰

There is more recent study conducted by Baruch Kimmerling (2000) in the occupied Palestinian territories, one year prior to the signing of Oslo Accords. Respondents were asked to declare their own identities. The study shows that the majority of respondents declared loyalty first and foremost to their families, followed by loyalty to the Palestinian people, then to the Islamic nation, and finally to the Arab nation.³⁵¹

In her study on the identity experience of Palestinians in the United States, Kathleen Christison (1989) shows that despite the hard work of first-generation Palestinian immigrants to acquire full citizenship—and that the number of Palestinians in US was fewer than immigrants from other nationalities, which may have compelled them to rapidly assimilate into this society—some Palestinian immigrants were absorbed while others felt alienation. In contrast, second-generation immigrants, who were born as Americans, identified themselves as Palestinian Americans. Kathleen argued that in contrast to Mexican or Cuban immigrants who have their own

³⁵⁰ Antoine Shalhat, *On culture, identity and vision*, ed. Eyad Barghouthi (2007), 7.

³⁵¹ Baruch Kimmerling, "The formation of Palestinian collective identities: The Ottoman and Mandatory Period," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 2 (2000):48-81.

lands and homelands, Palestinian immigrants have land but lacked a homeland. Therefore, they considered it to be a weakness to identify themselves as Americans.³⁵²

This section focuses on the types of identities embraced by Palestinians in the diaspora. It attempts to answer the question as to which identity was the most important and which identity is ranked first. It also attempts to provide answers to the questions as to the other sub-identities developed by Palestinian immigrants and whether Palestinians in the diaspora have reached a stage where they introduce themselves with both. It also seeks to provide answers as to whether there are differences between men and women as well as first-generation and second-generation in terms of the degree of allegiance embracing such identities. Finally, it attempts to provide an answer to the question as to whether these identities feed into the same melting pot or not.

Based on the field work, especially on the questionnaire, Palestinians in the diaspora responded to the question: "How do you define yourself today?"

Table 6: Self-defined identities for Palestinian Christian immigrants in the diaspora

Jordan	%	Total %	The US	%	Total %
- Palestinian	7.1%	14.1%	- Palestinian	28.5%	33.7%
- Palestinian refugee	1.7%		- Palestinian Christian	3.5%	
- Palestinian from X city/village	5.3%		- Palestinian from X city/village	1.7%	
- Palestinian Jordanian	3.5%	55.4%	- Palestinian American	37.5%	39.2%
- Jordanian with Palestinian roots	51.7%		- Palestinian American Christian	1.7%	
- Jordanian	12.5%	12.5%	- American	-	-
- Arab	3.5%	12.2%	- Arab	-	26.5%
- Arab Jordanian	3.5%		- Arab American	12.5%	
- Arab Jordanian Palestinian	1.7%		- Arab Christian	1.7%	
- Arab Jordanian Palestinian Christian	3.5%		- Arab Palestinian Christian	1.7%	
			- Arab Palestinian American	7.1%	
			- Arab Palestinian American Christian	3.5%	

³⁵² Kathleen Christison, "The American experience: Palestinians in the U.S.," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 4 (1989):18-36.

- Christian	3.5%		- Christian		
- Christian Palestinian	1.7%	5.4%	- Christian Palestinian		
- Christian Palestinian Jordanian			- Christian Palestinian American		-
<i>Total</i>		<i>100%</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>100%</i>

4.3.1 "I'm Palestinian" ... Alienation

Alienation is a rare occurrence, and it is a personal matter which could not be generalized. Although the majority of immigrants have attained a degree of adaptation and relative integration into host societies, they were unable to become a part of these societies, which considered them a pure Palestinian identity. This case applies specifically to women, elderly, and some political activists.

In spite of their integration into the labour market, along with their spouses in the American society and participation in clubs, religious, national, and regional institutions among others, Palestinian women have restricted their social relationships to the community of friends, relatives, acquaintances, and Palestinians from their homeland. They have done so as a result of the significant cultural differences between their homeland and the host society. In this regard, S. Sh. (who immigrated from Jifna to the US) says: "I have not integrated into the society here. I do not have lots of friendship with foreigners. My relationships are limited to the Arabs. I have established these relationships through the church. I have created my own framework of family and friends."

As for the elderly, the sense of alienation stems from two main reasons: The first lies in migrating at a later stage in life which certainly means being unable to culturally adapt, and having feelings of sudden detachment from the homeland, and being away from friends and family. The second reason is that some of them experienced displacement and exile in 1948. Thus, they have persistent feelings of suffering, displacement, and expulsion from their homeland. Z.N. (who uprooted from Jaffa in 1948) says: "I am part of the Palestinian issue. I feel committed to work for it. So, I say as a matter of fact, but not bragging, that I am a Palestinian refugee residing in Jordan."

Furthermore, the expression or disclosure of the Palestinian identity actually resulted from Palestinian immigrants' continuous engagement in political and social action and issues that serve them and their case wherever they are. Z. Sh. (who immigrated from Ramallah to the US) commented:

"Before I immigrated, I held many positions in Ramallah municipality and worked as a journalist in *Al-Quds* Newspaper. Since I was an activist, the occupied Israeli authorities decided to deport me. After settling at the United States, I dedicated myself to support my home country while being abroad. I assumed here the position of chairperson of Ramallah Federation in the diaspora over the period 1979/1980. I also helped in inaugurating many churches of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the United States. Additionally, I used to visit my homeland annually. So, I could not say anything other than I am a Palestinian."

4.3.2 Shifted 180 degrees ... Assimilation

Despite immigrating long ago, their deep integration into the American society, as well as their change in the lifestyle—including changing eating and drinking habits, customs and the mastery of a foreign language, especially for second-generation immigrants—Palestinian immigrants in the US have not abandoned their original identity, nor they have declared complete loyalty and allegiance to the new, American identity. On the contrary, the interviews showed that despite possessing US citizenship, Palestinian immigrants have asserted their original identity and developed political and national awareness as a result of their immigration experience as well as the sense of discrimination.

In sharp contrast, many Palestinian immigrants in Jordan, whether from the first or second generation, introduce themselves as Jordanians, but not as Palestinians—suggesting they are integrated and assimilated into Jordanian society. What caused such sense of "Jordanization?" N.H., (second-generation immigrant), says: "I was born in Jordan. For me, my identity is linked to the place where I raised. I was born and raised in Jordan and so were my children. I have no properties in Bethlehem; no house and no plots of land. My wife is of a Jordanian origin...So, I am 100% Jordanian." J. N. (who descends from Bethlehem) remarks: "I hold the Jordanian nationality, but I do not have a Palestinian identity nor a Palestinian passport. Consequently, I am a Jordanian."

Another example, R. J., (a second-generation immigrant born in Jordan) remarks, "I am Jordanian from head to toe, a son of this society and an active person in the field of industry, real estate, and business. I have also made many donations."

Therefore, the volume of immigrants' economic and social assimilation in the Jordanian society, the access to citizenship rights, most importantly possessing the Jordanian citizenship instead of the Palestinian, the cultural and geographic proximity and familial distribution between the two countries have all played a part in "Jordanizing" Palestinians.

4.3.3 "In the middle" ...Adaptation

On what seems a middle position, immigrants have adopted an identity consisting of both the identity of the original and host societies together. Such a position in between could be considered temporary, through which immigrants look forward to attain a complete Palestinian identity. They looking forwards to return to their homeland one day. For US Palestinians, obtaining US citizenship means being able to have social and economic mobility, providing a good upbringing and education for their children and exercising all of their rights and freedoms. In this context, I. N. (who immigrated from Birzeit), says:

"We must not deny that America has given us a lot. We worked freely and provided our kids with education, and thus enabled them to attain top academic positions. Here, we feel that we are citizens who have rights and obligations. Yet, as Palestinians, we do not like the political life."

On his part, M. Z. (an immigrant descends from Lidd) remarked: "I feel safe here. I have all the rights to do everything. I'm thankful for being a complete citizen. I feel like one of the people, and this is my country. My Palestinian roots and emotions are still deep, but I have also roots here. So: I'm Palestinian-American."

As for the Jordanian society, many Palestinians have declared their allegiance to both the Palestinian and Jordanian identities. This is because unlike other neighbouring Arab countries, Jordan has received Palestinians who were forcefully displaced following the 1948 War (*An-Nakba*), the 1967 War (*An-Naksa*) and the first Gulf War and granted them Jordanian citizenship.

Thus, Palestinians across Jordan have been granted all citizenship rights, including Palestinians in refugee camps, such as the right to stand and vote in elections, the right to property and the right to assume senior positions. In this regard, O.F., (a Jordanian resident with Palestinian background, born in Kuwait), says:

"I live in a state of co-assimilation. I cannot say that I am Jordanian, which is not accepted by Jordanians. Besides, I cannot say that I am a Palestinian, which is rejected by Palestinians. This is because I was neither born in Palestine, nor did I suffer any wars and uprisings. Thus, I introduce myself as a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin."

4.3.4 "I'm a Christian"... from the Holy Land

Few immigrants choose to introduce themselves on a religious basis, such as being a Christian, an Eastern Christian, a Christian from the Holy Land, or an Orthodox Christian. It is worth indicating here that such cases do not reflect religious intolerance as much as being a way of introducing oneself that supposes mutual trust between the two parties. The American society in general perceives all Arab countries as Islamic and terrorist countries, especially following the September 11th attacks in New York, the acts being committed by the so-called "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) in the Middle East and the Palestinian resistance during the Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli conflict being categorized as terrorism. In this regard, H. A. (who immigrated from Ramallah to the US) says:

"Americans do not ask you about your origins. However, once they know that you are Palestinian, some of them will change their view about you. Therefore, I have occasionally tended to introduce myself as a Middle Eastern Christian or a Christian from the Holy Land. This way of self-identification is safer and gives the opposite party the confidence to deal with me."

L. G. (American-born, resides in the US) remarked:

"There is a large Arab Christian community here, where I am able to have a sense of community and home and to be in touch with my roots. Being Christian makes it much easier to relate to Westerners also. In my job, I am able to propose news stories that reveal more about the Arab world. They accept my ideas easily."

This means that Americans treat Arab and Palestinian Christians better than they treat Arab and Palestinian Muslim. It appears that the discriminatory treatment by Americans and foreigners toward Muslims is based on appearances and Islamic rituals, including the way Muslims dress, especially women who wear the Shari'a dress, and daily customs, such as the Islamic habits relating to eating, drinking, etc. This shows that Americans perceive Islam only in terms of manifested practices. They do not know enough about Islam and Muslims nor about the Palestinian people's suffering. What's more, many of them do not know that there are Christians in Palestine and across the Middle East.

In Jordan, only a small percentage of immigrants declared their Christian identity, on the grounds that a person should not be identified or categorized based on his/her features, nationality, or wealth etc., but through his/her good manners, work efficiency, and human conduct with others—which is stipulated in all religions in general.

4.3.5 "I'm Arab"

The idea of adherence to Pan-Arabism, which emerged in the early twentieth century, still exists. Arab Christians were the first to advocate the establishment of Arab states based on citizenship rather than religion. Pan-Arabism has given rise to many political movements, such as the Arab Nationalist Movement and Al-Ba'ath Party among others. However, the role of these movements has declined since the emergence of Islamic movements in the 1970s. In this respect, A. N. (who immigrated from Birzeit and resides in Jordan) says: "I identify myself first and foremost as an Arab. Pan-Arabism brings Palestine and Jordan together. Once I move from Jordan to Palestine or vice versa, I feel like moving within the same territory." M. Q. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and resides in Jordan)—confirms: "Each Arab, even a Mauritanian, represents Palestine. Pan-Arabism still exists as the current success of the religious ideology is temporary."

In the United States, Palestinian immigrants identify themselves as Arabs due to the fact that American society does not ultimately differentiate between Palestinian, Iraqis, and Egyptians; they are all perceived as Muslim Arabs. Thus, they were subject to racism and discriminated against by the US government or American people only because they are Arabs. This means the Arab community in the US share the same challenges and are subject to some discrimination within the

American society. V. A. (who immigrated from Bethlehem and resides in the US) says in this regard:

"The way Americans perceive us is changing. When they know that we are Palestinians, I feel that there becomes a lack of confidence between us. My children were subject to discrimination during their schooling as the way they look; [with facial] features suggesting that they are Arab. Besides, my neighbours were mostly [non-Arab], and I felt that they did not want to communicate or to socialize with me. I remember that none of them visited me or made an inquiry about my health when I fell ill not even once. They also prevented their kids from playing with my kids merely because we were of Arab origins."

4.3.6 "The refugee ration card was revoked from my family" ... we are refugees

Many immigrants have indicated that they were forcefully displaced along with their families in 1948 or 1967. This means that some have experienced immigration, while others were born to refugee families. This begs the question as to whether the status of refugee could be repealed or fades away. Is it contingent upon the possession of a refugee ration card? In this regard, A.A. (who was forcefully displaced from Lidd and currently resides in Jordan) remarks:

"When my father and my family emigrated, they settled down in proximity to refugee camps just like the rest of the refugees. After a considerable period of time, my father was able to find an employment opportunity, which enabled him to earn a monthly income that exceeded 15 Jordanian Dinars. Consequently, and all of a sudden, the refugee ration card was revoked from my family by UNRWA. According to UNRWA, our financial condition improved and we became no longer in need of financial aid. Therefore, we are refugees, but were not treated as such."

This begs the question, does the importance of such a refugee ration card lie in the fact that it is necessary to attain financial and in-kind assistance or that it serves as a tool to preserve refugees' rights and status? This also means that refugees and their offspring, who have improved their financial conditions and relocated to better areas, are no longer considered refugees because of their financial status. This implies that their refugee ration cards are revoked. This issue needs more research.

4.3.7 Hybrid identities ... Second generation

Usually, the offspring of immigrants refuse to embrace the identity of their parents and rather attempt to assimilate in the country where they grew up. However, this does not apply to the case of children of Palestinian immigrants. As a result of policies targeting them in various countries, families with Palestinian origins are driven to become aware of their Arab roots and Palestinian origins. Hence, second-generation Palestinian immigrants are able to comfortably embrace a dual identity with no problems.

In the United States, second-generation immigrants introduce themselves first as Palestinians and then as US citizens, giving priority to the Palestinian identity over the American. This could be ascribed to two reasons: first, the increased awareness of discrimination against Arabs in the US; second, the rise of the Palestinian struggle as a political and national duty.

Parents spare no effort in order to let their children acquire the Palestinian identity and enhance it. They instil the Palestinian identity in the minds of their children through enabling them to acquire the Arabic language, enrolling them in clubs and associations, arranging visits to their homeland, following-up on updates on Palestinian issues through media on a daily basis, and introducing them to Palestinian folklore through teaching them folk dance and traditional meals. In this regard, M. Sh. (who immigrated from Jifna and founder of a popular dance troupe) reflects on cultural preservation:

"When we moved to the United States, I thought it was so important to keep our tradition going. So, we created our own group with a few of our cousins. We started performing at different places and on different events. The more we performed, the more Palestinians joined our dance group. We would perform at universities, days of Palestine, Arab cultural day, etc. My dancing days are over, but my children are in the process of learning. That's why two years ago, I created a group called "Children of Hope" for children aged 5 years and up. I have been teaching them different dances, and they also performed at the day of Palestine."

Young children also expressed their Palestinian identity. For instance, G. M. (an American-born nine-year-old with parents from Ramallah), recorded a video that was broadcasted on

Palestine TV in 2014. He expressed his identity and feelings towards what was happening in Palestine in Arabic. He said:

"I am a Palestinian. I live in America. I come to visit my grandparents in Ramallah every year. This time and during my visit, a war broke out between Israel and Gaza. Israel bombarded everything. Children did not find their parents because they were killed. Neither did they locate their schools because they were demolished. So, we should all be united. We should work and pray for Gaza."

Another example is voiced by L. G., (an American born to a Palestinian father and a Jordanian mother). She remarks:

"I am associated with a network of Palestinian activists. I associated with Students for Justice in Palestine, the Arab Cultural Center and the Arab American Institute. I spent many years trying to understand my culture and strengthen Arabic by traveling to the region a lot and worked as an activist for the Palestinian cause, trying to educate Americans about the history, current situation, and working towards changing American policy in the region. I feel that I am a liaison for the Arab world in the Western world."

S. Q., (who immigrated from Ramallah, is originally from Lidd and now lives in the US, is a father of three children). He confirms:

"Our children are our motivation for work. They fear nothing. They fight, and communicate with senators to express their objection, because they already know their rights. They were born Americans, and have the confidence and full power to preserve their rights and express their opinions and identities."

Palestinian immigrants in Jordan share almost the same racial and cultural backgrounds with Jordanians. This has helped Palestinian immigrants teach the second and third-generation about their Arab identity. But to what extent is the Palestinian identity reflected by immigrants of various generations?

Second-generation Palestinian immigrants tend to introduce themselves as Jordanians with Palestinian roots. This demonstrates that they give priority to their country of origin and country of residence. An explanation for this could be gleaned from the interviews, which show that

second-generation immigrants have a sense of allegiance towards the Palestinian identity, but this sense is rather weak, which could be ascribed to several reasons. First, second-generation Palestinian immigrants have mostly been unable to visit their native country for lack of Palestinian nationality. Second, they have studied the Jordanian curriculum and the history of Jordan. Third, they have not been involved in political associations or institutions as such associations are banned by the Jordanian government. Hence, they can only engage in donation campaigns or humanitarian actions. Hence, the family's role lies in the promotion of national awareness. In this respect, A. N. (a father of four who immigrated from Birzeit and now resides in Jordan) says: "My children launch awareness and donation campaigns for Palestine, but they have not experienced the same feelings I have gone through."

4.4. Palestinian identity developing either toward contraction or expansion

The Palestinian identity in the diaspora has neither gave up nor surrendered. It has not been easily maintained but it has been complemented by new life experiences of Palestinian immigrants. Moreover, the meaning of "Palestinizing" the identity varies from one diasporic state to another. It might mean for Palestinians in the United States political struggle and action as well as the establishment of institutions. It might mean steadfastness in refugee camps, especially for refugees in Syria and Lebanon, and economic and social achievement for Palestinians across Jordan and the Arab Gulf states. But eventually, we could not consider all these emigrants as Palestinians. The identification of Palestinians' identity in the diaspora has become based on immigrants' self-consciousness (personal identity), collective consciousness (collective identity) and awareness of the host society's identity (external identity).

The Palestinian identity has encountered competition from other identities, most importantly the Arab, religious and regional identities. This happened when Palestinians in the diaspora felt that their collective identity is fragile due to their divisions or when they felt that they should embrace a greater identity, such as the Arab identity. For Palestinian immigrants, they have embraced the identity of the host society either due to the Palestinian community's weakness in terms of safeguarding their national collective identity or their inability to withstand the host society's policies. As for immigrants who embraced a dual identity, i.e. the identity of their host country and homeland, by doing so, they have reflected the degree of balance they have attained in

terms of adaptation to host communities. They have adapted to the host communities without losing their original or first identity. Additionally, crossing transnational borders has played a major role in terms of facilitating immigrants' allegiance to two places and dual identities.

4.5 Conclusion

It is not easy to preserve immigrants' original identities. Immigrants have experienced a conflict between the necessity of integration into new societies and the necessity of preserving their original identities. This conflict resulted in "flexible" identities that adapt to the overall society, while also preserving their special nature. This means immigrants' identity has been constantly changing to meet the requirements of society.

Three major institutions—the family, political party, and the church—have played a pivotal role in having a direct impact on Palestinian Christians' identities after immigrating from the homeland. Such a role has been possible as immigrants' identities could not develop apart from the identity of the group to which they are affiliated due to their immigration. These institutions have played a major role in preserving the different identities of immigrants and helped immigrants integrate into host societies.

Immigrants have preserved their cultural identity (language, customs, and heritage) and passed it on to their children and subsequent generations through endogamy among other means. Therefore, they have preferred to return to their country of origin in order to look for spouses, taking into their consideration the role of Palestinian woman in upbringing children. Although it could be deemed by some people as closed-minded, this type of marriage has in fact helped families who have emigrated from Palestine overcome the difficulties related to integration into the new society. It has allowed them to preserve as much of their culture as possible. This type of marriage has also been observed among Palestinians across Jordan, as Jordanian-Palestinian marriages predated the *Nakba*.

Transnational political parties have helped Palestinians in the diaspora remain affiliated to their national cause and to bring their cause to the attention of outside world. However, Black September in Jordan and the September 11 attacks in the US have had an adverse impact on

Palestinian political activism and have delayed Palestinians' integration into politics in their host country. This has resulted in the poor participation of Palestinian immigrants in elections and made it difficult for them to hold senior political positions. On the other hand, as a result of belonging to nationalist and leftist parties, the majority of immigrants who do run in elections have not assumed senior political positions. Whether in Jordan or the US, these parties are rather weak in contrast to others. As a result, Palestinians have been compelled to retreat from political life or join other political parties.

The Church's role has not been separated from the role of the family and political party. Arab or Palestinian churches have been established in order to preserve the Eastern rite, including the language, to represent the Middle Eastern Christian identity. However, the Church has recently appealed to Palestinian nationalism since it believed that safeguarding Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and holding onto the land are necessary for preserving the Christian identity in the Holy Land.

When immigrants of Christian Palestinian origins classify their identities, they take into consideration numerous factors: imposed assimilation policies (most importantly imposed naturalization), respect for cultural diversity, the influence the family, political parties, church and village and city clubs, as well as their individual experiences with migration and the diaspora.

General Conclusion

This study has analysed Palestinian migration and the diaspora from a new perspective without being based on any presupposed ideas. The experience of Palestinian migration and diaspora is affected by a series of profound variables, characteristic of a chaotic and ill-considered nature. This underlies the fact that Palestinian migration is subject to a combination of predominantly political influences, wherein the timing and migratory patterns were mostly beyond the control of the emigrants. By making a comparison between two diaspora countries—the United States and Jordan—the study has also demonstrated dual geographic, sociological and perhaps historical elements that are rather dichotomous, continuous, and sometimes even contradictory on several levels. The researcher merely compared these two countries that reflect two different experiences in terms of culture, policies, and geographic remoteness from the homeland.

This study has attempted to discredit clichés related to the concepts of migration and diaspora. When one addresses the theme of Palestinian migration, the expulsions and forced displacement of the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation forces [Zionist militias in 1948] comes to his mind, when Palestinians were forced to flee on foot to neighbouring Arab countries, leaving behind their fortunes and properties. As a result of cross-border migrations, a specific group of Palestinian refugees migrated beyond neighbouring countries and to other Arab countries such as the Arab Gulf countries, or non-Arab countries such as the US. In contrast to Palestinians in refugee camps who could not immigrate as a result of having refugee status papers, this group obtained Jordanian or Palestinian citizenship and managed to immigrate. This begs the following questions: Were there any political and policy motives behind the naturalization of certain groups of Palestinians while others remain in refugees? Were there any political motives behind the lack of naturalization of Palestinian refugees in camps across Lebanon and Syria, as well as Gaza Palestinians in Jordan?

First-generation immigrants undoubtedly suffered from forced displacement, while second-generation immigrants arguably suffered from dispersion and economically and socially-motivated migration. Many Palestinian families were forcibly displaced from the land of Historic Palestine that became Israel in 1948, settling in the West Bank and Jordan, while second-generation members of such families immigrated to the remote US diaspora. Children of immigrants could not return to

any part of their homeland as a result of obtaining foreign citizenships, with the exception of those who have two dual citizenship. Therefore, Palestinians in the diaspora should not be perceived only as refugees who struggled for only a political cause. The fate of Palestinians in the diaspora is intertwined with several policies, most importantly the Israeli occupation policies, distinguishing the Palestinian diaspora from other diasporas. What makes the case of Palestinian migration different is that the conflict that caused it is ongoing, which renders an acceptance of the circumstances of exile more difficult.³⁵³

In spite of the problematic nature of the concept of diaspora, it has become common and very important to address all parts of Palestinian diaspora.³⁵⁴ Although it could not encompass all Palestinians in the diaspora, the concept of diaspora is used in this study in order to underscore the importance of the size of Palestinian diaspora who mostly remain emotionally and spiritually connected to their homeland. Palestinians in the diaspora have maintained remarkable connections with the diasporic communities. In the meantime, their homeland has undergone shifts. The majority of the land of Historic Palestine has been forcibly seized as a homeland for another people, while the Palestinians in the remaining part still live under Israeli occupation. As a result, Palestinians in the diaspora could only partly establish cross-border connections with their homeland, which has arguably become reduced to the occupied Palestinian territories.

The concept of diaspora serves purely sociological purposes, mainly to disseminate knowledge about the numbers of migrants across various states and continents. However, in the Palestinian case, it has sociological and political contents that cannot be divorced from one another. The migration of Palestinians into numerous states and their inability to return to their homeland has been politically motivated. Thus, the geographical diaspora of the Palestinians has been basically political. In the meantime, states have granted Palestinian immigrants citizenship, allowing them to settle down, integrate into the communities of diaspora and connect with opportunities to express and affirm their Palestinian identity. Diaspora is not a legal, but a

³⁵³ Ghada Karmi, "An early case of migration to the UK: Problems of adaptation and integration," in *Palestinians in Europe: The problems of identity and adaptation*, ed. Abbas Shibliak (Ramallah, Palestine: The Palestinian Refugees and Diaspora Center (SHAML) and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2001), 52-58.

³⁵⁴ Bassma Kodmani, *La position de la CEE dans le conflit israëlo-arabe* (Mémoire ou thèse, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 1981). [In French].

sociological concept. Nevertheless, the legal status of immigrants plays a role in terms of the degree and content of diaspora.

Dispersion seems to be related to stability. Stability means that one possesses comfortable and adequate housing, secures a job, professionally progresses, provides education for and guarantees the future of their children and have a pension (financial and health security in old age). These indicators play a psychological and social role in immigrants' lives, enabling them to live without fear. Every time immigrants achieve professional, economic, and academic success in their host country, they become more integrated. Thus, speaking from a social perspective, the majority of migrants have expressed a lack of sense of dispersion. However, this does not mean they were dispersed for political reasons.

Thus, the researcher deems it necessary to redefine or rather expand and amend the definition of "diaspora" at least in the Palestinian case. Diaspora is not restricted to the dispersion of a people across various regions separated by vast distances. It is not also restricted to their experience of being uprooted and forcibly displaced, or the shock they have suffered from and the collective identity and memory through which they maintain relation to their homeland. It includes their legal status manifested in their inability to return and settle down in their respective hometowns. Not only is this related to the issue of Palestinian refugees [who fled and/or were forcibly displaced from their hometowns] in 1948, but it is also related to economic migrations starting from the late Ottoman period to 1925 and the forced displacement of Palestinians during and after the June 1967 (*Naksa*) War. As a result of economic migrations over this period, and their forced displacement during and after the *Naksa*, migrants lost their citizenship. During the Ottoman period, Palestinian immigrants received Ottoman visas. In contrast, they held Jordanian passports after 1948 and Israeli identity cards after 1967] the start of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza] . So, Palestinians were stripped from their papers, which were considered invalid.

Furthermore, Palestinians living in the Palestinian territories occupied and Israel (since 1948) could not change their areas of residence, as their national identity cards determine where they are permitted to live. This suggests that the Palestinian people live within an artificial geographic diaspora based on colonial policies, both internally and externally. Thus, the concept of diaspora has undergone shifts as it is no longer restricted to geographic dispersion. As a result of

globalization and transnational migrations, many peoples (nations) are now dispersed across regions that are separated by vast distances yet, unlike many Palestinians in the diaspora, they can return to their respective homelands at any time. Thus, the researcher underscores the concept of "policy-governed diaspora" or "politicized diaspora" as well as the concept of "diaspora and human rights." This was affirmed by Anteby-Yemini and Berthomière (2005: 139). The concept of diaspora is often used in ways that give it a diluted or inaccurate meaning. Nowadays, one speak of "cultural diaspora", "diaspora of fear", and "virtual diaspora" among other concepts.³⁵⁵

The discussion on the theme of diaspora involves tackling a sociological system of memory and place. According to this system, migrants or refugees continue to cherish their habits, customs, and social class when they relocate to a certain camp or diaspora society. Palestinian camps and diasporic communities become Palestinian villages and cities outside the borders of the homeland, and memory becomes timeless. The collective memory, land, and places have continued to constitute key elements in the formation of Palestinian diaspora communities and identity. Nevertheless, there has been shifts in Palestinian migration and diaspora since migrants and refugees are impacted by their daily life in the diaspora, which is subject to the assimilation and integration policies among other factors.

Palestinian families have gone through the experience of dispersion as a result of the *Nakba* and *Naksa* wars, forcing them to rebuild and maintain robust inter-familial networks. Such networks were manifested in members of the same family and occasionally members of the same clan utilizing strategies to stay together in camps and in the diaspora. For example, members from one migrant family lived together in the same camp, neighbourhood, quarter, and street, which was characteristic of camps and communities of early immigrants. Although such camps and communities were developed in response to an emergency, immigrants managed to preserve a certain level of family unity. This also applies to Palestinian who immigrated to the US, where members from the same family or hometown lived in the same neighbourhoods. As their social and economic conditions improved, immigrants relocated to more affluent neighbourhoods, dispersing

³⁵⁵ Lisa Anteby-Yemini & William Berthomière, *Les diasporas : retour sur un concept* (Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 16, 2005, 139-149. Web site: <http://bcrfj.revues.org/57>). [In French].

and scattering once again. As migrants continued to live in the same area or city, the diaspora society (community) arguably expanded.

Christian migration has been both "within" and "outside" Palestinian migration. Christians were the first to immigrate to the remote Diaspora, especially the Americas as part of global migration trends that began in the nineteenth century. Later, Christian migration occurred because of the forceful displacement of Palestinians by Israeli occupation armies. Although Muslim and Christian Palestinians were forcefully displaced, Palestinian Christians were the most affected by the 1948 War. As a result of already having networks in the diaspora, Palestinian Christians abroad managed to attract and convene other migrants, mostly due to family or town connections. Members of one family often emigrated from their homeland and settled down in the same area in the diaspora. The social and cultural characteristics (status) of Christians encouraged them to immigrate, and accelerated their integration into and mobility in other countries where the predominant religion is Christianity. So, in the case of Christian immigrants, religion helped bolster the host society's confidence in them. Since Palestinian Christians were the first to immigrate, they became more concentrated in the diaspora than in their homeland. Conversely, Christians in Arab countries, such as Jordan, are a minority and face restrictions for integrating fully, especially politically.

Migrants have developed social and family networks that keep them in contact with their family members, friends, and compatriots throughout the diaspora and in the homeland. These networks could be perceived as two-way bridges. At the same time, these connections accelerate more migration since they help minimize the economic, social and integration-related challenges of migration and help refugees reunite with family. Such networks have transformed Palestinian forced emigrations into cross-border migrations. Following their forced displacement from their homeland in 1948, Palestinians managed to immigrate to the remote diaspora, thanks to such networks. Members of the same family became more dispersed (scattered) across several regions and states. At first glance, this indicates weak family ties and a shift in the traditional concept of family. Although cross-border migrations enabled members from one family to come together, such gatherings became less frequent and immigrants could no longer always gather in their homeland. So, such networks help maintain the diaspora-homeland connection and boost transnational activities. For instance, Palestinian families in the diaspora continue to preserve their

habits, heritage, and the way they raise their children. Despite being raised in the diaspora, second-generation Palestinian immigrants continue to live with their parents until they get married and are determined to marry someone from their homeland. This demonstrates that they continue to hold to their habits and heritage. That is because women are still perceived among immigrants as the preservers of heritage, values, habits, language, and religion.

Even though we are living within an ever-changing global context, this era is characterized with affirming one's national and cultural identity. Minorities and immigrant groups' right to be different is a fundamental condition (prerequisite) of the continuity of democracy. Hence, Palestinians in the diaspora have the right to be organized within a certain political, social, religious, or familial framework. They also have the right to practice transnational activities in their homeland and host country. This is very important in relation to the form of citizenship that emigrants prefer if they cannot or do not want to return to the homeland. The diversity of institutions set up by immigrants in the diaspora, be it village clubs, city clubs, oriental/Arab church, parties, families, conventions, and heritage festivals, underscores the fact that while immigrants respect and belong to their respective host countries, they maintain an actual sense of belonging to their homeland. However, such a sense of belonging is maintained at different rates and in different forms. For instance, Palestinians in Arab countries (such as Jordan), and Palestinian migrants in non-Arab countries (such as the US) are different in terms of the rates and forms of their sense of belonging to their homeland.

The *Nakba* had a decisive impact on class mobility. Following the *Nakba*, a bourgeois did not necessarily maintain their social status as they lost his money, land, and social status. In contrast, the *Nakba* gave rise to a new middle class and bourgeois class that had few links to the old bourgeois class. It also gave rise to aristocratic elites based on new professional expertise. The bourgeois class no longer remained restricted to certain families. However, it must be acknowledged that part of the bourgeois managed to transfer their capitals abroad, while the other bourgeois started from scratch. These new classes emerged from Palestinians taking refuge and immigrating to urbanized areas or pursued their education as a means to attain social status. This does not definitely mean that all Palestinian migrants attained a higher social status. Many of them have been living in the same residential community since their emigration/ displacement.

Undoubtedly, the economic status of migrants was related to the size of investments, remittances, grants, and assistance. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the recognition of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a political and administrative body (though its legal term has since expired), the size of temporal (contingent) economic activities have increased. One could not deny the fact that the Palestinian Authority perceive Palestinians in the diaspora as a mass of capital that should be invested, but not as a large group that should play a role on the political level.

The Church is a worldwide religious institution that connects the East to the West. Taking this into consideration, local churches in the homeland have reached out to all worldwide denominations, albeit at different rates. They have done so not for missionary motives, but with the purpose of preserving their existence and affirm that Palestinian Christians are an integral part of Middle East Christians and citizens in their homeland. Local churches have taken into consideration that churches outside of the Middle East serve as advocates against the Israeli occupation at varying levels of influence; however, their influence is not equal to that of the Zionist lobby. Local churches have not lost their Middle Eastern identity as a result of this openness to other Christian denominations. The establishment of many Arab churches in the diaspora provides a clear indication that immigrants hold on to their religious culture. In contrast, local mosques do not reach out to foreign mosques in the West due to linguistic and cultural differences. That is why mosques established by Muslim immigrants of various nationalities in the diaspora play little role in terms of reaching out to and having an influence on Western society.

Village and city clubs are the oldest institutions established by Palestinians in the diaspora. Such clubs were established to link immigrants together, especially immigrants hailing from the same village or city. Meetings and activities held in such clubs demonstrate that immigrants have preserved a certain level of national identity. However, some consider the fact that such clubs limit their membership to small villages and towns (and occasionally families) to be a form of societal fragmentation and disunity. They also consider the establishment of such clubs as being a reflection of the fact that geographical and family divisions that dominated Palestinian society followed Palestinians into the diaspora when they immigrated. Nevertheless, such clubs continue to work effectively by connecting immigrants together and linking them to the homeland. Besides, they play a key role in raising funds for many projects in the homeland as a matter of national duty.

Cross-border political parties have played an effective role in terms of organizing and uniting Palestinian communities. The fact that migrants are affiliated with branches of Palestinian political parties in the diaspora is clear evidence that they have not forgotten their cause. However, their affiliation has weakened their participation in foreign political parties and curtailed their ability to assume senior political positions in their respective host countries. Remarkably, the shift in Palestinian immigrants' participation in elections and political parties have resulted from political events involving Palestinian political parties or communities and foreign governments. Examples of such events are Black September (Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank), and the September 11th attacks in the US. Such events compelled Palestinians in one way or another to belong to political parties in their host countries. However, this does not indicate that all Palestinian in the diaspora go to the ballot box.

Palestinian immigrants' expression of their identity has been related to the scale of activities held by families, churches, city and village clubs, and political parties in the countries of diaspora. Such activities are ultimately intended to promote Palestinian immigrants' connection to the Palestinian identity, albeit at different rates and in different ways. Thus, the preservation of one migrant's cultural, religious, and territorial identity contributes to the preservation of the Palestinian identity as a whole. On the other hand, the policies of host countries have impacted how Palestinian immigrants identify themselves. The countries of diaspora continue to practice discriminatory policies against Palestinian immigrants on ethnic or religious grounds, albeit at different rates. For instance, Palestinian immigrants in Jordan have been classified on the basis of origin (West Bank Palestinians, Gaza Strip Palestinians or refugees in camps in the case of naturalization). Besides, Palestinian Christian immigrants in Jordan have been classified on the basis of religion in the case of legal cases, such as elections. Thus, Palestinian immigrants mostly describe their identity as "Jordanian-Palestinian" and occasionally as "Christian-Jordanian." As a result, some feel that they are second-degree citizens.

The Palestinian Authority institutions were absent in diaspora. Remarkably, transnational activities were conducted through family networks, churches, or village and city clubs as well as through some municipalities and many Christian and cultural institutions. This begs the question: what is the role of Palestinian representative offices or embassies in the diaspora? Is it restricted to the provision of legal services? This means that Palestinian communities have not become highly

organized, exacerbating divisions among Palestinians. Besides, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Expatriate Affairs Department has played little role. Official Palestinian representation is weak for two reasons. First, the Palestinian people could not realize their just and legitimate aspirations in an independent state, regardless of its geographical borders. The second reason is related to Arab and non-Arab governments' attitude towards the Palestinian cause (question). Most notably, the US government has always refrained from supporting the rights of the Palestinian people.

Despite the shifts initiated by the concept of nation-states and cross-border migrations, the theme of geography or territory remains a concern for Palestinians in the diaspora and in refugee camps. Whether immigration was prompted by war, displacement, or economic challenges, Palestinian immigration has constituted an opportunity for them to improve their living conditions and perhaps the conditions of their families in the homeland or refugee countries. Many have no choice to remain in the diaspora as they cannot legally return to their homeland as a result of Israel's current policies. Thus, historical Palestine could not be considered as a nation-state (legally) for all Palestinians in the diaspora.

Through addressing the following two dilemmas, the study aims to present a future vision of Palestinian migration and the diaspora. The dilemmas are based on finding political solutions to the Palestinian cause or the lack of such solutions. Accordingly, one could conceive the following two scenarios in relation to the future vision of Palestinian migration and the diaspora.

The first scenario is that Palestinian emigration continues unabated. It is anticipated that the drain of Palestinian emigration would continue as a result of ongoing adverse political and security conditions, namely lack of Palestinian statehood (regardless of the geographic borders of the future Palestinian state), persistent Israeli occupation policies, and restrictions on the Palestinian economy and freedom of movement, and ongoing Israeli colonies construction. Family networks would continue to play the larger role in stepping up and regulating Palestinian emigration. On the one hand, the Palestinian diaspora would continue to maintain connections with the homeland as Palestinians in the diaspora (refugees and immigrants) are incapable of returning to their homeland. At the same time, Palestinian immigrants or refugees would continue to have strained relationship with their host countries.

The second scenario is the return of Palestinian immigrants and refugees to their homeland. The establishment of a future Palestinian state would allow Palestinian immigrants and refugees to return to their homeland through agreements with the diaspora and refugee states, allowing immigrants and refugees to have dual citizenship or nationality. They would have the choice to return to their homeland and participate in local elections while they also carry out their duties in their respective immigration and refugee states. This would enable diaspora-homeland networks to develop and enable Palestinian immigrants and refugees to really have affiliation with two states and two identities.

Research on the Palestinian Christian diaspora and migration has provided an opportunity to understand and analyse many issues related to Palestinians' relationships to their homeland and the diaspora. The experience of Palestinian Christians has been outstanding since it is concerned with a certain group of Palestinians. Palestinian Christians in the diaspora share certain issues with other Diasporas, such as the Lebanese or Armenians, and they share other issues with all Palestinians. Thus, this study has many paradoxes.

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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

Angers University

Geography discipline (ESO)

A Questionnaire for the different generations of Palestinians Christian in the US

This questionnaire is dedicated to individual or families Christian who their first generation from Palestine before 1948 and not due to the war in the same year. And it is required to meet the requirements of the PhD thesis titled *the immigration of Palestinians Christian*.

You are kindly requested to carefully read and honestly and objectively answer the questionnaire items by crossing the box beside the appropriate answer for each item. It is worth noting that the information you provide are strictly confidential, and will be used only for academic research purposes. There is no need to mention your name.

Part 1: Community and Diaspora

1-The area where you live is considered as: (1) rural (2) urban (3) in-between (4) area for immigrants

2-Do you live in the same area/city where first-generation family lived/has been living? (1) Yes (2) No

***If you select 'no':**

3- Where did your first-generation family used to live?

4- Where did your second-generation family used to live?

5- Please list the names of states or cities where he stayed temporarily before making it to his final destination. These states/ cities are.....,.....,

6- You have relocated to the current area due to (the fact that): (1) available employment opportunities (2) available services (3) your friends and acquaintances live there (4) it is more safe and less crowded (5) standard of living is less expensive.

7- You have been interested in living in: (1) Arab neighbourhoods (2) Palestinian neighbourhoods (3) Palestinian/Arab Christian neighbourhoods (4) mixed neighbourhoods (5) It isn't important for you.

8- Do you and your cousins live in the same city/area? (1) Yes (2) No

9-The Arab/ Palestinian identity of the area/ neighbourhood where you live is manifested in: (1) streets and stores names (2) architectural style of houses (3) nature of markets and sales.

10-Examples for Arab/ Palestinian institutions based in your place of residence are: (1) a sport/ cultural club (2) church (3) mosque (4)an expatriates' society/ club (5) women society (6) school (7) an Arabic language center (8) other:

11-Have the Arab/ Palestinian residents formed a committee (association) tasked with running the neighbourhood's affairs? (1) Yes (2) No, why?

12-Are any group ceremonies, whether taking the form of Christian festivals, Palestinian national occasions, or Arab national occasions, being held in your locality/ neighbourhood? (1) Yes (2) No, why?

13-Do you believe that the Palestinian representative office/ consulate play a role in bringing together and organizing immigrants? (1) Yes (2) No why?

14-Do you maintain a solely official relation, i.e. a relation restricted to applying for official documents, with the Palestinian representative office in your locality? (1) Yes (2) No, why?

15-Does the Palestinian representative office in your locality play a national role in terms of bringing together all Palestinian immigrants without excluding anyone? (1) Yes (2) No, why?

16-You continue to feel that your fate is unclear or mysterious in the country of immigration: (1) Yes (2) No, why?

17-Does the fact that you are staying in the country of immigration makes you feel you are a foreign national? (1) Yes (2) No why?

18- Does the fact that you are living along with most of your relatives in the same neighbourhood and city make you feel that you are living in a miniature society representing your country of origin? (1) Yes (2) no why?

19-Although you hold US nationality (citizenship), you experience a state of confusion: (1) yes (2) no (3) sometimes why?

20-How do feel the fact that you have an American passport with Palestinian origin?

21-Has Your Palestinian origin adversely affected (slowed down or reduced) your integration into the society? (1) Yes (2) No why?

22-What does the concept of Diaspora mean to you? (1) a political situation (2) being geographically remote from your country of origin (3) detachment from your family (4) losing your Palestinian identity (5) lack of ability to return to your homeland.

23-Do you feel that you live in Diaspora? The living in the Diaspora means that you are living as part of: (1) Yes (2) No Why?

23-The living in the Diaspora means that you are living as part of: (1) a racial minority (2) persecuted group (3) you have gone through painful history (4) dwell on the past.

24-Your country of origin stands as: (1) a national symbol (2) fiction/ legend (3) part of history (4) the forefathers' land (5) the place where you eventually would like to return.

Part 2: Transnationalism, cross borders, and nets

1-You communicate with your relatives in your country of origin: (1) through visiting them (2) via phone (3) social media (skype/Facebook) (3) you don't communicate with them.

2-You are a member on a Facebook group related to: (1) your family (2) your church (3) your origin village/city (4) an Arab/Palestinian association

3-You have been communicating with or visiting your relatives for: (1) 1-5 Years (2) 6-10 years (3) 11-20 years (4) over 20 years (5) you haven't visited since you immigrated.

4-You have communicated with your relatives due to: (1) your sense of alienation and nostalgia (2) your desire to find out your original identity (3) your desire to get acquainted to other members of your family living in your country of origin (4) encouragement and support you received from your family members.

5-Communicating with your relatives in your country of origin has took the form of: (1) making your own investment in your country of origin (2) getting a temporary contract based job (3) attending family social occasions (4) making tours around the country of origin (5) volunteering in an institution for a specific time.

6-The obstacles you have faced when traveling to Palestine included: (1) lack of Palestinian ID card (2) not being granted a visa (3) lack of solid relations with your country of origin (4) no relatives living in your native town (5) not owning any assets, such as real estate, plot of land, or investment in the country of origin.

7-You send remittances to your country of origin in order to: (1) help sustain the rest of your family members (2) support charitable societies (3) make donations to needy individuals and families (4) support churches together with affiliated institutions (5) make profitable personal investment (6) support a particular institution (7) you don't send remittance for any of these purposes.

8-How much money you send by year: (1) less than 1000\$ (2) between 1000-2000\$ (3) between 2000-3000\$ (4) between 3000-4000\$ (5) more than 5000\$

9-The way you send the money: (1) by bank (2) with some relatives (3)

10-You consider your relation with other immigrants from various generations as: (1) weak (2) strong (3) restricted to your family

11-Do you consider yourself as representing Palestine in the country of immigration? (1) Yes (2) No why?

12-Do you believe that third and fourth generation immigrants represent the country of immigration?
(1) Yes (2) No why?

13-How the Americans look at you as you from Palestinian origin (the Palestinian stereotype)?

14-Is there a difference in the stereotype between you (as a Christian) and other Palestinian, Muslims, Arabs?

15- Is there a difference in you integration in the American society and their one? How?

16-You are a member of a an expatriates society/club that is affiliated to: (1) the Arabs (2) the Palestinians (3) Palestinian Christians (4) Christians coming from your native town/ city (5) a town/village society, like a *diwan* , irrespective of religious considerations (6) a Palestinian American society (7) you aren't a member of any such society (8) women society (9) you are a member of more than a society (please specify)

16-You meet third and fourth generation immigrants during: (1) religious festivals and national occasions (2) conventions (3) club's activities (4) other social joyful and sad occasions (5) family occasions.

17-You meet immigrants from different generations almost: (1) once a year (2) twice a year (3) only during the society or club's periodic convention (4) during social occasions (5) rarely and by chance.

18-You meet your third and fourth generation sons and grandchildren at: (1) your home (2) the society/club (3) during your family's social occasions.

19-You meet your sons and grandchildren almost: (1) once a week (2) once a month (3) twice a year (on religious festivals) (4) during annual vacations (5) once a year (during summer vacation)

Part 3: National identity, Eastern Christian identity, and the Arabic language

1-You use Arabic in: (1) daily domestic life (2) performing prayers and religious rituals (3) social gatherings (4) national gatherings (5) the society or club's conventions (6) you don't use it (7) you use it according to circumstances.

2-Have you taught your children Arabic through enrolling them in a school or registering them in special programs? (1) Yes (2) No Why?

3-Do you believe that the activities undertaken by the Arab and Palestinian communities reinforce the Arab culture and language? (1) Yes (2) No Why?

4-Do you believe that the activities undertaken by the Arab and Palestinian communities reinforce your Christian identity and religious affiliation (belonging)? (1) Yes (2) No why?

5-Have you used the oral narrative and your family's archive to document and reinforce your children and grandchildren's relation with their country of origin? (1) Yes (2) No why?

6-Is there a church that uses the Arab language regardless of its liturgy in the area where you live? (1) Yes (2) No why?

7-Are you interested in attending prayers (the liturgy) on various feasts and occasions? (1) Yes (2) No why?

8-Are you interested in attending a church from your denomination? (1) Yes (2) No why?

9-Apart from its religious role, the church plays other roles in the lives of immigrants, including: (1) helping introduce immigrants to parishioner (2) help needy immigrants (3) raise funds or donations for the country of origin (4) making sure that immigrants get married to people from the same denomination (5) none

10-You introduce yourself as: (1) American (2) Palestinian-American (3) Arab-American (4) American-Palestinian (5) American-Arab (6) Christian (7) Arab Christian (8) Palestinian Christian (9) Arab Orthodox/ Catholic/ Protestant (10) Palestinian Orthodox/ Catholic/ Protestant (11) something else: (please specify :.....)

11-Who does have the greatest influence over organizing the Christian/ Palestinian community in your locality? (1) The family unit (2) Palestinian expatriates society (3) Palestinian embassy (4) church (5) Arab community.

12-The aspect most reflecting your identify in the American society is (1) your Christian faith (2) your Palestinian origin (3) your Arabic (4) your Arab race (5) nothing (6) more than one aspect (please specify :.....)

General Information (about the respondent)

1-Sex :(1) male (2) female

2-age group: (1) 18-25 years old (2) 26-39 years old (3) 40-49 years old (4) 50-59 years old (5) over 60 years old

3-Birthplace (state or city):

4-Place of your origin in Palestine: village/city in Palestine

5-academic qualifications: (1) illiterate (2) primary level education (3) high school (4) diploma

(5) Bachelor degree (6) Master degree (7) PhD degree

6- Type of work: (1) employee (2) professional (3) trader (4) jobless (5) retiree (6) private business (7) more than one job

7-Marital (social) status: (1) single (2) married (3) widow (4) divorced

8-Current place of residence: the country the city the area.....

9-You are one of Generation: (1) the first (2) the second (3) the third (2) the fourth

10- How much passport you have? Specify

****this section about the wife and the marriage (if you are married)***

4-Your origin is: (1) Palestinian (2) Arab (3) foreign (4) US

5- Before you got married, you hold: (1) Palestinian passport (2) foreign passport (3) US passport (4) Arab passport (5) dual nationality (please specify)

6-You have a kinship with your husband: (1) he is a member of the same family/clan (2) he comes from your native village/town (3) he is a member of the same relative (4) none.

7-Before getting married, you used to live in: (1) the same country of immigration (2) the same mother country (Palestine) (3) in a different place (please specify)

8-you decide to married him because: (1) he from the same race, religion, the origin (2) you like the traditional marriage (relative marriage) (3) it wasn't your choice but your family (4) to escape from the tradition life where is the freedom (5) he was more rich than you and your family in Palestine (Good life guaranteed) (6) you loved or wanted each other

9-yourrole has you played in your family in the country of immigration: (1) You have helped maintain customs and traditions as much as possible (2) you have morally helped your children (sons and daughters) to integrate into the country of immigration (3) you have carried out common domestic chores (4) you have taken English courses to find a job

10-Was/Are you a member of a women society in the country of immigration? (1) Yes (2) No

*** If your answer is 'yes', answer the following:**

10-The women society is: (1) Palestinian (2) Arab (3) affiliated to a church (4) friendship society (5) US society (6) political

11-In this society, you carry out/ participate in: (1) traditional handiwork (2) various workshops (3) cultural lectures (4) social activities (5) recreational activities.

12-You believe that you have joined this society for: (1) recreational purposes and leisure pursuits (2) national purpose (3) demonstrating the Palestinian women's identity (4) establishing channels of communication with other immigrants from the same country of origin (5) get a financial assistance.

***If your answer is 'no',**

13-You have not joined such a society because: (1) there is no a nearby society (2) you work outside of the house and don't have enough time (3) you believe that there is no any benefit whatsoever from joining such a society.

*** *This section for the second/third/fourth generation of immigrants***

1-The way by which you immigrated was: (1) coming for a visit (2) coming for study (3) coming for work (4) you have some relatives (please specify) (5) got married with person with American citizenship (6) born there (born American)

2-You continued to live with your family until you were: (1) 18 years old (2) 1924 years old (3) 2530 years old (4) 3140 years (5) over 40 years old.

3-You have helped some of your relatives in your country of origin to immigrate through: (1) encouraging and providing them with necessary information (2) transferring ticket fees (3) receiving them in your house for some time (4) helping them obtain residency papers (5) helping them later get jobs (6) helping them to get married to a foreign national spouse (7) you have not attempted to do anything from that.

APPENDIX 2: STUDY SAMPLE

Factors	Total	The US	Jordan
Gender			
Males	73.21%	58.92%	87.5%
Females	26.78%	41.07%	12.5%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Age			
Less 25 years old	0.89%	1.78%	0.00%
26- 39 years old	8.03%	12.5%	3.57%
40- 49 years old	14.28%	17.85%	10.71%
50- 59 years old	8.92%	10.71%	7.14%
over 60 years old	67.85%	57.14%	78.47%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Social Status			
Single	4.46%	5.35%	3.57%
Married	85.71%	80.35%	91.07%
Widow	8.92%	14.28%	3.57%
Divorced	0.89%	0.00%	1.78%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Qualification			
Primary	8.92%	7.14%	10.71%
High school (Tawjihi)	28.57%	30.35%	26.78%
Diploma degree	16.07%	19.64%	12.5%
Bachelor degree	27.67%	25%	30.35%
Master degree	10.71%	12.5%	8.92%
PhD degree	8.03%	5.35%	10.71%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Place origin			
West Bank	73.3%	75%	71.4%
Jerusalem	3.5%	-	7.2%
Gaza Strip	-	-	-
Israel (Land of 1948)	23.2%	25%	21.4%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Generation			
First generation	82.2%	91%	73.3%
Second generation	17.8%	9%	26.7%
<i>Total</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>100%</i>

Thèse de Doctorat

Hadeel FAWADLEH

Migrations et diaspora : Expérience des Chrétiens palestiniens en Jordanie et aux États- Unis

Migrations and diaspora: The Experience of Palestinian Christians in Jordan and the United States of America

Résumé

Cette étude soulève de nombreuses questions sur les Palestiniens vivant au sein de la diaspora en se concentrant sur les Palestiniens Chrétiens. Elle traite de sujets majeurs concernant les migrations, la diaspora, l'identité et les réseaux ; quatre concepts interdépendants mais qui ne peuvent être analysés de façon isolée les uns des autres. La majorité des migrations palestiniennes ont commencé par des migrations forcées pour des raisons politiques ou économiques avant de devenir des migrations transnationales.

Bien que des politiques d'absorption des migrants par les pays de la diaspora aient été mises en place, ceux-ci ont conservé leur identité, grâce aux réseaux religieux, familiaux, nationaux et palestiniens. La création de clubs de villages et de villes, de clubs familiaux, d'églises arabes, entre autres, ont relié les migrants les uns aux autres et ont également mis en lien la diaspora et le pays d'origine.

Comprenant des réseaux sociaux, économiques et charitables, les réseaux transnationaux ont affirmé les relations des migrants avec leur pays d'origine comme un élément principal. Toutefois, la proportion de migrants palestiniens pouvant franchir les frontières de leur pays d'origine reste faible. Ceci confirme le fait que les Palestiniens à l'étranger constituent une vraie diaspora.

Les Palestiniens ont vécu différentes expériences de migration et de diaspora dans les pays arabes voisins et dans les pays éloignés étrangers (non-arabes). Le concept de diaspora a été redéfini à partir de notre terrain palestinien. L'étude présente différents modèles géographiques de familles palestiniennes dans la diaspora

Mots clés

Migration – Diaspora – Identité – Réseaux - Traversées de frontières - Réseaux familiaux - Chrétiens Palestiniens.

Abstract

This study raises many questions and issues on Palestinians living in the diaspora through focusing on the segment of Palestinian Christians. This study discusses major issues on the level of migrations, diaspora, identity and networks; four interrelated concepts that could not be examined or understood in isolation from each other. The majority of Palestinian migrations started as forced emigrations for political or economic reasons before becoming transnational migrations. This shift was accompanied by another shift in the legal statuses of this transient segment of Palestinians who obtained new nationalities.

As a result of the adoption of migrants' absorption policies by countries of diaspora, migrants have preserved their identities, which ranged from religious, to familial, to nationalist and to Palestinian. The establishment of village and city clubs, Arab churches and family divans (Diwans) among others have connected migrants to one another and also connected the diaspora to the homeland.

Ranging from social, to economic, to charitable, transnational networks have affirmed emigrants' relations with their country of origin as a main element. However, the proportion of Palestinian emigrants could cross borders to their country of origin is small. This confirms the fact that Palestinians abroad constitute a real diaspora.

Palestinians have gone through different experiences of migration and diaspora in neighboring Arab countries and remote foreign (non-Arab) countries; the concept of Diaspora has been redefined in a manner that fits the Palestinian case. The study presents different geographic patterns of Palestinian families in the diaspora.

Key Words

Migration – Diaspora – Identity – Networks - Cross borders - Familial networks - Palestinian Christians.