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What a Body can Become : cartography between Dance and Philosophy

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Laura Potrovic. What a Body can Become : cartography between Dance and Philosophy. Musicology and performing arts. Université Sorbonne Paris Cité; Sveučilište u Zagrebu (Hrvatska), 2017. English. NNT : 2017USPCA087 . tel-01779721

HAL Id: tel-01779721

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ED 267 ARTS & MÉDIAS

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Thèse en Cotutelle présentée par Laura Potrovic
en vue de l'obtention du Doctorat en Études Théâtrales

CE QU'UN CORPS PEUT DEVENIR: CARTOGRAPHIE ENTRE DANSE ET PHILOSOPHIE

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Soutenue le mercredi 27 septembre 2017

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CE QU'UN CORPS PEUT DEVENIR: CARTOGRAPHIE ENTRE DANSE ET PHILOSOPHIE

Résumé

Cette thèse n'explore pas ce qu'est le corps, mais ce qu'un corps peut devenir. Elle explore le corps comme un événement en train de se faire à travers les concepts tels que le Corps sans Organes (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari), le *bodying* (Erin Manning), le corps en train de se faire (Erin Manning) et le devenir (Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari). Ce que tous ces concepts ont en commun est l'état de devenir. Ici, le corps devient, et en tant que tel — c'est un verbe, une activité, une force. Cette thèse explore non seulement le corps comme une force de devenir, mais elle explore également le devenir de cette force — au niveau moléculaire, expérientiel et relationnel. Comme le dit Manning, un corps est toujours plus qu'un corps. Ici, nous essayons d'aborder les devenirs physiques, expérientiels et relationnels d'un corps en mouvement. Ce qui bouge le corps de l'état d'être vers l'état de devenir est le mouvement. Cette thèse tente de montrer comment le mouvement ne s'arrête jamais. Nous bougeons toujours, donc, il y a une continuité de devenir. Un corps n'est jamais uniquement une forme, il est une force-forme. Le mouvement est celui qui ouvre le corps vers son devenir de force(s). Un corps en mouvement n'est pas une forme d'expression, mais une force d'expressivité. Le mouvement relie le corps à sa force d'expressivité où le corps commence à danser ses capacités à faire, à produire et à devenir. Le corps n'est jamais prédéterminé ou fini — au niveau physique, expérientiel ou relationnel — il est un mouvement continu. Le mouvement fait le corps, par conséquent, le corps lui-même est un mouvement. Nous ne dansons pas avec le corps, nous dansons le corps lui-même. Le corps est une partition, un corps-partition, de son devenir. Nous ne nous intéressons pas, par exemple, à ce qu'est un cœur, mais nous sommes intéressés par les devenirs moléculaires, expérientiels et relationnels d'un cœur ; nous sommes intéressés par ce qu'un cœur peut devenir. Les organes ne sont pas des expressions, mais des flux, des intensités, des champs d'expressivité. Cette thèse tente de cartographier ces flux — performatifs et conceptuels — et de les réorienter vers de nouveaux devenirs.

Mots clés : Corps sans Organes, *bodying*, corps en train de se faire, corps-partition, mouvement, devenir.

WHAT A BODY CAN BECOME: CARTOGRAPHY BETWEEN DANCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

This thesis does not explore what body is, but what a body can become. It explores the body as event-in-making throughout the concepts such as Body without Organs (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari), bodying (Erin Manning), body-in-making (Erin Manning). What all of those concepts have in common is the same state — a state of becoming. Here, body becomes, and as such — it is a verb, an activity, a force. This thesis does not only explore the body as a force of becoming, but it also explores the becoming of that force — at the molecular, experiential and relational level. As Manning says, a body is always more-than one. Here, we are trying to approach the physical, experiential and relational becomings of a body in movement. That which moves the body from the state of being into the state of becoming is movement. This thesis is trying to show how movement never stops. We always move, therefore, there is a continuity of becoming. A body is never just a form, but a force-form. Movement is that which opens the body toward its becoming of force(s). A moving body is not a form of expression, but a force-field of expressivity. Movement connects the body to its very field of expressivity where the body starts to dance its capacities to do, produce and become. The body is never predetermined or finished — at the physical, experiential or relational level — but it is an ongoing movement. Movement makes the body, therefore, the body itself is a movement. We are not dancing with the body, we are dancing the body itself. The body is a score, a body-score, of its own becoming. We are not interested in what, for example, a heart is, but we are interested in molecular, experiential and relational becomings of a heart; we are interested in what a heart can become. Organs are not expressions, but flows, intensities, fields of expressivity. This thesis is an attempt to map those flows — performative and conceptual ones — and to redirect them toward new becomings.

Keywords: Body without Organs, bodying, body-in-making, body-score, movement, becoming.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank to Professor Josette Féral for challenging me from the first day we met. Because of her supervision this thesis was not only an act of writing on the subject of becoming, but also an act of becoming itself. Professor Féral helped me ground, as well as orient many of my ideas and I am truly grateful for that.

I would like to thank to Professor Sibila Petlevski for her infinite openness toward my ideas. Her presence helped me navigate through the hardest moments of this process. Her supervision was an act of thinking-with, feeling-with, becoming-with, an act that was transforming even the hardest moments into lines of flight.

I would like to thank to Ivan Magrin-Chagnolleau for his inspiration and support. His desire to explore the unknown, to think *from*, as well as to think *with* the body inspired the entire process of writing this thesis.

I would like to thank to Mathieu Prévot for his limitless giving. He inspired me to move-with the impossible, to go to what I thought was my limit and then go further. Thanks to his support I transformed my fears into the fuel for my becomings.

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1 | INTRODUCTION

There are numerous reasons for writing this thesis. The first and maybe the most important one is not knowing if I can actually do it. The attraction towards the impossibility of thinking, feeling, doing. The second reason is discovering what my own body can think, feel and do. Where does my body stop and this thesis begin? Is there a shared, relational body integrating my own body (or bodies) and the body (or bodies) of this thesis? I am not only writing this thesis, I am also being written by it. My entire being is being made by, through and in the act of writing. My body is an act of writing. My body is my thesis. The act of writing this thesis was mostly marked by the parallel feelings of ecstasy and crisis; discovery and the impossibility of a total transmission of the discovery. This thesis began before it began. I was directing a rehearsal in 2013 and at the moment everything I have ever known about a body seemed wrong. I allowed myself to write that down three and a half years after. What do we do when our body doesn't want to be determined anymore by what it is, but only by what it can become? Writing this thesis was hard because of the work that preceded the act of writing. In order to start writing I needed to say no to almost everything I have ever studied or learned about the body and I needed to continue saying no on a daily basis. In a way, this thesis is an act of saying no to that which body is and to the possibility of defining it. The more I worked on exploring my own or the body of the other, the more it seemed how body itself was a verb, bodying, and never a noun. The more I explored the state of bodying, the more it seemed how what I was perceiving as a body was completely experiential, relational, the state of becoming. Body(ing) experienced in, through and as a state of becoming is never one and is always many. The process of bodying is multi-timed and multi-spaced. The possibility of experiencing, but not capturing and transmitting those was one of the questions that kept my attention for a long time. How do we arrive to the point of being able to share that experience; what if the experience itself is being changed on a daily basis? In that case, in its most truthful state, this thesis would become the act of rewriting itself in the present moment. Is the purpose of our writing to describe the experience or to set the conditions to make it happen? How can I make my research felt? How can I perform it or allow the other to perform it? What do we do when our body arrives to the point of refusing to quote the experience? What do we do when our body arrives from the point of dancing its own experience or

dancing itself as an experience? At a certain moment I had nothing to write except questions, so I stopped writing. Why did I stop writing when I had nothing to say and everything to ask? One of the central problems I encountered during this process was

¹Experience is a milieu which provides the capacity to affect and be affected; it is a-subjective and impersonal. Experience is not an individual property. Instead, subjects are constituted in relations within experience itself, that is, by means of individuation via haecceity. Furthermore, the exteriority of relations presents "a vital protest against principles" (Deleuze, 1987: 55). Experience is made meaningful not by grounding empirical particulars in abstract universals but by experimentation. For Deleuze, something in the experiential world forces us to think. It is an object not of recognition but a fundamental encounter that can be "grasped in a range of affective tones" (Deleuze, 1994: 139). Therefore, novel concepts are to be invented or created in order to make sense out of singular experiences and, ultimately, to affirm this sense. Experience is qualitative, multidimensional, and inclusive; more precisely, it includes "a draft, a wind, a day, a time of day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness" (Deleuze, 1995: 141). However, an experiential event is subjectless. According to Deleuze (2000), we are made up of and experience makes sense to us only if we understand the relations in practice between conflicting schemes of the said experience. The difference embedded in real experience makes thought encounter a shock or crisis, which is embedded in the objective structure of an event *per se*, therefore transcending the faculties of perception beyond the "given" data of sense-impressions. Difference is an ontological category, "the noumenon closest to phenomenon" (Deleuze, 1994: 222), which is never beyond experience because every phenomenon is in fact conditioned by difference. Transcendental empiricism is what Deleuze considered his philosophical method: thinking is not a natural exercise but always a second power of thought, born under the constraint of experience as a material power, a force. Furthermore, the intensity of difference is a function of desire, the latter embedded in experience because its object is "the entire surrounding which it traverses" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 30). The experiential world is folded. The fold is what stands for "the inside of the outside" (Deleuze, 1988a: 96), where the outside is virtual yet real by virtue of its pragmatics. It unfolds in an unpredictable way, and it is impossible to know ahead of time what the body (both physical and mental) can do. Since the body, acting within experience, is defined by its affective capacity, it is equally impossible to know "the affects one is capable of" (Deleuze, 1988b: 125). Therefore, life becomes an experimental and experiential affair that requires, for Deleuze, practical wisdom in a Spinozian sense by means of immanent evaluations of experience, or modes of existence. The experience, as affective, is a-conceptual, and Deleuze emphasises the passionate quality of such an experience: "perhaps passion, the State of passion, is actually what folding the line outside, making it enduring... is about" (Deleuze, 1995: 116). The Deleuzian object of experience, being un-thought, is presented here only in its tendency to exist, or rather to subsist, in a virtual, sub-representative state. Furthermore, it actualises itself through multiple differentiations. Deleuze's method of transcendental empiricism, compatible with Henri Bergson's intuition, enables the reading of the signs, symbols and symptoms that lay down the dynamical structure of experience. Experience is not limited to what is immediately perceived: the line of flight or becoming is real even if "we don't see it, because it's the least perceptible of things" (Deleuze, 1995: 45). Thinking, enriched with desire, is experimental and experiential: experience is future-oriented, lengthened and enfolded, representing an experiment with what is new, or coming into being. Experience constitutes a complex place, and our experimentation on ourselves makes, for Deleuze, the only reality. By virtue of experimentation, philosophy-becoming escapes the old frame of reference within which its flight seems like an immaterial vanishing through some imaginary event-horizon, and creates its own terms of actualisation thereby leading to the "intensification of life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 74) by revaluating experience.

the problem of language. The impossibility of saying. The impossibility of writing. An ongoing search for making the impossible possible. I was asking myself: is it possible to make words feel; is it possible to make words create dance instead of describing it? What I was experiencing while bodying my research was the impossibility of a direct transmission of my experience in words. The language that I was supposed to use was the language that was describing the experience, but not making the other have the experience. How do we make other feel the concepts we are working on? Many of the concepts I worked with arrived from the body, many of them were experience-based concepts, so the moment of sharing them was not supposed to integrate only the level of description, but also the level of operation, the level of becoming. What if the concept of a body is completely situation-based, experience¹-based? What if the meaning of a concept of the body reorganizes itself in time, in relation to our experience, like our cells; what if the meaning lasts only as long as the experience? Is it possible to make felt the singularity of an experience of bodying in the act of writing? When does writing become bodying? When does a doctoral thesis become a stage and how? Is the act of writing the act of setting conditions for a thesis to happen? How do we stage, dance, move words, as well as make them stage, dance and move the perception of the other? Some of the questions that were constantly arriving from my body were:

- how to recreate the experience instead of describing it;
- how can I use or integrate my own body and its understanding of a subject as a reference point;
- what if there is no body; what if there are only bodyings;
- what if the experience of the body does not match the representation of the body;
- how is it possible to think experience-based representation of the body;
- what is the difference between the body schema and the body image;
- how is it possible to think experience-based body image;
- what if the body image we see does not match the body image we feel;
- what if body is not an organization, but a set of relations;
- what if anatomy is not only physiological, but also experiential and relational;
- what if body is a score, body-score;

- what if movement practice is a way of dancing the body-score, as well as everything a body-score can become;
- what if our experience of anatomy, our experiential anatomy is movement-dependent;
- what if there are no organs, but only organs-scores;
- what if body is a verb;
- what if there are only bodyings, handings, eyeings, etc.;
- what if there is no such thing as a hand, but only handing or a potential of a hand to become through movement;
- what if movement is a practice of qualitative transformation, as well as becoming of everything that a body is or can become;
- what if dance is a practice of exploring the body's potential to become²;
- how is it possible to create the context for body's potential to be danced — on the physical stage, as well as on the stage of text;
- how is body being made by, through and in movement;
- where does the movement stop and the body begin; where does one body stop and the other body begin;
- what if the form, the shape and the size of the body are not determined, but experiential?

How does a body become itself and how can we make that process visible, as well as shareable? There are numerous levels at which a body is becoming itself and which it is possible to make visible. For example, at the cellular level, a body is in an ongoing state of transformation and self-organization. What interest me is what motivates our cells to reorganize and how. Is a mode of cell reorganization experience-dependent? There are minimally two ways to look at a body as a becoming one:

1. molecular body;
2. lived body.

²According to Spinoza, we do not know what a body can and cannot do. One of the ways to explore body's potential of becoming is to explore its capacity to move, as well as to affect and be affected. Dance integrates both of those spheres, a sphere of movement and a sphere of affects. A dancing body is therefore a body exploring its own potential of becoming.

At the molecular level, body is constantly becoming itself because molecules are reorganizing in relation to numerous physiological processes, as well as our experience. What interests me is to discover if our molecules are reorganizing in a different way in relation to our experience of movement and how. Body is made of molecules and movement is a way to inform molecules of their way of organizing. When we introduce new, unexplored modes of moving to our body, do we also introduce new ways of moving our molecules? Every experience is a direct score. Being aware of the experience figures here as being aware of a certain mode of bodying. Does the experience change our body and how to make the imperceptible layers of that change perceptible? Body is a product of movement. Organs are products of movement. Everything there is — is a product of movement. How? At the molecular level, there is no goal or idea of a finished or determined organ. There are only modes of moving which are modes of (in)forming of a body itself. Organs are made of tissues, tissues are made of cells, cells are made of molecules, but the score for molecular becoming of a body is not just predetermined, but also emergent. Our experience instructs molecules of their mode of moving and organizing. Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish molecular becoming of a body and experiential becoming of a body. What if the entire organization of a body is experience-dependent? Molecular body is a becoming body at the level of its organization, size, orientation. Lived body is a becoming body at the level of body's perception of its organization, size and orientation. What I would like to make evident is how in that context the organization, size and orientation of a body become qualitative and not quantitative. More precisely, depending on the experience, it is only possible to talk about the qualitative transformation of an organ, as well as the body itself. Qualitative reorganization.

I would like to support, as well as confront that idea with some examples from my own practice that became a methodology of this work:

1. microscope research:

- microscope research on body tissues;
- microscope research on body fluids;
- microscope research on time-dependent transformation of body tissues and fluids;
- microscope research on experience-dependent transformation of body tissues and fluids;

2. body image tasks:

- task 1 on experience-based body image (measuring the size of different organs and body parts before and after the body practice; measuring by feeling; sensation as a compositional principle);
- task 2 on experience-based body image (exploring coming-into-being of body's organization, composing the organization of the body the way we feel its emergence through the experience; composing by feeling; sensation as a compositional principle);
- task 3 on experience-based body image (marking all words that we associate with the sensation of becoming, more precisely, body in a state of becoming);

3. interviews:

- auto-interview on experience-based body image (experiential anatomy and experiential body boundaries);
- interviews on experience-based body image (experiential anatomy and experiential body boundaries);

4. experience-based definitions:

- Body, a definition (every day, over the course of one month, redefining the body; exploring experience-dependent definition and its transformation in time);
- Body, a size (every day, over the course of one month, measuring by feeling a size of the body; exploring experience-dependent transformation of body size);
- Skin, a shape (every day, over the course of one month, redefining the shape of skin from the experienced sensation of it);
- Eye, a size (every day, over the course of one month, redefining a size of the eye from the experienced sensation of it);
- Lungs, a texture (every day, over the course of one month, redefining a texture of the lungs from the experienced sensation of it);

- Blood, a shape (every day, over the course of one month, redefining a shape of the blood from the experienced sensation of it);

5. situation-based definitions:

- defining the body in a situation of moving and sitting; exploring experience-dependent transformation of a definition;
- writing about the body from three different points of view, simultaneously, as a dancer, choreographer and dance researcher.

I would also like to make a comment on the methodology I used. A combination of two different approaches gave life to this thesis. The first one was based on the philosophical, phenomenological body of knowledge, more precisely, exploration of the concepts such as "bodying" (Erin Manning), "body in making" (Erin Manning), "Body without Organs" (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) and "becoming" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari). The second approach was based on the experiential body of knowledge, or more precisely, exploring, as well as creating different contexts in which "bodying" itself could happen and studying it directly, in my own body, with my own body, as my own body. I would also like to give a reason for every methodological tool I used while writing this thesis.

The reason I did microscope research was to be able to visualize and study the body in a state of matter. I began this research in 2013 and kept doing it over the course of more than four years. I was using my own microscope AmScope MD35 which gave me a possibility to make images and videos of the matter I was exploring. Over the course of more than four years I made around 5000 microscope generated images. In most cases I was using my own body material (body tissues and body fluids). In other cases I was using the body material of my collaborators, mostly people I was working with on a specific dance piece. For me, it was important to use my own body material and make it become a terrain of my research. At the time, it seemed as if I was working with my own body-terrain, the body-terrain of the other and the phenomenological body-terrain.

Theoretical reasons for doing a microscope research were, as previously mentioned, to explore the body in a state of matter, a state of flux. In the state of matter,

a body is not determined, or organized, but in an ongoing process of reorganization. It is a Body without Organs or the one bodying its pure potential, its modes of becoming. Practical reasons for doing a microscope research were to be able to visualize, as well as understand how the matter, or a body in a state of flux, reorganizes itself — here and now. Seeing that process as it was happening, live, was very important for my understanding of this subject. The first microscope research I did was the one of different body tissues and fluids. The first thing I noticed while working with my first sample was the absence of the hierarchy; more precisely — at the level of matter there is no fixed idea of that which is up or down, left or right, big or small, more or less important. What my first sample taught me was that everything was reorganizing, flowing, all the time. At the macro-level, arm always seems as an arm, but at the micro-level — arm is flowing. When we look at the sample of any body tissue or especially body fluid — it is absolutely heterogeneous and there are numerous ways to look at it.

Let's imagine a sample of blood (one blood drop) as a landscape. Within that landscape, there are numerous, heterogeneous landscapes, with different shapes, sizes, orientations, textures — being in a state of quantitative and qualitative transformation, as well as the reorganization, all the time. Working with the microscope is like working with a living image. There is something performative about that situation because there is a body studying itself. The act of placing a sample on the microscope is also very performative because it puts our body in a different mode of being; more precisely — our hand and microscope sample enter the state of shared being and our eyes and microscope camera also enter that state. The hand is moving the sample all the time and therefore manipulating the living image that we see, while the eyes are looking through the microscope camera and making decisions on which images to look at and eventually capture. As our hand moves, we travel "through" the body of a sample and observe different levels of transformation. There are two time-dependent transformations I have noticed so far: the first moments after placing the sample on the microscope are the moments marked by the qualitative transformation of movement of a given sample. More simply, once we place a sample we can observe its singular movement and its transformation in time. I have never noticed only one movement pattern within a particular sample. What fascinated me the most about the body fluid movement patterns that I was studying, especially blood movement patterns, was the fact that within one blood sample (one blood drop) there were numerous movement patterns. In terms of movement patterns, blood is heterogeneous. As we move through the body of a sample, in this case blood, we also move through different movement patterns which are also reorganizing all the time. Another type of sample

transformation that emerges in time is a transformation of its shape, size, orientation and texture. Even as a microscope sample, our body is still very much alive. Another thing that fascinates me is the fact that a body can survive outside of itself. A drop of blood continues to live outside our body and develops its own ecosystem, at the same time dependent and independent of our body. During the first months of my microscope research my favorite moments were those when I would come back to the same sample every day at the proximate time. More precisely, I would take a sample, make images of it and come back the day after, at the proximate time, as well as every other day, for weeks. In that way, I was discovering and learning to see different layers of time-dependent sample transformation. While exploring different modes of microscope research, I also became interested in the molecular performance or the performance of molecules themselves. Later on, I developed that through the idea of molecular becoming of performers' body.

In the beginning, I was exploring only my own body tissues and fluids, but after a while, I also began to explore the body tissues, as well as fluids of my collaborators. Upon noticing how body fluids were characterized by more vivid reorganization and flow I decided to do my first microscope research on saliva which consisted of the following: I took a saliva sample, placed a sample on the microscope and left it on the microscope for 7 days, making one image every 24 hours. In that way, it became possible for me not only to explore the saliva flow, but also its transformation in time. My second research on saliva included two other performers, Adriana Josipovic and Josipa Bubas. At the time, I was choreographing a piece in which I was exploring the state of becoming. I proposed to those two performers I worked with to take their saliva samples before and after the rehearsal in order to see if their saliva flow was changed due to the experience we were exploring. The third microscope research on saliva happened in collaboration with a dancer and dance researcher, Biliiana Vassileva. We attended the workshop on Gaga flow movement and I took our saliva samples before and after the workshop in order to see if our saliva fluid pattern was changed by the experience of Gaga movement. In both cases, microscope research showed how saliva fluid pattern was changed by different movement practices we were exploring.

In 2015 I joined Labodanse, a group of scientists, artists and philosophers working on the intersections of dance, cognitive science and new technologies. In May 2015, I worked on my first task on body image, as well as data analysis. More precisely, as a part of a group I was exploring the work of Myriam Gourfink in relation to the subject of body image. Here is a context and a description of the task I was working on: within the frame of one week (from Monday to Friday, May 2013) Labodanse was running experiments every day at CND — *Centre National de la Danse*, in Pantin. There were two

groups (A and B) of participants, each containing 31 participants. Participants were asked to do *yoga d'énergie* training every day and they were led by Myriam Gourfink and her collaborators. Before and after *yoga d'énergie* training they were asked to participate in a scientific experiment on body image. More precisely: participants were asked to show the size of their body parts, as well as their organs before and after the *yoga d'énergie* experience. There were five Labodanse members, myself included, taking photos of participants before and after the experience. After the end of the task, I continued to work on it through data analysis. Once I got the results I began to think about the difference between the representation and the experience of being, as well as having a body. According to data analysis results, most participants felt the enlargement of their body parts, as well as organs after *yoga d'énergie* training. At that moment, I began to think about the difference between the body schema and the body image; the representation and the perception of the body.

A few weeks after I created another task. At that moment, I was developing the idea of experience-based body image and I was trying to create a task that would make the practical exploration of that idea possible. This time I was not only creating or analysing the task, but also participating in it. Here is the description of a task: participants were asked to take photos of their own body parts and to put them together the way they felt them being organized in a state of becoming. More precisely: compose your body the way you feel it when being in a state of becoming. Some of the questions that emerged were: is there a difference between the way we see and the way we feel our body; at the level of feeling — how is our body organized; are the shape and the size of our body parts experience-dependent; how is our body organization changing together with the sensation; do new experiences create new organs; are there experience-based organs; how do we perform our organs; how many levels of body organizations do we know; what if there are different levels that co-exist at the same time; what if the "physical" — is not only what we feel, but also how we feel it; is physical experiential; is experiential physical; how many experiences of physicality do we have; how many physical bodies do we have? Task results showed how all participants composed their bodies in a manner that could not resemble the level of a representation of their bodies. They did not compose their bodies the way they appeared, but the way they were sensed. Usually, when we look at the body, we can say what it is made of. For example, a skin, a hair, the bones, etc. However, we cannot say how the body was made. The act of observing and analysing the images was more informative on how the images were made than what they were made of. This is exactly what is the motor of this research — body's how instead of its what; exploring how the body is being made, instead of what it is made of.

The third task on experience-based body image I created was the extension of the previous task. I made a two-page list of sensations related to the state of becoming and I asked participants to mark all the sensations they associated with being in the state of becoming. I did not only create, but I also participated in the task.

In 2015 I created an interview on experience-based body image, experiential anatomy and experiential body boundaries. The interview was based on the task results I previously talked about. More precisely, task results became a source and a generative force of the interview I was working on. The purpose of it was to explore if the task results could be deepened or, furthermore, questioned through the interview. I also did a self-interview.

After the interview work, I began to ask myself about the other possible ways of exploring, as well as capturing the creative processes of bodying. I chose to continue my work through experience-based definitions. I decided to work on them the same way I was doing the microscope research when exploring time-dependent transformation of body fluids. Instead of taking a new photo of the same body fluid every 24 hours, I decided to redefine the body itself every 24 hours, or more precisely, define it every day, over the course of one month, in order to explore the experience-dependent definition of the body and its transformation in time. Within the frame of one month I was working parallelly on redefining the following: a body itself, a size of the body, a size of the eyes, a shape of the skin, a shape of the blood and a texture of the lungs. While working on redefining the size of the eyes and the body, I used the method of "measuring by feelings" in order to explore the experience-dependent transformation of body size. While working on redefining the skin shape, as well as the shape of blood, I used the method of redefining the shape directly from the experienced sensation of it. When defining the texture of the lungs I also used the method of generating the redefinition from the direct, experienced sensation of a lung texture. What interests me in this exploration is how the modes of defining can undergo the same process of direct, ongoing reorganization, just like body tissues and fluids. How to conceptualize and explore the definition "in the state of matter"; a definition that is never fixed and is always undergoing a process of transformation and reorganization.

In 2015 I also began to explore situation-based writing practices. I experimented with two different approaches: redefining the body in the situation of moving and sitting, as well as writing about the body from three different points of view, simultaneously, that of a dancer, choreographer and dance researcher. In both cases, I was eager to explore experience-dependent transformation of a definition of the

body, as well the processes of redefining a body from different points of view. This work was also an attempt of discovering "gaze scores" (Ginot, 2016), or more precisely, how a particular gaze works and what type of body, experience, experiential body it produces.

Let's reflect on the situation of moving and sitting: how much is our writing practice influenced by the movement or by the absence of it; how much are our modes of thinking movement influenced by our modes of experiencing it? Are all movement definitions situation-based, movement-based? Are the situations of moving or sitting — while reflecting movement — transforming our ways of thinking, writing and bodying movement? Can a simple change, like a change in body posture or being in movement while writing change the way I work on my thesis? Is there a difference between defining a body in, as well as from the action of moving and the action of sitting? Body is not only reorganizing at the level of its materiality, but also at the level of its discursivity. The reason for exploring situation-based definitions was to explore the movement of redefining, the movement of discursivity of a moving body. If body transforms experientially, it also needs to transform discursively. Situation-based definitions, or, more precisely, the practice of redefining the body every day, over the course of one month, is a way to capture this double transformation — at the level of experience and at the level of definition. Just as switching from the position of sitting towards the position of moving, displacing oneself between the positions of dance researcher, choreographer and dancer is a way to integrate, as well as juxtapose different discourses on the body, as well as their modes of arriving into the language. How does a body arrive into its form; how does an experienced form arrive into its definition? If our body is always different, how can its definition remain the same? If we observe our body from the front, it differs from what it looks like if we observe it from the back or from any other angle. Body is all that — it is a totality of different points of view, not only spatial, but also discursive ones. Juxtaposing different discourses, like the one of a dancer, choreographer and dance researcher is a way to make visible the discursive heterogeneity of a moving body. Discourse is another type of microscope slide. Instead of cells, fluids or tissues we are examining definitions. Both cells and definitions are reorganizing all the time.

How to use the language while relating to the eventness of a moving body? In her book *Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance* Erin Manning introduces the idea of language-with: "This language of wonder is *with*, not *about*. It exists across, in the thinking-feeling" (Manning, 2012: 168). Furthermore, what is the difference between the language and the language-with? Language is external to us. It is born before us. We learn it and we use it. Language-with is internal to us, it comes from our flesh,

it is our flesh, it is relational and produced in relation with the other. It is born in the experience and it dies with the experience, always becoming something else, some other language-with. We don't learn it and we don't use it. We emerge through it and it emerges through us, as us. There is no difference between us and the language. We emerge through the language-with as the language-with emerges through us. Language-with emerges through thinking-with, feeling-with, moving-with. In our writing, we are not a subject interacting with the body as an object. Our writing moves-with the body as the body moves-with our writing.

How to think the possibility of language-with; language-with as an experience of performing the unrepresentability, immeasurability and singularity of the performer's

³A mode is usually considered in terms of a way of being. Spinoza, however, focuses on the way in which all particular, "finite" things, are modes or ways of expressing the same substance. Unlike Descartes, he believed that there was only one all-encompassing substance; thus, the attributes of that substance are in fact infinite before they are modified finite forms. These finite forms, or more precisely, these finite modes, are always contingent upon something else. The term of mode is important because in Deleuze's view, it involves the unique capacity for human beings to comprehend causality and act through this comprehension, therefore extending their power (and expressing the parallelism of the attributes). Deleuze uses the term in his reading of Spinoza, but also to explain both univocity and intensity: because the attributes qualify substances, the role of the modes is to modify the attributes in a quantitative manner — they are thus distinguished by virtue of intensity or power rather than quality. In Spinoza's work, mode is the essence and/or existence of something insofar as it is limited by others of its kind (that is, as a modification of the same attribute) and is conceived within something else (finite thoughts in the mind, bodies in extension). Mode is also that which exercises a capacity or power of affecting and being affected and serves as the basis for ethical determinations. According to Spinoza: "by mode I understand [...] that which is in something else, through which it is also conceived" (Spinoza, 2000: 75). For Deleuze, mode is that which modifies an attribute, in parallel with modes of different attributes insofar as it expresses the same substance (univocity). It is also that which constitutes the effects of eternal causes of attributes as expressions of substance: "[...] the absolutely adequate character of our knowledge [...] is in the univocity of the attributes which have only one form in the substance whose essence they constitute and in the modes that imply them, so that our intellect and the infinite intellect may be modes, but they nonetheless objectively comprehend the corresponding attributes as they are formally" (Deleuze, 1988: 81). Furthermore: "[In] the univocity of being [...] that of which being is said is repartitioned according to essentially mobile individuating differences which necessarily endow 'each one' with a plurality of modal significations" (Deleuze, 1994: 377, 303). Modal essence stands for the intensive reality of a mode which may or may not correspond to an existing mode: "Modal essences are thus distinguished from their attribute as intensities of its quality and from one another as different degrees of intensity" (Deleuze, 1992: 197). Furthermore: "modal distinction [...] is established between being or the attributes on the one hand, and the intensive variations of which these are capable on the other" (Deleuze, 1994: 49, 39). Existing mode stands for the extensive reality of a mode which has a duration and explicates the essence of an attribute (of thought or extension). Therefore: "An attribute no longer expresses itself only in the modal essences that it complicates or contains according to their degrees of power; it also expresses itself in existing modes that explicate it in a certain and determinate manner, that is, according to the relations corresponding to their essences" (Deleuze, 1992: 214—15).

body — on the stage of text? To be able to analyse certain phenomena we are searching for the language and its modes of expressing that would be as singular as the moving body itself. How is it possible to create the language that wouldn't interpret, but recreate the singularity of the body itself — within the process, as well as results of both theoretical and practical research? How do we present and/or perform our research results? One of the aims of this thesis is to search for the modes³ that would not interpret, but create, recreate and make others have the integrated experience of a given concept. How to create language-with instead of language about? How to search-with (the singularity of the body) and how to put the research itself into movement? How to explore relations between representable and unrepresentable, thinkable and unthinkable, expressible and inexpressible, measurable and immeasurable?

2 | ONTO-HETERO-GENESIS OF A MOVING BODY: FROM BODY TO BODYING

2.1 BWO: INSUFFLATION, EVAPORATION, FLUID TRANSMISSION

The first concept I want to base this thesis on is Artaud's concept of BwO (Body without Organs or the one that is being formless, unordered, transformative and always in a state of metamorphoses as opposed to the stratification and organization of static being). According to Artaud: "When you will have made him a body without organs / then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions / and restored him to his true freedom" (Artaud, 1976: 571). Through the concept of Body without Organs¹ I want to explore the onto-hetero-genesis of performer's body or its becoming of divergent entities. Following Simondon's ontogenetic theory of individuation, every individual body is immanent to the system of its own individuation. Therefore, the first step of this thesis is the re-conceptualisation of the moving body as a continuously self-individuating system, as opposed to the already individualised one. From that point of view, we can redefine an individual moving body, with its biological, anatomical and sensory structures, not as a pre-given performing entity but as a phase in its continuous becoming.

The Body without Organs is not defined in terms of forms, organs, or functions, but kinetically, in terms of an infinite number of particles in relations of motion

¹The Body without Organs (BwO) refers to a substrate that is also identified as the plane of consistency (as a non-formed, non-organised, non-stratified or destratified body). The term first emerged in Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense*, and was further developed with Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The Body without Organs does not exist in opposition to the organism or notions of subjectivity, and it is never completely free of the stratified exigencies of proper language, the State, family, or other institutions. It is, however, both everywhere and nowhere, disparate and homogeneous. There are two main points to note: firstly, that the BwO exists within stratified fields of organisation at the same time as it offers an alternative mode of being or experience (becoming); secondly, the BwO does not equate literally to an organless body. In relation to the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that although the BwO is a process that is directed toward a course of continual becoming, it cannot break away entirely from the system that it desires to escape from. While it seeks a mode of articulation that is free from the restrictive tropes of subjectification and signification, it must play a delicate game of maintaining some reference to these systems of stratification, or else risk obliteration or reterritorialisation back into these systems. Therefore, such subversion is an incomplete process. Rather, it is continuous and oriented only towards its process or movement rather than toward any teleological point of completion. Consistent with this, and in order to be affective it must exist, more or less, within the system that it aims to subvert.

and rest, and dynamically, in terms of the capacity for affecting and being affected, "as an intensive determination" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 123—4). "Considered apart from unifying and functional 'organs' or 'organization', bodies involve power, expression, and endurance; considering the body as an 'organism' suppresses those very capacities" (Young, Genosko, Watson, 2013: 51). The Body without Organs "is a whole non-organic life, for the organism is not life, it is what imprisons life. The body is completely living, and yet non-organic" (Deleuze, 1996: 45). In Deleuze's and Guattari's reading of Artaud, Body without Organs is that which involves the confrontation with the limit(s) of subjectivity, stratification, and the organism²; it is that which unifies fragmented organs or parts of the body in order to produce an indeterminate organ or unactualized organs, rather than unifying those fragmented parts such that they form an organism with the predetermined functions. The result of an ongoing experimentation of the body that undoes the organic association that organs have with one another or with their predetermining functions is the condition for new physical associations and functions. More precisely, Body without Organs does not lack organs, it lacks the organism or the particular organization of the

²An "organism", in the way that Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize it, is a centralised, hierarchised, self-directed body. The organism is akin to the "judgement of God" (who provides the model of such self-sufficiency); it is also a molarised and stratified life form. The organism stands for an emergent effect of organising organs in a particular way, a "One" added to the multiplicity of organs in a "supplementary dimension" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21, 265). Another important thing is that an organ is a "desiring-machine", that is, an emitter and breaker of flows, of which part is siphoned off to flow in the economy of the body. Organs make a body's way of negotiating with the exterior milieu, appropriating and regulating a bit of matter-energy flow. The organism represents the unifying emergent effect of interlocking homeostatic mechanisms that quickly compensate for any non-average fluctuations below certain thresholds to return a body to its "normal" condition (as measured by species-wide norms; hence Deleuze and Guattari's sense of "molar"). The organism as unifying emergent effect also represents a stratum on the Body without Organs (BwO); it is therefore a construction, a certain selection from the virtual multiplicity of what a body can be, and therefore a constraint imposed on the BwO: "The BwO howls: 'They've made me an organism! They've wrongfully folded me! They've stolen my body!'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 159). While all actual or intensive bodies are "ordered", or more precisely, contain some probability structure to the passage of flows among their organs (only the virtual BwO, at "intensity = 0", has removed all patterning among its organs), the organism is "organised", that is, its habitual connections are centralised and hierarchical. The organs of an organism are patterned by "exclusive disjunctions", or more precisely, series of virtual singularities actualised in such a way as to preclude the actualisation of other, alternative, patterns; in complexity theory terms, an organism is locked into a basin of attraction, or stereotyped set of such basins. As such a fixed habitual pattern locked onto normal functioning as determined by species-wide average values, the organism diminishes the creativity of life; it is "that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 503). Like all stratification, the organism has a certain value: "staying stratified — organized, signified, subjected — is not the worst that can happen" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 161), although this utility is primarily as a resting point for further experimentation.

organs. It is defined by the indeterminate organs, whereas the organism is defined by determinate organs. Body without Organs follows the line of disengaging of the organs from the organism in favor of their indefinite or contingent determination as intensities. It is founded on an embryological conception of the body which recognizes only dynamic and kinetic, but not formal differences, as well as synthetic functioning of the organs or parts of a body such that they are appropriated to compose, relay, or direct flows that exceed or transverse the body itself. Body without Organs is (in) a state of quantitative and qualitative flux. Organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced — flows, thresholds, and gradients: "A stomach, an eye, a mouth: the indefinite article [...] expresses the pure determination of intensity³, intensive difference (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 182, 164). The BwO is the egg. [...] you always carry it with you as your own milieu of experimentation, your associated milieu. You never reach the Body without organs, you can't reach it,

³Intensity is associated with the measurement of energy, or more simply, is another term for strength or force, and is not a common term in the history of philosophy (with the exception of Bergson and Kant). Deleuze uses it to characterize the dynamic of differential systems. In fact, Deleuze notes that the scientific field of energetics tends to subordinate the indivisible, quantitative nature of intensity to extensive qualities (for the purpose of measurement), and does not grasp the intensive itself. While the term can in fact be found in Bergson's work, Deleuze does not emphasize it in *Bergsonism*, and, in *Difference and Repetition*, he offers a critique of Bergson's use of the term for subordinating it to quality. The concept of intensity acquires incredible importance throughout Deleuze's writings and is utilized to characterize affect both in Spinoza's modes and in the Body without Organs. Intensity can be differentiated from force in that forces engender the relations that produce bodies, while intensities concern fluctuations or thresholds within bodies. In *What is Philosophy?* the term of intensity is differentiated from force in that intensity has to do with concepts that occupy the plane of immanence, while force has to do with the determinations or diagrams of chaos that construct the plane; in this case force concerns movement, while intensity concerns speed. However, in many ways, force can be considered in terms of that which puts series into communication, while intensity concerns the resulting difference. In Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, intensity is that which stands in distinction from the extensive parts that form characteristic relations of existing modes (bodies). It is a transient modal essence. According to Deleuze: "[...] physical reality is an intensive reality, an intensive existence. One sees from this that essence does not endure" (Deleuze, 1992: 312). Furthermore: "each finite being must be said to express the absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence. According, that is, to the degree of its power. Individuation is, in Spinoza, [...] quantitative and intrinsic, intensive" (Deleuze, 1992: 197). Intensity stands for that which is engendered in the body (of the subject, socius, earth, etc.) by relations of force, which fluctuates as a result of the strength of those forces but is always positive. Therefore: "It must not be thought that the intensities themselves are in opposition to one another, arriving at a state of balance around a neutral state. [...] the opposition of the forces of attraction and repulsion produces an open series of intensive elements, all of them positive [...] through which a subject passes" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 20, 19). Intensity also stands, in varying degrees, for the lived experience of the Body without Organs (in waves or passages which lack extension, stratification, or form): "Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive reality which no longer determines with itself representative elements, but allotropic variations" (Deleuze, 2003: 45).

you are forever attaining it, it is a limit" (Deleuze; Guattari, 1983: 166, 150). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Body without Organs is an intense and intensive body; as previously mentioned, it does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. Therefore, orientations, axes, speeds and rhythms become primary to the organization and structure of any body. The body without organs "operates entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission" (Deleuze, 2004: 100, 88). It is an unformed body, permeated by unformed, unstable matters, subatomic particles, pure intensities, preital and prephysical singularities, by flows in all directions.

Throughout his writings, Deleuze returns frequently to a remark by Spinoza that we do not yet know what a body can do⁴, and hence, we do not know the extent of the body's capabilities. In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* Deleuze points out how Spinoza defines the body in two ways: in terms of relations of slowness and speed between an infinite number of particles; and in terms of a body's capacities for affecting and being affected. By characterizing the body in terms of differential speeds, Spinoza emphasizes the body's participation in a single plane of immanence, a dimension of rhythms, movements, pauses, accelerations and decelerations, in which each body's form and function emerge as secondary products of kinetic relations among particles. By approaching the body in terms of its capacities of affecting and being affected, Spinoza imbues the plane of immanence with a pervasive affectivity generated through interactions among multiple forces: "In short, if we are Spinozists,

⁴Deleuze is fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza's saying that "no one knows what a body can do". The more power a thing has, or the greater its power of existence, the greater number of ways in which it can affect and be affected. More precisely, bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree. Furthermore, certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reaction in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other cases, the body being affected may reach a maximum threshold, such that it is incapable of being affected any further, as in a tick that dies of engorgement. Therefore, a body being affected by another, such that the relations of its parts are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passive determination of the body, or passion. For example, if an external body is combined or "composed" with a body in a way that increases the affected body's power of being affected, this transition to a higher state of activity is experienced as joy; if the combination decreases the affected body's power of being affected, this is the affect of sadness. However, it is impossible to know in advance which bodies will compose with others in a way that is consonant with a body's characteristic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decompose a body by causing its parts to enter into experimental relations. The effect of increasing or decreasing a body's power of affecting and being affected, one body affecting another, or producing effects in it, results in reality as a combining and a mixing of the two bodies, and most often "bit by bit", or part by part. A body is a relation of parts corresponding to an essence, or a degree of physical. Therefore, a body need not have the hierarchical and dominating organisation of organs we call an "organism". Instead, it is an intensive reality, differentiated by the maximum and minimum thresholds of its power of being affected.

we will define something neither by its shape, nor by its organs or its functions, neither as a substance nor as a subject. To borrow medieval terms, or geographical ones, we will define it by longitude and latitude. A body can be anything; it can be an animal, an acoustic body, a soul, or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity⁵. We call longitude of any given body the ensemble of relations of speed and slowness, of rest and movement, between particles that constitute it from this point of view, that is, between unformed elements. We call latitude the ensemble of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous force (force to exist, capacity to be affected). Thus we establish the cartography of a body. The ensemble of longitudes and latitudes constitutes Nature, the plane of immanence or of consistency, always variable and never ceasing to be altered, constituted, reconstituted, by individuals and collectivities" (Deleuze, 1988: 142). Performers' body is a multitude of different modes of becoming the body itself on a plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is the plane of assembling rather than organizing. Instead of shape, organs or functions, we bodily experience the relations of speed and slowness in-between the smallest particles of unformed organs, as well as organisms. The plane of immanence of performer's body constitutes itself between the dynamic affective charges of movement and stillness.

⁵For Deleuze, "body" is defined as any whole composed of parts, where these parts stand in some definite relation to one another, and has a capacity for being affected by other bodies. The human body is just one example of such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or even an idea. Therefore, a body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occupying space ("extension"), or by organic structure. Furthermore, it is defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu. More precisely, the parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing a power of existence of that body, a degree of physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its power of existing. Nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, therefore, nature as a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the whole order of causal relations in all its combinations.

2.2 BODY-SCORE

Another concept I would like to discuss is the concept of a body-score. The body itself can be perceived and performed as a score, body-score, or that which sets up its own relational modes of becoming a body. The body organizes itself through moving and developing each of its organs as polymorphic thinking tools, therefore, each organ becomes temporal, self-organizing tool-technique. Furthermore, body as a score does not represent a system of organs, but a system of relations (and relational becomings of organs, as well as the body itself). Therefore, body is a relational score — producing itself in and through movement. Performer's body is not that which embodies a certain technique, but the body itself becomes its own singular technique; technique emerges through the exploration of an individual body, internally, and it is not imposed onto the body, externally. That is the moment when the body starts to direct, choreograph and perform itself — as bodying or as a singular event of force taking form.

Erin Manning defined bodying as "a field of relation through which the body emerges as a multiplicity rather than a static, interactive self" (Manning, 2012: 38). Bodying also denotes a field of relation through which the body emerges as a becoming one. A body is not the one that is, but the one that takes form, the one that becomes. Movement does not only make a body, but it also makes a body its own score, or, in other words, it allows the body to dance itself as its own score. Body is a score; body is a movement. Bodying is the act of meeting between the score and the movement, it is the way a body becomes — in movement, through movement and as movement. How to think the body as a multilayered score; how do we choose and compose its layers; how are we being composed by them? How do we build and use score as an attractor? How do we create and co-create different attractors while moving? How to think the composition as a study of relations? How do we allow body to happen?

Within the idea of a body-score every organ or part of the body is producing itself in movement. More precisely, it is producing itself within the processes of sensing, being in relation and becoming. Throughout those processes every organ or part of the body is producing its own relational field of becoming. William Forsythe has developed an approach of using skin surface as an organ of proprioception. The dancers are asked to activate their bodies through their skin, making the skin what Deleuze calls the surface of recording of the event: "Put the activation into every part. Think about where the movement starts and stops. If you raise your arm, where does your skin stretch? Activate the skin. Get feedback from the skin. Go further if it tells

you something. What you feel is what you know. Look for the chain of sensations rather than the chain of positions" (Manning; Massumi, 2014: 50).

According to Deleuze, sensations should not be considered as "givens" (data) but as "encounters". As an encounter, sensation acts on the nervous system, and not on the "brain" of the subject: beginning with Bergson, Deleuze links sensation to the contraction of matter and the imagination (it is thus "psycho-organic"). In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, the vibration of matter, contracted by the senses results in perceived qualities (or "contraction-memory"): "What, in fact, is a sensation? It is the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing other than contracted quantity. [...] Sensation is extensive insofar as what it contracts is precisely the extended, the expanded (*détendu*) (Deleuze, 1990: 74). Sensation is "excitation itself, [...] insofar as it is preserved or preserves its vibrations [...]. Sensation is formed by contracting that which composes it [...]" (Deleuze, 1994: 211). It is a characteristic of sensation to pass through different levels owing to the action of forces. But two sensations, each having their own level or zone, can also confront each other and make their respective levels communicate. [...] The different levels through which this sensation passes already necessarily constitute couplings of sensation" (Deleuze, 1996: 47, 64).

The experience of sensing expands the field of possibility of what a certain organ can do, as well as become. In the case of William Forsythe, to activate the skin as the surface of recording of the event also means to activate it as indeterminate, unactualized, as well as intense organ. Here, the skin becomes a score, skin-score. It does not matter what the skin is, but what it can become. The skin does not only record the event, but is, becomes and emerges as an event of skinning or relational becoming of the skin. "Couplings of sensations" extend, as well as create new fields of becoming. Throughout the act of "chaining the sensations instead of positions" it is also possible to rethink the idea of the composition of a moving body. How can we think about the sensation as a new source of body's composition, a composition-in-making or a composition-in-motion? How to think sensing as simultaneous process of composing, decomposing and co-composing? How is sensing changing the anatomy of movement and how is moving changing the anatomy of sense? How to think the sense the nucleus, as well as the pre-skin of movement?

2.3 BODY-BECOMING

According to Deleuze, a body can become anything as long as it is considered in terms of its set of relations and affects. The capacity to affect and to be affected is what constitutes the singularity of performer's body. Affects are also closely related to the question of what a body can become and what a body is capable of. Affects are becomings. "Affect passes directly through the body, coupling with the nervous system, making the interval felt. This feltness is often experienced as a becoming-with. This becoming-with is transformative. It is a force out of which a microperceptual body begins to emerge. This microperceptual body is the body of relation. While affect can never be separated from a body, it never takes hold on an *individual* body. Affect passes through, leaving intensive traces on a *collective* body-becoming. This body-becoming is not necessarily a human body. It is a conglomeration of forces that express a movement-with through which a relational individuation begins to make itself felt" (Manning, 2012: 95).

Singularity of performer's body can be therefore understood as a capacity of the body to enter the relation, affect and be affected, move and be moved, a

⁶The understanding of actuality is tied to the concept of possibility. Possibility is something that can be predicated of, or attributed to, a being, which remains the same. Against this understanding of actuality, Deleuze sets a different couple: actuality/potentiality. More precisely, if there is something actual it is not because it takes up time, nor because time is that which links or contains the changes of actual beings; rather, actuality is unfolded from potentiality. It is important to see the actual not as that from which change and difference take place, but as that which has been effected from potentiality. Time does not represent the synthesis or continuity of actual terms, as in phenomenology where consciousness constitutes time by linking the past with the present and future. Instead, time is the potential for various lines of actuality. From any actual term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze, desirable) to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged. As empiricist Deleuze seems to be committed to the primacy of the actual: one should remain attentive to what appears, to what is, without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience. While it is true that Deleuze's empiricism affirms life and experience, he refuses to restrict life to the actual. In this way he overturns a history of western metaphysics that defines the potential and virtual according to already present actualities. We should not, Deleuze argues, define what something is according to already actualised forms. For example, we should not establish what it is to think on the basis of what is usually, generally or actually thought. Furthermore, we should not think that the virtual is merely the possible: those things that, from the point of view of the actual world, may or may not happen. Deleuze's empiricism is that of the Idea, and it is the essence of the Idea to actualise itself. Therefore, there is an Idea of thinking, the potential or power to think, which is then actualised in any single thought. Furthermore, we can only fully understand and appreciate the actual if we intuit its virtual condition, which is also a real condition. Real conditions are not those which must be presupposed by the actual — such as assuming that for any thought there must be a subject who thinks — instead, real conditions are, for Deleuze, the potentials of life from which conditions such as the brain, subjectivity or mind emerge.

capacity to become. To become is to participate in movement, vibrations, thresholds; beings (mineral, vegetal, animal and human) are distinguished only by thresholds, vibrations: "there are lines which do not amount to the path of a point, which break free from structure — lines of flight, becomings, without future or past, without memory, which resist the binary machine — woman-becoming which is neither man nor woman, animal-becoming which is neither beast nor man, becomings are exactly that, producing the line and not the point (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 26)". Choreo-singularity is a singularity of the body which emerges from and in moving, a capacity of the becoming-body in movement, a capacity of bodying in movement. Dancing the body itself includes the relation towards organs as relational techniques, and it provides an exploration of performativity and possibility of developing new dancing organs through moving. Another aim of this thesis is to explore the experience-dependent transformation of organs and if a particular organ is being changed by the experience of moving and how. According to Diderot, the consciousness is the product of moving and anatomy is the product of consciousness. How to think the anatomy as choreo-anatomy?

Choreo-anatomy as relational anatomy studies the possibility of dancing our own organs, instead of dancing with them, as well as dancing our entire body instead of dancing with it (for example, hand is not considered as a hand, but only as one of the infinite actualizations⁶ of the hand, therefore, moving becomes a process of exploring the potential of its becoming). Choreo-anatomy also addresses the process of producing new body, as well as its biological, anatomical and sensory structures through movement. Within the idea of choreo-anatomy movement is defined as a relation, as well as the relational becoming (of a body). Moving is entering a relation, therefore, anatomy becomes danced. Body itself also becomes danced in relation to the other, as a relational body-with. According to Souriau, "modes of existence are always plural and relational; existence can be found not only in beings, but between them" (Souriau, 2009: 16). Following Souriau, modes of existence are intermodal. Bodying as a mode of existence is also intermodal or that which is not already constituted, but coming-to-existence through singular events as "body-in-making" (Manning). Anatomy is not only intermodal, it is also plural in relation to itself, containing the other as a compositional feature of its own becoming. How is it possible to think the anatomy of a moving body as an ongoing knotting of intermodal vibrations? How do we distinguish an exterior anatomy of materials, an interior anatomy of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary anatomy of membranes and limits, and an annexed anatomy of energy sources and actions-perceptions? Is the notion of the anatomy unitary or does a body continually pass from one anatomy to

another, do the anatomies pass into one another, as relational anatomies, bodying the line and not the point, and how?

What also matters is how an individual body is being composed, because composition is an act of entering the relation, as well as sensation. According to Deleuze, a body's structure is the composition of its relations. What a body can do (and what it can become) corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected. Affects⁷ are not only transitions between states of the body, but also a passage or transitions between different bodies. In that context, we can explore performer's body as a composition of capacities for affecting and being affected, as well as a composition of continual becomings that compose different (potential) bodies within one body, and different anatomies within one anatomy. This thesis also puts into relation anatomy and dance, movement and molecular memory, in an attempt to investigate the molecular memory, not as a pattern, but as a score, score for dancing organs and body itself. How can we think about the molecules as scores for dancing the molecules themselves? Within the idea of choreo-anatomy moving itself becomes a score for the anatomy; moving is no longer conditioned by

⁷"Watch me: affection is the intensity of colour in a sunset on a dry and cold autumn evening. Kiss me: affect is that indescribable moment before the registration of the audible, visual, and tactile transformations produced in reaction to a certain situation, event, or thing. Run away from me: affected are the bodies of spectres when their space is disturbed" (Colman, in Parr, 2010: 11). In all these situations, affect stands for an independent thing; sometimes described in terms of the expression of an emotion or physiological effect. According to Deleuze, the affect is a transitory thought or thing that occurs prior to an idea or perception. Furthermore, affect is the change, or variation, that occurs when bodies collide, or come into contact. As a body, affect is the transitional product of an encounter, specific in its ethical and lived dimensions. It is also as indefinite as the experience of transformation. In its largest sense, affect is part of the Deleuzian project of trying-to-understand, as well as express all of the incredible, wondrous, tragic, painful, and destructive configurations of things and bodies as temporally mediated, continuous events. More precisely, Deleuze uses the term "affection" to refer to the additive processes, forces, powers, and expressions of change — the mix of affects that produce a modification or transformation in the affected body. Affect is to be distinguished as a philosophical concept that indicates the result of the interaction of bodies; an affective product. In his study of contemporary society, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Brian Massumi makes the crucial distinction between affect and its synonym emotion, arguing that this is an inappropriate association, since "emotion and affect — if affect is intensity — follow different logics and pertain to different orders" (Massumi, 2002: 27). Describing Spinoza's study of the transformation of a body, a thing, or a group of things over a period of space and time, Deleuze and Guattari write in *A Thousand Plateaus*: "Affects are becomings" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 256). Furthermore, affect expresses the modification of experiences as independent things of existence, when one produces or recognises the consequences of movement and time for (corporeal, spiritual, animal, mineral, vegetable, and, or conceptual) bodies. Therefore, affect is an experiential force or a power source, which, through encounters and mixes with other bodies (organic or inorganic), becomes enveloped by affection, becoming an idea, and as such, it can compel systems of knowledge, history, memory, and circuits of power.

the anatomy, but moving itself creates performer's new anatomy: "every part of the body is a knot of different potential stretches and retractions radiating from that point as 'so many vectors' (Forsythe 2011, Nov. 10). So many lines of movement, potentially passing through each point. Each starting point of movement holds these potential passings through in itself, together in their difference from each other. The move is less a point than a vectorial gestural nexus: a differential, dynamic knot of potential variations on itself. A milieu of movement potential synthetically including an infinity of disjunctions. The dancers are instructed to 'take the movement as far as it will go'. In Forsythe's vocabulary: transport the line, curve the motion, reorient and follow until your movement reaches a point where it can no longer develop. Capture the intensity! Redirect it, or let it go. Field residual movement. Prolong it! Extrude it! Fold it! Feel

⁸To experiment is to try new actions, methods, techniques and combinations, "without aim or end" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 371). Therefore, we experiment when we do not know what the result will be and have no preconceptions concerning what it should be. As an open-ended process that explores what's new and what's coming into being rather than something already experienced and known, experimentation is inseparable from not knowing. Furthermore, the elements with which we experiment are desires, forces, powers and their combinations, not only to "see what happens", but to determine what different entities (bodies, languages, social groupings, environments and so on) are capable of. Experimentation does not interpret what something "means", but seeks to discover how it works or functions by uncovering an order of causes, namely, the characteristic relations among the parts of an assemblage — their structures, flows and connections — and the resulting tendencies. Therefore, experimentation is necessary to reveal "what a body or mind can do, in a given encounter", arrangement or combination of the affects a body is capable of (Deleuze, 1988c: 125). Experimentation is also necessary to reveal the effects of combinations of different bodies and elements, and especially whether these combinations or encounters will increase the powers of acting of the elements combined into a greater whole, or whether the combination will destroy or "decompose" one or more of the elements. The compatibility or incompatibility of different elements and bodies, as well as the effect of their combination, can only be ascertained through experience; we have no *a priori* knowledge of them through principles or axioms. An experimental method of discovery through the experience of new combinations of things encountering each other is contrary to any deductive system or any system of judgement using transcendental criteria. Therefore, life-experimentation, through a set of practices effecting new combinations and relations and forming powers, is biological and political, and often involves experientially discovering how to dissolve the boundaries of self in order to open flows of intensity, "continuums and conjunctions of affect" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 162). Furthermore, active experimentation involves trying new procedures, combinations and their unpredictable effects to produce a "Body without Organs" (BwO) or a "field of immanence" or "plane of consistency", in which desires, intensities, movements and flows pass unimpeded by the repressive mechanisms of judgement and interpretation. Experimental constructions proceed bit by bit and flow by flow, using different techniques and materials in different circumstances and under different conditions, without any pre-established rules or procedures. "One never knows in advance" (Deleuze, 1987: 47), and if one did, it would not be an experiment. Experimentation by its nature breaks free of the past and dismantles old assemblages (social formations, the Self), as well as constructs lines of flight or movements of deterritorialisation by effecting new and previously untried combinations of persons, forces and things, "the new, remarkable, and interesting" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 111).

how it populates the interval. Use torsion to reclaim this residual movement, create a multiplicity. Play with what's left over, share it. (Manning and Massumi, 2014: 26, 35)". Movement anatomy becomes performer's second anatomy or anatomy in Becoming. If every part of the body is a knot of dynamic and kinetic potentiality then the way we choose to dance the body-knot is also the way we are being danced by it.

Moving itself becomes the context for creating the conditions for all possible becomings: "becoming is not to imitate or identify with something or someone. Nor is it to proportion formal relations. Neither of these two figures of the analogy is applicable to becoming. Starting from the forms one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is becoming and through which one becomes" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 272). Becoming indicates being in the zone of flow, it indicates the movement in which all particles are retracted when they enter the zone. More precisely, when two or more types of particles enter the zone of flow, singular relations of movement and stillness create a new body and its new anatomies.

For Deleuze and Guattari, flow denotes the matter, energy, or resources which have not yet been formed, overcoded, or territorialized: "There is always something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding machine. Those aspects of the body, the psyche, and the socius precede the subject-object dichotomy. Flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, micropceptions, have replaced the world of the subject (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 238, 216, 179, 162) with an "ongoing experimentation"⁸, ontologically unfinishable" (Lepecki, 2006: 40).

In his solo, *Self Unfinished* (1998), Le Roy is "constantly disorganizing and reorganizing that fundamental question profoundly binding philosophy and dance: what can a body do"? (Lepecki, 2006: 40, 41). According to Lepecki, Le Roy proposes a different understanding of what a body is: not a stable, fleshy host for a subject, but a dynamic power, an ongoing experiment ready to achieve unforeseeable planes of immanence and consistency. Le Roy's self is unfinished not because it has not been completed yet, but because it can never be finished or completed. This incompleteness derives from Le Roy's predication of ontology of radical incompleteness, on an ongoing process he calls "relation" (Le Roy 2002: 46). In order to explain his idea of relation, Le Roy invokes Paul Schilder's notion of "body-image" (1964)⁹, and

⁹For those interested in the subject of body image it would be useful to read the chapter 11 of

combines it with Deleuze and Guattari's notions of becoming and of Body without organs. In a *Self-Interview* (2000), Le Roy writes:

"X5: I don't know. But very often I ask myself, why should our bodies end at the skin or include at best other beings, organisms or objects encapsulated by the skin?

Y5: I don't know neither [*sic*] but you might talk about the fact that the body image is extremely fluid and dynamic. That its borders, edges, or contours are "osmotic" and that they have the remarkable power of incorporating and expelling outside and inside in an ongoing interchange?

X6: Yes. As you say, body images are capable of accommodating and incorporating an extremely wide range of objects and discourses. Anything that comes into contact with surfaces of the body and remains there long enough will be incorporated into the body image [...]

Y6: So, in other words, what you say is that the body image is as much a function of the subject's psychology and socio-historical context as of anatomy. And that there are all kinds of non-human influences woven into us.

X7: Exactly. So it [*sic*] must exist another alternative to the body image than the anatomical one.

X8: For example: I think about that the body could be perceived as space and time for trade, traffic and exchange...

X9: ... following that idea would mean that each individual would be perceived as an infinity of extensive parts. In other terms, there would be only composed individuals. An individual would be a notion completely devoid of sense" (Le Roy, 2002: 45—6).

Departing from Xavier Le Roy, it is possible to replace the idea of individual with the idea of becoming(s). Taking inspiration from Nietzsche, 'becoming' is unlimited and unending, as it has no true point of origin or destination (the world is always in 'flux'), and insofar as the past is itself considered infinite, the present counter-intuitively always occurs as the 'return' of recognizable and even foreseeable forms, but is irreducible to them because becoming can never be 'given': it is, as Deleuze says, always in between the past and future since 'it moves in both directions at once' and 'always eludes the present' (Deleuze, 2004: 3, 2). In this sense, becoming is not perceptible because its onset coincides with its immediate disappearance.

this thesis entitled "Body image". That chapter is exploring the multimodality of body image, its dynamic construction and experience-dependent transformation.

Following Nietzsche's cosmological theory of existence appropriated from the ancient philosopher Heraclitus ('I see nothing other than becoming'), being does not have a final state. In Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, the form of repetition or state of being in eternal return¹⁰, where being is never fixed (even when it appears to be so); any 'sameness' and 'similarity' (or link between cause and effect) is actually indicative of a continual process of change without an origin or destination. What is the being inseparable from that which is becoming? Return is the being of that which becomes. Return is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in

¹⁰The concept of eternal return, which Deleuze draws from Friedrich Nietzsche, is crucial for understanding of the philosophy of immanence and univocity. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze says that Duns Scotus, Baruch Spinoza and Nietzsche affirmed univocal being. According to Deleuze, it is only with Nietzsche that the joyful idea of univocity is thought adequately, and this is because Nietzsche imagines a world of "prepersonal singularities". More precisely, there is not a "who" or "what" that then has various properties; nor is there someone or something that is. Each difference is and has a power to differ, with no event of difference being the ground or cause of any other. Furthermore, by going through this affirmation of difference, and by abandoning any ground or being before or beyond difference, both Nietzsche and Deleuze arrive at the eternal return. If difference occurred in order to arrive at some proper end — if there were a purpose or proper end to life — then the process of becoming would have some ideal end point. However, difference is an event that is joyful in itself; it is not the difference of this being or for this end. Therefore, with each event of difference life is transformed; life becomes other than itself because life is difference. The only "thing" that "is" is difference, with each repetition of difference being different. More precisely, only difference returns, and it returns eternally. Time is what follows from difference (time is difference); however, difference cannot be located in time. The idea of eternal return, developed most concertedly in Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, has proved controversial in philosophical circles where it has generally been interpreted as either an existential or inhuman vision of existence. From the point of view of the existential reading, the thought of eternal return compels us to consider how we ought properly to live. It is also possible to express this thought in the following way: were we suddenly to recognise that every aspect of our lives, both painful and joyous, was fated to return in the guise of a potentially infinite repetition, how would we need to live to justify the recurrence of even the most terrible and painful events? The inhuman or cosmological reading understands Nietzsche's proposition as the fundamental axiom of a philosophy of forces in which active force separates itself from and supplants reactive force and ultimately locates itself as the motor principle of becoming. The perversity of this reading, Deleuze argues, is that it converts Nietzsche's vision of being as the endless becoming of differential forces into a simple principle of identity. We fail to understand the eternal return if we conceive of it as the ceaseless return of the same; instead, eternal return inscribes difference and becoming at the very heart of being. It is not being that recurs in the eternal return; the principle of return constitutes the one thing shared by diversity and multiplicity. Furthermore, what is at stake is not the repetition of a universal sameness but the movement that produces everything that differs. Therefore, eternal return is properly understood as a synthesis of becoming and the being that is affirmed in becoming. To think the eternal return is to think the becoming-active of forces. The eternal return represents the movement of transvaluation: according to its double selection only action and affirmation return while the negative is willed out of being. The eternal return is that which eliminates every reactive force that resists it and furthermore, it affirms both the being of becoming and the becoming-active of forces.

becoming. Becoming does not regress toward an earlier state or progress towards a final state: "pure becoming [. . .] is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time — of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more and less, of too much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect) (Deleuze, 2004: 4, 2—3). Everything that exists is in an ongoing process of transformation and reorganization. Everything is in the process of constant change.

There is no fixed idea of a world. There is only worlding. Or worldings. Processes of a world worlding itself. Processes of a world becoming itself. Everything there is — is an ongoing movement of perception. Perceptual texturings. Existing in textures. Existing through and between the textures. Existing as one texture becoming another texture. Even the chair I am sitting on while writing this thesis is not only quantitative, but also qualitative. It is in not just an object. It is a relation. The chairness of a chair reveals all the textual becomings of the chair. The chair is not finished. The chair is in the constant process of becoming that unfolds itself through the act of perceiving. There are no mental images, there are only textural becomings, sensations-in-becoming. There are no objects, only relations. The chair is a relation. The body is also a relation. Bodying is body's becoming: unlimited and unending, always reaching towards the new planes of actualization, new bodyings. In Erin Manning's words, being 'always more than one': "Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces, the body is a multiple phenomenon" (Deleuze, 2006: 37).

3 | PHYSICAL BODY

3.1 BODY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM

Let's portray the complexity of the body: an adult human being is made up of around 7,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (7 octillion) atoms. Every atom in our body is billions of years old. Hydrogen, the most common element in the universe and a major feature of our body, was produced in the Big Bang. More precisely, all the atoms that make up our human body today are the same atoms that formed during the Big Bang 13.7 billion years ago. Our body produces 25 million new cells each second. Every day an adult body produces 300 billion new cells. One cell in the human body can store five times more information than Wikipedia. Around 90% of the cells that make humans are not human in origin. We are mostly fungi and bacteria. There are more living organisms on the skin of a single human being than there are human beings on the surface of the Earth. We shed about 600,000 particles of skin every hour. Every square inch of skin on the human body has about 32 million bacteria on it. In one square inch of our hand we have nine feet of blood vessels, 600 pain sensors, 9,000 nerve endings, 36 heat sensors and 75 pressure sensors. A human body contains about 200,000 temperature detectors and 500,000 touch detectors. The human body has 4 million pain sensitive structures. There are 100,000 miles of blood vessels in an adult human body. If uncoiled, the DNA in all the cells in our body would stretch 10 billion miles. Every hour, the human eye can process 36,000 bits of information. The human eye can distinguish about 10 million different colors. The human eye contains five to seven million receptors for color perception. The human eye is the only multi-focus lens in the world which can adjust in 2 milliseconds. Human fingers can feel objects as small as 13 nanometers. Our nose can remember 50,000 different scents. Our mouth is the most advanced chemical laboratory that exists and can distinguish more than a billion flavours. Our heart beats 36 million times a year and pumps 2.4 million litres

¹Autopoiesis refers to the ability of living entities to self-regulate, self-perpetuate, and reproduce. The term is borrowed from the biology of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, for whom it designates a life form's ability to produce and maintain its own existence: "Since the relations of production of components are given only as processes, if the processes stop the relations of production vanish; as a result, for a machine to be autopoietic, its defining relations of production must be continuously regenerated by the components which they produce" (Varela, 1979: 13).

of blood through 90 thousand kilometres of veins and blood vessels. Half of our genes describe the complex design of our brain. The other half describes the organization of the other 98% of our body.

We can think about the human body as autopoietic¹ system. Our body is made up of 70 trillion living cells. It is not only our body that makes a complex biochemical laboratory, but each and every cell can also be considered as individual biochemical laboratory. Furthermore, each and every cell is a highly complex factory making thousands of new compounds every second. Each cell of the human body is an elaborate biochemical machine. It has its own power management and information processing structures. It communicates with its neighbor cells and the environment. Each cell is an individual organism. Under certain conditions it may live outside of the human body. Most cells have a complete copy of the genetic information and theoretically are capable of recreating the whole human body. The cell level is also a level of the body-score. Cells are first scores of the body, first body-scores because they produce the body as it is. What body is does not lie outside of it, but in the middle of it, furthermore — what body is and what it can become is determined only by the body itself. The body is a score of its own becoming.

Let's portray the complexity of the body producing itself:

- Skin: our skin can renew itself. The entire skin is renewed in 28 days. In order to renew itself, the skin needs to shed dead cells. It does so at the rate of 30,000 to 40,000 dead cells per minute. The skin of any average human has nearly 300 million cells. There are nearly 19 million cells per square inch (6.4516 square centimeters) of skin. Human skin contains 45 miles of nerves. In one square inch of skin there are 4 yards of nerve fibers. A square inch of skin consists of three yards of blood vessels and it contains 625 sweat glands. A human skin contains about 200,000 temperature detectors and 500,000 touch detectors;
- Brain: our brain has over 100 billion nerve cells. It is estimated that there are over 1,000,000,000,000,000 connections in the human brain. On an average, 100,000 to 1,000,000 chemical reactions take place in our brain every second;
- Muscles: the human body consists of over 600 muscles. Human speech is produced by the interaction of 72 muscles. We use 200 muscles to take one step. The muscles of the eye move more than 100,000 times a day. Human fingers stretch and bend about 25 million times in a normal lifetime;
- Bones: our ribs move about 5 million times a year, every time we breathe;

- **Lungs:** a human lung contains about 700 million alveoli. Each lung contains 300-350 million respiratory units called alveoli. The surface area of a human lung is equal to that of a tennis court. There are more than 300,000,000 capillaries in our lungs and if they were stretched out tip to tip they would reach approximately 3,500.64 km. Our lungs inhale over two million liters of air every day. Adults typically take 15 to 20 breaths a minute, which comes to around 20,000 breaths a day;
- **Liver:** the human liver consists of 100,000 tiny clusters called lobules. The human liver performs 500 different functions. A healthy liver processes 720 liters of blood per day. Liver is the only organ of the body, which regenerates itself completely even after being removed completely;
- **Stomach:** the human stomach contains about 35 million small digestive glands. The stomach cells are created faster than they can be destroyed. We get a new stomach lining every three to four days;
- **Kidneys:** human kidneys have about 1 million nephrons that filters out liquids and wastes. In each kidney, there are 1 million filters that clean around 1.3 liters of blood every minute and push out close to 1.5 liters of urine every day. All the blood in our body passes 400 times through each kidney per day. In a lifetime, the human kidneys clean over 1 million gallons of blood;
- **Tongue:** the surface of human tongue is covered with 100 of tiny structures called papillae. The human tongue has 10,000 taste buds;
- **Blood:** a drop of blood contains 250 million cells. It takes about 20 seconds for a red blood cell to circle the whole body. Every 60 seconds, our red blood cells do a complete circuit of our body. Every day 440 Gallons (1665.5812 liters) of blood flows through each kidney. In 24 hours, the blood in the body travels a total of 12,000 miles. Platelets, which are one of the constituents of the blood are produced at the rate of one hundred billion per day. The heart pumps about 1 million barrels of blood during an average lifetime;
- **Heart:** a heart pumps about 4,000 gallons of blood each day. Our heart beats around 100,00 times every day or about 30 million times in a year. The human heart pumps 6,000 liters of blood daily through our lifetime;
- **Hands:** there are 27 bones, 29 joints and at least 123 named ligaments in the human hand. In one square inch of our hand we have nine feet of blood vessels, 600 pain sensors, 9000 nerve endings, 36 heat sensors and 75 pressure sensors. There are around 100 receptors in each of our fingertips: our fingers are more sensitive than our eyes;

- Feet: the human foot contains 26 bones, 33 joints, 107 ligaments, 19 muscles and tendons, as well as 250,000 sweat glands. The average person takes 10,000 steps per day. The average person walks about 100,000 miles in a lifetime;
- Nose: our nose contains 10 million smell receptors, which can distinguish 10 trillion distinct scents. Our scent cells are renewed every 28 days, so every four weeks we get a new "nose", but our sense of smell diminishes with ageing;
- Eyes: One eye consists of more than two million working parts. There are around 1,200,000 optic fibers in the human eye. The human eye contains five to seven million receptors for color perception. Our eyes can distinguish up to ten million color surfaces and take in more information than the largest telescope known to man. The human eye is the only multi-focus lens in the world which can adjust in 2 milliseconds. The human eye has 110-130 million receptors to perceive light. There are 137 million light-sensitive cells in the eye's retina and the fluid that fills the eye is changed 15 times a day. Every hour, the human eye can process 36,000 bits of information. The eyes have the fastest reacting muscle in the whole body. It contracts in 1/100th of a second. If we blink one eye, we move over 200 muscles. We shut our eyes for 0.3 seconds, when we blink.

Some of the processes happening — at the 1-second and 1-minute level:

- 100,000 chemical reactions take place every second in one single cell;
- 6 trillion separate operations take place every second in one single cell;
- 100,000 to 1,000,000 chemical reactions take place in the brain every second;
- 600 million bits of visual information is interpreted by the brain every minute;
- 86 billion electrical signals are sent by the brain's cells every minute;
- 17.2 trillion neural firings take place in the brain every minute;
- 38 thousand-trillion separate operations can take place in the brain every second;
- 700,000 cells die every second;
- 25 million cells are made every second;
- 300 million cells die in the human body every minute;
- 1,5 billion cells are made every minute;
- 2.5 million red blood cells are made every second;

- 150 million red blood cells are made every minute;
- it takes about 20 seconds for a red blood cell to circle the whole body;
- it takes about 60 seconds for red blood cells do a complete circuit of the body;
- 1.3 gallons (4.921 liters) of blood are being pumped by the heart every minute;
- 30,000 to 40,000 dead skin cells are being shed every minute;
- 5.6 liters of blood circulates through the body three times per minute;
- 25 blinks take place every minute;
- 70 heartbeats (approximately) take place every minute;
- we breathe in about 7 quarts (approximately 7 liters) of air every minute.

3.2 IN THE BETWEEN OF ATOMIC COLLISIONS AND MOLECULAR BECOMINGS

How to think the complexity of the body at the level of atoms and molecules, how to think its molecular becomings? "Diderot derived from Epicurus, via Lucretius, the notion that all matter in the universe is comprised of tiny, invisible, and indivisible atoms. Because motion is an inherent characteristic of atoms, they randomly collide with one another and continually recombine to form everything in the universe. Diderot seized upon this notion of the random movement of atoms and made it the foundation of his view of the universe: motion is inherent in all matter, atomic motion is random, and hence, everything in the universe, including man, animals, and celestial bodies, are merely the products of random atomic collisions" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 8). In 1753 Diderot accepted Maupertuis' idea how consciousness is intrinsic to matter: all molecules have aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence. During conception, when parental elements combine to form the embryo, each element loses its memory of self and acquires the consciousness and memory of the larger unit that is formed. By 1769 Diderot identified these embryonic components as fibers [*brins*], threads [*files*], and bundles of threads [*faisceaux de fils*]: as these are formed, each successive organizational structure has a consciousness of its own that is greater than that of the sum of its parts. With this notion Diderot made a significant contribution to his time: he recognized the arousal of emerging consciousness and that this new consciousness was stronger and of a higher form than that of the sum of its parts.

In 1753 Diderot also asked a series of questions about the difference between inanimate matter and living beings. In *Thought 58, Questions 3—15*, Diderot asked whether one can turn living matter into dead matter, as well as if one can turn dead matter into living one. Diderot posed that question because of Maupertuis' premise about the consciousness of all matter. If all matter is conscious, then there is no such thing as dead matter, but only a change in form and consciousness. In *question 15*, Diderot asked whether living molecules can return to life after losing their lives, only to lose them again, *ad infinitum*. By 1769 he had the solutions to all of his questions: the hypothesis of a consciousness that arises that is greater than that of the sum of its parts explains the transition from the mineral to the vegetable and to the animal kingdoms. "In 1769 Diderot gave instructions on how to transform inanimate matter into living matter, marble into human flesh. If we pulverize marble, turn it into humus, feed the humus to plants, and allow the animal kingdom to consume the plants, we will have transformed latent consciousness into active consciousness. The transformation

works because motion and consciousness are intrinsic to all matter, at every level of organization. Because molecules are conscious, they can be reorganized to form entities belonging to any kingdom. By 1769 Diderot was able to answer the question that he had raised in 1753: dead matter is never really dead, it can be transformed into living matter, and vice-versa, *ad infinitum*" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 14,15).

Wartofosky discusses Diderot's monism and the importance of the property of motion in atoms to the metamorphosis of inanimate matter to animate matter. Wartofsky says how La Mettrie taught Diderot that consciousness is the product of motion. In *Philosophic Thoughts* (1746), "Diderot argued that the epoch of chaos that preceded biblical Creation is fictitious because atoms have always existed, motion is a property intrinsic to atoms, and motion causes atoms to continually combine, disassemble and recombine into new forms. The multiplicity of throws (flux or continuous stream) of probability theory concurs with Lucretius' multitudes of atomic clashes (many first-beginnings of things driven on by blows from time everlasting until now (V, 421—2), and yielding many animals (V, 799)" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 20, 32). The concept of flux from probability theory is important here, as well the understanding of several kinds of flux. The first understanding of flux is the following one: there is a continuous reorganization of molecules at the microscopic level; there is a continual motion, combination, and recombination at the micro-level. The second understanding of flux is: "there is a continuous stream of time periods, albeit infinitely minute: *à chaque instant* indicates a small instant; *continue et continuera* indicates eternity. Thus, there is a small time frame and the vast composite, eternity. Thus, we have a

²Informed by atomistic philosophy and biology that runs from Lucretius to Gabriel Tarde, Deleuze studies objects not as they seem to be before the naked eye but as dynamic masses of molecules. The chemical definition of "molecular" is broadened to include subjectivity. Deleuze uses molecularity to counter the orthogonal system of Cartesian philosophy to arrive, by way of Leibniz, at a sensibility touching on the chemical animism of all things, "the action of fire, those of waters and winds on the earth", in various systems "of complex interactions" (Deleuze, 1993a: 9). Therefore, molecular action becomes a vital element in what Deleuze uses to describe the processes of things and of creation. Furthermore, Deleuze uses molecularity to illustrate how wholes (worlds or spatial aggregates) are related to. More precisely, when a teaspoon of sugar is dissolved in a glass of water the "whole" is not the container and its contents but the action of creation taking place in the ionisation of the molecules of sugar, a sort of "pure ceaseless becoming which passes through states" (Deleuze, 1986: 10). Molecularity stands with the perception of wholes (such as molar masses) that are open and disperse themselves in a continuum of duration. The notion of molecular sensibility is found in Deleuze's appreciation of microscopic things, in the tiny perceptions or inclinations that destabilise perception as a whole; they function, he says, to "pulverize the world" and, in the same blow, "to spiritualize dust" (Deleuze, 1993a: 87). The microscopic perspective also has a political dimension; molecularity is tied to a "micropolitics" of perception, affect, and even errant conversation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 220). The concept of molecular enables Deleuze to move from philosophy of relation (or difference and repetition) to chemistries of being.

flux of physical objects (*molécules*) and parcels of time (*instants*)" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 38).

What is thought as an event is the stage or time frame in the individual's life. The individual figures here as a microcosm of the species. The fact that the body constantly reorganizes itself at the molecular² level can be considered as a proof how there are no species, only speciations. The originality of Diderot's thought can be seen in that he extended the chain of beings to the vegetable and then to the mineral realms. According to Diderot, it was possible for rocks to become vegetables, then animals, and finally, human. He illustrated that possibility when he showed d'Alembert how to make flesh from marble (*Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability, Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species*): "He says that he would pulverize a statue, mix the powder with humus, water it, give it time, feed it to plants, and eat the plants" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 46). Diderot's *spontaneous generation* is a microcosm of the metamorphosis of species, as well as the example of the transition of nonliving matter to living beings. Everything that exists is ephemeral and a subject to its organizational permutation: the animalcule, plants, animals, men, planets, and stars. At the level of consciousness, Diderot does not make difference between brute matter and organized matter: all matter, animate and inanimate, has consciousness, as well as retains its consciousness when it combines to form larger molecules. It is this consciousness that causes future generations to resemble previous ones. Diderot's hypothesis that molecules have desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence, explains why molecules unite in certain ways, or more precisely, why some molecules form a certain part of the body (for example, eyes) and why some molecules form other body parts (ears, etc.).

In *Question 3* Diderot asks whether living matter can arise from dead matter and whether dead matter can arise from living matter. Diderot recognized that for the vegetable kingdom to metamorphose from the mineral, living matter must, indeed, arise from nonliving matter. Diderot asks if living matter is always alive, and if dead matter is permanently dead. If matter can change from living into nonliving and then back into living, that would explain the growth of an organism from nutrients in the soil that are ingested by plants, and in turn, consumed by humans. Diderot envisages matter as containing its own energy, as self-propelled, and he rejects the idea that any matter can be dead. D'Alembert's birth is an example of latent (potential) awareness being converted into active awareness. This transformation is accomplished by the random collision of conscious molecules. All molecules are conscious and when they randomly assemble, they acquire the consciousness of the newly organized body and lose the memory of their former state. What if the memory is also a multilayered score, just like the body? What is there are memory-scores within the body of a molecule;

what if the molecule can remember and enter the new at the same time? That being said, I want to argue the idea of molecules losing the memory of their former state upon acquiring the consciousness of the newly organized body. What if different memory-scores co-exist at the same time; what if molecules reorganize their past in their present; what if the "now" of a molecule is its reorganized, as well as integrated "then" and "not-yet"; emerging in-between its future pastness and past futureness?

Diderot's idea of ephemerality, permutability, as well as the openness of life can also be put into relation with Harvey's observation that the formation of the embryo is a progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. In the *Conversation* Diderot declares that the egg is nothing more than an unperceiving mass, both before and after the germ is introduced into it. The egg begins to reorganize when the heat is introduced into it, and the heat is produced by the motion. Diderot begins his explanation of epigenesis by framing it in purely Newtonian terms i.e.: heat and motion. Motion creates heat and heat permits growth. "First, a point moves about and then a thread grows and takes color. Motion allows the transformation of a single point into a thread; with more motion, and subsequently the generation of more heat, the thread becomes flesh. Diderot demonstrates that each stage is successive: the organization of the embryo is effected by the gradual formation of organs. As Harvey posited, rather than believing that organs are preformed, Diderot maintains that they form themselves. Harvey had observed that the heart was the first to be formed, and he concluded that the formation of the embryo was a true progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. Diderot begins from an earlier stage: a point that becomes a thread and then flesh, because motion is innate to all matter" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 72, 73).

Given the fact that molecules are conscious, there is an infinite number of degrees of consciousness just as there is an infinite number of combinations of molecules. The molecule is the simplest form of consciousness. Another form of consciousness is the thread. The thread itself is also conscious because when molecules combine to form a thread, a new consciousness arises, separate from that of its constituent parts. "The fact that plants and animals arise from epigenesis illustrates that there is only one substance in the universe that comprises everything — conscious molecules" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 73). There is a breeding ground of conscious molecules, in the earth, that will nourish plants and vegetables, and, in turn, be consumed by humans. In that way, conscious molecules will circulate in the blood and lymph systems of the humans, randomly collide and organize, and, through epigenesis, perhaps gradually yield a new species over millennia. Unlike the fixity and closed nature of preformation, epigenesis presents the possibility of open-ended metamorphosis of species. Diderot

himself maintains that nothing is more false than preformation: "Julie was once an imperceptible speck, made of even smaller particles, dispersed in the blood and lymph of her mother and father. This speck became a fine thread, then a bundle of threads; each thread was fed and became an organ. In Bordeu's monologue, *'D'abord vous n' étiez rien'*, Diderot elaborates upon epigenesis in great detail. He reiterates the idea that at first there was nothing. Then, after nothing there was *'un point imperceptible'* comprised of molecules circulating in the blood and lymph (as he had said of d'Alembert in the *Conversation*). Then there was a thread, and then a bundle of threads. The bundle becomes an organ with a specific function. The bundle of threads has consciousness, and therefore it knows what pattern to take to form an organ" (Efrosini Gregory, 2007: 75).

Following the line of Diderot's thought, the fiber is a living element, the common element of all living matter. Each of the fibers of the bundle of threads is transformed, solely by nutrition, into a particular organ. Each bundle of fibers makes and represents a conscious system. When bundles join to form an organ, each organ becomes a conscious system. When organs work together to form a system, that system has an individual consciousness all of its own. What we can derive from Diderot's thought is how the body itself is comprised of an infinite number of consciousness. If every molecule, as well as every thread, bundle, fibre, and organs has a consciousness of its own, it becomes very interesting to think the body as a multi-consciousness system. However, that system is dynamic and open, and as previously mentioned, based upon its ephemerality and permutability, simultaneously spreading in two directions:

- atoms becoming molecules — molecules becoming a thread — thread becoming a bundle — bundle becoming a fibre, fibre becoming an organ; organ becoming a body;
- one molecule becoming another molecule — one thread becoming another thread — one bundle becoming another bundle — one fibre becoming another fibre — one organ becoming another organ — one body becoming another body;
- mineral becoming vegetable — vegetable becoming animal — animal becoming human; human becoming animal — animal becoming vegetable — vegetable becoming mineral.
- becoming mineral of human — becoming vegetable of human — becoming animal of human;
- becoming mineral of animal — becoming vegetal of animal — becoming human of animal;

- becoming mineral of vegetal — becoming animal of vegetal — becoming human of vegetal;
- becoming vegetal of mineral — becoming animal of mineral — becoming human of mineral.

3.3 BECOMING-UNLIMITED: ORGIASTIC BODY

As previously mentioned, the human body is made of 7 octillion atoms³. Molecules are formed by the combination of two or more atoms. Each atom and molecule are enveloped by the electron. The electron can be seen as a particle and as a wave, as well as the atom's and molecule's skin. More precisely, the electron determines the shape and the properties of atoms and their more complex formations — molecules. What makes the electrons so interesting? The electron is always more-than one on multiple levels: it can become a pure energy, a vibration, a vibrational wave, other particle, or disappear. The electronic skin of molecules is the one that is in constant transformation and reorganization and makes the level of becoming-electronic of the body. Electronic skin is our first and deepest skin. However, that skin is dual: it is actual and virtual or "excited" at the same time. In other words — its shape and properties are simultaneously actual and virtual. If we excite an actual skin, it becomes the virtual skin. More precisely, by exciting the actual skin we make it actualize one of its virtual shapes and properties.

Furthermore, each electron makes more-than one actual, as well as virtual skin. Depending on the number of electrons they consist of, many molecules that make our body have more than one skin. For example, carbon consists of 6 electrons, therefore, it has 6 different skins. Each of those 6 skins has its own shape and they co-exist at the same time. Their existence is not static, but a dynamic one: it is the existence that can be described as an ongoing shapeshifting. Excitation generates the change of particle's shape as well its properties. The wave of excitation becomes a movement, the movement becomes a shape and the shape becomes a particle. Each and every electron of our body is coming-to-be and yet-to-come at the same time; each and every electron is continuously shapeshifting and producing the state of becoming-electronic of our body. As previously mentioned, every electron is more-than one: it is a particle and a wave, it is actual and virtual. As a particle — it is actual and as a wave — it is virtual. Furthermore, as a particle — electron has a shape, while as a wave it can take any shape. The electron as a wave is a shape in becoming.

³Everything we can see, touch, and "feel" is made up of atoms — the infinitesimally small constituent parts of matter. The field of study related to these, called "quantum physics", gives us plenty of things to consider about the world around us; particularly, the indistinguishable activities going on at an atomic scale. Among the phenomena it encompasses, it is possible to distinguish: Quantum entanglement (particles that pop in-and-out of existence), the particle-wave duality (particles that shape-shift at random), strange states of matter and even strange matter itself. Quantum Mechanics also says that we are made up of particles, which means that microscopically, different processes are going on within us that aren't perceivable to the human eye.

As previously mentioned, the number of electrons determines the number of skins in molecules and atoms. Let's look inside our body, or more precisely, let's look which atoms and molecules our body is made of. Some of the atoms our body is made of are hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon, phosphorus, etc. Hydrogen consists of 1 atom — therefore it has 1 electronic skin, carbon consists of 6 atoms and therefore 6 electronic skins, nitrogen consists of 7 atoms and therefore 7 electronic skins, oxygen consists of 8 atoms and therefore 8 electronic skins, while phosphorus consists of 15 atoms and therefore 15 electronic skins. The water molecule that makes up to 60% of our body has 10 electronic skins. The glutamate that makes our body has 78 electronic skins. The two threads of DNA in Chromosome 1, largest human chromosome, consist of 64, 377 billion electronic skins (electronic skins of proteins not included). In other words: hydrogen has 1 shape, carbon has 6 shapes, nitrogen has 7 shapes, oxygen has 8 and phosphorus 15 shapes. The water has 10 shapes. The glutamate has 78 shapes. Two threads of DNA in Chromosome 1 have 64, 377 billion shapes — and all of those shapes co-exist. All of those shapes are determined and emergent at the same time. The possibility of their change is unlimited. In other words, the shape that I have and the shape I can become are equally important. What makes my body move from one shape to another are excited shapes or those that are simultaneously coming-to-be and yet-to-come. Excited shapes are also those that are magnetically or electrically stimulated: the excitation of electron causes the change of the shape of electronic skins. Since the excitation of electrons is a permanent condition the body shape-shifts all the time. Molecular shapeshifting of the body also indicates its molecular becoming.




Image 1: an electron changing shape

Image 1 is the image of electron changing shape. While all the light shapes show different forms an electron can take, the black space indicates the space of singularity, reorganization, potential. What is black is the virtual. What is black is the singular yet-to-come of electron's form.

At the level of energy — the body is a pure potential. More precisely, energy is a state of pure potential. In terms of its form, energy is also more-than one: there are kinetic, potential, mechanical, electric, magnetic, gravitational, chemical, ionization, nuclear, chromodynamic, elastic, mechanical, sound, radiant, rest, and thermal energies. It is not possible to discuss the energy is singular. Energy is always plural. Undifferentiated energy can take any form, as well as more than one form at the same time. The energy is more-than one in terms of its potential of transformation too: one form of energy can transform into another form of energy. At the virtual level — energy is plural; at the actual level — the action of the body is what makes it plural through the act of ongoing transformation. At the level of energy, the body, or more precisely, the energy body figures as the Body without Organs or the one that is being undetermined, pure potential, constantly becoming.

The level of energy of the body is the level of becoming-unlimited of the body. Since everything is made of energy, or better, energies — all bodies that exist are energy bodies. At the energy level, the only possible ontology is the one that Manuel De Landa (2006) calls a flat ontology or the one in which entities on different scales, and of different levels of reflexivity and complexity, are all treated in the same manner. Energy bodies also open up the question of the impossibility of ontology and the necessity of ontogenesis. All bodies are ontogenetic bodies — it does not matter what they are, but how they become; their coming-into-being is not predetermined, but emergent. All energy bodies are heterogenetic too — since they have more than one way of coming-into-being, as well as more than one mode of becoming.

Our hand stops at the surface of the table and doesn't go through it because the electrons of the hand and those of the table do not share the same quantum state.

⁴This opens up the question of hylomorphism which presumes that materiality, or the "sensible" (that which can be apprehended by the senses alone), is passive, inert, and intrinsically shapeless, as well as that it can only be organized by an intelligible form that is imposed upon it from outside or from above. Simondon argues that hylomorphism, with its rigid dualism, ignores all the *intermediaries* that are at work in any actual process of formation. According to Shaviro, "matter is never entirely passive and inert, for it always contains incipient structures. Matter already contains distributions of energy, and potentials for being shaped in particular directions or ways. "It's easier to plane a piece of wood if you work in the direction of the grain, rather than across it" (Massumi 1992, 10). For its part, form is never absolute, and never simply imposed from the outside, since it can only be effective to the extent that it is able to translate or 'transduce' itself into one or another material. That is to say, form is energetic: it works

However, two voices, even if not sharing the same quantum state can overlap. At the level of phonons (voice) and photons (light) our quantum state can overlap with another quantum state. More precisely, our body is not just emitting photons all the time, but the photons of our body can overlap with the photons of the other body — even though they do not share the same quantum state. In terms of its quantum states, or more precisely, its overlappings, again, it is possible to see how the body is more-than one.

At the energy level, as well as molecular level — we don't start or stop moving. We move, flow and change shape all the time⁴. At the molecular level, body is a flow. Excited potential is what makes the body flow from what it is toward what it can become. The shape is a wave. The skin is not just the wave, but also a field. Fields meet and overlap: when I push my hand against the wall the atoms of my hand go into the wall and the atoms of the wall pass into my hand. The body is an evanescent wave or the one that goes beyond the limits by making one quantum field pass into another. Evanescent wave is becoming-unlimited of the body. The most external of my actual skins — is the intermediary skin or the one being formed of the electronic skin of my body and the electronic skin of the wall. Apart from having their own shape, my body and the body of the wall share the intermediary shape determined by the relations of becoming-wall of my hand and becoming-hand of the wall. What my body and the wall share are not only shapes, but also skins in co-becoming. The skin is not static, but vibrating, pulsating, flowing. The skin is a movement. The body is a multilayered movement and more importantly, multilayered score, body-score. The body is a molecular score and relational score of its singular form-taking, as well as becoming. The body is not just a score of becoming, but also a score in becoming. Becoming-score of the body is what determines body's ontogenesis, its coming-to-be and yet-to-come. The body is not just a society, but a cosmos, or more precisely, chaosmos⁵ of matter, feelings and becomings. In the midst of potential, body-score is

by a series of transformations that transmit energy, and thereby 'inform' matter, affecting it or modulating it in a process of exchange and communication" (Shaviro, 2009: 6).

⁵In the following passage from *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, Deleuze expands what he takes to be the key difference between the Leibnizian and the Whiteheadian cosmologies: "For Leibniz ... bifurcations and divergencies of series are genuine borders between impossible worlds, such that the monads that exist wholly include the compossible world that moves into existence. For Whitehead, on the contrary, bifurcations, divergences, impossibilities, and discord belong to the same motley world that can no longer be included in expressive units, but only made or undone according to prehensive units and variable configurations. In a same chaotic world divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths. It is a 'chaosmos' ... [in which] even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the richest possible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms impossibilities and passes them through" (Deleuze, 1993: 81). Chaos stands for an infinitely complex, inaccessible, even though determined pattern whose directional components are unstable but serve as the

emerging through the relations of becoming-unlimited and becoming-perceptive of its own limitlessness in conjunction with the limitlessness of the world.

As Whitehead says, each occasion, taken in itself, is a quantum: a discrete, indivisible unit of becoming. When two occasions or two quanta pass through one another their modes of becoming also pass through one another — they co-become. One occasion becomes contaminated by the other occasion, one mode of becoming becomes contaminated by the other mode of becoming, one singular form-taking becomes contaminated by the other singular form-taking. This act of passing marks the act of change. Every act of change also marks the act of self-renewal. For Whitehead, to change is to be changed, as well as the other way around. The body becomes through the act of changing and being changed.

How is our body changing and being changed by the touch? Touching is one of the acts that make our atoms collide and pass from one quantum state into another, therefore — my body is made of all the bodies I have ever touched and makes all the bodies I have ever touched; my body is made of all the objects I have ever touched and makes all the objects I have ever touched; my body is made of the world and it makes the world. My body is the culminating point of large-scale atomic collisions.

To touch is to atomically collide, flow, pass, co-become. Let's observe this act of writing: I am wearing several layers of clothes. I am sitting on the chair and typing the text. My arms are laid down on the desk. My fingers are touching the keys of a computer keyboard. While doing so, I am looking at the screen. I respond to my cat as he asks me to give him some food. Occasionally, I drink some water. Another way to see this situation is: My body is atomically colliding with every layer of clothes I'm wearing, the chair I'm sitting on, the desk my arms are being laid down on, the keys touched by my fingers, the water I drink. The photons (light particles) of my body and the photons emitted by the screen are colliding as I write this text. The phonons (sound particles) of my body and the phonons of the body of my cat are colliding as we interact. Furthermore, my body is not sitting on the chair, but passing through it; at the same time — the chair is passing through my body. The clothes I

basis for milieus (and the rhythms which express the relation of milieus to chaos). According to Deleuze: "From chaos, Milieus and Rhythms are born. This is the concern of very ancient cosmogonies. Chaos is not without its own directional components, which are its own ecstasies. [...] The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus' answer to chaos. What chaos and rhythm have in common is the in-between — between two milieus, rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos [...] Chaos is not the opposite of rhythm, but the milieu of all milieus" (Deleuze and Guattari, 87: 345, 313). Furthermore: "a chaosmos [...] combines the functions of chaos and the cosmos in natural (i.e. terrestrial) or aesthetic milieus" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991: 204).

am wearing do not stop at my skin, but passes through it; my body passes into the fabrics. That opens up the question of body boundaries. How to think the idea of body boundaries at different levels — energy, atomic, molecular, kinetic, relational? At the atomic level, our body is not familiar of boundaries, but only passing from one state into another. Where does the body start, where does it end? At the atomic level, it is not possible to say where the body starts or stops because the atomic level is the level of becoming-unlimited of the body. Becoming-unlimited of the body is the event of orgiastic body⁶.

The body is not just an event, but is made of events. The body itself is a laboratory, a stage, a world, a chaosmos and all of those co-exist, as well as co-become through the multiplicity and series of events. The body as the most complex biochemical

⁶"Recovering the *orgiastic* body is for Deleuze the 'greatest effort of philosophy' (DR 262), because 'it discovers the infinite in itself', that is, 'it discovers in itself the limits of the organized; tumult, restlessness and passion underneath apparent calm. It rediscovers monstrosity' (DR 42). Deleuze expresses this 'becoming unlimited' (LS 258) by *orgiastic correspondences* (DR 64) like Cosmos = Chaos (DR 123, 299), Pluralism = Monism (TP 20), or *Omnitudo* = the BwO (TP 157—8) — which are *not* organic 'equations' of 'indifferent oneness' and 'identity' (DR 66). While the *organic* 'moves toward the absence of difference' (DR 65), *orgiastic* bodies, depriving of the One and of forms of sameness or resemblance, are liberated to *dissimilarity* granting heterogeneity of speed, potentiality, and intensity (TP 260). In Whitehead, the *orgiastic* body appears in his bold concept of the 'entirely living nexus' (PR 103—7), which is a chaotic overflow of organic structures (PR 104; N 143), a 'de-forming' de/construction of organisms by Life (PR 339; AI 295), thereby 'answer[ing] to the notion of "chaos"' (PR 72). The Category of the Ultimate (PR 21—2) implicates/explicates *orgiastic series of correspondences*: Creativity = the universals of universals = matter (PR 31) = pure activity; or activity = receptivity = unification = multiplication; or system = event (PR 36) = process = the form of the unity of the Universe (AI 179). Finally, Whitehead in his articles from 1941 makes a radical move: He de/constructs *all* of his *organic* categories — creativity, forms, God — rendering 'becoming unlimited' (LS 258), and producing an *orgiastic* body by 'cutting and cross-cutting' (Ph 16) infinity and finitude as unfolding/refolding *infinite multiplicity* — the becoming-Universe (MG 105ff; Imm. 79ff), *one* orgiastic BwO, with God as immanent abstraction (Imm. 80)! While Whitehead is well known for the first series — his *organic* philosophy (PR 18) — we can, however, trace the 'logic of multiplicities' in his multiple *phantasms of Life that speak of the becoming-multiplicities*. In Deleuze's eyes, here philosophy becomes *orgiastic* (DR 42). Deleuze's *phantasm* for philosophy-becoming-orgiastic is the 'Body without Organs' (TP 149—66) in which every organization is de/constructed as rhizomatic, spontaneous and nomadic Life (B 38; AO 8), 'full of gaiety, ecstasy, and dance' (TP 150). *Organic* structures extinguish singularities, leaving only parts of general systems, which 'exist' only by participating within a common form (PR 34) or the judgement of God (TP 158). Thereby, a *highest* principle of identity (LS 78) is enthroned, misconceived as creator of the multiplicity (AI 212; AO 13), the *One* that 'uproots it from its immanence and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject' (TP 159). So, we lose our 'body without organs' that God has stolen from us in order to palm off an organized body without which his judgment could not be exercised. The body without organs [however] is an effective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, thresholds, and gradients" of becoming-unlimited (Robinson, 2009: 213, 214).

laboratory performs trillions of chemical reactions per second. All of those reactions happen simultaneously. As I write about those chemical processes — all of them have occurred trillions and trillions of times during the time it took me to learn it, write it and explain it. The body finishing this sentence is not the body that started it. Within the process of writing this sentence my body has changed trillions of times. Whitehead is right when he says how everything is actively happening. Even though we are not perceptive of it, our body is happening, it is an event.

3.4 INTENSIVE CORPOREALITY: EDGES, POINTS, PARTICLES, DEGREES OF INTENSITY

How to explore the idea of a body-flow at the micro level? Within the practical part of my thesis research, I tried to explore the fluidity of different types of body material, such as blood, saliva and skin, as well as various body tissues. Within that part of my research, I was interested in discovering how a particular body

⁷A multiplicity is a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity. More precisely, multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. Following this line of thought, Deleuze opposes the dyad One/Many, in all of its forms, with multiplicity. Deleuze insists that the crucial point is to consider multiplicity in its substantive form — a multiplicity — rather than as an adjective — as multiplicity of something. The two people whom Deleuze associates with the development of the concept of multiplicity are the mathematician Georg Riemann, and the French philosopher Henri Bergson. From Riemann, Deleuze borrows the idea that any situation is composed of different multiplicities that form a kind of patchwork or ensemble without becoming a totality or whole. For example, a house is a patchwork of concrete structures and habits; even though we can list these things, there is finally no way of determining what the essence of a particular house is, because we cannot point to anything outside of the house itself to explain or to sum it up — it is simply a patchwork. This can also be taken as a description of multiplicities themselves. Deleuze's debt to Bergson is more profound. It is in *Bergsonism* (1966) that Deleuze first discusses multiplicity; Deleuze notes first of all that there are two kinds of multiplicity in Bergson: extensive numerical multiplicities and continuous intensive multiplicities. The first of these characterises space and the second, time. Furthermore, the difference between extensive and intensive is perhaps the most important point here; in contrast to space, which can be divided up into parts (this is why it is called numerical), intensive multiplicity cannot be divided up without changing in nature. Therefore, any alteration to an intensive multiplicity means a total change in its nature — a change in its intensive state. This means that there is no essence of particular multiplicities which can remain unaffected by encounters with others. Deleuze also makes the link between the concept of the virtual and that of multiplicity in the context of his reading of Bergson, and it is in connection with the theme of virtual intensive multiplicity that Deleuze most palpably remains a Bergsonian. When discussing the virtual, Deleuze quotes Marcel Proust's adage in relation to memory: "Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract". Therefore, virtual multiplicity is real without being necessarily embodied in the world. Rather than expressing abstract alternative possibilities, virtual multiplicity forms real openness to change that inheres in every particular situation. This perhaps makes the most difficult point to grasp in Deleuze's doctrine of virtual multiplicities. Even though virtual multiplicities are embodied in particular states of affairs, they must not be considered to be somehow transcendent or essentially immutable. As Deleuze shows in his discussion of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in *Difference and Repetition*, the virtual and the actual are interrelated. While the virtual is embodied in actual situations, the changes in actual situations also effect changes in the virtual multiplicity. The virtual counterparts of our actual multiplicities are those that make possible continued movement and change. Existence is a combination of actual multiplicities — states of affairs — and virtual multiplicities — particular intensive movements of change. Since we live among actual multiplicities (and are ourselves multiplicities), we are always elements of the world and its actors. Therefore, both philosophy and human existence are eminently practical.

material (blood, saliva or skin) is being changed over the course of time in terms of its movement and composition. Experience-dependent, as well as time-dependent transformation of body material is a potential source for rediscovering the perceptible, as well as imperceptible fluidity of a human body. Making the imperceptible levels of a body-flow perceptible is also opening the question of bodying, body-in-making and multiplicity⁷.

Stamatia Portanova identifies "the three milieus of formal and substantial organisation interwoven in the biophysical stratum of a dancing body and emerging out of it, as if out of chaos: a compositional milieu (where cells, tissues and organs are rhythmicised, or differentiated, by a continuous passage of energy which puts the infinitesimal parts of a body in a state of continuous variation); a milieu of actions (where bones and muscles and their coordinated performances are rhythmicised by a passage of electrical energy which provokes a continuous variation of the body's movements); a perceptual milieu (where the sensorial systems and motor coordination are rhythmicised by the passage of sound between external environment, sensory receptors and motor neurons, producing the continuous infinitesimal variations of a dance). All the different milieus of a dancing body are constituted by periodic sequences of basic components: the genetic code choreographing sequences of molecules and cells at a unidimensional level and generating the qualities, possibilities and capacities of the body; the anatomical structure giving shape to precise movement sequences; the five senses synchronising perception and movement, and directing the performance of dance as a sequence of steps" (Portanova, 2002: 82-83). According to Deleuze and Guattari, "every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions. [...] The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 345, 313). Dancing body is a dynamic system in continuous variation.

How to think the body at all of its levels? "At a kinetic level, a body is defined as an aggregate of infinite, non-quantifiable and non-confinable particles which enter in relations of movement and rest with other particles and provoke the actual affections (collisions) of the body. In this body cartography, all particle exchanges and affective variations are regulated by 'membranes', porous surfaces which delimit and articulate the body's individuality. At a dynamic level, the body exists in its affective capacities: all the relations and passages of a body and all its contacts or

connections with other bodies provoke a continuous variation of this capacity to affect and be affected. At each new movement the body, temporarily identified and enclosed into a stable territory or corporeal confine between its internal and external dimensions, undergoes a certain degree of deterritorialisation, i. e. of disidentification

⁸In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze reflects the distinction made by the Stoics between mixtures of bodies or states of affairs and incorporeal entities that "frolic" on the surface of occurrences (Deleuze, 1990: 5). For Deleuze, this distinction refers to two planes of being, one of which concerns the tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions of bodies; and the other of which concerns "incorporeal" entities or events that do not exist, but rather "subsist or inhere" in states of affairs. Even though incorporeal entities can never be actually present, they are the effect of mixtures of bodies and can enter into quasi-causal relations with other incorporeals. The example of the incorporeal is an event of sense. A proposition like "The sun is shining" expresses a sense that "inheres" in the proposition, but can never be reduced to the state of affairs of either one specific or even an endless series of specific instances of a shining sun (Deleuze, 1990: 19). Deleuze argues that while states of affairs have the temporality of the living present, the incorporeal events of sense are infinitives (to shine, to be the sun) that constitute pure becomings with the temporality of *aion* — a form of time independent of matter that always eludes the present. Therefore, no matter how many times the state of affairs of a shining sun is actualised, the sense of "The sun is shining" is not exhausted. It is this "frontier of sense" between what words express and the attributes of bodies that allows language to be differentiated from physical bodies. If the actions and passions of bodies make sense, it is because that sense is not itself either an action or a passion, but an incorporeal effect of a state of affairs that enters into relations of quasi-causality with other incorporeal events of sense. The virtual relations of the events of sense generate the condition of any given speech-act. Deleuze refers to Lewis Carroll's work as a revealing example of how these quasi-causal relations can form a "non-sense" that subsists in "common sense" language. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari portray a social field in terms of a "machinic assemblage" and a "collective assemblage of enunciation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 88). In relation to bodies, as well as the actions and passions affecting those bodies (the "machinic assemblage", for example, the body of the accused or the body of the prison), there is a set of incorporeal transformations current in a given society that are attributed to the bodies of that society (for example, the transformation of the accused into a convict by the judge's sentence) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 81). It is possible to view the incorporeal effects of states of affairs in terms of either the "order-words" that designate fixed relations between statements and the incorporeal transformations they express, or the deterritorialising play of Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (1865). In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze portrays the actor or Stoic sage as someone "able to evoke an instant with the intensity expressive of an unlimited future and past, and thereby embody the incorporeal effects of a state of affairs rather than merely its spatio-temporal actualisation" (Deleuze, 1990: 147). Actors as such do more than merely portray a character's hopes or regrets; they attempt to "represent" a pure instant at the point at which it divides into future and past, thus embodying in their performance an intimation of virtual relations beyond those actualised in the situation portrayed. If one wills to be just in the manner of a Stoic sage, one does not will the repetition of past acts of justice, but a justice that has always been and has yet to be — the incorporeal effect of justice that is never made fully manifest in any concrete situation. When the incorporeal effects of sense are reduced to order-words, we begin to ignore the pure becomings of sense and territorialise the infinite variability of meaning into stale repetitions of the past. Only when we allow the variables of corporeal bodies and events of sense to be placed into constant variation — order-words become a passage to the limit. Furthermore, "the movement of new connections among these variables pushes language to its limits and bodies to a metamorphic becoming-other" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 108).

and displacement, an interchange of molecules with other bodies, a state of total openness putting it in relation with an absolute exteriority (Portanova, 2002: 20, 22). At a dynamic level, the body is always becoming another body: "A degree, an intensity, is an individual ... that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual. In short, between substantial forms and determined subjects, between the two, there is ... a natural play of ... degrees, intensities, events, and accidents that compose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that receive them" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2002a: 453).

According to Deleuze and Guattari, 'affects' and 'percepts' constitute the non-human and non-organic, non-conscious and non-subjective, or virtual, becomings of the body and of its perceptions. 'Affects' and 'percepts' also constitute a body and a perception beyond and before the human. The paradoxical relation of affect to the body (as being part of it but always escaping it) unfolds as a vibratory event, an intensive state of the body exceeding itself. In this sense, affect is defined by Massumi as an incorporeal⁸ dimension, the unleashing of a bodily potential before and beyond the realisation of a stable, extensive corporeality. In parallel with affect (the becoming of the perceiving body), Deleuze and Guattari's notion of percept defines the non-human becoming of perceived objects, bodies and landscapes, their loss of all relations with the psychological and physical states of the perceiving subject. "A percept is the becoming sensible of a material force through the emergence of particular traits of expression, or qualities, in the perceived body or object (such as a sound timbre or frequency, or the speed and rhythm of a bodily movement). Affects and percepts (non-human ways of feeling and perceiving) compose a sensation, a transformational moment in which something attracts and something is irremediably attracted" (Portanova, 2002: 29). What bodies share in all performative process are sensations or 'becomings' of their actual states.

The molecular modulation of a dancing body by external forces crosses its path with the opposite vector of the body's own forces and with its own processes of modulation (for example, the force of the body modulating the air and ground, as opposed to the force of gravity giving weight to the body and modulating its motion): "how are we to define this matter-movement, this matter-energy, this matter-flow, this matter in variation that enters assemblages and leaves them?" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2002a: 407). The definition given by the two philosophers is that of an unformed flow of particles/intensities, subatomic and submolecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and prephysical free singularities condensed along the cartographic axes of different bodies. Following the line of this thought, "an individual dancer or a whole dance piece can be defined as bodies composed of multiple subsets,

populations with a capacity to connect with other individuals. As an example, we can draw on Manuel DeLanda's definition of the walking animal as forming a compositional body with the ground (which provides it with a surface) and with a gravitational field (which gives it weight)" (Portanova, 2002: 44). Within this approach it is possible to describe the dancing bodies, as well as their perceptual apparatuses as systems in continuous metamorphosis. "The dynamic, as well as kinetic aspect of dance can be thus related to the attraction of electromagnetic particles-intensities: the dancing body as a swarm of particles attracted between two opposite poles, gravity and anti-gravity, terrestrial and aerial tendencies, and generating different sensations; the impact of these sensations on perceptual apparatuses and the capture systems crossed by the rhythm of the dancing body-swarm" (Portanova, 2002: 47).

According to Portanova, a dancing body is more or less coherently assembled through the 'chorematical' composition of myriads of interwoven microscopic units, from the bending of an arm to its interconnected and indiscernible articulations, up to the infinitesimal electroshocks galvanising its neural cells. The definition of dance as a 'chorematic' (echoing the Hjelmslevian 'glossematic' theory of language) (Bosteels 1998, and Genosko 1998) proposed by Portanova focuses on the infinitesimal energetic moments (rather than on the signifying units) crossing and composing the gestures of a body, and on the minimal components of its steps, the microscopic gestural acts, or movements in movement, as a continuum of "unformed, unorganised material intensities", "semio-chips — edges, points, particles, degrees of intensity" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2002a: 69) that acquire a code (choreographic form) and a territoriality (corporeal performative substance) when actualised and expressed through particular perceptions and movements. The notion of "'chorematic' will draw an immanent perspective of micro-movements as choreutic particles-signs beyond signification" (Portanova, 2002: 53,63). How to think the body as a system of energy-signs? For Deleuze and Guattari, energy is desire, not desire of something but desire in itself, not hormonal or electric or magnetic energy but energy in itself, production in itself, movement in itself, a desire/energy producing and reproducing itself incessantly, creating reality before representation. "The energetic vibrations run over a body with neither unity nor fragmentation, producing a surface where only molecular chains of sensations inscribe themselves" (Portanova, 2002: 66). Therefore, dance becomes a rhythmic process generated in the connections between the body's molecules and cells, limbs and senses, movements and perceptions.

The rhythm can be seen as a proto-transformer of human body opening it towards its relational being and becoming. Through the rhythm a body is being generated as a passage from the inorganic to the organic, from plant to animal, from animal to

humankind. Rhythm as both inner and outer relational membrane system is putting into relation human and prehuman body. Can we consider the rhythm as a living phenomena connecting vegetal, animal and human bodies, as well as relations of becoming vegetal and becoming animal of human body? In that context, exploring the fluidity of corporeal rhythmicity becomes a mode of exploring nonanthropomorphic, as well as polymorphic body intelligence. Rhythm makes it possible to transgress the limits between the individual and preindividual body. How to explore the relation between the rhythm and body image? How to explore the boundaries of our bodies being affected by a certain rhythm; are we producing the boundaries of our bodies through the rhythm or are we being produced by them, as some sort of a body-flow? Do our bodies have their own rhythmic memory, more precisely, preindividual rhythmic memory patterns and is the process of rhythmic composing and decomposing, as well as co-composing the body itself creating the zone of shared boundaries, bodies, flows? What is the body of rhythm itself and how is our body producing it, as well as being produced by it? How to make the shared body-flow visible — as an act of co-composing the passages of rhythmical Becoming(s)?

3.5 MICROSCOPIC EXPLORATION OF THE BODY MATERIAL: TISSUES




Image 2: microscopic image of inner nose tissue (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 3: microscopic image of outer nose tissue (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 4: microscopic image of hair (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 5: microscopic image of eyebrows (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 6: microscopic image of nail (made by Laura Potrovic)

What all images of body tissues presented here have in common is the following:

- heterogeneity;
- multiple planes;
- multiple scales;
- multiple orientations;
- shape variations;
- asymmetry;
- multiplicity at the level of organization;
- without the fixed beginning or the end;
- without the center; multicentered;
- without the spatial organization characterized by the fixed distinction between left and right, up and down, etc.

3.6 MICROSCOPIC EXPLORATION OF THE BODY MATERIAL: SALIVA




Image 7: microscopic image of saliva, 1st day (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 8: microscopic image of saliva, 2nd day (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 9: microscopic image of saliva, 3rd day (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 10: microscopic image of saliva, 5th day (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 11: microscopic image of saliva, 7th day (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 12: microscopic images of saliva samples of two dancers (saliva samples given after the rehearsal) (made by Laura Potrovic)

What all images of saliva presented here have in common is the following:

- heterogeneity;
- multiple planes;
- multiple scales;
- multiple orientations;
- multiple flows;

- polyrhythm (of flows);
- time-dependent transformation;
- transforming their shape, size and orientation;
- time-dependent reorganization;
- reorganizing their shape, size and orientation;
- variation;
- varying their shape, size and orientation;
- asymmetry;
- multiplicity at the level of organization;
- without the fixed beginning or the end;
- without the center; multicentered;
- without the spatial organization characterized by the fixed distinction between left and right, up and down, etc.

3.7 MICROSCOPIC EXPLORATION OF THE BODY MATERIAL: BLOOD




Image 13: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 14: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 15: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 16: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 17: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 18: microscopic image of blood (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 19: microscopic image of different flows within one blood drop (made by Laura Potrovic)

What all images of blood presented here have in common is the following:

- movement;
- action;
- multiple planes of activity;
- multiple scales of activity;
- multiple orientations;
- flow;
- flowing at multiple speeds at the same time;
- flowing in multiple directions at the same time;
- flowing in multiple rhythms (polyrhythm) at the same time;
- heterogeneous dynamic;
- transformation;
- transforming their shape, size and orientation;
- reorganization;

- reorganizing their shape, size and orientation;
- variation;
- varying their shape, size and orientation;
- asymmetry;
- multiplicity at the level of organization;
- without the fixed beginning or the end;
- without the center; multicentered;
- without the spatial organization characterized by the fixed distinction between left and right, up and down, etc.;
- creating the feeling of space (spatial orientation) with movement — what is up or down, and left or right depends on the movement of molecules which form a certain shape, and therefore, space, through their movement;
- movement-dependency — everything is movement dependent — space, shape, size, and orientation of molecular organization of tissue are generated through specific mode of moving, therefore — every change at the level of movement also produces the change at the level of space, shape, size and orientation of molecular organization of blood tissue.

3.8 MICROSCOPIC EXPLORATION OF THE BODY MATERIAL: TEARS




Image 20: microscopic images of tears, from left to right: "tears of release", "laughing till I'm crying", "watering eyes", "tears of elation at a liminal moment" (made by Rose-Lynn Fisher)




Image 21: microscopic images of tears, from left to right: "tears for those who yearn for liberation", "tears of possibility and hope", "tears of grief", "tears of ending and beginning", "tears of change", "onion tears" (made by Rose-Lynn Fisher)

Photographer Rose-Lynn Fisher explores the microscopic structures of dried human tears. As part of a new project called *Topography of Tears*, she uses microscope to give us an unexpected view of tears. This is how she witnesses the moment when she caught one of her own tears on a slide, dried it, and then peered at it through a standard

light microscope: "It was really interesting. It looked like an aerial view, almost as if I was looking down at a landscape from a plane", she says. "Eventually, I started wondering—would a tear of grief look any different than a tear of joy? And how would they compare to, say, an onion tear?" (<http://rose-lynnfisher.com/tears.html>). Based on their origin, tears are divided into three different types. Both tears of grief and joy are psychic tears, triggered by extreme emotions, whether positive or negative ones. Basal tears are released continuously in tiny quantities (on average, 0.75 to 1.1 grams over a 24-hour period) to keep the cornea lubricated. Reflex tears are secreted in response to an irritant, like dust, onion vapors or tear gas. All tears contain a variety of biological substances (including oils, antibodies and enzymes) suspended in salt water, but as Fisher observes, tears from each of the different categories include distinct molecules as well. Emotional tears, for instance, contain protein-based hormones including the neurotransmitter leucine enkephalin, a natural painkiller that is released when the body is under stress.

Because the structures seen under the microscope are largely crystallized salt, the circumstances under which the tear dries can lead to radically dissimilar shapes and formations. "There are so many variables—there's the chemistry, the viscosity, the setting, the evaporation rate and the settings of the microscope" Fisher says (<http://rose-lynnfisher.com/tears.html>). As Fisher explored over the hundreds of dried tears, she began to perceive even more ways in which they resembled large-scale landscapes, or as she calls them, "aerial views of emotion terrain". Fischer witnesses: "It's amazing to me how the patterns of nature seem so similar, regardless of scale. You can look at patterns of erosion that are etched into earth over thousands of years, and somehow they look very similar to the branched crystalline patterns of a dried tear that took less than a moment to form" (<http://rose-lynnfisher.com/tears.html>). Studying tears for so long has made Fisher think of them as far more than a salty liquid we discharge during difficult moments. "Tears are the medium of our most primal language in moments as unrelenting as death, as basic as hunger and as complex as a rite of passage. It's as though each one of our tears carries a microcosm of the collective human experience, like one drop of an ocean" (<http://rose-lynnfisher.com/tears.html>). Next chapter of this thesis, entitled "Body-Terrain", explores body fluids (eye fluid, saliva and cervical fluid), or more precisely, the emergence of their patterns, before and after the specific type of movement experience.

4 | BODY-TERRAIN

4.1 MICROSCOPE SLIDE: A STAGE, AN INTERMEDIARY ECOLOGY, A SITE OF SELF-STUDY

In 2016 I attended Gaga workshop with Biliana Vassileva, a dancer and dance researcher. We decided to take our body samples (body fluids and tissues) before and after the workshop in order to see if our body material changed due to the dance experience. Within Gaga workshop we were exploring the body as a flow and the fluidity of our perception, as well as movement. The images above and below are the images of our fluid's samples before and after the experience. As we can notice, fluid patterns changed after the experience of dance. Images presented here are those in which the strongest change occurred (eye, saliva and cervical fluids). Fluid patterns changed in terms of their shape, size and orientation.




Image 1: Eye fluid pattern, before (left) and after (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 2: Eye fluid pattern, before (left) and after (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)

Let's give some more precise insight into the context of this research: Biliana and I attended one-day Gaga workshop (full duration of the workshop was one week). Unlike Biliana, this was the first time that I encountered, as well as bodily experienced Gaga training. Unlike Biliana's body, my body did not know what to expect. So, how did we choose this workshop as the common field of our future research experimentation? After sharing all the theoretical, as well as practical research interests Biliana suggested attending this workshop, while I suggested using my methodology. More precisely, I suggested doing the microscope research of our body samples (fluids and tissues) before and after the workshop experience. This methodology originates from my work within the Somagram — Experimental Corpography Lab (2013 — today). In the following chapters I am going to offer my own analysis of our research results.

For me, one of the most interesting facts surrounding this microscope research is the fact of using my own body as a terrain of research. More precisely, it is not just that the body becomes the terrain of research, but there is also a situation of body studying itself, body as one type of terrain exploring the body as another type of terrain, two terrains exploring one another. I would name those two terrains as molecular and experiential one. More precisely, the body as a molecular terrain is exploring how it is

being changed by the experience and the body as experiential terrain is exploring how it is being changed through its molecular transformation, as well as reorganization. The purpose of this research is not only to establish, as well as question the body as terrain within the terrain, double terrain, multiple terrain, but also to show how much everything that body is — here and now — is experience-dependent. Every movement we choose, every breath we choose, the *how* of that movement and the *how* of that breath — form our experiential body-terrain.

What we can notice from the resulting images is that Biliana's and my body fluids and tissues changed due to our experience. What makes our experiential ground is a specific type of movement we were exploring. I am going to describe that movement the way my body felt it. Therefore, I am going to speak with my body, from my body, according to my body. I don't find the analysis of other authors to be relevant in this case because the results that I am going to analyse are the results that were generated by my body. Therefore, I find it important to describe the experiential context in which those results were generated.

First of all, I used the word result which is completely wrong. Even though we can see a certain number of images on the following pages, those images are not results, but processes. What I have captured and presented here in this thesis can be thought only as a momentary result. Here, the microscope images of our body tissues and fluids appear as finished, but actually — they are not. Our body samples are autonomous ecologies that change with each and every microsecond. Their milieu is the microscope slide and all the intermediary processes that make our samples take a certain form and result as this or that image. To summarize, these microscope images are not results, but processes. They are presented as results, but essentially — they are ongoing processes. The images presented here are finished. As processes they are unfinishable. The milieu of the image presented here is a computer program. The milieu of its process is a microscope slide. Those two milieus co-exist. At the same time, our body samples exist as definite and complete results — within the computer program and as indefinite and incomplete processes — within the microscope slide.

Microscope slide is also the stage of those processes. More precisely, our body is the first stage and microscope slide is the second stage of its processes. Apart from being a milieu, and the stage, microscope slide makes the frame of our body, as well as its second, autonomous ecology. Microscope slide makes it possible for the body to survive outside itself. It also makes it possible for the body to study itself — both internally and externally — at the same time. Microscope slide provides the spatial, as well as the material context of body's molecular transformation and

reorganization. More importantly, it makes it possible for the body to perceive the imperceptible. Microscope slide is the link between the molar and molecular body. It represents a certain mode of seeing, perceiving, capturing, experiencing. What makes the difference is the way we choose to use it, the way we choose to relate the technology of the body and the technology of microscope imagery. What the technology of the body and the technology of microscope imagery share and have in common is the technology of event; the body is that which generates the event, or more precisely, is the event, and microscope imagery has the capacity not only to capture, but also to generate the event. What matters is how we use it. If we use it in a linear, result-oriented way — we are going to create the representation of event; if we use it in non-linear, process-oriented way, then the way of capturing the event can become the event itself. If we manage to do that then we are not only exploring the technology of the body, as well as the one of microscope imagery, but more importantly — its technicity, or, becoming-technological of the body and becoming-technological of microscopic imagery.

It is not that we are confronted with the body as the experiential sight and the microscope slide as the research-oriented, technological sight. We are confronted with two different, yet intertwined bodies, or more precisely, modes of bodying, that inform and transform one another while interacting. This process is not linear, but emergent. This process did not finish with the workshop, but it is still ongoing. It is actually and virtually unfinishable. What makes it actually unfinishable is the ongoing process of transformation and reorganization on molecular level. What makes it virtually unfinishable are all the present and future modes by which my body and the microscope slide are going to change and be changed by one another. Every time I see the image of my body fluids and tissues — I am changed. Those images don't represent my body; they make my body. In the beginning, my body was a score of its molecular becoming. Once moved to microscope slide, it began to exist as two different, yet intertwined modes of bodying. Now, microscope slide is the score of molecular becomings of my body. Every time I look at the images, every time I explore them, write about them, search for them or capture them — I am being changed by them, at the experiential, and therefore, molecular level.

Microscope slide is not only a microscope slide, but also a body. A body is not just a body, but also a microscope slide. How? In this experimental situation, the body and the microscope slide cannot be considered separately. We are talking about one intertwined body; my body makes the experiential firstness of that body, and microscope slide makes its experiential secondness. However, this is not a linear process, leading from point A to point B. This schema is valid only until the moment in

which microscope image presents itself. From the moment microscope image presents itself it ceases to exist as the experiential secondness and becomes the experiential firstness of my body — forming itself, and therefore, forming me — here and now. The act of visualizing, as well as perceiving the imperceptible makes the difference. More precisely, perception leads into transformation. This transformation is not only quantitative, but also qualitative.

Microscope slide is not just the space where the body happens, it is the body happening — here and now. It is not just the stage, but both the actor and the stage. As an intermediary ecology, microscope slide produces the body and is being produced by it. Microscope slide conditions the happening of the body. At the same time, it is being conditioned by it. The sample of body tissue or body fluid, that is being kept between the microscope slide on the one side and the microscope glass on the other side is a body-between. It is happening between two modes of bodying — that of a glass and that of a human body. It is happening as ecology of processes. That ecology of processes is active, as well as productive one, because it activates and produces various modes of bodying at the same time. Apart from producing itself as active multiplicity, it also produces my own body as reactive multiplicity¹. While producing my own body, it is also being produced by it. How? Every time I work with the slide, I encounter the state in which I appear as one body observing the other body. In this case, both of those bodies are me. One mode of bodying is observing another mode of

¹Although originally a concept from Riemann's mathematics for conceptualizing space as manifold and dynamic, Deleuze's first discussion on the concept of multiplicity occurs via Bergson's use of the term with regard to the way that time or duration affects the way space is conceived. While the idea of time as the "fourth dimension" of space is not new, Deleuze's interest in this stems from the notion that time is the condition for change or becoming, and, if it is taken as the foundation for conceiving space, then space (or objects and subjects within it) is not subjected to transcendent criteria but must be conceived in terms of difference and intensity. The concept of multiplicity is expanded on in *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy?*, on the one hand, to describe how enunciations do not refer to a subject of the statement, but to a collective assemblage that is distributed "rhizomatically", and, on the other hand, to characterize the variations of the philosophical concept, in distinction from the mathematical multiplicities of science. In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, multiplicity is, on the one hand, a configuration of matter in space where differences are numerical but not qualitative, and can divide without changing in nature, and on the other hand, a configuration of time where differences are qualitative but not numerical, and divide only by changing in nature. According to Deleuze: experience always gives us a composite of space and duration [...] But [...] the decomposition of the composite reveals to us two types of multiplicity. One is represented by space [...]: It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers" (Deleuze, 1990: 38).

bodying and being observed by it; one mode of bodying is transforming another mode of bodying and being transformed by it; one mode of bodying is producing another mode of bodying and being produced by it. Observing is transforming, transforming is producing. Every time I observe, then, I perceive, and I am transformed — at the energy level, molecular level, sensual level. My energy body, my molecular body and my sensual body are being transformed. It is not only that my body is transformed through the act of perceiving, but the act of perceiving generates the conditions of changing the other, in this case, microscope slide. The act of perceiving is producing affects, changing my body temperature, the rhythm of my breath, the speed of my movements. While touching the microscope slide, in order to capture the images, my fingers are also changing it. The temperature of my skin, as well as the speed of my finger movements are activating different processes and therefore changing the happening of microscope slide. The act of touching the microscope slide is the act of its qualitative transformation; the image generated through this act is not passive, but active one, because it activates the qualitative transformation of the observer, in this case, my own body. The body is not just the body, but also a microscope slide because it is a site of self-study, microscopic perception, as well as working with the emerging imagery.

As previously mentioned, microscope generated images are highly active and dynamic. When studying or observing the image, the body does not see, but experience the image as dynamic, active, transforming, the image-in-movement. What the body and the microscope slide, as two different, yet intertwined modes of bodying have in common is the act of putting perception into movement. Putting perception into movement is also the act of putting the body into movement, as well as its qualitative transformation and reorganization. Images that we see with our body; images that we experience with our body — are images that we make with our body. Those images are alive, affective, transformative, always productive of more body. Those images are passages from one mode of bodying into another.

4.2 FROM THE LIQUIDITY OF SKIN TO THE LIQUIDITY OF PERCEPTION

Let's go back to the beginning of the experience and give an insight into the movement we were exploring in Gaga workshop. As previously mentioned, that was my first encounter with Gaga movement training. Actually, the only experience of Gaga movement training I have ever had until that moment was the one generated through the conversation with Biliana, or more precisely, her extremely present and fleshy descriptions of the training. Those descriptions were actually more than that because they have informed my body of a certain mode of moving. Also, they have put it into certain mode of expectation. I would characterize the movement that we were exploring as fluid, flowing, fluctuating. It is a movement that puts the entire body on all of its levels — anatomic, structural, experiential — into the fluid state. The body flows — in multiple directions, through multiple sensations, at the same time. More precisely, within the Gaga workshop we were exploring the liquidity, as well as

²In Deleuze, perception is thoughts as a structure of possibility (though it bears no resemblance to its realization) which implicates the subject and is expressed by the Other: "[...] the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without which the entire field could not function as it does" (Deleuze, 2004: 346, 3079). In Deleuze's sensory-motor schema of the movement-image, perception-image is that which is subtracted subjectively from a diffuse, objective, and totalizing variation, where things are indistinguishable images, thereby creating a gap or distance between space and action. In Deleuze's explanation of cinematic signs, perception-image stands for the condition for movement ("zeroness") and the classification of images. According to Deleuze: "Perceptions of things are incomplete and prejudiced, partial, subjective prehensions [...]. And it is the first avatar of the movement-image: when it is related to a centre of indetermination, it becomes perception-image. [...] Perceiving things here what they are, I grasp the 'virtual action' that they have on me, and the 'possible action' that I have on them [...]. It is thus the same phenomenon of the gap which is expressed in terms of time in my action and in terms of space in my perception" (Deleuze, 2005: 66—7, 64—5). "The perception-image will therefore be like a degree zero in the deduction which is carried out as a function of the movement-image: there will be a 'zeroness' before Peirce's firstness" (Deleuze, 2005: 30, 329). Diffuse perception (also, solid or fixed perception) refers to cinematic perception that subtracts nothing from the image based on subjective need or interest, but retains an objective, albeit non-localized center within a complete image: "The thing itself must [...] be presented in itself as a complete, immediate, diffuse perception. The thing is [...] subject to their action and reacts to them on all its facets and in all its parts" (Deleuze, 2005: 66, 63). Liquid perception refers to the state in which the center of perception, created by the distance between an action and its possibility, owes by virtue of displacement: "The more the privileged centre is itself put into movement, the more it will tend towards an acentered system where the images vary in relation to one another [...]. The camera consciousness [...] was actualized in a owing perception and thus arrived at a material determination [...]" (Deleuze, 2005: 79—82, 74—6). Finally, gaseous perception refers to a perception that does not measure the distance between things and actions, such that the interval between the two cannot be anticipated. Rather, gaseous perception is of all possibilities or of the virtual: "If the cinema goes beyond perception, it is in the sense that it reaches to the genetic element of all possible perception" (Deleuze, 2005: 85, 83).

fluidity of different body systems. That experience has generated a feeling of both plasticity and elasticity. Therefore, the body appeared and was experienced — as plastic and elastic. What is the difference? Elasticity is characterized by the possibility of the subject or object to extend itself, but with one constraint — the subject or the object always come back to their initial form or state. Plasticity is characterized by the possibility of the subject or object to extend itself without coming back to their initial form or state. In other words, elastic shape is a shape than can be extended or transformed, but that shape will necessarily return to its initial shape. Plastic shape is the one that can be extended or transformed and will stay transformed further on. It will never come back to its initial shape, but continue to change with every new experience.

The body that we were exploring in the workshop was both plastic and elastic. Let's analyse that at the level of anatomy. One of the instructions we got during the workshop was to explore the liquidity of our skin, or more precisely, to "feel our skin as liquid". What makes the liquid skin plastic and elastic? What makes it plastic is the fact that even though we have built our own experiential liquid skin over the course of the workshop, that skin has returned to its initial state at the end of the workshop. We began with the certain experience of skin, then we experienced the skin as liquid, and after the end of the workshop we came back to the variation of our initial experience of skin. In order to feel the skin as liquid it is also necessary to work with the liquidity of perception². The liquidity of perception makes it possible for the skin to change its shape and state, from solid to liquid, or the other way round, and furthermore — just to rediscover itself as simultaneously solid and liquid. At the level of its elasticity, the skin never comes back to its initial state, but to the variation of its initial state. At the level of its plasticity — the skin is completely experiential and relational — continuously transforming, continuously becoming some other skin. The level of plasticity is the level of becoming of the skin. However, it is not possible to make a complete distinction between the elasticity and plasticity of the body. Why? Because the body never returns to its initial state, or more precisely, nothing ever returns to its initial state. At the level of its elasticity, the body simultaneously returns as the same and as different. The body is that which continuously variates.

Anatomy is not just structural, material, physical, but it is also relational, immaterial, affective. What makes those two levels communicate is the experience. In other words, experiential anatomy unfolds itself as both structural and relational, physical and affective. What makes this anatomy felt is the experience of elasticity and plasticity of a moving body.

4.3 FLOWING IN AND FLOWING OUT OF THE BODY

Another moment that appeared as really interesting to me was the moment when we were exploring our bodies as volcanoes. More precisely, we were given the instruction to feel our bodies as erupting volcanoes and to "erupt, explode, flow". This experience did not consist of one linear instruction. It consisted of a series of moments when we were addressing the instruction and coming back to it in a different way. The experience of the eruption revealed itself as the eruption within the eruption within the eruption within the eruption and so on. What I discovered was a flow within the flow within the flow within the flow and so on. What I discovered was the body as a multilayered flow. Another interesting experience that I would like to share is the experience of feeling the joints of my body as open and fluid. Within this experience, my joints were not determined by any fixed, starting or ending point. I did not feel finished, determined, physically present joints — what I felt was the movement of flowing in and flowing out of my joints. Calling those experiential joints mine is completely wrong. What I felt were relational joints, or the one relating bodies without belonging to any individual body. This is the closest description of the experienced sensation that I can offer: flowing in and out of my body, flowing in and out of my skin, flowing in and out of my joints, surfing on the feeling of flowing in and out. The body that flows is the body that is surfing on the feeling of its becoming. This is exactly how the anatomy is being felt in that moment; instead of feeling the act of having the anatomy what I felt was the act of surfing on the anatomy. More precisely, what I felt was that I was surfing on my body's potential to become. Through that experience my body was not given to me as finite or determined, but as a wave, or more precisely, waving, an activity — ongoing, infinite, indeterminate. That wave was arriving as my body and departing as my body. At the same time, it was arriving as the body of the other and it was departing as the body of the other. Exploring my body as volcanic lava, magma, plasma enhanced its ability to shape-shift. Molecular level is the level of ongoing shapeshifting. What this workshop, or more precisely, specific type of movement we were exploring, brought to me — was the ability to explore the shapeshifting at the level of molar. Everything that our body is made of shape-shifts all the time, the atoms, molecules, fluids, tissues, etc. The experiential body is transforming the molecular body. How? Through movement. Body is movement. What makes the body is the totality of its modes of moving. The totality of body's modes of moving also makes the totality of its modes of bodying. Movement actively makes, as well as transforms the body, each and every body, all the time. Therefore, the movement that appears as molar is transforming the movement that is molecular; the movement that appears as molecular is transforming

the movement that is molar. Becoming perceptive of that transformation is something that happens through the exploration of liquid perception.

4.4 LIVING IMAGES: ANALYSIS

What we can observe from all the microscope images presented here is that a certain change, due to the experience, happened. The change happened in both cases, both in the case of Biliiana's body tissues and fluids and mine. I am not interested in finding the definite way to analyse those images, but in finding the indefinite ways to reapproach our research results. What matters is not what the image is, but how it was made, and what it is going to produce. What matters is not the level of description, but the level of activation, or more precisely, the moment when the microscope image as one mode of bodying starts to activate my body as another way of bodying. What all images, presented here as finished results, have in common is the following:

- stillness
- heterogeneity;
- self-similarity;
- multiplicity;
- multiple planes;
- multiple scales;
- multiple orientations;
- multiple flows;
- polyrhythm (of flows);
- multiple activity centers;
- shape variations;
- asymmetry;
- rhizomatic structure;
- multiplicity at the level of organization;
- without the beginning or the end;
- without the center; multicentered;
- without the spatial organization characterized by the distinction between left and right, up and down, etc.

What all images, observed as unfinished processes, on the microscope slide, have in common is the following:

- movement;
- action;
- multiple planes of activity;
- multiple scales of activity;
- flow;
- flowing at multiple speeds at the same time;
- flowing in multiple directions at the same time;
- flowing in multiple rhythms (polyrhythm) at the same time;
- heterogeneous dynamic;
- fluctuation;
- transformation;
- transforming their shape, size and orientation;
- reorganization;
- reorganizing their shape, size and orientation;
- variation;
- varying their shape, size and orientation;
- creating the feeling of space (spatial orientation) with movement — what is up or down, and left or right depends on the movement of molecules which form a certain shape, and therefore, space, through their movement;
- movement-dependency — everything is movement dependent — space, shape, size, and orientation of molecular organization of tissue are generated through specific mode of moving, therefore — every change at the level of movement also produces the change at the level of space, shape, size and orientation of molecular organization of tissue;
- movement taking form;
- images-in-movement;
- living images.

What we can notice is that the first group of images, those presented as finished results are often described with nouns, while the other group of images, those considered as unfinished processes, therefore — living images — are more often described with verbs. However, each of the images presented here in this thesis, exists in three different modes at the same time. More precisely, each of those images simultaneously exists at the following levels:

- the level of my body;
- the level of microscope slide;
- the level of microscope image.

It is also possible to further develop "the level of the body" and extend it with the level of experience, as well as perception. Therefore, at "the level of the body" each of the images presented here exists at the following levels:

- the level of physical body;
- the level of perceptual body;
- the level of experiential body.

What the Gaga workshop, as well as the microscope research made possible for me was the journey from the physical to the experiential body and back — from the experiential to the physical body. Or better, bodies.

This process consists of the following steps:

- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids before the movement experience;
- exploring the movement of flowing (moving);
- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids after the movement experience;
- generating more than one thousand microscope images;
- selecting the images;
- creating new images (each image of body tissue or body fluid consisting of 8 images);

- observing microscope images;
- exploring microscope images as scores for new bodyings;
- exploring microscope images as scores for new modes of perceiving;
- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids before the act of observing microscope images;
- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids after the act of observing microscope images;
- generating new microscope images (of a body watching itself as image);
- selecting new images;
- creating new images (of a body watching itself as image, each image of body tissue or body fluid consisting of 8 images);
- observing new microscope images;
- being activated by new microscope images;
- exploring microscope images as scores for new bodyings;
- exploring microscope images as scores for new modes of perceiving;
- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids before the act of observing new microscope images;
- taking the samples of body tissues and body fluids after the act of observing new microscope images;
- generating new microscope images (of a body watching the watching of itself as image);
- selecting new images;
- creating new images (of a body watching the watching of itself as image, each image of body tissue or body fluid consisting of 8 images);
- analysing the results.

4.5 CONTRACTION: BECOMING-EXPRESSIVE OF MATTER

There is one characteristic that both my own and Biliana's body fluid samples have in common and that characteristic is contraction. Contraction is what appeared in all of our body tissues and fluids during and after the experience. I would like to introduce here Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the concept of contraction and, furthermore, apply it to this analysis.




Image 3: Cervical fluid pattern, before (left) and after (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, contraction does not represent repetition for itself, but repetition that generates difference. First, it concerns our visceral or physical nature, where we both "contract" the matter to form our bodies (even inorganic matter contracts chemical elements), as well as where we form cases within our imagination (which acts as another organ of contraction). Contraction concerns the manner in which the past as a whole coexists with the present in varying degrees, before it is telescoped through successive instants that become embedded. Therefore, contraction involves an interaction between repetition and difference. In Deleuze's early work on Bergson, as well as in his later work, the resonating nature of contraction is equated with sensation, which may preserve the elements or qualities of chaos insofar as they do not appear in disappearing; rather, they are prolonged.




Image 4: Cervical fluid pattern, before (left) and after (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)

In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, contraction is understood as a mode of repetition which introduces time and difference into matter, or prolongs the present in the past with a certain duration.

It is also understood as the generation of difference by virtue of repetition: "What is opposed to contraction is pure repetition or matter: repetition is the mode of a present that appears only when the other present has disappeared — the present itself, or exteriority, vibration, relaxation. Contraction, on the other hand, designates difference because difference in its essence makes a repetition impossible, because it destroys the very condition of any possible repetition" (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 45). Furthermore: "The identical elements of material repetition blend together in a contraction [...]. Whenever Bergson discusses memory, he presents two aspects of it, the second of which is the more profound: memory-recollection and memory-contraction. By contracting itself, the element of repetition coexists with itself — one might say, multiplies itself and maintains itself" (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 47).

In Deleuze and Guattari's explanation of experience and art (as well as in Deleuze's reading of Bergson and Bacon), contraction represents the feature of

sensations which, depending on their degree, provides variety or quality to their expression. A contraction also represents the manner in which sensation vibrates, resonates, or preserves itself within quality and/or on the plane of composition (as a "Monument" or work of art), as a response to the chaos of infinite variety or the force of an encounter: "All our sensations are extensive, all are 'voluminous' and extended, although to varying degrees and in different styles, depending on the type of contraction that they carry out" (Deleuze, 1990: 87). Furthermore: "How will sensation be able to sufficiently turn in on itself, relax or contract itself, so as to capture these non-given forces in what it gives us, to make us sense these insensible forces, and raise itself to its own conditions?" (Deleuze, 2003: 56). As understood here, "sensation is the contracted vibration that has become quality, variety. Sensation is pure contemplation [...] to the extent that one contemplates the elements from which one originates (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 212).

It is possible to say how contraction represents the vibration of matter and sensation. Our physical bodies are contracted matter. Our experiential bodies are contracted sensation. What connects the matter and sensation is relation. Therefore, it is possible to perceive the body as multilayered expression of matter, sensation and relation. How the body expresses itself depends on the movement of its physical contraction, experiential contraction and relational contraction. As we can see, the body is always more-than one. The organ is also that which is more-than one. Therefore, at the level of the body, it is possible to distinguish physical organs of contraction, experiential organs of contraction and relational organs of contraction.

For Deleuze, imagination is an organ of contraction. What imagination contracts is the vibrating sensation which becomes the body itself. Contracting sensation is a body taking form. How the body is going to take a form depends on the movement of contraction. The body is that which contracts. The body is also that which extends. What puts the contraction and extension into relation is the state of becoming. As Deleuze said, becoming is that which integrates two opposites or two extremes, for example becoming larger and becoming smaller. In this case, the state of becoming is that in which the body simultaneously extends and contracts. Contraction is the necessary condition of extension. Extension is what makes itself felt within the experience of contraction.

Contraction can also be considered as the "first" movement of the body. More precisely, contraction is the movement that precedes the formation of the body, as well as it is the movement that makes the body. Contraction is the generative process of the body. Furthermore, contraction is that which makes the body generative — of

infinitely more body. For example, atoms contract and form molecules, molecules contract and form tissues, tissues contract and form organs, organs contract and form the body. If we would define the body as movement, we would define it as contraction. Furthermore, what makes our experiential body is a contraction of perception and therefore sensation. What makes our relational body is a singular movement of contraction of matter and sensation. What makes the contraction living, palpable and visible is duration.

Originating from Bergson's philosophy, the term of duration was utilized by Deleuze when describing the paradoxes of contraction: that is, how the matter (which is in motion) contracts aspects of the past and the present and therefore has a temporality or duration that is indicative of its evolution or change, which is itself irreducible to the matter, space, or extension in which the contraction takes place. More precisely, duration is a term that Henri Bergson uses to characterize the continuous nature of lived experience where the present coexists with the past as a whole: "our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were, there would never be anything but the present — no prolonging of the past into the actual, no evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation" (Bergson, 1911: 4).

In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, duration stands for the coexistence of past and present instances in the memory as a spatial, qualitative multiplicity, in distinction from the succession of past and present instances in matter as a quantitative multiplicity. Duration also stands for an indivisible, subjective virtuality that differs in kind (in itself and from matter) by virtue of differentiation, in distinction from an objective actuality that can be counted, as well as divided without changing in nature. Furthermore, in Deleuze's explanation of difference, duration is perceived as the movement of matter which divides by changing in nature, whether psychically (the mind which perceives differences in kind based on intuition) or physically (movements of differentiation). According to Deleuze: "Movement is undoubtedly explained by the insertion of duration into matter: Duration is differentiated according to the obstacles it meets in matter [...]. Duration, to be precise, is called life when it appears in this movement" (Deleuze, B 94—5). Furthermore: "Not only do virtual multiplicities imply a single time, but duration as virtual multiplicity is this single and same time. Duration, memory or spirit is difference in kind in itself and for itself; and space or matter is difference in degree [...] Duration is only the most contracted degree of matter, matter the most expanded (*détendu*) degree of duration. But duration is like

a naturing nature (nature naturante), and matter a natured nature (nature nature)" (Deleuze, 1990: 83, 93).

In Deleuze's explanation of repetition, duration stands in distinction from a motor or automatic repetition where there is only presence in matter, a contraction where the present relates the past to the future in a movement of creative evolution. According to Deleuze: "What is expanded (*détendu*) if not the contracted — and what is contracted if not the extended, the expanded (*détente*)? This is why there is always extensity in our duration, and always duration in matter" (Deleuze, 1990: 87).

In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, duration is the indication of change, by virtue of movement, in the quality of an open whole which itself encompasses various sections, objects, or subjects (that is, while the state of individual parts or sections change, the relation between them constitutes the essence of this change and explains

³An event means that something is happening, however, the paradox is that, on the one hand, an event can only really be grasped in hindsight and, on the other hand, we do presume that we can refer to incidents, changes, or actions that are currently unfolding. How does this work? Deleuze argues that such references — in the linguistic form of infinitives — envelop the other propositional dimensions of language because while those dimensions involve determinations, subjects, and universal concepts within linear time (*Chronos*), infinitives occupy both past and future at once: how else could they be expressed? Furthermore, if we grasped them as what they are, they would have already happened (or would be a foregone conclusion); for this reason, they are expressed as the simultaneous instantiation of past and future (which itself occupies an eternal, infinitely divisible line). According to Deleuze's interpretation of Stoic *lekton*, an event stands for incorporeal surface effect which evades the causal state of corporeal mixtures (*Chronos*), and, because it is different in nature than effects within depth (it does not in turn induce mixtures), is reversible on the eternal line of the *Aion*; that which is irreducible to, but not independent of, the proposition, expressed in the infinitive form of verbs. According to Deleuze: "Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs [...] — but incorporeal events at the surface [...] are the results of these mixtures" (Deleuze, 2004: 8, 6). Furthermore: "Each event is the smallest time, smaller than the minimum of continuous thinkable time, because it is divided into proximate past and imminent future. But it is also the longest time, longer than the maximum of continuous thinkable time, because it is endlessly subdivided by the *Aion* which renders it equal to its own unlimited line" (Deleuze, 2004: 63, 74). In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, event is that which, on the one hand, originates in chaos (thus having no existence in space and time), and on the other hand, has serial extension (formal properties) and intensity (degrees) in space and time, and is objectified and subjectified by virtue of individual unities (monads). In Deleuze's reading of Whitehead alongside Leibniz, event is the prehension of series of singularities (a world) that is implicated by other worlds. "The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples [...]. For space and time are not limits but abstract coordinates of all series, [...] we can [thus] consider a second component of the event: extensive series have intrinsic properties (for example, height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a saturation of color), which enter on their own account in new infinite series [...]" (Deleuze, 1993: 77). Furthermore: "Prehension is individual unity. Everything prehends its antecedents and its concomitants and, by degrees, prehends a world. [...] the event is thus a 'nexus of prehensions' [...]; the event is [...] at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own becoming (Deleuze, 1993: 78).

it). Therefore: "if the whole is not giveable; it is because it is the Open, and because its nature is to change constantly [...] So that each time we find ourselves confronted with a duration, or in a duration, we may conclude that there exists somewhere a whole which is changing [...]" (Deleuze, 2005: 10, 9). Furthermore: "To say that duration is change is part of its definition: it changes and does not stop changing. [...] imagine I am starving at A, and at B there is something to eat. When I have reached B and had something to eat, what has changed is not only my state, but the state of the whole which encompassed B, A, and all that was between them" (Deleuze, 2005: 8—9, 8). The body is that which contracts, that which endures, as well as that which returns — eternally.

Whether in reference to ancient theories or not, eternal return conjures up images of cycles: the return of the seasons, the cycle of life, etc. The variations of each (re)occurrence belie the notion that things truly recur: each winter is just a little unlike the last, each life is somehow unique. While this may make appear the change itself as linear, Deleuze would argue it is, paradoxically, somewhere in-between. Eternal return is what makes each season or life both similar and different. Similarity and difference are impersonal singularities which have nothing to do with the identity of an individualized nature, nor are they reproductions of something original. Here we can begin to think the paradox of an infinite, all-inclusive past, which nevertheless changes by virtue of the present on its way to an infinite, all-inclusive future. That which returns passes through all the other disjointed series or events³ with which it is in communication, and therefore expresses the univocity of being and a state of permanent becoming. Eternal return is that which puts the matter into movement, as well as that which gives it expression.

In Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Hjelmslev, matter is that which precedes the formalization of content and expression, and exists independently of stratification: "[Hjelmslev] used the term matter for the plane of consistency or Body without Organs, in other words, the unformed, unorganized, non-stratified, or destratified body and all its flows" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 43). Furthermore: "Hjelmslev proposed a very important conception of 'matter' or 'sense' as unformed, amorphous, or formless" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 531).

How to put into relation the concept of matter and the concept of phylum? Phylum is conceptualized materiality. It is also matter in movement, as well as the one carrying particular qualities (as opposed to matter or materiality in general). According to Deleuze and Guattari: "We always get back to this definition: the machinic phylum is materiality, natural or artificial, and both

simultaneously; it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 451, 409). Furthermore: "Unformed matter, the phylum, is not dead, brute, homogeneous matter, but a matter-movement bearing singularities or haecceities, qualities, and even operations (itinerant technological lineages)" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 563 512).

How to put into relation matter and plane of composition? Plane of composition⁴ is the medium in which (chaotic) matter and materials are arranged; it is also the plane of art — in distinction from the plane of reference (science) and the plane of immanence or consistency (philosophy). According to Deleuze and Guattari: "Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation [...]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 204). Plane of composition is the aesthetic plane or plane of expression of composition itself. What plane of composition produces and is being produced by is the expression of a compound of sensations (affects and percepts) that does not exist outside of its material but nevertheless cannot be reduced to a (scientific) technical use of material (a 'technical plane of composition'). Therefore: "[...] technical composition [...] is not to be confused with aesthetic composition, which is the work of sensation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 141). "Matter becomes expressive [...when] the compound of sensations is realized in the material [...] on a specifically aesthetic plane of composition" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 196). Aesthetic plane of composition is a plane of affects and percepts⁵.

⁴Deleuze and Guattari treat The Plane of Composition as a synonym for The Plane of Immanence in *A Thousand Plateaus*. However, it is useful to examine the distinctiveness they attribute to it in *What is Philosophy?*, especially in terms of the role of chaos and the separate operations of art and philosophy. As "composition is the sole definition of art", what is actually composed by means of material (affects, percepts, and blocs of sensation) are themselves immaterial (just as art cannot be reduced to technique, sensation is both "realized in the material", but "the material passes into" it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 193). In distinction from milieus and territorial assemblages, composition therefore lays out a deterritorialized plane from chaos to the cosmos (or the future), through which it preserves affects and percepts.

⁵In Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of art, percept is that which is imperceptible but nevertheless appeals to vision. It is also that which separates itself from the perception of an object or the recollection of a memory. Perception in its objective state insofar as it is preserved and rendered as a work of art. According to Deleuze and Guattari: "Percepts [...] are independent of a state of those who experience them. The percept is the landscape before man, in the absence of man" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 164). Percept also stands for the proper entity, along with the affect, that engenders blocs of sensation and populates the plane of composition with aesthetic figures. Furthermore: "The composite Sensation, made up of percepts and affects, deterritorializes the system of opinion" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 196). Percept also stands for an aesthetic feature (of painting, music, literature, etc.) which renders force(s) (whether physical, temporal, etc.) or affects perceptible, sonorous, or figurative, in distinction from the intensity of the affect which is engendered by the relations between such

4.6 WATCHING THE WATCHING: BECOMING-PERCEPTIVE

How to think the attention as organ? Attention does not only create the organs, attention is an organ. A body that attends is always unfinished body — it is a body actively creating itself through the act of attending. Organs do not only make a body, but more importantly — they activate it. Attention activates the body and modulates it constantly. How many bodies, anatomies, organ(izations) do we have? How to think the idea of internal, external, as well as intermediary organs? Intermediary organs are attentional, relational, experiential. Organs as such do not belong to any particular body. They do not have a fixed point of beginning or end — they are not confined to a single, already organized body. They are activities, processes, relations — happening between two or more bodies. They last as long as the relations last. Perception makes the exteriority of the experiential organ, sensation makes its interiority. The relation between perception and sensation makes the how of experiential organs.

How to think perception as another organ? If we define an organ as expression, then perception makes the how of that expression. Perception is what makes it possible for a certain organ to express itself as multiple; perception is that which makes it possible for us to define an organ as expressive multiplicity. A perceiving body does not know of fixed, determined organs, but only of planes of expressivity of a certain organ. Liquid perception is what activates those planes of expressivity. Gaseous perception is what activates the planes within the planes of expressivity. When do we perceive? Do we perceive things when they appear as finished, or when they appear as active infinites, infinites within infinites, infinitive infinites? Within the field of mathematics there is a difference between the countable and uncountable infinite, as well as between the finite and infinite infinite. The act of perceiving is the act of grasping the infinite as uncountable and infinite. Each and every cell makes the infinite as such. Therefore, being able to perceive what a body is, as well as what it can become, is a lifelong effort. Plane of perceptivity and plane of expressivity always go together. To perceive is to become-perceptive of multiple planes of expressivity — of a moving body, or more precisely, one of its organs. Becoming-perceptive is also an act of body's self-invention. What I am trying to argue is that the question of what a

forces. Therefore: "the percept [...] make[s] perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 182). It is also a vision or a subjective mirage or phantasm that expresses something outside of objective comprehension: "The finest writers have singular conditions of perception that allow them to draw on or shape aesthetic percepts like veritable visions [...]. It is by virtue of a subjective disposition that Proust finds his percepts in a current of air passing under a door, and is left cold by the beauties others bring to his attention. In Melville, there is a private ocean [...where] Moby-Dick swims [...]" (Deleuze, 1998: 116).

body can do, or become, is closely related to the question of what a body can perceive. How much of the body is not perceived or stays unperceived over the course of our life?

The act of perceiving is not a static act. To perceive is to actively create, as well as actively transform. A perceiving body is a transforming body; the limits of its perception become the limits of its transformation. Perception makes the nucleus, engine, core source of what a body can do. However, that nucleus is non-centralized, multiple, transformative. A perceiving body is a becoming body. I will give an example to show how perception changes our body image, as well as our body limits. In the following lines I am going to offer two modes of perceiving in order to ground the idea of perceiving body as becoming body.

Example 1:

I am in the room. I am sitting on the chair, observing the light on the wall and breathing. There is a laptop in front of me. Sometimes, I write a sentence or two. My arms are touching the surface of the table. I am listening to the person talking. There is a sound of the bell echoing as I listen to the person talking. I am wearing several layers of clothes (3 layers). Occasionally, I drink some water.

Example 2:

I am the room and the room is me. The electrons that momentarily make my body pass into the body of the room; the electrons that momentarily make the body of the room pass into my body. I am passing through the body of the room and the body of the room is passing through me. What makes the feeling of "me" is the encounter between my body and the body of the room. My body does not exist without the body of the room. What is happening is the event of becoming-room of Laura, as well as becoming-Laura of room. Lourcing. Spacing. I am passing through the body of the room as more than one — as physical, experiential, relational body. My physical, experiential, relational bodies are passing through the bodies of the room; physical, experiential and relational bodies of the room as passing through me. My body makes one of the organs-expressions of the room. The room makes one of the organs-expression of my body. As previously mentioned, I am not in the room — I am the room and the room is me. I don't move in the room — I move the room and the room moves me. What I arrive to call a room is what I manage to perceive as room. Rooming. I am not a subject sitting on the chair, an object. At the level of energy, as well as physical, experiential and relational levels — it is not possible to say where my body stops and the chair begins. My body is always multiple — it is made of multiple

bodies of room, walls, chair, desk, keyboard, water, etc. — and it is actively making all of them. At the level of electrons, my leg is passing through the chair and the chair is passing through it. At the experiential level — chair is not only making, but also actively transforming my leg(s). It is provoking a certain mode of expressivity of my leg(s). Furthermore, I am not observing the light on the wall. Photons of the wall and photons of my body are intertwined and actively pass from one milieu into another. What makes my body, in this precise moment, a perceiving and therefore a becoming body, are not the photons that statically make my body, but those that move, those that pass from my body into the body of the wall, as well as those that pass from the wall into my body. What makes my body a becoming one is exactly this movement of passing from one milieu into another.

When I breathe I actively make oxygen a part of my body. The air that I breathe in is not just a gaseous body within my solid body, but makes my body gaseous, or more precisely, puts it into gaseous state. The water that I drink is not just a liquid body within my solid body, but makes my body liquid, as well as puts it into liquid state. Sitting, drinking and breathing body is a body that expresses itself simultaneously as solid, gaseous and liquid. Furthermore, the oxygen that I breathe in unites with my cells and is being distributed throughout the whole body. The water that I drink makes my body and is distributed through it. Cellular level is the level of becoming solid-gaseous-liquid of our body. At the same time, as relation, the cell appears as solid, gaseous and liquid. The action of breathing is the action of becoming-gaseous of solid. The action of drinking is the action of becoming-liquid of solid.

My arms, touching the surface of the table are also making the surface of that table. The surface of the table is affecting, and therefore transforming the expressivity of my arms. My weight, temperature, time spent touching the surface of the table — will change that surface forever. They will leave the trace of their presence in it. At the same time, the surface of the table will stay inscribed in the expressivity of my arms. What is happening — permanently — between the surface of the table and the surface of my body is an ongoing modification of the plane of expressivity. What happens when the other, the room, the table, the water — becomes one of the planes of expressivity of my own body? What happens when the other actively makes the planes of expressivity of what I call — my body? In this situation the body does not belong to anything or anyone in particular. The body is that which relates, as well as that which puts into relation different planes of expression.

My body makes the experiential skin of the table. The surface of the table makes one of the experiential skins of my body. The phonons of the person talking in this

precise moment and the phonons of my own body make another intermediary milieu or more precisely, a milieu where the body is passing from one state to another. The phonons of the speaker pass into my own sonorous body and the phonons of my own body pass into the sonorous body of the speaker. But that is not everything. The phonons of the echoing bell simultaneously pass into my own body and the body of the speaker. Again, that is not everything. What makes my sonorous body is all the phonons I am perceptive of, as well as all the phonons I am not perceptive of. In this precise moment, my sonorous body is made of phonons, and therefore sonorous bodies of a speaker, a car passing by, a chair, a keyboard, another speaker, a student asking a question, another student asking questions, etc. My sonorous body is made of all those sonorous bodies — at the same time. My body is a meeting point, as well as transmitting point of all those bodies. What happens with all the sonorous bodies I am not perceptive of; what happens with all the bodies that function on and within another frequency?

What makes the body is a multiplicity of frequencies. More precisely, the body is a multi-frequency field. The question of frequency is also the question of the limit. The question of limit is not the question of possible, but the question of impossible. The question of the impossible is the question of becoming. The question of becoming is the question of becoming-perceptive. A perceiving body is a body that is tuning into the frequencies, and therefore, limits, of its becoming. Being a multi-frequency field, the body is also a field of multiple becomings. The act of becoming-perceptive is also the act of making the impossible becomings possible.

Yvonne Rainer once said: "The mind is a muscle". What I would like to show is how perception is a muscle too. Affectivity is a muscle. Imagination is a muscle. Human body consists of 37.2 trillion cells. What if each and every cell of our body has a muscle of its own, a mode of thinking-feeling of its own, a mode of moving of its own, a mode of becoming of its own? How many modes of thinking-feeling, moving and becoming is our body made of? The body is not only made of 37.2 trillion cells, but also 37.2 trillion modes of becoming — happening at the same time. How can we become perceptive of what our bodies can do, as well as become? One of the ways to do that is to work on our thinking muscles, affective muscles, perceptive muscles, imaginative muscles.

Our body is composed not only of 37.2 trillion human cells, but it is also composed of 40 trillion bacteria. In other words, our human body is composed of 40 trillion non-human modes of thinking-feeling, moving and becoming. At the level of matter — it is not possible to distinguish the human and non-human. Our body

is becoming human and becoming non-human at the same time. It is a relationscape of becoming-human of non-human and becoming-non-human of human body. We cannot say how the body is human or non-human. The body is a passage from one milieu into another, from the milieu of human into the milieu of non-human. That passage is dynamic and it is moving in both directions at the same time.

What we can see from all the results, or more precisely, microscope images of:

- eye fluid pattern before and after the Gaga movement experience;
- eye fluid pattern before and after the experience of watching the microscope image of eye fluid pattern;
- eye fluid pattern before and after the experience of watching the microscope image of watching the microscope image of eye fluid pattern;

is the movement of contraction. In all three cases, or more precisely:

- experience of movement;
- experience of watching the image of experience of movement;
- experience of watching the watching of the image of experience of movement;

a sensation of contraction occurred. However, what we can notice, in this particular case, is that with each new repetition the sensation of contraction is less and less present. Another thing that I noticed from this experience is that there is a relation between contraction and duration. In other words, the duration of exposure to a certain type of experience generates a certain type of contraction. If I compare those three experiences that I previously mentioned (movement, watching the movement, watching the watching of movement) it is possible to conclude how longer exposure to a certain type of experience generates more contraction. This also opens up the following question: how to distinguish qualitative and quantitative contraction?




Image 5: Eye fluid pattern, after the movement experience (left) and before the experience of watching the image on the left (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 6: Eye fluid pattern, after the movement experience (left) and after the experience of watching the image on the left (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 7: Eye fluid pattern, before (left) and after the experience of watching the image of eye fluid pattern (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 8: Eye fluid pattern, after the watching experience (left) and before the experience of watching the image on the left (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 9: Eye fluid pattern, after the watching experience (left) and after the experience of watching the image on the left (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 10: Eye fluid pattern, before (left) and after the experience of watching the image of eye fluid pattern (right) (made by Laura Potrovic)

In order to explain the relation between duration and contraction I would like to present the time frame of all three experiences. The first experience, experience of Gaga movement workshop, lasted for 2 hours. The second experience, experience of watching the image of experience of movement lasted for 10 seconds. The third experience, experience of watching the watching of the image of experience of movement lasted for 1 second. I purposely exposed myself to three different durations — in order to see how much of the experience is being modified by the selected time frame. This is what I have concluded. According to my body, time can be measured. Duration cannot. Time can be counted. Duration cannot. Within the frame of a measurable time — the third experience I had lasted for 1 second; within the frame of immeasurable duration — that experience began at the moment I cannot determine and it is going to end at the moment I cannot determine as well. What does the act of watching activate — at the level of experience; does the act of watching the image of experience put the experience itself into movement; what does the body remember, and at the same time — creatively reimagines; who is watching who; which body is watching which body; how is the matter that I am activated by the act of watching the image of myself as matter; how does a matter watch the matter; how does a matter watch itself as matter; when does an image become a score, image-score; when does an image of matter become a score for a different becoming of matter; when does the act of watching become the act of dancing of what our body can do, perceive and become?

4.7 IMAGE-SCORE

I am going to finish this chapter with the last experience I would like to share. At a certain moment Biliانا and I began to think how to share the microscope images of our body tissues and body fluids, as well as discuss them with the other people. We decided to do that at the International Conference Langarts 2016 "Seizing the artistic gesture through other art forms and cultures" (29, 30 June and July 01, 2016, Paris). At the end of our joint presentation we distributed the microscope images of our body fluids and body tissues to conference participants without letting them know what they were looking at. We asked for their participation in our experiment. More precisely, we asked them to answer the following questions:

1. In which part of the body do you feel this image?
2. What do you feel; which type of movement or sensation do you feel in that part of your body?

Why did we ask those questions? For me, asking the first question was interesting for the following reason — I wanted to see which body parts of the conference participants were going to be activated by our body parts. More precisely, we distributed the images of eye, saliva and cervical fluid patterns. Therefore, I was wondering which body part of the participants was going to be activated by, for example, my eye, or more precisely, which body material was going to be activated by that act. What was interesting to discover was that most participants felt the images of our body fluids in their muscles. Another thing that was interesting to discover was that most participants felt the movement, as well as the sensation of the flow while watching the images. If we put together the body part and the movement or sensation, therefore, "muscles" and "flow" we get flowing muscles. In other words, we get a new experiential tissue or even better, an experience of a different plane of expressivity of tissue.

At the beginning of this chapter I described the sensation of my body during the workshop experience. I described my body as "flowing". More precisely, I talked about flowing skin, flowing bones, flowing muscles. What is interesting in this situation is that the experience of conference participants matches my experience. For example, what I felt was flowing skin. The sensation that I felt was registered with my entire body, at all levels of my body, at the level of matter, perception, experience. The act of taking the samples of our body fluids after the movement experience was an attempt

to make what was registered visible. The act of showing the microscope images to conference participants was an attempt to discover the potential similarities, as well as differences between our experiences. What is interesting, in the end, is how one sensation produces another sensation, or more precisely, how the sensation of flowing skin produces the sensation of flowing muscles. Another interesting notion is that of one body producing another body, or, one (mode of) bodying producing another (mode of) bodying. However, this process is not finished. Even now, while analysing the answers of conference participants — something is happening. My body is not just reading, or analysing the answers of conference participants, but it is also being changed by them. The change is happening in both directions. It is not that only my sensation of flowing skin produces the sensation of flowing muscles in conference participants. The sensation of flowing muscles felt in conference participants produces another sensation in my body — here and now. My body is changed and continues to change — both itself the other, as — one body producing other bodies, one sensation producing other sensations, a sensing multiplicity producing other sensing multiplicities.

The body is that which transitions. I began this chapter saying how shape, size and orientation of my and Biliana's body fluid patterns changed after Gaga movement experience. What I would like to add now is that the shape, size and orientation of our body fluid patterns transitioned into another shape, size and orientation. Furthermore, body shape, size and orientation are not transitional. What the body is made of is the relation between shape-in-transition, size-in-transition and orientation-in-transition. As such, they are not adjectives (transitional), but verbs (in-transitioning). Therefore, we cannot say how we have our body. We can say how we are our body — in a given moment — here and now.

How to use the image as a score, as image-score? What matters is not what the image shows, but how it shows, as well as how that which is shown transforms the spectator's body. How to read the image as a score? How to put into relation image-score and body-score, how to activate the relation of one score producing another score, not only the simultaneous process of an image producing a body and a body producing an image, but also the process of one image producing another image and one body producing another body. I would like to propose the following questions:

- how is this image giving itself to my regard;
- what is the mode of this image giving itself to my regard doing to my body;

- what is this image allowing to be seen;
- what is this image not allowing to be seen;
- what is the possibility of seeing doing to my body;
- what is the impossibility of seeing doing to my body;
- how is my body transformed by the act of seeing;
- how is my body transformed by the impossibility of seeing;
- what am I looking with;
- what am I looking at;
- which image am I looking at;
- which image do I see;
- which part of my body is activated as my eyes;
- which parts of my body do I use in order to see this image;
- which parts of my body are activated through the act of seeing;
- which parts of my body are activated through the impossibility of seeing;
- which sensation is this image producing in my body;
- which sensation is being produced through the act of seeing;
- which sensation is being produced through the impossibility of seeing;
- is there only one sensation, or several sensations giving themselves to be felt at the same time;
- how is this image looking back at me;
- when am I looking at this image and when is this image looking back at me;
- which body is this image looking at;
- which body is being seen by this image;
- which body is not being seen by this image;
- how is my body allowing itself to be seen by this image;
- how is my body not allowing itself to be seen by this image;
- does this image have a body;

- what is a body of this image made of;
- how is a body of this image being produced;
- what is the body of this image doing to my body;
- where does my body stop and the body of the image begin;
- where does my gaze stop and the gaze of the image begin;
- where is the boundary between my body and the body of the image;
- where is the boundary between my gaze and the gaze of the image;
- what makes, breaks or transforms that boundary;
- which state is this image putting my body in;
- which movement is this image putting my body in;
- how can my body activate this image;
- how can my body get activated by this image;
- how can my body put this image into movement;
- how can my body be put into movement by this image;
- how can my body dance this image;
- how can my body be danced by this image;
- what is this image doing to my body image;
- how is this image communicating with my body image;
- how is this image putting my perception into movement;
- departing from my body — which qualities of the image are activating solid perception;⁶
- departing from my body — which qualities of the image are activating liquid perception⁷;

⁶Solid or fixed perception refers to cinematic perception that subtracts nothing from the image based on subjective need or interest, but retains an objective, albeit non-localized center within a complete image.

⁷Liquid perception refers to the state in which the center of perception, created by the distance between an action and its possibility, owes by virtue of displacement: "The more the privileged centre is itself put into movement, the more it will tend towards an acentered system where the images vary in relation to one another [...] (Deleuze, 2005: 79—82).

- departing from my body — which qualities of the image are activating gaseous perception⁸;
- how is this image producing my body — here and now;
- how is my body producing this image — here and now;
- how is this image making one of the experiential organs of my body;
- how is my body making one of the experiential organs of this image;
- how is the act of watching and being watched changing my body;
- how is the act of watching and being watched changing this image;
- how is my body reproducing this image;
- how is this image reproducing my body;
- which qualities of this image cannot be reproduced by my body;
- which qualities of my body cannot be reproduced by this image;
- how is this image being captured by my body;
- how is my body being captured by this image;
- which qualities of this image cannot be captured by my body;
- which qualities of my body cannot be captured by this image;
- how does this image want to be looked at;
- how does my body want to be looked at;
- how does this image want to be seen;
- how does my body want to be seen;
- how can I make myself experiential or relational eyes;
- how can I share those eyes with this image;
- how can I appropriate the experiential or relational eyes of this image;
- how can I look at this image with its pair of eyes;
- how can this image look back at me with my pair of eyes;

⁸Gaseous perception refers to a perception that does not measure the distance between things and actions, such that the interval between the two cannot be anticipated. Rather, gaseous perception is of all possibilities or of the virtual (pure potential of perceiving).

- how to enter the relation of becoming-eyes of my body;
- how to enter the relation of becoming-eyes of this image;
- how to enter the relation of shared gaze, shared eyes;
- how can I look at the image with my entire body?

5

ANATOMIES OF A MOVING BODY

5.1 EXPERIENTIAL ANATOMIES

Experiential anatomy is as an embodied approach to anatomy developed by dancers and movement specialists such as Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. Experiential anatomy focuses on different aspects of our skeletal structure and through detailed anatomical exploration, touch and exercises, it makes dancers develop an embodied awareness of the intrinsic anatomy of an area to positively affect their use, functioning and mobility. Dancers are not portraying, but experiencing their corporal systems through the approach of experiential anatomy which is based on finding the free and effective flow of movement using the bodying of different systems.

Body-Mind Centering (BMC) is an approach to experiencing the living anatomy and a specific method of movement analysis. It is based on bodying the anatomical and developmental movement principles. BMC explores early developmental movement states and their relationship to the inner support and movement of the breath, organs and skeleton, as well as movement of the body's fluid systems (blood, cerebrospinal, interstitial, synovial, lymph, cellular) to access new specificity in movement qualities and expressions. By applying the BMC principles it is possible to retrain not only the body-mind system, but also the proprioceptive neuromuscular perception, as well as the movement schemes finding new sources of research of the movement. Body-Mind Centering approach to creating the experiential anatomy consists of:

- bodying the nervous system with a focus on: the somatic nervous system; the autonomic nervous system; sitting in the synapse, nerve reversal and healing; front, middle, and back bodies; releasing the brachial plexus and lumbosacral plexus; and embryology of the nervous system;
- bodying the organ system with a focus on: explorations of the organs; releasing adhesions between organs; initiating breath, voice, movement and touch from the organs; analyzing imbalances in individual organs; techniques to balance the organs; and the embryological development of the organs;

- bodying the fluid system with a focus on: cellular fluid, transitional fluid, extracellular fluid; fluid — membrane balance; blood; cerebrospinal fluid (CSF); synovial fluid; periorgan fluid; lymph; interstitial and cellular fluids; bone marrow; exploring the immune system through the fluids; fascia; fat; and ground fluid;
- bodying the bones and joints of the upper limbs from the hands to the shoulder girdle and ribs, with a focus on the bones of the hands, ulnar disk, radius and ulna, elbow, humerus, windmill action of the scapula, freeing the ribs, finger relationships to shoulder girdle and ribs and working with the layers of bone;
- bodying the bones and joints of the axial skeleton (central core): the spine and skull, with a focus on the six curves of the spine, the skull, hyoid bone, thoracic and pelvic diaphragms, relationship of the pelvic halves and legs, the embryological development of the axial skeleton;
- bodying the bones and joints of the lower limbs from the feet to the pelvic halves, with a focus on the foot, ankle, foreleg, knee, femur, hip, pelvic half and the embryological development of the lower limbs;
- bodying the ligamentous system with a focus on: explorations of the ligaments; finding the spiraling action of ligaments; ligaments of the hands, forearms, and elbows; ligaments of the shoulders and shoulder girdles; ligaments of the ribs and spine; ligaments of the pelvis and hips; ligaments of the knees, forelegs, and feet; differentiating flesh and bone; and the embryological development of the ligaments;
- bodying the endocrine system with a focus on: initiating breath, voice, movement and touch from the glands; relationship of the glands to the skeletal structures, reflex points and spinal energy centers; and techniques for integrating and balancing the gland, including the perineal body, coccygeal body, gonads, adrenals, pancreas, thoracobody, heart body, thymus, thyroid, parathyroids, carotid bodies, pineal, mamillary bodies and pituitary.

Here follows an example of BMC practitioner's work: "let's start with an arterial rhythm, feel the weight of the blood in your peripheries connecting to the earth, follow the pulse ... now add some venous flow, find the rebound, the cyclic return of the blood to the heart ... now drop the arterial and add some csf (cerebrospinal fluid) to the venous, your mass is becoming more diffuse, sensing the environment, your nerves are being magnetized, suspended in time and space ... and let's take out the venous ... and add some lymph for more spatial tension, specificity and detail, where are your boundaries? ... and drop the csf

(cerebrospinal fluid) now and let's bring in some synovial, fluid of the skeletal system, find the spaces between the bones, freedom, jiggle it, throw it away ... and now shift to interstitial, that juicy sponginess in your muscles and fascia, thick ocean connecting all the cells ... and let's come back to simply rest and breathe in the cellular fluid, just being present as you are" (<http://caraker.com/articles/body-mind-centering-as-a-somatic-approach-to-dance-education/>).

That was an example of dancing through the fluids, as well as dancing the fluids themselves, because experiencing the fluid, reimagining it physically, is also an act of moving, transforming and reorganizing it. BMC focuses on bodying the line of experience of different body systems and becoming perceptive of experiential anatomy. Experience first occurs on the cellular level. The nervous system records the experience and organizes it into patterns. Following the given experience it modifies the pattern by integrating it with the patterns of other experiences. Once knowing the experience, the nervous system becomes a primary controlling system of the body. The question that raises here is how to repattern the cellular level of an experience, as well as the experiential anatomy, through movement? How is the physicality of imagination affecting the physicality of a moving body? Where does the physicality of the imagination end and the physicality of a body begin? When is functional anatomy being changed by the experiential anatomy and how?

In her article *Dancing through the Transitional Fluid*, published in *Contact Quarterly* (2009) Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen addresses the question of membranes, as well as the distinction between yielding and collapse: "Everyone has a different fluid-membrane balance [in the cells] — a basic constitutional preference that also varies from day to day. Many people don't know how to maintain balance. Balancing involves flow toward the earth and/or space, flow coming back to self, and transitional fluid: flowing in or out. Flowing in gives the sense of more fullness of self; flowing out gives the sense of a release into gravity or space" (Bainbridge Cohen, in Olsen, 2014: 7). On a flow level, there is a difference between collapsing — letting go of the membrane so there's flow only in one direction, toward gravity, and yielding, where there is reciprocity of fluids flowing into and out of the cells. Collapsing involves giving up the weight to gravity, surrendering totally, while yielding involves release into gravity with rebound and resilience.

For Bainbridge Cohen the cycling of the fluids is a natural phenomenon. On its outside, a body appears as solid, but on its inside, body is a system of cycling fluids, it is liquid. How is it possible to think the body as a state of simultaneous solidity and liquidity or even as a juxtaposition of liquid solidity and solid liquidity? Blood, for

example, is constantly oscillating between the state of solid and liquid. While flowing freely, it appears as liquid; while flowing through the other organs, it appears as solid, but is actually oscillating between both states. Blood is not (a form) — it flows. Body is not (a form), but it flows too. Body is not choreographed, body is choreography. One way of seeing a body is to see it as a system of organs. Another way to see a body is to see it a system of choreographic processes. Every single organ emerges as its own singular choreographic process. On the other side of skin, it is possible to think the body in its imperceptible heterogeneity, or more precisely, heterogeneity of its imperceptible choreographic processes. A body emerges in and as a choreography of blood, saliva, sweat, tears, in short, its fluids and tissues.

5.2 FLOWING IN FORM AND FORMING IN FLOW

On the following pages I am going to introduce some exercises created by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. The reason why I chose to work on exercises is because they present the conditions of bodying, or more precisely, conditions of a certain body giving itself a form. Another reason is that exercises address the question of "how" — how a certain body is being made, how it works and what it produces. What is interesting about those exercises is that they make a dancer aware of the flowingness of his or her body, as well as its imperceptible choreographies. A dancer is not only becoming aware of the flow of his or her blood, for example, but becoming that flow. The dancer is dancing her own flow and therefore her own body. The way of becoming, as well as dancing her own flow lies in the following: reimagining the flow physically and letting the body emerge as a flow. Let's start with the exercise "Exploring Collapse and Yielding" by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen.

Exploring Collapse and Yielding

- "Lying on the floor, explore the sensation of collapse — letting go of your membranes so you feel flow in only one direction, toward gravity.
- Explore yielding, feeling release into gravity with natural rebound (awareness of "antigravity", that is, levity or support), where there is reciprocity of fluids flowing into and out of the cells.
- Change — spontaneously move in space, yielding toward heaven.
- Flow into stillness.
- Change — again release and move into space. (Keep the moment of change spontaneous — faster than you can think. Then it goes wherever it's going.)
- Flow again into stillness. (Never lose connection to the earth or to yourself; be comfortable while you explore.)
- Alternate between spontaneous transition into movement — yielding toward earth (gravity), yielding toward heaven (space) and flowing toward stillness (self), feeling the relationship and rebound.
- While moving, transitioning, or being still, notice the fleeting moment of surrender that precedes change — of consciousness, movement, or presence. Enjoy the surprise of transition, the possibilities of change" (Bainbridge Cohen, in: Olsen, 2014: 6).

Do yielding toward earth (gravity), yielding toward heaven (space) and flowing toward stillness (self) represent the body states: solid, gas and liquid? Exploring transitions from solid, liquid and gas is also a way to explore the difference between the body schema and body image. Body schema is "a term neuroscientists use for overlapping maps in the brain that make a person aware of what his or her body is doing. Body schema is fed by sensory nerves throughout the body that tell us about our selves in relation to the world. Body image, in contrast, describes the constructed representation developed through life stories and attitudes accumulated from birth. Body schema and body image may not match — what your body actually feels and looks like and how you imagine you look may be worlds apart. This is what science writers Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew Blakeslee describe as dueling body maps" (Olsen, 2014: 7). In the practice of Body-Mind Centering the experience of dueling body maps can emerge throughout the practice of flow and maintaining connection with the internal sense of fluidity. How is it possible to think an idea, as well as the practice of fluid body image? Within the context of fluid body image, a body exists only as a totality and awareness of its ongoing processes. It exists only as a totality of its simultaneous bodyings or more precisely, modes of bodying¹. As previously mentioned, there is no body, there are only bodyings. What does it actually mean? It means that there are no fixed modes of being a body, but only emerging modes of becoming a body. According to Spinoza, the difference between the finite modes and the infinite modes is in the following: finite modes can be named, measured and classified; infinite modes cannot. Movement and rest, as well as the relation between them — represent one of the infinite modes for Spinoza. Infinite modes are singular, immeasurable, unclassifiable. Modes of bodying are singularities in motion, being distributed along and across the multiple lines of body image. There is no body image as such. There is only a movement of body image. Exploring experience-based body image is an act of exploring the singular movement of a body image, or, more precisely, body-image-in-movement. In this particular case, we are exploring the movement of a flow, as well as the fluidity of body image.

According to Emilie Conrad, "we are basically fluid beings that have arrived on land. Flow is our oceanic heritage. As we focus on the sensations of flow throughout the body, we recognize that it exists in varying degrees and can be diminished or enhanced through attention" (Olsen, 2014: 13). Our inner body and the Earth's surface are both largely water, most of which is salty. Life-supporting oxygen enters the body as breath, and is pumped by the heart to every cell in the body through blood. The flow

¹Those who are interested in the subject of body image should read the chapter 11 of this thesis entitled "Body image". That chapter is exploring the multimodality of body image, its dynamic construction and experience-dependent transformation.

of breath as blood is an expression of the life force that makes all other flows possible. Attention to the fluid system of the body connects all body parts. Moving the "blood side of the skin", the inside, makes it possible to feel the ripples and responsiveness of fluid, rather than rigidity of body, as well skin. The blood side of the skin also indicates the dual nature of the skin, the solid and liquid one. To enhance the flow, "imagine the body as a sphere — undifferentiated and full of fluid. Using the metaphor of a single cell suspended in the ocean, we can return to a place of all possibility in movement. The semipermeable cell membrane connects us to and also separates us from context (the environment), defining inner and outer. Skin is both touching and being touched. Each cell condenses and expands through cellular respiration, a metabolic process. Expressing itself equally in all directions, the cell has omnidirectional volume. We can be moved by content (inner fluids) and by context (outer ocean). Throughout, there is permeability and fluidity when we make choices" (Olsen, 2014: 13). Cellular movement, cellular respiration, cellular organization open the possibility not only of a fluid, but also permeable body image.

According to Olsen, "dancing is an ongoing dialogue between flow and form: forming in flow and flowing in form. Rhythmic flow is a source for dance, an underlying current — not just the drum machine pulsing out the heartbeat to get us moving, but polyrhythmic pathways inherent in our body systems. Flow enhances our ability to move rhythm throughout our structure, and to feel it opening stuck places from inside. One's internal, individual flow meets the external rhythms of music, other dancers, and the choreographer's directions" (Olsen, 2014: 13). Where do two or more flows meet? In movement. Where do two or more movements meet? In body. Flowing, the body, as well as the movements, become modes of being more than one, always. Balance, stretch and extension are not goals in themselves; they reflect the flow of life force seeping, resting, or flooding through structures — internal and external ones. Entering the flow enhances our ability to inhabit new forms, new rhythms, new bodyings.

Rolling and Pouring (Caryn McHose)

Sometimes you need to reestablish flow in the body.

"Lying on the floor, eyes closed:

Imagine yourself as a water balloon. Gently roll the balloon, by pouring the water — your contents — from inside. (Like an amoeba, the cytoplasm pours into the membrane, creating movement through a pseudopod.)

Roll from the membrane — the container — allowing your skin to meet space and the ground.

Roll imagining a fluid environment — your context — moving your body.

Explore this with eyes open; notice when you are moving with awareness of container (skin), contents (fluid insides), or context (outside).

Engage the theater of your imagination. Move freely, allowing the body to respond. What does your body feel like doing now? After enhancing sensory impression with rolling and pouring, engage sensory expression: speak or write about your experience, squeezing back the sponge" (Caryn McHose, in: Olsen, 2014: 14).

With this exercise it is possible to explore the dynamic fluidity of body tissues and body fluid compartments. One of the most interesting body fluids, as well as body fluid compartments, are membranes. In physics and chemistry of colloids, a membrane is considered as a fluid. A colloid is a fluid dispersed in a fluid and that which has various properties and structures. Semi-permeable, as well as permeable membranes have a liquid structure that is reorganizing all the time. Membranes are heterogeneous and have more or less rapidly moving regions. At the cell level, membranes are very fast, moving all the time. How to think a transitional fluid as a transitional field; how to think a membrane as a transitional fluid-field? What does it mean to let go of the membranes? What is the act of letting go of the membranes doing to the structure and organization of a moving body? How does a moving body become through that act? How does a body flow with or without membranes? How do we notice and capture different qualities of "rolling" and "pouring" at a level of our flow — while moving, transitioning or being still; how do we allow that moment to dance our body?

5.3 MATERIALIZING IMAGINATION: BODY-IN-MAKING

According to Emilie Conrad, "as human beings, we are an accrual of many life forms that have been shaped by our own oceanic origins, still pulsating at the intrinsic world of our organs, our connective tissue, our nerve fiber. We are a process of millions of years of an open-ended experiment" (Conrad, in: Greil, 2011: 41). We are an ongoing and multilayered process of millions of years of becoming. We are becomings. Let's look at that more closely from the point of time. Instead of asking in how many experiences of time we exist I would like to ask how many experiences of time exist in us, in our body. More precisely: on the level of the atoms making our body — we are as old as the Universe, 13.7 billion years old (everything that exists is as old as the Universe on the atomic level); on the level of molecules we are having different ages (being extremely old and extremely young at the same time); on the level of our cells — we are having different ages too (depending on a type of cell — we can be anything from a millisecond to a second or a minute old); on the level of our organs we are experiencing ageing cycle and it is hard to determine precisely how old we are (our organs, as well as our cells are renewing themselves every day, a year or few years); on a level of our body experience is the one that determines the age and not only the chronological time applied to our life.

How to analyse the body in terms of the elements it is made of? The question of elements is being discussed in *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Material Imagination*, written by Gaston Bachelard. What is an "element" for Bachelard? Water, fire, earth, and air represent the elements in a pre-Socratic sense, both "inner" and "outer" (Bachelard, 1999: foreword, 7). The idea of "inner" and "outer" means following: elements are both internal and external to our body; our body is not just being surrounded by the elements, but also made of them. Our body is a composition of the elements and their relations. "In the zone of active imagination, where man is a thinking, willing being, an openness is retained. Here the depths are not so fearful nor the heights so unattainable. Here we can retrace, reclaim, retrieve, relive, and even transform experience in our imaginative selves" (Bachelard, 1999: foreword, 8). How to think the idea of "our imaginative selves"; how to put into relation the idea of "imaginative selves", material imagination and experience-based body image? How does material imagination work and what does it produce on a level of a body image? Is the act of exploring the material imagination also an act of reimagining the body schema in movement or creating new body image, reimagining the body by the body itself? If yes, then we can talk about the autopoiesis, or more precisely, heteropoiesis of a moving body, simultaneous processes of creating oneself and being

created by the other. As previously mentioned, body flows. Body image, being water-like, in a constant change generated by the experience, flows too. Just as water never stops flowing, our body also never stops flowing; movement never stops. Confronted with the imperceptibility of movement moving, the act of reframing our perception becomes necessary. How to become perceptive of our own flowing nature? According to Bachelard "it is in the flesh and organs that the first material images are born" (Bachelard, 1999: foreword, 8). What are material images and how is the act of imagining or reimagining those material images affecting our body image? According to Bachelard, "images whose basis or matter is water do not have the same durability and solidity as those yielded by earth, by crystals, metals, and precious stones" (Bachelard, 1999: 1). What kind of an image is a body?

While working with the experiential anatomy one is also working with the image, the experience of an image, as well as the encounter between the images-in-making and bodies-in-making. Just like water, body flows, in its constant movement responding to the environment and to the possibility. According to Bachelard, "images of matter . . . are images that stem directly from matter. The eye assigns them names, but only the hand truly knows them. What becomes important is the act of searching behind the obvious images for the hidden ones, of seeking the very roots of this image-making power" (Bachelard, 1999: 1-2). Another thing that becomes important is the notion of how: how the image is being made becomes more important than what it is or what it shows; if the image shows something then it shows how it is being made, directly, as a direct image in motion. Microscope images of body fluids and body tissues are exactly that — direct images in motion, as the matter moves, the image becomes, here and now.

"It seemed to me that the individualizing power of matter had been underestimated. Why does everyone always associate the notion of the individual with form? Is there not an individuality in depth that makes matter a totality, even in its smallest divisions?" (Bachelard, 1999: 6). Matter unveils the levels of action, imperceptible, but most vivid and most complex action, as well as the levels of movement and individuation, or more precisely, movements of individuation. The only thing that matter unveils is the movement of individuation never arriving to the point of individuality. According to Heraclitus, nature loves to hide. What is intriguing is the fact that the most complex levels of nature's activity are hidden. Nature's activity is also its way of becoming itself. How much of the body do we actually see, what does it mean to see, see-feel? How can we see with our senses? We are taught to look from the inside to the outside, but how can we (re)learn to look from the outside to the inside, remain in a state of flux?

"The flux is a concrete philosophy, a complete philosophy. One cannot bathe twice in the same river because already, in his inmost recesses, the human being shares the destiny of water. Water is truly the transitory element. It is the essential, ontological metamorphosis between fire and earth. A being dedicated to water is a being in flux. He dies every minute; something of his substance is constantly falling away. Daily death is not fire's exuberant form of death, piercing heaven with its arrows; daily death is the death of water. Water always flows, always falls, always ends in horizontal death" (Bachelard, 1999: 6). Water-like aspect of the body lies in its possibility to move, its movability. Furthermore, some other water-like aspects of the body are: its possibility to transform itself in and with movement, the possibility to transform itself in time, to shape-shift, and to be relational (to be itself and the other at the same time). In *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Material Imagination* Bachelard reflects on the last, previously mentioned aspect of a water-like being, being relational, being one and many at the same time, absolute shapeshifter: "Knowing my own quantity, It is I, I tug, I call upon all of my roots, the Ganges, the Mississippi, The thick spread of the Orinoco, the long thread of the Rhine, the Nile with its double bladder" (Paul Claudel, *Cinq grandes odes*, Paris 1913, p. 49., in: Bachelard, 1999: 9). What kind of body image is being constructed here? Is it possible to reflect that body image as a flowing one, simultaneously flowing-in-and-flowing-out-of-the-body's body image, being one and many at the same time, as well as always same and always different? Following the thought of Bachelard, "water is not only a group of images revealed in wandering contemplation, a series of broken, momentary reveries, it is a *mainstay* for images, a mainstay that quickly becomes a *contributor* of images, a founding contributor for images. Thus, little by little, in the course of ever more profound contemplation, water becomes an element of materializing imagination" (Bachelard, 1999: 11). A body is not only imagining an image, it is also being imagined by it. Since imagining is always reimagining or (de)constructing, a body is not only reimagining or deconstructing the image, but is also being reimagined, as well as (de)constructed by it. How to further develop an idea of water as a founding contributor of images on a level of a moving body? In order to do so, one must find water-like state of the body and let it flow toward its infinite possibilities, compossibilities, its infinite planes of composition. To be water-like is to dance the possible of the compossible. Here, we are also opening the question of technicity of the body. Is there a relation between the liquidity, fluidity and the technicity of the body? According to Thesaurus dictionary, in physics, liquidity signifies a liquid state or quality, while fluidity signifies a fluid state or quality. The meaning of "liquid" is following: 1. composed of molecules that move freely among themselves but do not tend to separate like those of gases; neither gaseous nor solid,

2. of, relating to, or consisting of liquids, 3. flowing like water, being water-like, 4. the ability of a substance to flow, 5. flowing freely.

The meaning of "fluid" is following: 1. a substance, as a liquid or gas, that is capable of flowing and that changes its shape at a steady rate when acted upon by a force tending to change its shape, 2. pertaining to a substance that easily changes its shape; capable of flowing, 3. consisting of or pertaining to fluids, 4. changing readily; shifting; not fixed, stable, or rigid: fluid movements, 5. being convertible. Body is both liquid and fluid — it is made of water and it is water-like, flowing. According to Bachelard, "images are born in us" (Bachelard, 1999: 18), but they also give birth to us. Images being born in us unveil the dynamic quality, as well the fluidity of imagination. Images of "liquid", as well as "fluid" are definitely born in, as and through our bodies. Just as fire becomes water, atoms become molecules, molecules become tissues, tissues become organs, organs become body.

It is also possible to reflect water-like qualities of body on its cellular level. Our bodies are highly dynamic entities. Our cells are reproducing, processing, and dying constantly. Within a year, a month, the time it takes to read these words, we are not the same person we were before or while reading these words. As previously mentioned, our cells are constantly flowing. One of the most important areas of body exploration is the awareness of what is happening inside: the dialogue between inner and outer experience in relation to the whole body. We spend much of our time involved in outer perception through the specialized sense organs of sight, sound, taste, smell, and touch. We are generally less involved in developing our capacities for inner sensing which is the ability of the nervous system to monitor inner states of the body and become perceptive of its own fluidity.

The cell is the fundamental unit of the body. The abilities of the cell to reproduce, to metabolize, and to respond to its environment, are basic to human life: creativity, processing, and responsiveness to change. Cells have common properties but vary according to function in the body. Each cell is composed largely of water, the basic substance of the body. Water is contained within the cytoplasm of the cell. The cell membrane differentiates the cytoplasm from the surrounding external environment and creates a semipermeable boundary governing exchange of nutrients and waste materials, and responding to stimulation. The nucleus supervises cell activity. The forty-six chromosomes in each human cell contain the genetic code for the individual body and for the specific functioning of each cell. Each nucleus, therefore, contains a master plan of the whole body. Individual cells have different functions; for example, a muscle cell contracts, a nerve cell transfers electrochemical signals, a fiber-producing

cell produces connective tissue fibers. A collection of like cells of similar structure and function is called a tissue. Groups of coordinated tissues form structures (organs), which comprise a body system. For example, bone cells form bone tissue, which makes bones, which create the skeletal system. The cell is also the functional unit common to all body systems. There are "seven body systems, as defined by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen: skeletal, muscular, nervous, endocrine, organ, fluid, and connective tissue. Although we can look at each system individually, it is important to remember that the body functions as an interrelated whole and that the systems balance and support each other. Let's take a look at our skeleton: our skeleton is alive. The 206 bones in the human body are living tissue. Both red and white blood cells are produced in the marrow of long bones" (Olsen; McHose, 2004: 19, 39).

It is not only cells that reflect water-like qualities of a body, but also a skin. The skin is the "external membrane of the body, a highly sensitive boundary between our body and our environment. Sixty to seventy per cent of lean body weight is water, and the skin literally keeps us from drying up. Two-thirds of this water is within the cells (intracellular) and one-third is between the cells (extracellular)" (McHose, 2014: 19, 20). Liquidity (being mostly made of water), fluidity (shedding and reorganizing itself on a level of a second) and permeability (being situated between the body and its environment, being the outside of the inside of a human body) of the skin reflect its water-like quality too. We are breathing with our skin, through our skin, from one cell to another. "Oxygen, essential to cellular life, comes into the body through our nose and mouth and travels through the trachea to the lungs. As the diaphragm descends, the lungs are expanded by the inrush of air called inspiration. When the diaphragm releases, the lungs are compressed to expel carbon dioxide in a process called expiration. The oxygen is absorbed through the capillaries in the lungs and enters the blood to be pumped by the heart throughout the body. Arteries carry the oxygen-rich blood from the heart to the periphery. Each cell participates in the absorption of oxygen and the removal of waste materials in connection with a process called cellular respiration. Deoxygenated blood returns via the veins to the heart. Through this process, every cell is in connection with the outer environment and breathes" (McHose, 2014: 20). Breathing is another way of flowing too, flowing in and flowing out: it is an exchange, bringing the external environment into the internal environment, and letting go of the internal to the external. Our body, being water-like, is flowing on multiple levels, those of its cells, fluids, skin, breath.

How do we make ourselves a body-becoming with experiential anatomy? Experiential anatomy does not know of a preformed body. Experiential anatomy is based on the process of bodying of different body parts and systems. In this context,

bodying denotes a continuous process of "taking form" or a continuously repeated action of forming a body. The bodying operates through imagination and movement. More precisely, there is a constant interaction between the real and the imaginary movement, as well as between the actual and the virtual body they make (in this context virtual is understood as potential). Body, constantly oscillating between the actual and the virtual — is never finished. Experiential anatomy knows only of an embryological conception of the body which recognizes only dynamic and kinetic, as well as synthetic functioning of the organs or parts of a body such that they are appropriated to compose, relay, or direct flows that exceed or transverse the body itself. As we have seen in one of the previous examples, experiential anatomy explores the body in a state of flux. Once it reaches the state of qualitative, as well as quantitative flux, a body becomes a space of possibility. In a state of flux, a body is not determined by any fixed organization, but is constantly emerging at the level of its organization. What activates the emergence of its organization is an interaction between the real and the imaginary movement. In this case, movement becomes a force of becoming of a body. Movement as a force of becoming is not external, but internal to the body. Movement makes the body, or, more precisely, it continuously creates new possibilities of a body, new body systems and new connections between them. As such, experiential body is a body-becoming — continuously oscillating between the real and the imaginary, between the form and the force, between the actual and the virtual.

5.4 ANATOMIES OF ATTUNEMENT

Anatomy of attunement is as an embodied approach to anatomy developed by dance and movement specialists such as Moshé Feldenkrais and Lisa Nelson. Moshé Feldenkrais is the founder of the Feldenkrais Method and Lisa Nelson is the founder of the Tuning Scores, an approach to spontaneous composition and performance.

The Feldenkrais Method is a neuromuscular re-education approach, and Tuning Scores are a set of compositional and improvisational structures. Even though the two approaches differ in function, they share essential traits. Feldenkrais and Tuning Scores both use perceptual research to help practitioners learn about their own physical tendencies through movement. They both show the way practitioners compose experience through the action of tuning. By practicing these two approaches, one develops tools to recognize the details of physicality and the structures that underlie it. Both Feldenkrais Method and Tuning Scores offer skills and a context to invoke a permeable state of attunement. Permeability is a specific physical state, referring to an interaction through surfaces or fields. The phenomenon of permeability defines an engagement between the whole sense of self and the environment within which a body is situated. When being permeable, a moving body is being available to the current situation, rather than being fixed in habitual patterns of action; it is in the state of attunement as well as its anatomical structure, composition and organization. Furthermore, Lisa Nelson's Tuning Scores address the question of how we compose perception through action; in other words, we learn how what we see is inextricably linked to how we see it, through our multisensorial layers of observation. Tuning Scores explore the composition of the body through the organization of its biological matter (skin, bones, muscles, eyes, brain, water) and its experience. Does the framework of Tuning Scores offer the possibility to study experiential organs as well as experience-dependent transformation of organs; is the action of tuning also the action of creating the shared body, as well as shared organs? Does the action of tuning create new sets of organs?

Some of the entry points of an exploration of the anatomy of attunement are:

- tuning practices as maps to follow with feedback systems to help one observe one's patterns, processes, and strategies for becoming physicalized, present and available to move;
- tuning practices as tools for creating ongoing, spontaneous composition and co-composition;

- tuning practices as tools for studying how a body composition arises and how one intentionally and attentionally tunes into it;
- tuning practices as tools for sensorial texturing and tuning into the experiential anatomy.

Lisa Nelson considers a body as a container, as well as the environment of the imagination, therefore, Tuning Scores become tools for exploring the physical base of imagination of a moving body: "The Tuning Scores provoke spontaneous compositions that make evident how we sense and make sense of movement, exposing our opinions about space, time, action, and desire, and provide a framework for communication and feedback amongst the players. The scores draw from genetic and acquired skills of survival: how we look at things, what we "need to know", the perceptual process of editing spontaneously in order to make meaning out of any moment. With the scores, we play with our desire to compose experience, to make our imaginations visible, to develop a sense of ensemble, and to transform our movement into dancing" (Nelson, <http://www.independentdance.co.uk/author/lisa-nelson/>).

Apart from playing with their desire to compose experience, moving bodies are also composing themselves as an experience: "For Stern affective attunement is key to interpersonal becoming. Affective attunement is another mode of immanent relation where the relation radically precedes the purported unity of the self. Attunement is a merging-with, it is not a feeling-of, but a feeling-with. In affective attunement, a relational merging occurs that creates a dephasing of vitality affects around new affective contours. This dephasing is as much a shift in process as shift in level" (Manning, 2012: 46). This experience evokes what Simondon calls a transduction, a redistribution of processes in the making, irreducible to the poles of the event. It emerges in the interval of two (or more) moving bodies, leading towards the creation of a body-with. The interval creates an opening through which a body-with emerges: "Then your body would take over and dance at that point where you had no more idea. I see that as an idealized form of dancing: just not knowing and letting the body dance you around" (Forsythe, 2003: 26). Letting our body "dance us around" is letting the body dance itself, in and as the phase of the line of bodying. If we consider movement as a force that precedes an organized body, bodying becomes a line of compressing movements in physical entities. How is it possible to think the bodying as a technique that is not technical, but temporal, sensing, becoming?

How do we make ourselves a body-becoming with the anatomy of attunement? One way to make it is to make it through the action of attunement. More precisely, the

composition of the body emerges through the interaction with the other — through the actions of tuning in and tuning out. This body is co-composed, its composition is a composition-in-motion. Attunement can be seen as a simultaneous act of composing the other and being composed by it. What activates this attunement is relation. We do not only compose a relation, but we are also composed by it. As such, body is never fully confined to only one dancer, but it made with the other, through the action of attunement. It is a body-between, determined by its milieu. Milieu in this case can be seen as a zone of indetermination between two or more bodies. This body is organized dynamically — through its capacity to affect and to be affected. The dynamic organization of the body is also based on the action of tuning between two or more dancers. What this action of tuning produced is a continuous becoming of kinetic and dynamic organization of a body.

5.5 DIAGRAMMATIC ANATOMIES OF FASCIA

Fascia is the body-wide network of connective tissue that forms pockets, tubes, slings and straps that contain all the other body tissues. The large proportion of the fascia is a type of liquid crystal, a water, so when we move in specific ways, water is squeezed back into the tissues. Fascia is nowadays understood as a major player in the capacity for body awareness. It is a sensory organ because the elasticity of the fascia gives it the capacity to store and rebound kinetic energy (like a rubber band). Invented by Ida Rolf, rolfing or Structural Integration is a form of deep-tissue bodywork that reorganizes the connective tissues through release and realignment. This improves the range of motion, flexibility, posture and bone structure. Rolfing helps break down calcification in the connective tissue and fascia. The main goal of rolfing is to organize a person's body structure in relation to gravity. According to Rolf: "Fascia is the organ of posture. Nobody ever says this; all the talk is about muscles. Yet this is a very important concept and because this is so important, as we must understand both the anatomy and physiology, but especially the anatomy of the fascia. The body is a web of fascia. We can trace the lines of that web to get an understanding of how what we see in the body works.?" (Rolf, <http://rolfresearchfoundation.org/about>).

There is another practice exploring the liquidity of the fascia, so-called fascial remodelling. A unique characteristic of the fascia as a connective tissue is its adaptability: when regularly put under increasing physiological strain, it changes its architectural properties to meet the demand. For example, through our everyday biped locomotion the fascia on the lateral side of the thigh develops a palpable firmness. If we were to instead spend that same amount of time with our legs straddling a horse, then the opposite would happen, after a few months the fascia on the inner side of the legs would become more developed and strong. How do we become aware of the web of the fascia throughout our bodies and how do we dance through our perceptual systems? Is it possible to think about the fascia as a body diagram or a diagrammatic map? In Deleuze's reading of Foucault, diagram is a mode of transmission or distribution of singularities. It is determined by its infinite movements or infinite modes of actualization. Diagrammatic nature of fascia reveals itself through its infinite modes of spatialization. Fascial remodelling is opening up a diagrammatic space of possibilities that defines what a body is capable of. Following its topology of potential, how is it possible to think about the diagrammatic anatomy of the fascia? If we think about the fascia as our environment — we dance from it, we dance it, and it dances us; we become through it and it becomes through us. We are active

constructors of our anatomy. Our body is out integrated tool-technique of dancing our own anatomy.

How do we make ourselves a body-becoming with rolfing? Enveloping our entire body, from both the outside and the inside, skin can be seen as a single, as well as multiple organ. Skin can also be seen as an indeterminate or unactualized organ, as well as our most mobile organ, constantly moving and being moved, becoming in and through movement. Fascia, being a co-constitutive part of the skin, is giving shape to our body and this act is actualized through a specific type of movement, in this case, rolfing. Fascia is organized through the kinetics and dynamics of touch. Skin is not just a functional, but also a kinetic organ, organ of movement. Skin is also a relational organ or the one through which we affect the other and are affected by it. Fascial remodelling involves the confrontation with the limits of our own organism. Because of the possibility of fascial remodelling, the skin is not defined in terms of a form, but kinetically and relationally. On a level of its movement, kinetically, skin is an infinite organ. On a level of its becomings, relationally, skin is an intensive organ.

5.6 TOUCHING THE BOUNDARIES: RELATIONAL SKIN(S)

What can be more personal than writing about touch? For the moment, I don't see any other way to start writing than to start from my own body. How does my body write touch? How to write the touch from the body, with the body, as the body? To me, touch is nothing less than an experience of being given a body. A body becomes through touch. It is through touch that we learn the materiality of our own body. It is through touch that we also learn its spatiality, spatiality-in-relation. We don't have a body, but "we are our own body" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 231). In relation to that, I would like to say how we don't have a skin, but how we are our own skin. We live in our skin and we live the experience itself of living in it at the same time. There is no skin. There is only skinning, becoming relational of our own skin. To live is to move as and between the acts of skinning. From one skin(ing) to another, from one body(ing) to another. To live is to exist between different skins; internal and external ones, our own and those of the other. My body doesn't believe in the difference between the internal and external skin. According to my body, there are only intermediary, relational skins. There is always more than one skin; we are always more than one skin.

We don't touch. We are the touch, or the touching itself. To live is to move from one touch to another. How does our very own skin become a reference point in writing about touch? How to write the touch from the place of touch, how to live writing itself as touching? Through my skin, through the act of touching, I know that I am. Through touch we learn the existence of our body, its solidity; we learn its edges as well as its becoming the body of the other. To touch is to live on the edge, as the edge. How would I have ever known the fact of having a body if I wasn't touched? Through touch, we can live the infinity of a single body becoming the body of the other. Through touch, we can also live as the infinity of bodies, or in Erin Manning's words, being *always more than one* (Manning, 2012). A touching body is a body that is always more than one body. To touch is to live the experience of the boundary, limit, edge; to touch is to live as a boundary, limit, edge.

Within the practice of Somagram — experimental corpography lab, what interests me the most is the relation between the touch and the body image. Touch creates the body, as well as it creates the body image. To touch is to dance our own body, its boundaries, limits, edges, as well as its body image. When I close my eyes and touch my fingers — a different, lived reality, as well as materiality of my fingers emerge. There is no distinction between the left and the right hand with five fingers on each hand. What emerges is the experience of skinning, fingering, handing. Becoming of the skin through the act of touching fingers. Becoming of the fingers through the act of

touching hands. Becoming of the hand(s) through the meeting of skin and fingers. To touch is to meet, to touch is to welcome: there is no such thing as one finger touching the surface of the other finger, but welcoming it within its own surface. Fingers don't meet at the surface; fingers emerge through the act of merging the surfaces. One finger welcomes the other finger within its own surface, its own existence. Fingering as surfacing; fingering as being *always more than one finger*².

According to my hand, to touch is to exist in, through and as infinity of qualities. According to my hand, touching is becoming of materiality of a hand. When touching or being touched, a hand becomes through its handness. Handness of a hand is its capacity to enter the relation of becoming a hand. Being relational of a hand. Existing as a relational hand; from one qualitative infinity to another; from one texture to another. Hand emerges through the meeting of infinite *handing* textures. "Hands are a complicated organism, a delta in which life from the most distant sources flows together surging into the great current of action. Hands have histories; they even have their own culture and their own particular beauty. We grant them the right to have their own development, their own wishes, feelings, moods and occupations, writes Rainer Maria Rilke in his essay on Auguste Rodin. The hands are the sculptor's eyes; but they are also organs for thought, as Heidegger suggests; '[the] hand's essence can never be determined, or explained, by its being an organ which can grasp [...]' Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that element [...]" (Pallasmaa, 2012: 60, 62). How to think the skin as an "organ for thought", as a hand of a hand, as hands extended? Just as every other part of our body, skin has a mind of its own. Because if forms and envelopes so many body parts and organs it is possible to perceive it as a multiple organ. Because if forms and envelopes the minds of so many body parts and organs it is also possible to perceive it as a multi-minded organ. The mind of the skin is both centralised and decentralised, localised and stretched. How to think the skin as a relational organ? Skin makes one hand become another hand; skin makes the hand become an eye: "our skin is capable of distinguishing a number of colours; we actually do see by our skin. All the senses, including vision, are extensions of the tactile sense; the senses are specialisations of skin tissue, and all sensory experiences are modes of touching, and thus related to tactility. Our contact with the world takes place at the boundary line of the self through specialised parts of our enveloping membrane" (Pallasmaa, 2012: 12).

²Fingering refers to bodying or to an ongoing process of forming of a finger. Fingering as being *always more than one finger* refers to unlimited modes of forming of a finger, as well as unlimited actualizations — physical, experiential and relational ones — of a finger. Finger, as understood here, is a processual body part; it is a verb (fingering), a dynamics, an activity.

Skin does not only give tactility to our visuality (eye becoming hand) but also relationality (hand becoming another hand or any other body part). As a membrane, skin is solid and liquid at the same time. Skin is characterized by its liquidity and relationality. On the level of a matter — skin flows and on the level of relation — skin is always becoming another skin. Skin of a skin of a skin of a skin of a skin of a skin. Liquidity of the skin can be studied with the help of a microscope. Microscope skin visualisation demonstrates how we have more than one skin, in terms of its texture. Therefore, the place of touch becomes a womb of all textural becomings of skin. Touch makes the skin. Touch breaks the skin. When touching and being touched its materiality, or more precisely, its liquidity, as well as its relationality is being transformed. As previously mentioned, there is *always more than one* skin, therefore, it is possible to distinguish skin as a matter, skin as a state, and skin as a movement. When touching, a hand flows in its materiality, state and movement. We do not only see, but we also move with our skin. Skin, as the first eye, informs the body on "how" to move, on how to arrive from one point to another. Being a skin is having eyes everywhere. Skin has a vision of its own, a vision before vision. Skin does not only have a mind and a vision, but also a perception of its own. How to rediscover the imperceptible perceptiveness of the skin? In the world of touch, everything is a verb: touching, bodying, skinning, handing — and that makes the singularity of touch. In the world of touch, everything is in a state of textural becoming. A skin becomes, a skin skins — in relation to ourselves and in relation to the other. Skinning of the skin as the process of one surface becoming another surface, one organ becoming another organ, one body becoming another body, one skin becoming another skin. A skin-with.




Image 1: microscopic image of outer ear skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 2: microscopic image of scalp skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 3: microscopic image of hand skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 4: microscopic image of foot skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 5: microscopic image of lip skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 6: microscopic image of back skin (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 7: microscopic images of different skins (made by Laura Potrovic)

Image 6 shows six different skins that make part of one skin. What we can conclude from looking at Image 6 is following: at the level of matter skin is a heterogeneous organ. Another important thing to notice is a question of the expressivity of matter. Skin expresses itself in different ways — depending on the body part it envelopes. We can, therefore, conclude how skin is heterogeneous at the level of its expression.

Before we learn to breathe, we learn to touch. Our first experience of life is the experience of touch; our first experience of being a body is given through the experience of touch: "[The skin] is the oldest and the most sensitive of our organs, our first medium of communication, and our most efficient protector [...] Even the transparent cornea of the eye is overlain by a layer of modified skin [...] Touch is the parent of our eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. It is the sense which became differentiated into the others, a fact that seems to be recognized in the age-old evaluation of touch as 'the mother of the senses'"(Montagu, in: Pallasmaa, 2012: 12).

Enveloping our entire body, from both the outside and the inside, skin is an organ that is one and many organs at the same time. More precisely, skin is an indeterminate organ, an unactualized organ, as well as our most mobile organ, constantly moving and being moved, becoming in and through movement. When don't we touch; when don't we skin? Do we spend a second of our life without touching or being touched, by the ground, our clothes, the air, the light, other being(s)? We are touching and being touched all the time, even in those cases when the act of touch appears as imperceptible (touching the air and being touched by it, or light, for example). Being both inner and outer organ at the same time, as well as being both in and on the body, we become our skin through multiple relations. From the point of view of our skin — what is the outside and what is the inside of our body; from the point of view of a touching hand — does the dichotomy between the outside and the inside exist? "The living lives at the limit of itself, on its limit... The characteristic polarity of life is at the level of the membrane; it is here that life exists in an essential manner, as an aspect of a dynamic topology which itself maintains the metastability by which it exists.... The entire content of internal space is topologically in contact with the content of external space at the limits of the living; there is, in fact, no distance in topology; the entire

mass of living matter contained in the internal space is actively present to the external world at the limit of the living. ... To belong to interiority does not mean to 'be inside', but to be on the 'in-side' of the limit.... At the level of the polarized membrane, internal past and external future face one another..." (Simondon, in: Deleuze, 2013: 106).

One of the limits we inhabit is our skin. Therefore, to touch is to move the inside of the outside, as well the outside of the inside. When two surfaces meet — what is their outside and what is their inside; where does one surface begin and where does it end; what are the edges of the touching body and the one being touched; where does our skin end and the one of the other begin? To live a life of a living being is to live as relational skin(s). The meeting between two surfaces, two skins, opens up the question of a relational body, body-between, or the one that emerges through touching. How to think the space between two touching bodies, two skins as two touching surfaces? How do we inhabit the skin-between, our relational skin, our becoming relational of the skin of the other, our skinning; where does it begin and end and who does it belong to?

A touching body is a "Body without Organs" (Artaud, 1948). To touch is to become aware that I am never yet fully formed. Your BwO coincides with my own" (Manning, 2006: 152). "A body can be anything. Unformed, a BwO seeks not its form but its potential. Touch operates as the directionality of this seeking. Touch takes place in the intensity of a movement-toward, the body becoming other through relation" (Manning, 2006: 144). In Deleuze's and Guattari's reading of Artaud, Body without Organs is that which involves the confrontation with the limit(s) of subjectivity, stratification, and the organism; that which unifies fragmented organs or parts of the body to produce an indeterminate organ or unactualized organs. According to Erin Manning, "touch involves a departure from organs *as* organs" (Manning, 2006: 155). The result of an experimentation of the body that undoes the organic association that organs have with one another or with their predetermining functions is the condition for new physical associations and functions.

How to think the skin itself as a Body without Organs? What makes the skin a Body without Organs is the following: skin is not just a functional, but also a kinetic organ, organ of movement; skin is a movement. Skin is also a relational organ — affecting and being affected. Being a skin involves the confrontation with the limits of our own organism. The skin is not defined in terms of a form, but kinetically and relationally. Skin is a relational score, skin-score, of all textual becomings of a moving body. On a level of its matter, skin is an indefinite organ. On a level of its texture, shape and size, skin is an indeterminate, as well as unactualized organ. On a

level of its movement, kinetically, skin is an infinite organ. On a level of its becomings, relationally, skin is an intensive organ. However, skin is not just extensive, or intensive, but skintensive; skintensity of a body signifies the relation of becoming intensive of a skin, its skinning through the intensity of touch.

How to study "choreo-anatomy" (Potrovic, 2016) of skin? How to dance our skin? Or, when is our skin not being danced? One way to explore the choreo-anatomy of skin is to dance-think the skin as plural, intermodal, relational, as skin-with, as well as skin-between. Another way to explore its choreo-anatomy is to dance what a skin can do, as well as become, in touch, through touch, as touch.

6 | EXPERIENTIAL BODY

6.1 EXPERIENTIAL BODY AS FORCE-FORM OF BECOMING

How to reconceptualize a moving body? How to reconceptualize the idea of individual body? One of the ways to reconceptualize the idea of individual body in movement is to see it as self-individuating system, as opposed to already individualized one. The body individuates through movement; movement *moves* the body from one phase of being to another. According to Simondon, the body is a relative fact, a phase of being. Every phase of being is co-constituted by two combined dimensions of process: individuation and the preindividual. Individuation and the preindividual cannot be thought separately, they are two sides of the same process. According to Manning, "individuation is a process of unfolding through a multiplicity of phases. What is preindividual is the phaseless excess — the more-than that envelops yet exceeds the nowness of the process in its unfolding. What is preindividual is the germ of potential in every activity. It can be thought as the force of becoming ... which is real and felt, but only in its effects" (Manning, 2012: 16, 17).

How does individuation unfold? The unfolding of individuation is carried by the movement; movement does not only carry the body from one phase of its being to another, but also from one of its unfoldings to another. The moving body is unfolding body. The body unfolds on multiple planes and through multiple phases — simultaneously. The plane of individuation is the plane of multiplicity of the body. Multiplicity in becoming. What makes the body a multiplicity in becoming is the preindividual — the force of more-than, the force of phaseless excess, the force of

¹Becoming is the central tenet of Nietzsche's cosmological theory of existence, appropriated from the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, that asserts continual process and denies religious, as well as scientific theories of existence which presume that, in one form or another, being may have a final state: "Straight at that mystic night in which was shrouded Anaximander's problem of becoming, walked Heraclitus of Ephesus and illuminated it by a divine stroke of lightning. 'Becoming' is what I contemplate", he exclaims [...] He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable 'indefinite'. And after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a second, far bolder negation: he altogether denied being. [...] Heraclitus proclaimed: 'I see nothing other than becoming. [...] You use names for things as though they rigidly, persistently endured; yet even the stream into which you step a second time is not the one you stepped into before'" (Nietzsche, 1998: 50—2).

becoming. Within the sphere of preindividual — it does not matter what a body is, but what it can become, and more importantly — *how* it becomes¹.

Simondon also conceived of "pre-individual fields" — "fields of tensions", "fields of potentials", "fields of more-than-one", "more-than-identity" and "more-than-unity" that make the individuation itself possible. Following the line of Simondon's thought — individuation is an always incomplete process, always leaving the excess of preindividual left-over. That excess is what makes possible all the future individuations. Furthermore, individuation always creates both an individual (one) and a collective subject (more-than-one), which individuate themselves together. The fact that individuation is an always incomplete process opens up the question of the ontology of incompleteness of a moving body, or furthermore, its heterogenesis² that is going to be discussed later on in this thesis.

Let's repeat and develop the following question: how does individuation unfold? The unfolding of individuation happens through dephasing. Therefore, individuation is not a linear, continuous process. According to Simondon, a phase is not a temporal moment that is simply replaced by another. There is never just one phase or one individuation, but overlapping phasings happening in nonlinear time. Dephasing is a multifaceted process undergoing a constant transformation. The transformation generated by the dephasing is what Simondon calls transduction, defined as a shift in level from individuation to individual, which is at the same time a shift that activates a new process or a new phase of a continuing process.

"Dephasings, seen from the point of view of the transduction, are at once how force takes form and how the rift in the continuity of an ongoing process is felt. Dephasing is about the activity of phases combining to the degree that they generate a turning point that resolves, momentarily, into this or that singular event or discrete occasion of experience — a remarkable point that shifts how an occasion continues to become. Dephasing is what activates what Whitehead calls the becoming of continuity³. In Eric

²In *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* and *Chaosmosis*, Guattari develops the notion of ontogenesis of machines and assemblages. Because of the heterogeneity of the components that make up the assemblage, Guattari calls this second ontology heterogenesis. Heterogenesis stands for the process of coming into being, understood as the emergence of order out of chaos as described by complexity theory: "A machinic assemblage, through its diverse components, extracts its consistency by crossing ontological thresholds, non-linear thresholds of irreversibility, ontological and phylogenetic thresholds, creative thresholds of heterogenesis and autopoiesis" (Guattari, 2012: 50).

³Robinson (2007) argues that one major difference between Whitehead and Deleuze is precisely that "Deleuze is committed to a continuity of becoming but Whitehead is committed to the idea of a becoming of continuity". For an attempt to revise Whitehead in the direction of a (more Bergsonian or Deleuzian) continuity of becoming, see Sha Xin Wei (2005).

Alliez's words, far from being the opposite of continuity, the break or interruption conditions this continuity: it presupposes or defines what it cuts into as an ideal continuity (Alliez and Goffey, 2011: 10). A body becomes "itself" in the break of dephasing" (Manning, 2012: 17,18).

Dephasings are not only the events of force⁴ taking form, but also a multifaceted process of body taking form. The moving body is a body taking form. Each dephasing leads into another event of force taking form, another bodying. To *body* (thought here as a verb) is to *dephase* from force to form to force. Within the process of dephasing the body is not the only one that becomes, but the phase, or more precisely, its phase(s) of being too. How does a phase become? The phase becomes through the process of combining and recombining until actualizing as a singular event of body taking form, an event of body-becoming. Therefore, the becoming of the phase can be thought as the becoming of the body; *how* the phase becomes is *how* the body takes form. Dephasings do not only generate the body, but also activate it — each dephasing denotes a shift from one mode of being to another, from one becoming to another⁵.

A body, as such, is a process shifting. A body, as such, can be considered an event. How does a body become an event? A body becomes an event through

⁴This term stems from Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche. The force is Nietzsche's term for the plurality of determined, conditioned, and quantitatively limited elements which produce the world, value, and qualities; the force is also that which contains quantity but cannot be definitively measured because its observable quality as well as its relative magnitude is always changing: "This world: a monster of force,[...] transformed as a whole which is untransformably large, [...] definitive force situated in defined space, and not space that would be 'empty' anywhere, rather as force everywhere, as a play of forces and force-waves simultaneously one and many [...], an ocean of forces storming and flooding within themselves [...]" (Nietzsche, 1922: 1067). In Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, the force is also that which, through necessary relation to other dominant and dominating forces, produces a living body, as well as active and reactive qualities of life: "Every relationship of forces constitutes a body — whether it is chemical, biological, social or political" (Deleuze, 2006: 40). In Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and affect, the force marks the relations determined by the will to power which exercise a capacity to affect and be affected: "The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected" (Deleuze, 2006: 57, 62).

⁵In Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, becoming stands for the form of repetition or state of being in eternal return, where being is never fixed (even when it appears to be so); any "sameness" and "similarity" (or link between cause and effect) is actually indicative of a continual process of change without an origin or destination: "What is the being inseparable from that which is becoming? Return is the being of that which becomes. Return is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming. The eternal return as law of becoming, as justice and as being (Deleuze, 2006: 23, 24). In Deleuze's reading of events — becoming constitutes the eternal time of the event. In accordance with Stoic logic, becoming is reversible insofar as it is considered in itself because it does not regress toward an earlier state or progress towards a final state. According to Deleuze: pure becoming [...] is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time — of future and past, of the day

the forces of agreement, as well as disagreement between processes or within a process of dephasing. The process of individuation can be also thought as a process of fielding. The body *fields* itself, or more precisely, more-than-itself, through the untapped tensions, potentials as well as becomings of preindividual. The relations between body's untapped tensions and potentials constitute its process of fielding, as

before and the day after, of more and less, of too much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect)" (Deleuze, 2004: 4, 2-3).

⁶In *Difference and Repetition* Gilles Deleuze defines remarkable points as shifting points or singularities.

⁷Throughout his writings, Deleuze examines the relationship between matter and time by problematizing the opposition between the organic and inorganic. He develops a concept of life based upon his notion of passive synthesis, and extends this concept to include notions of resistance which serve as an insurmountable origin and object of power (where life is encountered via the force of the Outside). Via Nietzsche, Deleuze characterizes "life" as that which is inevitably distorted and limited by knowledge and representation, and with Guattari, emphasizes the role of intensity as well as the Blanchotian notion of the impersonal and incessant (such that life is not something possessed by individuals). In Bergson, life stands for the *Élan Vital* (vital impetus) which involves a creative development and evolution that cannot be reduced to mechanic or teleological theories and tends toward diversity and complexity. According to Bergson: "The role of life is to insert some indetermination into matter. Indeterminate, i.e. unforeseeable, are the forms it creates in the course of its evolution. [...] the main energy of the vital impulse has been spent in creating apparatus of this kind [...]" (Bergson, 1911: 126). In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, life stands for the actualization of the virtual, or the insertion of duration into matter, as well as differentiation: "It is as if Life were merged into the very movement of differentiation, in ramified series [...]. Duration, to be precise, is called life when it appears in this movement. Why is differentiation 'actualization'? Because it presupposes a unity, a virtual primordial totality that is dissociated according to the lines of differentiation (Deleuze, 1990: 94—5). In Deleuze's explanation of time (and reading of Bergson), life stands for matter (organic and/or psycho-organic) that is contracted to form the present in time, or the first passive synthesis. Furthermore, life is matter which urgently relates the body to its milieu as a problem (the form of which is a response to the problem): "Each line of life is related to a type of matter that is not merely an external environment but in terms of which the living being manufactures a body, a form, for itself. This is why the living being in relation to matter appears primarily as the stating of a problem, and the capacity to solve problems: The construction of an eye, for example, is primarily the solution to a problem posed in terms of light" (Deleuze, 1990: 103). In Deleuze's reading of both Nietzsche and Foucault, life is thought as a set of non-organic forces of resistance (to power, reason, death, dominating forces, subjugation, etc.), expressed by virtue of thought or critique: "Life becomes resistance to power when[ever] power takes life as its object. [...] resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths of a particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life [...]? (Deleuze, 2006: 77, 92—3). Furthermore, in Deleuze's explanation of immanence, life is thought as the impersonal and yet qualitatively singular nature of the subject; haecceity: "The singularities and the events that constitute a life coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to it [...] a singular life might do without any individuality [...]. For example, very small children [...] have hardly any individuality, but they have singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face, not subjective qualities" (Deleuze, 2005: 29—30). Finally, in Deleuze's analysis of art, life stands for a destratified, unstructured, and vital rendering of forces that is distinct from the organic form (or organism) in which it emerges: "[T]he organism is not life, it is what imprisons life. The body is completely living, and yet non-organic" (Deleuze, 2003: 45).

well as its field of becoming. Through individuation — dephasing — transduction, where the force becomes form to become force once more, the singular event of a form-taking emerges. The process of form-taking cannot be abstracted from the processes of individuation, dephasing and transduction or those from which it has emerged. What emerges as a body is the relational node of its processes on multiple levels. More precisely, a body is the relational node of the following processes:

- combined process of individuation and the preindividual;
- processes of individuation — dephasing — transduction;
- tensions, potentials, becomings, fields of more-than.

What we know as "a body" is the culmination of all previously mentioned processes. A body as a relational node integrates all of those processes and emerges through them, in continuity and discontinuity, as a remarkable point⁶ in becoming.

Gilbert Simondon liberates the body from the predetermination of a form, demonstrating how a body is alive across interphasings. Gilles Deleuze has a term for the force that is activated across the differential processes of interphasing. Deleuze calls it *a life*⁷, a life that extends beyond the idea of organic to touch on the force of Becoming that accompanies all processes, all phases. "*A life* is another term for the preindividual; it is what accompanies, what remains unresolved, in the taking of form, what defines the hierarchy of the organic with respect to the inorganic in the organization of what we commonly understand as 'life'. This field of experience is alive with bodyings, each of which are nodes of relation — ecologies — actively co-composing with the force of the impersonal *a life* that flows through them" (Manning, 2012: 20). The body as more-than is vitalist only in the sense that it never exists in the negative; it is productive, infinitely, of more life. "Do you know what Life is to me? A monster of energy ... that does not expend itself, but only transforms itself. A play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many ...; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing" (Nietzsche, 1968: 549-550). The concept of *a life* liberates the body from the predetermination of a form making it a force. The body as a force folds and unfolds as *a life* running through it⁸. The excess of *a life* is the origin of body's movement because its unresolvedness, its more-than, makes the body move from one form to another, from one phase to another, from one

⁸Nietzsche presented a vision of life seen as a conflict between singular and antagonistic forces. Deleuze's use of the concept of "life" in his reading of Nietzsche is neither biological nor humanist; life is neither matter (as in biologism) nor the proper form or end of matter (as in humanism or vitalism). For Nietzsche, life is a power of singularisation; a power to create

becoming to another. Since *a life* can never be exhausted the body can never be finished or completed. *A life* is what makes the body move and become, not a form, but a force, a force of infinitely more, without the beginning or the end, across its interphasings. *A life*, or Nietzsche's monster of energy, cannot be expended, but only transformed — from force to form to force. The moving body is *a life* taking form and transforming it with each and every movement. *A life* is a force of becoming that cannot be controlled, stopped, measured or represented, but only felt as the uncontrollable, unstoppable, immeasurable and unrepresentable productive force of infinitely more life.

When talking about the body "moving from one form to another, from one phase to another, from one becoming to another" it is important not to misunderstand the idea of movement as displacement and movement as becoming. Within the idea of movement as displacement — a body displaces itself, it changes the position, it moves from point A to point B. Within the idea of movement as becoming — a body cannot displace itself, change the position or move from point A to point B because fixed points, or positions, as well as bodies, do not exist. Point A does not transform into point B; there is no displacement here. Becoming takes place *between* point A and point B, in the zone of indetermination. Therefore, we are exploring the relations of becoming B of A and becoming A of B, the relations that occupy the space of in-betweenness. When the moving body takes a form that form is never predetermined. The process of taking form is a double process; it is a process of in-forming of both the body and the form: the form and the body meet *between* and co-become. In the encounter with the body the form becomes (becoming-body of the form) as well the body itself — encountering the form through its becoming (becoming-form of the body).

How to think the relation between individuation and affects? Affect does not hold onto being, but disperses it. Affect also activates the thresholds of dispersal of being — continuously. To activate the threshold is to create a new field, to propel

differences. Phenomena, organisms, societies and States are nothing other than the expression of particular configurations of forces. One of Nietzsche's most influential contributions to the understanding of life, consciousness and moral thought was to conceive of each of them as the effect of a primary distinction between active and reactive forces. Nietzsche's diagnosis of the connection between reactive formations such as resentment, bad conscience and the ascetic ideal on one hand, and modes of subjectivity and forms of life on the other had a profound impression upon Deleuze's political thought. Also, Nietzsche's identification of Will to Power as the basis for a positive vision of life influenced Deleuze's elaboration of an immanent and anti-humanist mode of philosophy. Furthermore, the postulation of such an immanent principle — a principle that accepts nothing other than life — enables thought to focus upon the production and legitimation of divisions between different forms of life. Life, Nietzsche argues, is constituted by a common and inexhaustible striving for power; human life (with its regulative norms, moral judgements and social truths) is merely a form through which

a dephasing. "In its dispersal of being, affect does not undermine the possibility of being. It multiplies it at its collective limit where there is never one single possible state of being's achievement" (Simondon, 1989: 215). Affect multiplies the possibility of being to the point where there is no predetermining "I". "This does not mean that affect cannot give way to an occasion that resolves into the specificity of an "I", but that the "I" is the afterthought of a complex affective process that will always nonetheless, to some degree, retain the collectivity at the heart of its having come-to-be" (Manning, 2012: 28).

The being, always coming-to-be and yet-to-come, is not only activated by the threshold, but is a threshold: "The self is a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities⁹, as in Rimbaud's formula 'I is another'" (Deleuze and Guattari, in: Smith, 1997: xxx). The being-in-process, or more precisely, being as becoming, is always placed between two multiplicities, yet one term does not become the other; the becoming is something *between* the two, and what is *between* the two is called by Deleuze a pure affect. Therefore, becoming does not mean becoming the other, but becoming-other. Furthermore, becoming is defined as affect (affect defines the body's capacity to exist and its power to act; affect is beyond affection, similar to percept always exceeding a simple perception). The non-place in-between acts as a gap, or differentiator, introducing an element of discontinuity in the continuous process of

life passes. Nietzschean philosophy, which envisaged a plurality of forces acting upon and being affected by each other, and in which the quantity of power constituted the differential element between forces, remained of lasting importance to Deleuze's own philosophy of life.

⁹According to Deleuze: "There are many theories in philosophy that combine the one and the multiple. [...] We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis). Or else we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into non-being and produces becoming. The passages where Bergson condemns this movement of abstract thought are among the best in his oeuvre" (Deleuze, 1990: 44). Furthermore: "In this Riemannian usage of the word 'multiplicity' (taken up by Husserl, and again by Bergson) the utmost importance must be attached to the substantive form: multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system (Deleuze, 2004: 230). Multiplicity also marks the manner in which subjects are not unified with, or subjected to, a dominating signifier, power, object, or any supplementary dimension: "Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudo multiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. [...] A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 8, 8). Multiplicity is indicative of becoming: "packs, or multiplicities, continually transform themselves into each other, cross over into each other. [...] This is not surprising, since becoming and multiplicity are the same thing. A multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor by a centre of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it has [...]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 274—5, 249).

becoming and allowing the difference to actively intervene. Becoming, while "taking place" in a gap, created by non-place, is: "an extreme contiguity within coupling of two sensations without resemblance or, on the contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in a single reflection. It is a zone of indetermination, of

¹⁰In *A Thousand Plateaus*: "Finally, becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filiation... It concerns alliance. If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is the domain of *symbioses* that brings into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms such as wasp-orchid" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 238). It is possible to connect this to the thoughts of "niche construction" and "life cycle" in developmental systems theory (DST) (Oyama, 2000). "Niche construction" looks to the way organisms actively shape the environment and, thus, the evolutionary selection pressures for themselves and their offspring. Therefore, evolution should be seen as the change in organism-environment systems, that is, the organism in its constructed niche. It is the becoming of the organism-in-its-niche that needs to be thought as the unit of evolution (e.g. the wasp-orchid). The notion of life cycle as the unit of evolution encompassing intranuclear, cytoplasmic, organic, and extra-somatic elements comes close to what Deleuze and Guattari refer to above as "symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms". Furthermore, the weak sense of biological novelty is that which does result in a substantial filiation, that is, organisms with descendants. The emphasis is still on heterogenous elements entering a symbiosis, but the result has organismic form. The connection here is with the work of Lynn Margulis (1998) who posits that symbiosis, rather than mutation, is the most important source of variation upon which natural selection works. The most famous example is mitochondrial capture at the origin of eukaryotic cells. Margulis claims that mitochondria were previously independent aerobic bacteria engulfed by anaerobic (proto-nucleated) bacteria; eukaryotic cells thus formed produce the lineage for all multicellular organisms. Serial endosymbiosis short-circuits the strict neo-Darwinist doctrine of mutation as origin of variation upon which we find selection of slight adaptations. Even though there is organismic filiation, Margulis's notion of evolution via the symbiosis of different organisms seems at least in line with the spirit of what Deleuze and Guattari call "involution" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 238-9). In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze argues that individuation precedes differentiation. Individuation stands for real material development; differentiation is the relation of differences to each other, that is, how one individuation relates to another. To make the connection with West-Eberhard, let's recall how developmental plasticity stands for the creativity of the phenotype and environment (not the genotype and environment). For example, when an adaptive phenotypic change has a genetic component, the distributed networks regulating gene expression (arguably extending to the entire life cycle) for this adaptive phenotypic variant will now be selected (if the environmental change reliably recurs). Furthermore, these accommodated or now newly/creatively expressed networks regulating gene expression were only virtual, that is, only potentials of the pre-existing but unexpressed genetic variation. It is possible to see here the meaning of West-Eberhard's phrase that gene networks are followers as opposed to leaders in evolution. It is the developmental plasticity (in Deleuze's terms, "intensive processes of individuation") that takes the lead and brings out previously unexpressed potentials of hereditary DNA (strings of nucleotides on chromosomes), or, more precisely, they bring out their potential to take part in new regulatory gene networks. The potential of hereditary DNA to take part in new gene expression networks is 1) dependent on the distributed system (up to the life cycle) and 2) not preformed, in the sense that there is no program in the DNA that determines the actualisation of the potential for these new networks. The virtual realm of potential networks regulating gene expression is not self-determining, but it is determined on the spot, each time, by the individuation process. Therefore, it is the individuation process that takes the lead in creatively producing biological novelty.

indiscernibility, as if things, beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby Dick ...) endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation. This is what is called an affect" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 173).

What affect, as a zone of indetermination creates is a body-in-process. The body-in-process, always coming-to-be and yet-to-come, it is an event of bodying the line and not the point, a body—in-making. The rhizomatic line or the line of becoming "no longer goes from one point to another", but instead is "between points, in their midst" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 298). More precisely: "[a] line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes *between* points, it comes up through the middle. ... A line of becoming has only a middle. The middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it is the absolute speed of movement. A becoming is neither one nor two; ... it is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent running perpendicular to both. ... The line or block of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared deterritorialization: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid's reproductive system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 293).

Although the wasp and the orchid belong to quite different realms, the deterritorialization that they share allows them to find a common zone of proximity. It is in such a zone of proximity, of uncertainty, or of indetermination that becomings occur. Becomings are not related to resemblance, metaphor, analogy, personification, production of a new identity, historicism, evolutionism¹⁰, etc. Rather, becomings aim at finding a "zone of proximity" between things. "To become", writes Deleuze, "is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, *Mimesis*) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule — neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and non-preexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form" (Deleuze, 1997: 1). Becoming implies a series of assemblages (*agencements*) between deterritorializing forces circulating on the edge of the human and the non-human in order to make them indiscernible. Becomings are passages creating other passages. Bodies are becomings creating other becomings. The form, as well as the formation of the body never precedes this zone of proximity. It is in such a zone of proximity, of uncertainty, or of indetermination that the body, or more precisely, bodies, become a force in order to take the form once more. This zone of proximity, this zone of in-between, is where the body-in-making takes its form.

The body-in-making never reaches its final points, but always *becomes* between the points. The body-in-making is always more than one point and is always becoming more than one point¹¹. It is a becoming of one point becoming another point and becoming of that point becoming numerous other points. As previously mentioned, it is a line, a line of becoming¹². How does the body become a line? It becomes a line through bodying the space of tensions, possibilities and more-than between the two points. The body-in-making never reaches those points, but passes through them, as a force of becoming. It is in-between the force and form; it is a force that takes the form and breaks the form. The body-in-making is a form in becoming, always deterritorialized by its force. It is the assemblage (*agencement*) of forces taking and breaking form, forms in becoming and most importantly — bodies. The body-in-making is always more-than one body — being the assemblage (*agencement*) of potential bodies, never fully actualized bodies, as well as becoming bodies. We are never just one body. We are bodies and we *body* (verb) forth our becomings.

The line of becoming can also be interpreted as a line of individuation (Simondon) or subjectivation (Foucault) of the body. Subjectivation, functioning as a creative potential quite close to the Foucauldian "art of oneself that's the exact opposite of oneself" (Deleuze, 1995: 115) "has little to do with any subject. It has to do, rather, with an electric or magnetic field, an individuation taking place through intensities, fields ..., it has to do with individuated fields, not persons or identities. It's what Foucault, elsewhere, calls 'passion'" (Deleuze, 1995: 93).

As in Simondon's theory of individuation, subjectivation precedes the subject in the same way as the process of individuation precedes the creation of the individual¹³. The nature of the body always being more-than one can also be rediscovered through

¹¹The meaning of "point" here is that of a static entity. Point can be considered as static in terms of its position. It can also be compared to idea of "organism" whose organization is preformed and therefore static.

¹²The meaning of "line" here is that of a dynamic entity. Line can be considered as dynamic entity in terms of its position. It can also be compared to idea of "body without organism" whose organization is performed — here and how — and therefore dynamic.

¹³According to Simondon, "Individuation corresponds to the appearance of stages in the being, which are the stages of the being. It is not a mere isolated consequence arising as a by-product of becoming, but this very process itself as it unfolds; it can be understood only by taking into account this initial supersaturation of the being, at first homogeneous and static [*sans devenir*], then soon after adopting a certain structure and becoming—and in so doing, bringing about the emergence of both individual and milieu—following a course [*devenir*] in which preliminary tensions are resolved but also preserved in the shape of the ensuing structure; in a certain sense, it could be said that the sole principle by which we can be guided is that of the conservation of being through becoming" (Simondon, 1992: 301). For more information see "The Genesis of the Individual", in Jonathan Crary & Sanford Kwinter (eds.), *Incorporations*, New York: Zone Books, 1992, 297—319.

the previous quote. The concept of field can help us think the body as more-than one. In Deleuze, the concept of field is understood as a site of forces, relations, multiplicities. More importantly, "the field" is never understood as a noun, but a verb — fielding. It is the site where forces, relations and multiplicities *field* themselves. The body as a field is electric, magnetic, vibrational, intense, relational. In other words — the body fields itself on electric, magnetic, vibrational, intense, relational levels. The body is multiple and multiphased.

According to Manning: "The body is a multiphased relation that defines itself through the transversality expressive in the practice of becoming. Its project is to move life to its limit and at this limit, where the outside folds in, to express, again, differently. The body is infinitely variable, not subject but verb. And as verb it persists, infinitely" (Manning, 2012: 29). The body is not the what but the *how* of its expression¹⁴. Furthermore, it is not the expression, but the expressivity of its relation. The expressivity of the relation defines what a body can do, as well as become. Thinking the body as an expression of something or someone makes it a noun; thinking the body as a force-field of expressivity makes it a verb. The body worlds, fields, bodies forth its expressivity: "Self is a modality, a singularity on the plane of individuation — always on the way toward new foldings. These foldings bring into appearance not a fully constituted human, already — contained, but co-constitutive strata of matter, content, form, substance, and expression. The self is not contained. It is a fold of immanent expressivity" (Manning, 2012: 3). The concept of the fold¹⁵ allows us to think about the production of subjectivity, and ultimately about the possibilities

¹⁴Nietzsche's work becomes central to Deleuze through Nietzsche's reworking of the Spinozist idea of expressivism. More precisely, expressivism demands that we no longer conceive of an event as a predicate attached to a prior substance; there is not a matter or uniform substance which *then* becomes or takes on a form or quality. Rather, expressivism suggests that there is nothing other than the becoming of specific and singular qualities; and these qualities or events do not need to be related back to some neutral ground or substance. Deleuze claims that Nietzsche is the first philosopher to consider a world composed of these "pre-personal singularities". As Nietzsche suggests, we do not need to relate actions back to a subject or "doer", nor do we need to see events as effects or as having a pre-existing cause. Previously mentioned ideas provided Deleuze with a way of developing a philosophy of immanence and an understanding of being as univocity. Furthermore, if there is not a substance which *then* becomes, or a substance which *then* takes on qualities, it follows that there is no dualist distinction between being and becoming, or identity and difference. Therefore, there is no prior ground, unity or substance which *then* differentiates itself and becomes; instead there is only a univocal field of differences. Difference conceived in this way is not *difference from* some original unity. If there is only one univocal being, then differences themselves become primary and constitutive forces. Furthermore, there is not a hierarchy in which an original unity or being then becomes; there is an original becoming which expresses itself in the multiplicity of events.

¹⁵The fold is a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity — those that presume a simple interiority and exteriority (surface and depth) — for the fold announces that the inside is

for, and production of, non-human forms of subjectivity. Within the realm of fold, the plane of individuation constitutes itself not only throughout the processes of folding and unfolding, but more importantly, in-folding. While folding and unfolding represent two opposite directions of one and the same process, in-folding is what occupies their zone of proximity. The body that in-folds is the body exploring the limits of its own expressivity. The body that in-folds is the body that is taking its simultaneous processes of coming-to-fold and not-yet-to-unfold to the limit.

To think individuation "it is necessary to consider being not as substance, matter or form, but as a tensile oversaturated system beyond the level of unity" (Simondon 1995: 23). Being is a metastable system continuously individuating itself. Being is also a permeable system, individuating itself through the relation with the other. The metastability and permeability of being's system are affected by the process of informing of the system itself: "information supposes a change in the phase of a system, since it supposes a first preindividual state that individuates according to the discovered organization" (Simondon, 1989: 22). Furthermore, "Information is thought as an internal resonance of a system in the process of individuating, the power radiating from one domain of individuation to another" (Combes, 1999: 105). Information is that which circulates between the multiple poles of being — creating a certain possibility of being, or in Bateson's words, it is "a difference which makes a difference". By activating the coupling of force and form information makes the body a site for becoming. By supposing a change in the phase of system information also activates a singular form-taking. The moving body is an ongoing process of information, composite and compositional one, that singularly resolves but only long enough to activate new phasings. Bodying is the complex process continuously informed and informing by the effect of singular form-taking.

However, information does not presuppose an already existing matter-form. "Information creates the potential for an immanent organization that activates the body's coming to be this or that and its deforming into a field of relation, an ecology of a body-becoming. Becoming is not pure continuity. It is continuous dephasing, carrying a process across thresholds. The process is nonlinear, its field the topological surface of life always in co-composition with the forces of a life" (Manning, 2012: 20). Furthermore, "a body does not evolve according to a past becoming

nothing more than a fold of the outside. The fold also represents one's relation to oneself. The Greeks were the first to discover the technique of folding or of "self mastery" by inventing subjectivation or the self-production of one's subjectivity. This gives the fold an ethical dimension, but also a political one. As Deleuze remarks, the emergence of new kinds of struggle inevitably also involves the production of new kinds of subjectivity and therefore — new kinds of fold.

present becoming future, nor does it evolve in a pure phylogeny. Life in-formed is life in-forming, coursing through the 'between-times', the 'between-moments' of its bursts into coupling, in collusion" (Deleuze, 2007: 391). Information is what activates body's becomings; information is what activates the plane of immanent organization as well as its actualization. More importantly, what information activates within the plane of immanent organization is precisely the infinity of its modes of actualization. Information is the *how* of body's organization and that *how* is always more-than one *how*; it is always plural. The process of in-forming is the process of coming into this or that form, as well as departing from it into the pure potential of being. The being that in-forms is always more-than one, it is "singular-plural", as Nancy would say. The body that in-forms is not a body that belongs to one being — it is an ecology. The ecology that in-forms does not belong to the finite modes of being, but to the infinite modes of becoming. The body as a metastable, permeable system is an ecology in becoming.

The forces cursing through this ecology are the forces of *a life*: "A *life* does not come once and for all on the scene of the actual. It resonates on the cusp of the living, affective in tone. A *life* is experienced as the *feeling* of life welling across its dephasings. Think feeling here in the Whiteheadian sense, as propulsor to experience, always in the realm of the impersonal. This is not human feeling or emotion. It is affective tonality. It is the generative force, singular to this event, that moves the event toward its resolution. Each occasion has a tone, a singular expressivity, an enjoyment, as Whitehead would say. A *life* is how the preindividual returns as feeling onto life's topological surface of becoming. Whitehead's notion of feeling is allied to the Spinozean/Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of affect, both of which are intimately connected to the concept of *a life* and to the preindividual. The concept of feeling reminds us not to place affect within a schema of linear phases and already-formed bodies. Feeling is not attached to a form already-taken, nor is it an afterthought to a preexisting process. Feeling is how an occasion enjoys its coming into what Whitehead calls 'subjective form'. Feeling is the force that moves an event to reach its concrescence. Feeling is also what outlives it, always still resonating. This suggests that any process that occasions this or that experience must be motivated by a certain affective quality. This affective quality is a feeling-with that colors experience in the making. There is no body-emergent separate from the quality of its emergence" (Manning, 2012: 20, 21). A *life* is not limited to the organic. A *life* is that which spreads, not from the organic to the inorganic, but runs between them, an impersonal force of contraction/dilation that characterizes events, as much the events characterize life itself. Both organic and inorganic distinguish life as a kind of contained dynamism, a dynamism within a

porous boundary. Both organic and inorganic constitute *a life* as a complex folding of the chemical and the physical, a folding that reveals something not given within the chemical and physical, something new, an emergence. *A life* is the relation propelled by the force of in-formation, it is the tendencies, habits and attunements, as well as the appetition, that activate the singularity of this or that folding or unfolding process. *A life* is affective in tone because it does not belong to the individual nor it can be felt as individual life: "... the life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens..." (Deleuze, 2001: 28). We don't possess or live *a life*, we tune into it. What *a life* asserts is the primacy of experience and process, but experience and process not of and for a subject or object but in and of themselves in constant, or more precisely, processual variation. William James calls this pure experience: "Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges ... one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions... Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected" (James, 1912: 87). For Deleuze, the field of *a life* is one of the relationality of sensations; it is the passage from one sensation to another rather than the sensations themselves. *A life* is a life in becoming or the one coursing between-times and between-moments: "This indefinite life does not itself have moments..." (Deleuze, 2001: 28). A life is made up of both indefinites ("a") and singularities ("thisness")¹⁶. These indefinites are determined only by immanence; their immanence is their eventness. Passing from one plane of immanence to another is passing from one mode of eventness to another. *A life* is a life in process, a life that is all around — conjured out of relations and more-than the subject, yet passing through the subject — as if a subject were a momentary individuation of all that is passing through and around it.

The question is how life as a field of resonance carried by the appetition, the enjoyment of a process, the desire for the more-than, is connected to the event in its actuality. This question evokes, as well as remains an unresolvable tension in experience. On the one hand, there is the thisness of an occasion's resolution into this or that form. This resolution depends on an event constituting itself, or more precisely, *how* is the event constituting itself from the larger field of experience. "The *how* of the in-act is the more interesting and complex issue. For it is what consistently outlives the actual as defined by this or that singular expression of composition that

¹⁶Haecceity (from the Latin *haecceitas*, which translates as "thisness") is a term from medieval scholastic philosophy, first coined by followers of Duns Scotus to denote a concept that he seems to have originated: the discrete qualities, properties or characteristics of a thing that make it a *particular* thing. Haecceity is a literal translation of the equivalent term in Aristotle's Greek *to ti esti* or "the what (it) is."

touches on how *a life* courses through this life. Life is always about a double capture, on the one hand, it is the force of life-living that exceeds this or that life, and on the other, it is the monadic event of a singular set of conditions in momentary collusion. Life is always between. Too often, life is conceived as that which frames the already constituted life as human, life as organic. Life as defined here in no way privileges the human. Nor is it constituted as an envelope for experience. Life is life-living, in act, replete with the indefinable force of *a life* coursing through it. Life is a complex of feeling, an ecology not reducible to its data, to its content or its form-takings. Life is the plurality of becoming as felt, a plurality not of many parts, this would place the plural below the category of being, but a plurality at the very level of becoming, a multiplicity in act. Life as such, this life is known through the dephasings of processes of individuation. Yet each dephasing also activates a germ of force, a more-than of this life. Every life-welling carries within itself both the activity of its emergence in the now of experience and the seeds of its having-been many-phased: an actual particle has its virtual double, which barely diverges from it at all (Deleuze, 1997: 150), a collusion of the remarkable point with the associated milieu of relation. Life, a hunger for difference, an appetite for the more-than" (Manning, 2012: 21, 22).

Life that is always between is culminating in the body that is always between — the force and the form, one bodying and another. The same way life-living exceeds this or that life, body-bodying exceeds this or that body. Body-bodying is the indefinable force of singular form-taking. However, it is always more-than one form, or in other words, body-bodying always takes more-than one form culminating in the multiplicity of becoming. In his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze takes note of Nietzsche's point of departure: "What is the body? ... Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon, a 'unity of domination'" (Deleuze, 1983: 40).

The internal dynamism of the body is Nietzsche's point of departure, as well as Spinoza's. From a Spinozistic point of view, Deleuze attempts to show how Nietzsche puts to the fore a philosophy of immanence by seeing the body as the originary stratum of forces. Forces of life emanate from the body making it a unified multiplicity, an assemblage of forces. Bodies, furthermore, are understood as "singularities" (each body/force is different and irreducible in relation to other bodies/forces). To *body* (verb) is to live the difference producing another difference. Bodies are not singular; bodies are singularities. Singularities or remarkable points are shifting points. Bodies are singularities producing other singularities. Bodies are forces producing other forces. Bodies are shifting points producing other shifting points of life-living. Body-bodying and life-living — are two parallel processes, without the beginning or

the end, bodying us, living us, taking us to the limit. What takes the body to its limit is the concept of the Body without Organs: "You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 150). Within the experimental practice the Body without Organs seeks to affirm itself to the full extent of what it can do (a concept that Deleuze develops in his discussions of Spinoza's *conatus*, and Nietzsche's doctrine of active forces). More precisely, this means pushing a force, or a practice, to its limits, and confronting the Body without Organs as ultimate limit.

6.2 BODY AS EVENT OF EMERGING-WITH: A LURE FOR FEELING

For Whitehead, the body is a society. What does that mean? In order to examine that idea more precisely, we will need to introduce some other originating concepts coming from Whitehead. Whitehead distinguishes between *occasions* and *events*, and between *entities* and *societies*. He uses the term event in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions or ultimate components of reality. "An actual occasion is the limiting type of an event with only one member" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 73). At the limit, an event may be only one particular occasion, a single incident of becoming. More generally, an event is a group of such incidents, a multiplicity of becomings: what Whitehead calls a *nexus*. A nexus is "a particular fact of togetherness among actual entities" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 20); that is to say, it is a mathematical set of occasions, contiguous in space and time, or otherwise adhering to one another. When the elements of a nexus are united, not just by contiguity, but also by a "defining characteristic" that is common to all of them, and that they have all "inherited" from one another, or acquired by a common process, is what Whitehead calls a society (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 34). A society is "self-sustaining; in other words ... it is its own reason... The real actual things that endure, and that we encounter in everyday experience, are all societies" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 203-204). Whitehead sometimes also calls them "enduring objects" (Whitehead: 1929/1978: 35, 109). "Cleopatra's Needle is a society, or an enduring object; for that matter, so am I myself" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 161).

In short, an "occasion" is the process by which anything becomes, while an "event" — applying to a nexus or a society — is an extensive set, or a temporal series, of such occasions. An actual occasion is what Deleuze calls a singularity: a point of inflection or of discontinuous transformation. No actual occasion comes into being *ex nihilo*, but inherits its "data" from past occasions. However, each actual occasion also comes into being through self-creation, or *causa sui*, because of the way it treats these pre-existing data or prior occasions. Each actual occasion has its own singular coming-into-being. Therefore, no occasion is the same as any other, but each occasion introduces something new into the world through its singular form-taking. Each occasion, taken in itself, is a quantum: a discrete, indivisible unit of becoming. Each occasion has a limitation: once an occasion happens, it is already over, already dead. Once it has reached its final "satisfaction", it no longer has any vital power. According to Whitehead, "an actual occasion ... never changes, it only becomes and perishes" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 204). The perished occasion subsists only as a "datum" or raw

material that any subsequent occasion may take up in order to transform it in a new process of self-creation.

Apart from the immediate becoming and perishing of actual occasions, there is also the notion of change. Change can be understood as a passage *between* occasions, or as the "route of inheritance" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 279) from one incident of becoming to another. Furthermore, change is the mark of an event. According to Whitehead: "The fundamental meaning of the notion of 'change' is the difference between actual occasions comprised in some determinate event" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 73, 80). Since each actual occasion is atomistic and self-contained, and events only arise in the passage between them, there is "no continuity of becoming, but only a becoming of continuity"¹⁷ (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 35). Becoming is not continuous, because each occasion, each act of becoming, is unique: a "production of novelty" that is also a new form of "concrete togetherness" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 21), or what Whitehead calls a *concrescence*. The event of something new being added to the universe marks a radical break with whatever was there before. Continuity always has to *become*, precisely because it is never given in advance. The continuity implied by the existence of an enduring object — such as Cleopatra's Needle, a famous monument, or my own being — is something that always needs to be actively produced. Nothing comes into being once and for all, as well as nothing just sustains itself in being. Rather, an object can only endure through the continuous self-renewal and self-creation. The acts of self-renewal, as well as self-creating are considered as events.

Furthermore, for Whitehead, everything is an event. The world, Whitehead says, is made of events, and nothing but events: happenings rather than things, verbs rather than nouns, processes rather than substances. Becoming is the deepest dimension of being. Even a seemingly solid and permanent object is an event; or more precisely, a multiplicity and a series of events. Whitehead gives the example of Cleopatra's Needle, the monument on the Victoria Embankment in London (Whitehead, 1920/2004: 165). Following the line of Whitehead's thought — this monument is not just there. Cleopatra's Needle has a history: its granite was sculpted by human hands sometime

¹⁷According to Keith Robinson (2007), one major difference between Whitehead and Deleuze is precisely that "Deleuze is committed to a continuity of becoming but Whitehead is committed to the idea of a becoming of continuity". The problem for both thinkers is how to resolve the conflicting claims of unity and multiplicity, or how to achieve what Deleuze and Guattari call "the magic formula we all seek — PLURALISM = MONISM" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 20). Deleuze, following Spinoza and Bergson, opts for radical continuity, and accordingly leans towards monism more than Whitehead, whose quantum theory of events puts more of an emphasis on irreducible plurality.

around 1450 BC, it was moved from Heliopolis to Alexandria in 12 BC, and again from Alexandria to London in 1877-1878 AD. Some day, no doubt, it will be destroyed, or otherwise cease to exist. But for Whitehead, there is much more to it than that. Cleopatra's Needle is not just a solid, impassive object representing grand historical events. Rather, it is eventful at every moment. From second to second, even as it stands seemingly motionless, Cleopatra's Needle is actively *happening*. It never remains the same: "A physicist who looks on that part of the life of nature as a dance of electrons, will tell you that daily it has lost some molecules and gained others, and even the plain man can see that it gets dirtier and is occasionally washed" (Whitehead, 1920/2004: 165). At every instant, Cleopatra's Needle is an event: a renewal, a novelty, a creation in becoming.

Furthermore, at every moment, the continuing existence of Cleopatra's Needle is a new event. We can't encounter the same obelisk twice. The pure material existence of Cleopatra's Needle is an event, as well as our perception of the Needle. More precisely, our perception of Cleopatra's Needle is renewed and recreated with each and every encounter. "At any given instant, my encounter with the Needle is itself an event" (Whitehead, 1920/2004: 169). Encountering the monument becomes an event of perceiving it in a different way: "This encounter might take the form of my surprise at seeing the Needle for the first time; of my close scrutiny of its aesthetic features; of my barely conscious recognition of it as I walk negligently by; of the pain in my forehead, as I knock against it, without looking; of my vague memory of having seen it years ago; or even, if I have never been to London, of my reading about it in Whitehead's book. Each of these encounters is a fresh event; and each of the selves to which it happens is also a fresh event. Perceiving the Needle is not something that happens to me as an already-constituted subject; but rather something that constitutes me anew as a subject. Or, as Whitehead likes to put it, I am less the subject of this event than I am its *superject*, the remnant it leaves behind. I am an entity that "emerges from the world" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 88), rather than one that projects towards the world, or that phenomenologically "intends" it (Shaviro, 2009: 19, 20). For Whitehead, events do not "happen to" things, but events themselves *are* the only things. More precisely, an event is not "one of (the thing's) predicates", but the very thing itself. Body does not only emerge from the world, but more importantly, it emerges-with the world. The body that I am is an action of emerging-with the world, here and now. The body is an event of emerging-with.

For Whitehead, there is nothing besides the modes. There is no unified substance that subsumes the modes — not even immanently. Everything is *natura naturata* as well as *natura naturans*, "at once a creature of creativity and a condition for creativity"

(Whitehead, 1929/1978: 31). Everything shares this double character. Within itself, every individual "actual entity satisfies Spinoza's notion of substance: it is *causa sui*" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 222). The modes, affections, or actual occasions are all there is. In a world of process rather than predication, the sufficient reason for any actual occasion is entirely immanent to the occasion itself. Each actual entity is the architect of its own private "pre-established harmony" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 27, 224). Therefore, there is no stable and essential distinction, for Whitehead, between mind and matter, subject and object, human and non-human, or living and non-living.

Alongside events or actual entities, Whitehead also postulates what he calls "eternal objects". For Whitehead, these are "Pure Potentials", as well as "potentials for the process of becoming" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 22, 29). If actual entities are singular occasions of becoming, then eternal objects provide "the 'qualities' and 'relations'" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 191) that enter into and define these occasions. When "the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, it contributes to the definiteness of that actual entity" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 23). More precisely, it gives it a particular character. Eternal objects take on the role of universals (48, 158), predicates (186), Platonic forms (44), and ideas (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 52, 149). However, for Whitehead, "concrete particular fact" cannot simply "be built up out of universals"; it is more the other way around. Universals, or "things which are eternal", can and must be abstracted from "things which are temporal" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 40). They cannot be conceived by themselves, in the absence of the empirical, temporal entities that they inform. Therefore, eternal objects are neither *a priori* logical structures, nor Platonic essences, nor constitutive rational ideas. Eternal objects are adverbial, rather than substantive; they determine and express *how* actual entities relate to one another, take up one another, and "enter into each others' constitutions" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 148, 149). Eternal objects work problematically.

According to Whitehead, eternal objects and problematic Ideas never disappear because the substance out of which all of them are made is the eternal Presence which knows no birth or death. Eternal objects are "indispensable conditions" that cannot be grasped outside of the actualities that they condition, and that incarnate them. However, they also cannot be reduced to those actualities, and cannot be contained within them. They are not actual, but they haunt the actual. They subsist outside of their ingressions and actualizations, and according to a different temporal logic than that of the "specious present of the percipient" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 169), the present in which things happen. This outside, this extra-being, this space without "simple location" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 137), this time in which "a future and

past divide the present at every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once" (Deleuze 1990, 164): all this is the realm of the transcendental¹⁸.

For James, *experience* is the sole criterion of reality; we live in "a world of pure experience" (James, 1996: 39-91). Classical empiricism has great difficulty in making sense of all the phenomena that Whitehead classifies as "eternal objects": relations, as well as emotions, contrasts and patterns. Since these cannot be recognized as "things", or as direct "impressions of sensation", they are relegated to the status of mental fictions (habits, derivatives, secondary qualities, and so on). However, James says that, in a world of pure experience, "relations" are every bit as real as "things": "the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system" (James, 1996: 42). Whitehead argues, using the same logic, that eternal objects must be accounted as real as the actual entities which they qualify, and which select them, include them, and incarnate them. Eternal objects are real, because they are themselves "experienced relations" or primordial elements of experience.¹⁹

After the short introduction into Whitehead's thought, let's revisit the question of body as society and try to reapproach it. The body as society can be interpreted at multiple levels: the body as a complex of differentiating matter, a complex of feelings,

¹⁸Actual entities are not primordially located in space and ordered by time. Spatial location and temporal sequence are themselves generated through the becoming of these actual entities. More precisely, an entity composes or creates itself by feeling the other entities that have influenced and informed it; and it feels them as being spatially and temporally distinct from itself. This self-distinguishing action of each new entity, and the consequent differentiation of time and space makes a necessary concomitant of the very process of feeling. Every "pulse of emotion" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 163) is both a fresh creation of spacetime, and an immediate perishing, or "objectification". The "emotional continuity of past with present... is a basic element from which springs the self-creation of each temporal occasion... How the past perishes is how the future becomes" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 238). Only when an actual entity perishes — when it is no longer actively engaged in the process of feeling — it becomes fully "spatialized", to use Bergson's term" (Bergson, 1929/1978: 220; cf. 209). At the same moment, it becomes fully temporalized as well, since "the atomization of the extensive continuum is also its temporalization" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 72) Only when a process of feeling has completed itself and perished, can it be circumscribed as a datum to be felt, "a definite fact with a date" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 230). Being is the one that is timing space and spacing time, as well as being timed and spaced through the simultaneous acts of becoming-being of time and becoming-being of space.

¹⁹David Lapoujade (2000) reads James as a transcendental empiricist. James' "radical empiricism" postulates what Deleuze calls a plane of immanence, or "an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field". At the same time, in contrast to the transcendental reductions of Kant and Husserl, which posit the pure form of the "I" as the *a priori* condition for all experience, James' transcendental "pure experience" does not take the form of a subjectivity or a consciousness. It is rather a flux "pure of all form" and "free ... from the categories with

a complex of modes of being, as well as becoming. The body as society is the body that is always more-than one body. What makes the body a society, or more-than one body is its nexus or the event of coming-into-being through the multiplicity of becoming. At the level of differentiating matter, Whitehead sees the body as a dance of electrons. At the level of feelings, the body can be seen as a dance of intervals of feelings. At the level of its being, we can see the body as a dance of the multiplicity of becoming. More precisely, it is not only that the body becomes at the level of its matter, but each and every electron that makes the body become in its own singular and irreducible way. Furthermore, each and every feeling becomes through its interval. The body's being becomes through each and every singular form-taking, each and every becoming. The body is a being in becoming and becoming itself is a becoming in becoming.

Another way to see the eventfulness of all the previously mentioned levels of the body as society is to introduce how Whitehead reflects each of them. For Whitehead, electron is not just an electron, the same way feeling is not just a feeling. Whitehead uses the same vocabulary to describe the organic and the inorganic world, as well as the biological and the human world. He suggests that categories like will, desire, and creation are valid not only for the human, but also for the non-human, as well as non-organic entities. Whitehead writes about the "feelings" and "satisfactions" of a plant, an inorganic object like Cleopatra's Needle, or even an electron: every entity has what he calls both "mental" and "physical" poles, and both a "private" and a "public" dimension. In the vast interconnections of the universe, everything perceives and is perceived. All the entities are events, therefore, electrons and feelings are events too. To sum up, all the entities-events have feelings and feel. It is not that only our body feels, but it is being felt by a feeling, therefore, feelings also feel and have feelings. It is not correct to say "our" feelings because both our bodies and feelings are self-sustaining societies, at the same time autonomous and interconnected. What makes us who we are is the encounter between the feeling and the body and through that encounter we emerge as event. It is not enough to say how electrons feel. Each and every electron is a feeling society, and furthermore, a feeling universe.

There are approximately 37.2 trillion chemical reactions happening in the human body — at the level of one second. All those reactions remind us how short-lived the body is. The body is a successive instance of the same being: we do not feel a given body in the same way we did a minute ago because the memory of our experience of a minute ago has added itself to what we are feeling now. This is what

which it is traditionally partitioned» (Lapoujade, 2000: 193). He follows James in positing "pure experience" as a fundamental category: "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothing-ness" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 167).

Whitehead means when he says that "no two actual entities originate from an identical universe; though the difference between the two universes only consists in some actual entities, included in one and not in the other" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 22-23). The difference between our universe of "between a tenth of a second and half a second ago" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 181) and our universe right now, in the present instant, is that our experience of the former is an "actual entity" that has been "objectified", and added to the "data" prehended by the latter. Being perceptive of that or not, our body is constantly changing. It is colliding in the zone of proximity of being and becoming, force and form, life and *a life*. The body is a complex of feeling in co-composition with life-living. The body-becoming is an encounter between movement-moving, feeling-feeling and life-living. On the nexus of being and becoming, a body is more expressivity than form. The complexity of Whiteheadian thought reveals itself in the following: while it insists that an occasion marks the finality, the atomicity of a singular process, it continuously reminds us that the occasion is so short-lived that it is ultimately the multiplicity of transductions activated by its dephasings that defines experience. According to Whitehead, "each actual entity, although complete so far as concerns its microscopic process, is yet incomplete by reason of its objective inclusion of the macroscopic process. It really experiences a future which must be actual, although the completed actualities of that future are undetermined" (Whitehead, 1978: 215).

Every act of worlding involves the generating of a field that is co-constituted by all the pastnesses and futurities that compose it. According to Erin Manning, the question is not simply "'what is the body' but 'how will the bodying persist'." The bodying persists in its self-enjoyment as process: "organic philosophy interprets experience as meaning the self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the composition of many" (Whitehead, 1978: 145). Bodying persists as the more-than that strives to activate the forces of difference within its generative potential. In this regard, bodying is a lure to feeling. Lures for feeling call forth new immanent associations and new assemblages, bringing these constellations to life in the complex intersection between this life and *a life*. Feelings²⁰ are 'vectors'; for they feel what is *there* and transform it into what is *here*" (Manning, 2012: 22, 23). According to Whitehead, every feeling is a "'vector feeling', that is to say, feeling from a beyond which is determinate and pointing to a beyond which is to be determined" (Whitehead,

²⁰It is important to remain mindful of Brian Massumi's (2002) crucial distinction between *affect* and *emotion* (27-28 and *passim*). For Massumi, affect is primary, non-conscious, asubjective or presubjective, asignifying, unqualified, and intensive; while emotion is derivative, conscious, qualified, and meaningful, a "content" that can be attributed to an already-constituted subject. Whitehead's "feeling" largely coincides, in the first instance, with Massumi's "affect".

1933/1967: 163). In the material world, as it is described by relativistic and quantum physics, "all fundamental physical quantities are vector and not scalar" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 177); "scalar quantities are constructs derivative from vector quantities" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 212). The precedence of vectors over scalars, or of relational terms over atomistic ones, means that no point of space-time can be isolated from the overall "physical electromagnetic field" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 98) with its interplay of forces and its quantum interactions. Furthermore, Whitehead uses the language of vectors to speak about feelings because he makes no essential distinction between physical causality (the way one entity transmits energy or movement to another entity) and perception (the way one entity feels and responds to another entity). To say that entity A is the cause of entity B as effect is also to say that entity B prehends entity A. According to Whitehead, even mechanistic (and quantum-mechanistic) interactions are feelings and even the most "simple physical feeling" is at once both "an act of causation" and "an act of perception" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 236). Following the line of Whitehead's thought, "the 'emotional feeling' with which we receive *sensa* like color is not fundamentally different in kind from the manner in which subatomic particles relate to one another; it is only much broader in scope" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 163). Feeling, as such, is the primordial form of all relation and all communication.

Feeling can be thought as "vector transmission, as reference, and as repetition" (Shaviro, 2009: 15). All three determinations are closely related and intertwined. Every feeling involves a reference to another feeling. However, that reference moves along the line of the vector. "Feeling as reference is a transmission through space, a direction of movement as well as a magnitude. This transmission is also a process in time. In the vector, time has a direction: the arrow of time is always moving from the already-determined to the not-yet-determined and to-be-determined" (Shaviro, 2009: 15). The feeling entity is "conditioned" by, or is an "effect" of, all the other entities

²¹According to Shaviro, "an act of feeling is an encounter — a contingent event, an opening to the outside — rather than an intrinsic, predetermined relationship. And feeling changes whatever it encounters, even in the act of "conforming" to it. That is why feeling is irreducible to cognition. It isn't anything that we already know. The problem with cognitive theories of mind, and with hermeneutical modes of interpretation, is that they reduce the unknown to the already-known, the already-determined. These theories assume that my not-knowing is only a contingency for myself, that ignorance is a particular state that I am in; while they imagine that the object I am seeking to know is in itself already perfectly determinate, if only I *could* come to know it. They thereby elide "experience as a constructive functioning", and restrict their attention to that which has already been experienced and constructed. They only get half the picture; they trace the vector backwards into the past, but not forwards into the future. They grasp the actual, but miss the potential, the yet-to-be. They appreciate "conformity of feeling", but ignore deviation and novelty. They analyze whatever has already been felt, selected, and determined; but they miss the very process of selection and determination, which is feeling itself" (Shaviro, 2009: 15).

that it feels (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 236) and this entity, in turn, becomes a condition, or a cause, for whatever subsequent entities feel it in their own ways. Every entity therefore "conforms to the data" that it receives from the past "in such a way that it feels the data" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 85). Within the act of feeling its data — every entity also selects among, shapes, and alters these data, until it reaches a final determination. In doing so, it offers itself to be felt by other entities in its own turn, so that it is "referent beyond itself" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 72). The "objectification" of the entity, once it has been completely determined, allows for its repetition. And this repetition is the key to the future as well as to the past because every new process of becoming "involves *repetition* transformed into *novel immediacy*"²¹ (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 137).

Feelings pass through the body giving it a form. Feelings or force of the form constitute the *how* of singular form-taking. According to Whitehead, "*how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*... Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 23). It is possible to rewrite this thought into: *how* an actual entity *feels* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*... Its being is constituted by its feeling. Or: *how* a feeling *feels* constitutes *what* that feeling *is*... Its being is constituted by its feeling. Body and feeling, as well as being and becoming constitute two poles of one parallel process.

Body's lure for feeling is what constitutes the *how* of its becoming. More precisely, the lure for feeling activates time's differential and makes felt the multiplicity of each now. Bodying does not happen on a linear timeline. Even though it resolves as an occasion of experience, and that resolution has a specific date and time, bodying as a lure for feeling is less a stable rendering of metric time than a collusion of durations. Since every resolution activates a transduction, new processes are continuously underway. The body is a durational multiplicity, a becoming of continuity and not a continuity of becoming. Lures for feeling do not take form *per se*. Lures for feeling generate attunements, tendencies, forces of form. This is why Whitehead speaks of subjective form²² more than of form itself.

²²One of Whitehead's most important notions is that of "subjective form". For Whitehead, every prehension "consists of three factors: (a) the 'subject' which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehended; (c) the 'subjective form' which is *how* that subject prehends that datum" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 176). According to Shaviro, the third factor — the *how* — holds great importance. "Any given 'datum', Whitehead says, is objective and entirely determinate. In itself, a datum is always the same. But this self-identity does not entirely determine, although it somewhat limits, the particular *way* in which a given entity receives (prehends or perceives) that datum. There is always some margin of indeterminacy, some room for 'decision' (43), in '*how* that subject feels that objective datum' (221). This margin is what allows for *novelty*: 'the essential novelty of a feeling attaches to its subjective form. The initial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may have served other feelings with other subjects. But

What an occasion ultimately achieves is not a form but a mobile ecology of forces. As such, an occasion is less an object or a body than a node of relation expressing itself in a given moment as this or that body or object. The expressivity of this relational node, or more precisely, its *how*, represents the occasion's subjective form. According to Whitehead, "There are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions, aversions, consciousness, etc." (Whitehead, 1978: 24). The subjective form of an event says how an occasion of experience has come to feel itself in the culmination of this or that process. "While the culmination of a process into this or that subjective form has a definite endpoint, the affective tonality of the now perishing occasion will continue to color the process of the occasion shifting from its determinate nature to its perishing on the nexus of experience. From appetite to event back to appetite. The nexus in Whitehead is the immanent field where the force of eventness can be felt. It is contributory rather than known or experienced as such. What is contributed from the nexus into subsequent occasions is not a given form. The form of the occasion has perished. What remains is the appetition, the force of form. If what drives life is the creative advance always active in the constellation of occasions that make up experience, and experience is always to some degree co-constituted by the nexus of past and contemporary occasions, the nexus can be thought as the relational field that contributes a more-than to each taking-form. What is reactivated from the nexus into a given occasion is not the form the past occasion took. It is the lure for feeling, the lure for the creativity generated at the heart of difference. For each occasion, as stated above, only emerges as such as the difference in a multiphasing process of individuation. To have emerged as this or that constellation is to have colluded into a dephasing that activated a differential between what was and what will have come to be. Whitehead's notion of the 'creative advance' rests on the understanding that experience is not continuous but composed of differentials and integrations, once more, the becoming of continuity. It is the capacity of an event to activate certain vectors otherwise backgrounded, thereby generating an uneasy field of difference. This field of difference is complex in that it does not deny what it cannot include. To the contrary, it celebrates exactly this fissure, engendering the new out of a resonance of background/foreground. Novelty: less event in-itself than differential of the event in its coming-to-form" (Manning, 2012: 23, 24).

When the body culminates — it never culminates as only one point, but as the multiplicity of points, points-in-movement. Points-in-movement are those which are reorganizing themselves in the succession of now. Points-in-movement are

the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it is how *that* subject is feeling that objective datum' (232). Every subjective form is different from every other; no subject feels a given datum in precisely the same manner as any other subject has done. The important question

continuously moving from one singular form-taking to another. Their affective tonality colors the *how* of their singular form-taking. Moreover, affective tonality never resolves as this or that form, but moves the body from one form to another. Affective tonality²³ is the force of form that conducts the body from one bodying to another. Furthermore, it connects the body to its nexus of its becoming. The nexus is not just the immanent field of the eventness, but also the field of appetite for the event. It is a field generating and being generated by the force of form. The nexus is not only the field of the body's becoming, but also the field of becoming of forces. Connected to its nexus, it is not only the body that becomes. Forces become too. Forces field. The nexus is both generating and being generated through the event of becoming of force. Becoming of force and becoming of body is what makes an event. An event is a collision of becomings. What multiplies the becoming into becomings is the nexus itself thought as relational field of more-than. What activates the becoming of nexus is the lure for feeling, the appetite for the event. A lure for feeling is a lure for becoming. It is not that only body becomes connected to its nexus, but nexus itself connected to the body becomes too. The body (actual) and the nexus (virtual) co-become. The body or the force of actual and the nexus or the force of virtual are always co-becoming. What a body is (actual body) and what it can become (virtual nexus of body-becoming) are two parallel processes, two parallel becomings. What activates the becoming-nexus of body and becoming-body of nexus is a lure of feeling. The lure of feeling or making the actual (what the body is) virtual (what the body can become) — not the body as form but the body as coming-to-form. To feel is to perceive²⁴, to perceive is to become.

for Whitehead is not *what* something is, but *how* it is — or, more precisely, how it affects, and how it is affected by, other things" (Shaviro, 2009: 8).

²³Through his analysis of "subjective form", Whitehead privileges feeling over understanding. For Whitehead, experience is rather affective than cognitive. Every experience of perception involves an "affective tone" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 176). An affective tone precedes, as well as both determines and exceeds, cognition. We do not first perceive what is before us and then respond emotionally to these perceptions. According to Whitehead, the order is rather the reverse. For "the direct information to be derived from sense-perception wholly concerns the functionings of the animal body" (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 215). "Perception is first a matter of being-affected bodily. Contact with the outside world strengthens or weakens the body, stimulates it or inhibits it, furthers or impairs its various functions. Every perception or prehension thus provokes the body into 'adversion or aversion' — and this is already the 'subjective form' of the prehension (Whitehead, 1929/1978: 184). It is only later that (in 'high-grade' organisms such as ourselves, at least) 'the qualitative characters of affective tones inherent in the bodily functionings are transmuted into the characters of regions' in space (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 215), so that *sensa* can be taken to qualify (or to give us information about) objects of knowledge in the external world. "We respond to things in the first place by feeling them; it is only afterwards that we identify, and cognize, what it is we feel" (Shaviro, 2009: 10).

²⁴Whitehead's account of perception as feeling is an extension of William James' (1983) theory of the emotions. James says "that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or

6.3 BODY-WITH: IN THE BETWEEN OF LURES, ATTUNEMENTS AND APPETITIONS

What is known as "body as such" is not the preindividual, not the nexus, or a *life*, but the forces of collusion that bring a multiphasing process of individuation to an individualization. The body as such also exceeds itself — making known its excess, as well as the more-than of the process of individualization. The body individuates and individualizes at the same time. This simultaneous process always involves a weave of the actual and the virtual, of the preindividual and individuation, of a *life* and this life. Because of this double process each actual occasion is more-than what it seems. What makes each actual occasion more-than is a surplus that it carries in its dephasing, a surplus that cannot be contained by the occasion. The occasion is therefore multiple or collective because its emergence involves not only its resolution as this or that, but also its complexity as a field of relation that co-combines with the nexus of which it has been/will have become. An occasion cannot undo itself of its duality. Just like the electron, each occasion is a form (a particle) and a force (a wave). Each occasion resolves into one form and dissolves into another. Any occasion is at once the definiteness of itself in the moment of its concrescence and the will-have-become of its lures, attunements, and appetitions, both past and future.

fearful, as the case may be" (James, 1983: 1065-1066). Emotions do not cause bodily states, but bodily states come first and the emotions arise out of them. Our "perception" of an "exciting fact" takes the form of "bodily changes" and "our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion" (James, 1983: 1065). James' point is not to reverse the order of causality, so that (contrary to what we usually think) the bodily state would be the cause and the emotional state the effect. Rather, he asserts the identity of these conditions, in favor of affect: "whatever moods, affections, and passions I have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes which we ordinarily call their expression or consequence" (James, 1983: 1068). According to Shaviro, "there is no separating body from mind, or the (bodily) expression from what it (mentally) expresses. Perception is already, immediately, action in the form of 'bodily changes'; and the way that I receive a perception, or apprehend its 'sensa', is the way that my body changes, or has changed. Perception or excitation, action or bodily changes, and emotion or response, are all one and the same event" (Shaviro, 2009: 10).

²⁵The individual, as continuously produced in a process of individuation, is never an isolated Self. It is always coupled or coordinated with a milieu; the individual can therefore only be understood together with its milieu, and cannot subsist as a unity without it. The contact between individual and milieu is mediated by affect. Affectivity comes in between inside and outside, just as it comes in between sensation and action. Just as sensation gets oriented along a series of gradients in order to become perception, so (unconscious or preconscious) affect gets oriented along a series of processes of becoming in order to become (conscious) emotion. This also means that individuation is quite similar to the process of autopoiesis, as expounded by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Both autopoiesis and individuation understand sameness through difference by coupling the living individual with its milieu, as well as understanding what is unique and enclosed about the individual precisely in terms of its relation to the milieu which it is not, but which it requires contact with.

A body is not separate from its milieu²⁵. More precisely — milieu, or the associated milieu, as Simondon calls it, is a relational field activated by the event in-forming. Event and milieu are always cogenerative, as well as co-becoming which means that the milieu cannot be understood in spatial terms. What makes the milieu is an affective attunement²⁶ which is more than a space and more than a form. Affect, here understood as Whitehead's concept of feeling, is a transductive force that propels being to become across the phases of its individuation. "Affect is of the milieu: it resituates the body as force of form within what Isabelle Stengers (2010) calls an 'ecology of practices'. Affect activates the very connectibility of experience. It is the force, the lure, through which a certain constellation comes to expression. Take the example of a snake in the context of a phobia. Wandering through the desert, everything is felt as the force of snakesness. There is no rustling that does not elicit fear. But this is fear even before it can be defined. It is in the edginess of pace, the tenseness of posture. It alters how each step is taken. Every quick movement — lizard, wind, fly, activates a certain bodying that attends, intensively, to an environment in the making" (Manning, 2012: 26).

The body and milieu²⁷ emerge through one another. The milieu is not given — it is happening. Milieu that is happening cannot be thought as space, but as activity — spacing. The body and milieu space one another and are being spaced by one another.

²⁶In the article "Affective attunement: division of emotional states between mother and child by cross-modal exchange" (1987) Stern DN, Hofer L, Haft W, and Dore J. reflect affective attunement as interaction of a particular pattern between mother and child. The behavior of attunement appears around 8 months. Following the line of their thought, affective attunement is a matching, more than an imitation, that is cross-modal, each partner using a mode of expression different, unconsciously the most often. What makes the reference for the match is the internal state and not the external behavioral act. Affective attunement is felt like an unbroken process in the time and leads to define a new quality of feeling, a new vitality. The felt quality of an unbroken process is called the vitality affect. The quality of the relation of attunement affects the level of the inter-subjective relatedness of the ability to "be-with", as well as to share.

²⁷Milieu is a French term used in English to mean "environment", but it also carries connotations of "middle" and "medium". The term milieu has both a spatial and temporal dimension: our environment is something we are "in the midst of", in terms of being in the process of experiencing it, and we are also within some space (or body) that serves as a vehicle for that experience. Deleuze and Guattari claim that milieus are composed of "periodic repetition" (and are therefore 'coded'). Furthermore, "not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another, they are essentially communicating" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 345, 313). The concept of the milieu serves as the foundation for grasping rhythms that are expressive of the difference between milieus, where the force of chaos at the heart of milieus (which, they say, is the 'milieu of all milieus') is confronted. In Deleuze's and Guattari's explanation of territorialization, milieu stands for the stable, coded patterns that make up the internal and external organization of the environment of living things, which may be "transcoded" or part of other, larger milieus. The milieu also stands for the source of affects/actions and percepts in living things, whether internally or externally.

They stand for two forces of spacing that are co-constitutive. The body and milieu are parallelly in-forming and thus activating their shared field of potential. Transforming through the milieu — a body is spacing its potential. Transforming through the body — a milieu is bodying its potential. Together, transforming through one another, the body and its associated milieu are also transforming their potential. How does this transformation happen? What rides this transformation is affective attunement or the process of tuning into one another through the shared affect, as well as being transformed by it.

When activating the very connectibility of experience, the affect creates a body that is inter-subjective, a body-with. When tuning affectively — two bodies interact as two forces through which a certain constellation comes to expression. Through the affect of fear the body and the desert cogenerate. What moves the body through the desert is the fear of snake, or more precisely, force of snakesness. At the same time, the force of snakesness generates the affect of fear and determines how the body moves through the desert. With each step that body takes — the body and the desert transform through one another. It is not only the walker that is walking in the desert. The desert itself is walking inside the walker too. How? The desert, as understood here, does not stand for the external space, but the associated, as well as intermediary milieu. What makes the desert an intermediary milieu is the fact of being both internal and external at the same time. The desert is not just the sand that the foot of the

According to Deleuze and Guattari: "Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions. [...] The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 345, 313).

²⁸This body is an ecological unit. More precisely, through a structure of mutual flows and data-transfer, one that probably is best understood in reference to viral contamination or intensive interconnection, this body is environmentally interdependent. Furthermore, this environmentally-bound intensive subject is a collective entity; it is an embodied, affective and intelligent entity that captures, processes and transforms energies and forces. Therefore, being environmentally-bound and territorially-based is immersed in fields that constantly flow and transform. Deleuze's ecosophical ethics incorporates the physics and biology of bodies that together produce ethological forces. Instead of the essentialist question — "What is a body?" — Deleuze prefers to inflect his questions and ask: "What can a body do?" and "How much can a body can take?". We are invited to think about the problem of ecosophy in terms of affectivity: How is affectivity enhanced or impoverished? This way of thinking implies ethical virtue, empowerment, joy and understanding. Furthermore, an act of understanding does not merely entail the mental acquisition of certain ideas, but it also coincides with bodily processes. Therefore, it is an activity that actualises what is good for the subject, for example *potentia*. Mind and body, as well as body and environment act in unison and are synchronised by what Spinoza calls *conatus*, the desire to become and to increase the intensity of one's becoming.

walker steps into. The desert is a feeling, or better, an affect of fear associated with the desert — coursing through the body of the walker. It is not only the walker that is passing through the desert, but the desert itself is passing through the walker — as the force of snakesness, the affect. In a way, they parallelly walk within one another if we allow ourselves to imagine the steps that the walker takes as "positive" ones and those that desert takes as "negative" ones. Their steps are both internal and external, or more precisely, intermediary. The act of walking in the desert is the act of taking intermediary steps. By each step the body of a walker is being transformed by the body of a desert and the body of a desert is being transformed by the body of the walker. The affect that emerges and echoes makes the *how* of this mutual transformation, this encounter between bodying and spacing. This encounter culminates as intermediary ecology of body-in-making and environment-in-making²⁸. Since affect passes through the milieu of this intermediary ecology, it makes it an ecology always transforming into another ecology, co-emerging with each new step that is taken.

Let's discuss the concept of affect furthermore, via Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze. While affect is often used as a synonym for 'emotion', Spinoza's philosophical use of this term distinguishes between affects (of which we are actively the cause) and affections (which are feelings about something or someone). Therefore, we can have affections or emotions such as love and hate, hope and fear, when we are in a passive relationship to the world, or we can experience joyful affects as a result of comprehending and desiring that which would, in Spinoza's terms, extend our existence and increase our power: "By affect [*affectum*] I understand the affections [*affectiones*] of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the same time the ideas of those affections [*affectionum*]. If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then I understand by the affect an action; otherwise, I understand it to be a passion" (Spinoza, 2000: 75). Affect is Spinoza's term for both the actual effects of external bodies which cause the body to feel pleasure or pain, and the subjective ideas of the effects that external things produce in our body. Both lead to inadequate ideas and a passive relation to the external world (passions) and form the basis for adequate ideas and an active relation to the external world (actions).

Deleuze's interest in Spinoza's portrayal of affect has to do with the manner in which adequate ideas are not representative 'images of thought', but conceptions of dynamic and kinetic relations between bodies ('speeds and slownesses'). However, the emphasis changes when he applies the idea to the Nietzschean notion of becoming, which focuses less on extending existence, and more on a capacity for action and novelty (that is, an affirmation of the necessity of chance, rather than a comprehension

of necessary relations). In Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, affect is the source of the expression of power: "A mode's essence is a power²⁹; to it corresponds a certain capacity of the mode to be affected. But because the mode is a part of Nature this capacity is always exercised, either in affections produced by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own essence (called active)" (Deleuze, 1992: 93).

In Deleuze's and Guattari's reading of Nietzsche and Spinoza, affect is understood as a becoming which involves a modification in characteristic relations of forces (a capacity of the will to power) or of speed and slowness, which in turn increases or decreases the capacity for action: "will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. [...] The affects of force are active insofar as the force appropriates anything that resists it and compels the obedience of inferior forces" (Deleuze, 2006: 57, 63). Furthermore: "To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of power. To the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from external parts or from the individual's own parts. Affects are becomings" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 283, 256). Affect is also understood as that which cannot be felt or internalized by a subject but engenders feelings (designated here as 'affections'), as well as that which underlies emotions about lived experiences but cannot be attributed to or possessed by a subject: "Affects [...] go beyond the strength of those who undergo them" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 164).

Affect is that which occupies the gap between stimulus and response, perception and action: "the interval is not merely defined by the specialization of the two limit-facets, perceptive and active. There is an in-between. Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action" (Deleuze, 2005: 67, 65). Affect is that which stands for the *dividual*: "The affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individuated state of things [...]. The affect is indivisible and without parts; but the singular combinations that it forms with other affects form in turn an indivisible quality, which will only be divided by changing qualitatively (the '*dividual*')" (Deleuze, 2005: 101, 98—99). It is not only that the affect is distinct from every individuated state, but it is also distinct from every individual becoming: "The different faces of affect

²⁹The *conatus* or the essence of a mode affirms its power to act. It also affirms the expression of its capacity to be affected as its power to act. The dynamic variations of mode's essence can be therefore seen as the dynamic variations of our power of action.

create insertions at the level of the becoming of life itself, not at the level of individual becoming" (Simondon, 1989: 120).

Affect is always and only force. We should think affect, as Deleuze (1988b) would say, as the force of the outside³⁰. The outside is here not juxtaposed to an inside, but it is the limit where life as force of form resonates. "There is first of all the outside which exists as an unformed element of forces: the latter come from and remain attached to the outside, which stirs up their relations and draws out their diagrams³¹" (Deleuze, 1988b: 43). For Deleuze, the diagram does not stand for a fixed form, but a set of tendencies in resonance. In Deleuzian terms, it is possible to think life as the diagram the outside calls forth. This diagram is full of potentials and permutations, it is the force of a coming-to-form that generates a shaping of experience. This experience of life pairs it with *a life*: life as the irreducible outside that has no ultimate form, no final measure. Life-living coupled with *a life* is the diagrammatic force that activates the collective individuation through which transindividuations emerge. Here, the body is always already collective, transversed

³⁰Deleuze insists that there is a 'force of the Outside' that 'disrupts' diagrams of power, operating with a vital resistance, and instigating novelty; the logic is that because the only object of force is another force, forces cannot be reduced to the strategic codifications of power (or phenomena of resistance), but come from the Outside that is folded both within the inner and outer world (in terms of the 'encounter', it is what provokes us to think or experience sensation). In Deleuze's reading of Foucault, that which constitutes the Outside of forms but is not exterior to them; that which constitutes a power relation which involves provocation, seduction, enabling, or production, and may be diagrammed within forms (of knowledge; content and expression), but cannot be localized in any given form; an affect that can be determined as active or reactive (within diagrams of power), or exercises a capacity for resistance. According to Deleuze: "an exercise of power shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces. [...] force displays potentiality with respect to the diagram containing it, or possesses a third power which presents itself as the possibility of 'resistance'" (Deleuze, 1986: 74, 89). Furthermore: "the outside concerns force: if force is always in relation with other forces, forces necessarily refer to an irreducible outside which no longer even has any form and is made of distances that cannot be broken down through which one force acts upon another or is acted upon by another" (Deleuze, 1986: 72, 86).

³¹Diagram stands for a composition or distribution of points and lines (singularities or differences) that constitute the relations between forces, or power relations, which is presented in a fixed form but is founded upon a fluid, unstable, or formless form that emerges from the Outside and continually resists the formalization of power. According to Deleuze: "We can [...] define the diagram in several different, interlocking ways: it is the presentation of the relations between forces unique to a particular formation; it is the distribution of the power to affect and the power to be affected; it is the mixing of non-formalized pure functions and unformed pure matter [...] it is a transmission or distribution of singularities (Deleuze, 1986: 61, 72—3)". Furthermore: "The diagram, as the fixed form of a set of relations between forces, never exhausts force, which can enter into other relations and compositions. The diagram stems from the outside but the outside does not merge with any diagram, and continues instead to 'draw' new ones" (Deleuze, 1986: 74, 89)".

with the force of the preindividual as transindividuation. The outside stands for the topological surface of a becoming-body. New compositions emerge on this surface through the bursts of the singular becomings activated by dephasings. Dephasings involve bursts or bringing-to-life of new processes, new fields of feeling. "There must be a more-than-being, a new individuation, so that sensations can coordinate into perceptions; there also has to be a more-than-being of the subject so that affections become affective world" (Simondon, 1989: 116). As previously mentioned, "to belong to interiority does not mean only to be 'be inside' but to be on the 'inside' of the limit ... At the level of the polarized membrane, internal past and external future face one another. The living lives at the limit of itself, on its limit (Simondon, 1964: 260-264). Individuation takes place "at the surface not of the skin, but through a surfacing multiplicity, a smooth, amorphous space³² ... constituted by an accumulation of proximities, each accumulation [defining] a zone of indiscernability proper to

³²Deserts, plateaus, steppes, and oceans are some of the breathtaking, yet desolate images that may come to mind when thinking of "smooth spaces". When travelling in such a space, it is almost impossible to conceptualize or measure distance as such because there is nothing to mediate one locale to the next. In terms of time, it is difficult to tell how fast we're going, in what direction, or how far we've travelled. Deleuze and Guattari claim that smooth space does not "appear in a particular place", but is, paradoxically, a "nonlimited locality [...] in an infinite succession of local operations" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 422, 383). Furthermore, "nomads" who inhabit such spaces are immobile because their movement cannot be represented; they don't move as much as they cling to this space and even construct it. Such space cannot be conceptualized as a whole, or as a reified object, but only experienced step-by-step, even and especially within "striated" space (space that does contain points, distances, contours, architecture, etc.), as an accumulation of differences that only actually appear via the indifference of invisible, absolute space. For this reason it is possible to say that "the sea is a smooth space fundamentally open to striation, and the city is the force of striation that reimparts smooth space, [...] outside but also inside itself" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 531, 481). On the one hand, smooth space is a feature of geological space where there are little to no geographic referent points; on the other hand, it is a technological, mathematical, maritime, physical, and aesthetic model which permits understandings of spatial relationships that concern the nonmetrical division of time, as well as the haptic function of the eye, the primacy of directionality and multiplicity: "there is no line separating earth and sky; there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or contour; visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily topology that relies not on points or objects but rather on haecceities, on sets of relations (winds, undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the creaking of ice, the tactile qualities of both). It is a tactile space, or rather 'haptic', a sonorous much more than a visual space. The variability, the polyvocality of directions, is an essential feature of smooth spaces of the rhizome type, and it alters their cartography. The nomad, nomad space, is localized and not delimited" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 421—2, 382). Smooth space also stands for Deleuze's and Guattari's geographical, political, and historical concept of multiplicity: "Not only is that which peoples a smooth space a multiplicity that changes in nature when it divides — such as tribes in the desert: constantly modified distances, packs that are always undergoing metamorphosis — but smooth space itself, desert, steppe, sea, or ice, is a multiplicity of this type, nonmetric, acentered, directional, etc." (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 534, 484).

'becoming' (more than a line and less than a surface; less than a volume and more than a surface³³)" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 488). Furthermore: "When the skin becomes not a container but a multidimensioned topological surface that folds in, through, and across space-times of experience, what emerges is not a self but the dynamic form of a worlding that refuses categorization. Beyond the human, beyond the sense of touch or vision, beyond the object, what emerges is relation" (Manning, 2012: 12).

The body is a multiphased relation that defines itself through coefficients of transversality expressive with its becomings. The body as a multiphased relation moves life to its limit and at this limit, where the outside folds in, it is expressed, again, differently. The body is infinitely variable; it is not a subject, but a verb. And as a verb the body persists, infinitely. What is infinite is not the body's form, but its appetite. What lives on, what is immanent to life as expressive potential, exceeds the body as finished or whole. Simondon calls it "holes of individuality", which he defines as "veritable negatives of individuals composed of a core of affectivity and emotivity" (Simondon, 1989: 102).

The body, a haecceity³⁴: the thisness of experience active as a singularity in the dephased now — stands not for the individual, but individuation. It does not stand for the subject, but collectivity. Not the body that comes after the subject. "Not the body caught in the trap of hylomorphism where the individual is considered as created by the meeting of a form and a matter" (Simondon, 1989: 9, 11), but "the body *before* the subject, in advance and always *toward* subjectivity (rarely there), the body as transindividuation, the body as resonant materiality, the body as the metastable field before the taking-form of this or that. The body, more assemblage³⁵ than form, more

³³The concept of smooth space also stands for the manner in which space itself is distributed, multiplied, and occupied instead of being measured, striated, divided, and partitioned in order to distribute something (i.e. a territory, a code) within it. More precisely, a smooth space activates a geometry of movability and multiplicity (nomadic distribution) in distinction from a geometry of variables within immovable units or striations.

³⁴In Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Duns Scotus, a haecceity stands for the individual and unique, as well as contingent and impersonal nature (akin to Spinoza's modes) of life or assemblages (which cannot be reduced to subjects or things) that engender events; singularities. Haecceity is "sometimes written as 'ecccceity', deriving the word from *ecce*, 'here is'. This is an error, since Duns Scotus created the word and the concept from *haec*, 'this thing'. But it is a fruitful error because it suggests a mode of individuation that is distinct from that of a thing or a subject" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 599, 540). Furthermore: "haecceities form according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 294, 266). According to Deleuze and Guattari: "an assemblage of the haecceity type [...] carries or brings out the event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of being effectuated by persons" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 292, 265).

³⁵Assemblage is that which simultaneously produces corporeal mixtures and incorporeal forms of content and expression (on a horizontal axis) according to the arrangement of bodies, collective enunciations, and/or milieus, and which may be more or less (de)territorialized

associated milieu than Being (Manning, 2012: 30)". What makes the body infinitely more than one is the thisness of experience. It makes the body go in any direction or even several directions at the same time. It allows the body to take any form folded by the present moment. The body as resonant materiality is a pure potentiality and its way to actualize, as well as extend itself lies precisely in the thisness of experience.

(on a vertical axis) according to biological, social, historical, or political circumstances: "On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 97—8, 88). For Guattari, assemblage represents a collection of heterogeneous (mixed) components from which subjectifications are created, that engage in a variety of semiotic and machinic processes of enunciation. Assemblages are considered as enunciative components that are collective and neither human nor molar essences. For Deleuze and Guattari, molarity is related to the idea of a coded whole. It is a productive process resulting in making of the same. "Molar" represents the mode of *being*, rather than *becoming*. Molar refers to totalizable oneness. Assemblage, on other hand, refers to non-totalizable multiplicity: "Here we shall speak of collective assemblages of enunciation even if only one individual expresses himself, because he or she will be considered a non-totalizable intensive multiplicity" (Guattari, 2011: 55). Furthermore: "There are only multiplicities of multiplicities forming a single assemblage, operating in the same assemblage: packs in masses and masses in packs" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 38, 34). Assemblages also represent components of passage or that which permits intra- and inter-assemblage transversal relations to take place by performing various tasks, such as modulating consistency and articulating the modalities by which abstract machines are outputted, with relative degrees of deterritorialization, and in support of the potentialities of concrete machines. Inter-assemblages remain open to new components of mutation and improvisation despite the tendency to harden them (i.e. biologically): "Components of passage cannot be simple effects of transition, simple statistical reversals bearing upon molecular populations. They are the bearers of diagrammatic keys concealed by the abstract consistency of machinic nuclei. It is through these components of passage that possible worlds and real worlds clash and proliferate" (Guattari, 2011: 147).

6.4 WHERE MOVEMENT BEGINS TO DANCE: FROM TECHNIQUE TO TECHNICALITY

Erin Manning proposes the idea of body as ecology: "Think the body as an ecology of operations that straddles the flesh of its matter and the environmentality of its multiple form-takings. From such an environmentality retain the idea of technique. Think technique not as an add-on to a preexisting body-form but as a process of bodying. Think technique as an in-forming of a mutating body. And then think that body as a field of relations rather than a stability, a force taking-form rather than simply a form" (Manning, 2012: 31). Technique does not preexist the body. It also does not come after the body. Technique emerges with the body. It bodies. The making of the body is the making of technique. Such a technique is not descriptive, but operative. It cannot be passed from one body to another, but only reinvented. Each and every body makes its own technique, or more precisely, stands for its own singular technique of bodying. That technique is not only singular, but also relational.

How to think the idea of relational technique in practice; how to experience it as technique of tuning into the world of relational becomings: "Consider this image: you are in the garden, your knees covered in mud, hands deep in the earth for an early spring planting. Instead of seeing the earth as a quality apart from the knee attached to a preexisting human form, see the knee-hand-earth as a worlding, a force of form, an operative ecology. See this ecology as an active technique for creating, for the bodying, a taste of spring. Instead of thinking the body as separate from the earth, as separate from the arrival of spring, see the ecology knee-hand-earth in a spring planting as a technique for tuning the season. Notice that the more the knee-hand-earth constellation becomes its own intensive entity. This is not just about sowing a seed, it is about reconstituting the relation climate-body-environment. It is about becoming co-constituted by an environmentality in the making" (Manning, 2012: 30, 31). How to think operative ecology as ecology of relations; how to think it as an ecology of how — of body's taking form? How the ecology operates is how the body takes form. Within the idea of operative ecology, preexisting forms do not exist. The garden does not preexist the gardener and the gardener does not preexist the garden. Both garden and gardener come-into-form, or more precisely, in-form together. Two different modes of bodying (garden and gardener) invent the third relational mode of bodying — knee-hand-earth. Both gardener and garden are co-constituted by an environmentality in the making. Environmentality in the making produces bodies in the making. Bodies as such are open, processual, ontologically and technically unfinishable.

The body evolves as an assemblage, as well as a milieu of relations in this gardening scenario. Just like the body, an object (the garden spade, the earth, the tulip bulb, etc.) is a milieu of relations that are activated through the aliveness of a singular event. An object is a relational part of the environment. If we think an object in terms of its how (it is doing something) — it becomes possible for us to see an object as multiple, processual, an object in becoming. The action of doing defines what an object is, as well as what it can become. The sphere of doing is the sphere of object's becoming.

We cannot say how objects are (this or that). Objects are in-forming all the time — with every single action. Objects are produced by the implicit forces of their potential to become. Each and every becoming object is an ecology of practices. This is their technicality: "Technicality is the modality for creating out of a system of techniques the more-than of system" (Manning, 2012: 32). Technicality is the how of the ecology. Furthermore: "Technique and technicality coexist. Where technique engages the repetitive practices that form a composing body, be it organic or inorganic, technicality is a set of enabling conditions that extract from technique the potential of the new for co-composition. Think the new not as a denial of the past but as the quality of the more-than of the past tuning toward the future. Think technicality as the process that stretches out from technique, creating brief interludes for the more-than of technique, gathering from the implicit the force of form. Think technicality as that which marks the difference in the event of gardening, an event that, on the surface, uses the same techniques whether in November or in May. Think technicality as the field where movement begins to dance. Technicality: the art of the event" (Manning, 2012: 32, 33). While the idea of technique marks the domain of what a body is, the idea of technicality marks the domain of what a body can become. A body becomes through doing. Technicality is doing. It is how the technique itself works, or more precisely, it is the working of technique. It is also the outdoing of technique, its excess, as well as a rediscovered potential leading towards its more-than. Technicality is the more-than of technique. Technicality is what conditions the technique and that conditioning is precisely what makes the technique become. Technicality is a technique in becoming. Technicality is the eventness of technique.

Technique comes out of practice, but it also goes into practice. Technique comes out of the body, but it also goes into the body. Technique makes the body and is being made by the body. Technicality is the meeting point between the body and technique, a point in which both the body and technique reinvent themselves through one another. Techniques are hard to come by because they demand the patient exploration of how a practice best comes into itself. "Technicality is the dephasing of technique, it is the

experience of technique reaching the more-than of its initial application. Technicality is a craft, it is how the field of techniques touches its potential. From technique to technicality we have a transduction. Technicality is a shift of level that activates a shift in process. This is how techniques evolve. Without transduction we would have only mimicry, translation. The copying of forms. Technicality in-gathers form toward its implicit potentiality and squeezes from it the drops of the excess of its actualizations. Technicality captures the affective tonality of a process, a tendency, and catapults it toward new expression" (Manning, 2012: 33). When the technique reaches more-than of its application — technicality starts to work, and furthermore, produce the body that becomes more-than what it previously was. If technicality stands for the becoming of technique, bodying stands for the becoming of technicality. Technicality stands for the becoming of technique. It is also that which shifts the body from one mode of becoming to another. It does not only capture the affective tonality of this process, but also allows its expression.

An example of technique building on technique, as well as working with technicality: "William Forsythe shows his dancers that, for instance, you can lift an arm across the body by using the extension of the limb, creating a standard *épaulement*. Building technique on technique, however, he then shows that the amplitude of this movement's qualitative force is fundamentally altered through a movement of the rib cage. Instead of pulling the arm, push the rib cage and the body becomes a diagonal force, a torque, hip-shoulder syncing with an elasticity that dances almost without effort. The first option is a movement from the pretense of a stability. The second is a movement-moving. This is technique building on technique. Something else is happening here as well. A technicality is developing that draws on the diagonal force of a moving body. Suddenly ribs become fingers, and shoulders become articulate. Forsythe explains: When you move your shoulder, you can move it as expressively as the hand, the shoulder is the second most expressive part after the hand, the muscles over the rib are the serratus³⁶, they are like the finger ligaments going up the hand. Articulate your shoulder from the serratus. When shoulder becomes quality of hand, organ becomes expression. The body acts in implicit relation with a movement that tunes to a different constellation of articulation. Body becomes bodying, and in this transduction, a series of new potentialities for movement are born. Think technique as that which perfects a system and technicality as that through which a process is born that composes the more-than that is the body's movement ecology" (Manning, 2012: 34).

³⁶The serratus anterior is a muscle that originates on the surface of the 1st to 8th ribs at the side of the chest and inserts along the entire anterior length of the medial border of the scapula.

Within the realm of technicality — a body does not exist as pre-organized, finished or completed. More precisely, technicality works and operates on — biologically, structurally, and anatomically — unfinished body. Technicality is that which makes more-than of each and every organ of the body. Organs are expressions³⁷. As such, they are not limited in their expressivity. Expressivity stands for the infinitude of expressive force taking form. Organs are not only expressions, but also forces. Organs are movements. Movement folds the force into the form. That form is never expressed, but only expressive. Expressive form is a form that is not static, but dynamic, processual, open, constantly animated by its expressivity. It is a field of expressivity. Expressivity is the associated milieu of the body and all of its levels of organization — biological, anatomical, structural. It does not matter how organs are organized. What matters is how they relate. The way organs relate is the way they are being expressed — here and now. Organs are singular expressions of technicality operating on them in a present moment.

Technicality is the associated milieu of technique. "If technique is the learning of a certain kind of reach, a certain kind of pull or turn or spiral, if technique is the sounding of a voice or the rhythmic assertion of a step, technicality is the operational field of its expressivity. This field is co-imbricating. It is a lively interval, energized with all of the forces of movement-moving. The role of technique in the field of technicality is to create the potential for a singularity of forms to mutate toward a generative process" (Manning, 2012: 34). Technique is crucial because of its rigorous method of experimentation and repetition, a method that allays any passivity in the passage from the form of experimentation to its force. "Technicality, the associated milieu where form once more becomes force, where individual gesture becomes individuation, is the process through which the implicit is acted upon to generate something as yet unthought. The associated milieu of technicality is never given in advance, never conditioned before a process is under way. It is the event's

³⁷Deleuze's approach to immanence, inspired by his study of Spinoza, complicates the notion of expression, where that which is 'expressed' exists only by virtue of its expression. Expression is therefore not the expression that refers to an interior world, but an action and an affect which is undergone with knowledge of its cause. In Deleuze's analysis of the dimensions of the proposition, expression denotes the sense of the event: "The expression is founded on the event, as an entity of the expressible or the expressed. [...The event] differs in nature from its expression. It exists in the proposition, but not at all as a name of bodies or qualities, and not at all as a subject or predicate. It exists rather only as that which is expressible or expressed by the proposition, enveloped in a verb" (Deleuze, 2004: 209, 182). In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, expression stands for the manner in which the entire world, with varying degrees of clarity and obscurity, is enveloped by individuals or monads; in this manner, the world exists only in its expressions. According to Deleuze: "Since all the individual monads express the totality of their world— although they express clearly only a select part—their bodies form mixtures and aggregates, variable associations with zones of clarity and obscurity" (Deleuze, 2004: 128, 112).

process, never its mediation. Technicality is the field of incorporation in the making of technique's insistent difference and repetition. The taking-form does not accomplish itself visibly in a single instant, but in a number of successive operations. We cannot strictly distinguish the taking-form from the qualitative transformation (Simondon, 2005: 57). Technicality sets the conditions for successive operations, each of which incorporates the implicit, creating an opening toward an ecology of experimentation. Technicality is an open field for structured improvisation. It in-forms a process of taking-form, gathering from that process the myriad levels of information. In doing so, it reminds us that form is in-formation, at once a complex tending-toward that momentarily resolves as this or that, and the incipient nextness of a future-pastness" (Manning, 2012: 35). Technicality as the operational field of technique's expressivity takes both the technique and the body as far as they can go. Within the operational field of technicality form becomes force, body becomes bodying, expression becomes expressivity. Technicality stands for the field of pure potential, technicality fields pure potential. This ecology of experimentation is the ecology of making the virtual — actual³⁸. Intensity is what makes the passage from the virtual to the actual possible.

According to Manning, the core of improvisation is not in technicality. Its core is in technique, or more precisely, in the repetition of a certain form-taking. Without the rigor and precision that comes of repeated, habitual activity, improvisation's potential vocabulary becomes too narrow. I would like to question this idea. I wonder if the core

³⁸In Deleuze's ontology, the virtual and the actual are two mutually exclusive, yet joined characterisations of the real. The actual/real stand for states of affairs, bodies, bodily mixtures and individuals. The virtual/real are incorporeal events and singularities on a plane of consistency. Without being or resembling the actual, the virtual has the capacity to bring about actualisation and yet the virtual never coincides or can be identified with its actualisation. The virtual is a principle of emergence and creation. As such, it does not predetermine the actualities that emerge from it. Rather, it is the impelling force that allows each actual entity to appear (to manifest itself) as something new, something that has never existed in the universe in quite that way before. Virtual is a condition for dynamic becoming, rather than for static being. One way of characterising becoming is with the following schema: virtual/realactual/realvirtual/real. What this diagram points to is that becoming is not a linear process from one actual to another; rather it is the movement from an actualised state of affairs, through a dynamic field of virtual/real tendencies, to the actualisation of this field in a new state of affairs. This diagram safeguards the reversible nature of virtual and actual relations. In order to understand the relationship between virtual singularities and actual individuals in terms of resemblance or analogy, we would need to reduce the notion of repetition that Deleuze advances simply to a repetition of the same. To understand how the virtual may be characterised as an event it is important to recall Deleuze's theory of sense, which is given in the infinitive of verbs (a verb, unlike a noun or an adjective, is better suited for an ontology of becoming). In their infinitival modes, verbs best introduce the untimely nature of the virtual, as well as the absence of subjects or objects; yet they also introduce the strange combination: the impassive and dynamic aspects of multiplicities in the process of actualisation.

of improvisation could be found in the interaction between technique and technicality, in their co-becoming? How to think the core of improvisation as an interaction between the principle of repetition and the principle of emergence? "To create the new it is vital to have experimented with the outer limits of a vocabulary that is highly technical, and from there, but transversally, to invent. This invention takes place in the associated milieu, it is not I who invent but the bodying process itself, across the activity of movement-moving" (Manning, 2012: 35). The associated milieu is the environmentality of the technique in its dephasing; it is the field where technique and technicality meet. Paired with the active crafting of technique, improvisation can play an important role as an emergent procedure for the creation of new associated milieus of relation. What improvisation can do is texture technique to flesh out its potential. It does so by making "if" an open question, a time-loop, a folding proposition for the moving. From habit to invention, from technique to improvisation, the form becomes a folding-through of time in the making. The time of the if becomes an if ... if

³⁹For Deleuze, we can only truly perceive forces by intuiting them, or more precisely, by grasping them without reference to a conceptual understanding of existence. To capture in a few words or sentences what is learned through intuition is impossible. Generally, "force" means any capacity to produce a change or "becoming", whether this capacity and its products are physical, psychological, mystical, artistic, philosophical, conceptual, social, economic, or legal. All of reality is an expression and consequence of interactions between forces, with each interaction revealed as an "event". Every event, body or other phenomenon is the net result of a hierarchical pattern of interactions between forces, colliding in some particular and unpredictable way. The enigmatic characterisation of forces is developed in Deleuze's account of their activity. Every force exerts itself upon other forces. No force can exist apart from its inter-relationships with other forces and, considering such associations of struggle are always temporary, forces are always in the process of becoming different or passing out of existence, so that no particular force can be repeated. For Deleuze, forces are defined in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but in special ways. First, the difference in quantity is the quality of the difference in forces. Second, a force is "active" if it seeks dominance by self-affirmation, asserting itself over and above another force, and "reactive" if it starts its struggle by first denying or negating the other force. While "quality" usually refers to a particular complex, or body, that results from interactions between forces, Deleuze uses it to refer to tendencies at the origin of forces, regardless of the complex that derives from them. The theory of forces challenges the traditional philosophical dualism between essence and appearance, and also draws attention to the contingent and infinitely complex nature of lived reality.

⁴⁰Individuals are not subjects, but haecceities. For Deleuze, "haecceities" are degrees of intensity (a degree of heat, a certain time of the day) that, in combination with other degrees of intensity, bring about individuals. Haecceities consist entirely of movement and rest (longitude) between non-formed molecules and particles. Also, they have the capacity to affect and be affected (latitude). In the *Dialogues*, Deleuze explains that there are "no more subjects, but dynamic individuations without subjects, which constitute collective assemblages... Nothing becomes subjective but haecceities take shape according to the compositions of non-subjective powers and effects" (Deleuze, 1987: 93). Therefore, haecceities are eventual forms of individuation populating a plane of immanence that cannot be captured by any structure of places and differences. In order to accentuate their impersonality, Deleuze claims that we need a new language by which to refer to them, one that consists of proper names, verbs in the infinitive, and indefinite articles and pronouns.

... that lands only long enough to transduce, to ingather the potential of the coming individuation toward the force of its already passing future becoming. Technique remains here as the tool for the crafting of the movement's excessive force. At this juncture of invention, technique, improvisation, and technicality are at close quarters, each builds on the other. "It's not about designing the "never experienced before" but about creating an opening within the event for the outdoing of form" (Manning, 2012: 38). This involves a process of folding, through that activates a resonant fielding of different layers of dimensionalizing already in potentia. There is no reproducibility of technicality, it can never be generalized. Techniques, on the other hand, must to some degree be replicable, this very capacity for reproduction is what gives them their rigor. Technicality and improvisation share the same core which is outdoing of form. Improvisation stands for the mode through which the form can outdo itself. What is undoing the form is not a subject, or a dancer, but forces³⁹ of a life, haecceities⁴⁰, bodyings. What is undoing the form in order to in-form once more, is the force of becoming⁴¹.

⁴¹Deleuze uses the term "becoming" (*devenir*) to describe the continual production (or "return") of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whether physical or otherwise. Becoming stands for the pure movement evident in changes between particular events. Becoming does not represent a phase between two states, or a range of terms or states through which something might pass on its journey to another state. Rather than a product, final or interim, becoming stands for the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous terms and tending towards no particular goal or end-state. Becoming is most often conceived by deducing the differences between a start-point and end-point. For Deleuze, this approach means first subtracting movement from the field of action or thinking in which the states are conceived, and then somehow reintroducing it as the means by which another static state has "become". According to Deleuze, this approach is an abstract exercise that detracts from the richness of our experiences. Becoming is neither merely an attribute of, nor an intermediary between events, but a characteristic of the very production of events. It is not that the time of change exists between one event and another, but that every event is a unique instant of production in a continual flow of changes evident in the cosmos. The only thing that is "shared" by events is their having become different in the course of their production. The continual production of unique events entails a special kind of continuity: events are unified in their very becoming. It is not that becoming "envelops" them, but that becoming "moves through" every event. Deleuze discusses this productive cycle using Nietzsche's concept of "eternal return". If each moment represents a unique confluence of forces, and if the nature of the cosmos is to move continually through states without heading towards any particular outcome, then becoming can be conceived as the eternal, productive return of difference. Everything is a product of becoming, therefore, one's self must be conceived as a constantly changing assemblage of forces, an epiphenomenon arising from chance confluences of languages, organisms, societies, expectations, laws and so on.

6.5 OVERARTICULATION: *go to what you think is the limit, and then go further*

Let's consider José Gil's concept of overarticulation, which can be defined as the felt experience of the form outdoing itself. In rehearsal, William Forsythe asks his dancers to think about what it was about the position that made it motion? Overarticulation is one way the technicity of movement makes itself felt. The dancing body overarticulates not by bringing content to form or form to content, but by foregrounding the virtual share of technicity coursing through and across its movements in the making. Overarticulation is steeped in technique, but to make itself felt it cannot remain on the stratum of the technical. Forsythe calls it looking for a chain of sensations rather than a chain of positions. Forsythe speaks of refraining from holding the sensation hostage to your expertise, of making the experiential felt: you're dancing in order to have sensations, you're looking for where that sensation is in your whole spectrum of dancing. Dance from the vectors of position where position is already becoming motion, ask how you might get the most from that closed set of permissible positions: how can I take that movement as far as it can go?

How to think the relation between movement and overarticulation? "Think of the spiral as an example. A spiral as such cannot be danced. It is more duration than form. To spiral is to dance the future of a movement spiraling, to dance the overarticulation of the present passing. Each spiraling thus touches on the force of technicity, a technicity that can be amplified by emphasizing this tendency and composing with it. Take the spiral, diagonalize and torque it, follow the curves of the body, send the curve out from the hip to the arm raising and curving overhead, and note the hip is still moving when the arm is finished. Note the feeling of cross-attenuation (*tendu*) — find the cross patterns of the stretch, go for the feeling of the skin, the skin will tell you how to do it. Now add rotation: like an octopus who can do ballet. Seek not to locate the body in the afterposition of its having spiralingly diagonalized: feel its octopus. Dwell in the octopus and move it, leaving even this multiplying bodying-form behind" (Manning, 2012: 39). "Move and exfoliate", as José Gil would say (Gil, 1985: 140). The act of taking the body, as well as its form — as far as it can go is the act of overarticulation. It is also an act of experimenting with the movement's potential of unfolding. What unfolds is not only the movement, but also the body's technicity. What is interesting in Forsythe's approach is the fact that precisely the body itself, or more precisely, in this case — the skin — tells us how to do it. We communicate with the form in order to surpass it. We don't move with the body, we move what body is and what it can become, we move its form. The more we move the form of the body, the more we exfoliate.

The virtual share of movement, its technicity, its overarticulation, is not added on to the spiraling body. Technicity is made tangible by the felt experience of duration within the movement itself. When a movement becomes habitual, its durational force is backgrounded to make space for its capitalizable economy in the time of the now. Everyday movements are reduced, compacted, overarticulations muted by overarching directionality and predimensionalizing. A dancing body, on the other hand, learns to stretch out the force of duration, to express incipience, making palpable the force of form that is movement's procedural intensity. In the dancing, movement actualizes at the very limit of this intensity, making felt the activation of its in-formation as event. "To have moved is to have overarticulated in germ. Dancing is simply one example that brings to the fore the technicity of the body's overarticulating potential. To dance the virtual is to move while keeping alive the intervals that are the very compositions of an overarticulation that cannot be recognized or reproduced as such but that will feed every subsequent movement. Its mantra is: Already go to what you think is the limit, and then go further" (Manning, 2012: 40). Overarticulation, as the vibratory resonance of movement's excess, the felt surplus of its actualization, creates a field for durational movement that coexists with the timed event of movement moving. The more precise the technicity, the more complex the field movement leaves behind and casts forth. Technicity embeds margins of indetermination across systems of technique, activating the associated milieu of emergence itself. It is the practice that invents at the very edges of composition where the composition seems to have already come to

⁴²Intensities are not entities, but virtual yet real events whose mode of existence is to actualise themselves in states of affairs. Furthermore, intensity is a singularity capable of generating actual cases, none of which will ever come to resemble it. Placed in the context of the two sides of the Deleuzian ontology — the virtual and the actual — intensities catalyse the actualisation of the virtual. Intensities generate extension, linear, successive time, extended bodies and their qualities. In Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, intensity stands in distinction from the extensive parts that form characteristic relations of existing modes (bodies). According to Deleuze: "[...] physical reality is an intensive reality, an intensive existence" (Deleuze, SEP 312). Furthermore: "each finite being must be said to express the absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence. According, that is, to the degree of its power. Individuation is, in Spinoza, [...] quantitative and intrinsic, intensive" (Deleuze, 1992: 197). Intensity also stands for that which is engendered in the body (of the subject, socius, earth, etc.) by relations of force, which fluctuates as a result of the strength of those forces but is always positive: "It must not be thought that the intensities themselves are in opposition to one another, arriving at a state of balance around a neutral state. [...] the opposition of the forces of attraction and repulsion produces an open series of intensive elements, all of them positive [...] through which a subject passes" (Deleuze, 1983: 20, 19). In varying degrees, intensity represents the lived experience of the Body without Organs (in waves or passages which lack extension, stratification, or form): "The BwO is an intense and intensive body. [...] the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive reality which no longer determines with itself representative elements, but allotropic variations" (Deleuze, 2003: 45).

its limit. "To dance the virtual is to have been overarticulated as a mutating ecology that continuously moves beyond position. To dance the virtual is to have straddled the interval between technique and technicity" (Manning, 2012: 40). To overarticulate is to dance the virtual. It is to dance the limit itself, as well as to reinvent oneself as the new limit. What is overarticulated is not only the movement, but also the body as emerging ecology — constantly moving beyond its limits. Body is a dancing limit. To body is to dance a limit as limitless. The body emerging as and at the dancing limit is the intense body. Intensity⁴² is what catapults the body into bodying.

According to Erin Manning, "movement embodies nothing but itself. Movement never embodies anything. Embodiment is the wrong concept. Just "bodying" is better" (Manning, 2012: 11, 50). The question of dance is: "What is it about a position that made it motion?" (Forsythe 2011, Nov. 10). Answer: the dynamic knot. The differential gestural nexus. Feel the spray, field the nexus, form the movement out of the feeling. Keep in touch with the forming motion, chain the sensations⁴³ rather than

⁴³Beginning in his early work on Hume, Deleuze insisted on the irreconcilability of sensation with psychology; sensation may inform how the subject is constituted, but it is not "given" to us subjectively. If the given is "the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions" (Deleuze, 2001: 87), "the being of the sensible" involves "not a sensible being", that is, "not the given but that by which the given is given", which is "insensible", imperceptible, and "problematic" (Deleuze, 2004: 176, 140). This is why he insists that "problems must be considered not as 'givens' (data)" but as "encounters" which force each faculty to perceive the relations between sensations rather than perceiving them as data or representations of those sensations. In Deleuze's reading of Bergson, sensation denotes the vibration of matter, contracted by the senses, which results in perceived qualities: "What, in fact, is a sensation? It is the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing other than contracted quantity. [...] sensation is extensive insofar as what it contracts is precisely the extended, the expanded (*détendu*)" (Deleuze, 1990: 74). Sensation also stands for a stimulus of either the human nervous system, organic and non-organic matter, or the Body without Organs, which results from forces; this involves, on the one hand, the instantaneous contraction of vibrations (by a particular sense organ), which are, on the other hand, differentiated, contemplated, and preserved (or resonating) as a qualitative impression; consequently, they are composed and made to communicate with other sensations at various levels, movements, areas, or temporal domains (such that the lived experience of any one sensation exceeds the bounds of simple organic activity): "Sensation is excitation itself,[...] insofar as it is preserved or preserves its vibrations [...]. Sensation is formed by contracting that which composes it [...]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 211). It is a characteristic of sensation to pass through different levels flowing to the action of forces. But two sensations, each having their own level or zone, can also confront each other and make their respective levels communicate. [...] the different levels through which this sensation passes already necessarily constitute couplings of sensation. Vibration already produces resonance" (Deleuze, 2003: 47, 64). Body without Organs (BwO) is conceived as a surface of sensations, of a texture and elasticity of equal force and intensity over the entirety of its mass. Sensation passes over and through the BwO in waves and rhythms that meld its perceptible sites or organisation of parts into vibrations and spasms. Borrowing from Wilhelm Wörringer's writings on the generativity of gothic line, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of BwO is in continuous and autonomous movement, endlessly emanating sensation

the positions (Forsythe 2011, Nov. 10). When we are speaking of movement, we must remember: the virtual and the actual are aspects of the same event⁴⁴ (there is no actual without the virtual, and vice versa). What takes form as we move is the actualization of virtual potential rich in each displacement. The eventness of movement is a virtually concretized differentiation of matter-form that creates dynamics that is of the order of speed itself. According to Erin Manning, movement is one with the world, not body / world, but body-worlding. We move not to populate space, not to extend it or to embody it, but to create it. We also move to create the body. Not to populate it, extend it or embody it, but to create it. Who is moving — if the movement embodies nothing but itself? Which body does a movement belong to?

in its process. The line is continually becoming of itself, exuding force. Continuous becoming of oneself is what Deleuze calls the "condition of sensation".

⁴⁴Events are changes immanent to a confluence of parts or elements, subsisting as pure virtualities (real inherent possibilities) and distinguishing themselves only in the course of their actualisation in some body or state. Events might be characterised as incorporeal transformations that subsist over and above the spatio-temporal world, but are expressible in language nonetheless. As the product of the synthesis of forces, events signify the internal dynamic of their interactions. For Deleuze, an event is not a particular state or happening itself, but something made actual in the State or happening. An event is the potential immanent within a particular confluence of forces. Let's take as an example of a tree's changing colour in the spring. For Deleuze, the event is not what evidently occurs (the tree becomes green) because this is merely a passing surface effect or expression of an event's actualisation, and thus of a particular confluence of bodies and other events (such as weather patterns, soil conditions, pigmentation effects and the circumstances of the original planting). Therefore, we should not say "the tree became green" or "the tree is now green", but rather "the tree *greens*". By using the infinitive form "*to green*", we make a dynamic attribution of the predicate, an incorporeality distinct from both the tree and green-ness which captures the dynamism of the event's actualisation. The event is not a disruption of some continuous state, but rather the state is constituted by events. Events mark every moment of the state as a transformation. For Deleuze, there is no distinct, particular thing without the events that define it as that particular, constituting its potential for change and rate of change. An event is unrelated to any material content, being without fixed structure, position, temporality or property, and without beginning or end. For Deleuze, an event is a sign or indicator of its genesis, and the expression of the productive potential of the forces from which it arose. As such, it highlights the momentary uniqueness of the nexus of forces. All events are marked by three characteristics: first, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary unity between the forces of its production, being instead the primitive effect or change generated at the moment of their interaction; second, events are produced neither in the image of some model nor as representative copies of a more fundamental reality, being instead wholly immanent, original and creative productions; third, as pure effect, an event has no goal. Furthermore, an event has neither a beginning nor an end point, but it is always "in the middle". Events themselves have no beginning- or end-point. Their relationship with Deleuze's notion of dynamic change — becoming — is neither one of "joining moments together" nor one in which an event is the "end" of one productive process, to be supplanted or supplemented by the next. Instead, becoming "moves through" an event, with the event representing just a momentary productive intensity. Events carry no determinate outcome, but only new possibilities.

7

HOW A MOVING BODY BECOMES

7.1 FORCE TAKING FORM: ONTOGENESIS OF BODY-BECOMING

Manning proposes that we move toward a notion of a "becoming-body that is a sensing body in movement, a body that resists predefinition in terms of subjectivity or identity, a body that is involved in a reciprocal reaching-toward that in-gathers the world even as it worlds" (Manning, 2009: 6). Bodying and worlding are two parallel processes; the body co-becomes with the world as the world co-becomes with the body. The body is not in the world — the body is a world itself, the body is its's own worlding, as well as one of world's worldings. Furthermore, "the body becomes through forces of recombination that compose its potential directionalities: When I take a step, how the step moves me is key to where I can go" (Manning, 2009: 6). As we move our bodies we are being moved by them. More importantly, as our body generates the movement, it is also being generated by it, taken by it, directed by it, as one of movement's potential directionalities: the body emerges as elastic point between the force and movement.

The dynamic form of a movement is its incipient potential. Bodies are thought as dynamic expressions of movement in its incipency. They have not yet converged into final form. The body emerges through the parallel process of force taking and leaving its form. "Incipient movement preaccelerates a body toward its becoming. Preacceleration refers to the virtual force of movement's taking form. It is the feeling of movement's in-gathering, a welling that propels the directionality of how movement moves. In dance, that is felt as the virtual momentum of a movement's taking form before we actually move. The pulsion toward directionality activates the force of a movement in its incipency. It does not necessarily foretell where a movement will go" (Manning, 2009: 6). One of the most important questions becomes the immanence of movement moving: how movement can be felt before it actualizes and not the form it takes upon actualizing.

Working from a perspective of incipient movement, Manning explores how force takes form through an elastic movement that is curved through inflection. "Inflection is a mathematical concept that demonstrates how lines are moved by nodal points that not only change the line's direction but also alter the parameters for its mapping. Inflection makes apparent how even a "still" can move as it curves with the force of

preacceleration: movement's elasticity is felt in its curving-through a nodal shift that redirects its force. This nodal shift is movement's elastic point" (Manning, 2009: 9). How to think the body itself as a web/map/diagram of elastic points, points in becoming? How to think the nodal shift as an event of becoming-elastic of the moving body? The moving body is an elastic point in becoming, always becoming another point, a line of points, and eventually, the elastic line. The moving body is an elastic line in becoming.

The elastic point is the creativity of movement in the making. The elastic point takes the body, as well as the movement, as far as they can go. Elastic points are elastic limits of body-becoming. It is the ontogenetic force through which becoming-form is felt. "Movement folds around this elastic point such that what is felt is not the point per se but the elasticity of its becoming. This is a topological sensation which is a paradox

¹Deleuze's ontology stands for a rigorous attempt to think of process and metamorphosis — becoming — not as a transition or transformation from one substance to another or a movement from one point to another, but rather as an attempt to think of the real as a process. It presupposes an initial substitution of forces for substances and things, and of lines for points. The real bifurcates in two inextricably interlinked processes — the virtual and the actual — neither one of which can exist without the other. Present states of affairs, as well as bodies with their qualities and mixtures, make up the actual real. Furthermore, incorporeal events constitute the virtual real. Its nature is to actualise itself without ever becoming depleted in actual states of affairs. The bifurcation of the real does not enshrine transcendence and univocity: becoming is said in one and the same sense of both the virtual and the actual. It should be also noted that there is no separation or ontological difference between the virtual and actual. Deleuze claims how the virtual is in the actual; it is conserved in the past in itself. Meditating on the notion of temporality, Deleuze retrieves the Bergsonian *durée*, working it into three interrelated syntheses: first, the time of habit; second, the time of memory; and third, the empty time of the future. Substituting force for substance, and thinking of processes in terms of series, calls for an ontology of multiplicities. This happens because force exists only in the plural — in the differential relation between forces. Series diverge, converge and conjoin only in the deterritorialisation of themselves, as well as other series. Within the Deleuzian ontology, multiplicities, unlike the "many" of traditional metaphysics, are not opposed to the one because they are not discrete (they are not multiplicities of discrete units or elements), with divisions and subdivisions leaving their natures unaffected. They are intensive multiplicities with subdivisions affecting their nature. Therefore, multiplicities have no need for a superimposed unity to be what they become. Forces determining their becoming operate from within — they do not need transcendent forces in order to function or become. The virtual is where the intensive multiplicities of singularities, series and time subsist; it is the virtual that is differentiated in terms of its intensive multiplicities. As the virtual actualises and differentiates itself the series it generates become discrete, without ever erasing the traces of the virtual inside the actual. The ontology of Deleuze is firmly anchored by difference, rather than being. Being stands for the *different/ciation* at work in the dynamic relationship between the virtual and the actual. Its actualisation occurs in a presence that can never be sufficient unto itself for three reasons: first, the actual carries the trace of the virtual difference that brought it about; second, actualisation differs from the "originary" difference; third, actualisation is pregnant with all the differences that the never-before-actualised virtual is capable of precipitating at any (and all) time(s).

in itself: a topology of experience is a force-form before it is a feeling. Still, when we feel this sensation of ontogenetic force-taking-form, we do tend to smile, laugh, or at least feel surprised by the event as it expresses us. Ontogenesis is a reminder not to get stuck in ontologies of being. Ontologies¹ must remain thresholds — from being to becoming" (Manning, 2009: 9).

To move is to engage the potential inherent in the preacceleration that embodies us. Preaccelerated because there can be no beginning or end to movement. As previously mentioned, we move not to populate space, not to extend it or to embody it, but to create it. Our preacceleration already colors space, vibrates it. Movement quantifies it, qualitatively. Space is duration with a difference. The difference is our body-worlding, following the thought of Erin Manning, always more than one. "Moving (together) is recomposing: volumes, always more than one, emerge from surfaces, recombining with lines, folding, bridging, knotting. This coming-together proposes a combination of form-forces where preacceleration potentially finds passage. The passage flows not in a preinscribed direction: this is an intensive flow. Preacceleration: a movement of the not-yet that composes the more-than-one that is my body. Call it incipient action" (Manning, 2009: 13). To move together, the connection must be alive. As we move, our bodies reconnect; we enter a relational shapeshifting.

7.2 BODYING AND SPACING: ABSOLUTE MOVEMENT

We don't move in the space, we create the space with the movement. Let's think these two examples of the body and the space taking form through movement:

1. "I enter a room and see that room as preexisting me. I walk across the room, drawing an imaginary line that cuts the space.
2. My movement creates the space I will come to understand as 'the room'. The room is defined as my body + the environment, where the environment is an atmospheric body. Without that particular moving body that particular environment does not exist" (Manning, 2009: 15).

In the first case, there is a clear distinction, as well as separation between the subject, a body and the object, a space. The object, a space — preexists the subject, a body. The body is that which *walks in* the space. The processes of formation, as well as those of creation — of body and space — are separated. In the second case, there is no separation between the subject, a body and the object, a space. There is no subject or object. There are subjectifications and objectifications — processes of becoming of subject and object as multiple and relational. There are subjectiles² and objectiles, textures, fields of potentiality, zones of indetermination of becomings of subject and object. There is no body or space. There are bodyings and spacings — co-creating one another. The body is not that which walks in the space. The body walks the space and the space walks back the body. The body is not in the space. The body is the space and the space is the body. The body does not move in the space. The body

²Derrida opens his essay on Artaud's drawings, "To Unsense the Subjectile", with a following note: "I would call this a scene, the 'scene of the subjectile,' if there were not already a force at work prepared to diminish the scenic elements: the visibility, the element of representation, the presence of a subject, even an object" (Derrida, 1998: 1). Artaud says in a letter written in 1932: "Herewith a bad drawing in which what is called the subjectile has betrayed me" (Derrida, 1998: 61). Thévenin suggests to Derrida that Artaud may be referring to a drawing of his which was ripped from a letter, perhaps, as Derrida argues, because it was revealing too much and in doing so it betrayed him. At the time of the 1932 statement, subjectile was not yet found in dictionaries. Artaud articulates the word at the limit before representation. Derrida consequently transforms the word *subjectile* into, itself, a subjectile. In painting, the subjectile is what is called underpainting, or *le dessous*. It is the treated support that absorbs paint or pigment and the surface that allows the paint to be seen; it is the medium and what it allows to show. For Artaud, the subjectile is more than this; it is a matter of how he will treat the subjectile, what he will make the word itself mean. Derrida writes: "Between the beneath and the above, it is at once a support and a surface, sometimes also the matter of a painting or a sculpture, everything distinct from form, as well as from meaning and representation, *subjectile* is not representable (Derrida, 1998: 64).

moves the space and the space moves the body. The processes of formation, as well as creation of body and space are intertwined. Most importantly, the body does not enter the room as already formed body. Walking the room is the process of formation of the body. Each step the body takes becomes the step that makes that body. The room is co-constitutive part of the moving body. The body is co-constitutive part of the room. As understood here, the body makes the internal organ of the body while the space makes the external organ of the body. What they make is not an organism. What they share is not an organization, but processes of organizing, or more precisely, reorganizing.

"In Umberto Boccioni's terms, the first way of thinking movement might be termed "relative movement" and the second "absolute movement". In the first instance of relative movement, the form preexists matter. The matter, our body, enters into the form, the room. Both body and room are pre-given in this instance. The room defines the limits of our body's potential. In the second instance of "absolute movement", individuation occurs in intimate connection between the moving body and its atmospheric potential" (Manning, 2009: 15). What makes the difference between the relative and the absolute movement is the following — the absolute movement is that which makes the body and the room. More precisely, the body and the absolute movement produce one another. The body and the room do not pre-exist the absolute movement, because their singular mode of becoming, their singular act of taking-form is created by it. Within the first way of thinking movement, relative movement does not make a co-constitutive process of a broader process of formation of body and room. Within the second way of thinking movement, absolute movement is the co-constitutive process of a broader process of formation of body and room, and not only that, absolute movement is the singular condition of their formation.

Furthermore, within the second way of thinking movement, "the room becomes configuring as the body recomposes. There is no "body itself" here because the body is always more than "itself", always reaching toward that which it is not yet. The not-yet takes form through the intensities of preacceleration that compel recompositions at the level of both strata, the body and the room. What this means is that both body and space are experienced as alive with potential movement. The body-room series takes on an infinite variety of potential velocities. These velocities take form at certain intervals, remaining virtual at others. The body-room stratum is therefore neither object nor form, but infinite potential for recombination. By its centrifugal direction, the form-force is the potential of the living form (Boccioni 1964, 48). Force taking form" (Manning, 2009: 15).

The body-room does not stand for the body and the room as two separate entities. What body-room stands for is two co-constitutive modes of becoming. Movement is that which generates the field of their co-constitutive modes of becoming. It is also that which activates the infinite potential for its recombination. The moving body is that which recombines — as bodying, spacing, rooming, etc. Movement moves the body toward that which it is not yet: the room reconfigures, the body recomposes — continuously.

7.3 IN THE BETWEEN OF INTERVALS: A FORM THAT LIVES

Another way to perceive the body, as well as the room is to perceive them as ongoing acts of reconfiguring and recomposing. The body-room is not only a living form, but also a form that lives, a form of life-living. This living form is both a force-form and

³According to Deleuze, we can only comprehend the notion of duration by using Bergson's method of philosophical intuition (*intuition philosophique*), a deliberate reflective awareness or willed self-consciousness. Intuition reveals consciousness (or, more generally, mental life) to be essentially temporal. Intuition also reveals ongoing mental activity that constitutes, in its dynamism and the mutual interpenetration of its states, a time internal to one's self. Mental life is a kind of flowing experience, and duration is the immediate awareness of this flow. Bergson believes that intuition's findings are best expressed in images, and explains duration by using analogies with music. According to Bergson, mental states flow together as if parts of a melody, with previous notes lingering and future ones anticipated in the unity of a piece, the permeation of each note by others revealing the extreme closeness of their interconnection. Any attempt to grasp this flow as a complete set of notes is pointless, because the music is always on the verge of ending and always altered by the addition of a new note. To speak of "mind" or "consciousness" as a comprehensive system is to ignore an analogous attribute of duration: it is always flowing, as well as overtaking what might be called the "not yet" and passing away in the "already". Bergson considers quantification of duration to be inconsistent with its lived reality. It can be contrasted with "clock time", the time of physics, which either spatialises time by situating elemental instants end-to-end on a referential grid or uses the digits of a time-piece as a crass and imprecise physical image. When arranged in accordance with these models, time becomes a series of separable instants, consciousness is "situated" in time as a series of temporally disparate mental states, and movement is thought in terms of relations between static positions. Clock time abstracts from the notion of duration by distorting its continuity. However, constitutive integration of moments of duration must not be overemphasised. Bergson's intuition also confirms that consciousness is not "one long thought", as it were, but a flowing together of mental states that are different from one another in important ways. Bergson contends that differences between mental states allow us to mark one kind of thought or one particular thought from another, while constituting simultaneously a singular flow, a merging of thoughts as one consciousness. As such, duration becomes the immediate awareness of the flow of changes that simultaneously constitute differences *and* relationships between particulars. Several characteristics of duration are critical for Deleuze's understanding of this concept. In his early work on Hume, Deleuze used duration as an explicatory tool, rendering anew Hume's accounts of habit, association and time. Deleuze adopts the concept of duration as a means for exploring difference and becoming as key elements of life. If duration "includes", as it were, all of the qualitative differences ("differences of kind") of one's lived experience, Deleuze claims, then it also emphasises the productive, liberating potential of these differences. Even in the continuity of one's consciousness, there is a disconnection between events that generates creativity and renewal. One is able to call upon new concepts to reinterpret one's memories or perceive some vista anew in the light of one's exposure to a work of art. Deleuze uses duration to make some challenging philosophical points about time and difference. For philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, time is both a form of receptive experience about the world and a necessary condition for any human experience. For Kant, time is not an empirical concept but an *a priori* necessity underlying all possible experience. Furthermore, Kant considers time to comprise a homogeneous series of successive instants, standing in need of synthesis. In contrast, duration is always present in the "givennes" of one's experience. Duration does not transcend experience, and neither must it be derived philosophically. Furthermore, unlike matter, duration cannot be divided into elements

it is a force taking-form. The temporal dimension of this act of singular form-taking is activated by different intervals: "The interval is duration expressed in movement. It is not something we create alone, or something we can recreate by ourselves. It exists in the between of movement. It accompanies our movement, yet is never passive. It activates the next incipient movement. The interval is the metastable quality through which the relation is felt. Many potential intensities populate it. It expresses itself as the shifting axis that connects us. The interval creates the potential for movement that is expressed by at least two bodies" (Manning, 2009: 17).

Interval can also be seen as the movement's score. As such, it is internal to movement and more importantly — it produces the movement, and at the same time — it is being produced by the movement. How? Interval creates and activates the expressivity of movement. However, within the act of expressing itself, or more precisely, exploring its own field of expressivity, movement is affected by the interval, but, at the same time, as movement happens, it affects the interval and recomposes it. As the movement changes, the interval changes too. This is felt as the metastable quality of interval activated through the field of relations — between the interval and the movement, movement and the body, the body and the room, etc. Another way to perceive the interval is to perceive it as fielding of the movement. Interval is not a static field of expressivity of movement, but more importantly — the fielding of movement's expressivity. The limits of movement are the limits of the expressivity of its interval. Interval is that which determines what a body can do, as well as become — as, through and in movement.

Duration³ is a way of thinking space-time qualitatively without subsuming it to a certain measuring out of space. Duration is the rendering of what Bergson calls intensive magnitudes: "pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number; it would be pure heterogeneity" (Bergson, 2002: 61). When space-time is no longer entered but instead created, it becomes possible to think the body-world as that which is generated by the potential of movement. Body is not entered, it is created. Organs are not entered, but created in and as pure heterogeneity. "Movement takes time. But movement also makes time" (Manning, 2009: 17). Movement takes body. But movement also makes body. "This which, when divided or reconstituted, remain the same in aggregate as their unified form. Duration, as lived experience, brings together, as well as intertwines both unity and difference in a flow of interconnections. According to Deleuze, these contrasts represent the difference between a dictatorial philosophy that creates "superior" concepts that subsume and order the multiplicities and creativity of life and one that creates opportunities for change and variety.

is why the displacement itself, the movement from a to b is not what is essential about movement. Movement is the qualitative multiplicity that folds, bends, extends the body, becoming toward a potential future that will always remain not-yet. This body-becoming (connecting, always) becomes-toward, always with: I move not you but the interval out of which our movement emerges. We move time relationally as we create space: we move space as we create time" (Manning, 2009: 17).

7.4 DANCING AT THE LIMITS OF MOVEMENT: FROM EXPRESSION TO EXPRESSIVITY

Movement is not only the qualitative multiplicity that folds, bends and extends the body itself, but more importantly — the interval of its becoming. What moves is the relation between the becoming-interval of body and becoming-body of interval. The body moving the field of its own expressivity, activated by interval, is a body-becoming. The body and the interval are becoming-toward one another, as well as becoming-with one another. What makes this possible is the action of movement. What interval generates, between two bodies in movement, is the event of becoming-between. As previously mentioned, those two bodies in movement do not move one another, but the interval out of which their movement emerges. The emergence of the movement is the emergence of the body too, because, as emphasized, movement does not take the body, but it also makes the body. To move the interval of emergence is to move the force-field of body's singular form-taking. When the body becomes a mobile form-force rather than a stable axis, anything is possible. Cunningham, and later Forsythe, seek not to capture the form-force of the body but to prolong the interval that emanates from this form-force to disarticulate what we often define as movement. The goal is not to displace but to create, to qualitatively change the composition (of the bodies, of space-time). This recombination is an active process that generates an event.

According to Whitehead, "every actual entity is what it is, and is with its definite status in the universe, determined by its internal relations [its interval] to other actual entities" (Whitehead, 1938: 59). Furthermore, "the interval is not a thing but a quality of light, speed, closeness, purpleness. In Whiteheadian terms, this means that the interval preexists all actual occasions, composing them but not perishing along with them (when they have become "satisfied")" (Manning, 2009: 20). If interval is the network of internal relations of one actual entity to other actual entities, or, one body (mineral, vegetal, animal, human, all those and neither of those at the same time) to another body, then interval can be also considered as a relationscape of the body. The body is that which relates. How it relates is defined, and, at the same time, defines its interval. How it can relate, the potential of its reconfiguring modes of relating — defines its relationscape.

As a quality, interval is highly dynamic, metastable, it is a quality-in-movement, a quality-in-becoming. For Whitehead and Manning, the interval preexists all actual occasions, composing them but not perishing along with them (once they have become

"satisfied"). I would like to argue this idea and offer a different understanding of interval. I think that interval does not preexist all actual occasions, composing them as already formed interval. I think that the interval and actual occasion form the relation, as well as the relational field of co-becoming. Actual occasion does not only take a certain quality, but it also makes a certain quality. Actual occasion is not only activated by a certain interval, but it also reactivates a certain interval. This movement of mutual change — emerging between the interval and actual occasion — is that which puts both of them into movement, catapulting them toward the notion, as well as experience of interval-in-movement. Movement moves the interval toward its multiplicity, toward its multiple planes of actualization. Movement moves the interval, its qualitative becoming, from one mode of expressivity to another, as well as from one plane of actualization to another.

Furthermore, "if we had to locate creativity, the interval could serve as its nexus. I cannot show you how to move my movement, but I can show you how to potentialize the interval to help extend your movement to its qualitative limit. This is what Forsythe means when he says that he must work with the dancers to help them find their movement. To find movement is to work with preacceleration. It is not that we will know the movement in a potential future, but that we will invent the now in a time-slip we will come to know as the just-before. This just-before will never be about an individual movement, but about the relation between preacceleration and motion, between an infinity of intervals apprehended in the not-yet of our quantitative displacement. When you're actually dancing, it is seldom that the principles occur in isolation" (Forsythe, 2003: 18).

In order to reach, as well as to extend the qualitative limit of a particular movement one must potentialize its interval. What does it mean for a dancer to find her or his movement? Do we find our movement once we reach, as well as extend its qualitative limits? To dance is to dance at the qualitative limit of movement. To dance is to dance at the very possibility of movement. More importantly, to dance is to dance the limits themselves — those qualitative ones, as well as those of the very possibility of movement. Once we start to dance those limits movement starts to move itself. Dancing those limits is also dancing the very possibility of movement-moving. What activates this dance is preacceleration, or, more precisely, the relation between movement and preacceleration, between the actual and virtual infinity of intervals. "The interval cannot be shaped as such. It creates a folding into which bodies capitulate, an opening into which we surge. Bodies become many-timed, many-spaced: Then your body would take over and dance at that point where you had no more idea. I see that as an idealized form of dancing: just not knowing and letting

the body dance you around" (Forsythe, 2003: 26). What interval catapults us to is multiplicity, or, more precisely, multiplicities, that of time and space. The body is not in the time or in the space. The body is the time and the space, as well as the multiplicity of time and space. With each step it takes, with each movement it makes — the body multiplies the time and the space. At the same time, it is being multiplied by them.

This experience generates another experience — that of not knowing and letting the body dance us around. When the body dances us around — the body dances itself as multiplicity in becoming. "The dance floor moves the dancers. The ground shifts, and through its shifting, bodies recompose. At any given moment you have to be able to say: What is the potential of this configuration of my body? The potential of a movement is its ability to dynamically extend many (potential bodies) from one (actual body)" (Manning, 2009: 21). Another way to see a body in movement is to see it as a shapeshifting multiplicity. The body is not alone in its shapeshifting. What actively makes the shapeshifting of a body is the shapeshifting of everything that surrounds it, for example, that of the dance floor, ground, space, movement, interval. The shift, or, more precisely, the action of shifting — catapults the body into the multiplicity. The action of shifting is also that which shifts the body from one actual body toward many potential bodies. At this specific moment, it does not matter what a body is, but what it can become — through the potential of body's configuration — here and now. The potential of body's configuration determines what a body — as multiple — can become. To *body* (verb) is to dynamically extend many potential bodies from one actual body.

7.5 INTERVAL AS INTENSIVE TECHNOLOGY: FROM CONNECTION TO CONNECTIVITY

According to Erin Manning, we don't start dancing. We dance. Time is not endured — movement does not last in time. Time is activated — because, as previously mentioned, movement makes time. To dance is not to make steps. The dance can only be made from the inside. The interval is prehended not in the displacement as such but in the event of being-connected: the interval is a connection machine. It connects the body to the plane of its becoming. This plane of becoming is always shared — between the body and the world. The interval reminds us that the body-world (in recombination) is a technology. It is a technology insofar as it is capable of accessing the connection machine, of creating the movements of thought that extend the interval across space-time. It is a technology insofar as it is a Body without Organs (BwO), "a body that is always more than its biological organization" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). There are several ways to think the body as a connection machine. First, the very act of being alive, the very act of breathing, or allowing the outside to come inside, via oxygen, defines the body as a connection machine. Second, there are senses that connect the body to the world. There is not a single instant of our life that our body is not being connected to the world. How we sense, as well as how we feel — defines how we bodily connect to the world. Third, our skin makes another connection machine — making the inside and the outside of the body communicate. Movement is integrative connection machine — putting all body's modes of being a connection machine into relation. Interval is not only a connection machine, but more importantly, that which defines the very connectivity of the body.

Furthermore, "the interval is a technology of the body-becoming: organic insofar as it qualitatively alters the molecular and molar composites that make up our experience of space-time, prosthetic in the sense that the body is populated by senses that extend the regions of the body beyond its organic envelope to "technologically" connect it to its process of worlding. In this process of worlding, what exactly is prosthetic and what is biological is contestable: processes of relay are always at once machinic and biological, organic, and technological. Ontogenetic bodies as pure plastic rhythm are always recomposing, proposing relations between series. Movement is a technology of the becoming-body" (Manning, 2009: 24). What makes the interval a technology of the body-becoming is precisely its role of unlimited field of body's connectivity. When the body connects through the interval — it also connects to a singular mode of reorganizing at the molecular and molar level. It is not that only the process of formation of the body is altered, but what makes the body, its molar and

molecular composites, are altered too. Interval also extends the body, it takes the body, at all of its levels, as far as the body, in its making, can go. Interval is not only the technology of the body, but more importantly, technology emerging from the body, as

⁴The concept of "repetition", as it appears in the Deleuzian corpus, relates to a variety of other concepts such as "difference", "differentiation", "deterritorialisation", and "becoming". It should be noted that for Deleuze, repetition is not a matter of the same thing occurring over and over again. Repetition is connected to the power of difference in terms of a productive process that produces variation in and through every repetition. In this way, repetition is best understood in terms of discovery and experimentation because it allows new experiences, affects and expressions to emerge. To repeat is to begin again; it is to affirm the power of the new and the unforeseeable. In so far as life itself is described as a dynamic and active force of repetition generating difference, the force of which Deleuze encourages us to think of in terms of "becoming", forces incorporate difference as they repeat giving rise to mutation. The first question that arises is: how is repetition produced? For Deleuze, repetition is produced through difference, not mimesis. It stands for a process of ungrounding that resists turning into an inert system of replication. The whole Platonist idea of repeating in order to produce copies is completely undermined by Deleuze. Deleuze maintains this approach that is deeply flawed because it subsumes the creative nature of difference under an immobile system of resemblance. Deleuze rejects to seek for an originary point out of which repetition can cyclically reproduce itself. He insists that the process does not depend upon a subject or object that repeats, but that is self-sustainable. While repetition is potentially infinite, consisting of new beginnings, it is crucial we do not mistake this to be a linear sequence: the end of one cycle marking the beginning of the next. In his discussions of Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return, Deleuze turns his back on a teleological understanding of repetition condemning such interpretations to be flawed. Instead, Deleuze insists that the process Nietzsche outlines is considerably more complicated than that: the return is an active affirmation that intensifies as it returns. In other words, heterogeneity arises out of intensity. The return points to a whole that emerges through difference and variation: one and the multiple in combination. In his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze explains in his work *Difference and Repetition* that this is the "power of beginning and beginning again" (Deleuze, 1994: 136). This leads to the second question: What is repeated? It is important to note that repetition is not unidirectional, there is no object of repetition, no final goal toward which everything that repeats can be said to direct itself. What repeats is not models, styles or identities, but the full force of difference in and of itself, those pre-individual singularities that radically maximise difference on a plane of immanence. In an early essay from 1956 on Henri Bergson, Deleuze insists repetition is more a matter of coexistence than succession, which is to say, repetition is more virtual than it is actual. It is this understanding of the process of difference and differentiation that mutates the context through which repetition occurs. Therefore, in a very real sense, repetition is a creative activity of transformation. When Deleuze speaks of the "new" that repetition invokes, he is likewise pointing to creativity, while habit and convention are both destabilised. The "new" is filled with innovation and actually prevents the trap of routines and clichés; the latter characterise habitual ways of living. As a power of the new, repetition calls forth a sense of novelty and unfamiliarity. This is a far cry from Sigmund Freud who posited that we compulsively repeat the past, where all the material of our repressed unconscious pushes us to reiterate the past in all its discomfort and pain. Furthermore, psychoanalysis limits repetition to representation, and what therapy aims to do is stop the process entirely along with the disorders it gives rise to. Deleuze, on the other hand, encourages us to repeat because he sees in it the possibility of reinvention, or more precisely, repetition dissolves identities as it changes them, giving rise to something unrecognisable and productive. It is for this reason that he holds repetition for a positive power (*puissance*) of transformation.

well as with it. This technology is not a static or finished one, but exactly the opposite, a kinetic and dynamic one, a technology in becoming. This technology is not only extensive, but more importantly — intensive one.

According to Manning, the process of movement goes something like this: preacceleration — relation — interval — intensification — actualization — extension — displacement — preacceleration. Simultaneity of experience creates sensing bodies in movement shifting space-times of experience. To repeat is to act, to live the interval. Repetition⁴ is forgetting (in the Nietzschean sense): preacceleration not to find a previously lost displacement but to encounter the potential of what is not-yet. Repetition must remember relation while it actively forgets past combinations. Therefore, relation must be reinvented. To dance relationally is not to represent movement but to actively create it.

How to awaken the interval? "To create movement for the sake of movement, Merce Cunningham adopts randomness as a choreographic method and decomposes sequences of movement by multiplying traditional articulations" (Gil, 2002: 118). In this particular case, randomness becomes a way of awakening the interval, shifting the focus from the body as subject to the production of movement itself. "This production of movement potentially becomes a recomposition of the body not as subject but as collective individuation. The goal is to break the patterns of personal remembered physical coordinations (Cunningham, 1951: 59). Movement is no longer asked to express something outside it: movement becomes its own artwork (*oeuvre*)" (Manning, 2009: 26). The body — being recomposed by the movement as collective individuation — is a body that is more-than one. We are not witnessing only the decomposition of movement sequences, but also the recomposition of body's anatomic sequences. Here, body parts figure as sequences. Both sequences of movements and those of body parts — simultaneously decompose and co-become. Furthermore, as movement moves, and body *bodies* (verb) — body parts transform into movements and movements transform into body parts.

Mobile axes represent the specialty of the interval that can morph and recompose at will. According to Manning, the stable axis of Cartesian geometry never creates movement⁵: it produces displacement. To create movement requires a metastable sense

⁵In *The Fold*, Gilles Deleuze sketches out an aesthetics of variable curvilinear shapes and forms in non-Euclidean geometric spaces. "Non-Euclidean" may be equated here with dynamic, vectorial, transitional, or durational spaces that do not fit into the Cartesian triple-axis coordinate space. The visual surface in curving space is *transpositional*, meaning that it *transcends* Cartesian point-positions in space. It reflects the unending movement of flat, asymptotic spheres and distorted hyperbolic planes.

of balance, the extrusion of a line into a plane; it requires the energetic recomposition. The interval is that which adds the potential for energetic recomposition of the body that becomes a materiality-in-movement. The preaccelerated state of matter generates not a displacement but an event of form-taking that in-forms the body more than it displaces it. Following the line of thought of Manning, we should think of displacement not as a movement through space but as a movement-with the space. We do not move through the space as already known, but with the space being formed-with our body in movement — here and now. Forming and deforming, composing and recomposing — the moving body is that which exfoliates between forms and compositions not-yet and yet-to-come.

What Gil calls the plane of immanence⁶ is the interval. As understood here, interval is that which "populates the dance and makes tangible, through dance, how movement operates. It underscores the fact that movement is never displacement. Movement is incipient action: a dance of the not-yet. To dance is to create immanence through movement" (Manning, 2009: 30). Interval is also that which opens the dance toward its multiplicity. This multiplicity is actual and virtual. The interval generates, enhances and expands the field of virtual of a moving body. Out of this virtual field, the field of coming-to-be and yet-to-come, body's multiplicities emerge. The interval does not only generate this process, but also makes this process felt. It does not only make tangible how the movement operates, but also how the body forms, or, how the operating of movement produces body's in-forming. The movement is never displacement because we move all the time. Even when we are not perceptive of it — there is an infinite number of different modes of moving populating every individual body — here and now. The interiority of the body is that which moves

⁶Immanence, for Deleuze, refers to the ontological status of difference, while the plane of immanence refers to the absolute milieu upon which concepts are developed, as well as a movement that encompasses all blocs of space-time (in distinction from chaos, which as an ultimate disconnection of directional forces, has infinite speed). In Deleuze and Guattari's definition of philosophy, plane of immanence stands for the unlimited milieu which enables connections and linkages of concepts. Rather than functioning as a representation or image of thought that could be referenced (which would legitimate thoughts or place them within a structural system), plane of immanence is the domain that enables thoughts to connect and vary, which is not itself "thinkable". It also denotes an infinite movement that cannot be thought, in distinction from the infinite speed of the intensive concept that has subjective self-referents. Plane of immanence also denotes the Outside. According to Deleuze and Guattari: "Every plane of immanence is a One-All: it is [...] distributive [...]" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 50). Furthermore: "the problem of thought is infinite speed. But this speed requires a milieu that moves infinitely in itself — the plane [of immanence], the void, the horizon. [...] [T]he plane [of immanence] is the formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 36). Moreover: "The plane of immanence is [...] that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 59).

all the time, and this interiority is also that which moves the exteriority of the body. At the molecular level, the body never stops moving and this molecular plane is the plane where the infinite modes of moving are taking place. The molecule does not move from one place to another. Every time a molecule moves it actively creates a body. Therefore, movement is a generative process. The body cannot move from one place to another. When a single molecule moves, or when the body in its totality moves, it moves from one mode of bodying to another. To move is to build the body, to create it, transform it, reorganize it, invent it. The dance of not-yet can therefore also be seen as a dance of "what a body can become", a dance of bodyings, a dance of one mode of bodying connecting to another mode of bodying, and finally — a dance of one mode of bodying becoming another mode of bodying or other modes of bodying. This dance of extracting many out of one, of extracting bodyings out of body, and most importantly — of extracting becomings out of being — is a dance of relations.

7.6 WHEN EDGES START TO DANCE: RELATIONAL BODIES OR BODIES IN-BETWEEN

How to think the relational movement as a tool, as well as a condition of this multiple process of extraction? Erin Manning gives the following definition of relational movement emerging between her and her partner: "Relational movement means moving the relation. We walk. I am leading. But that does not mean I am deciding. Leading is more like initiating an opening, entering the gap, then following her response. How I follow, with what intensity we create the space, will influence how our bodies move together. I am not moving her, nor is she simply responding to me: we are beginning to move relationally, creating an interval that we move together. The more we connect to this becoming-movement, the more palpable the interval becomes. We begin to feel the relation" (Manning, 2009: 30). What does it mean to move the relation? To move the relation means to shift the body from one mode to bodying to another. To move the relation also means to create a relational body. How? The process of formation of the body is the process of becoming-movement of the body. Movement makes the body. Body is movement. Relational movement creates a relational body. Relational body is a chiasm. As Michel Bernard says, dance is the art of chiasm. In this particular case, relational movement is the condition of chiasm. When the act of "moving the relation" initiates an opening, the relational body enters the gap and furthermore — it enters the state of chiasm. One body is not moving the other body, but they move relationally and therefore — co-become. The becoming of moving is also the becoming of body. Becoming-relational of movement is becoming-relational of body. Two bodies, being both one and many, form the third, relational body, a chiasm. This thirdness, this shared mode of bodying and being bodied, is interval two bodies create and move together. The more they connect to this interval, the more they co-become. Furthermore, relational movement is always improvisational. For sustained improvisation, constraint is that which is essential. What the constraint of the movement allows is a particular texture of a shared interval. What that constraint creates is the possibility of a shared step, shared movement, shared bodying, a chiasm. To displace another body is to move-to, to move the relation is to move-with. Relational body is a body-with.

"The essence of relational movement is the creation of a virtual node, an in-between that propels the dance, that informs the grace that is not strictly of the body but of the movement itself. This spiral is intensive, it does not move away, it moves-with. Moving-with, our bodies spin together, turning on a shared axis that emerges out of the movement itself" (Manning, 2009: 31). This virtual node,

this node-between creates a completely new plane of immanence of what a body, as well as movement can do. Moving-with opens up the space of intercorporeal chiasm where the body appears as the joint force. Furthermore, "what occurs is a qualitative reshaping of a force. Taking form through the preacceleration of the movement, the interval folds into an intensive expansion, languidly "holding" the movement. This holding is not structural: it is elastic. It is almost the next movement, almost the next axis, almost the next equilibrium, but not quite yet. This elasticity of the almost is the intensive extension of the movement, a moment when anything can happen, when our bodies are poised in a togetherness beginning to take shape. The next movement has not yet come, the past movement is passing. No step has been taken, and yet in this elastic the microperception of every possible step can almost be felt" (Manning, 2009: 32). The interval makes the force-field of movement. That field-in-movement is elastic and populated by multiple forces. The folding of the force determines how the body takes form. The making of movement becomes the taking form of the body. This parallel making of movement and making of body is marked by the elasticity of not-yet.

The question of folding is a question of the curve. According to Leibniz, the curvature of the universe expresses itself in three fundamental notions: the fluidity of matter, the elasticity of bodies, elasticity as mechanism. Matter springs into curvature and, furthermore, it curves because force acts upon it. The body is not only fluid and elastic at the level of its matter, but more importantly, at the level of its creation, formation, operation. The processes of making, as well as becoming of body are elastic. More precisely, all those processes are marked by the elasticity of relation. So, how to move this relation itself in order to recreate it and reinvent it? According to Erin Manning: "Moving the relation moves not a person but the elasticity of relation. We move-with the togetherness of a curving that fields metastable equilibriums. This does not mean that we never lose our balance. It means that balance can no longer be thought as something to be lost or gained: there is no stable axis around which I lead her for us to "lose". We curve together, creating a folding interval out of which pure plastic rhythms begin to take form. Folding undoes the finality of form. Form becomes a folding-into, a force-toward that is a threshold, a becoming-spiral, a becoming-turn, a becoming-triangle. These are forms-in-making, resonant only in relation to the movements they give rise to" (Manning, 2009: 33). At the same time, relation does and does not belong to the body. At the same time, relation is felt inside, outside and most importantly — in-between. Relation makes the idea of beginning and the end of the body — at the level of its edges — impossible. Relation is a movable edge, fluid edge, porous edge. Relation is that which pushes the body toward its limit, and

at the same time, is the body's limit — at the level of each and every nanosecond — becoming another limit, moving, breathing, dancing itself. Relation is that which makes the body move beyond its limits. Therefore, as Manning said, it does not move the person, but the field of what a singular body can become, as well as all of its virtual modes of becoming. The relation is more plastic than elastic. The idea of elastic suggests the necessity of returning to the initial state. Within the realm of relations, as well as relational becomings, the idea of return does not exist. The only thing that exists is the one of going further on, taking the form we have never taken before, dancing our body we have never danced it before. The relation is plastic because it transforms — continuously, and most importantly — it always transforms anew — as relation-in-making.

It is not only the speed of the movement that keeps form from holding to a step. According to Manning, it is incipient movement's wave, of which the elastic is the emergent force. As the wave forms, we feel an interval creating itself. The waving of interval propels the body. Through the interval, we feel the emergent force of elasticity, the becoming-form of a relational movement. As the elasticity contracts, the impetus for becoming-form is infinite. This act, the act of moving the relation is populated by numerous microperceptions: "When we move the relation, we are creating and harnessing microperceptions that express themselves (virtually) in every movement. It is not that they preexist the movement, or that they can be called forth as such. They are the potential that is felt in the incipency of the action, the potential that transduces matter into form. Mattering-form is movement not as identifiable figuration but as intensive figure. Figure as force taking form, as movement-with that shapes bodies-in-making. An intensive figure does not represent. It durationally evokes. It provokes and propels. A figure is active transience from one form to another, a molecular, mattering-form that transduces" (Manning, 2009: 33). Microperceptions are emergent perceptions and they challenge, as well as extend the field of body's perceptivity. Microperceptions are also those that push to the limit body's capacity to perceive. The body is not only that which perceives, but also that which becomes perceptive of. The question of becoming-perceptive of is the question of microperceptions. Becoming-perceptive of is a state evoked by the event of microperceptions. The limits of our perception are the limits of our movement. The limits of our movement are the limits of our body. Perception determines the qualitative becoming of movement, movement determines the qualitative becoming of body. In order to rediscover what a singular body can do, as well as become — in, through and as movement, it is important to rediscover what it can perceive, and more importantly — how it can perceive, or make itself perceptive of — of the imperceptible.

7.7 STEPPING-INTO THE STEP: SENSING-TOWARD, SENSING-WITH, MOVING-INTO THE RELATION

Referring to Cézanne's idea of the figure producing sensation, Deleuze writes: "The figure is the sensible form related to a sensation; it acts immediately on the nervous system, which is of the flesh" (Deleuze, 2003: 31). The nervous system runs through the entire body, therefore, sensation takes the entire body. When sensing, there is not a single part of the body that is not participating in the sensation-in-making. Sensation is that which emerges between the body and the figure; within the figure the making of sensation becomes the making of body. According to Deleuze, there are two ways of going beyond figuration (that is, beyond both the illustrative and the figurative): either toward abstract form or toward the Figure. The Figure is the sensible form related to flows. Furthermore, the figure is "[...] the diagram acted by imposing a zone of objective indiscernibility or indeterminability between two forms [...]. And between the two, it imposes the Figure [...]" (Deleuze, 2003: 157). The indeterminability between two forms does not only make the essence of Figure, but also the essence of relational body in movement. To move the relation, in-between two bodies, is to move the becoming of sensation.

Sensation is what is produced, however, not as a sensation of, but as a sensing-toward and a sensing-with. When we move relationally we sense not the step *per se*, but we sense, what Manning calls, the intensity of an opening, the gathering up of forces toward the creation of space-times of experience into which we move. The step is not only that which moves-toward, but more importantly, it moves-into. When we talk about the experience of moving-into, we are talking about the experience of opening. The opening of the movement generates the opening of the body, which, furthermore, generates the opening of relation. The intensity of that opening determines the intensity of forces surging and passing through becoming body. The body does not take a step. The body opens itself to a step. The step is a mode of arriving. The step is a mode of receiving the event, and furthermore, walking it. Walking body is not a body displacing itself, but a body stepping into an event. When we make a step — we don't move from one point in the space to another, but we move from one mode of sensing our body to another. We step outside of one mode of being our body and step into the other mode of being our body. To make a step is to choose a mode of being. How we make that step determines what we become — here and now. To make a step is to step into the singular experience of space and time that exists only within that step. Each step is singular, irreducible and non-repeatable.

Each step is a singular state, a singular moment. Therefore, every time we make a step — we change our state, as well as the spatial and temporal axes of that state.

The shape of the movement is an event. To walk is to shapeshift the step. Each step is a sensation that a body steps into. How do we make sensation move beyond its limit? As the movement, in this case, a step, deforms, it steps into its own force-field of becoming. It does not only step into but, but it walks it, it takes it as far as it can go. The rhythm is that which enhances the qualitative, as well as quantitative transformation of movement's force-field of becoming. The rhythm is also that which opens a movement, a single step, for example, toward the multiplicity of its becoming. To rhythm (verb) is to move-with the becoming.

One of the ways to activate the interval is to activate is through the rhythm. More precisely, rhythm is that which activates the interval and interval is that which activates the sensation. Rhythm, at the same time, generative and regenerative force of interval, and furthermore, its associated milieu, is not only the transducer, but also a proto-transformer of sensation. Rhythm does not denote the sphere of a body (a single entity), but exactly the opposite, the sphere of bodies (a multiplicity). To change the rhythm is to change the body, or mode precisely, a mode of becoming a body, here and now. Rhythm is also a passage from one body to another, from one bodying to another, from one mode of becoming a body to another.

7.8 FOLDING-INTO THE ELASTIC POINT, STEPPING-INTO THE VIRTUAL

Relational movement produces a curvature. "The law of curvature is the law of folds⁷, and folds have a tendency to refold, to pleat, to crease, to wrinkle. The curve does not result from the movement. The curve *is* the movement" (Manning, 2009: 35). According to Manning, the elasticity makes a part of the curve. More precisely, it makes the curve's point of inflection. "Inflection is the elastic point" (Deleuze, 1988a: 20). Furthermore, inflection is the genetic element of the active line; it is the

⁷The concept of the fold allows Deleuze to think creatively about the production of subjectivity, and ultimately about the possibilities for, and production of, non-human forms of subjectivity. On one level the fold is a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity, that presume a simple interiority and exteriority (appearance and essence, or surface and depth). The fold is that which announces that the inside is nothing more than a fold of the outside. Deleuze uses Foucault's vivid illustration of this relation, that being the Renaissance madman, who, in being put to sea in a ship becomes a passenger, or prisoner in the interior of the exterior; the fold of the sea. In Deleuze's reading of Foucault, this picture becomes increasingly complex. There is a variety of modalities of folds: from the fold of our material selves, our bodies, to the folding of time, or memory. Subjectivity might be understood as precisely a topology of these different kinds of folds. From that point of view, the fold can also be understood as the name for one's relation to oneself (or, the effect of the self *on* the self). The Greeks were the first to discover, and deploy, this technique of folding, which they also considered as technique of "self mastery". Greeks invented subjectivation taken to mean the self-production of one's subjectivity. Certain cultures, such as Christianity, have invented their own forms of subjectivation, or their own kinds of foldings; and of course it might be said that our own time has its own folds, or even that it requires new ones. This imbues the fold with explicitly ethical and political dimensions, for as Deleuze claims, the emergence of new kinds of struggle inevitably also involves the production of new kinds of subjectivity, or new kinds of fold). In relation to Deleuze's use of Foucault and Leibniz, the fold names the relationship — one entailing domination — of oneself to (and "over") one's "self". One's subjectivity for Deleuze is a kind of Nietzschean mastery over the swarm of one's being. This can be thought as a question of ownership, or of folding. To "have" is to fold that which is outside on the inside. In *The Fold*, we are offered other diagrams of our subjectivity. For example, there is the two-floored baroque house. The lower floor of the baroque house, or the regime of matter, is in and of the world, receiving the world's imprint as it were; here matter is folded in the manner of origami, whereby caverns containing other caverns, in turn contain further caverns. The world appears as superabundant, like a lake teeming with fish, with smaller fish between these fish, and so on *ad infinitum*. There is no fixed boundary between the organic and the inorganic here as each is folded into the other in a continuous texturology. The upper chamber of the house is closed in on itself, without window or opening. This upper chamber contains innate ideas, the folds of the soul, or if we were to follow Guattari here, this might be described as the incorporeal aspect of our subjectivity. There is also the fold between these two floors which is like one's style in the world, or indeed the style of a work of art. The upper chamber paradoxically "contains" the whole world folded within itself. This world stands for one amongst many "possible worlds" each as different as the beings that express them. For example, the world of a tick, is different from that of a human, involving as it does just the perception of light, the smell of its prey and the tactile sensation of where best to burrow. This does not stand for the tick's representation of the world but the world's expression, or folding in, of the tick. As with Deleuze's book

point of the movement. Inflection is that which extracts from the movement's potential its becoming-form.

The elasticity of the point of inflection makes it a point of transformation and reorganization. Elastic point is a point that inflects, changes, transforms, reorganizes — becoming another point, fluctuating along another line of becoming. Elastic point, a folding point, an inflecting point, a point in movement — determines the body's plane of composition. More precisely, it does not only determine the planes of becoming-curve and becoming-inflection of movement, but also becoming-elastic of a moving body. The becoming body is a body riding waves of elasticity. Those waves, as well as curves, folds and inflections form the singular event of elasticity, the elasticity of almost. Within the elastic moment, the movement becomes more-than, enveloping in its folds all of the potential of its pastness and its futurity. Elasticity of the almost is an opening into the virtual — the body is exploring that which is not-yet, as well as movement's unlimited potential of actualization in a moment yet-to-come. Elastic movement is a movement exploring what a movement itself can do, as well as become. To move the elasticity of a relation is to move the very edges of virtual, and furthermore, to dance at the edges of virtual. Elastic point is dual point, it is both actual and virtual. We don't step on the elastic point. We can only step into it, and once we step into it, we step into the virtual itself.

As the elasticity of the movement — curving, folding, inflecting, becoming itself — makes itself felt, we also feel the completion of what Whitehead calls the subjective form of the event. According to Whitehead, the event is both vibration as action. The event as such never fully actualizes, since the actual is always charged with the virtual. This charge is what gives the movement its complexity. Without this charge, without the virtual, the movement would simply be a displacement, a falling into step. With this charge, the movement becomes an opening, the making of the step which becomes the making of the body, or even better, a step into falling. A step into falling figures here as a step into becoming.

The elasticity of the almost also marks a field of moving in, as and through textures. At the same time, it is a field of body's textual becomings. Within this field, one and many come together, and furthermore — express themselves as an

on Foucault, certain parts of his Leibniz book attend to future foldings. Deleuze highlights the possibility of a new kind of harmony, or fold, between the two floors of our subjectivity. This new kind of fold affects an opening up of the closed chamber of the upper floor and the concomitant affirmation of difference, contact and communication. Recalling his book on Foucault, here we might say that these new foldings are simply the name for those new kinds of subjectivity that emerged in the 1960s, in the various experiments in communal living, drug use and sexuality, as well as in the emergence of new prosthetic technologies.

infinity in movement. Elastic point is a heterogeneous point. Elastic point is a point of becoming-unlimited of a moving body. Within this point, infinite number of movements or subjectivities grow and move together. Elastic point is a relational point or the one that moves the relation between the one and many, formed experience and pure experience, actual and virtual, as well as the actualization or revirtualization of the experience. It is not only a double point, but also a double event, becoming and perishing.

The different planes that compose a given movement can be seen as modes⁸. The movement composes itself — composing each of its modes, as well as planes of composition — in its own singular way. When a mode or a plane of composition fulfills its process, another mode or plane of composition takes over. "In relational movement, modes would include preacceleration, intervals, spirals. The planes of movement are felt in the shifting of preacceleration toward the creation of an interval (moving the relation) through the propelling of a spiral, curving into the elastic point toward the becoming-form of the almost, leading back into preacceleration" (Manning, 2009: 39). The plane of movement, being heterogeneous, consists of infinite modes of movement-moving. The plane of movement, or more precisely, planes of movement, activate that infinity of modes, and furthermore — create an even of movement-becoming.

How to think the event of relational movement? Who moves and who is being moved by relational movement? "The event created by relational movement is not only concerned with two dancers. An occasion of experience always carries the many in the one. The modes of functioning that make the experience palpable jointly constitute its process of becoming. These modes can never be separated out from the worlding of the

⁸In Deleuze's view, the concept of mode involves the unique capacity for human beings to comprehend causality and act through this comprehension, therefore extending their power (and expressing the parallelism of the attributes). Deleuze uses the term in his reading of Spinoza, but also to explain both univocity and intensity: because the attributes qualify substances, the role of the modes is to modify the attributes in a quantitative fashion — they are therefore distinguished by virtue of intensity or power rather than quality. In Spinoza's work, mode stands for the essence and/or existence of something insofar as it is limited by others of its kind (that is, as a modification of the same attribute) and is conceived within something else (finite thoughts in the mind, bodies in extension). The concept of mode also stands for that which exercises a capacity or power of affecting and being affected and serves as the basis for ethical determinations: "by mode I understand [...] that which is in something else, through which it is also conceived" (Spinoza, 2000: 75). The idea of modal essence represents the intensive reality of a mode which may or may not correspond to an existing mode: "Modal essences are thus distinguished from their attribute as intensities of its quality and from one another as different degrees of intensity" (Deleuze, 1992: 197). Furthermore: "modal distinction [...] is established between being or the attributes on the one hand, and the intensive variations of which these are capable on the other" (Deleuze, 1994: 49, 39).

event: each event contains the world within it. The relationality of relational movement moves the world as much as the world moves through it. The becoming-body is the composition of a relation. In its taking form this becoming-body is always relational, produced in the between of the mobile relation (Manning, 2009: 40). The event of relational movement integrates the one and the many — at the level of each body, and more importantly — between them. In another, there is a multiplicity — within the interiority, exteriority and most importantly — between the bodies. Relational movement is that which moves between, but also — moves the between. The between marks another elastic point of body's becoming. To be between is to become relational as well as to relationally co-become. The body becomes with the world, its worlds the world and is being worlded by it. Each movement represents a singular mode of

⁹Deleuze mobilises the concept of variation in order to show that existence is not characterised primarily by unities, but rather by a continual sense of movement and change. That is, to recall the philosopher Heraclitus as Deleuze does, being is becoming. The unities and structures that we find in life are therefore the result of organising this fundamental movement, and not the other way around. Deleuze offers various examples for the concept of "variation" in his work, one of which is music. Music is usually understood on the basis of scales that are fixed moments of pitch extracted from the whole range of frequencies. In western music, there also exists the concept of the octave that divides sound up into repeatable scalar units. According to Deleuze, we must consider these structures to be secondary in relation to the movement of sound itself, which has no intrinsic notes or scales. There is, essentially, only the continuous variation of pitch — a pure movement of difference without identity. For Deleuze, if we examine language use, we do not find the fixed categories of a logical grammar or innate structure. The use of words is always shifting around, depending on the context of its use. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe this phenomena as the inherent variability of language. Language use does not remain fixed but is fluid is the very nature of language itself. There is also the example of space. Deleuze and Guattari state the opposition between smooth and striated space. Smooth space stands for the type of space in which there are no fixed points or boundaries, and in which movement is uninhibited. In smooth space, movement makes the continuous variation. Striated space is structured and organised, creating fixed points and limits between what movements can be undertaken. As a result, there is a sense that the nature and construction of certain spaces forms one of the primary concerns of politics, since smooth space is by definition the space of freedom. On a more elementary level, nature itself for Deleuze is continuous variation. Therefore, even animal species must be understood in terms of a movement of life which has been structured into localised patterns of stability. The central point with regard to variation in Deleuze's work comes in connection to the theme of difference-in-itself, pursued most systematically in *Difference and Repetition*. Instead of seeing difference as a difference between two things, difference must be thought of as the continual movement of self-differing, like the continual variation of a sound rising and lowering in pitch without stopping at notes in a scale. Difference is continuous variation. This stands in contrast to the bulk of the western tradition of philosophy since *Parmenides* that from the outset postulates a primary identity. The whole of Deleuze's work is in this sense based upon the primary value he gives to continuous variation. Therefore, Deleuze's books and concepts must also be considered according to the principle of continuous variation. No one on its own can be considered to be definitive, but each works best when placed alongside his other texts and concepts, that vary from each other, outlining the movement of his thought rather than the doctrines that he embraces along the way.

body's worlding. What a body can do, as well as become, depends on the composition of its worldings and most importantly — relations. This intensive body, this intensive bodying of relations, emerges through the elasticity of its worlding, its becoming-with.

The characteristic of relation is that it is always elastic. Relational movement makes this elasticity felt, and furthermore — it actualizes it in an almost-form that takes shape — here and now. Relational movement emerges as affective, as well as compositional fluidity in the between of constraint and improvisation. Each of these modes — constraint and improvisation — acts both as closing and opening. "We do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor to the extent of our power, writes Spinoza. How could we know this in advance?" (Spinoza, in: Deleuze, 1990a: 226). Modes emerge and shift according to the specificity of the relation, transforming it and opening it to new modes. "Modes in this sense can be thought of as techniques of relation. These techniques of relation are operational in the sense that they open the way for relation to be experienced" (Manning, 2009: 41). Furthermore, "while a mode exists, its very essence is open to variation⁹, according to the affections that belong to it at a given moment" (Deleuze, 1990a: 225 — 226). To enter a relation is to enter a singular mode of being a body. Modes, interpreted here as techniques of relation, open up the way for the relationality of the body to be felt. More importantly, they also open the way for the multiplicity of the body to be experienced. Modes are not only body's fields of connectivity, but also connectors — between different modes, and therefore, different fields of events.

Techniques of relation produce events. Therefore, every event is relational. What is emerging is co-creation — events create relation as much as relation creates events. It is not possible to know in advance what an event can do, any more than we can know what a body can do or become. Spinoza's question will remain unanswered; to know what a body is capable of would be to divest a body of its elasticity. "The essence of a technique of relation is not its content *per se* but its capacity to become more-than and to create more-than" (Manning, 2009: 41). The capacity to become, as well as create more-than opens up the question of conatus. A conatus is a mode's essence or degree of power. Conatus¹⁰ is a way of creating "more-than". "To create more-than is to move beyond what it seemed a body could do" (Manning, 2009: 42). A conatus, a mode's degree of power, is never fixed or finished. As the body moves

¹⁰Spinoza calls *conatus* the desire to become and to increase the intensity of one's becoming. More precisely, in Spinoza's work, *conatus* is defined as the desire to actualise one's power of becoming. For Deleuze, desire is as an affirmative, non-intentional intensity, producing connections — real in their function and revolutionary in their multiplicity. Deleuze's concept of desire is modelled after Spinoza's concept of *conatus*; it is neither a "want" nor "lack" but

beyond, the conatus moves beyond too, reaching toward a new limit. This limit is in movement; it is an elastic limit, always becoming.

the effort of an individual entity to persevere in its own existence. Spinoza thinks of *conatus* as being determined by its capacity to affect and to be affected; it is not, therefore, difficult to think of *conatus* as desire. Provided that we do not separate essence from action, a *conatus* can be also understood as the essence of an entity or its degree of power. Actions themselves constitute a person's affirmation of life and therefore, his or her will to exist.

8

COMING-INTO-BEING OF BODY'S ORGANIZATION

8.1 A SENSING BODY: COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUATION OF SURFACE-EVENTS

How to think the processes of individuation of a moving body? According to Simondon, "the principle of individuation is not an isolated reality turned in on itself, preexisting the individual as an already individualized germ of the individual. The principle of individuation, in the strict sense of the term, is the complete system in which the genesis of the individual takes effect. And that, in addition, this system prolongs itself in the living individual, in the form of an associated milieu of the individual, in which individuation continues to evolve; that life is thus a perpetual individuation, a continuing individuation across time that prolongs a singularity" (Simondon, 1995: 63). Individuation, or the genesis of the individual is an ongoing process. However, what activates this process; what generates it techniques, overarticulations, speciations? Is movement, or a sensing body in movement, a way to explore the dynamism of individuation? Stern and Manning note how processes of individuation are not explored ontogenetically (at the level of their emergence), but ontologically (at the level of their being). "What about the process itself, the very experience of making the leaps and creating relations or consolidating sensorimotor schemas. Can the infant experience not only the sense of an organization already formed and grasped, but the coming-into-being of organization?" (Stern, 1985: 45). How to explore this coming-into-being of organization; how to explore the processual complexities of individuation's emergence? One way to do it is to explore the sensing body in movement.

Manning suggests that in order to think the sensing body we should: (1) explore the body in movement; (2) explore the possibility of bodies not being limited to their organs; (3) explore the question of "what can a body do". Furthermore, we should not focus on what a sensing body is, but on how it works, what it does and how it becomes. Therefore, our question becomes the one of creating a sensing body in movement. Movement is that which opens the body toward its becoming: becoming more-than organism, becoming more-than organisation, becoming more-than "what a body is". One of the ways to enter this more-than is to enter it through the

touch. A touching body is a self-inventing body: "I reach out to touch you in order to invent a relation that will, in turn, invent me. To touch is to engage in the potential of an individuation. Individuation is understood throughout as the capacity to become *beyond* identity. We individuate inventively. Relationally, we engage in individuations that require difference and repetition. Bodies respond to one another through metastable configurations between the microcellular, the multicellular, and the intercorporeal, creating new mutating configurations. Bodies are connected through intensities of composition that in turn produce new bodies" (Manning, 2006: XV, introduction).

Do we reach out, or does a touch reach out? Touch is physical, but more importantly, touch is relational. When we touch, there is not only one physical body touching another, but there is also a relational body touching and being touched. Touch is a relational node — consisting of infinity of relations. When we reach out, we always reach out as more-than physical body, as well as more-than one physical body. What reaches out, toward the other, and what comes back, to constitute us, as the other, is a relational field of touch. To touch — is to touch our potential of individuation. We never touch as fully formed. If we think the touch as an event-in-making, the beginning of the touch changes the other, and the change that occurs in the other comes back to us — touching us, changing us. Do we, therefore, touch the other as the surface or as the event? Am I an event touching another event, or am I a surface touching another surface? When does a surface become an event, surface-event? I start the touch as a surface touching the other as a surface, but then, a change occurs, and that change touches me back, it touches me as a surface and transforms me into event, surface-event. Touch is that which transforms the skin into the event, or, surface of event. Here, we become beyond our skin, as well as beyond our identity. Every time we touch, we simultaneously leave our body and arrive into it. Every touch is a return into body, a body we have never been before. Every touch is also a creation of the incorporeal body, the one we have never created before.

How to, therefore, think the identity of a sensing body in movement? "If we think identity, we have returned to a stable body. A moving body, a sensing body, cannot be *identified*. It individuates always in excess of its previous identifications, remaining open to qualitative reiteration" (Manning, 2006: XVIII, introduction). It is impossible to think a sensing body in terms of identity because it is always beyond its identity. The only thing that changes is a degree of its beyondness. Furthermore, the identity of a sensing body changes constantly, it is an identity-in-movement, qualitatively becoming with each drop of experience. The identity of a sensing body is relational, just like a sensing body itself. A sensing body is an act of collective

individuation. The intensity of a field of relations determines the degree of collectivity of body's individuation. "Sensing bodies in movement are not individual bodies; their individuations are always collective. They are worlding bodies that are one with the potential of movement. To become is to move toward something that is not yet. To exist in the not-yet is to individuate incorporeally or virtually. This shift toward the virtual does not preclude actualization, it suggests that to reach toward is to engage with what Deleuze calls the crystallization of time, where the actual and the virtual coincide" (Manning, 2006: XVIII, introduction).

How to think the collective individuations of a sensing body in movement? Let's take a gaze as an example. What we perceive as a gaze, is a collective individuation of our eyes and all the information transmitted to our body by them. There is another example of this collective individuation and it is that of a touch. There is a level of collective individuation of experience at the level of each hand, at the level of our senses, at the level of the body as relational field. How does each hand collectively individuate? Each hand is made of a certain amount of pain, temperature, and touch sensors. The sensation that hand receives — upon the act of touching — is a combination, as well as collective individuation of all sensations gathered through all the pain, temperature and touch sensors a hand has. Furthermore, since each of our hands is its own irreducible mode of being a body, this is the case for both of our hands. When we touch with both of our hands, a sensation that arrives is a collective individuation of our left and our right hand — at the sense level. Every time we touch, we witness an event of coming-into-experience of our hands. There is a hand we have never touched with. There is also a hand that was never touched. Hand becomes touch. Touching becomes body that I am in this singular moment. To touch means to have never touched before — because the hand we are touching with is becoming itself — in this singular moment, by this singular experience of touch — here and now. We only touch if we encounter the firstness of this experience that reciprocally — touches us, constitutes us, moves us — toward the coming-into-experience of a body we have never been before. At this moment, we enter the virtual — with the body, within the body, as the body — in movement.

8.2 CHOREO-ANATOMY: A PROPOSITION FOR ORGANIZATION-IN-MOTION

The act of entering the virtual is also an act of entering the Body without Organs: "The BwO stands in for the becoming-body, the body that will-have-come. Bodies without Organs do not suggest that you have to divest yourself of your biology. To create a BwO means that you move toward the world in excess of your organs' organization. Bodies that are always qualitatively more-than their internal organizations" (Manning, 2006: XX, introduction). To enter the Body without Organs is to create the possibility of choreo-anatomy. Here, anatomy dances. Its dance is a dance of relations. Choreo-anatomy is a relational anatomy or the one that introduces the possibility of relational organization of a body. What generates this relational organization is movement, therefore, choreo-anatomy is a proposition for organization-in-motion. Body does not only move, it moves itself, its own anatomy, as choreo-anatomy. What a body can do, therefore, becomes a question of what a body does with its movement, and more importantly — how it does itself as movement. The question of *how* of a movement is a question of *how* of body's relational becoming. How we move is how we become — relationally. We never move alone. We always move in relation to something or someone, therefore, our becoming is always relational. What is a hand? It is a movement, and eventually, a dance. What is anatomy? Anatomy is a plane of dance, it is a plane of what a movement can do. Body without Organs is that which choreographs this plane of dance, and furthermore, its choreo-anatomy. The question of choreo-anatomy: what an anatomy can do, or, how can an anatomy actualize itself? Let's repeat Artaud's question: how to make human anatomy dance?

In order to think anatomy as that which engages symbiotically, incorporeally, virtually, always becoming more-than it already seems to be we need to go back to the concept of Body without Organs. "BwO are central because they reinforce the injunction to invent, operating always in the space-time of the "will have been", a future anterior that discloses the fact that we can never completely latch onto them. Bodies, all bodies, escape our grasp. They are not graspable partly because they exceed our expectations of them. Bodies are never quite there. They are not quite there because movement is characterized by its engagement with space-times that have not yet been charted, alphabetic space-times as yet undisclosed, undiscovered. Bodies are strange machines, machines because they produce extensions of themselves, because they generate systems both in and far from equilibrium, systems that resist strict organization" (Manning, 2006: XX, introduction). How to think Body without Organs as a singular mode of production, and what does that mode of production produce?

How to think Body without Organs as pure production, as well as the impossibility of reproduction? There is no one reproducible organization of Body without Organs. Its organization is organization-in-making, as well as organization-in-movement; Body without Organs is a perpetual act of coming-into-organization. This act of coming-into-organization is based on movement. Body comes-into-organization with the movement, as the movement. What makes a machine is not what it is, but what it produces. Machines are not objects, but modes of production. Therefore, it is possible to perceive Body without Organs as a singular mode of production. What does Body without Organ produce? It produces an ontogenetic body — an ongoing process of bodying and becoming.

8.3 BODY WITHOUT ORGANS: FROM ORGANIZATION TO EXFOLIATION

How to think Body without Organs as ontogenetic body, or the one that is always in genesis, as well as in the state of becoming? Bodies excess their modes of being and shift toward their modes of becoming through affects. "Affect is not emotion, though it does play on the idea of movement within the word *emotion*. Emotion is affect plus an awareness of that affect. Affect is the witness of the movement of the world. Affect is that which grips me first in the moment of relation, *firstness* in Charles Peirce's vocabulary. Affect is an ontogenetic power of existence. Emotion is the back-gridding of affect" (Manning, 2006: XXI, introduction). How does affect produce Body without Organs? Affects rule the sphere of non-organized energy, pure potential, virtual, connectivity, or, in other words, physical, experiential and relational firstness. There is no organization here; what exists here is an event of sensing of what an organization is capable of. When the body starts to explore of what it is capable of — it enters the sphere of affects which catapults the body into its becomings of Body without Organs. If affect is an ontogenetic power of existence, then body is its machine. Furthermore, body is both a product and a production of this ontogenetic power of existence. To produce a body is to produce a force, as well as power of existence. Body without Organs is a plane of becoming-unlimited of the power to exist, power to produce and power to become.

How to think affects as extensions of a moving body? How to think senses as extensions-in-movement? Who moves — when "I" move? "I" cannot conceive of moving. What moves is the technicity of the body: senses, extensions, matter/form. When I reach out to touch you, I extend the space I have created between me and you. This extension carries my sense perception (my almost-touch) and can therefore also be considered as prosthetic to my "organic" matter-form" (Manning, 2006: XXIII, introduction). Which body moves? Which body within my body moves? Who does this body belong to and does it belong to anyone? Who does movement belong to — if my body is not its starting or finishing point? How come movement makes me, and yet, it does not belong to me?

When affects, as well as senses — become the extensions of a moving body — we enter the relation of becoming-unlimited of body. At this moment, only the intensity of our affects and the connectivity of our senses determines what our body is capable of. To sense is to extend oneself — not only through the other, but more importantly — as the other. To affect and to be affected is to extend into limitlessness. Affect does not

know of the limit. Affect itself is a limit. However, this limit is constantly extending itself through the other affects.

How to think this body, this extending-toward, this permanent reaching? "A body that is always in the potentiality evoked by a reaching-toward is a body that must also always already be beyond *its-self*. This body is abstract in the sense that it is always virtually becoming its potential. Because there is no end-limit to becoming, this body-in-potential cannot be conceived of as a permanent space-time, but must instead be thought of as an exfoliating movement toward another exfoliating movement. The body as exfoliation¹ cannot be grasped. But it can be thought, abstractly. As an abstract potentiality, this body is not solely contained within an enclosure, skin which can be organized (tactfully) within a system of governance (a body-politic). The BwO is more than its discrete outside and inside. This body-as-multitude is a strata onto which intensities congregate. A BwO is a body that moves between metastable states, operating, always, within systems of protopermanence that seek to slow or even stop its movement" (Manning, 2006: 142). The Body without Organs is absolute movement. Movement as such cannot be stopped, it can only be continued. Body without Organs is a becoming of continuity. This continuity is absolute movement. Body without Organs, sensed as absolute movement, is a body fully dancing its potential — to move, to become, to exfoliate. Therefore, it is possible to define Body without Organs, as: (1) movement, (2) becoming, (3) exfoliation. Furthermore, Body without Organs is that which passes — from moving into becoming and from becoming into exfoliation. It is not an exfoliating movement reaching-toward another exfoliating movement, but exfoliation itself put into movement. To body (verb) is to exfoliate. It is also to make this act of exfoliation visible, perceptible, graspable. What makes this Body without Organs thought as absolute movement? What does Body without Organs as such

¹Using the term exfoliation, José Gil describes the way in which the body adapts and establishes links with other bodies or opens into the spaces it can occupy or articulate with. In this sense, exfoliation is the way in which the body 'turns onto' things, its form and space being affected and shaped by energetic connectivity. Through exfoliations, the body is diversified as a volume in perpetual state of disintegration and reconstitution. Each exfoliation is connectable to other past and future exfoliations, allowing a translation and a production of symbolic substitutions (for example, the association of the bodily sensations of lightness and heaviness, flight and fall, distension and contraction of body-space). What these different exfoliations share is the same "abstract form". Exfoliation, as a formal constitution, or moulding, of the body-space is what integrates information (about the body's relations) at a high level of abstraction, at an energetic level, and what creates concrete configurations after the emergence of abstract forms of relations. Through their de-coding actions, the abstract forms of the body-space allow us to move from one figure to the other, from one posture to the other, and this continuous passage (and re-emergence of forms) constitutes rhythm. In this way, it is possible to say that the exfoliating space of the body, like the surface of a canvas, is a "rhythming" space, a space which rhythms, through its abstract forms and postures, the actual forms and postures that are to appear on it as definite gestures: again, the body as artwork.

produce? What it is made of and what it produces is a force to extend, a force to mutate, a force to become.

Body without Organs is made up of plateaus. Furthermore, every Body without Organs is itself a plateau in communication with other plateaus. "The BwO is a passage" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 158). What happens if we consider the Body without Organs as a passage from one mode of bodying to another? What happens is a sense-event. "Sense-events are real but abstract. Actual but virtual. Virtual because the senses resist stratification within a stable configuration, responsive primarily to that which is not-yet. I move that which I am not-yet moving. What I touch is not the object itself, but the potential of the object to be touched. I touch my capacity to emerge through the object. I touch my experience of reaching-toward. Bodies are technologies of movement, of transposition" (Manning, 2006: 142).

How do we move that which we are not-yet moving? How do we body that which we are not-yet bodying? Body without Organs is an event of becoming-virtual of actual body. What moves is not the body, but its potential to be moved. When do we touch an object and when do we touch its relational becoming, its potential to be touched? Where do we touch? Where is this potential of the object to be touched situated; is it situated on, in, or in the between of object and me? What is the topology of this potential? Am I a constitutive part of object's potential to be touched? If yes, when touching an object, which self do I touch? How do we touch an experience? How do we touch an experience as an experience? How does my experiential self touches object's experiential self, or, furthermore, its experiential selves? How do we make two experiences, two experiential multiplicities meet; how do we emerge as experiential multiplicities? Who is touching who? Which body is touching which body? What do we touch? "I do not touch that which is already formed. I am attracted to the potential of attraction. I am driven by the potential of creating a spaced-time and a timed-space through the process of reaching out. This attraction gives a certain vitality to a politics of touch. Organs are not essential here. Nor are substances or even subjects. What is essential is movement: what the body can *do*" (Manning, 2006: 144). There is no finality of touch. Experientially, touch never ends. To touch is to produce the potential of attraction. Every time we reach out, we produce more of this potential. To touch is to tend, attend, extend. More precisely, to touch is to tend-toward this potential, to attend to it and to extend it. What I am touching with is not a hand. This is why the notion of organ or body part does not matter here. What I am touching with is my attraction. What I am touching is potential. As previously mentioned, there are no organs, only potentials. Hand, as it is experienced here, both touching and being

touched, is a pure potential. When I touch, I touch on the plane of hand's singular becoming. To touch is to experience a hand as becoming, a potential, a modulation.

The question of modulation is a question of an ethology of the body-becoming. Ethology studies the composition of relations or powers. Ethologies are about extensions, about expressions, about becomings — at the plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is not composed of bodies that precede or exceed it. Bodies on the plane of immanence are what they become now — as events-in-making. There is no subject here, only affective states individuating. For Spinoza, bodies — also thought as substances — are not prior to attributes. What does this mean? This means that cause does not precede its effects, or, that the body as such does not precede its bodyings. For Spinoza, there is no thought of unity or of division of body. Substance, or, in this particular case, body, is "its" infinite diversity itself; "it is realized in this diversity and is nothing other than the process of production without beginning or end (beyond teleology, without goals or direction) of itself through the infinity of its attributes" (Montag and Stolze, 1997: xvii). Effects create experiments; bodyings create bodies. As Manning points out, experiments exceed organs. Bodyings exceed organisms. These experiments; these bodyings — are composed of expressions, affects, concepts, precepts. "These are passages, becomings, rises and falls, continuous variations of power (*puissance*) that pass from one state to another" (Montag and Stolze, 1997: 22). Furthermore, "affects are variations of power (*puissance*). Affects call forth mixtures through chance, accident, confusion. Bodies without Organs meet in surprising ways. To reach out and touch is to touch not only the untouchable but the inconceivable. There are no causal linkages between Bodies without Organs. Affects do not organize the body. They play on the surfaces. They are surface-events that expose not the organism but its movements. Affects collude. Collide" (Manning, 2006: 144). A collision of affects is also a collision of capacities of a sensing body in movement to become.

How to think the body as a process of production — without the beginning or the end? How to think the body as a multiplicity of affective states individuating? How to think the body as infinite diversity — diversing itself even furthermore — at the level of every single movement, as well as every single breath — perceptible and imperceptible one? How to think the body not only as the infinity of attributes, but more importantly, as the infinity of attributes individuating themselves? How does a single attribute individuate as an infinity of attributes? What if a single attribute is already composed of infinity of attributes? How to think the attribute as an infinity-in-movement? How to think attributes as speciations? Expressions, affects, concepts, and precepts create that which is more-than organism. How? Expressions,

affects, concepts, and precepts are openings into body's more-than, into its becomings. Body without Organs, or, becoming body is not an expression. It is a field of expressivity, and even more, it is an act of fielding of expressivity. Its organs are forces, as well as expressions; its organs are forces of expression. Body without Organ is a force of expression. Therefore, it is necessary to move on from the notion of physical body, as well as perceptible body. Physicality is not only an expression, but also a field of expressivity. The body is not only that which is perceptible, but also that which is imperceptible; it is a field of perceptivity. Physicality, as well as perceptibility, is a tonality. This tonality is affective. It is a multiple passage from one state to another, from one expression to another, from one variation of power to another. We meet and we mix in this tonality, in these passages — from bodies to bodyings, from species to speciations, from beings to becomings.

9 | TO BODY

9.1 IN THE BETWEEN OF BODYING AND WORLDING: TRANSITORY INDIVIDUATIONS

To move is to create-with sense, it is to sense-with. A body perceives through senses and sensory events. Whitehead suggests that perception is both sensuous (sensing,

¹Deleuze abandons the traditional image of the subject as a fixed substance or foundation stone, in favour of a subject that is the provisional outcome of a process of subjectivation. The subject proposed by Deleuze is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements whose source is not the interiority of the traditional image of thought. Deleuze insists that subjectivity is not given, but always under construction. In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze outlines that "a subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed" (Deleuze, 1991: 85, 86). In the *Dialogues*, he explains that there are "no more subjects, but dynamic individuations without subjects, which constitute collective assemblages... Nothing becomes subjective but haecceities take shape according to the compositions of non-subjective powers and effects" (Deleuze, 1987: 93). In *Difference and Repetition*, the subject is thought as the tensive arrangement of many larval subjects. A self exists as a contracting machine, capable of drawing a difference from repetition. There is more than one self: there is a self lurking in the eye; another in the liver; a third in the stomach. A subject is the inclusive disjunction produced by the contraction of all these selves. Furthermore, in *The Fold* a subject is that which comes to a point of view, or rather that which remains at the point of view, provided that the point of view is one of variation. It is not the point of view that varies within the subject; on the contrary, it is the condition through which an eventual subject apprehends variation. A subject represents a monad that includes in itself — and also conveys — the entire World obscurely, by expressing clearly only a small region of the world. Deleuze and Guattari argue in *Foucault* that the inside is an operation of the outside or a doubling up of the outside. The subject is the result of a process of subjectivation in accordance with four different foldings. These foldings are: first, the material part of ourselves; second, the folding of force; third, the folding of knowledge; and fourth, the folding of the outside. A person does not fold the forces composing them, without the outside itself also being folded, therefore forming a self within a person. Folding represents the memory of the outside. Furthermore, the "other" as it is discussed in *The Logic of Sense* makes possible the categories of "subject" and "object". The other represents the structure of all possible worlds: it inhabits the transitions from one object to another; it relativises distances and differences; it forms the background from which forms rise up; and the other spatialises and temporalises. The intensive bracketing of "the other" is tantamount to the intensive bracketing of "the Self". The familiar world and the subjects that inhabit it, in the presence of others, release and molecularise the elements and singularities that were previously sedimented and stratified within them. The ideology of "lack" and negation that kept the subject's desire captive is therefore shown to be the result of socio-historical processes of subjectivation, rather than the irreducible datum of subjectivity. In the end, what emerges after the bracketing of the other as structure of all possible worlds is the "otherwise other" — *l'autrement qu'autre*.

here and now) and non-sensuous (a direct perception of pastness in the present moment). To perceive is not only to accumulate sense-data, but also to directly sense the relation, or, to sense the activity of taking-form. A subject does not perceive a world, but the world is pulled into experience¹. "Pulling" suggests that there is no subject that precedes experience. Furthermore, without an initial perceiving subject, a preformed or predetermined body cannot exist. "Worlding occurs in the process of a world becoming subject, or a subject becoming world. Or, to extend the analysis, subjects are transitory individuations² in a processual worlding whereby certain actualities take form in a nexus of "contemporarily independent" events. To understand the stakes in this argument, it is necessary to think actuality in terms of the stopgap of perception: about a half-second. What we perceive, we perceive always at a delay such that this perception is already composed of the holes of experience.

²Deleuze's concept of "individuation" stands for a genetic account of individuals. The concept of individuation emerges from a critique of hylomorphism that exposes the error in thinking of an individual as the end point of a progressive specification of the species. Replacing the image of "the mould" for a process-friendly idea of modulation, this critique also repudiates the idea that an individual is moulded in a specific way. As he develops his concept of individuation, Deleuze borrows and transforms analyses made by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Gilbert Simondon. Deleuze's concept of individuation addresses — in the process of virtual, continuous (intensive) multiplicities becoming (extended) discrete — the apparently contradictory co-existence of the continuum and the discrete. The process of individuation is thought as a process of "differentiation" — with respect to the continuum, and "differentiation" — with respect to the discrete. Deleuze's concept of becoming is based on the co-imbrication of the virtual real and the actual real. The conception of the virtual is thought as a differentiated flow of events, singularities and intensities. The actual is understood as the differentiated realm of bodies, their mixtures, and states of affairs. However, actualisation does not mean the death of the virtual, but its reinvention. Deleuze's ontology generates a robust theory of individuation that sustains a creative evolution developed around not just the non-fixity of species, but that of individuals as well. In order to elaborate his theory, Deleuze appeals to Leibniz — first, to Leibniz's concepts, each of which corresponds to an individual; second, to the Leibnizian method of vice-diction that understands an individual as the product of the law of a series and the internal difference that distinguishes one moment of its becoming from another. Deleuze also moves beyond Leibniz's theory of individuation because of the latter's reliance on *a priori* harmony, the compossibility of the series, and the best possible world. Finding new inspiration in Simondon's theory of individuation Deleuze considers "modulation" (instead of the mould of the old image of thought) as the process by which metastable (virtual/real) systems explicate the potential energy implicated within them. Furthermore, populated by singularities and events these systems bring about new (actual/real) metastable systems in the process of their explication. The metastability of these systems is due to the fact that the virtual does not consist only of elements and flows differentiated from one another. Instead, the differentiated virtual is difference itself — difference differentiating itself. The modulating process of individuation stands for the transduction of the virtual continuum of intensities to the discrete extended actual, all the while remembering that the actual is never totally devoid of the dynamism of the preindividual virtual. Therefore, the actual is capable of being reabsorbed by the virtual. Intensity is that which makes the passage from the virtual to the actual possible. The modulation itself is in a state of permanent variation — a promise of becomings — disallowing predictions of what an individuation is capable of.

I do not perceive an object *per se*, the objectness is pre-hended (drawn out from a pastness in a way that is qualitatively new) as an event that space-times me. Through the prehension, "I" am subjectified as an instance of that particular object-event. This object-event constructs me, individuates me, as much as it is individuated by me. Such an experience is actively creative: "I" must assist the perception, fill up its holes, give it form. This giving-form happens as "I" (as individuating event) in the gaps of perception, giving the object a contour or a background (that "I" may not directly have perceived), situating it in a worldness that cannot be separated from it. As "I" do this, "I" am also individuating (moving beyond any kind of discrete "I-ness" or thanness) on a plane of becoming that Whitehead calls an actual occasion. "I" am not detached from this process, and yet "I" am only composed by it to the extent that it will initiate my infinite recomposition. I is an event" (Manning, 2009: 66, 67).

How does worlding occur? Worlding occurs in, as and through the movement of a world becoming subject, or a subject becoming world. Worlding makes itself possible through movement. Movement makes itself possible through perception. Everything that moves, or, in other words, everything that worlds, is an assemblage of transitory individuations. How we perceive the world is how we become it. The activity of perception makes it possible for the world to be experienced in its multiplicity — as worldings. The limits of our perception are the limits of our worlding. Everything that exists is an event of worlding. Everything we perceive constructs and individuates our mode of becoming a world as we allow the world to become us. An act of giving form to our perception is also an act of taking that form. As that form recomposed, what emerges is I as event — unfolding itself in its multiplicity of parallel worldings.

Whitehead turns to the concepts of appearance and reality, redefining them as process and event. He does this in order to dislocate the notion that experience is a subset of an already formed body-world. For Whitehead, the world only preexists in so far as its pastness can be activated in the present. To appear does not mean to conceive the past as a world available to the present. What we call the present, to use Bergson's vocabulary, is an active recollection, composed of strands of pastness recomposing and perishing through it. This does not mean that the present is predetermined. The present is always new, but its newness is compelled by experience as it is reactivated or recollected from the past half-second of experience. "To reactivate is never simply to relive. There is no world that will remain the same after reactivation. Reactivation will always, to some degree, mean invention" (Manning, 2009: 67). Every time we use a body part, an organ, a hand — there is a reactivation, but also an invention, moving, therefore, occurs as an ongoing process of self-inventing.

9.2 BODY AS EVENT-IN-MAKING: COMING-INTO-FORM OF ONTOGENETIC PROCESS

Focusing on perception as an *activity* allows Whitehead to reconceptualize the vocabulary of preformation. Perception thought as an activity makes it impossible for the world to exist as preformed. The world is that which forms as an event — as we grasp it, and are grasped by it — here and now. For Whitehead, prehension is perception as event. An actual occasion is the expression of a particular prehension, or set of prehensions, that converges into a subjective form. "The subjective form is not the form of the object itself. It is the coming-into-form of the ontogenetic process out of which its objectness, its eventness, comes to the fore. We never prehend an object as such. The objectness of the prehension forms in the eventness that is the actual occasion. Objects emerge in relation as events of experience" (Manning, 2009: 67). The subjective form, or, the coming-into-form of ontogenetic process, makes the body emerge as event of experience.

As an object begins to take form, its process concretes such that it becomes more stable. This (meta)stability is the beginning of the perishing of the actual occasion, which creates an opening for new experience to take form. As the actual occasion perishes, it populates the nexus of pastness. The nexus as such cannot be perceived, however, parts of it can and will be reactivated in future actual occasions. "Reality is therefore always more than and less than appearance: less than what appearance can be, and more than what appearance is. To be experienced, reality must be activated. Even then, it is not strictly "what it was" but "how it can become". To think the body in terms of appearance and reality is to focus on the body's unactualized potential as an aspect of its becoming that cannot be realized as such, but can be called forth, adding novelty to its open system. The taking-form of an individuating body is an "appearance" of the body within a vastness of unrealized potential" (Manning, 2009: 68). When we activate the reality through the experience, we also activate its conatus, its power to become. Experience is a conatus of reality. More precisely, each experience figures here as reality's degree of power to become. Each experience activates a singular mode of becoming of reality. Since experience is unlimited, it constantly generates the body's unactualized potential. This unactualized potential makes the body an open system.

Activating perception also means activating the relation of object's very capacity to be perceived. The relation between objectness and experience allows the object to take form experientially. To dance is to sense in movement. A dancer actively perceives and

moves worlds — as experiential worldings. A dancer does not move on the ground, but the experiential ground shifts with each of dancer's movements. This mode of moving, as well as bodying, individuates with each shift in ground. "The ground becomes part of the shifting through which these individuations develop, emerging as a key aspect of the series dancer-movement-ground. As it enters into movement, the ground is reconstituted as novelty, intertwining with the capacities of what a gravitational body can do. The ground contributes to the dance as a form-finding element in the dancer's shapeshifting process, operating not as a stable entity but as an active determinant in the process. The ground is a compositional aspect of a dancer's movement, reconstituting the ways in which space-time potentializes the moving body and vice versa" (Manning, 2009: 70). Shifting is that which relates transitory individuations of dancer-movement-ground. When the ground starts to dance — it dances the limits of gravitational body. When the ground starts to dance — it also dances the very limits of what a gravitational body can do. The ground, as dance's form-finding element, activates not only the dancer's shapeshifting process, but also its taking-form. The ground, being a compositional aspect of a dancer's movement, also becomes an axe of dancer's gravitational becoming.

Furthermore, "the ground does not simply ground, it dances. A dancing ground is a technogenetic element in the dance. A technique of composition, the ground becomes a condition of emergence for the ontogenetic body" (Manning, 2009: 70). Ontogenetic body is a body that is forming-with. In this particular case, a dancing body is forming-with a dancing ground. "Techniques conceived this way are technologies composed with, for, and through a dancing body" (Manning, 2009: 70). To ground is to alter the composition body-floor such that the ground actively relocates in relation to movement. Movement here does not refer to movement-in-space, but to movement-with-space. The ground is not that which is "beneath dancer's feet". To ground (verb) is to move the very mobility of groundedness. "Shifting grounds are but one technique through which a body creates space-time. Dancers can, like all other movers, only more obviously, breathe space, folding the space into the duration of a textured tactility that moves the air, creating a sense of a clearing. Dancers can walk space, such that the dimensions of space-time seem to compress. They can sound space, such that the vectors of space-time seem to inflect, curving experience. By creating such occasions of experience, the sensing body in movement alters experiential space-time such that space-time is felt in its emergence" (Manning, 2009: 71).

Breathing space, walking space, sounding space, this coming-into-emergence, is a technogenetic experience. What makes it technogenetic is the emerging recomposition

of the body. This emerging recomposition takes form through a multiplicity of techniques. For Simondon, a technique is a technology of emergence through which new complex systems are composed. Another way to think these techniques is to think them as associated milieus of potential. Furthermore, associated milieus of potential are ecologies that emerge through the very technogenesis that gives them form. When the associated milieus become compositional matrices of body's onto-hetero-genesis, they open the body toward the excess of its organism, as well as its potential of body-in-making. Once we overcome the separation between the body and technique, a body-technique starts to dance. Once the body itself (emerging as a singular technique) starts to dance, it becomes an experiment in the making.

9.3 COMING-INTO-EMERGENCE OF TECHNOGENETIC BODY

How to put into relation digital technologies and moving body? "Digital technologies must work at the level of perceptual emergence. To do so, they must harness resources where they can. Technology has to become ontogenetic. By working ontogenetically,

³Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the "rhizome" draws from its etymological meaning: "rhizo" means combining form and the biological term "rhizome" describes a form of plant that can extend itself through its underground horizontal tuber-like root system and develop new plants. In their use of the term, the rhizome is a concept that "maps" a process of networked, relational and transversal thought, and a way of being without "tracing" the construction of that map as a fixed entity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 12). Ordered lineages of bodies and ideas that trace their originary and individual bases stand for the forms of "aborescent thought", and this metaphor of a tree-like structure that orders epistemologies and forms historical frames and homogeneous schemata, is invoked by Deleuze and Guattari to describe everything that rhizomatic thought is not. The concept of rhizome assumes how every thing and every body — all aspects of concrete, abstract and virtual entities and activities — can be seen as multiple in their interrelational movements with other things and bodies. The nature of the rhizome is that of a "moving matrix, composed of organic and non-organic parts forming symbiotic and parallel connections, according to transitory and as yet undetermined routes" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 10). Furthermore: "rhizomatic formations can serve to overcome, overturn and transform structures of rigid, fixed or binary thought and judgement — the rhizome is 'anti-genealogy'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 11). The concept of rhizome contributes to the formation of a plateau through its lines of becoming, which form aggregate connections. More precisely, there are no singular positions on the networked lines of a rhizome, only connected points which form connections between things. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, a rhizomatic plateau of thought may be reached through the consideration of the potential of multiple and relational ideas and bodies. The rhizome represents any network of things brought into contact with one another, functioning as an assemblage machine for new affects, new concepts, new bodies, new thoughts; the rhizomatic network is a mapping of the forces that move and/or immobilise bodies. Deleuze and Guattari claim how bodies and things ceaselessly take on new dimensions through their contact with different and divergent entities over time; in this way the concept of the "rhizome" marks a divergent way of conceptualising the world that is indicative of Deleuzian philosophy as a whole. Rather than reality being thought of and written as an ordered series of structural wholes, where semiotic connections or taxonomies can be compiled from complete root to tree-like structure, the story of the world and its components, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, can be communicated through the rhizomatic operations of things — movements, intensities and polymorphous formations. Contrary to descendent evolutionary models of classification, rhizomes have no hierarchical order to their compounding networks. Deleuzian rhizomatic thinking functions as an open-ended productive configuration, where random associations and connections propel, sidetrack and abstract relations between components. Furthermore, any part within a rhizome may be connected to another part, forming a milieu that is decentred, with no distinctive end or entry point. The "rhizome" also represents Deleuze's apparatus for describing affective change. He viewed every operation in the world as the affective exchange of rhizomatically-produced intensities that create bodies: systems, economies, machines and thoughts. For Deleuze, each and every body is propelled and perpetuated by innumerable levels of the affective forces of desire and its resonating materialisations. Therefore, variations to any given system can occur because of interventions within cyclical, systematic repetition. Since the rhizome may be constituted with an existing body — including existing thoughts one might bring to bear upon another body — the rhizome is necessarily subject to the principles

toward technogenetic emergence, rather than prosthetically, technology must become capable of actively *making* sense such that it creates new sensing bodies in movement. No longer held back by the limits of the software, movement might then be able to make the technological process appear rather than simply moving to its parameters. To add nuance to these experiential experiments, technology must also make its failures felt, its lagging behind, its system collapse, its loss of ground" (Manning, 2009: 72). To work at the level of perceptual emergence is to work at the level, as well as with the experience of coming-into-emergence. Digital technologies must co-become with that process. More importantly — they have to emerge from, as well as emerge-with that process. They have to make sense — as it happens — here and now. When the technology starts to work ontogenetically, toward technogenetic body — it starts to work from and with the body. This is the moment when the emerging duet — between the body and digital technologies — starts to take place. A technogenetic body cannot be based on a body that preexists its emergence. A technogenetic body is that which comes-into-emergence, as well as emerges-with digital technologies. The body as such must not be danced and then supplemented. As Erin Manning brilliantly points out, the body must dance its supplement, and furthermore — it must dance its novelty such that it introduces within the movement the mutability of the body's rhizomatic³ networks of actuality and virtuality. "We must never forget: a body is never wholly

of diversity and difference through repetition, which Deleuze discussed in his books *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze acknowledges Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return as the constitution of things through repeated elements (existing bodies, modes of thought) that form a "synthesis" of difference through the repetition of elements (Deleuze, 1983: 46). "Synthesis" is described by Deleuze and Guattari as "an assemblage of variable relations produced by the movement, surfaces, elusions and relations of rhizomes that form bodies (desiring machines) through composite chains of previously unattached links" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 39, 327). As a non-homogeneous sequence, the rhizome describes a series that may be composed of causal, chance, or random links. Rhizomatic connections between bodies and forces also produce an affective energy or entropy. As Deleuze describes in his work on Hume, "the interaction of a socially, politically, or culturally determined force and any given body both produces and uses associations of ideas" (Deleuze, 1991: ix, 103). The discontinuous chain is the medium for the rhizome's expanding network. It is also the contextual circumstance for the chain's production. Rhizomatic writing, being, or becoming is not simply a process that assimilates things. Rather, it stands for a milieu of perpetual transformation. The relational milieu that the rhizome creates gives form to transformational environments where relations alter the course of how flows and collective desire develop. There is no stabilising or unifying function produced by the rhizomatic medium; there is no creation of a whole out of virtual and dispersed parts. Instead, through the rhizome, points form assemblages, multiple journey systems associate into possibly disconnected or broken topologies; in turn, such assemblages and typologies change, divide, and multiply through disparate and complex encounters and gestures. The rhizome represents a powerful way of thinking without recourse to analogy or binary constructions. Therefore, to think in terms of the rhizome is to reveal the multiple ways that we might approach any thought, activity, or a concept — what we always bring with us are the many and various ways of entering any body, of assembling thought and action through the world.

actual" (Manning, 2009: 73). A technogenetic body, interweaving the organic and the techogenetic is never finished, but an ongoing process of emerging-with. The process of emerging-with introduces two other processes — that of "perceiving ecologically" and that of "forming environmentally".

To perceive ecologically is to directly perceive the relations out of which space-time is composed. Perceiving ecologically does not imply giving meaning to form, but forming environmentally — the meaning forms within the act of perceiving — here and now. To say we perceive ecologically — is to emphasize how the world creates modalities of perception, the same way modalities of perception create the world. "To think technogenetically, we must keep in mind that we perceive not an object-as-such but how the object merges with experience and emerges through the experience: the object is its experiential function. Objects are novel because their conjunctions are new, not pre-existing them, but immanent to them. Objects, prehended, are individuations within an ecology of practices wherein perception is key" (Manning, 2009: 74). To think technogenetically is to think the object's very process of coming into experience. Objects are immanent to their processes of perceptual unfolding. How the perception unfolds is how the object comes into the experience.

Ecological perception is an activity of relation. More precisely, through ecological perception we directly perceive relation. In Whiteheadian terms, what weprehend is the affective tone, the relation of an object-becoming-world. Manning suggests how a sensing body in movement is activated both sensuously and non-sensuously. Perception occurs on a continuum of relation between the body and the world. In order to emerge-with the body, new technology must make that relation felt. Let's give an example of such an experience: "the system recomposes the room even as the dancer composes with the system. The coupling causes the room to shift, to move, to breathe. As this happens, the intensity of a shifting space-time is felt. This is felt not through the sound shifting as such but through a slight difference in affective tone. The room reverberates around its color, its sound-quality, its becoming-form. Now, the spectator feels a concern with the space. This concern provokes a new kind of attention: a perception of the tonality of the interval. A new composition begins to unfold, one that may be related to an ontogenetic shift in the participating body of the spectator. Technogenesis: two bodies re-composed at different durations in the sensing spectrum" (Manning, 2009: 74). The coupling, the body and the system make the room emerge in a new way. This way activates different *roomings* (verb) of the room, as well as different intervals of its becoming. The room, giving itself to an experience as a form-finding element — activates it becoming-form through difference in tonality of

the interval. When two modes of bodying, a sensing body and a sensing system, start to recompose their taking-form together, it is possible to talk about their technogenesis.

Instead of perceiving the technology as a prosthesis, or the one being added to the body, externally, it is possible to incite the movement to appear out of the technological process, internally. To make the movement appear does not mean to restrict it to the parameters of visibility or measurability being generated by the technology. At the same time, it does not mean to delimit movement to gesture. What is required are operations that traverse the spectrum of the technology's potential metastability⁴ in relation to a becoming-body. More precisely, what is required from technology is not to measure the movement externally, but internally, to measure-with. When technology begins to operate along this sensing spectrum-in-movement it forms an associated milieu with the interval. Technology, therefore, should not be mapped-onto but emergent-with a body-becoming. The body and the technology should co-become. "Technological recomposition must no longer be inserted into a body-system: it must be emergent with it" (Manning, 2009: 75). What a body, as well as a system — can do, should emerge in the present moment, a moment of movement, here and now. What a body-system can become is determined only by its own co-present coming-into-emergence. The body-system recomposes as it senses and moves. Its moving is not about displacement in space, but about moving the limits of its own becoming — in the movement, through the movement, as the movement.

Each event creates a different experiential ground. Ground, therefore, is part of the technogenesis that makes events felt. There are no grounds. There are only experiences of *grounding*. We are not talking about the preformed *ground* anymore, but about *grounding* — a process of formation of the ground — emerging with the experience. Each grounding is ontogenetic because it creates a different actualization of a ground — forming here and now. Through different actualizations a ground opens itself toward its own reinvention. This movement of reinvention is the movement of technogenesis. This movement creates our experience of real. "What is real and what appears exist in a complex network of movement moving. Movement moving is relational. When we move the relation, we never begin with an already formed gesture. We move into gesture. What a body can do is characterized by its capacity to make sense beyond a vocabulary of the already-there. An ontogenetic body has an infinite potential for technogenesis" (Manning, 2009: 76). When we move into a certain gesture, we also move into the certain potential for technogenesis.

⁴The unpredictable output is called metastable or metastability. A metastable state is similar to an unstable equilibrium.

9.4 PERCEIVING-WITH

How to approach the level of appearance of event? There are two modes of appearance happening at the same time: there is the event that has taken form and there is an event taking-form — here and now. Each of those two levels of event's appearance folds with eternal objects that continue to populate the universe, not as objects, but as more folds, as elastic nodes in the process of becoming. What generates the difference between events taking-form is the contrast. The redness, for example, thought as event, determines how shades come together to create an affective tonality. For Whitehead, contrast does not mean the equal juxtaposition of two extremes. Contrast is thought as the activity that makes certain qualities stand out, creating what Whitehead calls *emergent evolutions*. According to Erin Manning, emergent evolutions are the individuation of relational fields composed by the activity of small perceptions [*les petites perceptions*] folding. These microperceptions are perceptions without objects because they express nothing but the emphasis on the quality of becoming. "Small perceptions are as much the passage from one perception to another as they are components of each perception" (Deleuze, 1993: 87). Small perceptions are perceptions-in-becoming. There is no movement without perception and there is no body without movement. Small perceptions are also passages from one mode of bodying-in-movement to another.

Small perceptions reveal the force of perception. They recompose perception, and therefore — they recompose the body too. The core of small perceptions is an act of perceiving-with. Perceiving-with is that which acts on the quality of perception's relational potential. "What we perceive is not the thing as such but its capacity for relation. Perceiving first and foremost the capacity for relation means that a stone is perceived, not as an object-as-such, but as the feeling of hardness in the hand (and many other qualities, in many other ways). Perception is the feeling-with of an event forming" (Manning, 2009: 80). Since we do not perceive the thing as such, but always its capacity for relation — what makes the thing is the very act of perceiving. This act recomposes in time, therefore, the thing as such recomposes too. The act of perceiving, as well as its relational becoming, makes it impossible for a thing as such to exist. There is no stone as such. There is stoning of perception. There are stonings of perception. There is a stone allowing my perception to explore it. At the same time, my perception allows the stone to recompose it through its qualitative becomings. What emerges between the stone and my hand is perceiving-with, feeling-with, moving-with.

This moving-with is felt as the folding of perception. Perception is not already folded, but it is the very act of folding. The specificity of this act of folding is that it has no object as such. Folding of perception is also an act of sensing-with. When we sense-with we do not access the folding of perception, but we fold into perception. The act of perceiving pulls out singularity⁵. What we perceive is the object's capacity to create contrasts, to differentiate its nexus of becoming. "It is that the perceived *resembles* something it forces us to think" (Deleuze, 1993: 95). Perception folds thoughts, movements and sensations in the making. "An object becomes the threshold for thinking feeling. The event is not "seeing an object" but folding the "objectile"⁶ that contributes to perception's infolding. We perceive-with objects, catching the edges of their contours, participating in the relations they call forth. Eternal objects make ingress into this object-world individuation, creating the potential for future relation. The objectness of the object is how it is felt relationally, rather than simply its actual matter-form. How it takes form on the nexus is how we apprehend it. This quality of relation is what gives an object-event its potential in finitude. Perception is the force for the world's infinite unfolding" (Manning, 2009: 81). When my hand touches the stone what happens is the following: my hand does not touch an object, but it folds

⁵A singularity stands for a decisive point and a place where perception is felt in movement. In Leibniz's concept of the monad, Deleuze notes how a "singularity" is associated with condensed events. More precisely, singularities are the "zone of clear expression" of the monad. Furthermore, the singularities of the monad are what assure the presence of a body in or through which they vibrate; they are the events that make it both unique and common, both an entity of its own perceptual data and a ground for the relation that the monad holds with its environs. They are the places where the "singularities belonging to each ... are extended up to the singularities of others" (Deleuze, 1993a: 86). Therefore, the world as a whole is perceived infinitesimally in microperceptions and gigantically, in macroperceptions. Singularity is that which allows the subject to perceive the world in both ways, infinitesimally and infinitely, in hearing the whir of a familiar watermill, in being aware of waves of water striking the hull of a boat, or even in sensing music that accompanies a "dance of dust" (Deleuze, 1993a: 86). Furthermore, these formulations about singularity inflect Deleuze's work on style and the creative imagination. Deleuze notes that great writers possess "singular conditions of perception" (Deleuze, 1997b: 116). Singularities allow great writers to turn aesthetic percepts into veritable visions; in other words, to move from a unique site of consciousness to an oceanic one. For Deleuze, oceanic consciousness is what makes the writer change the world at large through microperceptions that become translated into a style, a series of singularities and differences that estrange common usages of language and make the world of both the writer and those in which the reader lives vibrate in unforeseen and compelling ways.

⁶The meaning of objectile is similar to the previously mentioned meaning of subjectile which is "that which goes beyond the representation of a subject or an object" (Derrida, 1998: 21). Objectile, in this specific case, would be the qualitative becoming of a stone, for example, that which I feel, but cannot say about the hardness of a stone in my hand, etc. Objectile would also refer to a relational becoming of a stone, for example, the way the hardness of a stone affects my hand, as well as the way my hand affects the hardness of a stone, their coming-together and co-becoming — beyond the idea of an already formed subject (me) and already formed object (a stone).

the objectile. At the same time, each of my hands discovers its own mode of touching the stone, as therefore — its own mode of folding the objectile. Stone's objectile is its capacity for relation, as well as its capacity for relational becomings. To touch is to sense-with, to hand (verb), as well as to stone (verb), is to touch-with. Within the acts of touching-with and sensing-with, the stone and the hand unfold in their relational infinity.

10 | AFFECTS

10.1 AFFECTIVE WORLDINGS: TAKING SHAPE AT THE EDGES OF EXPERIENCE

What makes the body a sensing assemblage in movement? A skin? A skin is that which integrates all the senses and furthermore, puts them into movement. This sensing assemblage in movement is an event of reaching-towards. It is a body that is always attending to the world. At the same time, the world also tends toward the body. "Body-worlding is much more than containment, much more than envelope. It is a complex feeling-assemblage that is active between different co-constitutive milieus. It is individuation before it is self, a fielding of associated milieus that fold in, on, and through one another. Becoming-self is one of the ways in which this folding (body-worlding) expresses itself, but never toward a totalization of self, always toward continued individuation" (Manning, 2012: 3). The body, thought as a sensing assemblage in movement, is a dance of individuation. Furthermore, it is both a resonant field and a fielding of individuation. What activates these two parallel processes is the process of becoming. What this process generates is the relation between the self (thought as an active point of crystallization) and the individuation (ongoing process of transformation of the self).

For Stern, relation is the node of creative interpersonal potential, as well as the node of shifting. Stern suggests how "several senses of the self do exist long prior to self-awareness and language" (Stern, 1985: 6). The notion of "several senses of self" does not build toward a contained view of self, but toward the creation of a multiplicity of strata. The body of an infant, as thought and felt there, is not constituted nor integrated. Rather, it is an ongoing act of recomposition. According to Stern, "a core sense of self involves a non-self-reflexive awareness" (Stern, 1985: 6). This singular type of awareness is linked to direct experience. "Direct experience takes place not in the subject or in the object, but in the relation itself. According to Stern, events in early infancy lead toward the creation of modes of organization. These modes of organization do not preexist experience, they are immanent to it. Through the fielding of relations (in the associated milieu of organization), the infant develops"

(Manning, 2012: 3, 4). Direct experience is a form of immanent fielding (Stern calls this organization) through which events become experienced as such.

Affect is central for Stern's analysis of how senses of self develop. In order to move beyond the limiting realm of the sensory-motor schema, Stern develops the idea of "vitality affects". The concept of "vitality affects" undoes the notion of self as containment. Manning suggests how the affect in this context can be understood as the preacceleration of experience. More precisely, preacceleration refers to what has not yet been constituted but has an effect on actualization. The moving of affect figures here as becoming of body. As the affect moves, the body becomes. "Vitality affects are a range of affect elicited by changes in motivational states, appetites, and tensions" (Stern, 1985: 54). In order to understand vitality affects and the role they play in emergent infant processes, it is also important to understand Stern's concept of amodality. Stern foregrounds the research that shows that newborns operate by cross-modal transfer. "Cross-modal transfer, the feeling of touch that occurs in the seeing, happens without a discrete learning curve. No learning is needed initially, and subsequent learning about relations across modalities can be built upon this innate base" (Stern, 1985: 48).

Cross-modal transfer, as well as amodality transcends the sense "channel". Cross-modality and amodality offer the possibility of a supra-modal in-betweenness where sense-events take form that are neither directly associated to an organ nor to an object. Cross-modality and amodality foreground not the sense itself but its relational potential. "It is not, then, a simple issue of a direct translation across modalities. Rather, it involves an encoding into a still mysterious amodal representation, which can then be recognized in any of the sensory modes" (Stern 1985, 51). "Amodality makes apparent that the infant functions comfortably in the abstract concreteness of the radically empirical: the relation" (Manning, 2012: 6). The world of an infant is a world of relations. The infant itself is an experience of worlding of relations. The infant itself is an emergent experience of individuation. The worlding of an infant is affective. The world of an infant is a world of affective worldings. These worldings meet the infant halfway, transforming, at each level of the co-constitutive strata of experience, being and worlding as they come together.

The coming-together of the infant and the world is preconscious, situated in a pure experience of proto-awareness. It is an event of becoming-present of experience in experience. This event is the event of nowness, without a past or a future. Our experience of time is therefore determined only by vitality affects. "Affect can be thought of as supra-modal. It operates across registers: an affect is not bound to any

modality of perception" (Stern, 1985: 53). Preconscious, affects transform the force of the event, shaping it beyond its actual constitution. How does this shaping that exceeds the actual constitution of event occur? When affects exceed the realm of the modal amodality takes shape. The amodality takes shape at the edges of experience. "Think vitality affect as a species of affect, an affective tuning. If, for Stern's core sense of self, the organizational stratum is the dominant mode toward which direct experience unfolds, vitality affect can be understood as a co-constitutive qualitative infrastratum that provides a tending-toward immanent feeling in the constitution of the event. Organization is therefore always also experiential and affective, a fielding of relations" (Manning, 2012: 6). Is it possible to think vitality affects not only as species of affect, but also as speciations of affect? How to put into relation speciations of affects (affects thought as processes) and affective tunings? What happens in-between the speciations of affects and affective tunings is a fielding of relations which is also a fielding of relational self.

10.2 AFFECTIVE ATTUNEMENT: BECOMING BETWEEN-SELVES

The event, composed by vitality affects, "takes the form not of discrete things seen, heard or touched but of qualities of shape, number, intensity level" (Stern, 1985: 57). When we start to think the form in terms of quality — the notion of form starts to shapeshift. This is an intense form. It is a taking-form of expression which is also the dynamic of becoming-selves. We are becoming not only ourselves, but also between-selves. The becomings between-selves are activated by affective attunements. "For Stern affective attunement is key to interpersonal becoming. Affective attunement is another mode of immanent relation where the relation radically precedes the purported unity of the self. Attunement is a merging-with. Not a feeling-of but a feeling-with. In affective attunement, a relational merging occurs that creates a dephasing. This dephasing is as much a shift in process as a shift in level. It activates what Simondon calls a transduction, a redistribution of processes in the making. This experience is not reducible to the poles of the event, mother and child. It happens in their interval and is co-constitutive of a becoming that always exceeds their 'selves'" (Manning, 2012: 7, 8).

Another way to perceive the becomings between-selves is to perceive them as interpersonal becomings. What the self, thought here as porous multiplicity, can become depends on its capacity to affectively tune. To tune in is to populate a relation and therefore become. To tune in, is, at the same time, the act of allowing the relation to populate us. Furthermore, the act of tuning in is the act of merging-with, moving-with, feeling-with. This merging-with happens across bodies, across experiences, across modalities of experiential bodies-becomings. What this merging-with creates is dephasing, or, more precisely, dephasings. Those dephasings are affective. Each of them represents a process in the making. Every time there is a shift in dephasing there is also a shift in the process in the making. There are no poles within that process. The mother and the infant co-constitute and are co-constituted by this process. This process in the making also denotes an interval of mother's and infant's co-becoming. What is happening is intense relationality.

The mother and infant form a milieu. This milieu is hyperrelational. What offers this state is the possibility to perceive the worlding directly. Reaching-toward the world, as well as merging-with it — individuating dances of self begin to emerge. What predominates in this state are feeling-vectors. As Manning points out, feelings are co-constitutive of being and worlding, invested, always, in the milieu and its associations, never just linear or causal. Affective attunement is an act of tuning-with. This act is preconscious. It sparks a new set of relations that affect how singular

events express themselves. The singularity of these events expresses itself in time. What time, and therefore, repetition creates is a qualitative difference of repeated experience. "Affective attunement makes felt the activation contours of experience, the intensity, as Suzanne Langer would say, of virtual feeling. This links affective attunement to affective tonality rather than either to empathy or to the matching of behavior. Stern defines this as a *matching of feeling*. Affective attunement: an open field of differentiation out of which a singularity of feeling emerges and merges. A tuning not of content but of expression-with" (Manning, 2012: 11).

Affective attunement works across the potential of a feeling. It works in the several directions happening at the same time. More precisely, affective attunement works across the potential of a feeling. For example, there are an infant and a mother tuning-into the potential of a feeling. The act of tuning-into is creating a force-field of becoming — shared by a mother and an infant. This force-field is defined by the affective tonality of a feeling. When infant and mother match the same tone they merge affectively. Does matching really exist? If it does exist then it is a type of matching that is being co-created — here and now. It is not that the already formed pair — a mother and an infant -match affectively, but their affective tonalities create a third, shared, matching tone — emerging here and now. Through that tone, they tune-into one another and they merge-with one another.

10.3 LANDING INTO MOVEMENT

Emergent selves reach-toward in a worlding that becomes them. This worlding is intensified by vitality affects that themselves tune to the world and emerge as landing sites. They are not related to the notions of space and time. Landing sites, as thought here, are the conditions for the propelling of the event's actualization. As Manning suggests, landing sites are force-fields tending toward relational form. This becoming-event of landing is a feeling, a way of relating, a mode of engagement. It is not only vitality affects that emerge as landing sites, but the movement itself emerges as landing site in becoming. We don't start or end the movement. We also don't start from the movement. We land into movement. How we land into the movement determines how we become (through) that movement. We don't land on. Landing on presupposes the difference between two bodies. We land-into, as well as we land-with. Two bodies, as two touching surfaces, land one into another.

For Deleuze and Guattari, "absolute movement is a vibration, a resonance that precedes all form or structure. Absolute movement is without a subject, it passes through, it owns, but it does not yet cut: there are only relations of movement and rest, speed, and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 266). Absolute movement is a pure potential of all form or structure. It is also the absolute movement of unlimited formation and structuralization. One cannot own it. One can only ride as more-than one. There is always more-than one body riding an absolute movement. There is no body in absolute movement. The body-becoming is an absolute movement. What makes this body is the act of passing through. The body-becoming, being an absolute movement, as well as being more-than one, passes through other bodies, other corporal states, other corporal moments.

How to think-feel this absolute movement, how to make it visible? "Despite appearances, movement is not of a body. It cuts across, co-composing with different velocities of movement-moving. It bodies. The body-as-such is an extraction that appears in the collision of movement-moving and actual movement, a momentary collusion of tendencies that seem to make up a whole. Form in its bare actuality is a mirage. With total movement always coursing through it, form is infinitely more-than. Extrude the body, as William Forsythe would say, to find this movement in the more-than, to find the movement-moving coursing through actual movement. There is an infinity of ways of touching on the more-than that is movement-moving.

Dance is one example. What dance gives us are techniques for distilling from the weave of total movement a quality that composes a bodying in motion.

If the movement is not of the body — how does it create a body? If the movement is not of the body — how does a singular move of moving become a singular mode of bodying? If movement bodies — what does it body, or who? Movement is that which dances the form of the body, as well as everything a body can do and become. When and where does it become possible to separate the movement and the body? How to think the movement as double — movement as form-finding element and movement as force taking-form?

10.4 WHEN MOVEMENT DANCES

Movement activates more-than of its physical form. It activates not only the more-than of its potential, but also the more-than of this or that body. "To move is to think-with a bodying in act. This is what dance makes clear: it is not the displacement as such that makes the difference, but the quality of becoming of the micromovements and microperceptions that pass through not just the composing body but also the vibrating space of thought. Because in order for the more-than to be felt it must make the body vibratory, it must make the body a force for thought in the moving, unfastening the body from what we perceive as its integrity. It must create a differentiation, an involution, a fold, a setting-to-rhythm not only of this or that body, but of an ecology in co-composition, an ecology that is not only a recomposition of spacetimes bodying, but also is a thinking in act, a movement of thought. When movement dances in the dancing, what we experience is a lived extraction from the plane of immanence that is total movement, leaving us in the vibration of what is beyond the predetermined body, in the realm of movement-thinking. And it is here, in the thinking in act of movement-moving, that movement begins to compose (us)" (Manning, 2012: 15). To move is to explore the very possibility of thinking in movement. Furthermore, to move is also to move the very limit of thinking. When do we move? We move only when we qualitatively become. What does this qualitative becoming create? It liberates the body as a force for thought in the moving, and therefore, thought in the making. Here, the body appears as thinking in the act. When movement starts to dance — it dances body's pure potential, its plane of virtual; it dances everything a body can become. At this singular movement, a dance of movement becomes a dance of body's ongoing recomposition.

How to think this body, the body emerging at this singular moment, as this singular moment? "The body, here defined, is what comes-to-be under specific and singular conditions. It is the amalgamation of a series of tendencies and proclivities, the cohesive point at which a multiplicity of potentialities resolves as this or that event of experience. Every resolution of a process, every actual occasion, carries within itself the more-than of its taking-form. Force is everywhere active, on time-lines that intersect with the occasion at hand, and on transversal lines that extend beyond it or circle through it. The force of the preindividual reminds us that life is neither in the individual nor outside it but in what surpasses it while accompanying it. This means that all resolutions, as body, as individual, as object, are more-than the forms they inhabit. A body is always more than one: it is a processual field of relation and the limit at which that field expresses itself as such" (Manning, 2012: 16, 17). How a

movement moves determines how a body becomes. Movement, therefore, becomes a singular condition of body's becoming. It does not matter how a movement resolves. It does not matter if the movement resolves as this or that body. What matters is the movement's capacity of bodying, its affective charge or the one that makes the more-than of its taking-form. Since the affective charge can never be fully exhausted or organized — the body itself cannot be fully exhausted or organized too. The body is not an inhabited form, but a processual field of relation. To dance is to move the very expressibility of that field, as well as the limit at which that field expresses itself as such.

A body is the how of its emergence, not the what of its form. "More-than its taking-form, 'body' is an ecology of processes (and practices, as Isabelle Stengers might say) always in co-constellation with the environmentality of which it is part. A body is a node of relational process, not a form *per se*. A body is a complex activated through phases in collision and collusion, phasings in and out of processes of individuation that are transformed and transduced in order to create new iterations not of what a body is but of what a body can do. What we tend to call «body» and what is experienced as the wholeness of a form is simply one remarkable point, one instance of a collusion materializing as this or that. A body in the extended sense is the complexity of a multiplicity of the phasings that co-constitutes it, a society in motion, a resonant materiality, a metastable field" (Manning, 2012: 19). To think the body as an ecology of processes is to think it as body-in-making. The body becomes environmentally — emerging as a relational node between different processes. The body is not only the phase, but more importantly — an act of phasing in and phasing out. The relation between those two movement — phasing in and phasing out — determines the body's dance of individuation. What we call a body is not only one remarkable point but the extension of that point into the line. Remarkable point is a point becoming another point, and even more — numerous other points — at the same time, dancing, transducing, extending itself into the line of becoming. This makes the complexity of a body, not only the relation of one point becoming another point, but also the relation of all the virtual points or bodies folding within one actual point or body. To body (verb) is to fold-into the infinity, and more importantly, to fold infinitely more.

11 | BODY IMAGE

11.1 EXPLORING THE BODY BOUNDARIES: BODY IMAGE

How to explore the subject of body boundaries? The way we see our body boundaries does not have to be the way we feel them. Experience of a certain state can influence the way we feel our body and its mode of being in space and time. The way we feel and the way we move deeply influence how we become our own body. Therefore, I would like to explore how dancers, as well as movement practitioners feel the boundaries of their bodies while moving. I am interested in the idea of experiential body boundaries and relational anatomy. The representation of a moving body does not need to be our perception of it. Furthermore, I am interested in situation-based, fluid perception of a body. The history has been portraying a moving body in a very static way; hand has always been portrayed as a hand. What if there are states in which a hand can become an experience of handing or exploring the potentiality of becoming a hand; what if there are states in which a hand can take on a function of another body part; what if there are states in which the feeling of a size of the hand is highly subjective and it is changing from moment to moment? What if the perception and the feeling of our own body is deeply movement-dependent?

Furthermore, I would like to explore the process of moving as bodying or becoming the body itself through movement. From that point of view, we do not have fixed body boundaries, but we are bodying them and we are being bodied by them all the time. According to Simondon, the living being lives on the limit of its being. One of the limits of our being is our skin. The skin as such is not the outside of our being, but the outside of the inside. Therefore, to touch is to move the inside on the outside. Our bodies become our integrated tools-techniques of becoming when we start to explore our own skin as a tool of bodying through touching, as well as touching through moving. What are the lives of our body boundaries and how can we not only feel, but capture our perception of them?

I would also like to explore the idea of the inside and the outside of a body and question its inseparability. What is the inside of our body, what is its outside; where does it begin and where does it end; what are the edges of a moving body and the one being moved; where does our skin end and the one of our partner begin? What

if there is no one single skin; what if there are only relational skin(s); what if we are always dancing our own body boundaries? The fluidity of our body boundaries and the fluidity of movement open up a question of the body-between, relational one or the one that emerges through moving together. What happens with the space between two bodies in movement, two skins as two touching surfaces; can we talk about the body-between or skin-between, relational skin, bodying as skinning, touching as bodying, where does it begin and end and who does it belong to?

Some of the questions I would like to raise are:

- where does our body start and where does it end;
- which are our entry points, as well as points of exit;
- where does our feeling of a hand (for example) end and the feeling of an arm begin;
- when does a hand stop being a hand and becomes a hand-arm, hand-face, hand-skin, etc.;
- does a fact of moving together change the perception of our own body boundaries;
- is a size of our moving body experience-dependent;
- how do we sense our anatomy; what are the boundaries of the anatomy we sense;
- how does our hand become relational and how do we enter the state of handing (dancing the potentiality of a hand) instead of dancing with it;
- how do we perceive the outside and the inside of our body; when are we in and when are we out of it?
- how do we perceive our body on the outside as well as on the inside and do the outside and the inside of our body share the same size;
- is there a boundary between our body parts or do you perceive our body as a whole; are the boundaries between our body parts dynamic and how;
- how do we perceive the inside of our organs; does their size change depending on the way we move;
- when and where do we overlap with the body of your partner;
- how many bodies do we have;
- how many anatomies do we have;
- how do we feel the inner side of our organs;
- how do we feel our organs in sensation;

- how do we overlap with an object of our perception (being inside, outside and overlapped with an object of the perception);
- how do we overlap with the subject of our perception, the body of our partner (being inside, outside and overlapped with a subject of the perception);
- how do we feel a particular body part, for example, our spine, depending on different situations or modes of moving;
- making an enlargement or minimization of a particular body part in relation to their feeling of it;
- putting body parts together (composing the anatomy of a body) the way we feel them in a given moment and tracking how the body composition changes as our feelings change;
- creating the new body boundaries in relation to our feeling of them;
- creating a new anatomy, as well as the new ways of perceiving the anatomy in relation to our feeling of it.

All of the following images were composed in relation to my perception of the body part I was exploring. The main subject of this work is an exploration of the body image in making, as well as its transformation in time. What transforms the body image is movement. All of the following images are an attempt of reconstruction of a "feeling" of a certain body part, for example, hands, in a given moment. They are also an attempt to raise the question of that which we see and that which we sense and feel, at the level of anatomy, as well as body organization. What is the difference between the hand that we see and the hand that we experience, experienced hand? How much is our body image — experience-based, and therefore, actually — experiential body image, a body image in making?



Image 1: exploring the experienced anatomy of my hands (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 2: exploring the experienced anatomy of my hands (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 3: exploring the experienced anatomy of my hands (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 4: experienced anatomy of the clavicle of my dance partner (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 5: experienced anatomy of the clavicle of my dance partner (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 6: exploring the experienced anatomy of my clavicle (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 7: exploring the experienced anatomy of my palms (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 8: exploring the experienced anatomy of my palms (made by Laura Potrovic)



Image 9: exploring the experienced anatomy of my hair (made by Laura Potrovic)

What we can conclude from these images is that the way we see our body and the way we feel it do not necessarily match. Experiential body image or body image in making is not related to an already organized body, but to the processes of coming-into-organization of a body. Movement, for example, affects the processes of coming-into-organization of a body. At the level of its organization a body can be considered as a dynamic entity, constantly varying, transforming, reorganizing itself. What we can also conclude is that the *feeling* of body's organization, as well as of body image is movement-dependent. Because of its dependency of movement, body image can be considered as experiential body image.

11.1.1 Body Boundaries — Self-Interview

- How do you perceive your body on the outside, as well as on the inside and do the outside and the inside of your body share the same size?

My perception of both the interior and exterior of my body depends on the experience I am having in a given moment. I would define both the interior and the exterior of my body as experience-based, event-based, movement-based. However, movement makes my perception dynamic, fluid, perception-in-movement. As my body moves my perception of it moves too. As my body reorganizes, my perception of it reorganizes too. There are different, singular modes of perceiving the interiority and exteriority of my body. Right now, if I think from the experience of moving, it becomes impossible to separate or to make a difference between the interior and the exterior of my body. What seems "outside" can be experienced as "inside" and what seems as "inside" can be experienced as "outside". There is no fixed limit between the outside and the inside: exteriority of my body is experienced as the outside of inside and the interiority of my body is experienced as the inside of the outside. My body is experienced as a flow, magma, plasma, it is water-like, electricity-like, shape-shifting from one experiential form to another, from one experiential size to another, from one experiential texture to another. My body lives in movement and as movement. It exists in numerous different modes at the same time: as solid, liquid, gas. I don't perceive the "outside" and the "inside" of my body, but choreographic processes that operate on the outside and the inside of my body, as well as make it. For example, for me, lungs are not a finished organ for breathing, but an unfinished process of breathing. Lungs are processual and my experience of them, their position, size, texture, depends on the mode of breathing I am experiencing or exploring. Breathing = Lunging. Another example, skin is an organ of vision. I feel like I can touch-see with my skin, being aware of my skin is like having hands everywhere, putting awareness into every part of my body.

- Is there a boundary between your body parts or do you perceive your body as a whole; are the boundaries between you body parts dynamic and how?

The boundaries between my body parts are definitely dynamic and flowing. There is no fixed idea of a body part or an organ, as well as their limits. What makes a certain body part of an organ is movement. I feel like there are several levels of thinking our organs. I feel like organs exist in several parallel modes: there is a physical mode,

choreographic mode (operational mode — saying how a certain organ works and produces itself through its singular movement, as well as its singular choreography), experiential mode, relational mode, etc. On a physical level, lungs can be recognized as lungs. If I look from the outside, lungs can seem static or predetermined, but if I look from the inside of my body, they are not. The way they work, its choreographic mode of being, is constantly reorganizing itself. What interests me the most is the relational mode of being of a particular organ or a body part. This way, what defines the limit of a particular organ is its relation to the interiority and the exteriority of the body, as well as the world. The organ is being made by the relation. Organ is relational. Organ is relation. For example: I am sitting in the room, looking at the green wall and breathing. My lungs felt as relation become lungs-room-green-wall. They breathe in qualitative textures of the room, green and wall, as they breathe out qualitative textures of themselves, lungs. In the movement of breathing in and breathing out, as well as meeting between the lungs, room, green and wall my relational lungs are being made. Lungs, eyes, skin — flow in and flow out. Breathing in and breathing out becomes flowing in and flowing out of a form, boundaries as well as experience of lungs. There are moments when I feel the solidity of my body boundaries, but most of the time, they are flowing.

- How do you perceive the inside of your organs; does their size change depending on the way you move?

I perceive the interiority of my organs as set of movements, choreographic processes, relations, micro-perceptions. Their position, size, and texture are changing as I move. More precisely, what I feel is: position-in-movement, size-in-movement, texture-in-movement of my organs. Flow of my perception becomes the flow of my body, or more precisely, perceptual flow materializes itself as my body. Limits of my body are the limits of my flow, my modes of flowing, and therefore bodying. I don't feel that I have organs. I feel my organs as active and ongoing processes of formation and reorganization. I also don't feel that I am being a body, but I strongly feel that I am becoming a body. I feel that I can choose my modes of being and/or becoming a body. Working on specific modes of perceiving is my way of choosing my modes of becoming a body. When I sit, I feel that my organs are contracting; when I move, or for example, swim, I feel that my organs are extending. When I breathe in I feel my entire body expanding; when I breathe out, I feel it contracting. When I really look into someone's eyes, I feel my body expanding; when I avoid the eye contact, I feel my body contracting. I think-feel my organs as activities, processes, becomings. For

example, I don't think-feel the hand, but handing, or the process of a hand becoming itself. Except as becomings, for me, organs also exist as singular qualities. More precisely, I try to perceive the handness of a hand, or all of its qualitative becomings, all of its possibilities, compossibilities.

- When and where do you overlap with the body of your partner?

My body superposes with the body of my partner when I stop feeling the boundaries between our bodies and when I enter the state of having "relational body". I would describe it as: bodying in, through and as relations. My body can be anything: a thought, a texture, the air, the water, a wall, the floor, a person. For example, when I start to perceive the air not as external, but as internal to me, that is the moment when my body superposes with the body of the air. Also, when I start to explore myself, not as Laura, but lauring, as well as air, not as air, but airing, two parallel, intertwined process of becoming. Another way of superposing my body with the body of the other: for example, when I perceive the chair not as a finished object, "chair", but as an infinity of textural becoming(s), "chairness". In the first case, I am the subject and the chair, an object, is external to me. In the second case, my modes of perceiving the chair become my modes of becoming it. I live as one of chair's textures interacting with the other textures. I am not reducible to myself or the chair but to the infinity of relations between myself and the chair.

- How many bodies do you have?

I have numerous bodies that I cannot name and several ones that I can name. If I think about my body as a mode, I exist in numerous modes of becoming a body at the same time. I have physical body, experiential or lived body, relational body. There is another way to imagine all of those bodies within one body. One way is to imagine them as active layers of one and the same body. All of those layers — physical, experiential and relational one — are autonomous and intertwined at the same time. They interact and affect one another — all the time, therefore, it is hard to say where one of them stops and the other one begins. Another way to imagine them is to imagine different virtual or potential bodies within one actual body. A multiplicity of potential bodies animates, as well as activates the actual body — through movement, experience, relations — all the time.

- How many anatomies do you have?

I have several anatomies: physical, experiential, relational ones. All of them are anatomies-in-movement, anatomies-in-becoming. Therefore: becoming-physical, becoming-experiential, becoming-relational. The one that interests me the most is relational anatomy. There are different ways to think-feel it. For example, even on a physical level anatomy is relational: being made of bones, muscles, nerves — all those different layers of anatomy are intertwined and in relation all the time. More precisely, different layers of anatomy are being in relation physically, energetically, kinetically. Being in relation physically means that all layers of anatomy (bones, muscles, nerves) compose a body. Bones, nerves and muscles are different planes of composition called a body. Being in relation energetically means that all of them have its own type of energy flowing through them, as well as their singular energetic flow. Together, they co-compose body-flow. Being in relation kinetically means that all of them have their own singular mode of moving. They constitute a certain movement and they are being constituted by that movement, as well as body itself. Anatomy is, at the same time, structured, flowing and in movement. Anatomy is a movement. Body is a movement.

- How do they overlap with an object of their perception (being inside, outside and overlapped with an object of the perception)?

When interacting with the object of my perception, all of my bodies, as well as all of my anatomies, enter the state of co-becoming with that object. There are no object or subjects in that experience, only relations. There are also no ideas of being inside or outside the object of experience, only experiences. More precisely, outside can transform into inside and inside can transform into outside. It is possible to be outside, inside and in-between at the same time.

- How do they overlap with the subject of their perception, the body of their partner (being inside, outside and overlapped with a subject of the perception)?

It is the same as the previously described experience. On a level of becoming, there are no subject and objects, but only, as previously mentioned, relations.

- How do you feel a particular body part, for example, your spinal cord, depending on different modes of moving?

Different modes of moving change the feeling of my spinal cord. More precisely, different modes of moving, change the body image of my spinal cord. In most cases,

I feel my spinal cord as fluid, flowing one, being one and many at the same time. I feel every part of my body, as well as my spinal cord, as a score. Different modes of moving represent different possibilities of dancing particular body part or organ. Right now, while sitting in a class, I feel my spinal cord as both solid and liquid, but flowing in a very slow pace. If I imagine myself swimming I feel my spinal cord as mostly liquid; I feel my body being one with the sea and my spinal cord being one with the waves. Sea waves are putting my spinal cord in movement and my spinal cord is putting sea waves into movement. My spinal cord is made of sea waves and sea waves are made of my spinal cord. My spinal cord is a sea wave. My body image is wave-like. My body is a meeting point between the spinal waves and sea cords.

11.2 WHICH BOUNDARY? PHYSICAL, EXPERIENTIAL, RELATIONAL BOUNDARIES: MULTIMODALITY OF BODY IMAGE

When talking about body boundaries we are taking into consideration the following notions, those of:

- physical body;
- experiential body;
- relational body.

Which boundaries are we talking about — physical, experiential or relational ones? Body boundaries are multiple, or more precisely, they have multiple planes of existence that are intertwined. The question of body boundaries, as posed here, is the question of body image. Schilder's text *The image and appearance of the human body: Studies in the constructive energies of the psyche* (1935) contains the most often recited definition of body image presented in psychological research: "The image of the human body means the picture of our own body which we form in our mind, that is to say, the way it appears to ourselves. There are sensations which are given to us. We see part of the body-surface. We have tactile, thermal, pain impressions. There are sensations which come from the muscles and their sheaths — sensations coming from the innervation of the muscles — and sensations from the viscera. Beyond that there is the immediate experience that there is a unity of the body. This unity is perceived, yet it is more than a perception. We call it a schema of our body or bodily schema following Head, who emphasizes the importance of the knowledge of the position of the body, postural model of the body. The body schema is the tri-dimensional image everybody has about himself [sic]. We may call it 'body image'. The term indicates that we are not dealing with a mere sensation or imagination. There is a self-appearance of the body. It also indicates that, although it has come through the senses, it is not a mere perception. There are mental pictures and representations involved in it, but it is not mere representation" (Schilder, 1935: 11).

When talking about body image, it is important to mention how, in this particular case, the idea of image is not connected to the idea of visual representation. Body image does not represent anything. Body image does not stand for a visual image, but for a kinesthetic one. Furthermore, body image is also a multimodal image. Freud

called the image employed in act of dreaming — a multimodal image. According to Freud, a multimodal image cannot be reduced to a visual image. It is so much more than that. It is an experiential image. More importantly, it is a relational image. What makes it relational? The plasticity of relation. The plasticity of relation makes the plasticity of body image. Therefore, body image is a plastic image or the one being in permanent transformation and reorganization, it is an image in making.

It is important to make a distinction between the body schema and the body image. Gallagher and Cole (1995/1998) offer that distinction. According to Gallagher and Cole, the body schema is different from body image; it is a non-conscious, basic condition for habitual movement: "A body schema involves a system of motor capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance of posture" (Gallagher and Cole, 1995/1998: 132). Furthermore: "The visual, tactile and proprioceptive awareness that I have of my body may help me to learn a new dance step, improve my tennis game, or imitate the movements of others. Ordinarily, however, in walking I do not have to think about putting one foot in front of another... Posture and the majority of bodily movements usually operate without the help of a body image" (Gallagher and Cole, 1995/1998: 133). Gallagher and Cole also stated: "The body schema consists of a system of prepersonal anonymous processes. Even in the cases of intentional movement, most bodily adjustments that subtend balance and posture are not subject to my personal decision" (Gallagher and Cole, 1995/1998: 134).

According to Gallagher and Cole's formulation, body schema is a non-conscious functional capacity and is plastic at the level of motor functioning. From the point of view of phenomenal experience, the body schema is characteristic of propensities aiding motility, such as proprioception. However, in its absence motility can be guided by the perceptual aspects of the body image. Even though the body image is distinct from the body schema, it can take up the same function under certain conditions. Under these conditions, Gallagher and Cole (1995/1998) describe the body image in the following way: "The body image consists of a complex set of intentional states — perceptions, mental representations, beliefs and attitudes — in which the intentional object of such states is one's own body. Thus the body image involves a reflective intentionality" (Gallagher and Cole, 1995/1998: 132). Furthermore: "[It] involves a partial, abstract and articulated perception of the body insofar as thought, attention and emotional evaluation attend to only one part or area or aspect of the body at a time. It is also possible that as a set of beliefs or attitudes about the body, the body image can involve inconsistency or contradictions" (Gallagher and Cole, 1995/1998: 134).

As previously mentioned, the body image is closer to the idea of a multimodal image or thought than a functional capacity. More precisely, it is an idea and perception and, according to Metzinger (2003), is the limit of what can be called "my body" in phenomenal experience: "You are never in contact with your own body — as an embodied, conscious entity you are the contents of an image, a dynamical image that constantly changes in a very high number of different dimensions. However, this image is at the same time a physical part of your body, as it invariably possesses a true neurobiological description" (Metzinger, 2003: 301-2). When Metzinger says how we are never in contact with our own body, what he is trying to say, I guess, is that we are never in the contact with our own body as fully embodied entity, the body as finished.

Body schema is that which makes the *what* of a particular body and body image is that which makes its *how*. The difference between the body schema and the body image is the following one: body schema is universal and conscious while body image is singular and unconscious. Furthermore, body schema is not subjected to change unlike body image which is subjected to constant change. On the other hand, there is a way to challenge this idea. According to Gallagher and Cole: "The body schema (...) can be functionally integrated with its environment, even to the extent that it frequently incorporates certain objects into its operations — the hammer in the carpenter's hand, the feather in the woman's hat, and so forth" (Gallagher & Cole, 1998: 133). Is it possible to conclude how a singular type of movement, specific to carpenter's habitual work-related activity, integrates his hand and the hammer? Is it possible to conclude how movement extends both body schema and body image? Is it possible to say how movement integrates objects into body schema and relations into body image?

Vigarello's (2013) interpretation of silhouette complexifies the question, as well as the difference between body schema and body image: "Looks, silhouettes, and clothes are less and less markers of one's social origins or caste as they increasingly convey one's personality and particularity instead. Individuals no longer feel constrained to represent a group or milieu. One's singularity reveals itself by itself. These manifest changes suggest a decisive consequence: the subject "is" his or her appearance. What's more, the subject erects in the dense core of his or her organic being, with its singular history, traumas, and trials, the heart of one's identity. This explains the new quests that transform the organic into a place of explanation with answers to questions about the physical past of each person, and of reflection also on one's fleshy self that is supposed to be the key to another interiority now totally intimate and psychologized. This is a totally unprecedented exploration where subjects claim to discover themselves based on what they physically undergo and feel. We are

witnessing the emergence of what could be called a 'body cogito' that would replace the 'I think therefore I am' with 'I am my body'" (Vigarello, 2013: 194). Where to situate Vigarello's idea of silhouette, since it carries out the characteristics of both body schema and body image? Is it possible to think silhouette as that which is situated in the between of body schema and body image, or as that which puts body schema and body image into relation? The silhouette also troubles the difference between "being a body" and "having a body" — since it integrates both experiences at the same time. It integrates the "form" of the body and "its dynamic vectors, forces, tensions" — leading toward the constitution of a dynamic "contour" — irreducible to body schema or body image *per se* (Vigarello, 2013: 151).

11.3 DYNAMIC CONSTRUCTION OF BODY IMAGE: FROM STRUCTURE TO STRUCTURALIZATION

The definition of the body image put forward by Schilder (1935/1978) suggests that the body image develops from many levels of perception. More precisely, it develops through self-referential impressions supported by proprioception, through the interoceptive and exteroceptive impressions associated with all senses, and through visceral sensation. Shontz (1969) noted that the definition of the body image Schilder presented was much more than simply an internal representation of one's appearance: "Indeed the picture of the body seems to be a variety of things all at once. Although it is described as being 'mental', it is probably not purely so, for the body image is said to have its origins in somatic states and events which, under certain conditions, alter the body or affect it directly. Whether the body image is mental or somatic or both, it is clear the body image is both a part of the ego and something to which the ego reacts; it is the subject as well as the object of mental activity... Like the body schemata...the body image is structure as well as process" (Shontz, 1969: 170).

Furthermore, Schilder's (1935/1978) understanding of body image as dynamic construction is that of a balancing act where constructive and destructive tendencies form an indivisible pair¹. The activities of construction and destruction are the continuous efforts of testing out what the body is, as well as what it can become: "In the phases of construction and destruction, two principal human tendencies come out. One is the tendency to crystallize units, to secure points of rest, definiteness, and absence of change. The other is the tendency to obtain a continual flow, a continuous change... We have conceived the passing and the stabile as phases in creative construction" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 211). Let's recall the concept of intense body in Spinoza. According to Spinoza, intense body is that which is defined kinetically, in terms of an infinite number of particles in relations of motion and rest, and dynamically, in terms of the capacity for affecting and being affected. How to put into relation the idea of intense body, or that which is defined dynamically and kinetically and the idea of body image, or that which is defined as dynamic construction being generated through movement? Spinoza's intense body is experiential body. Schilder's body image is experiential body image. Was Spinoza a first thinker of the body image?

The work of dynamic construction of body image could be understood as that of bringing the experience of the body together. This activity corresponds with what

¹The unity of the body image is contingent and equivocal — it is "in perpetual inner

in psychology is referred to as apperception. Therefore, the specificity of dynamic construction of body image is that it does not only represents an ongoing activity, but is also the comprehension and awareness of changes in the experience of body image. Dynamic construction is a generative activity where insight is both the outcome and the inception of that constructive activity: "One does not really own the postural model of the body which is necessary for the start of any movement. One has to gain it by an active process which consists in bringing new parts of reality into the reach of the active mind. The final appearance, the gestalt, is therefore the result of an inner activity and of action" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 56). Another specificity of dynamic construction of body image is that it aims to capture form, but that form dissipates through the continual activity of perception.

The active process in the dynamic construction of the body image is characterized by Schilder as a continual flow. Schilder suggests how the active process of a continual flow is initiated and built up through bodily movement. What Schilder also suggests is that movement cannot begin without the effort accumulated from the dynamically organized body image. He characterizes the active process, like perception itself, as a continual flow such that the structure of the body image is captured as a process: "The image of the body is not a static phenomenon from the physiological point of view. It is acquired, and built-up, and gets its structure by continual contact with the world. It is not a structure but a structuralization in which continual changes take place, and all these changes have relations to motility and to actions in the outside world" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 174).

Schilder does not relate the body image to an appearance or structural entity. Instead, he relates it to the psychological activity, and dynamically organized phenomenon. Dynamic construction is characterized by Schilder as a continual flow of activity followed by the crystallization of points of rest. Furthermore, every crystallized point of rest is subsequently followed by what he referred to as further plastic activity. The alternation between continual flow and crystallization offers a conceptual device that allows one to think the process of formation. This device Massumi calls «taking-form» (Massumi, 2000: 9). The significance of taking-form, Massumi suggests, is the way it permits the conceptualization of potential events. The notion of taking-form allows the emergence and processuality Schilder associates with dynamic construction of body image. Taking-form is also that which allows the indeterminacy of that process. How to think the body is not a point of crystallization, but as an ongoing activity of crystallizing?

self-construction and self-destruction. It is living in its continued differentiation and integration" (Schilder, 1964: 16).

The active process of a continual flow does not present itself to consciousness, but is observable through the experience of change, or the secure points of rest that emerge from the process of change. The self-experience of the body is therefore subject to flux. However, at the same time, that experience is potentially coordinated into a stable feeling of bodiliness through the effort of dynamic construction. One of the processes that activate change in the body image is the process of perception.

Schilder stresses that the nature of perception is synaesthetic. Synaesthetic perception suggests that the action of perception is never confined to one sensory modality, but is a process in which all modes of perception contribute to a whole experience at any point in time. According to Schilder: "This means that there does not exist any primary isolation between the different senses. The isolation is secondary. We perceive and we may with some difficulty decide that one part of the perception is based upon the optic impressions. The synaesthesia, therefore, is the normal situation. The isolated sensation is the product of an analysis. In the scheme of the body tactile-kinaesthetic and optic impulses can only be separated from each other by artificial methods. What we have studied is the change in the unity of the postural model of the body by change in the sensation of the tactile and optic sphere. The nervous system acts as a unit according to the total situation. The unit of perception is the object which presents itself through the senses and through *all* the senses. Perception is synaesthetic. There is no question that the body presents itself to all senses" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 38-9).

Synaesthetic perception implies that we apprehend the world and our own existence through all our senses, and that the process by which we do this is central to the nature of both perception and the body image. Each mode of perception is supported by a differentiated system at the level of the organic structure. Our subjective experience of perception is synaesthetic and any differentiation between the senses is always the result of intellectual abstraction. Crary describes how, during the nineteenth century, Goethe and Schopenhauer conceptualized vision as integrative. Crary describes how each of these authors identified vision as "irreducible" in its composite and synaesthetic character (Crary, 1990: 70). Schopenhauer, Crary suggests, "rejected any model of the observer as passive receiver of sensation and instead posed a subject who was both the site and producer of sensation" (Crary, 1990: 75). According to Crary, vision, from the point of view of the phenomenal body, is never neutral, nor is it separate from the object perceived or disconnected from other senses, as well as other sensory impressions. How to think the sense of movement as the sixth sense integrating all senses?

11.4 PLASTICITY: TO MOVE OR TO TRANSFORM THE BODY IMAGE

According to Schilder, the experience of unity generated by the body image has a direct relationship to our capacity for bodily movement. Movement is that which affects the dynamic construction of body image, and dynamic construction of body image is that which affects our mode of "being our body", or, in other words, how we are our body. Rothfield (1992) and Sheets-Johnstone (2002; 2000) have attributed to movement, and the body that enacts movement, a central place in human development. Rothfield identifies that the quality of one's movement is central to the character of embodiment. For Rothfield, embodiment identifies the perception of one's consciousness not as a detached and objective mind, but as an embodied experience. The body is considered as condition of one's mental life, is an active and living expression of that mental life.

Schilder suggests that "we do not feel our body so much when it is at rest, but we get a clearer perception of it when it moves..." (Schilder, 1935/1978: 87). Furthermore: "Movement is a great uniting factor between the different parts of the body. By movement we come into a definite relation with the outside world and to objects, and only in contact with this outside world are we able to correlate the diverse impressions concerning our own body. The knowledge of our own body is to a large extent dependent upon our action" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 112-13).

Schilder recognizes movement as being more than the effect of motor coordination. He also recognizes how every movement has an anticipatory plan through which action is deployed. More precisely, action does not begin spontaneously, but the point of departure in every movement requires an anticipatory plan and each plan requires that a point in the body is found in order to begin and execute that movement. Another important role of the movement is that of generating, as well as enhancing the plasticity of body image. Therefore, it is possible to consider the body image as plastic image. One of the generative experiences of plastic body image is that of movement, another one is that of imagination: "It is one of the inherent characteristics of our psychic life that we continually change our images; we multiply them and make them appear differently. This general rule is true also for the postural model of the body. We let it shrink playfully and come to the idea of Lilliputians, or we transform it into giants. We have therefore, an almost unlimited number of body images" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 67).

For Schilder, dance is a mode of transforming the rigidity of the body image. Furthermore, dance loosens the body image and that loosening facilitates changes to our "psychic attitude" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 208). Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996)

and Sheets-Johnstone (2002) have augmented Schilder's (1935/1978) emphasis upon both the plasticity of the body image and the role of movement and dynamic construction. What Schilder, Gallagher, Meltzoff, and Sheets-Johnstone all have in common is emphasis of the emergent character of the body image. More precisely, Sheets-Johnstone underlines the synaesthetic basis of the body image by referring to it as an "affectively and tactile-kinesthetically charged" entity (Sheets-Johnstone, 2002: 43). Furthermore, Solms and Turnbull reinforce this idea when describing from what one's subjective knowledge of the body is constructed. Solms and Turnbull suggest that there are two sources of information serving the construction of knowledge about one's body. The first source of information derives from the "visceral body" which is regulated by the homeostatic systems² and organizes a map of the functions of the body (Solms and Turnbull, 2002: 109). The second source of information derives from the "musculo-skeletal system", or "sensorimotor apparatus", and maps the movements, as well as the potential movements of the body (Solms and Turnbull, 2002: 109). The affectively and tactile-kinesthetically charged body image described by Sheets-Johnstone derives from these systems as well.

Apart from bodily movement, emotions are those which contribute to construction, as well as modification of body image. The role of emotion in construction of body image, according to Schilder, is in facilitating a dialogue between body images: "Emotions are directed towards others (Schilder, 1935/1978: 218). Emotion links us to the body images of others and, the stronger the emotion the closer those others seem to be. This relationship is shaped by emotion and characterized by what Schilder referred to as the community of body images or body image interplay. Body image interplay is both a dynamic activity and a form. However, it is more a dynamic activity than a form because it denotes a fluid process where actions produce a continual exchange with the world and everything in it.

The concept of the body image is also conceptualized within a broad interpretation of the emergence of subjectivity. Grosz presents the relationship between subjectivity and the body image, as well as demonstrates that the subjectivity is a direct outcome of the productive effect of culture upon the corporeal body via the body image. According to Grosz: "A stabilized body image or imaginary anatomy, a consistent and abiding sense of self and bodily boundaries, requires and entails understanding one's position vis-à-vis others, one's place at the apex or organizing point in the perception of space (which, in turn, implies a knowledge that one could also be an object in the spatial field of others), as well as a set of clear-cut distinctions between the inside and

²There are six homeostatic systems: electrolytic system, metabolic system, immune system, endocrine system, circulatory system and nervous system.

the outside of the body, the active and passive positions, and as we will see, a position as a sexually determinate subject" (Grosz, 1994: 48).

Grosz critiques the effect that Cartesian dualism has had on the way the body has come to be understood in the Western tradition. According to Grosz, this tradition has constructed the notion that body is simply that which "is not mind" (Grosz, 1994: 3). What Grosz claims is that the body needs to be reinterpreted "as a series of processes of becoming, rather than as a fixed state of being" (Grosz, 1994: 12). What Grosz's and Schilder's portrayal of the body image have in common is the idea of dynamic construction. More precisely, both authors identify the body image as an emergent process that organizes the continual flow.

11.5 EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT TRANSFORMATION OF BODY IMAGE

According to Hanley, "Schilder's description of the body image centralized the temporal quality of dynamic construction characterized. "[Body image] is not a structure, but a structuralization" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 174). He then added a secondary focus to the primacy he attributed to the dynamic that was represented by the psychological effort required to consciously organize and construct a subjective understanding of one's phenomenal experience of the body image. The concepts of diachrony and synchrony thus illuminate how the layers within Schilder's theory circumscribe the body image as an emergent entity that, rather than being simply a set of separate constructions, is an activity that may be observed through the observation of changes marked by synchronically organized information" (Hanley, 2004: 7). What generates the complexity of body image is its time-dependent, as well as experience-dependent transformation. Body image is that which is subjected to constant modulation. What generates its constant modulation is a multiplicity of phenomenal states the body encounters and passes through.

Furthermore, Metzinger (2003) described phenomenal states as concrete experience, or, for example, physical sensations: "Phenomenal experience ... is an invisible interface, and internal medium that allows an organism to interact with itself" (Metzinger, 2003: 556). Phenomenal experience also allows an organism, or in this case, the body, to interact with itself. The order of the phenomenal experience is the order of becoming, as well as that of becoming-other. The order of the experience is also the order of the virtual, a pure potentiality generating more potentiality with each instant of the experience.

There are four levels through which Schilder understood body experience. Those are:

- physiological experience;
- emergence of consciousness;
- psychological experience of one's own consciousness;
- interaction between human psychology and somatic experience.

According to Schilder: "There is a continuous interaction of these four levels of the postural model of the body" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 295). No matter what level we may use to understand the body, all four levels are in continual interaction with

each other. The influence of Gestalt theory helped Schilder (1935/1978) to refine the notion of dynamic construction, but he did not propose that construction ever meant a final or completed process as Bullock and Trombley (1999) have suggested. Instead, Schilder consistently described dynamic activity that constructs forms from perceptual experience, but that these forms continually dissipate because of the continual flow of perceptual activity: "We expand and we contract the postural model of the body; we take parts away and we add parts; we rebuild it, we melt the details in; we create new details; we do this with our body and with the expression of the body itself. We experiment continually with it (Schilder, 1935/1978: 210). ...One should emphasize the continual activity, the trying out. One may speak of growth and passing of shapes, 'gestalten'. But here again one should be aware that one is not dealing with automatic development but with a tendency of the constructive life energy. It is a construction and destruction connected with the needs, strivings, and energies of the total personality. It is clear that we are far removed from the classical gestalt psychology in which there is no room for spontaneity guided by experience and for attitudes towards the world" (Schilder, 1935/1978: 211). Schilder emphasized the notion of continual change and brought the activity of perception and the capacity for apperception into a dynamic relationship.

Schilder's (1935/1978) concern with the activity underlying apperception, that is, its tri-dimensional structure through the notion of the body image and its dynamic activity, has a philosophical antecedent in Tiemersma's (1989) account of the phenomenon. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention the phenomenology of Brentano. McCall (1983) captured the nature of Brentano's (1874/1973) ideas by comparing them to that of Wundt. He wrote: "Wundt was primarily concerned with the content of our ideas, and though he accorded special status to the intellectual activity of apperception (following Kant and Herbert), his principal interest was in the quality contained in the idea (i.e., its qualitative content). Thus when Wundt examined the perception of red, it was to the 'idea of red' that he turned, a content different from the 'idea of green' or the 'idea of middle C'. Brentano, on the other hand, wanted to stress above all the activity of sensory perception, not the image or idea of red or middle C, but the act of seeing red or hearing middle C (McCall, 1983: 36). For Brentano it is thus the mental phenomena that are the true object of psychology.... Brentano strove most vigorously to remove the stigma of passivity from the human psyche.... To Brentano...the idea (*Vorstellung*) is the act of apprehending.... (McCall, 1983: 38).

How to think the idea of body-image, the phenomenon of intercorporeality between the body and the image, the relation of becoming-image of the body and becoming-body of the image? Body image operates in this indeterminate zone,

the zone of incompleteness. Body and body image are two intertwined modes of incompleteness interacting with one another. Body image is that which makes the body — a body-between. Body is that which makes the body image — an image-between. What body is and what it can do, as well as become, changes with each instant of the experience.

11.6 EXPERIMENT 1: BODY IMAGE IN MAKING

In 2015 I participated in an experiment on the subject of body boundaries. I was working on the task and data analysis. The participants were asked to show the size of their body parts or organs twice — before and after the yoga experience. More precisely, the photos exhibited below are two-layered photos, consisting of a photo before the yoga experience and the one after the yoga experience. As previously mentioned, each of those photos show how the participants felt the size of their body parts or organs before and after the yoga experience. The results of data analysis showed how most participants felt the enlargement of their body parts, as well as their organs. Are the boundaries of our bodies those that we see or those that we feel, those that we accept or those that we create and co-create?



Image 10: size of head (left) and heart (right) before and after the experience (made by Laura Potrovic)

This task was a task on body boundaries, or more precisely, body image and measuring its transformation induced by the movement experience. How does a body measure? How does a body measure a body? A body — being the measure, measuring tool, measuring system, both measuring and being measured at the same time. A measure is not measurable, but immeasurable, it is not quantitative, but qualitative.

A measure as such cannot be counted, but only experienced. In order to measure things we need to experience them and not to count them. We do not measure the body, but from the body, with the body. A measure is internal, experiential. The level of experience, the level of experience-dependent transformation of body image is the level of immeasurable.

What is interesting about this task on body boundaries is that all experiment participants felt the enlargement of their external and especially internal body parts after the Myriam Gourfink's yoga d'énergie workshop experience. In other words, their body image changed. Another thing that is interesting is that the participants especially felt the enlargement of that which makes the interiority of the body, or more precisely, organs. Even though most participants felt the enlargement of their organs, such as heart, many of them also felt the enlargement of their head which, traditionally speaking, would be classified as external body part. That brings the interesting question: at the level of body schema — it is possible to say which body parts are internal and external, but at the level of body image, the experiential reality of our body — is it really possible to distinguish that which is internal and that which is external?

11.7 EXPERIENTIAL BODY OR THAT WHICH RESISTS THE MEASURE

When talking about the idea and practice of measuring, what is always put into light is that which can be measured. What interests me is that which refuses the idea and practice of measure, or, in other words, that which refuses to be measured. The problem occurs when we define things only from that which allows itself to be measured, therefore, from the possibility of measure. Things are not only defined by their possibility to be measured, but more importantly, by their impossibility to be measured, the impossibility of measure. How to find the way to define things from their impossibility of measure, as well as their resistance to measure? How to define experiential body or that which resists the measure?

What this task, as well as many other tasks on the body image did not manage to measure is:

- full range of time-dependent transformation of body image or the way body image was changing on the smaller time scale, that of minutes, seconds and milliseconds;
- full range of experience-dependent transformation of body image or the way body image was changing with every single instruction that was given over the course of the entire workshop;
- activation of body image transformation at the individual level (which particular instruction, movement, or quality activated the transformation of body image in each participant);
- dynamism of body image transformation (dynamism of qualitative transformation of a particular organ);
- intensity of body image transformation (intensity of qualitative transformation of a particular organ);
- qualitative transformation of the shape of a particular organ;
- qualitative transformation of the function of a particular organ;
- qualitative transformation of the movement of a particular organ;
- qualitative transformation of the sensation of a particular organ;
- qualitative transformation of the energy flow of a particular organ;

- how the qualitative transformation of the energy flow of a particular organ is affecting the energy flow of the other organ(s);
- qualitative transformation of the relation between the particular organ and other organs;
- qualitative transformation of the relation between the particular organ and the entirety of body, etc.

To be able to measure dynamic, living phenomena we need living interactive systems — like the body itself. How to explore the possibility of moving body to register, measure and share certain phenomena or experience of it in a given moment? The main question is: what can a moving body measure; if we think of a body as both self-organized and intuitive measuring tool — what does it measure and how? Every moving body has a potential of individual measuring system. How to let the individual measuring method(s) come from the individual body, internally, and not impose the method onto it, externally? How to explore different modes of situation-based, as well as sensation-based measuring, but also the possible differences between the intuitive usage of body and the one generated through the specific type of training? Our bodies can be seen as collections of different measuring systems; every part of the body can be seen as both intuitive and trained, as well as improvised measuring system, for example: hands, fingers, skin, bones, eyes, whole body as integrated measuring system. Does every part of the moving body register and measure different phenomena? If it does, then it is possible to expand and develop both performer's and spectator's moving bodies as their own situation-based, as well as sensation-based set of tools. How to introduce the categories of measuring by sensing, measuring by feeling, measuring by moving? Moving is measuring. Every time a body moves it moves with a purpose to grasp and capture the event. Moving is measuring the immeasurable. Does the moving itself change spectator's movement perception and his or her modes of situation-based measuring? How to think measuring, not as an act of observing, but as an act of transforming the body into intuitive measuring tool?

11.8 EXPERIENTIAL ORGANS

Within the experiential reality of the body, or more precisely, as experiential organ, a head can be perceived as internal body part. In the same manner, as experiential organ, a heart can be perceived as external body part. Experiential reality of the body is created through movement. Singular movement experience is that which makes the experiential reality of the body. Since the movement is that which makes the body, the movement also makes its organization. Singular movement experience moves the internal, as well as external organization of the body. Within the experiential reality of the moving body the distinction between the internal and the external does not exist. Head, or the heart, as experienced here, are perceived as experiential head, as well as experiential heart.

Experiential organs are feeling organs. What makes the organ is sensation. Sensation makes both the interiority and the exteriority of an organ. Experiential organs are also highly dynamic organs, constantly reorganizing in time. What this task did not manage to measure was exactly that — time-dependent transformation of a particular organ. What this task managed to measure was only the transformation that occurred between two points — before and after the workshop experience. What it misses are all the micro-transformations that occurred along that line of time. It would be interesting to see the totality of different micro-movements and micro-sensations generated throughout the entire workshop duration. In that case we would be able to perceive the full dynamism of ever-changing body image. However, it still would not be the same experience because we would perceive it as spectators, but not as the one who participated in the initial experience, workshop. How is the change in the body image of the other changing my own body image? What can I see and what cannot I see? How is the act of thinking, analysing, sensing the body image of the other changing my own body image?

Within the *yoga d'énergie* practice, organs are not considered as finished or static. Rather, what becomes central is the act of embodying our organs through movement. Embodying our organs increases the flow of energy within and around them. Therefore, organs are not only considered as material, but also as immaterial, energy-based, energy flows. Each and every organ makes a singular energy flow. Once again, it is possible to say how organs flow. Therefore, everything they are, their shape, size, texture, movement, function — flows too.

Organs function both independently and as a unified, ever-changing system. Each organ and organ system expresses its own singular qualities, as well as its own

qualities of consciousness. Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen talks about the mind of the organ, saying how each and every organ has its own mind, as well as a singular type of mindfulness. The body, as appears here, is a multi-mind system or a system being generated through multiple types of consciousness. The difference that is made here is that of studying the organs from the inside out instead of the more traditional approach of studying the organs from the outside in. Studying the organs from the inside out also means studying the following questions: how does this organ want to be felt, how does this organ want to move, where does this organ want to take me, how does this organ want to make me, how does this organ want to relate to the rest of the organs, as well as my entire body?

11.9 INTERCORPOREAL ORGANS: ORGANS-WITH AND ORGANS-BETWEEN

Another interesting possibility that the dynamism of body image opens is the possibility of following:

- intercorporeal organs — organs-with — emerging between two bodies;
- intercorporeality of organs at the level of organization — organization-with — emerging between two bodies;
- intercorporeality of organs at the level of structure — structure-with — emerging between two bodies;
- intercorporeality of organs at the level of function — function-with — emerging between two bodies.

How to define intercorporeal organs? Intercorporeal organs are organs-with, or more precisely, organs created between two autonomous, yet intertwined bodies. Intercorporeality of organs at the level of organization denotes the sphere of organization-with, or the one generating through minimally two different modes of organizing. Furthermore, at the level of organization, intercorporeal organs are not organizations, but processes of organizing that are infinite, incomplete and ongoing. Every time one body changes at the level of organization, the other body, as well as that intercorporeal one, changes too. At the level of structure, intercorporeal organs can be characterized as structuralizations — dynamic processes — emerging between two different bodies. Therefore, intercorporeal structure is also a structure-with or the one emerging through two autonomous, yet intertwined modes of bodying. Intercorporeality of organs at the level of function denotes the sphere of co-created function, or a function-with. Two different bodies co-create the shared function of intercorporeal organs. Each time a change occurs in any of those two bodies, there is also a change that occurs at the level of organization, structuralization and function of intercorporeal organs.

There is another possibility to discuss, that of intercorporeal organs, not formed between two bodies, but instead, between two organs:

- intercorporeal organs — organs-with — emerging between two organs;

- intercorporeality of organs at the level of organization — organization-with — emerging between two organs;
- intercorporeality of organs at the level of structure — structure-with — emerging between two organs;
- intercorporeality of organs at the level of function — function-with — emerging between two organs.

How to define intercorporeal organs in this particular case? Intercorporeal organs or organs-with, in this particular case, are organs created between two autonomous, yet intertwined organs. Intercorporeal organs can emerge between two or more organs. The complexity of intercorporeal organs is unlimited, therefore, intercorporeal organs can emerge between infinite number of organs. A single organ can also enter the relation of intercorporeality with more than one other organ. More precisely, a single organ can enter the infinite number of relations of intercorporeality with other organs. For example, an eye can enter the relation of corporeality with the skin, hand, palm, finger, heart, lungs, etc. In that particular case, what we are experiencing is the corporeality of eye-skin, eye-hand, eye-palm, eye-finger, eye-heart, eye-lungs, etc. An eye exists as all those modes of intercorporeal bodying at the same time.

What we can see is that an organ is never one, but instead, always more-than one organ. Therefore, it is not possible to think the organ as a single organ. An organ is always more-than one, therefore, it is necessary to think — not in terms of organs as such, being always already finished and determined, but in terms of ongoing processes of formation of organs — organizations, structuralizations, functionalizations. Intercorporeal organ is a virtual organ. What makes it virtual are different modes of its processuality. Within the plane of organization — it does not matter what a particular organ is, but what it can become. The process of organization is an ongoing process, or more precisely, it is a movement from one mode of organizing into another. Within the plane of structuralization — the organ never culminates into this or that structure, but is an ongoing movement of structuralization — happening between two or more organs. Within the plane of functionalization — an intercorporeal organ is that which is performing more than one function and that function is mutating as the organs enter the new relations of intercorporeality with other organs.

Organs do not move. Organs are movements. Organs are singular modes of moving. Organs are networks of connectivity. The more connectivity, the more

singularity. The more singularity, the more virtuality or that of the order of becoming. What activates the intercorporeality of bodies or organs — at the level of organization, structure and function — is sensation. Sensation is that which moves the notion, as well as the experience of organs, towards the notion of organness. Within the experience of organness — there are no permanent organization, structures or function, but only planes of organization, structuralization, function. Those planes denote the sphere of pure and nonactualized potentiality. Organness is a texture, quality, connection, relation — activated through the sensation. Organness is the sphere of "what an organ can become", as well as that of "what can be felt as an organ". Within the sphere of organness it is not possible to think, feel or experience the eye, for example, as finished. What is possible to think, feel or experience instead is the eyeness of the eye, or more precisely, its singular how — activated as a singular texture, here and now. Therefore, the sphere of organness makes the sphere of eyeness, lungness, heartness of the body.

The sphere of organness is also the sphere of becoming-organ. More precisely, it denotes the zone of organizational, structural and functional indetermination between two or more organs. Previously, we discussed the event of corporeality of eye-skin, eye-hand, eye-palm, eye-finger, eye-heart, eye-lungs, etc. What is happening in the zone of organization, structural and functional indetermination between the eye and the skin, for example, are relational becomings of the eye and the skin — becoming-eye of the skin and becoming-skin of the eye. It is not just that a single organ is becoming another organ or other organs, but one organization is becoming another organization. Parallely, one mode of organizing is becoming another mode of organizing, or, furthermore, other modes of organizing.

Intercorporeal organs are feeling organs; their organization, structure and function is feeling-dependent. The limits of feelings are the limits of intercorporeal organs. The anatomy of intercorporeal organs is a feeling anatomy. At the same time, feeling anatomy is that which belongs and does not belong to the single body. At the same time, feeling anatomy is that which is internal and external to the single body. And finally, at the same time, feeling anatomy is that which is material and immaterial, physical/structural and experiential. Feeling anatomy is not that which belongs to the body, but that which courses through the body. What makes the feeling anatomy, and therefore, the feeling body are forces, affects, sensations. It is an anatomy-in-movement, making the body and being made by it, a choreo-anatomy. Choreo-anatomy is a plastic anatomy. Its plasticity is activated through movement.

Finally, intercorporeality of organs at the level of organization denotes the sphere of organization-with, or the one generating between minimally two different modes of organizing. At the level of organization, intercorporeal organs are experienced as multiple processes of organizing that are infinite, incomplete and ongoing. Every time a single organ changes at the level of organization, the other organ(s), as well as that intercorporeal one, changes too. At the level of structure, intercorporeal organs can be characterized as structuralizations — dynamic processes — emerging between two or more different organs. Intercorporeal structure is also a structure-with or the one emerging through two autonomous, yet intertwined organs. Intercorporeality of organs at the level of function denotes the sphere of co-created function, or a function-with. Two organs co-create the third, shared function, or the one that both of them do not have individually.

Intercorporeal organs are not only created through the movement, but are the movement itself, or singular modes of moving. Furthermore, they are not only organs-with, but also organs-between. What makes intercorporeal organs — organs-between is:

- intercorporeal organizations;
- intercorporeal structuralizations;
- intercorporeal functions.

Furthermore, what determines the intercorporeal organs as organs-between is:

- organizational intercorporeality;
- structural intercorporeality;
- functional intercorporeality.

What makes the difference between the intercorporeal organization and organizational intercorporeality? What makes the difference between the intercorporeal structure and structural intercorporeality? What is the difference between the intercorporeal function and functional intercorporeality? As previously mentioned, intercorporeal organization or organization-with is that which emerges between two different levels of organizations. Intercorporeal organization denotes the momentary mode of organizing of a particular intercorporeal organ. Organizational intercorporeality denotes the "how" of that process; it is the internal work of the

process of organizing. Furthermore, organizational intercorporeality denotes a plane of organization of a particular organ, a plane of all singular, as well as virtual modes of intercorporeality at its organizational level.

Another way to see a difference between the intercorporeal organization and organizational intercorporeality of an organ is the following one: in the first case, the one of the incorporeal organization, two organs form the third, shared organ, organ-with or organ-between, which is organized intercorporally. An organ consists of minimally three different planes of organization, that coming from one organ, that coming from other organs and the third one coming from both organs, or better, co-created by two organs. Organizational intercorporeality of an organ means that a single organ in itself, at the level of its organization is intercorporeal. More precisely, it means that it is already as, as well as through, multiple modes of organizing. Organ, in itself and within itself, even without forming an intercorporeal organization with the other organs, as well as bodies — is organizationally intercorporeal. Even as a single organ, it represents the intercorporeality *per se*. That intercorporeality is actualized at the level of its anatomy, movement, and experience. Intercorporeal anatomy is the anatomy-between that forms in-between the following:

- bone anatomy;
- ligament anatomy;
- muscle anatomy;
- nerve anatomy;
- energetic anatomy.

Furthermore, intercorporeal anatomy forms in-between the following anatomy systems:

- cardiovascular system;
- digestive system;
- endocrine system;
- reproductive system;
- immune and lymphatic systems;
- integumentary system;

- muscular system,
- respiratory system,
- skeletal system,
- urinary system.

Intercorporeal anatomy systems are plastic systems. As such, they are not interested in what a body already is, but in what it can become.

11.10 INTERCORPOREAL CHIASMS

According to Merleau-Ponty, in order to understand the relation between the object and the idea, their belonging-together, we must pay attention to their intertwining. For Merleau-Ponty, chiasm refers to the originary intertwining of impossible things, the unity of difference, and as such it represents the logic of the relation between the object and the idea, as well as between the sensible and sense. Furthermore, it is precisely this intertwining that; "makes us belong to the same world — a world which is not projective, but forms its unity across impossibilities such as that of my world and that of the other" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 214-215). One of the best examples of this relationship is the reversibility of the human body. That example lies in Merleau-Ponty's earlier work, the *Phenomenology of Perception*, in his account of the relation between monocular images and binocular vision. Merleau-Ponty notes that the two eyes of the human being, each with their own images of the world, nonetheless grasp one and the same object. More precisely, some synthesis appears to occur between the two monocular images. Merleau-Ponty writes: "For my gaze to alight on near objects and to focus my eyes on them, it must experience double vision as an unbalance or as an imperfect vision, and tend towards the single object as towards the release of tension and the completion of vision" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 269-70). What we can conclude is that our bodily orientation towards the thing in the world is the central stem in which the two monocular images are originally held together and from which they diverge in an upset in our grasp on the world, or in the separation of reflection. There is another important thing to notice — the two images exclude aspects of the other and contain some of that which the other does not. Finally, two different images emerge only from their initial intertwining in binocular vision.

Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty writes: "my two hands touch the same things because they are the hands of one same body. And yet each of them has its own tactile experience. If nonetheless they have to do with one sole tangible, it is because there exists a very peculiar relation from one to the other, across the corporeal space — like the holding between my two eyes — making of my hands one sole organ of experience, as it makes of my two eyes the channels of one sole cyclopean vision" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 141). What we can notice here is that this kind of relation is not restricted only to vision, but that we also find it in touch. The body is that which grasps the object in touch or in vision, and it is the body that is likewise grasped by the other; it sees and is seen, it touches and is touched, it moves and is moved — being both sentient and sensible: "we say therefore that our body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things and otherwise what sees and touches

them; we say, because it is evident, that it unites these two properties within itself, and its double-belongingness to the order of the 'object' and to the order of 'subject' reveals to us quite unexpected relations between the two orders. It cannot be by incomprehensible accident that the body has this double reference; it teaches us that each calls for the other" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 137).

The body, a chiasm of the sentient and the sensible, or that in which the sentient and the sensible are originally united, as well as intertwined, points us to belonging-together of these in a manner of being that precedes the separation between subject and object. Through its movement around and against things, the body interrogates the world and "through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves in the universe that they interrogate, are recorded on the same map" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 133). What we are looking for, according to Merleau-Ponty, is an aspect of our experience which has not been "worked over, that offers us, all at once, pell-mell, both subject and object — both existence and essence — and, hence, gives philosophy resources to redefine them" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 130).

How to approach, and furthermore, deepen the notion of chiasm³? Chiasm is that which points us towards the deeper notion of flesh⁴, which is precisely its expression, as well as the expression of the state of our bodily relationship with the world and being. What we seek to express here is that which is "always already", that relation

³In the final chapter of the book *The Visible and the Invisible*, entitled *The Intertwining—The Chiasm*, Merleau-Ponty describes his ontology of "flesh". Intertwining [*entrelacs*] translates here Husserl's *Verflechtung*, entanglement or interweaving, like the woof and warp of a fabric. Chiasm has two senses in French and English that are both relevant to Merleau-Ponty's ontology of "flesh: a physiological sense that refers to anatomical or genetic structures with a crossed arrangement (such as the optic nerves), and a literary sense referring to figures of speech that repeat structures in reverse order (AB:BA). For Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm is a structure of mediation that combines the unity-in-difference. A paradigmatic example of chiasmic structure is the body's doubling into sensible and sentient aspects during self-touch. Elaborating on Husserl's interpretations of this phenomenon, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes three consequences: first, the body as sensible-sentient demonstrates the kinship or ontological continuity between the subject and the object. Second, this relationship is reversible, like "obverse and reverse" or "two segments of one sole circular course". Third, the sentient and sensible never fully coincide, but are always separated by a gap [*écart*] that defers their unity. Chiasm is, therefore, understood as a crisscrossing, or a bi-directional becoming, as well as exchange between the body and the world. A "flesh" stands for a kinship between the sensing body and sensed world that makes their communication possible. As Merleau-Ponty writes, "the idea of chiasm, that is: every relation with being is simultaneously a taking and a being held, the hold is held, it is inscribed and inscribed in the same being that it takes hold of. It is the simultaneous experience of the holding and the held in all orders (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 319/266).

⁴Merleau-Ponty returns to the analysis of painting in his final essay, *Eye and Mind*, and writes: it is by "lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into

through which our body "knows before knowing". Chiasm is the expression of the pre-reflective that cannot be assimilated to the reflective. Our body is engaged with the world of visible things "as though it were in a relation of pre-established harmony with them, as though it knew them before knowing them, it moves in its own way with its abrupt and imperious style, and yet the views taken are not desultory — I do not look chaos, I look at things — so that finally we cannot say if it is the look or if it is the things that command" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 133). This singular mode of reciprocity requires a shared medium that each participant is being part of, because one may not simply engulf the other in order to command them; it is not relationship of containment, as Merleau-Ponty writes: "we have to reject the old assumptions, that of the body in the world and that of the seer in the body, or conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between body and the world, since the world is flesh? [...] as flesh is applied to flesh, the world neither surrounds nor is surrounded by it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 138).

As flesh, or, more precisely, as intercorporeal chiasm, the body and the world face one another, however, there is also a distance being co-constitutive of their belonging-together: "[...] at the same time we are separated by all the thickness of the look and the body; it is that this distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant with it, it is synonymous with it. It is that thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporiety; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 135). Furthermore, it is possible to understand this relation of proximity and distance through flesh by thinking it chiasmatically: they are two arcs of the same circle. Flesh, therefore, becomes a medium which enables difference without radical contradiction; it is the shared root that generates the body and the world; distance and depth. Finally, "it is not matter, not substance", but that through which we are primordially in touch with the depths of things. The body points us towards this, but "it does not explain it, does not clarify it, it only concentrates the mystery of its scattered visibility; and it is indeed a paradox of Being, not a paradox of man, that we are dealing with here" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 133).

How to think the relation between the body and the Being? How to think the body as a singular mode of being? A difference, and maybe similarity, between the body and the being is the following one: the body always stands in the plural. There is no single

paintings" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 353). This presupposes that the artist's body is immersed in and made of the same material as the world: to touch, one must be tangible, and to see, visible. Merleau-Ponty describes this as an "intertwining" or "overlapping", in which the artist's situated embodiment is the other side of its opening to the world. There is no sharp division between the sensing and the sensed, between body and things as one common "flesh".

body. There are bodies within a single body. In other words, we are always more than one body. Our body includes: bodies, flesh, corporealities, intercorporealities, intracorporealities, intercorporeal chiasms, intracorporeal chiasms, and furthermore, bodyings, bodies-in-making, bodies without organs, becoming-bodies, bodies in becoming, etc. Which body are we talking about? Physical body, experiential body, a relational one, all of them chiasmatically interacting at the same time? What being are we talking; what mode of *being* a Being are we touching on? Where body and being chiasmatically co-become, as well as co-construct one another is in their process of formation. Body forms the being and being forms the body; together, they co-emerge as body-in-process and being-in-process. The very flesh of this shared process, the very chiasm of this chiasm, is the experience of movement — emerging between the body and the being. Movement moves both the body and the being toward their processual co-becoming, their shared flesh, a chiasm-in-movement.

Painting arises as the expression of this relation: it is a "a carnal essence" of embodied vision (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 355).

12 | RELATIONAL BODY

12.1 FIELDING OF ATTENTION: MOVING-WITH THE ELASTICITY OF RELATION

For Erin Manning, autistic perception is marked by a dance of attention. What does that mean? It means that autistic perception is a perception in movement, completely relational, becoming and unbecoming from one experience to another. "The dance of attention is a dance of intensive shaping, a complex relational matrix, a milieu of light, color, movement, sound, and social context" (Manning, 2012: 152). Let's start with two examples. "My world is organized around textures ... All emotions, perceptions, my whole world ... [has] been influenced by textures, says Daina Kruminis, autistic artist and writer (Manning, 2012: 149). "Now that I knew I was autistic, I began to group things under it. I made up a whole list of things that I thought had autism. The curtains that *moved in the wind*, the big and small leaves that *moved a little more* with the air because of their suspended positions, the little bits of paper, or the pages of an open book under a fan were classified as autistic. They were affected with autism because they *flapped*, because they would not respond to any blocks, because they did not talk, and I was sure that they would not be able to imitate the clinical psychologist. I wondered how the clinical psychologist would look if she imitated the leaves on a branch if the leaves wanted to find out about her condition", says Tito Mukhopadhyay, autistic poet (Savarese, 2014: 83). As we can see, in both cases, and especially in the case of Tito Mukhopadhyay, things, such as curtains, big and small leaves, bits of paper — are not attended as already meaningful and finished, but they gain their meaning from the processual act of attending, from the movement. This movement of attending is what constitutes the core of a dance of attention.

According to Manning, autistic perception is characterized by ethics of relation. It is based on "an ecology that does not privilege the human but attends to the more than human" (Manning, 2012: 152). As a relational ecology, it is open, horizontal and inclusive. "As a child, everything was somewhat alive to me. I hear the rocks and the trees", says Daina Kruminis, autistic artist and writer (Manning, 2012: 149). "There was very little difference in meaning between the children next to the lake that I was playing with and the turtle sitting on the log. It seems that when most people think of

something being alive they really mean, human", she continues (Manning, 2012: 149). What characterizes autistic perception are hyperrelationality and dynamic expression. What characterizes the experience of "human" is total inclusiveness. "When things are open for you to imagine, you can go to any extreme. You are open to imagine any number of impossibilities. You can imagine the hermit talking like the thunder, his voice reverberating for a long while, traveling with the wind, cutting through the mist, and reaching the other end of the earth" says Tito Mukhopadhyay, autistic poet (Savarese, 2014: 83). "Maybe I do not have to try very hard to be the wind or a rain cloud. There is a big sense of extreme connection I feel with a stone or perhaps with a pen on a tabletop or a tree ... I just have to think about it and become it", he continues (Savarese, 2014: 83).

According to Manning, Daina Krumin's and Tito Mukhopadhyay's mode of attending could be described as attending-with. What is the difference between attending and attending-with? Attending as such is related to appropriation of external, more observing point of view. Attending-with is related to an appropriation of internal, more immersing point of view. In the first case, the idea of something I attend is already there — preceding the act of attending and not depending on that which I attend. In the second case, the idea of something is constituted by the act of attending and depends on that which I attend.

This opens another interesting question: how do autistics perceive their body image? "For many autistics the body does not feel pre-composed, with predetermined roles: it travels, shifting, changing, recomposing with events of experience" (Manning, 2012: 153). The difficulty of this position is a lack of body boundaries. Movement is very important for autistics because it gives them feeling of having a body. In one of her YouTube videos, Amanda Baggs, american blogger, says how she needs to move all the time in order to remind herself of the physical existence of her body. She says how even though she is aware of having a body — she does not feel it unless she moves (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnylM1hI2jc>). There is one interesting thing to notice. As we have seen in Chapter 11 of this thesis, entitled "Body image" — movement is that which loosens the rigidity of body image. In the case of Amanda Baggs, as we can see, movement solidifies the body image. Many dancers describe the experience of movement as the experience of dissolving (Forsythe) or evaporation (Gil) of the edges of the body. What is interesting here, in the case of Amanda Baggs, is the fact that precisely movement "gives" or solidifies a feeling of the edges of a body.

How to think attention as connection machine? Attention is that which connects the body to the sphere of its "more-than". In every dance, there are minimally two dances happening, that of the body and that of attention. Erin Manning calls this dance a dance of attention: "A dance of attention is the singular expression of the wider range of expressivity of a mode of existence. A dance of attention is not a general occurrence: it emerges only when the conditions are right. It can be felt as a quality of infinite potential with a margin of indetermination at its core. In a dance of attention, attention itself constitutes the limit. Attention not of, but toward. A dance of attention is a set of forces that modulate the event" (Manning, 2012: 141). A dance of attention is also a dance of expression, or even, a dance of expressivity. As the attention dances, the expression dances too. Every time attention takes a new step, the expression follows and takes another step too. To dance the attention is to dance the singular field of expressivity of a mode of existence. What activates this dance is a shift — from expression to expressivity, from technique to technicity, from body to bodying. There is another important shift happening — that from attention to attending. This dance of attending is a dance of tuning into, as well as tuning-with, the potential of emerging relations. The action of tuning in makes felt the field of emergence rising from the singular mode of attending.

A dance of attention gives birth to itself through its own technicity. It also gives birth to itself through a singular context, or, its singular conditions of emergence. How to step into the same field of attention twice? Is it possible to come into existence through the same field of attention? It is not possible to step into the same field of attention twice because there is no field to step into. What we are confronted with is fielding of attention. We cannot step into it, we can only move-with it. This movement, this fielding, cannot be experienced twice. "No movement can be cued, aligned to, or performed in exactly the same way twice. Conditions are pragmatic and based, always, on the elastic now of event-time as it makes itself felt" (Manning, 2012: 142). No fielding of attention can be experienced in exactly the same way twice. Conditions are the experiential soil of event. This soil is not only the soil that grounds, but also the soil that moves. Conditions are movements — moving themselves from one experiential ground to another. The elasticity of their now, the event-time, makes this movement possible. Here, a dance of attention makes itself felt as diagrammatic force-form in the now of experience. "What emerges as a dance of attention cannot be replicated. It is not a thing, a form. Attention dances in the between of diagrams in-forming. Attention is its own emergent choreographing. We feel attention's dance, but it is not of us or even for us. It is *with*, in the milieu. It is what we connect to when we feel the procedural pull of the event's magnetism, its overcoming of posture, form, figure, its

outdoing. It is how we feel the work working. For when attention dances, the ground begins to move, and in the moving, we are moved" (Manning, 2012: 142). A dance of attention cannot be replicated because a diagrammatic force-form — generating and being generated in the now of experience — cannot be replicated. A dance of attention is a force of this now. How to repeat this "now"? A dance of attention, a diagrammatic force-form, is in-forming now. As such, it dances in the between of its diagrammatic in-forming, as well as it dances in the between of "now". Attention dances with us, and more importantly — it dances us. When the attention starts to dance us — we become a field of connectivity. This is the moment when we overcome our posture, form, figure. In the between of this moment, we emerge as pure connectivities. We feel the attention attending; we feel the work working — when we are moved from a mode of being to a mode of becoming.

What makes itself felt in this singular movement is ecological sensitivity. "Through an ecological sensitivity, a sensing-with that occurs across registers and scales, being is always a composing-with in a dance of attention that registers the echoes, the silences, the rhythms of language, its subtractions and unsayabilities. In this regard, dancers are indeed otherworldly: they lead us toward an otherness of worlding. An otherness of worlding does not begin with the human: it engages with and across in a vibratory expression that must be "read between". An otherness of worlding is always more-than one. It composes-with experience, refuting the notion that the world is already known, preformed. This worlding is thought in motion, thought individuating in an amplifying incorporeality, a vibratory materiality" (Manning, 2012: 169). A dance of attention is an opening into different modes of being. A different mode of being is an opening into becoming. This becoming is always becoming-with. Ecological sensitivity, a sensing-with, is that which moves our becoming toward the other, beyond and across the scales and registers. Here, the other becomes a compositional feature of our own becoming. It is not only the other that populates our interval of our becoming, but also the otherness of worlding itself. Here, we move beyond and across the scales and registers of human — toward pure vibratory expressions. This world does not know of preformation, but only motion, vibration, a becoming of individuation. What we are being confronted with here is "not the becoming of the individuated being but the becoming of the individuation of being" (Simondon, 2005: 322). A dance of attention is a foray into the otherness of worlding. Otherness of worlding is a foray into the becoming of the individuation of being.

12.2 MOVING BEYOND THE SCALES OF HUMAN: PURE VIBRATORY EXPRESSIONS

The becoming of the individuation of being happens through participating in an attunement. An attunement transforms the field of expression, as well as the very expressivity of that field. Within the act of attunement — we come to expression — through tuning-with. Who is tuning-with who? Within the act of attunement, there is one field of expression tuning-with another field of expression, there are forms of life tuning-with the forces of life, there is life tuning-with *a life*¹. Within the associated milieu of relation there is no distinction between forms of life and forces of life. The act of movement-moving becomes the act of life-living. This life cannot be reduced to something or someone. It is a life coursing through, running through, moving through and not a life belonging to something or someone. The life as such is a pure potential of movement-moving, as well as life-living. Life-living is a force cutting through a form in order to rediscover itself as force once more. Life-living does not take human form. It is a force ingathering human and nonhuman and producing a body that is more-than — one body, human or nonhuman one. It is a pure vibratory expression. Whitehead writes: "Consider one definite molecule. It is part of nature. It has moved

¹A *life* is not limited to the organic. A *life* is that which spreads, not from the organic to the inorganic, but runs between them, an impersonal force of contraction/dilation that characterizes events, as much the events characterize life itself. Both organic and inorganic distinguish life as a kind of contained dynamism, a dynamism within a porous boundary. Both organic and inorganic constitute *a life* as a complex folding of the chemical and the physical, a folding that reveals something not given within the chemical and physical, something new, an emergence. A *life* is the relation propelled by the force of in-formation, it is the tendings, habits and attunements, as well as the appetite, that activate the singularity of this or that folding or unfolding process. A *life* is affective in tone because it does not belong to the individual nor it can be felt as individual life: "... the life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens..." (Deleuze, 2001: 28). We don't possess or live *a life*, we tune into it. What *a life* asserts is the primacy of experience and process, but experience and process not of and for a subject or object but in and of themselves in constant, or more precisely, processual variation. William James calls this pure experience: "Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges ... one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions... Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected" (James, 1912: 87). For Deleuze, the field of *a life* is one of the relationality of sensations; it is the passage from one sensation to another rather than the sensations themselves. A *life* is a life in becoming or the one coursing between-times and between-moments: "This indefinite life does not itself have moments..." (Deleuze, 2001: 28). A life is made up of both indefinites ("a") and singularities ("thisness"). These indefinites are determined only by immanence; their immanence is their eventness. Passing from one plane of immanence to another is passing from one mode of eventness to another. A *life* is a life in process, a life that is all around — conjured out of relations and more-than the subject, yet passing through the subject — as if a subject were a momentary individuation of all that is passing through and around it.

about for millions of years. Perhaps it started from a distant nebula. It enters the body; it may be as a factor in some edible vegetable; or it passes into the lungs as part of the air. At what exact point as it enters the mouth, or as it is absorbed through the skin, is it part of the body? At what exact moment, later on, does it cease to be part of the body? Exactness is out of the question. It can only be obtained by some trivial convention" (Whitehead, 1933: 30).

Let's take a molecule as a further example. Everything there is — is made of molecules. Which specie does a molecule belong to? Is a molecule human or nonhuman? If everything there is is made of molecules then we cannot define molecules as human. Our entire body is made of molecules, therefore — is it possible to conclude how our human body is also nonhuman? How to transgress the difference between the human and nonhuman? Molecule is an example of such a transgression — because it is not related to any particular specie, but to the process of speciation. Molecule is that which speciates. Speciations are species in becoming. The becoming of species is called dance of speciations. Throughout *Always More Than One*, speciation never leads to a species. However, species always lead to speciations. Speciation refers to the processual force that exceeds the concept of species. This force is a force of not-yet. How to think this molecule's dance of speciations, this dance of not-yet? First, it co-constitutes the nebula, then, it co-constitutes the vegetable or the air. Then, it enters the body and starts to co-constitute it. We cannot say when this molecule entered the body or ceased to be a part of it. Also, we cannot say when this molecule ceased to be a part of human or nonhuman body. Speciations are what connect in the moving, as Brian Massumi suggests. They are neither organic nor inorganic. Speciations are series, as Deleuze defines them, affective tonalities that merge form and force. If we would need to define speciations as movement, we would define them as composing-with. This movement, the one of composing-with, activates the relation between affective tonality and affective attunement. What it produces is expressive collectivity, a form of vitality moving beyond the difference between one and many, human and nonhuman.

Each experience is a process of coming to expression. Vitality forms color the coming-into-expression of life. "Vitality forms are the most fundamental of all felt experience. They are inherent in each coming-to-act, bringing forth a speciation that always exceeds containment (Stern, 2010: 8). These speciations occur in the between of experience and experiencing where embodiment is not-yet. They meet as tendencies, as proclivities. Arm meets rosebush to become gardening-tendency, thorn meets sound to become weapon, disintegrating rock meets water to become raft. Bodies, life-forms do emerge, but never as fully formed, never "as such": something always

escapes the delineation of the coming-to-act, and something always exceeds it. The body, the individual, life as such is but a shorthand for a million speciations, organic and inorganic, intertwining. Speciations create drifts, and these drifts create runoffs. This field of relation "includes" the "we" that is not "I". It creates a tending-toward, a procedure-for-life that is a shaping of the relational milieu of experience. Practice does not come after the emplacement of the terms and their relations, but actively participates in the drawing of the lines; it confronts the same dangers and the same variations as the emplacement does (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 203). Lines of drift are lines of life-living. They are emphatically real, if abstract. They shape the trajectories of life-living and of the more-than that animates it" (Manning, 2012: 199, 200). The singularity of vitality forms is in the speciations they bring forth, as well as in their coming-to-act which exceeds containment to this or that form, or to this or that being. Vitality forms activate and make felt that which is in the between of experience. They experience, and furthermore, body (verb) that which is not-yet. Vitality forms are not only tendencies, but also tendings. They happen in the between of one form tending toward the other form. This process of tending activates the form as force, or more precisely, force of *a life*. The body is a plateau of infinite speciations — happening here and now. The body is that which makes the origins of life touch the present moment. Every single atom our body is made of was made 13.7 billion years ago. However, at the same time, all of those atoms traveled through other bodies, and other speciations, in order to touch this present body that we are, as well as to touch this present moment. Each of those atoms is not only 13.7 billion years old, but also holds within itself 13.7 billion speciations. In other words, it holds within itself 13.7 billion passages. Speciations are passages — not only from one body to another, but more importantly — from one mode of bodying to another. Each body is a relational milieu of experience. Each body holds within itself an experience of being another body, and even more, it holds within itself infinite modes of bodying. This is another moment when we can reflect the body as a score, body-score, or that which is holding within itself its own modes of bodying, and more importantly — dancing them as far as they can go.

12.2.1 Microscopic Exploration: Human and Vegetal Mixes




Image 1: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 2: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 3: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 4: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 5: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 6: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 7: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 8: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 9: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 10: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 11: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 12: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 13: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 14: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 15: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 16: microscopic image of human and plant tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)

12.2.2 Microscopic Exploration: Human and Mineral Mixes




Image 17: microscopic image of minerals and human tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)




Image 18: microscopic image of minerals human tissues (made by Laura Potrovic)

What we can see in these images are hybrid tissues. More precisely, we are looking at the mixes of human and vegetal, as well as mineral body material. In order to create these images I used my own body material, such as saliva or skin and I mixed it with the material of vegetal and mineral origin (flower petal dust or stone dust). Subchapter "Microscopic Exploration: Human and Vegetal Mixes" demonstrates sixteen images, each of them showing a hybrid tissue generated through the act of mixing skin tissues and different types of flower petal dust (lavender, rose, orange, etc.). Subchapter "Microscopic Exploration: Human and Mineral Mixes" demonstrates two images, each of them showing a hybrid tissue generated through the act of mixing saliva and different types of stone dust.

What we can notice in all images is an interaction between body material of different origin — human, vegetal and mineral one. What we see is their coming-together leading toward the formation of a hybrid tissue. An interesting thing that emerges is the following one: at the macro level it is possible to easily distinguish two different entities — human and vegetal one; at the micro level, as we observe these hybrid tissues, it is much harder to say where the "human" part of the tissue ends and the "vegetal" or "mineral" one begins. What we see are transitory individuations, tissues-in-making, forming beyond the scales of human, irreducible to two different poles of the event, a pole that is strictly "human" and a pole that is strictly "vegetal" or "mineral" one.

12.3 BECOMING-BODY: A RELATIONAL FIELD OF LIFE-LIVING

Another question of bodying is the following one: "how do we craft the conditions for the creation of an ontogenetic process of bodying that does not begin with existing form but seeks to create speciations, new forms/forces of live-living? The common as becoming-body, as more-than, is not the result of a negotiation. The common is never there in advance of the field it proposes, it is a coming-to-expression of the associated milieu of life-living. Here, in the milieu of life-living, new forms of life emerge that are not beings so much as dynamic shapings of experience in the making" (Manning, 2012: 203). The drifts, the lines of life-living are those that seek to create speciations as ontogenetic processes. Each body, thought here as becoming-body, is a milieu of speciations, a milieu of form/forces of life-living. We are not talking about the human or nonhuman body anymore. We are also not talking about the organic or inorganic, as well as dead or alive. When the body becomes a milieu of dynamic shapings of experience in the making — the line forming a containment between the human and nonhuman, organic and inorganic, dead and alive — becomes impossible. It is a line-in-movement or the one moving the human and nonhuman toward one another and animating what is the between. It is a line emerging in the between and spreading toward the limit until the limit itself vanishes. Speciations are limit's vanishing points. When two different points vanish they do not disappear, but enter the state of merging-with, composing-with, sensing-with, as well as entering one another.

Whitehead's notion of concern² introduces a different notion of regard, regard not of the subject for the object, or of one individual for another, but of the occasion for its own unfolding. The notion of concern offers a possibility of deconstructing the dichotomy of subject and object, reinserting them in the event: "The occasion as subject has a 'concern' for the object. And the 'concern' at once places the object as a component in the experience of the subject, with an affective tone drawn from this object and directed towards it. The subject does not begin the process: it is the process that activates the subject. The subject-object relation can be conceived as Recipient and Provoker, where the fact provoked is an affective tone about the status of the provoker in the provoked experience, Whitehead writes, adding that the

²Whitehead uses concern to denote the "affective tone" that is an essential feature of any subject-object relation or of any act of perception. For Whitehead, concern implies a weight upon the spirit. When something concerns us, we cannot ignore it or walk away from it. It presses upon our being and compels us to respond. For Whitehead, concern is an involuntary experience of being affected by others. Concern opens us to the outside. It compromises our autonomy, leading us towards something beyond ourselves. Concern is, therefore, relational.

word 'recipient' suggests a passivity which is erroneous" (Whitehead, 1967: 176). As understood here, concern is not an intersubjective term but the basis for understanding that experience emerges through the rise of an affective tone originating from things having relevance for this process. A subject comes-into-experience through its concern for the object. Affective tone drawn from the object starts to constitute the how of subject's coming-into-experience. This process does not start in or from the subject, but it forms — here and now — in the between the subject and the object.

How to put into relation the following notions — the one of speciations and the one of counterpoint? Forsythe defines counterpoint as a field of action in which the irregular coincidence of attributes between organizational elements produces an ordered interplay. What is emphasized here is the relationship between movement and time. "Forsythe speaks of choreographing the future *in the present-moving*, asking his dancers to dance where the other dancer is going to meet him there. Dancing in an alignment with futures in the making suggests a structured improvisation that is attuned to the incipient more-than of movement—movement's technicity. To move into the technicity of movement is not to mimic or predict: there is no standing back from the event-in-moving. It is to move-with the movement's excess of position. It is to craft movement-moving in the more-than of movement's taking-form" (Manning, 2012: 207).

Forsythe asks his dancers to dance the future in the present-moving. At this moment, dancing the present-moving becomes an action of present-making. What does it mean to dance where the other dancer is going to? How do we meet each other there? Do we dance the future before it happens or do we actively create it — in the movement, with the movement, as the movement? Do we go where we feel the other is going to or do we create the place for the other to go to? When do we dance present(s) as future(s) in the making? Is the technicity of movement that which makes this act possible? Within the realm of the technicity of movement — movement does not happen in the present or in the future. Movement makes the present, as well as it makes the future. Movement makes presents and futures. Movement presents (verb) and futures (verb) — as event-in-making. Here, dancing the future, in the present, as the present, future-present, becomes possible. Technicity of movement does not know of linearity of time. Here, past, present and future — three different, yet intertwined events-in-making — happen at the same time. They do not just happen, but also transform one another. Here, time shapeshifts.

This is what happens in counterpoint as dancers shift each other's time. "Forsythe explains: syncing is not what's important, in the sense of matching an already known

timing. Move in the timeframes of the becoming-movement, preaccelerate into the relational field activated by movement-moving, move with the affective tonality, with future time presenting. This can operate in different timeframes: go slower, be in another's past right before they catch up to you, then move past them to their future, look for the moment, aim at it rather than going directly to it. Counterpoint is not the activity of an individual body, it is the activity of a relational field through which movement moves. Movement-moving is intensively distributed, always beyond its simple location, as Whitehead would say. In counterpoint, the movement exceeds the frame, the frame of time, the frame of the skin-envelope, activating an inframobility that tunes to a relational movement. As collective movement becomes attuned to this relational field, time folds, individual movements no longer abstractable from the whole. One movement-moving, in difference. Counterpoint" (Manning, 2012: 207).

In counterpoint — we are not matching an already known timing. Here, we are arriving-with the time, actively, co-constructing the time with movement. This co-construction is not happening from outside of the movement, externally, but exactly the opposite, from the inside of the movement, internally, with the movement-moving. Movement-moving moves us into the relational field of arriving into the time — with the time. What emerges is affective tonality of this arrival-with. What it produces is the singularity of this arrival-with. Counterpoint is that of the time and that of the body. Counterpoint of the time is multiple — it is not only the counterpoint of the past, present and future, but it is also a counterpoint of the past, present and future of each dancer moving toward the other. There has never been one counterpoint. There are counterpoints, multiple, plural, counterpoints-in-movement. Here, we do not go directly to the moment, but we aim at it. We look for the moment. We look for the body. Which body? As previously mentioned, counterpoint is not the activity of an individual body, but of a relational field. What makes this relational field is movement. What moves through it is movement. In counterpoint, the movement exceeds its own frame, as well as the frame of the body and that of time. Here, movement becomes relational and collective. Counterpoint itself becomes relational through one movement-moving, one body-bodying (individual and collective), one time-timing (past, present and future) — in difference.

Counterpoint itself is more-than one. Furthermore, it activates the relation of being more-than one within each body dancing. "The one is, of course, always more than one. It is an infinity of movement-speciations. Speciations make dancing-body, not the other way around. We no longer have one, two, three bodies dancing. We have an affective attunement" (Manning, 2012: 207). Body forms as movement speciates. What the body can do, as well as become depends on how far the movement

speciations can go. Limits of body are limits of movement speciations. How the movement speciates is how the body takes form. Anatomy is an event of movement taking form. There are numerous potential anatomies — within "one and the same" anatomy. Movement is heterogeneous, therefore, there are numerous speciations — within a single movement — speciating at the same time. There are multiple potential bodies within one actual body. There are dances within one dance. There are affective attunements between multiple bodies and multiple dances. Two dancing bodies are two multiplicities in movement — tuning-into one another — affectively. Two dancing bodies are also two dancing multiverses — each of them carrying a singular history of speciations. This history is always present because what makes it visible is movement-moving — here and now. Movement-moving or body taking form. This form speciates constantly.

12.4 SPECIATIONS: SHAPESHIFTING AND BODY-TAKING

A field of speciations is a dancing field. More precisely, it is a field that dances its pure potential to move, shift, morph. What we encounter in this field are not bodies as such but tendings-in-movement. The field of speciations is a field of ongoing shapeshifting. As the speciations move, the body in movement shape-shifts. Speciations do not have a fixed body. They take a body. Speciation is an act of body-taking. This process is never finished. More importantly — speciations can take infinite number of bodies — at the same time. Speciations can also shapeshift one body into an infinite number of other bodies or modes of bodying. Body-taking is an ongoing and always incomplete process. The body that is being taken — here and now — is not a body that has existed up until this moment. It is a body being created — in this singular moment. Speciations create a body that has never existed before. More precisely, a bodily composition being created within the process of speciations contains certain motifs it has never contained before. Now, bodies become compositional tendencies. As such, they tend toward a certain bodily composition, but tending is an open and ongoing process, therefore, it can never be completed. Speciations are bodies-in-tending. When dancer's movement becomes spiral-like — it does not mimic or resemble the idea of spiral. It dances the spiraling of spiral — its process of becoming a spiral, and its spiralness — its qualitative field, as well as all of its textures.

How to put into relation speciations and morphing? How does a process of speciation activate a process of morphing? "Speciations are rhythmic activations of a body-morphing that never precede the event of their coming-into-relation. They give rhythm, give tone, to the how of the event's in-forming, cutting across species fully formed, connective as they are in the milieu of their relational activation" (Manning, 2012: 208). Speciations do not only activate, but also generate body's potential for morphing. Speciations are affective charges of this potential. What generates the activation of a body-morphing is rhythm. According to Manning, "movement rhythms: it connects, prolongs, undermines, subverts, dances. It never stops. Movement is always of multiple valences" (Manning, 2012: 208). Movement is always a counterpoint of movements. Body is always a counterpoint of bodies. Specie is always a counterpoint of speciations. However, movement is that which connects one body to all the bodies contained within it; movement connects the body to its more-than. Movement is also that which connects one specie to all the speciations within it. Movement moves our perception toward the notion of bodies and speciations. There is no single body. There are bodies. There is no single specie. There are speciations. If we think of speciations as a singular mode of moving — what

kind of movement makes itself felt? Movement moves the body from one speciation to another. Movement makes it possible for the body to actualize itself as a multiple plane of speciations.

"Both "body" and "species" are general categories that can only be conceived as such by divesting them of the relational field that co-constitutes them. To posit such a notion of the whole is to have separated out the event of bodying from its activity. Speciations are how to think this activity, the in-act of body-world constellations in all their organic and inorganic intermixings. These in-acts are not strictly physical, they are a conglomeration of physicalities with affective tonalities that emerge from the very necessity of the milieu: it is the milieu that fashions them. Speciations body in the event of their direct co-relation to the event, they are not body-species pre-formed and are never finally formed, they are bodyings" (Manning, 2012: 210). To reduce the body, as well as species, to a category is to divest them of their eventness. The body, as well as the species — are events-in-making. It is not possible to separate the body from the event of bodying, the same way it is not possible to separate species from their speciations. Speciations are the how of species, the how of body-morphing. This how, this in-act, is both organic and inorganic, as well as both physical and affective. It is the emerging intermixing of all the previously mentioned levels throughout which speciations emerge as bodyings. "There is no body that is not infinitely more than one. An autonomy of expression is at work in the relational field speciations call forth. We are not talking of relations that exist outside of the event of their emergence. The relational field of movement-moving activates the distributed field in which the dancers dance, and in the dancing, they move with it, aligning to it, moving *it*. The field expresses, the field dances to attention, not the dancers as individuals. And what it expresses is a relational movement that exceeds the terms of the dancers' individual bodyness, bringing into complex constellations a rhythm that in-forms the speciations their movement-moving creates" (Manning, 2012: 210).

Relational field is the field of expression of body. More importantly, it is the field of its very expressivity that creates an opening for the infinity of bodies within one body to emerge. If we want to change a body, we need to change a relation. When we change the existing relation for the other one, we never enter an already formed relation. In order to change a relation we need to make it — with our own body. There are no relations outside of the body. Body itself is a relation, and furthermore, it is a multiplicity of relations, which is the origin of all the other relations and relational becomings. Relations merge-with the body. Body emerges-with the relations. The relational field of movement-moving activates the body which moves with it. They tend toward one another and in this tending they also move one another. It is not a

dancer who is dancing this dance. It is a field expressing itself through the bodyings of a dancer. Another step forward — it is also a very expressivity of movement expressing itself through the relational field of movement-moving. We can call this dance a fielding of expressivity. This is not a dance of an individual, this is a dance of individuation. This dance expresses nothing but the becoming of expression. Here, the very expressivity starts to dance. When the relational field of movement-moving enters the field of expressivity-moving — the relation of becoming-unlimited of the body becomes possible. A question of speciations is a question of becoming-unlimited.

12.5 MOVEMENT-MOVING OR NATURE-IN-MAKING: CHOREOCORPOGENESIS OF A MOVING BODY

Movement makes the body. Movement makes not only its being, but its very becoming. This is the process of choreocorpogenesis: as the movement moves the body becomes. Body's nature is a nature-in-making. Nature-in-making does not refer to predetermined forms of life, but to coming-to-form of life-living. According to Whitehead, "life means novelty" (Whitehead, 1978: 104). To restrict life to the physical plane, as Whitehead notes, is to underestimate the play of its capacity for invention. For Whitehead, nature thinks. When Whitehead says that "nature is impenetrable by thought", what he means is that "thought does not enter into nature from the outside" (Whitehead, 1929: 13). Nature is not a passive element to be mediated. Nor is thought a mediating activity. Nature creates thought. This thinking makes ingress into the event through the constellations speciations take. Nature and speciations are co-combinatory, they cannot be taken separately.

For Whitehead — nature thinks, and furthermore — nature is thinking. What nature is and what it is made of is infinite number of modes of thinking. Furthermore, nature creates thinking. This thinking happens from the within, from the experience, with the experience-in-making. Here, everything is about the processes of formation of a thought. Everything is about the arriving of a thought. Nature's play, and therefore, nature as thinking, is constituted by its event of its coming into being. Nature is an event of taking form of movement of speciations. Nature moves. Nature thinks. Nature speciates. There is no beginning or the end of this movement. This movement is ongoing, more precisely, it is an ongoing movement of nature-in-making. This is a choreocorpogenesis of a moving body.

When nature thinks, nature creates. What it creates is a life, life irreducible to any form. "Again, it is necessary to move beyond the thought of this or that human or animal life: life here touches on all that has the capacity for transition. It is life-living, *a life*: speciation in exquisite more than human configurations" (Manning, 2012: 215). What nature and life have in common is the following: both life and nature transition. Furthermore, it is possible to define both life and nature as transitions, as well as transitions-in-act. Let's recall the example of molecule. What this molecule was defined by was not its content. It was defined by its transitions — from one body to another, from nebula to air, from air to soil, from soil to vegetable, from vegetable to human being, etc. The question of transition carries within itself the question of novelty. For Whitehead, novelty abounds in mentality. According to Whitehead,

mentality is "intensive process", "organ of novelty", or "urge beyond", not necessarily related to the mind or of consciousness (Whitehead, 1929: 33). Erin Manning and Brian Massumi suggest to call it "thinking-feeling", emphasizing how it is "an activity in the event that co-composes with the occasion's physicality to create, in the act, a contributory more-than that emphasizes how novelty is a process of thought in the doing" (Manning, 2012: 215).

Mentality, thought as thinking-feeling, or a feltness in the thinking, opens up two questions. The first question is the one of the edges of experience; the second one is the question of edges of perception. The exploration of thinking-feeling is also an exploration of the relation of becoming-perceptive. A thinking-feeling stands for the feltness of not-yet. This is the field of pure potential. Here, a thought fields itself as feltness in the making. Mentality, or, thinking-feeling, as "organ of novelty" produces new modes of being. Deleuze calls imagination an organ of contraction. Here, Whitehead calls mentality an organ of novelty. How to think these organs? Where do they start and where do they end? Which body do they belong to? Do they belong to any body, or does a body belong to them? Mentality thought as organ of novelty creates a new cartography of the body. Mentality thought in this way is not related to the notion of mind. Mentality, or thinking-feeling, does not make the difference between the body and the mind. It is an activity that includes everything a body is and can become. Mentality can be therefore found inside the body, outside the body, between the bodies, within the bodies; mentality is a body. Each movement makes itself felt as a process of thought in the doing. How does thinking-feeling create a body?

The force of thinking-feeling is always present in germ and contributory in the dynamic form of events concreting. "As soon as a process falls into general categories, its capacity for creative advance is stunted, for general categories don't think. Creativity is always in the dynamic details of a process. These details are played out at the level of the emergent occasion in the constellation of the event. They are its speciations, its technicities, its overarticulations, its preaccelerations. They are the event's more-than" (Manning, 2012: 215, 216). How to move the creative process toward dynamic details? How to think the movement itself as speciations of creative process that leads into speciations of a moving body? Creativity is an opening into body's more-than, it is a movement-moving — beyond the technique, articulation, acceleration, toward — its technicities, its overarticulations, its preaccelerations. The creativity of movement-moving opens the body toward being more-than organism. According to Whitehead: "The community of actual things is an organism, but it is not a static organism. It is an incompleteness in process of production" (Whitehead,

1978: 215). Everything that exists is more-than organism, including the body itself. The body is organism-in-process, always incomplete. Furthermore, it is never an organism and it is always an organisation (verb, process, activity). This organisation is ongoing, taking the body from one mode of organising to another, as well as from one mode of bodying to another. It is not only the body that is an incompleteness at the level of process of its production. The processes themselves that make the body are incomplete and ontogenetic. This notion opens the space to think the body, at the level of its conceptuality, as well as at the level of its performativity, as more-than organism.

12.6 BODY AS NEXUS OF SPECIATIONS: BECOMING-SKIN OF FUR AND BECOMING-FUR OF SKIN

In order to deepen the idea of body as more-than organism Manning develops the following example: "Kanzi and Prince meet. Play ensues. Their movement moves them, connecting them at the level of speciations that exceed them as individuals. In the speciation, a counterpoint emerges. This emergent counterpoint is a structured improvisation: it moves into the habitual movements brought into play at the same time as it connects to a generative field of movement-moving. The generative force of movement in counterpoint activated in the moving creates a motif. This prolongs the dance, giving it a style all its own. This style exceeds Prince or Kanzi as individuals, exceeds their habitual ways of moving, a relational movement has emerged. This relational movement is a field of experience. Everything is concretely at play, the quality of air, the sound of breath on metal, on fur, on skin, the feel of paws on earth, on cement, the heaviness of limbs at play, the grumblings of stomachs, the pull of muscles, the rustlings of fallen leaves. Everything singularly contributes. New concepts, when they really do their work, activate speciations, which, in turn, affect how societies evolve. A society: "A type of order ... A nexus ... Endurance ... An animal body is a society involving a vast number of occasions, spatially and temporally coordinated. ... Each living body is a society" (Whitehead, 1967: 203—5). What we usually call a body, a body in the narrow sense, is a knot of speciations, a society" (Manning, 2012: 217).

Movement is a connection machine. It connects Kanzi and Prince as speciations and not individuals. Movement-moving does not know of individuals. It is a dance of individuation itself. As such it never stops. It individuates, transindividuates, it speciates. Movement-moving connects Kanzi and Prince, and furthermore, it moves their species toward novelties of emerging speciations. There is a counterpoint — of bodies, bodyings, movements, speciations, heaccaeities. What this counterpoint generates is a relational movement. What relational movement produces is a singular field of experience. Within that field — everything that bodies of Kanzi and Prince can do, as well as become — emerges as relational. This is the body-between, a tending between two autonomous, yet intertwined capacities for becoming. A relational body, or that of Kanzi and Prince, their body-with, does not know, for example, of the fur or of the skin. There is no preformed fur or preformed skin, but they emerge as sensations activated by the relational field. Kanzi comes into being through the sensation of fur. Price comes into being through the sensation of skin. However, these sensations are shared and they co-constitute one another. There is no skin, the same

way there is no fur. There are skinings, furings, there are relational becoming of skin and fur. Becoming-fur of skin and becoming-skin of fur forms another counterpoint. This counterpoint is where Kanzi and Prince meet and emerge as relational body, a body-between. Skin-fur. Kanzi-Prince. Human-animal. Once constituted, skin and fur come and go — for they are sensations traveling, forming a body and un-doing it, moving from one body to another, speciating. Sensations are speciations. A sensing body is a dance of speciations dancing itself, and furthermore, it is a score of speciations — writing and rewriting itself. Being always more-than one, each living body is not only a nexus, but also a society of speciations.

13

CHOREOGRAPHY AS CRAFTING RELATIONS

13.1 RELATIONAL BODY

According to Forsythe, movement does not begin and end with the human body. Manning's intention, alongside Forsythe, Valk, Klien and Gormley, is to think choreography not as the organizing principle of precomposed bodies but as a technique for crafting relations. According to Klien, Valk and Gormley (2008), choreography is a verb, as well as the activity of arranging relations between bodies. Therefore, what is crafted choreographically are not bodies as such but relations. For Manning, choreography is less that which is generated by the human for the human than a practice that foregrounds how the event itself attunes to a relational milieu that exceeds the human or wherein the human is more ecological than individual. Choreography is a practice that asks, as Deborah Hay does, how each cell attends to the encounter movement proposes. Choreography is a practice that attends to the immanent field of relation that is part and parcel of environments in-forming. For choreography is, in Guattari's terminology, a heteropoeisis, a self-generating practice of difference. It is at once, as Klien, Valk and Gormley suggest, a dynamic constellation, an exchange of forces, and the act of interfering and negotiating the [emergent] order (Klien, Valk, Gormley, 2008: 17). Choreography: "the act that sets into motion a milieu. Choreography: the milieu's self-generation into event" (Manning, 2012: 76).

If we think choreography as a technique for crafting relations — which body, or bodies, does it craft? Does it craft relational body, or, relational bodies — within a single body? Relational body can never be "a single body", because "to be relational" is to "be multiple, therefore, a relational body is always more-than one body. If the body is its own process of coming-into-experience, as well as that of form-taking, how to separate the body and the choreography? The body is not only one of relations, but more importantly — it is an activity of arranging relations between bodies. Therefore, how to think the body itself, bodying, as relational choreography? Forsythe said how movement does not begin and end with the human body. Choreography does not begin and end with the human body. Therefore, who is choreographing who? Which body is choreographing and which is being choreographed? Is it possible to think in those terms when choreography itself becomes a practice that explores modes of

attending to the encounter proposed by movement? When does choreography start and when does it end? It does not start with a descriptive instruction to move in this or that way. This is movement programming happening in the field of dance or theatre. Choreography starts with the activation of a singular relation. This relation is a relation of body-environment in-forming. The body, as well as the environment, as discussed here, are relational. They are also physical, but choreography always exceeds that which is physical. Choreography creates the physical through the creation of relational. Choreography does not actually have the beginning or the end. Choreography is. It is an ongoing exchange of forces and even more, it is a perpetual act of testing "what a force can do". Choreography does not only move the milieu, but it moves the relation of milieu's becoming(s).

13.2 BODY AS CHOREOGRAPHY

What makes the essence of choreography is a proposition. Choreography, however, is not a preposition of the event, but, as Manning suggests, "a proposition *to* the event. It asks the event how its ecology might best generate and organize the force of movement-moving. It does so not by abstracting itself from the event but always as part of the event, choreography can never be separated out from its coming into itself *as event*. Choreography as event is the fielding of a multiplying ecology in a co-constitutive environment. (...) The proposition is a lure. It is a force that cuts into the incipient event to alter its experiential vectorization. The proposition, however, is never added on to an occasion. It is of and with the occasion, its immanent cleaving. This cleaving activates the force of contrast within the occasion, opening the occasion to its difference. Contrast is here understood as the force of difference that activates the dephasing through which the occasion is felt as such. Contrast is not a difference between an external set of givens. The event itself is a field of contrast. Contrast is the force of difference directly felt in the event as well as the modality through which an event comes to expression in its absolute difference from all other events" (Manning, 2012: 77).

What can choreography propose to the event? It can propose to the event its modes of becoming. The becoming of choreography is also the becoming of event. The how of generating and organizing relations is also the how of event's coming-to-experience. This is the moment when choreography comes into itself as event. Choreography is never on the outside of the event, but is always inside, or, within the event; it is the very fielding of event. As such, choreography is never on the outside of the body or the movement, but is the very activation, as well as making of movement. Choreography does not precede the body and the body does not precede the choreography. They are one and the same entity, moving together, co-composing, co-becoming. There is no choreography made for the body. Body itself is choreography, singular, irreducible, happening here and now. What does a movement move; who moves? When "I", a relation, move — what "I" move are the relations of my own becoming. Those relations do not only move, but also multiply — co-constituting the multiple ecology of a moving body. What does choreography, thought as a proposition to the event, create? It alters event's experiential vectorization — at the level of movement, force, intensity, acceleration. Choreography is not only a relation producing other relations; choreography is a force producing other forces. One of the forces it produces is the force of contrast, or, the force of difference. Within the contrast, event differentiates, modulates, becomes. Force of contrast can

therefore be understood as force of becoming of event. We experience it once we feel the movement's differential and let it move the relation we are becoming. When choreography moves us, it is because it operates in the associated milieu of relation, becoming-propositional. Choreography as proposition — intensifies and transmutes the force of the event-in-making. As Manning points out, how a task or technique becomes propositional becomes a key question.

13.3 WHEN TECHNIQUE STARTS TO DANCE ITSELF: TECHNICALITY

According to Manning, "technique is what allows the ecology of movement to open itself to its generative potential. But technique is not enough. Technique becomes propositional when it becomes capable of activating the *beyond* of technique. It becomes a proposition when it begins to exceed the technical, making operable a kind of bodying that is unforeseen (unpracticed) but available from within the register of the movement that will have preceded and followed it" (Manning, 2012: 78). Let's start with an example. When does Forsythe's instruction "drop a curve" become propositional? "Drop a curve" is a proposition to the events of moving and bodying. The body does not dance from the place of knowing. It dances from the unknown. This unknown is that which is beyond the technique, it is an act of technique dancing itself, exploring its own technicality. When the technique itself starts to dance it becomes propositional. What it generates are unforeseen movements, as well as unforeseen bodyings. Proposition is also that which catapults the register of movement into the state of becoming. "Drop a curve" reaches its propositional potential when we dance a body we have never danced before. It also reaches its propositional potential when the act of dropping of a curve becomes the singular act of bodying itself. What happens is transindividuation. Becoming-curve of a body and becoming-body of a curve — the body moves in, as and through the curves of individuation — transindividuating itself — here and now. The force of movement-moving curves the body into the affective, as well as compositional fields never experienced before. Finally, the body, as a form, is overcome.

According to Whitehead, "the proposition constitutes what the feeling has felt"¹ (Whitehead, 1978: 186). Feeling is not that which comes after the fact, "it is the force of the in-act experienced in the now of an event's becoming. Say you're experimenting with drop a curve on stage, performing *Eidos: Telos* (Ballet Frankfurt, 1995). Many

¹According to Shavero, "an act of feeling is an encounter — a contingent event, an opening to the outside — rather than an intrinsic, predetermined relationship. And feeling changes whatever it encounters, even in the act of "conforming" to it. That is why feeling is irreducible to cognition. It isn't anything that we already know. The problem with cognitive theories of mind, and with hermeneutical modes of interpretation, is that they reduce the unknown to the already-known, the already-determined. These theories assume that my not-knowing is only a contingency for myself, that ignorance is a particular state that I am in; while they imagine that the object I am seeking to know is in itself already perfectly determinate, if only I *could* come to know it. They thereby elide "experience as a constructive functioning", and restrict their attention to that which has already been experienced and constructed. They only get half the picture; they trace the vector backwards into the past, but not forwards into the future. They grasp the actual, but miss the potential, the yet-to-be. They appreciate "conformity of feeling", but ignore deviation and novelty. They analyze whatever has already been felt, selected, and determined; but they miss the very process of selection and determination, which is feeling

hours of technique have preceded this event. The task is now in you: you move the movement as it comes, drawn in by choreographic principles, folding through technique. Suddenly the movement curves you in a way that elicits surprise — drop a curve appears in the moving in a way never experienced before" (Manning, 2012: 79). How to think choreography as a relation between the body moving the movement and the body being moved by the movement? How do we curve movement and how are we, at the same time, curved by it? Where is the body, or, that which curves-with, curves-within, as well as curves-in-the-between? How to think the body as a curve in becoming? To body (verb) is to curve. I don't think that the body moves the movement as it comes. The body starts to move once it collides with the movement. The body is a movement-moving collision. Once there is an encounter, between the body curving the movement and the body being curved by the movement — we start to dance. To body, or, to curve, is to move in a way we have never moved before. In this moment, "I" is nothing more than a dance, an ongoing dance — danced by the movement. In this moment, "drop the curve" has become a proposition not only moving me, but moving-through, as well as moving-with me. "Drop the curve" is an opening into experience in the moving. Every time we "drop the curve" we experience another interval of that experience. We enter the event-time. "Event-time is a mirroring in the multiplicity of nows, the now that has passed, the now that is passing, and the now that will have been, each phase of nowness contributing to the occasion at hand in a time-loop that resists the organization of experience into a linear continuum. Time as duration is unmeasurable, unknowable as such, unsustainable in experience" (Manning, 2012: 80). Event-time is also a mirroring in the multiplicity of "I" — the "I" that has passed, the "I" that is passing, and the "I" that will have been. Duration is an opening into the richness of interval, as well as infinity of intervals. It is also an opening into experiential time.

How to think experiential time as the time of the event? Rather than treating quantified time as the organizing principle for choreography's expression, Forsythe urges his dancers to become flexible in the time of the emergent event such that what is felt, in the moving, is how "measure and duration coexist in the activity of creating bodies of time" (Haffner, 2004: 136). Bodies are not in the time. Bodies are time. They are not only created as bodies of time, but they also create other bodies of time. When

itself" (Shaviro, 2009: 15). Feelings pass through the body giving it a form. Feelings or force of the form constitute the *how* of singular form-taking. According to Whitehead, "*how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*... Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 23). It is possible to rewrite this thought into: *how* an actual entity *feels* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is*... Its being is constituted by its feeling. Or: *how* a feeling *feels* constitutes *what* that feeling *is*... Its being is constituted by its feeling. Body and feeling, as well as being and becoming constitute two poles of one parallel process.

measure and duration meet, what emerges is not an act of being in time, but an act of making of time. Bodies make time and this is how they also make themselves bodies of time. Bodies as such cannot be measured. Bodies as such can only be endured. What makes them is the diagrammatic force that exceeds the idea or practice of measure. Diagrammatic force can only be felt. It is a force of "what a feeling has felt" — moving through the bodies, as well as transducing through them — diagrammatically. Diagrammatic force is also that which catapults the moving body from the realm of time measured into the realm of time felt. It is the very immeasurability of this process making itself felt and even more, making the time itself feel. Here, time feels, and in this feeling of time — we emerge.

13.4 MOVEMENT-EVENT: TO MOVE IS TO MOVE BEYOND THE EXPERIENCE

How to think the movement of jump as a meeting point between the individual and the event²? "The jump is less a jump-as-such than a dynamic coexperiencing of varying velocities in preacceleration, extension, and overarticulation. To jump successfully is to jump-through the singularity of *this* singular interweaving of preacceleration and overarticulation. It is to invite the thinking-feeling Forsythe emphasizes, the thought of the movement endlessly growing after it ends, into the movement even before the displacement through space has taken place. To jump well is to move-through velocities too quick to know, but not too quick to feel. It is to move-with the durational process of the time of movement as felt event. The jump-as-such, however, never

²An event means that something is happening, however, the paradox is that, on the one hand, an event can only really be grasped in hindsight and, on the other hand, we do presume that we can refer to incidents, changes, or actions that are currently unfolding. How does this work? Deleuze argues that such references — in the linguistic form of infinitives — envelop the other propositional dimensions of language because while those dimensions involve determinations, subjects, and universal concepts within linear time (*Chronos*), infinitives occupy both past and future at once: how else could they be expressed? Furthermore, if we grasped them as what they are, they would have already happened (or would be a foregone conclusion); for this reason, they are expressed as the simultaneous instantiation of past and future (which itself occupies an eternal, infinitely divisible line). According to Deleuze's interpretation of Stoic *lekton*, an event stands for incorporeal surface effect which evades the causal state of corporeal mixtures (*Chronos*), and, because it is different in nature than effects within depth (it does not in turn induce mixtures), is reversible on the eternal line of the *Aion*; that which is irreducible to, but not independent of, the proposition, expressed in the infinitive form of verbs. According to Deleuze: "Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs [...] — but incorporeal events at the surface [...] are the results of these mixtures" (Deleuze, 2004: 8, 6). Furthermore: "Each event is the smallest time, smaller than the minimum of continuous thinkable time, because it is divided into proximate past and imminent future. But it is also the longest time, longer than the maximum of continuous thinkable time, because it is endlessly subdivided by the *Aion* which renders it equal to its own unlimited line" (Deleuze, 2004: 63, 74). In Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, event is that which, on the one hand, originates in chaos (thus having no existence in space and time), and on the other hand, has serial extension (formal properties) and intensity (degrees) in space and time, and is objectified and subjectified by virtue of individual unities (monads). In Deleuze's reading of Whitehead alongside Leibniz, event is the prehension of series of singularities (a world) that is implicated by other worlds. "The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or submultiples [...]. For space and time are not limits but abstract coordinates of all series, [...] we can [thus] consider a second component of the event: extensive series have intrinsic properties (for example, height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a saturation of color), which enter on their own account in new infinite series [...]" (Deleuze, 1993: 77). Furthermore: "Prehension is individual unity. Everything prehends its antecedents and its concomitants and, by degrees, prehends a world. [...] the event is thus a 'nexus of prehensions' [...]; the event is [...] at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own becoming (Deleuze, 1993: 78).

represents the totality of our experience. We live the jump-event. From incipient movement to incipient movement with the experience of velocity in between, the jump cannot be known in metric time, but it can be thought-felt in the verge where time is elastic" (Manning, 2012: 82). In, as well as within, the jump — the event and the individual collide. Jump can be seen as event's decisive turn, but it can be also seen in the following way: becoming-body of event and becoming-event of body. To jump is to take the body somewhere it has never been before. To jump is jump out of the position and jump into the quality of taking of. The jump is never just a movement, but a dynamic constellation of movement-moving. We really jump only when we jump-through the singularity of this dynamic constellation. Here, a jump becomes an event, the jump-event. There is no one and the same body jumping twice. Each jump is, let's remember, event's decisive turn, and therefore — individuation's decisive turn. To jump is not to move-to, but to move-through — different velocities. The jump is an opening into the elasticity of time. When we jump we explore the elasticity of movement, as well as the elasticity of time. In the movement — the time makes itself felt as elastic. One way to test the elasticity of time is to jump and to allow the movement to take us, as Forsythe would say, as far as it can go.

"Forsythe spends a lot of training time teaching us about the quality of different speeds and instructing us on the change of tempo as felt in our bodies" (Haffner, 2004: 139). To study the speed as qualitative is to study the relation of becoming-speed of the body. Here, the speed does not come from the outside of the body, or, in other words, it is not imposed onto the body. Here, the speed emerges-with the body, as body's qualitative becomings of speed. The body does not only arrive with the certain speed, but more importantly — it arrives as a singular speed. To change a tempo is to change a mode of bodying. Therefore, the question becomes: how to push movement "beyond the turn, to the point where it goes beyond our own experience" (Deleuze, 1988: 27)? How to push movement beyond the individual, to the point where it goes beyond the individual experience?

When we move beyond our own experience — body becomes movement. More precisely, it becomes an event of movement-moving. Once movement takes over — anything becomes possible because the event of movement-moving is also an event of becoming-unlimited of a moving body. Microperceptions, as created here, are openings into the relations of becoming-perceptive of movement's imperceptibility. Each movement represents a new decisive turn, the one beyond our own experience. Each movement is a new limit, a new experience of beyondness. To move is to move the limit. To move is to move beyond the limit of experience. Movements are

experiential limits — deconstructing themselves. Limits as much are internal to the movement, as well as to the event.

When does the body go beyond its limits, beyond its experience? "When the body is no longer a container for movement but a force for the transduction of movement-moving, we will have gone beyond our own experience" (Manning, 2012: 83). How does a body become a force for the transduction of movement-moving? Movement becomes a force for the transduction of movement-moving through its propositionality. It is the propositionality of movement that activates its becomings of diagrammatic force, and furthermore — its dance of contrast, a dance of difference. Here, movement gives itself to the experience as a creation of difference. What emerges is a movement felt as an ecology of experience. This ecology is composed of an infinity of varying velocities, vibrations, sensations. The ecology of experience of movement-moving makes itself felt as an infinity of individuating tendings of movement in the moving.

How to think the difference between position and force of form, at the level of movement, for example, *épaulement*? "When the *épaulement* realizes itself, it momentarily stops becoming. This position is now what it is, and will always remain what it was. A form has unfolded. In Whitehead's terms, this singular movement, this occasion of experience, has achieved its satisfaction. (...) When the interval is activated, what is danced in the nextness of movement-moving is the force of form instead of simply the position the form has taken. The activated interval becomes the carrier for a continuity in the making. The interval is not added to the movement. It is the force or the processual quality within the form's time signature. Even when unactivated, it is always there, a key aspect of the relation between the event's potential for continuity and its concrescence into form" (Manning, 2012: 88). How do we move in the between of position and force of form, how do we transform position into the force of form? Interval is that which moves us into the more-than of position, into its force of form. Since interval activates the force of form, each position, or, each form-taking, is infected by the processual force of the more-than. This more-than, this force of form that accompanies the expression of a process's culmination — is activated by choreography. "Choreography is a proposition to movement-moving that asks how the plane of experience composes, how it remembers, how it becomes, and how it takes form, all in the register of the more than human. The focus is not on the body *per se*. For what moves choreographically is not first and foremost a body. It is rhythm, a cut in duration, a field of resonance, an interval, a relation, a relationscape. A choreographic proposition is always about the in-act, about the verge, the force of form that generates position but always, to some degree, exceeds it. It is about the

interval, the differential across which a multiplicity of rhythms make up event-time" (Manning, 2012: 89, 90).

What does choreography propose? And more importantly — who does it propose to? Once choreography becomes a proposition to movement-moving, it is possible to see it as ecology-in-making. Choreography as such has nothing but questions. It is an ongoing how. What constitutes the plane of experience is this ongoing questioning. To choreograph is to reinvent the plane of experience, it is an ongoing act of recomposition of a plane of experience. Movement does not move according to this plane of experience, but it moves-with it, cueing and alining it with itself. Every time a movement moves, the plane of experience follows — moving-with the movement. What moves is not the body, but a rhythm, an interval, a pattern, a relation. We can think of this pattern as pattern-in-movement, as well as a pattern-across-movements. It connects the register of human and the register of the more than human; it connects the registers of form and force of form. As it moves, in-the-between, across and beyond, what emerges is a play of relations. Another way to think the pattern is to think it as relationscape. Pattern as such is never just a form, but also a force of form, a movement, a relation, a connection. "What pattern connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all four of them to me? And me to you?" (Bateson, 2002: 8). Which relation, or, relational field, connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all four of them to me? And me to you? What if "the dancing is happening with and across bodies rather than on them? Bodies dance in an ecology of movement expression that in turn dances them" (Manning, 2012: 101). To move the relation, as well as, to move as a relation, a relational body, a relationscape, is to move with and across bodies. Once we start to think a moving body as an ecology of movement — we also start to explore the compossibility and expressibility of a body, or, all the ways a body can be danced.

13.5 DANCING THE BODY

How to dance the body, instead of dancing with it? How to let the body dance itself? How to allow to body to take itself as far as it can go? According to Forsythe: "The biggest difficulty ... is not consciously shaping your body, it is actually letting your body fold ... to develop a more reactive and many-timed body as opposed to a shaped body" (Manning, 2012: 103, 104). How do we let a body fold? Movement connects the body to its plane of folding. This folding is not only physical, but also experiential and relational. Physical, experiential and relational are three layers of one and the same movement of folding. Once the body starts to fold — as matter, experience and relation — it becomes many-timed, many-spaced and many-shaped. It shape-shifts from one mode of timing space and spacing time to another. There is no shape as such here. What is experienced here is shape as activation, transformation, reorganization. This shape, a shape in movement, affecting and being affected, feeling and being felt, thinking and being thought, does not confine an individual body, but shifts toward the emergent field of movement. Within the emergent field of movement, dancers and tables are equal.

In *One Flat Thing, reproduced* the tables are pushing the dancers as much as the dancers are pushing them. Tables morph into dancers, dancers morph into tables. The emergent field of movement opens the possibility of infinite morphing-in. This morphing is fluid and dynamic, it is completely carried by relations. The only limit of morphing of a body (human or nonhuman) is morphing of its relation. *One Flat Thing, reproduced*, a field-surface of mobility in a counterpoint of all the velocities — human and nonhuman — co-constructing it. What is a "person" here? Person is a verb, *to person*. In *One Flat Thing, reproduced* — everything persons, a movement, a floor, a table, the dancers, dancer's sweat, etc. Here, everything there is — is more composing than composed, more configuring than configured. Everything is a proposition for movement experimentation. *One Flat Thing, reproduced* is not a piece about dance, it is about the movement's very mobility. Once we reach, test and push forward the very limit of this mobility — what does it produce? It transforms the floor into surface, as well as tables into bodies of event.

First important thing to notice — dancers do not have, or, start with a certain position. They land positions. How do they land them? Where are they landing from? They land from the virtual into the actual, therefore, the act of moving becomes an act of landing from the virtual. Dancer's position always includes her more-than. It is made of an infinity of relational postures. The body does not only land in more than one way. It also lands as more than one body, a relationscape. Furthermore,

each part of the body, or, each cell, physical, experiential and relational one, lands in its own singular and irreducible way. To move is to land. Moving is an art of landing. Every time a body lands it brings with itself drops of virtual that activate new landings. A moving body is an act of landing. Landing is an opening into the multiplicity of movement. How do we dance this recalibration, between the movement itself and the associated milieu of movement-moving? The dance happens in the between of those acts — dancing our own movement and dancing the very mobility of the choreographic surface. This is a relational movement.

Relational movement does not know of the difference between bodies and tables, human and nonhuman. Relational movement does not see the starting or the ending points, but lines, connections. Within the experiential plane of relational movement — what matters is the space in the between of points, a space of lines, connections, becomings. It does not matter what a dancer is. What matter is what a dancer can become once it connects to the table. Dancers and tables are not isolated points. Dancers surround tables and tables surround dancers. This surrounding is dynamic and in movement, surrounding itself is a movement. Surrounding itself is also a movement that makes the dancers and the tables, it is a relational movement, always more-than human, always moving-with the nonhuman. Within the experiential plane of relational movement — dancers and tables are collective individuations and ever more — collective interindividuations. Their becoming of multiplicity opens up in the between. The dancer interindividuates — in the between of her own body and the tabled body — both of them multiplying and touching on themselves as relational movement.

What emerges is relational attention. Attention as such exceeds individual positioning. "You don't strictly align to a rehearsed position, you don't align to a person, you align to the dance dancing you (movement moving you). You align to the relational complexity of cues as they dance the environment reconfiguring. You move-with the topological surface of experience, moving the environment that persons, activating the relation. (...) The dancers co-compose an event that in turn postures them" (Manning, 2012: 109, 110). If we think choreography as activity of organizing positions — it is necessary to think it as impossibility. Choreography is impossibility of organizing positions. Why? Because movement is always more than a position. Let's remember, it is a force of form. This force of form makes the body resist the choreography as activity of organizing positions. Body does not want to be organized. It also does not want to be positioned. Body in movement is an ongoing act of landing. Body as such never positions itself — as personal body, individual body, human body. It also does not align to a person, or to an individual, or to a

human. It aligns to the very mobility of movement dancing the body itself. This mobility of movement is that which perpetuates the body as an ongoing landing. We dance the movement and the movement dances us — our relational qualities of coming into ourselves. We reconfigure. Each body moves as a topological surface of experience co-constituted by all the other — human and nonhuman — bodies. Body-table-floor — becoming assemblage, an ongoing recomposition. "When an event architects a mobility that outdoes it, the relationship between body and spacetime has fundamentally shifted. No longer do we have the human at the center. Instead, we have priming-for-movement, cues, alignments, inflections, vacuoles of expression. We have an architecture that persons and a moving that choreographs. This is not to discount the human dancing body. It is to open the body to its relational potential as a participatory node in the milieu of movement" (Manning, 2012: 123). What cues and aligns is not the human body *per se* but the landings of sites for future cueings and alignings. These landing sites are more than human; they are the active force of movement's fieldings. Priming-for-movement is, therefore, a force of body's expressivity and compossibility. How we tend to movement is how we express ourselves — relationally. How we prime for it — is how we charge our very force of becoming. Body-becoming is a relational node of multiplicity of becomings — all priming for more movement.

14 | CONCLUSION

What we can conclude from this thesis is that body is a multiple phenomenon. The right question is: which body? A physical, an experiential, a relational one? A body, as Manning shows, is always more-than one. Also, it is a verb, an activity, a dynamic process, a bodying, and furthermore, a force to exist (Spinoza) and a capacity to be affected (Spinoza). The very capacity of being affected is the capacity to become. We cannot say how body is. Body is that which becomes, it is a body-becoming (Manning). It is, therefore, necessary to raise the question of ontogenesis of a moving body, or, its very process of making. The body is never finished, therefore, it is in an ongoing state of becoming.

How to think this body-becoming? It is a force-form, a relational field, an intensive determination, exfoliation, invagination, insufflation, evaporation, fluid transmission. The concepts such as Body without Organs (Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari), bodying (Manning), body-score, and body-in-making (Manning) question the process of making of a body, as well as its becoming. The body, as explored here — is indeterminate and emergent, it is an intensive body. The body, as such, as an event of emerging-with the world, it is the very act of worlding. Intensive body does not express anything, but it is the field of expressivity. Its organs are not preformed expressions, but forces of expressivity. Intensive body is made of edges, points, particles, degrees of intensity. This is, as Deleuze would say, a new cartography of the body.

Who does this body belong to? Body-becoming is not a human body. More precisely, it is a more-than human body. Transgressing the notion of specie, the body becomes a dance of speciations. As demonstrated in this thesis, a moving body is not an individual body or a body belonging to an individual. Rather, it is a dance of individuation and furthermore — a dance of transindividuation. Once the body enters the relational field of its individuation, as well as transindividuation — it becomes populated by affective tones and affective attunements which are more-than human. The body never moves alone. The body always moves-with — at the molecular, experiential and relational level — as a transitory individuation.

The way we see our body and the way we feel it do not necessarily match. Experiential body image or body image in making is not related to an already organized body, but to the processes of coming-into-organization of a body. Movement, for example, affects the processes of coming-into-organization of a body. At the level of its organization a body can be considered as a dynamic entity, constantly varying, transforming, reorganizing itself. What we can conclude is that the feeling of body's organization, as well as of body image is movement-dependent. Because of its dependency of movement, body image can be considered as experiential body image.

Movement is that which makes the body. Movement is also that which moves the body from its being into its becoming. We are not confronted with a fully formed body performing a phrase of movement from point A to point B. We are confronting bodying and not a displacement. We never start or stop moving. We move and as we move, we *body* (verb) and we become. When thinking about the moving body we need to think the body as a verb. To body means to become and that which activates this force of becoming within the body itself is movement. It is not possible to separate the body from the movement because body itself is a movement, a movement of becoming. This body is never fully formed because it never stops to move — molecularly, experientially, relationally, therefore, the body is never finished. What does this notion of the impossibility of separation of body and movement produce? It produces the following: we don't dance with the body. We dance the body itself, its capacities to move, to experience, to become. There is no body practicing an already existing technique. Body itself is an emerging technique, and furthermore, a field of technicity. Technique emerges-with the body — as the body moves — here and now. Technicity is the moment when the body starts to dance itself as a technique, or, when it starts to dance at the edges of its technique, moving across the edges, moving from the actual into the virtual. It is not, therefore, possible to say how we have our body. We are not subjects possessing a body as an object. We are our own body. The only thing that matters, as Manning would say, is to go to what we think is the limit, and then go further. This is what it means *to body*, to become.

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1 | INTRODUCTION

Le corps est un phénomène multiple. Ce phénomène multiple est un point de croisement entre le corps physique, le corps expérientiel et le corps relationnel. Le corps, comme le montre Manning, est toujours plus qu'un corps. En outre, c'est un verbe, une activité, un processus dynamique, une force d'exister (Baruch de Spinoza) et une capacité d'être affecté (Baruch de Spinoza). La capacité d'affecter et d'être affecté est la capacité de devenir. On ne peut pas dire que le corps *est*. Le corps est ce qui *devient*, c'est un corps-devenir (Erin Manning). Il faut, donc, poser la question de l'ontogenèse du corps ou de son processus de devenir. Le corps n'est jamais fini, donc il est toujours en train de se faire et de devenir.

Comment penser ce corps-devenir qui est une force-forme, un champ relationnel, une détermination intensive, une exfoliation, une invagination, une insufflation, une évaporation, une transmission de fluides ? Les concepts tels que le Corps sans Organes (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari), le *bodying* (Erin Manning), le corps-partition et le corps en train de se faire (Erin Manning) remettent en question la vision que l'on peut avoir du processus de fabrication d'un corps, ainsi que de son devenir. Le corps, tel qu'il est exploré ici, est indéterminé et émergent, c'est un corps intensif. Le corps en tant que tel est un événement qui émerge-avec le monde. Le corps intensif n'exprime rien, mais c'est un champ d'expressivité. Ses organes ne sont pas des expressions préformées, mais des forces d'expressivité. Le corps intensif est constitué de bords, de points, de particules, de degrés d'intensité. Il s'agit, comme le disait Deleuze, d'une nouvelle cartographie du corps.

À qui appartient ce corps ? Le corps-devenir n'est pas un corps humain. Plus précisément, c'est un corps qui est plus qu'un corps humain. Comme montré dans cette thèse, un corps en mouvement n'est pas un corps individuel ou un corps appartenant à un individu. C'est plutôt une danse d'individuation. Chaque fois que le corps entre dans le champ relationnel de son individuation — il devient peuplé de tons affectifs qui sont plus qu'humaines. Le corps ne (se) bouge tout seul. Le corps (se) bouge-avec l'autre, au niveau moléculaire, expérientiel et relationnel — comme une individuation transitoire.

Le mouvement est ce qui fait le corps. Le mouvement est aussi ce qui fait passer le corps de son être à son devenir. Nous ne sommes pas confrontés à un corps

entièrement formé qui fait un mouvement du point A au point B. Nous sommes confrontés au *bodying* et non pas au déplacement. Nous ne commençons et nous n'arrêtons jamais de bouger. Nous bougeons et à mesure que nous bougeons nous devenons. En pensant au corps en mouvement, nous devons penser le corps comme un verbe. Ce qui active le corps en tant que force-forme de devenir est le mouvement. Il n'est pas possible de séparer le corps du mouvement, car le corps lui-même est un mouvement de devenir. Ce corps n'est jamais complètement formé, car il ne s'arrête jamais de bouger — de façon moléculaire, expérientielle, relationnelle — donc le corps n'est jamais fini. Que produit l'affirmation de l'impossibilité de la séparation du corps et du mouvement ? Elle produit ce qui suit : nous ne dansons pas avec le corps. Nous dansons le corps lui-même, ses capacités à bouger, à vivre, à devenir. Le corps lui-même est une technique émergente de son devenir. La technique émerge-avec le corps — à mesure que le corps (se) bouge — ici et maintenant. Il n'est donc pas possible de dire comment nous avons notre corps. Nous ne sommes pas des sujets possédant un corps comme objet. Nous sommes notre corps. La seule chose qui compte, comme le disait Manning, c'est d'aller à ce que nous pensons être la limite, puis d'aller plus loin. Cela signifie *être un corps*, devenir.

Comment un corps devient-il lui-même et comment rendre visible, ainsi que partageable, ce processus ? Il existe de nombreux niveaux auxquels un corps devient lui-même et qui peuvent être rendus visibles. Par exemple, au niveau cellulaire, le corps est dans un état continu de transformation et de réorganisation. Ce qui m'intéresse, c'est de comprendre ce qui motive nos cellules à se réorganiser et comment se déroule ce processus. Il existe au minimum deux façons de considérer le corps comme un corps devenant :

1. le corps moléculaire ;
2. le corps vécu (*lived body*).

Au niveau moléculaire, le corps est constamment en processus de devenir lui-même : ses molécules se réorganisent par de nombreux processus physiologiques, ainsi que par notre expérience. Ce qui m'intéresse, c'est de découvrir si nos molécules se réorganisent de manière différente de notre expérience du mouvement et comment. Le corps est constitué de molécules et le mouvement est un moyen d'informer les molécules de leur façon de s'organiser. Lorsque nous introduisons de nouveaux modes inexplorés de bouger notre corps, introduisons-nous également de nouvelles façons de bouger nos molécules ? Chaque expérience est une partition. Être conscient

de l'expérience, c'est être conscient d'un certain mode de *bodying*. Une expérience change-t-elle notre corps ; si oui, comment rendre perceptibles toutes les couches imperceptibles de cette transformation ? Le corps est le produit du mouvement. Les organes sont des produits du mouvement. Tout ce qui existe est un produit du mouvement continu. Comment ? Sur le plan moléculaire, il n'y a ni but ni idée d'un organe fini ou déterminé. Il n'y a que des modes de bouger qui sont également des modes de fabrication du corps lui-même. La partition du devenir moléculaire d'un corps n'est pas seulement prédéterminée, mais aussi émergente. Notre expérience instruit les molécules de leur mode de bouger qui devient, en fait, leur mode d'organisation et de fabrication du corps. Par conséquent, il n'est pas possible de séparer le devenir moléculaire et le devenir expérientiel d'un corps. Que faire si l'organisation entière d'un corps dépend de l'expérience ? Le corps moléculaire est un corps en devenir au niveau de son organisation, de sa taille, de son orientation. Le corps vécu (*lived body*) est un corps en devenir au niveau de l'expérience et au niveau de la perception de son organisation, de sa taille et de son orientation. Ce que je voudrais souligner, c'est comment, dans ce contexte, l'organisation, la taille et l'orientation d'un corps deviennent qualitatives et non quantitatives. Plus précisément, la fabrication expérientielle du corps se révèle être la transformation et la réorganisation qualitative d'un organe, ainsi que celle du corps lui-même.

Quelques exemples pris dans ma propre pratique m'ont permis de poser les bases méthodologiques de ce travail :

1. la recherche au microscope :

- la recherche au microscope sur les tissus corporels ;
- la recherche au microscope sur les fluides corporels ;
- la recherche au microscope sur la transformation temporelle des tissus et des fluides corporels (*time-dependent transformation*) ;
- la recherche au microscope sur la transformation dépendante de l'expérience vécue par les tissus et les fluides corporels (*experience-dependent transformation*) ;

2. des tâches sur l'image du corps :

- la tâche 1 sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent body image*) ; (la mesure de la taille des différents organes et parties du corps

avant et après la pratique corporelle, l'utilisation d'une mesure intuitive — mesurer par le sentiment et par la sensation) ;

- la tâche 2 sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent body image*) ; (composer l'image du corps de la façon dont nous ressentons notre corps, composer le corps par le sentiment et par la sensation, l'utilisation du sentiment et de la sensation comme principes de composition de l'image du corps ;
- la tâche 3 sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent body image*) ; (marquer tous les mots que nous associons à la sensation de devenir, ou, plus précisément, au corps dans un état de devenir) ;

3. des entretiens :

- l'auto-interview sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent body image*) ; (autour de l'anatomie expérientielle et les bords expérientiels du corps) ;
- des entretiens sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent body image*) ; (autour de l'anatomie expérientielle et les bords expérientiels du corps) ;

4. définitions fondées sur l'expérience (*experience-based definitions*) :

- Le corps, une définition (tous les jours, au cours d'un mois, en redéfinissant le corps, en explorant une définition dépendante de l'expérience vécue et sa transformation dans le temps) ;
- Le corps, une taille (tous les jours, au cours d'un mois, en mesurant la taille expérientielle du corps, en explorant une transformation de la taille expérientielle du corps) ;
- La peau, une forme (tous les jours, au cours d'un mois, en redéfinissant la forme expérientielle de la peau à partir de la sensation vécue de celle-ci) ;
- L'œil, une taille (tous les jours, au cours d'un mois, en redéfinissant la taille expérientielle d'œil à partir de la sensation vécue de celui-ci) ;
- Les poumons, une texture (tous les jours, au cours d'un mois, en redéfinissant la texture expérientielle des poumons à partir de la sensation vécue de ceux-ci) ;

- Le sang, une forme (chaque jour, au cours d'un mois, en redéfinissant la forme expérientielle d'un échantillon de sang à partir de la sensation vécue de celui-ci) ;

5. définitions fondées sur la situation (*situation-based definitions*) :

- définir le corps dans deux situations différentes, celle du mouvement (bouger) et celle du repos (être assise) ; explorer la transformation de la définition en fonction de l'expérience ;
- définir le corps à partir de trois points de vue différents, simultanément, celui d'une danseuse, celui d'une chorégraphe et celui d'une chercheuse en danse.

Dans les lignes suivantes, j'aimerais préciser la méthodologie que j'ai utilisée. Une combinaison de deux approches différentes a donné vie à cette thèse. La première approche est fondée sur les savoirs philosophiques et phénoménologiques, ou, plus précisément, sur l'exploration des concepts tels que le Corps sans Organes (Artaud, Deleuze et Guattari), le *bodying* (Manning), le corps en train de se faire (Manning) et le devenir (Deleuze et Guattari). Cette approche est en outre approfondie par l'exploration du travail de Gilbert Simondon et d'Albert North Whitehead. Simondon contribue au concept du corps par un refus de penser le corps comme une forme prédéterminée. Selon Whitehead, le corps est une expérience et, en outre, une forme expérientielle. Cette thèse est une exploration du corps en mouvement comme une forme expérientielle indéterminée.

La deuxième approche est fondée sur les savoirs expérientiels, ou, plus précisément, sur l'exploration des différents contextes dans lesquels le *bodying* être étudié. J'aimerais également donner la raison qui a motivé le choix de chaque outil méthodologique que j'ai utilisé au cours de cette thèse.

La raison principale pour laquelle j'ai entrepris la recherche au microscope était dans le but de réussir à visualiser et étudier le corps en tant que matière. J'ai commencé cette recherche en 2013 et j'ai poursuivi ce travail sur une période de plus de quatre ans. Dans mes recherches, j'utilisais mon propre microscope AmScope MD35 qui me donnait la possibilité de créer des images et des vidéos de la matière que j'explorais. Pendant plus de quatre ans, j'ai réalisé environ 5000 images générées par microscope. Dans la plupart des cas, j'utilisais ma propre matière corporelle (tissus corporels et fluides corporels). Dans les autres cas, j'utilisais la matière corporelle

de mes collaborateurs. Pour moi, il était important d'utiliser mon propre corps (mes propres matériaux corporels) et de le transformer en terrain de ma recherche.

Les raisons théoriques de faire une recherche au microscope étaient, tel que mentionné plus haut, d'explorer le corps comme matière, autant que comme flux. Considérant le corps comme matière, un corps n'est ni déterminé ni organisé de manière statique, mais est dans un processus continu de réorganisation. C'est un Corps sans Organes (Artaud, 1948) ou encore, comme le dit Deleuze, un corps qui explore son potentiel pur, ainsi que ses modes de devenir. Les raisons pratiques de faire une recherche au microscope étaient de pouvoir visualiser, ainsi que de comprendre comment la matière, ou le corps dans un état de flux, se réorganise — ici et maintenant. Observer le processus au moment où il se passe, en direct, était très important pour la compréhension du sujet.

La première recherche au microscope que j'ai faite était celle de différents tissus et fluides corporels. La première chose que j'ai remarquée en travaillant avec mon premier échantillon de tissu était l'absence de hiérarchie ; plus précisément — au niveau de la matière, il n'y a pas d'idée fixe de ce qui est en haut ou en bas, à gauche ou à droite, grand ou petit, plus ou moins important. Ce que mon premier échantillon de tissu m'a appris, c'était que tout se réorganise, s'écoule, tout le temps. Au niveau macroscopique, le bras apparaît toujours comme un bras, comme une forme statique, mais au niveau microscopique le bras coule, rendant visible un écoulement de la forme. Lorsque nous examinons un échantillon de tissu corporel ou plus particulièrement de fluides corporels — il est absolument hétérogène et il existe de nombreuses façons de l'observer.

Imaginons un échantillon de sang (une goutte de sang) comme un paysage. Dans ce paysage, il existe de nombreux paysages hétérogènes, avec des formes, des tailles, des orientations, des textures différentes — étant dans un état de transformation quantitative et qualitative, ainsi qu'une réorganisation permanente. Travailler au microscope est comme travailler avec une image vivante. Il y a quelque chose de performatif dans cette situation, car le corps s'étudie lui-même. L'acte de placer un échantillon au microscope est très performatif aussi parce qu'il place notre corps dans un mode d'être différent ; plus précisément — notre main et l'échantillon entrent dans un état de partage et nos yeux et la caméra de microscope entrent dans cet état aussi. La main déplace l'échantillon tout le temps et manipule donc l'image vivante que nous voyons, tandis que les yeux regardent à travers la caméra du microscope et prennent des décisions sur les images à regarder et éventuellement à enregistrer. À mesure

que notre main se déplace, nous voyageons « à travers » le corps d'un échantillon et observons différents niveaux de transformation.

Il y a deux types de transformations dépendantes du temps (*time-dependent transformation*) que j'ai pu remarquer jusqu'à présent : les premiers moments après avoir placé l'échantillon au microscope sont les moments marqués par une transformation qualitative du mouvement d'un échantillon donné. Plus simplement, une fois que nous avons placé un échantillon au microscope nous pouvons observer son mouvement singulier et sa transformation dans le temps. Je n'ai jamais remarqué un seul motif (*pattern*) de mouvement dans un échantillon particulier. Ce qui m'a le plus fascinée dans les mouvements de fluides corporels que j'étudiais, en particulier les mouvements sanguins, était le fait qu'au sein d'un échantillon de sang (une goutte de sang), il y avait de nombreux motifs (*patterns*) de mouvement. En matière de mouvements, le sang est hétérogène. Lorsque nous nous déplaçons à travers le corps d'un échantillon, dans ce cas le sang, nous nous déplaçons également à travers différents motifs (*patterns*) de mouvements qui sont également en réorganisation permanente.

Un autre type de transformation d'échantillon qui émerge dans le temps est une transformation de sa forme, de sa taille, de son orientation et de sa texture. Même en tant qu'échantillon, notre corps est encore très vivant. Une autre chose qui me fascine est le fait qu'un corps peut survivre en dehors de lui-même. Une goutte de sang continue à vivre en dehors de notre corps et développe son propre écosystème. Au cours des premiers mois de ma recherche au microscope, mes moments préférés étaient ceux où je revenais au même échantillon tous les jours au même moment. Plus précisément, je prenais un échantillon, j'en faisais des images et je revenais le lendemain, au même moment, ainsi que tous les jours suivants, pendant des semaines. De cette façon, je découvrais et j'apprenais à voir différentes couches de transformations d'échantillon.

Au début, je n'étudiais que mes propres tissus et liquides corporels, mais après un certain temps, j'ai commencé à explorer les tissus, ainsi que les fluides corporels de mes collaborateurs. Après avoir remarqué comment les fluides corporels étaient caractérisés par une réorganisation et un flux plus vif, j'ai décidé de faire ma première recherche au microscope sur la salive. J'ai donc pris un échantillon de salive, je l'ai placé au microscope et je l'ai laissé au microscope pendant 7 jours, en faisant une image toutes les 24 heures. De cette manière, il m'a été possible non seulement d'explorer le flux salivaire, mais aussi sa transformation dans le temps. Ma deuxième recherche sur la salive mettait en jeu deux autres interprètes, Adriana Josipovic et

Josipa Bubas. À l'époque, je chorégraphiais une pièce dans laquelle j'explorais l'état de devenir. J'ai proposé à ces deux interprètes de prendre leurs échantillons de salive avant et après la répétition afin de voir si leur flux de salive était modifié en raison de l'expérience que nous explorions. La troisième recherche sur la salive s'est déroulée en collaboration avec une danseuse et chercheuse, Biliana Vassileva. Nous avons assisté à l'atelier de Gaga, un langage du mouvement fluide, et j'ai pris nos échantillons de salive avant et après l'atelier afin de voir si notre flux de salive était modifié par l'expérience du mouvement. Dans les deux cas, la recherche au microscope a montré comment le flux de salive était modifié par les différentes pratiques de mouvement que nous explorions.

En 2015, j'ai rejoint Labodanse, un groupe de recherche comprenant scientifiques, artistes et philosophes travaillant sur les intersections de la danse, des sciences cognitives et des nouvelles technologies. En mai 2015, j'ai travaillé à ma première tâche sur l'image du corps, ainsi que sur l'analyse des données. Plus précisément, une partie du groupe explorait le travail de Myriam Gourfink quant à l'image du corps. Voici un contexte et une description de la tâche sur laquelle je travaillais : dans le cadre d'une semaine (du lundi au vendredi, mai 2013), Labodanse faisait des expériences tous les jours au CND — *Centre National de la Danse*, à Pantin. Il y avait deux groupes (A et B) de participants, chacun contenant 31 participants. Les participants étaient invités à faire du yoga de l'énergie tous les jours et ils étaient dirigés par Myriam Gourfink et ses collaborateurs. On leur a demandé de participer à une expérience scientifique sur l'image du corps avant et après l'atelier de yoga de l'énergie. Plus précisément, on a demandé aux participants de montrer la taille de leurs parties du corps, ainsi que celle de certains organes (cœur, poumons...) avant et après l'expérience du yoga de l'énergie. Il y avait cinq membres de Labodanse, moi inclus, prenant des photos des participants avant et après l'expérience. Après la fin de la tâche, j'ai continué à travailler à l'analyse des données. Une fois que j'ai obtenu les résultats, j'ai commencé à penser à la différence entre la représentation et l'expérience d'être un corps, ainsi qu'à celle d'avoir un corps. Selon les résultats de l'analyse des données, la plupart des participants ont ressenti un agrandissement des parties du corps qu'on leur demandait de mesurer, ainsi que celui de leurs organes après la pratique du yoga de l'énergie. À ce moment, j'ai commencé à réfléchir à la différence entre le schéma corporel et l'image du corps ; à la différence également entre la représentation et l'expérience vécue du corps.

Quelques semaines après, j'ai créé une autre tâche. À ce moment-là, je développais l'idée d'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-based body image*) et j'essayais de créer une tâche qui rendrait possible l'exploration pratique de cette

idée. Cette fois, je n'étais pas seulement impliquée dans la création ou l'analyse de l'expérience, mais je la faisais aussi. Voici la description d'une tâche : les participants ont été invités à prendre des photos de leurs propres parties du corps et à les mettre ensemble selon la façon dont ils sentent qu'ils sont organisés dans un état de devenir. Plus précisément, leur était transmise l'instruction suivante : « composez votre corps de la façon dont vous le ressentez dans un état de devenir ». Certaines des questions posées étaient : y a-t-il une différence entre la façon dont nous voyons et ressentons notre corps ; au niveau de la sensation — comment est organisé notre corps ; est-ce que la forme et la taille ressenties de nos parties du corps sont dépendantes de l'expérience ; comment l'organisation de notre corps change-t-elle avec la sensation ; est-ce que de nouvelles expériences créent de nouveaux organes ; y a-t-il des organes fondés sur l'expérience ; comment performons-nous nos organes ; combien de niveaux d'organisations du corps connaissons-nous ; y a-t-il différents niveaux d'organisations du corps qui coexistent en même temps ; combien d'expériences de la physicalité avons-nous ; combien de corps physiques ou expérientiels avons-nous ?

Les résultats de la tâche ont montré que tous les participants ont composé leur corps d'une manière qui ne ressemble pas à la représentation qu'ils en ont habituellement. Ils n'ont pas composé leur corps comme il apparaissait, mais comme ils le ressentaient. Habituellement, quand on regarde le corps, on peut dire de quoi il est fait. Par exemple, d'une peau, de cheveux, d'os, etc. Cependant, on ne saisit pas comment le corps s'organise à chaque instant. Par contre, en regardant et en analysant les images que les participants donnaient de leur propre corps dans l'expérience effectuée, on pouvait percevoir plus clairement les processus d'organisation du corps. Il s'agit exactement du noyau de cette recherche — la question du « comment » au lieu du « quoi », plus précisément, comment se fait le corps, au lieu de la question de quoi est-il fait ?

La troisième tâche que j'ai créée sur l'image du corps était fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-based body image*). Il s'agissait d'une extension de la tâche précédente. J'ai fait une liste de sensations liées à l'état de devenir et j'ai demandé aux participants de marquer toutes les sensations qu'ils associent à l'état de devenir. Je n'ai pas seulement créé, mais j'ai également participé à la tâche.

En 2015, j'ai créé un entretien sur l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-based body image*), l'anatomie expérientielle et les bords du corps expérientiel. L'entretien était fondé sur les résultats de la tâche mentionnée plus haut. Plus précisément, ces résultats sont devenus une source et une force génératrice de la création de l'entretien sur lequel j'ai travaillé. Son propos était d'explorer si les

résultats de la tâche pouvaient être approfondis ou questionnés au cours de l'entretien. J'ai également fait une auto-interview.

Après le travail d'entretien, j'ai commencé à interroger les autres façons possibles d'explorer et de saisir les processus créatifs du *bodying*. J'ai choisi de continuer mon travail dans le cadre des définitions fondées sur l'expérience (*experience-based definitions*). J'ai décidé de travailler sur eux de la même manière que je faisais la recherche au microscope tout en explorant la transformation temporelle (*time-dependent transformation*) des fluides corporels. Au lieu de prendre une nouvelle photo du même fluide corporel toutes les 24 heures, j'ai décidé de redéfinir le corps lui-même toutes les 24 heures, ou, plus précisément, de le définir tous les jours d'un mois, afin d'explorer l'idée d'une définition fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-dependent definition*) et sur sa transformation dans le temps. Dans le cadre d'un mois, j'ai travaillé parallèlement à la redéfinition de ce qui suit : un corps, une taille du corps, une taille des yeux, une forme de la peau, une forme du sang et une texture des poumons. Tout en travaillant à la redéfinition de la taille des yeux et du corps, j'ai utilisé la méthode qui consiste à « mesurer par les sentiments » la transformation de la taille expérientielle des yeux et du corps. Tout en travaillant à la redéfinition de la forme de la peau, ainsi qu'à celle du sang, j'ai utilisé la méthode permettant la redéfinition de la forme à partir de la sensation vécue de celle-ci. Lors de la définition de la texture des poumons, j'ai également utilisé la méthode visant la redéfinition à partir de la sensation vécue d'une texture pulmonaire. Ce qui m'intéresse dans cette exploration est de savoir comment les modes de définition peuvent subir le même processus de réorganisation, tout comme les tissus et les fluides corporels. Comment explorer une définition qui n'est jamais fixée et qui subit toujours un processus de transformation et de réorganisation conceptuelle ?

En 2015, j'ai également commencé à explorer les pratiques d'écriture fondées sur la situation (*situation-based writing practices*). J'ai expérimenté deux approches différentes : la redéfinition du corps en mouvement et en situation assise. J'ai commencé à explorer aussi l'écriture sur le corps à partir de trois points de vue différents, celui d'une danseuse, celui d'une chorégraphe et celui d'une chercheuse. Dans les deux cas, j'étais passionnée à l'idée d'explorer la transformation (*experience-dependent transformation*) d'une définition du corps, ainsi que les processus de redéfinition d'un corps de différents points de vue. Ce travail a été inspiré par l'idée d'Isabelle Ginot de « partitions du regard » (Ginot, 2016). Il s'agissait d'une tentative de découvrir les « partitions de regard », ou, plus précisément, comment fonctionne un regard particulier et quelle expérience du corps il produit.

Réfléchissons à la situation qu'implique l'action de se mouvoir et d'être assis : dans quelle mesure notre pratique de l'écriture est-elle influencée par le mouvement ou par son absence ; dans quelle mesure nos modes de penser le mouvement sont-ils influencés par nos modes de l'éprouver ? Est-ce que les situations de se mouvoir ou de s'asseoir tout en reflétant le mouvement transforment nos modes de penser, d'écrire et de mouvoir notre corps ? Est-ce qu'un simple changement, tel un changement postural, ou tel être en mouvement pendant l'écriture, change la façon dont je travaille sur ma thèse ? Le corps ne se réorganise pas seulement au niveau de sa matérialité, mais aussi au niveau de sa discursivité. La raison d'explorer les définitions fondées sur la situation (*situation-based writing practices*) était d'explorer comment s'élabore une définition du corps. Les pratiques d'écriture fondées sur la situation, ou, plus précisément, la pratique de redéfinir le corps chaque jour au cours d'un mois est une façon de saisir cette double transformation — au niveau de l'expérience et au niveau de la définition. Tout comme passer de la situation d'être assise à la situation d'être en mouvement, se compare au passage entre les positions de chercheuse, de chorégraphe et de danseuse. Ce sont des moyens d'intégrer et de juxtaposer des discours différents sur le corps, ainsi que leurs modes de surgissement dans le langage. Comment un corps arrive-t-il à sa forme ; comment une forme expérientielle ou sensible arrive-t-elle à sa définition ? Si notre corps est toujours différent, comment sa définition peut-elle rester la même ? Le corps est une totalité de points de vue différents, non seulement spatiaux et temporels, mais aussi discursifs. Juxtaposer différents discours, comme celui d'une danseuse, celui d'une chorégraphe et celui d'une chercheuse est un moyen de rendre visible l'hétérogénéité discursive d'un corps en mouvement. Le discours est un autre type de micrographie. Au lieu des cellules, des fluides ou des tissus, nous avons des définitions. Les cellules et les définitions se réorganisent tout le temps.

Que faire si la notion de corps est entièrement fondée sur la situation et sur l'expérience ? Et si la signification d'un concept du corps se réorganise dans le temps, par rapport à notre expérience ? Que faire si la signification dure autant que l'expérience ? Certaines des questions qui ont marqué le processus de travail sur cette thèse étaient :

- Comment recréer l'expérience au lieu de la décrire ?
- Comment utiliser notre propre corps et révéler la façon dont celui-ci nous permet de comprendre les choses ?
- Que faire s'il n'y a pas de corps fixe et s'il n'y a que des *bodyings* (processus du corps en train de se faire) ?

- Que faire si l'expérience du corps ne correspond pas à la représentation du corps ?
- Quelle est la différence expérientielle entre le schéma corporel et l'image du corps ?
- Comment réfléchir l'image du corps fondée sur l'expérience (*experience-based body image*) ?
- Qu'en est-il si le corps n'est pas une organisation, mais un ensemble de relations ?
- Que faire si l'anatomie n'est pas seulement physiologique, mais aussi expérientielle et relationnelle ?
- Qu'en est-il si le corps est une partition, le corps-partition ?
- Que faire si la pratique du mouvement est une façon de danser le corps-partition, ainsi que tout ce qu'un corps-partition peut devenir ?
- Que faire si notre expérience de l'anatomie, notre anatomie expérientielle, est fondée sur l'expérience d'être en mouvement ?
- Et s'il n'y avait pas d'organes, mais seulement des organes-partitions ?
- Et si tout ce qui est le corps n'est qu'un verbe — *bodying* ?
- Et s'il n'y a pas de telle chose qu'une main, mais seulement le potentiel d'une main de devenir elle-même par le mouvement ?
- Et si le mouvement est une pratique de transformation qualitative de tout ce qu'un corps est ou peut devenir ?
- Et si la danse est une pratique de danser le potentiel du corps à devenir ?
- Comment le corps est-il fait par, à travers et dans le mouvement ?
- Où un mouvement s'arrête-t-il et un corps commence-t-il ? Où un corps s'arrête-t-il et l'autre corps commence-t-il ?
- Et si la forme et la taille d'un corps ne sont pas déterminées, mais expérientielles ?

2 | ONTOHÉTÉROGENÈSE DU CORPS EN MOUVEMENT : DU *BODY* AU *BODYING*

2.1 CSO : INSUFFLATION, ÉVAPORATION, TRANSMISSION DE FLUIDE

Le premier concept sur lequel cette thèse est fondée est le concept d'Artaud de CsO (Corps sans Organes) ou celui qui est informe, désordonné, transformant et toujours dans un état de métamorphoses, par opposition à la stratification et l'organisation de l'être statique. Selon Artaud : « Lorsque vous lui aurez fait un Corps sans Organes alors vous l'aurez délivré de tous ses automatismes et rendu à sa véritable liberté » (Artaud, 1976: 571). À travers le concept de Corps sans Organes on peut explorer l'ontohétérogenèse du corps ou son devenir des entités divergentes. En partant de la théorie ontogénétique d'individuation de Simondon, chaque corps individuel est immanent au système de sa propre individuation. Par conséquent, la première étape de cette thèse est la reconceptualisation du corps en mouvement comme un système continu d'auto-individuation, par opposition à celui qui est déjà individualisé. De ce point de vue, on peut redéfinir un corps individuel en mouvement, avec ses structures biologiques, anatomiques et sensorielles, et non comme une entité prédonnée, mais seulement comme une phase de son devenir permanent.

Le Corps sans Organes ne se définit pas en termes de formes, d'organes ou de fonctions, mais cinétiquement, en tant que nombre infini de particules en relation de mouvement et de repos, et dynamiquement, en tant que capacité d'affecter et d'être affecté, « comme une détermination intensive » (Deleuze et Guattari, 1983: 123-4). Le Corps sans Organes est un corps qui implique la confrontation avec les limites de la subjectivité et avec celles de l'organisme. Ce CsO ne vise pas à unifier les parties fragmentées afin de former un organisme ayant des fonctions prédéterminées. Le résultat d'une telle expérimentation de l'organisme, laquelle annule l'association organique que les organes ont entre eux ou avec leurs fonctions prédéterminées, est la condition de l'émergence de nouvelles associations et fonctions physiques.

Le Corps sans Organes ne manque pas d'organes, il lui manque l'organisme ou une organisation particulière des organes. Il est défini par des organes indéterminés, tandis que l'organisme est défini par un ensemble d'organes déterminés. Il est fondé sur une conception embryologique du corps qui ne reconnaît que les différences

dynamiques et cinétiques, pas les différences formelles, ni le fonctionnement synthétique des organes ou parties d'un corps. Le Corps sans Organes est (dans) un état de flux quantitatif et qualitatif. Les organes ne sont plus que des intensités qui sont produites — des flux, des seuils et des dégradés : « Un estomac, un œil, une bouche : l'article indéfini [...] exprime la pure détermination de l'intensité, la différence intensive (Deleuze et Guattari, 1983: 182, 164), le CsO est l'œuf [...] vous le portez toujours avec vous comme votre propre milieu d'expérimentation, votre milieu associé. Vous n'atteignez jamais le Corps sans Organes, vous ne pouvez pas l'atteindre, vous êtes toujours en train d'y parvenir, c'est une limite » (Deleuze et Guattari, 1983: 166, 150). Selon Deleuze et Guattari, le Corps sans Organes est un corps intense et intensif ; comme mentionné précédemment, il ne dispose pas d'organes, mais de seuils ou de niveaux. Par conséquent, les orientations, les axes, les vitesses et les rythmes deviennent primaires à l'organisation et à la structure de tout corps. Le Corps sans Organes « fonctionne entièrement par insufflation, respiration, évaporation et transmission de fluides » (Deleuze, 2004: 100, 88). C'est un corps non formé, imprégné de matières non formées, instables, de particules subatomiques, d'intensités pures, de singularités préphysiques et prévitales, de flux dans toutes les directions.

Tout au long de ses écrits, Deleuze revient souvent à une remarque de Spinoza laquelle stipule que nous ne savons pas encore « ce qu'un corps peut et ne peut pas faire », et par conséquent, nous ne connaissons pas l'étendue des capacités du corps. Dans *Spinoza : Philosophie pratique* Deleuze souligne comment Spinoza définit le corps de deux manières : en termes de relations de lenteur et de vitesse entre un nombre infini de particules ; et en termes de capacités d'affecter et d'être affecté. En caractérisant le corps en termes de vitesses différentes, Spinoza met l'accent sur la participation du corps sur le plan de l'immanence qu'il définit comme une dimension de rythmes, de mouvements, de pauses, d'accélération et de décélération, dans lequel la forme et la fonction de chaque corps apparaissent comme des produits secondaires des relations cinétiques entre les particules. En abordant le corps en fonction de ses capacités d'affecter et d'être affecté, Spinoza imprègne le plan de l'immanence d'une affectivité envahissante produite par des interactions entre plusieurs forces : « Bref : si nous sommes spinozistes, nous ne définirons quelque chose ni par sa forme ni par ses organes ou ses fonctions, ni comme substance ou comme sujet. Pour emprunter des termes du Moyen Âge, ou bien à la géographie, nous le définirons par *longitude* et *latitude*. Un corps peut être n'importe quoi ; ce peut être un animal, ce peut être un corps sonore, ce peut être une âme ou une idée, ce peut être un corpus linguistique, ce peut être un corps social, une collectivité. Nous appelons longitude d'un corps quelconque l'ensemble des rapports de vitesse et de

lenteur, de repos et de mouvement, entre les particules qui le constituent, c'est-à-dire, entre les éléments non formés qui le composent. Nous appelons latitude l'ensemble des affects qui remplissent un corps à chaque moment, c'est-à-dire, les états intensifs d'une force anonyme (force d'exister, pouvoir d'être affecté). C'est ainsi que nous établissons la cartographie d'un corps. L'ensemble des longitudes et des latitudes constitue la Nature, le plan d'immanence ou de consistance, toujours variable et qui ne cesse d'être remanié, composé, recomposé, par les individus et les collectivités » (Deleuze, 1988b: 142). Le corps en mouvement est une multitude de différents modes de devenir du corps lui-même au plan de l'immanence. Un plan d'immanence se constitue par l'assemblage plutôt que par l'organisation. Au lieu de faire l'expérience de la forme, des organes ou des fonctions, nous faisons l'expérience corporelle des rapports de vitesse et de lenteur entre les particules d'organes non formés, ainsi qu'entre les organismes. Un plan d'immanence du corps en mouvement se constitue entre les charges dynamiques affectives du mouvement et le repos.

2.2 CORPS-PARTITION

Un autre concept que la thèse aborde est celui de corps-partition. Le corps lui-même peut être perçu et réalisé comme une partition, corps-partition, ou celui qui met en place ses propres modes relationnels de devenir un corps. Le corps lui-même s'organise par le mouvement et par le développement de chacun de ses organes comme un outil polymorphe. Par conséquent, chaque organe devient un outil auto-organisé. En outre, en tant que partition le corps n'est pas un système d'organes, mais un système de relations et de devenirs relationnels d'organes et du corps lui-même. Le corps devient donc une partition relationnelle qui se produit dans et par le mouvement. Le corps du performeur n'est plus celui qui incarne une certaine technique, mais c'est le corps lui-même qui devient sa propre technique singulière ; la technique émerge à travers l'exploration d'un corps individuel, elle émerge de l'intérieur, et elle n'est pas imposée au corps, de l'extérieur. Tel est le moment où le corps commence à se diriger, se chorégraphier et où il se performe — comme le *bodying* ou comme un événement singulier de forces prenant forme.

Erin Manning définit le *bodying* comme « un champ de relations à travers lequel le corps émerge comme une multiplicité plutôt qu'un soi statique et interactif » (Manning, 2012: 38). Le *bodying* indique aussi un champ de relations à travers lequel le corps émerge comme un devenir. Un corps n'est pas une entité qui est, mais une entité qui prend forme, qui devient. Le mouvement ne permet pas seulement au corps de se faire, mais il fait également du corps sa propre partition, c'est-à-dire, qu'il permet au corps de se danser comme sa propre partition. Le corps est une partition ; le corps est un mouvement. Le *bodying* désigne un acte de rencontre entre la partition et le mouvement, c'est un événement à travers lequel un corps devient — en mouvement, par le mouvement et comme mouvement. Dans l'idée de corps-partition, chaque organe ou chaque partie du corps se produit dans le mouvement. Plus précisément, chaque organe se produit dans les processus de sentir, d'être en relation et de devenir. Tout au long de ces processus, chaque organe ou chaque partie du corps produit son propre champ expérientiel, aussi bien que relationnel de devenir.

William Forsythe a développé une approche de l'utilisation de la surface de la peau comme organe de la proprioception. Les danseurs sont invités à activer leur corps par la peau, faisant de la peau ce que Deleuze appelait la surface d'enregistrement de l'événement : « Mettez l'activation dans chaque partie. Pensez à l'endroit où le mouvement commence et s'arrête. Si vous levez votre bras, où est-ce que votre peau s'étire ? Activez votre peau. Attendez la réponse de votre peau. Allez plus loin si cela vous dit quelque chose. Ce que vous sentez est ce que vous savez.

Recherchez la chaîne de sensations plutôt que la chaîne de positions » (Manning, Massumi, 2014: 50).

Selon Deleuze, les sensations ne doivent pas être considérées comme des « données », mais comme des « rencontres ». En tant que rencontre, la sensation agit sur le système nerveux, et non sur le « cerveau » du sujet. A partir de Bergson, Deleuze relie la sensation à la contraction de la matière et de l'imagination. Dans la lecture deleuzienne de Bergson, la vibration de la matière, contractée par tous nos sens, aboutit à des qualités perçues : « Qu'est-ce qui, en fait, est une sensation ? C'est une opération de contracter des trillions de vibrations sur une surface réceptive. La qualité qui en résulte n'est autre que la quantité contractée. [...] La sensation est étendue — où elle se contracte est précisément où elle se prolonge (détendue) » (Deleuze, 1990: 74). La sensation est « l'excitation elle-même [...] dans la mesure où elle est conservée ou conserve ses vibrations [...]. La sensation est formée en contractant ce qui la compose [...] » (Deleuze, 1994: 211). C'est une caractéristique de la sensation de traverser différents niveaux en raison de l'action des forces. Mais « deux sensations, chacune ayant son propre niveau ou zone, peuvent également se confronter et faire communiquer leurs niveaux respectifs. [...] Les différents niveaux par lesquels cette sensation passe constituent nécessairement des accouplements de sensation » (Deleuze, 1994: 47, 64).

L'expérience de sentir élargit le champ de la possibilité de ce qu'un organe peut faire, ainsi que de ce qu'il peut devenir. Dans le cas de William Forsythe, « activer la peau », une surface d'enregistrement de l'événement, c'est l'activer comme un organe indéterminé, non actualisé et pourtant tout aussi intense. Ici, la peau devient une partition, une peau-partition. Peu importe ce qu'est une peau, ce qui importe est ce qu'une peau peut devenir. Par l'acte de l'enregistrement de l'événement, celle-ci émerge comme un événement de la nuance ou comme un devenir relationnel de la peau. Les « accouplements de sensations » s'étendent et créent de nouveaux champs de devenir. Par l'acte d'enchaîner les sensations au lieu des positions, il est possible de repenser l'idée de la composition d'un corps en mouvement. On peut penser à la sensation comme une source de nouvelle composition du corps, une composition en devenir ou une composition en mouvement. On peut également penser à la perception comme processus simultané de composition, de décomposition et de co-composition d'un corps en mouvement.

2.3 CORPS-DEVENIR

Selon Deleuze, un corps peut devenir quoi que ce soit tant qu'il est considéré en termes d'ensemble de relations et d'affects. La capacité d'affecter et d'être affecté est ce qui constitue la singularité du corps du performeur. Les affects sont aussi étroitement liés à la question de ce qu'un corps peut devenir et ce dont un corps est capable. Les affects sont des devenirs. « L'affect passe directement à travers le corps, se couplant avec le système nerveux, faisant ressentir l'intervalle. Ce sentiment est vécu comme un devenir. Ce devenir-avec est transformateur. C'est une force dont un corps microperceptif commence à émerger. Ce corps microperceptif est le corps de la relation. Bien que l'affect ne puisse jamais être séparé d'un corps, il ne s'empare jamais d'un corps individuel. L'affect passe laissant des traces intenses sur un corps-devenir collectif. Ce corps-devenir n'est pas nécessairement un corps humain. C'est un conglomérat de forces qui exprime un mouvement-avec par lequel une individuation relationnelle commence à se faire sentir » (Manning, 2012: 95).

La singularité du corps du performeur peut être comprise comme une capacité du corps à entrer en relation, à affecter et être affecté, à bouger et être bougé, il faut, donc, la comprendre comme une capacité à devenir. Devenir, c'est participer au mouvement, aux vibrations, aux seuils ; les êtres (minéraux, végétaux, animaux et humains) ne se distinguent que par des seuils, des vibrations: « il y a des lignes qui ne constituent pas le chemin d'un point, qui se libèrent de la structure — des lignes de fuite, des devenirs, sans avenir ou passé, sans mémoire, qui résistent à la machine binaire — devenir-femme qui est ni homme ni femme, devenir-animal qui ne soit ni bête ni homme, les devenirs sont exactement cela, produisant la ligne et non le point » (Deleuze et Guattari, 1988b: 26). La choré-singularité est une singularité du corps qui émerge par le mouvement, une capacité de corps-devenir en mouvement, une capacité de *bodying* par le mouvement. Danser le corps lui-même comprend la relation aux organes considérés entités relationnelles et permet une exploration de la performativité et de la possibilité de développement de nouveaux organes par le mouvement. Selon Diderot, la conscience est le produit du mouvement et l'anatomie est le produit de la conscience. Comment penser l'anatomie comme choré-anatomie ?

La choré-anatomie en tant qu'anatomie relationnelle étudie la possibilité de danser nos propres organes, au lieu de danser avec eux, ainsi que de danser notre corps tout entier au lieu de danser avec lui (par exemple, la main n'est pas considérée comme une main, c'est-à-dire, une partie du corps prédéterminée, mais elle est considérée comme une main virtuelle ou comme le potentiel d'une main ; être en mouvement est un processus d'exploration de la potentialité d'une main et de son

devenir). La choré-anatomie se penche également sur le processus de production d'un nouveau corps, ainsi que sur le processus de production de ses structures biologiques, anatomiques et sensorielles par le biais du mouvement. Dans l'idée de la choré-anatomie, le mouvement est défini comme une relation, ainsi que le devenir relationnel (d'un corps). Entrer dans son corps c'est entrer dans une relation, donc, l'anatomie devient dansée ; le corps lui-même devient dansé également, en relation avec l'autre, comme un corps-avec (*body-with*). Selon Souriau, « les modes d'existence sont toujours pluriels et relationnels, on trouve l'existence non seulement chez les êtres, mais entre eux » (Souriau, 2009: 16). Selon Souriau toujours, les modes d'existence sont intermodaux. Le *bodying* en tant que mode d'existence est également intermodal ou ce qui n'est pas déjà constitué, mais qui arrive à l'existence par le mouvement. L'anatomie est non seulement intermodale, mais également plurielle par rapport à elle-même, contenant l'autre en tant que caractéristique compositionnelle de son propre devenir.

Ce qui importe, c'est de savoir comment un corps individuel est composé, car la composition est un acte d'entrer en relation. Selon Deleuze, la structure d'un corps est la composition de ses relations. Ce qu'un corps peut faire (et ce qu'il peut devenir) correspond à la nature et aux limites de sa capacité à être affecté. Les affects ne sont pas seulement les transitions entre les états du corps, mais aussi des passages ou des transitions entre les différents corps. Dans ce contexte, on peut explorer le corps comme une composition de capacités à affecter et à être affecté, ainsi qu'une composition de devenirs continuels qui composent les différents corps (potentiels) au sein d'un corps, et les différentes anatomies au sein d'une anatomie : « Suivant cette idée tout individu aurait une infinité de parties extensives. En d'autres termes, il n'y aurait que des individus composés. Un individu simple, serait donc une notion dénuée de sens. ...Des parties de mon corps quittent mon corps, prennent un autre rapport, un rapport avec quoi que ce soit, un rapport avec le moustique quand il me pique, le rapport ...

Je ne cesse pas d'intégrer des parties dans mes rapports, quand je mange, par exemple, quand je mange il y a des parties extensives que je m'approprie. Ça veut dire quoi, s'approprier des parties ? S'approprier des parties ça veut dire : faire qu'elles quittent le rapport précédent qu'elles effectuaient pour prendre un nouveau rapport, ce nouveau rapport étant un de mes rapports à moi, à savoir : avec de la viande je fais de la chair à moi. Quelle horreur ! Mais enfin, il faut bien vivre (rires), ça ne cesse pas d'être comme ça : des chocs, des appropriations de parties, des transformations de rapports, des compositions à l'infini, etc. Ce régime des parties extérieures les unes aux autres qui ne cessent de réagir, en même temps que les ensembles infinis dans lesquels elles entrent ne cessent de varier, c'est précisément ce régime de l'idée

inadéquate, des perceptions confuses, et des affects passifs, des affects-passion qui en découlent. En d'autres termes, c'est parce que je suis composé d'un ensemble d'une infinité d'ensembles infinis de parties extensives extérieures les unes aux autres, que je ne cesse pas d'avoir des perceptions des choses extérieures, des perceptions de moi-même, des perceptions de moi-même dans mes rapports avec les choses extérieures, des perceptions des choses extérieures en rapport avec moi-même, et c'est tout ça qui constitue le monde des signes. MERCI DELEUZE MERCI SPINOZA » (Le Roy, 2002 : 46-46). Un individu, comme Le Roy le perçoit, est un acte de transformation continu par le biais de la relation. Le corps de Le Roy est un corps relationnel. Il est une composition, aussi bien qu'un assemblage de relations.

Dans *Self Interview* X5 dit : « Pourquoi nos corps s'arrêteraient à notre peau ou dans le meilleur des cas incluraient d'autres êtres, d'autres organismes ou d'autres objets encapsulés par la peau ? » Y5 répond : « Je ne sais pas non plus, mais tu fais sans doute référence au fait que les images du corps sont extrêmement fluides et dynamiques, c'est-à-dire que leurs bordures et contours sont osmotiques. Ils ont les remarquables capacités d'incorporer ou de rejeter l'intérieur et l'extérieur pour être dans un échange incessant ». X8 conclut : « Je pense au corps perçu comme espace et temps pour l'échange, le trafic et le commerce » (Le Roy, 2002: 45). Dans ce contexte, « X5 — X8 » peut être considéré comme ce qui traverse une frontière entre le sujet et l'objet, entre l'humain et le non humain, entre le corps individuel et le corps collectif, ainsi qu'entre le corps physique et le corps relationnel. Les limites ne sont pas aussi claires et concrètes que l'on voudrait. Les corps se constituent sans cesse de nouvelles combinaisons ou agencements. Selon Y8 : « l'image du corps peut rétrécir et se dilater, elle peut donner des parties au monde extérieur et peut prendre des parties extérieures pour les inclure à elle-même » (Le Roy, 2002: 45). Comme on peut le constater, la création de l'image du corps se produit à travers l'échange avec le monde extérieur.

Qui est « Xavier Le Roy », un individu, alors ? « L'individu suppose la mise en convergence d'un certain nombre de singularités, déterminant une condition de clôture selon laquelle se définit une identité. [En revanche les] singularités ont entre elles des rapports de divergence ou de disjonction, certainement pas de convergence puisque celle-ci implique déjà le principe d'exclusion qui gouverne l'individualité : elles ne communiquent que par leur différence ou leur distance, et le libre jeu du sens et de sa production réside précisément dans le parcours de ces multiples distances, ou « synthèse disjonctive » (Deleuze, 1969: 201-204). De plus, « les individus que nous sommes, dérivant de ce champ nomadique d'individuation qui ne connaît que des couplages et des disparités, champ transcendantal parfaitement impersonnel et inconscient, ne renouent pas avec ce jeu du sens sans faire l'épreuve de

la mobilité de leurs frontières (Deleuze, 1968: 327, 331). À ce niveau, chaque chose n'est plus elle-même qu'une singularité qui « s'ouvre à l'infini des prédicats par lesquels elle passe, en même temps qu'elle perd son centre, c'est-à-dire son identité comme concept et comme moi » (Deleuze, 1969: 344-345). La singularité est indissociable de son milieu, elle « passe entre les bords » (Deleuze, 1968: 155). Ce milieu émerge comme « potentiel », comme différence initiale. D'où l'impératif méthodologique d'une pensée par le milieu : « On ne peut pas séparer un état de choses [l'éclair] du potentiel à travers lequel il opère » (Deleuze et Guattari, 1991: 145). La singularité est indissociable du champ de forces qu'elle actualise, du plan d'immanence dont elle s'arrache. Toute singularité réclame une éthologie des forces, aussi bien qu'une prise en considération du milieu constituant.

Xavier Le Roy a développé une approche à la construction du corps où toute forme est plissement, concrescence éphémère et libre, affectant un substrat conçu comme grouillement de singularités intensives. Si toute forme doit être pensée comme le pliage ou la « dune » d'un substrat aformel et lisse, il en résulte que le sujet ne peut plus être considéré comme un *sub-jet* préexistant, instance donnée *a priori*, mais comme un super-jet, une instance seconde. Aussi Deleuze définira-t-il l'individu comme « concentration, accumulation, coïncidence d'un certain nombre de singularités préindividuelles convergentes » (Deleuze, 1988a: 85), ou encore comme une enveloppe : « le sujet n'est pas un sujet, c'est une enveloppe » (Deleuze, 1990: 212). De plus, « nous devons concevoir (...) comme condition de l'expérience, des intensités pures enveloppées dans une profondeur, dans un spatium intensif qui préexiste à toute qualité comme à toute extension » (Deleuze, 2002: 135). Envelopper d'autres organismes ou d'autres objets encapsulés par la peau, comme le dit Xavier Le Roy, signifie incorporer à ses propres rapports des rapports hétérogènes qui demeurent hétérogènes ; envelopper l'autre ne revient donc pas à sentir comme il sent, mais à sentir comme nous sentons qu'il sent, à le sentir sentir en nous. Envelopper une autre sensibilité, c'est se sentir fugitivement d'une façon autre que la nôtre, comme sentirait un autre que nous ; et nous en recueillons les effets sur nous-mêmes. La subjectivité n'est pas à confondre avec le concept d'un sujet prédéterminé. Il s'agit plutôt de le comprendre comme un sujet dynamique, indexant des modes d'agencement (politiques, affectifs, chorégraphiques) qui révèlent « un processus de subjectivation, lequel est, le produit d'un mode d'exister qui ne peut égaler avec le sujet » (Deleuze, 1995: 98). La subjectivité doit être comprise comme une puissance performative, comme la possibilité d'être constamment inventée et réinventée, comme « un mode d'intensité, pas comme un sujet personnel » (Deleuze, 1995: 55). L'interprétation deleuzienne de la subjectivité est proche de celle de Foucault, ou, plus précisément, de

son idée de « technologies du soi », qu'il définit comme opération. Les techniques de soi, « qui permettent aux individus d'effectuer, seuls ou avec l'aide d'autres, un certain nombre d'opérations sur leur corps et leur âme, leurs pensées, leurs conduites, leur mode d'être ; de se transformer afin d'atteindre un certain état de bonheur, de pureté, de sagesse, de perfection ou d'immortalité » (Foucault, 1997: 225). Chez Deleuze et Foucault, les subjectivités sont toujours des processus de devenirs actifs.

Dans *Self Unfinished* (1998), Le Roy renonce à la notion de sujet et de catégories fixes : masculin et féminin, humain et animal, objet et sujet, passif et actif, mécanique et organique, absence et présence, toutes les oppositions qui déterminent la subjectivité moderne. Il remplace ces catégories par une série de devenirs : « Le devenir, [c'est] un paysage qui n'apparaît que dans le mouvement » (Deleuze, 1993: 16-17). Si le mouvement est immédiatement convoqué par le devenir, comme l'écrit René Schérer, « *devenir est advenir* ». Il convient de distinguer, dans le processus, l'advenu, *eventus*, de l'advenir, *eventum*. Le devenir est advenir : *eventum tantum*. Autrement dit, devenir, c'est « *l'être en train de se faire* » (Schérer, 1998: 53), non comme une « *autoproduction de l'être* », mais comme mouvement ou pur « événement ». De ce point de vue, il faut redéfinir un corps individuel, avec ses structures biologiques, anatomiques et sensorielles, non comme une entité prédonnée, mais seulement comme une phase de son devenir permanent. *Self Unfinished* (1998) restitue au corps sa puissance de constamment se réinventer. Ce que nous voyons est un devenir machinique *et* organique, sujet *et* objet, homme *et* femme, noir *et* blanc, actif *et* passif — en réorganisant constamment la question fondamentale de la danse et de la philosophie : que peut un corps ?

3 | CORPS-DEVENIR

3.1 COMMENT SE FAIT UN CORPS-DEVENIR PAR L'ANATOMIE EXPÉRIENTIELLE

L'anatomie expérientielle est une approche incarnée de l'anatomie, développée par les danseurs et les spécialistes du mouvement tels que Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. L'anatomie expérientielle met l'accent sur différents aspects de notre structure squelettique à travers une exploration anatomique détaillée, le toucher et les exercices. Cela permet aux danseurs de développer une conscience corporelle de leur anatomie intrinsèque. Cela leur permet de changer leur utilisation, le fonctionnement et la mobilité de leur corps. Les danseurs ne représentent pas, mais ils vivent leurs systèmes corporels grâce à l'approche de l'anatomie expérientielle qui repose sur la découverte d'un flux du mouvement par le *bodying* du système corporel.

Le *Body-Mind Centering* (BMC) est une approche à l'anatomie expérientielle et une méthode spécifique d'analyse du mouvement. Il est fondé sur le *bodying* des principes de mouvements anatomiques et développementaux. Le BMC explore les mouvements du développement précoce et leur relation avec le mouvement de la respiration, des organes et du squelette, ainsi que le mouvement des systèmes de fluides du corps (le sang, céphalo-rachidien, interstitiel, synovial, la lymphe, cellulaire) pour accéder à de nouvelles qualités de mouvements et expressions. En appliquant les principes BMC, il est possible de rééduquer non seulement le système corps-esprit, mais aussi la perception neuromusculaire proprioceptive, ainsi que de trouver de nouvelles sources de recherche du mouvement. L'approche *Body-Mind Centering* consiste à faire :

- l'entraînement du système nerveux en mettant l'accent sur : le système nerveux somatique ; le système nerveux autonome ; l'avant, le moyen et l'arrière du corps en libérant le plexus brachial et le plexus lombosacré ; l'embryologie du système nerveux ;
- l'entraînement du système d'organes en mettant l'accent sur les explorations des organes ; le relâchement de l'adhérence entre les organes ; l'initiation du souffle, de la voix, du mouvement et du contact entre les organes ; l'analyse des

- déséquilibres des organes individuels ; les techniques pour équilibrer les organes ; le développement embryologique des organes ;
- l'entraînement du système fluide en mettant l'accent sur : le fluide cellulaire, le fluide transitoire, le fluide extracellulaire ; l'équilibre fluide — de la membrane et du sang ; le fluide céphalo-rachidien (LCR) ; le fluide synovial ; le fluide periorgan ; la lymphe ; les fluides interstitiels et cellulaires ; la moelle osseuse ; l'exploration du système immunitaire à travers les fluides ; le fascia ; la graisse ; le fluide terrestre ;
 - l'entraînement des os et des articulations des membres supérieurs des mains à l'épaule et aux côtes, en mettant l'accent sur les os des mains, le disque cubital, le radius et le cubitus, le coude, l'humérus, l'omoplate ;
 - l'entraînement des os et des articulations du squelette axial (noyau central) — la colonne vertébrale et le crâne, en mettant l'accent sur : Les six courbes de la colonne vertébrale, le crâne, l'os hyoïde, les diaphragmes thoraciques et pelviens ; le développement embryologique du squelette axial ;
 - l'entraînement des os et des articulations des membres inférieurs des pieds, en mettant l'accent sur le pied, la cheville, le genou, le fémur, la hanche, le pelvis et le développement embryologique des membres inférieurs ;
 - l'entraînement du système ligamentaire en mettant l'accent sur les explorations des ligaments ; ligaments des mains, des avant-bras et des coudes ; ligaments des épaules ; ligaments de la colonne vertébrale ; ligaments du bassin et des hanches ; ligaments des genoux et des pieds ; la différence la chair et l'os ; le développement embryologique des ligaments ;
 - l'entraînement du système endocrinien en mettant l'accent sur l'initiation du souffle, de la voix, du mouvement et du contact entre les glandes ; la relation des glandes aux structures squelettiques, points réflexes et centres d'énergie rachidienne ; les techniques pour intégrer et équilibrer la glande, y compris le corps périnéal, le coccyx, les gonades, les glandes surrénales, le pancréas, le thorax, le corps du cœur, le thymus, la thyroïde, les parathyroïdes, les corps carotidiens, les corps pineaux, les mamelons et l'hypophyse.

Voici un exemple de la pratique du *Body-Mind Centering* : « Commençons par un rythme artériel, ressentez le poids du sang dans vos périphéries qui se connectent à la terre, suivez le pouls ... Ajoutez maintenant un flux veineux, trouvez le rebond, le retour cyclique du Sang au cœur ... maintenant, lâchez le mouvement artériel et ajoutez un peu de mouvement LCR (liquide céphalo-rachidien)

au mouvement veineux, votre masse devient de plus en plus diffuse, ressentez l'environnement, vos nerfs sont magnétisés, suspendus dans le temps et dans l'espace ... et prenons le mouvement veineux ... ajoutez un peu de la lymphe pour plus de tension spatiale, plus de précision et de détail, où se situent les bords du votre corps ? ... et laissez le mouvement LCR (liquide céphalo-rachidien) maintenant et apportez du mouvement synovial, le fluide du système squelettique, trouvez les espaces entre les os, la liberté, agitez-le, jetez-le ... et passez maintenant au mouvement interstitiel, spongieux et juteux dans vos muscles et votre fascia, un océan épais reliant toutes vos cellules... » (<http://caraker.com/articles/body-mind-centering-as-a-somatic-approach-to-dance-education/>).

C'est un exemple de danse à travers les fluides, mais aussi un exemple de danser les fluides eux-mêmes. Vivre un fluide, le réimaginer physiquement, c'est aussi un acte de transformation et de réorganisation du corps. Le BMC met l'accent sur l'expérience du *bodying* de différents systèmes du corps, créant ainsi l'anatomie expérientielle. Dans l'article *Danser à travers le fluide transitionnel*, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen aborde la question des membranes, ainsi que de la distinction entre *céder* et *s'effondrer* : « chacun a un équilibre liquide-membrane différent (au niveau cellulaire) — une préférence essentielle constitutionnelle qui varie également au jour le jour. Beaucoup de gens ne savent pas comment se maintenir en équilibre. Un bon équilibre met en jeu un flux vers la terre et/ou vers l'espace et un flux revenant à soi-même. Couler vers l'intérieur donne une sensation de plénitude envers soi-même, couler vers l'extérieur donne une sensation de libération vis-à-vis de la gravité ou vis-à-vis de l'espace. Il faut distinguer l'acte de briser la membrane afin qu'il y ait un écoulement dans une seule direction, dans le sens de la gravitation — et l'acte de céder, là où il y a une réciprocité des fluides circulant vers l'intérieur et vers l'extérieur de la cellule. Avec l'effondrement, vous abandonnez votre poids à la gravité, l'abandonnant totalement. Céder met en jeu un relâchement vis-à-vis de la gravité par le rebond et par la résilience » (Cohen, cité dans Olsen, 2014: 119). Au niveau du flux, il y a une différence entre l'effondrement — laissant aller la membrane de sorte qu'il n'y ait de flux que dans une direction, vers la gravité et le rendement, où il existe une réciprocité de fluides s'écoulant et sortant des cellules. L'effondrement implique d'endiguer le poids de la gravité, de renoncer à soi totalement, tout en entraînant une libération dans la gravité avec rebondissement et résilience.

Pour Bainbridge Cohen, la circulation des fluides est un phénomène naturel. À l'extérieur, un corps apparaît comme solide, mais à l'intérieur, le corps est un système de fluides qui circulent, il est liquide. Comment est-il possible de penser le corps comme un état de solidité et de liquidité simultanées ou même comme une

juxtaposition de solidité liquide et de solidité solide ? Le sang, par exemple, oscille constamment entre l'état solide et l'état liquide. En s'écoulant librement, il apparaît comme liquide ; tout en traversant les autres organes, il apparaît comme solide, mais il oscille en fait entre les deux états. Le sang ne prend pas une forme — il coule. Le corps ne prend pas une forme, mais il coule aussi. Le corps n'est pas chorégraphié, le corps lui-même est une chorégraphie. Une façon de voir un corps est de le voir comme un système d'organes. Une autre façon de voir un corps est de le voir comme un système de processus chorégraphiques. Chaque organe émerge comme son propre processus chorégraphique. Il est possible de penser l'intériorité du corps comme une hétérogénéité de processus chorégraphiques imperceptibles.

Comment se fait un corps-devenir par l'anatomie expérientielle ? L'anatomie expérientielle ne connaît pas un corps préformé. L'anatomie expérientielle est fondée sur le processus de *bodying* des différentes parties et systèmes du corps. Dans ce contexte, le *bodying* indique un processus continu de « prise de forme » ou une action constante de corps prenant forme. Le *bodying* se fait par le mouvement et par l'imagination. Plus précisément, il y a une interaction constante entre le mouvement réel et le mouvement imaginaire, ainsi qu'entre le corps réel et le corps virtuel qu'ils créent (dans ce contexte, le « virtuel » est compris comme « potentiel »). Le corps, oscillant constamment entre le réel et le virtuel, n'est jamais fini. L'anatomie expérientielle ne connaît qu'une conception embryologique du corps qui ne reconnaît que les différences dynamiques et cinétiques, pas les différences formelles, ni le fonctionnement synthétique des organes ou parties d'un corps. Comme nous l'avons vu dans l'un des exemples précédents, l'anatomie expérientielle explore le corps dans un état de flux. Une fois qu'il atteint l'état de flux qualitatif, aussi bien que quantitatif, le corps devient un espace de possibilité. Dans un état de flux, le corps n'est déterminé par aucune organisation fixe, mais il émerge constamment au niveau de son organisation. Ce qui active l'émergence de son organisation est une interaction entre le mouvement réel et le mouvement imaginaire. Dans ce cas, le mouvement devient une force de devenir du corps. Le mouvement en tant que force de devenir n'est pas externe, mais interne au corps. Le mouvement fait le corps, ou plus précisément, il crée continuellement de nouvelles possibilités du corps, de nouveaux systèmes corporels et de nouvelles connexions entre eux. En tant que tel, le corps expérientiel est un corps qui devient — oscillant continuellement entre le réel et l'imaginaire, entre la forme et la force, entre le réel et le virtuel.

3.2 COMMENT SE FAIT UN CORPS-DEVENIR PAR *l'anatomy of attunement*

Anatomy of attunement est une approche incarnée de l'anatomie développée par les spécialistes de la danse et du mouvement tels que Moshé Feldenkrais et Lisa Nelson. Moshé Feldenkrais est le fondateur de la méthode Feldenkrais et Lisa Nelson est la fondatrice des *Tuning Scores*, une approche à la composition spontanée et à la performance. La Méthode Feldenkrais est une approche de rééducation neuromusculaire, et les *Tuning Scores* sont un ensemble de structures de composition et d'improvisation. Bien que les deux approches diffèrent dans leur fonctionnement, elles partagent des aspects essentiels. Le Feldenkrais et les *Tuning Scores* utilisent la recherche perceptuelle pour aider les praticiens à connaître leurs propres tendances physiques. Ces deux méthodes permettent aux praticiens d'observer comment ils composent l'expérience du mouvement à travers l'action d'accordage (*tuning*). À travers ces deux pratiques, on développe des outils pour reconnaître les détails de la physicalité et des structures sous-jacentes. La Méthode Feldenkrais et celle des *Tuning Scores* offrent des compétences et un contexte qui permettent d'éveiller un état perméable d'accordage (*tuning*). La perméabilité est un état physique précis, se référant à une interaction à travers des surfaces. Lorsqu'il est perméable, un corps en mouvement est à la disposition de la situation immédiate, plutôt que d'être fixé dans les schémas habituels d'action ; sa structure anatomique est dans un état d'accordage (*attunement*). De plus, les *Tuning Scores* de Lisa Nelson abordent la question de la façon dont nous composons la perception par l'action ; en d'autres termes, ce que nous voyons est inextricablement lié à la façon dont nous voyons les choses. Les *Tuning Scores* explorent la composition du corps à travers l'organisation de ses éléments biologiques (la peau, l'os, les muscles, les yeux, le cerveau, l'eau) et à travers son expérience. Le cadre de *Tuning Scores* offre une possibilité d'étudier les organes expérientiels ainsi que la transformation des organes en fonction de l'expérience. L'action d'accordage (*tuning*) est également l'action de création du corps partagé, ainsi que des organes partagés.

Certains des points d'exploration d'*anatomy of attunement* sont les points suivants :

- les pratiques d'accordage comme cartes à suivre dotées de systèmes de rétroaction pour aider à observer les modèles, processus et stratégies du mouvement ;
- les pratiques d'accordage comme outils pour créer une composition, aussi bien qu'une co-composition spontanée et continue ;

- les pratiques d'accordage comme outils pour étudier la façon dont une composition corporelle se pose et s'accorde ;
- les pratiques d'accordage comme outils pour l'exploration sensorielle et l'accordage de l'anatomie expérientielle.

Lisa Nelson considère le corps comme un *container* ainsi qu'un environnement de l'imagination. Par conséquent, *Tuning Scores* devient un outil pour l'exploration de la base physique de l'imagination d'un corps en mouvement : « Les *Tuning Scores* provoquent des compositions spontanées qui montrent comment nous sentons et avons un sens du mouvement, en exposant nos opinions sur l'espace, le temps, l'action et le désir, et en fournissant un cadre de communication et de rétroaction parmi les interprètes. Avec les partitions, nous jouons avec notre désir de composer l'expérience, de rendre notre imagination visible, de développer un sens de l'ensemble et de transformer notre mouvement dans la danse » (Nelson, <http://www.independentdance.co.uk/author/lisa-nelson/>).

En plus de jouer avec la possibilité de composer l'expérience, les corps en mouvement se composent également comme une expérience : « Pour Stern l'accordage affectif est la clé d'un devenir interpersonnel. L'accordage affectif est un autre mode de relation immanente où la relation précède radicalement l'unité prétendue du soi. L'accordage est une unité-avec l'autre, ce n'est pas un sentiment de quelque chose, mais un sentiment-avec quelque chose ou quelqu'un » (Manning, 2012: 46). Cette expérience évoque ce que Simondon appelle la transduction, qui désigne, en fait, une redistribution des processus en train de se faire irréductible aux pôles de l'événement. Elle ressort dans l'intervalle de deux corps en mouvement, conduisant à la création d'un corps-avec (*body-with*). L'intervalle crée une ouverture à travers laquelle émerge un corps-avec (*body-with*) : « Ensuite, votre corps prendrait la relève et danse jusqu'à ce que vous n'ayez plus d'idée. Je vois cela comme une forme idéalisée de la danse : il suffit de ne pas savoir et de laisser le corps vous danser » (Forsythe, 2003: 26). Laisser notre corps « nous danser » signifie laisser le corps danser lui-même. Si l'on considère le mouvement comme une force qui précède un corps organisé, le *bodying* devient une ligne de compression de mouvements dans les entités physiques. Donc, il faut penser le *bodying* comme une technique *en devenir*.

Comment se fait un corps-devenir par *l'anatomy of attunement* ? Un corps-devenir se fait par l'action de l'accordage. Plus précisément, la composition du corps se fait par une interaction avec l'autre. Ce corps est co-composé, sa composition est une composition en mouvement. L'accordage peut être considéré comme un acte

simultané de composer l'autre et être composé par celui-ci. Ce qui active cet accordage est la relation. Nous ne composons pas seulement une relation, mais nous sommes également composés par elle. En tant que tel, le corps n'est jamais entièrement confiné à un seul danseur, mais il est fait avec l'autre, par l'action de l'accordage. C'est un corps entre-deux, déterminé par son milieu. Milieu dans ce cas peut être considéré comme une zone d'indétermination entre deux ou plusieurs corps. Ce corps est organisé dynamiquement — par sa capacité à affecter et à être affecté. L'organisation dynamique du corps est également fondée sur l'action de l'accordage entre deux danseurs ou plus. Ce que l'accordage produit est un devenir continu de l'organisation cinétique et dynamique du corps.

3.3 COMMENT SE FAIT UN CORPS-DEVENIR PAR LE ROLFING

Inventé par Ida Rolf, le rolfing ou l'Intégration structurale est une forme de travail corporel de structuration des tissus profonds qui réorganise les tissus conjonctifs grâce à la libération et au réalignement. L'objectif principal du rolfing est d'organiser la structure du corps d'une personne par rapport à la gravité. Selon Rolf : « Fascia est l'organe de la posture. Le corps est un réseau du fascia. Nous pouvons tracer les lignes de ce réseau afin de comprendre comment fonctionne le corps. Par exemple, pourquoi, lorsque nous travaillons avec le fascia superficiel, cela change-t-il le ton du fascia dans son ensemble ? » (Rolf, <http://rolfresearchfoundation.org/about>). Fascia est le réseau de tissu conjonctif qui forme des poches, des tubes, des élingues et des sangles qui contiennent tous les autres tissus du corps. La grande proportion du fascia est un type de cristal liquide, une eau, alors, lorsque nous nous bougeons de manière spécifique, l'eau est ramenée dans les tissus. Fascia est considérée aujourd'hui comme un acteur majeur de la conscience corporelle. C'est un organe sensoriel ; l'élasticité du fascia lui confère la capacité de stocker et de faire rebondir l'énergie cinétique (comme une bande élastique).

Il y a une autre pratique qui explore la liquidité du fascia, appelée le remodelage aponévrotique. Une caractéristique unique du fascia en tant que tissu conjonctif est son adaptabilité : lorsqu'il est régulièrement mis sous une pression physiologique croissante, il change ses propriétés architecturales pour s'adapter à la demande. Est-il possible de penser au fascia comme un diagramme corporel ou une carte diagrammatique ? Dans la lecture deleuzienne de Foucault, le diagramme est considéré comme un mode de transport ou de distribution des singularités. Il est déterminé par ses mouvements infinis ou ses modes infinis d'actualisation. La nature diagrammatique du fascia se révèle à travers ses modes infinis de spatialisation. Le remodelage aponévrotique ouvre un espace diagrammatique des possibilités qui définissent ce dont un corps est capable. À partir de la topologie de son potentiel, comment est-il possible de penser à l'anatomie diagrammatique du fascia ? Si nous pensons l'aponévrose comme étant notre environnement — nous dansons à partir de celui-ci, nous le dansons, et il nous danse ; nous devenons à travers celui-ci et il devient en nous traversant. Nous sommes les constructeurs actifs de notre anatomie. Notre corps peut donc être considéré comme un outil intégré de la construction de notre propre anatomie.

Comment se fait un corps-devenir par le rolfing ? Enveloppant notre corps entier, de l'extérieur et de l'intérieur, la peau peut être considérée comme un organe unique, aussi bien que multiple. La peau peut également être considérée comme un organe

indéterminé ou non actualisé, ainsi que notre organe le plus mobile, devenant dans et à travers le mouvement. Le fascia, étant une partie co-constitutive de la peau, donne forme à notre corps. Cet acte est actualisé par un type de mouvement précis, dans ce cas, le rolfing. Fascia est organisé par la cinétique et par la dynamique du toucher. La peau n'est pas seulement un organe fonctionnel, mais aussi un organe cinétique, un organe de mouvement. La peau est également un organe dynamique ou celui par lequel nous affectons l'autre et en sommes affectés. En raison de la possibilité d'un remodelage aponévrotique, la peau n'est pas définie en termes de forme, mais de manière cinétique et dynamique. Au niveau de sa texture, de sa forme et de sa taille, la peau est un organe indéterminé. Au niveau de son mouvement, cinétiquement, la peau est un organe infini. Au niveau de ses devenirs, dynamiquement, la peau est un organe expérientiel et relationnel.

4 | RECONCEPTUALISER UN CORPS EN MOUVEMENT

4.1 LE CORPS EN TANT QUE FORCE-FORME DE DEVENIR CHEZ SIMONDON

Comment reconceptualiser un corps en mouvement ? L'une des façons de reconceptualiser un corps en mouvement est de le voir comme un système auto-individuant, par opposition à celui déjà individualisé. Le corps s'individualise par le mouvement ; le mouvement bouge le corps d'une phase à l'autre. Selon Simondon, le corps est un fait relatif, c'est une phase d'être. Chaque phase d'être est co-constituée par deux dimensions d'un processus : l'individuation et le préindividuel. L'individuation et le préindividuel ne peuvent être pensés séparément, ce sont les deux côtés du même processus. Selon Manning, « l'individuation est un processus de déploiement de l'être à travers une multiplicité de phases. Ce qui est préindividuel, c'est le germe du potentiel dans chaque activité. On peut le penser comme une force de devenir » (Manning, 2012: 16, 17).

Comment se déploie l'individuation ? Le déploiement de l'individuation est mené par le mouvement ; le mouvement ne mène pas seulement le corps d'une de ses phases à une autre, mais aussi de l'un de ses déploiements à un autre. Le corps en mouvement est le corps qui se déploie. Il se déploie sur plusieurs plans et à travers plusieurs phases — simultanément. Le plan de l'individuation est le plan de la multiplicité du corps. Ce qui fait du corps une multiplicité, c'est le préindividuel — une force de l'excès, aussi bien qu'une force de devenir. Dans le domaine du préindividuel — peu importe ce qu'est un corps ; ce qui importe, c'est ce qu'un corps peut devenir et comment celui-ci devient.

Simondon a également conçu des « champs préindividuels » — « champs de tensions », « champs de potentiels », « champs de plus que l'identité » et de « plus que l'unité » qui rendent l'individuation elle-même possible. Suivant la ligne de la pensée de Simondon — l'individuation est un processus toujours incomplet et mené par l'excès de préindividuel. Cet excès est ce qui rend possibles toutes les individuations futures. En outre, l'individuation crée à la fois un sujet individuel et un sujet collectif qui s'individuent ensemble. Le fait que l'individuation mène un processus toujours

incomplet ouvre la question de l'ontologie de l'incomplétude du corps en mouvement ou de son ontogenèse.

Le déploiement de l'individuation se fait par le déphasage. Par conséquent, l'individuation n'est pas un processus linéaire et continu. Selon Simondon, une phase n'est pas un moment temporel qui est simplement remplacé par un autre moment. Il n'y a jamais une seule phase ou une seule individuation, mais les phases d'individuation se chevauchent dans un temps non linéaire. Le déphasage est un processus à facettes multiples subissant une transformation constante. La transformation générée par le déphasage est ce que Simondon appelle la transduction, définie comme un changement qui active un nouveau processus ou une nouvelle phase d'un processus continu.

Les déphasages ne sont pas seulement les événements de force prenant forme (*form taking*), mais aussi les processus du corps prenant forme (*body taking*). Le corps en mouvement est le corps prenant forme. Chaque déphasage mène à un autre événement de force prenant forme, un autre corps. Le déphasage ne génère pas seulement le corps, mais l'active également — chaque déphasage indique un passage d'un mode d'être à l'autre, d'un devenir à l'autre. Ce qui émerge en tant que corps est le nœud relationnel de ses processus à plusieurs niveaux. Plus précisément, un corps est le nœud relationnel des processus suivants :

- un processus combiné d'individuation et de préindividuel ;
- des processus d'individuation — le déphasage et la transduction ;
- des tensions, des potentiels, des devenirs, des champs de plus que l'identité » et de « plus que l'unité ».

Ce que nous appelons « un corps » est l'aboutissement de tous les processus mentionnés précédemment. Un corps en tant que nœud relationnel intègre tous ces processus et émerge à travers eux, en continuité et en discontinuité, comme un devenir.

Comment penser les processus d'individuation d'un corps en mouvement ? Selon Simondon, « le principe de l'individuation n'est pas une réalité isolée préexistant à l'individu comme un germe déjà individualisé. Le principe de l'individuation, au sens strict du terme, est le système complet dans lequel la genèse de l'individu prend effet. En outre, ce système se prolonge sous la forme d'un milieu associé à l'individu dans lequel l'individuation continue à évoluer. La vie est donc une individuation

perpétuelle qui prolonge une singularité » (Simondon, 1995: 63). L'individuation, ou la genèse de l'individu est un processus continu. Cependant, qu'est-ce qui active ce processus ? Le mouvement, ou un corps sentant en mouvement, est-il un moyen d'explorer le dynamisme de l'individuation ? Stern et Manning notent que les processus d'individuation ne sont pas explorés ontogénétiquement (au niveau de leur émergence), mais ontologiquement (au niveau de leur être). « Qu'en est-il du processus lui-même, de l'expérience même de faire des sauts et de créer des relations ou de consolider des schémas sensori-moteurs ? Le nourrisson peut-il expérimenter non seulement le sens d'une organisation déjà formée et saisie, mais l'apparition d'une organisation » (Stern, 1985: 45) ? Comment explorer le devenir d'une organisation ; comment explorer les complexités processuelles de l'émergence de l'individuation ? L'une des façons de le faire est d'explorer le corps sentant en mouvement.

Manning suggère que pour penser le corps sentant, nous devrions : (1) explorer un corps en mouvement ; (2) explorer un corps qui ne se limite pas à ses organes ; (3) explorer la question de « ce qu'un corps peut faire ». En outre, nous ne devons pas nous concentrer sur ce qu'est un corps, mais sur la façon dont il fonctionne, ce qu'il fait et comment il devient. Par conséquent, notre question devient celle de la création d'un corps sentant en mouvement. Le mouvement est ce qui ouvre le corps à son devenir : par le mouvement le corps devient plus que l'organisme, plus que l'organisation, plus que « ce qu'est un corps ». Le prochain chapitre explore le concept de devenir dans la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze, avec un accent sur la façon dont le corps devient avec le mouvement et par le mouvement.

4.2 LE CORPS EN TANT QUE FORCE-FORME DE DEVENIR CHEZ DELEUZE

Dans la première série de paradoxes qui ouvre *Logique du sens* (1969), Deleuze notait que devenir, c'est être emporté simultanément dans deux directions différentes. De plus, « À mesure que quelqu'un devient, ce qu'il devient change autant que lui-même. Les devenirs ne sont pas des phénomènes d'imitation, ni d'assimilation, mais de double capture, d'évolution non parallèle, de noces entre deux règnes » (Deleuze, 1977: 8). La capture représente « le mode par lequel des individus (biologiques, sociaux, noétiques) entrent dans des rapports variables qui les transforment. L'exemple princeps en est la symbiose qui lie la guêpe et l'orchidée (...) : la série animale (guêpe) 'captée' par l'apparence de l'orchidée assure la fonction d'organe reproducteur pour la série végétale (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980: 17). L'insecte devient une partie de l'appareil de reproduction de la fleur, tandis que la plante devient une pièce dans le système nutritif de l'insecte. La guêpe vit un devenir-orchidée (sans devenir une orchidée) tandis que l'orchidée vit un devenir-guêpe (sans devenir une guêpe). Il faut bien qu'il y ait eu rencontre, et que chacun des termes ait senti l'autre, en ait épousé les rapports pour pouvoir s'y adapter et en tirer partie. La capture produit un événement de devenir, comme agencement : les corps « agencés » par la capture sont pris dans un mouvement avec l'autre, qui les fait devenir sans rester les « mêmes » ni devenir un même « autre ». Être un corps, c'est devenir avec le mouvement et par le mouvement ; un corps émerge entre les deux. La création du corps n'est plus l'acte d'un sujet noétique, mais une pragmatique, un agencement impersonnel.

Deleuze écrit : « le mouvement du nageur ne ressemble pas au mouvement de la vague ; et précisément, les mouvements du maître-nageur que nous reproduisons sur le sable ne sont rien par rapport aux mouvements de la vague que nous n'apprenons à parer qu'en les saisissant pratiquement comme des signes. C'est pourquoi il est si difficile de dire comment quelqu'un apprend : il y a une familiarité pratique, innée ou acquise, avec les signes, qui fait de toute éducation quelque chose d'amoureux, mais aussi de mortel. Nous n'apprenons rien avec celui qui nous dit : fais comme moi. Nos seuls maîtres sont ceux qui nous disent ' fais avec moi ', et qui, au lieu de nous proposer des gestes à reproduire, surent émettre des signes à développer dans l'hétérogène. En d'autres termes, il n'y a pas d'idéo-motricité, mais seulement de la sensori-motricité. Quand le corps conjugue ses points remarquables avec ceux de la vague, il noue le principe d'une répétition qui n'est plus celle du Même, mais qui comprend l'Autre, qui comprend la différence, d'une vague et d'un geste à l'autre, et

qui transporte cette différence dans l'espace répétitif ainsi constitué. Apprendre, c'est bien constituer cet espace de la rencontre avec des signes, où les points remarquables se reprennent les uns dans les autres, et où la répétition se forme en même temps qu'elle se déguise. Et il y a toujours des images de mort dans l'apprentissage, à la faveur de l'hétérogénéité qu'il développe, aux limites de l'espace qu'il crée » (Deleuze, 1968: 35).

Tout devenir passe par le mouvement. Tout devenir passe par une rencontre. Le corps devient avec le mouvement, aussi bien qu'avec l'événement. Par les porosités, et par l'échange vivant entre le dedans et le dehors, le nageur devient une partie de l'eau, tandis que l'eau devient une partie de nageur. Le nageur vit un devenir-eau (sans devenir une eau) tandis que l'eau vit un devenir-nageur (sans devenir un nageur). L'eau et le nageur s'enveloppent l'un l'autre créant un double devenir, une double surface de l'événement. Le corps du nageur est fait d'eau et fait partie de l'eau. Il est une rencontre entre l'eau qui se trouve dedans et l'eau qui se trouve dehors de lui-même.

Le devenir implique la notion topologique de milieu : « le devenir n'est ni un ni deux, ni rapport de deux, mais entre-deux, frontière ou ligne de fuite » (Deleuze, 1980: 360). Tout devenir forme un « bloc » — la rencontre ou la relation de deux termes hétérogènes qui se « déterritorialisent » mutuellement. On n'abandonne pas ce qu'on est pour devenir autre chose, « mais une autre façon de vivre et de sentir hante ou s'enveloppe dans la nôtre et la ' fait fuir '. La relation mobilise donc quatre termes et non deux, répartis en séries hétérogènes entrelacées : X enveloppant Y devient X', tandis qu'Y pris dans ce rapport à X devient Y' » (Zourabichvili, 2003: 29-30). Devenir, c'est atteindre aux multiplicités qui nous habitent et s'ouvrent à des rencontres, c'est expérimenter, pour reprendre Spinoza, ce que *peut* un corps. Devenir se produit « entre », « par le milieu ». Autrement dit, « par les porosités, et par les contiguïtés improbables. Entrer en devenir, c'est un phénomène, non d'intériorité subjective, mais d'échange vivant entre le dedans et le dehors, un événement à leur limite » (Schérer, 2002: 47).

Comment se crée le devenir ? Le devenir se crée par une zone d'indiscernabilité ou une zone de deux corps en interaction, elle marque un lieu de transformation, de réorganisation, d'émergence. Ce qui crée cette zone, ou, mieux, ce qui se crée par cette zone est une pure multiplicité. « La multiplicité ne doit pas désigner une combinaison de multiple et d'un, mais au contraire une organisation propre au multiple en tant que tel, qui n'a nullement besoin de l'unité pour former un système » (Deleuze, 1968: 236). De plus, une multiplicité « ne se définit pas par ses éléments,

ni par un centre d'unification ou de compréhension. Elle se définit par le nombre de ses dimensions ; (...) elle ne perd ou ne gagne aucune dimension sans changer de nature. Et comme les variations de ses dimensions lui sont immanentes, il revient au même de dire que chaque multiplicité est déjà composée de termes hétérogènes en symbiose, ou qu'elle ne cesse pas de se transformer dans d'autres multiplicités en enfilade [...] » (Deleuze, Guattari, 1980: 305). Chaque multiplicité est donc définie par « une bordure fonctionnant comme Anomal » (Deleuze, Guattari, 1980: 305). L'anomal, du grec *an-homalos*, « est la rugosité du point saillant » nous dit Jean-Clet Martin. Continue, hétérogène, ne pouvant se diviser sans changer de nature, une multiplicité désigne une variété de dimensions qui ne cesse de changer l'ordre de ses rapports à chaque échelle considérée. Elle est composée de mouvements, de précipités, de suspens, de changements brusques, de frémissements. La multiplicité désigne une différenciation intensive, un ensemble d'intensités, moins une forme qu'un événement, ou, mieux, moins une forme qu'un événement d'événements. Elle est un dynamisme vital concernant une vie non organique, voire un corps dont l'agencement relève de certains flux, seuils ou des niveaux d'intensité plutôt que de ses organes.

Le plan d'immanence du corps ne connaît que des éléments non formés et des processus de subjectivation. Ceux-ci se déroulent dans un temps flottant procédant dans des directions multiples, et dans un espace toujours ouvert sur le dehors. Ici, « il n'y a plus de formes [préexistantes], mais des rapports cinématiques entre éléments non formés ; il n'y a plus de sujets, mais des individualisations dynamiques sans sujet, qui constituent des agencements collectifs » (Deleuze, 1977: 112). Ni l'objet ne préexiste au sujet, ni le sujet ne constitue l'expérience, mais sujet et objet sont coproduits et s'individuent l'un avec l'autre dans un mouvement d'actualisation. Le plan d'immanence ne précède pas ce qui vient le peupler ou le remplir, mais se construit et se remanie dans l'expérience, de telle sorte qu'il n'y a plus de sens à parler de formes *a priori* de l'expérience. Le corps en mouvement émerge comme une force-forme en train de se faire, il émerge force-forme d'expérience.

Au sein de cette immanence, il y a un autre plan que l'on pourrait désigner intensif, conformément à la définition de Deleuze, appelé planomène. Planomène, du verbe « planesthai » qui signifie errer, désigne le champ d'immanence illimité, parcouru à vitesse infinie par les mouvements de déterritorialisation qui emportent le corps vers le dehors. Le planomène « apparaît comme un champ perpétuel d'interactions, [...] Cette force d'expansion, comme une injonction centrifuge, nous exhorte à toujours aller explorer ce qui peut faire bordure avec le différent, avec ce qui pourra donner lieu à un nouvel agencement » (Heuzé, 2003: 277, 279). Deleuze parle du désir comme inséparable de ses agencements, de sa force liante, associative. « Il est acte, relation. Il

crée ce que Deleuze appelle un ' devenir '. En Désirant, on fait devenir quelque chose et l'on devient. Ce n'est pas une appropriation, mais un mouvement vers l'autre » (Schérer, 2002: 59-60). Le désir en tant que mouvement vers l'autre crée le devenir. Le devenir — est-il créé par le mouvement vers l'autre et le mouvement avec l'autre ?

Le devenir concerne aussi le domaine des affects. « Celui-ci ne se limitant pas à la subjectivité, l'affect est en effet conçu comme processus immanent à un plan qu'il faut construire : ce plan n'est ni structuration de formes ni fait naturel ou spontané, mais milieu instable toujours « agencé » par des affects-passions et des affects-actions, recomposé par des principes cinétiques (vitesses et lenteurs) et des principes dynamiques (intensités, degrés de puissance) » (Delourme et Lecercle, 2003: 32-33). Dans le mouvement de déterritorialisation, des intensités sont produites — le corps passe par elles, et, selon les variations de degré qu'elles présentent, il éprouve une augmentation ou une diminution de sa puissance d'agir. « Il n'y a plus de formes, mais seulement des rapports de vitesse entre particules infimes d'une matière non formée. Il n'y a plus de sujet, mais seulement des états affectifs individuants de la force anonyme » (Deleuze, 1978: 172).

Le plan de transcendance concerne des sujets ; le plan d'immanence, « ne connaît pas (...) des sujets, mais plutôt ce qu'on appelle des ' heccétés ' » (Deleuze, 1977 : 111). Deleuze écrit : « Une heccété n'a ni début ni fin, ni origine ni destination ; elle est toujours au milieu. Elle n'est pas faite de points, mais seulement de lignes. Elle est rhizome » (Deleuze et Guattari, 1980 : 321). L'heccété représente « toute individuation [qui] ne se fait pas sur le mode d'un sujet ou même d'une chose » (Deleuze, 1977: 111). Elle permet de « déterminer un champ transcendantal impersonnel et préindividuel (...) qui ne se confond pas pourtant avec une profondeur indifférenciée [et ne peut] pas être déterminé comme celui d'une conscience. (...) Ce qui n'est ni individuel ni personnel, au contraire, ce sont les émissions de singularités (...) [qui] président à la genèse des individus et des personnes » (Deleuze, 1969 : 124-125). Le corps en mouvement en tant que force-forme de devenir se fait d'heccétés, de compositions intensives, d'affects et de vitesses — fondées sur la synthèse disjonctive. Le chapitre suivant explore le concept d'expérience dans la philosophie d'Alfred North Whitehead, en mettant l'accent sur la façon dont le corps devient par l'expérience.

4.3 LE CORPS EN TANT QUE FORCE-FORME DE DEVENIR CHEZ WHITEHEAD

J'ai exploré dans la thèse la notion d'expérience d'Alfred North Whitehead. De plus, j'ai tenté de mettre en relation les notions d'expérience et de corps soumis aux affects. L'une des questions politiques, ontologiques, physiologiques et éthiques fondamentales que la chorégraphie et la philosophie partagent est la question de Spinoza : qu'est-ce qu'un corps peut faire ? J'ai souhaité transformer cette question en qu'est-ce qu'un corps peut éprouver (*experience*) ? Les limites de l'action sont les limites de l'expérience, les limites de l'expérience sont les limites du devenir. Comment penser le corps lui-même comme une expérience de devenir ? Toutes les expériences sont corporelles, par conséquent, la corporéité elle-même est expérientielle. Ce qui m'intéresse, c'est l'expérience de cette corporéité, sa mise en corps par l'expérience. Comment penser le corps affecté comme une force-forme expérientielle de devenir ? Comment penser le corps expérientiel comme un événement en train de se faire (*event-in-making*) — produit par des affects ?

L'un des concepts principaux de Whitehead est celui de l'entité actuelle ou de l'élément fondamental de la réalité. Whitehead favorise l'idée de la réalité comme des événements processuels interreliés. De plus, Whitehead conçoit la réalité en tant que composition de processus dynamiques de « devenir » plutôt que d'être statique. Ce qui active la réalité en tant que processus de devenir est l'expérience. Toutes les entités actuelles sont des événements d'expérience. Selon Whitehead, tout ce qui existe est une entité actuelle, donc, tout est expérience. Un être humain, par exemple, est composé d'une infinité d'expériences. Une roche, une fleur, un rayon de lumière, un sentiment ou une pensée — tous ces éléments sont des continuums d'événements qui se chevauchent, ou, comme Whitehead les appelle, ils sont « sociétés d'événements ». Toutes les entités actuelles ne précèdent pas l'expérience, mais elles en émergent — en tant qu'événements en train de se faire (*events-in-making*). De plus, l'acte qui se lit comme expérience ne préexiste pas à lui-même, mais se produit au sein de son déploiement.

Chez Whitehead, la notion de sujet est remplacée par la notion de « forme subjective ». Le sujet, ou la « forme subjective » est un continuum de processus d'expérience continue. Selon Whitehead, « il existe de nombreuses espèces de formes subjectives, telles que les émotions, les valorisations, les buts, les adversités, les aversions, la conscience, etc. » (Whitehead, 1978: 24). La forme subjective est plus qu'une forme, c'est une force, ou une force-forme de devenir à travers l'expérience.

La forme subjective est « la nouveauté immédiate, c'est la façon dont *ce* sujet sent ce datum objectif » — à ce moment singulier (Whitehead, 1978: 232). Chaque forme subjective est différente de l'autre puisque chaque sujet sent sa manière singulière et irréductible. La nouveauté se lit en termes de manières d'opérer plutôt que d'essence. La question importante pour Whitehead n'est pas ce que sont les choses, mais comment elles sont — ou, plus précisément, comment elles deviennent. Selon Whitehead : « Comment une entité actuelle devient une entité telle qu'elle est... Son 'être' est constitué par son 'devenir' » (Whitehead, 1978: 23). Puisque les formes subjectives constituent l'être — comment les penser comme des forces-formes de devenir des êtres ? La multiplicité des formes subjectives fait émerger le corps comme expérience. Lorsque nous activons la réalité grâce à l'expérience, nous activons également son conatus, son pouvoir de devenir. L'expérience est un conatus de la réalité. Plus précisément, chaque expérience peut être considérée comme un degré de pouvoir de la réalité, un degré de devenir. Chaque expérience active un mode singulier de devenir de la réalité. Puisque l'expérience est illimitée, elle génère constamment le potentiel non actualisé du corps. Ce potentiel non actualisé fait du corps un événement de devenir. Le corps expérientiel est un corps qui explore la relation de devenir-illimité. Le corps expérientiel est un processus, et en tant que tel, il ne peut jamais être fini. Comment penser l'ontologie de processus de Whitehead comme une ontologie de l'incomplétude, et de plus, comme une ontogenèse du corps expérientiel ?

Selon Whitehead, « la base de l'expérience est émotionnelle » (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 176). Brian Massumi distingue l'affect et l'émotion (Massumi, 2002: 27-28). Pour Massumi, l'affect est primaire, non conscient, asubjectif ou présubjectif, assignifiant, non-qualifié, intensif, tandis que l'émotion est dérivée, consciente, qualifiée et significative, un « contenu » qui peut être attribué à un sujet déjà constitué. Le « sentiment » (*feeling*) chez Whitehead coïncide avec l'affect chez Massumi. Toute expérience de la perception implique un « ton affectif » (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 176), et ce ton est premier, tant que l'on va au-delà de la connaissance. Nous ne percevons pas d'abord ce qui nous attend et ensuite nous ne répondons pas à ces perceptions. La perception est avant tout un événement d'affects corporels. La perception est une ouverture à penser le corps en tant qu'événement. La théorie de la perception de Whitehead est une extension de la théorie des émotions de William James (1983). James dit « que nous sommes désolés parce que nous pleurons, en colère parce que nous frappons, apeurés parce que nous tremblons, et non que nous pleurons, frappons ou tremblons, parce que nous sommes désolés, en colère ou apeurés » (James, 1983: 1065-1066). Les émotions ne causent pas d'états corporels, mais les états corporels arrivent en premier et les émotions en découlent. La perception est

une action sous forme de changements corporels. La façon dont nous recevons une perception est la façon dont notre corps change. La perception ou l'excitation, l'action ou les changements corporels, l'émotion ou la réponse — sont un seul et même événement. Le corps est expérientiel. L'expérience est corporelle. Les entités ne sont pas situées dans l'espace et le temps. L'espace et le temps sont plutôt produits par le devenir de ces entités. Une entité se compose elle-même en ressentant les autres entités qui l'ont affecté. L'acte de sentiment est une rencontre, un événement, une ouverture vers l'extérieur. Chez Whitehead, les sentiments ont des sentiments. Les êtres n'ont pas ou ne possèdent pas de sentiments. Ils sont tous égaux. Un corps qui sent est une rencontre entre le corps et le sentiment. Les sentiments traversent le corps — en l'ouvrant vers ses devenirs expérientiels. L'affect active la connectivité même de cette expérience. C'est la force, l'attrait, par lequel une certaine constellation s'exprime. « Les affects sont des devenirs » (Deleuze, 2004: 256). Ils changent tout ce qu'ils rencontrent — c'est ce qui les rend irréductibles à la connaissance. Ce que nous ressentons est l'inconnu.

Le plan de l'expérience est le plan du devenir. Ce qui fonctionne sur ce plan sont des affects. Les affects ne sont pas seulement des devenirs, mais aussi les passages entre devenirs. Le corps expérientiel est un corps complexe, car il est composé de forces irréductibles telles que des affects. Chaque corps est un *multivers* d'expérience. De plus, chaque cellule est un *multivers* expérientiel. Ce que Whitehead et Deleuze ont en commun sont les points suivants : l'exploration des aspects corporels de l'expérience (corporéité de l'expérience), l'exploration des affects en tant que forces de devenir, une approche ontogénétique de la notion d'être — qui devient une série de processus incomplets de devenir. Ils diffèrent également dans leurs approches ; tandis que Whitehead se concentre plus sur les formes subjectives en tant que force-formes de devenir, Deleuze le fait sur le devenir des forces. Par conséquent, il importe non seulement de savoir comment un affect transforme l'être en devenir continu mais aussi, et peut-être même davantage, de connaître la façon dont cet affect se transforme par la transformation de l'être. Ce que Deleuze nous fait éprouver n'est pas le corps affecté, mais la danse d'affects.

5 | CONCLUSION

On ne peut pas dire que le corps *est*. Le corps est ce qui *devient*, c'est un corps-devenir. Ce qui bouge le corps de l'état d'être vers l'état de devenir est le mouvement. Le mouvement ne s'arrête jamais. Nous bougeons toujours, donc, il y a une continuité de devenir. Un corps n'est jamais uniquement une forme, il est une force-forme. Le mouvement est celui qui ouvre le corps vers son devenir de force(s). Un corps en mouvement n'est pas une forme d'expression, mais une force d'expressivité. Le mouvement relie le corps à sa force d'expressivité où le corps commence à danser ses capacités à faire, à produire et à devenir. Il faut, donc, poser la question de l'ontogenèse du corps ou de son processus de devenir. Le corps n'est jamais fini, donc il est toujours en train de se faire et de devenir. En outre, nous ne devons pas nous concentrer sur ce qu'est un corps, mais sur la façon dont il fonctionne, ce qu'il fait et comment il devient. Par conséquent, notre question devient celle de la création d'un corps en mouvement. Le mouvement est ce qui ouvre le corps à son devenir : par le mouvement le corps devient plus que l'organisme, plus que l'organisation, plus que « ce qu'est un corps ».

Il faut reconceptualiser le corps en mouvement comme un système continu d'auto-individuation, par opposition à celui qui est déjà individualisé. De ce point de vue, on peut redéfinir un corps individuel en mouvement, avec ses structures biologiques, anatomiques et sensorielles, et non comme une entité prédonnée, mais seulement comme une phase de son devenir permanent. Le corps lui-même peut être perçu et réalisé comme une partition, corps-partition, ou celui qui met en place ses propres modes expérientiels et relationnels de devenir un corps. Le corps lui-même s'organise par le mouvement et par le développement de chacun de ses organes comme un outil polymorphe. Par conséquent, chaque organe devient un outil auto-organisé. En outre, en tant que partition le corps n'est pas un système d'organes, mais un système de relations et de devenirs expérientiels et relationnels d'organes et du corps lui-même. Le corps devient donc une partition relationnelle qui se produit dans et par le mouvement. Le corps du performeur n'est plus celui qui incarne une certaine technique, mais c'est le corps lui-même qui devient sa propre technique singulière ; la technique émerge à travers l'exploration d'un corps individuel, elle émerge de l'intérieur, et elle n'est pas imposée au corps, de l'extérieur. Tel est le

moment où le corps commence à se diriger, se chorégraphier et où il se performe — comme le *bodying* ou comme un événement singulier de forces prenant forme.

Un corps n'est pas une entité qui est, mais une entité qui prend forme, qui devient. Le mouvement ne permet pas seulement au corps de se faire, mais il fait également du corps sa propre partition, c'est-à-dire, qu'il permet au corps de se danser comme sa propre partition. Le corps est une partition ; le corps est un mouvement. Il faut explorer le corps comme une composition de capacités à affecter et à être affecté, ainsi qu'une composition de devenirs continuels qui composent les différents corps (potentiels) au sein d'un corps, et les différentes anatomies au sein d'une anatomie.

Le corps est toujours plus qu'un corps — c'est un point de croisement entre le corps physique, le corps expérientiel et le corps relationnel. Le corps n'est jamais prédéterminé ou fini — au niveau physique, expérientiel ou relationnel — il est un mouvement continu. Le mouvement fait le corps, par conséquent, le corps lui-même est un mouvement. Nous ne dansons pas avec le corps, nous dansons le corps lui-même. Le corps est une partition, un corps-partition, de son devenir.

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SAŽETAK NA HRVATSKOM

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1 | UVOD

Tijelo je mnogostruki fenomen. Taj mnogostruki fenomen predstavlja sjecište između fizičkog tijela, iskustvenog tijela i relacijskog tijela. Tijelo, kao što pokazuje Manning, je uvijek više od jednog tijela. Također, ono je glagol, aktivnost, dinamičan proces, tijelovanje (*bodying*), te nadalje, sila postojanja (Baruch de Spinoza) i sposobnost bivanja afektiranim (Baruch de Spinoza). Kapacitet bivanja afektiranim ujedno je i kapacitetom postajanja. Ne možemo reći kako tijelo jest. Tijelo je ono koje postaje, ono je tijelo-postajanje (Erin Manning). Ono što je nužnim jest postaviti pitanje ontogeneze tijela u pokretu ili njegova procesa nastajanja. Tijelo nikad nije dovršeno, već je u kontinuiranom stanju postajanja.

Kako misliti ovo tijelo-postajanje? Ono je sila-forma, relacijsko polje, intenzivno usmjerenje, eksfolijacija, invaginacija, upuhavanje, isparavanje, prijenos tekućina. Koncepti poput Tijela bez Organa (Artaud, Deleuze i Guattari), *bodying* (Manning), tijelo-partitura i *body-in-making* (Manning) dovode u pitanje proces stvaranja tijela, kao i njegovog postajanja. Tijelo, takvo kakvo je ovdje istraženo — je neodređeno i emergentno, ono je intenzivno tijelo. Tijelo kao takvo je događajem emergiranja sa svijetom. Intenzivno tijelo ne izražava ništa, ono je poljem ekspresije. Njegovi organi nisu preformiranim ekspresijama, već silama ekspresivnosti. Intenzivno tijelo je sačinjeno od rubova, točaka, čestica, stupnjeva intenziteta. Ovo je, kako kaže Deleuze, nova kartografija tijela.

Kome pripada ovo tijelo? Tijelo-postajanje nije ljudsko tijelo. Točnije, ono je više nego ljudsko tijelo. Kao što je pokazano u ovoj tezi, tijelo u pokretu nije individualno tijelo ili tijelo koje pripada individui. Ono je plesom individuacije. Kada tijelo uđe u relacijsko polje individuacije — ono postaje naseljeno afektivnim tonovima i afektivnim ko-komponiranjem koje je "više" nego ljudsko. Tijelo se nikada ne kreće samo. Tijelo je uvijek u su-kretanju — na molekularnoj, iskustvenoj i relacijskoj razini — kao tranzitorna individuacija.

Pokret čini tijelo. Pokret također izmiješta tijelo iz bivanja u postajanje. Ne suočavamo se s potpuno formiranim tijelom koje izvodi pokret od točke A do točke B. Suočavamo se s tijelovanjem, a ne premještanjem. Nikada ne započinjemo, niti se prestajemo kretati. Postoji kontinuitet kretanja, a prema tome i tijelovanja. Pri razmišljanju o tijelu u pokretu, nužno je misliti tijelo kao glagol. Tijelovati znači

postajati; ono što aktivira ovu silu postajanja unutar samog tijela je pokret. Nije moguće odvojiti tijelo od pokreta jer je tijelo samo — pokret, pokret postajanja. Ovo tijelo nije nikada u potpunosti formirano budući se ne prestaje kretati — na molekularnoj, iskustvenoj, relacijskoj razini. Tijelo, dakle, nije nikada dovršeno. Što proizvodi ova nemogućnost odvajanja tijela i pokreta? Ona proizvodi sljedeće: mi ne plešemo s tijelom. Mi plešemo tijelo samo, njegove kapacitete kretanja, doživljavanja, postajanja. Nema tijela koje prakticira unaprijed postojeću tehniku. Tijelo kao takvo je tehnika u nastajanju. Tehnika nastaje s tijelom — u pokretu — sada i ovdje. Nije moguće stoga reći kako imamo naše tijelo. Mi nismo subjekti koji posjeduju tijelo kao objekt. Mi jesmo naše tijelo. Jedina važna stvar, kako bi rekla Manning, jest ići do onoga što smatramo našom granicom, te nastaviti dalje. To je ono što znači tijelovati, postajati.

Kako tijelo postaje, te kako učiniti taj proces vidljivim, kao i djeljivim? Postoje brojne razine na kojima tijelo postaje i koje je moguće učiniti vidljivim. Na primjer, na staničnoj razini, tijelo je u stalnom stanju transformacije i reorganizacije. Ono što me zanima jest: što motivira naše stanice da se reorganiziraju i kako? Je li način reorganizacije stanica ovisan o iskustvu? Postoje minimalno dva načina gledanja na tijelo kao postajuće:

1. molekularno tijelo;
2. življeno tijelo (*lived body*).

Na molekularnoj razini, tijelo stalno postaje jer se molekule reorganiziraju u odnosu na brojne fiziološke procese, kao i na naše iskustvo. Ono što me zanima jest otkriti ukoliko se molekule reorganiziraju na drugačiji način s obzirom na iskustvo kretanja, te kako. Tijelo je sačinjeno od molekula; pokret je čin informiranja molekula o njihovom modusu organiziranja. Kada uvodimo nove, neistražene moduse kretanja, uvodimo li i nove moduse kretanja, kao i organiziranja naših molekula? Svako iskustvo je partitutom postajanja. Biti svjesnim iskustva figurira ovdje kao bivanje svjesnim određenog modusa tijelovanja (*bodying*). Da li iskustvo mijenja naše tijelo, te kako učiniti imperceptibilne slojeve te promjene perceptibilnima? Tijelo je proizvod pokreta. Organi su proizvodi pokreta. Sve što jest proizvodom je pokreta. Kako? Na molekularnoj razini ne postoji cilj niti ideja tijela kao dovršenog ili unaprijed određenog. Postoje samo modusi kretanja koji su modusima oblikovanja (samog) tijela. Organi su sačinjeni od tkiva, tkiva su sačinjena od stanica, stanice su sačinjene od molekula, no partitura molekularnog postajanja tijela nije samo unaprijed određena,

već i emergentna. Naše iskustvo informira molekule o njihovom modusu kretanja i organiziranja. Nije moguće razlikovati molekularno postajanje tijela i iskustveno postajanje tijela. Što ako cijela organizacija tijela ovisi o iskustvu? Molekularno tijelo je tijelo u postajanju na razini svoje organizacije, veličine, orijentacije. Življeno tijelo je tijelo u postajanju na razini iskustva tj. osjećanja organizacije, veličine i orijentacije tijela. Ono što bih željela učiniti vidljivim jest kako u tom kontekstu organizacija, veličina i orijentacija tijela postaju kvalitativnima, a ne kvantitativnima. Preciznije, ovisno o iskustvu, moguće je govoriti samo o kvalitativnoj transformaciji organa, kao i samog tijela.

Željela bih podržati, kao i konfrontirati tu ideju s nekim primjerima iz vlastite prakse koji su postali metodologijom ovog rada:

1. mikroskopsko istraživanje:

- mikroskopsko istraživanje tjelesnih tkiva;
- mikroskopsko istraživanje tjelesnih tekućina;
- mikroskopsko istraživanje vremenske transformacije tjelesnih tkiva i tekućina;
- mikroskopsko istraživanje iskustvene transformacije tjelesnih tkiva i tekućina;

2. zadaci na temu slike tijela:

- zadatak 1 na temu iskustvene slike tijela (mjerjenje veličine različitih organa i dijelova tijela prije i poslije tjelesne prakse, mjerjenje osjećajem, osjećaj kao organizacijski princip);
- zadatak 2 na temu iskustvene slike tijela (komponiranje slike tijela na način na koji osjećamo naše tijelo, komponiranje osjećajem, osjećaj kao kompozicijski princip);
- zadatak 3 na temu iskustvene slike tijela (označavanje svih riječi koje povezujemo sa senzacijom postajanja, točnije, tijelom u stanju postajanja);

3. intervjui:

- auto-intervju na temu iskustvene slike tijela (iskustvena anatomija i iskustvene granice tijela);

- intervju na temu iskustvene slike tijela (iskustvena anatomija i iskustvene granice tijela).

4. definicije temeljene na iskustvu:

- Tijelo, definicija (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, redefiniranje tijela, istraživanje definicije ovisne o iskustvu, te njezine transformacije u vremenu);
- Tijelo, veličina (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, mjerenje veličine tijela osjećajem, istraživanje transformacije osjećaja veličine tijela ovisno o iskustvu);
- Koža, oblik (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, redefiniranje oblika kože s obzirom na senzaciju kože);
- Oko, veličina (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, redefiniranje veličine oka s obzirom na senzaciju oka);
- Pluća, tekstura (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, redefiniranje teksture pluća s obzirom na senzaciju pluća);
- Krv, oblik (svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, redefiniranje oblika krvi s obzirom na senzaciju krvi);

5. definicije temeljene na situaciji:

- definiranje tijela u situaciji kretanja i sjedenja; istraživanje transformacije definicije s obzirom na iskustvo kretanja i sjedenja;
- pisanje o tijelu iz tri različita gledišta, istovremeno, kao plesačica, koreografkinja i istraživačica.

U sljedećim redcima željela bih dati komentar o metodologiji koju sam koristila. Kombinacija dva različita pristupa dala je život ovoj tezi. Prva se temelji na filozofskom, fenomenološkom tijelu znanja, točnije, istraživanju koncepata kao što su "bodying" (Manning), "body-in-making" (Manning), "Tijelo bez Organa" (Artaud, Deleuze i Guattari) i "postajanje" (Deleuze i Guattari). Ovaj je pristup bio dodatno produbljen kroz istraživanje rada Gilberta Simondona i Alberta Northa Whiteheada. Simondon je pridonio konceptu tijela činom odbijanja mišljenja tijela kao predeterminirane forme. Prema Whiteheadu, tijelo je iskustvo, te iskustvenom formom. Ova teza počiva na istraživanju tijela u pokretu kao indeterminirane iskustvene forme.

Drugi se pristup temelji na iskustvenom tijelu znanja, točnije, istraživanju, kao i stvaranju različitih konteksta u kojima bi se "tijelo" moglo proučavati izravno, u vlastitom tijelu, s vlastitim tijelom, kao vlastito tijelo. Također bih željela dati razlog za svaki metodološki alat koji sam koristila tijekom pisanja ove teze.

Razlog za mikroskopsko istraživanje bila je mogućnost vizualizacije i proučavanja tijela u stanju materije. Započela sam ovo istraživanje u 2013. godini i nastavila s njim tijekom više od četiri godine. U ovom istraživanju koristila sam svoj mikroskop AmScope MD35 koji mi je dao mogućnost stvaranja slika i videozapisa teme koju sam istraživala. Tijekom više od četiri godine napravila sam oko 5000 slika. U većini slučajeva koristila sam vlastiti tjelesni materijal (tjelesna tkiva i tjelesne tekućine). U preostalim slučajevima koristila sam tjelesni materijal svojih suradnika. Za mene je bilo iznimno važnim koristiti svoj vlastiti tjelesni materijal, te postati terenom svog istraživanja.

Teorijski razlozi za provođenje mikroskopskog istraživanja su, kako je i ranije spomenuto, istraživanje tijela u stanju materije, stanju toka. U stanju materije, tijelo nije određeno, niti organizirano, već je u kontinuiranom procesu reorganizacije. Ono je Tijelo bez Organa ili ono koji tijeluje svoj čist potencijal, svoje moduse postajanja. Praktični razlozi za provođenje mikroskopskog istraživanja su mogućnost vizualizacije, kao i razumijevanja kako se materija, ili tijelo u stanju toka, reorganizira — sada i ovdje. Vidjeti taj proces u njegovoj događajnosti, uživo, je bilo vrlo važno za moje razumijevanje ove teme.

Moje prvo mikroskopsko istraživanje je bilo ono različitih tjelesnih tkiva i tekućina. Prva stvar koju sam primijetila tijekom rada s mojim prvim uzorkom bila je odsutnost hijerarhije; točnije — na razini materije ne postoji fiksna ideja o tome što je gore ili dolje, lijevo ili desno, veliko ili malo, više ili manje važno. Ono čemu me je prvi uzorak naučio jest da se sve cijelo vrijeme reorganizira, teče. Na makro razini, ruka uvijek izgleda kao ruka, ali na mikro razini — ruka teče. Kada gledamo uzorak bilo kojeg tkiva tijela ili osobito tjelesne tekućine — on je apsolutno heterogen, te postoji mnogo načina gledanja istog.

Zamislimo uzorak krvi (jedna kap krvi) kao krajolik. Unutar tog krajolika, postoje brojni, heterogeni pejzaži s različitim oblicima, veličinama, orijentacijama, teksturama — u stanju kontinuirane transformacije i reorganizacije. Rad s mikroskopom je poput rada sa živom slikom. Postoji nešto performativno u toj situaciji u kojoj tijelo proučava samo sebe. Čin polaganja uzorka na mikroskop je također vrlo performativan čin jer stavlja naše tijelo u drugačiji način bivanja; preciznije — naša ruka i mikroskopski

uzorak ulaze u stanje su-bivanja, a naše oči i mikroskopska kamera također ulaze u to stanje. Ruka kontinuirano premiješta uzorak, te stoga manipulira živom slikom, dok oči gledaju kroz mikroskopsku kameru i donose odluke o tome koje od živih slika snimiti. Kako se ruka kreće, mi putujemo "kroz" tijelo uzorka i promatramo različite razine njegove transformacije.

Postoje dvije vrste vremenske transformacije koje sam do sada primijetila: prvi trenuci nakon polaganja uzorka na mikroskop su trenuci obilježeni kvalitativnom transformacijom pokreta određenog uzorka. Preciznije, kada položimo uzorak na mikroskop, moguće je promatrati njegov singularan pokret i njegovu transformaciju u vremenu. Nikada nisam primijetila samo jedan obrazac pokreta unutar određenog uzorka. Ono što me najviše fasciniralo u vezi uzorka tjelesnih tekućina koje sam proučavala, naročito uzorka krvi, bila je činjenica da je unutar jednog uzorka krvi (jedna kap krvi) nebrojeno mnogo različitih obrazaca pokreta. U smislu obrasca kretanja, krv je heterogena. Dok prolazimo kroz tijelo uzorka, u ovom slučaju krvi, također se krećemo kroz različite obrasce kretanja koji se cijelo vrijeme reorganiziraju.

Druga vrsta transformacije uzorka koja se pojavljuje u vremenu je transformacija njegova oblika, veličine, orijentacije i teksture. Čak i kao mikroskopski uzorak, naše je tijelo još uvijek veoma živo. Još jedna stvar koja me fascinira jest činjenica da tijelo može preživjeti izvan sebe. Kap krvi nastavlja živjeti izvan našeg tijela i razvija vlastiti ekosustav, istodobno ovisan i neovisan o našem tijelu. Tijekom prvih par mjeseci mog mikroskopskog istraživanja moji omiljeni trenuci bili su oni kada bih se vratila proučavanju istog uzorka svaki dan u približno vrijeme. Preciznije, uzela bih uzorak, izradila slike tog uzorka, te mu se vraćala dan kasnije, u približno vrijeme, kao i svaki drugi dan, tjednima. Na taj način sam otkrivala i učila vidjeti različite slojeve vremenske transformacije uzorka.

U početku sam istraživala samo vlastita tkiva i tjelesne tekućine, no nakon nekog vremena sam također počela istraživati i tjelesna tkiva, kao i tekućine mojih suradnika. Nakon što sam primijetila kako su tjelesne tekućine karakterizirane živopisnijom reorganizacijom i tokom, odlučila sam izvesti svoje prvo mikroskopsko istraživanje sline, koje se sastojalo od sljedećeg: uzela sam uzorak sline, stavila sam uzorak na mikroskop i ostavila ga na mikroskopu 7 dana stvarajući jednu sliku svakih 24 sata. Na taj je način za mene postalo moguće istraživanje toka sline, kao i njegove transformacije u vremenu. Moje drugo mikroskopsko istraživanje sline obuhvaćalo je još dvije izvođačice, Adrianu Josipović i Josipu Bubaš. U to sam vrijeme koreografirala izvedbu u kojoj sam istraživala stanje postajanja. Predložila sam dvjema izvođačicama s kojima sam surađivala uzeti uzorke njihove sline prije i poslije probe kako bih

vidjela ukoliko se je tok njihove sline promijenio s obzirom na iskustvo stanja koje smo istraživale. Treće mikroskopsko istraživanje sline zbilo se je u suradnji s plesačicom i istraživačicom plesa, Bilianom Vassilevom. Sudjelovale smo u radionici na temu Gaga pokreta, te sam odlučila uzeti uzorke naše sline prije i poslije radionice kako bismo vidjele ukoliko je naš uzorak sline promijenjen iskustvom Gaga pokreta. U oba slučaja, istraživanja mikroskopa su pokazala kako se je uzorak sline promijenio sukladno različitim oblicima kretanja koje smo istraživali.

Godine 2015. pridružila sam se *Labodanse-u*, skupini znanstvenika, umjetnika i filozofa koji rade na sjecištima plesa, kognitivne znanosti i novih tehnologija. U svibnju 2015. radila sam na svom prvom zadatku na temu slike tijela, kao i analizi podataka. Preciznije, kao dio grupe istraživala sam rad Myriam Gourfink u odnosu na temu slike tijela. Evo konteksta i opisa zadatka na kojem sam radila: u okviru jednog tjedna (od ponedjeljka do petka, svibanj 2013.), *Labodanse* je svakodnevno izvodio eksperimente u *CND — Centre National de la Danse* u Pantinu. Bilo je dvije skupine (A i B) sudionika, od kojih je svaka skupina sadržavala 31 sudionika. Sudionicima je predloženo svakodnevno sudjelovanje u *yoga d'énergie* radionici, vođenoj od strane Myriam Gourfink i njezinih suradnika. Prije i poslije *yoga d'énergie* radionice od sudionika je zatraženo sudjelovanje u eksperimentu na temu slike tijela. Preciznije: sudionici su zatraženi da pokažu veličinu svojih organa, kao i dijelova tijela, prije i poslije *yoga d'énergie* radionice. Bilo je pet članova *Labodanse-a*, uključujući i mene samu, koji su fotografirali sudionike prije i poslije radionice. Pri završetku eksperimenta nastavila sam raditi na analizi podataka. Kada sam dobila rezultate, počela sam razmišljati o razlici između reprezentacije i iskustva bivanja, kao i imanja tijela. Prema rezultatima analize podataka, većina sudionika osjetila je proširenje svojih organa, kao i dijelova tijela nakon *yoga d'énergie* radionice. U tom trenutku počela sam razmišljati o razlici između tjelesne sheme i slike tijela; reprezentacije tijela i iskustva ili osjećaja bivanja tijelom.

Nekoliko tjedana kasnije osmislila sam još jedan zadatak. U tom trenutku razvijala sam ideju iskustvene slike tijela i pokušavala osmisliti zadatak koji bi omogućio praktično istraživanje te ideje. Ovaj put nisam samo osmislila ili analizirala zadatak, već sam i sudjelovala u njemu. Evo opisa zadatka: sudionici su zatraženi da fotografiraju vlastite dijelove tijela, te da ih sastave sukladno tome kako osjećaju organizaciju svog tijela u stanju postajanja. Preciznije: sastavite svoje tijelo onako kako ga osjećate kada ste u stanju postajanja. Neka od pitanja koja su se pojavila bila su: postoji li razlika između načina na koji vidimo i načina na koji osjećamo naše tijelo; na razini osjećaja — kako je naše tijelo organizirano; jesu li oblik i veličina dijelova tijela ovisni o iskustvu; kako se organizacija tijela mijenja zajedno s osjećajem;

stvaraju li nova iskustva nove organe; postoje li iskustveni organi; kako izvodimo svoje organe; koliko razina organizacije tijela poznajemo; što ako postoje različite razine koje istodobno koegzistiraju; što ako je "fizičko" — ne samo ono *što* osjećamo, nego i ono *kako* to osjećamo; je li fizičko iskustveno; je li iskustveno fizičko; koliko iskustava tjelesnosti imamo; koliko fizičkih tijela imamo?

Rezultati zadatka pokazali su kako su svi sudionici sastavili svoja tijela na način koji ne odražava razinu reprezentacije njihovih tijela. Sudionici nisu sastavili svoja tijela u odnosu na razinu pojavnosti tijela, već u odnosu na razinu osjećanja tijela. Obično, kada gledamo tijelo, možemo reći od čega se ono sastoji. Na primjer, koža, kosa, kosti, itd. Međutim, ne možemo reći kako je tijelo izvedeno. Gledanje i analiziranje slika bilo je više informativno u smislu razumijevanja načina na koji su slike bile izvedene u odnosu na ono od čega su bile izvedene. To je upravo ono što je motorom ovog istraživanja — *kako* tijela umjesto njegovog *što*; istraživanje toga kako se tijelo stvara, umjesto istraživanja onoga od čega je stvoreno.

Treći zadatak na temu iskustvene slike tijela bio je produžetak prethodnog zadatka. Sastavila sam popis osjećaja koji se odnose na stanje postajanja, te zatražila sudionike da označe sve osjećaje povezane s njihovim iskustvom bivanja u stanju postajanja. Nisam samo osmislila zadatak, već sam također i sama sudjelovala u zadatku.

Godine 2015. osmislila sam intervju na temu iskustvene slike tijela, iskustvene anatomije i iskustvenih granica tijela. Intervju se je temeljio na rezultatima prethodno spomenutih zadataka. Preciznije, rezultati zadataka postali su izvorom i generativnom silom intervjua na kojemu sam radila. Svrha intervjua bila je istražiti ukoliko se rezultati zadataka mogu produbiti ili preispitati ovim putem. Također sam sudjelovala u intervju-u.

Nakon intervjua započela sam vlastito preispitivanje mogućih načina istraživanja, kao i "hvatanja" kreativnih procesa tijelovanja. Odlučila sam nastaviti svoj rad kroz definicije temeljene na iskustvu. Odlučila sam raditi na njima na isti način na koji sam se bavila mikroskopskim istraživanjem tj. istraživanjem vremenske transformacije tjelesnih tekućina. Umjesto snimanja nove fotografije iste tjelesne tekućine svakih 24 sata, odlučila sam redefinirati tijelo svakih 24 sata, točnije, definirati ga svaki dan, tijekom jednog mjeseca, u svrhu istraživanja iskustvene definicije tijela, te njezine transformacije u vremenu. U okviru jednog mjeseca radila sam paralelno na redefiniranju sljedećeg: samog tijela, veličine tijela, veličine očiju, oblika kože, oblika krvi i teksture pluća. Dok sam radila na redefiniranju veličine oka i tijela, koristila sam metodu "mjerjenja osjećajem" kako bih istražila transformaciju iskustvene

veličine tijela. Dok sam radila na redefiniranju oblika kože, kao i oblika krvi, koristila sam metodu redefiniranja oblika direktno iz iskustva senzacije oblika kože, kao i oblika krvi. Pri definiranju teksture pluća također sam koristila metodu generiranja redefinicije iz senzacije teksture pluća. Ono što me je zanimalo u ovom istraživanju jest uvidjeti ukoliko modusi definiranja prolaze kroz isti proces izravne, kontinuirane reorganizacije, poput tjelesnih tkiva i tekućina, te kako. Kako konceptualizirati i istražiti definiciju "u stanju materije"; definiciju koja nikada nije fiksna, te kontinuirano prolazi kroz proces transformacije i reorganizacije?

Godine 2015. također sam počela istraživati prakse pisanja temeljene na situaciji. Eksperimentirala sam s dva različita pristupa: redefiniranjem tijela u situaciji kretanja i sjedenja, te pisanjem o tijelu iz tri različita gledišta, istovremeno, kao plesačica, koreografkinja i istraživačica. U oba slučaja željela sam istražiti transformaciju iskustvene definicije tijela, kao i procese redefiniranja tijela iz različitih gledišta. Ovaj je rad bio ujedno i pokušajem otkrivanja "partitura ogleda" (Ginot, 2016.), točnije, toga kako određeni pogled djeluje, te koju vrstu tijela, iskustva, iskustvenog tijela proizvodi.

Razmotrimo situaciju kretanja i sjedenja: koliko je naša praksa pisanja pod utjecajem pokreta ili odsutnosti istog; koliko su naši načini mišljenja pokreta pod utjecajem našeg iskustva ili doživljaja pokreta? Jesu li sve definicije pokreta ovisne o situaciji, o pokretu? Da li situacije kretanja ili sjedenja — tijekom reflektiranja pokreta — transformiraju naše načine razmišljanja i pisanja pokreta? Može li jednostavna promjena, kao promjena u položaju tijela ili bivanje u pokretu tijekom pisanja promijeniti način rada na mojoj tezi? Postoji li razlika između definiranja tijela iz pokreta i iz mirovanja? Tijelo ne samo da se reorganizira na razini materijalnosti, već i na razini diskurzivnosti. Razlog za istraživanje definicija temeljenih na situaciji bila je mogućnost istraživanja pokreta redefiniranja. Ako se tijelo mijenja na razini iskustva, mora se mijenjati i na razini diskursa. Definicije temeljene na situaciji, ili preciznije, svakodnevna praksa redefiniranja tijela, tijekom jednog mjeseca, način je zahvata ove dvostruke transformacije — na razini iskustva i na razini definicije. Baš kao što je izmiještanje iz položaja sjedenja u položaj kretanja, tako je i izmiještanje između pozicija istraživačice, koreografkinje i plesačice načinom integracije, kao i povezivanja različitih diskursa o tijelu, kao i njihova dolaska u jezik. Kako tijelo dolazi u svoju formu; kako iskustvena forma dolazi u definiciju? Ako je naše tijelo uvijek drukčije, kako njegova definicija ostaje ista? Jukstaponiranje različitih diskursa poput onoga plesačice, koreografkinje i istraživačice način je činjenja vidljivim diskurzivne heterogenosti tijela u pokretu. Diskurs je još jedan tip predmetnog stakalca. Umjesto

stanica, tekućina ili tkiva razmatramo definicije. Stanice i definicije se cijelo vrijeme reorganiziraju.

Što ako se koncept tijela potpuno temelji na situaciji, na iskustvu? Što ako se značenje koncepta tijela reorganizira u vremenu, u odnosu na naše iskustvo, poput naših stanica; što ako značenje traje samo koliko i iskustvo? Neka od pitanja koja su stalno dolazila iz mog tijela bila su:

- kako stvoriti iskustvo umjesto opisivanja istog;
- kako koristiti ili integrirati vlastito tijelo i njegovo razumijevanje određenog subjekta kao referentnu točku svog istraživanja;
- što ako nema tijela kao jedinstvenog i takvog; što ako sve što postoji su tijelovanja (*bodyings*)?
- što ako iskustvo tijela ne odgovara reprezentaciji tijela?
- koja je razlika između tjelesne sheme i slike tijela;
- kako misliti iskustvenu sliku tijela;
- što ako slika tijela koju vidimo ne odgovara slici tijela koju osjećamo;
- što ako tijelo nije organizacija, već skup relacija;
- što ako anatomija nije samo fiziološka, nego i relacijska, te iskustvena;
- što ako je tijelo partitura, tijelo-partitura;
- što ako je praksa pokreta način plesanja tijela-partiture, kao i svega što ono može postati;
- što ako naša iskustva anatomije, kao i naša iskustvena anatomija, ovise o pokretu;
- što ako nema organa, već samo organa-partitura;
- što ako je sve što tijelo jest — glagol;
- što ako postoji samo tijelovanje;
- što ako nema takve stvari kao što je ruka, već samo *handing* ili potencijal ruke da postane kroz pokret;
- što ako je pokret praksa kvalitativne transformacije, kao i postajanja svega onog što tijelo može postati?
- što ako je ples praksa istraživanja potencijala postajanja tijela;

- kako je moguće stvoriti kontekst za istraživanje potencijala tijela — na fizičkoj pozornici, kao i na pozornici teksta;
- kako se tijelo stvara pokretom, kroz pokret i u pokretu;
- gdje se pokret zaustavlja i tijelo počinje; gdje se jedno tijelo zaustavlja i drugo tijelo počinje;
- što ako forma, oblik i veličina tijela nisu određene, već iskustvene?

2 | ONTO-HETERO-GENEZA TIJELA U POKRETU: OD TIJELA DO TIJELOVANJA

2.1 TBO: INSUFLACIJA, EVAPORACIJA, TRANSMISIJA TEKUĆINA

Prvi koncept na kojem se temelji ova teza jest Artaudov koncept Tijela bez Organa (TbO ili ono koje je besformno, neorganizirano, transformativno i uvijek u stanju metamorfoze, za razliku od stratifikacije i organiziranja statičkog bića). Artaud: "Kada ga učinite tijelom bez organa, tada ćete ga izbaviti od njegovih automatskih reakcija, te ga vratiti na svoju pravu slobodu" (Artaud, 1976: 571). Kroz koncept Tijela bez Organa moguće je istražiti onto-hetero-genezu tijela izvođača ili njegovo postajanje različitim entitetima. Slijedeći Simondonovu ontogenetsku teoriju individuacije, svako je tijelo imanentno je sustavu vlastite individuacije. Prvi je korak ove teze rekonceptualizacija tijela u pokretu kao kontinuirano auto-individuirajućeg sustava, za razliku od unaprijed individualiziranog tijela. S tog je gledišta moguće rekonceptualizirati individualno tijelo u pokretu, te njegove biološke, anatomske i senzorske strukture, ne kao unaprijed zadani entitet, već samo kao fazu u njegovom kontinuiranom postajanju.

Tijelo bez Organa nije definirano u smislu oblika, organa ili funkcija, već kinetički, u smislu beskonačnog broja čestica u odnosima kretanja i mirovanja, te dinamički, u smislu kapaciteta afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim, "kao intenzivna determinacija" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 123-4). "Osim jedinstvenih i funkcionalnih 'organa' ili 'organizacije', tijela uključuju moć, izraz i izdržljivost; tijelo shvaćeno kao 'organizam' potiskuje ove potencijale tijela" (Young, Genosko, Watson, 2013: 51). Tijelo bez Organa "je cijeli neorganski život, jer organizam nije život, organizam je ono što porobljuje život. Tijelo je potpuno živo, a ipak neorgansko" (Deleuze, 1996: 45). U Deleuzeovom i Guattarijevom čitanju Artauda, Tijelo bez Organa je ono koje uključuje suočavanje s granicama subjektivnosti, stratifikacije i organizma. Tijelo bez Organa je također ono koje ujedinjuje fragmentirane organe ili dijelove tijela kako bi se proizveli neodređeni ili neaktualizirani organi, za razliku od organizma s unaprijed određenim funkcijama. Rezultat kontinuiranog eksperimentiranja tijela poništava organsku povezanost koju organi imaju jedni s drugima, te s njihovim predodređenim funkcijama. Ovo je ujedno i uvjetom stvaranja novih fizikalnih asocijacija i funkcija.

Tijelo bez Organa nije definirano manjkom organa ili manjkom organizma. Ono je definirano neodređenim organima, dok je organizam definiran određenim

organima. Tijelo bez Organa slijedi liniju odvajanja organa od organizma u korist njihove neodređene ili kontingentne prirode. Ono se temelji na embriološkoj koncepciji tijela koja prepoznaje samo dinamičke i kinetičke, ali ne i formalne razlike, kao i sintezno funkcioniranje organa ili dijelova tijela koji su sada prisvojeni za sastavljanje, prijenos ili usmjeravanje tokova koji premašuju tijelo kao takvo. Tijelo bez Organa je stanje kvantitativnog i kvalitativnog toka. Organi postaju intenzitetima u stvaranju, obilježeni tijekovima, pragovima i gradijentima intenziteta: "Želudac, oko, usta: neodređeni članak [...] izražava čistu determinaciju intenziteta, intenzivne razlike (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 182, 164) TbO je jaje uvijek ga nosite s tobom kao svoj vlastiti milje eksperimentiranja. Nije moguće doseći Tijela bez Organa, ono jest i zauvijek ostaje granica" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 166, 150). Prema Deleuzeu i Guattariju, Tijelo bez Organa je intenzivno tijelo; kao što je prethodno napomenuto, Tijelo bez Organa nije određeno organima, već pragovima ili gradijentima. Sukladno tome, orijentacije, osi, brzine i ritmovi postaju primarnima za organizaciju i strukturu bilo kojeg tijela. Tijelo bez Organa "potpuno djeluje insuflacijom, evaporacijom i transmisijom tekućina" (Deleuze, 2004: 100, 88). Ono je neformirano tijelo, prožeto neformiranim, nestabilnim materijama, subatomske čestice, čistim intenzitetima, previtalnim i prefizičkim singularnostima, tokovima u svim smjerovima.

U svojim djelima Deleuze se često vraća na Spinozinu opasku kako još uvijek ne znamo što tijelo može, što uključuje i svijest o nepoznavanju potencijala tijela. U *Spinoza: praktična filozofija* Deleuze ističe kako Spinoza definira tijelo na dva načina: u smislu odnosa sporosti i brzine između beskonačnog broja čestica, te u smislu sposobnosti tijela da afektira i da bude afektirano. Karakterizirajući tijelo u smislu diferencijalnih brzina, Spinoza naglašava sudjelovanje tijela na planu imanencije, dimenziji ritmova, pokreta, stanke, ubrzanja i usporavanja, u kojima oblik i funkcija svakog tijela proizlaze kao sekundarni proizvodi kinetičkih odnosa između čestica. Pristupajući tijelu u smislu njegovog potencijala afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim, Spinoza definira plan imanencije putem pervazivne afektivnosti koja se stvara kroz interakcije između više sila: "Ukratko, kao spinozisti, nećemo nešto definirati niti po njegovom obliku, niti po njegovim organima ili njegovim funkcijama, niti kao substanciju niti kao subjekt. U posudbi srednjovjekovnih, ili zemljopisnih pojmova, nešto ćemo definirati prema njegovoj dužini i širini. Tijelo može biti bilo što, može biti životinja, akustično tijelo, duša ili ideja, ono može biti jezični korpus, društveno tijelo, kolektivitet. Dužina nekog tijela označava skupinu odnosa brzine i sporosti, odmora i kretanja, između čestica koje ga čine, to jest, između neformiranih elemenata. Širinom nazivamo ukupnost afekata koja u svakom trenutku zauzima tijelo, tj. intenzivna stanja anonimne sile (sile postojanja, kapaciteta afektiranja). Ovo čini

kartografiju tijela. Skupina dužina i širina predstavlja Prirodu, plan imanencije ili kontingencije, uvijek varijabilan i promijenjiv, konstituiran, i rekonstituiran od strane individua i kolektiviteta" (Deleuze, 1988: 142). Izvođačevo tijelo je ukupnost mnoštva različitih modusa postajanja tijelom na planu imanencije. Plan imanencije određen je asembliranjem, a ne organizacijom. Umjesto oblika, organa ili funkcija, tjelesno doživljavamo odnose brzine i sporosti između najmanjih čestica neformiranih organa, kao i organizama. Plan imanencije tijela formira se između dinamičnih afektivnih naboja pokreta i mirovanja.

2.2 TIJELO-PARTITURA

Drugi koncept na kojemu se temelji ova teza jest koncept tijela-partiture. Tijelo se može percipirati i izvoditi kao partitura, tijelo-partitura ili ono koje stvara vlastite relacijske moduse postajanja tijelom. Tijelo se organizira kretanjem i razvojem svakoga od svojih organa kao polimorfnog alata, tako da svaki organ postaje vremenskim, samoorganiziranim alatom-tehnikom. Nadalje, tijelo kao partitura ne predstavlja sustav organa, već sustav relacija (i relacijskih postajanja organa, kao i samog tijela). Tijelo je relacijskom partiturom — ili ono koje se stvara u pokretu i kroz pokret. Tijelo izvođača nije ono koje utjelovljuje određenu tehniku, već tijelo samo postaje vlastitom singularnom tehnikom; tehnika nastaje kroz istraživanje individualnog tijela, iznutra, te nije nametnuta tijelu, izvana. Ovo je ujedno i trenutak kada se tijelo počinje režirati, koreografirati i izvoditi — kao tijelovanje ili kao jedinstven događaj sile koja uzima formu.

Erin Manning definira tijelovanje (*bodying*) kao "polje relacija kroz koje tijelo emergira kao mnoštvo, a kao ne statično, interaktivno ja" (Manning, 2012: 38). Tijelovanje također označava polje relacija kroz koje tijelo uzima formu postajanja. Tijelo nije ono koje je, već ono koje uzima formu, ono koje postaje. Pokret ne samo da stvara tijelo, već također čini tijelo vlastitom partiturom, ili drugim riječima, pokret omogućava tijelu da se pleše i izvodi samo sebe poput partiture. Tijelo je partitura; tijelo je pokret. Tijelovanje je čin susreta između partiture i pokreta, ono je način na koji tijelo postaje — u pokretu, kroz pokret i kao pokret.

Unutar ideje tijela-partiture svaki organ ili dio tijela se proizvodi u pokretu. Točnije, svaki se organ ili dio tijela proizvodi unutar procesa osjećanja (*sensing*), bivanja u relaciji, te postajanja. Putem spomenutih procesa svaki organ ili dio tijela proizvodi vlastito relacijsko polje postajanja. William Forsythe je razvio pristup korištenju površine kože kao organa propriocepcije. Plesače se traži da aktiviraju svoje tijelo kroz kožu, čineći kožu onime što Deleuze naziva površinom snimanja događaja: "Stavite aktivaciju u svaki dio, razmislite o tome gdje pokret počinje i gdje se zaustavlja. Ako podignete ruku, gdje se proteže vaša koža? Aktivirajte kožu. Dobijte povratne informacije od kože, idite dalje ako vam nešto kaže. Ono što osjećate je ono što znate. Potražite lanac senzacija, a ne lanac pozicija" (Manning, Massumi, 2014: 50).

Prema Deleuzeu, senzacije se ne smiju smatrati "podacima", već "susretima". Kao susret, senzacija djeluje na živčani sustav, a ne na "mozak" subjekta: krećući od Bergsona, Deleuze povezuje senzaciju uz kontrakciju materije i imaginacije. Prema Deleuzeovom čitanju Bergsona, vibracija materije, kontraktirane osjetilima, rezultira

percipiranim kvalitetama (ili kontrakcijom-memorijom): *"What, in fact, is a sensation? It is the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing other than contracted quantity. [...] Sensation is extensive insofar as what it contracts is precisely the extended, the expanded (detendu) (Deleuze, 1990: 74). Senzacija je "excitation itself, [...] insofar as it is preserved or preserves its vibrations [...]. Sensation is formed by contracting that which composes it [...]" (Deleuze, 1994: 211). It is a characteristic of sensation to pass through different levels owing to the action of forces. But "two sensations, each having their own level or zone, can also confront each other and make their respective levels communicate. [...] The different levels through which this sensation passes already necessarily constitute couplings of sensation" (Deleuze, 1996: 47, 64).*

Iskustvo osjećanja proširuje polje mogućnosti činjenja, kao i postajanja određenog organa. U slučaju Williama Forsythea, aktiviranje kože kao površine snimanja događaja također označava i aktivaciju kože kao neodređenog, neaktualiziranog i intenzivnog organa. Koža ovdje postaje partiturom, kožom-partiturom. Nije bitno što koža je, već ono što koža može postati. Koža ne snima samo događaj, već i postanje događanjem relacijskog postajanja kože. Kombinacije senzacija proširuju, kao i stvaraju nova polja postajanja kože. Putem akcije "povezivanja senzacija umjesto pozicija" također je moguće nanovo razmotriti ideju kompozicije tijela u pokretu. Kako misliti senzaciju kao princip komponiranja tijela? Kako misliti kompoziciju-u-nastajanju ili kompoziciju-u-pokretu? Kako misliti osjećanje (*sensing*) kao istodobni proces komponiranja, dekomponiranja i ko-komponiranja?

2.3 TIJELO-POSTAJANJE

Prema Deleuzeu, tijelo može postati bilo čime dokle god je razmatrano u smislu relacija i afekata. Kapacitet afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim jest ono što čini singularitet izvođačeva tijela. Afekti su također usko povezani s pitanjem "što tijelo može postati", te potencijalom tijela. Afekti su postajanja. "Afekt prolazi direktno kroz tijelo, povezujući se sa živčanim sustavom, čineći interval osjetnim. Ovaj je osjećaj često doživljen kao su-postajanje ili postajanje s drugim. Ovo su-postajanje je transformativno. Ono je silom iz koje mikroperceptualno tijelo emergira. Ovo mikroperceptivno tijelo je tijelo relacije. Iako ne može biti odvojen od tijela, afekt nikada ne pripada individualnom tijelu. Afekt prolazi kroz tijelo, ostavljajući intenzivne tragove na kolektivnom tijelu-postajanju. Ovo tijelo-postajanje nije nužno ljudsko tijelo. Ono je konglomeratom sila koje istražuju su-pokret kroz kojeg relacijska individuacija počinje samu sebe činiti osjetnom" (Manning, 2012: 95).

Singularitet izvođačeva tijela može se razumjeti kao kapacitet tijela da uđe u relaciju, afektira i bude afektiranim, pokreće drugog i bude pokretanim, kao kapacitet postajanja. Postajati znači sudjelovati u pokretu, vibracijama, pragovima; bića (mineralnog, biljnog, životinjskog i ljudskog porijekla) se razlikuju samo na razini pragova, vibracija: "postoje linije koje nisu usmjerene spram jedinstvene točke, koje se oslobađaju strukture — linije leta, bez budućnosti ili prošlosti, bez memorije, koje se odupiru binarnom stroju — postajanje-ženom koje nije niti muškarac niti ženom, postajanje-životinjom koje nije niti zvijeri niti čovjekom, postajanja su točno to, postajanja su ona koja proizvode liniju, a ne točku" (Deleuze i Guattari, 1988: 26). Koreo-singularitet je singularitet tijela koji emergira iz pokreta i u pokretu, kapacitet tijela-postajanja u pokretu, kapacitet tijelovanja u pokretu. Plesanje samog tijela uključuje odnos spram organa kao relacijskih tehnika, te omogućuje istraživanje performativnosti i mogućnosti razvoja novih plesnih organa kroz kretanje. Drugi je cilj ove teze istražiti iskustvenu transformaciju organa, ukoliko se određeni organ mijenja iskustvom kretanja, te kako. Prema Diderotu, svijest je proizvod kretanja, a anatomija je proizvod svijesti. Kako misliti anatomiju kao koreo-anatomiju?

Koreo-anatomija kao relacijska anatomija proučava mogućnost plesanja vlastitih organa umjesto plesanja s njima, kao i mogućnost plesanja cijelog tijela umjesto plesanja s njim (na primjer, ruka se ne smatra rukom, nego samo jednom od beskrajnih aktualizacija ruke, dakle, kretanje postaje procesom istraživanja potencijala postajanja ruke). Koreo-anatomija se također bavi procesom stvaranja novog tijela, kao i njegovih bioloških, anatomskih i senzorskih struktura kroz pokret. U okviru ideje koreo-anatomije pokret je definiran kao relacija, te relacijsko postajanje tijela. Biti

u pokretu znači ući u relaciju, dakle, anatomija postaje plesanom. Tijelo također postaje plesano u odnosu na drugog, kao relacijsko su-tijelo. Prema Souriauu, "modusi egzistencije su uvijek pluralni i relacijski, postajanje se može naći ne samo u bićima, nego i između njih" (Souriau, 2009: 16). Slijedeći Souriaua, modusi postajanja su intermodalni. Tijelovanje kao egzistencijalan modus je također intermodalno ili ono koje nije unaprijed konstituirano, već dolazi-u-egzistenciju kroz singularne događaje "tijela-u-nastajanju" (Manning). Anatomija nije samo intermodalnom, već i pluralnom u odnosu na samu sebe, sadržavajući drugog kao kompozicijski princip vlastitog postajanja. Kako je moguće misliti anatomiju tijela u pokretu kao kontinuirani čvor intermodalnih vibracija? Je li anatomija jedinstvenom ili tijelo neprekidno prelazi iz jedne anatomije u drugu, prelaze li anatomije jedna u drugu, kao relacijske anatomije?

Ono što je također bitno jest kako je individualno tijelo komponirano, budući da je kompozicija čin ulaska u relaciju, kao i u senzaciju. Prema Deleuzeu, struktura tijela je kompozicijom relacija tijela. Ono što tijelo može (kao i ono što tijelo može postati) odgovara prirodi i granicama njegova kapaciteta afektiranja. Afekti nisu samo prijelazima između stanja tijela, već i prolazima između različitih tijela. U tom kontekstu, moguće je istražiti tijelo izvođača kao kompoziciju kapaciteta afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim, kao i kompoziciju kontinuiranih postajanja koja čine različita (potencijalna) tijela unutar jednog tijela, te različite anatomije unutar jedne anatomije: "Slijedeći tu ideju svaka bi se individua percipirala kao beskonačnost ekstenzivnih dijelova. Drugim riječima, ne bi bilo ničega drugog osim komponiranih individua. Individua bi bio pojam potpuno lišen smisla. Neki dijelovi mog tijela ... napuštaju moje tijelo, te ulaze u nove relacije, relacije s bilo čime, s komarcem kada me ugriže, relacije...

U konstantnom sam procesu integriranja dijelova u moje relacije, kada jedem, na primjer, kada jedem ja preuzimam ekstenzivne dijelove. Što znači preuzimati dijelove drugog? Preuzimati dijelove drugog znači: učiniti da oni ostavljaju svoje tijelo, te ulaze u novu relaciju, relaciju koja sada postaje jednom od mojih relacija, to jest: s mesom činim svoje vlastito meso. To je strašno! Stvari nikada ne prestaju biti takvima: šokovi, prisvajanje dijelova drugog bića, transformacija relacija. Komponiranje u beskonačnost. Ovaj sustav vanjskih dijelova — jednog spram drugog — koji nikad ne prestaje reagirati, je ujedno i sustavom u kojem se mi sami nikada ne prestajemo mijenjati. Drugim riječima, budući da sam i sam komponiran od beskonačnog skupa beskonačno ekstenzivnih dijelova, nikad ne prestajem opažati vanjske stvari. Percepcije samog sebe u vlastitom odnosu spram vanjskih stvari. Percepcije vanjskih stvari u odnosu na mene, to je sve što čini svijet znakova. Hvala Deleuze, hvala Spinoza" (Le Roy, 2002: 46-46).

U *Self Interview X5* kaže: "zašto bi naša tijela trebala završavati na koži, ili u najboljem slučaju uključivati druga bića, organizme ili predmete prekrivene kožom?" Y5 odgovara: "Ne znam, no možda bi trebali spomenuti činjenicu da je slika tijela izrazito fluidna i dinamična. Njezine su granice i rubovi "osmotski", te imaju izvanrednu moć uključivanja i odbacivanja onoga što je izvana i onoga što je iznutra — u tekućoj razmjeni?" X8 zaključuje: "Mislim da bi se tijelo moglo percipirati kao prostor i vrijeme za trgovinu, promet i razmjenu ..." (Roy, 2002: 45). U tom kontekstu, "X5 — X8" može se smatrati onime koje nadilazi granicu između subjekta i objekta, ljudskog i ne-ljudskog, individualnog i kolektivnog, kao i između fizičkog i relacijskog tijela. Granice nisu jasne i konkretne u onoj mjeri u kojoj bismo to željeli. Tijela stalno formiraju nove kombinacije. Prema Y8: "Slika tijela se može smanjiti i proširiti, može dati dijelove vanjskom svijetu, kao što može i preuzeti njegove dijelove, te ih uključiti u sebe" (Le Roy, 2002: 45). Kao što možemo vidjeti, proces stvaranja slike tijela ujedno je i procesom njezina nastajanja kroz razmjenu s vanjskim svijetom.

Tko je "Xavier Le Roy", individua, u tom slučaju? *"L'individu suppose la mise en convergence d'un certain nombre de singularités, déterminant une condition de clôture selon laquelle se définit une identité. [En revanche les] singularités ont entre elles des rapports de divergence ou de disjonction, certainement pas de convergence puisque celle-ci implique déjà le principe d'exclusion qui gouverne l'individualité : elles ne communiquent que par leur différence ou leur distance, et le libre jeu du sens et de sa production réside précisément dans le parcours de ces multiples distances, ou synthèse disjonctive"* (Deleuze, 1969: 201-204). Nadalje, *"les individus que nous sommes, dérivant de ce champ nomadique d'individuation qui ne connaît que des couplages et des disparités, champ transcendantal parfaitement impersonnel et inconscient, ne renouent pas avec ce jeu du sens sans faire l'épreuve de la mobilité de leurs frontières"* (Deleuze, 1968: 327, 331). Na ovoj razini, svaka je stvar singularnosti koja se "otvara spram neograničenih predikata kroz koje prolazi dok u isto vrijeme gubi svoj centar, to jest, svoj identitet i svoje ja" (Deleuze, 1969: 344-345). Singularnost je neodvojiva od svog miljea, ona "prolazi između rubova" (Deleuze, 1968: 155). Ovaj milje emergira kao "potencijal", kao inicijalna razlika. Upravo stoga je metodološkim imperativom misliti singularnost u odnosu na milje. Singularnost je neodvojiva od polja sila koje aktualizira, od plana imanencije. Sva se singularnost poziva na etologiju sila uzimajući u obzir svoj konstitutivan milje.

Xavier Le Roy je razvio pristup konstrukciji tijela gdje je forma samog tijela prolaznom i intenzivnom. Ako svaka forma treba biti mišljena u kontekstu prolaznosti, tada slijedi i da se subjekt više ne može smatrati sub-jektom ili onim koji postoji *a priori*, već super-jektom, trenutnom instancom. Deleuze definira individu kao "koncentraciju, akumulaciju, podudarnost određenog broja predindividualnih

konvergirajućih singularnosti" (Deleuze, 1988a: 85), ili kao omotnicu: "subjekt nije subjektom, već omotnicom" (Deleuze, 1990: 212). Osim toga, "moramo zamisliti (...) kao uvjet iskustva, čiste intenzitete duboko umotane u intenzivan *spatium* koji preegzistira svaku kvalitetu" (Deleuze 2002: 135). Umotati druge organizme u sebe znači, kao što kaže Xavier Le Roy, uključiti u vlastitu heterogenost postojanja heterogenost postojanja drugog bića; umotati drugog ne znači, dakle, osjećati ono što drugi osjeća, već osjetiti kako mi sami osjećamo ono što drugi osjeća, osjetiti naše vlastito osjećanje osjećanja drugog. Umotati drugo osjećanje znači osjećati na drugačiji način od našeg načina osjećanja. Subjektivitet se ne smije zamijeniti s konceptom predeterminiranog subjekta.

Umjesto toga, potrebno je shvatiti subjektivitet u odnosu na dinamički subjekt koji bira vlastite moduse organiziranja (političke, emocionalne, koreografske) koji otkrivaju "proces subjektivacije, koji je ujedno i produkt način postojanja koji se ne podudara s načinom postojanja subjekta" (Deleuzeu 1995: 98). Subjektivnost se mora shvatiti kao performativna moć, kao mogućnost kontinuiranog bivanja izumljenim, kao "modus intenziteta, a ne kao subjekt" (Deleuze 1995: 55). Deleuzeova interpretacija subjektivnosti je bliska onoj Foucaulta, ili točnije, njegovoj ideji "tehnologija sebstva", koje se definiraju kao operacije. Tehnike sebstva "omogućuju pojedincima da samostalno, ili uz pomoć drugih, izvedu određeni broj operacija na svom tijelu i duši, svojim mislima, svom ponašanju, svom modusu postojanja; da se transformiraju kako bi postigli stanje sreće, čistoće, mudrosti, savršenstva, ili besmrtnosti" (Foucault, 1997: 225). Kod Deleuzea i Foucaulta, subjektivnosti se uvijek odnose na aktivne procese postajanja.

U *Self Unfinished* (1998), Le Roy odustaje od pojma subjekta i fiksnih kategorija: muško i žensko, ljudsko i životinjsko, objekt i subjekt, pasivan i aktivan, mehanički i organski, prisutnost i odsutnost, kao i svih binarnih opozicija koje određuju modernu subjektivnost. Le Roy zamjenjuje ove kategorije s nizom postajanja: "Postajanje je pejzaž koji se pojavljuje samo u pokretu" (Deleuze, 1993: 16-17). Ukoliko postajanje odmah priziva pokret, postajati znači događati se, piše René Schérer. Treba razlikovati u tom procesu, ono što se je dogodilo, *eventus*, od onoga što se događa, *eventum*. Postajanje je događanje: *eventum tantum*. Drugim riječima, postajanje je "biće u nastajanju" (Schérer, 1998: 53), ne kao "samoprodukcija bića", već kao pokret ili kao događaj. S ove točke gledišta, potrebno je redefinirati individualnu tijelo, zajedno sa pripadajućim mu biološkim, anatomskih i osjetilnim struktura, ne kao unaprijed zadani entitet, već samo kao jednu od faza njegova kontinuiranog postajanja. *Self Unfinished* (1998) vraća tijelu njegovu moć kontinuirane reinvenije. Ono što vidimo je postajanje mehaničkim i organskim, subjektom i

objektom, muškarcem *i* ženom, crnim *i* bijelim, aktivnim *i* pasivnim — neprekidno reorganizirajući temeljno pitanje plesa i filozofije: što tijelo može?

3

ANATOMIJE TIJELA U POKRETU

3.1 KAKO SE PROIZVODI TIJELO-POSTAJANJE PUTEM ISKUSTVENE ANATOMIJE

Iskustvena anatomija je utjelovljeni pristup anatomiji, razvijen od strane plesača i stručnjaka za pokret poput Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. Iskustvena anatomija se usredotočuje na različite aspekte naše skeletne strukture i kroz detaljno anatomsko istraživanje, dodir i vježbe, daje plesačima mogućnost razvijanja utjelovljene svijesti o unutarnjoj anatomiji. Plesači ne prikazuju, već doživljavaju svoje tjelesne sustave putem iskustvene anatomije koja se temelji na pronalaženju slobodnog i djelotvornog toka pokreta, te tijelovanju različitih tjelesnih sustava.

Body-Mind Centering (BMC) je pristup istraživanju iskustvene anatomije, te specifična metoda analize pokreta. Ova se metoda temelji na načelima anatomskog i razvojnog pokreta. BMC istražuje rana razvojna stanja pokreta, te njihov odnos prema unutarnjoj strukturi, kao i pokretu daha, organa, kostura, tjelesnih tekućina. Primjenom principa BMC-a moguće je obnoviti ne samo sustav uma i tijela, već i percepciju, kao i sheme pronalaženja novih izvora istraživanja pokreta. Pristup stvaranju iskustvene anatomije sastoji se od:

- tijelovanja živčanog sustava s naglaskom na: somatski živčani sustav; autonomni živčani sustav; prednje, srednje i stražnje tijelo; otpuštanje brahijalnog pleksusa i lumbosakralnog pleksusa; embriologiju živčanog sustava;
- tijelovanja sustava organa s naglaskom na: istraživanje organa; oslobađanje adhezija između organa; iniciranje daha, glasa, kretanja i dodira iz organa; analiziranje neravnoteže u pojedinim organima; tehnike za ravnotežu organa; embriološki razvoj organa;
- tijelovanje sustava tjelesnih tekućina s naglaskom na: staničnu tekućinu, izvanstaničnu tekućinu; ravnotežu tekućine i membrane; krv; cerebrospinalnu tekućinu (CSF); sinovijalnu tekućinu; limfu; intersticijske i stanične tekućine; koštanu srž; istraživanje imunološkog sustava kroz tjelesne tekućine; fasciu;

- tijelovanje kosti i zglobova gornjih ekstremiteta iz ruke do ramena i rebara, s naglaskom na kosti ruku, radijus i ulnu, lakat, humerus, rad sa slojevima kosti;
- tijelovanje kosti i zglobova aksijalnog kostura (središnja jezgra): kralježnice i lubanje, s naglaskom na šest krivulja kralježnice, lubanje, torakalne i prsne membrane, odnos zdjelice i nogu, embriološki razvoj aksijalnog kostura;
- tijelovanje kosti i zglobova donjih udova od stopala do polovice zdjelice, s naglaskom na stopalo, gležanj, prednji dio, koljeno, femur, kuk, prsni dio i embriološki razvoj donjih ekstremiteta;
- tijelovanje sustava ligamenata s naglaskom na: istraživanje ligamenta; pronalaženje spiralnog djelovanja ligamenta; ligamente ruku, podlaktica i laktova; ligamente ramena; ligamente rebara i kralježnice; ligamente zdjelice i kukova; ligamente koljena, prsa i stopala; razlikovanje mesa i kosti; embriološki razvoj ligamenta;
- tijelovanje endokrinog sustava s naglaskom na: pokretanje daha, glasa, kretanja i dodira iz žlijezda; odnos žlijezda s koštanim strukturama, refleksnim točkama i centrima kralježnice; tehnike za integraciju i balansiranje žlijezda, uključujući perinealno tijelo, koštano tijelo, gonade, nadbubrežne žlijezde, gušteraču, timus, štitnjaču i hipofizu.

Slijedi primjer rada BMC-a: "Počnimo s arterijskim ritmom, osjetite težinu krvi na periferijama tijela koje se povezuju sa zemljom, slijedite puls ... sada dodajte nešto venskog toka, pronađite ciklički povratak krvi u srce ... sada ispustite arterijski ritam i dodajte nešto CSF (cerebrospinalne tekućine) u vensku tekućinu, vaša masa postaje difuznija, osjećate okoliš, vaši živci se magnetiziraju, suspendiraju u vremenu i prostoru ... i ispustite vensku tekućinu ... i dodajte malo limfe za više prostorne napetosti, gdje su granice vašeg tijela ... i ispustite CSF (cerebrospinalnu tekućinu) i dovedite nešto sinovijalne tekućine, tekućine koštanog sustava, pronađite razmake između kostiju, protresite i odbacite taj prostor ... i sada se prebacite na intersticijsku tekućinu, spužvastu tekućinu u vašim mišićima i koži, oceanu koji povezuje sve stanice ... i vratimo se da sada jednostavno odmoru i dišimo u staničnoj tekućini..." (<http://caraker.com/articles/body-mind-centering-as-a-somatic-approach-to-dance-education/>).

Ovo je bio primjer plesanja kroz tekućine, kao i plesanja tekućina, budući da je fizički doživljaj tekućine — ne samo činom fizičkog reimaginiranja tekućine, već i činom pokretanja, transformacije i reorganizacije iste. BMC se usredotočuje na njegovanje linije iskustva različitih tjelesnih sustava, te na percepciju iskustvene

anatomije. Iskustvo se prvo događa na staničnoj razini. Živčani sustav bilježi iskustvo i organizira ga u uzorke. Nakon navedenog iskustva živčani sustav mijenja obrazac integrirajući ga s uzorcima drugih iskustava. Nakon što je upoznat s iskustvom, živčani sustav postaje primarni kontrolni sustav tijela. Pitanje koja se javlja ovdje jest: kako preuzorkovati (*repattern*) staničnu razinu iskustva, kao i iskustvenu anatomiju, kroz kretanje? Kako tjelesnost mašte utječe na tjelesnost samog tijela? Gdje završava tjelesnost mašte i počinje tjelesnost tijela? Kada se funkcionalna anatomija mijenja pomoću iskustvene anatomije i kako?

U svom članku *Dancing through the Transitional Fluid* objavljenom u *Contact Quarterly* (2009) Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen obrađuje pitanje membrane, kao i razliku između popuštanja (*yielding*) i kolapsa (*collapse*): "Svatko ima drugačiju ravnotežu između tekućina i membrana [u stanicama] — koja također varira od dana u dan. Mnogi ljudi ne znaju kako održavati ravnotežu. Balansiranje uključuje tok prema zemlji i / ili prostoru, te tok koji se vraća u sebe — tok prema van i tok prema unutra. Tok prema unutra daje osjećaj punine jastva; tok prema van daje osjećaj gravitacijskog ili prostorog otpuštanja" (Bainbridge Cohen, u Olsen, 2014: 7). Na razini toka, postoji razlika između kolapsa — otpuštanja membrane tako da postoji tok samo u jednom smjeru, prema gravitaciji, i popuštanja, gdje postoji uzajamnost tekućina koje teku u stanice i iz njih.

Za Bainbridge Cohen, cirkularnost tekućina je prirodni fenomen. Na svojoj vanjskoj strani, tijelo se pojavljuje kao čvrsto. Na svojoj unutarnjoj strani, tijelo je sustav cirkulirajućih tekućina, ono je tekuće. Kako misliti tijelo kao stanje istodobne čvrstoće i tekućosti, ili, kao jukstapoziciju tekuće čvrstoće i čvrste tekućosti? Krv, na primjer, stalno oscilira između čvrstog i tekućeg stanja. U svom slobodnom toku krv se doima tekućinom. U svom toku kroz druge organe krv se čini čvrstom, no zapravo oscilira između oba stanja. Krv nije forma — krv je tok. Tijelo nije formom, već tokom. Tijelo teče. Tijelo nije koreografirano, tijelo je koreografija. Jedan od načina viđenja tijela jest viđenje istog kao sustav organa. Drugi način viđenja tijela jest viđenje istog kao sustava koreografskih procesa. Svaki pojedini organ zauzima svoju formu kao singularan koreografski proces. S druge strane kože, moguće je misliti tijelo u svojoj imperceptibilnoj heterogenosti, točnije, heterogenosti svojih imperceptibilnih koreografskih procesa. Tijelo zauzima formu u odnosu dinamičkih koreografija krvi, slina, znoja, suza, ukratko, tekućina i tkiva.

Kako se proizvodi tijelo-postajanje putem iskustvene anatomije? Iskustvena anatomija ne poznaje unaprijed formirano tijelo. Iskustvena anatomija se temelji na procesu formiranja različitih dijelova tijela i tjelesnih sustava. U tom kontekstu,

tjelovanje označava kontinuirani proces "uzimanja forme" ili kontinuirano ponavljaju akciju formiranja tijela. Tjelovanje operira putem mašte i pokreta. Preciznije, postoji stalna interakcija između realnog i imaginarnog pokreta, kao i između aktualnog i virtualnog tijela kojeg čine (u ovom kontekstu virtualno se shvaća kao potencijalno). Tijelo, kontinuirano oscilirajući između aktualnog i virtualnog — nije nikad dovršeno. Iskustvena anatomija počiva na embriološkoj koncepciji tijela koja prepoznaje samo dinamičko i kinetičko, kao i sintezno funkcioniranje organa ili dijelova tijela prisvojenih za sastavljanje, prijenos ili usmjeravanje tokova. Kao što smo vidjeli u jednom od prethodnih primjera, iskustvena anatomija istražuje tijelo u stanju toka. Kada dostigne stanje kvalitativnog i kvantitativnog toka, tijelo postaje prostor mogućnosti. U stanju toka, tijelo nije određeno fiksnom organizacijom, već je u kontinuiranom procesu dolaska u organizaciju. Ono što aktivira nastajanje njegove organizacije je interakcija između realnog i imaginarnog pokreta. U ovom slučaju, pokret postaje sila postajanja tijela. Pokret kao sila postajanja nije vanjska, već unutarnja samom tijelu. Pokret čini tijelo, točnije, kontinuirano stvara nove mogućnosti tijela, novih tjelesnih sistema i veza između njih. Iskustveno tijelo je tijelo u postajanju ili ono koje kontinuirano oscilira između realnog i imaginarnog, između forme i sile, između aktualnog i virtualnog.

3.2 KAKO SE PROIZVODI TIJELO-POSTAJANJE PUTEM *anatomy of attunement*

Anatomy of attunement je utjelovljen pristup anatomiji kojega su razvili plesni stručnjaci i stručnjaci za pokret kao što su Moshe Feldenkrais i Lisa Nelson. Moshe Feldenkrais utemeljitelj metode Feldenkrais, dok je Lisa Nelson osnivačica *Tuning Scores*-a, pristupa spontanoj kompoziciji i izvedbi. Metoda Feldenkrais je bazirana na neuromuskularnom pristupu pokretu, dok su *Tuning Scores* skupom kompozicijskih i improvizacijskih struktura. Iako se ova dva pristupa razlikuju na razini funkcije, oni svejedno dijele bitne osobine. Feldenkrais i *Tuning Scores* upotrebljavaju perceptivna istraživanja kako bi pomogli praktikantima učiti o vlastitim fizičkim tendencijama kretanja. Oba pristupa demonstriraju načine komponiranja iskustva kroz akciju *attunement*-a. Prakticiranjem ovih dvaju pristupa pojedinac razvija alate za prepoznavanje specifičnosti same tjelesnosti, te inherentnih joj struktura. Oba pristupa nude vještine i kontekst koji se zalažu za permeabilno stanje *attunement*-a. Permeabilnost je specifično fizičko stanje koje se odnosi na interakciju kroz površine ili polja. Fenomen permeabilnosti definira odnos između cjelovitog osjećaja jastva i okoliša unutar kojeg se nalazi tijelo. U stanju permeabilnosti, tijelo je dostupno sadašnjoj situaciji, za razliku od bivanja fiksiranim u uobičajenim obrascima djelovanja; ono je u stanju *attunement*-a. Nadalje, *Tuning Scores* Lise Nelson obrađuju pitanje komponiranja percepcije kroz akciju; drugim riječima, učimo kako je ono što percipiramo neraskidivo vezano uz singularnost modusa percepcije. *Tuning Scores* istražuju kompoziciju tijela putem organiziranja njegove biološke materije (koža, kosti, mišići, oči, mozak, tekućine), te njegovog iskustva. Dopuštaju li *Tuning Scores* mogućnost proučavanja iskustvenih organa, kao i iskustvene transformacije organa; je li akcija *attunement*-a ujedno i akcijom stvaranja zajedničkog tijela, kao i dijeljenih organa? Da li akcija *attunement*-a stvara nove skupine organa?

Neke od točaka ovog istraživanja su:

- prakse *attunement*-a kao karte za praćenje; prakse *attunement*-a kao karte s feedbackom koje pomažu promatranju vlastitih obrazaca, procesa i strategija postajanja tjelesnim, prisutnim i dostupnim kretanju;
- prakse *attunement*-a kao alati za stvaranje kontinuirane, spontane kompozicije i ko-kompozicije;
- prakse *attunement*-a kao alati proučavanja nastajanja kompozicije tijela, te uštímanja pojedinca u svoju tjelesnu kompoziciju na razini intencije i pažnje;

- prakse *attunement*-a kao alati za osjetilno teksturiranje i uštímavanje u iskustvenu anatomiju.

Lisa Nelson smatra tijelo kontejnerom, kao i okolišem mašte, stoga *Tuning Scores* postaju alatima za istraživanje fizičke osnove mašte: "*Tuning Scores* izazivaju spontane kompozicije koje čine jasnim kako osjećamo pokret, te mu dajemo značenje — izlažući naša mišljenja o prostoru, vremenu, akciji i želji, te pružajući okvir za komunikaciju i povratne informacije među izvođačima. Putem *Tuning Scores*-a igramo se s našom željom za komponiranjem iskustva, našom željom za činjenjem imaginacije vidljivom, razvijanjem osjećaja zajedništva i transformacijom pokreta u ples" (Nelson, <http://www.independentdance.co.uk/author/lisa-nelson/>).

Osim igranja sa željom za komponiranjem iskustva, tijela u pokretu se također komponiraju kao iskustva: "*For Stern affective attunement is key to interpersonal becoming. Affective attunement is another mode of immanent relation where the relation radically precedes the purported unity of the self. Attunement is a merging-with, it is not a feeling-of, but a feeling-with. In affective attunement, a relational merging occurs that creates a dephasing of vitality affects around new affective contours. This dephasing is as much a shift in process as shift in level*" (Manning, 2012: 46). Ovo iskustvo izaziva ono što Simondon naziva transdukcijom ili redistribucijom procesa u nastajanju, nesvodivom na dva međusobno odvojena pola događaja. Transdukcija se pojavljuje u intervalu između dva (ili više) tijela u pokretu, što dovodi do stvaranja su-tijela (*body-with*). Interval stvara otvor kroz koji su-tijelo emergira: "Tada će vaše tijelo preuzeti vodstvo i plesati u onoj točki gdje više nema ideja. Vidim to kao idealizirani oblik plesa: jednostavno ne znati i dopustiti tijelu da nas raspleše" (Forsythe, 2003: 26). Dopustiti tijelu da nas raspleše, ujedno je i činom dopuštanja tijelu da pleše samo sebe — kao jednu od faza svog kontinuiranog postajanja. Ukoliko razmotrimo pokret kao silu koja prethodi organiziranom tijelu, tijelovanje postaje linijom komprimiranja pokreta u fizičke entitete. Kako misliti tijelo kao tehniku koja nije tehničkom u stručnom smislu riječi, već vremenskom, osjetilnom, postajućom?

Kako se proizvodi tijelo-postajanje putem *anatomy of attunement*? Tijelo-postajanje se proizvodi putem akcije *attunement*-a. Preciznije, kompozicija tijela nastaje činom interakcije s drugim tijelom. Ovo je tijelo ko-komponirano, njegova je kompozicija — kompozicija-u-pokretu. *Attunement* se može smatrati simultanim činom komponiranja i bivanja komponiranim. Ono što aktivira *attunement* je relacija. Ne radi se samo o tome da mi komponiramo relaciju, već smo i sami komponirani njome. Kao takvo, tijelo nikada nije u potpunosti ograničeno na samo jednog plesača, već je komponirano

s drugim tijelom putem akcije *attunement*-a. To je tijelo — tijelo-između, određeno njegovim miljeom. Milje se u ovom slučaju može smatrati zonom neodređenosti između dva ili više tijela. Ovo tijelo je organizirano dinamički — kroz svoj kapacitet afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim. Dinamička organizacija tijela također se temelji na akciji *attunement*-a između dva ili više plesača. Ono što akcija *attunement*-a proizvodi jest kontinuirano postajanje kinetičke i dinamičke organizacije tijela.

3.3 KAKO SE PROIZVODI TIJELO-POSTAJANJE PUTEM ROLFINGA

Fascia je mreža vezivnog tkiva koja oblikuje sva tjelesna tkiva. Veliki udio fascie je vrsta tekućeg kristala, voda, tako da kada se krećemo na određene načine, to dovodi do stiskanja vode natrag u tkivo. Fascia se danas shvaća glavnim "alatom" razvoja kapaciteta tjelesne svijesti. Fascia je senzorni organ čija elastičnost omogućuje sposobnost pohranjivanja i odbijanja kinetičke energije. Izumljen od strane Ide Rolf, rolfing ili *Structural Integration* je forma dubinskog rada na tkivu kojime je moguće reorganizirati vezivna tkiva. Reorganizacija vezivnih tkiva se izvodi putem akcije njihova poravnanja i oslobađanja. Ovo poboljšava raspon pokreta, fleksibilnost, držanje i strukturu kostiju. Rolfing pomaže ukloniti kalcifikaciju u vezivnom tkivu i fasciji. Glavni cilj rolfinga je organiziranje tjelesne strukture pojedinca u odnosu na gravitaciju. Prema Rolf: "Fascia je organ posture. Nitko to nikada ne spominje, svi razgovaraju o mišićima. Kako god, ovo je vrlo važan koncept i zato što je od tolike važnosti, potrebno je razumjeti i anatomiju i fiziologiju, te posebice anatomija fascije. Tijelo je mreža fascie" (<http://rolfresearchfoundation.org/about>).

Postoji još jedna praksa koja istražuje tekućost fascie, takozvano fascijalno remodeliranje. Jedinstvena karakteristika fascie kao vezivnog tkiva je njezina prilagodljivost: kada se redovito stavlja pod povećani fiziološki napor fascia mijenja svoje arhitektonske karakteristike kako bi se prilagodila novim uvjetima. Kako misliti fasciu kao dijagram tijela ili dijagramsku mapu? Prema Deleuzeovu čitanju Foucaulta, dijagram označava modus prijenosa ili distribucije singularnosti. Dijagram je određen beskonačnošću potencijalnih pokreta, kao i beskonačnošću modusa aktualizacije. Dijagramska priroda fascie otkriva se u njenim beskonačnim modusima oprostorenja tj. aktualizacije. Fascijalno remodeliranje otvara dijagramski prostor mogućnosti koji definira ono za što je tijelo kapacitirano. Slijedeći njezinu topologiju potencijala, kako misliti dijagramsku anatomiju fascie? Ako mislimo fasciu kao naš milje — mi plešemo kroz taj milje; mi plešemo taj milje i taj milje pleše kroz nas; mi postajemo kroz njega i on postaje kroz nas. Mi smo aktivni konstruktori naše anatomije. Naše je tijelo našim integriranim alatom-tehnikom plesanja vlastite anatomije.

Kako se proizvodi tijelo-postajanje putem rolfinga? Omatajući naše cijelo tijelo, iznutra i izvana, koža se može istovremeno razmotriti kao jedan organ, no kao i više od jednog organa. Koža se također može razmotriti i kao neodređeni ili neaktualizirani organ. Koža je naš najpokretniji organ, u kontinuiranom kretanju i bivanju pokretanim, kao i u kontinuiranom postajanju u pokretu i kroz pokret. Bivajući ko-konstitutivnim dijelom kože, fascia daje oblik našem tijelu, a sami se čin "davanja oblika" aktualizira kroz određeni tip pokreta, u ovom slučaju, rolfing. Fascia je organizirana kroz

kinetiku i dinamiku dodira. Koža nije samo funkcionalan, već i kinetički organ, organ pokreta. Koža je također relacijski organ ili onaj kroz kojega afektiramo i bivamo afektiranima. Fascijalno remodeliranje uključuje suočavanje s granicama vlastitog organizma. Zbog mogućnosti fascijalnog remodeliranja, koža nije definirana na razini oblika, već kinetički i relacijski. Na razini materije, koža je neodređeni organ. Na razini teksture, oblika i veličine, koža je neodređen, kao i neaktualizirani organ. Na razini kretanja, kinetički, koža je beskonačan organ. Na razini postajanja, relacijski, koža je intenzivan organ.

4

RECONCEPTUALIZACIJA TIJELA U POKRETU

4.1 TIJELO KAO SILA-FORMA POSTAJANJA KOD SIMONDONA

Kako rekonceptualizirati tijelo u pokretu? Kako rekonceptualizirati ideju individualnog tijela? Jedan od mogućih načina rekonceptualizacije tijela u pokretu jest putem viđenja tijela kao auto-individuirajućeg sustava, za razliku od unaprijed individualiziranog tijela. Tijelo se individuiru kroz pokret; pokret pokreće tijelo iz jedne faze bivanja u drugu. Prema Simondonu, tijelo je relativna činjenica, faza bivanja. Svaka faza bivanja sastoji se od dvije kombinirane dimenzije procesa: individuacije i predindividualnog. Individuacija i predindividualno se ne mogu misliti odvojeno, budući da su dvjema stranama istog procesa. Prema Manning, "*individuation is a process of unfolding through a multiplicity of phases. What is preindividual is the phaseless excess — the more-than that envelops yet exceeds the nowness of the process in its unfolding. What is preindividual is the germ of potential in every activity. It can be thought as the force of becoming ... which is real and felt, but only in its effects*" (Manning, 2012: 16, 17).

Kako se individuacija odmatu (*unfold*)? Odmatanje (*unfolding*) individuacije događa se u pokretu i kroz pokret; pokret ne samo da nosi tijelo iz jedne faze bivanja u drugu fazu, već i iz jednog od njegovih odmatanja u drugo. Tijelo u pokretu je tijelo u odmatanju. Tijelo se odmatu na više planova i kroz više faza — istovremeno. Plan individuacije je plan multipliciteta tijela. Multipliciteta u postajanju. Ono što čini tijelo multiplicitetom u postajanju jest predindividualno — *the force of more-than*, sila besfaznog viška, sila postajanja. Unutar sfere predindividualnog — nije bitno ono što tijelo jest, već ono što tijelo može postati, te još važnije — kako ono postaje.

Simondon je također osmislio "predindividualna polja" — "polja tenzija", "polja potencijala", "*fields of more-than-one*" (više od identiteta i više od jedinstva) koja čine individuaciju mogućom. Slijedeći liniju Simondonove misli — individuacija je uvijek nepotpuni proces, uvijek ostavljajući višak predindividualnog neaktualiziranim. Taj višak čini ono što omogućuje buduće individuacije. Nadalje, individuacija uvijek stvara i individualan (jedan) i kolektivan subjekt (više-od-jednog) koji se međusobno individuiraju. Činjenica da je individuacija uvijek neputpuna otvara pitanje ontologije nedovršenosti tijela u pokretu, ili nadalje, njegove heterogeneze.

Ponovimo i razvijmo sljedeće pitanje: kako se individuacija odmata? Odmatanje individuacije događa se kroz defaziranje (*dephasing*). Individuacija nije linearan, kontinuirani proces. Prema Simondonu, faza ne označava vremenski trenutak jednostavno zamijenjen drugim vremenskim trenutkom. Nikada nismo suočeni samo s jednom fazom ili jednom individuacijom, već višestrukim preklapanjem faza koje se događa u nelinearnom vremenu. Defaziranje je višestruki proces koji prolazi kroz kontinuiranu transformaciju. Transformacija koju stvara defaziranje je ono što Simondon naziva transdukcijom, definiranom kao pomak s razine individuacije spram razine individue, što je ujedno i pomakom koji aktivira novi proces ili novu fazu ovog kontinuiranog procesa.

Defaziranja nisu samo događajima sile koja uzima formu, već i višestrukim procesom uzimanja forme tijela. Tijelo u pokretu je tijelo koje uzima formu. Svako defaziranje vodi u drugi događaj sile koja uzima formu, drugo tijelovanje. Tijelovanje (mišljeno ovdje kao glagol) je defaziranje iz sile u formu i natrag u silu. Unutar procesa defaziranja, tijelo nije jedino koje postaje, već i faza, ili preciznije, pripadajuće mu faze bivanja, također postaju. Kako faza postaje? Faza postaje kroz proces kombiniranja i rekombiniranja sve do svoje aktualizacije ili uzimanja forme tijela. Postajanje faza može se smatrati postajanjem tijela; način na koji faza postaje određuje način na koji tijelo uzima formu. Defaziranje ne samo da stvara tijelo, već ga i aktivira — svako defaziranje označava pomak od jednog modusa postojanja spram drugog, kao i pomak od jednog postajanja spram drugog.

Tijelo kao takvo je proces u kontinuiranom pomaku. Tijelo kao takvo može se smatrati događajem. Kako tijelo postaje događaj? Tijelo postaje događaj kroz sile slaganja i neslaganja između procesa ili unutar procesa defaziranja. Proces individuacije također se smatrati i procesom *fielding-a*. *The body fields itself*, kroz neistražene tenzije, potencijale, kao i postajanja predindividualnog. Odnosi između neistraženih napetosti i potencijala tijela tvore proces *fielding-a*, kao i njegovo polje postajanja. Kroz individuaciju — defaziranje — transdukciju, gdje sila uzima formu kako bi nanovo postala silom, singularan događaj emergira. Postupak uzimanja forme ne može se odvojiti od procesa individuacije, defaziranja i transdukcije ili onih procesa iz kojih je nastao. Ono što se pojavljuje kao tijelo jest relacijski čvor procesa na više razina. Točnije, tijelo je relacijski čvor sljedećih procesa:

- kombiniranog procesa individuacije i predindividualnog;
- procesa individuacije — defaziranja — transdukcije;
- tenzija, potencijala, postajanja, *fields of more-than*.

Ono što poznajemo kao "tijelo" je kulminacijom svih prethodno spomenutih procesa. Tijelo kao relacijski čvor integrira sve te procese i nastaje kroz njih, u kontinuitetu i diskontinuitetu.

Kako misliti proces individuacije tijela u pokretu? Prema Simondonu "načelo individuacije nije izolirana stvarnost koja prethodi postojanju individue. Princip individuacije, u strogom smislu, je kompletan sustav u kojem geneza pojedinca stupa na snagu. Osim toga, ovaj sustav je proširen u formi miljea individue u kojem se individuacija razvija. Život je, dakle, trajna individuacija koja se proteže u singularnost individue" (Simondon 1995: 63). Individuacije ili geneza individue je kontinuirani proces. Što aktivira ovaj proces? Je li pokret, kao i tijelo u pokretu — sredstvom istraživanja dinamizma individuacije? Stern i Manning napominjuju kako procesi individuacije nisu istraživani ontogenetski (na razini njihovog nastajanja), već ontološki (na razini njihovog bivanja). "Što učiniti po pitanju samog procesa, iskustva nastajanja relacija kao i nastajanja senzomotorne sheme? Može li novorođenče iskusiti ne samo unaprijed zadanu organizaciju tijela, već i dolazak tijela u organizaciju" (Stern 1985: 45)? Kako istražiti postajanje organizacije tijela; kako istražiti procesualnu složenost individuacije? Jedan od načina istraživanja je putem istraživanja osjećajućeg tijela u pokretu.

Manning sugerira da kako bismo mislili osjećajuće tijelo u pokretu, potrebno je: (1) istražiti tijelo u pokretu; (2) istražiti tijelo koje nije ograničeno na svoje organe; (3) istražiti pitanje "što tijelo može". Osim toga, ne moramo se usredotočiti na ono tijelo jest, već na ono kako tijelo funkcionira, što čini i kako postaje. Naše pitanje, dakle, postaje pitanje stvaranja osjećajućeg tijela u pokretu. Pokret otvara tijelo spram njegova postajanja: kroz pokret tijelo postaje više od organizma, više od organizacije, više od onoga "što tijelo jest". Sljedeće poglavlje istražuje koncept postajanja u filozofiji Gillesa Deleuzea, s naglaskom na to kako tijelo postaje s pokretom i kroz pokret.

4.2 TIJELO KAO SILA-FORMA POSTAJANJA KOD DELEUZEZA

U prvom nizu paradoksa koje otvara *Logika senzacije* (1969), Deleuze napominje kako postajati znači biti istovremeno nošen u dva različita smjera. Preciznije, "U mjeri u kojoj netko postaje, ono što netko postaje mijenja se zajedno s njime. Postajanja nisu fenomenima imitacije ili asimilacije, već dvostrukog hvata, neparalelne evolucije, braka između dva kraljevstva" (Deleuze, 1977: 8). Hvat predstavlja "način na koji individue (biološke, socijalne, noetičke) ulaze u različite odnose koji ih transformiraju. Ogledni primjer postajanja je simbioza koja veže osu i orhideju (...): životinja serija (osa) 'uhvaćena' pojavom orhideje osigurava funkciju reproduktivnih organa za nastavak biljne serije" (Deleuze i Guattari, 1980: 17). Insekt postaje dijelom reproduktivnog organa cvijeta, dok biljka postaje dijelom hranidbenog sustava insekta. Osa živi postajanje-orhidejom (bez postajanja orhidejom), dok orhideja živi postaje-osom (bez postajanja osom). Kako bi došlo do postajanja mora doći do susreta pri kojem svaki od susretu pripadajućih entita mora osjetiti drugi entitet, te mu se prilagoditi. Hvat proizvodi događaj postajanja kao događaj organiziranja: tijela organizirana hvatom se organiziraju u pokretu, jedno s drugim, što proizvodi postajanje bez ostajanja istim, kao i bez postajanja drugim. Biti tijelo znači postati s pokretom i kroz pokret; tijelo nastaje između dva entiteta. Stvaranje tijela nije činom noetičkog subjekta, zatvorenog u samog sebe, već impersonalnog su-organiziranja ili organiziranja vlastitog tijela s tijelom drugog.

Prema Deleuzeu: "*le mouvement du nageur ne ressemble pas au mouvement de la vague ; et précisément, les mouvements du maître-nageur que nous reproduisons sur le sable ne sont rien par rapport aux mouvements de la vague que nous n'apprenons à parer qu'en les saisissant pratiquement comme des signes. C'est pourquoi il est si difficile de dire comment quelqu'un apprend : il y a une familiarité pratique, innée ou acquise, avec les signes, qui fait de toute éducation quelque chose d'amoureux, mais aussi de mortel. Nous n'apprenons rien avec celui qui nous dit : fais comme moi. Nos seuls maîtres sont ceux qui nous disent ' fais avec moi ', et qui, au lieu de nous proposer des gestes à reproduire, surent émettre des signes à développer dans l'hétérogène. En d'autres termes, il n'y a pas d'idéo-motricité, mais seulement de la sensori-motricité. Quand le corps conjugue ses points remarquables avec ceux de la vague, il noue le principe d'une répétition qui n'est plus celle du Même, mais qui comprend l'Autre, qui comprend la différence, d'une vague et d'un geste à l'autre, et qui transporte cette différence dans l'espace répétitif ainsi constitué. Apprendre, c'est bien constituer cet espace de la rencontre avec des signes, où les points remarquables se reprennent les uns dans les autres, et où la répétition se forme en même temps qu'elle se déguise. Et il y a toujours des images de mort*

dans l'apprentissage, à la faveur de l'hétérogénéité qu'il développe, aux limites de l'espace qu'il crée" (Deleuze, 1968: 35).

Svo postajanje se događa kroz pokret. Svo postajanje se događa kroz susret. Tijelo postaje s pokretom, kao i s događajem. Kroz poroznosti, te kroz razmjenu između onog unutarnjeg i onog vanjskog, plivač postaje dio vode, dok voda postaje dijelom plivača. Plivač živi postajanje-vodom (bez konačnog postajanja vodom), dok voda živi postajanje-plivačem (bez konačnog postajanja plivačem). Voda i plivač, umotani jedno u drugog, stvaraju dvostruko postajanje, dvostruku površinu događaja. Plivačevo tijelo se sastoji od vode i sastavnim je dijelom vode. Ono čemu svjedočimo je susret između vode koja se nalazi unutar i vode koja se nalazi izvan plivačeva tijela.

Postajanje upućuje na topološki pojam miljea: "postajanje nije ni "jedno" ni "dvoje", ni odnos između dvoje, već ono što je između-dvoje, rub ili linija leta" (Deleuze, 1980: 360). Svo postajanje formira "blok" — susret ili odnos između dva heterogena entiteta koji se međusobno "deteritorijaliziraju". Mi ne napuštamo ono što jesmo kako bi postali nečim drugim, već se "jedan drugi način življenja i osjećanja hvata našeg načina življenja i osjećanja, te umata u njega. Ovaj odnos mobilizira četiri umjesto dva entiteta, raspoređena u heterogeni niz: X koji se umata u Y postaje X', dok Y koji se umata u X postaje Y'" (Zourabichvili, 2003: 29-30). Postajati znači odazvati se mnogostrukosti koja nas nastanjuje; postajati znači otvoriti se spram susreta, eksperimentirati sa Spinozinim pitanjem potencijala tijela ili onog što tijelo može. Postajanje se proizvodi "između", kroz milje. Drugim riječima, "kroz poroznosti, te zonu susjedstva. Ući u postajanje je fenomen, ne subjektivnog interioriteta, već žive razmjene između onog unutarnjeg i vanjskog, ono je događaj na samoj granici" (Schérer, 2002: 47).

Kako se stvara postajanje? Postajanje se stvara kroz zonu indeterminacije ili zonu između dva tijela u međusobnoj interakciji. Zona indeterminacije označava mjesto dijeljene transformacije, reorganizacije, te emergencije. Ono što stvara ovu zonu, ili bolje, ono što se stvara u ovoj zoni, jest čisti multiplicitet. "Multiplicitet ne određuje kombinaciju jednog i mnogostrukog, već suprotno tome, organizaciju jednog kao mnogostrukog koje nema potrebu jedinstva u svrhu formiranja sistema" (Deleuze, 1968: 236). Osim toga, multiplicitet "nije definiran svojim elementima, kao ni centrom ujedinjavanja ili razumijevanja tih elemenata. Multiplicitet je definiran brojem dimenzija; (...). Budući da su varijacije tih dimenzija imanentne, svaki je multiplitet komponiran od heterogenih uvjeta svog nastajanja, nastajanja u simbiozi, gdje se ne prestaje transformirati u druge multiplite koji ga okružuju [...] " (Deleuze, Guattari, 1980: 305). Svaki je multiplicitet, dakle, definiran "funkcioniranjem anomaljske

granice" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1980: 305). Anomalno, od grčkog *an-homalos* označava "hrapavost granice", kaže Jean-Clet Martin. Kontinuiran, heterogen, onaj koji se ne može dalje dijeliti bez promjena u svojoj vlastitoj prirodi — multiplicitet označava ukupnost različitih dimenzija koje se ne prestaju mijenjati. Multiplicitet se sastoji se od pokreta, precipitata, suspenzija, naglih promjena, ustreperenosti. Multiplicitet označava intenzivnu diferencijaciju, kao i dinamizam neorganskog života tijela — organiziranog ne kao sustava organa, kao sustava tokova i intenziteta.

Plan imanencije tijela poznaje samo neformirane elemente i procese subjektivacije. Ovi se procesi zbivaju u plutajućem vremenu koje istovremeno teče u više smjerova, te u prostoru otvorenom spram sile "vanjskog". Ovdje "postoji nešto više od preegzistirajućih formi, ono što postoji ovdje su kinetički odnosi između neformiranih elemenata; ovdje ne postoje subjekti, već dinamičke individuacije bez subjekta koje vode u kolektivne organizacije" (Deleuze, 1977: 112). Niti objekt preegzistira subjekt, niti subjekt konstituira iskustvo, već se subjekt i objekt međusobno individuiraju i proizvode kroz iskustvo, ili, kroz dijeljeni pokret aktualizacije. Plan imanencije ne prethodi ono što ga nastanjuje, već se konstituira događajem iskustva. Ne možemo, dakle, više govoriti o formama koje prethode iskustvu, već o dolasku u formu kroz iskustvo. Tijelo u pokretu emergira kao sila-forma u nastajanju, ono emergira kao sila-forma iskustva.

U okviru plana imanencije, postoji još jedan plan koji se može nazvati intenzivnim planom, a kojega Deleuze naziva *planomène*. *Planomène* od glagola "planesthai", označava lutanje, kao i neograničeno polje imanencije, konstituirano beskrajnom brzinom kretanja i deteritorijalizacije. *Planomène* se "pojavljuje kao polje kontinuirane interakcije [...]. Ova sila ekspanzije, poput centrifugalne sile, nas nosi onkraj granice, te stvara nove organizacije" (Heuzé, 2003: 277, 279). Deleuze govori o želji kao neodvojivoj od svojih *agencements*, svoje asocijativne sile. "Želja je čin, relacija. Želja stvara ono što Deleuze naziva "postajanje". Željati znači kretati se spram drugog" (Schéerer, 2002: 59-60). Želja kao pokret spram drugog stvara postajanje. Stvara li se postajanje kroz pokret spram drugog ili kroz pokret s drugim?

Postajanje se također tiče i domene afekata. "Afekt se ne može ograničiti na polje subjektivnosti, afekt je plan imanencije kojega se tek treba izgraditi: ovaj plan nije određen strukturiranim formama, već nestabilnim miljeom organiziranim u odnosu na afekte-strasti i afekte-akcije, re-komponirane kroz kinetičke (brzina i sporost) i dinamičke principe (intenzitete i stupnjeve moći)" (Delourme, Lecercle, 2003: 32-33). Pokret deteritorijalizacije proizvodi intenzitete — tijelo prolazi kroz njih, te u skladu s promjenama stupnja moći koje ti intenziteti proizvode, tijelo doživljava uvećanje ili

smanjenje svoje moći djelovanja. "Ovdje nema više formi, već samo odnosa brzina između sitnih čestica neformirane materije. Ovdje nema više subjekata, već samo stanja afektivnih individuacija anonimne sile" (Deleuze, 1978: 172).

Plan transcendencije se tiče subjekata; plan imanencije, "ne poznaje (...) subjekte, već *heccéités*" (Deleuze, 1977: 111). Prema Deleuzeu: "*heccéité* nema ni početka ni kraja, ni porijekla ni odredišta, već je uvijek *između*. *Heccéité* se ne sastoji od točaka, već samo od linija. *Heccéité* je rizom" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1980: 321). *Heccéité* predstavlja "individuaciju koja ne uključuje subjekta" (Deleuze, 1977: 111). Kao takva, *heccéité* omogućuje "odrediti jedno impersonalno i predindividualo polje (...) koje ne može biti određeno kao polje svijesti. (...) Ono što nije ni individualnim, ni personalnim su emisije singulariteta (...) [koje] prethode genezi individua i osoba" (Deleuze, 1969: 124-125). Tijelo u pokretu kao sila-forma postajanja je sačinjeno od *heccéités*, intenzivnih kompozicija, afekata i brzina — u odnosu disjunktivne sinteze. Sljedeće poglavlje istražuje koncept iskustva u filozofiji Alfreda Northa Whiteheada, s naglaskom na postajanje tijela kroz iskustvo.

4.3 TIJELO KAO SILA-FORMA POSTAJANJA KOD WHITEHEADA

Jedan od pojmova koje sam istražila u ovoj tezi je pojam iskustva kod Alfreda Northa Whiteheada. Štoviše, pokušala sam povezati koncepte iskustva i tijela u afektu. Jedno od najvažnijih političkih, ontoloških, fizioloških i etičkih pitanja koje koreografija i filozofija dijele jest Spinozino pitanje: što tijelo može? Pokušala sam transformirati to pitanje u sljedeće pitanje: što tijelo može iskusiti? Granice djelovanja su granicama iskustva, granice iskustva su granicama postajanja. Kako misliti tijelo kao iskustvo u postajanju? Sva su iskustva tjelesna, stoga je moguće zaključiti kako je i tjelesnost sama iskustvena. Ono što me zanima jest iskustvo ove tjelesnosti, njezino tijelovanje (*mise en corps*) kroz iskustvo. Kako misliti afektirano tijelo kao iskustvenu silu-formu postajanja? Kako misliti iskustveno tijelo kao događaj u nastajanju — proizveden relacijom afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim?

Jedan od Whiteheadovih glavnih koncepata je koncept aktualnog entiteta ili temeljnog elementa realnosti. Whitehead favorizira ideju realnosti kao relacijski umreženog događaja. Nadalje, za Whiteheada je realnost komponirana od dinamičkih procesa postajanja, a ne statike bivanja. Ono što aktivira realnost kao proces postajanja jest iskustvo. Svi aktualni entiteti su događajima iskustva. Za Whiteheada, sve što postoji je aktualnim entitetom, dakle, sve je događajem iskustva. Ljudsko biće, na primjer, je komponirano od beskonačno mnogo događaja iskustva. Stijena, cvijet, snop svjetlosti, osjećaj ili misao — svaki od njih predstavlja kontinuum preklapajućih događaja, ili, kako ih Whitehead naziva, svaki je od njih "društvom događaja". Svi aktualni entiteti ne prethode iskustvu, već se konstituiraju iskustvom — kao događaji-u-nastajanju. Također, čin iskustva ne prethodi samom sebi, već nastaje kroz čin vlastitog razotkrivanja (*unfolding*).

Kod Whiteheada, pojam subjekta je zamjenjen pojmom "subjektivne forme". Subjekt, ili "subjektivna forma", je kontinuum procesa iskustva. Prema Whiteheadu, "postoji mnoge vrste subjektivnih formi, npr. emocije, vrijednosti, svrhe, adverzije, averzije, svijesti, itd." (Whitehead 1978: 24). Subjektivna forma je više od forme, ona je silom, ili silom-formom postajanja kroz iskustvo. Subjektivna forma je "neposredna novost koja se odnosi na način na koji subjekt nešto osjeća u ovom jedinstvenom trenutku" (Whitehead, 1978: 232). Svaka se subjektivna forma razlikuje od drugih subjektivnih formi budući da je svaki subjekt osjeća na svoj jedinstveni i nesvodivi način. Novost je, dakle, funkcija načina, a ne esencije. Prema Whiteheadu, važno pitanje nije ono "što nešto jest", već "kako nešto jest", te kako to nešto postaje. Prema Whiteheadu: "ono što je važno jest kako aktualni entitet postaje to što jest... Njegovo je 'bivanje' konstituirano njegovim 'postajanjem'" (Whitehead,

1978: 23). Budući da subjektivne forme konstituiraju biće — kako je moguće misliti ih kao sile-forme postajanja bića? Multiplicitet subjektivnih formi dovodi do emergencije tijela kao događaja iskustva. Aktiviranjem realnosti kroz iskustvo ujedno je moguće i aktivirati *conatus* realnosti, njezinu moć postajanja. Iskustvo je *conatus* realnosti. Preciznije, svako se iskustvo može smatrati stupnjem moći postajanja same realnosti. Svako iskustvo aktivira singularan modus postajanja realnosti. Budući da je iskustvo bezgranično, ono kontinuirano generira neaktualizirani potencijal tijela. Ovaj neaktualizirani potencijal čini tijelo događajem postajanja. Iskustveno tijelo je tijelo koje istražuje relaciju postajanja-bezgraničnim. Iskustveno tijelo je proces i kao takvo — ono nikada ne može biti dovršeno. Kako misliti Whiteheadovu ontologiju procesa kao ontologiju nedovršenosti, te kao ontogenezu iskustvenog tijela?

Prema Whiteheadu, "emocije su temelj iskustva" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 176). Brian Massumi razlikuje afekt i emociju (Massumi, 2002: 27-28). Za Massumija, afekt je primaran, ne-svjestan, asubjektivan ili presubjektivan, onkraj značenja i intenzivan, dok je emocija izvedenicom iskustva, svjesnom, kvalificiranom i smislenom, "sadržajem" koji se može pripisati unaprijed konstituiranom subjektu. Whiteheadov koncept "osjećaja" se podudara sa Massumijevim konceptom "afekta". Svako iskustvo percepcije uključuje "afektivan ton" (Whitehead, 1933/1967: 176), a taj ton ne samo da prethodi spoznaji, već je i nadilazi. Ne radi se o tome da najprije vidimo ono što je pred nama, te potom odgovaramo na ono percipiramo. Percepcija je prije svega događaj tjelesnih afekata. Percepcija je "otvorom" u promišljanje tijela kao događaja. Whiteheadova teorija percepcije je ekstenzijom teorije emocija Williama Jamesa (1983). James tvrdi: "Tužni smo jer plačemo, bijesni smo jer smo napadnuti, bojimo se jer drhtimo, a ne suprotno, dakle, ne plačemo, ne osjećamo se napadnutima i ne drhtimo zato što smo tužni, bijesni ili uplašeni" (James, 1983: 1065-1066). Emocije ne uzrokuju tjelesna stanja, već tjelesna stanja dolaze prva, a emocije nastaju iz njih. Percepcija je akcija u smislu tjelesnih promjena. Način na koji "primamo" percepciju stvari ujedno je i način na koji se naše tijelo mijenja. Percepcija ili ekscitacija, akcija ili tjelesne promjene, emocija ili reakcija — dijelom su jedinstvenog događaja. Tijelo je iskustveno. Iskustvo je tjelesno. Aktualni entiteti se ne nalaze u prostoru i vremenu. Radije, prostor i vrijeme se proizvode kroz postajanja aktualnih entiteta. Entitet se komponira kroz akciju osjećanja drugih entiteta koji ga afektiraju. Čin osjećanja je čin susreta, događaj, otvor kroz kojeg postajemo nastanjeni silom "vanjskog". Za Whiteheada, osjećaji imaju osjećaje. Mi nemamo, kao što ni ne posjedujemo osjećaje. Aktualni entiteti (mi) i osjećaji smo jednaki. Osjećajuće tijelo je susret između tijela i osjećaja. Osjećaji teku kroz tijelo — otvarajući ga spram njegovih iskustvenih postajanja. Afekt aktivira samu konektivnost ovog iskustva. Afekt je sila, mamac, kroz

koje određena konstelacija dolazi do svoje ekspresije. "Afekti su postajanja" (Deleuze, 2004: 256). Oni mijenjaju sve ono što susretnu — to je ono što ih čini nesvodivim na kogniciju. Ono što osjećamo pri susretu s afektima jest — nepoznato (*unknown*).

Plan iskustva je plan postajanja. Ono što operira na ovom planu su afekti. Afekti nisu samo postajanjima, već i prolazima između postajanja. Iskustveno tijelo je složeno tijelo budući da je komponirano od afekata, ovdje razmotrenih u smislu nesvodivih sila. Svako je tijelo multiverzumom iskustva. Nadalje, svaka je stanica bića iskustvenim multiverzumom. Ono što Whitehead i Deleuze imaju zajedničko jest: istraživanje tjelesnih aspekata iskustva (tjelesnost iskustva), istraživanje afekata kao sila postajanja, ontogenetski pristup konceptu bića — koje sada postaje serijom nedovršenih procesa postajanja. Postoji također i razlika u njihovim pristupima; dok je Whitehead više usmjeren na subjektivne forme kao sile-forme postajanja, Deleuze je više usredotočen na postajanje samih sila. Stoga, nije dovoljno samo znati kako afekt transformira biće u kontinuirano postajanje, već i kako se sami afekt transformira kroz transformaciju bića. Ono što Deleuze dovodi u iskustvo nije afektirano tijelo, već ples afekata.

5 | ZAKLJUČAK

Ne možemo reći kako tijelo jest. Tijelo je ono koje postaje, ono je tijelo-postajanje (Erin Manning). Pokret nikada ne prestaje. Kontinuitet pokreta također je i kontinuitetom postajanja. Tijelo nikada nije samo forma, već forma-sila. Pokret otvara tijelo spram njegova postajanja silom. Tijelo u pokretu nije formom ekspresije, već poljem-silom ekspresivnosti. Pokret povezuje tijelo s njegovim poljem ekspresivnosti gdje tijelo počinje plesati svoj potencijal činjenja, proizvođenja i postajanja. Ono što je nužnim jest postaviti pitanje ontogeneze tijela u pokretu ili njegova procesa nastajanja. Tijelo nikada nije dovršeno, već je u kontinuiranom stanju postajanja. Osim toga, nije bitno usredotočiti se na ono tijelo jest, već na ono kako tijelo funkcionira, što čini, te kako postaje. Naše pitanje, dakle, postaje pitanje stvaranja osjećajućeg tijela u pokretu. Pokret otvara tijelo spram njegova postajanja: kroz pokret tijelo postaje više od organizma, više od organizacije, više od onoga "što tijelo jest".

Nužno je rekonceptualizirati tijelo u pokretu kao kontinuirano auto-individualizirajući sustav, za razliku od unaprijed individualiziranog tijela. S tog stajališta moguće je rekonceptualizirati individualno tijelo u pokretu, te njegove biološke, anatomske i senzorske strukture, ne kao unaprijed zadani entitet, već kao fazu u njegovom kontinuiranom postajanju.

Tijelo se može percipirati i izvoditi kao partitura, tijelo-partitura ili ono koje stvara vlastite relacijske moduse postajanja tijelom. Tijelo se organizira kretanjem i razvojem svakoga od svojih organa kao polimorfnog alata, tako da svaki organ postaje vremenskim, samoorganiziranim alatom-tehnikom. Nadalje, tijelo kao partitura ne predstavlja sustav organa, već sustav relacija (i relacijskih postajanja organa, kao i samog tijela). Tijelo je relacijskom partituro — ili ono koje se stvara u pokretu i kroz pokret. Tijelo izvođača nije ono koje utjelovljuje određenu tehniku, već tijelo samo postaje vlastitom singularnom tehnikom; tehnika nastaje kroz istraživanje individualnog tijela, iznutra, te nije nametnuta tijelu, izvana. Ovo je ujedno i trenutak kada se tijelo počinje režirati, koreografirati i izvoditi — kao tijelovanje ili kao jedinstven događaj sile koja uzima formu.

Tijelo nije ono koje je, već ono koje uzima formu, ono koje postaje. Pokret ne samo da stvara tijelo, već također čini tijelo vlastitom partituro, ili drugim riječima,

pokret omogućava tijelu da se pleše i izvodi samo sebe poput partiture. Tijelo je partitura; tijelo je pokret. Nužno je istražiti tijelo izvođača kao kompoziciju kapaciteta afektiranja i bivanja afektiranim, kao i kompoziciju kontinuiranih postajanja koja čine različita (potencijalna) tijela unutar jednog tijela, te različite anatomije unutar jedne anatomije.

Tijelo je uvijek više od jednog tijela — ono je sjecište između fizičkog, iskustvenog i relacijskog tijela. Tijelo nikada nije unaprijed zadano ili dovršeno — na fizičkoj, iskustvenoj ili relacijskoj razini — već je kontinuiranim pokretom. Pokret čini tijelo, dakle, tijelo je pokret. Ne plešemo s tijelom, već plešemo tijelo kao takvo. Tijelo je partitura, tijelo-partitura, vlastitog postajanja.

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CE QU'UN CORPS PEUT DEVENIR:

CARTOGRAPHIE ENTRE DANSE ET PHILOSOPHIE

Cette thèse n'explore pas ce qu'est le corps, mais ce qu'un corps peut devenir. Elle explore le corps comme un événement en train de se faire à travers les concepts tels que le Corps sans Organes (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari), le *bodying* (Erin Manning), le corps en train de se faire (Erin Manning) et le devenir (Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari). Ce que tous ces concepts ont en commun est l'état de devenir. Ici, le corps devient, et en tant que tel — c'est un verbe, une activité, une force. Cette thèse explore non seulement le corps comme une force de devenir, mais elle explore également le devenir de cette force — au niveau moléculaire, expérientiel et relationnel. Comme le dit Manning, un corps est toujours plus qu'un corps. Ici, nous essayons d'aborder les devenirs physiques, expérientiels et relationnels d'un corps en mouvement. Ce qui bouge le corps de l'état d'être vers l'état de devenir est le mouvement. Cette thèse tente de montrer comment le mouvement ne s'arrête jamais. Nous bougeons toujours, donc, il y a une continuité de devenir. Un corps n'est jamais uniquement une forme, il est une force-forme. Le mouvement est celui qui ouvre le corps vers son devenir de force(s). Un corps en mouvement n'est pas une forme d'expression, mais une force d'expressivité. Le mouvement fait le corps, par conséquent, le corps lui-même est un mouvement. Nous ne dansons pas avec le corps, nous dansons le corps lui-même. Le corps est une partition, un corps-partition, de son devenir.

Mots clés : Corps sans Organes, *bodying*, corps en train de se faire, corps-partition, mouvement, devenir.

WHAT A BODY CAN BECOME:

CARTOGRAPHY BETWEEN DANCE AND PHILOSOPHY

This thesis does not explore what body is, but what a body can become. It explores the body as event-in-making throughout the concepts such as Body without Organs (Antonin Artaud, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari), *bodying* (Erin Manning), *body-in-making* (Erin Manning). What all of those concepts have in common is the same state — a state of becoming. Here, body becomes, and as such — it is a verb, an activity, a force. This thesis does not only explore the body as a force of becoming, but it also explores the becoming of that force — at the molecular, experiential and relational level. As Manning says, a body is always more-than one. Here, we are trying to approach the physical, experiential and relational becomings of a body in movement. That which moves the body from the state of being into the state of becoming is movement. This thesis is trying to show how movement never stops. We always move, therefore, there is a continuity of becoming. A body is never just a form, but a force-form. Movement is that which opens the body toward its becoming of force(s). A moving body is not a form of expression, but a force-field of expressivity. Movement makes the body, therefore, the body itself is a movement. We are not dancing with the body, we are dancing the body itself. The body is a score, a body-score, of its own becoming.

Keywords: Body without Organs, *bodying*, *body-in-making*, *body-score*, movement, becoming.

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