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# Filtering class through space: security guards and urban territories in Delhi, India

Damien Carrière

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# Filtering Class through Space : Security Guards and Urban Territories in Delhi, India

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA  
AND TO THE FACULTY OF PARIS SORBONNE CITÉ  
BY

DAMIEN CARRIERE

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Under the supervision of:  
VINAY GIDWANI AND VERONIQUE DUPONT

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africains, américains et asiatiques (CESSMA)

# Filtering Class through Space : Security Guards and Urban Territories in Delhi, India

Par Damien Carrière

Thèse de doctorat de Géographie  
Dirigée par Véronique Dupont et Vinay Gidwani  
Présentée et soutenue à Minneapolis le 11 décembre 2018

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Priyam, will you keep walking by my side? *You make me happy when skies are gray...*



This work is for the students whom I had the honor and joy to teach.

## **Abstracts**

### **Titre en français : La Ville au filtre des gardiens de sécurité – Domination et territoires urbains, Delhi.**

#### **Résumé :**

Les gardiens de sécurité sont présents en grand nombre dans les quartiers des classes moyennes et supérieures de Delhi et dans les centres commerciaux. Je demande : quels effets ces gardiens de sécurité ont-ils sur la ville de Delhi ? Un quart de million d'hommes sont déployés dans ses rues, sans qu'ils parviennent à enrayer la criminalité contre les femmes. Il apparaît que les gardiens de sécurité ont essentiellement pour rôle de marquer le territoire qu'ils surveillent comme étant celui des classes moyennes et supérieures. Le premier chapitre expose en détail la méthodologie de ce travail. Le second propose une « phénoménologie des gardiens de sécurité », c'est-à-dire une description de qui ils sont et du travail qu'ils font. Ce travail tend à remettre en cause la notion d'espace public. Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse au cadre légal et montre ses contradictions internes. Non seulement les lois ne sont pas cohérentes, mais elles sont surtout ignorées. Cela ne doit pas être perçu comme un affaiblissement de l'État mais comme un renforcement de la position des classes moyennes et supérieures dans le contrôle de la ville. Dans le quatrième chapitre je propose de placer les gardiens de sécurité dans l'économie politique de Delhi. Je montre comment ils participent de retarder les crises du système capitaliste notamment en absorbant une partie de la main d'œuvre surnuméraire. Le système qui permet aux gardiens de sécurité de travailler repose sur une division genrée du travail qu'ils contribuent à accentuer en renforçant la domination masculine sur les rues de Delhi.

#### **Mots clefs :**

Delhi, gardiens de sécurité, sécurité privée, espace public, Lefebvre, production de l'espace, ethnographie, géographie du travail, capitalisme et sécurité, travailleurs d'interface.

**Title : Filtering Class through Space : Security Guards and Urban Territories in Delhi, India**

**Abstract :**

Security guards have become a fixture of a city like Delhi. They stand on duty in every upper and middle-class neighborhood and in every mall. I ask : what are the effects of security guards on the city of Delhi? A quarter of a million men are deployed in Delhi's streets, and they are not successful in stopping crimes against women. It appears that the role of security guards is to mark the territory that they keep under watch as belonging to the upper and middle-classes. The first chapter exposes in detail the methodology employed for data collection. The second one proposes a "phenomenology of security guards", that is, a close description of who they are and the work they do. Their work interrogates on the making and unmaking of public space. The third chapter pays attention to the legal framework and shows that the laws framing the work of security guards are neither coherent, nor respected. This should not be interpreted as a weakening of the state but rather as a reinforcement of the domination of middle and upper-class over the control of the city. In the fourth chapter I deploy the vocabulary of political economy approaches to explain the role that private security guards play in its sociopolitical fabric. I show that it participates in keeping at bay crisis by absorbing a significant surplus population. The system that permits the guards to work rests on a gendered division of labor which they contribute to reinforce by keeping Delhi's street masculine.

**Keywords :**

Delhi, security guards, private security, public space, Lefebvre, production of space, ethnography, geography of labor, capitalism and security, interface workers.

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## Glossary of Hindi terms

Azaadi	अज़ादी	Freedom, liberty
Bidi	बीड़ी	Hand rolled cigarettes without filter. The cigarettes of the poor.
Bindi	बिंदी	Make up coming, generally, under the form of a small red point worn on the forehead, above the arch of the nose.
Bhagidari	भागीदारी	Partnership. Name given to a major policy initiative in Delhi.
Chai	चाइ	Sweet milk tea.
Chowkidar	चौकीदार	Security guard, watchman.
Goondas	गुंडा	Muscle man, hired thug.
Hijra	हिजरा	Transgender.
Jhuggi	झुग्गी	Slum dwelling, hut.
Kabadi-walhe	कबाडीवाले	Literally, those who deal with recycling.
Kharcha pani	खर्चा पानी	“Water expense”. Bribes.
Kshatriya	क्षत्रिय	Second <i>varna</i> (social order) of traditional Hindu society. Upper caste associated with ruling and warfare.
Maalik	मालिक	Employer (boss).
Rajputs	राजपूत	Cluster of caste from North India, generally considers itself as upper caste. Associated with war.
Rickshaw	रिक्शाँ	Classically a hand pulled cart to transport people. By extension it often includes its cycle and automobile variations (auto-rickshaw or just “auto”).
Sabziwalha	सब्ज़ीवाला	Vegetable seller.
Thekedar	ठेकेदार	Contractor.
Tiffin box	टिफिन box	Tiffin means box, so literally, “box box”. The box is meant to carry the lunch or the snack, by metonymy, a tiffin is a lunch box.
Tilak	तिलक	(Not to be confused with bindis). Powder mark applied on forehead in Hindu temples and ceremonies.

## **List of Acronyms**

- **AAM:** Aam Aadmi Party
- **ATM:** Automated Teller Machines
- **BJP:** Bharatiya Janata Party
- **BSF:** Border Security Force
- **CAPSI:** Central Association of Private Security Industry.
- **CEO:** Chief Executive Officer
- **CESSMA:** Centre d'Études en Sciences Sociales sur les Mondes Africains, Américains et Asiatiques
- **CISF:** Central Industrial Security Force
- **CGHS:** Cooperative Group Housing Societies.
- **CrPC:** (Indian) Code of Criminal Procedure.
- **CRPF:** Central Reserve Police Force.
- **CSDS:** Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.
- **DCP:** Deputy Commissioner of Police.
- **DDA:** Delhi Development Authority.
- **ESI:** Employee State Insurance.
- **FDI:** Foreign Direct Investments.
- **FICCI:** Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
- **G4S:** Group 4 Security.
- **GES:** Geography, Environment, Society
- **GPS:** Global Positioning System.
- **HR:** Human Resources.
- **IGNOU:** Indira Gandhi National Open University.
- **ILO:** International Labor Organization.
- **INR:** Indian National Rupee.
- **IPC:** Indian Penal Code.
- **IRB:** Institutional Review Board.
- **JnNURM:** Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
- **MSDE:** Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (Union).
- **MCD:** Municipal Corporation of Delhi
- **NCRB:** National Crime Record Bureau
- **NDMC:** New Delhi Municipal Corporation
- **NOS:** National Occupational Standards.
- **NSDC:** National Skill Development Corporation.
- **OBC:** Other Backward Classes
- **PF:** Provident Fund

- **PMKVY:** Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana, a skill development program. “Program of the Prime Minister for the Development of Youth.”
- **PPP:** Public-Private Partnership.
- **PSARA:** Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act. The term can designate either the Act of 2005, the rules of Delhi in 2009, and the agency in Delhi in charge of verifying its implementation.
- **PSARR:** Private Security Agency Regulation Rules.
- **PUDR:** People’s Union for Democratic Rights.
- **RWA:** Resident Welfare Association
- **RPL:** Recognition of Prior Learning
- **SCST:** Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Caste
- **SEZ:** Special Economic Zones
- **SIS:** Security and Intelligence Services. A major security company
- **SPA:** School of Planning and Architecture
- **SQA:** Standards and Quality Assurance.
- **SSC:** Sector Skill Council.
- **SSSDC:** Security Sector Skill Development Council.
- **SWI:** Security Watch India
- **TSA:** Transport Security Administration (United States).
- **ULCRA:** Urban Land Control Regulation Act
- **UNOCD:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

« Il ne s’agit pas d’être jugé. Il ne s’agissait pas de bonne ou de mauvaise politique. Il s’agissait de répondre à une question – à une question intimidante – à une question que personne encore au monde n’a pu jamais laisser sans réponse, jusqu’à son dernier souffle.

- Laquelle ?

- « Qui vive ? » dit le vieillard en plongeant soudain dans les miens ses yeux fixes.

La nuit était claire et sonore quand je sortis du palais désert. Une lueur froide et minérale décapait les contours des arêtes de pierre dure, projetait sur le sol en treillis d’encre les ferronneries compliquées des vieux puits qui s’ouvrent encore au ras du sol sur les placettes de la ville haute. Dans le silence de la nuit, au delà des murs nus, des bruits légers montaient par intervalles de la ville basse, bruit de l’eau qui coule, roulement attardé d’une voiture lointaine – distincts et pourtant intrigants comme les soupirs et les mouvements d’un sommeil agité, ou les craquements inégaux des déserts de rochers que le froid de la nuit contracte ; mais dans ces hauts quartiers nourris d’altitude et de sécheresse, les pans durement coupés de la lumière bleuâtre et laiteuse collaient à la pierre comme une peinture et n’avaient pas un cillement. Je marchais le cœur battant, la gorge sèche, et si parfait autour de moi était le silence de pierre, si compact le gel insipide et sonore de cette nuit bleue, si intrigants mes pas qui semblaient poser imperceptiblement au-dessus du sol de la rue, je croyais marcher au milieu de l’agencement bizarre et des flaques de lumière égarantes d’un théâtre vide – mais un écho dur éclairait longuement mon chemin et rebondissait contre les façades, un pas à la fin comblait l’attente de cette nuit vide, et je savais pour quoi désormais le décor était planté. »

Julien Gracq, *Le Rivage des Syrtes*. (1951) p.352-353

“It’s not about being judged. It isn’t about good or bad politics. It is all about answering a question—an intimidating question—which no one in the world could ever leave unanswered, until his last breath.”

- “Which question?”

- “Who cometh? – ‘qui vive?’”—and plunged into mine his motionless eyes. The night was clear and full of echoes when I left the deserted palace. A cold mineral glow scoured the hard stone cornices, casting on the ground into inky trellises the elaborate wrought-iron of the old wells which still opened on the ground of upper city’s the little squares. In the silence of the night, beyond the naked walls, faint sounds rose at intervals from the lower city, sound of running water, the late rolling of a distant cart—distinct yet intriguing, like the sighs and movements of a restless sleep, or the uneven cracks of desert rocks contracting under the night’s cold; but in these upper districts fed with altitude and dryness, the harshly cut slopes of bluish, milky light clung unwaveringly to the stones like a layer of paint. I walked on with a pounding heart, a dry throat, and so perfect around me was the silence of the stones, so compact the tasteless and echoing frost of that blue night, so intriguing my foot imperceptibly stepping above the cobblestones, I believed I was walking among the bizarre organization and the bewildering puddles of light of an empty theater—but a harsh echo kept lighting up my way and ricocheted against the house fronts, a footstep finally fulfilled the expectations of that empty night, and I knew what the stage was set for.”

Julien Gracq, *Le Rivage des Syrtes*. (1951) p.352-353<sup>1</sup>

1 Translation by Richard Howard, for Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, revised by me.

## INTRODUCTION

### 1 - Preamble and main research question

As *The Economist* puts it: “It has become *de rigueur* for every ATM<sup>2</sup>, office, shop and apartment building to have guards. Across India millions of young men now sit all day on plastic seats in badly fitting uniforms with braids and epaulettes, unshaven and catatonically bored” (*The Economist* 2013). Despite their growing number and ubiquity, systematic geographical and anthropological research on these security guards is yet to be done. Delhi's security guards are tasked with insuring a lifestyle exclusivity which in Delhi has become class-defining (Srivastava 2012, 2015a).

At first glance, the guards inhabit a contradictory role. Guards are entrusted with the work of regulating the movements of the city's poor into and out of richer neighborhoods, whose inhabitants' lifestyles depend on the varied services such poor populations provide. The guards themselves, were it not for their uniforms, would be considered undesirable. Guards embody a role that places them in a position of domination vis-à-vis the members of their own class strata. Yet they are often disrespected in their daily job by the class that employs them. Indispensable, yet replaceable, tasked with “filtering out” members of their own class from the spaces inhabited by their employers without any realistic opportunity of upward socio-economic mobility, Delhi's security guards embody the paradoxes and difficulties of growing class

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2 Automatic Teller Machine

disparities in cities of the global South. Their work is illustrative of the growing rupture between lives that are considered worthy of safeguarding and those that are not.

The presence of private security guards in Indian cities raises questions. What are the roles they play in the production and reproduction of urban space in Delhi? What effect do they produce? What city do they make? In short, *what is the effect of private security guards on the city?* The guards are enforcing the class division of the city and making obvious where the borders between classes stand. This role is not only symptomatic, it is also enabling a certain life that depends on the guards. The guards play an instrumental role in the production of Delhi's urban space. (Lefebvre [1974] 2000) Lefebvre's "trialectic" of space production proposes to differentiate between:

"1- *Spatial practice*<sup>3</sup>, which embraces production and reproduction, particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. [...]

2- *Representations of space*, which are tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to 'frontal' relations.

3- *Spaces of Representation*, embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or under-ground side of social life, as also to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a code of space than as a code of *representational Space*)." (Lefebvre [1974] 2000, 43)<sup>4</sup>

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3 Often translated into the concept of "lived space" in English-speaking literature, even though the term appears just once in the English translation of the *Production of Space*.

4 I modify here slightly the common translation by Donald Nicholson Smith. He gives *Espace de representation* as "*Representational Space*". This removes the chiasmatic structure which I reconstitute. Note that Delhi does not correspond to what Lefebvre's called the "oriental city corresponding to the Asiatic mode of production"—whatever that really means—but is fully integrated in a capitalist space-

Security guards enable this “trialectic” to function in Delhi. Their *spatial practices*, and the practice they force others to follow, give form to the spatialized reproduction of capital and therefrom to the production and reproduction of class difference. The presence of security guards has a sensory impact. In regulating who can go where it is the aesthetics of the city that is modified. This aesthetics is also immediately political. Security guards manage, regiment, and look over the class division between rich and poor. They contribute to the difference in the way rich and poor encounter the city, making it rougher or more welcoming. This class approach must be supplemented by taking into account the parallel role they play in generating gendered space and caste discrimination. One could expect that they would play a role in protecting the women of their employer’s class as gender violence is a matter of concern in Delhi. Yet, they rather seem to take a part in keeping Delhi’s streets masculine.

Security guards’ presence in Delhi may have to do with aesthetic. In the mind of its “civil society” (Chatterjee 2004, 2011)<sup>5</sup>, Delhi and its neighborhoods are *represented* as possible objects of surveillance. Their imaginary of the city is imbalanced. The upper-class tends to imagine the city as a rational and manageable grid which does not leave place for the necessary presence of the poor. The role of guards is to attempt to make this

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economy.

« a) *La pratique spatiale*, qui englobe production et reproduction. Lieux spécifiés et ensembles spatiaux propres à chaque formation sociale, qui assure la continuité dans une relative cohésion.

b) *Les représentations de l’espace*, liées aux rapports de production, à l’« ordre » qu’ils imposent et par là, à des connaissances, à des signes, à des codes, à des relations « frontales ».

c) *Les espaces de représentation*, présentant (avec ou sans codage) des symbolismes complexes, liés au côté clandestin et souterrain de la vie sociale, mais aussi à l’art, qui pourrait éventuellement se définir non pas comme code de l’espace mais comme code des espaces de représentation. »

5 For Chatterjee (2004, 2011) the civil society is, in contrast to the political society, the part of the population that expresses itself in the terms of laws and rights and not through political negotiations. I come back later to those terms.

a reality. Yet this attempt introduces in the middle and upper-class' neighborhoods the stigmatized presence of the body of the poor. This contradiction is mitigated by the aesthetic of the uniform. This contradiction between representation and practice permeates the entire economy of security guardianship in Delhi. The *Spaces of representation* are the neighborhoods, the upper-class areas and the malls that serve as representations and monuments to Delhi's ruling class. Security guards are present at every pole of the "trialectic". My work attempts to capture these effects while contributing to the literature on urban fragmentation and to the literature on critical security studies.

First, I start by interrogating who the guards are, how they arrived there and how they became guards. Second, the presence of security guards is a testimony to the policing of Delhi. In one sense, this presence shows a security apparatus that is not the monopoly of the police; more fundamentally, it is an expression of a changing notion of state policing. Third, they are at the threshold of the city's social and spatial divisions. They stand as intermediaries between conflicting class interests and reveal, as much as they enforce, the urban territories of Delhi. Finally, security guards take part in the reproduction of class division and labor.

My first interrogations on security guardianship in Delhi started when I noticed the impact security guardianship had had on me. In Delhi there are airport-style patting and scanning of luggage and carry-ons each time one takes the metro, enters a mall or a cinema hall. After nearly seven months of my first research period in Delhi my parents



paid me a visit. We toured the city I had learned to navigate. My father was surprised to see me comply and adjust so naturally to searches by security guards. In his words, those of a retired prison psychiatrist, I behaved like “an old inmate”. The security guardianship of the city had crept into my habits further and faster than I would have thought possible. I had myself incorporated the processes even without accepting the norm. It was several years before I returned to that material under the angle of the geography of urban labor. I now turn to the evolution of the research questions that have guided my work.

### 1.1 - Evolution of research questions

When I started my work my main research questions were: How does the flourishing security sector guarantee the security and proclaim the existence of a visible upper-class city, and how does this work affect the guards, the employers and the lowest classes? This has not changed a lot, I am still at times bewildered at the functioning of this industry. Some of the subsidiary research questions and approaches have changed as my understanding progressed. In this part I present the evolution of the research questions. I assess the value of the hypotheses I formulated in the course of the project. The questions are presented in the order in which they shaped the research rather than in the order corresponding to the sequence of chapters.

#### 1.1.1 - The guards stand for the visible grid of the city

Security guards stand at the gates of class distinction. The visible and physical differences between classes encourage private security companies to advertise their services to prospective clients by presenting the poor as non-desirable. They play on

middle-classes anxieties vis-à-vis the city's underclasses. This situation creates an urban geography that rests on exclusion. Relegated to the city's margins where they can afford to live, security guards secure the upper-classes' representation of the city.

This representation of the city is the “visible spatial order” the guards defend. For Jeff Garmany (2014, 1243) “police is a systematized organizational code (i.e., a general law) that delineates and orders bodies in space, producing what is possible (and impossible), defining what can be known, and dividing a given community into logical coordinates”<sup>6</sup>. The guards do not belong to the police in the sense of the state institution tasked with enforcing law and order. They take part in this “organizational code” that divides the city. Yet, even as they are the living markers of this orderly fragmentation, the guards live in the interstitial space of the city. They belong to the class of workers who sustain and lubricate this order, while inhabiting spaces and while relying on networks of solidarity that are beside and below the “rule of aesthetics” (Ghertner 2015a). Two grids are superposed, one visible and one informal and invisible. Both are complementary to allowing the city to function. Yet this superposition forms a contradiction as their *representations* are mutually exclusive – one cannot draw two maps on one sheet of paper. I thus ask: How does the flourishing security sector guarantee the visible grid of the city?

I formulate the following hypothesis: security companies are providing guards to maintain the value of real estate capital, and not, for example, because of a surge in criminality. As such, the guards are a symptom of a larger problem embracing

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6 Jeff Garmany mentions the work of Rancière (1995, 2007, 2008).

inequalities, the “real-estatization” of the city. The economic importance of land gives landownership a politically determinant advantage. This domination expresses itself through an aesthetic that follows middle and upper-class ideological representation of the city (Ghertner 2015a). It is spatially enforced by land development agencies, public or private, such as the Delhi Development Authority. It mobilizes the judicial system by and for the upper and middle-classes through public interest litigations (Bhan 2016; Bhuwania 2018) and other legal petitions.

Yet, we can also ask, aren’t the neighborhoods already strongly laid out to separate the upper-class from the others? In Dwarka, in West Delhi, where I conducted some of my fieldwork, the Cooperative Group Housing Societies came together as already exclusive groups. The class divide is materialized by the concrete walls circling their buildings. Guards are the last human ring on a chain of securitization that was carried out by architects and clients and that has immobilized financial capital from the inception of each project (Newman 1972). Security guards proclaim that these buildings fully belong to—and represent, in the sense of “stand for”—the middle-classes of Delhi.

#### 1.1.2 - The guards mostly originate from upper-caste background.

Security guards are tasked with filtering the poor out of the upper-class territories. Yet again, guards themselves inhabit the ranks of the urban poor. Most of the guards I have interviewed are upper-caste, and in majority are Brahmans, while the majority of the population is not. I explain in the methodology section the choice of informants, and I come back at length on this issue in the first chapter. For now, it

suffices to say that a significant proportion of informants taken from several parts of the city and various companies, belong to this caste. Security guards describe their colleagues as coming from the same caste<sup>78</sup>. Some employers also indicate that the men they employ are “Jha from Bihar”<sup>9</sup>.

While caste-based employment has been extensively studied in the context of rural India, there is comparatively still some room to study its prevalence in urban settings. Sustained research efforts have been made in particular toward Dalits (Prashad 2000; S. Kumar 2013). Fewer researchers have written monographs on the role of other castes and dominant caste in urban India (Benbalaali 2013; Gooptu 2013a; Chari 2004; De Neve 2016).

The prevalence of caste-based networks of recruitment, combined with a near absence of formal training, seemed to indicate that the recruiting of security guards involved as much safety as it involved a symbolic of purification transferred from the caste hierarchy to the class structure. Indeed, the structures of class relations in cities have been shown to mimic and reproduce the social distances and distastes hitherto attached to caste relations (Fernandes 2006; Frøystad 2003; Waldrop 2004).

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7 Jay Prakash, Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.

8 All names of interviewee and companies have been changed in accordance with Institutional Review Board regulations.

9 K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi. English.  
Jha is a name indicating a belonging to the caste of the Maithil Brahmin, a dominant upper-caste originating from the region of Madhubani and Darbanga in Bihar.

How does the recruitment of upper-caste guards facilitate the representation of a dream city (Dupont 2011) from which the stigma of poverty would be materially and symbolically excluded?

To answer this question, I formulated the following hypothesis: Contrary to the common belief that contractual recruitment dissolves ascribed caste identities, the formidable manpower demanded by the sector has not broken the back of caste preferences. The persistence of the latter could be explained by preferential trust as well as by a form of symbolic attribution of the highest castes' purifying functions.

This reading of the caste system as a “hierarchy of purity” was in no small part inspired by the anthropology of Louis Dumont (1966) and has been widely criticized. Dumont tends to make of Brahmans, at the top of the hierarchy of castes, the “key” to understanding the system, and thus made of them, the authorized “interpreters” of Hinduism (Lardinois 1995).

No surprise then that the fieldwork I have conducted did not confirm this hypothesis. Most material elements tend to indicate that the recruitment of Brahmans is not a matter of demand but of supply<sup>10</sup>. The companies or employers do not appear to actively seek a certain caste, but men of a certain caste appear to seek this employment. I could not research in depth the networks of recruitments that have solidified this caste domination over this segment of urban labor.

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<sup>10</sup> I am grateful to Awadhendra Sharan for this formulation.

This question should not obfuscate that the most obviously missing category of workers is that of Muslims. I explain in the second chapter that questions on that account fell into another kind of dead end: many informants, from the top to the bottom of the industry, expressed prejudices against Muslims in a way that made questioning them about the recruitment of Muslims moot.

#### 1.1.3 - The guards learn skills they practice in an informal manner.

In the performance of their work, security guards use embodied judgment as a means of filtering the movements of poor people into and out of neighborhoods. That is, they use various unstated criteria to differentiate those who belong and those who do not. Growing segregation in housing and privatization of public amenities (such as roads and parks) has fostered a booming market for security service companies. A contradiction emerges: Security guards barricade public spaces, which are *de facto* marked private by residents and the State, and yet manage its permeability to flow of workers who ensure the lifestyle of the affluent.

Thus, I raised the question: What expectations and practices, formal and informal, govern how private security personnel manage the porous barriers between who is allowed “in” and who is kept “out”?

To answer this question, I formulated the following hypothesis: The ultimate criterion for entering a neighborhood seems to be appearance and self-confidence. The security apparatus relies on the class distinctions prevalent throughout the country. The clues that the guards use to know whom to filter are acquired on the job itself. They

expect a “bodily hexis” (Bourdieu 1980) betraying upper and middle-class belonging. This is built through contacts with employers and colleagues, and so are the practices they employ when they stop someone to question them or refuse access. This equally works in malls, in which few members of the lower class are expected to venture.

Experience and embodiment are very related, and in my fieldwork questions the two concepts came very close to one another. I explain in detail in Chapter 2 what I do with these notions. It proved correct that class distinctions prevalent throughout the country remain an essential criterion to move around certain neighborhoods.

My initial question remains important, but it has been difficult to exploit during the interviews with the guards. The change I had to make to this question also comes from the difficulties of my fieldwork. In order to experience what I then thought was the first step in “becoming” a security guard, and strongly impressed by Wacquant’s work among fighters in *Corps et âmes* (L. J. D. Wacquant 2004), I had set out to stand for the regular legal training described by the (“Private Security Agency Regulation Act” 2005).

This was not unproblematic. My positionality and own embodiment made me stand out among the guards. They would call me sir, and without conflating me with the management, assumed, unsurprisingly, that I belonged to the same class as their primary employers. I still thought this would be an interesting experiment and would help me access the men of the field with more ease. However, I discovered while in the field that the policy on training of guards was mostly implemented in the realm of ideas, and that

the trainings that I was able to join were in no case formalizing this sort of knowledge. I get back to this in more detail in the methodology chapter.

The aesthetically based distinction comes already naturalized. Standing in the uniform, one becomes part of a despised labor force in a new city (Gooptu 2013b). This question remained central however, as I interrogated the notion of “interface workers” (see Box 9 p.170), and the role of the latter in the fabric of the city. The transformation of this question through a passage in urban literature into “how to think the work of the guards in the context of South Asian cities”, helped me formulate the hypotheses that guide Chapters 4.

#### 1.1.4 - Guards as interface workers

Security guards negotiate the contradictions between their identities as inhabitants and their functions as uniformed guards. Elite discourses portray the poor as uncivilized and unruly, undeserving of proper recognition in the planning imaginary. The work of security guards is illustrative of the growing rupture between lives that are considered worth safeguarding and those that are not, while the guards themselves, were it not for their uniforms, would be considered undesirable. In the terms of an advertisement:

“[...] we are happy that we are serving human race via our stout security guards. [...] Our guards are well-trained to deter and fail any unexpected criminal protuberance to even touch you and your walls. You will be protected inside the safe cocoon of our guards security shelter.”

(Advertisement 2013).



A discrepancy emerges between their function under the guard's uniform and their belonging to the very class that they are paid to exclude.

I asked: How do “interface workers” like private security guards who are charged with gate-keeping the boundary between the “haves” and “have-nots”—but are intimately witness to the lives of both—experience their work (from the perspective of employment conditions, aspirations, moral predicaments, emotions, etc.), and how are they transformed by it?

I suggested the following hypothesis: Security guards respond to the class disparity they witness by strengthening, under their uniform, their caste identification and the sense of self-worth that it seems to procure for them.

If several security guards during the interviews did display caste pride<sup>11</sup>, my fieldwork did not confirm this hypothesis either. Similarly, wearing a private security company uniform, which they had to pay for, did not appear at all like a matter of pride. The guards did not seem to be building resentment against their employers as a class, even if the distance was often clearly expressed by expressions such as “these people”, or “these rich people”.<sup>12</sup>

If the hypothesis did not prove a useful one, the question remains relevant. I give some answers to it in the first part of this dissertation. I interviewed security guards and tried to frame my questions in a way that could help me understand their perceptions and experiences. A first qualitative survey of security guards in Delhi helped to determine a

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11 Jay Prakash, Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.

12 "ये लोग", "ये अमीर लोग"

typology of companies, while focusing on the lowest end of the market. Such groundwork permits me to reject right off the bat comparison between private security guards and police or soldiers. It also sets them far apart from the “wannabe” culture of the Northern American model of private policing described by Rigakos ([2002] 2016) in *The New Parapolice*. He shows how becoming a policeman is still the objective of security guards and how this objective permeates their work culture. By contrast, my work re-establishes security guards squarely within the ranks of a precarious and exploited working class.

#### 1.1.5 - Guards act within a regulatory framework that is fluctuating

Guards lubricate the relations between upper and lower class. They also act as part of the policing of the streets, as a part of the security infrastructure that shapes Delhi. The Central Government has put together a framework of rules and regulations considering them in turn as manpower and in turn as part of the security apparatus. The latter is left under the jurisdiction of the Home Department in the Government of the Union Territory of Delhi. Those two positions are difficult to reconcile. It shows disarray in the treatment of this major source of employment. In the words of Daniel O’Connor et al. in *Seeing Private Security Like a State* (2008, 204): “While the overall aim of state regulation may be to order conduct, the use of diverse regulatory mechanisms signals to us that the state regulation of private security is largely an assemblage of different, even incongruous, parts”<sup>13</sup>. It is thus not surprising but expected that different state institutions might develop contradictory schemes.

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13 See also: Diphorn (2016b).

The distinction between public and private keeps structuring our political imaginations as well as the legal field. Cracking open the security layers of neighborhoods in Delhi allows us to examine the problem with renewed eyes. I ask, “How does the organization of Delhi’s security guardianship open a window in the relations between state and private means of exclusion and control?”

The diverse and contradictory levels of regulation called for an in-depth exploration. I provide below a systematic explanation. Then I ask what effect those regulations have and how they form a “legal geography” clarifying, or on the contrary making murkier, the ground for security guardianship. Since the laws and regulations are not respected, what project is being written for Delhi’s security apparatus and the men carrying it out? The non-performance of the legal framework is not a problem of political will only. It was, to start with, poorly designed. But it is also off the mark in its distinction between state and market, public and private. It fundamentally misrepresents these categories. I argue that private security still unsettles the most common understanding of state and of the limits of state power.

Before turning to the literature review I trace a brief historical presentation of Delhi and its interests as a field site.

## 1.2 - Choosing Delhi as a site of fieldwork.

In the following section I explain why Delhi, the capital of India situated in the North of the country (see Map 1 p.17), is a relevant site for the topic I have studied. I first give a succinct historical background around the matter of urban security. Then I explain

that few scholars have explored the topic of private security in Delhi. It is surprising because the Indian capital stands apart among the cities that have witnessed a growth of the private security sector. If the other world cities that are generally the object of such studies have a high incidence of criminality, Delhi is by contrast a relatively more secure environment. The point here is not to establish accurate statistics and impossible comparisons. The aim is simply to point out the apparent lack of correlation between the growth of criminality and private security that justifies the investment of research time in this city.



*Map 1: New Delhi in India*

Source: Google Maps 2018. The international boundaries depicted on this maps may not be accurate.

Delhi is also a place I have come to know over the years. I have conducted there several research projects for my Masters and my MSc. Its history and geography, but mostly its culture, are more familiar to me than would be the culture of Lucknow or Hyderabad. I did my first interview in Hindi there and mimicked the Delhite way of speaking. I knew where to go and where to seek help, which allowed me more time for the completion of my study. Conversely, I might have chosen security guardianship precisely because of my encounter with the nightly transformation of the city into a maze

of absurd gates. Delhi is not a pleasant and accommodating city, and the guards are, for strangers, one of the most surprising and frustrating fixtures.

#### 1.2.1 - Succinct historical background

The legacies of colonization, of partition, of the Emergency and finally of the beginning of liberalization have left on Delhi multiple layers of security concerns and entrenched ethnic and religious divisions. What is now called Old Delhi was another capital built on a site that had witnessed many such capital foundation. It stands on the banks of the Yamuna, at the crossing point of the Yamuno-gangetic plains. The city of Shahjahanabad was founded by Mughal emperor Shah Jahan in 1648. The Mughal were a dynasty of Muslim rulers who managed to unify most of the sub-continent under their rule (Kulke and Rothermund [2004] 2006).

British colonization brought down the Mughal rule in deeds before it did in law. They left the Mughal emperor on his throne in Delhi while exercising the reality of power. The Sepoy revolt, or the first war of independence—depending on who writes history—broke out in Delhi in 1858, scaring the British crown into dissolving the East India Company, putting an end to the reign of the last Mughal emperor and transferring the political power to the crown. In the aftermath of the revolt, Muslim citizens were evicted from the city. The walls of Delhi were partially destroyed and the Red Fort, the city fortress and palace, were occupied by the British forces (Frykenberg 1993).

In 1911 king George the Fifth decided to transfer the capital of British India—the Raj<sup>14</sup>—from Calcutta to Delhi. He took that decision in order, officially, to inscribe the symbols of the Raj into the long history of Mughal rulers. In addition, the colonization of China, next door to Calcutta, had proven impossible. Delhi was centrally located and offered a rational place from which to rule the empire. Finally, nationalist agitation in Calcutta had started to undermine the British rule and moving to Delhi took the capital away from the hotbed of the Independence movement. The British architect Eduard Luytens was chosen to head the development of the new city (N. Gupta 1981; Irving 1981).

He opted for the small hill and the flat plain laying in the south of Shahjahanabad. The Capital was inaugurated in 1931. The old city was left underdeveloped and decaying under the twin weight of a fast-growing population and a chronic lack of investments. New settlements were authorized in the West of the city (Karol Bagh) to host the workers necessary for its functioning. The Delhi Improvement Trust was established in 1936 to remedy the crisis but it was left chronically underfunded. The city kept expanding to the South. As Stephen Legg (2007) points out, a network of police stations and security “*dispositifs*” was put in place to keep the populace at bay from the government center.

The Independence of India was obtained the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1947, alongside the partition of the country between India and Pakistan across approximate religious lines. This partition caused major displacement of population, estimated to reach 14 million


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14 Raj – राज – means rule in Hindi.

people and took a human toll ranging between several hundred thousand and 2 million (Talbot and Singh 2009). Out of a population of 900,000, an estimated 329,000 Muslim inhabitants of Delhi, including most of its traditional intellectual elites, fled inter-communal violence. 495,000 refugees, mostly from Punjab and Sindh took their place in Delhi (Dupont 2000, 230). Despite difficulties, Sikh and Hindu refugees in the city planted new roots (Kaur 2007). New areas were formed in particular in the South of the city. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was set up in 1957. The first Master Plan came in force from 1962 onward, facilitating the building of self-contained neighborhoods with their characteristic inner parks.

Delhi was subsequently marked by the Emergency between 1975 and 1977 (Tarlo 2001). Following a series of civil unrests, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared the state of Emergency (Guha 2008). Her son Sanjay Gandhi and the vice-chairman of the DDA Jagmohan forcefully carried out a series of beautification drives and de-congestion works (Jagmohan 1978). Those targeted mostly Muslim areas (Dayal and Bose 1977; “The Wrecking of Delhi” 1978).





Map 2: National Capital Territory.  
Source: Google maps, 2018.

Since the nineties the city has known a double movement of massive city growth as well as renewed policies of large-scale evictions of the poorest classes toward the outskirts of the city (Dupont, Tarlo, and Vidal 2000; Nigam 2001; Srinivas 1998). According to the Census of India<sup>15</sup> the population of Delhi crossed 16.3 million inhabitants in 2011.

The population growth of Delhi caused the city to expand geographically. The Delhi Development Authority authorized the development of the sub-cities of Rohini in the North West and Narela in the North in 1981, and Dwarka in the South West in 1987. The latter is the background of a part of my fieldwork. The creation of the National Capital Region was called for in the Master Plan of 1962. Its board was established in 1985.

At the same time, the courts, pushed by judicial activism, decided the closure of numerous industrial units and workshops under the name of pollution, depriving migrants of labor (Kathuria 2001; Bhan 2016). Awadhendra Sharan (2014, 205) gives the figure of 700,000 workers threatened by a Supreme Court Judgment in 2004. Resident Welfare Associations (RWA) and Cooperative Group Housing Societies (CGHS) spearheaded the movement of what Amita Baviskar (2002) has dubbed “bourgeois environmentalism”.

The liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 encouraged a growth in inequalities and middle-class lifestyle. The increased inequalities and relegation of the poorest classes to the margins of the city correlated with a fragmentation of the city along

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<sup>15</sup> The Census takes place every ten years.

lines of exclusivity (Srivastava 2015a). According to some informants, the first security guards came to Delhi with the first ATM, even though a journalist from the New York Times notes that the phenomenon was already well underway in 1988, when 80 companies employed already 50,000 guards (Hazarika 1988). It is in this context that security companies have started to deploy in Delhi. The trend of inequalities and fragmentations have been unabated in the second decade of the century. The Commonwealth Games of 2011 served as a pretext to accelerate evictions to unprecedented levels (“Planned Dispossession Forced Evictions and the 2010 Commonwealth Games” 2011). In Box 1 p.24 I give a brief overview of the political structure of Delhi.

*Box 1: A quick glance at Delhi's political structure*

The political structure of Delhi has evolved since Independence. As a Union Territory and specifically as the capital of the country, Delhi was under direct rule by the central government. By an Act of 1991 the Union Territory of Delhi became the National Capital Territory (see Map 2, p.21). The first elections for its Legislative Assembly were called in 1993 and led to the nomination of a Chief Minister taken from the rank of the winning party. However, central government prerogatives, such as law and order and land control are exercised through the Lieutenant Governor, who is nominated by the central government.

This two-headed situation is creating multiple conflicts. Since 2015 to date, the government of Delhi is led by the Chief Minister Arvind Kerjiwal from the *Aam Aadmi Party* (AAP, Party of the common man). The AAP was born from an anti-corruption movement and carried a distinct middle-class identity and was elected on a populist-inclusive platform. It is confronted with the reluctance and political maneuvers of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian People's Party) ruling at the center. The BJP was elected on a Hindu-identitarian and nationalistic platform. Among the intricacies created by this dual administration, in a full-fledged state the task of licensing guards and that of maintaining law and order would be under the same Home Ministry. In Delhi the Licensing is done by the Home Department to the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, itself under the control of the the Chief Minister. Maintaining law and order is the role of the Delhi Commissioner of Police, who depends on the central government.

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is under the purview of the Central Government. “The Delhi Development Authority, established in 1957 by the Government of India, is charged with drafting the Delhi master plan and developing the city to provide housing, commercial and recreational space, and infrastructure for Delhi's residents. The Authority's mandate is broad—“to promote and secure the

development of Delhi”—and it is involved in almost every activity related to land, housing, and infrastructure in Delhi. The Authority’s power extends far beyond the ‘planned city’: with control over countless acres of ‘encroached’ land, the DDA plays a larger role in governing Delhi’s jhuggi jhopri clusters (JJs) and other unplanned settlements than any other agency in the city.” (Sheikh and Mandelkern 2014)

### 1.2.2 - Delhi stands out in the international context

Delhi, by virtue of its size of more than 16 million people and the number of its guards—between a quarter of a million and half a million in Delhi<sup>16</sup> out of 7 million in India<sup>17</sup> (“CAPSI” n.d.)—could be a paradigmatic example of a security situation, which, with considerable variations, echoes through the metropolises of the global South. Yet the situation experienced in Delhi stands in stark contrast with trends observed, for example, in Latin America.

Most of the literature on private security in the global South has focused on South America (Ungar 2007), particularly on Brazil (Caldeira 2000; Garmany 2014), and in Africa, particularly on Kenya and South Africa (Fourchard 2011; Diphoorn 2016a, 2016b). The literature on private security in India, despite recent studies (Nalla, Murthy, and Omni 2013; Gooptu 2013b; Upadhyay 2011), has been surprisingly scarce when

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16 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

Vinod Chaubey, Training Institute, Interview, 21st February 2017, Delhi, English.

17 This figure cannot be verified, it is repeated by the Central Association of Private Security Industry and the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI, n.d.) without it being possible to know who came to it first or with which methodology.

weighted against the rising importance of this economic sector and the importance of the guards in the daily life of major Indian cities.

The level of violence, at least in blood crimes, seems to be much lower in Delhi (see in Box 2 the difficulties of establishing comparisons), setting it aside from those cities of the Global South. Everything happens as if there were something else behind security guardianship. Indeed, the reduction of thefts like auto-radios and mirrors is generally mentioned as a prime reason for deploying or keeping guards<sup>18</sup>.

If Delhi is not teeming with murderers, the level of violence has a strong gender dimension. According the National Crime Record Bureau (2016), the city largely deserves its reputation for being female unfriendly. Moreover, most upper and middle-class females I have interviewed informally or formally do not feel reassured by the presence of guards. Everything happens as if guards were hired for reasons that have only little to do with the safety of persons and bodies.

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18 Jules Maigret, Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.

Mrs Savita, Interview, 3rd January 2014, Mansarovar Garden, Delhi, English.

*Box 2: Homicide rate: a good measuring tool for insecurity?*

I would like to take the example of the homicide rate to illustrate the claim that the level of violence in Delhi is significantly lower than those of other cities in the global South. I do not mean that there is in any case a correlation between security guardianship and murder rates, nor that guards could have an impact on it. Homicide rates are only interesting because they permit a comparison between cities on a level of violence that allows comparable statistics. It is perfectly possible that a place teeming with violence could have a low murder rate if, for some reasons such as low gun possession, this violence was not causing fatalities.

Homicide rate is maybe the only comparable parameter among vastly different cities. It permits us to realize that Delhi is not as insecure as its reputation would have it, for this particular type of crime. Indeed Delhi's homicide rate contrasts starkly with that of other cities of the global South which also have had a surge in number of guards, and which have been the objects of research. Therefore, the growth of security guardianship can not be simply correlated with crime rates.

It is not possible to take a holistic approach on crimes to compare cities in different countries because the legal classifications vary. "Cognizable offenses to IPC (Indian Penal Code)" cannot be taken as an element of international comparisons any more than the Brazilian criminal code. Yet murders are generally classified and reported quite clearly and in easily comparable terms: A has killed B. Murders have other advantages. Homicides suffer from less under-reporting than other types of crimes like drugs related crimes or rape. An homicide is also quite binary: the victim is either dead or not dead, so the qualification is easier. In addition, it is generally considered the worst possible offense. This matters because statistical registrations often record only the later. I.e, a crime involving theft followed by murder can be simply recorded as a homicide. Every amateur of the *noir* genre knows that a body is hard to dissimulate.

The same goes for statistics about bodies, which—at least according to UNODC statisticians—are hard to camouflage.

In India the National Crime Records Bureau compiles the statistics on crimes. The NCRB relies on First Information Reports given by police stations. It uses population projections based on census, which make the exercise notoriously difficult. According to the National Crime Record Bureau (2016), the rate of murders in Delhi was 2.9 per 100.000, and 2.5 for the Union Territory of Delhi in 2015. This makes Delhi the 5<sup>th</sup> city with the highest murder rate in India. The homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil was 31 per 100,000 in 2015 (Ramos 2017), 28.2 in Johannesburg in 2015, and 61.5 the same year in Cape Town (Africa Check 2016). For comparison, the homicide rate in Paris, France, was 1.2 the same year and 8.4 in Minneapolis, USA (“INHESJ” n.d.; “City-Data” n.d.).

The conclusion of the above is that the rate of murders in Delhi is lower than that of its peers among the great metropolises of the global South. It does not say anything else on other crimes or forms of violence such as violence against women in particular. The point is that the bored men sleeping in the ATM booths of Delhi are simply miles away from the “armed response” signs of Johannesburg or the military police of Rio De Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Delhi’s security guards are there for other reasons that statistics do not point at. Of course, the incidence of gender and caste on the rates given above would require a much more detailed examination in order to establish firmer conclusions. This would go beyond the scope of this study.

Why such a massive deployment of security guards in the city, then? Concomitantly with the growth of the private security markets, all these cities have known deepening inequalities and increasing segregation between rich and poor. Delhi’s class divisions are well documented (Baviskar and Ray 2011; Srivastava 2015a; Tawa Lama-Rewal and Ruet 2009a; Waldrop 2004), and boundaries and exclusivity are



constitutive elements of its identity. The security apparatus of Delhi appears to be less about security than about exclusivity. This, I argue, explains the focus on properties and moral policing rather than the protection of bodies.

## **2 - Literature review and positioning of this research.**

The literature on private security in India and in Delhi in particular has been scarce. Mahesh K. Nalla, Kiran Ommi and V. Sreemannarayana Murthy (2013) conducted small-scale quantitative research with a distributed sample of 368 respondents, out of 480 questionnaires, in a metropolis of South India. The authors show that the general population of the city they observed tends to trust private security guards and are “*optimistic* that in the future, many of the police functions would be taken over by private security organizations” (p. 234)—my emphasis. Their methodology however reduces the scope of their finding to a rather narrow set of population. One of the authors of the article selected two of his graduate classes in management to run the questionnaire. After the students filled it, they were asked to administer questionnaires each to people of their own neighborhoods. The class distribution of samples, and therefore the results, are unsurprising: 56% of their respondents have a university degree, the rest still includes college degrees. They mobilize international literature mostly based on criminal justice journals. Their approach takes the angle of criminology and criminal justice studies, leaving little room for a critique of private security.

Sanjay Upadhyay (2011) conducted another quantitative study exploring the difficult social conditions of security guards in Delhi region. His approach takes cues

from essentially two sources: cases and court judgments published by the International Labor Organisation (ILO), and literature produced by the stakeholders of the market, nationally or internationally, such as *Security Management*, the on-line journal of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) (Berrong 2009). He explores the distinction between formal and informal labor and focuses mostly on the common violations to labor laws faced by security guards. He concludes with a set of policy recommendations. The latter sets the tone for what the industry should be, but remains a little afar from explaining the specificity of that industry in contrast with other sectors employing mostly informal employees.

Nandini Goptu (2013b), in “*Servile Sentinels of the City*” has produced probably the best anthropological work available on Indian security guards. She explains that “recruitment and training [in this regime of organized informality] are systematically institutionalized and formalized by private agencies, with the imprimatur of the state, but employment relations remain informal and insecure” (p.9). The work of security guards presents the characteristics of “embodied work and emotional labor that characterize low-end service jobs” (p.9). However, she “concentrated [her] in-depth qualitative research [...] on a major security company that supplies guards to numerous important sites in the Kolkata, along with its associated training agency that has extensive collaboration and partnership with the government and urban development institutions for the skill development of poor youth. (p.13)” I show that companies actually giving training, while important in the upper segment of the market, are not the majority.

The importance of security guards in the making of an exclusionary city as well as their practices and beliefs vis-à-vis the role they play in the city are two areas that have been, by and large, overlooked. My study will address this gap, and for that purpose will borrow its main supports in the following four overlapping sets of literature: the first one is the debate around what is commonly called neoliberalism, the second set of literature traces the urban geography of exclusion, the third questions the notion of territory, and the emerging set of Critical Security Studies is the last set of literature I identify here. I complete those specific sets with specific literature reviews on each part of this dissertation yet, those core questions around which I built my research questions remain fundamental throughout.

#### 2.1 - Debating neoliberalism in the city.

South Asian scholarship inspired by the writings of Michel Foucault ([1978] 2004) has attempted to illuminate the government (Chatterjee 2011) of urban populations. A mainstay of these approaches is an enacted distinction between the domains of “political society” and “civil society”. The first is the realm of the poor, who are citizens only in name and whose conduct ought to be regulated and managed. They are the object of development policies. Those policies are presented as de-politicized by the state, yet the political society reveals itself to be a site of intense politics. The latter domain comprises the elite, who, as bearers of substantive citizenship rights, can invoke law and power to influence the state in their interest (Chatterjee 2004, 2011). However, this work is oddly silent on the lived geographies of urban life, specifically the contact zones between the inhabitants of civil and political society that have to be secured, and the

workers who do that securing. The patterns of employment that secure everyday life in Delhi is dependent on the mobilization of logics which would be referred to as emanating from the political society, such as the caste-based employment of security guards.

Different thinkers characterize the process of de-politicizing issues of urban governance, including security, in vastly different manners (Foucault [1979] 2004; Agamben 2011). If most critiques consider that neo-liberalism has won, the real identity of the victor, and the nature of the victory is still the object of many debates. I sum up three approaches, those of David Harvey, Michel Foucault and Loïc Wacquant.

Harvey (2005) points out that neoliberalism is an ideology that sprung up among ruling classes because the power that labor acquired after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War was too strong. Labor organizations needed to be crushed and wages lowered. Neoliberalism is the economic ideology fostering the dismantling of public services and the reduction of state protection.

For Michael Foucault ([1979] 2004), neoliberalism is a technique based on knowledge of economic process. The State organizes the market to let their interplay produce its fruits. The State is better off not knowing and not intervening in the processes. This, however, goes hand in hand with a discipline and a power over life, produced and reinforced by and through the market. I come back in more detail to this notion, famously called “biopolitics”, in Chapter III, part 5 p.219.

Wacquant (2012) proposes a “*via media* between these two approaches that construes neoliberalism as an *articulation of state, market and citizenship* that harnesses

the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third” (p.73). I do not think that the State has rescinded, but it has changed the way it functions and tends to lend its power of organizing markets to the private sector, while favoring the upper-classes.

Security is traditionally seen as the first and most core mission of the State; the implication of the private sector reveals a sea change in the approach of public policies. These changes are in no way uncontroversial, and private security remains clearly distinct from the public services. Giving private security companies a role in public services shows that the ruling classes of Delhi rely more and more on the market and transform their surroundings into privatized spaces. The chronic under-staffing of the Delhi Police (Bhattacharyal 2017; Shankar 2017) is not alone at the origin of security companies’ growth. An examination of the regulation of the security sector shows how the involvement of security companies favors the most well-funded. The continuum between state and private sector goes both ways, favoring new avenues of corruption. I engage more in depth with the underlying theories of the state at the origin of those principles of control of violence through the market in the first two-parts of Chapter III. In Chapter IV, I argue that the economic conditions necessary for the emergence of security guardianship in Delhi were met with the liberalization of the Indian economy. This turn in the economic policy coincides with the adoption of theories and practices in Delhi in which, in short, previously public policies are contractualized to the private sector.

## 2.2 - Urban geography and exclusionary cities

Urban Geography in the Global South has responded to the growth of cities and become a major and contested subfield (Houssay-Holzschuch, Padovani, and Berger 2014). A core dispute has opposed scholars such as Saskia Sassen (1991), who situates and ranks cities in terms of their positions within the networks of global capitalism, and scholars such as Jennifer Robinson (2006), who argues that northern urban models and historical processes have had an undue influence on the analysis of cities in the South. She proposes to reassess urban theory in terms of “ordinary cities”.

The notion of public space appears to me paradigmatic of an urban and social structure that tends to concentrate interest and research without being re-asserted critically in various locations. Studies on urbanism and security apparatuses have by and large considered the disappearance of public space in cities across the world as problems to be addressed (Habermas [1962] 1990; Sennett 1977; Jacobs 1969; Kohn 2004). The notion of public space designates urban areas—streets, park, avenues—in which the democratic life of a city finds its multiple forms of expression. This is of course partly a fantasy; it is a performative one, as it orients political debates as well as urban design policies and realizations (Allain 2004). Malls and “semi-public” areas are built around the model of public space taking the “outside in” (Martin 2010), that is, mimicking the architecture of public streets inside privately owned and controlled malls (Sorkin 1992). Privately owned malls or public metros (Augé 1994) cannot be considered public space as they do not offer a ground for the elaboration of “public life”. I develop upon this idea specifically in relation to an appraisal of the “spatial ethnography of labor”, Chapter II

p.124. In the words of Vinay Gidwani and Sharad Chari, it brings the insights from “the radical geography emerging from the work of Henri Lefebvre to ethnographies of work” (2005, 267). Space, in this understanding, is not a given, but a produce. Correspondingly, the present work does not aim at painting an immobile landscape or at writing a job description. It aims at describing the social efforts, the practices and the social dynamics that are contributing to the complex production of Delhi’s urban space.

In India the partial disappearance of the idea of public space is manifested in the solid forms of the gates that are erected across public streets by neighborhood associations. Yet it is possible to question the relevance of the concept of public space, at least for Delhi. Its emergence is linked to a notion of equality that might not have taken a firm ground in the making of this city. The abandonment of the idea of public space is as much a domination of class as it is class defining. It entails the impoverishment of the lives of the excluded.

Delhi, as the capital of a major emerging country, has attracted a concentration of major research efforts (Tawa Lama-Rewal and Ruet 2009b; Dupont 2016; Ghertner 2015a; Baviskar 2003; Srivastava 2015a). These scholars have shed light on how the poorer classes navigate and make sense of a cityscape (Appadurai 1996). The guards form a part of the “human infrastructure” that regulates the permeability of middle-class islands. Their presence has been treated as a given parameter of the exclusionary city. I borrow the term of “human infrastructure” from Abdoumalig Simone (2008) but I give it a slightly different meaning. For Simone, the “human infrastructure” forms a network of

help among migrants, or among a city's poorer residents. Here, I use the term infrastructure in a sense closer to the infrastructure meant by the contributors to the body of work that has, in later years, taken particular interest in the metabolism of the city (Gandy et al. 2007; Anand 2017). The human infrastructure is necessary for the metabolic functioning of the city; it combines flesh and concrete, or in this case, the iron of the gate and the gray of the uniform.

Even when confronted with recurring waves of eviction, Delhi's poorer classes should not be considered as passive. They actively gather resources (Zérah, Dupont, and Tawa Lama-Rewal 2011) and political support (Chatterjee 2004). A body of work developed by mostly French scholars at the "Centre des Sciences Humaines" has contributed to examining the work of city-making accomplished by the poorest classes to transform progressively, sometimes against all odds, their environment. The actor-centered gesture of this "urbanization from below" (Raman et al. 2015) is comparable with the work of Asef Bayat (2010) and Michel de Certeau ([1980] 1990). Urbanization from below has focused on the elaborate strategies of the poorest and recalled that the poor are necessary for the city to function. In Chapter 2, part 4, I pay particular attention to the materiality of the guards' labor.

My research will take cues from this literature and examine life in Delhi as a condition, rather than a result of, international circulation of urban models of development and surveillance techniques. In this setting, security guards play the double role of making the city for themselves while making it for the others. It is in this sense



that I call security guards “interface workers”, with the same call for “learning from labor” as authors such as Vinay Gidwani (2015) or Patrick Inglis (2017). I take up the call of Mark Neocleous (2008), Jeff Garmany (2014), and Kevin Karpiak, (2016) that an anthropology of police (and guards) is overdue.

Indian sociology has extensively investigated the plight of the poorest workers (Breman 2004; Talib 2010). Only Gooptu (2013b) has penned an article on the “professionals” of class exclusion that are the security guards. I join her approach informed by the relationship of failed recognition between the serving and the dominating classes. Their relation of inequality is not only a by-product of their respective position in society but constitutive of the way they interact with the world. I will come back in more details to that point in a later section. Unlike readings inspired by Alexandre Kojève ([1947] 1979) I do not understand the relation between the serving class—here the guards—in the terms of psychological mis-recognition between master and slave (Ray and Qayum 2009). I do see on the contrary that the employers’ classes tend to be oblivious that the guards are performing work, and that work consists in lubricating the interaction between them and the messiness of urban life.

A very rich body of literature, among which one finds “Subaltern Studies,” has focused on the Indian working class and elaborated upon the conceptual pair of power and resistance, often emphasizing the latter term (Menon 2007). Few have “studied up” the ladder of domination at the interface between working classes and elite control (Nader 1972). I hold that the analysis and unearthing of forms of resistance cannot

overlook the analysis of forms and embodiments (Nagar 2006; L. Wacquant 2002) of domination. The research I propose will therefore take into account urban seclusion, security issues, trainings, origin and the recruitment of security guards and the learning curve.

The secessionist tendencies of higher classes have appeared in parallel with the challenging of redistributive policies around the world. In his seminal work *City of Quartz*, Mike Davis (1990) describes and explains the landscape of class violence and domination in contemporary Los Angeles. His work has generated numerous responses and critiques exploring the modalities and social consequences of city fragmentation (Caldeira 2000).

Works on the appropriation of the city by the established or emerging middle-classes (Fernandes 2006; Rajagopal 2002; Dupont 2013) have laid the foundations for theorizing the role played by spatial imagination (Soja 2011) in the basis of a claimed class identity (see Box 5 p.92). Sanjay Srivastava (2012) has examined the incorporation of middle-class neighborhoods into Resident Welfare Associations (RWA). RWAs have become fixtures of a decentralized organization of Delhi. They are hiring guards and erecting iron gates at the junction between the streets under their “jurisdiction” (Ford 1999) and those that are “outside”. A geography of security guards thus offers a unique vantage point onto the constitution of a territory at its point of solidification.

### 2.3 - Territory at the crossroads

The notion of territory was once discarded as irrelevant in modern societies (Badie 1995). The concept was too close to ethology at best, and it was opening the gate to a parochialism at worst. The concept is now understood as dynamically produced rather than static (Deleuze and Guattari 1980). It has remained widely in use in French geography (Di Méo 1998). Territory permits various notions to come together. A territory is a controlled space therefore it can be a jurisdiction. It can also be the home of an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), be it a nation, a class or a clan. It is also crisscrossed by travelers and roads, therefore by techniques and devices, themselves regulated. What the notion really permits is a geographical anchorage in which multiple phenomena, be they weather and law, interplay.<sup>19</sup> My research sheds light on the articulation between ethnography of what we have called interface workers and geography of urban fragmentation (Navez-Bouchanine 2002; May et al. 1998). In Chapter IV, I point out the economic conditions that have made this fragmentation possible.

The term of urban fragmentation is widely used to describe: the division of cities into classes (Madoré 2004), interruptions in infrastructures (Jaglin 2005), the making of political boundaries (Lefèvre and Jouve 2002), and even threats to biodiversity (Croci 2008). Urban territories can be a mode of this fragmentation. Generally, it is seen as the geographic expression of a threat to the metabolism of the city, the smoothness needed for its flows to function. It also describes perceived threats to a city’s social equilibrium,

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<sup>19</sup> For examples of very different approaches see: Brighenti 2010; Delaney 2010, 2005; Gervais-Lambony, Landy, and Oldfield 2003; Dupont and Landy 2010.

its redistributive capacity or even to its wildlife. Philippe Genestier (2002), in a contribution titled *The rhetoric of the fragmented city, or, when the holist ideal is passed down to the local level*<sup>20</sup> points out that the term tends to be used in a nostalgic way and obfuscates that there probably never was an unfragmented city. Deploing the fragmentation of the city or the social distances among its territories is less fruitful than elaborating on the social consequences. I tend to establish a link between the fragmentation of the city and Lefebvre’s idea that the built environment is the spatial expression of the prevalent relationship of production (Lefebvre [1974] 2000). Therefore, the geography of labor I propose not only sheds light on another case of urban fragmentation, but also aims at looking at what is in germination in this fragmented environment.

#### 2.4 - Critical Security Studies

It is also through the notion of territory—which implies control—that I link urban studies literature with the burgeoning field of critical security studies. I need to forthrightly disambiguate the term. “Critical Security Studies” was first employed in the context of international security and remains widely employed in the field of International Relations (Krause and Williams [1997] 2005). The adjective “critical” here seems to qualify the security, not the studies<sup>21</sup>.

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20 “La rhétorique de la ville fragmentée, ou quand l'idéal holiste est délégué à l'échelon local”, my translation.

21 Several scholars like Neocleous (2014), Wendy Brown (2017), and Kristian Williams et al. (2013) have shown the continuity between the international order, the tactics and strategies deployed on the battlefield and the techniques of police. I agree with them by and large, however, the scale of the present study does not permit me to engage with such wide claims.

The meaning I chose for this dissertation is a more recent development and concerns mostly urban policing, and the relationship between law and order and capitalism, particularly in urban settings (Diphorn 2016a; Garmany 2014). This body of literature attempts at rethinking “security” away from the idea that it would inherently be “a good thing” (Neocleous 2008, 3–4). The field has known a major growth in recent years under the influence that the idea that public security could be a market becoming mainstream and the realization that the dynamics of racism as well as economic and gender inequalities were pervading the police apparatus (Karpiak 2016; Caldeira 2000).

Roberto Esposito (2008) helps to theorize how notions of territories, legal order and security operate together. He suggests the paradigm of immunity to explain the articulation of exchange, permeability and circulations as well as the eventual interdictions that are constitutive of geographical territories. For him the “*munus*” is an anthropological concept designating something that must circulate among people, like a gift—or a revenge—that must be passed on, repaid, under pain of social exclusion. Thus, *immune* designates something that is abstracted from this circulation, a territory or a person. This immunity—like in the biological sense—is what permits one to construct an individual away from the group. It can be destructive as well as enabling to interrupt a ruinous circulation of gifts, or break the circle of revenge. This critique, more than a rejection of control, permits us to think about the effect generated by social groups extracting themselves from circulations positively or not. In this case, it permits us to escape the trap of either denouncing the fragmentation of the city and the exclusivity of

the upper and middle-class or condoning a paranoid obsession for security. I engage in further details with the work of Esposito in Chapter III, p 225.

Those four large debates in literature, neo-liberalism in the city, urban fragmentation, territory and critical security studies shed lights on different approaches to the problem at hand. State regulation and “incorporation” of norms by workers permits the domination of the upper-class to remake the city at its image. I now turn to the plan of this dissertation.

### **3 - Announcement of plan**

#### 3.1 - Context and methodology

In the first chapter I give a detailed account of what I have done and how I have done it. I present the sites of fieldwork, the methodology chosen and the actors I have identified. I also point out the limits of this research. This intends to give the reader not only a clear view of how I have conducted my fieldwork, but also of what can or cannot be held as reliable in this methodology. At times to explore or to answer a hypothesis it proved necessary, in view of the social context and the taboo on certain social phenomena such as cast preference, to adapt the research design.

For this research I conducted two research campaigns, one as preliminary fieldwork and one for a year. The details of the fieldwork are explained at length. I will proceed with a description of the labor of security guardianship. In the Appendix I explain in which contexts I carried out several research projects in Delhi before starting this one and the construction of the preliminary hypotheses.

### 3.2 - Embodiment of labor, phenomenology of security guards

Chapter 2 attempts a spatial ethnography of labor (Gidwani and Chari 2005) for the security guards of Delhi. I first follow the evolution of working class history and ethnography of labor. This ethnography of labor however, for understandable axiological reasons has, until recently, paid only scarce attention to the labor of security and surveillance. In parallel, a set of literature has emerged worldwide using ethnography to describe and understand the role that police and private security forces play in society. In India the work of Nandini Gooptu (2013b) and the recent publication of Beatrice Jauregui (2016) enact a junction between those two trends. The present work contributes to this effort, while pointing out that the security the guards are doing has little to do with the safety of goods and persons, and a lot to do with the affirmation of a class domination. This is reshaping the urban environment of Delhi through the presence of the security guards.

I draw a demographic, economic and sociological picture of security guards with data I have obtained from my own fieldwork. I point out that a majority of the guards are temporary migrants, mostly from Bihar, that they are poor landowners and that a large majority of them are upper-caste Hindus. I show the contrast between their demographic group and the demographic composition of the rest of the city.

I describe their work day and the adverse conditions in which they work. I explain what it is to wear the uniform of a security guard and I show how their work is spatialized in the streets. Finally, I show that their relationship with the rest of the

population of Delhi is not clear cut, but rather multifarious and moving. The class that is created through their labor is not a hypothetical class of permanent security guards. It is a guarded class that, through them, elaborate a culture that forgets the labor that invests in its insulation from the rest of the city. This obliteration of the condition of its production is what makes of Delhi's public space a fetish. In the next chapter I show, through a legal geography, what rules and laws were used to achieve the spatial organization of Delhi that corresponds to the current dominant mode of production.

### 3.3 - Control and Legality

The regulations framing Delhi's security guardianship are not only contradictory, they are also disrespected. Incidentally this also opened new avenues for corruption<sup>22</sup>. According to the authority in charge of verifying its application in the home ministry of the Delhi government, PSARA law seems woefully unadapted: guards cannot wait one month to be paid, and companies cannot pay them without revenues, finally customers will not pay and wait for one month. The "cost of compliance" is dissuasive. The result is an overall sentiment that dispensing with the law by ways of corruption or disregard is the only solution.

The legal organization of the market has altered the dynamics between the police and the guards. Under the name of safety, guards appropriate public spaces on behalf of their employers, with verbal agreement<sup>23</sup> from the South Delhi Municipal Corporations and District Police (*The Hindu* 2011). Private guardianship is not a dismantling of the

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22 Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.

Vinod Chaubey, Training Institute, Interview, 21st February 2017, Delhi, English.

23 Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.



state. In a context in which the developmental state (Kaiwar 2015) has given way to an upholding of real estate capital (Shatkin 2014b), it is a new terrain of intervention. The market of private security did not mushroom on its own. It depends on a set of policies that made it possible. In other words, the chapter contributes to a re-examination of what is meant by “the state”. I consider it to be essentially an ongoing project that realigns policies, paper trails and the usage of force around fluctuating projects.

I discuss how this challenges the common understanding of the relationship between state, violence and legitimacy. It is not surprising that “the state” would pay attention to private security companies. It is a mainstay of political imagination that maintaining the security of goods and persons is the first duty of the state. The state ought to maintain a “monopoly on the means of legitimate physical violence”, as it is one of the pillars of its legitimacy (Weber [1919] 1994, 35).

Yet I also show how the matter of security seems to have moved at the background of the policy-maker’s preoccupations. The central government, through the Ministry of Skill and Entrepreneurship<sup>24</sup>, gives incentives for a training that is not compatible with the training prescribed by PSARA. This time the goal advocated is the formalization of security guards’ employment. “Multiple regime of governmentality<sup>25</sup>” (Foucault [1978] 2004) are taking the bodies of the guards as objects of policy and security, through employment schemes, training and enrollment. In addition, Delhi police

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24 “SSSDC” n.d., <http://www.sssdc.in/index.php/2014-05-28-13-25-29/blogpost-right-bar>, Accessed April 18, 2017. The Security Sector Skill Development Council gives certificate for training reimbursed by the “Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY)” n.d., a scheme to foster skill development co developed by the National Skill Development Corporation.

25 “Régime de gouvernementalité multiple”.

has recently set up a new form of training attempting to use their number as “eyes and ears” and has set up a minimal training program<sup>26</sup> (Uniindia News 2017).

Guards do not have the right to arrest or search, they can only exclude and intimidate people. *Contra* Max Weber, Avant (2015) points out that outsourcing security could mean that trust is removed from the traditional guards and placed in the market. I show that security guards are the visible marks of a legal geography that has moved on from the idea that the state was a desirable provider of security.

The guards are not part of what is generally considered state apparatuses, yet they can be seen, through these ramifying regulations, as prosthetic agents for the territorialization of a vision of cities and of the ordering of class. The absence of Muslim guards here appear as a case in point. The Hinduization of the contemporary Indian state settles perhaps with even more ease in sectors which are out of reach from courts and standards hiring procedure. Thus, it is thanks to its private nature that security guardianship contributes to the state project of the current administration.

#### 3.4 - Labor Time, City Work.

In the fourth and last chapter I describe the position of Delhi's security guards in terms of political economy in order to trace a theory of their presence and effects in the city. From 1991 onward, the government of India adopted a series of reforms under pressure from international institutions and internal demand for faster economic growth. The urban middle and upper-class have been the first beneficiary of that growth which

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26 Vijay Kumar, Delhi Police, Interview, 7th June 2017, Hauz Khas, Delhi, English.

has also deepened inequalities. Those inequalities in turn foster the exclusionary urbanism that has developed, and which security guards realize.

The model of exclusion organized around Resident Welfare Associations and Cooperative Group Housing Societies, emerged simultaneously with contracted security companies. This model of urban development claims for exclusivity and safety from outside interferences. At the same time, transformation of labor brought to the city hundreds of thousands of unskilled men with little labor protection.

While their role is to bring a feeling of safety and keep up the value of surrounding real estate, the particularity of their work is to bring a simple presence. I argue that security guards provide an advanced example of unskilled labor. Here the mean socially necessary labor time seems equivalent to nothing else than the hours of labor that the guards realize. The extraction of surplus value is not realized on the difference between the cost of labor and the price of what they produce but on paying them less than the normal cost of labor. The work of the guard,—that is, keeping social domination effective—expresses the role of abstract labor in the circulation of value: that of up keeping a dominant order. I get back to Lefebvre’s hypothesis that the dominant form of production defines the production of space to affirm that guards trace on the ground the contour of an economic order that basks in inequalities. I point out that such labor should not be disconnected from its condition of possibilities. That includes female labor and a gender repartition of tasks and work.

I proceed to use those findings to sketch out how security guards play a double role in adverting the crisis of the form of capitalism that brought them where they are. Security guards mediate, symbolically and at times violently, the deepening social inequalities that form between the areas owned by the “haves” and those that are populated by the “have-nots”. And yet, while the *dispositifs* that I describe in chapter III are a case in point, security guards also represent an impressive mass of workers. If those *dispositifs* have been put in place by the administration, it is because security guardianship is a significant employer of manpower. Security guardianship thus contributes to staving off the crisis through enrolling an important part of the city’s surplus population.

This has consequences for the way we understand and think through the city. The notion of “right to the city”—taken from the eponymous political manifesto (Lefebvre [1968] 2009) that continues Lefebvre’s *Production of Space* ([1974] 2000) comes ashore on the presence of the guards. The guards materialize a “post-development” formation in which the notion of public space, predicated on equality of status over a common political space, comes under question.

In the conclusion of the work, I point out that guards, through their labor, make possible and foster a “production of space” that thrives on and reproduces class inequalities. This realizes “post developmental” social relations—social relations which do not trigger collective ethical engagement with the poor. The question of a public space

as a shared dimension of the city linked with the notion of collective emancipation lays broken. The guards, upper caste but casted out, rural bodies doing urban labor, work within a dialectic of master and bondsman that insulates the master from the material messiness of urban life at the expense of the poor.

## I - METHODOLOGY

### **1 - Introduction and early research.**

As indicated above, Delhi's class divisions are well documented, so are its boundaries and claim to exclusivity. The well-developed body critical research on Delhi I mention above made easier the task of starting a new project along the lines of critical security studies. In addition, the city provides a good paradigmatic example of a city transformed by private security guardianship. I conducted several research projects in Delhi before starting Ph.D. fieldwork. This offered me a familiarity with the terrain that proved an asset in choosing this city as field-site.

In this chapter I explain how this research started, and how it evolved. I trace a history of the evolution of research questions and choice of field-sites. I explain the sociological categories I have used. I develop how my research questions have evolved. Finally, I trace how I have gathered the primary material that I have used and the methods, scope and validity of the current research.

My two Masters researches and the preliminary fieldwork I could conduct in Delhi in August 2014 gave me a great familiarity with the city and facilitated this research. I describe them as well as the evolution of the research questions they permitted, in Appendix 1 p.304. The preliminary fieldwork in particular was instrumental in observing the caste particularity that I mention in introduction and which I had not

expected. In the following tables describe the questions and hypothesis I had elaborated before this preliminary fieldwork and the methods I had devised to answer them.

*Table 1: Research questions and proposed methods, preliminary fieldwork, August 2014*

Questions and Hypotheses	Methods
<p><b>Q1 How does the private security industry recruit security guards?</b></p> <p>Proposition A-The corporatization of private security has changed the structures of employment and recruitment.</p>	<p>-Life trajectories and personal narratives of twenty security guards.</p> <p>-Structured interviews at the scale of two neighborhoods.</p> <p>-Semi structured interviews of officials of four security companies, in different neighborhoods</p>
<p><b>Q2 What is the exact nature of the service provided by the security guards?</b></p> <p>Proposition B: The guards are the signifier of territorial control.</p>	<p>-In-depth interviews of security guards</p> <p>-Semi-structured interviews with Resident Welfare Associations representatives and residents.</p> <p>-Software based participatory mapping.</p>
<p><b>Q3 How do Security Guards filter the movements of people?</b></p> <p><b><i>Question 3 A: How does the criterion of judgment become an embodied skill?</i></b></p> <p>Proposition C: The filtration of neighborhoods is made through a “rule by aesthetic”.</p> <p><b><i>Question 3 B: How do security guards resolve the psychological tension of works that involves excluding members of their own class and caste strata?</i></b></p> <p>Proposition D: The work fosters a positive, hyper-masculine image of the self</p>	<p>-In-depth interview of small samples of security guards.</p> <p>-Semi-structured interviews with inhabitants (homeowners, residents)</p> <p>-Semi-structured interviews of non-resident working in the neighborhoods.</p>

I note in this second table the expectations that I had at the inception of this research and the confirmations or refutation of them. Since the prevalence of upper-caste workers among security guards was unexpected, I briefly turn to a description of the expectations I had.

I was aware by way of press of tensions between security guards and their employers. I have taken up in several papers the murder case of Ashok Khanna by his security guard, Mithlesh Pandey, in September 2006. “When Khanna returned home late in the evening, Mithlesh took unduly long to open the door. This irked Khanna and he allegedly beat up Mithlesh. To avenge his insult, Mithlesh allegedly planned to eliminate Khanna (Staff Reporter 2007)”. The newspaper uses the deceased's last name, while the employee is designated by his first name: the implicit class hierarchy persists through death. But it masks another social hierarchy, pertinent to the matter at hand: Pandey is a Brahmin (upper-caste) name, whereas Khanna is not. Despite knowing of this case I expected men from either Rajput castes<sup>27</sup> or from the Other Backward Classes (OBC) categories<sup>28</sup>. It is another way to say that I was expecting either a many former military men from the nearby State of Rajasthan or poorer men from the neighboring States of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh<sup>29</sup>. I was not expecting caste to be a central matter at all. I did expect, and correctly, that I would not meet Muslim security guards. Finally, I was

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27 The term Rajput designates an array of caste that are generally considered to be among Kshatriyas, or warriors, the second class in the traditional four varna system. They are a patrilineal group from the North West of the subcontinent. During the British colonial rule, the *Raj*, Rajput were considered to be a warring caste. Today they have kept a reputation for conservatism and massive involvement in the army.

28 The term OBC is used by the government of India to classify an traditionally disadvantaged segment of the population, in the economic and educational sectors in particular. Figures diverge widely between just about half of the population according to the Mandal commission, put together to address the issue of caste discrimination in 1979, to around 40 per cent in 2007 according to the National Sample Survey Organisation (Chauhan 2007). The OBC data from the 2011 census are yet to be released. For OBC and their role in North Indian politics at the turn of the century, see Christophe Jaffrelot's *India's Silent Revolution*, (2003).

29 Nepali immigrant used to form a significant contingent of Delhi's security guards, partly because of the loyal and martial qualities attributed to the Gorkhas, and partly because of the low cost of labor. I know this was already on the wane,. Despite many Nepali staying in position. The doorman of Bari Son's being well known in the local and foreign intellectual class of Delhi.



expecting most of the security guards to be formal labor and paid minimum wages, as I thought of private security as a more technical and risky job than it is.

The data obtained has been put to use for this dissertation. Some of the questions, like those on masculinity, “did not feel right” during the interviews, and I had to either drop the question altogether or reformulate it. The idea of participatory mapping of a neighborhood did not appear feasible. It was meant to map how the filtering of the street was organized and performed at which point of the day and night. It would have required gathering the guards together outside of their field of work, in addition to ask them quite possibly sensitive information and that appeared impossible.

*Table 2: Preliminary fieldwork expectations and findings from August 2014*

Expectations	Findings
Maybe Rajputs but caste not a major issue.	Abnormal majority of Brahmins, pending further fieldwork
Men from the States of Haryana and Rajasthan	Mostly Biharis and men from Jharkhand, one Nepali.
Unlikely to find Muslim security guards.	Confirmed
Former soldiers.	Former or current farmers with small land holdings, no employment for the state, one former factory worker.
Guards are on the lower end of the pay-scale and despised by their employers (Gooptu 2013b).	Confirmed
Guards have no PF or ESI (Upadhyay 2011).	Confirmed
Guards adopt masculinist and casteist attitudes as a reaction.	Unproven

*Table 3: Overview of interviews conducted in August 2014<sup>30</sup>*

Mansarovar Garden	1 interview with property owner
Dwarka Sector 10	6 interviews, 2 rejections with security guards
Jangpura	Multiple rejections.
Daryaganj	4 successful interviews, 4 rejections with security guards
Totals:	11 interviews and 4 rejections in all categories.

## **2 - Choice of sites: Dwarka sector 10 and Saket.**


Dwarka is situated in the comparatively less affluent West Delhi while Saket is situated in the affluent South Delhi (See Map 3 p.55). I introduce those two neighborhoods.

Dwarka’s architecture accommodates security from its inception and minimizes the number of “required” guards. I provide a sketch of the layout of a typical plot of Dwarka as I describe the security guards’ labor day in: *Fig. 24: Sketch of a plot in Dwarka sector 10.*, p.167. Security guards were there from the beginning of Dwarka’s history. They were hired first to keep a look on the construction sites of what was from the inception collective housing, generally through Cooperative Group Housing Societies (CGHS).

Dwarka has remained faithful to its functionalist design. The area is not divided in “blocks” but in “plots”, bearing not a letter but a number. (eg: Dwarka sector 4, plot 4, apartment 444) (see Box 3, p.56). The access to the plots goes generally through a single entry, which permits its residents to share the expense of guardianship across the entire residential unit.

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30 A detailed table of every interview taken is to be found in the annex.



Map 3: Dwarka and Saket, South And West Delhi

Source: Google Map, 2018.

In Dwarka Sector 10 guards work in pairs at the main gates. During the day there is sometimes another gate open at the back with one guard. Unlike the other three neighborhoods, where guardianship is a solitary task, in Dwarka the sociability between the guards made for a location of choice to interrogate, individually or in groups, how their perceptions of the divide they guard have changed them and how they elaborate, as a group, a value indexed on their caste belonging.

*Box 3: Neighborhoods, Blocks, Sectors, Plots*

Blocks in Delhi designate a subsection of a neighborhood often build around a small park and designated by a letter (e.g: Hauz Khas, block B, house 1/1, New Delhi writes as: B 1/1, Hauz Khas, New Delhi 110064.) unlike in the United States where it designates a build ensemble delineated by streets. In order to protect the identity of every informant, all blocks letters in this dissertation are changed.

In Dwarka, like in Gurgaon and Noida, the city is divided into sectors, which are given a number in the order of the development plan. The Sector is subdivided in plots, which are – more or less – serviced and sold as a unit in general. Eg: (Dwarka Sector 4, Plot 4, apartment 444.) The plot system helped in making the research systematic, but all the plot numbers are changed, once again, to protect the identity of informants.

Saket presented several advantages including a relative diversity of class and a large range of housing types. The area hosts a couple of shopping malls that permitted to contrast three different security guards employments: mall guards, private security guards at the scale of one neighborhood and private security guards attached to single homes. I provide sketches of a typical Saket Neighborhood as I describe the work of the guards in

the next chapter, Fig. 23 p.166, and a sketch of the layout of a mall in Fig. 22 p. 164. A locality such as Saket allowed me to control on mall guards the hypothesis I was drawing for neighborhood and individual house guards. The two sites appeared to be very different and would therefore provide an interesting array to gauge the situation of security guards in Delhi. The major malls are directly located east of Saket. Pushp Vihar, to the east, is generally called Saket by its inhabitants.



*Fig. 1: Aerial photography of Dwarka Sector 10.*  
Source Google Earth, 2018.

These two neighborhoods however cannot claim to be representative of the city as a whole. Some richer neighborhoods or some facing criminality problems would have yielded different results. In addition, some questions and some trends I observed took me away from those two neighborhoods. I am therefore not cantoning myself to those two main field sites. Except for security guards interviews, Resident Welfare Association representatives' interviews and Cooperative Group Housing Societies' representative interviews, significant part of my work was conducted elsewhere. Ministry representative and police representatives have their office in different areas despite having authority on those neighborhoods. Training centers and companies are also located in different places. I give in details the geographic locations of those as well as the mode of selections of informants below.



*Map 4: Saket Block H.*

Source: Google Map, 2018. Block chosen at random.



*Fig. 2: Fig. 2: Aerial photography of Saket area.*  
Source: Google Earth 2018.

### 3 - Choice of methods

Before describing the methods chosen, I recapitulate in a simple table the research questions I have developed at length in the Introduction, part 1.1 p5.

*Table 4: Recap of research questions*

1.	How do private security guards, who are charged with gate-keeping the boundary between the “haves” and “have-nots”—but are intimately witness to the lives of both—experience their work (from the perspective of employment conditions, aspirations, moral predicaments, emotions, etc.)?
2.	How are elaborated and “embodied” the expectations and practices which govern how private security personnel manage the barrier between who is allowed “in” and who is kept “out” of the neighborhoods?
3.	How does the recruitment of upper-caste guards facilitate the representation of a dreamed city from which the stigma of poverty would be materially and symbolically excluded?
To those questions, I added the last two during fieldwork:	
4.	How does the flourishing security sector guarantee the visible spatial order of the city?
5.	How does the organization of Delhi security guardianship open a window in the relations between state and private means of control?

I used methods inspired from human geography and anthropology. Preliminary fieldwork has convinced me that participatory mapping would be particularly difficult to organize, and did not appear to be very promising. I set out to join a training institute for unarmed security guards. I had in mind a center such as the month-long course that was proposed by the Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU). This proved impossible, but I managed to undergo other trainings. I conducted directed and semi-directed interviews, which form the bulk of my data. I also had to give a particular attention to the functioning of the security market, including regulations, laws and policy papers.



Table 5: Research questions and methods, synoptic table, 2017.

Research questions	Methods
<p><b>Q1 How does the flourishing security sector guarantee the visible grid of the city?</b></p> <p>Proposition A: Security companies are providing guards to maintain the value of real estate capital</p>	<p>-20 semi directed Interviews with security companies stakeholders concerned with the selected neighborhoods.</p> <p>-11 Interviews with RWA and CGHS in concerned neighborhoods,</p> <p>-3 Interviews with other employers</p> <p>-1 Interview with police representative</p> <p>-3 Interview with Delhi Home Department representative</p>
<p><b>Q2 How does the recruitment of upper-caste guards facilitate the representation of a dreamed city from which the stigma of poverty would be materially and symbolically excluded?</b></p> <p>Proposition B: Contrary to the common belief that contractual recruitment dissolves ascriptive caste identities, the formidable manpower demanded by the sector has not broken the back of caste preferences. The persistence of the latter could be explained by preferential trust as well as by a form of symbolic attribution of the highest castes' purifying functions.</p>	<p>-Interviews of 40 guards conducted in concerned neighborhoods, controlled with a second group taken in a different level of security guardianship. (See below)</p> <p>-2 Interviews with group of domestic workers, other employees.</p> <p>-5 Interviews with concerned company owners</p> <p>-Written material, written sources such as laws and regulations, newspaper clippings, contracts...</p>
<p><b>Q3 What expectations and practices, formal and informal, govern how private security personnel manage the porous barrier between who is allowed "in" and who is kept "out"?</b></p> <p>Proposition C: The ultimate criterion for entering a neighborhood appears to be appearance and self-confidence. The security apparatus relies on the class distinctions prevalent throughout the country. The clues that the guards use to know whom to filter are acquired on the job itself.</p>	<p>-Training with the guards (one month long planned, three short term trainings realized.)</p> <p>-11 Interview with managers, security professionals, including exchanges over e-mails.</p> <p>-2 Interviews with groups of domestic workers.</p>
<p><b>Q4 How do "interface workers" like private security guards who are charged</b></p>	<p>-2 Interview with group of domestic workers.</p>

<p><b>with gate-keeping the boundary between the "haves" and "have-nots" – but are intimately witness to the lives of both – experience their work?</b></p>	<p>-Interviews with 40 security guards -Observation, miscellaneous interviews. -Written material, written sources such as laws and regulations, newspaper clippings, contracts...</p>
<p>Proposition D: Security guards respond to the class disparity they witness by strengthening, under their uniform, their caste identification and the sense of self worth that it seems to procure for them.</p>	
<p><b>Q5 How does the organization of Delhi security guardianship open a window in the relations between state and private means of control?</b></p>	<p>-1 Interview with police representative (District Commissioner of Police) -12 Interview with representatives of institutions representing the security industry, including interview with Delhi Home Ministry representative -Written material, written sources such as laws and regulations, newspaper clippings, contracts...</p>
<p>Proposition E: Private security still unsettles the most common understanding of state and of the limits of state power.</p>	

3.1 - Training to become a guard.

In order to experience, as much as my difference with the guards could permit, what becoming a security guard could be, I proposed to register for a security guard training. I was not naive to think that the color of my skin, the languages I speak or the status given to me by my education could be forgotten by wearing the thick and uncomfortable uniform of a security guard. After all, even Wacquant (2002, 269), despite enduring years of sweat and punches, was sent back to the reality of his origins by his boxing trainer DeeDee: “You got enough for your book now. You don’t need to fight”. The purpose was to be able to describe what the guards were undergoing, to get to know them better and, if possible follow several of them through the early phases of their career. The method is more ethnographic than geographic but I hoped to be able to bridge the gap.

The joint course set up by SIS (Security and Intelligence Services) and Indira Gandhi National Open University closed before I could start fieldwork. I felt I should start my research with this project. After all, the law bans deploying guards without a 21 days theoretical and physical training, even though I knew most of the men guarding the city have not undergone such training. It proved impossible to find a Private Security Agency Regulation Act approved training. Only nine companies are given license to conduct the said training. I contacted them all. And their facilities were either inaccessible—that was the case of the Home guard, a national institution meant to supplement the police and armed forces in the conduct of their daily activities—or closed<sup>31</sup>. One of the company waited for an entire year a hypothetical authorization to open from SSSDC. Major companies like G4S would not let me observe. *In fine*, it became obvious that, for reasons I explain more in details below, there was no training happening in Delhi as prescribed in the syllabus described by the *Private Security Agency Regulation Act* (“Private Security Agency Regulation Act” 2005) was passed into law in the Union Territory of Delhi in 2009.

I realized that, in contradictions with the law, other companies were giving some forms of training under the aegis of the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship. Those might not be compatible with PSARA but could be attended. I found on the website of the Security Sector Skill Development Council a list of companies they had authorized to dispense a training. I contacted each member of this list, sent approximately 140 e-mails and visited several companies before obtaining

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31 Vinod Chaubey, Training Institute, Interview, 21st February 2017, Delhi, English.  
Jagadev Singh, multiple e-mail correspondence with the author, 2017, English.

responses. In the interval I conducted eight interviews with companies advertising training centers, all in English, recorded, with interview guides. One in particular yielded very interesting results including screen captures and e-mail forwarding of a bribing proposals: a private security company was asking for a quote for fake certificates (See Fig. 3).

Most companies informed me that they owned a training ground in some other part of Delhi. Other were rather vague about the extent of the training they offered. Two of these companies boasted to be in partnership or affiliated with international institutions, namely the Israeli College for Security & Investigation<sup>32</sup> and the London Metropolitan University. The first institution did not come back to me and the second informed me over the phone that they held no records of an agreement or affiliation with that particular company.

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32 <http://www.israeldefense.com/en/company/israeli-college-security-investigation>  
<http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/>




Fig. 3: E-mail from 2016 requesting certificates.  
Source : Anonymous, 2017.

By the end of my stay I had acquired the certitude that PSARA trainings were not being conducted despite alleged certificates being filled and paid for. After obtaining the trust of some companies, I could attend three trainings.

### 3.1.1 - Training in Manesar.

Using recommendation by a contact I had made in the Home Department to the Government of the Union Territory of Delhi, I contacted a company, 2Kuri, that had trained several of the guards I interviewed in Saket. It is interesting to note that a poster representing the achievements of 2Kuri hanged in the office of the official of the ministry who had recommended me. The company offered me a uniform as close to my size as possible, and took pictures with me. It was decided that I could attend one of the “Recognition of Prior Learning” (RPL) they were organizing in Manesar, Haryana, in

agreement with SSSDC. The recognition of prior learning does not meet in any way the legal standards described in PSARA<sup>33</sup>. According to 2Kuri, their training ground in North Delhi laid unused during at least 8 months. However, the State sponsors trainings through the PMKVY scheme, or *Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana*<sup>34</sup>, that is supposed to reimburse companies of their training expenses.

Despite a difficult beginning, which I will attribute to difficulties in communications with a staff from 2Kuri, I could finally join the training session in the walled precincts of new urbanized towers spread there and there in the plains of Haryana, after the last factories of Gurugram. Starting at 6 am, men who have just finished a 12 hours shift and men who are just about to start one meet in the parking lot. They stood in attention and rest positions for nearly two hours, while the trainer reads them the booklet provided by SSSDC. Twice that week the trainer did not come and the guards waited in vain. At the end of the training, an examination is conducted by an independent examiner from SSSDC. I paste in Box 4 some redacted fieldwork notes I wrote down.

*Box 4: Training in Manesar*

Manesar is a bad hour and a half of early morning traffic from South Delhi. Further than Gurugram, the place is dusty and teeming with construction cranes and bran new housing towers. Its landscape is the physical form of late capitalist development. Between fields from which peasants seem to have recently been evicted, towers raise every kilometer or so, self containing compounds with mock swimming pool and resident's sport's club, belted with concrete and brick precinct walls. Freshly

33 Manesar being in Haryana, the RPL is not compliant with the PSARA laws of Haryana instead of not being compliant to the PSARA law of Delhi.

34 Literally Prime Minister's Skills Development Scheme. It is always written in Hindi and left untranslated.


landed capital seem to fear the occasional Jaat—the local dominant caste, with a strong reputation for violence and exacerbated masculinity—rebellion as much as the incidental car thief. I made the first trip by metro and taxi, as instructed. The instructor catches me at a busy traffic intersection on the Highway that goes down to Jaipur and sits me at the back of his bike. All the potholes punch my spine. Once we reach I register the GPS localization in my phone to be able to come with my own motorbike.

Of course we arrive late, and I can't wear my uniform, so I stand near the trainer, awkwardly looking at approximately 40 men standing to attentions without I noticing any particular need for it. A sentence by the trainer catches my attention. After he rectifies the position of one guard, he says “if the army can do it, we can do it too”. I think of the comment by Gauz: “SUPER GUARD. Boredom, feeling of uselessness and waste, impossible creativity, over acted aggressivity, lack of imagination, infantilization, etc., are the corollaries of the work of guard. Yet, soldier is a very exaggerated form of guard (Gauz 2014, 116)”. It is quite a paradox. Few things are as different as a soldier and a guard. A soldier in action is meant to be furtive and lethal. Guards are unarmed and meant to be visible. Soldiers are expected to have pride in their uniform, while guards are ignored for it. The infantilization however, and the over acted aggressivity, are fairly well described.

The next day I reach at dawn. This time I am wearing the uniform I was given. Thick polyester, it stinks on sweat and dust in no time. The fourragère, which here is just an element of look, is too short and irritates my armpit. I understand why the men wear a cotton tee shirt underneath. At least my shoes are comfortable and I have not spent 12 hours there already. The men see me arriving and grin. One re-adjusts my fourragère as I had not tied it right. It is handy to put a whistle. We stand in attention position, then at ease, then in attention again. My back hurts, my shoulders are stiff. The trainer rectifies my position as I was doing it upside down. Take that Wacquant. Yet again, if boxing in Chicago was all about pride and incorporating gesture, here it seems upside down. Gestures might be incorporated—albeit the attention position is taught in

schools in India. But here, unlike the boxers of Deedee who trained to push their limits, guards are infantilized and expected to keep their position in society. The class begins. They are not taught anything, it is all a theater. Even the trainer obviously does not believe his material. He spells out SECURITY, and proceeds to give a meaning to each letter, as if it were an acronym. This is illustrated in the page 1 of the (*Student Handbook Unarmed & Armed Security Guards* 2013). Or as if English was a crossword. He gets an old man, visibly past the age and physical condition that PSARA would expect from a guard, to repeat the “lecture”:

- “S → Safety
- E → eagle eye
- C → courageous
- U → uniformed
- R → robust
- I → intelligent
- T → trained
- Y → youth”.



This last for two hours, then the managers disband the group.—In the confession of one of them, managers are former guards who could afford a bribe. As the group disperse, one of the men in the rank asked if PF and ESI would then be taken care of. The “trainer” replied that it would, as the paperwork was under way, since most of the guards were working here for “just one year”. Nobody deemed fit to reply. The contempt for the guards was obvious. Five days to go and the methodology I have chosen seem to be the most unpleasant I could think of. Then I wonder if my seniors working on waste pickers “tasted” the plastics. And I think that some of my friends are doing anthropology in Nepal. I chose Delhi for myself.

The trainer invites me for further training in different places, but then I am informed it is canceled. My bike breaks on my way back, transmission chain to be replaced, just at Delhi’s border. My security uniform intrigues the *karigar* (mechanics)



a lot. He leaves to fetch the broken piece while I try to get some rest on his *khath* (wooden bed). Never again wearing such a thick polyester shirt in Delhi's heat.

The next morning, at dawn again and after several near death experiences on the road, I reach Manesar. The men are there, standing, they welcome me, it seems I bring a friendly distraction. We wait. 30 minutes after the theoretical beginning of the training, the managers break the ranks. The trainer did not bother to come today. I stay a bit, talking and chitchatting with the guards. The manager sits me in the front sentry box. The residents of the towers seem to be either gone already – which would be necessary to reach their place of work by 9 or 10 – or not yet awake. I am kept there, a demonstration of the prestige and authority of the ground manager, until I have drunk the *chai* (sweet milk tea) that one of the guards went to fetch, despite my protestations. On my way back I give a lift to a late female worker toward a factory. I lift my helmet after I drop her. She bursts in laughter noticing I was a foreigner.

### 3.1.2 - Training in Saket.

During the interviews I conducted with security companies, some informed me that they were doing in-house training lasting a couple of days. One mentioned that, since there was no legal and worthy training available anyway, he had decided to do it himself. He used the same yellow booklet bought from SSSDC, and offered me a copy (*Student Handbook Unarmed & Armed Security Guards* 2013). We organized that I could attend the training.

It happened on a Sunday in the precinct of a bank that his employees were keeping. Everybody sat in a classroom setting, for one day with provided tea and a few snacks. The guards were wearing the uniform of the company. They seemed bored out of their mind, but I could not feel the same lack of empathy and mutual silent hostility that I had felt in Manesar. The gathering feels more intimate and artisanal, as the man giving the “training” is their employer. It is a medium-sized company and they know him directly. His behavior towards the guards and the way he speaks of them is every bit paternalistic.



*Fig. 6: End of training near Saket.*

Photo: Author, Delhi, 2017.

At the end of the training the guards leave and stand in attention position again, mimicking a military review, (see Fig. 6). The owner of the company invites me to talk to the group, and I have no choice but to execute myself. Now the security guards will have associated me to the management. He invites me to interview them, which I can neither really do in his presence, nor completely refuse. I take basic demographic data from a group of 9 guards. I tend to think the entire day was organized just for me, to show that there is a training and that he does not treat “his” guards like the other companies. This was the company owner’s pride from our first encounter.

### 3.1.3 - Training in the mall



*Fig. 7: "Fireman lift". Training room, basement of a mall.*

Photo: Author, Delhi, 2017.

Toward the end of fieldwork I attended a last training this time provided for the guards of a shopping mall in Saket, thanks to a series of recommendations and snowballing. The training lasted three days, and this time some practice joined theory. The trainers took some men in the last level of the basement and showed them how to team work to connect large hydrant tubes with hose and how to carry it toward the flames to lower the risk of fire spreading while waiting for the fire brigade. He demonstrated how to carry a man away from the flames with a “fireman lift” (see Fig. 7). The guards were interested and mentioned that they much preferred this day of training to a normal day of work. In the absence of management and during the three days that the training lasted, I could multiply informal conversations with security guards. I came to know at the end of

the training that they had to pay for this training, necessary to keep their jobs, on their own expenses.

### 3.2 - Interviews

Semi-directed interview have been my main source of data. Here I give a complete list of all the groups I have interviewed, how it happened, and why. The informants are also the actors of the landscape of security guardianship in Delhi. Synoptic tables recapitulate all interviews conducted in the annex.

*Table 6: Fieldwork interviews conducted in 2016-2017.*

Dwarka Sector 10	In addition to those already noted for 2014, I could conduct 5 successful interview, bringing the total to 11.
Saket Neighborhood	14 successful interviews. 2 follow-ups.
Saket mall	16 successful interviews, 3 follow-ups.
Saket Security compagny	10 Interviews were realized during a training organized by a company in Saket.
Security companies	I could successfully conduct interviews in 19 different companies, and one by e-mail. Some gave fake addresses, others 2 refused to give me informations. I do not 6 of them had shifted or closed before my fieldwork. In 3 of them I could conduct interviews with several employees (guards excepted), and three times I could conduct follow up interviews.
Trainings	I could take part in 3 different trainings.
Institutions	I conducted interviews in 8 different institutions, with several follow-ups and up to three different individuals in one institution.
Resident associations representatives	13 successful interviews in Resident Welfare Associations and Cooperative Group Housing Societies.
Domestic workers	1 group interview and 1 opportunity interview.
Miscellaneous	I could conduct 2 interviews that were not in the original research design but which could enrich the findings of this dissertation.
Total or recorded interviews:	83 interviews.

I successfully interviewed 40 security guards spanning several companies in the two main field sites, Dwarka and Saket (see page 73). Six guards I had approached refused to be interviewed, 2 in Dwarka, one in Saket and 3 in Jangpura. I asked to hear their life-narratives and impressions. In order to determine how caste preferences are enacted and how networks of recruitment are built, I conducted semi-directed interviews with the representatives and owners of security companies in a different location. I conducted interviews with representatives of institutions and with contractors, private homeowners and building associations. I conducted those interviews in order to determine how they perceive the work of security guards, how their work is framed in rules and laws and in which process of segregation it is embedded. Finally, those interviews were put against interviews realized with different publics, including a group of domestic workers and a trans-gender victim of harassment at the security gate.

All interviews with public authorities were conducted alone. Approximately two-thirds of the interviews I conducted with guards and one interview with a company were conducted with the help of a research assistant. The need arose for a research assistant when I was invited in the house of Pearl Sharma. It was not clear whether her husband would be present; but in order to simplify the meeting and gain her trust, as well as that of her husband, I figured that being accompanied and helped by a female research assistant would be an invaluable asset. Both of my female research assistants were more fluent than me in Hindi and helped me to catch nuances in interviews, and pose rebound questions, in a way that would have been more difficult had they been absent. It was also a fruitful exercise to be put in the position of having to explain my research project, and discuss with

them the methodology and interview guides. Priyam Tripathy, one of the RAs, also helped in the transcription.

### 3.2.1 - Security guards

All interviews with security guards were conducted in Hindi and, when technically possible, recorded. The three or four rejections I faced were for the interview altogether, the rejection never concerned, for the guards, the action of recording.

Interviewing and interacting with security guards was the core of my work and I took every possible occasion, in addition to the 40 formal interviews, to interact with them over the course of my various stays in Delhi. Security guards are not a homogeneous category. I have identified several “levels” of security guards, defined partly by the National Occupational Standards (NOS), but also by the place in which they work and the level of their wages.

At the lowest level we find guards working for small companies in neighborhoods such as Dwarka and Saket. They generally are among the lowest paid and are in the “unarmed security guards” ranks and files. They generally come from the countryside, have had different jobs and move back on a regular basis to the countryside where their family often has land. In most cases their families are not in Delhi. They have not received training, do not have PF or ESI and at times perform little menial labor for their employers when they are directly employed, or for residents of the RWA or CGHS for whom they work. They pay for their uniform. I observed that most of them did not

know their contract and had not seen it. I also observed that most were paid largely below the formal rate for the number of hours of work they spent on each shift.

Slightly upper category are employed in shops or in malls such as those of Saket. Their salaries approach those of the industrial minimum wages and they have received some form of training, often on the job. There is a little more pride to do the job in this category, even though working conditions remain very difficult. Some have had career evolution inside the system, through muscles, such as the bouncer of one of the malls I could meet, or through bribes. They do not work for RWA and CGHS. The cost of their uniform is also cut from their wages.

The third category of guards, still in the same standard of occupation, work rather for upper end companies such as G4S and SIS – even though those two companies employ guards in the second categories. They also work in schools or hospitals. It is in this category that we find former military men, Non Commissioned Officers etc. Some have responsibilities over the second category I am listing here. Some are armed and all of them have some forms of training. At the upper end of this category we find guards working in embassies and politically sensitive areas.

In the last category of this list are guards who have extensive training, often abroad, and who protect very important personalities (VIPs) like businessmen. Some retire from the army including from the “Black Cats” commando who specializes in the protection of personalities. This category merges with the management and can take



responsibilities in business in a second part of their career. In Colonel Rai’s words, “they should know even the blood group of the person they protect”<sup>35</sup>.

My work in this dissertation concerns only the two first categories, even though I occasionally met and interviewed men belonging or dealing with the elite of private security. I could not see the same guards again in 2017 and in 2014. All of them must have moved or been displaced.

*Table 7: Levels of security guards*

Category	Work	Place of deployment	Former or other works	Companies	Part of this research
1	Unarmed, untrained men	Neighborhoods, individual houses	Farmers, other small jobs, migrant laborers	Sea hawk, Ganesha security services	Yes
2	Unarmed mostly, semi trained	Malls, shops	Permanently employed in this line, farmers	Sterling security Services, 24 secure, Night Watch, SIS	Yes
3	Unarmed, armed, trained and highly trained	Schools, embassies,	Permanently employed in this line, former military	G4S, SIS	No
4	Armed, civilian cloths, highly trained and specialized	VIP protection, Protection of high value targets not covered by Central Industrial Police Forces	Highly qualified professionals, former special forces or paramilitary forces		No

I completed 40 interviews of security guards throughout the two sites, working in different companies, fifteen in groups, and the remaining individually. For some I could conduct follow up interviews. All security guards’ interviews took place in Hindi. With one exception, all respondent were males. I conducted a third of those interviews alone and a third with each of my research assistants. I took a female research assistant when I had the

<sup>35</sup> Sidhiman Rai, Asiatic Training Society, Interview, 5th June 2017, Delhi, English.

opportunity to interview Mrs. Sharma, security guard in one of the malls of Saket<sup>36</sup>. Since I was invited to her place, I figured being accompanied by a female assistant would raise fewer eyebrows and perhaps help me in getting more information. At times her native Hindi would also come at the rescue of my tried language skills.

I established different interview guides. I put some of them in the annex. One was specific for guards working in the companies I identify as first quarter. Another was specific for guards working in the second quarter companies. I made a variant for female security guards, as I had planned for a larger sample. This could not happen as most of the ones I contacted did not accept to give interviews. The interview guides were progressively modified, as the questions became more precise.




Fig. 8: Decoration of the *subterranean canteen*.

Photo: Author, Delhi, 2017.

The selection of the informants was different in the three settings: Saket, the malls of Saket and Dwarka sector 10. I started by a series of strolls throughout Saket neighborhood, talking with guards here and there and informing them of my intention of coming back. They saw me rather regularly over the course of the year. I took advantage of the division of the neighborhood in blocks (see Box 3 p.24) to identify and interview guards in each of them. I did the interviews during their long workdays, sometimes in the torpor induced by the summer's heat. I would walk in each block and interview guards who accepted to talk. I estimate that I successfully interviewed a third of

36 Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

the guards in total in the blocks I covered for this study. I could also interview a security guard who was keeping watch on the ATM of the metro station. The period of demonetization decided by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi in November 2016 had for consequence that the guards employed at ATMs throughout the city were particularly available. He had all the time in the world for an interview as he was watching over an empty ATM, twelve hours a day for nearly a month. I could conduct 13 full interviews in Saket, in additions to the smaller multiple encounters.

It was not possible to meet guards on duty in the mall. First, because they were monitored by supervisors and under the constant watch of surveillance cameras. Second, because at times their job was too demanding: patting, reading X rays screens and verifying purchase receipts. I found a providential solution by locating an affordable cafeteria located in the parking of the mall, in the second basement. Mall workers, including a lot of guards, have their lunch breaks there. The place is rather well lit for a second basement. The walls are decorated with managerial principles in English. One reads “ I will always put the interests of my company ahead of my own” (see Fig. 8 p 78). The injunction to self discipline contributing to fostering the class organization of labor are permanent, yet, in a second basement behind the wealthy customer’s cars, they appear quite cynical. The guards I interviewed did not pay attention to them and nobody had bothered to translate in Hindi. In addition to feeding myself with food I could afford, I could hand out my business card, a small explanation in Hindi of the nature of my work (available in the annex p.349), and fix some appointments for off-duty meetings. It is in these circumstances that I could meet with Mrs. Sharma as well as with most of the mall guards I interviewed. Some of those

interviews never materialized, but over a dozen quick interviews and five long interviews with follow-ups were organized. I could interview 13 guards in the various shopping malls.



*Fig. 9: A canteen in the basement of a mall in Saket.*

Photo: Author, 2017.

In Dwarka, I took advantage of the organization of the sub-city numbers and, in several visits, picked up plots in the 10, 20 and 30s sectors. In most of the plots, as I indicated above (see p.313 and below), guards work by pair at the main gate and at times, there is a third man manning the back gate, which is closed and unguarded at night. In Dwarka I interviewed 5 more security guards interviews in 2016-2017, bringing the number of guards I interviewed in Dwarka sector 10 to a total of 11, excluding the guards who refused to communicate with me.

I stopped recruiting new guards in each categories when I reached the point of “saturation”, that is, when the answers to my questions were becoming predictable.

### 3.2.2 - Security companies.

In addition to security guards I also interviewed security companies representatives. I often managed to talk with owners, but sometimes I had to keep my questions for the spokesperson or employees. This of course also depended on the level of the company in question. Like for security guards, I identified the corresponding several level of companies. Some are “fly by night”: I obtained from a security guard in Saket, dressed in a full black uniform under Delhi’s sun, the business card of his employer. At the given address, in a resettlement colony<sup>37</sup>, there was only a door standing unhinged, leaning on a wall. Latter contacted on the phone the company refused to give an address or to answer any questions. Some are top international companies settled in glass buildings in Gurugram.

Between those two extremes, I have interviewed men in basements or around conference tables in various offices settled all over the city. A general principle is that those companies generally ignored e-mails or never returned phone calls. A significant part of my time, particularly in the first months of my research, comprised of locating the addresses in the maze of sectors, plots, and blocks or identically named areas in Gurugram. Sometimes to no avail: one of the major company operating in one of the mall in Saket has moved to a different place and did not update its website during the year. Numerous attempts over phone, e-mails or word of mouth did not yield any results.<sup>38</sup>

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37 In few words, resettlement colonies are plots more or less serviced to house displaced slum dwellers. They are generally far from the place of employment and poorly connected (Tarlo 2000; Dupont 2008; Ramakrishnan 2016).

38 Except for one sustained e-mail exchange with the manager of a company, quoted as such in the references.

In the beginning of my research, I set out to interview the companies whose male employees—and occasionally female ones—were working in the two areas that I had selected for my research. I observed the guards and wrote down the names of the companies as written on their uniforms, alternatively I also took business cards from the guards. For locating the companies I used Internet or the addresses registered companies have to provide to the authority<sup>39</sup>. This led to some difficulties, either because the company moved or because the address was incorrect. For major security companies I asked if I could attend a training session. I explain in section 3.1, p.62 what I was intending and what were the results of my quest to obtain a training.

The low response rate of companies forced me to extend the geographical scope of my research to several other companies in the city. I could often access them through personal recommendations or serendipitous encounters. This led me to half a dozen supplementary interviews in different areas, including with a company that was in the process of being launched as a local venture of an Irish company. The latter however refused to give further information and, despite inviting me to their office, did not accept to share further contacts. In most cases, the ethic of discretion pervading through the companies, probably because of the military background of most of their officers, did impede my research. Silence was the most common reply to my questions.

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<sup>39</sup> I explain the nature and the limits of this list in section I -3.3, p.101. For now, the additional secretary to the Home Department of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi estimates that only 50% of companies are registered, and his list is 1000 company long. This is quite questionable however, as I explain below.

Companies at the two extremes of the social spectrum were the hardest to interview. Small, “fly by night” companies because the illegal nature of their practices made them very reluctant to talk with a foreigner, and big companies because of “security and discretion reasons”. Presumably, the illegal nature of their practices has already put them into too much light, like the biggest international private company. I also set up an interview guide. Most of them responded in English. Some of them, in the lowest quarter, responded only in Hindi. I redacted several interview guides corresponding to the level of the companies I was interviewing (see Appendix 6, p.353).

### 3.2.3 - Interviews in institutions

Several institutions regulate or intervene in the market of security guards, namely: PSARA, CAPSI (Central Association of Private Security Industry), SSSDC, the police, NSDC (National Skill Development Corporation) and PMKVY. I also count a think tank in this list, SWI (Security Watch India). I could conduct interviews with six of them, at times with difficulties. Since those institutions and their functioning shall appear repeatedly in the course of this dissertation, I give a quick introduction and explain how I could – or could not – interact with them from a methodological point of view. I will not dwell on details of their inter relations and functioning here. I specify what kind of published material each of those institutions produces.

The first and most obvious place to visit was the organization in charge of applying the 2005 Act of the Union of India, which was passed into law in 2009 in Delhi. The Private Security Agency Regulation Act (PSARA) requires the company to be

licensed, and their training to be inspected. The task of licensing and inspecting is devolved to an additional Secretary to the Home Department of the Government of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi. I could conduct several interviews and follow-ups with the holder of this office, quoted as Mr Omkar Sharma. We stayed in contact through e-mails and messaging applications. PSARA has its own website and its own teams. The meetings I conducted there were crucial to understand how the Home Department perceives the role of security guards in the city.

The meetings were pleasant and informative, yet the amount of real information Mr Sharma wanted to give me was uncertain. He stated his condemnations of the trainings operated by SSSDC, yet he did not or could not implement the law fully. He recommended me to one of his friends, Mr Vinod Chaubey, as the owner of a training company. According to Mr Chaubey though, Mr Sharma was very well aware that he had to stop the trainings two years before my visit because he could not compete against the illegal ones and the paid certificates given by other companies. Was Mr Sharma purposefully pointing me in a certain direction while not being able to fully disclose the true state of Private Security Services in Delhi? I tend to think so.

PSARA's website contains public notices published to notify companies that deploying guards who are not trained according to PSARA specifications is illegal ("PSARA Delhi Home Page" n.d.). It also contains a list of all the licensed companies. Approximately a thousand are on the list. For Mr Sharma, this is approximately half of the companies in activity in Delhi.



A quick investigation however, led me to doubt the consistency of this list. I noted the addresses of all the companies domiciled in the two neighborhoods I was working on, Dwarka Sector 10 and Saket. All but one of the companies in Saket had moved out, given false addresses or disappeared. All the companies in Dwarka Sector 10 had disappeared and one had moved. The Home Department (Delhi) representative pointed out that the registration being valid for five years, the owners of failed companies could get back into business at any point of time.

This casted a doubt as for his estimations of the actual number of companies in Delhi<sup>40</sup>, as well as the figures of guards he was suggesting. It also signifies that new companies disappear as quickly as they are established, and that the growth rate the industry boast about might not concern the whole spectrum of the sector (EY and FICCI 2013). If I used this list to track down, with a certain rate of success, the physical address of companies I needed to interview, I also paid attention to interview companies that were not on this list.

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40 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.



*Fig. 10: "Fair and Lovely". Remnant of a security company.*  
"Fair and lovely", in Dwarka sector 10 market, closed down several years before my visit.  
Photo: Author, Delhi, 2017.

The list started in 2010 (“PSARA Licences List” n.d.), the year following the adoption of PSARA law in the NCT of Delhi. After a slow start with approximately 75 licenses, the number of license grows to reach 190 in 2015, notwithstanding a certain inconsistency between 2013 and 2014 in data as a backlog seems to have formed and resolved from one year to the next. Unexpectedly, the number of new licenses retracts to 150 in 2016. 2017 was not significant yet as the last update of the list was in August. I could not produce a significant interpretation of those data. However, since a license is valid for five years, I could search and note the number of companies which had actually renewed their licenses. The latter, however, is not particularly significant, as only the last

three “batches” have reached that stage. The number of renewed licenses is respectively 15, 2 and 15, for 2010 to 2012. If I assume that 2010 was a particular year for licenses as major companies might have complied first, only approximately 6% of companies registered are renewing their licenses after only 5 years in activity. This gives an idea of how intense the competition is.




Chart 1: Number of PSARA Licenses granted per year.

Source of data : <http://psara.delhi.gov.in/licenceList.jsp> accessed October 2017.

At the end of our second meeting, Mr Sharma handed me an official invitation he had received to the “2nd Homeland Security Expo” and “3rd International Police Expo”, both taking place in the same time in the exhibition center of Delhi, Pragati Maidan. National and international firms were displaying materials related to the security industry such as infra-red cameras and police protective gears. It appeared bizarrely completely out of touch with the kind of security I had been confronted with during the

year. The security guards I was observing are “low tech”, cheap workers whose role was not to execute a dangerous mission necessitating expensive and complex gears. It was interesting nonetheless to explore the gap between the way major industry players brand “security” and the everyday reality of the workers.




Fig. 11: Invitation for the “Police Expo” in Pragati Maidan.

Source: Scan of original by author, Delhi, 2017.

The second institution in which I conducted interviews was the Central Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI). This association was funded in 2005 by a consortium of major security companies in India. Their role was to organize the industry and advocate on its behalf to the government of India. A task executed by the head of the foundation, Mr Vikram Singh<sup>41</sup>. In a nutshell, the role of CAPSI was to encourage the government to adopt legislation favorable to large security companies at the detriment of small ones and particularly of *chowkidars*.

<sup>41</sup> Politician and public figure whom I did not interview, Vikram Singh is not a modified name.

Interviewing representative of CAPSI was particularly difficult as the office is mostly a facade. I conducted two interviews there that were mostly pointless except to confirm my feelings that the activity conducted are meant to remain in the shades. The first one was with the head of Human resources, yet the interview yielded no results. I came back to the same office for someone else eight months later. Everything happened as if they had received orders not to talk to me, and, midway in the interview, upon intervention of the same Human Resources (HR) manager, they suddenly fell silent and told me they had nothing to do with guards but were dealing with a diamond cutting industry.

In addition to its website, CAPSI produces Security Post, a short format journal published irregularly. For my research, I have considered it to be the content as primary material published by an interested party.

The third institution in which I conducted interview was the Security Sector Skill Development Council. This organisation was co-created by CAPSI and the National Skill Development Council. Its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Vikram Singh, is a frequent interlocutor to the Union Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship. He is chair of both CAPSI and SSSDC. Identifying that the lack of vocational training was a factor holding back the Indian economy, the ministry has set up large schemes to help and finance the development of industrial skills among the Indian population. Several industries such as hosteling, textile and jewelry have organized to set up training standards in their respective industry. SSSDC is thus charged with drafting National

Occupational Standards (NOS) for the private security industry and a syllabus for trainings. They are also certifying those trainings. I conducted four interviews in their office, including one with the Chief Operating Officer and two successive deputy director of Standard and Quality Assurance (SQA). I could interview the first after he had left his office. The last SQA simply dodged most of my questions and did not get back to me. SSSDC publishes National Occupational Standards and the training syllabus I mentioned earlier. It also publishes videos, advertisements and lists of training centers they have approved.

Overall they refused interviews and did not communicate on their activities. In the terms of the “Sharda Report”, published in April 2017, at the end of my fieldwork research: “Security Sector Skill Development Council has the following subsectors – Commercial, Industrial, Personal protection, Training and assessment, Investigation and Vocational Education. It is not rational to have training and assessment, vocational education under the Security SSC” (Prasad 2017, 114). The contact I had established within SSSDC resigned during my fieldwork. After I left, in January 2018, the SSSDC was disbanded and its accounts frozen for fund misuses (PTI 2018).

Fourthly I conducted interview in the Union Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship. This ministry, as indicated above, has established a policy to devise and implement training for the low skilled population. One of its main tools is the National Skill Development Corporation, which is a Public-Private Partnership venture. The latter operate the PMKVY funds.

The National Skill Development Corporation is tasked with devising with the various Sector Skill Councils (SSC) how to implement the ministry's target objective in terms of numbers of trainees. I could obtain an impromptu interview with an employee by dropping on the site thanks to, in the terms used by one of the retired general interviewed in SSSDC in the same conditions "the element of surprise". All other attempts at contacting this organization have been unfruitful.

The PMKVY (Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana) is a prime-ministerial initiative that reimburses the companies of their training expenses or sponsors the training partners it designates. The training has to be approved, the facilities inspected and the target objectives met. If I could see two men tasked with verifying the implementations of those recommendations, they did not answer my questions, and none of my 28 attempts at contacting them, directly and indirectly, received a response.

The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, NSDC and National Skill Development Agency, which gathers the data and funds for the system to work, publish their own literature, including reports and policy papers. They also commend policy papers such as the "Report of the Committee for Rationalization & Optimization of the Functioning of the Sector Skill Councils" and reports from external agencies and economic intelligence firms such as KPMG (Sharma 2017; KPMG 2017).

I could conduct one interview with the South Delhi Deputy Commissioner of Police. The interview revolved around PSARA, the implementation of the law, the relations between guards and police and the *Prahari* training scheme. The *Prahari*, which

means vanguard, was a new scheme developed under the jurisdiction of the Delhi Police and designed to harvest the manpower and presence of private security guards to become the “eyes and ears” of the police. I could ultimately not attend as the scheme was launched in March 2017 and it seems only one such event took place during my stay. The interviews lasted approximately an hour. My subsequent request for a follow-up could not be met.

I also interviewed Security Watch India in the beginning of fieldwork. This organization presents itself as a think tank on Indian domestic security. When I asked for follow up some months later the people I had met had left. One replied my e-mails but were very elusive about the departures. I think the think tank tried to make space for itself alongside CAPSI, with a mitigated success. I could meet some trainers there but they were all working in Karnataka, a State of South India.

SWI publishes material on private security regularly and this is one of the sources I have used. I consider it to be a stakeholders’ publication. However, the last issue of their journal, “Genesis and Future Trend of Terrorism in India”, *Security Report*, came out in November 2016 (Chakraborty and Dube 2016), when the organization showed signs of losing momentum.

*Box 5: middle-classes, in brief: who am I talking about and why does it matter.*

The designation “middle-class” comes back very often in scientific literature as well as journalistic sources. It is common usage to talk of the “urban middle-class”, but – this in no way specific to India – it is difficult to see in which “middle” they



stand. This dissertation is not immune from this difficulty. The reality it points out at is far from easy to define in precise sociological terms. The “middle-class” is not the class “in the middle” of an hypothetical income curve : the people intuitively designated such or claiming to be “middle-class” are richer than that. It does not designate either the class falling in a bracket centered around the median income. Generally speaking and before further specifications, it designates the class that, without characterizing itself as rich, has the means of acquiring global consumptions and exclusivity.

The literature on Indian urban middle-class is extremely rich. Leela Fernandez (2006), William Mazzarella (2003), Christiane Brosius (2010), Satish Deshpande (2003), Sanjay Srivastava (2007), and Amita Baviskar and Raka Ray (2011) have characterized it in terms of its consumerist, intellectual, sexual, sociological and cultural practices. The ways in which their desires impact the city of Delhi through the desire for a “world class city” and through the rise in power of *bhagidari* politics is explored by Véronique Dupont (2011, 2016), Asher Ghertner (2015a) and Sanjay Srivastava (2009).

A re-reading of Antonio Gramsci ([1937] 1992), proposed by Desphande (2003), would suggest that the middle-class is the one that articulates the culture of the upper-class in the terms of the poor. In this case however, the cultural translation seems difficult particularly if it translates though exclusivity and a distance. There seems to be no cultural hegemony to translate and pass on, but simply a different urban class culture. Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre 1970) talks of the “Olympians” to designate these peoples, segregated and isolated from the city. For him, the Olympians pass through the city, disabled from interacting with it, not participating in the collective “œuvre” he calls for (Lefebvre [1968] 2009).

In this dissertation I suggest that what is emerging can also be characterized as a “guarded” class, for whom being protected from the stigma of poverty is itself class defining. The urban reality is, at least tentatively, mediated by guards, whose presence

becomes normalized. This presence loses its relations with any security purpose. Thus the actual wealth, and the relative position of a family on the wealth curve matters little as long as they are on the right side of the gate.

Those are some of the debates surrounding the terms of “upper and middle-class” that I am using many times. I will come back to those debates in due course.

#### 3.2.4 - Interview with residents and residents associations.

In order to answer research questions 3, 4 and 5 in the above in Table 5 p 61, I needed interviewing security guards employers. Even though residents have contact with security guards, residents associations take care of hiring a company that deploys guards through the neighborhood. In the two neighborhoods wherein I conducted fieldwork, homeowners associations contract the companies. In Saket the homeowners associations are Resident Welfare Associations and in Dwarka Sector 10 they are Cooperative Group Housing Societies (Srivastava 2015b; Coelho and Venkat 2009; Dupont 2016).

Resident welfare Associations are associations formed by homeowners. They show the sociological characteristics of their environment of origin, even though they tend to be everywhere quite conservative. Originally a “senior citizen’s group, a retiree’s group, a social committee for the elderly [with a bit of volunteering work]”, RWA emerged in the early 2000 as significant local force (Ghertner 2011, 46). They have been taking greater initiatives as the former chief minister Sheila Dikshit launched the *Bhagidari* (partnership) scheme (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2013), which harness local involvement of RWA into the governance of the city. Homeowner associations became the “voice of the people”, claiming for greater visible security and slum removal.

The management of Delhi’s parks and streets became local political issues at the scale of the neighborhood. Hiring companies for security guards—and, still commonly despite the illegality, *chowkidars*—has been delegated to the RWA which have also taken upon themselves to erect gates and walls. They are “[enclosing] spaces that are not private estates behind fences and gates, including the public streets that pass through them” (Dupont 2016, 231), fabricating a closed “urban utopia” (Ghertner 2011, 92).

Cooperative Group Housing Societies (CGHS) have a different history, as they formed with the collective housing they inhabit, and generally speaking are slightly lower in the class hierarchy. Where the RWA can behave as a power broker with the municipality, the CGHS seemed more often acted as building managers. In Dupont’s words (2016, 231):

“The constitution of the co-operative societies was based on an association of prospective flat buyers who belonged to similar social or professional networks, and usually shared some common attributes. Very frequently the association was formed on the basis of a common professional affiliation: lawyers of the Supreme Court, employees from the same press group, [...] or teachers from the same university, for instance. The founding group was then in a position to exert control on the selection of new buyers, while the owners renting out their flats applied a screening process on prospective tenants. This system of co-optation and selection ensured, at least in the beginning, social and professional homogeneity among residents in the same complex of apartment blocks.

A filtering procedure applies also to visitors as fences or walls enclose these residential complexes, with gates and watchmen controlling all people entering.”

Despite those differences in class, constitution and functioning, when it comes to hiring security companies, the practical differences between the two kinds of organizations were minimal.

I contacted seven RWA in Saket and six CGHS representatives, in both Saket and Dwarka, until the interviews got to the point of saturation. I got two rejections in Saket and one in Dwarka, the rest simply did not come back to me. Contacting CGHS in Dwarka was more difficult than anticipated as the directory was not available on line. I could conduct group and individual interview according to the context. In Saket there seemed to be one RWA per block – this is often but not systematically the case. There is a tendency to consolidation. However, several organizations have sometimes competed to represent the neighborhood. The small scale of the battlefield does not mitigate the Homeric battles that occasionally occurs among competing rightful claimants to legitimacy, such as in Jangpura in 2007.

I contacted systematically all RWA associations and conducted interviews with every respondents, or one third of the total. In Dwarka, there is one CGHS per building, and one building per plot, with a security guard contract each. I could conduct the same number of interviews taking two CGHS in every tenth plot. The CGHS representatives were overall more welcoming and younger than the RWA representatives. Both categories however were overwhelmingly male dominated, making difficult to interview or simply

meet female residents in a systematic way. All interviews were semi-directed interviews with interview guides and were recorded. In almost every case I was accompanied by either of my research assistants. I also cross-checked those informations with my own experience as a resident of Delhi and informal interviews with upper and middle-class residents.

The informations given by RWAs or CGHS do represent a particular point of view. RWA representatives have the time and the social and financial means to take the leadership in the management of their neighborhoods. Again, they tend to be wealthy and conservatives. A significant part of the inhabitants of the neighborhood at times refuse to take part in this forced representations. According to Hazari Prasad, up to a third of local residents refuse to contribute to the funds of the Resident Welfare Associations in Saket, which has no means of getting its fees enforced legally<sup>42</sup>. Thus, the opinions and ideas of a significant part of the homeowners, in additions to non-homeowner residents, might be misrepresented in this research. This is a significant shortcoming, which could not be circumscribed within the time of fieldwork. Conversely, in Dwarka, I could conduct an interview with a recently created RWA. The president of the latter aimed at taking over the representation of the neighborhood from the hands of the CGHS, which was, according to her, controlled by the developer of the building. The issue of representation is interesting but tended to take away from the focus of this research on private security guards.

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42 Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

In addition to this, despite several attempts, I could not get to interview the owners of individually guarded houses, in the case where residents have an additional sentry box within a guarded neighborhood. The sensitive and intimate nature of the security industry might be to blame in this other shortcoming of my research.

I needed to ask RWA and CGHS representatives why they hired guards. I asked them if they were aware of the legislation. I also asked if they knew how much the guards were paid. I have asked other questions about their experiences with hired security guards and asked if and to what extent they were satisfied with this situation. Overall their opinions and experience differed surprisingly little. Their differences of income might be stark, but probably less so than the difference of class between them and the security guards.

#### 3.2.5 - Interviews with domestic workers.

It was particularly difficult to interview domestic workers because it was unlikely they would confide to a white male finding them as they leave the house in which they work. It was also unlikely that residents would let me interview their domestic workers. Yet since their work time was not a possibility to contact them, I could not know where they reside or who among the residents of a lower class neighborhood was a domestic worker. It soon became a problem.

I made use of contacts I had made in Delhi during previous fieldworks to conduct a group interview. I asked the head of a domestic worker union to help me organize a group meeting and, with the help of my research assistant sat down in the

basement of the associations, among a dozen outspoken domestic workers whom I could interview at length. This interview does not satisfy fully some criterion. The domestic workers did not work in the neighborhood in which I was conducting my fieldwork. The number of interviews remains too small. All of them belonged to a union that might contribute in helping them frame their concerns in a particular way. However, I felt it could help overcome the main practical concerns and allow me at least a limited contact to confirm or change assumptions and hypotheses. I conducted a semi-directed, recorded interview—the interview guide was soon overwhelmed with changes and left abandoned by the enthusiasm of the informants. If methodologically clearly imperfect, I must add few interviews had such a pleasant and relaxed feel. The domestic workers reported a certain class solidarity with security guards, but equally pointed that they could be used by their contractors or employers (*thekedars* and *maliks*) to cordon the domestic workers in case of conflicts with their employers. They reported frequent demands of bribes from the guards, from them as well as from vegetable sellers. I could not interview this latter category of worker due to the lack of time.

In addition to contacts with this domestic workers union, I could also by chance ask my research assistant, a female, to conduct an impromptu interview with two female domestic workers in Dwarka. I was concerned again they might not respond to a male and would not have been able to talk of their relationship with guards under their gaze. This serendipitous interview was fruitful and followed quite closely the same narrative as the domestic worker union. It could not be repeated.

### 3.2.6 - Miscellaneous interviews

In addition to those planned interviews I have recorded a few others, when the opportunity arose. I interviewed individuals who were outside the research planning *per se*, because I judged their voice could be interesting for the purpose of this research. I could thus prepare neither an interview guide nor my recorder. I conducted an interview with a French police official working for the embassy, himself employer of a *chowkidar* who lives in the *barsati*<sup>43</sup> of a residence that is passed on, guard included, each time the diplomat is replaced.

I could also interview a transgender, former worker of one of Saket's mall and current client of one of the gym. I could not do a follow-up but I could ask questions on the various forms of discriminations she faces when confronted with body searches each time she enters the mall.

I was given the opportunity to conduct distant interviews with an active female member from an RWA outside of the two neighborhoods I have selected for fieldwork. The case appeared as particularly interesting for two reasons. First because the RWA in question was in the process of changing their guardianship contract. Second because the political and gendered politics of the RWA was laid bare in the account of the events. Such information was otherwise difficult to obtain as the interpersonal politics in the making of RWA work is obscured to the interviewer.

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43 A Barsati is a small apartment built atop a building, originally a shed. Many are rented out. The barsati (which comes from बरसात - rain), always has a terrace as it is build a little away from the street. This architectural particularity is due to the limit on the number of floors imposed on Delhi's residential buildings.



### 3.3 - Non interview based data.

I have used little non-interview based materials, except those coming from the institutional sources I have detailed above. I have of course used legal documents such as the PSARA Law (2009) and PSAR Act (2005). Both are widely available to the public. I have also used the occasional newspaper articles or advertisement printed in newspapers.

The most intimate source remains Delhi itself, and the physical experience of the blocked road, of climbing a closed gate after 10pm. And of course encountering the stern obsequiousness or warm handshake of a guard who has been up for 10 hours, in the cold, in the heat, or among the mosquitoes – the three seasons of Delhi.

## **4 - Limits of the methodology.**

The methods I have employed come with limits. Some of those limits are inherent to the work itself—an interview is never complete, an informant is never disinterested. Some are mine only—an interviewer has his shortcomings and his bias. And some were linguistic. I have conducted interviews until the point of saturation, that is, until the answers started to be repetitive and predictable, and stopped bringing new material.

Certain projects I had originally planned could not be carried out. I had planned to meet and interview trainers. Indeed, I met three, two during organized training and one thanks to an indirect contact. I could not interview them directly. For two cases—I mention above that of CAPSI, I suppose the employer gave them explicit orders not to talk to me before I could meet them.

I could not conduct a neighborhood wide quantitative survey. First it was less necessary as I conducted around 40 in-depth interviews. Second, it appeared rather incongruous and somewhat did not “fit”. The nature of the security market makes it a complicated ground for the sharing of information, particularly in writing. Thus, caste, income, the payment of provident funds and the states of origin acquired, if not the impossible scientifically of a hypothetical survey, at least the degree of certitude that permits, with all due *caveats*, a tentative and qualified generalization.

The most significant shortcoming of my fieldwork is the difficulty to access the point of view of women. The world of security guards is strongly masculine, from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. Except for the few female guards themselves, I saw two women in responsibility positions and one in subaltern position in security companies. I saw three in subaltern positions in two different institutions. The CGHS and RWAs I could meet were also strongly masculine dominated. With one exception, the leadership that received me and that was taking the financial decisions were all masculine. I was expecting such difficulties, particularly because most senior management in security company are former military personals, itself a rather masculine milieu.

Hearing female voices in the different categories was thus difficult. I explained above how I tried to circumvent this problem. For middle-class women voices, I relied on my personal circle of acquaintances and on people they knew. I happened to know women residing in Saket. Of course, they form a biased sample of rather progressive and

university educated women. For instance, when I asked company representatives or primary employers if they thought training for “handling female security” would be appreciated or necessary, most considered the question outlandish. They considered that security of good and persons is the same for all. The few female respondents I could interview in each class seemed to understand perfectly what it meant. Despite my best efforts, partly because of my own positionality, partly because of flows inherent to the research design I had chosen, it was not possible to overcome that limit sufficiently. Some of the most pressing issue in Delhi, like gendered insecurities and the male domination of the streets, will therefore be touched upon but will remain insufficiently developed.

## **5 - Timetable.**

The main fieldwork lasted 11 months. My affiliation to the Center for Policy Research gave me, in addition to a strong intellectual support, a total latitude to conduct my fieldwork. I had planned to conduct my fieldwork starting with the training in order to be able to use it as a way to open conversations with guards and follow up the becoming of the trainees. I had proposed to interview guards a first time. I then would have conducted the neighborhood and the mall surveys. Between March and April 2017 I proposed to interview residents and workers. I would have then come back to informants among the guards whom I would have noticed as talkative or desirous to exchange. Finally, I proposed to follow up with the trainees of the training center in order to observe their evolution and career paths.

I spent quite some time chasing a training that simply had stopped to exist. This chase took me to various security companies and the institution of PSARA, SSSDC and CAPSI. I had conducted neighborhood walks as soon as I arrived, but began systematically interviewing guards and non-institutional actors after the winter break. Moreover, I had not noted during my reading or during preliminary fieldwork the discrepancies and the latent conflicts between PSARA and SSSDC. Understanding the nature and the reasons of that conflict, as well as its meaning for the security industry of Delhi took the best of the first three months of my stay. I then conducted further interviews with guards and workers, before, serendipitously almost, obtaining to attend training thanks to recommendations from the institutions I had interviewed during the first phase. In the last month, I conducted the interviews I had planned with the RWA and CGHS in both neighborhoods.




Chart 2: *Realized timetable 2016-2017, overview.*  
Source: author, 2017.

## II - LABOR AT THE GATE, A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SECURITY GUARDS.

### 1 - The man in the glass box

My research assistant Priyam and I met Ramesh Pandey down in Saket metro station<sup>44</sup>. It had been a nice afternoon of fieldwork during which we were walking and conducting interviews. It was one of those rare weeks of the year when strolling all afternoon in Delhi's streets was pleasant. In the main hall of many subterranean metro stations in Delhi, between the ticket counters and the gates, there is a glass box with an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) inside. The box is manned by a guard, tasked with making sure that the ATM clients feel safe and that the machine is not degraded. This notwithstanding that the ATM box is in a space that is itself thoroughly controlled with cameras. Its entry is kept by men or women from the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) or from the Home Guard who do a patting-search of every person coming in as they pass under seemingly ever-dysfunctional metal detector gate<sup>45</sup>, and X-ray every luggage that enters inside the metro precinct. In addition, many metro stations also have, at the main gate, a CISF man with a machine gun, standing in sentry duty behind sandbags.

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44 Ramesh Pandey, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

45 Over years of living in Delhi I have never seen one functioning. I suppose it would cause too much delays to remove coins, belts, shoes, jewelries, and watches. Carrying medical certificates to justify the presence of pacemakers and medical devices might be an efficient solution for securing the occasional entry into an embassy or an airport. It might be judged too cumbersome for the frequent occurrence of commuting by metro.

That afternoon in Saket metro station, a guard with a bright blue shirt was kneeling inside the ATM box. His back stood opposing the door, his head curiously leaning towards the inside of an open cupboard. On the ATM screen, there was a handwritten sign saying “NO CASH”. More than three months after the demonetization of most of the country’s banknotes, most ATMs were still to be re-calibrated to the newly printed money and provisioned. We entered the box, despite the sign, more interested in talking to the guardian than in his the missing treasure. Ramesh Pandey was watching videos on his phone, taking electricity from the plug hidden inside the cupboard.

We sat on the ground of the box, oblivious that its glass walls were making us perhaps conspicuously visible. Ramesh Pandey was the son of a landless family of Brahmins from Bihar. His parents were doing ceremonies in marriages and other life moments for a small fee, but the income was too scarce. His wife, unemployed, had stayed in the village, with his daughter and his son.

Ramesh appeared exhausted. He said that he had been working two shifts of 12 hours for a month. He was working with two different companies, and he has two different company



Fig. 12: Ramesh tracking application.  
Source: Author, Delhi, 2017.

photo-ID cards on his name. During his night shifts he sleeps in his ATM box, washing himself and his uniform in the toilet of the metro station. Ramesh never received training. Of course, such a regime was not meant to last. He was collecting money to go home at the earliest. Before we left the metro station, he shared with me the CCTV footage of a security guard, fast asleep in one such ATM box. In the video he shared, one sees two men entering the box and hitting the sleeping guard on the head with a stick, until his skull breaks. Then they proceed to break the ATM. The video stops at that point. Ramesh did not appear to feel safe in Delhi.

His company was tracking his movements, thanks to an application installed on his phone (see Fig. 12). The application was measuring in real time the distance between the ATM and his phone through a GPS navigator integrated in the device. His phone thus appeared not only to help him pass the time in watching videos, it also tracked his work. During the course of the year Ramesh repeatedly added me to multiple *WhatsApp* groups in which his friends and himself shared short videos of all types, motivational “self help” messages, pornographic material, Hindu festival greetings, Hindu propaganda, racist memes, etc. In Delhi the application seemed to permit him to keep his local and distant sociabilities going. Before he left he visited the Lotus garden with his wife and sent me a selfie. He is now back in Bihar, his home state, officiating in religious rituals.

In this chapter, I describe the work of security guards. I describe what it is to be the “eye and ear” in the street. I take cues from the idea of “learning from labor”

(Gidwani 2012). The project is to draw a precise picture of the processes that are engaged in the reality of labor, using the words of the laborers.

A discussion of security guardianship draws in all too easily associated categories such as “privatization of violence”, “neo-liberalism” or “labor-time”. I hold that a closer look at the reality of this work is necessary before re-investing in those thought categories with meaning and critical validity.

The obfuscation of the work of security guards is made particularly easy because their work entertains two peculiar relationships with visibility. The first of those is a troubled relationship with the sensible impact of the guards attires. Guards are meant to be visible and their uniform answers this imperative. The point of a uniform is double: historically the first uniform in the police was as much to signal the presence of a policeman as to stop the policeman from mingling in the crowd and avoiding his responsibilities (Berlière 1996).

The uniform thus designates a person who stands apart because of the role he exerts, but also a man who cannot simply disappear. Yet the uniform tends to make the men wearing it indistinguishable from one another. It designates a man who “has business” being here, at the door. Whereas the same visibly poor man, standing at the same place, might be considered “loitering”. In Jacques Rancière (2008, 67) terms, “the principle of the well organized community is that everyone does just one thing, what his ‘nature’ intends him to do. [...] The idea of work is not first that of a determinate activity [...]. It is that of a distribution of the sensible: an impossibility to do ‘anything else’



based on an ‘absence of time’.”<sup>46</sup> The sentry is a part of the normal order of the secluded neighborhood, they are not introducing a rupture in the sensible, they are part of the background. Ramesh in his glass box is invisible to the metro commuters.

The second peculiar relationship with visibility lays not in the appearance but in the nature of the work of security guards. The labor of security guard is easily forgotten for the members of the classes whose movement are not impeded. Here security guards smoothen the movement. They are often posted at the gate to stop non-sticker-wearing cars from entering a neighborhood. In this sense their work is most obvious when it is *not* exercised, when cars and traffic are piling up. Like tools are visible for what they are when they cease to function, guards are rendered visible when circulation, of cars or people, is interrupted. The service they offer is the presence of their person.

Guards can be said to be their own commodity, paid by the hour. In Karl Marx’ terms, “The definite social relations between men themselves assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx [1867] 1976, 165). The guard’s commodity might be a feeling of security, or the sentiment to belong to a class of people that are “guarded”. Yet by being guarded, the “guarded class” must let in a rural body that does not belong. It is not innocent that companies insist that the guards they deploy are “well groomed” (Advertisement 2013) (see Fig. 13). The presence of the worker never relents, lest the feeling of belonging to the guarded class disappear.

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46 « Le principe de la communauté bien organisée est que chacun n’y fait qu’une chose, celle à laquelle sa “nature” le destine. En un sens, tout est dit là : l’idée de travail n’est pas d’abord celle d’une activité déterminée [...]. Elle est celle d’un partage du sensible : une impossibilité de faire ‘autre chose’, fondée sur une ‘absence de temps’. »

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Fig. 13: "Security you Deserve", caption from an on-line advertisement.

Source: <http://www.securityguardsdelhi.com/> (Accessed 11<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

For Marx ([1867] 1976, pt. 4, chap. 1), commodities are always more than their use value. “Its analysis brings out that it is a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (p.163). In a nutshell, the commodity hides within its phenomenal form the “social character of the labor which produces them” (165). This obfuscation, is the fetish of the commodity: always more than it is and social before being material. The commodity that security guards produce is the class distinction of being guarded, preserved of the city’s harms. This class distinction has effects on the neighborhood appeal and reputation and thereby on real estate value.

Yet the work of the fetish in this case is never complete, the producer of the commodity cannot disappear, the social work of production is trapped and kept in the neighborhood in which the commodity is produced. The uniform serves to obfuscate that

this is essentially labor production. These two paradoxes illustrate the role that guards play in the territorial organization of the city. Their visibility or invisibility revolves around time and space.

Their visibility is also what hold the visible “organizational order” (Garmany 2014, 1243), which I have above (see Introduction, p. 5) called the “visible grid” of the city. In this chapter I verify the first part of my first hypothesis: Security is not the main work of security guards. I also give partial answers to hypothesis 2, 3 and 4. For hypothesis 2, I show that a majority of the guards are originating from upper-caste background, and I come back on the difficulties I have faced to make sense of this fact. The third hypothesis pointed out that guards learned the criterion of judgment that permits them to fulfill their role informally. This anthropology confirms indirectly that the aesthetic of class is embodied and unquestioned not only in the work but also through the work of security guards. The category of “interface worker” that was central to the hypothesis 4 (see p.12) finds here a clear definition and a role in the production and reproduction of the labor day.

This chapter starts with a brief review of the literature I am engaging with in addition to the literature review I have given above. I propose to answer the old call for a “spatial ethnography of labor” (Gidwani and Chari 2005). I give an overview of the demographics of a labor category that is mostly composed of circular migrants (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003) from Bihar. I examine the caste distribution of guards and their precarious economic position. In the next section I examine their working settings

and conditions and I describe where the guards' fatigue comes from. I describe their uniform, and their daily tasks and labor. I show how their presence is marked on the layout of the city. Finally, I show the role they play in the reproduction of the class division of Delhi. They contribute to the insulation of the upper and middle-classes that employ them. This role of “interface workers” sets them in the middle of a class dynamics that contributes to their own exclusion of the cityscape.

## **2 - Literature review: listening to labor?**

The literature on labor is immensely rich. The work I propose does not simply aim at adding a new job item to an immense and unlimited catalog of different professional categories. I propose a geographic contribution to a field that is largely historical, sociological, and anthropological. The work carried out by security guards has several essential geographic components. It enacts urban seclusion. It marks the borders of the territories of the rich in Delhi. It shows the networks of labor sources. It controls circulations.

### 2.1 - From working-class history to history of laborers

Literature inspired by the work of Marx and Engels rose up to the challenge of explaining the production and reproduction of class through labor. The active, “form-giving fire” (Marx [1939] 1973, 361) that is labor induces different ways of engaging with the world, and therefrom different work cultures that must be understood in an array of infinite complexity. The anthropological focus on the reproduction of a working class after Friedrich Engels monumental *Condition of the working class in England* ([1845]

2009), was profoundly renewed in the post-war era with two monumental books coming out on both sides of the Channel, interestingly by two historians.

In France a significant step in the research on industrial working class culture is the *Classes Laborieuses Classes Dangereuses* by Louis Chevalier ([1958] 2002). Chevalier shows the level of poverty and violence accompanying the constitution of a laboring class during the late and tedious arrival of the industrial revolution in France. It tends however to presume the existence of a correlation between poverty, city growth and criminality, a correlation that has been widely questioned.

In England the work of E.P Thompson comes out five years later with the no less monumental *Making of the English Working Class* ([1963] 1980). The book focuses on the dynamic aspects of the construction, and the involvement of the working class and the emergence of a proper working class culture. This trend is followed by sociologists such as Paul Willis who shows in *Learning to Labor* (1981), how the culture of a group of working class boys plays a full part in maintaining them as a part of that class. I take inspiration from this set of literature for the fine-grained attention it gives to hearing the laborer.

I now move toward two more sets of literature of different status and size to continue my demonstration. The first is the immense set of literature concerned with studies on labor in India. This set is of course not unified. Nevertheless, a certain number of debates, such as the role of caste or the status of the history of capital is animating rich discussions. The corpus is formed around—against or for—the work of subaltern studies,

the debates on Indian working class history and the relevance of the informal/formal labor division.

The second set of literature on labor and work is formed around a much more recent and much narrower literature on police and private security guards. The narrow topic – oriented around the nature of the work and not on a large geographic area – permits international comparisons and cross-pollinations. My own work, after that of Nandini Gooptu (2013b), comes naturally at the crossroad of both those sets.

#### 2.1.1 - Indian labor history and sociology on one side...

Indian sociologists and anthropologists have contributed largely to the field, sometimes with critiques particularly difficult for Marxist historiography. *Rethinking Working Class History* ([1989] 2000) by Dipesh Chakrabarty, again a historian, studies the working culture and condition of West Bengal jute-mill workers. He shows, for example, how difficult choices were made on going on strike or not against appealing working conditions. He argues that the relationship between the contractors and the workers is in essence different from the relationship between employees and employers in European factories. For Chakrabarty, cultural factors explain why the jute-mill workers were not proletarians and thus were not formulating their hardships in terms of class interests.

Chakrabarty himself recanted this conclusion, yet it was taken up as a moment of what was becoming the Subaltern Studies research effort. His work tends to deny to the working men of the jute-mill a rationality that could be compared with that of their

European counterpart (Chibber 2013, 128). Both Vivek Chibber and Vasant Kaiwar (2015) have demonstrated the epistemological danger of this denial, which reproduces the ideological framework of a unique, rational “West” compared with an irrational orient.

The sociologist Jan Breman revisits the title of E.P Thompson’s classic. *The Making and Unmaking of an Industrial Working Class* (2004) is a two-part book. The first, historical part, shows the patient “making of an industrial working class” in Ahmedabad between 1850 and 1980. The second part is more sociological and anthropological and covers the period running from 1980 to 2004. During this period Breman observes the destruction of the working cultures and livelihood of the textile mill workers. He shows how the informalization of labor in India affected cultural constructions among the working class, even though *in fine* only a tiny part of the laboring class belonged to an industrial proletariat. While I am interested in particular with the making of the working culture, I am not affirmative that the contours of a unified class can be drawn in the case of security guards. De-industrialization—or at least informalization and casualization—of labor since the liberalization of the Indian economy plays a role in furnishing to the security industry the mass of labor it requires.

In a beautifully written book—the value judgment is mine—*Writing Labor, Stone Quarry Workers in Delhi*, Mohammad Talib (2010) chronicles the work, resistance and final evictions of the workers he studies. His intense and extensive fieldwork covers a period going from the early 80’s to the late 2000’s. He shows how the stone quarry workers of Delhi have collectively attempted to resist their evictions and the end of their

occupation and attempted to keep a laboring culture while remaining in the informal sector. In *Cultures of Servitude* Raka Ray and Seemin Qayum (2009) trace an account of the working cultures of domestic workers inside the home of their employers, in Calcutta (now Kolkata), across the turn of the century.

Those two ethnographic works show the interests of listening to the voice of the lowest class to understand the impact of socio-economic changes such as liberalization and informalization of labor on the lives and expectations of the poorest classes. They also point out at the multiplicity, historical volatility and richness of the cultures of labor. Both books tie strongly their empirical findings with the dynamics of capitalism in an urban setting. The first ties the work of the stone quarry workers with primitive accumulation and the exploitation of land resources for construction. The stone quarry were at the fringes of Delhi and their progressive evictions has to do with the urban extension and the creation of a protected area.

The second book shows how the working conditions of domestic workers, which have moved from feudal relationships with their employers to contractual relationships, has co-evolved with Calcutta's housing stock (Ray and Qayum 2009, chap. 2). My work on Delhi's security guards explores the diverse aspects of their work and working culture through an exposition of the security guards' recent and personal history. The passage from feudal to contractual labor described by Ray and Qayum is of particular importance to my own thoughts. My sole point of contention with their work might seem petty, but I hold it is quite crucial.



In their treatment of Hegel’s master-bondsman dialectic ([1807] 2011, para. 190), arguably a *passage-obligé* with such a topic, Raka Ray and Seemin Qayum (2009, 5) follow the reading of Alexander Kojève ([1947] 1979). Kojève interprets the master-bondsman dialectic in terms of failed recognition between the two poles. The master is dissatisfied because the recognition of the slave<sup>47</sup> is insufficient, precisely because the slave is worthless: Here is the plight of the master. Rather than with Ray and Qyum, it is actually with Kojève that I would beg to differ. I argue that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not warrant such reading, and the problem of failed recognition, albeit a fascinating proposition, is not the point of the text – the question of mutual recognition is resolved in the paragraph 184, precisely before the diremption between master and bondsman, paragraph 190.

My reading is quite classically materialist: the master becomes disabled in his capacity to understand the world because the bondsman assures the mediation between his desires and their fulfillment. The master thus loses touch with the practicalities of confronting a difficult world. *Cultures of Servitude* follows its premises. It explores the misunderstanding and difficulties fraughting the relations between master and servant within a theoretical framework that is a little to bend toward a psychological approach. I

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47 Kojève and Ray and Qayum use the term “slave”, and indeed the famous passage from the German philosopher has come to be widely known under that name, despite being one among many such descriptions in the book. The German term for slave does appear in the *Phenomenology*, but not in this part in which Hegel uses the term *Knecht*, which translates better into English by bondsman, and not slave (*Sklave*). The nuance is particularly important if one follows Susan Buck-Morss (Buck-Morss 2009). She argues that Hegel’s understanding of slavery and his defense of emancipation is inspired—contra Kojève again—by the Haitian revolution and the revolts against colonialism. Hegel’s universal history—in the *Phenomenology* at least—is not limited to a bourgeois confusion between work and slavery, and he does understand the racial and inhumane foundation on which international commerce was built. The paradox is that he both simultaneously draws clear inspiration from History unfolding in his time yet obscures the origins of his thoughts.

think it is worth elaborating upon this theoretical point. The description I give of the relationship between security guards and their employers is less likely to lend to this Kojévian inspired psychological reading. Similarly, if the account I make of the transition between feudal and contractual regimes of employments runs parallel to Ray and Qayum's, my approach does not take the psychological origins and implications of this transition as central, rather, it is for me a key to understand a class culture that reproduces itself.

#### 2.1.2 - Ethnographies of security personals on the other side.

The other set of literature I describe here is smaller by several orders of magnitude. It is also perpendicular to the first. This set concerns the ethnographic work on security personals. In later years, and increasingly, these peculiar categories of workers started to be the object of ethnographic studies.

The term “security personnel ” is vague as it could designate military personnel, police officers, paramilitary or private security firm employees. Here I will mean it to include private security companies and at times the police. It is paradoxical on my part as I point out several times that private security companies do not do a lot of security, yet it is how the literature has approached it. Critical security studies have started by looking at the police and in countries such as the USA and Canada, countries where private security and police tend to do a comparable work. I present the evolution of this field while keeping in mind that difference. It is not without raising further questions.

The blurring of the boundaries between the functions exercised by the different categories of “security personnels” does not simplify things. However in India the distinction between private security guards and police is rather clearcut: security guards are not given police powers and their relations with the police is clearly that of an inferior status. This should not obscure that a blurring of function is still taking place with other “security forces”, such as the para-military organization Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) in particular. The CISF obtained contracts to secure harbors such as Mumbai’s and does realize security audits on behalf of private firms (“Consultancy | CISF” n.d.; Trivedi 2018). Indian paramilitary forces however, have not as yet been the object of ethnographic monographs<sup>48</sup>.

Ethnographic research as a contribution to critical security studies started late (see section 2.4 page 40). There have been several reasons to it. One of them hangs on the statutory obedience of security personnels to the State. This has been problematic as post-war social research efforts were in no small part geared toward an anti-totalitarian agenda. The police is quite simply the arm of the state inside its territory. For Hannah Arendt (1958) this uncritical obedience leads to questioning the belonging of the police to

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48 The Indian paramilitary forces play multiple roles, including that of upscale security guards. They have in common to come under the purview of the Union Ministry for Home Affairs and not under that of the Defense Ministry. The Border Security Forces secure the border between Pakistan and India. The Assam Rifles conducts counter insurrection operations and secure the border with Myanmar. The Central Industrial Security Force, raised originally to protect the assets of the government has grown into a multifarious agency. It advises private companies for their security in a consulting venture, secures Delhi Metro and conducts war-like operations with the Central Reserve Police Force against the Maoists rebels in Chhattisgarh and Bihar. The term paramilitary forces in general designates a vast number of roles and agencies that defies international comparisons. The Indian CISF, the American Transport Security Administration, specialized in airport security, and the French *Service Action* of the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure*, that conducts targeted operations are all considered paramilitary forces.

human society. Another reason, for left-leaning anthropologists, was that the police remained the bearer of state violence. They enforce a class order directly detrimental to the socio-professional categories they were studying and with which they were often identifying.

Finally, one would not need to look a long time for traces of a certain amount of disdain for police agents at the lowest level of the hierarchy among intellectual classes. Anthropologists or ethnographers tend to focus on those that are at the receiving end of State—and thereby, police—violence.

In that view the police might be the one distributing power, but in no way the origin of it. For Michael Foucault, the police is the continuity of the prison system in *Surveiller et Punir* (1975), or tasked with managing life to increase “the forces of the State while preserving the State in good order” in *Sécurité, Territoire, Population* ([1978] 2004, 321). By and large in the literature, whatever the policeman may think or do, individually or collectively, is of very little importance. At best, he embodies the “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser 1975) with more or less enthusiasm. Left and anarchist literature on police can therefore be very straightforward about their treatment of the subject, such as in *Our Enemies in Blue* (Williams 2015). It appears that security cannot be “just a normal job”, domination is always already a part of it.

According to Kevin Karpiak (2016, 421), the anthropology of police was also facing an uphill battle because it was suspected to take the focus away from the colonial subject. The police was “an institution associated, especially by early anthropologists,

with the West and processes of modernization”. In addition, “anthropologists who have been concerned with addressing issues of power and inequality have tended to consider nuanced engagements with police to be a less critical task than capturing and giving voice to the perspectives of more marginalized populations, despite rather widespread calls to ‘study up’ (Nader 1972)”. In addition, anthropologists have at times crossed a difficult barrier in consciously lending their art to policing. Richard Kania proposed candidly, in the title of his article, to “Join anthropology and Law Enforcement” (1983).

Despite this state of affairs, Didier Fassin publishes what can be considered as a pioneering ethnography of police in *La Force de l’Ordre* (2011). His study took place after a series of urban violence in the suburbs of Paris. One of the major one was consecutive to the death of two teenagers who, despite their innocence, had preferred to run away from the police. They hid in an electric transformer. He shows how the racism and boredom of ordinary police patrols contribute to forging a subject of policing and a security obsession ordered around targeted urban territories.

The publishing of *Policing and contemporary governance: the anthropology of police in practice* (Garriott 2013) suggests that ethnography of police is becoming mainstream. Jeff Garmany (2014) conducted his work with the police forces of a *favela* community in Northeast Brazil. He shows how policing and police contribute, partly because of the distance between state and non-state actors, in creating disadvantaged territories. The field deepens in the richness of details, with for example the study of British police uniforms conducted by Camilla Rebec De Camargo (2016). It also extends

in geographical scope with works in South Africa (Faull 2018) and international comparative editorial work (Fassin 2017).

In India, Beatrice Jauregui (2016) has conducted a long-term fieldwork in the Northern State of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in which she shows the arrangement made by the police with law and legality, and how the uniform they carry yields them power and benefits. She also describes the difficult situation in which the policemen of Uttar Pradesh are living.

The journal *Theoretical Criminology* published a special issue on police anthropology in 2016. Tessa Diphorn and Erella Grassiani (2016) conducted a comparative research on the “securitizing capital” in Kenya, Israel and Jamaica. They show how a “securitizing capital” is formed, often in the service of the state, and can be traded in private or public security market. This capital is crucial to understand the making of the private security order as well. In my own fieldwork, the presence of former military, paramilitary or police personals in almost every corner of the private security industry can only be explained in those terms. “After a military [...] career, the most obvious career choice is to work in the private security sphere. These men, often consultants, then use their capital to train other security officials, and even the police, who are specialized in law enforcement, but not in ‘security’” (Diphorn and Grassiani 2016, 438–39). To bring it back to Delhi’s context and reformulate this in the direct language of Mr Sharma, civil servant in the Home Ministry to the Government of Delhi:

“[The Security Sector Skill Development Council] is absolutely scam in which some generals are making huge money, out of government funding and that scam will one day blow up. [SSSDC] is like a retirement pension for army generals”.<sup>49</sup>

The emerging field of private security studies has not taken many cues from the scrutiny put on police. None of the 26 articles of *the Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies* (Abrahamsen and Leander 2016) takes interest in an anthropology of the men tasked with securing shipping routes or waging wars on behalf of their employers. That burst of interest in private security studies can be read as the consequence of the meeting of neo-liberalism and anti-terrorism policies, completely unlike the ethnographic work on police which seems to have sprung from growing discontent with police violence across the world. Indeed the research on private security started from the top with private military as the paradigm from which private security would be understood.

The astounding efficiency—efficiency and morality having nothing to do with one another—of Executive Outcomes in the long civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola inspired the United States to employ similarly equipped and trained mercenaries in the war against terror. Capitalist ventures, such as Blackwater<sup>50</sup>, made a fortune in little time claiming to be cheaper and more efficient than the army, and mostly, needing no political oversight, for a comparable job (Prince and Coburn 2013).

This paradigm remains dominant, despite growing literature on private policing as the privatization of public space in Western cities (Sorkin 1992; Garrett 2015)

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49 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

50 The private security company famous for its actions in Iraq.

increasingly hands over to private companies the maintenance of law and order (Wakefield and Button 2014; Reisig and Kane 2014). George S Rigakos ([2002] 2016) and Tessa Diphoorn (2016a) have paid attention to the police work exerted by private security services with anthropological fieldwork. The first has paid a particular attention to the culture of Canadian “parapolic” officers. The second has proposed a large monograph of Private Security in South Africa. She shows the blurring of the distinction between state and private actors of security.

Laurent Fourchard (2011) had taken a counter point to this. He pointed out, through a study on vigilantism and private security companies in South Africa, how those practices could be understood as part of the process of State formation. In India, Nandini Gooptu’s (2013b) work shows how the workers of the private security sector are less part of a functional system of policing than a socio-professional category embedded in the inequalities they protect.

## 2.2 - Spatial ethnography of security guards

Ethnography has departed from the remote village and the industrial work-floor to engage with multiple groups and activities. As Sharad Chari and Vinay Gidwani (2005, 267) have argued, “ethnographies must be as attentive to space and nature as to human creativity, or cultural production”. Chari and Gidwani take *All that is Solid Melts into Air* ([1983] 1999) by Marshall Berman as the starting point of their analysis. Berman points out at the importance of demonstrations as a “primary symbol of modern life”. He puts the emphasis on the “signs in the street”. Based on his readings of Charles Baudelaire



([1863] 1963) himself read by Walter Benjamin ([1938] 2006), Berman's work considers the street as the place of making of modernity. The latter takes shape and hues in public sphere, in the boulevard and the street-side workshop. As Chari and Gidwani rightly point out:

“This is a decidedly Lefebvrian vision. Henri Lefebvre, saw the lived space of the street as potentially skewing the fit between dominant spatial practices and subaltern representations of space. The production of space under capitalism becomes one arena of contestation over the dialectics of capitalist development, in which ordinary people seek to remake place and spatial relations to some extent, but not under conditions of their choice.” (p. 270).

Pointing out at the importance of the “spatial fix” (Harvey [1982] 2006) in delaying the contradictions of capitalism, they state that class struggle is “always already spatial struggle” (Gidwani and Chari 2005, 272). Capitalism however, has not smoothed the ground on which it moves, rather, it reinvested the forms of domination that were already present. “Specific and uneven geographies of capitalist development have not ‘melted into air’” (p.273). For them therefore,

First, a non-teleological understanding of capitalism requires a conception of work attentive to changing cultural and material grounds. [...] Second, the importance of a geographical focus takes the ethnography of work into broader arenas of practice and cultural politics, whether in families, neighborhoods, social or cultural associations, political parties and social movements of various stripes. What are the precise spatial dynamics that link these arenas of livelihood and struggle? Third, we return to the importance of pre-ideological sensibilities, [...], in

relation to emergent spaces. Geographical ethnographies of work must be attentive not only to dominant structures, power relations and practices, but also to the fleeting, nascent, and marginal, and to the forms of working-class yearning that so powerfully move the work of Marshall Berman. (Gidwani and Chari 2005, 273)

I argue that this challenging research program for a spatial ethnography of labor remains paradoxically under the sway of Berman’s optimistic approach. I agree without reserve that the street is a locus for contest, resistance and collective action.

Yet it is also a place—and this is the point where security guardianship is not just another object but a nodal one—where the very nature of the work can be domination and exclusion. This is not to say that security guards and police are the only categories doing this work. This does not mean either that they do not fraternize, socialize or share their space with other workers, at least as individuals. Quite the reverse, their primary role, I refer here to Foucault ([1978] 2004), was to organize the circulation of goods to make it possible. Letting the work of “security personals”, which serve and represent upper-classes or the State, out of a spatial ethnography maintains a dark spot in our political imagination and in the understanding of the streets. It amounts to taking for granted that a “public space” remains the invariable marker of modern cities<sup>51</sup>. I have

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51 The term modern here is to be understood as defined in the writing of Bauman and many others (Meschonnic 1993). It corresponds to a historic time but also, and more importantly, to a certain shape of the capitalist relations of production and, it is possible to say, to a mode of political communication (Habermas [1962] 1990). Using the term in non-eurocentric perspectives has been fraught with difficulties because the modern city—Modernity in general—has been presented as the apex of historical achievement. Thus, the non-modern was described as the pre-modern. Read, the non-European was described as the European in becoming. Contemporary understandings of the term (Appadurai 1996) have permitted to escape this deterministic reading and shown that modernity is not unique but fragmented. Not always and only European, and systematically contested. The modern is less opposed to the pre-modern than to the post-modern (Compagnon 2005).

mentioned in the literature review p.34 how a large segment of literature shows how this public space is under threat. The work of the police may be to regulate this public space or to repress the expression of dissent that forms there. Yet the daily labor of private security guards is also to capture this space.

One may now ask what remains of public space. Has it not become a fetish of nostalgia or has it not been reduced to a legal category? In any case, neglecting that the negation of public space is also the object of working-class labor amounts to not taking seriously enough the spatial ethnography of labor that is the object of the call by Gidwani and Chari. The capturing of the streets and the seclusion of the richest classes in protected enclaves changes the nature of “public space”.

The forms of the built environment are the expression of the relations of production—that is Lefebvre’s core thesis. The late capitalist, disaggregated form of production (Jameson 1991) may be recognized as it affects the spatial avatar of modernism: the public street. The possibility of public expression, and the re-activation, contra Jean-François Lyotard (1979) of “grand narratives of emancipations”, may hang on the understanding of how to navigate what we could ironically call a “post-public space”.

This chapter traces this spatial ethnography of labor. The questions I want to raise are : how do security guards “become who they are”, how do they obtain their job, how do they get used to it, and what is the nature of their work concretely? I start by a

presentation of demographic and economic findings that help situate who the guards are and where they come from.

### **3 - Demographics of security guards**

Maadav Jha is manning the boot at the entry of a plot in Dwarka, sector 10. His colleague Jahangeer sits near the red and white metallic beam barring the entry for cars. I enter the place, and shake the guards' hands. They ask me whom I want to see. I explain, in a speech that has become automatic, that I have come to meet them. We sit on the wall that separate the entry from the parking lot.

Mr Jha is a Maithili Brahmin, a high caste dominating the district of Madhubani in Bihar. Madhubani, in the north of the State, is among the poorest district in the country. It is home to more than 4 million people. Maadav Jha stays in another sector of Dwarka, with his wife—who reportedly stays at home with his two young daughters. His father is a landless laborer. He studied until the 12<sup>th</sup> standard<sup>52</sup>. He was a production manager, but the relocation of the production unit to the Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh forced him to take up the job of security guard. Paid 7500 INR per month, without Provident Fund (PF) or Employee State Insurance (ESI), he still hopes to find another job.<sup>53</sup>

In this section, I focus on a broad description of the demographic data I gathered. Since there has been no systematically conducted quantitative study of the origins, class, religion and caste of security guards in India and in Delhi in particular, I

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52 Approximately until 18 years old. The 12<sup>th</sup> is the last year of high school in India.

53 Maadav Jah, Interview, 24th February 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

Mr Jahangeer, Interview, 24th February 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi.

develop a perspective based on a limited set of data. I believe (for reasons I have developed in page 75) that the study I have conducted offers a coherent view into this matter.

### 3.1 - States of origin

Maadav Jha's trajectory parallels that of many of the guards I met. Among all the guards whom I interviewed and who answered that particular question<sup>54</sup> without incoherences<sup>55</sup>, all came from the northern part of the country and nearly all from the Hindi belt. In details, among the 41 answers: 18 were from Bihar, 7 from Uttar Pradesh, 4 from Delhi, 4 from Jharkhand, 3 from Nepal, 2 from West Bengal, 1 from Haryana, 1 from Punjab, and 1 from Bangladesh<sup>56</sup> (see Map 5 p.130). Some of the data I have used come from the systematic—if incomplete—interview I did in the training I could do in Saket (see page 70). In this particular company, 8 of the 10 guards I interviewed were coming from Bihar. However, even without this particularly strong proportion an absolute majority of the guards interviewed come from this state, despite this state being further from Delhi than Uttar Pradesh and accounting for half its population (approximately 105 million inhabitants against 200 millions in 2011 (Census Commissioner 2011)).


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54 I could not necessarily dwell on this aspect of their lives, particularly while in training.

55 In two interviews, the guards give two different locations. The first gives Bihar in the beginning of the interview and Jharkhand when the issue of migration is mentioned again. The other guard gives successively Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Jharkhand is a recent state, it was carved out of Bihar in 2000, hence such confusion or error is explained easily. The confusion between Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is more difficult to explain.

56 In that particular company, guards seemed to stay for a considerable length of time, with an average of 10 years of service. In an interview that happened before this meeting the head of the company had joked that the lower turnover of his company—a loyalty in which he takes great pride—was costing him a lot in wage increases. It must be pointed out that it was the only company I saw that claimed to pay PF and follow “as much as possible” the legal obligations.

K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi. English.



Map 5: *Origin of guards interviewed per state, 2017.*

Source: d-maps.com for background, author's own survey for data.

Bihar is arguably one of the most economically depressed states in India (“India States Briefs” n.d.). Biharis have made an entry into Delhi’s internal migration “catchment area” in the 80’s. Different indicators show contrasted results when it comes to evaluate the importance of their contribution to Delhi’s population. Dupont (2000, 236) notes that “among the recent migrants [that is, migrants whose migration is less than five years old] residing in Delhi in 1991, 11 per cent had come from Bihar” (as per the Census of India 1991).

For Sanjay Kumar (2013, 18–24), migrants from Bihar are the poorest in comparison with migrants from Delhi and from other origins. 63% of them are in the “poor” category, with migrants from UP coming second at 46%. The proportion of skilled and unskilled worker, namely 34% was also the highest relatively to other states.<sup>57</sup> The over-representation of Biharis among security guards is explained by the difficult economic situations of the men constrained to seek that work.

### 3.2 - Assets and migration

Most of the security guards (75%) who had answered the question claimed that they had a little land in the village<sup>58</sup>, or that their family had land. It is possible that guards would indicate as “theirs” a land that “belongs” to their relatives who have stayed in the village. It is also possible that, for a part of them, the little land they have does not provide enough labor and incomes to sustain an entire family. Some, like Ramesh Pandey, come to Delhi for a short period of intensive work, probably to pay a debt.

With two exceptions, guards I interviewed claimed to be free of debt in their village of origin. This came in contradiction with the assertions of Rishab Tiwari<sup>59</sup>, the manager of a mid-sized security company with approximately a hundred employees. Rishab had found that several of his employees were in a debt circle that constrained them to keep working as security guards. According to him, several of the men working for him were directed to this work by their debt owner.

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57 The figures emerge from the Census of India, the National Sample Survey Office for the proportion of migrants. The figures on poverty and qualifications exploited by Sanjay Kumar come from The Hindustan Times – Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) of 2003. (“Hindustan Times - CSDS Delhi Survey” 2003).

58 Again, this question was asked when the circumstances permitted.

59 Rishab Tiwari, CMBody, 8th December 2016, Delhi, English.

### 3.3 - Hindu security.

Badri Chauhan might have arrived where he works a month ago from as far as West Bengal. He already has no doubt about this: “All security guards are Hindus”<sup>60</sup>. He has it almost right. Excepting one Sikh guard I could interview in a small, mid-level company in Saket, all guards are indeed Hindus, despite a Muslim population of 13% in Delhi (“Delhi Religion Data - Census 2011” n.d.). This does not come as a surprise. It would be surprising from rather conservative groups to hire members of Delhi’s historically significant Muslim community in security positions, in particular in Saket and Dwarka. Both sectors are both predominantly Hindu areas. The results might have been different in Daryaganj or in the old city, yet this remains to be proven.

At the end of our interview, Madhur Gautra, who heads a major security company in Delhi, proposed to drive me back home. I had not bought my bike yet and had to walk a long stretch to get to the road. His office laid deep in bougainvillea lined lanes in the heart of South Delhi’s farmhouses. Not expecting such an offer, I had turned off my recorder already. Mr Gautra was a former member of the Indian Administrative Service (AIS) and had worked at the helm of some of the most successful companies in the country. Oblivious of his driver, he started mentioning how Pakistan had seceded from India after treacherous bargains, and hopefully, soon, not only Kashmere would get back to India but the whole of Pakistan reintegrated to a Hindu India that should not have ceased to exist. For him, “Muslims were too busy praying to get a job” and found strength in their women “breeding 8 to 10 kids” each. The cordiality of his demeanors

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<sup>60</sup> Badri Chauhan, Interview, 27th April 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

“सारे गार्ड हिन्दू हैं”.



and the matter-of-fact tone he was using made for a stark contrast with the extreme violence of his statements<sup>61</sup>. I pointed at the falsehood of his statements, but he ignored my protestations. He nevertheless felt necessary to say that he had hired Muslims several times, but that was rare.

These deep sited prejudices against Muslims came in various form in many conversations. Thus the head of a governmental police service felt appropriate, at the end of our meeting in his office, to warn me that my country was in danger of being over-run by Muslim immigrants:

“And of course Islamic rule [is] spreading in Europe, if you let it go it will spread to Europe and it’s already spreading. And France being culprit for allowing them to dwell.”<sup>62</sup>

Only one security company head had a Muslim name. His company was not registered and, it seemed, had simply reached the stage of printing business cards<sup>63</sup>. The private security sector in Delhi belongs to Hindus and Sikhs and hire Hindus and Sikhs.

This religious preference is obvious, uncontested and therefore forgotten. I realized late that I had overlooked this simpler fact, absorbed as I was in trying to solve the “caste riddle” (see section 3.4 p. 134). Yet despite this, there was very few other apparent signs of religious practices<sup>64</sup>. Several security guards where wearing *tilaks* (a religious mark made by applying generally red powder on the forehead). But in India this

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61 Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.

62 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

63 Farooq Jafri, Security Guard Company A, Interview, 1st March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

64 I have in mind an idol of Hanuman in a sentry box in Hauz-Khas, but this did not appear very significant.

is very common, not the mark of any exacerbated religiosity. This contrasts, for example, with the well-rooted cult of Hanuman among the policemen of Uttar Pradesh (Jauregui 2016, 99). They seem to find in the monkey-god and servant of the kind Ram of the *Ramayana* an inspiration for his strength, loyalty and fortitude. Among the guards, such a cult has not developed. This could be explained by the relative short stay of security guards, who do not consider their job positions as perennial. However, since some of them do stay over years, it may be the mark of a rather low cohesion among them on the one hand and that of difficulties in bringing the material elements of religious practice in the context of their work on the other hand.

#### 3.4 - Caste up, casted out.

I was doing one of my first interviews in a by-lane of Daryaganj. The man sitting in front of me, Jay Prakash, talks vehemently. He is a middle aged security guard of Bihari origin, his normally graying hair hennaed orange. “I am an authentic Brahmin”<sup>65</sup>. Obviously this part of his identity is important to him. My first thought is that he emphasizes this part of his identity to compensate for the rather low status and consideration that his job gets him.

Fast forward nearly three years. I am at the 8<sup>th</sup> floor of a glass building with an overly powerful air conditioning. The office room is overlooking Gurgaon, among areas and zones sporting names such as “Golf Something” and “Something Professional”. I was cordially invited by Mr Tripathy to observe the first development of his company.<sup>66</sup>

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65 Jay Prakash, Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.

66 Mr Tripathy, EuroSec, Interview, 14th February 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.

We had met in the office of General Maitra<sup>67</sup>. General Maitra was Chief Operating Officer of the Security Sector Skill Development Council (SSSDC, see institutions, p.83). Recently retired from the army, his “security capital” (Diphorn and Grassiani 2016) had helped him secure this position.

A very tall guard suited in an impeccable blue uniform holds the door of Mr Tripathy’s company. In the entry, a full-size portrait of the Irish funders of the company looks at me with frank and determined ice-cold blue eyes. After conducting a series of relatively fruitless interviews and obtaining the not-to-be fulfilled promise that I will be called to attend the training, whenever it takes place. I am taken into the boardroom meeting. There I am seated in front of the infant company’s top brass. I had not expected such a treatment and I felt unprepared. I explained my research and what I expected from them. Clearly, they were neither familiar nor interested with either human geography or ethnographic methods. I asked if they knew about a caste pattern in the recruitment of guards.

A young executive in his thirties leads the charge, presumably to terminate a meeting that I did not call for. He starts by repeating what nearly all informants in the administration or in the management of company have been repeating. The private security sector, they say, is just like the army. Castes and religion have no importance. But he is more vehement. Castes have disappeared. They are only “for sociologists and anthropologists”, it “gives them something to do”. I take due notes, and I do not bother to write down the name of this employee of Mr Tripathy, whom I met in the office of Mr

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<sup>67</sup> General Maitra, SSSDC, Interview, 10th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.

Maitra. Both have Brahmin names. As a matter of fact, nearly all informants have such names.

Does that mean the market is purely Brahmin dominated, or that there is a solidarity emerging? Not quite. As I take the last interview of my fieldwork, sipping a warm *chai* with a jovial and friendly Mr Mishra, I understand what Jay Prakash meant. He was not only Brahmin while the others were not, he claimed the authenticity of his Brahmin's status as compared to those of his colleagues. The status of Brahmin, even though always claimed, is not necessarily recognized among the guards themselves.

“Mishra: Low castes won't go out. Badaun, Muradabad, Bihar, wherever they are coming from they say we are Chaubey, Dubey, Tiwari<sup>68</sup>, we are Brahmins. It means lower castes don't leave the village to work, great castes come to the big city for work. (Laughter) [His tone is sarcastic].

PT: Why is it the case?

Mishra: They hide their caste.

PT: So you think they are not...

Mishra: No No No. How to tell you such shameful thing... When they go to the bathroom they only rinse their hands with water instead of using soap.

PT: And from this you know their caste?

Mishra: Yes, you know the abject castes. You do recognize these. Do you understand madam [he addresses Priyam Tripathy] ? I will tell you the reasons.

PT: So you are saying that they are not all Brahmins?

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68 He gives a list of Brahmin names.

Mishra: No they all hide. There are maids coming here no? Well they take money even from those poor girls. I mean they take bribes. They even take money from *hijras*<sup>69</sup>. Around here 80% of them are Biharis<sup>70</sup>.

PT: Who could well be Brahmins...

Mishra: They think of themselves as Brahmins and call themselves such. [...] Here in this place there are such big cheaters. Gosh... The one who keeps a *tilak*. [...] What can I tell you madam. Whatever points he accumulates for his karma are bad points. [...] It is a matter of respect. You don't get it? Here if I say I am lower caste or backward caste so everybody will keep distances from me, right? Everybody will say let it be, what is there to do with such man. If I say I am Pandit-ji or Sharma-ji... then people will talk more respectfully to me. Right? I am not making this up, it is the reality. It is a fact.

PT: During recruitment, did they ask you about this? If you are Brahmin or Yadav?

Mishra: They asked. Who are you, you are Mishra, you are Paal...<sup>71</sup>

PT: Did they ask?

Mishra: Yes, I showed my name, my Aadhaar card<sup>72</sup> says I am a Mishra. It is on the Aadhaar so...<sup>73</sup>

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69 Hermaphrodites. There are deep running prejudices in Delhi against this community. The idea of taking money from *hijras* is incongruous, and probably impossible. It shows the extend of the depravity that Mishra identifies among those “fake Brahmins”, ready not only to racket poor women but even to steal from beggars associated with threat over sexual identities.

70 This has little bearing on the actual origin of the guards (even though it might be geographically true, see States of origin, p.129). It is another sign of distrust as Biharis are poorly considered by prejudiced people coming from other regions, in this case, Uttar Pradesh.

71 A Brahmin and a (mainly) *Kayastha* Bengali name, respectively.

72 A recently deployed government biometric identification card.

73 Mr Mishra, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka sector 10, Delhi, Hindi.

“Mishra: छोटी जात बहार नहीं निकालती। बादायु, मुरादाबाद हुआ, बिहार हुआ, जो भी आता है, वह बोलते हैं हम छोबे हैं, डूबे हैं, तिवारी हैं, हम पांडे हैं, मतलब छोटी जात उनके गाव से बहर नहीं निकलती हैं और बड़ी जात शहर आके नौकरी करती हैं। (laughter).

PT : ऐसा क्यों?

Mishra : अपनी जात छुपाते हैं।

I asked security guards<sup>74</sup> their caste (see Fig. 14 p.139). Slightly above 60% of all 27 Hindu respondents are Brahmins, 25% were Kshatriya, the second highest caste. Caste Hindus formed a significant 85% of all 28 respondents. Lower caste were 11% of the sample and only a single guard told me that he was from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC ST)<sup>75</sup>. He did not give more precisions. It might be interesting to note that he was the only man who said he paid a bribe of ten thousand rupees to enter the job. I asked him why he had paid it. He curiously responded “without asking anything”<sup>76</sup>. Of all the guards I could interview, he was the only one who had passed a Bachelor of

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PT : तो मतलब आप सोच रहे हैं वह होंगे नहीं...

Mishra : नो नो नो, अब क्या कहूँ मैं आपको, इतनी शर्म की बात है bathroom जाते हैं, हाथ सबून से धौने चाहिये सर्फ पानी से धौकर आते हैं।

PT : तो उसे उनकी जाती पाता चलती हैं?

Mishra : हाँ, नीच्छता की जात पता चलती है। हाँ, नीच्छता की जात पता चलती है। समझे madam मैं कारण बताता हूँ।

PT : तो आप यह बोल रहे हो कि सब ब्रह्मण हैं भी नहीं?

Mishra : ना। सब छुपाथे हैं। यहाँ तक कि maids होती हैं ना, बेचारी maids से भी पैसा लेते हैं। मतलब घूस लेना। यहां तक कि हिजरो से भी पैसे लेते हैं। यहाँ पर 80% Bihari हैं।

PT : जो भी ब्रह्मण हो सकते हैं

Mishra : जो अपने आपको ब्रह्मण और अच्छी जात का मानते हैं, बताते हैं। [...] एक यह हमारे यहाँ बाड़ा cheater है, बाप रे बाप... वह तीलक जिसने लगा रखा है। [...] बस क्या कहूँ madam मैं मुह से नहीं कह सकता। बस यह समझो उसके जितने number है वह बुरे number है। [...] यहाँ पे इज्जत होती है। नहीं समझे आप ? यहाँ पर अगर मैं कहूँ कि मैं छौटी या backward जाती का हूँ तो सब मुझसे दूढ़ रहेंगे। yes के no? हर आदमी कहेगा छोड़ो इसके साथ क्या काम करना। पंडित जी, शर्मा जी... तो आप मुझसे ज्यादा बात करेंगे। या नहीं? बिल्कूल मेरा मानना ही नहीं, हकीकत (reality) है। यह fact है। पंडित जि, शर्मा जी... तो आप मुझसे ज्यादा बात करेंगे। या नहीं?

PT : जब recruitment होता है तो ऐसे सावल आपसे पुछते हैं? आप ब्रह्मण हो या आप यदाव हो?

Mishra : पुछते हैं। आप कौन हो, शर्मा हो, [...] पाल हो...

PT : आपसे पुछा था?

Mishra : हाँ। मैं नाम देखाता हूँ अपना। आधार card पे तो बोले आप शर्मा हो। आधार card पे तो ...”

74 The issue is sometimes sensitive and I abstained from asking the question in large groups, even though the family name of informants is at times a strong indication. I presume the name given is the real one, for even if it were not, the simple fact that they would lie on their name would reinforce the hypothesis of a caste dominance in this sector more than it would weaken it.


75 The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes are historically recognized group of citizens against whom discrimination and casteism have had a particularly adverse impact. The principle of positive discrimination in their favor is written in the constitution. They represent 24% of the population of Delhi in 2011. (“New Delhi District Population Religion - Delhi, New Delhi Literacy, Sex Ratio - Census India 2011” n.d.)

76 Ram Kuriar, Interview, 20th February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

Arts, which he did by correspondence classes in IGNOU. One guard was of Sikh obedience.

### Caste repartition of security guards

Source: fieldwork interviews, 2016-2017



*Fig. 14: Repartition of respondents by caste, 2017*

Source: Author, field data. Number of respondents: 28.

Several informants, such as CGHS 5 appeared genuinely surprised to learn about the cast composition of the men at the gate. The guards, except Mr Mishra, also denied that their selection had anything to do with caste during the interviews. Mishra pointed out that his name is a clear enough indicator of his caste and that his name is written on his identity documents.

Security guards also indicated that once in uniform their solidarity and mutually dependent safety would overstep any other consideration<sup>77</sup>—A claim difficult to take at

<sup>77</sup> Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

face value hearing Mr Mishra’s prejudices. I am therefore inclined to think that this solidarity could be a principle more than a reality.

Denying that the job was given to them due to their identity could be a claim instead on their merits. Yet it seems that the caste composition of the profession is due to recruitment, either because of the networks of recruitments, or because of a preference from the guards themselves. Several guards, such as Girish<sup>78</sup>, indicated that they preferred a job that did not demand manual labor. Yet preferring clean hands or a less sweaty fatigue is in no way the prerogative of a caste.

Someone I knew intimately reported her story from the inner working of a Resident Welfare Association. Such familiarity was necessary to hear this story, even though it takes place outside of the formalized setting of fieldwork. Babita indicated that the choice of a Hindu guard was clearly formulated during a recruitment. A guard working in a colony was going back to his village. The task was not given to the manager of the guards, but to another, “trusted” guard, maybe a *chowkidhar*<sup>79</sup> (see Box 10: The National Skill Development Corporation p.204), himself a Brahmin, to pass on the word to his acquaintances.<sup>80</sup>

Is the caste composition significant at the scale of the city? To verify this it becomes necessary to establish a comparison with the general population of Delhi: if the caste composition is only slightly different, then the caste composition might be relatively

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78 Mr Girish, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

79 I will come back at length on the signification of the term *chowkidar*, which traditionally designate a security guard. Here I mean a guard employed directly by the people he guards, without the mediation of a company. This is technically illegal but still very common.

80 Babita Sharma, Interview, 10th May 2018, Delhi, English.



insignificant. The Government of India has stayed the full release the results of the 2011 Socio-Economic Caste Census, the first one conducted in the country for over 80 years. It is thus not possible to have a clear and methodologically consistent view on recent demographic data on caste and class. Kumar (2013) uses a survey conducted by the CSDS (“Hindustan Times - CSDS Delhi Survey 2003 - Post-Poll Survey” 2008) to approximate the caste repartition of the population of Delhi. He estimates the population of Brahmins at 10 to 12% of the general population (p.38). See Box 6 p.141.

*Box 6: Difficulties to estimate the religious and caste composition of the general population of Delhi.*


I use the findings of Kumar (2013) – that are not originally intended for such purpose – to draw the chart below. I mention four caveats. The numbers have certainly evolved since the survey was taken in 2008. The categories might be slightly different: I counted Rajputs as Kshatriyas, the former being a specific category of the latter. The number given are extracted from a survey to analyze Delhi’s electorate, and therefore the guards who are temporary migrants might not have been recorded. Entire minority categories of population such as Christians, Buddhists and foreign immigrants are not counted.

The Fig. 15 is an educated ballpark. It remains, in a nutshell, that the religious and caste composition of Delhi's security guards does not reflect proportionally Delhi's general population at all and it clearly favors upper-caste guards.

### Estimated caste and religious composition of Delhi

Source: Changing Electoral Politics in Delhi

Fig. 15:



*Estimated caste and religious composition of Delhi. c2008*

Source: Kumar 2013.

I do not have a clearcut answer to why upper-caste guards are forming the bulk of Delhi's guardianship manpower. I did not manage to break the taboo surrounding caste preference. I form a series of hypothesis and explanations that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The first hypothesis I explored was that Resident Welfare Associations (RWA) and Cooperative Group Housing Societies (CGHS) would consciously select Brahmins for reasons linked to the religious function the latter exert in Hinduism. As I explained above (see Introduction, 1.1.2 p.7) I rejected this explanation. Informants of CGHS and

RWA appeared surprised to hear that most of the guards working for them were Brahmin. Chowkidars are recruited directly by the organizations, or by the household for which they work. Guards are recruited by companies (see Box 7 p.143).

*Box 7: Chowkidars or security guards?*

Throughout this dissertation I am using the two terms to designate different – albeit related – categories of workers. Security guards are employed by a company and work for primary employers such as individual, companies or even for the State, like in Delhi’s historical monuments. In the context of Delhi the two terms are at times employed interchangeably outside of the industry.

*Chowkidars* by contrast work directly for individuals or groups. The latter position was historically the norm. Since PSARA, hiring *chowkidars* has been outlawed. Only security companies registered in PSARA are allowed to give security services: the market of security guardianship has been created. *Chowkidars* are still common however. Old families had their guards, and they still intend to keep them. Several blocks in Saket had *chowkidars* they hired directly, working in a uniform resembling closely that of their colleagues security guards. In several areas of Delhi *chowkidars* still break the silence of the night by hitting the ground with a long stick as they walk through the neighborhood – and residents can still wonder whether the noise is meant to scare thief or to attest of their working presence. Security guards and *chowkidars*, in residential neighborhoods in particular, are doing virtually indistinguishable jobs.

In the countryside, *chowkidars* can play a role in the social order of the villages. The same term can designate even state workers in rural areas. However, in the context of this work, the term “*chowkidar*” will designate men working in the traditional structure whereas “security guards” will designate the men working in the

capitalist context of the private security industry. This does not mean that the security industry has been privatized by contrast with an hypothetical time when it would have been public. *Chowkidars* might well have pre-dated the notion of a state police. Their work condition scan be assimilated to that of family retainers, in the terms of Ray and Qayum (2009, chap. 3).

The family retainers were inserted in a feudal system in which interpersonal relations and obligations were holding for contracts through patron and client. The *chowkidar*'s or the servant's job was guaranteed. In case of hardship, such as diseases or marriages, as well as in old age and in the education of children, the employing family was expected to extend an helping hand. Of course this describes an ideal type and abstract the situation of domination in which the retainers were kept. Ray and Qayum (2009) describe the disappearance of this system in favor of a system based on wage and entrepreneurship, at the regret of their informants.

In the case of security guards, the market for security companies has been opened against another private relationship, and not against public services. The *chowkidars* working for RWA seem to be happy to escape the discipline of the companies. Several of the guards and *chowkidars* I interviewed were conscious of this difference and, respectively, regretted the former situation or were glad that theirs had not changed.

In both cases, recommendations seem to play a major role in the process of selection<sup>81</sup>. The president of the RWA of the Blue block of Saket<sup>82</sup> employs 5 security guards and, illegally<sup>83</sup>, 4 chowkidars who depend directly on the RWA. All those guards come through recommendations. It is also the case in some security companies, where recommendations from a current worker can help securing a job. The president of the RWA in which Babita Sharma proposed to work<sup>84</sup> selected a guard and asked him to take charge of bringing further acquaintances of him<sup>85</sup>. Recruitment of manpower appear to be at least partially based on cooptation by network. This is how the system reproduces, and this explains why, of the 12 guards who spontaneously said not only the state, but also the district from which they came, 3 are Brahmins from Nawada, Bihar, and 2 are Maithil Brahmins from Madhubani, Bihar.

This does not explain everything. Why were they Brahmin in the first place? Did it matter that the guard selected by the president of the RWA was also a Brahmin<sup>86</sup>? Could

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81 Several guards indicated that they just “walked in”. Most companies indicated the same. However, the companies can be difficult to find and are generally located in back alleys or inside buildings. My personal experience in chasing them might be a case in point! I tend to think that recommendations are wide spread, even though I do not rule out spontaneous candidatures, such as described by Jahangeer. Mr Jahangeer, Interview, 24th February 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi.

Several companies and institutions mentioned recruitment drives in job fairs, or the sending of bus in the countryside as well as the sending of recruiters to the points of migrant arrivals. However, I could not observe any of this nor meet a guard who had joined a company this way, so I tend to doubt this happens.

Manish Mishra, SSSDC, Interview, 13th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.

Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.

82 Mr Kaur, RWA, Saket Block Blue, Interview, 21st June 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

83 The PSARA act has banned the independent hiring of guards who are not in a registered company.

84 She was denied a post in the executive team, and, as a woman, the executive team proposed her to take care of the flowers near the temple garden.

85 Babita Sharma, Interview, 10th May 2018, Delhi, English.

86 I could not conduct an interview with him, nor with the *chowkidar* working for Mr Maigret, they are not counted in the caste ratio I have established above.

it be that, like Jules Maigret<sup>87</sup> was suggesting to explain the caste of his *chowkidar*, working class Brahmin use their caste status as a token of honesty? What to make of Mr Mishra's declarations above? He clearly associates his caste status with honesty, but to better differentiate himself from men who have the same claim. I do not think that a tractable "caste capital" would function through eliciting respect from other workers or as a source of reputation on its own.

As I explain above, I raised the hypothesis that the absence of manual labor and physical contact played a role in the "caste riddle". Several guards confirmed that hypothesis<sup>88</sup>. Others indicate a stigma about working in general, like the head of 2Kuri<sup>89</sup>. For him it is: "A problem of ego. They can't work in local areas, whereas there is no stigma in working in Delhi".

However, this is lending too much credit to a brahminical interpretation of labor, making of brahminism again the key to understand a system dominated by Brahmins (Lardinois 1995). They do not have the monopoly of preferring non-manual labor, their dominance in this particular job remains partly a mystery, particularly when the actual labor, if not "dirtying" is marked with a contempt that confines to hatred<sup>90</sup>. To reproduce some of my informant's words textually, security guards are said to be "too dumb to drive a rickshaw" or "just uniform on a bamboo".

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87 Jules Maigret, Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.

88 Birmal Rathore, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

Mr Girish, Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

89 Col. Singh, 2Kuri Company, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.

90 Schweta Arora, Evening Vigil, Interview, 20th January 2017, Delhi, English.

#### **4 - A long work day**

I met Pearl Sharma in the underground canteen of one of Saket’s malls. A middle-aged woman wearing a large *bindi* on her forehead, she was smiling and eager to engage in a conversation during her short lunch break. Pearl was the only informant who invited me into her home, in the one bedroom apartment she was sharing with her husband and two children, in a working-class neighborhood south of Saket.

Pearl started working in a security company, talking with her husband and her husband’s manager. Before that she had stayed in the village while her husband was working in a major security company. This situation lasted two years. He developed kidney stones from drinking, but could not last his 12 hours shift without it. The cost of the addiction and the sudden loss of income due to the incapacity of working led the family into hard times. When her daughter fell in serious ill-health, Pearl decided to move with her family to Delhi. She brought her daughter to the reputed All India Institute of Medical Science, a major public hospital. Her family was running into important debt. She took a job, braving the judgment of her in-laws – but she refused to clean toilets. In Delhi, she worked for the first time as a nurse, and enjoyed a new-found freedom. When she joined AllDay-Safe company, she got two weeks of training<sup>91</sup>, including physical activities “like the army”. She enjoyed herself.<sup>92</sup>

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91 The law in Delhi imposes a minimum of 21 days of training.

92 Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.



Fig. 16: Pearl's training certificate, 2014.

Source: Picture taken by author during the interview, 2017.

Yet the company refused to pay the guards those two weeks, despite an oral promise. This is the common practice, in the few cases where there is at all a training. Pearl told us that the guards brought the matter to court. At time of writing, four years after the training, the matter has not been settled. The food was provided at the training. The hearsay came that guards in the neighboring mall had been paid 10,000 INR for the training. One lady guard asked the mall owner for the same treatment, but the mall informed the company and the lady lost her job.

As a woman, her main task is to do body searches on women at the entry of malls. According to Pearl, around 40 or 50 women work in this mall, across the three shifts. She tells us that customers are very disrespectful, pestering at the lines even



though they should know guards are here for their security. For Pearl, it is women customers who are stealing things, putting them in their lady's purse or under their skirts. She tells us a story that seems to be a lore among mall security guards<sup>93</sup>: three women came in a Mercedes that they parked in the basement and committed numerous theft until they got caught. That rich people would do that seems to be a sign of absolute moral depravity.

Rajeev Kumar describes the same story:

“Ladies, inside select city walk they come in cars like BMW... I am telling you, ladies are very fast. BMW or Mercedes, they don't have any car less than that... They usually come in groups of 3-4 and they will usually make a theft... they usually ask to show some stuff here and show some stuff there.. If one is a customer then sometimes I may not check you inside out, and they know that .. but the camera catches the location... once upon a time a group of four ladies were arrested by the police, they came in the mall in 4 Mercedes... and sometimes there are Africans [he uses a derogatory term meaning “beast”], in the case of Africans [again], we are a little cautious... they are into theft sometimes... gents and ladies enter together in the shop...”<sup>94</sup>

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93 With minor variations, the same story appeared in different interviews:

Mr Girish, Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

94 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

Ladies, इस Select city के अंदर BMW से आएंगी ... मैं बता रहा हूँ सबसे fast ladies है होती है। BMW Mercedes निचे से गाडी नहीं मिलेगी उनकी करोड नीचे गाडी नहीं मिलेगी लेकिन वे 3-4 lady group में आएंगी। और वह [inaudible] चोरी करके जायेगी, यह समान दिखाना, यह समान दिखाना, आप customer हैं तो... मैंने कुछ... इसके अंदर इसके अंदर... क्योंकि वे जानते कि हमें check नहीं कोई करेगा। लेकिन camera location को पकड लेता है... एक बार चार ladies को police चौकी में बंद किया गया था। 4 Mercedes से आए थे। और ज्यादा करके होबसी होते हैं? क्या हम लोग तो होबसी के नाम से [inaudible] उनका ज्यादा ... चोरी gents और lady आपके shop में गुसे आपके निकाले वो...

The company for which Pearl works, *Day-long-Safe*, pays her extra times, PF and ESI. Her salary amounts to approximately 10,000 Indian Rupees a month, which is under the minimum wages for semi-skilled labor but rather good for the profession. Like every security guard in Delhi, she paid for her own uniform. Her husband is recovering from the kidney stone. He wants to change job. When we left, she was receiving a delivery of large boxes full of bags of ships: her husband was planning to open a little shop.

Pearl's case stands quite apart from that of her colleagues. As a woman her opportunities for finding employment in the security sector are simultaneously greatly reduced and of better quality than those of her male counterpart. In the same time only companies dealing with a feminine public and advanced security would offer employment for women. Around Pearl's story, I turn to a systematic description of security guards' work day.

#### 4.1 - Wearing the uniform

Is there something special about the uniform? As I was waiting for a visa-related paper, resting on the sofa of the Center for Policy Research on a wet hot day of July, my interlocutor, a bright young fellow in the center, asked me if guards were taking pride in the uniform they wear. It surprised me. If I had thought of this before going to the field, 10 months of fieldwork talking to the guards had dissipated it. Drafting a question on that topic would have felt absurd at best, displaced at worst. The uniform—a uniform I had myself worn in training—was rather if anything a sign of subservience. Even CAPSI, an

organization of companies which rarely uses its ethical achievements as a selling point, released a pedagogical video to encourage employers to treat security guards with dignity. In a short movie meant as a counter-example, a visibly emaciated and depressed guard is scolded and humiliated as he stands to attention in the presence of a shocked client (Pandey 2018) (see Fig. 17). The take away point is that clients might be shocked if they see employers humiliating guards.




*Fig. 17: Saluting.*

Source: Dignity, CAPSI, Pandey 2018. caption. 1'01".

What is a uniform though, and why does it take so much importance? Uniforms of different kinds are common in the service sector. Railway and Pizza-Hut employees, flight attendants, nurses and firemen wear uniforms. Would my colleague have raised the question of pride in a uniform if I had interviewed Coffee Coffee Day employees instead? Probably not.

One of the functions of a uniform is to make the man forgotten beyond the function or their employers. Historically uniform were livery, showing the attachment of men to their feudal masters. From there the uniform became that of the police and army. The quintessential uniform, the one people are proud of, can be that of the army. The PSARA (*Private Security Agency Regulation Act 2005*) law explicitly prohibits that private security guards uniforms resemble that of public forces. Despite this, the paraphernalia and the style they develop are inspired from army parade uniforms. The handbook produced by CAPSI (*Student Handbook Unarmed & Armed Security Guards 2013, 157*) describes the uniform as it should be worn (see Fig. 18).



*Fig. 18: The uniform.*

Source: *Student Handbook Unarmed & Armed Security Guards, 2013.* p.157.

In practice, all the guards I have interviewed had to pay for their own uniform, and generally wore it until the last thread. A uniform costs approximately 2000 INR which can represent up to a quarter of a monthly salary. The fabric is generally polyester and the pants are itchy. Many guards complain of pain from their shoes and the uniform seem to accentuate the fatigue. Mostly, the uniform does not comprehend a summer or

winter variation. Guards thus freeze or roast year long. Winter nights are generally spend wrapped in gray blankets or chasing the cold away with rubbish fires.

The uniform remains a fundamental part of security guardianship because they signal the entry to neighborhoods and zones in which the liberty of movement is restricted by the presence of men whose dress are meant to resemble that of a policeman and whose job is to control identities and movement. Yet the uniform is also the cover and *laissez-passé* for working-class bodies that otherwise would not be tolerated in the neighborhood in which they work. By working-class bodies I mean the bodies that do have the *hexis* (Bourdieu 1972) and appearances of their class of origin.

Based on the real life of Devinder Singh, aka Bunty, the motion picture *Oye Lucky! Lucky Oye!* (Banerjee 2008) (see Fig. 19 p. 155)<sup>95</sup> has exemplified in popular culture the class appearance bias and ultimately impossible filtration of the neighborhood. The thief moves around freely in and out of the richer houses simply by displaying the self-confidence and the attitudes expected of the upper-class.

There are limits to this though, as some neighborhoods demand stricter, or exclusive, security control from the guards. Thus in Dwarka, my field-site in West Delhi, it was impossible to move in and out without signing in, and without the approval of a resident. In Press Enclave, in Saket, South Delhi, the security was extremely tight and I could not even contact the president of the RWA. By contrast, the guards of comparatively wealthier neighborhoods of Saket would not intervene to stop me.

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95 In this scene, Lucky, without hesitation, enters a house in which an old woman is laying on her sofa. When she asks who it is, he replies, in English “It’s Lucky”. His English and his tone reassure the old lady. He takes the TV, and orders the guards to put it in his car. The guard has no choice but to obey.



*Fig. 19: Ordering the guard.*

Source: *Oye Lucky! Lucky Oye!* (Banerjee 2008) Caption (detail), 39'47".

#### 4.2 - Standing duty

The work that is expected from security guards shows differences between the work in the mall and in the residential neighborhoods. The work is always difficult, not necessarily physically but mentally. The impression of uselessness, the constant intervention of the hierarchy and the infantilization, in addition to interminable hours with poor pay seem to be the most common grounds for complaints from the guards<sup>96</sup>. In Box 8 p.157 I describe their labor day.

Alcoholism among the men is present in every setting, yet for security guards, it is in Dwarka that it seems the most frequent. In all cases it seems to be the most common motive of complaint directly addressed against guards and the most common reason for

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96 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

dismissals. The organization of labor as well as the physical settings, the space and time of labor, deserve attention.



*Box 8: Labor day*

The typical labor day of security guards is very different depending on their place of work and on the company for which they work. It is difficult to trace an ideal-type for the profession. At the gate of malls, the activity of patting and controlling bag is visible and constant. By contrast, in the plains of Haryana, just south of Sonipat, north of Delhi, men sit on plastic chairs on the side of a dust road, every 100 meters or so. They keep their gaze on flat former wheat fields which have not been tilled for years, in order to prevent potential squatting of lands that were acquired as speculative real estate investments several years before, and which lay undeveloped. If in both cases the typical work day is somewhat easy to narrate: repetitive gesture or abysmal boredom, guards in various settings experience that work day differently.

In a place like Dwarka or in the residential neighborhood of Saket, the typical work day starts at 6 in the morning and goes on until 6 in the evening. Some shifts are aligned on an 8 to 8 basis. Managers or supervisors from the company are likely to come and verify that the guards are present on duty. Guards working in the streets of upper-class neighborhood and guards working for individual houses are often seen dusting the cars of their employers.

Between 7 and 10 in the morning cars of the employers who work outside of their neighborhood depart. Shop opens around 11 am. Guards in Dwarka often pick up letters from the post-man. Guards working in malls eat their lunch from tiffin boxes (stainless steel or plastic containers in which take-away lunches are stored all across South Asia) on duty. Guards employed in malls have a short lunch break during which they either go to the canteen or eat the content of their tiffin in a common room in the parking.

In the afternoon mall security guards resume their work while guards in the residential neighborhoods of Saket and Dwarka keep doing their duty. I have seen occasionally guards who work for individual houses playing cards and smoking bidis –

a thin and cheap mini-cigar – with drivers and other neighborhood working men behind a parked car. Guards in the neighborhoods of Dwarka and Saket verify that vehicles entering neighborhoods have the correct windshield stickers, or ask the purpose of visit to walkers. In the word of a guard working in Dwarka, he “kicks out stray dogs”.

Guards are routinely requested to take care of different kind of work unrelated to their primary mission. One of the interview I conducted was thus interrupted by the daughter of the house handing out the leash of a large breed dog to the guard. He set off to give the dog its walk. According to the resident of Mansarovar garden I interviewed, guards are often used as obedient handymen able to change a light bulb, keep the goods of a delivery service or fetch cigarettes upon request. In exchange guard expect tips. Guards also expect pecuniary gratifications for Diwali, a Hindu religious festival that occurs in autumn.

The guards working in the mall work in three shifts of 8 hours, and their position in such shift permutes every three weeks. Guards working after the mall closes are tasked with maintaining the security of goods. For the guards working in residential neighborhoods or individual houses, the night shift takes over after 12 hours.

Guards working the night-shift are tasked with opening the gate when a vehicle with legitimate business or look comes into the neighborhood. In places such as Saket, most of the access are closed and cars are directed along a single path left open by a few gates. During the cold winter months, guards often light fire with fallen leaves and trash to chase a little bit the cold. It is then common to see them share this fire, and at times bidis with rickshaw drivers or private drivers waiting near the cars of their employers.

#### 4.2.1 - Guarding Saket mall

The guards working in the mall for *Day-long-Safe* are organized in three shifts, A, B and C. The A shift goes from 6 am to 2 pm, the B shift from 2 to 10 pm, and the C shift carries through the night. Before leaving, guards have to wait that their replacements arrive. Twenty minutes of delay will result in a no-duty notice, which signifies that guards will not be paid for that day.

“I just told you, if one leaves at 9.50 [instead of 10], there should be a fine, but they should not take the whole 400 INR of daily wage!”<sup>97</sup>

In addition, the guards in *Day-long-Safe* benefit from Provident Fund (PF), a social security scheme for retirement, and the mandatory Employee State Insurance (ESI). This is a recent improvement which Rajeev Kumar attributes to the efficient work of a new Human Resource manager. Before that, he says:

“Our PF and ESI is supposed to be deducted from the salary, but the company does not deposit money on their part. PF they launder, ESI money is deducted from the salary but company doesn't contribute from their end and if someone is unwell in some guard's family and he goes for treatment and at that point he gets to know that the salary has not been deposited for the last 3 months! When he goes to the company they say “get a letter”... in the meanwhile the sick person will already be dead.”<sup>98</sup>


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97 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

“आपको बताया 9 बजे 50 हमसे अगर गलतियो हो जाए तो उसके लिये हमे fine किया जाता है यह नहीं कि पूरी duty कि 400 कि 400 डीहारी बंद किया जाए।”

98 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

“४००-५०० रुपया काटते हैं, इसका solution चाहिए, uniform free! हमारा जो PF है जो salary से काटता है, उसमे company से पैसे जमा नहीं करते थे, PF का भी घोटाला कर रहा था.. फिर, ESI के पैसे काट रहे हैं, company वहां जमा नहीं किया और उसके घर कोई बीमार पद गया तोह विह गया इलाज के लिए तोह पता चला की ३ महीन से उसकी salary नहीं आयी, जब company के पास पहुँचता है, तोह company बस बोलती है यह लेटर लेकर आओ ... अब उतने में आदमी ही expire हो जाएगा।”



*Fig. 20: The customer's entry of the mall.*  
Photo: P. Tripathy, 2018

In the malls, the entry duty is quite simple: Even customer exiting the previous mall to enter the new one must pass his bag in the X-ray machine, while a guard keeps an eye on the screen (see Fig. 20). Male and female are separated in two different lines and walk under metal detection door—doors I have never seen functioning. Male guards greet males and female guards females with a *namaste* (greetings), and pass a hand-held metal detector on his or her body. Alternatively the guards pat the customer. To hasten the process that is slowed down when guards have to sit and stand up at each passage, customers walk to a standing guard who pats the upper body while a guard who stays

sited pats the lower body only. Customers are often passive or irritated and guards describe this passage as a point of friction in which they are at the receiving end of customer's frustrations.

Rajeev Kumar describes the experience in harsh terms:

“The one who has the job of cleaning, has more respects than what we get. The sweeper gets more respect than me. Because we have to touch customers directly. Face to face. At that moment customers think of the problem they have at home, of their wives and their children, that's it, their mood is off. They come to hang out in the mall. You come directly I give you *namaste* and I check you. Humpf. They behave so badly at that moment I feel like picking up a stone and hitting him with it. But I have to control myself. If you can control yourself you can do security work, if not forget it. That is the problem. That is why a majority of the population do not want to do this job.

In security, there is one thing our company teaches us, that is: the customer is like god, that is why we must fold our hands and say *namaste* to them... This is an issue, and this issue keeps re-emerging. Folding our hands as security means losing our image... this is also a problem... You must have seen it in Select city walk... It is the customer's pride, it is just that... They treat us badly that is one thing... In the mall there is a concierge, there is a table, near the ladies bathroom... There they go and complain about us that the guard did not fold his hands and do *namaste*... So sometimes they tell the customer that there must be a big line in the mall and so the guard couldn't salute you... Because at that moment the priority is to check the customer and let him in, checking is most important than saying *namaste*, but sometimes the company takes action

also... They ask us why we don't do *namaskar* anymore... Why we stopped saying *namaskar*...

After wearing a uniform, wearing a belt, putting on our hat, folding our hands is pathetic, if you ever ask a soldier or a police officer to fold his hands what respect will he have ? So basically, we are doing it for the money, it is a compulsion therefore doing it, not because we like it. Even if one is folding hands, there are so many guards who curse people in their mind... they will fold hands because they are asked to, but won't say *namaste* as they mean it... In fact they will be cursing you inside their head... you won't be able to hear it, am saying that's why you know, but it is a fact they will be cursing...

Security is seen at the lowest stratum in India, every time there is a problem, at the bottom most position security is placed...

Even if there is a beggar begging on the street and he comes to the mall... We have to address him "SIR"... I know that beggar sits on the road<sup>99</sup> but in the mall we have to address him as SIR, we can't even push him aside... This is the policy to run a mall, and in that those who get crushed are the security guards."<sup>100</sup>

99 I think it is an hyperbole.

100 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

“इसे तो एक labor जो है जो मोट धोते हैं उनकी जीतनी इजात है उसे कम इजात हमारी है। एक झाड़ू मरने वाले का इतना इजात है उइके सामने मेरा इजात कम है। क्योंकि हमें directly कोई customer से touch करना है। आमने-सामने होता है। और उस समय customer यह सोचते हैं कि वह जैसे घर पे बीबी बच्चे किसी problem बस उनके mood off है। वह हमारे पास हमारे mall में गुमने आ गए हैं। आप directly आए मैंने नामासकर किया आपको check किया। Behave इतनी गांड़ी हो जाती उस समय लगता है कि पत्थर उठाऊं और मार दूं। लेकिन फिर भी उसको control करना पड़ता है। और control करेंगे तभी सेक्यूरटी की नौकरी कर पाएंगे नहीं तो नहीं करता है। Problem यह ही है। इसलिये अधीक्तर लोगों ने सेक्यूरटी की नौकरी करना पासंद नहीं करते। लेकिन कुछ लोग हैं जो सेक्यूरटी की नौकरी करना पासंद करते कारण कयों इसमे कोई काम होता शरिरीक परिश्रम है नहीं।

Security में रहने के बाद, एक चीज़ हमारी कंपनी में सिख्या जाता है की customers भगवान् है, इसलिये उनको हाथ जोड़के नमस्कार करो, यह सबसे बुरा चीज़ है, और यहाँ यही पन्ना बार बार होता है, security को हाथ जोड़ना मतलब अपनी image खो देना, यह भी एक तकलीफ की बात है... आप जब गएँ होंगे तोह कोई हाथ जोड़के नमस्ते किया होगा एक दो बार SELECT CITY में। हाँ बस उनको शान है मैडम। वह बुरा treat कर दिये तोह कर दिए.. वहां जाके हमारे mall में एक कंसीर्ज है, लेडीज बाथरूम एक आगे एक टेबल लागा हुआ है। वहाँ जाके कंप्लेंट कर देते हैं....क्या की गार्ड ने हाथ जोड़के नामासते नहीं किया। तोह वहां यह हि मिलता है की हो सकता है की कस्टमर का भीड़ लम्बा हो इसीसलए नमस्ते नहीं किया ,, इस समय कस्टमर को हमे जल्दी मॉल में लेना है चेक करके, हमे चेकिंग पहले ज़रुरत है नमस्कार नहीं, और कभी कभी एक्शन में आ भी जाते company वाले.. कयों नमस्कार बंद हो गया ? तुम लोग नमस्कार बंद कर दिए। हम वर्दी पहनने के बाद , बेल्ट लगाने के



*Fig. 21: Guard standing in front of a shop, inside the mall.*

Photo: author, Saket, 2017.

There are four malls in Saket. Someone walking from the first to the fourth, without passing in the street, will undergo four times the same process. In addition, different guards employed by shop within the malls stand in front of individual shops, sometimes verifying shopping bags and receipts. This is where Girish worked, “at least in the air conditioning”<sup>101</sup> (see Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 for a sketch of the situation).

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बाद, टोपी लगाने के बाद, कोई कहे हाथ जोड़ो , आप फौजी को या पुलिस वाले को बोलोगे की हाथ जोड़ो तो उसकी इज़्ज़त क्या रह जायेगी ? तोह बस पैसे के लिए कर रहे हैं , मजबूरी हैं की कर रहे हैं, लेकिन दिल से नहीं कर रहे हैं । .. अगर आपको हाथ भी जोड़ा तोह कितना गार्ड ऐसा है की दो गाली देता है मन ही मन में.. हाथ जोड़ेगा लेकिन नमस्कार नहीं किया, गाली बका अंदर ही अंदर । आपको सुनाई नहीं देगा मैं बोलूंगा ताभी सुनाई देगा मन ही मन में गाली दे रहा है ।

Security को सब से निचे स्थर से देखा जाता है इन्दिया के अंदर । कोई भी है । छोटी सी एक problem आती सब से down position पे security को बैठाया गया...

अगर वह बीखारी भि जो रोड पे बीक मंग रहे हैं mall में गुमने आ गया है... तोह अरे हट, ... उसको "सर" करना है... मुझे पाता है कि वह साले रोड पे कछरा छुंता है, लेकिन उस समय हमे उसको भी sir करना है । उसे धक्का भी नहीं देना । यह है mall चलाने की policy । और उसके साथ पिसते हैं तोह security guards ।”

101 Mr Girish, Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi..




Fig. 22: Sketch of the security organization of a mall in Saket.  
Source: Author, based on field observation, 2017.



#### 4.2.2 - Saket : over public land?

The organization in three shifts remains the exception, as most companies have adopted a 12-hour shift. In such case the guards are sometimes paid wages for an 8-hour shift and given overtime payment. Most of the guards I could interview were simply given wages corresponding to 8 hours. Except for one exception, security guards working in such security companies do not receive PF or ESI<sup>102</sup>.


In the residential neighborhood block Blue in Saket (see Fig. 23), five security guards and four *chowkidars* employed by the RWA work on two shifts of 12 hours. During the day, five men verify that the cars coming in are equipped with the right windshield stickers that attest of their right to circulate in that neighborhood. During the night, two men stand at the gate that can be opened, and, in theory verify the motives beyond every visit. In practice, either the door is left unattended or, if one arrives in the middle of the night the guard begrudgingly wakes up to open the gate. Rickshaw drivers without customers, delivery men or manual workers such as plumbers are more likely to be stopped at the entry of the neighborhood by day light. Only one gate remained closed for me in a residential block of Saket as I was barred to enter for lack of an invitation. The possibility to circulate and to belong, the geography of the neighborhood, has social and time variables.

During the time of the shift, men who work in Saket neighborhood have little places and possibilities for physiological needs. In the posh area of Niti Bagh, in South

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102 I come back in chapter IV p. 235 on the question of time spent as labor time.

Delhi, where many houses are individually guarded, a sign bans the employers to let the guards urinate in the neighborhood. In Saket Blue block, the RWA’s president was planning to install urinals at the gate to avoid odors.



*Fig. 23: Sketch of a Saket residential neighborhood.*


Source: Author, based on field observation, 2017.

The land enclosed by gates and kept by guards in Saket remains in theory public. RWA presidents get the oral permission<sup>103</sup> from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and of the police commissioner to erect the gates. In Dwarka sector 10, the land constructed upon is private and the plots are built as units. Even though the number of

<sup>103</sup> Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

guards appears lower, they tend to be more systematic in filtering the entries, a work made easier by the architectural setting of the plot.

#### 4.2.3 - Dwarka



*Fig. 24: Sketch of a plot in Dwarka sector 10.*

Source: Author, based on field observation, 2017.

In Dwarka the general situation is that the entire security team is composed of five men, three during the day and two during the night. The back gate is kept by a single man during the day and locked during the night (see Fig. 24). The guards are generally supposed to verify that every entry is justified. When I visited the plots to meet CGHS members they would generally call to verify that they knew who I was and sometimes walked me up to the apartment. I have seen them write down car plates numbers. Their

presence is verified by mobile managers who tour all the places where guards are supposed to be present. Security cameras are installed but the control room is generally empty, even when the cameras are actually functional.<sup>104</sup>

## **5 - Class production and reproduction?**

The monsoon had finally reached and with it the end of fieldwork time. A heavy steamy heat suffocates Delhi. I had started packing and selling my belongings. I was, for once, home in the middle of the afternoon, and I was sorting out gardening issues on my terrace, wearing merely my shorts, my hands covered in mud. A young and colorfully clad lady stepped in, uninvited, her eyes shining in a contagious and white teathed smile she did not part with during our entire encounter. She had been informed that, in this rather wealthy neighborhood, two men, a doctor and an engineer, were sharing a 2 bedroom flat. And that they did not have a domestic worker. She proposed insistently her services: cooking, cleaning and grocery shopping. Flattered as I was by the overlooking of the quite major distinction between a doctoral candidate (in geography) and a (presumably medical) doctor, I held my ground of refusing to employ a domestic worker, especially days before leaving, however peculiar that might sound. She insisted. We obviously did need a domestic worker since we did not employ one already. I had to promise I would share her contact with my flatmate, sole condition under which she would let me retreat my modesty into my room. I said that he might be interested in hiring her after my imminent departure.

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104 Mrs Lohar, incumbent RWA president, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, English.

How did she know? How did she enter the neighborhood, figured out that two men were living there without a domestic help,—almost—got their job titles right, and how did she not even doubt a second she had reached the right floor of the right building? The answer to those questions stood guard at the neighborhood gate. My apartment was right by it and I would salute the guards every day. In exchange for my ever respectful attitudes, the guards had shared accurate sociological, demographical and geographical informations with an entrepreneur.

What is surprising is that it took almost a year for this to happen. The guards were keeping the belongings of the *sabziwalha* (vegetable seller) whose cart was blocking my door every day after 6 pm when he was not there. They would also keep in their sentry box the empty glass bottles that I was keeping for him. My college-going friends and colleagues were directly shown the way up. A white American female friend doing her masters was thrown into my apartment before she could utter any reference. However the comrades of the *Mazdur Bigul*, a Maoist union I was working with in Masters had to call me down so the guards would let them pass. The guards also tried to physically stop the *kabadi-walhe* (waste pickers) I had called up to help me get rid of the remnants of the urban gardening that my landlord demanded me to remove. The guards knew who they were, but they did not “belong” to the people whom I was supposed to normally invite. They were not in my informal, never written, guest list.

5.1 - Interface workers: gender and class.

Installed as they are at the interface between class, the guards are in a position to transmit and interrupt information, they are also in a position to judge of class belongingness, and they establish sociable relations with rich and poor (see Box 9 p.170). Researching precisely a general characterization of the attitudes of guards on lower classes was methodologically fraught with difficulties, not least because the class relations are not linear but composed of multiple different functions.

*Box 9: Researching Interface Workers*

I have pointed out that “interface workers” are tasked with mediating the relations between the “haves” and the “have-nots”. I picked up the term during a conversation with my advisor Vinay Gidwani. They are thus in contact with both, and forge sociability and enmity, friendships and client relations with both rich and poor. In Dwarka guards will pick up letters and get to know the delivery men, smoke *bidis* with drivers and perform menial labors for their employers.

During my interview of Chaaran, who was guarding a separate home in the South of Saket, local workers like the tea vendor and drivers came and listened to the questions. Chaaran was not seeing the point of this interview and put an abrupt end to it when the daughter of the owner of the house brought out a massive golden-haired pedigree dog. Without much of a glance at us or at the small group that had gathered around Chaaran’s plastic seat, she handed him the leash. Chaaran stood up and walked toward the park, preceded by the dog.

This interaction illustrates the varying forms assumed by class relations in contemporary Delhi: the interface workers do not fulfill only one limited function but

situate themselves at the crossroad of different social interactions, and perform additional menial labors at the behest of their employers. Unveiling all these interactions is a methodological challenge: how to meet and talk with those who are excluded? How to interview those who are tasked with delivery and who do not have the time to engage in conversations? Finally, spending large durations of time with the guards could possibly alter their behaviors, as well as of those who approach them, for example, to play cards to wait out the stifling heat of Delhi's afternoons. During my fieldwork and with the methodological limits of this work, it was not possible to dwell in depth on this sociability yet it remains observable in and indispensable to the functioning of neighborhoods.

The work of filtration operated by the guards thus takes multiple dimensions, defining accessible and inaccessible spaces that vary not only with time, but also with work and gender. In this regard it is difficult to compare the three sites of fieldwork because my fieldwork did not permit me to dig in depth on those aspects. However, some patterns have emerged.

In the mall several security guards denied that a class selection was always already there, as if going to one of the most upper-class mall in the city was a natural thing<sup>105</sup>. I was trying to stand near the checking area as inconspicuously as possible. I aimed to observe if there were class distinctions in the way the work was done at the gate. Johana passes in front of me. She walks fast, and passes in the female lane. I step after her, I give her my card and ask her if she can answer one or two questions. She invites me to take a coffee in the first floor.

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105 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

Johana is a make-up artist, she went to study in Berlin before coming back. She goes to the mall in the gym because she used to work here. She knows everybody, included most of the guards. It was before she started taking hormones, and her appearance has changed from that of a young man to closer to that of a young lady. She tells me that guards take every occasion to touch her, particularly at the gate.

She does not suspect “homo-erotic” aggressions but rather she feels that the guards are very frustrated and curious, and that her loneliness makes her an easy target. Even if Johana is not a *hijra*, or hermaphrodite, her body might be considered as such by the guards, and thereby associated with prostitution (Reddy 2010). Her body might thus be perceived by the guards as somewhat “public”. The “frustration of the guards” that Johana mentions might be linked to her changed sexual identity and curiosity among guards who have been socialized with a patriarchal mindset. Her solitude and her carefully chosen dress affect her capacity to claim and assert her space when she passes through the binary class and gender assemblage that is the “security” gate of the mall<sup>106</sup>.

Carrying an upper-class body does not shield from sexual aggressions, but the experience of gender-biased violence may change according to one’s identity. In Dwarka two domestic workers tell us that guards were asking bribes of a hundred rupees to let them pass, but only the young, green domestic workers would fall for that<sup>107</sup>.

During the group interview in the domestic workers’ union, one of the maid narrated comparable experience:

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106 Miss Johana, Interview, 16th January 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

107 Miss Shweta and Miss Bhavia, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka 10, Delhi, Hindi.



“This one time I had an argument with a guard in the DDA apartments, as I lost my ID card, the guard wouldn’t let me in and also asked me for some bribe to enter. Despite being regular entrants into the colony we are stopped, however trespassers who just “come to walk” inside the colony are not stopped. Maybe because they don’t look poor like us.”<sup>108</sup>

This money is immediately substantial for the domestic workers as well as for the maids, yet is it only a matter of money or equally a matter of reasserting, through this bribe, a hierarchy based on gender?

The activists of the Domestic Workers Union<sup>109</sup>, on the contrary, narrate a situation that does not improve with time. They are women<sup>110</sup> working inside the home of wealthier inhabitants of Delhi. If some stay in servants quarters and may be attached during the entire length of their service to the house of their employer, the situation is increasingly frequent of women serving in many houses and staying in their own place, often after long commute (Ray and Qayum 2009). Their dependence on their employer is also important and strongly gender based as they are expected to fulfill roles traditionally associated with female labor. In addition, the fact that they work outside of their own home is considered with suspicion and a sign of failed masculinity on the part of their putative husbands. The situation of domestic workers is that of labor dependence on their employers.

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108 Domestic Workers Union, Group Interview, 15th May 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

"एक बार मेरा झगडा हो गया DDA [Delhi Development Authority] apartment वाले guard के साथ, कयुनकि मेरा ID card खौ गया था उसने अंदर नाहिन जाने दिया, खर्चा-पानी भी मांगे... रोज आते है colony मे फिर भी रोक दिया..जबकि ऐसे इतने है जो सिर्फ घूमने आते हिा colony मे, उनहे नाहिन रोकते | क्या पाता कयुनकि वह गरीब नहीं लगते हमारी तरह..."

109 शहरी महिला कामगार यूनियन |

110 There exist of course masculine domestic labor. As Ray and Qayum (2009) explain, the latter is in a relatively higher social position and prestige. It is also increasingly rare. As a matter of fact, all the interviewees were female and I could not see a male domestic worker in the context of fieldwork.

For the workers of the Union, guards seem to take opportunities such as a forgotten ID card to demand “*kharcha pani*” (bribes)<sup>111</sup>. They note conscious strategies from the *maliks* (employers) and the *thekedars* (contractors) to avoid intermingling or solidarity between guards and domestic workers.

“The rules of the RWAs and the DDA are very strict and with guards we feel that it has added a layer of security on us. We are answerable not only to the employers but also to the guards now. They do not really keep constant surveillance on us but they do operate only on the instructions of the employer. The more the layers of security, the worst our work conditions become. A lot of times employers use guards to scold and cordon off the maids if any issue comes up between the maids and employers.”<sup>112</sup>

My questions to the group of welcoming ladies gathered in the basement of the Domestic Workers Union first elicited narratives of resentment and unfairness committed by the guards on behalf of their common employers. This narrative diversified as the meeting progressed, and soon the guards were also a victim, or an occasional ally.

One lady reported a Machiavellian scheme. To get a guard fired, a *malik* made him keep watch on an empty plot throughout the night, and hired a *goonda* (bouncers) to take pictures of the inevitably sleeping man. Other stories developed narratives of solidarity and help:

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111 Domestic Workers Union, Group Interview, 15th May 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

112 Domestic Workers Union, Group Interview, 15th May 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

“RWA DDA के रूलस बहुत सख्त है, उपर से guards के होने से एसा लागता है कि एक और level है हमरे उपार। हमारी जवाबदारी ना सिर्फ़ मालीक से हैं, लेकिन अब guards से भी हो गयी हैं। वे हममे हमेशा नज़र नहीं रखते हैं, पर अगर मालीक बोलता है तभी। जीतनी ज़्यादा security हैं, इतनी ज़्यादा हमें परेशानी होती है। कई बार मालीक guard को इस्तेमल करते हैं हमें डातने के लिये और बागाने के लिये।”

“I do feel safe with guards around in upper-class houses. Once there was a case where a man from a rich upper-class house tried to molest me but I threatened him to call the guard. So we do feel in the presence of a guard against the *maaliks*.”<sup>113</sup>

It is not surprising to record multiple narratives. The position of the domestic workers can be simultaneously undermined or protected by the guards. The situation remains precarious for domestic workers however as the help security guard provide them seems to confine itself to limited instances and calibrated risk.

Thus, in extreme examples like in the storming of the Mahagun Modern Society in Noida in July 2017, newspapers reported that the guards of the luxury condominium were throwing back stones thrown by the villagers that had set out to free a domestic worker that was sequestered by her employers (Dey 2017) (See Fig. 25, p176). The division of genre and labor remains firmly in place, at the expense of any class solidarity when the situation “requires it”.

The multifarious role they play in those narratives make particularly visible the role guards play as interface workers. This interface is active, and transforms the relationship between employees and workers, balancing the power relation further in favor of the formers. This operates through and reinforces rifts that existed through genders and social positions.

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113 Domestic Workers Union, Group Interview, 15th May 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

मैं safe महसूस करती हूँ guards के साथ, अमीर लोगों के घर में। एक बार एक आमीर आदमी ने मुझे छडने की कोशिश की तो मैंने उसे कहा कि guard को बुला दूंगी।



*Fig. 25: Throwing stones back at locals.*

<http://zeenews.india.com/uttar-pradesh/noida-mahagun-moderne-society-in-sector-78-attacked-by-villagers-after-maid-allegedly-beaten-for-theft-2023168.html> (accessed 30-09-2018) (“Noida: Mahagun Moderne Society in Sector 78 Attacked by Villagers after Maid Allegedly Beaten for Theft” 2017) (sic).

I understand the notion of class as already relational. Classes first find their existence in the relations imposed by the mode of production. The role the guard plays change this relation. If the built environment is—I go back to the Lefebvrian approach I have described above—the spatial expression of a mode of production, then the closure of the city by gates and walls should not be merely understood as a security matter. It is the dominant class and gender relations in concrete and iron form<sup>114</sup>.

## 5.2 - Production of class identities

I have established that guards share economic, demographic and, overall, caste origins. Have they come to form a class culture that reproduce itself? And if so, how to look and understand this reproduction? According to the District commissioner of police,

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<sup>114</sup> I am grateful to Caroline Michon for her remarkably astute comments on this section.

the hiring of Nepali *chowkidar* seems to be in rapid decline since the law (*Private Security Agency Regulation Act 2005*) banned the hiring of foreigners for this work.

The circuit of Nepali migrations (Brusle 2010) that were alighting the *chowkidar* system might face further difficulties even if the Nepali *chowkidar* remains a common sight. Nepali *chowkidars* appear to have formed a class culture. This class reproduced through time by sending their sons toward the same destination with an ethos of labor culturally attached to their Gurkha origins. The latter were classified by the British administration as a “martial race”. Until today Gurkha regiments keep serving in the British and Indian armies, as well as in international private security providers (“Brigade of Gurkhas” n.d.). Unemployed men and army retirees have made of this reputation a capital.

When he settled in the apartment that has been passed on from departing to arriving French civil servant, Jules Maigret received this one sincere request: keep the *chowkidar*<sup>115</sup>. The rest was a matter of getting used to the obligations of a feudal relationship. The *chowkidar* has aged, and arguably kept a longer term memory, thanks through the administrative turnover, of more French civil servants than any worker in the embassy. Last year for the first time, he has brought in his son, to teach him the trade. For the comrades of the Domestic Workers Union, the *chowkidars* of their neighborhood were not wearing uniforms, but were origination from traditional families of Nepali *chowkidar*, occupying the job for generations.

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115 Jules Maigret, Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.

By contrast to this elaborated culture intermingling feudal expectations, fixed circuits of migration and elements of transmission, the security guards ban their children, whom they push through school, to take their work after them<sup>116</sup>. The idea that their children would do something better was present in almost all interviews, even if one guard had his son doing the same work<sup>117</sup>. Furthermore, some guards lie to their family in the village, telling them they are supervisors or about “better” jobs<sup>118</sup>. The reproduction of security guards is parthenogenetic, springing only from the superabundance of labor.

Can we talk of a class identity? Probably. Its transitory nature might not stop the formation of a common experience. It is at this point that picking back up the masters-bondsman dialectic becomes interesting again. The security guard quits this job of subservience, if not him, his children will, or at least aspire to it. In Hegel’s ([1807] 2011, para. 190) formulation of the dialectic, it is the bondsman who extracts from the relationship, whereas the master is trapped in it because of his acquired incapacity to deal with the world without the mediation of the bondsman. The class identity that guards, as interface workers are creating, is less theirs than that of their employers which I have called the “guarded class”.

The security guards stand at the entry of the private, the privatized space of the mall, the residential neighborhood or the plot. Outside is a domain that is reserved for circulation, not for appropriation. If there remain public spaces, they are even farther,

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116 Mr Chaaran, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

117 Daanish Mishra, Interview, 3rd May 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi

118 Mr Girish, Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

where the guards maybe live, in the areas that are not object of privately enrolled surveillance.

## **6 - Chapter conclusion**

At a moment of local and world history marked by important media attention given to violence made against women, I expected that security companies would record a change in this matter. I asked several companies if they were giving a particular training about handling security for women, and none did. RWAs and CGHS representatives said they would be happy to have guards trained for that, yet would not spend an extra rupee on it<sup>119</sup>. The guards tend to act within a nexus that favors a safety which seems exclusively expressed in masculine terms. Companies, correspondingly, indicated that they receive no demand for dispensing a training that would sensitize guards with female security<sup>120</sup>.

The key to solve the conundrum might be there, the guards role in security is minimal. Their role is the control of the street, the permanent presence that forbids their reinvestment by new meaning, different class, and cosmopolitanism. This demographic and ethnographic presentation of Delhi's security guards has shown who the guards were and the array of their activity. The streets as a place for standing work are the antithesis of the street of re-interpretative freedom. Michel de Certeau ([1980] 1990) saw the city as a text and the de-ambulations in the street, a rhythm and a detour that can be reclaimed

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119 Mr Kaur, RWA, Saket Block Blue, Interview, 21st June 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

Mrs Lohar, incumbent RWA president, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, English.

Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

120 Col. Singh, 2Kuri Company, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.

from work and habits, as a place of interpretative freedom. The *Tapori* (Mazumdar 2007) was this figure of modern cinema that was the dancing, joking character of Bombay cinema. Guards are the nemesis of this understanding of the street. The spatial expression of contemporary class structure is tempering with movement and class interrelation. For this it reinvests and develops the old forms of oppression that pre-existed capitalism, including gender, caste and religious lines of fractures.

Ray and Qayum (2009) showed the difficulties for aged domestic workers to adapt to the economic model of contractual labor, in which they do lose protections. Guards, like domestic workers, embody a labor that shield the middle and upper middle-class within a “bubble of euphoria” (Sawhney 2009) that disable employers to keep seeing security guards as workers. Do they not, after all, sit idly?

The guarded class is marked by its oblivion of the active work that the men securing their streets and permitting their circulation do. The reign of the modern bourgeois classes was co-extensive with the qualification of city space as public space. Guarded class subverts this in delegating to guards the work of selecting who has a right to urban space. In the next chapter, I examine the legal and regulatory mechanisms that are allowing this taking over which I call, after Carl Schmitt, the *Nomos* of the city



### III - CONTROL AND LEGALITY

#### 1 - The monument behind the gate

A spell of October rain has rinsed the cloud of particles that engulfs Delhi and significantly lowered the temperature. I decided to tour my own neighborhood, Hauz Khas market. In the south, near the metro station, Mayfair Garden is a small posh enclave that seems to have seceded from the rest of Hauz Khas market neighborhood. Its Resident Welfare Association has walled every access except one, erected a large iron gate, a double story stone sentry box, installed a CCTV camera, blocked the pathway, set a mobile barrier, bumped the road with a speed breaker, and posted a full time-guard. Behind him, visible from the main road, stands the object of my curiosity that evening. It is the 15<sup>th</sup> century Makhdumki Shahpurjat mosque, one of the many mosque-cum-tomb complexes scattered all over the landscape of Delhi. This one is a rather well-preserved example of Lodi period architecture<sup>121</sup>. The monument is listed by the Archaeological Survey of India and considered of architectural significance among the ruins of the Lodi period, thanks to its rare arched balcony.

I walk toward it, quite certain that this monument, that sits in the middle of a park equidistant from Hauz Khas market and the metro station, is preserved for everybody's enjoyment. The guard stops me. I am banned to go for a walk in the neighborhood. I insist. The guard smiles, I can go. He does not have the right to stop me

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121 ("Makhdum Sabzwari's Mosque" n.d.; "Mosque of Makhdum Sabzwari, Tombs and Mosques of Delhi, Famous Monuments of Delhi." n.d.)

and I know it as well as he does, yet I know it is my class status that has given me a go, not my legitimate curiosity.



*Fig. 26: The entry of Mayfair Garden neighborhood.*

The blue sign reads “No Thorough fare Entry for residents only”.

Photo: Barkha Bhatnagar, Hauz Khas, Delhi, 2018.

On my way out, I explain to him that everybody, rich or poor, has the right to visit historical monuments and that it is the gate that is illegal. Our discussion on the legal subtleties of the situation does not go unnoticed, as a couple of residents stop by to listen. The RWA is legally recognized, so has its right to set a watchman, he points out. Yet if a public monument lies within the RWA’s constituency, should not the way to the monument remain open? Can a monument be privatized if the state remains its owner? The important questions are left unasked. Would the guard have smiled if I my appearance had been different? If I had shown myself uncertain of my right to pass through? What would happen to the flâneur who wanted to walk in a park at nightfall,

when the gate is really closed and the guard gone? Woe to the walker on a winter's night, when every gate is closed and the watchman sleeping.



*Fig. 27: By order of RWA.*  
Photo: Priyam Tripathy, Hauz Khas, Delhi, August 2018.

What authorizes the nightly transformation of Delhi into a labyrinth, and the enclosing of parks for the exclusive usage of morning walkers? This question forces us to consider the impact of gates and guards, legal or illegal, on Delhi's inhabitants, but also the transformation of state policies. Clearly, enclosing some areas that are public is not

legal<sup>122</sup>. Yet it is tolerated, even encouraged by authorities through the establishment and the recognition by the state of RWAs.

The central question guiding this dissertation is: “what is the effect of private security guards on the city?” In this chapter I show that security guards are object of regulatory *dispositifs*, but those are fragmented and the regulations are barely followed. Yet the guards are taking part in a control of the street that manifests the class division of the city and foster the inequalities in which their job is embedded. I finally point out that guards work on behalf of “post-development formations” (Gidwani and Reddy 2011, 1640) questions the relevance of the term of public space. The order they express is attune to a biopolitics that “fluidifies” the city for the few at the expense of the many.

I have advanced the hypothesis that security guards act within a regulatory framework that is fluctuating. I do not mean here only the trivial point that regulations framing the work of security guards are rapidly evolving but rather that they are uncertain and constantly re-arranged. It expresses the affirmation of the power of a class over the city. The “representation of space” that gives its form to what I have called the “visible grid of the city” is another expression of the same class relation.

Before I proceed further, I expose two paradoxes that have triggered some questions I elaborate upon in this chapter. The first paradox concerns the relations of trust and distrust with legal authorities. The class division of Delhi is materialized in the urban layout by security guards and security devices like gates and walls. Yet in theory as much

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122 Priyanka Andrew and Shweta Bhatnagar, Security Watch India, Interview, 15th November 2016, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, English.

as in law, the custodians of legitimate order—that is, the only one allowed by statutes and laws to make use of physical violence (Weber [1919] 1994)—are normally police officers.

In Delhi, the police institution suffers from a deficit of reputation for different reasons among different classes of the population. Many RWA representatives or company owners explained their hiring of security companies because of a perceived lack of efficiency of the police<sup>123</sup>. Indeed, the Delhi Police is not acting exclusively at their behest. This discredit does not fall only on Delhi Police. Public services in general are seen as inefficient. Economic theories which stipulate that the private sector is always more efficient have gained traction. Political parties like the BJP made a campaign argument favoring privatization of services (“Bharatiya Janata Party Election Manifesto - Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat” 2014). In the literature review of the introduction, p.31, I give cues on the debate surrounding privatization of services. In the following, I develop on the economic and political approaches to this matter.

Despite the lack of trust in the state, security guards discharge their functions clad in uniforms that are reminiscent of armed forces and public services; the imagination of the state endures. To limit this, article 21 of PSARA (2005) strictly prohibits the use of dress “having the appearance or bearings of public uniforms”<sup>124</sup>, and article 9 (6) of PSARA – Delhi (2009) states that private security companies shall not use the terms

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123 Group Interview with CGHS, Plot Red, 25th June 2017, Dwarka Sector 10, Delhi, English.

Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.

124 Emphasis mine.

“‘Indian’ or ‘National’ or any other such word, which give the impression of any Government patronage”.

The management of companies and public agencies is largely given to former military officers, when they do not invest part of their retirement pension in setting such companies. Thus the founder of Seagull, one of the private security companies I interviewed in Dwarka, is a retired navy officer<sup>125</sup>. The founder of Pound Security Room, a mid-level company in Saket, was a wing commander in the Indian Air Force<sup>126</sup>. Long after fieldwork, I sorted the business cards I had harvested conducting interviews: 12 out of 17 business cards that were handed out to me by private security companies’ owners—not all of them did hand out one—bear the names of corps of origin or military grades. Of course the business card is not an official certificate, and the sample was not at all intended for this purpose, however, that a military title was displayed is further proof that companies (or their heads) want to stress certain experience and credentials.

Tessa Diphoorn and Erella Grassiani (2016) have called “securitizing capital” the capacity to exchange know-how and network obtained in the service of the State in the service of private security companies. Only the army seems to have somewhat escaped the general trust deficit clouding public institutions. The guarded classes are simultaneously rejecting the idea of a protective State while favoring its symbols in the form of private police and uniforms and expressing their demands in terms of law and rights.

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125 Raj Thakur, Seagull Security, Interview, 5th May 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi.

126 K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi. English.

The legal order of Delhi is being contested in favor of a control of the city that does not focus on crimes as defined in a legal framework but on canvassing the city. Max Weber famously described the modern state as the institution that acquires the legitimacy of physical violence. The devolution of the maintenance of upper-class order in Delhi questions the extent to which public institutions in Delhi are still giving to themselves such a task.

The second paradox is of a different nature and concerns the epistemological realm. The relatively new field of legal geography (Ashton, Lake, and Pendras 2004) focuses on the interactions between law and geography. Those interactions go both ways as the regulation of human activities and nature impacts landscapes, while territories or jurisdictions are often the space in which laws apply. The regulations framing the work of security guards suffer from internal contradictions, while at the same time significant parts of the framework are simply ignored.

How is it possible to trace a legal geography then, when the observed phenomenon seem to be paralegal or illegal? I do not mean here that Delhi has no rule of law. Quite the contrary the legal order has affirmed itself vehemently in the making of the contemporary city (Bhan 2016). Yet when RWA members ask permission to erect gates they are generally given only oral permissions. The recruitment of guards is not only dependent on several sets of opposing legislation, none of them is actually respected. This order seems to lose the appearance of legal balance. The “gentrification of the state” (Ghertner 2015a) has involved upper-class homeowner associations gaining

unprecedented proximity to the executive levels of the municipal services and has secured the position of RWAs as entities controlling intra-urban territories.

To solve this paradox I propose that Carl Schmitt’s insights in the *Nomos of the Earth* provide a framework that permits us to think the capture of the city and the emergence of a form of legitimacy that is expressed through private force. This hypothesis provides a way to resolve both paradoxes and opens up a reconsideration of Delhi’s urban form.

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In this chapter, I examine four different approaches to the question of state and private security. I start with an examination of the insights of Max Weber ([1919] 1994). He developed a theory of modern state in which the state is the instance that ultimately keeps control of the legitimate use of physical violence over a territory. Regulations matter little, they are just one of the means of legitimacy. The ubiquity of Delhi’s security guard questions the status of the “monopoly of legitimate physical violence”. The questions of legitimacy he raised remain central.

Second, I show that regulations are plural and multiform. The state ceases to be a monolith but becomes, with Foucault, the effect of multiple governmentalities. Taking the example of training, I give a detailed description of two incompatible regulations. I propose to see in security guardianship a part of the process of state building in which private *dispositif* permits the upper-class to gain further control without talking about dismembering the state.



Third, the regulations might be incompatible, however what probably matters the most is that they are not respected. To put it in a nutshell, the “guarded class” of Delhi might simply disregard the regulations as their control over their neighborhoods might dispense them with it. I mention the work of Asher Ghertner on *Bhagidari* (2015a). He seeks to explain how the upper and middle-classes have expanded their power over Delhi. Since his study, the *Bhagidari* scheme, which was launched under the government of Sheila Dikshit in 2008, has lost momentum. Other schemes such as the *Mohalla Sabha*, which has a more pro-poor inclination, have been set by the current government of Arvind Kejriwal. Yet the position of the upper and middle-class domination of the city has kept reinforcing itself. Perhaps, this is my suggestion, we should understand the recourse to private security within this framework. The guards are tasked with keeping “the visual signs of poverty from public space” (Fernandes 2006, xxii). The property owners argue in courts for the eviction of what the guards cannot remove themselves. The force that the guards display institutes legitimacy in a “‘*nomos*’ of the city”.

Fourth, I return to the work of Michael Foucault and the “war-repression model” (Foucault [1976] 1997, 35). At this point I draw the consequences of what has been established to question again the notion of “public space” before turning to final considerations on biopolitics. I discuss in details the work of Agamben and that of Esposito to push further the analysis of the effect of security guards on the city.

## 2 - Weber and law and order.

Max Weber’s work unavoidably comes to mind in every work that questions law and order. In the first part of my argument, I return to his definition as well as its limits. In a conference on ethics and politics, *Politik als Beruf*<sup>127</sup> ([1919] 1994) the German sociologist points out “that violence is of course not the normal or the unique mean of the state [...] but it is really specific to it<sup>128</sup>”. He proceeds to give one of the most seminal definitions of the concept of modern State, worth reproducing at length, as its classic status tends to obscure the content:

“The State is this one human community, which, on a given territory—and the notion of territory being one of its characteristics—claims (with success) for itself, *the monopoly of legitimate physical violence*. What is particular to our own times is that other groups or individuals are only authorized the use of physical violence under the condition that the State tolerates it from its side. It thus holds to be the unique source of the ‘right’ to use violence.”<sup>129</sup>

This definition brings together a geographic dimension, a tactical component—upon which depends the success of the claim—and an economy of violence. Other groups might at times use violence *if the state permits it*. This tolerance can be understood as a way to foster legitimacy—the central element of this definition—from the groups in

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127 “*Politics as vocation*”

128 “Gewaltsemkeit ist natürlich nicht etwa das normale oder einzige Mittel des Staates [...] wohl aber: das ihm spezifische” (p.35). Translations from German are mine unless otherwise indicated.

129 “Staat ist diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes – dies: das “Gebiet” gehört zum Merkmal – das *Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit* für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht. Denn das der Gegenwart Spezifische ist: daß man allen anderen Verbänden oder Einzelpersonen das Recht zur physischen Gewaltsamkeit nur so weit zuschreibt, als der *Staat* sie von ihrer Seite zuläßt: er gilt als alleinige Quelle des “Rechts” auf Gewaltsamkeit.” (p.36)  
Emphasis in the text.

position to exert this violence. Legitimacy is what makes acceptable the domination of the state. It avoids a constant repetition of violence:

“The State is a relation of *domination* of man by man sustained by the specific mean of legitimate violence (that is to say, which is seen as legitimate).”<sup>130</sup>

For Weber legality comes as one way among others to obtain legitimacy, a legitimacy that grants to the “human community” the exclusive usage of physical violence.

Weber aimed at shedding light on the processes of modernization of state and institutions which he was witnessing. His definition here is an ideal type of what the modern idea of the state should lead to, not a model that would apply to every circumstance such as contemporary India. As Beatrice Jauregui humorously notes, “the conception of coercion itself seems to have a monopoly on theorization” (2016, 12). This monopoly has effects, of which I mention two.

First, the towering presence of Weber maintains theories of legitimacy and of state formation within the paradigm of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* ([1651] 1985). The state is perceived as a single, coherent—or tending to coherence—body in which conflicts are resolved by a superior power to avoid a lapse into the “state of nature”. Weber’s theory thus tends to hide that the control of violence is but a moment of a permanent state formation. The critique should not hold to the definition of Weber like to a lifebuoy but rather see to what extent it permits us to go further as the definition and scope of the modern state are evolving rapidly.

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130 “Der Staat ist [...] ein auf das Mittel der legitimen (das heißt: als legitim angesehenen) Gewaltsamkeit gestütztes *Herrschaftsverhältnis* von Menschen über Menschen.” (p.36) Emphasis in the text.

Second, the definition by Weber that I have reproduced above also tends to obfuscate that it essentially speaks with and for the upper-class, which attempts to channelize the violence of the state to foster their interests. Whose violence is legitimized? On whom is this violence conducted? Examining the work of the state and the limits of the modern state project with security guards forces us to re-situate legitimate violence within class relations. That “the State is a relation of domination of man by man” is correct, how this domination functions and expands is the crux of the question.

I have shown in the previous chapters that the physical violence of the security guards is mostly theoretical, yet it is symbolically well present. It has a class and gender variation that makes it an element of the city. In a sense, even if individually the guards are not using their fists or sticks on a daily basis against hypothetical intruders, we can still speak of a landscape of violence of which the guards are a part. Iron gates mounted with spikes long and sharp enough to impale a human being are violent, just like barbed wire. However passive these objects might be, barbed wire plays an active role in movement control of humans and cattle alike through the pain it can inflict (Netz 2004).



*Fig. 28: Pikes above the gate of a residential neighborhood.*

Photo: Priyam Tripathy, Delhi, August 2018.

The guards are nevertheless making violence more visible, more present, less dependent on a hierarchical structure. Guards working in different companies, obeying shorter and decentralized chains of command, are spreading through the upper and middle-class parts of the city a (potential for) violence that their employers perceive as legitimate and which the state regulates and accepts. The work of maintaining order is fragmented but the relation of “domination of man by man” remains. Does the presence of security guards challenge Weber’s definition? No. The State has developed rules and regulations. The fundamental legitimacy of the state remains unquestioned, as it hinges on the legitimacy of the potential violence.

The discourse among the upper and middle-class in Delhi revolves around a critique of the institutions of the state—that is, institutions build over history to answer to

the transformation of ruling power and demands of citizens. This discourse asserts that the institutions assembled by the state are too inefficient, corrupt, or incompetent to address the safety concerns of upper and middle-class residents in Delhi in a manner satisfactory to them. This does not mean that the state was ever “efficient”. It does not mean either that there ever was a golden age of safety, or even a golden age of trust. The discourse on the incompetence of the state to insure safety is mostly the symptom of a displacement of legitimacy from political institutions to the market. In the words of Mark Neocleous, “the common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and the good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to ‘secure’ us” (2008, 4).

I have pointed out above that the police in Delhi, already understaffed, suffer among the upper-class from a reputation of incompetence, corruption, extreme violence and laziness<sup>131</sup>. This reputation is widely accepted among upper-class inhabitants and reflects the outlook of upper and middle-class on state organizations whose rank-and-files originate from the “political society” (Chatterjee 2004).

The Delhi Police stands in disequilibrium. Its actions are in principle strictly regulated. Yet its methods, and the accession of the rank-and-files to their jobs implies a gray zone—and sometimes outright violations of procedures—vis-à-vis the letter of the law (Jauregui 2016). Those actions are at times outrightly assumed by police officers. In “Just War: The Metaphysics of Police Vigilantism in India” (2015) Jauregui shows how

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131 Group Interview with CGHS, Plot Red, 25th June 2017, Dwarka Sector 10, Delhi, English.

the police showcases itself as self-sacrificing while staging encounters to conduct extra judicial executions.

The police thus disrupts class dynamics<sup>132</sup>. It will not intervene without public mandate. And yet, from the perspective of upper-class residents, some arrangements can occasionally be made. From the perspective of lower class residents the police might be seen as a daunting, unpredictable force exerting violence, yet it represents an ultimate recourse. Private security systems, on the other hand, will intervene without public mandate and fully at the behest of their primary employers.

The justification given by upper-class residents for the erection of the gate is the incapacity of the tool of the State par excellence, the police, to ensure the safety of belongings and persons. “This is the story that the industry likes to tell about itself, a story in which ‘private’ security is said to take off from the general security problematic, but which also reinforces it; capital is once more presented as making its own inimitable contribution to (national) security” (Neocleous 2008, 152).

The private security industry is presented as a potential contributor, if not as a potential solution to Delhi’s “crime problem” because the recourse to private security guards permits to avoid both the need for mandates and the messiness of the police interventions. I have presented the treatment of this topic by Nalla et al. (2013) in the Introduction p.29.

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132 I am indebted to Sudeshna Mitra for her comments in this part.

For the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), constitutional dispositions protecting citizens might impede the economic growth of the sector, even though this sector seems to have no difficulties expanding. The growth of the sector, variously estimated by public and private actors, is pegged at around 25% per annum according to a blog maintained by FICCI (Sarita 2012). Or maybe it is 20% per annum (EY and FICCI 2013). FICCI again indicates that the “growth is perceived to reach 40%” (FICCI, n.d.)<sup>133</sup>.

FICCI thus laments that there are:

“[zero] rights to detain. At present there is no clause in the [PSARA 2005] Act, which empowers private security officers with right to detention. In developed economies, the private security officers can detain a suspect till local authorities take charge of the situation<sup>134</sup>.” (Sarita 2012).

Independently of the controversies surrounding law enforcement agencies, the frame of reference for power remains that of legality. What to do of the claim of the Deputy Director with the Homeland Security desk at FICCI, Rashmi Sarita? In India, individual can make arrests (*Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2016, sec. 43) if witness to a cognizable offense<sup>135</sup>. It might not be the case that procedure is systematically respected to the letter of the law yet eventual lapses in procedure can, potentially, be used in court. Even if “there is a tremendous opportunity for Private security industry to

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133 The periodicity of this growth is not precised, I suppose it is per annum. Note that at this latter rate of growth, if the growth of the sector is reflected mechanically in the number of its manpower, the number of security guards will have surpassed the number of inhabitants in the country by a wide margin by 2033.

134 This claim is not substantiated.

135 The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure is often quoted as CrPC.



become an extended arm of the authorities” (FICCI, n.d.) private security companies are not given the right to arrest or detain under conditions different from that of any particular citizen, that is:

“Every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forth with communicate to him full particulars of the offense for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.” (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec 50)<sup>136</sup>.

It is interesting that the claim of efficiency and that of potential market gain overshadow the considerations for the fundamental rights. The proposal of FICCI thus is not to permit security companies to help or replace the police forces but to be able to set in principle the rights, for their organizations as such, to exclude, and to make of this right to exclusion a commodity.

State regulation lends legitimacy to the private security industry (Crawford and Lister 2006; White 2010). The elaboration of a market goes through the elaboration of a regulation that favor private actors, and not through deregulation. The economic effect is the continuous growth of a sector—at the expense of the traditional occupation of *chowkidars*. The legitimacy of the domination of man by man through private violence is asserted, visually by referencing to the “idea” of the state as expressed in the guards’ uniform, and in legal *dispositifs* by sets of regulations that enshrine private security services as a legitimate activity.

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136 This may look daunting yet it simply translates as “Any individual conducting an arrest must immediately explain to the person arrested the reasons for the arrest.”

Measured with the yardstick of Weber, the state might not be losing the control of legitimate violence in as much as it authorizes it. However, it is the modern state itself, not as a perceived form of governance but as a theoretical concept, that needs to be re-examined. The presence of private security guardianship does not challenge Weber's definition because the state sanctions them. Yet the multiplication of the agencies and loci from which a violence is exercised reveals that the monopoly of legitimacy is contested. Upper-classes legitimize this latent violence outside the usual perimeter of the state.

### **3 - Plural regulations**

In her study of the private security market, in which she focuses on international security, Deborah D. Avant points out that “the privatization of security does not so much transfer power from one institution (the state) to another (the market) as poses challenges to the way both states and markets have functioned in the modern system” ([2005] 2015, 263). Avant's analysis of private security contractors focuses on three dimensions of control: the political—who gets to decide about the deployment of arms and services” (pp. 5-6), the functional—how security is deployed, and the social—how acceptable the practices deployed are to the populations. She examines the effect of that “privatization of security” in rich and poor countries. Avant mostly works on international private security companies that are deployed in war zones. However, her analysis that the relations of state and market in private security are complex remains relevant in different contexts.

The issue remains for the state authorities to exert, as Tessa Diphorn puts it: “Surveillance of the *Surveillers*”<sup>137</sup> (2016b). That is, to frame and regulate the way security guards exert their functions. To reach this conclusion, Diphorn compares the regulations in Kenya and South Africa. She analyzes “regulation as an assemblage consisting of numerous layers” (177). “Regulation has become integral in the neoliberal context of the contemporary nation-state, highlighting the shift from a centralized state to a more pluralized form of governance” (163). I have mentioned in Introduction (p.31) the work of Loïc Wacquant for whom neoliberalism is “an *articulation of state, market and citizenship* that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third” (2012, 73). Here the situation seems to work as such: various sets of regulations are in place from the state that permits the market to position itself as offering security within a framework that justifies it.

The phenomenon of “regulatory assemblage” that Diphorn describes can be observed in Delhi. The Delhi Police, who depends on the central government, proposed a scheme to harness the private manpower of security companies as a “force multiplier” at no added cost for the police. State and market have devised regulations to use security guards—this is an expression employed by South Delhi Police commissioner—as the “eyes and ears of the police”. “Security guards and *chowkidars*” are to act as “force multipliers” (“PRAHARI’, Delhi Police Press Release” 2017).

The Delhi Police Commissioner Mr Amulya Patnaik, IPS, launched the *prahari* (vanguard) community policing scheme in April 2017 (Anita Roy 2017;

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137 Emphasis in text.

“‘PRAHARI’, Delhi Police Press Release” 2017; Uniindia News 2017). It seems that the training took place only once in South Delhi, and consisted of a one-day event during which several hundred guards were made to stay in the police station precinct of Hauz Khas and received paraphernalia such as baseball hats. The police asked several companies to send guards working in areas of contact with the public for the event<sup>138</sup>. The *Prahari* scheme opened the door to collaboration between police and security guards that was not previously considered from the angle of law and order.

Private security companies are thus not taking away from the legitimacy of the state. Quite the contrary, in operating private control over public streets, in giving satisfaction to the upper and middle-classes while giving ground for regulations and state *dispositifs* to be deployed, it rather reinforces the process of state construction over the landscape of Delhi.

Laurent Fourchard (2011), who studies community policing and vigilantism in South Africa, makes the argument in a different situation. He describes a process of progressive integration of citizens into the police forces via local police schemes. Integration starts with citizens volunteering in policing organizations, which are almost vigilantes. This integration is encouraged by political parties. There is no rupture in the case he studies, but rather continuity between the private security apparatus and the public structures. Fourchard concludes: “the integration of former vigilante members into the police force and the institutionalization of vigilante operations as part of community policing schemes are less a challenge to state sovereignty than an aspect of the dynamic

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138 Raj Kapur, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

process of state formation” (2011, 21). It is possible to see the presence of security guards as part and parcel of a process of state formation, read in a wider sense of the tightening of public control of the population with a territory. However, this does not happen through a process of integration at all but through shifts in the nature of the spatial organization of Delhi. What is different is thus the shape that the state formation is taking.

On the one hand, the situation appears radically different in the neighborhoods of Delhi that I studied. For a start, the process of state formation in India compares tenuously with South Africa’s. Second, the involvement of homeowners’ associations—RWA or CGHS—does not imply any personal involvement by citizens. Finally, I could not detect any trace of continuity between private security forces and public forces, at the level of the manpower.

On the other hand, the attempt at enrolling private security guards into the public *dispositif* seems to have fizzled out. First, the District Commissioner of Police informed me that they had not deemed it useful to verify the registration status of the guards, thus disregarding the schemes and the law set respectively by the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship) and the Home department of the Government of Delhi<sup>139</sup> (I come to this in the next section). Second, I could only find evidence of two meetings having taken place in South and East Delhi, while the scheme is not advertised any more on the Delhi Police website.

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139 Vijay Kumar, Delhi Police, Interview, 7th June 2017, Hauz Khas, Delhi, English.

Delhi's private security guards cannot be considered as proto-state forces, but it does not stop the *dispositifs* of security guardianship to expand over Delhi and increase the control of its neighborhoods. In “Seeing private security like a state” (2008), Daniel O’Connor et al. take cues from James Scott ([1998] 2008). Their article in *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, adopts an approach informed by legal and regulatory considerations. They examine the rules and regulations framing the work of private security in the United States and Canada. They show how the state regards private security:

“... as a diversely constituted problematic and acts on these problems through multiple regulatory mechanisms [...] While the overall aim of state regulation may be to order conduct, the use of diverse regulatory mechanisms signals to us that the state regulation of private security is largely an assemblage of different, even incongruous, parts” (O’Connor et al. 2008, 204).

Faced with multiple and decentralized territories and modes of control, it is not surprising but expected that different state institutions might develop contradictory schemes.

I recap. States are generally understood in Hobbes and Weberian theories as unifying principles, as coherent hierarchical organizations. The inadequacy and the messy systems of regulations of private security indicate that there are limits to this approach. Quite to the contrary, the state structure is nothing but a state building that adopts the form of the apparatus of control that it sets in place over landscape. In this context a territory is nothing but the landscape created by a *dispositif* of violence as deployed.

Perhaps the mistake was to seek a coherent pyramidal structure in the first place. “The State”, for Foucault ([1979] 2004, 79), “is nothing but the moving effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities”<sup>140</sup>. To illustrate this point I now turn to a detailed analysis of Delhi’s legal situation regarding training and deployment in private security guardianship.

### 3.1 - The training enigma.

In 2005, the Government of India decided to regulate the market of private security that had emerged. It did so first from the point of view of law and order. Guards were however, banned from detaining people (*qua* guards) and the firearm provisions governing them were the same as for the general population. The State created a market for the private security companies that excludes foreigners and traditional *chowkidars*. In the terms of A. Didar Singh, which are also those of Rashmi Sarita (2012), the sector “has the potential to become an extended arm of law enforcement” (EY and FICCI 2013, 4).

The sector is said to absorb all the manpower it can find (FICCI, n.d.), and indeed the guards are unafraid of leaving the companies that employ them for a short time, assured as they are to find another one upon their return. The annual rate of turnover was estimated as 30 % by several companies I interviewed. The number of security guards in the country is estimated to be around 6 million (FICCI, n.d.). The truth, however, is that those are wide estimates which seem to have very little grounding. In any case, apparently concerned with the low rate of compliance to labor laws such as

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140 “L’État, ce n’est rien d’autre que l’effet mobile d’un régime de gouvernementalités multiples” (January 31<sup>st</sup>, 1979).

Provident Funds, a policy was drafted to favor training of the guards, assuming that they would access the status—and therefore the wages—of semi-skilled labor. The government of Narendra Modi initiated the “Skill India” campaign in 2015. Its objective is to increase the proportion of trained workforce in the country, with the ambitious target of “40 crores” trained people (“Skill India” n.d.)—that is 400 millions individuals<sup>141</sup>—by 2022.

*Box 10: The National Skill Development Corporation*

According to its website, the “National Skill Development Corporation India (NSDC), established in 2009, is a not-for-profit company set up by the Ministry of Finance [...]. The present equity base of NSDC is Rs.10 crore [10,00,00,000 INR] of which the Government of India through Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship (MSDE) holds 49%, while the private sector has the balance 51%. (“National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) - About Us” n.d.)” It funds the training organizations to the extent of 75% under the form of “soft loans” (“NSDC FAQ” n.d.). The NSDC sets Sector Skill Councils (SSC) with representatives of the industry. In this case, the Central Association of Private Security Industry. NSDC is tasked with setting training and giving subventions for the settings of for-profits institutions dealing with the skill ecosystem.

I could meet a representative of NSDC by coming to his office unannounced. Despite many attempts, I could not set up an appointment, before or after that meeting.

The rapid growth of the private security sector offered an easy public for this skilling scheme. The National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) (see Box 10204), a company working under the regime of public-private partnership (PPP) is tasked with setting goals, allocating funds and verifying that the trainings are met. Each sector

<sup>141</sup> One crore is equivalent to 10 000 000, or a hundred lakh, in Indian counting system.



develops its own standards through a dedicated Skill Development Council. For the private security sector, the logically named Security Sector Skills Development Council (SSSDC) was tasked with creating the norms of occupations as well as the syllabus for the training.

However, the skilling scheme is failing for several reasons. Widespread corruption has sullied the scheme's reputation. The SSSDC is currently suspended and its bank accounts frozen while an inquiry into mismanagement of funds is ongoing at time of writing (Pant 2018). Another reason is more fundamental: training does not increase the efficiency of neighborhood security guards in any visible manner.

I have described above the Delhi Police's *Prahari*, a third training *dispositif*, after PSARA and Skill India, meant to enlist the labor of security guards into the state project. As I have indicated, for pragmatic reasons, the commissioner of police opted to disregard the compliance – or non-compliance – of companies toward the two schemes<sup>142</sup>.

I now enter into the details of the paperwork.

### 3.2 - PSARA regulations

The Private Security Agency Regulation Act of 2005 functions through a system of mandatory licenses. It is a central legislation. These are some salient traits:

1. Every state must appoint a “Controlling Authority” to verify the application of the Act, draft a syllabus and establish a list of companies that are being granted

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142 Vijay Kumar, Delhi Police, Interview, 7th June 2017, Hauz Khas, Delhi, English.

licenses to operate. States are left to specify for every category a ratio between supervisor and guards.<sup>143</sup>

2. Every company must imperatively obtain a license prior to deployment or they would be fined.
3. All guards must be trained, be citizens of Indian origin<sup>144</sup> and have no police record.

In 2009 the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi passed the Private Security Agency Regulation Rules (PSARR), that complies with the demands of the Act. However the acronym used to designate the authority or the set of rules remain “PSARA”<sup>145</sup>. Admittedly, this has a negative impact on the general clarity of this exposition.

In details, the title 9 of PSARA “9: Conditions for commencement of operation and engagement of supervisor” imposes that a training as prescribed by the state should take place before deployment or within a year for the guards already deployed<sup>146</sup>, under penalty of fine in addition to suspension or cancellation of the license (art.20.2)<sup>147</sup>.

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143 In Delhi, the title 8 section 1 sets a ratio of no more than 1 supervisor for 15 guards.

144 Unless specified otherwise in the Gazette of India, which has not happened.

145 “PSARA” also designates, in the parlance of private security companies, the authority set by the government. To avoid here the understandable confusion, I keep within brackets the year of the passing of the law, PSARA (2005) is the law of the central government, PSARA (2009) is that of the government of the Union Territory of Delhi. PSARA (Regulations) designate the latter.

146 “9.2 Every private security agency shall ensure imparting of such training and skills to its private security guards and supervisors as may be prescribed: Provided that the person carrying on the business of private security agency, before the commencement of this Act, shall ensure the required training to its security guards and supervisors within a period of one year from the date of such commencement.” (*Private Security Agency Regulation Act 2005*)

147 In addition:

“22.1 Where an offense under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offense was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of

However, the procedure to verify the application of title 9 is not defined. The content, length and curricular of the training are left to the states, and in the case of Delhi, to the Government of the Union Territory.

The latter established the Delhi Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Rules in 2009. The specifications of the training are described under title 6 of the Delhi Rules.

“6.1 The Controlling Authority shall frame the syllabus containing the details of the training.”

Section 6 (1) specifies the length of the training (100 hours of theoretical instructions and 60 hours of practical training), while 6 (2) lists 18 items which must be included in the instruction material, included proper salute and fire-fighting. Sections (3) and (4) of title 6 specify respectively that the trainees must get a certificate and that the training can be delegated to a company which would satisfy the requirements set by the controlling authority.

The section (5) points out that:

“6.5 The officer authorized by the Controlling Authority for the purpose, shall carry out regular inspections of the recognized institute or organization.”

“6.6 On receiving the recommendation from the authorized officer, the Controlling Authority may after affording a reasonable opportunity to the institute, de-recognize the institute or organization.”

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the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offense and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

This training is verified as per section 9.2 and a termination of license for non-compliance is the rule as per 9.3.

“9.2 The Controlling Authority either by itself or through its officers including the officer authorized by it may verify the training and skills imparted to the private security guards and supervisors of any private security agency.”

“9.3 The Controlling Authority may review the continuation or otherwise of license of such security agencies which may not have adhered to the conditions of ensuring the required training.”

The training is again mentioned as a condition for a grant of license as prescribed by the controlling authority in 10.1 and regular inspection “by the officer authorized by the Controlling Authority” is set as a condition for renewing of license in 12.1. The controlling authority in Delhi has a team composed of policemen, men from the Home Guard<sup>148</sup> and employees from its own service. The Home Guard refused my request to accompany them in their inspections.

The syllabus also specifies an instructor ratio for classroom training of 1 to 60 in a 600 square foot classroom and for physical training of 1 to 50 candidates. The administrative block should be of 800 sq. ft., and the syllabus details the laboratory facilities, simulators and detecting devices, which should be part of the equipment of the training center.

PSARA has released a list of 9 companies authorized to deliver training under its syllabus. It includes the Home Guard, leaving a total of 8 private companies. Only 3 of

<sup>148</sup> The Home Guard is a para-military organization raised in Delhi after independence and revived after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 to assist the police in its tasks.

those companies appear on the SSSDC list of authorized training centers. However, I could not find any trace of prosecution under the act by the PSARA authority against any contravening company.

I have contacted by e-mail every company on the list to ask for interviews. The three companies that have come back to me for comments regarding the training have confirmed that their training facilities are not being used because of a lack of demand<sup>149</sup>. Only one company among the dozen I have interviewed had its employees trained under PSARA recognized training duration.

PSARA law might not be implementable for several reasons. From the point of view of companies, in a highly competitive and labor-intensive market, they cannot afford to keep guards under training for a month. While the guards cannot go unpaid for the same amount of time. Meanwhile the contractors want guards to be immediately available. It is not possible for most companies to keep even 20 guards on payroll without revenues.<sup>150</sup> As for the training, there seems to be no added value to the guards nor to the companies to actually train the guards. There is simply no efficiency gain.

### 3.3 - SSSDC training

The Union Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship has set the goal to foster inclusive and sustainable growth through improving wages and skills among the

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149 Naveen Chaubey, 2Kuri, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.

Rajeev Nitharwal, International Campus of Security, Interview, 29th November 2016, Delhi, English.

Jagadev Singh, multiple e-mail correspondence with the author, 2017, English.


150 Of course this point of view is situated. The margin taken by small companies is already dependent on not paying the guards minimum wages. The most classical dynamic of regulations versus free enterprise is playing out here, at the expense of employees.

immense workforce available in India. The Minister for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship is present in the board of the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC), which the minister considers to be one of its “functional arms”. In turn, the NSDC co-organizes “Sector Skill Councils” (SSC) with the representatives of various industries:

“They create Occupational Standards and Qualification bodies, develop competency framework, conduct Train the Trainer Programs, conduct skill gap studies and Assess and Certify trainees on the curriculum aligned to National Occupational Standards developed by them.”

(“Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship - SSC” n.d.)

The SSCs are central in laying down the expectations of the job and the standards of the training. They also organize and verify its execution.



The advertisement features a central image of a security guard in a light-colored uniform with a dark tie and a peaked cap. To the right of the guard, there is a red shield logo with three white stars and the acronym 'SSSDC' below it. Below this shield is the headline: **ARE YOU RISKING YOUR LIFE & PROPERTY WITH UNSKILLED SECURITY GUARD ?**. The text below the headline explains that it is mandatory to hire security guards who have undergone a minimum of 160 hours of training as per the Private Security Agencies Regulatory Act of the Govt. of India. It further states that a trained Security Guard proudly wearing the Star Badge will provide effective safety and security to you and your Organisation. The text mentions that the Star Badge is set up by NSDC-MSDE, Security Sector Skill Development Council, which is the authorised Council that certifies the Security Domain work force following very stringent quality control, thereby ensuring professional excellence. After successfully completing the training, they are awarded the certification as per the rules of Govt. of India and become eligible to wear the Star Badge given by SSSDC. The text concludes by asking to look for the SSSDC Star Badge to ensure that you have the right guard to protect you and your assets. Below the text is a large, ornate star badge with 'SSSDC' and 'CERTIFIED SECURITY GUARD' inscribed on it. At the bottom of the advertisement, there is a grey box containing the contact information for the Security Sector Skill Development Council: 305, City Court, Sikanderpur, MG Road, Gurgaon-122002 (India), Email: manager.entp@sssd.in, Mob.: +91 9599817542, Tele.: +91-124-4937450, Website: www.sssdc.in. To the right of this box is the PMKVY logo with the tagline 'प्रधानमंत्री कौशल विकास योजना'.

**ARE YOU RISKING YOUR LIFE & PROPERTY WITH UNSKILLED SECURITY GUARD ?**

It is mandatory to hire security guards who have undergone a minimum of 160 hours of training as per the **Private Security Agencies Regulatory Act of the Govt. of India**.

A trained Security Guard proudly wearing the Star Badge will provide effective safety and security to you and your Organisation. **Set up by NSDC-MSDE, Security Sector Skill Development Council** is the authorised Council that certifies the Security Domain work force following very stringent quality control, thereby ensuring professional excellence. After successfully completing the training, they are awarded the certification as per the rules of Govt. of India and become eligible to wear the Star Badge given by SSSDC.

Look for the SSSDC Star Badge to ensure that you have the right guard to protect you and your assets.

**कौशल रक्षक - सुरक्षित भारत**  
**Skilled Guards - Secure India**

**Security Sector Skill Development Council**  
305, City Court, Sikanderpur, MG Road, Gurgaon-122002 (India),  
Email: manager.entp@sssd.in, Mob.: +91 9599817542, Tele.: +91-124-4937450  
Website: www.sssdc.in

**PMKVY**  
प्रधानमंत्री कौशल विकास योजना

*Fig. 29: Advertisement published for Security Sector Skill Development Council.*

Source : *The Times of India*, Delhi, November 25th, 2016.

The SSC in charge of the private security sector is the Security Sector Skill Development Council (hereafter SSSDC). It “was jointly formed by the Central

Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI) and National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC)” (“SSSDC” n.d.)

CAPSI is a federation of private security companies that claims to represent the interests of the sector. It claims membership of all of the biggest players in the field, such as SECURITAS, Checkmate, Knight Watch, or G4S. All of them are situated at the higher end of the security market. Everything happens as if they aimed to increase the regulation to raise the cost of compliance, a cost that small companies working for residential neighborhoods and RWA cannot bear. Indeed, observations indicate that RWA and CGHS go to the lowest bidder while mid and upper-level companies find no interest in deploying guards in residential neighborhoods, as the rate of interest is too low—and according to them—lower than what it is possible to do while respecting laws and regulations<sup>151</sup>.

The SSSDC has put in place the National Occupational Standards (NOS) in 2013 (“NOS for Unarmed Security Guard SSSDC” 2013). It mentions that the training time must be of 160 hours as per PSARA. The assessment noted for the qualification pack (p.2) does not refer to and does not reproduce the syllabus imposed by the PSARA authority as it takes into account the PSARA Act of 2005, and not its declension to Delhi in 2009.

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151 L.S. Arora, Evening Vigil, Interview, 13th October 2016, Delhi, English.

K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

Mrs Lohar, incumbent RWA president, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, English.



Yet for the PSARA authority: “None of the agencies which are not recognized by the state PSARA authority have any business to give any certificate. Full stop.”<sup>152</sup>

SSSDC has brought together a list of 21—at time of fieldwork—“training partners” companies conducting recognized training in Delhi. Only three of them are to be found on the list published by the Delhi PSARA authority. The training conducted in the others is therefore, as the PSARA authority stated<sup>153</sup>, illegal. I contacted all the companies that are authorized by SSSDC and not authorized by PSARA, none of their representatives have agreed to meet with me.

SSSDC organizes, with those partner companies, a scheme to train already deployed guards. This “Recognition of Prior Learning” (RPL) reduces the training to one week of theory. The syllabus for this scheme is not available but the one I could attend (see Box 4 p.66), delivered by a company that has both PSARA and SSSDC approval in Haryana, did not include elements of the syllabus set by PSARA. It lasted a total of 7 hours approximately. It was subsequently assessed by Skill India. Five companies have been authorized by SSSDC to conduct RPL (“CAPSI” n.d.). One of them also signs PSARA certified training certificates (see Fig. 16 p.148).

SSSDC gives accreditations to some training centers to receive Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana<sup>154</sup> (PMKVY) trainees (“Guidelines for Skill Ecosystem” n.d.). PMKVY is the “flagship” program of the Union Ministry of Skill Development and

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152 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

In the same interview, the representative I interviewed indicates that “SSSDC and CAPSI all are scams”.

153 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

154 “Program of the Prime Minister for the Development of Youth.”

Entrepreneurship, launched in 2016. In short, the SSC gives accreditations to training centers, for a fee. The PMKVY then reimburses the training expenses to the companies. Most companies will therefore go through a PMKVY recognized agencies whenever possible, to have their expenses covered. PMKVY also recognizes the RPL trainings. In a document dated of the 5<sup>th</sup> of April 2017, 12 companies had received such accreditation. None of them matched the names on the PSARA list.

For two of those companies, the training ground earmarked for PSARA trainings lay unused. Both companies focus on RPL trainings. Since the law is not implemented, why train guards for a month before deployment—which means making the client wait and paying guards for a month without return on investments—and in addition pay the trainers for 160 hours when guards can be put to work and subsequently trained in 7 hours that will be covered by a state subsidy? In a nutshell, companies that are trying to get some form of recognized training cannot have it done legally from the point of view of PSARA and yet at the same time be reimbursed by the state sanctioned schemes.

In alignment with the scheme to increase training, the Union Ministry of Labor decided in March 2017 to classify security guards as skilled workers (“Office Of The Labour Commissioner” n.d.). The aim was in principle to increase the recognition and living standards of guards. The same month, the Delhi government headed by Arvind Kejriwal decided to increase the minimum wages for all categories of workers. The hike in wages for skilled workers should be 36 per cent. This would in theory signify that they should earn 16,1822 INR per month in Delhi, or approximately twice what most of the

guards working in residential neighborhoods and whom I have interviewed earn. At the time of fieldwork, Kerjiwal’s decision was bogged down in court cases<sup>155</sup>.

Many sources, some coming from official quarters, other from heads of small companies, reported fake classrooms that emptied after inspections, requests for bribes (see Fig. 3 p.65), and wide scale embezzlement of funds on the side of SSSDC<sup>156</sup>. The government disbanded the organization in January 2018 over misuse of funds (Pant 2018). However, the scheme as a whole and its functioning have not been fundamentally questioned—the SSCs and the work of NSDC and PMKVY are not in question. Solely the management of SSSDC has been the subject of inquiry.

I have described at length two *dispositifs* that overlap without seemingly interacting with one another. The first is PSARA, a set of regulations that consider the role and presence of private security companies as a matter concerning law and order. The second is SSSDC, a scheme that emanates from the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship and for which security guardianship is essentially a matter of labor management. To come back to Foucault, whom I referred to while opening this section, those are indeed “multiple” regimes of governmentality. Their effect however must be questioned, and this forces us to go one step further.

There is an element that Diphoorn and Daniel O’Connor et al. have not fully taken into consideration. What is most intriguing here is not really that there are several

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155 K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

156 Col. Priamvaad Kumar, RSSS, Interview, 9th February 2017, Delhi, English.

Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.

Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

competing regulations. It is that none of them is followed. The state-centric vision of security must be put to the test in face of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of private guardianship. The growing class divide that is transforming the city is also the one upon which security guardianship is built. To carry on the exposition of the construction of private security guardianship in Delhi, I now turn to the informal and paralegal realities of the sector.

#### **4 - But is it about the state?**

It is a pleasant afternoon of September 2016, I am doing my first reconnaissance fieldwork in the south-western part of Saket. I introduce myself to the guards and *chowkidars* of the area. I want them to know who I am and what I do before I start asking a lot of questions. I exchange words with each of them and give away my newly printed business card from the Center for Policy Research.

Posted near the iron-gate closing the block toward a quiet, trees lined street, Shyam Kampur sits on a plastic chair, waiting out the afternoon. He has been a guard there for the last two years<sup>157</sup>. He earns approximately 7000 INR per month. His uniform was cut out from his salary. Before coming to Saket he was working in Okhla. And before that he was a house painter. One day he fell from his scaffolding, and broke his leg. He has been limping ever since. He cannot climb a scaffolding. He cannot run. He had no choice, he said, but to become a security guard.

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157 Shyam Kampur, Interview, 13th October 2016, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

The prescribed “physical fitness training” of Delhi’s *Private Security Agency Regulation Rules*’ syllabus, drafted for the training of Security guards, is a daily jogging of 3 km for males and 2 km for females. A minimum of high jump of 1.2 meters is a set standard. For the incorporation, a guard must be “free from knock knee and flat foot, able to run one kilometer in 6 minutes for the age group between 18 to 30 years, 8 minutes for the age group between 31 to 40 years and should be able to walk one mile in 15 minutes for the age group between 41 to 50 years and in 17 minutes for the age group 51 and above” (*Delhi Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Rules* 2009, para. 7, f.). I did not ask Mr Kampur how fast he could run that kilometer.

No rule or penalty for non-compliance is described in the Delhi Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Rules.<sup>158</sup> I could not find trace of any company being charged or sued for non-compliance with PSARA. The PSARA authority regularly uploads notices demanding that the law be respected. Since 2013, five Public Notices and two circulars have been published on the website of the Delhi authority for PSARA, to no effect.

When I inquired as to why there had been no charge and no coercive measure taken, the authority for PSARA replied that the goal was, for the time being, to constitute a file with the information on the companies, and, once that file comes near to being comprehensive, implement the law. Yet originally, according to him the first role of PSARA was the safety of the State:

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<sup>158</sup> The PSARA website <http://psara.delhi.gov.in/> contains informations for the procedures and training valid for Delhi (following PSARA 2009). Including the syllabus described in section 6.1 (of PSARA 2005) and a model type for public tenders on contracts for trained guards.

“The primary purpose was... stopping labor exploitation is one of the aims, but the major aim was to know who the agencies are, who are the people who are running it... they could be security threat to the country itself.<sup>159</sup>”

As I mentioned in Introduction, a significant proportion of private security agencies that are registered seem to have closed or moved on, even in the last few years of validity of their licenses (see Chart 1 p.87). According to the authority, half of Delhi companies might be registered in the file, yet this seems to be a wild guess. How then to understand its impact on the security of the State?

The crux of the question of control of the street is therefore only partly found in the “regulation assemblage”. What is at stake is a different reading of the city. Asher Ghertner, in *Rule by Aesthetics* (2015a, chap. 3) points out that Delhi’s middle-classes have been vocal about their claims to cleanliness and exclusivity for years, but it is through a public governance scheme, namely *Bhagidari*—a scheme that created links between representatives of RWAs and city officials—that their “vision of urban space [was] able to gain traction and become hegemonic” (57). The achievement of “weakening the political ties in political society required a restructuring of the state itself” (57). For Ghertner, the lower levers of the state were brought to the level of RWA representatives. This “brought about nothing less than the gentrification of state space” (77).

The “gentrification of the state space” has been accompanied by a disarticulation between control of the street and police. What I call the “guarded class” of Delhi has not only gentrified the administration; they have solidified this victory through the use of

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159 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

private security that is tasked with “defending society”. The “world-class city” has its territory and its forces. If aesthetics have become the ground to justify a legal ruling, the presence of disciplining-disciplined bodies in the street grounds their control of the street under the umbrella of insecurity.

## 5 - The “war-repression model”

It is tempting to see the role of private security guards as essentially repressive. The guards do “congeal” Delhi in the shape given to it by its dominating class. The relations of production and the circulation of value have favored one segment of society over others and that segment intends to protect itself, while it also represents and speaks for itself as “civil society” (Chatterjee 2011).

Over one page of the first lecture of *Il faut défendre la Société* ([1976] 1997, 16–17), Michel Foucault makes stunning suggestions on the nature of power and repression<sup>160</sup>. I quote at length. He starts by tracing two hypotheses. The first one is that the “mechanisms of power are fundamentally and essentially repressive”<sup>161</sup>. The second hypothesis is that “power is war, war continued by other means”<sup>162</sup>. Then he inverts one of Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz’s<sup>163</sup> famed statements into: *politics is war by*

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160 I am indebted to Etha Williams for her comments on the first elaboration of those hypotheses.

161 “Le mécanisme du pouvoir, c’est fondamentalement et essentiellement la répression.”

162 “Le pouvoir, c’est la guerre, la guerre continuée par d’autres moyens.”

163 Albeit abbreviated through this formula, the complete quote by Clausewitz is :

“We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” (Clausewitz [1832a] 2007, 28–29) (translation Howard and Peter).

*other means*. This hypothesis, for Foucault, has three corollaries. Firstly, that “power relations [...] are anchored around a certain power balance established at a given, historically precise moment, in war and through war.”<sup>164</sup> In this hypothesis:

“the role of political power would be to re-inscribe perpetually this power relation, through a kind of silent war, and to re-inscribe it in the institutions, in the economic inequalities, in language, and even into everyone’s bodies”<sup>165</sup>.

Second, the hypothesis implies that “in ‘civil peace’, political struggles, confrontations about power, with power, for power, the modifications of power relations[...] all that, within a political system, should only be interpreted as the continuation of war.”<sup>166</sup>”

Foucault points out that the aphorism by Clausewitz would finally mean that:

“The final decision can only come through war, that is, a trial of strength in which arms, finally, shall judge. The end of politics would be the last

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Original: “So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln. Was dem Kriege nun noch eigentümlich bleibt, bezieht sich bloß auf die eigentümliche Natur seiner Mittel. Daß die Richtungen und Absichten der Politik mit diesen Mitteln nicht in Widerspruch treten, das kann die Kriegskunst im allgemeinen und der Feldherr in jedem einzelnen Falle fordern, und dieser Anspruch ist wahrlich nicht gering; aber wie stark er auch in einzelnen Fällen auf die politischen Absichten zurückwirkt, so muß dies doch immer nur als eine Modifikation derselben gedacht werden, denn die politische Absicht ist der Zweck, der Krieg ist das Mittel, und niemals kann das Mittel ohne Zweck gedacht werden” (Clausewitz [1832b] 2007, para. 24, part 1, section 1.)

164 “Les rapports de pouvoir [...] ont essentiellement pour point d’ancrage un certain rapport de force établi à un moment donné, historiquement précisable, dans la guerre et par la guerre.”

165 “Le pouvoir politique, dans cette hypothèse, aurait pour rôle de réinscrire perpétuellement ce rapport de force, par une sorte de guerre silencieuse, et de le réinscrire dans les institutions, dans les inégalités économiques, dans le langage, jusque dans les corps des uns et des autres.”

166 “À l’intérieur de cette ‘paix civile’, les luttes politiques, les affrontements à propos du pouvoir, avec le pouvoir, pour le pouvoir, les modifications de rapports de force [...] tout cela, dans un système politique ne devrait être interprété que comme les continuations de la guerre.” (Emphasis in the text).



battle. So as to say, the last battle would suspend, at the end, and only then, the exercise of power as a continuous war.<sup>167</sup>”

In the next pages, he reduces this analysis to a part of a wider “war-repression” diagram upon which he plans to elaborate. He finally moves, sideways, to an analysis of racism that opens toward biopolitics, and leaves considerations of the war-repression model and Clausewitz at that.

Foucault points out that the term of “repression” is the weak link. What functions is the term of war in that war produces a relationship of discipline and power that goes beyond the application of force. Security guards, we might say, “perform a perpetual relation of power, inside a pseudo-peace in which a continuous war is hiding<sup>168</sup>” (Foucault [1976] 1997, 17). The pseudo-peace is revealed by a pseudo-legal order. The domination of the guarded class over Delhi is perpetually re-instated by the presence of guards.

The middle-class territory is claimed by middle-class residents as exclusively their own. Those areas are treated like a collective private property constituted around landownership. The guards actualize this claim at the expense of the political society. Private property implies the right to exclude and to regulate circulations. Such a statement has several implications. First it pushes us to reconsider what is meant by

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167 “La décision finale ne peut venir que de la guerre, c’est-à-dire d’une épreuve de force où les armes, finalement, devront être juges. La fin du politique, ce serait la dernière bataille, c’est-à-dire que la dernière bataille suspendrait enfin, et enfin seulement, l’exercice du pouvoir comme guerre continuée.” (p16-17.)

168 “... la mise en œuvre, à l’intérieur d’une pseudo-paix que travaille une guerre continue, d’un rapport de force perpétuel” (Foucault [1976] 1997, 17).

“public space”. Second, it permits us to push further the question of street regulations toward that of biopolitics.

### 5.1 - Of public space in unequal cities.

In Chapter 2 section 2, I briefly reviewed literature on the notion of public space in contemporary Indian cities and pointed out that the role of security guards was to capture it on behalf of their employers. I pointed out that the negation through appropriation of public space was the object of the labor of a part of the working class. I questioned whether it had been reduced to an empty legal category or to a fetish of nostalgia and proposed to understand the work of security guards as creating a “post-public space”. This public space—in the sense of Berman ([1983] 1999) as I quoted above—is, or was, a part of the modern project.

The legal denomination of public space of course remains. Yet it designates a place holder. The category is emptied of its political project, including that of becoming the collective *œuvre* that Lefebvre calls for in his *Droit à la Ville* ([1968] 2009). Places remain of course where people can gather and exchange, or simply chill out. In Delhi, malls can play this role. Yet they cannot be called public space because the behaviors and political claim are strictly controlled by the owner for commercial purpose. In the terms of Lefebvre, those places are products, where space is treated as “*exchange value*” and not as “*use value*” ([1968] 2009, 2)<sup>169</sup>. This change of project is evidently limited in scope, and other areas remain in central Delhi, like India Gate, Ram Lila and Connaught

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169 Italics in text.

Place (Rajeev Chowk).<sup>170</sup> The local neighborhood streets and parks have been the object of an appropriation by the neighborhood landowners through a process that I have called the “*nomos* of the city”.

The expression of “*nomos*” is inspired by the work of Carl Schmitt. I summarize the work in a nutshell: In *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* ([1950] 2001) Carl Schmitt traces at a macro scale, a history of European public rights. *Nomos* is a Greek term that signifies “sharing”, it was the word used to designate the founding of the geographical order that followed the establishment of a new colony. Schmitt designates with it the division of the earth, in this case, between European colonizing powers. In a nutshell, the externalization of European conflicts through the world gave birth to a public right in which Europeans were considering each other as equals. Past the “amity lines”, conflicts were restricted among “*justus hostis*”, or fair enemies. In his construction, not only is the judicial order based on space, but also space—power over space—is at the origin of law. After the first world war, the Society of Nations condemned Germany as criminal. This irruption of criminalization among European countries paves the way to wars of exterminations because the “*justus hostis*” has become “*injustus hostis*”, or unfair enemy, criminal.

The theory of Schmitt and that of Foucault touch briefly before diverging again. For Foucault, there is politics because there is permanent war. The criminalization of the

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<sup>170</sup> India Gate and Connaught Place are under constant application of the section 144 of CrPC, which extend power of police to forbid gatherings. However, what matters is the public appropriation of such areas. India Gate in particular still has its share of public protests despite the ban, even though those protests tend to be strictly originating from the middle-classes (Carrière 2009).

loser by the victor is its perpetuation. For Schmitt, there is politics as long as there is war, but the criminalization of the loser spells its end. The *nomos* of the city would thus be the sharing of the city, a sharing that gives rise to a new legitimacy, and mostly, a sharing that takes place at the expense of the others. The political society here is excluded from that sharing and that *nomos* is dis-empowering them.

The transformation of the notion of public space into something different and the “gentrification of the state” mutually reinforce each other. They are the expression of a change in the power balance in favor of the upper-class. Regulations and laws can be disregarded by a class that feels entitled to a sovereignty that is expressed through a regime of visibility and control. RWAs obtain verbal authorization to block streets and close public parks<sup>171</sup>, whereas they were simply required to contribute to fighting against crime. If anything, we observe a criminalization of lower classes in Delhi, who cannot call upon the state to get their right respected. The “spatial practices” of people in public space have been removed away from residential neighborhoods toward areas that are either commercial produces—the malls—or invested as “space of representations” (Lefebvre [1974] 2000, 43).

The gentrification of the state has fostered the interests of guarded-classes and constrains us to re-read sovereignty and force in a polycentric, fragmented manner. For Foucault, the discipline was an ensemble of technologies acting through populations to organize circulations to foster those that are not threatening the state while keeping the others in control ([1978] 2004, 67). The monopoly of legitimate means of violence is

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171 Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

fragmenting as the control of the city is distributed amongst the guarded classes, in a trajectory that parallels that of the gentrification of the state apparatus.

## 5.2 - Hardening or fluidifying the city?

In Saket RWAs, such as in blocks Blue and Red<sup>172</sup>, security guards are tasked with verifying that only vehicles with the right stickers can enter, pass through or park. This in order to sort between traffic that is considered normal and positive, the traffic associated with residents and their sanctioned guests, and one that is not, the traffic caused by workers, or people residing in different localities.

The work of exclusion conducted by security guards sorts in the city those who can access neighborhoods and those who cannot. The legal and regulatory *dispositifs* that justify the work of exclusion solidifies at the level of the neighborhood. Guards trace a distinction between those who have the right to circulate anywhere, and those who do not. They put a constraint on their bodies and lives. In short, it decentralizes a biopolitical control at the level of the gate.

The term of “biopolitics” is famously introduced by Foucault in his lecture “*Il faut Défendre la Société*” ([1976] 1997, 216). He defines it as a technology that supplements discipline. In the beginning of the lecture he describes the transformation of the old notion of sovereignty that revolved around “make die and let live” into one that revolves around “make live and let die”<sup>173</sup> (214). The new technologies of power that he regroups under the term of biopolitics has for object populations, health, and the

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172 Hazari Prasad, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.

173 “Faire mourir et laisser vivre” and “Faire vivre et laisser mourir”.

management of bodies. Health and circulations become objects of politics. The guards are certainly contributing to the management of bodies. The metabolism of the city includes the “human infrastructure” (Simone 2008). The biopolitical work in which the guards are inserted decentralizes a process of exclusion that dehumanizes a part of the population on a scale that Aiwā Ong has—in the context of south-east Asia—called “graduated sovereignty” (Ong 2005).

I mentioned above that Foucault had left rather suddenly his analysis of the “war-repression model”, to turn to the question of racism. It is precisely because “under the law, war keeps raging through every mechanism of power”<sup>174</sup> (Foucault [1976] 1997, 43), that a division of society into internal races is predicated. Foucault thus moves from an analysis of the war model of social domination to a model that permits us to think about the transformation of the population itself through politics that takes racial “improvements” as their object. It is thus unsurprising, if we understand the role of security guards as parttaking in a biopolitical approach, to read in the advertisement published by a security company found on the Internet: “Security is a prime need in today's time and we are happy that we are serving human race via our stout security guards” (Advertisement 2013).

I do not propose to understand this development as a rift between races within the society of Delhi, yet it gives a possible explanation as to how security guards foster rifts within the cityscape. Those concrete and iron build-ups are, as I pointed above, the

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174 “Sous la loi, la guerre continue à faire rage à l’intérieure de tous les mécanismes de pouvoir”.

materialization of class relations which, as Fernandes (2006) has pointed out, are taking the shape of relations between castes.

The notion of biopolitics however permits us to think further about how those relations give way to differentiated citizenships and to the removal of the stigma of poverty from the common space of the middle and upper-class. Two Italian philosophers have pushed forward the concept of biopolitical and established stimulating propositions. I expose them and show their limits as well as how they can help thinking through the legitimate violence exerted by security guards on the city.

I sketch briefly the theory developed by Agamben. In *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Giorgio Agamben (1998) borrows from Schmitt his definition of sovereignty as “he who decides of the exception” ([1922] 1985). Agamben finds in geographical origins of the legal order that Schmitt describes in the *Nomos of the Earth* ([1950] 2001) a principle that contradicts the organization that is created. The decision that presides through the *nomos* – the sovereign act that institutes in one moment the legal and the spatial order is a sovereign act, and the sovereign himself remains ambiguously between and beyond those orders. For Agamben this “dislocating” principle finds its expression in the concentration camp, a space that is excluded from the normal rule of law, an “absolute space of exception” (20).

Agamben famously finds a distinction between *Bios* and *Zoe*. Slightly twisting Greek etymology, he calls *bios* the historical-biological man and *zoe* the bare life reduced to its metabolic processes. In the camp, men are stripped of their *bios*, while the bare life

is worthless. For Agamben the *Homo Sacer* is, after the Roman tradition, the life that “*may be killed but not sacrificed*”<sup>175</sup> (101). For a life to be sacrificed it must have a value. The one who terminates the life of a *Homo Sacer*, a living dead man (131), is not breaking the law. The camp in which bare life is left stripped of rights and left to die is the paradigm of modernity for Agamben because it is the pendant of sovereignty. The spaces of exception, of which the camp is only the paradigmatic incarnation, are progressively extended. Other spaces of exceptions are, among an infinite declension, airports and transit zones. The capitalist-democratic project, through its biopolitics, inscribes in and through bodies the domination over life.

Agamben draws as conclusion that:

“Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biological paradigm of the West. [...] This throws a sinister light on the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban studies, and architecture today are trying to conceive and organize the public space of the world’s cities without any clear awareness that at their very center lies the same bare life (even if it has been transformed and rendered apparently more human) that defined the biopolitics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century.” (181-2).

Theorized with these insights, security guards reproduce a space of exception that is not concentrated—if I may—in the camp, but spread through vast sketches of the city in which the political order is inscribed on and through bodies. The security guards are not only guarding this order but also bearing the marks of this biopolitics. The public space is not simply contested by guards, gates and cameras. Rather, it crumbles from the

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175 Emphasis in text.



inside as it becomes an outside-in space of exception from which life that does not belong, that is “matter out of place” (Douglas 1966, 35) is removed. The sovereignty that Agamben mentions is not centralized and vertical but decentralized and fragmented.

This exclusively negative approach to the notion of biopolitics tends to mask its effect. In an attempt to rescue the concept from the paradigm of its deployment in national-socialism, Roberto Esposito (2008) re-frames biopolitics in terms of what it can permit. I turn now to a quick description of his work. If for Agamben, Nazism was the apex of biopolitics, for Esposito it is an autoimmune disease within a world of biopolitics, because it directed against the body-politic the strength normally allocated to its protection. The biopolitical principles follow logically from the understanding of groups as population: the protection of individuals passes through the protection of the community, just like the constitution of a body-politic for Hobbes was a necessity for the safety of its part. As I pointed out in the introduction, for Esposito the *munus* is what circulates, it is the gift that one must pass on or return. Immunity is the possibility of keeping a gift, the possibility for possession. Be it for gift or for diseases, the immunity of the individual is the possibility of a barrier between the self and others, a condition for liberty. “If *immunitas* is not even thinkable outside of the common *munus*, that also negates it, perhaps biopolitics, which until now has been folded tightly into it, can also turn its negative sign into a different, positive one” (12). Immunity is not only the condition of possibility for the emergence of an individual life, it is also the condition of possibility for the emergence of a sharing community.

In a nutshell, the body-politic as a whole needs to protect itself, immunize itself against threats: this is biopolitics. As with vaccination, it is the group immunity that protects the individual, focusing on the health of the group as a whole permits putting some epidemics to an end. Biopolitics is thus, to summarize, the ensemble of policies that aims at treating, protecting and serving communities. In this view security guards serve as the immunity principle that permits community to rise and flourish, and an urban life that was threatened by circulation of traffic through propertied neighborhood to blossom. The traffic control conducted by Daanish Mishra and his colleague<sup>176</sup> fluidifies the city for their employers, who are not forced to be a part of traffic jams when they leave their home.

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176 Daanish Mishra, Interview, 3rd May 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi

*Box 11: A Tale of Two Cities*

In 1995, Dillip, who had come to Delhi to attend the festivities of Republic Day died in the custody of the police. He was beaten up and forced to run and squat until his death occurred. He had passed the breached wall that separate the posh colony of Ashok Vihar from a nearby *jhuggi* colony and, like other residents, had used the park as a latrine, the *jhuggi* being deprived of a sufficient number of amenities. The event, which occurred at the beginning of the rise of RWA exclusionary politics, were the object in 1996 of a People's Union for Democratic Rights fact finding mission bearing the title "A tale of two cities" (PUDR 1996).

The RWA of Ashok Vihar, an upper-class neighborhood in north West Delhi, had argued that the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) had built a park for their use. They obtained from the court the permission to build and guard a wall to bar residents from a local slum from accessing the public amenities of their neighborhood, including a school, a hospital and a ration-shop. The residents of Ashok Vihar demanded police protection so that they can share a park among themselves, as a community. The nearby slum, deprived of public amenities and sufficient toilets, were using the park of Ashok Vihar. Dillip, who was not a resident of Delhi, did not know about the tensions that existed between the residents of Ashok Vihar and those of the *jhuggi* colony.

When the police attempted to remove the corpse of Dillip, a mob formed, demanding that a higher police authority come to observe the wrongful death of Dillip under torture. When the mob grew in number, the police opened fire, killing 3 people, including a woman inside her home. 123 people were arrested and 17 people were taken to the public Hindu Rao Hospital, while the injured policemen were treated in the private hospital of Ashok Vihar. The police later claimed that the residents of the *jhuggi* colony had displayed intentions to loot Ashok Vihar, a claim that was not sustained.

The biopolitics of community making in Delhi which the guard are making possible permits the transformation of Delhi into the “post-development formation” it has become. In the terms of Gidwani and Reddy:

“Present-day urban India, we contend, is emerging as a post-development social formation. How so? Because as the paradigmatic form of biopolitical power, development has always presupposed a nominal ethical engagement with the subjects whose lives and conducts it seeks to manage and cultivate. This is no longer a tenable assumption. Today, neither the apparatuses of the state nor an increasingly anti-poor urban bourgeoisie seek an ethical engagement” (Gidwani and Reddy 2011, 1640).

The labor of security guards, in essence, permits this absence of ethical engagement to be as seamless and fluid as possible. The events reported in Box 11 , p.231 exemplify this situation.

## **6 - Conclusion**

This chapter has followed a long and admittedly rather sinuous arc. I started by interrogating the work of Weber ([1919] 1994) on the “monopoly of legitimate physical violence”. I pointed out that this understanding of the state tends to foster the idea of the state as a Hobbesian body-politic, whereas the policies of the state should be understood as plural and possibly contradictory. As a case in point, I have given detailed explanation of the regulations and laws on the skill training environment for guards.

The contradiction between understanding guards as a law and order matter, or as a question of management of a neutral manpower is not resolved, but it has become moot. The hiatus fosters the idea among the upper and middle-classes that the state is not

capable of a unified strategy, and *in fine* serves a “representation of space” (Lefebvre [1974] 2000) that corresponds, in the privileged areas, to an ideal model of upper-class communities. I pointed out that the crux of the matter to understand the regulation of the streets in Delhi might not revolve around the state, but around a class appropriation of public streets. Reading Foucault, I show the interest of reading the appropriation of Delhi through a war-repression model. I follow his turn toward more recent theorizations, which permits us to understand upper-class Delhi’s ecology through the prism of biopolitics. I show how this biopolitics is a condition to understand the “post-development” mode of engagement of upper-class with the city in which they live.

In this chapter I have explained what I mean by the notion of “fluctuating regulations” and showed why this notion is necessary to make sense of the work of guards while the laws and regulations published by the governments are not only contradictory, but also largely disregarded. The “visible grid” that the guards are tasked with keeping is not that of formal versus informal, but the space of representation of a class of citizen that sees its city as “primary community of belonging” (Bhan 2016, 182).

The labor of security guards enables the “guarded class” to enjoy a “lived space” (Lefebvre [1974] 2000) that frees them from dealing materially with a messy outside that is constituted as such at the moment of the establishment of the gate. Security guards permit the “representation of space” as that of a community that needs the protection of guards as well as that of public forces (Bhan 2016).

Two questions remain to be explored. Firstly, what are the conditions of possibility of emergence of such an exclusive approach to the city? Second, what is the kind of space that social relations of productions revolving around exclusion are producing? In the next and last chapter, I show how labor time and real-estatization of the city give the key to the production of Delhi as a post-development, post-public city space. In fact the conditions of possibility of emergence of developmental space and that of public space are the same: that of an “ethical engagement” with the city that the guards are tasked with keeping at bay.

## IV - LABOR TIME, CITY WORK

### 1 - Introduction: plastic seats

The work of Delhi's security guards involves fatigue, exhaustion, muscle pain, and constant exposure to dust and pollution. It is quite a lot to bear for the thousands of men sitting "on plastic seats [...] watching the economic miracle pass them by" (*The Economist* 2013). What is the deal with time? What is it the guards are doing within the capitalist process that is "producing the space" (Lefebvre [1974] 2000) of Delhi? To get there I must proceed step by step. First, I need to shed some light on this comment by *The Economist*, and situate it ideologically.

According to *The Economist*, India could become the next economic giant if only it could prepare its numerous workforce through skilling and absorb them into the economy in meaningful, economically productive jobs such as factory work. This would permit India, after China, to exploit its "demographic dividend"<sup>177</sup>. Yet "let down of unskilled labour [by] the country's education system" (argues *The Economist*) and "arcane labour laws" and work floor relations are stopping the country from realizing its potential.

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177 "Demographic dividend" is a concept that designates the benefit that a demographic transition can have on a country's economy. In simple words, India has a large and young manpower available thanks to its dynamic demography. According to this theory labor productivity peaks when the maximum part of the population is healthy working young adults. Before that, the cost of over-numerous children slows down economic takeoff. Afterwards the weight of older generations drags the economy toward saving rather than investing. According to this way of looking at things, Europe and Japan are now bogged down in their economic progress by the proportion of retired and less productive people. China and Korea will soon follow in this direction. African countries have not yet accomplished their demographic transitions and should benefit from their "demographic dividend" in the coming decades.

The “economic miracle” passes by security guards because they belong to this large, under educated pool of manpower that is not provided with formal jobs or with the economic conditions necessary for their “success”, in terms measurable by *The Economist*. The magazine has the candor of a perfectly assumed intellectual economic-liberal positioning.

There is another way to look at the guards and at their role in the making of the city. The guards are employed to fulfill a demand for class exclusivity and security. The use of their labor time is not wasted for everyone. The crux of the issue is to examine the role of guards in the production of the urban space of Delhi. In this chapter I deploy the categories of political economy to situate that role precisely, highlighting the role the guards play in the city as well as in its transformations. For Henri Lefebvre ([1974] 2000, 43), as I pointed out in the introduction (see p 2), the production of space under a capitalist mode of production results from the dynamics of a “trialectic” between “spatial practice, representations of space, and space of representation”.

In preceding chapters, I have touched upon the ways in which the work of security guards is enmeshed with each pole of this “trialectic”. The spatial practices of the city are traversed, helped or hindered by security guardianship and its differential impact on senses and mobility. I have pointed out that the representations of space—from the various agencies tasked with imagining the spatial organization of the city—implies the presence of guards as both manpower to utilize and as auxiliary to law and order. The space of representation is, to simplify, the space in which inhabitants and state display



themselves, in which the streets and squares of the city become the public space. The state represents itself and its history in monuments, and people appropriate to themselves, for enjoyment or for protests, an ever contested public grounds. I have shown above that the notion of public space should not be taken uncritically in the case of Delhi. By making impossible the presence of the poor in some streets of the city they put in jeopardy the idea of public space in favor of the inscription in the physical space of the city of deeply entrenched inequalities.

What remains to be established is how the security guards' role is embedded in the production of that fragmented space itself, that is, in nothing less than the expression on the city of the development of a capitalist mode of production which fosters inequalities.

I made clear that I approach this matter through the labor of the guards, in this chapter I set the emphasis on its place in the production of value and seek to sketch a theory of guardianship. The place of security guard is at the junction between rich and poor, that is the core of their role as interface workers. Again security guards are poor working among and for the rich, at the border between the production and reproduction of capital. As such their presence seems to delineate the areas invested by capital and those which are not.

In this chapter I develop my argument in the following way. First, recent literature has explored the links between finance capital and the development of residential enclaves in post-liberalization India. I briefly explain the meaning and

significance of post-liberalization in Delhi. A review of the relevant literature indicates that real estate capital, driven, among others, by Non-Resident Indian (NRI) investments, tend to develop gated residences and “world-class living” (Brosius 2010, 72). As I narrate above (see Box 4, p.66), it is in such an area, namely Manesar, Haryana, that I conducted participant observation among training guards. The pattern of exclusion organized around Resident Welfare Associations and contracted security companies emerged simultaneously with that particular model of urban development at the turn of the 90’s. The concomitance between the sharp rise in inequalities that followed liberalization, and the increasingly exclusionary residential claims of upper and middle-class (Fernandes 2006; Baviskar and Ray 2011) (see also Box 5 p.92) are articulated and materialized by the labor of security guards.

Second, I argue that in this form of capitalism, the labor time of security guard takes a particular hue. The role of security guard in the chain of value is to maintain and enhance the value of real estate. In a context in which an important part of value creation is indexed on the return of speculative investments, guards are tasked with the crucial task of maintaining the value of real estate. In the realm of value circulation, of persons, and of vehicles, guards maintain an order that keeps the system flowing. I draw from Karl Marx and Moishe Postone to show how the social labor of security guards curiously reflects abstract labor in that it organizes the domination of men in and by capital. This particular relationship between security guardianship and capitalism does not stop at this point and I explore further its role in organizing the domination of a class over the city in different domains, such as class and gender relations.

Third, the presence of security guards espouses the contour of the “urban process under capitalism” (Harvey 1978). By exploring its possible role in labor I propose two ways of understanding how it contributes to the staging the crisis generated by the capitalist mode of production. Security guards are enablers of a system that runs on inequalities and their number is a consequence of its success. Security guards espouse the growth of inequalities so well because they play a role in keeping at bay the crisis that are generated by this system. In the last part of this chapter I elaborate a theory of crisis and show that the guards, as interface workers, mediate the violence generated by inequalities, and that the massive employment of guards absorbs a part of what Marx named “surplus population” ([1867] 1976, 781). The *dispositifs* put in place by the authorities to frame the industry can only be explained within a context in which security guardianship is and remain a massive employer of unskilled labor power<sup>178</sup>. Armed with this theory of security guardianship I show the impact it has on the production of space and on the project of the “Right to the City” (Lefebvre [1968] 2009). The right to the city might not be compatible with the extension of guardianship.

## **2 - From economic liberalization to urban enclaves**

In 1991, the government of Pamulaparti Venkata Narasimha Rao, with Manmohan Singh at the Finance Ministry, initiated a widespread liberalization of the Indian economy. This set of reforms took place in a longer economic history (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004) and under the pressure of a severe crisis in the country’s balance of

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<sup>178</sup> To make it clear, “unskilled” here does not mean that individual security guards have no skill or talents, simply that it does not matter to their employers.

payment (Ahmed 2014). It is widely considered to be a turning point that favored private developments and a greater rate of growth at the expense of workers' protection and of socio-economic equality (Topalova 2005; Raghbendra 2004; U. Kumar and Mishra 2008).

It is not the place here to mention in detail the ongoing effects of liberalization, nor the large bodies of works that have been conducted on this theme. My own argument at this stage remains simple: liberalization of the Indian economy has fostered aggressive class affirmation of the upper and middle-classes at the expense of the poor on the one hand. And, on the other hand, it has made available a large manpower in cities. Security guards enable the seclusion of the rich while they are themselves struggling to live in harsh economic conditions.

In the decades that followed liberalization, the Government of India set up tools that permitted international finance to enter the real estate sector. In 2005 the Government of India removed the restrictions on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and permitted the creating of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) across the country (Levien 2011). The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) fostered private investments in large scale infrastructures and led the states to repealed the Urban Land Control Regulation Act (ULCRA), a piece of legislation that protected urban land from speculation and appropriation by the few at the expense of the many. The repeal was effective across the country in 2007 (Banerjee-Guha 2015).

The literature on the urban transformations that followed in Indian metropolises in general and in Delhi in particular is abundant. In addition to the sets of literature I have developed in introduction, in this chapter I take particular cues from the following. In “Secured residential enclaves in the Delhi region”, Véronique Dupont (2016) points out, after Aurélie Varrel (2012), at the importance of Non-Resident Indians (NRI) investment capital and models in the making of residential enclaves. Hortense Rouanet and Ludovic Halbert in “Leveraging Financial Capital” (2016), show that “globally connected but locally embedded real estate developers contribute to anchoring transnational investment” (1401). For Llerena Guiu Searle (2010, 1), “real estate industry members use representations of a prosperous globally integrated Indian future to fuel the expansion of global finance capital into Indian real estate”. The link between liberalization, desire for developers’ imagined space and financial capital is well described in Constantine V Nakassis and Llerena Guiu Searle (2013):

“Finally, the concrete walls and metal gates (along with security guards) that Searle’s real estate developers construct help to materially substantiate the social exclusion and prestige of such developments and to create the kind of enclaves that have come to be emblematic of neoliberal urbanity and elite social standing more generally. (179)”

The “production of space” under the rule of financial capital forgets the urban poor. Yet it employs the labor of security guards, among other “interface workers”, the set of workers tasked with lubricating the frontier between rich and poor. Security guards are both “making the city” and “surviving in it”. The position of guards is right there, at the diremption between city making and life making.

I have pointed out that capital has been immobilized in the walls of Dwarka from the inception of the projects. Security guards deployed in the speculative fringes of the city make sure that the space vacated by farmers is not squatted. The buildings and cities that will be built there will be guarded enclaves. Security and capital come together. Saket is adapting its layout to the desires of the upper-classes, security there is a late comer because it was built when the city was experiencing a different form of capitalism—and of security.

The guards distinguish desirable and non-desirable neighborhoods. They upkeep the value of neighborhood. The aesthetic (Ghertner 2011), desirable value of the neighborhood and its speculative value are mediated by labor, that also manages the class “distinction” (Bourdieu [1979] 2007) between those who can go in, and those who cannot.

Models of real estate capital, indigenous and transnational (Dupont 2016) are made to circulate. Non-Resident Indian (NRI) investments (Varrel 2012) and the production of “globally familiar elite landscapes” (Searle 2014, 61) influence the “representation of space” that developers and private investors realize in the city. “Citational practices put into circulation a symbolic language of globally significant urban style that has traveled beyond Asia” (Ong 2011, 18). This “world-class” (Dupont 2011) space evacuates ethical engagement with local and takes the shape of archipelagic new cities and fortifying neighborhoods. I have described above how Saket and Dwarka are evolving in that paradigm. This changing form of the city, propelled by liberalization,

is concomitant with the arrival of international and domestic security companies in Delhi. For instance, the international leader and largest private security company, G4S, came to India in 1989 (“G4S | History” n.d.). Pound Security Room, the company launched by L.S Bhatia, was first registered in 1988.<sup>179</sup> As I pointed out in the introduction, some informants<sup>180</sup> situate the arrival of security guards in Delhi with the first ATM. The *New York Times* notes the emergence of security companies in Delhi in 1988 when 80 companies reportedly employed 50,000 guards (Hazarika 1988).

Security guards are playing an indirect but visible role. They separate the land appropriated by capital from that of the “need economy” (Sanyal 2007). Capital is invested into speculative real estate while laborers do not find employment or stagnate in jobs that do not permit them to escape poverty (Schindler 2015b, 2017). Security guards occupy a paradoxical position in which their role is to maintain this order: Guards maintain the value of real estate by keeping at bay the poor that would disrupt it. They trace into the city the difference between the realm of the desirable and that of the rabble.

For instance, Michael Goldman (2015) “highlights how Bangalore’s public spaces are being converted into speculative real estate and how this troubles conditions for many urban laborers” (153). He points out that, as finance overpasses commerce and production in accumulation (Arrighi 2010), the place of finance in state and private investment is ever increasing:

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179 K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi. English.

180 Priyanka Andrew and Shweta Bhatnagar, Security Watch India, Interview, 15th November 2016, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, English.

“The very same finance-led forces that are restructuring the economy into a low-employment, highly liquid investment platform create the “surplus” population forced onto the commons, joining those people who have been maintaining these sites over the long term, contributing to the city economy in a multitude of ways.” (Goldman 2015, 153)

In urban spaces such as in Bangalore or Delhi, “speculative urbanism” (Goldman 2011) contributes to the eviction of the poor from urban fringes, slums, places of work and what Michael Goldman identifies as “urban commons”. What is encompassed by the idea of common is not very clear, but the gist remains that the result of the real-estatization is a city that is becoming increasingly inadequate to the poorer sections of its inhabitants.

I recap: liberalization of the Indian economy opened cities for speculative investments. Those investments have fostered inequalities and those inequalities are manifested by symbolically—and at times physically—violent class relations and materialized by gates and guards. The urban middle-class “[under the sway] of the logic of accumulation” (Chatterjee 2011, 224) inhabits the space of accumulation economy and breaks relations with the inhabitants of the need-economy who work, sometimes for them. Thus guards may work for the accumulation economy yet dwell and reproduce their labor power among the need economy. The guards here are purveyor of a spatial order that preserve the value of real estate and maintain the unequal ordering of the city. I now turn to a theorization of their labor.



### **3 - Labor time**

On the matter of the progress brought by capitalism, Karl Marx ([1867] 1976) quotes the kind words that Heinrich Friedrich von Storch does not have for the lot of security guards:

“‘The progress of social wealth,’ says Storch, ‘begets this useful class of society ... which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions, which, in a word, takes on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life, and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional’ (c’est bon, ça) [sic] ‘dignity of character.’ Storch then asks himself what the actual advantage is of this capitalist civilization, with its misery and its degradation of the masses, as compared with barbarism. He can find only one answer: security!” (801).

The “progress of social wealth” demands security and obtains it from the lower classes that it generates in its wake and which always threaten to turn against it. To reformulate the ideas of Storch with the vocabulary of Hegel, the security guards are the bondsman mediating between the world and the master.

The labor of security guards has a peculiar property, that of time spent with no other mean of production but the body of the guard itself and no skill. In the next sections I locate the place of security guards in the circulation and in the fabric of capital.

#### 3.1 - Security in capital circulation

The labor of security guards thus appears—as per Storch—to be outside the classical circulation of labor and commodity, as if it were the fruit of capital and not a

means to it. Is there a particularity in the work of security guards that makes it stand out from the normal extraction and distribution of surplus value? This question needs a little unpacking.

What do guards produce that justifies their salary? In other words, where in “M – C – M’” are the guards sitting? In the neighborhood, the guards render a service: they keep up the value of real estate, they make and keep a place desirable to live in for the people employing them, they provide a sense of security for the people who employ them. The guards mark up the neighborhood as upper or middle-class, and therefore contribute to its social recognition, to their exclusive aesthetic. More than this, they protect, through symbolic and physical violence, the distribution of surplus value. Here by keeping the value of a place does not mean that they are paid from the value generated by real estate but to protect how surplus is distributed. I propose M – C (LT-MP) – Guards – M’, in which M’ is only realized in time. Here LT is Labor Time and MP is Mean of Production.

*Box 12: A brief explanation of the notion of surplus value and  $M - C - M'$ .*

In the first three chapters of the *Capital* ([1867] 1976), Marx shows the difference between use value and exchange value. Use value is, in brief, the interest of an object (the use of a pot is to make soup). The exchange value is the equivalence necessary for its exchange, be as barter (five pots for one coat) or against money, the universal equivalent (one pot for 10€). He also shows that the growth of value can neither come from simple, honest commerce (because it would be a null sum) nor from labor if labor were paid the price of its production (if one gets one coat, or five pots, in exchange of five pots, there would be no accumulation). Thus configuration would be expressed by the circulation: Money – Capital – Money. The formula of capital  $M - C - M'$  remains a mystery as one cannot explain the difference between  $M$  and  $M'$  without a commodity that would have the curious property of multiplying value. Only a peculiar commodity can do that: labor.

Marx demonstrates, in the fourth chapter of *Capital*, that the basic rule of capitalist accumulation rests in the exploitation of labor. That is, the laborer, which is doubly free in the sense that “he disposes of his labor power as his own commodity”, and is “free from all the objects needed for the realization of his labor power” (272) comes to the market to barter his labor power for money. Simply formulated, the labor power’s exchange value is paid for less than what its use value produces. In the conditions of de-skilling of labor that presided over the growth of capitalism, the formula of capital is thus simply:  $M - C - M'$ , in which the commodity  $C$  is composed of labor and means of production.

I take two examples. 1- Without the guards deployed in the fields in the plains of Haryana, the places might be squatted or built upon. One can speculate that dislodging the encroacher would cost to the developer more than what the expense of setting

watchmen represents. 2- In Saket the guards ensure that poverty remains out of sight. The situation is a little different in the mall where consumption and not real estate might be considered to remain at the center of value creation yet exclusivity and elite-belongingness of space remains a factor that drives prices up and guards ensure the safety of persons and belonging in the mall. In the residential neighborhood the guards' output is invisible because they manage and organize an absence, that of the visible traces of misery.

Security guards contribute to making the “spatial practice” (lived space) of the city different between classes. Their role in the production of space cannot be separated from their role in the preservation and distribution of the fruits of “the progress of social wealth” (Marx [1867] 1976, 801) – that is, surplus value.

In their role in the production of space the guards do not extract primary material, they do not use tools or skills. The “means of production” is reduced to its simplest expression: the presence of the laboring body of the guard. I pointed out in the previous chapter that the training some guards receive does not increase the efficiency of the guards. Simply put, the work of security guard is unskilled to the extent that the mean time to complete a task is equal to the time of work.

This does not mean that guards limits the circuits of labor to theirs and those of their employers. Quite the contrary guards hinder or enable the presence of the various other service providers of the city. The labor of domestic workers, as I quote above p.173, is hindered yet made possible by guards as they filter the entries of the neighborhoods.

The role they play in the biopolitics of the city (See chapter III, 5.2 p.225) is also permitting this labor to take place in the first place, by insuring to the upper-classes the safety of a filtration.

Let us point out that the capital that is invested into the security system from the beginning of some of the urban projects, in the form of fences, walls, and the place needed to construct them is not primary material either. The passive defenses that are walls and gates are investments by landowner, RWA or realtor. The form of the city however, responds to the demand for surveillance as the form adapts and grows. Capital is immobilized in the landscape of the post-public space production of the city (see II. 2.2. Spatial ethnography of security guards p.124.)

From the point of view of security companies, the investment for guards is minimal. The product is the work itself. Obtaining a license for PSARA, in 2018, costs 25000 INR for the entire National Capital Territory, and 5000 INR<sup>181</sup> for operations in only one district (“PSARA Delhi Home Page” n.d.). As I indicated above, most of the companies pay the guards for 8 hours of work, as neighborhood’s associations have paid for, while guards actually stay for 12 hours, and they are required to cover the cost of their own uniforms.

I quote at length the infuriated words of Vinod Chaubey, who owns a training company that has not received a trainee in years. He explained the extraction of surplus

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181 416 USD and 83 USD respectively.

value and the disregard for this situation in a single, long response to my questions. I decided to keep and reproduce it in its entirety.

“Security guards as I said, they are all untrained and they get the same salary whether they are trained or untrained. And [in terms of] number of security guards the requirements of the city is very high. So if a person is removed from there and leaves the job he can have the similar job in some other agency. So employment is not a problem. Majority of them do not get even minimum wages. Government has minimum wages which is not sufficient but still in this very high prices for everything, survival is difficult, but still, they are all getting much less than minimum wages. There is no enforcement of minimum wages. The worst part, these people [the guards] are good for nothing. These people are good for nothing, am repeating, these people are just good for nothing. They are just like putting a uniform on a bamboo. A rickshaw-wala, they put uniform. Even in the government sectors where these are employed, there are lot of bumbling in the security services. So the government also does not pay, government also does not pay minimum wages. Government also does not pay minimum wages as per the law which they are supposed themselves to obey and enforce. So what happens, how the security agencies are then working? They are working because, instead of 500 suppose in some institution 500 security guards are deployed. Practically there are not more than 300. Rest 200 are ghost employees. If you are in Delhi, you must have heard of ghost employees in corporations and all that. Ghost, that do not exist and the government department officers and the security agencies they share that amount. It is a very pathetic situation as far as private security is concerned. Then these people, the employers, they say government also does not give, and then private also does not want to give minimum wages. So these people overwork. Wherever they

say minimum wages is given they give for 8 hours. 8 hours minimum wages are given, but they have to work for 12 hours. In the same wages. Private... the employers, they do not give wages and everybody ask for tenders. And then they go for the L1<sup>182</sup>. L1 is the lowest tender, lowest quotations. And in the lowest quotations if you see a tender... there are many heads under which the claim is filed... this is the minimum wages, these much is the Provident Fund from the employer, this much is the pension, this much is ESI, Employee State Insurance company... I charge per the minimum wages, I charge for ESI, then I charge for EPF (Employee Provident Fund) and thereafter, I don't charge for anything, and that's all, they don't want to give... and thereafter I charge my service charges... You will be surprised to know people file tender without any service charge. And the people who are awarded the contract they go by the L1. If you have to really provide for a proper security service you have to... minimum 15% extra, manpower one has to recruit, 10 to 15% manpower you have to recruit because then they go on leave or they run away, or they become absent because of medical other needs [...] the agency has to provide a substitute. So you have to recruit 10 to 15% extra. Then the uniform. Then their training. Everything has to... then I have to if I run a security agency I have to manage my office, I have to provide for a supervisor, I have to have two vehicles, field officers? How do I pay for them? How do I pay? And I need a business to make profit. But if I have to do all this from my pocket I can't do that. So what do I do? I take away your salary, I create ghost security guards, I create all kinds of facades to see that I get the contract by quoting the minimum at the same time. I do all kind of cheating. I have 3<sup>rd</sup> class, 3<sup>rd</sup> rated security guards whom I pay 6000 rupees only, instead of 12000 or

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182 When governments (Delhi or Center) need private security to secure, say, a historical monument it puts out a public tender. Level 1 is the first level, the lowest bidder, regardless of quality or respect of labor laws.

8000. I make them work for 24 hours or 18 hours, and their wretched security guard is also happy with that, he will not like to get himself trained, he would not like to do the proper job, he will not like to have a police verification... so both are ... it is a fodder that is being used by the security agencies. These are all bogus industries. Entire industry is bogus.”<sup>183</sup>

The surplus value here is extracted by subtracting the cost of the minimum reproduction of labor power from the cost of labor, including wages, taxes and overhead costs. The disregard for the salaries of security guards frustrates Mr Chaubey, yet he holds the guards partly responsible for this. His contempt of the workers exemplifies well the kind of responses I have obtained from other security companies, employees, and their heads.

The guards however, explain their wage situation in a similar way. Rajeev Kumar, who works for AllDay-Safe in the Mall, describes it in those terms:

“In the security sector there is such exploitation. Many such private company have opened. Who are making profit from desperation. They exploit by paying 10000 INR for 12 hours of work. Some give 7000 INR. There are these kinds of companies in Delhi. Some get 6-7000 for 12 hours of work, and that not even the first month, but the following one.”<sup>184</sup>

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183 Vinod Chaubey, Training Institute, Interview, 21st February 2017, Delhi, English.

184 Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.

Security में ऐसा भी अत्याचार है। कितने company ऐसे private खोल के बैठे हुए हैं। जो मज़बूरी का फायदा उठा रहे है। और मज़बूरी का फायदा कया 12 घंटा काम काराने और 10000 salary दे रहे हैं। 12 काम कारा है 7000 र देते हैं। ऐसे भी company हैं ऐसे भी company है दिल्ली करता है। उनके पास ज़यादा है नहीं। वह भी 12 गंठा काम कार राहा है 6-7000 उनको payment मीला वह भी इस महीने के अगले महिने में। एक महीने बात उनके payment हो गई है।



Concrete labor, that is, the actual work that individuals employed in the capitalist system are performing (the use value of labor), and abstract labor, that is the social labor time (its exchange value) might, in this particular case, reflect each other quite curiously for two reasons.

Firstly, because the complete unskilling of labor—and the visual appearance of the uniform—makes it possible to exchange places with other workers, as the case was incidentally reported to me by the Human Resource head of a rather small company. He narrated that he had surprised an individual in Meerut, who was holding several employments as security guard, and renting his badge out for the day to other men. The scheme was probably meant to permit men to work for only one day when necessary, while he would be collecting the weekly wages and keep a proportion of it<sup>185</sup>. I could not find such case or witness of such cases in Delhi, but the essence remains that the appearance of the uniform makes the individual irrelevant. The matter interestingly reflects Marx' comment :

“Men are effaced in front of labor; the pendulum of the clock has become the exact measure of the relative activity of two workers, like it is that of the speed of two locomotives. Therefore it should not be said that one man's hour is worth another man's hour, but that an hour's man is worth another hour's man. Time is everything, man nothing; he is at best the skeleton of time. Quality is no longer the matter. Quantity alone decides everything.” (Marx and Engels [1847] 1961, 25)<sup>186</sup>.

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185 Rishab Tiwari, CMBody, 8th December 2016, Delhi, English.

186 “Les hommes s'effacent devant le travail; que le balancier de la pendule est devenu la mesure exacte de l'activité relative de deux ouvriers, comme il l'est de la célérité de deux locomotives. Alors, il ne faut pas dire qu'une heure d'un homme vaut une heure d'un autre homme, mais plutôt qu'un homme d'une heure vaut un autre homme d'une heure. Le temps est tout, l'homme n'est plus rien; il est tout au plus la

Again, the notion of abstract labor permits us to think through labor-time independently of the particular quality and training of workers—not because abstract labor is a category of thought but through the time spent that it encapsulates. One point of clarification: The term “abstract” does not mean “theoretical”—that it is without effect. Quite the contrary, abstract labor is always imbricated with concrete labor, “the performance of a specific task by a specific worker”<sup>187</sup> since it is around this notion that an equivalence of labor in different industries can be apprehended. The state *dispositifs* framing labor time, such as minimum wages, ESI, and retirement pensions are centered on that notion.

Abstract labor is measured in the abstract time of capital. That is, the time of the clock, of the factory and the fatigue that comes with standing under its sway (Thompson 1967). This abstract labor is the one that permits the exchange of commodity – and thereby the extraction of surplus value. The quantification of time is what permits capital to give value to the products it transforms, it is also what permits speculation. Again, in the particular case of security guards the abstraction and theory are in contact: it is possible to consider the difference between abstract labor—empty time—and concrete labor—time spent—as quite theoretical.

The second reason for this curious reflection is linked with social organization. The concrete (social) labor of the guard is to maintain, through time, the social

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carcasse du temps. Il n'y est plus question de la qualité. La quantité seule décide de tout.”

This extract is famously cited in length in Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* ([1923] 1971, 89). However, the translation from French of Marx and Engels ([1847] 1961, 25) is mine.  
187 I am grateful to Vinay Gidwani for this clear formulation.

organization of the city. For Moishe Postone in *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, ([1993] 2006), “the *function*<sup>188</sup> of labor as a socially mediating activity is what [Marx] terms “abstract labor” (150). The production of surplus value, and that of value are made possible because labor mediates social relations under capitalism. In Vinay Gidwani’s terms:

“abstract labor comes alive only within the geographically expansive sociality of a “world market,” where the vast majority of social interactions take the form of market transactions that are mediated by commodities” (Gidwani 2018, 170).

Workers are ensnared within the net of necessary labor time while “the form wealth (value) *and* its measure (abstract time) are constituted in capitalism as “objective” social relations” (Postone [1993] 2006, 189). Later he writes : “Labor is not only the object of domination but the constituent source of domination in capitalism” (282). As I pointed out, abstract labor inserts security guards in the circuit of social, capitalist domination. Their concrete, social work is the reflection of abstract labor in the material space of the city. Not only for them, but also because their role is to keep the order of the city’s “trialectically” produced space for production, accumulation and for the “serenity of mind” (to quote Storch again) of the upper-classes.

For Moishe Postone again, concrete labor (the hand making a determinate product) produces value while abstract labor (structural determination) constitutes value ([1993] 2006, 144). Therefore guards are both producing and constituting a social order. In the quote that starts this section, Marx mocks Storch but does not contradict him.

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188 Emphasis in text.

Capitalism produces security. In fact, the two are inseparable from their inception: The curious reflection I have described finds its origin in this inseparability.

I recap. I have highlighted two-particularities of the work of security guards. The first, is that their work revolves around nothing but time. The second, is that the work that they do, the expenditure of their energy, is the expression of a production of space which is characterized by inequalities and “post-developmental” (see Chapter II) formation. Circulation of urban models and the investment of foreign as well as local capital is made realizable by the guards and their constant work on social order. The guards are not the only form of security in Delhi, as I pointed out, far from that. However, this is a case in point: public police cannot espouse the contours of an “urban process under capitalism” (Harvey 1978) that is more and more essentially fragmentary, privatized and exclusionary. In Box 13, p.257, I give heads out at another way to look at the old relationship between capitalism and security.

*Box 13: Locke, Capitalism, and Security*

Observation of the correspondence between capitalism and security predates Marx and Storch. In *Critique of Security*, Mark Neocleous (2008) points out that security and capitalism have historically been consubstantial. He explains that modern political thought has often opposed “the ‘absolutist’ Hobbes and the ‘liberal’ Locke” (13). Quite contrary to this explanation, “Locke might in fact be thought to inaugurate less a tradition of ‘liberty’ and much more a liberal discourse on the priority of security” (15).

The main criterion that justifies state and politics, for Locke, is the demand for security, as market and exchange are natural. The freedom of the market, and that of seizing land that Locke would perceive as “uncultivated” for market and expansion must be secured through the “prerogative” to do the “common good” outside of the rule of law. Locke thus poses “the key function of the state as the protection of property rights” (22).

“In other words, one should see the street powers granted to the police as an expression of the state’s contribution to class formation as well as class domination. The new forms of police operation coming into existence were fundamental to the imposition of the money wage as a means of making the working class, and thus need to be seen in the broader context of the role of police in the fabrication of a new, bourgeois, order.” (Neocleous 2000, 75–76)

Security does not come to the help of capitalism, it expresses it where it takes hold.

### 3.2 -           Reproduction of security: labor power

Let me pull a bit on the thread. A configuration of the production of space is possible thanks to a range of factors. The availability of security guards is one of them. Economic disruptions and wide-scale displacements of population within the country (Li 2010; Ashis Nandy 2007) have “freed” (Marx [1867] 1976, 272) thousands of people from their bind to the land or from their traditional occupation. The particular nature of the work of security guard entailed that I met mostly men. This masculine migration is also possible due to the patriarchal structure of their households of origin.

The economic condition of possibility is not enough and remains within the frame of purely economic considerations. I mention two other major factors, caste and gender. I have indicated above that a majority of the guards whom I met during my research were from upper-caste background. I also mentioned that I have not found a fully satisfying explanation for this fact. It remains nonetheless that the extension of the logic of caste discrimination within the realm of class difference weighs on the presence of guards as custodians of the class purity of the neighborhood.

The gender dynamics of the Delhi region are taking a full part in the particular, security-enabled “production of space” that is dominant in the cityscape of Delhi. Firstly, the bulk of security guards are migrant laborers whose families remain in their villages. Sending males as workers to the city implies a reconfiguration of work for the left behind families (Desai and Banerji 2008). Sometimes the family follows. The case of Pearl is different<sup>189</sup>.

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189 Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

Pearl works in the entry of the mall, she verifies ladies' bags. I did not see a woman working in what I have described as the first level of security companies. Her husband held a position in Mumbai<sup>190</sup> as a guard in a major international security group. He was coming home irregularly in Jharkhand, reportedly drank his wages away and exerted violence on his wife.

“Family back in the village started troubling me a lot, when I called up my husband in Bombay he said if they are beating you, you take it, if they are rushing you out then leave, he was also not with me, he did not support me... but being the elder of the house I have to think about everything and move forward, when the husband becomes idiotic the wife must remain wise.”<sup>191</sup>

An illness of her daughter justified going to the All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS). She left the village and settled in Delhi with her husband.

“My husband used to do overtime, so I used to go to deliver his food... at that time in the morning I used to notice that a lot of women leave for work, so I used to think that I can also do it. Then I found a job in a hospital, 7 months I worked in nursing... then I fell ill and lost my job. I used to think that 7-8 hours standing job demanded for security won't be possible for me. Then my husband's boss, the manager, my husband told me to talk to him... The supervisor told me okay you can come and do a cleaning job here, so to that I told him that I am from a high caste, a

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190 Previously Bombay.

191 Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

"परिवार वाले ज़्यादा परेशां करने लगे, पति को बॉम्बे में फ़ोन किया तोह बोले, मारता है तो मार खाओ, भागता है तोह भाग जाओ, यह भी मेरे साथ बद्तमीज़ी बहुत किये.. लेकिन हम बड़े हैं घरके हमको सबकुछ सोच के चलना पड़ता है, अगर पति नालायक हो जाए तोह पत्नी को होशियार रहना चाहिए।"

pundit, I will not clean toilet-bathrooms... I clean in my house but someone else's... I couldn't...

Then he offered and said okay then you can do security job, both husband-wife will work in one place, it will be good. But I also thought I am a girl from the village, wearing a shirt pant will be awkward for me.”<sup>192</sup>

Pearl had to face resistance in the village and in her own family. Her husband lamented that “your parents will say that you have married our daughter to make her come to the city and work”. For Pearl, working in All-DaySafe proved emancipatory.

Her husband had kidney stones, an ailment she attributed to his drinking habits and when I met her, he was in the process of leaving his job in the large private security company to open a small shop in the slum in which they live. Meeting her was difficult and her husband did not appear enthused by our presence, possibly because we were interviewing his wife about her work.

From the beginning of fieldwork I have interviewed guards on the work of their wives. All 27 male guards I have formally interviewed and with whom I have covered the full questionnaires, except one, have invariably responded that, at home in the village, and in few cases in Delhi, their wives did not work. I give an example below.

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<sup>192</sup> Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.

मेरे पति ओवरटाइम करते थे, तोह मैं इनको कहना देने जाती थी... तोह सुबह सुबह देखती थी हमसे खराब खराब लेडीज, बुरी हालत में नौकरी पे जा रही है... तोह सोचती थी की मैं भी कर सकती हूँ। तब जाकर हमने हॉस्पिटल में नौकरी किया, ७ महीना काम किया नर्सिंग में... सोचते थे ७-८ घंटे खड़े होक सिक्योरिटी में काम थोड़ी न होगा हमसे... तोह नर्सिंग में किया... फिर मैं बीमार पड गयी तोह नौकरी छूट गया...

फिर इनके (हस्बैंड) जो सिक्योरिटी गार्ड के हेड थे, मैनेजर थे, मेरे पति बोले इनसे बात करो यह ले लेगा, तोह वह सुपरवाइजर को बोले के यह हमारी गार्ड की वाइफ है... तोह वह हमे बोले ठीक है आप साफ़-सफाई का काम करो... तोह हम बोले उचा जाती का पंडित होके हम लैटिरन बाथरूम नहीं धोयेंगे। ... ऐसे साफ़ करते हैं लेकिन वहाँ दूसरे का करने में थोड़ा लगता था... तोह हम बोले नहीं सर यह काम हम नहीं करेंगे... तोह वही बोले अच्छा चलो तुम सिक्योरिटी गार्ड में करलो... फिर हम सोचे एक जगह मिया बीवी काम करेंगे... मैंने सोचा थोड़ा अजीब लगता है, मैं गाँव दिहात की लड़की हूँ शर्ट पंत पेहेनना अजीब होगा...



DC: Are you married?

Mishra: Yes, my wife is well, she is fine.

PT: She works?

Mishra: No (Vehemently). She is not allowed to work. She was getting a good job. It was a great job. She was a primary school teacher, she would be a civil servant by now. I forbade it.

PT: Why?

Mishra : Our elders used to say isn't it a disgrace to eat the bread earned by your wife? Old times were rough. Please don't get this written in the newspaper. [One of my daughters works in the airport], but to give worries to my daughter or ask her for money and I will be reborn in hell.<sup>193</sup>

Within the methodological constraints of this work, it has not been possible to explore this thread further. However, I incline to think that the response of the guards on their wives labor should probably not be taken at face value.

Firstly, because their own upbringing and perspectives might not conduce them to see domestic labor as labor *per se*<sup>194</sup>. Secondly—and I incline to this perspective strongly—they are under cultural expectations to fulfill entirely the economic need of

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193 Mr Mishra, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka sector 10, Delhi, Hindi.

“DC: आपकी पतनी है

Mishra: हाँ पातनी है ठीक है | मेरी wife भी अच्छी है

PT: वह काम करती है?

Mishra: No (vehemently). उनको काम के लिये allowed नहीं है | उनका job लग रहा था बहुत अच्छा | great job लग रहा था उनका | Primary में teacher थी, आज government servant होती | मैंने हतवा दिया |

PT: क्यों?

Mishra: हमारे बड़े-बुजुर्ग कहते थे ladies की कमाई का खाएगा क्या? पहले का time बहुत rough था |

कहीं अखबार-वखबार मत दे-देना | [...] [One of my daughter is working at the airport but] बैठी को तकलीफ़ दूंगा बैठी से पैसा मंगूंगा तो अगले जन्म में नर्क जाऊंगा | ”

194 The same can be said about agricultural labor, in which women are often unpaid familiar helper, regardless of the actual labor produced by everyone.

their family. Their failure to do so—and the fact that their wives work—might be a cause of shame as they talk to a stranger.

The male domination of Delhi’s cityscape is thus multifactorial. It requires the availability of surplus masculine labor. It also requires the inhabitants of the upper and middle-class “colonies” to feel an “anxiety that revolves around the vulnerability of the safety of the daughters as they move through public space” (Brosius 2010, 99). The male gaze that the guards keep on the city, for themselves or on the behalf of their upper-class employers, is thus not separable from the capitalist conditions of the recruitment of the guards.

I do not mean to flatly reproduce the triptych of critical studies and give to the “class, race/caste, gender” its now classic shape. I would like to point out simply that the production of space is not mechanically materializing onto land the economic conditions of production. It adapts to the local and social realities in the same way that capitalism sutures together and reconfigures dynamically what it finds on its way. Laborer and families hurled under the “sway of value” (Gidwani 2018) contribute to the reorganization of city life.

The “economic structures” might super-determine social phenomenon (Althusser et al. [1965] 2008), but they are essentially embedded in fully local sets of conditions that are dynamically transformed. This of course is not new, but it bears repetition because the “trialectic” of the production of space in Delhi integrates the local dynamics in and through which it unfolds.

#### **4 - Crisis**

In this last part I conclude the description of security guardianship in the categories of political economy with a contribution to the formulation of a theory of crisis. Delhi's spatial structure does not evolve and respond to what Lefebvre ([1974] 2000, 186) had, following Marx – dubbed “the Asiatic mode of production”. It responds to Asian and international models of development, circulating through the continent (Ananya Roy and Ong 2011). It gives birth to a representation of space that can come under the name of “Shanghai” (Banerjee 2012; Shatkin 2014a), to the speculative development of late capitalism.

It is possible to see speculative urbanism as crisis-bound for several reasons – and heading toward different possible types of crises. The first reason is the seemingly boundless increase in social inequalities which deepens the disconnection between capital and labor (Schindler 2015a). Simply put, underemployment and rising inequalities can fuel discontent and lead to either a situation of unrest, or to a situation in which the poorest classes find life in Delhi so unaffordable that it would upset the benefit of working there.

In this crisis hypothesis, the role that security guardianship plays is double. It protects the “guarded classes” from the social consequences of the gap between rich and poor, and it modestly attenuates the crisis by absorbing a part of labor power that might otherwise be “wasted”. “Labor can neither be accumulated nor even be saved, unlike true

commodities. Labor is life, and if it is not each day exchanged for food, it suffers and soon perishes” (Marx and Engels collective work vol 3, cited in (Gidwani 2018)).

The argument that guards contribute to expending labor power need not be functionalist. It became a possibility once the mass of laborers grew. The *dispositifs* set by the Central government aim precisely at framing the organization of the market so as to increase the stability of the work. The Union Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship have thus decided to make the guards part of their flagship program, NSDC and Skill India, unconcerned about increasing outputs or about the lack of effective training for guardianship.

Paradoxically, it is for the same reason that, according to the account of the civil servant in charge of implementing the PSARA regulation in Delhi, the approach to the law is very flexible: implementing it forcefully would reject people into illegality and ruin the purpose of the entire *dispositif*.

“The right way is that, we have to be a little liberal about making people compliant... until less I am liberal, why would people join me to be compliant? People are not compliant because we are not liberal. Honestly speaking the law needs a lot of modifications... Law should not be a deterrent. It should become... the fact, the moment you become a deterrent, people will not join you. I think law is a little tough now and not very welcoming. We need a law that welcomes people. Get my point? The moment people are happy about it...”<sup>195</sup>

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195 Omkar Sharma, civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.

The implementation of the law should, according to him, pay attention to greater goal, yet in the same time for him the *dispositifs* set by NSDC and SSSDC are and remain illegal (See chapter III). Implementing strictly the law would reject hundreds of thousands of people into illegality—or joblessness. Security guardianship thus preserves itself as a part of a system it defends. For both scenarios the guards act like upholders of the city’s order. The *dispositifs* set to frame the work of security guard take into account their number.

By absorbing a part of the manpower dispossessed by capital into its service, security guardianship also stave off the crisis by attenuating and displacing the consequences for labor of a demand from the urban middle-classes “that the national economic growth be maintained at a very high rate and that the requirements of corporate capital be given priority” (Chatterjee 2011, 224). The management of circulation and the management of space through labor time that guards are performing keeps at bay the violence of a crisis-bound capital. Again, it is not only social labor but also abstract labor that is brought to contribution to keep the men busy and the gate manned. Security guards, indeed, are the keeper of the visible spatial order of the city. In an excursus, Box 14 p.266, I push forward this theory of crisis and briefly discuss its relation with biopolitics.

*Box 14: Excursus: Katechtonic guardianship*

For François Debrix (2015), the role of security is the survival of the sovereign order. He takes cues from Carl Schmitt's ([1922] 1985) claim, against Weber's understanding of modernity as a process of secularization of politics, that the principal concepts and systems of modern politics derive from theology (see chapter III). Carl Schmitt ([1922] 1985), then Giorgio Agamben (2011) develops an understanding of the biblical concept of *katechon*. The *katechon* is what prevents the logical course of things to take place, in Agamben's terms, "the power that defers and eliminates 'concrete eschatology'" (2011, 7). By contrast, the *eschaton* are the agents of the eschatological time, the time that has an end. The end of time is the *parousia*, the reign of God which is outside of history.

In theology the return of God (*parousia*) is considered imminent and of course beyond doubt. His reign will come and last for ever. Meanwhile the Church (*eschaton*) has to keep evangelizing the world to prepare the return. Something, (*katechon*) is keeping it from happening. The non-conversion of the Jews was a problem for medieval theology for that reasons. I give examples of the presence of this theory in two totally different universe of thoughts.

Firstly, the question arises with capitalism and revolution. Since capitalism (the current order of the world, *eschaton*) is bound to end in crisis with the tendential fall of the rate of profit, and a new society will take its place (*parousia*), what stops this fall from happening? Taking cues on Marx' *Value, Wages and Profit* ([1898] 1969, 29), revolutionary factions accused reformist unions and workers organizations. For the former, those reformist organizations were standing between the total pauperisation of workers, and capital, thus paradoxically preventing the necessary revolution by improving the lot of proletarians.

Secondly, the easily criticized *End of History and the last man* (Fukuyama [1992] 2012) pivots around the same idea: The one ideology that was preventing the

undisputed rule of liberal democracy and liberalism was – for Francis Fukuyama – no more, hence its reign had arrived and capitalism could take care of issues without recourse to force. The *katechon* being no more, History was but time passing. For Agamben, the government rules because the vicissitude of life keep happening, otherwise the administrations of things would have taken over.

I go back to Debrix (2015). He suggests that security forces keep the *eschaton* of barbarity at a safe distance from the sovereign power. Security guards are thus, logically, the *katechon* that provides to the political order the possibility of duration (the same goes of the forces they fight). To connect this with the treatment of Roberto Esposito, the immunity paradigm that he is proposing is nothing but a manner of withholding decay by preserving or impeding circulation.

I agree with Debrix on his analysis of security guardianship as custodian of a temporal order on behalf of which they are entitled to use force and “terror”. This analysis however, might be a way to put Greek words on a rather simple problem, except if the idea of *katechontic* security is not simply treated in the classical terms of political-theology but also in that of capital. Agamben in *The Kingdom and the Glory* (2011) makes the link between economy and politics, showing that if salute is individual matter eschatology is a collective. For him the aim of western sovereign is to organize the world until the government itself is redundant, basking in glory, having let to things themselves the administration of things.

In the case of security guards in Delhi – the leap is quite large but the argument remains valid, their role is indeed to keep the “barbarians” (or the surplus humanity) at bay from upper and middle-classes’ neighborhoods and localities.

## 5 - Conclusion (*Œuvre*)

The role that security guards play in the capitalist production of the city is inserted into and enabling the “trialectic” of space and is realized in their labor time. Time, pointed Luckács ([1923] 1971, 90) “sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable 'things' [...] : in short, it becomes space.”<sup>196</sup> At the gate, boredom becomes solid.

The annual turnover of guards, that is, the percentage of guards quitting the job in a year, is estimated by security companies to reach 25 to 30%<sup>197</sup> in the smaller companies dealing with RWAs. We can suppose that boredom, low wages, and disrespect to be among the chief causes of this rather high turnover, yet guards can also need to return to their village of origin periodically or attend personal events that force them to quit a job they will find again upon their return. Should this be understood as a form of finger dragging, a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985), a way to reclaim *Azadi* (Gidwani 2012)<sup>198</sup>? It seems a stretch. Security guards are accomplishing a work that stitches together concrete and abstract labor.

The security guards insure the aesthetic divide between the desirable aesthetic and the undesirable. Ghertner (2015a) points out that some slums are declared so because they look like slums. Following this aesthetic principle, that the guards insure the visible grid of the city and the underlying one—that permits the existence of the first—are not

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196 Also cited in Gidwani (2018)

197 Col. Singh, 2Kuri Company, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.

K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi. English.

198 “‘Azadi’ is the possibility to tell the *Malik* (employer) to f\*\*\* off.” (Gidwani 2012)



confused. In other words, for a city like Delhi –in fact like for most cities in the global South—to function, it needs the informal and the daily arrangements and negotiations that should not appear in the socio-spatial order of the city.

The question of creating a better city does not stop there, in front of the “enemy in blue” (Williams 2015). The emancipatory perspective must remain to disarticulate the making of the city from the speculative investments, and create an alternative between the city built in the precarious neighborhoods (Deboulet 2016), where guards live.

Reinhold Martins notes that:

“The atomization and fragmentation of the entire postindustrial consumerist landscape, by imagining a series of individual, private futures in place of a single, collective one. Or, in another possible extension, it risks simply replacing the homogenizing universalism that guided earlier efforts to build for the stereotyped masses, with a logic of diversified enclaves that rapidly begin to resemble the “neighborhood” or other forms of supposedly local, organic “community” whether gated or otherwise, to say nothing of the accompanying “archipelagoes of exception” (sic) à la Agamben.” (Martin 2010, 176)

For Lefebvre ([1968] 2009), the solution to the city fragmented between rich and poor neighborhoods, against exclusion and destruction, is to make of the city a collective “*œuvre*”. That is, a city that is not a product of capital but the result of an artistic project, “disarticulated from the sway of value” (Gidwani 2018, 13). The ‘Right to the City’ is the right to be there, to contribute in the remaking of public spaces, and it cannot be separated from a critique of the production of space. Security guardianship secures the

order in place that suppresses this claim. It is the order against which the political society negotiates and struggles. On the other side of the iron gates, there is a “claim and a demand” (Lefebvre [1968] 2009) for a shared city, with safety of work, and livelihood for all.

## CONCLUSION

This research project aimed at shedding light on the effect of private security guards on the socio-spatial organization and structure of Delhi. I have shown that the guards are fully taking part in the production of space and by extension, in the reproduction of class relations (Lefebvre [1974] 2000). They enable some circulation while impeding others. Security guards limit the circulation of members of the lower classes while easing the circulation of capital and traffic among what I have called the “guarded classes”. Guards are workers separated from all means of production except their own bodies, time and space. Because of that particular quality, private security guardianship is, in Delhi, consubstantial to the predominant urban processes under capitalism. To reach such conclusion my work has been constructed around five primary research questions.

First I asked how the flourishing security sector guarantees the visible grid of the city. I proposed the hypothesis that security guards are hired to help maintain the value of real estate capital, and not, for example, because of a surge in criminality. As such, the guards are instrumental in materializing and building the unequal city that is financed through the “real-estatization” of the city.

Here I do not mean that there is no criminality at all in Delhi. It is indeed a matter of severe concern for women, whose claim for security has not been addressed. I mean here simply that the level of criminality in Delhi, based on the available data, does

not seem to explain such a proportion of private guards, and the multiplication of private security guardianship does not answer the existing problems of safety, for women in particular.

The geographic role of security guards posted at neighborhood's gates is not to ensure safety—even though safety can be seen as an occasional by-product. It fulfills two roles: that of reassuring the anxieties of residents, and that to signal the class to which this or that area of the city belongs. Security guardianship, by keeping at bay the stigmata of poverty contributes to maintaining the value of real estate investment. Their role is therefore playing out in the aesthetic domain, that is, the domains of perceptions, of the lived space. This aesthetic permits to uphold the value of the neighborhoods in which they are posted. Economics and aesthetics are intimately linked.

This aesthetic is performative. Asher Ghertner (2015a) has shown that appearance has political and even legal impacts for neighborhoods that form the fabric of the city. The guards stand for the visible grid of the city, that is, the city of the “civil society”. The civil society (Chatterjee 2004, 2011) is a part of the population that expresses itself in the language of rights, even though their own approach to securing land is not devoid of illegalities (Ananya Roy 2009). By contrast, the “political society” is the section of the population that negotiates with authorities their means of existence and their access to the physical space as well as the infrastructures of the city. As Ghertner has shown, the “gentrification of state space” (2015a, 77) has made the situation more precarious for the political society. Taking cues from his argument, I point out the

role that security guardianship plays in this political aesthetics. In short, they contribute in making the lived space of neighborhoods a bit more like the represented space of city planning, resident associations and advertisements.

To simplify the narrative, the visible grid of the city in which the “accumulation economy” (Sanyal 2007) lives and work remains dependent on the interstitial (Simone 2009, 44) city in which those who live off the “need economy” are dwelling. The need economy provides the labor that the commodity economy needs. The guards are negotiating the friction between those classes worthy of being guarded and those that are not.

I suggest for further research to explore more in depth a possible correlation between private security guardianship and insecurity. Jeff Garmany and Ana Paula Galdeano (2017) have already hinted toward a correlation between growth of private security companies and insecurity, showing possible linkages between crime and companies, as security companies benefit from insecurity. I did not find evidences of this South American model in Delhi. I have found traces of corruption but not violent activities. What I would like to suggest, however, is that the urban layout of the cities made possible by the presence of private security, such as in Dwarka, contributes in feelings of insecurity and in making the streets unsafe. Long, blind walls pierced every now and then by a closed gate contribute in the justified impression that whatever happens in the street is too far away from inhabitants for locals to intervene (Bergen 2013; “Urban Infrastructure | Safe Delhi | Safe Delhi Campaign” n.d.).

My second question was related to the curious over representation of upper-caste security guards I had observed, against my expectations, during a preliminary fieldwork in 2014. I asked if this particular recruitment facilitated the representation of a dream city (Dupont 2011) from which the stigma of poverty would be materially and symbolically excluded.

To answer this question I formulated the following hypothesis: Contrary to the common belief that contractual recruitment by companies dissolves ascribed caste identities, the formidable manpower demanded by the sector has not broken the back of caste preferences. Although my findings validated this statement, I could not find a clear explanation for the preferential recruitment of upper-caste, and specifically Brahmin, guards that was fully satisfying.

The hypothesis that guards were recruited preferentially because of their high caste status implies a selection from the “demand” side. I was expecting informants to deny any caste preference, and it was indeed the case. But I could not find any trace of such demand and some primary employers appeared genuinely surprised by the caste compositions of their own guards. The question itself is problematic because it supposes a reading of caste from the point of view of the upper-castes, making of Brahmins the key to understand the system. It rather seems that the reason for this over representation of Brahmins is to be found in the “supply” side.

What did not raise a question, in a staggering contrast, was the absence of Muslim guards. I could not meet a guard who would identify himself to me as one. The

security company that I have interviewed would claim to have a nation-based recruitment, mimicking the official principles of the Indian armed forces. Most of the executive staff are retiring from this set of institutions. However, this first protestation passed, some made clear that Muslim were not to be hired in the industry, and the question itself simply fell in incongruity.

I could not, during my fieldwork, document networks of recruitment that would join the city and the village. Some upscale companies and the Security Sector Skill Development Council claimed to have recruiters and even buses going to job-fairs in the countryside, however, I could not confirm this and I tend to doubt it. All guards claimed that they simply came to the office of their companies or talked to already employed guards. The relative over-representation of Brahmins still shows that capitalism adapts and expends in stitching together heterogeneous social constructions.

My third research question focused on the practice of the work of security guards. I asked what expectations and practices, formal and informal, governed how private security personnels managed the porous barriers between who is allowed “in” and who is kept “out”. In a nutshell, the social norms on which the guards work are based on appearance and self-confidence. The *hexis* (Bourdieu 1972), that is, the socially acquired conduct of the body permits one to judge of the social origins of individuals. In some neighborhoods in Dwarka as in Saket the porosity of the security apparatus is reduced and it is not possible to enter unless specifically invited.

Security guards working in residential neighborhoods do not learn specific techniques for identification or for conducting their jobs in an organized manner. Despite the law making training mandatory for all security guards in Delhi since 2009, most guards are untrained. I could attend several training, all of them for companies that are slightly above the kind of companies that are contracting with the Resident Welfare Associations of Dwarka and Saket. The lower end of the spectrum is unlikely to receive forms of training as training does not increase productivity.

In my fourth research question I pointed out that the guards are interface workers. By this, I mean that their work consists of mediating the relationship between the upper-class and the lower classes. Security guards are handling the roughness and edges of city life on behalf of the upper-classes, like they at times manage the circulation of their cars while ensuring their tranquility. This relationship between employers and employees permits the first to inhabit the secluded urbanism of Delhi without dealing with poverty.

In the fifth research question I raised the issue of legality and regulation. I suggested that the guards act within a regulatory framework that is fluctuating and questioned how the organization of Delhi's security guardianship opens a window in the relations between state and private means of exclusion and control. Inconsistencies in laws and regulation framing the training and deployment of private security guards question the consistency of state policies in the matter of private security guardianship. I have given a detailed analysis of the Private Security Agencies Regulation Act (*Private*



*Security Agency Regulation Act 2005*) and of its declension in Delhi and contrasted it with the regulations concerning training and subventions for skill developments (“Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY)” n.d.; “SSSDC” n.d.). The two sets of regulations are not compatible. The first one concerns law and order and the second one aims at increasing the skill level of the general population.

In fact, the state should be seen as permanently in construction and in reconfiguration. For Foucault ([1979] 2004, 79), “the State is nothing but the moving effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities”. Thus, the inconsistencies are not abnormal but part of the normal construction of the state. Not only are the regulations inconsistent, they are also disrespected. This however should not be seen as the trace of a potential lawlessness in the city, but instead, as a part of the construction of a state power that is dominated by upper and middle-classes. In short, the police cannot adapt to class demands the way private security can, its regulation is thus a way to content the ruling class while creating a market where the traditional occupation of *chowkidhar* was escaping the purview of state control.

My main research question was what is the effect of private security guards on the city? To answer it, and the five subsidiary questions supporting it, I articulated this dissertation in four main chapters.

In Chapter I, I presented in depth my research methodology. I focused on two neighborhoods, one upper-class, in Saket and one middle-class, in Dwarka. Saket was not

built with security in mind and consequently it has erected gates and deployed guards after its embourgeoisement, following the trend of gating.

Saket, a Delhi Development Authority colony, has always had parks, considered public space free and open access to all. Its rich gentry has relied on the services of vast sections of labor, like *dhobis* (cloth washer), *dudhwalas* (milk delivery), *kabadiwaalas* (recycling man), domestic workers, and also construction laborers who use parks (as public spaces) for mobility and rest. The growth in power and the embourgeoisement of the RWAs have led to privatizing public spaces and filtering access of streets and parks, at the expense of the labor class.

This neighborhood also has several malls and one central commercial zone. This particular feature has let me compare the work and origins of guards in residential neighborhoods and individual houses with those of the private security guards working in malls. Guards working in the mall have generally better salaries and regular contracts, while those working for Resident Welfare Associations are generally considered the lowest degree of the market.

Dwarka sector 10 was built in the 80's and its layout reflects an urban development led by a more pregnant private sector. Dwarka was built like a chaplet of insulated, car-dependent buildings. Security was integrated early in the architecture of the sector, with little concept of a public space open to outsiders, safe for the markets. Guards are posted in permanence at the entry of each neighborhood while the main streets are dedicated solely to traffic.

I have employed several methods for data collection. I conducted participatory observation. I took part in three different training sessions for upper-level companies of guards, two in Delhi and one in Manesar, to observe in person the condition of formation and establish with the guards a relation of trust. This was crucial to respond to the research questions three (skill) and four (interface workers) that I have elaborated upon. I have also examined published and unpublished papers, such as legal documents and advertisements, so as to understand the functioning of the market and how it is regulated. This was of particular importance for the research questions one (visible grid) and five (regulatory framework). However, I obtained the bulk of my data through personal, semi-directed interviews in both English and Hindi with a series of various actors that I had identified. This last method allowed me to answer the second research question (caste) along with providing supplementary data for all the others. It is around that data set that I built my answer to the main question I had set to examine, that of the effect of private security guards on the city of Delhi.

I conducted interviews with security guards of lower and middle range companies, spokespersons for Resident Welfare Associations (RWA) and Cooperative Group Housing Societies (CGHS), police and state officials, representatives of security companies, representatives of associations regrouping security companies, domestic workers and, most of all, security guards. In this latter category, I have identified four levels for purpose of clarification. The first level is composed by elite guards, former special forces in the military and tasked with protection of important personalities or building. The last level is composed of men who received no training, who have no

physical pre-condition and who are tasked with filtering the entries in middle-class neighborhoods. It is on this last level that I have focused my fieldwork research, as well as on men of what I have called the third level. I mean by third level guards who did receive some minimal amount of training; they are deployed in malls, for example. This field work permitted me to answer my research questions in the way I have detailed above and permitted further research.

In Chapter II, I propose a spatial ethnography (Gidwani and Chari 2005) of security guards. The work that security guards do is intimately linked with the city space in which they are deployed, and their conditions of labor are dependent on it. Some will have access to a sentry box, some to electricity, some will have to burn plastics to chase the cold of winter nights. Their salaries are generally very low and, in their large majority, they do not receive Provident Funds or Employee State Insurance. The spatial ethnography is not limited to that aspect.

The emancipation of workers has often been linked with access to the public space. This public space in turn is often described as contested, but it remains the place in which voices can be heard in democratic societies. The idea of public space, understood as the inscription in cities of the no less ideal public sphere (Habermas [1962] 1993), permeates the geographic and philosophic literature as a performative idea. In this spatial ethnography of labor I argue that public space is first and foremost built by laboring hands, and, conversely, that other laboring hands can be tasked with impeding its development. Security guards are also tasked with organizing a city that is marked by

“post-developmental” (Gidwani and Chaturvedi 2011) structures. That is, by relations of class within space that do not integrate ethical engagement with the other classes. The city that security guards contribute to build is not only fragmented into walled neighborhoods, it is essentially the space produced by a form of capitalism that has formed a society in which the modern project, to which the idea of shared public space and progress are tied, (Berman [1983] 1999) stands in trial for irrelevance.

I have shown that a large proportion of guards are temporary migrants from the Gangetic plains, with Bihari guards leading the numbers. Most of the guards I could interview, hailed from families who owned a little land in the village. With few exceptions, they intend to go back as their families are still living there. I show that their caste status does not stop the servile sentinels (Gooptu 2013b) of the city from being despised by the people who employ them, primary employers or contractors. I make the hypothesis that this disdain is related to the presence among what I have called the “guarded classes”, that is, lives that are deemed worth guarding, of men marked by rural poor bodies. Their very presence and their role in the reproduction of class domination stands like a sore.

In Chapter III, I describe the relations between state and private security in Delhi. I refer to Weber’s ([1919] 1994) famous interpretation of the state as “this one human community, which, on a given territory—and the notion of territory being one of its characteristics—claims (with success) for itself, *the monopoly of legitimate physical violence*”. I hold that this definition has a strong normative power. Its pertinence may

however come under question with the growth and spread of private security guardianship. I argue that we should look at the problem from the angle of state building, that is, the permanent reconfiguration of power structures around projects of governments. Private security guardianship is not operating against the will of the state or on a different plane, but rather contributing to the reconfiguration of a “gentrifying state” (Ghertner 2015a) in favor of the dominant propertied classes.

I show that the incompatibilities between different laws and regulations framing the market are testimonies to this evolution. I take the example of the training of security guards. The Union’s Private Security Agency Regulation Act of 2005 was translated into regulations in Delhi in 2009. It imposes a certain duration and a syllabus for training guards. Regulations from the ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, a recent initiative by the Government of India, have established guidelines for funding trainings that are not compatible with the first. Within this incompatibility security companies navigate a landscape of associations, police actions such as Prahari, and widespread corruption.

In this context of “fluctuating regulations”, the RWA and the CGHS, as empowered private citizen bodies, assert their domination over territories. This division of the city is foundational of a relationship to power and authority. I argue it is reminiscent of a “*nomos*” (Schmitt [1950] 2001). This in turn lets those members of the civil society, decide of some degree of “the exception” (Schmitt [1922] 1985). This further endangers the possibility of a “public space” if it is understood as a shared space.

The presence of security guards in Delhi establishes the domination of propertied classes. I turn to the work of Michel Foucault ([1976] 1997) to test the limit of his “war-repression model”. Security guards permit to establish a control on non-desired bodies, and facilitate the circulation of upper-classes vehicles while impeding that of lower class workers. This biopolitics is reminiscent of the idea of space of exception (Agamben 1998). I examine the relevance of the theories of biopolitics developed respectively by Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Roberto Esposito (2008) in the context of Delhi’s private security industry. The “positive” model of biopolitics defended by Esposito, that of an immunity system that permits circulations in as much as it can suspend it, is particularly interesting to understand Delhi as it permits to think the work of the guards in terms the spatial practices (Lefebvre [1974] 2000, 43) that the guard enable: the “post-development” (Gidwani and Chaturvedi 2011, 1640) sociability of the guarded classes.

In the fourth and final chapter, I describe the place of the guards in the political economy that produces the urban form of Delhi. The guards in residential neighborhoods carry further the value of real estate. The real-estatization of the city is made possible by the work of thousands of men who are dealing with and reacting to displacement, jobless growth, and generally the predatory nature of the “commodity economy” over the “need economy” (Sanyal 2007).

Security guards, again produce spatial exclusivity, and at times a class-determined feeling of safety. The reproduction of social relation in space by security

guards is what materializes those feelings of security and entitlement. Most security guards are not trained, and the training some of them have received does not increase their output. The twelve hours they spend at the gate is strictly equal to the 12 hours any other uniformed man would have done. Their social labor is simply the assertion of the domination of the class that employ them over the city. Taking cues from Moishe Postone ([1993] 2006) I point out that the concrete labor of security guards reflects their abstract labor, that is, in a nutshell, the construction of a position of domination within the capitalist economy. This economy is spatialized and invests some particular areas while letting other behind. The growth of security companies that has taken place in Delhi during the last two decades despite the relatively low degree of criminality is not a mere coincidence. Private security guardianship espouses the contour of unequal urbanism.

This expression of the place of security guards in the political economy of the city permits to contribute to a theory of crisis. I point out firstly that security guards, as interface workers, mitigate through violence, symbolic and real, the social consequences of the disconnection between “capital and labor” (Schindler 2017). I also point out that the hiring of guards, through their sheer number, permits to reduce the number of “latent surplus population” (Marx [1867] 1976, 796) in the city by absorbing them into accumulation economy (Sanyal 2007), even if their place is, from the point of view of individual mobility, a dead end.

The growth in private security guardianship plays a role in a “production of space” (Lefebvre [1974] 2000) that takes a direction that seems to exclude the modern



idea of “public space” (Berman [1983] 1999; Kohn 2004). The notion of a shared city, which implies the idea of a public space, is essential in the elaboration of a collective “œuvre” (Lefebvre [1968] 2009). Against this, security guardianship enables and fosters a post-developmental Delhi.

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My work stands at the junction between the emerging literature on anthropology of police (Fassin 2011, 2017; Jauregui 2016; Garriott 2013), the branch of critical security studies (Neocleous 2000, 2008, 2014)<sup>199</sup> that takes security for object and the now well established literature on urban theory in the global south (Robinson 2006; Ananya Roy and Ong 2011). I have showed how guards are not only a conservative, but also a transformative force in the city. This does not mean that they are willing agents of this transformation.

Further work should attempt a deeper understanding of guards’ psychology and sensitivities. As I indicated in the introduction, significant sociological work inspired, among others, by James Scott (1985) has taken cues from the second term in the duality, “domination and resistance”. This work has mostly focused on the first term, in order to thwart a certain tendency to grant the same status of “resistance” to every act that reveals the putative agency of the worker behind the uniform. I was also concerned to avoid such

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<sup>199</sup> I establish a clear distinction between the “critical studies of security”, which interest me here, and the “studies of critical security” which remain firmly within the field of International Relations and do not question either the legitimacy of security as pivot of the world order nor the national framework that underpins it (Krause and Williams [1997] 2005).

inducing or eliciting a particular type of desired answer among disgruntled workers. Yet resistance is of course not absent.

Jules Maigret, the French consul in Delhi, did not give Diwali money to the guards keeping his neighbor's door, and by extension his own car, under watch. A month later, he found that the side mirrors had been sawed clean off his personal car. He has since given generously at every religious festival, and now enjoys an unblemished vehicle<sup>200</sup>. Assuming that there is more than a correlation between the two, the damage to Maigret's car can be considered revenge. Or maybe the guard felt that Maigret's car was not his problem. In either case, the guard's agency is manifest and the "resistance" was paid off in cash.

Have I tilted the balance too far in one direction? It is possible. Further research should keep seeking for this sensitive balance and seek empathy, without transforming an overall negative narrative of deeply unequal power relations into a heroic one that celebrates the "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1985).

Future work should also pay a greater attention than I could, partly because of my positionality as a foreign white male, to the experience of female inhabitants of the city, both resident of the neighborhoods and workers in the neighborhoods. I have kept the focus on the class relations that are shaping the city of Delhi. I have pointed out at the impact of guardianship on gender violence, patriarchal domination of the street and the reproduction of the caste system in Delhi. I have not engaged in any depth with the large set of literature that has showed how the caste, class and gender entanglement reproduces

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200 Maigret, Jules, Interview, November 3rd, 2016, Delhi, French.

inequalities and domination, in large part because I felt that my empirics on security guards did not let me hear other voices as would have been necessary. However, the material I have gathered shows one side of this entanglement and, in this capacity, supports the notion of “Brahminical patriarchy” that have been elaborated by Uma Chakravarti (1993; 2003, 2013), Shailaja Paik (2009), Sharmila Rege (2006) and others.

I have pointed out that the rise in security guardianship coincides with the rise in real-estatization and, thereby, with a capitalism that is increasingly financial and speculative. This has fostered a rise in inequalities that has favored the emergence of a large middle-class with disposable income and a claim to exclusivity.

I have pointed out that security guards, in that system, preserve the value of capital. Another way to look at this is that they are not only preserving value but enhancing it. As such, their labor would be akin to that of gardeners, landscapers and artists whose work benefit mostly the propertied classes. This crucial difference, between preservation and enhancement, should be theorized with rigor in future engagement with the subject matter, as it may, on the one hand, call for formulating a new intermediate category of the “working class”, and on the other hand, extend the importance of this category of labor in the reproduction of capital in cities. It may also open up possibilities for an international comparison between cities of the global south and the global north that bypasses concepts such as “gentrification” that are ill-fitting in the former. The notion of “gentrification”, while extremely generative for understanding urban transformations in cities of the global north, where it has been studied in detail and with

great nuance (Smith 2006; Shin 2009), becomes limiting and fails to explain the phenomenon of ‘real-estatization’ in the global south (Ghertner 2015b)<sup>201</sup>.

It is possible to speculate that the worldwide rise of real-estatization, more than anything else, explains the parallel growth of security guardianship in Delhi, São Paulo (Caldeira 2000) or in South Africa (Faull 2018). It is possible to formulate the hypothesis that private security guardianship is simultaneously as internationally present and as structurally diverse as the class it serves. Establishing comparative ethnography of police forces (Fassin 2017) is in the order of the day. It would be a welcome initiative to follow suit with private security guards, and for example, to set up a comparison with cities of South Asia such as Karachi or Lahore in Pakistan.

Karachi has been described in a short term perspective by Michel Boivin (2007) and in a long-term historical and ethnographic study by Laurent Gayer (2014). The harbor city of Karachi witnesses a really different ordering of violence through private means, starting with the level of actual violence and the magnitude of the problems of insecurity linked with religious and ideological aspects. A comparison with Delhi would shed light on processes of violence and ordering that are strikingly different in some aspects, such as the amount of actual violence, and similar in others, such as the high level of corruption and the importance of industrial security. This would also offer a fascinating angle on the persistence of castes in Pakistan. It would also permit one to test the limits of the political economy of private security that I have elaborated.

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<sup>201</sup> This approach, suggested by Bruce Braun, deserves careful consideration in future studies on territorializing security.

In Delhi, by contrast with Karachi, I have not directly observed insecurity that could be directly attributed to militancy or political groups. I have observed exclusion, racism, and the fact that no security guard in Delhi was a Muslim. Everything happened as if the question of “hinduisation” of the upper and middle-class neighborhoods that I have studied had already happened. Between this absence and the increasingly secluded spaces produced through walls and guarded gates, everything happened as if the idea of Delhi had already been dismembered.

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## APPENDIX

### **1 - Master research and preliminary research.**

In this section I give a brief overview of the works I had realized in Delhi before the main fieldwork. I explain how I came to work on this topic, what planning was involved in the realization of the fieldwork, and how it came to change, along with some of the research questions.

My doctoral fieldwork crowned several years of engagement with the city of Delhi and its intimate functioning. I conducted three masters research projects in the city, which gave me the possibility to rely on a strong network of support as soon as I landed. It also afforded me ample opportunity to learn Hindi. I conducted most of my interviews in that language, keeping English for the most fluent of my informants. The three pre-doctoral researches I conducted took place between 2007 and 2011. I give here a brief summary of them.

#### 1.1 - Masters research.

##### 1.1.1 - Propositions for an urban history

I started engaging with Delhi in 2007, during a year of an exchange program between the University of Rennes 2 (France) and the University of Delhi. My Masters thesis, “Propositions for an urban history: Delhi- Identity and everyday life, 1931-1951” (2008), explored the urban history of Delhi under several angles. I identified what at the time was a historiographic gap. I gathered archives, oral histories, pictures and literary

sources to give a description of the city-scape. This Masters thesis outlined the continuities in urban government before and after Independence (1947), despite the cultural and demographic upheaval caused by the partition of the country.

### 1.1.2 - Spaces of Protest

I came back to Delhi for a semester of research under an exchange student program between the University of Rennes 2 and the School of Planning and Architecture (SPA). My thesis, “Spaces of Protest in Delhi between 1976 and 2009” (2009), aimed at interrogating the notion of public space. I proposed to take up the challenge of Ramachandra Guha (2008, 9), to write a “story of India as told from a single street, and in a single year.” I discovered that the “space of protest” had moved across the years, even before being constrained to Jantar Mantar, and that this constriction was not always the same, depending on who demonstrates.

I took the evacuation of the Indian Coffee House in 1976 as a starting point for my narrative. It had already become a gathering point for the opposition to Indira Gandhi during the Emergency. The fall of Indira Gandhi’s regime appeared as a watershed for Indian street democracy, but expression of discontent in public space started shrinking again in the 90’s, except for nationalist show of force and the emerging and self-conscious, middle-class power that took inspiration from the movie *Rang de Basanti* (Mehra 2006) and pride in the victory it achieved in triumphing of a blatant class injustice in the Jessica Lal affair<sup>202</sup> (R. K. Gupta 2011). In sum, my thesis established a

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<sup>202</sup> Jessica Lal was a model. She was serving drinks to upper-class guest. She was shot dead at point blank by the son of a politician from Haryana. He was acquitted in court despite numerous witness. The demonstration that followed the case took inspiration, self-consciously, from the demonstration scenes

critique of the superimposition of Habermas' notion of "public space" ([1962] 1990) on the increasingly privatized streets of Delhi.

### 1.1.3 - Noir Delhi

My last pre-doctoral research in Delhi was conducted for the completion of the "Urban Studies" MSc of the University College of London. My final thesis was "*Right to the city in the Noir NCR*" (2011). I set out to see how the Lefebvrian concept of the "*Right to the City*" (Lefebvre [1968] 2009) could help us understand a city as deeply unequal and divided as Delhi. I aimed at taking the theoretical approach of the philosopher as seriously as possible. Lefebvre considers that the city should be a collective "œuvre" that implies the participation of all. The deeply unequal setting of Delhi and the entrenchment of its class and caste division make difficult to imagine the reconstitution of a "public space", a condition for an equal co-construction of the city by all its inhabitants.

In 2011 Delhi was in a craze to become a "World Class City". This discourse led to "mass evictions and increased insecurity while deepening the massive inequalities that accompany an economic growth that doesn't benefit most of the population. The best mirror image of Delhi World Class [was] Delhi Noir, the dark and unsettling Delhi in which murders succeed one another, in an atmosphere of class revenge and paranoia furthering inequalities and seclusion" (2011, 2). I suggested Noir Delhi (Sawhney 2009) was the other side of World class Delhi, its mirror image. Still exclusively English speaking and class exclusive, it also contemplated the wreck of the destruction it was

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in a popular movie, *Rang De Basanti*, that came out the year of the first trial.

absentmindedly causing among the poorest classes through a phantasmatic nightmare of insecurity. Between the “nationalistic euphoria” (Sawhney 2009, 14) of a world-class status that seemed within reach and the return of the bad consciousness in through a pervading Noir imagination, there was little room for a shared oeuvre to emerge. I came back thinking that it probably did not make sense to employ the concept, at least from an analytical point of view, in a city as divided as Delhi. I felt compelled to direct my work toward forms of domination rather than toward resistance.

From there, and in continuity with the fieldwork I had done, I paid an ever-closer attention to the life and work conditions of the worker tasked with the gating and walling of Delhi. Having engaged in research on Delhi over several years, I have personally witnessed the growing presence of security guards in the city and its exclusionary effects. I could also orient myself in the city and know how to appreciate neighborhood differences.

#### 1.2 - Choice of topic

After the fieldwork for *Right to the city in the Noir NCR*, I proposed to keep working on workers tasked with making the standards of life of the middle and upper-classes possible. Inspired by the work of a domestic worker union and by the novel *Journal of a maidservant*<sup>203</sup> (Vaid 2002), I proposed to work on domestic workers for my PhD dissertation. However, this raised problems of positionality. It was methodologically risky, as mostly female lower class workers would probably not want to talk to a white

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203 "एक नौकरानी की डायरी ।"

male, but it was even more likely that I would not be granted access to their place of work. This probably would have impeded the collection of data.

I remained interested however in the concept of “interface workers”, that is, workers tasked with lubricating the relationship between rich and poor, and by the anthropological twist it would give to my geography dissertation. The golf caddies studies by Patrick Inglis (2017) are a typical case of interface workers who tend to be overlooked yet manage their own agencies in the midst of difficult predicaments. The choice of security guards appeared like a good fit. This topic permitted not only to develop my questioning on the city but also to learn from different fields of literature, such as the critical security studies. From then I could start elaborating hypotheses and planning for preliminary fieldwork.

### 1.3 - First hypothesis and preliminary fieldwork

I obtained preliminary fieldwork thanks to a Global Spotlight Student Grants, awarded by the Global Programs and Strategy Alliance, University of Minnesota. This was a unique opportunity to design a research project and test its viability and feasibility in August 2014. I thus could elaborate on my research questions and put together a research design in order to “crash test” it against reality. After the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the research without modification of methods, I could start taking interviews. I opted for a set of non-directed interviews to explore tracks I might have overlooked, and semi-directed interviews to gather basic, demographic and labor data so as to verify some of my assumptions before I could even turn to the hypothesis. I explain



below every step of this important preliminary work, as it was instrumental in shaping the fieldwork I set out to do two years later.

### 1.3.1 - Research questions.

It is necessary to observe the rapidly evolving landscape of exclusivity in Delhi and inform the unfolding effects of the privatization of public space and means of order. In order to make this possible, the first research questions I suggested were the following:

1. How does the private security industry recruit security guards?
2. What is the exact nature of the service provided by security guards?
3. How do security guards filter the movements of people?

3a. How does the criterion of judgment become an embodied skill?

3b. How do the security guards resolve the psychological tension of work that involves filtering and excluding members of their own class and caste strata?

I proposed to answer those questions with a combination of directed and semi directed interviews spread across four different neighborhoods. I also proposed participatory mapping of a neighborhood to understand and make visible the geographic functioning of the labor of guardianship. The correspondence between the questions and methods is made explicit in the Table 1 p.51.

### 1.3.2 - Who are the “actors”?

The term “actor” is not common in American geography but the presentation and critique of the “actors” is systematic in the French tradition, to the extent that the term makes immediate heuristic sense. The “actors” of a described system or situation designate not only the stakeholders but also all the people who deal with or interact with a given situation. How categories are constructed requires a description and particular attention. I give in the second part of this methodology chapter complete and described lists of the actors I have identified throughout my fieldwork. For the preliminary fieldwork which I did to “crash-test” the methodology of this dissertation, I figured I would interview: security guards, contractors, primary employers such as homeowners, residents of guarded neighborhoods and Resident Welfare Associations representatives, and workers commuting daily into the neighborhoods such as domestic workers or drivers. I detail each of those categories in the descriptions of my main fieldwork and findings as each of them have been refined and elaborated, and some new categories entered.

- Security guards

I planned interviews with the first person concerned with this research, security guards, in order to document their life stories, their demographics, their opinions and ideologies, and their working conditions. Security guards, which I distinguished from the start from traditional *chowkidars*, wear the uniform of their companies or stand near or in

a sentry box, often equipped with a massive register to record entries and exits. This makes the identifications of security guards rather easy.

- Contractors

Interviewing contractors was instrumental to understand the market better. I wanted to hear the point of view of small entrepreneurs in particular, how they started, how their company worked.

- Primary employers

Primary employers are the ones paying for the service of guardianship, that is, the mall owners, the shop owner or operator, associations of middle and upper-class residents (generally Resident Welfare Associations), companies desirous to provide security to places or individuals, and upper-class individual themselves. Naturally the class of origin of the primary employers tells a lot about what the guards are expected to do. What do they want and what do they obtain? Some guards, sometimes from the same company, work inside the neighborhoods in front of an individual house while others are employed by the neighborhood resident associations to keep watch over an entire street or an entire “block”.

- Employees

Delhi upper and middle-classes require the intervention of massive manpower to maintain their lifestyle and expectations. Women and men taking part in this economy are sometimes called the “walha” from the Hindi “the one who”. *Istriwalha* and *sabziwalha*

are respectively the one who irons cloths and the one selling vegetables. This lists includes, but is not limited to: domestic workers, guards, drivers, laundry “walha”, gardener, *sabziwalha*, etc. By meeting them I wanted to verify how efficient or how loose surveillance could be. I also wanted to know if guards were taking advantage of their positions to extract money from *sabziwalhe* or to assert gender domination over female domestic workers.

### 1.3.3 - Proposed methods

I proposed a mixed-method framework combining three ethnographic techniques: oral-survey, semi-directed interviews and life histories with collective mapping. First, I would conduct semi-structured interviews with fifty security guards over four neighborhoods presented in the next section : Daryaganj, Jangpura, Mansarovar Garden and Udyog Vihar (Propositions A and B in the Table 1, page 51: “Research questions and proposed methods, preliminary fieldwork”). This would verify the hypothesis I outlined regarding their regional and caste origins, their salaries, their trainings and the modalities of their recruitments. For the oral survey that would follow, it would also important that most of them have seen me. An oral – rather than written – survey would be necessary as I supposed possible that a part of them might not be literate in either Hindi or English (Proposition A). It would be necessary to triangulate the information collected during the semi-structured interviews and to gather data that are yet to be addressed.

Upadhyay (2011) uses stratified purposive sampling method to send questionnaires to security guards regarding their salaries, but he has not touched upon their behaviors and has received what seems a disproportionately high rate of response from the upper layers of employees of these companies. A neighborhood-centered survey to determine how companies overlap and how the guards learn from each other could not be realized (Proposition B). Finally to complete and deepen the findings I proposed to gather life histories from a dozen guards (Proposition C).

Second, in order to know how caste preference is enacted and how the networks of recruitment are built, I proposed to conduct semi-directed interviews with the representatives and owners of three security companies ( Proposition A). Then I proposed to conduct interviews with contractors, Resident Welfare Associations and private owners to determine how they perceive the work of security guards, as well as that of the segregation in which it is embedded. ( Proposition B) Finally, such results would be contrasted with a dozen interviews with poor people working in the neighborhoods and who experience and navigate the dominated landscape of Delhi.

#### 1.3.4 - Preliminary fieldwork sites

Delhi, like Calcutta, is built “with the availability of a serving class in mind” (Ray and Qayum 2009). This availability has fluctuated over the years, as has the expected level of security. A bigger population than ever can now afford and request service labor, including guards, which used earlier to be the privilege of the *very few*. This historical variation reflects in the layouts of the four areas of Delhi that I had

previously identified: Daryaganj in the Old City (1), Jangpura in the South (2), Mansarovar Garden in the West (3), and Udyog Vihar phase one in Gurgaon<sup>204</sup>, and subsequently Dwarka sector 10 in the East (4). All four sites have guards placed at all times, as well as supplementary personnel and closed gates at night. All four are residential neighborhoods for middle and upper middle-classes. See Map 6 p.320.

I initially proposed to spread the four neighborhoods throughout the National Capital Region, including Gurgaon in the southern periphery. The four non-contiguous neighborhoods have been built and populated at different times but with comparable income populations. They cover a wide spectrum of layouts, from multi-storied developer plots of Dwarka Sector 10 to the segmented houses of Daryaganj in the old city. This would permits me to realize a geographical comparison while making possible to interview the Resident Welfare Associations, the workers and the guards in places in which they do not know each other, in order to make sure that they do not feel threatened by each other's reactions. I proposed that the research pay attention to the circulations in and out of the neighborhoods. The rational behind the choice of fieldwork was the following:

Both Daryaganj and Jangpura have experienced a surge in security guards long after their creation and therefore present ideal sites to explore on the creation of a visible grid of surveillance. In Mansarovar Garden gates were put in place recently, relatively to Daryaganj and Janpura. I supposed it would make of it an excellent site to observe how

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<sup>204</sup> Gurgaon was renamed Gurugram in 2016. It remains Gurgaon in common parlance. In this case the research project of 2014 was organized before the change of name. Here, and subsequently, both terms designate the same city.

relatively newly appointed security guards would develop criteria of inclusion and exclusion.

- Daryaganj

Daryaganj has the peculiarity of being a neighborhood with mixed land use as it is the center of Delhi's book publishing offices and workshops. The part of the neighborhood east of Netaji Subhash Marg, the one interesting me here, was constructed during the British occupation in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The layout is made of straight streets crossing at right angles, a stark contrast from the labyrinthine alleys of old Shahjahanabad. It was originally populated by Bengali doctors and lawyers moving from Calcutta, the old capital of the *Raj*, the British Empire in India, to the new one. Daryaganj was build with security in mind, but in the form perhaps of patrols and visibility.



*Fig. 30: Daryaganj, near Hindu Park, Spring 2008*  
Photo: Author, Delhi, 2008.

The current security apparatus was added to it in later years. The security guards there occasionally work for the shops rather than only for residences, adding private security guards to the police station present near Delhi Gate. The latter closes the neighborhood to the South. Daryaganj is less trendy than it used to be but remains among the most expensive area in the old city.

- Jangpura

Jangpura was my neighborhood during past research and I felt confident using this as a resource. It is a “resettlement colony” that was built for the refugees from western Pakistan after the Partition of 1947. Since then it became quite wealthy. At present Sikhs compose a majority of its population. Jangpura kept climbing up the property value ladder across the years I spent in Delhi, between 2007 and 2017. It is now in the center of South Delhi, and the metro makes it easily accessible. I thought studying its security history would permit an interesting contrast with Daryaganj, which was built before the Partition.

- Mansarovar Garden

The third place, Mansarovar garden is more typical of later developments. It is still an up and coming neighborhood that also benefited from a nearby metro station. Gates have been put in place several years ago to close streets that were not meant to accommodate gates and guards.



- Udyog-Vihar – Dwarka.

I quickly abandoned Udyog Vihar phase one for Dwarka Sector 10. First because the spread of the study was too wide and travel times to Gurgaon would have quickly become problematic. Second because the laws of Haryana concerning private security are different and the authority in charge of controlling them are in Panchkula, in the suburb of Chandigarh, the capital that the State of Haryana shares with the State of Punjab. In view of the difficulties I sometimes encountered to secure interviews, it would not have been compatible with the length of the fieldwork. Finally I knew nobody there, whereas, like for Mansarovar Garden, I had there a friend in Dwarka sector 10 able to host me should the need arise of an overnight stay. I replaced Udyog-Vihar by Dwarka for reasons I explain p.54.

The experience of this preliminary fieldwork produced theoretical and practical changes. The first formulations of my research questions had neglected the legal and statutory aspects of deploying private security guards in a country ruled by laws. It also appeared that security guards were not a uniform category and that subdivisions and distinctions among guards were crucial. Finally, spreading the fieldwork over four different neighborhoods created major difficulties of transportation and commuting time for a minor gain. Overall, my research did prove to be doable and worth pursuing: I had doubted that guards or homeowners would let me ask questions pertaining to private security.

The mode of selection of informants was geography dependent. Except for Dwarka, I started by walking in the neighborhood and interviewed guards who accepted to talk to me. In some cases I simply walked every streets in a block. I conducted four interviews in Daryaganj and two guards refused to communicate with me. I first met my expectations with the Nepali security guard of a book shop. I was surprised however that the following interviews started revolving around the issue of caste<sup>205</sup>. It came as a surprise to me that all but one (the Nepali) guards I had interviewed in Daryaganj turned out to be Brahmin. It became a regular question on all subsequent questionnaires.

In Jangpura all the security guards I could see during this first field trip were guarding individual houses, some of them sitting in sentry boxes. The neighborhood had become posher in my absence. No guards accepted to answer my questions. I did not have at the time the documents certifying my researcher's status that I subsequently used. I tried my luck in neighboring Nizamuddin East to no avail.


In Mansarovar Garden I interviewed a primary employer, but could not pursue longer investigations. I could not record this interview but came in contact with the informant again during the main fieldwork period.

It is in Dwarka that I made the biggest strides. I could conduct three semi directed interviews of guards working in tandem, so six security guards. I could record two of those interviews, but missed one for technical reasons. I received one rejection from the security guards of one of the plot. The interviews covered the conditions of

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205 Jay Prakash, Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.

employment, the geographic, class and caste origins of the guards as well as their prior employment. Again, large majority of them were Brahmins, a trend I kept confirming during my main fieldwork period.



Map 6: Delhi, overview with all field-sites mentioned  
 Source: Google maps, 2018, highlights by the author.

### 1.3.5 - Conclusions of preliminary fieldwork

In conclusion, contrary to my expectations, not only guards were not Rajputs or indifferent to castes, but a large majority were Brahmins. None of the men who I interviewed during that preliminary fieldwork was a former soldier, and none were from Haryana. None took pride in his uniform and none appeared to make of it an “object” of masculinity. The results I obtained were consistent with Gooptu’s work on “Servile Sentinels of the City” (2013b). The security guards I interviewed also reported being the object of disdain and scorn. Upadhyay’s (2011) insights on the irregularities were also confirmed: The security guards I interviewed were paid below minimum wages and did not receive Provident Funds (PF) or Employees' State Insurance (ESI).

Coincidentally, it is also at this point that my academic affiliation with the University of Minnesota was supplemented with a second affiliation with the University of Paris 7 Diderot. I joined the *Centre d’Études en Sciences Sociales sur les Mondes Africains, Américains et Asiatiques* (CESSMA) adding the expertise of a second advisor to guide me through the field.

## 2 - Substantial summary in French.

Ce projet *La ville au filtre des gardiens de sécurité*, est le fruit d'une collaboration entre le département de Géographie, Environnement, Société de l'université du Minnesota (GES) et l'université Paris 7 Diderot. Il a été réalisé sous la codirection de Vinay Gidwani aux États-Unis et de Véronique Dupont en France. Il a bénéficié de plusieurs soutiens financiers majeurs. Parmi eux figurent, aux États-Unis, le GES pour des financements de déplacements, l'organisation « Global Spotlight » pour le terrain préliminaire et l'*American Institute of Indian Studies* pour le terrain de recherche proprement dit. En France, ces recherches ont bénéficié d'un contrat doctoral attribué par l'École Doctorale 382, « Économies, espaces, sociétés, civilisations : pensée critique, politique et pratiques sociales » ainsi que du soutien financier et intellectuel du Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques (CESSMA). En Inde, mes travaux ont trouvé l'appui du *Centre for Policy Research* (CPR).

Ce projet est né d'un paradoxe, celui de l'omniprésence de gardiens de sécurité à Delhi, alors même que la ville est relativement peu dangereuse pour les hommes, et reste hostile pour les femmes, même en leur présence. Les gardiens de sécurité se tiennent aux frontières des quartiers, qui sont de plus en plus marquées par des grilles. À l'intérieur des quartiers ainsi fermés, on trouve en outre des gardiens devant certaines maisons. Ils se tiennent aussi devant les centres commerciaux, où ils fouillent chaque client, et à l'intérieur des centres, devant chaque magasin. Dans toutes les entrées du métro de Delhi,

ainsi que devant tous les bâtiments publics, chaque voyageur est contrôlé avec un détecteur de métaux, et chaque sac scanné.

La présence, ne serait-ce que numérique, des gardiens de sécurité à Delhi n'est pas neutre. Le représentant du ministère de l'intérieur du gouvernement du Territoire National de Delhi (NCT), dont l'un des rôles est de veiller à l'application des lois sur la sécurité privée, estime leur nombre à un demi-million<sup>206</sup>. Le principal lobby représentant le secteur, l'Association Centrale de l'Industrie de la Sécurité Privée (CAPSI) ainsi que la Fédération Indienne des Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie (FICCI) estiment leur nombre en Inde à environ 7 ou 8 millions, dont un ou deux millions à Delhi (EY and FICCI 2013; "CAPSI" n.d.). Ni ces chiffres, ni les méthodologies qui ont permis leur élaboration, ne sont vérifiables. Néanmoins, l'expérience de la vie à Delhi est marquée par l'omniprésence des gardiens.

Je me suis attaché à comprendre quel effet ces hommes ont sur l'organisation socio-spatiale de la ville de Delhi, ce qu'ils permettent et ce qu'ils interdisent. Je précise qu'il s'agit essentiellement d'hommes, les recrutements féminins étant réservés à des situations très spécifiques, par exemple pour fouiller d'autres femmes à l'entrée des centres commerciaux. Je me suis inspiré pour ce travail de « l'architectonique de l'espace » que Henri Lefebvre décrit dans son ouvrage *La production de l'espace* ([1974] 2000, chap. III). Lefebvre décrit, à l'origine de la production de l'espace capitaliste, une « trialectique » composée d'une pratique spatiale, d'une représentation de l'espace, et d'un espace de représentation. Je reprends au fur et à mesure de mon travail ces éléments,

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206 Sharma, Omkar. February 2nd, 2017. "PSARA Law is poorly designed". Delhi. English.

au travers desquels la sécurité privée est vécue, se pense, et permet une représentation de soi, au moins pour ceux qui en bénéficient.

Je montre dans ce travail que les gardiens jouent une part pleine et entière dans la production d'un espace marqué par les inégalités. Ils facilitent la circulation des uns, que j'ai appelé les « classes gardées », et empêchent celle des autres. Ils permettent donc la mise en place et l'accroissement d'inégalités spatiales au moyen, entre autres, de la violence symbolique. Les gardiens sont dépourvus de qualifications professionnelles et n'ont d'autre moyen de production de l'espace que leur propre corps et le temps. Je montre au cours de cette thèse que la sécurité privée est à Delhi la forme prise par le capitalisme prédominant en milieu urbain. Je pose cinq questions de recherche et je propose les hypothèses correspondantes.

J'ai premièrement posé la question suivante : comment l'industrie florissante de la sécurité privée se pose-t-elle comme garante de la forme urbaine reconnue, « visible » ? Par « visible », je ne prétends pas que les bidonvilles ou les espaces interstitiels sont invisibles, mais qu'ils ne sont pas rendus visibles, qu'ils sont effacés dans les représentations de l'espace. Ils forment la grille invisible sur laquelle l'autre s'appuie.

J'ai formulé l'hypothèse que les compagnies de sécurité privée fournissent des gardiens dont le rôle consiste à maintenir la valeur du capital foncier. Les gardiens ne sont pas présents pour répondre à une hypothétique montée de la criminalité. Dès lors, les gardiens peuvent être considérés comme partie prenante de la problématique plus large



des inégalités et, partant, de la prégnance des logiques foncières et immobilières dans la ville.

Il ne s'agit pas de nier l'existence d'une criminalité à Delhi. De fait, même si les statistiques de la police sont toujours sujettes à débats et à caution, je montre que la criminalité est plus faible à Delhi que dans d'autres villes du Sud qui ont servi d'exemple dans les études sur la montée en puissance de la sécurité privée, telles que São Paulo ou Johannesburg – je prends l'exemple du taux de meurtres, plus fiable que d'autres indicateurs. Il faut cependant ajouter un correctif : ces chiffres ne traitent pas les cadavres de façon différentielle selon leur sexe, or Delhi est une ville dont la réputation en termes de violences faites aux femmes est établie. Mais cela souligne un deuxième paradoxe : les gardiens sont impuissants à enrayer ce phénomène, et tendent même à participer de la domination masculine dans les rues. Les compagnies de sécurité admettent ne pas s'intéresser à ce problème, pas plus que les représentants des associations de quartier qui recrutent les gardiens, et sont essentiellement masculines au niveau des prises de décisions. En résumé, le paradoxe reste le suivant : la criminalité réelle à Delhi ne semble pas justifier une telle multiplication des gardiens, alors même que ceux-ci, en outre, ne règlent pas le problème.

Le rôle principal des gardiens de sécurité postés aux portes des quartiers n'est pas d'assurer la sécurité des personnes – même si celle-ci peut être un sous-produit de leur présence. Leur rôle est d'abord de signifier à quelle classe sociale appartient l'espace urbain devant lequel ils sont postés. La sécurité privée maintient à bonne distance les

stigmates de la pauvreté, contribuant ainsi à maintenir la valeur des investissements immobiliers. Leur rôle est donc économique et esthétique.

Cette esthétique est performative. Asher Ghertner (2015) a montré que l'apparence avait des effets politiques et même juridiques pour les quartiers qui forment la ville telle qu'elle est représentée par les institutions du pouvoir. De fait, cette apparence est à la base de leur qualification comme quartiers légaux ou illégaux, davantage même que les documents d'urbanisme. La « ville visible » est celle de ceux que Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2011) a qualifié de « société civile ». Cette société s'exprime dans le langage du droit, quand bien même ses pratiques de l'espace et de son appropriation ne sont pas nécessairement légales (Ananya Roy 2009). Le vis-à-vis de la « société civile » est la « société politique », c'est-à-dire une partie de la population contrainte de négocier en permanence sa place dans la ville et ses accès aux services fondamentaux, tels que l'eau ou l'éducation. Comme l'a montré Ghertner, la « gentrification de l'état » (2015, 77) a rendu la situation d'autant plus précaire pour la société politique, qui s'est vue progressivement évincée des représentations de l'espace, qu'il s'agisse des représentations politiques ou des représentations publicitaires (Brosius 2010; Dupont 2013).

En somme, la représentation dominante de l'espace est celle dans laquelle s'épanouit « l'économie de consommation » (Sanyal 2007). Cette dernière dépend malgré tout de son pendant, « l'économie du besoin »<sup>207</sup>, dont elle se nourrit. Ceux qui travaillent dans cet espace économique toujours plus restreint habitent dans les quartiers précaires,

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<sup>207</sup> “Commodity economy” et “need economy”.

ou les « espaces interstitiels » (Simone 2009, 44). L'économie du besoin reproduit la force de travail dont l'économie de consommation a besoin sans pour autant qu'elle prenne en charge sa reproduction. Les gardiens de sécurité lubrifient les interactions entre les classes « gardées » de l'économie de consommation et les autres.

Ma seconde question est en rapport avec la curieuse surreprésentation relative des castes les plus élevées de l'hindouisme parmi les gardiens de sécurité. J'avais relevé ce fait lors d'un terrain préliminaire en 2014, et j'ai pu le confirmer au cours du terrain principal. Je pose comme hypothèse que, contrairement à l'idée répandue, la demande formidable du secteur en main-d'œuvre contractuelle n'a pas brisé les structures sociales préexistantes telles que les préférences de castes. Je ne suis pas parvenu à expliquer complètement une telle préférence.

La première possibilité est que cette préférence trouve son origine du côté de la demande, chez les commanditaires. Je n'ai trouvé nulle trace d'une telle demande, même en m'attendant à une dénégation formelle. Par surcroît, la question elle-même est problématique, car elle suppose de trouver dans la « pureté » attribuée aux brahmanes la clef d'explication du système de préférence, et *in fine* d'orienter la question dans un sens qui fait du brahmanisme le principe explicatif de l'organisation sociale des castes (Lardinois 1995). Quant aux compagnies de sécurité, elles semblaient simplement ignorer la caste d'origine des gardiens qu'elles emploient. Même si cela peut être mis en doute, il semble néanmoins que la clef de ce phénomène se trouve plutôt du côté de l'offre. Si plusieurs gardiens brahmanes ont admis une préférence pour un travail non manuel, cela

ne suffit cependant pas à faire d'une préférence attribuée à une caste un mode de recrutement pour un secteur entier. À l'autre extrémité de la hiérarchie rituelle des castes, un intouchable pourrait également exprimer une préférence pour un travail non manuel.

Je me suis efforcé sans succès, lors de mon terrain, de remonter les filières de recrutement qui relient la ville aux villages. Certaines compagnies de standing supérieur prétendent qu'elles déploient sur le terrain des autocars et des équipes chargées de recruter les gardiens. Je n'ai pu trouver aucune trace de tels recrutements, y compris parmi les gardiens. Tous les gardiens interrogés affirment s'être rendus d'eux-mêmes aux bureaux des compagnies. La surreprésentation relative des gardiens de haute caste montre bien en tout cas que le capitalisme, dans son extension, réutilise et recoud des formes sociales qui lui préexistent.

Il faut noter – et cela correspond à ce à quoi je m'attendais – une exclusion totale des musulmans du métier de gardien de sécurité. Au point que la question elle-même apparaissait parfois comme incongrue à certains de mes informateurs.

Ma troisième question portait sur la pratique du métier de gardien de sécurité. J'ai demandé quelles attentes et pratiques, formelles et informelles, commandaient la façon dont les gardiens de sécurité organisent la barrière poreuse entre ceux qui sont admis à l'intérieur des quartiers protégés et ceux qui en sont écartés. Simplement, les normes en vigueur dans cette sélection sont fondées sur les apparences physiques et vestimentaires, ainsi que la confiance en soi, même si certains quartiers s'avèrent être filtrés avec plus de rigueur.

Bien qu'une loi imposant un entraînement de 21 jours à tous les gardiens soit entrée en vigueur à Delhi en 2009, la plupart des gardiens interrogés n'ont reçu aucun entraînement formel. J'ai pu prendre moi-même part à trois entraînements, dans des compagnies qui sont au-dessus du niveau des compagnies qui déploient des gardiens pour les associations de résidents des quartiers comme ceux où j'ai conduit mes enquêtes. Un de ces entraînements s'est déroulé dans le sous-sol d'un centre commercial, avec les gardiens qui y sont déployés. Il s'agissait essentiellement d'une formation de prévention et de réaction aux incendies. Le deuxième s'est déroulé dans la banque que les gardiens sont employés à surveiller, et le troisième, hors de Delhi, au pied de tours résidentielles construites au-delà de la limite sud du territoire de la capitale. Aucun ne correspondait aux minima requis par la loi. Le paysage du développement des compétences est en pleine restructuration en Inde, néanmoins il est peu probable que les gardiens employés par les compagnies les moins dotées du système soient touchés par ces changements, qui augmenteraient leurs salaires avec leurs compétences. En effet, l'entraînement des gardiens ne change rien à leur efficacité, d'une part, et personne, pas même les gardiens, ne semble y voir le moindre intérêt, d'autre part. Enfin, il semble peu probable que les compagnies payent des gardiens lors d'un entraînement d'un mois, que les gardiens renoncent à un mois de salaire, et encore moins que les commanditaires se passent de leurs services pendant la même période.

Ma quatrième question est : quelle est l'expérience vécue des gardiens, qui négocient les frictions entre riches et pauvres sans jamais pouvoir rejoindre les premiers ? L'hypothèse est que les gardiens agissent comme des « travailleurs » d'interface. Je veux

dire par là que leur travail consiste en une médiation entre riches et pauvres. Les gardiens s'occupent, au profit des plus favorisés, de faire en sorte que les difficultés de la ville ainsi que les effets de la concentration des richesses n'affectent pas ces derniers. Les gardiens organisent la circulation des véhicules dans les quartiers aisés, tout en assurant l'absence de vols – et éventuellement époussettent les voitures le matin. La relation entre gardien et employeur permet au second d'habiter l'espace de l'immobilier spéculatif de Delhi sans avoir à en percevoir les conséquences.

Mes recherches auprès des gardiens m'ont permis de cerner davantage leurs conditions socio-économiques. Ainsi, leurs salaires bas et les irrégularités multiples qui entachent leurs conditions de travail. Cet axe de recherche m'a aussi permis de remarquer l'étanchéité du mur qui sépare les forces de polices et les gardiens de sécurité. Cela n'avait rien d'une évidence. Dans un autre contexte, celui du Canada, Rigakos ([2002] 2016) montre qu'une culture d'imitation des forces étatiques s'est mise en place.

La cinquième question est la suivante : comment les régulations encadrant l'exercice de la sécurité privée permettent de repenser les relations entre État et sociétés privées ? J'ai finalement posé l'hypothèse que les gardiens agissent au sein d'un réseau de régulations fluctuant, et j'ai suggéré que l'organisation de la sécurité privée à Delhi éclaire les relations entre l'État et les moyens privés d'exclusion et de contrôle. J'ai montré que les dispositifs légaux qui encadrent le travail des gardiens de sécurité sont à la fois incohérents et peu respectés.

Cette incohérence permet de repenser la façon dont l'État fonctionne au travers de l'une de ses fonctions les plus essentielles, celle du maintien de la sécurité des biens et des personnes.

L'effet des gardiens de sécurité sur la ville est donc large et multiple. J'ai organisé la présentation de la méthodologie, des résultats de cette recherche et de leur théorisation en quatre chapitres.

En premier lieu, je présente en détail la méthodologie. J'ai concentré mes recherches sur deux quartiers de Delhi, l'un de classe supérieure – Saket, dans le sud –, et l'autre de classe moyenne – Dwarka, à l'ouest. Saket n'a pas été conçu *a priori* pour garantir la sécurité ou l'exclusivité des habitants. Les Associations de Résidents (RWA) du quartier n'ont fait ériger des grilles et déployer des gardiens qu'après un embourgeoisement certain du quartier. Pour être plus précis, des *chowkidars* y étaient déployés de longue date, mais leur remplacement par des gardiens – quoiqu'il reste des *chowkidars* occasionnellement –, et la mise sous contrôle de tout le voisinage sont plus récents. Ils suivent le processus de cloisonnement de la ville plus qu'ils ne le précèdent. Les *chowkidars* étaient les employés traditionnellement chargés de veiller sur une maison ou un quartier. Ils ne travaillaient pas pour une firme mais dans une relation de dépendance inter-personnelle.

Saket, un quartier construit par l'Agence publique de Développement de Delhi (la Delhi Development Authority, ou DDA), a toujours eu des parcs et des espaces

publics librement accessibles. Les gardiens ont privatisé de fait ces espaces, au bénéfice des résidents et au détriment des travailleurs pauvres, qui pouvaient les traverser ou s’y reposer.

Saket comprend plusieurs centres commerciaux (*malls*). Ce trait particulier m’a permis de comparer le travail et l’origine sociale et géographique des gardiens travaillant dans le centre commercial avec les caractéristiques de ceux qui travaillent dans la rue. Les gardiens travaillant dans les centres commerciaux ont sans surprise un meilleur salaire, un contrat, et sont plus souvent installés à Delhi. Partout à Delhi les gardiens qui travaillent pour les associations de résidents (RWA) sont les plus mal payés.

Dwarka a été construit dans les années 1980, et reflète un développement urbain marqué principalement par le fonctionnalisme, la dépendance à la voiture, et les constructions privées. Le secteur que j’ai choisi, le numéro 10, se présente comme un chapelet de parcelles entourées de murs, percés d’une ou de deux grilles gardées en permanence. La sécurité y a été intégrée dès la conception d’un projet qui n’a d’ailleurs que peu d’espaces publics, en dehors des murs d’enceinte.

J’ai employé plusieurs méthodes de collecte de données. Premièrement, l’observation participante. J’ai pris part à trois entraînements de gardiens, deux à Delhi, dont un dans le sous-sol d’un centre commercial, et un à Manessar, en banlieue sud de Delhi, sous des tours d’habitation de construction récente et déjà bordées de hauts murs. Le principe de cet entraînement était d’établir avec les gardiens une relation de confiance et d’observer par moi-même l’effort physique que le métier demande. Ce travail m’a



permis de répondre aux questions trois et quatre, détaillées plus haut. J'ai également examiné des documents écrits, publiés ou non, tels que des lois et règlements, des publicités ou des études de marché, afin de comprendre le fonctionnement du marché de la sécurité et sa régulation. Cela était nécessaire pour répondre aux questions une et cinq. Néanmoins, j'ai obtenu l'essentiel de mes données par des entretiens semi-dirigés en hindi et en anglais, occasionnellement en groupe, avec des acteurs que j'ai identifiés.

J'ai conduit des entretiens avec des gardiens de sécurité employés par des compagnies de bas niveau et de niveau intermédiaire. J'ai rencontré les représentants de plusieurs associations de résidents à Saket, comme des Sociétés Coopératives de Groupement d'Habitation (CGHS). J'ai rencontré des policiers, ainsi que des représentants du ministère de l'intérieur du gouvernement du Territoire National de la Capitale (NCT). J'ai également interrogé des habitants des quartiers, et des employées domestiques. Ce travail est centré principalement sur les gardiens du niveau le plus bas de la hiérarchie, qui n'ont aucun entraînement et ne savent pas tenir une arme.

Ce travail m'a permis, pour le chapitre II, de contribuer à une « ethnographie spatiale » (Gidwani et Chari 2005) des gardiens de sécurité. Le travail des gardiens est intimement lié à l'espace urbain dans lequel ils sont déployés, et duquel leurs conditions de travail dépendent. Certains ont ainsi accès à une guérite, à l'électricité qui leur permet de recharger leurs téléphones ; d'autres devront allumer des feux de matières plastiques pour chasser le froid des nuits d'hiver. Leurs salaires sont généralement très bas et, dans une large majorité, ils ne reçoivent pas leurs fonds de retraite (Provident Funds), et ne

bénéficient d'aucune sécurité sociale (Employee State Insurance). L'ethnographie du travail ne se limite cependant pas à ces aspects.

L'émancipation des travailleurs a souvent été liée à leur accès à l'espace public. L'espace public est à son tour décrit comme contesté, comme l'espace dans lequel les citoyens peuvent faire entendre leur voix dans les sociétés démocratiques. L'idée d'espace public, compris comme l'inscription dans la ville de la non moins idéale sphère publique (Habermas [1962] 1990) traverse les littératures géographique et philosophique comme une idée performative. Dans cette ethnographie spatiale du travail, j'indique que l'espace public est d'abord et avant tout construit par des travailleurs, et que, corollairement, d'autres travailleurs peuvent être chargés d'en empêcher le développement. Les gardiens de sécurité sont chargés d'organiser une ville marquée par une structure de « post-développement » (Gidwani and Reddy 2011), c'est-à-dire par des relations de classe qui n'intègrent pas d'engagement éthique. La ville que les gardiens contribuent à construire n'est pas seulement fragmentée en quartiers grillagés et murés. Elle est essentiellement l'espace produit par un capitalisme et une société dans lesquels le projet de modernité (Berman [1983] 1999), dont l'idée d'espace public est partie prenante, s'interroge sur sa pertinence.

J'ai montré qu'une large proportion de gardiens de sécurité sont des migrants venus de la plaine gangétique, avec un large contingent de gardiens originaires de l'État du Bihar. La plupart des gardiens de sécurité avec lesquels j'ai pu conduire des entretiens ont leurs familles au village, et possèdent souvent un lopin de terre. Ils rentrent de façon

irrégulière. À quelques exceptions près, ils entendent revenir un jour au village de façon définitive. Je montre que leur statut de caste supérieure n'empêche pas ces « sentinelles serviles » (Gooptu 2013b) d'être méprisées par leurs employeurs, directs ou indirects. Je pose l'hypothèse que ce dédain est lié à la présence d'hommes marqués par le « corps rural » au sein même de ce que j'ai appelé les « classes gardées ». Leur présence et leur rôle dans la reproduction de la domination de classe restent visibles et dérangeants.

Dans le troisième chapitre, je décris les relations entre l'État et la sécurité privée à Delhi. Je commence par la célèbre interprétation de l'État par Max Weber ([1919] 1994) comme étant « la communauté humaine qui, sur un territoire donné – et ayant la notion de territoire comme l'une de ses caractéristiques – réclame pour elle-même (et avec succès), *le monopole de la violence physique légitime* ». Je considère que cette définition comporte une forte charge normative. Sa pertinence peut cependant être remise en question par la croissance de la sécurité privée. Je propose de considérer le problème sous l'angle de la construction de l'État, c'est-à-dire sous l'angle de la reconfiguration permanente de structures de pouvoir autour de projets de gouvernement. La sécurité privée n'opère pas contre la volonté de l'État ou sur un plan différent, mais au contraire contribue à la « gentrification de l'État » (Ghertner 2015) au profit des classes possédantes.

Le gouvernement indien a mis en place un certain nombre de dispositifs légaux. Certains encadrent la pratique de la sécurité privée dans une perspective de maintien de

l'ordre. D'autres encadrent la formation des gardiens dans une perspective de formation des ressources humaines. Ces deux perspectives entrent en conflit.

On peut supposer qu'il s'agissait pour l'État et pour les entreprises d'ouvrir un marché de la sécurité privée en interdisant le recrutement de gardiens individuels (les traditionnels *chowkidars*), au profit des gardiens recrutés par des compagnies enregistrées.

Deuxièmement, les incohérences entre la loi et les régulations encadrant l'entraînement et le déploiement des gardiens de sécurité forcent à reconsidérer l'intervention de l'État dans ce domaine, et montrent les origines et les réponses multiples apportées au problème de la sécurité privée à Delhi. Pour les représentants du ministère de l'intérieur au gouvernement du Territoire National de la Capitale (NCT), la première justification à la promulgation d'une loi était la nécessité de pouvoir contrôler la multiplicité des compagnies, afin de s'assurer que les gardiens ne soient pas eux-mêmes des criminels. L'Acte de Régulation des Agences de Sécurité Privées a ainsi été voté au niveau fédéral en 2005, et traduit dans une loi du NCT en 2009.

Plus récemment, le gouvernement a mis en place plusieurs programmes afin d'améliorer le niveau de formation de la population, et donc le niveau des salaires. Le ministère des *Skills and Entrepreneurship* a ainsi encouragé le développement de corporations chargées de mettre en place des cursus et des programmes d'entraînement ("National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) - About Us" n.d.). Un programme supplémentaire attaché au premier ministre, le Programme du Premier Ministre en Faveur

de la Jeunesse (“Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY)” n.d.) rembourse les compagnies qui avanceraient la somme nécessaire à l’entraînement de leurs hommes. Ces programmes ne sont pas compatibles, et ne sont pas reconnus par le ministère de l’intérieur de l’État de Delhi. Parallèlement, ce système a favorisé la mise en place d’une importante corruption. Dans les mois qui ont suivi la fin de mes recherches de terrain, l’organisme principal chargé de superviser la formation des gardiens a été suspendu, et ses comptes mis sous séquestre (Pant 2018).

Que faire de ces incohérences ? En fait, l’État ne doit pas être vu comme un tout cohérent mais comme un ensemble toujours en construction et en reconfiguration. Pour Foucault ([1979] 2004, 79), « l’État, ce n’est rien d’autre que l’effet mobile d’un régime de gouvernementalités multiples ». Ainsi, ces incohérences ne sont pas anormales mais partie prenante d’une construction permanente de l’État.

En outre, ces régulations ne sont pas seulement incohérentes, elles sont avant tout ignorées, tant par les représentants de l’État, qui ne les appliquent pas – il n’y a eu aucune condamnation ni retrait de licence depuis 2009 – que par les compagnies, qui n’en tiennent pas compte. Simplement, les classes dominantes à Delhi se satisfont de cet état de fait, qui leur permet de faire intervenir en leur faveur les gardiens privés de sécurité quand la police est tenue, en principe, à la loi.

Dans ce contexte de régulations fluctuantes, les associations de voisinage (*Resident Welfare Associations* et *Cooperative Group Housing Societies*, RWA et CGHS), en tant que groupes de citoyens constitués, affirment leur domination sur des territoires

urbains. Cela n'est pas sans évoquer un « *nomos* » – c'est-à-dire un partage d'espace fondateur en droit (Schmitt [1950] 2001). Le contrôle que les classes moyennes et supérieures effectuent sur leurs territoires leur permet de « décider de l'exception ». Cela met en danger la possibilité même d'un espace public partagé.

Je me tourne vers le travail de Michel Foucault pour explorer les limites du modèle « guerre-répression » qu'il propose. Les gardiens de sécurité permettent un contrôle sur les corps non désirés, et facilitent la circulation des véhicules et des personnes des classes supérieures au sein de leurs quartiers, tout en rendant plus difficile la circulation des personnes des classes plus défavorisées. Cette « bio-politique » (Foucault [1979] 2004) rappelle l'idée d'État d'exception défendue par Giorgio Agamben (1998). J'examine la pertinence pour le contexte de la sécurité privée à Delhi des théories bio-politiques développées par ce dernier, ainsi que par Roberto Esposito (2008). Le modèle « positif » développé par Esposito, celui d'un système biopolitique qui permet la circulation précisément parce qu'il peut la suspendre, est particulièrement intéressant pour comprendre le cas de Delhi. Il permet en effet de penser le travail des gardiens dans les termes des pratiques de l'espace (Lefebvre [1974] 2000, 43) que les gardiens rendent possibles – cela inclut la sociabilité « post-développement » (Gidwani and Chaturvedi 2011, 1640) des classes moyennes et supérieures.

Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, je m'attache à décrire le rôle des gardiens de sécurité dans l'économie politique de Delhi – et, par là même, leur rôle dans la production de l'espace et de la forme urbaine de la ville. À partir de 1991, le

gouvernement indien, sous une double pression interne et externe, a adopté des séries de mesures qui ont amplifié la croissance économique. Les classes moyennes et supérieures urbaines ont été les premières bénéficiaires de cette croissance, qui a également renforcé les inégalités. Ces inégalités ont à leur tour renforcé un urbanisme de l'exclusion, que les gardiens contribuent à mettre en place.

La production d'un urbanisme d'exclusion organisé autour des RWA et des CGHS a émergé de manière concomitante avec l'arrivée en Inde des premières sociétés privées de sécurité, domestiques et internationales. Dans la même période, des transformations du marché du travail mises en place par la libéralisation ont amené en ville – et, par là, vers ces compagnies –, une masse de travailleurs sans qualifications ni protection sociale.

Les gardiens sont employés pour apporter un sentiment de sécurité et d'exclusivité. À leur insu, ils servent également à maintenir la valeur de l'immobilier. La particularité de leur travail est qu'il se mesure en une simple présence. J'indique que les gardiens de sécurité offrent un exemple paradigmatique de travail non qualifié. Ici, le temps de travail moyen est équivalent aux heures travaillées. L'extraction de la plus-value est réalisée sur la différence entre le coût réglementaire du travail et le coût effectif des salaires.

Le travail des gardiens est de rendre effective la domination sociale de leurs employeurs sur le reste de la ville. Je reviens vers Lefebvre pour dire que la forme économique dominante définit la production de l'espace. Ici, le capitalisme s'appuie sur

des particularités locales dues à la place des femmes et au régime de castes. Je détaille en particulier la dynamique de genre, ayant déjà abordé la dynamique de caste dans d'autres sections.

Dans une dernière section, je propose d'examiner la double place que jouent les gardiens de sécurité pour tenir à distance les crises économiques. D'un côté, les gardiens jouent le rôle de « travailleurs d'interface », et protègent les riches des conséquences sociales des inégalités. D'un autre côté, leur nombre, malgré les difficultés qu'il y a à l'évaluer, permet d'absorber une partie du « surplus d'humanité » (Marx [1867] 1976) attirée par la perspective de sortir de la misère à Delhi.

Ces considérations sur le rôle des gardiens a des conséquence sur la façon de comprendre la ville. La notion de « Droit à la Ville » (Lefebvre [1968] 2009) – empruntée au manifeste éponyme de Lefebvre et dont la *Production de l'Espace* ([1974] 2000) est la forme théoriquement achevée – s'accommode mal des espaces de domination dont les gardiens sont les premiers acteurs. Ces espaces matérialisent les formations « post-développementales » dans lesquelles la notion d'espace public, indexée depuis son origine sur la notion d'égalité entre citoyens, est remise en cause. La ville de Lefebvre devait être œuvre commune.

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J'ai indiqué que l'accroissement de la sécurité privée coïncidait avec le tournant de la libéralisation et de la valorisation de l'immobilier. Ces phénomènes ont favorisé la montée en puissance de classes sociales dont le mode de vie idéal est fondé sur



l'exclusivité. On peut se demander s'il s'agit d'un phénomène mondial, qui s'observe également à São Paulo (Caldeira 2000) ou en Afrique du Sud (Faull 2018). Comme cela a été fait pour les forces de polices (Fassin 2017), établir une comparaison des forces de sécurité privées avec d'autres villes, telles que Lahore ou Karachi, serait une initiative bienvenue.

### 3 - List of interviews<sup>208</sup>

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Farooq <b>Jafri</b> , Security Guard Company A, Interview, 1st March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.
Madhur <b>Gotra</b> , Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.
Mr <b>Girish</b> , Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, Hindi. Research Assistant: P. Tripathy.
Mr <b>Girish</b> , Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi. Research Assistant: P. Tripathy.
Maadav <b>Jah</b> , Interview, 24th February 2017, Delhi, Hindi. Research assistant: N. Jha.
Mr <b>Jahangeer</b> , Interview, 24th February 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi. Research assistant: N. Jha.
Miss <b>Johana</b> , Interview, 16th January 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.
Shyam <b>Kampur</b> , Interview, 13th October 2016, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.
Raj <b>Kapur</b> , Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.
Mr <b>Kaur</b> , RWA, Saket Block Blue, Interview, 21st June 2017, Saket, Delhi, English. Research assistant, P. Tripathy.
Col. Priamvaad <b>Kumar</b> , RSSS, Interview, 9th February 2017, Delhi, English.
Rajeev <b>Kumar</b> , Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi. Research Assistant: P. Tripathy

208 All names have been changed. Names are classified by alphabetical order of family names,

Vijay <b>Kumar</b> , Delhi Police, Interview, 7th June 2017, Hauz Khas, Delhi, English.
Ram <b>Kuriar</b> , Interview, 20th February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.
Mrs <b>Lohar</b> , incumbent RWA president, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, English. Research assistant: P. Tripathy
Jules <b>Maigret</b> , Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.
General <b>Maitra</b> , SSSDC, Interview, 10th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.
Mr <b>Mishra</b> , Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka sector 10, Delhi, Hindi. R. A. P. Tripathy.
Daanish <b>Mishra</b> , Interview, 3rd May 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi. Research assistant: N. Jha.
Manish <b>Mishra</b> , SSSDC, Interview, 13th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.
Rajeev <b>Nitharwal</b> , International Campus of Security, Interview, 29th November 2016, Delhi, English.
Ramesh <b>Pandey</b> , Interview, 2nd February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi. Research Assistant: P. Tripathy
Birmal <b>Rathore</b> , Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi. Research assistant: N. Jha.
Jay <b>Prakash</b> , Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.
Hazari <b>Prasad</b> , RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English. Delhi. Research assistant: P. Tripathy.
Sidhiman <b>Rai</b> , Asiatic Training Society, Interview, 5th June 2017, Delhi, English.
Mrs <b>Savita</b> , Interview, 3rd January 2014, Mansarovar Garden, Delhi, English.
Miss <b>Shweta</b> and Miss Bhavia, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka 10, Delhi, Hindi. Interview conducted by P. Tripathy.
Col. <b>Singh</b> , 2Kuri Company, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.
Jagadev <b>Singh</b> , e-mail correspondence, 2017-2018, English.
Babita <b>Sharma</b> , Interview, 10th May 2018, Delhi, English.
Pearl <b>Sharma</b> , Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi. R. assistant, P Tripathy.
Omkar <b>Sharma</b> , civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.
Rishab <b>Tiwari</b> , CMBody, 8th December 2016, Delhi, English.
Mr <b>Tripathy</b> , EuroSec, Interview, 14th February 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.
Raj <b>Thakur</b> , Seagull Security, Interview, 5th May 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi. Research assistant: P. Tripathy.

## 4 - Synoptic tables of interviews

### 4.1 - Interviews with security guards

Table 8: Interview with security guards, synoptic table.<sup>209</sup>

	Salary	State of origin	Caste	Land?	Previous occupation
Anonymous		Nepal		yes	farmer
Anonymous			Brahmin		
Anonymous					
Anonymous	6000	Uttar Pradesh	Brahmin	yes	export line, also farmer
Anonymous	6000	Uttar Pradesh	Kshatriya, Rajput	yes	farmer
Anonymous	6000	Delhi	Kshatriya, Rajput	yes	Production (?)
Anonymous	6000	Delhi	Kshatriya, Rajput	yes	farmer
Anonymous	No Data				Military
Anonymous	6000	Jharkhand	Brahmin		
Anonymous	No data	Delhi			
Anonymous	13000	Jharkhand	Brahmin		
Anonymous	13000	Nepal			
Anonymous				yes, before	
Anonymous	12000	Bihar		family passed	garment manufacturer
Anonymous	7500	West Bengal	Kshatriya		
Anonymous	9000	Delhi	OBC, Jaat		
Anonymous	7000	Nepal	Baniya, Aggraval	yes	farmer, then electrician in a factory that closed

209 I only mention here the details for the interviews that have been mentioned in the text. I removed all informations permitting the identifications of informants..

Anonymous	17000	Haryana	Brahmin		
Anonymous	14000	Uttar Pradesh	Brahmin		
Anonymous	unknown	Uttar Pradesh			
Anonymous	10000	Bihar			
Anonymous		Bihar	Brahmin	yes	farmer
Anonymous		Bihar	Brahmin	yes	
Mr Chaaran, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	5000	Bihar /UP	Kshatriya, Rajput	yes	
Badri Chauhan, Interview, 27th April 2017, Delhi, Hindi.	8500	West Bengal	Kshatriya, Rajput Rasbuns	no	Bike shop closed down
Mr Girish, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, Hindi.	12000	Jharkhand	Brahmin, Bhoomiar	yes	seed trade
Mr Girish, Interview, 28th March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.					
Maadav Jah, Interview, 24th February 2017, Delhi, Hindi.	7500	Bihar	Brahmin, Maithil	No	production manager
Mr Jahangeer, Interview, 24th February 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi.		Uttar Pradesh		yes	
Shyam Kampur, Interview, 13th October 2016, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	7000	Uttar Pradesh			painter
Raj Kapur, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.					
Rajeev Kumar, Interview, 1st February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	10000	Bihar	Brahmin, Bhoomiyar		farmer
Ram Kuriar, Interview, 20th February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	15000	Jharkhand	st sc	no	student, bike shop
Mr Mishra, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka sector 10, Delhi, Hindi.	9000	Bihar	Brahmin		
Daanish Mishra, Interview, 3rd May 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	5600	Uttar Pradesh	Brahmin		
Ramesh Pandey, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	17000 (2 jobs)	Bihar	Brahmin	yes	Puja Brahmin
Jay Prakash, Interview, 3rd August 2014, Daryaganj, Delhi, Hindi.			Brahmin		
Birmal Rathore, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.	9400	Bihar	Kshatriya	yes	multiple, farmer
Pearl Sharma, Interview, 17th January 2017, Delhi, Hindi.	10000	Bihar	Brahmin	no	none

#### 4.2 - Interviews with companies

Table 9: Interview with companies, synoptic table<sup>210</sup>.

	Name of company	Contact	Localisations	Deployment observed
Col. Singh, 2Kuri Company, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.	2Kuri		Patel nagar	Gurgaon
Naveen Chaubey, 2Kuri, Interview, 8th February 2017, Delhi, English.	2Kuri	Singh		
Rishab Tiwari, CMBody, 8th December 2016, Delhi, English.	CMBody	Rishab Tiwari	Rajindra pl	no
Mr Tripathy, EuroSec, Interview, 14th February 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.	EuroSec	Tripathy		
Anonymous, EuroSec, Interview, 14th February 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.	EuroSec			
Madhur Gotra, Evening Vigil, Interview, 5th October 2016, Delhi, English.	Evening Vigil	Madhur Gotra	Vasant kunj	Saket MGF mall
Schweta Arora, Evening Vigil, Interview, 20th January 2017, Delhi, English.	Evening Vigil	Arora L.S		
L.S. Arora, Evening Vigil, Interview, 13th October 2016, Delhi, English.	Evening Vigil	Schweta Arora		
	Fair and Lovely Security		Dwarka 10 main market	closed x years before refusal to communicate
	Fast Forward company		address	Saket
Rajeev Nitharwal, International Campus of Security, Interview, 29th November 2016, Delhi, English.	International Campus of Security			
K.L. Bhatia, Pound Security Room, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.	Pound Security Room	K.L. Bhatia		Saket
Col. Priamvaad Kumar, RSSS, Interview, 9th February 2017, Delhi, English.	RSSS			
Raj Thakur, Seagull Security, Interview, 5th May 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, Hindi.	Seagull Security	Raj Thakur	West	dwarka
Farooq Jafri, Security Guard Company A, Interview, 1st March 2017, Delhi, Hindi.	Security Guard Company A	Farook Jaffrey		

<sup>210</sup> I only mention here the details for the interviews that have been mentioned in the text. I removed all information permitting the identifications of informants. The companies are classified by name of company.

Vinod Chaubey, Training Institute, Interview, 21st February 2017, Delhi, English.

Training Institute

Vinod  
Chaubey

Sultanpur  
MS  
Gurugram/So

Sidhiman Rai, Asiatic Training Society, Interview, 5th June 2017, Delhi, English.

Sidhiman Rai

uthex  
Dwarka 10  
main market Closed 5 years ago  
Dwarka 10  
main market Closed 4 years ago  
Dwarka 10  
main market Closed 4 years ago  
Dwarka 10 shifted to dwarka  
main market mor

Jagadev Singh, multiple e-mail correspondence with the author, 2017, English.

#### 4.3 - Interviews with institutions' representatives

*Table 10: Interview with institutions' representatives, synoptic table<sup>211</sup>*

	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Person of contact</b>
Priyanka <b>Andrew</b> and Shweta Bhatnagar, Security Watch India, Interview, 15th November 2016, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, English.	SWI	
General <b>Maitra</b> , SSSDC, Interview, 10th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.	SSSDC	General Maitra
Vijay <b>Kumar</b> , Delhi Police, Interview, 7th June 2017, Hauz Khas, Delhi, English.	Delhi Police	Vijay Kumar
Manish <b>Mishra</b> , SSSDC, Interview, 13th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.	SSSDC	Manish Mishra
Omkar <b>Sharma</b> , civil servant, Interview, 2nd February 2017, Delhi, English.	PSARA CAPSI	Omkar Sharma

<sup>211</sup> I only mention here the details for the interviews that have been mentioned in the text. I removed all informations permitting the identifications of informants.

#### 4.4 - Miscellaneous interviews

*Table 11: Miscanellous interviews, synoptic table<sup>212</sup>*

Domestic Workers Union, Group Interview, 15th May 2017, Delhi, Hindi.  
Group Interview with CGHS, Plot Red, 25th June 2017, Dwarka Sector 10, Delhi, English.  
Miss **Johana**, Interview, 16th January 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.  
Raj **Kapur**, Interview, 27th April 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.  
Mr **Kaur**, RWA, Saket Block Blue, Interview, 21st June 2017, Saket, Delhi, English.  
Col. Priamvaad **Kumar**, RSSS, Interview, 9th February 2017, Delhi, English.  
Ram **Kurjar**, Interview, 20th February 2017, Saket, Delhi, Hindi.  
Mrs **Lohar**, incumbent RWA president, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka, Delhi, English.  
Jules **Maigret**, Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.  
Manish **Mishra**, SSSDC, Interview, 13th January 2017, Gurgaon, Haryana, English.  
Hazari **Prasad**, RWA, Saket Block Red, 3rd July 2017, Saket, Delhi, English. Delhi.  
Mrs **Savita**, Interview, 3rd January 2014, Mansarovar Garden, Delhi, English.  
Miss **Shweta** and Miss Bhavia, Interview, 25th June 2017, Dwarka 10, Delhi, Hindi.  
Babita **Sharma**, Interview, 10th May 2018, Delhi, English.  
Jules **Maigret**, Interview, 3rd November 2016, Delhi, French.

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<sup>212</sup> I only mention here the details for the interviews that have been mentioned in the text. I removed all informations permitting the identifications of informants.



## 5 - Letters and hand-outs used for fieldwork

### 5.1 - Hand-out for security guards



Damien Carrière  
81 30 656 933  
carri196@umn.edu

नमस्ते,

मैं दिल्ली के सेक्युरिटी गार्ड के बारे में किताब लिख रहा हूँ। यह किताब मैं अपनी पढ़ाई के लिये लिख रहा हूँ। यह खोज मेरी पी० एच० डी० का काम है। मैं फ्रांस से हूँ और दो विश्वविद्यालयों के लिये काम करता हूँ। पहला अमेरिका में है: यूनिवर्सिटी ऑफ मिनेसोटा और दूसरा फ्रांस में है: यूनिवर्सिटी पारीस दीदरो। दिल्ली में एक रिसर्च सेंटर में रहता हूँ जिसका नाम है सी० पी० आर०। मेरे प्रोफेसर हैं: अमेरिका से, बीने गीदवानी, और फ्रांस से - वेरोनिक दुपोन।

आधुनिक युग में दिल्ली में सेक्युरिटी गार्ड हर तरफ खड़े हुए हैं। फिर भी उनके बारे में कुछ नहीं लिखा गया है। सेक्युरिटी गार्ड कहाँ से आते हैं? उनका वेतन कितना है? क्या उनकी जाती और उनके काम के बीच रिश्ता है? वे गांव से आते हैं या शहर से? वे दिल्ली क्यों और कैसे आते हैं? आदि। यह सवाल सिर्फ उदाहरण हैं और मेरे लिये सबसे महत्वापूर्ण सवाल होगा कि वे क्या सोचते हैं? वे अमीर - गरिब लोगों के बीच रहकर कैसा माहसूस करते हैं? उनका गाड़ बनने का अनुभव कैसा है? इसलिये मैं ट्रेनिंग के बारे और ज़िन्दगी के बारे में इतने सवाल पूछूँगा।

मेरा काम विश्वविद्यालय में रिसर्च है। यूनिवर्सिटी आफ मिनेसोटा के कानून के अनुसार हर जानकारी में नामरहित अपने पास रखूँगा। किसी भी परिस्थिति में मैं किसी सन्ता, कम्पनी या सरकारी एजेंसियों से कोई भी सूचना नहीं बाँट सकता हूँ। किताब में भी आपका असली नाम या पता नहीं इस्तेमाल किया जाएगा।

आप कभी भी यह पछताछ खत्म कर सकते हैं। यदि आपके पास कोई सवाल है इस रिसर्च के बारे में तो आप मुझे फोन कर सकते हैं, या सी० पी० आर०, या मेरे प्रोफेसर बीने गीदवानी को फोन कर सकते हैं। अगर आप किसी और से बात करना चाहें तो आप "Research Subjects' Advocate Line" से फोन कर सकते हैं।

मेवा में,

Damien Carrière  
(अभिधान)  
01/02/2016

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Centre for Policy Research	INDIA	+91 (11) 26415273-76 info@cpriindia.org
Research Subjects' Advocate Line	USA	+001 612 625-1670

Fig. 31: Hand-out for security guards.

## 5.2 - Letter for security companies



June 2016

Sir,

I am conducting a research on security guards and security companies in India. Despite a booming market, virtually no anthropological study has been done about the men tasked with protecting our city. I expect to shed light on the nature and structure of the security industry and on the social and demographic background of the guards. This project could contribute to making Delhi safer and more pleasant to live. This study is required for the completion of my PhD in the Geography department of the University of Minnesota in the US and of the University Paris Diderot in France. It is hosted in India by the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi and it is financed by the American Institute of Indian Studies. It is supervised by Professor Vinay Gidwani for the University of Minnesota and Professor Véronique Dupont for the University of Paris Diderot.

My study will take place entirely in Delhi, over three phases. 1- I will interview management and trainers of unarmed security guards training centre. 2- I will register myself in a training course to do a participant observation. This will be crucial to understanding the techniques and mindset of the guards. 3- I will interview guards working in different neighbourhoods in Delhi.

In order to carry out this study, I would be extremely grateful if you would accept to receive me for an interview. As per the rules and regulations guiding research conducted by the University of Minnesota, every information will be strictly anonymous and shall not be shared with any third party. After completion of the study, records will be kept in a safe in the University of Minnesota, USA, for two years and subsequently destroyed.



Fig. 32: Handout for security companies

### 5.3 - Certificate of confidentiality



Dr Véronique DUPONT  
Joint Director, CESSMA, IRD

Paris, 15 December, 2016

#### To whomever it may concern

Damien Carrière is a PhD student who is conducting a research on security guards and security companies in India. Despite a booming market, virtually no anthropological study has been done about the men tasked with protecting the city. This study is required for the completion of his Ph.D with the University of Minnesota in the US, under the supervision of Professor Vinay Gidwani, and with the University Paris Diderot in France, under my supervision. In India, this study is hosted by the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi.

As per the rules and regulations guiding research involving the University of Minnesota and listed and controlled by the Institutional Review Board:

- **The information collected will be strictly anonymous and shall not be shared with any third party.**
- **The names of private persons and companies will be changed so as to protect the privacy of the respondents as well as the integrity of the research.**
- **After completion of the study, existing records will be kept in a safe in the University of Minnesota, USA, for two years and subsequently destroyed.**
- **The conclusions of the research on the other hand will be publicly available.**

I remain at your disposal for any further information you may require.

Véronique Dupont  
Email : veronique.dupont@ird.fr

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Fig. 33: Certificate of confidentiality

5.4 - Letter of credential for the Center for Policy Research




Fig. 34: Credential letter from Center for Policy Research.

## 6 - Samples of interview guides

The interview guides were modified and progressed as questions became more precise. Those reproduced here are but a sample that only represent the state of my research at a given moment in the field. In addition, those guides were meant to trigger conversations and support a semi directed interview. As expected, the further away from those frameworks interviews went, the more interesting they were.

### 6.1 - Interview guide for security guards

NAME:

DATE:

#### Demographics

What is your age

आपकी उम्र कितनी है?

Where are you from?

आप कहाँ से हैं?

Where in Delhi do you live?

दिल्ली में आप कहाँ रहते हैं?

Are you married?

क्या आपकी शादी हो गई है?

Do you have children?

बच्चे हैं? लडके - लडकियाँ ?

(Male) Does your wife work?

क्या आपकी पत्नी काम करती है?

What works does she do?

वह क्या काम करती है?

Can I ask you how much she earns?

क्या मैं पुछूँ कि वह कितना कामाती है?

(Female) does your husband work?

क्या आपका पती काम करता है?

What does he do?

वह क्या करता है?

Can I ask you how much he earns?

क्या मैं पुछ सकता हूँ कि वह कितना कामाता है?

What do your children do ?

आपके बच्चे क्या करते हैं?

Do they study?

पढ़ते हैं?

What and where do they study?

वे क्या पढ़ते हैं? कहाँ से?/कोनसे विश्वविद्यालय से?

What do/did you parent do?

आपके माता-पिता क्या करते हैं?

### **Life before**

Why did you leave your village ?

आप क्यों गाँव से गए ?

Could you describe your place of origin? (village, city, small city?)

कृपा आप अपने गाव/शहर का वरनन कर सकते हैं ?

क्या आप गाँव से हैं?

Does your family have land there?

क्या आपके परिवार के पास उधर ज़मीन है?

Is someone still living there?

कोई पारिवार से उधर राहता है?

Any other mean of income for your family there?

कोई और कमाई के साधन थे /हैं ? जैसे ज़मीन, प्रोपर्टी, दुकान, गाय ...?

Did you do any other job before becoming a security guard?

सिक्यूरटी गार्ड बनने से पहले आप दुसरे नौकरी करते थे?

Is it your first job in Delhi?

क्या दिल्ली में आपके पहले जोब है ?

(some used to be factory workers, some just start. Not the same companies it seems.)

Why did you chose Delhi?

क्यों दिल्ली ?

When did you arrive here?

आप कब दिल्ली आए ।

Where you surprised by Delhi's way of life?

Could you compare the experience of working there with your experience as a guard?

सिक्यूरटी काम के अनुभव और पिचले काम के अनुभवों के फर्क का वर्णन करें ?

Have you always worked for the same company?

क्या आपने सिर्फ इस कम्पनी के लिये काम किया है?

Have you been posted elsewhere before as a security guard?

क्या यहाँ आने से पहले आप दुसरे जगह में सिक्यूरटी का काम करते थे?

Where all have you lived?

### **Recruitment**

How was your recruitment?

सिक्यूरटी कम्पनी में आपकी भरती कैसे हुई थी ?

How did you get the idea of becoming a security guard?

सिक्यूरटी गार्ड बनने का खयाल कैसे आया?

Did you consider other line of work?

क्या आपने कोई और नौकरी लेने का विचार किया है?

- Had you considered the army or the police?  
क्या आपने फ़ौज य पूलीस बनने का विचहार किया था?
- Is manual labor a problem?  
शारीरिक श्रम करने में कोई अपत्ती होगी?
- Would you consider a manual job if the pay were better?  
अगर तनख्वाह बेहतर हो तो क्या आप शारीरिक श्रम करेंगे?
- Were you recommended?  
क्या किसी ने आपको सलाह दि थी ?
- Did you have to give a bribe?  
क्या आपको घूस देना पडा?  
Do you know someone who had to?  
किसी को जानते हैं जिसे पडा ?  
To whom? How much? To obtain what?  
किसको, कितना, किस काम के लिये?
- Did you walk in or did you meet a recruitment drive, did you read a newspaper announcement?  
आखबर में विज्ञापन, पहचन से, रक्रुटमन्ट द्राइव, ऐजेंसी?
- What questions did the recruitment agency/team ask?  
आपसे ऐगंसी ने क्या पूछतछ किया?
- When did you start in this company?  
इस company में आपने कब शुरू की?

### **Training**

- Can you tell us more about the training?  
ट्रैनिंग के बारे में और गहराई में बताये ।
- How did you feel about it? Did you find it strange?  
क्या आपको कठिनाई महसूस हुई ? क्या ट्रैनिंग एक अजीब अनूभव था?
- What did you learn in a few words?  
कुछ शबदों में अपने कया कया सिखा?
- Could you describe the physical training?  
शरीरिक ट्रैनिंग के बारे में कोई बात कीजिए ?
- Was there a theory training?
- Do you think the training helps you in your daily job?  
क्या आपके खयाल में ट्रैनिंग आपके दैनिक काम में ज़ारुरी है?
- Do they train you from time to time?  
क्या कभी कभी वे आपको ट्रैनिंग देते हैं?
- Did the training change your attitude? (standing?)
- You got a certificate for your training? Could I see it?  
क्या उनहोने आपको ट्रैनिंग सेर्टिफिकेट दिया है ? मैं देखूँ?
- Was there only a PSARA training or also a company training?  
क्या सिर्फ़ PSARA ने ट्रैनिंग दिया था या कम्पनी का ट्रैनिंग भी था?
- How did you perceive the trainers?  
ट्रैनेर्ज़ के बारे में आपका क्या खयाल है?

Who were the trainers according to you? (military, civilians, police?)

आपके खयाल में ट्रेनेर्ज़ कौन कौन थे ?

### **Working conditions**

Can you tell us a little more about your work?

आपके काम के बारे में कोई बात बताये?

How long have you been working for this company?

कितने महिने/साल से इस कम्पनी में काम कर रहे हैं?

How has been your experience of working with your current company?

इस कम्पनी में काम करने का अनुभव कैसा रहा है ?

How are your relationship with your employer?

कम्पनी के साथ संबंध कैसे हैं?

Has there been talks of union drives?

क्या कभी यूनियन बनाने की बात हुई है?

Would you describe for us the hierarchy in your company?

आपकी कम्पनी की अनुक्रम के बारे में कोई बात सुनाइए

What have been your relationship with this hierarchy?

अनुक्रम के साथ कैसे चलता है ?

Is giving bribes necessary to become supervisor.

क्या supervisor बनने के लिये घुस देना है ?

Has there been any change in your working conditions since you joined the security sector? (want to know how is the sector evolving).

जब से आपने सिक्क्यूरटी की नौकरी शुरू की है, क्या आपके काम की परिस्थिति में कोई बदलाव आया है?

How would you describe your current living conditions?

आपकी वर्तमान जिवन की स्थिति के बारे में कुछ बताएं।

Does the company give PF and ISI?

क्या कम्पनी पी० एफ० और एस० आई० देती है ?

What is your net salary?

पी० एफ० और एस० आई० कटकर आपकी तनख्वा कितनी है?

Do you have any other work to supplement your incomes?

क्या आपकी कमाई के और कोई सधन है? जैसे कि ?

Do you see your work here as a long term employment?

क्या आप यहाँ लम्बे समय तक नौकरी करना चाहते हैं ?

What do you think you will do after this?

इस नौकरी के बाद आप क्या करना चाहते हैं?

Did you have to purchase your own uniform? (what kind of expenses did you have to do?)

क्या आपको अपनी यूनीफर्म खुद खरीदनी पडी ?

Do you have a copy of your contract? Can I see it by chance?

क्या आपके पास आपने कान्ट्रैक्ट की कापी है? मैं देख सकता हूँ?

Do you only work in the standing post or do you sometimes check the video surveillance?



आप सिर्फ स्टैंडिंग द्यूती करते है या सी० सी० टी० वी० भी देखते है?  
If so, whom do you keep under watch the most?  
अगर हाँ तो आप किसपे ज्यादा निगरानी रखते है?  
how do you know whom you should stop?  
आपको कैसे पाता चलता है कि किसे रोकना है?

### **Perception and self perception**

What does your family think of the job?  
आपका परिवार इस नौकरी को बारे में क्या सोचता है?  
Is your husband approving of the job?  
आपकी पत्नी क्या काम करते है?  
How do you feel this work is affecting you?  
क्या आपको लगता है कि इस नौकरी से आप में व्यक्तित्व रूप में बदलाव आया है ?  
How do you perceive the behaviors of the customer of the Mall?  
आप मॉल के कस्टमर के बरताव ( behaviors) कैसे लगते है?  
How do you feel they perceive you?  
आपके खयाल में वे आपको कैसे देखते है?  
Would you /approve of/ want your children to work for the security industry?  
क्या आप अपने बच्चों को सिक्यूरटी गार्ड बनने की अनूमत दंगें?  
How safe is the job for you? Thief/terrorist attack/fire?  
क्या आप इस काम में सैफ महासूस करते है? चोर से, टेरोरिस्ट से? आग?  
Do you think Delhi is a safe city?  
आपके खयाल में क्या दिल्ली सुरक्षित शहर है?  
Even for women?  
आरातों के लिये?  
In your opinion, are there any difference between security guards and chowkidars?  
आपके खयाल में, क्या सिक्यूरटी गार्ड और चौकिदारों के बीच कोई फ़र्क होता है ?  
How do you see the difference between current security guards and chowkidars who were attached to a family?  
What according to you has changed in the last 10 years?

### **Symbolic violence?**

Everybody come to the mall?  
क्या सब लोग यहाँ आ सकते है?  
क्या आप मॉल में काम करनेवालों से भाईचरा महसूस करते है?  
Do you feel close to the other mall workers?  
क्या आप मॉल में काम करनेवालों से भाईचरा महसूस करते है?  
With sellers? Cleaners?  
Are you asked to keep them under watch?  
क्या क्लिंट चहाता है कि आप उनको निगरानी रखें ?  
Do you think some poorer people might feel threatened or bared away by the presence of so many security guards?

आपके खयाल में क्या गरीब लोग इतने सिक्यूरटी गार्डज़ के होने से घबरा जाते हैं?  
even beggers?

### **Gender and security**

(for female) How is the relationship with male guard?

पुरुष गार्ड के साथ आपके ताल्लूक कैसे है ?

(for female) How do you juggle between the long shift in the mall and house work?

लंबी शिफ्ट व घर के काम के बीच कैसे संभालते हैं?

We were told that more shop lifters were women, how do you interpret this?

हमें बताया गया था कि ज़्यादा चोरी करने वाली ज्यादातर महीलाएं होती हैं, इसके बारे में आपके क्या खयाल है ?

आपने कुब देखा?

### **Social position and performance of acts related to security.**

Under which circumstances do you have to stop somebody?

Have you ever had to stop someone?

क्या आपको किसी कसटमर को रूकने की ज़रूरत पाडी है ?

What do you do in such circumstances?

इस परिस्थिति में आप क्या करते हैं?

Do you call the police?

पूलीस को भूलाते हैं ?

What do you think you are guarding ?( for shop guards like Gopal saab)

आपके खयाल में आप किस चिज़ की पहरेंदारी कर रहे हैं?

### **Caste and work**

Could I ask you what is your caste?

क्या मैं पूच सकता हूँ कि आपकी जाती क्या है?

Do you know the caste of your colleagues?

क्या आपको मालूम है कि आपके सहपाठी कि जाती क्या है?

Are they from one caste?

क्या ज्यादातर एक ही जाती से हैं?

Is it the same as yours?

क्या वे आपकी जाती से हैं?

Why, in your opinion, is it the case?

आपके खयाल में क्यों?

Do you think that castes do not matter in this line of work?

जातीवाद महत्व है?

How do you explain the majority of brahmins in this line of work?

आपके खयाल में इस काम में क्यों ज्यादातर बरहमन हैं ?

Did the contractors or recruitment ask you questions about that?

क्या ऐजेंसी या क्लिंट यह यह पूछताछ करता है?

clients, colleagues?

### **Bounded labor**

Were you in debts before starting the work?

सिक्यूरटी कम्पनी के लिये काम करने से पहले क्या आपके ऊपर कोई कर्जा था?

Did your money lender suggested you that line of work?

क्या आपके सहकार ने इस काम का सुझाव दिया?

Did he take a commission for this?

क्या उसने कमीशन लिया था?

Does all your salary money come straight to you?

क्या आपकी तनकवह सीधी आपके पास आती है ? जमा होती है ?

Could you explain me how the system work?

मुझे बताये security business कैसे काम करता है ?

By chance, would you have the address of your training center?

क्या आपके पास ट्रेनिंग सेंटर का पाता है ?

Would you suggest some of your colleagues we could meet?

Is there anything I did not ask about and you would like to let us know?

### 6.2 - Interview guides for security companies.

As per regulations with the research conduct code of the University of Minnesota, all the information collected will be strictly anonymous and will not be shared with any third party, even within one company.

### **Demographics and infos on company.**

Name, how long have you been working here?

Where are you from?

Where were you working before?

What is your role in company?

May I ask your caste background?

### **Security Industry**

How did you come to work in the Security Industry?

Why did you chose that line of work?

Why, according to you, is it so succesful?

Is it still in expansion or has it reached a phase of consolidation?

Are you aware of PSARA regulations? / what is your stand on PSARA/SSSDC difference?

How do you evaluate the cost of compliance?

How do you get contracts? Do the RWA contact you directly?  
How many clients?  
What are your rates?  
Where all do you have guards?

### **Training**

How do you perceive the training obligation? Could this be useful?  
Are the guards employed for prestige?  
Do you train the guards?  
    What is the major threat that you perceive and that the guards are trained to repel?  
    How do you think they could be sensitized to handle women security?  
    How do you train them, who gives the training?  
    Where does it take place? Is it PSARA or SSSDC compliant?  
    What is the curricular? Is there both physical and theoretical?  
    Is it outsourced or in house?  
    How long does the training last, can I attend?  
    How is the training assessed?

### **Guards employed**

How many guards do you employ?  
Do you employ female too?  
How do you recruit the guards?  
    Do you recruit guards after of before training?  
What are your criterion of recruitment?  
    What is their education level?  
    In your opinion, does it matter?  
In your opinion, why do these men seek those jobs?  
What are their background? (caste, jobs, region?)  
Which states are they from? Are they from the city or from the countryside?  
In your opinion, where do they live?  
Are they temporary migrant or permanent residents?  
    Do you have difficulties recruiting in some moments of the year?  
    If temporary, how long on average do they work for the company?  
        When do they go back?  
    What are their career evolution?  
    What percentage of the guards are former servicemen? What role do they have?  
    Do you offer armed security services or only unarmed? Why, and in what proportion.  
        What kind of guns?  
Several guards I have interviewed in other companies feel that they are not trusted, why is it the case according to you?  
    How do you verify the guard's presence?

Are there written rules on what they can and can't do? Is there a tolerance of they arrive late because of sickness for example? Could I see those?

How much are the guard paid?

Do they get PF and ESI? How much more would you need to charge?

Do they have leaves?

Is unionization common in this line?

Do you take steps to avoid it?

What relations does your company have with police forces?

Are you more contracted by RWA or individual households?

In your opinion, what is the main difference between security guards and chowkidars?

Are you employing former chowkidars?

Could you explain me how the system work?

मुझे बताये security business कैसे काम करता है ?

Is there anything I did not ask about and you would like to let us know?

### 6.3 - Interview with domestic workers.

#### **Demographics:**

How long have you worked as a domestic worker?

आप कितने साल से domestic workers का काम करते हैं ?

Where do you stay in Delhi?

आप दिल्ली में कहाँ रहते हैं ।

Are you in Delhi alone or with family ? If so, what does your husband do?

आपके पती क्या करते हैं?

Are you from Delhi itself?

क्या आप दिल्ली से हैं?

Which state are you from?

किस राज्य से हैं?

Are you from a village?

गाँव से हैं?

Are there men from your village who would work as guards?

क्या आपके गाँव से आदमी हैं जो security guards हैं?

#### **Relations:**

Do you work for individual houses?

क्या आप कोठियों में काम करते हैं?

Do you work in apartments?

Building में?

How many houses do you work for?

कितने घर के लिये काम करते हैं?

Do the house you work in have individual guards?

- क्या कोठी में guards हैं?  
Could you describe the relations you have with them?  
उनके साथ आपके संबंध के बारे में बताये?  
Could you give an example?  
क्या कोई किससे बाताना चहेगी?  
How do guards behave with women?  
Guards महिलाओं के साथ कैसा व्यवहार करते हैं?  
How do they behave with you?  
और आपके साथ?  
Do the neighborhood you work in have guards?  
क्या जीस colonies में आप काम करते हैं security guards हैं?  
From which company?  
क्या आपको पाता है कि वे किस company से हैं?  
Chowkidars ?  
क्या रात को चौकीदार हैं?  
How do they behave with you?  
Colony के guard आप के साथ कैसा व्यवहार करते हैं?  
Do they sometimes stop you at the gate?  
क्या वे आपको gate पे रोकते हैं?  
Do they extract money from vegetable sellers?  
क्या guards gate पर कोई छोटा business करते हैं, जैसे कि सबज़िवालों से पैसा मिलते हैं?  
(explain.)  
Do you feel safe with the guards?  
क्या आपको guard के साथ सुरक्षा महसूस करते हैं?  
Do they ensure your safety?  
क्या वे आपकी सुरक्षा का ध्यान रखते हैं?  
Do you feel safe in your daily life in Delhi ?  
क्या आपके खयाल में दिल्ली सुरक्षित शहर है?  
Do you think the guards are useful for something?  
आपके खयाल में guards की उपयोगिता क्या है?  
Is there a solidarity amongst workers with the guards?  
आपके खयाल में colony के काम करनेवालों के बीच भाईचरा है?  
Are they keeping surveillance on workers?  
क्या वे काम करनेवालों पर नज़ार रखते हैं?  
Could you give an example?  
इस के बारे में कोई बात बताइए?  
Are there chowkidars in your neighborhood?  
क्या colony में चौकीदार हैं?  
Do you see a difference between them and guards?  
आपके खयाल में क्या चौकीदारों और guard के बीच फर्क है?

### Recruitments:

Has your employer asked you suggestions on recruiting guards or other people?

क्या आपके employer आपसे guard के बारे में सुझाव लेते हैं?

Did you take a commission?

उनसे पैसे मिलते हैं?

Did you know workers in that neighborhoods before joining? which?

क्या वहाँ काम करने से पहले उस colony में किसी worker को जानती थी?

#### **Demographic of guards:**

A lot of guards in Delhi are upper caste, why so according to you?

दिल्ली में बहुत से guard उपरीजाती से हैं। आपके खयाल में क्यों ?

How does you think it matters in your relations?

उसे आपकी संबंध में फर्क?

Is there anything else you would like to tell us about?

क्या आप इस मामले में और कुछ बाताना चाहते हैं?

#### 6.4 - Interview guides for RWA.

RWA (neighborhood, block):

Date interview:

How many households approximately does your colony have?

How many guards per gate as a RWA? Day and night time?

When/How did the RWA get permission to erect gates in the colony/neighborhood?

Are you also employing chowkidars?

What difference do you make between role of a chowkidars and guards at household v/s neighborhood level?

- From which company are the guards? Why did you choose that company? How do you contact security companies? What do you look for?
- How did you get to know about this company- through advertisements/word of mouth/personal contact?
- In your locality do you have guards who are not part of this company? If so Why? Or why having a company altogether?
- Have you inquired if the guards were paid minimum wages and received PF? Would it matter to your RWA?
- What are the duties of the guards- daytime and nighttime?
- How many shifts do the guards do, and for how many hours?
- How much do you pay for one guard, approximately?
- How much does security costs you in total?

How would you define safety in a few words? To what extent does your colony feel unsafe without them? Do you feel they protect people and vehicles satisfactorily?

A lot of guards feel a lack of trust on them; to what extent does the RWA trust its guards?

Can you tell us about any instances of lack of respect/misbehavior towards the employer and why is it the case?

Do you think the guards need to have training to handle female safety issues?

Are more people in your locality working away from their houses?

Do you think the community is participating less in surveillance and hence the need for more guards?

The Private Security Agency Regulation Act (PSARA) is regulating the market of private security. What impact does it have on recruitment according to you? Are the guards you employ certified by PSARA?

Would you be inclined to employ guards certified by the Security Sector Skill Development Council?

Have you heard of the Delhi police Prahari initiative?

A significant majority of guards across new Delhi happen to be upper castes. According to you, why is this the case?

Are there any other aspects you wish to share with us about security guards/security?





