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Negotiating space: cities in Lebanon and the challenge of the Syrian refugee influx (2011-2018): case studies in Tripoli (Tebbeneh) and Beirut (El-Nab'a, and the Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp)

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Normandie Université

THÈSE

Pour obtenir le diplôme de doctorat

Spécialité GEOGRAPHIE

Préparée au sein de l'Université de Caen Normandie

Négocier l'espace : les villes du Liban devant l'afflux des réfugiés syriens (2011-2018). Etudes de cas à Tripoli (quartier de Tebbeneh) et à Beyrouth (quartier de El-Nab'a et camp Palestinien de Bourj El-Barajneh).

**Présentée et soutenue par
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**Thèse soutenue publiquement le 24/06/2019
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List of acronyms

3RP: Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan

CAS: The Central Administration of Statistics

CDR: Council for Development and Reconstruction

GSO: General Security Office

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IDPs: Internally Displaced Persons

ILO: International Labour Organization

LCPS: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

LCRP: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan

MoSA: Ministry of Social Affairs

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PCM: Presidency of the Council of Ministers

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

PLS: Palestinian refugees from Lebanon

PRS: Palestinian refugees from Syria

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UN-Habitat: United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East

WFP: World Food Programme

Transliteration, Arabic nuances and sources

When dealing with the Middle East or Arab studies in general one is faced with the problem of transliteration. There are elaborate systems devised by scholars to give accurate scientific English representations of the Arabic letter. At the same time informal transliteration methods have been popularly devised and used globally especially due to the effects of social media. In addition, there is a difference between the spoken Arabic and classical Arabic. The former is commonly referred to by the name of the country (Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, Moroccan etc.), or region in the country (*Shami, Baalbaki, Nasrawi*) and is usually a nuanced accent (soft or hard nuances, depending on the country) stemming from the classical Arabic language.

At present, there is a growing problem concerning what is referred to as “facebook/social media Arabic”, “chat Arabic”, or “Arabizi¹” (Yaghan, 2008) that all Arabs have used in one way or another. The issue is important enough to raise flags within the national education system in Lebanon specifically in the teaching of classical Arabic grammar and dictation, as youth find the Arabic letter in its original font less relevant. (In addition we are witnessing a decline in the level of Arabic literature taught in schools; the frequent use of two or three languages in one sentence exacerbates the problem)². The gap between scientific or linguistic transliteration and popular transliteration can be significant. The phrase *عم يلحقنا* for example literally means “he is following us”. In chat Lebanese and Syrian (although pronunciation is discernable) it could read: *3am yel7a’na*, or *3m yilhakna*, while in IJMES it would read: *‘m yilḥaqna*. A rural Palestinian chat version could read *ga3ed bel7agna*. In classical Arabic, IJMES transliteration it would read: *Innahu yulāḥiqunā* (as such it would be heard and understood in the same way in all countries). In this thesis, I follow the IJMES transliteration system loosely, whether for classical or country accents as per the interview or quote. I have made exceptions for words that are familiar or have been popularised, especially proper nouns.

Furthermore, I have chosen to keep some of the literal transcriptions of the phrases when possible. While it might seem grammatically wrong to do so, I feel that as long as the general meaning is clear, the literal translation reflects a local reality and the authenticity of the interview. For example, one of my interviewees said: “*اجو مثل القاعدين تحت الدعس بالنظام، اجو لهون شمو اوكسيجين أو فلتو*”. I have chosen to transcribe this phrase as: “they came here after being trampled on by the regime, and inhaled oxygen *ou felto* (and they went loose)”, while the meaning of the phrase can be relayed as “they arrived from where they had been oppressed for decades, and they felt a burst of freedom”.

Because this thesis deals with contemporary events, it relies on a variety of sources. Many of them are online social media sources which have been utilised as secondary oral sources with reservations. Unless otherwise stated, all translations and photos are produced by the author, and all the names of the interviewees have been changed.

¹ A combination of the words *‘arabi* (Arabic) and *enḡlizi* (English)

² “*Hi, kifak, ça va?*” is today a symbolic phrase referring to the Lebanese language, portrayed in popular literature and art such as the song by Charbel Rouhana with the same title.

Reference maps



Figure 0.1 - Reference Map, Lebanon. Source: (LCRP, 2019)




Figure 0.2: Distribution of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon
 As of April 30, 2014, just over one million refugees became registered in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2014).

General introduction




Figure 0.3: Pedestrian bridge at the entrance of the Bourj el-Barajneh camp, Beirut.
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Colour: Raphaëlle Cottreau

In the early evening, every day, a successive flow of *servees*³ cars and vans drop off workers on the sidewalk across from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp's main entrance on the Old Airport road. Hundreds of men are returning from a day's work in the center of Beirut. The vehicles stop momentarily and groups of men descend from each one. They take the stairs and cross a physical and symbolic pedestrian bridge, linking the southern suburb of the capital with the Palestinian camp. Many of these men are Syrian refugees. In their quest to access the city they have taken up residence in one its most affordable neighbourhoods. Many do not exist on paper: their rent and salary are off the record, and they do not have legal residency. They are for all intents and purposes outlaws, prone to arrest or assault at anytime, with little or no recourse to legal protection. Their over-visibility has made them invisible. In Lebanon's cities they have found interstices to exist in within the overwhelming social, urban and political informalities surrounding them. All they can do is continue to negotiate a place for themselves, moving between gaps while they wait in transit mode - for an unknown future to unfold

³ Shared taxi, commonly used in Lebanon as a quasi-public transportation method

I started working on this thesis three years after the Syrian refugee crisis began. For the last five years, when asked about my work, I used a combination of four keywords in my reply that guaranteed immediate interest from the person facing me: “Syrian,” “refugee,” “city,” and “Lebanon”. One of the longest, bloodiest wars in modern history erupted in Syria in 2011 and has produced millions of refugees in record time; a large part of the world has come face-to-face with their plight. The crisis was especially visible in Lebanon, because of its proximity to Syria and the influx of refugees, whose number reached a quarter⁴ of the population in the country.

It is a major challenge for any society to accommodate an extra quarter of its population in a matter of three years. To address this process, my thesis investigates how this perceived impossibility came to be in the cities of Lebanon. In the many urban spaces where refugees tended to concentrate, how have Syrian and Lebanese dwellers and state and civil society agencies referred to, contested, and more generally addressed the challenge? With 173 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants,⁵ Lebanon has the highest refugee density in the world by far, followed by Jordan at 89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants. To quantitatively compare the magnitude of over one and a half a million refugees coming to Lebanon, one must imagine close to seventeen million refugees reaching France in a few years.

Because the country continued to function, it can only be assumed that there are lessons to be learned from this experience. My aim is to understand why this is a reality, due to which factors, and through what kind of combined processes. Several actors were involved in the production of this phenomenon. At the smallest scale, refugees and hosts on the front line were faced with the obligation to share and negotiate urban space. From the outset, Syrian refugees arriving to Lebanon settled in the cities, like other migrants. They had the flexibility and access to rent shelter and use urban spaces until 2015. With the increased strain on an already weak and degraded urban infrastructure, the influx of refugees multiplied instances of conflict in the cities and heightened tensions between communities that struggled to cope.

One scale above are internal politics, or the different institutional and individual players managing the situation. The consociational political structure in Lebanon divides power between eighteen religious groups. A complicated electoral system, based on “a plurality list-based majority system within districts of a manageable size”(Salamey, 2009, p. 84), has solidified the strength of religious groups’ elites in their respective areas and in the country. They have the

⁴ The exact percentage is difficult to discern, as will be discussed in Part 1 of this dissertation. In principle, the number of refugees reached at least a quarter of the population.

⁵ This number only includes registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon and does not include refugees from other nationalities, like Palestinians. It is furthermore an underestimate, as not all refugees are registered due to reasons discussed in this dissertation.

opportunity and access to divide public services among themselves, while increasing their spatial influence. “The main consequence [being] that low priority is given to overcoming the common and pressing reform issues that [challenge] the entire country, such as the need for economic growth, public accountability, and the rule of law” (Salamey, 2009, p. 84).

A third scale is the overarching Middle Eastern power struggles that play a significant role in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Even during its inception, the Republic of Lebanon required foreign intervention to separate its minority communities from the larger regional communities, at the initial dismay of a significant part of its dwellers. Christian–Muslim tensions at the regional level lay at the root of a fifteen-year civil war, with Christian–Christian tensions crystallising during that war. Today, regional Muslim - Muslim tensions are mirrored in cities in Lebanon - notably in Tripoli, where for decades Alawis and Sunnis have engaged in physical violence, most recently echoing the conflict in Syria between the Alawi regime and the Sunni majority. Moreover, the Israeli occupation of Palestine south of Lebanon also had direct implications for the country’s political and urban stability. Two major invasions - in 1982 and in 2006 - have severely damaged infrastructure and left hundreds of thousands displaced, contributing to demographic changes that create tensions in certain areas.

Cities in Lebanon, or Lebanese cities?

The different order of these words may at first glance look like a nuance, but there is a choice behind this precise wording that is based on two reasons. First, as I develop in some detail in Part 1, there exists a peculiar social and political climate in Lebanon. It stems from the very ethos of the creation of the nation in the early 1900s and the formula for power-sharing between its confessional communities. This formula renders its largely urban territories⁶—and even the neighbourhoods within its cities—acutely different from one another. Of course it can be argued that differences between cities are a pretty typical phenomenon and that no two cities are alike, but cities within the same nation usually follow a significant number of common social codes that render their identity comparable to a large degree. In Lebanon, the differences between cities exist at every level—social, urban, cultural, political, etc.—so much so that since the 1950s, geographers have described the various Lebanese communities as “actual nations”⁷ (Lacoste,

⁶ Lebanon is at least 90 percent urban (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007).

⁷ Original, extended citation: “D’jà, en 1955, avant la tourmente, le géographe E. de Vaumas concluait son étude sur la répartition confessionnelle au Liban et l’équilibre de l’Etat libanais par ces mots: ‘Les communautés libanaises sont, en fait, de véritables nations.’”

1983, p. 14). More importantly, because Lebanon's civil law is not universally applied, each religious community - which usually claims one or more cities as its own - is bound by a specific personal code of law enforced by a religious court, rendering even the most basic of common codes, such as inheritance, different between cities. While I do not argue that this fact makes it futile to have a national identity (to the contrary), I believe that because of the drastically diverse nature of communities within neighbourhoods and cities, the more appropriate wording is "cities in Lebanon" rather than "Lebanese cities." This distinctive nature renders a geographical approach to the study of the cities valuable.

Second, there are currently twelve Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon that were created after 1948, one of which is a case study in this dissertation. These camps are "spaces of exception" (Hanafi, 2008) and while they physically lie within the boundaries of Lebanon, they are in fact not considered Lebanese. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) defines a camp as "a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs."⁸ In fact, the land plots that camps are built on are "either state land or, in most cases, land leased by the host government from local landowners ... refugees in camps do not 'own' the land ... but have the right to 'use' the land for a residence". The camps are governed in practice by UNRWA and Palestinian factions. While the Lebanese army has the legal right to enter the camps and while it guards their entrances at varying security levels, it does not enter the camps except in rare and extreme cases.⁹

Cities in Lebanon are therefore fragmented, both socially and spatially. The question of political structure is central to this fragmentation as well. The fact that this structure thrives on division has a direct impact on how Syrians have settled in the different cities. As such, each space responds differently to disturbances. As a major episode that culminated in significant demographic and urban change in a short period, the Syrian refugee influx was received with some common but mainly varying reactions, depending on the spaces refugees arrived to. In the absence of a national strategy under which all spaces and communities in Lebanon could formulate a concerted reaction, the different responses of local authorities and communities created socio-urban gaps in which Syrians were able to slide and make a place for themselves. Incidentally, it is these same processes and gaps that allowed for the chaotic and quiet encroachment of the influx to occur. This encroachment, which Asef Bayat describes as a "silent, protracted, but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the

⁸ <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>.

⁹ The army intervened heavily in the Nahr el-Bared camp conflict of 2007. See Long and Hanafi (2010).

public, in order to survive and improve their lives” (Bayat, 2010, p. 56), necessitates significant socio-urban informality, which is provided by the status quo in Lebanon. Albert Piette (1990) suggests three types of gaps, or interstices that could describe the spaces of migrants in a host city: the full gap, in which an established community accepts contact with an outsider community but keeps the latter at a distance; the empty gap, in which the established and outsider communities share no collective communication or space; and the transparent gap, in which the established and outsider communities render valuable their differences and share their spaces (Piette, 1990, p. 74). Mainly due to their large numbers, Syrian refugees could not fully fall into the empty gap—they are present in the majority of the territory and therefore it is unreasonable to imagine an empty gap. The transparent gap is also hard to find, with the exception of some neighbourhoods where a very specific niche of the population dwells (educated youth and artists for example). In general, refugees have found their place in the full gap: in contact with the established society but kept at a distance.

But while these gaps, along with the Established-Outsider theory first introduced by Elias Norbert in 1965, can be relevant for understanding local urban conflict between different communities, they “cannot be studied in isolation. They are shaped by developments at other spatial scales” (Hogenstijn, van Middelkoop, & Terlouw, 2008, p. 150). Here, the concept of scale moves beyond the order of magnitudes to express levels of scales and the relations between those levels and to look at how the “national scale is made up of several local or regional scales and is influenced by these smaller scales while at the same time the national scale is influencing the ‘smaller’ scales” (Hogenstijn et al., 2008, p. 150).

What factors or mechanisms involved in the production of cities in Lebanon have allowed them to take in the Syrian refugees? In what ways and to what extent have the Lebanese shared their dwelling spaces? How have the refugees been able to negotiate a place—even though they were unwanted—in the cities? What urban, social, and legal frameworks have accompanied them? Even with the challenges that consociationalism poses at the political level, were there any national urban and legal directives that accompanied the settlement of refugees over the years? How have these served or not served their potential integration? What mechanisms have refugees employed to cope with the crisis and what mechanisms have they introduced to the functioning of the city? This dissertation provides keys to answer these questions. In this introduction, I will first discuss concepts and define terms that can serve as a basis on which to read this work. I will then provide a brief overview of the methodology and relevance of the research, and finally present the structure of the dissertation that follows.

Urban resilience, or spatial justice?

During the first phase of this research, I considered the concept of resilience, understood in its social and/or urban dimension, as a central analytical key for approaching these questions. This is reflected in the title of my master's thesis: Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Between resilience and resistance.¹⁰ I considered the massive influx of refugees into Lebanon a shock to the city, which prompted me to look into the ways in which the latter “bounced back.” The question following that was: “bounce back to what?” International organisations approached their relief efforts from the resilience angle as well, doing so in the rhetoric and performative aspect through which the concept has been disseminated (EU, 2018; ILO, 2014). In general, three key actors tend to address the situation in Lebanon in terms of resilience: the collective response from the United Nations (UN) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the impact of the Syria crisis was dubbed the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (UNHCR, 2017b). From their side, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) set up local community kitchens and other cash-for-work schemes to “strengthen the resilience of the community” in Beb el-Tebbeneh (ICRC, 2015). Finally, there are the various urban cash and livelihood programmes of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), whose objective has been to “build long-term recovery and resilience” in Lebanon and Jordan (Saliba, 2016).

While in all these cases, the general connotation of the process is positive, the multitude of definitions of the term resilience and the disciplines that have adopted it render it vague enough to be used by different actors who might not necessarily agree on a common meaning. In a volume dedicated to “Governing for Urban Resilience,” authors contributing to a special issue of the journal *Urban Studies* cautioned that

without careful attention to power and structural realities, resilience can easily be co-opted by the powerful and reaffirm a ‘business as usual’ norm, even in the face of social-ecological devastation (Hurricane Katrina) or socio-economic degradation affecting social-ecological outcomes (Wilkinson, Parnell, & Beilin, 2015, p. 1209)

Since “either by design or inadvertent omission, the potential spatial and temporal variability in resilience can lead to inequalities in outcomes” (Cutter, 2016, p. 110), it is important to question the concept and the usefulness of its application and to avoid its generic use as a label with which the “good,” resilient urban spaces can be differentiated from the “bad,” vulnerable ones. In his *Critique de la résilience pure*, Samuel Rufat extensively explains the ways in which the concept may not be adequate for studies on cities and concludes by arguing that “the main

¹⁰ El Khouri, D. (2014). *Les réfugiés syriens au Liban: entre résiliences et résistances* (Masters in Social Geography, PhD research project). Université de Caen Normandie, France, 60 pages.

problem with resilience is knowing who employs resilience, which resilience and why?¹¹ (Rufat, 2012, p. 16). Indeed, resilience can be deceptive if used in the context of informal neighbourhoods, for example. If the concept invites city systems to return to a pre-crisis state without major structural transformation, what would slums “bounce back” to? Is the ability to adapt to dire and degrading conditions a desirable state, as the positively viewed “resilience” of poor neighbourhoods may seem to indicate? In addition, against which criteria would this be measured?

Meerow, Newell, and Stults have attempted to formulate an inclusive definition of urban resilience in their comprehensive review of the concept. If such a definition were to be a useful analytical tool, however, I believe it implicitly requires an acceptable baseline:

Urban resilience refers to the ability of an urban system—and all its constituent socio-ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial scales—to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity (Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016).

The potential misuses of urban resilience in the context of underdeveloped urban areas must be highlighted. Resilience must be clearly differentiated from vulnerability and current societal change. I am wary of labelling phenomena or systems resilient, lest this obscure or blur a more profound truth. The settlement of Syrian refugees in cities in Lebanon is not propelled by a perceived resilience—in the sense of elasticity—of the host society. In fact, Lebanon is the country that was “least hospitable to Palestine refugees” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61) in the past. Since the first years of the refugee crisis, research found “significant social discrimination and an unwillingness or inability—at the local level—to help Syrians with basic health and education needs” (Chatty, 2015, p. 5). Rather, remarkable injustices in cities in Lebanon by far predate the Syrian crisis that allowed for this challenging settlement. These injustices have internalised and more dangerously normalised society’s capacity to organise the exploitation of poor migrants and allowed for them to settle. Paradoxically, this situation presented an opportunity for Syrian refugees to settle in Lebanon while paying the price in terms of injustice.

This conception builds on the following statement made by Wilkinson, Parnell, and Beilin: “Urban resilience begins with the ordinary business of telling stories, creating networks, revisiting initiatives—and these reinforce the everyday and the ordinary capacities of people”

¹¹ Original, extended citation: “*Le problème clé de la résilience est de savoir qui dit la résilience, quelle résilience et pourquoi. Elle apparaît d’abord comme une mise en récit incantatoire de l’après catastrophe visant à imposer la ‘bonne’ ville à ses habitants en brandissant la menace des catastrophes.*”

(Wilkinson et al., 2015, p. 1214). In that sense, this research and dissertation have at least served the purpose of promoting what could be an effective form of urban resilience. But rather than adhere to the concept of urban resilience, this dissertation may also be seen as an investigation into spatial justice—as clarified in 2009 by the authors of the *Annales de Géographie* in the volume dedicated to the notion:

Working particularly in the context of large cities where forms of social injustice are especially visible in space, [Anglo-Saxon and French geographers including David Harvey, Edward Soja, Alain Reynaud, and Bernard Bret] characterized “structural” spatial justice by the equal access of all city dwellers to urban resources, the provision of services to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, or the development of adapted transport for the access of inhabitants of peripheral districts to central urban facilities, for example. ... they often tend to favor the idea of a “procedural” justice, defined and negotiated between several stakeholders (and particularly the beneficiaries of public redistributive intervention), rather than imposed by “the top”¹² (Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 7).

Indeed, “it is crucial in theory and in practice,” as Edward Soja insists, “to emphasize explicitly the spatiality of justice and injustice, not just in the city but at all geographical scales, from the local to the global” (Soja, 2010, p. 1). The multiplicity of geopolitical configurations in cities is better served therefore from a spatial justice point of view than from a resilience point of view.

Migrants, displaced, or refugees?

Being officially recognised by qualified authorities as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, 1951), a refugee is in a broader sense a person in need of protection. While in theory the term is neutral and does not connote positive or negative attributes, the reality is that today, a refugee is often viewed negatively by many societies. Lebanese communities have an especially complicated relationship with the term. As detailed in Part 1, the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon and the role it played in the beginning of

¹² Original, extended citation: “*Travaillant notamment dans le cadre des grandes métropoles où les formes d’injustice sociale sont particulièrement visibles dans l’espace, ils ont caractérisé la justice spatiale ‘structurelle’ par l’égal accès de tous les citoyens aux ressources urbaines, qu’il passe par l’équipement en services des quartiers défavorisés, ou par le développement de transports adaptés pour l’accès des habitants des quartiers périphériques aux équipements urbains centraux, par exemple. En effet, ces auteurs ne nient pas l’existence d’inégalités socio-spatiales quantifiables qu’il est nécessaire de réduire dans l’absolu par des politiques urbaines d’équipement public. Toutefois, ils tendent souvent à privilégier l’idée d’une justice « procédurale », définie et négociée entre plusieurs acteurs parties prenantes (et notamment les bénéficiaires de l’intervention publique redistributive), plutôt qu’imposée par ‘le haut’.*”

the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 cast Palestinian refugees and refugees in general in a strong negative light. In addition, the Lebanese, like many other societies, also have a complicated relationship with poor foreign migrants and with Syrians in general, especially after the thirty-year occupation of Lebanon by the Syrian regime. For many Lebanese, Syrian refugees symbolise civil unrest, poverty, political domination, and the combination of these three ideas, which evidently put the refugees in a bind once it became clear that their stay in Lebanon would be protracted. Politically, the label and all asylum terminology caused a dilemma, and from the onset there were debates on how to label them. The fact that Lebanon is not a signatory to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees strengthens the reluctance of the government to call them refugees.

The [Lebanese] government had an obsession with swapping out this terminology for different words in all official documents and communications. The most obvious example of this is the replacement of the word *laji* (refugee) with *nazih*, despite the clear difference in meaning. The *nazih* is a person who leaves one region for another within the borders of a single state (i.e. a “displaced person” or what is conventionally known as a *muhajir* in Lebanon), while a true *laji* is someone who crosses state borders and decamps from one country to another, which is the case with Syria’s refugees (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014, p. 2).

For many of the Syrians themselves, the term “refugee” is pejorative as well and they avoid or even reject it. Nevertheless, except for a small minority, returning to Syria at the time of writing represents real risk and danger for most.¹³ In line with Saghieh and Frangieh’s discourse, I refer to Syrians in Lebanon today as refugees, with a few exceptions. I choose to do so even though they are treated, for all intents and purposes, as economic migrants—against international law and human rights—and are placed *ipso facto* in a position of second-class dwellers in Lebanon’s cities. This is also “a deliberate position against the ongoing criminalisation of refugee presence in Lebanon and elsewhere” (Fawaz, Gharbieh, Harb, & Salamé, 2018, p. 6).

What “negotiating space” signifies in this work

In its most straightforward definition, negotiation is a “discussion aimed at reaching an agreement.”¹⁴ Because reaching an agreement implies compromise, effective negotiation requires a certain equality between the negotiating parties’ positions. Bernard Rougier suggests that:

¹³ In addition to the danger to their lives, they risk conscription, persecution, and imprisonment. National security in Syria still unclear; they also risk the inability to secure an education or livelihood or even to prove ownership of their property.

¹⁴ Negotiation. 2019. In *Oxforddictionaries.com*. Retrieved from: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/negotiation>

Negotiation is a relation of power. It is part of a context that determines its form and nature. In this sense, negotiation is an “empty concept” and it is impossible to describe its characteristics in abstracto without knowing the configuration of the social relations within which it lies. Since conflict (latent or manifest) and tension are the original characteristics of a negotiation, the latter must be thought of as an interaction in which the actors both seek to influence each other in a manner favourable to their interests, relying alternatively or simultaneously on threats and on promises¹⁵ (Rougier, 2014, p. 86).

Rougier goes on to describe three types of negotiation: (1) that which accompanies a process, such as the process of decolonisation; (2) that which creates a process, such as a peace treaty; and last, (3) negotiation that blocks a social process, such as a political system that relies on maintaining a flawed status quo in order to survive (Rougier, 2014, p. 86). He suggests that these three types are not mutually exclusive but can be present in a situation all at once

In this dissertation, space is added to the concept of negotiation. Building on Rougier’s three types, I add three scales of analysis and apply them specifically to the Syrian refugee crisis. The first type can be described as negotiating space on the international level, creating a space sharing social process. This is the case when the construction of camps is agreed upon before the arrival of refugees. In this case, agreement on how space is divided between hosts and refugees is predefined and physically clarified. This is what happened in Jordan and Turkey in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The second type I propose is negotiating space at the national level, accompanying a space sharing social situation: this is embodied in the changing policies and actions of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis the Syrian urban refugees, such as forced evictions, changed residency requirements, or curfews that are introduced sporadically to regulate settlement conditions.

The third type is the continuous cycle of negotiating space at the local level, largely blocking a social process. Here the negotiation of space takes place at the finest, mundane level, illustrated in the tension and conflict, or the activism and resistance against this tension, between different microcommunities in the cities. These three types are not mutually exclusive either and affect each other. The empirical observations undertaken for this dissertation focus on this last type of negotiation, while the first two are mobilised in the analyses, discussions, and conclusions.

¹⁵ Original citation: “*La négociation est une relation de pouvoir. Elle s’inscrit dans un contexte qui en détermine la forme et la nature. En ce sens, la négociation est un ‘concept vide’ et il est impossible d’en décrire les caractéristiques in abstracto, sans connaître la configuration des relations sociales dans laquelle elle s’inscrit. Le conflit (latent ou manifeste) et la tension étant les caractéristiques originelles d’une négociation, cette dernière doit donc se penser comme une interaction où les acteurs cherchent mutuellement à s’influencer dans un sens favorable à leurs intérêts, en ayant alternativement ou simultanément recours aux menaces et aux promesses.*”

For Rougier, negotiation as creating and negotiation as accompanying a social process tend to be positive in that they seek to avoid violence, while negotiation blocking a social process tends to be negative in that it denies the advancement of society by disregarding major elements. This thesis argues that while Syrian refugees may have found a place in the cities in Lebanon and today have a role in making these cities (Fawaz et al., 2018), their negotiation of space at all levels tends to yield rather unfavourable results for them—the root of this being the unequal balance of power between the actors at each level.

An overview on the Syrian refugee situation in the region

This dissertation focuses on the refugee situation in Lebanon and does not delve into the push factor, the Syrian conflict, that has produced the refugee influx, even though it touches on the regional geopolitical effects on Lebanon. Neither does this dissertation provide an in-depth comparison between the situation in Lebanon and that in Jordan and Turkey, the two other countries in immediate proximity to Syria that also host significant numbers of refugees. Rather, this dissertation focuses on the negotiations between refugees and the host society in urban spaces in Lebanon, in a unique socio-political context. The following brief highlight of the humanitarian situation of Syrian refugees in general will show Lebanon's position in the region as a host country and will shed broader light on the humanitarian disaster that is the Syrian refugee reality since 2011.

For the past seven years, Syrians have been fleeing from an armed conflict whose protagonists are numerous. Both international and local actors played a role in the conflict, resulting in alliances that could resemble a global war. The renowned French paper *Le Monde* represented these alliances in Figure 0-1, reflecting the complexity of the situation. It represents the local forces and alliances that have a role on the ground and the various regional and international coalitions supporting them.¹⁶

¹⁶ For a brief overview of the Syrian crisis since 2011, see Baczkowski, Dorransoro, and Quesnay (2016); Sallon, Camus, and Alouti (2019).




Figure 0-1: Diagram representing alliances in the Syrian conflict Grandin & Papin (2015).

As a direct consequence of this conflict, half the population of Syria has been displaced, adding up to almost eleven million people. Of those, over 5.5 million have crossed the borders, mostly to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (Figure 0-2), but also beyond.

Location name	Source	Data date	Population
Turkey	UNHCR, Government of Turkey	4 Apr 2019	64.2% 3,630,767
Lebanon	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	16.7% 944,613
Jordan	UNHCR	9 Apr 2019	11.7% 660,393
Iraq	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	4.5% 253,672
Egypt	UNHCR	21 Feb 2019	2.3% 132,165
Other (North Africa)	UNHCR	30 Nov 2018	0.6% 35,713

Figure 0-2: Distribution of Syrian refugees in Middle Eastern countries
Source: UNHCR data portal, 2019

There was a regional total of 5,663,876 registered Syrian refugees in neighbouring host countries on December 31, 2018. However, the total number of Syrians that reflects host government estimates (including registered Syrian refugees, unregistered Syrian refugees, and Syrians residing in host countries under alternative legal frameworks) is significantly higher at 7,245,754 (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 2). In the case of Lebanon, and as will be developed in Chapter 3, the number of refugees that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports is lower than the real number of refugees in the country, for political and social reasons.

In terms of funding, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)¹⁷ reported in 2018 that only 62 percent of the total requirements of the plan were funded. In the case of Lebanon specifically, only 48 percent of the required \$2.68 billion was funded (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 3).

Two aspects of the Syrian environmental and political climate before 2011 are especially useful to partly understand the demographic of the Syrian refugee population. The first aspect is the dictatorial regime, which has been in place since 1971. Power in Syria is in the hands of the second largest religious group, the Alawis, who in 1943 made up 11.3 percent of the population. The largest religious group, Sunnis, made up 68.9 percent¹⁸ (Hourani, 1947, p. 76). The second aspect is environmental: “four years of devastating drought beginning in 2006 caused at least 800,000 farmers to lose their entire livelihood and about 200,000 simply abandoned their lands” (Polk, 2013). These two aspects show that, even before they came to Lebanon as refugees, a large section of the Syrian population had already reached a place where they were extremely poor, with no real prospects for advancing their livelihood and little support from their government.

Method, choice of case studies, and relevance of the research

This dissertation brings internal politics, migration, and refugee studies together in a socio-urban geographical analysis. It particularly emphasises urban and social relationships in the city as producers of social and spatial change, based mainly on qualitative ethnographic research. The ethnographic approach is necessary for two reasons. First, because of the complexity of scales, the local variability of the phenomenon, and the data expressing this process so partially and inaccurately. Therefore, proceeding to a quantitative analysis would be unrealistic and yield skewed results. As will be detailed throughout this work, the urban and social features of Lebanon’s cities vary according to numerous delicate, complex, and entangled factors. They include religious group and political party affiliations, class structure, and debates on identities, which all materialise in the form of negotiations on space. Studying them requires an understanding of the historical and political context and of the spatial expressions of society’s and territories’ social and cultural divisions. The second reason is the serious lack of comprehensive, reliable quantitative data related to urban space in general. A proper population survey, which could help to locate the Syrian influx within the demography of the country, does

¹⁷ As per its website: “The UN and NGO response to the impact of the Syria Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, in support of national efforts.” Retrieved from <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/>.

¹⁸ This figure comes from the last survey that took into consideration religious affiliation in 1943. Since then, surveys do not include a question on religion, but it is safe to say and commonly known that the ratios still stand to a large degree.

not exist. For general demographic, housing, and economic realities, researchers and organisations have to rely mostly on estimations. These are as scientific as possible, but they remain educated guesses. Because of this context, ethnographic research is the starting point in this thesis and forms the basis of the fieldwork. It is complemented by secondary sources: observations, commented urban walks with dwellers, social media analyses, photographic imagery, a wide number of informal chats with taxi drivers, coffee kiosk vendors, etc., and a review of a plethora of reports produced by the leading and local NGOs working on the Syrian refugee crisis. Three lenses are then utilised to analyse this socio-urban data.

First, an urban lens which seeks to understand the intricate power relations between the different communities. This is mainly used in the fieldwork to collect data on urban contestations and social relations. I look at actors in the field and the power relations between them to gather elements for analysis. These observations and data are then complemented by a national social lens. Using this lens, I look at the elements that directly and indirectly affect the situations observed at the micro-urban scale. These elements include the history of Lebanon and its relationship with Syria, the dire economic reality, and the complicated ethnic-religious makeup of the Lebanese communities. The third lens is geopolitical and has to do with the broader, overarching elements that speak for the very ethos of Lebanon. The roots of the east–west identity debates, allegiances to religious groups’ leadership, and the degree of international influence such as international aid are all examples. Urban observations as such tend to be at the crossroads of spatial, social, and political processes that are revealed in the cities.

The case study neighbourhoods are chosen due to several factors that make them similar and very different at the same time. All three are extremely dense and poor neighbourhoods located on the peripheries of the Beirut (Bourj el-Barajneh, El-Nab’a) and Tripoli (Tebbeneh)¹⁹, the largest cities in Lebanon, and all three have received significant numbers of refugees since 2011. At the same time, the social mix in each of the neighbourhoods is unique. Both Tebbeneh and the Bourj el-Barajneh camp are composed mainly of Sunni Muslim populations. While Tebbeneh’s residents are Lebanese, the area is one of the most conservative in the country and follows largely tribal modes of life. El-Nab’a is the neighbourhood that is the most mixed of the three. It has received various waves of poor migrants over the years that have shaped its current urban character. It is also the only neighbourhood that includes a mixture of religious groups, having a significant presence of Christian communities. Bourj el-Barajneh is a Palestinian refugee camp and therefore has few or no Lebanese dwellers in it. However, the Palestinian refugees dwelling there today are generally second-, third-, and even fourth-generation refugees. They do

¹⁹ For their geographical locations and context, see Chapter 4.

not hold Lebanese citizenship and are excluded from various social and urban rights, but my interviews have indicated reactions to the new influx of Syrian refugees similar to their Lebanese counterparts in the other two neighbourhoods.

Dissertation structure

The first part of this dissertation provides an extensive description of the main features that characterise Lebanon's cities; places where refugees tend to converge. It seeks to present the main aspects and context of Lebanon's urban landscape before 2011 and the arrival of Syrian refugees. Chapter 1 includes a socio-political and urban description of cities in Lebanon, with a section dedicated to the historical relations between Lebanon and Syria. These relations have current repercussions for both the Syrian and Lebanese societies and are crucial for understanding the tensions between them. Chapter 2 goes on to present the social structure in the cities, including the fragmented nature of societies, urban governance, and the rights of dwellers. The chapter provides the context underpinning the varied reactions to refugee populations in the different cities.

The second part presents the theoretical framework and justification of the case studies selected. Chapter 3 develops the approach, guiding questions, the position of the researcher, and the methodology. It marks social events that had an effect on the fieldwork and discusses the difficulties involved in working with unreliable statistics, which characterise the situation in Lebanon. This chapter lays out the challenges and opportunities that the fieldwork presented and clearly points out the personal background of the researcher in an effort to "[render objective] the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). Chapter 4 highlights the personal aspects of fieldwork and goes on to describe the three selected case studies, justifying their selection and providing elements of comparison.

In its final part, the dissertation culminates in a discussion on negotiating space as presented in this introduction. It elaborates on how space has been utilised as a tool for co-optation and exploitation on the local, national, and regional levels. Negotiating space is not only seen as a binary relation between the refugees and the host community, but also as a mechanism that produces and reproduces inequality at different scales. The four chapters of this part place the refugees on the social, urban, and physical map. It traces their journey from their arrival to

Lebanon to their social and urban conditions of settlement and describes the reactions of the host communities to these settlement conditions.

Due to its subject matter and methodology, this thesis contributes to the socio-urban understanding of cities in Lebanon and more generally to urban studies in their political dimension. It utilises a multiscalar approach to discern a complex phenomenon that would be difficult to reduce to one specific area. It is furthermore a committed contribution to social geography, conscious of the turmoil in spaces and societies of the world. At a time when cities are facing age-old challenges that continue to present struggles on the global scale, this thesis questions the ways in which it is possible, necessary, and desirable to respond to the challenge of coexistence in the city and the nation in a world in perpetual movement.

Part 1: Cities in Lebanon in before the rapid influx of Syrian refugees

Introduction to Part 1

Lebanon is a young country with a rich and complex history. It was born out of a desire for independence from regional influence under the pretext of the protection of minority religious groups. Today, Lebanon is trapped in a gridlock of socio-urban and political webs that is difficult to move on from. This is even more so because the keepers of this gridlock, the religious groups' elites that have gained in influence and authority over the decades, are the very actors that benefit from it. As such, they block any attempts at negotiating long-term solutions. This reality dates back to the period before the arrival of the Syrian refugees to Lebanon's cities. Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, these cities have been permeated with memories of war and violence, dire economic conditions, and regional influence on their internal politics.

The main objective of this first part is to present a picture of Lebanon's cities in the wake of the arrival of the Syrian refugees. It seeks to place the situation in the larger context of international relations between Lebanon and Syria since their inception. The first chapter presents the social and political climate in the country and sheds light on the presence of Syrian migrants in the cities before 2011. Then, after an overview of urban refuge and its implications, the chapter delves into the several sources of tension between Lebanese and Syrian communities since the early 1900s. The second chapter focuses on the political structure and local governance and pays special attention to the nature of coexistence between different Lebanese communities and between Lebanese and dwellers of other nationalities, especially poor migrants.

Chapter 1: Syrian migrants in the city: Historic context

1. The social and political climate in Lebanon

1.1 Uncertainty, inequality, and socio-spatial division: Three challenges that burden cities in Lebanon

Uncertainty

Lebanon could be referred to as a country of uncertainty and inequality. The first uncertainty that precedes and affects all research on Lebanon is the fact that there is no recent population census, with the last official survey dating back to 1932.²⁰ All subsequent population figures are estimates and vary from one source to another.²¹ Éric Verdeil explains this fact well, in his Atlas of Lebanon, stating that without possible verification, the latest, most precise figures are those published by the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) in 1997, estimating the population at four million (Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007). The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs' profile of Lebanon places the population at 4.6 million in 2016²² (including Palestinian but excluding Syrian refugees²³) and the United Nations Population Fund UNFPA places it at 6.1 million in 2017, with no mention of whether Syrian refugees are included (UNFPA, 2017). Due to this statistical imprecision, all other quantitative factors become equally imprecise, including urban density overall, gross national income per capita, and social/demographic data that would be indispensable in analysing socio-spatial divisions. Working with these uncertainties requires moving beyond the limits of quantification and addressing this aspect along with its possible meanings. In an ironic tone, Professor of Urban Planning Mona Fawaz shared with international media outlets: "In Lebanon we don't like numbers..., we prefer what they call 'creative mathematics'" (quoted in Gustafsson, 2016). The base of this imprecision could lie in the very process of the formation of the Lebanese nation and its power-sharing formula; as such it may not be in any political-religious party's best interest to update the statistics. Should a census be undertaken in 2018, it would probably show that the Christian percentage of the population is much lower than what legitimises a Christian presidency and that Shiites account for over 60 percent of the population, according to estimations. Counter-intuitively, Shiites would not want complete government control. They already have over a third of the seats in parliament, and by virtue of their militia status they can continue their resistance efforts against Israël and support the Syrian regime with more flexibility and efficiency than from a non-governmental position.

²⁰ Even this census is contested, because of unclear and irregular data collection processes (Maktabi, 1999; Jaulin, 2014)

²¹ See Chapter 3, section 4.1: Unreliability of quantitative data

²² This is the population estimate I have chosen to use in my research.

²³ France Diplomatie. (2018). Présentation du Liban [Governmental]. Available at <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/liban/presentation-du-liban/>.

Uncertainty is not exclusive to population and demographic statistics and is not caused by technical challenges or a lack of human capacity. Rather, the difficulties stem from an intentional lack of political will to counter it. There is no official register for the number of Syrians in Lebanon over the years. In reality, Syrians have been part of the labour market in Lebanon in significant numbers and since the independence of the two countries.²⁴ Some economists have evoked the non-confirmed number of one million workers in the last decade, before Syrians sought refuge in Lebanon (Chalcraft, 2009; Verdeil et al., 2007). The basic difference between the workers and refugees lies in the nature of their residency, with the former's stays being mostly cyclical, transitional, and short term and the latter's protracted and anchored at many levels.

Inequality

Moreover, Lebanon is a country of profound economic inequality. The income of the top two percent accounts for a level of income comparable to that of the bottom 60 percent and Lebanon ranks 129th of 141 countries in terms of income equality (E. Saliba, Sayegh, & Salman, 2017); low compared to Jordan (111) and Turkey (58) (Index Mundi, 2011). In Lebanon's cities, economic inequality is highly visible; for example, uninhabited but highly maintained high-rise buildings tower over old, run-down houses suffocating their residents for lack of air Figure 2-1. Informal settlements and camps are a short drive away from the posh, cosmopolitan Beirut city centre. Land and housing speculation are generating a situation of high pressure on the socially most vulnerable, who have seen for a few decades now the growing privatisation of urban lands. Aside from private residencies, public space is also increasingly reflecting such exclusivity, expressed mainly by general restrictions on access. A major expression of this phenomenon is the case of the Lebanese coastline that has been privatised to a large extent, and accessible only to the privileged few (Dictaphone Group, 2013; Makhzoumi, 2011).

²⁴ See Chapter 1, Section 1.3: The change in the type and profile of Syrian migrants since 1948



Figure 2-1: Old house in Beirut

An old Lebanese house stands among modern building and a construction site on Beirut's Corniche. October 2015. Photo Patrick Baz/AFP

Inequality in Lebanon is not limited to economics. Gender, religious, social, racial, and cultural inequalities and contradictions exist and are visible as well. Pictures of churches and mosques fill tourism websites, but they do not reflect the loud competition of their calls to prayer. Pictures of women in bikinis next to veiled women on the boardwalks also fill the Internet, but do not reflect that all these women are inferior their male counterparts with regard to their civil rights.²⁵ Should one of these women be a foreign domestic worker or nanny, she would not be allowed in the swimming pool next to Lebanese children; she would only be permitted to ensure their safety while dressed in her uniform in the heat. Racial inequality is pronounced and institutionalised; government policies and practices governing the issue are highly contested, both from within Lebanon and on the international level (OHCHR, 2016, pp. 2–7).

Socio-spatial division

²⁵ In fact, women have different civil and cultural rights, depending on their religious group affiliation. Some inequalities however exist across the board. For example, no Lebanese woman can pass down her nationality to her spouse or children.

There are eighteen official religious groups that share and divide the land politically, culturally, legally, and even spatially. Even without physical borders, the majority of areas in Lebanon are easily identifiable in terms of religious identity. Churches and mosques are the first but not the only identifying element. Material expressions like clothing (such as, but not exclusively, the veil or *sherweil*²⁶), wearing religious symbols, wall graffiti, and publicity banners are relatively easily identifiable—especially for locals—and reflect the sociocultural and religious identities of a place. Importantly, the religious groups all own substantial areas of land, known as *waqef* or *awqaf* in plural.²⁷ These territories are frozen by law to the benefit owners who legally keep all profits from them. The *awqaf* serve as an example of the weight that religious institutions hold over urban land. In addition to providing religious communities with significant and visible wealth and power, they also reinforce the religious facets of different places.

The cultural tendencies of religious groups largely vary and are expressed in numerous nuances. Essentially independent from social class, those tendencies can be roughly placed on a spectrum. On one end, there is the “extreme East” tendency, where those who identify with an Arab nationalist identity are located. On the other end, there is the “extreme West,” where those who reject any Arab affiliation are found. The latter identify themselves as descendants of the Canaanites and prefer to be referred to as “Phoenicians” (AFP, 2010; “Middle East, Lebanon,” 2018). This represents perhaps the most significant division. The majority of the population lies somewhere in between these two extremes, and make Lebanon a country where both Eastern and Western values and cultural attitudes are sometimes simultaneously embraced. While there are exceptions, it is generally believed that the Christian (and specifically Maronite) population in Lebanon tends to embrace the “Phoenician” label while the Muslim population tends to embrace the “Arab” one (AFP, 2010). For example, in order to prove this spirit of openness and attract western tourists, Broumana (a well-known touristic village) chose to employ young female traffic officers in 2018 with hot pants for uniforms (Les Observateurs, 2018). This act invited some approval but also significant public disapproval both locally and worldwide. Still, it reflects the distorted understanding of “openness” in some Lebanese circles. At the same time, a mere twenty-minute drive from Broumana one finds cities that are more conservative, with women generally veiled on the streets. It is important to keep this dichotomy in mind when analysing the social context of the cities in Lebanon that Syrian refugees arrive to.

²⁶ Traditional trousers worn by the Druze communities

²⁷ For more information, see (Sakr, 2018)

1.2 The Lebanese political climate and its implications for Syrian refugees

International influence on Lebanese politics

East–West tensions are very present in Lebanese politics. Political parties are funded and/or supported by different international forces, from the East (e.g. Iran) and the West (e.g. France). International influence on Lebanon’s interior political scene lies at the core of the stagnation and impotence of the government. Politicians’ allegiances are not only to the nation; they forge different agreements and alliances with other regional and international players which dictate their actions and positions in Lebanon. One example among innumerable others is the message Saudi Arabia sent to Iran via Lebanese Prime Minister Saad el-Hariri²⁸ and his sudden and shocking resignation from his position via a televised broadcast from Saudi Arabia. It is known that the Hariri family is closely allied to Saudi Arabia, where the late Rafik el-Hariri accumulated his wealth in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Hariris remain Saudi Arabia’s political arm in Lebanon, much like the Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s. Wanting to send a message across the region generally but to Iran specifically, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia summoned el-Hariri from Beirut to Riyadh in November 2017 and forced him “to resign ... and publicly blame Iran, as if he were an employee and not a sovereign leader” (Barnard & Abi-Habib, 2017). The act shook Lebanese politics and stability for a month, and rumours of an imminent war raged on the streets. Regardless of its ultimate success or failure, this episode shows the reach of international players’ control of Lebanese politics.

Lebanon saw a violent and protracted civil war that raged for fifteen years. It came to an end not with a winner and a loser, but thanks to a regionally coordinated agreement known as the Ta’ef Accord. This laid out the foundation of a government of *Tawafiq al-Watani* (National Accord).²⁹ After fifteen years of fighting, no side had prevailed and the solution was to give each party/religious group a share in power.³⁰ The agreement included the distribution of government positions among certain factions that took part in the conflict. It also institutionalised the religious group power-sharing formula and allowed the Syrian Ba’thist regime to obtain a quasi-

²⁸ The son of Rafik el-Hariri, assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon

²⁹ The Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975 and ended in 1990 (see more details in Chapter 2, Section 2). With the backing of the League of Arab States, a tripartite committee composed of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia presided at the signing of the agreement that officially ended the war: Ta’ef (22 October 1989). In this Saudi city, the protagonists of the civil war approved a seven-point deal. In addition to forging a sectarian consensus that has brought entire Lebanese political society to deadlock since, this agreement gave the Syrian regime a quasi-protectorate over Lebanon, along with a military occupation that lasted until 2005 (Chalcraft, 2006b).

³⁰ The previous Lebanese Civil War of 1958 was also brought to an end via a compromise proposed by the United States at the time. No side had prevailed, and a moderate Christian President was proposed by the Americans.

protectorate over Lebanon, accompanied by a military occupation that would last another fifteen years, until 2005. Logically, no real political change or decision can be reached in such a setting. Each parliamentary block pushes and pulls towards a certain side, often depending on international interests in the country and in the area. This has become more tense considering the importance of Lebanon's situation vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict. It is in this pre-existing context of uncertainty, inequality, and division that Syrians refugees started arriving to Lebanon. It set the scene for a plethora of reactions to the arrival of the Syrians, and for each reaction, a complex set of reasoning, affiliations, and allegiances were involved that can only be observed on the finest level.

Syrian refugees' settlement conditions were dictated and complicated by the historical and geopolitical context in which refugees had arrived. Their presence in Lebanon is often cast in terms of the history of the Palestinian refugee settlement that played a role in the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. In addition, many Lebanese individuals see the presence of this large population as a continuation of the history of Lebanese-Syrian relations, during which the current Syrian regime dominated local and international politics for extended periods. It was understood in Lebanon that as a consequence, the country's economic and social life were dominated by Syria. It was widely said for example that "a flood of unwanted Syrian workers [was imposed] on the country" (Chalcraft, 2006b, p. 81).

The Lebanese government is in many ways not functional because of the fragility and inflexibility of its confessional power-sharing nature as dictated in the Ta'ef Accord. The dysfunctionality of the government has translated into the tardy and chaotic policies implemented in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis. No religious or political group took immediate action between 2011 and 2015, opting instead to dissociate from the conflict and stay neutral. With no national strategy, matters were left in the hands of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a myriad of under-resourced and over-stretched local municipalities.

A status of illegality imposed on Syrians that is difficult to circumvent

Syrians in Lebanon live under pressure, which has three main causes. First and foremost, there is the *kafala* framework (detailed below), which has led to placing 74 percent of refugees outside the law (Frelick, Khawaja, Fakh, & Van Esveld, 2018, p. 13). The *kafala* limits the mobility of Syrians and makes them prone to arrest and interrogation. Second, there are the evacuations of settlements; for example, between January 2018 and April 2018, four thousand

refugees were forcibly evacuated³¹. Third, there are local authority actions such as arbitrary home searches by the army, random arrests, and evictions that have placed immense pressure on the refugees. By not according refugees the same treatment that is “accorded to [its own] citizens” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, Sigona, & Goodwin-Gill, 2014, p. 5), and by not facilitating and even complicating refugees’ residency status, the mentioned pressure strategies constitute indirect *refoulement*.³² Even though Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 1951), “today, the principle of non-*refoulement* is not only the essential foundation for international refugee law, but also an integral part of human rights protection, implicit in the subject matter of many such rights, and a rule of customary international law” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014, p. 5).

The legal status of refugees is important for maintaining their livelihoods (Bailey, 2004). The added difficulties that Syrian refugees have experienced since 2015 have contributed to the deterioration of their living conditions and increased their feelings of both insecurity and tension (Ayoub, 2017; Barjas, 2016; Bobseine, 2016; Saghieh, 2015). The Lebanese government refers to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon as *neiz̤heen* (displaced) for three reasons: (1) its dissociation from the conflict politically makes it difficult to admit that the latter produces refugees; (2) the fact that Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 protocol for refugees and therefore does not provide them with any rights; and (3) the desire not to repeat the experience with the Palestinian refugees and to avoid the construction of refugee camps that could become cities within cities, ultimately posing a security threat to the country. Between 2011 and 2014, refugees’ entry and residence were regulated as per the bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Syria reached during the early 1990s, “allowing reciprocal freedom of movement, residence, and property ownership” (Betts, Ali, & Memi, 2017, p. 15). The government, having opted to dissociate itself from the Syrian conflict in 2012, did not review or change the open-door policy and the refugees settled in their historic capacity as temporary migrants. Without having planned ahead and reactively rather than proactively, the government changed its policy in 2015, and refugees were now placed in the same category as unskilled economic migrants under the framework of the *kafala*. At the same time, they were required to notarise their agreement not to work, pushing the large majority of

³¹ According to Human Rights Watch: “At least 3,664 Syrian nationals have been evicted from at least thirteen municipalities from the beginning of 2016 through the first quarter of 2018, with the qualification that this is their best estimate based on cases reported to them.... UNHCR estimated that another 42,000 Syrian were at risk of eviction in 2017.” (Frelick, Khawaja, Fakh, & Van Esveld, 2018, p. 58)

³² “The word *refoulement* derives from the French *refouler*, which means to drive back or to repel. The idea that a state ought not to return persons to other states in certain circumstances was first referred to in Article 3 of the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. It was not widely ratified, but a new era began with the General Assembly’s 1946 endorsement of the principle that refugees with valid objections should not be compelled to return to their country of origin” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, Sigona, & Goodwin-Gill, 2014, p. 5).

refugees outside the law and outside its protection (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). When the Lebanese General Security applied these restrictions, Syrian refugees could not seek legal protection because of their fear of legal prosecution and were placed in a situation of legal precarity.

Access to legal services, when they seek it, appears to be a difficult task. The large majority who cannot secure legal residency do not have the protection of the law and would not report wrongdoing to avoid being arrested or evicted. They use invisibility as one among other strategies to avoid situations of conflict and thus the need for legal support. When “the right to legal counsel is one of the most important rights that a refugee can have” (Fiddian, 2006, p. 313), the impact of this specific difficulty becomes all the more significant. As a matter of fact, Syrian refugees do not trust the Lebanese judicial system or are afraid of it, and are reluctant to face the authorities³³. They also worry about costs related to accessing legal services including their transportation needs or the need to produce notarised documentation.

The kafala: General framework, origins in Lebanon, and present application to Syrian refugees

To understand the social and legal implications of the application of the *kafala* system to the Syrian population in Lebanon since 2015, one must first understand its initial application and role in the management of the population and its social perception. I will briefly introduce the *kafala* system in Lebanon from the 1970s onwards, as it has mainly been used in the case of female domestic workers,³⁴ and move on to explain the way in which it has been adopted for the Syrian population.

Nizam al-kafala (the *kafala* framework) is used in Lebanon³⁵ to regulate the residency of low- or unskilled (mostly female) migrant domestic workers. While the more appropriate translation of the term *kafala* is “guardianship,” because of the extent of influence, control, and responsibility accorded to the *kafeel* (guarantor), the system is widely known and referred to as the sponsorship system, and the *kafeel* as a sponsor. The framework ensures that foreign migrants’ residency is legally bound to the guarantee of their employer. The employer is therefore the legal guardian of the person under *kafala* (known as *makfoul*), responsible for the latter’s well-being and

³³ This issue came up numerous times during my interviews for this thesis. Syrian refugees have often opted to lose in a verbal disagreement and to avoid confrontation for fear of legal repercussions—it is one of the negative coping techniques I will detail in Chapter 3, Section 1.1: On coping mechanisms and economic competition.

³⁴ Even though the *kafala* is meant to regulate the residency of all low-skilled migrants, it has almost exclusively been applied to female domestic workers.

³⁵ While the *kafala* system originated in the Gulf States in the 1950s, Jordan and Lebanon apply it as a regulatory framework as well.

adherence to the rule of law.

It is under this pretence of caring for another's well-being and making sure they adhere to the law that most exploitative aspects of the *kafala* are socially justified. For example, an employer would not want the *makfoul* to get in trouble (pregnancy is a form of what is considered serious trouble) and therefore the *makfoul* may not have a day off, lest she participate in any illegal practice (including sexual activity, which could in addition bring back diseases to the home of the employer).

The *kafala* system in Lebanon is not a legal system that can be found in one specific law and there is no exclusive, comprehensive legal document comprising all relevant regulations regarding the sponsorship system as such. Instead, the *kafala* comprises various customary practices, administrative rules, and legal regulations that tie a migrant domestic worker's residence permit to one specific sponsor in the country.... the *kafala* system consists of a set of guidelines administered and regulated by the Lebanese General Directorate for General Security with some requirements from the Ministry of Labour. This implies that migrant workers' immigration status within Lebanon is treated as a security matter rather than a labour one (Abou Jaoudeh, 2017, p. 39).

The system is highly contested and has been labelled inhuman, racist, and illegal by civil society groups in general due to the exploitation of migrants that it allows for (Abou Jaoudeh, 2017; Migrant Rights, n.d.; Saghie, 2018). While reform occurred in 2009 in the form of a unified labour contract (Migrant Forum in Asia, 2012), this has had little effect on the exploitative practices related to the system. Nizar Saghie³⁶ details "three features of this system of sponsorship and privilege" (Saghie, 2018, p. 3) that are invaluable to explaining the trap that the *kafala* sets for its subjects:

Firstly, a worker's legal residency is tied to the employment relationship. In other words, the worker's status becomes illegal if this relationship ends for any reason, even if the employer failed to pay the worker's wages or sexually assaulted her. Secondly, the sponsor cannot be changed, which means that the worker's status cannot be regularized without the sponsor's permission. Thirdly, General Security usually combines deportation orders with another order banning the worker from re-entering Lebanon for a period, usually three years. This closes the circle by making it impossible for the worker to circumvent the sponsorship system by leaving Lebanon without regularizing her status with her first sponsor and returning under a new sponsor's name (Saghie, 2018, p. 3).

These features of the *kafala* essentially bind the *makfoul* to the *kafeel*, with little or no

³⁶ A prominent Lebanese lawyer.

leeway to contest forms of exploitation. In addition, it is important to note that even when a *makfoul* decides to leave the guardianship (flee the guardian's home and reside elsewhere for instance), corrupt practices take place in order to keep the migrants in check. For example, *kafeels* are encouraged (by their social network and by the security forces) to report a (fake) theft or other criminal offence of the *makfoul* in order to facilitate their capture and legal prosecution.

Encadré 2-1: Statistics on the relationship between *kafeel* and female domestic workers

Saghieh cites the results of a survey conducted in Lebanon with 1200 employers or *kafeels* on their approach to the relationship between them and their domestic workers. He notes that the answers that employers are willing to provide are most probably the best-case scenario, meaning that the reality is more extreme, and cites the most dangerous of statistics produced:

Approximately 38 percent stated that the monthly wage is less than \$200, and approximately 80 percent stated that it is less than \$300.³⁷

Approximately 40 percent stated that they do not pay the worker's wages at the end of each month.

Approximately 94 percent stated that they retain the worker's passport.

More than 57 percent stated that the worker works seven days a week.

More than 11 percent stated that the worker works for more than ten hours a day (3 percent stated that she works for more than twelve), whereas more than 53 percent stated that the worker works for more than eight.

No more than 25 percent stated that they allow the worker to go out alone on her weekly day off.

Approximately 23 percent stated that they lock the worker in the house, though 100 percent deny the worker's right to a private life on the basis that she came to Lebanon for the purpose of serving them.

These statistics show that the *makfoul* in Lebanon is regarded as a product or an investment rather than as a human being, a citizen, a dweller. *kafala* controls the socio-spatial mobility (Dahdah, 2015, p. 95) of its subjects and places them in a legally, socially, and politically inferior position.

³⁷ The minimum wage in Lebanon since 2012 is \$450 or €400.



Figure 2-2: Human trafficking on social media

Social media announcement: “Maid for sale due to travel reasons” Date: 9 March 2019. Source: Facebook

In Lebanon today, female domestic workers are not considered as part of the urban fabric and do not have a choice in where to dwell. They are also not allowed to form unions and have resorted to secret and informal networks of support in order to free themselves, in the few instances that they succeed (Hall, 2018). The Lebanese have interiorised the idea of a *makfoul* as being an investment rather than a worker with rights to the extent that it is now normal to speak of them as such in most circles. So endemic is the issue that even the voices of those who find it abhorrent (both individuals and organisations) and actively seek change are largely stifled by the main current. Figure 2-2 illustrates a recent and by no means unique incident. On a Facebook page dedicated to private classified advertisements, one employer posted: “Ethiopian maid for sale for reason of travel. Arrived in Lebanon three months ago and has a valid residency. Her work is excellent and she speaks Arabic. Those interested call 76xx.” The post was picked up by an outraged individual and reposted with the comment “What kind of disaster is this? To what court should [the person who posted it] be taken ... [contrary to posts criticising political/religious leaders or authorities], this post does not bother authorities.³⁸ I place this post in the hands of whomever it concerns, especially the Minister of Labour.” What ensued was an intervention by the newly appointed Minister of Labour, Camille Abousleiman, and the

³⁸ While it is not mentioned in the post, this phrase probably refers to a wave of charges against and interrogations of activists who post comments criticising politicians or corrupt government practices.

subsequent interrogation of the owner of the post that ended in an apology because “it wasn’t meant in that way.”

With this short background on the socio-urban implications of the *kafala* in Lebanon and all the negative connotations attached to it, one can better understand the significance of the adoption of the system to regulate the Syrian population’s residency in Lebanon since January 2015. It is more than a matter of legalising entry or residence status like a number of other countries apply (many countries require an invitation letter from a local resident and even proof of financial support when applying for visas, such as the European Union countries). Placing Syrians under *kafala* in Lebanon is placing them ipso facto in a second-class dweller status. Their dependence on a Lebanese guarantor restricts not only their mobility but their choices in general. Most importantly, the *kafala* for Syrians was implemented with one further restriction: that of the right to work, forcing them to work informally and illegally. To secure a legal residency permit therefore, a Syrian would have to find a *kafeel*, pay a hefty price to produce documentation and certification,³⁹ and officially certify that s/he would not seek any employment in Lebanon. Above all, in the *kafala* system, the status of the Syrian refugee no longer falls under public policy but becomes a contractual agreement between private individuals. This contract, however, protects every right of the *kafeel* and leaves the *makfoul* with no rights and no possible recourse to justice.

Debate on refugees’ status in Lebanon used for political gain

The subject of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is used in political discourse as a political card to influence elections or cabinet formation or to sway public opinion. In fact, the issue of how to deal with refugees was one of the top five if not top three challenges that candidates were asked about during the parliamentary elections of 2018 (Ajroudi & Chughtai, 2018). Even as early in the crisis as 2013, politicians turned to this challenge as a key element in their discourse and in the stability of the country. In a 2013 radio interview, four high-profile Lebanese politicians at the time⁴⁰ discussed the issues of infrastructure, unemployment, and the Syrian crisis. They “reiterated Lebanese requests for international funding assistance in absorbing the country’s new refugee burden ... dealing with the humanitarian situation is the best way to preserve Lebanon’s stability” (Hamdan, Baroud, Chatah, & Rayess, 2013). In this case, the presence of refugees was used as a pressure tool to attract international aid, while insinuating the dangers that the refugees pose to the country’s stability. The application of the *kafala* and its effects and inconveniences is

³⁹ International aid organisations have reported that the fees and cost of preparing a residency application come to €60–70 per person, and the application fee is €180.

⁴⁰ Ziad Baroud, former Minister of Interior and Municipalities; Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to Prime Minister Saad el-Hariri and former Minister of Finance; Ali Hamdan, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Lebanon’s Amal Movement; and Rami Rayess, spokesman of the Progressive Socialist Party and media advisor to Walid Jumblatt.

not highlighted in instances such as radio interviews, while the aspects of the burden are put forward as a bargaining chip.

Stances on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon change depending on the situation (conference, local press meeting, private conversation, etc.) and location, both within the country and internationally. One position treats them as a purely humanitarian subject, especially when organisations or politicians are seeking funding, to the extent that the regional political context and the national socio-urban context are disregarded. Some have even viewed and presented the refugee crisis as an opportunity for Lebanon to build its infrastructure through attracting funding to indirectly support refugees by improving their living conditions. A second position is the purely political one, where the humanitarian aspect is largely disregarded. This is reflected in instances where refugees are referred to as displaced immigrants or when they are portrayed as a threat to Lebanon's demography. It is within this context that the strongly contested calls for return are placed and where Syrians are portrayed as the cause of all socio-urban problems in Lebanon (poverty, infrastructure and economic challenges, etc.).⁴¹

Lebanese government struggles to position itself vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict and the refugee presence in its territories

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the Lebanese government feared a spill over. This was the main reason behind the neutrality towards, or dissociation from, the conflict. Dissociating from the Syrian conflict also meant dissociating from the refugees arriving to Lebanon as a consequence. No refugee camps were constructed and no formal national political (or local) strategy was put in place to properly deal with the influx. This dissociation lasted until mid-2013, when Hezbollah (the local actor for Iran⁴²) announced its public and open support of the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad (Betts et al., 2017). Hezbollah saw a direct threat to its own existence in the defeat of the Syrian regime and by extension a threat to its mission of resistance against Israel (Al-Amine, 2013), and could therefore not remain neutral. It positioned itself as a protector of minorities and in 2013 had “received delegations from a considerable number of Druze, Christian, and Shiite movements who [believed] that their minority communities [were] seriously threatened ... and gave them the means to prevent their displacement” (Al-Amine, 2013).

When dissociation ended, the predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees became a political

⁴¹ An anecdotal example that received satirical feedback is Lebanese television station MTV's report in September 2018 on the “increasing infections caused by the presence of Syrian refugees ... they bring dangerous bacteria that cause diseases” (MTV, 2018).

⁴² See Chapter 2, Section 1: Governance of cities in Lebanon

threat to the fragile demographic Lebanese construct. In 2014, Lebanon witnessed real security threats, such as the assassination attempt on the Shiite Head of General Security. The Lebanese Army became involved in fights with armed groups in towns along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Armed conflicts increased and the Lebanese government was forced to react. These events led to the adoption of a policy paper outlining several conditions to be applied to the regulation of the presence of refugees in Lebanon, in October 2014 (PCM, 2014). Its goal was to severely restrict the entry of new refugees into Lebanon and encourage, by any means, those inside the country to leave. It authorised local municipalities to take any action they deemed fit in order to achieve this goal.

Yet in order for the refugees to actually return to Syria, relations with the Syrian regime must be normalised through open communication. The Sunni Future Movement is against this, while Hezbollah and the president's Tayyar movement⁴³ are spearheading the calls for return. In parallel, Syrian authorities have passed several laws, such as "Law 10," that render return difficult.⁴⁴

Generally, Sunni political parties tolerate the presence of the refugees and are against normalising relations with the Syrian regime to return them. Christian political parties have mixed reactions, with some parties supporting the Sunni argument against normalising relations and others wary of the important presence of the demographic group. Shiite political parties are security-driven in their dealing with the refugees and obviously support coordinating with the Syrian regime in order to facilitate their return (Betts et al., 2017). Applying pressure on the international community to support the return of the refugees, in April 2018 the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil⁴⁵ ordered a "freeze on residency applications submitted by the United Nations" (Nehme & McDowall, 2018). As mentioned earlier, policies put in place to directly or indirectly pressure refugees to return to the country they fled from is *refoulement*. Therefore, any policy pushing or pressuring refugees to leave or creating an atmosphere of high tension which eventually induces refugees to leave is illegal in the eyes of international law. The decision to freeze UNHCR residencies comes almost immediately after the Lebanese government has come under heavy criticism for a recent naturalisation decree, which naturalised four hundred individuals of Syrian and other nationalities (MEMO, 2018). It has been rumoured that those naturalised Syrians are in close connection with the regime and have paid in exchange for the

⁴³ The Tayyar movement, while inclusive to a certain extent, remains mainly composed of Christian groups and specifically Maronites.

⁴⁴ The law implies that any Syrian who cannot prove ownership of land or residence within thirty days starting April 1, 2018, will automatically lose claim to any such property (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

⁴⁵ Gebran Bassil is also the leader of the *Tayyar al Watani* (Free Patriotic Movement) founded by current President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law.

Lebanese nationality (AFP, 2018; Domat, 2018; Moubayed, 2018; Moukalled, 2018; The Daily Star, 2018c). By acquiring Lebanese nationality and using Lebanese instead of Syrian banks for their financial transactions, these individuals can evade international sanctions (Jokhdar, 2018). Minister Bassil is also directly involved in the passing of the decree. Acquiring nationality furthermore significantly increases their rights in the city⁴⁶: Lebanese nationals have access to all job clusters and may own property, two elements that are not always accessible to foreigners.

1.3 The change in the type and profile of Syrian migrants since 1948

The arrival of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is not an isolated event. The image of one-and-a-half million people with no networks or resources flooding a country unknown to them in a matter of months is false. It is true though that the registration of refugees with the UNHCR peaked at more than one refugee per minute in April 2014 (UNHCR, 2014b) as the events in Syria intensified. This continuity can be explained by the fact that Syrians have always resided in Lebanon in different capacities. Actually, an estimated half a million to one million Syrians resided in the country just before the Syrian crisis in 2011 (Das, Davidson, & Fleming-Farrell, 2011, p. 42). Even before the Lebanese Civil War and since the establishment of the two countries,⁴⁷ unskilled Syrian male labourers were present in Lebanon, where an estimated 400,000 workers resided in Lebanon in 1972 (Chalcraft, 2006a, 2009), working in agriculture, cleaning services, and construction: industries in which they made up 90 percent of the labour force (Chalcraft, 2009). These numbers are only estimates because of the open border policy (*Pax Syriana*) and, before January 2015, the flexibility that allowed Syrians to work as unskilled labourers in Lebanon without work permits. In fact, “in 1995 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated Syrians to number around 450,000. Yet in that same year the Lebanese Central Administration for Statistics showed the number of work permits issued to Syrians as only 1,056” (Jureidini, 2002). John Chalcraft, an expert on Syrian migration to Lebanon, asserts that the most convincing estimates are “200,000 Syrian workers in 1992; 450,000 to 700,000 in 1995–96, and 225,000 to 450,000 in 2000” (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 148). These estimates have been further validated by others, who have also quoted the number of one million “at certain times in the past decade”⁴⁸ (Verdeil et al., 2007). Even in 2015, at the height of the refugee crisis, the Lebanese Contractors Syndicate estimated that 350,000 Syrian workers were

⁴⁶ See Encadré 2-2: The ambiguous and contested (*tawteen*) naturalisation decree of 1994.

⁴⁷ Lebanon and Syria's borders were drawn by colonial forces in 1929 and both countries remained under French mandate until their independence in 1943 and 1946 respectively.

⁴⁸ Original citation: “De nombreuses incertitudes entourent le nombre de travailleurs syriens dans le pays, qui n'étaient officiellement, selon les permis de travail de 2003, qu'au nombre de 500, mais que certains analystes estimaient à un million à certains moments de la décennie passée” (Verdeil et al., 2007).

employed in the sector (Manisera, 2015). This in itself leads to the question: who qualifies as a refugee?⁴⁹ The label in itself lays the basis for a debate on the motive and validity of the presence of Syrians in Lebanon.⁵⁰

There are conflicting points of view as to why Syrian migrants have had such a significant presence over the years. Pro-Syrian analysts argue that the Lebanese economy could not remain standing without cheap labour and that Lebanon keeps the border open for economic gains. Pro-Lebanese analysts argue that Syrian political domination over Lebanon has forced the labourers on the country (Chalcraft, 2006a). Irrespective of viewpoint, the fact remains that Syrian workers have been present in Lebanon since the independence of the two republics, in different but substantial numbers at different times (Fawaz & Peillen, 2003). Their position in Lebanese society has mainly been one of disempowerment and subalternity (Chalcraft, 2006a).

Actually, the lack of regulation of foreign unskilled labour in general and Syrians in specific has encouraged dominant attitudes towards poor migrants. Syrians have been placed in a submissive position for decades, at the service of the Lebanese population who use them to secure cheap luxury services. They usually resided in immediate proximity to urban centres where they could find work or inside their workplace, such as on constructions sites, in a room in a petrol station, etc. The open border policy⁵¹ allowed for migrants to work for low wages, without rights or social security benefits. The Lebanese population profits directly and indirectly from the situation of Syrians in spite of the harsh discourse against their presence. They buy their products from the cheaper albeit illegal Syrian stores, they rent out their apartments to Syrians instead of Lebanese when it is more profitable. In fact, many Lebanese have recently found it more profitable and less complicated to rent out apartments to Syrians than Lebanese. Syrians will always find a way to pay rent for fear of eviction, they comply with the requests of owners without contestation, and importantly it is easier for the Lebanese owner to ask them to leave when needed. The Lebanese authorities facilitate this by allowing and even reinforcing difficult living conditions for Syrians among other poor migrants. By placing various restrictions on the Syrian population in Lebanon, the government has solidified their inferior and exploitable position vis-à-vis the Lebanese population.

The profiles of Syrians in Lebanon have therefore differed throughout the years. During the Civil War (1975–1990), and in addition to the male workers, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon (who remained in a protectorate capacity until 2005). At the

⁴⁹ The estimate was made public in reaction to the *kafala* regulations that demanded the regularisation of all workers' residency permits, a move that would cost the sector millions of dollars in paper regularisation.

⁵⁰ See Chapter 5, Section 5.3: A debatable identity? Who are the Syrians in Lebanon?

⁵¹ As allowed by the bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Syria in 1991 and 1993.

time, Syrians represented the occupying forces that were mostly feared and resented by the Lebanese. The human rights trespasses they committed reverberate to this today, notably the disappearance of at least 17,000 Lebanese citizens during the war, part of whom who are said to have been detained, tortured, and killed in Syrian prisons (Khawaja, 2018). The Lebanese have failed to deal with this past (Smaira & Cassehgari, 2014) and it is therefore very much present in the collective memory of the population. “The question of Lebanese nationals who were forcibly disappeared in Syria is particularly contentious in light of Syria’s influence in Lebanon and resulting domestic divisions. Syrian officials repeatedly deny that they are detaining any Lebanese” (Smaira & Cassehgari, 2014, p. 16).

In March 2005 and in direct reaction to the assassination of Rafik el-Hariri,⁵² hundreds of thousands of Lebanese came together in a series of demonstrations in Beirut which became known as the Cedar Revolution. They successfully called for the withdrawal of all Syrian forces (BBC News, 2005; Dameli, 2005; NY Times, 2005). The last Syrian troops retreated from Lebanon in April 2005. This affected the presence of Syrian workers by leaving them politically and physically unprotected. Their presence without the cover of the Syrian regime certainly affected the way they were perceived and treated, especially in the immediate aftermath. With several violent repercussions that ensued the withdrawal of the Syrian troops (assassinations, bombings),⁵³ tensions grew and in some areas, resentment from the Lebanese population translated into individual instances of violence directed at Syrian migrants (*Chadi, elected member of the Tripoli Municipality, personal interview, 2014*)

The arrival of Syrian refugees in 2011 is therefore but a new phase of their presence in cities in Lebanon, and estimates of their number are new political cards in play. The first refugee arrivals comprised mainly families of the workers already residing in the poorest cities. The open border policy along with the presence of an immediate or extended family member made Lebanon a desired destination for refugees. As the violence escalated, so did the refugee influx until late 2014, steadily. The number of registrations increased exponentially in 2012–2013. In coming to Lebanon, Syrian refugees had the perceived flexibility that urban refugees have: to integrate into the cities would offer more opportunities in terms of mobility, economic prospects, and personal freedom (UNHCR, 2018b). In their other immediate options (Jordan or Turkey) they would most probably have to reside in camps in a more traditional refugee situation, with more restrictions and less opportunities. The seemingly and realistically chaotic situation in Lebanon left enough leeway for Syrians to imagine better navigating and even surpassing their

⁵² Popularly believed to have been carried out by Syrian forces or their allies

⁵³ For a timeline of assassinations see: (DeFraia, 2012)

exile than in other countries. This situation simultaneously left Syrians more vulnerable and exposed to exploitation.

2. Urban refugees in developing countries in general and in Lebanon in specific

2.1 From an international to a national perspective

A glance at south–south urban refuge

The experience of urban refuge has only relatively recently been addressed in the academic field. It was not officially considered a distinct category by the United Nations (UN) until around 2009 (UNHCR press office, 2009). Although there is a wealth of research on classic refugee situations, it is not until the late 1980s that scholars started to study the “growing problem of urban refugees and nature and impacts of repatriation of refugees” (Rogge & Akol, 1989). Literature on urban refugees focuses mostly on the African continent, where most of the world’s refugees reside, since the early 2000s (Easton-Calabria, 2016; Fabos & Kibreab, 2007; Fiddian, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Landau, 2004).

More recent studies have shown some commonalities that would explain the choice for a city over a camp for a refugee, starting with the case of urban dwellers in their place of origin who would logically opt for remaining in an urban setting (Crisp, Janz, & Riera, 2009; Marfleet, 2007). Other reasons include the perceived opportunities refugees would access in cities, anonymity, access to education and healthcare, and freedom of mobility (Fabos & Kibreab, 2007). This sought-after anonymity turns into exclusion in the cases where urban refugees are excluded from formal urban life (Vivet, 2012). Refugees also choose cities over camps in efforts to join family members already living there (Landau & Jacobsen, 2004; Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010). Perhaps this delay in studies on urban refugees lies in the methodological difficulties, as Loren B. Landau suggests:

Despite forced migrants’ long-standing presence in the world’s cities, there are surprisingly few studies focusing exclusively on displaced persons’ experiences in and effects on the urban environment. This oversight is rooted at least partially in the methodological challenges associated with studying refugees in urban environments as well as thematic and conceptual biases within ‘refugee studies’. (Landau, 2004, p. 2)

The UNHCR revised its policies in 2009 to highlight the rights of urban refugees and include their assistance in their programmes (UNHCR, 2009). On the one hand, urban refugees

have less access to assistance, which is usually insufficient to start with. On the other hand, by opting to seek refuge in a city, refugees exercise some independence and face less restrictions than those usually prevalent in camps (Campbell, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004). Urban refugees also risk security problems and difficult coping possibilities due to perceptions from host communities (Jacobsen, 2006) and their protection remains a major challenge (Guterres, 2010; Zetter & Deikun, 2010). Their employment is predominantly informal and highly prone to discrimination and exploitation, especially in the countries that have not signed the 1951 Convention of the UN securing the rights of refugees (Campbell, 2006; Chatty, 2015; Crisp et al., 2009; Landau & Jacobsen, 2004; Vivet, 2012).

Syrian urban refuge in Lebanon

The above raises the question of a positively differential right to the city for urban refugees. When they are concentrated in specific areas such as camps and therefore visible to aid organisations, they have better access to aid but their status as refugees is highlighted. On the other hand, their non-sensational urban settlement (such as in cities in Lebanon) banalises the refugee label but limits positive discriminations in terms of access to aid. Their presence in the city allows them to seek an ordinary urban life and avoid the pejorative stereotype of destitute refugees living in tents. In Lebanon though, the significant number of urban refugees limits their anonymity. They therefore do not have access to the positive discrimination of international aid organisations that their counterparts in the informal settlements⁵⁴ do, nor do they have real potential to navigate the city as unknown dwellers. A multiplicity of situations and interactions between Lebanese hosts and Syrian refugees needs to be observed in order to obtain an understanding of such a complex phenomenon. The paradoxical junction between positive discrimination and insignificance, between spaces dedicated to migration and ordinary spaces, makes the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon even more special.

Once in the city, urban refugees fall into the discourse cycle surrounding their employment. When they are employed, they are blamed for competing with the local community. When they are not employed, they become, in the words of some Lebanese, a “burden”, “beggars”, “prone to crime”, etc. (Jacobsen, 2006). Another challenge for urban refugees is their inability to access financial services through official channels, since they cannot open bank accounts for example. Such a barrier and this severely affects their economic prospects (Landau & Jacobsen, 2004) and positions them in vulnerable situations with owners, employers, etc.

⁵⁴ Around 250,000 Syrian refugees out of the one million refugees registered in Lebanon in 2017 lived in informal settlements in the cities closest to the Lebanese-Syrian borders (UNHCR, 2017)

Today, over 60 percent of the world's refugees live in urban areas (Liu, 2016; O'Loughlin & Benali, 2017). Syrians representing 6.3 million (UNHCR, 2018a), constitute the third-largest refugee population worldwide. Of the Syrians residing in the three neighbouring countries Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, over 4 million are urban refugees, with an estimated 750,000 of those in Lebanon alone.

While I have focused on refugees' experiences in the urban environment in Lebanon, this thesis does not fall exclusively within the scope of refugee studies.⁵⁵ Rather, it falls into a broader scope of interdisciplinary studies. As I detail in Chapter 3, Section 3, I have approached the subject from three disciplinary lenses, encompassing three scales of reflection: first, the regional geopolitical, then the national socio-political, and last the local urban levels.

2.2 An overview of refugees in Lebanon in 2018

Since Lebanon's independence in 1943, there have been two major instances of refugee migration to the country: Palestinian (1948, 1967) and Syrian (2011). Iraqi refugees also sought refuge in Lebanon in 2003, and while they number into the tens of thousands, this does not compare with the hundreds of thousands and more Palestinians and Syrians. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and UNHCR are the two UN bodies that manage the needs of all refugees in Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese government is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and therefore does not take part in the management or support of refugees in the country.

When the first Palestinian refugees arrived in Lebanon in 1948, they settled in makeshift tents in camps in the peripheries of cities across the country. With rapid urban sprawl that transformed the country especially after the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, the camps have come to be in immediate proximity to or completely inside the cities. Furthermore, "[e]conomic activities, daily mobility, presence of new international migrants, strong political and cultural significance for the Palestinian refugees, are the different elements that characterize the refugee camps today as urban settlements" (Dorai, 2010, p. 19). Their residents are by extension urban refugees. Today, UNRWA manage some half million Palestinian refugees' needs in twelve camps across Lebanon (Figure 2-3).

⁵⁵ Some of the most renowned research in forced migration studies in the Middle East is published by the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University by authors such as Dawn Chatty, Roger Zetter, and Elena Fiddian-Qasmieh (<https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/research>); the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, with notable publications from Nasser Yassin, and more recently by The Project on Middle East Political Science, POMEPS, run by Marc Lynch.

Operating in Lebanon during the last five decades, the UNHCR served “a few thousand refugees and asylum seekers annually”. In 2010 it declared to have “met the needs of around 10,000 mostly Iraqi refugees” (UNHCR, 2018a). Iraqi and Syrian refugees in a country that is 90 percent urbanised (Verdeil et al., 2007) are therefore in 2018 mainly urban dwellers. This goes somewhat against the norm observed in developing countries, where refugees are not usually allowed into urban settings, and when they do settle in urban areas it is “in violation of the host country policy” (Bailey, 2004). With no framework, directives, strategies, or policies, the settlement of these refugees went ahead informally, creating a situation whereby refugees weighed heavily on the failing urban infrastructure. It is therefore accurate to assume that poor (forced) migrants would choose the most affordable settings for their settlement, initially at least. This is the case worldwide, even when referring to rural–urban migration within the same country. Poor migrants in general accept to settle in precarious conditions hoping that their presence in the city and the potential opportunities it may provide would help elevate their social status with time. This is also the case for refugees, who remain attentive to any possibility to enhance their network and seek better conditions. Not long after their arrival in Lebanon, Syrian refugees found themselves in a hostile environment where the prospect of integration was and remains highly unlikely and assistance from the UNHCR and other organisations insufficient. They therefore “balance risks and costs of marginalization to advance their livelihoods” (Grabska, 2006, p. 289).

In a spatial perspective, Syrians are present in every region of the country and its peripheries Figure 2-3. This map reflects the extent of the challenges in relation to managing the influx by showing the presence of refugees in literally every region. The largest concentration of refugees is in the region of the Bekaa, one of the first points of entry from the east. While it has densely populated cities and towns, the Bekaa mainly comprises rural and agricultural areas. It harbours most of the informal settlements of Syrians and, even though the latter have settled in the cities of the region, their overarching presence is less urban and more classic in terms of refugee situations. The Beirut and North governorates are today home to more than half the refugee population.

Total Persons of Concern JSON

Location name	Source	Date date	Population
Bekaa	UNHCR	31 May 2018	35.7% 350,560
Beirut	UNHCR	31 May 2018	26.4% 259,350
North Lebanon	UNHCR	31 May 2018	25.8% 253,066
South Lebanon	UNHCR	31 May 2018	12.1% 119,036

Figure 2-4: Syrian refugees in the regions

The distribution of Syrian refugees on the four main Lebanese regions as defined by the UNHCR.

Source: UNHCR Data portal. (UNHCR, n.d.)

2.3 The rapid decline in the social and urban position of Syrian refugees in cities

The nature and challenges of refugees' settlement in Lebanon's cities changed and host society's tolerance decreased with time. In the very beginning of the crisis, the tone was generally a receptive one, with some disparities across the regions linked to religious affiliations. Soon after, hostility to the presence of forced migrants began to visibly materialise. Threats and racist signs filled rural and urban landscapes throughout the country Figure 2-6, often with the implicit or explicit support of municipal authorities, many of whom imposed curfews on this population. In 2014, "at least 45 local curfews [were] imposed on Syrian refugees" (Human Rights Watch, 2014), restricting their mobility in all regions and an important number of places. This has affected every aspect of their life in the city; curfews enforced ipso facto a second-class dweller status on them. Lebanese citizens and especially youth have felt empowered to stop and harass Syrians who broke the curfew, even if they were running to the pharmacy (El-Khoury, 2018, p. 101). Figure 2-5 depicts the positions of curfew announcements and public threats directed against Syrian refugees, mainly in 2014. While the list is not exhaustive, the number coincides with the Human Rights Watch report; those were gathered from two main sources, and other secondary social media references. The large concentration of these banners was documented in the capital and its peripheries, with banners photographed in every area. While the curfew banners have all been placed on the map, there are still eight other public threat signs that were photographed, but the location is unknown, as it is not noted on the sign as is the case with the curfew banners⁵⁶. On this map, the religious majority (or specific confession majority where known) is specified. What can be seen is that the majority of publicly visible announcements were photographed in Christian-majority localities.


⁵⁶ See Annexes for the complete list of curfew banners and public threats.

Curfew announcements and public threats directed at Syrian refugees in Lebanon, 2014

- Lebanon
- Regions
- ★ Capital
- ☆ Main cities
- Nature of banners**
- Curfew announcements
- Public threats
- Religious majority of the localities where banners were photographed**
- Christian
- Christian Maronite
- ⊙ Christian Orthodox
- Christian / Druze
- ◆ Druze
- Sunni
- ⬡ Shiite

Localisation of banners

- 1 - Abadiyeh
- 2 - Abey, Ain Darafil
- 3 - Abou Samra, Tripoli
- 4 - Ain El Remmaneh
- 5 - Ain El Saydeh
- 6 - Annaya, Kfar Baal
- 7 - Araiya
- 8 - Achrafieh Sassine Square
- 9 - Baalchmay
- 10 - Babliyah municipality
- 11 - Boutchay, Merdacheh
- 12 - Beit El Chaar, Mazraat El Hdaira
- 13 - Beit Chama, El Akidiyyeh
- 14 - Bhamdoun
- 15 - Blat
- 16 - Bourj Hammoud
- 17 - Bchamoun
- 18 - Chanay
- 19 - Dbayeh, Zouq El Kharab, Haret El Bellan, Aoukar
- 20 - Deir El Qamar
- 21 - Ebrine
- 22 - Falougha-Khalouat
- 23 - Ghaboun
- 24 - Ghaziyeh
- 25 - Halba
- 26 - Hammana
- 27 - Hemlaya
- 28 - Hemlaya
- 29 - Ehden
- 30 - Jaj
- 31 - Jdeideh, Bouchriyeh, Sad Bouchriyeh
- 32 - Jeita
- 33 - Jiyeh
- 34 - Jounieh
- 35 - Kahaleh
- 36 - Karm Saddeh
- 37 - Lehfed
- 38 - Mansourieh, Mkalles, Daychouniyeh
- 39 - Mar Chaaya, Mzaki
- 40 - Miyeh w Miyeh
- 41 - Monsef
- 42 - Qraiyyeh
- 43 - Sahel Alma
- 44 - Salima
- 45 - Chouaifet
- 46 - Sin el Fil
- 47 - Wadi Chahrour
- 48 - Zahlé-Maalaqah and Taanayel
- 49 - Zouk Mosbeh



The banners shown on this map are not a comprehensive compilation, rather the most visible and shared on social media, mainly in 2014. The number coincides more or less with the Human Rights Watch report of 2014 that documented «at least 45 curfews imposed on Syrians»

Sources:
 Human Rights Watch. (2014). Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees.
 Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018). Banners in Dialogue. Refugees as City Makers, 82-89.
 Facebook page: "The Campaign in Support of Syrian Refugees against Racism"
 Concept: Dima El-Khoury
 Execution: Louise Sagot, May 2019, with the support of Toufik Kheirich



3 - « My Syrian brother... we support you but don't act against us... We already have a lot to deal with - The gathering of mobile shop owners in Abi Samra » - Abou Samra, Tripoli, Facebook page « The Campaign in Support of Syrian Refugees against Racism »



8 - « The day will come when we say to the Syrian: gather your things and everything you have stolen, and leave » - Bachir Achrafieh Sassine Square, Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018)



17 - « Motorbikes and non-Lebanese workers residing in Bchamoun are prohibited from circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability. » - Bchamoun, Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018)



42 - « Syrians and foreign nationals are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am. Subject to liability. » - Qraiyyeh, Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018)



Figure 2-6: Curfew banner

Banner in a Mount Lebanon village. Translation: “You Syrian: we will cut off the hand that threatens our livelihood. [signed] The village workers.” Source: Facebook

In addition to political discourse and local authorities’ actions that affected Syrians’ access to the cities in the first three years, another issue played a major role. In the poorer areas, where Lebanese communities are vulnerable and poverty is prevalent, international aid for the Syrians strongly increased tensions between the communities. Refugees’ negative coping strategies drove them to accept very low wages, increasing economic competition, especially in these areas. Vulnerable Lebanese communities complained of what they saw as Syrians stealing their jobs and receiving assistance on top of it. In the first few years of the crisis, international aid was more significant than it is today and refugees received both cash and in-kind support (Anderson, 2014; EU, 2015; UNHCR, 2012b, 2013, 2014a). Poverty and apprehension about the other coupled with feelings of injustice strongly increased tension in these areas. UNHCR was thus faced with the issue of providing fair treatment for all vulnerable communities. By providing much-needed basic humanitarian assistance to refugees, the aid created a sense of increased inequality in the poorest areas.

Dire conditions were further exacerbated as of January 2015, after the Council of Ministers passed the decision to restrict Syrian refugees’ entry into Lebanon and encourage those already present to leave by all means (PCM, 2014). Since then, it has become virtually impossible

for Syrians to legally enter Lebanon (El-Khoury, 2018, p. 102). A changing regulatory regime, which extended the *kafala* system to all Syrians for a period, has made it particularly difficult for refugees to work legally. The system reinforced Syrians' dependence and vulnerability vis-à-vis the local population. In addition, the *kafala* system was not clearly communicated to the public nor properly enforced. Regulations changed regularly and frequently, different documentation was requested from different individuals. The *kafala* reinforced the illegal and informal working conditions of refugees and increased their vulnerability and precarity. The label refugee, which is a largely pejorative term in Lebanon, places Syrian refugees instantly in a dominated position. The *kafala* reinforced this position: illegal from an international law point of view—and ultimately ruled illegal even in Lebanon (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2018)—it placed refugees further “outside the law and outside its protection” (Frangieh, 2017). Both in theory and in the observed reality, they are second-class dwellers. They regularly see insulting street markings and graffiti targeting them (Figure 2-7). They have experienced direct and indirect rejection, including people refusing to serve them and being denied access to, or asked to leave, public places.

Adding a layer to these violent social instances, the procedures to renew residency papers is difficult and humiliating, referred to as punishment by the refugees.⁵⁷ Like other migrants claiming official recognition by the authorities of their host country, they wait outside the official instances in charge of immigration – the General Security Offices in this case – for hours with no assurance that they will get to apply on that day. For their first visit or for any special requests, the Lebanese *kafael* must be present and it is officially the latter who must submit the paperwork, including the identity card or passport. In June 2018 and at the time of writing this dissertation, the Lebanese government has introduced yet another level of difficulty into the cycle that regulates the settlement of registered Syrian refugees: it has halted the renewal of residency permits for all UNHCR staff. The Lebanese government accused UNHCR of not doing enough to encourage Syrians to return and on the contrary advising them not to by turning their attention to the various risks associated with premature return. The freezing of residency permits is an effort to coerce the UNHCR into encouraging Syrians to leave the country and cease to “facilitate Syrian refugees' stay” (Nehme & McDowall, 2018; The Daily Star, 2018b).

⁵⁷ This was a recurring subject during both interviews and informal discussions with refugees. Source: Field notes, 2016–2018.




Figure 2-7: Graffiti hostile to Syrian refugees

Graffiti hostile to Syrian refugees in Beirut reads: “To every Syrian bastard: leave,” later modified to: “to every racist bastard: leave.” Bottom: “Leave, leave you Syrian, beware your enemy, the Syrian is your enemy.” Source: Campaign in support of Syrians in the face of racism (Facebook page).

Unregulated, random restrictions on Syrians’ use of public spaces

The presence of Syrians in public spaces is generally not tolerated. That said, it is important to note the different factors that may impact this tolerance, including the social class of the Syrians (the wealthy for example have little trouble moving around), their religion, and political stances. In addition to the clearly outlined curfews mentioned above, other random and informally applied restrictive measures are numerous. In Figure 2-8 one Syrian woman describes

her experience in a public garden, illustrating the different forms and levels of tolerance towards different groups of Syrians. She recounts that while she was with her daughter in a public garden in Beirut, she witnessed a security officer asking “a mother wearing a headscarf and obviously a Syrian refugee” to leave the garden, because the space was supposed to be accessible to locals only, while this was not mentioned anywhere. She came to the mother’s defence and confronted the officer with the fact that two French ladies were on the seats beside her, which prompted the officer to say “it is prohibited for Syrians only.” At this point, having heard her Syrian accent, the officer asked her to leave as well and waited to check that she had indeed exited the garden. She had not been approached initially, as it seems her appearance did not raise suspicions: she is not veiled and probably belongs to the middle classes. Whether it was her accent or her action that provoked the officer is unknown: would the officer have asked her to leave, even having heard her accent, had she not defended her less wealthy countrywoman? And had she defied the order, what would have been the consequences? This instance gained some traction on social media, and there were statements of support and indignation by individuals and organisations, notably by the independent political movement Beirut Madinati.⁵⁸ While ultimately not tolerating the presence of either Syrian woman in the public space, the security officer acted differently with each due to a set of presuppositions he made based on their appearance.

Many Lebanese groups are uncomfortable when seeing refugees in public areas and express their despondency at being “deprived of taking a walk” because of this presence of foreigners.⁵⁹ As a consequence, refugees have been denied use of the public beach and asked to leave private pool areas in several regions. This sort of recurrent example illustrates the randomness surrounding the treatment of Syrians by Lebanese locals and authorities, which is generally dependent on social status, religion, and political stance (van Vliet & Hourani, 2014). While this reveals the significance of an ethnographic study in the field, in order to understand the subtleties of Lebanese-Syrian relations in all these aspects, it seems therefore important to consider the recent history of the Middle East.

⁵⁸ An independent political movement that ran for Beirut’s municipal elections in 2016

⁵⁹ Interview with a Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh. Source: Field notes November 2015



Figure 2-8: Syrian denied use of public space
 On social media, a Syrian dweller expresses frustration and dismay at being asked to leave a public garden. Source: Facebook. Date: 9 June 2018

3. Tension within Lebanon and between Lebanon and Syria rooted in the division of the Levant by colonial powers

3.1 An overview of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic relations since the beginning of the twentieth century

With immediate geographic proximity and a common colonial past, the Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian populations have much in common. One hundred years ago, these countries did not exist in their current borders. The area of the modern Middle East was administratively divided into Ottoman *vilayets* (provinces) until the First World War and then into zones under different degrees of French and English colonial rule until the mid-1900s. Up to that point, populations in all these areas had been free to move and settle within the Levant.

In 1916, the French and British divided the territories under their mandate into five states, including Greater Lebanon, which today is the Republic of Lebanon. These borders of Greater Lebanon were not completely arbitrary, as the delineated area included a significant Christian community, favourable to France's presence. In fact, to be understood correctly, the current Lebanese-Syrian relations and both countries' relations with Palestine and Israel need to be traced back to this era. In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Great Britain and France proposed a division of the Middle East into two sub-regions. Figure 2-9 and Figure 2-10 show these divisions as per correspondence between the French and British ambassadors at the time. The hand-drawn borders divide the Middle East into five zones: one under French authority, another under British authority, two zones under French and British mandates respectively, and one internationally controlled zone. The region in which Lebanon lies submitted as such to French authority and was considered strategic due to its geographic position as an entry point to the entire region. The Sykes-Picot agreement makes no reference to Lebanon as a separate entity; it is part of the blue region "A."⁶⁰ The borders between the French and British "zones" later became the borders between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is often cited as a cause of the warfare, violence, and extremism in the Middle East, due to the largely arbitrary borders that forced disparate ethnic and religious groups together (Fisher, 2015).

It is a longstanding theory that the French created two countries but not two nations when they drew the Syrian-Lebanese borders (Salibi, 1988). To ensure the survival of the minorities, a constitution based on the division of powers between the different religious groups

⁶⁰ There is broad research on the details and reasons behind the divisions of these territories, including the role of the production of oil. Among other references, see France's Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918 by Edward Peter Fitzgerald.

was elaborated, basing the proportions on the demography at the time. This system continues to be in place to date, as a Christian Maronite heads the Lebanese government and eighteen religious groups each have a specific power seat(s) in government (Nahas, 1980). By seeking a distinct nationality and aligning themselves with colonial forces, the Maronites and their allies broke the unspoken Arab alliance and specifically their Arab connection with Syria, to the discontent of their neighbour:

the Lebanese have always lacked a common vision of their past. Muslims and Christians fundamentally disagree over the country's historical legitimacy as an independent entity. Christians in general affirm this distinct identity while Muslims emphasise Lebanon's place in the broader Arab history (Salibi, 1988).

The Lebanese Constitution was published in 1926. It gave religious communities the right to be a part of the governing political structure. In its article 7,⁶¹ equality between all Lebanese citizens is confirmed, but article 95 contradicts this by stipulating the sharing of power between religious groups and recommending that the “Chamber of Deputies [must] take the appropriate measures to eliminate political sectarianism,⁶² according to an interim plan” (Lebanon's Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004, 1926). In the Greater Syria region in the 1920s, “pan-Arabism rapidly replaced pan-Islamism as the prime political loyalty commanding Muslim as well as Christian allegiance among the Arabs, the Maronites in Lebanon being the principal exception” (Salibi, 1988). For Muslims, however, the idea of Arabism was blended with Islam, which was not the case for the Christians of the area, who saw it as a “purely secular national identity which was separate and distinct from Islam as the traditional basis of Arab political life” (Salibi, 1988). Salibi argues that while Christians and Muslims in the Arab region supported a pan-Arab national identity, Muslims still viewed Arabism as somehow linked with Islam, which was not acceptable for Christians in general. The Maronites in Lebanon were the most vocal in contesting this pan-Arabism. It is from this conflict that the most basic identity controversy in Lebanon stems. Christians (Maronites specifically) have always pressed for an identity separate from the larger Muslim Arabism to which the Muslims in Lebanon mainly adhered. Maronites in Lebanon feared that the presence of a significant number of Sunni Syrian refugees directly threatens to tip the balance strongly towards pan-Arab thought and away from a Lebanese identity distinct from its Arab neighbours.

⁶¹ Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution: “All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and political rights, and assume obligations and public duties without any distinction among them” (*Lebanon's Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004*, 1926)

⁶² The word “sect” is widely used as a synonym for religious group or confession.




Figure 2-9: Sykes-Picot borders

Map of Sykes–Picot Agreement showing Eastern Turkey, Syria, Western Persia, and areas of control and influence agreed between the British and the French. Signed by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot on 8 May 1916. Source: Royal Geographical Society, 1910–1915.




Figure 2-10: Schematic diagram of Sykes-Picot borders

The 1916 divisions of the Middle East between France and Great Britain. Source: (Fisher, 2015).

A National Pact based on the division of powers was later elaborated in 1943, the year of the country’s independence from France. Unwritten, it reflects the fears of the Christian communities in the country and accordingly places different religious groups in different power

positions, according to the population census of 1932. It states that the Republic will always be organised around an equilibrium of religious representatives, thus balancing power at the head of the state: the Lebanese Presidency will be occupied by a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister will be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite Muslim. By way of a series of laws—including the electoral law—the constitutional text, and the unwritten National Pact, fixed positions in the different government services and political institutions are also attributed to each religious group (Nahas, 1980). These laws include the electoral law of the parliament, which was updated in 2018 under the pretence of alleviating some of the confessional divisions. Importantly,

the state officially recognizes 18 religious communities in Lebanon. Each has its own courts and laws ... On the other hand, the Lebanese legislation that recognizes 18 religious groups also states that whoever does not follow one of them can follow a civil code that will be developed for personal status. The civil personal status code, however, was never developed (Zalzal, 1997, p. 37).

In essence, not developing a civil code under which all citizens would be equal with equal access to social, urban, and political rights meant that ipso facto religious communities are categorised differently and have different rights.

Moreover, during the 1940s, Lebanon's southern neighbour⁶³ was facing a political crisis of their own, one that would have an immeasurable and protracted political, social, and urban impact on the entire region. The declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 (following the British Balfour promise to the Zionists) marked the date of the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe), or the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homeland to neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Of these three countries, "Lebanon was the least hospitable to Palestine refugees" (Peretz, 1993, p. 61), with the exception of the wealthy Christian non-registered refugees, who received better treatment and who were given Lebanese nationality in the 1950s (Peretz, 1993). In Jordan, the Palestinians initially found the most appropriate atmosphere to resist Israel. As such, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that was founded in 1964, with the mission to liberate Palestine through al-jihad al-mokaddas (holy war) (Palestine National Charter, 1964), operated from Jordan at first.

Christian–Muslim tensions in Lebanon were evident in the 1958 crisis (known as a short civil war) when Muslim Lebanese contested Lebanese–Western relations and sought to strengthen Lebanese–Arab relations. By aligning with Egypt's Jamal Abdel Nasser, a close ally of Syria at the time, they sought to create a United Arab Republic, with strong support from leftist groups and

⁶³ Under British and international mandate.

especially Muslims in the two countries and beyond. Neither side prevailed, and after the military and political intervention of the United States, moderate Maronite President Fuad Shehab was elected, leaving things in Lebanon unresolved. At the time, Palestinian refugees were present in Lebanon, who numbered around one hundred thousand but were not armed and had no role in the conflict. Syrian workers were also present in Lebanon at the time, although there are no clear estimates of their numbers. In 1947, for example, they made up 25 percent of the workers on building sites (Chami, 2002).

In the late 1960s, the relationship of the PLO with Jordanian authorities became increasingly strained and in 1970—following tensions with the Jordanian authorities, specifically the events known as Black September—the PLO was expelled from Jordan and came to Lebanon, eventually setting up its operations in the south of the country, mainly in the refugee camps. These events, coupled with the first Palestinian commando crossing from Lebanon into Israel, shifted the political balance between Palestinians and Lebanon profoundly. While the Lebanese political system was beginning its slide into crisis once again, the Palestinian resistance movement was growing in popularity and gaining power in the Lebanese territories.

In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out. Like in 1958, Christian–Muslim tensions and the profound disagreement of these communities on the identity of the country played a role. This time though, there were more stakes and more players involved, including the Palestinian resistance—in coalition with Lebanese leftist and Muslim groups. An Ain al-Remmeneh church shooting on April 13, which killed two Maronite figures, followed by a retaliation massacre of thirty Palestinian civilians on a bus in the same area were the two events that started the war, with a succession of massacres and the destruction of the downtown area in Beirut. This time around, Christian authorities called on Syria for backup, and Syrian troops entered the country to support the authorities against upheaval of the Muslim coalition and ultimately stayed on in Lebanon until 2005⁶⁴. The Lebanese Civil War is still present in the political and urban life in Lebanon. The Ta'ef Accord that ended the war is still the basis of the shaky political structure and its physical effects on the cities are still seen in the form of buildings and infrastructure in the areas that have not been reconstructed Figure 2-11. Most importantly though, no Lebanese side has ever prevailed and urban life is an enduring negotiation between religious communities over space and power.

⁶⁴ This date span, 1976–2005, is regarded as a thirty-year occupation by Syria, with between thirty to forty thousand troops continually stationed in Lebanon over the years



Figure 2-11: Beit Beirut

Emblematic war-damaged building in Sodeco, Beirut—and in the background, Sama Beirut, one of the highest skyscrapers in the country Photo: Toufik Khreich

In 2005 and after a national movement calling for the end of the Syrian military presence, Syrian troops retreated entirely, leaving behind the migrant workers, who faced a violent backlash from Lebanese communities as they were perceived to have lost their protection. This phase did not last long and Syrian workers remained in Lebanon in different unskilled jobs, as was the case before 1975. In 2011, the Syrian crisis began.

Understanding the turbulent nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations along with the contradictory representations of the Syrian population for Lebanese communities permits a better vision of the more recent events and consequences of the Syrian conflict for cities in Lebanon. On the one hand, there is the figure or profile of the unskilled, second-class Syrian migrant dweller continuously present in Lebanon since the 1950s. On the other hand, there is the direct and significant influence that the Syrian government has had on Lebanese politics and internal affairs, especially since 1975.

In this section, I give an overview of the different stages of Syria's official involvement in Lebanon since the establishment of both countries. This is relevant because, as mentioned earlier,

the relations between the host Lebanese and Syrian refugees cannot be separated from the socio-political history of the two countries.

“When it rains in Syria, the Lebanese should hold up their umbrellas,” or so goes the saying. Syrian-Lebanese relationships are complex to say the least, with family and economic ties dating back to the early 1900s, when the entire Levant area was under colonial rule. Both Syria and Lebanon comprise numerous religious groups, and both countries have a shared border with Israel. Syrian leadership has played a big-brother role in neighbouring Lebanon ever since these colonial divisions in the early 1900s took shape and the political relations between the two countries have always been tense. Conversely, Lebanese historians have stated:

Lebanon has always been the entry point for any intervention in Syria’s internal affairs. During the past 40 years we got used to hearing people criticising the Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs but the truth is all the coups that took place in Syria between 1949 and 1970 had been planned in Beirut. Beirut was the starting point for the planning and support of every coup in Syria” (Rafei, 2013).

A new phase in Lebanese-Syrian political relationships began in 1970, when Hafez al-Assad (Minister of Defence at the time) took over Syria’s leadership. The year 1976 saw a specific turn of events which directly and for a long time since has affected these relations. Lebanese President Suleiman Franjeh, backed by other Christian leaders, called on al-Assad for military support in the Lebanese Civil War in which the PLO⁶⁵ was implicated. Political parties in Lebanon were in conflict over a central question: the legitimacy of the presence of the PLO in Lebanon as an active arm of resistance against Israel. This eventually led to the fifteen-year Civil War.⁶⁶

Towards the end of the 1970s, Christian leaders called for the Syrian intervention to end. Syrian forces were strongly implicated in Lebanese internal affairs (and different political parties’ affairs) at that point. They had gained a stronger hold over Lebanese territories and were an active and serious player in the Civil War, qualifying them in effect as an occupying power. Tensions kept rising and Syria’s control of the Lebanese territory kept getting stronger until 1988, when army general commander Michel Aoun declared the Liberation War against the Syrian army in Lebanon. On 13 October 1990, Syrian forces took over the presidential headquarters in Baabda. This meant the defeat of Michel Aoun, his subsequent exile to France,⁶⁷ and the end of the war.

⁶⁵ Established in Lebanon in 1970 after Black September and their expulsion from Jordan.

⁶⁶ For a detailed account of the Lebanese Civil War, see (Picard, 2012).

⁶⁷ Aoun returned to Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution and the retreat of all Syrian troops from the country, in May 2005.

A year earlier, in October 1989, the Ta'ef Accord was signed by different regional actors and the surviving 1972 Lebanese parliamentary members. It was designed to bring an end to the Civil War. Two major political directions were laid out in this agreement. First, it shifted some political weight from the Maronite Christians' side to the Sunni Muslims' side by giving more power to the Sunni Prime Minister. Second, it officially placed Syria in a position of acting as a protector over Lebanon. As such, the Accord confirmed Syrian political domination. It was charged with the complete supervision of the situation in Lebanon. In one part, the Ta'ef Accord reads:

Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the Internal Security Forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the Lebanese legitimacy to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than two years, beginning with the ratification of the National Accord document, the election of a President of the Republic, the formation of the National Accord Cabinet, and the constitutional approval of the political reforms (The Ta'ef Accord, 1989)

In 1991, the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, justifying the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon beyond the two years outlined in the Ta'ef Agreement. This treaty legitimised the Syrian presence in and domination of Lebanon for the next fourteen years. Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President at the time, famously used the phrase “one people in two countries” in his speech, a phrase that still echoes the inferior political Lebanese position at the time. Linking the Lebanese to their neighbouring Syrians in this phrase, Hafez al-Assad insisted on the Arab face of Lebanon and the Lebanese, thus provoking the significant part of the population that resists these ties and insists on a separate Lebanese character.

Over the years, Syrian intelligence services gained a reputation of cruelty. Until today, almost thirty years since the end of the Civil War, Lebanese families are demanding to know the fate of their relatives who disappeared during the war. In fact, the fate of 17,000 Lebanese—including almost 650 who were confirmed to have been imprisoned in Syria—is still unknown (IRIN, 2007a). The politics of terror used by the Syrian army and intelligence earned them the contempt of the Lebanese population. Until today, the *kaak* (Levantine bagel) vendor is jokingly referred to as a Syrian *moukhabarat* (intelligence officer) in the Lebanese street.⁶⁸ These officers evoked fear and silenced dwellers in public areas.

⁶⁸ It was widely known that undercover intelligence officers would be disguised as *kaak* vendors.

Encadré 2-2: The ambiguous and contested (*tawteen*) naturalisation decree of 1994

In 1994, under the prevailing pro-Syrian government, a non-transparent naturalisation decree was approved (Frangieh, 2016; Malik, 1996). Neither the exact number of those naturalised nor the conditions and criteria for their selection was made public. Christian groups in the form of the Maronite League challenged the decree, considering it a “dangerous process of demographic and social change” (Frangieh, 2016), as reports claimed a significant number of those naturalised were Sunni Muslims. Citizenship and by extension naturalisation in Lebanon has always been a political tool that serves to maintain Lebanon’s distorted confessional democracy. In fact, researchers have argued that “Lebanese confessional democracy does not consist of a simple system of proportional communal representation. It is characterized by the primacy of communal over individual rights and by the subversion of the principle of equality among individuals by citizenship status” (Jaulin, 2014, p. 252). Even the only Lebanese official population census of 1932, on which the distribution of political power is based until today, has been contested. It is suggested that the Christian demographic majority was fabricated through a politicised selection of which parts of the residing population received nationality and through using emigrants, immigrants, and nomads as trump cards as needed (Jaulin, 2014; Maktabi, 1999). In 2018, Lebanese women still cannot pass their nationality to their spouses or children. It is practically impossible for immigrants to apply for citizenship, especially since the process, regulations, and laws concerning naturalisation are vague where mentioned. This places all migrants, especially poor migrants, in an inferior position vis-à-vis Lebanese nationals, with significantly less of a role in their urban surroundings.

The significance of naturalisation for a city

In his brief overview “Space, citizenship, and the right to the city,” Eugene McCann notes the “political importance of understanding the spaces that lie out there ... as both reflections of contemporary political economic conditions and as sites through which identity politics, citizenship, and alternative political agendas are articulated and struggled over” (McCann, 2002). His arguments (like many geographers who are interested in urban politics) build on the body of work proposed by Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s and 1970s on the “Right to the City.” For Lefebvre, “the right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 174). Therefore, he introduced the idea that citizenship is more than a legal right bestowed by a nation-state on dwellers who fit a set of criteria. Rather, he argues that citizenship belongs to the inhabitants, the urban dwellers, including the nation-state’s citizens. The right to the city is by definition inclusive and does not take into consideration sub-group differences.

These rights are explicitly spatialized in Lefebvre’s perspective. Achieving them, “depends ... upon an essential quality of urban space: centrality. Here and elsewhere we assert that there is no urban reality without a center, without a gathering together of all that can be born in space and can be produced in it, without

an encounter, actual or possible, of all 'objects' and 'subjects'" (McCann, 2002, p. 78).

Almost twenty years after Lefebvre's arguments, "[m]ost agree that it is the everyday experience of inhabiting the city that entitles one to a right to the city, rather than one's nation-state citizenship" (Purcell, 2014, p. 142). It follows that most also "emphasize the importance of the use value of urban space over and above its exchange value" (Purcell, 2014, p. 142). This is not the reality in most cities in the world today—dwellers do not all have rights to appropriate (in Lefebvre's sense of use, not ownership) the city and sometimes they have no rights at all. This is where the struggle for nation-state citizenship originates. Almost everywhere, becoming a citizen gives dwellers more urban access. Becoming a citizen would allow the Palestinian refugees—who have been in Lebanon since 1948—to own property, for example.⁶⁹ It is useful to note here that "what determines the composition of rights and obligations [of citizens] that pertains to a given nation-state depends on its historical trajectory" (Isin, 2000, p. 4) and therefore differs from one nation-state to the other. Isin shows that "[m]odern citizenship rights that draw from the nation-state typically include civil rights, political rights, and social rights" (Isin, 2000, p. 3) and that democratic states usually "uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligations."

The criteria for naturalisation⁷⁰ as a nation-state citizen are complicated in modern societies, and the more political and urban privileges it provides for the person naturalised, the more complicated it becomes. It instantly elevates the individual to the group of urban owners rather than urban users (regardless of whether the person actually owns property). This is what Lefebvre argued against, imagining "the right to the city entirely differently: as a cry that initiated a radical struggle to move beyond both the state and capitalism" (Purcell, 2014, p. 142).

The year 2005 as a turning point in Lebanese-Syrian relations

On 14 February 2005, then Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri was assassinated in a major car explosion just outside the Saint George Yacht Club, the owner of which is the loudest opponent of Solidere, the Hariri-owned company responsible of the reconstruction of Beirut after the Civil War (1975–1990). It was widely rumoured that the Syrian regime was behind the assassination, but no official ruling was made. While opposition to the Syrian presence had begun to rise in Lebanon in the early 2000s, it was the assassination that escalated public opinion. In the months immediately following the event, the streets of Beirut saw continuous and large manifestations,

⁶⁹ In 2000, the Lebanese government prohibited Palestinian refugees from buying property, increasing their precariousness and dependency on Lebanese counterparts

⁷⁰ Bestowing citizenship on a person not born to individuals who have that citizenship, or not born in the territory (rules differ from country to country)

some calling for the retreat of Syrian troops and others thanking the Syrian regime for its support of Lebanon throughout the years. The Cedar Revolution, a “grassroots movement of some 1.5 million Lebanese from all walks of life demanding meaningful sovereignty, democracy, and an end to foreign meddling” (Bayat, 2010, p. 6) brought together Christians and Sunnis along with several leftist parties and resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. These demonstrations were different in that no party banners were held up; only the Lebanese flag. It had rarely if ever happened that masses in Lebanon showed allegiance to the flag without also showing it to a political party or religious confession. Demonstrators chanted *huriyye, siyedah, istiqlal* (freedom, sovereignty, independence), calling for the complete retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the ousting of all pro-Syrian government officials.

Encadré 2-3: Example of short lived experiences of national allegiance

Instances of such allegiance to the country and not to a religious group or party are few and short lived. Another example of such an instance was the demonstrations on the issue of waste management in 2015,⁷¹ which were quickly politicised. The *Tul’et Rihitkun* (You Stink)⁷² movement, which was born during these demonstrations, carried national youth slogans free of any political party allegiance. For a short while, it gained strong political traction, which threatened the ruling parties. Soon after, allegations of corruption of the movement started to fill popular discourse, questioning the real motivations behind it, its governance, and its funding. Some demonstrators—or infiltrators—subsequently tried to instigate violence during the manifestations, harming the unified secular front the movement aspired to. Political parties then tried to co-opt it, “dragging both the language and practical concerns of the movement into the political mainstream”⁷³ (Massih, 2016).

The controversy [surrounding the YouStink movement] provides a case study in how Lebanon’s political system short-circuits reform efforts. The country’s state institutions may not command much respect, but its diverse political parties are legitimate in the eyes of their supporters and are ruthlessly efficient at playing on their members’ fears (Kenner, 2015, p. 3).

The assassination of Rafik el-Hariri revealed the profound divisions between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime. Less than a month after the Cedar Revolution, on 8 March 2005, a massive counter demonstration took place to thank the Syrian government for their role in Lebanon, throughout the Civil War and beyond. By organising this demonstration in its telling size, Hezbollah sent the message that anti-Syrian movements did not dominate the political

⁷¹ See Encadré 3-3

⁷² For more information, see <https://www.facebook.com/YouStinkLebanon/> and The Daily Star. (2018, June 3). Civil society coalition slams landfill expansion plans. The Daily Star.

⁷³ Quoting Carmen Geha.

debate and were not representative of the majority of Lebanese.⁷⁴ It turned into a debate on numbers and the response came on 14 March, with another massive demonstration of the anti-Syrian coalition. Thirteen years later, in 2018, the political divide in Lebanon is still referred to as the March 8–March 14 divide, symbolising pro- and anti-Syrian alliances. The composition of these alliances has changed since 2005. One of the main instigators of the Cedar Revolution, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by then-exiled General Michel Aoun, switched sides in 2006. The FPM claimed that this shift was possible because their initial demands for Syria's withdrawal were fulfilled and because Lebanon was no longer under Syrian occupation. This eventually secured the Presidency of the Republic for the leader of the movement, Michel Aoun.

The retreat of the Syrian troops did not mean that Syrian workers left Lebanon. In the immediate aftermath of the retreat, they became the target of violence, more so than ever before (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 202; IRIN, 2007b, 2009; IWPR, 2008). Those who had been protected, presumably and/or realistically, by the Syrian political presence in Lebanon were no longer protected. Most Lebanese communities, including Shiites (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 201), expressed hostility towards the Syrian workers, although detailed narratives or statistical evidence of violence are difficult to find.

In 2008 and for the first time ever, diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria were established. From 2011 onwards, however, the conflict in Syria almost immediately infiltrated cities in Lebanon, adding a new political challenge for the two countries. The sudden influx of Syrians escaping the war rapidly generated localised clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Tripoli (Amrieh, 2011; BBC, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013) and spontaneous protests in Beirut (Dhumieres, 2011; Sherlock, 2012; The Daily Star, 2011a, 2011b, 2014), among other incidents. These clashes accompanied the beginning of the arrival of Syrian refugees.

Encadré 2-4: Have you forgotten what they did?

On a Friday night in July 2018, municipal authorities in Kehalé, a town located on the main highway between Beirut and Damascus, evicted over one hundred Syrian refugees, who had no residency permits, from their apartments. They were awakened at two in the morning by members of the municipality and some men from the town. A report of local TV station Al Jadeed said the men were handcuffed, asked to leave their apartments half naked, and chased in the streets while the Lebanese men shouted profanities at them. The reporter also noted that the municipality was contacted for comment, with no response (Chamseddine, 2018).

On Facebook, the televised report was shared by a Lebanese resident of Kehalé with the caption: “*Ya khayyeh* (brother), we are racists and we don't welcome everyone. We don't welcome those who

⁷⁴ The Alawi confessional group (which are the ruling minority in Syria) is a branch of Shiite Islam (Hezbollah).

[expletively] hit on us and physically assault our men. We don't welcome those who speak the language of knives" (Figure 2-12, top). The comments that followed included people doubting the accounts of the Syrians and insulting the integrity of the journalist and the network. One comment in specific (Figure 2-12, bottom) reflects how the Syrian remains an intruder, occupier, in the memory of the Lebanese, specifically those who grew up during the Civil War. This kind of description of Syrians remains very much alive in the collective memory of the Lebanese and it is commonly brought up in discussions on the refugee crisis, as I have seen in my interviews for this dissertation.

If Al Jadeed has forgotten what the Syrians did to Kehalé when they came into our houses with their guns and bullets and the smell of the gunpowder, to rob us and kill our men and scare our women and to suffocate our children with the smell of their gunpowder and the rockets, and confiscated so many houses and didn't leave one hanging boxer unstolen and didn't leave a piece of gold unstolen, we haven't forgotten and we will not forget. We will not forget when we were young children walking on the streets afraid of the dirty Syrian who might follow us and hurt us and until today we are wary of them, we will not forget when we would be walking to school and the Syrians would be training between the houses and block our way and delay us. Until today, we look at our ceilings and see the remains of the bullets, until today, the blood of Kehalé's martyrs is not dry; we still [remember] and we won't be able to forget what they and others did and they should thank their lord that we hosted them and on top of all this they want to act like gangsters and apply the rule of the jungle, which is the only way they know. And anyway I wonder how there still is one Syrian in Kehalé, they should have been thrown out long ago, these are insolent dirty people and nothing else works with them and they have been oppressed in their country all their lives and now they want to be the strong ones here, by the way those who like them a lot and are afraid for them better host them we don't want them. :)



Figure 2-12: Reaction to violence against refugees on social media

Facebook post and comment in reaction to the eviction of Syrian workers from an apartment in Kehalé. Date: July 15, 2018.

3.2 A Lebanese understanding of Syrians

“*Sha’bon wahed fi baladayn*” (one people in two countries) is a phrase famously spoken by Hafez al-Assad⁷⁵ (Hijazi, 1991) to describe the peoples of Lebanon and Syria. It is controversial in Lebanese circles as it was used to justify thirty years of occupation. For a year or less after the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Lebanese communities readily hosted and supported Syrian refugees. This is because the Syrian crisis started at a time when the region saw several revolts known as the Arab Spring and was as such seen as the beginning of the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian regime. The Lebanese, who were occupied by the Syrian regime for decades

⁷⁵ Late former President of Syria and father of current President Bashar al-Assad.

before 2005, welcomed these efforts. Eventually, with the significant increase in numbers and no foreseeable end to the crisis, the Lebanese hosts' tolerance decreased; identity politics, along with a strong political discourse, played a major role in this. Foreign aid efforts also played a role, as they fuelled perceptions of inequality from the side of vulnerable Lebanese communities.

With no real statistics or quantified effects of the weight of the Syrians' presence, the different religious and political groups' discourses in Lebanon—dictated by their individual gains and needs—have been at the core of the violent rejection of the presence of Syrians. Political discourse against Syrians has exaggerated the already large numbers of refugees to sometimes their double (The Daily Star, 2017). Indeed, the numbers reported by UNHCR are underestimates, but with no documentation on to which extent. The political discourse has also exaggerated the economic competition that those refugees have posed. They have attributed the deterioration of the Lebanese economy singularly to the presence of Syrians in the country. In reality, experts have produced data that shows the extent of spending of Syrians in Lebanon (Bajec, 2017; Bonnet, 2013; Yassin, 2018) and its positive impact on the economy, mainly in terms of consumption and rent. This data refutes many of the popular arguments against Syrian refugees.

These negative portrayals have affected the way Lebanese groups and local authorities have dealt with Syrian refugees and their humanitarian, developmental needs. Syrian refugees have been portrayed as wanting to stay in Lebanon for economic gain. The truth is that over 70 percent of them live below the poverty line⁷⁶ (W. Polk, 2017). In the discourse of leaders, Syrian refugees have been referred to as a “ticking time bomb” (Osseiran & Solomon, 2017; The Daily Star, 2017). Accordingly, discriminative policies have been implemented against Syrians by local authorities in all regions and in almost all cities at different levels, pertaining to their mobility and residence. These instances of collective punishment have limited refugees' rights to the city⁷⁷ and have transformed the latter. Henri Lefebvre has forwarded the following argument:

the city's transformations are not the passive outcomes of changes in the social whole. The city also depends as essentially on relations of immediacy, of direct relations between persons and groups which make up society (families, organized bodies, crafts and guilds, etc.). Furthermore, it is not reduced to the organization of these immediate and direct relations, nor its metamorphoses to their changes. It is situated at an interface, halfway between what is called the near order (relations of individuals in groups of variable size, more or less organized and structured and the relations of these groups among themselves), and the far order, that of society,

⁷⁶ Under \$4 per day

⁷⁷ See more details on these practices in Chapters 6 and 7.

regulated by large and powerful institutions (Church and State), by a legal code formalized or not, by a “culture” and significant ensembles endowed with powers, by which the far order projects itself at this “higher” level and imposes itself. (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 101).

In cities in Lebanon, the far order that may be represented by local authorities’ policies forced on the refugee population has indeed imposed itself on the near order, which we may consider to be those relations between host communities and the refugees. The cities are as such transformed in response to these dialectics between the institutional and the individual levels. They are also being re-transformed at a fast pace, considering the changing framework of the far order.

Living in close proximity, the populations of Lebanon and Syria have gained an understanding of each other over the decades. One of the most predominant negative stereotypes is that Syrians are taking the jobs of the Lebanese. But there are no exhaustive statistics that can prove or refute such claims.⁷⁸ As is the case for any proposed research, policy, or strategy for Lebanon on a national scale, data and statistics are lacking. What can be done are limited case studies in an area where certain indicators can be quantified over a limited period of time. Still, there will be limitations to the findings and they will not be representative of the entire situation.

Then there is the issue of the mainly unregulated Lebanese labour market. Some policies have been put in place in favour of Lebanese employment but those go unenforced, intentionally or because of a lack of resources, depending on the employer and the gravity of the situation. Since 2015, Syrian refugees’ prospects for even informal work have been restricted by their obligation to produce a notarised declaration not to work, should they want to renew their residency. This has not significantly changed the tone of the media or politicians in their claims that Syrians continue to take Lebanese jobs. In any case, Syrians have worked informally in Lebanon for decades. In the specific case of Syrian workers replacing Lebanese workers as waiters, cashiers, cooks, or similar, one can argue that it is actually the Lebanese employers who are affecting such replacements. This means that ultimately, the profits go back to the Lebanese. Syrian refugees in that sense supply cheap services to Lebanese employers informally as they have historically done.

When the Syrian refugee crisis spilled into Lebanon in the form of poor refugees entering in large numbers, it had substantial effects on the already fragile socio-economic and urban fabric and revealed the reality of poverty in cities in Lebanon. This added pressure and revealed a reality that had been actively hidden in Lebanon, consciously or unconsciously, since the end of the

⁷⁸ See Chapter 3, Section 4: Unreliability of quantitative data

Civil War. The tourism sector is important for Lebanon's economy, along with banking and services, which form 70 percent of the economy ("Presidency of the Lebanese Republic," 2018). The Lebanese pride themselves on being the perfect hosts: a country where one can ski and swim on the same day, a trilingual population, good food, historic and religious sites, relaxing mountains, lively cities, and a soaring nightlife are among the country's attractions.

3.3 The arrival of Syrian refugees highlighted a dire economic and urban reality

The prominent businessman and then Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri sought to restore Lebanon's image as the *swissra al-sharq* (Switzerland of the East) after the destruction caused by the Civil War (1975–1990). Foreign investments poured into reconstruction projects, the most important of which was Solidere,⁷⁹ a contested project that privatised public space in the city centre (Delage, 2004; Ragab, 2011; Salaam, 1994; Schmid, 2006). Solidere was not the only effort to beautify the country though. Construction projects, commercial spaces, restaurants, etc. were established to highlight the attractiveness of the country and literally hide its poverty. For example, a wall was built on the main airport road leading into Beirut that hid the poor suburbs, so tourists would not see poverty at their arrival. Between the end of the Civil War and 2011, Lebanon was starting to gain its place as a tourist attraction for Arab communities and Westerners alike, but several violent clashes and continued political instability marked real setbacks.⁸⁰ In reality, almost 30 percent of the Lebanese population has lived in poverty and extreme poverty since the end of the Civil War. There were little or no efforts made by the government to strengthen sectors such as agriculture or industry. Public urban services have remained drastically debilitated and insufficient. Human development projects are purely funded by the civil society or international donors. One report shows:

nearly 28 per cent of the Lebanese population can be considered poor and eight per cent can be considered extremely poor. However, the most important finding of the report is that regional disparities are striking. For example, whereas poverty rates are insignificant in the capital, Beirut, they are very high in the Northern city of Akkar. In general, the North governorate has been lagging behind the rest of the country and thus its poverty rate has become high (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008).

With the presence of Syrian refugees (Figure 2-13), poverty levels rose to new heights.

⁷⁹ Société Libanaise Pour le Développement et la Reconstruction. Solidere continues to be the corporation responsible for maintaining the downtown area of Beirut. It was created and led by Rafik el-Hariri in the early nineties and today is synonymous with the luxurious Beirut Central District. In the heart of Beirut, the public spaces of Solidere are highly guarded and not accessible to all dwellers.

⁸⁰ Namely a string of assassinations in 2005, the Israeli bombardments in 2006, the Hezbollah/government clashes in 2008.

Beggars, mostly women and children (Meaker, 2017), lined the streets of major cities all day and most of the night. The already fragile urban infrastructure worsened, with traffic to and from the capital becoming suffocating and electricity and water shortages increasing throughout the country. Initially, public schools could not take in Syrian children. International funding was subsequently made available for afternoon shifts for Syrians. This meant more traffic for longer hours. The crisis confirmed what the Lebanese had known but turned a blind eye to since 2005⁸¹ and even before: the political class's dysfunctionality and inability to manage the country and its different cities. In addition, these political parties that reflect the different religious groups continually seek to geopolitically position themselves favourably with their allies (which differ from one party to the other). While political parties continually seek to strengthen their presence and allegiances in specific cities and might make efforts to develop these areas on social and urban levels, they are less concerned with the development of the country as a whole.

In immediate reaction to the refugee influx in 2011 and early 2012, the Lebanese government focused on terminology (should they be called refugees or displaced?) and whether camps should be built, rather than on dealing with the crisis. Consensus on even the most basic question of building camps for the refugees was not evident. While a number of politicians backed the idea of aiding the refugees, others vehemently disagreed. In this general atmosphere of non-agreement, the only possible policy was a non-policy. The government did not have a clear strategy regarding the refugees and it did not have the relevant data or political will and consistency required to deal with the issue.

The presence of Syrian refugees made visible what had been invisible in the cities in Lebanon: the reality of poverty in Lebanon and the lack of political will or strategy to alleviate it since the Civil War. Das, Davidson, and Fleming-Farrell expressed it as such in their report on Profiles of Poverty in Lebanon in 2011, just before the Syrian refugees began arriving to Lebanon:

Poverty in a middle-income country like Lebanon is often ignored as the country as a whole is not poor. Many within the country even see [poverty] as an embarrassment and actively try to cover it up, though most are not even aware of its extent, much less understand its causes and dynamics (Das et al., 2011, p. 429).

In fact, while Lebanon's economy relies mainly on services such as banking and tourism, both highly depended on political stability and peace. As such, the economy has suffered due to the consecutive episodes of conflict and protracted, continuous political crises. There are no significant manufacturing or agricultural activities and the government has made little efforts to

⁸¹ The assassination of Rafik el-Hariri and the consequent complete retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon

develop them. “High access to education, [fair] health indicators in terms of maternal and child mortality rates as well as morbidity rates [in addition to] little food insecurity” (Das et al., 2011, p. 429) have before 2011 hidden the gravity of the situation in the poverty pockets throughout the country. The lack of a holistic government strategy targeting poverty makes it difficult for poor communities to break the cycle of poverty, and while NGO efforts have been aimed at alleviating poverty, those remain restricted and short term.



Figure 2-13: Syran refugee beggars, Hamra
Beggars dot the streets of Beirut. Photo: Peter Harrison. See (Meaker, 2017)

Conclusion to Chapter 1

The presence of Syrians in Lebanon can be traced back to many causes, not the least the need for unskilled labour that the Lebanese have historically not carried out. The politics of the conscious and consensual open-border policy between the two countries until 2015, even after the retreat of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, shows at least that Lebanese authorities profited from this labour. In addition, and before the start of the crisis in Syria, reports have shown extremely high levels of poverty and inequalities (Das et al., 2011), affecting almost 30 percent of the Lebanese population even at the height of the substantial economic growth indicators, according to World Bank statistics⁸² (Laithy et al., 2008; World Bank, 2018). In fact, the arrival of Syrian refugees has made these realities visible and did not create them. It did so first because of the high number of refugees registered, who weighed on the fragile urban infrastructure and heightened inter-religious group tensions because the majority of them were Sunni Muslims. The familiar relations with the Lebanese along with historic familial networks

⁸² Statistics to be read indicatively as there are no real population estimates or other statistical data available.

caused Syrians to flee to Lebanon as a priority refuge country. The confessional and urban fragmentation has allowed the refugees to negotiate their place in the cities, notwithstanding this being a second-class place for second-class dwellers.

In this chapter, I presented a broad overview of the urban political dimensions that govern the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Syrians in Lebanon are not a new phenomenon. The fact is that they have always been present in Lebanon. In the above, I focused on the general urban presence of Syrian dwellers in Lebanon over the years. This was important because the current refugee crisis is not a distinct event but is in continuity with the historic narrative of the two countries since their inception.

I have shown above how Lebanese communities have accumulated lasting negative ideas on Syrians, mostly because of the latter's direct and protracted involvement in the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). Lebanon and the Lebanese communities still feel the effects of the war on the political, socio-economic, and urban levels. To a certain extent, Lebanese were able to make do with a 30 percent poverty rate in 2010, by ignoring or being ignorant of it, actively trying to hide it in order to build on the tourism and service sectors that could boost the economy. While this may have been possible before 2011, the sudden realisation of the imminent long-term residence of poor Sunni refugees in every region and practically every city and locality was less acceptable.

The immediate and initial reactions to the refugees were positive, but the economic and urban strain on the micro–local level quickly became too heavy a burden on the already vulnerable Lebanese poor. The realities of the dysfunctional political status quo along with the extremely difficult socio-economic situation came strongly to the forefront and could not remain invisible any longer. The Syrians made visible the difficult reality in Lebanon—communities were forced to face the fact that a democracy based on religious group divisions, with a flawed democratic formula, does not work.

In the following chapter, I will discuss contextual elements of an urban nature that exist in cities in Lebanon. I start by answering the deeply complex question: “who governs Lebanon and its cities?”, then move to describing the status quo of what I see as the spatialised fragmentation of the city in Lebanon, to finally touch on the rights of dwellers in them

Chapter 2. Syrian migrants in the city: urban context

1. Governance of cities in Lebanon: the national and local scales

1.1 A complex political structure

Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic (“Presidency of the Lebanese Republic,” 2018). While in its constitution the country is said to be a secular democracy, it functions in reality as a confessional, consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969) - based on power sharing between religious minorities. Religious confessional groups are popularly referred to as sects and therefore the democracy is also commonly known as a sectarian system.

The eighteen recognized religious groups are all represented in the 128-seat parliament, with 64 seats attributed to Christians and 64 seats attributed to Muslims. Three religious groups that make up the largest parts in parliament namely the Maronite Christians (34 seats), the Sunni and the Shiite Muslims (27 seats each). In 2018, two main political blocs controlled the parliament. The March 8 are pro-Syria allies including Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement party. The March 14 bloc are Western-backed and include the Sunni Muslim Future Movement (led by Saad el-Hariri, son of assassinated Rafiq el-Hariri) and two nationalist Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces (led by Samir Geagea) and the Phalangists (led by Sami Gemayel).

In 2017 the parliamentary elections law was changed and provides an example that can illustrate the complications that arise from the political power sharing formula. Instead of elections based on majority votes in 26 districts, now citizens would vote based on proportional representation across 15 electoral districts (Figure 3-1). This new law is put in place, in theory, to allow for more just representation of minority groups. In each district a certain number of seats are allocated according to confessional distribution.




Figure 3-1: Electoral districts in Lebanon

Electoral districts and their religious representation in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Source: The Daily Star, 2018

Voters are no longer permitted to choose individual candidates but have to vote for one complete list in the district where they are registered and not where they live⁸³. Each list would win a certain number of seats according to its results. To bypass the new law, coalitions between the political parties were formed separately and not in accordance with party values. This led to a complex web of inter-party coalitions within and outside of the main party lines. In Figure 3-2, the two main clusters represent the alliances of parties with the same political direction. The cluster to the left of the figure includes the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah and Amal who are pro-Syrian regime and comprise of Christian and Shiite communities. The cluster to the right includes the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces and the Phalangists who have historically been and continue to be anti-Syrian regime; it comprises of Christian and Sunni communities. The last cluster to the bottom right includes the independent lists, or those that were popularly named the civil society lists. Not attached to any existing political party, they are the most diverse in terms of religious community mix even though they are not comparable in numbers. The attitude and nature of affiliation or dissociation towards Syria is an important factor among several others that influence and condition the Lebanese political structure.

⁸³ See Chapter 2 section 2.1

Figure 3-3 is a representation of the coalitions of the Free Patriotic Movements across the 15 districts. Parliamentary candidates for the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) ran on the same list with Future Movement (FM) candidates in 4 of the 15 districts. The FPM ran on lists competing with the FM in 7 of the fifteen districts. Supposedly, those two parties are in stark disagreement over some basic political directions, the most obvious of which is that the FPM is a strong ally of Hezbollah, non-aligned with the FM. It is evident therefore that attitudes of municipal authorities vary from place to place and cannot be reduced to the sole factor of acceptance or rejection of the presence of Syrian refugees but are affected by various other intermediary factors.

Ultimately, the outcome of the last elections showed little change in the status quo (McDowall, 2018) - with the Hezbollah and its allies - including the Free Patriotic Movement or the President's party - taking the lead (Ajroudi, 2018; Chulov, 2018) and largely keeping their political weight in the government. The numerous independent lists and coalitions formed of new faces made little or no impact on the process and the results.

The parliament has difficulty agreeing on legislation. In fact between 2009 and 2018 the parliament illegally prolonged its four year mandate twice, and there was a presidential vacuum between May 2014 and October 2016 because of non agreement within the parliament⁸⁴. The vacancy of the head of state constrains the parliament from passing legislation and holding elections. It also creates a space of political insecurity within which state institutions underperform and the general economic cycle slows down. For instance, a major waste management crisis began in July 2015⁸⁵, in the midst of the presidential vacuum and has still not been completely solved in 2018. In a certain manner the only continuously functioning authority remains at the municipal level, legislative and executive powers are less legitimate due to the election processes, changing coalitions, illegal mandate extensions, and corruption.

Another recurring event that illustrates the translation of the political power-sharing complexity to all matters of daily urban life is the process of nomination of civil servants. In late 2001 for example, the nomination process for administrative appointments to the Electricité du Liban and Ogero (the telephone maintenance company) stood pending for several months.

Initially, the possibility of passing Ogero's chairmanship from the Sunni community to the [Christian] Orthodox community in exchange for the presidency of Tripoli port was contemplated. But the suggestion sparked the protests of Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares, who insisted that the Tripoli port should remain in the hands of

⁸⁴ Since the end of the Civil War, one other presidential vacuum took place for 5 months in 2007-2008 further to a political feud between the government and Hezbollah. It ended in May 2008 after violent clashes between Sunnis (pro-government) and Shiites (opposition factions) mainly in Beirut and Tripoli but also in other areas such as Aley.

⁸⁵ See Encadré 3-3: The waste management crisis of 2015

the Orthodox. With the reported agreement to appoint Hamdan, a Sunni, as the head of Ogero, the Tripoli port question would also be settled, as it is likely to remain in the hands of the Orthodox community. (Abu Rizk, 2001)

The journalist Abu Rizk continues to report that “there was no conflict over potential candidates for the various posts”, asserting that these names “had not even been discussed among top leaders”, indicating that the competence of the candidates was not in question, rather the “principles of appointments”. The importance of an agreement on the “whole package” was paramount as “the last name could spoil everything” (Abu Rizk, 2001).

1.2 Local authorities in Lebanon: their mandate and shaky role as regulators of the refugee influx

In terms of local governance, Lebanon is divided into eight *Mouhafazat* (governorates) representing the central government (Figure 3-4). Governorates are divided into 26 *aqdiyyeh* (districts, singular *qada'*). Every town with more than 300 inhabitants is authorised to form a *baladiyyeh* (municipality) and those number over 1108 in the country. Municipality councils are locally elected by all individuals registered in the area. Each council elects a mayor and vice mayor and assigns other executive positions. When referring to local authorities in this dissertation I am referring to the municipalities.

The 1977 Law of Municipalities and its amendments govern the current system. Each municipality has jurisdiction over all matters of public interest and work in its boundaries. This includes setting and balancing the budget, collecting fees and taxes, managing properties, and establishing or maintaining a range of public utilities and infrastructure such as health, sanitation, water, lighting, local transportation, streets and gardens. However, many of these functions are subject to various degrees of supervision by the [...] governor or minister of interior. Furthermore, a lack of adequate administrative and fiscal capacity characterizes many municipalities. Such dynamics are a function of the laws governing public employment, municipal taxes and fees, and the transfer of municipal funds from the central government.

Voters elect municipal councils for a six-year term in a bloc-vote list (as opposed to a proportional-vote) system. Each municipality is a single unified voting district. In contrast to the parliament, there are no sectarian quotas. Each voter casts a single list with up to as many names as available spots (Abu-Rish, 2016).




Figure 3-4: Eight districts in Lebanon

The eight *Mouhafazat* (districts), including Baalbak-Hermel and Akkar that were created in 2003.
Source: (E. Verdeil, 2005)

Encadré 3-1: On the definitions and translations of administrative divisions

There seems to be no consensus on the translation of urban terms to English. For example, the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) states “The *Mouhafazat* (district) in the capital (or chief place) of which all public services are present under the authority of the *mouhafez*” (CAS, 2018). The UN-Habitat translates the term differently: “At the intermediate administrative level, the *Mohafazat* council (Governorate) was created as an application of de-concentration” (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 7). Furthermore, while the *Mouhafazat* administrative borders were revised in 2003 to form eight rather than six official *Mouhafazat*, “various public administrations (including CAS) still adopt the six *Mouhafazats* division” (CAS, 2018). The United Nations equally adopt the six *Mouhafazat* division and have registered the Syrian refugees accordingly. The numbers of Syrian refugees registered in the two governorates of Bekaa and Baalbak-Hermel are aggregated in the statistics. There are no

strict definitions on what a *madineh* (city) versus a *day'a, baldeh* (village) are. Commonly, the larger municipalities are referred to as cities while the smaller ones are referred to as villages. A *hayy* (neighbourhood) is the term that describes a part of a municipality that usually has a distinctive aspect, mostly related to its history (such as the families who historically inhabited it, or an urban element like a water well as in the case of *hayy El-Nab'a* (neighbourhood of the water source).

The number of municipalities rose from 120 in 1932⁸⁶ to over a thousand in the mid 1960s. This growth was due to various reasons including residents of certain areas seeking some autonomy either from the central government or from other communities (Abu-Rish, 2016). In 1977 the government passed a Law of Municipalities which remains the basic guideline for Municipalities today, and since there has been little change in the number of municipalities across the country. Therefore municipality urban boundaries that are in use today date back to 1977⁸⁷. In 2018's largely urban Lebanon⁸⁸ it has become difficult therefore to address certain urban issues on that municipal scale when the boundaries between urban areas are blurry if existent (Fawaz, 2017a). A year or so after the Syrian refugees began arriving to Lebanon, 50+ "Unions of Municipalities (UoM)"⁸⁹ bringing together almost 700 municipalities were activated in order to better consolidate efforts being undertaken by local authorities, and to facilitate international funding procedures⁹⁰. The "decisions taken by the Federation Council⁹¹ are binding for member municipalities" (Localiban, 2009). These unions were authorised in the 1977 law of municipalities but they were not always active. They are authorised to

Discuss projects of common interest to municipalities in the federation; develop plans, prepare specifications and decide on expropriation necessary for the implementation of projects of common interest to municipalities in the federation, Establish the budget for the federation, Decide on vacant posts in the federation and decide on the general urban plan of the federation" (Localiban, 2009)

Furthermore, 251 localities were identified by the UN-Habitat as the most vulnerable (Figure 3-5) in order to prioritize the areas where they would work in response to the refugee crisis. Those are multi-deprived in terms of access to Health services, income levels, access to

⁸⁶ Also the year of the last official population census

⁸⁷ "The closing months of [1977] represented a particular juncture in which political elites, local laypersons and foreign observers incorrectly (though understandably) predicted the war's end. [...] municipal reform and elections were one of the major items on the agenda of state elites in the aftermath of the "two-year war." Yet it would not be until after the Civil War ended in 1990, and in a very different context, that the reforming of the municipal elections and holding of elections would once again serve as a focus of elite and popular mobilizations" (Abu-Rish, 2016)

⁸⁸ Mona Fawaz argues that " Lebanon is 100 percent urban since its entire national economy and organisation is actually pegged to urban centers..." (Fawaz, 2017)

⁸⁹ UoMs can be compared to the French intercommunalités

⁹⁰ As per interviews with UN-Habitat, 2015

⁹¹ Also known as the Union of Municipalities

education services, access to water and sanitation services and housing conditions.




Figure 3-5: Most vulnerable localities in Lebanon

Map of the most vulnerable localities in Lebanon Source: Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, UNHCR. Data is based on estimations that the UN uses in its operation in Lebanon. Date: March 2015

Municipalities in Lebanon enjoy a broad mandate, and they are authorised to implement projects in infrastructure among others. Municipalities have two main sources of funding: direct funding from residents of the municipality in the form of fees for certain individual services

(building permits for instance), and indirect funding from the central government in the form of an Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), the government distributes this fund according to a set of criteria including the number of residents. As such, municipalities that include coastal lands are wealthy, due to the amount of direct taxes on these lands – regardless of their number of residents or voters. In reality they are under-resourced in terms of funding and human resources (UN-Habitat, 2008). Around 400 municipalities operate with one employee (LCPS, 2015b). Municipalities have shown different degrees of tolerance to the Syrian refugee crisis and have each acted accordingly. Municipalities act as the local arm of the central government in the different regions, having to deal with a lot of red tape. The Ta’ef Accord of 1989 proposed eventual decentralisation, but other than a proposed bill in 2014 (Abou Jaoude, 2014) and conferences on the issue (DRI, 2018), no legal changes have come about.

Since 2011 “municipalities have been forced to shoulder an ever growing share of responsibility [...] to deliver services to both Lebanese residents and refugees” (LCPS, 2016). But municipalities face major administrative and financial challenges that hinder their potential to deliver these services (Atallah, 2016). Municipal Funding is unfairly distributed amongst the 1000+ municipalities (Figure 3-6) across the country and it makes up a mere six percent of the government budget, largely below the international average of 27 percent (Atallah, 2016).




Figure 3-6: Lebanese government hierarchy
Representation of hierarchy government bodies from the central government to the municipality level Source: (LCPS, 2015a)

While “the Municipalities Law does not have any reference as to whether this body has powers to regulate the labour market, or restrict the right of any individual to work” (Ayoub,

2017), municipalities have taken direct action to evict or close Syrian-led shops or businesses within their boundaries, confirming their “jurisdiction in this regard” (Ayoub, 2017). Rather, it is the Ministry of Labour that issues yearly decisions regarding the restriction of access to certain professions to Lebanese citizens. In this regard, municipalities are acting at the request of the Ministry of Labour but it is not clear whether or not the channels and processes are communicated and applied in the different cities. It is noteworthy to mention that even Syrians (and other foreign workers) married to, or sons/daughters of Lebanese women are not exceptions. Cases of evictions or forced closures of several businesses of immediate family members of Lebanese women have been documented.

Another case documented [...] is about a young man born to a Lebanese mother. He has worked for an organization in Beirut for years, yet the Furn El Chebbak municipality gave him a warning to regularize his status; otherwise he would be subject to expulsion from work. The municipality’s police officer signed the warning which included the phrase: “at the request of the minister of labour” (Ayoub, 2017).

Encadré 3-2: An example of urban governance in Lebanon (governorate to neighbourhood levels)

The city of Tripoli is the capital and one of the six *Qada’s* (districts) of the North governorate (Figure 3-7). In all the governorate includes 141 municipalities, four of which (Tripoli, Mina, Qalamoun and Beddaoui) form the Fayḥa’ Union of Municipalities (UoM). Only three of these form the Tripoli urban area, which comprises of 17 cadastres, 12 of which are in Tripoli (Figure 3-8). The currently elected mayor of Tripoli also serves as the head of the Fayḥa’ UoM. Cadastres are territorial units that serve for land registration and related information. These may correspond to municipality limits, include several municipalities or be one of several comprising a municipality. They are not presided over by an elected or assigned official, and largely vary in area. In the case of Tripoli, demographic information available is at the cadastre level. Then there are neighbourhoods: those are not officially recognised, but the UNHCR has identified 58 neighbourhoods further to surveys with residents and municipality officials (there is no comprehensive physical boundary available for all neighbourhoods at the time of writing). At another hierarchy there are 69 elected *Mohtars* (village representatives) in the Tripoli urban area, 51 of which serve Tripoli’s neighbourhoods. *Mohtars* receive wages by the Ministry of Interior for notary-type administrative work. Informally, religious bodies (Islamic entities in the case of Tripoli) are active at political and security levels, and play an important role in social governance. (adapted from (Maguire, Saad, Saad, Khalil, & Schinder, 2016))



Figure 3-7: The qada’s of the North Governorate

The six *qada*’s of the North Governorate including Tripoli. (Maguire et al., 2016)




Figure 3-8: Cadastres by municipality

Cadastres by municipality, number 11 on the map corresponds to Tebbeneh. (Maguire et al., 2016)

1.3 Policing the streets: public and private security providers in Lebanon

Several types of armed men (and a few women) can be seen on the streets in Lebanon. The legal national forces include: the *jeish* (army), the *darak* (Internal Security Officers) and the (*shorta*) municipality police. Quasi-legal forces including the *Indibat* officers (Hezbollah police) can also be seen, and Palestinian faction youth are very present in the camps. There are also numerous illegal arms in the possession of the population, be it via illegal factions or militias or even at the level of the individuals. By law, the Internal Security Forces or the *darak* are responsible of preserving order, communal peace, protecting publics and properties and preserving freedoms⁹².

In reality, political and religious factions also play roles in maintaining security in the cities and it is not uncommon to hear about clashes in different areas that were disseminated further to political party interference. “In fact, In Lebanon the state’s ability to project its authority is highly limited, particularly in the realm of security provision, where myriad private actors, often motivated by political or sectarian competition, dominate this sphere” (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 4).

While this is true for the majority of Lebanese regions, studies on state and non-state security providers in Lebanon has focused on Beirut. The city presents an interesting case study because it “has a fragmented, overlapping, and contested security system where the definition of what constitutes a threat is constantly negotiated and therefore changing, the monopoly of state agencies on security is openly challenged, and the boundaries between the public and private identities of public agents blurred” (Fawaz, Harb, & Gharbich, 2012, p. 174).

In their case study on the capital, Belhadj “analyzed the dynamics of convergence and divergence between the interests of the state, political parties and other actors with regards to the provision of security” (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 4). They identified, in addition to the official national security actors: (1) political parties that have organized militants and stand-alone party security apparatuses, (2) commercial private security companies (PSCs) that are visible throughout Beirut and include the local arms of international security firms, and (3) in Palestinian camps, popular committees (often operating in conjunction with armed Palestinian political factions) that fulfill similar functions to neighbourhood committees. (4) local neighbourhood committees that have auto-organized to protect the community, mostly male self-appointed local residents patrolling sectarian territories (Belhadj et al., 2015). Fawaz, Harb and Gharbich describe the last type as

⁹² See Internal Security Forces website: <http://www.isf.gov.lb/en/about>

marked by “observation” stations, a cluster of chairs at street corners often The “threatening public” population to be profiled and/or stopped is hence dependent on profiling which is generally tainted by sectarian, national, and class stereotypes garnered by the traditional water pipe (*arguileh*) that men smoke while passing the time and chatting. In times of tensions, following fiery political speeches, young men are seen patrolling neighbourhoods until late at night or organizing night watches with scheduled shifts (Fawaz et al., 2012, p. 181).

Non-state security providers are usually more effective and efficient as they need to comply with less bureaucratic rules, often at the micro local level - and are more popular because of it. However, they also have less of an obligation to comply with human rights and impartiality seeing that their very nature in some cases is local and confessional. “By restricting the mobility of Syrians, certain municipalities effectively enforced a second class status on the refugees” (El-Khoury, 2018, p. 101). In fact, scholars have looked at the “impact of the security apparatus on the city, both from the perspective of urban practices and economic development [and have found that] vulnerable groups often avoid policed public spaces because of the harassment with which they generally associate policing” (Fawaz et al., 2012, pp. 176–177)

Similarly to other urban services therefore, security in Lebanon is also partially privatised.

The city is an increasingly important site for tackling this dilemma [of non-state security providers]. A global trend in urban migration is concentrating more of the world’s population in metropolises. Chaotic or rapid influxes can quickly overwhelm the service capacity of cities, particularly in states already challenged by underdevelopment, conflict, or fragility. Because local governments seldom have direct control over state security providers, they are often compelled to use other policy levers (spatial planning, mobility, housing policy, and so on) to impact citizen safety and security (Belhadj et al., 2015, p. 5).

Experiences of security have important effects on urban practices of dwellers and especially vulnerable groups like refugees in Lebanon. It does so mainly by adding a layer of fear of mobility even outside curfews, and by increasing social exclusion in the sense that refugees begin to regard any Lebanese as a potential non-state security enforcer and therefore dominant again.

2. The difficult coexistence of different groups in fragmented cities in Lebanon

“*Lakom loubnanoukom wa li Loubnan?*” (To you, your Lebanon; and to me, mine), is the title of a Gebran Khalil Gebran poem from the early 1920s (Gebran, 1923). There are many

Lebanon, politically, culturally, socially etc. with different aspirations and outlooks, different allegiances and identities. This has been the case since the country's inception further to colonial power divisions. The country is divided proportionally amongst eighteen officially recognized religious groups, each group bound by the other but not aligned with it, each group careful to keep the fragile power balance as is in order to insure its continuity.

The Lebanese context has rendered possible the urban settlement of over a million Syrians in less than four years in Lebanon. The

sectarian legacy of its process of nation building, the religious divisions of its society (including access to and control of land), the very liberal public sector that was created in this country [...], as well as the recurrent Civil Wars that have marked its recent history (1958, 1975–1990) (Traboulsi, 1993)" (Fawaz, 2008, p. 568)

have left the cities in fragments. This context has allowed for the gaps in which Syrians have been able to slide in their attempt to overcome their refugee status.

2.1 Religion, conflict, and money: three elements that fragment cities in Lebanon

The metaphor of a fragmentation "suggests and emphasizes, an increase of pre-existing differences between socio-economic and / or national or ethnic groups. These differences are mainly marked in regards to income, wages, employment conditions and work"⁹³ (Rhein & Elissalde, 2004, p. 115). While it may be presumed that spatial proximity between different groups would reinforce positive social relations, the opposite is also probable (Chamboredon & Lemaire, 1970). The sociologist Françoise Navez-Bouchahine largely details the origins and different definitions of the notion on fragmentation (Navez-Bouchahine, 2002). Under socio-spatial fragmentation she explores the two ideas of the "vertical" fragmentation rooted in socio-economic classes and the "horizontal" fragmentation rooted in cultural differences. While both these notions have certain limitations, this work is mainly concerned with fragmentation on the basis of culture.

What can generate these alienations or identity affirmations that take shape in specific urban territories is however a "culture" understood in its broad sense: race, ethnicity, religion, region, sexual preference, lifestyle... are indeed identified as

⁹³ This metaphor suggests an accentuation, an increase of pre-existing differences between socio-economic and / or national or ethnic groups. These differences are mainly marked with regard to income, wages, conditions of employment and work

capable of generating this socio-spatial fragmentation⁹⁴ (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002, p. 69)

Fragmentation in this thesis is seen as the spatial expression of the tensions and divisions between the different dweller groups, in the sense of negotiations over space, rather than in the strict planning sense in which fragmented spatial organisation is a study of urban management and planning, as can be seen in the work of Marcello Balbo (Balbo, 1993). As the society in Lebanon is of extreme diversity on the ethnic, religious, and economic levels, fragmentation here does not refer to physical differences between spaces but rather to the spatial dimension of this complex social fabric, segregated to a large extent. This notion of social segregation has been studied in depth in sociology especially since the 1970s within the school of Chicago, after the massive societal changes that affected the city at the time - with seminal works on the subject by Nels Anderson, Robert E Park, Louis Wirth among others. Urban fragmentation may be seen as the spatial dimension of this social segregation - a difficult to coin reflection in space of complex social relations between extremely mixed social groups, such as the case is in Lebanon today.

Religion, conflict, and money are three elements that fragment cities in Lebanon. Religion has been omnipresent as a *raison d'être* in Lebanon since the borders of the Republic were drawn by colonial powers in 1920. In 2018, it would suffice to take a short walk in El-Nab'a, a dense neighbourhood in the suburbs of Beirut, to notice the religious borders that divide the spaces. Marked with religious symbolism and different political faces and slogans decorating the walls of the building and the chaotic electric cable hovering over the streets, the divisions are clear - a person cannot pass from the Christian side to the Shi'ite side without knowing it (Figure 3-9: Street El-Nab'a Figure 3-9).

⁹⁴ This can generate withdrawal or identity affirmations taking shape in specific urban territories is however a "culture" understood in the extensive sense: race, ethnicity, religion, region, sexual preference, style of life ... These are indeed identified as capable of generating this socio-spatial fragmentation



Figure 3-9: Street El-Nab'a

A large hanging cross marks the Christian part to of El-Nab'a Photo: Pierre Bergel Date: June, 2017




Figure 3-10: Tebbeneh general view

Signs of violence reminiscent of war and violent clashes in the area. Date: November, 2015

The second factor of fragmentation is conflict and violence. The two Civil Wars (1958, 1975) also left their mark, so did the conditions which brought them forth and the direct and indirect consequences of each. A walk in Beb el-Tebbeneh takes a person back to the years of the war. Syria Street in the neighbourhood divides the Alawi and Sunni communities that have been

in conflict for decades, and violent clashes between them still erupt every couple of years⁹⁵ (Figure 3-10). The army checkpoint at the entrance of a Palestinian refugee camp, or on the highway linking Mount Lebanon to the North reflects the same divisions⁹⁶.

The conflicts have left other traces as well, such as the situation of the Internally Displaced Persons. “Lebanon’s Civil War caused the violent fragmentation of a pluralistic society into fairly distinct sectarian areas. [...] Many of the displaced, particularly from the south, settled in Beirut. Internally displaced persons in Lebanon include those from the internal conflict and Civil War, which broke Lebanon into sectarian districts, and those displaced by the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982.” (Global IDP Database, 2004). Even ten years after the end of the Civil War, some 450,000 IDPs had not yet returned. (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000). This condition of fragmentation of the society and the cities is paradoxically what made possible the insertion of the Syrian refugees. Indeed, the foundation of the Lebanese nation is not solid enough to face a challenge as substantial as the important influx of refugees.

The third layer of fragmentation comes in consequence to the liberal public sector. With practically zero government social aid, dwellers are left to fend for themselves, and privatisation is one of the government’s solutions for urban matters⁹⁷. Often the government will not react to a growing problem until it is too complicated to solve, and opt for an emergency solution. Urban infrastructure services to dwellers are at the forefront of this issue, with the services of electricity, waste management, telecommunications, and water privatised (Figure 3-11) - either at the national or the local levels. In 2000, the High Council for Privatisation and PPP (Public Private Partnership)⁹⁸ was mandated by the government to oversee all relevant projects, and today it runs a multitude of projects ranging water dams to expressways to many more. One example illustrates the process leading to the partial privatisation of an urban service in Lebanon: the energy sector.



Figure 3-11: Privatised sectors in Lebanon

Partially or fully privatised sectors in Lebanon as per the website of the High Council of Privatisation and PPP. Source: https://hcp.gov.lb/hcp.gov.lb/ks_ohh4f.html

⁹⁵ See Chapter 3 section 5.1

⁹⁶ For security reasons, it is not possible to take photos of army checkpoints.

⁹⁷ It is also through privatisation that the political ruling class profit the most - as most privatised urban structures are owned or co-owned by political leaders.

⁹⁸ <https://hcp.gov.lb/hcp.gov.lb>

The electricity service in Lebanon and the progression towards its looming privatization

Lebanon has had an electric power crisis since the Civil War. More than two decades after the war, in some areas power outages reach 12-13 hours per day. Even the best served city, the capital Beirut, is currently rationed at three hours per day. Dwellers have privately dealt with this issue since the war, managing differently from region to region depending on the number of rationing hours they are faced with. This urban infrastructure deficiency increases inequalities between the cities. As Figure 3-12 illustrates, Beirut is privileged with much less need for private electricity providers than other regions. The most affected region is the Bekaa, where households get around ten hours of public electricity per day and almost 80 percent supplement this with private electricity.

In fact during the war and in the immediate aftermath, most apartments had small private generators (usually with the capacity to produce 5 amperes of electricity and installed on a balcony) which would power the fridge, a television and a lamp. With time and while the government lagged behind on providing real solutions, these small generators were replaced with bigger and collective ones. It was not uncommon in the late 1990s for buildings to have a generator in the basement, one that would provide for the needs of all the tenants and that would be maintained collectively. Eventually, these generators were replaced with neighbourhood generators run by private individuals. The private ventures developed to a point where in 2018 they have employees who make rounds in the neighbourhoods to collect a monthly bill that is at least double or triple the amount of public electricity bill. Private generator owners charge a flat rate as per an ampere level subscription, be it consumed or not consumed - and many times the number of hours they operated during the month is factored in the formula. In recent years they have installed small lights on public electricity posts to indicate whether the electricity provided is that of the government or the generator (Figure 3-13).

Due to their informal nature, these private electricity providers (commonly referred to as the electricity mafia) are irreproachable and their prices are non-negotiable. In 2009 the World Bank reported that an estimated “third of all electricity generated in Lebanon comes from private generators” (Akkaya, Junge, & Mansour, 2009). The government was aware of the growing issue, both of the deficiency of the Electricité du Liban, and of the informality of the growing private generator business. Even though it has tried several short term solutions, such as renting electricity ships, not much advancement has been achieved, 28 years after the end of the Civil War.

Today it seems as though the government has decided to take action by attempting to

regulate the informal generator supply. It has mandated the providers to place electricity counters for each apartment, to unify the rate and to charge for electricity used, not a flat rate. This action which is not yet in place comes 10 years after the Minister of Finance announced: “Electricity is the mother of all problems in Lebanon. The size of the problem is beginning to pose a danger to public finances” Mohammad Chatah quoted in (Akkaya et al., 2009, p. 4).




Figure 3-12: Use of generators vs electricity rationing
The share of households using generators is inversely proportional to the number of hours of EDL service provided to an area. Source: World Bank SIA survey 2008 (Akkaya et al., 2009)



Figure 3-13: Private Generator signals

Light bulbs are installed on street lamp poles and on the sides of buildings to indicate whether the power is public or private at the time. Photo Toufik Khreich, 2019

Housing is also unregulated, social housing non-existent, and laws that govern the rent market are outdated. The “old rent agreement” places owners and tenants of an estimated 180,000 residences in direct conflict (Marsi, 2017). The law protects tenants from eviction but does not account for any incremental increase of rent⁹⁹, creating a deadlock situation. Public water, waste collection, and internet in every region do not suffice and need to be complemented through private initiatives similar to that of the private generators.

Such social segmentation, highly materialized in the city, has produced profound inequalities and injustices for the dwellers, be they Lebanese or not. Still, the “Other” dwellers have less of a right to the city. It is these pre-existing conditions that have systematically placed poor migrants in positions of inferiority. And it is not different in the case of the settlement of the Syrian refugees since 2011 whose largest numbers have settled in the poorest areas. With under-resourced municipalities at the local level, Syrians were let in the cities without any regulation and were placed in exploitable positions. Paradoxically, it is these same conditions which have allowed the settlement of the Syrian urban refugees. In a sense cities in Lebanon have been hospitable and violent at the same time; it was their hospitality due to their pre-existing

⁹⁹ Rental rates remain unchanged from before the start of the Civil War in 1975.

violence and violence in consequence to their hospitality of the Syrians since 2011. Indeed, “Lebanon is a place which is simultaneously accessible and impenetrable, welcoming and incomprehensibly unyielding” (Robert Fisk, cited in Moghnieh, 2017, p. 26).

The memory of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) is still visible in cities in Lebanon in different ways. At one extreme, some areas in major cities have been largely reconstructed, most obviously the Beirut city centre but other major areas as well such as the airport and the road from the airport leading to Beirut. At the other extreme there are areas which have not been formally reconstructed or developed since the end of the Civil War in 1990, the peripheries of Beirut such as Bourj Hammoud, Dora, the surroundings of the Shatila and Bourj Palestinian camps, and most of the poorer cities outside Beirut including Sidon, Tripoli, and Nabatieh.

Traces of conflict are present abundantly. Even in the most developed of areas today the presence of checkpoints and heavy security is very visible. The public spaces in the city centre are not accessible to the population at large and every entry into the city’s core public space *Se7et le Nejmeb* (Place de l’Etoile) is controlled (Figure 3-15). In the poorer areas conflict is further visible with traces of heavy gunfire still appear on buildings that are inhabited. Other buildings stand in their state of immediate aftermath of clashes, uninhabited for the most part (Figure 3-16, Figure 2-11). Entire streets and blocks reflect the war and the presence of armed military and/or Internal Security Forces in many of these areas further accentuates the state of tension. What is furthermore noteworthy is that there is no monopoly over legal violence in Lebanon, neither on the government level nor on the citizen level. The army, the Internal Security Forces, and the municipal police are all present in the public sphere and armed with two main exceptions. The first exception is the Palestinian refugee camps which are auto-governed in theory, with illegal arms held by the different governing factions. The second exception is the Hezbollah governed cities, where all security and urban services is assured by the party with their own arms.

Encadré 3-3: The waste management crisis of 2015

During the second half of 2015, Beirut (and other areas in Lebanon as well), saw a major waste management crisis. Garbage piled up on the streets, with no apparent solutions in sight (Figure 3-14).

The reasons behind this crisis can be traced back to the end of the civil war, when the government was not capable of insuring garbage collection and street cleanliness, and contracted a private company, Sukleen, for the job. The starting contract was for \$3.6 million in 1994, and grew to \$150 million in 2015, and “the contracting [with Sukleen] was devoid of any competitive bidding and the details of the contract remain confidential. Consequently, Lebanese pay one of the highest costs per ton for garbage collection in the world” (Atallah, 2015). During the summer of 2015, Beirut saw major protests and the formation of the “you stink” campaign, denouncing the government and demanding solutions. Many points can be deduced from the waste crisis, the most relevant to this research are two:

- 1- Sukleen’s owner has ties to the Hariri family, and has monopolised the waste management industry in Lebanon since 1994. This is a clear example of how politics, privatisation, and political elitism prioritise private gain over sustainable urban planning.
- 2- During over twenty years during which Sukleen was contracted, little has been done to treat garbage, or to prepare a sustainable plan for waste collection on the long term. In fact, the crisis in 2015 started with the closure of the biggest landfill¹⁰⁰. For years, it had been taking in three times the amount it was designed for. This ties into the incapability / or resistance of the government to make long term decisions. Like the solutions to most urban matters, the government allows a problem to get to a high emergency level, and then short term solutions that are highly profitable to the elite, are proposed, with little recourse to longer term, sustainable solutions.



Figure 3-14: River of garbage, 2015

After months of build up, the waste crisis in Lebanon culminated in garbage piling up in the streets of the city. Photo: Associated Press, Bilal Hussein

¹⁰⁰ The Naameh landfill was set up in 1997 as an emergency solution for garbage dumping, and has since taken over half the garbage of Beirut and Mount Lebanon.



Figure 3-15: Security in the Beirut Central District, Solidere

Beirut Central District, Solidere. An army soldier guards one of the entrances toward the Place de l'étoile. Photo: Per Huttner. Date: December 2012. Source: (Giannini & Al-Rajji, 2013)



Figure 3-16: Holiday Inn Hotel, Beirut

Former Holiday Inn Hotel destroyed in the Civil War in Beirut, Lebanon. Date: October 9; 2005
Source: dpa - Alamy Stock Photo

Cities are also largely divided according to their religious identity. There is little need for a

guide or a map to reveal the religion of an area - as religious icons, signs and graffiti dot the streets (Figure 3-17) and key roundabouts while the sounds of places of worship rise high to invite the pious to prayer. Perhaps not instinctively to a foreign eye, but locals can surely discern the specific religious group of an area by the type of icon, the architecture of a church or mosque, the clothes of the people on the streets. Syrian refugees upon their arrival have also had to learn to discern these specific codes to negotiate their place in those diverse cities and have learned that this also plays a role in their pursuit.



Figure 3-17: El-Nab'a water tower

Religious markings of different groups on a street commonly known as Ghilan in Nab'a. In the image a cross, an icon of Saint Joseph, a banner reads "Oh ye, Hussein", and the image of Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal Movement, donated by a resident of the area. Date: October 2018

Encadré 3-4: Electoral laws reinforce urban fragmentation

The religious urban divisions mirror these intricate political allocations. For example, according to the new electoral system of 2018, the country was divided into fifteen different electoral districts and candidates were asked to form lists with seat allocations complying with the confessional distribution. Voters would choose a complete list and select a preferred candidate from the specific *qadaa* (district) they are registered in (not the *qadaa* where they reside). In Lebanon a person is always registered and vote in their place of familial origin. In theory a person can change this to the area of residence but this it is not accessible to most (Abu Rish, 2016). This fact makes religious divides between cities more difficult to change or overcome. It also fixes the spatial divisions between the religious groups.

This means that most Lebanese who have moved to the larger cities for work or other purposes still vote in their family's hometown, preserving as such the religious aspect of the places where their family spatially belongs, and maintaining the religious outlines of the urban fabric. For instance, a long standing Christian resident of Beirut would still vote in his father's town or village of origin¹⁰¹ - which could be a town he barely knows but where his civil status is registered along with his wife and children¹⁰². The weight of his religious vote will therefore always count for a town he does not dwell in (Christian in this example), and at the same time he does not have political weight in the city where he resides¹⁰³. This means that elections are flawed from the source and elected individuals are not representative in many cases. By definition democracy is not attainable. In theory a person may change their place of residence but in practice this is a difficult procedure and rarely done. In terms of election politics, Eric Verdeil has differentiated a "legal Lebanon" from a "real Lebanon", referring to the distortions created by the registration of individuals at their village of origin regardless of their actual village or city of residence (Verdeil, 2005).

The Lebanese government has therefore always been weak and more or less illegitimate as a unit - in the existing electoral process a representative government is fundamentally weak. Religious communities have formed quasi proto-states competing with the central government in different scales and temporalities. The leaders of these communities are usually members of one historically prominent family. During the Civil War for example, the Phalangists had started executing a plan to officially declare East Beirut along with Mount Lebanon a separate country, complete with a central bank and airport. In 2018, the Hezbollah operate another proto-state complete with armed security forces, private schools etc. Of course, the families that head these religious communities, along with the religious leaders to a large extent, profit personally from these divisions via private business initiatives within or outside the legal frame.

¹⁰¹ These villages of origin were essentially fixed during the French mandate and specifically in 1932 during the first and only official census of the population. (Maktabi, 1999)

¹⁰² The fact that a woman's place of residence changes after marriage cements her inferior position in the society.

¹⁰³ In many towns, there are quasi-ruling families. Those are wealthy and have a long history of local political power. The communities pay tribute to these families on special occasions, and may even ask for favors, resources or other kinds of support. (access to education or job opportunities, access to healthcare, facilitation of legal procedures etc.). Examples include the Frangieh family in Zgharta (North), the Gemayel family in Bekfaya (Mount Lebanon), the Hariri family in Beirut, etc.

2.2 Difficult coexistence for dwellers amidst discerning negotiations on space

The transversal question of who can claim Lebanese citizenship is controversial, perhaps at the core of all other controversies. It is mainly but not only controversial because religion plays a part in the Lebanese *raison d'être* and its political construction both in terms of legal framework and social values. In fact the borders of the Republic of Lebanon were drawn by colonial forces in 1920 further to local pressure and with religion in mind. The *Doustour* (constitution) of 1926 (Lebanon's Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004, 1926) is complemented by the unwritten *Mithaq al Watani* (National Pact) of 1943, agreed upon by the President and Prime Minister at the time, just before the independence of the republic. The constitution guarantees equality of all citizens and their freedom of religious practices and the National Pact divides powers amongst not only religions but religious groups, or sects, as well. The idea of *al ʿāiṣh al moushtarak* (common living, co-existence) between the different religious groups is particularly rooted in political discourse and is presented as the basic principle for the success of the Lebanese nation. Tripoli is a city of Sunni Muslim character and majority, and Christians live in the towns and villages of its peripheries. Byblos, a mere 30-minute drive south of Tripoli, is a city of Christian character and majority, and Muslims live in and around the center as well. Neighbourhoods tend to be divided as well; with exceptions, certain blocks or buildings are known to be inhabited by a certain religious group. In general, a building of Christian tenants will not appreciate renting out (or selling) to a Muslim and vice versa - the agreement is not official in most cases but it is the societal norm.

The following example though extreme and not representative of the majority of localities, shows the extent of divisions between religious groups in the cities and reflects an unwritten community practice in numerous cities and villages¹⁰⁴. In 2010, the Ḥadath¹⁰⁵ municipality elections were won by the candidates with the slogan *mā thy' arḍak, el baladiyyeh mā rah temḍylak* (don't sell your house, the municipality will not sign¹⁰⁶). The message meant that the Christians in Ḥadath, a city in immediate proximity with the Shiite Daḥieh in south-east Beirut, should not sell their lands or apartments to non-Christians and specifically Shiites. Banners with

¹⁰⁴ It is common for communities to come together to convince property owners wishing to sell to individuals of different religious groups to reconsider. It is also a common practice to search for an alternate, acceptable, buyer in that case, and possibly pressure the seller to reduce the price in favor of the desired buyer.

¹⁰⁵ A city in immediate proximity with the Shiite Daḥieh in south-east Beirut

¹⁰⁶ While municipalities do not have the legal right to forbid a sale, it has the means and authority to delay and hinder the process and to place pressure. Without validation from the municipality no upgrades to the construction can be undertaken, for example. Municipalities can also cut water supplies, keep a manhole open at the entrance of the building, harass the owners and tenants etc. or in other words make a situation intolerable.

the slogan could be seen in the streets (Figure 3-18). By doing so the municipality shifted what is usually an implicit spatial understanding into an institutionalised local policy. To defend the policy the Head of the Municipality noted a decrease in Christian ownership in his municipality from over 95 percent in the 1990s to 40 percent in 2010 (Nakhleh, 2015), with the majority of property sold to Shiites. The municipality defends the policy on its website in a blog post quoting several Christian leaders, including a Maronite Cardinal: “the balance in Lebanon would be lost if one of the religious groups bought land from another, because the transfer of lands may lead to immigration [for those who sell]” (Municipality of Hadath, 2018). It goes on to state: “For the past seven years this decision has been implemented without a single exception [...] what was a shy start has developed into a tangible reality in the increase of private initiatives by Christian investors to re-buy lands and properties”. (Municipality of Hadath, 2018)



Figure 3-18: Banner in Hadath

Banner in Hadath reads “Hadath Municipality. Don’t sell your house, don’t sell your land, the municipality will not sign off”. Source: (IM Lebanon, 2017).

While spatial and social distance are logically correlated, spatial proximity and social distance are not mutually exclusive. The generalisation that social distance is strongly correlated

to spatial distance was contested by French sociologists Chamboredon and Lemaire in their study of the large neighbourhoods in the peripheries of Paris in the 1960s. Their results showed that the relative social mixture did not in fact rule out social distance (Chamboredon & Lemaire, 1970). They argue against other sociological studies that could “reduce coexistence to the act of speaking or getting to know one’s neighbours”¹⁰⁷ (Chamboredon & Lemaire, 1970, p. 13). Instead, they propose that it is only by analysing the specific mundane behaviours and by taking into consideration the numerous sub-categories that real coexistence can be evaluated. American sociologist Linton Freeman later argued that dominant groups could impose spatial segregation to maintain their higher status vis-à-vis lower status persons by keeping the latter spatially isolated. But he added that “it is also possible that limitations on interaction, whether they involve spatial separation or not, may be built with the support or even at the initiative of less powerful persons” (Freeman, 1978, p. 413). Individuals with no power to impose spatial segregation can still practice social distancing between themselves and those undesired others. He suggested that “any social device that results in restrictions on some form of social contact between persons who possess different socially relevant characteristics fosters segregation and at the most fundamental level” (Freeman, 1978). Freeman’s definition complements Chamboredon and Lemaire in that perspective, inviting researchers to look beyond proximity or neighbouring in order to understand social distancing. Indeed, social domination may in some cases rely on spatial proximity where poor migrants in cities provide services for rich dwellers. The political right in England for example claims to be tough on immigration, while it

promotes a business model that depends on a constant churn of workers to carry out jobs that are underpaid and insecure at best, and all too often dirty, dangerous, and degrading. It requires not just immigration, but immigration without end, since only the newly arrived, the desperate and the vulnerable will tolerate the conditions that have been created (Lawrence, 2015).

The process is well illustrated in the initial placement of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In 1948 when the first massive influx of Palestinian refugees arrived to Lebanon, they were “viewed by the Lebanese ruling establishment as a threat to internal political and social stability” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61) and they were “deliberately put [by the Lebanese] near urban areas and not on the frontiers, in response to the wishes of businessmen for cheap labour” (Petran, 1987, p. 74). Indeed, they were “often exploited as cheap labour during periods when Lebanon’s

¹⁰⁷ Original citation: “On croirait, à lire certaines études, que les conduites de sociabilité n’engagent rien d’autre qu’une disposition particulière à l’échange et que, efflorescences de la vie sociale, elles ne se relient à la situation sociale que de façon très lâche, en sorte que la sociologie pourrait ici se limiter à l’étude d’un homoloquens défini par la faculté de parler et de lier connaissance avec ses voisins”

economy was booming” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61), without being given basic urban services such as water, electricity, drainage etc.

While idealistically it may seem desirable to have a social mix of ethnicities and races cohabiting in a sort of a melting pot of culture, studies have shown that “segregation and aggregation are two faces of the same reality” (Avenel, 2005)¹⁰⁸. It can also be said that aggregation between communities of different social classes facilitates the exploitation of the dominated. There are therefore different scales of separation and proximity to be considered. In Lebanon communities live side by side and apart simultaneously. While in some settings Lebanese communities tend to coexist amongst themselves (on the surface at least), such as in universities or places of work, investigation into inter-religious group relations tells a different story. In 2010, a study based on a psycho-social survey designed to describe Lebanese youth found that “a third of participants expressed negative emotions towards, and low acceptance of, other sects (hostile prejudice)” and that “two thirds of the youth would not consider marrying someone from a difference sect” (Harb, 2010, p. 17). In fact in 1971, just some years before the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanon Family Planning Association (LFPA) survey found that “Interfaith marriages are negligible in number in Lebanon; only about one percent of the couples had married outside their faith” (cited in Chamie, 1980).

Since 1948 there have also been other cities inside the cities in Lebanon: the Palestinian camps. Today these camps count as an integral part of the city in Lebanon’s urban fabric - even though they are not concerned with *al ʿaish al moushtarak*. To protect their *Haqq al ‘awda* (Right of Return to Palestine), Arab nations to which Palestinian refugees fled in 1948 do not naturalise them, and this is considered part of the resistance to Israël. As such, Palestinians are not encouraged to integrate with the host society, and various policies are put in place to ensure their inferior position as non-citizens¹⁰⁹. The Palestinians’ situation is an exception in the urban immigrants’ landscape but they are not the only migrants who have come to the city in Lebanon. Iraqi, Armenian, Somali, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Sri Lankan and Syrian migrants have also resided for protracted periods in the cities in different capacities, with different stories and imprints. These diverse waves of immigration add a complex layer to the diverse nature of the city in Lebanon and character. In all these cases except for the Armenians¹¹⁰, the migrants have not been

¹⁰⁸ Original citation: “*Dans des études classiques sur la formation des villes, la sociologie a pu montrer une dimension essentielle: la ségrégation et l’agrégation sont les deux faces d’une même réalité. La mise à distance de l’autre a pour contrepartie la recherche de l’“entre-soi”* (Avenel, 2005, p. 63)

¹⁰⁹ For example, Palestinians are banned from over 80 job categories (doctors, engineers...). They are not allowed to own property, and at different security levels their mobility between the camp and the city is restricted.

¹¹⁰ Armenian refugees were granted citizenship soon after the proclamation of the Republic in 1924, there is evidence of their inclusion in the 1932 census. (Maktabi, 1999)

treated as equal dwellers in the cities, and have not been included in the *'aish al moushtarak* principle.

The Lebanese society is segmented despite its coexistence. The most recent wave of Syrian forced migration is not the only cause that has bearing on the present day urban situation and the everyday practices of many neighbourhoods in the cities in Lebanon. The pre-crisis urban situation should not be overlooked, and it is indeed the condition that made possible this crisis.

3. Rights of dwellers in cities in Lebanon

3.1 Insufficient and ineffective urban services are for dwellers in Lebanon

In describing the pre-crisis housing challenges in Lebanon, the World Bank reported two main statements: First that “Lebanon has been facing a housing crisis for the past three decades”. They note that the majority of the low and middle-income population could not afford adequate housing before 2011. There is moreover and “absence of appropriate spatial, regulatory and fiscal policies” (Le Borgne, Sayed, Beides, & Arshad, 2013, p. 116). The World Bank also reported that “escalating land prices and the absence of affordable housing has led to the development of marginalized poverty pockets and informal areas”(Le Borgne et al., 2013, p. 116). These areas with poor housing conditions can be found inside and in the peripheries of cities alike, except in the areas which were highly developed in the aftermath of the Civil War such as the Beirut Central District. When housing is adequate it is not affordable for all city dwellers in Lebanon. It accounts for the largest share of spending for households, reaching 45 percent for the lowest income groups (as per survey in 2004). This is 15 percent above the international norm of 30 percent (Fawaz, Saghiyeh, & Nammour, 2014).

Limited in scope and strategic vision, national planning efforts in Lebanon produce inequality. In fact, there are four different government players that have key roles in “urban planning”, and those can be supplemented by non-governmental key players including political parties and religious institutions. First, the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP) falls under the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and mainly defines urban master plans and issues building permits in areas where municipalities are too small or under-resourced. Then there is the Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP), under the DGUP, that is constituted of representatives from several ministries and specialists, with the role of making recommendations mainly on large-scale development projects. The third actor is the Council for Development and

Reconstruction (CDR), established in 1977 (after the first two years of the Lebanese civil war) to oversee reconstruction and rehabilitation. The CDR reports directly to the Council of Ministers. The fourth and last governmental player are the municipalities, that implement urban follow up on cleanliness and public health issues, water works, public transport. While the four entities do have linkages with each other, planning efforts are not clearly defined at the national level. In her recently published book, Hiba Bou Akar introduces other key players that have significant influence on urban planning. “With unclear state structures and outsourced public processes”, she argues, “urban planning [in Beirut] has instead become a contest between religious-political organizations and profit-seeking developers. Neighbourhoods reproduce poverty, displacement, and urban violence” (Abou Akar, 2018). A study by Public Works Studio found that up to 85 percent of Lebanese territories are unregulated, neglected and subject to a myriad of illegal decisions, allowing misuse of power by local authorities (Public Works Studio, 2018).

Discussions about a “comprehensive development plan” began in the mid 1950s with the establishment of the Ministry of Planning. However this ministry was closed down in 1977 and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) was instead established, with the central mission to develop the development plan. It was not until half a century later when the plan was developed, and it was reduced to one chapter related to the land-use titled “Comprehensive Plan for the Arrangement of Lebanese Lands”. Issued in a decree in 2009 and not yet put into practice, it remains a mere guideline for individuals. In parallel, the ministries of “Housing and Cooperatives” and “Municipal and Rural affairs” were dissolved in 2000 ending as such any official talk about the rights to housing and balanced development (Basbous, Bekdache, & Saksouk, 2017)

In fact, the government has not adopted a formal urban policy (Fawaz, 2017b). At present adequate housing is not affordable. There is no public transportation. There are few green spaces and public spaces, and those are not accessible to all dwellers. The majority of the coast in Beirut is privatised (Dictaphone Group, 2013), and there are well over a thousand illegal structures on the Lebanese coast (Saidi, 2015). Waste management was privatised between the 1990s and 2015 and has since been an increasingly urban and environmental crisis (The Daily Star, 2018a). Public electricity is largely insufficient (Westall, 2015) with some areas receiving less than 12 hours per day. The same goes for water services and there is no clean drinkable water available publicly. “[cities] are increasingly segregated, economically exclusive, and marred with growing inequalities and environmental degradation.” (Fawaz, 2017b). Privatisation has been an easy and profitable solution for politicians. In fact, in 2018 there are no less than six basic urban services that are partially or fully privatised in Lebanon, through formal and informal practice.

Electricity as mentioned the first example, but also water, waste management, telecommunications, civil aviation, and infrastructure development are privatised in full or part as Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) endorsed by the government.

The Lebanese government created a High Council for privatisation and PPP in 2000, overseen by a ministerial committee including the Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, Minister of Economy and Trade, Minister of Labour permanently, along with other minister as per project needs (HCP, 2018). It is mandated with “initiating, preparing and implementing privatisation programs and public private partnership projects”, as well as proposing general privatisation policies and subsequently issuing all necessary decisions and recommendations. The council (run by a Sunni Muslim) currently oversees the privatisation the telecommunications company *Organisme de Gestion et d’Exploitation de l’ex Radio Orient* (OGERO), and introduces on its website “calls for unbundling of generation transmission and distribution activities [of the *Electricité du Liban* (EDL)] through their incorporation into separate companies [...] would be joint stock companies governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code” (HCP, 2018).

The national government has done little to proactively face the urban infrastructure problems, and usually lets matters get too complicated before turning to short term, emergency solutions. In the case of waste management for example, warning signs had been brought up well before, and not only in Beirut. To give but one example, a waste crisis broke out in Sidon, south of Beirut in 2011. There, as well, it was lack of political will that delayed dealing with the problem until 2015 when the waste crisis became a national one. Speaking of the refugee crisis, a report from Heinrich Boëll notes: “Lebanon takes a relaxed approach to problems, either denying they exist or playing them down, only to draw up policies once reality hits home and the problem has reached crisis point” (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). When things get to “crisis” levels before the problems go away, it becomes easier for the government to seek the quick fixes which ultimately generate more opportunities for shady private entrepreneurial ventures.

It is also echoed in the electricity problem. During and in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, dwellers had mostly faced the electricity shortages by securing small personal electricity generators. Slowly, private, non regulated¹¹¹ initiatives of community generators started to develop in all the regions. In 2018 these initiatives are organised (though still not-regulated) with professional network technicians and even bill collectors who perform door-to-door collections. In many regions these generators provide more electricity than the government. This issue causes regular outcry from dwellers, but little alternatives are possible. In

¹¹¹ There is no regulation on safety measures, amount of electricity sold or on pricing.

the spring of 2018, the government has launched an attempt to regulate the issue, by imposing certain safety measures and counters to be placed on all houses being serviced, and by imposing a price on each ampere sold.

3.2 Poor migrants regarded as second class dwellers in Lebanon




Figure 3-19: Private security on Beirut streets

A private security officer asks a Syrian child beggar to get off of the sidewalk in Beirut City Center. Photo: Nicolas Bautès, August 2018

In the city in Lebanon the intruder is tolerated without being accepted, the Other even draws hostility. Nationality is one main factor in placing a person on the class spectrum and it dictates how that person is seen and treated. The only thing that could trump a person's inferiority-by-nationality is money. A poor person of the wrong nationality is in the most vulnerable position. In 2001, renowned Architect and Urbanist Assem Salam said in a round table discussion on who controls the country: "the most powerful force controlling Lebanon is money" (F. Traboulsi, 2014).

This hostility towards the other is socially acceptable and there is ample evidence to prove it. For instance, at their arrival to the Lebanese International airport, dozens of foreign female migrants coming to serve as domestic servants are bundled up in the waiting area. They wait for their *kafeel* (guarantor) to arrive and claim them by receiving their passport directly from the security officers. Many of them continue to work in dire conditions and face physical assault, rape, 15+ hour working days, no day off etc. In fact in 2008 the Human Rights Watch reported that domestic workers die at a rate of more than one per week. (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Placing an entire migrant population under *kafala* is giving monetary value to the movement of

this population. It fixes a price on individual liberty. A person under *kafala* is ipso facto inferior, dominated, exploitable and ultimately generates profit for the dominant.

Another example is how Palestinians, Syrians among other non-Lebanese individuals are systematically asked to vacate public gardens because “foreigners are not allowed”. In 2018, a Kenyan woman was beaten in public, for no apparent reason than being on the street, for over half an hour with little or no help from passers-by. In consequence she was arrested and ultimately deported, and her main aggressor sentenced to minimal time in jail. These violations of human rights are so common to the extent of mundanity. The issue is more appalling given that “Today, according to most estimations, around half of the labour force is non-Lebanese” (Longuenesse & Tabar, 2014).

In Figure 3-19 a security officer is asking a Syrian beggar to move off the sidewalk in the Beirut City Center. The Beirut City Center saw tremendous reconstruction after the end of the Civil War. An estimated \$1.65 billion went into its physical reconstruction, but not a minute fraction went into any efforts or “activities that could address cultural and inter-communal aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation” (Yassin, 2012). It is an exclusive public space, and security officers are authorized to take action in order to protect its privacy - including actions such as the one seen in this picture.

Even though the poor migrant non-Lebanese is almost always considered and placed in an inferior position, it must also be noted that the other is not always the foreigner. Religious group affiliation, education, second “better” nationality, wealth, and power also affect how Lebanese view each other. Dwellers of the city in Lebanon are categorized according to their access to urban services. Because the basic urban services are not available to all dwellers, those who access them are superior in the city.


At this stage of the development, and before addressing more specific issues, background information about the two populations seems relevant. I will first give a brief history of the Palestinian refugees who have also become hosts for the Syrian refugees since 2011. I will then move to the most recent episode of forced migration of Syrians into Lebanon.

3.3 The Palestinians in Lebanon: both refugees and refugee hosts

As previously mentioned, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has had extreme significance on both the regional geopolitical position of the country and the local urban fabric. Two specific reasons make including Palestinians and the camps they live in an important part of this study. First, Palestinians are the largest refugee population to come to Lebanon before the

Syrian influx starting 2011 and the experience of Palestinian refugee in Lebanon has directly influenced the reaction of the Lebanese individuals and authorities towards the Syrian refugees. Second, both Syrian refugees, and Palestinian refugees from Syria have come to the country since 2011 and have been settling inside the Palestinian camps. This is due to the proximity of the camps with the major cities, to the high informality, and affordability, that makes them more accessible to refugees.

Between “April and August 1948 more than 700,000 Palestine refugees [were] displaced as a result of the Arab-Israëli War”¹¹². This *Nakba* (catastrophe) accompanied the independence of the state of Israël and the start of a decades-long refugee status for the exiled Palestinians. In 1950 there were 127,600 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (Amnesty International, 2007). In 2014 those numbered shy of 450,000¹¹³, half of whom resided in 12 official camps (UNRWA, 2018). However, due mainly to migration “unofficial estimates put the real number closer to 250,000” (Elsayed-Ali, 2006, p. 14). Today those twelve camps (Figure 3-20) are a part of Lebanon’s largely urbanised territories inside the cities, or in direct proximity with them. The refugees in these camps are in the unique situation of being camp dwellers, but also urban refugees, especially their immediate proximity and social interactions with the host society (K. Dorai, 2010).



¹¹² According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are>

¹¹³ Due to natural population increase

Figure 3-20: Palestinian camps in Lebanon

The distribution of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and the position of the camps (Verdeil et al., 2007)

In 1948 the Palestinian refugee camps were a collection of tents placed in selected areas near urban centers. Eventually those were replaced by concrete houses built by the refugees themselves. Growing in population but legally not allowed to grow in area, the camps grew in density, and exponentially so since the Syrian refugees started to arrive. In 1995 Rosemary Sayigh summed up in simple words the harsh political reality facing the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

the Palestinians of Lebanon stand virtually no chance of returning either to their places of origin or to the areas that will come under Palestinian control. At the same time, opposition to their settlement in Lebanon is one of the few issues that unites the Lebanese government and public opinion across most of the sectarian communities (Sayigh, 1995, p. 37)

Simple and condemning, her statement reflects the state of political and social limbo that Palestinians in Lebanon face as refugees. The state of limbo is twofold, first with respect to their *Haq al Awda* (right of return) to Palestine, and second with respect to the different views that Lebanese communities have of them. On one hand, Palestinian “lack of a stable, overarching governing system could only lead to erratic and undisciplined behaviour” (Hudson, 1997, p. 247). On the other hand, the Lebanese “divide between Christians and Muslims [...] created a certain political schizophrenia, with the Christians generally looking toward the West and the Muslims toward the Arab East” (Hudson, 1997, p. 247). These profound and difficult political realities of the two nations make a complex matter more complicated, as there is no single opinion of Lebanese on Palestinians and no single opinion of Palestinians on the Lebanese. While the vast majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are those who are in the camps today, there still are some Palestinians who had a different experience integrating into Lebanese society. Indeed, non-registered refugees, especially if they were Christian, received better treatment, and some 3,000 “mostly wealthy, Christian Palestinians” were given Lebanese citizenship between 1952 and 1958 (Peretz, 1993, p. 61).

From the time of their arrival, as was the case in other hosting countries, their right of return has been at the centre of all arguments on the quality of their residence. Until today, second, third and even fourth generation Palestinians who have been born and raised in the country have no claim to citizenship and do not enjoy all the social or urban rights of their Lebanese counterparts. Living in cities within cities, they face systemic discrimination (Amnesty International, 2007). (1) Their rights to residency, travel, and freedom of movement are

contingent on the political atmosphere of the moment, with rules changing sporadically and with no room for appeal or reaction. (2) Currently, they are banned from seeking employment in 50 jobs, trades and independent or private sector professions - and when they do manage to find a job and secure legal work permits, they are not eligible for social security benefits. (3) In 2001, the Lebanese parliament passed a law to prohibit Palestinians from owning and inheriting property. The law not only prevented Palestinians from acquiring property from then on but it also prevented them from inheriting real-estate which had been bought previously, increasing their spatial confinement to the camps. (4) Their rights to education and to health are severely restricted. Palestinians do not have access to state hospitals but have access to health services provided by UNRWA. The latter also provides education for the refugees, as the access allowed to the Lebanese public school and university system is minimal (J. Suleiman, 2010).

Furthermore, not all camps are treated equally by the authorities who do not have legal jurisdiction inside the camps. Depending on the area where the camp lies and on the political atmosphere, different kinds of restrictions are placed. For example, the entrances of the Ein el Helwe camp in the South of Lebanon and with the Nahr el Bared camp in the north (which is still under reconstruction further to its complete destruction in 2008) are strictly controlled by the Lebanese army. The Bourj el-Barajneh and Shatila camps, which are under the control of the UNRWA and different Palestinian factions, in Beirut have, at the time of writing, less strict checkpoints at their entrances (Figure 3-21: Entrance to the Bourj el-Barajneh camp






Figure 3-21: Entrance to the Bourj el-Barajneh camp

Main entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh camp from the highway looking into the camp (above), and from the camp looking to the outside (below), Lebanese army checkpoint visible (below), February 2018

The role that Palestinian refugees have played in the recent history of Lebanon was not insignificant. The mere spatial existence of the camps has had a major imprint on the cities. In fact, those camps are neither traditional in the sense where they are completely independent of the city nor are they an integral part of it. They are spaces of exception in which different actors have experimented for decades (Sari Hanafi, 2008). While the Palestinian refugees are socially excluded in Lebanon, the camps have “become parts of urban areas, as is the case for many Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East” (K. Dorai, 2010, p. 5). The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are spaces of extreme precarity and vulnerability. This is due to several factors at the base of which lie two grim realities. First the social exclusion of the refugees and the “mechanisms that cement their persistent poverty” (S. Hanafi, Chaaban, & Seyfert, 2012), and second the successive waves of violence or “ruptures” as Dorai puts it, that have continued to add layers of precarity. These include

the exile comes out following the exodus of 1948 and with the stabilization of the Palestinian population in camps and informal gatherings in Lebanon. The second rupture was the Israeli invasion of 1982, which destroyed the main part of the Palestinian infrastructure and generated a large emigration movement both internal and international. The third rupture arose following the Oslo Agreements in 1993¹¹⁴,

¹¹⁴ See Damen, R. (2013). *The Price of Oslo*. Al Jazeera. “The Oslo Accords marked the first time Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally recognised one another. Many at that time believed this was a step in the right

which shifted the focus of the PLO to the Palestinian territories and led to the increasing marginalization of the refugees in the Diaspora (M. K. Doraï, 2010, p. 6)

In political terms, the camps are not independent of Lebanese games of power nor are they an integral part of it. They are self-managed and have a follow distinct political order, and at the same time, they are confined in their political sphere while affecting the larger Lebanese political space. Most significantly it was the presence of the PLO and other armed factions inside the camps and their implication in the Lebanese Civil War that has had repercussions for the place of Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese urban and political fabric today. The Civil War was complicated by the implication of regional powers including Syria, Israël and the PLO from inside Lebanon. In what follows I will not go into the details of a fifteen year long, violent and politically complex Civil War, but I will briefly list the elements significant to the present situation in the cities in Lebanon and this dissertation.

Two marking regional events in the timeline of their presence in Lebanon and after their initial exile in 1948 were the Six-day War¹¹⁵ between the Arabs and Israël and Black September. The 1967 war, also known as the Six-day War tarnished Arab political leaders with humiliating defeat and radically changed regional politics in Arab world. In its immediate aftermath came a second wave of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon, and calls for armed struggle against Israël by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, based primarily in Jordan at the time. After September 1970, dubbed Black September, which saw violent clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian government¹¹⁶, the leader Yasser Arafat was forced to move his operations from Jordan to Lebanon. The south of Lebanon became ipso facto the place from which armed resistance against Israël was based. The Palestinian refugee camps, under the authority of the PLO and not the Lebanese government, became ipso facto places of armed resistance, especially in the south of Lebanon.

By 1975 popular opinion was divided in support of two main coalitions. On one side there were the supporters of the Lebanese National Movement who advocated solidarity with the Palestinians and the PLO among other political objectives such as the elimination of political and administrative divisions according to religious groups (Khalidi, 1983). Those opposed, on the other side, the Lebanese Forces, the right Christian (mainly Maronite) groups that were in control

direction. But what followed over the next 20 years of negotiations reveals that Israel merely used the agreements to justify the further expansion of illegal settlements in the territories it occupied in 1967" (Damen, 2013)

¹¹⁵ Analysing the war over five decades later, Dimitrios Macharias writes: "It undoubtedly brought significant change in the strategic outlook of the region—and especially Israël's security situation, eliminating threats and creating new ones—as well as within the Israël and Arab societies, fomenting fundamentalism and extremism. It was a decisive moment which, in hindsight, seemingly determined, to a certain extent, the long-term winners of the power struggle in the region, both on the local and international level, establishing Israël and the US as the primary arbiters of its fate (Machairas, 2017 p. 7).

¹¹⁶ In 1970, the PLO was planning to operate its armed resistance efforts against Israël from Jordan.

of the country as per the existing (since the end of French colonial rule) confessional system of government and that opposed any reforms that would benefit the Muslims. Tensions rose to high levels and culminated in the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War after a series of violent clashes and massacres that occurred on April 13, 1975, namely the Bus Massacre in Ain el Remmeneh, when 28 civilian Palestinians were massacred by Phalangists¹¹⁷.

Seven years into the war, in 1982, Israël launched a wide invasion of Lebanon to dismantle the PLO's military arm. The latter were concentrated in the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. This brought both physical and moral devastation and increased tensions as it was accompanied by massacres, most notably the Sabra and Chatila camp massacre.

Among other events that have deeply affected the refugees were the 1982 expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the country¹¹⁸, which was quickly followed by a massacre of Palestinian refugees, as well as Lebanese residents, in the Sabra and Chatila camps, and the 1984 "war of the camps" in which hundreds of Palestinians were killed and thousands faced starvation. In addition, the Gulf War of 1990 slashed remittances sent home to their families by Palestinians working in the Gulf states. Attacks by Israeli forces during the July-August 2006 conflict with Hezbollah destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and economy, and littered with cluster bombs, land on which some Palestinians had worked. (Amnesty International, 2007)

The issue of Palestinian refugees has driven public debate for decades, as will the issue of the Syrian refugees for decades to come. Politically elaborate conspiracy theories arise regularly, and fears of *tawteen* (nationalising) are always in the forefront, with the demographic balance always at heart. Being predominantly Sunni Muslims, hypothetically naturalising hundreds of thousands of Palestinians would tip the demographic balance to the side of the Sunnis over the Shiites, and make the Christians more of a minority than they already are. Further to my interviews, even the Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are not prone to the idea of nationalising the Palestinian, or the Syrian refugees. The initial and continuing Lebanese government's stance against building official refugee camps for the Syrian refugees ties directly to the Lebanese experience with Palestinian refugees. Similarly, the initial and continuing fears that the Lebanese express in relation to the Syrian refugees tie directly to the experiences surrounding the presence

¹¹⁷ Phalangist ideology focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but with a "Phoenician" identity, distinct from its Arab, Muslim neighbours. Party policies have been uniformly anti-communist and anti-Palestinian and have allowed no place for pan-Arab ideals. (Abu Khalil, 2018).

The party borrowed its name from the Spanish Falangist party created in 1933, a fascist party that adopted the following principles among others: the abolition of political parties, the establishment of a nationalist dictatorship led by the party, the use of violence in regenerating Spain, the development of Spanish imperial power, the recognition and support of Catholicism as the official religion of Spain but rejection of any clerical influence in government

¹¹⁸ As an immediate consequence of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon

of Palestinian refugees.

They are swallowing our country. Soon, there won't be much room for us here," said George while sipping a quick espresso in a nice coffee shop in Saifi, near the port of Beirut, as he rushes to make another delivery for his small business. "It is a conspiracy I tell you, to have us Lebanese leave town so they can settle the refugees." "Like in 1982, remember?" added an older man. "They tried settling the Palestinians then. But we aren't going anywhere. This ship is not sailing. Lebanon is our homeland." Jamal, who needs a quick bite before he goes back to his family so his son Tony, 'can take the boat out one last time in this beautiful November weather', chimed in: "You might not have much of a homeland soon. The ship is sinking; can't you see? The president said so himself: Our very existence is at stake." Back in September, Lebanon's president Michel Suleiman spoke of the crisis in his country, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and said it had an "existential dimension (Katkhouda, 2013, p. 47).

Third and fourth generation Palestinian refugees still reside in Lebanon's camps. Although marginalised and discriminated against, Lebanon is the only country they know. The camps are their only homeland. Indeed, when young Palestinian refugees are asked where they are from the answer is usually the name of the camp where they reside. It is neither Palestine nor Lebanon (Haddad, 2018). They are literally "cut off from Palestine and squeezed in Lebanon" (Haddad, 2018) and many aspire to emigrate.

Since 2011, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon host both Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees from Syria in the official camps, in addition to the resident Palestinian refugees. At the end of 2015, the UNRWA estimated that "half of the more than 42,000 Palestine refugees from Syria present in Lebanon were living in one of the 12 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, with the other half living outside of camps" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 12). Those make up less than 4 percent of the total population in the camps. Since the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon, the camps have generally doubled in population. UN reports place the percentages of the three groups of refugees across the camps in Lebanon as such: Syrian refugees at 47.9 percent of the total population inside the camp), Palestinian refugees from Syria at 3.7 percent and Palestine refugees at 44.8 percent (OCHA, 2018, p. 3).

Conclusion to Part 1

The French channel M6 aired a documentary on Lebanon in November 2018 within its famed *Enquête Exclusive*. In it, the mayor of *Ḥadath* recounted the story of an outdoor vegetable stall that was "returned" to a Lebanese manager after being "taken back" from a Syrian

family that had been running it. No details were given as to how the venture was started or by whom, nor as to who owned the business or the land, and the process by which it was taken over. The new Lebanese owner expressed her happiness and gratitude to have this opportunity because according to him, “the Syrians took whatever they could from Lebanon and sent everything back to Syria”. The camera then moved to film a young boy, not older than ten¹¹⁹, working at the stall who turns out to be Syrian. When asked about the boy, his laborious tasks, and his obvious absence from school the manager said: “it’s not my problem, it’s his country that should look after him... I don’t know” (de La Villardière, 2018).

It is a simple example that reflects a difficult reality: the manager believes the space and the opportunity were rightly returned to her, as a more deserving dweller than the Syrian. At the same time, she hires a Syrian boy instead of a Lebanese (boy or worker) - this time not minding the former’s less deserving status, as it is almost surely more profitable to her business. By doing so, she placed her business profit ahead of the question of nationality, in stark contradiction to her initial argument. She also facilitated his (and his family’s) dwelling in Lebanon albeit in precarious conditions. The Syrian in this example was not tolerated as a profit making entrepreneur, and returned to his tolerated place as the informal employee, at risk of exploitation on the whim of his employer. It is these gaps that Syrians and poor migrants fill in Lebanon; the gaps that lie within the inconsistencies in how the Lebanese hosts deal with the Syrian refugees and that are emulated across regions and socio-political classes. Inconsistencies are in turn sustained by a lack of formal, national governance of migration in the country. These inconsistencies have allowed for a space in which this sort of illegal and informal work contributes to the economy. The same inconsistencies can also be observed in other areas. For instance in the housing trends of Syrians in the cities, Lebanese landlords actually prefer to rent out to Syrians because it is more profitable and controllable, and at the same time complain about their tenants habits such as cooking smells, clothing styles etc.

In the first two chapters, I have provided the reader with some elements of context that in different ways affect the presence of Syrians in Lebanon since 2011. Surely, the polemic of identity amongst Lebanese communities and religious groups in relation to their past has pre-conditioned the spaces in the cities to be tense. The nature of the fragmented cities and diversity of Lebanese religious communities that coexist in them lays the grounds for complex relations with the unwanted “other”, and especially an “other” refugee who is reminiscent of the Palestinian refugee.

¹¹⁹ The minimum working age in Lebanon according to the ILO Convention 138, ratified in June 2003, is fourteen.

The history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is long and bloody, and has become an ideal type phenomenon, as Max Weber describes it, in hosting refugees for the Lebanese. Regardless of the sequence of events and politics that led up to the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, Palestinian armed factions played a major role in it. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon became the representatives of that role - and paid a high price for it. Invited by Lebanese leaders at the time to support against the Palestinian arms, the Syrian military overstayed its welcome and occupied Lebanon for the next three decades. The poorly simplified version of this correlation is vivid for many Lebanese groups: the Palestinians caused the war and the Syrian occupation that followed. The version does not consider the pre-existing identity tensions within the Lebanese communities and the profound differences in the way the different religious groups understand their country and its future. The socio-spatial inequalities here deviate somewhat from the explanatory model of the right to the city that highlights solely class inequalities in accessing the latter, without necessarily taking into consideration national identity. The dissymmetry between the Lebanese and the Syrians is due to the geopolitical context since 1920 and the situation of refugees is due to the questionable nationalism.

Each of these groups, the Syrian migrants, the Syrian army, the Palestinian factions and the Palestinian refugees have left their mark on the cities in Lebanon over the last decades. The arrival of the Syrian refugees in 2011 should rather be seen as a continuity of the Syrian presence in the country¹²⁰, even though perceived differently throughout the years due to the role that Syria played in the Civil War. Their current large number weighed heavily on the fragile political and urban fabric. The cities in Lebanon today are home to many different groups of dwellers, but some dwellers are more equal than others¹²¹, so to speak.

The Lebanese government is found wanting: its different bodies lack the capacity for regulation and are laden with strong corruptive relations that obstruct any authority, be it at the central government level or at local authorities level to offer a secure environment or basic urban infrastructure to city dwellers. The only official position during seven years of crisis has been the decision to regulate the residency of Syrian refugees. It did this by prohibiting the UNHCR from registering any more refugees in 2015¹²², and the enforcement of the *kafala* system - which was

¹²⁰ See Part 3 Chapter 1: "Who is a refugee" for details on the quality of Syrians in Lebanon and their changing urban labels and status.

¹²¹ The phrase "some are more equal than others" originates from George Orwell's 1945 *Animal farm : a fairy-tale story*. The original extended sentence is: "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others". In the book it appears as one of two commandments proclaimed by the ruling pigs of a farm. With it, the author points out the hypocrisy of governments that claim equality but actually centralize power with an elite few.

¹²² On their data portal, the UNHCR note: "As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon's instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included." (UNHCR, 2018)

ultimately deemed illegal as a regulation in 2018 (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2018). Unable or unwilling to take a stance vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, and haunted by the experience of the Palestinian refugee camps, the Lebanese government left it up to international organisations and the civil society in Lebanon to deal with the influx as best they could - coordinating with the only Lebanese authorities they could: the terribly understaffed and under-resourced local municipalities. With no national strategy or action plan, individual reactions to the influx began to arise. That, along with the reality of a fragmented city created legal, social and most importantly urban gaps in which the Syrian refugees could pretend to slide into to access the city and its resources. In the example in this conclusion, the Syrian boy and his family have been able to penetrate the interstices created by the need for cheap, precarious service. Such a condition gave them hope of relative anonymity, economic stability and opportunity, while it ultimately created space for increased exploitation. Similarly to what Rosemary Sayigh wrote of the Palestinian refugees as quoted earlier in this part, opposition to the settlement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is one of the few issues that unites the Lebanese government and public opinion across most of the religious groups.

Largely supported by political and religious leader discourse, the Syrian refugees have become the scapegoats for the causes of all Lebanese national and local troubles (Ayoub, 2017). Their presence invokes multiple hostilities and obliges the Lebanese to face their particularly painful past (Mink & Neumayer, 2007)

**PART 2: Dissertation approach:
Posing an analytical framework
in a fast-changing field**

Never let yourself be diverted either by what you wish to believe or by what you think could have beneficent social effects if it were believed. Look only and surely at 'what are the facts'. (Bertrand Russell - Face to Face Interview, BBC, 1959)

Introduction to Part 2

After posing the context of the cities in Lebanon before the influx of Syrian refugees in 2011 this part lays out the analytical framework, the methodology and tools utilised, then presents and justifies the selected case studies. After discussing the hypothetical questions and interrogations about the situation, and in a somewhat linear fashion, several elements that forged the field investigation mechanisms are laid out. Examples of these elements encompass the type or urban interaction that was observed, choosing to include a refugee camp among the case studies, and looking at the refugee situation as a continuation of a migration history rather than an event in itself. It goes on to enumerate three events that took place between 2014 and 2015 that had significant effects on the situation as a whole and consequently the field research.

Chapter three places a special emphasis on the position of the researcher with respect to the study and the pre-existing relation between the researcher and field. This to “[render objective] the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). From here, the chapter focuses on the three lenses used in the analysis of this work, then details the methodological tools used in data collection and the categories of actors approached.

Chapter four is mostly dedicated to the three case study neighbourhoods. It presents an overview of the geographic uniqueness of each one of them, followed by its main socio political characteristics. The chapter ends on a section on informal settlements, reasoning being that while this study looks exclusively at the situation of the urban refugees, it was important to point out some details on the settlements and their specificity, and to clearly differentiate the experiences in them from those of the urban refugees.

Chapter 3. Approach and guiding framework

1. Preparing for fieldwork : some preliminary thoughts

When starting out this research, I described my work as the “study of the resilience and resistance of Syrian refugees in cities in Lebanon”. I wanted to know how the refugees were facing their exile, and to understand their challenges. The line of thought changed with time as I looked more into the role of the refugees in the cities rather than solely their reactions to it. The accounts I documented in the field were often those of sadness, frustration, distress, violence, and fear - from most of the dwellers I interacted with. In what is developing into one of the more complicated and protracted situations of forced displacement, notably due to its close articulation with complex and multiscale political games, I seek to understand the urban experiences of Syrians’ settlement in three neighbourhoods in city peripheries in Lebanon, and the role that the history of the peoples cohabiting them plays in forming those experiences. I see this study as a way of addressing and drawing from the “urban experiences” of the refugees in Lebanon. As I advanced in my investigations, I understood that the lens was too restrictive. While refugees would share with me their struggles to secure residency and how they would devise certain mechanisms to face government restrictions on their residency, it was essential to also understand how, by whom, and why the restrictions on residency were introduced, in their specific spatiality and temporality, in the first place. This necessitated understanding the functioning of the government and local authorities from a national policy lens or rather the politics behind their action, or inaction. While some researchers have suggested that “‘doing nothing’ is at heart a political activity and it should be examined as such” (McConnell & t’ Hart, 2014, p. 12), the non-policy in the case of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis has been described as “disastrous” (El Mufti, 2014). It has “played a major role in structuring the responses that did emerge, both “below” and “above” the state, that is namely by local authorities and international agencies” (Mourad, 2017, p. 49) and “[enabled] the emergence of alternative actors, whose actions were ultimately bounded and structured by the context created by these inactions” (Mourad, 2017, p. 55). To understand how it was possible for Lebanese authorities and citizens to host a refugee population equal to a quarter of its own, for better or for worse, I needed to use geopolitical, sociological and spatial lenses.

With time, I began to describe my work as rather the “study of inequalities and power struggles in the cities in Lebanon in light of the presence of the large number of Syrian refugees”. The city, the urban dimension, is the entry point for this study. I would begin by observing the material urban processes in order to analyse the way the society was being constantly reshaped. Still, it was lacking I could not observe the Syrian refugees’ from an urban perspective without

considering first the socio-urban context in which they arrived. Furthermore the historical geopolitical context in Lebanon, a young and weak nation-state, presents implications on the urban experience of dwellers - how do they make the cities they are in? (Fawaz et al., 2018). From within the very difficult conditions of residency at a legal and economic level, the refugees live, work and interact in the city and consequently become part of its making. It fuels the constant need of the different communities to negotiate their place, and it brings to the forefront another urban reality that is not secondary: the continuous presence of the other poor migrants in the city in Lebanon.

The more I observed, the more I understood that the situation in the city in Lebanon today cannot be analysed solely from the point of view of the refugees nor solely from the point of view of the hosts, it is the analogies and differences between the two viewpoints that matter. No single lens or point of view suffices to study the societal change in cities in Lebanon today; it can only be observed as a continuum and as a combination of factors that are perceptible in the urban experience. Indeed, the present situation in the city in Lebanon is not one where over a million refugees have settled and are changing the society. Rather, it is the latest phase of a continuing socio-urban crisis, particularly observed at the local scale, but underlined by profound national and regional political intricacies, that affects the micro scale urban experiences of dwellers.

I used three lenses to approach the subject. Social geography, geopolitics on the regional and local levels and finally the urban lens for the micro perspective, where the negotiation over space is most visible. It is only by superimposing these three viewpoints and highlighting their simultaneous effects that a comprehensive idea of the reality in cities in Lebanon today can be formed.

Geopoliticians have underlined the strong relation between international geopolitics and the local geopolitics, stressing for example that “most often, there is no “barrier” or “separation” between international geopolitical realities and the internal realities of states. What we observe is “permeability,” interweaving, and multiple and often decisive interactions.” (Subra, 2012, p. 48). Subra argues that geopolitical conflict has “as such become a fundamentally multidisciplinary research object”, while specifying that geopolitics does not only refer to the international conflict, it is also concerned with power struggles on the local territorial level. He proposes that geopolitics is the “study [of] power rivalries over territory [that] concern local issues (planning, local political power, environmental protection, immigration issues, the suburban segregation and relations between ethnic communities) and mainly mobilize local actors” (Subra, 2012, p. 53). This is largely in line with Yves Lacoste’s view of the internal geopolitics and the discipline.

Béatrice Giblin defines it as “the study of territorial rivalries between various political forces within the same state” (Giblin, 2012, p. 1)¹²³, that she started to study by looking into the geography of elections in France, specifically the territorial strategies used by political parties to maintain control over certain areas (Giblin, 2012, p. 2).

In fact, geographic territory is essential in geopolitics. However, this refers not only to territory as such, with its surface area, topography, and resources, but also the men and women who live there and the authorities they accept and those they fight against because of the historical narratives they rightly or wrongly tell themselves and the fears and representations they have of their distant or recent past and their distant or near future (Lacoste, 2012, p. 15).

Such a vision is useful for approaching the case of cities in Lebanon in which all the issues mentioned are relevant. I add to those the historical dimension and the national identity weaknesses that exacerbate local rivalries between populations in the cities in Lebanon. This study could not move forward without reflections on identity and belonging. These abstract but engulfing terms underlie the very definition of the word Lebanese and in relation to it: the other. The relations between this Lebanese and the other affect the presence, the conditions of settlement of Syrians in cities in Lebanon, as well as the ways they access economic, social, or urban resources.

The social geography lens serves as the compass of this study and centers on questions about the right to the city that “can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 158). Most significantly as Peter Marcuse puts it: “whose right(s)? In what city?”

Lefebvre’s right is both a cry and a demand, a cry out of necessity and a demand for something more. Those are two separate things. I would reformulate them to be an exigent demand by those deprived of basic material and legal rights, and an aspiration for the future by those discontented with life as they see it around them and perceived as limiting their potentials for growth and creativity (Marcuse, 2012, p. 37)

Indeed recurring, the question of who has a claim to social justice in the city in Lebanon, especially since 2011, is not easily answered. On the one hand, economically vulnerable Lebanese populations have been the most affected by the massive influx of Syrian refugees, who mostly arrived economically, but also socially and politically vulnerable, and were made legally vulnerable in 2015. Palestinian populations in Lebanon since the mid 1950s are also economically,

¹²³ Original extended citation: La géopolitique interne signifie donc l'étude des rivalités sur du territoire entre diverses forces politiques à l'intérieur d'un même État.

socially, politically, and legally vulnerable and have also been faced with the new influx of refugees. If the right to the city is both a “cry and a demand”, then the demand comes from “those directly in want, directly oppressed, those for whom even their most immediate needs are not fulfilled: the homeless, the hungry, the imprisoned, the persecuted on gender, religious, racial grounds” (Marcuse, 2012, p. 37). In the case of the city in Lebanon, must one find the most oppressed? the most persecuted? should their nationality matter? what does the virtue of their birth and life in Lebanon count for?

Social geography at the center

The seminal work *Géographie Sociale* - that established the fundamentals of social geography in France in 1984 - detailed four explanatory factors of this approach of the discipline (Frémont, Hérin, Renard, & Chevalier, 1984). Those are the effects of place, class, culture, and mobility, that “exist in constant interference and in permanent inter and retroaction, that structure the different societies”¹²⁴ (Frémont et al., 1984, p. 246). This dissertation follows these orientations closely in considering each of these factors throughout the analysis, and in its ethos is the “analysis of social relations within spatial systems” (Frémont et al., 1984, p. 379). The study of power-relations is thoroughly investigated in social geography that provided the intellectual cadre for this dissertation. Whether it be the geography of inequalities as practiced by Robert Hérin, the studies on segregation developed, for example, by Pétros Pétsimeris (Pétsiméris, 1995), or the studies on places by Guy Di Méo (1998), among others, these founding texts have structured the approach today. Yves Lacoste’s writings in political geography (related closely to social geography), and in extension the journal *Hérodote* that he spearheads, are also foundations for this dissertation.

What drew me to the field of social geography in the urban space is how questions can be studied by looking at the spatial dimension of social relations and social classes at different scales and temporalities, to bring the theme of inequality to the forefront. How are inequalities distributed and visible in the cities, and what are the processes that feed the continuous increase of these inequalities?

Furthermore, what rights for the dwellers? Do they go beyond the urban “necessities for a decent life” which would include access to decent housing, water, electricity etc. or should they be the “right[s] in a political sense [...] *The* right to the city, not *rights* to the city... a right to social justice, which includes but far exceeds the right to individual justice” (Marcuse,

¹²⁴ Extended original citation: “Ainsi quatre types d’effets, jouant en constante interférence et en inter et rétroaction permanente, structurent les différentes sociétés”.

2012, p. 40 stresses by author). In Lebanon in 2018 the demand for *the right* to the city remains elusive. It is the urban rights, those rights necessary for a decent life, that are the revealing element for all the other challenges. My observation started here, with the continuing negotiations over space at the urban level between dwellers in cities in Lebanon, greatly and quickly exaggerated following the arrival of the Syrian refugees. Those are causes and effects at the same time. Caused by the larger geopolitical factors and affecting social and geopolitical rivalries, in a closed circuit.

From social geography I also observed the social segregation that “seems to shape the city or at least to impregnate many of its localities” (Netto, 2018, p. 17). Restrictions on contact are enforced both formally and informally in the cities in Lebanon, and not only between the Lebanese and the Others. Rather, restrictions on contact span widely and profoundly between the communities. Social restrictions on contact start with family and culturally imposed female-male relations, community imposed Christian-Muslim relations, Shiite-Sunnite relations, Maronite-Druze relations etc. but also between the Lebanese and other nationalities, and between social classes amongst the Lebanese and between the religious communities. If “all restrictions on interaction, whether they involve physical space or not, are forms of segregation - in social space” (Linton Freeman quoted in (Netto, 2018, p. 22), then segregation in Lebanon indeed has specific spatial expressions.

The restriction of social contact and mobility of a certain community cohabiting a space minimises the possibilities of encounters, defined as “being co-present [in a space] within a distance where focused interaction become possible through facial engagement, gesture and verbal communication” (Netto, 2018, p. 38). Less possibilities for encounters leave spatially co-present communities exposed to rejection and fear of the other, for lack of opportunities of pure encounters. These encounters are conditioned by “mobility and income”, that both affect the possibility of the spontaneous creation of “urban nodalities” as Edward Soja refers to them, or spaces of social life. In a quantitative study on the interplay of forms of mobility and of segregation, Netto found that “different levels of mobility lead to distinct networks of movement in urban space, which imply different encounter opportunities, homophilic personal networks and consequently segregated class networks” (Netto, 2018, p. 41). Indeed in Lebanon the different access of different dweller communities to mobility and income, dictated by the dire economic situation in the country as well as the legally imposed policies have made the possibility of encounter minimal, increasing the potential for segregation.

The presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon today is the most recent phase in their long history of migration in Lebanon and not as a new, unique phenomenon. The urban dynamics of

cities in Lebanon, by virtue of their divisions and political instability have allowed the phenomenon of the urban settlement of Syrian refugees making up almost a quarter of the population. In turn this important presence has affected the socio-urban fabric of the cities. In order to characterise the various dimensions of this process, I will address it on three scales: (1) on the urban micro level I ask how it has been received by the host communities and how this is reflected in the city, (2) on the national scale I reflect on the weight of the changing stances of the Lebanese authorities on the issue, and (3) on a regional scale I look at the history of the migration of Syrians in Lebanon.

1.1 Analytical framework and hypotheses

In fact, this work of categorization, i.e., of making-explicit and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning of the social world and of their position within it, the meaning of their social identity, through all the forms of benediction or malediction, eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments, or insults, reproaches, criticisms, accusations, slanders, etc. (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 729).

My observations focus on the continuous redistribution and negotiation over space due to the restructuring of social relations generated by the mass influx of Syrian refugees. Urban space and access to urban resources which I join Rafael Soares Gonçalves in defining as “those available in the city and that dwellers specifically need to live in the city” (Gonçalves, 2017, p. 1), are bargaining tools for both communities (Michel & Ribardi re, 2017). Each group is in continuous negotiations over its share, presence and legitimacy in the public space, and, as in other contexts, in cities of Lebanon, “collective urban services, such as water, electricity, public transportation are being treated more like products than rights for dwellers¹²⁵” (Gonçalves, 2017, p. 1). “Who” is authorised to use a public park and “when” are daily negotiations. In this sense, the spatial presence of refugees is often perceived as a threat by host communities, in that - according to them - it affects their opportunities in securing a social and spatial place for themselves. In Lebanon the urban restrictions (mobility, legal residence, etc.) placed on the Syrian refugees play a role in how that community is producing public space. “Refugees nonetheless demonstrate political agency by claiming visibility and affirming their right to mobility despite restrictive conditions... or again by consolidating their individual and collective presence [...]” (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 7). What follows are reflections on the different aspects and questions used to tackle the

¹²⁵ Original citation: “Les services collectifs, tels que l'eau, l' lectricit , les transports sont de plus en plus entendus comme des produits de march  plut t que comme des droits des citoyens”.

subject.

On urban interactions

When I started this research in 2014 the number of Syrian refugees had already reached the hundreds of thousands. Two images have remained with me from that time. The first is a graffiti calling for the Syrians to leave, widely shared on social media, and second a photograph of activists attaching a banner from a bridge over the highway, welcoming refugees and apologising for the racism of their countrymen (Figure 4-1) As the months passed the protracted nature of the refugee crisis became clearer and everyone started settling into the new reality. The voices of those who oppose grew louder as the new political card, the refugees, was played by politicians and the media. Four years later, these two opposing reactions still manifest in the cities in Lebanon. There are still those who support the stay of Syrian refugees and they are still expressing themselves in the same ways. Those who oppose though have become louder and are today calling for *refoulement*.



Figure 4-1: Visual expressions towards the refugees

(left) A banner welcoming refugees reads “Welcome to Syrian workers and refugees in Lebanon, sorry for what the racists among us are doing”. (right) A hostile graffiti initially reads “To every lousy Syrian: leave” and is modified to read “To every lousy racist: leave”. . Date: 2014 Source: (الحملة الداعمة للسوريين بوجه العنصرية, 2014)

Restrictive practices in the public sphere, curfews and other restrictions by local authorities, shortages in urban services such as electricity, water and heavy traffic constitute an urban geography viewpoint which has been revelatory of the magnitude of the refugee crisis in Lebanon, and to the ways institutions and civil society are responding to it. The Lebanese and Syrians specifically in poor or vulnerable areas are forced to co-live to the detriment of both communities. Both are struggling to make ends meet, and continuous power struggles with a few

instances of solidarity, are apparent in their social spaces. I argue that by analyzing these practices and mundane rhythms on the local and urban scales we can draw on how subtle societal changes have been incurred by the relatively sudden and significant increase in population. Cities in Lebanon have, and continue to be modified due to the refugee crisis. The analysis of the spatially and temporally localised situations of domination, conflict and tension; but also of support and resilience; adds elements of understanding that are revelatory of social change.

In their efforts to find normalcy in a complex situation both Lebanese and Syrians have had to apply different coping mechanisms - mostly negative. Interdependent to a certain extent, the power struggles between the communities seems exposed and implicit at the same time. Socially dominant, the Lebanese tend to exploit the Syrian refugee presence and show a paradoxical hostility towards it at the same time. On the other hand, the Syrians depend on the Lebanese for residency and livelihood while they limit their interactions with them as much as possible. The space where the communities co-live is therefore in continuous tension and negotiation, the specificities of which constitute an important aspect of this dissertation.

On including a camp in the study

The situation of the refugees who have resided in the Palestinian refugee camps is different due to the urban status of the camp itself, and due to the nature of their refuge. While there are refugees of sole Syrian nationality who sought refuge in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the majority are Palestinian Refugees from Syria. It is reported that around 12 percent of the Palestinian refugees who resided in Syria sought refuge outside the country since 2011, and 50,000¹²⁶ of those came to Lebanon (Dorai, 2016, p. 155), the country known to be the “least hospitable to Palestine refugees” and which “prevented [the Palestinian refugees] from being absorbed” (Peretz, 1993, p. 61). This is due to the various historic and political factors governing the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon as discussed in Chapter 2 section 3.1 of this work. While one reason behind the choice of the Palestinian camps over the city can be related to the fact that the camps offer some of the most affordable and least formal settings for refugees, the “dynamics of high mobility processes involving cross-border migration and the existence of well-established transnational networks” (Dorai, 2016, p. 154) play a major role in the selection of the camps - in the least - as the first place of settlement for urban refugees. The camps are internally auto-governed by Palestinians¹²⁷ and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), but any social or urban relation with the outside (Lebanese territory) lies

¹²⁶ “these figures should be viewed with caution as they do not come from a specific census of Palestinian Syrian refugees” (Dorai, 2016 p. 159)

¹²⁷ Palestinian factions mainly govern the camps

under Lebanese jurisdiction. The camps were sites for violent clashes during the Civil War (1975-1990). The PLOs armed resistance had been expelled from Jordan in the early 1970s, and they took part in the Lebanese Civil War¹²⁸.

Parallels can be drawn between the reactions of the host communities in the camps (the Palestinians) and outside the camps (the Lebanese). These parallels are interesting from a social geography point of view because the power relations inside and outside the camp are different. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (those still residing inside the camps) have a very specific position vis-à-vis the influx of refugees. On one hand they have a deep understanding of the situation of Syrian refugees today, and on the other hand they share some of the same discourse and reactions that Lebanese hosts have shared. In very similar ways to the mechanisms observed outside the Palestinian refugee camps, the Palestinians exploit the Syrian and Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) and are simultaneously apprehensive towards them. Indeed we can observe some of the same patterns of apprehension towards the newcomers that are recurrent in other cities in Lebanon.

On the refugee situation as the latest phase of the history of Syrian migration into Lebanon

Since Syrians have continuously been actors in the Lebanese urban fabric since the mid 1900s, this has had direct effects on the socio-spatial place as urban refugees today: The sole factor of their current condition as urban refugees does not encompass the complexity of their place in the city. In fact, Syrian migrants numbering at times in the hundreds of thousands have worked in Lebanon since the 1950s and before. Today they have become (over) visible due to their sheer number, the informal entrepreneurial ventures they are undertaking (kiosks, shops), and the fact that women and children have joined the traditional male migrant. Those had traditionally worked on construction sites, in agriculture and other unskilled labour jobs with little or no resistance from Lebanese workers or employers, and with minimal visibility in the public sphere. In their most recent forced, and therefore different type of migration to Lebanon, the Syrians' profiles have changed yet again from the Lebanese communities' point of view. Both the official and popular reactions to this new presence has changed in parallel with the progression of events.

On coping mechanisms and economic competition

Different socio-urban coping mechanisms and different modes of urbanity have been

¹²⁸ See Chapter 2 Section 2

adopted by Syrian refugees especially in the poor cities. These mechanisms are first unique to the situation in relation to their recent forced displacement and their places of arrival, but also depend on a variety of social factors including religious and political affiliations and social class. The Syrian refugees are in majority of the Muslim Sunni religious group and comprise of a minority of Christians and Alawis. Although statistics of the UNHCR do not include religious affiliation of the refugees, it is widely known and has also been confirmed throughout my field visits that refugees of all three religious groups are present in Lebanon. For a year or less after the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the refugees were welcome into the cities in Lebanon in support of the revolution (at the time) in Syria. The Syrian Sunnites especially, who were perceived as the main opposers to the Syrian regime, were welcomed and supported in the Sunni areas in Lebanon. Frequently Lebanese homes were open to them with all the resources that could be provided. The Lebanese Sunnites in specific were welcoming in the beginning, as it was perceived that overthrowing the Alawi would be quick and Sunnite power in the region would be reinforced. This is particularly well reflected in the case of Tripoli, a city with strong and historic familial ties with Syrian cities of Homs, Hama and Lattakia. For this second largest city in Lebanon the French mandate of 1918¹²⁹ hit the hardest, and “severely disrupted this complex web of social, cultural and political relationships” (Conflict in Cities, 2007) between it and Tartus, Homs, and Hama - those cities had all been one province under the Ottoman rule (Figure 4-2). Indeed, Tripoli was one of major provinces (*vilayets*) during the early Ottoman period, and it may be considered “representative of non-Lebanese Arab cities” (Gulick, 1967). The “demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9 percent) and includes, in addition to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 percent, or 28,525 persons)” (Oktav, Gade, & Osoegawa, 2015, p. 20).

¹²⁹ See Chapter 1, Section 3 for more details on the French mandate.




Figure 4-2: Map showing Ottoman provinces in 1609
 Province of Tripoli including present day Homs, Hama, Lattakia and Tripoli. Date: 1609 Source: (Ágoston & Masters, 2009).

When the Syrian conflict proved to be longer and more complex than expected, refugees became more of a burden on the already vulnerable Lebanese communities, who also struggled for survival and for decent living conditions in the cities. By this time though, the influx had grown exponentially and without strategic vision or management it became an unwanted reality. These changing political factors along with the fragile infrastructure and the vulnerability of both communities resulted in continually changing power relations. This is spatially reflected for example by the restrictions imposed on Syrian refugees’ mobility by the most informal graffiti to the formal curfews (Figure 4-3), the implicit acceptance of these curfews by the majority of Lebanese groups and the counter reactions of a minority of opposers in favor of the Syrian refugees. (Figure 4-4).



Figure 4-3: Curfew banner in Ain el Remmeneh, Beirut

“We ask Syrian brothers not to circulate after 9pm in the interest of public safety - the Municipality”



Figure 4-4: Demonstration in support of refugees, 2016

A demonstration gathering around a hundred people to protest curfews. (above) sticker distributed during the demonstration. Date: July 2016.

Not all the forcibly displaced Syrians were in the same position, and the very nature of interactions differed according to the places, but the vast majority of the displaced still needed to cope with their residence in Lebanon. The term refugee being largely pejorative, Syrians who were not in dire need of assistance from the UNHCR have employed the coping mechanism of dissociating themselves from the nature of their refuge. For example, it is not uncommon for the educated Syrian youth from all religious groups to deny being refugees and correlate that with the fact that they have neither registered with the UNHCR nor do they seek any assistance. The access they have had to the city in Lebanon has been a main factor in their ability to deny their refuge, as they continue to seek normalcy. While the preoccupation of one Syrian I met in Beirut in 2016 was to make sure I knew that: “I never registered with the UNHCR, why would I? I’m not a refugee”, another Syrian I met in Tebbeneh was not as worried about the label, rather she told me: “I am now an expert on fooling [the Lebanese], I dare them to know I’m a Syrian without me saying it!”. Syrians have employed different modes of urbanity and have sought to alter their habitus in slightly different ways in the different cities. Some of these mechanisms, such as assimilation, came to them artificially or forced in the beginning, and they have internalised it - to the extent that during the course of a focus group I moderated with Syrian refugees in Tebbeneh, one participant said to the other: “will you stop it with that accent *yob* (you)” as he laughed.

A central concept in Bourdieu’s work, habitus “designates not only the foundational basis of practices but also the analytical objectives of circumventing the impasse of subjectivism versus objectivism.” (Navarro, 2006, p. 16). It is the “internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality” according to Bourdieu, developed through

processes of socialisation and determines a wide range of dispositions that shape individuals in a given society. It is not a ‘structure’ but a durable set of dispositions that are formed, stored, recorded and exert influence to mould forms of human behaviour. It may vary in accordance to the social environment, because unstable social domains may produce unstable systems of dispositions that generate irregular patterns of action. It does reinforce cohesion but also stimulates change and innovation, especially when it does not fit the surrounding social world where it evolves (Navarro, 2006, p. 16).

Be it through changing their accent or vestimental or behavioral habits, Syrians habitus has been influenced by the constraints of living in the city in Lebanon. They have sought to experience their behavior in the city with a different set of cultural-specific behaviours.

Securing shelter and livelihood are the foremost struggles for refugees. At the beginning

of the crisis the international community, through the United Nations, secured direct in-kind and cash support for Syrian refugees¹³⁰. This had several direct consequences on the situation as a whole. On the plus side, it aided refugees in securing a significant if not comprehensive portion of their rent (as urban refugees no shelter was provided by the UNHCR directly), along with their basic needs. On the negative side, it created a backlash from the vulnerable Lebanese who claimed being in the same economic difficulties without any support. Eventually, most international aid was deterred from direct aid to Syrian refugees to support for all vulnerable communities. As such, Syrian refugees lost their leverage and were treated like their Lebanese counterparts, compelling them to employ even more drastic mechanisms to survive.

Two strategies were largely employed by Syrian refugees to cope. First they shared shelter, with up to three families consisting of fourteen or more¹³¹ individuals sharing a three-bedroom apartment. Second, they accepted to work for less wages and less benefits. In my interviews, the first and most common complaint that Lebanese give when talking about Syrian refugees is that the latter are “taking [their] jobs” and that they have had a negative effect on the economy. With the significant lack of statistics on the employment market though, these claims remain unproven, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate a real depreciation of revenues nationally generated by the informal economy. First, as mentioned earlier, Syrians have always been part of the Lebanese economy; when they are indeed in competition or have replaced Lebanese jobs they were hired by Lebanese employers, most of them taking advantage of the vulnerability of the Syrians; and second there have been studies that have shown the contrary, that the Syrian refugee presence has in fact had positive effects on the local economic development in the country especially with the rise in consumption¹³². In the housing sector for instance, Syrian refugees in the country paid 378 million dollars in rent in 2016 (Yassin, 2018, p. 96). Furthermore, not all the forced migrants were poor, and in the same year the “value of real estate purchases by Syrians in Lebanon [came to] 78 million dollars” (Yassin, 2018, p. 95).

What has changed therefore, is the visibility of the Syrian worker, and the ratio between the new number of dwellers to the infrastructure capacity in the cities. All the residing population has as such been impacted by this refugee and urban crisis. A spatial analysis of this situation provides particular elements of understanding that cannot be found elsewhere. Indeed, before 2011 the Syrian would have mainly been either on the construction site or in the agricultural field.

¹³⁰ The sum of \$27 per person per month was what the UNHCR provided in the first year or two, to a part of the refugee population. This sum gradually decreased. Today there are other projects (community kitchens, community cleaning activities etc.) that provide cash support to refugees but those are limited in scope.

¹³¹ In my interviews this was the largest number of people sharing an apartment that I was confronted with.

¹³² Notably the works of renowned Economist Jad Chaban and Professor of Policy and Planning, Nasser Yassin

Today, the Syrian worker can be a waiter, a salesperson, and most notably the owner / manager of a small shop, and exceptionally, Syrians have successfully launched larger businesses¹³³. Even those informal entrepreneurial ventures are set up with great risks and are under continuous perils of closure by authorities, increasing their precarity. If economic competition is exaggerated due to its increased visibility, then Lebanese tensions as host society stem primarily from socio political and religious roots. This competition is mostly manifested in the spaces where all communities are struggling.

Legal restrictions increase segregation

Between 2011 and 2014 the UN and a few NGOs were the sole managers of the refugee crisis and the government took a minimal role even in the management of the day-to-day issues. In January 2015, the Lebanese government took its first and only official stance vis-à-vis the Syrian refugee crisis. It adopted a policy paper which suggested “decreasing the number of refugees in the country by any possible means” (PCM, 2014), translating to the introduction of the *kafala* system. By transferring the already existing and contested *kafala* system to the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese government, under the pretence of controlling the refugee crisis, has limited the possibility for refugees to obtain informal employment and considerably limited their mobility, increased their spatial insecurity, and placed them outside the law and its protection (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). The *kafala* and related policies have placed Syrian refugees in an inferior status, legitimizing the social dominance of the Lebanese over the Syrians and consequently making any cohabitation efforts almost impossible. In all but name, they became second degree dwellers. Lebanese felt empowered to take on control roles over Syrian refugees, by personally enforcing curfews for example. Daily power struggles and encounters multiplied and extremist discourse against the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was normalized. Putting the Syrian refugees under the *kafala* umbrella was a very risky move by the Lebanese government. Today over 70 percent of the Syrian refugees do not have legal residency due to the impossibility of securing a *kafael* (guarantor) or the financial resources necessary for the process. With this one policy, the Lebanese government instantaneously dubbed close to three quarters of a million people illegal and prone to arrest at any time.

Observing the mundane aspects of urban interactions in places of extreme vulnerability, and analysing how local authorities are spatialising their domination, reveal the government’s impotence in managing the country and ensuring the rights to the city for its dwellers. In the last seven decades but especially between the 1970s and today, Syrians have been alternated being

¹³³ See Chapter 5, Section 2.2

tolerated migrant workers, oppressive occupants, undesired workers, and undesired refugees. The profile of the Syrian as an occupant seems to be still vivid in the memory of most Lebanese groups, and perhaps the most marking due to its violence. It makes the inferior position of the Syrian refugee today almost acceptable as a form of revenge that can spatially take place in the daily urban life. The city has in a sense become a battlefield and the war revolves around entitlement over existence, legitimacy, and space. Furthermore, comparisons with the Palestinian refugees and fears associated with that presence increase hostility towards Syrian refugees.

2. Conducting fieldwork in three cities in Lebanon between 2014 and 2018

As mentioned by Michel Agier, “to approach a social world in particular, is to often witness the extent to which the individuals that compose it are subject to social injustices, cultural or racial discriminations, or fight for their dignity, for their acknowledgement, for their right of expression, the political right, etc. even if this does not only concern fields of “miserable” or vulnerable” populations¹³⁴” (Agier, 2001, p. 176). The Syrian conflict of 2011 was ongoing between 2014 and 2018, during which time I undertook the field trips for this research. Doing field research, including in depth interviews with different players, in conflict sites like Lebanon a researcher can not avoid encountering and reading violence. “Reading violence in the everyday is a practice people in Lebanon engage in and are very much familiar with, as they strive to distinguish between the sounds of fireworks and gunshots, between war and a street fight, between a life-threatening bomb aimed at sowing random chaos or a bomb with a political message targeting a person” (Moghnieh, 2017). Several elements render this a reality in the cities in Lebanon - specifically the sites of my research. Those include the invisible divisions following conflict, religious, and economic lines as well as site-specific codes that have to be understood and respected. While I seldom experienced a sense of fear or threat during my field visits, I did take some security precautions, such as informing someone (usually a friend from the area) of my whereabouts and how long I estimated remaining there, and parking my car at a secure spot, etc.

2.1 Several events mark turning points in the field during the research period

The evolving nature of the social and political scene between 2014 and 2018 was not without its challenges. When I started this work almost two years after the beginning of the

¹³⁴ Original citation: “S’approcher d’un monde social en particulier, c’est bien souvent constater à quel point les personnes qui le composent font l’objet d’injustices sociales, de discriminations culturelles ou raciales, ou bien luttent pour leur dignité, pour leur reconnaissance, pour leur droit d’expression, leur droit politique, etc., même si cela ne concerne pas seulement des terrains peuplés de “misérables” ou de “vulnérables”.

arrival of the Syrian refugees, the social and legal cadres were different from what it is at the time of writing. These changes had effects on the situation in itself and on its political treatment. It also had consequences on the follow-up of the field investigation and their subsequent analysis. In what follows I present three examples of socio-urban events that had direct effects not only on the overall situation in Lebanon but also on the refugees' status, their local socio and national political treatment.

The number of refugees reaches one million, rendering refugees over visible in the cities

The first event and turning point was the Million Mark in 2014. The immediate reaction to the refugee crisis in Lebanon was one of emotional spontaneous support. As the crisis drew longer and it became more clear that the presence of Syrian refugees would be more protracted, popular opinion began to shift and the realisation of the weight of that increase in population began to materialise. This shift in opinion became an outcry in April 2014 when the refugees hit the “One Million Mark”. The UNHCR observed the event with a series of infographics as shown in Figure 4-5, and innumerable local and international news pieces covered it (Al Jazeera, 2014; Surk, 2014, etc.).




Figure 4-5: Examples of two Infographics observing the “Million Mark”

Source: UNHCR website Date: April, 2014

The drastic and quick increase in numbers, especially in comparison with the numbers of refugees in other countries, and Europe especially, was consequential. Indeed, it is an “obvious challenge for any people to absorb in less than four years a population increase of over 25 percent” (El-Khoury, 2018). The million mark brought the issue of refugees to the forefront of private and public conversation. All the lights shone on the refugees, their settlement, their conditions, the length of their presence, and most importantly the threat they posed, mostly on the demography of the country. In a span of a year, refugees went from being the symbol of

resistance to Bashar al Assad and the Syrian revolution to a national threat in Lebanon, reminiscent of the presence of the Palestinian refugees. In December 2013, Henrich Böll Foundation reported

“They are starting to cause serious social concerns,” said Mustapha Akel, the mayor of El-Minieh, a middle/low-income city in North Lebanon. “Besides the volume of electrical and water consumption, sewage and garbage disposal problems, the cost of infrastructure repairs and the lack of solid waste set-up in the tent settlements, housing costs in town are also skyrocketing.” He modestly added: “I want to marry my son off, but there are no more houses available. And the Syrian women who require much less financial security to be wedded are competing with our girls. Many are worried that their daughters will be spinsters! (Katkhoua, 2013, p. 1)

Conspiracy theories were not scarce, as the Syrian refugee crisis was being compared to the Palestinian refugee crisis with all the political implications such claims hold.

“They are swallowing our country. Soon, there won’t be much room for us here,” said George while sipping a quick espresso in a nice coffee shop in Saifi, near the port of Beirut, as he rushes to make another delivery for his small business. “It is a conspiracy I tell you, to have us Lebanese leave town so they can settle the refugees.” “Like in 1982, remember?” added an older man. “They tried settling the Palestinians then. But we aren’t going anywhere. This ship is not sailing. Lebanon is our homeland.” Jamal, [...] chimed in: “You might not have much of a homeland soon. The ship is sinking, can’t you see? The president said so himself: Our very existence is at stake” (Katkhoua, 2013, pp. 5–6)

While many Lebanese groups had begun to feel the gravity of the situation when their number hit the Million Mark, it was another event in May 2014 that rendered the Syrians’ presence a visible, real, and substantial issue: the Syrian presidential election. Just two months after the Lebanese were saturated with the news of the quantity of refugees, Syrians “flocked” (Lutz, 2014) to embassies across the Arab World to vote (Atassi, 2014; Lutz, 2014; Muir, 2014; Taylor, 2014). Turnout in Lebanon was impressive (Figure 4-6) to the extent that the BBC reported “the massive turnout for the expatriate Syrian vote at the embassy above Beirut produced scenes rarely observed at any embassy or polling station in the world” (Muir, 2014). These two almost simultaneous events contributed to a complete shift in popular opinion socially and politically. First, the Syrian refugees became over-visible in the cities. Second, the Lebanese posed the question: “If the Syrians are not afraid of Bashar al-Assad, if they support the regime, why are they afraid to go back and why are they refugees?”

This line of reasoning also affected opinion on who should be considered a refugee. Did

political or religious affiliation matter to determine whether or not a person should be allowed to flee? “The scale of turnout at the embassy and the vocal displays of support for President Bashar al-Assad angered Assad’s Lebanese opponents, who said any refugee who took part should be sent back to Syria” (Evans, 2014). The debate became an additional stressor for the refugees as their political beliefs were deployed as social pressure against them



Figure 4-6: Refugees on the way to the Syrian Embassy to vote for Bashar al-Assad
Sources: Getty Images for CBS; Joseph Eid, AFP, Getty Images for the Washington Post, Date: May 28, 2014

The Policy Paper of October 2014, another turning point in national politics and local policies

The event that most directly affected the management and urban experience of refugee settlement in Lebanon was the adoption of the “Policy Paper on Syrian Displacement to Lebanon proposed by the Ministerial Committee for Syrian Displaced Persons” (PCM, 2014) in October 2014. Its consequences included the application of the *kafala* system in January 2015 to regulate the flow and the residency of the refugees. In an official assembly on October 23, 2014, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers approved the Policy Paper proposed by the Committee in charge of the Syrian Displaced Persons. It was the first time the Lebanese government took an official stance vis-à-vis the refugee influx, and it marked a complete shift in policy and a radical change in requirements for Syrians in their access to Lebanon. Before 2015 they could easily enter the country and acquire a six months renewable residency permit upon visiting the General Security Offices. Since 2015 the requirements for entry and residency became markedly restrictive, difficult and costly. Although the *kafala* system is not mentioned in the policy, it was apparently independently determined and implemented by the General Directorate of General Security as their practical answer to regulating the residency of the Syrians in the country (Figure 4-7, See Annex for the list of detailed requirements).

The screenshot shows the website of the General Directorate of General Security, Lebanon. The header includes the title "المديرية العامة للأمن العام اللبناني" and a navigation menu with items like "عن الأمن العام", "الإقامات", "تأشيرات الدخول", "جوازات السفر", "خاص بالفلسطينيين وقيد الدرس", "خدمة فعالية ومتفاعلون", "الأخبار والإعلام", and "اتصل بنا". Below the menu are icons for "حركة المطار", "دوام العمل", "مجلة الأمن العام", "إستيبيان رضا المواطنين", "شعبة الشكاوى", and "1717". The main content area is titled "تنظيم دخول السوريين إلى لبنان و الإقامة فيه" and features a highlighted sentence: "تعلن المديرية العامة للأمن العام عن وضع معايير جديدة، تنظم دخول السوريين إلى لبنان و الإقامة فيه. على الشكل التالي". To the right, there is a sidebar with a link "روابط ذات علاقة" and a list of links: "الإقامة الدائمة", "الإقامة السنوية", "إقامة مجاملة", "إعفاء من رسوم التأخير عن إطار الإقامة السنوية", "آلية تسليم وتحديد الإقامة", "البيومترية عبر شركة لبنان بوست", "ضم تأمين صحي إلزامي لبعض الرعايا الأجانب المقيمين في لبنان". Below this is a table with two columns: "نوع ومدة إذن الدخول أو الإقامة" and "المستندات المطلوبة".

نوع ومدة إذن الدخول أو الإقامة	المستندات المطلوبة
يُمنح سمة سياحية يتناسب مع مدة الحجر الفندقية (على أن لا تتعدى مدة أسبوعين) وغير قابلة للتجديد.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> حجز فندقية خطي أو شقة مفروشة أو ما يوازي ذلك. مبلغ لا يقل عن ألفين دولار أميركي. الأوراق الثبوتية اللازمة (هوية سليمة أو جواز سفر). دفتر العائلة (إذا كانت عائلته برفقة).
يُمنح إذن دخول لمدة خمسة عشر شهراً غير قابلة للتجديد.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> الأوراق الثبوتية اللازمة (هوية سليمة أو جواز سفر).

Figure 4-7: From the website of the General Directorate of General Security

Highlighted sentence: “The Directorate of General Security announces new criteria regulating the entry and residency of Syrians into Lebanon as follows”. Source: <http://www.general-security.gov.lb/ar/posts/33>.

Encadré 4-1: Excerpt from interview with the Lebanese Minister of Labour, Saj'an Azzi, in 2016

Question by the Legal Agenda: Did the measures taken by the General Security in early 2015 affect work permits [for Syrians]?

Minister Azzi: "They legislated illegal work". A person [now] places a significant capital in a bank and creates a fake company. Why all this cost? For an annual residency¹³⁵!

A contractor employs 3,000 Syrian workers to build a complex on the basis of residency and sponsorship without work permits. When we pursue the subject, the contractors argue that there is no cost of vacations when submitting offers. (Legal Agenda, 2016)

The above answer by the Minister of Labour illustrates three points. First that the *kafala* measures were decided upon by the Directorate of General Security and not necessarily with the approval of the government, or all the government. Second that the government is well aware of the increase in informal and illegal work that the *kafala* created but do not or can not act upon it. It lastly shows the clear inequality between Syrian migrant classes in terms of seeking residency, and how wealthier Syrian dwellers have more access to the city in Lebanon.

While on one hand the policy seems to seek criteria to qualify, or re-qualify Syrians (travelling back to Syria for example would automatically mean the loss of the “displaced person” quality), on the other hand it implicitly places most Syrians in Lebanon in a position where acquiring legal residency is either not possible or too expensive. Furthermore, it does not give clear guidelines on dealing with the crisis and leaves matters up to local authorities to act as they see fit in their areas. The policy highly truncates the previous mandate it had given to the UNHCR and other international NGOs. It dictates that the UNHCR shall hand over all the documents relative to the registration of refugees, and more importantly it dictates that all international funding shall be directed towards Lebanese state institutions or the Trust Fund for Lebanon managed by the World Bank (World Bank, 2014). Those funds would go to strengthening the most vulnerable municipalities’ capacities in order to serve all communities within their areas, and not only the Syrian refugees.

The extreme shift from a complete “open border policy” to a practically “no entry policy” in a matter of months could only be qualified as a social shock for the refugees. It restricted their local and international mobility, and for the majority placed them outside the law and its protection (Saghieh & Frangieh, 2014). While some political voices raised concerns about the crisis as early as 2012-2013, the Lebanese government did not take an official position vis-à-

¹³⁵ In the full context of the interview: By illegal work the Minister means working without a permit due to the *kafala* measures taken by the GSO. Also, he refers to fake companies created by wealthy Syrians to secure residency.

vis the influx until the end of 2014. Politicians from different party affiliations and ideological backgrounds were divided on the issue early on, with Christian leaders warning against the political dimensions of the crisis while Muslim leaders stressed the humanitarian side of it.

MP Michel Aoun recently stated that the “Syrian refugees are a serious danger”, while Samir Geagea, the main figure in Lebanon’s Lebanese Forces¹³⁶, stressed on the 30th of August 2013, about “Lebanon’s inability to handle [the Syrian refugee crisis] more, and that a viable solution needs to be put in place, and the only solution is to establish safe zones within Syria’s borders under international protection.” Moreover, Marwan Charbel, Lebanon’s internal security minister declared on February 28th 2013 that the “Syrian refugees are threatening the security situation in Lebanon”. Other major political forces in Lebanon, like Hizbullah, Amal, Jumblatt’s PSP (Progressive Socialist Party), and Hariri’s Future Current mostly stressed the Humanitarian aspect of the “Syrian refugees Crisis” in Lebanon, but have refrained from countering any of the racist and xenophobic discourses, in the political and media spheres and even among their base of supporters and cadres. (Chit & Nayel, 2013)

These contradictory positions created the deadlock situation within the government and as such no national reaction was officially declared, leaving the management of the crisis completely in the hands of international NGOs (mainly the UNHCR) between 2011 and 2014. During these years, as I will develop in later chapters, the weight of the substantial increase in population on the urban infrastructure in Lebanon led to increasing social tensions between the various local hosts and refugee communities. In a sense the introduction of the *kafala* by early 2015 calmed the tensions on the Lebanese dwellers side because it placed the latter in direct position of power over the Syrians. Consciously or not, the government may have attempted to secure short term social peace by allowing this power positioning amongst dwellers. While it may be so, the medium and longer terms repercussions of the action have not proven successful. The *kafala* in itself only regulates the residency permit acquisition for Syrian refugees, but the policy of October 2014 takes matters a step further by providing legal cover for local authority practices such as curfews and restrictions on the use of public space.

Encadré 4-2: Excerpt from the Council of Ministers’ minutes of meeting on October 23, 2014 (see Annex 5 for original document in Arabic)

A last point out of thirteen items that were deliberated in that meeting, is the policy which clearly reflects the political attitude and plans of the Lebanese government towards the presence of the Syrians in Lebanon and indeed it had a direct effect on the latter’s daily lives. What follows is a translation of the text, originally published in Arabic on the website of the Presidency of the Council

¹³⁶ Christian political party

of Ministers:

Lebanon that has been an outstanding international and unique model in the extent of its adherence to humanitarian principles and implementing them towards its neighbours and brothers the people of Syria, is today approaching social, economic and security explosions threatening its existence, should it not implement - in the interest of the Lebanese and Syrian people - a responsible policy to reduce the number of displaced Syrians on its territories and to ensure security for Lebanese and Syrians and to reduce the burden on its people and economy.

Reduction of numbers:

Stop all displacement at the border with the exception of extreme humanitarian cases, and register individuals at the border according to the reasons of their entry to ensure the proper application of this regulation, and moreover require the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop all registration of the displaced individuals except further to approval by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Encourage displaced Syrians to return to their country or to other countries by all means possible, and insist on the application of Lebanese laws upon their presence, furthermore remove the quality of "displaced" from any person who travels back to Syria, and any person who violates Lebanese laws and entry requirements.

Regulate the relationship with international organisations according to Lebanese laws and agreements, which necessitates for the state to obtain all information about the registered displaced persons in order to study their files and to periodically assess their displacement according to legal criteria and ultimately reduce their number(s) and secure the needs of the deserving displaced persons.

Security provisions:

Authorise Security forces to follow-up on the implementation measures of controlling the displacement, and authorise municipalities to perform periodic statistical surveys of the displaced within their administrative areas, and provide those municipalities with the necessary human resources to maintain security.

Reduction of burdens:

Strictly enforce Lebanese laws on the displaced Syrians in order to protect the Lebanese in all areas of work and employment.

Balance assistance between the displaced and the host community, and provide direct funding to Lebanese state institutions through the Multi-Donor Trust-Fund (MDTF) and through special programs designed by donor(s) in agreement with the Lebanese administration concerned as appropriate.

Finance international programs aimed at developing the Lebanese economy and activating its productive sectors.

The policy paper regarding Syrian displacement enjoys national consensus and aims to achieve Lebanese interests, and holds executive quality which necessitates its continuing implementation through all concerned Lebanese ministries and administrations, and through periodic reports to be

submitted to the ministerial committee for displaced persons and in turn to the Council of Ministers in order to achieve its objectives. (PCM, 2014)¹³⁷

Entitlement to international aid creates local tensions

The third factor of continuous change in the social and political scene of refugees in Lebanon is the aid offered to refugees mainly by the UNHCR but by other local and international NGOs as well. In fact in the very beginning of the crisis in 2011, international aid came directly for the refugees. This exasperated the vulnerable Lebanese populations who were for a significant part living side by side with the refugees. With time the refugee numbers increased and the crisis became less of an emergency and more of a protracted refugee situation. Aid was becoming more difficult to attain for the Syrian refugees, and the UNHCR shifted its strategy to accommodate “all vulnerable communities”¹³⁸ and not only the Syrians. This fact is clearly illustrated in the UNHCR reports on the situation of refugees in Lebanon since 2012. For example in 2012 the yearly report on global activity designates as people of concern “were Syrian refugees who have arrived in Lebanon since March 2011 and Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees who fled conflict in their country over the past decade” (UNHCR, 2012a, p. 1). In 2017 the UNHCR reported serving 1,000,000 “members of impacted host communities who will be directly targeted for assistance under the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP¹³⁹)” as direct beneficiaries, while the number of registered refugees was placed at 954,000 (


Figure 4-8); implying an equal ratio of support for Syrian and vulnerable Lebanese groups. In reality,

as signs of increased tension among communities became more apparent, international aid providers and national authorities “woke up” to the significance of ignoring host community needs. As a result, “[while] the pendulum swung 100 percent to the Syrians in the first two to two and half years of the response, [...] when it swung back, it swung back to an extreme level because people wanted to compensate for their failures (Mourad, 2016, p. 3)

¹³⁷ In translating the minutes of meeting I have tried to remain congruent with the arabic sentence structure where possible.

¹³⁸ As per field interviews with UN staff, 2015, 2016

¹³⁹ The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is the UN and NGO response to the impact of the Syria Crisis in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, in support of national efforts



On the ground so to speak, this sense of entitlement to aid was clearly reflected and increased especially during 2015 and 2016. Certain phrases and questions systematically found their way into conversations with both the Syrian and Lebanese communities and eventually became generic. On the Lebanese side: “Why them not us?”, “consider me a refugee”, “they take our jobs at cheaper rates because they can afford it with the financial support from the UN”, and on the Syrian side: “we don’t all get cash support, and do you believe it’s enough anyway?”, “they pay us less because they know we don’t have a choice”. These attitudes fueled collective mistrust and increased perceived feelings of injustice. The most prevalent example evoked was the food voucher program of the World Food Program, through which 60-70 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon received a voucher of \$27 per person per month which could be used to buy food. Syrian refugees would sometimes sell the voucher for less than its value (to other Syrians or to Lebanese), a practice that the Lebanese resented. The effect of this voucher could be felt

throughout the communities although not all Syrian refugees received it, and notably in 2015 and for a period of over a year, the value of the voucher was halved due to lack of funding (Reuters, 2015).

As a result of this agitation over aid Lebanese and Syrian interviewees often expressed the incessant need to prove they were more entitled to aid than the others. On several occasions I found it difficult to move beyond that conversation. While interviewing Palestinian refugees in the Bourj el-Barajneh camp for example, on two separate occasions interviewees showed me the boxes of medication they received from the UNRWA, and insisted I note down the number of pills per box and the prices - assuring me that they had felt a real depreciation of aid since the arrival of the Syrians to the camp. Syrian refugees in all the three cities where I collected data readily showed me, without me asking, different documents that would prove their legitimacy. These included intimate records of their registration with the UNHCR, their informal rent agreements, their family records etc. A majority invited me into their shelters (those varied from garages to shared apartments) and insisted I inspect the state of the place so that I may see how they were living¹⁴⁰. Even with the shift in strategy of aid organisations to include host communities and ensure the inclusion of all vulnerable communities in aid efforts, social tensions have persisted due to perceptions of injustice.

In consequence to each of these events, among others, tensions rose and effects could be seen almost immediately in the cities and were reflected in my interviews. Both Syrian and Lebanese were under pressure and affected by the political discourse surrounding events. Feelings of insecurity amongst both communities were clear. According to a cross-region survey conducted by the Université Saint Joseph in 2014¹⁴¹, nine percent of Lebanese had reported assaults and fifty-four per cent did not feel safe. On their side, twenty-four percent of Syrians had also reported assaults and twenty-six percent did not feel safe (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2017), 2017). Among their conclusions for the period between 2011 and 2014 “Syrian refugees are becoming increasingly vulnerable while worries are rising among Lebanese host communities” (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2017).

¹⁴⁰ It was not always possible to ask to take photographs of the interior of shelters, and when I did feel the situation allowed, I was not always granted approval

¹⁴¹ Study included surveys with randomly selected Syrians (1,200) and Lebanese (600) respondents in 120 different localities. Sampling details are available in the report. **Source:** Alsharabati, C., & Nammour, J. (2017). Survey on Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (p. 48)

2.2. Dealing with situations of excessive inequality

I elaborated earlier in this chapter on my struggle with the fact that I have been privileged with opportunities unattainable to most of the persons I interviewed for my research. Some of the more difficult moments during my field trips were the shifts between fieldwork and family/friend time. As the latter were mostly casual get together in the evenings, my days and nights were opposites in most senses. During the day I would be graciously invited into a dwelling of a refugee, often with little or no furniture to discuss matters of extreme poverty, violence and inequality. In the evening I would be at somewhere in Hamra, Mar Mkhlael, Badaro or whatever neighbourhood was trendiest that season, sipping on a \$7 drink. In such a situation, Paul Routledge suggests that “in our writing, we stage a representation of particular “reality” in order to display it. Such a display reflects, at least in part, who we are (or [...] who we think we are)” (Routledge, 1996, p. 401). This aspect then needs to be further addressed.

2.3 From a third space?

A metaphor of terror and violence, *l-balad 'ala kaff 'afrit* (the country lays on the palm of a devil) is often invoked to indicate the delicately balanced politics of governance in Lebanon, contingent on unpredictable terror, and is also a discursive form of reading and assessing violence. The metaphor, strategically employed by political actors, journalists and laypersons in times of instability and unknowable futures, is one form of discursive assessment and reading of terror and risk (Moghnieh, 2017).

In social sciences, geography included, the position and place of the researcher vis-à-vis the subject has received renewed interest in recent years. I did not approach my field with a conscious decision of whether my work would be politically-oriented, linked, in one way or another with activism or even with the production of an engaged research, as other scholars who have placed their scientific production within the domains of radical or critical theories. In a sense, when we conduct research in fields of pronounced inequality, the very act of reflecting and writing about it is subjective because we have seen the field with our personal, ideological filter¹⁴². Our interest in understanding certain social events does not stem from a place of neutrality, and if it does our human nature and curiosity do not leave us untouched. I tend to agree with Paul Routledge when he proposes “a third space” that lies between academia and activism to describe a researcher who is simultaneously involved in social action and writes it: “The third space implies inappropriate(d) encounters between academia and activism where neither site, role, or representation holds sway, where one continually subverts the meaning of the other” (Routledge,

¹⁴² See Chapter 3, Section 5 : Submitting to the personal aspects of field investigation

1996, p. 400). The researchers work lies somewhere in between the worlds of academia and activism, and juxtaposing the two can tend to be problematic for some authors who believe that “at the same time intellectual scientifically productive and transmitter socially responsible, seem difficult to conciliate” (Bautès & Chirot, 2012). The nature of this work tends to be delicate in Lebanese social circles. It is current, significant, and touches all aspects of daily life in Lebanon. Indeed, one of the difficulties I faced was trying to explain my research to my Lebanese friends. Most sought to place the work: “you’re taking the side of the refugees, are you showing the Lebanese point of view?”. A close friend who is a political activist most recently insisted on explaining to me how after day-length workshops he runs in border areas with Lebanese and Syrians simultaneously, they get to a point where “they understand each other” and where “they even sometimes want to work together”. Often, when I evoke the three year delay in the government’s reaction to the Syrian refugee influx I would be faced with: “so what did you want them to do? close the borders from the start?”.

My work is not about victimising refugees and vilifying the host community or state. I rather seek to identify certain socio-urban elements that drive the relations between actors in the city in Lebanon and transform it, and I seek to set these against the overarching cultural and political context. Syrian refugees if only by virtue of their numbers and dispersion have been and are city-makers in Lebanon (Fawaz et al., 2018). This aspect of the situation seems very important to me, that in spite of the tensions surrounding their situation, the legal, mobility, and social restrictions, Syrians continue to be makers of the cities in Lebanon by virtue of their urban dwelling. This fact cannot be minimized or overlooked regardless of the political question surrounding their presence, or return, for “there is a need to acknowledge the transformative impact refugees have on the very substance of “urban life”” (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 5).

“The Marxist doctrine teaches that the analysis of society is that of the class struggle, which can today be translated in a more nuanced manner: the very nature of social dynamics is revealed by the conflicts”¹⁴³, Kayser states (Kayser, 1978, p. 14), and therefore practicing ethnography is often navigating social worlds formed by war, political violence, extreme poverty and disease. At the level of the individual, it implies getting used to seeing pain, suffering, violence and death as aspects of continuity of a space rather than a rupture of everyday social life¹⁴⁴ (Perdigon, 2010). Why do we do it, then? Is there a higher purpose for probing, deducing

¹⁴³ Original citation: “L’analyse de la société est celle de la lutte des classes, enseigne le marxisme doctrinaire, ce qui peut être traduit aujourd’hui de façon plus nuancée : la dynamique sociale est révélée par les conflits”.

¹⁴⁴ In reference to the following citation: “La pratique de l’ethnographie implique fréquemment, aujourd’hui, d’évoluer dans des mondes sociaux façonnés de manière profonde par la guerre, la violence politique, la pauvreté extrême et la maladie. Cette pratique implique aussi des efforts pour acquérir et pour cultiver un point de vue local sur ces mondes, par la présence

and theorizing and how will that help advance society if it does? “What remains of critical thought when it is disconnected from political action?” (Bautès & Chirot, 2012). This is a particularly sensitive question. For the better part of the last two decades I had applied all my competence, skills and passion in civil society projects aimed at serving underprivileged communities. This was through short and long-term projects that would enhance livelihoods. During that time when I was met with difficulty in the field I went back to the office and brainstormed, with others, if and how we could intervene to fix the situation. It was our way of pursuing social and spatial justice, and it was frustrating. Domination is a socio-spatial system not a binary confrontation, and dealing with it necessitates a rupture to the system. With no real reach or policy backing up our initiatives, every attempt at effecting change would ultimately fail, or fail to persist. Is the ultimate goal, then, to strive to engage with policy makers and forward any critical understanding we have of the inequalities in a society, and would that be a justified third space in between academia and activism?

3. Using a combination of three types of geographic approaches

Urban, social and geopolitical elements interact in this research. The entry points, at the center of the study, are the urban observations that contribute to the transformation of urban life in the cities. These are directly (locally) and indirectly (nationally, regionally) affected by different realities that vary in nature from the urban to the socio-cultural and the political. Notwithstanding the different degrees as to which each element affects urban transformation, the figure represents how geopolitics may be placed in interaction with urban studies in order to understand the city. Urban observations tend to be at the crossroads of spatial, social and political processes and are therefore affected by those overarching elements.

dans la durée, par un éventail d'activités de recherche et, souvent, par des relations personnelles fortes – perspective à partir de laquelle il est fréquent pour l'ethnographe de s'habituer à voir la circulation de la douleur, de la souffrance, de la violence et de la mort dans ces espaces non pas comme une rupture du quotidien mais plutôt comme un aspect de sa continuité” (Perdigon, 2010).




Figure 4-9: Three lenses of the study

Representation of the interaction of the different lenses used in the study. Date: 2018

This combination is illustrated in the Figure 4-9. At the center are the local observations that can be made at the fine scale of the city. For instance a dweller might show frustration or dismay at the presence of another in a certain space. He or she feels threatened and decides to act. Depending on their social position vis-à-vis the other and the site where the incident is taking place, different scenarios may arise. At this point some national elements play a role. Are both dwellers of the same religious group? Social class? Are they similarly politically inclined? Do they feel protected by a political network or legal cover? A combination of these elements is considered and the dwellers will act accordingly. Either a fight might arise, or a person might avoid eye contact and leave. In any case, one of the two will abandon the space eventually. The person in the inferior position will either physically remove him or herself from the space or defer to the other dweller through the use of different coping mechanisms. Or on the contrary, the dweller in the superior position may decide to abandon the space for lack of interest in interaction.

These religious and political elements are dictated by regional affiliations and tensions that make in Lebanon a sort of microcosm for debate in the Middle East. Whether that be Sunni-Shiite tensions reflected in the positions of the population with or against the Syrian regime, or east-west tensions embodied in the Lebanese societal contradictions. The three geographic approaches described earlier in this chapter may be used to read this situation

4. Method and tools for data collection

No method is without fallacies, it is a matter of how honestly and openly we approach them. Being accountable to the people we study requires us to recognize our fallibility and, thus, to wrestle with that fallibility. The methodological dogmatists, who declare they have found the flawless method and spend their time condemning others for not following the golden trail, are the real menace to our profession (Burawoy 2013: 527).

Indeed, there is no flawless method in social fieldwork, more so when it is based in qualitative techniques. An interview with someone who has allowed the researcher the privilege of intimacy into his or her realities and thoughts will most probably not go according to a plan or a questionnaire, digression and a range of emotions are a part of it. Listening with an open mind does not eliminate our subjectivity but it may curve it, making the craft a developing one, clearer from one talk to the other. This is our own imperfection that we have to be aware of, and ultimately accept.

Doing fieldwork, for me, was synonymous with going home. I had the privilege of not having to spend time figuring out any logistics. Upon landing I would activate my phone and call whoever was picking me up. I would go to my parent's house where I lived for years, use my key, and settle in. Doing fieldwork also meant speaking my mother tongue, and using lingo and expressions that only people in Lebanon understood. While creating a comfortable field situation for me, the challenge was to be able to correctly transmit the totality of this informal expression, which for me was at many instances self explanatory. It was also an advantage to have previously worked inside or in proximity of the neighbourhoods and areas I had chosen for my case studies. What this meant was that the entry points to the field were usually set up before I arrived, and I was able to concentrate on moving past that initial entry phase. Doing fieldwork is an organic process that can and must change between visits and sites. It has not been a step that I needed to pass to go on to the next - it accompanied all the process of the production of this thesis. Doing fieldwork is "before everything a manner of being in the world, marked by sensitivity and

empathy, before being labelled by the institutional recognition of Science¹⁴⁵” (Buire, 2010, p. 10). Furthermore it is an extension of a set of theoretical presuppositions for “Indeed, the most ‘empirical’ technical choices cannot be disentangled from the most ‘theoretical’ choices in the construction of the object” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 225). In this section I will describe the methodology tools that I used and the various intentional and unintentional practices I developed while in the field. The first element of reflection on approaching field was how to physically approach it.

In his work on migrants in the peripheries of Beirut, Assaf Dahdah expressed the value of seeing the city at a slow pace. Using a more anthropological approach to his field, he describes his choice to live and move around Beirut as a dweller-researcher observing the city while participating in producing it (Dahdah, 2015, p. 64)¹⁴⁶. He furthermore notes the difficulties that non-Lebanese experience in terms of mobility in Beirut (Dahdah, 2015, p. 64), an element that has been repeatedly confirmed in my fieldwork, in Beirut and Tripoli specifically but in the country in general. In fact, (i) understanding how semi-public¹⁴⁷ transportation works and then (ii) the difficulties encountered while using it are important elements that the refugees mentioned as part of their difficulty in accessing the city. Women specifically but refugees in general have expressed real apprehension of using “vans” and “*servees*” throughout my interviews. Mobility is problematic for some Lebanese dwellers as well, although not in the same ways and not with the same consequences on their livelihood and access to the city.

After a first very enthusiastic but ultimately unsuccessful “day 1 of fieldwork”, I understood the value of the necessary slow pace to an understanding of a space. A slow pace not only in getting to the site physically, but also entering the field with “attention to sensory experience” (Al-Masri, 2017), “[attune] to other people’s practices” (Pink, 2008) in an attempt towards Bourdieu’s participant objectivation: “objectivizing the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti-scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity” (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 273). In what follows I will present the different tools I used in the field including observations, commented walks, interviews, and I describe the challenges of unreliable quantitative data for the research.

¹⁴⁵ Original citation: “Faire du terrain, c’est avant tout une façon d’être-au-monde, marqué par la sensibilité et l’empathie, avant que d’être adoubé par la reconnaissance institutionnelle de la Science.” (Buire, 2012)

¹⁴⁶ Original citation: Résider et se déplacer à Beyrouth consiste donc à être dans la posture du citoyen-chercheur qui à la fois vit et observe la ville, ses espaces, ses habitants, leur place et leurs mouvements comme autant de « citoyens ordinaires » [Berrychikhaoui et Deboulet 2000 : 12] qui participent à faire Beyrouth au quotidien. (Dahdah, 2015)

¹⁴⁷ There is no formal public transportation in Lebanon, but some vans, busses and taxis are used collectively and the former two follow a preset circuit in the city and between cities.

4.1 The unreliability of quantitative data

In 2013 an advisor at the Ministry of Finance in Lebanon described the challenges of the country's lack of statistics. Searching through stacks of papers, he says many of Lebanon's statistics are unreliable.

"We have statistics issued in an IMF document showing that...from 2000 to 2005 we having cumulative inflation of only 1.5 percent. How can that be possible?" Skepticism, he says, is key to understanding Lebanese economic figures. "In Lebanon some people collect statistics when they are sitting at home," he half-jokes (Redd, 2013).

National economic data is not the only insufficient data though. In practically every field there are no credible statistics meaning quantitative studies are often futile and unreliable. Researchers rely on estimates and educated guesses - basing them on localised studies in restricted areas and on projections.

Data on the population in Lebanon

Neither the Lebanese nor the exact migrant population among which are the Syrian refugees are officially known. All numbers of populations are estimated, or the product of educated guesses. The Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), an institution under the authority of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers offers population characteristics in 2009 as their most recent documentation on the Lebanese population.

For the purposes of this research I chose to rely on the estimation of the total population of 6.1 million in 2017 according to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2017). Excluding from this estimation the number of Syrian refugees as registered with the UNHCR (just shy of 1 million) brings the total population including the Palestinian refugees to almost 5.2 million. For comparison purposes, the French Ministry of Foreign affairs estimates the Lebanese population in 2016 at 4,6 million including 174,222 Palestinian refugees. They add the 997,905 Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR, and the 50,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria registered with the UNRWA (France Diplomatic, 2018). Their estimated total would be 5.65 million. I also refer to data and maps published in the Atlas of Lebanon (Verdeil et al., 2007) citing various sources and relying mostly on the 1997 Census estimates undertaken by the Lebanese Central Administration for Statistics (Figure 4-10). Concerning the statistics on the Syrian refugees, I refer mostly to the Operational Data Portal¹⁴⁸ provided by the UNHCR in response to the Syria Regional Refugee situation (UNHCR, 2011). The portal was regularly updated until January 2015,

¹⁴⁸ The Refugees Operational Portal is a Partners coordination tool for Refugee situations provided by UNHCR

but much less since then. In fact the UNHCR halted all registration of refugees as of May 2015 at the request of the Lebanese government¹⁴⁹. The request coincided with the shift of government policy regarding the Syrian refugees, and the introduction of restrictive policies on their entry and residency in Lebanon, including the *kafala*. Putting a halt to the registration of the refugees was both symbolic and tactical. It meant that refugees could no longer access aid, or register their children. For many who could not afford the *kafala* process, the UNHCR documentation served as the only legal proof of their presence in Lebanon.




Figure 4-10: Population and population density in Lebanon

Population and population density in Lebanon. Source: (É. Verdeil, Faour, & Velut, 2007b).

¹⁴⁹ The portal indicates that “As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon’s instructions. Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included.”

Data on the market economy

The absence of data concerns other domains and research areas as well. For example, there are very few statistics on Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) that make up the largest part of the Lebanese market (Building Markets, 2016; Malaeb, 2018). The Ministry of Economy's report states that SMEs "[Comprise] over 90 percent of the Lebanese registered enterprises and [affect] the livelihood of some 50 percent of the declared employees" (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2014, p.46). It is of course a statement to be taken at face value, not all enterprises are registered, in fact "a large segment of the business population [operates] in the informal economy" (Building Markets, 2016, p. 19). Moreover not all employees, even those in registered enterprises, are declared: "SME owners tend to resort to freelance contracts, underreporting of employees, or other means to lower their fixed costs" (Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2014, p. 30). The most recent official report on the Labour Market issued by the Central Administration for Statistics dates to 2011 (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011). Published eleven years before the time of writing means that it is outdated. Furthermore it does not take the informal market into consideration. Although they may be indicative these statistics are therefore incomplete and, as such, inadequate to any quantitative analysis.

Data on the economic competition between Syrians refugees and Lebanese

Historically, Syrian migrants in Lebanon worked informally and no work permit was required for their seasonal unskilled labour (Chalcraft, 2009). When Syrian refugees in 2011 sought to gain their livelihood in Lebanon they overwhelmingly did so through the informal job market as well. This allowed them to work more hours for less pay. Statistical reliable data on the exact jobs they occupied, the wages they received, and the conditions of their place of residence and work is practically unavailable. For comparison, in their report on Labour Market Implications of the crisis in Jordan and Lebanon, the European Commission elaborate on a labour market data graph for Jordan, and only on estimates for Lebanon (Errighi & Griesse, 2016, p. 17), showing the difficulties International Organisations have in working in Lebanon and that there is no statistical proof of economic competition claims, even though the competition seems to strongly exist further to qualitative interviews. Discourse on economic competition between Syrians and Lebanese is predominantly based on educated guesses, analyses (though qualitatively telling and well documented) on limited areas, or snapshots, and qualitative case studies on specific areas. In 2013 for example, in an Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile, the ILO surveys 400 refugee households in four regions, a sample they deem "too small to make reliable generalisations about the entire

population of Syrian refugees, despite the valuable results the study was able to offer” (Masri & Srouf, 2013, p. 11). The literature on the Lebanese labour market and the impact of Syrians on it systematically confirms the deteriorating socio-economic conditions (M. Harb, Kassem, & Najdi, 2018, p. 3). Indeed,

The prevailing perception is that these businesses are competition to the Lebanese (selling quality goods or services at lower market prices) leading to violent reactions on the part of host communities and municipalities. In recent events, several mayors closed down shops operated by Syrians in their localities¹⁵⁰, accusing them of taking jobs away from the Lebanese. These violent reactions are, however, not corroborated by any hard data (M. Harb et al., 2018, p. 4)

In addition, Syrian refugees are not allowed to open bank accounts in Lebanon. This means that their transactions are either done through Lebanese networks or in cash, and are also not reflected in the national economic statistics. In fact a study has challenged misconceptions on the negative role of Syrian refugees on the Lebanese economy showing that “in 2016, refugees spent US \$378 million as a total amount for renting purposes. This is equivalent to US \$1.03 million a day. Furthermore, 7 percent of Syrian refugee households also cover the costs of their accommodation by working for their landlord” (Yassin, 2018).

Status quo and data on housing

Data on housing is also insufficient, and the housing sector in general faces challenges not the least being that it is not considered a priority at the policy level. As is the case of the official report on the labour market by the CAS, the most recent official report on population and housing dates to 2012, and does not include statistics on informal housing. Out of an approximate 408,515 buildings in the country in 2005, it reports that half are not connected to a sewage system (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, p. 14)¹⁵¹. Results of its surveys in 2009 suggest under occupation of dwellings in Beirut and Mount Lebanon and over occupation mainly in the North; and that 71 percent of dwelling are privately owned (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, p. 14). Though indicative, these statistics however tend to reflect the reality of the absence of both

¹⁵⁰ Similar to the example in the Conclusion to Part 1

¹⁵¹ It is noteworthy that both reports by the CAS mentioned in this section were published between October 2011 and April 2012 as part of a four-report series. They are captioned “prepared within the EU Twinning project to support the Central Administration of Statistics in Lebanon” (Yaacoub & Badre, 2011, 2012). The need a footnote number details of the kind of support are not mentioned but there are no EU contributors or authors included in the acknowledgements, which suggests the support was at least partially financial. There have been no follow up or updated reports since 2012 which in turn suggests the support was temporary and not part of a strategic or long-term plan. This trend is also very common in NGO partnerships in Lebanon. It is mainly due to difficulty in cultivating long term relationships with partners in an atmosphere of unpredictability and political instability. It contributes to the lack of consistency in such efforts, the lack of follow up, a disruptive repetition in community support projects, over-funding in some areas and under-funding in other etc.

policy and effort or strategy for housing in Lebanon. The Ministry of Housing was dissolved in 1996, six years after the official end of the Lebanese Civil War and two years after the establishment of Solidère, the company responsible for the reconstruction, development and maintenance of the downtown area of Beirut. Different institutions have consequently dealt directly with low income housing in Lebanon since then, including governmental and non-governmental organisations, and religious entities.

The first national institution is the Public Corporation for Housing (PCH) established in 1996, and offers long-term housing loans at low interest rates. To be eligible the primary applicant or beneficiary must be “Lebanese for more than ten years” among other criteria. These include having a formal job (at least one working member in the family) and the total revenue of the family (including active adult children) must not exceed the equivalent of \$4,500 (4.000 €) - for a residence of a maximal value of \$180,000 (160,000 €). The rules automatically exclude Palestinian refugees among other long term foreign residents such as the children of Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers (Syrian, Palestinian or other) who do not have Lebanese nationality. They also exclude vulnerable communities working, when they do, in the informal sector. While the institution was initially created with the main objective to “perform studies and housing surveys in all Lebanese regions and to facilitate the housing of beneficiaries [...]” (“Public Corporation for Housing,” 2018), there are no reports published on their website (Figure 4-11). The second national institution that deals with housing is the General Directorate of Cooperatives (DGC), under the Ministry of Agriculture, which has “undertaken only a few housing related initiatives, yet with limited success” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 18).

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Figure 4-11: Screenshots of the Reports and Statistics pages on the PCH website
The page includes no reports or statistics since 1996. Source: PCH Website Date: 2018

The Ministry of the Displaced was established in 1992 with the mandate to cover “all issues of the displaced in all Lebanese regions, to facilitate their return to their areas and villages, and to enhance and develop their socio-economic situation and to enable them to settle in their area of residence to be able to participate in full in their citizenship rights and duties” (Ministry of the Displaced, 2018). Their activities include supporting the reconstruction and resettlement issues of individuals displaced as a direct consequence of the Civil War and the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon by facilitating long term loans for those eligible to apply, through a Displacement Fund and partnerships with banks across the country. The Displacement Fund has “undertaken the rehabilitation of deteriorated neighbourhoods in Beirut and has built one large scale low income housing complex in Tripoli. Accusations of corruption have dogged the agency in the past” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 18). In fact the initial period of activity of the ministry was characterised by a “lack of coordination between the Ministry for the Displaced and the ministries in charge of infrastructure and social services. Cash payments were made to rebuild and restore houses in regions where the infrastructure and social services were inadequate if non-existent”, while “elsewhere no restoration or reconstruction payments were available” (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000, p. 32).

The non-governmental sector in Lebanon has taken some initiative to address the issue of housing as well. While limited in scope and reach, two projects have been realised. In the North, in the city of Tripoli, the Khan el Asaker building has been reconstructed and resettled families originating from the area, and funded by the World Bank. The other project was a new housing project elaborated for the fishermen from Tyr, the Al-Baqaa project (Dubin, 2017). In the case of Tripoli, the project was based on collaboration between the World Bank and the Municipality of Tripoli as the land is owned by the government, but in the case of Al-Baqaa project, the land was donated by the Greek Catholic Archdiocese and the funding came from the Association for the Development of Rural Capacities (ADR). The project most likely saw the light due to individual motivations and opportunities, as well as what was referred to by the ADR as flexibility of the civil society groups. “the clergy, frankly, has more money than the government. There is less political interference as well. The clergy also owes a lot to the people” (Dubin, 2017).

Lebanese policymakers have not engaged in property regularization and neighbourhood upgrading and perceive informal settlements as strictly undesirable, while as in many other contexts, they tend to criminalize their population (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 17). “Even pro poor policies – such as rent control introduced in the period preceding the Civil War – have [...] been lifted. In 1992, rental agreements were liberalized, allowing rental prices to be set by the market” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 14). In 2013, the World Bank reported that Lebanon had been in a housing

crisis for three decades, and that furthermore

escalating land prices and the absence of affordable housing has led to the development of marginalized poverty pockets and informal areas. These are located at the fringes and/or in the deteriorated areas and historic cores of cities in Lebanon. Low-income and poor dwellers resort to living in informal areas characterized by poor housing conditions and limited access to basic urban services and infrastructure. (Le Borgne et al., 2013).

At the time of writing it is “safe to speak of an ongoing housing crisis, one that forces a substantial number of Lebanese citizens, refugees, and migrant workers to dwell in inadequate conditions, lacking security and access to basic services” (Fawaz, Salamé, & Serhan, 2017, p. 1).

The Lebanese housing market is therefore largely dysfunctional and not for lack of recommendations or policy briefs. The Syrian refugee arrival and rapid increase in numbers added a level of complexity by affecting the rent rates. And as “rents have quickly risen, relatively low-cost housing in urban informal settlements increasingly attracts the poorest” (Ford & te Lintelo, 2018, p. 1). In their policy briefing, the authors note:

Rents cause major worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities, not least as forced evictions occur regularly. Additionally, frequent moves in search of affordable housing mean that it is hard to maintain social networks that could contribute to improved social cohesion and that are important to feelings of inclusion and wellbeing (Ford & te Lintelo, 2018, p. 2)

Rents cause major worries and anxieties for both host and refugee communities, not least as forced evictions occur regularly. Additionally, frequent moves in search of affordable housing mean that it is hard to maintain social networks that could contribute to improved social cohesion and that are important to feelings of inclusion and wellbeing (Ford & te Lintelo, 2018, p. 2).

The challenges of rent in Lebanon do not start with the Syrian refugee influx. Especially affecting Beirut as the capital, but across the country as well, the rent-control law enacted in 1944 and suspended in 1992 is at the heart of a social crisis. Under this law tenants, and their descendants, have the right to extend the lease indefinitely at the same rate as long as they occupy the rented residence. During the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese pound dropped in value from an approximate 3 Lebanese Pounds to the Dollar in the early 1980s, to around 1,000 Pounds to the Dollar in 1990, to its worst value of around 2,500 Pounds to the Dollar in 1992, and has been fixed at an approximate 1,500 Pounds to the Dollar since 1998 (Banque du Liban, 2018). Rent control was of course set at a rate in Lebanese Pounds, and this has resulted in around 180,000

residences rented at extremely low rates in Beirut (\$600 / year, for example). Those residences lie in the immediate proximity of apartments free of the rent control law (rented or constructed after 1992), and have been the subject of heated and controversial debates since the end of the war.

The Syrian refugee influx has affected rent in Lebanon in two main ways. In areas where the rent gap is attractive for investors, or where locals seek to reconstruct or develop their housing, it has

provided a large pool of cheap construction labour, lowering construction costs for developers and thus enlarging the amount of potential rent that they can reap. Of course these refugees have influenced the housing market as well [Fawaz, 2017b; Picascia & Yorke-Smith, 2016; UN-Habitat & UNHCR, 2014]. Therefore, rent gaps in Beirut are influenced by civil, sectarian conflict and forced displacement up to this day (Krijnen, 2018, p. 1053).

The refugee influx has thus caused middle class communities who cannot afford the potential rent of the residences they had occupied. Second, in the peripheries and areas where construction is largely informal and substandard, the influx has caused a rise in rental rates which has affected the quality of housing that vulnerable Lebanese communities can afford.

Data on Syrian refugees between 2011 and 2018

The increase of number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon was quick and substantial. In 2014, the UNHCR reported registering around 2,500 refugees per day, or over one per minute. The number grew from 6,000 in January 2012 to 1,000,000 in April 2014, and was dubbed a “devastating milestone” for the country (Amin, 2014). At this point Lebanon became the country with the “the highest per capita concentration of refugees worldwide” and was “struggling to keep pace” (Amin, 2014). The numbers continued to rise (with a fluctuation of 3,000-5,000) to a high point of 1,185,241 on April 10, 2015 (UNHCR Data Portal, 2018). Since then, the number has been steadily decreasing to reach just over 950,000 at the time of writing.

While these numbers are telling to a certain extent, they are underestimated as not all the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are registered with the UNHCR. In fact, several reasons discouraged refugees to register since the beginning of the crisis. First there is a politically driven set of reasons to avoid registration, or to be refused the possibility.

There are many Syrians who have refused to register with UN agencies in Lebanon, out of fear that their names might be discovered by the Syrian government and that they might be accused of being defectors. Those with relatives still trapped in Syria often worry that they will be subject to reprisal attacks, or that they themselves will

be targeted if they ever return (Macfarlane, 2014).

Since Lebanon is not a signatory of 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Syrians who register do so for the humanitarian aid they would aspire for and not for refugee rights. Also, “some Syrians [did] not register out of fear. Minority communities and others [feared] that registration might bring retribution from other refugees or one of the many ethnic and religious groups within Lebanon” (Beals, 2013). Men fearing conscription who would have been arrested at an official crossing would also fear registering as refugees. They also include individuals who fear being identified by Syrian intelligence at the borders, for having taken part in protests or other political activities in Syria.

The second set of reasons is socially and economically driven. There is a lot of stigma that is related to the label of a refugee: they are seen as vulnerable, disenfranchised, victims etc. Those refugees who could, or felt they could manage by themselves and did not want the stigma of being labeled refugees did not register. Those include the upper class of the Syrian communities, and the middle classe(s) who at first did not need assistance but may have struggled at later stages and opted to register.

Within the repertoire of humanitarian concern, refugee now constitutes one of the most powerful labels. From the first procedures of status determination - who is a refugee? - to the structural determinants of life chances which this identity then engenders, labels infuse the world of refugees (Zetter, 1991, p. 39).

“This has proven particularly true in Lebanon, where a wide array of modes of ordering have become central in shaping a Syrian individual’s chances in life” (Janmyr & Mourad, 2018). In fact being labeled a refugee in Lebanon is connected to a history of negative perceptions related to the Palestinian refugees, their role in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and to the destituteness of their situation. The rejection of the term by the government further added to the stigma around it. Fear then, of social rejection or retribution from their own community (in Lebanon or in Syria) and from the Lebanese community has made many Syrians opt out of registering with the UNHCR.

The last set of reasons accounting for the ambiguity surrounding the number of refugees in Lebanon are organisational and policy related. First, as per a Lebanese government’s decision to limit and decrease the number of Syrians in the country, it instructed the UNHCR to stop registering refugees, a decision that took effect on May 6, 2015 (Figure 4-12).




Figure 4-12: Suspension of registration of refugees

Screenshot of the UNHCR Data Sharing Portal indicating that the organisation has suspended registration of refugees on May 6, 2015. Source: UNHCR Data Sharing Portal Date: 2018

Moreover, the registration of children born to Syrian refugees in Lebanon is a real challenge (Figure 4-13). It involves at least three visits to different official entities with the proper paperwork (at a cost that could reach over 25€ without transportation cost). Often, certain documentation is required which the refugees cannot produce such as a marriage certificate or legal residence papers. The UNHCR may intervene in some instances, but the process is still difficult. In fact,

UNHCR has estimated that 83 percent out of the 130,000 children born in Lebanon to Syrian refugees since 2011 do not have a legal birth registration. Barriers to acquire a civil status registration are many but primarily include a lengthy procedure, lack of refugees' awareness about the requirements for registration as well as a lack of proof of marriage or legal stay documents that they usually do not possess after being displaced. Registering a child becomes even more difficult after the age of one year as late birth registration requires lengthy and expensive court procedures¹⁵² (Yassin, 2018, p. 55)

¹⁵² In August 2018, the government started simplifying the court process for the registration of children. The new procedures come at a time where refugees have started to return to Syria, and having the correct paperwork is essential to that process. Source: Cherri, R. (August 16, 2018). Lebanon eases birth registration rules for Syrian refugees.

9. Summary overview of documentary requirements and fees for each step of the birth registration process:

	Required documents	Fees
Step 1: Birth notification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No documents required Identification documents may be asked 	No cost
Step 2: Mukhtar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Birth notification ID card or Passport of both parents, other identification documents may also be accepted 	Between LBP 5,000 to 35,000
Step 3: Nofous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Birth certificate from the Mukhtar ID card or Passport of both parents, other identification documents may also be accepted <p>This must be done before your child is one year old</p>	LBP 5,000 stamp fees. + LBP 1,000 stamp fees for each document presented for the registration.
Step 4: Foreigners' Registry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Birth certificate from the Mukhtar ID card or Passport of both parents Family civil extract or Syrian marriage certificate stamped by the MFAs in Syria and Lebanon, or Family Booklet If available, proof of legal stay of you and your spouse If you or your spouse do not have legal stay, after the birth is registered, the Foreigners' Registry will share copy of your child's birth certificate with the General Security Office. 	Around LBP 8,000 – 10,000 (LBP 1,000 stamp fees for each document presented for the registration)

Figure 4-13: Requirement for birth registration for Syrian refugees

Summary overview of documentary requirements and fees for each step of the birth registration process Source: UNHCR. Q&A on birth registration for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Information flyer) (p. 5). Date: 2018

These challenges allowed for an extreme margin of estimation on the actual number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and politicians used it as need be according to the situation. In 2017, the head of the General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim said “the number of refugees and displaced people exceeds 2.5 million” (The Daily Star, 2017), referring to all refugees including Palestinians and other nationalities. It is widely agreed that Palestinian refugees are around half a million, and refugees and displaced persons from other nationalities do not amount to over the tens of thousands. He therefore implied that there were 2,000,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon of whom just shy of a million were registered with the UNHCR.

Other statistical, national data on infrastructure, civil status, crime, security, etc. are equally scarce and unreliable. This consistent lack of statistics, coupled with the extremely large number of refugees renders quantitative analysis almost always contestable. It also contributes to inconsistent information amongst actors, be they refugees or host communities. Generalisations like “they are taking all our jobs” or “they are violent”¹⁵³ become current and increase tensions, and are difficult to manage in discussion. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the lack of resources could also represent social information in itself and point to certain intentional policies or other factors. The lack of statistics therefore allows generalisations on the situation of the refugees to go unchallenged. It could be said that in a way, these generalisations, especially when used satirically in discourse, are one mechanism that Lebanese use to release their stress in relation to the tension created by the situation (Figure 4-14). In her research on urban refugees in Maputo, Jeanne Vivet notes that the scarcity of resources should not be reduced to a simple methodological difficulty but that it also informs the research and can be an interesting element in terms of taboos on the politics surrounding the issue of the war in Mozambique¹⁵⁴ (Vivet, 2012, p. 97).



Figure 4-14: Joke about Syrian refugees

An example of a joke that circulated on social media regarding the generalisation that Syrians have taken over all the jobs. “Not every person who speaks Syrian is necessarily a Syrian..... it may well be a Lebanese looking for a job :)”

¹⁵³ Various field interviews with Lebanese residents in the three case-study sites 2014-2018

¹⁵⁴ Original citation: “La rareté des sources ne saurait être réduite à une simple difficulté méthodologique ; elle renseigne aussi, et c'est l'élément le plus intéressant, sur le tabou de la guerre au Mozambique, les enjeux mémoriaux et politiques liés au conflit dans la société et les rapports de force qui la traversent”

Encadré 4-3: One Syrian for every two Lebanese

Excerpt from John Chalcraft's work on Syrian migration into Lebanon

In July 1995, economist Michel Murqus published an article in the daily newspaper al-Nahar that sparked years of heated debate in the Lebanese press about the numbers and social impact of Syrian workers in Lebanon. Murqus' headline stated that "1,435,991 Syrians have stayed in Lebanon since 1993." The headline was a bombshell: only in June 1994 the official figure had been 50,000. Murqus derived the new statistic by subtracting the number of border exits by Syrians from the number of their entries recorded by Lebanese General Security. This method gave the balance of Syrian migrants who stayed in Lebanon. If the Lebanese population was about 3 million, wrote Murqus, then "one Syrian lives in Lebanon for every two Lebanese." Murqus' numbers were developed and greatly extended in press organs opposed to the Syrian presence over the ensuing decade. Some headlines claimed that Syrians made up about half the population of Lebanon. The authority of this oppositional discourse was given a boost in August 1997 when the patriarch of the Maronite Church, Nasrallah Sfeir, endorsed a figure of 1.2 million Syrian workers, citing their competition with Lebanese workers as one of five "basic problems" facing the country. Numbers like this were later backed in certain academic quarters.

The first major attempt to rebut Michel Murqus' figures was a 1998 study for the Syrian-Lebanese Supreme Council by demographer Roger Sawaya, who claimed that Lebanon hosted no more than 253,000 Syrian workers. He argued that Murqus' numbers related to entries and exits, but not individuals. The same person could enter and exit 12 times a year, however, greatly inflating the gross figures. Further, exits were undercounted as many did not hand in their entry cards on departure in order to escape the exit fee from Syria on return. Moreover, Murqus' calculations ignored the fact that many exits and entries registered not workers, but tourists, residents, visitors and students. Others picked up the baton, arguing that al-Nahar was biased, that Murqus' figures were against all logic and science, and his estimates for workers by sector greatly exaggerated, his figures for remittances wildly inflated and his economics self-contradictory or simply wrong.

Chalcraft, J. (2005). *Of Specters and Disciplined Commodities: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon*. Middle East Report, (236), 28.

4.2 Actors in the study and data collection tools

Categories of actors

During my fieldwork, I interacted with individuals who could be initially identified in four broad categories : Syrian refugees, Lebanese hosts, Palestinian refugee-hosts and officials (including government and NGO staff). The course of my observations led me to nuance this first categorization, mobilizing criteria relating to each actor's discourses to be able to move beyond a dichotomy based solely on the condition nationality (Lebanese/Syrian), official social status (citizen/refugee) or institutional/political affiliation. For example, I will show here how religious group and social class affiliation play an important role in the conditions of dwelling of

both the Lebanese and the Syrians.

With Syrian refugees in general, uncertainty was the an overwhelmingly present sentiment - though not always pronounced. Not having a choice in their present situation but more importantly the lack of predictability for their future was difficult for the refugees to understand and deal with. This uncertainty often rendered them emotional and highly sensitive. In addition there is a feeling of powerlessness that is difficult to manage especially in conversations - as certain aspects of their lives, they feel, may be dictated by the state, NGOs and host communities. Their daily routines consist either of applying different coping mechanisms to get through the day, and therefore when confronted with a researcher such as myself, they did not always know how to position themselves. It was very important to me to always explain my position and what I was there to do, and no to do. In many instances there was understandable reluctance to share their experiences with me, who in the midst of some their most difficult human experience, wanted to basically understand what it felt like.

Lebanese generally shared frustration in the interviews, as the situation seemed unfair to most of those I interviewed. In contrast to my interviews with the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese in general were much less reluctant to sharing their opinions. Mostly, the frustration stemmed from a feeling of loss of ownership, and specifically of the public space, and a perceived loss of job opportunities. There was consistent discourse amongst my interviewees around the limitations of the country in hosting refugees. In some instances, my interviewees were uneasy - and a few times hostile - especially when I wanted to understand the nature of their (economic) relations with the refugees.

With the Palestinians, conversations oscillated between two scopes and moved from: “We have been forgotten, the UNHCR does more for the Syrians than the UNRWA for us”, to: “we understand it, but we are frustrated”, to “they are actually taking all our opportunities”, to “they are refugees as well so we understand”, and almost always ended with “they will always have a country to go back to”. This reflected the pending social state in which Palestinian refugees in Lebanon find themselves in 2018. They tend to have most of the same reactions and discourses that the Lebanese hosts have, and at the same time show a deeper understanding of the Syrian refugees situation albeit noting their own impossibility of returning to their homeland.

During each field trip, I had formal and informal conversations with members of each group in order to have elements of comparison of the different temporal stages. I also wanted to observe and “report on the brutality of daily life which [the researchers / anthropologists] routinely witness in their practice, without sensationalizing or trivializing it (Perdigon, 2010, p.

973). To do so I avoided being immersed into only refugee discourse, or only host discourse, or only official discourse (such as NGOs or government officials).

Systematic and situated observation

The sheer number of Syrian refugees in all the sites of my fieldwork meant that there was no lack of opportunity to observe. I often started my day with an informal discussion with a *servees* driver and other clients. I followed that up with another informal chat with the owner of some random coffee kiosk over a cup of turkish coffee in a small caramel plastic cup. During the field trips I then experienced and practiced three types of observation. First, in almost all my field visits, I set aside time for the ‘whatever happens or does not’. I would walk around sometimes with my camera visible, sometimes taking notes. I paid attention to noise and smell and mostly I listened and looked on “passively”. In these instances I planned a pause every two or three hours to note down the feel of the place. Second, I would keep the same informal practice of the space but I would seek to engage in conversations with people. I kept in mind the “basic ethnographic questions [that] persist and guide us: how do city dwellers go about meeting the exigencies of their everyday lives; what is their interpretation and ‘definition of the situation’; and how ultimately do they make sense of their social worlds?” (Anderson, 2009). During this type of observation I began to notice the different ways dwellers engaged with me - some trends started to form; some were more open and curious while others were reluctant. The third type of observation was the most formal. I would engage in discussion with a person or group whom I had pre-identified, I would formally introduce myself and spend a couple of hours, sometimes more, with them in a shop or public space. In these instances I would return a second and third time - leaving a day or two between visits, to continue to my observation.

I had some limitations during observation. Occasionally, I would be stopped and asked why I was carrying a camera, and rarely I was asked not to linger in a space. This happened in one part of El-Nab’a when I was trying to approach people near a mosque, and in Tebbeneh in a street off of Syria Street. According to Bourdieu, reflexivity necessitates the deconstruction of a researcher’s unconscious knowledge, and a re-examination of the underlying purposes of the choice of subject in order to identify and break with the ‘blind spots indicative of her/his own vested interests’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 259). A decade later he developed:

one does not have to choose between participant observation, a necessarily fictitious immersion in a foreign milieu, and the objectivism of the ‘gaze from afar’ of an observer who remains as remote from himself as from his object. Participant objectivation undertakes to explore not the ‘lived experience’ of the knowing subject

but the social conditions of possibility – and therefore the effects and limits – of that experience and, more precisely, of the act of objectivation itself. It aims at objectivizing the subjective relation to the object which, far from leading to a relativistic and more-or-less anti scientific subjectivism, is one of the conditions of genuine scientific objectivity (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 282)

A researcher needs to own his or her subjectivity and in doing so objectivize the relation with the field and the process of observation. “It is this double truth, objective and subjective, which constitutes the whole truth of the social world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 255).

Qualitative interviews

Stories – in particular, migrant stories – have become a favoured way to address the interplay of identity and migration (Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Lawson 2000). These are not the popular fictionalized stories of migration and identity, but rather the stories told by migrants about their migrant lives or the stories told by researchers about their direct or indirect encounters with migrants (Gilmartin, 2008).

In the introduction to this chapter I spoke of my ‘nativeness’ as a researcher in my chosen field. Dealing with this was perhaps most evident for me when conducting interviews, specifically with the Syrian and Palestinian refugees but also with my Lebanese interviewees in different manners. “Even as insiders or partial insiders, in some contexts we are drawn closer, in others we are thrust apart. Multiple planes of identification may be most painfully highlighted among anthropologists who have identities spanning racial or cultural groups (Abu- Lughod 1988, 1991; Kondo 1986,1990; Lavie, 1990)” cited in (Narayan, 1993).

With thousands, or tens of thousands of refugees in each of my three study sites, and over a million and a half in the country at one point, a real representative sample of the refugee community was an impossibility. I privileged a qualitative approach and an open-ended, comprehensive style of interviews¹⁵⁵. For the most part, I interviewed my participants in an informal place of their choice, or their homes.

I also conducted focus groups in the offices of two local NGOs in Tebbench and Zahlé¹⁵⁶. In a relatively short amount of time, these collective interviews allowed me to observe interaction between members of each group. Indeed, a focus group “can yield quality research and it is at the heart of scientific debate because it challenges the researcher to analyse the

¹⁵⁵ See Kaufmann, J.-C., & Singly, F. de. (2016). *L'entretien compréhensif*. Paris: Armand Colin

¹⁵⁶ At the start of the research I had planned to include Zahlé as a site in the study, and had begun research there and in Tripoli during the first year. Further to many discussions with my directors we decided to focus on Beirut and Tripoli, as the urban milieu of the Beqa' in general differs from that of the two largest cities of Beirut and Tripoli in that on the whole it is more rural and agricultural, and secondly that the overwhelming presence of Syrian refugees in the Beqa' is in informal settlements. We decided instead to focus on the dense neighbourhoods in the peripheries of Beirut and Tripoli.

collective and individual dynamics¹⁵⁷” (Duchesne & Haegel, 2004, p. 122). Having moderated many focus groups in my previous experiences in the civil society, I was aware of some of the practical challenges and limitations of this method. For example, the focus group dynamic as well as the discussions that ensue are highly affected by the selection of the group members. At the same time, it is never easy to insure the presence of members invited to a focus group (specifically when it is not paid for). It is therefore a good idea to seek to have 18 invitations to end up with 10-15 participants. The information I could get from a focus group could be subjective to a certain degree and could be swayed by group dynamics.

A particular concern with using focus group methodology is the ethical issues involved of having more than one research participant at a time. This has two implications: first people may be uncomfortable with talking about their concerns in a group context, whether with strangers or with people they know. Sometimes group members may not respond appropriately to other members' disclosures. (Smithson, 2007, p. 359).

It could at the same time show a lot of the collective feelings in the community and it could definitely connect me with individuals with whom I would go on to have more in depth interviews. I sought the support of my network at two NGOs (UTOPIA in Tripoli and NAJDA Now in the Bekaa) to set up the groups. I finalised the selection criteria for the participants with members of the NGO who were connected with the community members through their job, and therefore knew them to a certain extent. Once everyone was in place, I took permission to film and animated the discussions in as much an open way as possible, leaving space for the participants to interact and posing an occasional question or remark when I felt the discussion started to derail.

In the case of formal interviews, I would only sit with a willing interviewee after having gotten to know them in another setting. I had either met them during my observation, or they would have heard about my work and sought me out¹⁵⁸, or they would have been referred by another person I met at a focus group. I usually had a list of themes in my field notebook which I used as my talking points but no defined questions (Figure 4-15). Those themes were nuanced

¹⁵⁷ Original citation: “il peut donner lieu à des travaux de qualité et il est au cœur de débats scientifiques stimulants, notamment parce qu’il met le chercheur au défi de saisir l’imbrication du collectif et de l’individuel”

¹⁵⁸ Especially in Tebbeneh and Bourj el-Barajneh, less in El-Nab’a, word of mouth travels fast and many people were curious about what a female researcher with a camera was doing. Many times people would come up to me and ask about the reasons behind my presence. They would especially want to know if I was there to map the area for development purposes and with whom I worked, because they would have one or more requests for their individual needs. I was also often mistaken for someone from the “Embassy” (any embassy), and they would want to ask about procedures or whether I was seeking potential migrants. I disappointed many residents with my real purpose...

and developed between interviews and from one field trip to the next. In fact I tried to speak less and listen more, and left time for silence. I used a lot of “Ah”s, and “OK”s, followed by “but how?” “I did not understand why...” thus inviting my participants to say more. I started every interview with: “tell me about how you got here”, and almost always ended it with: “would you be able to tell a Syrian from a Lebanese at a distance? How?”




Figure 4-15: Themes to refer to during interviews

Source: Field notebook

Many participants were taken aback very suspicious by my type of questions. Many were taken aback by the interest I showed to understand ‘why’ they acted the way they did in a certain situation. In the case of the Syrian refugees interviewees specifically, I was surprised at the fact that they almost all arrived with ‘proof’ on hand. “Here look, my brother has rented the apartment since 2007”, they might say, while holding the informal document signed at some notary public office but not registered in the correct channels. “*Wallah w-rahmet abi...*” (I swear by God, on my father’s soul), they would start their account on how much assistance they have received from the UNHCR, for example. At night when transcribing or adding notes, and back behind my screen, I would resist the urge to (over) interpret using my personal lens, and be true to the description of the accounts of my participants. Sometimes, listening to a recording I would

hear my own comment or question and think “I think I led that answer”. But it is not evident to

attempt to situate oneself in the place the interviewees occupy in the social space in order to understand them as necessarily what they are . . . to give oneself a generic and genetic comprehension of who these individuals are, based on a theoretical and practical grasp of the social conditions of which they are the product (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 613)

In all, I conducted 73 interviews of one to three hours long with participants from the three sites of my study, in addition to another 32 interviews with participants from other areas. Participants include Lebanese hosts (dwellers of the area), Palestinian refugees (who are hosts at the same time), and Syrian refugees in priority. They also include government and local authority members (elected and/or assigned) such as heads of municipalities and members of parliament, and lastly junior and senior employees of local and international NGOs. A last category of informal interviews or chats which have been enriching to my work are the conversations I had with *sewees* drivers, family members, friends and random members of the community who had something to say. I did not count this last category of persons towards the total of interviews, but I do point to the value of their input - which has notably guided some of the formal interviews.

	Case study sites				Sites external to study	Zahlé	focus group bekaa	Total
	El-Nab'a	Bourj el Brajneh	Beb el Tebbeneh	Tebbeneh, Focus group				
Syrian refugees	9	7	17	2	4	6	2	43
Lebanese dwellers	10		10	2	6	5	1	31
Elected officials	1		1		2	2		6
Government / local authority	1				1	1		3
NGOs	3	1	4		3	2		13
Palestinian refugees from Lebanon		9						9
	24	17	32		16	16		
					Total interviews within case study sites			73
					Total interviews			105

Figure 4-16: Number of interviews undertaken between 2014 and 2018

Photography and videography

“Photography is considered a means to simultaneously document social conditions and to bear witness to them, in order to instigate actions to counter misery”¹⁵⁹ (Raoulx, 2004, p. 125). Doing fieldwork in geography necessitates and even invites the use of multiple methods and therefore any tool that may add to the ethnographic understanding of a society must be exploited to further that knowledge. “Geography as a discipline would benefit greatly from expanding the researcher’s toolset to include the consistent use of digital video, especially in ethnographic contexts” argued Bradley Garrett in 2011. He explains:

video is capable of offering an alternative form of representation, something inherently different in terms of both production and consumption from text, photographs, performance, aural media, etc. (Witmore, 2005). The process of making video as part of our research process is [...] both of scholarly value and useful for expanding interest in geographic research to wider audiences (Garrett, 2011).

However, visual representations as tools are neither new nor innovative for ethnography. In fact the first ethnographic film by French physicist Félix-Louis Regnault dates back to the 1880s. He used it to study cross-cultural phenomena through film, and “argued for the formation of anthropological film archives as early as 1912” (Harper, 2000). Today and with the large access we have to high quality digital media, it seems evident that still photography and videos alike should find their way into scientific methodology. I used photos and videos throughout my observation phases and less during interviews. Although I felt that as a method they could be interesting, I could not deny the fact that the moment I proposed using a camera to film and more intensely the moment it rolled, there was a new filter and participants were conscious of the fact they were being filmed (much more so than with a voice recorder, and even that was sometimes undesired by the participants). With time and experience I was able to know at what point a participant would be more inclined to accept being filmed, and I would not propose it unless I felt a certain value for its later use. For “a video is ‘ethnographic’ when its viewer(s) judge that it represents information of ethnographic interest” (Pink, 2007, p. 79). Another challenge was the fear of normalising or beautifying marginality and poverty. Instinctively I wanted to take “nice” photos and videos. When possible I waited for the right light, I took several pictures of a situation or place, thought of the cadre of the photo etc. At the same time my photos were meant to provide a certain ethnographic sense and their technical beauty was less relevant. Especially

¹⁵⁹ Original citation: “La photographie est désormais considérée comme un moyen à la fois de documenter les conditions sociales et d’en témoigner, afin de susciter des actions contre la misère”

when filming commented walks, I had trouble keeping the camera fixed. At first it frustrated me and I stopped my interviewee or asked them to walk slower for example, but I felt I started to lose the spontaneity of the situation and decided to prioritise the rhythm of the walk over the quality of the video. It is true that “Filming marginality leads to a difficult position. The conditions of directing and articulating could lead to rendering misery exotic, to double social distance with the condition of marginality, in a similar manner to colonial imagery¹⁶⁰” (Raoulx, 2004, p. 134).

An ethnographic film of an interview or a person works differently, almost moving backwards, from a written text and may therefore offer different but complementary knowledge. In that it is largely more accessible, especially to a wide public, its wager is to “stage a character filmed in its present reality, with the desire that the viewer first understands its singularity and eventually projects him or herself into it, identifies with it and / or distinguishes him or herself from it”¹⁶¹ (Friedmann, 2006, p. 18). Indeed, recently social scientists have used this method to “give a voice to the accounts mentioned in the [research]”¹⁶² (Buire, 2010, p. 11), and to “aspire to show that the city - from the intimacy of the home to the street - is not a fixed system”¹⁶³ (Dahdah, 2015, p. 82).

I experimented in ethnographic filmmaking within the “Research and film in Human Sciences”¹⁶⁴ program in 2016. My colleagues and I focused on the gestures and interactions of

¹⁶⁰ Original citation: “*Photographier la marginalité, toutefois, conduit à un positionnement difficile. Les conditions de réalisation et d'énonciation peuvent mener à exotiser la misère, à redoubler la distance sociale avec la condition de marginalité, selon un procédé similaire à l'imagerie coloniale*”.

¹⁶¹ Original extended citation: “*La sociologie textuelle des recherches écrites procède de façon symétrique ; elle s'efforce, par la construction que Max Weber appelle l'« idéal-type », de concevoir une abstraction rationnelle, irréaliste, sans existence empirique, et donc idéale, qui va permettre de comprendre non seulement les aspects essentiels d'un phénomène social singulier mais aussi en quoi il se distingue d'autres phénomènes sociaux ressemblants, mais antérieurs ou ultérieurs, et donc typiques. Le pari documentaire va à rebrousse-poil, il met en scène le personnage pris dans le réel, avec le désir que le spectateur en comprenne d'abord la singularité puis éventuellement se projette en lui, s'y identifie et/ou s'en distingue*” (Friedmann, 2006).

¹⁶² Original citation: “*Mais au delà de la description factuelle, la vidéo permet de donner une voix aux discours évoqués dans l'article. Après avoir suggéré comment lesquels les chercheurs contribuent à la construction des discours identitaires, je voulais redonner la parole à un individu particulier. Ce qui en ressort est surtout la remarquable adéquation entre les fils d'explication proposés par Eugene pour décrire son itinéraire et les grands récits historiques construits scientifiquement*” (Buire, 2010 p.11).

¹⁶³ Original citation: “*l'analyse de l'image peut être à la fois celle du sujet qui est filmé et celle de l'environnement géographique dans lequel se déroule l'action, nous permettant d'étudier les acteurs, leurs pratiques et les temporalités, l'espace support et enjeu de l'action. À cet égard, le film peut être une « méthode alternative pour produire de l'information géographique » [BROWAEYS 1999 cité par SIMOES 2012 : 2] pour une géographie qui aspire à montrer que la ville – depuis l'intimité du logement jusqu'à la rue –, n'est pas un système figé*” (Dahdah, 2015 p.82).

¹⁶⁴ Information on the the research workshop. “*Film et Recherche en Sciences Humaines*” (FRESH) propose de travailler les résonances entre cinéma documentaire - et plus globalement des approches documentaires : photographie, notamment- et recherche en sciences sociales, dans une optique transdisciplinaire. Ce programme s'appuie sur un « triangle » entre la Maison de la Recherche en Sciences Humaines (MRSH) de l'Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme en Bretagne (MSHB, Rennes) et des professionnels de l'image (documentaristes). <http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/fresh>

illegal migrants in France when managing mundane but necessary logistics. In a video ethnographic vignette, we shared excerpts of the routine of migrants in squats in northern Europe, and offered viewers a window to their daily struggles, their resilience and resourcefulness but also their hardship amid the stresses of an uncertain future¹⁶⁵. The program was imagined in the “interest of develop[ing] the documentary film as a fully-fledged method of research” as it “involves recognizing the role of subjectivity - the gaze - in the construction of awareness, a stage which precedes objectivation” (Dickason & Raoulx, 2007, p. 205). This experience prepared me for some of the practical aspects of using video in the field.

Ultimately, I decided on using what I call “snippets” of the videos I recorded. In very short time-frames, the videos will portray one or two of the elements that I speak of in this thesis; their value will mostly be in representing a holistic vision of the field. Sometimes attention will be on the noise level, other times on the infrastructure, or on a specific event or comment from one of my interviewees who accepted to be filmed.

Commented walks

This method is one I particularly enjoyed during the fieldwork. It is the time my interviewees were most at ease, and the discussions were most organic. “Commented walks obviously draw on the reflexive capacity of human actors and on their ability to understand, describe and interpret the situations in which they find themselves” (Thibaud, 2013, p. 15). Rather than answer my questions generally in a closed space, commented walks placed my interviewees in the lead - which created a different feel and pace to the discussions. What was also interesting for me, beyond their explanations on how they use the space, their mobility patterns, etc. was to notice how empowered, or not, they were in certain parts. There were clear differences, for example, between the commented walks I took with residents and with refugees on the same routes, in their mannerisms, in the elements they pointed out, in the rhythm of their walk.

While on their own “the results obtained from commented walks raise the question of whether such naturalistic observation is actually possible” (Thibaud, 2013, p. 16), because of the technical difficulties they incur (noise, movement, blur etc) I believe they are effective as a complement to a set of observation and data collection tools, and have added value to my understanding of the spaces where I worked.

In general, I did not ask for, or use, any security clearances during my walks (or

¹⁶⁵ <http://www.unicaen.fr/recherche/mrsh/forge/4415>

observation). During one of my first interviews in Bourj Hammoud which happened to be with the Vice President of the municipality, he insisted on the secure nature of the area in 2015, but he also insisted I be accompanied by a member of the municipality security forces at all times while doing fieldwork, and asked me to fill out an official request for approval to take photographs, detailing my research (Figure 4-17). When I asked him about the need for security he suggested that as a female with a camera, I risked being stopped and interrogated about my presence “especially in certain streets” (*Georges Krikorian, Vice President of Bourj Hammoud Municipality, personal interview, 2015*). In subsequent field visits I did not abide by the recommendations of the municipality, not wanting the presence of a security officer with me for the purposes of the research. I was often stopped and asked about my presence (by Lebanese dwellers, not once by someone from another nationality), and especially about my camera, and during commented walks I would be warned several times to hide my camera in certain streets, and not to take photos of certain elements, such as mosques¹⁶⁶. It seemed as though the simple act of taking a photograph of a building or a street could create tension. At the same time, I was almost never denied an interview and my questions were always answered. In fact, those who did stop me to ask about my camera allowed me some of my most accessible, and welcome, informal chats.




Figure 4-17: Permission to take photos

(left) Request of permission to photograph in El-Nab’a (right) Approval of request. Source: Personal field documents. Date: 2015.

Graffiti as social expression

In 1976, Gonos, Mulkren and Poushinsky argued that graffiti artists may use their writings to manifest content which is otherwise restricted or taboo within their social life, and that it is the

¹⁶⁶ I had the same experience in Tebbeneh and Bourj el-Barajneh, where I was often stopped and asked about what I was doing, and often requested not to photograph in certain streets.

5. Submitting to the personal aspects of field investigation

It is important for me to further underline some elements related to the context within which I undertook this research project in 2014. Pierre Bourdieu has stated:

I believe that the researcher can and must mobilize his experience, that is, his past, in all his acts of research. But he is entitled to do so only on condition that he submits all these returns of the past to rigorous scientific examination. For what has to be questioned is not only this reactivated past but one's entire relation to this past which, when it acts outside of the controls of consciousness, may be the source of a systematic distortion of evocation and thus of the memories evoked. Only a genuine socio-analysis of this relation, profoundly obscure to itself, can enable us to achieve the kind of reconciliation of the researcher with himself, and his social properties, that a liberating anamnesis produces¹⁶⁷ (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 291).

I was born in Paris to a Palestinian mother and a Syrian father, and spent most of my life in Lebanon. I was seven years old when my family moved indefinitely to *Bayrut el Shar'iyyeh* (East Beirut) in Lebanon. It was 1985, at the heart of the Civil War. Before school started I clearly remember my mother's repeated warnings about my pronunciation: "When you are in school, you say *beib* not *bab* (different pronunciations of the word: door); you say *banadoura* not *bandora* (different pronunciations of the word: tomato)¹⁶⁸. Don't let anyone know you're Palestinian, and don't say you're Syrian either - speak in English whenever you can." I did not understand why at the time, but I grew up afraid anyone would find out what I then considered a secret. Eventually my family gained citizenship as part of the 1994 naturalisation decree¹⁶⁹. When I graduated as an architect in Lebanon, I was shocked and saddened that actually, I was not allowed to be a syndicated architect in my country, as I had not been an official Lebanese citizen for ten years... Several such anecdotes remain very present in my mind. Perhaps the following one will in a small way reflect some Lebanese community perceptions of Syrians, as they became clearer to me in my adulthood, and even more precise during this research. Almost two decades after my mother's accent and pronunciation lessons, an incident brought nationality and identity to the

¹⁶⁷ Original citation: "*je crois profondément que le chercheur peut et doit mobiliser son expérience, c'est-à-dire ce passé, dans tous ses actes de recherche. Mais qu'il n'est en droit de le faire qu'à condition de soumettre tous ces retours du passé à un examen critique rigoureux. Ce qu'il s'agit de mettre à la question, en effet, ce n'est pas seulement le passé réactivé, mais tout le rapport à ce passé qui, lorsqu'il agit inconsciemment, peut être au principe d'une distorsion systématique de l'évocation et, par là, des souvenirs évoqués. Seule une véritable socioanalyse de ce rapport, profondément obscur à lui-même, peut permettre d'accéder à cette sorte de réconciliation du chercheur avec lui-même, et avec ses propriétés sociales, que produit une anamnèse libératrice*" (Bourdieu, 2003)

¹⁶⁸ The pronunciation of the word 'tomato' specifically is very symbolic. It is widely told that at Phalangist checkpoints in Beirut during the early years of the war, people were asked to name the tomato and those who named it with a Palestinian accent were immediately executed. (Friedman, 2017; Dean, 2016; de Bréadún, 2006; Sirhan, 2014)

¹⁶⁹ See Encadré

forefront of my psyche. A colleague/friend whom I had been working with for years literally cried when she found out, during casual conversation, that I was of immediate Syrian descent. Her initial reaction was of satirical disbelief (echoed by mine) and shock; she thought she was being pranked. When eventually she understood that this was a fact, she started apologizing profusely - “for the mockery” she said, for the stereotyping, and for the hatred she had shown to Syrians. Her reaction was so emotional and organic that it profoundly touched me. She was the only one in our team of around fifteen people who did not know about my descent. At that time, I had not made efforts to either hide the fact or talk about it openly, the others just knew... We had a long discussion after that, in which she explained to me where her hatred for Syrians came from, it had stemmed from the years of the war, when her village was occupied by the Syrian army. Some time later, she said that the incident had changed her. While it did touch me, the incident did not have the same effect for me. I was already used to the idea of difference, identity, meeting the unknown other... After all, I grew up a non-Maronite Christian, Palestino-Syrian in the ultra-Maronite Mount Lebanon of the 1980s¹⁷⁰. Unlike the families of most of my classmates at the time, my parents opted to move me to my school’s branch in West-Beirut soon after the civil war ended. It was with apprehension that I met Lebanese Muslims for the first time in 1992 as I discovered a very different kind of city in the country I called home.¹⁷¹

I am curious about some of the most basic and simple questions about how dwellers are experiencing the cities in Lebanon... how they “go about meeting the exigencies of their everyday lives [...] and how ultimately they make sense of their social worlds” (Anderson, 2009). But as Kirin Narayan points out, every researcher has “threads of a culturally tangled identity to demonstrate that a person may have many strands of identification available, strands that may be tugged into the open or stuffed out of sight” (Narayan, 1993). Having a mixed background she argues “marks one as inauthentic for the label of “native” (Narayan, 1993). In reality I struggle with defining myself as a local or native researcher. My being Lebanese is highlighted by the diversity of my immediate descent and my cultural and educational backgrounds, and complemented by my early years in the UAE and my higher study experience in England.

My network further to many years of work experience in civil society circles have allowed me relatively quick and broad access to the different actors in my field. My fluent knowledge of

¹⁷⁰ In these areas especially during the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinians and Syrians, being synonymous with Arabs and Muslims were undesired dwellers; I have never resided in Syria or Palestine and my knowledge of both countries stems mainly from family stories and touristic visits.

¹⁷¹ On the first day of school in West Beirut, my physics professor said: “the three kids from *Ain Aar*, stand up”. (*Ain Aar* was the town where the branch in East Beirut was located). This reflected how exotic the three of us were, some of the first who had crossed the east-west line. The school bus driver who was from West Beirut agitatedly exclaimed on the way back to my house: “do you live on the moon?”, it was the first time he had been in my area, at 400m above sea level

the language and culture, with the accent nuances that come more or less naturally to me in the different settings have allowed me to build rapport relatively quickly with people in place. Moreover, “being an Arab woman in the field can constitute a vantage point with the potential to enable a more nuanced, less gender-biased and less Western-centric take not just on women’s worlds but on social realities of the Arab region more generally” (Kanafani & Sawaf, 2017). At the same time, during most of my fieldwork I have not been able to ignore the ways in which my social background and class has allowed me to bypass many of the social inequalities I witnessed during my fieldwork (Narayan, 1993). In that sense I have felt a clear dichotomy in my nativeness.

I approached my field with the belief that by asking the simple questions, the deeper issues would spontaneously emerge. To have enough first hand field material and distanced analysis in order to reflect on how people are living their everyday lives in an exceedingly complex urban and socio-political context, and how this manifests in urban life. My approach is essentially qualitative, inspired by urban ethnography methods.

The fieldwork and consequent reflections which I draw upon for this dissertation are at the core of the work, and the essential steps that have led to analysing the different issues and perhaps answering some of the questions. For “to understand the reality of a localised social group in its globality and complexity, social fieldwork is necessary”¹⁷² (Kayser, 1978, p. 11). I have used urban ethnography methods as “defined to include those studies which employ participant observation and intensive qualitative interviewing 'to convey the inner life and texture of the diverse social enclaves and personal circumstances of urban societies’” (Jackson, 1985). Within it I seek to understand a snapshot (both temporal and spatial) of the urban life of three different neighbourhoods in cities in Lebanon, within the larger social and historical context, and continuum of the cohabitation of different populations. As such, this research is an attempt to apply interdisciplinary and cross scale lenses at different intervals in order to achieve this understanding.

Privileging the “central place of social interaction in ethnographic fieldwork” (Emerson, 2009), I spent time observing and discussing instances of social interaction that I witnessed. ‘How’ the actors interacted, the spatial dimensions of this interaction, and also ‘when’ and importantly ‘why’. In many ways, the subject is national and touches every community. As such, even upon arriving at the airport, and taking the first taxi, my fieldwork began. Every driver had a story and a point of view and these bits and pieces have also fed into my understanding. In this

¹⁷² Original citation: "... de découvrir dans sa complexité et sa globalité la réalité d'un sous-système social localisé? Dans ce cas, c'est bien de l'enquête qu'il s'agit."

way I look at my field trips as “a human experience before anything, made of encounters” (Vivet, 2012, p. 99). Indeed, “the ethnographer’s ‘states of being’, including the ‘emotions, reactions, and experiences that are consistently evoked’ in her (Davies & Spencer, 2010 p:1), are not only enabling and conducive to the process of learning fieldwork, but they are also ultimately amenable to ethnographic knowledge making.” (Kanafani & Sawaf, 2017).

Encadré 4-4: Conversations with taxi and *servees* drivers

Over the course of four years of field trips I used taxis and *servees* as my preferred method of transportation within the cities when doing field work. It wasn't difficult to start up a conversation with the driver about the situation in Lebanon and specifically the refugees. Although a few times I immediately knew the chat would be futile and promptly ended the discussion, I found that many times the drivers would shed an interesting light on the situation, and would suggest where or whom I should consider interviewing. I have over 24 chats noted in my field journals, some too quickly interrupted when a new client hopped in the car and some redundant or quite superficial. Specifically, seven of these interviews have found their way into my study and are included in my analyses.

Chapter 4.

Case studies in context

251 are the localities in Lebanon where 67 percent of the poorest Lebanese live and where 87 percent of Syrian refugees are hosted. In Lebanon, the same areas that are home to the most impoverished Lebanese are hosting the vast majority of Syrian refugees. 87 percent of Syrian refugees and 67 percent of poorest Lebanese are living in the 251 most vulnerable cadasters of the country. These areas characterize the geography of poverty in Lebanon, and were already marked by poverty, youth unemployment, and high demand for basic services prior to the crisis. The Syrian crisis has put more strains on these issues especially that public institutions have limited capacities to deal with the vulnerabilities of Lebanese and Syrian communities alike. For instance, municipalities which are the first responders, main service providers, and guardians of security in these disadvantaged areas were already overburdened before the crisis and are still struggling to deal with the situation. (Yassin, 2012, p. 41)

1 The three case study sites: justification and characteristics

“Social fieldwork [is] inevitably global or encompassing, although applied to a fraction, spatialised or otherwise determined, of social structure¹⁷³” (Kayser, 1978, p. 11). One of the founding steps of a research study is choosing sites for fieldwork. Lebanon is at least 80 percent urban¹⁷⁴ with the largest populations and population densities in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli consecutively. In 2008 the UNDP reported that the poverty ratio¹⁷⁵ reaches 28.5 percent (accounting for about one million Lebanese) including 8 percent extreme poverty¹⁷⁶ (Laithy et al., 2008). The settlement of over a million refugees between 2011 and 2015 in the country has been predominantly urban. In fact only thirty percent of the refugees stay in informal settlements in the Bekaa and in the North. Their trajectories were most often, at least in the beginning of the influx, linked to pre-existing family and community networks within Lebanon. The majority of the Syrian refugees are of the Sunni confession. Figure 5-1 reflects the predominant presence of the Lebanese Sunni communities in Beirut and its suburbs, and in the North governorate. Moreover, the UNDP report of 2008 also showed that “the North has the lowest per capita expenditure, it exhibits the highest inequality compared to that in other governorates” (Laithy et al., 2008).

I focused on the poor suburbs of Beirut and the North as sites that could reflect the different expressions of the social transformation provoked by this massive migration movement. I looked for neighbourhoods which were traditionally diverse - both socially and in terms of religious affiliation - and accessible for refugees due mainly to low rent rates. Upon preliminary investigation with key informants in those two cities, I started an observation phase in the neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh and el-Nab’a. In addition, the specificity of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon as hosts to Syrian refugees needed to be addressed. The proximity of Bourj el-Barajneh with Beirut, in addition to its density made it an interesting place to examine.

¹⁷³ Original citation: “L’enquête sociale, [est] nécessairement globale ou globalisante, quoique appliqué à une fraction, spatialisée ou autrement déterminée, de la formation sociale.” (Kayser, 1978 p.11)

¹⁷⁴ While there is no official definition of the term urban in Lebanon, urbanists and the UN-Habitat concur that over 80 percent of the population in Lebanon live in urban areas, with some suggesting that Lebanon may be considered 100 percent urban (Fawaz, 2017)

¹⁷⁵ Between \$ 2.4 and \$ 4 per capita per day. (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008)

¹⁷⁶ Under \$ 2.4 per capita per day.” (Laithy, Abu Ismael, & Hamdan, 2008)




Figure 5-1: Distribution of registered Muslim electors in Lebanon

Electors do not necessarily reside where they vote, rather where their family roots are registered. Date: 2007, Source: Verdeil, É., Faour, G., & Velut, S. (2007). Atlas du Liban: Territoires et société.

1.1 Localising high refugee concentration areas

In January 2015, a program manager from the UN-Habitat gave me access to a datasheet on vulnerable cadasters they had just elaborated. In partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and 53 Unions of Municipalities they assembled data from over 900 cadasters in the country (Figure 5-2). This data included three important elements: the estimated Lebanese population in 2004, the vulnerable Lebanese population living under \$ 4 (€3) per day, and the number of refugees as per the UNHCR registration in October 2014. Comparing these three statistics allowed the organisations to do two things, the first was to identify 242¹⁷⁷ of what they referred to as “most vulnerable localities¹⁷⁸”. These localities had a significant number of Syrian refugees and also a significant number of vulnerable Lebanese. The second enabled them to produce a ranking of UOMs by vulnerability from 1 to 53. The main objective of this datasheet was to prioritize the areas most in need for humanitarian intervention.




Figure 5-2: Overview of the statistics on vulnerability developed by UN-Habitat
 Overview of the statistics developed by UN-Habitat to identify the 242 most vulnerable localities in 2014. Source: UN-Habitat working data sheet, 2015.

For me the interest in this datasheet was the map in Figure 5-3 which as a representation

¹⁷⁷ This number is based on UN-Habitat statistics which are slightly different from the UNDP estimates that mention 251

¹⁷⁸ A locality as defined by the UN-Habitat is an area within a municipality and may include several neighbourhoods. The municipality is in turn part of a Union of Municipalities (UoM). Sometimes the locality is a municipality. For example, while the locality Bourj Hammoud (which includes El-Nab'a) is also a municipality, Trablus el Tebbeneh (which includes Beb el Tebbeneh) is not a municipality.

shows the most vulnerable localities. While these are present all over the country, Mount Lebanon has the least number of vulnerable localities or cadastres. Instead those are more heavily concentrated around the major cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, and the border areas in the Bekaa.




Figure 5-3: Vulnerable Cadasters in Lebanon

Based on the 2004 Multi-Deprivation Index from CAS, UNDP and MoSA, 2002 CDR data on the Lebanese population, and UNHCR and UNRWA figures on Syrian refugees (2014), Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (2011), and Palestinian refugees from Syria (2014). Source: Atallah, S., & Mahdi, D.. Law and Politics of “Safe Zones” and Forced Return to Syria: Refugee Politics in Lebanon (Policy Paper) (p. 15). Beirut Date: October 2017

The distribution of the most vulnerable cadaster matches to a large extent that of the Syrian refugees, the higher concentrations of refugees are frequently seen in poorer neighbourhoods. The datasheet reports that the most vulnerable Union of Municipalities is the Fayhaa in the North, and includes the Tebbeneh neighbourhood, a case study in this dissertation. In Fayhaa, there were 71,145 registered refugees, making up 22 percent of the Lebanese population (close to 259,000), of which 148,000 lived under the poverty line Table 1 : Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities). The UoM also included ten out of the 242 most vulnerable localities. In these ten localities the datasheet reports a population (all nationalities) of 270,900 -

making up 82 percent of the total population (all nationalities) in the UoM. These details are listed for the 20 most vulnerable UoMs, and they include the neighbourhoods studied in this thesis as follows: rank 1 (UoM Fayhaa includes Tebbeneh neighbourhood), rank 8 (UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya includes the Bourj el-Barajneh camp) and rank 13 (UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat includes the el Nab'a neighbourhood)¹⁷⁹.

Table 1 : Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities

Union of Municipalities	Cadaster	Governorate	# of 242 localities	Lebanese Population: 2004	Lebanese-4\$	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Total population Leb+Syr	Total population in 242 localities	Percentage Syrian / total	Percentage Leb < 4\$ / Leb tot	Population in 242 localities / total population	Rank total
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	10	258992	148620	71145	330137	270900	22%	57%	82%	1
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat	Zahle	Bekaa	5	42931	9394	82081	125012	120601	66%	22%	96%	2
UoM Caza Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	8	77460	16950	57424	134884	108438	43%	22%	80%	3
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	4	268710	65834	59488	322198	322198	17%	25%	100%	4
UoM El Menieh	Minieh-Danieh	North	3	32791	20652	25248	58039	55592	44%	63%	96%	5
UoM Baalbeck	Baalbek	Bekaa	4	67889	22091	31237	99126	90742	32%	35%	92%	6
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	Akkar	North	5	58247	36683	22040	80287	72854	27%	63%	91%	7
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	4	197263	48330	31242	228505	228505	14%	25%	100%	8
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El Chamali	Chauf	Mount Lebanon	8	61454	13991	30488	91942	69448	33%	23%	76%	9
UoM El Sahel	West Bekaa	Bekaa	7	26274	7868	48211	74485	66832	65%	30%	90%	10
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	17	199202	72525	31618	280820	166296	14%	36%	72%	11
UoM El Daneih	Minieh-Danieh	North	7	49668	31278	18289	67957	40337	27%	63%	59%	12
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	11	388620	49445	50201	438821	322612	11%	11%	74%	13
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	9	170310	77557	28564	198874	120439	14%	46%	61%	14
UoM El Chafat	Akkar	North	3	24580	15480	13947	38527	26985	36%	63%	70%	15
UoM Sahil El Zahrani	Saïda	South	8	64139	29208	16605	80745	55814	21%	46%	69%	16
UoM El Bouhayra	West Bekaa	Bekaa	6	37283	11167	17386	54669	41258	32%	30%	75%	17
UoM Gharbi Baalbeck	Baalbek	Bekaa	8	38097	12395	13499	51596	49281	26%	33%	96%	18
UoM Charq Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	5	31518	6897	24034	55552	45542	43%	22%	82%	19
UoM El Chqif	Nabatiye	Nabatiye	9	109298	13040	25990	135288	76144	19%	12%	56%	20

Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities as ranked by UN-Habitat. Source: Table derived from UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014

The datasheet also includes population numbers for the 242 most vulnerable localities as defined by the UN-Habitat. To situate the three case study neighbourhoods in this dissertation I sorted the data from largest to smallest in three consecutive columns. First I sorted in terms of Lebanese population living under poverty line (Table 2), then in terms of estimated Lebanese population in 2004 (Table 3), then in terms of Syrian refugees as per the October 2014 statistics (Table 4). The three neighbourhoods are within the top 30 most vulnerable localities in each of these rankings.

¹⁷⁹ Although the statistics of the camp itself are not included in the population counts and continue to be estimations with the UNRWA and the UNHCR

Table 2: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by Lebanese living in poverty

Union of Municipalities	Cadaster	Governorate	Locality	# 242 Localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Lebanes e< 4\$
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Chiyah	1	201214	48202	49297
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous Et-Tell	1	57625	3603	32685
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous El-Qobbe	1	55817	10094	31659
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Haddadine		52252	1719	29637
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Bourj El-Brajneh	1	115476	23291	28292
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	Saïda Dekerman		60434	3	27522
UoM El Fayhaa	Minieh-Danieh	North	Beddaoui	1	27460	16761	17294
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	Sour	1	47479	8971	17287
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	Akkar	North	Mhammaret	1	26750	8862	16847
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Haret Hraik	1	65240	4369	15984
UoM Baalbeck	Baalbek	Bekaa	Baalbek	1	48664	22433	15835
UoM El Menieh	Minieh-Danieh	North	Minie	1	21320	17715	13427
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Choueifat El-Aamrousiyat		53522	18851	12187
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous et Tabbaneh	1	19931	6418	11305
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	Miyeh Miyeh	1	23184	2337	10558
UoM El Hermel	Hermel	Bekaa	Hermel	1	30732	5847	10000
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Mina Jardin	1	15574	4242	8834
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	Bourj Hammoud	1	75866	17591	8482
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	Borj Ech-Chemali	1	22311	2741	8123
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	Akkar	North	Bebnine	1	12787	5322	8053
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Baabda	1	30349	2029	7436

Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “Number of Lebanese living under 3€/day”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014

Table 3: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by number of Lebanese population in 2004

Union of Municipalities	Cadaster	Governorate	Locality	# 242 Localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Lebanes e< 4\$
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Chiyah	1	201214	48202	49297
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Bourj El-Brajneh	1	115476	23291	28292
	Beirut	Beirut	Mazraa		113516	12090	6641
	Beirut	Beirut	Msaïb – fonci hzre		90437	3442	5291
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	Bourj Hammoud	1	75866	17591	8482
	Beirut	Beirut	Achrafieh fonci hzre		68514	2972	4008
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	Baouchriyeh	1	65371	7108	7308
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Haret Hraik	1	65240	4369	15984
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	Saïda Dekerman		60434	3	27522
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous Et-Tell	1	57625	3603	32685
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous El-Qobbe	1	55817	10094	31659
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Choueifat El-Aamrousiyat		53522	18851	12187
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Haddadine		52252	1719	29637
UoM Baalbeck	Baalbek	Bekaa	Baalbek	1	48664	22433	15835
	Beirut	Beirut	Ras Beyrouth fonci hzre		48189	2150	2819
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	Sour	1	47479	8971	17287
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	Sinn El-Fil	1	34751	3400	3885
	Beirut	Beirut			33260	35	1946
UoM El Hermel	Hermel	Bekaa	Hermel	1	30732	5847	10000
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Baabda	1	30349	2029	7436
UoM El Fayhaa	Minieh-Danieh	North	Beddaoui	1	27460	16761	17294
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	Akkar	North	Mhammaret	1	26750	8862	16847
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Metn	Mount Lebanon	Dekouan	1	24240	3617	2710
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Hadath Beyrouth	1	24156	2575	5918
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	Miyeh Miyeh	1	23184	2337	10558
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	Borj Ech-Chemali	1	22311	2741	8123
UoM El Menieh	Minieh-Danieh	North	Minie	1	21320	17715	13427
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Choueifat El-Quobb		20973	5587	4776
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous et Tabbaneh	1	19931	6418	11305
UoM Kesrouane El Ftouh	Kasrouane	Mount Lebanon	Zouk Mkayel	1	18864	698	2875
UoM El Choïf	Nabatie	Nabatie	Nabatieh Et-Tahta	1	17503	3623	1990

Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “Lebanese population estimate of 2004”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014

Table 4: Most vulnerable Unions of Municipalities sorted by number of Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR in 2014

Union of Municipalities	Cadaster	Governorate	Locality	# 242 Localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Lebanese e< 4\$
UoM Sahil El Matn El Janoubi	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Chiyah	1	201214	48202	49297
	Baalbek	Bekaa	Aarsal		17105	41672	5566
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat	Zahle	Bekaa	Barr Elias	1	10620	33731	2324
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat	Zahle	Bekaa	Qabb Elias	1	11262	27532	2464
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Baabda	Mount Lebanon	Bourj El-Brajneh	1	115476	23291	28292
UoM Baalbeck	Baalbek	Bekaa	Baalbek	1	48664	22433	15835
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Chouaifat El-Aamrousiyat		53522	18851	12187
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous Et-Zeitoun	1	4902	18816	2780
UoM El Manieh	Minieh-Danieh	North	Minie	1	21320	17715	13427
UoM El Matn El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Matn	Mount Lebanon	Bourj Hammoud	1	75866	17591	8482
UoM El Fayhaa	Minieh-Danieh	North	Baddaoul	1	27460	16751	17294
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat	Zahle	Bekaa	Majdel Aanjar	1	7912	16298	1731
UoM Caza Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	Saadnayel	1	7108	15891	1555
	Akkar	North	Aamayr		5865	15508	3694
UoM Caza Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	Zahle El-Midana	1	4160	14786	910
UoM El Sahel	West Bekaa	Bekaa	Marj BG	1	3299	14671	988
UoM Saïda El Zahrani	Saïda	South	Saïda El-Qadimeh	1	9028	14189	4111
UoM El Sahel	West Bekaa	Bekaa	Ghazze	1	4487	13642	1344
	Beirut	Beirut	Maara		113515	12090	6641
UoM El Chafat	Akkar	North	Halba	1	5833	11067	3674
UoM Caza Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	Taalbays	1	13334	10862	2917
	Baalbek	Bekaa	Qaa Baalbek		3372	10445	1097
UoM Charq Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	Kfarzabad	1	4121	10269	902
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous El-Qobba	1	55817	10094	31659
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Aaramoun Aaley		5846	9434	1331
UoM Caza Sour	Sour	South	Sour	1	47479	8971	17287
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	Akkar	North	Mhammarat	1	26750	8862	16847
UoM El Bouhayra	West Bekaa	Bekaa	Joubb Jannine	1	5652	7257	1693
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El Chamali	Chouf	Mount Lebanon	Barja	1	11756	7516	2677
UoM El Daneih	Minieh-Danieh	North	Sir Ed-Damniyeh	1	4228	7402	2663
	Beirut	Beirut	Bachoura		15896	7321	930
UoM El Matn El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	El Matn	Mount Lebanon	Baouchriyeh	1	65371	7108	7308
UoM Charq Zahleh	Zahle	Bekaa	Riyaq	1	3892	6685	852
	Baalbek	Bekaa	Brital		9682	6546	3151
UoM El Fayhaa	Tripoli	North	Trablous et Tabbaneh	1	19931	6418	11305
	Aley	Mount Lebanon	Aaley		16610	6264	3782
	Chouf	Mount Lebanon	Nsam		7436	5966	1693

Most vulnerable localities sorted from largest to smallest by “number of Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR in 2014”. Source: Tables adapted from a UN-Habitat Data Sheet, Annex X. Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics (Data spreadsheet). Beirut: UN-Habitat Date: October 2014

1.2 The neighbourhood of Tebbeneh, in the periphery of Tripoli



Figure 5-4: The position of Tebbeneh in the periphery of Tripoli.

Google Maps, 2019

Tebbeneh¹⁸⁰ is an area formed of several neighbourhoods in Tripoli (Figure 5-4: The position of Tebbeneh in the periphery of Tripoli.), the capital of the North governorate and the second largest city in Lebanon. Tebbeneh is widely known to be one of the poorest areas in Lebanon. It has a complex history of conflict between its main resident Sunni religious groups and the neighbouring 'alawis in Jabal Mohsen and the area has seen armed clashes as recently as 2015. "The two neighbourhoods have seen a series of tit-for-tat episodes of attacks and violence, springing from the large-scale massacre carried out by the Syrian regime in Tebbeneh in 1986. The uprising and war in Syria, and Hezbollah's fighting alongside the 'Alawi Syrian regime, gave a big push to the renewal of sectarian tension and clashes between the two neighbourhoods, to the point where suicide attacks began to be used"¹⁸¹ (Abou Mrad, Abou Moussa, Micocci, Moawad, & Samaha, 2015).

The city of Tripoli underwent its major population growth in the 1950s. Sunnis came to the city (mainly to Tebbeneh and the souks) from the neighbouring rural areas that are also closer to Syria, such as Akkar. Segregation started at that time with the wealthier families moving out of the historic centers as the rural populations settled in the Tebbeneh area. With the Civil War between 1975 and 1990 came further segregation and the rise of illegal construction throughout the city. (Maguire et al., 2016). Its major violent clashes started in the 1980s with the rise of extremism and profound religious group conflict, namely between the Sunnites and the 'Alawis of the area¹⁸². Tripoli has often been referred to as a microcosm of the Syrian War (Meloni, 2013; Strickland, 2015; Vohra, 2017; Workman, 2013). The tellingly named Syria Street divides Tebbeneh from Jabal Mohsen and is the scene of violent fighting between the Alawis and the Sunnis. (Figure 5-7).

In 2018 the UN-Habitat reported the Tebbeneh area to be 0.42 square kilometers (Maguire, Schinder, Karageozian, & Bergby, 2018). The borders shown in their report do not coincide with the administrative borders in their Tripoli City profile report of 2016 (Maguire et al., 2016). This is because the methodology used in the former study called for residents to locally

¹⁸⁰ Commonly referred to as Tebbeneh or Beb el-Tebbeneh, the latter being one of several neighbourhoods in the wider Tebbeneh area such as Dahr el Moghr, Soueika, and others (Map 4.9)

¹⁸¹ http://www.lb.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/CrisisPreventionRecovery/Publications/Tripoli_percent20Eng_percent20approved_percent20for_percent20web.pdf

¹⁸² In fact, the *Sunni*-*'Alawi* conflict can be traced to Syrian geopolitics. There, the *'Alawi* minority had been in control of the country and its majority *Sunni* population since 1970 when Hafez al-Assad took over the presidency in a *coup d'état*. The peaceful demonstrations in Syria in 2011 which led to nationwide conflict started in the *Sunni* city of *Dar'a*.

draw their own neighbourhood borders (Figure 5-5). The neighbourhoods not included in the Tebbeneh area borders in the report are some of the most informal, such as Dahr el-Mogher and Souaika (Figure 5-6). Statistics of the UN-Habitat for the Tebbeneh are only used indicatively for the purposes of this research. With eighty seven percent deprivation (Nehmeh, 2015, p. 13), the area's population comprises mainly of Sunni Muslims. Non-Lebanese residents are estimated at a minimum of seventeen percent, of whom seventy percent arrived between 2011 and 2014 (Nehmeh, 2015). This suggests that close to twenty percent of the population in the area in 2018 are Syrian refugees.

Socio Political characteristics

On the national level and in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik al-Hariri in 2005 Lebanese political parties were clearly divided into two camps. The March 8 coalition, formed of pro-Syrian regime parties (including the Shiite Hezbollah); and March 14, formed of the rest of the political parties, against the Syrian regime (including the Sunni Future Movement). In Tripoli in general, and in Tebbeneh / Jabal Mohsen specifically, these political divides are clearly expressed in the city. In Figure 5-10 the army is being deployed in the area of Tebbeneh after violent clashes between Sunnites and 'Alawis in 2008.

The heaviest clashes took place in the northern city of Tripoli, where pro-government supporters in the Tebbeneh (sic) neighbourhood exchanged rocket propelled grenades and heavy machine gun fire with opposition followers in Jabal Mohsen (sic) [...] The clashes were over by morning when the Lebanese army deployed on the streets between the warring factions. One woman was killed in the northern violence¹⁸³ [sic], bringing the toll across the country for the past five days to 38 – the worst sectarian fighting since Lebanon's 1975-1990 Civil War. (Mroue, 2008)

¹⁸³ Violence in the North of Lebanon (Tripoli, Tebbeneh)




Figure 5-5: Cadastres in Tripoli

Cadastres by municipality and urban area boundary; area 11 corresponds to Tebbeneh, including Jabal Mohsen. Source: (Maguire et al., 2016).




Figure 5-6: The different neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh

Neighbourhoods of Tebbeneh, Qobbé, and Jabal Mohsen Date: 2015, Source: (Abou Mrad et al., 2015).



Figure 5-7: Syria Street, Tripoli

Syria Street, Tebbeneh neighbourhood, Tripoli. The street separates the Sunni Lebanese of Beb el Tebbeneh from the Alawi Lebanese of Jabal Mohsen. The groups are divided on local political levels, and more importantly around their positions vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict. 2016




Figure 5-8: Location of Syria Street

Location of Syria Street; Conditions of buildings in the Beb el-Tebbeneh Date: 2015, Source(Abou Mrad et al., 2015)




Figure 5-9: Unclear boundaries of Tebbeneh

Comparison between administrative borders of Tebbeneh (right) and the neighbourhood borders as perceived by residents (left) Source: (Maguire et al., 2016, 2018).



Figure 5-10: Army in the streets of Tebbeneh, 2008

Army intervenes in Tebbeneh to stop community violent clashes Date: May 12, 2008, Source: Ramzi Haidar, Getty Images



Figure 5-11: Symbols of violence at a funeral, Tebbeneh 2013

Funeral of a sixteen year old boy in Tebbeneh Date: August 13, 2013, Source: (Meloni, 2013)



Figure 5-12: Armed street fights, Tebbeneh, 2013

Sunni fighter from Tebbeneh Date: August 13, 2013, Source: (Meloni, 2013)

“Tripoli is a city marred by neighbourhood conflicts dating to the Lebanese Civil War period and occasionally erupting since the 1980s. Political sectarian divides are deeply rooted in the history of the city.” (Maguire et al., 2016). Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11 show reactions in Tebbeneh after a bomb attack near a mosque in 2013. “Bombs hit two mosques in the northern city in Lebanon of Tripoli on Friday, killing at least 42 people and wounding hundreds, intensifying sectarian strife that has spilled over from the Civil War in neighbouring Syria” (Holmes & Siddiq, 2013). Like in 2008, the clashes were violent and in relation to the Syrian crisis, but also to internal Lebanese politics that place religious communities in direct conflict. The Sunni Tebbeneh neighbourhoods against the *‘alawi* Jabal Mohsen neighbourhoods in this case. Civilians in these areas have access to weapons and they use them in public at certain events or conflicts¹⁸⁴, the buildings and urban structures still show important signs of the war, and the army and official security personnel are a regular site in the streets. Efforts to bring communities together and diffuse tensions exist. Just off of Syria Street for example, in the Baal el Darawish neighbourhood, a community football field was inaugurated by the army in January 2017, to serve youth from Beb el-Tebbeneh and Jabal Mohsen (Figure 5-13). Such public spaces are rare due to the high density in the entire area.

¹⁸⁴ In fact, it is common to use guns in funerals and celebrations alike in Lebanon, as reflected in Image 4.5. The phenomenon is serious enough for the Permanent Peace Movement (A partner of UNDP), among other NGOs to have dedicated campaigns such as Eleguns warning against the dangers of stray bullets. For example, there were 90 deaths due to stray bullets in 2017. <http://www.eleguns.com/#the-cost>



Figure 5-13: Football field in Baal al-Darawish

Built in 2016 through funding from the Danish embassy, this field is meant to bring together youth from Jabal Mohsen and Beb el-Tebbeneh, in an effort to build unity



Figure 5-14: Nasr Street, Dahr el Moghr, Tebbeneh, February 2018

Being of a majority Sunni population, the initial reaction from the Lebanese hosts in Tebbeneh was one of extreme welcome to the Sunni majority Syrian refugees. In addition to their common religious group there were strong family ties between the communities, dating back to the Ottoman era. A year or so after their arrival though, reactions in the host community started to harden, and the excessively increased load on urban services along with increased competition on work opportunities changed the initial coherence between the refugees and their hosts.

1.3 The neighbourhood of El-Nab'a, Bourj Hammoud, in the periphery of Beirut



Figure 5-15: The position of Bourj el-Barajneh and El-Nab'a in the periphery of Beirut
Google Maps, 2019

Bourj Hammoud is an area formed of several neighbourhoods including El Nab'a (Mount Lebanon governorate), and is known for being home to migrant workers and refugees of all nationalities and ethnicities. In the peripheries of Beirut (Figure 5-16, Figure 5-17), the area has been known to house workers in the capital for decades. The word El-Nab'a literally translates to “source of water”, pointing to the agricultural history of the area. In fact less than one hundred years ago the Bourj Hammoud and its neighbourhood in general was an agricultural field (Dagher, 2015). Its rapid population growth was due to three major waves of displacements. The first was the Armenian refugee influx after 1915. This population was authorised to stay on the fields of Bourj Hammoud in tents after the Armenian genocide. Until today this community thrives in Bourj Hammoud and are the large majority of residents. Members of the local authorities are mainly Armenian and the language is commonly used in the streets and visible on commerce and banners (Figure 5-18). The second wave was that of internal migration of Shiites from rural areas in the 1940-50s who sought employment in Beirut and residence in the cheaper

peripheries. Those eventually left the area during the Civil War¹⁸⁵ and were replaced by Christian refugees from other areas. Shiites have since returned to the area, as their owned residences were returned to them by the Ministry of the Displaced. Shiite families also sought refuge in the area following the 1982 and 2006 Israeli invasions of Beirut and South Lebanon (Harake et al., 2017).




Figure 5-16: Location of Bourj Hammoud

Location of Bourj Hammoud., Source: (Harmandayan, 2009)

¹⁸⁵ Bourj Hammoud is on the Eastern side of Beirut. During the Civil War (1975-1990), Muslim populations gradually moved to West Beirut and Christians to its East.




Figure 5-17: El-Nab’a neighbourhood

Left: El-Nab’a neighbourhood borders as reported by UN-Habitat in 2017; Right: administrative neighbourhood borders. Sources: (Harake et al., 2017; Harmandayan, 2009)



Figure 5-18: Bourj Hammoud, general view

While in the vast majority of the country commerce is indicated in Arabic and English/French, in Bourj Hammoud the Armenian language is also used (Byblos Bank’s name is visible in three languages) on the main street. Date: June 2017

The population is estimated to have risen from 12,000 residents in 2000 (World Vision, 2000) to over double in 2014. Close to 26,000 residents are estimated in studies in 2015 (Samaha,

2015). Since 2011, El-Nab'a has witnessed a significant increase in Syrian residents. As in the case of Tebbeneh in Tripoli, the UN-Habitat released a neighbourhood profile report on El-Nab'a in 2017. The borders of the neighbourhood they propose do not coincide with the administrative borders (Figure 5-17). The area covered in the UN-Habitat report is smaller, and they place the population estimates at 14,760, sixty three percent of whom are Syrian refugees (Harake et al., 2017). This is significantly larger than the Syrian refugee population estimate in the rest of the Bourj Hammoud area as per official estimates. In fact the official estimates used place the total population of Bourj Hammoud at 75,866 with the Syrian refugee population at 17,927, or almost nineteen percent. The reason according to UN-Habitat is possibly that “densification has not been possible to the same extent as in other poor neighbourhoods” (Harake et al., 2017). This may be due to the very informal social nature of the neighbourhood, it is not uncommon for example for a street to be commonly referred to as “Ethiopian street” due to the high number of Ethiopian tenants¹⁸⁶. It also may possibly be due to the unreliability of quantitative data provided by official instances¹⁸⁷.

Socio Political characteristics:

In an urban study of the El-Nab'a, Petra Samaha shows how the neighbourhood is marginalised physically, institutionally and socially (Samaha, 2015, pp. 61–70). Indeed, its specificity with respect to the rest of the Bourj Hammoud and other places in Lebanon is the diversity of the ethnicities and religious groups of its population. Streets are dotted with religious signs (Figure 5-19) and it is not possible to cross from the Christian to the Shiite area without noticing and without being noticed. Since 2011, the large influx of Syrian refugees has caused a perceived feeling of insecurity. Tensions are high and street fights are a common occurrence, in addition to rampant verbal and sexual harassment. Law enforcement is not always well perceived, and any activity that may be considered out of the normal is considered suspicious¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁶ Without clear statistics on the matter, it can be assumed that the large majority of Ethiopian workers' rent agreements are informal. Under the *kafala* system, a worker may only live in her employer's residence.

¹⁸⁷ The El-Nab'a population count is based on a comprehensive and detailed population count by UN-Habitat. (Harake et al., 2017, P. 4-5)

¹⁸⁸ During my first field trip and upon meeting with the municipality I was officially advised not to take any photos or walk in the neighbourhood unaccompanied, and I was asked to fill a form to request permission to take photographs. Though there may have been need to avert a researcher to the possible danger in the area, the security process was exaggerated. Reasons may have included the intention to portray the difficult management of the area.



Figure 5-19: Religious symbols in El-Nab'a

Left: A cross soars high in a street in El-Nab'a, Right: An icon of the virgin Mary. Date: June 2017

Residents rely on political parties for security. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 1, the army and security forces are not the only protectors of the population. In fact, allegiances and dependence on political party support is quite important (Figure 5-20). In El-Nab'a, this is even more pronounced due to the high density and poverty levels. Residents of the area have no say in matters concerning their environment because they either are not Lebanese, or Lebanese but

mainly registered in other cities or villages¹⁸⁹. As such,

the main political parties (Hezbollah, Haraket Amal, Lebanese Forces, Al Kataeb party, Al Taakhi and Tashnag Armenian Movement) play a significant role in the support of residents in terms of services and protection against a context of reported weakness in municipal and governmental sustenance. (Harake et al., 2017, p. 9)



Figure 5-20: Adoration for the political leader

A large banner portraying the leader of the Lebanese Forces¹⁹⁰, Samir Geagea, in El-Nab'a. Text reads: "you are the leader. El-Nab'a neighbourhood" Date: June 2017, Photo: Pierre Bergel.

Adding to increasingly high levels of poverty, informality, and marginality, the neighbourhood also suffers from significant urban deterioration (Figure 5-21). In fact, according to the UN-Habitat neighbourhood profile (Harake et al., 2017), 35 percent of the buildings are substandard or necessitate emergency intervention, and those house 38 percent of the population. Moreover, 25 percent of the buildings are not connected, or connected with serious defects to basic urban services and they house 30 percent of the population. The majority of Syrian in El-Nab'a are Sunni Muslims, echoing the case of the entire refugee population.

¹⁸⁹ Electors (for Municipality and Parliament representatives) vote in the place where they are registered, not where they reside.

¹⁹⁰ An extreme Christian nationalist right party



Figure 5-21: Urban deterioration in EL-Nab'a

Increased urban deterioration in streets and buildings Date: June 2015

Bourj Hammoud in general is an area with a majority of Lebanese Armenians who arrived as refugees after the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in the early 1900s. Today the area in general, and El-Nab'a neighbourhood specifically, is a highly dense and popular one, including a plethora of minority religious and ethnic communities, of Lebanese and foreign nationalities. Being in Beirut's immediate periphery and offering affordable albeit substandard housing, the neighbourhood has attracted poor migrants throughout the years. While there are no definitive statistics on the origins of Syrian refugees who have settled in El-Nab'a since 2011, it is widely acknowledged that Kurdish Syrians made up the majority of Syrians in the neighbourhood. In fact, interviewees repeatedly mentioned the presence of Kurdish workers in El-Nab'a from before the crisis. Kurdish Syrians predominantly oppose the Syrian regime and have been some of its most vocal protagonists. Lebanese Armenians on the other hand predominantly support the Syrian regime, in solidarity with Syrian Armenians, who have historically been favored in Syria similarly to the other minorities including Christians and Alawis.

1.4 The Palestinian refugee camp of Bourj El-Barajneh, in the periphery of Beirut




Figure 5-22: Sketch of the entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh

Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019. Color, Raphaëlle Cottereau

Spaces of transit and waiting, [the camps] are organized like “cities” yet without strategic planning as everything is designed not to last. They stabilize and last. A spatial organisation and a certain social life develops in a situation of extreme legal precariousness, oscillating between no rights and the pure virtuality of international

law, between a very far and broad humanitarian law and a local power of those who, being closest to the beneficiaries of international aid, control the resources¹⁹¹ (Agier, 2005, p. 86).

Monkhabayyam (camp) Bourj El-Barajneh is a palestinian refugee camp in the suburbs of Beirut. According to UNRWA it is “the most overpopulated camp around Beirut and the living conditions are extremely poor” (UNRWA, 2018). In 1948, the Bourj El-Barajneh camp, like all other Palestinian camps in Lebanon, started out as a settlement of tents. Eventually those were replaced by concrete houses built by the refugees themselves. The population grew from an estimated 28,000 in 2011 to an estimated 40,000 in 2018 (Abou-Diwan, 2016)¹⁹². Amnesty International reported that “Bourj el-Barajneh camp [had] more people per square kilometre than Hong Kong or Mumbai” (Amnesty International, 2007, p. 13). The camp grew from within and also eventually urbanised, and its residents transformed “from camp dwellers to urban refugees” (K. Dorai, 2010). Looking at the urban sprawl of Beirut we can see how the camp transformed from a space physically outside the city to a space integral to the city, and central in the (urban) periphery (Dorai, Puig, & Ababsa, 2012). In fact,

Even if they are still marginalized and segregated areas Palestinian refugee camps are now part of the major cities in the Middle East. Economic activities, daily mobility, the presence of recent international migrants, and strong political and cultural significance for the Palestinian refugees, are the different elements that characterize the refugee camps today as urban settlements. (Dorai, 2010, p. 19).

Since shortly after the Syrian refugees began arriving to the camp, two things have happened. First it grew dangerously vertically¹⁹³ without any regard to structural or environmental guidelines (The camp is extremely dense in comparison to its immediate surroundings). This is not surprising since the camp has continued to grow informally, without planning or structural regulation since 1950, while being restricted in surface. And second, the Palestinian urban refugees (and dwellers of the city in Lebanon for decades) have now become hosts to Palestinian refugees from Syria, and to Syrian refugees alike. This places the Palestinians in a double role,

¹⁹¹ Original citation: “Espaces de transit et d’attente, ils s’organisent comme des « villes » sans être pour autant dotés d’un projet urbain dans la mesure où tout est conçu pour ne pas durer. Ils se stabilisent et durent. Une organisation de l’espace et une certaine vie sociale se développent dans une situation générale de grande précarité juridique, oscillant entre le vide de droit et la pure virtualité du droit international, entre un droit humanitaire très général et lointain et un pouvoir sur la vie qu’exercent ceux qui, localement, au plus près des bénéficiaires de l’aide humanitaire, contrôlent les ressources” (Agier, 2005)

¹⁹² In the camps, like in the cities in Lebanon, statistics on population and most urban services is always estimated, and estimates largely vary from one source to another.

¹⁹³ In fact the vertical growth of the camp had started when there was no longer the possibility for horizontal expansion.

simultaneously inferior to the Lebanese and superior to the Syrians.



Figure 5-23: Pedestrian bridge at the entrance of Bourj el-Barajneh Camp

A pedestrian bridge, symbolic of the connection between Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian communities in Lebanon. , 2018.

Figure 5-23 represents several aspects of the city in Lebanon and its different dwellers. I took this photo from a highway leading to the airport (the old airport road as known in Lebanon) at around 4pm. The pedestrian bridge is mainly used at this hour by the workers returning to the Bourj el-Barajneh camp. Workers coming back from Beirut descend from the red-licensed vans (equivalent to public transportation) and cross the bridge to enter the camp (to the left side of the picture). To the immediate right is a small gated green area, donated by the Tehran Municipality to the “honorable and resisting Lebanese people”, and closed to the public (Figure 5-24). This reflects the dependence of Lebanon on foreign aid in all aspects. It is also worthwhile to note that such a donation by the Tehran Municipality could not have possibly been found in other areas, and this reflects the segmented Lebanese allegiance to external political powers.

The bridge itself is branded with an advertisement amongst the many other visual brands. To the immediate left is the main entrance of the Bourj camp, guarded by a formal but not very visible army checkpoint. In this picture, Palestinians live on one side and Lebanese on the other, with Syrian refugees permeating the already fragile balance between the communities. Almost certainly in this one picture and one moment there is a Lebanese, a Palestinian, a Syrian

refugee and a Palestinian refugee from Syria going about their daily life in the city in Lebanon.



Figure 5-24: Garden closed to the public across from the entrance

To the immediate right of the pedestrian bridge, a gated garden, donated by the Municipality of Tehran to the Lebanese people, 2018.

Socio Political characteristics:

As Israel refuses to accept responsibility for their exodus from their Palestinian homeland – and Lebanon refuses to allow them to resettle – displaced Palestinians have to deal with the knowledge that their homes in Lebanon are not really homes, while their real homes are not about to be restored to them (Sayigh, 2004)

Access to the camp from the airport road is minimally guarded. There is only a small checkpoint at the main entrance of the camp (Figure 5-25) but the Lebanese army never seem to stop anyone from entering¹⁹⁴. The structure of governance of the camp is complex. It can be described as self regulated and managed, though it is a complicated system of governance:

There is a web of complex power structures composed of popular committees, a

¹⁹⁴ The degree of security varies depending on political stability in Lebanon. At times security is more strict. Also, while individuals may enter and exit the camp freely, general materials (especially construction material) are not easily authorised.

security committee, UNRWA camp officers, notables, political factions, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)'s popular unions and organizations (workers, women, engineers, etc), Community Based Organizations (CBOs)¹⁹⁵, NGOs¹⁹⁶ and the Palestinian Scholars' League (*imam* [Muslim religious leader] coalition close to Islamic Resistant Movement-Hamas). These forces vary in importance from camp to camp and from area to area. In each camp, leaders impose measures, and these in turn have a habit of changing; a consequence of a constantly shifting balance of power between these different groups. The Popular Committee, however, stands out as the most important local governing body in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territory. What is important to note is that the label 'popular' may be misleading; members to this committee are not elected, rather, the title projects the strength of one group or party vis-à-vis others (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 8)

The camp includes various UNRWA-run urban services within its area of around 0.3 square kilometers: a hospital, several mosques, community centres and nurseries, etc. but no schools. Electricity is acquired by illegal tapping into the main (Lebanese) city lines. Practically everyone in the camp knows how to perform manoeuvres to the lines¹⁹⁷. The wiring is chaotic and poses a real and present danger to the lives of the residents (Figure 5-27). Other basic urban services are also chaotic, scarce and hazardous. No potable water pipes exist, and water in general is scarce and extremely salty. The camp was entirely disconnected from the municipal sewer system until 1995. That year the European Union funded a project to connect the camp to the sewers¹⁹⁸, and Lebanese garbage collection services, like all other urban services, do not apply. "Apart from Palestinians, there are also Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians and Sri Lankans living in the camp". (Roberts, 2000, p. 5).

Living in Bourj el-Barajneh and other Palestinian camps is often compared to "like living in a prison" (Khoury & Salem, 2017). They are clearly and openly discriminated against in Lebanon, "their population is strongly marginalised and segregated" (Doraï, 2007). They are "treated as second-class residents, restricted from working in most fields, banned from owning property, forced to live in run-down camps and barred from formal education" (Khoury &

¹⁹⁵ CBOs are mainly youth, women centres as well as rehabilitation centres for people with disabilities. They were created by UNRWA in the 1980s but now are quasi-financially independent having proven effective in establishing links with local and international NGOs, attracting more than \$3 million in grants and in-kind assistance during 2002-2003 (MTP Relief and Social Services Program). (Geneva Donors Conference 2004) (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 8)

¹⁹⁶ In many camps, the social role of NGOs is much more important than that of the political factions. However, some of these NGOs are connected to the political factions. Interviewees reported a climate of mistrust towards the NGOs. Meanwhile, Hamas is increasingly playing a social role in the camps (Sari Hanafi, 2010, p. 8)

¹⁹⁷ Recurrently during my observations and interviews, a side electricity issue would come up and someone (usually a young male) would immediately fix it. It ranged from fixing a broken line to adding a new extension altogether.

¹⁹⁸ The grant was only approved by the Lebanese government after an agreement to include the upgrading of the sewerage system surrounding the camp.

Salem, 2017). Effectively, Palestinians are banned from working in over eighty job categories including medicine and engineering¹⁹⁹, they are not allowed to enroll in Lebanese public schools or universities, and are not allowed to own property²⁰⁰. Inside the camp, opportunities are very limited. Working for the UNRWA is considered a life-line in terms of the security it could offer the person and his or her family.



Figure 5-25: Entrance to the camp

Entrance to Bourj el-Barajneh camp. Symbolic checkpoint at the end of the street right side. June 2017

¹⁹⁹ An informally employed Palestinian accountant would have to move from his or her desk and pose as a cleaner when outsiders or officials visit. Even when they are registered, their job titles are systematically changed to match the categories in which they are allowed to work.

²⁰⁰ It is a common practice for a Palestinian to buy property in the name of a Lebanese spouse or partner, and problems surrounding ownership arise regularly, further to a divorce for example.




Figure 5-26: Growth of the camp

Schematic growth of the camp between 1950 and 2016. Source: (Chamma & Zaiter, 2007)




Figure 5-27: Electrical wiring in the camp, June 2017

While the Bourj el-Barajneh camp in this dissertation is regarded as one of the cities in Lebanon that has hosted a significant number of Syrian refugees since 2011, it has to be clearly expressed that the intention behind this is not to draw any conclusions or speak to comparisons between the Palestinian camps and other areas in Lebanon. There are clear profound differences between the political, social, and urban realities in the camps that make them unique as spaces. Also, the complexity of the Palestinian identity vis-à-vis Lebanon within the “Right of Return” is a major element of relevance in the camps and it is not a central one in this work. The site was

selected here first to acknowledge the Palestinian refugees as hosts for Syrian refugees since 2011, and second to include the space of the camps as a neighbourhood / city within Lebanon, even though it is a political exception, and to attempt to discern some of the heightened difficulties the camps have faced since the influx began in 2011.

2. Five forms of injustice across the three sites

In all three sites the living conditions are dire with little or no planning. No building codes are respected, ensuring security is difficult, and informality runs deep at the urban, economic and political levels. Syrian refugees have come to all three sites in large numbers, mainly but not only due to the affordable shelter available. The concentration of refugees is therefore high in all three neighbourhoods in this study. In the three spaces Lebanese security forces have limited or no presence as in the case of Bourj el-Barajneh. Tensions between the different communities in the three sites is both visible and invisible, changing with the times and political discourses. Most notably, the dwellers in the three areas do not have a voice in affecting policy, urban or other, concerning their situation. In Tebbeneh and El-Nab'a, the majority of the Lebanese dwellers cannot vote due to the fact that they are not originally from the area, and the Palestinians of the camp are for all intents and purposes non-citizens and therefore are not represented in government or local authorities. The dwellers in the three neighbourhoods are some of the most disenfranchised and least empowered in the country.

In 1991, David Harvey proposed six principles for just planning and policy practices (Harvey, 1991), based on five faces of oppression introduced by Iris Marion Young (Young, 1990). Those are exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, imperialist culture, and violence. In using them to define spatial justice, Gervais-Lambony and Dufaux propose that “a situation as unfair when a group is the victim of at least one of these forms of oppression (all combinations may exist)” (Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 5). In fact, each of these forms of oppression is present in the three neighbourhoods presented above:

(1) Exploitation in the workplace, and exploitation of labour in the living space. New dwellers compete with old dwellers over already limited work opportunities. Sources of income are too precious for workers to let go of, and they accept more and more precarious and exploitative measures to hold on to them.

(2) “Marginals are people the system of labour cannot or will not use” (Young, 1990). While the system of labour in Lebanon does use the Syrian refugees, it does so under the

condition of precarity and informality. I argue that in the unlikely case that employees are compelled to protect Syrian workers under the labour law, the latter would indeed become marginalised. It is the nature of their cheap, available, and easily disposable labour that allows them to access precarious work. This feeds into the notion that it is the injustices that exist in the cities in Lebanon are what have allowed for the Syrians to find a place in the city. Moreover, in the case of Bourj el-Barajneh, Palestinian refugees already face marginalisation and are unable to access the formal labour market in Lebanon.

(3) Powerlessness is the most visible form of oppression in the three sites. The dwellers in general, and Syrian and Palestinian refugees specifically do not have the channels to express their needs or concerns and many, if not most of them do not have the “ability to be listened to with respect” (Harvey, 1991, p. 599). In the two neighbourhoods in the Lebanese cities, voting-dwellers are only considered valuable in the run up to an election, but are otherwise politically excluded.

(4) Cultural Imperialism, that “relates to the ways in which the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Harvey, 1991, p. 599). While Harvey suggests that this form of oppression is difficult to identify clearly, I argue that in Lebanon it is perhaps the clearest form, as my field research has shown. Syrian refugees have been ‘defined from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them’ (Harvey, 1991, p. 600).

(5) Lastly, violence. “It is not the violence itself that constitutes oppression, but the fact that it becomes a “social practice” towards certain groups, a practice that may be considered acceptable because it is simply a consequence of belonging to [an ethnic] group” (Gervais-Lambony & Dufaux, 2009, p. 6). As the field research in Part 3 will show, this definition can be applied to the Syrian refugee group in Lebanon.

They Syrian refugees in Lebanon constitute not only a poor group, they are also faced with the five forms of social oppression mentioned above. As such and to insist on an idea presented in the General Introduction: because their dwelling in Lebanon’s cities is being tolerated with difficulty and domination, not accommodated for in a way that may be described as resilient - the situation may be better framed from a spatial justice than an urban resilience angle.

3. Informal settlements: a narrow path for urban negotiation

In 2017 the UNHCR estimated that approximately 258,601 Syrian refugees in Lebanon were sheltered in informal settlements across the country (UNHCR, 2017). The settlements are most numerous inside and in the immediate surroundings of the Lebanese-Syrian border cities in the Bekaa and the North, and in 2017 comprised some 45,827 tents (Figure 5-28). Being a small country and urbanised to a large extent, informal settlements are close proximity with towns and cities. Furthermore due to their informal nature they are extremely permeable, making it possible for the residents to interact with the neighbouring communities within the mobility restrictions placed on all the Syrian population.

While the entry of new refugees into Lebanon has been largely restricted since 2015, the number of refugees living in informal settlements continued to increase between 2015 and 2018. Between June 2016 and June 2017 almost 30,000 Syrians left their shelter in urban areas and resettled in the informal settlements, an increase in 10 percent of the latter's global population. Between June and December 2017, a further 12,500 individuals moved to the settlements (UNHCR, 2017a). Should the criteria and methods of the statistics collected by the UNHCR be true, this may reflect the deteriorating circumstances of the refugees who had initially settled in urban areas and have had to relocate to the informal settlements. Drawing such conclusions is however not easy due to the truly informal situation in the settlements. A number of criteria may need to be factored into the statistics and may affect them. This issue is broader than the scope of my thesis and may be interesting to look at in further research. In fact, the processes of settlement in play in spaces like the informal settlements are different for those that I have included in this study. The role of NGO is more significant and the negotiations for space are largely on that level, more than between dwellers. Moreover, I am interested in the interstices in which Syrians have been able to secure a space in the city, a possibility which is not present in the settlements.

Informal settlements, or more precisely Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) in NGO lingo, are a collection of makeshift tents that are constructed in a spontaneous manner by the refugees themselves and range in size from two or three tents to several hundred per settlement (Figure 5-29, Figure 5-30). There are several criteria that may define an "informal settlement" and they differ from one region to the other and from one situation to the other. According to the UN-Habitat informal settlements are

residential areas where 1) inhabitants have no security of tenure vis-à-vis the land or dwellings they inhabit, with modalities ranging from squatting to informal rental

housing, 2) the neighbourhoods usually lack, or are cut off from, basic services and city infrastructure and 3) the housing may not comply with current planning and building regulations, and is often situated in geographically and environmentally hazardous areas. [...] Slums are the most deprived and excluded form of informal settlements characterized by poverty and large agglomerations of dilapidated housing often located in the most hazardous urban land. In addition to tenure insecurity, slum dwellers lack formal supply of basic infrastructure and services, public space and green areas, and are constantly exposed to eviction, disease and violence (UN-Habitat, 2015, p. 1).

Specifically in the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the different agencies working in the country define an informal settlement as a collection of shelters “established in an unplanned and unmanaged manner, which means they are generally unrecognized. There may or may not be an informal or formal agreement between landlords and residents of the settlement” (HDX, 2018). These spaces came to be further to the non-encampment stance that the Lebanese government took in 2011, and did not admit to the refugee influx, insisting that Syrians who arrived be referred to as Displaced Persons.




Figure 5-28: Distribution of informal settlements in Lebanon
Geographic distribution of informal settlements in Lebanon. Source: UNHCR report “In Focus: Informal Settlements” Date: June 2017

Settlements are managed locally, and by a number of actors including local authorities, international NGOs, landowners and a *shaweesh*²⁰¹ (sheriff). Every settlement is set-up on privately owned land, and usually the *shaweesh* negotiates a deal with the landowner, although NGOs have sometimes played direct and indirect roles in those negotiations. The relationship between the different actors involved in the set-up and management of the informal settlements affect their spatial and social situation, and the quality of security for its residents. In fact, “some of them were directly and more robustly supported by charitable organizations and international NGOs

²⁰¹ The *shaweesh* is a representative for the residents of a settlement. Most *shaweesh* have a certain personal connection to the landowners, either through family kinship or previous work experiences.

while others had more limited or fragmented support. Landlords also provide varying degrees of support. This extends from physical spaces to infrastructures as well” (Sanyal, 2017, p. 121). The tents are all similar and are made from wood panels, fabric, and tarpaulin, and make for precarious shelter conditions. In fact, innumerable accounts of dire living conditions have been reported from the camps, most dramatic those related to winter weather conditions. For example, there have been numerous reports of extreme cold conditions and even deaths due to cold in the settlements during winter months throughout the years (BBC, 2015; Gayle, 2013; Kanaan, 2016; Lodge, 2018).

While they make up a quarter of the refugee population in Lebanon, it is these informal settlements that come to mind in general when referring to Syrian refugees, and to refugees in general, contributing to the stigmatization of the term. Informal settlements are synonymous with poverty, poor education, poor sanitation and most other negative perceptions about refugees. They are more visible, though, than urban refugees, and

if we compare them to ‘invisible’ urban settlers (like some refugees living in Nabaa hidden behind shops), refugees in ITSs are less vulnerable due to their visibility, as they can easily receive aid and protection. However, in some cases, especially in small and isolated ITSs, settlements’ visibility stigmatizes refugees and exposes them to discrimination and violence, owing to the widespread perception that these environments are places of extreme poverty, insalubrity, and crime (Kikano, 2018, p. 144)

As in the case for Syrian refugees in urban settings, residents of informal settlements have been the target of different degrees of violence that depend on the location of the settlement, its size and the reach of NGOs inside it. Especially since early 2017, The Lebanese Army has been serving eviction notifications for tens of thousands of refugees at a time. Sometimes those who had been evicted would be notified of a new eviction notice in a matter of months (Frelick et al., 2018, p. 29; Kanso, 2017; Première Urgence, 2018).



Figure 5-29: Informal settlement, Jebjennine, Bekaa



Figure 5-30: Informal settlement, Jebjennine, Bekaa

Informal settlement on either side of the road leading to the village of Jeb Jennine (8,000 residents) - Bekaa valley. Date: November 2015

Conclusion to Part 2

The analysis in this dissertation relies to a large extent on observing and analysing relationships between people in an urban space, as society is the foremost influencer on the

development of place. One way to study this spatial dimension of societies is to look at the different actors in a place and study the power relations between them, their practices of that place, and their experiences in it. These are most commonly regulated by economic inequality, policy, politics, adherence to social equality standards, and access to the place, the city in this dissertation, and to the services the place offers. It is all the more telling to study relation between society and place in a raw situation where the norm is increased informality, quasi absence of public policy or wealth redistribution, and lacking urban regulations or services, which explains the high densities of population(s) in informal areas.

The three case studies listed above all present a plethora of possible inequalities, in varying ways and to varying degrees. Two of the three sites lie in the periphery of the capital and largest city Beirut, and the third is in the periphery of the second largest city in Lebanon, Tripoli. El-Nab'a has a long history of mixity and migration, with several waves of poor migrants choosing it as a place of residence primarily due to its proximity with Beirut and the potential economic opportunities that proximity promises. It has developed in a highly informal manner with little to no planning efforts. El-Nab'a is known for its juxtapositions in ethnic and religious groups as well, with a strong presence of non Arab migrant workers, Lebanese of Armenian descent, Christians, Shiites, and Sunnis especially with the arrival of the Syrian refugees. For instance, one of its streets is informally dubbed Ethiopia street due to the significant number of domestic workers, who are not only Ethiopian natives (undocumented in most cases) who live there.

Bourj el-Barajneh equally has a long history of migration, being initially created as a makeshift camp for Palestinian refugees in 1948. In this city within a city today reside tens of thousands of forced migrants facing systemised exploitation and exclusion. They fall into three categories, the Palestinian refugees of Lebanon (referring to the Palestinians who came directly to Lebanon after the nakba), the Palestinian refugees from Syria (those who went to Syria after the nakba and have now become second time refugees in Lebanon since the Syrian crisis) and the Syrian refugees. The last group is the only one that has a real though complicated option to return to a homeland. Both Palestinian refugee groups face a profound identity crisis, and next to no hope of ever returning, or belonging anywhere. For the Palestinian refugees, hosting new refugee presents not only an urban and logistic challenge but an intellectual and emotional one as well. They identify with both sides of the equation, and their discourse matches that of the Lebanese hosts but for bursts of moments when they identify strongly with the refugees. Of the three groups, the least in number and the most vulnerable are the Palestinian refugees from Syria.

Of the three sites, Tebbeneh in Tripoli is the one with the strongest Lebanese presence.

It's community is highly patriarchal and conservative, and tribal to a large degree. I found it to be the site where the least social research has been done and because of that it was the site where people were the most receptive to my presence. The main underlying issue in the area is the Sunni-Alawi conflict: it reflects the more regional problems in the middle east. While the three sites have common characteristics, they each present a uniqueness in terms of social diversity. I saw signs of violence mostly in Bourj el-Barajneh but felt them mostly in the discourse of people in Tebbeneh. In el-Nab'a there was always a sense of careful peace. The near to complete lack of quantitative data in the three sites made the qualitative approach inevitable and more difficult at the same time, in that some the information being given to me with high degrees of confidence could never be verified. On the contrary they could be disproven in another confidently presented discourse.

Part 2 began with an analytical framework presented at the beginning of Chapter 3 and ended with the case study justifications at the end of Chapter 4, between those parts I discussed my own subjectivity along with the challenges and advantages that came with it. I had been away for 18 months straight before going on the first field trip for this dissertation, it was the longest time I had been away without even a visit home, and I strongly felt the difference of being someone looking in from the outside. I have spent some time reflecting on the way subjects in social sciences are approached and the effect of the place, not only of the field but also of the researcher, and how it affects the analysis. With this said, I will to move to present the major features of Syrian refugees in the cities of Lebanon and analyse the ways they interact and negotiate their lives in the city.

URBAN DENSIFICATION OF EL TEBBENEH, EL-NAB'A, AND BOURJ EL-BARAJNEH CAMP 1956-2017



Bourj El Barajneh 1956



Bourj El Barajneh 2001



Bourj El Barajneh 2008



Bourj El Barajneh 2017




El Nab'a 1956



El Nab'a 1974




El Nab'a 2001



El Nab'a 2008




EL Nab'a 2017



El Tebbeneh 1956




El Tebbeneh 1974



El Tebbeneh 2001






El Tebbeneh 2008



El Tebbeneh 2017

Legend:

-  Study area of Bourj El Barajneh
-  Study area of El Nab'a
-  Study area of El Tebbeneh

Source:

The Directorate of Geographic Affairs of the Lebanese Army

Concept: Dima El-Khoury

Execution: Loai Tannous, May 2019

Part 3. The refugee turn, beyond border crossings

To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to define - Simone Weil (1984, p. 41)

Introduction to Part 3

In more ways than one, this quote from the distinguished S. Weil touches on the sensitivity and the complexity of the daily struggle faced by the Syrian forced migrants, like others before them and many who will come after them, in relating to the places where they have been dwelling and striving to make a living. Finding their roots is of course a metaphor to express the multitude of meanings this new dwelling represents to them, while never fulfilling their aspirations as human beings and citizens. Part three analyses in detail the ways in which refugees I interacted with in each of the case study sites devise their own paths in accessing Lebanon's cities and neighbourhoods, to find jobs, face administrative requirements and resistance from the host society - it addresses the ways in which they live their everyday life.

To address the different aspects of these itineraries, which in the end only speak to fragments of the refugees' lives, this part respectively positions them in the overall national

landscape, in the cities where they tend to be concentrated, in their neighbourhoods, and at a more intimate scale, in their places of dwelling - be they a shared flat or room. It then addresses their relations with the host society, Lebanese citizens, the latter being their employers, their neighbours or simply the people they come across in the streets. Even in the cases where there is indifference - an absence of reaction from these Lebanese to the presence of the refugees presence is hardly insignificant, and needs to be further interpreted. All these scales of co-presence and social interaction express, to the observer, a complex set of issues generated by the presence of Syrian refugees in cities of Lebanon that this part will disentangle, based on empirical analysis, and illustrated through the description of specific situations and a selection of narratives.

In its last chapter, this part culminates in a discussion on negotiating space as presented in the general introduction of this dissertation. It elaborates on how space has been utilised as a tool for cooptation and exploitation on the local, national and regional levels. Negotiating space is not only seen as a binary relation between the refugees and the host community, but also as a mechanism that produces and reproduces inequality at different scales.


Preparing for this discussion, the three chapters which open this third part are largely dedicated to the direct results and analyses of the field investigations carried out for this research, which invite the discussion proposed in chapter 8. More specifically, Chapter 5 describes the journey of the Syrians as they arrive and settle in Lebanon and turn into refugees. It presents where they are spatially located and how they arrived there, and furthermore how they are socially placed on the map, within the complex territorial fabric in Lebanon.

Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the same issues from different points of view, and can be seen as a conversation between dwellers. Chapter 6 tends to reconstitute the daily living conditions of the refugees in the three case study sites. It details the housing challenges, the stressors of finding work and securing basic life needs, their mobility within the legal framework placed by the authorities and the access they have to public space. Chapter 7 then presents the four most prominent generalisations that Syrian refugees fall under from the Lebanese point of view: Syrians steal jobs, they live in overcrowded and precarious conditions that are unacceptable, they have taken over public space and are unapproachable, and they abuse international aid. By crossing these points of view, this dissertation will have attempted to reveal the perceived and lived inequalities of the communities that have been thrown into a situation they both seek to overcome.

Chapter 5. Situating Syrian refugees on the Lebanese socio- spatial map

5.1 Places of origin, causes of migration and choice of refuge city

Neighbouring Syria on all but a minor portion of its land borders, Lebanon is a prime destination for Syrians fleeing the violence of the crisis²⁰². Not only were there no entry requirements in 2011 when the events started, but there have also always been historical familial and business networks between the two countries, making it relatively easy and inexpensive to relocate to. To cross to Lebanon, Syrians have the legal option to use one of four official land border crossings, and the illegal option of using the informal points of entry and the stretches of porous border regions (Figure 6-1). These routes have historically been used to smuggle people and goods between the countries, and Syrians continue to use them three years after refugees have been denied entry to Lebanon. In January of 2018, ten people including children were found frozen on a smuggler route near the Masna' border crossing (number 20 on the map), reflecting the continuing need for Syrians to seek refuge (Al Jazeera News, 2018).



²⁰² Jordan and Turkey are also in direct proximity with Syria and have also been first choices for Syrian refugees. In fact the three countries host over 5.2 million refugees, 92 percent of the total persons of concern in the Syria crisis situation. The context in which refugees were hosted differ from country to the other, the main difference between them being that in both Jordan and Turkey, Syrian refugees have mainly been placed in refugee camps rather than integrated the cities. The following two articles by the Refugee Studies Center may serve as references to the different situations in these countries.

Crossing points
Official and unofficial

	Name	Syrian name	Control	
Turkey	1	Yayladagi	Bab al-Kasab	Government of Syria
	2	Harem		Opposition forces
	3	Hacıpasa	Darkosh	Opposition forces
	4	Reynanlı/Cilvegözü	Bab al-Hawa	Opposition forces
	5	Atmeh		Opposition forces
	6	Öncüpınar	Bab al-Salam	Opposition forces
	7	Karkamis	Jarablus	Islamist groups
	8	Akçakale	Tell Abiad	Kurdish forces
	9	Ceylanpınar	Ras Al Ain	Kurdish forces
	10	Nusaybin	Qamishi	Kurdish forces
	11	Cizre	Ein Diwar	Kurdish forces
Iraq	12	Peshkapor	Simalka	Kurdish forces
	13	Sahela		Kurdish forces
	14	Rabia'a	Yarabiyeh	Kurdish forces
	15	Al Qa'im	Abu Kamal	Opposition forces
	16	Al Waleed	Al Tanf	Unknown
Jordan	17	Naseeb	Jaber	Government of Syria
	18	Da'ra	Ramtha	Government of Syria
Heights	19	Quneitra		Government of Syria
	20	Masnaa	Jdaidet Yabous	Government of Syria
Lebanon	21	Mashari' Al-Qaa	Joussieh	Government of Syria
	22	Al-Amari	Tal Kalakh	Government of Syria
	23	El Aaboudieh	Dabbousieh	Government of Syria
	24	El Aarida	Tartous	Government of Syria

Figure 6-1: Crossing points between Syria and Lebanon

Crossing points of Syrian refugees along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Source: ACAPS. Syria Needs Analysis Project. Date: 2014

The migration (seasonal and long term) and resettlement of Syrian families and communities inside Syria and into Lebanon has been a reality since before the crisis²⁰³. While there has been no census in either country on the number of migrants and their reasons for migration due to the open border policy and pax syriana between the countries until 2015, there are a few broad geopolitical, socio-economic and environmental reasons that have caused it.

First, governmental oppression of certain areas (such as Hama) and groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) in Syria led to internal and international displacement of the communities in these areas. In the northern regions of Syria, minorities were oppressed (ex. Kurds) or marginalized (ex. Assyrians). Kurds historically migrated to Lebanon²⁰⁴ as seasonal workers, and the Assyrians have been in a continuous cycle of immigration from the region - Lebanon being a classic transitional stop on the way to immigration towards Europe (*Maber Samaan, personal interview, 2018*). The Kurdish minorities in Syria live in cities in immediate proximity with Turkey, but political tensions between them and the Turks on one hand, and the Iraqis on the other (Iraq being the second closest country to their cities) made their only options internal displacement in Syria and / or refuge in Lebanon.

Additionally, the late 1950s and early 1960s were turbulent in Syria's political and

²⁰³ See Chapter 2, Section 2.3

²⁰⁴ For background on the history of the Kurdish community in Lebanon see (Meho & Kawtharani, 1995)

economic history. The formation of the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt, and the nationalisation policies that accompanied this union largely impacted the Syrian economy and class structure (Ahsan, 1984; Longuenesse, 1979). These years witnessed the immigration of money and family business towards Lebanon and other destinations, and Syrians of different classes migrated to Lebanon and other countries. Armenians in Syria were especially affected during this period and opted to join their peers in Lebanon, as “the emergence of centralizing, authoritarian regimes [in Syria] in the 1950s and 1960s severely damaged [their] autonomy and cultural diversity” (Migliorino, 2008).

While the immediate cause of the refugee influx to Lebanon is the 2011 conflict, “behind that is a complex mix of social and political factors both inside and outside the region. One fiercely studied and debated driver has been a recent dip into a series of severe droughts starting in the late 1990s” (Kahn, 2016). In fact, “the drought that preceded Syria’s Civil War was likely the worst in 900 years” (Cook, Anchukaitis, Touchan, Meko, & Cook, 2016; Stokes, 2016); Stokes, 2016). It caused 75 percent of Syria’s farms to fail and 85 percent of livestock to die between 2006 and 2011, according to the United Nations. The collapse in crop yields forced as many as 1.5 million Syrians to migrate to urban centers, like Homs and Damascus (Stokes, 2016). This means that the movement of Syrians from rural areas may have been caused by more than the conflict, as people sought alternative means of livelihood.

Figure 6-2 depicts the places of origin of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. It shows that in December 2014 - when the number of registered refugees was almost at its highest - the largest number of Syrians in Lebanon (147,624) had fled from Homs. The third largest city in Syria, it was home to Muslim, Alawi and Christian communities alike and the second largest Christian community in the country. The second largest number of refugees (128,312) came from the Jabal Semaan district that includes Aleppo, the second major city of Syria after Damascus and also religiously mixed. The number of refugees from other areas is less than 70,000, and includes Idleb and rural Damascus that are less represented in terms of religious groups.

While these numbers are telling, it is important to note that internal displacement trends prior and during the conflict in Syria might have skewed their precision. When the UNHCR asked a refugee in Lebanon where they came from and the answer was Raqqa, “it did not necessarily mean that the refugee was residing in Raqqa at the time, but that his familial origins were from Raqqa, they might have been living in another city for years before 2011” (*UNHCR project officer, personal interview*, 2015). These specificities are difficult to account for, but what is important to note is the fact that Damascus, both its urban and rural parts already housed a

number of internally displaced Syrians from other regions, who eventually came to Lebanon.




Figure 6-2: Refugees' places of origin

Map showing the places of origin of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Source: UNHCR Data Portal. Date: December 31, 2014

Over the years Syrians in Lebanon have taken several characterizations including tolerated unskilled migrants, military men, occupiers, oppressive intelligence officers, undesired migrants, and most recently refugees, with all the complex dimensions the term holds. While their numbers have never been statistically exact they have always been significant (Chalcraft, 2009). The Syrians who came to Lebanon after 2011 could be political refugees, or economic migrants/refugees, or immediate and extended family members of workers residing in Lebanon, or illegal refugees, or rich minority refugees, or a combination of any two or more of these categories. The Syrians who had been residing in the country have in many instances registered as refugees and therefore the quality of their residence changed. Instead of being the temporary migrants who stay for certain periods of time but ultimately live in Syria, they now became quasi-

permanent residents.

Further to interviews with UNHCR staff and the refugees, I have distinguished five broad categories. (1) Syrians who entered Lebanon after 2011 for fear of imminent danger to their lives. Those, if they stayed or returned to Syria would either be imprisoned or drafted to the army depending on their political activism. They include the young males of Sunni Muslim confession, and usually resided in cities (Dar'a, Aleppo, Homs, etc.).

(2) Some came to Lebanon fleeing the violence but with no fear of imprisonment or conscription. Those feared death as collateral, and had almost no means of economic survival in Syria. This category of Syrians could still make trips back and forth to some cities in Syria until 2015²⁰⁵.

(3) Syrians who are the immediate and extended family members of those Syrians who were already in Lebanon. Those include the wives, children and elderly. In fact in December 2017 “80.9 percent of registered Syrian refugees [in Lebanon] are women and children” (Yassin, 2018, p. 23).

(4) Syrians who were residing in Lebanon before 2011. Those individuals had the options to register as refugees with the UNHCR. This is perhaps the most challenging category to quantify and qualify.

(5) Syrians who came to Lebanon from the relatively safe regime-held areas (such as Damascus and the coastal cities of Lattakia, Tartous), who were not in immediate fear for their lives but fled war conditions. Those include the rich minorities who came to Lebanon to wait out the conflict.

Of all the preceding categories only the first one comprises of individuals who categorically could not return to Syria even before 2015.

²⁰⁵ Starting January 2015, any Syrian who crossed from Lebanon to Syria would no longer have the right to enter Lebanon under residency rules introduced by the General Security.




Figure 6-3: Representation of Syrian refugees' choice of the city of refuge in Lebanon

In addition to these different categories to which the Syrians may belong to, their position vis-à-vis the Syrian regime also plays a role in their choice of city²⁰⁶. Figure 6-3 maps the reasons behind refugees' choice of city. The types of refugees to leave Syria, as detailed above are represented in the upper section of the diagram. Although exact statistics for these categories are not known, the UNHCR registration trends show that the majority of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon are women and children. The middle section represents the main factors taken into consideration by the refugees when choosing a city. The bottom section represents the profile of the city or neighbourhood, and why it may be attractive to refugees. Traditionally, poor migrants will settle in the peripheries of a city as an easier access point, and move as need be once they have started to settle. In any of the sections, one or more of the criteria mentioned may apply. For example, a neighbourhood may be attractive due to the type and affordability of housing available in it, and also because of the diversity of residents' nationalities, such as the case of El-Nab'a. Nabil, a Syrian in his thirties came to El-Nab'a in early 2013 because he had "a lot of experience in tiling" and the employers in Sin-el-Fil knew him and could "count on his

²⁰⁶ For example, in the Tebbeneh area of Tripoli, one of the case studies in this dissertation, the neighbourhoods are divided along religious and political lines, mainly pro and anti Syrian regime.

seriousness”. He told me “I came here because I knew my landlord from before, and I’ve never had issues with him, I always pay him on time. He increased the rent this time because of the situation, you know...” (*Interview with Nabil, Syrian refugee in el Nab’a*, 2016)

The accounts I documented during the field echo those in John Chalcraft’s *Invisible Cage* from well before the Syrian crisis in 2011. It confirms that the choice of cities for the Syrian refugees is largely based on personal networks. It is also in line with the literature on urban refugees highlighting the importance of these networks in the trajectories of refugees (Landau & Jacobsen, 2004; Pavanello et al., 2010). In 2004, one Syrian migrant told John Chalcraft

I am a Syrian from Tartous. People - mostly christian and Alawi - from Tartous and Lattakia, I mean the Syrian coast, are very good workers. I mean they work in gypsum, restaurants, clothes shops, or in hotels. While people - mostly Sunni - from the inner part of Syria, like Hama or Idlib, they do jobs like digging, carriers and porters in Lebanon. While other people from Aleppo, the city, work in trading. People from the countryside around Aleppo work in cultivation. People from Masyaf work in planting vegetables and fruits. So Syrians from special parts in Syria have their special style of work down in Lebanon. People from the coast dress all the time very well and they do just specific type of work which is clean and elegant. While people from the inner part of Syria... there will be fifteen persons living together in one room! (Chalcraft, 2009, p. 182).

The transcript is in line with responses I have received throughout the years, especially from Lebanese dwellers but also from Syrian and Palestinian refugees. also reflects several aspects of the Syrian migration history that I will further discuss during this part of the thesis, especially the patterns of housing that Syrians adopt.

5.2 Distribution of Syrian refugees at the national scale

The UNHCR estimates 945,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon at the time of writing. A census undertaken in 2017 counted just over 250,000²⁰⁷ individuals residing in informal settlements²⁰⁸. It can therefore be estimated that at least 700,000 Syrian refugees have resided in Lebanese urban areas, and this since 2014, the year when the number of registered refugees reached one million. Syrian refugees are settled in all regions, mostly concentrated in the larger cities and their peripheries and usually in neighbourhoods where housing is cheap and largely

²⁰⁷ This number does not include individuals living in precarious shelter conditions outside the informal settlements, or in the cities.

²⁰⁸ See Chapter 4 Section 3

substandard. The geographic distribution map (Figure 6-4) visually reflects the magnitude of the situation as well as its gravity. As can be seen the Syrian refugees are present in every area though in different concentrations. This percentage of population increase in a matter of three years is unprecedented and presents an “obvious challenge for any people” (El-Khoury, 2018, p. 99).




Figure 6-4: Evolution of Syrian refugee influx
 Based on the statistics of the UNHCR, this map developed for CARTO in 2017 shows the Evolution of the influx since 2011 and the spatial distribution in 2017. Source: (Gillette, Faour, & Verdeil, 2017, p. 17).

Estimated at hundreds of thousands, Syrian migrants in Lebanon before 2011 were

already residing in most cities of the country (Buccianti-Barakat, 2016, p. 263). During the first three years of the crisis (2011-2014) their entry to Lebanon took place with no constraints and was mostly unregulated. In this context, the choice of installation depended on social networks, access to shelter (Fawaz et al., 2014) and potential economic activity. Syrians are present in the eight *Moubafazat* (governorates) - as per the latest administrative reforms in 2003 (Figure 6-5) and there are trends that make some areas more accessible to them, especially living cost, personal networks and religious-political affiliation. The least costly shelter is in the informal settlements dotting the governorates closest to the Syrian border in the Bekaa and the North. These places shelter the most vulnerable and disenfranchised, those who need to rely most on aid. Most refugees however prefer the urban setting outside the settlements whenever possible, even when shelter conditions outside the settlements they can afford are precarious. "Of course I'm better off here, even in this garage. I'm closer to the highway, I can get picked for a day's construction work, I can get to places much faster and easier. It's very bad in the settlements, they're dying of the cold..." (*Wael, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016*).

The most consequential numbers of refugees are in the governorates of Bekaa-Baalbak-Hermel²⁰⁹ that comprise of large agricultural lands and include some of the only spaces in Lebanon that can be considered rural. Over 340,000 (36 percent) Syrian refugees are registered in these governorates that are bordered by Syria to the East, and include the first cities on the trajectory of a Syrian entering Lebanon. By virtue of their seasonal migration to work in agricultural fields in the Bekaa (and other industries across Lebanon), they have historically worked in these governorates. One refugee, around 50 years old originally from the rural areas of Aleppo told me: "The men in my family have worked in cultivation in Lebanon since the 1950s! We know our way around, it's not my first time here you know... but now I can't find work, what can I do?" (*Abu Amer, Syrian refugee in Jebjennine, personal interview, 2015*). Throughout the Syrian crisis, several cities in the Bekaa have been in the forefront of the news. Examples of such are Aarsal which ISIS infiltrated in 2014 and that has seen military intervention and numerous security events (Obeid, 2016; Perry & al-Khalidi, 2017; A. Suleiman, 2015; The Daily Star, 2018d), Jebjennine where some of the first informal settlements were set up, or Bar Elias, known to be home to more Syrians than Lebanese at present (Kanaan, 2016), among others.

The South of Lebanon has the least number of registered refugees. Almost 115,000 (12 percent) of the refugee population reside in this region in proximity with Israël²¹⁰. Lebanese residents in the south are predominantly Shiite Muslims with the exception of the major city of Saida that includes an important percentage of Sunni Muslim residents. The governorates of Beirut and the

²⁰⁹ See Chapter 2, Encadré 2-1 for details on administrative divisions in Lebanon

²¹⁰ Almost half of Southern Lebanon was under Israeli occupation between 1982 and 2000

North are home to around 250,000 (26 percent) registered refugees each, and are areas with significant numbers of Sunni Muslim communities. The governorate of Mount Lebanon is not accounted for separately in the UNHCR data, but included and managed for by the Beirut offices. Similarly, the governorates of the South and Nabatieh are aggregated in the accounts of the UNHCR, due to the relatively low number of Syrian refugees (Interview with UNHCR project officer, 2015).

Location name	Source	Data date	Population
Bekaa	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	36.3% 342,560
North Lebanon	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	26.2% 247,863
Beirut	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	25.6% 242,008
South Lebanon	UNHCR	31 Mar 2019	11.9% 112,182

Figure 6-5: Number of registered refugees
 Total number of registered refugees by area in Lebanon. Source: UNHCR data portal, 2019

Several factors have contributed to such a national distribution. The first was the government’s refusal to construct refugee camps (Buccianti-Barakat, 2016, p. 263). In 2011 when Syrian refugees began to arrive they would choose a location in an urban environment based on personal social networks. In many ways it could have been expected that “a large section of the Syrian refugees to capitalize on historical networks of migration and employment” (Fawaz, 2017a, p. 100) further t the history of migration of Syrians into Lebanon. Scholars have moreover found that refugees tend to prefer the anonymity and opportunity that a city would provide them, in contrast to the confinement and dependence on aid that a camp or informal settlement tend to present²¹¹. According to the UNHCR, they tend to “perceive urban areas as havens of modernity and democratic and economic prosperity. They hope to find safety, anonymity and better conditions allowing them to improve their livelihoods” (De Vriese, 2006, p. 17).

²¹¹ See Chapter 1 section 2

5.3 A debatable identity? Who are the Syrians in Lebanon?

The present day relationship between Lebanese and Syrian communities draws from two factors. First the old stereotypes rooted in historic events and perceptions: for many decades before 2011, Syrians were present in Lebanon as low-skilled migrants working primarily in agriculture and construction, and over a period of 30 years they were most visible on the streets as soldiers, and intelligence officers²¹². Second, since 2011 the Syrians have taken in a different quality as refugees. It was no longer only the active men who came to work or man the checkpoints, now the Syrians include entire families of refugees. The term refugee is also in itself complex for the Lebanese considering the history with the Palestinian refugees, still very present in cities. The old stereotypes have thus been nuanced in light of the recent and novel situation, and combined, they created renewed stereotypes and generalisations about Syrian refugees, four of which I will describe in Chapter 6.

Lebanon has not signed the 1951 UNHCR Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees. There is furthermore no national legislation dealing with refugees (Janmyr, 2016). On one hand the Lebanese government has opted against referring to the Syrians in Lebanon as refugees and has insisted on naming them *naziboun* (displaced)²¹³ in a conscious effort not to deal with them as refugees, emphasising the fact that the government does not adhere to nor is it willing to recognise any special rights - as intended by the United Nations and International laws - for this population. At the same time the term *laje'* (refugee) is increasingly pejorative, derogatory, and implies an “assumed passivity of individuals and collectivities labelled [as such]” (Fawaz et al., 2018, p. 5). For this reason some scholars and Syrians alike reject the term refugee, as I have seen repeatedly throughout the fieldwork for this thesis. In fact, 30 percent of the Syrian refugees I spoke with do not identify with the term or reject it completely: “No, I’m not a refugee”, they would tell me, “I don’t need to be”. The other 70 percent, while accepting the fact that they were refugees tended to be apologetic about it, and mostly linked their refugee status with the need for aid. Those would answer: “I don’t want to be, but what can I do?”, “where would I live?”, or “I need to feed my children”.

Once assigned, the power of a name is such that the process by which the name was selected generally disappears and a series of normative associations, motives and characteristics are attached to the named subject. By naming, this subject becomes known in a manner which may permit certain forms of inquiry and

²¹² See Chapter 1, Section 3

²¹³ In reality this is not the case, as “displaced” persons are those who do not cross borders but are displaced in their own country due to conflict or other reasons. according to UN definitions

engagement, while forbidding or excluding others. No doubt such simplifications allow people to both engage with and understand a complex world. However, the need for simplicity can be rapidly appropriated and taken advantage of by those with their own political agenda (Bhatia, 2005, p. 8).

Indeed the term refugee in Lebanon has become synonymous with extreme poverty and the need for aid, reflecting a status of extreme dependency and the reactions of the refugees I met over the years varied from disliking the term to rejecting it completely. Typically, when Syrians are not registered with the UNHCR, or when they do not seek aid, they use that as justification to reject the label. “Let me tell you something, whatever money I made while I was here, I made from international parties²¹⁴. I have not taken a Lebanese dollar since I came” (*Abu Nidal, Syrian refugee in Beirut, personal interview, 2016*) with this statement Abu Nidal rejected the fact that he is a refugee, revealing how the term is synonymous with the need for humanitarian aid, and almost devoid of its larger socio political aspects.

Another label used to refer to the Syrians is *El-Soureh* (the Syrian) that reflects the nationality and could refer in some situations to a job cluster, mainly concierge and construction worker. Since 2011, it is also used to refer to refugees. In Lebanon it is in fact not uncommon to refer to a job cluster by a nationality. For example house maids are often referred to as *Sirilankieh* (Sri Lankan) regardless of her²¹⁵ actual nationality. The nationality becomes therefore a stereotype, for example “the generic term *Sirilankieh* commonly refers to a domestic worker”²¹⁶(Dahdah, 2015, p. 107).

After positioning the refugees on the spatial and the social map, which has served to address the Syrian refugees in Lebanon as a specific social group within the country, and after delineating demographic tendencies and echoing a particular political situation at both the national and regional levels, I will turn in the following chapter to another scale. In it I will not only refer to the refugees as individuals, but I will detail their daily lives, addressing the processes of access to shelter/housing, work and to the public urban space specifically. While each refugee has an individual path taken to access the resources of the city, I will first draw on some general figures built on my empirical corpus, prolonging them with extracts of personal narratives and selected commented photographs, in a bid to express the main issues and reconstitute specific situations as well.

²¹⁴ Abu Nidal insisted on the fact that all the work he has done in Lebanon has been with or for international NGOs or individuals, and he considers that his revenues have never been from a local Lebanese individual or company.

²¹⁵ House maids, or the domestic help, are predominantly female.

²¹⁶ Original citation: “Le terme générique de *sirilankiyeh* (Sri Lankaise, en arabe) désigne d'ailleurs communément une domestique”.

Chapter 6. Daily life conditions of a Syrian refugee in cities in Lebanon



Figure 7-1: Garages as shelters for Syrian refugees, Tebbeneh

Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Couleur: Raphaëlle Cottreau

Over the course of my fieldwork for this dissertation I conducted thirty-three formal interviews with Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Eight of those were commented walks in which the conversation we were having would be complemented with notes on places, streets, and other urban experiences. I was able to record forty percent of the conversations due either to bad sound conditions or to reluctance from my interviewee. I also complemented these formal interviews with numerous informal chats that served mainly to validate or raise doubts on some of my notes. My findings fall into four themes that encompass the conditions of settlement for Syrian refugees' in the country. Those are housing, conditions of settlement, economic opportunities and to some more detail, access to public space.

6.1 Access to shelter

Of the refugees I met, fifteen lived with their immediate family in apartments of varying standards (including concierge rooms on the roof or at the entrance of a building); nine shared their apartments with one or more related families (usually siblings or cousins); four lived in garages or a storage room of a building, and five refugees did not disclose their shelter conditions. These types of shelter match four of six types of accommodation identified by the UNHCR in 2014. Based on a phone survey with 6,000 refugees, the organisation listed built apartments or houses, unfinished or substandard buildings, garages or shops, one room structures, collective shelters, and informal settlements as types of accommodation, and a seventh type listed as “other”, in which sixteen percent of the refugees resided (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 33).

A glimpse of the poor condition of housing

For all my interviewees, the shelter they could afford was sometimes in need of minor, but mostly major repairs, ranging from plumbing to serious structural problems. One of the families in Tebbeneh lived in the old and fragile building structure shown in Figure 7-2. “Before 2011, a couple of Syrian men resided on that first floor, but since then it’s an entire family with kids, I’d say seven or eight people”, told me a neighbour from a nearby building in an informal chat.



Figure 7-2: A Syrian refugee family lives in a building with degrading structure
Tebbeneh. October 2018

In fact, a vulnerability assessment carried out by the World Food Programme (WFP) with 4,966 households in 2017²¹⁷ found that “four percent of shelters are in dangerous conditions, severely damaged and/or at risk of collapse, while 28 percent have other urgent repair needs, such as unsealed windows, leaking roofs/walls, or damaged plumbing, latrines, bathing facilities or electricity” (Saiid, Elzuhairi, & Papavero, 2017, p. 22). Even in the cases where repairs have been undertaken, the results remain substandard. In Figure 7-3, a Syrian refugee family in Tebbeneh (Dahr el Moghr area specifically) explained to me the upgrades to their apartment that had just been finalised by “the UN” as they stated it, but were not sure of the exact organisation. In my notebook that day I wrote:

Today I took a walk with Em Tarek, a 42 year old Lebanese resident of Tebbeneh and maternal grandmother to two girls whom she financially cared for because her daughter is divorced and unemployed. She explained that Syrian families had recently been leaving the street where we were walking as rent was becoming too

²¹⁷ Precision on the methodology of the survey: “a two-stage cluster sampling methodology was utilized in 2017. A total of 4,966 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugee households were surveyed.¹ The interviewed households were comprised of 24,415 individuals, out of which 4,839 were children aged five and under” (Saiid, Elzuhairi, & Papavero, 2017 p.7)

much of a burden, they were moving to a cheaper area a few streets above. Only a few apartments rented to Syrians remained on the stretch of Nasr Street where we were walking. At one point she stopped and with an eager tone said: “Let’s see if Em Omar is at home, I want to show you, come on, they’ve just had the place done, it was a fund from the UN²¹⁸, the owner and tenant are very happy”, she said. (*Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2018*)





Figure 7-3: Upgrades in a Tebbeneh apartment

Upgrades by unknown organization include sealing windows, and inserting a door to the bedroom. October 2018

As the family showed me around the 40m² apartment lodging their family of seven, they repeated their gratitude and relief for the upgrades. The apartment was still substandard, with the most serious issue I witnessed being the very damp and degrading walls. The process that led to these upgrades is interesting. According to Em Tarek, some UN people were walking around the

²¹⁸ She was not sure which organisation it was exactly, it could have been the UN, the ICRC or any other international organisation.

area a while back, and she approached them to see what they were looking for. They were offering upgrades for apartments where Syrian refugees resided, and Em Tarek brought them to this family. No formal agreements were made with the owner, to the best of Em Tarek's knowledge, but the UN surveyed the apartment and sent three workers within a week to fix it up. They installed two wooden doors, one to the patio and the other to the bedroom, they sealed up four small windows, and installed new bathroom and kitchen accessories. Em Tarek commented on how the situation was a win-win, for the organisation that needed to work, for the Syrian tenants and for the Lebanese landlord as well. Em Omar and her family have been in Lebanon since 2011, some of the "very first people who came here", and paid \$300 (€260) in rent.

Before this intervention, the apartment owner had made no upgrades and the Syrian family had made no such request, even though the amount of rent paid is considered significant, and significantly superior to the rent rates from before the crisis. According to Em Tarek, the place would not have been rented for more than €150 before 2011. "Maximum, maximum, she said. Who could afford more? Don't forget the Syrians have aid, that's how they pay this much" (*Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016*). The owner therefore benefited twice from the space, making almost double the amount of rent the apartment is worth for over many years, and receiving upgrades at no cost because he was renting out to Syrians. In spite of the family's long term presence and their seemingly stable situation in the apartment, they still had no assurances. There was no rent contract and no legal residency documents²¹⁹, which meant they were exposed to eviction at any time with no recourse whatsoever to legal support. When I asked about this issue the mother said to me: "No our landlord is very good with us, he wouldn't do that... it's been almost seven years and we are never late to pay, and we don't give him any trouble" (*Em Omar, refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2018*).

In the cases where refugees rented garages to reside in, such as the four garages in Figure 7-4 they faced many challenges, mostly in terms of sanitation. With no toilets or showers, refugees would usually cope by sharing a bathroom with another family living in an upstairs apartment in the same building. The fact that there are no windows and no partitions also exacerbates the difficult living conditions in such spaces.

²¹⁹ Conditions of residency are discussed in more detail in the next section



Figure 7-4: Syrian refugees renting garages in Tebbeneh, June 2015

The situation in both El-Nab'a and Bourj el-Barajneh compares in terms of dire shelter conditions. Figure 7-5 from the EL-Nab'a neighbourhood shows the rooftop room housing a Syrian family of five, who use giant banners in lieu of a roof. It also shows the facade of an apartment housing two Syrian refugee families just below. When their windows are not used to hang laundry, they are closed with makeshift aluminum or cardboard panels. The frontage also reflects the poor status of the walls and structure. In Figure 7-6 the entrances to two different apartment buildings that housed Syrian refugees show extreme degradation, one in better condition that still reflects the existence of various electric systems - both formal and informal - (which explains the important number of wires) and the degraded walls and staircase. It was unclear to me whether the former tenants were Lebanese or other migrants, the Syrian families residing there did not know or did not say. Figure 7-7 shows the entrance to an electrical appliances workshop which harbored a Syrian refugee family for a while. They were not living there anymore at the time I took the photo, but Hala, my Lebanese interviewee on a commented walk that day said: "a family of five used the back room as shelter for several months between 2012 and 2013, and paid rent against it" (*Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab'a, personal interview, 2015*).



Figure 7-5: : Facade of a building where Syrian refugees live, El Nab'a, February 2015



Figure 7-6: Electrical appliance workshop in which a Syrian refugee family resides, 2015



Figure 7-7: Entrances to apartment buildings

Examples of three entrances to buildings where Syrian refugees reside, El Nab'a. February 2015

Housing conditions in Bourj el-Barajneh are the most challenging. To say shelter for an estimated 40,000 in almost 0.3 square kilometers, built informally over decades has produced a dangerously dire situation is not an exaggeration. The camp is, for an outsider, a maze of narrow streets of less than a meter wide at some points, full of critically low electrical cables, mostly placed close to water cables²²⁰ (Figure 7-8). It has grown vertically and quickly since 2012 without proper structural considerations. In the building to the left in Figure 7-9 the top five stories were built between 2012 and 2017, intentionally to be rented out to Syrians, just like the top three stories in the building in the center of the photo. The high-rise in Figure 7-10 was “almost all built for the Syrians” (*Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2018*). Already overcrowded before 2011, the camp would not have been able to almost double in population size were it not for these new constructions. The residents, Palestinian refugees who already struggled with securing livelihood, saw renting their apartments to Syrians as a worthy investment. Like the Lebanese hosts, they saw in Syrians a sure monthly rent, because the latter “get help with their rent, and they always pay on time” (*Setti Em Mohammad, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2018*). Em Mohammad, a grandmother who has lived in the camp since her birth in the 1950s, said she preferred to rent out to the Syrians than to the Palestinians. Living on the ground floor of her three story apartment, built by her family decades ago, she said they were acceptable neighbours, they gave her no trouble. Her main complaint about the Syrians though was that they were getting more aid than the Palestinians, an issue I will develop in chapter 7.

²²⁰ Although no official count exists, it is widely reported that at least a dozen deaths occur from electrical shocks per year in the camps.

Granted that housing conditions in a number of neighbourhoods in Lebanon have common features with the ones currently inhabited by refugees, seeing that a significant number of citizens in the country are poor, and that most of the urban setting is lacking or suffers from highly inadequate infrastructure, the question of rent value provides further explanation on the ways that refugees could also be considered a target to increase revenue in the housing sector.




Figure 7-8: Entrances to apartment buildings where Syrian refugees reside, El Nab'a February 2015



Figure 7-9: Vertical growth
Five new stories between 2012 and 2018 in the building to the left, and three new stories in the building in the center. February 2018



Figure 7-10: Figure 6.9: “That tall building didn’t exist in 2012”. February 2018

Monetizing vulnerability

To the question of rent values the migrants interviewed had to pay monthly for getting a place to live in, the answers mentioned strong differences from one site to the other. The rates I was given ranged between \$200-400 in Tebbeneh, \$150-350 in Bourj el-Barajneh and \$200-500 in El-Nab'a. Paying rent was one of the most pressing factors of stress for all the refugees I spoke with. While twelve of my interviewees reported receiving between “*shouai* (some)” of their rent value at some point from the UNHCR, they all reported having difficulties securing the rest, and most said the aid, when received, was insignificant. Rent was the factor that mostly influenced the choice of shelter for refugees (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 34) Those who did not have any support coped by (1) sending their children to work, (2) by sharing housing, (3) by moving to more affordable shelter, or by a combination of these strategies, like in the following example.

Yassin, a Syrian refugee in Bourj el-Barajneh since 2015, resorted to all three coping mechanisms to make ends meet. “We were staying at a place near Cola, but I couldn’t pay the \$400 ... we moved here to the camp in 2015, with my brother and his family, Here we are paying less than \$200. I secure around \$200 a month, and my sons [ages 11 and 13] now bring in another \$150, we are doing ok” (Yassin, *Syrian refugee in Bourj el Barajneh, personal interview*, 2018). Effectively, Yassin had to move to a more affordable area, he had to send both his children to work, and he opted to share shelter, to make ends meet. In a commented walk in the Tebbeneh, my Lebanese guide explained how most of the Syrians who lived on Nasr street had moved during the previous year. “They moved a couple of streets above - they’re now just anywhere, in storage rooms or rooms under staircases... *t’attaro* (they’ve been dealt a bad hand)” (Em Tarek, *Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview*, 2016).

Rental agreements are predominantly private, informal and not registered, between private dwellers: Syrian refugees and Lebanese in the cases of Tebbeneh and el-Nab'a, or Palestinians in the case of Bourj el-Barajneh. Importantly, of the twenty-four refugees I met with who live in apartments (not garages or storage rooms) share the buildings with Lebanese dwellers. In the example in Figure 7-11, a Lebanese dweller drew me a sketch of her building explaining where the Syrians were. The apartment facing her is exactly the same size (approximately 80m²). It is split in two and shared by two Syrian refugee families (nine people in all), who pay \$500 in rent per month. They pay \$100 more than the Syrian family of five on the top floor because they are overcrowding the apartment, and their landlord²²¹ deemed it more fitting that they should pay more in total because they pay less per family.

²²¹ The two apartments occupied by Syrians are owned by two different Lebanese landlords.

I asked Mirvat, my Lebanese interviewee, if she knew her Syrian neighbours next door. “Not really, no... we don’t talk much. They are two families that share the apartment, it’s very crowded - they’ve placed a separation in the entrance, it’s not very practical but they are ok with it”. Mirvat then asked if I wanted to see the neighbour’s apartment and knocked at their door. A surprised woman opened, and I could see four children playing in the background. Mirvat greeted the woman and asked her if I could look around the apartment - a request which clearly made the tenant uncomfortable. After a brief moment I apologised for the intrusion and we went back into Mirvat’s apartment. “Of course they wouldn’t want you to see... when a person is proud of their place they let you in... you’ve been welcome in my house, because I’m proud of it”.

Abusive practices: brokers, evictions, arbitrary rent increases

In 2019, a refugee in El-Nab’a told me via whatsapp that they had moved. I pressed to find out why, because the last time I saw her she seemed satisfied with the apartment they were renting. “What do you want me to say ya Dima?” (*Maryam, Syrian refugee in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 2016*) she said in a voice note. Their broker asked them to vacate in one week maximum, because he found someone that would pay \$50 more for it. When they tried to negotiate, he said he could reconsider if they matched the amount, which was an impossibility. For the price they were paying, he offered them another place still in El-Nab’a, it had been their third move since 2016, and the last two managed by the same broker.

Maryam’s story is not unique, in fact in El-Nab’a the “broker” phenomenon is widespread. Many apartment owners have left the management of their places to individual brokers or even small brokerage firms that have significant power in the process. In fact, “the rental market in Naba’a clearly favors landlords and those with strong social networks. Rental arrangements are informal, and landlords or their middle-men are able to charge higher rents, increase them more often, and enforce evictions more readily” (Fawaz et al., 2014, p. 61).

In contrast, the phenomenon does not exist at all in Bourj el-Barajneh, and in very limited scope in Tebbeneh. This is probably due to the fact that residential mobility is present to a larger degree in El-Nab’a than in the other two sites, and also to the fact that there is a larger mix of nationalities, ethnicities and religious groups, as described in chapter four. The nature of the populations in the other two sites is more conservative, and there is a dominant presence of one religious group, within which the dwellers are more familiar with each other.

Evictions are a common occurrence across the three sites. They are enforced at varying degrees of violence, ranging from a friendly “request” to move out, to a threat of police

intervention; and varying degrees of authority, ranging from the landlord to the neighbours to the local authorities. Based on the information I gathered in my interviews as direct experiences, and indirect experiences (where my interviewees knew of someone who was evicted), I was able to identify three types of evictions (Table 6.1). The first type is at the landlord - tenant level and mainly takes place when the refugees are not able to make rent on time. This type of eviction is mainly enforced through dialogue, that can range between a civil conversation to a violent one. While in most cases a conversation happens before the eviction, refugees expect them to the extent that they will sometimes leave an apartment or shelter before being asked, when they know they cannot pay as was the case of Maysaa's family. In 2017, she had been residing in Tebbeneh for around six months when I met her. Her family of five had been living in closer to the center of Tripoli but had been struggling with rent for a year before moving.

We had always found a way to pay on time, we paid \$300 for a nice apartment, we were comfortable. I sold most of my jewelry, my husband worked on anything and everything. It was ok for the first year, but it started to get harder with time. Around [June 2016] we were really struggling, and we started to borrow money from our friends. That was a big mistake... by the end of last year, we knew we couldn't pay the rent anymore. In December my husband had hardly worked four or five days in all and we were already in debt. My husband's cousin suggested we move in with them and share rent... but I did not accept... no no no... I told my husband we would find anything else, even a single room but have our privacy... before the end of December we had found this place, and moved. I told [my husband] let's just do it before [the landlord] kicks us out... We are still in debt but it's already less stressful at the end of the month. (Maysaa, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2017)

The second type of eviction is carried out by the authorities, and are usually mass evictions that have become more frequent since January 2015. The date when new residency requirements were elaborated, as discussed in section 6.2. These are violently carried out by municipal police. The case explained in chapter 1, Encadré 1-4 serves as an example of this type of eviction. In that case, around 100 Syrians were woken after midnight and forced to leave under police surveillance, in public view. In another example, all Syrians within the boundaries of the municipality of Ehden were asked to vacate their shelter within a certain timeframe. This was done by public announcement via banners placed in the municipality (Figure 7-12). The message on these banners was vague, though, and literally reads "It is requested of all Syrian workers present within the boundaries of Ehden to leave before 31/10/2016". It was unclear whether it was only the workers who were asked to leave or the entire families, and equally unclear whether the banners were meant to evict the workers from their residences or only from their work

activity. I showed this banner to fifteen Syrian refugees whom I interviewed, and their unanimous understanding of the message was that all Syrians in the area were being evicted. Had they been residing in Ehden, all fifteen said that they would make arrangements to leave.

The third type of evictions is the hardest to describe, because it comes in the form of social pressure. All thirty three of my refugee interviewees expressed in some way feeling unwelcome at some point during their residence, but three refugees clearly and specifically felt socially pressured to move, when the reason was not related to rent. One such case happened with Mansour, a refugee residing in Tebbeneh. He used the words “we were thrown out” from Abu Samra, a central neighbourhood in Tripoli. I initially understood that they were not able to pay rent, but when he explained it was not that, I wanted to know more. I noted this as one of the very tense conversations I had during my field investigations, because Mansour was getting very agitated as he explained.

No nobody asked us to leave but how can I tell you? I just knew I had to get my family out of there. [I pressed to know more]. You know... How can I say it... For example our upstairs neighbours threw water at our balcony every day. Whenever we passed any Lebanese neighbours they would whisper profanities, but just loud enough so we could hear them. My wife would not let my children play outside, she was afraid all the time... and we were the only Syrians in the building, there were six or seven other families, all Lebanese. There was this one man, from a couple of floors up... his look made me feel dirty... he almost scared me. He would have done something bad. We just couldn't stay, do you understand now? (*Mansour, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2017*)

Another example of this type of social pressure can be seen in public banners and graffiti. In Figure 7-13 the banner reads: “the day will come when we tell the Syrian: pack up your things and everything you stole and leave”. This quotation from a former, assassinated, political leader²²² was used during the parliamentary election campaign of 2018, and reflects the spatially represented social pressure against Syrian refugees.

²²² Bachir Gemayel, former leader of the Lebanese Forces who was assassinated shortly after being elected as President of the republic. The figure of Gemayel is very significant as a representation of the maronite christian right


Table 6.1: Three types of evictions

Type of eviction	Reason	Enforcement
Evictions at the tenant-landlord level	Mainly inability to pay rent	Dialogue, ranging from friendly to violent
Evictions by authorities	Non adherence to municipality rules, no residency permits	Public demand, army or police raids
Socially enforced evictions	Different and numerous acts of daily rejection	Social pressure

The story of Rami: a struggle for dignity

May God never try anyone [as he has tried me]... I am so afraid all the time. I don't want to end up in a camp with my wife and children, people are freezing there. I am making enough right now. I bring in \$300, sometimes \$350 or a bit more! I am lucky, the bosses know I am serious and good at what I do. I pay the \$250 for rent, but then we struggle for the food and heat. At least we're in a proper apartment. I wouldn't accept the camp, *abadan, abadan* (never ever). I wouldn't. I would die first... If it gets to that I will sell my kidney, I know where to go to do that. (*Rami, personal interview, El-Nab'a, 2016*).

Rami, a gypsum board worker was living in El-Nab'a in 2016 with his wife, four children, and his mother-in-law in a one bedroom apartment. He was reluctant to take me to see it all the while insisting his family was much better off than most families he knew. He had already moved twice in three years - because of the rent rate. This type of housing mobility is experienced by at least 10-20 percent of the refugee population as detailed in Encadré 6.1.



Harba street, at Mirvat's

Syrian 5 people 400USD rent		Lebanese
Lebanese		Lebanese
Lebanese		Lebanese
Lebanese		Lebanese
Syrian 9 people 500USD rent		Mirvat



Figure 7-11: Sketch by Lebanese dweller of her apartment building in Tebbeneh, and the street showing the building to the right. 2017



Figure 7-12: Public banner in Ehden requesting all Syrian workers to leave the municipality boundaries. Source: The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014



Figure 7-13: Public banner in Ashrafieh reads: “the day will come when we tell the Syrian: pack up your things and everything you stole and leave

The figure of Gemayel is very significant as a representation of the maronite christian right.
Source: Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018

Encadré 7-1: Excerpt from vulnerability assessment

In a vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in 2017, the World Food Programme surveyed 4,966 households. Twelve per cent of those said they had changed accommodations during the previous six months, while 10 percent were planning to move in the following six months, with a higher prevalence in Tripoli (20 percent).

Eviction is increasingly the main reason cited by households for either a recent or planned move. Other major reasons for past or expected mobility were unaffordable rent expenses and unacceptable housing conditions. For those households that moved in the previous six months, 38 percent left because of eviction, 20 percent due to unaffordable rents, and 9 percent due to unacceptable housing conditions. Of those households planning on moving within the following six months, 45 percent cited eviction (compared to only 25 percent last year), while 22 percent specified unaffordable rents, and 7 percent named unacceptable housing conditions. Security threats or tension with the community were mentioned by 5 percent of households who had recently moved, as compared to 2 percent in 2016. (Saiid et al., 2017, p. 28).

	Households that had moved in the previous six months 11.9%	Household that expected to move in the next six months 10.30%
Reasons		
End of assistance/hosting	2%	4%
End of rent agreement	1%	0%
Eviction by authorities	6%	5%
Eviction by owner	32%	40%
Harassment	1%	0%
No work opportunities in the area	4%	1%
Not enough privacy for the family	5%	3%
Rent too expensive	20%	22%
Security threats	2%	1%
Shelter and WASH conditions not acceptable	9%	7%
Tension with the community	3%	0%
Tension with the landlord	3%	4%
Other	12%	11%

6.2 The strenuous road to residency

Since 2015 the conditions of residency of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have been very complicated. After historically being a matter of formality for both Lebanese and Syrians to cross the borders, it is now a costly, lengthy, and difficult process to go through. In fact, the conditions of residency can be divided into four phases (Encadré 7-2) that saw their legal status and social standing deteriorate in Lebanon (El-Khoury Tannous, Bautès, & Bergel, 2018)

In the first few months of the influx, Syrian refugees entered Lebanon without significant administrative processes. In that sense, their settlement did not differ much from other economic

migrants coming to cities in Lebanon. In February of 2013, the number of refugees reached 188,000. Those first arrivals constituted mainly of the families and extended families of Syrians already in Lebanon, and therefore arrived directly to their networks' places of residence. In that sense they had little socio-political or urban effects. Other than the almost immediate set up of the UNHCR as the primary governing body of the crisis²²³, and the few but loud warnings from various political leaders, administrative processes remained unchanged. During this first phase, some local authorities reacted immediately by increasing security patrols and placing illegal curfews, but otherwise on the national level no major decision or action was taken.

With the conflict in Syria clearly escalating, the protracted nature of the presence of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon became clearer. The influx continued and increased, and in February of 2013 alone, 160,000 new refugees were registered by the UNHCR. The rate continued at 60,000 refugees per month for the next fourteen months, when the one millionth refugee was registered. During this phase, social tensions were on the rise. The open border policy remained unchanged and Syrian refugees were still arriving at a rate of “more than a refugee per minute” (DW, 2014).

When they first came we welcomed them, I'm telling you from personal experience. We provided housing, immediately provided materials. I gave them mattresses from my own house, and pots, and basic household needs. But quickly their presence reflected negatively on us! The rent went crazy high, they were getting help and we were getting nothing... (*Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016*)

International aid during this second phase was already limited “current humanitarian aid appeal for Lebanon was only 13 percent funded” (DW, 2014) and it was being directed towards Syrian refugees exclusively. Even though it was hardly sufficient to support the large Syrian refugee population, it still aroused resentment from vulnerable Lebanese communities. A year after that, a Lebanese construction worker in el-Nab'a told me “we can't buy new shoes for our children, we struggle to send them to school, and Syrians are getting all this support for free! Of course they will keep coming!” (*M'allem Jamil, Lebanese dweller in El-Nab'a, personal interview, 2015*). This discourse, born from the first two years of international aid being directed to Syrians, has lingered even till 2018. At a community event organised in Tebbeneh by a UN agency, one Lebanese organiser told me: “It's a good thing to help refugees, we all know that. But what about the Lebanese? I know people who are much worse off than the Syrians. Do you think Tebbeneh did not need this kind of project before they came? Now, they are looking at us - but there has to

²²³ Further to the dissociation policy adopted by the Lebanese government

be Syrians as well for us to be considered for aid, I'm telling you that's the way it is" (*Em Tarek, Lebanese dweller in Tebbeneb, personal interview, 2016*). Em Tarek words reflect the fact that while Syrian refugees have been dominated by certain Lebanese, they have at the same time aroused the latter's resentment, who in some cases feel forgotten or less visible as nationals, but equally vulnerable. The domination of Syrian refugees is as such also an accusation, doubled and contradictory.

During this second phase, the refugees who were in majority settled in the cities started to weigh heavily on the frail urban infrastructure. In some municipalities refugees outnumbered Lebanese dwellers. Starting mid-2014, the government came under large popular pressure to act as tensions rose to high limits in the second half of 2014, and during this third phase the government prepared for drastic changes to the entire process of Syrian refugees' entry and residency in Lebanon. The fourth phase began with the government assuming the lead over the management of the refugees instead of the UNHCR and the international aid community (Boustani, Carpi, Gebara, & Mourad, 2016, p. 15).

Encadré 7-2: Syrian presence in Lebanon, four phases of changing conditions.

	Condition of entry	Conditions of residence	Approximate number of refugees	Sociopolitical context
Phase 1 : March 2011- February 2013	Free access with passport or ID card. Verification at the border. Six-months visa automatically granted.	Renewable Six-months residency upon personal visit to the General Security Offices, symbolic fees.	188,000	Short lived support from Lebanese communities. Syrians socially considered refugees with restricted mobility in some municipalities.
Phase 2 : March 2013- April 2014			1,045,000	200, 000 refugees registered between February and March 2013. The one millionth refugee mark resonates nationally and internationally.

Phase 3 : May 2014- December 2014			1,170,000	Tensions rise right after the Syrian presidential elections that the Syrians in Lebanon heavily participate in. Government places new restrictive conditions on entry and residence of Syrians in Lebanon. The number of entries starts to decrease.
Phase 4 : January 2015- December 2016	Restricted access. A few categories of refugees are more accepted than others including educated youth, artists, the rich, and Christians in some areas.	Renewable one year residency under very restrictive conditions. A fee of \$200 per person for residency renewal is enforced.	1,033,000	Restrictions on mobility and residency, and the <i>kafala</i> system applied to Syrians. Syrians placed under personal responsibility of a Lebanese guardian. Number of registered refugees begins to decrease.
Phase 5 : December 2016-present		Majority of refugees dwell without legal residency	944,613	Continued decrease in number of refugees

Source: (El-Khouri Tannous et al., 2018, p. 43)

To secure residency under the *kafala* system²²⁴ is one of the most stressful and challenging

²²⁴ For details, see Chapter 1 Section 1.2; and Chapter 3 Section 2.1

issues for refugees. And the

situation was further exacerbated by the informality through which the *kafala* regulation was/has been enforced: regulations change, access to information is difficult, and enforcement flaky at best. In consequence, the *kafala* reinforced Syrians' dependence and vulnerability vis-à-vis the local population (El-Khoury, 2018 p.102)

The *kafala* facilitated the exploitation of refugees, and for it to be successful it highly depended on the personal relationship a Syrian refugee would have with his or her *kafeel*. Every Syrian refugee I spoke to, whether it be the thirty-three formal interviews, informal chats, or even references made to other Syrians in their network, everyone spoke worriedly of the challenge of *kafala*. The nine people who had it and were 'legal' worried about the cost of renewing it, or about the losing of their *kafeel* for whatever reason. The remaining majority worried about being stopped on the streets and interrogated, their papers being taken from them, or being deported. While most Syrian refugees tended to worry equally about shelter and *kafala*, it is the latter that caused them the most stress. I believe it is because the consequences of not having legal papers go beyond their control and are almost entirely in someone else's hands.

Mohammad, a refugee in his mid twenties living in el-Nab'a told me that he came to Lebanon to escape army drafting.

I was told there's a man who would be willing to be my *kafeel* and do all the papers but that he would charge \$400, and I had to send him the money in advance. Of course I did, I had no choice... I never heard from him again! His line was always closed... I was in real trouble, then a friend of mine spoke with his *kafeel* and connected me with another Lebanese man who became my *kafeel* for free. He lives not far from here, I clean his car three times a week and run errands when he needs me - I do it happily, I would be in the army if it weren't for him! And he really doesn't overdo it. I know Syrians who practically work full time for their *kafeel* without a dime... I was really lucky but it was a personal connection. (Mohammad, personal interview, 2016)

These favors against being someone's *kafeel* are very recurrent, and except in extreme cases they are seen as fair game on both sides, as mentioned to me by over 90 percent of the Syrians who had a guarantor. The Syrians are grateful to their guarantor, and the latter sees the exchange as a form of fair barter. In many cases as well, the Syrian under *kafala* would work full time for the guarantor at a reduced rate - mostly as building concierges. This is perhaps one of the more direct forms of negotiating space between refugees and hosts in Lebanon: a clear barter, service for residence. It has far reaching implications, as sponsors exert significant control over

the person they guarantee. Abuses my interviewees have directly been subject to, or that they have heard about include being asked for small favors (cleaning a car, or painting a wall or a post), significant work (work part time or even full time), sexual favors (ranging from flirtation to not clear what the barter is in this case, who is the woman, Syrian or Lebanese and marrying who?). The Syrian's contribution to the barter, to the negotiation, varies considerably, against an unchanging contribution from the Lebanese side: allowing the refugee to legally dwell in Lebanon.

While being a *kafeel* should in theory be free, 15 percent of my interviewees mentioned the phenomenon of Syrian *kafala* brokers that has emerged since 2015. In a role similar to the one Mohammad's friend played to secure him a *kafeel*, a Syrian *kafala* broker who has a network would link Syrian refugees with a potential *kafeel* against a varying fee - which could be between 10 percent and 30 percent of what the *kafeel* would charge (the rates mentioned ranged from \$200 to \$1,000 per year for the *kafeel*). The whole process being informal means that the Syrian refugee seeking a *kafeel* risks wasting time and money with no guarantee of success. The steps of the process are reflected in Encadré 7-3

Encadré 7-3: Process undertaken by Syrian refugees to secure a *kafeel*. 2019

Step	Option	Process	Most probable result	Risks
1- Find an individual who would accept to be the <i>kafeel</i>	Personal network		Friendly relationship, best case scenario	
	Work connection (the boss is the <i>kafeel</i>)		Double exploitation / reduced wages, increased working hours and tasks	
	Secure a paid <i>kafeel</i>	Contact a <i>kafeel</i> directly	pay a high fee, risk losing the money with no follow up	Be asked to work for the <i>kafeel</i> for free
		Contact a <i>kafeel</i> broker	pay a high fee, calculated risk	Be asked to work for the <i>kafeel</i> for free
2- Get information	Ask NGOs or network		Receive basic information	
	Call General Security Offices	make two or more calls to check process	Risk receiving conflicting information, need to start over	
3- Prepare documentation	Notarise various documents	Visit different authorities	Change documentation , pay	

			fees twice	
4- Apply at GSO of the place of residence	No option	Arrive as early as possible and wait in line	Wait outside for hours with no information	Humiliation, spend another day waiting, give up the process and reside without documentation.
			Be turned away after several hours of waiting	
			Be asked for different documents, or minor changes in provided documents Figure 7-14: Statement of responsibility	
			Wait between 1-3 months for processing	



Figure 7-14: Statement of responsibility

Notarised “Statement of Guarantee of Responsibility”, or *kafala*, provided by a Lebanese *kafeel* for a Syrian refugee. The document was rejected the first time on April 2, 2015 because of a missing phrase, which necessitated the duplication of the process of producing the document and its cost. (Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 2016)

In Figure 7-14: Statement of responsibility and within a week’s time, the refugee and his *kafeel* were obliged to reproduce a document due to a missing phrase. While on April 2, 2015 the guarantor signed an attestation accepting legal responsibility over the refugee, she had to add the phrase “knowing that I am not the guarantor of any other refugee”, after being turned down by the GSO. The informality of the residency secured via the *kafala* system does not stop at the

process. The actual residency permit is not entirely official. Jad, a Syrian refugee residing in Beirut told me in 2016

I just discovered that it's not really an official residency (Figure 7-15: Two sample *kafala* residency cards) and I am not officially a resident. I only have the authorisation of my *kafeel* to reside in Lebanon. I discovered this because I couldn't apply for a three-day tourist visa to Cyprus to attend my friend's wedding - the embassy did not accept my file, because they said it's not legal.. And yet I supposedly have the residency that cost me \$200 (180€) per year. And I had to pay it retroactively to cover for 2014... They did not give me any receipt but I don't suspect foul play, there's a system and everybody pays. This system is in place to limit the number of Syrians in Lebanon. (Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 2016).




Figure 7-15: Two sample *kafala* residency cards

Just shy of thirty per cent of the refugees I interviewed did have legal residency and a *kafeel*, but none of them was from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp. My interviewees in the camp, both Palestinians and Syrians concurred that it was unlikely that any Syrian in the camp had a legal residency. “Who would check?” was an answer I got in 90 percent of the cases. They also concurred that the Syrians in the camp would only need to worry about the legality of their residency once they decide to leave the country and need to regularize their residency or “pay the fines”.

6.3 The decisive question of accessing a job

“I don’t have the right to work, but when I announce that I don’t work, no GSO agent believes me” (*Jad, Syrian refugee, personal interview, 2016*). Indeed, the informality within which Syrian refugees work in Lebanon is implicitly acknowledged and publicly rejected at the same time. Less than twenty percent of the refugees I interviewed said they were not able to secure work at all. Sixty percent were able to work on an irregular basis, with no assurances of securing jobs from day to day.

Only fifteen percent, or five of the refugees I interviewed had what they referred to as secure jobs, though none of them had signed a contract, or had any sort of benefits. Three of those individuals were shop vendors (one female and two males), and two were waiters (both males). They have little choices other than accepting informal, precarious working conditions because legally they are not allowed to work. It places them in an unavoidably exploitable situation, and they risk legal repercussions if they are caught working. “My brother was arrested and beaten because he was caught working at a café in Tripoli” (*Mansour, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2017*). Indeed, Syrian refugees in my interviews all reported knowing someone in their immediate family who was physically assaulted at the workplace.

The prevalent opportunities for Syrian refugees to work lie in the construction, agriculture and low-skill service sector (waiters, delivery-men, petrol station attendees, supermarket baggers), not much different than the case had been before 2011. The most comprehensive assessment of the employment profile of Syrian refugees in Lebanon was conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2013, with 400 households in the North (Akkar, Tripoli), the Bekaa, and South Lebanon, and the survey was complemented with various qualitative interviews (Masri & Srour, 2013). Clearly “the sample size and design is too small to make reliable generalisations about the entire population of Syrian refugees; the data provides for a basic situation analysis only” (Masri & Srour, 2013, p. 11), and moreover it does not include any households in Beirut. It found that 47 percent are active, and of those 30 percent are completely unemployed. Employment includes monthly and part time employment, predominantly in the informal sector. While it varies largely from one area to another, “Syrian refugees have an average monthly income of \$277”²²⁵, and the “lowest average monthly incomes were found in Akkar and Tripoli - respectively \$238 and \$245” (Masri & Srour, 2013 p. 28). In my findings, Syrian refugees who were able to secure some sort of work (including the five I

²²⁵ The minimum wage in Lebanon is \$450

interviewed and the information they gave me on some of their family members who found work) gained between \$100 and \$350 per month, numbers that are comparable to the findings of the survey.

While these statistics suggest the broad nature of the economic situation of the refugees, what is more relevant in this thesis are the relations that have ensued between the different groups further to the increased competition over work that was mentioned by every person in my interviews, Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians alike. The competition comes at two levels, first at a micro enterprise or small shop level, and second at the low skill job level - specifically waiters and delivery men. There is also competition at the skilled construction work level. From what I have seen, competition at jobs that require advanced education, such as banking, engineering, teaching etc. is minimal if existent.

Among and beyond the Syrian refugees: the recurrence of competition

In 2018, I met a Lebanese bakery owner in El-Nab'a, Farahat Bakery, who had operated for around 11 years (Figure 6.17).

Last year, I made the mistake of my life. I hired a Syrian to help me out in this shop. I paid him well, \$250 per month, and I taught him everything. He learned, and he met all my clients, and six months later, he quit the job without notice and without explanations - I never heard from him again. Then a month ago, a client of mine came by and asked my why my man'ousheh (traditional Lebanese thyme breakfast) were not as good in the other place! I was shocked, I didn't understand what he meant. It turns out the Syrian I had hired opened his own bakery just down the road [Al-Malek] (Figure 7-16: Position of Farahat bakery, the competition, and a commercial street in El-Nab'a)... and he is telling everyone it's a new branch of my shop!

The shop down the road which he indicated was also a bakery and run by a Syrian who did not accept to speak to me. In a commercial street in the same site, out of nine shops, seven were managed by Syrians, and two of those said they were the owners of the business, but rented the shop from a Lebanese person. All the shops were small, mostly selling clothing items.




Figure 7-16: Position of Farahat bakery, the competition, and a commercial street in El-Nab'a

While in some areas micro enterprises such as these have been targeted by the authorities with immediate notices of closure given to the shop owners or managers, application is not nationwide and in El-Nab'a for example, no serious action against them has taken place.

In Bourj el-Barajneh, such competition is also very visible. In the main street at the entrance of the camp, 60 percent of the shops are owned and run by Syrians. “My main problem with them is that they only benefit each other. Us Palestinians, we don’t mind benefiting a Syrian shop - but they only work with each other” (*Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2018*). It is actually a complaint I heard over and over in the camp. Ihsan, who had been running an orange juice kiosk during the holy month of Ramadan (Figure 7-17: Palestinian and Syrian shops Figure 7-17) told me the same thing: “they wouldn’t at all buy juice from me, I know it. I only count on the Palestinians, but even the Palestinians buy from them when it is cheaper, my mom buys her lentils from the Syrian next door, it’s cheaper” (*Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-Barajneh, personal interview, 2017*).



Figure 7-17: Palestinian and Syrian shops

Formerly one big shop, the Palestinian owner split the space into three and rented two shops to Syrians at the entrance of Bourj el-Barajneh, while he ran the pharmacy (to the right of the photo).

Ihsan’s account touched on the specific situation of the Palestinians. While the difficulties

resulting from competition and the presence of refugees parallel those of the Lebanese dwellers in other cities, the reality of the Palestinian identity added to the complexity in this case.

Assimilation as a coping mechanism to access work

In Figure 7-18: Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is?, a Lebanese asks on social media: “Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is?”. The reply below reflects several aspects of the widespread phenomenon of assimilation that Syrians have used as a coping mechanism.

Silly but sometimes funny: you are at one of the Lebanese restaurants and the poor waiter who's been instructed by his employer to address the clients with a Lebanese accent in order to prevent the clients from boycotting his place!! It's sometimes hilarious when he/she desperately tries, and the cherry on top: he introduces a couple of French words like *Meeeeercieee* (Merci, thank you) and *siltouplai* (s'il te plait, please)

First to note is the fact that Lebanese restaurants opt to hire Syrians rather than Lebanese because it is more profitable, and prefer it if their clients did not notice, knowing that this would cause, in the least, private complaints to the owner, and in more extreme cases official complaints to authorities - which could imply legal problems. This confirms the second aspect, that Syrians indeed compete with Lebanese at this level, and in this job specifically, which Syrians before 2011 did not work in. Lastly, the reply well reflects the efforts of Syrians to assimilate to the Lebanese culture, not only by learning the accent, but also the nuances including using more than one language in a phrase - in this case French, with stress on the wrong pronunciation - to insist that a Lebanised Syrian can still be recognised. This also confirms what 90 percent of the refugees I spoke with told me, that they find it necessary to fake a Lebanese accent to be able to access basic services, or to avoid trouble, in the cities.



Figure 7-18: Do you know what a Lebanised Syrian is?

Syrians have grown accustomed to the Lebanese ways and accent, and have become able in many cases to pass for Lebanese as a coping mechanism²²⁶. They often employ this specific mechanism to avoid tensions. Widad, a Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh since 2012, shared a story:

The other day, a woman came into the clothes shop where my daughter works as a salesperson and was obviously agitated. When my daughter asked her the reason, the woman asked her if she was Lebanese or Syrian. My daughter replied that she was Lebanese, which was not true. The woman then angrily says: “All the salespeople are Syrians! I’ve had enough! they’ve taken our jobs and our children! I can’t stand to shop anymore” And my daughter replied to her “ I hope we get rid of them very soon ya hajjeh”. Just like that I’m telling you!

While the story serves as a joke in the home of Widad, the reality is that her daughter was in a position where she felt she had to betray her origins to avoid a potentially conflictual situation

²²⁶ See section 3 below for details on coping mechanisms.

6.4 Access to public space: constraints and tactics of invisibility

The only Lebanese official authorities dealing directly with the Syrian refugees between their arrival in 2011 and 2014 were the municipalities. This was the direct effect of the national government's dissociation with the Syrian crisis. No national strategy or framework to govern and organise their conditions of dwelling. Between March 2011 and December 2014, municipalities were left to deal with the Syrians as each deemed fit. Coupled with two factors, first that municipalities reflect the religious and political divides of the land (and the families originating from the municipality²²⁷), and second that many municipalities are underfunded and under-resourced, the way the different municipalities dealt with the issue varied significantly. For example a municipality of a right wing Christian area would favor the Christian Syrian refugees who are *min melletna* (like us) and “facilitate their movement” (*Tanios Ghanem, Head of Municipality of Baskinta, personal interview, 2015*)²²⁸ while holding Sunni Syrian strictly to the curfew. A municipality of a Shiite majority area would favor Shiite and Alawi Syrians and provide them with support in their quest for work, as one taxi driver in Dahieh pointed out to me “*badol minna ou fina* (they are our brothers)” (*Taxi driver, personal informal interview, 2015*). The religious and political affiliations of the refugees themselves was also a factor in the degree of rights they were given as dwellers. Negotiation and confrontation between the Lebanese and the Syrians is as such concentrated at the local levels. In consequence, it is not surprising that the question of use of public space is a central one.

Curfews as regulators of the use of public space

One security measure that was adopted by municipalities across the country is the enforcement of curfews on Syrian dwellers. Sometimes formally and sometimes informally, the mobility of Syrians was restricted especially during the hours of the night. Officials have stated that the foremost reason for these curfews is to insure security. In reality, the curfews appeased the tensions amongst Lebanese dwellers who felt empowered, and increased tensions amongst Syrian dwellers who felt frustrated.

Towards the end of 2014, Human Rights Watch “identified at least 45 municipalities across the country that [had imposed] curfews” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These highly “restrictive measures prohibited [Syrians] from the use of public spaces and reinforced the mistrust between Lebanese and Syrians, giving rise to negative coping mechanisms including avoidance practices, reactions of intolerance or even acts of violence” (El-Khoury Tannous et al.,

²²⁷ See Part 1 Chapter 2, Governance of cities in Lebanon

²²⁸ A town in the Keserwan district of Mount Lebanon, comprised mainly of Maronite Christians

2018, p. 37). They furthermore contributed “to an increasingly hostile environment for Syrian refugees in the country” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Indeed, “soon after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Lebanon, hostility to the presence of forced migrants began to visibly materialize” (El-Khoury, 2018, p. 101). The curfews are most commonly communicated through large banners hanging over main streets and detailing the specific curfew details, with the implicit or explicit support of municipal authorities. Some banners seem more official than others, due to size, placement, presence of a municipality name or logo etc. These restrictions on mobility placed Syrians in a second class status: not only did they fear being stopped and interrogated by municipal police or authorities, but local civilian groups became empowered to apply the curfew by means of violent behavior. Human Rights Watch reported an incident when “municipal police prevented [a Syrian refugee] from getting medicine for his sick child from a pharmacy next to his house at 8:45 p.m.” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In other more telling examples of how curfews are being enforced

[refugees] did however report instances of violent acts committed by Lebanese civilians. One refugee was beaten by two Lebanese residents who saw him walking on the streets during curfew times. Another woman stated that her husband’s car was stopped by a group of Lebanese civilians while he was on his way to a work-related emergency at a construction site. Armed with sticks, the men forced her husband and his colleagues to stand against a wall, while they searched the car and threw away the working tools. They verbally insulted them and seized their passports. As they were about to beat them up, the municipal police patrol showed up and put an end to the attack. The civilian men justified their actions on the grounds that the Syrians were in breach of the curfew. However, the police told them that they were responsible for enforcing the curfew, and not the residents themselves. Yet, the police proceeded with scolding the Syrians for breaking the curfew before letting them go (El Helou, 2014, p. 3).

While none of my interviewees had direct encounters with curfew enforcement, almost half of them told me they knew someone who did. The stories range from mild incidents to violent ones, not very different from the above example. Curfews are technically illegal in Lebanon as a former minister of Interior confirmed (Sharq al Awsat, 2013). Municipalities are moreover not authorized to enforce a curfew which is the jurisdiction of national security and are only to be used during a state of emergency. I asked municipality officials in Tripoli, Mount Lebanon and in Beirut how they might approach a person if they were not sure of his or her nationality. In all instances, and mirroring the answer I continually got from Lebanese dwellers throughout this research, the answer was: “we know them. From their clothes, from their slippers, from their walk. You could not mistake a Lebanese for a Syrian”.

Community expressions countering the violence of the curfews is present but spatially and temporally limited (Figure 7-19). For example, in 2016 a demonstration of around one hundred youth²²⁹ took place in Beirut, calling out curfews as racist actions and also calling for more rights for the Syrian refugees. While vocal and bold in the slogans, the demonstration remained limited both in its number of demonstrators and its impact, that did not exceed a newspaper announcement during the course of the week following it.



Figure 7-19: A demonstration in Beirut against curfews, July 2016

A factor that largely limits refugees' access to public space, even outside curfew times, is the risk they run of being caught in conflict with Lebanese dwellers. It is a significant risk, because it could entail several serious consequences including verbal or physical assault, and arrest. This conflict is a daily occurrence in all three sites of this study, what follows are some examples.

²²⁹ In general the demonstrators were university students

Conflict in public spaces of El-Nab'a

According to a Lebanese coffee vendor at a kiosk in the neighbourhood, “most of the conflict [in El-Nab'a] is because of cohabitation [sharing urban services] with Syrians, and girls. Those Syrians allow themselves to harass²³⁰ our girls. Would I harass a Syrian girl if I was a refugee in Damascus? No, I wouldn't”. He added “if we're not able to live with each other, how can we live with the Syrians? *Hayda yalli kein na'es* (that's just what we needed). It's very difficult, believe me”. Actually verbal harassment of women is often cited as a trigger for street violence, and not only in El-Nab'a. While gender based violence is a national problem in Lebanon regardless and preceding the refugee crisis²³¹, it seems to have come to the forefront of the micro-level tensions between Syrian and Lebanese communities. As social conduct relative to cross gender relations especially in public spaces is subjective. it is relatively easy to assume or accuse men of harassing women. A mere look or smile, or the most minimal gesture, can be viewed and acted upon as an intentional provocation. A phrase such as “he smiled at my sister” can in certain situations instigate verbal conflict that may quickly escalate into violent street fights.

A rapid escalation of violence

In May 2014 a highly mediated conflict culminated in a Syrian throwing a gas cylinder from the balcony of the first floor in the neighbourhood of El-Nab'a, seriously injuring a Lebanese resident (Figure 7-20). There were different stories of how the conflict started, (argument over parking space, argument over rent due) but the root cause seems to have been the verbal harassment of a Lebanese woman by a Kurd. While everyone agrees that the cause of the fighting was mundane and happens on a regular basis, the escalation of anger and the media coverage it received, was not.

A few young men quarrelled after one man *lattash* (verbally harassed) the fiancé of

²³⁰ | gathered he meant verbal harassment (*talteesh*), shouting out vulgar compliments or invitations to women

²³¹ Gender based violence in Lebanon is a longstanding national problem. There are several civil society organisations that are working towards raising awareness on the issue and on the amelioration of laws protecting women, the most prominent of which is KAFA (<https://www.kafa.org.lb/ar>). Still, there is a lack of laws (and application of laws) on domestic violence and early marriage. Women are subject to religious family laws that predominantly discriminate against them to the benefit of men in the areas of divorce, custody and inheritance among others. Furthermore, women in Lebanon are socially bound by discriminatory and sexist cultural rules that place them *ipso facto* in a lower category than their male counterparts - and that affects all aspects of their lives including their freedoms in the urban environment.

While gender based violence varies in reach and degree across the different religious groups, all women are still discriminated against by religious courts, as a study by Human Rights Watch shows “a clear pattern of women from all sects being treated worse than men when it comes to accessing divorce and primary care for their children” (Geagea, Fakih, & Makhlof, 2015, p. 1). The report presents findings to prove the “systemic discrimination against women under personal status laws in Lebanon” (*Ibid*, p. 9)

another man. The quarrell escalated to the extent that one of the men threw a gas cylinder from his balcony and hit a man in the street. It happened in the presence of internal security forces that did not make an effort to intervene as can be seen in the recorded video [that was widely viewed on TV stations and social media]. The news went viral and and Lebanese media became more enthusiastic when it was announced that some of the men involved in the quarrell were Kurds . For the media then, the plot was complete! It was the “others” then, again [...]. (Wansa, 2014)



Figure 7-20: Incident of the gas cylinder

(left) gas cylinder being thrown from balcony, El-Nab'a (right) crowd disperses and a man injured lays on the ground. Source: LBCI Local television station. “A conflict in Bourj Hammoud ends with a gas cylinder thrown on a person’s head”. News. Date: May 18, 2014

In the immediate aftermath of this incident the streets of El-Nab'a grew quiet with tension and the neighbourhood was under a national microscope. In June 2014 the Bourj Hammoud municipality declared a curfew between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. on Syrians (Figure 7-21, Figure 7-22). While practically not applicable due to the number of Syrians and other foreign residents of the area, the announcement appeased the anger within the Lebanese community in the short term, but angered Syrian dwellers. In June 2015, I asked Georges Krikorian, the Vice President of the Bourj Hammoud Municipality about the curfew:

During the last year an urgent security situation arose in the area. There were conflicts between some²³² of the locals and some of the displaced. Unfortunately at the time the media portrayed these in an exaggerated manner. I will explain: the number of Lebanese and Syrians who were involved in these violent conflicts, and I mean fist fights with no weapons involved, did not exceed one hundred in all. This in an area in which our *Moh*tars now report a population of 200,000. The media buzzed with “conflict in Bourj Hammoud” and “clashes in the area between

²³² He insisted on the words “some”

Lebanese and Syrians” and etc. so people thought the area was out of control - as though the two camps were at each other's throats. The conflicts were dispersed... at the time, the government sent us complementary security forces to help get things under control. Still, due to the density in this area there was a lack of sufficient backup units (all the country was facing challenges in terms of security). To facilitate the work of the security forces further to the request of certain authorities, we announced for a short period of time a kind request to foreigners to avoid mobility during certain hours, between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. - to facilitate the work of the army and internal security who were trying to restore calm to the area. This request was made for ten days only. This is all what we did. Other municipalities with much lower density and numbers of Syrians started placing curfews before us and have continued to date. In Bourj Hammoud, it was only for ten days only and it was not a curfew, it was a kind request to avoid mobility (*Georges Krikorian, Vice President of Bourj Hammoud Municipality, personal interview, 2015*).

The discourse of the representative of the municipality matched that of the authorities in general, and was phrased in politically correct terms. He referred to the Syrians only as displaced, never as refugees. He also addressed the curfew issue from a pure logistics point of view, pointing out that it was placed only briefly. Both Lebanese and Syrian residents of El-Nab'a confirmed the application of a curfew for “some time” in Bourj Hammoud, some of my interviewees said it was placed for only a short time, and others mentioned “several months”. Syrians I spoke with maintain that even without being officially announced, they feel they are expected to stay indoors in the evenings and only go out when necessary - this especially applying to men.





A banner is viewed along a street, in the predominantly Druse village of al-Qrayyeh, Mount Lebanon July 28, 2014. The banner reads: "13 kilometers is banned for foreigners and buses from here, all fees, subject to penalty".
Picture taken: July 28, 2014. REUTERS/Colin Andrieu

Figure 7-21: Official municipality curfew banners

Official municipality banners detailing curfew details in the towns of Kanafar (Bekaa), Bshamoun (Mount Lebanon), Qrayyeh (Mount Lebanon) Source: (J. Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018); (“Campagne en faveur des syriens face au racisme-العنصرية-بوجه-السوريين-بوجه-العنصرية,” n.d.).



Figure 7-22: Curfew banner in Bourj Hammoud

Banner visibly placed in a main street in Bourj Hammoud in June 2014 reads: “The Bourj Hammoud Municipality declares that all foreigners (Syrians) are prohibited from circulating between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.” Source: Photograph broadly disseminated on social media. Date: September, 2018

A window into the daily life of Syrians in Lebanon

During a focus group conducted in Tebbeneh in 2015 with Syrian refugees, I met Salma, a married woman in her forties, and Molham, a sixteen year-old, who accepted to stay in for a more detailed discussion. Below is an excerpt from their daily life routines in Lebanon - it touches on several of the aspects discussed in this chapter.

Salma: I spend my days at home... I don't go anywhere usually. My husband goes to get groceries in the morning and I spend my time around the house.. I don't visit

any of my neighbours, they don't like Syrians. I have one Syrian neighbour and the rest are Lebanese... We greet each other, they say hello and even say *tfaddaleh* (come in) but they do it downstairs, they don't mean it, you feel that it's not authentic. In my block we're the only Syrians. My husband says it's better this way. When Syrians become too many in a building or block they risk raids and other things... better to stay at a distance. I have boys, it's better to keep them out of trouble's way. There have been several raids where there is a certain density of Syrians.

Molham: Yes, three days ago, no a week ago, there was a raid in my block, they took several men... I was walking by and I saw it happening and changed my direction - they would have taken me for sure.

DK: Where are they taken to? When do they come back?

Salma, Molham: to one of the prisons, no one knows when they come back...

Molham: I worked at a bakery for six months, then another bakery for a couple of months, now I'm looking for a job. I spend my days with my upstairs [Syrian] neighbour, and I play football with a team here. We are two Syrians and the rest are Lebanese, but I only hang out with the Syrian. When I need to go into the city [Tripoli] I walk. I know all the side roads - if [the army, the police] see me I'd be taken to prison. I don't have residency.

Salma: All our boys are at risk, most Syrians don't have legal papers. My son is right now at the GSO offices. He was imprisoned for four days - we need to find a *kafeel*... we would pay the \$200, but we need a *kafeel*... there are no alternatives. We can't go back to Syria, I fled with my children to protect them from the war, how would I go back?

Molham: There's a place I can work at in Beb el Haddadine, but I can't take the job - there are too many checkpoints at night. I cannot risk it.

Salma: a couple of weeks ago my other son, Mohammad, disappeared! I looked everywhere for him for three days... in the end a man called me from the police station and told me to collect my son...

DK: have there been curfews in the area?

Salma, Molham: No, there aren't curfews here.

Salma: But it's not very safe to move around. My son was mugged two times - a phone like the one you're holding. It was a Lebanese man who took it last time. Each time the phone cost \$150. They hide in the alleys at night... My son decided to carry a knife to protect himself if it happened a third time - and that's when the army caught him and imprisoned him... [she laughs].

DK: Would you recognise a Syrian from a Lebanese?

Salma, Molham: Yes of course. From their clothes, their looks. You feel the Syrian is *m'attar* (impoverished)... you feel the Lebanese is at ease, it's his country. We can tell even before we hear them speak.

Molham: They know me as well, they can tell I'm Syrian... from my clothes, the way I walk...

DK: You never pass for Lebanese?

Molham: Now I'm starting to get the accent. I'm learning it on purpose to protect myself. The other day my friend got into a quarrel and when he spoke Syrian a whole group came at him... I need to pass for a Lebanese. (Salma, Molham, Syrian refugees in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2015)

As expressed by this interviewee, the lack of confidence in the immediate living environment, illustrated by the distant relations, the silent mistrust, threats and intimidations that characterize the everyday relations between hosts and refugees, is enhanced by a more structural fear towards possible repressions exerted by police and government. The fact that they are migrants not only obliges them to accept inferior positions both in housing and in work; additionally, the fact that they are not legal residents compels most of refugees to step aside, adopt negative coping mechanisms for protection and invisibility purposes, accept lesser and unstable positions, all in order to avoid facing the dramatic and definitive consequence of being evicted, from their shelter, from a public space, or from the country. As such, getting a place to live and to work is just a first step in a process which could any time provoke unexpected chain failure.

Chapter 7. The representations of Syrians for Lebanese dwellers



Figure 8-1: Syrian laundry, El-Nab'a, Beirut.
Sketch: Ziad Moutran, 2019, Colour: Raphaëlle Cottreau.

The first time I heard about Syrian laundry was in the Bourj el-Barajneh camp. On a commented walk with a Palestinian refugee, and in response to my question on how he could tell a Syrian from a Palestinian in the camp, my guide started to point out physical aspects that made him believe a person was a Syrian. At one point, he ushered me to look at a line of laundry that was dripping. “A Palestinian would never hang their laundry before squeezing it, that’s a Syrian apartment”, he said. This Figure depicts Syrian laundry in El-Nab’a, also pointed out by my guide as she said: “those colors...”

7.1 “Invaders of public space”

Terms like “*yfaltounon*”, “*sha'b mhabdal*”, “just like goats” “*ze'ran*” (disobedient, vulgar) and other such terms have highly negative connotations, and they were recurrent in my interviews with host communities. Especially the term “*yfaltounon*” which translates to ‘let them loose’ is something I noted numerous times²³³. “*Mfalteenon* (they let them roam) in so and so place” my interviewees would say, or “*falatein add ma baddek* (as much chaos as you can imagine)”. Different uses of the same term, host communities often expressed dismay or frustration at the Syrian refugees being let loose in the city, not being under control.

As perceived invaders of the cities in Lebanon, the presence of Syrian refugees has often altered the way the Lebanese use public spaces. During a commented walk around the area of El-Nab'a in 2015, with Hala - an active Lebanese resident - I asked to see where families would take children to play. She brought me to a public garden in Bourj Hammoud, not far from El-Nab'a. It was midday and the garden was not crowded, a dozen people in all were inside. A group of men sat in a closed circle on the floor (Figure 8-2), even though benches were available around them. I asked Hala if she knew them: “No, those are Syrians, you see. That’s how they gather. It’s not the same anymore” she said. It is clear that today in El-Nab'a, the Syrian figure represents the unwanted other. This was not always the case, as Tania al Alam notes in her thesis on El-Nab'a based on research undertaken between 2010 and 2014.

In 2010, long-time Lebanese residents of Nabaa told me that they were much happier in previous years when the population was more homogeneous. They perceived the “invasions” of African and Arab migrant workers as a drastic change to their everyday life. Until 2011 and according to residents, the foreign population in Nabaa was mostly constituted of Sri Lankan, Eritrean, Indian and Filipino domestic workers as well as Syrian and Egyptian male construction workers. However, Syrian refugees have been coming in large numbers since 2011 and have become the majority of foreign nationalities in Nabaa. Lebanese residents have since changed their discourse. They say that they were actually quite satisfied with life in Nabaa until 2011 and did not think that non-Lebanese bothered them then. They say that it is only now that they feel outnumbered. Clearly, this is contradictory with what I had heard in 2010. Their memories of what their perceived reality was a few years ago has changed and they now talk about a happier past. (El Alam, 2014, p. 59)

My interviews confirm El Alam’s accounts of how Lebanese dwellers view El-Nab’a, not without a certain - and rather common - sense of nostalgia of a recreated past. Approaching El-

²³³ See Table 7.1 in section 7.4

Nab'a differently, El Alam looked beyond the generally mediated image of the neighbourhood and delved into the complexities of the social relations between the different ethnic and religious groups. In this highly mixed neighbourhood, it seems, the newest influx of foreigners seems to always be the most dangerous according to its dwellers. Since the Syrian influx is by far the most significant influx in terms of large quantity and short timeframe since the arrival of Armenians in the early 20th century, it is not surprising that the tensions with this specific community are the highest.

In the Tebbeneh neighbourhood, Wael, a Syrian refugee in his twenties told me he didn't go to the public garden anymore. "There are always fights, usually over girls. I don't go anymore". In public spaces in Tripoli people are careful who they are around and are weary of strangers. Figure 8-3 shows families who have appropriated a large empty parking lot to picnic in on Sundays. A few of the families were Syrian but mainly Lebanese families were picnicking, grouped - with the exception of one family - at one end of the parking lot.



Figure 8-2: Group of Syrians sitting in a public garden in proximity of El-Nab'a. Date: June 2015



Figure 8-3: Families appropriate a large parking lot to picnic in on Sundays. Photo: DK Date: February 2018

At another focus group with the Lebanese dwellers of the same area I met Mohammad, a twenty something year old new groom. Before 2011 he said, the favorite outing for him and his bride was a walk along Corniche el Mina (Figure 8-4). He shared with me that he stopped taking his new bride to the Mina because it was “Out of the question... Syrians are everywhere”. Mohammad said that the Syrian society was very conservative, and that the “way they looked at Lebanese women is provocative”. Others in the focus group nodded in agreement as Mohammad spoke of his couple’s recent experiences in public spaces. Especially because his bride is not veiled, they now feel they are restricted in the outings. For Mohammad and his bride the Mina Corniche is not a destination anymore. “Not one Lebanese [would you find], it’s as if you were in Homs or Hama”. Another person in the focus group interjected: “Tartous, you mean”²³⁴.

²³⁴ Homs, Hama and Tartous are all Syrian cities. Tartous is coastal, less than a 2-hr ride from Tripoli.



Figure 8-4: Corniche el Mina, Tripoli. Photo: DK. Date:

7.2 “Robbers of jobs”

The economic role of Syrians in Lebanon was one of the reasons for the choice of Lebanon as a place of refuge. In the early months of the Syrian crisis, it was the immediate families of Syrian workers already residing in Lebanon who joined the ranks of those fleeing violence. Economic competition is also at the core of the hostility of Lebanese hosts towards Syrian refugees whereby it is widely perceived that Syrians are taking the jobs of the Lebanese especially in the unskilled and low skilled labour markets. This is debatable as Lebanon has hosted important numbers of Syrian workers since the 1950s and even before (Balanche, 2005; Bonnet, 2013; Chalcraft, 2009; Corm, 2009).

The Syrians who came to Lebanon in 2011 were refugees by nature, but economic migrants as per their residence status. Avoiding the pejorative “refugees” label was one of the reasons many Syrians were attracted to Lebanon, as they would have a chance to make it their own way. In fact, “only 8 percent of all Syrian refugees [in the entire region including Syria] live in camps. [...] Around 90 percent of Syrian refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)s are concentrated in urban centers within Syria and its neighbouring countries, searching for better access to economic opportunities and social services” (Yassin, 2018 p. 36). Upon arrival to Lebanon, they filled the classic job clusters they had always filled: concierge, construction worker, agriculture field worker (Figure 7.3). These classically Syrian jobs were less visible in nature. There would be little contact between a construction worker and passers-by, as no contact was necessary. Since 2011, Syrians have continued seeking and filling new low-skill jobs, but this time

those jobs had a more visible nature: waiter, salesperson, delivery driver etc. It was not a given for a Syrian to apply for a cashier's job before 2011, to the extent that an employer in El-Nab'a felt the need to specify the nationality of his required employee further to several Syrian job-seekers coming forward (Figure 7.3). Some Syrians have higher skills-requiring jobs, especially in linguistic skills, but the Syrian population remains unable to compete with the Lebanese workforce. While the lack of statistics makes it difficult to find out to what degree Syrian refugees have really taken the jobs of the hosts, the situation is evoked by the latter continually. In every interview I had with a host, be it Lebanese or Palestinian dweller, the issue of economic competition came up. "My uncle used to get a paint job for an apartment at \$1,000, now he's lucky if he gets a job for \$500!" (*Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-Barajneh, personal interview, 2017*). It is not any different for Mirvat's husband, Majed, in Tebbeneh who's an artisan carpenter. "I always got the best jobs, there are a few architects who always requested my work because they know how good I am at my craft. But even they have recently been forcing me to reduce my price... it's my work, my pride... but what can I do? I have to shut up and do it, or a Syrian will. I have turned down many jobs since they came - and you will see, the owners will regret it with time, but for now it's me who's in a bind" (*Majed, Lebanese carpenter in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2018*).

In 2015 I asked the assistant to the Head of Municipality in Baskinta, Mount Lebanon about any positive aspects due to the presence of refugees and he replied: "Well, when you need a worker, you can get one for a cheap rate" (*Assistant to the Head of Municipality, Baskinta, personal interview, 2015*). The demand in Lebanon for the work of a Syrian is high and informal. One classic scenario for work-seeking Syrian males is to gather early in the morning, at an urban reference point (such as the Saloumech roundabout in proximity to El-Nab'a) and wait to get picked up. Usually, a pickup would pass by and choose a number of men as needed for the work of the day and they would hop on. Word of mouth and personal connections are also strong ways of securing jobs. It is clear from my interviews that the vast majority of able Syrian men, and a significant percentage of able women actively seek any sort of work in Lebanon. It is therefore crucial for them to live in the city.

Yet, the Lebanese government issues a work permit only if the Syrian refugee has a residency permit. Residency permits, on the other hand, have not been easy to acquire due to the obstacles that Syrians continue to face throughout the process, particularly for those who fall outside of the fee waiver categories. The vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in 2017 has found that only 26 percent of Syrian refugees over 15 years of age have legal residency. All these complications have made it difficult for employers to submit work permit applications for their employees.

By 2017, applications have only been submitted for 0.5 percent of the working age refugee population in Lebanon (Yassin, 2018, p. 53).

While it is true that submitting a work permit application is complicated, Lebanese employers do not actively seek to apply for it. This has been true since before the crisis, as Syrians have worked informally in Lebanon for decades, and “did not benefit from labour protection and were often left with very little recourse if they suffered abuse by employers” (Bobseine, 2016, p. 22). It is possible to acquire an official work permit for a Syrian, and since 2015 the individual or company for which the Syrian works is considered the *kafael*²³⁵. However, in order to secure a completely legal work permit for a Syrian, the procedure is costly and very complicated. Even long before 2011, business in Lebanon

relied on a cheap, manipulable and disposable labour force, and so stood opposed to the potential “hassles” of written work permits—through which workers might lay claim to protection and even social insurance [...] workers were required on the cheap, to be easily hired and fired, and to work long and variable hours at variable times and intensities in greatly variable numbers (Chalcraft, 2006b, p. 90)

Since 2015 the “hassles” of obtaining such a permit have increased, and furthermore because of the cost incurred and the rights of a worker associated with a work permit (such as minimum wage), especially in terms of benefits to the workers²³⁶, only a small fraction of legal work permits for Syrians are issued every year. In theory, should a Syrian be caught working illegally, the employer and the Syrian should face legal troubles. In practice, however, it is rare that Syrians doing low-skill labour jobs would be interrogated, and if they are, it is even more rare that the employer faces serious, if any, legal repercussions.

It is indeed much more practical to hire Syrians informally because it would mean more flexibility for the employer. From my interviews, none of the five refugees who had regular monthly work had a contract or a work permit, and were subject to abuses due to this fact. “I try to keep a very low profile at work, I cannot afford to anger the clients or the boss, I would immediately lose my job” (*Refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview*, 2016). This issue is also reflected in the example of the manager of a vegetable stall in Hadath, as detailed in the conclusion to Part 2, who had hired a young Syrian boy in a clearly informal framework. The stark difference that arose after 2011 is that Syrians could no longer return to Syria should they be unsatisfied with

²³⁵ On the GSO website, under “Entry by Pledge of Responsibility”, Syrians may enter /reside with a *kafala* (with 300,000 LBP/\$200 deposit) for entry in order to obtain a one year residency submitted by the persons or institutions or companies pledging to seek work permit from the Ministry of Labor in accordance with applicable procedures. See Annex: “Organizing entry of Syrian Nationals and their residency in Lebanon”

²³⁶ With a legal work permit, any migrant would be eligible and obligated to register with National Social Security Fund, which would insure health and retirement benefits to the worker but would incur heavy costs to the company.

their working conditions.

Another aspect that is in direct relation to the nature of the long term residence of the refugees (in contrast to their seasonal migration before 2011) is the fact that many started to reason in terms of short or longer term entrepreneurial ventures as well. With a prolonged stay, it was possible to think of opening a shop or a kiosk as one refugee from Tebbeneh told me: “I was tired of working at a different place everyday and I was being treated really badly. Back in Syria I had a vegetable place, so I know the trade. I rented this stand last month and even though I don’t make enough, I don’t have to wake up not knowing what I’ll be doing today. Somedays are better than others” (*Rami , refugee running a vegetable kart in Tripoli, personal interview, 2016*).

As I have already mentioned, in El-Nab'a most shops are managed by Syrians, but owned by Lebanese; or rented by Syrians from Lebanese. Specifically after 2015, Syrians were no longer allowed to set up businesses without a Lebanese partner. One Syrian salesperson from Aleppo told me: “Comfortable? who’s comfortable? I’m just like everyone else - at least I have this job. Most of the people here today [Ghilan street] are Syrians” (*Interview with Syrian refugee, El-Nab'a, 2018*).

In the Bourj el-Barajneh camp, Syrians have also opened innumerable shops. Notably, one Syrian has set up three large textile shops at the entrance of the camp. “I don’t know how they function” Mahmoud, a twenty-four year-old resident of the camp since birth, said to me in 2017. “They seem to have so many employees, and a lot of material, but I never see any clients in their shops!”. Mahmoud said they get their products from Syria, that the borders are “ooohhh, of course open” for this kind of trade. His friend, Iḥsan, was preparing orange juice for the Iftar of that night.

What happened was that Syrians came and they had a lot of money²³⁷. I don’t know where they got their money. They buy material in large quantities, we cannot afford that, we cannot compete. You see? Here in the camp, there are so many Syrians... they rent shops, they rent apartments. My parents used to rent an apartment for \$100, now the owner says you either pay \$300 OK !! or I’ll rent it to a Syrian. You see? 22 of them could live in that apartment, with their kids! Look there’s a Syrian. (Iḥsan calls out to a passer-by) ‘what would you accept for a day’s work?’ (Without waiting for an answer he continued) He’d accept anything, he wouldn’t care because of the aid he’s receiving. Plus, Syrians like to take, they don’t like to give. they only work with each other. In their case what is mostly different is that they have a

²³⁷ In this case as in many others, I would sometimes feel a bit conflicted towards discourse that I could interpret as rumours, and, as such, use with uncertainty, but that could also affect my empathy or confidence in the discourse of my interviewees. This aspect is very central in sensitive and personal narratives, and represents a hidden part of qualitative data.

country to go back to. They are displaced, they are not refugees. We are the refugees. where would we go back? Of course, God help them they are refugees as well but... (*Ihsan, Palestinian refugee in Bourj El-Barajneh, personal interview, 2017*).

A statement stands out in Ihsan's talk: "They are displaced, they are not refugees. We are the refugees". It sums up the main self perceived, and real, difference between the Palestinians and the Lebanese as hosts of Syrian refugees in Lebanon's cities. The Palestinians have faced the same issues and have reacted in the same ways to the Lebanese hosts, as reflected in my interviews. They have the same concerns for economic competition, and rent rate inflation, and uses of public space. Even more so, because Palestinians are already excluded from a large segment of dweller rights. The situation inside the camp may be described as a heightened reality of the Syrian refugee influx. First because of the identity struggles, Palestinians today - even third and fourth generation refugees - do not feel like fully entitled dwellers. They are in the end refugees themselves, with their own struggles vis-à-vis the Lebanese authorities. And second, the social, urban, and political informality in the camp - as detailed in Chapter 4, is heightened in comparison to the other neighbourhoods and cities in this study and in Lebanon in general.

Also, Ihsan spoke of money that Syrians brought with them. The idea that Syrians who came to Lebanon had resources was mentioned in other interviews as well. Lebanese dwellers have told me how Syrian women wear gold bracelets, how they have lands and homes back in Syria, and that their stay in Lebanon is profitable for them. These claims are utterly refuted by all the refugees I spoke with. While twelve refugees said they did indeed have limited resources at their arrival, in the form of cash and gold, they all insisted that they have depleted all their savings and sold off most of their valuables to be able to pay rent.

One last element to consider is that different Syrian working classes feel different treatment from the Lebanese. Many of them (in all its classes and regions) tend to accept the wealthy and, to some extent, contribute to criminalizing the poor. As it is the case in many other countries, one could observe that a richer Syrian who starts up a high-end enterprise, be it a butcher, vegetable market or even a veterinarian may find a relatively safe haven in Lebanon. In contrast, not unexpectedly, the poor often find it difficult to cope and find a place within the landscape of political divides in Lebanon, their presence being "measured through sectarian lenses that [...] make [some of them] more "desirable" than others" (El-Khoury, 2018 p.101). As one Syrian veterinarian voiced it:

[Lebanon] isn't treating me, it treats my money. Because of the nature of my job I'm dealing with middle upper class Lebanese who only make their judgments based on

money. They see that I'm here spending, and they see that I too come from the middle classes so they don't show as much bigotry as it is normally the sentiment against us in Lebanon (Chit & Nayel, 2013 p.1).

A few ventures of Syrian refugees that started small have grown to become medium enterprises. Abo Abdo's vegetable market is one such example. Around 2012, Abu Abdo started selling vegetables off an open vegetable kiosk on the main mansourieh road. Eventually, he gained enough clients and capital to grow his business, and is considered today a high end vegetable shop, with mainly Lebanese clients. It is not clear whether Abu Abdo used financial resources from before 2012 or whether he grew his business solely in Lebanon (Figure 8-6).



Figure 8-5: “Needed female cashier” “Needed Syrian or Lebanese concierge”
 (left) Mount Lebanon, 2015. (Right) El-Nab'a, 2016.



Figure 8-6: Abu Abdo, high-end grocery shop and restaurant owned by a Syrian refugee.
 Photo: Marc Ghauüi, Google Maps. Date: February 2018

7.3 “Abusers of aid”

In 2011 at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the United Nations and a number of local and international aid organisations quickly responded by setting up, or growing their operations in Lebanon. The refugee influx was dubbed a humanitarian crisis and aid was abundant for the Syrians. Both in-kind and cash support was provided for those fleeing the violence. In addition to external aid, there was an initial short-lived positive, or extremely positive, reaction of host communities who welcomed refugees in their homes and shared their own resources to support them²³⁸.

In the year 2012 the UNHCR reported an approximate \$4.3 million deficit: (their budget requirements amounted to \$49.3 million, while funds available were at \$45 million “meeting 91 per cent of the overall needs” (UNHCR, 2012a), which meant that the outcome of the aid was satisfactory. Indeed, Syrian refugees present in Lebanon at the time were supported in cash and in kind - and they numbered less than 250,000 individuals at the time. In 2017, for the \$464 million that the UNHCR budgeted, they reported receiving \$326 million, marking a deficit of over \$120 million dollars with only 70 percent of the needed budget covered (Figure 8-7). This explains the various aid cuts that Syrian refugees have faced throughout the years, as an example in 2014 the Financial Times reported panic amongst refugees amid a “funding crisis” of international organisations (Solomon, 2014). Consequently, for Syrian refugees to abuse aid seems unlikely, as the total they had been receiving has been on the decrease since 2012. In fact, while there were almost 830,000 refugees who received \$27 / month in food vouchers in 2016, refugees’ expenditure per capita during that year was over \$100 / month in Lebanon. Indeed,

monthly income for the majority of refugees is not sufficient to cover monthly expenditures. 76 percent of Syrian refugee households are living below the poverty line, while 58 percent are living below the extreme poverty line. Syrian refugee families often struggle to sustain their living. For instance, the average monthly rent in 2017 was \$183, while the average monthly income was \$193, making the cost of rent a significant burden for many households (Yassin, 2018 p.94)

While at the level of the individual Syrian refugee aid was not enough, and while it was significantly less than the budget required, it has to be noted that hundreds of millions of dollars have been injected yearly into Lebanon’s economy because of the Syrian refugee crisis. For example, the total amount injected into the Lebanese economy since 2012, for the sole purpose

²³⁸ See Chapter 3 section 1.1

of food assistance²³⁹ is just under 1 billion dollars; “Providing this type of assistance not only delivers essential aid to vulnerable communities, but also encourages the Lebanese economy. As such, refugees can be valuable consumers and can contribute to the local economy” (Yassin, 2018 p.97).




Figure 8-7: Budget and expenditures for Lebanon, 2012-2018

Source: UNHCR data portal

The UNHCR are not the only organisation that received international aid directly targeting the Syrian refugee crisis, but they are the largest receiver and donor. They are also the only organisation that was registering refugees in an official capacity until 2015. This data is therefore telling of the shortage of funding, and in consequence the support, that international aid provided Syrian refugees throughout the years.

Table 5: Estimated UNHCR expenditures per refugee per year (in US Dollars)

	Nb of registered refugees	UNHCR reported total expenditure at end of year (USD)	UNHCR reported total expenditure on Basic needs and essential services at end of year (USD)	UNHCR reported total expenditure on Security from violence and exploitation at end of year (USD)	Community Empowerment and Self Reliance	Estimated total expenditure per refugee	Estimated expenditure on basic needs and essential services per refugee	Estimated expenditure on Security from violence and exploitation per refugee
January 2012	6699	45077864	22260130 (49%)	1148073 (3%)	978783 (2%)	669	330	17
February 2012	7435							
March 2012	9106							
April 2012	13405							
May 2012	17041							
June 2012	25411							
July 2012	33382							
August 2012	42947							
September 2012	57335							
October 2012	77014							
November 2012	103160							
December 2012	128106							
December 2016	1011366	326864632	251090667 (77%)	12629035 (4%)	15716030 (5%)	325	250	13
June 2017	1001051							
November 2017	997905							
December 2017	997552							

²³⁹ Electronic vouchers worth \$27 each that can only be used in selected stores in Lebanon

Estimated UNHCR expenditures per refugee per year (in US Dollars) Source: Based on UNHCR Financial reports 2012-2017

Table 5 details the nature of expenditures for the year 2012 and 2017²⁴⁰. Expenditures for “basic needs and essential services” decreased from \$330 in 2012 to \$250 in 2017. These needs include shelter, health, education, domestic items and water. Similarly, expenditures going towards “security from violence and exploitation” decreased from \$17 in 2012 to \$13 in 2017. These include protection from sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) as well as child protection. Most budget lines decreased with the overall budget shortage, but two areas of expenditure saw an increase. For example, the average support for refugees in “basic needs and essential services” decreased from \$330 to \$250 per year, which again makes abuses of aid seem unlikely considering the limited amount of aid. The areas that saw an increase in expenditure are the areas that included the Lebanese communities. First, “community empowerment and self reliance” which in the detailed financial report includes “coexistence with local communities” increased from 2 percent to 5 percent (UNHCR, 2012-2017). Also, “favorable protection environment” which includes “public attitudes towards persons of concern” increased from 1 percent to 3 percent (UNHCR, 2012-2017).

Indeed, between 2011 and 2013 most registered refugees received cash and in-kind support in the form of mattresses, rent support, children’s nutrition, women’s hygiene products etc, and most of their basic needs were covered. They even had a surplus of in-kind support as per numerous accounts by refugees, host communities and NGO representatives alike. While the funding deficit increased and the NGO support with it, the generalisation that refugees were well-off persevered in the collective discourse of host communities. In 2015, a Lebanese resident in the Tebbench neighbourhood told me “They sold the material they got from the UN, I’m telling you they made fortunes [...] How can we survive? Who’s helping us? They get their rent, food, medicine for free! Of course they can work for less than me. I cannot compete”. But the UN has reported a consistent shortage in funding since 2012. As early as the spring of 2013, the UNHCR began “cutting basic aid programs to over 400,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon because of lack of funding” (Dockery, 2013). And while “secondary health care coverage is usually one of the first areas of aid which is affected by funding shortage, “The food assistance program, which helps most refugees in the country prepare meals [...] and other programs [including] housing aid and education tuition payment” are also affected” (Dockery, 2013). Shortages in funding continued and

²⁴⁰ Detailed expenditures for the year 2018 were not available online at the time of writing.

In 2015 the World Food Programme received only one fifth of its projected budget for food assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan and was forced to reduce the food aid it could provide. Today, a Syrian refugee living in Lebanon receives only \$21.60 (£15; €20) a month for food—about 20 percent less than the intended food ration. Last year, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), an interagency partnership intended to meet refugee needs while supporting socioeconomic recovery and strengthening institutions in host countries, faced a funding gap of almost \$3.5 billion—77 percent of its target (Murphy, Woodman, Roberts, & McKee, 2016).

Other reports reveal an even smaller amount of aid for refugees in 2015. Amnesty International reported that “funding shortages mean that the most vulnerable Syrian refugees in Lebanon receive just \$13.50 per month or less than half a dollar a day for food assistance” (Amnesty International, 2015). The trend continued and the United Nations began developing difficult selection criteria by categorizing refugees who almost all lived under poverty line. In the summer of 2017, they “halted cash assistance to 20,000 Syrian families in Lebanon due to a shortage of international aid” and shifted that assistance to “some 20,000 “more needy” Syrian families” (Houssari, 2017). The situation still continues and in 2018 the United Nations foreshadowed that a “critical gap in funding for Syrian refugees and host communities this year could lead to cuts in vital services, threatening social stability in host countries and refugees’ futures” (Barrington, 2018).

Even though aid decreased at significant rates for the Syrian refugees, the Lebanese populations in the low socio-economic classes had formed an idea that Syrians easily received all their needs. To a certain extent, even the least amounts of aid seemed unfair to Lebanese families with economic challenges. Unemployment rates exceeded the 28.5 percent of 2011, especially among youth, and many struggle to make ends meet. Aid therefore created tensions, and the tensions in turn affected aid policies and directed them to the support of all vulnerable communities in Lebanon rather than the refugee population. But even with these policy changes and increased expenditures of the UNHCR on community coexistence and public attitudes, anger resides within the Lebanese communities to the extent that refugees have since 2014 continuously reported fear from physical attacks in public spaces after dark.

7.4 “Vulgar, discernible”

“They treat us like we are, like, dirty - I don’t know how to say it... like they don’t want to touch us” (*Rahaf, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2016*) were the first words that Rahaf, a Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, said to me when I asked for her experience with Lebanese hosts.

Indeed, phrases like “They live like cattle”, “they would eat anything”, “they don’t send their kids to school”, “they dress badly”, and “they smell” have come out verbatim from my field notebook, during interviews with Lebanese dwellers in El-Nab’a and Tebbeneh, and with Palestinian dwellers in Bourj El-Barajneh. And while not all phrases were stressed in the three sites of this study in the same degree, the comment on clothing was mentioned every time I spoke with Lebanese or Palestinian hosts alike. Overcrowdedness was also a notion that most of the host interviewees mentioned, and resented it because it caused rent inflation.

Table 6: Expressions mentioned in field interviews when qualifying refugees

Expression/verbatim or synonym	El Nab’a / 10	Tebbeneh / 10	Bourj el-Barajneh / 9
" <i>feltenin</i> "	7	6	2
"they smell"	5	3	0
"they dress badly"	10	10	9
"accept overcrowdedness"	8	6	9
"they are dirty"	7	4	3
"lack etiquette"	5	5	6
"not educated"	7	2	4
"they are only used to dictatorship - cannot function otherwise"	6	8	3
sarcasm over certain words " <i>Mou?</i> ", and nuances (extended vowels etc)	6	7	0

Of these expressions, there were two that I specifically sought to better understand. I wanted to know how the Syrians were *feltenin* (loose), and how they lacked etiquette. The latter was easier for my interviewees to explain. While on a commented walk in Bourj el-Barajneh, Mahmoud told me: “Did you just see how she slapped her boy? did you get it on camera? We don’t do such things, at least in public” (*Mahmoud, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2018*). “You know, you see them sitting in public with their legs wide open, you could almost see their private parts, excuse me - that’s something a Palestinian would never do...”. As we walked on, I stopped to take a photo of a building entrance and Mahmoud smiled and told me to look up. There was a line of laundry hanging, and dripping water. “A Palestinian woman would never hang the laundry without at least squeezing the water out first” (Figure 8-8). During that same walk, Mahmoud pointed out several other balconies with Syrian laundry, and when we climbed to a fifth floor balcony of his friend’s house for a global view of the camp, he also showed me what he clearly recognised as Syrian laundry (Figure 8-8). “Right Fatmeh?” he asked his friend at that point, and Fatmeh replied jokingly “Right, in any case we don’t wear these ‘abaya and these sorts of color, they are in technicolor



Figure 8-8: Syrian laundry in Bourj al-Barajneh

Laundry dripping water in Bourj el-Barajneh (left), and in “technicolor” at the window (right)

I found the discussion on laundry more interesting because in fact, in El-Nab’a my attention was turned by my guide to the same issue (Figure 7.8). I had been invited by a Lebanese community leader from El-Nab’a to attend a celebration of the opening of a community center *Markaz al Hayat* (The Center of Life), on what is popularly known as the Hayat street. The center was built over what was one of the rare open children play areas in the neighbourhood (Figure 8-9, Figure 8-10). Hala, one of my regular contacts in El-Nab’a, told me that an organisation had funded the project and that the organising committee was a group of Lebanese and Syrian women working together. One of the objectives of the project is to enhance relations between the communities.



Figure 8-9: Share' el-Hayat (Street of Life) in 2015

Showing public garden built by scouts and the Red Cross (Fakhreddine, 2015). Wall graffiti reads Street of Life



Figure 8-10: Center of life, replacing public space

Share' el-Hayat (Street of Life) in 2018 showing the “Center of Life” replacing the public garden, and new wall graffiti reads: Women to reach justice

The center was set up to serve all the neighbourhood dwellers as a common meeting place for all sorts of activities. The people in attendance of the opening were almost exclusively Syrian women and children. As the event unfolded inside the center, I approached a group of women who were standing outside and chatting, clearly organisers as per their name tags. I asked why the invitees were all Syrian. Renée was quick to answer: “there’s food, they came to take the food”, daring me to look inside the window and witness how the Syrian women were “surely placing” the buffet items in their bags to take back to their homes. “The Lebanese wouldn’t come, they know how it will be and who the majority will be - we invited everyone”, she said. It became clear that these women were the Lebanese on the organising committee. I briefly explained my presence and research interest, and this prompted one of the women, Renée to immediately react

Look, we have been forgotten. There is no longer any support for us vulnerable Lebanese. A while back there were some resources being distributed by the *shou’oun* (the Ministry of Social Affairs) and they were in line before us. We had a lot of trouble with them, a lot - we do not get along. There are 80 percent Syrians today!

If we are to get support, Syrians have to be getting it as well. No fund whatsoever comes to us directly. I've learnt this. If you want to support us, support them first! Anyway just look around you, you don't need even ask, it's evident... Just look at the balconies and you'll know where they are. (*Renée, Lebanese dweller, El-Nab'a, personal interview, 2018*)

As she spoke the rest were nodding adding a word or two in approval. She touched on the sensitivities surrounding international aid. Indeed, as explained in section 7.3, the initial aid that arrived for the direct support of Syrian refugees in the early years of the crisis was diverted to supporting all vulnerable communities in Lebanon after social tensions rose. What this meant was that funding would reach Syrian refugees under a condition that it supported, directly or indirectly, other Lebanese vulnerable families²⁴¹. Aid for the Lebanese became conditioned by the aid for Syrians, and vice-versa. In her discourse, Renée was referring to the way they hung their laundry, and to the *sarami* (slippers) in front of their doors. "Come", she told me, "do you want to see? do you want to take pictures? just look at the place". She took me around the block and continued to point to different balconies and entrances (Figure 8-12) asking me to take pictures, as though to document them. "All this street, do you see the laundry? Look, there's a Lebanese, do you see those jeans? Take the picture, do you see the difference?" (Figure 8-12) I was able to discern a difference in the quality of clothes, the colors and the way in which the laundry was hung between the two balconies she pointed out. For Renée, the shabbier looking, less organised laundry was the Syrian laundry

²⁴¹ Palestinian refugees are not supported by the UNHCR but by the UNRWA and are not therefore concerned with this condition



Figure 8-11: Entrances to buildings where "mostly Syrians" live
On a commented walk in El-Nab'a, a Lebanese host pointed to what she described as Syrian residences



Figure 8-12: Syrian laundry in El-Nab'a
Some of the balconies René pointed out with visible “Syrian” laundry, with the exception of the upper left picture, the “Lebanese” laundry. Date: February 2018

“Can you tell a Lebanese from a Syrian at a distance?” is a question I repeated to every person I interviewed, Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian. The answer without fail was “yes”. “You know them, comon, you can tell very quickly!” (*Chadi, Lebanese resident in Tripoli, personal interview, 2015*). As he was driving me from the center of Tripoli towards Tebbeneh, he started to point out to people and tried to explain how he knew. “That’s a Syrian, and there a Lebanese. The one of the motorbike is Syrian, and that one behind the cart, clearly...” it continued as such for almost five minutes, in which Chadi pointed out at least twenty Syrians and an equal number of Lebanese.

In Bourj el-Barajneh, while walking with Mahmoud, I asked him to point out Syrians when he saw them. He said to me: “No that would be complicated, everyone you see is Syrian. I’ll point out a Palestinian when I see one, how about that?” he said jokingly. It was during this same walk that he had pointed out the woman slapping her son in the example I mentioned above. It was in Bourj el-Barajneh as well that I met Abu Talal who, also jokingly, told me: “I know them from their model, the way they’re fabricated” (*Abu Talal, Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, personal interview, 2017*). It was equally clear to dwellers in El-Nab’a who was Syrian. “From the way they walk, *soubhan allah* (as God saw to it)” (*Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab’a, personal interview, 2015*), Hala told me in 2015, as we walked down the busy street one day, she dared me to test it. I would point out a random person from afar, and she would guess, then I would go speak with them to check. It was the only such experiment I did, and we tried it on eight people - five times Hala guessed correctly.

Frustrations of a servees driver in Tebbeneh

On a rainy day in 2018, I hailed a *servees* from Tebbeneh to take me back to Tripoli. The usually short drive was clearly taking longer than usual with traffic. During what ended up being a thirty-minute ride, the driver’s chatter served as a barometer for the typically generic “refugee talk” on the Lebanese street. He depicted the situation as a “‘host community’ [being] ‘invaded’ by a ‘wave of refugees’ that threatens its livelihood, coherence, work, health, way of life [...]” (Fawaz, Gharbieh, Harb, & Salamé, 2018 p.4). While they may sound harsh and inconsistent, the words of my driver echoed the content of the reactions I heard throughout my fieldwork when speaking to host communities. His chat touched on several generalisations discussed in this chapter. From social relations, to housing, to perceptions, to patriarchy... this kind of monologue could easily represent a truthful account, very unrehearsed and natural, of the generalisations expressed by Lebanese towards Syrian refugees. For the driver it did not seem to matter much that I was in the

car²⁴². An excerpt from my field notes of that day further illustrates such common forms of expressions Lebanese tend to address. Five of them tend to dominate the general representations.

He touched on the undesired presence of Syrians in public space:

It's a school day and I got into the back of a *servees*²⁴³ in Tebbeneh at around 2PM - just as the first school shift was ending, and traffic was heavy. The driver was anxious to get out of the traffic and tried several short cuts, mostly taking the wrong direction in narrow streets and maneuvering his way around other angry drivers. I asked if he knew which schools offered the second shift for the Syrian refugee children, and what time it started. "Yeyyy, I'm so fed up with that! I live facing one of those schools... if you could just see at 5 or 5:15 pm when they *yfalltown* (let them loose) to the streets... they climb on cars and get on pickups, I feel like taking pictures and posting them on facebook I swear". He was getting more agitated due to traffic. "It's not only the schools... all of Lebanon has become full of traffic. Look at that, just look".

He also spoke of economic competition

"It's always been crowded in these parts of Tripoli", I said. "*No wallah* (by God) it's never been like this. If you wanted to buy something before the *azmeh* (crisis), you would find one or two shops on a street, now there are shops everywhere [those create traffic], even in their [Syrians'] houses you'll find shops. In my neighbourhood [Nef'a], there are maybe six Syrian chicken shops, and two butchers! I swear to God I never saw this much traffic here, except on special occasions." Without interjection from me, he continued. "The Lebanese *ya haram* (pity) can't find work anymore. They get cars and work as taxi drivers. In the vegetable market, all the vendors are Syrian.

Also, he raised the question of the paradox of the relations between the Lebanese and Syrians - while the latter are undesired in public space they are still preferred as tenants and workers, like in the example of the young Syrian worker in the vegetable shop mentioned in the conclusion to Part 1.

"Let me tell you, I have a building in the Nef'a²⁴⁴, ok? I rent out four apartments and a shop to Syrians, and one apartment to a Lebanese woman. The Lebanese tenant *m'awfetni allah* (is very difficult)". I asked if he had rented to Lebanese before the crisis. "Yes but they didn't pay, it's better to rent out to Syrians. The Lebanese tenant is a hassle. It's already the 12th of the month today, and she hasn't yet paid me this month's rent. She doesn't answer me on her phone. Syrians pay on time, maybe two

²⁴² I wondered if his attitude would have been different had I been a male passenger, because his demeanor and discourse was in general quite patriarchal, and he didn't seem to care much for my reactions.

²⁴³ Private collective taxis very commonly used in Lebanon

²⁴⁴ A neighbourhood in the peripheries of Tripoli

days late. You know, what they do is they borrow money from anyone to pay their rent on time, and if they can't they will tell you and they will leave with no hassle. They would stay with other families... they huddle up. And you know they would live anywhere! The shop I'm telling you I rent out, it's used as a home, for a newly wed couple!" he let out a short laugh.

He confirmed that the Syrians would accept any precarious working conditions, and that they are vulgar

"You know what? They do anything. They'd work for LBP 20,000 [10-11€/day]. Their food is different than ours. It's different... we eat proper food, they just... just a fried egg would work for a Syrian, just to fill up his stomach... a potato. Just anything. You know I have an olive land up there, when I go I swear to you I sometimes see 200 Syrian women I swear on the Qoran²⁴⁵, just like goats picking herbs... I don't even know these herbs, and it's my land! Like *hindbeh* (dandelion), I wouldn't recognize the herb... would you eat that?". "Yes actually, I like *hindbeh*" I said. "I mean would you have that for a proper lunch? You know, [a Syrian] would take it to work to eat it! They'd bring vine leaves to the construction site to eat them... I would go get myself a *man'ousheh*²⁴⁶ or two... they would eat anything. *Sha'b mbahdal* (A messy people). Even our poorest Lebanese people live better than they do.

And finally he insisted on their discernible features

After a short silence I asked: "Can you tell them apart from a distance?" "Yes, of course. And I dare you to go check." He rolled his window farther down and pointed his hand at three or four individuals indicating they were Syrian. "They are everywhere I swear on the Holy Qoran. Pick up a cardboard off the street, you'd find a Syrian under it. I once tripped on a man sleeping on the floor in the park, it was dark, and he was holding a child... I asked him what he was doing there and he said that he didn't expect anyone to pass by at this time. I mean he didn't even know how to sleep in the right direction! I asked if he was ok, and he told me he's been sleeping here since even before the crisis."

Such general views on refugees are widely spread among the various social classes that form the Lebanese society, even though they are more pronounced amongst the most vulnerable. The latter are directly affected by the presence of the Syrian refugees, who tend to benefit more of the help and assistance from NGOs, as their cause is generally more visible and represents a major political and diplomatic issue.

²⁴⁵ The holy book of Islam

²⁴⁶ A Lebanese sort of pizza with different toppings that may include cheese, herbs and other. In the area of Tebbeneh a *man'ousheh* costs 1-2€ depending on the toppings and the shop.

As such, refugees are not only struggling for their lives, housing, work and presence in the public sphere, but also forced to face, prevent or thwart attempts to label them as “criminal” or “dangerous” classes. Paradoxically, they are also considered preferable as tenants and employees by Lebanese, because they accept more precarity with less hassle. It is within these contradictory issues that Syrians are able to “sneak” into the interstices of the city. They negotiate the best place they can considering the differing expectations of their host dwellers. This result they achieve allows them an inferior place in a difficult setting - the price to pay to escape the Syrian chaos. Because they face such contradictions at the different scales of their presence, from the very specific nation and state building to the micro-local in their everyday lives, insight into the processes by which they access Lebanon’s cities through different negotiation practices is useful, as it provides grounds for further discussion on the role played by these refugees in the country as a whole. As such, I will avoid categorical analyses that describes them solely as victims in all their forms of political systems, economic forces and social norms. Instead, in the following and last Chapter, I propose a discussion on how these refugees - as representatives of many other marginal groups - not only deploy practices, tactics and sometimes strategies of negotiating their very presence, legitimacy in the public urban sphere, but how they tend to play a specific role at both national and local levels, as an economic workforce, but also as political subjects.

Chapter 8.

Negotiating

space

The problematic settlement conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon's cities today are further complicated by the historical context in which refugees have arrived. This leads me to claim it is virtually impossible for Syrian refugees and host communities today to develop a healthy space sharing situation in Lebanon (El-Khoury, 2018 p.99).

Negotiation, as "a relation of power" (Rougier, 2014, p. 86), can yield positive outcomes when the negotiating parties each have bargaining capital. In the General Introduction to this dissertation, I proposed three types of negotiating space based on Rougier's reasoning: (1) negotiating space on the regional level, creating a space sharing social process, (2) negotiating space at the national level, accompanying a space sharing social situation, and (3) the continuous cycle of negotiating space at the local level, largely blocking a social process. The third type is mainly linked with the urban lens used in direct field investigation and in the analysis framework it allowed me to elaborate. In the first two I will discuss negotiations on space on the national and international scales, for which the geopolitical and social approaches have been mobilised in the analysis.

8.1 At the international scale - setting the stage

This type of negotiation is concerned with the international relations between Lebanon and Syria, not only since the 2011 crisis but since the very creation of the two nation states in 1920. Deciding on the borders of the countries was a first international negotiation for an independent state in Lebanon. In his seminal "A House of Many Mansions", Kamal Salibi describes the moment:

While France had strong sympathies for the maronites, the French government did not support their demands without reserve. In Mount Lebanon, the Maronites had formed a clear majority of the population. In a 'Greater Lebanon', they were bound to be outnumbered by the Muslims of the coastal towns and their hinterlands, and by those of the Bekaa valley; and all the Christian communities together, in a 'Greater Lebanon', could at best amount to a bare majority. The Maronites, however, were insistent in their demands. Their secular and clerical leaders had pressed for them during the war years is any other word missing here? the Allied powers, not excluding the United States. After the war, the same leaders, headed by the Maronite patriarch Elias Hoyek in person, pursued this course at the Paris Peace Conference; and in the end the French yielded (Salibi, 1988, p. 26)

They did yield, but the specific borders as they were drawn can be considered arbitrary. Not only for Lebanon, but for Syria as well. Had the Allied powers decided on more than two

states, the current geopolitical situation would have been different, maybe more problematic. Nation states were created without real consideration of the question of nationality - for instance, the Tripoli coastal Region was primarily part of Syria but further included into the new Lebanese Republic in 1926. As a matter of consequence, Syria's Mediterranean outlet was reduced, fuelling the demands of Syrian authorities, which led them to occupy this region from 1976. This integrated nation and state building between Lebanon and Syria explains the relationships between the two populations that are both intense and confrontational today. Christians, then, secured a place within the region - however problematic it was. While the geopolitical relations with both its neighbours, Syria, and Israeli occupied Palestine, have been turbulent, and while there are direct and indirect effects stemming from each of these relations on each other, it is the Syria-Lebanon relations that have most significance for this dissertation. More specifically, it is the successive events since the independence of Lebanon that time have continued to define, redefine and transform the place of Syrians in Lebanon a relationship to the present day that I am concerned with, seemingly far removed from the urban question, are events that directly affect the conditions within which Syrians have continued to reside in Lebanon, therefore affecting the spaces they could hope to fit in.

More recently, an important trend was the economic bilateral agreement of 1991²⁴⁷ and its consequences. Through this agreement, Syrians were invited to work in Lebanon within conditions that did not foster long term settlement. On the one hand, they were given significant flexibility in entering Lebanon and working in it with little or no administrative procedures required - a prospect attractive for many, due to Lebanon's more liberal economy that insured Syrians higher wages than they would hope for back home. On the other hand, the absence of administrative procedures also meant the absence of a work contract and the benefits that would come with it. Workers were guaranteed neither the minimum wage, nor health insurance, nor a limitation on the number of working hours, etc. and most importantly, their invisibility as workers²⁴⁸ denied them recourse to legal aid or justice should any complaint arise. These conditions made their trips to Lebanon limited in time and scope, they mainly came as seasonal agricultural workers, and construction workers. This context allowed for seasonal labour migration, particularly in the Bekaa. It also established a negative balance of power for Syrian workers, a legacy that refugees suffer from today. They consented to their condition of coercion in return for economic opportunities they had little access to otherwise. This was authorised and encouraged at the political level by the governments. Through the open border

²⁴⁷ The "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination signed between Syria and Lebanon"

²⁴⁸ No work contract, no formal rent agreements, and most importantly no formal tracking of their entry-exist trends.

policy, the Lebanese government provided cheap and disposable labour to its constituents in the form of a migration pattern that was unique in its protractedness. John Chalcraft describes it as “prolonged unsettlement” (2009, p.20), and explains it due to the fact that:

emerging communities that were thwarted and truncated, partly by recurrent hostility and violence, but above all by high social costs (rents, utilities, health, education, transportation, and food) in Lebanon, where there was virtually no government or non-governmental social assistance.

These challenges that Syrians faced to access and settle in Lebanon’s cities, along with the subsidized costs in Syria under the regime made it viable for them to continue their circular migration, without the need for further intervention from the Lebanese government. The latter, through bilateral agreements, had insured an easy enough process for Syrians to find quasi-legal interstices within the informal economy in which they could fit, all the while leaving the “unsettlement” climate to the difficult conditions of access to the cities. This would indeed explain why “Syrian migrants spawned no second generation in Lebanon, even after around half a century of mass migration” (Chalcraft, 2009 p.21) even though, before 2015, Lebanon had never “pursued policies to prevent settlement or encourage [the] return” (Chalcraft 2009, p.20) of Syrians.

This trend, then, made for a temporally limited precarious space for the Syrians in Lebanon until 2011. While the agreement was still in place until 2015, some of its core elements changed. Now, Syrians did have access to social assistance from non-governmental sources, even though it was hardly sufficient. They also had a good enough reason to want to settle: fleeing violence. What the Syrian refugee crisis brought to the negotiation table is the new found need for Syrians to settle long term, and to provide social benefits for their families. It is in this twofold change that causes the existence of the declared hostility of the Lebanese towards the Syrians since 2011, such as they repeatedly appeared during the interviews. The new geopolitical situation introduced by the Syrian war also contributed to explain the paradox. Syrians are undesired by Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees, but the latter two prefer renting their houses to Syrians, and the Lebanese prefer hiring Syrians in many industries.

Aside from the political implications of the dissociation policy that the government adopted vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, and for the better part of the first four years of the crisis, the Lebanese government struggled to maintain the existing status quo of the Syrian worker. By refusing the refugee label and the construction of camps, it insured that Syrians would continue to be regarded and treated as economic migrants within an informal context - the only space it had ever allowed them. Paradoxically, it was this same dissociation and denial that imposed itself

as a new and significant element in the negotiation. Syrians in Lebanon in 2015 had formed a large enough population that absorbing them was no longer a possibility; dealing with their presence had become a political, social and a largely urban challenge.

Quick fixes and emergency solutions (such as those used during the garbage crisis or electricity crisis) to the issue were beyond the government's reach. The Syrian refugees became scapegoats, the root cause for all the problems in Lebanon.

The discourse of Lebanese politicians towards Syrian refugees changed drastically in 2016 and in the lead up to the 2018 parliamentary elections, fueling rising tensions between refugees and some host communities, framing refugees as the cause of unemployment, instability, and diseases. Emboldened by World Bank estimates that the economy had incurred losses up to \$13 billion, Lebanese politicians, foremost Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, began calling for the immediate return of refugees to Syria. (Geha & Talhouk, 2018, p. 2)

But with no real guarantees for safety upon return to Syria, the international community represented by the International NGOs categorically refused the Lebanese bid for *refoulement*, and re-settlement efforts to other countries is a long and difficult road, and largely out of the hands of the government. The reaction, then, was to pass the ball on to the hands of local authorities, to “take any measures to reduce the number of Syrians” (PCM, 2014) in their municipalities. It was now up to the municipalities, supported by the Lebanese General Security to take control of the situation. In the meantime, the calls for the return of the Syrians strongly continue on the Lebanese side (Khodr, 2019; Vohra, 2019; Wintour, 2019).

The negotiations over the space that Syrians occupy in Lebanon cannot be dissociated from the geopolitical position of the country mainly with respect to Syria. The ongoing migration dynamics of Syrians in Lebanon are a part of a long history that has not been disrupted at any point, only transformed, and continues to do so. The most recent episode of this migration is the refugee crisis - that as I have discussed, is different in some ways but similar in others.

8.2 At the national scale: providing a cadre

Overlapping and anchoring in many ways the major issues observed at the international scale, the place for Syrians in Lebanon and especially in its cities account for another scale revealing the very sensitivity of the question. This very presence of Syrians between the days of independence and 2011 had already largely been agreed upon before they arrived. A temporary place, marked by menial labour and precarity, but widely acknowledged and clear. This section discusses the heavy influence that the changing national regulations has had on the situation.

As the arrivals of Syrian refugees in Lebanon grew and developed between 2011 and 2015, the initial understanding and place that the country - i.e. its government in all its representations - as well as its national citizens - had afforded to this population was being surpassed - Syrian refugees were not settling on a temporary basis, and they had clearly gone beyond their allotted spaces. They had begun to integrate entire job sectors beyond the traditional labour on construction and agriculture, they had brought in their families and were no longer a group of single males - all signs for potential longer term settlement, not in tune with the accepted status quo. To reframe the place, at the national level and at the municipal one, the General Security and the municipalities, empowered by the municipal decision of October 2014, officially launched and rapidly implemented the *kafala* system. It was clearly not enough to radically reduce the number of Syrians, but the effect it had at the same time on the representations of the Syrians and on Lebanese people, as well as on their spaces in the city was indeed radical.

Jad, a Syrian refugee in his late twenties has been one of the more fortunate in regards to the *kafala* rules. A young recording artist, Jad had been in Lebanon since 2012, when he left Syria for fear of circumscription. Belonging to the middle class, and having been to Lebanon before, he already had some connections in the artistic milieu in Beirut. He stayed with friends for a short while before moving in with a roommate and securing a comfortable setting for himself. Between 2012 and 2015, Jad was relatively sheltered from the refugee crisis. He frequented Syrian and Lebanese friends, usually in his industry, and became a regular in some restaurants and pubs of the capital. When the *kafala* system was announced, Jad had little trouble securing a *kafeel* who was also a friend, Nayla, and they went through the required steps, provided all the necessary documentation and paid the yearly fee of \$200²⁴⁹. In 2016, he was brutally confronted with the fact that outside his circle and comfort zone, Lebanon did not afford him the space he thought it did. "I had a very sweet encounter with the law" he sarcastically told me.

My sister had come to visit from the States²⁵⁰, I was overjoyed to see her. I took her to a place in Gemmayze²⁵¹ to have a drink. We asked the bartender where we could smoke and he signaled a table on the sidewalk right outside. Shortly after, a police patrol vehicle parked near us, and the officers came out and asked for our identification cards. While my sister and I were taking those out, I asked him what

²⁴⁹ He was required to provide his own identity documents and those of his *kafeel*, a certificate of residence, a certified statement indicating that he will not work in Lebanon, a lease or a document proving that his *kafeel* owns his principal residence, and a certified guarantee from the *kafeel* stating that he takes full legal responsibility over Jad's presence in Lebanon

²⁵⁰Jad's entire family had applied for resettlement in the USA, but only the females in the family were granted visas. Jad and his father stayed behind in Lebanon

²⁵¹ A neighbourhood in Beirut known for its active night scene

the trouble was, and he said: 'you are smoking'. I told him the bartender was aware and agreed we could smoke, but by this time he had heard and seen that I was Syrian... He held on to our IDs and moved a bit further, clearly agitated. A half an hour later, I dared²⁵² to get out of my chair and take one step out, and ask: "is there something we are waiting for?". He told me to get back into the pub - and I told him I couldn't run away because he had my ID. "Get back inside!" he shouted, along with some other words, I don't remember - so I started laughing. This provoked him... he pulled me by the arm to the side and started shouting profanities "*yel'an rabbak* (your God be cursed)" and other things, and wanted to handcuff me, but I refused - why would he handcuff me? For smoking? So he kicked me and continued to hit me violently. I could not hit him back... it's a police officer - all I could think of was to shout out to my sister *min ta7t el anqad* (from under the rubble²⁵³) to use her phone and film what was happening. When he heard that he got even more angry, snatched her mobile... it was very violent, he was actually hitting me with the chairs. Eventually he did handcuff me, and they took me to the station, and called upon my *kafeel*.

Nayla arrived at the station and after a few calls and a few hours, Jad was coerced into signing a declaration stating that he had not been assaulted and that he was detained because he refused to respond to the requests of a public security officer. He was informed that this the only way to avoid an overnight stay at the station. The declaration he signed exposed him to legal pursuit. Having officially acknowledged disobeying an officer, Jad was subject to legal prosecution, and sentenced in a military court to ten days imprisonment or a fine of \$200 - which he paid.

In this example, a negotiation took place at the national level between a dweller and the government. Symbolically, it represents the government placing Syrians back in their place, once they have shown some comfort, or settlement tendencies, in the city. Jad is the embodiment of the Syrian that does not fit in the "soureh" boxes described in Chapter 5, or agreements that had until now been in place. He represents the Syrian who does not fall into the prominent norm, but has, like his compatriots, turned into a refugee. In the case study sites, Syrian refugees felt the weight of the refugee turn. In the end, Jad was tried and convicted for assaulting a Lebanese officer, and the initial smoking accusation was forgotten. His pursuit was conditioned by his nationality not his alleged crime, feeding again into the continuous cycle of negotiation between the groups, and the social status of dwellers.

Fifteen years old Wael, a Syrian residing in Tebbeneh in 2015 told me that he stopped

²⁵² Spoken in an exaggerated manner, to portray how the policeman saw Jad's action

²⁵³ An expression to portray that he was on the floor, being assaulted from above

going to the public garden. I had met Wael during a focus group I conducted with Syrian refugees in Tebbeneh and he volunteered to take me on a commented walk of the area. He kept his eyes down most of the time, and was nervous about my camera - frequently asking me not to take a picture or to hide it (Figure 0-1). He arrived to Lebanon in 2012 he said. At first, he felt at ease moving around and made some friends especially when he joined a neighbourhood football team. Now, however “I wouldn’t go to the public garden” he said, with a smile as if surprised at the question. “Every day there’s a fight. Problems over women, over anything... I risk being beaten at any moment. I have no papers²⁵⁴” (*Wael, Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh, personal interview, 2015*). Fist fights are almost a daily occurrence in Tebbeneh. Like many other refugees, Wael was biding his time until he could find a way out of Lebanon and even confided at the end of our time together that he came to the focus group just in case I was someone “who could help” or who knew someone who would. He told me he was almost decided on “booking a journey”²⁵⁵, but was trying a better option because of all the stories he had heard about the dangerous crossing.




Figure 0-1: Teenage Syrian refugee walks with his eyes down for the quasi-totality of a 45-minutes commented walk, 2015

In the example of Wael, the indirect implications of the application of the *kafala* system to the Syrian refugees is clear. Deemed “illegal” like the majority of the refugee population, Wael’s living space in the city - while available - became restricted after 2015 because any altercation in the public space potentially has grave consequences, given its irregular situation in regards to residency. It has altered the way he dwells - not only his route, but also his apprehension of everything around him. He feels and fears the risk of being caught, for being a Syrian, and the unknown consequences that situation may hold for him. It is this cadre that the

²⁵⁴ Meaning that he does not have a *kafeel* or legal residency

²⁵⁵ While he did not develop on this issue, he was referring to the informal passages out of Lebanon to Turkey, or Cyprus, en route to Europe

local authorities allowed for the refugees - one in which they will only stay if all other options are exhausted. As such “the government's directives to restrict and decrease the number of Syrians is as such succeeding - indeed, it is only the most disenfranchised who are compelled to stay” (El-Khoury, 2018 p.103). This cadre has also brought about negotiations at a finer scale, that of the street or the block between dwellers, which I will discuss in the below section.

8.3 At the local scale: a large space for injustice within restricted boundaries

The streets of El-Nab'a

I will start this section with a focus on the El-Nab'a neighbourhood, and specifically a follow up of a situation I described in Section 7.4. Renée, a Lebanese dweller in El-Nab'a described her frustration at being put aside, forgotten, as a vulnerable community. She had expressed her dismay at the need to be part of a project that included Syrian refugees to be considered for international aid and support. Renée was part of an active Lebanese group of women who frequently coordinate with organisations to implement various projects in the neighbourhood, and is therefore well placed to know when and to whom funds or aid arrive to El-Nab'a. This group is headed by Hala, another active Lebanese dweller from the area. As we made our way through the neighbourhood, we came across the Hayat street (Figure 8-9). I exclaimed that it was a real shame for the children that they replaced the playground with a closed space, I wondered if Renee knew why.

You know? It was me who had the key to that playground! We [the Lebanese organisers of the children's event] had decided to open it for three or four hours a day in the afternoon. I would come to open and find that the [Syrian] kids had climbed the fence and gone inside. They don't respect anything, nothing suits them. It was better to close it down. *Nawar*²⁵⁶, what can I tell you - *ma byelba'lon shi* (they don't deserve anything). (Renée, Lebanese dweller, El-Nab'a, personal interview, 2018).

Hala, the community leader, gave a different explanation. When I asked her why the public garden was closed down, she told me that ‘an organisation’ had “commissioned a study that found that the garden was not useful because it received only two hours of sunshine per day” (Hala, Lebanese resident in El-Nab'a, personal interview, 2015-2018), and that it was necessary to have a collective community center in the neighbourhood. Hala said that the center was consequently funded by that organisation in partnership with the municipality, and its

²⁵⁶ The term *nawar* refers to a nomad people (sometimes translated as gypsies) who come from several countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It is used in the common Lebanese lingo in a pejorative manner to describe poor/dirty communities.

management was handed over to the Lebanese organising group, and as such, Hala hosted the opening ceremony described in Section 7.4.

Here, the negotiation was at the finest level, between dwellers for a very specific space. As one group was not satisfied with the use of the space, the latter's utility was changed. The users of the garden, the Syrian children as per Renée's description, were obviously not part of the negotiation nor did they have a say in what it would become.

In 2016, I observed another conflict concerning the sharing of public space. While on a commented walk with a Lebanese dweller²⁵⁷ I witnessed a street fight between two pre-teen boys. They were physically attacking each other and one of them was visibly bruised and crying. They said something about a bicycle which the smaller boy was holding on to and they argued about whom it belonged to. We gathered that the argument was not new, it had been going on for a while and the boys were trying to finish it. A crowd was beginning to form and it included several adults residing in the street. Rania reacted quickly, coming up to the boys and physically pulling the smaller one away from the grip of the older boy. The boys were very vocal and their anger was escalating, I made out the accent of the smaller boy to be Syrian. One of the adults from streets sided with the bigger boy and said to Rania: "don't bother with that [the smaller] one, God knows what he's up to". The boys backed off for a minute, visibly waiting for us to leave to get back to their quarrel. Indeed, the minute we started to walk away the quarrel started again and Rania stepped in, threatening to call the policemen who were close-by. By this time the smaller one was crying uncontrollably. He said the others teased him about his home and swore the bicycle was his. In our background, the bigger boy backed by several adults were saying: "go back under the bridge where your family is, stop with your false tears". When we chatted with the adults after the boys had disappeared, they explained that he was a Syrian and the family were living in a shed under the bridge. They said the smaller boy was always stirring trouble, along with his entire family, and that the bicycle was "surely stolen". Here again, while the cause for the violent expression of anger was mundane and literally childish, there was a clear readiness for an escalation of physical violence amongst the children and the adults alike. The readiness for physical expressions of anger seems present at all times. While Lebanese and Syrian communities in El-Nab'a share their spaces in careful peace, and have each drawn their boundaries as to the lines they allow each other to cross.

Accepting to sharing spaces within an implicit social contract

²⁵⁷ Lteif, R. . Formal and informal interviews and commented walks with Rania Lteif between 2014 and 2018.

In El-Nab'a today, the Lebanese and the Syrians seem to accept they will have to co-live for a protracted period and they have implicitly implied and accepted certain limitations. Syrian children could play in a public garden but only when the Lebanese guardian unlocks the door. Syrian women could be part of certain volunteering or organising efforts, but it's the Lebanese that are in charge. A Syrian family could live under the bridge, but the children cannot own or use bicycles. Syrians may use public spaces at certain times only. Syrians, while to a large extent disenfranchised in regards to legal rights as dwellers²⁵⁸, have understood the boundaries and are continuously negotiating them. Out of necessity, urgency, or a need to find normalcy, Syrians face their present living space in Lebanon head on. The children will climb the fence to play in the garden before the guardian unlocks the door, the women will join the organising committee even as inferiors, and the boy living under the bridge will ride his bicycle in the street. Theirs is a process of quiet encroachment, a

noncollective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective consumption or urban services, informal work, business opportunities, and public space) in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion (Bayat, 2010, p. 45).

El-Nab'a is an interesting field in terms of the coliving of the Lebanese and Syrians after 2011. The fact that the neighbourhood was ipso-facto mixed pre Syrian crisis highlights the fact that dwellers of El-Nab'a have faced coliving scenarios for decades. They share the neighbourhood amongst Lebanese religious groups, amongst Lebanese and poor migrant workers from many countries, and since 2011 amongst Lebanese and Syrians. This last population is the most significant in recent history in terms of their impact on the neighbourhood. While El-Nab'a dwellers may have had learned to appreciate that "peaceful coexistence has to go through the tolerance of the visual culture of the "other"" (El-Alam, 2014, p. 119) before 2010, their expressions tell a different story since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis. Any visible expression related to the presence of the Syrian in the urban space seems not tolerated, being graffiti, icons, domestic objects as the very simple practice - not specific to Syrian - of drying clothes on windows²⁵⁹. As I have shown in the different examples in the last three chapters, Lebanese dwellers notice, and disapprove of the Syrians. They are frustrated with their numbers, as well as with the implications of their socio urban space presence.

²⁵⁸See Chapter 1 section 1.1: Refugees' legal status; Chapter 3 section 1.2: Legal restrictions increase segregation; Chapter 3 section 2: The Policy Paper of October 2014

²⁵⁹ Such expression of a visible expression which disturbs because it reminds of the very presence of "the other" is common in many contexts where migrants or poor urban dwellers are considered as a nuisance. The case has largely been publicized in both metropolises of the global South and in the North.

Streets of Tebbeneh

More than in any other area where I spent time, the Lebanese and Syrians of Tebbeneh seem disappointed in each other, though their expectations have been shattered. One graffiti in the Nasr Street of the Tebbeneh neighbourhood (Figure 0-2) dated October 23, 2017 reads: “We did not forsake anyone but an ingrate²⁶⁰ is an ingrate. It struck me because I had heard sentiments along those lines during my interviews especially with the Lebanese dwellers. I had little doubt that it was written about the situation of Syrian refugees, although I could not confirm it. Lebanese interviewees more often than not expressed feelings of dismay as though the Syrian to whom they had opened their doors to, had let them down.



Figure 0-2: Graffiti on Nasr Street

Graffiti on the Nasr street - Dahr el Moghr, Tebbeneh neighbourhood reads “We did not forsake anyone but an ingrate is an ingrate” 23/10/2017. Date: February 2018

Their disappointment tends to be mainly due to the fact that the hosts were ‘very

²⁶⁰ The literal translation of the graffiti is “an animal is an animal”. Referring to someone as an animal is a lighter form of a curse; its connotation is usually “asshole”. I used the word “ingrate” in the text as it is in line with the general meaning of the phrase.

welcoming' in the beginning²⁶¹. Every Lebanese dweller mentioned this, and so did the Syrian refugees in the neighbourhoods. Here, in a highly conservative, informal and poor neighbourhood, the tensions rose acutely when the refugees "stayed". No official curfews were placed in Tebbeneh, but this did not mean the Syrian refugees felt empowered enough to move freely during certain hours. Like in the example of Wael in Section 8.2, Syrians are forced to use negative coping mechanisms to cope in Tebbeneh. In this poor infamously neighbourhood, poured a lot of international aid during the first two years of the crisis, and it was highly felt by the hosts. I spent some time with an elected member of the Tripoli municipality in 2017, he shared the chronology of the arrival of refugees as he saw it.

In 2011, when the Syrian crisis started, the majority of the Lebanese in Tripoli supported the "revolt", because they were against the Syrian regime - thinking it was to be for a short time. Alawis came to Jabal Mohsen, the others to other parts of Tebbeneh.

The Syrians overstepped in many places - they acted as if they ruled the country, just like the Palestinians acted when Abu Ammar²⁶² was here [1980s]. The government did not act at all at this point, neither the central government nor the municipalities - they stood completely on the side. The tensions grew, the Lebanese started to get angry, feelings of frustration and inequality especially in terms of international funding going to the Syrians.

It was not until 2015 that the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) forced international organizations to shift funding from support to refugees to support to the vulnerable communities, including the Lebanese. At that time for example, the UN was fixing apartments occupied by Syrians so the Lebanese would find themselves living in less maintained housing than the Syrians who now had better kitchens and bathrooms etc. Don't forget we're in a city where there is 60 percent unemployment rate amongst youth and 43 percent under poverty line, a very difficult social and economic reality. It has continued till today: there's a very tense feeling in the city. I think this issue [international aid] created this hatred, not hatred I think - jealousy you could say, from the Lebanese towards the Syrians. Today the main Lebanese argument is for the Syrians to go back to the safe areas in Syria, "why are they still here?" is a common question these days. Even when President Aoun spoke on the Syrian file²⁶³ [encouraging them to leave by any means], the Sunnis supported him to the surprise of many, they didn't empathize with Sunnis of Syria. Even the Sunnis today are against the presence of the Syrians in Lebanon, especially since it's not a

²⁶¹ The majority of Tebbeneh, and Tripoli, residents are Sunni Muslims, as such are in general opposers to the Syrian regime, and initially supported the refugees as a symbol of support to the uprisings.

²⁶² A nickname for the Palestinian leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat.

²⁶³ President Aoun, in line with the Free Patriotic Movement's discourse, spoke openly in Lebanon and internationally about the need to send Syrians back to safe zones in Syria. See Chapter 1 for details

governmentally organized presence. It seems to me there is a political consensus to keep things under wrap. Every time tensions rise to the brink of explosion something is done to alleviate the potential violence, a speech, a big fund, something to appease the people. But in general there is no support for the presence of Syrians in Tripoli; it has been the same since 3 or 4 years. (*Chadi, elected member of the Tripoli Municipality, personal interview, 2017*).

This interview shows some of the main paradoxes of the Lebanese reaction to the arrival of Syrians. At first, Syrians were favourably received because they embodied the resistance to the neighbouring regime, the Syrian border being only 10 km north of the city. But soon after, with the prolongation of the Syrian refugee settlement and its effects, the reactions of the host dwellers in the cities changed. In addition to these geopolitical questions, the competition for international aid, exacerbated the reactions of the vulnerable Lebanese dwellers.

My fieldwork in Tebbeneh strongly confirms these views. In fact, more than any of the three case study sites, the hosts in Tebbeneh wanted the Syrians to leave, and disliked sharing public space with them. Wael, the young refugee I introduced in Section 8.2 took me to meet the football coach at a coffee shop. The coach was with four other Lebanese players, and Wael introduced me and how we met (Figure 0-3). The coach, Abu Bilal, proceeded to tell me about how he has welcomed the two Syrian boys into the team. “I always tell the boys, sports are sports, it’s not about politics”, he said. I noted this statement and asked him what he meant, what politics had to do with it, but he only laughed and changed the subject. I then invited the Lebanese players to talk some more after my walk with Wael, and asked them to share more about their experience. They explained to me that the Syrians were alright on the field, they played well, but that they didn’t have much else in common. None of the boys imagined developing a social relationship with Wael.

The above conversations with the football team touch on three subjects. Abu Bilal, while including the Syrians and indeed providing them the opportunity to play on the team, very clearly saw their presence in a political light. On the field they represented the refugee crisis and it was a political statement to integrate them. Because he “always tells the boys”, it is also clearly an engrained issue within the team. They have collectively made the choice to include Wael and his Syrian teammate. The line though, ends abruptly there, it is in the second point that the conversation touches on the limits of the space afforded to the refugees. On the field they are part of the team, but off the field they return to their place as subaltern individualities in the city. The third thing the conversation shows is how the negotiation for space has blocked a social process. By clearly defining the limits of where the boys are together and where they are not, all

the actors in this situation have contributed to the negotiation - and framed a situation difficult to overcome.



Figure 0-3: Football coach Abu Bilal and three of the players including Wael, 2017

Restricted real and symbolic living space

I met one Syrian refugee in Tebbeneh in 2017. After several days of informal chats and exchanges over the phone, this man of just under 50 years invited me to his home to meet his family. Their story, not especially unique, reflects the limited dimensions of the space they can access in Lebanon. It is a space restricted in size, due to various factors not the least of which is affordability, and it is also restricted symbolically, as they are closely bound to the whim of other dwellers. The family was compelled to move three times in three years, everytime to a smaller, less private residence. They were also confined to work under difficult employment conditions, and in harsh surroundings that did not allow them the smallest of luxuries.

Abu Mahmoud had three young children and was living in a two-bedroom substandard apartment which his family shared with his wife's cousin, her husband and two children. He didn't want me to take pictures, "You'll take pictures of my real house one day, back home inshalla", he said, "we will not stay here forever". His wife made coffee and brought out juice and sweets, insisting I have one of each. It was mainly his wife who spoke, Em Mahmoud. She told me of their arrival and settlement, how they moved into three apartments since they had arrived. They first stayed in Tripoli, in Abu Samra, but moved after only a couple of months - it was too

expensive as they paid \$350 for the place, which was as big as the one they were currently residing in, and for which they pay \$300 for, and share. They then moved to a building in the city, where Abu Mohammad was hired as a concierge. They occupied the ground floor rooms meant for the concierge, and they stayed there for another eight or ten months. “*Walla ya habibti* (I swear by God, my dear) they promised him to fix our papers, and his salary was to be \$150. I thought *insatarna* (we had found safety). One of the building’s residents said he would take care of it and we moved in”. Then the services required of them as a family began to increase. At first, Abu Muhammad was expected to wash no less than five cars every day, and Em Muhammad was expected to clean the common staircase and entrance (with no extra salary). The children were not allowed to be seen in the entrance, they would have to be out in the street or in their closed room. Then, Em Muhammad started to be called into homes to support with the cleaning. Still, her work was not remunerated, but for some “tips and gifts” from some of the women. Abu Muhammad was asked to run errands continuously, park the cars, and clean the larger windows in the building. All the while, the residency of the family was still not taken care of. Every week, the resident who had promised would come up with an excuse, and would be annoyed with Abu Muhammad for asking. Eventually, Abu Muhammad understood that the *kafala* would not be taken care of, and he and Em Muhammad were getting physically tired of the workload. One week before they left, Abu Muhammad complained to his main employer about the situation, and was told to either stay on, or leave, but not to bring it up again. That’s when they finally moved to Tebbeneh, into the apartment they shared with their extended family.

She also spoke of the humiliation at the United Nations offices, how she would stand for hours waiting for a turn and often not be admitted. Her accounts were more or less representative of the accounts I had been hearing from refugees in the last few years. An hour or so into the conversation, Abu Mahmoud paused suddenly and profoundly, looking into a void. As though taking the time to talk as we if had given him insight and courage. It seemed like a long pause, then he said

I can't wait to get out of Lebanon. On the day I get my visa I'm going to spit on every Lebanese resident in this street. They think they are better than us, why? my children are just as good as theirs. The other day my wife couldn't stop crying: our neighbour cursed at our daughter because she was carrying a new school bag [that was given to her by the UN]. She asked my child where she got the money for a new school bag. Are we not allowed to live with dignity? Are our children not allowed the smallest of joys in this country? We are refugees but we are people!

In the alleys of Bourj el-Barajneh

In Bourj el-Barajneh, and in relation to the other two sites of this study, the negotiation for space was largely heightened and somewhat diluted at the same time. On one hand the extreme density of the camp and the scarcity of open and public spaces make for a spatially challenging setting that is already heavy with infrastructure challenges, that has been stretched to dangerous limits since 2011. Moreover, the social position of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is precarious to a large extent, and the group is already excluded from a significant part of the Lebanon's social and economic sectors, and faces exclusion and hostility. To add to that, third and fourth generation refugees in the camp have a profound crisis of belonging, they are prohibited from seeking roots in Lebanon, and they have come too far from Palestine to have even symbolic roots in the country, like the first and second generations perhaps had. These three factors heightened the effects of the arrival of the influx of refugees, that only decreased what already was restricted social and physical space available for the dwellers of the camp.

On the other hand, the nature of the Palestinian refugees residency in Lebanon places them in the best position to empathise with the new Syrian arrivals. No one understands, more than the Palestinian refugees, the difficulties of being undesired dwellers in Lebanon's cities. It is not easy to compete with the challenges they had and have to access the city, and even though throughout the years they have developed various mechanisms to cope, and have succeeded to create linkages with their Lebanese surroundings, they still represent the figure of the unwanted dweller par excellence. In this sense, the weight of the influx was more accepted, tolerated in the camp than other sites.

But, paradoxically, in the camp I saw many of the same trends vis-à-vis the Syrian refugee crisis that I saw in the other two sites. It was in the camp that my attention was first turned to the different way that laundry was hung by Syrians, for example. I also heard the same complaints about vulgarity, how the (new) refugees did not have the same manners. The two most pronounced issues that I heard about in the camp, though, like in the other two sites, concerned first economic competition, and second, a competition over their refugee identity (access to aid, and identity). It is the latter that I will discuss here, below this excerpt from my field notebook relating an interview with a Palestinian family.

It didn't take long after I met Setti xxx in her living room with her niece and grandson for her to start telling me about the problem. Ya setti battalo el omam shayfinna (the UN don't see us anymore). She proceeded to bring and hold up a bag of medicine, and started to take one box after the other: "this one costs \$30 per forty tablets and I take a tablet a day, this one costs \$35 and I need two boxes per month...". For a

moment I felt very uncomfortable and feared I had misrepresented myself. I addressed this quickly with her and everyone in the room - that I was not surveying the situation nor was I in a position to offer support. The niece relieved me by saying it was clear, but that the grandmother was explaining what had changed since the arrival of the Syrians to the camp. With the arrival of the Syrians, she said, the priorities of aid shifted. There was confusion early on, between what the UNRWA offered and to whom, and what the UNHCR offered, and to whom - especially in the case of the Palestinian refugees who came from Syria since 2011. This was clarified with time, but the feeling among the Palestinian refugees was that their access to UN resources had been significantly affected by the presence of the Syrians.

As the conversation progressed, it came back to some of my principal line of inquiries including differences in habits, culture and economic competition. It also came to another issue that I had observed in the other two sites. Setti was renting out the two apartments above her, which her family had built in the 50s, to Syrians. She has preferred them to Palestinian refugees, because they paid more, and on time, and therefore the dominant-dominated dialectic was also present in the camp. For the Palestinians, aid is a valid income resource to which they feel entitled. This differed from the case surveyed in the other two sites, where aid was also a problematic point, but it was viewed as supplementary income.

Five of the nine the Palestinian refugees I interviewed said the following in one form or another: “at least the Syrians have a passport”, “at least they have a country they may hope to return to”. It is perhaps the greatest paradox of all: refugees hosting refugees, on borrowed land that neither hosts, nor rejects them. The Palestinians stuck in spaces of exception, the Syrians seeking a place within that exception. The Bourj el-Barajneh camp is the only site where negotiation started with an equality of inequality. While the refugee hosts do have an upper hand on the management of their apartments and their alleys to a certain extent - they, too, like the Syrians, remain highly blocked in a negotiation on all levels. On the local level with Lebanese dwellers, with the Syrian refugees and with the Lebanese authorities; but most of all, they remain the heirs of a legacy of negotiating space that has been blocked far beyond their reach, at the international level, for their physical space since 1948 and for their identity ever since.

Conclusion to Part 3:

In light of the tangible and intangible elements shared by Syrian refugees which I have here tried to discuss from both a distant approach and through the depiction of some case studies, it seems that injustice in Lebanon's city is random. No reference points seem to exist

with respect to which dwellers could pragmatically and consciously position themselves. In regard to both its norms and its representations, injustice in Lebanon's city appears to be capricious, touching all of its dwellers, even though in different ways and intensities. Mostly, injustice in Lebanon's city has created processes by which it pits its dwellers against each other, and by so doing produced patterns of injustice that repeat and trickle through its layers from the local to the national to the regional. What can be analysed is the varying degrees in which injustice touches the different groups of dwellers, and how they reproduce this injustice amongst each other.

In this part I used selected interviews and observations that highlight some ways in which random situations of conflict have ingrained spatial injustice in the city - using the situation of the Syrian refugees in my three case study sites as the focal point. Through their struggles to find a space in the three neighbourhoods, the effects of random injustice is clear. In the above examples, the Syrian refugees expressed in one way or another the fear of unforeseen events that could have serious consequences on their safety and residency. This randomness has generated for the Syrian refugees a prominent sense of fear that has pushed them to invisibility.

The constant negotiations for space are a reality of each group of dwellers. At the beginning of the crisis, Syrian refugees' concerns centered on finding shelter and insuring their livelihood. As can perhaps be expected of any migrant moving to a new country, they attempted to access the city in as fast and effectively as they could - by taking advantage of every opportunity they could. If they could receive aid, they would stand in line for hours to get it. If they could insure a job, for whatever salary, they did. If they needed to share an apartment to get by, they did. Due to their significant number, this approach was viewed as aggressive by the host communities, who struggled to keep up. The Syrian refugees were forcing other vulnerable communities to renegotiate their own spaces, mainly to the decline. In what was already a dire economic situation in the three case studies, the arrival of Syrian refugees heightened the weight. Host communities resisted the restrictions on their own spaces. They abhorred the fact that Syrians accepted less for their own jobs, and paid more for their apartments.

The 2015 regulations imposed by the government tipped the balance back towards the hosts. In it was an opportunity to gain back their space, by restricting that of the Syrians, and benefiting from the latter's presence when and where they could. Here lie the most pronounced instances of injustice that have been mentioned in the above chapters. While in Chapter 6, I described the daily struggles of the refugees in accessing shelter - substandard in most cases, Chapter 7 attempts a description of how these struggles were viewed by the hosts, in the generalisations than has become the basis of the general discourse.

Chapter 8 presented a detailed analysis of the different negotiations on space and their expressions from the largest to the finest scale explaining how each level of negotiations tend to overlap and influence the other. At the urban scale, from the city in itself to the neighbourhood, the dweller-dweller negotiations are continuous, and to a certain extent silent and discrete. Syrians are in pursuit of interstices to slide into and get access to a minimal degree of stability, while hosts are, on the contrary, in the pursuit of preserving their own individual and collective spaces, an objective for which they need to restrict and decrease those interstices as much as possible.

Figure 0.1 that opened this dissertation depicts a moment in a successive flow of *sewees* cars and vans dropping off workers on the sidewalk across from the Bourj el-Barajneh camp's main entrance on the Old Airport road. My interviewee who pointed out the daily event to me was a Palestinian refugee from Bourj el-Barajneh and we were walking past the bridge around five in the afternoon. He stopped me and said: "Look Dima, look. You will understand what I've been telling you. Everyday... by the hundreds, just look and count, let's wait for five minutes, you will see". Ramzi had been having trouble finding work since the arrival of the refugees. He had been struggling with rent, and was seriously thinking of leaving the country, "*mish 'aref kif* (I don't know how)" he said. "If I were Lebanese, I mean, the Lebanese government should do something".

The Bourj el-Barajneh case study also shows that issues analysed in part 3 are not strictly delimited by a confrontation between a host society and an abroad refugee influx. A superficial look at these events could lead one to read them as a crisis mitigated by the extraordinary plasticity of Lebanese society, forged in a structurally chaotic history since the independence of 1943. The inclusion of Bourj el Barajneh in the case study shows a more complex situation where, paradoxically, inequalities that exclude are also the driving force for the inclusion of Syrian refugees.

Recomposing urban settlements, spatial practices, social relations, the driving force of such injustice paradoxically reinforces the overall cohesion of Lebanese society, including its deepest and, certainly, most traumatic fractures. In a historically fragmented society and cities, yesterday's refugees align themselves with the same representation as the dominant groups when it comes to looking at "the other" Syrian. In practical terms, this unity of view is fuelled by the benefits that both sides hope to derive from the dominated situation in which they find themselves.

General conclusion

On the research approach

I have organised this dissertation over three parts and eight chapters. In the first part, I presented a picture of Lebanon's cities in the wake of the arrival of the Syrian refugees, tracing the history of the creation of the two nation-states since the early 1900s. After an elaboration on the sociopolitical climate, and insistence on the fact that the Syrian migration is not a recent phenomenon, but it is in fact as old as the country's independence. This old migration is not without its tensions, and those are highlighted in order to present a background on the Lebanese-Syrian individual relations over the decades. The second chapter, which concludes the first part, describes the delicately formed political structure and discusses how the dwellers fit into the governance of the cities, with a focus on the relationship between Lebanese and low-skilled migrants. The second part poses the analytical framework of the study and delivers a detailed account of the methodology used to gather the data for this dissertation, it also clearly lays out the researchers position with respect to the object. Importantly, this part presents the three neighbourhoods selected for fieldwork and justifies the choice. The third and last part centers on empirical observations and discussions. After a chapter describing the spatial itinerary of the refugees upon crossing the borders into Lebanon, two chapters expose selected field examples from different points of view - that of the Syrian refugees first, then that of the hosts, in the form of generalisations placed upon refugees. The dissertation ends on a discussion chapter, framing the situations within the notion of negotiating space, as proposed in the very title of the dissertation.

In the general introduction to this dissertation, I proposed an investigation as to how a perceived impossibility of a country taking in a quarter of its population in a short period of time came to be in Lebanon. Throughout, I have tried to show that the injustices pre-dating the massive influx of the Syrian refugees are, in reality, the key to the answer. Lebanon's cities are difficult to access for all their dwellers, regardless of their nationality, origins, or their collective or individual histories.

Timing of the research, timing of the event

In fact, after a paroxysmal period that accompanied the first years of the refugee crisis, when the unity of Lebanon and civil peace seemed to be in question, the situation appears to be stabilizing. In parallel, the influx of new refugees has severely decreased, and the departure of refugees that had come to Lebanon between 2011 and 2015 is slow, but ongoing. Those who still dwell in Lebanon are being forced into invisibility and the silent acceptance of the unjust fate they are being subjected to in Lebanon's cities. Just outside the borders, the Syrian war seems to

be on the verge of closure, even though the situation is still extremely uncertain as the writing of this thesis comes to its completion in May 2019.

This thesis has been in development roughly in parallel with the timeline of the Syrian conflict, with my field research starting around the time when social and political tensions were soaring and the number of refugees reached its highest point. The temporal coincidence between the time of the thesis and the time of what is designated in Lebanon as the “refugee crisis” has enabled this “total social fact” (Mauss, 1989) to be documented as closely as possible to the expressions of the processes, by collecting empirical material based on testimonies and documented discourse. At the same time, this coincidence also developed into a constraint. Forcing scientific elaboration to be mixed with current events, it delayed the problematic elaboration of the first part and, above all, complicated the interpretation and objectivation of the field data.

As this thesis is being finalised, the situation seems to be slightly stabilizing, while the Syrians in Lebanon remain in a subordinate position in Lebanon’s cities. The relative decrease in tensions, however, is not accompanied by a significant decrease in the number of refugees. Even if it is to be assumed that the Syrian refugees will go back to Syria eventually, it is not likely that they do so in the same temporal trend in which they came. More likely, a certain proportion will stay on in the long term - as their return to Syria is not a simple equation related only to the cessation of armed violence. How will the future of this urban co-living look like? Of course, this question remains far beyond the framework assigned to this thesis.

Three Lenses to understand the “fait social total” represented by the Syrian influx in Lebanon

With this work, I have attempted to contribute to the socio-urban understanding of cities in Lebanon, combining approaches from the field of urban and migration studies, and furthermore bringing geopolitics into the urban sphere as a factor that cannot be dissociated from the former two. I have applied three lenses to propose a framework of analysis which could help in the understanding of how conflict has materialized in these cities.

I conducted field research using a socio-urban lens, looking at specific situations related to sharing spaces in the city. My observations and interviews were undertaken in a largely qualitative, ethnographic spirit, and I drew on them to emphasize the similarities and differences, that is, not through systematic comparison - site to site, or process to process - but rather with the ambition to put in perspective, in different contexts, how a similar question could provide a system of understanding the conflicts and more largely, the relationships tied up in the everyday

lived spaces Syrians refugees and Lebanese are conducted to share.

I investigated at this scale of the processes trying to articulate observed situations within the national level, looking at the policies and strategies that have - directly or not - influenced the relation between these dwellers. At their level, governmental and non-governmental actors and institutions involved have to be also observed with a second lens, from a geopolitical perspective, to try and find the specific dynamic that was in play in the field. Their role is of heightened significance, as they were the first official hosts to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, thus representing the latter first, and sometimes only access to livelihood and other resources. In addition, their initial strategy to solely support Syrian refugees and the subsequent shift towards supporting all vulnerable communities also had an effect on the views that dwellers held of each other.

Lastly, I used a regional lens, geopolitical but historical as well - as the common history of the two countries has profound effects, perhaps the most pertinent ones, on the mundane details of the unremarkable co-living situation between all groups of dwellers. As such, I was able to link the observations in the street with the direct influences of the neighbourhood and the nation, and the direct and indirect influences of the region.

Confronting three study sites: crossing perspectives

Furthermore, the multiplicity of geopolitical configurations that are identifiable in each of the three case studies renders it difficult to describe the situation from a broad point of view. Such bias also justifies the thesis being an urban geography thesis. Challenges in addressing issues relating to urban refugees are far from specific to Lebanon. In fact, this phenomenon is of rising importance in the world, now that most of us live in urban settings, and that refugees are more than ever before opting to settle in urban spaces rather than classical camps, due to the opportunities that cities provide them.

What makes the case in Lebanon peculiar are two factors: first the brutal nature with which the influx occurred, including its size and shortness of time span, especially compared with the total population in Lebanon before 2011 and also compared with the small size of the country and its high urban density, which could not allow Syrians to settle in places where they would not have been visible to the Lebanese. Second, and adding to these concrete conditions, is the particular relationship that different Lebanese religious groups maintain with their spaces making it also an important determinant in the reactions to the arrival of the Syrian refugees.

The place that Syrians can hope to occupy in the Lebanese society is necessarily

restricted. It can only be so in a fragmented country in which regional micro-spaces are controlled, normalised, and marked by clan-like communities that hold significant political weight and in some instances have access to arms.

Cities in Lebanon, despite their diversity, have a common potential to reveal social phenomena of the same nature. In them, the current tensions between refugees and their hosts are but extensions - new expressions - of old ones that had drawn from longstanding disagreements on identity, nationality, and allegiance. In this fabric, Syrian refugees have become political subjects at the national and local scales. Their presence and the way they are dealt with in the different case studies are not dissociable from what they demographically represent as diplomatic and religious objects.

How to negotiate a place ? The dialectics of inequalities and injustices

The situation of pronounced inequalities in the Lebanese society, as well as the quasi-absence of public regulation on all levels paradoxically allowed the refugees to take a place in the interstices with a certain degree of effectiveness, in spite of their significant numbers. In terms of shelter, they rented garages and stayed under bridges. In terms of work, they took menial jobs even when they were overqualified, and accepted exploitation and non-regulated conditions. In terms of legal residency, they sought guarantors and paid high fees, or used negative coping mechanisms to avoid exposure.

Rendered highly vulnerable due to the informality and lack of regulation, it is paradoxically in this way that Syrians were able to negotiate a place in the Lebanese society and urban space with regard to the three most important elements: securing residency, finding shelter, and securing livelihood. In the three case studies, the negotiations are conducted under very unfavorable conditions, in which the Syrians are in the dominated and subordinate position that is further aggravated after their settlement. And for this settlement, Syrians are expected to pay higher rent than the average while simultaneously accepting lower wages than the average. In terms of the other aspects of everyday life, the situation is even worse. Their presence in public spaces invites hostility from the “established” city dwellers, and this translates in verbal or physical assault and other forms of violence. There is little hope for police protection, who as seen in many of the examples, remain passive, or systematically accuse the refugees. Furthermore, co-living spaces are very limited: a community activity or a football team. But in these situations of co-living, Lebanese dwellers, and Palestinian dwellers to a certain extent, regardless of their social or religious group of origin, keep a distance that limits the encounter to its most formal

aspects. In spite of the accumulation of these injustices, negotiation is still in place - within which the hosting dwellers have, despite their hostility and resistance, granted a place to the hundreds of thousands of Syrians installed since 2011.

Negotiation is a notion which started to take shape with the advancement of my field investigations. I started to notice that most of the situations I was observing were related to the Syrian refugee's acceptable space, both physical and social and that most conflicts arose when the latter gained or attempted to gain more space. When the Syrian refugee was in the already accepted role of concierge or construction worker, there were no major issues. But when the Syrian refugee became a waiter or a salesperson, it was only acceptable where exploitable. Thus, the Syrian refugee could negotiate a waiter's job as long as the wages were less than those of a Lebanese waiter. It is more or less the same story in other areas, whether it be access to aid, or housing, or public space. For the latter, the negotiation was not between dwellers, but between the dweller and the authorities: public space would only be accessible at certain times for the Syrian refugees, either in an informal and integrated way by the Syrians, or more formally through official municipality authorised curfew announcements. Most significantly, for the Syrian to reside legally in Lebanon, which was the only possibility that they had considering they were already in the country, they would have to accept a legally inferior status and the guardianship of a Lebanese.

Through their agency, their network and the gaps they have filled, Syrian refugees have transformed cities in Lebanon - in spite of their difficult journey to access the city, and however challenging their daily lives continue to be. I submit this dissertation as a small contribution to efforts being undertaken towards a better understanding of the challenges that cities face in their endeavours to take in urban refugees.

Resilience or socio-spatial injustice?

In an urban setting where public regulation is virtually non-existent and key denominational links as well as the market economy are explicitly oriented towards the ultra-liberal, groups with strong cultural, political, or financial endowments who are expectedly well positioned to compete for access to comfortable urban life, fuelling growing inequalities with inferior groups. It remains, however, that the construction of an urban wellbeing in Lebanon requires the deployment of strategies and the mobilization of financial resources that are out of proportion with respect to what we know, for example, in Western Europe. The urban settlement of Syrian refugees since 2011 is part of this particular relationship that Lebanese society maintains with its spaces: although specific, the latter needs to be linked to broader and

more structural trends in order to be understood in all its complexity.

In these pages, I have sought to show how, since 2011, Syrians, often familiar with Lebanese society and its cities through temporary labour migration or family ties, have symbolically turned into refugees rather than arrived as refugees, and how they have been coping to address the challenges that cities have presented them with. I have suggested that socio-spatial gaps - interstices - exist in the cities in Lebanon, by and because of the existing complexities of socio-politically and culturally fragmented cities. The multiple and unstable urban systems in the latter are what has allowed Syrians to find a place in the interstices of urban life. The reactions of the hosts to the Syrian refugees has not tipped the balance towards a state of equilibrium, on the contrary it has added to the increase of these imbalances. As such, the Syrian influx has aggravated the disequilibrium equally for both groups of dwellers.

More than the notion of resilience, which would imply the ability of the Lebanese society and its spaces to regain an initial state at the end of a geopolitical and migratory crisis, it is the core notion of socio-political inequality that seems to be more suitable to utilise as a means of accounting for the urban situations empirically analysed over the course of the field research carried out during this thesis. From a social geography perspective, this thesis poses, as a result, that it is the dynamics of inequality that fuel the process of settlement of Syrians in the city, forcing them to negotiate their place in a power relation that is largely unfavourable to them, especially since the introduction of *kafala* in 2015.

Perspectives

Due to time and to the inherent limitations of elaborating a framework that would fit within the objectives of this thesis, this work did not touch on every aspect of the social fabric that plays into affecting public opinion, nor did it study and analyse in all its subtlety and complexity every aspect of the phenomenon. In what follows I will present three, out of several other, aspects that may be considered for further research.

While there have been various excerpts from local newspapers and other journalistic resources mobilised in this work, the role of the media has not been included and analysed as a separate actor. This is an area that deserves and necessitates further study. Like other infrastructure in Lebanon, media outlets are in the vast majority private organisations, and most belong to the prominent families who are already represented in the political structure. Such examples include MTV (of the Murr family), NBN (Nabih Berri Network), OTV (the station of the Free Patriotic Movement), LBC (initially set up as the station for the Lebanese Forces) etc. There is only one national television station, Télé Liban, that has very limited budget and reach.

The effect of the media on the evolution of the refugee crisis and its consequences on the socio-urban fabric in Lebanon is significant. What follows is an example of a television report on the situation in El-Nab'a since 2011. A news report on MTV²⁶⁴ Lebanon in 2011 titled "East Beirut is in Danger" stated: "As a first impression when passing through the street between Daoura and Bourj Hammoud, you imagine that you are not in Lebanon but in Sudan or a country that brings together the Kurds, or some country in Asia. The residents of this area for over 70 years feel that they are strangers and they, unfortunately, live in a state of constant fear of being robbed or sexually assaulted and all sorts of perversion you can think of, that non-Lebanese youth are carrying out [...] in the area which they visit to pick up Asian girls or to spend time in coffee shops ..."

The report which is loaded with racial speech in its basic messages, not just towards one ethnic group, but towards any "other" in El-Nab'a, is ultimately biased news reporting. It is politicised media that contributes to the fueling of the mass rhetoric that has become synonymous with the word refugee or outsider. The role played by the media in Lebanon, be it in favor of or against the refugee is notable and the role it has in influencing social relations is worth further investigation.

In Chapter 4, I included a section on informal settlements, from a mostly quantitative point of view. While it is true that the majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are urban refugees, the population in the camps represents a quarter of a million people. Those live in tented settlements on privately rented land, and have experienced very specific social trends. For example, it would be worthy to investigate the ways in which the Syrian refugees have chosen specific settlements to join, including looking into the role of a "*Shawish*": usually a Syrian who has pre-crisis connections with the Lebanese land owners. These *shameesh* become the de facto rulers of the camps and hold significant social and political power in how the camps are run. Moreover, a trend used by authorities vis-à-vis the most informal tented settlements includes random evictions. A group of tents would be asked to move, sometimes a mere kilometer away, with no reason given. This strategy has apparently been used to block any signs of prolonged settlement, and to prohibit tent residents from trying to place any sort of fixed shelter. Mostly located in the Bekaa and Akkar, these settlements present a plethora of humanitarian difficulties, in addition to the social difficulties related to the refugee status.

As mentioned in this dissertation, most refugees who have the means and the

²⁶⁴ MTV or Murr Television has operated since 1991 and is owned by the Murr family. The CEO of the station is Gabriel el Murr, a vocal protagonist against the Syrian regime. The Murr family including his brother and their children collectively run over 15 media outlets ranging from music radio stations to political newspapers and MTV.

opportunity will seek to apply for long term resettlement in the west. Throughout my field research, I have come across several intriguing situations where families have either been partially selected, or rejected for asylum, for vague reasons. In the case mentioned in Chapter 8, section 8.2, only Jad's female family members were granted long term visas to the USA, when the family had applied as a unit. In another case, Widad, the refugee from Tebbeneh was the last member in her immediate family to be in Lebanon. Her two brothers and their own families had been resettled to France and Sweden. When I met her brother, Mahmoud, in France, I gathered that they were selected due to a medical condition that his son had. The boy, Nouredine, was being treated by the French government. I also gathered, while in the field, that "Embassy scouts", would roam the streets arbitrarily in search for potential recruits for resettlement, and that NGOs also sometimes took on the role of these recruiters. I was unfortunately mistaken for one of these scouts on more than one occasion - and understood after having spoken to refugees that they had actually accepted to speak to me thinking I might be recruiting for some Embassy. It is therefore worthy to look into these trends of selection for resettlement, to understand the intricacies that come into play between dweller-Embassy-NGO.

I wish to end this dissertation by going back to the position of the researcher in a third space. I wrote earlier that "when we conduct research in fields of pronounced inequality, the very act of reflecting and writing about it is subjective because we have seen the field with our personal, ideological filter. Our interest in understanding certain social events does not stem from a place of neutrality, and if it does our human nature and curiosity do not leave us untouched". In 2012, when I braved into the GSO offices in Beirut to register my marriage certificate to my Palestinian husband, the officer said to me: "so you didn't find a Lebanese man to marry? why have you complicated your life so much?". While I had always been half-Palestinian, this was the first time I came face to face with the difficult reality of what being a non-Lebanese arab in Lebanon meant. With that statement, it quickly became very clear to me that my space in Lebanon with my chosen family had decreased. And I am one of the privileged ones. In many ways, some of which are yet to be understood, the work undertaken throughout these years, as a whole, and leading up to this manuscript, has not left me untouched.

Synthèse en Français

Titre: Négocier l'espace: les villes du Liban devant l'afflux des réfugiés syriens (2011-2018). Études de cas à Tripoli (quartier de Tebbeneh) et à Beyrouth (quartier de El-Nab'a et camp de Bourj El-Barajneh).

L'augmentation d'un quart de sa population sur trois ans représente un défi majeur pour toute société. Cette thèse étudie comment un tel fait, à priori improbable, est devenu une réalité dans les villes du Liban. Dans les espaces urbains où les réfugiés se sont concentrés en quelques années, comment les citoyens, quelque soit leur nationalité, les agences étatiques et l'ensemble de la société civile ont-ils relevé un tel défi ? Avec 173 réfugiés pour 1 000 habitants, le Liban abrite en 2018 la plus forte densité de réfugiés au monde, suivi par la Jordanie avec un taux de 89 pour 1 000. Pour prendre la mesure d'un tel phénomène, il faut imaginer près de dix-sept millions de réfugiés arrivant en France dans un intervalle de quelques années.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'exposer les manifestations de ce processus afin d'en comprendre les tenants à la fois spatiaux, socio-économiques et politiques, qui diffèrent selon les lieux et les configurations d'acteurs concernés à différents titres. Aux échelles les plus fines, réfugiés et "citadins-hôtes" se font face, confrontés à l'obligation de partager et de négocier un espace urbain identique. Dès 2011, les réfugiés syriens arrivant au Liban se sont principalement installés dans les villes, à l'instar d'autres migrants. Jusqu'en 2015, ils ont eu la possibilité d'occuper des logements de fortune ce qui, en dépit de conditions matérielles très difficiles, leur a permis de gagner une place dans l'espace et dans la société urbaine libanaise. Contraints de partager des infrastructures et des services le plus souvent déficients, voire dégradés, un tel afflux a cependant accru l'hostilité des populations libanaises, multiplié les conflits et exacerbé les tensions.

À une échelle supérieure, apparaissent les enjeux concernant la politique intérieure où différents acteurs institutionnels et individuels, forts de responsabilités politiques et de compétences institutionnelles, sont chargés de gérer la situation. Or, la structure politique du Liban depuis son accession à l'indépendance a eu pour résultat de diviser le pouvoir entre dix-huit groupes religieux. Un système électoral complexe a consacré la domination de ces groupes dans leurs régions d'ancrage respectives. Organisés de façon clanique, ces différents groupes se sont partagé les mandats électifs locaux et nationaux ainsi que la gestion des

services publics, ce qui leur a permis d'asseoir leur influence sur les espaces et les populations correspondant au périmètre de leur pouvoir.

Une troisième échelle concerne quant à elle les enjeux politiques à l'échelle du Moyen-Orient. Dès le début de son existence, la République libanaise a sollicité diverses puissances étrangères afin de garantir l'autonomie politique de ses différents groupes religieux vis-à-vis de communautés régionales de plus grande ampleur. Ces équilibres précaires ont été rompus plus d'une fois : les tensions entre chrétiens et musulmans qui traversent l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient sont ainsi à l'origine d'une guerre civile de quinze ans qui a déchiré la société libanaise entre 1975 et 1990 et qui, depuis, n'a fait qu'exacerber les tensions. De même, les oppositions régionales entre musulmans qui se revendiquent de divers courants de l'Islam se reflètent dans les villes du Liban, notamment à Tripoli, où Alawites et Sunnites se sont opposés par les armes, exportant au Liban le conflit syrien entre le régime Alawite et la majorité sunnite de la population. À partir de la fin des années 1970, l'occupation israélienne du sud du Liban a également eu des incidences sur la stabilité politique du pays. Deux actions militaires majeures de l'armée israélienne en 1982 et en 2006 ont gravement endommagé les infrastructures et provoqué le déplacement de centaines de milliers de personnes, contribuant à des changements démographiques qui créent toujours des tensions dans certaines régions. Dans l'introduction de la thèse, je pose l'ensemble des facteurs qui influent sur l'analyse des relations entre Syriens et Libanais. Dès le titre, je prend en compte l'extrême diversité des situations urbaines en retenant la désignation "villes du Liban", plutôt que "villes libanaises". En effet, selon les régions, les villes diffèrent par la manière dont les droits civils sont appliqués, du fait de l'absence de lois communes à l'ensemble du pays. L'argumentation s'attache en outre à interroger la pertinence des notions de "résilience urbaine" et de "justice spatiale". Cette exploration me conduit à opter pour la notion de justice spatiale, plus pertinente selon mon point de vue. Dans l'introduction, je questionne également la façon dont les Syriens sont désignés au Liban. Qualifiés de "migrants", de "déplacés" ou de "réfugiés", ils subissent des traitements plus ou moins défavorables selon les endroits où ils s'installent. Pour ma part, je propose de retenir le seul terme de "réfugié", qui semble le mieux à même pour désigner la population syrienne vivant aujourd'hui au Liban.

J'analyse ensuite les significations associées aux pratiques de négociation de l'espace. En référence à Bernard Rougier, trois formes de négociation entre Syriens et Libanais sont abordées aux trois échelles internationales, nationales et locales. Les enquêtes de terrain effectuées dans le cadre de cette thèse montrent que les réfugiés syriens ont trouvé une place dans les villes libanaises, au sein desquelles ils jouent souvent un rôle actif. Cependant, compte tenu de leur position très subalterne, les négociations dans lesquels ils s'engagent produisent des effets qui leur sont majoritairement défavorables.

Cette thèse articule une approche de géographie socio-urbaine et des champs d'étude relevant des sciences politiques, des études migratoires et des études sur les réfugiés. L'analyse met l'accent sur la description des relations urbaines et sociales dans la ville à partir d'une recherche ethnographique. L'approche ethnographique est privilégiée en raison de la diversité extrême des situations urbaines au Liban. En outre, elle est la seule possible dans un pays qui souffre de fortes carences en matière d'informations statistiques.

Comprendre les logiques d'installation des Syriens dans les villes libanaises suppose de traiter plus largement de la question des inégalités. La vie dans les villes libanaises est difficile pour l'ensemble des citadins, quelles que soient leurs nationalités, leurs origines, leurs histoires collectives ou individuelles. Dans des villes où l'ensemble des services est partiellement ou complètement privé, y compris les plus vitaux, où les transports publics sont inexistants, ou le travail est dérégulé, le bien-être urbain ne concerne que la fraction la plus aisée et la mieux dotée de la population, la majorité vivant quant à elle dans des conditions difficiles, voire très précaires. Au plus bas dans la hiérarchie socio-économique, récemment arrivés, les Syriens subissent plus que d'autres les difficultés. Cependant, leur situation s'insère dans un mécanisme global, produisant et reproduisant des inégalités et des injustices qui concernent l'ensemble des populations citadines.

Trois perspectives sont utilisées pour structurer l'analyse des données de terrain. Premièrement, une perspective micro-urbaine, qui cherche à comprendre les relations de pouvoir complexes qui s'établissent, à échelle fine, entre les différents groupes sociaux et les différentes communautés. Cette perspective s'appuie sur une observation rapprochée des pratiques sociales, des contestations urbaines ou des relations de voisinage, qui mène à une analyse des jeux d'acteurs et des relations de pouvoirs. En second lieu, est mobilisée une

perspective sociale à l'échelle nationale, centrée sur l'étude des facteurs qui affectent directement ou indirectement les situations observées à l'échelle micro-urbaine. Ces facteurs incluent l'héritage des relations syro-libanaises, la terrible réalité économique et la structuration ethno-religieuse de la société libanaise. La troisième perspective, quant à elle, est d'ordre géopolitique. Elle concerne des éléments plus globaux affectant la société libanaise : enracinements à la fois orientaux et occidentaux, allégeances aux dirigeants de groupes politico-religieux, conséquences de l'aide internationale, etc.

Résumé de la première partie :

Les villes au Liban à la veille d'un afflux rapide des réfugiés syriens

Le Liban est un pays jeune. Il est né d'un désir d'indépendance vis-à-vis des multiples influences régionales, prenant pour prétexte la protection de groupes religieux minoritaires, principalement chrétiens (Maronites). Depuis plusieurs décennies, le fragile équilibre libanais est paralysé, tant à l'extérieur qu'à l'intérieur des frontières de la république. Issues des principaux groupes religieux, les élites qui se partagent l'exercice du pouvoir ont gagné en influence et en autorité au fil des décennies. Largement bénéficiaires d'un système sans avenir pour la majorité de la population, elles bloquent toutes perspectives de réforme.

Un tel blocage est bien antérieur à l'arrivée des réfugiés syriens. Depuis la fin de la guerre civile, les citoyens vivant au Liban sont imprégnés des souvenirs de la guerre et de la violence, cette dernière ayant particulièrement touchée les espaces urbains. Ils ont également le souvenir des conditions économiques désastreuses qui ont accompagné cette guerre, ainsi que de la perte de crédit international dont le pays souffre depuis. Dans les deux chapitres qui constituent cette partie, je fournis les éléments d'un contexte de longue durée qui affecte la présence actuelle des Syriens au Liban. La structure fragmentée des villes comme la diversité des communautés religieuses qui y cohabitent constituent le fondement de relations complexes avec "l'autre", surtout lorsque la proximité n'est pas souhaitée. Si "l'autre" est un réfugié, comme c'est le cas des Syriens, peuvent se mettre en place des mécanismes incontrôlés d'identification entre Syriens et réfugiés palestiniens arrivés au Liban à partir de 1948, ces derniers ayant contribué par leur présence à déclencher la guerre civile libanaise.

Concernant les Syriens, ce premier faisceau de représentation est complété par un second, également négatif : l'identification du Syrien-réfugié avec le Syrien-soldat ayant occupé le pays durant trois décennies. Rabattues sur le précédent palestinien, les représentations associées aux réfugiés sont de ce fait extrêmement négatives. Pour de nombreux groupes libanais, les Palestiniens ont provoqué la guerre civile et l'occupation syrienne qui a suivi. Une telle façon d'écrire l'histoire ne tient compte ni des tensions préexistantes au sein des différentes communautés libanaises, ni des profondes différences dans la manière dont les différents groupes religieux envisagent le pays et son avenir. Autant réels que fantasmés, ces groupes, imprègnent les sociétés urbaines libanaises : saisonniers agricoles syriens, soldats syriens, factions palestiniennes, réfugiés palestiniens. L'arrivée des réfugiés syriens en 2011 doit donc être considérée en fonction de ce maelström de représentations contradictoires qui travaillent la société libanaise depuis de nombreuses années. De ce fait, et en dépit de son caractère massif et inédit, il est nécessaire d'envisager un tel afflux en continuité avec la présence historique des Syriens au Liban, même si cette dernière est perçue différemment au fil des années. Leur afflux massif et rapide pèse toutefois lourdement sur le fragile tissu politique et urbain libanais. Les inégalités socio-spatiales présentées dans cette thèse s'écartent donc du modèle explicatif classique du "droit à la ville", qui met principalement en évidence les inégalités sociale, sans nécessairement prendre en compte les identités nationales, politiques ou culturelles.

Paralysé par l'absence de stratégie à l'égard des réfugiés syriens, le gouvernement libanais est faible et soumis à de multiples intérêts claniques ou privés. Ni le gouvernement central ni les autorités locales ne proposent un environnement sécurisé ou une infrastructure urbaine de base aux citoyens, que ces derniers soient Libanais ou non. La seule position officielle prise pendant les sept années de crise a été de réglementer la résidence des réfugiés syriens. Pour ce faire, le gouvernement central a obligé le HCR à cesser leur enregistrement à partir de 2015. Au même moment, il a décidé d'appliquer le système de la *kafala*, déclaré illégal en 2018. Incapable de prendre position vis-à-vis du conflit syrien ou peu disposé à le faire, hanté par l'expérience tragique des camps de réfugiés palestiniens, le gouvernement libanais a laissé le soin aux organisations internationales, aux autorités locales et à la société civile libanaise de faire face à l'afflux des réfugiés, sans qu'aucune règle ne soit édictée au niveau étatique, ni aucun moyen affecté à cette tâche. En l'absence de stratégie ou de plan d'action national, des réactions localisées ont commencé à se manifester à partir de 2012 et se

sont intensifiées jusqu'en 2015, élargissant la diversité de traitement dont les Syriens faisaient l'objet et ajoutant à la fragmentation des villes libanaises. Précarisant la situation des réfugiés, l'incapacité politique à tous les niveaux du pouvoir a toutefois créé des lacunes juridiques, politiques, sociales et surtout urbaines dans lesquelles les réfugiés syriens ont pu se glisser. Négociant leur place dans des conditions très défavorables, les réfugiés syriens sont devenus des boucs émissaires. Rendus prétendument responsables de tous les maux de la société libanaise, ils ont servi de prétexte aux chefs politiques et religieux pour s'exonérer de leur impuissance.

Résumé de la deuxième partie :

Positionnement de la thèse : stabiliser un cadre analytique dans un paysage en évolution rapide

Après une première partie qui présente le contexte des villes libanaises avant l'afflux de réfugiés syriens en 2011, cette deuxième partie présente le cadre analytique, la méthodologie et les outils utilisés, avant de présenter et de justifier les études de cas sélectionnées. Après avoir discuté les hypothèses, sont exposés les mécanismes de l'enquête sur le terrain. Sont également abordés les types d'interaction urbaine observée, ce qui a conduit à inclure un camp de réfugiés palestiniens dans les études de cas, considérant la situation des réfugiés comme un continuum dans l'histoire des migrations au Liban plutôt que comme un événement en isolé. Le contexte récent est en outre brièvement rappelé, en insistant sur les années 2014 et 2015, période qui a eu des effets importants sur la situation des réfugiés et, par conséquent, sur le développement des recherches de terrain.

Les analyses développées dans cette thèse reposent sur l'observation et l'analyse des relations entre des personnes vivant dans un espace urbain commun. Une façon d'étudier cette dimension spatiale des sociétés consiste à examiner les différents acteurs d'un lieu ainsi que leurs relations, leurs pratiques et leurs expériences. Celles-ci sont souvent régies par les hiérarchies socio-économiques, les politiques mises en oeuvre, le respect des normes d'égalité sociale et l'accès au lieu.

Dans cette partie, un accent particulier est mis sur la position du chercheur vis-à-vis de son étude et sur la relation préexistante entre le chercheur et le domaine concerné. Ceci pour «[rendre objectif] le rapport subjectif à l'objet qui, loin de conduire à un subjectivisme relativiste et plus ou moins anti-scientifique, est l'une des conditions d'une véritable objectivité scientifique» (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 282). Dans les sciences sociales, y compris la géographie, la position et la place du chercheur vis-à-vis du sujet ont suscité un regain d'intérêt ces dernières années. À ce moment du développement, j'explique que je n'ai pas abordé mon sujet avec la certitude préalable que ce dernier serait politique ou engagé, proche d'un travail militant ou même soucieux de produire une recherche engagée, plaçant ce travail dans le champ des études critiques ou radicales. Mon intérêt pour la compréhension des événements observés sur le terrain et relatés dans cette thèse ne m'a pas pour autant conduit à la neutralité. Suivant Paul Routledge, je propose «un tiers-lieu», entre les sphères académiques et militantes, pour rendre compte d'un chercheur détaché mais simultanément impliqué dans l'action sociale : «Le troisième lieu implique des rencontres inattendues entre le monde universitaire et le militantisme ; là où ni le lieu, ni le rôle, ni la représentation ne prévalent, où les uns subvertissent continuellement l'interprétation des autres²⁶⁵» (Routledge, 1996, p. 400). Je suis convaincue que juxtaposer recherche et militantisme peut poser question, ainsi que le soulignent certains auteurs qui pensent que la posture conduisant à être «à la fois intellectuellement scientifiquement productif et transmetteur socialement responsable, semble difficile à concilier» (Bautès & Chirot, 2012).

Le chapitre quatre est principalement consacré aux trois terrains plus spécifiquement étudiés. Il présente un aperçu de leur spécificité géographique, suivi de leurs principales caractéristiques socio-démographiques et politiques. Il se termine par un développement concernant les campements informels de réfugiés. Bien que cette étude se concentre sur la situation des réfugiés qui investissent la ville existante, il a semblé important de souligner les spécificités des camps de réfugiés afin d'expliquer pourquoi il a finalement été décidé de les exclure du champ de l'étude.

²⁶⁵ Citation originelle: "The third space implies inappropriate(d) encounters between academia and activism where neither site, role, or representation holds sway, where one continually subverts the meaning of the other" (Routledge, 1996 p.400)

Les trois études de cas sélectionnées présentent un éventail très large d'inégalités. Deux des trois sites étudiés se situent à la périphérie de la capitale, Beyrouth, le troisième étant localisé à la périphérie de la deuxième plus grande ville du Liban, Tripoli. À l'est de Beyrouth, El-Nab'a présente une longue histoire migratoire qui a générée une forte diversité des populations résidentes. Plusieurs vagues de migrants pauvres arrivées de divers pays étrangers à partir des années 1920, ont choisi ce quartier comme lieu de résidence, en raison de la proximité avec Beyrouth et des opportunités économiques qui y étaient liées. El-Nab'a s'est ainsi développé de manière très informelle, sans aucun effort de planification publique. El-Nab'a est également connu pour la juxtaposition de nombreux groupes ethniques et religieux, avec une présence dominante de travailleurs migrants non arabes, de Libanais originaires d'Arménie, de chrétiens, de chiïtes et de sunnites, particulièrement depuis l'arrivée des réfugiés syriens. L'une des rues du quartier est par exemple surnommée "rue Ethiopie" en raison du nombre important d'employés de maison qui y résident et qui, d'ailleurs, ne sont pas exclusivement de nationalité éthiopienne.

Le camp palestinien de Bourj el-Barajneh présente également une longue histoire migratoire. Ce quartier informel a été créé en 1948 pour constituer un camp de fortune destiné aux réfugiés palestiniens. Ce qui apparaît aujourd'hui comme une véritable ville abrite des dizaines de milliers de migrants forcés, confrontés à une exploitation et à une exclusion systématiques. Ces derniers appartiennent à trois catégories : les réfugiés palestiniens du Liban arrivés lors de la première vague migratoire en 1948, les réfugiés palestiniens installés en Syrie après 1948 et ayant fui la guerre civile à partir de 2011 ; enfin, les réfugiés syriens non palestiniens. Les deux groupes de réfugiés palestiniens sont confrontés à une crise d'identité profonde et n'ont pratiquement aucun espoir de retourner dans leur pays d'origine, qu'ils ont parfois quitté depuis trois générations. Les réfugiés syriens non-palestiniens sont les seuls qui peuvent espérer retourner dans leur patrie, même si la probabilité semble faible. De ce fait, pour les réfugiés palestiniens, accueillir un nouveau réfugié constitue un défi urbain et logistique mais aussi un défi intellectuel et émotionnel.

Parmi les trois sites, Tebbeneh (Tripoli) est celui où la présence libanaise est la plus forte. Les relations socio-culturelles y sont dans une large mesure patriarcales, conservatrices et tribales. Dans ce quartier, peu de recherches en sciences sociales ont été effectuées jusqu'ici, ce qui m'a permis de bénéficier d'une forte coopération de la part des personnes interrogées. Le

conflit entre sunnites et alaouites s'ancre dans des rapports de force noués à l'échelle de tout le Moyen-Orient. Il constitue le principale facteur de fragmentation à Tripoli.

Si les trois sites ont des caractéristiques communes, ils présentent aussi des spécificités en termes de diversité sociale. Les signes de violence y sont partout explicites, principalement à Bourj el-Barajneh, tandis qu'ils apparaissent principalement dans le discours des habitants à Tebbeneh. À El-Nab'a, le sentiment dominant est celui d'un optimisme prudent, au fur et à mesure qu'un règlement de la guerre semble s'ébaucher en Syrie. L'absence presque complète de données quantitatives sur les trois sites a rendu l'approche qualitative inévitable, même si cette dernière est difficile, certaines des informations qui m'ont été fournies n'ayant jamais pu être vérifiées. Dans cette deuxième partie, je discute en conséquence de ma propre subjectivité ainsi que des défis et des avantages qui en découlent. J'ai été absente du Liban pendant dix-huit mois avant d'entamer la première phase de ma recherche de terrain. C'était la première fois que je quittais le Liban aussi longtemps sans y revenir, même pour quelques jours. De ce fait, j'ai fortement ressenti une position d'extériorité, n'étant plus strictement une "Libanaise de l'intérieur". Il m'a donc fallu un certain temps d'adaptation avant de formaliser la façon dont j'allais aborder un tel sujet de recherche en sciences sociales, dont j'allais m'accommoder des effets de position et de la manière dont ils affectent l'analyse.

Résumé de la troisième partie :

Le "refugee turn", quelle(s) frontière(s) ?

La troisième partie analyse la manière dont les réfugiés avec lesquels j'ai dialogué dans chacun des sites de l'étude trace son propre chemin pour accéder aux villes du Liban, trouver un emploi, faire face aux exigences administratives et à la résistance de la société d'accueil. Pour aborder les différents aspects de ces itinéraires migratoires et résidentiels qui concernent le fragment libanais de la vie des réfugiés, cette partie situe ces derniers dans les villes, où ils ont tendance à être concentrés dans les quartiers les plus pauvres et, à une échelle plus intime, dans leurs lieux d'habitation, qu'il s'agisse d'un appartement ou d'une chambre en colocation. Cette partie aborde également les relations des réfugiés syriens avec la société d'accueil, les citoyens libanais qui sont leurs employeurs, leurs voisins ou, plus simplement, les personnes qu'ils rencontrent dans la rue. Dans les cas où la relation est faite d'indifférence, l'absence de réaction de la part des Libanais n'est guère anodine et elle doit être interprétée en tant que

telle. À l'autre extrémité, les relations peuvent déboucher sur des séquences de violences allant parfois jusqu'à l'affrontement physique. Entre ces deux bornes extrêmes, la recherche empirique révèle des échelles emboîtées de co-présence et d'interactions entre Syriens et Libanais qui matérialisent des situations complexes où la méfiance, voire l'hostilité, n'interdisent pas un minimum de relations. La troisième partie de cette thèse tente donc de démêler la complexité des situations en s'appuyant sur une analyse empirique fondée sur la recherche de terrain et illustrée par une sélection de récits considérés comme les plus représentatifs.

Les chapitres 5, 6 et 7 sont consacrés aux résultats directs et aux analyses des enquêtes de terrain. Leur exposition conduit à la discussion proposée au chapitre 8, qui clôt la thèse. Le chapitre 5 décrit le parcours des Syriens à partir de leur arrivée et la façon dont ils deviennent réfugiés en s'installant au Liban. Il décrit également leurs localisations résidentielles privilégiées, ainsi que la façon dont ils y sont arrivés. Au-delà de la stricte localisation géographique, ce chapitre expose en outre la façon dont les Syriens se situent dans la mosaïque sociale libanaise.

Les chapitres 6 et 7 analysent les entretiens menés dans les trois sites d'étude, ainsi que dans d'autres lieux à Beyrouth ou à Tripoli. Le chapitre 6 restitue la vie quotidienne des réfugiés. Il détaille les problèmes de logement, les difficultés liées à la recherche d'un travail et à la satisfaction des besoins quotidiens. Il détaille aussi leurs déplacements dans la ville, leur accès aux espaces publics contraints par le cadre juridique restrictif défini par les autorités libanaises à partir de 2015. Le chapitre 7 détaille quant à lui les représentations que les populations libanaises hôtes se font des réfugiés syriens. Les entretiens menés auprès de Libanais de différentes origines, religions, appartenances sociales ou culturelles développent invariablement quatre figures négatives. Les Syriens volent les emplois ; ils vivent dans des conditions précaires et inacceptables ; ils ont envahi l'espace public et il faut s'en méfier lorsqu'on les croise ; ils accaparent l'aide internationale au détriment des Libanais pauvres qui, eux, ne peuvent prétendre à aucun soutien. En croisant ces points de vue, le chapitre aborde la question des inégalités perçues par des Libanais quotidiennement confrontés à la cohabitation avec les Syriens.

Dans son dernier chapitre, cette partie se termine par une discussion sur l'espace de la négociation entre Syriens et Libanais à partir des premiers jalons posés dans l'introduction générale de la thèse. Le chapitre explique comment l'espace a été utilisé comme un outil de cooptation et d'exploitation aux niveaux local, national ou régional. Il expose également comment chaque niveau de négociation tend à chevaucher et à influencer l'autre. À l'échelle urbaine, de la ville au quartier, les négociations entre habitants sont continues et, dans une certaine mesure, ordinaires et discrètes. Les Syriens sont à la recherche d'interstices dans lesquels ils pourraient se glisser en vue d'accéder à un minimum de stabilité, tandis que les hôtes cherchent au contraire à préserver leurs propres espaces. Ces espaces de la négociation ne doivent pas être considérés à partir d'une relation binaire entre réfugiés et communautés d'accueil. Plus généralement, il doivent être vus comme un mécanisme produisant et reproduisant un jeu subtil d'inégalités entrecroisées d'ordre social, économique, culturel, religieux, etc. Ces inégalités sont subies par la majorité des citoyens, que ces derniers soient Syriens, Libanais, Palestiniens, étrangers ou nationaux originaires de pays divers. Les seuls épargnés sont ceux qui concourent activement à la production de ces inégalités et qui en bénéficient au premier chef. Ces privilégiés ne sont pas plus de quelques dizaines de milliers au Liban. Ils constituent l'élite politico-économique qui domine le pays et concentre l'écrasante majorité des richesses.

À la lumière des divers éléments tirés des enquêtes de terrain, il apparaît que les injustices qui séparent les citoyens n'obéissent pas à des critères simples et permanents. Selon les lieux, les moments, les acteurs, les mécanismes de production des inégalités sont différents et frappent de façon aléatoire. L'injustice dans les villes du Liban semble capricieuse. Elle touche une majorité de citoyens selon des modalités et des intensités différentes qui les opposent à toutes les échelles : du local au national, en passant par le niveau régional. Dans cette partie, j'exploite les sources issues de mon travail de terrain pour décrire des situations de conflits qui enracinent l'injustice dans l'espace des villes libanaises, utilisant comme point central la situation des réfugiés syriens dans les trois sites de l'étude. Dans les exemples développés, les réfugiés syriens expriment d'une manière ou d'une autre l'anxiété qu'ils éprouvent continuellement, craignant des événements imprévus ou des changements de règles juridiques susceptibles d'avoir des conséquences graves sur leur sécurité et leur résidence. Cette anxiété diffuse les incite à limiter leurs déplacements et leurs usages de l'espace public.

Cantonné dans un logement souvent inconfortable, ils renoncent à la ville et deviennent invisibles aux yeux des Libanais.

Dans les premières années de leur arrivée, la condition des réfugiés syriens pouvait sembler moins difficile. À partir de 2011, ils ont eu pour principale préoccupation de trouver un abri et d'assurer la satisfaction de leurs besoins de base. Comme on peut l'attendre de n'importe quel migrant s'installant dans un pays étranger, ils ont tenté d'accéder à la ville aussi efficacement que possible, tirant parti de toutes les opportunités. S'ils espéraient recevoir une aide, ils n'hésitaient pas à faire la queue durant des heures en vue de l'obtenir. S'ils se voyait proposer un emploi, quel que soit sa rémunération, ils n'hésitaient pas à l'accepter. S'ils avaient besoin de partager un appartement, ils acceptaient également. Quelque soit le montant du loyer. En raison du nombre élevé de Syriens arrivés en quelques années, ces initiatives ont été bien vite considérées négativement par les communautés hôtes. Par une sorte d'effet domino, le volontarisme des réfugiés syriens a contraint d'autres groupes vulnérables à renégocier leur place dans la ville et dans les rapports sociaux, notamment du point de vue des salaires. En position inférieures, les Syriens n'ont pas hésité à accepter des rémunérations inférieures, notamment pour les emplois peu qualifiés sur lesquels ils étaient en concurrence avec les Libanais les plus modestes. Dans une situation économique déjà désastreuse, l'arrivée de réfugiés syriens dans les trois sites d'étude a donc accru les difficultés des populations pauvres et vulnérables, aggravant la misère générale.

Par une réglementation datant de 2015, le gouvernement a imposé le système de la *kafala*, qui a notablement aggravé la situation des réfugiés syriens, les transformant en citadins de seconde zone. Cette mesure injuste a cependant rééquilibré les choses en faveur des Libanais les plus pauvres. L'instauration de la *kafala* leur a en effet permis de regagner des positions sur les marchés de l'emploi et du logement. Dans l'espace urbain, ils ont bénéficié de la quasi-disparition des Syriens, cantonnés à leurs domiciles ou dans des lieux très restreints. La vulnérabilité juridique accrue des Syriens a en outre conduit à une aggravation de leurs conditions d'exploitation et à un élargissement des potentiels bénéficiaires de cette dernière. Outre le *kafeel* ou les employeurs les plus solvables, l'instauration de la *kafala* a ainsi permis à des employeurs très modestes, voire pauvres, de bénéficier également de la force de travail des Syriens pour un salaire très faible, donc acceptable pour eux.

Le cas Bourj el-Barajneh présente l'intérêt de montrer que les questions analysées dans cette troisième partie ne sont pas strictement limitées à une confrontation entre une société d'accueil homogène et un afflux de réfugiés venus de l'étranger. Un regard superficiel pourrait en effet donner à penser que la crise des réfugiés a activé un mécanisme de résilience au sein d'une société libanaise structurellement plastique, car forgée dans une histoire chaotique. Le principal résultat de cette thèse est au contraire de démontrer que c'est plutôt la recomposition permanente des espaces urbains, des pratiques spatiales et des relations sociales qui constitue le principal moteur des injustices socio-spatiales au Liban. Pour être compris de façon pertinente, le sort injuste fait aux Syriens doit donc être inséré dans des mécanismes plus globaux de production des inégalités, ces derniers concernant l'ensemble des populations vulnérables résidant dans les villes du Liban. Profitant de la position inférieure des Syriens, chacun essaie d'en tirer un profit matériel, exploitant une force de travail devenue quasi-gratuite depuis l'instauration de la *kafala*. La présence des Syriens permet également à certains groupes inférieurs de tirer un profit symbolique visant à réduire la domination dont ils sont par ailleurs l'objet, à l'image des Palestiniens de Bourj el Barajneh. Réfugiés d'hier, citadins de seconde zone à la liberté restreinte, les Palestiniens se rapprochent des Libanais en s'essayant eux aussi à l'exploitation de la misère des Syriens et en mobilisant des représentations identiques lorsqu'ils les regardent en tant qu'«autre». Paradoxalement, l'arrivée des réfugiés syriens semble avoir renforcé la cohésion générale de la société libanaise, réduisant les fractures les plus profondes et les plus traumatiques, notamment celles qui ont été produites par la guerre civile des années 1970-1980.

Conclusion

Après une période de crise paroxystique dans les premières années de l'arrivée des réfugiés, à un moment où l'unité du Liban et la paix civile semblaient être mises en cause, la situation semble s'être stabilisée depuis 2015. Simultanément, l'afflux des réfugiés a fortement diminué et le départ de migrants arrivés entre 2011 et 2015 est en cours, même s'il est lent. Les Syriens qui résident encore dans les villes du Liban sont contraints à l'invisibilité et acceptent silencieusement le sort injuste auquel ils sont soumis. À quelques dizaines de kilomètres au nord et à l'est, de l'autre côté des frontières libano-syriennes, la guerre civile

semble sur le point de se terminer, même si la situation est encore extrêmement incertaine au moment où cette thèse s'achève (mai 2019).

Commencée par un mémoire de Master 2 en 2013, cette thèse a été construite dans des temporalités identiques à celles du conflit syrien et de l'arrivée des réfugiés au Liban. Mes recherches sur le terrain ont débuté en 2014, à un moment où le nombre de réfugiés atteignait son apogée et où s'aggravaient les tensions sociales et politiques. La coïncidence temporelle entre le moment de la thèse et ce qu'on nomme au Liban la « crise des réfugiés » a permis de documenter ce « fait social total » au plus près des événements en collectant des données empiriques basées sur des entretiens et sur des sources documentaires abondantes, car liées à une actualité « chaude ». Cependant, cette coïncidence est également devenue une contrainte. Forçant l'élaboration scientifique à se mêler à l'actualité, elle a retardé l'élaboration problématique de la première partie et a surtout compliqué l'objectivation puis l'interprétation des données de terrain.

Alors que cette thèse se clôt, les tensions dans les villes libanaises semblent s'apaiser, quoique les réfugiés Syriens demeurent assignés à une position de totale subordination. Toutefois, la diminution des tensions ne s'accompagne pas d'une diminution significative du nombre des réfugiés. Même si on peut supposer qu'une bonne partie d'entre eux retournera un jour en Syrie, il est peu probable que ces retours se feront dans un délai aussi court que celui des arrivées. Plus probablement, une certaine proportion des Syriens installés au Liban restera sur place car leur éventuel retour dans le pays d'origine n'est pas uniquement lié à un arrêt de la violence armée. À quoi ressemblera l'avenir de la cohabitation urbaine entre Libanais et Syriens ? Cette question excède le cadre de la thèse, y répondre obligera à mener de nouvelles investigations de terrain dans les prochaines années.

Compte tenu de la durée de la thèse et des contraintes inhérentes à son élaboration, ce travail n'a pas abordé tous les aspects de la cohabitation urbaine entre Libanais et Syriens. Je présente donc dans cette conclusion trois aspects me semblant important à prendre en compte dans le cadre de recherches ultérieures.

1- Bien que divers extraits de journaux et d'autres ressources journalistiques aient été mobilisés dans la recherche, ce type de sources n'a été que marginalement intégré dans le corpus documentaire et, surtout, il n'a pas fait l'objet d'une analyse en tant que tel. Compte

tenu des caractéristiques socio-politiques du pays, les entreprises de médias et de communication sont dans leur grande majorité détenues par les familles et les clans appartenant aux groupes dominants qui, au Liban, concentrent la majorité des instruments de pouvoirs. De ce fait, une lecture systématique des manières dont la presse rend compte de la présence syrienne présenterait un intérêt majeur pour la compréhension du phénomène, particulièrement pour documenter les représentations que les populations libanaises ont progressivement produites à l'égard des réfugiés.

2- S'il est vrai que la majorité des réfugiés au Liban vit dans des villes, la population syrienne installée dans des camps représente tout de même un quart de million de personnes. Ces réfugiés sont tant bien que mal installés dans des tentes implantées sur des terres louées par des particuliers. Dans une thèse centrée sur les conditions de vie urbaine des réfugiés syriens, le choix a été fait de ne pas inclure les camps dans le champ de l'étude. Dans une recherche ultérieure, il serait toutefois utile d'enquêter sur ce thème. Il serait par exemple pertinent de documenter la manière dont les réfugiés syriens ont choisi de s'établir dans tel ou tel camp, notamment en examinant le rôle du « Shawish », généralement Syrien, qui présente l'intérêt d'avoir tissé des liens avec des propriétaires fonciers libanais antérieurement à la crise. Une fois la localisation des camps convenue avec le propriétaire du sol, ces Shawish deviennent de facto les chefs de camps. En conséquence, ils détiennent un pouvoir déterminant qui leur permettent d'orienter la manière dont les camps seront administrés.

3- La plupart des réfugiés qui en avaient les moyens ou la possibilité ont tenté de s'installer dans le Liban littoral à l'ouest du pays, à leurs yeux plus propice à un départ ultérieur vers l'Europe ou l'Amérique du Nord. Au cours de mes enquêtes j'ai été plusieurs fois interpellé à par des Syriens m'interrogeant sur les mérites comparés de tel ou tel pays européen en matière d'accueil et d'installation des réfugiés. De manière plus anecdotique, on m'a aussi demandé pour quelle ambassade je 'recrutais' de potentiels migrants, afin de me proposer une candidature à transmettre aux services intéressés... Il convient donc de pousser plus avant les investigations dans ce domaine afin de mieux comprendre les emboîtements entre les différentes échelles de la migration, une telle façon d'envisager les circulations migratoires étant d'ores et déjà documentée sur différents terrains d'investigation. Ces migrations par étapes et d'échelles emboîtées engagent des dynamiques entre réfugiés, des structurations de réseaux familiaux ou amicaux, des négociations avec des administrations consulaires ou des

ONG, ceci afin de trouver le compromis optimum entre les attentes des réfugiés et les critères de délivrance des visas imposés par les législations des pays prêts à les accueillir.

Pour terminer, j'aborde le débat concernant la position du chercheur lorsqu'il est confronté aux phénomènes extrêmes de l'exil, du déracinement, de la violence armée. Immergé dans une actualité « chaude » et tragique, il lui est forcément difficile de rester insensible à la misère visible autour de lui. Pour autant, et au-delà d'une posture classique de "recherche-action", il se doit de maintenir une distance suffisante en vue d'engager l'indispensable démarche d'objectivation requise par un travail de thèse. Coincé entre une objectivation toujours imparfaite et des sollicitations permanentes incitant à quitter la position du spectateur pour celle de l'acteur engagé, j'ai choisi de positionner ma recherche dans un "tiers espace" tentant de maintenir un équilibre fragile entre ces deux extrêmes.

Libanaise de nationalité, appartenant au groupe minoritaire des Grecs orthodoxes, née en région parisienne, de mère palestinienne et de père syrien, maintenir cette position médiane nécessite toutefois un effort de tous les instants. En 2012, après avoir fait le siège des bureaux de la Sécurité Générale à Beyrouth, je suis parvenu à triompher de l'inertie de la bureaucratie. À force d'entêtement, j'ai pu faire enregistrer le certificat attestant de mon mariage avec un Palestinien. Au moment d'enregistrer l'acte, le fonctionnaire en charge de la procédure m'a pris à parti avec les arguments suivants : "En somme, vous n'avez pas réussi à épouser un Libanais ? Pourquoi vous êtes-vous tellement compliqué la vie ?" Ayant passé mon enfance et mon adolescence au Liban, c'était la première fois que j'étais confrontée à cette réalité à la fois brutale et inattendue : être considérée comme une citoyenne libanaise de seconde zone. Appartenant à un milieu social favorisé, ce genre d'injustice ordinaire et gratuite n'a pas directement affecté ma vie quotidienne. En revanche, il est possible que cet épisode ait contribué à renforcer mes dispositions à enquêter sur les injustices socio-spatiales et sur la négociation dissymétrique pour les espaces.

Annexes

ANNEX 1 - Detailed list of banners and threats targeting Syrian refugees, Lebanon, 2014 (Figure 2.5)

	Locality	Kadaa	Incident	Banner	Religious Majority	Source
1	Abadiyeh	Baabda	Curfew banner	Syrian brothers are asked not to circulate between 8pm and 6am. All non conforming motorcycles are banned under personal accountability and financial fines	Christian/ Druze	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
2	Abey, Ain Darafil	Chouf	Curfew announcement	Informing all Syrian brothers that they are prohibited from circulating after 8pm and before 5am. Subject to liability.	Druze	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
3	About Samra, Tripoli	North	Call for non-competition	My Syrian brother... we support you but don't act against us... We already have a lot to deal with - The gathering of mobile shop owners in Abi Samra	Sunni	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
4	Ain El Remmaneh	Baabda	Curfew banner	We ask Syrian brothers not to circulate after 9pm in the interest of public safety	Christian	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
5	Ain El Saydeh	Aley	Curfew banner	We ask Syrian brothers not to circulate after 9pm in the interest of public safety	Christian Maronite	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
6	Annaya, Kfar Baal	Byblos	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. within Municipality boundaries. Subject to liability.	Christian Maronite	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
7	Araiya	Baabda	Curfew banner	Announcement: In line with the municipality council decision number 52B dated 15/5/2013, it is strictly prohibited for foreign and Syrian dwellers and workers to circulate within municipality boundaries between 8:30pm and 6am. Subject to liability and arrest, and fines.	Christian	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
8	Achrafieh Sassine Square	Beirut	Threatening announcement	"The day will come when we say to the Syrian: gather your things and everything you have stolen, and leave" - Bachir	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
9	Baalchmay	Alay	Curfew banner	Our Syrian brothers are prohibited from circulating within the boundaries of Baalhsamiyeh Municipality between 8pm and 6am and are also required to obtain personal ID cards from the municipality. Subject to liability.	Druze	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
10	Babliyah municipality	Sidon	Municipality official statement	Foreign and Arab dwellers are prohibited from circulating in the municipality after 7:30 pm under penalty of legal prosecution, and should a dweller be given more than one warning, his or her kafeel will be pursued by relevant departments and made to pay a fine.	Shiite	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
11	Boutchay, Merdacheh	Baabda	Curfew banner	The municipality announces the prohibition of circulation of all foreigners within its boundaries between 8:30pm and 5:30am.	Christian	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
12	Beit El Chaar, Mazraat El Hdaira	Matn	Curfew banner	The Beit Al-Sha'ar and Al-Hadira Municipality hereby announces the imposition of a curfew on all foreign workers living within the municipal boundaries between 9pm and 5:30am	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
13	Beit Chama, El Akidiyyeh	Baalbek	Curfew banner	To all Syrian brothers living within the municipality, we inform you that starting today circulation is prohibited between 8pm and 6am for any reason to preserve your safety and security	Shiite	Data gathered personally via social media outlets

	Locality	Kadaa	Incident	Banner	Religious Majority	Source
14	Bhamdoun	Alay	Curfew announcement	To Syrian workers: we ask all Syrian workers not to circulate within municipality boundaries between 8pm and 6am and those who break the curfew will be held accountable.	Christian/ Druze	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
15	Blat	Byblos	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8:30p.m. and 5 a.m. within Municipality boundaries. Subject to liability.	Christian	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
16	Bourj Hammoud	Beirut	Curfew banner	Bourj Hammoud Municipality hereby warns all foreign (Syrian) residents that they are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
17	Bchamoun	Chouf	Curfew banner	Motorbikes and non-Lebanese workers residing in Bchamoun are prohibited from circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability.	Druze	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
18	Chanay	Alay	Curfew banner	It is strictly prohibited for Syrians to circulate after 10pm.	Druze	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
19	Dbayeh, Zouq El Kharab, Haret El Bellan, Aoukar	Matn	Curfew banner	The municipality announces the prohibition of circulation of all foreigners within its boundaries between 8pm and 5:30am.	Christian	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
20	Deir El Qamar	Chouf	Curfew banner	Announcement: For their own safety, Syrians and foreigners are requested not to circulate within the municipality boundaries between 9pm and 5am. Subject to liability. (With the exception of restaurant workers who have been issued municipal permits)	Christian Maronite	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
21	Ebrine	Batroun	under the radar curfew	No, my town is not, like other places, hiding behind the shroud of "foreigners" when they mean one thing and one thing alone. There are no fliers being posted around the place. There are no banners to welcome you with the news. It's all under the radar, hoping it would go unnoticed [...] I didn't want to write about this issue until I made sure it wasn't simply townspeople gossip. I went to the municipality and asked. They confirmed. Their explanation? We got an order from the ministry of interior affairs recently to organize the Syrians inside our town and to have them listed – as per orders of Lebanon's intelligence. They didn't say anything about a curfew but, believing I was worried about the Syrians in my town, they went on further: "you don't have to worry. A curfew was enforced on Syrians. The policeman is also patrolling the streets from 8 pm till 12 am. The town will stay safe."	Christian Maronite	(Fares, 2013)

	Locality	Kadaa	Incident	Banner	Religious Majority	Source
22	Falougha-Khalouat	Baabda	Curfew banner	Displaced persons and workers are prohibited from circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability.	Christian Orthodox	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
23	Ghaboun	Alay	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6 am. Subject to liability.	Druze / Christian	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
24	Ghaziyyeh	Sidon	Curfew banner	All Syrian brothers are requested not to circulate after 8pm and 6am to preserve their safety and security. Subject to liability.	Shiite	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
25	Halba	Akkar	Curfew banner	Syrian are prohibited from circulating after 8pm	Orthodox	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
26	Hammana	Baabda	Curfew banner	For their own safety, foreigners and Syrians are prohibited from circulating within the boundaries of the municipality between 8pm and 6am and they must obtain official personal ID cards from the municipality. Subject to liability.	Druze	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
27	Hemlaya	Matn	Curfew banner	Hamlaya Municipality hereby announces that under penalty of law and heavy fines: - Travelling scrap vendors are prohibited from entering the town of Hamlaya - Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 5am	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
28	Hemlaya	Matn	Curfew banner	The Hemlaya municipality announces under personal accountability and fines: foreign workers are prohibited from circulating within municipality boundaries between 8pm and 5am	Christian	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
29	Ehden	Zgharta	Collective eviction notice	All Syrian workers within the boundaries of Ehden municipality are requested to leave before 31/10/2016	Christian Maronite	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
30	Jaj	Byblos	Curfew banner	Workers and foreigners are strictly prohibited from circulating in Jaj Municipality between 7pm and 6:30am. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
31	Jdeideh, Bouchriyeh, Sad Bouchriyeh	Matn	Curfew banner	To preserve the safety of the displaced Syrian brothers, you are asked not to circulate between 8pm and 6am.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
32	Jeita	Keserwan	Curfew banner	Foreign and Syrian workers, and motorcycles and ATV are prohibited from circulating after 7:30pm	Christian Maronite	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
33	Jiyeh	Chouf	Curfew banner	All non-Lebanese are prohibited from circulating between 9pm to 6am, especially motorbike users.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)

	Locality	Kadaa	Incident	Banner	Religious Majority	Source
34	Jounieh	Keserwan	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating between 8 pm and 6 am to preserve public safety.	Christian Maronite	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
35	Kahaleh	Baabda	Curfew banner	It is strictly prohibited for foreign workers to gather or circulate within the boundaries of the municipality between 8pm and 6am, just as the use of bicycles and motorbikes is strictly prohibited. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
36	Karm Saddeh	Zgharta	Curfew banner	Karm Saddeh hereby announces a curfew on all foreigners between 8pm and 5am. Subject to liability.	Christian	<i>Traboulsi, J., & Adnan, H. (2018). Banners in Dialogue. Refugees as City Makers, 82-89.</i>
37	Lehfed	Byblos	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating after 6pm. Subject to liability.	Christian Maronite	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
38	Mansourieh, Mkalles, Daychouniyeh	Matn	Curfew banner	Announcement: all displaced Syrians residing within the boundaries of the municipality are requested to present themselves at the municipality within a month to register, and they are prohibited from circulating after 8pm for their safety and security.	Christian Maronite	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
39	Mar Chaaya, Mzaki	Matn	Curfew banner	Motorbikes and foreigners are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
40	Miyeh w Miyeh	Sidon	Curfew banner	Syrians are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6:30am	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
41	Monsef	Byblos	Curfew banner	Foreign workers are prohibited from circulating on motorbikes, in cars, or on foot between 8:30pm and 6am. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
42	Qraiye	Sidon	Curfew banner	Syrians and foreign nationals are prohibited from circulating between 8pm and 6am. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
43	Sahel Alma	Keserwan	Threatening announcement	We have warned and the time has come to enforce. No circulation for foreign workers on the streets of Sahel Alma after 7pm	Christian Maronite	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
44	Salima	Baabda	Curfew banner	In the interest of your safety: Foreigners and Syrians are prohibited from circulating within the boundaries of the municipality, especially on motorbikes, between 8pm and 6am, Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
45	Chouaifet	Alay	Municipality official statement	To all foreigners residing in Shoueifat. Starting May 29, 2013 you are prohibited from circulating within the boundaries of the municipality for security reasons. Subject to liability and legal action.	Druze	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014
46	Sin el Fil	Matn	Curfew banner	All foreign workers residing within the boundaries of the municipality are required to present themselves at the municipality before June 10, 2013 to register and they are prohibited from circulating between 9pm and 6am. Subject to liability	Christian Maronite	The Campaign in support of Syrians against racism, Facebook page, 2014

	Locality	Kadaa	Incident	Banner	Religious Majority	Source
47	Wadi Chahrour	Baabda	Curfew banner	Wadi Shahrouh Municipality announces a curfew effective Saturday, February 9, 2013, applicable to all foreigners residing within the town, between of 8:30pm and 5:30am. All motorbikes that have not obtained a permit from the municipality are prohibited from circulation	Christian Orthodox	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
48	Zahlé-Maalaqah and Taanayel	Zahlé	Curfew banner	Zahleh-Mu'allaqa and Ta'anayel Municipality hereby announces that all our Syrian brothers are prohibited from circulating, both on motorbikes and on foot, within municipality boundaries between 8pm and 6am. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
49	Zouk Mosbeh	Keserwan	Curfew banner	Zouk Mosbeh municipality request that Syrian and foreign residents not circulate between 8pm and 6 am. And not to use motorcycles. Subject to liability.	Christian Maronite	(San Lucas, 2014)
50	Somewhere in Beirut	Beirut	Burial restriction	It is strictly prohibited to bury any Syrian regardless of age, under strict personal accountability and perusal by the designated committee.	Unknown	(De Stone & Suber, 2018)
51	Unknown	Zahlé	Threatening announcement	No Syrians allowed. Subject to liability.	Christian	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
52	Unknown	Unknown	Curfew banner	Syrians are permitted to circulate between 6:30am and 7pm. Peddlers are prohibited within the boundaries of the municipality. All unregistered motorbikes and cars, or vehicles whose drivers are not in possession of a Lebanese license, will be seized and towed"	Unknown	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
53	Unknown	Unknown	Negative announcement	My Syrian Brother, I apologize but I have more right to work in this country than you do. Rabih Barbour	Unknown	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
54	Unknown	Unknown	Curfew banner	Syrians workers must remain indoors and motorbikes are prohibited from circulating after 8:30pm. Subject to liability.	Unknown	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
55	Unknown	Unknown	Threatening announcement	"Listen, Syrian: if you threaten our livelihoods we will cut off your hands. The workers of the town"	Unknown	(Traboulsi & Adnan, 2018)
56	unknown	Unknown	Call for refoulement	We will not wait to become minorities in our cities and villages. Join us in raising a common voice during the popular gathering to ask for the return of the displaced Syrians to their country	Unknown	Data gathered personally via social media outlets
57	Zahlé-Maalaqah	Zahlé	Banner announcing law	Decision nb 319 by the Zahlé-Mu'allaqa municipality: Group gatherings in public places are prohibited for foreign workers between 7pm and 5am. Please uphold the content of this note to preserve public safety	Christian	(Nayel, 2014)

ANNEX 2 – Banner placed at Masha' border crossing between Lebanon and Syria, October 2018

Required Document for entry of Syrians to Lebanon (Schedule No. -2-)	
For departure via airport or sea port	- Passport - Non-refundable travel ticket - Proof of visa to country of departure Granted 48 hrs entry
For medical treatment	- Passport or valid ID - Medical Report from a Lebanese Doctor or Hospital Granted 72 hrs entry
Husband or minor children holding yearly, permanent, or courtesy Residency	- Passport or Valid ID - Residency card of father or mother or husband - Family booklet (should the family be accompanying) Granted entry permit of seven days during which a residency card must be acquired from the GSO if the person has that right
Husband or children of a Lebanese [woman] – wife of a Lebanese [man] – wife of a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon	- Passport or Valid ID - Proof of familial relationship (marriage certificate, family booklet...) Granted six months temporary residency
Taxi driver, or van or truck driver	- Passport or Valid ID - Vehicle registration and insurance - Ownership or driving authorisation Truck driver granted one month residency, taxi driver granted 72hr residency
Driver accompanying (religious figure, business man, officer, banker)	- Passport or Valid ID Granted residency or entry equal to accompanying employer
Domestic worker accompanying Syrian guarantor (<i>kafeel</i>)	- Passport or Valid ID - Proof of employment and guarantee (<i>kafala</i>) Granted title equal to guarantor (<i>kafeel</i>)

المستندات المطلوبة لدخول السوري الى لبنان (جدول رقم - ٢ -)	
جواز سفر - تذكرة سفر غير قابلة للإسترداد - تأشيرة دخول الى البلد المتوي السفر اليه يمنح إذن دخول لمدة ٤٨ ساعة	للمغادرة عبر المطار أو البحر
جواز سفر أو هوية سليمة - تقرير طبي صادر عن طبيب أو مستشفى في لبنان يمنح إذن دخول لمدة ٧٢ ساعة	للعلاج الطبي
جواز سفر أو هوية سليمة - بطاقة الإقامة للوالد أو الوالدة أو الزوج - دفتر عائلي (إذا كانت العائلة برفقته) يمنح إذن دخول لمدة سبعة أيام ويراجع خلالها المركز الإقليمي التابع له مكان سكنه للإستحصال على بطاقة الإقامة أسوة بحامل الإقامة إذا كان يحق له بذلك	زوج أو اولاد (القاصرين منهم) حاصلي بطاقة الإقامة السنوية أو الدائمة أو المجاملة
جواز سفر أو هوية سليمة - ما يبين صلة القرابة (وثيقة زواج منقذة - دفتر عائلي - اخراج قيد عائلي) يمنح إقامة مؤقتة لمدة ستة أشهر	زوج أو اولاد اللبنانية ، زوجة لبناني زوجة فلسطيني تاجر في لبنان
جواز سفر أو هوية سليمة - أوراق المركبة المسجلة مع تأمين الزامي - ما يثبت ملكية السيارة أو وكالة سوق يمنح سائق الشاحنة إقامة لمدة شهر ويمنح سائق السيارة العمومية أو الباص أو الفان إقامة لمدة ٧٢ ساعة	سائق سيارة عمومية أو سائق باص أو فان أو شاحنة
جواز سفر أو هوية سليمة يمنح إذن دخول أو إقامة موازية لما منح لرب عمله القادم برفقته	سائق مرافق ل (رجل دين - مستثمر - رجل اعمال - ضابط - مصرفي)
جواز سفر - ما يثبت قانونية عملها وكفالتها يمنح سمة موازية لسمة كفيلها	عاملة الخدمة المنزلية برفقة الكفيل السوري

ANNEX 3 – Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics

Prepared by the UN-Habitat, 2014.

27 January 2015		Prepared by UN-Habitat. Contact: Synne Bergby, synne.bergby@unhabitat.org									
Union coverage											
Total number of Unions: 53											
936 out of 1558 cadastre, including Municipalities, are linked to a Unions (60%).											
Approximately 800 out of 1015 Municipalities are members of a Union (79 %)											
* Note: Given the nature and mandate of the Unions, cadastre outside any Municipality will normally not be formally part of a Union. The Union may however, extend it's functions and services to localities in the same region outside the formal Union.											
	Country	Unions									
242 most vulnerable localities:	242	197									81 %
MOSA Social Development Centers (SDCs):	191	146									76 %
Average number of cadastre per Union: 17,5											
Average number of 242 localities per Union: 3,7											
Average number of SDCs per Union: 2,75											
Population in Unions compared to total											
Lebanese	4 032 535	3 056 762									76 %
tot syr	1 116 969	858 208									77 %
Lebanese <4\$	1 136 904	946 955									83 %
Summary Unions figures:											
	# of Cadastre:	# of SDCs	# of 242 localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Lebanese <4\$	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Total population Leb+Syr	Total population in 242 localities	Percentag e Syrian / total	Percentag e Leb <4\$ / Leb tot	Population in 242 localities / total population
Total all Unions	936	146	197	3 056 762	946 955	858 208	3 914 970	2 776 569	22%	31%	71%
Top 20 most vulnerable	280	43	83	1 112 715	312 992	240 134	1 352 849	944 708	18%	28%	70%
Top 10 most vulnerable	105	13	58	1 092 011	390 413	452 604	1 544 615	1 406 110	29%	36%	91%
Top 20 ex. the largest cities / metropolitan areas	296	44	103	920 831	319 619	458 098	1 378 929	1 086 164	33%	35%	79%
* Note: As Union of Sour includes some 63 Municipalities and cover the whole caza this is not excluded.											

ANNEX 3 (continued) – Unions of Municipalities in Lebanon - Overview and Statistics

Unions of Municipalities ranked from least to most vulnerable

UoM	MOH_NA1	# of 242 localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Lebanese< 4\$	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Total population Leb+Syr	Total population in 242 localities	Percentage Syrian / total	Percentage Leb < 4\$ / Leb tot	Population in 242 localities / total population	Rank total
UoM Jabal El Rihane	South	0	3735	1701	598	4333	0	14%	46%	0%	0
UoM El Chouf El Aaala	Mount Lebanon	0	14925	3389	965	15890	0	6%	23%	0%	1
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El Janoubi	Mount Lebanon	0	6254	1425	1382	7636	0	18%	23%	0%	2
UoM El Hasbani	Nabatiye	1	15773	4055	883	16656	8276	5%	26%	50%	3
UoM Iqlim El Touffah	Nabatiye	0	17128	1945	2868	19996	0	14%	11%	0%	4
UoM Caza Bcharreh	North	0	21029	5201	2862	23891	0	12%	25%	0%	5
UoM Jabal Aamel	Nabatiye	0	27780	7086	2415	30195	0	8%	26%	0%	6
UoM Caza Jezzine	South	1	12392	5643	1756	14148	6068	12%	46%	43%	8
UoM El Qalaa	Nabatiye	1	18646	4757	3066	21712	3661	14%	26%	17%	9
UoM El Dreib El Gharby	North	1	3432	2162	1080	4512	2284	24%	63%	51%	10
UoM El Maten El Aaala	Mount Lebanon	1	31972	7970	3979	35951	3870	11%	25%	11%	11
UoM Bint Jbeil	Nabatiye	2	31354	8001	3729	35083	15141	11%	26%	43%	12
UoM El Challal	Bekaa	1	8028	2613	1831	9859	7468	19%	33%	76%	13
UoM El Souayjani	Mount Lebanon	2	23544	5361	3846	27390	14842	14%	23%	54%	14
UoM El Jord El Aaala Bhamdoun	Mount Lebanon	0	13026	2966	4970	17996	0	28%	23%	0%	15
UoM Mintaqat Deir El Ahmar	Bekaa	1	10721	3241	3178	13899	7389	23%	30%	53%	16
UoM Ghareb El Aaala Oua Chahhar	Mount Lebanon	1	22279	5214	5057	27336	7931	18%	23%	29%	17
UoM Caza Jbeil	Mount Lebanon	2	57664	8788	4311	61975	28810	7%	15%	46%	18
UoM El Arqoub	Nabatiye	1	12096	3087	4369	16465	8603	27%	26%	52%	19
UoM Jabal El Sheikh	Bekaa	2	18978	5684	5029	24007	10323	21%	30%	43%	20
UoM Naher El Istiwan	North	0	9563	6022	4932	14495	0	34%	63%	0%	21
UoM Qala'a El Estiqlal	Bekaa	2	11115	3858	5880	16995	7344	35%	35%	43%	22
UoM Charqi Baalbeck	Bekaa	2	18130	5900	4422	22552	16357	20%	33%	73%	23
UoM Mintaqat El Batroun	North	2	28665	7092	10961	39626	14987	28%	25%	38%	24
UoM Jord El Qaytaa	North	4	38248	24092	5061	43309	24867	12%	63%	57%	25
UoM Kesrouane El Ftouh	Mount Lebanon	5	162816	25405	14737	177553	70593	8%	16%	40%	26
UoM El Koura	North	5	48236	13279	11962	60198	25243	20%	28%	42%	27

LIST OF FIGURES

UoM	MOH_NA1	# of 242 localities	Lebanese Population 2004	Lebanese< 4\$	Syrian refugees 23-10-2014	Total population Leb+Syr	Total population in 242 localities	Percentage Syrian / total	Percentage Leb < 4\$ / Leb tot	Population in 242 localities / total population	Rank total
UoM Chamal Baalbeck	Bekaa	3	26117	8499	6486	32603	23451	20%	33%	72%	28
UoM Caza Zgharta	North	3	46258	11387	11348	57606	30994	20%	25%	54%	29
UoM Sahel Akkar	North	4	17265	10874	8524	25789	11964	33%	63%	46%	30
UoM Mintaqat El Joumeh Akkar	North	4	30867	19440	6095	36962	24554	16%	63%	66%	31
UoM El Hermel	Bekaa	1	33826	11007	5947	39773	36579	15%	33%	92%	32
UoM El Dreid El Aousat	North	4	10174	6406	10941	21115	14152	52%	63%	67%	33
UoM El Chqif	Nabatiye	9	109298	13040	25990	135288	76144	19%	12%	56%	34
UoM Charq Zahleh	Bekaa	5	31518	6897	24034	55552	45542	43%	22%	82%	35
UoM Gharbi Baalbeck	Bekaa	8	38097	12395	13499	51596	49281	26%	33%	96%	36
UoM El Bouhayra	Bekaa	6	37283	11167	17386	54669	41258	32%	30%	75%	37
UoM Sahil El Zahrani	South	8	64139	29208	16606	80745	55814	21%	46%	69%	38
UoM El Chafat	North	3	24580	15480	13947	38527	26985	36%	63%	70%	39
UoM Saida El Zahrani	South	9	170310	77557	28564	198874	120439	14%	46%	61%	40
UoM El Maten El Chamali El Sahili El Aousat	Mount Lebanon	11	388620	43445	50201	438821	322612	11%	11%	74%	41
UoM El Daneih	North	7	49668	31278	18289	67957	40337	27%	63%	59%	42
UoM Caza Sour	South	17	199202	72525	31618	230820	166296	14%	36%	72%	43
UoM El Sahel	Bekaa	7	26274	7868	48211	74485	66832	65%	30%	90%	44
UoM Iqlim El Kharroub El Chamali	Mount Lebanon	8	61454	13991	30488	91942	69448	33%	23%	76%	45
UoM El Dahia El Janoubiya	Mount Lebanon	4	197263	48330	31242	228505	228505	14%	25%	100%	46
UoM Oussat oua Sahil El Qaytaa	North	5	58247	36683	22040	80287	72854	27%	63%	91%	47
UoM Baalbeck	Bekaa	4	67889	22091	31237	99126	90742	32%	33%	92%	48
UoM El Menieh	North	3	32791	20652	25248	58039	55592	44%	63%	96%	49
UoM Sahil El Maten El Janoubi	Mount Lebanon	4	268710	65834	53488	322198	322198	17%	25%	100%	50
UoM Caza Zahleh	Bekaa	8	77460	16950	57424	134884	108438	43%	22%	80%	51
UoM El Beqaa El Aousat	Bekaa	5	42931	9394	82081	125012	120601	66%	22%	96%	52
UoM El Fayhaa	North	10	258992	148620	71145	330137	270900	22%	57%	82%	53
TOTAL		197	3 053 027	945 254	857 610	3 910 637	2 776 569	22%	31%	71%	

ANNEX 4 – Regularising the entry and residence of Syrians in Lebanon

Excerpts from the official General Security requirements applied onto Syrian dwellers in Lebanon as of January 1, 2015

	<p>حاملين بطاقة عضوية من غرفة الملاحة البحرية السورية.</p> <p>حاملين بطاقات عضوية صادرة عن اتحاد غرف السياحة في سوريا والبطاقات الصادرة عن غرف السياحة في مختلف المناطق السورية.</p>		<p>تُمنح إقامة مؤقتة لمدة اقصاها شهر.</p>	<p>الأوراق الثبوتية اللازمة (هوية سليمة + جواز سفر).</p> <p>دفتر العائلة (إذا كانت عائلته برقمته).</p> <p>ما يثبت صفته كفحل أعمال مستمر، نقابي، موظف في إحدى السفارات اللخنية أو العربية أو السفارات السورية</p>	<p>زيارة عمل</p> <p><i>Rich ppl income</i></p>
<p>إذن دخول 24 ساعة اعتباراً من توقيت الدخول.</p> <p>يشار على بطاقة دخول صاحب المركبة باسمه، الداخليين برقمته، على أن يغادروا معه كما يشار على</p>	<p>الأوراق الثبوتية اللازمة (هوية سليمة + جواز سفر).</p> <p>دفتر العائلة (إذا كانت عائلته برقمته).</p> <p>أوراق المركبة الخاصة على أن تكون مسجلة وفقاً للاصول + تأمين الزامي.</p>	<p>للتسوق</p> <p><i>Rich? 2ykes</i></p>		<p>في الخارج من غير التحيلوماسيين، موظف القطاع العام السوري، ضباط القوات المسلحة والمتقاعدين منهم، رجل دين، بطاقة وطنية، بطاقة نقابة، إقامة في الخارج مدون عليها المهنة.</p> <p>أو تعهد اجمالي او افرادي بالمسؤولية من شركة او مؤسسة عامة او جمعية، ...</p> <p>لحضور اجتماع عمل او للمشاركة في مؤتمر أو ندوة،</p> <p>حاملين اذونات صادرة عن "اتحاد المصدرين السوريين".</p>	
<p>بطاقات دخول المرافقين لصاحب المركبة بأنهم دخلوا برقمته ويغادرون معه.</p>	<p>تُمنح إقامة مؤقتة لمدة ستة أشهر قابلة للتجديد في المركز الإقليمي بعد إبراز إقامة عقارية حديثة (أسبوع) للتثبت من إستمرارية ملكيته للعقار على أن تُمنح من قبل رئيس الدائرة الإقليمية (جون متفرداً إذا برز نسخة عن سند الملكية +</p>	<p>مالك عقار</p> <p><i>Rich Gomtha Renewable</i></p>		<p>حاملين كتاب صادر عن "غرفة صناعة دمشق وريفها" بما فيها لجنة صناعة السينما والتلفزيون.</p> <p>خبراء من تجمع شركة مستكا اليونانية اسالكو الإيطالية للعمل على مشروع محطة دير علي بريف دمشق والمرافقين لهم.</p> <p>حاملين بطاقة عضوية من غرفة الملاحة</p>	



من العام اللبناني

تنظيم دخول السوريين إلى لبنان و الإقامة فيه

بإشارة إلى العلاقة للامن العام عن وضع معايير جديدة، تنظم دخول السوريين إلى لبنان والإقامة شكل التالي

نوع ومدة إذن الدخول أو الإقامة	المستندات المطلوبة	
<p>يُمنح إذن دخول للسياحية يناسب مع مدة الحجز المتعددي قابلة للتجديد في مركز الإقليمي بعد أخذ موافقة رئيس د. الإقليمية عبر الفاكس والتحقق من صحة الحجز المتعددي ومن مبلغ الموازي للنف دولر.</p> <p>يُحدد إذن الدخول لسبب سياحي وفق لملحاحية الحجز المتعددي بعد التأكد من صحة السبب والحجز المتعددي على أن لا تتعدى إقامته مدة شهر من تاريخ الدخول.</p>	<p>حجر متعددي (خطي)، المقاص دون الـ 15 سنة ليسوا بحاجة لحجز متعددي.</p> <p>مبلغ يوازي ألف دولار أمريكي.</p> <p>الأوراق الثبوتية اللازمة (هوية سليمة + جواز سفر).</p> <p>دفتر العائلة (إذا كانت عائلته برقمته).</p>	<p>سياحة</p> <p><i>Tourism Rich People 1 month More</i></p>

ANNEX 4 (continued) – Regularising the entry and residence of Syrians in Lebanon

Excerpts from the official General Security requirements applied onto Syrian dwellers in Lebanon as of January 1, 2015

	<p>عليها إقامة لمدة سنة بموجب تعهد بالمسؤولية. أو للسوري وأفراد عائلته لغير العمل. - تطبق أحكام الفقرة 2 و 3 على السوريين الموجودين في لبنان والراغبين بتجديد الإقامة المؤقتة بعد إستيفاء رسم /300.000/ ل.ل إلا في حال سبق واستوفى الرسم عن السنة الطارية.</p>			<p>تعهد بالمسؤولية (دون إيداع رسم /300.000/ ل.ل) زيارة محتتها /7/ أيام قابلة للتجديد مرة واحدة ولمرة مماثلة في الدائرة الإقليمية بحيث يسمح لأي لبناني بدعوة سوري وأفراد عائلته لزيارته في لبنان (زيارة عائلية/قرلية أو مصاهرة) أو تعهد إجمالي أو فردي بالمسؤولية (إقامة مؤقتة لمدة أقصاها شهر) لأي جمعية أو شركة أو مؤسسة أو منظمة مُعترف بها في لبنان ومسجلين وفقاً للنص، وذلك بصورة مجانية ودون إيداع أي مبلغ مالي. تعهد بالمسؤولية (مع إيداع رقم /300.000/ ل.ل) للدخول والإستحقاق على إقامة لمدة سنة فردي أو إجمالي المقدم من قبل الأشخاص والمؤسسات والشركات والذي يعهد بموجبه السعي لدى وزارة العمل للإستحقاق على إجازة عمل وفقاً للنص. تعهد بالمسؤولية (مع إيداع رسم /300.000/ ل.ل) للأفراد عائلة السوري في لبنان والذي يحمل: إقامة عمل قئة /3/ و /4/. بطاقة إقامة غير عمل (سنة، 3 سنوات) إذا كان لا يحق للأفراد عائلته بالحصول</p>	<p>VII للدخول بموجب تعهد مسبق بالمسؤولية</p>
	<p>عدم السماح بدخول أي سوري بصفة تارح إلا في حالات إستثنائية تحدد إجراءاتها لاحقاً بالتنسيق مع وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية. يُسمح بدخول السوريين المسجلين سابقاً كتازحين شرط إستيفاء شروط الدخول المحددة بموجب هذه المذكرة.</p>	<p>بصفة تارح</p>	<p>IV</p>		

ANNEX 5 – Excerpt from the minutes of meeting of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers – October 23, 2014

Elements relevant to the policy paper concerning the residency of Syrian refugees, translated in Encadré 4-2: Excerpt from the Council of Ministers' minutes of meeting on October 23, 2014



خدمات	المركز الاعلامي	السراي الكبير	الجريدة الرسمية	مجلس الوزراء	رئاسة مجلس الوزراء	رئيس مجلس الوزراء
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» مجلس الوزراء « مقررات مجلس الوزراء « جلسة 23 تشرين الأول 2014

الخط + -

جلسة 23 تشرين الأول 2014

مقررات جلسة مجلس الوزراء التي عقدت بتاريخ 23 تشرين الاول 2014 برئاسة دولة رئيس مجلس الوزراء

وزارة المجلس

مقررات مجلس الوزراء

تنظيم أعمال المجلس

- الموافقة على ورقة سياسة النزوح السوري الى لبنان (Policy Paper) المقترحة من اللجنة الوزارية للنازحين السوريين وقد تضمنت الآتي:
 - ان لبنان الذي اعطى مثلاً عالمياً فريداً يمدى التزام المبادئ الانسانية وتطبيقها تجاه الشعب السوري الجار والشقيق، أصبح على شفير انفجار اجتماعي اقتصادي امني يهدد وجوده، ان لم يعمد، حفاظاً على مصلحة الشعبين اللبناني والسوري، الى اتباع سياسة مسؤولة تؤدي الى تقليص أعداد النازحين السوريين الموجودين على أرضه والى توفير أمن اللبنانيين والسوريين، والى تخفيف الأعباء عن شعبه واقتصاده.
 - تقليص الأعداد:
 - وقف النزوح على الحدود باستثناء الحالات الإنسانية الاستثنائية، وتسجيل الداخلين على الحدود وفق أسباب دخولهم للتأكد من تطبيق هذا الإجراء، وكذلك الطلب من مفوضية شؤون اللاجئين في الأمم المتحدة UNHCR الالتزام بوقف تسجيل النازحين الا بعد موافقة وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية.
 - تشجيع النازحين السوريين على العودة الى بلادهم او الى بلدان اخرى بكل الوسائل الممكنة، والتشدد في تطبيق القوانين اللبنانية عليهم، وكذلك نزع صفة "النازح" عن كل من يذهب الى سوريا، وكل من يخالف القوانين اللبنانية وشروط الدخول.
 - تنظيم العلاقة مع المؤسسات الدولية بحسب القوانين اللبنانية والاتفاقيات مما يستوجب حصول الدولة على كل المعلومات حول النازحين المسجلين لدراسة ملفاتهم وتوفير احوال تزوجهم دورياً من اجل تقليص أعدادهم وفق المعايير القانونية وتأميناً لاحتياجات النازحين المستحقين.
 - توفير الأمن:
 - متابعة القوى الامنية تنفيذ التدابير الآلية الى ضبط امن النزوح وتكليف البلديات بإجراء مسح احصائي دوري للنازحين في اطارها الجغرافي وتوفيرها العناصر الضرورية للشرطة البلدية لحفظ الأمن.
 - تخفيف الإعباء:
 - التشدد في تطبيق القوانين اللبنانية على النازحين السوريين لحماية اللبنانيين في مجالات العمل والعمالة كافة.
 - التوازن بالمساعدات بين النازحين والمجتمع المضيف، وتأمين التمويل المباشر لمؤسسات الدولة اللبنانية عبر الصندوق الائتماني المتعدد المانحين MDTF وغير برامج خاصة ترغب بها اي جهة مانحة بالاتفاق مع الادارة اللبنانية المعنية حسب الاصول.
 - تمويل برامج دولية تهدف الى تنمية الاقتصاد اللبناني وتنشيط القطاعات المنتجة فيه.
- ان ورقة سياسة النزوح السوري تتمتع بتوافق وطني وترمي الى تحقيق المصلحة اللبنانية، وهي تحمل الصفة التنفيذية مما يوجب متابعة تنفيذها عبر كل وزارة وادارة لبنانية معنية، وغير تقارير دورية تُرفع الى اللجنة الوزارية للنازحين والتي ترفعها بدورها الى مجلس الوزراء تحقيقاً لاهدافها.

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NEGOCIER L'ESPACE : les villes du Liban devant l'afflux des réfugiés syriens (2011-2018). Études de cas à Tripoli (quartier de Tebbeneh) et à Beyrouth (quartier de El-Nab'a et camp Palestinien de Bourj El-Barajneh).

Recevoir en trois ans un afflux de migrants correspondant à un quart de sa population constitue un défi majeur pour n'importe quelle nation. Cette recherche tente de comprendre comment un tel phénomène, à priori inconcevable, a pu advenir dans les villes du Liban, qui ont accueilli plus d'un million de réfugiés depuis 2011. Partant de ce phénomène brutal, elle examine les facteurs qui ont permis à ces réfugiés urbains de s'installer tant bien que mal dans des espaces marqués par des processus extrêmes d'injustices socio-spatiales.

La thèse aborde cette question à trois niveaux : (1) à l'échelle urbaine locale, où citoyens et réfugiés vivent un cycle continu de négociations dissymétriques concernant l'occupation et l'appropriation de leurs espaces respectifs, reflété dans des situations quotidiennes de tension et de conflit ; (2) au niveau national, dans lequel la géopolitique interne à la société libanaise et les effets de l'action publique du gouvernement, des collectivités territoriales et des ONG prennent un rôle direct, influençant l'accès des réfugiés à la ville ; (3) à l'échelle géopolitique internationale enfin, qui aborde la situation du Moyen-Orient. À cette échelle, l'analyse s'attache aux effets des relations historiques entre le Liban et la Syrie dans l'installation actuelle des réfugiés. Cependant, l'espace de négociation n'est pas exclusivement perçu comme le résultat d'une relation binaire entre réfugiés et société d'accueil. Plus largement, la thèse démontre comment cette relation s'insère dans des mécanismes qui produisent et reproduisent des inégalités exprimées à des échelles multiples et qui opèrent sur l'ensemble des populations citadines, que ces dernières soient d'origines syriennes, palestiniennes, qu'elles appartiennent aux différentes communautés religieuses libanaises ou qu'elles soient originaires de pays étrangers.

L'étude repose sur une approche ethnographique qualitative faisant appel à diverses méthodes, particulièrement des entretiens approfondis auprès d'échantillons de population très divers. Ceux-ci sont accompagnés d'observations systématiques menées dans trois quartiers urbains : Tebbeneh à Tripoli, El-Nab'a et le camp palestinien de Bourj el-Barajneh à Beyrouth

Mots clés : négocier l'espace, inégalités socio-spatiales, réfugiés urbains, villes du Liban

NEGOTIATING SPACE: Cities in Lebanon and the challenge of the Syrian refugee influx (2011-2018) Case studies in Tripoli (Tebbeneh) and Beirut (El-Nab'a, and the Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp)

It is a major challenge for any nation to accommodate an influx of migrants corresponding to a quarter of its population in three years. This research seeks to understand how such a phenomenon, inconceivable at first glance, could have taken place in cities in Lebanon that have hosted over a million refugees from Syria since 2011. With this brutal phenomenon as a starting point, the thesis examines the factors that have made it possible for the urban refugees to settle in places marked by extreme processes of socio-spatial injustice.

The thesis addresses this issue at three levels: (1) at the local urban scale, within which urban dwellers and refugees live a continuous cycle of dissymmetrical negotiations on the occupation and appropriation of their respective spaces, reflected in daily situations of tension and conflict; (2) at the national level, within which the internal geopolitics and the effects of government, local authority, and NGO actions play a direct role in influencing the access of refugees to the city; (3) finally at the international geopolitical scale which addresses the situation of the Middle East. At this scale, the analysis focuses on the effects of historical relations between Lebanon and Syria in the current settlement of refugees. Negotiating space is not seen as the result of an exclusively binary relationship between refugees and the host society. Rather, the thesis demonstrates how this relationship fits into mechanisms that produce and reproduce inequalities expressed on multiple scales, and touch all urban dwellers - whether they are originally Syrian, Palestinian, Lebanese from different religious groups, or even from a foreign country.

The study is based on a qualitative ethnographic approach using a variety of methods, particularly in-depth interviews with diverse population samples. These are accompanied by systematic observations in three urban neighborhoods: Tebbeneh in Tripoli, El-Nab'a and the Palestinian camp of Bourj el-Barajneh in Beirut

Keywords: negotiating space, socio-spatial inequality, urban refugees, cities in Lebanon

Spécialité : Géographie physique, humaine, économique et régionale