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Efe Peker

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Ecole Doctorale d'Histoire

UFR 09 Histoire

Thèse pour l'obtention d'un doctorat unique d'histoire
(en cotutelle avec sociologie, Université Simon Fraser, Canada)

**Une sociologie comparative et historique de la sécularisation : formation
de l'état républicain en France (1875-1905) et en Turquie (1908-1938)**

**A Comparative-Historical Sociology of Secularisation: Republican State
Building in France (1875-1905) and Turkey (1908-1938)**

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A Comparative-Historical Sociology of Secularisation: Republican State Building in France (1875-1905) and Turkey (1908-1938)

by

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-and-

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Abstract

This dissertation features a comparative-historical examination of macrosocietal secularisation in France (1875-1905) and Turkey (1908-1938), with particular attention to their republican state building experiences. Bridging the literatures on secularisation theory (sociology of religion) and state formation (comparative-historical sociology), it is the purpose of this work to contribute to “historicising the secularisation debate” by scrutinising the “sociopolitical conflicts” involved in the making of macro-level secularisation (Gorski, 2003b, 2005). The existing literature often interprets different patterns of secularisation through voluntaristic perspectives (overemphasising the ideologies/beliefs of rulers and individuals) or deterministic lenses (anticipating civilisational or modernist path dependencies). To overcome the duality, this study provides a comparative-historical approach that investigates secularisation as a non-linear, uneven, and dialectical process contingent upon the course of sociopolitical struggles and structural transformations.

Differing from many other national states, why did France and Turkey converge to embrace secularism as a central principle and doctrine, based on an accentuated form of “separation” from and “regulation” of religion? What accounts for their divergence, that is, why did the “separation” aspect prove more dominant in French *laïcité*, whereas “regulation” came to be prominent in Turkish *laiklik*? Resting on a rich array of archival and bibliographical sources, my analysis proposes to explain the convergence and divergence between France and Turkey through the interaction of “extra-religious” and “religious” sets of variables. The former set takes into account geographically specific class struggles/alliances, and dynamics of internal/external sovereign state building. The latter set explores the doctrinal/institutional configuration of dominant religions, and the situation of religious minorities. Highlighting the interplay of these “extra-religious” and “religious” dynamics, the dissertation offers an analytical framework to contribute to the social scientific understanding of secularisation/desecularisation beyond the French and Turkish cases.

The highly contentious histories of France and Turkey reveal that secularisation is not merely about the conflict of ideational visions. Secularisation is also a concrete state building strategy operationalised through a combination of “separation” and “regulation”. As part of the struggle against religiously affiliated/legitimated sociopolitical contenders, these dual strategies are utilised by bourgeois-national state builders to bring about “differentiation”, “societalisation”, and “rationalisation” (Wallis & Bruce, 1992). While the strategy of *separation* “differentiates” (and transfers to the state) diverse social functions previously assumed by “religious authority” (Chaves, 1994), the latter’s remaining prerogatives are placed under the *regulation* of “societally” and “rationally” organised secular-bureaucratic institutions. In this sense, secularisation is intimately linked to the consolidation of sovereign infrastructural power (Mann, 1984; Soifer, 2008) in “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional” spheres. France and Turkey allow for a cross-religious and cross-regional comparison to crystallise the national and extra-national social forces and mechanisms that influence the ebbs and flows in the secularising process.

Keywords: Secularisation, state formation, France, Turkey, Catholicism, Islam.

Résumé

Une sociologie comparative et historique de la sécularisation : formation de l'état républicain en France (1875-1905) et en Turquie (1908-1938)

Cette thèse propose un examen comparatif et historique de la sécularisation macro-sociale en France (1875-1905) et en Turquie (1908-1938), avec une attention particulière portée sur leurs expériences de formation de l'état républicain. Mettant en rapport les littératures sur la théorie de la sécularisation (sociologie de la religion) et la formation de l'état (sociologie historique comparative), l'objet de ce travail est de contribuer à « historiciser le débat de la sécularisation » en examinant les « conflits socio-politiques » engagés dans son développement (Gorski, 2003b, 2005). Les ouvrages existants en la matière interprète souvent la sécularisation d'un point de vue volontariste (soulignant les idéologies / croyances des dirigeants et des individus) ou déterministe (anticipant les sentiers civilisationnels ou modernistes). Afin de surmonter la dualité, cette étude fournit une approche comparative et historique qui étudie la sécularisation comme un processus dialectique, non-linéaire, et inégal, qui est déterminé par des luttes sociopolitiques et des transformations structurelles.

À la différence de beaucoup d'autres états nationaux, pour quelles raisons est-ce que la France et la Turquie convergent à accentuer la *laïcité* et le *laiklik* comme un principe central, fondé sur une forme forte de « séparation » et de « régulation » de la religion ? Qu'est-ce qui explique leur divergence, en d'autres termes, pourquoi est-ce que la « séparation » est plus dominante dans la *laïcité* française, alors que la « régulation » est plus importante dans le *laiklik* turc ? Basée sur des sources archivistiques et bibliographiques, mon analyse propose d'expliquer la convergence et divergence de ces deux pays par l'interaction des variables « extra-religieuse » et « religieuse ». La première prend en compte des luttes de classes et la formation interne / externe de l'état souverain. La seconde explore la configuration doctrinale / institutionnelle des religions dominantes, et la situation des minorités religieuses. Soulignant l'interaction de ces variables « extra-religieuse » et « religieuse », la thèse propose un cadre analytique

pour contribuer à la compréhension scientifique de la sécularisation sociale au-delà des cas français et turc.

Les histoires très controversées de la France et de la Turquie montrent que la sécularisation n'est pas seulement un conflit de visions idéelles. La sécularisation est aussi une stratégie de formation de l'état, opérationnalisée par la combinaison de la « séparation » et de la « régulation ». Dans la lutte contre les concurrents sociopolitiques religieusement affiliés et légitimés, ces deux stratégies sont utilisées par les républicains afin de mettre en place la « différenciation », « sociétalisation », et « rationalisation » (Wallis & Bruce, 1992). La stratégie de *séparation* « différencie » (et transfère à l'état) diverses fonctions sociales précédemment assumées par « l'autorité religieuse » (Chaves, 1994). En même temps, les anciennes prérogatives de ce dernier sont placées sous la *régulation* des institutions bureaucratiques-laïques qui sont organisées de façon « sociétale » et « rationnelle ». En ce sens, la sécularisation est intimement liée à la consolidation du pouvoir infrastructural de l'état souverain (Mann, 1984; Soifer, 2008) dans les sphères « juridico-institutionnelle », « socio-éducative », « symbolique-idéologique », et « redistributive ». La France et la Turquie permettent donc une comparaison interreligieuse et interrégionale dans le but de cristalliser les forces et les mécanismes nationaux et extranationaux qui influencent les flux et reflux dans le processus de sécularisation.

Mots-clés: sécularisation, formation de l'état, France, Turquie, Catholicisme, Islam.

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PART I – A Tale of Two Paths to Secularisation

Chapter 1. Introducing *Laïcité* and *Laiklik*

In the social scientific literature on secularisation that compares different states' relationship with and policies toward religion, "two countries stand out, France and Turkey" (Akgönül, 2008b, p. 5). The historical relationship these two national states¹ established with their dominant religions, namely Catholicism and Sunni Islam, respectively, has often been classified together to exemplify either an assertive/hard variant of secularism (Kosmin, 2007; Kuru, 2009), or an alternative to secularism referred to as "laicism" (A. Davison, 2003; Débray, 1992; Hurd, 2008). Whichever term one might employ², the most discernible feature of the French and Turkish cases is the extraordinary emphasis ascribed to the notion of secularism as a central legal-institutional principle as well as a politico-ideological doctrine of the national state. Diverging from most other trajectories of national state building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, France and Turkey established secularism as a distinct constitutional principle embedded in their legal framework and institutions, and among the main tenets of their official ideology and national identity. In Europe and the Middle East, France and Turkey were the only two cases to have done so, and they are among the "few countries in the world" to have followed that path (Burdy & Marcou, 1995, p. 2). As Madeley (2013, p. 56) writes, France was "Europe's first *laïciste* state. ... No other countries followed the French example until after the First World War when in Turkey after 1923 Kemal Atatürk introduced his own *laiklik* version of *laïcité*".

The adjective "laïque" entered a French constitution for the first time in the Fourth Republic, almost forty years after the 1905 Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State defined its essence. The first article of the 1946 Constitution read, "France is an indivisible, *laïque*, democratic and social Republic". Interestingly, although it was the Turks that emulated French laicism to the point of phonetically translating the word itself, the adjective "laik" made its way to a Turkish constitution nearly a decade before France. With an amendment in 1937, the second article of the 1924 Constitution specified that the "State of Turkey is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, *laik*, and revolutionist".

The peculiarity of these texts is that the concept of secularism is not mentioned in passing, as in the clauses on education in the comparably secularising constitutions of Mexico (1917, Article 3), Spain (1931, Article 48), and Portugal (1933, Article 43). Instead, the French and Turkish constitutions highlighted secularism at the very outset, and among the fundamental tenets of these states. This is because, as Akgönül (2008b, p. 5) notes, “France and Turkey have made laicism not only a constitutional principle, but above all one of the foundations of their regimes”. Constitutions are normative expressions of societal, functional, historical, ideological, and political transformations (Thornhill, 2011). They represent the priorities, contentions, and mentalities of those involved in their making, as can be observed in the secularising thrust of the French and Turkish national state builders. As Jean Jaurès, one of the architects of *laïcité*, wrote in 1904, the French Republic is “based outside of any religious system in all its institutions, its political and social rights ... and sovereignty”, for it is “profoundly *laïque* ... in its essence as in its forms, in its principle ... and in its morality as in its economy” (Jaurès, 1904a). In the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1938, one official document echoed a viewpoint similar to that of Jaurès’ to define *laiklik*: “the functioning of the Republic of Turkey derives not from ... religious dogmas, but from life itself and its positive ... necessities. Religion has no influence on governmental and worldly affairs. This principle is known as *laiklik*” (CHP, 1938, p. 12).

The exceptionality of France and Turkey, nevertheless, is not so much the formal adherence to secularism as its substantive operationalisation. After all, political secularisation is a rather well-documented phenomenon in the formation of national states³, and some other countries also explicitly adopted secularism as a state principle (as in the constitutions of India, Madagascar, and Senegal). France and Turkey stand out in the particular implementation of secularism that prioritises strictly demarcating the boundaries of religion vis-à-vis the political sphere, as well as religion’s increased supervision by the state. José Casanova (2009, p. 1061) writes that “as a statecraft doctrine, every form of secularism entails two principles ... namely the principle of *separation* ... and the principle of state *regulation* of religion ... It is the relationship between the two principles that determines the particular form of secularism” (my emphases). Expressed in these terms, it can be put forward that France and Turkey have conceived and practiced a rigorous combination of “separation” and “regulation” in

relation to religion, much more intensively than most other secular national states. In the formative period of these two republics, state builders were specifically concerned to delineate the domain of activity of the religious in differentiation to that of the political (“separation”), and they sought to make sure through the surveillance of religion that these borders were not infringed by its different influences and manifestations (“regulation”). Hurd (2008, p. 26) is thus right in maintaining that “laicism pursues the Kantian ... public morality ... It rejects theology in public life as dangerous sectarianism ... Laicism attempts to contain ecclesiastical intrusions into public life”. A central undertaking of this dissertation is to re-operationalize the concepts of “separation” and “regulation” as contentious strategies of national state building, and explore why France and Turkey put them to use, in their unique ways, much more abundantly and conspicuously than most other cases.

Exemplifying “separation”, the Law on the Separation of the Churches and the State in France (1905) and the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey (1924) were among the major steps to disestablish religion from the state apparatus. Yet disestablishment is only one, albeit vital, moment of my conceptualisation of separation. Separation may be understood, in reference to secularisation theory, to refer to the “differentiation” of various structures by sociopolitical actors in a way that diminishes the hold of religious authority in favour of a secular form of power. Differentiation produces secularisation not simply due to an evolutionary or functional necessity (as implied by Bellah, 1970; Parsons, 1966), but through the agency of actors that separate/differentiate diverse manifestations of religious authority away from sociopolitical prominence (Alexander, 1990; Chaves, 1994; Yamane, 1997). Some French and Turkish examples include the secularisation of constitutions (1789 in France, 1928 in Turkey), the education system (1882 in France, 1924 in Turkey), the severance from society the hold of Catholic and Sunni Muslim religious orders (1901 in France, 1925 in Turkey), the replacement of avatars of religious legitimacy with secular-republican symbolism, and the nationalisation of religious property (1789 in France, 1924 in Turkey). Inherent in all these episodes that “separation” involved a “transfer” of certain prerogatives, resources, and meanings “from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay [that is, national] use, possession, or control” (Casanova, 2006, p. 8). In dialogue with secularisation theory, that process of separation/transfer can be further defined through the concepts of “societalisation” and

“rationalisation” (Wallis & Bruce, 1992). The latter two go hand in hand with “differentiation”, and they denote the shift from local community to nationally organised and bureaucratically coordinated social structures that are impersonal, efficient, and instrumental (Wilson, 1982). Expressed in state building terms, separation then features the transfer of particular entities previously controlled by religious authority to “societally/nationally” and “rationally” organised secular-bureaucratic institutions. In this sense, secularisation and constructing national state capacity are two sides of the same coin.

Societalisation and rationalisation speak not only to “separation”, but also to the parallel strategy of “regulation”. As separation “differentiates” various sociopolitical spheres to gradually demote religious authority from its extensive status, it follows that the activities of religious entities become subject to some level of regulation (like any other publicly relevant organisation) by “societally/nationally” and “rationally” configured state apparatuses. Through the strategy of “regulation”, political authority exercises control over religious institutions so as to maintain the latter’s field of activity as demarcated from the state, and within the limits of secular law. Both the French and Turkish republics sustained, although in different ways, a considerable degree of regulation over religion. Barras (2014, pp. 21-40) holds that in addition to “separation”, “a tradition of regulation” also characterises these two cases, which seeks to define and delimit the area of influence of the religious. The 1905 Law on Separation in France, for instance, stipulated detailed provisions on the legal status of “religious associations”, introducing rules on their buildings, properties, public ceremonies, and restricting their political activities. Regulation was even more pronounced in Turkey, as it went beyond mere surveillance. In 1924, the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Directorate of Pious Foundations were established to assume organising and funding the activities of Sunni Islam as a means to manage and define religion’s boundaries within the Republic. In Section 1.3, “separation” and “regulation” will be theorised in more depth. Still, the preliminary conceptualisation reveals that these are neither mutually exclusive modes of operation, nor are they in any way special to the French and Turkish cases. On the contrary, they are complementary strategies that can be found, in various permutations and levels of intensity, in every historical process of secular-national state building. As Hurd (2004, p. 242) notes, all varieties of secularism “regulate the place of religion in

politics by assigning it a fixed and final location in (or out of) public life”, and “adopt a set of rules concerning the relationship between religion and politics”. “Separation” and “regulation” act as the governmental strategies to organise that relationship.

The relative uniqueness of France and Turkey stem from their thorough and ostensible utilisation of “separation” and “regulation” towards Catholicism and Sunni Islam, which has been recognised in the comparative literature on secularisation. Accordingly, France and Turkey are almost always categorised under “assertive”, “hard”, or “combative/hostile” secularism as opposed to the “passive”, “soft”, or “appeased/friendly” variants ascribed to the US, UK, or Canada. To name but a few, Kuru (2009, p. 11) qualifies France and Turkey as emblematic of “assertive secularism” whereby the state vigorously seeks to “exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain”, which is in contrast to cases of “passive secularism” that allow the public visibility of religion. Similarly, pairing France and Turkey up under “hard secularism” in his typology, Kosmin (2007, p. 9) writes that these two countries “have developed a highly centralised, statist trajectory” that “advance a secular ideology of republicanism or *laïcité*”. Along the same lines, Muhlmann and Zalc (2008, p. 101) hold that “in France, laicism was built combatively ... against the Church”, which Burdy and Marcou (1995, p. 9) apply to the Turkish case by calling it a form of “combative secularism imposed by force” against Islam. These classifications are echoed by Linz (1996, pp. 105-106) as he labels France the “hostile” model “imposing secular patterns ... to reduce religion to the intimate private sphere of the family and the church buildings without allowing a variety of public manifestations”; and by Fuller (2004, p. 76), who calls Turkey “the most militantly anti-Islamist in the Muslim world”. French and Turkish history, therefore, represent a particular “mode of secularism”, which Charles Taylor (1998, p. 35) refers to as the “independent political ethic” mode. The latter expels religion from politics, and “the state upholds no religion, pursues no religious goals, and religiously-defined goods have no place in the catalogue of ends it promotes”. Another clarifying distinction is McClay’s (2002, pp. 45-48) “positive” and “negative” concepts of secularism. In contrast to the “negative” secularism that is relatively minimalist, neutral, and non-interventionist; France and Turkey are associated with the “positive” variant, which presents a normatively secularist outlook so as to “exclude religious thought and discourse from any serious participation in public life”.

Such apparent similarities notwithstanding, the trajectories of secularisation in France and Turkey are also marked by significant differences, which is also recognised widely in the literature. Secularism in Turkey, “which was greatly nourished by the French model, has presented itself with very different characteristics” (Dumont, 2008, p. 155). Put broadly, in the French politics of *laïcité*, separation of the state and religion is prevalent over the regulation aspect, whereas in the Turkish politics of *laiklik*, regulation of religion by the state is predominant over the separation element. The second article of the Law of 1905, which terminated Napoléon’s 1801 Concordat with the Catholic Church, speaks for the separationist character of French secularism: “The Republic does not recognise, remunerate or subsidise any religion”. This is in contrast to Law no. 429 of 1924 in Turkey, where the state took on the administration and funding of all Sunni Islamic institutions and officials in the country. As Alfred C. Stepan (2001, p. 245) notes, “France in 1905 never assumed this degree of management of religion”. In comparison to France’s “separationist” path, Turkey thus exhibits a more “regulationist” trajectory of laicism. Despite subscribing to the notion of *laïcité*, separation of religion and politics in Turkey is not taken to its full extent in *laiklik* to bring about complete state neutrality⁴. Such difference, however, should be understood as one of degree than of kind (Çitak, 2004): France never stopped regulating religion in the name of public order, and Turkey did not abandon the practice of separation in its institutions. Jansen (2006, p. 476), for instance, holds that “the French state, despite its ideology of the strict independence of religion and state, has a long tradition of the *gestion* (‘management’) of religion. This implies ... its centralization and at least partial control by the state”. Likewise, despite the state regulation of Sunni Islam, according to Lewis (1961, p. 412), the principal purpose of Turkish laicism was to separate “the power of religion and its exponents” from “political, social, and cultural affairs”.

To be more precise, one can identify the laws of 1905 and 1924 as following two sub-strategies of regulation: exterior and interior. France’s law of 1905 illustrates “exterior regulation”, which implies a higher level of separation between the national state and the religious organisation in question, where the former polices the latter from outside (like any other extra-state association). Turkey’s law of 1924, on the other hand, epitomises “interior regulation”, where the national state incorporates the religious organisation in its administrative apparatus so as to manage it for the purpose of

defining and/or reducing its sphere of activity. It is interesting to note that France also relied on a version of interior regulation between 1801 and 1905, where the Catholic Church was placed largely under state management. In fact an important aspect of the sociopolitical conflict during the Revolution, especially after the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), was about whether the state should/could practice “interior regulation” of the Church. Historical examination of these two countries will reveal that although it seems counterintuitive, state management of religion can also be an effective secularising strategy employed by national state builders (which I will conceptualise as “regulated diminishment” of religious authority). Suffice it to say in this introductory section that the French and Turkish republics maintained a combination of rigid separation and regulation of religion to ascertain the autonomy and primacy of national politics. This was, however, done at varying levels: prioritising the different strategies of “separation” (characterising *laïcité*), and “regulation” (typifying *laiklik*).

1.1. Research Problem and the Literature

This dissertation proposes a comparative-historical examination of sociopolitical secularisation in the making of the French (1875-1905) and Turkish (1908-1938) republics. Narrowly defined, the time frame of the research is delimited to these “critical junctures”⁵ that coincide two intertwined processes: the establishment of laicism as a politico-ideological doctrine and practice (through “separation” and “regulation”), and the consolidation of the bourgeois/national/republican state⁶. In France, the focus is on the first part of the Third Republic, namely between the Constitutional Laws of 1875 that set the foundations of the new regime, and the pivotal law of 1905 on *laïcité*, which promulgated the separation between the church and the national state (Chapter 5). In Turkey, the emphasis is on the period between the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which instigated the national state building initiative, and the juncture of 1937/8 that overlapped the constitutionalisation of *laiklik* with the end of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s presidency of the Republic (Chapter 6). These three-decade junctures represent the culmination of long-term processes of market-based transformation and centralised state building in France and the Ottoman Empire, which intensified throughout the “long nineteenth century”⁷ to set the context for politico-ideological polarisations involving

Catholicism and Sunni Islam. The long nineteenth century constitutes the wider time frame of the research to provide the historical background for the critical junctures in question (Chapters 3 and 4). Throughout the analysis, class struggles/alliances and building internal/external national-sovereign state capacity are taken as the two “extra-religious” master processes influencing the course of secularisation –which correspond to a combination of Marxist and bellicist accounts of state formation in the historical sociological literature (Gorski, 2003a, pp. 3-15)⁸. These “extra-religious” processes, namely “the organization of social classes” and the “method of building political power” (Portier, 2012, p. 94) interact in various ways with “religious” determinants, namely the geographically specific doctrinal/institutional configuration of the dominant spiritual establishment and the situation of religious minorities.

Combining historical and sociological perspectives allows for surmounting the apparent dichotomy between particularising and generalising approaches (Goldthorpe, 1991; Lange, 2013; MacRaild & Taylor, 2004; Mouzelis, 1994; Wallerstein, 1987). Accordingly, the purpose of the study is to offer idiographic as well as nomothetic contributions to the social scientific literature⁹. The examination of France and Turkey is undertaken here not only to expand the knowledge on the historical particularities of these cases, but also to contribute to the macrosociological understanding of secularisation/desecularisation processes. In addition to maintaining a dialogue with the French and Turkish historiography on their state-religion relations, the research thus intends to add to the “secularisation debate” (sociology of religion) by associating closely with the literature on state formation (comparative-historical sociology). The central research questions are organised accordingly in two sets, addressing idiographic and nomothetic objectives that are, needless to say, intimately interconnected. The idiographic aspect of the inquiry aims to trace these polities’ secularising lineages of convergence and divergence:

- Convergence: differing from most other cases, why did France and Turkey embrace secularism as a central legal-institutional principle and a politico-ideological doctrine of the national state, which is based on a much more accentuated “separation” from and “regulation” of religion?
- Divergence: what accounts for the evident variation between the French and Turkish republican politics of secularism, that is, why did the “separation” aspect

prove dominant in French *laïcité*, whereas “regulation” came to characterise Turkish *laiklik*?

The contemporary relevance of expanding the historical-sociological knowledge on state-religion relations in France and Turkey requires little justification. Hardly a single day passes in these countries without a public controversy revolving around the meaning and practice of *laïcité* and *laiklik*, which finds echo in global news as well as in academia. Ranging from the headscarf issue (Barras, 2014; Bowen, 2007; Secor, 2005), to the integration of Muslim immigrants in France (Bowen, 2011; Davidson, 2014; Roy, 2007) and the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey (Coşar & Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012; Eligür, 2010; Uzgel & Duru, 2010), secularism lies at the heart of the debate on French and Turkish national identity (Ahmad, 2003; Weil, 2011). Remarkably, every sociopolitical actor taking part in the debate, be it a promoter or a detractor of the concept, shares the commonality of making frequent historical references to the secular-national state building processes of these two countries¹⁰, which further validates the ongoing significance of scrutinising the periods in question. It is interesting to note, however, that in the social sciences literature (in English, French, and Turkish), although there is an abundance of allusions concerning the similarities and differences between French and Turkish secularism, most of them are incidental references found in studies that are not organised around an equal-weighted comparison of these cases. Except for a few thematic (and not always historical) comparative books and dissertations (Akan, 2005; Barras, 2014; Çelikoğlu Özdikmenli, 2013; Çitak, 2004; Kılınç, 2008; Kuru, 2009), and a number of edited volumes (Akgönül, 2008b; Bacqué-Grammont & Eldem, 1990; Burdy & Marcou, 1995), the literature lacks a systematic historical sociological comparison of *laïcité* and *laiklik*. The present work seeks to remedy that by offering a non-reductionist “materialist interpretation of religion” (Turner, 1991), which takes into account contentious processes such as class formation and state building in the making of secularisation.

The nomothetic dimension of the dissertation takes the materialist interpretation as its starting point. The term general does not mean here an inductive (and methodologically dubious) attempt to establish a general theory of secularisation through these two cases. Instead, understanding comparative-historical sociology as an enterprise that “juxtaposes historical cases to illustrate and refine theoretical arguments

about macrosocietal change” (Gorski, 2003a, p. x), the focus is on what the comparison of French and Turkish experiences may bring to the “secularisation debate” that has been “one of sociology’s most enduring research programmes” and “long-standing theoretical frameworks” (Wallis & Bruce, 1992, p. 8). To summarise: whereas the “old paradigm” of secularisation observed a decline in the “social significance of religion” through the modernising influences of differentiation, societalisation, and rationalisation (Berger, 1967; Fenn, 1978; Luckmann, 1967; Martin, 1978; Wilson, 1966); the “new paradigm” since the 1980s, namely the “religious economies model”, assumed a rational choice methodology to document increased religious participation/belief and called into question the secularisation perspective (Finke & Stark, 1988; Hadden, 1987; Stark, 1999; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994; Warner, 1993). In response to the “new paradigm”, “neo-secularisation” scholars came to meet the criticisms against the “old paradigm” with qualifiers and clarifications, which amounted to a lively and fruitful debate that advanced the theorisation of how secularisation works (Bruce, 2002; Casanova, 1994; Chaves, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1981; Goldstein, 2009; Gorski, 2000a; Lechner, 1991; Tschannen, 1991; Yamane, 1997).

My work intends to speak directly, and contribute to the “neo-secularisation” literature. More particularly, it responds to Philip Gorski’s (2000a, 2003b, 2005) call to “historicise the secularisation debate” through a careful investigation of the “sociopolitical conflicts” inherent in processes of secularisation/desecularisation. Correspondingly, secularisation is not taken as *explanans* (independent variable) in my analysis, but as *explanandum* (dependent variable) contingent upon the interplay of social structures, forces, and actors. Comparing France and Turkey may prove conducive to furthering the agenda of “historicising the secularisation debate” in two ways. First, the relative swiftness and the highly polarised nature of the French and Turkish cases manifestly crystallise the structures, powers, and agents that produce secularisation, which facilitate their observation. I propose to identify the “decline of religious authority” (Chaves, 1994) in France and Turkey through its four interrelated dimensions, which I categorise as “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional” (more on this in Section 1.3.1). Second, juxtaposing France and Turkey also responds to the call for “cross-religious and cross-regional comparisons as a promising avenue of research for the new sociology of religion” (Altınordu, 2012, p. 68) –

and the “secularisation debate” in particular. France and Turkey not only exemplify two major polities with Catholic and Sunni Muslim historical traditions (cross-religious), but they also allow for comparing “metropolitan” and “peripheral” states of the global political/economic/military system in the European and Middle Eastern geographies (cross-regional). Based on such considerations, the nomothetic aspect of the inquiry places sociopolitical secularisation in the context of the material processes of state formation:

- How can the master secularising variables of differentiation, societalisation, and rationalisation be operationalised in relation to the bourgeois-national state building strategies of “separation” and “regulation”; namely, in terms of instituting national state capacity/infrastructural power vis-à-vis religious authority?
- In what ways are these contentious national state building strategies conditioned by “extra-religious” macrosociological processes (such as class struggles/alliances, internal/external sovereignty), as well as “religious” determinants (such as the institutional-doctrinal attributes of the dominant religious organisation, and relationship with minorities)?

As a research agenda, Casanova (2009, p. 1061) suggests that social scientists “should focus less on secularism as an allegedly prescriptive ... norm or as a functionalist requirement of modern differentiated societies and more on the critical comparative historical analysis of the different types of secularism that have emerged in the process of modern state formation”. Following the latter path, my research compares the elements of convergence and divergence in the French and Turkish cases (idiographic objective), and through historicising the state-religion relations in these polities, it aims to contribute to the theorising of “extra-religious” as well as “religious” determinants (more on the distinction in Section 1.2.2) that influence the course of secularisation in national state building processes (nomothetic objective). Parallel with these objectives, the next three subsections offer a brief overview of the existing literature on comparative France-Turkey (1.1.1, 1.1.2) and the secularisation debate (1.1.3). The review will show that the interpretation of secularisation may often feature voluntarist or determinist presuppositions. In other words, secularisation/desecularisation is explained either through the voluntary behaviour of actors (such as the ideologies of state builders, or religious preferences of individuals), or through structural/civilisational necessities (such as modernisation, or religiously determined path dependencies). As

Section 1.2 seeks to elaborate, comparative-historical sociology seeks to go beyond the structure-agency dualism.

1.1.1. Exploring Convergence

Regarding convergence, a widely accepted historiographical notion is that France and Turkey share similar characteristics due to Turkish national state builders' ideological emulation of the French case. Hanioglu (2011, p. 159), for instance, highlights that the Young Turks and later the republicans were "profoundly influenced by the triumph of *laïcité* in France in 1905 and, viewing the French model as the authentic form of secularism, wished to apply it to the letter in Turkey". Mango (1999, p. 393) agrees that Turkey "was inspired by the French principle and practice of *laïcisme*, the separation of church from state". Such emulation is considered to be the outcome of a general, and longer-term French influence on the Ottoman elite. Berkes (1964, pp. 25-26) writes that since "the eighteenth century, France alone would capture the focus of the outward looking Turks", and that it "continued to represent the West in Turkish eyes until the present [twentieth] century". Writing in the early twentieth century, Toynbee and Kirkwood (1927, pp. 128-129) confirm rather romantically that the "Turks ... had turned towards France and had drunk in the Western stream through French channels ... The leaders of the new Turkish movement ... looked out at Western civilization through French eyes, and saw visions of a Turkey Westernized in the likeness of France".

It is indisputable that since their first modernisation attempts in the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman elite looked up to the French experience as a political, institutional, and cultural model (Göçek, 1987). In this regard, the Ottoman Empire was by no means an exception in the non-European world. As Hobsbawm (1996, p. 53) elucidates, "the ideology of the modern world first penetrated the ancient civilizations which had hitherto resisted European ideas through French influence". Turkish historiography too is full of references on this matter. National state builders at the turn of the twentieth century represent the culmination of that tradition, and consequently, the "influence of the French revolutionary tradition and positivism" on "both the Unionists and the Kemalists" was reflected in their conception of secularism (Ahmad, 1993, p. 77). As Davison (1998, p. 188) notes, "that the Kemalists chose to describe their project of

laicism in terms of the French anticlerical experience is a hermeneutic fact of indispensable importance". That is to say, they consciously modelled their state-religion relations in the same spirit as those of French republicans, although the institutional manifestation of that spirit took a different form in the particular polity of Turkey. The limitation of the emulation argument, however, is that it pronounces a historical fact without providing answers: it does not illuminate why the Turkish political elite did not adopt other Western practices of organising state-religion relations. Turkish reformers, after all, were very pragmatic and eclectic in their Western borrowing: the Civil Code (1926) was taken from Switzerland, the Penal Code (1926) from Italy, and most importantly, German political, economic, and military influence in the period was much more prevalent than that of any other country (Ortaylı, 1983). Why secularism was assumed *à la française*, therefore, remains to be explained.

In response to the emulation perspective, Kuru (2009, p. 29) holds that the Turkish reformers "preferred the French model to other alternatives because the historical conditions in both countries were relatively similar". In his comparative-historical study between the United States, France, and Turkey, Kuru argues that the latter two cases shared two commonalities. First, in each of them, there was "an *ancien régime* [that was] based on the alliance of monarchy and hegemonic religion". Second, this alliance was overthrown by a successful republican revolution. These two conditions set the foundations of what he calls "assertive secularism" (Kuru, 2009, p. 14). In Kuru's account, France and Turkey are comparable to other cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where republican revolutions against religiously allied *ancien régimes* produced anticlerical policies towards religion (such as in Mexico, Spain, Portugal, and the USSR). In the Kingdom of France and the Ottoman Empire too, given that Catholicism and Sunni Islam were institutionally and ideologically intertwined with the state apparatus, French and Turkish republicans came to "perceive the hegemonic religion as the source of justification for the declining monarchy and the potential supporter of its reestablishment" (Kuru, 2009, p. 23). That is why, in the "laicist trajectory ... religion is seen as an adversary and an impediment to modern politics" (Hurd, 2008, p. 23). In the cases of "passive secularism", by contrast, the religiously allied *ancien régime* and/or the republican revolution element must be missing. In the multi-confessional United States, for instance, the lack of an *ancien régime* dominated by a

single religious establishment allowed the political elite to be in much less frictional terms with religion during the national state building process, and more accommodating in their ensuing policymaking. The UK, as well as Sweden, Norway and Denmark, did not overthrow their monarchies with a republican revolution, so political polarisations based on a religious-secular divide were largely avoided.

Kuru's comparative account, which is an extended and systematised version of David Martin's (1978) work (to be elaborated in Chapter 2), provides a valid starting point¹¹. It rightly identifies the distinguishing feature of French and Turkish secularism as their rootedness in the successful republican confrontation against a monarchical tradition coupled with a dominant religion. This approach not only elucidates why Turkish national state builders identified specifically with their French counterparts and their experience of *laïcité*, but also why these countries implemented a more pronounced combination of separation/regulation towards Catholicism and Sunni Islam. My work proposes to further this agenda of exploring the multifaceted ways in which religion gets politicised in the contention for national-capitalist state building. The shortcoming of Kuru's framework, nevertheless, is that it functions predominantly at the level of ideas and ideologies. The central claim of his work is that "state policies toward religion are the result of ideological struggles" (Kuru, 2009, p. 10). Kuru stresses this point to oppose rational choice theories that reduce ideas to the immediate interests of actors, and to challenge his simplistic reading of historical materialism, which allegedly regards ideology as "a mere reflection of the economic structure and a means for the dominant economic class to exert power" (Kuru, 2009, p. 13). Although Kuru admits that "ideology and material conditions are separate but interrelated", his narrative gives supremacy to ideologies in the development of state-religion relations, and it almost always comprehends "material conditions" only in the limited sense of direct monetary interests (Kuru, 2009, pp. 22, 83, 135). The result is an account that pays little attention to material processes that are historically specific to the French and Turkish cases, such as their trajectories of class formation, position in the global system, minority integration, or the specificity of their religious-institutional configurations.

The primacy given to secularist ideas and ideologies, as seen in the emulation argument (and Kuru's response), is frequent in many accounts on French-Turkish

convergence as well as case studies that deal with these countries individually. Historical works often allude to the role of state builders' positivist/scientist mentalities as explanatory of secularisation. Accordingly, the ideologies of key secularising political figures (such as Gambetta, Ferry, Bert, Jaurès, and Briand in France; or Atatürk, İnönü, Bozkurt, Saraçoğlu, and Kaya in Turkey) are brought to the fore to explain why secularism happened in the way that it did. For instance on France, Stock-Morton (1988, p. 92) highlights that in the making of *laïcité*, "the influence of positivism ... extended from mid-century to the elaboration of the discipline of sociology". Eros (1955) talks of "the positivist generation of French Republicanism" ... who were "influenced by positivism ... when they formulated their political doctrines"; and Fedi (2003) critically points to the tendency in the literature "to exaggerate the ascendancy of ... positivism on the actors and thinkers of the Third Republic". Likewise on Turkey, Zürcher (2010, p. 214) writes that the Young Turks "primary concern was to instil a positivist mentality and worldview in the Ottoman public". Hanioglu (2011, p. 59) concurs that "like many disciples of scientism, Mustafa Kemal saw no problem in importing the culture ... of Europe" to endorse *laiklik*; and Lewis (1961, p. 231) concludes that "positivist sociology ... profoundly influenced the ... development of secularist radicalism in Turkey". Examples can be multiplied. There is no denying the rising influence of positivism/scientism in the long nineteenth century to affecting intellectuals, elites, as well as state building processes (Chadwick, 1993). However, these worldviews do not prescribe concrete blueprints as to how to organise state-religion relations; and even if they did, it is methodologically questionable to assume a one-to-one correspondence between philosophical doctrines and social practice (after all, who needs sociology if the world is a mere epiphenomenon of systematised ideational frameworks?)¹² As the multiplicity of geographically specific institutional configurations of secularism suggest (Madeley, 2003; Martin, 1978), the "actually existing" experience of secularisation is too complex, multidimensional, and variegated to be explained by an overarching *Weltanschauung* (world-view). To overcome the inherent idealism and voluntarism in these perspectives, comparative-historical sociology may offer the tools (to be discussed below) to trace the emergence and implementation of such secularising mentalities in relation to larger sociopolitical transformations and struggles (Gorski, 2005).

1.1.2. Understanding Divergence

Regarding the divergence between French and Turkish secularism, another type of idealism is generally at work, although this time with deterministic rather than voluntaristic implications. Here, an underlying theme in the literature is to make reference to essential religious differences between Catholicism and Sunni Islam. Simplistic versions of this approach rely almost exclusively on religious philosophies, whereas more nuanced ones seek also to underscore the enduring influence of past institutional configurations. Altınordu (2012, p. 69) states that social scientific accounts that defend the incommensurability or incomparability of Christian and Muslim traditions may ironically come from scholars “who depart from nearly opposite normative-political positions”: those who put forward rather simplistic Eurocentric religious-civilisational analyses (Huntington, 1996; B. Lewis, 1993), or those that seek to positively underscore the uniqueness and subjectivity of the Islamic tradition (Ardıç, 2012; Mardin, 1995). In any case, the argument rests on “inherent distinctions between certain religions and religious communities” and “direct causal impacts of these religious differences on politics” (Kuru, 2009, p. 17). While the focus is on a combination of religious doctrines and/or institutions as independent variables, the tendency is to overlook the social forces/formations behind those ideas and institutions.

In this viewpoint, unlike Christianity, Islam is understood as philosophically and institutionally incompatible with the separation of religious and temporal realms. Gellner (1981, p. 1), for instance, puts forward that “Islam is the blueprint of a social order” that allows no room “for an internal separation of society into two parts”. Kazancıgil (1992, p. 33) concurs that “in Islamic countries, religious and secular spheres are not doctrinally separated” as in Christianity. “Islam is not merely a system of belief and worship, a compartment of life”, adds Lewis (1993, p. 4). “It is rather the whole of life, and its rules include civil, criminal, and even what we would call constitutional law”. Toprak (1998, pp. 20-22) speaks of the “special nature of Islam” as “a religious doctrine” as well as “a political philosophy” and “legal system”, which makes it “a political religion *par excellence*” that defines the “totality of ... spiritual and temporal existence”. Ardıç (2012) reproduces the same insight by referring to Islam as a “religio-political system where there is the fusion of religious and political functions in one single body, unlike

Christianity". "In the Christian lands", by contrast, "the State and the Church have emerged as two separate and autonomous entities" (Heper, 1991, p. 42). Whereas "God is Caesar" in Islam, God and Caesar are distinct figures in Christianity, and this means that "the separation and recurring clashes between church and state that typify Western civilization" is unique and cannot be replicated in other civilisations (Huntington, 1996, p. 70). Lewis (1993, p. 179) confirms: "the notion that religion and political authority, church and state, are different and that they can or should be separated is, in a profound sense, Christian".

Why French *laïcité* features separation and Turkish *laiklik* highlights regulation is explained against this religious background. According to Mango (1999, p. 394), for instance, "French *laïcisme* could not be applied logically to a Muslim society", since "the Koran is not only a compendium of moral principles; it is also the constitution of the state". Özek (1960, p. 15), expounds a similar view on Turkey: "given that Islamic theory envisages the unity of political and religious authority, their separation would be inconsistent with Islam". "In Islam", Berkes (1964, p. 7) continues, "there were no concepts of church and state as specifically religious or political institutions. Religion and state were believed to be fused together; the state was conceived as the embodiment of religion, and religion as the essence of the state". Akgönül (2008a, p. 15) joins the chorus by writing that "as was the case in France, the will to relegate religion to the private sphere" was manifest in Turkish state builders, "although that process was particularly difficult in the context of Islam", given that it is a "communal religion *par excellence*". As a result of these differences, Mardin (1993, p. 191) notes, "in Turkey, laicism amounted to more than the official disestablishment of religion, since Muslims did not dispose of an autonomous religious institution such as the Catholic Church which could carry its religious functions independently of the state". The literature is replete with such examples.

In response to this "propensity to posit radical incommensurability" between Christianity and Islam, Altınordu (2012, p. 69) argues that "detailed and systematic comparative-historical studies facilitate a more nuanced approach". He adds: "Historical comparisons ... assume neither identity nor incommensurability". They "pay attention to doctrinal, organizational, and historical differences but are open to the exploration of

structural similarities across cases that belong to different religious traditions ... The back-and-forth between the drive to compare, theorize, and generalize, on the one hand, and the deep attention to historical context and specificity on the other hand marks the difficult but productive endeavor of historically contextualized comparisons". The present work subscribes to this comparative-historical framework. Differences between religious-ideational frameworks and institutional path dependencies are crucial in understanding the development of secularism in different countries, including France and Turkey. However, a purely ideational-institutional epistemology runs the risk of taking religions as monolithic, unchanging, essential, and ahistorical entities, which inevitably leads to deterministic conclusions regarding secularisation patterns (such as equating Christianity with "separation", and Islam with "regulation").

In reality, different sects of Christianity and Islam have historically and geographically interacted with political power in very different ways, which cannot simply be reduced to their doctrines or tautologically explained with their institutional relationship with the state. The stress on religious difference as an all-encompassing explanatory factor fails to account for the uniqueness of France and Turkey within their respective religious geographies (Lapidus, 1996; Madeley, 2003). Given that no other country in Christian and Muslim cases embraced such a strict separation/regulation permutation as France and Turkey, religious difference alone cannot be regarded as an isolated independent variable. Secondly, that France came to prioritise separation was not written in stone. For more than a whole century before the 1905 Law on Separation, France gave precedence to ("interior") regulation, which was promulgated by the Concordat of 1801 that Napoléon signed with the Catholic Church. The Concordat recognised Catholicism as "the religion of the great majority of the French citizens" and stipulated state remuneration of Catholic ecclesiastics on condition that they take an oath of loyalty to the French constitution. This history indicates that separation in France was not a teleological/theological result of its religious background, but the work of contingent sociopolitical struggles that dominated the long nineteenth century.

Çitak (2004) and Kuru (2009), both critical of accounts based on religion (referring to them as "dogmatic" and "civilisational" perspectives), seek to provide alternative explanations for the divergence of France and Turkish laicism. Çitak (2004, p.

10) holds that divergence is the outcome of the different ways in which French and Turkish nationalisms, in their historical formation, engaged with religion. In her argument, one of the two main trajectories of French nationalism (namely, the right-wing variant) was closely intertwined with Catholicism, whereas in Turkey, Sunni Islam was denied any integral part among the constituents of Turkish nationalism. Consequently, French nationalism did not perceive Catholicism as a threat but as a negotiating partner for the Third Republic, while in Turkish nationalism, Sunni Islam was seen as the Republic's main adversary (Çitak, 2004, p. 268). The result is separation in France, which gives Catholicism its relative autonomy, and regulation in Turkey, which highlights Sunni Islam's surveillance. Çitak's account is problematic on three grounds. First, it severely downplays the Islamic elements and partialities in the building blocks of Turkish nationalism and secularism since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 (more on this in Chapter 6). Second, it understates the fact that *laïcité* was based on the absolute neutrality of the state, and it sought to protect the liberty of conscience in France "against the power and public exposure of Catholic faith", especially from intransigent forces such as Pope Pius X (Weil, 2004, p. 143). Finally, even if the argument on the different trajectories of nationalism were valid, it still seeks to illuminate the divergence of French and Turkish secularism through a purely ideational indicator, namely nationalism, with almost no regard to the historical sociological conditions in which it developed.

Kuru (2009, pp. 32-34), on his part, approaches the issue of divergence only in passing, and explains it through two socio-institutional indicators: the level of social embeddedness/hegemony of religion under the old regime (lower in the Kingdom of France, higher in the Ottoman Empire) and the level of democratic participation in national state building (higher in France, lower in Turkey). In France, given the hierarchical organisation of Catholicism and its relative remoteness from society, local anticlerical sentiments and practices were much more widespread. In the Ottoman Empire, by contrast, diverse manifestations of popular Islam, locally embedded through Sufi orders, generated no such anticlerical tradition. As an eventual result, in their national state building periods, French republicans could lean on democratic mechanisms to gain significant social support for their secularism (which was more "indigenous" socially), whereas Turkish republicans needed an authoritarian structure to implement their relatively unpopular secularism, which pursued Westernisation (Kuru,

2009, p. 33). Although Kuru exaggerates Catholicism's "remoteness" from society, he is justified in underlining the higher levels of individual secularisation in France than in Turkey, which one can argue to have provided a stronger popular basis for *laïcité* (resting on separation) than *laiklik* (hinging on regulation). However, Kuru's line of reasoning seems to be resorting back to an explanation that isolates religious differences. Social embeddedness of religion as worldview and institutions, in their differing levels in these polities, is taken as a given and self-explanatory, where their "extra-religious" material foundations are not considered. Kuru and Çitak's criticisms, therefore, share a similar theoretical shortcoming.

1.1.3. The Secularisation Paradigm

Leaving the territory of France and Turkey for the larger secularisation debate, one observes that since the 1980s, the literature featured constructive revisions of the secularisation paradigm (Chaves, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1981; Goldstein, 2009; Gorski, 2000a, 2003b; Gorski & Altınordu, 2008; Lechner, 1991; Tschannen, 1991, 1992; Yamane, 1997) as well as harsh criticisms that advocated its burial (Hadden, 1987; Stark, 1999; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985; Swatos & Christiano, 1999; Warner, 1993). It is impossible to do justice to all the nuances of this debate in a brief review. Instead, my focus will be on the theoretical contributions of the secularisation literature and how it can be furthered as a research agenda. In its classical formulation in the "old paradigm", secularisation refers to the "diminution in the social significance of religion", a structural loss of its influence in "the working of the social system" (Wilson, 1982, pp. 149-150). Berger's (1967, p. 107) definition, likewise, views secularisation as a "process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols". Luckmann (1967, pp. 39-40) concurs by construing the concept as "the shrinking relevance of the values institutionalised in ... religion, for the integration and legitimation of everyday life in modern society". Similar interpretations are present in the works of the "old paradigm" scholars (some of whom are structural functionalists), where modernisation (through a combination of differentiation, industrialisation, rationalisation, urbanisation, societalisation, and pluralisation) presents itself as the independent variable that drives secularisation (Bellah, 1970; Fenn, 1978; Luhmann, 1977; Martin, 1978; Parsons, 1971). Four clarifications are necessary to meet the allegations of critics,

and to challenge the *idées reçues* (common preconceptions) regarding the secularisation paradigm. These concern disappearance, normativity, linearity, and individuality.

First, almost none of these theorists explicitly predict the complete disappearance of religion (Gorski, 2003b, p. 141). Gorski's detailed assessment responds to the oversimplification reproduced by scholars like Hadden (1987, p. 605), who claim that for secularisation theorists, "it is not necessary to establish a timetable for the disappearance of religion. In due course it will happen". Second, despite *ad hominem* arguments in that direction, secularisation theorists do not normatively defend religion's death; in fact, evidence suggests that some of the central figures (such as Martin, Wilson, and Berger) are rather disillusioned by religion's societal retreat (Bruce, 1992, pp. 1-2). Fox (2013, p. 27) is thus grossly off the mark when he names, in his introductory textbook no less, "neo-atheists" like Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens as within the secularisation paradigm. Third, the secularisation perspective does not propose "unilinear theories of religious decline" (as claimed by Swatos & Christiano, 1999, p. 216) that imply an inevitable evolutionary path from the sacred to the profane. On the contrary, Goldstein's (2009, p. 175) close study of the old paradigm identifies "cyclical", "dialectical", and "paradoxical" readings of secularisation; and that "there is broad agreement among members of the old paradigm that secularization is not a linear process". Finally, rather than having their "primary concern ... with individual piety" to assert a necessary deterioration of "belief in the supernatural" (as put forward by Stark, 1999, pp. 247, 251), scholars of the secularisation paradigm commonly prioritise a social-structural level of analysis. Wilson (1982, p. 150), for instance, underscores that the paradigm "does not ... suggest that most individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion"; and Lechner (1991, pp. 1106-1107) indicates that secularisation is "a theory of societal change", which "does not primarily address religious behavior of individuals". Therefore, "the level of spirituality of the masses is not decisive at all".

The debate between the "old paradigm" and the "new paradigm" continues to revolve around the degree, levels, and measurement of secularisation as well as related issues such as normativity/reflexivity, and decline/change (Demerath, 2007, pp. 61-65).

Drawing on a neoclassical economic framework and utilising data on individual religious participation and belief, the “new paradigm” (or the “religious economies” school) argues that the end of religious monopolies (that is, state religions) gave way to increased competition between faiths, which boosted “consumer demand”. Given the resurgence of religious vitality (particularly in the US), they hold, the concept of secularisation does not pass the test of history (Finke & Stark, 1988; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994). As Gorski and Altinordu (2008, p. 58) summarise, “because it defines secularization as a decline in religious demand, and because it defines religious demand as a constant, the religious economies model simply defines secularization out of existence in much the same way that neoclassical economics defines irrational action out of existence”. Yet despite the polemical nature of the debate, the secularisation controversy partly tones down when the participants distinguish between individual (micro), organisational (meso), and societal (macro) levels of analysis. According to Dobbelaere (2004, pp. 17-43), the first level is about persons’ belief and practice of religion, the second level concerns the modernisation of religious institutions themselves, and finally, the last level denotes the significance of religion in sociopolitical structures. There is a relative consensus on secularisation at the sociopolitical/structural level. Stark (1999, p. 252), for instance, famously conceded (in his article titled “Secularization R.I.P.”, no less) that at the macro level, one can meaningfully talk about “a decline in the social power of once-dominant religious institutions whereby other social institutions, especially political and educational institutions, have escaped from prior religious domination. If this were all that secularization means, there would be nothing to argue about”. Swatos and Christiano (1999, p. 214) agreed that the concept of secularisation is rather “uncontroversial” if it is used “to describe institutions that once were controlled by a religious organization and now are not”.

My dissertation operates at that –relatively uncontroversial– terrain of macrosociological analysis¹³. By examining the French and Turkish cases of national state building, it intends to contribute to the comprehension of how secularisation at the sociopolitical level takes place. Functioning particularly at this level, systematised revisions of the “old paradigm” deduce three principal conceptual tools to make sense of secularisation, which I take as the point of departure in my investigation. As introduced earlier, these are “differentiation”, “societalisation”, and “rationalisation” (Wallis & Bruce,

1991, 1992). “Differentiation” describes the process whereby “sectors of society which historically were controlled by the church begin gradually to emerge as separate and autonomous spheres” (Davie, 2007, p. 49). “Societalisation” denotes the historical shift from local community (*gemeinschaft*), where “religion has traditionally celebrated and legitimated local life”, to society (*gesellschaft*), namely a system that “relies less on the inculcation of shared moral order and more on the utilization of efficient technical means of eliciting and monitoring appropriate behaviour” (Wallis & Bruce, 1992, p. 13). Finally, “rationalisation” in the macrosociological sense describes the development of modern social structures as “a centralized, rationally articulated system, increasingly organized and consciously planned”, and “dominated by instrumental values” (Wilson, 1976, p. 264).

While providing a valid starting point, the shortcoming of these conceptualisations is that they interpret secularisation predominantly as a structural-functional necessity of modernisation rather than the conscious work of social actors. As Bruce (2009, p. 145) contends, “the explanation of secularisation” through these concepts “owes more to the unintended consequences of diffuse social changes than to the deliberate actions of people promoting a secularist agenda”. Wilson’s (1982, pp. 148-149) analysis, likewise, takes the deliberate actions of people as “at best, marginal to the momentum of the process of secularization”. The distinction here is between what Dobbelaere (1981, p. 7) calls “latent” and “manifest” processes of secularisation¹⁴. The latent variety refers to long-term structural transformations (such as industrialisation and urbanisation) that produce secularisation. The manifest kind indicates the agency of individuals and social groups to deliberately transfer certain societal functions and capabilities from religious to secular authority (such as in education, politics, and so on). Bruce and Wilson’s remarks suggest that manifest processes of secularisation constitute a neglected theme in the literature. The paradigm tends “to explain macro-societal secularization in a vague and often tautological fashion, as the result of other macro-societal trends” (Gorski, 2003b, p. 117). It views secularisation mostly as the outcome of “deep-seated social processes that occur beneath the feet of historical actors and without their knowledge”, while leaving “no room for the possibility ... that secularization was (also) a political program that was consciously pursued by certain groups or organizations” (Gorski, 2005, p. 176). The comparative-historical study of “manifest”

processes of secularisation in their structural context may hold the key for furthering the agenda of the paradigm.

As a fertile research program towards that direction, Gorski proposes “historicising the secularisation debate” and empirically/comparatively demonstrating the “sociopolitical conflicts” inherent in the making of secularisation (Gorski, 2000a, 2003b, 2005). The call for historicisation is in response to the prevalence of ahistorical methods in both the “secularisation” and “religious economies” paradigms. “Despite the historical character of both schools’ object of study, neither is particularly historical in its approach”, nor do they pay “much attention to politics” (Gorski, 2003b, p. 115; 2005, p. 170). According to Gorski (2003b, p. 122) historicising the secularisation debate involves, among other things, adopting a “longer-range ... historical perspective”, engaging more closely with “historical sources and literatures”, and viewing secularisation “as a contingent outcome of particular events involving particular actors”. Focusing on historical events and actors “would mean treating secularization as a conceptual variable, rather than a developmental trend, and explaining it in contingent and historical terms instead of teleological ... ones” (Gorski, 2005, p. 175). Historicising, therefore, goes hand in hand with empirically examining the contentious nature of secularisation, which is encapsulated by what Gorski calls the “sociopolitical conflict model” (SPCM). The SPCM takes “sociopolitical conflict as the master variable in the secularization process, and changes in church-state relations as a key part of the outcome” (Gorski, 2003b, p. 115). It “provides a concrete explanation for macro-societal secularization” by focusing on the “battles between religious and secularist movements for control of particular institutions and sectors” (Gorski, 2003b, pp. 117-118). With a view to contributing to and furthering the agenda of the secularisation literature, my work responds to this call by historicising sociopolitical secularisation in the French and Turkish cases and empirically studying its contentious/contingent lineages.

1.2. Towards a Comparative-Historical Sociology of Secularisation

The review of the particular literature on French and Turkish convergence/divergence as well as the general debate on secularisation reveals the

frequent tendency to view secularisation through voluntaristic or deterministic lenses. Voluntarism manifests itself often in the overemphasis on the ideologies of rulers (e.g. French/Turkish historiography) or in taking the religious “demands” of individuals as the master variable (e.g. religious economies paradigm). Determinism, on the other hand, is present in inflexibly established religious path-dependencies (e.g. civilisational analyses) or in the insistence that modernisation will automatically bring about a diminishment in the social significance of religion (e.g. classical secularisation paradigm). In order to surmount this dichotomy, comparative-historical sociology may help develop a more nuanced approach to secularisation¹⁵. This is because “where secularization theory is concerned, ... comparison, history, and politics are notable mainly for their absence”, and the comparative study of “cross-national differences ... is one area in which historical sociology ... could contribute to the study of secularization” (Gorski, 2003b, p. 117; 2005, p. 176). After all, comparative-historical sociology has made, and continues to make, significant contributions to the social scientific study of religion (for an overview, see Altinordu, 2012; Gorski, 2005; J. A. Hall, 2007). It has produced, among others, promising studies on the influence of religious doctrines and practices in shaping nationalist ideologies (Gorski, 2000b; A. W. Marx, 2003; Zubrzycki, 2006), instituting the national state (Fulbrook, 1983; Gorski, 2003a; Ikegami, 1995), the emergence of social movements (Smith, 1996; Young, 2002), the development of capitalism (Tawney, 1998; M. Weber, 2001), and the creation of welfare structures (Kahl, 2005). Still, “the comparative and historical approach never penetrated to the paradigmatic core” of the social scientific study of religion, namely “the theory of secularization” (Gorski, 2005, p. 176). My work hopes to contribute to taking a step in that direction. Before tackling the research problem in Chapter 2, the next two subsections seek, respectively, to expound my recontextualisation of secularisation within contentious national state building processes (1.2.1), offer a preliminary framework for the macrosociological inquiry of religion and secularisation (1.2.2), and lay out the methodological and epistemological foundations of the study (1.2.3).

1.2.1. Secularisation and National State Building

As discussed above, the most significant shortcoming of the “old paradigm” is the disregard for historical actors and events in the examination of secularisation. To remedy

such neglect of sociopolitical agency, the primary task at hand is to be able to “put a face on” the three principal secularising processes of “differentiation”, “societalisation”, and “rationalisation”. Accordingly, I propose placing these three processes in the framework of the contention for national state building; more particularly, re-operationalising them in terms of the statecraft strategies of “separation” and “regulation”. This endeavour requires taking a closer look at the meaning of the trio. In the sociology of religion literature, sociopolitical secularisation is conceptualised above all as a process of “differentiation”, which constitutes the core of the paradigm (Casanova, 1994; Davie, 2007; Gorski, 2000a; Tschannen, 1991; Yamane, 1997). Differentiation has its roots in the structural functionalism of Parsons, Bellah, and Luhmann, where it refers to an evolutionary process in which a social “system, structure, or unit” becomes more complex, especially through modernising forces, to get divided “into two or more subsystems, substructures, or smaller units which differ in both structure and function for the larger system” (Goldstein, 2009, pp. 159, 164). As a result, religion “becomes progressively differentiated from other domains of social life, eventually emerging as a very specific institutional domain within a new type of social structure made up of several such institutions” (Tschannen, 1991, p. 400). Religion “loses its overarching claim” and “becomes one institution alongside other institutions” (Dobbelaere, 1981, p. 11). Through differentiation, according to Chaves (1994, pp. 756-757), there is a decline in religious authority, namely in the “influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural”, and in the “capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres”. Wilson (1966, p. 200) concludes that before going through differentiation, “religion once provided legitimacy for secular authority; endorsed, at times even sanctioned, public policy; sustained with a battery of threats and blandishments the agencies of social control ... The loss of these functions is the core of the secularization thesis”.

Parallel with differentiation, macro-level secularisation is also a process of “societalization” and “rationalization”, where local and religiously organised traditional community gives way to a complex network of nationally organised social structures – namely, to “the emergence of modern states coordinated through massive, impersonal bureaucracies” (Wallis & Bruce, 1991, p. 5). Through “societalisation”, Wilson (1982, p. 154) maintains, “life is increasingly enmeshed and organised, not locally but societally

(that society being most evidently ... the nation state)". "The process of state-formation" is a "significant element" of the transformation towards the establishment of "large-scale, ongoing, internally co-ordinated, complex social systems". An inherent component of "societalisation", Wilson adds, is "rationalisation", which affects "not only the economic system", but also the "political organization of social life". Rationalisation "has increasingly become the conscious goal of modern states ... The political tendency follows the economic in the ... further rationalization of the various departments of" society (Wilson, 1982, p. 157). Regarding the "economy, polity, law, education ... the solutions proposed are not only non-religious, but solutions that depend on technical expertise and bureaucratic organization" (Wilson, 1982, p. 177). That is to say, societalisation is coterminous with the emergence of "a centralized, rationally articulated system, ... organized and consciously planned. It is increasingly dominated by instrumental values" (Wilson, 1976, p. 264). That process of societalisation-rationalisation "manifests itself" also "as a transformation of social control, which loses its moral underpinnings and becomes technical and anonymous", and "in the growing bureaucratization of social interactions" (Tschannen, 1991, p. 399).

Defined through these three master variables, it is not difficult to discern the link between secularisation and the ascendance of the modern state apparatus in autonomy from religious authority as a "differentiated", "societally" (that is, nationally) organised, and "rational" political entity (Tilly, 1975, p. 70). My conceptualisation of "separation" and "regulation" as statecraft strategies offers to crystallise the role of sociopolitical actors in bringing about secularisation. Through separation, national state builders consciously and manifestly "differentiate" the sphere of religious authority from that of the state, while transferring certain societal functions and capabilities from the religious to the "societally" organised and "rationalised" secular-national sphere (Monod, 2007, pp. 54-55). Through regulation, the "societal" and "rational" bureaucratic apparatus exercises supervision over religious institutions so as to maintain the demarcation of their remaining field of activity from sociopolitical influence (Campiche, 2003, p. 9). The two secularising strategies are not contradictory, but complementary. As "separation" gradually deprives religion of its extensive status to transform into a differentiated institution among others, it follows that the activities of religious institutions become subject to some level of "regulation", like any other organisation in civil society. "Separation" and "regulation" are

thus among the essential governmental strategies to build and consolidate centralised, autonomous, and nationally organised state infrastructural power/capacity. The historical sociological literature on “state infrastructural power” may help further clarify the meaning of these strategies.

In its general sense, “state infrastructural power” (used interchangeably here with “state capacity” and “state power”) is defined as the central governmental capability to rule, monitor, and transform society (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008; Besley & Persson, 2008; Mann, 1984; Soifer, 2008). In analytical distinction from “despotic power” (referring to authoritarian control), state infrastructural power is the capability “of the state actually to penetrate civil society”, “to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”, and to “centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” (Mann, 1984, pp. 189, 190). The literature on state capacity is rich and variegated, focusing on coercive, extractive, and administrative aspects of governmental power (such as military, taxation, efficiency of institutions), as well as its domestic/foreign territorial capabilities and various pedagogical effects on society (Gorski, 2003a; Hendrix, 2010; Soifer, 2008). The underlying premise of these works is the conceptualisation of the state in its national form as the territorial, centralised, autonomous, differentiated, and monopolising political organisation. According to Bäck and Hadenius (2008, p. 3), the necessary condition for state infrastructural power is “the capacity of the state organs to maintain *sovereignty* ... over a geographical territory. This implies that the organs of the state uphold monopolistic control” over different aspects of social life, allowing “no competing power centers exercise control” (including religious). This is to say that nationally defined state capacity “presumes a substantial centralization of public activities ... The central state institutions either exercise *sovereignty* within their geographical territory, or they do not. *Sovereign* state organs possess a basic capacity of supremacy, that is, they are able to hold competing power centers at bay” (Bäck & Hadenius, 2008, p. 15) (my emphases). Developing internal/external sovereign capacity, therefore, requires territorially centralised national states to differentiate themselves from other major power groupings “socio-spatially” and “organisationally” (Mann, 1984, pp. 198-199; 1993, p. 59), as well as in the articulation of their source of legitimacy (Poggi, 2001, p. 82; vom Hau, 2008, p. 335).

Further operationalised in view of this literature, “separation” and “regulation” designate strategies to establish the sovereign capacity of the national state vis-à-vis competing sources of power exercised and/or legitimated by religious authority (Chaves, 1994). Studying the contention for state building, especially in cases like France and Turkey where religion gets highly politicised in the process, would make visible the actors, groups, and powers that influence the course of secularisation. My investigation will demonstrate that secularisation in the French and Turkish republics was key in consolidating the sovereignty of nationally organised infrastructural power through the severance (from the state) and supervision (by the state) of religious institutions and influences in at least four interrelated spheres. I classify these spheres as “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional”. “Legal-institutional” refers to the secularisation of politics, policymaking, constitutions, laws, judicial mechanisms, and other bureaucratic bodies. “Socio-educational” denotes not only the secularisation of schools and instruction, but also a wide array of other fields of socialisation with normative-pedagogical influence (involving morality, birth, death, marriage, association, and so on). “Symbolic-ideological” corresponds to the shift of sources and avatars of sociopolitical legitimacy from religious-traditional to secular-national ones (such as anthems, flags, emblems, monuments, garments, and so on). Finally, “property-distributional” marks the nationalisation of religious land and property, and the public provision of related goods and services (health, charity, and so on). These four spheres are intimately interconnected and partly overlapping. However, secularisation of one domain does not automatically bring about the same result in another. Instead, given its contentious and negotiated character, building sovereign state power through secularisation often occurs in an imbalanced and dialectical fashion (Goldstein, 2009; Gorski, 2000a).

That is to say, according to Warren S. Goldstein (2009, p. 158), “rather than ... occurring in a straight line”, secularisation “is driven by conflict, tension, and antagonisms between opposing forces. In this pattern, each movement is followed by a countermovement; they can occur sequentially, simultaneously, or take place on different levels of society. As a result of such a process, there are advances as well as reversals”. Gorski (2000a, p. 159), likewise, puts forward a “dialectical model of religious change” where “differentiation” and “de-differentiation” may occur simultaneously instead

of following a unilinear logic. That there is nothing unilinear, inevitable, or irreversible about the progress of differentiation, and secularisation in general, is firmly emphasised in the literature (Alexander, 1990, pp. 11-13; Chaves, 1994, p. 751; Yamane, 1997, p. 121). This is because secularisation is contingent upon the course of sociopolitical struggles. It is “not a mechanical process to be imputed to impersonal and abstract forces”. It is “activated by persons, groups and quasi-groups who manifestly or latently, laicize or sacralize social institutions” (Dobbelaere, 1981, pp. 69, 150). According to Fenn (1978), secularisation involves a sociopolitical contention over where to draw the boundaries of the religious; it is “a drawn-out battle between the social actors who wish to expand the domain of ‘the sacred,’ and those who wish to restrict it” (Tschannen, 1991, p. 399). Chaves (1994, p. 752) agrees: “secularization occurs, or not, as the result of social and political conflicts between those social actors who would enhance or maintain religion’s social significance and those who would reduce it ... Understanding and explaining secularization thus requires attending to these conflicts”. Once this is accepted, the evolutionary/unilinear connotation of the concept of secularisation disappears, and the possibility of “desecularisation” or “resecularisation” becomes evident (Dobbelaere, 1981, p. 69).

1.2.2. Macrosociological Inquiry of Religion and Secularisation: A Preliminary Framework

The analytical tools of “separation” and “regulation” may contribute to empirically explaining how macro-level secularisation takes place, and which social agents are historically involved in the process. But they do not necessarily say much about the sociopolitical conditions in which these strategies are put to use. As Gorski cautions, the SPCM (of the sociology of religion literature) is inadequate in accounting for the various macro-level determinants of contentious politics. On its own, the SPCM fails to analyse “the roots of the sociopolitical conflicts themselves”. It rather “treats these conflicts as a given and focuses on their dynamics and effects”, but “says nothing about their underlying causes, about the ... conditions of possibility for the emergence of political religions and secular ideologies” (Gorski, 2003b, p. 119). To remedy this limitation, the SPCM must be supplemented by the conceptual/practical toolkit of comparative-historical sociology. For the macrosociological inquiry of secularisation as a

contentious/dialectical process, a socio-politically embedded conceptualisation of religion, sensitive to historical-material processes, is fundamental.

Antonio Gramsci's operationalisation of religion, which is a relatively less studied area of his work, provides a sophisticated vision to make sense of religion's politicisation in various ways (Adamson, 2013; Barbier, 1987; Billings, 1990; Caceres, 1988; De Rosa, Letendre, & Poulat, 1978; Fulton, 1987; Gramsci, 1971; Maduro, 1977; Mansueto, 1988; Nesti, 1975; Portelli, 1974). According to Gramsci, the starting point for the definition of religion has two dimensions: an "active conception of the world" that has a supernatural referent in interpreting the natural world and social relationships¹⁶, and the existence of an institutional mechanism that organises "the relationship" between society and the deity/deities (Portelli, 1974, p. 22). Building on these preliminary qualifications, Gramsci's view of religion is "socio-historically grounded and is shaped by his concrete analysis of past and present events, power struggles, and the development of ... power alliances" (Fulton, 1987, p. 214). In other words, a Gramscian analysis requires the "examination of the historical function of each religion", studying it "as a particular form of ideology" (Portelli, 1974, p. 35). Religion as *such* is a category that has little to offer without the in-depth analysis of particular religious ideologies and institutions in given historical junctures. Religions for Gramsci "are not fixed entities but dynamic forces that are constantly changing as they both shape and respond to a wide complex of historical events and processes" (Adamson, 2013, p. 471). This means the same religion may be articulated in dissimilar ways by various groups in a given social formation, for "there are different religious forms according to the degree and kind of power religion exercises in society" (Fulton, 1987, p. 214).

As Gramsci (1971, p. 420) puts it, "every religion ... is in reality a multiplicity of distinct and often contradictory religions". Religion may be mobilised as a force of social opposition or political control (Maduro, 1977, p. 362); subordinate and ruling classes may enunciate religion differently. Denoting the former case, "religion of the people" refers to the spontaneous, fragmentary, and incoherent beliefs, morals, and practices functioning at the "commonsensical" level, embedded in the daily lives and experiences of subordinate groups. "Religion of the intellectuals", by contrast, provides a systematised, elaborated, and unified "theological" articulation of those popular beliefs

organised to serve the interests of dominant classes. Here, religion is “a source of political power” with hierarchical ecclesiastical institutions reproducing relations of hegemony, coercion, and exploitation (Fulton, 1987, pp. 204-205; Portelli, 1974, p. 27). Class struggles/alliances and state transformations are thus central to Gramsci’s understanding of religion. As Maduro (1977, pp. 364, 362) summarises, for Gramsci, “the place of religion in the historical bloc” (that is, “an organic bond between the existing classes and the ideological-political superstructure”), “its social ties with each class, as well as the background and internal configuration of the religion studied, constitute important items which should not be disregarded”.

Inspired by Gramsci’s materially and historically oriented approach to religion and sociopolitical power, I propose identifying “internal/external” and “religious/extra-religious” sets of determinants that may prove influential in shaping the course of secularisation in national state building processes. Regarding the first pair, as Gramsci (1971, pp. 182, 264) underlines, examining the “organic relations” between national and extra-national forces is crucial. As Hobden (1998, p. 5) clarifies, “international relations intertwine with ... internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations”. This is because the national state is “both ... in competition with other domestic social ... [groups]”, and “with other states ... in different territories”. Concerning the second pair, “religious” factors affecting secularisation are those that are directly related to the organisation of religions in a polity (including institutions, doctrines, and groups). “Extra-religious” refers to major determinants of national state building (which may be internal or external) that are not strictly religious, but interact with religions in various ways (such as class conflict/alliances, and war/diplomacy). Placing the two sets of variables in a matrix, Table 1 offers an outline (which is not an exhaustive list of determinants) that could serve as a starting point for the macrosociological inquiry of secularisation in national state building processes. How “separation” and “regulation” are implemented (or not) may be influenced by factors such as these.

Table 1: Possible Determinants Influencing the Course of Secularisation in National State Building

	1. Internal	2. External
A. "Extra-religious"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Class struggles/alliances • State making (civil and intra-bureaucratic conflicts) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defensive/Offensive warmaking and diplomacy
B. "Religious"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominant religion as doctrine and institution • Religious minorities and degree of pluralism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extra-national entanglements of dominant religion • Extra-national connections of religious minorities

Each of these intersections evokes questions for empirical investigation that may contribute to "historicising secularisation":

- **A1:** Expressed in class terms, national state building denotes a historically specific mode of sociopolitical transformation warranting "capitalist societalisation", where bourgeois "form of property relations" and "form of control over the means of production" is established, and "the successful installation of a legal and political framework in which the free development of capitalist property relations is assured" (Jessop, 1990, p. 7; Stedman Jones, 1977, p. 86). In a given polity, therefore, how do the dominant and minority religions get entangled in the geographically specific class struggles/alliances revolving around bourgeois-national state building? Do religions play a part in civil conflict and intra-bureaucratic fragmentation that affect state making?
- **B1:** In the contention for bourgeois-national state building, how do the doctrines and the modes of organisation of the dominant religion vis-à-vis the state become pertinent? In what ways do the dominant religious institution and its members get involved? What is the degree of pluralism in this process, especially with regard to the state's relationship with minorities (Martin, 1978; McLeod, 1995)?
- **A2:** In addition to class struggles/alliances and domestic infrastructural power, the establishment of national states is determined also through their historical lineages of warmaking and diplomacy (Tilly, 1990). In what ways do religions become a factor in interstate conflict? For instance, does religion become an element of "cultural defence" in times of foreign invasion and "external domination" (Bruce, 2002, pp. 31-34; Martin, 1978, pp. 55, 107)? Does it (doctrinally and institutionally) underpin offensive strategies such as colonial expansion? Are stipulations on religious groups featured in international treaties?
- **B2:** Related to A2, does the dominant religion have an extra-national disposition that has a bearing on domestic/foreign policymaking? Some examples can be

the Catholic Church having an influence on national politics, or the Islamic Caliphate, seeking to wield power beyond national borders. Moreover, do religious minorities have (or are seen to have) extra-national entanglements (such as external religious centers or political powers)?

Deriving from these questions, it is possible to deduce two “extra-religious” (and partly overlapping) master processes impacting the course of secularisation: 1) building internal/external national-sovereign state capacity, and 2) geographically divergent trajectories of class formation/struggles. The first refers to constructing state infrastructural capacity vis-à-vis domestic and foreign contenders. Tilly (1985, p. 181) calls the internal contention “state making” and the external one “war making”, referring respectively to “eliminating or neutralizing rivals” inside or outside the national territory. The second process denotes the conflicts and alliances between social classes in the establishment of the bourgeois-national state, that is, “the varied political roles” played by various classes “in the transformation from agrarian societies ... to modern industrial ones” (Moore Jr., 1966, p. viii). The distinction between the two processes corresponds in general terms to the “territorial” and “capitalist” dimensions of power, which are ultimately interrelated but not analytically reducible to each other (Arrighi, 1994, pp. 33-34; Harvey, 2003a, pp. 26-31)¹⁷. These two master processes overlap with the primary concerns of bellicist and Marxist accounts of national state formation, respectively. Despite their differing emphases on geopolitics and class, Gorski (2003a, p. 165) holds that “most Marxists and bellicists would ... agree that “state power or capacity is essentially a function of (a) the level of economic development, insofar as it determines the overall level of material resources that are available; (b) state structure in the sense of administrative rationalization and/or administrative centralization; and (c) state autonomy in the sense of independence from societal institutions and actors”. Class structure and dynamics of a given polity, understood as a combination of “property relations” and “social relations of domination” (Gorski, 2003a, p. 160), gets closely entangled with building internal/external sovereignty in multifaceted ways. Furthermore, the multiplicity of possibilities laid out in Table 1 suggests that “religious” factors (such as religious doctrines/institutions and the situation of religious minorities) may interact with these two master processes in diverse ways. It is the purpose of my work to elucidate the interaction of “extra-religious” and “religious” factors in the making of *laïcité* and *laiklik*.

Relatedly, a final albeit central note on my comparative-historical approach to secularisation concerns the interaction between interests and ideas. That is to say, offering to study the “extra-religious” and “religious” variables of secularisation raises the question of how to conceive the relationship between material interests and religious/secular beliefs. Does emphasising class struggles and internal/external sovereignty to understand secularisation imply that religious/secular beliefs are mere reflections of political economic motives and gains? Or do ideas operate completely independently of material processes? In order to avoid such deterministic or voluntaristic assumptions, this study employs the Weberian concept of “elective affinity”, or more particularly, “a materialist account of elective affinity” (Thomas, 1985, p. 40), to dialectically comprehend the relationship between ideas and interests (Gerth & Mills, 1946; Giddens, 1971; Hill, 1973; Parkin, 2002).

“Elective affinity” is “the decisive conception by which Weber relates ideas and interests”, which rejects seeing ideas as simply an “expression” of interests (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 62), or as fully self-regulating entities divorced from material realities. Instead, the concept, which constitutes an essential analytical tool in Weber’s sociology¹⁸, suggests that “social and material factors must be drawn into account to explain why some beliefs are absorbed” while “others [are] rejected” (Thomas, 1985, p. 41). Accordingly, “systems of belief, sacred or profane, do not emerge ready-made from the ether; they take root only to the extent that they share an ‘elective affinity’ with the life-chances of particular groups or strata” (Parkin, 2002, p. 70). As Giddens (1971, p. 211) elaborates, “the mode of life of a given social class or status group can generate an affinity to accept certain sorts of religious [or secular] ethic, without ‘determining’ the nature of the beliefs involved”. Although it takes “ideas and interests” as “logically distinct”, elective affinity denotes “a *process* ... of convergence by which religious [or secular] ethic and material interest” may tend to “move ever closer to each other” (Hill, 1973; Thomas, 1985, p. 43). Interpreted as such, Weber’s conception of “elective affinity” is “perfectly compatible with Marx’s treatment of ideology” (Giddens, 1971, p. 211). In Marxist sociology, likewise, material reality refers to “a process and not a state”, which can be understood as “setting limits and exerting pressures” vis-à-vis ideational life worlds, as opposed to directly prefiguring them (R. Williams, 1973, pp. 4, 5). That is to say, the influence of the “balance of social forces”, structures, and material realities on

ideas and ideologies can be defined as “setting of limits, the establishment of parameters” or “defining of the space of operations”, which occurs in a relationship of “relative openness or relative indeterminacy” (S. Hall, 1986, p. 43). Based on these considerations, my comparison of the French and Turkish cases traces the struggle of religious and secular ideologies in their “elective affinities” with material processes and interests revolving around class struggles and state building¹⁹.

1.2.3. Comparative-Historical Methodology and Epistemology

Comparing complex and multidimensional phenomena such as secularisation and national state building necessitates lucidly defining methodological and epistemological guidelines. According to Matthew Lange (2013), comparative historical analysis has four dimensions –two methodological, one epistemological, and one regarding scope. The methodological pair brings together “comparative” and “within-case” methods, whereas epistemology is about one’s “social scientific philosophy”, and relatedly, scope concerns determining the “unit of analysis”. “Comparative methods” set out to “compare cases to explore similarities and differences in an effort to highlight causal determinants” and “gain insight into the research question”. Yet comparing is not the only means of producing knowledge. It is complemented with “within-case methods”, which “offer insight into the determinants of a particular ... case”, by providing a historical and in-depth analysis of the “processes and characteristics” peculiar to each of the compared units. The “social scientific philosophy”, or the epistemological approach “considers the possibility of knowledge and understanding” regarding “gaining insight into the causes of social phenomena”, and “unit of analysis” defines the level and extent of the entity being studied (Lange, 2013, pp. 4, 5, 19-20, 21). Making conscious choices regarding each of these definitional elements is mandatory for any comparative-historical inquiry. Below are the methodological and epistemological underpinnings of the present study –based on Lange’s framework.

Table 2: Methodological and Epistemological Considerations of the Study

Social Scientific Approach	Critical realism
Comparative method	Small-N, process-oriented narrative, encompassing
Within-case method	Causal narrative
Level/Unit of Analysis	Macrosociological/National

The social scientific philosophy of this dissertation is informed by “critical realism” (Bhaskar, 1975)²⁰. The ontology of critical realism is positioned between positivism (or empiricism) and constructivism (or interpretivism). Unlike strong forms of constructivism that reduce social reality to a discursive production, critical realism accepts the existence of social reality independent of the observer, which is “structured, differentiated, stratified and changing”, and possesses “underlying causal mechanisms of which we can obtain knowledge” (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, pp. 5, 9). Unlike positivism’s claim to establishing fixed universal laws, however, critical realism concedes that social reality can only be comprehended partially and imperfectly. This is mainly because social sciences operate at a different ontological level than natural sciences (studying open systems vs. closed systems, respectively), and also due to the fact that “our representations and classifications ... are fallible and corrigible”, and can only “be expressed in language”, which may be “inflected by power” (Gorski, 2013a, p. 462). Social scientific inquiry, accordingly, represents the constant attempt to advance our understanding of the causal connections between “real structures (mechanisms, capacities, vulnerabilities), actual processes or events (the actualization of certain potentials), and empirical evidence (traces of these events)” (Jessop, 2008, p. 45). Arguably, a critical realist outlook is a prerequisite for practicing comparative-historical sociology. This is because critical realism not only accepts “the ability of social scientific methods to provide causal insight” (Lange, 2013, p. 5), but it also empowers those methods through its ontological and epistemological vision concerning causality, agency, explanation, knowledge, and values (Gorski, 2013b, pp. 668-669)²¹.

Given its focus on two cases, the “comparative method” of this study is based on a “small-N” analysis (comparing fewer cases, “usually between two and ten”), which is

“the most common type of comparison used in the research tradition” (Lange, 2013, p. 87). This is in contrast to “large-N” comparisons utilising statistical or Boolean methods. Within the “small-N”, my work employs a “narrative” method to compare France and Turkey (as opposed to the Millian option that does nominal or ordinal/interval comparisons). Narrative comparisons do not numerically measure a few chosen variables, but closely study historical “processes and events”. They narratively compare “actual causal processes” in a given number of cases to “highlight the most influential factors” that mark their convergence and divergence. Narrative comparison provides the most historically embedded type of analysis, making it “advantaged over all other comparative methods” with regard to “comparing the actual sequences leading to the outcomes, and noting the influence of events” (Lange, 2013, p. 96). Some examples Lange gives for this methodological category are the works of Gorski (2003a) and Bendix (1964). More particularly, I employ a “process-oriented” narrative method in my comparison, which ascertains “causal processes for multiple cases and subsequently compare the processes to explore similarities and differences”. Process-oriented works “implicitly rely on counterfactuals. That is, the researcher weighs the evidence from the within-case analysis and considers what would have happened if a case was similar to or different from another case in one or more ways” (Lange, 2013, p. 99).

Small-N, narrative comparisons necessarily need to be complemented with a “within-case” method, and such combination “is usually so complete that it can be difficult to separate the two” (Lange, 2013, p. 95). Within-case methods (WCM) comprise two phases: a process of data collection (primary WCM), accompanied by an analysis of the findings to gain insight and provide input for the comparison (secondary WCM). Regarding the primary WCM, the historical data for this study rests on the archival research carried out in Paris and Istanbul/Ankara. The accumulated data features parliamentary archives, legislative processes, archives of relevant state institutions, contemporary newspapers, speeches of politicians, school textbooks, as well as various other pamphlets published in these polities. Bibliographical works on the formative periods of these national states supplement the archival data, along with historical sociological texts on processes of state building, class formation, and secularisation. Based on the compiled material, the secondary WCM of my comparison pursues a “causal narrative”, that is, it examines the French and Turkish historical events,

processes, and mechanisms in their temporality to establish causal connections (Lange, 2013, pp. 43-44). Lange cites the work of Skocpol (1979) in this category. Organising the evidence chronologically, my work presents a “sequential account” of how the relationship between politics and religion unfolded in the French and Turkish cases of national state building, so as to make sense of their elements of convergence and divergence, and gain insight into the inner workings of their secularising processes.

The level of analysis of my work is macrosociological, where the national state is the primary unit of analysis and comparison. Although its emphasis is on the structural, macrosociological analysis “does not prevent comparative-historical researchers from recognizing the causal importance of individuals”, especially “how the structural and institutional environments” interact with “individual actions” in a dialectical fashion (Lange, 2013, p. 5)²². My work contextualises the mentalities and actions of French and Turkish national state builders in the context of larger structural transformations and contentious processes, which they help shape and are shaped by. Moreover, while the national state is the primary unit of analysis, my comparison does not take these two countries as isolated units to merely keep a record of their likenesses and distinctions. The existing literature comparing secularisation in France and Turkey follows precisely that path: they take these countries as two independent units, with little or no regard to their common historical context. To overcome this limitation, my comparative methodology is further informed by what Charles Tilly (1984) refers to as “encompassing comparison”²³. In Tilly’s (1984, p. 125) definition, encompassing comparison selects at least two cases located within a given historical structure to “explain similarities or differences among those ... [cases] ... as consequences of their relationship to the whole”. Tilly urges for situating cases of comparison in their shared framework of world-historical conjuncture so as to explain “their characteristics in the context of their varying relationships to the system” (Tilly, 1984, p. 83). This would mean that the particular ways in which France and Turkey were integrated into the global political economic system in the long nineteenth century must be taken into consideration as a starting point for their comparison. According to Tilly, this approach has dual advantages: first, it directly takes account of “the interconnectedness of ostensibly separate experiences” conditioned by uneven and combined development. And second, it provides “a strong incentive to

ground analyses explicitly in the historical contexts of the structures and processes they include" (Tilly, 1984, p. 147).

The common historical framework that French and Turkish secularisation share is characterised by "the two interdependent master processes of the era", namely "the creation of a system of national states and the formation of a worldwide capitalist system" (Tilly, 1984, p. 147). Tilly finds it "hard to imagine the construction of any valid analysis" of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries "that does not connect particular alterations, directly or indirectly" to these "epochal" processes. Theda Skocpol (1984b, p. 16) concurs that "the historical sociologist's task is to analyse the relationships between these epochal processes and to probe their consequences for forms of group action". Accordingly, sociopolitical secularisation in France and Turkey are not compared here as two completely separate units, but as parts of a historically specific and geographically variegated global economic system, where capital accumulation and fundamental political, organisational and rhetorical structures began to take place within emergent national territories (Sassen, 2006, p. 18). More specifically, France and the Ottoman Empire were part of the same regional political economic framework, namely the European capitalist network and interstate system, since the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into its structure from the late eighteenth century onwards (Kasaba, 1988; Wallerstein, 1989). And besides being a part of the same network, there was also a direct bilateral exchange between the two polities diplomatically, culturally, and especially with French imperialist involvement in the Orient (Göçek, 1987; Thobie, 1977). Encompassing comparisons facilitate the observation of such "direct" and "indirect" connections between geographies. It is my contention that the ideological conception and institutional practice of French and Turkish secularisation cannot be comprehended, or compared, without regard to the particular locations these polities held in the global capitalist economy and interstate system. This is to understand France and Turkey as ultimately linked through relations of uneven and combined development, leading to differing trajectories of class formation, contentious politics, and internal/external processes of national state building (Ashman, 2009).

Organisation of the Dissertation

Part I of this dissertation, “A Tale of Two Paths to Secularisation”, is composed of two chapters. The present introductory chapter outlined the research problem, critically summarised the existing literature, and proposed some conceptual and methodological guidelines for a comparative-historical sociology of secularisation. Based on this conceptual and methodological outlook, Chapter 2 tackles the research problem to offer my comparative-historical analysis of the convergence and divergence of the French and Turkish cases of sociopolitical secularisation. Part II, “Lineages of the *Longue Durée*”, takes a historical focus in two complementary chapters. Chapter 3 examines the organisation of state-religion relations in the early modern French and Ottoman social formations (namely, “the long sixteenth century”), as well as their diverging developmental patterns on the road to 1789. Chapter 4 provides a synopsis of the French and Ottoman social history in the long nineteenth century, and how the sociopolitical contentions in these polities interacted with religion in various ways to set the stage for the critical junctures of national-secular state building. Part III, “Building the Republic(s): The Secularising Process”, builds on this historical background to offer a detailed account of the institutionalisation of French *laïcité* (Chapter 5) and Turkish *laiklik* (Chapter 6). Focusing respectively on the 1875-1905 and 1908-1938 intervals in France and Turkey, these latter chapters rely primarily on legal-historical data to demonstrate how the strategies of “separation” and “regulation” were operationalised in the contention for bourgeois-national state building. In “Conclusions”, finally, the theoretical inferences of my comparative-historical analysis are briefly discussed, as well as its contributions and implications for further research.

Chapter 2. Explaining Convergence and Divergence: Synopsis of the Comparison

What are the “extra-religious” and “religious” factors that have influenced the course of secularisation in France and Turkey, and produced convergent and divergent patterns? The theoretical and methodological discussion in the introduction suggested two “extra-religious” master processes that may impact the pattern of secularisation in different cases: building internal/external sovereign state capacity, and trajectories of class formation/struggles. In a given territory, these closely intertwined variables interact with geographically specific “religious” factors (involving the configuration of dominant religions and the situation of religious minorities) in multifaceted ways to alter the dynamics of secularisation, that is, the operationalisation of “separation” and “regulation”. To gain comparative-historical insight into *laïcité* and *laiklik*, it is the undertaking of this chapter to systematically discern the relationship between these two sets of factors in the French and Turkish experiences of national state building. The process-oriented comparative approach employed here offers a framework to tease out the major similarities and differences between the two cases, and serve as the foundation for the historical sociological examination. In the subsequent chapters, this comparative outline will be accompanied by a within-case causal narrative delving into the details of each polity to further the analysis.

2.1. Convergence: Politicisation of Religion in National-Sovereign State Building

The comparative literature on state-religion relations establishes in general terms that the level of pluralisation, that is, whether or not there is a monopolising religious organisation in a particular polity, sets the primary foundation for different paths to secularisation (Kuru, 2009; Martin, 1978; McLeod, 1995; Rokkan, 2009). “In situations of religious monopoly”, Gorski (2003b, p. 116) summarises, the religious establishment and

the state “tend to become closely identified with one another, and social protest and partisan opposition ... tend to evolve in an anticlerical ... direction”. “In situations of religious pluralism, by contrast ... opposition to the existing regime” does not “automatically translate into opposition to the religion *per se*”. In this light, we can begin answering the question of French and Turkish convergence by alluding to the “organic monopoly” (Martin, 1978) of the Catholic and Sunni Islamic establishments in these territories, against which national state building was carried out. Kuru (2009, p. 14) has shown that in these two cases, “the presence of an *ancien régime* based on the alliance of monarchy and hegemonic religion”, and that this alliance was overthrown by a successful republican revolution, produced an analogous tendency of “assertive” secularisation. France and Turkey prove the rule that “anti-clericalism and conflicts over religion as such”, especially in the contention for national state building, “will vary positively in accordance with the degree of [religious] monopoly” (Martin, 1978, p. 56). Regarding France, Martin (1978, p. 6) states that given the organic monopoly of the Catholic Church in the old regime, “forces build up within the system towards” a national state building episode “with an explicit secular ideology”, where “religion as such is frequently a political issue”. Likewise in Turkey, Kuru (2009, p. 204) adds, “reaction to the Ottoman *ancien régime* based on the alliance between the monarchy and hegemony of Islam” caused the politicisation of religion and the rise of secularist ideologies in the national state building interval. The convergence of *laïcité* and *laiklik*, therefore, is caused by their rootedness in the successful republican confrontation against a monarchical tradition coupled with a monopolising religion. French and Turkish republics were able to institute a “secular monopoly” to replace the religious one, which is in contrast to other cases of religious monopoly like Spain and Portugal, where the failure of the republican revolution resulted in the founding of “reactive organicism” along fascist/conservative lines (Kuru, 2009, p. 25; Martin, 1978, pp. 45-49, 244).

While the variable of pluralism offers a valid point of departure, it only scratches the surface of how secularisation historically unfolds. The argument resting on the combination of religion-monarchy alliance (or “organic monopoly”) plus “successful republican revolution” (leading to “secular monopoly”) is not so much an explanation for the similarity of the French and Turkish cases than its preliminary outline. It correctly touches upon one “religious” factor (religious monopoly vs. pluralism) accompanied by

an “extra-religious” one (failure vs. success of republican state building), but it leaves out a plethora of other vital variables and nuances²⁴. More specifically, “extra-religious” processes of class formation and internal/external state capacity are not taken into consideration. Also missing are “religious” variables like minority integration and the institutional organisation of the Catholic and Sunni Islamic establishments. The present section on convergence (2.1) and the subsequent one on divergence (2.2) begin to demonstrate the historical relevance of some these variables for France and Turkey. Regarding convergence, the purpose is to answer the following question: Why and how did the French and Turkish bourgeois-national state building processes produce an extreme polarisation along religious versus secular lines of contention? In other words, why was “the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing nation-state and the historically established corporate privileges” of the religious establishment more intense compared to other cases? (Rokkan, 2009, p. 102) The questions require historically comparing France and Turkey in the larger European framework.

2.1.1. Historical Trajectories of Secularisation in Europe

Foundation of national states in Europe, and the development of varying patterns of secularisation, can be broadly construed in the context of the gradual transition from feudalism to capitalism (Hamilton, 2001, p. 203). In feudal France, as in the rest of Europe, Catholicism was the dominant institutional and ideological power organising the social formation, exercising hegemony over the peasantry in maintaining the influence of aristocratic authority. In symbiotic relationship with the latter, the clergy was a part of the ruling bloc promoting an “active conception of the world” conducive to feudal relations of property, exploitation, and political power. This conception was based on a principle of Christian universalism standing above the “parcellized sovereignty” of feudal principalities across Europe (P. Anderson, 1974). Around the continent, “Catholicism mattered” above all “as an institution, with its courts, tithes, estates ... armies”, much more so than simply “as a belief system that counselled passive acceptance”. The clergy, in this system, exercised a “multifunctional quality” stretching “economic, political and juridical as well as ideological domains” (Lachmann, 2010, p. 18). The sociopolitical system that “allowed this clergy to constitute the ‘central’ ISA [ideological state apparatus] of the feudal bloc was based on (a) its economic-political intermingling with

the feudal aristocracy, and (b) the ideological monopoly it exerted in this society” (Maduro, 1977, p. 362). According to Gramsci, “the situation of the medieval Church was that of control over feudal ... society”, where the clergy were the fundamental “organic intellectuals” that legitimised and reproduced pre-capitalist politico-economic relations (Portelli, 1974, p. 69).

Since the “long sixteenth century”²⁵, the formation of a European “world economy” through a rising commercial/financial bourgeoisie disrupted feudal class relations legitimated by the Catholic Church to initiate the long march towards national-capitalist state formation (Wallerstein, 1974). In the comparative-historical literature, the Protestant Reformation is regarded, although through varying interpretations, as the preliminary stage of the latter process, creating “several religious Europes” (Rémond, 1999, p. 20). Among the classics, Gramsci views the Reformation as the primary “revolutionary critique of feudal Catholicism from a bourgeois point of view” (Portelli, 1974, p. 92), and Engels (1926, p. 21) refers to it as “the first precursor of modern bourgeois society”. Among contemporary scholars, Mann (1993, p. 216) calls the Reformation the “religious phase” of early nation building, which is the first of the five stages he identifies. Turner (1988) demonstrates the link between Protestantism and the rise of nationalism and political centralisation, and Gorski (2003a) underlines the centrality of the Reformation in engendering a disciplinary mechanism that contributed to building rational, efficient, and powerful national-administrative structures. Emphasising political economic factors, Wallerstein (1974, p. 152) concurs that “in the period of the Reformation ... Protestantism became identified ... with the forces favoring the expansion of commercial capitalism within the framework of strong national states”. Rokkan (2009, pp. 112-117), finally, understands the Reformation as the “the first critical juncture”, or the “first dichotomy” of national state making in Europe. Rokkan’s typology matches that of Martin’s (1978, p. 4) in characterising the Reformation as the first “crucial historical event” to impact the path of secularisation, the failure or success of which created different trajectories of state-religion relations in Europe to have long-term effects on their national state building processes in the long nineteenth century.

In northern Europe where the Reformation triumphed (such as in the UK, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark), the church was nationalised under the control of the

state, independently of Rome. This was in contrast to cases of southern Europe where the Counter-Reformation succeeded to further intensify the alliance between the state and the Roman Catholic Church (such as in France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal). As Mann (1993, p. 216) puts it, "Protestantism and the Catholic Counter-Reformation created two kinds of potential protonation". In the north, Tilly (1990, p. 61) writes, "notably England and the Nordic countries, rulers promoted and co-opted ... the Reformation, which established extensive state control over the religious apparatus and close cooperation between clergy and lay officials in local administration". In these cases, Rokkan (2009, pp. 103, 112) adds, "the established national churches simply became agents of the state", and "the processes of centralization and standardization triggered off after 1789 did not immediately bring about a conflict between the two. The temporal and spiritual establishments were at one in the defence of the central nation-building culture". Expressed in class terms, in the northern cases, the emergent bourgeois relations and political power were gradually accommodated within the reformed aristocratic order in relatively non-frictional terms. Protestantism, as an "established religion" (Stepan, 2011, pp. 115, 121-123), provided the national-ideological framework of that settlement. In such cases, "rising social classes ... opposed the privileges of the established churches but they did not oppose religion as such; there was no significant anti-clerical spirit" (Bruce, 2009, p. 145). What is more, "Protestant Churches" managed to "adapt themselves more rapidly to the changes in the character of the state" instead of forming an "organicist" reaction (like the Catholic Church). Accordingly, "the church was based on subordination [to the national state] from the start, it had no ... theory of its social paramountcy" due to its "withdrawal ... as an institution from any attempt at independent domination of society" (Martin, 1978, pp. 23, 38, 112). As a result, "the creation of territorial churches also enhanced state power", especially due to the "elective affinity" between Protestantism and mechanisms of rational and efficient social-discipline (Gorski, 2003a, p. 18).

While Protestant churches were embedded in emergent national states relatively peacefully, the opposite was valid for the Catholic Church. The "Church as a *transnational* institution was threatened by the emergence of an equally transnational economic system which found its *political* strength in the creation of strong *state* machineries of certain (core) states, a development which threatened the Church's

position in these states” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 156) (emphases in original). Intending to reverse that tendency in the Catholic south, the Counter-Reformation “consolidated the position of the Church and tied its fate to the privileged bodies of the *ancien régime*. The [eventual] result was a polarization of national politics between a national-radical-secular movement and a Catholic-traditionalist one” (Rokkan, 2009, p. 116). In post-1789 France, for instance, “the opposition between the nation as integrated by Catholicism under the old regime and the liberal nationalism proclaimed by the Republic divided” the country “between irreconcilable opponents” (Martin, 1978, p. 102). This is in contrast to the Protestant north, where “the settlement of the sixteenth century gave a very different structure to the cleavages of the nineteenth. The established churches did not stand in opposition to the nation-builders in the way the Roman Catholic Church did on the continent” (Rokkan, 2009, p. 117). In national state building cases of the Catholic south, like France, religion became “too closely associated with the right wing in politics” to endorse the noble-aristocratic order, which is why “the bourgeois opposition to the *ancien régime* tended to be ... hostile to the teachings of the Church” (Martin, 1978, p. 117; Rokkan, 2009, p. 117). In post-revolutionary France, Catholicism was “straightforwardly identified with the antecedent system of authority”, which created “a social split, with Catholics and legitimists on one side and other groups”, especially the “newly ascendant” classes “on the other” (Dobbelaere, 1981, p. 51; Martin, 1978, p. 38). The sociopolitical conflict was thus expressed in a “vicious circle” of a religious-secular divide in France, leading to the “separatist pattern” as the Republic triumphed (Stepan, 2011, p. 117).

As a third category, moreover, Rokkan identifies mixed cases that created a “multi-confessional belt” between the Protestant north and the Catholic south (such as Holland, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland), where various arrangements between divided principalities and Catholic-Protestant populations were negotiated. In the post-Reformation period, although most of these polities were adjacent to “mono-confessional” neighbours, “the distinctiveness of this belt of territories” is that religious monopolisation failed, for “in each of them significant groups of the population resisted such attempts”. This is how “the multi-confessional belt became a patchwork of small territories” with multiple “confessions” and “minorities” (Madeley, 2003, pp. 32-33). Due to the lack of a single established religion underpinning noble privileges and the

existence of multiple denominations, nineteenth century bourgeois politics in these countries produced weaker and fragmented manifestations of anticlericalism than in the south. The outcome was that these polities were able to “positively accommodate” (Stepan, 2011, pp. 123-125) various religions. Referring to them as the “mixed pattern”, Martin (1978, pp. 49-50) identifies the countries in this category by their construction of “a loose or federal structure and the existence of political compromise and consensus”, where religion *as such* does not become a major political issue. In that sense, the mixed pattern is more similar to northern cases than the southern ones, as it produces a “beneficent spiral” leading to mutual accommodation rather than a “vicious circle” of religiously divided conflict. As an external but clarifying example, the case of the United States presents the least anticlerical variant compared to the three European trajectories, due to its lack of “organic monopoly” (*ancien régime* allied with dominant religion) and high levels of pluralism in a migrant society (Kuru, 2009, pp. 28-29; Martin, 1978, pp. 5, 21)²⁶.

Finally, there is the east. As mentioned, the Catholic-Protestant split in the west took place within the emergent European capitalist “world system”, where the influence of bourgeois forces set in motion early processes of national state building. At the outskirts of that system to the east, however, the pre-capitalist Orthodox Christian and Sunni Islamic establishments in the Russian and Ottoman Empires organised their state-religion relations in stark contrast with the west. Rejecting a “relatively autonomous” religious authority vis-à-vis the state, these empires followed a “caesaropapist” path that instituted “the complete subordination of priestly to secular power” that “exercises supreme authority in ecclesiastic matters” (M. Weber, 1978, pp. 1160-1161). Influenced by and continuing the “Byzantine paradigm” of politics-religion relations, Russian and Ottoman states embedded ecclesiastical authority, although in very different religious-doctrinal and institutional frameworks²⁷, within their monarchical structures (Baron, 1960, pp. 165-212; M. S. Birdal, 2011, pp. 65-66; Rémond, 1999, p. 24; Swenson, 2009, p. 266). Exercising an “organic monopoly”, the Orthodox Christian and Sunni Muslim establishments served as the central ideological, political, and economic state apparatuses of the pre-capitalist social formation dominated by aristocratic/patrimonial privileges. It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, namely “the incorporation of vast new zones into the world economy”, that these countries would

integrate with the European world system to undergo increasing capitalist-centralising political influence and market-based transformation (Wallerstein, 1989, pp. 127-129). Given that the organically monopolising religious establishments were intimately intertwined with aristocratic/patrimonial power, late capitalist modernisation in these polities brought about extreme polarisation involving religion, comparable to cases of the Catholic Counter-Reformation. In Russia, the unity of the Orthodox Church and the Empire set the stage for the sociopolitical resistance to produce an anticlerical “inversion of the Caesaro-Papist conjunction” in the Bolshevik Revolution (Kuru, 2009, pp. 23-24; Martin, 1978, pp. 6, 22). The Ottoman-Turkish case went through an analogous (but non-socialist) process, where, for bourgeois-national state builders, “the struggle against” the Islamic establishment became “part and parcel of their struggle against the *ancién regime*”, namely “the Ottoman ruling class” (Margulies & Yıldızoğlu, 1988). Based on the discussion so far, Table 3 below presents a synopsis of the intra-European comparative-historical analysis so as to put France and Turkey in context.

Table 3: Historical Trajectories of State-Religion Relations in Post-Reformation Europe

	Country Examples	Religion-State Relations (16th and 17th Centuries)	Sociopolitical Conflict (18th –19th Centuries)	Anticlericalism in National State Building (Long 19th Century)
Protestant Reformation (North)	UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark	Nationalised-established church	Relative bourgeois-aristocratic settlement (with no religious polarisation)	Low
Mixed Protestant-Catholic (Central)	Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium	No established church, multi-confessional arrangements	Dispersed bourgeois-aristocratic struggles (with limited religious polarisation)	Medium (fragmented)
Catholic Counter-Reformation (South)	France, Italy, Spain, Portugal	Established supranational church	Bourgeois-aristocratic polarisation (involving religion)	High
Caesaro-Papism (East)	Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire	Religion embedded in feudal/patrimonial state	Capitalist transformation vs. aristocratic/patrimonial privileges (polarisation involving religion)	High

The larger European framework suggests that France and Turkey, along with other southern and eastern examples, represent cases that experienced extreme politicisation of religion in their national state building processes. This is because the “organic monopolies” in these polities maintained an “elective affinity” with aristocratic/patrimonial classes, powers, and worldviews, which in turn led to the development of anticlerical ideologies and strategies by bourgeois social forces²⁸ during and after the long nineteenth century. Around the same time in the Protestant north, bourgeois political and economic development was already accommodated in a nationalised Protestant context, where religion had long ceased to be a highly divisive ideological matter. In mixed countries, finally, the presence of Catholic and Protestant populations prevented any one religious establishment to fully dominate the political

scene, and national state building generated only limited and fragmented occurrences of anticlericalism that did not necessarily permeate into subsequent policymaking. In Counter-Reformation France, by contrast, continued noble-absolutist political domination in fusion with the Catholic Church paved the way for a bourgeois-national upheaval that juxtaposed the religious and the secular, first in the Enlightenment and then in the Revolution. Simultaneously, as the Ottoman Empire was being integrated into the European political economic network, a segment of the Islamic-patrimonial establishment emerged in various episodes as the bastion of opposition against capitalist modernisation and centralisation, thus leading to the expression of the social conflict within a religious-secular dichotomy.

2.1.2. War of Two Frances vs. Ottoman Split-Up Modernisation

Although they rested on distinct “extra-religious” processes (social forces and geopolitical realities) and “religious” contexts (Catholic/Sunni institutional configuration and the situation of religious minorities), polarisation concerning religion presented itself in comparable ways in France and the Ottoman Empire. The year 1789, the starting date of the long nineteenth century, was a turning point for these polities, although in distinctive ways. It coincided the Great Revolution, which overturned the vestiges of the feudal-aristocratic order in France, with the coming to throne of Sultan Selim III in the Ottoman Empire, which commenced a long-term and comprehensive modernisation initiative. Although its immediate effects were certainly more profound in France than in the Ottoman lands, 1789 set the foundations in both countries for deep-rooted polarisations concerning the place of religion in politics and society, which were to be played out throughout the subsequent century. With the Revolution, “Catholicism was to face the most determined challenge since the Reformation, a challenge whose reverberations would shape the face of Catholicism for the nineteenth century and beyond” (Atkin & Tallett, 2003, p. 46). A similar challenge was present for Sunni Islam: “when Selim III came to the throne of the troubled empire in 1789, his reign began the empire’s longest century of continuous reform” that directly affected the religious establishment (Ahmad, 2003, p. 22). The “dual revolution”, namely the rapid industrialisation/commercialisation of economies and concomitant centralisation/nationalisation of states, was responsible for the massive cycle of politico-

religious transformation and conflict in this period (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 53). The dual revolution disrupted the traditional organisation of Catholicism and Sunni Islam vis-à-vis the French and Ottoman states, where these religious establishments functioned, although in distinct configurations, as part of the dominant class alliance to serve as the principal ideological state apparatuses that legitimised and reproduced feudal/patrimonial relations of political domination and economic exploitation (more on this in Chapter 3).

Correspondingly, in France, the long nineteenth century instigated what would come to be known as the “war of two Frances”, and it prompted the “split-up modernisation” of the Ottoman Empire (Findley, 1980; Poulat, 1988). According to Baubérot (2007, pp. 28-29), the war of two Frances opposed “two divergent visions: Catholic France as the ‘eldest daughter of the Church’, and modern France as the daughter of the 1789 Declaration of Rights”. Writing in the nineteenth century, renowned scholar Ernest Renan (1868, p. XXVIII) likened this polarisation to two children seeking to strangle each other in their mother’s womb. Regarding the Ottoman split-up modernisation²⁹ involving Islam, Findley (1980, pp. 149-150; 2010, p. 18) notes the emergence of two currents since 1789, namely a “secularising” and an “Islamically committed” one, where “certain elements of society push for modernization, while others oppose it”, and “the sense of contradiction between demands for change ... and the traditionalistic foundations of the established order eventually becomes too great”. The similarity of these French and Ottoman internal divisions was threefold. Firstly, they often placed Catholic/Islamic and modern/secular conceptions of sovereignty and power at the opposite ends of the political spectrum. Secondly, neither of them can be explained away as purely cultural/ideological polarisations, but should be understood against the background of larger sociopolitical conflicts and transformations. In both cases, thirdly, there was no unilinear trend toward declining religious authority. Instead, the changing course of internal/external state building and class struggles/alliances generated moments of secularisation as well as desecularisation (and resecularisation), which was accompanied by certain episodes that exhibited contradictory and simultaneous tendencies of secularisation and desecularisation in different spheres of the societal scene (Chaves, 1994; Goldstein, 2009; Gorski, 2003b). A comparative social history of the long nineteenth century (as presented in Chapter 4), namely the French “age of

revolution” and the Ottoman “age of reform”, reveals the particular ways in which the politicisation of, and polarisations based on religion materialised in these cases.

The sociopolitical conflicts, transformations, mentalities, and institutions that emerged and ossified in the post-1789 interval carried over to the critical junctures of republican state building in France (1875-1905) and Turkey (1908-1938). It is in these latter intervals that bourgeois-national state infrastructural power was consolidated. Secularisation became a central component and consequence of that highly contentious process, culminating in the establishment of a new *modus vivendi* between religion and politics through the institutionalisation of *laïcité* and *laiklik*. Notwithstanding the “extra-religious” and “religious” differences between these two cases (to be discussed in Section 2.2), *the underlying similarity between French and Turkish national state building periods was the sociopolitical contention that pitted the various manifestations of their dominant religions against the internal and external sovereignty of national/republican power*. In other words, unlike the Protestant and mixed cases exemplified earlier, the consolidation of nationally organised infrastructural power in the French and Turkish cases featured (and in many ways necessitated) the diminishment of religious authority in its domestic and foreign dimensions –where “separation” and “regulation” would serve as the governmental strategies towards that end. The comparable patterns of secularisation that materialised in France and Turkey thus stemmed from their close association with “the search of full state sovereignty” in its “two dimensions: internal and external” (Akgönül, 2008a, p. 16). Given that state power simultaneously involves its dealings in the “internal sphere” and the “external sphere” (Gorski, 2003a, p. 35)³⁰, the critical junctures of 1875-1905/1908-1938 merit historical scrutiny to discern these dimensions. Table 4 demonstrates the contentions involving Catholicism and Sunni Islam in French and Turkish bourgeois-national state building.

Table 4: Internal/External Contentions Involving the Dominant Religions in National State Building Periods

	France (1875-1905)	Turkey (1908-1938)
Internal Sovereignty	<p>Politico-religious: Monarchy (Legitimists, Orléanists, or Bonapartists) allied with the Catholic establishment (the Gallican Church)</p> <p>Social-ideological: Catholic congregations (such as Jesuits and Assumptionists)</p> <p>Some Key Events: Conservative parliamentary coup (24 May 1873), <i>Ordre Moral</i> and monarchical restoration attempts (1871-77), 16 May 1877 Intervention, Boulangism (1880s), Dreyfus Affair (1890s).</p>	<p>Politico-religious: Monarchy (Ottoman Sultanate) intertwined with the Sunni-Islamic establishment (the Caliphate, <i>Şeyhülislam</i>)</p> <p>Social-ideological: Islamic Sufi/dervish orders (such as Naqshbandis and <i>Nurcus</i>)</p> <p>Some Key Events: 31 March Incident (1909), <i>Fatwa Wars</i> during “multiple sovereignty” (1920), Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), the Free Party experience (1930), Menemen Incident (1930).</p>
External Sovereignty	<p>Politico-religious: the Vatican (intervention in national affairs as well as in French foreign policy)</p> <p>Military: European inter-imperialist competition (Catholicism identified as source of laggardness)</p> <p>Some Key Events: Franco-Prussian War (1870-1), Vatican’s pleas against Italian nationalists, French Presidential visit to Rome (1904)</p>	<p>Politico-religious: Islamic Caliphate (jeopardising national foreign policy and facilitating European meddling)</p> <p>Military: Territorial integrity against European powers (Sunni Islam identified as source of backwardness)</p> <p>Some Key Events: Albanian Revolt (1912), Franco-British politics of Caliphate (1913-22), Arab Revolt (1916-8)</p>

In order to crystallise and explain the similarity of the French and Turkish cases, Table 4 provisionally singles out internal/external sovereign state building (as an “extra-religious” factor) in relation to the strife with dominant religions (as a “religious” factor), thus leaving out many other variables for now. In these critical junctures where the struggle against the French and Ottoman *ancien régimes* reached a decisive stage, the internal and external sovereignty of bourgeois-national state building was undermined and challenged, directly or indirectly, by the Catholic and Sunni Islamic establishment, personnel, organisations, social forces and ideologies. Consequently, secularisation

became part and parcel of the national/republican contention. This is clearly reflected in the mentalities and “framing strategies”³¹ of French and Turkish national state builders, who closely associated secularisation with sovereignty in their speeches, and underlined the former as an inherent condition for the latter. As one French republican uttered in 1903, the “deeply secular and national soul” of the Republic is based on two mutually enforcing principles: “independence of civil society from the Church, and the independence of the French policy towards all ... foreign organisations [namely the Vatican]” (Deschanel, 1903, p. 22). The stress on the religious encroachment on sovereignty was echoed similarly in the speech of a Turkish republican in 1925: “Those who employ religion to endanger our national existence deserve to be damned ... The whole world must know that the children of this land are ready for all kind of sacrifice against internal or external threats” (TBMM, 25 February 1925, p. 309).

Internally, since the foundation of the Third Republic in France in 1870, the Catholic establishment held the central politico-ideological framework unifying all anti-republican social forces, manifested and energised in various episodes. The conservative parliamentary coup of “24 May” (1873), the ensuing *Ordre Moral* period that combined religious extravagance with monarchical restoration attempts (1871-77), the right-wing intervention against republican advances on “16 May” (1877), Catholic endorsement to General Boulanger’s authoritarian bid to power (1880s), and the full-blown war against the Republic in the Dreyfus Affair (1890s) represent some key moments that contributed to polarising religion and republican politics. Likewise, since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in the late Ottoman/early Republican Turkey, the Sunni Islamic establishment/ideology came to be the meeting point of repeated resistance against secular nation-building attempts. The Islamic counterrevolutionary wave of the “31 March” Incident (1909), the religious salvo of the Ottoman government against the nationalists in Ankara during the War of Independence (1920), the large-scale Islamic (and Kurdish) reaction targeting the Republic in the Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), manifestations of religious opposition in the short-lived Free Party experience (1930), and the violent religious reaction of the Menemen Incident (1930) signify some important intervals that directly opposed religion and national/republican power.

In the French and Turkish secular-nationalist mentalities, which were originally shaped during their opposition to the religiously legitimised rule of Napoléon III and Abdülhamid II (Chapter 4), these episodes were clear confirmation that secularisation and republican power were mutually dependent. To what extent each of these religiously expressed upheavals posed an actual danger, and to what extent they were rhetorically articulated by republicans may vary, and have been open to interpretation in French and Turkish historiography (Ahmad, 1993; Caperan, 1957a; Dansette, 1961b; Zürcher, 2004). What is certain, however, is that in the face of religiously involved adversaries, the national state builders in both countries resolved to “separate” the domain of politics from the religious and “regulate” the latter by the state as an integral component of their contention for sovereignty. The strategies of “separation” and “regulation” were shaped and realised during the process of that contention, which was also reflected in republican rhetoric. French republican Léon Gambetta, for instance, strongly protested in 1877 against “the prerogatives and privileges of the Church of France” and “the political unity of the French monarchy and Catholicism” against national sovereignty; ending his speech with a slogan that would reverberate in the decades to come: “Clericalism? That’s the enemy!” (Gambetta, 1909, pp. 214, 237). The words of President Adolphe Thiers follow the same logic: “For the Republic to live ... we must trim the nails of clericalism” (cited in Bonnefoy, 2002, p. 27). In Turkey, similarly, Mustafa Kemal declared in 1922 that “sovereignty can be shared ... neither in its meaning nor its frame of reference. May their title be the Caliph or anything else, they cannot have a say whatsoever in the destiny of this nation” (TBMM, 18 November 1922, p. 1052). A parliament member, Vasıf Bey, reiterated the same thought in 1924: “The Sultan” used his religious authority, “the Caliphate ... as a weapon to crush us ... A nation that declares the Republic ... cannot allow dualities” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, pp. 37, 39). These declarations hint at the intensity of religiously blended internal politics of contention in France and Turkey.

In relation to these primary politico-religious contenders embodied in the monarchies, national state builders in France and Turkey also targeted the prominent Catholic congregations and Islamic orders (such as the Jesuits and Assumptionists, and the Naqshbandis and *Nurcus*). These religious groups, who got involved in some of the antagonistic intervals listed above, were seen as a dangerous social basis for the old

regime, and a threat to the consolidation of republican power. Émile Combes, for instance, highlighted in 1902 the link between monarchical aspirations and religious orders: “The royalists and Bonapartists demand today that the *laïque* state place congregations outside and above the law, and sacrifice its entitlement of sovereignty to the monastic omnipotence” (Combes & France, 1904, p. 84). Anatole France, likewise, saw in congregations a force against the state: “To conquer temporal domination in France, the Church turned for years to these paramilitary organisations, namely the ... congregations. And the latter’s multitude grew constantly” (Combes & France, 1904, p. VI). Similarly, Ekrem Bey, a Turkish deputy, held in 1925 that religious orders and the sultanate were organically intertwined: “These [orders] say to the Sultan, ‘we belong to you ... we are your subjects, ready to serve you’. And the Sultan responds: ‘you are the reliable subjects of God’. As a result, they both commit crimes that would satisfy each other”. Refik Bey likewise underlined that the religious orders, through “provocation and deception”, betrayed national interests (TBMM, 30 November 1925, p. 282). It is based on this understanding that the national state restricted congregational influence on public life.

In terms of external sovereignty, the primary politico-religious strife was against the Vatican in France and the Caliphate in Turkey, although in different ways. French republicans disdained the political and ideological interference of the Vatican in the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic, which they viewed as preventing France from becoming an independent national state (Duclert, 2010; Mayeur & Rebérioux, 1984). They disapproved the papal encyclicals passing critical judgement on the Republic and modernity (such as the notorious Syllabus of Errors by Pius IX, 1864), constantly having implications on French politics. Also, the Vatican’s repeated demands for military protection against Italian nationalists since the mid-1800s was seen as a violation of French foreign policy by religiously oriented motivations. Future Prime Minister Jules Simon touched upon this latter point as early as 1867: “We go to Rome and support the Pope with a spirit of chivalry, and to obey certain religious principles, without asking anything in return for our heavy sacrifices. No way! That’s not how politics is done” (Simon, 1867, p. 16). Gambetta (1909, p. 219) asked the parliament in 1877: “How could this happen, gentlemen? How did we come to this degree of weakness and helplessness, where we can see the Pope address either individuals or a community

directly in France, without recourse to the means of civil power ... in defiance of the secular laws of this country?” Responding to the Pope’s attempt to prevent a French presidential visit to Italy in 1904, which caused a major diplomatic crisis, Jaurès (1904b) wrote along the same lines: “The complete emancipation of France, finally liberated from all political interference of the Church, is not only the absolute condition for its free internal development, but it is also ... a national necessity”. Separation of the Churches and the State in 1905, therefore, also meant fully proclaiming the external sovereignty of the Republic against the Vatican.

For the Turkish republicans, the Caliphate was not only a matter of internal sovereignty as discussed above, but also a concern for external sovereignty. This institution had been revitalised since the last quarter of the nineteenth century to serve the pan-Islamist aspirations of Abdülhamid II in the Middle East. The sultan called for unity in a crumbling Empire under his title as the Caliph, with a claim to represent the Muslim world against the Christian West (Deringil, 1999; Georgeon, 2006). Pursuing the same pan-Islamist strategy after 1908, the Unionists experienced firsthand its catastrophic consequences during World War I. The precariousness of the Caliphate against the strategic use of religion by Franco-British diplomacy, and the Arab Revolt, became all the more apparent to the national state builders (Ardıç, 2012). In the debates on the abolition of this institution, for instance, deputy Halid Bey said, “we have not benefited from the Caliphate one bit ... as seen in the Arab betrayal”. Vasif Bey seconded: “by renouncing holistic policies ... our situation in external politics will be much more powerful” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, pp. 36, 38). Eradicating that institution in 1924, the republicans not only ended “multiple sovereignty” at home, but they also relinquished the politico-religious aspirations of the Empire in the Muslim world in order not to put their external sovereignty in further jeopardy against European powers, and against the complicated sectarian politics of the Middle East (Evered & Evered, 2010). Mustafa Kemal referred to this situation in 1921 as follows: “We wish the best for the fellow Muslims around the world. Yet, the administration of this community from a single centre is a fantasy ... Instead of increasing the number and pressures of our enemies like that, let us retreat to our legitimate borders” (Atatürk, 2012, pp. 69-70). In addition to the Caliphate issue, for the Turkish republicans secularisation was also related to preventing European interventions in state affairs on behalf of non-Muslim minorities in

the framework of the “Eastern Question”, which was an ongoing policy since the nineteenth century. Through the secularisation of civil and other laws, the republicans sought to assure European powers that non-Muslims would enjoy equal citizenship, and they used this as a bargaining chip for the recognition of Turkey’s external independence (Bilgin, 2008, p. 603; Parla & Davison, 2004, pp. 116-117; Tanör, 2001, p. 98).

Lastly, in terms of external sovereignty, republicans in both countries came to believe that the modernisation of the state, which was essential for protection from and competition with other states, required secularisation as a prerequisite. Although the roots of that perspective go back to their oppositional periods against the Napoleonic (1860s) and Hamidian (1890s) Empires, instants of Catholic and Muslim antagonism to national state building efforts further confirmed the conviction that religion was utilised as a force against modernisation. National states, after all, “always appear in competition with each other, and gain their identities by contrast with rival states; they belong to *systems* of states” (Tilly, 1990, p. 23). In this process, France was in fierce inter-imperialist rivalry with other European countries, while the late Ottoman Empire was in defence against multiple Western powers for its territorial integrity. In France, the Republic was established by the fall of the Empire with the Prussian defeat in 1870, and it developed in conditions of intensifying European scramble for colonies in the 1880s (Cooke, 1973). In Turkey, the Republic was founded in the context of a disintegrated Empire facing European forces, barely surviving by a War of Independence that followed World War I (Ahmad, 1988b). The Prussian defeat and the inter-imperialist rivalry convinced French republicans that the Catholic influence on the state and public life had to be eliminated for France’s modernisation (Ozouf, 1982b, pp. 7-21). “In France after 1870 ... the Church was blamed for the defeat”, and secular education was thought to bring France on a par with contending powers (Martin, 1978, p. 129). In a much more accentuated fashion, the Turkish republicans interpreted the backwardness of the Empire vis-à-vis Europe as caused by the dominance of Islam in the state and public affairs (Mardin, 1977, p. 285). Especially in the étatist industrialisation and capitalist-developmental initiatives of the 1930s, religion and science were placed on opposite ends as mutually exclusive entities (Parla & Davison, 2004, pp. 118-119). At varying levels in both countries, secularisation was directly affiliated to advancing economic development and state capacity by facilitating modernisation.

All in all, the convergence of the French and Turkish patterns of secularisation lies in their commonality of going through analogous contentious episodes that clashed various manifestations of their dominant religions against the internal and external sovereignty of national/republican power. In multifaceted ways, the Catholic and Sunni Islamic establishments, along with social groups and worldviews in France and Turkey, became politicised and actively mobilised on the side of traditional social forces during the critical junctures of national state building. *Laïcité* and *laiklik*, in this sense, denote not simply ideological positions, but also concrete political strategies embraced by republicans to entrench the sovereign infrastructural power of the national state against religious authority. As Chapter 5 (on France) and Chapter 6 (on Turkey) will elaborate, these strategies involved “separating” and “regulating” various faces of religious authority in “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional” spheres. *Laïcité* and *laiklik*, therefore, became the central political-ideological component of building the French and Turkish bourgeois-national states, which distinguishes them from most other European experiences where the struggle against the religious establishment was not an essential constituent of that process.

2.2. Divergence: “Extra-Religious” and “Religious” Variables

The convergence of the French and Turkish experiences of secularisation as elucidated above is based on the isolation of one “extra-religious” and one “religious” factor, namely internal/external sovereignty juxtaposed with dominant religions. French and Turkish national state building, however, is not limited to a conflict with religious authority, and neither does the latter always engage in conflictual terms with the former. Based on the course of the multifaceted contentious process, republicans also sought to utilise religious authority in certain episodes and/or spheres to endorse internal/external national state building efforts. Examples from France include the rapprochement with the Church to “moralise” and pacify rising working class activism (as in the *esprit nouveau* of the early 1890s), or the vigorous endorsement of Catholic missions in the colonisation initiatives (1880s and after). In Turkey, likewise, Islamic rhetoric constituted the core of

the mobilisation against western occupation and domestic Christian separatisms (as in World War I), and it was also fostered as a legitimisation strategy especially in the early years of the Republic (1923-28). In both polities, such recourse to religious authority often occurred simultaneously with the wholesale secularisation of other sociopolitical spheres.

These examples are by no means exceptions, and they speak to the fact that several other contentious dimensions of national state building should be taken into consideration to make sense of the ebbs and flows of the secularising process. National state building processes feature “extra-religious” variables such as class struggles and geopolitics, which are ultimately linked to uneven and combined development (Ashman, 2009; Harvey, 2005). Moreover, additional geographically specific “religious” determinants come into play, which require a closer examination of the doctrinal/institutional configuration of the dominant religions in question, as well as the situation of religious minorities. The relationship between these multiple elements influences the dynamics of sociopolitical secularisation, because they effect the intensity, strategies, and tactics of contention pursued vis-à-vis religious authority. The divergence between French *laïcité* and Turkish *laiklik*, that is, the stronger emphasis on “separation” versus the emphasis on “regulation”, can be understood by observing the multiple interactions between those variables. France and Turkey built their secular-republican states in dissimilar contexts. During their struggle against Catholic and Sunni Islamic manifestations of authority, national-bourgeois political actors in these countries were conditioned by and acting in disparate socio-historical realities and “political opportunities”³². Four ultimately interrelated, non-sequential explanatory factors come to the fore: social class basis and imperialist geopolitics (“extra-religious”), and the configuration of dominant religions and minority integration (“religious”).

Firstly, in France, at the core of the world system, republican state building against Catholic authority rested on a progressive bourgeoisie and secularly oriented working classes (and the integration of the small peasantry). In peripheral Turkey, the weakness of such politically influential classes (and low peasant integration) against Islamic authority brought forth the reformist bureaucracy to undertake bourgeois-national transformation. The difference in social base is linked to long-term relations of uneven

and combined development where France and the Ottoman Empire followed “capitalised coercion” versus “coercion-intensive” paths to state formation, respectively (Nisancıoğlu, 2014; Tilly, 1990). Consequently, to express in Gramscian (1971) terms, the French Third Republic was based on bourgeois-democratic “hegemony”, whereas the Republic of Turkey rested on bureaucratic-reformist “passive revolution”, which prompted secularisation in varying ways and levels. Secondly, geopolitically, France was on the offensive side of imperialism in competition with other European powers, and faced no significant threat on its territory during most of its republican state building, namely between 1871-1913. The Republic of Turkey, by contrast, was on the defensive side of imperialism, founded out of a collapsing Ottoman state that took its final blows predominantly from the Christian West between 1911-1919. This difference matters due to affecting the intensity of “cultural defense” that reinvigorates religious social identity (Wallis & Bruce, 1992, pp. 17-18). Thirdly, the historical configuration of the Catholic Church in France was “relatively autonomous” from the state apparatus (even under the Concordat of 1801), whereas the position of the Islamic establishment in the Ottoman heritage was characterised by “state embeddedness”, which influenced the development of differing secularising strategies (Perchoc, 2007, pp. 25-30). And finally, regarding religious minorities, the non-Catholic elements were much highly integrated into the French Republic than the non-Muslim elements were into the Turkish Republic, which contributed to changing the character of “religious monopoly” and moulding the state’s relationship with the dominant religion in different ways (Martin, 1978). A combination of these historical factors set the framework for the difference between *laïcité* and *laiklik*. Table 5 provides a synopsis of these multiple differences, which is followed by an explanation of these trajectories that led to distinctive dynamics of secularisation.

Table 5: Diverging Paths to State Building and Secularisation in France and Turkey

	“Extra-religious” Factors			“Religious” Factors		Dominant Aspect of Laicism
	Path to State Formation (Pre-19 th Century)	Position in Capitalist System and Imperialist Order (19 th Century)	Secular-Republican State Building	Dominant Religious Institution	Republic vis-à-vis Religious Minorities	
France	Capitalised coercion (with bourgeoisie)	Central-metropolitan (offensive)	Bourgeois-democratic hegemony	Relative autonomy	Higher integration into the Republic	Separation (<i>laïcité</i>)
Ottoman Empire/ Turkey	Coercion-intensive (without bourgeoisie)	Peripheral incorporation (defensive)	Bureaucratic-reformist passive revolution	State embeddedness	Lower integration into the Republic	Regulation (<i>laiklik</i>)

2.2.1. “Extra-Religious” Trajectories: Class Struggles and State Formation

Historically, the paths to state formation followed by France and the Ottoman Empire were characterised by significant differences, which have had long-lasting influences on their political, economic, and ideological structures in the long nineteenth century. The main point of divergence between the two state building experiences resides in the extent to which coercion and capital have been fused in the process³³. Based on their varying combinations of coercion and capital, Tilly (1990) identifies three historical modes of state building in Europe. These are “capital-intensive”, “coercion-intensive”, and “capitalised coercion” modes. The capital-intensive mode was characterised by the “interaction between substantial ... concentrations of capital and weak, fragmented concentrations of coercion”, which failed to produce a strong and durable state apparatus (Tilly, 1990, p. 144). The Italian city-states illustrated an example to this mode. The opposite was valid for the coercion-intensive mode, where “rulers squeezed the means of war from their own populations and others they conquered, building massive [state] structures of extraction in the process”, yet impeding the development of private capital accumulation (Tilly, 1990, p. 30). The Ottoman Empire and Russia belonged to this category. The capitalised coercion mode, finally,

established a balance between the first two modes via bringing together high “concentrations of coercion and of capital ... in greater equality and tighter connection with each other” (Tilly, 1990, p. 153). Countries on this latter path, of which the absolutist France and Britain were the pioneers, incorporated “capitalists and capitalist sources directly into the structures of their states”, therefore producing a more efficient and powerful state machinery than the other trajectories (Tilly, 1990, p. 30). This is why, all these three trajectories eventually converged on the capitalised coercion path, for the latter, “from the seventeenth century onward ... proved more effective in war, and therefore provided a compelling model for states that had originated in other combinations of coercion and capital” (Tilly, 1990, p. 31). In other words, the capitalised coercion path ultimately won out to produce a full-fledged modern territorial state earlier than the other modes. It thus obliged other states such as the Ottoman Empire to seek for ways to establish similar state structures to be able to compete politically, militarily, and economically in the international arena.

The fundamental difference between France and the Ottoman Empire, as their diverging paths to state building suggest, was the “virtually complete absence of private property in land” in the latter, and thus the lack of the historical conditions to develop a bourgeoisie as a social class (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 365). Having followed a coercion-intensive path to its state building, the Empire was among the geographies that “left little space for an autonomous bourgeoisie, hence for accumulation and concentration of capital outside the state” (İnalçik, 1969; Tilly, 1990, p. 143). This was in contrast to France, where “the long sixteenth century” induced the development of a commercial and financial bourgeoisie. Through a capitalised coercion path, the resources of this nascent class were integrated into and organised around a centralised, massive coercive machinery in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to produce “the home ground of the most formidable Absolutist State in Western Europe” (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 113). The rise of absolutist states in Western Europe was “coordinate in time with the emergence of a European world-economy” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 133). That is to say, in the “long sixteenth century”, a European division of labour started to develop in the context of, and in close correspondence with certain bureaucratic state machineries at the core of the system (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 63). This political economic network would remain confined mostly to Europe before the advent of industrial capitalism. It was not

until the mid-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries that “the European world economy broke the bounds it had created in the long sixteenth century and began to incorporate vast new zones into the effective division of labour it encompassed” (Wallerstein, 1989, p. 129). One of these vast new zones in the east was the Ottoman Empire (along with Russia). Nonetheless, due to the Empire’s historical lack of a bourgeoisie as a social class as well as competitiveness in capitalist production and warmaking, Ottoman integration meant its peripheralisation in the world system under imperialist influence. As for France, although it was outpaced by Britain in the eighteenth-century competition for global supremacy, it occupied a central-metropolitan position in the world system with its consolidating bourgeoisie and overseas colonies (Arrighi, 1994, pp. 51-52).

Consequently, nineteenth century class formation and struggles in France and the Ottoman Empire demonstrated different patterns. Since 1789 in France, four prominent social classes were determinant in the socioeconomic scene: the waning aristocracy, the rising bourgeoisie, the emergent proletariat, and the disorganised peasantry (Magraw, 2002; McPhee, 2004). The French Revolution and industrialism gave the bourgeoisie the upper hand over the aristocracy especially after the 1830s, while the nascent proletariat was already asserting its social and political demands. The peasantry oscillated between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, showing regional variations. Different combinations of intra- and inter- conflicts and alliances that took place between these classes provided the basis for political struggles involving the Legitimists, Bonapartists, Orléanists, Republicans and Socialists/Communists throughout the long nineteenth century. Starting from the 1870s, the Third Republic consolidated bourgeois hegemony by organising a balance between the monarchist right and the radical left. As a social class, the bourgeoisie was wary not only of the arbitrariness and lack of accountability of monarchical rule and Catholic-aristocratic privileges, but also of the socialist aspirations of “dangerous classes” targeting private property in repeated intervals since the Revolution (Elwitt, 1975, 1986). These concerns were represented in the political project of the bourgeois Republic, which formed a class coalition with rural and urban petty bourgeois elements including small to medium scale producers, merchants, shopkeepers, professionals, and small holding farmers. The republicans referred to this alliance as the *nouvelles couches sociales* (“new social

strata”, namely the middle classes) taking over political control against a mixed collection of Catholic-traditional *notables*.

Deriving from that class basis, on the right, the Republic managed to prevent the reestablishment of the monarchy, and absorbed and soothed Catholic-aristocratic political advances with a republican emphasis on legality, order, respect of property, and reconciliation with the peasantry (Grévy, 1998; E. Weber, 1976). On the left, it suppressed the revolutionary initiatives of the Commune, and sought to incorporate and appease the communist potential by focusing on anticlericalism, social rights and freedoms, national *solidarité*, *morale laïque* (secular morality), and other unifying values of 1789. In Gramscian parlance, therefore, *laïcité* was born in the context of bourgeois “hegemony”, that is, “the exercise of political, intellectual and moral leadership ... to bring social forces and institutions into conformity with the requirements of capitalist reproduction” (Jessop, 2002, p. 6). *Laïcité* was embedded in the bourgeois “struggle against specific other forces [such as monarchists and the church] and helped by specific auxiliaries or allies [working classes and peasants]”. The republicans, “in order to become a State, they had to subordinate or eliminate the former and win the active or passive assent of the latter” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 53). As an ideology, secularisation helped rally the middle and working classes in favour of the new regime; and as a political strategy, it served to weaken the authority of the Catholic Church in favour of the Republic, internally and externally. French strategies of “separation” and “regulation” against the Catholic establishment were endorsed by this substantial multi-class alliance.

Meanwhile in the peripheral Ottoman Empire, which classically juxtaposed a surplus-collecting traditional bureaucracy with the small peasantry, two new influential social groups materialised during capitalist integration. These were a non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie, and a reformist faction within the traditional state bureaucracy (Keyder, 1988, pp. 159-163). The non-Muslim bourgeoisie developed under the protectorate of European states, concentrating mostly in coastal regions and acting as intermediary to the process of economic integration (Kasaba, 1988, pp. 28-32). Concomitantly, the “defensive modernisation” (Black, 1966, pp. 70-71) of the state apparatus in the face of European wars and diplomacy consolidated a secularly oriented

Muslim reformist bureaucracy as a political stratum (Boratav, 1993). Throughout the long nineteenth century, the reformist bureaucracy was in struggle with the non-Muslim bourgeoisie over the management of the capitalist integration process, and with the traditional-Islamic bureaucracy over the control of the state apparatus (Göçek, 1996, p. 51; Pamuk, 1988, p. 131)³⁴. Meanwhile towards the end of the century, a nascent Muslim class of notables and landlords began to emerge in interior Anatolia, who resented non-Muslim privileges and sought to influence state power in favour of the “Muslim bloc” (Emrence, 2012, p. 57). These interrelated intra-bureaucratic and social polarisations, both divided along religious lines (Muslim versus secular, and Muslim versus non-Muslim, respectively), manifested themselves in the contentious politics involving Ottomanist, Islamist, Westernist, and various Nationalist groups and ideologies.

Represented by the Young Turks and later the Republicans in the early twentieth century, the reformist bureaucracy managed to prevail over the Islamic-traditional bureaucracy implanted in the monarchy (first in the Revolution of 1908 and then the Republic in 1923). In the process, however, they failed to integrate the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and population into the state building project, thus depriving the polity of its most secularised societal basis. As the latter groups pursued their own nationalist-separatist agendas, the reformist bureaucracy subordinated and expelled them by coercive means (Keyder, 1988, p. 162). During the 1914-22 interval, the national state builders secured the support of Muslim notables and landlords against foreign occupation and non-Muslim separatisms. Yet due to fear of losing their religiously underpinned local status and power, the “Muslim bloc” did not readily endorse the republican secularisation wave that followed. To the contrary, some of them allied with segments of the traditional bureaucracy (particularly the Islamic *ulema* and sheiks) to spark off a series of localised rebellions. Closely related to the opposition of landlords, agrarian reform stalled, leading to low level of peasant integration into the new regime (Önal, 2010; B. Toprak, 1981). On account of feeble industrialism, finally, the urban proletariat was almost nonexistent. *Laiklik*, in this context, was “short of such expansive hegemony” as in the French case, given the lack of social classes that could potentially underpin its development, and thus had to be the product of “passive revolution” (Jessop, 1990, p. 212). According to Gramsci, in passive revolution, one cannot talk of “a social group which ‘led’ other groups”, such as the bourgeoisie in France, “but a State

which, even though it had limitations as a power, 'led' the group which should have been 'leading' and was able to put at the latter's disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 105)³⁵. Turkish strategies of "separation" and "regulation" against Islamic authority lacked a broad class basis, where the reformist bureaucracy took the lead in the process through what some scholars referred to as "revolution from above" (Savran, 2010; Trimberger, 1978)³⁶.

Geopolitical forces, finally, interacted with these local French and Turkish dynamics in various ways. Specifically, these polities' position in imperialist-geopolitical relations (France on the offensive, Turkey on the defensive side) was a key factor that produced divided and imbalanced patterns of secularisation. Simultaneous with the making of *laïcité* in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, France undertook an initiative of imperialist expansion in Africa and Southeast Asia, also exerting considerable influence over the Middle East, particularly the Ottoman Empire (Thobie, 1977). Paradoxically, as Catholic schools and missions were promoted in these efforts as an integral part of French imperialism, an intense politics of secularisation was being implemented at home in the 1880s. As Asad (2006, p. 499) observes, "anticlerical schooling at home ... and imperial expansion abroad were the pillars on which *laïcité* was established under the Third Republic". Turkey, on the other hand, was established out of the ruins of the Ottoman state that collapsed under Christian-European encirclement, where the Muslim identity came to be an essential part of that external struggle (adding to the internal one). As part of the "Eastern Question", the international disputes of the period over territory was based on religiously identified demographics, and this confessional definition of the population created a republican bias for Muslims against non-Muslims. This was unlike France, where thanks to the lack of external threat against French borders, Catholicism did not crystallise as a predominant identity of "cultural defence". That would occur later during World War I, (which created a relative appeasement in state-church relations), but not during the critical episode leading to 1905. Relatedly, as the next subsection shows, non-Catholic minorities were highly incorporated into the republican alliance.

2.2.2. “Religious” Lineages: Dominant Establishments and Confessional Minorities

In addition and in relation to their “extra-religious” dynamics of class struggles and internal/external state formation, two “religious” variables differentiated the French and Turkish paths towards secularisation. The first one concerns the establishment of Catholicism and Sunni Islam vis-à-vis the state, which can be characterised as “relative autonomy” versus “state-embeddedness”³⁷. In the Ottoman Empire, “religion and the state were considered one and the same entity. Islam was equated with the state; in fact, there was an institutional merger between the two”, as epitomised by the concept of *din-ü devlet* (Heper, 1991, p. 44). Catholicism in France also rested on a configuration that strongly intertwined state and religion; but as a transnational entity, the Church historically developed in juxtaposition –and at times in competition– with the territorialising state (Le Goff & Rémond, 1988). The Church, although “Gallicised” considerably by the seventeenth century and further nationalised with the Concordat in the nineteenth, was still an institutionally separate and centralised body that was in a position to domestically and diplomatically negotiate its terms with the French state. The situation of the Islamic establishment was much more nebulous. It was an integral component of the Ottoman bureaucracy under the title of *ilmiye*, yet it did not possess a clearly distinct, unified, and self-sufficient institutional apparatus to interact with secular power as an independent entity (Kazancigil, 1992, p. 43). Political centralisation in the long nineteenth century pitted these religious bodies and personnel against secular authority in different ways. Although the Concordat of 1801 made the clergy paid officials of the French state, Ultramontanism³⁸ began to rise as a dominant force within the Catholic Church especially following the Restoration, which sowed the seeds of a great divide in the “national” versus “extra-national” visions, priorities, and functions of secular and religious authority (Bracq, 1916; McManners, 1972). In the post-1789 Ottoman Empire, likewise, the “uneven development” between the Islamic *ilmiye* and other segments of the bureaucracy (above all, the *kalemiye*) caused a major ideological, administrative, and symbolic “bifurcation” within the state apparatus that polarised religious and secular expressions of power (Berkes, 1964; Findley, 1980). The difference between the “relative autonomy” versus “state embeddedness” of religious authority

would lead the French and Turkish republicans to develop distinct secularising strategies in the national state building periods.

The second “religious” variable involves the level of integration of non-Catholic and non-Sunni minorities into the national state building enterprise. By 1789, these polities had inherited starkly different confessional demographics and politics from the preceding centuries. Episodes of violence and expulsion such as the counter-Reformation (16th-17th centuries), Wars of Religion (1562-98), and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) in France left a Protestant population of about 2 percent by the Revolution (Cabanel, 2012). The Jewish population was less than 1 percent. The Ottoman *millet* system, by contrast, carried over a much more cosmopolitan religious demography into the nineteenth century. Whereas the Ottoman Jews constituted a percentage comparable to that of France, the total number of Greek and Armenian Christians in the Muslim Empire amounted to more than 25 percent of the population (Shaw, 1978). This was in addition to an Alevi minority of around 15 percent within the Muslims. Conditioned partly by this religious-demographic difference, but more importantly by their nineteenth century politics and polarisations involving religion, non-Catholic integration to the French republican project came to be much higher than the non-Muslim integration into the Turkish republic. Protestant and Jewish bourgeoisies, intellectuals, and politicians of France were drawn to the republican project from the 1870s onwards against the domination of the Catholic-aristocratic establishment, and assumed significant roles in secular-national state building (Birnbaum, 1994; Cabanel, 2000). In Turkey, that the sociopolitical conflict (involving the state bureaucracy and interior notables against the coastal merchant bourgeoisie) was acted out as a Muslim-Christian confrontation prevented the integration of non-Muslims into the Young Turk/republican initiative. The non-Muslim bourgeoisie increasingly pursued nationalist-separatist agendas, while the reformist bureaucracy (endorsed by Muslim notables) concurrently adopted a Turkish nationalism exclusionary towards non-Muslim elements (Keyder, 1988; Okutan, 2004). As a result, even in the most secularising episodes of its history, the Republic still maintained a Muslim “elective affinity” over non-Muslim elements. Also in this process, the difference between Sunni and Alevi sects were systematically disregarded and underplayed (to the disadvantage and failure of recognition of the latter) as a means to promote national-religious unity (Dressler, 2013).

The opposite tendency was valid for France. Against the advances of the proto-fascist and authoritarian nationalism fostered by the Catholic right, which reached its zenith at the turn of the century with the Dreyfus Affair, the republican side emerged as the upholder of pluralism and the defender of religious minorities. Consequently, as Patrick Weil (2015, p. 78) writes, “the Law of 1905 allowed French Judaism and Protestantism to develop a new independent diversity than the older official structures” offered. French republicans developed a higher level of neutrality towards non-Catholics than their Turkish counterparts could against non-(Sunni)Muslims.

How did these “extra-religious” and “religious” factors contribute to shaping the particular patterns of secularisation in France and Turkey? At the political, economic, and military core of the world system, French *laïcité* was erected on a highly contentious bourgeois-hegemonic class and multi-religious alliance against Catholic forces. Geopolitically, relative conditions of domestic peace free from external intrusion helped the entrenchment of republican rule without recourse to Catholicism as a unifying identity. Instead, Catholicism was actively promoted in the colonies, while it was simultaneously weakened and disestablished at home. In this process, that the Catholic establishment had a “relatively autonomous” extra-national institutional basis rendered its severance from the state a feasible policy to minimise religious sociopolitical influence. In peripheral Turkey, *laiklik* was born out of the passive revolution carried out by the national state builders, which lacked a secularly oriented social class and multi-religious coalition against the Islamic-patrimonial order. The strife against non-Muslim separatisms concluded with the expulsion of the Christian bourgeoisie and populations, which not only debilitated the secular class basis of state making, but also produced Islamic partialities in the policymaking of national state builders. Geopolitically too, continuous wars and conflict with Christian powers energised Islamic rhetoric and identity, which were promoted for the purposes of “cultural defence” especially in the early stages of national state building. The defensive priority also led to deemphasising the Sunni-Alevi difference at the expense of the latter’s invisibility, leaving it officially unrecognised as a distinct confessional entity. Still, the Alevi population mainly continued to support the secular Republic to keep Sunni-extremism in check (Koçan & Öncü, 2004; Öktem, 1994). It is due to this remaining Sunni-Islamic partiality that the “religious monopoly” could not be sufficiently weakened despite the diminishment of

religious authority through secularisation. Lastly, as the Ottoman Islamic establishment was embedded within the state, furnishing it with an independent standing would mean not being able to effectively oversee and pacify religiously articulated dissent, and it would also deprive the state builders of the necessary religious legitimacy in the transition from the Empire to the national state.

Based on a combination of these historical factors, sociopolitical secularisation followed dissimilar paths in France and Turkey. The multi-class and multi-religious coalition in France, coupled with limited recourse to religious legitimacy due to the lack of external conflict, engendered “separation” as a viable and effective secularising strategy against the “relatively autonomous” religious institution –which was “regulated” thereafter under the status of “religious associations”. The weak societal and multi-religious mobilisation for secularisation in Turkey, accompanied by external Christian encirclement that kept alive Islamic identity and “monopoly”, brought forth “regulation” as a primary means to keep the “state embedded” dominant religion in check and benefit from its legitimising power, while unwaveringly “separating” it from its major sociopolitical functions. Confident of their position vis-à-vis Catholicism and in higher independence from its legitimating influence³⁹, French republicans could opt for “separation” as the dominant strategy. For Turkish republicans, however, Islam was viewed both as the social basis of state building efforts, as well as the main source of reactionary threat against it. To constrain and “domesticate” it in line with the national state, the strategy of “regulation” was prioritised. *Laïcité* and *laiklik* are therefore the outcome of two geographically diverse, yet historically interconnected trajectories of national state building. French and Turkish republicans operated in dissimilar social conditions and political opportunities, and consequently developed different strategies to prevail in their struggle to consolidate bourgeois-national infrastructural power.

Reprise and Review

The multiple variables of convergence and divergence laid out in this chapter only begin explaining the trajectories of secularisation in France and Turkey. Unlike most other European trajectories, French and Turkish national state building episodes featured sociopolitical contentions that directly pitted the various manifestations of their

dominant religions against the internal and external sovereignty of bourgeois-republican power. *Laïcité* and *laiklik* produced convergent patterns, because they both emerged as an inherent component of these contentious junctures, representing not simply ideological positions, but also concrete governmental strategies to “separate” and “regulate” religious authority for the consolidation of republican politics. Nevertheless, a combination of “extra-religious” (class formation, geopolitics) and “religious” factors (configuration of dominant religion, minority integration) caused the divergence of *laïcité* and *laiklik*, prioritising “separation” and “regulation”, respectively. This schematic process-oriented comparative account needs to be supplemented by a within-case narrative of each case to gain further insight into their secularising processes. Towards that end, Part II traces the “extra-religious” and “religious” historical lineages of France and the Ottoman Empire prior to and during the “long nineteenth century”, whereas Part III sheds light on the critical junctures of 1875-1905/1908-1938 that witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the secular republics.

PART II – Lineages of the *Longue Dureé*

Chapter 3. Historical “Baselines” and Multiple Trajectories

“The notion of secularisation ... implies a comparative historical perspective”, and requires a historical “base-line” to serve as a marker in registering the changes that came about with modernity (Dobbelaere, 1981, p. 31). Based on that understanding, the present chapter sets out to delineate the historical configurations of religion in the French and Ottoman social formations of the “long sixteenth century” (Section 3.1), as well as their diverging developmental trajectories on the road to 1789 (Section 3.2). These sections highlight and compare certain “religious” and “extra-religious” historical dynamics in the making, which would have implications for the future processes of secularisation in France and Turkey. Chapter 4 will then take it from where this chapter leaves, (that is, the eve of 1789), to provide a social history of the long and contentious nineteenth century in these countries, which polarised and politicised religion in multifaceted ways. Having laid out theoretical/methodological foundations of the study along with the general outline of the comparison in Part I, it is the purpose of Part II to highlight the significant moments of French and Ottoman politico-religious confrontations before and throughout the long nineteenth century. Given the scale of the *longue durée* involving several centuries, the aim in Part II is not to provide a detailed recount of events, but a narration that teases out the relationship between politics and religion in the context of the social forces and geopolitical realities at work.

3.1. Religion in the French and Ottoman “Long Sixteenth Century” (c. 1450-1650)

In their late medieval/early modern social formations, Catholicism in France and Sunni Islam in the Ottoman Empire shared the commonality of being state religions inseparably intertwined with the configuration of sociopolitical power. In both cases, like most other polities of the time, the source of sovereignty and legitimacy was identified as God having bestowed the French King and the Ottoman Sultan a mission to rule the

faithful community and ensure the protection and spread of religion (Barkey, 2010; Beaune, 1985). Some of the founding myths of the two realms confer in astonishingly similar ways the divine right to rule to the Frankish and the Ottoman. In the baptism of the Merovingian King Clovis (fifth century), “God, in the form of light, appeared to the king”, and it was “prophesied that his offspring would be kings forever” on the condition that “Clovis would have to honor Christian religion. The France to come would be Christian or nothing at all” (Le Goff, 1998, p. 198). Likewise, in (the first Ottoman ruler) Osman Bey’s dream (thirteenth century) in the house of the Islamic Sheik Edebali, “a moon arose from the holy man’s breast and came to sink in his own breast”, and “a tree then sprouted from his navel and its shade compassed the world”, thus becoming “one of the most resilient founding myths of the empire, conjuring up a sense of temporal and divine authority” (Finkel, 2005, p. 2). Directly representing the will of divinity, French kings were believed to have the power of healing (*le roi te touche, Dieu te guérit*) and Ottoman sultans were the “shadow of Allah on earth” (*zillullah-ı fil alem*).

Such mythical notions were rather retrospectively fortified as these polities evolved to institute two of the most advanced politico-military apparatuses that endorsed and were endorsed by Catholicism and Sunni Islam, particularly vis-à-vis other religions/sects. As early as the eleventh century, the Franks’ involvement in the crusades against Muslims, and the Turkic-Seljuk leadership against the Christian Byzantine Empire contributed to consolidating the foundational governing philosophy as the protector of religion in their respective territories. For centuries, the Kingdom of France came to be known as the “eldest daughter of the Catholic Church” due to being among the highest capacity political powers to represent, promote and protect Catholicism through internal/external wars. French monarchs were recognised as “the most Christian kings” by the Holy See, which itself was headed by 17 French popes, the second highest represented nationality in that seat after Italy (Galton, 1972). The Ottomans, similarly, established the strongest territorial power in the Islamic geography, stretching across three continents, where Sunni Islam and the corresponding *ghazi* tradition were the key ideational components of imperial expansion. Differentiating between the “house of Islam” (*dar-ül islam*) and “house of war/west” (*dar-ül harb/garb*), they “claimed Islam as their main source of legitimacy, and interpreted and practiced religion as an important political means of the empire” (Barkey, 2010, p. 93).

In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, Catholicism and Sunni Islam were further centralised and entrenched in the late medieval/early modern state apparatus due to geopolitical and social developments. In France, continuous struggles with the Vatican laid the foundations of the Gallican Church centered on the Kingdom, with considerable autonomy from the Pope. Late medieval French history is full of contention with Rome due to growing incongruence between the universal and territorial conceptions of sovereignty promoted by the Popes and the increasingly centralising rule of the Capetian kings, respectively. These conflicts involved matters such as the collection of taxes, organisation of the clergy in the French territory, the divine right to rule, determination of foreign policy, and so on. (Le Goff & Rémond, 1988; Montclos, 1990) One tumultuous episode was the fallout between King Philippe IV (*le Bel*) and Pope Boniface in 1302, which ended in the enslavement and eventual death of the latter. Subsequently, between 1309-1377, seven successive popes (all French) had to reside in the French town of Avignon (as opposed to Rome) under direct influence of Capetian Kings. This was followed by the period of Papal Schism (1378-1418), where two claimants to Papacy in Avignon and Rome created divided allegiances throughout Europe. In result of these intervals, the seeds of Gallicanism were sown, which would fully mature in the Pragmatic sanction of Bourges (1438), the Concordat of Bologna (1516), and finally in the Post-Reformation period, the Declaration of the Clergy of France (1682) (Dansette, 1961a, pp. 32-33). Despite promoting monarchical autonomy away from the Vatican, Gallicanism was far from enabling sociopolitical secularisation per se. On the contrary, it further embedded Catholicism in the territorial-administrative organisation of the French Kingdom (Haarscher, 2011, p. 13).

In the Ottoman Empire, likewise, the conquest of Istanbul (1453) and the official appropriation of the Islamic Caliphate from the Mamluks of Egypt (1517) contributed to the centralisation of the administrative structure in close association with the religious establishment (Barkey, 2014, p. 473). With the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror) undertook a comprehensive initiative to centralise the Ottoman state apparatus politically, economically, and administratively. An important component of this large-scale process was the Empire's institutional centralisation of Sunni Islam accompanied by its increasing clampdown on what was considered as heterodox Islamic interpretations. Such policies were intensified after the acquisition of

the Caliphate by Selim I; the “assumption of the caliphate ... further enhanced the Ottomans’ ideological extensiveness giving it greater infrastructural reach” (Jacoby, 2004, p. 30). Frequent wars with the Shiite Safavid Empire (Allouche, 1983) strengthened the same tendency: “the struggle with the Safavids assumed an ideological character, as a contest between the Sunni or orthodox Islam of the Ottomans and the heterodox, Shia Islam of the Safavids” (Ahmad, 2003, p. 11). The Empire acted as the advocate of Sunni Islam, where the intra-Islamic political struggle was played out not only in continuous wars between the two dynasties, but also in the persecution of Shiite-Alevi populations in Ottoman lands to further ascertain the Sunni Islamic character of political rule. In result of these internal and external developments, the long sixteenth century in the Ottoman lands created a relatively homogenised “official” Islam deeply entrenched in the political apparatus (Mardin, 1977).

Parallel in time, although much more violently, was France’s defence of Catholicism against the surge of Protestantism during and after the Reformation. The wars of religion in France during the Counter-Reformation involved a massive Protestant-Huguenot purge, and solidified the Catholic underpinnings of the Kingdom against external “Reformed” influences (Forrestal & Nelson, 2009). In this process, “the monarch’s role as defender of the faith enabled him to rally Catholic members of the privileged classes behind a program of monarchical absolutism as the best defense against heresy” (Gorski, 2003a, p. 159), thus further sealing the fate of the state with religion. Protestantism was seen as “a threat to the secular and religious bases of the French monarchy”, and indeed “the Protestant challenge re-invigorated the Catholic Church” in France and boosted its sociopolitical influence (Price, 2005, pp. 60, 71-72). Framing the scope of the Papal reaction against the Reformation, the Council of Trent (1545-1563) sought to build, in the Catholic south, “a territorial whole that was relatively compact and almost in a continuous bloc”, of which France was a part (Rémond, 1999, p. 20). For the larger course of the battle between Catholicism and Protestantism, “the battle for the soul of France was absolutely pivotal”, the outcome of which “entrenched Catholicism”, in its Gallican form, in the Kingdom (Mullett, 2010, p. xxxvii). The Council also empowered novel and more radical religious orders to wield Catholic influence across Europe (and later in the colonies). The most significant and relevant of these for France was the *Compagnie de Jésus* (the Jesuits), who were to become particularly

politicised in the post-1789 period. It is in relation to these larger geopolitical and sociopolitical conflicts that France and the Ottoman Empire emerged by the sixteenth century as among the leading polities of Catholicism and Islam in Europe and in the Middle East.

3.1.1. Catholic and Sunni Hegemony in the Social Formation

In a mutually enabling fashion with their external affairs, the domestic configuration of the French and Ottoman social formations was irrevocably entangled with Catholicism and Sunni Islam, both functioning as the dominant *Weltanschauung* to reinforce the existing order. Parallel with the religiously legitimated rule of the Kingdom and the Sultanate, official ceremonies and royal-dynastic symbolism were enmeshed in a Catholic and Muslim framework of meaning and rightfulness (İnalçık, 1973; McManners, 1998). The coronation ceremonies of French and Ottoman rulers (*sacre* and *cülus*, respectively) reveal the centrality of religious legitimation in governmental power. In the French *sacre*, taking place at Notre-Dame de Reims Cathedral, archbishop's prayers were followed by the anointment of the king and a public mass (Giesey, 1990). Similarly in the Ottoman *cülus*, taking place in the *Alay Meydanı* at Topkapı Palace, *nakibüleşraf* said prayers in the new sultan's presence, which was followed by the funeral ceremony of the deceased sultan after the midday prayer in one of the imperial mosques (Necipoğlu, 1992). Despite the differences regarding their formal organization within government, these religions were deeply rooted in the legal-institutional and politico-ideological structures of the state apparatus so as to create a legitimising framework for feudal/patrimonial relations of political domination and economic exploitation. Inherently political institutions, these belief systems provided "active conceptions of the world" regarding sovereignty, legitimacy, social unity, and "commonsensical" notions of everyday life for the reproduction of the social formation and its prevailing class interests (Portelli, 1974).

Early modern French and Ottoman state apparatuses were based on aristocratic/tributary appropriation of agricultural surplus from a predominantly peasant population. The prevailing class hierarchies in society were identified and justified in the notions of "Estates of the Realm" (*Société d'Ordres*), and "Circle of Justice" (*Daire-i*

Adalet), respectively (Duby, 1980; Itzkowitz, 1972). The French estates system ranked the Catholic clergy, the nobility, and the commoners as the three layers of society (in that order), whereas the Ottoman regime relied on the formal division between a stratum of bureaucratic elites (*askeri*) and the ruled community composed mainly of peasants (*reaya*). The Catholic-aristocratic ruling estates in France constituted a very small percentage of the total population, similar to the proportion of *askeri* in the Ottoman Empire, an important segment of which comprised the *ilmiye/ulema* (Islamic clergy). The Catholic clergy and the aristocracy in France, as well as the *askeri* in the Ottoman lands (including the *ulema*) were exempt from taxation, and they were fused inseparably with the state apparatus. It was the third estate of commoners and the *reaya* who generated the bulk of tax revenue in both polities. Serving as functionaries as part of the ruling bloc, the Catholic clergy and Muslim *ulema* were deeply invested in this pre-capitalist order. They were constituents of the dominant class that lived off of the extracted surplus from the non-privileged masses. Moreover, they played key roles in the governing apparatus that were not confined to matters of faith/worship as a distinct set of practices, for religion and political administration were not conceived in such terms of partition. As Rémond (1999, p. 30) clarifies, even the term religious-political “alliance” would be misleading, because “to speak of alliance implies a prior distinction ... between two clearly individualized powers”. Instead, it is more appropriate to talk of “osmosis”, “interpenetration”, or “joint possession” involving religion and politics, where “the spirit of the age” deemed “this symbiosis quite legitimate”.

In France, the three first ministers of the King were ecclesiastics, and the clergy performed duties as diplomats, acted as *conseillers clerics* of the highest law courts, and had magisterial posts reserved for them in each *parlement* (regional government). All government and municipal institutions, as well as the army and the navy had a chaplain central to its functioning. The clergy were profoundly organised across the French territory through close to 150 regional dioceses/archdioceses (led by bishops/archbishops) governing over more than 60,000 local parishes (led by priests), thus qualifying France as *le Royaume aux cent mille clochers* (“the land of a hundred thousand bell towers”) (Dubois, 1965). Affairs and records of marriage and family as the bedrock of the social system were largely undertaken by the clergy, which was also valid for keeping registries and performing services regarding birth, baptism, and death.

Embedded in the daily lives of the people, the clergy was responsible for reproducing Catholicism as an inherent mechanism of social control in conjunction with state coercion. As late as the eighteenth century, it was a conventional governing philosophy that “the State had to support religion by its laws, its law courts, and their penalties” because religion was “an essential part of the hierarchical structure of society”, and any deviation and disrespect against its moral values was deemed “as subverting the decencies and deference that helped to preserve the stability of the social order” (McManners, 1998, pp. 74, 78).

In the Ottoman Empire, similarly, the ruling bureaucracy featured a “huge hierarchy of clergy, stretching from the sultan’s council to the plethora of religious officials in every provincial community”, and “influenced ideals of political legitimacy and integrated the Muslim masses into a caliph-led and broadly coalescent *umma*” (Jacoby, 2004, p. 31). The *ulema* “were the upholders of a complex network of institutions”, which “encompassed a vast field of functions” including highest figures (with seats in the Imperial Council) such as the *Şeyhülislam* (principal authority in religious affairs) and the *kazasker* (military legal authority), overseeing the locally organised *kadı* (judge/magistrate) and the *müftü* (expounder of Islamic law) as well as mosque imams (Kara, 2005, p. 163). In the locality, the *kadı* was the meeting point between legal-Islamic and social-administrative affairs, whose “public role extended beyond the courtroom to make them adjunct officers of state. Kadis reported on the conduct of the sultan’s secular administrators and supervised transactions in the marketplace” (Zilfi, 2006, p. 213). In everyday life, they were the implementers and interpreters of *sharia* and *kanun* (the Sultanic law) across the Empire, “adjudicating issues concerning individual rights, family law, inheritance, commerce, and the rights of foreign subjects” (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 18). This was in addition to the *ulema*’s roles in marriages, funerals, education, and so on. In this setting, religion was vital for social order, as “the *ulema* were integrated into the state system along with other administrative elements, and the primary task of this bureaucracy was the preservation of the integrity of the state and the promotion of Islam” (Yavuz, 2003, p. 40).

In Gramscian terms, the French Catholic clergy and the Ottoman Islamic *ulema* can be understood as the socially embedded “organic intellectuals” of the pre-capitalist

regime, establishing the main link between the state and society to engender hegemony. According to Gramsci, organic intellectuals are “the persons or groupings of persons who construct, develop or unify ... the hegemonic values or who organise and administer the state’s coercive procedures ... Hence, those who perform the task of organising hegemony and domination are both ‘organic’ to the operation of the mode of production, as well as necessary to social control” (Fulton, 1987, pp. 204-205). The clergy and the *ulema* systematically articulated “religion of the people” in the form of “religion of the intellectuals” to organise and reproduce the dominant belief systems, customs, and practices in the interest of the class alliance and relations of production they were part of. The state’s influence and visibility at the local level was to a large extent through religious venues and personnel assuming administrative-ideological roles. The local church and the mosque served not only as agents of socialisation, but also as intersection points for popular and official morals so as to maintain the values of religious solidarity and obedience to authority. The parish priests were ascribed “the duty of making government legislation known to their people”, and of “reading out official announcements” during the Sunday *messe* (McManners, 1998, p. 89). Friday prayers in Muslim lands were not too different, where the imam would communicate government regulations to the community in his *hutbe*, which “was one of the most important symbols of dynastic rule” (Ertuğ, 2009, p. 209).

In both cases, religious commentary on sociopolitical affairs would be accompanied by the offering of collective allegiance to the King and the Sultan. The clergy and the *ulema* also held the monopoly in the educational system through *petite école* and *mektepe* for children, and *collegel/université* and *medrese* for higher learning. Moreover, they were associated at varying levels with numerous Catholic and Islamic congregations and brotherhoods organised in villages and towns, which were themselves deeply embedded in the functioning and meaning creation of local community (Le Gall, 2005; Sorrel, 2003a). Religious institutions such as these functioned as the ideological state apparatuses underpinning the dominant relations of production and authority. Through multifaceted mechanisms epitomised by the local church, schools, congregations, and hospitals, the Catholic clergy and “the Church took the form of an encompassing institution under the *Ancien Régime*” that held cultural-ideological monopoly over knowledge, values, and the everyday lives of a great majority

of the French population (Portier, 2005, p. 117). In the Ottoman case, likewise, in addition to their judicial duties, the *ulema* “defined, obtained, safeguarded and transferred knowledge (and eventually culture) via the *medreses*, the mosques and their guidance services, and thus influenced the mentality, conscience and values of society as a whole” (Kara, 2005, p. 163).

3.1.2. Variances: Levels of Autonomy and Diversity

The Catholic clergy and the Sunni *ulema* essentially held very similar positions of privilege vis-à-vis the *tiers état/reaya* in the configuration of exploitative relations of production and oppressive political authority. As religious historian McManners (1998, p. 96) writes on France, “in our fashionable enthusiasm for the study of nuances of social structure, we should never lose sight of the sheer oppressiveness of the *ancien régime*. It requires an effort of the imagination to understand how these unjust arrangements were stolidly and fatalistically accepted from below, and imposed, with only rare tremors of conscience, from above”. The politico-ideological and legal-institutional role of Catholicism in this picture of class domination is easily comparable to that of Sunni Islam in Ottoman lands. Turkish historian İnalcik (1969, p. 97) puts it as follows: “all classes of society and all sources of wealth were regarded as obliged to preserve and promote the power of the ruler. Hence all political and social institutions and all types of economic activity were regulated by the state in order to achieve this goal ... The legitimacy of the exercise of unbounded power by a single ruler was based in the Islamic state upon the assumption that it was the sole means of ensuring the application of the *sharia*, the holy law of Islam”. The similarity of their sociopolitical positions and roles notwithstanding, the politico-religious history of France and the Ottoman Empire feature two significant “religious” variances that would have long term consequences for their national-bourgeois state building intervals and secularisation patterns in the long nineteenth century. The first concerns the institutional organisation of the dominant religion in relation to politics (level of autonomy), and the second is about the weight and situation of religious minorities (level of diversity).

Regarding the first, the organisation of Catholic and Muslim “organic intellectuals” vis-à-vis the state apparatus demonstrated considerable dissimilarities. The Catholic

Church in France, although drastically “Gallicised” by the late seventeenth century, maintained a relatively autonomous standing apropos the Capetian King. A duality was present in that the administration of the Catholic Church, headquartered in Rome, was bound by its own regulations based on canonical law and courts. State administrative divisions did not necessarily overlap with ecclesiastical (arch)dioceses, and the appointment of parish priests and (arch)bishops were determined internally. The Church, moreover, controlled and expended its own finances, including undertaking the remuneration of the clergy. Its financial independence derived mostly from ownership of land (6 to 10 percent of arable land in France) and direct appropriation of the agricultural surplus through taxation. “The real property of ... the clergy, including land, forests, and buildings, produced a revenue” comparable to that of the French state itself when combined with tax incomes (Galton, 1972, pp. 41-42). The extraction of a mandatory tithe from the parishioners called *la dîme* was complemented by fees, alms, and leaseholds. The role of the French peasant was thus to pay exorbitant taxes both to the church (*dîme*) and the state (*taille*), while the two were instituted in distinct yet ultimately linked organisational forms.

The Ottoman *ilmiye* stratum (comprised of the *ulema*), by contrast, operated in the same administrative framework with the other two chief segments of the ruling bloc, namely *kalemiye* (scribal service) and *seyfiye* (army). These groups were all paid officials of the state with essentially no self-governed hierarchical or financial existence. Compared to the clergy, the Ottoman *ulema* took more central judicial-bureaucratic duties within the governing apparatus, but unlike their Catholic counterpart, they did not possess land or tax revenue independent of the state. Islamic and Sultanic law were to a certain extent separate, but in practice, “the magistrate [*kadı*] was the embodiment of this duality, being the administrative official entrusted with popularly resented practices such as tax collection, but also remaining an important religious figure at the local level” (Barkey, 2010, p. 96). The *ulema* were embedded in the state at every level of its organisational schema, which prevented the duality between ecclesiastical and territorial rule observable in Catholic states. The *ulema*’s “highly centralised role controlling the education system, the judiciary and the administrative service positioned the upper echelons of the clergy at the very centre of the Ottoman state” (Jacoby, 2004, p. 30). They were not landowners as a distinct estate, but they were the main administrators

and beneficiaries of the *vakıf* property (pious foundations), which constituted up to half of Ottoman arable land and about one-third of state revenues (Kuran, 2001, p. 849; Van Leeuwen, 1999, p. 68). And regarding taxation, although the *ulema* were often not the direct extractors of surplus (as in the case of the Catholic *dîme*), they were still part of the class coalition that fed on that surplus (above all the Ottoman tithe, *öşür*).

As introduced in the previous chapter, the variance in the configuration of these early modern religious establishments can be conceptualised as “relative autonomy” (Kingdom of France) versus “state embeddedness” (Ottoman Empire). Although Catholic and Sunni Muslim institutions were fundamentally similar in reproducing mechanisms of privilege and legitimacy, that organisational difference characterised by the level of autonomy was to be a factor in influencing the form of the secularising contention, rhetoric, and strategies developed against them in the republican state building periods. Unlike the religiously determinist accounts discussed in Chapter 1.1.2, however, “relative autonomy” and “state embeddedness” do not deterministically preconfigure path dependencies towards “separation” in France and “regulation” in Turkey. They merely constitute one of the factors creating different sociopolitical realities that affect the course of the sociopolitical contention and secularisation. The second “religious” variance that would also prove significant in the long run was France and the Ottoman Empire’s levels of diversity, that is, their experience and dealings with religious minorities. The latter polity always exhibited a more cosmopolitan demographic reality than the former. By the nineteenth century, French non-Catholic minority (namely Protestants and Jews) did not amount to more than 3-4 percent (which was up to 11-2 percent in the sixteenth century), whereas non-Muslim Ottomans (namely Christians and Jews) constituted as high as 30-5 percent of the populace. There was also a roughly 15 percent Alevi minority within the Muslims. Since the fifteenth century, the Ottoman policy towards the multi-religious composition of the Empire was (retrospectively) called the *millet* system, which was based on the state’s confessional recognition of non-Muslim communities, guaranteeing them protection and legal-religious autonomy, albeit in partial segregation from and in inferior social status to Muslims (Quataert, 2005, pp. 174-175).

The *millet* system was a pragmatic form of indirect government resting on legal inequality, and not a democratic “multicultural” organisation in the modern sense of the

term. It instituted “a loose administrative set of central-local arrangements for each community used as a script for multi-religious rule. *Millet* allowed for the simultaneous division and integration of communities into the state and ... permitted intermediaries with a real stake in the maintenance of the status quo to administer internally autonomous self-regulatory religious communities” (Barkey, 2010, p. 98). The whole system was framed in the Islamic political-theoretical framework of dealing with the *ehl-i kitab* (“people of the book”). Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and other groups implemented their own regulations, religious courts, and education system in their communities, and their safety as a whole was warranted by the state. This substantially tolerant mechanism for religious minorities (especially compared to contemporary Europe) was at the expense of being a second-rate citizen vis-à-vis the *millet-i hakime* (dominant confessional community, namely Muslims). Non-Muslims had to pay additional taxes (such as *haraç* and *cizye*), they could not be employed in civil service or military, and each *millet* was subject to a public dress code to mark their particular religious belonging (Timur, 1994). Not recognised as a separate *millet* on account of being Muslim, most politico-religious violence in early modern Ottoman lands was directed towards the Shiite-Alevi minority. In the context of the sixteenth century strife with the Safavid Dynasty, massacres under Sultan Selim I cost Alevi lives in tens of thousands (Lellouch, 2005; Yıldırım, 2008).

Within the same century, the intense inter-aristocratic conflict in post-Reformation France instigated a spiral of violence involving Catholics and Protestants with much more disastrous consequences (Febvre, 1929). It is estimated that the French Wars of Religion between 1562-1598 instigated a death toll of two to four million on both sides (Knecht, 2002, p. 91). Civil unity was restored with King Henry IV’s adoption of Catholicism and declaration of the *Édit de Nantes* that granted the Huguenots substantial rights in the Kingdom. About a hundred years later, however, the Edict was revoked in 1685 by the absolutism of Louis XIV (*Édit de Fontainebleau*), and caused a massive Huguenot expulsion from France reaching up to 900,000 individuals. It is interesting to note that some members of the deported Huguenot families, such as Comte de Bonneval and Baron de Tott, would serve as military advisors to the Ottoman Empire during the latter’s eighteenth century modernisation efforts. After the Revocation, the idea of “one faith, one law, one king” continued to prevail (albeit in relatively relaxed

terms) well into the age of Revolution, and “although ... eighteenth century philosophers were beginning to question this in the name of freedom of conscience”, Catholic domination “still received almost general acquiescence” (Rémond, 1999, p. 31). Only two years prior to 1789, *Édit de Versailles* granted certain rights non-Catholics, which the Revolution would expand towards equal citizenship. In conclusion, nineteenth century French and Ottoman polities inherited starkly different levels of religious diversity from their early modern demographic trajectories: relative Catholic uniformity in the former, and a multi-confessional Islamic framework in the latter.

3.2. The Long Road(s) to 1789

“At its apogee under Suleiman I in the mid-16th century, the *Osmanlı* realm was the most powerful Empire in the world. Overshadowing his nearest European rival, Suleiman I enjoyed a revenue twice that of Charles V” (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 365). Financial superiority, moreover, was reflected in areas such as the military, diplomacy, and culture to have significant influences on European society (Coles, 1968). The following two centuries, however, discernibly reversed this tendency of Ottoman ascendancy (the underlying causes of which were already underway during Suleiman’s reign) through the rise of commercial capitalism and colonialism in Western Europe and the parallel consolidation of the absolutist state as its political form (Adams, 2007). The stagnation and gradual financial and military decline of the Ottoman Empire was linked to and simultaneous with such European developments, causing momentous disturbances in the classical composition of its social formation. It is through these geographically interrelated transformations that France and the Ottoman Empire entered 1789 in diverse positions within the global (geo)political economic system. Their divergent trajectories rooted in the long sixteenth century produced dissimilar processes of class formation by the nineteenth, and led to differing paths to state building (that influenced sociopolitical secularisation patterns). As discussed in Chapter 2, these paths can be termed as “capitalised-coercion” (for France) vs. “coercion-intensive” (for the Ottoman Empire) (Tilly, 1990). This section succinctly outlines the general propensities of this political economic “great divergence” (Frank, 2001) as these historical trajectories

would constitute the essential “extra-religious” determinants transmuted the relations between the state and religion in the secularisation process.

3.2.1. Historical Roots of the “Great Divergence”

The bulk of Ottoman wealth stemmed from agricultural taxation based on the *timar* system (and to a lesser extent tax revenues from merchants, and craftsmen organised into guilds). All land in the Ottoman Empire was the property of the Sultan, and within the *timar* system (emulated partly from the Byzantine *pronoia*), “*sipahis* were state employees who were assigned by the Sultan as administrators of state land and were responsible for the collection of taxes. In return, *sipahis* were obliged to use these revenues locally to maintain a local army, and provide the central administration with a predetermined number of cavalry units in times of war” (M. Birdal, 2010, p. 17). Whether or not the Ottoman land system can be conceptualised as feudalism has been a lengthy debate within historical and sociological circles (see, for instance, Barkan, 1975a; Berktaý, 1987; İnalçik, 1964; Keyder, 1976). It has been argued that the *timar* system differed from European feudalism due to the following reasons: “*timars* (military fiefs) were non-hereditary; all fiefs whether large or small were handed out by the sultan (i.e., subinfeudation did not exist); timariot *sipahis* (small knights) did not exercise private judicial rights over the *reaya* (dependent tenants); and demesne production through compulsory labour services was exceptional within a generalised system of taxes and/or rents in kind” (Berktaý, 1987, p. 293).

Such dissimilarities suggest that the Ottoman system established a more centralised variant of European feudalism politically, economically, and administratively. Yet despite their differences, it is possible to contend, as Berktaý (1987, p. 311) does, that European and Ottoman pre-capitalist social formations can still be termed feudalism, because in both cases, “the state is always essentially the state of the entire ... ruling class endowed with - various sorts of - legal and political rights to subject and exploit the peasantry; most importantly, endowed with a class monopoly - whatever the degree of privatisation this monopoly might undergo - of that principal and irreproducible means of production, the land”. Berktaý identifies the main difference between Western European and Ottoman feudalism as being relatively “decentralised” and “centralised”,

respectively, which he regards as two different forms of the same political economic essence, and not necessarily two different modes of production. Indeed, regardless of whether one chooses to categorise the Ottoman state as “feudal”, its higher level of centralisation is a key factor that has rendered it a more powerful ruling apparatus than its European counterparts in the sixteenth century. As Nisancioğlu (2014, p. 336) puts it, Ottoman “devices of ruling class reproduction proved remarkably efficient, considerably more so than the contemporaneous feudal form found in Europe ... The unity and stability of the Ottoman Empire contrasted significantly with European forms”.

Paradoxically, what made the Ottoman state a more unified and better-organised feudal/tributary political-military machinery was also what made it less conducive to capitalist transformation. The organisation of property relations in the Empire was determinedly resistant towards economic activities outside the state, and towards private capital accumulation. In the words of İnalçık (1969, p. 135), “the Ottoman state endeavoured to exercise close control over production and distribution, as having a close bearing on its own financial and political ambitions”. Starting particularly from the centralising reforms of Mehmed II in the fifteenth century, other influential governing families that could potentially rival the Ottoman dynasty (such as the Çandarlı) were systematically ousted and their property confiscated (Kastritsis, 2013, pp. 14-15). Within the Sultan’s court, the *devshirme* system created a closed community of centralised functionaries and soldiers (the janissaries) with no remaining ties to the rest of society. This system was based on taking young boys from Christian families in the Balkans on an annual basis (mainly from Albanians, Serbs, and Greeks). The boys would then be converted to Islam, and they would be educated by the state to constitute the foundation of the *yeniçeri* troops. Brightest ones among them would be sent to the Palace *Enderun* School, and they would take central governing positions as high as the Grand Vizier. This mechanism made the Ottoman Palace mostly immune from the political influence of local notables, and it created a bureaucratic body that would be linked to no regional or particularistic interests (Shaw, 1976, p. 27; Wittek, 1955). The non-hereditary nature of *timars*, moreover, prevented incessant accumulation of capital over generations, which was in direct contrast with the *seigneurie* owned and ruled by the French aristocratic families. “The Ottoman state trained and rewarded provincial officials - they were created by the state for the purposes of the state. In this sense, they differed greatly from the

nobility in France. Within the Ottoman system, the corporate autonomy characteristic of the 'estates' of Western Europe did not exist and could not develop" (Barkey, 1991, p. 704). Enduring entities with private legal personality were not recognised as a principle in Ottoman lands.

The institution of the *vakıf* was the only exception to this rule, highly preferred by capital holders in the locality (and administered by the *ulema*). Yet even there, due to high costs of maintenance and close state supervision of superfluous *vakıf* income, the pious foundations "never assumed the characteristics of a really capitalistic enterprise" (İnalçik, 1969, p. 136). The pious/charitable foundations accounted for a considerable portion of the arable land in the Empire, and they absorbed large investments in construction projects such as mosques, schools, hospitals, caravanserais, fountains, bridges, and so on. The *vakıf* was a relative safe haven for capital holders in order to avoid state confiscation of property (Işın & Lefebvre, 2005, p. 18). It was also deeply embedded in a religious framework of duty towards God, and status within the community. "As in the medieval West, in the medieval Islamic world the rich commonly set aside a portion of their wealth to draw near God and secure for their souls a place in heaven. Just as countless Christians of means funded the building and decoration of churches ... so many mosques and Qur'an schools [within the *vakıf*] were financed by wealthy Muslims out of a desire to perform good works" (Kuran, 2001, p. 853). As a distinct legal person in the Ottoman Empire, the *vakıf* thus coincided material and ideational interests for the wealthy, although it did not yield to substantial capitalist accumulation or development in the long run. Craftsmen, as another potential venue for capitalist development, were organised into guilds regulated and protected by the state through the Islamic notion of *hisbe*, which actively prevented tendencies of "endless accumulation" by any of the guildsmen. Merchants, finally, were in an even less favourable position: "whereas in the West feudal lords and kings had on the whole given more support to merchants than to artisans, in the Ottoman Empire the situation was reversed ... Not only did the state protect the guilds against monopolistic practices by merchants, but, more importantly, by denying corporate personality and independent government to towns it blocked the formation of oligarchies of merchant capitalists" (Mardin, 1969, pp. 260-261). In its social formation of the long sixteenth century, therefore, private capital accumulation (be it through agriculture, artisanship, or trades)

was largely hindered by the Ottoman state, for the latter “tended to regard any rapid accumulation of capital ... as a potential disruption of the existing order” (Pamuk, 2004, p. 234).

Meanwhile in France, and in its surrounding geography, opposite tendencies were at work due to the emergence and consolidation of a European capitalist economic network, which was rapidly unsettling the foundation of feudal ties across the continent. It is important to see the subsequent political economic divergence between the West European and Ottoman geographies not in isolation from each other, but through relations of uneven and combined development (Abou-El-Haj, 1991). It was partly the Ottoman military superiority over Europe and ultimate control of trade routes to the east (both in land and sea) that forced western states to seek for fresh sources of income. Developments that proved crucial for the emergence of capitalism in the West, such as “the political fragmentation of feudal Europe [through centralising-territorial state apparatuses] in resistance to Habsburg attempts at Empire building, the structural shift away from the geopolitical and commercial centrality of the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic, and the primitive accumulation of capital [in the colonies] ... were causally inseparable from Ottoman geopolitical pressure on Europe” (Nisancioğlu, 2014, p. 331). The literature on the origins of capitalism in the West is rich and diverse (P. Anderson, 1974; Arrighi, 1994; Beaud, 2001; Brenner, 1977; Dobb, 1963; Wallerstein, 1974), and it is not a central concern in this work. The underlying causes aside, the interwoven relationship between flourishing commercial/financial capital and the rising absolutist state profoundly transformed the political economic structure of European polities. Wallerstein (1974, p. 133) explains their connection as follows: “were it not for the expansion of commerce ... there would scarcely have been the economic base to finance the expanded bureaucratic state structures ... On the other hand, the state structures were themselves a major economic underpinning of the new capitalist system”. Born out of this reciprocal relationship, overseas colonialism and mercantilism heralded a new era in Europe, of which France was an important player.

Inter-European comparisons of early capitalist development and growth accurately describe France as a relatively laggard polity in relation to the British and Dutch cases. This is often associated, among other things, to France having trailed a

more statist-bureaucratic economic course as the most overbearing absolutist monarchy in Europe (Nef, 1937; O'Brien & Keyder, 1978). Its relatively stagnant performance notwithstanding, there is no dispute that France was among the leading early capitalist polities struggling for hegemony in the world system. French social formation from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries can be seen as a transitional territory that amalgamated feudal and capitalist dynamics in various forms. In the words of Furet (1978, p. 147), the period featured “a volatile compromise between the building of a modern state and the preservation of ... social organisation inherited from feudal times”. Regionally, Braudel (1984, pp. 342-343) identifies three Frances that demonstrate such discrepant tendencies. What he calls France I was the “western seaboard ... where wealth and an early version of capitalism had taken up residence”, placing France among the leading centres of the Atlantic trade (Braudel, 1984, p. 342). By the seventeenth century, France had already secured a series of colonies in North America, the Caribbean, India, and (to a lesser extent) West Africa in direct commercial relationship with its string of major trade ports (such as Bordeaux, Nantes, and La Rochelle). In the East and North, there was France III, “the urban border zone” (including Lyon, Alsace, and Franche-Comté) that served as lively trade centres with the rest of continental Europe. In contrast with these urban regions where commercial, financial, and artisanal activity flourished, France II, namely “the huge and varied interior” that constituted most of the territory, was based on unreservedly feudal agricultural relations. The French absolutist monarchy internalised these contradictions. As Anderson (1974, p. 40) notes, absolutism was paradoxical in representing “an apparatus for the protection of aristocratic property and privileges, yet at the same time the means whereby this protection was promoted could *simultaneously* ensure the basic interests of the nascent mercantile and manufacturing classes” (emphasis in the original).

The absolutist state heavily increased the tax burden on the French peasantry. After all, the centralised monarchy was consolidated in response to the inability of the French aristocracy to extract surplus from the peasantry, due to the latter’s considerable securing of small land ownership following the late medieval crisis of feudalism (Bloch, 1966). Summarising Anderson’s work, Gorski (2003a, p. 4) explains that “the twin threats of peasant unrest in the countryside and the merchant dominance in the cities drove the Western European nobility into the arms of the crown”. In France, among other

polities, “a series of ‘new monarchs’ enhanced their power by entering into an alliance with the nobility against the peasants and the merchants. This alliance ... provided the social foundation of absolutism”. In return for reinstating feudal domination, the monarchy claimed a larger share (vis-à-vis the Church and the aristocracy) of the agricultural surplus directly as state income, thus imposing a dual burden on the peasantry (leading to a series of revolts). Agrarian capitalism, which was to mark off England and paved the way for the industrial revolution, hardly materialised in this picture (Brenner, 1977, pp. 73-77). Merchant and banking capital centred on cities, on the other hand, was strongly encouraged and promoted. According to Braudel (1981, p. 514), “capitalism and the towns were basically the same thing in the West” particularly in terms of trade and financial relations, and to a lesser extent, artisanship and manufacture until the industrial revolution. The interests of the monarchy and the merchants coincided as the latter dramatically increased taxable revenues and financial assets that could in turn be used to strengthen the state apparatus and its inter-European competitiveness. Tilly (1985, p. 179) confirms that there was a “symbiotic relationship ... between the state, military power, and the private economy’s efficiency in the age of absolutism”, where “access to ... bourgeois resources proved crucial to the princes’ state-building and centralizing policies”.

One eighteenth century French statesman put it in these words: “upon the navy depend the colonies, upon the colonies commerce, upon commerce the capacity of a State to maintain numerous armies, to increase its population and to make possible the most glorious and useful enterprises” (cited in Graham, 1965, p. 17). The French absolutist state thus sowed the seeds of a national-territorial economy through mercantilist policies that accommodated the rising commercial (and also financial) bourgeoisie. It created an increasingly uniform legal system, decreased internal barriers to trade, placed protectionist external tariffs against foreign competitors, fostered trading cities, afforded profitable state borrowing and offices, and sponsored colonial enterprises and companies to enable the primitive accumulation of capital (Cole, 1965; Lachmann, 2013, p. 24). Nevertheless, France was still “a State founded on the social supremacy of the aristocracy and confined by the imperatives of landed property. The nobility could deposit power with the monarchy, and permit the enrichment of the bourgeoisie: the masses were still at its mercy. No ‘political’ derogation of the noble class ever occurred

in the Absolutist State” (P. Anderson, 1974, p. 41). Correspondingly, early bourgeois development in France was heavily dependent on the state, and in fusion with the traditional nobility (*noblesse d’épée*). Purchasing of ennoblement and government office (such as *secrétaires de roi*) was the conventional venue for investment and social promotion for the majority of the emergent middle classes (who thus became *noblesse de robe*). Starting from the eighteenth century, however, upward mobility of status through state offices were increasingly clogged due to financial instability, which pushed bourgeois elements to seek for other ways to influence policymaking (Mooers, 1991, pp. 61-63). The intensifying tension between feudal privileges and the interests of non-noble elites would eventually set the stage for 1789.

3.2.2. Towards “Core” and “Peripheral” Territories

The progress of mercantilism, colonialism, and strong absolutist states not only placed Western Europe on a higher political/economic/military ground than the Ottoman Empire, but it also had a direct effect on the disruption of the latter’s classical social system. According to Kasaba (1988, p. 17), the long sixteenth century was a “turning point in the annals of Ottoman history” in signifying deterioration. He holds that the key to Ottoman decline “should be sought not in some internal decay but in major changes that took place in the external conditions of existence of the Ottoman Empire”. European circumnavigation of the Atlantic and Africa killed off the Ottoman tax revenue coming from its control of major trade routes (such as the Silk Road, Spice Trade and Mediterranean commerce). Partly related to this phenomenon, the Ottoman Empire granted generous concessions to French tradesmen operating in its territory (*capitulations*, or *ahidnâme*), who were made largely exempt from prosecution, taxation, and conscription. The capitulations became part of a Franco-Ottoman alliance starting in the long sixteenth century, and gave French tradesmen virtual monopoly in the Orient to contribute to the rise of merchant capital in their home country. Territorial expansion, moreover, vital for the reproduction of the Ottoman economy, was halted by the Habsburg Empire in the West. Enhanced European military technologies caused the disproportionate political supremacy of janissaries in Istanbul, and weakened the significance of cavalries (*sipahi*) to have a bearing on the *timar* system as a whole. The inflationary current of the European “price revolution” (caused partly by the influx of

valuable metals from the Americas) was also negatively consequential for Ottoman state finances, land system, and guilds as a whole (Barkan, 1975b).

As a result of such Western influences that debilitated the revenues and war-making capacity of the Ottoman state, the Empire went through a profound process of decentralisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in direct contrast with its contemporary European counterparts. With the gradual breakdown of the state-controlled *timar* system and its replacement with tax-farming (*iltizam*, and later, *malikâne*) the period witnessed the rise of the *âyan* (regional notables or *eşraf*) as an influential political and economic actor in the locality that worked with, yet also counteracted, central authority. In France, “domestic borrowing by sovereigns was financed by the banking houses. In the Ottoman Empire, domestic borrowings were mainly handled through these tax-farming arrangements by which individuals possessing liquid capital assets advanced cash to the government in return for the right to farm the taxes of a given region or fiscal unit for a fixed period of time. In this period, former government officials, merchants and certain other wealthy individuals became the new tax collectors. The emerging local elite, *âyans*, gradually turned economic control over their territories into political power and became involved in numerous provincial revolts against the central government” (M. Birdal, 2010, p. 18). Tax-farming deeply intensified the exploitation and uprooting of the peasantry, and like in contemporary France, led to revolts in Anatolia. Ottoman peasant revolts, however, were in different nature than those of France.

Comparing seventeenth century France and the Ottoman Empire, Barkey (1991) demonstrates that in the former case, alliances between the peasantry and provincial lords were fostered to spark off strong rebellions. This was due to the absolutist state’s increased control of the periphery as a long-term strategy. In the Ottoman case, however, revolts of that scale and force were absent on account of the state’s short-term alliances with and control of the provinces (as well as intra-*âyan* competition), which did not create a peasant-lord alliance. This also reveals the difference between the French nobility and the Ottoman *âyan* as the latter lacked the collective class-consciousness of the former. Still, in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, tax-farming practices led to the substantial embourgeoisement of the Ottoman local notables,

accompanied by their semi-autonomous military presence. In addition to agriculture, the *âyan* also amassed economic revenues through guilds and *vakıf* in the provinces, and wielded coercive force through the *sekbân* troops of their local entourage. The classical Ottoman system based on preventing independent accumulation of capital and/or power, therefore, was drastically changing. “The remarkable feature about this entire process”, however, was that the *âyan* as “an incipient market-oriented group” were drawn to “reproduce in miniature the lineaments of the state, instead of launching itself in new directions” (Mardin, 1969, p. 267). That is to say, no parliamentary pressures emerged as in the West, as “the monarchy remained relatively immune from the growing power of [the] rich aristocracy”. And unlike the French case, “the possibility of a capitalistic development through the socio-economic pull of an upper class did not occur in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottoman Empire” (Ergil, 1974, p. 80).

Dialectically related to their trajectories of class formation (characterised by the presence and absence of bourgeois-capitalist development) and paths to state formation (“capitalised-coercion” versus “coercion-intensive”), France and the Ottoman Empire found themselves in differing positions by 1789 geopolitically as much as socioeconomically –constituting, respectively, “core-metropolitan” and “peripherally incorporated” geographies in the global system. Without essentialising or ascribing it deterministic qualities (Abou-El-Haj, 1991), it is important to highlight that difference as a marker for conditioning diverse patterns of “extra-religious” determinants such as class struggles and warmaking in the building of secularisation. As a pioneer centralised political machinery, France was constantly involved in intra-European and colonial wars, especially with Britain. The Franco-British conflict for hegemony in the world system throughout the eighteenth century was so severe that it was dubbed by some historians as the “Second Hundred Years’ War”, where the rivalry “for the possession of the New World” constituted the heart of the confrontation (Seeley, 1914, p. 34). British naval superiority and coalition with the Habsburgs, however, placed the French in a disadvantageous place in that competition. In the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763), France lost, to a large extent, the battle for global dominance to Britain. Nevertheless, it continued to be one of the foremost colonial powers with sustained political economic weight in the core of the world system. Meanwhile in the east, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly on the defensive, and shrinking. The failure of the siege of Vienna in 1683

precipitated a series of battles against the Holy League (including the Habsburgs, Russians, Polish, Venetians, and others) that lasted until the end of the century, resulting in ultimate Ottoman defeat. The Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 marked the beginning of the end for the Ottomans, as it was the first time that the Empire was forced to cede extensive territories. The disastrous loss against the Christian League was to be repeated against the Russians throughout the century that followed, as documented in the treaties of Passarowitz and Küçük Kaynarca in 1718 and 1774.

The first examples of admittance by the Ottoman elite that the Empire was beginning to lag behind the Christian West can be found as early as the seventeenth century (Itzkowitz, 1972, pp. 105-106). Yet this became a commonplace notion only in the eighteenth, perhaps due to continuing defeats, which stimulated western cultural emulation and early military modernisation initiatives. The interval between 1718-1730 in Ottoman history is referred to as *Lale Devri* (Tulip Age), which was the beginning of “the Westernization of Ottoman statesmen and the Palace through various attempts to copy the pomp of Versailles and the libertinism of eighteenth century France” (Mardin, 1973, p. 175). The period witnessed the augmentation of Frankish manners and styles in Istanbul, where “French gardens, French decorations, French furniture acquired a brief vogue in palace circles” (B. Lewis, 1961, p. 46). Ottoman ambassadors were sent to Paris “to make a thorough study of means of civilization and education, and report on those suitable for application in the Ottoman Empire” (Göçek, 1987, p. 4). As a result, however, there were no deeply penetrating reforms in the Empire (R. H. Davison, 1994, p. 22). *Lale Devri* was followed by military reforms under the guidance of French advisors like Comte de Bonneval and Baron de Tott, yet in Ottoman historiography, these are considered as the precursors to the larger set of reforms that was to start with Selim III in 1789. It was in the same century that the expanding European capitalist network (of trade, manufacture, and labour) and interstate system (of centralising political apparatuses) began to incorporate the Ottoman Empire as a peripheral geography to elicit a major wave of transformations.

In what ways did the sociopolitical position and functions of the Muslim *ulema* and the Catholic clergy alter as the Ottoman Empire and France were trailing these divergent paths to 1789? Historical evidence suggests that despite increasing corruption

and deterioration in the quality of some of their services, the eminence of the *ulema* and clergy as part of their respective ruling blocs remained exceptionally strong on the eve of the long nineteenth century. In line with the weakening of the central state apparatus, the Ottoman high *ulema* gained a relatively independent status as a *de facto* hereditary bureaucratic stratum (Clayer, 2004). “Since the seventeenth century”, this ruling class fraction “had strengthened its hold on its own resources to the benefit of the *ulema*-born and the *ulema*-reared”, and a “new corporate stability of the *ulema* family in the eighteenth century and the formalization of patrimonial instruments” were established (Zilfi, 1983: 320, 362). More than 60 percent of high officials were recruited from the *ulema*, as “the indulgence of aristocratic *ilmiye* leadership ... coincided with broad shifts in Ottoman statecraft and the regime’s consequently greater reliance on the several roles of the *ulema*” (Clayer, 2004, p. 53; Zilfi, 2006, pp. 224-225). A tendency to note here is the growing socioeconomic discrepancy between the high and low segments of the *ulema*, which would prove important in the post-1789 period of contention (Heyd, 1961).

These developments “coincide with the inflation of the *Şeyhülislam*’s power to gain juridical powers parallel to the *Padişah*’s [Sultan] rights, and even the authority to depose the ruler if his legislation was not concordant with the *Şeriat* (divine law). Until then, the area left to the ruler was free from the limitations of the *Şeriat*” (Ergil, 1975a, p. 56). In the provinces, moreover, middle level *ulema* had instituted close ties with the *âyan*, and continued assuming legitimating roles and administrative duties in courts, education, *vakıf*, mosque, and social life in general. Finally in international affairs, following the disastrous Russian defeat of 1774, the Empire revitalised the institution of the Islamic Caliphate to highlight itself as the protector of Muslim communities (to solidify territorial integrity against the West), which further played into the *ulema*’s hands against the modernisation initiatives that were to follow. “The Ottomans began to attach importance to both the title [Caliphate] and its prerogatives after 1774, in order to counter Tsarina Catherine’s claim to be the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The sultans in turn claimed spiritual authority over Muslim communities under Christian rule and found that this was a useful tool to use in their relations with Europe ... The claim to the caliphate was an important innovation and had considerable

influence on the future policy of the empire, strengthening the conservatives and enabling them to manipulate Islam in order to forestall reform” (Ahmad, 2003, p. 22).

In contemporary France, the rise of bourgeois elements as an influential social force and the parallel growth of a rich civil society was reflected in the philosophy of *Les Lumières* in the eighteenth century, which was critical of the Catholic Church along with its economic wealth, political privileges, social intolerance, and overall relevance (Roche, 1998, pp. 353-389). Partial enlightenment (among the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the nobility) was also accompanied by minimal and isolated manifestations of an anticlerical tendency among a portion of the peasantry, especially as the domination of the absolutist machinery was heavily felt in the rural areas (Rémond, 1976). In the Ottoman case, neither the centrifugal struggles of the wealthy *âyan*, nor intermittent peasant revolts assumed a remotely anticlerical character. Nonetheless, as a refurbished ideological state apparatus of the French Kingdom, the “effective religious socialisation associated with the Catholic” establishment was one of the factors that kept social unrest to a minimum under absolutism (Price, 2005, pp. 68-69). The situation of the French clergy in the eighteenth century was comparable to the Ottoman *ulema* in terms of continued dominance and privileges, as well as internal disparities between the low and high clergy (in this case, between bishops and rural parish priests). “On the eve of 1789”, the clergy was still “the first order of society ranking before the nobility and the Third Estate”, whose primacy was “not only honorary, but signified that the Catholic Church was the main foundation of society” (Boudon, 2007, p. 9).

The absolutist state and its centralising policy of Gallicanism had reinvigorated Catholicism with a strong cadence: “clergy were very visible in eighteenth-century France” with more than 100,000 personnel, and they “were responsible for setting the moral tone in society in general” (Burleigh, 2006, p. 24). The overall capability of the Church “to interpret ... the social phenomenon represented in modern times by the bourgeoisie” was utterly limited, although there were isolated attempts among the clergy (Groethuysen, 1968, p. 132). This was partly related to the fact that by the age of Revolution, “a non-Christian French monarchy was simply unconceivable” for the Church, which was still “the greatest land proprietor in the Kingdom” (Dansette, 1961a, pp. 4, 8). Overseas, moreover, the Church provided the central ideological and

institutional framework for colonisation. Serving as the central marker of French identity, especially in the face of Protestant Britain, the Church “had a profound influence on colonial society, where priests presided over ceremonies that marked every stage of an individual’s life and offered the only formal education that most colonists received” (Conrad, 2012, p. 57). All in all, the “Church of France ... was inextricably involved in the question of privilege, being ... a stronghold of privilege as against the rest of the nation” (McManners, 1970, p. 4). As long as the ultimately feudal-aristocratic disposition of French political power was not disturbed, neither would be the authority of the Church as its chief legitimiser and benefactor. 1789 brought about precisely that.

Reprise and Review

In their social formations of the long sixteenth century, Catholicism and Sunni Islam were deeply integrated in the French and Ottoman states. They functioned as a central source of legitimacy for the aristocratic/patrimonial configuration of class power, and conception and practice of internal/external state capacity. These religions were institutionalised as ideological state apparatuses, where the clergy and the *ulema*, as part of the ruling bloc, assumed fundamental roles as “organic intellectuals” that established the main link between the state and society to generate hegemony. They organised and systematised “religion of the people” in the form of “religion of the intellectuals” to reproduce dominant belief systems, customs, and practices within the framework of the existing pre-capitalist relations of economic exploitation and political domination. Relatedly, French and Ottoman *raison d'état* were ultimately linked to Catholicism and Sunni Islam, not only in terms of denoting the primary socio-demographic basis of the state –which was favoured over the members of other religions and sects, if necessary by force–, but also in geopolitical affairs such as warmaking and territorial expansion. Two essential differences marked the French and Ottoman entanglement with religion, namely the level of autonomy of religious organisation and the level of diversity in the population. Regarding the first, the “relative autonomy” of the Catholic establishment vis-à-vis the state contrasted with the “state embeddedness” of the Islamic establishment. Concerning the second, the weight of their minority populations diverged markedly: in 1789, about 30-35 percent of the Ottoman Empire

was composed of non-Muslims, whereas only 3-4 percent of the French Kingdom comprised non-Catholics. These “religious” dissimilarities would be momentous in their processes of sociopolitical secularisation in the long nineteenth century, although far from being the only determinants.

Following the “great divergence” initiated in the long sixteenth century, France and the Ottoman Empire trailed different trajectories of class formation and state building. Proliferation of bourgeois social forces in France did not materialise in the Ottoman Empire, and accordingly, French absolutism was able to follow a path of “capitalised coercion” that combined mercantilism and colonialism to enable the dual accumulation of capitalist wealth and centralised political power. Lacking that early capitalist transformation partly due to relations of uneven and combined development, the Ottoman Empire’s “coercion-intensive” path to state formation gradually hampered its socioeconomic and war-making capabilities vis-à-vis Europe. Consequently, as the threshold of 1789 approached, the two polities found themselves in different positions within the global (geo)political economic system, namely in the “core” and “periphery”, respectively. Constantly expanding its territorial reach through colonisation, France fiercely competed with England for global hegemony, although it had to accept the runner-up position in the core following the “Second Hundred Years’ War”. Concurrently in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman defeats and losses against Christian powers put the Empire on the defensive, while setting in motion the rise of Western emulation and early attempts at military modernisation. Interacting with these “extra-religious” processes, the “religious” predominance of the Catholic and Sunni establishments in the French and Ottoman social formations remained largely unaltered during the “great divergence”, if not strengthened. The Church greatly contributed to French colonisation initiative overseas against the British and comfortably exercised its social privileges at home. Likewise, the Muslim Caliphate was reinvigorated in Ottoman lands to propagate Islamic unity in the face of Russian advances, while the *ulema* became even more powerful within the ruling apparatus. “Religious” as well as “extra-religious” developments such as these would contribute to framing the dynamics of sociopolitical contention and secularisation in the age of revolution/reform, which is the narrative of the next chapter.

Chapter 4. Religion and Social History: The Long Nineteenth Century

Accelerating economic commercialisation and intensifying political centralisation, the long nineteenth century prompted an exceptional period in world history that crystallised the polarisation various class forces as well as geopolitical struggles (Hobsbawm, 1996; Mann, 1993; Polanyi, 1944). France and the Ottoman Empire were no exceptions, although they went through distinct experiences. 1789 in France brought forth the leadership of emergent bourgeois forces (in alliance with the peasantry and urban-popular classes) against feudal-aristocratic privileges, where the fate of the Church came to be bound inseparably with the latter. Meanwhile in the Ottoman Empire, Selim III's military-administrative modernisation reforms, which were energised by a particular faction within the state bureaucracy (namely *kalemiye*, or scribal service), disturbed the vested interests of the *ulema* and the janissary (as well as the local *âyan*) to produce a reactionary alliance within the ruling bloc. Maintaining an "elective affinity" with traditional social forces; the religious establishment, personnel, and lifeworlds in both polities were immediately politicised in the early phase of the sociopolitical struggle, which laid the foundations for the "war of two Frances" and the Ottoman "split-up modernisation" (Findley, 1980; Poulat, 1988). The domestic contention, moreover, was closely entangled with and affected by episodes of foreign conflict, may it be in its offensive or defensive form. Despite resting on distinct "extra-religious" processes (social forces and geopolitical realities) and "religious" contexts (Catholic/Sunni configuration of power and situation of religious minorities), polarisation concerning religion presented itself in comparable ways in these two polities. Following 1789, "a radical antagonism" was instigated between those who envisioned France as the secular heir of "Revolution" and as the customary upholder of "the Catholic Church" (Champion, 1993, p. 593); while "two major currents" found themselves at battle in the Ottoman Empire, namely "a comparatively radical, secularizing current ... and a more conservative, Islamically committed" one (Findley, 2010, p. 18).

The historical investigation in the present chapter demonstrates that these divisions were neither purely cultural/ideological nor did they trigger a unilinear trend towards secularisation. They were closely entangled with the “extra-religious” factors of class struggles and processes of internal/external state making. Preliminary instances of “separation” and “regulation” vis-à-vis religious authority and institutions can be traced back to this post-1789 period, which were manifest/latent consequences of the “societalisation” and “rationalisation” of economic relations and governmental power that precipitated the “differentiation” of politico-legal structures vis-à-vis religion. Intervals such as the Revolution (1789-1799) and Napoléon’s restructurings (1799-1815) in France, and Mahmud II’s reforms (1826-1838) and *Tanzimat/Islihat* period (1839-1876) in the Ottoman Empire embodied primary elements of sociopolitical secularisation in these polities. These functioned at “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional” spheres. Yet it should be noted that even in episodes of ostensible Catholic/Muslim revitalisation, such as the Bourbon Restoration (1815-30), the Second French Empire (1852-1870), or Abdülhamid II’s neopatrimonialism (1876-1908), there was never simply a “return” to the pre-1789 reality, for the modernising state apparatus interacted with, accommodated, and utilised religion in novel forms of legitimation, and in direct relationship with the sociopolitical and geopolitical realities of the time. All in all, these earlier phases of contention set the stage for French and Turkish secular state builders in the 1875-1905/1908-1938 periods by way of consolidating institutional frameworks for them to operate in, and of bequeathing them ideational structures that influenced their course of action as they took power.

In France (Section 4.1), rising bourgeois forces evolved to become the politically dominant social group in the long nineteenth century. Notwithstanding their internal differences, the collective interests of this class united them against two ultimate enemies: the waning aristocracy on the right, and the emergent working classes on the left. Domination of aristocratic power and privileges appeared equally detrimental and daunting for the bourgeoisie as the radical-egalitarian advances of popular masses. As Hobsbawm (1996, p. 72) puts it, starting with the Revolution, “the rapid alternations of regime—Directory (1795-9), Consulate (1799-1804), Empire (1804-14), restored Bourbon Monarchy (1815-30), Constitutional Monarchy (1830-48), Republic (1848-51), and Empire (1852-70)—were all attempts to maintain a bourgeois society while avoiding

the *double danger*" (my emphasis). In line with the course of the class struggle, which also involved the peasantry as a major force to reckon with, the position of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis Catholicism demonstrated substantial fluctuations, where the priority was always to protect relations of private property, order, and bourgeois political influence. It would therefore be misleading to simply think of the French bourgeoisie as an inherently secularising class against the Catholic establishment. Regardless of the level of religiosity of bourgeois individuals, Catholicism could be a friend or foe for bourgeois politics contingent upon whether it was the working classes or the aristocracy that constituted the more imminent menace, and whether religious authority was under sufficient governmental control. Closely interacting with these domestic social contentions, moreover, geopolitical developments and foreign policy priorities also factored in to have a bearing on the relationship with the Gallican Church, and by extension the Vatican. Episodes such as foreign invasion (Revolutionary wars), expansion (Napoleonic wars), colonial competition, and various Roman political intrusions rendered the sovereignty factor particularly discernible, and affected the course of the secularisation process. Republicans in the 1870s would bid to consolidate their secular bourgeois regime on this complex internal and external reality.

In the Ottoman Empire (Section 4.2), class relations became more complicated as the century wore on to incorporate the polity as a semi-colony into the capitalist world system. The first phase of Ottoman modernisation under Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) was mostly in response to external military pressures, and it witnessed the rationalisation of the army and bureaucracy despite strong opposition from the *ulema*, janissaries, and the *âyan*. As these early contenders were compelled to retreat in this initial stage of secularisation, the reformist faction of the bureaucracy (centered on the scribal service) took control of government at the expense of traditional Islamic officials in the *Tanzimat/İslâhat* Period (1839-1876). Meanwhile, the rising non-Muslim merchant bourgeoisie became gradually influential as an intermediary with the European economy, which was in addition to slowly growing Muslim local notables (mostly landowners and regional merchants) in interior Anatolia closely allied with the *ulema*. In the second half of the century, the resentment of disadvantaged Muslim notables vis-à-vis the non-Muslim bourgeoisie (entangled with internal separatisms and external European pressures) provided the foundations for the traditional bureaucracy to

strike back with the heavily Islamic neopatrimonial rule of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). In the context of the burning “Eastern Question” occasioned by semi-colonial accumulation patterns and European military encirclement, sociopolitical conflicts were expressed and acted out in religiously polarised terms. The secularisation process was influenced not only by the increasing tension between Muslim and non-Muslim social forces, but also between traditionalist and reformist Muslim elements caught up in a fierce intra-bureaucratic struggle. Typifying the latter, namely the reformist bureaucracy, Young Turks and later the Republicans in the early twentieth century would contend for secular bourgeois state building in this convoluted domestic and foreign milieu.

Having narrated the earlier processes of secularisation/desecularisation in France and the Ottoman Empire by reference to their social histories and contentions, the chapter finally (Section 4.3) sheds comparative light on the immediate background to these polities’ republican state building periods, namely the authoritarian regimes of Napoléon III (1848-1870) and Abdülhamid II (1876-1909). Although distinct social forces and geopolitical realities underpinned their rule, these monarchs were analogous in three ways. The first resemblance concerns the Catholic and Islamic sacralisation of their authority along with the substantial reinvigoration of the religious establishment, which contributed to eliciting the secularising thrust of future republican state builders. Second, both of these monarchs pursued strong centralising tendencies that served to found the preliminary institutional capabilities for national/territorial state power, which was to be inherited and built on by the republicans (some examples include the fields of education, administration, securitisation, and infrastructure). Third, it was during their opposition to the Bonapartist and Hamidian rule that the political and ideational frames of the contentious nationalists/republicans were formed. The mobilisation of the latter groups would eventually succeed to end these respective empires while undertaking a major wave of secularisation. The secularising mindset, priorities, and future policymaking initiatives of French and Turkish nationalist/republican generations cannot be fully comprehended without reference to these earlier monarchical intervals.

4.1. The French Age of Revolution (1789-1848)

In the early phase of the Revolution in 1789, the National Constituent Assembly eliminated seigneurial-aristocratic privileges to take the first steps towards establishing bourgeois-national political power (Soboul, 1975). The Church, as the first order of the *ancien régime*, would undoubtedly receive its share of this major wave of transformation. As feudal entitlements were abolished on the historic night of 4 August 1789 to deprive the aristocracy of its seigneurial rights, the religious establishment lost its *dîme* revenue, fee incomes, annates and other ecclesiastical dues. The first two estates were thus placed in equal legal status with the third, namely the rest of society spearheaded by bourgeois actors⁴⁰. On the eve of the Revolution, the French bourgeoisie comprised a wide array of socioeconomic groups including merchants, manufacturers, professionals, bankers, and landowners; and “by 1789, the bourgeoisie, with 2.3 million members, had trebled in size since 1700” (Magraw, 2002, p. 32). Throughout the revolutionary contention, the bourgeoisie received their larger social base from the urban popular masses (above all the famed *sans-culottes* organised into people’s militias) and the rebellious peasantry in the provinces, both of whom intervened in critical moments to keep the Revolution alive. Regarding governing philosophy, the essence of the *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen* adopted on 26 August 1789 was ultimately incompatible with monarchical-absolutist rule legitimated by Catholic monopoly. Among the seventeen articles featured in the Declaration (Legifrance, 1789), the inviolability of property, the rule of law, and national sovereignty stood out as the dominant features of the bourgeois state, which also dropped the notion of state religion to introduce a neutral conception of state-religion relations⁴¹. Article 10 of the Declaration affirmed that “No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views”, and Article 11 endorsed the dissemination of such views: “Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom”. These articles set the early framework for “the state’s *laïque* abstention from matters of spiritual belief, ... which evidently breaks with the whole tradition of obliged theological-political creed” (Peña-Ruiz, 2003, pp. 126-127). Congruent with the religious impartiality of the Declaration, December 1789 and September 1791 marked the recognition of Protestants and Jews as full-fledged citizens eligible for public office, thus further decoupling Catholicism and

French citizenship. Civic oaths were introduced for deputies in April 1790. These early sets of legislation typify some major steps towards political secularisation.

Yet despite common belief, the Revolution did not intend to annihilate Catholicism as the moral foundation of the polity. Given the legitimacy religion enjoyed amongst the majority of the population, that would be antithetical to the social order and stability bourgeois actors sought to consolidate. Ideally, “the Church was to be a buttress of regenerated France, as it had been of the old monarchy” (McManners, 1970, p. 24). The joining en masse of the lower clergy to the ranks of the third estate during the *États Généraux* of spring-summer 1789 was an additional facilitator to reconcile Catholicism and the Revolution. Parish priests, for instance, were instructed to read and explain the new laws to the faithful on 23 February 1790, and on 13 April of the same year, the Assembly acknowledged its attachment to Catholicism (while rejecting a proposal to make it state religion). The relative economic and administrative autonomy of the Church, however, was a problem. Its organisation had to be rationally reconfigured within the uniform framework of the nationalising state. The duality in the fields of jurisdiction, allegiance, and finance witnessed in the old regime contradicted with the nascent centralised government. To counteract that duality and create revenue, all Church property was nationalised on 2 October 1789 as *biens nationaux*, putting up for sale clerical land worth of 400 million livres to be transferred to the bourgeois state. This was a few days after the suspension of monastic vows, and a few months before the suppression of all independent religious congregations in February 1790 (Latreille, 1946, p. 77). The purpose was to nationally control, supervise and provide for the educational and charitable roles of the clergy. Having deprived the Church of its financial independence (through abolishing its feudal revenues and confiscating its property), the next step was to institutionalise a system where, as one deputy noted, “the church is part of the state, the state is not part of the church” (Camus, 1790, p. 17).

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 12 July 1790 was the Revolution’s fundamental strategy to subordinate Catholic institutions and ministry to state infrastructural power (through “interior” regulation), and it turned out to be the real trigger to spark off the “War of Two Frances”. The term “civil” highlighted the temporal reorganisation of the Church in line with the national state, which was in direct opposition

to interference from the Vatican. The Constitution (Assemblée Nationale, 1789, pp. 335-357) turned all clergymen into paid officials bound to take an oath of loyalty to the new state, remapped diocesan and parish boundaries according to France's newly found national-administrative *départements*, and democratised the election of priests. In its Title I, the Constitution abolished all other bishoprics existing in the *ancien régime* (Article 1). This would mean reducing the number of dioceses from 135 to 83. The clergy were to be chosen by local elections, and no other unauthorised bishops or archbishops were to be recognised "whose see is under the supremacy of a foreign power" (Title I, Article 5; Title II, Article 1). Upon election, moreover, "the new bishop may not apply to the Pope for any kind of confirmation" (Title II, Article 19). More controversially, all clergy must take an oath of loyalty "to the Nation, the Law, and the King", and "support with all his power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly" (Title II, Article 21). Otherwise, their positions would be considered as vacant (Title II, Article 40).

Consulting with Pope Pius VI, Louis XVI hesitated to sign the Civil Constitution to heat up tension between him and the Assembly in the summer of 1790. At stake were two conceptions of sovereignty, one nationally imagined, and the other pontifically (Dwyer & McPhee, 2002, p. 45). When, in October, bishops of France published a reactionary declaration (*Exposition des Principes*) that renounced the national state's sovereign authority over divine power⁴², the National Assembly passed a crucial decree on 27 November 1790, imposing all members of the clergy to take an oath of loyalty to the national state in a week, or be prosecuted for disrupting public peace. The Pope's official condemnation of the Civil Constitution, finally, invalidated any possibility for reconciliation. In *Quod Aliquantum* (10 March 1791), Pius VI maintained that the Civil Constitution aimed to "destroy the Catholic religion, and with it the obedience owed to kings". He resolutely condemned freedom of conscience, calling it "a monstrous right", and warned that "the most sacred dogmas" were threatened by the Revolution (Pius VI, 1791a). In the encyclical *Charitas Quae* (13 April 1791) moreover, Pius VI found it "intolerable that a political assembly should change the universal practice of the Church". He called the Civil Constitution a "foolish form of Church government", and held that "no one can be in the Church of Christ without being in unity with its visible head and founded on the See of Peter". Referring to the National Assembly as "the enemies of religion", Pius VI threatened to suspend from duty every priest who has taken the civil

oath “unless he abjures his oath within forty days” (PiusVI, 1791b). Consequently, the allegiance of the clergy was unmistakably torn apart between two sovereigns, as demonstrated in the rising antagonism between “jurors” and “non-jurors” (refractories). The upper clergy stayed almost unequivocally on the side of Rome, as only 4 of the 135 French bishops took the oath. The lower clergy were much more divided, where 55 percent of priests, 57 percent of *curés*, 48 percent of vicars, and 42 percent of chaplains swore loyalty to Paris (Boudon, 2007, p. 12). The clerical split directly represented the polarisation of the French peasantry at large. As Price (2005, pp. 127-128) puts it, “a map representing these juror– non-juror decisions in 1791 would continue to correspond quite closely to those illustrating the left-right political divide throughout the nineteenth century”. The war of two Frances was on.

In 1791-2, with the initiatives of Louis XVI, the Pope, and the *émigré* aristocracy/clergy, European monarchies were summoned to invade France to reinstate the old order. Civil war and counterrevolution loomed over France. More particularly, Louis XVI’s attempted escape from France on 21 June 1791 (to initiate a counterrevolution with the help of Austria) intensified the popular hatred towards the politico-religious establishment, and escalated the tension between Catholicism and the Revolution⁴³. Internal and external threats to the gains of 1789 increased the bourgeoisie’s (then represented by the moderate *Girondins*) dependence on the masses. Consequently, revolutionary leadership fell gradually in the hands of popular-egalitarian groups epitomised by the *Montagnards*-Jacobins (headed by Maximilien Robespierre) and the *sans-culottes* (Lefebvre, 1969, pp. 221-241). The Revolution was thereafter inevitably radicalised against the “enemies of the Revolution”. The Assembly passed the historic declaration *La Patrie en Danger* (The Fatherland is in Danger) on 11 July 1792 to mobilise the masses against Prussia and Austria, where the collaborators of the enemy were also targeted at home, including the Catholic establishment. That the refractory priests and the ecclesiastical leadership remained unreservedly in “elective affinity” with the counterrevolution made Catholicism directly polarised as part of the class conflict, thus causing it to receive major blows in the subsequent stage. As early as summer 1791, the refractory clergy were deprived of their pensions and all clergy were prohibited from wearing religious garments outside of buildings of worship. In April 1791, Church St. Genevieve in Paris was changed to a secular mausoleum for the interment of

great Frenchmen (*aux grands hommes la patrie reconnaissante*), named *Le Panthéon*. On 29 November 1791 and 27 May 1792, the Assembly voted for austere measures to arrest and deport the refractory clergy under suspicion of conspiracy. Louis XVI vetoed both decrees, although they were actively enforced in practice⁴⁴. As foreign invasion became imminent in early fall 1792, prisons of Paris were raided in what is known as the *Massacres de Septembre*, where more than a thousand counterrevolutionary inmates were killed, including about 300 nonjuring Catholic priests. With the decree of 20 September 1792, registers and services regarding birth, death, and marriage were taken from the monopoly of the Church and placed under the control of the civil municipality of the national state. Divorce was also legalised for the first time contrary to Catholic doctrine. In the same month on 22 September, the National Convention abolished the royalty, and founded the First Republic. “*Citoyen*” Louis Capet was executed the following January.

In the context of exacerbating European military threat and escalating civil conflict, the period known as the *Terreur* (September 1793-July 1794) under the leadership of *Comité de Salut Public* took severe measures to salvage the Revolution⁴⁵. How the Revolution quickly turned into Terror can be explained by many factors such as “the state of war existing between France and much of Europe” and “the organized efforts of dissident opponents to launch a counterrevolution”. Yet “a full explanation of the origins of the Terror must also reflect on the impact of a single event: the attempted flight of the reigning king of France on June 21, 1791” (Tackett, 2003, p. 2). With his escape attempt, the king created a vacuum of authority across the polity, and “exerted a deeply traumatic effect on the whole population” (Tackett, 2003, p. 222)⁴⁶. The flee of the king unquestionably facilitated the transition into a chaotic situation that gave birth to the reign of Terror. Addressing Catholicism, the immediate policy of the Terror period was to initiate the full-scale process of *déchristianisation*, which involved an active assault on Catholic personnel, buildings, and symbolism. The Convention decreed in August 1793 to melt all church bells to make canons. On 26 August, refractory priests were deported *en masse*. In September, Paris churches were stripped of any sign or symbol relating to the royalty. 5 October 1793 marked the end of the Christian-Gregorian Calendar to replace it with a revolutionary one. Accordingly, months were composed of three weeks of ten days, hence eliminating Sundays to be replaced by *décadi* as the nonspiritual day

of rest. On 28 October, juror clergy were banned from teaching altogether. Four days later, a decree on the construction of a special prison for the refractory clergy was passed. In what followed, clerics were imposed to renounce belief, abdicate their positions, and get married. Places of worship were closed, iconoclasm and pillage of Church valuables was generalised, and all religious street names were changed. To replace Catholicism, moreover, the Cults of *Raison* and of the *Être suprême* were promoted with extreme vigour to serve as alternative sources social cement and civil unity⁴⁷. Although unsuccessful, these were according to Gramsci (1971, p. 170) attempts to lay “the first root of the modern lay State, independent of the Church, which seeks and finds in itself, in its own complex life, all the elements of its historical personality”. All in all, during the *Terreur* and *dechristianisation*, it is estimated that a total of 17,000 authorised and 23,000 unauthorised executions took place. Among the clergy, 30,000 priests had to flee, 20,000 were abdicated from their roles, and approximately 3,000 guillotined (Boudon, 2007, pp. 13-15). This was a major trauma in the history of Catholicism.

4.1.1. From the Directory to Napoléon’s Concordat

Jacobin victories against internal and external contenders saved the Revolution, but not the Jacobins themselves. The intense interval of 1793-4 was concluded with the Thermidorian Reaction, which reinstated the power of moderate bourgeois elements that were becoming increasingly worried about the radical-egalitarian advances of the Convention. It is in the subsequent Directory period (1795-1799) that all the Jacobin openings to the left were reversed in favour of bourgeois priorities, while “White Terror” against Jacobin/*sans-culotte* individuals took the lives of thousands. The social base of the Jacobins comprised urban popular and middle-lower class groups such as shopkeepers, artisans, workers, and journeymen, who were prepared to go much further than bourgeois notables regarding social policymaking. The bourgeois concern was not only caused by the Jacobin rhetoric that targeted “aristocrats, financiers, landowners, merchants, or speculators in general who were believed to be exploiting the poor” (Price, 2005, p. 142). It was also due to the Jacobin’s generous agrarian reform plans to further redistribute land to peasants, heavy taxation of wealth, and the egalitarian Declaration of Rights of 1793 (that envisaged social welfare, the right to work and education, and to

resist oppression) (ConseilConstitutionnel, 1793). The Directory immediately increased property requirements to be eligible for voting, which significantly narrowed down to social basis of government to the well-off. As Soboul (1975, p. 453) writes, in this interval, “the hegemony of the notables was restored: once again, the character of the nation was being determined in the narrow confines of the bourgeois property franchise”.

Fittingly, the moderate Republic also sought to appease tensions between state and religion for the sake of social stability. Religious freedoms were restored in February 1795, and at least two-thirds of the *émigré* clerics returned to France by 1797. More importantly, conscious of the turmoil caused by the Civil Constitution of 1790, Article 354 of the Constitution of 1795 (adopted on 22 August), separated the state and the Church for the first time: “No one may be compelled to contribute to the expenses of a religion. The Republic does not remunerate any religion” (ConseilConstitutionnel, 1795). Separation, however, did not indicate the state’s indifference to the activity of the Church, as Catholicism was still approached with suspicion on account of its ties with royalism. About a month later on 29 September, a decree on the Exercise and Surveillance of Religions (Duvergier, 1835, pp. 293-296) was passed, which brought in detailed provisions concerning the regulation and close scrutiny of religion in the name of public order. All religious gatherings, for instance, were placed under government supervision. All clergymen had to sign the following document: “I recognize the universality of French citizens as the sovereign, and I promise submission and obedience to the laws of the Republic” (Article 5). Clerics faced expulsion if they did not conform to these rules (Article 8). Any collection of revenues by a religious body was outlawed. No religious signs could be placed on buildings other than churches (Articles 13 and 14). And it was clearly stated that any priest who publicly criticised the nationalisation of Church property, propagated for the “restoration of the monarchy”, and incited people to rebellion for the “destruction of the Republic” or “national representation” would be imprisoned (Title V)⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, the Directory period solved neither the problem of social mayhem, nor the ambiguity regarding the state’s relationship with Catholicism/Vatican. Papal lands were invaded in 1796, leading eventually to the escape of Pope VI to Valence, where he died in 1799. Meanwhile, the division between jurors and non-jurors intensified

upon the return of the latter. Insurrection in Vendée continued sporadically. Another anticlerical wave began in the wake of the anti-royalist coup of September 1797 (18 Fructidor), featuring clerical arrests and exiles in thousands. A new clerical oath was introduced that explicitly affirmed “hatred of the royalty”. Sunday worship was banned. Overall, the Directory was inconsistent toward religion due to the changing balance of social forces (Suratteau, 1991). There was widespread belief among notables, especially the large landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie, that strong government was necessary to counteract leftist-revolutionary advances (such as those led by Babeuf and remaining Jacobins) while preserving the achievements of 1789 from counterrevolution (such as the royalist upsurge and conflict in Midi and West⁴⁹). They found the answer in the person of General Napoléon Bonaparte: “property owners ... gave power to Bonaparte as a means of avoiding the uncertainties of election and parliamentary government ... Like the conservative republic which preceded it, the new monarchy was ... devoted to the preservation of the social status quo” (Price, 2005, p. 153). As part of his hegemony-building strategy following the coup of 18 Brumaire (1799), Napoléon accorded a general amnesty both to the *émigré* nobles and Jacobins. He appealed to the former by representing himself as the guardian of order, and the latter as the upholder of revolutionary values. The social significance of religion in this picture was evidently recognised by the pragmatic Bonaparte. To put an end to the decade-long internal and external class hostilities revolving around Catholicism and to attain a sense of national consensus, Napoléon initiated a rapprochement that culminated in the Concordat that was signed in July 1801 with Pius VII. Overall, the document, which was to be effectual –to the surprise of many– for a century until the Separation of 1905, can be seen as firmly entrenching the foundations of “interior” regulation of religion along national lines. The agreement sought to maintain Catholicism as an element of social unity and control provided that it did not contradict with the sovereignty of the bourgeois-national state. Given its proven endurance, the document is worth discussing at length.

The Concordat (“Concordat: Convention entre le Gouvernement Français et sa Sainteté Pie VII,” 1801) recognised in its Preamble that the “Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is the religion of the great majority of the French citizens” –and not state religion. In its Article 1, the freedom of Catholic worship was guaranteed, although “in conformity with such police regulations as the Government shall consider necessary to

public peace". Articles 2 and 3 envisaged drawing "a new circumscription of the French dioceses" cooperatively between Paris and Rome, which represented conciliation. Articles 4 and 5 stipulated that the First Consul (Bonaparte) would nominate the higher clergy, namely bishops and archbishops, with only subsequent approval by the Pope. Articles 6 and 7, moreover, specified the oaths of fidelity to France to be taken by the higher and lower clergy upon assuming office⁵⁰. Articles 9 to 12 designated the responsibilities of bishops such as circumscription of the parishes, "which will only be valid after the consent of the Government"; or bishops' duty to nominate for parishes, which "will be limited to those persons agreeable to the Government". Fittingly, Article 14 assured that the government would provide a "suitable remuneration" for the clerics, thus consolidating their position as the paid officials of the state, as envisaged in the Civil Constitution of 1790. Perhaps the most important sign that the Concordat reflected the priorities of the French state was in Article 13, which stated that the Pope or his successors could under no circumstances reclaim the ecclesiastical property nationalised during the Revolution. The property relations overturned by the Revolution thus remained as they were. Written all over the Concordat was the government's "interior" regulation of Catholicism, where the relative autonomy of the Church was placed under the prerogatives of the state (Roberts, 1999, pp. 34-80). It is in the same year as the Concordat in 1801 that the *Ministère des Cultes* (Ministry of Worship/Religions) was founded to function as the central state institution dealing with religious affairs throughout the nineteenth century. Overall, the Concordat (and the 77 Articles Organiques ("Articles Organiques de la Convention du 26 Messidor an IX," 1802)⁵¹ that Napoléon unilaterally added a year later) brought about significant measures aimed at the further centralisation, rationalisation, standardisation, societalisation-nationalisation, and to a certain extent, monopolisation of Catholic activities by state infrastructural power. The Concordat was extended to the Protestant and Jewish populations in 1802 and 1808 to ascertain the system known as *cultes reconnus* (recognised religions), which continued to be the main governmental tool for dealing with the major religions in the hundred years to come (Lalouette, 2005a).

Napoléon's instrumental approach to religion as an element of social utility was seen all the more clearly in his grandiose coronation ceremony at Notre-Dame de Paris with the participation of Pope Pius VII in 1804, and his promotion of *Catéchisme Impérial*

in 1806 so as to sacralise his rule. Bonaparte's usurpation of Catholic authority for personal glorification was also used to underpin and legitimate his imperial thrust for military expansion (Boudon, 2002). Yet the Empire also introduced lasting legislations and reforms to consolidate bourgeois-secular authority resting on a uniform legal structure. The Civil Code of 1804 organised civic rights, familial issues, and contractual property relations in the framework of the national state irrespective of religious authority. These were safeguarded by the new *Conseil d'État* and the Penal Code of 1810⁵². The Commercial Code and cadastral system in 1807, the foundation of a Central Bank in 1808, and extensive investments on public works further modernised and rationalised the economy in line with capitalist accumulation. Moreover, Napoléon significantly contributed to instituting medical and educational systems away from Church influence (Baubérot, 2007, pp. 23-24). Law of 1803 on the "Illegal Practice of Medicine" gradually diminished Catholic control over the health system, and although primary education remained largely in the hands of the clergy, the institution of the *lycée* and the imperial university centralised secondary and higher education under the sanction of secular state power. It is through reforms such as these that Bonaparte completed the national-bourgeois oeuvre of 1789 by finding a midway between Royalism and Jacobinism.

The period of 1789-1815 was a critical one in constructing the legal-institutional frameworks and sociopolitical polarisations that were to dominate the rest of the long nineteenth century. Bourgeois-national transformation of state power advanced in this juncture to the detriment of customary-aristocratic privileges⁵³. Land ownership was profoundly transformed in favour of owner-occupier farmers, and a property market was opened up. More egalitarian plans of land redistribution (such as those of the Jacobins), however, were carefully hampered by rural *notables* to change little in the life of the lower peasantry. The clergy "was the clear loser; members could no longer be regarded as significant landowners", while noble descendants continued to possess one-fourth of all land despite loss of legal entitlements (Moulin, 1991, p. 36). The latter continued to exist as part of the wealthy elite side by side with the bourgeois. In the 1789-1815 interval, sociopolitical secularisation initiatives were at their highest during the most intense moments of the contention against counterrevolution, namely against the alliance of internal noble-clerical actors with external European monarchies. Embodied

in the Jacobins and the *sans-culottes*, popular classes met and neutralised the conservative challenge, while significantly weakening the Catholic establishment in the process (1793-4). Once the counterrevolutionary threat was partly averted, however, bourgeois forces sought for a compromise during the Directory period while siding with other propertied classes against the egalitarian Jacobin demands. They found their “moderate” yet firm solution in the pragmatism of Bonaparte, and the Concordat of 1801. From the final downfall of Napoléon I in 1815 to the election of Napoléon III in 1848, a series of compromises was sought between *notables* of bourgeois and aristocratic backgrounds across France, both of which agreed unambiguously on keeping the popular masses away from political influence. The first of these settlement attempts was the Bourbon Restoration (1815-30), and the second was the Orléans monarchy (1830-1848). The course of secularisation showed variations in these intervals based on the push and pull of aristocratic versus working class forces.

4.1.2. Bourbon Restoration and Orléans Reformism

Although it revitalised aristocratic prestige and political weight, the Restoration was in no way a simple return to the *ancien régime*. The Charter of 1814 had to incorporate some of the most important bourgeois-political gains of the Revolution such as legal equality, personal liberty, and protection of property. Many non-noble bourgeois, “even if not enthusiastic adherents of the Bourbons were prepared to accept the regime provided it respected these basic aspirations” (Price, 2005, p. 185). Constitutional monarchy seemed like a viable alternative to them in the ambiguity of post-Napoleonic wars. Yet for the noblemen and the clergy, the Restoration came to signify something else: it elevated hopes to reinstate themselves as the ruling estate, which was to inevitably deepen class frictions to instigate another bourgeois-led revolution by 1830 (Lough & Lough, 1978, pp. 38-64). Regarding state-religion relations, unsurprisingly, the Restoration re-sacralised the sociopolitical scene by establishing the official unity of Catholicism and the Kingdom. The preamble of the Charter (“Charter of 1814: Charte Constitutionnelle,” 1814) asserted that “Divine Providence, in recalling us to our estates after a long absence, has laid upon us great obligations”, and its Article 6 declared that “the catholic, apostolic and Roman religion is the religion of the state”. Religious liberties, however, had to be conceded. The document recognised that “every one may profess

his religion with equal freedom, and shall obtain for his worship the same protection” (Articles 5), and it bestowed Catholic as well as the Protestant clergy stipends from the royal treasury (Article 7). Article 9 acknowledged that all property (including “national”) was inviolable, which meant there was no returning of *biens nationaux* land to the Church. In addition to the revolutionary land arrangement, the Concordat also remained untouched in this period. A new agreement was negotiated between 1817-1821, yet in the end both Paris and Rome opted to continue with the terms delineated in Napoléon’s original pact (Lalouette, 2005c, pp. 87-93).

The Catholic character of the Restoration was overbearing in its symbolism, legislation, and clerical revival, parallel with the mounting royal-aristocratic test of power for class dominance. White Terror against Republicans and Bonapartists incrementally gained a legal character. Royal family members that died in the Revolution were honoured in pompous religious rituals, and “crimes” of the revolutionary and imperial periods reprimanded in major cathedrals. The national flag was changed from the revolutionary *tricolore* to the white flag of the Legitimists. In 1814-6, divorce was once again banned and Sunday was re-sanctified as the Catholic day of rest. Criticism of religion was limited with the severe censorship laws of May 1819 and March 1822. *Panthéon* was restored as Church St. Genevieve. Clerical influence boosted at every level of government and civil society. The number of newly ordained priests each year increased from 755 in 1814 to 2140 in 1831. Concordatory clergy rose from around 30,000 to 40,000 between 1821 and 1848 (Boudon, 2007, p. 47). Catholic congregations also entered a golden age with the Restoration, during which the number of Jesuits reached two million⁵⁴. As Charles X came to power in 1824, re-Christianisation was amplified with vigour by the ultra-royalists. The enthronement ceremony of the new King took place at *Cathédrale de Reims* in an identical fashion with the *sacre* of pre-revolutionary times. Likewise, Pope Leo XII’s declaration of 1825 a Jubilee year symbolised the revivification of the Vatican, and was celebrated by the French monarchy in various ceremonials. With the initiatives of Bishop Frayssinous as the Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs, the weight of the clergy over the education system was significantly augmented at all levels, ranging from the clerical supervision of communal primary schools to the purge of liberal professors in universities. Minority rights across the country was systematically violated. The controversial Sacrilege Law of

25 April 1825 made the public profanation of sacred vessels and the Eucharist in Catholic churches an act of blasphemy punishable by public execution (Ormières, 2002, pp. 54-65).

Extravagant Catholic resurgence during the Restoration was the ideological-institutional component of the final ultra-royalist/aristocratic endeavour to reassert itself as “the dominant political class” of the polity (Magraw, 2002, p. 20). Charles X openly favoured the aristocratic elite over the non-noble bourgeois not only in political representation and appointments, but also regarding financial redistribution. The massive compensation awarded to more than 70,000 returning *émigré* nobles in April 1825 due to their revolutionary losses was one example to the latter. As the decade came to a close, there was widespread fear among the public that a return to the *ancien régime* was imminent. In view of the weakness of Republican or Bonapartist alternatives, bourgeois opposition united under liberal monarchists, who gained the majority of seats in the Chamber in November 1827. When Charles X responded with ultra-authoritarian ordinances in July 1830 to tighten the grip of censorship, dissolve the Chamber, and restrain the electoral corps, a point of no return was reached between bourgeois politics and legitimism. Similar to the interval of 1789-1794, the Revolution of 1830 brought forth the insurrection of urban popular masses and the peasantry against counterrevolutionary advances, though ultimately to the advantage of bourgeois forces. *Trois Glorieuses* (26-29 July) were concluded with a liberal consensus under Orléans rule, personified in the “citizen-king” Louis-Philippe and symbolised by the return of the *tricolore* as the national flag. While once again depriving the popular masses of their revolution, 1830 unquestionably consolidated the bourgeoisie as a class for itself. “By 1830 it was evident that the Revolution had made the bourgeoisie” in the process of “crucible of prolonged struggles with aristocratic and popular ‘others’”. 1830 was also “a key moment in the aristocracy’s political decline. Never again – except momentarily after 1870 – would they have a chance of controlling national politics or the state machine. Yet their economic, social and cultural power survived” (Magraw, 2002, pp. 21, 33-34).

Louis-Philippe confirmed the entrenched bourgeois basis of his regime as follows in January 1831: “We seek to place ourselves in the middle [of the political spectrum] equally distant from the excesses of popular power and abuses of royal authority”

(Antonetti, 1994, p. 713). This idea of *juste milieu* was in fact the class motto of the bourgeoisie since 1789. Along with the liberal-bourgeois criticism towards the unwarranted Christianisation during the Bourbon rule, it was the anticlerical response of the popular classes in 1830-3 (including the vandalising of several churches across France and the destruction of ostentatious crosses erected in public spaces) that advised the July Monarchy (1830-48) to restrain clerical overindulgences (Kselman, 2002, p. 73). Although with significant limitations, the revolutionary ideal of establishing a system of religious tolerance began to slowly take shape under Louis Philippe's rule. Unlike the Restoration government, the relationship between political rights/citizenship and religious affiliation was significantly weakened in this period, which meant a significant "change in the relations of Church and State" towards partial secularisation (Allison, 1916, p. 9). Catholicism lost its status as state religion and returned to being that of the "majority of the French" in the revised Charter, which was followed by other moderate reforms. In 1831, remuneration of Jewish Rabbis was also undertaken by the state to officialise the equal recognition of the three major religions under the Concordat. Protestants such as Guizot, Gasparin, Hunnaun, and others, along with free-thinkers, were able to hold political office as ministers and statesmen (Allison, 1916, p. 167) The Sacrilege Law was abolished, *Panthéon* was reopened as a national monument, and Jesuit congregations were dispersed due to their intransigent royalism. Financial credits for bishoprics established in 1817 were annulled. Philippe's enthronement was devoid of Catholic rituals, and a suggestive decline in religious rhetoric and symbolism was observed at the governmental level. Divorce, however, remained prohibited.

The secularisation of Orléans rule was strictly limited by its concern to contain the advance of lower classes. The July Monarchy emphasised allegiance to the Concordat so as to once again depolarise/normalise Catholicism as civil religion (and the clergy as its loyal delegates) in conformity with the reaffirmed bourgeois order. "From the very outset", Allison (1916, p. 96) writes, the July Monarchy "had recognized the political utility of Catholicism", especially vis-à-vis the poor. In direct contrast with the secular university aimed at educating a bourgeois-intellectual elite, Prime Minister François Guizot's Law on Primary Education of June 1833 represented the mentality to "moralise" the lower classes for social peace, which, in his words, would seek "to restore the authority of religion in the soul of children" as well as "faith in Providence, the holiness of

duty, submission to the paternal authority, compliance with laws, and the prince” (Guizot, 1889, pp. 146, 166). Stock-Morton (1988, p. 8) writes that Guizot and his bourgeois circles sought to create a liberal *élite* through secular university education for the upper classes, while “it is certainly clear that they were content to leave the lower classes ... in the arms of the Church”. Ormières (2002, p. 73) agrees: “For sure, the bourgeois was more and more convinced that religion constituted the only real shield against the thrust of revolutionary movements”⁵⁵. In this sense, the period witnessed the accommodation and regeneration of the Catholic clergy, which was also amplified by the generalisation of religious charity and aid organisations for the poor (such as *Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul*). Meanwhile, the electoral system strictly excluded lower-middle classes, workers, and peasants; and political meetings of any kind were banned. Faced with the “social problem” of the emergent industrial proletariat in the 1840s, the clampdown of the regime on working populations intensified further (especially with the authoritarian laws of September 1835) along with tightened censorship, and violent repression of popular strikes and insurrections nationwide (Vigier, 1962).

Aggravated by the economic crisis of 1847-51, the Revolutions of 1848 rested on such popular grievances, where the peasantry and proletariat, allied with lower middle class groups, professionals, and small shopkeepers rose together against the July Monarchy. They were also supported by the rising industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie, which likewise resented the domination of the financial bourgeoisie and the traditional *notables* under Orléans rule. Elwitt (1975, p. 6) refers to 1848 as the “maiden voyage” of the industrial bourgeoisie into French politics despite it was still “relatively weak and scattered and, as a class, unsure of itself as an independent political force”. This builds on Marx’s analysis of the period, which highlights the dominance of the financial bourgeoisie during the *Orléans* regime, or the “finance aristocracy” comprised of “bankers, stock exchange kings, railway kings, owners of coal and iron mines and forests” (Abrams, 1982, pp. 50-63; K. Marx, 1964). Unlike 1830, 1848 was not accompanied by an anticlerical revolt of the masses, and an atmosphere of reconciliation with Catholics seemed possible in the early days of the Second Republic. This temporary appeasement can be explained by the lack of ostentatious religious symbolism under the July Monarchy, and by the Catholic advocacy for liberty of higher education that saw 1848 as an opportunity for change. In terms of ideological evolution,

moreover, the emergence of liberal Catholicism in the post-Restoration period as well as the religious undertones of early French socialism (such as the romanticism-inspired teachings of Saint-Simon and Fourier) also contributed to a perception of alliance (Biéler, 1982).

Yet as the revolutionary class alliance broke rapidly, the escalation of violent social conflict inexorably placed the Church in opposition to left-wing urban and rural popular movements. With the pressures of working groups, the Second Republic initially recognised the right to work, and National Workshops for the unemployed were established. The small peasantry similarly expected reform to protect itself from exploitative farming practices. The bourgeoisie and landowners were not willing to make such concessions, and the introduction of a heavy land tax and closure of the National Workshops paved the way for the popular uprisings in the summer. During the *Journées de Juin* of 1848, bourgeois-conservative forces clustering under the banner of *Parti de l'Ordre* pugnaciously destroyed proletarian ascendancies in one of the bloodiest episodes of French history, killing more than 5,000 and imprisoning 25,000 in a few days. The death of the Archbishop of Paris by a random bullet coming from the barricades during the June Days symbolised the end of leeway for conciliation between the church and the left. This was arguably never a real possibility given the Church's vested interests lying with the political and economic elite. From summer 1848 onwards, various bourgeois-notable fractions united against the *péril rouge* in favour of authoritarian alternatives. They formed "a negative consensus of all those who feared the unleashing of the class struggle and wanted a strong state ... which served as cement and apparent arbiter among contradictory interests" (Charle, 1994, p. 52). In the presidential elections of December 1848, the remedy was to be once again found in a Bonaparte, who also received the unreserved support of major Catholic circles.

Bolstering the Catholic Church as a bulwark against socialism was a point of consensus among the ruling classes after 1848. The spread of progressive-egalitarian ideals amongst the "dangerous classes" had to be curbed, and the religious establishment was desperately called to action to do the job. As Gibson (1989, p. 199) puts it, "there is no doubt that 1848, and in particular the June Days, marked an important caesura in relations between the Catholic Church and the French bourgeoisie

... The shock was certainly enough to change the habits of mind of many French bourgeois, and to cause them to look to the Church as a bastion of social order". Fittingly, the Constitution of 1848 declared itself to be "in the presence of God" (in its Preamble) and multiplied religious references (Conseil Constitutionnel, 1848)⁵⁶, while reforms such as the right to work and free primary education were removed from its final draft. Louis Napoléon's election as president in 1848, which eventually resulted in his coup of 1852 and proclamation of the Second Empire, unsurprisingly strengthened the ties between the state and church. As Section 4.3 will clarify, the 1848-1870 interval was to have a profound effect on the political views and mentalities of republican politicians that carried out the secularising reforms of the 1880s under the Third Republic.

4.2. The Ottoman Age of Reform (1789-1876)

As France was shaking with revolutionary struggles in the 1790s, the Ottoman Empire was commencing an episode of military-administrative reform under the rule of Selim III. Yet unlike France, Ottoman sociopolitical change did not originate from the immediate thrust of domestic class forces, but predominantly from external dynamics. A series of western military defeats throughout the eighteenth century convinced the Empire's ruling elite of the necessity to enhance the state's warmaking capabilities, which they quickly realised would require the centralisation and rationalisation of the patrimonial political apparatus along European lines. The polity's gradual absorption into the capitalist world-economy and interstate system under semi-colonial conditions further crystallised the need for modern institutions. The meaning of "semi-colonialism" can be clarified through Pamuk's (1988, pp. 129-131) distinction between three categories of the capitalist periphery, which is based on political criteria. The first is formal colonies (such as India), where there is "the ability of the colonizing power to intervene in the incorporation process and to use extra-economic means more directly than it could use elsewhere". Informal Empire is the second category (Central and South America), where "the opening to world capitalism proceeded under conditions of formal political independence", although still under "the sphere of influence of one imperialist power". The third category is "penetration of world capitalism under conditions of inter-imperialist rivalry" (China, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire), where "relatively strong

state structures ... coupled with conditions of rivalry between the major imperialist powers in order to obtain greater political and economic advantage and influence". Belonging to the third category, semi-colonialism in Ottoman lands tied the fate of the Empire closely on its capacity to counterbalance and neutralise the political/economic/military dominance of various European powers.

Domestically, economic stagnation, the centrifugal challenge of local *âyans* and secessionist ascendancies of non-Muslim *millet*s accompanied the external gravities. It is in this complicated context that Selim III inaugurated a process of governmental modernisation that represented a "shift of orientation, away from traditionalism and toward the creation of a legal-rational order" (Findley, 1980, p. 113). Selim came to power in the same year as the French Revolution, and there is evidence to suggest that he "had sympathy for this event, which encouraged his initiative to modernise institutions". Acknowledging the laggardness of the Empire vis-à-vis the West, "the answers to the question of how the Empire could be saved were multiple"; yet they mostly converged on "the introduction of European –and particularly French– institutions and techniques" (Bilici, 1989, p. 176; 1991, p. 540). Selim's reforms made the most important imprint on the military and bureaucracy. Distinct from the resistant janissaries and *sipahis*, a modern army named *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order) was instituted in 1793-4 under the guidance of European military advisors; supplemented by naval, military, and engineering schools where foreign officers and technicians trained Muslim pupils. In this process, "Europeans of all nationalities were instrumental in introducing new ways, but the French had a special impact" (Shaw, 1976, p. 266). To fund the new army, a separate treasury *İrad-ı Cedid* (New Revenues) was founded. Within the state administration, the scribal service (*kalemiye*) was reorganised, streamlined, and its authority extended to lay the foundations of a modern civil officialdom. Appointment of permanent ambassadors to European capitals and the overall augmentation of diplomatic relations –which was becoming all the more vital for the survival of the Empire– highlighted the western-oriented *kalemiye*'s pre-eminence.

Although Selim's reforms were mostly about crafting parallel institutions (such as a new army and treasury) as opposed to liquidating old ones, they quickly exposed and intensified the contradiction of interests within the Ottoman ruling bloc. The reaction

came from an alliance of *âyans*, the janissaries, and the Islamic *ulema*. The *âyans*, especially of the Balkans, were discontented by the conscription demands of the central government to staff its new army, given that many could afford to act as semi-independent entities. They thus joined in with the janissaries, who, on their part, were concerned about the institution of a separate military force growing in numbers and power in the early 1800s. Moreover, constant monetary debasements and primary inflow of European commodities undermined the revenues of guilds, where janissaries were actively involved as small traders and craftsmen⁵⁷. Faced with the loss of their privileges under Selim's rule, they adhered to the eighteenth century practice of being the "armed supporter of the *Medrese (ulema)*, and an additional social obstacle to change" (Ergil, 1975a, p. 56). Last but not least, the *ulema* were rapidly losing ground to the *kalemiye* in the bureaucratic hierarchy, which threatened their semi-aristocratic status and entitlements within the ruling apparatus. For *medrese* students (*softa*) and other lower level *ulema* in the provinces, socioeconomic deprivation was all the more ominous.

During the decisive episode that led to the overthrow –and later execution– of Selim III in 1807/8, it was the *ulema* that headed and provided the Islamic-ideological justification for the insurgence, which was effective in provoking larger masses. The *Şeyhülislam* issued a *fatwa* that denigrated Selim's reforms as illegal and in violation of religion and tradition. "The main driving force behind the opposition were the *ulema*", where the *Şeyhülislam* Atullah Efendi became the leading ideologue of reaction against Selim. The *ulema* "had at their disposal the means of communication necessary to win over the masses to their cause. The preachers in the central mosques and the imams of the various city quarters were able to incite the masses and thus ensure extensive popular backing for the forces of reaction" (Levy, 1971, p. 15). There is evidence to suggest that "besides his desire to have a modernized army Selim intended to crush the resistance of the *Ulema*, and that he wanted to restrict the authority of the *Şeyhülislam* in order to be an independent enlightened monarch" (Berkes, 1964, p. 81). Although he failed to bring the religious establishment under state infrastructural power, the New Order sowed the seeds of "split-up modernisation" within the Ottoman ruling apparatus, where the "elective affinity" of the Islamic *ulema* (its lower ranks in particular) positioned them unreservedly on the side of reactionary forces against westernisation and the rising scribal bureaucracy. Like the Catholic Church in the French Revolution, the religious

institution became directly polarised/politicised in the early phase of the sociopolitical struggle.

It is during the rule of Mahmud II (1808-1839) that the traditional bureaucracy spearheaded by the *ulema* lost the upper hand and was forced to accept a subordinate status lacking immediate political influence, which could only be possible via the elimination of the janissary corps altogether in 1826⁵⁸. Mahmud's reign can be considered in two separate periods divided by that turning point, typified by the preparation for, and implementation of, a substantial process of governmental centralisation and rationalisation, which was to have a direct impact on the Islamic establishment. Having personally witnessed the gloomy fate of his cousin Selim, Mahmud sought and succeeded in the early part of his rule to earn the allegiance of the *ulema* both in its upper and lower levels⁵⁹. In the 1820s, he also managed to restrain, to a large extent, the power of local *âyans* in the Balkans and Anatolia through military and other means to reassert the dominance of Istanbul⁶⁰. Finally, with the eradication of the janissaries in the summer of 1826 in one of the bloodiest episodes of Ottoman urban history, "the *ulema* ... had now lost their strong arm and the sultan made use of their weakened position to curb their power in two vital areas" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 40). These were related to the *ulema*'s property and its organisational structure within the state.

First, *vakıf* land and property were placed under direct government regulation by the formation of *Nezaret-i Evkaf* (first Directory, then Ministry, of Pious Foundations), and second, *Şeyhülislam* was configured as a closely regulated administrative office (*Bâb-ı Meşihat*) within the state bureaucracy (Yakut, 2005, p. 56). "The effective control and disposition of these *evkaf* [*vakıfs*] and their revenues was usually in the hands of ... members of the *ulema* ... The most important were directly or indirectly under the control of the *Muftis* and *Kadis*, and thus constituted a major source of economic power for the religious institution ... Mahmud's aim was nothing less than to centralize the collection and expenditure of *Evkaf* revenues in his own hands, receiving them from the collectors and administrators and paying out what was necessary for the upkeep of religious buildings, the salaries of religious personnel, and other pious purposes" (B. Lewis, 1961, p. 93). In result, starting with Mahmud II, "the religious establishment was increasingly bureaucratized, placed more firmly than before under the authority of the central

government, faced increasing encroachments into its traditional jurisdictions, and lost most of its financial autonomy” (Bein, 2011, pp. 4-5). The 1789-1839 interval in the Ottoman Empire can thus be compared to the 1789-1801 period in France in that they both completed, although in different ways, the oeuvre of subordinating the religious establishment/ruling fraction under state infrastructural power (through tighter “interior” regulation). “By the beginning of the *Tanzimat* [Reorganisations] in 1839 ... of the several medieval orders, the Janissaries had been destroyed, the local notables ... crushed ... Only the *ulema* survived ... despite a diminution of their autonomy, wealth, prestige, and political power” (Chambers, 1972, pp. 36-37).

Notwithstanding the relegation of the *ulema* within the ruling apparatus, the official unity of Islam and the state was never put into question. Both Selim and Mahmud, for instance, found the legitimacy for the modernising reforms in Islamic political-philosophical conceptions interpreted and promoted by the higher *ulema* in palace circles⁶¹. The lower level *ulema*, however, proved much more resistant to reform due to their socioeconomic position. The latter had long resented the aristocratisation of the upper *ulema* as an exclusive elite, and found their situation to get only worse with the introduction of westernisation and the rise of the civil officialdom. “These elements of class struggle within the *ulema* corps ... were bound to serious trouble in periods of ... drastic attempts at reforms”; and, “since the studies at the *medrese* were strictly limited to the traditional subjects of Muslim learning, the *softas* objected violently to European reforms; in all probability they considered them a danger not only to their religious beliefs but also to their economic prospects” (Heyd, 1961, pp. 71-73). As the net loser of the early phase of Ottoman modernisation, the *ulema* in general and its lower ranks in particular continued to be the usual constituent and agitator of oppositional alliances against reform throughout the century. In what followed, “every effort of the military-bureaucratic class towards ... secularization of social and economic institutions, which meant the penetration of capitalist relations into new areas of social life”, was met with “opposition from the *ulema* and the traditional pre-capitalist ... classes” (Ergil, 1975b, p. 72).

The decline of the *ulema*’s relative self-sufficiency and sociopolitical status in the first half of the nineteenth century was ultimately linked with the disproportionate

increase in the weight of the reform-oriented scribal bureaucracy within the ruling bloc. Mahmud organised the scribal service along rational-bureaucratic lines away from patrimonialism to give them a secure standing. Between 1826-1838, the practice of confiscating their property was ended, and they were guaranteed a regular salary as opposed to customary fees⁶². A Translation Office (*Bâb-ı Âli Tercüme Odası*), initially established in the early 1820s, was revitalised 1833 onwards to grow into a prestigious department that constituted the core of the reformist scribal elite, as well as the point of entry for European intellectual life in the Empire. Diplomatic services were reinvigorated further with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836, followed by other ministries (such as Trade and Internal Affairs) with a modern, centralised bureaucratic outlook⁶³. The credence of the scribal service, however, was not limited to executive functions. As lawmaking became more detailed and technical than could be handled by the Sultan's traditional Imperial Council, the Supreme Council for Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yi Ahkâm-i Adliye*) was established in 1838 along with numerous advisory boards on legislation (such as on trade, agriculture, public works, and so on) to deal with complex legal-rational matters. *Kalemiye*'s educational credentials and expertise allowed them to increasingly have a larger impact on imperial codification. In the period that ensued Mahmud's death in 1839, the scribal service centred on *Bâb-ı Âli* (The Sublime Porte) consolidated itself as the uncontested ruling fraction above the Palace itself, a civil officialdom (*mülkiye*) referred to as the "Patriciate of the Pen". The Porte thus became a semi-independent executive with strong legislative prerogatives (Findley, 1980, pp. 140-147)⁶⁴.

4.2.1. From Mahmud II to the *Tanzimat*

The split-up modernisation of the Ottoman ruling apparatus was most visibly observed in the bifurcation of the education system juxtaposing traditional and modern institutions. Originally, the *ulema* had held the monopoly of schooling the Muslim *millet* – another privilege they lost under Mahmud II. Yet Mahmud crafted parallel educational institutions without touching the basis of the *medrese*, and like in the Guizot Law of 1833 in France, primary education was left almost completely to the religious establishment⁶⁵. Instead, Mahmud devised nonreligious middle schools (*rüşdiye*) with western-style education to prepare bureaucratic elites, serving as a passage to government bureaus

or higher engineering schools. The latter were also expanded and revitalised, complemented by medical and military academies with no affiliation to the *ulema*, and an increasing number of students were sent to European capitals for training. The new educational establishments ensured the reproduction of the civil-military reformist bureaucracy dressed in westernised attire and a new headgear –the *fez*– (with Mahmud’s reform in 1829), and were familiar with European culture and informed on world affairs. Mahmud’s portraits were hung in government offices despite the Islamic doctrine. “Knowledge of ... French”, especially, “became a key qualification for advancement in Ottoman state service ... For many ... proficiency in French served not merely as a symbol of cultural modernity but became virtually its content” (Quataert, 2005, p. 81). Göçek (1987, p. 121) similarly notes that in the long nineteenth century, “71 percent of all Western words in the Ottoman language were of French origin”, which suggests that “the French language had a very significant cultural dominance on the Ottoman meaning system”. Hanioglu (2008, p. 34) confirms: “much of this borrowing was of course associated with the Ottoman reform movement, which drew upon French legal codes and fiscal regulations, opened the Ottoman market to European materials and techniques of production, and welcomed European advances in the sciences”.

Meanwhile, “the *Ulema* ... became singled as a class of clergyman distinguishable ... through their conservatism and insistence upon retaining their medieval attire [represented by the robe and the turban]”, and with very limited access to western developments (Berkes, 1964, p. 124). They “had a vested interest [in the old order] and expressed their opposition. The religious institution itself remained basically unreformed and the major bastion of conservatism in Ottoman society” (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 49). As the century wore on, the *ulema* would not have trouble finding new social allies from the Muslim *millet*, particularly the notables of interior Anatolian provinces, who were being placed in a disadvantaged position by the generalisation of semi-colonial capitalist relations across the Empire. In this picture, expanding non-Muslim privileges and separatisms coupled with increasing political/economic/military intrusions of Christian European powers facilitated the expression of Muslim concern for status in Islamic-reactionary terms. The *ulema* as a declining bureaucratic fraction would seek to incite and capitalise on such grievances. To analyse this process, the focus must be shifted to the long-term political economic transformations of the Ottoman century

that reconfigured the nature of class forces and state power. And it should be reiterated here that “the development of capitalism in the Ottoman Empire was not an indigenous affair, but the result of the impact of the already developed capitalist economies of Western Europe (Gülalp, 1994, p. 166).

As early as the last quarter of the eighteenth century, trading privileges in Ottoman lands had been conceded to Russia, Austria, Britain, France and Prussia; where “each of these signatory powers obtained also the right to extend the privileges ... to ‘protected persons’ in the ... Empire, that is, those who had ethnic or religious affiliation with the state in question ... The main beneficiaries of these provisions were the non-Muslim merchants who had come to occupy a central position in the empire’s foreign trade” (Kasaba, 1988, p. 33). Moreover, Mahmud II had to repeal in 1824 the stipulations protecting Ottoman merchants against their foreign counterparts, which above all touched Muslim traders due to the dual citizenship and entitlements enjoyed by non-Muslims. The culmination of early semi-colonial integration with Europe was the Free Trade Treaty of Baltalimanı signed with England in 1838, a year before Mahmud’s death. The agreement heralded a new era. It disallowed state monopolies on trade and export restrictions, rendered foreigners exempt from internal taxes, and dictated the rate of custom dues in favour of colonial interests (Pamuk, 1987, p. 20). Similar treaties with other European powers followed soon after, while the Ottoman state gradually lost sovereign jurisdiction over its fiscal/trade policies as well as the capacity to regulate the inflow of western commodities and impose proper taxation on economic activity. With these treaties, the status of “protected persons”, namely non-Muslim intermediaries, was firmly entrenched. Although a merchant bourgeoisie did start to flourish out of this arrangement, its fate was more closely tied with European trading partners than the Ottoman state, as they were “a distinct and judicially privileged class” functioning as “the domestic extension of foreign commercial interests and privileges” (Ergil, 1974, p. 81).

The politico-legal counterpart of peripheral capitalist transformation in the Empire was the *Hatt-ı Şerif* (Edict) of Gülhane proclaimed a year later on 3 November 1839, which inaugurated what is known as the *Tanzimat* (reorganization) period (1839-1876) (“Tanzimat Fermanı,” 1839). The edict pledged to guarantee the “perfect security of life, honor, and property” of all Ottoman subjects, outlawed the confiscation of private wealth,

and ensured that no punishment could be inflicted on any individual without public trial⁶⁶. Besides, “a regular system of assessing and levying taxes” according to one’s means was introduced; accompanied by standardizing conscription by regulating “the levying of troops and the duration of their service”. Regarding secularisation, importantly, the edict announced that “these imperial concessions shall extend to all our subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception”. Mahmud II’s abolition in 1829 of the non-Muslim obligation to wear distinct clothing was a noteworthy precursor, yet the edict was the first time that the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims before law was officially recognised in an Ottoman document. At least in theory, the conceded rights (as well as taxation and conscription requirements) would not vary according to one’s belonging in a religious community. Also according to the document, “the *ulema* or the grandees of the Empire” were expected to swear allegiance to the principles of *Tanzimat*, and they would undergo punishment if they infringe its provisions, which underlined the Porte’s will to secure reform against traditional interferences.

There was no mention of a requirement of consecration by the *Şeyhülislam*. According to Shaw and Shaw (1977, p. 61), “though presented in the context of the Ottoman experience and expressing particular goals rather than abstract principles, the Decree of Gülhane ... encompassed many of the ideals contained in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789”. Above all, the Edict of 1839 was an attempt, albeit a naïve one, to counteract the non-Muslim separatist movements inside the Empire, and relatedly, the relentless meddling of European powers under the pretext of the “Eastern Question”. The latter was an umbrella concept used by nineteenth century European statesmen and newspapers to denote the situation and affairs of Ottoman non-Muslim minorities, tied closely to the western geopolitical power struggles over the territory of the Empire –the “sick man of Europe”⁶⁷. The “ultimate implication” of the Decree was that *millet* barriers would be broken down”. Here “the creation of a multinational brotherhood of all Ottoman subjects was the official aim”, “while the *ulema* were not, as a body, prepared to see radical departures toward equality and secularisation” (R. H. Davison, 1963, pp. 40, 42-43). Therefore, it would be correct to say that “with the inauguration of the ... Charter ... the differences between the forces of secularism and the Shari’a became formalized” (Nadolski, 1977, p. 521).

In the succeeding *Tanzimat* era led by the reformist bureaucracy, the Supreme Council for Judicial Ordinances and various other ministerial councils became the heart of codification in the Empire, more so than the sultans Abdülmecid (1839-61) and Abdülaziz (1861-76) themselves. Following the first phase of Ottoman modernisation through interstate military pressures under Selim III and Mahmud II (1789-1839), the *Tanzimat* witnessed the wholesale “capitalist transformation of the state” as the Empire “began to acquire legal-rational features for the first time in this period” (Gülalp, 1994, p. 167). These features involved a “grand project of legislation that was aimed at centralizing the administration and modernizing the state, and was largely inspired by ... French ideas and administrative practices” (Rubin, 2008, p. 2). The first instance of legislation was the Penal Code of 1840, which underscored the concept of legal equality “by stressing equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims and the principle that punishment would be imposed only according to the law” (Peters, 2005, p. 127). The amended Penal Codes of 1851 and 1858 were more systematised and closer to western forms, especially as the latter was partly translated from Napoléon’s *Code Pénal* of 1810 to underline the protection of life, security, property, and dignity. Commercial Code of 1850, which was initially thwarted by the *ulema* in 1841 due to its contradiction with Islamic law, was also inspired by its French counterpart of 1807, and it served to systematise capitalist exchange in Ottoman territory. The Code of Maritime Commerce followed in 1863. Land Code of 1858 recognised private property in land for the first time, and the Mining Law of 1861 (and 1869) regulated the extraction of minerals by capitalist ownership. The property law of 1867 allowed foreigners to privately own land and operate mines. This wholesale process of market-based codification during the *Tanzimat* was “the first attempt to differentiate between law and religion and ... to promulgate legislation based on available sources and on certain rational or secular criteria ... Stage by stage, increasing areas of life had to undergo legal redefinition and even reorientation, removed from the sphere designated as ‘religious’, and brought under state law” (Berkes, 1964, p. 161; Z. Toprak, 2007, pp. 32-33, 37).

The inevitable outcome of these sets of legislation, aside from consolidating semi-colonial capitalist relations and centralising political power, was partial politico-legal secularisation, which occurred through the bifurcation of the judicial system along religious and secular lines. To enforce the new statutes, from the 1840s onwards, mixed

courts were established first for commercial, and later for civil, police, and criminal affairs where non-Muslims and foreigners could serve on an equal footing with Muslims. In the 1860s, judicial bifurcation deepened as civil tribunals (*nizamiye*) were founded. These were supervised by the Ministry of Justice and independent of sharia courts, which “meant a secular, hierarchical court system was being established throughout the empire, an occurrence formerly unheard of in Islamic law countries” (Starr, 1992, p. 32). Codes of procedure were enacted on commercial (1861) as well as criminal and civil courts (1879), and in 1868, the Supreme Council for Judicial Ordinances was organised into a Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) and Court of Appeals (*Divan- Ahkam-ı Adliye*), all contributing to the further rationalisation and differentiation of the judicial system away from Islamic prerogatives. Nevertheless, the reforms were far from bringing about a unified legal-administrative mechanism, as the existence of parallel institutions constantly created confusion and jurisdictional clashes, and various efforts to overcome the dualism in law and courts characterised the *Tanzimat* era and after. “Legally speaking, the *Tanzimat* engendered “a series of dichotomies with ill-defined limits and conflicting interests. There were secular law codes, codified *Şeriat* and uncoded *Şeriat*, statutory customs and courts of Holy Law, a Ministry of Justice and the office of the *Şeyhülislam*. These differentiated legal systems overlapped and contradicted one another at many points, but the sum effect was a dramatic curtailment of the legal jurisdiction of the *ulema* through successive reinterpretations of what was ‘religious’ and what was ‘worldly’”. Consequently, the *ulema* continued to lose ground to the reformist bureaucracy, as they were “still tied to the political system which was dominated by the new elite coming from the secular schools, were not free to pursue an autonomous development and incapable of resisting the steady encroachments upon their traditional spheres of influence and activity” (Chambers, 1972, p. 45).

4.2.2. Religious Articulation of Sociopolitical Conflicts

The Imperial Reform Edict (*Islâhat Hatt-ı Hümayûnu*) of 1856 was the second major cornerstone of the *Tanzimat* period, which confirmed and further consolidated the restructuring agenda outlined in the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of 1839 (“Islahat Fermanı,” 1856). It amenably guaranteed the preservation of “privileges and ... immunities granted ... to all Christian communities or other non-Muslim persuasions”, and endorsed these

communities to form commissions to submit further reform suggestions to the sultan. In return, “Patriarchs, Metropolitans, Archbishops, Bishops, and Rabbis” of non-Muslim communities were expected to take an oath of allegiance to the Empire upon assuming office. Deriving from these provisions, religious heads of *millets* would be invited in the Supreme Council of Justice (*Meclis-i Vala*) for matters related to their communities, and non-Muslim representation in local councils was subsequently affirmed in the Provincial Law of 1864 and the Municipality Law of 1878. Religious equality set the tone throughout the *Islâhat* document. The “use of any injurious or offensive term ... on account of ... religion, language, or race” was criminalised, and freedom of religious exercise warranted. Public employments, military conscription, civil and military schools, would be admissible to all “without distinction of nationality”, valid also for the collection of taxes. Mixed public courts and councils would continue to oversee cases between Muslims and non-Muslims. Besides, many other provisions of the Edict spoke to the solidification of capitalist legality and property relations. Police forces would be strengthened to ensure safety of person and property, and death penalty and torture were abolished. State budget and expenses were made transparent. The state, moreover, would undertake roles to facilitate capitalist development. As the document insisted, “everything that can impede commerce or agriculture shall be abolished. To accomplish these objects means shall be sought to profit by the science, the art, and the funds of Europe”. It is following this Edict that the previously discussed capitalist codification process was accelerated with vigour. Regarding education, it is interesting to note that in the 1860s, Napoléon III’s Minister of Education Jean Victor Duruy was invited to Istanbul to advise on the education system, which reflects the *Islâhat* spirit. Among Duruy’s recommendations was the foundation of interdenominational secondary schools and a secular university, which were implemented by the “Regulation for Public Education” of 1869.

The main contradiction of the *Tanzimat/Islâhat* period was that instead of engraining a secular notion of Ottoman citizenship (*Osmanlılık*, as professed in the Nationality Law of 1869 –inspired by its French counterpart of 1851– and the Constitution of 1876), it engendered the contrary effect of highlighting socioeconomic/political divisions along religious lines throughout the Empire⁶⁸. Above all, semi-colonial integration into global capitalism exacerbated the “marked economic distinctions between the Muslims and non-Muslims” (Nadolski, 1977, p. 521)⁶⁹, thus

contributing to the articulation of Muslim social claims/grievances in religious terminologies. Particularly in coastal regions, a cosmopolitan non-Muslim middle class culture abounded, where upward mobility for Muslims was limited largely to government employment. In port cities, “non-Muslim merchants eliminated local Muslim groups from economic competition in long-distance trade”, and given that the non-Muslim merchants’ “economic fortunes depended more on the global economy than the Ottoman state ... the coast slipped away from imperial control” (Emrence, 2012, pp. 36, 52). In the Anatolian interior, however, the situation was different: imperial-bureaucratic hegemony and Islamic ideological dominance was reaffirmed parallel with the consolidation of a local Muslim elite. After the suppression of *âyans* by Mahmud II, a new type of provincial Muslim middle class emerged in the nineteenth century, which involved landlords, merchants, tax-farmers, artisans, former military families, local bureaucrats, and the *ulema*. The economic and political interests of this “Muslim bloc”, which constituted the immediate social basis of the Empire, converged on opposing “non-Muslim commercial groups, the equality discourse of the *Tanzimat*, and the penetration of Europeans into inland regions” (Emrence, 2012, p. 57).

The notables dominated Ottoman provincial councils, took significant bureaucratic posts, controlled regional trade networks and urban-rural links, extended their landownership, and extracted surplus from the peasantry. Under the ideational guidance of the *ulema* as part of the imperial bureaucracy, Sunni Islam was the officially embedded ideological component of the notables’ activity, especially in the latter’s intermediary role between the masses and the central government (Hourani, 1968). The provincial *ulema* were regenerated and took redefined moral-intellectual roles in the *Tanzimat* period. *Medreses*, for instance, “provided ... subsistence living for many of the impoverished peasant youths who were coming to the cities in large numbers. This influx of displaced peasant boys into the urban *medreses*” had the effect of “reinforcing attitudes antithetical to the *Tanzimat*” (Chambers, 1972, p. 37). “They housed, thanks to their endowments, a reserve army for a reaction against the *Tanzimat* or, more correctly, against its failures” (Berkes, 1964, p. 142). In eastern Anatolia too, finally, Islam was accentuated to provide the link between the state and local leaders against non-Muslim elements. Although the central state’s presence was much less visible there, the Empire sought to control the region through semi-autonomous Muslim tribal and religious

leaders. Especially against the spread of Armenian nationalism and Christian missionaries in the last quarter of the century, the central state was to support Sufi-Islamic notables and tribal chieftains, who came to possess vast lands to function as semi-feudal landowners (Emrence, 2012, pp. 88-93).

Eventually, the rise of Muslim notables across the Empire “affected also the political thinking of the period” to underpin “an intellectual stratum” highly critical of non-Muslim ascendance (Karpas, 1972, pp. 254, 260-261). It is based on the grievance of the Muslim *millet* that the *Tanzimat* politics came to be denounced in the 1860s “for making the Europeans, the Levantines ... and ... Christians, a privileged group while neglecting the Muslim population” (Ahmad, 2003, pp. 36-37). The strong Islamic undertones and partialities in the work of the Young Ottomans, the first modern intellectual movement in the Empire that advocated for constitutionalism and a pan-Ottomanist representative government, is indicative of the confessional antagonism created in the *Tanzimat* era (Mardin, 1962)⁷⁰. Among other things, the Young Ottomans spoke of the need for developing and endorsing Muslim banks, enterprises, merchants, and businessmen; and although they promoted egalitarian Ottoman citizenship regardless of religious affiliation, their writings were contradictory in implicitly or explicitly recognising the Muslim element as the primary foundation of the Empire (R. H. Davison, 1954, p. 862; Karpas, 1972, p. 264). In the 1870s, as non-Muslim nationalist uprisings and Christian European domination became all the more menacing, Muslim reaction was noticeably amplified. Internally, conflict in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Crete in the 1860s aggravated to have an imprint on the ensuing decade. Externally, victory against Russia in the Crimean War (1853-6) with British and French aid came at the expense of total financial dependency to Europe. In 1854, the Empire began external borrowing for the first time to cover for military expenditures, which was to lead to the declaration of total bankruptcy by 1875.

The *ulema* and *softas* capitalised on the growing Muslim discontent against domestic and foreign Christian forces to build mass support and spearhead a wave of Islamic revitalisation in the 1870s. Although the *ulema* remained relatively weak, “the conditions after 1871 enabled them to build mass support for the idea that it was the secularization imposed by the *Tanzimat*, the influence of foreigners, the intrusions of the

foreign representatives, the resulting 'equality' given to non-Muslims, and the agitation of the latter for increased privileges and even independence that had caused the empire's difficult situation. These feelings, shared in part by many Young Ottomans, generated a new wave of Muslim revivalism" (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 157)⁷¹. In May 1876, the *ulema* joined in with Young Ottoman-inspired bureaucrats (such as Midhat Pasha) to contribute to the overthrow of Sultan Abdülaziz, who was replaced by Murat V and shortly after, Abdülhamid II, who came to throne upon the promise of promulgating a constitution. Meanwhile, Christian rebellion of 1875 in Herzegovina had spilled over to other regions in the Balkans, and in 1876, a Bulgarian revolt had been accompanied by the declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro on the Empire. The Empire managed to suppress the insurgences, though not without causing a major European diplomatic offensive regarding the ill treatment of non-Muslims.

It is in this convoluted context that the first Ottoman constitution was proclaimed in December 1876 ("Kanun-i Esasi," 1876). This was an effort to establish a unifying political framework for Muslim and non-Muslim elites and communities, which was hoped to counter separatisms while keeping European powers at bay (by demonstrating that their intervention for reform regarding minorities was no longer necessary). In fact the constitution was partly a diplomatic move, as it was proclaimed on the very same day (23 December 1876) when great powers held a conference in Istanbul to discuss the issue of Ottoman minority reform in the post-Balkan conflict. That the document sought to accommodate both Muslim and non-Muslim groups was discernible in its inconsistent provisions on state-religion relations. Accordingly, sovereignty lied with the sultan (Article 3), who was identified as the "supreme Caliph" and "protector of the Muslim religion", although he was the "ruler of all Ottomans" (Article 4). All subjects were to be called *Osmanlı* and were legally equal "without distinction whatever faith they profess" (Articles 8 and 17), despite the fact that "Islam is the state religion", and "religious privileges granted to various bodies [namely non-Muslims]" were maintained (Article 11). The holy character of the sultan was also confirmed in that "he is unaccountable and his person is sacred" (Article 5), "his name is pronounced in the mosques during public prayer", and "he carries out the provisions of the sharia along with other laws" (Article 7). The concept of legal equality irrespective of religion thus contradicted both with the state's overstated affiliation with Islam, as well as the preservation of non-Muslim privileges⁷². Other

provisions sought to appease non-Muslims, such as the foundation of local councils “appertaining to each of the different confessions” (Article 11), and the upholding of independent religious education of *millets* (Article 16). More importantly, according to the electoral regulations, 50 of the 130 members of the Chamber of Deputies would be non-Muslims, which considerably overrepresented European provinces over Anatolian lands to enable the integration of Balkan minority communities into the Empire.

Only a few months after the proclamation of the Constitution, internal conflict and external encirclement intersected to reach a zenith in the Russian War of 1877-8, known traumatically as the “93 War” in public memory (according to the Islamic calendar). The proclamation of the constitution was irrelevant to the pan-Slavic aspirations of Russia, whose military intervention followed in April 1877 in the name of protecting Orthodox communities, concluding with a disastrous Ottoman defeat in 1878 where the Tsar’s armies arrived at the outskirts of Istanbul. The Treaty of San Stefano with Russia (1878), which was followed by the Congress of Berlin (1878) with the added involvement of Austria-Hungary and Britain, resulted in major territorial losses and ultimate European dictation of terms. Overall, approximately 40 percent of the Empire as well as 20 percent of its population was lost in the 1877-8 interval, where the coalescing of non-Muslim separatisms and European intervention took its heaviest toll to date on the Ottomans⁷³. It is during this war that Abdülhamid II dismissed the parliament in February 1878, suspended the constitution, and established his autocratic rule that not only reversed the primacy of the reformist bureaucracy in favour of the Palace, but also consolidated a politics of extravagant Islamism that was to characterise the three subsequent decades of the Empire until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

4.3. Napoléon III (1852-1870) and Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)

Although the source of their political power was based on different social forces and geopolitical realities, the commonality of Napoléon III and Abdülhamid II for the purposes of the present analysis lies in three factors. First, they both established regimes that strongly fused religion within the political apparatus (under the control of the latter) in its ceremonials, symbolism, legitimation, and policymaking to partly offset some of the secularisation processes of the earlier eras. This was stronger especially in the

first decade of Bonaparte's rule, whereas it characterised Abdülhamid's reign as a whole. Besides its social and geopolitical utilities, religion for these French and Ottoman monarchs also served to sanctify their authority at a personal level. For the former, Catholic legitimacy was necessary to offset the Legitimist and Orléanist contenders to the throne, and for the attempt to rally working classes and peasants for the regime. For the latter, the politics of Islamism capitalised on the grievances of the Muslim notables and represented a means to re-sacralise the sultanate to counteract the weakened status of that seat during the secularising reforms led by the Porte (Georgeon, 2006; Milza, 2006). Second, both Bonaparte and Abdülhamid advanced a massive initiative of authoritarian governmental centralisation and bureaucratic expansion based on security and law enforcement. Governmental expansion of territorial reach and deepening of social influence considerably enhanced French and Ottoman state infrastructural power, which was to be inherited and built on by the republican elites in the subsequent period. And third, long-lasting opposition against Bonaparte and Abdülhamid played a crucial part in forming the secularising ideational frameworks of the French and Turkish republican state builders, who mobilised against, and eventually ended their respective empires. The consolidation of nationalist-republican mentalities in this oppositional period would also have implications for the policymaking towards religion in the 1880s (France) and 1920s (Turkey).

In France, the fear of socialism that peaked in the summer of 1848 (and continued by the republican successes in the by-elections of 1850-1) bolstered a bourgeois-conservative alliance (primarily of Orléanists, Legitimists, Bonapartists, and Catholics) that united under the name of Louis Napoléon, first in the presidential elections of December, and then in the legislative elections of May 1849. The 1848-52 interval was characterised by a direct elite response, led by the bourgeoisie, against the threat of working classes. The popular upheavals of 1848 "certainly aroused fear of social revolution and demonstrated the willingness of social élites to resort to violent repression to protect their privileges". In this sense, Napoléon's coup that followed in 1851 "could be seen as the culmination of a long period of repression directed at the left", as "the Emperor's claim to be the 'saviour of society' was widely recognised throughout the property-owning classes" (Price, 2005, pp. 206, 207, 210). Although some of the social elites may have been half-hearted in their support for Bonaparte due

to fears of authoritarianism and unaccountability, class priorities triumphed over liberal niceties. Within his power as president in the 1848-52 period, Napoléon's emphasis on social conservatism and order was reflected in his favourable approach towards Catholicism. The new president undertook two immediate initiatives, one external and the other internal, to demonstrate his support of the Catholic Church as bastion of order and assure conservative backing against the *péril rouge*. The first was the invasion of Rome by French troops in April 1849, right before the legislative elections, to restore the temporal power of Pope Pious IX against the advances of Italian republicans. Despite strong oppositions from the republican deputies in the French parliament, the new president singlehandedly ordered the troops already present in Rome to defend the papal lands at all costs, which caused a military strife that proved particularly popular among conservative circles and the clergy (Kselman, 2002, p. 73; Milza, 2006, p. 195). Likewise, the Crimean War of the early 1850s, where France fought on the side the Ottoman Empire against Russia, also strengthened the image of Bonaparte as the protector of Latin Catholics in the east.

The second important religious policy that marked Napoléon's presidency was the Falloux Law of 15 March 1850 ("Loi relative à l'enseignement," 1850), which heightened the religious disposition of the French education system along with the mechanism of clerical supervision. According to the law, Higher Councils of Public Education (Article 1) and departmental Academic Councils (Article 10) would include numerous clergymen of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish confessions; and religious ministers would also be directly responsible for inspection in both public and private schools at primary and secondary levels (Article 18). Building on the Guizot Law of 1833, "moral and religious instruction" was defined as the chief goal of the primary education curriculum (Article 23), and seminary teachers could now open private secondary schools –with their graduates made eligible to take the *baccalauréat* exam. The Falloux Law marked a clear victory for Catholics, although the university remained relatively immune from Church influence. As a consequence of the law, "religious orders came to play an increasingly important part in education, both primary and secondary, often with minimal academic qualifications ... Terrified by the social upheaval which France had just gone through, even the free-thinking conservatives in the Assembly welcomed this clerical control over education" (Lough & Lough, 1978, pp. 112-113).

The ideals of secular education were “jettisoned as Voltairean liberals found hitherto unsuspected virtues in Catholic schooling which offered workers’ children the consolation of an afterlife to compensate for resigned submission here below. Briefly the threat of socialism persuaded the fragmented elites to unite in a ‘Party of Order’” (Magraw, 2002, p. 50). Even Victor Hugo, who vehemently opposed the Falloux Law in his famous 1850 parliamentary speech as “a weapon in the hands of the clerical party”, and declared that he wanted “a purely and exclusively a *laïque* state” to supervise education; affirmed in the same speech that religious education was a must for the masses. This is because religion would “lift all heads skyward”, and “lead all souls to turn all expectations to a later life where justice will be done”, so that “no one will have unfairly or unnecessarily suffered”. He added: “Therefore I wish, I wish sincerely, firmly and ardently religious education” (Hugo, 1937, pp. 177-188). Hugo’s words can be taken as representative of the bourgeois mentality of the time to use Catholicism as an element of social control, yet without giving the Church too much independence in the process. In the following quarter of a century, namely between 1850-1876, “Catholic schools accounted for 80 percent of all the growth in enrolment” (Harrigan, 2001, p. 56), which demonstrates the dominance of church influence on education during the Second Empire. Besides, in the same period, “an effort was also made to encourage the rapid expansion of the religious teaching orders” (Price, 2004, p. 195).

After the coup of 1851 and declaration of the Second Empire the next year, Bonaparte “clearly sought to consolidate his power by developing a veritable Christian monarchy” that re-envisaged the “alliance of the throne and the altar”, and received significant clerical support (Boudon, 2007, p. 79). His constitutional changes after the coup included a message to the people that read as follows: “May the authority you gave to my efforts be blessed by the Heavens” (14 January 1852)⁷⁴. The *Panthéon* was once again turned into the Church of St. Genevieve “according to the intention of its founder”, and the revolutionary hymn *La Marseillaise* was banned. The Catholic Church “received substantial subsidies, support for its educational mission, and the reinforcement of its public status, through official participation in religious ceremonies” (Price, 2004, p. 198). The budget ascribed to “recognised religions” increased from about 42.5 million francs in 1852 to 49.1 in 1870, which marks a growth of almost 16 percent in less than two decades. The financial backing manifested itself also in the expansion of clerical

salaries, seminary scholarships, and the number of local parishes. The number of priests in France was around 40,000 in 1848, which reached 56,000 by 1870. At the congregational level between 1851-61, the number of monks rose from 3,000 to 17,600, and nuns from 34,000 to 89,000 (Chadwick, 1998, pp. 102-103). Napoléon's decree on press censorship in February 1852 also protected religion from public criticism, and other measures prevented the prosecution of priests without prior approval from *Conseil d'État*, signifying the inviolability ascribed to religion for social order. Besides utilising religion as an element moral-ideological stability, Bonaparte also sought to secure peasant votes through the promotion of Catholicism, which could easily outnumber working class ballots in a predominantly agricultural social formation. As Marx (2009, p. 97) put it, "as the Bourbons are the dynasty of large landed property, as the Orleans are the dynasty of money, so are the Bonapartes the dynasty of the farmer".

In the words of Delfau (2005, p. 66), the Empire and the Church had an implicit agreement: "in return for its capacity to mobilise votes, particularly those of the rural, the Church once again enjoyed a status that it had lost since the Concordat". Local landowners and *notables* acted as intermediaries between the small peasantry and the central government to reinforce the Bonapartist image as their protector of order and religion in rural France –some contemporaries even called his regime "*campagnocratie imperiale*". The "honeymoon of Church and Empire" was prompted under these social conditions (Dansette, 1961a, pp. 275-282). Bonaparte's policies were particularly beneficial to the Church. He "wanted Sunday kept quietly; was willing for a tighter control of alcohol and the wine bars; arranged that cardinals should have seats in the Senate; made it easier for nunneries to be founded; exempted ordinands from serving in the army; allotted money to raise the very poor pay of curates; decorated bishops; stiffened the censorship on anti-Catholic books and tracts; exiled opponents (Chadwick, 1998, p. 98). Religious symbolism was abundant throughout Napoléon's reign. His son was baptised in a pompous Catholic ceremony in 1856. An imperial chaplaincy was founded in 1857. Imperial festivals and ceremonials mixed temporal and religious means of legitimation and glory (Hazareesingh, 2004). Dansette (1961a, p. 276) writes that "an even clearer indication of the Church's position was ... afforded by the fact that it enjoyed a freedom denied to other sections of society. It alone enjoyed unrestricted

freedom of the press and of speech, and the right to hold meetings and form associations, all privileges which were otherwise strictly limited”.

Comparable to Bonaparte’s employment of Catholicism, yet in an even more accentuated fashion, Abdülhamid II of the Ottoman Empire “broke away from an essentially secular political tradition [since at least Mahmud II] by generalizing the rule of Islam in government affairs”, and “he won the *ulema* to his side and succeeded in controlling the bureaucracy”. His reign was “a reassertion of the Islamic identity and of piety as strongholds of resistance to the onslaught of change” (Karpát, 1972, pp. 271-272). Napoléon’s authoritarian sacralisation of political power rested on an alliance of bourgeois and aristocratic class fractions aiming at pacifying the urban working classes and winning over the peasantry. By contrast, Abdülhamid’s autocratic Islamisation of the Empire drew on distinct conditions characterised by a religiously articulated social struggle in the semi-colonial setting. Against the consolidation of non-Muslim legal privileges and capital accumulation in the *Tanzimat* era, Hamid’s rule rested on the reaction of Muslim notables particularly of interior Anatolia and Arab provinces, composed first and foremost of landowners, regional merchants, and the *ulema*. Abdülhamid “‘put Islam into action’ to integrate the local [Muslim] elite more firmly into the modernizing Ottoman state, and to produce legitimacy in the eyes of his Muslim subjects by promoting “a Sunni version of Islam” (Emrence, 2008, p. 294). The local notables, endorsed by the *ulema*, established the link of legitimacy between the peasantry and the state, and their family members came to hold significant positions within the state bureaucracy. It is during the reign of Abdülhamid that these Muslim propertied elements began to rapidly grow, although still lagging considerably behind their non-Muslim counterparts at the turn of the century (Karpát, 2001, pp. 96-98).

Closely interrelated with the religiously divided social struggle between Muslim and non-Muslim propertied groups, Islamisation under Abdülhamid was also an endeavour to preserve the territorial integrity of the Empire in the face of non-Muslim separatisms and tightening conditions of western imperialism. Following the declaration of bankruptcy in 1875, the Empire lost its financial autonomy with the foundation of the European-controlled Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*) in 1881 (Pamuk, 1987, pp. 13-15). The Debt Administration acted as a separate treasury to

appropriate a substantial portion of state revenues in the name of European and domestic non-Muslim creditors, which directly undermined Ottoman sovereignty and agitated Muslim sentiment⁷⁵. Moreover, following the traumatic Russian defeat of 1877-8, the Empire lost an important segment of its Christian population and received an influx of Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus. In result, the ratio of the Muslim population rose from 66 percent in 1875 to 75 percent in 1880, which set the background for the shift from *Tanzimat*'s pan-Ottomanism to Abdülhamid's pan-Islamism as the official imperial policy of legitimation. This was "a self-conscious attempt ... to recharge and redefine basic Islamic institutions, namely the *Şeriat* and the caliphate, as the basis of the quest for a new Imperial/national identity" (Deringil, 1999, p. 48). Accordingly, the institution of the Caliphate was reinvigorated in an attempt to unite the Muslim majority to counterbalance the spread of non-Muslim nationalisms, and to be used as diplomatic leverage against the various pressures of European powers. In external relations, "like his Russian and Japanese contemporaries, the Sultan viewed the cultural identity of empire as an important ideological instrument to seal off western threat" (Emrence, 2012, p. 81).

Through policies such as the safeguarding of the holy cities Mecca and Medina (Kuehn, 2011, p. 9)⁷⁶, boosting religious symbolism and ceremonials, and welcoming Sunni sheiks and orders of different provinces in palace circles, the sultan sought to create an image of himself as the protector of Islam and leader of all Muslims on earth. In western diplomatic relations, Abdülhamid often brought forth the spiritual character of his rule, using his –rather unsubstantiated– authority to declare *jihad* as a bargaining chip (Georgeon, 2006, pp. 239-245). Deringil (1999, p. 21) identifies three categories of Islamic symbolism that revolved around the sultan. The first was "the symbols relating to the sacrality of the person of the sultan/caliph", including "coats of arms on public buildings, official music, ceremonies, and public works which reflected directly the glory and power of the Ottoman state". The second was "the more specific and personal manifestations of imperial munificence such as decorations, specially donated copies of the Qur'an, imperial standards and other ceremonial trappings". And finally, there were "the religiously symbolic items acquired by the palace such as calligraphy purported to belong to Islamic great men and other artifacts of similar significance". Appropriately, and additionally, the sultan "promoted Islamic unity, facilitated the *Hajj*, made

investments in the Muslim Holy Land, enhanced communication and transportation between the caliphal center and the *Hijaz*, developed friendly relations with other Muslim leaders, and portrayed himself as the leader of all Muslims, the great caliph” (Ardıç, 2012, p. 190)⁷⁷.

Domestically, especially in the eastern Anatolian regions, pan-Islamist policies rejuvenated Islamic religious orders and sheiks, and integrated them to the Empire to serve as bulwark against the rising tide of Armenian nationalist movement and Christian missionaries. The pro-state power of mobilisation and hold of these Islamic leaders groups on the masses, coupled with tribal regiments, led to the first large-scale wave of ethno-religious violence against Armenians in the mid-1890s, which foreshadowed the events of 1915. Although violence was limited in the interior and coastal regions, Hamid’s Islamic appeal managed to speak to the Muslim *millet* at large, who resented non-Muslim privileges and wealth. All around the Empire, “the *tarikats* [Islamic orders] ... grew and flourished as the chief beneficiaries of Abdülhamid’s policies” (Chambers, 1972, p. 46). After all, “it was from Islam that the Muslim Ottomans could draw the emotional resonance that could mobilize both the upper and lower classes. It was Islam that would provide the store of symbols which could compete with the national symbols” of non-Muslims at home and abroad (Deringil, 1999, p. 18). It is in this sense that Hamid’s rule can be regarded as a proto-nationalist articulation of legitimacy to maintain imperial sovereignty (Keddie, 1969). In line with the emphasis on Islam deriving from religiously divided class relations and sovereignty concerns, “the *ulema* enjoyed one last period of official approbation under this regime which stressed traditionalism, anti-Westernism, and pan-Islamism” (Chambers, 1972, p. 46). The budget of the *Ilmiye* department rose from 18.6 million *kuruş* in 1881 to 27.4 million in 1908, representing a 46 percent increase. Still, the promotion of religious officials was closely overseen by the state and linked to the personal image of the ruler. As Findley (1980, p. 62) puts it, although there was the “promotion of an explicitly religious policy” by Abdülhamid, this was “in ways carefully tailored to emphasize the figure of the sultan-caliph, and not the religious establishment as such”. His mistrust towards the *ulema* stemmed from their approval for the deposition of sultans prior to him (Abdülaziz and Mehmed V being the most recent).

A similar, yet externally entangled concern was valid for Napoléon III and the religious establishment/personnel, leading to fluctuations in his policymaking towards the church. Although his rule was in a mutually reinforcing relationship with Catholicism, there was also an underlying tension between France and the Vatican, which polarised the Gallican tendencies of the Emperor with the temporal aspirations of the Church. Especially after the intransigent Pius IX assumed the papacy in 1846, claims of increased authority over the organisation of the Church in France had heightened, adding to the rise of Ultramontanism among French Catholics and the clergy. Napoléon, however, held his ground: primacy of civil marriage and the organic articles remained intact despite papal pressures. Starting with 1859, which marked a change in France's foreign policy to favour Italian unity against Austrian advances, a swift deterioration occurred in Franco-papal relations. Accusing Napoléon of jeopardising the territorial integrity of the Papal States, domestic Ultramontane opposition against the emperor (which now included most parish priests, regular clergy, and Roman congregations) augmented throughout the decade that followed. Bonaparte responded with increased clerical surveillance, tightening control on episcopal appointments, and clamping down on some segments of the Catholic press. Despite the ongoing discord, however, Napoléon could not afford to sever his regime's ties with Catholicism, as he desperately depended on it for sociopolitical legitimacy.

Like in the case of his uncle half a century ago, religious propaganda constituted an important component of the conservative class alliance Bonaparte represented. Naturally, "a complete breach with the Catholics would deprive him of very necessary support. He would have to ... turn a right wing and conservative empire into a left-wing régime depending on popular support. But such an empire was only theoretically possible because it would have lost the support of the monarchists without gaining that of the republicans. Whatever his feelings, Napoléon had no option. He was forced to treat the Catholic opposition gently and he put a button on his foil before fencing with it". Fittingly in 1867, the emperor once again stepped in for the defence of the Pope against Italian nationalists, while the protection of Catholic and missionary interests in the colonies also remained uninterrupted. Also, fear of the rising republican opposition pushed Napoléon to ally all the more closely with the Church following the elections of 1869. In result, although the Second Empire witnessed ups and downs between Paris

and the Vatican, this was based not on a disagreement regarding the privileged position of Catholicism, but on how much independence and power could the Church exercise vis-à-vis the Empire (Pichot-Bravard, 2008). While Napoléon stood against ultramontane encroachments and intransigent advances, he never sought to diminish the sociopolitical significance of religion.

Augmented concentration of power constituted the second major similarity between Bonaparte and Abdülhamid. Building on the post-revolutionary centralisation in France and the centralising legacy on the *Tanzimat* in the Ottoman Empire, these rulers enhanced state infrastructural power through increased securitisation as well as modernising communication, transportation, infrastructure, education, and public works. Powered by authoritarianism, securitisation was the primary sphere of “progress” in both polities. Both monarchs severely restricted public reunions, press freedoms, and fiercely clamped down on political dissent. Knowing that the “effectiveness of political surveillance ... depended on the workings of the police system”, Napoléon made “substantial efforts ... to improve its efficiency”. In this process, “the communications revolution, which saw the development of an electric telegraph network, initially along the railway lines, greatly facilitated the centralisation of government (Price, 2004, pp. 134-135). Likewise, Abdülhamid established the most elaborate law enforcement to date in Ottoman lands and a personalised secret service network to suppress opposition, which was endorsed by an unprecedented initiative to construct railroads and telegraph lines across the territory (Ergut, 2007, pp. 144-145, 148-150). Besides securitisation, novel communication and transportation technologies also facilitated the development of an internal market in both Empires, although much more unified in France than in Anatolia, and contributed to the expansion of capitalist relations. Napoléon’s major-scale urban renewal and public works programs served to absorb surplus capital, produced growth, enabled securitisation, and promoted Catholic symbolism through new churches, as encapsulated in the wholesale transformation of Paris (Boudon, 2001; Harvey, 2003b). Having visited Paris in his youth, Hamid envisaged a similar grandeur for Istanbul, which he sought to display through the construction of roads, large squares, and palaces, accompanied by new mosques underpinning Islamic power (Çelik, 2008; Yılmaz, 2010).

Moreover, both rulers undertook the modernisation of the education system. Bonaparte's education minister Victor Duruy (who visited Istanbul as an advisor) sought to regulate and contain Church influence in schools, especially in the context of the sporadic tension between Paris and Rome in the 1860s (Harrigan, 1980). Abdülhamid undertook an extensive reform in the 1880s on primary as well as higher education, where the latter aimed at boosting the administrative and military power of the Empire. Duruy's suggestions for the Ottomans in 1869, although subject to significant changes, "continued to serve as the touchstone" under Hamid's rule "well into the twentieth century" (Fortna, 2002, p. 15). All in all, recognising the modernisation and centralisation initiatives in Napoleonic France and Hamidian Ottoman Empire is significant for two reasons. First, although they married religion and politics in various dimensions to engender desecularisation, these intervals did not represent a simple return to the pre-1789 reality. Instead, Catholic and Muslim religious establishments were reinvigorated and articulated in novel ways to speak to the internal and external sociopolitical realities of the time –namely the uneven and combined development of capitalist relations and the territorialisation of political power. Second, the republican state builders of the following generation would further advance the infrastructural capacity they inherited from these empires. Republican secularisation through the systematic "separation" and "regulation" of religious authority would be among the central components of the process that contributed to constructing bourgeois-national state power in the 1875-1905/1908-1938 junctures.

This latter point hinges on the third and the final element of comparison between Napoléon and Abdülhamid, namely the consolidation of secular nationalist/republican oppositional movements under their rule, which would ultimately manage to overthrow religious-monarchical authority. In France, the bourgeois support for the emperor began to dwindle parallel with the disappearance of the immediate socialist threat in the 1850s. Moreover, with the solidification of industrial capitalism by the 1860s, "an enlarged bourgeoisie emerged whose dependence upon the Empire's program of capital accumulation and essential public works decreased as its own economic position became consolidated" (Elwitt, 1975, p. 7). Although the Second Empire witnessed "industrial development" and "the rise and enrichment of the whole bourgeoisie to an extent hitherto unknown", the latter was increasingly apprehensive of the "corruption and

mass robbery ... clustering around the imperial court, and drawing their heavy percentages from this enrichment” (Engels, 1891, p. 6). The empowered industrial and rural bourgeoisie thus began to push for responsible government and a more direct involvement in policymaking, and consequently, republicanism slowly regained prominence in the 1860s. The republican movement organised and grew, voicing demands of popular sovereignty and civil freedoms while denouncing clericalism, and managed to mobilise some support from workers, farmers, and petit-bourgeois groups (Hazareesingh, 2004, pp. 179-200). It is in this atmosphere that Napoléon III had to take a liberal turn in the latter decade of the Second Empire to reintegrate the social elites into the regime as well as appeal to working classes. In 1861, the power of the legislature (especially over the budget) was increased. In 1864 and 1866, the emperor issued, although in a limited way, the right to strike and organise for French workers. Freedom of press and public meetings were partly extended in 1868.

Meanwhile, under the influence of Pope Pius IX, a considerable portion of French Catholic intellectuals and clergymen were becoming more intransigent and ultramontane than ever. Particularly, the Pope’s official condemnation of modernity and liberal values in his notorious *Syllabus Errorum* in 1864 did not sit well with the increasingly secularising French urban population and liberal ideas⁷⁸. The papal document has no doubt contributed to the consolidation of anticlerical views among republicans, whose middle and upper class members were convening in masonic lodges such as *Grande Loge de France* and *Grand Orient de France* as well as civil society organisations such as *Ligue de l'Enseignement* that pushed for secular education (Auspitz, 1982; Dachez, 2003). The latter organised a massive petition campaign between 1866-72 for a secular, obligatory, and free primary education system, collecting more than 1.2 million signatures (Couturier, 2005). Republican grievances regarding the Church as an internal/external body constantly intruding in France’s sociopolitical affairs were no doubt confirmed in this interval. The secular political “leadership of the republican movement”, which would take power in the 1870s through figures like Gambetta, Ferry, and Simon, “was provided ... mainly by professional men – lawyers, doctors, journalists– and provincial businessmen” (Price, 2004, p. 345). By the end of the decade, propertied groups began to suspect another mass upheaval as in 1848. Frequent worker strikes and the upsurge of republican ideas in the press (which were associated with

communism especially by the help of alarmist Catholic circles) once again created a bourgeois-conservative alliance to back Napoléon against the *peril rouge* (Price, 2005, p. 218). Based on that fear, the Empire had a final reunion with the Church in the 1869-70 period, which was also reflected in the plebiscite of 8 May 1870, which earned Bonaparte 83 percent of the votes. Even Gambetta found it necessary to admit that “the Empire is stronger than ever”. If it were not for the Prussian war of the same year, the Empire did not seem to be on the verge of collapsing due to domestic forces. The French Third Republic was to be founded in these intricate conditions, where the state builders sought to establish bourgeois hegemony against a mixed collection of clerical-aristocratic *notables*, while mobilising and appeasing working classes and small producers and peasants in favour of the secular-national regime. Chapter 5 elaborates on that story to narrate the making of *laïcité* in the French Third Republic.

In the Hamidian Empire, the strongest tide of opposition in the 1890s came from within the bureaucracy, led by the new generation of reformist military-professional groups educated –ironically– in the imperial colleges opened by the Sultan in the 1880s (Georgeon, 2007). Centred on the *İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Unity Society, 1889) and later *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, 1895), this educated bureaucratic-intellectual stratum (especially in military, administrative, and medical schools) came to be known in the 1890s as the “Young Turks”, who “had become politically organized and articulate, demanding ... a constitutional state, and a new [secular] intellectual and moral order to go with it” (Ahmad, 1988b, p. 267). For them, “Union” denoted conserving the territorial integrity of the multi-religious Empire, and “Progress” represented the attempt at modernising/westernising political and economic structures predominantly for survival vis-à-vis Europe. This preoccupation with “the ideal of preserving the state” explains why the Unionists “singled out positivism and ... solidarism ... as [core components of] their ... ideology”, both of which they borrowed largely from the intellectual currents of the French Third Republic (Mardin, 1969, p. 277). One of the first pamphlets of the Unionists, titled *Vatan Tehlikede* (The Fatherland is in Danger), for instance, signified not only their mentality of “defensive modernisation” (Black, 1966, p. 71), but also that the Committee consciously modelled its movement on the French Revolutionary tradition (Özkan, 2012, p. 46)⁷⁹. In this oppositional period, the marriage of Abdülhamid’s absolutism with Sunni Islamic forces, cadres, symbolism, and

legitimacy led the Unionists to question the place of religion vis-à-vis sociopolitical power.

As the latest instalment of the reformist bureaucratic tradition, the Young Turks, “with their positivist scientific logic ... and with fresh concepts of progress and civilization, could not accept the explanation that the hordes of religious men of dubious character, of beggars, occultists, who had filled the towns and enjoyed government support, symbolized the empire’s true identity and purpose, and that the empire’s salvation lay in even more identification with religion” (Karpas, 1972, p. 279). Although there were dissident voices within the *ulema* (Kara, 2005), Hamidian rule clearly preferred the loyalty of traditional bureaucratic forces over the merit of reformist factions⁸⁰, as epitomised by the exile of Young Turk activists in the 1890s. Patrimonial bureaucratic favouritism diminished the life chances of the Unionists, and contributed to their view of religion as “a major obstacle to social progress”, and of Islamist politics as “old-fashioned and unresponsive to the problems of the day” (Hanioglu, 1995, p. 15; 2005, p. 27). Moreover, the Young Turk apprehension was that extravagant Islamism damaged Ottomanism by exacerbating the “Eastern Question”, where the Sultan’s religious extremism and Armenian massacres of the 1890s were condemned in Unionist publications (Mardin, 1983, pp. 206-207)⁸¹. Simultaneously, however, the Unionists increasingly felt the need to embrace Islam in their rhetoric (like the Young Ottomans), especially in the face of looming internal Christian separatisms and external European occupation. Following the turn of the century, the Muslim population gradually appeared to them as the only feasible social basis for national state building against Christian demands for independence and imperialist encirclement of Ottoman lands. This paradoxical interaction with Islam, simultaneously the foundation for, and the source of challenge against national state building, was to set the framework for the particular trajectory of secularisation after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the post-1923 Republican period. Chapter 6 offers a detailed account of national state building in the late Ottoman/early Republican Turkey, where *laiklik* became a central component of that process.

Reprise and Review

The major structural transformations set in motion by the long nineteenth century, namely the commercialisation of the economy and centralisation of politics, created the framework for the politicisation of religion to spark the “war of two Frances” and the Ottoman “split-up modernisation”. At the turning point of 1789, which coincided and inaugurated the French age of revolution and the Ottoman age of reform, Catholic and Sunni Muslim establishments, doctrines, interests, and lifeworlds remained in “elective affinity” with the traditional order resting on religious material and ideational pre-eminence. That the clergy and the *ulema* were not internally homogeneous (and showed variations especially between their lower and upper levels) was relatively insignificant in the face of the extreme polarisation of the sociopolitical contention along religious/secular lines, where Catholicism and Sunni Islam offered the legitimising frameworks and mobilising agents to preserve aristocratic and patrimonial privileges. Consequently, the first phase of the struggle, namely the 1789-1801 interval in France (via the Revolution and Napoléon) and the 1789-1839 period in the Ottoman Empire (via Selim III and Mahmud II), featured the preliminary submission of religious authority to the “interior” regulation of state infrastructural power. It is during and following these episodes that early manifestations of separation and regulation began to “differentiate” and “societally”/“rationally” organise religious authority vis-à-vis state power. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 exemplified these highly contentious initial secularising processes, which were by no means linear, but took place in a dialectical fashion where legal-institutional, socio-educational, symbolic-ideological, and property-distributional spheres experienced secularisation and sacralisation unevenly, and at times simultaneously (Goldstein, 2009; Gorski, 2000a).

Nevertheless, diverse “extra-religious” factors including social forces, geopolitical realities, and contentions underpinned the course of secularisation in France and the Ottoman Empire. In France, the bourgeoisie pursued to carve its path to political power in struggle/alliance with the aristocracy on the right and popular classes on the left, and secularisation/sacralisation varied primarily based on which social group bourgeois politics formed an alliance with against the other. In the Ottoman Empire, the intra-bureaucratic conflict was acted out between traditional and reformist Muslim factions,

whereas the rising social conflict between coastal and interior elites was expressed in Christian-Muslim terms, both of which representing a religious articulation of contention that influenced secularisation. The French and Ottoman domestic struggles and secularisation patterns, moreover, closely interacted in various ways with their external affairs, be it in their “religious” form (for instance, the French relationship with the Vatican and Ottoman politics of the Caliphate) or “non-religious” dimensions (such as the French revolutionary wars triggering dechristianisation and Ottoman defeats feeding Islamic reaction). It is building on these internal and external struggles that Napoléon III and Abdülhamid II constituted the immediate background for the secular-republican state builders of the subsequent generation, especially regarding the religiously polarising material and ideational legacy they bequeathed. Deriving from this historical context, it is the task of Part III to shed light on the making of *laïcité* in the French Third Republic and the building of *laiklik* in the Republic of Turkey.

PART III – Building the Republic(s): The Secularising Process

Chapter 5. Making of *Laïcité* in the French Third Republic, 1875-1905

The impetus for the exceptional episode of sociopolitical secularisation in the French Third Republic came from two intertwined and overlapping “extra-religious” contentious dynamics: historically specific class conflict/alliances and the initiative to consolidate the internal/external sovereign capacity of the Republic. In terms of class relations, the Third Republic presents an exemplary history of bourgeois hegemony building, although this was by no means a linear or uncontested process. Spearheaded by the industrial fraction of the French bourgeoisie, the republican movement since the late 1860s hinged on forming an alliance with petty bourgeois elements (such as small to medium scale producers, small-holding peasants, merchants, shopkeepers, and professionals) against a mixed collection of aristocratic *notables* endorsed by the church, as well as against working class radicalism. Such “broad-political movement with a solid class core” underpinning the Republic found a “stable bourgeois system fortified against both aristocratic reaction and social revolution” (Elwitt, 1975, p. 10). Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the leadership of the republican bourgeoisie mobilised small farmers and petit-bourgeois class fractions, and appeased the working classes by resting on hegemonic notions that highlighted the unity of all producers, national education and *solidarité*, sanctity of property, legal equality, legacy of 1789, and democracy powered by society’s middle strata (*nouvelles couches sociales*). At the material level, Freycinet Public Works Programme of 1878, mounting protectionist tariffs after 1881 (culminating in the Méline Tariff of 1892), and collaborationist agricultural unions bid to conciliate the interests of small producers, farmers and the big bourgeoisie by crafting an integrated national market. Liberal legislation such as amnesty to communards (1880), law on public meetings (1881), freedom of press (1881), and trade unions (1884) were headed in a similar direction to build popular mass support for the new regime. Revival of colonial expansion in the mid-1880s, moreover, helped externalise the economic costs of the domestic class coalition through “social imperialism”⁸². Emanating from these multifaceted developments, as Gramsci (1971, pp. 179-180) puts it, “the internal

contradictions which develop after 1789 in the structure of French society are resolved to a relative degree only with the Third Republic ... It was then that the new bourgeois class struggling for power defeated not only the representatives of the old society [aristocracy] ... but also the still newer groups [working classes]”.

A fundamental mobilising component of this hegemony building process was the struggle against the Catholic Church, which not only contributed to integrating middle, rural, and working class fractions into the ranks of the Republic, but also actively debilitated the hold of aristocratic *notables* and their clerical allies that threatened the primacy of bourgeois political rule. Above all, “the Republican coalition defined itself against ‘parasitic’ notables of the old France – aristocrats, obscurantist clergy, idle rentiers and the forces of ‘financial feudalism’” (Magraw, 2002, p. 52). The 1870s provided many instances where the combined effort of these elements directly infringed republican state building in favour of monarchist-authoritarian alternatives. Episodes such as “24 May” (1873) and “16 May” (1877) as well as the active endorsement of Orléanist/Legitimist/Bonapartist pretenders to the throne were exemplary of the reactionary alliance. Section 5.1 demonstrates that the Catholic Church held a central politico-ideological position unifying this anti-republican coalition (reaching its zenith in the *Ordre Moral* period), which resolutely convinced the “opportunist”⁸³ republicans of the need to undermine clerical pre-eminence once they gained full power in 1879. Consolidating republican politics without destabilising the elevated status the Church gained under Napoléon III’s Empire and the *Ordre Moral* period was not a viable historical possibility.

The first wave of secularisation in the 1880s came as part of this bourgeois-hegemonic struggle for republican state building. The Republic strengthened its sovereign infrastructural power by way of “nationalising” many sociopolitical spheres away from the dominion of the Church. In this process, the “religious” fact that the institutional configuration of the Catholic Church was essentially non-national, that is, Roman, gave the contention for sovereignty also an external dimension⁸⁴. As Elwitt (1975, pp. 141-142) puts it, “since clericalism stood for forces alien and apart from the nation and its representatives occupied an ideological position separating them from the national republican system, a campaign against clericalism” was also “a campaign to

strengthen the political supremacy of the secular order of bourgeois property and the national market". First and foremost, Jules Ferry's secular educational reform broke the virtual monopoly of religious authority over schools to inculcate the masses (especially the peasantry) with national-republican values of *solidarité* and neutralisation of class conflict –all in the framework of a secular conception of morality (*morale laïque*). Secular education was "a means by which the bourgeois state could consolidate itself, by providing the enlightenment which would weaken both the socialism of the Left and the main bulwark of the Right, the Church" (Stock-Morton, 1988, p. 95). Secularisation of the larger sociopolitical scene in the same decade (including the constitution, national symbols, military, hospitals, cemeteries, funerals, civil affairs, and so on) was another manifestation of the same contentious process. Throughout this interval, Protestant and Jewish communities supported and partook in the republican initiative. Externally, moreover, the catastrophic Prussian defeat of 1870-1, and the aggravating inter-European competition for imperial expansion in the 1880s stood as additional incentive for republicans to modernise educational and other spheres along secular lines at home (although the "elective affinity" of Catholicism and the Republic continued in colonisation efforts). Section 5.2 exhibits that throughout the first secularisation wave of the 1880s, the dual strategies of separation and regulation were at work against religious authority. These strategies detached the church and congregations away from governing various fields of civil/political society, while simultaneously increasing the surveillance of their continuing activities to exert the prevalence of the Republic.

By the late 1880s, the first wave of secularisation, along with the hegemonic sway of the republican bourgeoisie partly withered away. Throughout the 1890s, especially as the global depression of 1873-1896 took its toll on French society, petit-bourgeois and rural class fractions became more susceptible to right-wing authoritarian alternatives, while the working classes moved largely towards socialism. The astonishing success of *Boulangisme* that fell just short of a coup in 1889 was an alarming indicator for bourgeois-republican hegemony, which only weakened further with the Panama scandal of 1892 that unmistakably exposed the command of big business in politics. It is in this context that the opportunist republicans initiated a conservative policy of appeasement with the Catholic Church to offset the rising tide of socialism. The "new spirit" (*esprit nouveau*) involved the Church's call to Catholics for supporting the

Republic (*ralliement*, starting with the Algiers Toast of 1890 and the Papal Encyclical of 1892), a paternalistic outlook to the “social question” (as in the Papal Encyclical of 1891 that dealt with capital-labour relations), heightened colonial cooperation, and an extensive rhetoric of “tolerance” and “peace” between the church and state. In the words of socialist Millerand, conservative republicans “made peace with the Right to wage a war against the Left”. Expelled congregations were allowed back in France in this period, secularisation of schools slowed down, while state violence against strikes and leftist activity increased. Yet parallel with the radicalising working class movement, political ground was in fact shifting beneath the opportunists. From the 1893 elections onwards, bourgeois-republican politics had to move towards the left (at least in rhetoric) to preserve what remained of its hegemonic allure, and consequently, “Radical” and “Socialist” republican deputies gradually replaced moderate majorities in the parliament. Meanwhile, the Catholic Right reinvented itself and began to succeed in capitalising on socioeconomic issues through the promotion of proto-fascist nationalism, anti-Semitism, authoritarian populism, and German revanchism.

The ultimate battle between the Catholic Right and the Republican Left to win over the discontented middle, rural, and working class fractions was fought in the Dreyfus Affair, which prepared the stage for the second wave of secularisation at the turn of the twentieth century. Political polarisation peaked in the late 1890s between “Radical” republicans –who became the new mainstream that sought to absorb collectivist tendencies through the emphasis on *solidarité* while shielding bourgeois property rights–, and chauvinistic nationalism of conservatives underpinned by Catholicism. Once again, secularisation came forth as the principal hegemonic constituent for republicans of all class backgrounds and denominations to provide the basis for the *bloc des gauches* of 1899-1906. Despite the differences regarding their liberal versus anticlerical tones, the 1901 Law of Associations, measures against congregational activities, and eventually, the landmark Law of 1905 on the Separation of the Churches and State were the products of an interclass and inter-religious coalition. These sets of legislation succeeded to mobilise a good portion of small farmers and middle and working class fractions as well as Jewish and Protestant minorities for *défense républicaine*, and in the short term, they managed to draw attention away from significant social reform (such as the notorious income tax and pensions), which the

Radicals proved utterly reluctant to carry out. More lastingly, the second wave of secularisation completed the oeuvre of the 1880s in establishing the internal/external sovereign capacity of the Republic vis-à-vis Catholicism. Clerical alliance with chauvinist nationalism against the Republic, and relatedly, the Vatican's disregard for French autonomy of policymaking marked the unfeasibility of continuing the cohabitation. Section 5.3 exemplifies the republican strategies to reinforce state infrastructural power by disestablishing the Church from its privileged position accorded by the Concordat, while continuing to oversee the affairs of "religious associations" in the name of public order. The liberal law of 1905 was "the only major act of those years that has survived the passage of time" (Larkin, 1974, p. 2), which was founded on the principles of liberty of conscience, separation of church and state, free exercise of religion, and the absolute neutrality of the state (Weil, 2007a, pp. 16; 2015, p. 82). Resting on "religious" and "extra-religious" explanatory variables, it is the purpose of this chapter to elucidate how the French Third Republic constructed *laïcité* and how, in turn, *laïcité* constructed the Republic.

5.1. Republic without Republicans (1870-1878)

5.1.1. Prussian Defeat, Commune, and Restoration Attempts

"The Third Republic in France emerged in the most unfavourable circumstances –military defeat, revolution, further military defeats, civil war and a humiliating peace treaty. These circumstances profoundly influenced nearly all aspects of French life, particularly during the first decades of the Third Republic" (Fortescue, 2000, p. 1). Above all, the Republic was born out of the Empire's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. As the Emperor Napoléon III was captured by the Prussian troops in Sedan, the Empire had practically come to an end, and the Republic was declared in Paris on 4 September 1870. Reading the declaration document to the masses at *Hôtel de Ville*, Léon Gambetta found the Republic's source of legitimacy in the Revolution: "To save the country in danger, the people demanded the Republic ... The Republic had triumphed over invasion in 1792. The Republic is proclaimed!" (JournalOfficiel, 4 September 1871) The new regime, however, was periled by immediate threats at birth, externally and

internally, rendering its chances of survival appear rather slim to a contemporary observer. As it was proclaimed, Paris was falling under siege to the Prussian army along with the complete occupation of northeastern France. In the five months following 4 September 1870, the “Government of National Defence” proved ineffective, and multiple military campaigns against Prussia only prolonged the ultimate defeat. 1871 thus commenced as a disastrous year for the young Republic.

The first disaster was the completion of the Prussian War with the Armistice of January 28, which was ten days after the proclamation of the German Empire, humiliatingly in Versailles, at the very heart of France. The terms of the Armistice, fully outlined and consolidated by the Treaty of Versailles (February 26) and the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10) were extremely heavy on the French. Alsace and Lorraine were lost to the Germans, and a war indemnity of five million francs was stipulated. The damage on the French national identity was even more severe. The second disaster for the Republic in early 1871 was the legislative elections of February 8. Ironically, the Republic’s first legislative elections resulted in a monarchist victory. Legitimists and Orléanists received 27 percent and 32 percent of the votes, respectively, magnetising two-thirds of French society, whereas the sum of moderate and radical republican votes turned out to be no more than 22 percent. It seemed that in the aftermath of the defeat and the peace treaty, “many peasants turned to aristocrats as ‘protectors’. The 1871 elections produced the highest number of aristocratic deputies for fifty years” (Magraw, 2002, p. 27). This assembly was to undertake the task of making peace, yet also deciding the future regime of France, where the idea of Republic seemed only provisional to the majority of its deputies (as confirmed in the conservative Pact of Bordeaux)⁸⁵. Finally, the third challenge of early 1871, which also came partly in response to the humiliating Prussian defeat, was the eruption of the Paris Commune on March 18. This was eight days after the newly elected assembly decided to move the seat of government to Versailles due to fear of the popular masses in Paris. As its history is well known, the Commune governed the city for two months, and then “Versailles seized the moment to attack and, in one horrifying week, executed roughly 20,000 Communards or suspected sympathizers, a number higher than those killed ... during Robespierre’s ‘Terror’ of 1793-94” (B. Anderson, 2004, pp. 94-95).

The tumultuous first years of the new regime, where the Republic “reigned but did not govern”, left a significant mark on the course of the bourgeois hegemony building process that followed. Already by the late 1860s, “a substantial portion of the economic élite ... had come to favour a conservative republic”, who were convinced that it would best serve their “material and social aspirations” (Price, 2005, p. 227). The “republican bourgeoisie” preferred an economically accountable and politically controllable government instead of unpredictable monarchies, while still demanding protection of property against socialist advances. In the words of the bourgeois economist Léon Say, the Republic’s task was to bring order “in the budget as much as in the streets”. During the ensuing 1871-9 period, republican politics “made steady advances toward eventual national power”, where “the republican bourgeoisie made impressive gains in recruiting the masses of ... [rural and urban] petty producers to their ranks ... against aristocratic reaction on the right and independent workers’ movements on the left” (Elwitt, 1975, p. 12). “Opportunist republicans” (such as Gambetta, Ferry, Freycinet, Simon, Favre, and Grévy) were the crafters of that bourgeois-republican class coalition, who promised a middle path between royalism and socialism to advocate law and order, as well as democracy and reform (Grévy, 1998). Anticlericalism was to be among the main pillars of the bourgeois-republican contentious process to mobilise small peasants and producers as well as working classes alongside the Republic against aristocratic *notables* endorsed by the Church.

The Commune gave the opportunists the chance to clearly demarcate their position from revolutionary upheavals. In the French collective memory at the time, the republican experience still resonated strongly with the popular mobilisations of 1793-4 and the “summer days” of 1848, which had to be rehabilitated to secure middle class backing to the third republican initiative. Indeed, the violent suppression of the Commune assured the rural and urban propertied classes that “kings and emperors were not necessary for the defence of property”, for it was, after all a republican government led by the “bourgeois” Adolphe Thiers that “shot down the Communards” (McManners, 1972, p. 39). Despite sharing some common historical values with the Commune and its secular track record that separated church and state⁸⁶, in the aftermath of the bloodshed, “moderate republicans, having gotten rid of the burden of revolutionary baggage, could easily reassure the peasantry and the bourgeoisie to get

them rally for the regime” (Grévy, 1998, p. 22). Ex-Orléanist conservative republican Thiers would singlehandedly play a key role in soothing elite fears towards the Republic. Opportunists, on their part, underlined repeatedly that the Republic meant protection of property and stability against “adventurous” politics, be it in the form of monarchism or collectivism. To mobilise petty bourgeois elements and woo working classes in favour of the regime, the opportunists announced “the arrival and presence of *nouvelles couches sociales* [new social strata]” to rule modern France by replacing the clerical-aristocratic rentiers of the old regime. As the “traveling salesman for the Republic”, Gambetta’s countless speeches across France helped establish that democratic middle class outlook⁸⁷. By the end of the decade, “the republic’s triumph was” going to be “that of the more ‘progressive’, flexible, and strategically perceptive sections of the capitalist class, which outmanoeuvred their royalist and radical rivals by attracting a broad cross-class alliance of petty producers into a national consensus which they defined and controlled” (Magraw, 1986, p. 209). This convoluted hegemony building process unfolded in several phases against monarchist advances in the 1870s.

In mid-1871, the opportunist republicans were still a minority in the Assembly, and they looked rather far from establishing nationwide authority. The immediate dangers posed by the Commune and Prussia were averted, yet the Republic was anything but politically consolidated vis-à-vis monarchist contenders to the regime. Legitimists and Orléanists dominated the political scene, which was based on a social class composition of aristocratic *notables*, segments of the financial elite, nearly all members of the Catholic establishment, and a part of the rural population that preserved their relations of patronage with local leaders (Charle, 1994, pp. 179-187). Fittingly, schemes for the restoration of the monarchy quickly transpired. On 8 June 1871, laws of 1832 and 1848 concerning the exile of Bourbon princes were abrogated, which effectively allowed their return to the French territory. What the law had in mind in particular was Henri d’Artois (Comte de Chambord), the legitimist pretender to the throne. Orléanists also supported Chambord, with the hope that their pretender Philippe d’Orléans (Comte de Paris) would eventually succeed the childless Henri. Again on 8 June, the Assembly ratified the election of Orléans princes in three departments. Law of 21 December 1873, moreover, restored the confiscated property of the Orléans family in 1852.

The monarchist project was underway, and its success looked imminent if it were not for the insistence of Comte de Chambord to reinstate the royal white flag (*fleur de lys*) in lieu of the *tricolore*. In July 1871, he issued a message to the French asserting his readiness to take power, yet on the condition that the white flag would be brought back⁸⁸. Chambord's fixation on the flag issue, which proved particularly unpopular among the masses, bought republicans some time to institutionalise the regime so as to liberate it from its shaky status. The first step in this direction was the Rivet Law of 31 August 1871. The law changed the title of "Chief of the Executive" to the "President of the Republic", and clarified the role of the president in relation to the assembly. It is in this period that the basis of parliamentary support for Thiers, now President of the Republic, began shifting from the monarchists to moderate republicans. Thiers became convinced of the "conservative" Republic as a regime that would "divide France the least", especially given the lack of any reasonable accord between monarchical families⁸⁹. The result was that "an important part of the upper middle class followed the lead of Thiers in accepting the Republic and working with it" (R. D. Anderson, 1977, p. 35). During the ensuing contentious episode of 1871-3, the Catholic clergy was unreservedly on the side of the aristocratic *notables*, "united in wanting France to accept a king again" (McManners, 1972, pp. 35-36)⁹⁰. Nevertheless, peasants and small producers were put off by "the political activism of ... the clergy, who encouraged pilgrimages and advanced their support for the royalist cause", which was a factor that "served to increase fears about the alternatives to the republic" (Moulin, 1991, p. 125).

Counteracting President Thiers' rally for the Republic, conservative deputies spearheaded by the monarchist Duc de Broglie launched a swift attack in the spring of 1873. They first passed the Law of 13 March 1873, practically forbidding the President from speaking in the Assembly, and partially limiting his powers. Later in the same month, republican Speaker of the Assembly, Jules Grévy, was pressured to resign on 17 March to be replaced by an Orléanist. And on 23 May 1873, finally, President Thiers was toppled with a conservative vote of no confidence in the Assembly. In a long speech Broglie delivered that day, he warned of the rising tide of radicalism that allegedly reigned in the Assembly, and pointed out to Thiers as responsible for this situation. Upon Thiers' fall on 24 May, he was replaced promptly by the monarchist General Patrice Mac-Mahon, initiating what is known as the period of "Moral Order" that envisaged a

reinforcement of Catholic values over society and aspirations of monarchical restoration. In the republican mentality of the late nineteenth century, the expression “24 May” would always be remembered as a monarchist-clerical “coup” on the values of the Republic.

5.1.2. From *Ordre Moral* to “16 May”

The new President Mac-Mahon, who was the military general responsible for the carnage against the communards, declared his understanding of *Ordre Moral* on 28 May 1873: “With the help of God ... we will continue the work of ... re-establishing moral order in our country. We will maintain internal peace and the principles on which society rests” (Boudon, 2007, p. 102). The loose conception of “Moral Order”, which was already fairly embedded in the first three years of the Republic, “signified, above all, an ultra-religious politics ... rendering the Church an instrument of social control”, particularly to offset republican and socialist values (Duclert, 2010, p. 108). Catholicism constituted the main thread that held the aristocratic political factions together, and this was translated into an extravagant religious rhetoric and policymaking. Above all, the new government “gave the Catholic Church a privileged and powerful position, which was enhanced by several factors” (Acomb, 1967, p. 15) such as an 8 percent increase of budget and loosened state regulation⁹¹, accompanied by boosted religious symbolism and tightened conservative hold on civil society. The number of clerical personnel and congregationists augmented significantly: “with 51,000 secular clergy” and “157,000 regulars ... the church had reached the apogee of its nineteenth century power” (Magraw, 1986, p. 259). The most ostentatious symbolic enterprise of the Moral Order government was to pass a law on 24 July 1873 to build a church (the well-known *Sacré-Cœur*) in Montmartre in Paris –to the exact location where the Paris Commune began– “to expiate the crimes of the Commune”⁹². Pilgrimages flourished across the country, and the intransigent Catholic press thrived. Duc de Broglie, now the Head of Government, brought restrictions on the republican press, eradicated busts of Marianne from city halls, prohibited civil funerals, and removed republican prefects and functionaries from office (Mayeur, 1973, p. 28). The ban on divorce remained untouched (despite republican challenges against it), commemorating 14 July was forbidden, and alcohol consumption was closely monitored. Meanwhile, priests were placed in welfare committees, and congregations such as the Jesuits and Assumptionists received official support to go

through a renaissance. With regard to education, finally, the law of 19 March 1873 reinforced the conservative spirit of the Falloux Law of 1850 by placing ministers of established religions in the Higher Council of Public Education and Academic Councils, thereby assigning them considerable authority over the education system. The Law of 12 July 1875 abrogated state monopoly over higher education for the first time, which paved the way for the blossoming of Catholic universities entitled to confer degrees (Duval, 2011, p. 77).

Projects of monarchical restoration also appeared to be reaching completion. In October 1873, a plenary session held by the conservatives resolved that the Bourbon monarchy was to be instated under Comte de Chambord, and the tricolour would be maintained. A spirit of victory was in the air for the monarchists, as *Journal de Paris* wrote: "A great event has just taken place: the union is concluded; the monarchy is made, and all the difficulties are overcome!" In response, opportunist republicans called on to middle and working class citizens to join together against the royalist advance to form, in the words of Gambetta, "a union of all republicans to save the fatherland". In his speech of 3 October 1873, the latter made a call to "the bourgeoisie, small or large", to "understand the gravity of the moment" and "rally firmly for the flag of the Republic in order to silence the conspirators and schemers" (Gambetta, 1885, p. 85). He ensured that the Republic would best bring a "spirit of order and legality" to avoid "anarchy and dictatorship", and promised reform, among which was "detaching wisely but firmly, the ties that bind the Church to the State" (Gambetta, 1885, p. 83). Against what Thiers called the advance of "monarchical and clerical restoration", a letter penned by deputies of Seine also underlined the political economic instability caused by the conservatives, adding that "the losses in commerce and industry caused by this trouble is enumerated in millions" (Gambetta, 1885, p. 89). The opportunists presented the Republic as the guardian of order to the rural and urban propertied classes, and this hegemony building strategy proved all the more effective given the failure of consensus between monarchists. By the end of 1873, the boat for a Bourbon restoration sailed for good, marking what Grondeux (2000, pp. 49-78) calls the "suicide of conservatives"⁹³.

Disillusioned by the fruitless restoration attempts, Head of Government Duc de Broglie promptly passed the law of 20 December 1873 (known as the *Septennat* law), to

extend the presidency of General Mac-Mahon to a period of seven years. The plan was to gain time for an eventual Orléanist restoration under Comte de Paris (Mayeur, 1973, p. 30). However, Broglie had to settle for a compromise with republican deputies in a “centrist coalition”, and he had to concede that a committee to outline a constitution for the Republic would be established (Article 2 of the law). Popular support for republicans was rising slowly but surely since the defeat in the legislative elections of February 1871, making them a force to reckon with in the Assembly. Already in the by-elections of July 1871, republicans had gained 99 of the 114 seats that had opened up; and in several other partial elections held between 1871 and 1875, they won a total of 195 seats against 32 monarchists. Increased republican weight in the Assembly forced Broglie to give green light to the drafting of a constitution. In what followed, from February to July 1875, what is known as the Constitutional Laws were promulgated, which created bitter controversies, but managed to institutionalise and solidify the organisational and institutional basis of the Republic (albeit with a very small margin)⁹⁴. The long process of republican constitutionalisation had begun (Sacriste, 2011). Soon after, in the first constitutional legislative elections of the Third Republic in February-March 1876, the republicans won a landslide victory. The total of left, centre-left, centre-right, and union republicans received 74 percent of the votes, while conservative votes remained around 27 percent with a Bonapartist majority. Left republicans accounted for almost half of the entire republican votes. According to McManners (1972, p. 39), “the electoral defeat ... ended the halcyon period of Church-State cooperation, five years during which the country had been ruled by an Assembly predominantly Catholic in sentiment”. Although this was the case, the Catholic influence over France’s social and political institutions at the time was much broader and deeper than the personal sentiments of deputies. Republicans of various class backgrounds concurred that only by weakening the close structural ties between the state and the church could they could surmount the precariousness of the bourgeois regime.

In the spring of 1877, an external development added to the polarisation between “republican-secular” and “conservative-catholic” groups at home, manifesting itself in a standoff between the Chamber and the President. On 12 March 1877, Pope Pius IX made a call to Catholics of Europe to mobilise their governments in an effort to protect the independence of the Vatican against Italian nationalists. Catholics were urged “to

make use of all the means which the laws of their country place within their reach, to act with promptness with those who govern, to induce these latter to ... take effective measures toward dissipating the obstacles that stand in the way of his absolute independence” (Pius IX, 1890, p. 681). Responding to this call, numerous petitions were circulated by a part of the French clergy to incite a military campaign in support of the Vatican. One such petition said, “Pius IX is still king, even to his enemies ... Return Rome to its former masters: Rome is the Pope, Rome is God”; while another Catholic publication uttered: “we have fallen so low since we are in the Republic that for the first time in our history, we are scared of the Italian army ... This war would take a religious character; it would not be a national war, but a war between Catholics and anti-Catholics” (JORF, 4 May 1877, p. 3251). To the republicans, now in government led by Jules Simon, statements such as these were in direct contradiction with the national determination of politics. In a parliamentary interpellation submitted by Left Republican Leblond on 3 May 1877 (who cited the declarations above), the government was asked to take action against the rise of Ultramontanism in France⁹⁵. The next day, Gambetta took the stage in the Chamber to deliver what would become his milestone speech: “Clerical evil has infiltrated deeply into ... the ruling classes of the country, where their spread and propagation is endorsed for twenty years, in public administration schools ... and in government circles themselves ... This is clerical domination. Clericalism? That is the enemy!”⁹⁶. After fierce debates, the following agenda was accepted on the same day: “the Chamber, considering these Ultramontane manifestations ... that jeopardise the internal and external security of the country ... invites the government to suppress such unpatriotic agitation” (JORF, 5 May 1877, p. 3288). These statements foreshadowed the republican secularisation initiatives of the decade to come, linked directly to consolidating the sovereign capacity of the Republic.

Alarmed by the anticlerical tendencies of the government, monarchist President Mac-Mahon wrote a letter to the Head of Government Jules Simon, insinuating that he was too passive to control the “radicalism” in the cabinet. “The attitude of the Head of Government”, Mac-Mahon wrote, “makes one wonder whether he still possesses the necessary influence over the Chamber to make his views count”. Jules Simon resigned immediately, and Mac-Mahon appointed the monarchist Duc de Broglie once again as the Head of Government. The next day, republican deputies issued a vote of no

confidence to cause the fall of Broglie's government. Faced with a political deadlock, Mac-Mahon suspended the parliament on 16 May 1877, which would come to be known as the "coup" of *seize mai*. Indeed, *seize mai* represents a turning point in the establishment of bourgeois-republican hegemony in France. It is in this juncture that a republican class coalition was firmly mobilised against conservative forces branded as "politics of reaction and adventure"⁹⁷. At the material level, Elwitt (1986, pp. 136-169) demonstrates using ample evidence that "16 May" was the culmination of the ongoing class conflict that pitted the industrial and agrarian fractions of capital against the traditional financial elite allied with clerico-aristocratic *notables*; where the disputes on the Freycinet Public Works Programme marked the final battle of that struggle⁹⁸. Catholicism crystallised in this contentious process as the key ideological axis of polarisation that differentiated the republican bloc from the class forces underlying the *ordre moral*. In the hegemonic alliance they established with urban and rural petty producers (as well as some working class elements), "the republican bourgeoisie found in the clerical issue the unifying factor essential to the solidarity of the republican coalition", although "something more than momentary tactics was at work here" (Elwitt, 1975, p. 141). The first wave of secularisation that followed in the 1880s was certainly more than simple momentary tactics, as the consolidation of republican infrastructural power depended partly on the subordination of the clerical establishment to the national government.

5.2. Building *Laique* Hegemony: The First Wave (1879-1891)

Following the crisis of 16 May, the elections of October 1877 placed a definitive republican majority in the Chamber. *Union Républicaine* received about 60 percent of the votes against a total of 30 percent conservative ballots comprising of Bonapartists, Legitimists, and Orléanists. The landslide victory demonstrated that the small holding peasantry, who were systematically "solicited by politicians and government" since the beginning of the new regime, had now "become a powerful and influential political force ... and came eventually to represent the social ideal of the III Republic" (Moulin, 1991, p. 131). Charle (1994, p. 109) agrees that in this period, "the peasants in some ways constituted the first class to be born of representative democracy" in France. The

elections definitely sealed the end of monarchist-clerical aspirations, although “the ‘Moral Order’ continued for a twilight period of nearly three years while President Mac-Mahon struggled to prevent the Republican majority taking over control of the Republic” (McManners, 1972, p. 41). The divided situation lasted until the presidential elections of January 1879, where moderate republican Jules Grévy was elected with 84 percent of the votes as the first actually republican President of the Third Republic. After “ten years of difficulty”, it is only after January 1879 that the regime could be fully “sure of itself” (Aguilhon, 1979, p. 12). The republican contention for hegemony building throughout the 1870s now reached a decisive stage, where bourgeois and petit bourgeois (petty producers, professionals, shopkeepers, small farmers) elements constituted the backbone of the republican class coalition. “Now there was no political way back for the aristocracy” (Magraw, 2002, p. 27). At this point, to entrench the republican regime that had barely survived the decade against aristocratic and working class advances (as in the *Ordre Moral* and the Commune), secularisation of the Republic constituted a key strategic state building and hegemony consolidation tool for bourgeois politics. As Boudon (2007, p. 107) puts it, “the alliance of Catholics and monarchists during the 1870s, which followed the union of the throne and the altar in the Second Empire, reinforced the republican will to build a Republic founded on *laïcité*, ousting religion from the public to the private sphere”. This would not only diminish the vestiges of aristocratic influence, but also integrate the middle and working classes through the promotion of liberal-progressive ideals with constant reference to the Revolution –although excluding socioeconomic reform, as “the social question remained as a kind of background noise during those years” (Elwitt, 1986, p. 289).

Before secularisation came an upsurge of symbolic legislation, which appealed to the popular masses to secure support for the Republic. On 14 February 1879, *La Marseillaise* was made the national anthem of the French Republic to be played in official ceremonies⁹⁹. Another symbolic gesture on 22 July 1879 was to move the seat of the executive and the parliament (both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) from Versailles, the traditional residence of the monarchy, to Paris, alongside the public. As Grondeux (2000, p. 81) writes, “the return to Paris was highly symbolic” as it stands for “a gesture of republican reconciliation” with the people after the suppression of the Commune¹⁰⁰. The Republic also established its national day of commemoration that

found its source in 1789. With the Law of 6 July 1880, it was promulgated that “the Republic adopts the date of 14 July as an annual national holiday”¹⁰¹. In the 14 July celebrations that year in 1880, the revolutionary maxim *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* was inscribed on the pediment of public buildings for the first time. Symbolic laws such as these were critical in mobilising middle and working class politics in favour of the Republic, and for creating a republican culture to solidify the regime. Agulhon (1989) shows that from the 1880s onwards, republican imagery such as Marianne, Marseillaise, the tricolour flag, *Liberté-Égalité-Fraternité*, the Gallic rooster, and the official monogram RF (*République Française*) have flourished in ceremonies, busts, monuments, public buildings, statues, paper bills, coins, documents, and stamps. On 16 May 1885, Church St. Genevieve was restored one last time into its republican status as the *Panthéon*, completing the turbulent symbolic journey of this building since the Revolution¹⁰². As another meaningful overture to the left, the communards were awarded full amnesty with the law of 11 July 1880, confirming the will to appease and incorporate elements of the socialist left into the new regime. Law expanding the rights to hold public meetings (30 June 1881), Law on the Freedom of Press (29 July 1881), and the Law on Trade Unions (21 March 1884) were headed in the same direction. As a central part of this struggle to entrench bourgeois hegemony and republican state capacity, the 1880s witnessed the first wave of sociopolitical secularisation in the Third Republic.

5.2.1. Educating a Secular-Republican Generation

The point of secular educational reform “was to provide the means for securing the *bourgeois* republic against both its clerical and monarchist enemies on the right, and the threat of social revolution on the left. It provided the means of inculcating fundamental notions of civic responsibility, patriotism, and respect for the law, property, and the established social order” (Price, 2005, pp. 228-229). Stock-Morton (1988, p. 95) concurs that “the entire system of ... education set up by the republic ... can be seen as a program aimed at guaranteeing, politically, the existence of the republic, and socially, the predominance of the bourgeoisie as the natural leaders of the republic”. In the early 1880s, “the dangers of a monarchical restoration, supported by the Church, were still too close not to haunt the republicans in power”. Therefore, “to ensure their rule by the organisation of education became the most urgent task” (Ozouf, 1982a, p. 55). It is not

surprising that the most immediate republican advances against the clerical establishment were in the field of education. In the words of Mayeur (1973, p. 113), “to found the *laïque* school was also to found the Republic. The two notions were inseparable for the consolidation of the *patrie*. It was not just about winning over the new generations to the regime, but it was also to uphold a unitary conception of the national community”. Going hand in hand with railroads, the postal system, mass media, and universal conscription, secular education would become the crucial means to economically and culturally “insert” the isolated peasantry into the nationally organised Republic. Through these reforms, “the countryside” was “won over to the new enlightenment of the Republican schools”, and would serve as “a bastion of support for the regime” (Charle, 1994, pp. 114-116). Hobsbawm (1983, p. 271) similarly adds that the secular educational reform in the Third Republic was part of a contemporary European process of “mass-production” of national traditions and culture, whose “revolutionary and republican principles and content” in France aimed “to turn not only peasants into Frenchmen but all Frenchmen into good republicans”. The discernible tendency in these laws (see Appendix A for full list) is that the Republic took a step to “separate” the hold of religious authority from the education system (be it in the form of institutions, personnel, or curriculum), complemented by a move to “regulate” the remaining domain of the religious in education. Sovereign capacity of the republican state was significantly enhanced by these sets of legislation.

The Law of 27 February 1880 on the Higher Council of Public Education and Academic Councils was the first republican advance against the old order. The law envisaged the exclusion of the clergy from the Higher Council of Public Education, which, according to the Falloux Law 1850, featured 4 Catholic, 2 Protestant, and 1 Jewish delegates representing these religions. The extensive report prepared by the Left Republican Chalamet issued that removing the clergy from the Council represented “the notion of a *laïque* state, ... and it is one of the most precious gains of the Revolution”. It would be unthinkable for a “republican government”, Chalamet added, “to keep its ... most formidable adversaries at the head of its universities”, who are openly “in rivalry with the state”. This is why, “education given by the state must remain out of all religions”, and the state cannot let church authority “to exercise official supervision on its teaching” (JORF, 7 July 1879, p. 6291). Minister of Education Ferry argued similarly that

in the past, public education was controlled largely by bishops (JORF, 31 January 1880, p. 1062). He said that those bishops contradicted with civil authority as they wielded “a theological, mystical, and unquestionable power proclaimed by an infallible authority”. As a republican, he added, “I cannot accept that we give signs of approval to doctrines that are the negation of national sovereignty”. That is why Ferry contended that the clergy must be removed from the Council, for “the national tradition requires us to keep an impassable barrier between the temporal and spiritual domains” (JORF, 31 January 1880, pp. 1066-1067)¹⁰³.

Along with separation, the law also strengthened state regulation over education, both public and private. The Higher Council, now liberated from religious supervision, was empowered with “extensive jurisdiction over the programs, degrees, texts, administration, discipline, and staff of public education” (Acomb, 1967, p. 149). Article 5 of the law, for instance, mentioned that the state could interdict the textbooks of private schools (mostly Catholic) if they were found “as contrary to morality, the constitution, and the laws”. According to Chalamet’s report, this was only natural, for the regulation of private education institutions is a “function that belongs uncontestably to the state that cannot be shared by anyone” (JORF, 7 July 1879, p. 6292). In moderate Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire’s report, this idea was repeated: “the state should supervise private establishments for the observation of laws, so that they are not violated to the detriment ... of the youth” (JORF, 7 February 1880, p. 1393). The establishment of Academic Councils gave the state further prerogatives. Deputies of the right, such as the monarchist Keller, called the law “anti-liberal and despotic”, insisting that the state intervened too much in the affairs of Catholic schools, yet to no avail. As the Chamber adopted the law, republican Paul Bert cried with relief: “first victory!” (JORF, 24 February 1880, p. 2146). He was certainly right. The Law of 27 February 1880 was the first of the many secularising laws to come in the subsequent period.

Less than a month later, the Law on the Freedom of Higher Education was legislated on 18 March 1880, proposed by the Minister of Education Ferry. The law ensured that only state faculties could confer higher education degrees in the territory, and that the matriculation of students must be through state examinations (Article 1). Mixed juries consisting of religious and secular professors were abolished, so that

students of Catholic faculties had to pass a state examination to receive their degrees. The law also declared that private higher education institutions, run mostly by religious organisations, could not carry the title “university” or confer degrees such as “*Baccalauréat, Licence, or Doctorat*” (Article 4). Moreover, Article 7 stated that private higher education institutions could not be recognised as “public interest” (*d'utilité publique*) foundations as before, which would deprive them of tax benefits and other entitlements. Directly invalidating the *ordre moral* Law of 12 July 1875, the law of 18 March 1880 was a major step in proclaiming the pre-eminence of the Republic in higher education. The struggle for sovereignty found its clear representation in republican speeches and reports¹⁰⁴, where religious congregations, particularly the Jesuits, were pointed out as the ultimate enemy with an external base. The law, however, fell short of completely banning unauthorised congregations from higher education. Article 7 of the original draft had foreseen precisely that, stirring violent discussions in both chambers. In the end, despite the allegations on the Jesuits, Article 7 was defeated in the Senate. Still, the law succeeded according to Ferry in “maintaining ... the power of the state in education. Not a monopoly, but ... control” (JORF, 12 June 1879, p. 5005).

Shortly after, the government resorted to another strategy to undermine the Jesuits. Decree no. 9349 issued on 29 March 1880 ruled that “within three months ... the unauthorised association of *Jésus* is to dissolve itself and evacuate the establishments they occupy on the ... territory of the Republic” (Article 1), which included their educational facilities. The Decree based itself on a long list of laws and orders since the Revolution that targeted the Jesuits. On the same day, Decree no. 9350 ruled that “all unauthorised congregations or communities” should apply to the state to “obtain verification and approbation of their statutes and regulations, as well as legal recognition for each of its currently existing establishments” (Article 1). A particular emphasis was made on the “foreign” character of congregations¹⁰⁵. These decrees are of significance due to the increased state regulation they promulgated on religious congregations and their educational activities. The idea behind them was similar to what the Minister of Cults Bardoux said in 1878: “forbidding religious orders to have moral and civil personality without the intervention of the state” (Acomb, 1967, p. 229). The Society of Jesus was dissolved three months later, and by the end of the year, their 261 religious houses were closed and 5,643 monks were expelled.

On 16 June 1881, two major laws envisaging educational secularisation were passed: on primary education certificates, and more importantly, on free primary public education. The Law on Primary Education Certificates required all teachers, school heads, and assistants working in public and private primary schools to hold a certificate of competence issued by the state, forbidding anyone to exercise these functions without that certificate (Articles 1 and 2). Article 3 of the law clarified that the aforementioned groups are to present themselves before a government examination commission to receive their certificates. According to Acomb (1967, p. 168), the law gave the government the upper hand in determining “the type of examination for the certificate, which might easily be used to exclude those critical of the republican regime”¹⁰⁶. The groundbreaking second law passed on the same day established free primary education in public schools, thereby realising the first of the three republican principles on the primary education system: “free, obligatory, and *laïque*”. Article 1 of the law abolished fees in all public primary education institutions. For many republicans, establishing the gratuity of primary education was intimately linked with its obligatory and secular character, which would be instituted the following year. The law was based on a solid consensus involving the radical left, republican union, left, and most of the left center. Bert’s report of 11 May 1880 contended that the schoolteacher “must be considered like a state official ... free from local [religious] influences that easily degenerate into tyranny”, and added: “the financial consequence of this principle is the concentration, in the hands of the state, all resources ... to settle the costs of primary education” (JORF, 20 May 1880, p. 5447). Building national unity regardless of religious or socioeconomic background was the main justification provided for state-funded primary education¹⁰⁷.

To supplement the law on gratuity, the law on obligatory and *laïque* education was adopted on 28 March 1882, which stands as one of the most significant piece of secularising legislation in the making of the French Third Republic. The law made primary schools obligatory for children aged 6 to 13 (Article 4), and secularised the curriculum (Article 1). The first article of the law named “moral and civic instruction” as among the basic tenets of primary education curriculum in France. This was in replacement of Article 23 of the Falloux Law of 1850, which alluded to “moral and *religious* instruction”. Religious education was removed from public schools. Instead, the law allowed public schools to have a day –other than Sunday– off each week, so that

families could have students take religious education on their own initiative, yet outside of school buildings (Article 2). Moreover, by abolishing Articles 18 and 44 of the 1850 Law, the supervision and inspection of public and private schools were taken off from the hands of clerics (Article 3). Instead, secular Municipal Commissions were established in every commune to monitor schools and prevent absenteeism (Article 5). No cleric was allowed in the composition of these committees. State monitored examinations were made compulsory to graduate from primary school, which nationally standardised the education system (Article 6).

The republican vision of free, compulsory, and *laïque* schools delineated education from religious influences and monitoring (such as in Articles 1, 2), and instituted comprehensive secular surveillance and organisation of public schools (such as in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6). In their parliamentary speeches, many republican deputies and senators based their arguments on republican authority vis-à-vis the church, and highlighted the separationist character of the law. Rapporteur Bert declared in the discussions that the law envisaged “the neutralisation of the school”, in other words, “separation of the school and the churches”¹⁰⁸. The creator of the law, Ferry, also highlighted the issues of sovereignty and separation in his speeches, holding that “we have set out to defend the rights of the State against ... political Catholicism” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 114-115)¹⁰⁹. Republican politicians pointed in many occasions to clericalism as an immediate danger to secular authority, which must be limited and managed¹¹⁰. France’s need to keep up with and sustain its external sovereignty against other western powers, especially Prussia, was also mentioned by some deputies as justification for educational reform¹¹¹. Finally, hand in hand with sovereignty, another prevalent republican argument for the law was the creation of national unity free from religious divisions¹¹².

Following the landmark law of 1882, the final republican project on the education system was the Goblet Law of 30 October 1886, which completed Ferry’s work of 1881-2 with the secularisation of the teaching personnel. Article 17 of the law was its central element: “In public schools ... instruction is entrusted exclusively to secular personnel”, and according to Article 18, current public school teachers from religious orders (in boys’ schools) would be replaced by secular personnel in the following five years. Article 4 of

the law brought restrictions on foreign teachers functioning in public and private establishments, which directly affected congregation schools that employed non-French ministers. The law also engendered further regulation of public and private schools by the Republic. According to its Chapter II, "On Inspection", public and private schools were to be inspected by secular authorities to verify that their education "is not against morality, the Constitution, and laws" (Article 9). In Title III, named "On Private Education", it was declared that private schools could not use books banned by the Higher Council of Public Education (Article 35). Articles 37-39 laid out detailed procedures on the opening of a private school, which required several checks from state officials, and Article 40 reminded of the punishments for those who do not comply with those regulations. The law also established Departmental Councils of primary education, in addition to the Municipal Councils established in 1882 (Article 44), which introduced another layer of surveillance over public and private primary schools. Fierce parliamentary debates confirm the contentious character of the law in establishing the primacy of the Republic vis-à-vis religious authority¹¹³.

The secularising educational laws of the 1880s, which followed a discernible pattern of "separation" and "regulation" as complementary state building strategies, left a substantial mark on French society. The figures in the government publication *Statistique de l'Enseignement Primaire* (cited by Ozouf, 1982a, pp. 233-234) suggests that the laws precipitated considerable deterioration for Catholic-led education in France, while public and secular education institutions flourished immensely. Accordingly, in the period of 1877-1907, the number of secular public schools increased from 45.8 to 66.9 thousand, whereas private congregation schools dropped from 6.6 to 1.3 thousand. Similarly, in the same period, the number of secular public school teachers rose from 55 to 121 thousand, meanwhile congregationists fell from 19.8 to 6.5 thousand people. In state building efforts, moreover, the idea of "social mobility via educational opportunity proved seductive to broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry and a key factor in legitimating bourgeois republican hegemony" (Magraw, 1986, p. 219). The figure of the republican teacher became the symbol of this major process of transformation, dubbed the "black hussars" of the Republic to disrupt the intellectual monopoly of the priest in the locality (Leduc, 2005). Along with "the shopkeeper, and the subprefect", the secular schoolteacher became "the Republic's shock troops at the grass roots in the

struggle against the clergy and the aristocratic *notables*" (Sedgwick, 1968, p. 33). As Furet (1978, p. 4) writes, "the lay schoolteacher of Jules Ferry was a missionary for the values of 1789", which facilitated the "integration of France's villages and peasant culture into the republican nation". Education based on *moral laïque* and class *solidarité*, as represented in school textbooks¹¹⁴ and the influential sociology of Émile Durkheim (Baubérot, 1990; Hayat, 2007), went hand in hand with the creation of a national transportation and communication system (Freycinet Plan), which build a domestic market interconnecting various remote rural areas to turn "peasants into Frenchmen" (E. Weber, 1976). Protectionists measures (such as the Méline Tariff) and the foundation of class-collaborationist agricultural unions (*syndicats agricoles*) sponsored by the regime underpinned that process economically. Imperial expansion, adamantly defended by Ferry himself, helped the financial and ideational consolidation of this class coalition at home (Brunschwig, 1960; Sackur & Chafer, 2002). Overall, "central to the Third Republic's educational project was the assumption that republican values could only finally be embedded in French society if the power of the Catholic Church over the minds of the young could be broken" (McPhee, 2004, p. 253). It is in this sense that the educational laws of 1880, along with other secularising legislation of the decade, truly found the Republic.

5.2.2. Other Secularising Reforms

Throughout the 1880s, several other significant laws were promulgated to engender sociopolitical secularisation, involving spheres such as constitutional law, the military, hospitals, cemeteries, funerals, and various civil affairs (see Appendix B for full list). For republican state building, the military was a key field to secularise, given its nationally unifying character. The first example of that came with the Law of 8 July 1880 that abolished military chaplaincies. The chaplaincies had been eliminated during the Revolution, which was undone, like many other revolutionary reforms, during the Restoration period in 1816. They were closed again in the Revolution of 1830, and reopened with the laws of 20 May and 3 June 1874, by the *ordre moral* government. "It is only in 1873", a republican government report resented four years later, "that the National Assembly, inheritor of the ultramontane zeal of 1816, considered reorganising them" (JORF, 4 March 1877, p. 1674). Republicans argued in the parliament that the

presence of the religious establishment in the military was a divisive factor against national unity, which caused a partition of authority and allegiance, and nourished royalist propaganda¹¹⁵. The law abolished the chaplaincies, placed ministers of religion outside of barracks in remote camps, although allowed their presence in hospitals and military prisons (Article 2). In time of war, ministers of different religions could be attached to the military, yet “without any hierarchical distinction”, and the government would regulate “their mode of recruitment and numbers” (Article 3). At the end of the decade, another piece of legislation on the military, namely the Law of 15 July 1889 on the Recruitment of the Army, abolished ecclesiastical exemptions from military service, thus directly contradicting what the Pope Pius IX declared in Article 32 of his infamous *Syllabus of Errors* (1864). According to the law of 1889, secular and religious instructors could be exempt from military service provided that they commit to teaching for a period of ten years in France or in the colonies. Regular clergy members who were not primary school instructors, however, were not exempt from military service under any circumstances. Left and radical republicans held that this was an egalitarian law eliminating privileges, and a patriotic one that protects France from internal and external clerical influence¹¹⁶. Radical Bert’s declarations in the debate showed that the law also sought to extend the Republic’s ideational influence over schoolteachers and congregations through obligatory military service¹¹⁷.

Soon after the promulgation of the law abolishing military chaplaincies in 1880, another law was passed on 12 July 1880, which legalised labour on Sundays by abrogating the Restoration’s Law of 18 November 1814. A parliamentary report suggested that the law of 1814 could only be accepted in a country where “the head of state is ... the head of religion, and legal traditions and customs are closely linked to religious requirements” and where “the sovereign unites spiritual and temporal authority”. In France, however, the report argued, “there is no state religion since 1830”, and “the state cannot forget that Sunday is the day of rest prescribed by the Christian religion”, therefore “it has no right to impose a citizen to observe Sunday as the day of rest” (JORF, 30 January 1878, p. 865). Another report prepared in 1879 by Maigne linked the draft law directly to the Republic’s survival. During the *ordre moral* period, the report argued, “the clerical and monarchist camp thought that their time had come ... as France seemed like an easy prey to the monarchy of divine right and theocracy ... [which] ...

surrendered a part of public authority to Vatican” (JORF, 14 June 1879, p. 5129). Legalisation of work on Sundays was seen as proclaiming the authority of the Republic’s civil laws, not to mention its enabling aspect on capitalist development and exchange relations¹¹⁸.

Along with the military reforms and religious holidays, another aspect of secularisation for the republican state builders was death, which revolved around the organisation of cemeteries and burials (Baudot, 2007; Bertrand, 2005). The primacy of religion in these areas was difficult to challenge, but the laws of 1881 and 1887 managed to break the monopoly. For the secularisation of cemeteries, the republicans found the precedent in the revolutionary decree of 2 December 1793, which legislated against religiously separated and managed burial spaces. The Law of 14 November 1881 consisted of one single article, which abrogated Article 15 of the Napoleonic Decree of 12 June 1804 (23 Prairial, Year XII). Article 15 of the Decree of 1804 had ruled that in every commune, “each religion must have a distinct place of burial”, and in communes where there is only one cemetery, that space is to be divided “by walls, hedges or ditches ... according to different religions ... in proportion with the number of habitants belonging to each denomination”. The Decree represented the spirit of the Concordat in managing and organising citizenship around “recognised religions”. With the abrogation of that decree in 1881, cemeteries were to be regulated by municipal authorities, and not by particular religions. This was another move by the Republic to assume a previously religious public service, and no denominational divisions were to be allowed in any cemetery in the French territory. The law signified more than it implemented: it unreservedly underlined that religious affiliation was not a variable in the articulation of citizenship, which was an important step to promote allegiance to the national state, neutral towards religions¹¹⁹.

Complementarily, the Law of 15 November 1887 ended the monopoly of the church in funerals. The law gave the individuals and families the right to decide the type of ceremony to receive upon their death. In practice, civil funerals were increasingly popular in the Third Republic, although the conservatives took every measure to hinder them, particularly in the 1870s (Lalouette, 1983). Victor Hugo’s funeral at the *Panthéon* on 1 June 1885 was one such civil funeral with massive participation, which turned into a

manifestation for the Republic. The Law of 1887 stipulated that every individual “can arrange the conditions of their funerals, especially regarding ... the civil or religious character of their ... burial” (Article 3). Preparing a signed testimony would be sufficient for individuals to choose their preferred ceremony. The law also brought repercussions for those who do not respect that choice: “any person who gives a funeral contrary ... to the will of the deceased” would be punishable by the articles 199 and 200 of the Penal Code (Article 5). Effectively, the law took away the priest’s right to provide an individual a religious burial regardless of their declaration to receive it, which used to be the case in many small communes. Parliamentary records suggest that for the republicans, secularising funerals along with cemeteries was above all a matter of liberty of conscience and equal citizenship, which they understood as the only possible way to ascertain republican politics¹²⁰.

Authorisation of divorce was another republican campaign of the 1880s. In 1816, divorce was prohibited by the Restoration government, which had been authorised during the Revolution. It remained illegal until 1884 due to the continuing influence of Catholicism over the state apparatus. The bill was opened to debate in February 1881, a year after Pope Leo XIII condemned the idea of divorce in his encyclical *Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae*. In this document, the Church declared that civil authorities had no say on matrimonial matters, divorce was regarded as an “evil”, which “tends to the certain destruction of society” (LeoXIII, 1880). Nevertheless, the Law of 24 July 1884 abrogated the Law of 8 May 1816 abolishing divorce, and brought back the relevant articles of the Civil Code regarding divorce by mutual consent (Article 1). Accordingly, Article 234 of the Civil Code gave the civil courts the sole authority to implement divorce. The parliamentary discussion for the law exhibited the republican contention to extend its jurisdiction over religious authorities. Alfred Naquet, sponsor of the bill, put it in these words on 7 February 1881: “Gentlemen, you have begun a great struggle ... against the encroachments of the ... clergy upon the political domain, against the progress of clericalism, which wishes to recapture one by one all the conquests of our great Revolution”. Authorising divorce would be a part of that struggle, Naquet added. Royalist Bishop Freppel responded from a Catholic position in line with the encyclical of the Pope: “The role of civil legislation is to regulate the civil and temporal effects of marriage and not to form bonds, much less to dissolve them” (Acomb, 1967, p. 199), suggesting

that only the church possessed the authority to marry or divorce individuals. These opposing arguments represented a secular-religious struggle over the daily lives of citizens. In conclusion, by authorising divorce, the Republic not only conferred this right to its citizens, but also claimed for itself another territory that used to be under the monopoly of the Church¹²¹.

In yet another major secularising reform in the political sphere, the constitutional amendments of 14 August 1884 set out to entrench the legal foundations of the Republic along with its *laïque* character. Article 2 of the law amended the Constitutional Law of 25 February 1875 to add the following sentence to its Article 8: “The republican form of government cannot be the object of any amendment”, which forbade a possible bill on the restoration of monarchist rule. The next paragraph of the same article specified a similar guarantee on the republican regime: “Members of families who have reigned over France are ineligible for the Presidency of the Republic”, thus preventing an authoritarian takeover through the presidency as in 1851. Lastly, Article 4 of the law removed a section of the Constitutional Law of 25 February 1875, which had declared that on the Sunday following the reopening of the Chamber and the Senate every year, “public prayers are offered to God in churches and temples to call for his blessing on the work of the two assemblies”. The amendment brought about by Article 4 effectively deleted the word “God” from the Constitution of France. The Republic hence freed itself from religious legitimisation, both legally and symbolically. Severely criticising the law, monarchist Freppel made a remark that identified the link between republican sovereignty and secularisation: “It is at the very moment when you decree the eternity of the Republic that you erase the name of God from the frontispiece of the Constitution ... It is in the very same legislation that you treat God a dead thing and you attribute immortality to yourselves! (JournalOfficiel, 13 August 1884, p. 176). Conservative deputy Bourgeois repeated the same argument: “You have solemnly declared that the Republic was permanent, non-assignable and eternal, and you have awarded it with the honours of divinity!” (JournalOfficiel, 13 August 1884, p. 181). The constitutional amendments indeed strengthened the foundations of the republican regime while detaching its basis of legitimacy from religious confirmation¹²².

To further incapacitate remaining monarchical forces, another law passed on 23 June 1886 expelled the “heads of families that have reigned in France and their direct heirs” (Article 2). Defiance of this law was made punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 5 years (Article 3). Moreover, other monarchical family members were disallowed to serve in the army or take part in elections, or assume public functions (Article 4). Parliamentary discussions on this law reveal the republican perspective that identifies a close alliance between the monarchy and the church as a continuing threat to republican sovereignty¹²³. Lastly, the Law on the Freedom of Press (29 March 1881) and the Municipality Law (5 April 1884) also contributed to the process of secularisation in this interval. Extending freedom of speech, the former effectively legalised the criticism of religion, which was severely limited during the *ordre moral* period. The latter brought in measures to increase the local policing of churches for public safety (Article 97), municipal regulation and limitations on chiming church bells (Articles 100 and 101), and made priests ineligible for local elections (Article 33). All in all, the first wave of republican secularisation of the 1880s was an indispensable component of republican state building, not only in terms of securing popular support for the regime, but also enhancing the infrastructural power of the Republic vis-à-vis religious authority. Using its governmental power for “regulated diminishment”, the period also witnessed the reduction of *budgets des cultes* from 53.5 million francs in 1878 to 45 million by 1891, and to 41.3 million by 1905. And with the laws of 27 December 1879 and 21 March 1887, the salaries of bishops and archbishops were reduced along with other religious expenditures (Barbier, 1995, p. 39). As these numbers suggest, “regulated diminishment” of religious authority in the French case refers to the utilisation of the state’s concordatory rights by the republicans as a means to control and weaken the social significance and roles of the Catholic Church. The will to maintain this privilege of “interior” regulation would be the central reason for some republicans to initially reject the idea of separation in the episode culminating into 1905.

5.3. The “Radical” Republic (1892-1905)

As the decade came to a close, it became clear that the allure of republican hegemony had lost its original spark. Beginning with the late 1880s, the regime found

itself more and more inadequate to contain the advance of working class movements, and to prevent the attraction of rural and urban petit bourgeois groups by right-wing authoritarianisms. The reverberations of the global crisis of 1873-96, capitalist concentration that endangered petty producers, and the maturing of an organised urban industrial proletariat were among the underlying socioeconomic factors that threatened bourgeois-republican hegemony. The astounding mass support for populist *Boulangisme* in the late 1880s, which managed to mobilise middle and working classes disillusioned by the republican promise, was the earliest warning sign revealing the precariousness of the regime¹²⁴. The Decorations Affair of 1887 and more importantly, the Panama Scandal of 1892 further weakened republican legitimacy by exposing the intricate network of big business, politicians, and the press undermining the interests of average citizens¹²⁵. In what followed during the 1890s, the transformation in the balance of class forces, –which found its political reflection in the rise of socialism on the left and chauvinistic nationalism on the right–, was to have a direct bearing on the course of the secularisation process.

5.3.1. Social Question and *Ralliement* in the Age of Dreyfus

The 1890s was above all the decade of the *question sociale*, centred on glaring inequalities and labour-related issues and struggles. Between 1880 and 1890, the number of strikes increased by 250 percent, and to the ruling classes, “the escalation of labor militancy looked like an assault on the socioeconomic foundations of the Republic. In other words, a challenge to the bourgeois political order appeared to be imminent” (Elwitt, 1986, pp. 6, 297). Opportunist republicans were now more alarmed by the growth of socialism than clericalism: “middle-class and conservative republicans, having ousted the traditional *élites*, found that they had achieved their essential political objectives and now sought to defend their privileged positions against more radical groups” (Price, 2005, p. 229). Politically, “socialism had begun to coalesce within the large proletariat that serviced the cities”, and “also antagonistic to the stolid Republican power base on the far left were ... the anarchists” (Thomson, 2004, p. 6). The set of restrictive legislations on the press in 1893-4, known as the *lois scélérates* (Villanous Laws) by the French left, was a reflection of the opportunist reflex to maintain order against socialist movements and anarchist attacks (Pressensé & Pouget, 1899). Moderates also sought

for ways to appease working classes. Following the 1884 Law on Trade Unions, state regulated labour councils (*bourses de travail*) were extended across France; strike arbitration procedures were introduced in 1892, and limited protective legislations ensued (such as law banning female night work in 1892, reduced child labour, Compensation Act in 1898, and limitations on work hours promulgated in 1900). Nevertheless, the number of strikes and violence against strikers rose steeply as the century came to a close.

It is based on these social dynamics that an atmosphere of rapprochement became possible between moderate republicans and the Catholic Church in the early 1890s –initiating what Agulhon (1990, p. 89) refers to as the “decade of the conservative Republic”. Following the same trajectory trailed by bourgeois politics since the Revolution (as outlined in Chapter 4), the opportunists turned to the Church as a means to soothe mounting leftist advances, only to find that Pope Leo XIII was more than ready to give his blessing to the Republic to prevent its replacement by socialism. As Ternisien (2007, p. 66) puts it, “the Catholic Church accepted the Republic ... only to fortify it against communism. On the eve of elections, priests in their Sunday sermons warned believers against the ‘worse’ of evils”. This Roman turn of attitude is known in French history as *ralliement*, and from the Vatican’s point of view, there were several strategic factors –in addition to the rise of socialism– that were at play in its making. First, the precarious position of the Vatican under conquest by Italian nationalists oriented the Pope towards an appeasement with other European regimes to increase his prestige and space for diplomatic manoeuvre (Larkin, 1974, p. 33). Second, monarchical restoration attempts in the two preceding decades had borne no fruit. The utter failure of Boulanger’s coup, which “the conservatives hoped to utilise for a monarchical restoration, ... was decisive in the decision of the Pope to encourage Catholics to accept republican institutions” (Boudon, 2007, p. 114). Lastly, the Republic’s promotion of Catholic missions in its colonisation wave since the mid-1880s reassured the Church of a continued alliance and opportunity to broaden its sphere of influence (Grondeux, 2000, p. 173). Deriving from these considerations, Leo XIII extended an olive branch to conservative republicans, first in the Toast of Algiers by his Cardinal Lavigerie (1890) and then in his statements to the press (1891)¹²⁶, and finally, in his milestone encyclical *Au Milieu des Sollicitudes* (1892)¹²⁷.

Vatican's overture towards the Republic was in reality fairly limited, and it was more of a tactical disposition than a wholehearted embracement of the regime. The 1892 encyclical did not hold back from condemning the secularising laws of the 1880s, and "in private, Leo XIII assured" his cardinals "that he retained royalist sympathies and hoped that royalism could win a majority for a peaceful restoration" (Magraw, 1986, p. 271). Yet for moderate republicans, the olive branch was enough to try and mobilise a refurbished propertied coalition. As the Church decided to "join forces with conservative Republicans against left-wing demands for social reform" (especially regarding the graduated income tax and old-age pensions), opportunists "who were in office in the mid-1890s were glad enough to have the support of Catholics against the Left" (Larkin, 1974, pp. 1, 37, 63; 1995, p. 7). Minister of Education Spuller's announcement of a "New Spirit" (*esprit nouveau*) in state-church relations in March 1894 represents that conformism. Urging for the need to "struggle against all sorts of fanaticism", above all the left, Spuller argued that "it is time to uphold, in matters of religion, the true spirit of enlightened tolerance ... This *esprit nouveau* is ... to bring all the French around the ideas of common sense and justice" (Debidour, 1906, p. 116). Although this call for religious reconciliation did not produce substantial desecularisation/sacralisation as in the earlier defensive bourgeois episodes of the long nineteenth century, it definitely exhausted the first wave of sociopolitical secularisation that characterised the 1880s. Despite being heavily reprimanded by Radicals and Socialists in the Assembly, for the Opportunists, "a deal with Catholics was ... the key to 'social peace'". As they talked of a 'new spirit' of toleration in state-church relations, the religious orders were allowed to return, and the pace of laicization of primary schools slowed. A shared interest in colonial expansion united opportunists and the clergy", while "industrialists welcomed a broad antisocialist coalition in the face of leftist gains" (Magraw, 1986, pp. 219, 271).

Indeed, paternalistic control of labour at home and imperialist expansion abroad constituted the main points of convergence between moderate republicans and the Catholic establishment. Regarding the first, the necessary framework was laid out in the papal encyclical of May 1891, titled *Rerum Novarum*. Dealing with the relationship between capital and labour, the document recognised the "misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class", yet warned against those ideologies that target private property, as "private ownership is in accordance with the

law of nature”. Instead, it called for harmony between the worker and the employer in a paternalistic fashion, and strongly underlined the need for “Christian charity”, given that “capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital”, and “mutual agreement results in the beauty of good order” (LeoXIII, 1891). Since the 1870s and 1880s, the stress on class cooperation had found its secular articulation in the republican conception of *morale laïque* and *solidarisme* –the latter often dubbed the official ideology of the Third Republic (Hayward, 1961). In the 1890s, the opportunists did not see any harm now in adding Catholic flavours to that collaboration, which led them “to rub shoulders with sometime royalists, Bonapartists and social-Catholic paternalists and to exchange ideas on the strategies needed to woo workers into a broad national consensus” (Magraw, 1992, p. 24). Related to the drive for “industrial peace”, overseas collaboration between the Church and republican imperialism further underpinned the *esprit nouveau*. As Ferry’s “social imperialism” had emphasised back in the 1880s, “the crisis in production could be averted only through colonial expansion”, as domestic “social peace, in this industrial age, is tied to the expansion of markets” (cited in Elwitt, 1975, p. 279). Imperial cooperation with the Church was never interrupted, as “many republicans who tirelessly sought the eradication of all Catholic influence at home found themselves depending on missionary expertise to facilitate ... their rule abroad” –which is represented in Gambetta’s famous words: “Anticlericalism is not an item for export” (Daughton, 2006, p. 6). With their schools, churches, and ideological influence to spread western values, Catholic missions provided an excellent institutional and spiritual thrust for French imperialism, which territorially expanded almost tenfold between 1880 and 1895, adding 50 million people to its area of control in two decades (Andrew, 1976; Lough, 1978, p. 204; Tudesco, 1980)¹²⁸. Although not a colony, one such area of strong influence was the Ottoman Empire (Thobie, 1977).

The *esprit nouveau* and *ralliement*, however, were bound to be short-lived due to the unforeseen sociopolitical polarisation stirred by the infamous Dreyfus Affair¹²⁹, although one can question their level of success even prior to the outbreak of the Affair (Macmillan, 2008, p. 230). Above all, the Affair rendered impossible the conservative class coalition between opportunist republicans and the traditionalist elements underpinned by the Catholic Church. The controversy revolving around Captain Dreyfus set the stage for the ultimate battle between a broad left-republican alliance and a

reinvigorated nationalist right, where attracting the middle classes for or against the Republic was at stake. In the 1890s, “the crisis of republicanism served to create” a powerful “alliance of the jaded reactionary-royalist parties with a youthful, burgeoning, irresponsible nationalist and anti-Semitic movement”, where an important part of Catholic politics and “the old monarchical ... parties ... were resuscitated by the passions generated during the Affair” (Partin, 1969, p. 4). The class basis for this renewed right-wing politics emerged among the “petty bourgeoisie whose wounded nationalism was aggravated by foreign economic competition in a decade of imperialism and tariff wars, and whose socio-economic position was threatened by depression, labour militancy and capitalist concentration” (Magraw, 1986, p. 263). “Largely incorporating the personnel and ideas of traditional conservatism, this new right created a more potent political force than conservatism had known since the 1870s, one which was fundamentally anti-democratic and anti-parliamentarian in its demands for a strong executive power to overcome political and social ‘factionalism’” (Price, 2005, p. 234). To meet the challenge of the Catholic-nationalist right and engross working class militancy, a broad interclass and inter-religious republican coalition was devised at the turn of the century, and anticlericalism once again became the unifying cement of a revamped bourgeois-republican plea for hegemony. The Dreyfus Affair, in this sense, was directly responsible for the new wave of secularisation that followed at the turn of the century.

5.3.2. *Bloc des Gauches* and Secularisation: The Second Wave

Whereas it was the opportunist republicans that commanded the bourgeois-hegemonic initiative of the 1880s, the “Radicals” led the revitalised republican campaign culminating in the Left Block of 1899. Parallel with the rise of working class politics throughout the 1890s, the weight of republican politics gradually shifted towards the left in rhetoric – a process that Thibaudet (1932) refers to as *sinistrisme*– to absorb and mobilise revolutionary militancy against the new right. Accordingly “Radicalism”, unlike the 1880s where it was the ardent leftist critique of opportunism, became the new mainstream of bourgeois politics in the late 1890s with social democratic undertones. As Partin (1969, p. 15) notes, the “Radicals ... despite their names, were in reality spokesmen for the bourgeoisie”, and “aside from their perennial advocacy” of limited social reform, “their most constant characteristic was a determined anticlericalism”. It

was this latter theme that held together middle, peasant, and working class politics, as well as Jewish and Protestant support against Catholic domination in the hegemonic *bloc des gauches* of 1899. The most pressing conflict at the turn of the century was in fact between the bourgeois state and working class militancy, and the radicals sought to “build a laic front which would enable the progressive wing of the bourgeoisie to reassert its leadership over the popular classes. Anticlericalism was, thus, an attractive solution to the potential state crisis and was proclaimed as the quasi-official state ideology in the hope of channelling popular grievances against the clerical-feudal enemy” (Magraw, 1986, p. 251). In the post-Dreyfus context, “the Chamber was realigned once more on the issues” involving “religion and the ‘moral’ purpose of the state”, while “the ever pressing needs of social and economic development were pushed yet again under the carpet” (Larkin, 1974, p. 89).

The working class movement of the late 1890s can be seen as the most substantial social force that energised the second wave of sociopolitical secularisation in the early 1900s. *Ralliement* had never really appealed to the proletariat, for “as long as the Church continued to regard better working-class conditions as charity rather than social justice”, it could not compete with the “promises of the secular champions of working-class interests” (Larkin, 1974, p. 18). The opportunists’ promotion of a “new spirit” had backfired for the same reasons. Working classes were all the more aware of the “tie-up between industrialists and the Church, the former using the latter to ensure a submissive work-force”. Despite regional variations, a majority of urban workers saw the Church as “hand in glove with industrial capitalism”, and “this belief was important in reinforcing the profound anticlericalism of the socialist movement” (Gibson, 1989, pp. 202-203). Noiriél (1986, p. 101) similarly notes that in “industry, one of the main reasons for the power of workers’ struggles lied in the disenchantment with respect to paternalism”, for “social Catholicism never succeed in taking root within the working class”. In *fin de siècle* French labour struggles, therefore, “mobilization against employers and capitalism was fused with ... mobilization against the Church, both in its control over the state and its control over national culture” (Ansell, 2001, p. 46).

The success of the Radical leadership was to form a hegemonic coalition against the extreme right, which managed –although with limitations– to rally the anticlericalism

of working classes in favour of bourgeois-republican politics. Yet the radicals' anticlericalism cannot be reduced to a strategic manoeuvre with no real stakes. The second wave of secularisation between 1899-1905 was not only about attracting popular support to the Republic, but it was also about "the question of how to deal with ... the Catholic Church that had played all too large a part in the Dreyfus Affair" (Partin, 1969, p. 19). The Affair exposed the direct involvement of a part of the clergy and the majority of congregations on the side of chauvinistic alliances that directly challenged minority populations and republican sovereignty. During the Affair, "army officers educated at Catholic schools" and "elements of the Catholic Church" in various fields of civil society "had revealed an apparent contempt for republican values and loyalties" along with a hysterical anti-Dreyfusard campaign targeting "Jews, Protestants, Freemasons and socialists" (Fortescue, 2000, p. 75). In this context, "many republicans ... came to see ... the need to vindicate a secular and republican conception of justice and the nation against a *raison d'état* that ultimately derived from the Old Regime" (Macmillan, 2008, p. 230). All in all, "there were many genuine reasons why republicans should mount an anticlerical counterattack after 1898" (Magraw, 1986, p. 277). These reasons were particularly about the internal sovereign capacity of the Republic against religiously blended proto-fascist agitation, as well as the regime's independence of external policymaking put under question by Roman intransigence, especially after Pius X took power in 1902.

It is deriving from these sociopolitical grounds that as the new century began, the radicals inaugurated a multifaceted secularisation initiative, which dealt with spheres such as congregational activities, education, associations, the military, and justice. (Appendix C provides a snapshot of the French secularising laws of the early 1900s, namely the "second wave"). The closure of the Assumptionist order was the first intimation of the new episode. On 24 January 1900, the order, which had led the anti-Semitic and anti-Republican campaign (with its influential newspaper *La Croix*), was abolished and a part of their property was confiscated by a judicial decree. Especially during the Affair, "the Assumptionists had ... characterized the Republic as a persecutory monster infiltrated by occult, diabolical powers". They made constant calls to overthrow the regime, and the Radicals felt obliged to take action due to their conviction that the order ran "clandestine political operatives subverting the regime" (Harris, 2007,

pp. 201, 203). *La Croix*, for instance, had proudly announced that they were “the most anti-Jewish Catholic newspaper of France” (in their article “La Croix et Les Juifs,” 1890). Shortly after the abolition of the order, some of the fourteen French bishops and archbishops expressing sympathy for the Assumptionists were suspended. Socialist Minister Millerand explained the government’s position as follows: “The Republic ... cannot permit persons, under the guise of religion, to carry a campaign against it” (cited in Partin, 1969, p. 23). The contention against religious congregations, particularly against the Assumptionists, Dominicans, and Jesuits, was thus underway, which intensified with the ensuing sets of legislation (McManners, 1972, pp. 125-126).

The situation of religious congregations presented a legal loophole disadvantageous to the Republic. In the year 1900, there were 1663 congregations in France with around 160,000-190,000 members, owning property worth more than a billion francs (Bracq, 1916, p. 252; Sorrel, 2003b, pp. 230, 234). Unlike the official clergy, these congregations were completely ignored by the Concordat and the Organic Articles, which left their affairs largely unregulated, and gave them a liberty of action that overshadowed and at times constrained the activities of the paid ministers of the state. Addressing this issue, the Law on Associations of 1 July 1901 stands out as the first momentous secularising legislation of the French twentieth century. The strategies of “separation” and “regulation” towards the congregations were clearly inscribed in this groundbreaking law. Radical Head of Government Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau proposed the bill on 14 November 1899, and the core of its finalised version was to make a distinction between (secular) associations and (religious) congregations. In the parliamentary discussions of January 1901, Waldeck-Rousseau (1901, p. 50) held that two doctrines were at war here, namely between those that champion “the supremacy of civil society” and “the pre-eminence of religious power”. Deriving from that distinction, the law allowed the forming of associations without prior authorisation (Title I, Article 2), whereas it required legislative authorisation for the forming of congregations (Title III, Article 13). This differentiation envisaged enabling an active civil society through secular associations, which the Radicals saw as the popular-democratic foundation of the Republic; while congregations were conceived as separate from republican civil society, and accordingly, they were to be regulated much more closely than secular associations. Radical Georges Trouillot, rapporteur of the law, explained that intention as follows: “we

want to establish the freedom of association in this country without removing from civil society the protections ... vis-à-vis religious congregations” (Trouillot, 1906, p. 4). The rapporteur added that this was the exact opposite of the *ordre moral* period, where congregations were free and associations were under control, and concluded that “the Commission rejected the theory of absolute freedom”, because “it does not think that the situation of congregations is identical to that of all other associations” (Trouillot, 1906, p. 11)¹³⁰.

The congregations, moreover, were identified as an ultimate menace to the sovereignty of the state, internally and externally. Regarding the latter, the implication was that congregations were non-French in origin, and that they engendered the “total and complete abdication of the people under the rule and domination of a foreign will” (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, p. 17). Similar remarks were iterated in the discussions of the masonic lodge *Grand Orient de France*, where congregations were perceived as unfit to take place in civil society, because they “receive instructions from foreign governments ... orders that prevent them from being independent in their opinions” (GODF, 1897, pp. 100-101). Their education, moreover, was antinational. As mentioned in one masonic meeting, “what we want above all is that in our Republic there be a national education ... given only by the state. We are convinced that ... because of the very nature of their education, because their leader is in Rome, congregations are unable to give a truly national education” (GODF, 1899, p. 183). Congregations were also viewed as inimical to internal sovereignty for plotting against the Republic, or forming “a state within the state”, as the popular expression of the time went. They seek to “substitute their own will with the higher interests of the State. That is the problem”, uttered Waldeck-Rousseau (1901, p. 61) in the Assembly. He branded the congregationist scheme as “conquering the government, ... training new generations of servants ... and placing them in the great institutions of the state to unite faith and interest ... And the goal? Counter-Revolution!” (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, pp. 80-81) Having ousted the Assumptionists, Jesuits were once again on the hot seat for the Radicals. Trouillot (1906, p. 25) argued that the Jesuits, “by their numbers, their wealth, the development of their education, their press, trade, and by the variety of their means of action over the state ... create a danger which is now more vigilant than ever, calling for the attention of ... the civil power” (Trouillot, 1906, p. 25). Waldeck-Rousseau

seconded that congregations such as the Jesuits do not recognise the authority of the Republic. In their eyes, he went on, the Church is “considered as the head of society” and “it cannot be assigned boundaries or limits”. They “recognise no other power than the Church, and they ignore the state” (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, p. 84).

Conceptualising congregations as separate from civil society and a danger to the Republic, tightened regulation was the logical path to be followed by the Radicals. Accordingly, the Republic could not “depart from the principle that when a religious congregation is formed, [the state] has the right to examine its statutes, consider its purpose, trace its regulations and ... monitor its operations” (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, p. 153). The Law did not aim to shut down all congregations, but obliged them to accept close scrutiny of the Republic if they were to exist legally. Waldeck-Rousseau (1901, pp. 18, 20) explained their point of view in these words: “It is clear that the State cannot recognise in advance, eyes closed, a priori, all categories of religious associations that would like to develop in France”; because “there is no true freedom which might be a threat to the state”. The text of the law manifested this mentality. Its Article 13 required legislative authorisation for the forming of a new congregation. Article 14 banned non-authorised congregations from teaching. Congregations were to present their annual budgets as well as detailed lists of their members for government approval (Article 15). All congregations found without authorisation were considered illicit (Article 16); and existing ones had to apply for authorisation within three months, or face dissolution, punishment, and confiscation of property (Article 18). The legal status of associations (Title I and II), on the other hand, accorded them more room for manoeuvre regarding their activities, thus rendering congregations “a state of exception” (Sorrel, 2003b, p. 7)¹³¹. The 1901 Law of Associations, in the words of Mayeur (1966a, p. 21), can be understood as a “Concordat for congregations” that placed them under close scrutiny in the name of republican sovereignty. It must be noted, however, that the Law of 1901 was qualitatively different from the forthcoming 1905 Law of Separation, given the former’s uncompromising attitude towards religious organisation (Weil, 2008, p. 2704). “In fact”, Patrick Weil (2014, p. 199) underlines, the Law of 1905 “represents a break from, rather than a continuation of, preceding antireligious laws or regulations” such as those of 1901. The final subsection elaborates on this point.

5.3.3. The Path to the Law of Separation

The highly polarised legislative elections of April-May 1902 confirmed the popular support for *bloc des gauches* and its secularising legislation. The bloc (consisting of Radical Independents, Radical Socialists, and Republicans) received 50 percent of the votes against a 43 percent right-wing coalition. Independent socialist parties (*Parti socialiste français* and *Parti socialiste de France*) collected the remaining 7 percent. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the Radicals under the leadership of Émile Combes followed a much more vigorous policy of anticlericalism, which was against the background of an unparalleled strike wave in 1902 (amounting to a total of five million working days) (Mayeur & Rebérioux, 1984, p. 223). Combes was very well aware that anticlericalism was what kept the bloc alive, and successfully shifted public attention away from social reform (Partin, 1969, pp. 115-116). Unlike Waldeck-Rousseau, the new Head of Government pursued an extremely strict application of the 1901 Law of Associations –turning it from “a law of regulation to a law of exclusion” (Bellon, 2004, p. 151)–, which exacerbated the conflict between the Republic and the Church. On 27 June 1902, Combes decreed the closing of 135 unauthorised Catholic schools founded after the Law of 1901, and throughout the summer, he directed the closing of 2,500-3,000 religious-educational institutions established before 1901 (Weil, 2007a, p. 13). Towards the end of the year, the Law of 4 December 1902 amended Article 16 of the Law of 1901 by extending the coverage area of penalties against those involved in founding unauthorised congregations (Article 1).

Meanwhile, the government began rejecting congregational requests for authorisation *en masse*. In spring 1903, for instance, Radical Combes brought to parliament more than 50 such requests, all accompanied by a negative recommendation that would result in their closure. In April 1903, the government banned members of closed congregations to preach in parish churches (Sorrel, 2003b, pp. 122-124), which was in addition to a series of other anticlerical circulars addressed to prefects (Combes, 1904, pp. 409-460). Combes’ anti-congregational upsurge of 1902-3 reached its zenith with the Law of 7 July 1904, which completely prohibited religious congregations (authorised or non-authorised) from education, and envisaged the termination of their existing institutions in the course of a decade (Article 1). This would influence

approximately 3,500 schools. Echoing the words of Waldeck-Rousseau and Trouillot a few years back, yet with a much fiercer tone, the speeches of the Head of Government revealed the perception of Catholic congregations as an internal threat –with a foreign head– against republican state capacity, which needed to be fought with vitality¹³². The strain caused by congregational policy in the first few years of the century seriously affected the state’s relations with the official clergy. The majority of prelates as well as a considerable number of the lower clergy protested with petition campaigns, letters to the President, and actively supported anti-republican candidates in elections¹³³. In response, a total of 342 clergymen were suspended under the Combes government, for, in his words, the Republic must “confine the priest to the domain of religion, and prevent him to intervene in the political domain” (Combes, 1904, p. 54). In this atmosphere, separation of Church and State became a rather tangible notion, voiced ever so strongly by socialist deputies, “who were much more open to religious freedom than their radical colleagues [such as Combes] in the Parliament” (Weil, 2014, p. 199).

Parallel with and in relation to the escalating internal tension involving the congregations and the official clergy, the souring diplomatic relationship between Paris and Rome emerged as another factor of central importance that engendered the path to the law of separation. Following the Law of Associations of 1901, the Vatican had “made a thinly veiled threat” that they “might be obliged to reappraise its pro-French policies if the French government persisted in its present attitude” (Partin, 1969, p. 100). Such remarks were interpreted as a direct intervention in France’s domestic affairs. Expectedly, the situation got worse during Radical Combes’ anticlerical advance in 1902-3, which coincided with the coming to power of the intransigent and uncompromising Pope Pius X in August 1903. In the intensifying contentious process, the government made it clear that the implementation of its national laws was not subject to diplomatic negotiation with an external power, namely the Vatican (Combes, 1905, pp. 311, 355-316, 412, 418). To add to the crisis, the Vatican responded by publicly condemning the Republic’s secularising laws, and systematically rejecting government-nominated prelates. In early 1904, Rome’s suspension and disgracing of two bishops with republican tendencies (of Dijon and Laval) was the last straw that contributed to the rupture of diplomatic relations. The strife between the two conceptions of sovereignty, namely national and pontifical, produced numerous incidents of dispute in the 1901-4

interval¹³⁴, thus revealing to the left bloc that the Concordat was not a feasible mechanism that served the interests and infrastructural power of the Republic. As Aristide Briand, Socialist rapporteur of the separation law, observed, the Concordat was no longer a useful tool to protect the state. Instead, it became a venue through which the state found itself under constant attack by the Church (Briand, 1904).

Besides the intrusions of Vatican, there were also larger geopolitical forces at work that set the framework for the deterioration –and eventual breakup– of Franco-papal relations. At the turn of the century, the European balance of powers was being realigned substantially, and in this emergent picture, France’s days of isolation (as it was imposed by Bismarck in the 1870s) were long gone. Consequently, dependence on the Vatican’s support in international relations was no longer a central concern for *Quai d’Orsay*. Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, France had gradually allied with Russia and Britain to constitute the Triple Entente, which stood increasingly in opposition to the Triple Alliance (composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy). As part of such delicate geopolitical realities, from 1902 onwards, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs began considering a policy of rapprochement towards Italy with the hope of weakening the Triple Alliance. Plans to send President Loubet for an official visit to Rome were devised accordingly to establish stronger ties with the fellow Latin nation (Debidour, 1906, pp. 395-396). Yet from the start, the Vatican protested energetically against the amelioration of Franco-Italian relations, which increasingly became an active impediment to France’s determination of autonomous foreign policymaking. Cardinal Rampolla said that France would be acting like a “heterodox state” if it went along with that visit. From the Vatican’s point of view, the visit would be a major blow to their prestige in the international arena, which was the only asset the Pope could cling to given its lack of territorial sovereignty since 1870 (Larkin, 1961). In April 1904, nevertheless, President Loubet visited Rome without meeting with the Pope. On 17 May, a papal letter of protestation against France was revealed. Exposed by the socialist newspaper *l’Humanité*, the letter –addressed to the heads of Catholic nations– humiliated France, and jeopardised its independent foreign policymaking. The official rupture of diplomatic relations followed on 25 May 1904¹³⁵.

It is in this internal and external context that “the 1905 law of separation ... was built against the influence, indeed domination, of the Catholic Church in public affairs” (Weil, 2008, p. 2704). According to Mayeur (1966a, p. 10), “the struggle against clericalism was decisive for the Republic” so much so that it placed the “social question in the background”. Onboard the initiatives of separation were civil society organisations such as *Grand Orient de France*, *la Libre Pensée*, and *la Ligue des Droits des l’Homme*, while Protestant and Jewish communities also showed their almost unanimous support (Delmaire, 2005; Harismendy, 2005)¹³⁶. As early as 11 June 1903, an ad hoc committee on separation was founded with the initiative of socialist Francis de Pressensé and radical Eugène Réveillaud, with radical Buisson and socialist Briand serving as president and rapporteur, respectively (Fabre, 2007, pp. 54-59). It is interesting to note that separation was desired neither by Waldeck-Rousseau nor initially by the Radical Combes, as these politicians –along with many other figures of the left since the 1880s– saw the Concordat as a central tool to keep the Church in check through “interior” regulation (Lalouette, 2005d). The discussions on the separation law took place in 50 long sessions (between 21 March to 3 July 1905) in the Chamber, followed by senatorial debates (Weil, 2007a, p. 15). This was marked in French history as one of the longest legislative procedures. Around 300 amendment proposals were discussed, where the finalised law was shaped “by the socialists Aristide Briand, Francis de Pressensé and Jean Jaurès, who were much more open to religious freedom” (Weil, 2008, p. 2704) – especially compared to Radical Combes’ own bill proposed in November 1904. Unlike some of the Radical leadership, these Socialist statesmen were not motivated by staunch anticlericalism, which would allow the 1905 Law to be liberal in tone. It is impossible to do justice, in a short section, to the nuances of the law’s legislative history and the implications of its legal stipulations, which culminated in what Jaurès (1905) called the “greatest reform undertook since the French Revolution” (for detailed accounts on the law, see, for instance, Boyer, 2004; Briand, 1908; Bruley, 2004; Cabanel, 2005; Caperan, 1957b; Fabre, 2007; Lalouette, 2005b; Larkin, 2004; Mayeur, 1966a; Poulat & Gelbard, 2010; Schiappa, 2005; Unger, 2005; Weil, 2007b). The emphasis here is rather on the dimensions of “separation” and “regulation” the law envisaged, as well as the perspectives of republican, radical and socialist deputies’ on the internal and external sovereignty of the Republic.

The Law of 1905 brought about the “separation” of religions from the state along with their (“exterior”) “regulation”. In terms of separation, the message was clear: “The Republic does not recognise, salary or subsidise any religion ... All expenses concerning the practice of religion shall be abolished from the budgets of the state, departments and municipal councils ... Public establishments of religion are abolished” (Article 2). The Concordat of 1801 and its relevant stipulations for Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish “recognised religions” were thus abrogated (Article 44). In what radical-socialist Clemenceau called the process of *discordat*, religion ceased to be institutionally embedded or represented in the state, which guaranteed “liberty of conscience” and “free exercise of religion” (Article 1). Separated from the Republic, the legal status of religious organisations were identified as “religious associations” (*associations cultuelles*), and according to the highly contentious Article 4 of the law, their moveable and immovable property and accounts would be “transferred by the legal representatives of those establishments to the associations, ... *in conformity with the regulations of the general organisation of the worship which they intend to assure*” (my emphasis). The latter part of the article clearly respected the internal organisation of religious institutions, namely that of the Church, which was a liberal victory that guaranteed freedom of worship and soothed conservatives. Article 8 appointed a secular authority, namely the Council of State as the arbitrator of property disputes between religious associations. Article 19 clarified that the newly established associations must function “exclusively for the purpose of exercising a religion”. The contributions they received were subject to the Law of Associations of 1901, although “they may not, under any form whatsoever, receive subsidies from state departments or municipalities”. Their finances were under scrutiny as well: “Financial control is exercised on associations ... by the ... General Inspectorate of Finance” (Article 21). Their places of worship continued to be the property of the state, although they were allocated to the religious associations at no expense and in exemption from property tax (Article 24). These articles suggest that separation did not refer to a complete indifference of the state to the religious organisations, as several measures were taken to regulate them under a novel legal existence.

Title V of the law, “Regulation of Religion” (*Police des Cultes*), further highlighted the “exterior” regulationist aspects of the law, seeking to address the potential threat

religious organisations could cause the Republic. Article 25, for instance, stipulated that “meetings for the celebration of religion taking place in premises belonging to a religious association or in those put at its disposal ... remain under the surveillance of the authorities in the interest of public order”. Article 26 declared that “it is forbidden to hold political meetings in premises habitually serving for the exercise of religion”. Article 27 ruled that “ceremonies, processions and other external manifestations of worship” will be regulated according to the Municipal Law of 1884. Article 28 forbade “to put up any religious sign or symbol on public buildings or in any public place, except on buildings used as places of worship”. Religious education remained out of public schools (Article 30). Article 31 criminalised the coercion of others “to practice or refrain from practicing a religion, to take part in or to cease taking part in a religious association, to contribute to or to refrain from contributing to the expenses of a religion”. The law thus paid particular attention to “protecting the individual against any pressure of the religious group” (Weil, 2008, p. 2705). Articles 34 and 35 introduced punishments for ministers of religion that publicly “insult or defamed a citizen charged with public service”, or made a call “to resist the implementation of laws or legal acts of the public authorities ... or to cause an uprising or to arm one group of citizens against others”. Lastly, Article 40 specified that for a period of eight years from 1905, “ministers of religion will be ineligible to partake in municipal councils in communes where they exercise their ecclesiastical ministry”. These measures repeatedly manifest the will to separate the religious from the political while simultaneously placing former under the regulation of the latter.

The overall liberal tone of the law was largely thanks to its rapporteur’s successful navigation of radical as well as conservative pressures. Briand sought to trail a middle path between the antireligious proposals of the extreme left (such as those of Allard, Vaillant, Dumont, or Bepmale) and the conservative reactions to endanger the concept of separation in favour the Catholic Church (as upheld by Groussau, Bercy, Baudry d’Asson, or Cochin). The rapporteur managed to create an alliance involving elements of the extreme left, the left, mainstream republicans, as well as the progressive right. As he insisted, the law had to be liberal and moderate, but also without weakness or failure (Bellon, 2005). The justificatory report Briand presented to the Assembly on 4 March 1905 was strongly influenced by the Protestant Senator Louis Méjan (Méjan, 1959, 1960) as well as Catholic Léon Parsons and Jewish Paul Grunebaum-Ballin

(Unger, 2005, p. 10). The report was historically framed to demonstrate the diverse violations of the Catholic Church against French sovereignty since the old regime¹³⁷. It stressed that following 1789, the Revolution witnessed “the furious and repeated assaults of the Church against national power”, the Directory saw “refractory priests regularly violating the law on the policing of religion”, and “the Napoleonic Concordat” made things even worse by allowing “the Church to recover during the nineteenth century and acquire a power equal to that of the few years before the Revolution” (Briand, 1905, pp. 3, 46, 51)¹³⁸. Even the “organic articles”, the rapporteur underlined, were not sufficient to police the Church and keep papal intrusions at bay, for “a century of experience has demonstrated the fragility and inadequacy of the precautions that the Holy See has never wanted to recognise”.

According to Briand, the Church, which Bonaparte “wanted to be obedient to his orders, was in fact nothing other than Roman”. Concordatory France became even “more dependent on the Holy See” than “in the days of the monarchy”. Under the Restoration, “the Bourbons” further “surrendered the state to the chains of the Church, giving the latter a new lease on life, a power that weighed on the century against which the secular power could only fight intermittently” (Briand, 1905, pp. 55, 62). Briand held that the July Monarchy did not change this exploitative relationship, and episodes and moments such as the Second Empire, *Syllabus Errorum*, 24 May 1873, *ordre moral*, 16 May 1877, the rise of congregational activity, and the presidential visit to Italy crystallised and confirmed the indispensable need for separation¹³⁹. Protestant and Jewish religious organisations, by contrast, were not presented as posing any internal/external political threat like the Catholic Church¹⁴⁰. The rapporteur finally added that since 1870, “whenever the Republic was in danger or she has undertaken the realisation of secular progress”, the Concordat was always ineffectual to “impede ... the defiance of the French clergy and its leaders”. On the contrary, this “sacred” covenant served to “capitulate all republican principles”. In the last three decades, “if the Republic survived, if it has flourished, this was in spite of the Church and its initiatives”. Therefore, separation was regarded as the natural and necessary consequence of the last “thirty-five years [where] the *laïque* society has been marching, slowly but surely, towards its definitive emancipation” (Briand, 1905, pp. 86, 123-124).

In the parliamentary discussions (Assemblée Nationale, 1905)¹⁴¹, conservative deputies strongly rejected the idea of separation, branding it as vengeance against the church and abuse of state power. Royalist Benoist, for instance, said: “whatever your liberalism may be ... when you are given a choice between the freedom of the church or the sovereignty of the state, you will choose sovereignty ... Your freedom is ... tempered by surveillance” (27 March 1905: 9, 13). Castellane agreed: “what the government proposes ... is a project to destroy the church by the state” (27 March 1905: 16). Catholic Groussau concurred that separation is “demanded and prepared mainly by the enemies of the Church”, and that it “runs the risk of turning into a better organised religious persecution” (27 March 1905: 64). Plichon of *Action Libérale* held that “this is a law of anger ... and retaliation”. Instead of creating a “free church in a free state”, he asserted, the law would bring about “a church fettered in a tyrannical state”, which is unacceptable in a country “whose name in the world is synonymous with Catholicism” (28 March 1905: 47, 52). Estourbeillon opposed separation, because the nation could not be atheist or indifferent to religion, given that “all moral grandeur, prosperity and security of the nation comes from God” (8 April 1905: 36). According to Lerolle, “for men to realise their destiny, these two powers [state and church] ... must be not in hostility or indifference, but in union” (11 April 1905: 106). Gayraud seconded that their ideal was “the unity of civil society and religious society” (to which Socialist Fournier reacted: “but that is papal domination!”) (21 March 1905: 40). Royalist Rosanba insisted that “the law is unacceptable to French Catholics, and I hope that the Church of France rejects it unanimously and fails to recognise it” (3 July 1905: 105). Delafosse claimed that delinking state and church would “seriously affect the external prestige of France”, especially its “great moral heritage” over “our religious protectorate in East and Far East” (12 April 1905: 26). Overall, the intransigent Catholic reaction throughout the parliamentary debate was uncompromising.

On the other extreme were anticlerical socialists. Briand had to find a fine balance between intense conservatism and socialist dechristianisation attempts by figures like Maurice Allard and Edouard Vaillant, who proposed amendments that went much further than what the rapporteur envisaged. Allard and Vaillant’s suggestions included confiscating church property for civil use¹⁴², banning religious garments in public space, and replacing religious holidays with secular ones¹⁴³. In the Assembly,

Allard openly denounced Christianity (and not just clericalism) as “a permanent obstacle to the social development of the Republic, and any progress toward civilisation”. The bourgeoisie needs religion, he added, “because while you entertain the people ... with mystical and religious musings ... the bourgeoisie” multiplies its “abundance and wealth”. Therefore, “we fight religion, because we see in religion the greatest tool that remains in the hands of ... the capitalists to keep the worker in a state of economic dependence”. The primary task should be to separate Church, “the instrument ... of moral domination favouring the propertied class”, from the state, the organ “representing the political power of this class” (10 April 1905: 27, 30, 31, 50). Vaillant defended Allard’s views: “Separation is a necessity for the development of socialist democracy and the working classes ... As long as the church is not completely destroyed ... our task will remain incomplete” (10 April 1905: 51). Briand disagreed with his detractors: “If I had to name Mr. Allard’s project”, he said, “I believe we could call it ... a plan to eliminate the churches by the state”. He “demands to place the church in a defenseless position ... I beg my friends in the Republican majority, especially my friends from the far left, to resist the desire to make an anticlerical demonstration, which would ... put into the hands of enemies of the Republic a dangerous weapon” (10 April 1905: 56, 58). Briand stressed repeatedly that the Commission’s goal was not dechristianisation, but to ensure “freedom of conscience, that is to say freedom of all beliefs and religions, which currently does not exist under the regime of privilege and exclusivity enjoyed by certain religions” (12 April 1905: 27).

The heart of the debate, which would largely determine the character of the law, concerned Article 4 as well as Article 6 (Article 8 in the finalised text). The controversy regarding the former article was whether the internal organisation of religious bodies would be recognised in the process of devolving Church property to religious associations); and the latter article was about whether civil tribunals or the Council of State would arbitrate associational disputes regarding property. Briand and Jaurès soothed conservative apprehensions by defending the recognition of associations’ internal organisation in Article 4, but they accepted the left’s proposition in Article 6 to make the Council of State arbitrate property disputes (which would give the government a higher level of regulation). Briand and Jaurès’ efforts to find a middle path between royalist and collectivist politics became all the more clear in these particular debates,

reflecting the bourgeois-republican undertaking since 1870. Unger (2005, p. 9) writes that the rapporteur's genius "was to demonstrate to [the Catholic] opponents of the law that he was their best defense against excessive anticlericals", while showing the left "that his text was the only one that could be acceptable to the country without tearing it apart". Preventing the radicalisation of Article 4, Briand gained the approval of moderate Catholics like Ribot (20 April 1905: 7)¹⁴⁴. Regarding Article 6, however, the rapporteur and his supporters sided with the left, and held their ground to firmly defend the state's judicial prerogative to arbitrate disputes. Still, they assured the conservative right that this did not violate Article 4. As Jaurès put it, "we are concerned about guaranteeing Catholics' free and fair exercise of their religion *without abandoning any of the laïque state's rights*" (24 May 1905: 55). The debate on Article 6 was in essence a jurisdictional battle between church organisation and the state, where conservative deputies rejected secular power having a say in arbitrating religious-associational matters. While Briand made sure to designate the Council of State as the arbitrator to preserve the secular right to "regulation", he sought to calm Catholics by iterating that "separation must be made in a spirit of liberalism ... It is only fair that you leave the church what belongs to the church, and that we allow it to enjoy that *within the limits in which public order will not be threatened*. That is what separation means" (25 May 1905: 47).

Throughout the discussions, sovereignty concerns came to the fore as a central justification, echoing Briand's report. Among the ones who voted in favour of the law, a general understanding was that separation was necessary to halt the clerical advances towards the state and civil society, both internally and externally. As one deputy put it: "Gentlemen, the question we are dealing ... here is not just a domestic issue, because it affects foreign affairs by many points" (30 March 1905: 3). Barthou made a similar point: "we decided today to accept the abolition [of the Concordat] to ensure the internal and external dignity of the French state" (28 March 1905: 54). With regard to internal sovereignty, radical Zévaès held that the church conspired against the Republic "in the last thirty-five years with monarchical or caesarean plots, whether at the time of 24 May [1873], 16 May [1877], the Boulanger Affair, or in the crisis that occurred in the last five years" (27 March 1905: 68). The Concordat, Zévaès argued, was useless for the state: "What guarantee can the Concordat provide to the state to defend itself against the encroachments of the church? ... Separation may, on the contrary, bring peace ... not in

a free state ... but in a sovereign state” (27 March 1905: 65, 74). On this point, Barthou cited Combes, who argued that separation would “usher in a new era of sustainable social harmony guaranteeing religions ... real freedom under the undisputed sovereignty of the state” (28 March 1905: 89). Regnier also held that this was a matter of defending republican prerogatives against religious encroachments: “In France more than anywhere else the people are jealous of their rights and, therefore, it is necessary that we get as quickly as possible to the separation of church and state” (30 March 1905: 52)¹⁴⁵.

Regarding external sovereignty, republicans highlighted the non-national character of the church, which infringed on French politics. Reveillaud argued that separation would solve the problem of Roman intervention, especially “after the provocative claim of the Pope to interfere in our foreign relations and internal affairs” (4 April 1905: 13). When moderate conservative Ribot uttered that “the French clergy is patriotic”, Socialist Zévaès shouted, “yes, patriot of Rome!” (3 April 1905: 41). Deville asserted that France did not need any external legitimation: “For a solution that is exclusively in the domain of our internal politics, we do not have to take the advice of anyone outside our borders. This is, in my opinion, so indisputable, that I shall consider as an insult to a French Chamber to stress this item” (23 March 1905: 52). Buisson put forward that the state “does not need the permission ... of the pope to make laws” (15 June 1905: 44). Responding to conservative claims¹⁴⁶ that France’s colonial influence would diminish, Minister of Education and Religions Bienvenu-Martin maintained that “we want to keep intact the heritage of France, but [our role as] the protectorate of the Orient derives not from the benevolence of the sovereign pontiff, but from international treaties that have nothing in common with the Concordat” (4 April 1905: 60). Regulation of the Church mattered, according to Martin, for “liberalism must have limits and stop where the independence and security of the state could be compromised” (4 April 1905: 72). Briand agreed: “Gentlemen ... I insist that the state has the right to claim its full and unconditional independence” (6 April 1905: 32). Lacombe added that the state can no longer be disarmed [against the Church]; on the contrary”, it should “maintain more guarantees and freedom for public order” (6 April 1905: 59). These declarations suggest that the infrastructural power of the state vis-à-vis the Vatican was seen as a key justification for the law¹⁴⁷.

In result of the long deliberations where Briand sought to conciliate the right and the left, the Assembly passed the law on separation on 3 July 1905 (with 341 votes against 233), which was approved in the Senate on 6 December (with 181 votes against 102). The law was promulgated by President Loubet on 9 December. The Law of 1905 constituted “the final step towards the secularisation of the state” to embrace three principles: “liberty of conscience, separation of state and church, and free exercise of religion” (Weil, 2007a, pp. 9, 16). “It was not an anti-religious legislation. The law was ... the recognition of the right of everyone to practice their own beliefs” (Weil, 2004, p. 142-3)¹⁴⁸. Despite the harsh reaction of Pope Pius X in his encyclicals *Vehementer Nos*¹⁴⁹ and *Gravissimo Officii Munere*¹⁵⁰, the royalist upsurges of the anti-Semitic *Action Française*, and the inventory incidents of 1906; a majority of French bishops accepted the formation of religious associations, while the government made further concessions in 1906-8¹⁵¹. Directorate of Religions (within the Ministry of Internal Affairs) was closed in 1911. Later on, the First World War created an atmosphere of conciliation between the Church and the Republic, and diplomatic relations with the Vatican resumed in 1921. Yet similar to the secularisation processes since the 1880s, the Law of 1905 concerned mostly Metropolitan France, and was not implemented in the same way in the colonial Empire¹⁵². All in all, at the turn of the century, the “second wave” of sociopolitical secularisation that culminated in the Law of 1905 confirmed the consolidation of republican government in three interrelated ways: first, by putting an end to the religious quarrel that pitted “France against France” (Mauduit & Mauduit, 1984), second, by contributing to neutralising and incorporating royalist and collectivist social forces into the ranks of the bourgeois Republic, and third, by instituting internal and external state infrastructural power vis-à-vis religious authority. Secularisation and the Republic, in this sense, were virtually synonymous.

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Magraw (1986, p. 362) writes that “during the nineteenth century the dominance of the French bourgeoisie was subject to periodic threat from aristocratic-clerical ... or working-class movements. By 1914, however, parliamentary politics appeared to be dominated by centrist parties which accepted the bourgeois republic’s consensus”. The

period of 1875-1905 was extremely crucial in this history of bourgeois-republican hegemony building, where the initiative for sociopolitical secularisation constituted an indispensable component of the contentious process. Without the campaign for secularisation, it is unlikely that the Republic would be able to forge the interclass (middle/working class and peasant) and interreligious (Protestant and Jewish) support it required to maintain bourgeois hegemony. *Morale laïque* and *solidarité* served as the main pillars of the republican coalition. Also, in opposition to the monarchist and right wing alternatives, the Republic would not be able to fully institutionalise itself without “separating” and “regulating” the spheres of activity previously controlled by the religious establishment. Foreign affairs, moreover, got entangled with these domestic struggles in various ways, as seen in the Republic’s relationship with the Vatican as well as its larger politics of imperialism, to have a bearing on the course of secularisation. The particular type of secularism in France, namely *laïcité*, was born out of such intertwined “extra-religious” factors interacting with “religious” ones, concluding in the law of 1905. The next chapter shifts the attention to examine the same set of intertwined dynamics in a peripheral geography, namely the building of *laiklik* in Republican Turkey.

Chapter 6. Constructing *Laiklik* in the Republic of Turkey, 1908-1938

The extraordinary wave of sociopolitical secularisation that characterised the Turkish national state building experience lacked the thrust of a powerful domestic bourgeoisie, working classes, and a mobilised peasantry (as was the case in France). At the turn of the twentieth century, the bourgeoisie of the semi-colonial Ottoman Empire was composed predominantly of an intermediary non-Muslim commercial class. Instead of bidding to influence state power for bourgeois-political transformation, these groups preferred increasingly to pursue their respective nationalist-separatist agendas, often under the protectorate of the Great Powers¹⁵³. Muslim landlords and small/medium-sized merchants specialising in internal trade, on their part, were still too weak and disorganised to lead a bourgeois-national advance, although they had grown during Abdülhamid's rule. Working class formation was even more insignificant (proportionate to feeble industrial development), and the dispersed small peasantry could only indirectly impact politics, if at all. Such class dynamics in the semi-colonial Ottoman geography were superposed by incessant conditions of "political strife, violence, and war on an unprecedented scale", where "there was hardly a year when the empire was at peace" between 1908 and 1922 (Ahmad, 1988b, p. 265). The episode leading to the eventual collapse of the Empire witnessed a series of separatist internal rebellions accompanied by disastrous external conflicts in Tripoli (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-3), which were in turn followed by European occupation in the First World War (1914-8) and concluded with the War of Independence (1919-22). In this intricate setting characterised by ethno-religious domestic strife, western military encirclement, and the absence of powerful domestic capitalist, working, and peasant classes, it was the reformist faction within the civil-military bureaucracy that spearheaded bourgeois-national transformation through "passive revolution". The Turkish bourgeois revolution took place in two phases: first in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, led by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, or Unionists); and then in the Kemalist Revolution of 1919-22, commanded by

Mustafa Kemal and (formerly Unionist) nationalists. Founded immediately after the War of Independence in 1923, “the young Turkish Republic was the culmination of a bourgeois revolution (against a politically and economically bankrupt theocratic polity and the social forces that sustained it), as well as a national liberation movement (against the expanding Western imperial powers)” (Ergil, 1975a, pp. 59-60).

The course of sociopolitical secularisation in the late Ottoman/early Republican polity can be understood against this background, which involves the interweaved dynamics of ethno-religiously divided class relations, and the contention to build the internal/external capacity of a national state over the debris of the Empire. In this process, the relationship the national state builders established with Islam came to assume a twofold character. The Unionists, and later the Republicans, experienced Islam simultaneously as the fundamental social basis for, *as well as* the primary source of threat to, bourgeois-political transformation. Such duality had a direct imprint on the trajectory of secularisation in Turkey. Following the Revolution of 1908, the Unionists became gradually convinced that the Muslim population and local elites in what remained of the shrinking Empire was the only loyal social basis on which national-bourgeois state building was possible, which is a view taken on by the Republicans. Nationalist separatisms of the non-Muslim population at home, along with the increasing military squeeze of Christian-European powers, consolidated an “elective affinity” for Islam (more specifically the Muslim landowners, merchants, notables, *ulema*, and peasants) as the underlying foundation for sovereignty. The evident Islamic bias in the Turkish-nationalist demographic politics and bourgeoisie creation (to the detriment of Greeks and Armenians), the official declaration of *jihad* in World War I, and the abundant utilisation of Islamic motifs in the mobilisation for independence demonstrate that affinity. According to Toprak (1981, pp. 36-37), such religious partiality is historically in line with “the case of countries under colonial rule with incipient nationalist movements”, where religion “became a symbol of identity with the cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples”.

Concurrently, however, the Unionists and Republicans were strongly suspicious of the contemporary articulations of Islam in the territory, which they faced as a force threatening national state building. Representing the reformist faction of the split-up

bureaucracy, the Young Turks' critique of Abdülhamid's Islamic conception of authority since the late nineteenth century was a central component of their political contention against the neopatrimonial regime. Given the intertwined association of religious authority with dynastic rule as well as the traditional bureaucratic faction and social forces, the bourgeois revolutionaries' struggle against the Ottoman *ancien régime* inevitably caused them to problematize and challenge Islam's dominance in the sociopolitical scene. After the Revolution of 1908, Islamic identification of political opposition and social reaction at home, accompanied by the external territorial exposure caused by the failure of pan-Islamism further invoked national state builders' scepticism of Islamic politics as a detriment to sovereignty. Major episodes such as the 31 March Revolt (1909), the *Fatwa Wars* (1920), the Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), the Free Party interval (1930), and the Menemen Incident (1930) confirmed the internal defiance of Islam in the Unionist/Republican perspective. This was in addition to the external vulnerability Islam was deemed to cause by the British and French politics of Caliphate, as well as the Arab and Albanian revolts during the Empire's collapse. Consequently, state builders acknowledged and implemented secularisation a key strategic aspect of building a sovereign state along national-capitalist developmental lines.

Such contradictory interaction with Islam, simultaneously the anchorage point for, and the locus of challenge against national state building, established the particular framework for "separation" and "regulation" in the Turkish case. Muslim identification of internal/external threat to bourgeois modernisation and sovereignty brought forth "separation" to disestablish Islam and eliminate its influence from a variety of sociopolitical spheres. Abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, establishment of secular educational and legal systems, and the eradication of Islamic orders and other sources of religious symbolism were but a few exemplary moments of this process. Yet since the Muslim population was also the condition of possibility for nationally defined sovereignty (in the face of domestic and foreign non-Muslim adversaries), separation was offset by "regulation". The latter strategy went beyond monitoring religious activities "in the name of public order", as was stipulated in the 1905 French Law on Separation. The nationalists partially embraced and used Islam to underpin and legitimise (especially the initial phase of) the state building process, while monopolising Islam's management and institutional apparatus for the close surveillance of its oppositional potentialities. In this

sense, the new Turkish Republic's relationship with the Islamic institution was more analogous to the spirit of the French Concordat of 1801 in promoting the "interior" regulation of the dominant religion (Tanör, 1997). Through the institutions of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Directorate of Pious Foundations, religious property was nationalised, *ulema* were made the paid officials of the state, and religious services and teachings were reconfigured in line with bourgeois-republican priorities. Meanwhile, the remaining Christian and Jewish minorities were subject to "exterior" regulation due to suspicion of separatism and foreign cooperation, while the Alevi population remained largely neglected in republican policymaking. Consequently, Sunni Islamic affiliation endured as an implicit/explicit element of Turkish secularisation.

The period of 1908-38 embodies an underlying continuity regarding the contention "to create a modern, rational state [based on the Muslim element] with institutions and laws which would facilitate the development of capitalism" (Ahmad, 1991, p. 3). However, there are significant turning points in this secularising trajectory contingent upon the nature and course of the sociopolitical struggle, where the leadership of Mustafa Kemal emerged as a significant determinant in navigating these conflicts and shaping a model of secularism that are in many ways unique to the Turkish case. In what follows, three sub-periods are identified. First, the Unionist Prelude of 1908-18 (Section 6.1) set the stage for the domestic and foreign conflicts inherent to the late Ottoman context, where enactments of secularisation against the Muslim establishment were at best reticent albeit suggestive of the reforms that typified the subsequent period. Second, the decisive 1919-27 interval witnessed the Turkish War of Independence and the collapse of the Empire (1919-22), followed by the foundation and consolidation of the Republic (1923-7). Here (Section 6.2), "the traditional social strata" of Muslim landlords, notables, and *ulema* (who had constituted the backbone of the War of Independence), "were giving their final battles to reclaim the social status they had lost" (Ergil, 1974, p. 89); and sociopolitical secularisation became an integral and explicit constituent of the republican struggle for national state building. "In attacking religious officials and the culture of the traditional elite, Atatürk was ... trying to undermine the ... political opposition from vested economic interests at the local level" (Trimberger, 1978, p. 29). This is why "the Republican government ... expressly sought to end the political, social and cultural influence of Islamic institutions and to achieve a total dominance of

the secular state over those institutions” (Zürcher, 2010, p. 73). Various expressions of religious authority were eliminated and/or transferred to the prerogative and monopoly of the national state in this period.

By 1927, the transfer and concentration of power was largely complete as the Kemalist Republic solidified itself vis-à-vis internal contenders. In the final phase of 1928-38 (Section 6.3), the initiative of secularisation assumed an industrial-developmental emphasis. In response to the Great Depression and its religiously expressed social discontents at home, the period coincided the transition to étatism (*devletçilik*) as an official path to capitalist development with the “regulated diminishment” of Islam. The latter concept refers to the Republic’s continued monopolisation of Islamic institutions and services for the purpose of gradually deemphasising and lessening their significance in public life. Concurrently, *laiklik* became a formal principle of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in 1927 (and of the Republic in 1937), supplemented by the populist claim (*halkçılık*) to build a “classless society” based on national-secular solidarity (borrowed from the *solidarité* of the French Third Republic) (Hanioglu, 2011, p. 134). The étatist turn further crystallised the link between sociopolitical secularisation and the goal of “integrating Turkey into the Western capitalist political economies to promote national economic growth and industrial and scientific development”. This took place “at a particular historical period where rapid ‘material advancement’ was crucial for [Turkey’s] survival” and to “succeed as a state” (Bilgin, 2008, p. 599; Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 118). Yet insofar as the Republic failed to carry out a comprehensive land reform to “destroy the economic power of local landlords [and other Muslim notables] with aristocratic status”, the revolution “excluded peasants from integration into the nation” and fell short of sufficiently transforming their “traditional values and way of life” dependent on the landlord (Trimberger, 1978, pp. 29, 110). In the long run, the regime’s continued compromise and alliance with the local elite at the expense of the small peasantry would be the key factor to debilitate the reach and consolidation of sociopolitical secularisation in the countryside. All in all, the particular form of secularisation in Turkey can be understood as going through a discernible evolution and maturation in the actuality of the contentious process involving “religious” and “extra-religious” factors. As in the history of French *laïcité*, yet taking place under peripheral realities, *laiklik* and the Republic evolved together in the Turkish case.

6.1. The Unionist Prelude (1908-1918)

6.1.1. Revolution of 1908 and the Second Constitutional Period

Long before they took power in 1908, the idea of “saving” the failing Empire from complete annihilation was the central preoccupation of the Young Turks, which was partly inherited from and drew on the bureaucratic reformist mentalities of the nineteenth century¹⁵⁴. The Unionist experience since the late 1890s led its members to acquire a divided perspective regarding Islam. On the one hand, Islam was a threat, especially given that the Young Turks’ ideological formation was shaped during their political opposition to the Islamist absolutism of Abdülhamid II. The Sultan’s abundant utilisation of Islamic ideology, politics, and symbolism (Deringil, 1999), along with the revitalisation of the traditional bureaucracy fronted by the *ulema*, contributed to the critical stance the Unionists developed towards religion. This was one of the reasons why “the Young Turk *Weltanschauung*, as it developed between 1889 and 1902, was vehemently antireligious, viewing religion as the greatest obstacle to human progress” (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 305). In this context, the reformists saw Islam as a backward force thwarting state infrastructural capacity, for they were convinced of a “‘lack of fit’ between [the] value of ‘state preservation’ ... and the shabby residues of an imperial-Islamic structure”, which led them “to question the desirability of keeping an association between the state and Islam” (Mardin, 1977, p. 285). Abdülhamid’s neopatrimonial rule that appointed bureaucrats based on loyalty to the Sultan, as opposed to merit and competence, blocked the Young Turks’ chances of upward mobilisation in the state apparatus, which further confirmed their suspicion of Islamic political conventions. At this juncture, “the struggles that surrounded the 1901 Law of Associations and the 1905 ‘separation’ in France were followed closely by ... the Young Turks”, who “considered the anticlerical measures as the victory of positivism essential to save the Empire” (Akgönül, 2008a, p. 15). The Young Turks often likened the Islamic *ulema* to the Catholic clergy as part of their strategy to discredit the predominance of the religious bureaucracy (Bein, 2011, pp. 21-24)¹⁵⁵, and they were very familiar with the French tradition of *laïcité* (Zarcone, 2006, p. 142).

On the other hand, however, Islam had to be maintained and embraced as the social basis for sovereignty in the face of non-Muslim separatisms, as well as the various intrusions of Christian European powers. Adding to the degrading history of semi-colonial domination, the Russian War of 1877-8 (the “’93 War”) was particularly traumatic as it combined Christian external threat and internal uprisings to disastrously undermine Ottoman rule in Europe. “The memory of the tragedy was vividly instilled in the Committee of Union and Progress ... and the fear of another ‘93’ was part of their mental make up” (Zürcher, 2010, p. 287). The Young Turks assumed the grievance of Muslim notables vis-à-vis the privileges of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and foreign capitulations. They were to be gradually convinced that territorial integrity could not be sustained without the Sunni Muslim population, and a “national bourgeoisie” recruited from its ranks (Z. Toprak, 1982, 1995). Pre-revolutionary Young Turk publications reveal an increasing Islamic partiality, even in those penned by the most antireligious members, which is indicative of a defensive attitude against the rising tide of separatism, imperialism, and anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe at the turn of the century (Mardin, 1983, p. 212). Determined anticlericals Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet, for instance, talked extensively about the utility of Islam as “social cement ... cohesion, and progress”. The same was valid for other key secularist thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Yusuf Akçura (Zürcher, 2005, pp. 15-17)¹⁵⁶. As Barkey (2010, p. 106) summarises, “many of the best early Young Turk thinkers wrote that the social ills of the empire were caused by increased power of the *ulema*, but urged maintaining a Durkheimian vision of religion as the source of social cohesion”.

By the unfolding of events after the Revolution of 1908, the divided mentality regarding Islam was further accentuated and reflected in policymaking. In a rather incongruous fashion, Unionist legislation sought simultaneously to diminish the influence of Islam from political and social life, while it unequivocally leaned on Islam as an underlying identity and national cement. The religiously articulated 31 March Incident (13 April 1909 in Gregorian calendar), which took place less than a year after the Revolution, was the first trauma of the Unionists. Unlike the initial Islamic reaction to the new order in October 1908, “the counter-revolution of 13 April was not the work of a few *hojas*; this time virtually the entire *ilmiye class* allied with the troops of the Istanbul garrison and non-academy trained officers (the *alayli*) joined forces. They were supported by the

Naqshbandi order, the most extensive and influential sufi order in the late Ottoman period”, who received Abdülhamid’s patronage. Continuing the conservative bureaucratic tradition of the nineteenth century, the leaders of the rebellion “would have liked to set up a theocratic monarchy with legislative power in the hands of the *ulema*” (Ahmad, 1991, p. 5)¹⁵⁷. In terms of social base, the uprising of 1909 voiced the sentiment of Muslim notables and landlords across Anatolia, who had made substantial material gains under the Islamist proto-national politics of Abdülhamid. Intimidated by the initial cosmopolitanism of the 1908 Revolution, the “Muslim bloc” feared that the Revolution would retract their gains made in the preceding period (Emrence, 2012, p. 110). For the Unionists, “the fact that a revolt in the name of Islam had been able to shake the foundations of their regime so easily and quickly came as a rude shock”; and given that almost all the Republicans of the 1920s were of Unionist background, “the memory, or trauma, of the 1909 revolt was theirs, too” (Jäschke, 1972, p. 95; Zürcher, 2010, p. 76). Future founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal himself took part in the suppression of the revolt. In a message penned to the Army and Navy of Istanbul that week, he stressed that the revolt was carried out by those who “pretend to demand Sharia”, but in fact was “entirely against our religion”. In another message of the same day, he addressed the people of Istanbul holding that the constitution was the real upholder of Sharia (Atatürk, 2012, pp. 24-25)¹⁵⁸. These messages can be seen as among the early Unionist/Republican initiatives to communicate to the Muslim masses that their national state building project was not against Islam, but embraced its essential qualities.

The dependence on religious legitimacy is explicable by the fact that the Muslim population of the Empire seemed to be the only reliable constituent to operate with. Although the Revolution of 1908 was underpinned by a cosmopolitan bourgeois constituency and enabled the participation of Muslims and non-Muslims in the new parliament, its aftermath quickly demonstrated the failure of reconciliation between the various material interests of ethno-religious communities (Kansu, 1995; Savran, 2010, pp. 130-131)¹⁵⁹. This became all the more clear to the Unionists after the traumatic Balkan Wars of 1912-3, where domestic separatism and external invasion were once again fused¹⁶⁰. The War represented the very own “93” of the new generation of the reformist bureaucracy, after which the Unionist enterprise to create a homogeneous national territory based on the Muslim element was fully underway. Around this juncture,

the CUP, “long the principal supporter of Ottomanism, ... began to give up hope that the minorities could be kept within the empire and ... turned strongly toward Turkish nationalism” with clear Islamic undertones (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 289). “During these years, the Unionists came to understand the importance of Islamic discourse for their very survival; first, it helped protect their flank from the right and facilitated the legitimisation of their policies; and second, Islamic solidarity became much more important after the loss of the mainly Christian Balkans in 1912-13” (Ahmad, 1991, p. 5). The duality of the Unionists’ secularising policymaking during the First World War can only be comprehended by taking into account the two distressing incidents of 1909 and 1912-3.

6.1.2. Unionist Rule and Reticent Secularisation

By the time the First World War was underway, the link between state sovereignty and the creation of a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie in the framework of a “national economy” was long evident to the Unionist ideologues. Akçura, for instance, wrote in the 1910s that “the bourgeoisie constitutes the basis of contemporary states” and “if Turks failed to produce among themselves ... a bourgeois class, it would be very difficult for them ... to sustain their survival as a modern state” (cited in Z. Toprak, 1995, pp. 219-220). These views were seconded by Gökalp, who held that establishing a modern state would be impossible if the Muslim-Turkish constituent of the Empire did not go through a process of embourgeoisement (cited in Z. Toprak, 1982, p. 32). The national-capitalist thrust of the CUP that bluntly opposed socialism has been well documented both in the speeches of their leaders as well as in their policymaking¹⁶¹. Fittingly, the Unionists sought to generate a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie with active state involvement during World War I, along with an aggressive demographic policy to clear the territory from non-Muslim elements (Dündar, 2011). The Armenian and Pontic Greek expulsion and massacres during the war went parallel with the replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie with Muslim artisans, merchants, and bankers. In this sense, “the policy of creating a ‘national economy’ ... meant the transfer of the economic position of the Christian minority to the Turkish-Muslim majority ... Thus, the ‘national bourgeoisie’” referred to a “segment of the Turkish-Muslim population which would take over those trading positions” (Gülalp, 1994, p. 159)¹⁶².

The Great War was “partly fought out as a brutal ethnic/religious conflict in Anatolia” (Zürcher, 2010, p. 148). The result was that whereas in 1913 “one out of every five persons living in present-day Turkey was non-Muslim”, in 1925 (that is, after WWI and the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange of 1923), “only one out of forty persons was non-Muslim”. In this period, “about 2.5 million Greeks and Armenians had perished, departed or been expelled, a number which probably contained 90 percent of the pre-war bourgeoisie” (Keyder, 1987, pp. 79, 69). In terms of class formation, the “national economic” policy of the Unionists managed to seed a Muslim class of *nouveaux riches* based on a process of primitive accumulation facilitated by the conditions of mobilisation. During the War, capitulations and non-Muslim privileges were abrogated by the CUP, while protectionist duties were instated. Muslim merchants benefited from all sorts of state promotion for enrichment, where the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1913) aimed boosting national production. In this process, “patronage was one way to reward and enrich loyal party members and to create the bourgeois class missing from the Ottoman-Muslim social structure. It would be more accurate to say that rather than creating a new class out of nothing, the Unionists were providing economic opportunities for established groups and attempting to instil in them the spirit of capitalism” (Ahmad, 1988b, p. 271). National state building and Muslim bourgeoisie creation (largely through primitive accumulation) were the two sides of the same coin under the CUP rule.

Likewise in foreign politics, the Unionists officially declared the Great War a *jihad* to be fought alongside the Central Powers¹⁶³, and they heavily utilised the symbolic, diplomatic, and sociopolitical power of the Ottoman Caliphate to unify Muslim subjects against the Christian West (Veinstein, 2006). The Allied Powers countered with an alternative Islamic strategy of “divide and rule”, as the French and the British devised their own Caliphate projects. Congruent with their respective regions of influence, the former state promoted (rather unsuccessfully) a “Maghrib Caliph” centered on Morocco, whereas the latter forcefully endorsed the Sharif of Mecca so as to re-establish the “Arab Caliph” (Ardıç, 2012, pp. 192-209). The British project, which was long in the making since the late nineteenth century, proved particularly impactful in mobilising Arabs against the Young Turks (Kayalı, 1997). The British put forward the illegitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate on three grounds: that the Ottoman Caliphate was only a recent invention by Abdülhamid II with no historical significance, that the Ottomans were not the

descendants of Mohammed, and that the Ottomans had captured the Caliphate by force (Ardıç, 2012, p. 198). The Sharif and the *ulema* of Mecca, similarly, accused the Unionists of betraying the Islamic tradition, disobeying God, and harming the institution of the Caliphate. The Unionists and their supporters responded with Islamic claims, underlining the legitimacy and necessity of the Ottoman Caliph, as well as the unity of all Muslims, against European invasion¹⁶⁴. Different interpretations of Islam were at battle on the Middle Eastern scale. In result, British plans succeeded in arming and triggering the Arab Revolt of 1916-8 against the Ottoman Empire, which not only sealed the fate of Ottoman rule in the Arabian territories and North Africa, but also that of pan-Islamism¹⁶⁵. Much more so than the Albanian Uprising of 1910, the Arab Revolt exposed the failure of Islamic unity as a viable imperial policy, which was to have a bearing on the debates regarding the Caliphate in the 1920s.

Paradoxically, and simultaneously, the openly Islamic character of national state building by the Unionists in domestic and foreign politics was juxtaposed with their attempts to secularise the state apparatus to the detriment of the religious-traditional bureaucracy. The germs of most of the major secularising reforms of the Republican era can be found in this period, while power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the government, and away from the palace and the *ulema*. The institution of the Caliphate itself was reconceptualised along temporal rather than religious lines¹⁶⁶. Especially after the Unionists took full control of government with the coup of 1913, they swiftly centralised the state apparatus on a national basis while rendering the independent authority of the Sultan-Caliph and the traditional bureaucracy virtually immaterial. In 1916, the office of the *Şeyhülislam*, the highest Islamic authority in the Empire, was removed from the cabinet to be subordinated to the government, and his “temporal influence in state, educational, legislative, judicial, and financial affairs” were severely limited to be transferred to secular ministries (Berkes, 1964, p. 416)¹⁶⁷. Here, separation and regulation vis-à-vis the religious establishment, along with the transfer of authority, served as early national state building strategies¹⁶⁸. The motivation to weaken the independent power of Islam was primarily visible in the political and legal spheres¹⁶⁹. Although the *Şeyhülislam* still controlled family law, his domain of influence was systematically curtailed. Tighter regulations on religious courts were introduced in 1911. A new inheritance law was enacted in 1913. The first Family Code of 1917 (recognising

marriage as a temporal contract between parties), partial secularisation of the content of primary education, and attempts to adopt the Western calendar, clock, and alphabet signified the bourgeois-national vision of the secularising reforms at the expense of traditional forces (Georgeon, 2012, pp. 259-268; Zürcher, 2004, pp. 121-122). Some Young Turk publications of the era voiced even more radical reforms¹⁷⁰. These preliminary ideas and initiatives, however, were not effectively articulated and implemented, particularly due to the conditions of mobilisation. They had to wait for the Republic of the 1920s to be taken to their logical conclusions.

6.2. Birth of an Unlikely Republic (1919-1927)

6.2.1. War of Independence and *Fatwas*

The disastrous Ottoman defeat resulted in the demise of the Unionists as well as the politics of pan-Islamism. Shortly after the humiliating Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, the Ottoman capital was under British and French occupation. France and Italy also controlled provinces in southern and southwestern Anatolia, and the occupation of Izmir by Greek forces followed half a year later. It is in this convoluted setting that a nationalist resistance movement was energised under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The latter reinvigorated the cadres and organisational network of the Unionists (Zürcher, 1984), managed to mobilise a successful military and diplomatic campaign to liberate the territory from Christian occupation, while concurrently demolishing the Islamic Ottoman establishment. The War of Independence (1919-22) and its aftermath can be understood in terms of what Tilly calls “multiple sovereignty” between the nationalists in Ankara and the Ottoman rule in Istanbul, acted out in the context of foreign occupation. Multiple sovereignty represents a situation “when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities” (Tilly, 1978, p. 191)¹⁷¹. The domestic and foreign politics of contention pursued in this period significantly moulded the manifestation of *laiklik* in the Republican era, as it intensified the national state builders’ twofold experience with Islam.

On the one hand, the perception of Islamic threat was revitalised. On 11 April 1920, twelve days before the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) in Ankara, the Ottoman government in Istanbul made a major religious offensive to suffocate the nationalist movement at birth. The office of the *Şeyhülislam* issued five edicts calling all Muslims to take armed action against the nationalists. The edicts, known as the Istanbul *Fatwa*, accused the “rebels” of “betraying the supreme institution of the Caliphate”, and declared fighting and killing them a “religious obligation based on the Sharia” (Cebeci, 2009, pp. 233-234)¹⁷². The *Fatwa* was published in the official newspaper and distributed abundantly across the country via different means, including British and Greek planes and allied ships (Sarıkoyuncu, 1997, p. 33). Two days later, a major uprising began in Düzce against the local representatives of the national forces, which spilled over quickly to multiple cities and regions, while the Istanbul government formed a “Caliphate Army” to fight the nationalists. To the national state builders, the Istanbul *Fatwa* and its repercussions proved once again that Islam could be a direct threat against their undertaking. Their response, however, was also in religious terms, as they got a counter-*fatwa* from the Mufti of Ankara to meet the challenge. The five edicts known as the Ankara *Fatwa* explained that the capital was under occupation “by the enemies of Muslims”, which is why “His Excellency the Caliph’s ... right of judgement is violated” under British pressures. Therefore, it was a “religious obligation for Muslims to do everything in their power to save their Caliph” (Sarıkoyuncu, 1997, p. 38)¹⁷³. Written on 14 April 1920, the edicts received the official approval of more than one hundred fifty local muftis throughout the country, which significantly increased its legitimacy, as well as that of the Ankara government. In a massively rural population closely interweaved with Islam, religion became a terrain on which multiple sovereignty was acted out. It can be contended that the *Fatwa Wars* served as a critical instigator that led the strained relationship between the capital and the nationalists to a complete rupture, thus paving the way for multiple sovereignty¹⁷⁴. Still, the nationalist response to the Istanbul *Fatwa* embraced Islam instead of confronting it, following the same pattern as in the “31 March Incident” of 1909 and the Caliphate conflict during World War I.

In addition to its element of threat, the national state builders once again acknowledged Islam’s indispensability for sovereignty during the War of Independence. The Islamic plea of the Ankara *Fatwa* is explicable by the fact that the war was being

fought above all as a Muslim-Christian military/diplomatic conflict against Greeks (in the west) and Armenians (in the east) as well as European occupiers. In this process, the national state builders needed to secure domestic legitimacy from the Muslim notables and masses along with support from the larger Muslim geography. Domestically, it was “the allegiance of Moslem merchants and landlords to the cause [that] gave the nationalist mobilisation a clear social base”, which was “defined by opposition to the expelled and departing [non-Muslim] bourgeoisie” (Keyder, 1987, p. 81). The support of the Muslim notables to the War of Independence was first and foremost based on their fear of losing their new wealth and status acquired during World War I at the expense of the non-Muslim element. Forceful and/or disadvantageous transfer of wealth from non-Muslims to the burgeoning Turkish landlords and Kurdish chieftains constituted the foundation of the Muslim elite’s mobilisation alongside the neo-Unionist nationalists. Unsurprisingly, the exaggerated rhetorical and symbolic embracement of Islam by the national state builders is exclusive to this period, which is clearly observable in the official declarations issued in the national congresses of 1919¹⁷⁵. A quantitative study of Mustafa Kemal’s speeches indicate that his utilisation of Islamic references (such as “Allah”, “Mohammad”, “Muslim”, “Islam”, and “Religious”) in the April 1920-June 1923 interval was approximately eleven times more than in the July 1923-November 1929 period that followed (Akyol, 2008, pp. 548-549). In a speech made in May 1920, for instance, Mustafa Kemal referred to the occupation as “the latest offensive of a Crusade”, but “the Islamic world has now awoken”. He expressed the main purpose of their struggle is to show the enemy that the “Sultanate and Caliphate cannot be separated”, and to “save these sacred institutions from foreign enslavement” (Atatürk, 2012, pp. 48-49)¹⁷⁶.

In the course of the war, the ban on alcohol (Law no. 22, 14 September 1920), the exemption of the non-Muslim population from military service in return for an additional tax (Law no. 139, 21 July 1921), and the interdiction for local Islamic officials to retire (Law no. 147, 27 August 1921) suggest that Islam was seen as a significant social and ideological component of the mobilisation¹⁷⁷. Committees of religious functionaries (*irşad heyetleri*) were established to inform and rally the masses for Ankara’s cause (B. Toprak, 1981, pp. 63-66). These initiatives sought to strengthen Ankara’s infrastructural power vis-à-vis the Ottoman government¹⁷⁸. Islamic references

were abundant also for external purposes. In various declarations to the Muslim geography in the spring of 1920, the GNAT stated that the Caliphate was enslaved, and that the liberty of the Islamic world was in question¹⁷⁹. Here, the concern was to “maintain the support of the Muslims in Central Asia and India who had raised considerable funds to support the nationalist struggle in order to protect the Ottoman Caliphate from Western occupation” (Hanioğlu, 2011, p. 104). The religious character of the war was further confirmed in the aftermath of the Turkish victory, as the population exchange of 1923 with Greece was implemented along exclusively confessional lines. The first article of the Protocol iterated that the exchange would be between the “Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory” (LeagueofNations, 1923/1925, p. 77). In terms of property relations, the transfer of Christian wealth to Muslim hands through the Population Exchange was comparable to that of World War I. The second most important moment of the Muslim-Turkish primitive accumulation process, which had begun under Unionist rule, was completed following the war. Now, as Mustafa Kemal put it, “national sovereignty must be underpinned by financial sovereignty” based on the Muslim element. His declaration to the Islamic world to seek financial aid for the incoming Muslim population (from Greece) also drew on that religious partiality¹⁸⁰. Yet despite the continuous religious appeal to the Muslim world during the War of Independence and after, it was emphasised repeatedly by the nationalists that pan-Islamism was not their intention, given its disastrous consequences during the Great War¹⁸¹. The dismissal of pan-Islamism would be clearer in the subsequent period.

6.2.2. Founding the Republic through Secularisation

Tilly writes that multiple sovereignty ends “when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government” (Tilly, 1978, p. 191). In the Turkish Revolution, the first – and the major– step towards this direction was taken with the abolition of the Sultanate in the fall of 1922. The second and conclusive step, namely the abolition of the Caliphate and deportation of the Ottoman family, had to wait for the spring of 1924. Following the nationalist victory in September 1922, Britain (as well as France, Italy, and Greece) summoned both the nationalist government in Ankara and the Ottoman government in

Istanbul to the Peace Conference in Lausanne, which was a red flag for the national state builders that their sovereignty had to be undivided¹⁸². Both in their debates and messages, deputies in Ankara claimed sovereignty along with the Islamic reputation¹⁸³. Consequently, before the Conference began, the six hundred year-old Ottoman Empire was abolished with a parliamentary decree issued on 1 November 1922. The intertwined strategies of separation and regulation regarding Islam (the embryonic form of which was observable in the Unionist period) fully crystallised in the establishment of the national state. This period also initiated the march towards the wholesale secularisation of the sociopolitical scene (see Appendix D for list of laws between 1922-27), complemented paradoxically by Islam's utilisation as a legitimising tool for reforms and contentious bourgeois nation-building efforts.

On 30 October 1922, Decree no. 307 declared that the Empire came to an end to be replaced by "the Government of Turkey". It further stated that there was no longer "a legitimate government in Istanbul". The last sentence, however, paid homage to the Caliphate, as now separated from the Sultanate, and highlighted its regulation by the state: "the institution of the Caliphate, *which is the legitimate right of the Turkish Government*, is to be freed from the foreigners that enslaved it" (Decree no. 307, 30 October 1922). Decree no. 308 issued the next day, which officially ended the Ottoman Empire, also cherished the Caliphate as an exalted spiritual institution that belonged to the Turkish state¹⁸⁴. Mustafa Kemal's long and religiously decorated speech in the Assembly that day held that the monarchy was not an Islamic institution, and argued for separation by citing the historical trajectory of the Caliphate: "In the period of the Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, and then in Egypt", he said, "we have seen for centuries that the ... Caliphate stood side by side, yet *separate from* ... the sultanate". He then added: "It is only natural today that ... political power and the ... Caliphate stand side by side" (TBMM, 1 November 1922, p. 311). A fierce debate followed this speech, where conservative deputies strongly rejected the separation of the Caliphate and Sultanate, as well as the elimination of the latter. Mustafa Kemal ended the discussion as follows: "Gentlemen, sovereignty has never been given to any nation by scholarly disputation. It is always taken by force and with coercion ... The Turkish nation has now taken back its usurped sovereignty ... This is a fact ... If those who have assembled here recognise this natural fact, all will be fine. If not, what is natural will happen anyhow, with the only

difference that a few heads will probably have to be chopped off” (cited in Berkes, 1964, p. 450). A few hours later, the Sultanate was officially abolished; while the Caliphate, now recognised as a separate spiritual institution devoid of political power¹⁸⁵, was to be regulated by the national state along with the particular religion and social basis it represented. The very next decree issued on the same day demonstrated the embracement of Islam even more clearly. As 1 November 1922 coincided with the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed that year, Decree no. 309 celebrated the dual significance of that day by proclaiming it a public holiday: “The night of 1-2 November, and the following day, *as it coincides the birth of the Prophet with the proclamation of national sovereignty*, is proclaimed a holiday” (Decree no. 309, 1 November 1922).

On 17 November, the ex-Sultan Vahdettin, who still assumed the title of Caliph, fled the country on a British warship, which was regarded by the deputies in Ankara as an act of disgrace for Islam. The next day, the GNAT elected the deposed sultan’s cousin Abdülmecid as the new Caliph, and issued a *fatwa* that provided religious justification for the change¹⁸⁶. In the election process, conservative deputies expressed their desires to welcome the new Caliph in Ankara as the head of the Assembly with full political power, as well as the leader of the Islamic geography. Mustafa Kemal’s group managed to resist the Islamist aspirations. His speech in the closed session that day rejected ascribing political power to the Caliph, where he contrasted national and Islamic conceptions of sovereignty: “This Assembly belongs to the people of Turkey. Its title and mandate belong only to the people and state ... of Turkey. This Assembly cannot bestow itself authority that encompasses the whole Muslim world ... Our Assembly will not simply surrender its existence into the jurisdiction of someone that carries the title of Caliph!” (TBMM, 18 November 1922, p. 1051). In the rest of his speech, Mustafa Kemal maintained a clear line of separation between the Assembly and the Caliph, and although referred to the latter with reverence, underlined the primacy of the former’s independence¹⁸⁷. Elsewhere, he compared the abolition of the sultanate with the French Revolution¹⁸⁸. In November 1922, multiple sovereignty was partly resolved, although the Caliphate question continued to create complications in the sixteen months that followed. The geographical and symbolic aspect of the struggle between Ankara and Istanbul, however, came to an official end on 13 October 1923 as Ankara was declared the new capital of Turkey (Decree no. 27) (Klinghardt, 2007). Given the Islamic

connotation and weight of Istanbul, the justification for the decree sought to pacify religious concerns by the following statement: “Our Istanbul, one of the most valuable assets of the nation, will forever preserve its status ... as the seat of the Islamic Caliphate” (TBMM, 13 October 1922, p. 665).

Approximately a year after the abolishment of the Sultanate, following the Treaty of Lausanne that internationally recognised the new Turkish national state in July 1923¹⁸⁹, the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29 November with a constitutional amendment. This marked the beginning of a new chapter in the political history of the geography (Law no. 364, 29 October 1923). Repeating the dual strategies observed in the abolition of the Sultanate, the founding of the Republic was also coloured by a step that appeased and embraced religion. The second article of the law introduced a state religion for the first time, which was absent in the 1921 constitution: “The religion of the State of Turkey is the Religion of Islam”. Falih Rifki (Atay), a contemporary republican journalist and deputy, wrote in his memoirs that in those days, the word “Republic” was considered by many to be “evil and scary”. In the eyes of religious groups, he added, “it meant the same thing as being *gavur* [non-Muslim, infidel]”, while Mustafa Kemal was inspired by the French republican ideal of *chose publique* (Atay, 1961/2012, pp. 470-472). Establishing the Republic simultaneously with the declaration of Islam as state religion was another cautious move to introduce a radical secularising reform without provoking the Muslim social basis of the new state, along with the strong conservative political opposition in the GNAT. The parliamentary discussion during the proclamation of the Republic revealed the Islamic rhetoric adopted by the nationalists¹⁹⁰. One deputy accused the Sultan “to turn a blind eye when the Koran, and the holiness of religion was being trampled” by the enemy. Another pointed out that the Sultan thought he stood above the nation; he even held a “separate place in mosques” (TBMM, 29 October 1923, pp. 93, 94). Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) took this argument further when he suggested that the political system instituted by the Prophet Mohammed was a republican one: “He established the government of Allah, which brought honour to the nameless, rights to the weak, and felicity to the miserable, and the name of that government was Republic”. He added: “Fourteen centuries later ... Allah chose another nation to deliver his second miracle, and that is the Turkish nation!” (TBMM, 29 October 1923, p. 96). Another deputy, Sheik Saffet (Yetkin) iterated that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 had been

against the Islamic spirit, whereas all the articles of the Republic's constitution were "based on principles embodied in Islam", and re-established the period of "The Righteous Caliphs" (of the seventh century) (TBMM, 29 October 1923, pp. 96-97). As the voting was over and Mustafa Kemal was elected the first President of the Republic, the meeting ended by a session of prayers led by one of the deputies.

The Caliphate was still there, and did not sit well with the Republic. From the outset, the relationship between the GNAT and the Caliphate reproduced and prolonged the situation of multiple sovereignty. Since his election on 18 November 1922, the Caliph Abdülmecid Efendi was seated in Istanbul under the strict regulation of the Ankara government due to concerns of divided sovereignty¹⁹¹. Such concerns were not unfounded, given that "there were still some actors, both in the GNA[T] and the media, who wanted to see the caliph as the leader of the GNA[T] and head of the new Turkish state ... Abdülmecid Efendi himself was probably willing to support such a plan" (Ardıç, 2012, p. 274). The 1922-4 period, which resulted in the end of multiple sovereignty with the abolition of the Caliphate, was characterised by what Tunçay (1981, pp. 64-67) calls the "war of pamphlets" between Islamic monarchists and secular nationalists, where religious arguments were presented by both sides so as to claim popular legitimacy. Internally, the Caliph's independent reception of official delegates and gifts, participation in Friday ceremonies, and issuing of envoys and statements to the Muslim world undermined Ankara's authority¹⁹². Conservatives in the GNAT initiated a campaign to reinstate the temporal leadership of the Caliph over the national state. A book published in 1923 by Ali Şükrü Bey, an Islamist deputy, argued that the Caliph had to be "the president of our government and state", because according to Sharia, "the Caliph could not exist without legislative prerogatives" (Şükrü, 1339/1923, pp. 17, 295). Many conservative newspapers and deputies followed the lead to promote the political ascendancy of the Caliph¹⁹³. The crisis exacerbated in January 1924 when the Caliph requested further resources from the state treasury, in response to which the President Mustafa Kemal referred to the actions of the Caliph as "a clear violation of the Republic's independence"¹⁹⁴. In the parliamentary debates for the abolishment of the Caliphate, the Republican apprehension regarding multiple sovereignty was easily discernible. Vasif (Çınar) Bey said: "for the purpose of self-preservation, a nation that proclaims a Republic must leave no room for any power that may claim the Sultanate" (TBMM, 3 March 1924,

p. 37). Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) Bey furiously stated that “in any given period of history, if a Caliph even thinks of interfering with the destiny of this country, we will behead him!” (cited in Atatürk, 1927/1969, p. 843) Some deputies also brought up the Istanbul *Fatwa* and the Caliphate’s collaboration with the enemy during the War of Independence, marking its compromising disposition for the Republic.

In foreign politics as well, the Caliphate complicated republican infrastructural power. The contentious politics of 1922-4 was above all caused by the “tension between the universal/ecumenical nature of the Islamic Caliphate and the territorially-limited, national character of” the Ankara government (Ardıç, 2012, p. 275). The latter believed that pan-Islamism and the politics of Caliphate constituted a liability for the integrity of the national state, both vis-à-vis western powers and the Muslim geography¹⁹⁵. The ill-fated Unionist policy of Islamic unity in World War I, which was manipulated by Franco-British diplomacy and undermined by the Arab Revolt, was still fresh in the state builders’ memory. Halid (Akmansü) Bey, for instance, said many deputies claimed that “we have not benefited from the Caliphate one bit ... as seen in the Arab betrayal” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 36)¹⁹⁶. Halide Edip (Adivar), moreover, wrote that the Western powers either sought to “control the Caliphate and use it on behalf of their own ambitions”, or “suspected Turkey ... of scheming against” them through the Caliphate’s utilisation for pan-Islamism” (cited in Kili, 2003, p. 356). In either case, the Caliphate generated external fragility. Mustafa Kemal referred to this situation as follows: “We wish the best for the fellow Muslims around the world. Yet, the administration of this community from a single centre is a fantasy ... Instead of increasing the number and pressures of our enemies like that, let us retreat to our legitimate borders” (Atatürk, 2012, pp. 69-70). In several other speeches, he referred to the politics of Islamic unity as impairment for internal and external sovereignty¹⁹⁷.

These concerns were fuelled as two Indian dignitaries wrote a letter to Ankara in November 1923, urging for “the imminent necessity for ... placing the Caliph-Imamate on a basis which would command the confidence ... of the Muslim nations” (cited in Berkes, 1964, p. 458). The letter was viewed as a direct external intervention to the Republic’s internal affairs, which accelerated the abolishment of the Caliphate. Minister of Justice Seyit Bey put it in these words: “We fell into ruin in the name of the Caliphate. We lost

our lives for it ... Is that the benefit of the Caliphate, gentlemen?" (CHP, 2002, p. 434) Vasıf (Çınar) Bey seconded in the parliament, "by renouncing holistic policies ... our situation in external politics will be much more powerful" (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 38). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the abolition of the Caliphate uncomplicated Turkey's external affairs in the Middle East, which had long been prone to European interference. The British were favourable to the idea of abolition, given the potential danger of pan-Islamism. They have put forward this position at the Treaty of Lausanne (Ardıç, 2012, pp. 290-291). With Article 27 of the Treaty, moreover, Turkey accepted to not intervene in the politics of neighbouring countries, namely the Muslim nations under the protectorate of western powers¹⁹⁸. Turkey thus solidified its sovereignty and independence through secularisation. As Evered and Evered (2010, p. 17) write on the Caliphate, "for the Kemalists, decolonization of Turkey came not only with the War of Independence against foreign powers but also with a rejection of institutions and legacies of the Ottoman Empire that might jeopardize their future sovereignty". This explains why, despite suggestions towards that direction, Mustafa Kemal is known to have derided the idea that he should establish himself as the new caliph¹⁹⁹.

Internal and external sovereignty concerns were also voiced in the justification for the law abolishing the Caliphate: "The presence of the Caliphate within the Republic of Turkey ... [causes] ... duality in internal and external politics. Refusing interference in its future and national life, Turkey does not tolerate duality, though it may be of a symbolic or indirect nature". The document also underlined the identity between the monarchical family and the religious establishment as a threat to the Republic: "That the [Ottoman] dynasty, under the cloak of the Caliphate, poses a powerful threat to the existence of Turkey has been ... proven by experience. This dynasty ... endangers our national existence" (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 27)²⁰⁰. In result, on 3 March 1924, Law no. 431 abolished the Caliphate along with denationalising and expelling all the members of the Ottoman dynasty. As one deputy put it: "the justice of the revolution requires this [expulsion]. Otherwise, our revolution will always be prone to danger". Yahya Galip (Kargı) Bey added: "The nation will live ... So they [members of the monarchy] must go to hell! (CHP, 2002, pp. 445, 448). Here too, the dual strategies were at work. The wording in the first article of the law is worth noting: "The Caliphate, *given that it is intrinsic to the meaning and notion of ... the Republic*, is abolished" (Law no. 431, 3

March 1924). This is to suggest that what the caliphate represents was not removed from the Republic, but it was assumed to be already embedded in it. The justification for the bill accentuated that idea: “there is no need for a separate Caliphate alongside the already existing Islamic government” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 28). In the Assembly that day, Tunalı Hilmi Bey said, “the caliphate is not being abolished, the seat of the caliphate is. The caliphate, however, lives on ... Imamate and caliphate, they are both here!” Süleyman Sırrı (İçöz) Bey seconded: “We have established [today] that the real seat of the caliphate is the Grand Assembly” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 66). Yahya Galip (Kargı) Bey argued similarly that the President of the Republic can now be regarded as the head of the Muslim world (CHP, 2002, p. 398). While the Caliphate was abrogated, the state incorporated Islam and branded itself as the representative of that religion.

The other laws passed on the same day proved that the religious incorporation was not merely in word, but based on a refurbished institutional framework. Law no. 429 closed the Ministry of Religious Affairs (sharia) and Pious Foundations (*vakıfs*) (Article 2), thus putting an end to the functions of *Şeyhülislam*. It replaced this institution with the Directorate of Religious Affairs (henceforth *Diyanet*), and the Directorate of Pious Foundations, both of which were attached directly to the Prime Ministry. The task of *Diyanet* was identified as the “management of religious institutions” as well as “Islamic provisions and matters related to faith and worship” (Article 1). The law clarified that the administration of all the mosques and masjids in the territory along with the appointment and remuneration of religious officials such as imams and muftis were now monopolised by *Diyanet* (Article 5). Rejecting the closure of the Ministry, some conservative deputies accused the sponsors of the bill to have “based their ideas on the wrongful notion of separating religion and government”, and argued that “our religion cannot be separated from government; it goes together with it” (CHP, 2002, p. 464). Future prime minister Recep (Peker) Bey responded: “The functions of the Ministry ... are now being assigned to the departments of foundations, education and justice” (CHP, 2002, p. 465), which entailed separating and transferring these matters to civil authority. The Directorate of Pious Foundations, likewise, nationalised the management of Ottoman foundations and their properties “to serve the real benefits of the nation” (Article 7). This was an important transfer of funds and property to the national state, for it is estimated that at the time, “15 percent of land in Turkey was enclosed by *vakıfs* and remained out of the market

economy” (Ergil, 1975c, p. 250), which is a figure that goes as high as “three-quarters of the country's arable land” according to some experts (Kuran, 2001, p. 849). In any case, the idea was to regulate and utilise the properties of foundations for national purposes. One deputy put it in these words: “When the government places heavy taxes on other citizens ... it is unacceptable for our national life to let millions [of liras] remain in the hands of unidentified men, used for unidentified purposes” (CHP, 2002, p. 466). Abolishing the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations was no doubt a move to render politics independent from religious influences. Instead, religion would be regulated by the political through the newly established directorates.

With the foundation of *Diyanet* in 1924, the Republic could now provide official religious justification, paradoxically, for secularising reforms. Thereafter, Islam’s utilisation for underpinning capitalist nation-building efforts became centralised around this institution, which meant “using Islam for republican purposes” as a “channel through which a consciousness of citizenship could be developed” (Mardin, 2011, p. 76). Just three days after the abolishment of the Caliphate, for instance, a communiqué sent to *Diyanet* by the government advised that Friday sermons should not mention the Caliph any longer, but “pray for the salvation and felicity of the nation and the Republic” (RepublicanArchives, 6 March 1924). Another communiqué ordered that old prayer books that praise the Sultan must be confiscated and replaced by a new book “suitable to new conditions and times” (RepublicanArchives, 1 March 1927). Gramsci (1971, p. 242) underlines the “educative and formative role of the state”. He writes that the state’s “aim is always that of ... adapting the “civilisation” and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production”. In the Turkish context, functioning in a massively rural society with ideational references largely based on Islam, *Diyanet* sought to provide religious legitimisation for the transformation of society along national-capitalist lines. It played a significant function of “interior” regulation to communicate the necessities of modernisation in religious terms²⁰¹. The functioning of *Diyanet* as an ideological state apparatus was based on a centralised mechanism, as the imams and muftis across the country were warned to strictly follow the sermon and prayer templates sent from Ankara, and not to talk of political matters otherwise (RepublicanArchives, 11 November

1928, 22 July 1924). Examples regarding *Diyanet*'s legitimating role will be featured in the rest of the chapter.

An even more fundamental venue for the cultivation of modern-republican citizens was education, which also underwent a major reform on the same day. Law no. 430 concentrated all educational affairs in the Ministry of Education, transferring the budget and property that belonged to the former Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Articles 1-3). As Mustafa Kemal (2012, p. 98) advocated a year before, the goal was “not to have *medreses* and schools separately. There is only one place to provide the nation with religion and all humanly needs, and that place is called the school”. The justification for this milestone legislation resented the ongoing duality in the education system between modern and religious schools since the *Tanzimat* period: “Members of a nation can receive only one type of education. Two different types of education in a country produce two types of people, and that would be against the unity of sentiment, ideas, and solidarity” (TBMM, 3 March 1924, p. 25). As in Jules Ferry's secularising laws of the 1880s, creating a generation united under republican values was the main goal. The law also monopolised the regulation of religious education by establishing a faculty of theology in Istanbul to educate “high religious experts”, and by making it the Ministry's task to “open other schools for the training of officials responsible for the implementation of religious services” (imam-preacher schools) (Article 4).

A month later, Law no. 469 abolished all Islamic courts and replaced them with civil ones under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, which was another important step in the secular reconfiguration of the state apparatus (Law no. 469, 8 April 1924). The judicial reform was heralded by the President in his parliamentary speech on 1 March 1924: “A crucial point is to liberate our judicial conception, laws, and organisation from certain ... features that are not compatible with the necessities of the time ... The nation demands the civilised method that assures justice with swiftness and precision ... The only path to be followed in our civil and family law is the path of civilisation” (TBMM, 1 March 1924, p. 5). The justification for the law stated that “sharia courts” give the impression of an exception for Muslims, and the Minister of Justice Necati Bey held that with this law, the Republic now had “only one court, and a unity of jurisdiction”. Besim (Atalay) Bey underscored regulation: “in reality sharia courts are not being abolished ...

Their prerogatives are being transferred to other institutions. Therefore the duality is overcome” (TBMM, 8 April 1924, pp. 435, 437). On 20 April 1924, finally, a new republican constitution was ratified to herald the end of the major political phase of the revolution. By the spring of 1924, the foundations of the national state was established through secularisation, which entailed transferring religious prerogatives to secular ones in the judiciary, religious services, national education, charitable foundations and property, and the source of political power. The bifurcation of politico-legal authority between secular and religious bodies since the *Tanzimat*, which had caused a jurisdictional duality (discussed in Chapter 4), largely came to an end.

6.2.3. Secularisation in the Consolidation of the Bourgeois Republic

The subsequent period of 1924-7 witnessed the consolidation of bourgeois-republican state building by Mustafa Kemal’s faction against various forms of opposition (Özoğlu, 2011). It is in this deeply contentious and antagonistic period that the elimination of oppositional and counterrevolutionary initiatives, which were largely expressed in an Islamic framework (Brockett, 1998), went parallel with the further secularisation of the sociopolitical scene. As Keyder (1987, p. 89) puts it, “religion was doubly suspect”, for “it was the legitimating principle of the old Empire, as well as the vocabulary most commonly available to the opponents of the new legitimating principle” –namely secular nationalism. The social basis of dissent stemmed from among the very Anatolian Muslim notables and *ulema* that had supported the War of Independence, who viewed secular-republican state building as a threat to their local authority and interests. “Both these elements were traditional and conservative and in alliance, they formed a parliamentary group generally hostile to reforms ... They fought vigorously to maintain the Islamic understanding of the nation by rejecting objective elements of nationhood and by stressing religious ties” (Karpaz, 1959, p. 53). Spearheaded by landlords, chieftains, and the recently dispossessed *ulema*²⁰²; some notables sought and managed to galvanise Muslim peasants in a series of localised rebellions²⁰³. Toprak (1981, p. 67) holds that these rebellions were “counter-revolutionary in that all aimed to destroy the secular Republic that Kemalist nationalists were trying to build and replace in its place the old Ottoman religio-political structure”. In such upheavals, religion served “as a

dynamic and radical ideology of reaction for organized traditional groups and classes in transition against the forces of capitalism". This was "especially true of the landed oligarchy who use the influence of local religious figures to exploit religious sentiments for the perpetuation of their dominant position" (Ergil, 1975b, p. 74). In other words, in the 1924-7 period, "the Kemalist state's struggle against [the oppositional manifestations of] religion was a concrete struggle against one of the primary impediments facing the establishment of bourgeois social forms" (Savran, 2010, pp. 80-81). Secularising reforms sought to "cripple the ability of the old ruling class to organize and fight back" (Margulies & Yıldızoğlu, 1988). That some of the most important legislation on secularism took place during the *Takrir-i Sükûn* (Law on the Maintenance of Order, 1925-9) period is indicative of the link between secularisation and bourgeois-national sovereignty.

The Law on the Maintenance of Order was issued on 4 March 1925 in direct response to the Sheikh Said Rebellion that broke out in eastern Anatolia, giving the government extraordinary powers to prohibit any organisation or publication it deemed threatening against the Republic²⁰⁴. The Rebellion began in February 1925, shortly after the law abolishing the feudal tithe (*aşar*) was opened for discussion in the parliament (Önal, 2010, p. 65). It assumed an openly Islamic character (along with Kurdish nationalism) hostile to the Republic's secularisation initiatives. Protesting against the deportation of the Caliph, Said argued in one of his declarations that "Islam cannot be without the Caliphate", and he blamed the government for "constantly diffusing irreligiousness" (Cemal, 1955, p. 48). In another declaration, the Naqshbandi leader accused the Republic "for seeking, since its establishment, to destroy the foundations of religion" through "insulting the provisions of the Koran as well as denying Allah and the Prophet". He then concluded with a call to arms: "the annihilation of this illegitimate government should be a religious duty for all Muslims" (Fırat, 1981, p. 180). The rebellion was "declared ... to be a *jihad* in which whoever was killed would be a martyr ... and go straight to paradise" (Ahmad, 1991, p. 7). The blatantly Islamic aim of the rebellion, which was able to mobilise 10,000-15,000 people, was underpinned by the material interests of powerful landlords in the region, who reacted "against the expansion of the authority of the new central Government into their once semi-independent territories ... Each of these feudal lords owned numerous villages and their entire populations" (Ergil, 1975b, pp. 72-73). With the abolition of the tithe²⁰⁵, "the new state

had renounced the prerogatives of traditional political authority”, which implied “a new relationship between the state and the economy” in modern capitalist terms (Keyder, 1981, p. 128) –putting in question vested local interests. The rebellion brought together “tribal chiefs, property owners and *tarikât* (religious order) sheikhs who were severely threatened by the modernization efforts of the new regime”, and it marked another “major clash between the new and the old elite which ended with the defeat of the latter in its claim to redeem its place in the new power structure” (Ergil, 1975a, p. 60).

It is estimated that 16.3 percent of the country’s total budget in the 1925-6 period was deployed exclusively for the suppression of the rebellion, spread out to 14 cities, which indicates the government’s level of apprehension against religiously identified insurgency (Özoğlu, 2011, p. 91). Independence Tribunals were reinvigorated in this period to execute dissidents, including Sheik Said himself. For many other influential local religious leaders (such as Said-i Nursî of the *Nurcu* order), an elongated era of exile and/or imprisonment began (Mardin, 1989). Fearing that the Islamic agitation of Sheik Said could incite a larger uprising, the government called *Diyanet* to action “to prevent the counter-Republican propaganda in the eastern provinces” by way of explaining to the masses the values of the Republic (RepublicanArchives, 7 May 1925, 9 May 1925). As in many earlier occasions, different articulations of religion were at battle. It is in reply to the Islamic character of the Rebellion that the GNAT made an amendment to the High Treason Law on 25 February, approximately two weeks after the rebellion broke out, banning the utilisation of “religion or sacred concepts ... for political purposes” (Law no. 556, 25 February 1925). Individuals who exploit religion “to change the form of state ... or violate the security of the state” were categorised as traitors punishable by death. This included making use of religion to “stir up trouble” among the people by “giving speeches or issuing publications”. To the national state builders, the Sheik Said Rebellion clearly evoked and substantiated the traumas of the past vis-à-vis religious reactionism. Even Kazım Karabekir, known for his moderate approach toward Islam, was convinced that “those who employ religion to endanger our national existence deserve to be damned”, and that “the whole world must know that the children of this land are ready for all kind of sacrifice against internal or external threats” (TBMM, 25 February 1925, p. 309). The justification for the bill argued that throughout history “religion has been exploited by evildoers for the purpose of reactionism”, and then drew

a parallel between the Sheik Said Rebellion and the Istanbul *Fatwa* of 1920 as two such cases where the people are “deceived ... with sacred religious values”. Prime Minister Ali Fethi (Okyar) Bey went further back to equate the Sheik Said Rebellion with “the Albanian Revolt ... and the 31 March Incident before that”, and asserted that “the very same tools and manipulation that were used in these episodes are manifested in today’s rebellion” (TBMM, 25 February 1925) 309-10.

It is with the intention to prevent the continuation of Islamic insurgency that the government prohibited all dervish orders and closed their lodges at the end of 1925, which were viewed as the hotbed of social opposition to the Republic. In the Ottoman Empire, the dervish orders represented popular Islam in linkage to, but in differentiation from the official Islam of the *Şeyhülislam* (Mardin, 1971, p. 206). Although the secularising laws of 1924 abolished the latter, to the national state builders “it soon became apparent that it was from the dervishes, not the [official] *ulema*, that the most dangerous resistance ... would come” (B. Lewis, 1961, p. 409). Consequently, Law no. 677 (30 November 1925) promulgated the closure of all dervish lodges. The justification for the law put forward that these lodges exploit the sincere religious sentiments of regular citizens for political purposes, and that Turkish history is full of such examples²⁰⁶. Mustafa Kemal framed the contention against the old elites in these words: “the Republic of Turkey will not be a country of sheiks, dervishes, and disciples. The right and true *tarikât* (path) is that of civilisation” (cited in Jäschke, 1972, p. 36). The dual strategies of separation and regulation were discernible also in this law. The Republic closed and banned dervish orders and their activities²⁰⁷, while seeking to incorporate their suitable venues and members into *Diyanet*. Among the closed lodges, the law read, “the ones that are immediately turned into mosques or masjids will be maintained” (Article 1). That is to say, “when the *tekkes* (convents) and *zaviyes* (recluses) were abolished, their property together with all vakifs, came under governmental administration” (Ergil, 1975c, p. 250) which was yet another example of property transfer to the national state. Given that the administration of all mosques and masjids had been assigned to *Diyanet* a year earlier, this would mean that the lodges could survive only by submission to the administration of the state. In addition, “sheiks, dervishes, disciples, *dede*, *seyyid*, *çelebi*, *emir*, *nakib*” and other people who hold Islamic spiritual titles and positions in the community have been outlawed. According to the 1927 annual budget, among these

groups, the ones who are sufficiently “competent and possess clerical qualities [*şeraiti ilmiye*]” were to be salaried by *Diyamet* (Law no. 1011, 19 April 1927). A communiqué sent by the government to *Diyamet* on 5 November 1927 laid out the specific qualifications sought in the former dervish lodge members to be entitled to remuneration (RepublicanArchives, 5 November 1927). *Diyamet* was also advised to communicate to the people to not offer donations or any kind of support to the closed lodges (RepublicanArchives, 3 September 1925)²⁰⁸.

These steps demonstrate that while the Republic eliminated the influence of certain groups and spaces related to popular Islam, it also took over and maintained its remnants to ensure their close supervision. The idea was to pre-empt Islam’s articulation as a component of social opposition against the Republic, given that religion “during the formative years of the Turkish Republic, has been the most important centrifugal force with a potential to challenge the state” (B. Toprak, 1998, p. 120). This is reflected also in Law. no. 676 passed on the same day as the closure of dervish lodges, which made it a criminal offence to wear the Islamic garments assigned exclusively to *Diyamet*’s officials. The law stipulated that those who wear such religious attires without the authorisation of the government were to be imprisoned for three to twelve months (Article 1). Complementary to the closure of dervish orders, the ban on garments envisaged the further disempowerment of local religious leaders in their communities by depriving them of the symbolic power embedded in Islamic clothing. From then on, it was solely the government’s religious officials that were entitled to such symbolic sway. The justification for the law stated that the wearing of religious garments by unauthorised individuals would “harm the reputation of religious officials”, by making the two “indistinguishable”. This was considered dangerous especially given that some harmful individuals would “exploit the influence these garments have on the people” (TBMM, 30 November 1925, Appendix, p. 1). The concern for state monopoly of religious authority and symbolism was expressed by Mustafa Kemal earlier in August 1925²⁰⁹.

The ban on unauthorised religious garments was the offshoot of a more influential and controversial law ratified five days earlier, known as the “Hat Law”, which took a bold step towards the creation of a secular public sphere devoid of religious symbolism (Law no. 671, 25 November 1925). The law made it an obligation for all

public officials to wear the western-style hat. It officially identified the western hat as the “public headgear of the Turkish nation”, and prohibited “the continuation of any custom which contradicts that” (Article 1). The latter statement effectively banned *fez* and other traditional headgears. The law was directly linked to ascertaining bourgeois-national rule, internally and externally. Internally, it served to further weaken the symbolic hold of various Muslim notables and sheiks in the locality, as proven by the fact that the law “met ... loud resistance from the clergy and conservative small town notables who enjoyed the status of wearing religious apparel which distinguished them from the common man” (Ergil, 1975c, p. 251). In the fierce parliamentary debate (triggered by the opposition of Nurettin Pasha), allusions to sovereignty confirm the struggle against traditional class alliances. Sponsor of the bill said the law was among those that seek “to protect the spirit and the existence of the constitution”. Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) Bey stated that “the progress of the Turkish nation in the field of civilisation will not be sacrificed”. Mustafa Necati Bey labeled the challenge of Nurettin Pasha as “a rebellion against the Turkish nation. Externally, the law sought to prove that Turkey now belonged with the civilised world²¹⁰. The justification for the law underscored that “the hat question” carried a “special significance for Turkey”, given the country’s resolve “to join the family of modern and civilised nations” (TBMM, 25 November 1925, pp. 221, 223, 224, 228). Mustafa Kemal (1927/1969, p. 895) later referred to the *fez* as a “trademark of ignorance, stupidity, bigotry, and hostility to progress and civilisation”, and contended the necessity of wearing the hat “to demonstrate [to the world] that the Turkish nation is not different, in terms of mentality, from civilised social life”. Such statements reveal that the hat in particular, and attire in general, were seen as key symbols of establishing a bourgeois-national society. Reaction against the hat law, however, was much stronger than the reaction against the abolishment of the Caliphate. In response to the rebellions in several cities (such as in Erzurum, Maraş, and Rize), around seventy people were hanged by the Independence Tribunals, while many more were imprisoned (Tunçay, 1981, pp. 159-161). To provide religious legitimisation for the law and counterbalance the reaction of the masses, *Diyamet* was instructed to promote the wearing of hats by everyone in prayers (*namaz*) by declaring its acceptability according to Islam (RepublicanArchives, 5 January 1926, 14 January 1926).

By 1926, although the judiciary had been fully secularised, “the legal structure of the new nation-state was still a hotchpotch collection of Muslim law (Sharia) and Turkish/Muslim practices and various Western laws”. The bourgeois-national state had to institute “a homogeneous legal system which would safeguard private property and regulate social relationships based upon it”, and enable capitalist “predictability and security” (Ergil, 1975c, p. 252). Towards that end, four foundational laws were passed in the first half of 1926, largely translated from their European counterparts: the Penal Code (Italy), Civil Code (Switzerland), Commerce Code (Germany), and Obligations Code (Switzerland). With regard to religion, Article 163 of the Penal Code prohibited the establishment of “political associations based on religious ideas and sentiments” along with “the utilisation of religion ... for inciting people to violate the security of the State” (Law no. 765, 1 March 1926). Article 237 stipulated the imprisonment of religious officials who administer a religious marriage prior to civil marriage; and Articles 241-2 issued the same for those religious officials who publicly criticise the government, or mobilise people for disobedience. As a counterbalance, Articles 175-6 of the Code forbade preventing individuals’ right to worship, issuing publications against religion, and the damaging of religious sites, which recognised the social significance of religion. The justification for and the discussions regarding the Penal Code made reference to the need to secularise the legal system, and strike fear into the enemies of the Republic²¹¹.

The Civil Code was one of the milestones of secularisation in Turkey. It comprehensively reconfigured individual, social, and family life; which had always been the abode of Islamic law, in line with a national-secular culture based on values of private property. Fittingly, presenting the law to the Assembly, Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat told the deputies that “when you raise your hands and accept this law, the last thirteen centuries [referring to Islam] will stop; and a new, prosperous, and civilised life will begin for the Turkish nation and society”. Rapporteur of the law Şükrü Kaya highlighted that Ottoman “despotism needs superstitious and weak doctrines to take hold in the consciences”, whereas the Assembly’s duty was “to pass laws that the Republic deserves, and abolish those that nourish [Islamic] reactionism (*irtica*)”. Emin (Bayav) Bey likewise contended that the law is the product of modern civilisation, which “dissociates divine law and temporal law” (TBMM, 17 February 1926, pp. 230, 232)²¹². The justification for the Civil Code, penned by Mahmut Esat, is considered to be among

the key documents explaining the meaning and spirit of *laiklik* (TBMM, 17 February 1926, Appendix, p. 1-3)²¹³. This text distinctly identified a link between sociopolitical secularisation and the internal/external sovereign infrastructural capacity of the national state. Mahmut Esat began by strongly contrasting progress and theocracy, for basing laws on religion “constitute one of the major factors and reasons impeding progress”. That situation has been “tying the Turkish nation’s destiny to the stipulations and rules of the Middle Ages”, for secular progress has always been hindered by social strata “whose interests were threatened, who have misled and corrupted the people in the name of religion ... and superstitious beliefs”.

European civilisation, on the other hand, executed “the separation, in an absolute sense, of religion and the state”, and so they “have strengthened and fortified their political and national unities and their economic, social salvations, and developments”. Therefore, he added, “the Turkish nation should adopt to the necessities of modern civilisation at all costs. This is a must for a nation who is determined to survive ... [as] the distinguishing feature of states belonging to contemporary civilisation is the separation of religion and the world”. Here, Mahmut Esat also made a reference to the French Civil Code as a triumph over the Church²¹⁴, which was meant to echo republican Turkey’s struggle against its *ancien régime* and social forces tied to the religious establishment. Moreover, Esat placed secularisation in the context of Turkey’s external sovereignty vis-à-vis European powers, which had been systematically violated since the *Tanzimat* through the protectorate of non-Muslim minorities. “Especially in states that contain subjects belonging to various religions”, he clarified, the “severing of relations with religion is a requisite for the sovereignty of the nation”. Otherwise, he admitted, special privileges and capitulations would be given to the members of certain religions (as was given to non-Muslims in the past), which is “totally opposed to the political, social, economic, and national unity”²¹⁵. Esat specified later that the legal equality of all citizens, regardless of religion, was a precondition put forward by European delegates at the Lausanne Treaty for “their acceptance of Turkey’s sovereignty”. He “situated Turkey’s adoption of the civil code in the context of meeting preconditions for Turkey’s independence”. That is to say, “a central pillar of the laicist project was undertaken in order to achieve recognition for Turkey’s sovereignty” (Parla & Davison, 2004, pp. 116-117)²¹⁶.

These major sets of legislation were explicitly underpinned by two interrelated motivations: further integration and synchronisation with global capitalism, and creating a national-capitalist market through standardised rules and regulations. The justification for the Commerce Code, for instance, stated that “the Turkish Republic, which is *in very close relationship with world civilisation*, develops and expands its commercial activity day by day”. That is why, the “re-alteration of the Code has been long needed” (TBMM, 29 May 1926, Appendix, p. 21). The Minister of Justice also clarified that “contemporary commercial and economic conditions”, which “carry an international significance”, cannot be “managed by customary and traditional practices” (TBMM, 29 May 1926, p. 590). Regarding the Obligations Code, one deputy held that “from now on, we can forcefully argue that we are a noteworthy and valuable member of the civilised world”. Here, the concern for instituting nationally standardised laws, which was already expressed in Mahmut Esat’s justification for the Civil Code²¹⁷, was once again brought up. Esat said: “the primitive rules” laid out by “the [Islamic] *Mecelle* weakened the economic, social, and commercial reputation of the Turkish nation, and paralysed our economic activity. With the Obligations Code, such activity will be reinforced”. On this note, Tunalı Hilmi Bey repeatedly emphasised the significance of writing these codes in simple Turkish (as opposed to using Arabic and Persian terms), which he deemed important for national unity (TBMM, 22 April 1926, pp. 173-175).

Towards the same national-economic end, on 26 December 1925, the 24-hour clock system and the international (Gregorian) calendar were adopted (Law no. 697 and Law no. 698), which rendered religiously identified temporality obsolete in the new Republic. These two laws not only territorially standardised time to facilitate national integration, but also internationally realigned the country’s official conception of date/time to put an end to long-lasting confusions between calendars (*hicri*, *mali* and western) and time (*alaturca* and *alafranga*) (Georgeon, 2012). Referring to the Islamic calendar in the Assembly, Besim Atalay protested that “it is not right that we lag so much behind in economic life. Our government accepts the latest and most precise calculations”. Muhtar (Cilli) Bey agreed: “our transactions with Europe are closely knit”, and to facilitate that intimate relationship, “instead of using two separate dates, we are unifying our calendars. Thus, we will be using the same calendar as the rest of the world” (TBMM, 26 December 1925, pp. 277-278). Secularisation and forging globally connected national

capitalism were intimately intertwined. It is interesting to add that while officially “separating” religious temporality from the state, the law on the calendar also stipulated “regulating” Islamic holidays (based traditionally on lunar calendar), which would be scientifically calculated by the national observatory (Article 3)²¹⁸. Several communiqués were thereafter sent to Diyanet for its standardisation of prayer hours in line with the new clock system, as well as the identification of religious holidays such as Ramadan based on data from the observatory (RepublicanArchives, 14 February 1928, 25 May 1926).

In addition to the secularising legislation that fostered a bourgeois society against local-traditional contenders, the 1923-9 period was also characterised by a series of laws that were particularly directed at the creation of a globally integrated national-capitalist market. As Boratav (1981, pp. 165, 167, 169) writes, “the Turkish economy of 1923 was a disarticulated one, in the sense of a lack of organic complementarity between its parts”. To remedy that, the nationalists’ strategy was to enable “an open economy and active state support for private accumulation”, for “the most painless method of producing a truly national bourgeoisie seemed to pass through a process of active state support”. In 1923, the national Economic Congress of Turkey was organised in Izmir. In 1924, the Turkish National Commerce Union held a congress. All railroads were nationalised under the Directorate of Turkish State Railways (1924). The Turkish Lira was adopted. Several banks were founded by the state to finance industry, agriculture, and mining. Tariffs were put in place and the tithe was abolished (1925). Strikes were effectively banned with the Law on the Maintenance of Order (1925). Marine transportation was fully nationalised (1926). Turkish Statistical Institute was founded (1926); a national census was held (1927). Law for the Encouragement of Industry was ratified, and a Supreme Assembly of Economy was founded in 1927. Also in the 1923-9 interval, numerous bilateral trade agreements were signed with countries such as Austria, the US, the USSR, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Estonia, Romania, France, and Ireland. Overall, this was “a period of full integration into the world economy despite the constitution of an independent nation-state”, where [Muslim] merchant capital in close cooperation with the state flourished (Keyder, 1981, p. vii). As the global crisis struck in 1929, the Republic would respond with protectionism and a shift towards an étatist

industrial-developmental path, which coincided –and interacted in various ways– with a new chapter in the course of sociopolitical secularisation.

6.3. The Republic in Charge: Industrialism and the Regulated Diminishment of Islam (1928-1938)

Concurrent with a major secularisation wave, the period of 1924-7 also witnessed Mustafa Kemal's consolidation as the unchallenged leader of the national state. In addition to eliminating the communist movement (1921-2) and the opposition of the "second group" active in the first parliament (1923), the Maintenance of Order period (1925-9) allowed the RPP to eradicate various other political contenders such as the Progressive Republican Party (1924-5) and ex-Unionist factions (1926-7). The Sheik Said Rebellion (1925), various uprisings against the hat law (1925-6), and the assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in Izmir (1926) facilitated and accelerated the removal of the last remnants of serious political opposition (Özoğlu, 2011, pp. 15-154; Tunçay, 1981, pp. 99-109; Zürcher, 1984, pp. 150-167; 2003, pp. 79-134). In this interval, "by consolidating political power in the Republican Party and by suppressing religious institutions, Atatürk broke the political authority of landlords and religious leaders". That is to say, the "abolition of the political power of the *ulema* ... was also an attempt to undermine the potential political power of a landed class ... It was this combined power of rural landowners and *ulema*" that "had provided the main opposition" to the national-bourgeois initiative in the parliament and in counterrevolutionary upheavals (Trimberger, 1978, p. 29). It is important to note, however, that while the Republic temporarily neutralised their direct political influence, it did not challenge the economic power of these local landlords and notables, whose wealth and centrality in the locality went largely unchallenged. This would be the main reason why the sociopolitical influence of secularisation did not sufficiently permeate into the countryside in the long run.

What is noteworthy for the purposes of the present analysis is that the Islamic undertones of the nation-building process gradually declined as the sovereignty of the state was solidified in the second half of the 1920s. In other words, given that the internal and external threats to bourgeois-national state building were largely eradicated

by 1927-8, the Republic's utilisation of Islam to legitimise its modernisation attempts became increasingly less central. The strategies of separation and regulation, which dominated the two preceding decades, were still maintained, as the Republic never stopped supervising Islam while strictly demarcating its boundaries vis-à-vis the sociopolitical sphere. Yet, with regard to what Gramsci (1971, p. 247) calls the state's role as a "rationalising" superstructural organ, an "educator ... to create a new type or level of civilisation", the role of Islam as a justificatory element became relatively immaterial²¹⁹. From 1927-8 onwards, the dual strategies culminated into the "regulated diminishment" of religious authority. Regulated diminishment in the Turkish case refers to the state's continued monopolisation of Islamic life and institutions for the purpose of progressively deemphasising and lessening their significance in public life. Having eradicated religious institutions (such as the Caliphate, *Şeyhülislam*, *medreses*, and dervish orders) from the scene while partly transferring their services and capabilities to state infrastructural power, the Republic utilised this monopoly to weaken religion's remaining sphere of influence. In this sense, regulated diminishment was also inherent to the previous periods, but it became more pronounced as the sovereignty of national state building was complete²²⁰. Regulated diminishment would be energised particularly during the étatist developmental period in the 1930s, where it gained a systematised positive content offering an alternative to religion –namely secular-national solidarity. It is in this final interval of 1928-38 that "the previous changes [regarding secularisation] were supplemented, extended, and consolidated" (Berkes, 1964, p. 461) (see Appendix E for list of laws between 1928-38).

The language of the party statutes and programmes "concerning laicism" after "the RPP completed its consolidation of power ... reflects this new situation" (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 106). The RPP Statute of 1927, for instance, talked for the first time of official separation and *laiklik*. Article 3 emphasised the centrality of "liberating beliefs and consciences from politics", that is, "in the affairs of the state and the nation, completely separating religion and the world". The word "*laik*" made its way into the first article of the RPP Programme in the same congress. The party defined itself as "republican, *laik*, populist, and nationalist", adding that it "ascribes primary importance to ensuring the economic welfare of the nation" (CHP, 2014, pp. 80-81, 103). The changes in the official RPP documents were only the prelude to the momentous legislation that followed in

1928. Law no. 1222 on 10 April 1928 introduced major secularising amendments to the Constitution. Most importantly, state religion was abolished²²¹. The statement declaring Islam as “the religion of the state”, put in place five years ago, was deleted from Article 2. Accordingly, “executing the Sharia” was removed from the responsibilities of the National Assembly (Article 26), and parliamentary and presidential oaths no longer made reference to religion, as the word “*vallahi*” (“in the name of God”) was erased from Articles 16 and 38. The justification for the constitutional amendment uttered that “the separation of religion and state” was a necessity for “contemporary civilisations”, but it did not mean “the promotion of irreligiousness”. Instead, separation meant “the assurance of religion’s liberation from being used as a tool by politicians”, which the foundational struggle of the bourgeois Republic had experienced first hand. The document, finally, relegated the public character of religion by making it solely a private affair “between God and the individual”, which, it argued, would enable religion “to take its sublime place in the conscience, untouched by others” (TBMM, 9 April 1928, Appendix, p. 2). It is interesting to note that a constitutional amendment of this magnitude was approved in the Assembly with no discussion in merely 40 minutes, which is indicative of the riddance of parliamentary opposition by 1928.

Another groundbreaking reform of 1928, which Lewis (1999) refers to as a “catastrophic success”, was the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the international numeral system for written Turkish, abandoning the Arabo-Persian script (Law no. 1288 and Law no. 1353). The “letter reform” inherently featured a secularising thrust, as “it was yet another way to cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 189), and “to facilitate communication domestically as well as with the Western world” (G. Lewis, 1999, p. 27)²²². As Necip Asım (Yazıksız) mentioned in the parliament, “Gentlemen, we don’t want Arabic. We want the Occident!” (TBMM, 20 May 1928, p. 205). This was reiterated by Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), who held that the Arabic script was not suitable for “spreading the spirit of progress and civilisation among the people”, for it has created a huge gap between the elite and the masses. In fact, according to Refik (Koraltan) Bey, the Arabic script has caused Turkey to lag behind on the path to progress” (TBMM, 1 November 1928, p. 9). Mustafa Kemal (2012, p. 331) had endorsed this opinion in an earlier statement: “Today, Arabic is not any more the language of learning and science”. The justification for the law, likewise,

stressed that “Arabic letters do not fit the structure of the Turkish language”, and they have impeded the development of Turkish typography and created confusion in the use of the telegram (TBMM, 1 November 1928, Appendix, p. 1). Indeed, that Arabic letters connoted Ottoman symbolism was already confirmed by a law of the previous year (Law no. 1057, 13 April 1927), which removed imperial *tughras* and other signs from public buildings²²³. The colossal change of 1928 was also seen as a way to further consolidate national-capitalist relations in connection with the global economy. The justification for the law on international numerals highlighted Turkey’s “social and economic relations with the civilised world”. In the discussions, Minister of Education Mustafa Necati defended this perspective: “by using these numbers ... our nation will participate in the international world in the fields of trade and economy”, which would be a facilitation for “our merchants and factories”. Recep Bey also pointed to the worth of the reform for “commerce and the economy”. He added: “This is not just a matter of being similar [to the West]. More importantly, this is a matter of the economy, which constitutes the point of departure and the essence of life in today’s world”²²⁴. Finally, the Minister of Finance Şükrü Saraçoğlu held that accepting the international numerals was a part of Turkey’s “struggle to make up for the lost centuries” in the fields of economy and budgeting (TBMM, 20 May 1928, pp. p. 204-205, Appendix, p. 34).

6.3.1. Étatism and Secular Solidarism in the 1930s

After the crucial secularising reforms of 1928, the shift towards regulated diminishment was confirmed in the context of three developments at the turn of the decade: the short-lived multiparty experience through the Free Party (August-November 1930), the Menemen Incident (December 1930), and more structurally, the global economic crisis of 1929. Soon after its foundation, the Free Party (FP) attracted diverse sources of opposition to the RPP, and it was branded by the ruling party as the hub of religious reactionism (Emrence, 2006). In the immediate aftermath of the 1929 crisis, which resulted in “economic collapse and expropriation for wide sections of poor and middle peasants”, the popular support for the new party was astounding (Boratav, 1981, p. 173). Although the FP was founded under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal himself, the “opposition to the regime coalesced around the new party and attacked the reforms and the secular policy of the government” (Ahmad, 1988a, p. 754). The Party was closed

after only three months, but “the experience holds a significant place in the institutionalisation of *laiklik*” (Akin, 2012, p. 49), especially in convincing the RPP of the need for a nationally unifying secular-ideological framework. Soon after, the violent Menemen Incident, where a Naqshbandi mob in western Turkey rioted in the name of sharia and beheaded a reserve officer, exacerbated the anxiety of Islamically articulated challenge to bourgeois-national state building²²⁵. Adding to the memory of 1909, 1920, and 1925; the Menemen Incident “proved to be traumatic for the Kemalists” (Ergil, 1975b, p. 73; Jäschke, 1972, p. 95). In the RPP Congress of the following year, Prime Minister İsmet Bey (İnönü) referred to the two events of 1930 as exemplary of Islamic reactionism coming from traditional social forces. The FP, he argued, created the conditions for “reactionary elements to openly position themselves against the revolution”, where “our party was treated like an enemy”. “Following that, the Menemen Incident”, he added, “demonstrated that reactionism is as violent and revengeful as in the Middle Ages”. In response, he concluded, “our secular, republican, and revolutionary party has to take counter measures. For the protection of our revolution, all party members and organisation must be ready to retaliate ... We will remain resolute and determined to establish all aspects of a secular, republican and populist government” (CHP, 1931, p. 5).

The transition to *étatisme* as the official developmental policy in the 1930s was partly shaped and accelerated by such episodes of mass reaction to economic downturn –where Islam became the language of opposition at varying levels. Facing “its most serious crisis since the defeat of the Greek invaders in 1922” (Hale, 1980, p. 101), the RPP government realised that the depression was “gradually undermining the very foundations of the new regime” and “a radical reorientation of economic policies seemed necessary” (Boratav, 1981, p. 174). *Étatisme* was formulated in this context as the governmental response, officialised as one of the principles of the RPP Programme in 1931. Initial protectionist measures included the Law on Foreign Exchange Markets (1929), foundation of the Society of National Economy and Savings (1929), establishment of consortium banks (1930), the Law on the Protection of Turkish Lira (1930), foundation of a Central Bank (1930), legislation on export control, quality and standards (1930), and quantitative control on quotas of imports (1931) (Birtek, 1985; Okyar, 1965). These preliminary measures were then complemented by a structured

étatist framework: foreign trade and capital were closely monitored and restricted, partial state control of the internal market ensued along with the nationalisation of foreign industries, and the state stepped in as the “major productive and investment agent” through planning, undertaking an “ambitious programme of ... investment in industry and mining” (Boratav, 1981, pp. 174-175). As Boratav (1981, pp. 180, 188) clarifies, “at a time when the capitalist world economy was passing through the most serious crisis of its history”, the Turkish economy largely “closed itself to the external world”, and “the Kemalist leadership correctly perceived the conditions of the early 1930s as an historical opportunity for industrialisation”. Influenced and advised by the USSR, and pursuing a form of state capitalism, étatism “meant that the state took over responsibility for creating and running industries for which the private sector could not accumulate the necessary capital” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 197). In this process, “the peripheral state and the domination of merchant capital were replaced by ... policies favouring industrial capital”, where gradually the “bureaucrats and the manufacturing bourgeoisie merged into a homogeneous coalition” (Keyder, 1981, pp. 129-130; 1987, p. 106).

The politico-ideological component of that economic transition manifested itself with a marked decline in the sociopolitical significance ascribed to religion. Following the Islamic-oppositional experiences of 1930 and in line with the étatist turn, “the idea of carrying out a reformation in Turkish Islam”, which had already lost prominence after 1928, was completely “abandoned” (Ahmad, 1988a, p. 755). Until then, the idea of modernisation assuming “religion as a relatively important factor in the nation-building process was not totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling elite”. But “after 1930, there began a tendency towards constructing a secular, revolutionary morality that would not require resort to religion at all” (Aydın, 2003, pp. 216, 244). The long term Young Turk mentality of modernising Islam thus mainly came to an end (Hanioglu, 1995, pp. 200-203). Mardin (2011, p. 76) concurs that “by the end of the 1920s and in the 1930s, such utilitarian policy [toward Islam] slowly vanished”. Given “the unsuccessful drive to produce a modernized” Islam, “after 1928 there was a definite decline of interest in ... philosophy of divinity”, and “perhaps the first to recognize the practical implications of the 1923-33 experiences was Mustafa Kemal himself ... [who] ceased to evince interest in reforming religion after 1928” (Berkes, 1964, pp. 495-496)²²⁶. One final attempt at wholesale Islamic modernisation in 1928 was the “Religious Reform Project”, proposed

by a committee formed in the Faculty of Theology, led by İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu). The committee argued for the rationalisation of religion according to the needs of modern life, and put forward propositions such as worshipping and praying in Turkish, and introducing benches, shoes, and instrumental music to mosques (Jäschke, 1972, pp. 40-42). From that point on, comprehensive initiatives of Islamic reform were discontinued, although the use of Turkish in prayers, sermons, and worship was actively promoted in the 1930s (Mardin, 2011, p. 127)²²⁷.

Simultaneously, the Republic “decided to take the offensive and educate the masses ... by emphasising nationalism and downplaying religion” (Ergil, 1975b, p. 73). The new source of legitimacy was found in national solidarity expounded in the concept of *halkçılık* (populism). According to the RPP Program of 1931, *halkçılık* was based on “social order and solidarity as opposed to class conflict, and to establish the harmony of interests” between small farmers, small manufacturers and traders, the worker, professionals, and industrialists and landowners (CHP, 2014, pp. 129-130). This French-inspired theme of *solidarité* “included Turkish nationalism, the construction of a classless, homogenous and amalgamated ... mass, the cultural regeneration of society, and an all encompassing project of secular morality politics” (Aydın, 2004, p. 66). *Halkçılık* was formulated so that it “neutralised the concept of class conflict and class struggle and served the purposes of the newly emerging bourgeoisie” (Ahmad, 1993, p. 63). Indeed, small farmers and the emergent working classes were the overly exploited segments of society that underpinned étatist development, while landlords and industrialists greatly flourished. *Halkçılık* not only offered an ideology of national solidarity to pacify class struggle, but it also assumed a distinctively non-religious character to help secularising the masses and preventing the utilisation of Islam for oppositional purposes. Directly influenced by Durkheim’s sociology of solidarity, Gökalp had formulated this idea as follows in the 1920s: “Turks love freedom and independence ... they cannot be socialists. But since they love equality, they cannot be liberals either. The system best suited to Turkish culture is solidarism. Private property is legitimate in so far as it serves social solidarity” (cited in Barlas, 1998, p. 46). During the 1930s, official documents repeatedly propagated étatism as a “third way” between socialist/fascist collectivism and liberal capitalism, representing national solidarity (Türkeş, 1998). Civic education textbooks highlighted that “to work is a social obligation”,

because “all humans are the members of a social body and are connected to each other”, and that “everybody should be happy with the profession that they have” (Afet İnan, 1930/2014, pp. 127, 135, 145).

The secularising thrust of the 1930s reveals that whereas “efforts toward the Turkification of religion gained considerable momentum in the initial years of the Republic; they eventually culminated in an appeal ... to replace religion with nationalism” (Hanioğlu, 2011, p. 63). Here, the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic history of the Turkish people were emphasised as part of a secularised “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) –as epitomised in the symbolic choice of name for national banks, such as the Sumerian Bank and the Hittite Bank. The Turkish Language Association and the Turkish Historical Society, both founded in 1932, served to trace the linguistic and historical roots of the nation away from Islamic heritage. The “Turkish History Thesis” and the “Sun-Language Theory” sought to put forward claims as to the centrality of the Turkish people and language in the development of the larger human civilisation (Çağaptay, 2002; Zürcher, 1985). People’s Homes (in towns) and People’s Rooms (in large villages) were opened in 1932 to educate the masses through disseminating ideas of secular nationalism. Islam was swiftly undermined in the definition of citizenship, as can be seen in the civic education textbooks penned largely by Mustafa Kemal himself²²⁸. Various other educational and anthropological endeavours of the government carried a similar secular message to underscore biological evolution and humanly creation of religion (Z. Toprak, 2012)²²⁹. Statues of Atatürk and other secular-republican symbols swarmed across the schools, squares, streets, and public buildings of the country, along with national holidays, commemorations, and celebrations (Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Özyürek, 2006). Concurrently, the definition of *laiklik* became more elaborate. The RPP programmes of 1931 and 1935, for instance, stipulated that “in the making of laws, bylaws, and procedures, the party accepts as a principle to use the latest scientific and technical tenets in accordance with the needs of the age. Given that religion is a matter of conscience, the party regards separating religion from world, state, and political affairs as one of the main conditions for the advancement of our nation on the path of contemporary civilisation” (CHP, 2014, pp. 129, 175). During the discussion on the 1931 Programme, Refik Şevket explained the significance of the article separating politics and religion: “essentially, the meaning of this article is to prevent

those, since the beginning of political life in the country, who take place in party politics to delude/seduce the people under the guise of religion” (CHP, 1931, p. 29).

While secular educational venues were amplified across the country, state-promoted religious instruction lost its centrality through “regulated diminishment”. The Party Programme of 1927 had already accentuated that education was to be “national, *laik*, and based on the unity of schools”, while that of 1931 clarified its aim as “cultivating strong, Republican, and *laik* citizens”, who would be devoid of “all kinds of superstition and foreign ideas” (CHP, 2014, p. 134). By that time, even religious education textbooks in elementary schools had assumed a largely secularised character. They provided civic and moral guidance deriving loosely from Islam, yet without a strong footing on theological matters²³⁰. Despite the secular interpretation of Islam, religious education at all levels was abolished by 1935, along with the closure of imam-preaching schools (1930), removal of Arabic and Farsi from school curriculum (1929-30), and the dissolution of the Faculty of Theology (1934). Koran courses, managed by *Diyanet*, were made almost inexistent. Various forms of religious education, monopolised by the Republic under the Ministry of Education in 1924, were completely eliminated in a decade²³¹. Another instance of regulated diminishment can be observed in *Diyanet* itself. As mentioned, *Diyanet* played a central role since 1924 in underpinning nation-building efforts with the promotion of Islam as modernised civic religion. Friday sermons, for instance were key in communicating national-capitalist values to the masses in religious terms. A book of sermons published by *Diyanet* in 1927 is full of such examples, teaching lessons on the religious benefits of trade, industry, agriculture, modern medicine, personal hygiene, national defence, hardworking, and avoiding alcohol and gambling (Usta, 1927/2010)²³². These sermons exemplified the use religious teachings to educate the masses for the nationally defined modern capitalist epoch. Despite such instrumental use of Islam for modernisation, the centrality of sermons and *Diyanet* in general was gradually displaced in the 1930s. The opening of new mosques significantly slowed down (which was negatively correlated to the increase in population) especially after the transfer of their administration to the Directorate of Pious Foundations in 1931 (Law no. 1827, 8 June).

The Pious Foundations (*vakıfs*) resolved to “classify mosques according to real needs, and remove the redundant ones for economising”. That move was in relation to the redefinition of *vakıfs* in largely secular-charitable terms as opposed to “backward and defective practices that tied the administration of vakıfs to the darkness of the past” (CHP, 1938, pp. 491, 483)²³³. In 1933, similarly, it was decided that vacant positions in *Diyanet* for preachers and religious teachers would not be filled, but eliminated (Law no. 2171, 8 May 1933). In the justification for the law, the riddance of vacant posts in *Diyanet* was explained by the general budgetary cuts that the government sought to implement (TBMM, 1 May 1933, Appendix, p. 1-2). As a whole, the annual funds of *Diyanet* plummeted especially after 1930, with a continuous tendency of decline in its ratio within the national budget. Whereas in 1924 this institution was allocated 1.013 percent of the national budget, its share dropped to 0.163 percent in the course of twenty years. The tendency of decline was to continue virtually uninterrupted until the end of the single-party regime in 1950. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the republicans never seriously contemplated relinquishing the administration of *Diyanet* (or the Pious Foundations). Full separation was an idea mentioned over the years only in passing by a handful of deputies in the parliament²³⁴, never amounting to a real debate. On the contrary, detailed laws rationalising the organisational structure of *Diyanet* (Law no. 2800, 14 June 1935) and Pious Foundations (Law no. 2762, 5 June 1935) were promulgated. Such measures show the republican reluctance to give up the “interior” regulation of Islamic institutions as a means of control. The cases of *Diyanet* and Pious Foundations are also indicative of the “regulated diminishment” of religious authority. After having replaced with all its prerogatives the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations in 1924, these new institutions’ monopoly on religious life was utilised to gradually decentralise Islam from sociopolitical life. The depoliticisation of Islam also manifested itself in the composition of the Assembly. Whereas deputies with religious occupational background constituted 20 percent of the GNAT in 1920, the figure dropped to 7 percent in 1923, 4 percent in 1927, 3 percent in 1931 and 1935, 2 percent in 1939, and 1 percent in 1943 (B. Toprak, 1981, pp. 70-71)²³⁵.

6.3.2. Other Secularising Laws of the Decade

The experience of the 1930s demonstrate that secularisation became directly entangled with “economic developmentalist goals” that matured with the étatist transformation. Together, “laicism and étatism summarized the political, cultural, and economic means for elevating the Turkish nation to a position of prosperity, prominence, and superiority within the field of ‘contemporary civilization’” (Parla & Davison, 2004, pp. 119, 132). In this process, the promotion of secular-national solidarity through *halkçılık* went parallel with Islam’s “regulated diminishment”. Throughout the decade, the republicans also took other measures to complete the work of instituting bourgeois-national forms through secularisation. On 1 April 1931, for instance, the Law on Measurements (Law no. 1782) nationally instituted the international metric system to abandon every other unit of measurement that was used in the Islamic tradition. Once again the purpose was to facilitate the creation of a standardised national economy, and synchronise with the West. The justification for the law mentioned that the coexistence of old and new standards of measurement in the territory caused confusion in transactions with the outer world. This was unacceptable “given that we are intensely integrated with world trade and economy”, and that “in export and import, merchants and the people suffer from various losses”. In domestic trade as well, using multiple sorts of measurement harmed the “regularity and consistency” of the national economy. For these reasons, the government sought to “facilitate commercial activity and calculations” to contribute to the “economic progress of the nation” (TBMM, 2 February 1931, Appendix, p. 1-2). Accordingly, Article 23 of the law declared Turkey’s participation in the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (*Bureau international des poids et mesures*), founded in France in 1875. The law provided a detailed description of the measurement units to be used in length, surface area, volume, weight, energy, electricity, heat, light, and so on (Articles 6-16). A pecuniary punishment was envisaged for those who continue using traditional measurement systems in their transactions, and imprisonment up to three months for recidivism (Article 24).

Another step towards western-economic integration with a consciously secularising implication was featured in the law on holidays (No. 2739, 27 May 1935). Article 3 of the law changed the weekly day of rest from Friday (sacred for Muslims) to

Sunday. The justification for the law complained that “deviating from the international day of rest [Sunday] ... has caused us to effectively lose a day”, and “was very costly”. This situation had to be changed, “given that world markets are closed on Sunday”, and “commercial and economic affairs” cannot be synchronised. In the parliament, Hakkı Kılıç seconded: “Gentlemen, the names of days have not descended from the heavens ... to be recognised as holy. It was humans who coined names for them, as for everything else. As proposed in the bill, the essence of this [law] is directly economic”. He added that “at a time when we are walking definitely towards the western civilisation, we cannot remain bound to the east ... Archaic laws can have no impact on us”. Armenian deputy Berç Türker held that holy days were randomly chosen by the clergies of different religions “according to their interests”, but then “reasonable people and businessmen ... around the world” agreed on Sunday. İhsan Tokgöz concurred that “standardisation ... is useful both in work and economy ... Our nation will not oppose this, because it is far from the periods of bigotry” (TBMM, 27 May 1935, pp. 302-303). The law also identified three national and two religious holidays to complete the process of “rationalising, unifying, centralising the state and providing it with new symbols of legitimation” (Georgeon, 2012, p. 277). One deputy claimed that having a total of seven days annually for religious holidays was too much, to which another responded: “there is an economic consideration for that. It benefits candy makers and other artisans” (TBMM, 27 May 1935, pp. 303-304).

Secularising reform continued regarding the appellation of citizens. Two important laws were promulgated in 1934, one of which decreed the use of surnames (Law no. 2525, 28 June), and the other forbade the utilisation of other appellations suggesting religious or other types of hierarchy (Law no. 2590, 27 November). According to the Surname Law, every family was to choose a last name (Article 1), which was not based on a legally standardised system in the Ottoman Empire. Article 3 of the law prohibited the choosing of surnames that indicated “rank, status, tribe or foreign ... names”. The introduction of obligatory and consistent family names was an essential step in a legal mechanism based on nationally organised private accumulation and inheritance. In the report prepared by the Ministry of Justice, it was declared that surnames existed “in every civilised nation today” and that according to legal scholars, it was regarded as a “property right”²³⁶ and a “personal right”. Refet (Bele) Bey argued that

the law would strengthen Turkish identity by eliminating the use of Persian and Arabic appellatives. Minister of Internal Affairs Kaya said legal surnames were necessary to avoid confusions in “military, administrative, civil, and commercial procedures” (TBMM, 16 June 1934, pp. 192, 198, Appendix, p. 5, 7). More particularly, the law openly promoted secular-national citizenship over other (especially religious) ways of articulating social relationships. Şükrü Kaya put it in these words: “from regions that still live memories of clans and tribalism, we must erase these memories ... Removing this is required for the principle of national unity” (TBMM, 21 June 1934, p. 246). The justification for the law uttered similarly that “our ancestors were under the influence of religion”, but today, “these sublime appearances fall apart against the prohibitions of our law”. It added: “surnames indicate the nationality of those who carry it. Religion and race ... has no relevance here” (TBMM, 16 June 1934, Appendix, p. 1). Five months later, the complementary law prohibiting the use of religious/traditional titles and nicknames of reverence such as “*agha, haji, hafiz, hodja, mullah*” in official documents was promulgated, which also banned hierarchical terms like “*efendi, sir, ... pasha, ... Excellency*”. The official justification for the law was democratisation, which is “based on having no legal, formal, or procedural distinction between the members of the nation”. The document put forward religion as among the central causes of inequality. It held that early Turkish societies were much more egalitarian, but “in the middle ages, inequalities arose *based on religion, superstition, or ambition for power and domination*. Privileged classes were thus created”, which ascribed themselves “divine and imaginary titles and labels ... used for constantly oppressing the people”. However, “the Turkish revolution and Republic have now rendered everybody equal”. In the parliamentary discussions, this view was reiterated. One deputy said, “we are abolishing the last remnants of backwardness” (TBMM, 26 November 1934, p. 47, Appendix, p. 1).

The replacement of religious appellations with official last names sought to promote bourgeois-national integration at the expense of the symbolic sway of Islamic notables. Before the year was over, the Assembly tackled yet another aspect of religious symbolism, this time on garments. Legislated on 5 December 1934, Law no. 2596 stipulated that clerics, “regardless of the religion and sect they belong, are prohibited from wearing religious garments *outside of places of worship and ceremonies*”. This was in addition to Law. No. 676 of 1925, which had criminalised the wearing of Islamic

garments assigned exclusively to *Diyanet*'s religious officials. Now, even the official *ulema* could not wear religious garments off duty. Kaya unmistakably placed secularisation brought about by the law in the context of republican sovereignty: "gentlemen, one of the foundations of our great revolution is to be *laik*. To be *laik* is to eliminate religion from state affairs and national affairs ... This law ... addresses an issue of public order that is related to the survival of the Republic ... It is an obligation necessitated by the revolution. Hence, if this precaution is not taken today, the security of the country's future will be in danger". Kaya's words implied the threat caused to the national order by Islamic reactionism²³⁷. Hakkı Kılıç clarified that the law was against "those who represent superstition ... Although they are already in the grave, this law will serve as a stone weight above them, and it will prevent the outflow of their superstitions" (TBMM, 3 December 1934, p. 75). Along the same lines, the justification for the law underscored the "separation of religion and state", the "exclusion of religious doctrines from statehood", and recognised *laiklik* as "*the main principle* of the revolution and the regime". It further stated the goal to bring about "equality regarding freedom of conscience ... irrespective of the religion and sect one belongs" (TBMM, 3 December 1934, Appendix, p. 1). Besides separation, the law made a key exemption that represented the strategy of regulation. The stipulations regarding religious garments was to be applicable to all except for one designated cleric of each religion assigned by the government (Article 1, Paragraph 2). In this specific sense, the law echoed the logic of Napoléon's Concordat in officially recognising established religions and their representatives, "as a sign of respect for all denominations". On this exception, Şükrü Kaya said, "the government would like to assume that authority" (TBMM, 3 December 1934, p. 77, Appendix, p. 2).

Women's national rights of suffrage and running for office were secured also with a constitutional amendment of the same year (Law no. 2599, 5 December 1934). The amendment built on and completed the work of the preceding four years, where women had gained the right to run for office in municipalities (Law no. 1580, 10 April 1930) and villages (Law no. 2322, 26 October 1933). The justification and parliamentary discussions for the law underscored the democratic nature of the reform, which deputies deemed would be unthinkable in the Islamic Empire. One deputy said: "if we claimed women's rights from sultans, whom we served for so long, they would either hang us or

throw us into the sea!” In the justification document penned by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, a similar thought was voiced: “bad and defective mentalities inherited from the periods of despotism and ignorance ... have no place in the clean and virtuous territory of the Republic”. In his speech in the Assembly too, İnönü held that the essence of the revolution was emancipation from such conservative worldviews, and to “liberate women from an evil regime that left them in darkness”. In history, he added, “whenever Turkish women worked together with men in the affairs of the country, the great Turkish nation then embraced the world with its civilisation” (TBMM, 5 December 1934, pp. 82-84, Appendix, p. 1). Refik Bey similarly underlined that the civilised essence of Turkey can now be seen by the whole world²³⁸. The RPP Programme of 1935 incorporated these changes by stipulating that “the party does not differentiate between men and women regarding citizenship rights and responsibilities” (CHP, 2014, p. 173). As such, women’s emancipation was also placed in the context of *laiklik*, for the latter was understood as a break from past traditionalism that subjugated women.

In 1937, *laiklik* found its place in the constitution as an unchangeable feature of the Republic. Law no. 3115, promulgated on 5 February, amended Article 2 of the constitution as follows: “The State of Turkey is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, *laik*, and revolutionist”. Echoing the RPP Programmes of 1931 and 1935 cited above, the constitutional commission’s report defined *laiklik* as a principle by which all national policies would be made not according to “ancient mentalities and traditions and their requirements, but only by the needs and necessities of the times, and for the ... advancement of the country” (TBMM, 5 February 1937, Appendix, p. 3). In the parliamentary discussions, separation of religion and state was again a prevalent theme. Minister Kaya clarified that “what we mean by *laiklik* is to ensure that religion does not influence or factor in the affairs of the state ... We say that religion should remain in the consciences and temples, and not interfere with material and worldly affairs. We do not, and will not, let it interfere!” (TBMM, 5 February 1937, p. 61). As seen in earlier episodes, the deputies linked secularisation closely to modernisation, progress, and the protection of the Republic²³⁹. In his last inaugural speech delivered in person at the parliament, Mustafa Kemal clarified the secular philosophy of the Republic beyond doubt: “Our main governmental program is that of the Republican People’s Party. The administrative and political principles of this program illuminate our path. Nevertheless,

one should not confound these principles with the dogmas of books believed to have descended from the heavens. We take our inspiration not from the heavens or other worlds, but directly from life” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 313).

Finally, the Law of Associations (No. 3512) of 28 June 1938 completed the oeuvre of republican secularisation. Article 9b of the law prohibited the foundation of associations that would be against Article 2 of the recently amended constitution, which included *laiklik*. More specifically, Article 9e of the law forbade the establishment of an association that is “based on principles of religion, sect, or congregations”. These were made punishable by imprisonment or fine (Article 35). Kaya identified their objective of religious regulation as follows: “what we expect from all religions and sects is that they obey the laws ... If they do not, we have all sorts of legal mediums to make them obey” (TBMM, 28 June 1938, p. 413)²⁴⁰. Article 49 of the law stipulated that existing “charitable, religious, social, medical, and educational ... organisations” would now be run by “associations to be found in accordance to the stipulations of the present law”. This effectively removed religious ministers, particularly those of non-Muslim religions, from the administration of associations. Kaya explained the article: “clerics ... are free to exercise their rituals only within the bounds of their churches ... as long as they do not contradict or harm public law and security. It is the essence of our principle that all other temporal affairs ... are to be carried out by the people. Therefore, the administration of schools, hospitals, and other charitable organisations will be given to non-clericals” (TBMM, 28 June 1938, p. 417). The Law of Associations of 1938 marks the end of the major secularisation wave in republican Turkey, which went through different stages to culminate in *laiklik*. An RPP document of the same year defined the meaning of the concept as follows: “In social life, that an individual is irreligious or belongs to a given belief system ... can be considered neither a vice, nor a virtue”. This is because “separation of religion from worldly affairs, and the proclamation of *laiklik*” entails that “no one can be forced to a kind of worship, or no one can be prohibited from a worship they accept by heart” (CHP, 1938, p. 13).

The sociopolitical reach of secularisation outside of urban centers, nevertheless, was hampered by the fact that the Republic did not “emerge with a program of serious commitment to structural or economic change in the countryside”. Despite initiatives of

agrarian reform in the 1920s and 1930s, these policies “were limited in scope” and they “benefited the big landowners rather than the poor peasants” (B. Toprak, 1981, p. 70). As “the Turkish Revolution did not try to change the peasants or integrate them into the new polity”, it “strengthened the [Islamically articulated] traditional bond between local notables (usually landlords) and peasants”, especially by increasing the latter’s dependency to the former (Trimberger, 1978, pp. 112-113). Although the local notables and landlords had relatively limited political influence in national politics during Atatürk’s lifetime (until 1938), their economic power and hold on the local community constantly grew. The Republic allied with these powerbrokers and shied away from substantial land reform and redistribution that would give small peasants an independent political standing. The local notables resented secularisation, for “in more than one instance they felt that the peasants were awakening in the wrong direction” (Karpas, 1962, p. 309), and they saw it as a force that could potentially challenge their authority. Not long after 1938, these “landlords with traditional noble and religious status” (merging with other notables, merchants, and religious leaders) were able to nationally organise as a social class and “mobilize mass peasant support by an appeal to religious ... values” and political clientalism (B. Toprak, 1981, p. 72; Trimberger, 1978, pp. 110, 114). Representing that conservative class coalition, the Democrat Party’s rise to power in the elections of 1950 would not only end the étatist industrial-developmental pattern, but also reverse many of the initiatives of sociopolitical secularisation undertaken in the 1923-38 period²⁴¹.

Reprise and Review

Founded “in the interwar period ... the Republic ... created the conditions for the transition to industrial capitalism in Turkey, as well as to ... a mode of production based on private property” (Savran, 2010, p. 106). In this three-decade juncture that started with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the enterprise of secularisation came to be an essential constituent of national-bourgeois state building in at least three interrelated ways: to fight against the sociopolitical remnants of the traditional Ottoman structure, to counteract European interventions revolving around the Caliphate and the question of minorities, and to promote industrial development and national solidarity as a means to modernisation (that is, to reach the level of “contemporary civilization”). The course of

secularisation varied in different intervals based on the interplay of class forces (ethno-religiously divided until mid-1920s) and the struggle for internal/external sovereignty through “passive revolution”. Throughout Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, and based on the pragmatic and creative mechanism he established vis-à-vis religion, the “interior regulation” of Islam went parallel with the continued “separation” of Islamic authority from various sociopolitical spheres. The tendency to note is that the Islamic-reformist tone of nation-building efforts gradually faded as foreign threat was averted and domestic traditional forces were overpowered. Especially as the Kemalist Republic consolidated its rule and turned to étatism, “regulated diminishment” was actively pursued to weaken the social significance of religion, as well as its substitution with secular-nationalist solidarity catering to the needs of industrial development. The fate of *laiklik* and the Republic, in these various episodes, became fully adjoined.

Conclusions

Deriving from the complex historical trajectories and the rich empirical evidence they offer, what are some idiographic and nomothetic insights to be gained from the French and Turkish experiences of sociopolitical secularisation? Parallel with the research questions and in dialogue with the literature presented in the introductory chapter, the idiographic contribution of this dissertation speaks to the historiography on these polities' national state building intervals, while its nomothetic contribution concerns the larger theoretical debate on secularisation. Regarding the former, the process-oriented comparative-historical narrative in the preceding chapters confirms that secularisation in France and Turkey cannot be fully understood through voluntaristic presuppositions that overemphasise the ideational convictions of national state builders (Kuru, 2009; Stock-Morton, 1988). Although they cultivated secular/positivist worldviews during their opposition to the sacralised regimes of Napoléon III and Abdülhamid II, it is methodologically and historically questionable to assume that French and Turkish republicans simply followed (or were powerful enough to follow) a preconceived ideological blueprint to realise their visions of secularisation. The highly confrontational history of these polities reveals that *laïcité* and *laiklik* did not emerge merely as ideational desires or constructs; they were also concrete state building strategies involving "separation" and "regulation" against the challenges coming from the various faces of religious authority. Accordingly, secularisation was moulded, matured, and experienced various ups and downs and contradictions in the very process of contention. By the same token, another critique can be directed against deterministic accounts that interpret secularisation in France and Turkey by sole reference to their Catholic and Sunni Muslim "civilisational" backgrounds (Kazancıgil, 1992; B. Lewis, 1993). While it is true that the doctrinal/institutional configuration of these religious establishments vis-à-vis political power was a factor influencing the secularising struggle, the historical analysis shows that this was just one "religious" determinant among others, which interrelated with several "extra-religious" variables. In other words,

Catholic and Sunni Islamic ideas and establishments did not predetermine the emphasis on “separation” in France and “regulation” in Turkey. That eventual outcome was contingent upon the critical junctures of 1875-1905/1908-1938, which featured a complex combination of additional factors such as class struggles, internal/external sovereign state making, and the situation of religious minorities. The elements of convergence and divergence between the French and Turkish lineages of secularisation are set against this contingent and multifaceted causal mechanism.

In relation to the idiographic discussion, the nomothetic insights gained from France and Turkey engenders a dialogue with the secularisation debate, which also suffers from certain voluntaristic and deterministic tendencies. In reply to the “religious economies paradigm” that prioritise the voluntaristic religious preferences of individuals (Iannaccone, Finke, & Stark, 1997; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985), the French and Turkish cases suggest that a macrosociological focus is necessary to understand how state power, and the various internal and external sociopolitical struggles that it encapsulates, may reach and transform society to affect religious affiliation and “consumer demand”. That is to say, the influence of macro-level political processes and contentions affecting religious behaviour goes beyond the sole variable of “regulation/deregulation” of “religious economies” (as suggested by Stark & Iannaccone, 1994). France and Turkey provide ample evidence that religions (as ideological, institutional, and political entities) interact in multiple ways with macro-level processes such as class struggles, civil conflict, wars, and diplomatic relations –each of which may prove central to shaping individuals’ religious “consumer demand”. As a research agenda, this calls for establishing stronger connections between “individual” (micro) and “societal” (macro) levels of secularisation (Dobbelaere, 2004) as well as the “private” and “public” dimensions of religion(s) (Casanova, 1994).

On the other side of the debate, the findings of the research also render the “classical secularisation paradigm” subject to criticism due to its deterministic implications (Bruce, 2009; Wilson, 1982). The French and Turkish experiences bear witness to the point that sociopolitical secularisation cannot be reduced to a “latent” phenomenon that evolves as a structural component of modernisation; it is also a “manifest” and highly contentious undertaking carried out by the agency of individuals

and social groups (Dobbelaere, 1981). Echoing the relationship between structure and agency in the social sciences, these two can be understood as closely interconnected rather than mutually exclusive. Structural transformations such as political centralisation and economic commercialisation of the long nineteenth century set in motion the “latent” dimension of secularisation as an unintended consequence. In France and the Ottoman Empire, these larger developments challenged in distinct ways the traditional functions, norms, doctrines, and institutions of religious authority. Yet this was only one side of the coin. The religious domain did not passively accept modernising forces to gradually wither away. Instead, it fought back to reaffirm its social significance in novel ways and through different social alliances in a changing world, which created sociopolitical polarisations that brought forth the “manifest” agency of historical actors that intentionally transferred certain functions and capabilities from the religious to the secular sphere. The strategies of “separation” and “regulation” employed by national state builders, as discussed and documented at length in Part III, validate the notion that secularisation can be a highly agency-driven process, responding to and conditioned by a multi-layered array of contentions and macrosociological realities. While the structural environment created the conditions of possibility for certain tendencies towards secularisation/sacralisation in both polities, it was the leadership and creativity of key French and Turkish republicans that acted upon political opportunities and instituted *laïcité* and *laiklik* as they historically unfolded.

What are the main contributions of the present study to the social scientific understanding of secularisation? Gorski (2005, p. 176) writes that “the comparative and historical approach never penetrated to the paradigmatic core” of the sociology of religion, namely “the theory of secularization”. Goldstein (2009, p. 175) concurs that “there is a reluctance” in the sociology of religion literature “to take ... secularization and ground it historically through studies of religious and social movements and countermovements”. A central enterprise of this dissertation has been to follow precisely that “less travelled” path and associate the secularisation paradigm (sociology of religion) closely with the literature on state formation (comparative-historical sociology). This was done for the purpose of contributing to “historicising the secularisation debate” through the scrutiny of the “sociopolitical conflicts” that influence the progression of secularisation/desecularisation (Gorski, 2000a, 2003b, 2005). Several theoretical and

methodological insights on secularisation crystallise based on the historical-comparative research on the French and Turkish experiences of national state building. First, and most evidently, the “war of two Frances” and the Ottoman-Turkish “split-up modernisation” corroborate the idea that secularisation is a dialectical process rather than homogenous or unilinear, and that it transforms diverse spheres of the sociopolitical scene in uneven ways (Goldstein, 2009, p. 158; Gorski, 2000a, p. 159). The historical trajectories of the two cases lucidly demonstrate that “the process of secularisation is far from a uniform, continuous or even ... irreversible one. Nor has the pattern of secularisation been an even or homogeneous one across different societies. The process of secularisation is greatly affected by the *surrounding social context*” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 204-5) (my emphasis).

On this note, a few examples can be recapped from Part II. After 1789 in France, secularisation of education took place predominantly at secondary and higher levels (to raise liberal-bourgeois elites and bureaucrats), whereas primary schools were left to the church (to keep the masses in check by “restoring the authority of religion in the soul of children” (Guizot, 1889, p. 146; Stock-Morton, 1988, p. 8)). During the same period in the modernising Ottoman Empire, the educational, legal, and bureaucratic spheres were deeply “bifurcated” along religious versus secular lines, creating jurisdictional confusions, disputes, and contentions throughout the long nineteenth century (Berkes, 1964; R. H. Davison, 1963; Findley, 1980). In both polities, moreover, some of the secularising processes instigated by the Revolution and *Tanzimat* were reversed in subsequent episodes (like the Bourbon Restoration and Hamidian rule), although desecularisation meant the reintegration of religion in novel ways rather than turning back to the pre-1789 reality. More examples can be reiterated from Part III. The French Third Republic initiated a major wave of secularisation at home in the 1880s while simultaneously incorporating the Catholic Church in its colonisation efforts, as epitomised in Gambetta’s motto: “Anticlericalism is not an item for export” (Daughton, 2006). Likewise, the Republic of Turkey in the 1920s undertook an unprecedented secularisation initiative against various dimensions of religious authority while concurrently monopolising the institutional basis of Sunni Islam within the political apparatus (A. Davison, 1998). Such seemingly paradoxical instances are not anomalies in an otherwise linear and uniform trend of secularisation. On the contrary, historical

evidence suggests that this is what actually existing processes of secularisation look like: they internalise various contradictions and experience constant ebbs and flows parallel with the balance of societal forces and struggles.

In relation to that latter term, a second contribution my research offers is to widen the comprehension of what “sociopolitical conflict” regarding secularisation may mean. Even in historically conscious studies that successfully expose the contentions of religious versus secular groups in the making of secularisation, there seems to be an overemphasis on religion as if all the battles of the periods in question were almost exclusively about secularising or sacralising the societal scene (some examples include the works of Kuru, 2009; Martin, 1978; McLeod, 1995; Smith, 2003). The tendency to single out the object of research (that is, secularisation) may understate the larger contentious framework, where secularisation/sacralisation is often not the sole motivation of actors, nor is it the only asset at stake. Gorski (2003b, p. 119) identifies such neglect of the bigger picture as a potential shortcoming of sociopolitical conflict approaches. Accordingly, researchers may fail to account for “the roots of the sociopolitical conflicts themselves”, but instead treat “these conflicts as a given” and focus “on their dynamics and effects” without saying anything about “their underlying causes” or about the “conditions of possibility for the emergence of political religions and secular ideologies”. To overcome that limitation, the present study placed secularisation against the complex and contentious background of national state building in its internal and external dimensions so as to carefully analyse the essential mechanisms that may have fashioned and energised secularising mentalities, motivations, groups, and strategies.

More specifically, and as a third contribution, I proposed two “extra-religious” master processes (class struggles and internal/external state building) that influence the course of secularisation, which intersect and interact with two major “religious” variables (the doctrinal/institutional configuration of the dominant religion and the state’s relationship with religious minorities). Deriving from that framework, I put forward that the French and Turkish cases of national state building produced convergent patterns, because in both cases the dominant religious institutions and worldviews were entangled with and embraced by social forces resistant to bourgeois-republican transformation.

Consequently, secularisation came to be part and parcel of the sociopolitical struggle for attaining sovereign infrastructural power. That the Catholic and Sunni Muslim establishments as well as religious orders and notables were directly politicised on the side of the *ancien régime* stimulated and contributed to the development of secularising ideologies and strategies (Akgönül, 2008a; Burdy & Marcou, 1995; Kuru, 2009). In addition and in relation to the domestic contention, external sovereignty also became a factor in secularisation. Vatican's intrusions in French policymaking and the Caliphate's claim to extraterritorial authority further convinced national state builders to remove the influence of these religious bodies to reinforce nationally organised sovereignty (Evered & Evered, 2010; Partin, 1969).

Accentuating the relationship between secularisation and the internal/external dimensions of sovereignty does not mean that *laïcité* and *laiklik* were merely pragmatic responses to address nation-building concerns. They were also representative of the genuine passions, convictions, and ingenuity of sociopolitical actors and forces that evolved in the actuality of the struggle, where the ideational confrontations between the religious and the secular were in "elective affinity" with various material interests and "life chances" of the groups involved (S. Hall, 1986; Thomas, 1985). For historical reasons outlined in Chapter 2, France and Turkey were among the few European cases where the consolidation of bourgeois-national power was antagonised by an outright and long-standing challenge coming from actors, groups, and institutions possessing religious authority. Aristocratic/patrimonial reaction to modernisation in the post-1789 reality (as exemplified in Chapter 4) clearly revealed the "elective affinity" between religion and traditional class power, accelerating "a process ... of convergence by which religious ethic and material interest" tended to "move ever closer to each other" (Hill, 1973; Thomas, 1985, p. 43). As "organic intellectuals" of their respective social formations, the Catholic clergy's response to centralisation/commercialisation showed striking similarities to that of the Sunni Muslim *ulema* in the Ottoman Empire. For these class fractions, the loss of economic privileges, social status, and religious-ideational pre-eminence were one and the same process. Likewise, the secular passions of republican state builders in the twentieth century were intimately linked to their political, economic, and social standing, as well as the class forces they represented. Weber's notion of

“elective affinity” serves as a critical tool in this historical narrative to make sense of the irreducible relationship between ideational and material interests.

The divergence of the French and Turkish cases sheds further light on how the interplay of “extra-religious” and “religious” factors may be explanatory of secularisation. In the core of the global system, the secularising current of the French Third Republic was built on the hegemony of the bourgeoisie that formed alliances (through various material and ideational mechanisms) with petty producers, working classes, and the peasantry (Elwitt, 1975; Magraw, 1986). The wave of secularisation in peripheral Turkey lacked a strong bourgeois and working class basis. What is more, the Republic prioritised the material interests of traditional local landlords and notables over those of the small peasantry, which failed to sufficiently integrate the latter into the secularising project (B. Toprak, 1981; Trimberger, 1978). In result of the ethno-religious strife in Turkey, the lack of integration was also valid for the non-Muslim population, whereas the Protestant and Jewish minorities in France were won over by the Republic and they actively contributed to its consolidation (Akgönül, 2013; Birnbaum, 1994; Cabanel, 2000; Okutan, 2004). The minority question tied in closely with these polities’ position in the age of imperialism. That Turkey was on the defensive side of imperialism, “external domination” brought forth the centrality of Sunni Islam as an element of “cultural defence” (Martin, 1978; Wallis & Bruce, 1992), which defined itself not only against Christian occupiers, but also against domestic non-Muslims. In the same period, France’s imperialist expansion created a similar bias for Catholicism in the colony (Daughton, 2006), but that did not translate into a religious partiality against minorities in domestic politics. Consequently, the “religious monopoly” (Martin, 1978) of Sunni Islam was partly and implicitly maintained in Turkish secularisation, which was not the case for Catholicism in France. Finally in France, the “relatively autonomous” and extra-national basis of Catholicism facilitated its severance from the state, which could thereafter be overseen as a “religious association”. In Turkey, rendering the “state embedded” Islamic establishment independent would deprive the republicans of the power to confine religiously voiced dissent, and of using religious legitimacy in the transition to the national state. In that sense, Atatürk’s priorities echoed Napoléon’s intentions in instituting the concordatory system (Tanör, 1997). A combination of these multiple factors, as expounded and exemplified in the previous chapters, characterised the

particularities of *laïcité* (emphasising separation) and *laiklik* (accentuating regulation) as geographically specific strategies of national state building that operated in dissimilar social conditions and political opportunities conditioned by uneven and combined development.

Fourth, the conceptualisation of “separation” and “regulation” merits elaboration as a potential contribution to “historicising the secularisation debate”. Operationalised in this dissertation as the main point of intersection between comparative-historical sociology and the sociology of religion, these statecraft strategies engender and invigorate the macro-level processes of “differentiation”, “societalisation”, and “rationalisation” to diminish the social significance of religious authority, and reorganise its relationship vis-à-vis the nationalising state (Chaves, 1994; Dobbelaere, 1981; Wallis & Bruce, 1992; Wilson, 1982). The French and Turkish experiences laid out in Part III attest that the national state builders have consciously and actively used “separation” and “regulation” to secularise the various spheres of the sociopolitical scene as part of their contention to reinforce state infrastructural power against religiously identified, affiliated, or legitimated contenders (Gorski, 2003a; Mann, 1984; Rokkan, 1975; Soifer, 2008). The operational logic of these strategies, often used simultaneously and complementarily, was entrenched in the French and Turkish secularising legislation that impacted “legal-institutional”, “socio-educational”, “symbolic-ideological”, and “property-distributional” spheres (see appendices). In each case, while separation “differentiated” certain manifestations of religious authority away from social power and transferred its functions and capabilities to the secular state, regulation was used to oversee and confine the remaining domain of the religious through the “societally” and “rationally” organised political apparatus. Documenting the modus operandi of separation/regulation through abundant historical data crystallises the mentalities, motivations, and tactics of historical actors to bring about differentiation, societalisation, and rationalisation; which further confirm the prominence of “manifest” sociopolitical agency in the making of secularisation.

Fifth, another insight related to these dual strategies is that they belie the unidimensional understanding of secularisation that solely emphasises the “differentiation” between the religious and the secular (as epitomised in the

commonplace term “separation of church and state”). On account of its dialectical nature discussed above, the “de-differentiation” of some aspects of state-religion relations may very well be an inherent component of a larger secularising process (for an example of how this happened during the Reformation, see Gorski, 2000a). Historical evidence suggests that in different periods and ways, French and Turkish political actors relied on “de-differentiation” (through what I call “interior regulation”) as a conscious secularising strategy to diminish the social significance of religious authority. Napoléon’s Concordat and Atatürk’s *Diyanet* exemplify how “de-differentiation” can be a strategy to weaken religious authority by subordinating it to the boundaries defined and managed by state power (Barbier, 1987, pp. 69-125). In many occasions, secularising agents actively defended and utilised “interior regulation” as a means to prompt the “regulated diminishment” of religion. The rapidly declining budgets and public prominence ascribed to the Catholic and Muslim establishments, personnel, and edifices during the 1875-1905 and 1924-38 periods indicate how “de-differentiation” can be employed for lessening religion’s sphere of activity and authority. This explains why even among the most determinedly secularising republicans, there was a persistent resistance to the idea of institutional “separation” (some examples include Ferry, Gambetta, and Combes in France and Bozkurt, Kaya, and Saraçoğlu in Turkey).

All in all, the theoretical and methodological approach employed and developed in this dissertation proposes a sociologically and historically informed framework to study macro-level processes of secularisation and sacralisation. Having empirically scrutinised the French and Turkish experiences of the *longue durée* that culminated in their republican state building episodes, I hope that my attempt to expound a non-reductionist “materialist interpretation” of secularisation has offered valuable conceptual tools and perspectives to “historicise” the debate (Gorski, 2000a; Turner, 1991). In addition to this historical goal, and as a suggestion for future research, the examination of contemporary phenomena such as the global resurgence of religions in the neoliberal age could also benefit from the instruments of comparative macrosociology. The re-sacralisation of national and international politics since the 1980s is yet to be systematically analysed in the context of the changing nature of social classes and state sovereignty under neoliberal globalisation. Comparatively studying the contentions involving class forces and market-based state transformations of the last three decades would be particularly

fertile to the social scientific inquiry of religious revival (or the instrumental use of religion). Cross-religious and cross-regional comparisons of “extra-religious” and “religious” factors underpinning desecularisation/secularisation may hold the key for furthering the agenda of the secularisation debate, and shedding light on the complicated relationship between religion and sociopolitical power in the 21st century.

Appendices

Appendix A: French Republican Laws on Secular Education in the 1880s

Date	Legislation	Description
9 August 1879	Law Establishing Instructor Schools	Major initiative to found instructor schools in all departments
27 February 1880	Law on Higher Councils of Public Education and Academic Councils	Clergy removed from Higher Councils of Public Education. Secular Academic Councils established
18 March 1880	Law on Liberty of Higher Education	Only state institutions can carry the title "university", confer degrees, and matriculate students
21 December 1880	Law on Girls' Secondary Education	Girls Secondary Schools opened with optional religious education by authorised clerics
16 June 1881	Law on Primary Education Certificates	Both public and private school staff required state certificate through examination
16 June 1881	Law on Free Public Primary Schools	Public schools made free, and more competitive
28 March 1882	Law on Obligatory and <i>Laique</i> Primary Education	Primary education made obligatory with a <i>laique</i> curriculum
30 October 1886	Law on the Organisation of Primary Education	Secularisation of instructors in public schools

Appendix B: Other French Republican Laws of Secularisation in the 1880s

Date	Legislation	Description
8 July 1880	Law Abolishing Military Chaplaincies	Chaplaincies removed from military premises
12 July 1880	Law Abolishing Obligatory Holiday on Sundays	Work authorised on religious holidays
29 March 1881	Law on Press	Criticism of religion decriminalised
14 November 1881	Law on Cemeteries	Denominational separation of cemeteries prohibited
5 April 1884	Law on Municipalities	The municipality given prerogatives over the local church
29 July 1884	Law on Divorce	Divorce authorised for the first time since the Restoration
14 August 1884	Law on Constitutional Amendments	The word "God" removed from the Constitution along with public prayers in the opening of the Parliament
16 May 1885	Decree Secularising <i>Panthéon</i>	The symbolic Church St. Genevieve restored into <i>Panthéon</i>
13 June 1886	Law on Royal Families	Royal family members expelled from France
15 November 1887	Law on the Liberty of Funerals	Religious monopoly on burials broken. Non-religious civil funerals are authorised.
15 July 1889	Law on Military Service	Compulsory military service extended to include the clergy

Appendix C: French Republican Laws of Secularisation in the Early 1900s

Date	Legislation	Description
24 January 1900	Court Decision on Assumptionist Order	The Assumptionist order dissolved
1 July 1901	Law on Associations	Increased authorisation and regulation over religious congregations
4 December 1902	Law on Congregations	Congregationist schools without authorisation criminalised
1 April 1904	Decree on Crucifixes in Courts	Removal of crucifixes in courtrooms
7 July 1904	Law Abolishing Congregationist Education	Congregationist education at all levels outlawed
30 July 1904	Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with Vatican	Parliamentary decision to end diplomatic ties with Vatican. Ambassador called back.
28 December 1904	Law Abolishing Religious Monopoly on Burials	Complementing the Law of 15 November 1887
21 March 1905	Law on Military Service	Further eliminating clerical exceptions in recruitment
9 December 1905	Law on the Separation of the Churches and State	Official separation between state and church, and regulation of the latter by the former in the name of public order

Appendix D: Turkish Republican Laws of Secularisation (1922-27)

Date	Legislation	Description
1 November 1922	Decree no. 307/8 Ending the Ottoman Empire	Caliphate and Sultanate separated (the latter abolished)
13 October 1923	Decree no. 27 on the Capital of Turkey	Ankara replaces Istanbul as the new capital
29 October 1923	Law no. 364 Constitutional Amendments	Republic of Turkey established
3 March 1924	Law no. 429 Abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations	“Interior” regulation established through <i>Diyanet</i> and Directorate of Pious foundations. Nationalisation of property.
3 March 1924	Law no. 430 on the Unification of Education	Secular education replacing <i>medreses</i>
3 March 1924	Law no. 431 on the Abolition of the Caliphate	Caliphate abolished, dynasty members expelled
8 April 1924	Law no. 469 on the Abolition of Sharia Courts	Secular court system ended bifurcation in the justice system
17 February 1925	Law no. 552 on the Abolition of the Tithe	Tithe replaced by a modern system of taxation
25 February 1925	Law no. 556 Amending the High Treason Law	Political use of religion criminalised
25 November 1925	Law no. 671 “Hat Law”	The western hat accepted as the headgear of the nation
30 November 1925	Law no. 676 Amending the Penal Code	Criminalisation of non-officials wearing religious garments
30 November 1925	Law no. 677 Abolishing Religious Orders	All religious orders banned, property confiscated
17 February 1926	Law no. 743 Civil Code	Abolished Islamic family/civil law
1 March 1926	Law no. 765 Penal Code	National-capitalist legal transformation enabled
22 April 1926	Law no. 818 Obligations Code	
29 May 1926	Law no. 865 Commerce Code	
26 December 1926	Law no. 697 on the 24-Hour Day	International time adopted
26 December 1926	Law no. 698 Calendar Reform	Islamic calendar replaced with the Gregorian calendar
28 May 1927	Law no. 1057 On Ottoman Symbols	Removed Ottoman symbols from public and other buildings

Appendix E: Turkish Republican Laws of Secularisation (1928-38)

Date	Legislation	Description
10 April 1928	Law no. 1222 Amending the Constitution	State religion abolished, other Islamic references removed
24 May 1928	Law no. 1288 on International Numerals	International numeral system adopted
3 November 1928	Law no. 1353 on the Alphabet	Arabic script abolished, replaced with Latin alphabet
1 April 1931	Law no. 1782 on Measurements	All traditional measurements abolished, metric system adopted
31 May 1933	Law no. 2252 Abolishing <i>Darülfünun</i>	Faculty of Theology in Istanbul eliminated
21 June 1934	Law no. 2525 on Surnames	Obligation to have legal surnames, all other traditional/religious appellations
26 November 1934	Law no. 2590 Abolishing Certain Appellations	
5 December 1934	Law no. 2596 Prohibiting Certain Garments	Complementing Law no. 676, extended bans on religious garments (including officials)
8 December 1934	Law no. 2599 Amending the Constitution	Women's right to suffrage and running for office
29 May 1935	Law no. 2739 on Holidays	National and religious holidays regulated
5 February 1937	Law no. 3115 Amending the Constitution	<i>Laiklik</i> enters the constitution
28 June 1938	Law no. 3512 on Associations	Forming associations for religious purposes prohibited

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Notes

- ¹ Following Charles Tilly's (1990, pp. 2-3) classification, I use the term "national state" throughout this dissertation to refer to "relatively powerful, centralized, and differentiated sovereign organizations", which are "governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of ... autonomous structures". This is in differentiation from "nation-states", "whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity". Historically, "only during the last few centuries have national states mapped most of the world into their own mutually exclusive territories, including colonies". Emerging parallel with the development of capitalism as a global system, only after World War II have national states become the predominant political form.
- ² Etymologically, word "secular" comes from the Latin *saeculum/saecularis* meaning "age, generation, temporal world" and it is defined as "belonging to the present or visible world as distinguished from the eternal or spiritual world". The particular words that are used in French and Turkish to define secularism (*laïcité* and *laiklik*) come from the Greek *laos/laikos*, meaning someone "of the laity", and they are defined as "the process of rendering lay or subjecting to lay control, to deprive of a clerical character" (OED, 2001a, 2001b). In contrast to hermeneutic approaches that offer an incommensurability between the two (A. Davison, 1998; Hurd, 2008), I take a historically-embedded perspective to use the concepts *secular(-ism/-isation)* and *laic(-ism/-isation)* interchangeably. Historical analysis reveals that "secularism" or "laicism" both highlight processes whereby social and political life has been made more "worldly" and "of the laity", both of which suggesting a decline of religious authority (Chaves, 1994). Instead of overemphasising etymological differences, my work traces the convergence and divergence of French and Turkish secularisation in the comparison of their concrete historical sociological developments and contentions.
- ³ According to one classification, 120 of world's 197 countries today may be regarded as "secular states" (in terms of being legally and judicially "out of institutional religious control" and constitutionally declaring "neutrality toward religions"), while an additional 60 are also secular states albeit with an "established religion" (such as England, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Greece) (Kuru, 2009, pp. 7-8).

- ⁴ Whereas the Law of 1905 establishes full state neutrality towards religions, Turkey funds, regulates, and partly monopolises Sunni Islam since 1924 through the Directorate of Religious Affairs and Directorate of Pious Foundations. Comparatively speaking, this makes *laiklik* difficult to categorise. Turkey does not constitutionally adhere to a religious establishment like England, Denmark, Norway, or Finland (Chapter 2 provides a historical comparison of these cases). In practice, however, Turkish *laiklik* does give primacy to Sunni Islam in terms of financially endorsing it and controlling its activities. Yet given that Islam has no legal jurisdiction or power in this arrangement, the Turkish case is also different than many other Muslim-majority countries, –including French Algeria (Weil, 2015, p. 66)–, where religious law and stipulations are overseen and/or carried out by the state. An undertaking of this dissertation is to highlight the historical sociological mechanisms and processes that gave *laiklik* its relative uniqueness.
- ⁵ “Critical junctures” in historical sociology refer to contingent, yet significant historical intervals that end up creating novel trajectories through “the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among ... alternatives” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 513). Contingency here does not mean that “the event is truly random and without antecedent causes”, but that the particular transpiring of a phenomenon, such as state-religion relations in this case, is often dominated by critical processes of political struggles whose conclusions are not predetermined. The result is the creation of “path dependencies”, namely, historical trajectories “in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). In Tilly’s words, “every existing structure stands in the place of many theoretically possible alternative structures, and its very existence affects the probabilities that the alternatives will ever come into being. In short, social processes are path-dependent” (Tilly, 1988, p. 710). For France and Turkey, the contingent/contentious politics of national state building in the junctures of 1875-1905/1908-1938 created path dependencies for their particular pattern of secularisation.
- ⁶ This periodisation signifies for the French and Turkish national state building experiences the organisation and consolidation of their four “sources of social power” along bourgeois lines (Mann, 1993); namely in its ideological, economic, political, and military forms. According to Mann (1993, pp. 6-9), ideological power organises “ultimate meanings, values, norms, aesthetics, and rituals”. Economic power “combines intensive, everyday labor” relations “with extensive circuits of the distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods” in a historically/geographically specific fashion. Military power is the administration of physical force around defense and aggression, which “concerns intense organization to preserve life and inflict death ... over large sociospatial areas”. And lastly, political power revolves around “territorial and centralized regulation” carried out in a set of institutions that amalgamates domestic and geopolitical relations. Mann (1993, pp. 9-10) underlines that these four sources of social power and their embodying institutions are not distinct “levels” or “dimensions” of a social formation, but “they weave in and out of one another in a complex interplay”. This is why “actual power organizations” such as national states, “mix them, as all four are necessary to social existence and to each other”.
- ⁷ The “long nineteenth century”, as operationalised in the work of Eric Hobsbawm (1987, 1993, 1996), refers to the period between 1789 and 1914, which encapsulates major sociopolitical transformations triggered by the French and industrial revolutions. Capitalist economic development and national political centralisation characterises the “long nineteenth century”.

- ⁸ In the historical sociological literature on state formation, the Marxist position “focuses on material factors” involving class relations, and the bellicist viewpoint “emphasizes geopolitical ones” such as warmaking and state capacity (Gorski, 2003a, p. 3). The works of Anderson (1974) and Wallerstein (1974) exemplify the first group, whereas the studies of Tilly (1990), Downing (1992), Ertman (1997) are in the second group. Other historical sociological classics that feature the relationship between classes and state building include those of Mann, Moore (1966), Skocpol (1979).
- ⁹ The concepts idiographic and nomothetic are elaborated in the works of Wilhelm Windleband, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Max Weber. The “opposition forms a significant distinction within social research. ‘Idio’ derives from Greek and is concerned with the individual, and ‘nomos’ refers to ‘law’ in the sense of order and consistency” (Wharton, 2006, p. 143). This is to say, idiographic “is concerned with the detailed understanding of particular circumstances”, while nomothetic “pertains to the construction of general models and laws” in the social sciences (M. Williams, 2004, p. 729). The distinction denotes different (and not mutually exclusive) approaches to knowledge production. “Whereas idiographic refers to specific, idiosyncratic cases, the particular circumstances that give rise to them and the occurrence of unique and non-recurrent aspects, nomothetic approaches, on the other hand, emphasize that the social world cannot be characterized as a set of random occurrences, but as repeatable entities that give rise to patterns, predictions and rules (Wharton, 2006, pp. 143-4). Max Weber interpreted “the distinction not as a scientific versus nonscientific mode of inquiry; rather, he saw both as forms of scientific inquiry. The former Weber equates with abstract generalizations, as in law-like statements. The second he regarded as a science of concrete reality, of specific instances” (M. Williams, 2004, p. 729).
- ¹⁰ Following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks of 7 January 2015, for instance, French President François Hollande uttered that “*laïcité* is about legal values and rules. It is not negotiable, because ... it enables liberty of conscience ... There is no question of modifying the law of 1905” (Libération, 5 February 2015). That statement is clearly different than what the previous President Nicolas Sarkozy had said on the subject: “interpreting the law of 1905 as a text of liberty ... is a retrospective reconstruction of the past ... *Laïcité* does not have the power to sever France of its Christian roots” (LeMonde, 21 December 2007). Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan is also known for his historically revisionist statements about secularism in Turkey. In his message on the 77th anniversary of *laiklik*’s constitutionalisation, Erdoğan asserted that “in our history, wrongful practices regarding the principle of *laiklik* have caused polarisations and escalation of tension in our society” (Haber7, 5 February 2014). Head of the main opposition party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, referred to *laiklik* as “the basis of freethinking, and principal rights and freedoms”, and added: “as it was yesterday, *laiklik* is among our red lines today” (Haberler, 5 February 2015). These are but a few examples of the centrality of secularism, especially its historical significance, in contemporary France and Turkey.
- ¹¹ Interestingly, Kuru’s book does not cite Martin’s (1978) seminal comparative study on different trajectories of secularisation.
- ¹² As Marx (1976, p. 956) puts it, “all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their essence”.

- ¹³ More particularly, my primary concern is what Creppell (2010, p. 29) calls “political secularisation”, denoting the “historical, institutional and normative process by which collective public power developed a justification separate from a religious foundation”. This is to say that my level of analysis will be at the sociopolitical/structural level, and not concerned with secularisation as decline of individual religious beliefs and practices (Sommerville, 1998).
- ¹⁴ Although Dobbelaere borrows the terms “manifest” and “latent” from the work of Robert Merton, his work does not subscribe to the structural-functionalist paradigm (neither does mine). Instead, Dobbelaere’s use of the terms seeks to differentiate between the agency-driven processes and structural transformations that bring about secularisation, respectively. Accordingly, whereas sociopolitical conflicts are much more visible in manifest secularisation, the latent variant prompts secularisation mostly as a relatively slow undercurrent (Dobbelaere, 2008, p. 69).
- ¹⁵ Historical sociology, according to Braudel (1980, p. 69), is a shared research agenda resting on the assumption that sociology and history make up “one single intellectual adventure, not two different sides of the same cloth, but the very stuff of that cloth itself”. The underlying premise of historical sociology is not simply “a fruitful and contented marriage” between “sociology as a theoretical discipline and history as an empirical discipline” (Abrams, 1982, p. x; Stedman Jones, 1976, p. 295). It is rather “an imagination ... a synergy ... that represents more than the some of its parts” (Özdalga, 2009, p. 9). As such, historical sociology does not represent a monolithic set of theoretical concepts or methodological approaches (Delanty & Isin, 2003). Instead, it is “a continuing, ever-renewed tradition of research devoted to understanding the nature and effects of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of change” (Skocpol, 1984b, p. 4). Fusing the two disciplines, it takes “from history, the desire to interpret and understand the past; from sociology the ability to structure variables” (MacRaild & Taylor, 2004, p. 54). The historical sociological agenda is also prevalent in the francophone academic tradition (Bourdieu & Chartier, 2010; Déloye, 2007; Noiriel, 2006; Simiand, 1987).
- ¹⁶ This is to say that Gramsci is closer to a “substantial” definition of religion (that makes reference to the supernatural) rather than a “functional” one (with a focus on religion’s roles) (Berger, 1974). His conceptualisation differs from Durkheim’s (1972, pp. 222-224) functional understanding of religion that includes any set of beliefs and practices that promote a moral community. Unlike Durkheim, in Gramsci’s work modern ideologies such as nationalism or socialism do not qualify as religion.

- ¹⁷ Although national state building is historically coterminous with the rise of the bourgeoisie to political power, it is analytically valid “to see the territorial and the capitalist logics of power as distinct from each other” (Harvey, 2003a, p. 29). Drawing on the work of Arrighi (1994, p. 33), Harvey notes that “the politics of state and empire” and “the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time” exhibit different yet related priorities as well as “motivations and interests”. The “territorial logic” concerns the “political, diplomatic, and military strategies invoked and used by a state”, and the “capitalist logic” is about economic power involved in “practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, ... and the like”. Their primary difference is that “the capitalist holding money capital will wish to put it wherever profits can be had, and typically seeks to accumulate more capital. Politicians and statesmen typically seek outcomes that sustain or augment the power of their own state vis-à-vis other states” (Harvey, 2003a, pp. 26-27). The two logics are distinct also in their “individual” versus “collective” goals as well as their “mobile/impermanent” versus “immobile/permanent” dispositions. Regarding the first, “the capitalist seeks individual advantage and ... is responsible to no one other than his or her immediate social circle, while the statesman seeks a collective advantage and is constrained by the political and military situation of the state”. Regarding the second, “the capitalist operates in continuous space and time, whereas the politician operates in a territorialized space ... Capitalist firms come and go, shift locations, merge, or go out of business, but states are long-lived entities, cannot migrate, and are... confined within fixed territorial boundaries” (Harvey, 2003a, p. 27). Therefore, the relationship between “territorial” and “capitalist” logics, namely between “internal/external state capacity” and “class conflicts/alliances”, is “dialectical ... rather than ... functional or one-sided” (Harvey, 2003a).
- ¹⁸ Weber has used the concept in many of his works (for a detailed treatment, Howe, 1978). Some examples include his emphasis on the elective affinity of Calvinism for capitalism, the elective affinity of the bourgeoisie for certain life-styles, and the elective affinities between the various social strata and their characteristic forms of religiosity. Howe (1978, p. 369) argues that according to Weber, “the sole significant universal propositions that social science could make would be propositions of elective affinity, which would be to say that the very possibility of social science would rest on the logic of elective affinity”.
- ¹⁹ A delimitation of my explanation of secularisation in France and Turkey is that it gives primacy to material processes and interests over ideational ones –hence my use of the term “materialist account of elective affinity” (Thomas, 1985, p. 40). This is not to deny the existence of “ideational interests” such as those related to religion. Gorski (2003a, p. 161), for instance, underlines that “it is important to remember that individuals can also have ideal interests (for example, in an afterlife)”, which is in line with Weber’s (1946, p. 280) claim that “not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct”.
- ²⁰ It is impossible summarise the tenets of critical realism in a paragraph. In addition to the ones cited, see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie (1998); Bhaskar and Callinicos (2003); Callinicos (2006); Collier (1994); Olsen (2010).

- ²¹ Approaching religion from a critical realist perspective, I subscribe to Luhmann's (2013, p. 201) notion that "sociology does not proceed from axioms of faith, even (in fact, especially) when the issue is religion. To preserve its scientific credentials, it maintains a 'methodological atheism'". Needless to say, this social scientific position does not exclude or prevent the analysis of religious ideas, values, and passions as tangible social realities that motivate actors, groups, and institutions.
- ²² The relationship between structure and agency can be dialectically understood by combining what Skocpol (1984a) calls "analytic" and "interpretive" methodology. The analytic strategy aims to identify causal regularities in historical circumstances through "developing an adequate explanation for a well-defined pattern or outcome in history" (Skocpol, 1984a, p. 374). The interpretive strategy, on its part, seeks for a "meaningful" understanding of history by paying careful attention "to the culturally embedded intentions of individual or group actors in the given historical settings under investigation" (Skocpol, 1984a, p. 368). Analytic historical sociologists, prioritising causal regularities, "focus on explaining why phenomena happen and how they happen, rather than relying on description and interpretation" (Barkey, 2009, p. 712). For interpretive historical sociologists, "'understanding' of individual historical processes and meanings takes precedence over 'explanation' in terms of historical outcomes or abstract causal relationships" (Brown, 1990, p. 185). I employ a combination of these strategies to analyse the structural transformations in France and Turkey in the long nineteenth century (analytic strategy), while being attentive to the meanings created by national state builders in the process, which guided their course of action (interpretive strategy).
- ²³ I disagree with Lange's (2013, p. 81) argument that "encompassing comparisons are not really comparisons—they are within-case analysis focusing on the causal impact of inter-case relationships". In my interpretation, Tilly's comparative method does not claim that the relationship of given cases with the whole is the only source of insight. Considering those relationships (e.g. position in the global system) can indeed be complemented with a "process oriented narrative" comparison as well as a within-case method prioritising "causal narrative". This is what my methodology seeks to do so as to demonstrate the "organic links" between the national and the international.
- ²⁴ This does not mean that these outlines are wrong, but that they require systematic elaboration based on historical data, which the present work intends to pursue. For a critique of falsificationism in the social sciences, see Gorski (2004).
- ²⁵ In the work of the French Annales school and world-system theorists, the "long sixteenth century" denotes the origins of the capitalist world economy flourishing in Europe (c. 1450-1650), which was born out of the wholesale crisis of the feudal social formation (Chase-Dunn, 2012; Wallerstein, 1972).
- ²⁶ Martin (1978, p. 111) writes that in the United States, "everything combines to prevent anti-clericalism. There is no association of any specific religion with the state. The Catholics, by arriving later and taking up lower status positions, have been on the progressive side of politics. Religion has been the *sole* source of migrant identity. And each denomination has moved in flexible symbiosis with various currents of sub-cultural change to that no log-jam associated with religion per se has built up across the movement of social development".

- ²⁷ Orthodox Christian and Sunni Islamic religious establishments in Russia and the Ottoman Empires were fundamentally different both in terms of their doctrines and institutionalisation within the state apparatus. However, in the larger European framework, they can be classified together in representing a contrast with the west due to their almost complete subordination of religion to political power in the interest of aristocratic/patrimonial power. In this picture, many other Eastern-Orthodox cases (such as Serbia, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria) are omitted in the comparison given their long-term lack of independence under the Ottoman Empire (Rémond, 1999, p. 22).
- ²⁸ I refer to bourgeois “forces” or “actors” not based on the class belonging of individuals, but on the (manifest/latent) agency of certain social segments and groups in contributing to establishing and consolidating a historically specific sociopolitical system predicated on capitalist relations of production. In this regard, I follow Stedman Jones (1977, p. 86) understanding of bourgeois-national state building/revolutions: “The triumph of the bourgeoisie should be seen as the global victory of a particular form of property relations and a particular form of control over the means of production, rather than as the conscious triumph of a class subject which possessed a distinct and coherent view of the world ... If the definition of a bourgeois revolution is restricted to the successful installation of a legal and political framework in which the free development of capitalist property relations is assured, there is then no necessary reason why a ‘bourgeois revolution’ need be the direct work of the bourgeoisie”.
- ²⁹ Findley borrows the concept of split-up modernisation from Eisenstadt (1966, pp. 67-75) and applies it to the Ottoman case.
- ³⁰ The internal and external dimensions of sovereignty are closely bound up with each other “as possession of one form is considered to imply, by definition, possession of the other” (Kurtuluş, 2005, p. 81). They “do not describe exclusive sorts of sovereignty, but different aspects of sovereignty that are coexistent and omnipresent ... exercised within borders, but also ... with respect to outsiders” (Philpott, 2008, p. 4).
- ³¹ Framing refers to “the conscious strategic efforts” political actors make “to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate” their movements (Baud & Rutten, 2004, p. 1). Through various rhetorical tools and articulations, framing “defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s structure of conflict and alliances”. Through framing, “challengers delimit the boundaries of their prospective constituencies and define their enemies by their real or imagined attributes and evils. They do this through the images they project of both enemies and allies, as much as through the content of their ideological messages (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31).
- ³² “Political opportunities” indicate the historically and geographically specific conjunctures, processes or events such as class forces, wars, ideological influences, international political alignments, and so on, which provide the framework and material conditions of possibility for the various strategies employed by sociopolitical actors (McAdam, 1982, pp. 40-41)

- ³³ Coercion and capital, according to Tilly (1990, pp. 14, 17, 19), represent two distinct yet interrelated practices assumed by rulers and capitalists, respectively. “Where capital defines a realm of [economic] exploitation, coercion defines a realm of [political] domination”. Means of coercion includes “armies, navies, police forces, weapons, and their equivalent” utilised by rulers to extend their territorial power, while capitalists “specialize in the accumulation, purchase, and sale of capital” to augment their financial wealth.
- ³⁴ The reformist bureaucracy feared losing political power and territory due to the European entanglements of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, while it contended against the traditional bureaucracy over the control and modernisation of the state (Findley, 1980).
- ³⁵ Especially valid for peripheral polities with underdeveloped bourgeoisie formation patterns, passive revolutions may bring forth the role of bureaucratic elites and their initiatives to transform the state along bourgeois-capitalist lines within “global circumstances of uneven and combined development” (Morton, 2010, p. 332). In other words, the “transformations that create the political conditions of capitalist domination” are brought about with a push by the state in the lack of sufficient social forces (Callinicos, 2010, pp. 494-496).
- ³⁶ According to Trimberger (1978, pp. 2-3), “revolution from above” represents a type of revolutionary change carried out by “highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime”, where the masses are not particularly active as the initiators of change. Instead, it is the bureaucrats who take the lead to “destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy or upper class” in favour of a bourgeois-national system.
- ³⁷ I use the term “relative autonomy” for the case of the Catholic Church in France as opposed to “full autonomy”. This is because although the Catholic Church has a fully separate institutional configuration centred in Rome, its organisation in France was inseparably entangled with territorial power in multifaceted ways (Rémond, 1999, p. 20). Chapter 3 further elucidates that point.
- ³⁸ Ultramontanism is an ideological position within the Church that prioritises the prerogatives and powers of the Vatican over individual national states (and in the case of France, against Gallicanism). Its principle theoreticians include figures like Joseph de Maistre, Félicité de Lamennais, and Antoine Blanc de Saint-Bonnet.
- ³⁹ “Legitimacy”, according to Poggi (2001, p. 82), means that states “can assume, in their routine operations, that subjects or citizens will comply with the orders of political authorities on the basis not only of unreflecting habit or of fear of punishment, but also of a willing disposition to obey, motivated by a sense of obligation and of moral self-respect”. “Religious legitimacy”, in turn, induces “the faithful to consider existent political institutions as a necessary, indeed a beneficent, component of a God-willed ordering of human affairs, entitled to a dutiful submission on the part of those they control” (Poggi, 2001, p. 82).
- ⁴⁰ As Abbé Sieyès (1789, p. 3) famously wrote in his revolutionary pamphlet: “What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. What does it demand? To become something”. The bourgeoisie led the Third Estate both in terms of parliamentary weight and social-ideological influence.

- ⁴¹ Although the document alluded to a “Supreme Being” in its Preamble, this was a vague reference that invoked deistic connotations. Alongside religious uniformity, the Declaration principally rejected the estates system that exalted the clergy and nobility as the first two orders of society, as in its well-known first article, “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights”. Article 3, moreover, expounded that “the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation”, which belied providential sovereignty materialising in the monarchical establishment. Article 17 highlighted the bourgeois character of the document: “property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of it”.
- ⁴² The *Exposition* maintained that the Civil Constitution was “established ... without any dependence on the authority of the church, and without recourse to canonical forms”. This was unacceptable, because “only from the Church do bishops receive their jurisdiction, and it is only the Church that can deprive them of that” (Boisgelin, 1801, pp. 4, 9).
- ⁴³ In a letter he addressed to the people, the King declared that in fact he “solemnly protested against all the decrees that were issued by him” since 1789, the most controversial of which was the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Instead of the Civil Constitution, he envisioned another arrangement “that he has freely accepted”, which would “ensure that our holy religion will be respected” (LouisXVI, 1791). The fate of the Catholic establishment and the French Monarchy became inseparably entangled.
- ⁴⁴ The Constitution of 1791, moreover, declared that the “law does not recognise religious vows” of any kind. It denationalised anybody who took a religious vow to a foreign body, and accepted as citizens the people previously expelled from France due to religious reasons.
- ⁴⁵ Hobsbawm (1996, p. 68) writes that its excesses notwithstanding, the “Terror” was what saved the Revolution: “In June 1793 sixty out of the eighty departments of France were in revolt against Paris; the armies of the German princes were invading France from the north and east; the British attacked from the south and west: the country was helpless and bankrupt. Fourteen months later all France was under firm control, the invaders had been expelled, the French armies in turn occupied Belgium and were about to enter on twenty years of almost unbroken and effortless military triumph”. In other words, 1789 would not have survived without 1793-4.
- ⁴⁶ It is interesting to compare the French king’s 1791 escape attempt with the Ottoman sultan’s flight in 1922. In both cases, the monarchs collaborated with the enemy to secure their position at the expense of the nation. In contrast to France, however, the Ottoman sultan’s escape did not cause a similar vacuum of authority and bloodshed like in the French Terror of 1793-4. This difference can be explained by at least two factors. First, a situation of “multiple sovereignty”, with two heads of government in Istanbul and in Ankara, had been going on for at least two years prior to the sultan’s flee. That is to say, as Chapter 6.2 will clarify in detail, the Ankara government had already established itself as the *de facto* political authority of the territory at the time of the sultan’s departure. Second, external war conditions had just ended in Turkey when the monarch fled, whereas in France, the most devastating period of revolutionary wars was just around the corner. Consequently, due to the lack of internal political vacuum and external war, political turmoil and violence in the transition to a republican government was significantly limited in Turkey compared to the French case.

⁴⁷ The Cult of Reason led by the Hébertistes was atheistic, naturalist, and human-centred, which upheld truth and liberty as ultimate values. Critical of the cult's atheism, Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being was deistic and recognised the immortality of the human soul. It highlighted civic virtue as the ultimate end for republican morals. Both cults, although short-lived, speak to the Rousseauian understanding of civil religion, and can be seen as bold –although failed–rehearsals to engender a civic notion of citizenship delivered from the legitimacy of established religions (Vovelle, 1988, pp. 155-192).

⁴⁸ Moreover, officials of the national state remained in charge of civil records and services (Section IV). Appointing a non-resident of France as a priest was criminalised.

⁴⁹ Religious causes alone cannot account for the counterrevolutionary mobilisation of the masses in some parts of France. They “have to be considered alongside disappointment with the revolutionary property settlement, hostility towards taxation and conscription, and the requisitioning of foodstuffs and horses in return for increasingly devalued paper money” (Price, 2005, p. 143).

⁵⁰ “I swear and promise before God, on the Holy Scriptures, to observe obedience and loyalty to the Government established by the Constitution of the French Republic. I also promise to have no dealings, to attend no council, to converse with no group, whether within or without, which would be contrary to the public peace; and if, in my diocese or elsewhere, I learn that something is being plotted to the detriment of the State, I will make it known to the Government”. Likewise, Article 8 stipulated the saying of the following prayers “at the end of divine office in all Catholic churches in France: “*Domine, salvam fac Rempublicam* [God save the Republic]; *Domine, salvos fac Consules* [God save the Consuls]”.

- ⁵¹ Articles 1 and 3 of the “Organic Articles” prohibited the publication of any papal document in France without government authorisation. Other articles banned unauthorised ecclesiastical titles (Article 2) and unauthorised ecclesiastical councils (Article 4) on French soil. Moreover, in articles 6 to 8, Napoléon’s Conseil d’État (established in 1799) was furnished with jurisdiction over the activities of ecclesiastical personnel to pass verdict on their “abuses”, namely “contravention of laws and regulations of the Republic”. Article 39 standardised Church rituals and teaching by stating that “there will be only one liturgy and one catechism for all the Catholic churches in France”. Article 40 prohibited special prayers unless authorised by bishops, and Article 44 banned unauthorised domestic chapels and private oratories. Article 41 stipulated that no holiday other than Sunday could be established without government authorisation (also article 57). Article 43 put forward that “all ecclesiastics will be dressed in the French manner in black”. Article 45 held that “no religious ceremony is to take place outside of the buildings consecrated for Catholic worship”. Bishops and prefects, moreover, were to plan together “to regulate the manner of calling the faithful to divine service by the sound of bells” (Article 48), and other arrangements are to be made “when the government orders public prayers” (Article 49). Article 51 decreed that “at the sermons of parish masses the curates will pray ... for the prosperity of the French Republic and for the Consuls”. No non-religious announcements could be made in sermons (Article 53). Another significant measure is that the clergy could only marry couples that document in paper form to “have contracted marriage before the civil officer” (Article 54). Church registers were allowed, but they could not “in any case take the place of the registers prescribed by law to establish undeniably the civil state of the French” (Article 55). Part Two specified that all bishops must be of French origin (Article 16), and that they could only carry the name *monsieur* or *citoyen* (Article 12).
- ⁵² The Penal Code also strengthened state control of clerical activity Articles 199 and 200 banned religious officials from performing marriage ceremonies without prior state authorisation, the violation of which was punishable by deportation (in the case of second recidivism). Articles 207 and 208 prohibited clerics from communicating with a foreign body without prior civil approval.
- ⁵³ “The aristocracy were the net losers of the Revolution; 1158 were executed ... At least 16,000 spent time as *émigrés*. Estimates of the size of the pre-Revolution aristocracy vary from 400,000 to a mere 120,000, but a significant proportion of the 25,000 noble families contained at least one *émigré* ... Aristocrats lost their monopoly of bureaucratic, military and church posts ... Nevertheless, the aristocracy had survived, retained considerable assets – and found imaginative ways of re-inventing itself to adapt to the new society” (Magraw, 2002, pp. 16-17).
- ⁵⁴ Domestic missionary movements (such as *Société des Missions de France*) were encouraged and financially supported. The missions involved “rousing sermons accompanied by lavish ceremonies – including processions, hymn-singing and, most notably, the erection of huge missionary crosses – all of which were calculated to make a deep impression on the popular imagination” (McMillan, 2008, p. 219). They suspended artistic, theatrical, and other “profane” activities by force in every locality they visited.

- ⁵⁵ The law stipulated that “primary instruction necessarily includes moral and religious education”. It rested on two principles: the liberty of primary education (that guaranteed the clerical/congregational freedom to teach), and the establishment of state subsidised primary schools, although not free, secular, or obligatory. In every commune and arrondissement, the clergy would be responsible for the supervision of primary education (“Loi du 28 juin 1833,” 1833).
- ⁵⁶ The Constitution of 4 November 1848 underlined the freedom of religious exercise, and assured state provision for the personnel of all recognised religions (Article 7), thus constitutionalising the concordatory arrangement. Article 48 featured the phrase “in the presence of God” in the presidential oath, whereas Article VIII noted that “the Republic is obliged to protect the citizen in his person, family, religion, property, and work”. Article 9, finally, recognised the complete freedom of education to all organisations (though “under state surveillance”), which paved the way for the expansion of Catholic education, especially after the Falloux Law of 1850.
- ⁵⁷ In line with its peripheral incorporation to the global economy, “the Ottoman state, whose trade balance was favourable well into the nineteenth century, gradually became an importer. Its exports, which consisted in good measure of manufactured items, gradually shrank to agricultural commodities” (Karpát, 1972, p. 246). Domestic artisanship was thus damaged.
- ⁵⁸ After deposing Selim in 1807, the reactionary alliance brought to throne Mustafa IV, and a purge of reformist bureaucrats and *Nizam-ı Cedid* officers ensued. Soon after, internal strife between the janissaries and the *ulema* surfaced, and an alliance of Balkan *âyans* (known as the Rusçuk Committee) sought to restore Selim III to power. Upon the latter’s assassination by the conservatives, the Committee led by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha declared Mahmud II the new sultan in the summer of 1808. By the end of the year, another major janissary rebellion threatened the life of the sultan, which was concluded by a reluctant document of obedience (*Sened-i İtaat*) signed by the janissary leadership. This temporary peace initiated a long period of preparation for Mahmud II before his final blow on the janissaries almost two decades later (Finkel, 2005, pp. 413-446).
- ⁵⁹ Following a “rigorous appointments policy, for which the main criterion was the ability to carry out the Sultan’s programmes, Mahmud managed to command a high degree of obedience from the *ulema* leadership. At the same time the Sultan also tried to win the good opinion of the *ulema* of all ranks by a policy of clever appeasement. He regularly attended religious ceremonies and public prayers, built mosques and founded religious trusts (*evkaf*). In 1824, in order to gain the support of all the *ulema*, he issued a decree forbidding parents to withdraw their sons from the elementary religious schools (*mekteb*) before they had acquired the necessary proficiency in the principles of Islam”, which was a particularly popular move among the lower *ulema* (Levy, 1971, p. 17).
- ⁶⁰ “Without an administrative network for tax collection, the government was forced to share tax revenues with the powerful groups in the provinces. In the 1820s, however, the central government began to undermine the powerful alliance between the high-level bureaucrats and financiers in the capital and the notables in the provinces. As a result, it was able to exert greater control over the tax-collection process. Through this centralization the state was able to increase, in real terms, the revenues collected at the center” (Pamuk, 2000, p. 189).

- ⁶¹ “For the propagation of new ideas the reformers therefore largely depended on support given by the *ulema* in their writings”, and “on a popular level a similar function was often fulfilled by the imams ... who were instructed by the [kadı] ... to act against any criticism” (Heyd, 1961, pp. 65-66). “The ruling elite incorporated Islamic laws (sharia) and values into the reform program, making every effort to justify the adoption of a Western model of the absolutist state by redefining conventional Islamic notions. Within this context, Ottoman reformers invited the population to understand the Western idea of civic duty within the more familiar Muslim framework of serving state and religion (*din-ü-devlet*) and submission to the ultimate state authority (*ulu'l-emre ita'at*). Likewise, the principle of due reciprocity (*mukabele-i bi'l-misl*), the Islamic formula justifying the adoption of Western military techniques, became a more general principle for the transfer of knowledge from Europe” (Şakul, 2009, p. 435).
- ⁶² Moreover, a clear division of tasks, hierarchy, and promotion and tenure systems were introduced. The Public Law of 1838 protected state officials from arbitrary punishment. All in all, civil officials came to hold a much more permanent position within the ruling apparatus by the beginning of the *Tanzimat* period (1839).
- ⁶³ As further reforms of governmental centralisation, Mahmud established a postal system and a Turkish official gazette (*Takvim-i Vekayi*). To streamline the state budget and land organisation, he held the first Ottoman population census, carried out a detailed land survey of cadastres, which was supplemented by the abolishment of the long dysfunctional *timar* system in 1831 through the revocation of the rights of remaining fief holders. In its place *iltizam* (tax-farming) was encouraged with the hope of boosting state revenue and contributing to the hold of the central government in the provinces.
- ⁶⁴ Findley (1980, p. 152) identifies three factors that facilitated the domination of the civil officialdom: incompetence of the sultans between Mahmud II's death (1839) and Abdülhamid II ascension to power (1876), Mahmud's consolidation of ministries along with bureaucratic tenure and security, and the increased significance of diplomatic relations that gave the scribal elite leverage over other fractions.
- ⁶⁵ Aside from financial and organisational difficulties, there are two interrelated reasons why Mahmud could not secularise the Muslim primary education system. The first, and the evident one is that he was fearful of further agitating the *ulema* in a way that would endanger his legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim masses. The second is, given that he could not secularise the basis of non-Muslim education without taking away the prerogatives of Christian/Jewish establishments and thus cause a plethora of internal and external tensions, “Mahmud could not do more than pass an identical order on to the *Şeyhülislam* ... [O]therwise Mahmud would have been liable to the charge that he was contravening the *Şeriat* and depriving Muslims of rights guaranteed to the non-Muslims” (Berkes, 1964, p. 108).
- ⁶⁶ The Edict very specifically protected property rights and rule of law in contemporary bourgeois terms: “Each one shall possess his property of every kind, and shall dispose of it in all freedom, without let or hindrance from any person whatsoever; thus for example, the innocent heirs of a criminal shall not be deprived of their legal rights, and the property of the criminal shall not be confiscated”.

- ⁶⁷ In the first few decades of the century, Serbia had already won autonomy (1804), and Greece gained full independence (1832) with the joint support of Russia, Britain and France, accompanied by several other non-Muslim revolts in the Balkans. Externally, Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt (1798), and Russian defeats of 1792, 1812 and 1829 consolidated the western military encirclement, and ironically, the internal threat posed by the governor Mehmed Ali of Egypt (in 1831-33 and 1838-39) could only be dissipated by European aid –in return, of course, for considerable political and economic concessions.
- ⁶⁸ Geographically, Emrence (2008, 2012) identifies three distinct political economic trajectories within the nineteenth century Ottoman polity. Although his comprehensive analysis includes the larger Middle East, for the purposes of the present work I confine the focus mostly to the regions that fall within modern Turkey. Accordingly, the “coastal”, “interior”, “frontier” trajectories refer respectively to western-south, middle, and eastern Anatolia.
- ⁶⁹ “Muslim mercantile class, engaged in wholesale commerce like their counterparts in domestic manufacturing, found themselves by the middle of the 19th century being driven out of business” (Karpat, 1972, p. 250). “The Muslim-Turkish craftsmen who had formed the backbone of the manufacturing groups ... were pushed to less important trades and eventually to ordinary menial jobs. By the middle of the nineteenth century they had ceased to be a meaningful economic force” (Ergil, 1979, p. 219).
- ⁷⁰ As a result of the *Tanzimat*, Muslims “found it more difficult to compete against the protected Christian merchants. Therefore they began to abandon commerce and industry and seek employment in the state bureaucracy and army ... But by the 1860s, the Ottoman bureaucracy had reached saturation point ... Those who were affected by this new trend – the new intelligentsia – blamed the *Tanzimat* statesmen for the deterioration of the empire and for their own plight because of the concessions they had made to Europe and to Ottoman Christians ... A new movement known as the ‘Young Ottomans’ rose out of this popular discontent” (Ahmad, 2003, p. 36).
- ⁷¹ For instance, in his well-known article titled “İttihad-ı İslâm” (“Islamic Unity”, published in *İbret* on 27 June 1872), Young Ottoman Namık Kemal advocated for the unification of “two hundred million muslims” within and outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire against European encirclement, which foreshadowed the pan-Islamist policy of Abdülhamid II that followed.
- ⁷² About secular and religious courts, moreover, Article 87 held that “affairs touching the sharia are tried by the tribunals of the sharia. The judgment of civil affairs appertains to the civil tribunals”, which did not do much in solving the problem of legal-administrative duality. Lastly, following the *Tanzimat* tradition, the constitution consolidated bourgeois-legal concepts of property and liberty. Personal freedoms were guaranteed (Articles 9, 10), property was rendered inviolable and confiscation prohibited (Articles 21, 24), and the privacy of the home from government intervention recognised (Article 22). Ottomans, moreover, could establish commercial companies (Article 13).

- ⁷³ According to the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were declared independent, and Bulgaria autonomous. Russia won east-Anatolian territories in the Caucasus, and Austro-Hungary was to administer Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cyprus was later ceded to Britain. Another crucial aspect of the Congress of Berlin was its Article 61, according to which the Ottoman Empire guaranteed, under the supervision of European powers, the protection of Armenians in eastern Anatolia. The clause foreshadowed the ethno-religious violence in the region, and is generally considered to be the starting point of the “Armenian Question” that was to dominate the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
- ⁷⁴ One circular issued by the Minister of *Police Général*, similarly, paid homage to “the services rendered by the Head of State [Bonaparte]” and how, thanks to him, “country is saved from rebellions, authority reinstated, religion restored to honour, and prosperity and health reborn ... in less than four months” (15 April 1852) (Louis-Napoléon, 1853, pp. 9, 109). Bonaparte’s legitimation by, and protection of, “religion and morality” was a repeated theme that sacralised and underpinned his rule.
- ⁷⁵ The Public Debt Administration “was at the center of public attention from the early days of its operation. As a foreign-controlled administration it was perceived as a severe blow to Turkish pride, which made it the target of the nationalist critiques of the Young Turks” (M. Birdal, 2010, p. 7).
- ⁷⁶ Thomas Kuehn (2011, p. 9) writes that since their conquest in the early sixteenth century, controlling Mecca and Medina “played an important part in the Ottoman dynasty’s politics of legitimacy”. Throughout the nineteenth century, “this control became an increasingly central concern ... when Ottoman rulers came to emphasize, more than ever before, their role as caliphs and the Islamic character of the regime, all as part of an effort to create political unity and cohesion at the domestic level against both internal and external pressures”. Hamidian rule represents the pinnacle of this Islamic policy, especially as “fears that Britain sought to take control of Arabia and establish an Arab caliphate based in the Hijaz were widespread among members of the Ottoman government”.
- ⁷⁷ Hanioglu (2008, p. 130), likewise, writes that Hamidian pan-Islamism had two dimensions: “The first prong entailed knitting together the Muslim elements of the empire into a cohesive new core of identity ... The second prong of his Pan-Islamist strategy was the use of Pan-Islamic propaganda as a wild card directed against colonial powers who ruled over substantial Muslim populations”.
- ⁷⁸ The infamous encyclical was above all a response to the modern conception of political power and its ideological counterparts. It severely condemned not only socialism, communism, and freemasonry (along with pantheism, naturalism, rationalism), but also “modern liberalism” that questioned the belief that “Catholic religion should be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship”. The document unquestionably rejected religious freedoms, freedom of speech, Protestantism, authority of civil power, national churches, state provision and control of education, civil marriages, and governmental limits to ecclesiastical affairs (Pius IX, 1864).

- ⁷⁹ The pamphlet read as follows: “A hundred years ago, during the French Revolution when France was attacked by foreign forces, a well-known individual [Danton] unfurled the flag of patriotism and shouted ‘our *vatan* [fatherland] is in danger ... We draw parallels with our situation today. Our precious *vatan* has been in danger for some time ... Our goal is to find a solution together to save our common holy mother, our dear *vatan*” (cited in Özkan, 2012, p. 46).
- ⁸⁰ “By the Hamidian era the concept of loyalty, deemed by antimodernist statesmen to be the sole underlying tenet of the state, had been reinstated as a principle fundamental to Ottoman administration”. Consequently, “a potent feature of the Young Turk program was the aspiration to replace the sultan's neopatrimonial administrative system with a modern bureaucracy” (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 23).
- ⁸¹ Many articles penned by Young Turk ideologues such as Halil Ganem and Ahmed Rıza in *Mechveret Supplément Français* after 1898 accused the Sultan for responding to Armenian reform demands with violence. Ganem and Rıza argued that Abdülhamid consciously sought to prevent the unity of Armenians and Young Turks. Rıza (July 15, 1898, p. 2) made a call to Armenians to fight together with them against the common autocratic enemy, and leave religious prejudices aside, for “religion must always remain in the private domain; it should never serve as the basis of a social or political movement”.
- ⁸² The notion of “social imperialism” in the French case can be summed up as follows: “France needed colonies ... both as economic and demographic outlets for expanding markets (which would in turn make France competitive with its continental rivals) and as destinations to which excess capital and labor could emigrate (to help ease social tensions at home)” (Daughton, 2006, p. 10).
- ⁸³ “Opportunists” refer to the centre-left, moderate republican wing in the 1870s and 1880s that differentiated themselves from the Radicals or Socialists on the left, and the conservative monarchists on the right. Their successful political campaign managed to consolidate the Third Republic. Some major figures include Gambetta, Ferry, Freycinet, Simon, Favre, and Grévy.
- ⁸⁴ Constant interventions of the Vatican to influence French foreign policy (especially regarding Italy), as well as its support to the anti-republican bloc necessitated the undermining of Rome’s authority to instate national-sovereign state capacity.
- ⁸⁵ In what is known as the Pact of Bordeaux on 10 March 1871, the Chief of the Executive Adolphe Thiers declared to the conservative Assembly that peace-making, reorganising and reviving work was “the only possible politics at this time”, assuring that “posing theories of government” would come later. The Republic was there, but it seemed only a matter of time to its own deputies that it would be replaced.

- ⁸⁶ Although the Commune's approach to private property and revolutionary mobilisation clearly differed from the opportunist republican outlook, they shared some common historical values since 1789, especially against royalism. As Grondeux (2000, p. 34) puts it, "indeed, the program of the Commune was largely a program of republican tradition pushed to the extreme ... It included many policies that the Republic would implement eventually". Among these were the liberties for press, trade unions, associations, and most importantly for our purposes, the separation of Church and State. The communal decree of 2 April 1871 separated state and church (Article 1), abolished *budget des cultes* (Article 2), and nationalised the property of religious congregations (Article 3). One of the justifications presented in the document was "that the clergy has been an accomplice of all monarchical crimes against liberty" (JORF, 1871, p. 133). Moderate republicans shared this anticlerical sentiment and practice, which was to be a central theme to attract working class support to the bourgeois Republic. Gambetta's Belleville Manifesto of 1869, for instance, comprised the separation of church and state along with many other liberal propositions.
- ⁸⁷ Gambetta defined the republican outlook in these words in October 1878: "We want nothing that is not on legal means, or that is not the work of the majority. We thus remain silent on the future of the Republic we have erected ... Because, founded for the first time with the participation of *small and average men* ... this will be ... an edifice built slowly and patiently, whose foundations are based on the entire surface of our territory". In the same speech, Gambetta assured the smallholding peasantry of the republican respect to property: "They said to the peasant that the Republic ... threatened the owners, it threatened the family. We denied, for some ten years, these repeated lies and slanders. How ridiculous it is to say, in a country of 24 million smallholders, that property could be jeopardized by a party that is concerned with the greatness of France and with order!" (Gambetta, 1878, pp. 23-24, 13)
- ⁸⁸ On 5 July, Chambord (1871, p. 22) issued a message addressing the French: "I am among you! You have opened the doors of France to me, and I could not deny myself the pleasure of seeing my country again". He presented his monarchy as a solution to the "real needs of the country", and promised that he would "bring ... order and liberty", yet under one condition: "Henri V cannot abandon the white flag of Henri IV" (Chambord, 1871, p. 26). The insistence on the white flag turned out to be one of the most crucial symbols to thwart the restoration, as it caused tensions among the monarchists, and drifted public opinion away. The tricolour had been consolidated as a national symbol since the Revolution, and Chambord's campaign for its replacement came across as petty and capricious to the French population.
- ⁸⁹ In his speech of 13 November 1872, Thiers declared: "The Republic exists, it is the legal government of the country. Demanding anything else would be a new revolution, and the worst of all". Resting on his track record against the Commune, he added that a conservative republic would be the only solution: "the Republic will be conservative, or it will cease to be" (Thiers, 1883, p. 28). "You have said the opposite in Bordeaux!" monarchist deputies cried, accusing Thiers of not keeping his promises.
- ⁹⁰ The strong religious undertones in Chambord's messages comforted the Catholics. For instance, soon after the proclamation of the Republic, Chambord declared that "republican institutions ... will never take root in our old monarchical soil". Instead, "with God's help", and leaning on "the traditions of faith", he promised he would return France "to the ways that Providence has traced it" (Chambord, 1871, pp. 12-13).

- ⁹¹ In the Moral Order period, the state's right of regulation over religious affairs as stipulated by the Concordat was largely relinquished in favour of the Church. Most Catholic clergy, in practice, did not take an oath of fidelity to the Republic anymore; while their costumes, titles, and movement inside the territory were not regulated as before. The appointment of bishops no longer required government approval.
- ⁹² In a parliamentary report on the proposed church, it was argued that this monument was a moral and spiritual necessity for France. "In the presence of our public misfortunes", rapporteur Keller wrote, the new Church in Montmartre would aim "to invoke the mercy of God" by constituting a site of "prayer to implore God to appease our civil discords and put an end to the evils of the country" (*JournalOfficiel*, 11 July 1873, p. 62).
- ⁹³ Once again, Comte de Chambord ruined hopes of restoration by the end of 1873. In yet another letter, to monarchist Charles Chesnelong, published in *l'Union* on 31 October, Chambord refused to accept any "conditions" or "guarantees" presented to him by other parties, and rejected to "sacrifice my honour" and become the "legitimate king of the revolution". "I retract nothing, subtract nothing from my previous statements" Chambord said denoting the question of white flag, and concluded with what would become his motto: "My person is nothing. My principle is everything" (Ménard, 1874, pp. 2-5). On 12 November, finally, Chambord had a secret meeting with President Mac-Mahon in Versailles, hoping his immediate proclamation as King of France, which also proved unsuccessful.
- ⁹⁴ The Law of 24 February established an upper chamber, namely the Senate, whereas the laws of 25 February and 16 July systematised the relationship between public powers, particularly between the President and the Parliament. The amendment proposed by Henri Wallon to Article 2 of the law of 25 February is considered in French history as among the founding moments of the Republic. The final version of the article said: "The President of the Republic shall be elected by majority vote in the Senate and the Chamber ... He is elected for seven years. He can be re-elected". The amendment was crucial due to two reasons: one, because it referred to an impersonal "President of the Republic" as opposed to direct reference to Mac-Mahon as in the previous drafts, and second, because it introduced the re-election of the President, thus putting an end to the discussion regarding the regime. "What you want is a definitive Republic, say it honestly!" protested monarchist deputies. Wallon responded: "I'm not asking you to declare the Republic indefinitely ... But do not declare it provisionally either ... We must get out of the provisional situation. If the monarchy is possible, if you can show that it is acceptable, propose it! ... I'm asking you to constitute a government that is currently established" (*Assemblée Nationale*, 30 January 1875). Wallon's amendment was accepted in the Chamber on 30 October 1875 with a very slim majority of 353 votes against 352. Wallon's speech as well as the extremely narrow margin in the vote indicates the shaky and somewhat contingent foundations under which the Republic stood.

- ⁹⁵ Leblond interpreted the reaction of the Catholic clergy as a virtual declaration of war against Italy, which he found problematic for the sovereignty of the Republic: "There is here a great danger to the country. It is not only the internal peace that is compromised, but as you can see, it is also the external security". Leblond added that tightened regulation was necessary to address the issue: "I therefore request the application of the law. You are armed against these men, you can monitor them, you can withdraw their authorisations ... Catholic committees, Catholic circles; you have the right to interfere in their irregular developments" (JORF, 4 May 1877, p. 3251).
- ⁹⁶ He added that "since 1870 ... in the midst of the ruins that had accumulated around us", clericalism has been on the rise as a "political strategy, hidden under the cloak of religion", to manifest itself in junctures against the Republic as in the "24 May" incident (JORF, 5 May 1877, pp. 3281-3282). The current petition movement, according to Gambetta, was carried out by the same clerical faction organised in the state and civil society, seeking to overshadow the primacy of the Republic. In France, he went on, "the Catholic clergy is linked to the state, its bishops are functionaries of the state", which is why they cannot act independently, pledging allegiance to an external force. Gambetta argued finally that "it is rare thing for a Catholic to be patriot" (JORF, 5 May 1877, p. 3284).
- ⁹⁷ Gambetta linked Mac-Mahon's "coup" to his close ties with the Church: "Do you remember, gentlemen, for how long have we been reminding the President that he was surrounded by compromising men of so-called conservative politics ... and clerical manifestations?" (JORF, 18 May 1877, p. 3743). Alluding to clericalism, Gambetta added that the people demanded "loyal officials to protect the Republic", not an ambitious bunch "disturbing the peace either within or outside the country" (JORF, 18 May 1877, p. 3744). Republican deputies then convened and issued a manifesto to the public, known as the *Manifeste de 363*, denouncing "the politics of reaction and adventure". The document called on to the French to support the "sensible, firm, peaceful, and progressive" policies of the Republic in the upcoming elections, and concluded as follows: "The Republic will emerge stronger than ever from the popular elections, the parties of the past will be decisively defeated, and France will look to the future with confidence and serenity".
- ⁹⁸ The alliance of the industrial/agrarian bourgeoisie and petty producers rested on founding a connected national market, as outlined in the Freycinet Plan. The plan "appeared to coincide with the national industrial and market outlook of the bourgeoisie and the ... regional horizon of petty producers. A combined program of railroad building, harbors, and canals covered all interests", although it was significantly partial to the haute bourgeoisie (Elwitt, 1986, pp. 159-160). The old financial elite, on their part, resented losing control of the economy to industrialists, while the local aristocratic *notables* and the clergy feared losing their economic, as well as political and cultural-ideological pre-eminence due to national integration.

⁹⁹ In his speech in the Chamber on that same day, Monsieur Barodet, a radical republican, complained: “in the past, *La Marseillaise* was prohibited to citizens, the military, and official ceremonies”. Instead, “plainchants and religious hymns were preferred!” In the republican perspective, religion was associated tightly with the monarchies of the past. Today, “times have changed”, Barodet added, for now, “we have two republican chambers, republican ministers, and a republican president”, and consequently, “*La Marseillaise* has now gained full freedom ... as national chant” (JORF, 15 February 1879, p. 1088). To the monarchist right, on the contrary, *La Marseillaise* stood for everything that was wrong with France: “Our fathers were guillotined to this chant!” one deputy shouted; “the Commune was made with this chant” another cried, to which Barodet responded firmly: “The fatherland was saved with this chant!” It is out of this commotion that the republicans succeeded to reinstate the Revolutionary Decree of 14 July 1795 (26 Messidor III) that effectively rendered *Hymne des Marseillais* the anthem of the national state.

¹⁰⁰ In the justification for the law, it was stated that “the confidence that henceforth reigns between the nation and its representatives” allows the latter to move with the former (JORF, 28 June 1879, p. 5718). As the senators of the right argued that residing in Paris with the people would not be safe due to the possibility of another Commune-like popular resurrection, rapporteur of the law Jules Simon declared that the “people” are now on their side: “what scares you [the monarchists] the most, gentlemen, is what reassures us the most”, for the difference is that “we are the Government of the Republic!” (JORF, 4 July 1879, p. 6099). He added that the Republic was what the popular classes were rising up for in the first place.

¹⁰¹ To defend the law, left republican Monsieur Achard declared in the Chamber that “our Republic, whose destiny was entrusted too long to men whose hostile to its principles” needs national holidays to “remind to the people the memories that tie them to the existing political institution” (JORF, 9 June 1884, p. 6267). The choice of 14 July was doubly symbolic to refer to 1789 and 1790. In a report prepared for the law, 14 July 1789, the fall of Bastille in the Revolution, was commemorated as “the decisive victory of the new age over the *ancien régime*”. Also, 14 July 1790 was brought up to denote *Fête de la Fédération* adopted during the Revolution “as the symbol of the fraternal union of France [that] finally achieved a national accord”. In both cases, republican/national sovereignty was championed. Conservative deputies objected that there was nothing to commemorate about a “bloodshed”, for after all, “we don’t celebrate St. Bartholomew’s Day!” In the debates, two conflicting views of the Revolution and French history were at battle. As the left republican senator Eugène Pelletan put it: “Perhaps we have not read the same history, gentlemen, for we have not understood it the same way”, and he added that it was thanks to 14 July that external enemies of France were fended off along with the old regime (JORF, 30 June 1880, pp. 7238-7241).

¹⁰² The fate of *Panthéon* alone tells the story of political secularisation/desecularisation in France. The building was conceived as Church St. Genevieve under the old regime; turned into *Panthéon* in 1791 for Mirabeau’s funeral. The Restoration restored the church in 1821, the July Monarchy secularised it again in 1830. The Republic established the building as Temple of Humanity in 1848, and Napoléon reinstated the church in 1851.

¹⁰³ In a parliamentary report prepared by the moderate republican senator Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, these ideas were reiterated. The rapporteur maintained that “the clergy cannot invoke a sacred authority to enter into higher education councils”, simply because of a conflict of interest: their private schools are competitors of public schools, so they cannot be in a council governing public schools (JORF, 7 February 1880, p. 1399). The report alluded to history, especially to the Royal Order of 1815 and the Falloux Law of 1850, as well as the conservative laws on education in 1873 and 1875, all of which sought to “attack and rob the state for more than half a century ... so as to substitute the church with the state and to seize public education”. Most of all, it is the Jesuit sect that is, “with a spirit of vengeance ... is in an antinational struggle against the state”. Hence, the report concluded, “the clergy must stay in church, and must not leave it”, and that “the Republic, respectful of religion, has a duty to defend the French society as it emerged from the Revolution, against the reactionary groups ... attacking public education” (JORF, 7 February 1880, p. 1400). The emphasis on republican sovereignty is evident in the words of Chalemet, Ferry, and Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, who made a call to separate religious influences from a public institution.

¹⁰⁴ Ferry, for instance, stated that “the bill that we submit ... is the act of a government concerned about the entitlements of the state and jealous of its responsibilities ... in the domain of education”. Ferry underlined that the law on higher education came “at a moment when the government seeks to restore the heritage of the state in matters of education”, and that it is necessary to “take a step in the name of the Republic” (JORF, 12 June 1879, pp. 5004-5005). In a report prepared by republican Spuller on 29 May 1879, it was likewise put forward that the state failed to exercise its authority over matters of education throughout the nineteenth century, and it criticised the monarchists and the clergy, who support such weakness in the name of liberty. What would “the mortal enemies of the state” say, the report asked, “if tomorrow, state monopoly of justice and of the army were to be attacked as well, just like its monopoly of education?” The analogy indicates that the government perceived republican authority over education as central as the defence of national territory, for it signified “the sovereignty of the state in matters of public instruction” (JORF, 12 June 1879, p. 5007). Spuller’s report concluded with a call for the protection of the secular state and society: “There is, therefore, no room for hesitation. What is at stake, for us, is a matter of existence. The war declared is not only against the Republic, but it is against secularised society freed from the tutelage of the church and ecclesiastical domination” (JORF, 12 June 1879, p. 5010).

¹⁰⁵ Article 6 of the Decree held that the application for authorisation must also mention if the association in question had any activities in foreign countries, “or are confined to the territory of the Republic”. Article 7, similarly, demanded a list of members to the organisation, with clarification on whether they are “French or foreigner”. Article 8, moreover, required their statutes to be approved by the bishop of the dioceses where they have establishments; and that they include a clause stating that in spiritual matters, the association is subject to ordinary courts.

¹⁰⁶ Paul Bert's report of 13 December 1879 held that the weight of the state in education vis-à-vis the congregations was decreasing, and "such state of things cannot be preserved longer without causing danger". This is why, "education in public schools should be exclusively reserved to the *laïque*" (JORF, 15 January 1880, p. 341). In the parliamentary discussions, monarchist Boyer protested that the draft law was "part of a war waged with extraordinary insistence against Christian education", to which one deputy on the left shouted: "against ignorance!" Boyer continued: "It is again a willed exclusion of all religious ideas from ... civil society" (JournalOfficiel, 24 May 1880, p. 381). Jules Ferry argued in response that the law was against religious organisations, referring to them as "anarchical", which "recognise neither the law, nor the right of the state", and instead, "place themselves against and above" them (JournalOfficiel, 25 May 1880, p. 420). Ferry insisted that the "liberty of education ... should be submitted to ... the surveillance of the state, which does not allow for the poisoning of the youth by doctrines opposed to what they are supposed to be taught" (JournalOfficiel, 25 May 1880, p. 422). Bert, on his part, put forward that what was at stake was "public order", and asked: "do you know of a matter of public order that is more striking ... than the education of children, that is, the future of the fatherland?" (JournalOfficiel, 27 May 1880, p. 457).

¹⁰⁷ Bert, speaking in the parliament, complained of the division that exists in France between children of different socioeconomic backgrounds, and claimed that the law must be passed to remedy this issue (JORF, 7 July 1880, p. 7713). Ferry similarly argued that the law would bring about the strengthening of national identity in the population: "in a society like ... France, it is important for children to mix on school benches ... and mingle under the flag of the fatherland. The conservation and development of our social unity lies here" (JORF, 14 July 1880, p. 8151). Based on this premise, Ferry maintained that "the duty of the state in primary education is absolute ... Because this duty is measured by public interest itself" (JORF, 14 July 1880, p. 8154). The law placed private schools in jeopardy as it subsidised their competitors. Royalist deputy Monsieur de La Bassetièrre voiced this concern in the Chamber: "Your schools will have the resources of the state and ours have nothing!" (JORF, 7 July 1880, p. 7715)

¹⁰⁸ Bert added: "we do not want schools enslaved to the church, we want them to be independent" (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, pp. 62, 77). Paul Jozon of the republican left also looked at the issue from the perspective of separation: "Gentlemen, if it were possible ... separation of Church and State would be applied in France in an absolute manner. Yet if that is not possible today ... we must then examine the matter of state independence from the church distinctly for each matter" (JournalOfficiel, 14 December 1880, p. 302). Bassetièrre from the monarchical right reacted with fury: "The public school you dream of ... is without religion, without God and even against God, and reigns as sovereign without competition or rivalry". He added: "In the name of state sovereignty ... you demand us the soul of our kids!" (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, pp. 80, 82). Left republican M. Hippolyte Maze disagreed. He maintained that by promulgating this law, the government "will be crowning the work of our fathers ... on behalf of the sacred rights of children and human intelligence, and on behalf of the dearest interests of the Republic" (JournalOfficiel, 14 December 1880, p. 315).

¹⁰⁹ Ferry argued that “to ensure peace between two rival powers, the state and the church ... the first condition is to prescribe good frontiers ... The wellbeing of the future lies in the clear and definitive separation of their functions and authorities” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 160-161). He stressed that the sovereignty of the civil state was in question: “I ask you to support ... the independence of civil power, the independence of civil society vis-à-vis religious society ... and the Church”. Ferry then went on to cite Guizot’s words on the matter: “The independence and sovereignty of the state is the first principle of our public law. This is the principle that we are primarily responsible for ... to defend and maintain ... the general secularisation of powers, and the *laïque* character of the state” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 124-125). If, on the contrary, “religious education is not separated from secular education”, Ferry warned, then “it follows necessarily that ... religious doctrines will hold the first place ... the only place” (Ferry, 1896, p. 122). He accentuated on the urgency of the law by declaring that “the Republic and democracy don’t have the time to wait”, to which Bonapartist deputy Paul de Cassagnac responded: “You’re right, because they’re not going to last long!” (Ferry, 1896, p. 98) These statements speak to the centrality of the contentious politics for sovereignty in the debates on education.

¹¹⁰ Republican deputy Chamalet, for instance, underlined that “the state does not have to entrust the French youth with to men who in their affections [give priority] to the supernatural and mystical ... over the ... fatherland”, and “hate freedom of thought and free scientific research”. Instead, he held, the real theory of the modern state ... [is that] the state is incompetent regarding matters of religious or philosophical conscience”, and for this, “we the republicans ... have found the word ‘laïcité’” (JournalOfficiel, 16 December 1880, pp. 336-337, 342). The royalist Bishop of Angers, Monseigneur Freppel, refused such a conception of the state by insisting that “the modern state” is equivalent to “oppression and tyranny” (JournalOfficiel, 14 December 1880, p. 315). Paul Bert contributed to identifying clericalism as a national threat: “the Church wants to hold on to the school ... not only for [providing] religious education, but for [providing] the entirety of education” (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, p. 76). Ferry touched upon a similar peril: “the subordination of the school to the church, which is necessary and inevitable ... according to the very nature of Catholicism, is contrary to all our institutions. Our institutions are based on the opposite principle: the secularisation of the state, public institutions and services ... in the name of state sovereignty and independence of the school” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 153-154). It is on these grounds that the law of 28 March 1882 not only eliminated religious education from the curriculum and buildings of public schools, it also took away the entitlement of religious ministers to supervise and wield their influence over public schools. Ferry regarded this latter aspect as the crux of the law: “The main purpose of the law ... for me is to eradicate the direct action and inspection of the dominant pastor over the school and the teacher”. Instead, these functions were to be taken over by “secular supervision and inspection carried out by *laïque* authorities”, as instituted in Municipal Commissions. Ferry then ended with a remark that underscored the demarcation and empowerment of republican sovereignty: “When the borders are well drawn, and there is no land in dispute between the two domains, then no one is tempted to cross!” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 254-255).

¹¹¹ Ferry (1896, p. 103), for instance, asserted that “when we compare the state of primary education in France with that of the neighbouring nations, our nearest neighbours, we can not conceive any pride”. Among those “nearest neighbours” that France competed with, what came to mind above all was Germany, as the horrors of 1870-1 was still fresh in public memory. This is why “compulsory primary education was defended as essential ... to restore France after her humiliation at the hands of Germany” (Acomb, 1967: 173). On this note, Bert uttered the following quote: “the question of legal obligation is equivalent to trench war with Germany!” (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, p. 66). Following the same line of thought, Ferry quoted the philosopher Victor Cousin’s words on the superiority of the German education system: “In Prussia ... the duty of parents to send their children to primary schools is so rooted in the national, legal, and moral habits of the country that it is embodied in a single word, Schulpflichtigkeit (the duty of school). This, in the intellectual order, corresponds to military service, Dienstpflichtigkeit. These two words constitute the entirety of Prussia, and contain the secret of its originality as a nation, its power as a state, and the germ of its future ... that expresses the two foundations of true civilization, which consists of both light and strength” (Ferry, 1896, pp. 107-108). The German emulation and concern for external sovereignty suggested above were directly linked to the republican belief that religious education was an impediment to France’s process of civilisation and progress. Ferry, for instance, asked in the parliament: “Who is that won the independence of the human mind and human science? Who? Was it religious authorities, religious forces?” He then answered his own question: “No, it was laïque forces and laïque powers! These gains were made and can only be preserved by laïque and civil authorities. We’ll never hand them over to ecclesiastical powers to keep, but we’ll push the progress of this laïcité a little further” (Ferry, 1896, p. 125). In this long march of *laïcité*, Ferry thought, like many other republicans, that they were fulfilling the promises of the French Revolution to win “the war of two Frances”, which dominated the nineteenth century, in the name of the Republic. As Ferry put it, “the secularisation of the school ... is, in my eyes and in the eyes of the government, the result of the secularisation of civil power and all social institutions ... which constitutes the system under which we live since 1789”, and it “brings the security of the state and the future of republican generations” (Ferry, 1896, p. 116, 126).

¹¹² Bert called the Falloux Law of 1850 “disastrous”, for the religious education it promoted divided the children of the same school along religious lines, and that they learned first of all “not that they are French, but they are Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish” (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, pp. 66-67), which is against national identity and solidarity. Bert also cited an imperial circular of 1855, which required the instructor to carry “the spirit of catechism”, which he found unacceptable in a secular state. “There is only one solution to this problem, it is to abolish religious education ... and to return freedom of conscience to the student and to the instructor” (JournalOfficiel, 4 December 1880, p. 71). Ferry also suggested that free, obligatory, and secular education is necessary to endorse national unity. After all, he said, “the child is not composed just of a pair of arms, but a soul and a heart that we must elevate” (Ferry, 1896, p. 110), and that “teaching about the Revolution and the Republic ... is our national policy” (Ferry, 1896, p. 257). As Acomb (1967: 176) puts it, “the ... law brought to fruition a reform long demanded by the republican party. Compulsory primary education, including instruction in civics and an independent morality, could not fail to strengthen the foundations of the republic and to contribute to national unity”.

¹¹³ Royalist Freppel, for instance, resented state surveillance on private schools: “The representatives of the State, the academic inspectors, have nothing to do with this teaching. It does not inspect or control it” (JORF, 14 November 1883, p. 2328). Another deputy protested along similar lines: “you believe that the state has enough power ... to guide all minds in the way of truth. Well, you're wrong ... It is undeniable that education placed in the hands of the state, which thinks of itself as so wise ... is the most deplorable one on earth” (JORF, 16 November 1883, p. 2351). Legitimist Senator Chesnelong, for his part, maintained that Departmental Councils on education were given powers without limits over private schools (Article 9), which “favoured a war against private education” (JORF, 30 January 1886, p. 62). Responding to such claims, rapporteur of the law Paul Bert put forward that the state let private schools to run their own curriculum and methods (Article 35), yet the state must have the right to prohibit certain textbooks. He deemed it unthinkable “that the introduction of books in private schools can be left to its director without any kind of oversight and limitation”, and put forward similar arguments for state regulations on the opening of private schools (JORF, 16 November 1883, p. 2352). Minister of Education Rene Goblet, who had introduced the bill, likewise defended restrictions on foreign teachers, arguing that “if we allowed the introduction of foreign teachers in schools, we would not be able to enforce the law” (JORF, 30 January 1886, p. 59), which was a move against congregations with foreign teaching staff. Republican Ferrouillat, moreover, accused the right “to demand the preservation of the exorbitant privileges exercised today by religious congregations” (JORF, 1 March 1886, p. 291).

¹¹⁴ Republican school textbooks of the last quarter of the nineteenth century offer a vision of a society based on the cooperation of its various segments, and underline the significance of obeying the laws and regulations of the state as a civic duty (see, for instance, Bert, 1882; Compayre, 1888; Janet, 1890; Steeg, 1882). The idea of solidarity and secular morality went hand in hand as a central component of bourgeois reformism in the 1880s and 1890s to keep working class politics in check, and offer a secular source of national unity against the monopoly of the Church. In this sense, these concepts represent a middle way between communism and liberalism, which laid the foundations of French social democracy and the welfare state. *Solidarité* and *morale laïque* were developed in various ways by the intellectual and political efforts of figures such as Charles Gide, Alfred Fouillé, Léon Bourgeois, Émile Durkheim, Jean Jaurès, Ferdinand Buisson, and Félix Pécaut (Audier, 2010; Bouglé, 1907; Bourgeois, 1896; Çelikoğlu Özdikmenli, 2013; Drioux, 1902; Loeffel, 2000; Ognier, 2008; Sheradin, 2000; Stock-Morton, 1988).

¹¹⁵ Rapporteur Duvaux insisted that religion cannot be made obligatory in the military, for “on the battlefield, there is only one religion that everybody belongs to: that is the religion of patriotism, respect for the flag and dedication to the country!” (JORF, 18 January 1880, p. 454) Minister of War General Farre supported Duvaux from a military point of view, arguing that the presence of the chaplains causes a partition of authority: “the influence that the chaplain exercises is ... to the detriment of that of the captain, the colonel” (JORF, 18 January 1880, p. 455). Republican deputy Guillot echoed these ideas by pointing out to the partition of allegiance created by the clergy, particularly the Jesuits, who create “an army within the army ... a state within the state, a nation within the nation”. Guillot underlined that abolishing the chaplaincies was a must for the wellbeing of the Republic: “This is a matter of life and death for France: we must accomplish an absolute separation between the church and the army ... The army must remain outside of such intrusions” (JORF, 18 January 1880, pp. 458-459). The clergy and religious congregations, moreover, were charged with disseminating monarchist propaganda within the army, thereby injuring national unity, as the “longing for domination and invasion has been in all ages the watchword of clericalism”. Republicans “accused chaplains of ... spreading propaganda by preaching and by distributing anti-French Revolutionary pamphlets” and “sketched a terrifying picture of clerical activity within the army for the overthrow of the Republic” (Acomb, 1967: 184-5). One general, for instance, is quoted to describe the danger of clericalism in these words: “the cannons of the church are a lot more dangerous for the army than the cannons of the enemy” (JORF, 20 July 1877, pp. 5323-5324).

¹¹⁶ Left republican Monsieur Labuze: “we are asking you ... to remove from the law of recruitment all exemptions and privileges applicable at present to the clergy or teaching personnel”, which would be “to remember that we are all French citizens” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 11). On this path, Labuze added, the state must exercise its internal sovereignty regardless of church doctrines: “We, legislators of France, who make laws for the benefit of the free citizens of our country, must have no concern to put our work in accordance with the ideas of canonical law” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 13). Paul Bert complemented Labuze’s reasoning by touching upon external sovereignty, particularly vis-à-vis Rome: “the state is absolutely free to do whatever it wants in its own domain, no foreign law imposes itself and dominates its law” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 13). Madier de Montjau of the extreme left joined the chorus in attacking the monarchist-Catholic alliance, holding that for them, “civil laws have changed nothing of the past, for them the Catholic religion is still the religion of the state and its interests dominate everything” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 14). Again from the extreme left, Lockroy held that “the true Catholic sentiment today ... is opposed, more energetically than ever, to the Republic and democracy”, and criticised the moderate republicans for not going far enough. Lockroy claimed that the bill reproduced the values of the Concordat, while it should be aiming for true separation. He justified his point by underlining the untrustworthiness of the clergy against the Republic: “Have you not seen that a day after the proclamation of the Republic, they allied with those who wanted to bring back the monarchy or empire? ... Have you not seen again after May 16 [1877], the Triduums sung in all cathedrals for the success of an initiative against the Republic and against the law?” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 22). Lockroy added that the bill dealt with the congregations and secular teachers on an equal footing, which he declared was against the neutrality of the state on religious matters. Praising the secular schoolteacher for entrenching the Republic, he condemned the clergy: “The State is not engaged in the same way with the priest. What separates his interests from those of the State is this: he works only for his Church ... What does he ever have in common with the fatherland?” (Annales, 14 May 1881: 21)

¹¹⁷ Bert stated, for instance, that a schoolteacher “is not only an instructor of writing, maths, and history ... He must also be an instructor of patriotism, and how can he do that if he does not exemplify it himself?” (Annales, 5 April 1881: 775) The statement demonstrates the republican will to educate instructors along national-republican lines, where serving in the army was seen as a key moment of this process. The same was true for students of seminaries. Bert criticised the secluded way in which seminary students were raised, away from national life: “you [the clergy] have to hide him from this world, which might give him blameworthy ideas ... He must be, since the beginning ... surrounded by high walls, and with windows that open only towards the inside ... He will hear nothing but the sacred words of the priest murmured to his ears”. Bert then added that this extremely secluded student goes on to assume public roles when he grows up, which is where the real danger lies: “Tomorrow this young seminary student will be a vicar in a great city ... he will mingle often with communal life! ... I say that the nation has the right to be concerned”. Bert concluded with why military service will be good for this person: “What matters is to show the young seminary student real life” (Annales, 5 April 1881: 779). Bert’s arguments reveal the republican will to introduce seminary students with national consciousness through the institution of the military. As Acomb (1967: 192) put it, with the law of 1889, “the glorious and patriotic duty of military service was to be required of all without exception, so that even teachers and priests might grow in love of country and moral discipline through the experience”.

¹¹⁸ The report insisted that not abrogating the law of 1814 would be to “give a new life within our Republic to old monarchical institutions of divine right”, and it would be to tolerate the rising clericalism, which “declares war on all that came out of our Revolution, compromises our most natural alliances abroad, talks of civil war, ... extends its influence on ... public authority, and whose actions reveal a daily threat, aggression, a new invasion” (JOC, 14 June 1879: 5127). This is why the Republic must act immediately to secularise its social and public institutions to reclaim its authority. In conclusion, the Law of 12 July 1880 legalised labour on Sundays and on other religious holidays (Article 1) except for officials, judicial courts, and children employed in industry (Article 3).

¹¹⁹ In the report presented to the parliament by the republican Rameau on 12 June 1880, it was stated that the Decree of 1804 was against freedom of conscience, as it forced citizens and their families to disclose their religious affiliations, and it spared no room for non-believers. The report also cited many cases throughout the nineteenth century in which the decree caused confusions and practices privileging Catholics over minorities (JOC, 5 July 1880: 7596). Rameau held that “Catholicism was the state religion in France for fifty years, but it is not any longer, and ... consequently, the privileges that this brought with it, cannot be maintained”; which is why it is necessary to “take away those privileges [from the hands of Catholicism] and bring them back into common law”. The report concluded that cemeteries have a “public character” and are “common property, which should be open to all, without religious distinctions” (JOC, 5 July 1880: 7597-8). Another report by Rougé underpinned the same idea by holding that the Decree of 1804 “established privileges and distinctions that might injure different beliefs”, and that the draft law endorsed “conditions of absolute equality of all citizens whatever their religion may be” (JOC, 25 January 1879: 765).

¹²⁰ The parliamentary report prepared by Bosc regarding the topic of funerals stated that “liberty of conscience is one of the great principles recognised by our Revolution”, and since then, although it received “some attacks ... by certain governments or certain religious factions ... this principle remains uncontested”. The report also placed French citizenship above and beyond the religious affiliations of individuals: “In France, one is a French citizen before they are Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or free-thinker” (Annales, 29 November 1880: 437). In his report on the matter, Chevandier touched upon religious advances against civil liberties: “it could seem inappropriate to legislate to defend them [civil liberties] only if we didn’t know how much our religious customs are rebellious to the independence of civil acts, such as marriage and burial”. Chevandier continued to underline the contentious politics against the Church: “if we consider how intense it is, at this time, the struggle between a formerly omnipotent Church and civil society, we comprehend the need to demarcate an impassable barrier against the advances of ancient ecclesiastical prerogatives ... to protect our public law in the face of offensive pretensions to return to another age” (Annales, 14 March 1882: 691). Chevandier then accused the Church of forming close alliances with anti-republican forces: “The Catholic Church, ... under the pretext of dealing only with spiritual matters ... extends its influence on the political and temporal domains ... Hence the hostility we encountered in the National Assembly ... in reactionary governments or the assault of 24 May 1873 and 16 May 1877” (Annales, 14 March 1882: 691).

¹²¹ The rapporteur of the law Marcère underlined on 8 May 1882 that the legislation on divorce was related to the separation of the religious and secular. “Under the ancien regime” he said, “the civil status of citizens was subjected to canonical law. This was a consequence of the alliance of two powers: spiritual ... and temporal” (JOC, 9 May 1882: 528). He added that under the Restoration, “the moment when Catholicism became state religion, it became necessary that the institution of marriage was reinstated ... within the canonical law”. The law of 1816, Marcère said, “is a reactionary law against the essential principle of the secularisation of the state ... It is an illiberal law ... introduced by those ... who held the intention of bringing back ... the ancien regime ... By abolishing this legislation, ... we are asking you to return to the essential principles of the Revolution” (JOC, 9 May 1882: 528).

¹²² In a report prepared for the constitutional amendments, the existing paragraph on “public prayers” and “God” were deemed irrelevant to an official state document: “considering that the provision contained in this paragraph is, by its nature, alien to a constitutional law ... in our understanding, must be removed from the text of the constitution” (Annales, 14 January 1882: 13). Republican Andrieux seconded the same idea to support Article 4: “public prayers have no place in a constitution” (Annales, 23 January 1883: 40). In the debates, conservatives were strongly opposed to republican reform as usual, particularly responding to the proposition of Article 4 with utmost fury. Freppel once again took the stage: “I’m not surprised at all ... given that hostility towards religion has been the distinguishing trait and dominant character of the Third Republic ... And more particularly, since the last few years, atheism has become the watchword of the republican party” (Annales, 13 August 1884: 175-6). Freppel added that “chasing away the idea of God from the school, hospital, courtroom, the army, the family, the state ... is the constant and invariable goal pursued by the republican party ... and that is the real meaning of the removal of public prayers!” (Annales, 13 August 1884: 176) De Pressensé discredited Freppel’s remarks as belonging to “a view according to which the state must be the soldier of religion to protect it”, and which “plainly accepts a theocratic theory that closely associates religious and civil authority”. De Pressensé added: “That theory is a legacy of the royalty ... that has its excessive culpabilities (Annales, 13 August 1884: 177).

¹²³ Republican deputy Susini, for instance, held that they could “no longer avoid solving the great political, social and economic problems that we inherited from our ancestors of 1789”, and added that “if we want to be the successors of great French Revolution ... we will continue building the Republic, which already has sixteen years of existence” (JOC, 10 June 1886: 1048). “Building the Republic”, in this context, meant the undermining of monarchical contenders to political sovereignty, who often provide religious justifications for their legitimacy. As Susini put it, “we have the old monarchical parties ... who believe and claim that they are called by God to domineer France and lead society. They constitute a nation within a nation, a government within the Republic” (JOC, 10 June 1886: 1049). The monarchists, Susini went on, “are more dangerous than you think, because they have with them all the clergy, which plots maliciously and knowingly against the Republic, inventing religious issues that do not exist in France” to propagate that “the Republic is an illegal government”. He added that “the majority of the French people sent us here not to cut deals with monarchical parties, but establish the Republic ... and to defend it against all its allied enemies (JOC, 10 June 1886: 1048). Henri Maret of the radical left, although critical of the bill, similarly held that the monarchical-religious alliance, since the foundation of the Third Republic, said that “the Republic is nothing but a temporary regime, we’ll be the government tomorrow” (JOC, 11 June 1886: 1064). Susini specifically accused the conservative/religious side of the parliament to plot against the Republic: “Orleanists, Legitimists and Bonapartists ... certainly represent the dynastic pretensions of those that they consider to be their future sovereigns”. He then asserted that they have been fighting against these pretenders for the last sixteen years, but “the Republic ... is well superior and indifferent to these ideas of the middle ages” (JOC, 10 June 1886: 1049).

¹²⁴ As Minister of War in 1886, Charles Boulanger had gained considerable reputation among the popular masses in the second half of the decade as a republican General. “Revenge (against Germany), Revision (of the Constitution), and Restoration (of the Monarchy)” became his slogan. After his election as a deputy in early 1889, Boulanger’s coup attempt failed and he fled to Belgium, where he committed suicide in 1891 (Dansette, 1946).

¹²⁵ Decorations Affair of 1887 was a corruption scandal that revealed the involvement of Daniel Wilson, President Grévy’s son-in-law, as part of a political network procuring state decorations (especially the *Légion d’honneur*) to wealthy businessman. Grévy was forced to resign in December of the same year. The Panama Scandal was the major corruption scheme that left its mark on the French Third Republic. It was exposed in 1892 that the Panama Canal Company had been bribing leading politicians and journalists to conceal the firm’s pending bankruptcy, causing about a million French citizens to lose their investments while some financiers and politicians pocketed large amounts (Dansette, 1934).

¹²⁶ The first intimation of the *ralliement* became visible in the fall of 1890. After his visit to Rome in October, Cardinal Lavignerie, Archbishop of Algiers, received French naval officers for dinner in his residence on 12 November 1890 and offered his famous toast, which came to be known as the “Toast of Algiers”. In this short speech, the Cardinal made a call to the French clergy to unite under the Republic: “When the will of a people is legally affirmed ... we must be adherent to this form of government [the Republic] ... for the salvation of religion and the fatherland. This is what I teach the ones around me, and it is what I would like to see being taught in France by all our clergy”. The night ended with the playing of *La Marseillaise*. Following these initial steps, the Pope Leo XIII himself became active in the *ralliement*. In 1891, he told a journalist: “in France, they don’t like the clergy getting involved in politics. France does not want a government of bishops”. Also in 1897, Leo XII made a call, in an official communiqué for “obedience to the established forms of power”, and to not “directly or indirectly combat the government of the Republic”, and instead act on “constitutional terrain” (Grondeux, 2000, p. 174).

¹²⁷ The encyclical was an acknowledgment, albeit limited, of the Republic. It did not refrain from severely condemning the secularising laws as a “vast conspiracy ... for the annihilation of Christianity in France and the animosity ... for the inalienable rights of the Catholic Church”, arguing that the “greater part of the nation” did not approve of such policies. The bull added moreover that “religion, and religion only, can create the social bond” and “it alone maintains the peace of a nation on a solid foundation”. Having established these points, Leo XIII made a plea for appeasement by calling on Catholics as well as “all upright and intelligent Frenchmen” to “disregard all germs of political strife in order to devote their efforts solely to the pacification of their country”. He justified this point by underlying that worldly governments were but temporary, unlike the Church, which is “the guardian of the truest and highest idea of political sovereignty”. The Church thus declared itself indifferent to the type of regime. Given that for the French, the Republic “is the actual government of their nation”, and that the Church “condemned men who rebelled against legitimate authority”, instead of fighting against the established regime, “all their efforts should be combined to preserve and elevate the moral greatness of their native land” (Leo XIII, 1892). All in all, only through the institutions of the Republic could the Catholics have weight in French politics.

¹²⁸ “Century’s end was the golden age of the missions, when two-thirds of the approximately 14,000 priests working outside of Europe were French. These priests were joined by other French *religieux*, such as teaching brothers and sisters, bringing the total number of Catholic religious workers abroad to approximately 58,000 in 1900, according to one missionary estimate. Assisting in the French effort were many thousands of indigenous priests, brothers, and sisters” (cited in Partin, 1969, p. 95).

- ¹²⁹ In November 1894, an artillery officer of Alsatian Jewish origin, Alfred Dreyfus, was charged with sharing French military secrets with the German Embassy in Paris, and he was convicted of treason. He was sent, with utmost humiliation, to imprisonment in Devil's Island. In 1896, new evidence surfaced suggesting that an officer named Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy may have been the real culprit in the treason scandal. Esterhazy was tried in 1898 yet found not guilty, and Dreyfus was additionally charged with forging the documents. "The ... Affair became, in effect, a battleground between elements of the French Right and their opponents over the fundamental question of the definition of France's national identity and of the character of the French Republic" (Daughton, 2006, p. 11).
- ¹³⁰ Waldeck-Rousseau, on his part, justified the close regulation of congregations, especially the ones where education is given, for otherwise "the student will learn that the laws [of the country] are contemptible, that the society created in 1789 is nothing but temporary ... and that theocracy can revise its judgements" (Fortescue, 2000, p. 50). Congregations avoid regulation, he continued, because it runs against their objectives of establishing "the absolute pre-eminence of religious power on *laïque* society" (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, p. 179). This is why, Trouillot (Waldeck-Rousseau, 1901, p. 180) summarised, "religious congregations do not have the right to the same treatment as the associations of all other citizens". The statements of republican politicians suggest that while associations strengthen civil society and the Republic, religious congregations run precisely against that. In the words of Waldeck-Rousseau (1906, p. 15), a congregation "is not an association formed to develop the individual. It eliminates ... and absorbs the individual". Trouillot (1901, p. 59) agreed: "we are fighting to protect freedom of thought ... to prevent the Catholic religion from tyrannising over the conscience ... We are not fighting against your freedom of belief, but to definitely prevent you from imposing it by force".
- ¹³¹ This is not say that associations were unregulated. Although the forming of associations was free (Articles 1-2), to obtain legal status they would have to make a declaration to the local prefect (Article 5). This, however, is much less strict than the legislative approval required for congregations. Associations, moreover, could be granted the right to act as public utility (*utilité publique*) institutions (Article 10 and 11).
- ¹³² Externally, Combes insisted that congregations created "a France governed by Rome, within France governed by the Republic ... It is not France that they serve, but their spiritual fatherland". He added that clericalism wages a war against the Republic (1906, pp. 52-53). Internally, he said, "their existence alone ... is an anomaly in a sociopolitical organisation that rests on the principles of the Revolution" (Combes, 1905, pp. 51-52, 72).
- ¹³³ In October 1902, for instance, 74 of 77 bishops signed a petition addressed to the Chamber, warning the government regarding its recent congregational policy. The provocative document held that the ongoing struggle was not about "the Church engaging in politics", but about "politicians declaring war on religion". The bishops said the latter would lead to "dangerous emotions", and called on to politicians "who deserve that name" to be "careful" (Combes, 1904, p. 194). Similarly in 1904, bishops penned a letter to the President.
- ¹³⁴ One such strife was caused by the Latin words *nobis nominavit* ("has presented us") used in papal correspondence to France regarding the nomination of bishops (Debidour, 1906, p. 361).

¹³⁵ The letter argued that “the heads of Catholic states, given their special bonds with the Supreme Pastor of the Church, have the duty to pay him the greatest respect ... regarding his dignity, independence and inalienable rights”. This was a religion-based understanding of foreign policy, which the republican statesmen did not share. The letter openly condemned France for failing to show respect to the Vatican, and for acting against their bilateral understanding (the Concordat). A thinly veiled threat followed regarding “the protectorate of Catholic interests in the Orient”, where French stakes were high. Socialist Jean Jaurès commented on the same issue of *l'Humanité* that “the Pope did not hesitate to indict, before other governments, the French Republic and its President”. He added: “The moment the Pope sent out this note, the diplomatic rupture of the Papacy and France is virtually accomplished” (Jaurès, 1904b). The actual rupture took place a week later (Lavissee, 1921, p. 232).

¹³⁶ Protestant and Jewish influence on secularisation, and separation in particular, was not limited to passive support, but it also featured the active involvement of politicians and intellectuals coming from these religious traditions/communities. Some key figures contributing to secular-republican state building since 1870 include Ferdinand Buisson, Louis Méjan, Francis de Pressensé, Eugène Réveillaud (Protestant); as well as Camille Sée, Alfred Naquet, Paul Grunebaum-Ballin (Jewish).

¹³⁷ Beginning his narrative from the Baptism of Clovis in the 6th century, the first part of the report outlined major historical developments in state-church relations, where the Vatican was presented predominantly as an external body infringing on France’s internal affairs. The result of the Concordat of Bologna (1516), for instance, was nothing but “to establish in France a foreign power, favourable ... in some cases to the personal interests of the king, but harmful to the country ... Religion was transformed by the popes into a simple tool for government (Briand, 1905, pp. 108, 114, 120). Briand reminded that the Holy See always stood against the Gallican Declaration of 1682, but supported the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), which caused “moral and material ruins” in France (Briand, 1905, pp. 19-20).

¹³⁸ Briand (Briand, 1905, p. 23) argued that the pragmatic Bonaparte needed the legitimacy of Vatican to rule and restore order at home: “A Gallican clergy could not be useful to Bonaparte, since that clergy, outside Rome, could have no authority over the country. It was therefore absolutely necessary that the relations with the Holy See were re-established”.

¹³⁹ In the Second Empire, “Napoléon III ... left the church to take care of its interests while giving it the broadest protection. His only concern was ... being similarly sanctified by the Holy See [like his uncle] ... The requirements of the secular authority was violated with impunity (1905, p. 52). The *Syllabus* “has preached the world the complete rupture of secular law and theocratic principles, and the declaration of open war, without rest or mercy, ... to the governments that refuse to submit to its temporal and spiritual power ... Catholics therefore” were forced to “to side either with the State or the Church; proclaiming the latter superior to the former or renounce their faith” (Briand, 1905, p. 75). During the *ordre moral*, “the Roman Church was omnipotent. In the midst of a national and social crisis ... the bishops did not fear to demand, in a petition, the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope ... And 24 May [1873] consecrated the reign of the clergy”. It is in this period that congregational activity flourished, where it “sank its roots into the ground, built vast barracks, huge buildings, confines, enclosed multitudes, dug its tentacles into all social strata to suck their life and wealth” (Briand, 1905, pp. 78-79). In the crisis leading to 16 May (1877), likewise, the Pope “invited the bishops to urge their governments in favour of ... the Holy See”, and republicans were always aware that “since the *Syllabus*, the ultramontane clergy never ceased to intervene in the internal affairs. The pope intervened directly by brief ... and the Bishops made a call to vote for Catholic candidates” (Briand, 1905, pp. 86, 87). The bulk of Briand’s report is on the Catholic Church (first 102 pages), which presents countless other historical examples of papal infringement on French internal and external politics.

¹⁴⁰ Unlike the Catholic Church, Briand held that “the history of French Protestantism shows clearly that its ecclesiastical organisation is free from any foreign influence”, and Protestant denominations are “confined exclusively to religious affairs alien to political issues”, and “the functioning of the national synod is far from being a threat”. The Jewish community, on its part, was only institutionalised after the Revolution, and in conformity with the state. Until the Concordat, Jews were not institutionally organised, where “Ministers of religion were invested with no administrative authority”. And only after the decree of 25 May 1844 could they begin to develop institutional centralisation “established by the government hierarchy”, which allowed “satisfying the varied aspirations in collectivity”, and “maintained unity and harmony between various Israelite aggregations” (Briand, 1905, pp. 88, 92). Overall, Briand’s account highlighted the freedom of conscience separation would bring for Protestant and Jewish communities, and unlike Catholic circles in the age of Dreyfus, it did not see any national threat coming from religious minorities.

¹⁴¹ For the parliamentary discussions of the Law of 1905, the digitised version of the debates (by Claude Ovtcharenko) has been used (Assemblée Nationale, 1905).

- ¹⁴² Allard argued that “there is ... a clear danger in ... leaving the property belonging to the nation to private religious associations, which are first and foremost political associations”. Without confiscation, he claimed, “you give the Church full ownership, with the faculty and the ability to turn ... [their property] ... away from a cultural purpose and use them in the fight against the Republic. You impoverish the nation to the benefit of the Church!” (10 April 1905: 14, 11). Vaillant agreed that not confiscating church property would be “to arm them against secular society, against the Republic”. This is because under the guidance of the Pope, “the national association of the Catholic Church” would act “against civil society and the secular state” (10 April 1905: 40). On the same day, Allard added: “It must be said loudly: there is incompatibility between the Church, Catholicism, or even Christianity and the republican regime. Christianity is an insult to reason, an outrage to nature” (10 April 1905: 28-9).
- ¹⁴³ On 14 April 1905, Allard and Vaillant proposed another amendment to abolish religious holidays and replace them with civil ones. Allard defended his position as follows: “The Government and the Committee want, so they say, to ensure the religious neutrality of the state. The amendment I propose is precisely to complete the secularisation of the state. It is a necessary complement of the law”. A secular state, cannot celebrate holidays on “the day of Christ’s resurrection, the day of his birth, or the day of his ascension into heaven. If we want secularisation to be more than an empty word, we must follow the example of the Revolution and abolish religious holidays” (14 April 1905: 59). Briand and the government rejected the proposal.
- ¹⁴⁴ Jaurès held that “France is not divisive, it is revolutionary! ... Our work is not that of brutality, not that of cunning, but a work of sincerity. This is the nature of the Commission’s undertaking, which is why I endorse it” (21 April 1905: 19, 22). Briand rejected antireligious proposals as follows: “Do you want a law that is pointed at the Church like a revolver? Ah! You will achieve so much when you do that!” (22 April 1905: 61). Instead, he stressed that “the republic has common sense; it also has equity”. Its purpose is “not to make a cunning law of persecution against the Church” (21 April 1905: 41). As Article 4 was voted by 482 deputies against 52, Jaurès is known to have cried with relief: “separation is made!” (Mayeur, 1966a, p. 76).
- ¹⁴⁵ Reveillaud defined clericalism as “exploitation of the idea religion in the service of the interests and ambitions of the clergy”, and warned of its dangers: “Clericalism has always been against the republican progress and against the program of the Revolution. It has always represented in France the party and the ideas of counterrevolution” (4 April 1905: 11). Briand summed up the same point: “The truth is that in this country, during this long concordatory period; in all serious, difficult, critical hours ... when its existence was threatened, the Republic saw the clergy rise as an enemy ... On 24 May and on 16 May, under Boulangisme, and once again recently, you know what the attitude of the clergy was. You spoke of freedom; but there is not a single freedom this country enjoys that did not have to be won against the fierce resistance of the Church. Here it is, the truth!” (6 April 1905: 28). To counteract that, Zévaès held that separation was a natural continuation of the last century: “We have, for a century, secularised marriage, family, education ... It is time now to proceed to the secularisation of the State ... France laïque, offspring of the Revolution, must definitively break the bond that attaches it to religious denominations” (27 March 1905: 82, 94). Barthou, similarly, likened separation to Ferry’s education laws, both of which bring about the liberation of the Republic “from all religious domination and tutelage through the oeuvre of secularisation” (28 March 1905: 90).

- ¹⁴⁶ Ribot argued that French influence abroad would be weakened by separation: “You say that France is no longer a Catholic country; she no longer knows the Holy See, therefore she does not know its own influence or his own interests! Do not give up that old influence [that the Church wields in the colonies], do not give up the flag of France!” Gerault-Richard responded: “France will exist just as well without the Church!” (3 April 1905: 62-4).
- ¹⁴⁷ In the *Grand Orient de France*, comparable thoughts were shared regarding separation since the 1880s: “We salary precisely those religions that declare themselves to be superior to the state ... If they are so powerful, then why do they need the budget of cults? ... There is no managing the church. It either dominates, or proclaims itself persecuted. It is less dangerous to live completely outside of and away from it than to have neighbourly relations of compatibility” (GODF, 1886, pp. 522, 532).
- ¹⁴⁸ Patrick Weil underlines that liberty of individual choice and conscience is the most important principle that *laïcité* brings about in the Law of 1905, which is reflected in one of George Clemenceau’s correspondences as early as 1870: “It is our duty to respect the freedom of conscience for all citizens and to leave each one to practice their religion” (cited in Weil, 2015, p. 120).
- ¹⁴⁹ In *Vehementer Nos* of 11 February 1906, the Pope referred to the law “as disastrous to society as it is to religion”. He saw it as the end result of “many dreadful blows aimed from time to time by the public authority at religion” in France, where “the enemies of religion have succeeded at last in effecting by violence what they have long desired, in defiance of your rights as a Catholic nation”. He added: “That the State must be separated from the Church is a thesis absolutely false, a most pernicious error”, and claimed that the law is against the Concordat, and it seeks “to place the Church under the domination of the civil power”. Therefore, it is the duty of “the children of the Church, putting on the arms of light”, to “act with all their strength in defense of Truth and justice” (PiusX, 1906b).
- ¹⁵⁰ In *Gravissimo Officii* of 10 August 1906, decreed against the formation of religious associations, which the Law of 1905 envisaged, referring to them as “a violation of the sacred rights pertaining to the very life of the Church” (Article 3). Instead, the document made a call to French citizens “to set yourselves to work and to employ all means which the law recognizes ... to arrange for and organize religious worship” (Article 6); “let the Catholic men of France struggle for the Church in accordance with the directions We have already given them ... for the defence of religion” (Article 11). This is because the Pope claimed that the law of 1905 was “not of separation, but of oppression” (Article 9).
- ¹⁵¹ In accordance with Article 3 of the law, state officials would record the inventory of church belongings prior to their devolution to religious associations. Although this had created no controversy during the voting of the law, its implementation met with unexpected resistance in some historically conservative regions of France, leading to fierce clashes between Catholics and police forces (PiusX, 1906a). 48 against 26 French bishops approved establishing religious associations in 1906. Moreover, the laws of 2 January and 28 March 1907 as well as that of 13 April 1908 further facilitated free exercise of religion and provided solutions to problems regarding the devolution of property (Grévy, 2005, pp. 183-206; Mayeur, 1966b).

¹⁵² Article 43 of the law stipulated that “the regulations of public administration will determine the conditions in which this law shall apply to Algeria and the colonies”. (Also, the law was silent on protectorates, such as Tunisia). Based on this flexibility, in Algeria the law was implemented in a way that maintained colonial administrative control over Muslim groups, which was due to fear of resistance that could arise from independent Islamic movements (Weil, 2007a, p. 21). The application of the law demonstrated further variations in Guiana, Madagascar, the Antilles, Indochina, and French Equatorial Africa (Bozzo, 2006, p. 215; Weil, 2007a, pp. 22-23).

¹⁵³ As Keyder (1987, p. 77) notes, “the Christian commercial bourgeoisie never entertained the idea of becoming a class in itself through exercising influence over the state. Especially during the later period, rather than looking at the Porte as a political authority to be swayed in the direction of its economic interests, it rejected the Ottoman state as a legitimate field to be conquered and utilized”. Ahmad (1993, p. 44) seconds: “the non-Muslims ... did not regard the post-1908 state as their state, through which they could further their interests. On the contrary, their interests were better served while the state was weak and dominated by the Powers”.

¹⁵⁴ Twentieth century national state builders in Turkey, the Unionists and later the Republicans, represent the latest instalment of the reformist bureaucratic heritage discussed in Chapter 3. National state builders did not constitute a social class, but a political stratum (Boratav, 1993, p. 130), whose main priority “was the ancient ideal of the preservation of the state” (Mardin, 1971, p. 202) in a period where the political, economic, and military pressures of European powers gradually cornered the Empire. They followed a “territorial” course of action that sought to “sustain or augment the power of their own state vis-à-vis other states” in a capitalist framework (Harvey, 2003a, p. 27), as well as their own position in that structure, and they came from a tradition that believed in the necessity to “adopt Western methods if they were to retain their independence” (Black, 1966, p. 71).

¹⁵⁵ Bein (2011, p. 14) also writes that “France served as the example par excellence ... Ottoman observers were familiar with the long-drawn-out battle over the position of organized religion in the Third Republic and with the 1905 law of separation between church and state”. Toprak (2007, p. 37) concurs: “The secular outlook of the French Third Republic during the Second Constitutional Period in the Ottoman Empire gave a further spurt to the Young Turks”.

¹⁵⁶ Hanioglu (2001, p. 306) likewise underscores that after the Revolution of 1908, “the frequent use of Islam” by the CUP was “mainly for three purposes: first, as a protonationalist device to agitate the Muslim masses against the sultan; second, to attack European imperialism [and internal separatisms]; and third, to delegitimize the sultan’s position from an Islamic point of view”.

¹⁵⁷ “The lower *ulema* clearly felt threatened by the change in atmosphere. One particular measure which aroused feeling among this group was a new measure, stipulating that students at the religious schools who did not pass their exams in time were no longer exempted from military service” (Zürcher, 2010, p. 80).

¹⁵⁸ Both of these documents were written by Mustafa Kemal, and signed by Hüseyin Hüsnü, Commander of the Action Army.

¹⁵⁹ Savran (2010, pp. 131, 150) rightfully argues that 1908 did not only signify a regime change, but also “a change in the class character of political power”. The Committee of Union and Progress, accordingly, were “a political movement that represented initially the interests of the Ottoman bourgeoisie [as a whole, regardless of religion or ethnicity], and shortly after, exclusively of the Turkish bourgeoisie, the dominant nation of the Ottoman lands”.

¹⁶⁰ In the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans lost “83 percent of their land and 69 percent of their population in Europe” while Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro made considerable gains (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 298). “As a result of the substantial territorial losses in Europe suffered during the Balkan wars, the total population of the empire fell to 18,520,016, of whom an even larger percentage than before, 15,044,846, was Muslim, with 1,729,738 Greek Orthodox, 1,161,169 Armenian Gregorian, 187,073 Jewish, 62,468 Greek Catholic, 68,838 Armenian Catholic, and 65,844 Protestant” (Shaw, 1978, p. 336). The new demographic reality also encouraged the Unionists to rely more heavily on Islamist rhetoric.

¹⁶¹ In 1908, for instance, a CUP publication argued the following: “In Europe, two classes are at war: one possesses liberal ideas, the other socialist ... Which of these ideas we are to prefer and implement is a matter of great interest. On this topic, we deem it right to never abandon liberal politics and economics ... Otherwise ... if we step into socialism, then we would intimidate the capitalists, for whom we are obliged to provide security” (cited in Z. Toprak, 1982, p. 22). Likewise, the Minister of Finance Cavit Bey addressed businessmen as follows in 1912: “Capitalists! If you form associations among you and show workers that you are stronger than them, then you will get better results from the policies of the government ... Once the workers grasp that ... they cannot overpower you, they will then become docile” (cited in Haupt & Dumont, 1977, p. 238).

¹⁶² The social basis of the national project “had to derive from ... ethnic groups which did not pose any threat to the integrity of the state. The constituency which appeared to fit the description were merchants of Moslem Turkish origin ... The overwhelming political theme of the war years was the creation of an indigenous bourgeoisie, with its proponents arguing the necessity of state policies designed to further Moslem enterprise ... In provincial towns the politically led process of promoting Moslem enterprise was even more transparent: market centres witnessed the establishment of new merchant companies organised along cooperative lines” (Keyder, 1987, pp. 61, 63, 65).

¹⁶³ On 14 November 1914, the Empire declared what is known as *Cihad-ı Ekber* (the Great Jihad) to call on to *all Muslims* to fight against Britain, France, Russia and Serbia on the side of the Germany and Austria. A week later, a charter carrying the same message was transmitted to the rest of the Muslim world (Cebeci, 2009, pp. 230-231).

¹⁶⁴ A major argument that served –and promoted by– the Unionists was that the Ottoman state possessed the highest capacity infrastructural power in the Middle East to protect Muslims from the Christian threat. A pro-CUP cleric, for instance argued that “being a caliph means being able to take necessary measures to conduct wars, collect and train soldiers, and to protect religion and safeguard Muslim society. Therefore, the caliph must have the ability and power to manage the affairs of the state and the society; he must also have a genius and mastery over the Islamic principles of government” (cited in Ardiç, 2012, p. 213).

- ¹⁶⁵ “The Arab Revolt had an impact on Istanbul in two opposing ways. On the one hand, it led to the belief that it was futile to struggle to preserve the multinational empire. On the other, it prompted the adoption of modern propaganda methods consistent with traditional religious values to prevent the revolt from spreading. The attacks and counterattacks between the sharif and the government were intended to appeal to the religious sensibilities of the Ottomans and all other Muslims” (Kayalı, 1997, p. 147).
- ¹⁶⁶ According to Ardiç (2012, pp. 144-145), as soon as they took power, the Unionists employed the strategies of “defining the Caliphate as a temporal-political institution”, “identifying the social contract and popular legitimacy as basis for the caliph’s authority”, “emphasising the limits of the caliph’s temporal authority”, and “nationalizing the caliph”.
- ¹⁶⁷ Already with the Revolution of 1908, the *Şeyhülislam*’s status was reduced to that of a state minister, thus paving the way for discussions regarding his removal from the cabinet. The traditional bureaucracy, in contrast, was seeking to render this office as above the law and unaccountable, which the Unionists would not allow.
- ¹⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that the same Gökalp who argued for the endorsement of a Muslim bourgeoisie and referred to Islam as one of the pillars of Turkish nationalism, prepared an extensive report for the Unionists in 1916 to eliminate the sociopolitical roles of the *Şeyhülislam* from the state (Gökalp, 1959, pp. 202-214). In line with this report, the *Şeyhülislam*’s removal from the cabinet was accompanied by the transfer of his jurisdiction over the sharia courts to the Ministry of Justice, the madrasas to the Ministry of Education, and the charities and religious institutions to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations.
- ¹⁶⁹ “The CUP gradually diminished the role of religion in many aspects of social life despite its use of Islam as a tool. For example, the limitation of the power of the sharia courts began with the imperial decree of June 13, 1909, which banned these courts from hearing cases of private law in which verdicts had been pronounced by regular civil courts; it ended with the attachment of all sharia courts to the Ministry of Justice in March 1917” (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 308). Moreover, the authority of the Sultan-Caliph was significantly diminished. Legislation and approval of treaties were taken on by the parliament, which he had no right to dissolve. He also had to take an oath upon assuming power. Government expenditure on the Ottoman family was reduced by two thirds (Ardıç, 2012, pp. 150-151).
- ¹⁷⁰ A famous article in this vein is that of Kılıçzade Hakkı, published in 1912 in Abdullah Cevdet’s journal, *İctihad* (Opinion). In the article, Hakkı suggests major reforms such as replacing the fez with the western hat, liberty of dress for women, abolition of dervish orders and shrines, closure of all *medreses* and Islamic courts, limitation of religious garments to religious officials, replacement of *Mecelle* with a European Civil Code, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet (Tunaya, 1948). These farsighted views were largely realised in the Republican period.

¹⁷¹ Although “multiple sovereignty” began officially with the foundation of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara on 23 April 1920, it can be argued that its roots date back to May 1919, when Mustafa Kemal set foot in Samsun as an officer of the Ottoman army, yet defied orders and initiated a countrywide mobilisation against foreign occupation. Basing itself on the local organisational networks of the former CUP, the national resistance movement grew into an alternative centralised authority in less than a year. That the Istanbul government was almost completely incapacitated under foreign occupation facilitated the nationalists’ acquisition of power. Elaborating further on the concept, Tilly (1978, p. 192) writes that what differentiates revolutionary situations of multiple sovereignty from other types of challenges to the state “is whether some significant portion of the subject population honours the claim” of the new body of power. He clarifies: “The revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and from an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to *be* the government”. This is indeed what happened between Istanbul and Ankara. From April 1920 onwards, the nationalist movement claimed to *be* the government and acted accordingly, regardless of its avowed goal to save the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

¹⁷² Istanbul’s third and fifth edicts affirmed that the Muslims that do not obey the Caliph’s call to fight the nationalists are “sinners and criminals” that “deserve strict punishment on earth as well as severe torment in the afterlife”. Finally, the fourth edict mentioned the reward for Muslims that fought the nationalists, which is correspondent to the highest status achieved by fighting a *jihad* against infidels: “Would the soldiers of the Caliph that kill the rebels be counted as ghazis, and the ones killed by the rebels as martyrs? – “God knows that they would” (Cebeci, 2009, pp. 233-234).

¹⁷³ Ankara’s second and fourth edicts assured Muslims that battling against the ones that “deprived the Caliphate of its legitimate rights” would neither be “deviating from God’s way” nor qualify as sinners and criminals “according to the Sharia”. The third edict reversed the logic of Istanbul’s fourth edict by stating that the Muslims that “die in the struggle ... to retrieve the Caliphate’s rights” would “qualify as martyrs, and the ones that survive as ghazis”. Finally, the fifth edict unambiguously declared the Istanbul *Fatwa* null and void: “Therefore, are the *fatwas* that were issued unwillingly under the domination and deception of the enemy ... to be followed and obeyed by Muslims?” – “God knows that they are not”. Later, Mustafa Kemal requested a second *fatwa* from the *ulema* of Bursa to further strengthen his position.

¹⁷⁴ The diametrically opposed *fatwas* represented what Tilly refers to as “incompatible demands” from two sources of power. It was from this point on that the relatively intertwined relationship between the Ottoman government and the nationalists, which was the case from May 1919 to March 1920, was irrevocably severed. As the last deputies arrived from the occupied capital to the future one, an outright political struggle with mutually exclusive demands commenced between two geographically distinct seats of government, namely Ankara and Istanbul. On the significance of public support in situations of multiple sovereignty, Tilly adds: “And those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body. They pay taxes, provide men to its armies ... or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still existing government they formerly obeyed. Multiple sovereignty has begun” (Tilly, 1978, p. 192). For the newly established government in Ankara, the counter-*fatwa* served as an important strategy in wielding the kind of public support and obedience that Tilly describes. Refusing to take a confrontational position against the Sultanate and Caliphate, yet implying their incapacity, the *fatwa* declared Ankara’s utmost goal as defending these “sacred” institutions against “the enemies of Muslims”. The Ankara government thus presented itself as the only political body that could organise resistance efforts to save what remained of a predominantly Muslim territory from Christian occupation, and the *fatwa* provided ideological support for the legitimacy of this endeavour.

¹⁷⁵ The Congress of Sivas, held in early fall 1919, encapsulated the main resolutions of the movement, which demonstrated a clear Muslim affinity. Its Programme, for instance, stipulated that within the Empire, “all Muslim elements share a reciprocal sentiment of respect and sacrifice towards each other ... and are brothers” (Article 1). Article 2, in turn, declared “unity and resistance” against “all occupation and intervention, and especially against those initiatives benefiting Greek and Armenian organisations”. The article also underlined respect for the “lives, property, and honour” of non-Muslim citizens. Article 3 highlighted “the continuity of the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultanate” as its central principle, and called “our co-religionists” to action. The fourth article resolved, if necessary, to establish a temporary government so as to “prevent the fatherland from being trampled under Greek and Armenian feet”. In the section on the organisation of the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, it was mentioned that “all Muslim citizens are the natural members of the Association”. These points were reiterated in Declaration of the congress. Article 4 of the Declaration added that non-Muslims “cannot be given privileges that would disrupt our political sovereignty and social balance” (CHP, 2014, pp. 45-57). The National Oath of 1920, accepted by nationalist deputies in Istanbul who would later join the Ankara government, represent a similar Islamic partiality. Article 1 held that the “territories inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority constitute an indivisible whole”. Its Article 2 referred to Istanbul as “the seat of the Islamic Caliphate and the glorious Sultanate”. Article 5 resolved that the rights of the non-Muslim minorities are to be protected “provided that the Muslims in neighbouring countries benefit from the same rights”.

¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal and his faction successfully fended off conservative projects to legally recognise the Caliphate as the head of state, especially due to concerns of British meddling in the region through this institution. In a closed session of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal expressed his disapproval of Caliphate-related projects in the following words: "It is not acceptable that this Assembly opens this debate all too often. Today the person who occupies this seat is a traitor ... If we stop playing this game [politics of Caliphate], our enemies would see that the British ... hopes will be ruined ... This is a delicate subject". He then commented on making the Caliph the head of state: "If we add such an article, they will ask us: 'where is your caliph and sultan? Is he enslaved?' ... If we try to solve this situation [through legislation], we will not be able to succeed. What is more, we will be giving our enemies the impression that we are hesitant and undecided. Therefore, the best is not to talk about it" (TBMM I/1, 25 September 1920, pp. 135-137).

¹⁷⁷ The symbolism revolving around the Assembly is also worth mentioning. The Assembly was intentionally opened on a Friday with Koran recitations. The building contained a replica of Mohammed's banner and beard. As Hanioglu (2011, pp. 102, 105) writes, "the Islamic character of these opening ceremonies outdid any comparable solemnity in Ottoman history and gave no inkling of the secular revolution that would follow in the years to come". In terms of its composition, the first term of the GNAT featured the highest percentage of *ulema* and sheiks (more so than the assemblies during the Second Constitutional period). All in all, such Islamic appeal "sought to mobilize the force of Islam in a struggle against the Allies and the non-Muslim Ottoman groups they supported". Still, in what followed, the Kemalist faction killed off certain bills that reflected extreme conservatism. These bills featured the prohibition of gambling, requirement for women to wear the full veil, assigning all schools to the authority of the Ministry of Sharia, opening 465 new religious schools, and the obligation of polygamy for population growth (Şen, 2014, p. 72).

¹⁷⁸ Along with Islamic language, the Ankara government also proved its state building capacities through passing elaborate laws on different items of taxation. Among the first one hundred laws passed by the GNAT was included detailed tax legislation on items such as animal husbandry, customs, commerce, mining, agriculture, forestry, property and land, and transportation. These laws clearly reflect the initiative to redirect countrywide resources towards the newly established government. In addition to taxation, Ankara also demonstrated its will for exclusive exercise of sovereignty through legislation on the military and public administration. The second law ever passed by Ankara, namely the Law on Treason, stipulated that the ones who “rebel against the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly ... are deemed traitors” to be punished accordingly. The establishment of gendarmerie forces (Law no. 5), a state agency for press and intelligence (Law no. 6), and independence tribunals for deserters (Law no. 21) are among the early initiatives to further the military consolidation of Ankara’s rule. In terms of public administration, the Law on Fundamental Organisation promulgated on 20 January 1921 was the first Constitution of the Ankara government. It stipulated that “executive power and legislative authority is ... concentrated in the hands of the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and real representative of the people”. Moreover, as early as 1920-1921, the Ankara government began signing treaties with other sovereign powers such as Armenia, Afghanistan, Soviet Union, and the French Third Republic. The adoption of the “Independence March” as the national anthem of Turkey and the declaration of 23 April as a national holiday, finally, were among the early symbols of the new regime.

¹⁷⁹ One declaration upheld that “the country that they [the West] seek to destroy is the one that has given so many ill-fated sons of Islam a chance to live”. Quoting Sultan Selim I, who had brought the Caliphate to the Ottoman lands, the letter ended with a call to help, “so that the eclipsing sun of Islam would not die away” (Atatürk, 2012, pp. 46-47, 50-44). In another message, Mustafa Kemal wrote: “Following the fall of the caliphates in Damascus, Cordoba, Cairo, and Baghdad, the last center of the Muslim caliphate has fallen under the shadow of enemy weapons . . . Anatolia, the union and independence of which we are trying to defend, is a land of refuge for many Muslim communities driven out of their homelands. . . . Hundreds of mufftis and scholars have issued *fatwas* to show the right direction to our nation and the Islamic world. . . . Please hear this voice of sharia” (cited in Hanioglu, 2011, p. 103).

¹⁸⁰ Our brothers and sisters are suffering under Greek cruelty ... which is sad enough to hurt the heart of every Muslim, and to make every Muslim weep. Their salvation is above all a matter of religious obligation ... Therefore ... Turks, who are preparing to relocate and feed six hundred thousand Muslims living under Greek rule, are appealing to the generosity of the Muslim world to prevent the desolation of our brothers and sisters ... Please keep in mind that your smallest donation will save the lives of several Muslim families ... May God help us all” (LozanMübadilleri, 1923).

¹⁸¹ In the early 1920s, Mustafa Kemal began openly criticising pan-Islamism: “Our unity is not towards pan-Islamism. It is the unity of the oppressed against the oppressors, and I have no doubt that this will be triumphant” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 67). As the next section will show, this emphasis would gradually increase as the War of Independence was won in the fall of 1922.

¹⁸² At this juncture, the abolition of the monarchy was facilitated by the telegrams sent to Ankara by the Grand Vizier of the Istanbul government, Tevfik Pasha. In his message, Tevfik Pasha reminded the “Great National Assembly of Ankara” (not Turkey) of the dual invitation, and insinuated that the Sultan was the real ruler of the territory that Ankara must abide by. Mustafa Kemal replied by highlighting that the GNAT possessed “the sole responsibility ... regarding the future of Turkey”, and accordingly, only Ankara was entitled to represent the nation in the conference (TBMM, I-24-3, 30 November 1922: p. 270).

¹⁸³ In his reply, Tevfik Pasha warned of the dangers to ignore the weight of the Ottoman Empire in the conference given its six hundred year-old influence on the Islamic world, and he denied that a real duality between Istanbul and Ankara existed, which, in practical terms, was to trivialise the significance of the latter. As Mustafa Kemal read these telegrams in the GNAT on 30 November 1922, most deputies reacted with fury. One deputy shouted, “we don’t recognise a state official named Tevfik ... because we don’t have a Grand Vizier”. Another one resented the claiming of Islamic prestige by Istanbul, for the Muslim world “sees where the real seat of the Caliph is!” (TBMM, I-24-3, 30 November 1922: 271, 274) In his visit to Istanbul earlier in November 1922 as representative of the Anatolian resistance, Refet (Bele) Pasha likewise characterised monarchy as an oppressive system to be embraced, yet embraced Islam: “This victory was born out of belief in national sovereignty, national power ... and in almighty God! This place will remain Muslim for all time!” (quoted by Ardıç, 2012, p. 254; cited in Shaw, 2000, p. IV: 1874)

¹⁸⁴ Describing the Sultanate as the internal enemy of the Turkish nation “that collaborated with the external enemies”, and noting that it was now passed on “forever to history”, the Decree ended with the following article: The “Caliph is to be appointed ... by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. *The State of Turkey is the basis of ... the Caliphate*” (Decree no. 308, 1 November 1922).

¹⁸⁵ Ziya Gökalp, similarly, underscored the idea of separation in the following words: “When the Caliphate and the Sultanate were united in one person, one of the two dominated the other ... The Turkish revolution of today has assured the complete independence and freedom of these two powers. As the right of sovereignty of the Turks has passed to the people, the Caliphate, too, has its independence *by being separated* from the Sultanate” (cited in Ardıç, 2012, pp. 271-272). Mustafa Kemal expressed the same idea to Rauf (Orbay) Bey in these words: “we will abolish the Sultanate by *separating* the Sultanate and the Caliphate” (Atatürk, 1927/1969, p. 686).

¹⁸⁶ In the debates, Minister of Sharia Vehbi (Çelik) Efendi said: “It is a shame and humiliation for Islam that a man known as the head of Muslims sought foreign protection and escaped on the ship of the British, our enemy”. Based on this, he proposed the election of a new caliph. Then the *fatwa* that justified the deposition was read in the parliament (TBMM, I-24-3, 18 November 1922: 563-4).

¹⁸⁷ “The Caliph may be taken prisoner. The Caliph may take refuge with the British and escape with them. He can do whatever he wants. But they cannot disturb the form of government, policies, and power assumed by the Great National Assembly of Turkey! It is not like we are going to worry about them kidnapping or imprisoning the Caliph” (TBMM Closed Session, I-3-III, 18 November 1922: 1052).

- ¹⁸⁸ Based on the French comparison in January 1923, Mustafa Kemal warned against reactionism: “The French have struggled for nearly a century to succeed in its great revolution. We are just in the third year of our revolution. No one can argue that this revolution will not meet reaction ... We must suffocate such reaction wherever it is born” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 90).
- ¹⁸⁹ The Treaty of Lausanne is a milestone in establishing the sovereignty of the national state and its territorial integrity. The Treaty, ratified on 24 July 1923, recognised the contemporary borders of Turkey as legitimate. All capitulations of the Ottoman period were terminated. Ottoman debts were partly assumed by Turkey, which were to be repaid until 1953.
- ¹⁹⁰ Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu) declared that the constitutional change reaffirmed two facts that were already in place: that sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the people, namely the Republic, and that the religion of the state is Islam (TBMM, II-8-1, 29 October 1923: 91).
- ¹⁹¹ The new Caliph was instructed to not use any other title than the “Caliph of Muslims”. He was to pen a declaration addressing the Muslim world, which would be published only after the government’s approval. In the declaration, he was told to express gratitude to the GNAT, protest Vahdettin’s escape, quote the first nine articles of the Constitution and underline the primacy of the GNAT and the people’s government. Abdülmecid did not fulfill the requirements. He went on to use the titles “Caliph of Allah” and “Han” (representing the Ottoman dynasty), which caused distress in Ankara (Atatürk, 1927/1970, pp. 695-698).
- ¹⁹² In the budgetary discussion on 27 February 1924, Vasıf (Çınar) Bey complained that the Caliph organises pompous Friday ceremonies, and added: “We have destroyed the Sultanate, but the quintessence of the Sultanate vis-à-vis the people, namely the Palace, lives on with all its pomp and circumstance. Unfortunately, it is our nation who pays for that ... What is the meaning of the Caliph in the precious politics of the Republic? ... In the budget ratified by the Republic of Turkey and its great Assembly, there is no place for the Caliphate” Another deputy intervened: “We will also destroy that!” (TBMM, II-6-I, 27 February 1924, p. 414-5).
- ¹⁹³ For a detailed account of the arguments presented on both sides of the “war of pamphlets” revolving around the Caliphate, see Ardiç (2012, pp. 274-300).
- ¹⁹⁴ Mustafa Kemal wrote to İsmet (İnönü) Pasha on 22 January 1924: “The Caliph and the whole world should clearly comprehend that ... the Caliphate has no religious or political *raison d’être*. The Republic of Turkey cannot endanger its existence and future with nonsense. For us, the Caliphate can carry no further meaning than being a memory of history” (Atatürk, 1927/1969, pp. 846-847). In another comment, Mustafa Kemal argued that “if the Caliph is given more rights and authority than those bestowed by the laws of the State of Turkey, that would mean the limitation of national will and the fragmentation of sovereignty, which is nothing but returning to the old regime” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 112).

- ¹⁹⁵ Mustafa Kemal iterated this point in his Speech of 1927: "If the Caliph and the Caliphate were to embrace, as they say, the whole of the Muslim world ... should we not consider the heaviness of the weight to be carried by the people of Turkey?" Accordingly, he went on, all the Muslims in "China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine..." would be ruled by the Caliph, and added: "It is known that such a dream has never been realised". In another instance, he repeated this idea: "The people of Turkey cannot assume such an illogical responsibility. For centuries, our nation has been mobilised based on that premise. What was the result? We left millions of dead wherever we went. Do you know the number of the sons of Anatolia that have been devastated in Yemeni deserts?" (Atatürk, 1927/1969, pp. 709-710).
- ¹⁹⁶ In the closed session of the Republican People's Party, Minister of Justice Seyit Bey similarly put forward that the declaration of *jihad* in World War I proved utterly useless in the Muslim world. He also provided religious justification for the unnecessary nature of the caliphate: "The Koran says ... believers are brothers and sisters ... [Their solidarity] is a religious duty, which is not sourced from an individual possessing the seat and title of the Caliphate" (CHP, 2002, p. 419).
- ¹⁹⁷ "The reasonable politics to follow is the one that is proportionate to the natural capability and needs of the nation. For us, neither Islamic unity nor pan-Turkism can be a logical political path. Now, the official politics of Turkey is to live independently within its national boundaries and sovereignty" (Atatürk, 2012, p. 89). He continued on this note: "Our nation has been mobilised for centuries based on this false premise [pan-Islamism] ... The people of the new Turkey have nothing to prioritise but their own lives and wellbeing ... We cannot continue the stupidity of seeing ourselves as the masters of the world" (Atatürk, 2012, p. 159). The British politics of Caliphate was also clearly identified in Mustafa Kemal's speeches: "The British need a useful tool, an agent, to maintain their pressures on the Muslim world, which they have enslaved. In their eyes, that useful agent is ... the Caliph" (Atatürk, 2012, p. 62).
- ¹⁹⁸ Article 27 read as follows: "No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish Government or authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of a territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other Powers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a territory detached from Turkey. It is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are in no way infringed" (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923).
- ¹⁹⁹ Even the French Embassy in Istanbul wrote to Paris to underline the likeliness of that possibility (Archives Diplomatiques, Turquie, 13 November 1923). Mustafa Kemal, however, never took the idea seriously. When it was proposed to him by deputy Rasih (Kaplan) Efendi, he replied: "... is it not farcical to assume a title that has no real meaning and function? Gentlemen, ... those who try to occupy and manipulate Muslims via the scarecrow of the Caliphate can only be the enemies of Muslims, and especially of Turkey. To get involved in such a game would be caused only by ignorance and blindness" (Atatürk, 1927/1969, pp. 850-851).

- ²⁰⁰ On this note, deputy Süreyya (Yiğit) Bey mentioned the following in the closed session of the Republican People's Party: "As long as they stay in the country, the members of this dynasty will always constitute a threat that will raise our suspicion and concern" (CHP, 2002, p. 443). Mustafa Kemal likened the situation to the French case: "Due to concerns of independence and sovereignty, even today, the French deem it a threat to allow the royal dynasty and their relatives to enter the country". Likewise, he added, "in our dealings with the members of the [Ottoman] dynasty, who constantly pray for a royal sunrise, we cannot let the Republic of Turkey fall victim to politesse and empty words" (Atatürk, 1927/1969, pp. 847-848).
- ²⁰¹ This is in line with Mustafa Kemal's earlier speeches, which pointed to the centrality of mosques in the education of the masses: "It is a key duty [of the government] to provide the content of the valuable sermons that would guide and enlighten the people ... It is thus important to know the qualifications and abilities ... of the preachers" (Atatürk, 2012, p. 71). In another occasion, this idea was repeated: "Along with worship, mosques are also built for deliberation, that is, to think of what can be done for religious as well as worldly affairs ... This is why the sermons should be completely in Turkish, and suitable to the requirements of the time" (Atatürk, 2012, p. 112).
- ²⁰² With the secularising reforms the members of the old *ulema* class were "cut off from their source of livelihood", and therefore "a large class of unemployed religious and quasi-religious agents of obscurantism and conservatism were released into the small town and rural communities of Turkey. These men, many of whom became imams and Qur'an teachers, constantly inculcated hatred and distrust towards the central government. This propaganda left deep marks in the popular mind of the peasant masses in whose economic and social conditions a significant improvement did not come about" (Ergil, 1975c, pp. 250-251). Marguiles and Yıldızoğlu (1988) similarly contend that the Kemalists "purged the Ottoman *ulema* class from the state apparatus and transferred the revenues of pious foundations' (*vakif*) properties to the treasury, thus depriving the *ulema* of its source of income. They abolished shar'ia courts and pensioned off their judges (*kadi*), thus eliminating the *ulema*'s judicial role. The abolition of the entire system of religious schools, dervish lodges (*tekke*) and cells (*zaviye*) helped sever the Ottoman ruling class' contact with the populace". The *ulema*'s resistance was thus a counterrevolutionary one that sought reinstate its privileges.
- ²⁰³ The Sheik Said Rebellion (February 1925), the Rize revolt (November 1925), protests against the Hat Law in multiple cities (1925-6), Erzurum revolt (1926), Menemen Incident (1930), Bursa Rebellion (1933), and eastern rebellions of 1935-6 all featured an explicitly religious rhetoric to mobilise the masses for the cause of "saving Islam" (B. Toprak, 1981, p. 69).
- ²⁰⁴ Already in the 1922-4 episode that intensified contention revolving around the Sultanate and the Caliphate, the national state had taken steps, such as the revitalisation of the High Treason Law in April 1923, to eliminate opposition. Independence Tribunals swiftly tried and punished opponents. A year later in April 1924, 150 individuals considered to have committed treason during the War of Independence were declared *personae non gratae* and expelled from the country (Özoğlu, 2011). These episodes can be seen as the precursors of the Maintenance of Order period that was to be effective between 1925 and 1929.

- ²⁰⁵ In the parliamentary discussions on the abolition of the tithe, many deputies were triumphant. İsmail Kemal (Alpsar) Bey held that “the *aşar* is a matter of life and death. It has, for so long, caused the devastation of our villages, and the ignorance of the people”. Another deputy seconded, “I congratulate the Turkish nation on this major revolution. This is the *real* revolution!” (TBMM, II-14-II, 15 February 1925, p. 12).
- ²⁰⁶ The document added: “It is obvious that in the Republic of Turkey, which implements new and modern principles of statehood, ... that such a situation cannot continue ... The Turkish nation has accepted to follow all the necessities of civilised life (TBMM, II-19-3, 30 November 1925, Appendix, p. 3). Similarly, the motive behind closing the dervish lodges is explained in a school textbook as follows: “because these are the fountains of reactionism and the stamps of ignorance. The Turkish nation could tolerate neither such institutions nor their members” (Afet İnan, 1930/2014, p. 94).
- ²⁰⁷ In the parliamentary debates, Ekrem (Rize) Bey held that these lodges “have been home to the most disgusting social realities, and they have played destructive and ominous political roles during the most difficult times of the country”. Rasih (Kaplan) Bey added that dervish lodges are the cause of the nation’s laggardness: “since eleven centuries ... [these lodges] have devastated not only Turkey, but the whole of the Muslim world. They have driven the Muslim world to laziness ... derogation, and ignorance” (TBMM, II-19-3, 30 November 1925, p. 282, 285).
- ²⁰⁸ Mustafa Kemal stated during this period that it is the duty of the Republic to do what the dervish orders used to do, thus underlining a transfer of authority from a religious to a secular one: “Dervish lodges should definitely be closed. The Republic of Turkey is capable of guiding in every aspect of life. None of us need the guidance of dervish lodges. We take our strength from civilisation, learning, and science” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 144).
- ²⁰⁹ “Our Republic has a Directorate of Religious Affairs. This institution employs numerous officials such as muftis, imams, and preachers. The scientific level and status of these employees are attested. However, I also see many other people, who are not charged with this task but still continue to wear the same garment ... I would like to ask those latter: From whom did they receive their titles and authority? ... I will bring this to the attention of the government” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 144).
- ²¹⁰ The hat was constantly used by the republicans as a metaphor for the modernisation of the societal mindset, the absence of which would lead the country to ruins. Accordingly, this was not a matter of “changing headgears, but of changing heads” (Atay, 1961/2012, p. 545). Mustafa Kemal added elsewhere regarding the hat law that “the Turkish and the Muslim world have been in devastation and pain, because they have not adapted their mentalities and ideas to the changes and progress dictated by civilisation” (cited in İmece, 1975, pp. 25-26).

- ²¹¹ “The Republic of Turkey ... is characterised by the most populist and *lâyık* [*laik*] principles. Therefore ... it cannot be satisfied with penal stipulations dating from the era of sultanate and absolutism”. The justification document, written by the Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) Bey, contended that the penal law was “needed urgently by the Republic and the Revolution”, and it would be a great asset “in the presence of the civilised world”. In the parliamentary debate, he underlined that the “the Penal Code is tough, because the Revolution is jealous ... Those who are against the interests, laws, and revolution of the Turkish nation should indeed fear”. Reporter of the law Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) Bey held that the Penal Code supersedes the randomness of “Sharia and customary laws” (TBMM, II-23-III, 1 March 1926, p. 4-5, Appendix, p. 1).
- ²¹² Şükrü Kaya also pointed to the confusion caused by the duality of jurisdiction in the Empire, and highlighted the rupture the Civil Code enables vis-à-vis the past: “Gentlemen, making a law is not necessarily about taking the regulations of the past and imposing them on future generations. Laws are born out of conditions and needs ... The Civil Code is also the Code of Civilisation”. Besim Atalay touched upon the Code’s usefulness in safeguarding the Revolution, for “every revolutionary episode is bound to wither away if it does not posit its financial and judicial politics”, and added: “we are bound to follow the West in science and knowledge” (TBMM, II-22-III, 17 February 1926, p. 231-233). A similar point was iterated by Mustafa Kemal in 1923: “The new Turkey cannot stay loyal to the stipulations of *Mecelle*, which do not meet the requirements of the times and needs. We will ameliorate our legal provisions to the level of the most civilised nations” (Atatürk, 2012, p. 95).
- ²¹³ In citing this document, I largely benefited from the translation of Davison (1998, pp. 197-203), although I have made minor changes.
- ²¹⁴ Although Mahmut Esat cited the German and Swiss cases as well (where the emphasis was mostly on national unity), it is only in the French case that he distinctly talked about secularisation through breaking the hold of the Church: “The French Civil Code ... brought forth new principles by trampling over old codes, customs, and traditions. Among the most evident innovations of the law were the annulment of class and land privileges and the taking charge of family law from the church ... The Civil Code ... was an overwhelming blow to superstitious beliefs”, as it “erased all relics and declared in their place new codes and regulations. This is because this law denied domination of Catholicism in civil relations and especially in matters of family law”.
- ²¹⁵ Mahmut Esat mentioned, both in this document and elsewhere that based on the equality established in the Civil Code, the Rabbinate and Patriarchates communicated with him to forgo special privileges (above all the capitulations), which he deemed as a crucial step in establishing Turkey’s sovereignty (TBMM, II-24-III, 22 April 1926, p. 173-4).
- ²¹⁶ Mahmut Esat wrote in 1944 that at Lausanne, the Europeans “were saying ‘that the laws should be *layik*’ is a requirement of the idea of a modern state. As for yours [they said], they are taken from religious foundations. We cannot give up our subjects [non-Muslim citizens] to the principles of the Muslim religion ... You cannot impose these on your subjects who belong to other religions” (Bozkurt, 1944, pp. 9-10; cited in Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 116).

²¹⁷ “In the administration of justice, the people of Turkey are being exposed to irregularities and persistent disorder. Fate of the people does not depend on a definitive and stable principle of justice, but on medieval *fikih* rules that are coincidental and change-dependent and that are mutually contradictory. To rescue the Turkish Republic from this chaos, deprivation, and very primitive situation, it has become indispensable to create quickly and legislate a new Turkish Civil Code that is fitting to the requirements of our transformation and of the civilization of the present century”.

²¹⁸ Mahmut Nedim (Zabcı) Bey brought up the issue of not being able to precisely calculate religious holidays, due to the confusion caused by multiple calendars: “What is the situation today? There is holiday here but not there. We have difficulty identifying the days of Ramadan. There is a social chaos all over the country. Given the progress of science, it is not acceptable to say ‘I don’t know what day of the month it is!’” Rıza Nur added: “we’ve faced this problem at Lausanne. The [European] delegates asked us when our [religious] holidays were, but we could not tell them. It was such a shame. I beg the Assembly to determine these, for God’s sake!” Based on such grievances, the article regarding the national observatory was included in the law (TBMM, II-20-III, 26 December 1925, p. 278-9). Georgeon (2012, p. 274) writes that “for the first time in 1927, the first day of Ramadan was determined in advance by precise astronomical calculation”.

²¹⁹ This is not to suggest that the Republic put a complete stop to the instrumentalisation of Islam. “During the month of Ramadan in 1930, for example, mosques in Istanbul displayed the injunction in lights stretched between the minarets: ‘Waste is Sin, Buy Local Goods’. *Kadro*, an important Kemalist journal, noted that: ‘In the sermons delivered in mosques, people were told that among issues in the contemporary world the most important ones centred on the economy and [capital] accumulation’ (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 106).

²²⁰ Echoing controlled diminishment, Barkey (2010, p. 109) stresses that the Republicans thought their project would work “only if religion was eliminated”, and adds: “How would religion be eliminated? By controlling its institutional manifestation as well as withholding its cultural meaning in everyday life”. Controlled diminishment thus encapsulates elements of separation and regulation.

²²¹ In the Speech of 1927, Mustafa Kemal insinuated that establishing a state religion was a concession they had to give in the early stages of the nation-building period. He then called on to the Assembly to take the necessary steps for its abolition, which was finalised in 1928.

²²² In an article of 31 August 1928, *The Times* of London celebrated the reform and underlined its secularising significance: “Conservatism, the religious associations of Arabic which gave a sanctity to the letters in which the Koran was written, and the oriental delusion that writing should not be made too intelligible in content or in form explain the long domination of the Arabic letters over the Turks ... By this step the Turks, who for centuries were regarded as a strange and isolated people by Europe, have drawn closer than ever to the West. It is a great reform, worthy of the remarkable chief to whom the Turkish people has entrusted its destinies” (cited in G. Lewis, 1999, p. 38).

- ²²³ The justification for the law stated that it was absurd to have “a school nourished with the idea of the Republic to have above its door the emblem of and eulogy for a sultan”. The Republic, it was added, was “not to leave even the smallest vestige of the [Ottoman] autocracy in the ideas of the coming generations” (TBMM, II-31-IV, 13 April 1927, p. 133).
- ²²⁴ Recep Bey then gave the example of western commercial catalogues, magazines, and other documents involving industrial products; and asserted the importance of understanding and keeping up with the latest scientific and economic developments. The reforms on numerals and letters, he added, would help Turkey do that (TBMM III-4-I, 20 May 1928, p. 204).
- ²²⁵ Following the morning prayers on 23 December in the small western town of Menemen, a group led by the Naqshbandi Dervish Mehmed marched to the town square and made a call “to re-establish the caliphate and bring back the Sheriat, the law of divine justice, equality of all believers and the ‘unchanging’ social order” (Ahmad, 1991, p. 7). As Hasan Fehmi Kubilay, a reserve officer of the local gendarmerie went to the scene to quell the disturbance; he was captured and beheaded by the mob, and his head was placed on a spike and paraded across the town. With regard to its social basis, “the revolt was supported largely by the rural petty bourgeoisie and some peasants. In the early 1930s ... the Turkish rural petty bourgeoisie was subject to heavy economic pressures caused by falling prices” (Ergil, 1975b, p. 73), and religion once again became the displaced language of material grievance. In turn, the government responded by executing tens of rebels.
- ²²⁶ Parla and Davison (2004, p. 110) write that “Kemal’s intentions in promoting Islam [in the early period] may have been solely strategic ... The language of Islamic reform should be seen as part of an early legitimation strategy to ensure Kemalist hegemony so that the reforms could be implemented at a later point without resistance”.
- ²²⁷ Specifically, *ezan*, the Muslim call to prayer was switched from Arabic to Turkish in 1932, causing a series of reaction On 18 July 1932, Diyanet issued a circular to all mosques for reading *ezan* in Turkish. The next year, an uprising took place in Bursa claiming the return of the Arabic version, followed some other minor riots in other cities (CHP, 1938, p. 58). In 1941, reading the *ezan* in Arabic was made a criminal offence (along with opposing to the Hat Law of 1925 and the alphabet reform of 1928) punishable by up to three months of prison and a fine of 200 liras (Law no. 4055, 6 June 1941). Turkish *ezan* continued for 18 years until 1950, when the Democrat Party returned the Arabic version. Regarding the Koran, its Turkish translation was ordered by the government in the mid-1920s, and the Turkish version was promoted in the 1930s (Tunçay, 1981, p. 229).

- ²²⁸ Published by Afet İnan in 1930 (partly translated from the Instruction Civique textbook she studied in her French High School), and officially adapted by the Ministry of Education in 1931, the Civic Education (*Medeni Bilgiler*) textbook for middle and high schools identified citizenship and solidarity in clearly non-religious terms: “Some argue that religious unity is influential in the making of a nation. However, we see that the case of the Turkish nation presents a contrasting picture ... The Turkish nation considers its national sentiment in congruence with humanism, not with religious sentiment” (Afet İnan, 1930/2014, pp. 28-29). The book then lists the constituent factors that have made the Turkish nation (language, history, morals, and so on), with no mention of religion. In the section on liberty, it is underlined that religion negatively affects freedom: “the fear of Allah has left numerous taboos in the minds and actions of people. Customs and traditions based on taboos and superstitions” have weakened “freedom of personal thought and action” (Afet İnan, 1930/2014, pp. 81-82).
- ²²⁹ Toprak (2012) demonstrates that the weight on Turkish nationalism and anthropological research was also a response to the disillusionment with the liberal West after the 1929-30 crisis, and also the rise of racial ideologies that dismissed Turks as biologically inferior. Mustafa Kemal thus not only tried to diminish the significance of religion through secular nationalism, but also to promote a credible idea of Turkishness to be respected by the West.
- ²³⁰ In the introduction to *Religious Education for the Republican Child*, for instance, it was mentioned that the book would “only discuss historical realities ... and not dwell on miracles and supernatural legends” (Gölpınarlı, 1927/2005, p. 13). Accordingly, the book purported that separation of state and religion was inherent to Islam: “worldly affairs are designated by national laws”, and they “have nothing to do with Islam” given that the latter “accepts the authority of reason and science in temporal affairs” (Gölpınarlı, 1927/2005, p. 83).
- ²³¹ 29 imam-preaching schools were established following the Law of 3 March 1924. In 1925-6, their numbers dropped to 20, and in 1926-7, to 2. In 1929-30, finally, all imam-preaching schools were closed. In 1930, religious education was removed from the curriculum of the primary and junior level schools, except for village schools, which continued until 1940. (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 159-160). Koran courses continued to exist under the regulation of *Diyanet*, but with very low profile. Between 1932 and 1950, only a total of 1750 students received diplomas (Jäschke, 1972, p. 76).
- ²³² Trade, for instance, was declared to be the most fruitful of endeavours, as confirmed by the Prophet. Complemented by agriculture and manufacture, it enriched a nation’s wealth and secured its economic independence. Agriculture was to be based on modern machinery and not age-old traditions, for otherwise it served neither religion nor the world. Working hard, moreover, was to work for the afterlife, as a good Muslim must establish a balance between the two. Serving in the army and obeying your superiors, lastly was a religious duty (Usta, 1927/2010, pp. 77-78, 81, 87-78, 121, 174-125).
- ²³³ In 1935, the government initiated a classification and reorganisation of mosques and masjids in the territory, declaring that mosques and masjids that remain outside of this classification “would be closed for use of other purposes” (Law no. 2845, 19 November 1935).
- ²³⁴ These include Kâzım Vehbi (Oral) Bey in the budgetary discussions of 1927, Sırrı (Bellioğlu) Bey during the discussion on Pious Foundations in 1931 and in 1932, and Hakkı Kılıçoğlu in the 1937 constitutional amendment discussions on *laiklik* (Çitak, 2004, pp. 255-256).

- ²³⁵ In line with regulated diminishment, Berkes (1964, p. 499) notes that starting from the 1930s, “the single party of the Kemalist regime never resorted publicly to playing on religious sentiment; rather, social and, especially, educational problems were conscientiously reformulated so as to bring out their unifying moral, cultural, or aesthetic quality”.
- ²³⁶ On this note, Refet (Bele) Bey emphasised the importance of continuity for family names, especially if one is involved in business such as production and trade. He held that certain family names already have credibility in the market, which is why the law should be liberal in allowing people to use their previously used (yet non-official) family names (TBMM, IV-23-3, 21 June 1934: p. 248).
- ²³⁷ Şükrü Kaya added that “not to fulfill the necessities of the revolution would mean to serve reactionism ... It would mean recreating the consequences that the Empire has prepared for this nation”. Yet he also comforted the deputies: “religion is an institution that has completed its duty and exhausted its mission, which can no longer find life and vitality” (TBMM IV-25-4, 3 December 1934: p. 75, 77).
- ²³⁸ “The great Turkish nation! ... They looked at you ... without seeing or knowing your essence. Now, there is a power that shows your existence and essence to world nations. I see that ... the world looks at you with dazzled eyes” (TBMM, 5 December 1934).
- ²³⁹ Regarding sovereignty, one deputy declared that thanks especially to Article 2, “the Republic ... can be shaken by no internal or external earthquakes”; whereas another argued that the constitutionalisation of the Republic’s principles is for “protecting itself against destructive propaganda” (TBMM, 5-16-2, 5 February 1937, p. 62, 67). Concerning progress Şükrü Kaya referred to fellow republicans as “historical determinists” and “pragmatic materialists”, and resented that state administration in the past was based on “mystical and dogmatic principles”, which prevented Turks from “going forward ... and serving civilisation”. Religious congregations were also identified as a cause of laggardness: “Another ill inheritance for Turks is allegiance to certain religious orders (*tarikats*). The only *tarikats* (path) ... we know for the Turk is nationalism, which is based on positive sciences” (TBMM, 5-16-2, 5 February 1937, p. 60-1).
- ²⁴⁰ Likewise, civic education textbooks clarified that although freedom of religious worship is protected, “religious ceremonies cannot be against public security and customs, or implemented as a political gathering. Such situations, which have been witnessed abundantly in the past, will not be tolerated in the Republic of Turkey” (Afet İnan, 1930/2014, p. 93).

²⁴¹ After 1950, the Democrat Party (DP) “government led by landlords and commercial interests chose to admit foreign aid and American advisors and to reverse the previous policy of independent, state-directed development” (Trimberger, 1978, p. 122). The weakening of secularisation had already begun under the RPP government after 1945, and “regulated diminishment” was gradually abandoned. As part of the anti-communist rhetoric in the early Cold War context and to compete with the DP, elective religious courses were brought back, imam-preacher schools were reopened along with the Faculty of Theology, and religious discourse made its way back into politics (for other proposals to increase religious authority coming from the RPP, see CHP, 1947). The DP took these measures further after 1950. The call to prayers were switched back to Arabic, Koran readings were broadcasted on the state radio, the budget of Diyanet more than tripled in a decade, 1500 new mosques were built every year, Koran courses and other religious educational services flourished, the ratio of religious organisations to the total number of social organisations rose from 1.3 percent in 1946 to 31.9 percent in 1959, and religious symbolism and rhetoric became integral to national politics (see, for instance, B. Toprak, 1981, pp. 78-88).