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# Being In-between : Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization

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
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UNIVERSITÉ DE BORDEAUX



École Doctorale SP2 : Sociétés, Politique, Santé Publique

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## **Being In-between:**

# **Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization**

## **Thèse pour le Doctorat en Science politique**

Sous la direction de Dominique DARBON et Dieter NEUBERT

présentée et soutenue publiquement

le 15 juin 2018 par

**Anna FICHTMÜLLER**

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## **RESUME en français**

Cette thèse vise à une double de-construction : celle de la notion « classe moyenne » dans un contexte africain et l'espoir énoncé qu'une telle classe serait un moteur de la démocratisation. Choisisant avec l'Ouganda une économie solide, mais pas non plus avancée, nous pouvons examiner la question de « Africa rising » loin de la médiatisation des grandes économies du continent. À l'aide d'une enquête qualitative nous étudions la vie, les conditions de vie et les trajectoires des individus qui appartient à ce que la banque africaine du développement décrit comme « classe moyenne ». Nous essayons de voir s'il est possible de déceler des traits caractéristiques « classe moyenne » qui pourront nous permettre de mieux comprendre ces groupes, et de parler des classes plutôt que des strates économiques. Dans une deuxième étape nous procéderons à analyser leurs attitudes politiques, leur comportement électoral, leur participation politique et leur point de vue sur les protestations qui ont eu lieu dans le pays. Voyant qu'ils s'abstiennent politiquement alors qu'ils ont des attitudes très critiques envers le régime politique nous tournons vers leurs activités de loisir. La littérature sur les mobilisations sociales a montré que ces derniers sont des lieux importants pour créer des environnements de ce qui pourra déboucher sur des mobilisations politiques. Nous analysons les activités, les valeurs négociées, les attitudes exprimées et les préférences révélées pour tenter de trouver des preuves qui pourront suggérer que ces groupes s'investiront pour plus de démocratie, grâce à leur statut de « classe moyenne ».

## **RESUME en anglais**

This thesis aims at a double deconstruction: of the applicability of the notion of middle class in the African context and the hopes for it to be a motor of democratization, that are sometimes attached. Choosing a good, but average economic performer like Uganda, allows us to examine the hype of "Africa rising" beyond the continent's economic giants. Through a qualitative study of the lives, livelihoods and life trajectories of Ugandans who would economically belong to the middle class, according to the African Development Bank, we try to see whether we can single out specific middle class characteristics, that would allow us to better understand this stratum and determine whether we can speak of a class or mere income groups. We then proceed to analyze their political attitudes, voting behavior, participation and their point of view on protest in Uganda. Finding that they are rather critical of the current regime, but abstaining from political participation, we eventually turn to their leisure activities – an important vector that can feed into social mobilization once it takes place – to analyze the values negotiated, the attitudes expressed and the preferences manifested, in order to find any evidence that will suggest that these groups will contribute positively to democratization, due to their middle class status.

## **MOTS-CLES en français**

Classes Moyennes, Mobilisations Sociales, Démocratisation, Ouganda, Pauvreté

## **MOTS-CLES en anglais**

Middle Classes in Africa, Social Mobilization, Democratization, Uganda, Poverty

## RESUME OPERATIONNEL

À la fin de la première décennie du millénaire, un nouveau paradigme émerge, mené par les consultants économiques et les médias : l'« Africa rising » et la classe moyenne en Afrique (Deloitte, 2012; Jacobs, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; The Economist, 2011). Basé sur des taux de croissances élevés des produits intérieurs bruts (PIB) de certains pays Africains pendant plusieurs années et en lien avec des discours sur les classes moyennes globales (World Bank, 2006) ou en développement (Ravallion, 2009) la banque africaine de développement (BAD) a constaté l'émergence et la forte croissance des classes moyennes africaines (Ncube, Lufumpa, & Vencatachellum, 2011). De plus, un lien, qui trouve ces origines dans les théories de modernisation, est souvent établi, entre développement économique, émergence des classes moyennes, stabilité politique et consolidation démocratique, au travers des pratiques de bonne gouvernance.

Or, les définitions données par la BAD incluait les personnes n'étant pas « pauvres », c'est-à-dire ayant un revenu de plus de \$2 par jour. Ce groupe était le plus grand des classes moyennes. Par conséquent, les attentes évoquées concernant ces classes moyennes par rapport à leur capacité de consommation, mais aussi de transformation démocratique ne se sont pas réalisées, ce qui a mené à une remise en cause de cet « Afro-optimisme » (Rosen, 2015; Shorrocks, Davies, & Lluberas, 2015). Avec cette thèse nous proposons un débat sur la pertinence de la notion « classe moyenne en Afrique ». Nous examinons comment elle est chargée politiquement et nous essayons de proposer une vision plus réaliste. Nous visons donc à une double de-construction : de-construction de la pertinence des théories de classes, et notamment de la classe moyenne en Afrique et de-construction de l'idée que leur potentiel politique pourrait engendrer une transformation démocratique. L'Ouganda nous semble un bon pays d'étude pour sa position intermédiaire : la nation ne fait pas partie des grandes économies du continent, comme l'Afrique du Sud, le Kenya ou le Nigeria – économies souvent citées dans le contexte des classes moyennes, mais loin d'être représentative de l'ensemble du continent, mais elle ne fait pas non plus partie des pays en crise continue. Au contraire, sortie de presque deux décennies de gouvernance arbitraire et guerre civile, le pays a connu une relative stabilité qui s'est avérée positive pour la croissance économique. Or, des scandales de corruptions, des taux de chômage élevés, qui touchent notamment les jeunes, l'insuffisance des services publique et un régime de plus en plus autoritaire ont augmenté le mécontentement à l'égard du gouvernement. Un tel environnement – croissance économique (et donc émergence d'une « classe moyennes » ?) et système autoritaire au pouvoir – semble être un bon terrain pour une étude de cas analysant l'existence des classes moyennes et leurs formes de mobilisation politique, qui mèneraient donc à la démocratisation du pays.

Dans un premier temps nous examinons le débat académique, et notamment sociologique, de la question de classe. En travaillant sur la généalogie du concept de classe, ses racines marxiste et wéberienne, nous voyons que primo, il n'y a pas de définition globalement acceptée de classe, et encore moins de classe moyenne, et que secundo, le terme classe moyenne est devenu populaire en Europe dans des circonstances historique très spécifique, liées à l'opposition du prolétariat à l'aristocratie et à la révolution industrielle. Aujourd'hui en Afrique le

contexte est fortement différent. Donc, les discussions des classes moyennes globales ou développant étaient principalement menées par les économistes et étaient axées sur les strates de revenu intermédiaires. Une telle approche macro-économique pose plusieurs problèmes, de la viabilité des données utilisés aux interprétations tirées (voir par exemple Devarajan, 2011; Jerven, 2013; Melber, 2016c). Il apparaît en tous les cas impossible d'en tirer des conclusions sur le comportement politique de ces classes moyennes.

Dans un deuxième temps nous observons qu'il n'existe aucun accord scientifique ni sur la définition des classes moyennes ni sur leurs effets politiques. Les auteurs qui établissent des liens positifs entre classes moyennes et démocratie se basent sur des études quantitatives et déduisent leurs conclusions des corrélations observées. De plus, elles sont souvent chargées de suppositions positives des comportements des classes moyennes et négatives des autres classes (des riches et des pauvres) et ils suivent une argumentation téléologique, se résumant à des hypothèses très générales (par exemple : les classes moyennes rendront l'État responsable), accompagnée de peu de vérification empirique. Les auteurs qui sont plus critiques quant à l'effet des classes moyennes sur la démocratie utilisent des études de cas spécifiques, souvent dans des pays en développement. Ils rejettent une corrélation positive entre développement économique et démocratique, mais ils commettent également des erreurs de conception. Notamment par la supposition qu'un intérêt commun existe parmi ces groupes dû à leur position économique, et que la classe moyenne agirait donc de manière homogène. Finalement, les deux camps échouent à baser l'évaluation du comportement politique sur des théories de mobilisations sociales nécessaires pour l'analyse des transformations politiques.

Nous introduisons alors dans notre travail les théories de mobilisations sociales, pour proposer un cadre théorique qui nous donnera des éléments d'analyse, comme les questions d'identités collectives, des structures politiques d'opportunités, et des répertoires d'action. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui ont insisté sur le fait que les théories de mobilisation sociale, nées dans des contextes occidentaux, négligent des particularités d'autres sociétés, et oublient d'inclure des actions qui ne se définissent pas comme strictement politique. Cela implique les politiques par le bas, les non-mouvements, ou les objets politiques non-identifiées, d'autant que les structures associatives, qui ne sont pas forcément politisées, servent de réseau de mobilisation en temps de mouvements sociaux. Elles sont des lieux importants de discussions, de négociations de valeurs et de formation des identités collectives. Nous retenons ces aspects car nous les pensons importants à inclure dans notre enquête.

En prenant en compte ce qui était dit, notre recherche est guidée par deux questions :

1. Comment les transformations économiques récentes promeuvent-elles le développement d'une identité consciente de soi parmi des Ougandais d'un même groupe au revenu intermédiaire ?
2. Comment est-ce que ces groupes se positionnent par rapport au régime politique ? Quelles formes de mobilisations existent parmi eux ? Pouvons-nous identifier des activités politiques propre à ces groupes, dû à leur position économique partagée ?

Notre réponse repose sur des enquêtes qualitatives menées en Ouganda entre 2012 et 2017, d'une durée totale de sept mois. Nous avons ciblé des Ougandais qui appartenaient à la classe moyenne définie par la BAD. À l'aide d'un questionnaire nous avons collecté des informations sur leur situation économique, leurs conditions de vie, leur situation familiale, leur point de vue politique et leurs loisirs. Au-delà des questionnaires nous avons menés des entretiens semi-directives, pour obtenir plus d'information sur leur trajectoire de vie, leur perception de la situation politique et sociale en Ouganda, leurs valeurs, leur insertion dans des réseaux d'entre-aide et leurs activités du temps libre.

Dans la seconde partie nous analysons ces groupes à revenu intermédiaire, pour établir leurs points communs et les stratifications que nous voyons émerger, liées à la situation économique (ici la comparaison, bien que limitée par un petit échantillon nous permet de différencier entre les classes moyennes supérieures et les classes flottantes, par exemple). Nous constatons que, certes, le revenu structure les conditions de vie, notamment par le fait qu'un revenu élevé augmente la possibilité de choix. Mais néanmoins la plupart des interlocuteurs restent dans une situation « d'entre deux », ni riche, ni pauvre, et concentre leurs efforts à mitiger le risque de vulnérabilité (de retomber dans la pauvreté). Les stratégies principales étant la diversification des revenus, l'entretien des réseaux entre-aide, l'investissement dans l'éducation de soi-même et des enfants, et dans leurs pratiques de consommation. Dans ces caractéristiques nous observons une forte ressemblance aux critères établies par la littérature sur la sortie de la pauvreté (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2007; Narayan & Petesch, 2007; Narayan, Pritchett, & Kapoor, 2009), ce qui dévoile encore une fois la proximité du débat des « classes moyennes » avec les questions de pauvreté. Dans les trajectoires de vie partagées un point masqué par l'« Africa rising » devient visible : les limites de la mobilité vers le haut, et la réelle possibilité d'un déclin économique pour de nombreux membres de ces groupes. La classe moyenne n'est-elle alors qu'un euphémisme des pauvres (voir aussi Darbon, 2018) ? Nous remarquons également l'absence d'auto-identification à la classe moyenne de nos interlocuteurs. Le discours économique et politique national étant axé sur la vision d'établir une classe moyenne dans une future proche transmet aussi l'idée de son absence dans le présent, souvent reflété par les Ougandais interviewés, qui se décrivent plutôt, soit comme pauvre, soit comme ni riche ni pauvre.

Par contre déjà ici nous voyons également d'autres identités pertinentes émergées, qui seront encore plus visible dans les chapitres suivants, comme celle de la religion, de l'ethnicité ou de l'âge. Ces identités chevauchent au moins les identités des groupes moyens, s'ils ne les remplacent pas carrément.

Au début de la troisième partie nous essayons de couvrir les aspects de l'activisme politique conventionnelle, l'attitude envers la démocratie, les comportements électoraux, la légitimité des élections et les expériences et attentes envers les politiciens. Ayant une attitude plutôt positive envers la démocratie et jugeant son état en Ouganda comme critique, le plupart des interviewées exprime leur soutien pour l'opposition (ces résultats reflètent des tendances de milieux urbains, et donc également des pauvres urbains). Donc nous voyons que les groupes intermédiaires ne sont pas forcément favorable au régime en place, et pourtant de là ne résulte aucune mobilisation pour sa transformation ou remplacement.

Ensuite nous décrivons les protestations politiques, donc l'activisme contestataire, et nous analysons au travers du prisme des réponses reçues par les Ougandais des groupes de revenu intermédiaires leur légitimité et participation (intentionnée et réelle). Cela nous permet d'établir quand une cause est considérée légitime et de déceler les mécanismes qui empêchent la mobilisation politique contestataire, comme la mauvaise réputation du « politique », du parti au gouvernement autant que l'opposition, mais aussi la mauvaise réputation de ceux qui protestent, puisqu'ils menacent l'harmonie sociale et finalement, non négligeable dans un contexte autoritaire, la peur de la répression. D'ailleurs le processus de création d'une identité collective se heurte à des fractions de la société qui sont concernées par les mobilisations du passé, notamment les ethnies, mais aussi des groupes sociaux comme les jeunes ou les pauvres urbains. Par ailleurs nous observons que les acteurs « professionnelles » de la mobilisation, comme les organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG), les syndicats ou les groupes religieux, sont rapidement intégrés dans le système politique où la contestation prend donc un caractère très conformiste. Ils ajoutent à l'impression des interviewées que l'obligation d'agir revient à d'autres instances qu'eux et qu'en plus, l'action est souvent considérée inutile, car elle n'est que rarement suivie de concessions du régime.

Ces analyses permettent de répondre à la question : quelles sont les répertoires d'action légitime dans l'Ouganda contemporain ? Alors qu'il est acceptable de chercher le contact personnel avec des politiciens pour obtenir soit du soutien financier, soit des opportunités exclusives, il en est moins pour la contestation protestataire, comme le montre les nombreux mécanismes pour la délégitimer. Dans ce contexte, les groupes de revenu intermédiaires, même s'ils sont favorable à l'idée de la démocratie (supposant que cela ne repose pas seulement sur l'internationalisation d'un discours ubiqué de la bonne gouvernance), ne montre pas des comportements visant à promouvoir des transformations démocratiques. On y voit plutôt régner un certain pragmatisme, qui les fait jouer selon les règles du jeu, afin d'arriver à leurs fins dans les structure politique de l'Ouganda.

Gardant en tête que l'activisme politique n'est pas considéré comme une option pour de nombreux gens, il est intéressant de voir quelles alternatives ils poursuivent. Or, rappelant que la mobilisation « classique » ne suffit pas pour montrer le vaste éventail des aspects qui peuvent rentrer en considération de ce qui est politique, nous nous mettons à la recherche des « objets politique non-identifiées », pour emprunter ce terme à Martin (1989) en regardant les loisirs de ces groupes dans la partie IV. Considérant que le temps est également une ressource, et d'autant plus une qui est rare pour des nombreuses personnes, il est aussi intéressant de voir à quoi elle sera allouée.

Nous observons un effet structurant des revenus disponibles sur les choix des loisirs. Mais cet effet structurant n'est pas la seule dimension qui rentre en considération pour nombreux de nos interlocuteurs, il est également question d'âge, de région d'origine, de genre ou d'appartenance religieuse. Et cet éclatement d'identités montre bien la diversité régnante au sein de ces groupes du milieu, ce qui nous fait suggérer de parler plutôt des différents milieux (voir aussi Neubert, 2014; Neubert & Stoll, 2015). Ces milieux favorisent le développement d'identités et de valeurs très diverses et rendent la généralisation sur les attitudes et préférences de ces groupes difficiles. Malgré ce phénomène de diversité, dans les milieux ob-

servés nous avons constaté l'absence de discours qui soutiendra une transformation démocratique ou des actions contestataires. Nous observons plutôt, entre autres, l'expression d'un besoin de sécurité, un retrait dans la sphère privée et un retour sur soi, au travers de l'amélioration et de l'efficacité de soi, tout en se rappelant que ces tendances observées n'incluent pas tous les interlocuteurs, mais varient d'un individu à l'autre. Nous trouvons un discours qui valorise la stabilité et l'avancement individuel plutôt que l'incertitude et un gouvernement plus inclusif. Il est possible que nous n'ayons pu les identifier, ces objets politiques, mais nos résultats soulignent l'absence d'une vision partagée, alternative et démocratique du régime politique contemporain en Ouganda. Nous observons plutôt une baisse d'attente envers les services fournis par l'État et un repli sur soi, plus facile pour les groupes à revenus intermédiaires puisqu'ils ont les moyennes de se retirer.

Pour répondre à nos questions de recherche, nous pouvons dire que nos données ne nous permettent pas de parler d'une classe consciente de soi, mais plutôt de groupes intermédiaires qui ne diffèrent pas dans leurs attitudes ou préférences des groupes moins aisés, mais plutôt dans leur capacité d'agir. Au travers des réseaux d'entraide, notamment familiale, ils restent néanmoins très connectés aux strates inférieures ce qui posent un obstacle supplémentaire au développement d'une conscience de classe. Et puis, non, nous ne voyons pas non plus au sein de ces groupes de formes spécifiques de mobilisation sociale qui pourrait s'avérer bénéfique à l'évolution démocratique du pays. Leur hétérogénéité interne ne favorise pas une mobilisation de masse, mais se traduiraient plutôt dans des demandes ad-hoc et spécifiques, énoncées par des petits groupes particuliers ou l'abstention totale de la sphère politique.

Nos groupes à revenus intermédiaires sont des individus capables, qui organisent leurs vies avec les moyens qu'ils possèdent et en respectant les règles du jeu, en prenant en compte le contexte local et historique, mais qui ne s'organisent pas sur la base de leur appartenance à une classe commune.

Il semble alors que l'idée des classes moyennes en Afrique et leur potentiel démocratique demeure une chimère. Embrassée par les cabinets d'affaires pour leur potentiel de consommation, par les organisations du développement pour souligner le succès des stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté et pour leur capacité d'amener la bonne gouvernance. Cette idée ne semble pas adéquatement refléter les réalités africaines. Elle sert plutôt à masquer une inégalité croissante et donne l'illusion d'une croissance économique inclusive là où il y en a pas. Pour avancer dans le débat de la structuration de la société en Afrique nous devons donc rapidement laisser de côté cette notion de « classe moyenne » qui sert plus à brouiller qu'à éclaircir et opter pour des catégories plus précises afin de proposer des explications significatives.



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## ***List of Abbreviations***

AfDB	African Development Bank
BMM	Black Monday Movement
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DP	Democratic Party
EU	European Union
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMC	Global Middle Class
IRCU	Inter-Religious Council of Uganda
KCC	Kampala City Council
KCCA	Kampala Capital City Authority
LAM	Les Afriques dans le Monde
LC	Local Chairman
LDC	Least Developed Country
LIC	Low Income Country
LSM	Living Standards Measurement
MIC	Middle Income Country
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MUASA	Makerere University Academic Staff Association
NAPE	National Association of Professional Environmentalists
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPHC	National Population and Housing Census
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
PCC	Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches
POMA	Public Order Management Act
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
SAARF	South African Advertising Research Foundation
SACCO	Saving and Credit Cooperation
SMO	Social Movement Organization
SSA	sub-Saharan Africa
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
WVS	World Value Survey



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## ***Introduction***

Betty is a young woman in her twenties. She was born in Western Uganda. The memories of her early childhood are rather bright; she does not recall hard times. That changed when her father left to marry another woman. Her mother remained with her and her three younger siblings in their small house. Deprived of the primary income earner the economic situation at home deteriorated. To raise her children, the mother started selling second-hand clothes that she bought in bulk at the market in the city center. But shortly after Betty completed her primary school, the mother fell sick, and she and her sister had to take over to sustain the family. That time of her life Betty describes as one of “*abduct poverty*”. However, as fervent believers, they kept praying to God to change their lives. And one night her mother had a vision, of a stranger coming to save them. Shortly after the minister of her church told Betty that he found a sponsor from the Netherlands to take her and her sister back to school. With his support, Betty was able to start her O-Level. At about the same time her mother defeated her illness and returned to work. Things got easier, and after finishing secondary school, Betty went on to get a certificate in electrical engineering. Even though the pay was bad, she took a job with a security firm in Kampala, installing surveillance cameras all over the city. But after a while, some of her co-workers started making sexual advances, and she felt that she got disadvantaged in her job because she refused the propositions made. So she decided to give up the security of her monthly salary to escape that situation. “*It is better for you to work in an environment where you have peace of mind, even think clearly than working at a job where you are under pressure.*” She had managed to save some money while working with the security company and on top of that convinced some relatives in the village to give her a loan. With that, she was able to start a small dairy business in Kawempe, a lower class Kampala neighborhood. That was a year ago. Business is picking up only slowly. So far she was busy paying back her loan, but it is nearly cleared off, and she hopes that she will now be able to invest more in her venture.

Betty is renting a room attached to her shop that she shares with one of her younger sisters. The sister studies in secondary school, and Betty is paying her school fees. This year she will complete her O-Level, but Betty thinks she will not support her any further than that. So far Betty has not been able to diversify her sources of income, to stabilize her financial situation. She is cognizant of her economic vulnerability. When asked about her financial safety nets, Betty answers: *“My safety or my help is that one: to give a call to a friend or a relative, that is the security that I have when I am in hard conditions.”* Well aware that her family is not better off than herself, she knows that these situations truly must be exceptional. On the contrary, more often it is her family asking her for some support. And while she feels that this hinders her from advancing, it is nearly impossible for her to refuse, as long as she has some money to give. For the little money she has left at the end of the month, she considers it is not worth maintaining a bank account, and so she rather puts her savings on mobile money. Knowing that money is tight, she seeks to limit the expenditures she has, by buying in bulk and in the morning at the local markets and limiting her mobility to save transport costs. Every once in a while, she treats herself with an outing, maybe going to one of the popular quarters with friends and eating roasted pork. But because she has her shop open from 8 am to 11 pm, free time is scarce. She barely has time to attend Sunday service at one of the local born-again churches, which is only possible if her sister watches over her shop during her absence. All in all, however, she remains rather positive about her financial situation. She considers herself to be middle class because she can afford the necessities, contrary to some of her rural family members. She is also confident that her business will pick up, allowing for higher revenues. Moreover, she knows that her economic conditions will improve once she gets married. That is why she is looking for a God-fearing man in sound economic conditions. *“I need someone who is financially stable; I don’t want him to be a burden to me.”* Her dream is to one day continue her education at the university and become a leader. She feels that this is necessary because even though she thinks the President himself is doing a good job, there is too much corruption and nepotism in

society. In her view, jobs and scholarships are mainly attributed within a family. Despite all challenges Uganda and herself are facing, she remains positive about her future, and that of her country, both of whom she believes are developing.

Similar to Betty, Martha, a 33-year-old woman, only has one source of income, too. However, she is not self-employed but receives a salary from a bank in Kampala that she can count on every month. She first started five years ago as a teller, but slowly worked her way up and is now employed in the headquarters. Other than Betty, Martha is already married and can hence rely on the financial support of her husband. They have two young kids together and rent a self-contained house about 20 kilometers outside of Kampala. The house has its kitchen inside and is part of a fenced compound. Even though they have a gas stove, they mainly use charcoal for cooking because it is cheaper. Two maids help out with housework and take care of the kids, nevertheless Martha finds it hard to reconcile family and work. She considers motherhood as one of the hardships in her life: *“It has always been really hard to me to be a mother and at the same time, work.”* Staying on the outskirts of Kampala was a conscious choice, to afford better housing. Since both partners work in Kampala, daily commuting is tedious because they do not have a car on their own. Her husband is employed by an international donor agency. With both earning a salary they manage to make their ends meet. Nevertheless, they remain conscious about their spendings. To save on food, they have staple crops sent from the village where they can purchase them at a better price. Once a week they try to eat meat and once fish. All of their diet is local, for financial reasons, but also because of preference, not having developed a particular liking for imported foods like pizza or cheese. Their priorities lie in advancing their education and securing the future of their children. So right now both pursue a master’s degree in evening classes and they started putting aside some money for the time when their children will start schooling. All these activities leave little time for free time activities, apart from regular church attendance and a savings group, where Martha contributes money fortnightly, knowing that every six months it is her turn to be on the receiving end. Besides, Martha and her husband are developing plans for fur-

ther investment. With mobile money gaining popularity, they feel it is a safe venture to set up a booth, too. Right now they are in the process of registering the booth with one of Uganda's leading telephone companies and hope to start their business soon, as a means of securing their financial conditions through diversifying their income. When asked about her class position, she is not quite sure where to put herself, somewhere below middle class, but not poor either.

Coming from the east of Uganda, Martha grew up in a village near the Kenyan border. Despite being polygamous with eleven wives, her father was always able to provide food, since he was an agricultural officer in Moroto district. When he died in 1990 – she was nine at that time – her relatives took over her education up to university. So now she considers it her responsibility to support some family members herself. Martha is well aware of the expectations of her family, yet she does not perceive it as pressure knowing she would not be where she is, if it was not for her family. On the other hand, she knows that she has hardly any financial security, as long as her business is not working because she is among the top earners of her family and could hence not turn to them for help. Martha believes that all Ugandans would be better off if politics would support the most vulnerable. Instead, corruption is being practiced on all levels, so that *“now people at the lower level look at corruption as a way of life.”* However, she credits to the government that it has brought peace, which for her is of utmost importance: *“But anyway what I can say that there is peace. What has changed is that there is peace because the time I was growing up guns were in wrong hands, people were being killed.”*

Only a stone's throw from Martha's workplace is the office of Steve. Steve is a lecturer at a private university. His father was a veterinary surgeon, and his mother was working as a secretary to a minister. He did not recall any financial problems in his childhood. His sisters being married to affluent people equally helped to put Steve through secondary school – *“one of the best schools in the country!”* Steve pursued his bachelor at university with the help of a government scholarship and while still studying got employed with the tax authority. Having a stable salary did not stop him however from furthering his education, he continued with a master in

a related field and several postgraduate courses. Right now Steve is fostering plans to continue with a Ph.D. When his contract with the tax authority did not get renewed, he switched fields and became a lecturer at that university. However, he is not satisfied with his pay. His salary is barely enough to fuel his car, he argues. Luckily his wife is running a well-performing shop giving her a weekly profit, they are renting out two houses and have some hectares of land that they use for commercial agriculture. Moreover, he knows that his various assets protect him from *“getting to the lowest level of the poverty line.”* Still, expenses are high, so when asked about his financial situation, Steve laughs and says: *“At least out of thirty days I can survive 26. And the last three days I am broke like a mouse.”* For that reason he is also hesitant to classify himself as middle class: *“You are just at the boundary [...]. Some days you have money, you are middle class, others you don’t and you are poor.”* Now in his forties, Steve lives in his own house a few kilometers north of the city center. The house is well-equipped with a gas stove (even though they use charcoal for cooking as well), a fridge, several TVs and laptops, a microwave and a sandwich toaster. Just when asked about a washing machine, he shrugs and says he does not know anyone who owns a washing machine. His diet consists mainly of local food, as he did not acquire a taste for those imported foods, which he also deems unhealthy. His spendings are not consistent; however, one thing that remains a priority for him and that he is budgeting for, is a regular vacation. Steve believes that everyone should take some vacation time and leave the country to change their mind and be exposed to new things. He has four children, between the ages of two and eight and several relatives who live with him and his family in the house. Right now, Steve estimates that about ten relatives depend on him for their school fees. And while he knows it is his turn now to support his family because others have supported him, he weighs how much money he gives to his relatives. Concerning his finances, he states: *“I do as the bible says: from your income you should give some, spend some and save some.”* Steve is also a paying member of the local golf club even though, he admits, he does not even know how to play golf. For him, this is just a way of *“greeting the*

*old men*” and finding new ventures. Once a month he also meets with longtime friends, all coming from the same region and now living in the same area. They go out, have some drinks together and they also constitute a savings group. Everyone contributes \$20 monthly and in case of big expenditures they can borrow from the pool. Steve is also interested in politics and even harbored some intentions to participate, but he believes right now the environment is not conducive to become politically active. For him the government is not doing any good, there is one person who has been in power for too long and even though the country enjoys stability, there is no chance for institutions to develop. Participating in elections to him is just a waste of time since the votes will be rigged anyway. Unless Uganda reinstalls term limits, Ugandans are heading towards another Libya. Thus, he has a rather bleak picture of society whom he believes is deteriorating as people are becoming increasingly poor. On the contrary, about himself, Steve states positively: *“I see myself as a young man that is out to achieve my potential to the fullest.”*<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of the second decade of this millennium economists (Mahajan, 2009; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Ncube et al., 2011) and journalists (Courier international, 2013; Gaus, 2011; Perry, 2012; The Economist, 2011b) wrote increasingly about “Africa rising” and, closely linked, about the African middle class. This has become so popular, that it was even called “a meme<sup>2</sup>” by some observers (Jacobs, 2012). According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the three fictitious people in the example, but based on the stories of our respondents, are all part of the African middle class, because they can spend between \$2-20 in purchasing power parity (ppp) per day (Ncube et al., 2011). Albeit their common class, their lives have not many points of contact. Their social circles, lifestyles, living places, and attitudes differ. And if they pass each other on the street, they will probably not consider themselves to be peers. Besides, their perception of class differs, Betty would describe herself as middle class, yet Steve feels he is just *“oscillating.”* Hence, this feeling is not tied to income, but in their case more to

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<sup>1</sup>This introduction is taken from a presentation I made at the SA UK conference 2016, “Uganda, vignettes to illuminate class categories” at Cambridge, 7-9<sup>th</sup> of September and inspired by the introduction in Ferreira, 2013.

<sup>2</sup>A meme is an idea or behavior that spreads rapidly, often with the help of the internet.

the context and their point of reference. If their subjective and objective life situation is so disparate, what then is the benefit of calling them all middle class?

Closely related with the optimism about Africa's future, derived from several years of economic growth and the postulated emergence of its middle class is the hope that this will equally support the democratic advancement of the continent (Birdsall, 2010; Easterly, Ritzan, & Woolcock, 2006). Already Aristotle highlighted the civic virtues of the middle class:

“Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well administered, in which the middle class is large [...] And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end.”

(Aristotle cited in Lipset, 1960)

The evidence that the middle class can have such a pro-democratic transformative role is, at least, questionable, and thorough empirical analysis of the relation remains scarce, particularly in an African context (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016, p. 6).

This thesis aims therefore at a double deconstruction: for one the scrutiny of the applicability of the middle class concept in the context of an African country like Uganda. We will not concentrate the analysis on continental economic outliers, such as Kenya or South Africa, as the Africa Rising Narrative is often doing, but at a close to the average performer. Uganda has had steady growth over the last twenty years which has led to a reduction of people living below the poverty line, yet the country remains far from becoming a middle income country (World Bank, 2016b)<sup>3</sup>. A middle class definition like the one of the AfDB has increasingly been under attack, mainly for its low entry thresholds. With higher economic thresholds, in a country like Uganda the size of the middle class would drastically diminish, raising doubts whether Uganda has a “real” middle class, living a “middle class

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<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed discussion see chapter 3.1.



lifestyle” (Melber 2016, p. 2) as if this does not need further elaboration. However, there is no general agreement on what is middle class, as the many diverging definitions show. Rather, the term evokes mental images that are shaped by assumptions and experiences. Connected with the living conditions in the respective African countries, those images cannot stand the test, because the biggest share of what has been defined as African middle class (using here the often cited definition of the AfDB) is the so-called *floating class*, living from \$2-4 per day. Such a criticism, however, ignores the need for an analysis that is adapted to a particular historical and national context and it raises the question whether the way a “Western” middle class is understood can be easily transposed into an African context. Such a simple negation may blur the picture for the changes on *how* “Africa is rising”, who is touched, and who is not. So there is a need to clarify the middle class concept regarding Africa: Are there proper, locally bound trajectories of emergence? In how far do they correspond to other understandings of middle class in vastly different contexts? By looking at personal trajectories of emergence, we can grasp a better understanding of what it means to be in an intermediate position, as neither rich nor poor, in many African societies. We can single out processes and patterns that are recurrent for economic emergence and we can link them to demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, religion or regional origin and wider behavior, such as consumption and leisure. This allows us to give a micro-sociological description, based on qualitative research of the everyday lives of Ugandans who do better than the large, mainly rural, majority, but who still feel they are “not there yet”. Besides, our analysis shows that it may be premature to speak of a class, as a class consciousness in the larger sense does not exist. To avoid the prejudices and because of the doubt concerning the “class” label, we, therefore, suggest framing these middle classes in terms of economic strata, and refer to them as middle income groups.

The second deconstruction is linked to the normative concept of the middle classes’ implication in democratic development. The idea that the middle class is beneficial for democracy stems from the perceived correlation between economic

development and democracy (Lipset, 1959b). In their review of studies on class theories that explain democratization, Kurzman & Leahey (2004) find that

“Economic development also underlies all of the main class-based theories of democratization: it is associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie, the expansion of the working class, and the emergence of a middle class.”

(Kurzman & Leahey, 2004, p. 945)

The concept gains in importance when connected to the notion of social change, which is often related to instability. Thus, if we have a society that has been undergoing rapid social changes (for example, triggered by economic development), the risk of instability is increasing. If there is now equally a middle class emerging that fosters democratic values, a transition towards democracy would become likely.

This argument has equally been challenged on several grounds. For one, some authors have pointed out that the middle class will not necessarily sideline with democracy, this will instead depend on specific local and historical context, and the alliances formed (Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, 1997; Huntington, 1972). Also, a prevailing assumption considers the middle class to act coherently, driven by shared class interest. Third, most studies treating the relationship between middle class and democracy do not specify *how* the middle class contributes to democracy: Through the overthrow of an undemocratic regime? The fostering of democratic values? However, this again raises two questions: First, what are democratic values? Is it enough to participate in elections? If elections are not free and fair, this can be seen precisely as an act of legitimizing an authoritarian regime (J. Chen, 2013, p. 113). Second, is it enough to adhere to certain principles, while not insisting that they shall be implemented on a society-wide scale? Some authors argue that by paying taxes, the middle class supports redistribution of wealth and feels entitled to demand accountability from the government. But what if the government can only hardly be held accountable and paying taxes is not a choice but a governmental decision that leaves little room for negotiation?

“This macro-level conviction about the role of the middle class is derived from the micro-level observations and analyses mainly of the Western societies, most of which suggest that middle-class individuals think and act *democratically* [emphasis in original]: that is, they have attitudes in support of democratic principles, and engage in actions (non-actions) for the rise and/or maintenance of a democratic system and against a non-democratic system.”

(Lu, 2005, p. 160)

However, empirical analysis shows that such an argument can be hardly upheld and that even in Western societies outcomes of middle class implications in democratic transformations have been very diverse (Huber et al., 1997). Very often, general arguments ignore particular historical and local contexts in which the societal transformation (if any) needs to take place. In the same vein, the argumentation for regime change is not the same if the starting and ending point change: in what kind of regime situation is the middle class and what is the likely outcome if they advocate change? Will the regime shift from a stable authoritarian regime to an unstable democracy? From an unstable authoritarian regime to an unstable democracy? From an unstable democracy to a stable one? We argue that to comprehend the link between middle class and their implication in democratic transformation; there is an urgent need, widely ignored in the literature of linking middle class discourses with the literature on social transformation and social mobilization theory and abstaining from gross generalizations.

Our contribution here is not another systematic macroanalysis, correlating macroeconomic data with democracy levels, but a small, qualitative sample of those that could be considered middle class (according to the definition by the AfDB) and their activities. We try to shine light on the processes *how* exactly these groups can contribute to democracy, by analyzing their actions and attitudes through the lens of social mobilization. Reflecting on their views, participation or abstention in protests that have taken place in Uganda in the last decade, we are able to understand crucial categories relevant for collective action, such as the political opportunity structures, available repertoires of action, and prevailing collective identities (or the obstacles in creating them). While we find that most Ugandans have outspoken political opinions, critical of the incumbent president or at least his govern-

ment, few perceive themselves as actors to change the situation. Definitely not as collective actors on the grounds of class affiliation, but even as individuals they feel their hands are tied. Due to the combination of a repressive political environment, an increasingly authoritarian state, the bad reputation of politics, and the widespread view that political action threatens social harmony most people choose to refrain from political action (Fichtmüller, 2014b). Thus, we decide to push the analysis one step further. Social movement theory suggests that social movements draw on smaller, already existing structures of networks, associations or informal groups for their mobilization (Diani, 2004; McAdam & Scott, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Ohlemacher, 1996; Polletta, 1999; Taylor, 1989). In addition, the strand of literature subscribing to the “*politics from below*” (Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; D.-C. Martin, 1989; Scott, 1990) suggests that there is more to political action than mere demonstrations, petitions, campaigns or elections. Hence, we turn our attention to these existing structures and try to see how within these groups members of the so-called middle class negotiate meaning and identity. Do they politicize in these “free spaces” that are beyond state control or foster interests that relate to other areas? As a result, do they continue their withdrawal into the private from a political sphere that is not open to them for an exit in the sense of Hirschman (1970)? We draw on literature from leisure studies that has often put the structuring effect of leisure in terms of class, age, and gender in the forefront but has rarely made the connection between leisure activity and social or political mobilization.

In summary, our double deconstruction aims at questioning the notion of middle class in the Ugandan context, and the idea that such a middle class per se is beneficial to democracy. Instead, we propose a closer look at the characteristics of these groups and the identities that shape them. We cannot confirm the commonly made assumption that social positions will structure interests because these social positions themselves are heterogeneous, and these differentiations impede the development of one clear-cut identity. It hinders them from acting collectively, and the

question remains whether through their individual actions they could pave the way for a more democratic environment.

In the first part, we will therefore critically examine and define the relevant concepts of middle class and social mobilization, in the Global North as well as Southern countries. We will justify our choice of Uganda as a relevant site of fieldwork and introduce our research questions, hypotheses, and methodology. In the second part, we thoroughly analyze the interviews to single out trajectories of emergence, the factors that contribute to it and the lifestyle and value changes that come with it. We then turn to the political activity in the country and the role the middle income groups play in political activism. To complement, in the fourth part we analyze social activities, to see what they can tell us about the shaping of new norms and identities, and the creation of dissent or consent.

***Part I:***

***Theoretical  
Considerations***

## **1. Africa Rising - Africa Falling. The Changing Discourse on the Emergence of an African Middle Class**

There had been a shift in the perception of the African continent between the beginning of the millennium and the end of the first decade (Nallet, 2015, p. 23). Whereas for a long time the continent had been perceived through bad news of war, famine, poverty, and AIDS, a wave of new literature jubilated the African emergence, which became known as the *Africa Rising* narrative (Jacobs, 2012). In this context, analysts, inspired by earlier works on Latin America and Asia, started mentioning the African middle class that would emerge with the economic development. The main thrust of the analyses was presented by economists and consultancies and thus referred only to economic definitions of middle class (Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Ncube et al., 2011). It is only slowly and reluctantly that scholars on Africa have claimed ownership over the debate (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016). Simultaneously, with economic crises linked to falling oil prices and companies such as Barclays and Nestlé withdrawing from African countries, the continent's emergence is put into question. Recent studies such as the by the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, 2015) or *The Global Wealth Databook* (Shorrocks et al., 2015) assume that the size of the African middle class is smaller than thought and that the continent may not catch up so fast to developed countries as hoped. These completely diverging analyses are due to the very different definitions applied (see also table 3, p.105). Here we argue that this back and forth is fueled by these definitional problems and contradicting views of what it means to be middle class in Africa. On the one hand, low statistical thresholds such as those of the AfDB, label everyone as middle class who is not poor and on the other glossy images of big cars and shopping malls portray a lifestyle that these income groups cannot have. As a result, the Global/Developing/African middle class becomes an overused concept, which has been stretched too far to maintain its analytic value. Though, it would be false to throw the baby out with the bath water

and put the all postulated transformations into question. Enaudeau observes that “*a growing number of Africans are indeed lifting themselves out of poverty but, contrary to the African economic revolution narrative, this is not happening overnight.*” (Enaudeau, 2013). Thus, we suggest instead of looking at clear-cut categories, we should rather consider the effects of a slow transformation of social structures in Africa, that take into account processes of intergenerational uplifting. To better shed light on this contested notion, we first look at the historical origins of the “class” and more precisely “middle class” concept and its transformations throughout history. In the second part, we trace the discourse that led to talking about the rise of the African middle class and how it is recently called into question. Finally, we question its applicability on the Ugandan context and suggest talking about economic emergence and vulnerability instead, as it seems to better reflect the living conditions of most of the Ugandan middle class (in the AfDB sense) today.

### **1.1. A Review of the Class Concept(s)**

Class is a particularly relevant concept in sociology, yet it remains highly contested as well. While there seems to be a general agreement that societies are stratified, there is little consensus on the lines according to which this stratification takes place. The concept is used in a wide range of contexts, as popular discourse, in a descriptive, or explanatory way. Thus, a changing context also requires changing concepts of class (E. O. Wright, 2008a, p. 2). And if there is no general agreement on what exactly constitutes a class, it becomes even more challenging to define the middle class. This chapter aims to give a short overview of the different theoretical origins of class concepts and their evolution, first of class in general and second, the specific concept of the middle class. The objective is to situate the current debate on the African middle class better, to see its continuities and ruptures with the past in the academic fields of sociology and economy.



### **1.1.1. Marx, Weber, Bourdieu - Which Classes Are We Talking About?**

The idea to divide a society according to income lines can be traced far back in history. Maurice Halbwachs argues that already the ancient Romans have divided their people into five different categories, according to their wealth (Halbwachs, 2008, p. 24). Albeit a resurrection of class distinction through income strata, such a definition is not sufficient if the concept is approached from a sociological angle. Only in recent years and with the availability of more statistical data such numerical definitions have shifted back in to focus. It is, therefore, useful to distinguish between qualitative class analysis, that takes into account other aspects as well and quantitative class analysis, which operates by numbers.

#### **a) Qualitative Class Analysis**

Depending on the strand, the emphasis on other aspects, such as asset ownership, occupation, control over means of production, comes into focus of the sociological observation. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Karl Marx used class as a tool for analyzing social relations and explaining social change (E. O. Wright, 2008b, p. 5). The Marxist conceptualization takes as a starting point an antagonism between a superordinate and subordinate class. This opposition is at the core of social change and revolution (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 107). The position within one of the two classes depends for Marx on the control over the means of productions, which lead to different power relations that in return yield into different capacities to accumulate means of production. With this Marx does not refer to the inequality as a mere inequality of income between capitalists and working class, but as a relation of exploitation, since *“the surplus product of society is controlled by a group which effectively excludes the actual producers of that surplus.”* (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 112) Thus, even if a capitalist pays an adequate wage to his laborer, by allocating the surplus, he would enrich himself and thus impoverish the other. The exploitation lies within the unequal bargaining power between the worker and the capitalist; and by agreeing to the wage contract determined by the capitalist, the laboring class gives up control over the process of production and the product, as

well as a claim on the added value of the product, which remains with the bourgeoisie (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 116). Yet, the dominant class, and this is distinctive for exploitation, also depends on the exploited class. Because there is a continuous need for interaction between the two classes, but on highly unequal terms, the class antagonism is turned into an “*explosive form of social relation*” (E. O. Wright, 2008b, p. 25). Herein lies the propensity for conflict and class struggle so inherent in the Marxian theory. Since the dependence equally gives bargaining power to the exploited class, they can alter their conditions by acting collectively. This, however, presumes that they take conscience of their shared (class) interests: to develop a class consciousness (E. O. Wright, 2008b, pp. 22–25). Such a consciousness is often used to describe the difference between a class *in itself* and *for itself* whereby the former is defined through objective circumstances and the latter through a subjective understanding of its members to belong to this class – hence as having a class consciousness (Heinrich, 2004, p. 37). The shift from a class in itself to one with a shared consciousness is not an inevitability, but depends on historical circumstances, hence the objective class is always numerically more significant than the subjective one (Heinrich, 2004, p. 37; Vester, 2008, p. 736). Albeit often attributed to him, Marx himself never made a distinction between a class in and for itself, it was among subsequent Marxist scholars that the difference became an essential element of analysis (Andrew, 1983, p. 577; Vester, 2008, p. 736).

Critics of the Marxian class analysis have – among others – pointed out that the dichotomy of two classes was too simplistic and failed to depict the empirical reality. Indeed, Heinrich points out that in *Das Kapital*, Marx did not even bother to define class (Heinrich, 2004, p. 36). However, neo-Marxists argue that this was not the point of the Marxian class conception, which should not be understood as a descriptive category of social reality, but an analytical one of social change (So, 1991, p. 39). This should not be equaled with stratification analyses, in which social behavior is attempted to be explained by “mapping out” certain attributes. Dahrendorf describes this as the difference between strata and classes:

“Wherever classes are defined by factors which permit the construction of a hierarchical continuum, they are wrongly defined; i.e. the term has been applied wrongly. Status, ranking by others, self-ranking, style of life, similar economic conditions, and income level are all factors which define social strata but not social classes. However one may interpret, extend, or improve Marx, classes in his sense are clearly not layers in a hierarchical system of strata differentiated by gradual distinctions. [...] *Class* [emphasis in original] is always a category for purposes of the analysis of the dynamics of social conflict and its structural roots, and as such it has to be separated strictly from *stratum* [emphasis in original] as a category for purposes of describing hierarchical systems at a given point in time.”

(Dahrendorf, 1959, p. 76)

Marx did not intend to describe an empirical stratification. Such approaches fail to explain *how* the social structure determines unequal life chances (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973, p. 108). That distinction makes Marxian class analysis quite distinctive from subsequent class analyses<sup>4</sup>, which focus more on explaining social behavior rather than social change.

Similar to Marx, Max Weber analyzes how inequality is structured and derives from there diverse fault lines (Breen, 2008, p. 31). For Weber, however, the advantages of the one do not necessarily come at the expense of the other. Hence, the possibility of conflict is not among his preoccupations. He introduces the concept of life chances, that is the likelihood of a person determining the extent to which they have a part of the economic or cultural good of a society (Weber, 2002, p. 632). In capitalism, it is mainly the market who will determine these life chances; it will put people into different positions, according to their means of production, but also according to their skills. He distinguishes his social classes between those who own property and those who do not, which are then further divided into sub-categories depending on the type of property (for the property owners) and their skill levels (for those who do not own any property). Hence, a four-tiered class structure arises: the entrepreneurial and property class, the petty bourgeoisie, workers with credentials and workers who only have their labor to offer (Breen, 2008, p. 32). This added a new dimension, that has remained prevalent in Weberian

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<sup>4</sup>And eventually from our analysis of Ugandan middle income groups

class analysis: the focus on profession. In his work, the relevance of profession is much more pronounced than with Marx, and he equally includes “residual” categories, that cannot be neatly divided into bourgeoisie or proletariat. Neo-Weberians such as Goldthorpe have turned their attention primarily to the labor market and how a certain position in the labor market turns into a certain class (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Goldthorpe adds, however, to the ownership of production also the relationship between the employee and employer (wage work vs. service relationship). In his most advanced version, Goldthorpe comes up with eleven different classes. The focus on profession has also been reflected among other scholars, such as Gustav Schmoller who supposes that the profession of a person determines his personality (Halbwachs, 2008, p. 64).

For Weber, however, classes are only one aspect of social stratification. Power relations within society are equally shaped by parties and *Stände* (roughly translated as status groups). So while classes are structured through their relation to the means of production, *Stände* are defined through their consumption and their particular lifestyles (Weber, 2002, p. 639). He believes they are more prone to collective action than the classes, as they are more likely to develop a shared consciousness. While he does not exclude the possibility for a class conscience to develop, he makes it dependent on other conditions, such as geographical proximity, a common enemy, and the awareness of a similar class situation for a mass of people (Breen, 2008, p. 33). Thus, Weber does not aim at explaining social conflict through his class analysis, as for him power and thus power struggles instead fall into the realm of parties and *Stände*. His theory, therefore, provides no explanation, when and under which circumstances classes become essential in shaping political action (Sørensen, 2008, p. 120).

This distinction between Stand and class is put into question by critics of Weber. Instead of seeing them as dichotomies, they should be considered as two different aspects of the same matter (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008, p. 17). The most renowned sociologist who has developed a theory of class by merging the two was Bourdieu. Through his integration of the habitus, his analysis looks at economic

aspects of class as well as at symbolic aspects (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 101 ff). Class affiliation is determined through the possession of economic (money, assets), social, cultural (education), and symbolic capital. Bourdieu also considers that not a common profession leads to a common class affiliation, but similar consumption patterns. Consumption functions as a way to convey a certain taste, or lifestyle, and is used as a distinction (this is what he refers to as symbolic capital) from other classes (Bourdieu, 1986). However, his approach is different from others such as Veblen, as the consumption does not necessarily have to be conspicuous, to become a marker of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 6).

“Toute consommation, et plus généralement, toute pratique est conspicuous, visible, qu'elle ait été ou non accomplie afin d'être vue ; elle est distinctive, qu'elle ait ou non été inspirée par l'intention de se faire remarquer, de se singulariser (to make oneself conspicuous), de se distinguer ou d'agir avec distinction.”

(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 7)

The dominant class sets the measure for a “legitimate culture”, the working class serves as a negative reference point, and the petty bourgeoisie strives to distance itself from the working class by copying as much as possible the lifestyle of the dominant (Weininger, 2008, p. 95 ff). And even though Weininger uses these categories, Bourdieu himself opposed drawing boundaries between the classes, as it would run the risk to treat classes as preexisting, “*self-subsistent entities*” (Weininger, 2008, p. 85). For him, social collectivities are created through symbolic practices, such as certain forms of consumption, that delimit regions of social space, but these collectivities are dynamic.

“Sur la base de la connaissance de l'espace des positions, on peut découper des classes logiques ou théoriques composées de l'ensemble des agents occupant des positions semblables qui, placés dans des conditions semblables et soumis à des conditionnements semblables, ont toutes les chances d'avoir des dispositions et des intérêts semblables, donc de produire des pratiques, des comportements et aussi des opinions semblables. Ces classes ne sont pas des classes réelles, c'est-à-dire des groupes constitués d'individus unis par la conscience de leur identité commune et de leur appartenance à la même unité sociale ; il s'agit plutôt de classes probables dont les éléments constitutifs sont mobilisables (et non nécessairement mobilisés pratiquement) sur la base de leurs similitudes, c'est-à-dire de leur appartenance à une même classe de positions, à une même région de l'espace social.”

(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 95)

For them to become mobilized for collective action, discursive practices are needed, which itself contribute to the reshaping of the social space.

“Furthermore, it is only with a discursive identity that is known and recognized by the members of the class (or fraction) that they become capable of acting in concert for a specified purpose – that is of *mobilizing*. Hence, ‘social classes,’ as they are typically envisioned in social theory – namely as groups entering into conflict for the sake of ‘class interests’ are profoundly discursive entities; and insofar as the preservation or transformation of the underlying distributions of economic and cultural capital in fact hinges on collective action, discourse contributes to the shaping and reshaping of social space itself.”

(Weininger, 2008, p. 103)

To sum up, in this very brief and incomplete sketch of class analysis, we can broadly distinguish between two approaches to class analysis: as *relational* categories or as primarily *descriptive* ones. The first approach, following Marx, sees classes as conflict groups born out of the antagonistic interests of exploitation and through the analysis of their relations to each other it becomes possible to comprehend social conflict and social change. The second approach, following the lines of Weber and Bourdieu, describes particular class attributes, like income, occupation, education, etc. which result in specific lifestyles associated with certain classes (Sørensen, 2008, p. 120 f). These analyses do not aim at explaining the production of social inequality, but rather depict as accurate as possible the stratification of a

society at a given moment in time (Lentz, 2015, p. 18). Regarding the “middle class analysis”, the second approach had been the prevailing one, recently more often in a reductive form by focusing purely on quantitative indicators.

### **b) Quantitative Class Analysis**

In recent years we have observed a shift from more qualitative accounts of class analysis to quantitative approaches. Ferreira et al. argue that today large amounts of available household data, aggregated by government bodies have given a preference to define class affiliation through income strata (Ferreira, 2013, p. 30 f). They do concede, however, that these thresholds are defined somewhat arbitrarily. Another approach with a focus on consumption can also be seen in more recent accounts of classness (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Owning a particular set of assets becomes an indication of one’s class location. It is the consumption that defines class affiliation. And it remains its sole indicator, detached from other sociological aspects, such as habitus, or economic and cultural capital. Critics of such an approach argue that there is a need for a more holistic, sociological (instead of economic) class analysis, which brings back in Weberian or Bourdieu’s characteristics (Melber, 2016a). Both methods, using household data or asset indexes are common in defining classes (and mainly middle classes) in the Global South. They will be taken up and elaborated further in chapter 1.2. But before, we shall look at the significance of the middle class within the various theories of classes, which sometimes are solely theories of *middle* classes.

#### **1.1.2. Positioning the Middle Class - the Muddle in the Middle**

If it is already hard to find an agreement on what constitutes a class (E. O. Wright, 2008a, p. 2) it is even harder to do so for the term “middle class” (Raynaud, 2014, p. 16). There had been considerable variation in what was considered to be a middle class over time, geographical location, and context, and with which categories they share the social stratum. Moreover, the definition has equally been linked to the particular historical and local context of a country and varied according to po-

litical circumstances, as the category has often been used to legitimize a certain political discourse (Kocka, 2004; Lentz, 2015; Nallet, 2015). Hence, the explanatory value of “the middle class” will very much depend on the definition used (Damon, 2013, p. 7). Here, a certain risk is inherent: if one author writes about middle class with a specific concept in mind, and another author uses this work, still writing about middle class, but with a different definition, the correlations established in the end may not be tenable (see also Kroeker & Voigt, 2017, p. 3).

Aristotle, often cited as an early authority on the positive effects of the middle class for democracy, used the category to describe an income stratum<sup>5</sup> (Lipset, 1959a). For Marx, the middle class did not play a decisive role, as they would be absorbed by the proletariat at one point. This assumption has for some been the proof that Marx is wrong, because they see that class striving (Goux & Maurin, 2012, p. 19) for others the disappearance seems real (Gaggi, 2006). Weber broke up the Marxian dichotomy by equally including education as a necessary asset, which does not lead to more significant capital or property ownership per se. It does, however, increase the life chances offered by the market. This turned him into a more popular reference for subsequent theories on middle class. In her historical overview of the middle class terminology, Nallet has shown how the phrase itself has experienced several epistemological shifts over the centuries (2015, p. 59 ff). Thus, the “bourgeois” initially designated a town dweller in medieval France, and only later was used in differentiation with other urban inhabitants to describe someone living from his investments, and after the French revolution was ascribed to industrialists, merchants and financiers (Seed, 2014, p. 114). At that time “middle class” was closely associated with the bourgeoisie, in opposition to the working class and aristocracy, or, in the case of Marx, the capitalists (Damon, 2013, p. 10f). Later on, in a semantic turn, petty bourgeoisie and small entrepreneurs were equally included (Lebon, 2014; Nallet, 2015, p. 59). These middle classes were traditionally small and mainly constituted by a group of independents (Kocka, 2004, p. 16). The rise of similar social strata, be it *bourgeoisie* and *petite bourgeoisie*, *middle class*, *middling sorts*, or *Bürgertum* could have been observed all over Eu-

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<sup>5</sup>For a detailed discussion of the political role ascribed to the middle class see chapter 2.1.



rope, even though their constitution and role heavily varied from one context to another (Kocka, 2004). Through industrialization and urbanization, these classes were able to grow significantly in number, so that they occupied a much larger part of the societal structure by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Damon, 2013, p. 11). Authors date the “*long nineteenth century*” (Kocka, 2004, p. 16) with these evolutions as the time when “middle class” became a prominent category, also reflected in their understanding and political discourse (Seed, 2014). Their rise in numbers would give them more political clout, explaining their rise as a salient category (O’Boyle, 1966, p. 827). One example could be the speech giving by Gambetta in 1872, announcing the accession of a “new social stratum” (Gresle, 1993, p. 36). The question remains, however, whether the idea of the middle class, that developed out of the particular context of European industrialization can easily be applied elsewhere (Kroeker & Voigt, 2017, p. 5).

In addition to the different historical trajectories, varying between countries, categories with whom the middle class, once defined, shares the social stratification differ as well. The easiest stratification might be of lower, middle, and upper class, but other categories such as proletariat, working class, bourgeoisie (Marx, see also (Huber & Stephens, 1999)), labor and capital (Mills, 1953), the poor, the elite, the military, the peasants (Huntington, 1972), the intellectuals (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004) might similarly be evoked. Since the terminology used and also the “significant others”, that would stand above or below the middle class would vary, the plural of the word has often become common (Lentz, 2015, p. 15). Over time, there have always been ascriptions to the characteristics of these middle classes. They allegedly shared a “bourgeois culture”, described by the value for education and an ethos that embraces hard work. They were also said to believe in individual achievement and meritocratic ideals, strive for independence, either individually or through gathering in associations and through insisting on the separation between the private and the public sphere (Glassman, 1995; Kocka, 2004; Seed, 2014). Their modest consumption would draw a boundary with the aristocracy and their preference for conspicuous behavior, and despite their diverging political views,

they would agree on common values of civil society and freedom (Lentz, 2015, p. 21 f). The development of these characteristics was linked to the specific historical trajectories of the Western European countries and would change with shifting circumstances. After the two wars, with the decline of industry and the rise of the service sector, the composition of the middle class changed, with a decreasing number of self-employed workers, while a larger service sector gave rise to the “white collars” (Mills, 1953). Mills is much less positive about this group of white collars. They are commodity-minded and driven by self-interests, and, due to their heterogeneity, internally fragmented. This society is rendered political apathetic through consumption and mass media, self-alienation and social meaninglessness and driven by status panic (Mills, 1953, p. 342). In the 1970s the middle class again experiences a shift towards a more positive representation, through the literature on the “new class”. Roland Inglehart draws on the Maslowian pyramid of needs and argues that once the most basic needs are fulfilled, a society can pursue other goals than establishing economic security (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). While the generation that has experienced the scarcity of war and the post-war period is drawn to frugality, their children have grown up taking economic security for granted. This is particularly true for the “*younger cohorts of the modern middle class*” (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). Inglehart predicts a change in values, drawing an increasing number of middle class members to vote for a left agenda, whereas the working class, having acquired a certain level of prosperity, will in return vote more conservatively. These post-materialists will be more affluent, informed, and educated and their demands will focus on greater social questions (Inglehart, 1977). The Green movement or the peace movement of the 1980s have been examples of these post-materialist concerns and have given rise to their description as “new social movements” (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004). While this deserves to be discussed in relation to the social mobilization of the middle class, the ascription to values and their support for a higher societal aim, beyond their mere self-interest are relevant here. However, being bound to specific geographic and historical circumstances, in addition to the heterogeneous group of people commonly described as “middle class”

make such generalizations at least risky and lead to sometimes opposing descriptions of middle class characteristics (such as them being frugal vs. conspicuous in their consumption).

Finally, in the 1990s there has been a “cultural” turn in sociology, seeking to explain societal phenomenon through different markers of identity, such as race, gender, or ethnicity, rather than through redistribution (Lentz, 2015, p. 16). At the same time, the notion of civil society gained visibility. It carried a unified and positively oriented perspective of social organizations, that would supersede class and other divisive categories. This has led to a decline of the prominence of the class concept, which has only been revitalized in the 2000s, but this time on a global scale (for example World Bank, 2006). New approaches of middle class, however, have been primarily brought forward by “number crunchers”, focusing much on macroeconomic data, consumption and asset indexes to describe the middle class as those who are situated in the middle stratum of society (Bosc, 2014, p. 3). The availability of detailed household data and statistical methods has favored economic approaches of “middleclassness” over sociological ones (Ferreira, 2013). These numbers have led to the observation that the middle class in the Global North is declining, as the numerical middle seems to become smaller, while inequalities are growing (Gaggi, 2006; Lebon, 2014; Marguerit, 2016). And the same methods, but with different thresholds predict a rise of the middle classes in the South (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Ravallion, 2009). However, such methods ignore many of the factors highlighted by sociologists, such as their desire for distinction from other groups or the existence or not of a class conscience.

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To sum up, we have seen how the middle class has developed as an analytical category out of the awareness that the Marxian dichotomy between property owners and non-propertied groups is not sufficient. Hence, they have developed as a category whose existence is bound to the opposition from its surrounding groups

(Kocka, 2004, p. 18). Due to their intermediary position, defining the boundaries of middle class has always been a challenge. Lentz remarks that:

“Discussions of the question of who belongs to this fuzzy category and whether the middle class is not, after all, a ‘myth’ (Wahrman 1996, Maza 2003), upheld by political discourse but not by social practice, are as old as the appearance of the term in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.”

(Lentz, 2015, p. 15)

By allowing for a more nuanced distinction, including lifestyle and status, Max Weber was able to break up the Marxian dichotomy. Thus, most contemporary (sociological) middle class analysis can be traced back to the Weberian understanding (Lentz, 2015, p. 18). Similarly, Bourdieu’s focus on milieus and the different compositions of capital made it possible for him to acknowledge the complex and fractured nature of class consciousness. As a result, however, the definition of middle class becomes even more complex, regrouping a variety of occupations, lifestyle and consumption preferences. This leads various authors to underline their heterogeneity (Chauvel, 2006, p. 31) or to describe them as “occupational salad” (Mills, 1953, p. 291), “a chameleon among definitions” (Kocka, 2004, p. 15), or a residual category (Rocca, 2008, p. 129). Yet, despite these multiple approaches to middle-classness, authors frequently mention some recurrent values, closely associated with the class, regardless of its definition: their meritocratic ideals, their moderation, education and their value of it, their support for freedom, independence, and civil society, their fear of declassification, their ethos for hard work and concerns beyond their immediate financial well-being (Bosc, 2014; Deloitte, 2012; Inglehart, 1977; Lentz, 2015). Due to the heterogeneity of these classes, these appreciations are doubtful, yet they play an essential role in the assumptions stated by scholars that an existing middle class will bring democratic advancement in a society, as we shall discuss in chapter 2.1.1. The definition chosen will depend on the intention of the class analysis. Shall it be an explanatory category, that aims to show the production of social inequality through class affiliation, or a descriptive concept, that merely sorts members of society according to different criteria, such

as income, education, or assets (Stolzman & Gamberg, 1973)? While the former approach puts individuals in mutually exclusive categories, the latter opts for a more gradational ordering, which considers dividing lines to be mere constructions of the sociologist (Lentz, 2015, p. 19). Yet, it runs the risk of ignoring self-perception and ongoing boundary work done by the individuals to construct their appearance to a particular category. In recent literature, we witness an increase in use of a gradational approach, where class lines are more or less arbitrarily drawn income thresholds. This tendency is equally visible in the literature that argues for a decline of middle class in the Global North, as well as for the literature promoting the rise of middle classes in the Global South, as we shall see.

### **1.1.3. Are We in a Middle Class Crisis?**

Today, in most Western countries, the majority of people consider themselves to belong to the middle class or above (Damon, 2013, p. 26). This evolution may be somewhat paradoxical, because, as Henri Mendras observes: “*en pure logique, si tout le monde est moyen, personne ne l’est*” (Mendras, 1994, p. 60). Albeit constituting the majority in Europe and America, a strand of literature predicts the disappearance of the middle class in the Western world. This literature is by no means new. Bechofer and Elliot mention a newspaper article of 1975 who foresaw the end of the middle class in Great Britain (Bechofer & Elliot, 1978, p. 294), nevertheless the category remained salient, especially as a self-descriptive category up to today. More recent literature sees the increasing inequality as a sign that the middle class disappears, resulting in a more distinctive gap between the rich and the poor (Chauvel, 2014).

However, the disappearance does not necessarily go along with a downgrading of the middle class, as growing inequality will lead to shrinking middle income strata, at the favor of lower, but equally upper classes (Pew Research Center, 2012). And Camille Peugny shows that the lower middle classes experience a degradation of their situation, while the upper middle classes can maintain their status. As a result, tensions arise among the middle class itself, even though they are close to each other in the social space (Peugny, 2014, p. 54). There also prevails a general senti-

ment that it is harder today for the middle class to maintain their standard of living than it was still a decade ago (Marguerit, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2012, p. 1). Others, however, insist on the expansion of the middle class, encompassing a growing fraction of society (Goux & Maurin, 2012). These contradicting observations can – once again – be traced back to conflicting definitions (Peugny, 2014, p. 51). Using profession as an indicator, as Goux & Maurin did, will, in the context of de-industrialization, lead to the observation that the class is expanding, because an increasing percentage of the population is working in the salaried workforce (Goux & Maurin, 2012). Thus, there seems to be no agreement on whether the middle classes are in decline and the different conclusions derive from different definitions of middle class. However, Julien Damon points out that most of the authors, at least in France, agree that today's middle class is not at all comparable to the one of the *Trente Glorieuse*, that period after the second world war up to the 1970s, which was marked by strong economic growth. Regarding cohesiveness, the middle class appears to be more splintered today. The increasing tendency towards a definition through self-identification equally led to a decrease of the salience of the label (Peugny, 2014). So, at a time when the concept is losing analytical value in the Global North, we find its increasing use in the literature on the Global South (Neubert, 2014).

## **1.2. The Translocation of the Middle Class to the Global South**

The continuous economic growth in a majority of countries in the Global South has led to a change of perceptions. An early precursor, from today's viewpoint, was the appearance of the BRIC countries, an acronym signifying the main five emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China. This acronym was first introduced by Jim O'Neill, a Goldman Sachs Manager in 2001 (O'Neill, 2001). It reflected the acknowledgment that the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) of these countries over the long term will exceed this of the G7, leading to their increasing share of world GDP (O'Neill, 2001). In 2009 the leaders of these countries met on a

common summit. In 2011, South Africa officially joined the group, adding an S to the acronym (“Information about BRICS,” n.d.). At a similar time, the Group of Twenty (G20) announced that it would replace the much more restricted Group of Eight<sup>6</sup> (G8) as the primary economic forum for wealthy nations. This shift from a predominantly European and North American group (except for Russia and Japan) to a more global representation testifies the tribute paid to the responsibility and capacity of the emerging markets – especially around the concerted effort to mitigate the financial crisis of 2009 (Cardim de Carvalho, 2014). In that context, of economic boom in emerging markets, as well as the financial turbulence in the Global North, the World Bank, OECD and various consultancies released their reports of a prospering global middle class (Kharas, 2010; Ravallion, 2009; World Bank, 2006).

### **1.2.1. The Global Middle Class**

In its 2007 global economic outlook, the World Bank predicts that the global middle class will grow from 7.6% in 2000 to 16.1% in 2030, accounting for more than one billion individuals (World Bank, 2006, p. 73). The definition of middle class, as many subsequent approaches, was entirely monetary, and somewhat arbitrary: it would include all individuals earning an income between the mean income of Brazil and Italy. Their approach referenced the work of Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) which aimed at measuring global inequality, as a reconciliation between international and intranational inequality (Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 155). Milanovic and Yitzhaki divided the world into the rich, the poor and the middle class. As a conclusion, they come up with a familiar tripartite distinction: the first world, middle income countries and the third world, comprised of the Least Developed Countries (LDC). The high inequality between nations explains to a large extent the global inequality, and their prospect is bleak: only 11% of the world population is middle class, another 11% is rich, and 78% is poor (Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 175). They conclude:

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<sup>6</sup> Comprised of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia  
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“Thus, world seems—any way we consider it—to lack middle class. It looks like a proverbial hourglass: thick on the bottom, and very thin in the middle. Why does the world not have a middle class? First—an obvious answer—is that it is because world inequality is extremely high. When the Gini coefficient is 66, higher than the Gini coefficient of South Africa and Brazil, it is simply numerically impossible to have a middle class.”

(Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 175)

So, while Milanovic & Yitzhaki are rather skeptical about the state of the middle class, the World Bank turns it into a much more positive outcome. The authors of the World Bank outlook concede that the middle class share has hardly changed between 1993 and 2000, but will now turn the global middle class into “*the fastest-growing segment of the world population.*” (World Bank, 2006, p. 73). Regardless of the different interpretations, the middle class here is interpreted as the “neither-nor”, those that are neither rich nor poor. Some of these thresholds are based on percentiles of the income distribution, thus making them comparable across different nations, whereas others use absolute monetary boundaries. As a result, a multitude of middle class definitions exists, sometimes putting mutually exclusive categories under the same label (see table 1). The fact that all these income groups are united under the label middle class adds to the conceptual confusion, as the purchasing power, consumption behavior, and lifestyles differ starkly between a global, developing and African middle class, yet they tend to become blurred in the conventional discourse.



Relative definitions of the middle class		<i>As percentiles of the income distribution</i>
Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato (2000)		0.75 – 1.25 of median income
Blackburn and Bloom (1985)		0.60 – 2.25 of median income
Davis and Huston (1992)		0.50 – 1.50 of median income
Alesina and Perotti (1996)		40 <sup>th</sup> - 80 <sup>th</sup> percentile
Barro (1999) and FASTERLY (2001)		20 <sup>th</sup> - 80 <sup>th</sup> percentile
Partridge (1997)		40 <sup>th</sup> - 60 <sup>th</sup> percentile
Solimano (2008)		20 <sup>th</sup> - 90 <sup>th</sup> percentile
Absolute Definitions of the middle class		<i>In US\$ ppp per day</i>
Banerjee and Duflo (2008)	Developing Countries	\$2-10
Ravallion (2010)	Developing Countries	\$2-13
Asian Development Bank (2010)	Asia	\$2-20
African Development Bank (2011)	Africa	\$2-20
International Labor Organisation (2013)	Developing Countries	\$4-13
López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011)	Latin America	\$10-50
Kharas (2010)	Developing Countries	\$10-100
UNDP (2013)	Global South	\$10-100
Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002)	Global	\$12-50

*Table 1: Economic Definitions of Middle Class, Composed from Ferreira & al (2013 p.31) and Stoffel (2016 p.56)*

While the relative definitions have the advantage to be used across different countries, they ultimately state the existence of a middle income group, and – as in case of the percentiles – even its size. Thus, a question whether or not a middle class is emerging does not make any sense. In the Global South, absolute definitions have been adapted more often, even though the thresholds chosen are very often arbitrary (Ferreira, 2013, p. 31). Ferreira argues that for example the \$2 lower bound adopted by Ravallion, Banerjee & Duflo or the Development Banks of Asia and Africa is much too low, as this cut off is below the poverty line of most developing countries. The \$2 bound, taken from the poverty line of the World Bank (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) is significant, as it gives another, more qualitative definition of middle class: everyone, who is not poor anymore, becomes middle class. As we shall see, this group of the “non-poor” among the middle class often constitutes the

biggest part, especially in Africa (Ncube et al., 2011). Thus, by putting the thresholds sufficiently low, a middle class can easily be defined into existence, and into a numerically important number. This exercise serves an important function: It paints a positive picture of global income growth and ultimately serves the neoliberal narrative of the positive effects of global capitalism. Thus, the World Bank foregrounds the prospect that higher income will increase demands for consumer goods:

“The fact that the middle class will be growing twice as fast as the overall population implies that multinational enterprises will be able to market their products to a much larger audience in 2030 than they do today.”

(World Bank, 2006, p. 75)

The centrality of consumption is subsequently picked up by various authors, mainly in relation to the growing middle class in China and India, often reducing consumption to the central feature, beyond a shared income stratum (Damon, 2013, p. 101). Jaffrelot & van der Veer even go as far as to argue that we can talk of the middle class in singular today because its common consumption patterns bestow them with homogeneity as a class (Jaffrelot & van der Veer, 2008, pp. 12–15). A similar assumption accompanies middle class measurements through asset indexes. It assumes that a particular wealth will lead to a particular consumption behavior and the purchase of particular goods. The type of assets that can be used to affiliate members to a particular class will vary over time and geographic location (Haupt, 2005) and it conceals essential variation, such as the age of an asset, or its quality (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Above all, Johnston & Abreu consider it to be an inadequate measurement of class because it only measures absolute wealth, but not social inequality, which is a decisive feature in class theories of authors like Marx or Weber (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 410). However, here again, the middle classes are described as not any kind of consumer, but as consumers that value quality and try to approach a Western lifestyle, as a means of distinction from their poorer counterparts (Jacquemot, 2014, p. 61). The car for example is, by some, suggested as the international marker for middleclassness (Damon, 2013, p. 121). Again, this puts us in front of the challenge of generalizations on a global scale: whereby the

car has become ubiquitous in developed countries, regardless of the class of its owner, it remains a luxurious good in developing countries, reserved only for the elite. Hence, arguing about a global form of consumption borders on wishful thinking and ignores local contexts, and the income disparities between countries and within them, blurring the fact that the majority of the world population is still poor. This is due to the aforementioned confusion between local and global middle classes. So, while it may make sense to quantify all people of the world numerically into income categories, to give prospects about global inequality<sup>7</sup>, it conceals the local status of people sharing one global income group.

Some authors have thus tried to be more specific, adapting the thresholds to developing countries or particular regions. Yet, their principal definition still relies on monetary thresholds and therefore puts the discussion mainly in the realm of economists. This marks a sharp distinction with the class definitions mentioned before. Sociologists will question the lack of class consciousness and doubt that economic thresholds are sufficient to speak of a “class” in the proper sense (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016, p. 97; Damon, 2013; Darbon & Toulabor, 2011; Melber, 2013). The popularity of the middle class label on a global scale leads Göran Therborn to ask whether we are entering (at least rhetorically) a “middle class century”. He observes that “*The workers of the last century are banished from memory; a project of universal emancipation led by the proletariat is replaced by universal aspiration to middle-class status.*” (Therborn, 2014, p. 15). Thus, in a context where the working class has lost its explanatory power as a driver of political transformation, it may be not surprising that this role is now ascribed to these so-called middle classes. However, the aspirations of “middleclassness” might be primarily driven by political discourse, rather than objective changes, as it serves to conceal a growing inequality and increasing disparities between the few rich and the mass of subalterns. Therefore, Kalb (2014) suggests that “*the informal slummified global working class*” is more of a reality than the global middle class. It is in this context that the existence of the African middle class became popularized, however, the

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<sup>7</sup>Even though the GINI approach is equally contested as an adequate measure of world inequality, but this not part of the debate here. See, for example, De Maio (2007).


contradictions already inherent to the economic definitions brought the concept to its analytical limits in Africa.

### **1.2.2. The African Middle Class**

Early class analyses in Africa in the post-independence era often took on a Marxian perspective, theorizing the rise of an African working class and class struggles (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral have been among the leading indigenous thinkers on the topic, discussing the historical roots of class formation in Africa (Melber, 2016b, p. 6). Simultaneously, in the post-independence era, African nationalist have repeatedly referred to African societies as being classless (see Grundy, 1964). Kenneth Grundy refutes that assumption, describing it as a typical argument of elites to justify their domination. He concedes, though, that social stratification in Africa cannot be adequately captured with Marxian class analysis. Because their characteristics are so different from the European middle class, the social stratification is harder to discern for Western analysts (ibid.). Instead of property, education is a vital marker of social class, turning them into bearers of “*traditional middle class functions*” (though he does not specify what kind of functions these are). The centrality of education for the African middle classes has been maintained throughout the years. In the 1950-1970s the middle class label in scholarly literature on Africa often referred to the small group of the highly educated, which bore close resemblance to the core of the dominant group and had little in common with contemporary definitions axed on income and consumption (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 11). This strand remained small and seemed to disappear in the 1980s when African countries were hit by economic decline (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). However, Lentz points out that the debate has equally been led in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) under the concept of “elite studies” in the post-independence era. Because this group was so few in numbers, the term “middle class” seemed inappropriate, yet their characteristics (highly educated, affluent) would have them labeled middle class in other contexts (Lentz, 2016, p. 17). In the 1980s and 1990s, the analysis of social stratification turned more to the prevalence of patronage and ethnicity, which were seen as hindrance to

class formation (Lentz, 2016, p. 23) and it was widely believed that the interconnection between economic and political power did not allow perceiving African societies through a class lens (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 14). Even though that period (1980-1990's) covers the time of the democratic transitions in Africa, the middle class as analytical tool had been widely neglected in scholarly research, replaced by the categories of *civil society* and *elite* (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 15; see Lentz, 2015). Thus, the decline of popularity of Marxian class analysis, coupled with the economic crisis in African countries and the high rates of poverty, the prevalence of communal ties such as kinship or ethnicity, and the emergence of other concepts such as elites and civil society make the middle class appear a category of little salience in SSA. It is only through the economic analyses of a Global Middle Class, triggered by high growth rates (see 1.2.1) that the term returns to Africa. Even though, on a global scale, the middle class in Africa rather describes its elites and remains nearly non-existent. The World Bank puts its number at 2% of the GMC and considers it to be a rather marginal phenomenon. Subsequently, however, when economists turned their focus to Africa, they closely linked the concept to a different strand of literature, which focuses on the consumption possibilities of the "*bottom of the pyramid*". Vijay Mahajan for example, sees Africa as "*900 million consumers*" (Mahajan, 2009) and defines the middle class mainly in terms of their potential for consumption. In a similar vein, McKinsey argues that economic growth, triggered by a higher demand for resources, but also better macro- and microeconomic environments, rapid urbanization and the "*rise of the middle-class African consumer*" (2010, p. 18) bears a potential that "*global businesses cannot afford to ignore*" (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010, p. 2). They advertise foreign direct investment in Africa, because of its high returns and the possibility to create and shape new markets that are little explored so far. A middle-class household here is one that has an income of \$20 000 and above per year, comprising 14% of African households (2010, p. 22). It remains unclear though, how this threshold has been established. However, these middle class consumers are said to drive economic growth throughout the continent (Deloitte, 2012; McK-

insey Global Institute, 2010, p. 26). The AfDB has joined this chorus by publishing its development brief about the emerging African middle class (Ncube et al., 2011). In their choice of thresholds, they follow approaches similar to Ravallion or the Asian Development Bank. The lower bound of the middle class is the \$2 poverty line, and its upper bound a \$20 disposable income.



Because of the great disparity, the AfDB then differentiates between the floating class (\$2-4), the lower middle (\$4-10) and the upper middle class (\$10-20). The poor (<\$2) is still the biggest

Figure 1: Distribution of the African Population by Subclasses, 2010 (Ncube et al. 2011, p. 4)

group on the continent, comprising 61% of the population, followed by the floating class with 21%. The lower and upper middle class account only for 9 and 5% respectively and equally the rich constitute only 5% of the population<sup>8</sup>.

Such reports have come at a similar time as other statistics, referencing high growth rates, like accelerated urbanization, and demographic shifts (Nallet, 2015, p. 24). These positive trends have been picked up by several media outlets as “Africa rising”, a catchword made famous through the title page of *The Economist* and *Times Magazine* (Jacobs, 2012; *The Economist*, 2011b). The contemporary approach to the middle class in Africa has mainly been driven by economic analysis: sustained growth rates and demographic shifts favor a new group that is defined through its capacity for consumption, which is then dubbed the African middle

<sup>8</sup>Numbers do not add up to 100 due to rounding errors.

class (Nallet, 2015, p. 27). Such a definition is quite different from historical class analysis and still raises questions whether the approach can adequately reflect the economic and social realities on the continent. It may, therefore, seem not surprising that the whole narrative of *Africa rising* has been challenged of recent.

### **1.2.3. Challenging *Africa Rising***

The argument of an emerging African middle class can and has been challenged from various angles. Critics have questioned the validity of the data used, the arbitrariness of the thresholds established, the lack of structural transformation in the respective national economies, the significance of “class” as an analytical category in an African context, and the generalization of 54 African countries in one phenomenon of African emergence. These criticisms shall be looked at in more detail.

#### **a) The reliability of macroeconomic statistics**

For one, the robustness of the underlying data can be questioned. This tackles the whole phenomenon at a very early stage: the reliability of the GDP growth rates used to proclaim the African growth miracle. Already in 2011, the World Bank economist Shanta Devarajan cautions the use of statistical data from Africa, pointing to various shortcomings in the data sets (Devarajan, 2011). Morton Jerven has pointed out that the National Accounts in Africa are often in a dire state, and ranking African economies through GDP growth would be misleading (Jerven, 2013, p. 5). Referring to the GDP re-estimations of Ghana and Nigeria, he argues:

“The news of an ‘Africa Rising’ came hand in hand with the newly acquired knowledge that the GDPs of many countries were very soft estimates and that GDP per capita could double overnight because of accounting changes.”

(Jerven, 2016, p. 347)

Though he acknowledges that most African economies are doing better than reflected in their growth rates, he warns against using such numbers as an objective reality. Rather, they represent “*a negotiated prognosis*” (2013, p. 53) and are “*a product of a process in which a range of arbitrary and controversial assumptions are made.*” (Jerven, 2013, p. 121) Statistical capacities have been eroded through

the Structural Adjustment Programs and continuous budget cuts, and they are only of little priority to policy-makers today. The statistical problems he mentions concern outdated statistical methods, gaps in underlying statistics, the quality of the data gathered in the field, the use of outdated base years in GDP statistics, the use of forecasts instead of official estimates for announcing growth rates, and the neglect of sick, poor and nomadic populations, due to household survey designs (Jerven, 2016, pp. 345–353). Thus, he challenges the GDP growth of African countries that led to the proclamation of *Africa Rising*. For him, it is misleading to state that seven out of ten of the fastest growing countries are in Africa (cf. Deloitte, 2012). An adequate observation would state that “*On average some African economies are expected to grow slightly faster than other non-OECD countries.*” (Jerven, 2016, p. 347) He argues that wrong conclusions had been made: Africa’s wealth being greater than previously thought had been turned into Africa is growing faster than expected. But he also criticizes the proclaimed numbers of the African middle class directly:

“The claim of a rising middle class in Africa between 1990 and 2011 has been made on the basis of data that contain only 84 observations from 35 countries, and there are more than 1,000 gaps in the country time series.”

(Jerven, 2016, p. 353)

So, while neither Jerven nor Devarajan are against the use of statistics per se, they call for a critical investigation into how these numbers are produced and remind scholars that they are not objective, but always political (Devarajan, 2011; Jerven, 2016).

### **b) The arbitrariness of monetary thresholds**

A second set of critiques concerns the thresholds established or the methods used (income or consumption expenditure). Thus, while a Standard Bank report of 2014 is still positive about the growth of the African middle class, it assumes that it is much smaller than the estimates given by the AfDB because it believes a middle class consumes between \$15-115 per day (Awiti, 2014). Credit Suisse “*just debunked a huge claim about the size of the African middle class*”, according to the



title of an article by *Business Insider* (Rosen, 2015). Yet, the only difference was that they set up higher thresholds than other work referenced. The Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook uses assets instead of income as measurement and puts its threshold of having between \$50 000 and \$500 000 ppp as wealth in assets (Shorrocks et al., 2015, p. 114). Here the size of the African middle class is considered to be 3.3% (Shorrocks et al., 2015, p. 115). Such criticism of the lower bound thresholds reveals an important contradiction between the perception of a legitimate middle class lifestyle and the bulging group of non-poor, which constitute the majority of the African middle class according to the AfDB. Hence, Melber argues:

“It requires substantial creativity to visualise how the defined minimum income or expenditure (be it a paltry two dollars a day or even the substantially higher ten) allows for a lifestyle and social status that qualifies as middle class, even in African societies.”

(Melber, 2013, p. 116)

Even though not explicitly, Melber describes a middle class lifestyle as one that reflects consumption patterns and living conditions similar to those in the North. Lemanski critiques such an assumption by noting that a “[...] *class-based label carries normative expectations around lifestyle, education and income that are not easily transferred between countries and cultures.*” (Lemanski, 2017, p. 101) In the African context, the young couple or family, with one, maximum two children, shopping in a supermarket is an emblem of this reflection, if one is to trust the results of the google image search “*African middle class*”<sup>9</sup>. Indeed, such a lifestyle requires a substantially higher amount of money, and therefore this vision of a middle class is not reconcilable with the \$2-4 category given by the economists. The latter instead reflects a phenomenon of a vulnerable, economic emergence, characterized by the prevailing risk to fall back into poverty (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 20).

Reflecting a lifestyle similar to what could be considered middle class in the North is most common in recent work in anthropology on the middle class, and often the boundary with an upper class is either blurred or not given (Lentz, 2015; Mercer,

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<sup>9</sup><https://www.google.de/search?q=Africa+middle+class&tbm=isch> [checked on 20/04/2017]

2014; Spronk, 2012). Common descriptions such as *urban, educated, with a stable income, exposed to ICT*, etc. may delimit such a group from the poor, but apply to the middle as well as upper classes. Approaches, focusing on boundary work as substantial to middle class identity follow Bourdieu's idea of the need for social distinction (Weininger, 2008). Obviously, it is easier to show the lower frontier for distinction, the one the middle class tries to distance itself from, than an upper line, towards the taste they make an effort to copy. That approach has its merits, but will once again depend on the question to be asked. With such a definition though, the African middle class is much smaller than posited by the AfDB. It is possible that this contradiction, between expectations how a middle class consumes and lives, and the practice of surviving with \$2 per day has contributed to questioning the *Africa Rising* narrative. Nestlé, Barclays, and Coca-Cola, for example, have all announced to downscale their activities in most SSA countries, precisely because their expectations were not met (Jackson, 2016; Pelz, 2016; The Economist, 2015).

### **c) The lack of structural transformation of the systems of production**

The economic growth of African countries has mainly been driven by an increased global demand for resources. Thus, it is likely that the middle class in Africa will not expand if the demand is halted. Currently, this seems to be the case, and growth in Africa is slowing down (Pelz, 2016). Economic growth driven by resource exports is not sustainable unless it entails an economic transformation into the manufacturing sector (Asche, 2015; Rodrik, 2013; Rowden, 2015). Yet, in recent years in most of Africa, the share of manufacturing in the GDP has either stagnated or declined, quite contrary to the East Asian experience (Melber, 2016b, p. 5). Inequality remains high and under- and unemployment is common (ibid.). If these trends are not reversed, the demographic growth, hailed by McKinsey and others (Deloitte, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; World Bank, 2006) can turn into a severe threat to African governments.

#### **d) The generalization of all African countries**

The insufficient analysis of the structure of the national economies is further blurred by the fact that general claims about the African middle class talk about the continent as a whole and do not sufficiently pay attention to the wide disparities that exist among the countries. So, while there might be some countries which are experiencing growth, it is exacerbated by the generalizations of all African countries as “Africa rising”, whereas considerable disparities between the countries exist. In general, the much-heralded growth is often resumed to some few economic outliers, South African, the Northern African states, and countries like Kenya or Côte d’Ivoire (Darbon, 2014, p. 7).

#### **e) The appropriateness of “class” as an analytical category**

Several authors have questioned “class” as a significant level of analysis in Africa. Thomson argues that a Marxian class analysis reaches its limits in SSA because capitalism did not fully penetrate the continent. The high percentage of subsistence farmers present on the continent is not directly part of exploitative relationships because they work mainly for themselves. This independence leaves them with the possibility to opt out of the system, if it becomes unfavorable to them (Thomson, 2016, p. 90 ff). Even though they can be partially forced into the system, through taxation, their additional sources of subsistence put them in an in-between mode, of old and new modes of production. Besides, the proletariat is not at the bottom of the societal ladder, stable employment and higher income than peasants make them less inclined for revolution, as foreseen by Marx (Thomson, 2016, p. 91). Aspects, like the only partial penetration of capitalist modes of production, the absence of a bourgeoisie and the presence of a small and privileged proletariat due to low levels of industrialization raise doubts whether the idea of classes actually can be sustained in Africa (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016; Darbon & Toulabor, 2011; Thomson, 2016). Instead, collective identities based on region and religion seem in many cases more salient.

#### **f) The politicization of a constructed category**

Jean-Louis Rocca, in relation to the Chinese middle class, points out that very often researchers and intellectuals construct a category they are supposed to define (Rocca, 2008, p. 127). He states

“In brief, the ‘middle class’ problem cannot be analyzed in terms of an objective phenomenon to be described and to be understood but as the formation process of an imaginary stratum in a context of political struggles.”

(Rocca, 2008, p. 128)

The particular success of the *Africa Rising* meme can be seen through this light. The journalist John Gatsiounis argues that

“*New Africa* [emphasis in original] is an attractive sell. As editors have told me over the years, readers are tired of hearing the same sad story coming out of Africa. *New Africa* is about a miraculous pass on the world's largest frontier, and that makes for vital reading.”

(Gatsiounis, 2012, p. 10)

Such good news about Africa's growth fits well with the neoliberal discourse on the positive effects of globalization. It conveys a message about the benefits of a globalized world, in which even the most destitute regions profit. Moreover, the representation of a middle class, as portrayed by consultancies and international financial institutions is emblematic for positive capitalism: they embody modernity, liberal political values and cherish the opportunities of free markets (Joshi, 2014), and they give legitimacy to the Structural Adjustment Programs in the past. International donors can equally profit from that narrative, as proof of the efficiency of aid (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 7). However, such a discourse masks the ever-present high inequality and can actually serve upper class elites to legitimize their superior position (see Lentz, 2015, p. 15).

Hence, critically challenging the *Africa rising* narrative has been imperative. This is not to argue that we should return to the representation of Africa as a continent of *doom and gloom* but that we need a more balanced approach to comprehending the economic transformations in Africa. And a vague concept, impossible to define, that is “middle class” may rather be a projection for political ambitions or media

outlets instead of a scientific term adding analytical value to the social stratification on the continent.

### **1.3. Making Sense of a Problematic Concept**

Contemporary academic debates have challenged the legitimacy of the middle class concept for Africa. Even though the term has never been an easy one for social science to deal with, it is particularly under attack in relation to Africa. One conclusion drawn from these debates could be the recognition that we need a different approach. Which approach to choose, will – once again – depend on the question that is asked. It seems that “middle class” is too empty, and too easily filled with different content, that the term loses its analytical value. One remedy is to replace *middle class* with more precise terms, that leave less room for interpretation. If one talks about the entrepreneurial middle class (Akinkugbe & Wohlmuth, 2016), why not call them entrepreneurs? If one suggests merging the middle class with elites (Lentz, 2015), why not call them at least “upper ‘class’”? If the sole criteria is an economic indicator, why not talk about middle income strata? Why not use milieu, rather than class to describe a smaller subgroup, or chose a suitable name, as Rachel Spronk (2012) has done when designating the “young urban professionals” of Nairobi? That list could continue. Neubert points out that the class concept is increasingly losing validity in Western countries, yet at the same time it experiences an upsurge of attention in the Global South (Neubert, 2014). Darbon even doubts the academic gain that is made by using *middle class* as an analytical category, saying that it is just another social category and another effort to explain complexity in simple terms (“La « classe moyenne » en Afrique. Construction et usage d’une catégorisation sociale,” 2012). This is especially true in countries where the subjective perception as middle class is not guaranteed and where other identities, such as ethnicity, age, or religion, are predominant (E. O. Wright, 2008b, p. 22). Assumptions about the coherence of lifestyle and attitudes or even behavior are then hard to make because a similar income itself is not sufficient to

explain the previous items. However, it leaves us with the question which term to use when talking about the transformations the African continent is undergoing?

### **1.3.1. Moving out of Poverty**

The Pew Research Center (2015, p. 16) has pointed out, that while there may be some decline in poverty, the groups that are increasing in size are of low income (between \$2-10 ppp). This is even more so true for Africa, where the floating class (\$2-4) constitutes the most significant part of what they call middle class. It seems therefore reasonable to look at these lower ends when apprehending the growth of specific income groups. We caution to talk about an *African Growth Miracle*, but neither proclaim that it is *business as usual* on the continent.

Young (2012) and Sahn & Stifel (2000) use asset indexes as measurement of economic well-being and conclude that the bleak picture of an impoverished continent was not accurate. Sahn & Stifel remark that poverty has been declining in the 1980s and 1990s and Young concludes that Africa is emerging since the beginning of the 1990s. Jerven makes a similar observation:

“The debates on economic development in Africa are symptomatic of this problem [of critically questioning data]. It is particularly frustrating, and it surely stands in the way of objective evaluation, that the narratives in African economic development switch from one extreme to the other so swiftly. *The truth lies somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘tragedies’*. [Emphasis added] It is the job of scholars to give tempered assessments that navigate between what is make-believe and what passes as plausible evidence.”

(Jerven, 2016, p. 358)

Stoffel (2016) criticizes the AfDB for their reference to statistics that are used to underline the success of poverty alleviation when proclaiming the African middle class, despite well-known conceptual problems. While there is the need to keep the challenges of literature on poverty in mind, this argument reveals the close link between the emergence out of poverty and that newly acquired, still vulnerable, status of the floating class. In its longitudinal study on economic mobility, the World Bank aimed at understanding factors that contributed to *moving out of poverty*. It spans micro-data from fifteen different countries, to present a more nuanced pic-

ture on poverty and poverty alleviation than macroeconomic statistics usually do (Narayan & Petesch, 2007). Certainly, the caveats about statistical methods used pertain here as well. Ferreira et al. point out that economic mobility is a concept equally broad as middle class, because mobility can measure very different things and hence yield very different results (2013, p. 25f). We will not dwell on the abundant literature on economic mobility, but synthesize key factors that these studies have found decisive for economic mobility out of poverty. And they bear a lot of resemblance to many characteristics used to describe the middle classes (see for example Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) of Uganda, who collaborated with the World Bank on the *Moving Out of Poverty* study, discerns seven criteria vital for poverty exit. They list them in the order of priority as:

1. Having multiple sources of income
2. Education or a formal job, regular salary
3. Being Hardworking
4. Having productive assets and using them wisely (especially land)
5. Having hardworking spouse(s) and/or abundant family labour
6. Having a good saving culture
7. Being enterprising

(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2007, p. x)

Other factors beneficial for escaping poverty include work in the non-farming sectors, house ownership and residence in an urban area or a regional capital, gender and household composition (Dercon & Shapiro, 2007, p. 90; Ferreira, 2013, p. 95). These factors are recurring in literature on intragenerational mobility and provide therefore a blueprint for decisive factors to look at when tackling individual economic emergence. Another important criteria equally recurring in poverty literature is the concept of vulnerability. Shocks, like sickness, or natural disasters keep households poor. Being resilient to shocks is thus crucial when leaving poverty and not falling back. The World Bank study highlights the high degree of mobility in and out of poverty. In other words, most households that have been described as

poor at one point, have not been poor at another point (Dercon & Shapiro, 2007, p. 80). The more data rounds are used, the more the likelihood rises that someone is at one point not poor. Dercon & Shapiro call this a “*considerable degree of poverty mobility*” (2007, p. 81). Such an observation seems close to the *floating class* of the AfDB, or the *vulnerable* middle class of Ravallion (Ncube et al., 2011; Ravallion, 2009). Hence, vulnerability has equally entered the realm of the middle class debate. There are two diverging strands of thought though: whereas some authors link economic security (and thus the absence of vulnerability) with their definition of middle class (Ferreira, 2013; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012), others see the vulnerability as a distinctive feature of the emerging middle class (Ncube et al., 2011; Ravallion, 2009). Regardless of the stance to take, these criteria equip us with the material to define the population we aim to study in Uganda.

### **1.3.2. In Search of an Adequate Label**

We will not attempt yet another definition of middle class for our country of study, Uganda. As we have seen, *class* is a contested description for social stratification in Africa. Historical conditions that have given rise to the particularities of classes in Europe, such as massive industrialization, the delimitation from the aristocracy, or the relevance of socio-professional categories are not present in most of contemporary Africa. Uganda is no exception. We have seen the limits of Marxian class analysis in Africa (Grundy, 1964; Lentz, 2016; Neubert, 2016; Thomson, 2016). And in its contemporary meaning, class is preferably used to talk about income strata, ignoring class consciousness. We recall that *middle class* is too broad of a category and can often be replaced by more specific terms.

Keeping in mind the call of analysts to make the definition depending on the question to explain, we elaborate our intentions as the quest to understand how income structures other aspects of life, such as education, professions, identity, consumption patterns, or political attitude.



Taking different income groups as our starting point from which we try to understand the life choices made and without wanting to add yet another original label<sup>10</sup>, we describe our subjects of inquiry as *middle income groups*. Even though much criticized, we make use of the subgroups identified by the AfDB. They propose a first economic stratification of society, by differentiating between the poor, floating, lower middle, upper middle and upper class (Ncube et al., 2011). The bulk of interviewees are identified as loosely fitting into these categories of middle class. Because other work on Ugandan “middle classes” has suggested their urban nature (Ayoki, 2012; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2014), we will add as another defining characteristic their urban residency.

In summary, we, therefore, define our middle income groups as those having an income between \$2-\$20 per day per capita and living in an urban setting – in our case Kampala.

Our approach is mainly gradational (see Lentz, 2015, p. 19), that means we see class frontiers as constructions and consider them to be more fluid. As a consequence, we will also include people not fitting in our income groups, to see whether discrepancies from the lowest and highest strata become visible.

From this minimalist definition, we then try to look at characteristics that could provide common grounds beyond income. These characteristics are not chosen aleatorily, but refer to indicators mentioned in the literature on economic mobility and middle class (see 1.2 and 1.3.1). Hence, we do not build an inductive theory of social differentiation in Uganda. Instead, we use pre-established categories comparing them with the living conditions of the individuals on the ground in relation to their income. The categories we will look at are:

- Income
- Profession
- Source(s) of income, such as stable work, but also the diversification of income sources
- Education

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<sup>10</sup>Even though we admit to having thought about calling them “neither-nors”, as in neither rich nor poor.  
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- Age
- Gender
- Vulnerability to shocks or absence thereof
- Consumption (including Housing, Food, Communication, Transport, and Savings)
- Their integration into social networks

Because of the intention to examine their relation to politics, we will equally look at

- Their political attitudes and activities
- And their free time activities in general

Such an approach bears a resemblance to Weber's life chances: we examine how different dispositions give rise to different socio-economic positions and their likelihood to succeed in the market. But we also question whether similar socio-economic positions give rise to similar interests and behavior and if this does or not lead to a shared class conscience – thus whether we are talking about classes or *Stände* in the sense of Weber (Weber, 2002). Lentz (2015) or Rocca (2008) have both pointed out, that “middle class” is as much of a discursive practice as an objective reality. This allows us to confront our interviewees with the category, to see how much it speaks to them, compared to different descriptions. Therefore, we will equally inquire to which point other positions, namely religious, regional or of the life cycle play a role in developing common interests and behavior. Thus, socio-economic positions are described and put in relation to other relevant categories, often mentioned by the interviewees themselves.

In a nutshell, this work aims to scrutinize the so-called “middle class” (in the AfDB sense). It is a deconstruction of an over-utilized term (done here in chapter 1) and a reconstruction of a new notion, by picking up some elements of the middle class discourse that seem relevant in the Ugandan context. We use these elements to paint a picture, as accurate as possible, of what it means to be among a middle income group in urban Uganda today (this is principally done in part II).

## 2. The Middle Class and Political Transformation

A vast body of literature tries to explore the role of a middle class in the context of democratization (Mills, 1953). Some authors consider them drivers of political change and responsible for the advancement of democracy because they will demand accountability from their leaders (Birdsall, 2007; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Easterly et al., 2006; Lipset, 1959b; Moore, 1966). Others describe them as the prolonged arm of the government, conservative and not willing to put their acquired benefits at stake (J. Chen, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2013). Finally, some find there is no kind of specific political behavior and action associated with the middle class (Jary, 1978, p. 134). While it is worthwhile to have a look at these studies, two problems arise: The definitions of middle class diverge from one study to another. As a result, the comparison between the various research becomes difficult. A second problem arises through the sometimes only implicit assumptions that are made with political participation: does this refer to voting, or other forms of political mobilization, or both? Is it bound to a democratic context? Is political participation good if it maintains stability or if it brings about regime change? Most of the work also neglects the starting point within a regime (democratic or authoritarian) and how it will affect the position taken by the citizens in case of mobilization (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). These interpretations vary from one author to the other, mainly depending on the political circumstances. Therefore, for a thorough analysis, it is necessary to link the discussion on the middle classes' political behavior with the literature on social mobilization and theories of democratic transitions (Hellsten, 2016, p. 96).

In this chapter, we will review the literature on the political role that has been ascribed to the middle class, either as a driver for democracy, or a guarantee of authoritarian stability. Subsequently, we look at the literature that has described the implication of African middle classes at independence, during the democratic transitions at the beginning of the 1990s and in more contemporary uprisings. We con-

clude this review by arguing that in most cases the statements on the implications had been made on very general assumptions. To overcome this, we suggest linking such an analysis with theories of social mobilization, and of individual contentious (or supportive) action. We conclude by suggesting a more nuanced picture when analyzing social mobilization, which looks at its institutionalized forms, but equally on the less visible activities that happen before. This framework will serve us in our analysis when understanding the forms of social mobilization of the middle income groups in Uganda and their interaction with the political sphere.

## **2.1. The Political Role Ascribed To The Middle Class**

The literature on middle class and politics subsumes a wide range of middle class definition and aspects of political activity. Maybe due to this reason existing theories on middle class and politics come to such diverse conclusions, either seeing the middle class as a stronghold of democracy, or a friend of authoritarian regimes. These different attitudes shall be looked at, in a brief literature review.

### **2.1.1. The Middle Class as Agent of Democracy**

The tendency to attribute civic virtues to the middle class has a long tradition. Aristotle is one of the oldest sources often mentioned, to give weight to the argument that the middle class brings democracy (Lofchie, 2015, p. 34). Other prominent supporters of the positive effect on democracy are Georg Simmel (1896), or Martin Lipset (1959a, 1959b).

The work of Martin Lipset (1959, 1960) has laid the ground and has given rise to an abundance of literature linking economic development with establishing democracy and attributing a pivotal position to the newly emerging middle classes. The main argumentation chain can be resumed as such: Economic growth does change the social structure. In a regime where all wealth is concentrated in the hands of the state, access to state control becomes the only access to wealth, and, therefore, the political struggle is shaped by a winner-takes-all attitude, making it hard for

democracy to be implemented (Lipset, 1994, p. 4). An emerging middle class is a sign that resources are distributed differently among the population, hence having access to the regime will not be the only access to wealth anymore. Similarly, economic development leads to higher education, which has been singled out as decisive for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset, 1959b; Lu, 2005; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969a). As a result, the middle class will embrace individual values and civil liberties. Contrary to the upper classes, the middle class is not linked to the governing elite and, therefore, does not fear to demand political change, such as a more considerable share of political participation or a different distribution of resources (J. Chen, 2013, p. 4). On the other hand, they have the economic resources and the leisure time to engage in various kind of political mobilization, contrary to the lower class, who might be too busy to make ends meet (Huntington, 1972, p. 52) or has an inherent inclination towards authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959b). These argumentations lead to various recurrent hypotheses on the positive effects of the middle class on democracy:

**a) Keeping the state accountable**

The argument on state intervention brakes into three different strands, which can be combined but can also appear separately in the literature, depending on the author's stance. First, for a middle class to prosper, there is a need for capitalist development, which controls state intervention and keeps it accountable. As a result, a bourgeoisie independent of the state develops and redistribution of assets among broader strata of the population becomes possible (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Unlike the upper class, the middle class is not well-connected to the governing elite. As a result, they cannot count on favoritism on their part. Secondly, because of their frustration with corruption, over-regulation and state ownership in neopatrimonial regimes, a newly emerging middle class will pressure for democratic processes to gain control over state intervention. Barrington Moore resumes this need for transparent policymaking in his famous phrase: "*No bourgeois, no democracy.*" (Moore, 1966, p. 418) As such, to assure that their

interests will be taken care of, they have to rely on due process, the rule of law, elections and other democratic procedures:

“Thus middle-class members have to rely on such democratic institutions as the popular election of leaders, the limitation of state power, the constitutional protection of individual rights to protect their own rights and properties against any powerful intruders (e.g., the government and its officials.)”

(Lu, 2005, p. 160)

Thirdly, because the middle class is not affiliated with the regime, they have been attributed a go-between role, a mediating position between the upper class and the lower class. This position will attenuate conflicts and avoid a “*clash of classes*”, and, therefore, contribute to the stability of the regime (Gerteis, 1998; Lipset, 1959b).

#### **b) Availability of resources to mobilize**

Anthony Oberschall has been among the first to point out that not everyone has the potential to mobilize, but for a successful social mobilization resources are required. These can be in the form of financial assets, organizational skills (acquired through education), time, etc. (Oberschall, 1973). Authors such as Huntington consider the proletariat to be mainly occupied with survival on a day-to-day basis, who will, therefore, concentrate its energy on earning money (Herbst, 1990; Huntington, 1972, p. 289) Instead, the middle class has some time to spare and the money needed for the mobilization of a particular cause (Walsh, Jennings, & Stoker, 2004). Other authors concede that the working class may have an interest in democracy, they do lack, however, the resources to lead a sustained struggle (Huber & Stephens, 1999; Lu, 2005; Oberschall, 1973)

#### **c) Democratic virtues of the middle class**

Education has been considered the most relevant asset available to the middle class in their strive for democracy. Lipset himself argues that education has been found to be stronger related to democracy than wealth (Lipset,

1959b, p. 79). Kurzman and Leahey even go as far as to introduce intellectuals as a new class and as principal agents for the development of democracy (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004). And for Nie, Verba, and Kim the difference in education is one of the leading factors explaining different levels of political participation (Nie, Verba, & Kim, 1974). Because they are politically more active, they feel that politics is more accessible to them and demand a greater say in politics (Lu, 2005, p. 169; Walsh et al., 2004). Higher education is inextricably linked to higher income (Strode, Crawford, Moratti, & Schmieding, 2015, p. 90); hence, the likelihood rises for someone in the middle class to be better educated than someone in the lower class. And higher education is also linked to more liberalism and the respect of civil liberties, tolerance towards others, etc. From there, a shortcut is often made that the middle class, because they are higher educated, will also have a higher regard of democratic values (Huber & Stephens, 1999; Huntington, 1972; Lipset, 1959b). Their thinking democratically will equally lead them to act democratically, i.e., contesting undemocratic regimes or supporting the maintenance of democratic ones (Lu, 2005, p. 160). As a result, it is assumed that the middle class will demand more accountability from the government (Birdsall, 2007; Easterly et al., 2006), insist on a society that is based on merit, or commit themselves to “higher” values because they have no more materialist worries (Inglehart, 1977).

#### **d) Discrediting of other classes**

Embracing the middle class as virtuous often goes along with the tendency to disparage other classes. Hence, the rich are portrayed as arrogant and egoistic and in alliance with the regime, and the working class as interested only in short-term economic gains (Lu, 2005, p. 159) and as political abstinent (Walsh et al., 2004) or even drawn to authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959b). The middle class, being more educated and affluent than the lower class,

but not as corrupted as the upper, is, as a result, portrayed as free of these counter-democratic attitudes.

Several conceptual problems guide these reasonings: for one, these works are fraught with favorable assumptions about the behavior of the middle class, and negative assumptions about the other classes (political inertia or tendency for non-democratic values of the lower classes, cooptation of higher classes into the political system).

Secondly, the arguments are guided by the theoretical foundation of classical modernization theory, presenting the course economic development of the middle classes alongside democratization as inevitable. However, in recent literature, the teleological approach of classical modernization theory has been widely disputed and generally refuted. Nevertheless, it is still present as a latent assumption in a good deal of academic literature on the middle class (J. Chen, 2013, p. 5).

Thirdly, the method most often used, linear regression analysis, usually considers either a single point in time or a cumulation of one period, such as a decade, and ignores variations within a given country within a given time (Arat, 1988).

Finally, all of these works have used quantitative, macroeconomic data, and deductions were made from correlations. Apart from the misleading interpretation that correlation would mean causation, Kurzman and Leahey criticize this approach for using national wealth as a substitute for measuring social groups:

“Quantitative studies of democratization frequently theorize the importance of one or more classes but have not used direct measures to test their theories. [N]one of these studies measures the size, much less the strength or political attitudes or activism, of the social groups in question. Instead, these studies use national-level variables – primarily national wealth – as proxies for social classes.”

(Kurzman & Leahey, 2004, p. 941)

And while quantitative studies using macroeconomic data may show these correlations, qualitative research hardly confirms these linkages (J. Chen & Dickson,



2008). It remains doubtful whether such generalizing statements about the middle class can be made, ignoring the specific circumstances of the various countries.

### **2.1.2. A Contingent Approach to Middle Class and Democracy**

It has not been the intention of Martin Lipset to make the direct correlation between capitalism and democracy; he states himself that economic development is a requisite of the latter, but as such not sufficient (Lipset, 1994). Authors instead made this deduction following his hypothesis (Arat, 1988, p. 22) In his later work he emphasizes the need of not seeing capitalism as the single explanation of democracy:

“Clearly, socioeconomic correlations are merely associational, and do not necessarily indicate cause. Other variables, such as the force of historical incidents in domestic politics, cultural factors, events in neighboring countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and movement behavior can also affect the nature of the polity. [...] The various factors I have reviewed here do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine the outcomes. The record of social scientists as futurologists is not good. [...] Whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviors, and decisions of political leaders and groups.”

(Lipset, 1994, p. 16ff)

And Chen and Dickson have pointed out that even authoritarian regimes experience relative stability if they record a steady economic performance (J. Chen & Dickson, 2008). In a more nuanced approach, a body of literature has been developed supporting the thesis that the relationship between economic development, the middle class and democracy might not be as straightforward. Instead, it hinges on various other factors such as their dependence on the state, affiliations with other classes or their perceived threat of them, their subjective perception of their well-being and the current political system and the effectiveness of its policy implementations (J. Chen, 2013, p. 5).

**a) Dependence on the state**

Authors, who underline the independence of the middle class from the state argue that because they earn their income through working in a privatized sector, they do not need the state for the distribution of resources because they secure their access. This point of view quickly reaches its limitations, especially in late-developing countries, where the state plays a much more active role in shaping policies and markets. For example in countries with import substitution industry, entrepreneurs rely on protective laws for them not to compete with international products. In areas more focused on export, this dependence is considerably lower (J. Chen, 2013). Secondly, in many developing countries with a small private sector, those enjoying the benefits of a regular salary (one of the entries into a “middle class lifestyle”) are often civil servants. These dependencies may alter how the individual perceives even an undemocratic state, as long as the policies are beneficial to them, and they cast doubt on the argument that the middle class has no ties with the government anymore.

**b) Class alliances and the threat of other classes**

In a similar vein, the way class alliances are formed will determine whether or not the middle class is tied to the regime. For Samuel Huntington, the middle class gets the role of a “game changer”, deciding over the stability of a system depending on whether they ally with the military or with the peasants (Huntington, 1972, p. 78). Similarly, in their historical study of the role the bourgeoisie played for democracy, Huber and Stephens found that the bourgeoisie would take on a pro-democratic stance if it allied with the working class (Huber & Stephens, 1999). Whereas, if the working classes were organized independently, they would be perceived as a threat, challenging the bourgeois’ property rights (ibid). While some authors include the bourgeoisie as part of the middle class, Huber and Stephens treat them as a distinctive category. They also attribute the crucial role for democrati-

zation in Latin America to the middle class (ibid., p. 767), provided that they would not ally with the elite.

“However, the middle classes needed allies, and depending on these alliances, democracy took limited or inclusive forms. Where sectors of the oligarchy or the military allied with the middle classes, the middle classes were content with their own inclusion and supported literacy qualifications for the franchise (e.g., Brazil in the 1930s). In contrast, where the middle classes were dependent on working class support in their push for democracy and the working class had an organizational presence, these class coalitions were more likely to push for full democracy (e.g., Venezuela in the 1940s, Bolivia in the 1950s).”

(Huber & Stephens, 1999, p. 767)

If, however, the middle class would perceive the working class as a threat, they would not mobilize for full-fledged democracy. In developing countries, where the middle class constitutes a minority, and the majority of the population is poor, middle class interests would be outnumbered in a democracy. Hence, under such circumstances, the middle class has little interest to promote the rule of the people. Kurlantzick analyses this pattern in various countries since the beginning of the millennium, such as Venezuela, Philippines, Thailand, and Egypt, and for him the middle class is a driving factor not for the promotion, but for the *retreat* of democracy (Kurlantzick, 2013).

### c) **Satisfaction with their situation**

Despite some hopes expressed, the Chinese middle class might not bring democracy to the country, for two reasons. First, their close ties to the state, as seen above, make them primary beneficiaries of the current political system, and second, they seek to preserve their interests and defend their social position against newcomers (Rocca, 2008, p. 137). Moreover, they will attempt to maintain their status because they fear to lose what they have acquired. Especially the lower middle class is often considered to be the most conservative group in society. Bacqué and Vermeersch observe this for the French middle class after May 68 (Bacqué & Vermeersch, 2007), and Be-

chofer and Elliot find a similar positioning of the British middle class. Here, opportunism prevails, and the middle class's motivation for action stems from defending their capital against others (Bechofer & Elliot, 1978). Finally, it seems to be equally valid in China (Rocca, 2008, p. 137). Hence, a person who is relatively well off in a given system has no incentives pushing for change. Rather, they are driven by egoism; thus they decide to focus on their individual goals and depoliticize (Varma, 2009). And James Wright observes for the United States that

“Of all groups considered thus far, surely the white, non-South upper middle class is best able to effect genuine political change, but at the same time, they have little reason to do so. Given the social, political, and economic benefits which the system has provided for them, one would be very surprised to find them distrustful of its representatives or skeptical of their ability to work within the system. Having distributed an unequal share of political power and material rewards to approximately the same persons, the system thus guards admirably against potential insurgency among those best able to carry it out.”

(J. D. Wright, 1976, p. 141)

In his statement, again the proximity to the political elite is linked to the general satisfaction, but also to the means one possesses for mobilization (with the middle class being the best endowed). As a result, the middle class is not guided by democratic virtues, which will allow them to push for more participation within a system, but rather by egoism and the effort to maintain what they have achieved so far.

#### **d) Satisfaction with the political system**

The fear of losing privileges and hence the decision not to push for change does not yet say anything about the middle class's position towards the regime. If they feel that their achievements have come through own efforts, they might likely still take a critical stance towards the government. If however they are satisfied with the policies implemented by their government and believe in its overall legitimacy, they are less inclined to demand more democracy. Chen has shown in his work that the regime support, for poli-

cies as well as for the general legitimacy, is higher among the middle class than among the lower class of society (J. Chen, 2013, p. 77). Similarly, Stephens et al. argue that the middle class has more widespread social networks and hence more clientelist ties with the regime. Thus, they will be more satisfied due to their accrued ability to take influence in government, thanks to their connections (Stephens, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, 1992).

The contingent approach to analyzing the likelihood of democratic demands from the middle class does not assume linearity leading from economic development to an increased middle class and hence democracy; it looks more on the context surrounding the economic advancement. However, in these argumentations, too, are several flaws:

For one, the fear of losing what one has acquired can be attributed to all strata of society. Huntington, for example, does not see the middle class, but the industrial proletariat as those who have too much at stake in the status quo that they could risk losing it (Huntington, 1972, p. 288). And inversely, a perceived high stake in society does not push for higher political participation either (Nie et al., 1969a). These arguments are by no means bound to one class, and even though they assume that the middle class is *more likely* to be satisfied with their personal economic and social position, this may also account for other classes as well. This criticism is similar to the one on Gurr's theory of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1974): there is no commonly shared threshold when someone feels deprived, and neither is there one for satisfaction (see Daniel, 2016, p. 23). It might even be, in their strive for higher achievement, that the middle class is precisely not satisfied, but aspire for even more.

Secondly, these arguments are still guided by the veiled assumption that there exists a common interest due to a common materialist position. In the contingent approach, these are sometimes divided into dichotomies (between those who are pleased with their situation and those who are not, those who have a link to with the state and those who have not, etc.) but it still assumes that the middle class will

act in big homogeneous blocks. Already in 1953, C. W. Mills observed for the American white collars the lack of a common public position, and hence, rather than being organized, their individual positions will decide upon their political commitment. He states:

“Internally, they [the middle classes] are split, fragmented; externally, they are dependent on larger forces. Even if they gained the will to act, their actions, being unorganized, would be less a movement than a tangle of unconnected contests.”

(Mills, 1953, p. ix)

Focusing on the inherent heterogeneity raises doubt about all work assuming that class position itself will affect political mobilization. Even though Mills concedes that there might be common interests, they will not lead the expression of common positions. The middle class itself is too heterogeneous as to make general deductions about their behavior. For precisely that reason, theories about middle classes' political behavior are so manifold and come to very different conclusions.

Thirdly, all theories adhere to the link between economic development, the rise of the middle class and, as a result, democratization. However, Kurzman & Leahey have pointed out that this is inherent to *all* theories explaining democratization through a class angle. It is linked to the establishment of the bourgeoisie as well as to the increase of the working class, which both might similarly lead to democracy (Kurzman & Leahey, 2004). Hence, it raises the question how much explanatory power lies in the argument that a *particular* class will foster democracy.

Lastly, all of these works, even those who have been carried out in an authoritarian context, assume that political participation comes at no cost. This is not true and has been one of the major shortcomings in social mobilization theory (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). In most of the research on the middle classes' role in bringing democracy, the democratic implication has been defined in very narrow terms, as participating in elections, petitioning and contacting government officials (J. Chen, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2013). Some authors also included contentious actions which aim at the defense of common interests (Braud, 2011). Yet in an authoritarian context all these parameters might be modified. In his study on the Chinese

middle class, Chen showed that those middle class members *most* inclined to democracy would *not* participate in elections, because they considered them as a mere pretense, in order to give legitimacy to an authoritarian regime (J. Chen, 2013, p. 123). Thus considering voting as a pro-democratic behavior will not reflect the entire picture in a context where the elections themselves lack credibility. This is equally true for open contentious action: in a state where freedom of speech and assembly are not guaranteed, claiming these might involve high risk, such as violent repression of demonstrations, manhandling by the police, but also more subtle disadvantages, such as the impediment to perceive a desired career, due to a public positioning in opposition to the government. As a result, it might be that the members of the middle class, similar to the poor or the women in other analyses (Ferreë Marx & McClurg Mueller, 2004) consider politics not available to them and decide, therefore, to either pursue political goals through other means or not to pursue them at all.

So, at best, ideas of the political role of the middle class are contested, as different contexts and different definitions lead to very diverging outcomes. For some, there is even no link at all. For Rose, all these explanations of middle class implication in social movements fail because they do not rest in the framework of class interests. He believes that

“[...] class is not correlated with any one set of ideas or politics, and efforts to identify the working or middle classes with particular political beliefs have proven to be of limited applicability.”

(Rose, 1997, p. 475)

Hence, any action is motivated out of individual interest, such as career advancement, and not to advance “*middle class institutions or class interests.*” (ibid., p.481).

It becomes evident that there is a need for a more nuanced analysis, of the relation between economic emergence coupled with theories of social mobilization, to introduce some analytical rigor that goes beyond assumed links between a class and their attitudes. To fully acknowledge these types of social mobilization, it is inevitable to adapt them to the particular political and historical context of Uganda.

But before we will do so, we turn towards the African middle classes and the role that has been ascribed to them in the various political transformations.

## **2.2. The Middle Class in African Political Transformations**

Melber reminds us that the power of influence mainly pertains to the top 10-5% of a society: “Pinning hopes for social advancement on the emerging middle classes, as Birdsall’s (2015) optimistic conclusion suggests, is like the trust that those who row the galley will decide its course.” (Melber, 2016a, p. 205) Such an observation, however, relies largely on behavior in routine action, in case of big transformations (what Melber refers to as *mutiny*) this is put into question. Indeed, the role of the middle class in Africa has been mentioned recurrently, concerning major political transitions that the continent, or sometimes only specific countries, have undergone. The most prominent would be the African independence from colonialism, the “*third wave*” of democratization in the early 1990s and the more recent uprisings, ignited by the Arab Spring. A short review of these transformations shall give some indication on how the role of the middle class has been described in these social movements, and we shall conclude whether this allows deducing a particular political stance of these middle classes.

### **2.2.1. The African Middle Class and Independence - a Racially Defined Elite Minority**

At the time of independence in the African countries, “middle class” had been used as a precursor of a ruling elite, rather than for a class of small prosperity, and was far from being a commonly applied concept (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 12). In a similar vein, Lentz reveals the conceptual proximity between *elite* (used by those who found that a class label would not adequately reflect the social stratification in the African societies at the end of colonialism) and *middle class* (Lentz, 2015, p. 9). In general, the use of middle class was justified by describing an educated, urban stratum working in professional jobs, often as civil servants in the colonial administration (e.g., Sklar, 1979, p. 533f). Thus, Amilcar Cabral sees the national



petty bourgeoisie as “[...] *the only social stratum capable both of having consciousness in the first place of the reality of imperialist domination and of handling the state apparatus inherited from that domination.*” (Cabral 1980:134, cited in Mamdani, 1990a, p. 59) Such a middle class would be situated between the rural masses and the colonialists (Lentz, 2015, p. 10). Kilson (1958) for example argues that the African middle class in British West Africa has brought about nationalism because they felt their advancement was hindered under colonial rule, and that nationalism was foremost designed to serve their own middle class interests. Mamdani (1976) makes a similar conclusion for Uganda in the 1940s:

“Thus, *all* [emphasis in original] sections of the petty bourgeoisie found the path to further development blocked: traders were subordinate to Indian commercial capital, civil servants found themselves at the lower rung of a three-tiered, racially structured government service, and kulaks [Baganda rich peasants] found themselves subject to the political rule of the Lukiko [parliament of Buganda] chiefs.”

(Mamdani, 1976, p. 170)

The violent incidents of the 1940s had a specific political agenda, and led to a change in the relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and the colonial state, transferring power from the chiefs to the petty bourgeoisie. That petty bourgeoisie would eventually become the ruling class in post-independent Uganda (Mamdani, 1976, p. 221). Michael West drives the conceptual proximity even further by using elite and middle class interchangeably in his account on colonial Zimbabwe (West, 2002). He shows, how the Zimbabwean middle class has first tried to enhance its social status while cooperating with the white settlers, claiming better treatment for “civilized” Africans than for the “raw natives”. The refusal of the white settlers to share their privileges led ultimately to a radicalization of the middle class and mobilization of peasants and workers to seize power and to construct a class agenda suitable for all, instead of just following their own (West, 2002, p. 121 ff). The work cited here, however, fails to be more specific about the actions of this so-called middle class. Often the statements remain unspecific, referring to the middle class occupation of leadership position in movements that had been decisive for the

mobilization of nationalism and demand for independence. As mentioned before, it is questionable whether such a somewhat vague role is sufficient to deduce the political position of the middle class. As pointed out, the use of middle class is close to that of a post-independent dominant elite; thus one has to keep in mind, that, if at all, it mainly refers to an upper middle class. But the characteristics used to describe this group are strikingly similar to those evoked in later accounts on who was active in other protests, such as the democratic transitions and contemporary uprising.

### **2.2.2. The African Middle Class and the Third Wave - Replaced by Civil Society**

In the 1980s, there seemed to be little belief that African countries would transition towards democracy. Samuel Huntington argued that they are too impoverished, and their states too violent, for them to become democratic (Joseph, 1997, p. 363). Besides, the middle classes were seen as too weak and dependent on the state structures (because of their bureaucratic nature) as that they would oppose their regimes (ibid.). The middle class at that time was principally made by the state, through a conflated civil service sector, with an inherent interest in authoritarian stability (Lofchie, 2015, p. 40). Such analyses, though seem to have been proven wrong, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war, when the “third wave” of democracy reached Africa (Huntington, 1993). The principal drivers of these transitions have, however, often been analyzed through the lens of civil society, with a remarkable absence of the middle class in many accounts (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 14). Many of the transitions that have taken place were led by national conferences, institutions guided by well-educated professionals, such as advocates or the clergy (G. Martin, 1993). For example, Zeilig & Dawson (2008) have argued that university students had been drawn into activism due to the tension between their awareness of their higher educational status and the threat of facing poverty, as previously held assurances that a good education leads to a good career began to erode<sup>11</sup>. Bratton & van de Walle (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992) describe students,

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<sup>11</sup>Note here the resemblance with arguments made about the implication of the youth in more contemporary protests across Africa.

civil servants, unions and churches as the main social groups involved in the protests in many African countries. For them, the protests were “*an outlet for a coalition of diverse corporate interests. Students were joined by faculty and civil servants complaining about salary arrears, subsidy cuts, or [...] the possibility of a salary reduction.*” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 442) And for Herbst (1990, p. 200) the biggest threat to regime stability comes from student and labor movements. Albeit meeting middle class criteria, such as education and salary, these actors have often been described as elite or civil society instead (Darbon & Toulabor, 2011, p. 15), except for the two authors mentioned above. Bratton and Van de Walle believe that in neopatrimonial regimes the clientelistic nature of the economy hinders private capital accumulation. In addition to a continued financial crisis, the middle class is hindered in its advancement and will sideline with the opposition because “[...] *would-be capitalists want to use a transition from neopatrimonialism as an opportunity to include them in the new rules of the political game.*” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994, p. 467) Thus, these political transitions are driven from below, and they are supported by the emerging middle class who can counterbalance the weakness of civil society and political organizations (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994, p. 485). Bratton even believes that “*middle classes are likely to be the protagonists of civil society*” (Bratton, 1994, p. 4)

At the end of the 1990s, however, many analysts have been dampened about the prospects of the democratic transition due to subsequent democratic backlashes (Tshiyembe, 1998). It is only with the more recent uprisings that have taken place all over Africa since 2005 but gained prominence with the Arab Spring in 2011, that hopes of a new democratic shift in African countries were voiced. Occurring at the same time as the debate of an emerging global middle class, these protests were sometimes seen as a “middle class revolution” (Fukuyama, 2013).

### **2.2.3. The African Middle Class and Contemporary Uprisings - and the Prominence of the Urban Poor**

In 2011, popular protests triggered a change in leadership in several North African and Arab countries. In the same year, the movement of 23<sup>rd</sup> June (M23) succeeded through their protests to have a law proposal withdrawn, that would have facilitated the re-election of President Abdoulaye Wade (Demarest, 2016, p. 64). They also played a vital role in rallying for the opposition candidate Macky Sall in national elections the year after, eventually ousting the incumbent president. In 2014, *le Balai citoyen* led to the removal of Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso's long-standing president (Bouquet, 2017). And these are just the most successful ones. For the last decade, all over Africa, regimes have been faced with an increasing number of popular protests, often triggered by declining living conditions (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). Branch & Mampilly argue that recent protests all over the world, such as the Occupy Movement, the Arab Spring, the European *indignados* and the anti-corruption protests in Latin America and Asia have been interpreted as “*the ultimate challenge to capitalism, a rejection of liberal democracy, an uprising by the ‘multitude’, the work of social-media-savvy youth, or an outburst by a frustrated middle class.*” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 2) They point out, though, that such analyses ignore local and historical conditions. Thus, the protests in Africa that have been increasing since 2005 (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 63) build on a history of dissent that can be traced back to the anti-colonial struggle. They see the roots of today's contention in the urban underclass which had always been confronted with state violence. Because, contrary to civil society, they lack institutional representation, their only option to be heard is through directly relating with the state (ibid. p. 20f). Goodfellow (2013) makes a similar observation for Kampala, where urban informal groups communicate their grievances through rioting and the state, in return would solely respond to that form of demands. In both cases, the authors see the main actors in the “urban underclass” or “urban informal groups”, quite distinctive from previous descriptions of a middle class. Notwithstanding, Branch & Mampilly describe that underclass as having “*defied tradi-*

tional, class-based categories and [...] defined only negatively, by setting it off from what it is not.” (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 19) That, again, shows surprising similarities with the description of the middle class as “neither rich nor poor”. The proximity should not be overstretched, though, because the authors discard the middle class implications as a neoliberal narrative, that highlights its success story of global capitalism by presenting the middle class as the democratic force that is hindered in its aspirations by their national crony capitalism (ibid. p. 201f). Eventually, this brings us back to the question of how to define middle class and its appropriation by the concerned actors. Contrary to Russia, where protesters against Putin have assumed that definition for themselves (Bikbov, 2012), activists from current movements in Africa have been more hesitant to describe themselves as such. In April 2017, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation Berlin convened several activists and Zacharia Mampilly, one of the authors of “Africa Uprising” (2015) for a roundtable titled “AfriqUPrising” (“AfriqUPrising!,” 2017). Activists included Linda Masarira of #21daysofactivism in Zimbabwe, Cheikh Oumar Cyrille Touré of *Y’en a marre* in Senegal, and the Burundi photographer Teddy Mazina. When asked about the role of the middle class, the respondents were hesitant, their answers underlined the inclusive nature of their social movements and they described their own social status as “*poor urbanite*” as Masarira called it. And Branch & Mampilly draw a similar conclusion:

“The African experience of protest thus affirms that the occurrence and outcomes of urban uprisings worldwide cannot be predicted from a universal model of liberal progress driven on by a middle class, but are contingent upon complex political dynamics between a diversity of classes on the street.”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 202)

We see here that the middle class label has not been used extensively by analysts to describe uprisings in Africa, even though they have occurred at a similar time as the *Africa Rising* narrative. At best, they even contradict this narrative, by showing how the growth has not led to employment among the young urban populations and that growing inequality and corruption have instead rendered life in the city precarious. But, many of these protests have also been limited in their achievements. For

one, even if they managed to organize a regime change, they however often lacked the support from the rural population and only succeed due to the help of the military (Bouquet, 2017). In other instances, the movements did not call for broad social transformation but rather concentrated on small, localized uprisings which only concerned a small part of the population (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).

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Admittedly, the review done here is broad, it does not give credit to the abundance of literature on each of these topics, and it neglects to take into account country-specific trajectories. Whereas trade unions, associations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) present high level of organization, urban informal groups are much less institutionalized. In the SMO literature, the middle class has been seen as an educated group, with sufficient income and capacity to lead and eventually bring about a political transformation, thus as representatives of the organized spectrum. Yet, all the movements discussed here, and this is pivotal for social movements, could only succeed because they were able to form alliances between different factions of society. And even though their leaders would come from the middle class, they were not at all “middle class movements” and it is doubtful that *all* members of the middle class joined or that they constituted the majority of these people on the street. So while Oberschall observes that indeed most opposition leaders come from a middle class background, he reminds us that “[...] *this is equally true for political leaders in political parties and in other institutionalized groups that have access to political influence and decision-making.*” (Oberschall, 1973, p. 155) Thus, the middle class is not more critical towards the status quo per se, but simply more likely to assume a leading role. In the case of the more recent uprisings, which have been less institutionalized we have even seen some of their leading figures refusing the middle class label, seeing their identity as “urban poor”, in order to underline the broad base of the movements.

In the literature on middle class and democracy, very often, no direct action is taking place. Instead, the middle class brings political change through their being par-

ticularly virtuous. Or, on the contrary, their inaction is explained through their satisfaction with a system in which they are not the worst off, thus taking action for them is not necessary. These are, however, in some way conceptual shortcuts, that fail to analyze actual actions and attitudes of these middle classes. Especially in the quantitative literature, that relies mainly on correlations between levels of democracy and income (e.g., Lipset, 1959b). Such an argumentation mirrors the research on democratic transition, much debated in the 1990s that suggested that a given set of preconditions (e.g., a middle class) would lead to a specific outcome (e.g., a consolidated democracy). This overtly deterministic view of transitions had been criticized (see Ben Néfissa, 2011; Dobry, 2000; Hermet, 2001). Instead, these authors argued that we have to let go of a linear narrative. Failing to democratize should be considered as much as a successful transition, the focus should turn to small events as well as big ones, and social movements need to be rehabilitated in such an analysis (Ben Néfissa, 2011, p. 78; Dobry, 2000, p. 588ff). Therefore, we argue that one has to look at the *activities* and the *political attitudes* of a middle class, in order to put them in the context of the theory of political transformation. With these arguments in mind, we turn to the theories of social mobilization, that help put individual actions in context to collective ones, as a way to bring about societal change. It gives us an entry on how to analyze the political role of the middle income groups in Uganda from various levels: at the level of individual actions, individual positions (such as a favorable attitude towards democracy) and positions in the context of collective action (as participants of a movement).

### **2.3. Social Movements and Nonmovements**

The idea of the link between social change and conflict has been recurrent in sociology. Coser shows how, as rigid medieval structures broke down, conflicts over interests and values that had formerly been retained now gave rise to new forms of unification and integration, leading to the modern western world (Coser, 1957, p. 199). He argues that “[c]hange, no matter what its source, breeds strain and conflict.” (ibid. p. 204). Scholars like Anthony Oberschall (1973) and Samuel Hunt-

ington (1972) promoted the concept especially in the context of developing countries. For Oberschall (1973) social conflict exists because of the desire to change an established social order, fueled by social hierarchies and the struggle of scarce resources in a context of domination and subordination. He draws, similar to Huntington (1972) a strong link between social change and the potential for conflict since transitional societies (in the transition from traditional to modern forms of organization) show a great disparity in wealth and living standards, which raises the potential for conflict. And whereas in a routine situation, problem-solving takes place through routine mechanisms, in a phase of transformation the situation is considerably altered, therefore, making usual responses inadequate (Koopmans, 2007, p. 32). And in this context, many authors bring particular attention to the emerging middle class, bourgeoisie, or which term they might apply. These groups are seen as particularly prone to act because:

1. They challenge, in the words of Thorstein Veblen “*vested interests*” (cited in Coser, 1957, p. 203) in the redistribution of resources. They start making claims (assuming that before they have been poor and, therefore, marginalized from the political field), that encounters the opposition of groups “*who previously had established a ‘vested interest’ in a given form of distribution of honour, wealth and power.*” (Coser, 1957, p. 203) An example could be a claim of a middle class for accountability and rational bureaucracy, challenging elites, who have functioned arbitrarily and through personal rule, as it is frequently brought forward by those authors arguing for a middle class in favor of democracy<sup>12</sup>.
2. They have a surplus of resources to be invested, as they are not busy anymore to make ends meet, but not comfortably installed in their situation either, leading to the desire to continue to strive forward (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164ff).
3. Since their situation changed, their demands for the government have altered as well, leading to different expectations regarding services provided by the state (Kim, 2007, p. 189).

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<sup>12</sup> For a critique of these assumptions, see 2.1.



There are several problems with these assumptions, concerning the position of the middle class, already discussed at length in chapter 2.1.1. Another problematic argument regards the rigid dichotomies between traditional and modern forms of organization and between what is a “routine situation” and what a “crisis” (Dobry, 2009, p. 7). Charles Tilly, himself refusing this approach, writes:

“If we take [these] arguments seriously, we will expect to find sharp discontinuity between routine and nonroutine collective action; their causes, content, and consequences will all differ significantly. We will hypothesize that the faster and more extensive the social change, the more widespread the anomie and restorative forms of collective action; concretely, we will expect rapid industrialization or urbanization to produce exceptionally high levels of conflict and protest.”

(Tilly, 1978, p. 23)

Though both, Tilly and Dobry, argue that there is no essential difference in the means of collective action used, Dobry concedes, that a link between mobilization and social transformation can often be observed (Dobry, 2009, p. 7). Kriesi argues that social change itself does not create conflict, but only in combination with processes of mobilization, turned manifest through social movements:

“While the social-structural basis of a political conflict emerges from social change, the conflict itself results from the coupling of the processes of social change – urbanization, population growth, industrialization, globalization and the like – with the processes of democratization, politicization, and mobilization. Social change determines structural and cultural potentials for political mobilization that remain latent as long as they are not politicized by a collective political actor as such as a social movement.”

(Kriesi, 2007, p. 73)

Kriesi thus turns the attention to collective action, in forms of sustained social movements, that are necessary to convert dissatisfaction triggered by social change into a source of conflict, that itself can then lead to social transformation. There have been several paradigmatic shifts in the theory of social mobilization, reflecting the different kinds of movements, as well as the particular biographies of those who tend to explain them, leading to shifting assumptions and perspectives (Buechler, 2004, p. 47). We shall briefly sketch here some dominant strands of so-

cial movement theory, focusing on aspects that are particularly relevant for our analysis of the political activities of the middle income groups in Uganda. In the following section we concentrate on collective action, the relevance of organization for sustained social movement, of the political context in which a movement takes place, the importance of a shared collective identity and the importance of being organized in networks, prior to the existence in a social movement. In the next section, we will focus on individual action, and why they can give us more subtle information about the positioning of the middle income groups towards politics. We conclude this chapter by laying out our framework for the analysis of the activity of the middle income groups.

### **2.3.1. Social Movements**

Collective action can be defined as an activity by two or more individuals, trying to achieve a common goal through collaboration, carried out as a result of mobilization (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004). Mobilization in return is the process of assembling and organizing resources (financial, human, technical, etc.) to reach a particular objective. Social scientists over time have made different attempts explaining why and how individuals decide to take on collective action.

Early explanations of the reason for protest and social uprisings were sought in the causality with protest. People rebel because they are frustrated. Yet, that causality had been widely refuted; while it is true that people who protest are dissatisfied, not all dissatisfaction leads to protest. Tilly points out that:

“[The] central idea comes from elementary psychology: if an individual senses a large gap between what he gets and what he deserves, he will become angry. Given the opportunity, he will rebel. When many people sense such a gap simultaneously, rebellions occur. [...] Run backwards, the argument can hardly be faulted, if only because it is virtually true by definition. Political violence can hardly occur without shared dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs; shared dissatisfaction cannot occur without individual dissatisfaction; individual dissatisfaction results from an unfavorable comparison between things as they are and things as they should be.”

(Tilly, 1971, p. 417)

Mancur Olson (1965) has introduced rationality to social movement theory. He was one of the first trying to explain the rise and course of social movements through collective action, inspired by rational choice, rather than as an expression of mass hysteria and irrational collective behavior (Daniel, 2016, p. 21). Olson distanced himself from mass theories, which assume that social movements originate in uncontrolled masses, are leaderless and without structure. Instead, he argued that actors of social movements are actors of rational choice and, therefore, actively decide to take part in a movement.

Olson with his focus on rationality pointed out one paradox: what would individuals motivate to join a protest instead of waiting for others to take the risk, as the gains achieved would benefit everyone? Based on his work and that *free rider paradox* the focus of mobilization theory shifted much towards the emphasis of organization in the 1970s. This insistence, especially in North America, came through resource mobilization theories:

“It replaced the crowd with the organization, and dismissed the psychological variables of alienation and frustration in favour of the rational actor employing instrumental and strategical reasoning.”

(Foweraker, 1995, p. 16)

Critical questions evolved around sustained collective action and the functioning of social movements (Daniel, 2016, p. 23). For a movement to be successful, it needs various material and non-material resources, such as money, organizational structures, equipment (e.g., photocopying machines for distributing leaflets,

premises to house a headquarter from which the coordination takes place), but also leadership skills, etc. Anthony Oberschall (1973) has been among those foreseeing a leadership role for the middle class in these movements, due to their endowments with said resources.

“It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the upper and middle strata in society supply the substantial bulk of opposition leaders to all manner of social movements in proportion far above that of their percentage in the population at large.”

(Oberschall, 1973, p. 154)

He concedes though that not all middle class groups are equally likely to join the opposition. It concerns foremost those whose own advancement is blocked, and who have primarily cultural capital, a resource that cannot be taken away if they need to go underground. Thus, the entrepreneur middle class is more conservative, as their assets can be confiscated (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164 f). Edwards & McCarthy (2004) consider the middle class to

“[...] remain privileged in their access to many kinds of resources, and, therefore, not surprisingly social movements that resonate with the concerns of relatively privileged social groups predominate and the mobilizations of the poor groups are quite rare [...].”

(Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 117)

In this respect, Nie et al. (1969a) and J.D. Wright (1976) also observe that those who are the most capable of mobilizing have the least reason to do so.

In general, the resource mobilization theory has put much weight on understanding how social movement organizations (SMO) *structure* a social movement, and less on the origins of a movement (Daniel, 2016, p. 24). However, resource mobilization theories have also been criticized for several reasons. Piven & Cloward (1977) for example argue that organization actually hinders mobilization because it takes the people from the street into the conference rooms and is, therefore, a tool of the elites for cooptation. Poor people, they continue, lack the resources for organization, and thus the only way for them to voice their discontent is through riots in the streets (Fillieule & Péchu, 1993, pp. 108–114). Even though that criticism is

sought to be too simple of a dichotomy, between the organization and the masses (ibid.) the SMO approach has been considered too focused on institutionalized movements, neglecting more informal groupings, such as networks or scenes (Haunss & Leach, 2007, p. 71). Besides, if stretched sufficiently far, a resource can include everything that leads to a social movement, and thus be true by virtue of definition (Fillieule & Péchu, 1993, p. 115). Moreover, it does not account for successful movements which had only minimal financial and personal resources (Daniel, 2016, p. 25). Others point out the neglect of the political context, which might be more or less conducive for social movements to thrive (Tilly, 1978, p. 133). Finally, the theories did not consider values, experiences, and solidarity as possible explanations for the motivation to join a movement (Daniel, 2016, p. 25). Since then, social movement theory has undergone several conceptual shifts, to overcome the weaknesses of resource mobilization theories (Foweraker, 1995, p. 17). Tilly (1978) for example introduces the *concept of the political opportunity structure* (POS). The POS approach links social movements to the political system and whether it is characterized by openness or repression, whereby an opportunity is defined as the extent to which a dominant group is open to new claims (Tilly, 1978, p. 133). Hence, the approach tries to determine when the opportunity for political action is conducive. Subsequently, this approach has taken on very different stances, looking at broader societal and cultural influences as well. However, that diversity has increased the complexity of the concept, making it hard to be applied. Besides, the theory can be criticized, in a similar vein as the deprivation approach: “[...] *political opportunity theory tends towards a tautology: any source that produces social movement activity is post hoc identified as an opportunity.*” (Smith & Fetner, 2007, p. 17) On the contrary, opportunities that did not lead to a social movement may be neglected. Therefore, the primary contribution of the POS approach lies in putting the focus on the specific political context in which a social movement comes into being (Daniel, 2016, p. 28). This is particularly true in authoritarian regimes, where mobilization often comes at a high cost. Similarly, the *repertoire of action* is equally shaped by the geographical, historical and political

context. Tilly describes how collective action, comparable to the art of a particular era takes on not any form, but one that is already familiar to the participants (Tilly, 1978, p. 143). These actions are bound to change, throughout time, space, and depending on the political context. Thus, charivaris may have been a form of collective action throughout Europe in the past, but they rarely still are (Tilly, 1978). On the other hand, demonstrations have become an action commonly considered legitimate, which has not always been the case (Norris, 2007). In a politically oppressive context, we might expect more subtle forms of contentious action, as the costs associated with any action might be higher, if the agent is identified, hence leading to an adaption of the available repertoire. Nevertheless, these expressions, even though more disclosed than movements should equally be included in the spectrum of collective action (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, pp. 29, 45).

The heavy emphasis on the structure of social movements has failed to link the individual with shared group interests and collective action (Daniel, 2016, p. 28). The *collective identity approach* tries to overcome this shortcoming by showing how social movements emerge and are sustained through a shared collective identity (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 433). Melucci (1996) describes the collective identity as the process of constructing an action system (ibid. p. 70 f) which implies a constant renegotiation between the individuals within the movement, by agreeing on the ends of the action, the means to use and the environment in which it takes place (ibid. p. 40). It is a constant process, shaped through interaction and discursive mechanisms. Proximity can be created in several ways, through a shared language, conscience, experience, ethnicity, gender, but also lifestyle or living situations (Daniel, 2016, p. 29). The precursor of the collective identity approach can be found in the Marxian distinction between a class *in itself* and a class *for itself* and has subsequently been picked up by other class analysts as well (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 434). For Weber, for example, class, status group (*Stand*) or party are among the sources that create a collective identity (Scott Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 435). Hence, in our work, we may see how the middle income groups in Uganda refer to particular identities, either in the individual interviews,

but also when they are among groups they feel close to: which identity is evoked, in which context? That will be a central question to keep in mind to analyze on which basis people take action. Though Daniel already points out that often several identities exist, and a particular identity (in her case gender) does not create solidarity by default (Daniel, 2016, p. 30). Hence, we may expect that different identities are evoked depending on the situation, and some might be stronger than others. Finally, very early on, authors have pointed out the relevance of pre-existing networks for the coming into existence of a social movement.

Networks predating movements [...] are critical in supplying the personnel, resources, and tactical expertise necessary to mobilization. They are also important in fostering and impeding the very identities and interests on the basis of which mobilization is mounted.

(Polletta, 1999, p. 25)

This is essential for the development of a common identity and trust among members. Taylor has criticized analysts of the 1960s movements who seem to assume that the origin of these movements lies in an “immaculate conception” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). Instead, she shows the continuity between the US women’s movement from 1945 to 1960. The women’s movement did not end once suffrage was won, but went into, what she calls “abeyance”, that she describes as “*a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another.*” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). During that phase, alternative structures emerge to absorb activists who refrain from disruptive activities because the POS is not conducive. These structures then shaped the women’s movement in the 1960s, by providing already existing activists networks, an already established repertoire of action and a collective feminist identity (Taylor, 1989, p. 770). Her contribution is essential because it questions the dichotomy between phases of contention and “routine” activity and rather sees them linked through continuity. Scholars on multiple accounts have mentioned the relevance of such pre-existing networks. Oberschall (1973) highlights the importance of shared norms for a movement to be sustained. And prior structures are helpful in creating such norms. In a similar vein, *free spaces* can be

perceived as “*small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political mobilization.*” (Polletta, 1999, p. 1) Therefore, they allow for counter-hegemonic ideologies to be elaborated, or, in other words, for shared norms to be created. Examples mentioned by Polletta are the church in the civil rights movement in the United States, the intimacy of the family, bars in working class communities, or mosques in Kuwait in the time of Iraqi occupation (ibid. p.6). She calls, however, to strip the concept of its spatial notion because it is not physical proximity in itself that is decisive for mobilization to emerge, but the character of the associational ties shared between the individuals (Polletta, 1999, p. 25). Moreover, Oberschall shows how such pre-established structures facilitate communication because they can draw on already existing communication channels (Oberschall, 1973, p. 125). Finally, they are a pool to draw participants for a movement from (Diani, 2004; McAdam & Scott, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Ohlemacher, 1996). Ohlemacher (1996) picks up the idea, that social mobilization derives from preexisting social networks and recruitment occurs through personal contact. But for Ohlemacher a meso-level is missing, that would depict how these personal contacts, in organizations, clubs, associations, or on a private basis turn into social mobilization. He suggests that this is the case through *social relays* (Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 199): extensive networks, that do not need face-to-face interaction. Instead, they serve as an umbrella, providing passive contact between subgroups. While homogeneity is important within the subgroups, to develop a collective identity, heterogeneity is decisive across the relay for the success of a movement because it will bring together a wide range of citizens and form alliances.



“A social relay in successful mobilization must be able to attract a high number of heterogeneous people. Internally, the relay must differentiate the heterogeneity of the overall population into the critical mass of relatively homogeneous subnetworks, which themselves generate new networks. Heterogeneity is the key to linking many networks, and homogeneity is the key to developing the ‘critical mass’ at the starting point of collective action. Adjusting and mediating between heterogeneity and homogeneity is the task of ties within the relay.”

(Ohlemacher, 1996, p. 202)

He illustrates his theory with the study of two protest groups against low-flying military jets. One group has nonpartisan organizations such as parental association or local sports clubs as social relay, connecting heterogeneous people themselves connected to various sub-groups. Therefore, they can reach out to a more diversified mass of people to mobilize for the protest. On the contrary, the other group had more ideologically homogeneous social relays, like the local green party and anti-nuclear movement, attracting only people from leftist groups, making it less attractive for others, who would not identify with these groups, to join. Therefore, they had fewer members and were not as able to mobilize successfully.

However, as with the physical free space, one should be careful to see in the correlation a causality (Diani, 2004, p. 343). While it is true that many social movements have their origins in prior networks, not all networks are equally prone to be mobilized. It will, once again, depend on the character of the ties and the norms shared within a network. Although this is not to imply that solely networks with a particular political character will eventually act collectively, sometimes even the contrary might be true, as Ohlemacher’s example has shown (Ohlemacher, 1996).

Finally, it should neither be assumed that these networks, associations, groups, etc. are inherently democratic nor that they have “positive” values. This has been one of the pitfalls in *civil society* approaches. Authors like Putnam have considered activity in non-political associations as automatically fostering civic virtues; instead, this will more likely depend on the democratic nature of the association, but also of the society, and the political context (Haunss & Leach, 2007, p. 84).

### 2.3.2. Nonmovements

“The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent.”

(David Hume cited in Ludwig, 2007, p. 355)

Social movement theories have been criticized by their emphasis on organized forms of action (Buechler, 2004; Haunss & Leach, 2007) and their focus on Western liberal democracies (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). This has led to only few systematic literature on social movements in non-western societies (Daniel, 2016; Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003) and the perception of entire regions such as the Arab world as authoritarian and, therefore, void of political contention. Instead, there is a need to reconsider definitions of resistance, contentious action, or political participation (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 29). In the same vein, Bayat reminds us that collective action models are shaped by local, historically and culturally built behaviors and social practices (Bayat, 2013, p. 4).

So, whereas social movements, according to Tilly (2004) are characterized by organized and sustained claim making towards the authorities, and displayed in a public manner to emphasize the claim, Bayat proposes to speak of “nonmovements” in an authoritarian context, as “*collectivities of disjointed yet parallel practices of noncollective actors*” (Bayat, 2013a, p. 5). They are in several ways distinct from social movements, as table 2 resumes:

Social movements	Nonmovements
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Ideologically driven</li><li>• claims through (small) groups</li><li>• pressure on authorities to fulfill demands</li><li>• extraordinary deeds (petitions, demonstrations)</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Action-oriented</li><li>• claims through (millions of) individuals</li><li>• actors practice their demands despite sanctions</li><li>• ordinary practices of everyday life, action is often extralegal, “<i>subverting governing norms and laws.</i>”</li></ul>

Table 2: Social Movements vs. Nonmovements (Bayat 2013, p. 21)

These nonmovements can alter the societies in which they are carried out, without the need for a revolution or mass protest, albeit being neither self-conscious nor acting in an attempt of resistance. This is done through everyday encroachment, furthering claims by the subalterns, namely the poor, women and the youth (Bayat, 2013a, p. x). These groups lack institutionalized channels for expressing their dissent, but instead of exiting from the social and political stage, they create their own spaces, mainly through the effort of improving their lives. Bayat gives as examples the widening of women's rights. Because they had no possibility of making open claims, they instead pursued education and a career, participated in sports, or wore their hijab "badly", showing some inches of hair. These new situations allowed them to make new claims, such as driving a car or traveling alone.

"These mundane doings had perhaps little resemblance to extraordinary acts of defiance, but rather were closely tied to the ordinary practices of everyday life. Yet they were bound to lead to significant social, ideological, and legal imperatives. Not only did such practices challenge the prevailing assumptions about women's roles, but they were followed by far-reaching structural legal imperatives. Every claim they made became a stepping-stone for a further claim, generating a cycle of opportunities for demands to enhance gender rights."

(Bayat, 2013a, p. 17)

In other words, even the subalterns have the possibility to either reproduce or transform society through their practical actions. In the example given by Bayat it is through the modification of a practice, such as the way women are wearing the hijab, that social change is brought about. The scope of action, however, is embedded in the resources and practices shaped through experiences, leading to every individual having their particular "repertoire of action", depending on their status, age, and wider local and historical circumstances. And this repertoire is both restraining and investing individual practices. Bayat's reading of the mundane practices brings to mind Giddens' idea of the practical consciousness, a mutual knowledge about how to act, and about the right or wrong way of doing things (Inglis & Thorpe, 2012). Thus, the modification of accepted practices is at the core of soci-

etal change. At one point, the formerly nearly invisible alterations become so apparent that they either have to be officially rejected or de facto accepted.

For Bayat, however, this is distinctive from everyday resistance, as he considers resistance to be *intentional*, that is, people want their action to express defiance towards the established order (Bayat, 2013a, p. 42). Awareness of being oppressed is not in itself a form of resistance. In this regard he criticizes the literature on the “*resisting*” poor, that draws on Gramscian and Foucauldian notions of power (wherever power is, is also resistance) and tends to consider any action as resistance. For him, much of the actions described by the resistance literature should rather be considered as *coping strategies* (Bayat, 2013a, p. 41 f). For that reason, he considers his examples not as expressed resistance, but as “*the quiet encroachment of the ordinary*” (Bayat, 2013a, pp. 46–55). Bayat sees these encroachments for example in self-employment, in seeking alternative means of conflict resolution instead of reporting to the police, in traditional marriages, or saving in informal savings and credit cooperations (SACCO) instead of using formal banking. These decisions are not made because they are considered to be the best option, but because their circumstances do not leave them with a choice (Bayat, 2013a, p. 49). Scott (1990), instead, distinguishes between verbal forms of resistance, such as hypocrisy, the use of coded language (jokes, metaphors, rumors, etc.), the explicit expression of frustration in “free spaces”<sup>13</sup> (what he refers to as *hidden transcripts*), and political discussions in public places without fearing repression. In a similar vein, Toulabor describes political derision in Togo in the 1980s through linguistic puns and jokes, often heavily connoted in sexual or fecal terms as weapons of the powerless against the regime. Albeit not leading to any concrete action, he considers them to be a proof of raising awareness, and as a result a form of social contention (Toulabor, 1981). Finally, Bayart (1992) observes in Africa several tactics of social groups to resist the state and its efforts to oppress them. Among those practices figure under-productivity, strikes, electoral abstention, withdrawal into religion, to the extent of creating “theocratic communities”, falsification, the informal economy, or joking (Bayart, 1992, p. 70). He describes, how the effort by the

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<sup>13</sup>Though he does not call them like that

African state to depoliticize these social groups, in turn, led to an over-politicization of the everyday life, and the actions carried out by these groups as *le politique par le bas*. Critics of the approach objected that the clear separation between “above” and “below” cannot be upheld empirically, as there are always overlapping or mediating dynamics. Besides — and this resonates with Bayat’s criticism of the “resisting poor” — it remains unclear who defines the political nature of the action, the actor or the analyst? This might result in an over-interpretation of “the political” by the research, as technically everything can become political (Mayrargue & Toulabor, 2009, p. 107)

Despite these criticisms, these authors have the merit of bringing different repertoires of action into the scope of analysis, and to widen the comprehension of political participation. All authors (Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; Scott, 1990) underline the importance to look at mundane activities of the everyday life and their potential to subvert state authority and bring social change, intentionally or not. This takes place on an individual level and is not carried out as organized collective action. Instead of passing through institutionalized channels of political decision-making, change in such instances is brought about through the mundane, individually executed activities of everyday life, that remain nevertheless linked through daily social practices.

One crucial difference with social movements is that claims are not made directly to authorities or political institutions. This might be due to their marginalized status in society. Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi (2003) remind us that

“[T]ous les groupes, au sein des sociétés considérées, ne disposent pas des mêmes armes. Il en résulte que le spectre des formes disponible pour défendre ses intérêts dépend des ressources sociales et de la manière dont l’État distribue les richesses [...]”

(Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 64)

That lack of other means of political expression is equally emphasized by Branch & Mampilly (2015) when analyzing the urban underclass. However, they argue that due to the lack of intermittent institutions, that class is exposed directly to state violence, which in return increases their likelihood for rioting and street vi-

olence (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 20 f). Both examples show that there is no determinism either, as people may resort to subversion through mundane activities, or violence, or both, or neither. Similarly, these options are equally available for less marginalized groups in society. For them, such reactions might be possible *in addition* to more institutionalized forms of claim-making. What differs is the possibility to choose from the actions at disposition, and these repertoires are often shaped by the availability of resources and the place one occupies in society.

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From these accounts, we can observe a social stratification within the movement theories. With more resources and capacities at disposition, the possibility to mobilize through more institutionalized channels increases, whereas the subalterns or informal urban groups resort to more subversive tactics, either intentionally or not. However, it is likely that this dichotomy is neither that pronounced nor mutually exclusive. More likely the options to choose a particular form rise with the income. For example, a more affluent person can have a bank account as well as being a member of a SACCO, or choose one of the two options.

A tendency can be observed for a call to get rid of the dichotomies. Taylor (1989) demands for social movements to be considered beyond the active mobilization, by looking at their abeyance structures. Similarly, Melucci (1996) and Dobry (2009) call for leaving behind the distinction between routine political behavior and a political crisis. Instead, they consider the latter just to be the continuation of the former (Dobry, 2009, p. 39). Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi demand for collective actions to be seen on a continuum, and not as dichotomies (Fillieule & Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003, p. 45) and Rigaud considers the differentiation passivity vs. revolution to be too reductive:

“La dichotomie passivité/révolution [...] occulte l’espace médian qui existe entre la paralysie et le passage à la violence et où se déploient un certain nombre d’attitudes, de pratiques, et de discours trahissant la défiance et l’insoumission à l’égard des ‘puissants’ du moment.”

(Rigaud, 2003, p. 206 f)

This idea, of a continuity, rather than a dichotomy of political and “non-political” actions will guide us when proposing our framework on how to approach the activities carried out by the middle income groups in Uganda.

## 2.4. Proposing a Framework

We have pointed out several elements of social mobilization theory and forms of contention that are hardly mentioned in the literature analysis of the middle classes’ political behavior. Most of these analyses either focus on macroeconomic data of national wealth and democracy levels (see Kurzman & Leahey, 2004) or at questionnaires testing attitudes (for example Cheeseman, 2015; M. Chen & Goodman, 2013). Such questionnaires ask respondents if they adhere to political and civil rights associated with democracy, about their preference of regime type and the leeway a political should have. However, two problems arise in that context. First, there is a risk of receiving answers with limited viability. It is possible that respondents either have a very specific or only limited understanding of what “democracy” means and, in relation to this, they might give an answer that is more based on what they estimate desired rather than their own attitude (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 659; Mattes & Bratton, 2016). Second, the attitudes themselves do not allow any conclusion about efforts to bring about democratic transformation. In his literature review, Cheeseman mentions that authors who link the middle class to democratic behavior hypothesize that they will hold the state more accountable, and to force political coalitions against the ruling elite (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 649ff). Yet, his analysis of attitudes does not give insights into the actions they might take. So, while maybe the middle class may *think* democratically, it is not deriving that they will also *act* democratically.

It is the intention of this work to overcome this shortcoming and link the debates of middleclassness with those of political mobilization, in its various forms. We retain the essential recognition that there is a continuity between social mobilization, associational structures, and individual behavior; they interact and influence each other, but they differ in their intentions and their degree of institutionalization. Ludwig (2007) suggests differentiating between individual and collective action, but among the collective action also between intentional and unintentional ones. He distinguishes “we-intentions” (the intention to do something together) and “I-intentions” (doing something together, but without having the intention to do so, which brings back to mind Bayat’s example of the hijab). He argues that:

“In particular, to understand collective intentional behavior: (1) must we admit the existence of agents over and above the individuals who are members of groups that act; (2) if so, must we attribute intentions and plans to such agents; and (3) in any case, must we accept that the intentions of agents who participate in collective intentional behavior, we-intentions, cannot be exhaustively analyzed in terms of the concepts which are used in understanding individual intentional action, that is, must we introduce concepts of forms of agency or intention specific to group action?”

(Ludwig, 2007, p. 356)

Ludwig proceeds to answer these questions from the standpoint of semantics and albeit an intriguing perspective this is not a field we intend to venture into here. However, we believe the previous discussion here in chapter 2 may provide some answers, by showing how all intentions feed into one another, and that collective intentions are formed through processes of collective identity and framing.

Thus, we do not limit ourselves to an analysis of the social movements that have taken place in Uganda (which would only be the most visible tip of the “mobilization iceberg”), but consider equally attitudes, discourses around democracy (or their absence), non-actions in the sense of Bayat, discussions in free spaces and leisure activities. There are many layers which feed into the final product of a social movement, and thus there are also many possibilities for an individual to stop short of any visible contentious action. Yet, they all help to contribute to the multi-



faceted way in which meaning, in this case around democracy, emerges or why precisely it does not.

As guidance for our analytical framework, we suggest the following table (see p. 105)

Label	Description	Examples	Measurement
Individual	Involves personal beliefs, ideas, actions of the daily life.	Personal beliefs, actions, values, attitudes	Afrobarometer, WVS, interviews, individual leisure
Street level	<i>“mundane practices, [...] closely tied to the ordinary practices of everyday life [but] bound to lead to significant social, ideological, and legal imperatives.”</i> (Bayat, 2013a, p. 17) and contentious action as forms of resistance	“mundane practices”, “hidden transcripts”	Analyzing riots, newspapers, Whats App groups, jokes, contentious actions
Free Space	<i>“small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political mobilization.”</i> (Polletta, 1999, p. 1), for the generation of shared norms and a common identity	Associations, informal groups, personal discussions, group leisure	Participant observation, interviews
Social Relay	The superstructure, that links various free spaces, but also other organizations that might be under direct control from the dominant groups. Sometimes social relays can also be free spaces, as the church in the civil rights movement, an example used by Ohlemacher as well as Polletta.	Churches, cultural institutions, trade unions, umbrella organizations such as Uganda NGO Forum	Literature analysis, expert interviews
Social Movement	An analytical category to describe all kinds of action, based on collective identity which is carried out to challenge or defend existent authority, whereby the action breaches the accepted limits of the system in which it is carried out (Melucci, 1996).	Black Monday, Walk to Work, Save Mabira Crusade	Literature analysis, expert interviews, participant interviews

Table 3: Analytical Framework for the Forms of Mobilization

We believe that all these levels are significant when trying to figure out the positioning of the middle income groups. Therefore, when we speak of “*forms of social mobilization*” we refer to all of these positions, regardless whether they fit the formal definition of mobilization. The schema provides a blueprint to categorize the actions of the middle income groups. If put in relation to the POS and the collective identities that are called upon in the various actions, we hope to provide an understanding of social mobilization, in relation to economic emergence, collective identity, and the political context in Uganda.

Evaluating whether the middle income groups support a democratic transition opens a vast field of methodological options. In part III we try to break this down, by choosing an approach relating to political participation. Verba et al. (1987) define political participation as “*those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.*” (Verba et al., 1987, p. 46) In their definition, Verba et al. narrow the focus to the actions taken by citizens, even though they contend that actions taken by political leaders can equally be considered political participation. The attention on the citizen however, is what appeals to us as well. Their restriction on *legal* activities, on the other hand, refers to a rather dated distinction between conventional and contentious activities, with the former referring to citizen activities such as voting and party membership and the latter to protest activities like illegal strikes, boycotts or demonstrations (Norris, 2007, p. 639). Norris reminds us that what is considered “conventional” depends on the repertoire of action currently available, and these shift over time and space (ibid.). Thus, it can be argued that in democracies demonstrations today have become a legitimate way of communicating with political officials (Norris, 2007, p. 639). Instead, she suggests distinguishing between cause-oriented and citizen-oriented activism. She acknowledges herself, though, that such a distinction is not watertight either. Thus, following the suggestions by Verba et al. we focus our attention on activities carried out by citizens, but do not limit the observation to what can be considered “legal” or “legitimate”. The intention is to examine attitudes and behaviors of our respon-

dents in relation to political participation, protest, and democracy. As stated in the table, we will use the middle income group interviews, as well as expert interviews, analyses from the questionnaires, but also Afrobarometer data and the results from the WVS to construct our argument.

But to capture the broader picture, we turn in part IV towards the analysis of leisure activities, to derive more subtle nuances of attitudes expressed, and the willingness to take action. Here we will use participant observations, sources like WhatsApp groups, but also interviews to argue how leisure might be able to capture the less visible reasons that might bring people (or deter from) becoming active.

Through the various methods applied, we hope to sketch the complexity, but also the continuity between the various forms of mobilization. It is not the intention to imply that all these stages are passed through linearly, that they are inevitable or that they will necessarily lead to collective action, and if it does, this does not have to be pro-democratic either. Individuals may be at various points at the same time, stop at one stage, skip several steps, or go back and forth. By considering all these layers of social mobilization, we try to paint a picture, as complete as possible, of the link between various characteristics, such as income, ethnicity, age, and gender and the forms of mobilization taken. By doing so, we hope to overcome the shortcomings of social mobilization theory, with its tendency to focus mainly on formal organization, and its limited applicability to an authoritarian political context as well as the tendency to see a breach between “routine political behavior” and social mobilization.

To do so, we, therefore, look at the position taken by the individuals at various stages, but equally, we try to decipher how these stages are embedded within the broader societal and political context. As we intend to paint an ethnographic picture as detailed as possible, we will draw on a mix of methods. Our approach shall be explained more in detail in the chapter on methodology.

### 3. Uganda as a Relevant Site of Fieldwork

When talking about the middle class in Africa, usually countries like Ghana, Nigeria, North African nations, definitely South Africa and Kenya, and sometimes Ethiopia are mentioned. So, why choosing Uganda as a site of fieldwork, for a notion that is already contested elsewhere, but probably even less applicable here? What makes the “*pearl of Africa*”, as Winston Churchill has called it (a fact that Ugandans like to remind their visitors of), a suitable place to question middleclassness? There is an interplay of several factors which turn Uganda into an intriguing place of research. First, it turns away the attention from the economic outliers to an average performer. Uganda has had steady growth for nearly the last twenty years, conducive, in the argument of economists, for the development of a middle class, accompanied by numerous other transitions, such as urbanization, connectivity, and educational attainments of the population (see p. 109ff for more detail). Secondly, the political regime is becoming “*increasingly brittle*” (Barkan, Cooke, & Downie, 2011, p. 4). Ugandans are aware that they have never had a democratic (for many equivalent with peaceful) change of leadership since independence and many hope for one to happen. The current president, Yoweri K. Museveni came to power in 1986, after a civil war. Whereas he had enjoyed a lot of legitimacy in the beginning, after ending years of violence, he continuously loses support, especially among the younger population, who do not remember the civil war, but only his presidency. Thirdly, and in relation to what has just been said, Uganda has the youngest population in the world, and so far it is not clear whether it can provide the educational structures and employment opportunities to accommodate this group (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012; UNESCO, 2012). Such concurring tendencies offer a stimulating field of research to test the notions of an emerging middle class due to emerging wealth and their positioning towards a regime that is increasingly less democratic. The youth factor adds even more pressure on the system, as young populations are seen more prone to openly protest.

### 3.1. Uganda's Economic Growth: Starting Low, Growing Fast

Already in 1997, Uganda was rated as one of Africa's emerging economies (Berthélemy, Söderling, Salmon, & Solignac Lecomte, 2002, p. 194). At that time, Uganda has come out of a prolonged economic and political crisis, led to a gross national product which, in real terms was in the 1990s lower than in 1972 (when Idi Amin took power) or even in 1960 (two years prior to independence) (Berthélemy et al., 2002, p. 189). Data is scarce on the years before the NRM took power in 1986. Therefore, the macroeconomic analysis concentrates on the time





Figure 2: Annual GDP Growth 1992-2015 (World Development Indicators, 2016)

a steady improvement of the economic situation in Uganda. Yet, much of it was due to reconstruction after the civil war (Berthélemy et al., 2002, p. 17), and growth started from a very low level. When looking at the change in GDP per capita, assessed in constant 2011 international \$, it becomes evident that Uganda is below the sub-Saharan average. The comparison with other lowincome countries (LIC) seems more accurately depicting the catch up of Uganda in relation to other countries in its income class.

from 1992 up to 2016. First, regarding GDP growth, we can observe steady growth over the last twenty years in Uganda, even above the sub-Saharan average.

So there has been



So, while there is still a substantial gap of approximately \$1500 ppp between Uganda and the average of SSA, Uganda has managed to pass the average of low-income countries. However, this raises the question whether all Ugandans

Figure 3: GDP Per Capita (World Development Indicators 2016) have profited in equal terms from economic growth, or, more importantly, whether lower income groups have profited over-proportionately which would give more weight to the argument of an emerging middle class.



Figure 4: Income Shares and GINI coefficient (World Development Indicators 2016)

Looking at figure 4 it seems though, that no income group profited more than other income groups. The income distribution changed very little over the course of the last 20 years and neither did it translate into an equal society. 60% of the popula-

tion hold approximately 30% of the country's income, and the highest 20% account for half of the nation's wealth. So while the distribution did not change much, it seems that the GDP growth had a similar effect on everyone. What this graph cannot tell, is how the total sum of wealth may have increased, thus making even the lowest 20% less poor. Here the poverty headcount and the poverty gap are better indicators and they do indeed confirm a picture of economic emergence among the poorest.




Figure 5: Poverty Headcount and Poverty Gap (World Development Indicators 2016)

The total number of poor at the \$1.90 ppp poverty level had seen a small decline since the beginning of the 2000s. This is even more remarkable because Uganda had a population growth of 3.3% over the same period (World Bank, 2016b). Additionally, households with less income on average have more children, so we might assume population growth to be even higher among the poorest, yet the total poverty headcount declined slightly. The second poverty line, determined as \$3.10 a day falls \$0.90 short of the threshold for the floating class, situated at \$4. Here we witness a slight increase in the total number, which we can assume to be even bigger if the gap would be extended to \$4. Thus, these depictions confirm that the floating class did increase. The decline in poverty becomes even more visible when



looking at the continued, and in the last decade even accelerated, reduction of the poverty gap. Hence, even those who are poor (at any of the two poverty lines) are not as “deep” in poverty as they used to be, making more transition out of poverty likely, if growth continues. In summary, there seems to be indeed some evidence, that the floating class in Uganda is on the rise, similar to the interpretations voiced by the AfDB. The question remains, however, in how far this overcomes other challenges and qualifies Uganda as a middle class country.

According to the AfDB (2011), Uganda has a middle class of 18.7%, of which 10.6% are part of the floating class (thus, its majority). This ranks it on place 27 out of 44 countries for the size of its middle class. That is slightly in the lower half, but not substantially. However, as shown above, Uganda remains an LIC by World Bank terms. In the wake of the 2016 election, one of Museveni’s campaign promises was to turn Uganda into a middle income country by 2020 (Mwesigwa, 2016). To do so, it would have to raise its annual GDP per capita from currently \$740 to above \$1000. While some believe this is possible if the country starts earning money from oil sources discovered in the West of Uganda, exploitation officially still has to start, and the changes it will bring to the country remain to be seen. Despite becoming or not a MIC, Uganda is currently, and projected to remain one of the least developed countries (LDC) (UNCTAD, 2016). While the share of agriculture as part of the GDP has declined and those of industry risen, the majority of the GDP is produced in the service sector. This again raises the question, whether a class system adequately reflects the social structure in Uganda, as the working class remains negligible. Taking into account the small percentage of population having a tertiary education or a formal job, it becomes evident that a middle class measured with criteria of educational attainment and profession cannot reflect the numbers given by the AfDB. We do witness, however, that these numbers are increasing, indicating an emergence that goes beyond the income projected by the AfDB. As human capital is considered one of the driving factors of economic growth, but with delayed results, it is possible that Uganda’s investment in education over the last twenty years will pay off in higher productivity and

growth rates. Two caveats remain, though: first, there is a need for a structural transformation of the economy, as to absorb the increased labor force, and second, human capital is only contributing to productivity if not invested into rent-seeking activities (Berthélemy et al., 2002, p. 109). So, while there have been substantial changes in Uganda in the course of the last 25 years, as can be seen in the following table on p. 114, challenges to growth remain<sup>14</sup>.

Similarly, the Ugandan population is better connected today, the road network is getting denser, electricity supply reaches a bigger part of the population, even though it remains a privilege of a minority, and mobile phone and internet access have increased. There are more vehicles on Uganda's roads today than in the 1990s, again increasing connectivity between the rural and the urban.

If put in relation to the debate about nascent African middle classes, we can conclude that people at least are better off than they were 20 years ago. There is general economic growth, and while the income repartition remains nearly the same, it has not led to a rise in inequality, suggesting an equal distribution of this newly acquired wealth. In addition, people reach higher educational attainments, have better access to infrastructures such as electricity or road networks, and are more able to buy consumer goods such as TVs and cars. However, these positive trends should not hide the fact that while the growth rates are impressive, these phenomena are not touching all Ugandans in the same way, due to the low level of departure. Thus while a middle income stratum might be emerging, it is not touching a majority of the population, and it still does not give any indication that it allows us to talk about a "class".

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<sup>14</sup> The table was compiled from statistics of the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2016b), the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) (2014b, 2016), the Demographic Health Survey (1996), the Human Development Report (2015), the Freedom House Index (2015) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (2017).

	Indicators	1991	2014
Population	Population (Millions)	12.6	34.9
	Urban Population	1.7	6.4
	Urban Population (as % of total)	13.5	18.3
	< 15 years (as % of total)	47.3	47.9
Health	Total fertility rate (children per woman)	7.1	5.8
	Child Mortality (<5), per 1000 live births	162 (1995)	90 (2011)
	Life Expectancy in years	44.6	58.5
	Prevalence of HIV (% of population aged 15-49)	13.3	7.1
Education	Literacy rates (as % of population)	56.1	71
	No education (as % of population)	27.1 (1995)	18.9
	Educational attainment primary	61.8 (1995)	58.4
	Educational attainment secondary	10.1 (1995)	18.5
	Educational attainment tertiary	N/a	4.3
Wealth	GDP per capita (constant 2010 US \$)	309	661
	Median monthly revenue (in US \$)		44
	Agriculture (% of GDP)	52.8	26.7
	Industry (% of GDP)	12.4	21.7
	Services (% of GDP)	34.8	51.6
	Paid Employment (vs. Self-Employment)		47.4
	Net ODA received (% of GNI)	20.3	6.0
Infrastructure	Access to Electricity (% of population)	5.6	20.4
	Internet Penetration	1.1 (2009)	20.7 (2013)
	Mobile Cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	0	50.4
	Estimated N° of vehicles (in '000)	50	636 (2011)
	Account at a financial institution (% of age 15+)	20.5 (2011)	27.8
Politics	Freedom House	Partly free (1999)	Partly free
	Corruption Perceptions Index	2.71/10 (43 out of 54)	26/100 (142 out of 174)
	Human Development Index	0.308 (1990)	0.483

Table 4: Selected Development Indicators, 1991 and 2014

## **3.2. A Brief Political History of Uganda**

The aim of this short introduction into the political history and current state of the Ugandan regime is to show how the NRM managed to rebuild state structures after a prolonged political crisis. It did so by relying on the co-optation of old elites into the new system, but it also managed to tighten its control over the state by continuously eroding democratic principles held at the beginning of their reign. We witness, therefore, how a regime started with much popular support but has increasingly lost legitimacy due to its long hold onto power.

### **3.2.1. Uganda up to 1986**

Historically, Ugandan politics had been for a long time divided along religious, and to a lesser extent ethnic lines. Ethnically, the Buganda kingdom, with its well-developed administrative structure has been privileged by the British colonialists, employing principally Baganda in the colonial administration (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Besides, the economic wealth of the country at independence originated mainly from the cash crops coffee and cotton in the South (Twaddle, 1973, p. 449). Due to the colonial origins, Uganda's political elite at independence was composed of the colonial civil servants from the South, whereas the colonial army had been recruiting dominantly among Northerners (Milton Obote's home region), to restrain the power of the Buganda kingdom (Human Rights Watch, 1999). At independence, the British granted a semi-federal system, whereby the four kingdoms Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole enjoyed some federal rights, but all other areas were merely considered as "districts". De facto, however, only Buganda had real federal autonomy (Carbone, 2001, p. 33).

Religiously, the country had been divided between Anglicans and Catholics, leading to several religious wars in the 1890s. Uganda's first political parties in the wake of independence originated from religious divisions between Catholics and Anglicans (Médard, 2003; Twaddle, 1988). Despite the former constituting the majority in the country, public offices were predominantly held by the latter. Out of protest against this practice, the Democratic Party (DP) was founded in 1954 and

managed to gain support in areas with a Catholic stronghold, mainly in southern Buganda and Catholic northern districts (Carbone, 2001, p. 36). As a result, the party managed to overcome regional divisions (especially a north-south divide) but contributed to the politicization of religious affiliations (Carbone, 2001, p. 37) as its main adversary emerged shortly after, in 1960: the Uganda's People Congress (UPC). The UPC formed itself in opposition, as a specifically anti-Buganda, anti-Catholic party (Carbone, 2001, p. 38).

In 1961 finally *kabaka yekka* (KY) was founded. The phrase is Luganda and means "the king alone". Conservative Protestant royalists constituted the majority of the party, but the emphasis of their loyalty towards the *kabaka* (the Buganda king) made them gain considerable support among Baganda Catholics (Médard, 2003, p. 152 f).

These cleavages resulted in a divided state at the beginning of the 1960s:

"In particular, the early pre-eminence of Buganda within processes of state formation and development, and the further inculcation of difference along religious lines, left a new state that was heavily divided along ethnic and religious lines. This was further exacerbated by the limited time that the decolonisation process left for political parties to form and organise around genuine national platforms, as opposed to more sectarian concerns."

(Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013, p. 10)

To this, one may add a north-south divide, between the prosperous south, with its well-educated Baganda elites and the marginalized north, who has mainly served as a reservoir for the colonial army and cheap labor in the south (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This marginalization continues up to today (Lindemann, 2011). In the elections following independence, KY and UPC formed an alliance, united in their anti-Catholic sentiments. The *kabaka* became the country's head of state, with the leader of the UPC, Milton Obote, as prime minister. However, tensions in the alliance were inherent in their foundation, the former being the party representation of the kingdom and the latter created out of the resentment of this kingdom. In the following years, Obote subsequently diminished the powers of the king and finally relieved him from his functions in 1966 (Carbone, 2001, p. 41). He then

wrote a new constitution, increasing his powers and declared a state of emergency, that led to the abolishment of the traditional kingdoms (in 1967) and the banning of all opposition groups (in 1969). From that time on, religious cleavages attenuated, while ethnic tensions rose (Médard, 2003, p. 154 f). When General Idi Amin Dada seized power in 1971, by exploiting ethnic allegiances in the army, he received widespread support from many Ugandans, who had become weary of Obote's oppressive government (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In the next years, however, his popularity eroded, as his reign became increasingly brutal. Ethnic cleansing in the army, the expulsion of Asians, and terror against the Ugandan intelligentsia led to a rapid disintegration of the state and a severe economic backlash, leaving the country without an economic interest group, independent of the state for the accumulation of resources (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012; Perrot, 2003, p. 16; Twaddle, 1973, p. 12). During that time, Ugandan citizens lived not thanks to, but in spite of the state (Perrot, 2003, p. 17). In 1973, the scholar Michael Twaddle oracled, that the Amin regime, while not everlasting, may be sustained for some time “[...] *so long as Amin [...] takes care not to provoke his neighbours too far [...]*” (Twaddle, 1973, p. 454). Indeed, the regime of Idi Amin eventually came to a fall when Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda in 1978, in response to an annexation of the Tanzanian Kagera salient. Supported by the Uganda National Liberation Army, an alliance between different opposition groups, among them those of Yoweri Museveni and the UPC, the Tanzanian army managed to oust Amin, who fled to Saudi Arabia and eventually died there in exile (Human Rights Watch, 1999). What followed was a sequence of interim governments and a highly disputed election in 1980 that brought Milton Obote back to power. This triggered a civil war from 1980-1986 to oust Obote and from which, eventually, in January 1986 Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) would come out as winners (Carbone, 2001, p. 45).

### 3.2.2. Co-optation Into an Inclusive Government

When Museveni reached power, “[...] *the notion of Uganda as a coherent political entity and the idea that the state was a legitimate political force were both heavily damaged during this era, beyond repair even to this day in the eyes of some.*” (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013, p. 14) Thus, Museveni was tackled with the task to rebuild state structures in a failed and divided state. One essential element of the reconstruction of order was the abolishment of all political parties, in favor of an all-encompassing movement system. The justification for such a system was derived from Uganda’s violent past, and the strong presence of communal identities. In the absence of economic class differentiation, people would adhere to parties that correspond to their ethnic or religious affiliations, and by doing so, these parties would rather foster than transcend communal identities (Museveni, 1997, p. 187). The NRA was transformed into the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and all citizens of Uganda became its members. Political offices were supposed to be gained through individual merit, and not through party affiliation.

Further inclusive steps were the integration of opposing rebel groups into the army, a decentralized administrative system, quite advanced for African standards, and the drafting of a new constitution, after a long process of citizen consultations throughout the entire country (Odoki, 2014; Perrot, 2003; Therkildsen, 2002). Because they had been a vital support during the civil war and represented a significant constituency, Museveni also reestablished the traditional kingdoms<sup>15</sup> in 1993, to appease the Baganda (Perrot, 2003, p. 235). Such measures can be described as “hegemonic quest”, that consists of bringing a relatively stable relationship between different dominant groups, old and new elites, and between their regional and ethnic cleavages (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 41). Because a lot of warring factions had to be included in the system, a large clientelist network developed. This led, however, to a distinction between being “in the government” and “being in power”, with the latter constituting a closed and homogeneous circle (Perrot, 2003, p. 136 f). The first ten years of Museveni’s rule have been considered a “success

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<sup>15</sup>A notable exception provides the kingdom of Ankole, Museveni’s home region, that has not been reestablished, allegedly because of pressures by the President, who himself was not in favor of bringing back the kingdoms.

story” because he managed to rebuild a functioning state and turned Uganda in one of East Africa’s center for stability and economic growth. As a result, Uganda became a “donor darling”, even though political party activities had been banned (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 6). While this was originally considered only a temporary measure, it was eventually enshrined in the 1995 constitution, declaring Uganda to be a no-party state. With time, however, this model has become increasingly under attack, with critics arguing that Uganda, in fact, is rather a one-party state, due to the way the movement operated and dismissing Museveni’s claim that parties created sectarianism in a pre-industrial country as “pseudo-Marxist” (Carbone, 2001). Nevertheless, he enjoyed considerable support among Ugandans, for bringing stability to Uganda, even though this came continuously at the expense of political freedom:

“The view of the NRM that political parties were largely responsible for Uganda's post-independence woes finds strong resonance in the Ugandan population. Ugandans suffered greatly under the abusive governments of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, and the wish to avoid a return to such a period of abuse is almost universal. [...] But while the fear of a return to the turmoil of the past is a legitimate concern for many Ugandans, it is also used by the current Ugandan government to justify present restrictions.”

(Human Rights Watch, 1999)

Instead of using coercion, the NRM regime tries to limit critics through co-optation. Museveni’s politics of a “*clientelist political settlement*” (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013) has led to a system of “*inflationary patronage*” (Barkan et al., 2011). Obtaining consent from the parliament or judiciary and silencing the opposition is becoming increasingly expensive because it is bought rather than forced. While Uganda initially seemed to be heading for democracy, when Museveni took power, these tendencies eroded over time. In the first 15 years, there was a genuine effort to strengthen the independence of political institutions, a semi-tolerance for civil society and the attempt for an inclusive political system, but since 2001 these approaches to governance have been in decline (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 7). The no-party system deteriorated more and more into a one-party state (Carbone, 2001), harassment of opposition candidate has increased, and the media and civil society



organizations are restricted. Thus, in 2012, the International Crisis Group observes that “[s]tate policies have created a more personal, patronage-based, executive-centred and military-reliant regime.” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 1).

### **3.2.3. Erosion of Democracy**

Since the beginning of the 2000s, a continued erosion of democracy can be observed, as well as an increase in state suppression. This manifest itself mainly in the electoral process, in the widening of the mandate of the political executive and the curtailing of civil liberties. Since 2001 elections have seen an increasing decline in voter’s participation and an increase in political violence and repression (Dufief, 2016, p. 61; Perrot, 2003, p. 408). In the 2001 election, a serious opponent to Museveni emerged, in the person of his former ally Kizza Besigye, who challenged his position ever since. The government responded to that threat after the election by extending the mandate of the executive, to the detriment of the parliament and the courts and broadening their power further than what had been foreseen by the constitution of 1995 (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 12). Eventually, in 2005, amidst donor pressure, the constitution was altered, as to allow for multipartism while the occasion was equally used to abolish term limits, which would have prevented President Museveni from presenting himself in the following election. For some observers, the shift to multipartism helped the NRM to regain internal coherence, as it allowed for opposing factions within the movement to break away (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2013). So while there has been an increase in candidates running for the presidential office, voter’s participation has declined – which can be interpreted as a lack of legitimacy (Dufief, 2016). Despite repressions of freedom of expression and civil liberties, international observers have judged the elections of 2001, 2006, and 2011, albeit not fair, as free (Barkan et al., 2011). It has been considered that Museveni still benefited from widespread popular support, so that the fraudulent practices, in the end, did not change the overall outcome. In the most recent elections in 2016, international observers have criticized numerous malpractices in a highly competitive election (EU Election Observation Mission, 2016). Official election observers, while critical, have been

hesitant to call the election outrightly fraudulent<sup>16</sup>. Restrictions of free speech and assembly curtail important civil liberties and, together with increased military control have led to a decline on the Freedom House rating from “partly free” to “not free” since 2015 (Freedom House, 2015). The media have come increasingly under pressure, with the closing of several media houses following the “Buganda riots” in 2009 (see chapter 9.2 for more details), and self-censorship out of fear of repression (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010). Nevertheless, Uganda still has a rather vibrant media scene, with several private radio and TV stations and print outlets and in general, a critical stance towards the government is tolerated (Freedom House, 2015). Since 2006 the civil society had been weakened by the “NGO Act 2006”, that augments control over non-governmental organizations, and determines whether they are “*working in the interest of the country.*” (Dufief, 2016, p. 63) Freedom of assembly has been curtailed through the “Public Order Management Act” (POMA) 2013. As a response to the Arab Spring and the following Walk to Work Protests in 2011 (see chapter 9.3 for more details), the government tightened the regulations for public gatherings used for political discussions. The police gained much room for maneuver to determine whether these gatherings are in public interest (Freedom House, 2015).

The events of 2011 most likely increased the authoritarian tendencies. Following the “Arab Spring” in North Africa, the Ugandan regime decided to increase militarization, which, in an already budget ridden, expensive election year<sup>17</sup>, led to high inflation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 113). High food prices, the example of the revolts in Northern African countries, and the discontent of those who considered the elections fraudulent favored the “walk to work” protests (more on this see chapter 9.3). It lasted for two months and led to a violent response from the state (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 32). Since then, acts curtailing civil liberties have been passed, or tightened, such as the NGO Act and the Public Order Management Act.

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<sup>16</sup>The EU EOM has just denounced malpractices, and the US Embassy in a press release remarked that “the Ugandan people deserved better”. (Toner, 2016)

<sup>17</sup>Elections were held in February 2011

Thus, Uganda's political environment displays characteristics of competitive authoritarianism (Kagoro, 2016). Levitsky and Way (2002) describe competitive authoritarianism as regimes in which

“[...] formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.”

(Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 52)

Democratic criteria, such as free and fair elections, political and civil rights, and a government that draws on elective authority, rather than military or religious support are frequently disregarded in competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 53). As we have seen above, this is the case in Uganda. In contrast to full authoritarian regimes, however, there is still some respect for democratic principles.

“Rather than openly violating democratic rules (for example, by banning or repressing the opposition and the media), incumbents are more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to “legally” harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics.”

(ibid.)

Elections are still competitive, even with a substantial advantage for the incumbent, and the judiciary, legislative and media have some room for maneuver. As detailed in the paragraphs above, this holds equally true for Uganda.

Hence, the context of competitive authoritarianism, where critics are either harassed or bought off, and demonstrations restricted and framed as a cause of violence and a threat to social harmony (Tangen, 2012), has an essential influence on the political opportunity structures for social mobilization, and will thus likely determine how political activities by citizens are carried out. While there might be reasons for dissatisfaction and a wish for more democracy, the context itself is not conducive for groups to openly take action in demanding democratization, as has been suggested by the literature establishing a positive link between democracy and middle class.

### 3.3. The Ugandan Middle Class

Despite the economic growth Uganda has witnessed, references to a Ugandan middle class are sparse and are often voiced regarding its absence. We have already touched upon the historical dimensions of the middle class in Africa (see chapter 1.2.2), and similar observations can be made about a Ugandan middle class. In his analysis of class formation in Uganda for example, Mamdani ascribes the petty bourgeoisie, comprised of civil servants, traders and rich peasants a critical role in opposition to the colonial government:

“The social forces that coalesced in this historic and mass opposition to the colonial order included various interests, some of which were in harmony only over the short run: bureaucrats upset about racial discrimination in pay scales, cash-crop farmers full of resentment against ginnery and state marketing boards [...], traders demanding an end to state-protected monopoly privileges, and urban workers demanding better wages. What was later called a ‘nationalist’ movement was in fact a coalition of groups, each with its own specific interest.”

(Mamdani, 1976, p. 148)

In his analysis, Mamdani pointed already at the diverging interests between the very diverse factions of what he described as the *petty bourgeoisie*. However, he also points out the limitations for the development of shared consciousness. Thus, the political actions of the rich peasants, the *kulaks*, which came from the Buganda kingdom, were mainly motivated by ethnic concerns, whereas the petty traders developed their consciousness in opposition to those of Indian traders, which was above all a national one (Mamdani, 1976, pp. 175, 204). Besides, they diverged considerably in terms of wealth (*ibid.* p. 228). From these groups, the governing elites at independence emerged (*ibid.*). However, precisely of the diverging interests, namely between the government bureaucracy and the other groups, tensions heightened. They resulted in the coup d'état led by Idi Amin; thanks to an alliance between the African petty bourgeoisie, with an organizational base, but without a class organization that would allow them to take political action and the army who

made up for these deficiencies (Mamdani, 1976, p. 294). The expulsion of the Indian commercial and petty bourgeoisie can then be seen as another step in advancing the political benefits of the petty bourgeoisie. Thus, in his analysis, Mamdani ascribes the driving force for political change to the African petty bourgeoisie, but also mentions its limitation, due to its internal, fragmented nature. Moreover, the political and economic instability of his regime weakened further the petty bourgeoisie (Monteith, 2016, p. 129). With the neo-Marxist analysis of the Ugandan class structure around the time of independence and the relevance ascribed to the petty bourgeoisie, Mamdani follows the thinking of writers like Fanon or Cabral (Kasfir, 1984), other writings on what could be considered a Ugandan middle class remained sparse. And, as Darbon & Toulabor (2011) or Lentz (2016) have pointed out, such a description actually could be used interchangeably with a post-independent elite.

In the 1990s the category seemed to have lost further relevance. In his critique of the IMF programs implemented in the 1980s, Mamdani attributes the decline of the urban wage earners to the structural adjustments imposed, at the cost of working people (instead of the propertied class) (Mamdani, 1990b).

In the discourse held by Museveni, himself on repeated accounts highlighted the absence of a middle class.

“Sectarianism is a consequence of an incomplete social metamorphosis. In other countries, society has been changing continually [...]. Now Europe is again basically a two-class society, of the middle and working class. [...] The problem with Africa is that not only has its society not metamorphosed, it has actually regressed.”

(Museveni, 1997, p. 187f)

By doing so, he justified the no party rule of the NRM government as parties would only promote sectarianism along the lines of region and religion, instead of representing class interests (Carbone, 2001, p. 16). Images of a middle class society are also evoked to legitimate policies done in the interest of “development” (see p. 274). Turning Uganda into a middle income country has also been among the visions set for 2017 then changed to 2020 (to be a lower middle income coun-

try) or 2032 (as an upper middle income country). Such an economic development is a legacy he wants to build before leaving power (BBC, 2016; Mulangwa, 2013; Mwesigwa, 2016; National Planning Authority, 2013, p. 27). The current absence of a middle class has also been brought forward as one of the reasons that the Arab Spring did not propagate to Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; The Observer, 2012). Finally, the category is one that has for Ugandans, as elsewhere in Africa (see Darbon, 2018, p. 39), little meaning. Most Ugandans would not consider themselves to be middle class. In their *Poverty Status Report of 2014*, the Uganda Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) took up the class label as well. Their statistical definition put someone as middle class if they had a consumption twice above the poverty line, and as insecure non-poor if their consumption was above the poverty line, but not twice as much (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2014, p. 6). They conclude that:

“[...] nearly 80 percent of those households classified as insecure non-poor and 56 percent of the middle class classify themselves as either very poor or poor. 42.8 percent of the middle class judge themselves as being neither poor nor rich.”

(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2014, p. 25)

So, while present in some earlier literature, the middle class category is remarkably absent from recent discussions about Ugandan societal structure, which is not surprising given the inherent contradictions discussed earlier. It is more of an aspirational image, modeling living standards and consumption patterns of Western countries, rather than an inherently felt affiliation.

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In this chapter, we have tried to sketch the recent economic and political context in which Uganda evolves. We have seen that there is indeed a group economically emerging among the poor that could be considered a floating class, to use the terms of the AfDB, even though the country is not among the big economic achievers that are usually mentioned in relation to the African middle class. This allows for a nuanced questioning in how far the middle class label is appropriate to describe

that economic emergence just mentioned. Through observations and questions, we can analyze how living conditions, efforts to mitigate economic vulnerability, increasing options for choice affect “*doing being middle class*” (Lentz, 2016). We have also seen that in the past 32 years of the NRM regime the country has become increasingly authoritarian and the popular support the president enjoyed for the first decade is continuously waning. This noticeable decline of democracy allows for a second interrogation, whether now these middle income groups become active in one way or another, or at least form opinions that would provide an ideological ground for demands of democracy.

## 4. Methodology

“For me, therefore, it is central to any argument about ‘middle class politics’ to show that a middle class (or classes) existed as a self-conscious collectivity, to identify its specific forms of political activity, and to explain their genesis and development in terms of its class situation however class is conceived. Otherwise, middle class becomes nothing more than a residual category and so of no analytical interest to either the historian or the social scientist.”

(Nossiter, 1978, p. 72 f)

This quote by Nossiter adequately guides us in our own research questions. It highlights two central points: to see whether such a middle class exists as a self-conscious collectivity (and, if applicable, how this class situation has developed) and to identify whether specific forms of political activity exist. Bearing in mind the doubts we have raised concerning the adequacy of the “middle class” label, discussed in chapter 1.3 (p. 60) we suggest talking about the middle income groups, with an income of \$2-\$20 per day and living in a predominantly urban setting.

### 4.1. Research Questions

From the conceptual challenges laid out in the first two chapters in this section, we come to the following research questions:

- I. **How do recent economic transformations foster the development of a self-conscious collectivity among Ugandans within a shared income range?**

We will answer this question by referring to macroeconomic statistics and connecting them to a detailed description of our study population in Uganda. We aim to understand better who these people are that we are talking about while avoiding evoking the preconceptions that are usually tied to the notion “middle class” (Lemanski, 2017). We speak of middle income *groups* instead of *classes* as the development of the self-conscious collectivity is the question that needs to be answered



affirmatively first. We will draw on the use of questionnaires, narrative interviews, economic and demographic statistics on Uganda, and broad-based surveys such as the Afrobarometer or World Value Surveys (WVS).

Considering the literature on the link between middle classes and political mobilization, we inquire about the forms of mobilization pursued by these income groups. Hence, in relation to the first research question, our second one asks:

## **II. How do these middle income groups cope with the political regime?**

### **What forms of mobilization exist? Can we identify specific forms of political activity that can be linked to their commonly shared income range?**

We answer this question by looking at forms of formal political mobilization: party participation, voting, demonstrations, etc. However we acknowledge that the focus on formal political mobilization neglects other vital aspects of social interaction (see chapter 2.4, p. 102). Therefore, we equally consider here other forms of social mobilization, which might fit less neatly theories of social movements but focus on everyday contentious action and the *politique par le bas*, individual attitudes and values, and leisure behavior. And again, we try to explain these actions in connection with class identity, income, and also other factors. How do political consciousness and mobilization change with rising income? If it is the poorest who are the easiest to be mobilized, how does this change when revenues are rising? Is more at stake? Less? How are actions linked to an increase in education? The value of looking at choices of pastime activity relies on its revelation about the preferences individuals set and these, in return, shape their identities and beliefs.

The aim of the study is not to predict or refuse the likelihood of a future mobilization of these middle income groups against or in favor of the regime. As Lipset already pointed out: “*The record of social scientists as futurologists is not good.*” (Lipset, 1994, p. 17) It is rather a contribution to the critique of an overly simplified debate on the middle class as backbone of democracy. This thesis intends to paint a more nuanced picture, of what it means to be in the middle income groups and refute simple dichotomies of such a heterogeneous category in pro- or contra

democracy supporters, made on the basis more of wishful thinking and ideological assumptions, rather than rigorous analysis.

## **4.2. In the Field**

We have spent in total seven months in Kampala, Uganda's capital. The fieldwork was repartitioned among three different stays, all with a specific focus, which changed as the research questions evolved. The reasons for choosing Uganda are detailed in chapter 3, but we also decided to narrow our focus down to only one city. As a result, it is not possible to highlight differences and particularities between different regions in Uganda, or also between urban, semi-urban or rural areas. We chose to accept these shortcomings, though, because of several reasons. First, conducting research in several locations would have meant to increase the time spent in the field substantially. There would have been the need to get acquainted once more with a new environment, to gain the trust of interviewees and learn about the specific local and historical conditions. It is certainly worthwhile to do so, as different settings might reveal particular characteristics of the different income groups. For example, we assume that the post-war emergence in northern Uganda will follow different dynamics than those of Kampala, and it must be interesting to single these out. But, and that brings us to the second point, it limits the comparability between the cases. Johnston & Abreu (2016) remind us that asset indexes as markers of economic stratification should only be used in a limited geographical location and over a short time span, and this applies to other markers of economic emergence as well. Wealth, or its counterpart poverty, are very context specific and multidimensional and must be understood in its local specificities. In addition, the rural-urban divide in many developing countries is so pronounced, leading to changing signs of "privilege". Therefore, for Kampala residents access to electricity or piped water will be less of a marker of social distinction than for people living in rural areas. On the other hand, homeownership will be a privilege, whereas most rural inhabitants occupy their own dwellings. Kampala is also the economic hub of Uganda, home to the ministries, a large part of the service sector

and various forms of employment (formal or informal), contrary to the prevalence of subsistence agriculture in rural regions. Studies on the middle class have often underlined its urban character (Ayoki, 2012; Huntington, 1972, p. 290; Ncube et al., 2011), as well as their non-agricultural employment. Both reasons make us expect to find the most significant part of the Ugandan middle income groups in Kampala. Because of the economic opportunities it can offer, Kampala attracts rural migrants from all parts of the country. Therefore, we can expect to find a higher ethnic diversity here than anywhere else. Such exposure might help to create identities that go beyond ethnic affiliation, and it allows us to explore in how far a wealth-related identity may replace an ethnic one. Finally, because of the tendency to send young children to rural regions, and for elderly to return to their home villages, our target group of people in a working age should be overrepresented. All these reasons convince us to assume that Kampala is the most relevant site of fieldwork for us in Uganda.

#### **4.2.1. May-June 2012: Questionnaires and Political Attitudes**

This first stay in Uganda was part of the master's thesis and of a project at the LAM research institute. The intention was to research and compare middle classes, inspired by the AfDB definition, in several African countries, as well as their influence on the political stability in the country. The basis was a standard questionnaire designed by the research group and applied to all countries. This questionnaire was, in the Ugandan case, supplemented by more narrative questions, in the form of semi-structured interviews to learn about the views of these identified middle classes on political and societal issues in Uganda, as well as their confidence in institutions, the opposition, and formal political mobilization. The questionnaire (see the annex on p. 473) had been used throughout all three field stays. However, in the last two periods, the questions had mainly been coded from the narrative answers given by respondents, instead of being gathered in a survey style manner, as it has been in the first case. During that period, a total of 70 interviews had been conducted, mostly as interviewer-administered questionnaires, but in 15 cases as

self-administered questionnaires. Discussing the questionnaire with the respondent would take about 30 minutes. In 40 cases the questionnaire was then followed by the more in-depth interviews, of which 35 had been transcribed for analysis. The remaining five had been impacted by comprehension difficulty between the interviewer and the respondent, by several omissions of questions, or by apparent contradictions, so that the validity of the responses could not be assured. The length of this part of the interviews would vary considerably, between 20 minutes and two hours. Most of these parts, however, would be between 20 and 40 minutes. In the cases where the researcher would fill out the questionnaire together with the respondents, the interview was recorded from the beginning. However, as the recording of this part is for our purpose only little more revealing than the questionnaire itself, transcription usually starts with the question on political party membership, at a point where the respondents would typically start to talk more freely and extensively. Thus, this first fieldwork was aimed at providing an answer for the specific characteristics of the Ugandan middle class (this label, despite its shortcoming was used during the master's thesis) and their political attitude and action.

#### **4.2.2. July-October 2014: Emergence, Leisure, and Religious Bodies**

Having concluded from the first field data that the middle income groups mainly choose to abstain from political action, this second stay was guided by an entirely different focus, namely by the question of what they do instead. A second question revolved around the trajectories of emergence. Through extended, narrative interviews the respondents would discuss their upbringing, personal challenges and how they have overcome them, their current life and living situation, values. To answer the first question, a strong emphasis was also put on their free time activities<sup>18</sup>. What does their preference reveal about their values and identities? Can we expect to find particular forms of leisure that are tied to a particular income? Because of the anonymous nature of the first round of interviews, new participants were selected this time<sup>19</sup>, with an effort to balance between different income

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<sup>18</sup>Here, no particular definition of free time was given to the respondents, to see how they would frame it.

<sup>19</sup>For details on the sampling process see 4.3.

groups, age, and gender. In total, 23 narrative interviews have been conducted, and all recorded (with the consent of the interviewee). The interviews usually lasted between 2-3 hours and had all been transcribed for analysis. Because of the focus on pastime activities, we have made an effort to join Ugandans in their leisure after having them describe their activities extensively. This turned out to be a very challenging task because of several entry barriers. First, it turned out to be quite complicated to attend the various meetings: they are not held frequently, respondents would often state that they are part of a certain association but that they have not been there for months, others have not taken place at all during the time of the research or have been continuously postponed. Second, some of them are very personal meetings, and the respondents would be hesitant to allow a stranger to attend, and third, most of these, especially the personal meetings, would be held in a local language. The researcher's presence often altered the nature of the meeting decisively, making participant observation more difficult, because of the status as the guest of honor.

In total, research participation in the gathering of five different groups took place, some several times, others only once (see chapter 13). Information on other leisure activities was obtained through the descriptions of the interviewees. Additionally, 14 expert interviews have been conducted with leading representatives of religious bodies in Uganda, as well as several members of parliament, to understand the link between religion and the regime in Uganda. During this second stay much of the primary data from the statistical office, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) had been collected, through several visits to their headquarters, and research in their library. Finally, observations and informal discussions that we considered relevant for the analysis have been noted in a file, compiling miscellaneous notes, quotes, or observations collected "on the go".

#### **4.2.3. January-February 2017: Who is a Participant of Protest?**

That last stay again had a binary focus, on leisure and political protest. In an attempt to push harder for information about leisure activities, and to participate in

as many as possible, a specific leisure questionnaire (see annex, p. 575) was designed and disseminated through the mailing lists of the Young Leadership Alumni Forum of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), and the Pan African Club. The responses were disappointing, though, for several reasons. One, the low turn out rate: of about 600 emails contacted, 18 filled out the survey, yielding a 3% response rate. Of these questionnaires, 12 people left a contact option for a follow-up interview, and seven follow-up interviews were realized. In the follow-up interview, the leisure was combined with the questionnaire already used during the first and second field stay, to integrate them in the data pool. This led to the second disappointment: the follow-up interviews took up questions already asked in the leisure survey but yielded very different responses – in one extreme case the number of children one respondent stated to have differed between the internet survey and the interviewer-administered questionnaire. In conclusion, this confirmed the choice for a more laborious and less representative qualitative study, but with more accurate data, as it was created in the interaction between the researcher and the respondent. Finally, the third disappointment came with the unfulfilled hopes of more possibilities to participate in leisure activities of these Ugandans. While respondents were asked more information on the type of activities they pursued, this yielded only in one concrete offer for the researcher to participate, but which eventually never took place during our stay. Because the sample group was already biased, and the results neither added additional insight nor could they be used to correct skewed responses (overrepresentation of young male respondents), they were eventually not included in the data used for SPSS analysis.

More satisfactory results were gained through interviewing political activists. As the previous research has shown, most people would not participate in political mobilization. Therefore, this time we tried to answer the question the other way around, by wondering who would participate, and under what motives? What were the different mobilizations about, who would constitute the core of the participants? This question was enlarged, to not only encompass mobilization and political activists but to ask more broadly: what do people do to get their interest taken

care of? Hence, other groups, such as market vendor associations, transport sector representatives, or teachers unions have equally been included. As a result, a total of 46 interviews had been conducted, with 30 expert interviews, the aforementioned seven interviews based on the leisure survey, and nine questionnaire interviews with low income people, to balance our data towards the lower end. This time, not all interviews have been recorded, and of those with a record, not all have been transcribed. This was reserved for the expert interviews that revealed the most relevant. For the remaining expert interviews, content summaries were made. In other cases, only relevant quotes were retained.

### **4.3. The Data**

Hence, in total, 153 interviews were conducted, containing 44 expert interviews and 109 middle income group interviews. 12 others were excluded from the analysis, due to doubt on their reliability. Because of the different foci of the stays in Uganda, the reader will find that, depending on the section in the following analysis, some parts draw more on one set of interviews and another on a very different set. Each person has been assigned a pseudonym, and in case of the expert interviews, their functions were mentioned. In the annex (see p. 485 and 491) a list with all interviews and some basic biographic data, or in case of the experts, their institutional affiliation can be found. It equally lists the pseudonyms used, as well as the year of the official interview and a reference number for each interviewee, which is also used in the references of the coded categories (see p. 494).

Secondly, since the same questionnaire was maintained throughout the three rounds of data collection, but altered in between, the number of relevant answers collected sometimes varies in between the questions. To maintain coherence when presenting the data, we mainly chose a representation as percentage of answers given, instead of total numbers. This is not to conceal the small number of our sample and imply statistical representativeness which is not given, but rather to contribute to the readability of the work. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the nature of this work is qualitative and hence no statistical projections for the en-

tire population can be made. The challenges of quantitative data collection, of which we gathered a short glimpse through the self-administered internet questionnaires confirmed us in this approach, even though it has its trade-offs. Through the repeated inquiry we were able to learn about the sporadic attendance of activities mentioned in the leisure surveys, and we were able to detect better blatant contradictions. Instead of merely validating hypotheses we were able to reiterate and refine the research questions that led us through our fieldwork. As we have shown before, it is precisely the distortion that came through quantification that has led to the questionable validity of the middle class concept in the Ugandan context and its perceived linkages with democracy in general.

One of the serious shortcomings of the data is the insufficient triangulation: because the researcher knew few of the respondents beforehand and because most interviews have been conducted in public places, the workplace of the respondent or the office of the FES, no opportunity had been available to cross-check the answers with other people knowing the respondents, with what has been said at a different time, or to take the interior of the houses into consideration, for example. That means the analysis relies mainly on what respondents said in the interview setting, decreasing the validity of the data. To overcome this shortcoming, we triangulate for coherence between respondents in similar living conditions, but we also try to rely as much as possible on literature on research in similar environments (for example Bornschein, 2009; Kroeker, 2016; Nallet, 2015; Neubert & Stoll, 2015) and primary sources such as newspaper articles, WhatsApp groups, advertisement, internet forums, and the like.

The data was collected through a snowball sampling method (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005): first contacts with people were established either in public places like the street, public transport, the university, etc., or through personal connections, either with the help of the staff at FES, through the family that hosted us during the several stays or through the neighborhood in which the researcher was residing. Once an interview was conducted, the interviewee was asked to name a few other people who could be willing to answer the same ques-



tions. This referral usually worked well. Because we assume that people would refer us to friends with similar backgrounds (gender, age, income, education) we tried to keep the “entry points” of the first contact diverse, by approaching males as well as females, younger or older people, etc. Despite these efforts, the dataset is biased towards males aged between 26-35 years, educated up to tertiary education. The data bias, however, is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

#### **4.3.1. The Questionnaire and Its Analysis**

As already mentioned, the original questionnaire was elaborated concertededly in the research group on *Middle Classes in Africa* of the LAM. In its original version, the researcher had little influence, as it was developed prior to our joining the group. However, through getting to know better the Ugandan context, some questions were paraphrased, answer categories added or withdrawn, and some questions left uncoded. Its final version is attached in the annex (see p. 473). Usually, the questionnaire was filled out in an interviewer-administered interview, thus enhancing the quality and amount of information given (see Bowling, 2005). However, it would make the interviewing process more time intensive and prone to interviewer bias, as the presence of the interviewer (always the researcher herself) most likely influenced the responses given by the respondents (Bowling, 2005). The interviews were done as conversational interviews, allowing for individually adapted narrative elements that would enhance the comprehension of the respondent (Conrad & Schober, 2000). If recorded, the parts of the interviews that would be used to fill out the survey usually would not be transcribed, as they were mainly oriented by the structure of the questionnaire. The questionnaire would then be coded and analyzed using SPSS. Because of the small sample size, the analysis would remain descriptive, and we abstain from inferential statistics. Instead, we focus on illustration in most cases. We acknowledge to be guilty of using the generated statistics in Jerven’s words “*as a drunk uses a lamppost – for support, not illumination*” (Jerven, 2016, p. 345). Since we do not aim at statistical inference, but rather description, we believe this fault can be forgiven.

### 4.3.2. The Narrative Interviews and Qualitative Content Analysis

The interviews focusing on the political attitudes, and the personal life trajectories and living situations left much more open space for narrative answers. The researcher deliberately tried to reduce her own interactions, while still maintaining a communication situation that would make the respondent feel at ease and not like they were being interrogated. An interview guideline did, however, exist in the first two fieldworks, which decisively structured the interviews. Whereas the first interviews each time had been more narrative, the researcher very quickly followed the interview structure given through the guideline, unless the respondent initiated a topic by themselves, turning it into quite directive interviews. This was due to the precise data needed, such as demographic questions, biographical ones on the personal life trajectories, income, living conditions, values, and political opinions. Hence, we have become a victim of the “*interview guide line bureaucracy*” (Rosenthal, 2011, p. 143), that made it increasingly difficult to detach our focus from the guidelines and be more open to the categories mentioned by the respondents themselves. Thus, we relied very much on categories established beforehand. The expert interviews had been more open in their structure, as each interview would be adapted to the expert to be consulted. After familiarizing ourselves with the particular topic at hand and doing some background reading, some general questions were marked. The interview, however, was much structured through the answers given by the expert, that would lead to new questions on the side of the interviewer. Therefore, these interviews have each a very individual structure, revealing very particular information.

Most of these interviews have been transcribed, in some cases only interview summaries were established. Regardless of the extensiveness of the transcription, however, they have then been subjected to qualitative content analysis (QCA). This has been done without the help of specific content-analysis software but through mostly inductive coding. The coding process aims at condensing complex textual material, such as field notes, interview transcripts, but also newspaper articles, etc. into units that can be processed for analysis (Berg, 2001, p. 238).




Figure 6: Schematic Process of QCA (Berg 2001, p.240; Mayring 2010, p.68)

Here we follow an approach of *compression and inductive construction of categories*. It serves to systematize text components in a category system, to evaluate the categories according to the context, to make statements about their frequency

and to deduce their importance (Mayring, 2010, p. 63). The intention is “[...] to reduce the material in a way that the relevant content remains, but to create a corpus via abstraction, that is easy to grasp but nevertheless remains a reflection of the original material.”<sup>20</sup> (Mayring, 2010, p. 65). This usually involves a process including several steps (see figure 6): after data is turned into text, codes are derived from this data, either predefined or inductively developed during the analysis. Depending on the quantity of the material, this can be done several times by consistently reducing the material through paraphrasing or in a single step. In the end, the assigned codes should give rise to new categories, and the material is sorted according to these categories. Recurrent patterns, relationships, commonalities or differences are identified and eventually triangulated with already existing research and theories, and generalizations are made (Berg, 2001, p. 240).

We chose *themes* as our units of analysis, and hence analyzed the interviews according to passages relating to one topic. From there we deduced the codes that seemed suitable to use. As already mentioned, since some questions asked were quite directive, in these cases the codes chosen were close to the theme of the question. In other cases, however, new codes evolved out of the responses given. The codes were categorized in two ways: for one summarized sheets for each person were established, containing their condensed information on two to three pages, according to the previously defined codes. We would equally establish category sheets, where all responses made by interviewees concerning a specific category were cross-referenced, including relevant citations. Finally, for a better overview, a spreadsheet was made, listing all codes on the horizontal, and all respondents on the vertical axis, allowing for a quick referencing on particular issues. Additionally, if possible, we turned the narrative answers into coded answers of the questionnaire, to include them in the statistical processing. The coded categories and the spreadsheet are equally referenced in the annex. By doing so, we hope to pursue a systematic approach to our data processing, increasing the validity of our data and allowing for others to retrace the generation of our findings.

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<sup>20</sup> „Ziel der Analyse ist es, das Material so zu reduzieren, dass die wesentlichen Inhalte erhalten bleiben, durch Abstraktion einen überschaubaren Corpus zu schaffen, der immer noch Abbild des Grundmaterials ist.“ [own translation]

### 4.3.3. Participant Observation

To complement the information given by the respondents, participant observation is a valuable tool to reveal contradictions between what individuals say and what they do (Mack et al., 2005, p. 13). We included participant observation in our research in two ways. First, we observed everyday life, held informal discussions, eavesdropped in the public transport, etc. We do acknowledge, however, that our mere presence, as unobtrusive as we tried to be, would impact the activities observed around us. In this case, recording would be rather unsystematic, usually as entries in the field journal, but, if possible, included in the coded categories of the QCA. Most actively, participant observation was applied during the participation in leisure activities of the respondents. This time, more systematically notes were taken during the activity (as far as possible), describing the setting, the number, and characteristics of the people participating, themes discussed, moments or statements that provoked a common reaction within the group. These notes have equally been subjected to the analysis and serve the general arguments made.

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While qualitative research methods sometimes are reproached for being too subjective, and thus non-scientific, they still contribute significantly to the social understanding of reality (Berg, 2001, p. 2). This is not to argue for the superiority of qualitative over quantitative methods, but to suggest instead a new view on a topic often approached through quantitative, macroeconomic measures (bear in mind, that a quantitative, micro approach is equally possible and carried out by some scientists (see M. Chen & Goodman, 2013). By rendering the process of data gathering and processing as transparent as possible, we hope to “objectify” the data, and even though we are far from any statistical representativeness, nevertheless to make valid generalizations through our qualitative interviews and observations. By doing so, we intend to advance the understanding of the complex realities of middle income groups and their forms of social mobilization.

***Part II:***

***The Middle Income Groups  
in Uganda***

This section aims at providing a thorough description of the characteristics, livelihoods, and demographics of our sample, to test the middle class label and the characteristics commonly referred to. We have already covered the shortcomings of the term middle class and the challenges of common contemporary middle class definitions (see chapter 1). We also bear in mind calls for a class analysis (Melber, 2013) or a more qualitative description of life situation on grounds, that transgress pure macroeconomic analysis – a necessary task if one wants to give meaning to the numbers (Jerven, 2016). By doing so, we hope to move perceptions away from a normative idea of how a middle class *ought* to be to how people who consider themselves as neither rich nor poor *actually live* in an African country like Uganda. We have shown that the depiction of the “African middle class” is equally misleading as the one of Africa as a continent of gloom. The *middle class meme* has been called into question in recent years, precisely because the living conditions of those that should be middle class did not seem to concur with how scholars expected a middle class to live. However, we should not throw out the baby with the bath water. We do indeed witness a group of people that are better off than substantial parts of the population (especially those that are living in rural areas) and sometimes even as their parents. It is doubtful, though, whether the description as “class” would be the most suitable. We, therefore, provide a detailed description of our sample. In chapter 5 we cover their demographics, their income, age, gender, household composition, profession, religion, origin, and education. Regarding these descriptions, we will evoke the possibilities of other prominent identities, that may go along or concur with one derived from a shared socio-economic status. In the chapter 6 we try to single out some recurrent characteristics, which were decisive for the economic and social emergence of the respondents. Chapter 7 will then look at their consumption and expenditure behavior, in areas as diverse as food, education, housing, transport, and finance. In our conclusion, we engage in some reflection on how the different dispositions give rise to different socio-economic positions and whether the deriving shared life chances are sufficient to call these groups “classes” through the development of a shared identity.

## **5. Demographics of the Study Population**

Society can be structured along different lines. Here we look at some of the most important aspects, that may provide equally some explanations to varying attitudes and behavior. Among these lines, income is the most frequent characteristic studied in structuring class affiliation. But such an approach relies on mere income strata and does not per se imply a homogeneity in behavior and attitude. Other important factors are the education of a person, but also their age. Finally, in a country like Uganda with strong regional and ethnic identities, and limited social mobility, the origin of a person plays a role in a double sense: their geographic and ethnic origin, as well as the social position of the parents, are decisive in their trajectories. Thus, in the first part, we make a mere description of our sample and in the second part, we advance some analysis on persistent identities in addition to income.

### **5.1. The Composition of the Sample**

Here we situate our sample in the context of national and urban statistics. We want to draw the attention once more to the fact that the sample is not statistically representative, but in the line of qualitative approaches, we believe that the observations made will still help us to draw conclusions. Albeit this is not a clear-cut separation, in the first part, which is merely descriptive, we look at income, sex, age, religion, and region. In the second, we already advance some analysis about these demographic aspects, with the intention in mind to show that there is not one shared “middle class” identity, but rather a mix of persistent identities which can be simultaneously or subsequently evoked.

#### **5.1.1. Income**

Income is probably the most popular form of structuring class affiliation (E. O. Wright, 1979). In our analysis, we use income as well to divide the sample into the subgroups as proposed by the AfDB. In careful inquiry and with several probes we



tried to determine the household income of the interviewed person as accurate as possible. Then we divided the figure by the number of people living in the household and, according to the money available to each person, we would classify the household into the subgroups of Poor, Floating Class (FC), Lower Middle Class (LMC), Upper Middle Class (UMC) and Upper Class (UC). This would yield the following income distributions:

Subcategory	Income per person in \$	
	Per day	Per month
Poor	0-2	0-60
FC	2-4	61-120
LMC	4-10	121-300
UMC	10-20	301-600
UC	>20	>600

*Table 5: Income by Subcategory*

We acknowledge several methodological caveats with the data:

- The income is not weighted according to household members. It is widely known that not every household member uses the same share of the income. Fix costs such as rent, electricity, or water will not increase proportionally with every person entering a household. Hence, usually equivalence scales are used, with less value assigned to every person following the first adult. Even if this is desirable, this adjustment cannot be made to our data, since we did not inquire about the age of every household member. Additionally, non-permanent members, such as relatives staying during the school holidays (or, inversely, during the trimester) or household helpers may not be counted in the same manner. Alber (2016a) points out that the household size is subject to variations, as it is rather the norm than the exception for middle class households to take in some relatives or foster children. As a result, economic heterogeneity even within the same household is common; a reality in stark contrast to the assumption inherent to statistical observations based on household data, which assumes an income homogeneity within the same household (Alber, 2016a, p. 188). Using household income and divid-

ing it by household members to determine the subclass is a shortcoming we acknowledge. Thus, we bear in mind that our income stratification is a rough categorization, and should only be taken as an estimate. However, in itself the sample is coherent. Nevertheless, triangulation with other characteristics, such as education, living conditions, etc. is inevitable.

- The income is not converted to US \$ ppp. Instead, we maintained the same conversion rate of 2500 UGX per dollar throughout the findings. This was the approximate conversion rate in 2012 and 2014. Between 2015 and 2016 the dollar has increased, leading to a conversion of approximately 3500 UGX per dollar. Hence, our data cannot be easily compared across nations and time, but in our sample consistency remains given. Ayoki (2012) has used the same conversion rate for his discussion of the Ugandan middle class, which confirms our choice as a reasonable one in the country-specific context.
- There is also the risk of misreporting income. Since some income types are not regular and hard to foresee, such as earnings from harvest or unexpected money earned with brokerage and consultancy, respondents would only give these figures after several probes and sometimes by giving rough estimates. Similarly, because many couples have separated bank accounts (see chapter 7.5), not everyone was aware of the earnings of their spouse. Finally, some respondents might have deliberately chosen not to tell their actual income, because they judged the question inappropriate or they might have forgotten to mention some of their side incomes. Very telling in this matter was the discussion that unfolded with Andrew, who was very unsatisfied with his income: *“I don’t earn quite a lot of money to sustain more than a family of three. [...] I earn one million [\$400] per month. I fuel my car about more than half of that money, pay bills for water and electricity. [...] A man with two degrees should earn more than that.”* (Andrew) It turned out, upon probing, that he had several side incomes, rental units, his wife runs a well-performing shop and he is doing some consultancy work that their actual

monthly income added up to \$2240. In this case, his various side incomes were finally mentioned, but it is likely that in other cases, despite careful probing, these incomes went undetected.

- We used disposable income as a reference, that is income after tax but before expenditure. Some authors suggest considering daily *consumption*, rather than income (Ncube & Lufumpa, 2015, p. 11). The main reason is that consumption expenditure is considered more reliable, even though they admit to the possibility of a measurement error since the difference between consumption and income increase with rising income (Ncube & Lufumpa, 2015, p. 11). Unfortunately, we are not able to use that approach because expenditure has not been inquired as consistently as income. We believe, however, that our data in itself is reliable because the same income inquiry has been used throughout the entire research.

Upon these calculations, our sample was repartitioned among the different sub-groups, as follows:




Figure 7: Income Classes

First of all, it has to be noted that the spread of the income classes does not reflect the income repartition of the Ugandan population as a whole and it is not intended to do so either.

For example, the World Bank states that 35% of the Ugandan population live below the poverty line. In urban areas that rate drops to 9% and thus reflects more our findings (World Bank, 2016a). This reveals an essential bias of our work that will also be reflected in most of the other findings. By limiting the research to Kampala, the most prosperous region of the country (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 99), the distribution will necessarily be skewed towards the wealthier fractions of society. At the same time, increased costs of living somewhat relativize this distortion. As argued before (see p. 129), we do believe that this environment is most conducive to research trajectories of emergence, as life chances and opportunities for choice are greater than in rural regions. Some even argue that “Africa rising” is not a phenomenon of the continent, neither of nations, but one of the 67 cities with over one million inhabitants (Quénot-Suarez, 2012, p. 39). If we take such an argumentation seriously, we also have to re-adapt national statistics to urban contexts for our purposes. Besides, it is not our intention to measure the Ugandan middle income groups but to describe their features and main traits.


Hence, our data displays a relative overrepresentation of the lower middle to upper class and underrepresentation of the poor. The LMC is the most represented among the sample. At the same time, even if represented by only a few cases, UMC and UC are overrepresented in comparison to their frequency in the Kampala population. Besides, impoverished people have been targeted only punctually. However, outliers on both ends (UC and poor) are allowed to appear in the data as well, to learn from the delimitations that exist between the different subgroups.

Having established the subgroups that will be referred to throughout the analysis, we like to recall a crucial factor before proceeding: these income groups are a mere means to an end, they do not in itself constitute classes. We use the terms floating, lower and upper middle *class* because this has been done so otherwise (Ncube et al., 2011) and we believe that these subdivisions may provide some valuable in-

sight. However, definitions of middle class based on income remain merely descriptive, they have neither the potential to uncover underlying social dynamics nor to explain common identities or collective social action (E. O. Wright, 1979). Hence, income groups can structure the analysis, but to deduce class cohesiveness they are not sufficient.

### 5.1.2. Age

Similar to income, age is another essential description for analysis. For one, income and age are often linked, as usually income progresses with advanced age, until to the state of retirement. But the commonly shared experience of one birth cohort will also have an effect on the mindset and behaviors of people from the same generation (Ryder, 1965, p. 846).




Our sample shows a strong representation of the 26-35-year-olds, the category accounts for more than half of our respondents. Minors have not been surveyed at all, and even those up to the age of 25 are only a few because many of them are

still schooling. The absence of regular employment and salary would distort the sample because parental support could overcome the lack of income and thus not make them poor per se. Some students were surveyed, but we tried to limit these cases. This does imply, however, an underrepresentation of those below the age of 26 who are not schooling, but already working or in search of employment. Second, older adults, above the age of 60, but also in the group of 46-60 are few for two reasons. One, in comparison with the rest of Uganda, there are only few people above the age of 60. One reason might be that elderly would often become less visible, once retired. It is common practice for them to return to their home village,

or they remain more in private settings and thus making it harder to get in contact with them.

Trajectories of economic emergence are not solely linked with income and income opportunities, but also with age. Depending on the age of someone, their living conditions, job, education, family status, even leisure time will very likely change and depending on the potentials for earning income will vary according to age, as the figure below shows.



Each dot stands for one respondent. The spread of the data is high, as all income categories and ages are covered. However, the trend line (shown as solid line in the figure) has the shape of a flat, inverse U-curve because in general in-

*Figure 9: Age and Income*  
income starts low and raises with an advanced career and increasing household size (because fixed costs are lowered), and then declines with advanced age due to retirement. Indeed, we find that the highest income on average (\$365 per person per month) can be found in the group of the 36-45-year-olds.

### 5.1.3. Gender

Our data reveal a bias towards an overrepresentation of men, who constituted two-thirds of the interviewees.

We assume that this is most likely because more men than women are in the workforce. This assumption is supported by the data which indicates that men have been three times more likely as women to indicate that they are the only person with an income in the family. Since we concentrated most of our efforts on the working

population, less visible members of society, such as housewives (or, as mentioned before, elderly) are less represented.




Figure 10: Distribution by Sex

This underrepresentation is regrettable since women face different challenges than men and the position they occupy in society equally structures their perceptions and behaviors. Their income position depends a lot on their marital status, with female-headed households being more prone to poverty than male-headed ones (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a). They have less access to politics

(Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller, 2004; Tripp, 2000) and are more prone to be victims of violence (I. C. F. International & Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012). However, the reliance on their identity as women also has the potential to transcend ethnic or religious barriers because of shared interests common to all women (Daniel, 2016; Tripp, 2000). Thus, in the analysis, we might expect to see behavior that can also be explained by gender difference, and we will include this factor when opportune to do so.

#### 5.1.4. Household Composition




Figure 11: Average Number of People per Household

On average, interviewees indicated to live in households composed of 5.11 people. We see that this number is declining with rising income, with poor households hosting on average 7.57 people and the wealthiest households 3.5.

Regarding the number of children, we witness a similar trend with rising income: the number of children declines, from 2.4 among the poor to 1.84 among the UC. Hence, we might conclude with an observation also made elsewhere that the middle income groups tend to have lesser children and live in smaller households together. As mentioned above, however, the complex realities in terms of household composition and income stratification even within the same household need to be kept in mind (Alber, 2016a).

### 5.1.5. Occupation

Occupation has in some cases been the sole defining factor of a middle class (Mills, 1953), sometimes it has been an essential feature besides economic factors (Weber, 2002). In the context of the middle class in the developing world, the focus on profession had been determined by the access to a stable, predictable salary. In Uganda, 47.8% of the working population is employed, and only 47.4% of those have a paid employment. Hence, more than half of them are self-employed (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 47). Thus, salaried employment touches only about 25% of the Ugandan working population. In our sample, roughly two-thirds were employed and one-third self-employed.




Figure 12: Occupation of the Respondents

As shall be seen in the discussion on the diversification of income (see p. 184), the salaried job is not necessarily the only one nor the one generating the most income, but frequently it is the one that the respondents used to define themselves. Regarding the type of job executed, limited conclusions could be made.


While it is sometimes said that civil servants would constitute an important part of the middle class, they did not figure prominently among our sample. Most frequently administration was mentioned, allowing at least for



the conclusion that indeed most of the respondents were white-collar workers, working in the service sector. This raises questions about their dependency on the state for employment: since they are not predominantly employed by the state, they may feel less obliged towards it (Darbon & Dedieu, 2014, p. 298). Secondly, since they are not deriving their primary income from property, they might be less fearful to protest (Oberschall, 1973, p. 164). Such an analysis quickly reaches its limits, however, if one considers the multiplication of class positions through the diversification of income, making it the rule rather than the exception to be an employer and employed at the same time.

### 5.1.6. Region

Uganda has about 60 different ethnic groups, whereby the six major groups (in descending order: Baganda, Banyankole, Basoga, Bakiga, Iteso, and Langi) constitute more than half of the population (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 20).



*Map 1: Ethno-regional cleavages in Uganda (Lindemann, 2011, p. 394)*

Among the respondents in our sample, Baganda and Banyankole are over-represented, with other ethnicities being less frequent. Due to the ethnic diversity, we decided to distinguish between regions of origin, rather than ethnicity itself, which could have easily led to oversampling. Where it seems viable for understanding, ethnic groups may explicitly be referred to.




Figure 13: Region of Origin of the Respondents

The high incidence of people from the Central region, mainly Baganda, is not particular surprising, as Kampala, the site of the fieldwork, is located there, thus making their presence more likely. People from the West are mainly Banyankole, but not exclusively. However, since they are the second biggest ethnic group in Uganda, it is not surprising that Westerners also represent the second largest group in our sample. Inversely, the North is only sparsely populated, and by far the most impoverished region, thus we might suspect that they are less present in Kampala.

When coupling region of origin with income, we see only little variation of the median, as shown in Figure 14, except for the East. The earnings of the upper half of




Figure 14: Income and Region

the respondents from each region differ significantly though. Here, contrary to the perceptions shared by some that people from the West are advantaged, Ugandans from the Center are earning better than any other group. It seems then that the distribution better reflects the more historical advantages that have grown since colonial times rather than more recent, political changes. Interestingly, it may hint at an often ascertained claim, that the middle class accumulated its wealth independently from the governing elite. If the government favors groups with ethno-regional proximity, yet here the best earning are from the Central and the East, we may deduce that they reached their achievements without direct intervention from governing elites. The most destitute respondents come from the Center as well. This is

most likely due to the fact that poor people from other regions probably lack the means to move to the capital, whereas poor people from Central region are already there. The boxplot of the North shows little variation and is indicating rather low incomes. Thus, it confirms the marginalized position of people from the North, as had been described before.

To summarize, we might say that the felt imbalance voiced by some cannot be confirmed in our data, at least not in the middle and lower income groups (it might be justified among high earners, though), regarding income. The picture might be different if looked at employment opportunities in the ministries (see (Lindemann, 2011) and 6.4 for more detail). But while the statements of respondents above reflect their grievances, they are not shared by all interviewees. Others, like Nelson (from the West), feel that historical regional imbalances are leveled out and point at the high voter turn out in favor of Museveni in the North of Uganda. Overall, ethnic tensions were not the concerns most voiced. Instead, corruption and over-staying in power have been the leading causes of discontent among the respondents, regardless of their regional background.

### **5.1.7. Religion**

Religion plays an important role in the life of most Ugandans. Only 0.2% of Ugandans indicate not to have any religion at all. The most significant religious groups are Catholics, followed by Anglicans, Muslims and Pentecostals (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). Our sample is biased towards protestant faith groups, with an underrepresentation of Catholics and Muslims (see figure 15). Most respondents of our sample indicate that they attend at least once a week Sunday service. But religious groups are also important places for socialization. Choir practice, door-to-door evangelism, Mothers' and Fathers' Union – there are numerous ways to be active in a religious setting beyond the service. In these groups religious identities are being reinforced and create a common frame for interpretation of the surrounding world, they constitute communities of practice (Eckert, 2000). Even though most respondents indicated to have friends from various religious backgrounds, in intimate relationships the importance of having a partner from the

same religion has been underlined. This was particularly pronounced among Pentecostals, who said most often that they need a spouse with whom they can share their faith, and who is equally “*God-fearing*”.




Figure 15: Religious Affiliation of the Sample  
 stratification according to income lines *in addition* to a particular denomination among the different urban church parishes. This does affect economic mobility since churches are potential places for networking, as shall be discussed later (see chapters 5.2.1, 6.4 and 13.1.1 for more thorough discussions on the points raised).

While our data shows an overrepresentation of Protestant faith groups, it is not sufficient to make any statements about their particular status among income groups. We do not want to argue in the vein of Max Weber about a pronounced protestant work ethic as an explanation for making them more likely to be among the middle income groups<sup>21</sup>. Instead, we suggest that the different faiths can be found among all income groups, however, that in an urban context we might witness a

### 5.1.8. Education

Most Ugandans value education a lot. It is considered to be one of the decisive factors determining personal success.

In comparison, the respondents of our sample are better educated than the average Ugandan. Once again, urban-rural differences factor here, as well as the focus on sampling people with regular employment.

<sup>21</sup> Maxwell and Meyer both have refuted this link in relation to Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches (PCC) in different African countries (Maxwell, 1998; Meyer, 2004).




Figure 16: Education Level in Comparison: Sample and UBOS (2016, p. 26)

Here the differences between the sample and the average Ugandan might be the most striking, among all derivations discussed so far. Notably, that the categories of no education and only primary, who comprise the two biggest groups of the national sample, are non-existent among our sample. And the 71% who have a degree in tertiary education is in stark contrast to the 4% on a nationwide scale. This shows the significance of education in relation to having a middle income status, as has also been shown elsewhere (Kunene, Mubila, & Akinkugbe, 2015; Kurzman & Leahey, 2004; Zipp, 1986).

Contrary to what one might expect, there is no significant correlation between income per person and education level of the respondent, probably due to the high number of university degree holders with a small income. However, if depicted as a box plot, as done in Figure 17, it becomes apparent that the median income is rising with a higher education level and that in general the distribution is skewed towards higher income, if the education is higher as well.




Figure 17: Income and Education Level

These observations confirm the importance of education in obtaining higher salaries and thus increasing the probability of consolidating one's economic position.

In this section, we tried to sketch the general demographics of our sample. They lead us to conclude that we deal here with a predominantly young (35-45), male, well-educated group of salaried employees. With their rising income, their household size and their number of children is declining. In the following sub-section, we intend to draw the attention to other, relevant identities that have come up during the interviews.

## **5.2. Markers of Identity**

Class is only one sociological category for marking identity, and it is not even necessarily the most powerful one (CFAO, 2015; Spronk, 2014, p. 210). Hence, in our effort to seize the validity of the class concept in Uganda, it is equally insightful to have a look at other, prominent categories.

### **5.2.1. Religion - Morality and Prosperity**

Religion is present in the public sphere, through religious claims on buses, such as “Masha Allah”, “Inch’Allah” or “God is Good”, preachers in the street, who seize the occasion of rush hour congestion to preach their sermon to the passers-by in the cars, and politicians who make reference to the Bible to display their integrity. Religious leaders enjoy the reputation of being respectable and are thought to put the people’s needs before their own, contrary to the opinion on politicians (Afrobarometer, 2015).

On a personal level, religion plays a vital role in the life of many Ugandans. As we shall see, it is one way of socializing during leisure time (see chapter 13.1), and it remains a relevant category for identification (CFAO, 2015; Stephen Hunt, 2002). It surely does not have the same relevance for all respondents alike, but we did find a coherence among some attitudes expressed.

We did find little evidence though, that a specific behavior or attitude can be linked to a particular faith, contrary to what will be shown concerning the different regions (see chapter 5.2.3). While religious points of views play an important role, especially in attitudes towards morality, these attitudes did not differ between the religion per se. So, all respondents except one (a male) of the 2014 dataset agreed that the wife is subordinate to her husband, in reference to the Bible or the Qur’an. Similarly, there was a critical stance towards homosexuality expressed across all religions and also across all income groups (with the men being more vocal about it, though)<sup>22</sup>. This is not to say that such differences do not exist. In the analysis of the interviews conducted they did not turn out to be of any explanatory value.

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<sup>22</sup>At the time of the 2014 interviews, the President had recently signed the Anti-Homosexuality Act into law, just for the Supreme Court to repeal it a few months later (Fichtmüller, 2014a). Thus, without being explicitly asked about, respondents liked to give their opinion on the issue, mostly related to the question about modernity.



A crucial question remains the role of Born-again regarding “middleclassness”. Through their use of modern technology, their focus on consumption, their global orientation, and their emphasis on prosperity they can sometimes obtain similar attributes as the middle classes (see Gifford, 2008, p. 280). While cautioning too many generalizations about the heterogeneous group of Pentecostal and charismatic churches (PCCs), Ojo confirms that whereas in West Africa the PCCs would enjoy large popularity among the middle classes, in Southern Africa it would be more attractive to the urban poor. However, he also contends, due to its increasing popularity, it is attracting people from all income groups (Ojo, 2012, pp. 301–305). Similarly, in his analysis of the Zimbabwean Assembly of God Africa, Maxwell concludes that “*in a sense, the movement has become a microcosm of wider society and shares many of its tensions.*” (Maxwell, 1998, p. 366)

Indeed, through embracing materialism, Pentecostal teachings may justify capital accumulation, which has often been shunned upon in other denominations. So in its emphasis on hard work, being entrepreneurial, leading an integer life, and giving tithes to the church the teachings propose a seemingly simple formula for becoming wealthy, while neglecting broader social and economic circumstances (Gifford, 2008, p. 285; Maxwell, 1998, p. 365). However, Meyer points out that herein lies also one of the tensions within the PCC preaching, as the church may lose its credibility if the promised miracles do not manifest (Meyer, 2004, p. 460).

Due to this promise of miracles, the prosperity gospel has equally attracted its fair share of criticism (Gifford, 2008, p. 287). Among different individuals, the teachings were criticized for their insistence on “*planting a seed*”. Thus, one lecturer at a debate club remarked that if praying would bring wealth, why then are Africans, who are praying the hardest, also the poorest? Similarly, a charismatic pastor who has been selling “holy rice” for 50 000 UGX (\$20) per kilo has been a reason for repeated mocking by Kampala inhabitants, although this did not hinder a large crowd to gather in front of his church in Mulago every Sunday.

Some authors also highlight that for the believers being born-again gives an excuse to distance themselves from their extended family, as evil spirits can travel through

blood ties, which, therefore, need to be cut off. Instead, the church congregation functions as a surrogate, and members often address each other in family terms, such as brother or sister (Maxwell, 1998, p. 354; Meyer, 2004, p. 448). By doing so, they can avoid expectations of financial support of their family that comes along with their newly acquired wealth (Maxwell, 1998, p. 354). In a critique of this assumption, Lindhardt writes:

“[B]orn-again Christians do not cease to be social beings, deeply embedded in family relationships and sharing a social world with non-born-again Christians. [...] A too-narrow association of born-again Christianity with modernist individualism fails to account for the complex processes of navigation and social reformulation in which converts are engaged.”

(Lindhardt, 2010, p. 266)

Similarly, Meyer suggests seeing these claims “*to break with the past*” as a narrative rather than an achieved state (Meyer, 2004, p. 457). Our observations confirm these findings mentioned here: we have seen that PCCs are attractive among all strata. Numerous small churches spring up in poor neighborhoods and are very popular. As already mentioned above, there might be some economic stratification within the congregations themselves. Thus, the big churches in the city center who hold their services exclusively in English might be more attractive to the people who can afford the transport and follow the sermon. Yet, we cannot conclude that PCCs are particularly attractive among middle income groups. According to official statistics, they remain a minority, after all (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). The data did not confirm either that the born-again believers would be more likely to cut ties with their extended families. Of the 23 respondents in 2014, 18 mentioned their extended family (either as a support to them or as a receiver of support) and those who had no relation to them did not do so out of religious reasons, but in general due to very personal tragedies. Neither were those five people all born-again. While we cannot make any statistically strong claims about the relation between Pentecostalism and middle income groups, our data allow us at least to challenge a narrative that puts PCC (attributed) virtues in proximity to (attributed) virtues of the middle class. For example, David Martin argues that:

“[T]he lineage running from Pietism to Pentecostalism is linked positively to modernity in respect of the domains of gender, secular law, transnationalism, voluntarism, pluralism, the nuclear family, peaceability, personal release and personal work discipline, consumption, modern communication, social and geographical mobility – as well as changes in mediation, authority and participation.

(D. Martin, 2005, p. 144)

Such assumptions bear a striking resemblance to the hopes attached to the positive effects a middle class could have in an underdeveloped country. In both cases, however, it is worthwhile to remember the heterogeneity beneath the common label. Therefore, the grand narratives outlined by Martin neglect the local context in which they take place, and while Pentecostalism may provide a “compass” for individuals in rapidly transforming societies, they do not shed their anterior beliefs entirely (cf D. Martin, 2005, p. 151).

Religious groups are essential sites of assembly and as such formers of collective identity (Stephen Hunt, 2002, p. 147). Such an identity is one that can, in return, quickly be mobilized, even though these kinds of movements are often ignored by social movement theory because they do not fit into liberal progressive conceptions scholars like to have about social movements (Siméant, 2013, p. 130). While most respondents indicated that the precise faith of someone did not play a role in interaction, it was more important for spouses to have a common religion. Dividing lines would hence not occur as much between religion or faith groups, but more among questions of morality, which were perceived to go against God’s will, and often triggered by “modernity” or “westernization”, such as homosexuality, pornography, miniskirts, or gender equality. These fault lines can spark intense debates, as has been shown in the discussion on the Anti-Homosexuality Bill. They reveal the mobilizing potential of religious groups, but this potential is not necessarily used for the cause of democratic advancement.

### 5.2.2. The Youth

The importance of life cycles has been widely recognized in social science (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990). For one, diverse maturational processes often referred to as life stages or life course (e.g., birth, adulthood, marriage, parenthood, or retirement) affect the life of an individual. Also, specific generational circumstances converge the experiences within an age cohort. O’Rand and Krecker write:

“The idea here is that the relative structural compositions (e.g. size, sex ratio) and the historical experiences of successive birth cohorts moving through time have causal implications for the life course of individuals.”

(O’Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 240)

This observation holds true for Uganda as well. Experiences by generations who have lived through independence differ from those who have witnessed the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin and the guerrilla war, and they have different perceptions from generations who have only lived under the Museveni regime and have been exposed to ICT rather early on in their lives.

It has already been pointed out that the mere size of a birth cohort will have an impact as well. Thus, the younger ones, who are part of generations with high birth rates face different challenges regarding education and employment as the generations before them. Additionally, gerontocratic structures play a crucial role in many East African societies (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 243). Even more so because Uganda has the youngest population in the world, with 48% of the population being below the age of 15 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 14). Popular media discourse reflects these structures. Contrary to income categorization, which is hardly used as descriptive labels in the media, “*the youth*” is a category widely referred to. *The youth* as a relevant phenomenon, concept, and ideology (see van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011) has equally been discussed in African studies. While scholars admit to the “fuzziness” of the concept (Christiansen, 2011; Durham, 2000; van Dijk et al., 2011), it has implications on the everyday political life. The youth is represented in institutions, in Uganda, they even have reserved parliamentary seats, together with other marginalized groups such as women and disabled (Christiansen, 2011, p. 131) Ugandans perceive especially youth unem-

ployment as one of the big challenges the society has to face today (Wire, 2018). Claims have become popular that the youth should be “job creators and not job seekers” and are widely taken up, for example by the World Bank (2015). The category can give access to government programs, such as the Youth Livelihood Program (Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development, Uganda, n.d.). Forums like the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA) have the objective to be an advocacy group for the youth. It seems, in line with the research cited above, that the term “youth” can be stretched, due to the absence of an official definition. It is often used as self-description when making claims about the cohort. On the opposite, people considered as *elders* often have a good reputation. Christiansen in her study in eastern Uganda describes how the youth feels dependent on older generations, instead of placing themselves in rebellion against them (Christiansen, 2011, p. 134). Several respondents expressed a similar view, when they stated that they are friends with older people, in order to learn from them (see 6.4 for more detail).

It needs to be retained that age groups thus do have a structuring effect on society and we argue that this effect is even more exacerbated in gerontocracies, that have been dominant forms of societal ordering in East Africa (O’Rand & Krecker, 1990). Van Dijk even goes as far as to argue that the recent reification of the category has turned “youth” into an ideology, similar to ethnicity, because interests and access to scarce resources (especially through accessing funds by donors or governments particularly targeted at youth) are controlled through the label (van Dijk et al., 2011, p. 7). Hence, orienting policies towards youth and tying them into the political process can become a way for the state of assuring their loyalty, as Sinha-Kerkhoff has demonstrated in the case of India (Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2011). Youth movements thus have the power to transcend other identities, such as regional ones, or kinship ties, but in the process, they create new borders of exclusion (van Dijk et al., 2011, p. 12).

### **5.2.3. The Baganda, the West, and the Rest**

In addition to being the majority in the country, historically, the Baganda have been treated preferentially during British colonial rule, which exacerbated anti-Baganda sentiments in the rest of the country (Lindemann, 2011, p. 392). The post-independence governments of Milton Obote and Idi Amin targeted the marginalization of the North by concentrating positions of political and military power in the hands of Northerners. When the NRA came to power, they consciously tried to overcome sectarianism by forms of inclusive elite bargaining (see chapter 3.2.2 for more details). The attempt remained futile, though, because regional and ethnic factionalism remained (Lindemann, 2011). This tendency is particularly pronounced in certain ethnicities, mainly those that are governed by monarchies (International Crisis Group, 2012). The country is further structured by regional cleavages, which have their origins in the times of colonial administration. The distinctions also led to disparities in economic development: the North was mainly marginalized because most economic activities were concentrated in the South, and foremost in the central region (Lindemann, 2011, p. 392). The West is the home region to the President (a Munyankole) and many government officials and is often suspected to be favored in terms of development over other regions. Besides, most oil resources are found here (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 2).

However, despite historically entrenched factionalism, ethnicity had not been a very intensely debated topic among the respondents. If mentioned, it usually came up in the relation of the Baganda lobby for a federal arrangement and their loyalty to the kingdom. Another aspect was the suspected favoritism of people from the West in the attribution of government jobs (see also Tripp, 1994, p. 107). Research suggests that this is an adequate representation of the ethnic distribution in the political landscape (Lindemann, 2011, p. 396). Efforts of Museveni to form a broad-based government ceded shortly after coming to power. At least since 1995, government positions were dominated by people coming from the Southwest of Uganda. Among the respondents, this was voiced in the frustration that not qualification counted to be employed, but origin.

“[A good society is] a society based on merit, where the best is taken, not because I come from a particular region [...]. Today’s society in Uganda I see there is unfairness in it. Let me just begin in my own work environment, the level of promotions are long; people are promoted because they are related to the manager or somebody who is big in the bank. Someone has stayed in the bank for five years like me, but someone has stayed for one year he is already leading you and all that. You need to be related to someone to realize your ambitions, not through your capacity. [...] I have not gotten promotion for the last three years, I have passed the interview, but there is a manager in that department because he is a Munyankole [from the West], he refused.”

Arthur

“We/ our problem is tribalism, as a country. There is a lot of it. It might seem not like it, but to get a job, to get this/ now people like me don’t mind tribe. If I got somewhere out there, I will not ask him what tribe he is. I will look at him and accept him for who he is and then I would buy (from any tribe).”

Reagan

Baganda are also well represented, even though dissatisfaction increases, as they feel the most important positions are held by Westerners and because of continuing tension between the Buganda kingdom and the national government. This feeling is not constrained to the Baganda, even though the disputes about the sovereignty of the kingdom and the strong cultural identity many Baganda embrace may intensify the conflict. Elisabeth, a Muganda, feels that the economic decline in her region, and her own, are due to tribalism:

“When this regime came, things of agriculture were crushed down. We don't know whether it was intentional or what. We used to deal in coffee, coffee industry collapsed, all factories were down. By the time these people came in, what some people think, they introduced a certain coffee wilt and it had dried and all areas which had coffee, perished. [...] So, everything is in chaos in this area where I come from. This regime came when I was working. [...] I got unemployed, I worked there for 17 years, again, what I think as me, it was maybe intended. When they came they started to lay off those people working in such places, banks, ministries, they closed some of them, for me, my thinking, they wanted to suddenly erase our tribe to fail, which is happening today. And funnily enough, they laid off people which they call a retirement, yet they are employed. And if you take statistics, most of the offices it is one tribe. So the rest we are suffering.”

Elisabeth

“Politics, there is a lot of tribalism, even in the tribe it comes back to the clan, even within the clan people pay more attention to family, and institutions are not strong to check this.”

Arthur

The attacks by government soldiers on the palace of the king of the Bakonzo, Charles Wesley Mumbere in Kasese in December 2016 have been the most recent confrontations between the central government and a kingdom. Accusations that the king has planned to create his own republic and to secede from Uganda were used by the military to storm the palace and arrest King Mumbere. At least 55 people died during the attacks (Associated Press, 2016). These recent sparks of violent encounter show the underlying regional tensions that persist, and the firm identity claims made by the kingdoms.

Kato and Rose are a married couple, where he is originally from the North, even though he has been growing up nearly all his life in Entebbe, and his wife is from the West. During the interview, they started to argue about whether the North was impoverished because it was marginalized or whether it was because poor people, in general, were lazy and did not try hard enough.



- Kato “I wouldn’t mind a leader leading for 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, but is he taking care of what is necessary? Hospitals, social services, like roads, are they good? Or is wealth distributed equally well over the country? [...] You find one particular area is well developed and the other area / and that is why I fear to go to my home area [the North]”
- Rose “Most people are lazy, they don’t want to involve themselves in an agricultural set-up. [...] They are trying to specialize people in agriculture, and they are constructing roads, but the people are not taking the idea. For example, in the west, the roads are well constructed, but the people are poor.”
- Kato “In comparison, those people are doing well. If you want an epithet of poverty, you go to the north; you will see what poverty is. Yes, the government is trying, but it is not doing enough. [...]”
- Rose “There is only job seeking, not job creating, even in schools. Most people are just seeking for jobs, but they are not creating, so that is what causes the unemployment.”

Interestingly, Rose has been unemployed at the time of the interview, yet she brings up the catchphrase often used by Museveni and internalized by many that people should be job creators rather than job seekers. These observations also show that the criticism of Western favoritism is often coupled (albeit not dependent on) criticism of Museveni.

Thus, if mentioned, ethnicity was framed in relation to perceived injustice in access to resources. However, as said before, ethnicity was not a dominant topic for many. Respondents, in general, would confirm that it did not matter much to them where someone came from and several have interethnic marriages, or their parents had been ethnically mixed. Similarly, most would state that their close friends have diverse regional origins. However, tribalism has a bad reputation and is regarded as one of the evils hindering development. Therefore, it is also possible that respondents did not explicitly state ethnic preferences because they felt they may not be appreciated. There have been instances during the field research where people would unite for other purposes, but the group turned out to be ethnically homogeneous (see 13.1.1). Spronk in her research has shown that ethnicity also gains importance with advanced age, when people start assuming responsibilities within

their clans and participate increased in family functions (Spronk, 2012, p. 276). Thus, the relative neglect or importance of ethnicity may equally be linked to age. Ethnicity is still one major factor in the mobilization of people, as the various insurgencies have shown, that Uganda experienced since 1986, motivated by regional or ethnic marginalization (Lindemann, 2011). The same has been true in more recent upheavals, such as the Buganda riots of 2009 (see p. 279), the Save Mabira campaign (see p.272) or the Kasese clash in 2016 (mentioned above). They are not the sole motivator, but, particularly among Baganda, the regional identity is a strong potential for mobilization, overcoming other markers of identification, such as income or age.

#### **5.2.4. Neither Rich nor Poor**

One central question when trying to judge the appropriateness of a class label is the presence of a commonly shared identity. This, in the case of the respondents in Uganda, remained highly problematic. The respondents themselves rarely evoked class, or more precisely middle class. Usually, the notion only came into the discussion if brought up by the researcher. If asked, 72% of the respondents would state that they believe a middle class existed in Kampala. Of those, about half would indicate that they considered themselves to be part of it. The others would describe themselves either as lower class or as “*in between*”, implying that they were neither rich nor poor. Someone classified as poor would be more likely to state that a middle class did not exist, and if they would say it did, the poor were more likely to consider themselves not to be part of it. This share of people considering themselves to be part of the middle class would continue to grow with income. For those who felt they were not part of the middle class, the poor, FC and LMC were more likely to state that they were part of the lower class, whereas the UMC and UC would consider themselves to be “*in between*”. In the narrative interviews this emphasis on being in a transcendent rather than a settled state has been evoked quite frequently, as the following quotes illustrate:

“My own position, currently I am below middle class. I am not exactly a pauper; I am not middle class.”

Herbert, LMC

“I am on the boundary between the poor, to be middle class you must be able to predict your income. [...] You are just at the boundary there, oscillating.”

Innocent, UMC

“I am not middle class; I am just penetrating.”

Benjamin, n.a.

“I am in the middle; if you go to the village, these people are poor, I am not poor like this.”

Sarah, UMC

“We are not peasants and not millionaires; we can afford comfortable living, in economic terms, we are the so-called middle class.”

Alex, UC

These citations highlight the vulnerability and the potential of downward mobility, in emphasizing the temporary nature of middleclassness, by using words such as “*oscillating*”, sometimes with the idea of upward mobility, when talking about “*penetrating*”. Interestingly, even Sarah and Alex, who described themselves as middle class did so by excluding other labels. For others who considered themselves middle class, they did so because they could “*afford the necessities*” (Jennifer) or “*live comfortably*” (Economist). No one of those asked derived their middle class status from anything else than their purchasing power, their assets, or their ability to sustain themselves until the end of the month. We have also observed that in the last field research people were more vocal to refuse the middle class label, painting the Ugandan society as an opposition between the rich and the poor, “*the haves and the have-nots*”. While inequality probably did not noticeably widen between 2012 and 2017, it may be an indication how the current overall economic situation of the country at the time of the interview plays into the perception of socio-economic stratification. In their own descriptions, being middle class thus has been equaled to successfully mitigating economic vulnerability, but we did not

find any indication that from there a commonly shared class consciousness would derive.

\* \* \*

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In this chapter, we have tried to outline a first analysis, using some demographic factors as a starting point. This analysis is, however, rather superficial. The sample size is small, and thus statistical representativity is not given. It also does not reflect the life of an average Ugandan. But this was not our intention either. We focused on the description of prominent characteristics that shape and influence the multi-layered identity of a person, such as their income, age, gender, profession, region, religion and their education. This list is not exhaustive, and it can be adjusted to a different context, but we feel these have been the most prominent markers that have come up during the interviews. Our intention is, in the words of Van Dijk et al., to understand

“[...] the pursuit of certain identity-constructs in the defence and enlargement of socio-political, socio-cultural and economic interests in society. That is, in how far is the pursuit of a[n] identity forceful with regard to processes of inclusion and exclusion in the defence of such interests? In how far is it becoming normative for (the control of) behaviour, expression and desires?”

(van Dijk et al., 2011, p. 6)

Through such an analysis we will be able to discern the distinctive characteristics of the middle income groups, or try to discover what could be “a typical middle class lifestyle and attitude”. So by taking into account these other identity constructs, we might delay differing points of view, not only (or maybe not even at all) according to income, but also according to other factors which may play into account or even figure more prominently. Doing so will hopefully either bring us closer to a justification for talking about “class” when talking about Uganda or it will instead delegitimize this idea, for the sake of different analytical categories.

## 6. Strategies of Economic Advancement and the Mitigation of Financial Vulnerability

The entire part II is dedicated to better describe the middle income groups in Uganda and to understand their recurrent characteristics. We try to provide detailed descriptions of specific demographic factors (done in chapter 5), their lifestyle linked with their consumption practices (in chapter 7), and behavior that we have found recurrent among nearly all our respondents – this shall be the focus of the current chapter<sup>23</sup>. This behavior was often linked to the efforts of the respondents made in the quest for a better life, namely through achieving financial stability and the capacity to mitigate unexpected hardships and times of economic crisis. We identified four main themes that were prominent in many of the interviews: lived trajectories of emergence, stability, and in some cases decline, their tendency to diversify income, their priority of investing into education, and the significance of networks. These themes may seem somewhat arbitrarily put together, but they are linked by a common motive: the mitigation of vulnerability to economic shocks. As we shall see, their trajectories influence the prospects of their economic advancement. The ability to diversify income sources is essential; without, financial stability does not seem possible. Education is cherished as a way to prosperity in many cases and, therefore, people will go to great lengths to get the best education for their children and themselves. Finally, kinship and other social networks are vital means of support; but sometimes also a strain or hindrance. It is also through these themes that stratification among income lines becomes distinguishable and the economic emergence is mainly determined by the capacity to mitigate vulnerability. Being vulnerable, therefore, means for a big part of the middle income groups that *downward* mobility is as much of an option, or even more so, than upward mobility. Resilience to vulnerability is also a decisive factor for middle class affiliation in the work of Ferreira et al. on Latin America. This World Bank study

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<sup>23</sup>The analysis of this chapter is predominantly drawn from the dataset of 2014, where the long narrative interviews left room for new topics and categories to arise

determines the lower economic threshold of the Latin American middle class as \$10 per day – the amount perceived necessary to not be *vulnerable* anymore; that is a likelihood of 10% or less to fall back into poverty within a five-year interval (Ferreira, 2013, p. 33 ff). They differentiate thus between those who are poor, who are vulnerable and finally those who are middle class. They acknowledge though that the most significant share of the population is not in the middle class but among the vulnerable. This does lead interestingly to a similar categorization than the AfDB, but with different conclusions: the latter includes those who are vulnerable in the middle class, described as floating class (Ncube et al., 2011, p. 4), whereas Ferreira et al. make not being vulnerable decisive for being considered middle class. Likewise, it has become conventional wisdom in research on poverty, that many households that are poor, are not so at all times, but show substantial mobility in and out of poverty (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Narayan & Petesch, 2007). This up- and downward mobility closely relates to the approaches of vulnerability and floating class mentioned above. Hence, the mitigation of vulnerability, or the efforts to do so, become central to leaving this kind of insecurity. Therefore, it is not surprising that the narratives of our respondents revolved a lot around these topics. Even though, and this caveat remains if a majority of the participants have passed the state of vulnerability defined in economic terms (the \$4 per day threshold between floating and lower middle class). However, subjectively for the respondents of Kampala, this point seems to come at a higher daily income per capita. In general, the people of the UMC were most likely to acknowledge that they felt they could not fall back into poverty again.

Since we are less focused on boundaries and more on processes, it is not vital to determine fixed thresholds at which a person is not vulnerable anymore. Instead, we try to show how vulnerability decreases, through the different themes discussed here. And not only as actual decrease, but also one subjectively felt by the participants of the study. By doing so, we hope to determine crucial turning points towards more resilience and try to draw more comprehensive conclusions how this might affect behavior and attitudes.

## 6.1. Life Trajectories

The narrative of Africa Rising has been very prominent starting from 2010, as already discussed in chapter 1. If this holds equally true for Uganda, so that we can talk about “Uganda rising” as well, it should be reflected in the macroeconomic statistics of the country. The Museveni era is widely credited for continuous growth and stability. These achievements are recognized even by opponents of the president and are used as justification for the legitimacy of the regime. Museveni portrays himself as the man with a vision for Uganda, whereby this vision is one of evolving into a peaceful middle income country.

Compared with the whole region, Uganda is not one of the big players and punching below the continental average (see p. 109ff). However, the country has experienced economic emergence on a macroeconomic level, lifting people out of the first poverty line and placing them in the class of the vulnerable, making the group of the floating class thus salient for analyses. We have seen that the upward mobility is not restricted to this class alone. Instead, the income distribution itself did not change significantly. Also, we need to bear in mind that at the same time a part of the floating class may have seen downward mobility as well. The question that remains now, is how these macroeconomic changes translate into the personal experiences of the respondents.

Education of father	Percentage of Respondents with University Degree	
Primary	47	Nearly all respondents are doing better than their parents did. It manifests itself in their education, compared to the educational attainments of their parents. However, it would be too hasty to
O-Level	57	
A-Level	71	
University	85	

*Table 6: Relation Between Parental Education and Educational Attainment*

conclude high intergenerational mobility from such an observation. Ferreira et al. point out though that in countries where educational attainment was historically very low (they use Ethiopia as an example, but this may hold equally true for Uganda) achieving better education than the parents should not be interpreted as high intergenerational mobility. Instead, the low starting point allows for easier

catch up (Ferreira, 2013, p. 54). The education of the parents, however, played a role in the likelihood for their children to obtain higher degrees. There is a significant correlation at the 0.05 level between the educational level of the parents and the respondents. In general, the children would obtain a higher education level than their parents, but the correlation also shows the limits to social upward mobility if someone is coming from a humble background.

The site where someone has spent their childhood might be another indicator, even though it is not straightforward. All respondents now are living in Kampala or the surroundings. Thus, we might assume that their children (if applicable) grow up in an urban environment. Among the respondents, however, about half of them grew up in the city or a small town, the other half came from a rural setting. Since urbanization is a critical factor of moving out of poverty (Narayan & Petesch, 2007), we might hence conclude that those who have left in the course of one generation the village to settle in the capital have advanced on a welfare ladder, compared to their parents.

In the personal narratives, it also becomes apparent that there are obstacles to these trajectories of upward mobility, often constrained by the parental background (such as parental education, as already mentioned), therefore, limiting intergenerational mobility. For us to determine intergenerational mobility itself is not possible, since we did not inquire much about or talk to the parents of the respondents. Instead, we decided to focus on their childhood conditions and compare them to their current situations. At the beginning of each interview, the respondents were asked to tell the interviewer about their life, in as much detail as possible. In our narratives, we can distinguish between different pathways.

- I. **The Struggle** – From a poor background, passing their parents, but with limited advancement.
- II. **The Success Story** – From a poor background, passing their parents succeeding very well now.
- III. **The Privilege** – From a privileged background, continuing and expecting a privileged position in the future.



**IV. The Decline** – From a privileged background, with a decline in their economic situation.

Certainly, these differentiations are hard to make and do not necessarily correspond to how the respondents would describe their situation. Additionally, it is not easy to disentangle which factors are structural and which are situational. As described in chapter 5.1.2, income is also bound on the life cycle. Thus, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether someone is affluent because of their background or their age.

So to make a more thorough analysis, we isolated recurrent categories<sup>24</sup> from the narratives of our respondents which have influenced the overall economic well-being of the respondent. If present, each category for each respondent would be attributed a +1 if the situation had a positive effect and a -1 if the situation was negative. Recurrent categories would be as follows:

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<sup>24</sup>These categories are not supposed to be exhaustive, and there is a wide range of topics that have not been covered at all, such as health or exposure to environmental shocks. But, as said before, they are based on items that respondents felt worth mentioning to describe their situation, especially during their childhood. In the categories of the current situation, there has been more probing through the researcher. Thus, these categories possibly reflect equally our framing of decisive markers of wealth. Yet, this framing has been shaped through the various stages of the research process and hence is not entirely external to the lives of the respondents. For example, grocery shopping places would not be included in these categories, because they pertain only to a negligible fraction of the respondents, as discussed elsewhere in this part. Even education of the respondents would not figure into, because the sample had a rather homogeneous level of tertiary education, with only few exceptions.

Childhood Category	Score attributed
Presence of both parents	+1 both parents were present -1 one parent was absent -2 both parents were absent
Employment of both parents	+1 Both parents had employment -1 Both parents were unemployed
Polygamy	-1 Parent was polygamous/multiple families
Ability to pay school fees	+1 Parents were able to pay school fees 0 Parents struggled but managed to pay school fees -1 Parents were incapable of paying school fees
Student working	-1 Respondent had to work to pay school fees or support family
Sponsorship	+1 A sponsor from outside the family paid school fees
Support through family members	+1 External family was able to provide support, financial or other
Growing up in Kampala/Entebbe	+1 Growing up in an urban environment is more likely to be associated with financial well-being
Self-reported condition	+1 Respondent describes childhood conditions as positive -1 Respondent describes childhood conditions as negative/ poor

Table 7: Categories Determining Childhood Conditions

Current Category	Score attributed
Sufficient Income (derived from budget sheets)	+1 Income exceeds expenditure -1 Expenditure exceeds income
Ability to pay school fees	+1 Respondent able to pay for school fees -1 Child cannot go to school because unable to pay school fees
Employment status	+1 Currently employed -1 Currently unemployed
Multiple sources of income	+1 Respondent has multiple sources of income
Single parent	-1 Respondent is raising a child/children alone
Self-reported condition	+1 Respondent describes their condition as positive -1 Respondent describes their condition as negative/poor
Car ownership	+1 Respondent owns a car
House ownership	+1 Respondent owns a house

Table 8: Categories Determining Current Conditions

The scores obtained in each category would be added up, resulting in two final scores, one for the childhood and one for current conditions. Depicted in a scatter diagram, the position of our respondents would be determined by their childhood and current conditions, whereby the score of the current condition is represented by the y-axis and the childhood condition by the x-axis. Interestingly, the groupings by quadrant would roughly (but not always) correspond to the four pathways described above.




Figure 18: Economic Emergence; Scatter Diagram of 2014 Sample

So, those who started off with a low score in their childhood (represented on the x-axis), but managed to score high in their present life (y-axis), considerably improved their lives compared to their childhood. But it also shows that those who are not doing as well today did not have a comfortable childhood either, and on the contrary, those who are in the third quadrant usually had a good start and are doing very good now, as well. This confirms the importance of upbringing and parental endowments, even though the respondents in the second quadrant show that even from a less privileged start advancement is possible. This graph, however, does not reveal the net differences between the childhood conditions and now. It masks

small improvements in the first quadrant and small decline in the third. When only plotting for net difference (that is the current condition score minus the childhood condition score), and sorted from lowest to highest, the net progress of the respondents becomes more visible.




Figure 19: Net Difference in Economic Emergence of 2014 Sample

Actually from those respondents who saw a decline in their living situation, only 11 (Rose), 6 (Oliver) and 23 (Kato) are in a situation of struggle. 10 (Herbert) and 4 (Alex) are relatively young, and from well-to-do families, hence it is not surprising that they have not yet built all their assets, and since their start was from a high score, it was hard to improve on this one right away. They are also not seeing their living situation deteriorating, but rather as *“I am establishing myself as any other man at my age should be doing.”* (Alex). 13 (Elisabeth), whose case will be discussed in chapter 7.3, is particular since she saw her living situation decline, but remains in a somewhat privileged position, compared to one-third of the sample. Yet, she perceived her decline as very strong and considers herself to be a pauper. Oliver, on the other hand, gave up a well-paying job to pursue his political interests and accepted considerable disadvantage. These examples show the relevance of subjective life assessments, as different people with different aspirations judge their life situations differently.

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### **Case Story: The Decline**

Rose (11 in the graph) comes from Fort Portal, in the west of Uganda. Her father was a businessman, owning a small stationery shop. Even though he had to close it eventually, he succeeded in educating his children and taking care of his polygamous family. She recalls her financial situation at home as acceptable since her father even managed to support other people. To pay for her education, he sold small plots of land. During her studies, she met her boyfriend, Kato (23 in the graph), whom she soon moved in with. She got pregnant during her studies, and right now the couple has two girls. Despite motherhood, Rose finished her degree and is now in search of a job, which she finds very challenging, as she lacks experience. Instead, she turned to multi-level marketing but failed to generate an income with it so far. They live in a rented three-bedroom house in Entebbe because Kato works at the airport. He comes from a military family from the north. His father was an army officer under Idi Amin but got killed during in-house fighting. He was raised by paternal relatives but describes these relationships as being without love, making him distancing himself from his family, to the point that he does not speak his local language at home with the children but English. After school, he got a diploma in marketing, and a first employment selling pagers in the wake of the expansion of mobile phones. He describes this as *“selling combs to bold men”*, an experience that he hated to the point that he decided to never do marketing again. After being idle for a year, he found an opportunity at Entebbe Airport. During his time he went on a mission for the UN in the DRC, earning \$3000 a month. He used this money to invest it in a very luxurious house in Entebbe, with the plan of renting it out at \$1200 per month. However, the tenant is not paying, and Kato is involved in a lawsuit over the overdue rent. Right now his job earns him \$400 of which he spends everything. To the point that at the moment of the interview their children were at home because he could not afford to pay their school fees for the trimester that had just started. He is not pleased with his conditions complaining *“I am living in this lousy place, I don’t even have a car. [...] Now I am not even able to pay school fees, my girls will not go to school on Monday because this salary cannot handle.”* For him, a car is of utmost importance to his lifestyle, so he plans to invest the money from the lawsuit in an SUV, which will considerably improve his life. His girlfriend confined in a private moment that her partner does not know how

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to handle money, but that he is also immune to any advice. While in DRC her father had repeatedly urged him to set up different side investments, but he insisted on putting everything into the house. She feels she cannot say anything since he will not listen and arranges herself with the situation. The couple was several times during the interview engaging in arguments (“Every day this is a house of arguments.”), but they also confirmed each other and to the researcher their love for one another.

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### **Case Story: The Struggle**

Oliver (6) comes from an impoverished family that he describes as living below \$1 per day. Because his brother was not interested in continuing education beyond primary school, he convinced his father to send him to secondary school, which he managed to do for some years, selling plots of land to finance his education. He excelled academically, which gave him the opportunity to study on a scholarship while also working on the school’s land to contribute himself as well. After his A-Level studies, Oliver received a government scholarship for Uganda College of Commerce, which he accepted even though being “*academically devastated*” because he had hoped to do political science instead. In school, he had already always been head prefect, and during his studies, Oliver continued by joining NRM and constructing the NRM youth league. He finally got a job as an election manager for the NRM, but eventually quit his job and put all his earnings in the establishment of his own party, which so far has failed to register for elections. He is without formal employment now and is focused on pursuing his political career while surviving on handouts he receives from friends and some funding for work he does for an NGO, but which is not consistent. He describes his living conditions as bad: “*I am barely surviving, I am poor and have no income. I even got evicted from the last place because my history of paying rent is so bad.*”

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As can be seen from these two case stories, these trajectories stagnated or declined because the respondents chose not to mitigate their vulnerability. For Kato and Rose, this was because they chose an investment which failed to pay off, in addition to Rose being unemployed and the unsuccessful business of multi-level marketing. Even though all three received tertiary education, this had not been suffi-

cient protection to their decline. On top, they cannot rely on their families who are geographically far away, not well-endowed to support them with opportunities or handouts. Gordon, whose case will be discussed in relation to the need for education is another well fit example here, of a constant struggle against limited possibilities.

Those who scored highest are not necessarily those who made the most advancement, as has been the case for respondents 9 to 7 in figure 15. And finally, respondents 8-21, who made the most progress, are all presented in quadrant II, as success stories (except for 16 (Innocent)).

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### **Case Story: The Success**

Raphael (2 in the graph) comes from a polygamous family; his father had more than 30 children. Raphael's family is poor, but his father has much influence in his home area. Because he was a head teacher in primary school, Raphael was able to go to school. He then managed to get a sponsor from Germany, *"not because we were the most needy, but because my father was the most influential."* After secondary school, he got a government scholarship due to his good grades and took a bachelor in politics at Makerere University. He later continued his master in Germany, with the help of a scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and today is working for a German organization in Kampala. He is pleased with his situation – he considers himself to be middle class – and confident about his future, saying *"I progress, I am like MDGs, I have socially and economically evolved."*

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### **Case Story: The Privilege**

Alex is a young man at the end of his twenties. He grew up in Kampala, his father is a UPDF captain who has joined the rebels in 1985, during the fights in Luwero. His mother runs a small kiosk. At one time his father was accused of allying with the wrong people and had been suspended from service for two years. During that time the family managed to survive nevertheless, living from investments (mainly houses) they had put in place before. Alex knows about his privileged position: *"I come from a loving, caring*

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*family, my parents provided everything, I grew up with peace and security. God has been merciful.”* He studied law at Makerere University and the Law Development Center, graduated in 2013 and is now working in his first job. He invested into multi-level marketing as a side business, hoping for high returns, as his ambitions are to become a millionaire. Side earnings can come through the drafting of a legal agreement for the family or an acquaintance and through doing well-paid studies for the World Bank. He is living by himself in a self-contained two-bedroom house in Bukoto that belongs to his parents, thus freeing him from the charge of paying rent. He has plans for further investment into agriculture and real estate, and is optimistic about his future.

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The majority of those in quadrant III can be considered as a second generation of members of the middle income groups, with well-to-do parents. As shown in the case story above, they are to some extent conscious about their beneficial position. This awareness will equally shape their perception, as the mitigation of vulnerability is not the highest priority anymore. Instead, they focus on wealth accumulation, since they know that they can turn to their families for support in case of need. The respondents most determined to become wealthy were found in this quadrant, some of them even quite overtly, such as Alex, mentioned above. Inversely, if the generational contract of doing better than the parents is violated, as in the case of Elisabeth, the deception may be even worse, as the fragility of the own position had not been perceived as such before.

Through the figures 18 and 19, we have tried to visualize the trajectories of the respondents and show some recurring patterns. Usually, those who came from well-to-do families would score high in their current situations as well, and some of those from struggling families did not manage to dramatically improve their lives, compared to their parents. Others, however, managed to make substantial leaps forward. Through their life stories, some important factors decisive for poverty or well-being in childhood and now have been singled out and have been reflected in the categories that we used to attribute the scores. These determinants correspond with findings from other studies on the necessary endowments for moving out of poverty (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012, p. 35



ff). Among others, a study conducted by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in Uganda lists multiple sources of income, formal employment, education, support from family members as decisive for moving out of poverty (ibid. p. 35) and other factors such as divorce, family size, death of an earning family member or employment loss as likely to increase falling into poverty (ibid. p. 41). Here we determined factors that would lead or hinder their emergence. These categories had been illustrated by chosen case stories, to get a better understanding of the endowments needed to advance, but also to the limits that may be hard to overcome. Three of these factors, namely the ability to diversify income, to invest in education, and the connection within networks will be looked at closer now because they have figured so prominently in these trajectories of economic emergence.

## **6.2. Diversifying Income**

That point has been a central characteristic of leaving poverty (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012) and of petty prosperity (Nallet, 2013, p. 92; Strode et al., 2015, p. 83). In the research group on the African middle classes at the LAM, this was common practice among all countries researched. While a regular salary and formal employment are decisive for reaching a status of “respectability” that goes along with the notion of middle class (see also chapter 5.1.5), very often a particular lifestyle could not be maintained without other sources of income. Also, it would not be unusual if the side income exceeded the formal salary, yet the latter would be the first income mentioned. It would also be the label how the respondents would refer to themselves. Hence, Andrew would complain how his income as a university lecturer was barely enough to fuel his cars, but upon further inquisition it became apparent that his real monthly income was nearly six times as high, putting him among the best-earning individuals interviewed. Even though he describes himself as poor, he concedes that

“I do not see myself getting to the lowest level of the poverty line. [...] I do not foresee a situation that I am not able to not completely have money to run my home. My shares will always be there; the houses will always be there.”

Andrew

Since the time of our interview, his contract with university expired and did not get renewed. He used this as an opportunity to establish his own NGO in the area of conflict resolution. Even though he cannot rely on his regular salary anymore, he was able to maintain his lifestyle without any concessions.

On the contrary, those who are among the most destitute struggle to put aside sufficient money to invest in another business and as a result remain in a state of vulnerability, where they are unable to compensate once they lose their current source of income. Additionally, many of them cannot turn to their families because they are already better off than them and thus know that they do not have any securities, in case of economic hardship.

“My safety net is not yet constructed; there are a lot of risks surrounding my life, I am just building, I am just building.”

Nelson

Even here the notion of temporality is evoked. Most of those respondents are aware of the benefits that come with diversified income sources and are thus working hard to receive multiple incomes. There is some variation in the nature of the capital used for generating the secondary income. Since the poorest do not have any surplus money, if the opportunity is present, they will most likely put their own labor to productive use. One person, for example, after working half-time as a cleaner in an international foundation, would spend the other half of the day as an electrician in his neighborhood. The surplus money he earned he invested into his third income opportunity, setting up a store for electronic equipment, such as sockets and switches. Even here, he is still working on his own labor since he is the only salesperson. If he manages to make more profit, he plans to employ someone to do the work for him. It would be interesting to see whether he will use that time to do further work or for his leisure. Thus, even with very little money, most respondents would plan investments in other income opportunities. If the surplus

money is more, investments become more cash intensive, such as buying a plot and building a house for rent. Nicole said they would even first invest their money to build houses for tenants and only after finishing the construction, build their own house, so that they could use the money earned from the rent to invest in their construction and thus avoid taking a loan. On the other hand, people with many savings are giving out credits and earning through the dividends (often in addition to the side business they already run). Innocent says he is not saving with the bank out of principle:

“I decided never to go to these schemes of the bank; I would rather lend some money to my colleagues, this system is much better, you get much better returns than with the bank.”

Innocent

As a result, he usually engages in business ventures with friends, which earns him about \$10 000 in a year, even though it is not regular and sometimes he loses out or returns are less than expected. Albeit some financial risks involved he is still confident about his future. *“Even if the money is not there, you know, you will not collapse.”*

In general, regardless of their earnings, respondents perceived their salary not to be sufficient and hence concentrated on generating more income. George, who has diversified into very different activities explains he is doing so because:

“First: out of interest. Second: Because of economic benefit. What you earn [in his case approximately \$400 per month] is not enough to be sustainable considering the family, so you need other income generating projects.”

George

Because he is running his firm, he cannot be entirely sure about the amount, and the time he will be paid. Thus, some side incomes he set up (carpentry, agriculture, a wine business) give him a more regular income:

“They helped me the most because some of those incomes are daily, some of these are daily incomes, coming every day and you find that at least you are able to sustain a home a period of time.”

George

Others, again among the higher ends of the income spectrum are actively seeking investment opportunities, such as Herbert. He has set up a Savings and Credit Association (SACCO), and while he did not know yet in what to invest, he and 13 other friends contributed \$40 per month. They planned to accumulate money for about a year and a half and then choose where to invest. They eventually decided to acquire a plot of land and use it for farming, waiting now for their payouts.

The most common side incomes are from real estate, agriculture or small shops, and often relying on poorer family members as employees. This combines the advantages of having someone take care of the business or field who can be trusted, and at the same time supporting a member of the extended family; thus, reducing expectations from family members to share the wealth.

The diversification of income leads to blurring class lines in a Marxian sense because it is quite possible that someone is a laborer, a farmer and an entrepreneur at the same time. This duality of salary and side incomes is mutually reinforcing, and one without the other increases the economic vulnerability. The salary gives a certain predictability and security, yet in itself it is often too low to meet the financial needs of the household. The side income serves to bolster the paycheck, however, is often riskier. A failed payout, due to a bad harvest, a tenant who has run away before paying or a badly-performing shop are, therefore, no threats to the economic survival. The accumulation of activity gives rise to several questions: whether class allegiances can be found through the primary employment, which is often used as a personal identification or if they are blurred or even overcome by interests that stem from other incomes, how they structure the perception of and relation to the state, or the relation between the “formal” and “informal” sectors.

However, there remains also the questions whether this duality salary/side income will persist. While educational attainments rise, the job market has difficulty to adapt. A challenge for the government remains in this regard the prevailing high

levels of youth unemployment, underemployment (26%) and informal employment (95%) (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. iv). In such a context, having a salaried profession remains a source of prestige as well as an exception to the Ugandan rule. The World Bank observes in a report on youth unemployment, that chances for unemployment rise with higher educational attainment and when living in an urban area (World Bank, 2009, p. 5), most likely because little educated, rural youth can be more easily absorbed into agriculture. A youthful population can have a significant potential for the Ugandan economy, given that they will be absorbed in the productive sector, increasing pressure for the government to create jobs. However, the formal sector “*is small and produces jobs at a much slower rate than the out turn of graduates from universities and other higher institutions of learning.*” (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 45) In addition, insufficient real wages make it more likely for young, educated Ugandans to venture into self-employment. Bennon, for example, works as a baker, albeit having a diploma in education. He explains his choice due to “*meager pay. It would be meager if they were paying it.*” Albeit being financially far from secure, this still seemed to be the more reasonable decision. Similarly, it is possible to find young graduates who prefer driving a boda boda because it offers better earning potential than working in an office at an entry-level wage. Equally, respondents would sometimes assert that the second-hand clothes traders amass quite some income, yet no one would suspect them of “being middle class”, as they do not live conspicuously. The emphasis on entrepreneurialism is also supported by government agencies. Thus, for example, the Uganda Investment Authority commissioned a paper in 2010 outlining 500 business ideas and the money for investment required, which now regularly circulates in its complete or abridged forms through WhatsApp groups. It raises the question whether occupation is an adequate characteristic of middle class in Africa, or if it creates blind spots concerning micro-entrepreneurs. This tendency is not unique to Uganda. In a study on entrepreneurship in Africa, the authors observe for Kenya:

“There is a strong culture of entrepreneurship in Kenya, and survey responses suggest that entrepreneurs are accorded a higher level of status and respect than mid-level and senior managers in medium-sized companies. Entrepreneurship is increasingly being viewed as a desirable career option. This is at least in part due to the role the media has played in profiling successful entrepreneurs.”

(Omidyar Network, 2013, p. 30)

The valorization of self-employment, even though not commonly shared by all, goes along with declining confidence in the utility of an educational degree, as sometimes doubts are raised. One common narrative is of the university producing only “*job seekers and not job creators*”. While the usefulness of going to university is questioned by some, though, we have not yet seen anyone who was willing to forgo the education of their children for them to work in a micro-enterprise.

### **6.3. Investment in Education**

Since a majority of Ugandans is young, and at the same time, educational attainments are at the rise, we might expect that a major preoccupation for those having accumulated some wealth will be to invest into education. Programs for Universal Primary (started in 1997) and Secondary Education (started in 2007) have contributed to higher school enrollments, nevertheless high drop out rates in primary school and the low quality of the education affect the achievements. Therefore, for those who can afford, private educational institutions remain the first choice. Going to university remains an exception, rather than a rule (even though the number of students has increased), and is still below the regional standard (UNESCO, 2012).

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#### ***Case Story: The Need of a Breakthrough***

Gordon was born in 1987 in a village in Western Uganda. His parents are subsistence farmers and are, according to him, the poorest family in the village. Because it was clear that they could not pay for his school fees beyond P7, Gordon ran away as a child, one night he jumped on a lorry that brought him to Kampala. He did

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not know anyone and had nowhere to go, so he lived as a street child, sleeping in the trenches around Kalerwe and doing small jobs like being a porter. Once he got himself 200 000 UGX, Gordon joined S1 but stopped again in S2 for four years because he could not raise the tuition. He then was lucky because he found a former employer who was willing to pay his schooling up to S6. From then on Gordon had been on his own. While he has the grades allowing him to go back to university he did not manage to get the money to pay for tuition. He also did not get any formal employment, thus doing small contractual works in data entry and some brokerage to make him survive and support his brother. He is now desperately hoping for a breakthrough, allowing him to pursue a university degree and get stable employment.

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The story highlights the difficulty of accessing education if the parents or extended family are not able to pay for tuition and if there is no sponsor available. It also reveals the limits to the promise of education. With high school graduates becoming more common than in previous periods, the high school diploma is losing value, due to its inflation. For Gordon advancement now seems blocked because his prospects of being able to finance his university education are limited. Several studies have shown that higher income is linked to higher education (Strode et al., 2015) and everyone will go to great lengths to educate themselves or their children.

It is also very common for someone who can afford to do so, to continue their education. Hence, higher education in such cases is due to higher income and will possibly entrain higher income; thus the respondent becomes part of a virtuous circle.

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### ***Case Story: From Teaching to Banking***

Arthur has grown up in northern Uganda. Both of his parents died in the 1990s, while he was still in primary school. His relatives then financed his education in secondary school. When he finished his A-Level, he had to choose a degree; his brother agreed to pay the tuition. He explains his choice: *"I took B.A. Education, English language because it was the cheaper option. It was not what I was intending to study. My interest was in law, but I went to education because it was 205 000, but law was about 1.5 million, so I looked at*

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*myself as not in the capacity to pay the law cost, it was too much for me.” After graduating, he worked for two years as a teacher but finally left because salary payments had been infrequent. He then started working in a bank, inspired by the career changes of other teachers, even though he lacked any formal training. While he was teaching, he started a Master’s in Ethics and Public Management, but he only managed to pay half of the tuition so far. Thus, he arranged with the university that he will slowly pay off his debts, and when everything is cleared out, he will be able to graduate. But he still has more plans: “My ambition has been that now that I am working in a bank to study afresh because my degree now is not relevant to the bank. [...] Now I am taking a post graduate diploma financial management. [...] The fee is about 2.8 million, I already paid one million, and they agreed that I start to study. So I am left with 1.8 million which they say I can pay in February.” His wife, too, started her master’s degree in 2014, after having graduated in 2008. The couple pays the school fees from a joint account, but Arthur adds that he had started saving for tuition already earlier on. He puts 100 000 UGX away for his schooling, and already 50 000 UGX for his children, even though they are not in school yet.*

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This case story shows how people rarely pursue their desired degree but opt for the most practical choice and how, in return, this may have little to do with their future employment, or with their consecutive degrees. In the case of Arthur, after paying off all tuition, he will have obtained a master’s and a postgraduate degree since he started working full time. Hence, an undergraduate degree often serves for getting a title and thus an academic qualification. The real specialization, however, is pursued afterward in a post-graduate degree or a master’s degree. Besides, the story illustrates the various arrangements made around the payment of tuition. Starting from the family support to give an education foundation, but then the own efforts to continue the education and adapt it to the current needs and situation, often resulting in evening classes and less time for family or free time. Arthur admits to sometimes skipping church, or not attending a club where he used to be a member because he is under pressure due to his studies. Education, therefore, is highly valued and it does not necessarily stop with the first job. Its high value is also reflected in the priority that parents place on the education of their children. This



will be further detailed in the chapter 7.2 when looking at expenditure for education. It is often said that the middle class places a high value on education (Alber, 2016b, p. 23; Kroeker, 2017, p. 281; Spronk, 2014, p. 210). We would argue that in a context like in Uganda, this holds true for everyone because people have understood the relevance of education in securing a good future. Lindhardt has found a similar attitude on the universal value of education among Tanzanians:

“But education is in and of itself related to prestige, modernity, development, and progress. Whatever it may lead to in terms of future occupation, education is seen as an efficient way of cultivating productive, healthy young people and preventing the youth from going idle.”

(Lindhardt, 2010, p. 248)

As shown above, though, the extent to which this aspiration can be realized changes according to financial and human capital. The financial capital to pay for tuition or the connection to others who might be able to finance the education is vital. Such observations indicate that social mobility is rather limited and thus contributes to reproduce a class effect where poor people will be more likely to have poor children, due to the lack of these connections. Haveman and Wolfe have demonstrated how the parents' education played a vital role in the income of their children, as it would affect time and goods dedicated by the parents towards the children's upbringing, which in return would affect the final schooling level. The income would also influence the post-school investment, and eventually, all these factors influence the income of the children (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995, p. 1833). Even though Haveman and Wolfe conducted their studies in the US, it remains applicable to Uganda as well, since similar mechanisms are at work. The government can have a decisive influence in this trajectory, though, through providing an inclusive school system and an efficient labor market (Ferreira, 2013, p. 50). In the case of Uganda, it does seem that the government cannot live up to these expectations, as the relatively low number of high school graduates and the high rate of youth unemployment show (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012, p. 45). Hence, there are important impediments to intergenerational mobility. Financial support systems within the extended family are, therefore, vital to overcoming these boundaries. It

is of no surprise then, that nearly all respondents regardless of their income, have other family members at their charge, for whom they pay school fees (see also 6.4 and 7.2). Education levels play a role beyond mere income though, as it will shape attitudes and values. Hence, for example, Bourdieu's distinction between cultural and economic capital. They can exist independent of each other, and cultural capital (that includes schooling) is even more prestigious than economic capital (Jurt, 2008, p. 73). For some authors, the origin of the erroneous assumption that middle classes would foster democracy lies in the confusion between middle class and education. Kurzman and Leahay (2004) argue that it was rather an intellectual class than a middle class who pushed for democratization in various historical settings. Lipset himself in his famously cited study that laid for many the ground of the relationship between middle class and democracy points out that more than income education will decide about the fostering of democratic values (Lipset, 1959b, p. 79). Such assertions should be treated with caution, though, as they ignore the historical and political context of the countries studied. We might consider though to scrutinize certain attitudes not only according to income but also to education level, even though the two are closely linked, as shown before.

#### **6.4. Networks**

Knowing the right people is another relevant factor for the mitigation of economic vulnerability. This has become quite visible in the narratives of the respondents' childhood experiences. Those who did not manage to find someone to step in to pay their school fees when their parents were not able had the hardest time to advance economically. Raphael in the case story mentioned above pointed out that he was able to get a sponsor from Germany, not because he was the most destitute, but because his father was well-connected within the community; thus this opportunity had been pointed out to him. Gordon, on the other hand, ran away from home after primary school because he felt his parents, whom he describes as "*the poorest of the village*" could not provide him further opportunities. In Kampala, he lived on the streets because he did not know anyone who could help him. Even though Gor-

don succeeded to educate himself up to senior six, he feels now that his advancement has stalled because he fails to get an opportunity to prove himself and he does not know anyone who could provide such an opportunity to him. It is even possible that he agreed to the interview in the hope that this would give him further employment opportunities as he repeatedly highlighted his data processing skills. When asked what he was doing for leisure, Gordon said, among others, that he seeks advice from people who are better off than himself. Later on, he conceded that particularly with politicians this was difficult to do, as they would believe he will only ask for money and not even pick their phone anymore after he had called once.

Having realized the importance of knowing the right people has led several respondents to engage in conscious networking – actively seeking contact with key figures, often described as mentors. Learning, or seeking advice, from older or more affluent people has come up several times during the interviews.

“That is why I use them [older friends] /ok, not using them but/ that is why I make them my friends, that is why they are my friends because they have been where I am, so they guide and say ok, so where is the problem?”

George

Sometimes the respondents would frequent a place because of the people they could meet there. This was the case for Nelson, who would attend a sauna and steam bath once a week because “*there are these high profile citizens*”, like ministers, officers, prominent business people and the like. “*And I feel happy; you meet, sweat, you discuss with them.*” For a similar reason Innocent is a member of Entebbe Golf Club, even though, according to his own words, he does not even play golf, the membership is merely “[...] *to go and greet these old men and learn from them.*” Even though he pays full the membership fee for the golf club, he is only rarely going there. He had also been a member of the Rotary club but is not active anymore. Aida hinted that she used the occasion of their befriended family meetings to learn from people better off but also to get customers for her business. Career advancement had also been a networking reason for Joy, who is a member of an alumni association from her school. Women who have graduated from that

school would meet up and try to benefit from each other's connections when looking for job opportunities for themselves or relatives or friends.

Finally, various respondents indicated that they would befriend with some people because of the benefits they could get, like being friends with older people for advice on business matters, or to get support in case of financial hardship. Raphael said when talking about the type of friends he had: *"You will think of I have a problem like I need 500 000, whom do I talk to? So I need to get friends of that caliber."* George and Alex also stated that they had older friends to learn from them, as well as friends of the same age. For Alex and Abdul meeting with friends is also an opportunity to find new ventures for business opportunities. For Abdul, who describes himself as an introvert, friends are mainly there to discuss questions on how to bring forward their careers instead of personal issues.

Even though coincidence may play a role, there is a re-enforcing tendency. Knowing the right people (whereby "right" depends on the context) offers opportunities which in return offer more connections. On the contrary, someone with little exposure will have fewer opportunities and thus a harder time making meaningful connections. Income stratification does indeed play a role here, on several accounts those who are poor have pointed out the hard times they have to get in contact with people who are better off and who fear that they will ask them for money. Options like the steam bath or the golf club do not exist for somebody like Gordon simply because he cannot afford such leisure activities. Entry barriers are high, therefore, (deliberately) creating spaces of socio-economic homogeneity. Here we can witness stratification of groups in the sense of Bourdieu's social capital: resources become available (current or potential) due to the adherence to a particular group. If this group, as in our case, is structured along income lines, we can see a reproduction of class or income structures within the social networks (Rehbein, 2011, p. 113).

Religious groups can provide one opportunity to transcend these income frontiers. Out of the 13 respondents who had a childhood in poor conditions, and were not particularly well-connected into higher echelons of the community, more than half

managed to receive a scholarship through church organizations or find a willing cleric who would take over their school fees. And all except one are now situated in quadrant I or II, which in a way reveals the extent to which they have managed to overcome the lack of network in their childhood through their scholarship.

The extended family is often, especially at a younger age a very viable source of support. In many cases, the family had played a key role in the education of the respondents. George, growing up in a female-headed household because his father left when he was ten years old, describes his childhood conditions:

“So of course there were financial pressures, but because of / as I was saying / because of the extended families that helped us/ groomed us, we would find ourselves working and earning for ourselves.”

George

The support of the extended family had been most important in cases where only one or no parent was present, and no religious organization would step in to pay for school fees. Most likely these were not clear-cut dichotomies, as presented here because relatives may have supported the parents or paid school fees until a religious sponsor was found. But in the narratives of the respondents, these situations were presented as consecutive events, and no further inquiry in the subject was made. Hence, these events are reflected here as they had been told. Beyond school fees, relatives might have proved valuable in finding job opportunities or the like, but this had not been explicitly mentioned. It only became evident in the case of Alex who found his first employment through personal connection, though he did not specify whether this was a family member and in the case of George and his uncle Innocent who both mentioned various family members that were working in different ministries. Additionally, they came both from the West, thus nurturing through their statements accusations made by other Ugandans that nepotism prevailed within the state structures. Other respondents simply mentioned family members who were married to influential people or who had been abroad, which in these cases led to opportunities to travel abroad for the respondents as well.

Sometimes this assistance of the family would continue up to today and, therefore, be even now a decisive factor of decreasing vulnerability. This, however, would

only be the case among those people well off and from well-endowed families, mainly those represented in quadrant III. For those in quadrant I and II, turning to their family would not be an option because they are not able to give any help. As a result, respondents find themselves again in either a virtuous or vicious cycle, where those who are already less vulnerable know that they can get support in case of hardships and those who find themselves in fragile positions are aware that any shock will increase their poverty. Hence, their necessity to mitigate vulnerabilities is even bigger, yet their capacity to do so is smaller. Neubert suggests here to distinguish between the upward mobility of the vulnerable, with poor networks in which they have more to invest than they might get out of and the established, who can rely on better-situated networks to consolidate their positions (Neubert, 2017). This positioning and its desire to change it has a decisive impact on the life choices made, on the decision what to spend money on and what to do in their free time.

Because they enjoyed the support of their families, and even if they did not, respondents feel the responsibility to help out their other family members. *“I have to make that sacrifice [of supporting the extended family] because there were others who did sacrifice for me.”* (Innocent). As a result, nearly all respondents, with the exceptions of the young respondents from privileged families, would pay school fees for a family member, regardless of their financial situation. The benefit of education has already been discussed, and respondents are well aware of its importance. George stated that he would support his nephews’ education so that they will not “disturb” him later on by remaining dependent. Very often, family support is expected from the family members. This sometimes came to be seen as a strain for the respondents. Joy had been the most outspoken on the issue:

“I hate this social responsibility; I hate it. I feel like it is one of the things that has kept us Africans in poverty.”

Joy

She comes from a destitute family, her father abandoned the family, and the mother had to leave the country to look for work, leaving her children with a friend (for

more details see the case story on p. 402). Joy could not count on any support from the family but got her education through a well-meaning nun and finally through a government scholarship. While she is in steady employment now, the most dramatic change in her income situation was her relationship with a wealthy man. So while he pays for most of the expenditure at home, she uses her salary to help her family. Her mother got sick, and now she is the one who has to see her siblings through school.

Sarah is financially helped by her children, and in return, she helps out some other relatives of her. She describes her financial situation as such:

“We have many relatives and most of us we are very poor. [...] If I was alone, if I didn't have those extended family, when I am by myself, that money could maintain me. Except, the problem [is] expensive relatives, those extended family, they are difficult.”

Sarah

Her case shows the brokerage going on in the negotiation of dependencies. While her daughter could support those relatives and she would be off the hook, this solution does not seem acceptable because then she would not give any help to anybody.

In most cases, the respondents do not suffer so much from helping their family, even if it is not easy for them. Some even do not perceive it as a pressure at all, which will very much depend on the financial situation of the respondent and of the wider family. Some authors argue that PCC churches are particularly appealing to new middle classes because they allow them to break with their kin and hence free themselves from social obligations towards them (cf Lindhardt, 2010). We believe that these arguments undermine the agency of those subjected to family contributions. From our interviews, we instead got the impression that there was negotiation involved concerning the extent of help given. Pamela has barely enough income to get through the month herself. She explained:

“I don’t feel happy when my family asks for money, but I cannot say no when I am not willing, only when I really don’t have. Unless I know it is not a serious issue, but not if someone’s life is depending on it.”

Pamela

This quote shows that she very well evaluates the severity of the problem before giving money and she also has the option to decline if she feels that she cannot spare any money. Raphael describes this as “*You have to learn how to disappoint people here*”, referring to the constant demands made on him. Innocent responded when asked about his budgeting: “*The Bible says, whatever you get, give some, spend some, and save some. So it is a principle.*” He then continues explaining that he has at any time at least five relatives depending on him and he confesses not using mobile money on his phone because it would make it too easy to send the money, as soon as someone calls and asks for a small sum of money. Instead, he can reply that he would have to go and look for the next mobile money kiosk to make the transferral and that this is not a good moment right now. By this indirect refusal, he can reduce financial pressure on him, again, for demands that do not seem to be vital. Nelson described that he would connect young boys from his family to construction companies in town, so that they would be able to earn an income and reduce expectations from his family on him: “*Instead of looking at me, they look at them for support.*”

So, while the respondents may not give out their money enthusiastically to their family, they are not victim to a rapacious family either. They know about the importance of their contribution, and they are willing to accept their social responsibility. However, they are also able to protect themselves from requests they deem inappropriate. Hence, support to the family is not a single road, but a bargain within the person and with their relatives (see also Kroeker, 2017, p. 293).

Thus, networks provide an essential safety net for the respondents from which they can draw material, emotional, and social support. To be strategically well-placed within such networks is a crucial factor of stabilizing a middle income position. These networks can be based on traditional solidarities, such as kinship, but they can also transcend these. Knowing that they cannot rely on their less privileged ex-



tended families, middle income groups seek to diversify their support network (Kroeker, 2017, p. 295). In alumni groupings, networks are entertained that evolve around similar education (and age), in women networks gender is a basis for mutual support (see Tripp, 1994), and sometimes the networks are established in regard to income. However, as the analysis of the leisure activities shows, these categories of networks are not exclusive. They can easily overlap, as is the case with the middle-aged, Western-dominated, Anglican, women's group of Mother's Union (see p. 369). Hence, we need to bear in mind concerning our analysis that identities are not unidimensional.

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In relation to the ascension to or maintaining of a middle income position, we have seen through our data that the theme of vulnerability and its mitigation had been central. Hence, the picture drawn here, shows that leaving poverty is a process that often unwinds over several generations, and is not unidirectional, but may include down- as well as upward mobility. Thus, those who have come from privileged backgrounds are the least exposed to vulnerability because of the assets their parents can give, regarding education, financial assistance in times of hardship and also connections with influential people. On the contrary, those without meaningful family assistance and other external help struggle the most to advance themselves economically. Catalysts for economic emergence can be external factors such as receiving a scholarship from an NGO or religious organization. But even those are not necessarily targeted to the most destitute, but again to those who are the best connected within the local community and thus the most likely to learn about the opportunity.

Singling out decisive factors that are necessary for economic emergence allows us to have a more honest debate about those that have left poverty and their needs, instead of a celebration of the emerging African middle class. Chances are not equally distributed, as the examples have shown. For a broader-based middle income group to emerge, the responsibility of the state has to be brought back in fo-

cus. In a well-functioning educational and labor market system having a sponsor for education or being well-connected lose centrality because educational opportunities are more accessible for everyone and jobs are distributed on merit (Ferreira, 2013, p. 50). If this is not the case, social advancement is not open to anyone but will remain with those who are already privileged.

The crucial turning point between the respondents seems to be the awareness that they are not vulnerable anymore, and this has been present only in the UMC and UC, where people know they have sufficient reliances that protect them in case of unforeseen hardships. Kroeker has shown in her work that the middle class in Kenya occupies a privileged position, because it can draw on a mix of several methods for assuring their social security, such as government-provided welfare schemes, private insurances and social networks (Kroeker, 2017, p. 278). We have observed similar tendencies, especially regarding government schemes and social networks. Perceiving oneself as vulnerable (and here the subjective perception is more decisive than actual income) will affect people's behavior. They will strive to feel as economically secure as possible, by directing their consumption towards the choices that help them construct their economic safety, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.

## 7. Consumption and Expenditure

When trying to point out common characteristics of these middle income groups (besides their income range), it is helpful to look at their consumption patterns. Using net income as a definition for middle class categorization has several shortcomings, as has been pointed out before in chapter 1.2 and measuring consumption can be one way to overcome them. Chinganya et al. (2015) consider measuring consumption to be the most reliable welfare indicator. They compared the consumption of the fourth to ninth decile of the population, in 19 different countries over a period of ten years, using the PovCalNet Database from the World Bank. For Uganda, the data reveal a positive trend in consumption over the last years. Using expenditure data, however, still runs the risk of high measurement error, due to misreporting and, especially in African countries, unreliable and infrequent data (Jerven, 2016; Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 401). Asset indexes have the capacity to draw a more nuanced picture of inclusive growth (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). According to Johnston & Abreu asset indexes already revealed a growth of wealth in Africa at the beginning of the 1990s, when the common narrative on the continent was one of doom (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 400). Using assets derived from the Demographic Health Surveys in several African countries, Sahn & Stifel conclude that poverty has been declining in the 1990s, particularly in rural areas (Sahn & Stifel, 2000, p. 2152). And Young, equally working with the Demographic Health Surveys observes that “*real household consumption in Africa is growing between 3.4 to 3.7 percent per annum [1990-2006] i.e. three and a half to four times the 0.9 to 1.1 percent reported in international data sources.*” (Young, 2012, p. 698) All authors suggest that the reliability of data in Africa is a problem and believe that asset indexes can paint a more accurate picture. These observations underline our assumptions that we indeed witness a slow decline of poverty over time. However, this does not in itself allow to conclude that a middle class is emerging. With these suggestions in mind, our analysis of economic stratification will, therefore, trian-

gulate our qualitative findings with data from the most recent National Household Surveys and various asset indexes. By doing so, we hope to provide a nuanced picture of consumption and expenditure behavior. We use the subgroups proposed by the AfDB to highlight changes in consumption behavior that are related to changing income.

In the 2012 dataset, we asked respondents what their household main expenditure was, in the 2014 dataset we deduced the principal expenditures from the budget overview given. Since we assume that most people have an accurate estimation of their most significant spendings, we imagine that the answers would have been similar to our calculated output in 2014. When treated as equal, the 2012 and 2014 results show that by far the biggest perceived spending is still on *food* (indicated by 55% of the respondents), followed by *education* (27% of answers). Other significant budget items are *transport* and *housing*; *health*, *business*, and *other items* yielded only very few responses.

When looking at income classes, the picture gets somewhat refined. The percentage of people who would call food their main expenditure decreases within the middle classes (FC to UMC). At the same time, the number of people stating rent and housing as their main expenditure increases, and transport, not having been named by the poor and FC becomes a relevant expenditure item for the LMC to UC. This increase is probably due to more people owning a car and thus spending more money on gas and maintenance than those using public transport or even walking. Thus, with increasing income the willingness increases as well to spend on items that are beyond mere (felt) necessities, such as comfortable housing (discussed in chapter 7.3) or personal transport (see chapter 7.4). However, one of the primary concerns in spending habits remains education, which is in line with our observations made earlier (see chapter 6.3). This focus becomes possible, once the burden to spend money on food decreases, as we shall see.

## 7.1. Food Expenditure<sup>25</sup>

Food expenditure is a necessity for everyone, but it can also become a marker of wealth, a possibility of distinction through consumption. However, with increasing budgets, the percentage of money spent on food will decrease. Thus, while it may remain the main expenditure (depending on the percentage spent on other items), we see that, nevertheless, in the smaller sample of the 2014 interviews, the percentage of income spend on food tends towards zero (see figure 21).




Figure 20: Food Expenditure and Total Income per Household

The figure above shows data from 17 households of all income groups collected in 2014. On the horizontal axis, each number represents one household of the sample. The purple squares describe the households' expenditure on food, varying roughly around 300 000 UGX (approximately \$130), while total incomes – represented by the orange diamonds – differ significantly from one household to another. It is striking how little the expenditure on food varies, despite the higher amount of money at disposal.

<sup>25</sup>This sub-chapter is a revised version of an analysis made for l'Institut fran çais des relations internationales (IFRI) in 2016 and reused with permission from the IFRI. For the original text see Fichtmüller (2016).




Figure 21: Food Expenditure as Percentage of Total Household Income

Figure 21 uses the same data but depicts the food expenses as a percentage of the total household income. It illustrates, as stated before, that whereas the households with less income spend a substantial share on food, those of the UMC and UC use only a fraction of their income – showing that a surplus in money is not necessarily invested in food consumption.

Albeit the percentage of income spent on food decreases, it is still widely considered to be the primary household expenditure among all strata. Because food is still perceived to be the most significant financial burden for the majority of the respondents, conscious choices are made to cut down on food expenditure to alleviate budget strains and to be able to invest the surplus somewhere else. Similarly, the upbringing and acquired tastes affect their food expenditure decisions. Hence, the middle income groups do not spend more on food simply because they earn more. Through the interviews the following reasons could be found:

### a) Nutrition habits only change slowly

When asked about their diet, most interviewees responded to rely mainly on local food, such as rice, maize, plantains, beans, cabbage, or tomatoes. Even though imported food like pizza, cheese or ice cream can be bought in the big supermarkets, they do not constitute an essential part of the daily menu. For those of the lower end of the middle income groups, they remain too expensive. Even for the UMC such items are “special treats” and are rarely consumed. Sophie Chevalier points out that even though eating is a way to express lifestyle, it is also part of more persistent identities, usually formed in early stages in life and *“this changes more slowly than our willingness to experiment with fast foods imported from around the*

*globe.*” (Chevalier, 2015, p. 119) Eating imported food becomes hence a form of conspicuous consumption for the Ugandan UMC – a deliberate choice made because one can afford it, but remains far from being integrated into the regular menu. Local markets are, therefore, the principal food shopping places for all the respondents. Small grocery stores are used to supplement the basics bought on the market by everyday items like sugar, bread or margarine. Big supermarkets or shopping malls are mostly avoided. Even someone who can afford to shop in the supermarket is not necessarily interested in doing so because the imported foods do not correspond to their eating habits. The pattern changes, however, depending on the type of product bought: especially for electronic equipment people will more likely buy them in supermarkets or abroad if they can afford to do so and have the necessary contacts.

#### **b) “Health consciousness” among the higher income range**

The Uganda National Household Survey establishes a correlation: the number of meals taken per day goes up in accordance with the rise in income (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). In our sample, the relation is not as straightforward since the respondents who declared to take only one meal per day are evenly distributed among the income classes. Money can be an explanation, but this can also be attributed to a lack of time due to a stressful working day or for health reasons, such as the desire to control weight or blood pressure. The “healthy” choice often seems to consist of skipping an unhealthy meal instead of replacing it by a healthy one. Most interviewees eat meat only rarely, in general once a week. Some because they lack the means to do so, others because they choose to do so due to its reputation of being unhealthy. With rising income and education, awareness of the risk of unhealthy eating rises as well, making meat consumption, therefore, not a proportional indicator of wealth. Besides, among the younger members of the middle income groups, other lifestyle choices have to be taken into account: for example, the redefinition of beauty norms, corresponding to an accrued interest in weight loss. As a result, nearly half of university graduates take only two meals per day,

and one-third eats meat only once per week. Regarding gender, however, there are no significant differences in the number of meals and the amount of meat consumed.

### **c) The availability of agricultural exploitation**

Thirdly, many of the individuals with higher income have access to arable land, usually possessing it and letting someone exploit it on their behalf. The harvest may be used for resale, but it is equally a mean to supplement individual needs, therefore, cutting the budget considerably lower. Particularly if the land available for agriculture is small, food supplementing is preferred over agriculture for resale.

### **d) Seeking ways to save on food expenditure**

Related to the aforementioned point is the search for ways to cut on food expenditure. This involves, as pointed out before, buying on local markets, buying in bulk or sometimes buying in the villages. In the case of Arthur, this search turned into a sophisticated system. Arthur, a representative of the LMC, sends money via mobile money to the village, where someone in return puts the food on a bus and sends it to Kampala, without anyone having to go to the village to get the food. Other ways to cut back on food expenditure involve limiting the amount of fish, or meat consumed, or of bread, margarine, and other non-vital food commodities. In the same vein, if people are eating out regularly, they do so in local restaurants; hotel restaurants or fast food chains are only visited occasionally as a “special treat”. However, eating in restaurants remains a privilege of unmarried men and UMC. Because the priority to mitigate vulnerability goes up to the UMC, the tendency to save on food expenditure, or at least to shop parsimoniously is widespread among the entire income stratum. Big supermarkets, like Shoprite or Nakumatt, are mostly avoided because they are perceived as too expensive, regardless of the income of most respondents. Knowing that supposedly cheaper alternatives exist nearby, it seems unwise to “waste” money in such a place. The surplus is instead saved and



invested somewhere else. Innocent, who is among the best-earning interviewees, responds to the question of the shopping place:

“Usually, I buy my groceries / depends on where I am currently oscillating [income wise, between poor and middle class]. But, you know, if you have an economic sense, these are things you look at. We have different grades of markets, where the poor shop, where another group of poor shop, where poor of my character shop and then there are these shopping malls. You look at where you get the things in an economic sense. When I need groceries, I cannot go to the shopping malls, no.”

Innocent

Studies from IFRI (2012) and CFAO (2015) come to similar conclusions concerning the reticence of all but the highest income groups to go for shopping in big supermarkets. The CFAO observes that supermarkets are

“[...] a place that one plans to go to rather than a store well-suited to everyday shopping needs. [...] Nevertheless, supermarkets are visited less frequently due to their less central location, the added time needed to do one’s shopping and the (sometimes mistaken) idea that their products are more expensive than those in small shops.”

(CFAO, 2015, p. 27)

And Quénot-Suarez (2012) adds as an additional explanation the difficulty of payment, a reason equally evoked by our respondents, particularly those of the lower echelons: whereas prices are negotiable in small shops and items can be bought on credit, these options are not available in supermarkets, making them again less attractive. Those who do shop there belong to the upper end and would do so out of convenience: because all the products needed can be found in one place, and parking is available. This makes them attractive to car owners. On the other hand, for those not having a car shopping in a shopping mall turns out to be more hassle, as they are usually not located in residential areas, but rather at big streets, contrary to local markets which can often be found within walking distance. Bearing in mind, that the density of car owners still is quite low, shopping in the big supermarkets often represents a more impractical choice for most people.

Yet, the convenience of parking does not in itself guarantee that car owners will buy there. Most affluent people, instead of going to the supermarket would adopt grocery buying strategies to their needs. One prominent example are the street vendors, selling necessities, fruits, vegetables, or other food to those stuck in the traffic jam (see also Quénot-Suarez, 2012, p. 19). John, an entrepreneur from the UMC, explained how he perfected this system with one of the vendors at the local markets: he would send him his grocery list in advance and transfer the money via mobile money. In the evening when passing by at the market, the vendor would hand him the bags through his car window.

The difference in food expenditure of the middle income groups interviewed and the average Ugandan (9% of the budget vs. 34%) confirms the observations of Chinganya et al.: food becomes an increasingly smaller item of the overall budget. This trend is well documented among different nations and different periods. Already in 1887 the economist Ernst Engel undertook a study among Belgian households and concluded that for those with the lowest income, the highest share is spent on physical needs, such as food and shelter and with rising income the expenditures for luxury, religious and intellectual items increase (Engel, 1887). The interpretations brought forward in this section give some reasons why people do not necessarily spend a higher percentage of money on food if they have a higher income. Even though more money might be available, household budgets are still tight. Because they still consider themselves struggling, they will deploy various techniques to keep their food expenditure as low as possible. In her work on the South African middle class, Sophie Chevalier observed that especially the lower middle classes still feel precarious and that this is equally reflected in their food buying habits (Chevalier, 2015, p. 120). Hence, to counter these feelings of economic vulnerability, consumers will go to great lengths to save on food expenditure, through the various ways mentioned here. In our sample, it is striking that the efforts to limit the food budget do not seem restricted to the lower echelons of our respondents, but even present among the upper middle and upper class. Instead, the techniques of saving change. The poorest, for example, are not able to buy in bulk

because they do not have sufficient daily disposable income. This is equally reflected by the possibility to buy everything in small units, such as single cigarettes, single roles of toilet paper, single diapers, small size packages of laundry detergent, or small units of telephone credit. An entire market is focused on people with only very little disposable daily income and adapted to cater for their needs according to their means. In the same vein, buying in bulk or hunting for bargains requires a car, to facilitate transport. Again, this option is only available to those better off. The lowest strata can mainly limit their budget by cutting off all items not deemed vital and reducing the food intake. But, as already outlined before, these indicators are not straightforward, as even those who can afford to have several meals a day or eat meat on a regular basis do not necessarily do so, but for different reasons. This places the Ugandan middle income groups somewhere “in between”. They are on the cusp between their humble backgrounds, that will contribute to the consumption choices they make, and the possibility to afford new lifestyles. They also find themselves between the vulnerability of falling back into poverty and new opportunities and aspirations that have come with the rising disposable income. As a result, choices for surplus spending concentrate on advancement, either their own or that of their children. It indicates also that the middle income groups may not be the promising new market, at least not for comestible goods, and at least not for now (see also CFAO, 2015, p. 39).

## **7.2. Education**

Instead of food, most of the surplus income is invested into education: among our 2014 sample, the average household will allocate nearly 20% of the budget to education. Education is one of the most robust indicators of future income (Kunene et al., 2015, p. 140) and Ugandans are well-aware of this fact. The middle income groups are putting much effort into securing good education: either through continuing their education, in forms of higher or different courses, or through investing in their children’s education. Even though more expensive, the middle income groups prefer private instead of public schools. Also, when asked, most respon-

dents name education as priority for their children. However, especially in tertiary education, school fees are rising while the possibilities to obtain government scholarships are declining. Gathering the funds to pay is still a challenge for many. Therefore, education will most likely remain a preoccupation even for the less vulnerable.

Among the 23 interviewees of 2014, five recorded their highest expenditures on school fees, in some cases for themselves, but mostly for their children and other dependents. Most of them would come from the upper middle and upper class. The average figure compiled to 700 000 UGX (\$280) on education expenditure, representing one-fifth of the monthly budget. When taking into account the dataset of 2012 as well, the figure lowers to an average spending of 540 000 UGX (\$216) in total on education per month. This finding is contradictory to the results mentioned above, however. When asked what demanded the most significant share of their budget, most respondents answered food. It reveals the necessity to gather more precise data on the issue. Is the underreporting due to the impression that more money is spent on food because the spending is more regular (on a daily or weekly basis, compared to once per term or semester)? We also have to take into account that variation, in this case, is very strong, depending on the age of the educated child. Pre- and primary school education is comparatively cheap, contrary to secondary, and even more so tertiary education, quickly skyrocketing expenditures per semester. It also hides nuances, since some respondents may seek help in paying the school fees from other relatives, but when asked they might only indicate the general tuition fee, not the share covered by them. Nevertheless, the data reveals linearity between the income class and the money spent on education: the higher the class, the more money is spent on education. Equally, the number of people for whom education is paid, apart from own children, increases with income range. Hence, it is safe to assume that the middle income groups have more capacity to spend money on education. Some indicators are their preference for private instead of public schools, the priority of education for their children and the positive correlation found between income and investment in children's education (Strode et al.,

2015, p. 92). Besides Kunene et al. point out that countries with higher education levels also have a more significant middle class (Kunene et al., 2015, p. 140). This is often represented as the middle class valuing education more than others, a statement that should be used with caution. From our findings, it becomes clear that there is much awareness of the importance of education in securing a good job, a positive correlation that is confirmed all throughout social sciences' literature (Strode et al., 2015, p. 90). What differs is the extent to which this can be realized by the respondents (evident through the correlation between income and money spent on school fees). Having had someone to step in to pay for school fees when the parents were not capable, has proven as a turning point in the social trajectories of many respondents. Vice versa, the failure to do so has, in the respondents' view, hindered them from attaining a more stable economic position. Similarly, one support that nearly all respondents would give, irrespective of their own income, was paying school fees for some relative. Much more than giving cash handouts this was the most common form of support given to the extended family, reflecting the general awareness throughout all economic strata of the importance of education, especially secondary and tertiary.

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***Case Story: "From a P7 Nobody to being a graduate, with the capacity to attract a graduate and even go to church and wed"***

Nelson was born into a family of peasant farmers in 1976 in a village in Western Uganda. His mother was the fifth of seven wives of his father, and neither parent was able to support his studies. After having completed P7 with some delays due to the lack of school fees, he stopped schooling in 1991 to work in masonry. However, because he had political ambitions and feared that his low education level would be turned against him and because he always considered himself an intellectual, he decided to continue his studies. In 1998, he agreed with a headmaster to allow him to sit for O-Level exams, even though he had not attended Secondary School Form I-IV. He caught up on the material covered and passed the exams, allowing him to continue with A-Level. He then made an arrangement to work on the school farm and repair the school build-

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ings to pay for his tuition. He finished his A-Levels in 2000 and came to Kampala in 2002, to work as a contractor around town. By doing so, he earned some more money and in 2003/04 he applied for the Bachelor of Political Science and Philosophy at Makerere University. Two dead years in between his studies allowed him to gather the money needed and Nelson finally graduated from Makerere in 2009. For him, having managed, against all odds to educate himself, has been a major transformation in his life: *“This is a person, five years or six a P7 nobody, [...] with some tools building in town there, but he is now a graduate, with the capacity to attract a graduate and even to go to church and wed.”* Also, his ambitions do not stop there. At the time of the interview he was campaigning for the NRM primaries, but once his financial situation stabilizes again, he has plans to continue with a master and even a Ph.D. *“In ten years I see myself a leader [...], an opinion leader, an academician, a writer, with a family that is ready to conquer the world.”*


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Nelson’s story shows the individual value of education and the difficulties of continuing higher education if the support of the family is lacking. It requires more determination, seeking special arrangements adapted to the personal situation, accepting temporary setbacks and a prolonged period of financial instability to achieve a long-term goal. Having had this life trajectory makes Nelson, he believes, a suitable leader because he knows the needs of the small people since he has come from a humble background. It has also led him to pay the school fees for a stranger, a girl he picked interest in because she was smart but not able to afford to pay school fees and who reminded him of himself: *“The very feelings I had about education, I am transferring them to her, that at least you can extend a hand to someone.”*

There are several stories similar to the case mentioned here, where the interviewee had only been able to get the education he or she was aspiring for because they have shown some persistence. However, it is also proof of the lack of opportunities if one has not at least some higher education. Moreover, it underpins the importance of the parents and extended family who would in many cases step in and pay for tuition; which in Nelson’s case was lacking. As the respondents of 2014 indicated, in 25% of the cases, the parents paid the tuition, followed by the extended

family and a state scholarship (both 17%). Own efforts or a private sponsor or scholarship would be relevant in 21% of the cases.

The government has implemented some educational policies, such as the Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1997 as a commitment to attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). This has led to an increase in primary school enrollment, attaining 94% in 2011 (UNESCO, 2014, p. 352 f). In 2007 the government launched the Universal Secondary Education (USE) program, guaranteeing free secondary education in the first cycle. As a result, secondary enrollment has more than doubled in the period between 1999 and 2011 (ibid.). Both programs allow receiving free education (apart from paying for school fees and uniforms which for the poorest can already present an obstacle), but often at the cost of the quality of education, which has made those who can afford, to concentrate entirely on private schools. Hence, 13% of students in primary education are enrolled in private institutions (UNESCO, 2014, p. 352). Data on secondary enrollment in private institutions is not available in the “Education for all” report of UNESCO. In our research, no distinction between primary and secondary school had been made, the level of private enrollments is significantly higher, though, on average of 86%. The figure below details the percentage according to income class:



*Figure 22: Type of School Attended by Children*

In contrast to the nationwide figures, this reveals once again the privileged position of the middle income groups or even those that are qualified as poor in this sample. The substantially higher enrollment in private schools, even among the LMC is a testimony of the availability of private schools on the one hand and the higher spending power compared to rural environments on the other. Not surprising, but very telling as well, is the disappearance altogether of public schools in the UMC and UC. This emphasizes the withdrawal of the wealthy from poorly functioning state institutions. Even though we have not explicitly inquired on that point, similar behavior can be observed in the health sector. Because institutions offered by the state are considered of poor quality, those who can afford to pay a higher price but receive a better service instead will do so. The logic that we can find in food buying patterns, to save as much as possible, does not apply to education, where everyone will go to great lengths to get the best service possible.

However, insufficient state funding for tertiary education remains a challenge for many of the lower groups. Oliver Provini has shown in his Ph.D. dissertation how public funding of universities in East Africa has deteriorated since the implementation of the structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (Provini, 2015, p. 398). Concomitantly, the demand for higher education has risen, due to higher levels of



secondary school completion. Yet, the budget allocated by the government has consistently been below what the academic staff of the university deemed necessary. As a result, entry to public university has been restricted, and tuition fees have gained importance to offset lack of funding (ibid.). Uganda's oldest university, Makerere University at Kampala, has become increasingly reliant on tuition fees paid by private students. In 2008, they accounted for 60% of Makerere's overall budget, contrary to 17% in 1995 (ibid, p. 410). These evolutions have left an impact on the middle income groups as well. Whereas 17% of our respondents were able to go to university funded by the government, most of them pay tuition fees for their children, relatives or themselves nowadays, or they do not go to university because they lack the means. Government scholarships are still available, they are supposed to be allocated based on academic performance, but the attribution is not always transparent, and the demand is continuously rising. Since tertiary education is expensive, it represents a big burden in the individual's budgets. This has led to diverse financing mechanisms, like only having evening or morning classes to work part-time, not finishing a degree in one straight go, but pausing in between the years to gather more money, or making a first degree, than starting to work in a job (not necessarily related to the field of the first degree), than doing a master's or a post graduate with more relation to the field of working. However, it also marks a shift in the generational expectations of continued economic emergence. With increasing reliance on private funding, social upward mobility within a generation becomes restricted, and social status will be more determined by the family's financial position. Similar to the insertion into various networks, the family's ability to pay for tuition becomes a decisive point for the future economic emergence.

### **7.3. Housing**

Especially in Kampala, housing is a problem, since the demand is high due to rapid urbanization. Nyakaana et al. (2007) estimate the annual population growth rate of the capital at 5.61%<sup>26</sup>. This makes Kampala one of the fastest growing cities on the

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<sup>26</sup>In comparison, annual national population growth was 3% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016)  
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continent (Nyakaana, Sengendo, & Lwasa, 2007). Since urban development cannot keep pace with growth, in 2006 the estimated housing gap amounted to approximately 300 000 houses, according to the authors. While there have been several policy initiatives, such as the Condominium Property Act 2001<sup>27</sup> and slum upgrading projects, the demands are still high. Informal settlements (usually referred to as slums) are the principal type of housing in Kampala, giving shelter to more than half of the population (ibid.). These tenements are called “mizigo” (singular: “muzigo”) and consist of usually a single room, at the most two, without sanitation facilities inside the house (by the interviewees described as not self-contained), in a slum area. From our observations, it seems that even the most simple housings are still concrete and brick constructions, being somewhat permanent structures. This correlates with the finding of the UNHS 2013, indicating that in Kampala 96% of houses had iron sheet roofings<sup>28</sup>, 81% were constructed with bricks, and 85% had concrete floors (UNHS p. 123). Because Kampala is built on hills, the high class neighborhoods are built uphill, and the slums are concentrated in the wetlands, usually being flooded during rain season, leading to “poverty hot spots” marked by high density and low income (Nyakaana et al., 2007, p. 18). It does, however also increase the proximity between the rich and the poor. Michael Lofchie points out that before the old middle class was geographically living on a different side of a city than the poor, therefore, assuring some social peace because inequalities were not as visible. Now the proximity will lead to more awareness among the poor of their social status, becoming, therefore, a possible source of unrest (Lofchie, p.53).

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<sup>27</sup>The law was passed as an attempt to tackle the housing deficit by developing estates in some Kampala residential areas. However, demand had been nominal, in 2007 only about 100 titles had been issued under the act. There might be several explanations, but among others it is assumed that the condominiums offered are too expensive for the average Ugandan, foreseeing installments of approximately 2 million shilling per month (Hinamundi, 2013).

<sup>28</sup>None of the houses in Kampala would have thatched roofs, being more prone to disease-causing agents. The remaining 4% constitute tin, asbestos or concrete.

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### **Case Story: ComPol Muyenga**

LC 1 II is the local chairman of one of the more affluent neighborhoods in Kampala, situated on one of Kampala's hills. However, due to demographic pressures, more and more people have settled in the area down the hill, in informal settlements, in proximity to the uphill neighborhood. Over the years, an increase in crime has been observed, which led the chairman to start a community policing initiative, with the goal *"to reduce the gap between those who don't have and those who have. Those who have, we can call them the middle class. Which we don't have in Uganda, but let's assume. And the poor. Because we established that one of the biggest causes of crime is based on the theory of different social classes. The poor blaming the middle class for their problem, therefore, they justify actions on them, by stealing, attacking, assault, what not."* Among other aspects, they started charity programs for the people downhill, collected old toys and clothes, sometimes money, to distribute them in the downhill settlements. According to him, it worked: *"Muyenga became safer because the mothers told their children: why do you steal from them, when they are our friends, they are helping us, they are giving us money to start our business, they help."* Apparently, however, now the neighboring quarter of Bugolobi reported an increased incidence of crime.

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Apart from the LC's vision of the social stratification of Kampala, the case story illustrates the tensions brought about by the increasing visibility of inequality. Thus, it is not surprising to see security becoming a concern for many of the middle income groups, particularly in the higher echelons (discussed in more detail in chapter 14.4).

House ownership remains an aspiration for many but becomes increasingly challenging. The majority of the people (60% of our interviewees) are renting, contrary to 28% of house owners, but many have intentions to build. This leaves the middle income groups slightly above Kampala average (24%), but compared to the nationwide figure of 78% the number is low. This is not surprising since demands are much higher in the capital than anywhere else in the country (UNHS 2013, p. 104). When sorted by income group, the figure of housing remains somewhat inconclusive, however.




Figure 23: Living Conditions by Income Group

We do witness a decline in renting and an increase in house ownership, but in every income group, renting prevails over owning a house. Because the people in the sample are rather young, we can assume that the part of future house owners will be higher since many voiced their intention to build. Thus, it is more a matter of time, than a matter of money. If arranged for age rather than income, this assumption can be confirmed.




Figure 24: Living Conditions by Age Group

Here a sharp increase in house ownership can be observed for the group of the 36-45-year-olds. The trend is not linear, though, because again house ownership decreases for the age groups of 46-60 and >60. The sample sizes (5 and 2) are too limited here, making the data more volatile to outliers. Hence, we intend not to make a statistical regression, but use our data for an informed guess and provide a plausible explanation for our observations. The data reveals the strongest correlation of house ownership and age for the age group of 36-45, people who are well-established in their respective careers and as parents, thus increasing the need for a house and at the same time providing the best means to afford one. This correlation is more robust than between high income groups and house ownership, which in any class never exceeds 50% of the respondents.

Even for those who are renting in Kampala cost of housing is an important issue. In general, the most basic living conditions consist of a single room, not self-contained. All respondents lived in permanent brick and cement structures, and all of them have access to electricity. This kind of habitation, generally used by the poor costs 100 000 UGX (\$40) per month in the various slum areas of Kampala. For a cheaper place to stay one has to move to the outskirts of Kampala, but thereby directly increasing the cost of transportation. For those who are commuting every day, this then becomes a considerable share of their budget.

On average, rent in our 2014 survey is approximately 250 000 UGX (\$100). Essential variations here are of course depending on the size of the house and its location, with the highest rents being in Entebbe (Rose, Kato, George, and Abdul). As seen in table 9, however, there is some linearity: with increasing income, money spent on rent will increase as well.

	Total Household Income in UGX	Rent in UGX
Jude	200.000	150.000
Pamela	300.000	100.000
Oliver	300.000	100.000
Elly	420.000	350.000
Gordon	480.000	100.000
Herbert	500.000	0
Nicole	580.000	0
Jennifer	660.000	200.000
Rose	1.200.000	400.000
Kato	1.200.000	400.000
Sarah	1.670.000	0
Nelson	1.825.000	250.000
Alex	2.000.000	0
Arthur	2.427.000	250.000
Elisabeth	2.790.000	500.000
Josephine	5.250.000	500.000
Joy	5.350.000	0
Andrew	6.225.000	0
Innocent	9.250.000	0
Abdul	10.630.000	650.000
George	13.000.000	500.000

*Table 9: Total Income and Rent Expenditure*

The table shows the indications given by respondents on their total household income and the amount of money spent on rent. Contrary to food expenditure, which remains somewhat stable across income groups, it becomes evident that people are willing to spend an income surplus on housing. Moreover, rough categorizations are possible on which class will spend how much: for the poor and floating class seem to opt for the cheapest housing possible, paying around 100 – 150 000 UGX (\$40-60). Outliers here are Elly, who is living with 24 other people and thus cannot be contented with a single room, like many other of the poor and floating class do, and Rose and Kato (a couple) who are living in Entebbe. They were the only ones in this sample who would consistently live above their means. The LMC spends

between 200 000 and 500 000 UGX (\$80-200) and UMC and UC 500 000 UGX (\$200) and above on rent. The number of those not paying rent at all is increasing at the top, since many of them can afford to have their own houses. Again, beyond income, age plays an important role here as well, as many of the respondents, regardless of their current subclass, foster plans of buying a plot of land and slowly constructing their own house. Similarly, two respondents are still lodged by their parents and thus do not have to pay, and another one's rent is paid by her daughter. Also, needs for housing rise with increasing age, whether the accommodation has to provide sufficient room for a single person or an entire family will equally impact rent expenditure. The South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF) has noted the importance to stratify according to life stages, in order to understand socio-economic differentiation. Their research has shown that young, independent singles are more likely to live in single rooms or flats than the rest of the population, whereas young or mature families and mature couples will most likely be living in a house (SAARF, n.d.) This pattern is confirmed in our findings. While people can cut on expenditure according to where they choose to stay, there seems to be some consistency in the amount of rent according to the income ranges. It is possible to discern different types of housing, equipment, and rent according to the income group:

	Dwelling	Equipment	Rent (approx.)
Poor and FC	Single room, often in informal settlements; unless it is a family, then small houses	Not self-contained; kitchen outside; cooking with charcoal; TV, kettle	100 000 – 150 000
LMC	Houses, one to three bedrooms, often somewhat outside KLA	Self-contained or not; kitchen inside, cooking with charcoal, sometimes gas; TV, kettle, fridge	200 000 – 250 000
UMC	Houses within KLA , two to three bedrooms	Self-contained, kitchen inside, cooking with gas, sometimes charcoal; within a fenced compound; TV, kettle, fridge	500 000
UC	Houses within KLA or EBB, two to four bedrooms; furnished apartments in KLA	Self-contained, kitchen inside, cooking with gas, sometimes charcoal, fridge, microwave	≥500 000

Table 10: Living Conditions according to Income Group

More resilient to geographical variations, household equipment may provide a more systematic marker of wealth. Johnston & Abreu (2016) have pointed out the various advantages of using asset indexes to measure wealth in Africa. They are often more reliable, less prone to underreporting and cheaper to make (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 401). They are an efficient way to counter unreliable or insufficient macroeconomic data (Johnston & Abreu, 2016, p. 406). The authors note that asset indexes are suitable to depict socio-economic differentiation, even though they point out, in response to its use by Shimeles & Ncube (2015) that they are not sufficient to determine class status, which is more complex than mere ownership of assets (ibid. p. 403ff). Since the inquiry in the narrative interviews had not been structured, we merely concentrate on recurring descriptions given by the interviewees in the table above. It is noticeable that the dimensions mentioned here can also be found (though not exclusively) in other indexes, such as the *Multidimensional Poverty Index* (MPI) from the University of Oxford (OPHI, 2016) or the *Living Standards Measurement* (LSM) by SAARF (Haupt, 2005). Hidden gradients, however, may apply to the quality of the product, or its age (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). Every respondent interviewed owned a TV, however, whether this would be a small cathode ray tube monitor or a flat screen does make a difference.



The same differentiation applies to radios, computers, and mobile phones, or even cars. In general, hardly anyone owns a new car, but even within the car owners, type and age of the vehicle differ greatly. Nevertheless, the possession or not of an item is an indicator of the person's wealth. Two other important, and in the interviews recurring, makers of wealth are cooking means and sanitation. In an urban context the lowest households use charcoal for cooking, then predominantly charcoal but with use of gas for quick cooking procedures, such as scrambled eggs and heating milk for the children, or predominantly gas but with charcoal for long cooking times, such as steamed plantains. Striking is here the persistence of charcoal, even in affluent families, as a way of saving because refilling gas is too costly. Results from the National Population and Housing Census (NPHC) 2014 show that in urban areas, charcoal is the main source of energy for cooking, used by 58% of households, whereas gas is only used by a minority of 2% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016, p. 32). It underlines the relatively privileged position of the UMC and UC of our sample which are able to use such cooking means and reminds us of the small size of these populations, compared to the lower groups. In the same vein, sanitation facilities differentiate between the various socio-economic groups. Up to the LMC, it is common that bathroom and toilet are not included in the dwellings – this is usually referred to by the respondents as not self-contained. There are several distinctions here that allow for more precise differentiation, such as the complete absence of a toilet, which really concerns the poorest population of Kampala (New Vision Online, 2016), paid public toilets, shared toilets on the compound, and private toilets on the compound and even the type of toilet used. These details have not been asked during the interviews. Thus, they can only be pointed out here, without making more remarks concerning our interviewees. While 55% of Kampala inhabitants have access to piped water, only 8% have water access inside their house (Nyakaana et al., 2007, p. 11). In our case that concerns some LMC members, the UMC and the UC; showing once more their privileged position in comparison to the rest of the population. When asked about their household equipment, most commonly TV sets, mobile phones, and kettles were

named, owned by nearly everyone. According to the NPHC, 95% of the Kampala population owned phones and 66% at least one TV (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Thus, these findings are close to our results, yet the difference in TV possession already shows that our sample on average is more privileged than the general Kampala inhabitant. Economic differentiation within our sample became obvious when asked about the possession of a fridge or computer and car. According to the data gathered during the field trip in 2014, 61% of the respondents owned a refrigerator, with an increase in the higher income groups, starting from the LMC. Here three out of four can cool their food. Compared with the urban average (including other urban centers than Kampala) of 18%, again the interviewees are relatively better off (Uganda Bureau of Statistics & I. C. F., 2015). Strikingly, no one in the sample owns a dishwasher or washing machine. Instead of risking high electricity bills, it is easier to have the maid or houseboy do the dishes and laundry. Because labor is cheap (a maid costs between \$15-30 per month, plus board and lodging), assets for doing labor-intensive work that are expensive in purchase and use are hardly present in Uganda. It holds probably equally true for a vacuum cleaner. This is more telling of the economic state of the country rather than its individuals and shows once more the necessity of specific local knowledge when assessing the middle income groups.

When comparing the results from this limited sample size with the nationwide survey, the relatively privileged positions even of these urban income groups become apparent, through the rural-urban divide. Even the poorest among the sample use electricity for lighting and are thus among the only 14% of Ugandans who do so (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 126). Since all of them acquired secondary education, their educational attainment places them among the top 25% of the country (ibid. p. 24). The MPI names Kampala as the wealthiest region of Uganda (OPHI, 2016), which gives weight to the assertion of Johnston & Abreu that asset indexes and their conclusions about welfare should only be used over a limited geographical area (Johnston & Abreu, 2016). It equally supports our decision to limit the scope of the research to Kampala, even though inquiring in different regions

may be revealing. Since trajectories of emergence are bound to local context and poverty, or respectively wealth, is multidimensional, we might get an entirely different picture of wealth and emergence when researching for example in post-war Gulu town. Restricting the research to Kampala allows us to paint a refined picture of social ascension in the specific context of the capital and reminds us that even the urban poor have access to infrastructures that put them in a privileged position in comparison to their rural counterparts. To put the figures in relation to the countrywide data, reveals the significant disparities, even within the country and is a reminder that the majority of Ugandans is poor (Ncube et al., 2011).

#### **7.4. Communication and Transport**

Communication and transport are essential parts of everyday life for city dwellers. Because of its size, density and, as mentioned earlier, rising housing costs using transport means becomes inevitable. Respondents rely mainly on public transport, principally used by 36 respondents and closely followed by a private car, used by 30 respondents. This figure is relatively high since only 3% of Ugandans own a car (Poushter, 2015; Uganda Bureau of Statistics & I. C. F., 2015). Even though this number is likely higher in Kampala, there are no reliable data on actual car ownership. We may assume though, that again here the interviewees have a relatively privileged position in comparison to the average Ugandans. However, the car ownership itself does not give any indication about its usage: The car is by far the most expensive means of transport because fuel prices correlate with the prices paid for in Europe, but income levels are not the same. For example, Elisabeth owned a car but said they only use it on the weekends for outings or to visit the family in the village because it was too expensive. So for her daily commuting to work, she prefers to use public transport. Boda bodas, motorcycles who function as private taxis, are often a popular alternative to or combined with public transport because they allow to circumvent the daily congestion during rush hour traffic and provide a more efficient, even though more expensive, way of transport. As with the cooking methods, once more, these groups have in common that they mix transportation

modes. On the lower end the mix of public transport with boda bodas, for faster and more comfortable transport and on the other end between the own car and public means or boda bodas when the budget does not allow for refueling again at the end of the months.

Every respondent in our sample owned at least one phone, in several cases even two or more. This corresponds to the findings of the UNHS, which indicate a mobile phone coverage of 95% in Kampala (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 103). Similarly, the CFAO witnesses that the usual frugality observed among African consumers does not apply to technical appliances, which enjoy a high spending priority (CFAO, 2015, p. 39). Again, economic differentiation here is along the number of phones, its quality and age, and the usage. Money spent on airtime varies significantly between the respondents, and expenditure for internet and communication technology (ICT) range from \$6-65 (in the latter case they often include internet and digital TV subscription). The market is well adapted to a target group with only little disposable income. For one, most mobile phones are on pre-paid subscriptions, and it is possible to recharge telephone credit (airtime) with very low denominations. In addition, the telephone companies have a range of special offers, called “bundles”, allowing for reduced prices for calling or texting for a limited period. Besides, many Ugandans have several subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. For one, this ensures greater network coverage since, especially in remote areas, not all networks have the same signal strength. Secondly, prices vary when calling within the same network or across networks. To be always able to get the best price, Ugandans will decide which SIM card to use according to the person they want to communicate with and the offers currently available. Other reasons for switching SIM cards include the various services they want to use. As one Ugandan explained in 2014: “*You need three SIM cards, Airtel for telephone, MTN for mobile money and Orange [now Africell] for internet.*” This citation again reveals an attitude of in-between; brand loyalty is not as important as receiving the best service at the best price. Another cost-saving technique is *beeping*: the person with little credit but the need to call someone will let the phone

ring only shortly and then wait for the other person to return the call. The practice of beeping reflects the social responsibility of those with a higher income, as for some people beeping is more acceptable than for others. Thus, it is not the one with a matter at heart that pushes them to initiate the call and who has to bear its cost, but the one who is most able to do so. Finally, another cost-reducing factor is the provision of mobile phones or internet through the working place. This has been the case for four people, and in four more cases, the respondents could at least access internet through their working place. However, that privilege was only for those respondents with stable, formal employment, as respondents of the Poor and FC usually could not resort to that option, thus making communication expenditure not linear.

Apart from communication, the mobile phone gains importance as a substitute for computers. In many SSA countries, computer use is still minimal, especially compared to developed countries (Pew Research Center, 2007, p. 78) and computer literacy remains a problem. According to the Afrobarometer, internet use in Uganda is below the average of the Afrobarometer countries, with 81% of Ugandans who never use the internet, compared to 67.3% across the entire continent (Afrobarometer, 2015). With the rapid expansion of mobile phones (see above), and mobile internet, it is likely that the leap in Africa from no computer to mobile or smartphones will bypass the step of owning a computer. Mobile broadband systems are more affordable than fixed broadband systems, especially in developing countries, where fixed broadband prices are three times higher than in the developed world (International Telecommunication Union, 2015). As a result, household internet access is rarely an option. The expansion of mobile broadband, however, allows for the purchase of even small units of megabytes and thus making it affordable to the majority of the population. It does mirror the development of mobile phone use in comparison to landlines, which had faced similar challenges. Through the expansion of mobile phones, the subscription to expensive landline rates had not been necessary anymore and, additionally, small pre-paid telephone credits target especially households with little disposable income. It is thus likely that internet usage

via mobile phones will continue to grow over the next years. In Kampala, internet access is easier available. Thus, only 53% of the Kampala population have never used the internet. When cross-tabulated with the perception of their living conditions (very bad, fairly bad, neither good nor bad, fairly good, very good), those who perceived living in very bad conditions would be most likely to never use internet, with an increase of internet use when living conditions are better (Afrobarometer, 2016). However, the variation is equally strong, when cross tabulated with age (ibid.). So while the possibility to use internet depends indeed on income, the age of the respondent is a decisive factor as well. In our sample, most people do use the internet (approximately 87%). This figure above average can be explained through the young age of most of the respondents (34 years on average) and because most respondents have stable, formal employment which grants them internet access, in case they cannot afford it at home. Thus, the respondents here are relatively well-connected through the internet, mainly through social media and email and many of them also report that they use the internet for news.

As a result of the long distances and the high prevalence of mobile phones, a higher part of the budget is allocated to communication and transport. In our study, an average of 9% of the total income is spent on communication and transport. It thus makes this item one of the top priorities – maybe surprisingly as it is neither vital nor does it directly contribute to the mitigation of economic vulnerability. However, these spendings can allow for saving time and more efficient means of communication; they become essential for all our income groups. Moreover, the market has well adapted to respond to all the needs of the various income groups as well.

## **7.5. Finance**

The banking system in Africa faces several challenges, such as insufficient policy regulations, macro-financial policies that increase uncertainty, or external shocks. The primary problem, however, is the excessive unit cost for banking transaction, due to low population density and lack of infrastructure (Honohan & Beck, 2007,

p. 5). Low saving rates, high fees and inadequate banking services that do not reflect the need of the clients makes banking unattractive or simply not affordable for a large part of the population. In return, the banks consider these low-income groups without a regular income as “unbankable” (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 59). Additionally, because risks are elevated, interest rates are often prohibitively high, making on the one hand borrowing unattractive for many, and on the other hand, increasing fault rates. As a result, banks in Africa have difficulties to find credit-worthy loans and remain thus with high liquidity rates (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 32). Yet, a financial system with debt is a sign of a well-developed economy, and it can contribute to economic growth since it can channel funds into necessary investments that in return have the potential to create jobs (Honohan & Beck, 2007, p. 71). Uganda is no exception to this situation in Africa, as only 4% of communities have banking institutions within their community (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 162). The state of the banking system is reflected in everyday life of the middle income groups, through their efforts to mitigate its effects. Mobile money systems replace basic savings and withdrawal accounts, and Savings and Credit Cooperations (SACCOs) are an accessible alternative to bank loans with high interest rates.

#### **a) Banking accounts and loans**

A majority of 88% of the respondents have at least one bank account, in many cases even several, often one for own expenses, and a shared one with the spouse for running household expenditure. Some even have additional business accounts for their various side businesses. All those who did not have an account were part of the LMC or lower. So the access to formalized banking does reflect income strata as well, even though not exclusively, as also many poor would use bank accounts (64% of poor). It is common for couples not to pool their entire income. Instead, they make arrangements who will cater for which expenses. Most often, it is the man’s responsibility to take care of school fees and rent, whereas the woman will pay for clothes, household items and food. These arrangements are negotiated and also depend on the financial capacity of each spouse. Even though separate ac-

counts increase costs for fees, they are popular because they maintain some financial privacy towards the partner and leave money for personal spendings and hence some financial independence for both partners (see also Spronk, 2014, p. 221). The option proposed by the bank to take a loan is used by only few respondents. According to the data, only one-third of the respondents took a loan (see also CFAO, 2015, p. 16). Many respondents shun away from that option and those who did borrow hope that they will never have to take one again. George had paid off his loan, which was a great relief to him and he said: *“I fight so much to make sure that we never get a loan again.”* As a result, he tried to increase his savings and his income so that these profits could finance other ventures. Sarah is aware that her only financial security is her (grown up) children. In order not to rely too much on them, she tries to adapt her needs to her budget. Loans are not an option for her, as they imply too much stress: *“You will have sleepless nights, and you will cause hatred.”* Hence, financing for example of a house, becomes a challenge. Interests on loans are prohibitively high – around 20-30% – and in general people avoid taking loans. Abdul and Nicole are both building houses right now, but they advance only slowly, putting every available income in the construction because they do not want to take loans. Nicole explains: *“We don’t have a loan because when you go for a loan, those people want a lot of profit and this profit could have worked for our [own profit].”* Kampala is the region with the lowest percentage of people taking loans (12%). This might be due to the higher availability of cash, the absence of microcredits, which in general concentrate on rural areas and as mentioned, the perception of loans. The case story of Elisabeth illustrates for one the status symbol of house ownership and secondly, the attitude towards loans:

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**Case Story: “Generally life is not so good, we are all miserable.”**

Elisabeth had come from a background of what could be described as the old peasant middle class, the *kulaks* (Mamdani, 1976), her father being a cultivator and trader of coffee. She seemed to be heading into a comfortable lifestyle as well, having formal employment with a bank and being married to a doctor. But in 2000 Elisabeth lost her job due to retrenchment, concerning all those having



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been employed for 15 years or longer. She got a loan to invest in an already existing side business, but because interest rates went rapidly up, she was not able to pay the installment. The company of the father was by then indebted and sold off and her husband had retired, both not able to step in financially. Reportedly, she then got into the hands of a dubious “well-meaner” who bought off her loan but then seized her house to cover the expenses. The experience with the loan and the impounding of the house were deeply traumatic for her, giving her an impression of her life being a failure and living in abject poverty. She considers it a shame that a person at her age (54 years) is still renting and she feels that the decline of her living situation and income has put her in a situation of social isolation. *“I am on the pauper side, someone at my age without a home, I am a pauper.”*

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Besides the risks of taking loans and the importance of house ownership the case story illustrates another interesting point: the dominance of the perception of the own situation over the actual underlying numbers. Even though she still has an income from the business she invested in at the time of the loan, her husband still receives his pension and they have some land in the village allowing for agricultural exploitation and leasing; and even though she has been able to pay for university education of her four children, she perceives herself as a pauper. The decline of the living situation and income has, therefore, an exacerbated effect on her positioning in society than an improvement would have. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) note that subjective value is more attributed to changes in wealth rather than fixed states of wealth. Thus, their studies have found that the loss of something is perceived much stronger than a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). This principle might also explain why many respondents would be reluctant to describe themselves as middle class. Instead, they are “not there yet”, or somewhere in between being poor and middle class, as their “gain”, economic emergence, weighs not as strong as a decline in their living situation would have weighed. The reluctance to call themselves middle class may equally affect their behavior, as we have seen with their food buying practices beforehand. Because they still consider them-

selves as poor or “in between”, their consumption practices might rather reflect patterns of economic scarcity than of wealth.

The negative attitude towards loans, in relation to a deficient banking sector and the absence of consumer credit offers, as found in South Africa for example, indicate the low scale at which the Ugandan middle income groups function, compared to other middle classes (cf Escusa, 2013, p. 18f). Similar to their supermarket shopping behavior, they are not yet an attractive target for banks and credit companies because their liquidity remains limited.

However, the rather high presence of saving accounts puts the middle income groups once more in a relatively privileged position, contrary to the average Ugandan. The availability and complexity of the bank services used are also signs of economic stratification. Many of the respondents who lack a regular, fixed income used to have a bank account at one point, but chose to close it because they failed to make regular deposits. Instead, most of them resorted to mobile money to replace their savings and withdrawal account, as shall be detailed below.

### **b) Saving and Credit Cooperations (SACCOs)**

SACCOs can be found all over the world and have a long history in Africa, some dating back to the 16<sup>th</sup> century (Rosberg & Coleman, 1964). In general, they can be distinguished in two types of savings associations. Some are with a rotating spill out, where members contribute on a regular basis, and at one point each member receives the full share of contributions. In a more investment centered form, members accumulate capital for a certain period, which is followed by an investment (Bouman, 1995). Estimations of membership vary between areas and studies but are, in general, esteemed to be high, covering between 50 and 100% of the population (ibid., p. 371). SACCOs can make up for deficiencies of the banking sector because they fulfill important welfare and insurance functions (ibid.) and because they have nearly no transaction costs. Thus, fees remain affordable for the clients. Some authors also suggest that they provide an efficient way of channeling money away from claims of the extended family (Miracle, Miracle, & Cohen, 1980, p.

702). If the volume and scope of the group gets too big, it is even possible that they transform into banks, as has been observed in Cameroon (*ibid.* p. 720). Through their self-regulation and self-sufficiency, they operate outside of the control of governmental authorities and provide hence an alternative to state institutions which are viewed suspiciously by the population. This separation, however, is not clear-cut, as many SACCOs, especially in Kampala, do not operate fully isolated from the banking sphere. Hence, the group savings may be deposited into a bank account to be well administered.

This overall popularity of SACCOs is also reflected in our sample. Being part of an investment group has turned out to be among the interviewees the most common form of organized meeting. Of the 23 interviewees, seven were part of a SACCO. However, in its procedures and primary purposes, the groups would differ from one another, ranging from mere financial services up to groups who unite for socialization processes, with the benefit of saving.

The most impersonal SACCO was the saving scheme of one respondent proposed by his employer, a bank. With that institutionalized SACCO, a certain amount of money would be directly withdrawn from his income for savings. It seemed that there was not much social gathering involved. Gordon, who has no regular income and is continuously struggling is part of a SACCO, initiated by a news vendor who approached twenty different acquaintances and asked them to join. Each one of them brings every day a certain amount to the newspaper vendor and gets a receipt in return. After every six months they come together in a general stakeholder meeting and the money saved up gets distributed. The SACCO thus fulfills the mere function of a savings account, with an additional incentive to save due to peer pressure. Abdul works as a legal advisor for a SACCO that is using a similar procedure. He does not contribute though, probably because the amount of money saved is irrelevant to him. Innocent is part of a similar savings club, but they meet once a month as a long-standing, well-acquainted group, and everyone contributes \$20. Herbert, Aida, and Sarah contribute money not for it to be saved, but to be invested afterward, which in return, will bring them more profit than the mere saved money,

plus maybe interests. Herbert just started, so he has had no payouts so far, only contributions of \$40 per month, but for Aida (member of two investment clubs) and Sarah, these systems work well.

For Aida and Innocent, there is yet another and maybe more important dimension to the investment and saving groups: the social gathering. In the case of Aida, they meet as “*Mr. and Mrs.*”, about 20 couples who have known each other for 15 years. They pay \$20 per month plus \$40 annual fee, and the money is used to acquire various goods, like a car for the club, finance gatherings and the like and the meetings take place once a week in a hotel in Kampala. It is also an important place for networking, as Aida confirmed, the members are those “who have properties”, some are her customers, from others she seeks advice in business questions. Usually, during their meetings, Luganda is used, which hints at an ethnically homogeneous group. She is also part of a second investment group, concerned with the rebuilding of Luwero Dioceses, which had been severely destroyed during the war. Here about 40 families invest in cattle rearing, and of the returns, 30% goes as a donation to the dioceses, and 70% remain as profits. Meetings take place once a month. For Innocent, the meetings of his savings group are also more about the social gathering. These men meet at a restaurant once a month, eat, drink and chat. The money they contribute can be borrowed by the members if they have significant investments coming up, so the payout is not that regular, but every once in a while it is each one’s turn to be on the receiving end. Again the group is rather homogeneous, genderwise, agewise and regarding ethnicity, as all its members come from the West and the language used during discussions is Runyankole. Most likely this is equally true for income, as the participants must be able to pay the \$20 plus the social outing. All of its members also live in Entebbe. In both cases, for Aida and Innocent, members attend the social functions (weddings, introduction ceremonies, burials) of other members, indicating once more the close social ties established. Because sometimes individuals are entrusted with large sums of money from each participant, this kind of saving requires some amount of trust among the members and thus hint at stronger social cohesion. Because the amount

of money needs to be adapted to the needs of the participants, economic stratification takes place in these associations. Bouman notes that:

“Because members make equal contributions at regular intervals, they need a rather steady income of comparable size. Hence, [SACCO] membership tends to be homogeneous, participants sharing the same occupation, income group or residential area. The rich and the poor generally have separate clubs. [...] For a social researcher, an analysis of [SACCO] membership is an ideal way to detect the horizontal substrata that divide a society.”

(Bouman, 1995, p. 374)

And while the economic homogeneity certainly can be observed in our cases, we do witness the persistence of other identities, mainly ethnic and agewise, especially in groups with greater social cohesion, beyond the mere process of saving. It remains, therefore, questionable whether vertical cleavages substitute horizontal ones or whether they add just another layer.

### **c) Mobile money as a substitute for saving accounts**

Already at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, first pilot studies to use mobile phones for sending and receiving money have been conducted in Africa (Honohan & Beck, 2007). In 2007, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Vodafone developed a system for the Kenyan market which became known as M-Pesa (M stands for mobile and *pesa* is the Swahili word for money). From there the service has rapidly spread to the neighboring countries and is today also very present in Uganda under the name of mobile money. Even though these services were praised as “banking the unbanked” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, p. 212) its early adopters were the wealthy and educated, and even up to today many respondents use the service in addition to their regular bank account. For those respondents with only irregular income, however, many of them used to have a bank account but decided to turn it inactive, by making all their transactions through mobile money services. It is possible now to pay electricity bills or school fees via mobile services, thus reducing transaction costs, as it is not necessary anymore to own a bank account or send money via other people. And even though mobile money is

not banking from a legal perspective since no interest is earned on savings, it does fulfill the most basic banking services and thus reflects better the actual needs of clients, as Honohan and Beck have called for (2007). Thus, mobile money has become a vital system of payment. While it is essential for the lower income groups who would otherwise not have any form of banking at all, the higher echelons of the middle income groups use the system in combination with their regular bank accounts, mixing once more between the different available options.

In chapter 7 we tried to understand the economic stratification of the Ugandan society, and of the middle income groups in particular, through a thorough description of their consumption and savings behavior, covering their choices for expenditure on food, education, housing, communication, transport, and finance. Even though these descriptions do not allow any conclusions for class allegiance, we used the subcategories proposed by the AfDB to distinguish at which points of income consumption behavior changes. This has led to several conclusions:

A first insight concerns the economic stratification within the subgroups. While some stratification is discernible, it is not always straightforward. The strata are most apparent concerning the living conditions. Living area, type of dwelling and household equipment correlate well with the income subgroups. They do not entirely depend on income, though, since the needs for housing rises and falls with age, as well. The importance of taking into account the position in the life cycle in market analysis has been pointed out elsewhere (SAARE, n.d.), but they hold equally true in our sample. Expenditure and income usually change with the living situation, whether single, married, with or without children will all have a significant impact on the living conditions. They do not only transcend consumption behavior but also attitudes and values, as we shall see below. As a result, age groups undermine the coherence of class, or add another layer of stratification to it and make a thorough class analysis even more challenging. However, bearing in mind that our sample group, particularly when divided into subgroups becomes too small to make statistically relevant statements. Instead, we invite the reader to take our

observations as critical reflections on the straightforwardness correlations between income and consumption.

A second insight is derived from the relatively privileged position of the middle income groups, even of the urban poor, compared to their rural counterparts. Their housing conditions are better than the rural average, and they have access to electricity, education, opportunities to earn cash (in comparison to subsistence farming in rural areas), they own a mobile phone, have easier access to internet and bank accounts and a public transport system. Despite these privileges, the lower middle income groups still perceive themselves as poor, and many of them experience the everyday life as a struggle, guided by uncertainty about their next source of income. This is also reflected in their consumption decisions. In a similar conclusion than ours, the CFAO observes

“This rational approach to budget management is a defining characteristic of the middle classes that appears to leave little room for non-essential spending or ‘treats’, even when factoring in a hypothetical increase in income. This helps explain their needs and receptiveness to selling points rooted in saving time and money, efficiency, durability and health benefits, rather than conspicuous consumption.”

(CFAO, 2015, p. 26)

Thus, thirdly, the consumption behavior reveals very often a position of “in-between”, an indicator of the recent emergence of our sample. Hence, their reluctance to increase spending on food, by buying “extravagant” food or by shopping in places that are deemed too expensive. If money still is short at the end of the month, then food is often not a priority to many of the respondents, and they rather see it as a possibility to save and invest elsewhere, most likely in education. Other behaviors, such as combining cooking means, or transport, or using formal banking as well as informal SACCOs or mobile money tell about the flexible adoption to everyday life, recurring to different means according to the situation in which they suit best. It uncovers that the stratum interviewed is not in economic abundance, to the point where they do not care about their expenditures, but many of them are in the position of being able to make a choice: “I can choose to take the car to work,

even if I do not use it today because I have to save gas money and pay for my children's school fees." "I can use gas for cooking, even if I prefer charcoal when I cook steamed plantains." The choices change with income, a poorer person may choose between using public transport or walking, instead of using a car or using public transport, but a possibility of choice nevertheless remains. It is among the poorest, and parts of the FC in our sample that the option to choose becomes restraint. Unless it is an emergency, Pamela will not go to town other than on foot, to save costs. Gordon does not have a choice but cannot open a bank account because fees would be too expensive for him and mobile money covers his needs.


This "in-between" position places the middle income groups on the cusp, between their own economic vulnerability on the one hand, and the aspiration for and access to new lifestyles on the other. These decisions are usually carefully weighted and more often than not surplus income is rather invested in securing the future – their own or of their children – rather than in luxury and leisure.

\*            \*  
                 \*  
                 \*

In section II we have tried to carefully examine the features of what we call the *middle income groups* in Uganda. We label them as *middle income* because, in general, they are in better economic positions than large parts of the population. However, we have also seen the challenges that prevail, especially if one wants to call these groups *middle classes*.

In their literature review and own quantitative survey, the CFAO has distilled a picture of a typical middle class individual which in many instances comes close to the characteristics we have outlined in the chapters above.





In blue: findings of the field survey

Sources: CFAO, BearingPoint, Ipsos, 2015

Figure 25: CFAO Middle Class Profile (CFAO, 2015, p. 29)

Some of their findings we could not confirm because we did not inquire specifically about them, such as future intended purchases, and some seem to be in stark contrast to our findings, such as the class awareness. However, this particular point is presented misleadingly, as they describe their class awareness elsewhere as a definition “by what they are not: rich or poor” (CFAO, 2015, p. 12). Such a description bears more resemblance to our analysis. Neither could we confirm the health insurance coverage nor the refrigerator possession (and even less so for a freezer) or the solidarity as being focused on the immediate family, as we have seen that the extended family still plays an important role.

Our analysis has brought some other aspects to the fore as well: For one, we have shown how other identities equally prevail, namely regarding age, region, or religion. This is not unique to Africa. In marketing research in the Global North studies talk about milieus rather than classes (Neubert, 2014, p. 26). The categories of

region and religion weigh even stronger than in Europe (CFAO, 2015, p. p.40; Neubert, 2014). Thus, one needs to bear in mind when explaining behavior or attitudes through class that such identities are rarely unidimensional and that we might expect to find a vast range of behaviors within one income range.

Secondly, it turned out that efforts to mitigate vulnerability were central to the behavior of the middle income groups and would also guide their consumption practices. What turned out to decrease vulnerability in the case of our respondents correlated with findings from literature focused on poverty reduction (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012; Narayan et al., 2009). Hence, we see that most respondents, even if they do not objectively belong to the categories of the Poor or FC given by the AfDB, are still in proximity to poverty. Having education and diversified income sources and being well-connected within a social network is crucial to increasing the distance with the poverty threshold. Many of the behaviors display an “in-between” strategy, mixing methods or utensils of lower and upper groups. This does indeed reveal some stratification between the respondents. Even those in the higher strata are still in a position where they have to ask themselves which transport or cooking material to use, but they are in the position where they *can* pose themselves the question. This puts them in a preferred position to those who have to cope with whatever comes along. Such an observation adds a second definitional aspect to the middle income groups, besides limiting vulnerability: the aspect of choice. Thus, different socio-economic positions allow for different social strategies in the way the individuals deal with their surroundings. If a similar position also gives rise to similar interests, as Bourdieu (1984, p. 4) suggests, however, remains to be seen, at least in the case of Uganda. So far we have seen, that the life chances are distributed differently and that the different dispositions indeed lead to different socio-economic positions. We have identified some similar behavior that changes as the income changes. However, from there does not derive a commonly shared class awareness and neither is it a salient category for identification for our respondents.

In our analysis we have also seen the limits of upward mobility. Here one of the blind spots of the *Africa Rising* narrative becomes visible: the African emergence is by no means one of a continent-wide social upward mobility. Instead, many of those who are doing economically better at one point might as well fall back into poverty at another point in time. However, for a stable middle class to establish, there would be a need for inter-generational upward mobility, a sign of equal societies (Ferreira, 2013, p. 51) and in stark contrast to the increasing inequality in many African countries. Religious or kinship ties offer the possibility here to transcend income barriers, as an influential person may be more inclined to speak to a impoverished person from their own ethnic group than from a different one. Hence, the observations made so far do not allow us to speak of a middle *class* in Uganda, even more so because other identities remain very strong. As we shall see in the discussion of their leisure activities (see part IV, p. 357), a socio-economic position often comes *in addition* to other aspects but does not necessarily manage to transcend them.

***Part III:***

***Forms (and Absence) of  
Political Participation***

In this part III we try to see how the Ugandan middle income groups invest themselves for the democratic advancement of their country – or not, by analyzing the behavior and attitudes of our respondents. From these answers we will then draw some hypotheses on the forms of political participation these groups partake, and which ones they shun upon. We let us guide by several questions: how do our respondents view democracy, elections and conventional forms of political participation? Which major protests have taken place in Uganda in the last years and who were the main participants? Do we have evidence for particular middle class protests? How do our respondents view protest actions and what acts as a deterrent for them to participate? To answer these questions, in the first chapter, we look first at democratic attitudes in general in Uganda, using data from the Afrobarometer and World Value surveys and link them with insights gained from our own field research. We then proceed to look at citizen-oriented activism, particularly voting, but also other interactions that have taken place with politicians and government officials. The second chapter turns to cause-oriented activism, by analyzing the main demonstrations, protests and an anti-corruption movement that have been taken place over the last ten years. Historically demonstrations have played an essential role in the democratization of countries, and they are still seen as a struggle for citizenship in non-democratic regimes (Cottle, 2008). This has also been the case in the democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa in the beginning of the 1990s (Bratton, 1994). We will analyze these demonstrations and link the academic discussion of the events with the positions taken by our respondents. In the third chapter we look at some other dynamics at play in social mobilization, notably the co-optation of leaders and the “NGO-ization” of protest. Drawing on the conclusions made in the previous three chapters, chapter four will investigate the reasons why our respondents refrain from political participation, and we suggest this is mainly because they feel their access to politics limited. It is our intention with this chapter to illustrate the context in which political participation takes place and how the middle income groups position themselves in this context and act within the

options that remain accessible to them. Such an analysis will allow us to start a reflection on what is considered a legitimate, or useful, repertoire of action in political participation in Uganda today.

## 8. The Presence of Citizen-oriented Activism?

Before analyzing whether or not the middle income groups become in some way active in promoting democracy, we can at least refute the assumption voiced by some authors that they are politically apathetic (cf Mills, 1953). We find high rates of interest in politics among Ugandans in general and the middle income groups in particular. Hence, in the Afrobarometer survey, 69% of Ugandans indicated that they have an interest in politics (Afrobarometer, 2015). The number was slightly higher for men than for women. Among the middle income groups interviewed, the number was similar, albeit lower than the Afrobarometer results, with 60 out of 95 people showing an interest in politics. 55% consider politics to be very or rather important and 67% indicate that they discuss political matters with friends or family occasionally or frequently. Gamson (1992) has shown that discussing political matters is an important way to construct meaning about an issue and that these are helpful to develop political consciousness, through constructing collective frames. This itself is a prerogative for collective action (Gamson, 1992, p. 175). Thus, while conversations about politics itself does not lead to political participation, it is an essential step towards it. Hence, we may maintain that there is a general interest in political matters. However, the interest itself does not necessarily lead to political participation. Rather, a sentiment of political efficacy – among others – is decisive; i.e., citizens need to have a feeling that they *can* change something through their actions (see Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969b, p. 811). Here we will look at their democratic attitude in general, and voting behavior and experiences with public officials more specifically and see how these avenues of “conventional” forms of activism are perceived.

## 8.1. Attitudes Towards Democracy

Some authors have noticed a global decline of democracy (Diamond, 2008; Kurlantzick, 2013). Since 2006 the Freedom House Index marked a continuous drop in worldwide civil liberties (Mattes & Bratton, 2016). Governmental malpractice had dampened the democratic euphoria that caught many transitioning countries at the beginning of the 1990s, and, as a result, disappointed citizens would turn to populists and autocratic strongmen, the argument goes (Diamond, 2008, p. 38). Others are more optimistic; while there might be a current democratic recession, the countries in question are all more democratic today than they were at the end of the 1980s (Mattes & Bratton, 2016). It is not our intention to join the debate whether or not a democratic recession is taking place. Instead, here we want to use the observation, and the data gathered from the Afrobarometer surveys to see how far a popular demand for democracy is present in Uganda. To put it bluntly: is there a desire of the Ugandan people to be ruled democratically? How do the middle income groups position themselves in this regard? The answer to these questions will factor into the actions taken or not in advancing democracy in the country.

Asking whether someone supports democracy is not sufficient, as people, surrounded by democratic rhetoric, often fostered through donor discourse, may have a positive attitude towards the concept while neglecting elements such as accountability or being at the same time supportive of paternalistic rule (see Neubert, 2016). In Uganda, the World Value Survey registered 88.2% of people who believed that a democratic political system was either a very good or fairly good system of governing the country (World Values Survey Association, 2001, p. 44), and Afrobarometer reports an approval rate of 67% for democracy. However, when combined with the rejection of presidential dictatorship, military rule, and one-party rule, the percentage of “committed” democrats drops to 42% (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 5 ff). Significant variations exist regarding education, occupation, gender, age and living area. Thus, male, urban respondents, with post-secondary education and full-time employment, aged between 26-35 years and living in East



Africa are the most likely to demand democracy (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 11). Ugandans are slightly below average in their demand for democracy, and while they are more likely to reject presidential dictatorship and military rule, they are more positively inclined towards one party rule (ibid.). This is telling of the historical and political context of the country, where the experiences with past regimes are often negatively associated, whereas the movement system, a de facto one-party rule (Carbone, 2008), has higher societal acceptance. Overall, the demand for democracy (what Mattes & Bratton refer to as the committed democrats) has declined, particularly since 2011/13.




Figure 26: Demand for Democracy in Uganda 2002-2015 (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 16)

In this graph, we might be able to recognize the broader societal developments that Uganda has undergone during that period. Interestingly, support for democracy was at its lowest in 2005/06, at the moment of the introduction of multipartyism. These might have been the aftereffects of the 2002 referendum, which had been preceded by a successful campaign for the maintenance of the movement system (Therkildsen, 2002). However, since the introduction of multiparty elections, support for democracy has grown, until the 2011 elections, which were accompanied by allegations of fraud and the Walk to Work protests. Mattes & Bratton have noticed a relationship between elections and the demand for democracy: if the elections were successful, demand for democracy would increase in the aftermath. However, if they were flawed, the negative impact on democratic demand would be much more significant (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 17). The contested elections of 2011 might be

one explanation, but there is another correlation as well. While in 2011, 73% of Ugandans believed the country was heading in the wrong direction, the figure was nearly inversed in the sixth round of the survey (Afrobarometer, 2016). Hence, it might equally be possible that Ugandans were content with the performance of their government and thus did not feel the necessity of a more democratic regime. The drastic changes over a short period show us equally the volatility of such opinions, often influenced by situational circumstances. This also highlights the limits of such broad-based surveys because they remain in their answers highly contextual.

We suggest that it might be useful to look at other variables when measuring “committed” democrats because the rejection of other types of rule might be too narrow. Mattes & Bratton themselves note that

“[...] people are more certain about the kinds of political regimes they don’t want (perhaps based on earlier experience with authoritarian rule) than the kind of regime they affirmatively do want (that is, something called “democracy”).”

(Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 11)

The approval rate for democracy is similar to the rate of people who understood what ‘democracy’ means. And indeed, most people who would believe that democracy did not matter would also not assign any meaning to the term (Afrobarometer, 2016). Inversely, those who believed that democracy was the most preferable regime type, would mention positive connotations such as civil rights and liberties, multiparty competition, accountability, mutual respect, etc. when asked what the term meant to them (Afrobarometer, 2016). Consistently, more than half of Ugandans asked during the survey would approve of democratic principles, such holding the government accountable, even if it means that the decision-making process takes longer, that leaders should be chosen through regular elections, that the president is accountable to parliament or that people should abide to the rule of law (Afrobarometer, 2015, pp. 27–31). Approval rates would in general be higher in Kampala than for the whole nation, although the differences rarely exceeded five percent points. Similarly, men were more approving than women. If we take educa-

tion as a proxy we find that support for democracy rises with the level of education obtained. The graph below illustrates some examples, by taking the percentage of people who strongly agreed with statements on democratic support, multipartyism, government accountability and the superiority of laws and courts.




Figure 27: Attitudes towards Democracy (Afrobarometer, 2016)

Hence, using the Afrobarometer dataset, we might conclude that those with the highest education level (as is the case with most of our respondents) are also the most supportive of democracy.

Turning to our dataset, we might gain some additional insights. Even though respondents in 2012 were explicitly asked about their opinion on democracy in the country, we did not test for democratic attitudes thoroughly, as done by Afrobarometer. In the subsequent rounds, people would sometimes mention it but were not explicitly asked about their point of view on democracy. Thus, we cannot make a similar analysis only pertaining to our sample. Considering the Afrobarometer data as reliable, we would expect general support for democracy from our respondents, as many of them resembled the ideal democratic supporter mentioned above. Only two people in the 2012 dataset expressed the view that democracy was not good and preferred a military government. For others, the kingdoms were better

options because they worked before the adaptation of democracy. However, the majority either would feel that even though the country was democratic, there was the need for more; or they would respond that there is no democracy in contemporary Uganda.

“There is no real democracy. Democracy is just in favor of some. Because someone tells you: if you don’t vote me, chaos is coming back. Will that be democracy? You will just vote that person so that you have rid chaos. Period. But not your own free will.”

John

The Afrobarometer (2016) shows similar results, with striking differences according to residency and education:

**In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Uganda today?**

	Total	Kampala	University completed
Not a democracy	5%	7%	15%
A democracy, with major problems	19%	33%	45%
A democracy, with minor problems	38%	31%	23%
A full democracy	14%	4%	13%
Do not understand question	7%	10%	-
Don’t know	17%	16%	3%

*Table 11: Extent of Democracy in Uganda (Afrobarometer, 2016)*

Among those with a completed university education, the impression that Uganda either was no democracy at all or one with major problems prevailed among nearly two-thirds of the degree holders<sup>29</sup>. Continued analysis of the Afrobarometer data shows that support for democracy, in general, is high, albeit higher for those with more education. What differs, though, is the evaluation of the democratic situation in Uganda. While people with higher education are more critical of the state of democracy in the country, the average Ugandan is rather content, believes the President never ignores the laws and is pleased with the regime’s performance (Afrobarometer, 2015). In concordance, Mattes & Bratton (2016) conclude that, in

<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, the rate of those who believe it is a full democracy is elevated as well among those with a university education, close to the national average. Thus, albeit the critical point of view of our respondents, there are equally circles among the well-educated who are content with the system as it is.

Uganda, the supply of democracy outweighs the demand for it – contrary to most African nations. They suggest that the decline in demand for democracy is due to the narrowing political space and the flawed presidential elections (Mattes & Bratton, 2016, p. 18).

From our analysis, we have seen that the middle income groups seem to be supportive of the idea of having democracy in Uganda, but they see its current implementation in the country as critical. For some, this is an indication that the country is not “ripe” for democracy, as the Ugandan or African “culture” is more inclined to authoritarianism, but for many, it is an expression of misguided politics. In comparison, it, therefore, seems, as if the middle income groups are more supportive of democracy than the rest of the population and have a higher demand as the current supply can provide.

“We have rulers masquerading as leaders. I think if we were democratic enough, we would be having leaders, not rulers.”

Anthony

However, does this lead to the individual desire to participate in changing the situation? We try to answer this question by looking at their actions: Albeit in a flawed institutional environment, do the middle income groups resort to forms of “conventional” political participation, such as voting or petitioning to bring about change within the system? Also, what is their general experience with and expectation of politicians?

## **8.2. Elections**

A minimalist approach to democracy usually describes regularly held elections as the essential factor (Perrot, Makara, Lafargue, & Fouéré, 2014, p. 7). However, in countries like Uganda, often characterized as “semi-authoritarian” or “hybrid”, it becomes evident that the mere electoral exercise is not sufficient to qualify it as a democracy, even though it introduces aspects of uncertainty (Kagoro, 2016). While Uganda indeed has held regular elections since 1996, they have often provoked

criticism from NGOs, international Human Rights Groups and opposition parties. Thus, interpreting the participation in elections of the middle income groups as support for democracy might be misleading, since in a context where free and fair elections cannot be guaranteed, abstention, rather than participation, can be seen as a pro-democratic stance (see J. Chen, 2013, p. 142). In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, initial optimism about the continent's democratic transition at the beginning of the 1990s ceded to an “electoral crisis” in many countries. In these cases, elections came to be considered as

“[...] an expedient political exercise for ruling regimes, partly because of their economic implications in terms of external aid flows and economic assistance, and partly because of their public relations advantage in propping up the political profile of the regime in the international arena.”

(Adejumobi, 2000, p. 66)

In Uganda, the electoral record is not a great one either. Since the first elections in 1996, at that time under the movement system, the process has been marred by through irregularities, intimidation, and violence (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 13). This was accompanied by a trend of declining voter’s participation, from 73% in 1997 to 59% in 2011 (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 16) Only the 2016 election marked a reversal, as voter’s participation went back up to 68%. However, since the bulk of the fieldwork had been done in the aftermath of the 2011 election (in 2012 and 2014), the focus of our analysis will be on the 2011 election and the post-election violence that was triggered by the aggressive response of the regime to the Walk to Work protests.

### **8.2.1. The Voting Behavior of the Middle Income Groups**

We have already touched upon the challenges that arise when attributing a particular political stance to the middle class (chapter 2). Particularly the idea that the middle class has a shared political ideology, derived from collective interests (often material ones) has been challenged. The heterogeneity of the group itself, made up of different occupational categories and – in the case of the African middle

classes – large income ranges, make it difficult to generalize (Bechofer & Elliot, 1978; Gerteis, 1998; C. S. Rallings & Andeweg, 1979; Rose, 1997). Additionally, in Europe, some differentiations approximate the working class as being on the left spectrum of the political ideology and the middle class on the right, with some nuances depending on the kind of capital they have available (cultural vs. economic) (see Jary, 1978, p. 135). Such a distinction between left and right is of little relevance in many sub-Saharan countries, as well as in Uganda, as the parties do not differ substantially in their programs (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 440). Rather, voting behavior and party allegiance are perceived in terms of ethnic or clientelist ties (see Bratton, Bhavnani, & Chen, 2012; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). However, even in Western democracies, scholars suggest that class affiliation cannot convincingly explain voting behavior (Jary, 1978; C. Rallings, 1978). Instead, age and gender are found to influence, while not voter choice, at least voter turnout (Nie et al., 1974, p. 319ff). On the other hand, particularly in the context of the Global South, we find proponents who suggest that the middle class will sideline with the regime, due to the intertwining between the economy and politics, and thus even support undemocratic regimes, as long as they are beneficial to them (J. Chen, 2013; Tamarkin, 1978). Looking at our data, and using voting behavior as a starting point, we might thus expect the vote to give an indication about the attitudes towards the status quo rather than a particular political ideology. Through the analysis, we might also discover variations between sub-groups. However, since the sample is small, the results cannot be treated as statistically representative, but rather as an indication towards certain trends.

When asked, “What did you vote in the last<sup>30</sup> election?” the majority of the respondents indicated that they voted for the opposition.

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<sup>30</sup>Depending on the time of the interview, respondents answered either in regard to the 2011 or 2016 presidential elections (with the majority referring to 2011).

## What did you vote in the last election?




Figure 28: Voting Behavior of the Middle Income Groups

It needs to be pointed out that the vote for opposition was split among the different opposition parties. Not all respondents indicated the party they voted for, making an estimation difficult, whether any one opposition party was able to gather more votes than the ruling party. For those who were more precise (N=64), 20 respondents voted for NRM, whereas 17 respondents voted for FDC, which was the strongest opposition party. Thus, in that subsample, NRM was still the most dominant among all parties. The table below presents a comparison with the national results<sup>31</sup>:

	2011	2016	Field Data
NRM	68.4%	60.6%	32.8%
Opposition	31.6%	39.4%	67.2%
Not Voted	40.7%	32.4%	33.7%

Table 12: Election Results in Comparison

The relation of votes cast for the ruling party and the opposition is nearly inverse, whereas the abstention rate does not differ significantly from the national average. Hence, we notice that the middle income groups were much more likely than the average Ugandan to support the opposition, but not to be more or less involved in voting. Many respondents expressed concerns that their vote will not be counted since they intended to vote for the opposition; thus we might even assume that a

<sup>31</sup> To be able to compare, the percentage of the party votes was calculated by using the number of all respondents who voted (N=61), instead of all who answered (N=92).



considerable share of those who did not vote, would support the opposition as well. The high vote for the opposition may be due to the urban environment in which the research was conducted and where most of the middle income groups can be found, rather than a particular political preference of the group. This reminds us of the rural/urban divide which is pronounced in many African countries and has already played a role for us when comparing living conditions of the respondents with the average Ugandans. Kampala, like many other African cities, has traditionally been an opposition stronghold (Gore & Muwanga, 2014, p. 2202; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 117; Resnick, 2011, p. 142). In Kampala in 2016, Museveni received 30.9% of the votes, whereas the opposition was able to draw a support of 69.1%, which resembles more closely our results (Electoral Commission, 2016). Thus, the results from our respondents present an urban phenomenon, and can equally be applied to the urban underclass, hence is not guided by a collective interest derived from a common ideology or material position. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to have a closer look at the voting behavior and see whether any difference arises according to income, education, sex or age.

### Voters' Alignment by Income

N=73




Figure 29: Vote by Income

### Voters' Alignment by Age

N=89




Figure 30: Vote by Age

### Voters' Alignment by Income

in %




Figure 31: Vote by Income, in Percent

### Voters' Alignment by Age

in %




Figure 32: Vote by Age, in Percent

Voters' Alignment by Education




Figure 33: Vote by Educational Attainment

Voters' Alignment by Sex




Figure 34: Vote by Sex

Voters' Alignment by Education




Figure 35: Vote by Educational Attainment, in Percent

Voters' Alignment by Sex




Figure 36: Vote by Sex, in Percent

We chose to depict the results in their total numbers as well as in percentage, to allow a better comparison between the subgroups, while also revealing distortions that come about due to small sample size. Thus, the 100% abstention for those above 60 is put in context when compared to the table above, revealing that only one respondent was 60 or older. All other income groups have a similar range of respondents (between 9 and 15); only the LMC is much more represented, with 26 respondents. Hence, figure 31 helps to put the LMC in perspective to the other groups. The conclusions drawn from alignment according to income are somewhat ambiguous. We see that opposition support is high among all groups except for the floating class, but highest among the UMC and UC. The floating class, equally termed as the “*vulnerable*”, might also be the most vulnerable to political change that may threaten their already unstable status. With some caution, we may say that those respondents best off are more likely to support the opposition than any other group. This would go against the assumption that those who managed to be in a good position will support the regime that allowed for their ascension. Instead, it might be that for these groups the services provided by the government are not sufficient anymore and other benefits gain importance, such as the guarantee of civil liberties, or the respect of human rights.

In terms of age, we notice a generational shift concerning political alignment. For those aged up to the age of 45, opposition was the preferred voter’s choice, followed by abstention. Only for those above 46 regime support is more pronounced. Even the person who is above 60 intended to vote for the NRM, but could not do so because she was not in Kampala at the time of the election. As indicated by some interviewees, the “youth” is more critical of the regime and more likely to vote for the opposition. The experience of the previous regimes and times of civil unrest play a big role in support for Museveni, a consideration absent among younger respondents who have only known Museveni as a president (see chapter 11.2.2 for more details). It remains to be seen whether in following years this trend will continue, as more and more young people reach voting age.

Regarding education, the sample gives an overrepresentation of people with tertiary education, which does not allow us to make any statements about the other educational groups. Here, the rates of abstention and opposition vote reflect approximative the general results, which is not surprising, given that they constitute the majority of the respondents. The vote in terms of gender is more revealing. Women are more likely than men not to vote at all or to refuse to answer that question. If they vote, they will less likely vote for the opposition; vote for the NRM regime remains about the same. This observation brings back to mind the argument from Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller (2004) that women feel that access to politics is more restricted towards them and thus refrain from engaging in any political activity. This seems to be supported by the voting behavior of the female respondents. Similarly, they were less likely than men to report having an interest in politics (38.9% vs. 69.7% of male respondents), while at the same time they have more trust in the current political leaders than men (32.4% of women trust their political leaders, contrary to 15.4% of men).




Figure 37: Interest in Politics, by Gender




Figure 38: Trust in Political Leaders, by Gender

In her study on women and politics in Uganda, Tripp shows how Ugandan women movements, particularly in the time after the civil war were able to gain considerable rights, which may explain their favorable stance towards the regime (Tripp, 2000, p. 68ff).

On the contrary, neither religious affiliation nor regional origin gives some revealing insights into voting behavior. This has also been confirmed elsewhere (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016). So we find that voting behavior is influenced by some demographic characteristics, as already mentioned in other research on the topic, such as age or gender. We do not find a strong indication of regional voting, especially since the President and the principal contender both come from the Western region. Neither do we find that people with higher income are more inclined to vote, as suggested by Verba et al. (1987, p. 76). Thus, in this regard, the middle income groups do not behave overly “democratic”, by making use of their constitutionally given right to vote. Linking a democratic attitude with voting remains problematic, however, given that the credibility of the elections is highly questioned by many respondents and the stakes are quite low, as people are relatively sure of the outcome.

### **8.2.2. The Legitimacy of Elections**

There have been several issues that challenged the legitimacy of the various elections held in Uganda. For one, every election had been accompanied by irregularities (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 13). Thus, for example, only 44% of Ugandans believe that elections are adequate to remove unwanted leaders from office – in Kampala this rate is even eight percentage points lower (Afrobarometer, 2015, pp. 35–37). Ugandans like to remind themselves and others that the country has never seen a peaceful change of leadership, and there is a prevailing sentiment that the chances they will any time soon are rather bleak. For many, there is a dire need for change, but unless Museveni decides to leave power, this change will not come. Hence, in such a context, voting for change seems futile:

“Because really, it is like doing something when you know the end result. So you do a formality, but you know the end result. So there was no need for that [to go and vote].”

John

“Why should I elect, I stopped voting because I can already predict the results [...] I rather go to the beach and get some fresh air.”

Kato

“It is a waste of time. They are going to rig, what the heck.”

Taibu

Voter bribery is another problem mentioned. In a recent Afrobarometer survey, 75% of Ugandans indicated that they believe voters are at least sometimes bribed during election times (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 36). Many respondents share this view. In a discussion about the local council elections, the president of the leading opposition party FDC was outspoken when he said that not the method (voting through lining up), that caused much controversy, was the problem, but “*YOU, the people, who vote for small bribes.*” (Fieldnotes 2017) Such a point of view, however, is in stark contrast to results from a survey done by Research World International, in which 81% confirmed that they did not get any material incentives prior to the election (Research World International, 2016).

Furthermore, elections are questioned as people feel that there is no viable alternative to the ruling candidate (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 60).

“There is no difference between Museveni, Besigye, Mugisha Muntu, they all still believe in the NRA ideology from their time spent together in the bush.”

Martin

Martin in this quote refers to the same origins of the current principal opponents in the political system, who have all been fighting together in the civil war. Fall outs which appeared later on, led to the fragmentation of the group into opposing parties. The feeling that there is no alternative to Museveni is also related to the bad reputation of politicians.

“I voted Museveni [in 2016]. Even though many things are bad, but we have no alternative. I rather remain with the thief I already know.”

Janet

“Politics is always the same since I was born, it is all about individual benefits, that is why the President says no one can take over his shoes. At least, under him, the country has been developing. I have only been voting Museveni, the only president I have seen because no one else is there to administer the country.”

Rose

However, that picture is somewhat mitigated. While some still criticized the opposition for their internal fighting or lack of agenda, others believed that they are a genuine solution to the country’s problems. Often, albeit not always, the views expressed would correlate with voting behavior.

Finally, there have nevertheless been some respondents who expressed their sentiment that voting was part of their civic duty, regardless whether they considered it would make any difference or not.

“You must look for a way forward to pull out our country; otherwise, it is still rotting.”

Salome

“I understand well, voting is my right, and I need to exercise it, and that’s why I vote. But I vote also knowing that this system is not transparent. [...] It would discourage me, but I have the strong feeling that I still need to exercise my right. And you/ definitely there is some small hope that one day things will become right, we cannot fool things always.”

Geoffrey

Compared to the criticism voiced concerning the electoral process, these considerations were only expressed by few respondents. All in all, concerns about electorate fraud prevail, damaging the credibility of what is supposed to be the minimum requirement for a democracy. Thus, even among the voters in the last election, a sentiment exists that their space for expressing citizen-oriented activism through voting is limited.



### **8.3. Politicians: Experiences and Expectations**

Beyond voting, there are other possibilities to engage with the government. Another often mentioned form is petitioning, bringing an issue to the knowledge and debate of parliament. According to the World Value Survey, 16% of respondents have already done so, and 33% might do it, while 28% say they would never do it (World Values Survey Association, 2001, p. V134). Thus, while it is nothing people would shun away from, it is neither a common practice. In our sample, such an attempt was made by those interviewees who were already involved in some kind of activism, thus by people who are already somewhat familiarized with the political system. However, in general, they perceived their actions to be rather futile. At the Pan African Club (see p. 379) members were discussing a bill tabled by parliament concerning the regulation of genetically modified organisms. At the end of the discussion, participants decided to bring their concerns to parliament, in the form of a petition. Eventually, they were even invited to present their petition in front of parliament. However, the organizer of the club was convinced that this was merely a formal procedure, that will not yield any significant results if their petition goes against government plans. Similarly, the founders of the Jobless Brotherhood recounted how they developed ideas and petitioned the government to contribute to the development of plans directed at resolving pending problems of youth unemployment.

“So having interacted with people of our perception, we decided we, first of all, wrote concepts, we wrote proposals, but they all ended up in waste baskets. We wrote proposals to parliament because this is where / but they ended up in waste baskets because you find that in Uganda a budget is discussed in parliament [...]. So, we wrote concepts, we wrote letters, we wrote proposals, we went and sought [sic] meetings, and no one was paying attention. Through again, internet, of course, we realized that there are some other people who had a better mode of communication which made it to the authorities to respond. So that's when together we sat, we designed the pig demonstration. That was in 2014.”

Brian

The experience from Brian shows how he felt compelled to engage in other actions to make the government respond, which made them turn to non-violent protest. The same was true for Ronald (for the background information see the case story p. 331): before mobilizing the spare part sector and planning a boycott, the association petitioned government to enforce the laws and act against the Chinese retail traders, but nothing was done. Ronald described how he felt ignored by the government and a lack of comprehension for their situation because the controlling bodies were not the ones acting on the ground. Similar to elections, petitions, if perceived futile, are not considered an efficient way of engaging in communication with the government, which ultimately will narrow once again the space of political participation given to the citizens.

The uselessness of interaction with politicians was not only described concerning petitions but even face-to-face interactions. Afrobarometer asked citizens how often they have contacted District Councillors, Members of Parliament, officials of government agencies, or political party officials concerning a problem they had. 82% of Ugandans they said they had never done so. For Kampala, the score rose to 85% (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 20). In contrast, only 62% had never contacted a traditional and 39% never a religious leader for an important problem (in Kampala 82% and 49%) (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 21). Among the middle income groups, negative experiences or a perceived uselessness of going to public officials prevailed. Josephine explained how she had been to the Local Councilor ones, but he

only wanted bribes. She left angered, wondering what she was paying taxes for, if such services can only be given with an extra “fee”. Chris also explains the shunning away from officials in a similar way: “*Rarely Ugandans ask the regime for something because they know they are corrupt.*” (Chris)<sup>32</sup> Jennifer said she never contacted public officials because they will do nothing. She lost her faith when someone stole her chairs and even though she pointed out the thief, no one would support her, as the thief had bribed the police officers. These figures can lead us to two conclusions: for one, public officials are not considered the best address for the solution of a problem. Given their bad reputation and the little trust they enjoy, this might not be surprising. It also shows that the middle income groups will not keep the state accountable, as hoped by some (see p. 68). This might be due to an accurate estimation of the situation, since the state can hardly be kept accountable if elections are not working. Secondly, the rate of people who had never contacted an official for the solution of a problem is higher for Kampala. This might be an indication that the people of Kampala have access to other mechanisms of problem-solving, and we suggest that self-sufficiency, which is often tied to income, might be one of them.

Because public officials are considered inapt to solve particular problems, people tend to find their own solutions. In our case, respondents would use their money to make up for shortcomings, such as taking their children to private schools, using private hospitals, repairing their own roads, or the like.

“If there is a pothole, why to wait for state council? You pay the money, and we fix it.”

General Secretary, LC1 Parish

Such engagement is partially wanted by the government, for example the community program *Bulungi Bwansi* (Luganda, meaning *Good Citizen*). In such a case, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) provides the material and the citizens put in their labor to achieve a change. However, if it is not planned through KCCA, these self-initiatives altering the urban landscape are seen critical by the authorities. Similarly, neighborhood watches develop in close cooperation with the local

<sup>32</sup>Transparency International ranks Uganda on place 142 out of 174 countries (see p. 114)

police station as a way to improve security in the different Kampala neighborhoods (for more details, see chapter 13.5 and 14.6).

The insufficient service delivery and its increasing monetarization have led to the development of two kinds of attitude. Particularly among the poor, political officials are contacted for financial assistance, in cases like paying for school fees or medical bills. In the Afrobarometer survey, nearly half of the respondents who had contact with a leader in the last twelve months did so due to a personal problem (Afrobarometer, 2016). During our fieldwork, the deputy mayor of Kampala Central, as well as the Regional District Commissioner, both mentioned this as reasons for being contacted (Fieldnotes 2017), and some respondents resumed their experiences with public officials in their seeking assistance. Arthur who grew up in a camp for internally displaced people mentioned that the current (at the time of the interview) minister of foreign affairs lived in a neighboring village from his home and that he approached him for support in paying his university tuition. While the minister promised to connect him to a sponsor, Arthur never heard of him again, and eventually, his brothers paid his school fees. Gordon mentioned in the interview that he cannot even get in contact with public officials, as they will not pick their phones because they believe *“you are calling for money, yet you seek advice. They promise to call you back but then will not answer your calls.”* (Gordon). Hence, politicians try to limit their contact with citizens, as they suspect to be solely asked for money. On the other hand, political activists mentioned that politicians, when approached with a particular policy concern would propose personal solutions to their problems, instead of addressing the issue itself:

“Oh, by the way, we do our work, those kind of guys they don't want to meet us. First and foremost for them they are used to these kind of people who come with problems, expecting, expecting temporary solutions. We have gone with fundamental solutions. [...] But these ministers, we had an interface with some. But they are asking what is your personal problem as you? Can we sort you out? Because you are not Jesus, you are not going to die for.”

Joseph

The cooptation of critical voices into the patronage system has been mentioned by many activists as a common way of silencing dissent and will be discussed in chapter 11.4.

Combined with the perception of vote buying, there seems to be a shared perception, that poor people expect handouts and financial solutions to their problems, instead of changes in institutional arrangements. On the other hand, many of the respondents said that they have little to no expectation of the government, as they feel it cannot do anything for them.

“But socially, I have lived without this government, and I don't think this government has anything to help me.”

Andrew

“I lost my expectations for this government a long time ago. I am just waiting for them honestly to go.”

Raphael

Especially the lack of service delivery led to some disillusionment, which dampened all expectations. Most often, if anything at all, respondents would expect the government to provide for them peace and stability.

“I don't have a lot of expectations of the government at the moment, all I need the state to do for me as a person is to provide an atmosphere that is convenient to carry out my work. That would be a state where we do not have wars, a state that is free of terrorists, a state where the economy is steadily growing, something like that.”

Herbert

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\*

Our analysis has shown that the middle income groups are in general more supportive of democracy than the average Ugandan, and, contrary to the findings from the Afrobarometer (Mattes & Bratton, 2016), they are not pleased with its current state in Uganda. This is in some aspects reflected in their voting behavior. We find above-average support for the opposition and below-average support for the ruling party. However, this finding mirrors the official results for Kampala and hence cannot be attributed to a shared political attitude of the middle income groups due to a similar material position. Rather, it confirms what Rallings has already pointed out: the social environment is more decisive to determine political behavior than class affiliation (Rallings, 1978, p. 202). Thus, in an urban environment, with more access to media and better communication from the opposition parties, ideas contrary to the dominant regime narrative can circulate more easily. While we have already highlighted the strong presence of middle income earners in urban environments, the voting behavior seems to apply also for the urban poor. However, the finding also refutes the idea that the middle income groups are particularly attached to the incumbent regime because it made their position possible (Musyoka, 2017; Tamarkin, 1978). We find that discontent with the current regime, mistrust towards the political leaders and strong opposition support are pronounced among urban Ugandans. Instead, women show a voting behavior that we would have expected for status-quo oriented income groups: they have more trust in the leaders, show less interest in politics and are more likely to vote for Museveni. While less coherent on the other aspects, elderly as well are more likely to support the current regime, even though they do not necessarily trust them more. The findings suggest that their experience with previous regimes has left an overall disenchantment with politicians, and the current situation as one of the lesser evils, since, at least “*there is peace and stability.*”

Seeing the state as the guarantee for peace and stability echoes the popular discourse led by the NRM and Museveni, that depict them precisely as these

guardians and hence in a way, albeit not necessarily being in support, respondents at least give some legitimacy to the regime because it fulfills this function. Yet, in other aspects, a general sentiment prevails that there can nothing much be expected of public officials. Whereas poorer people might turn to them for material support, wealthier respondents have the feeling that they cannot do anything for them, and that they are only interested in bribes. It seems that the state can hardly be held accountable by its citizens, particularly if problems arise. As a result, many of the middle income groups turn away from the state, as their financial resources permit them to seek solutions elsewhere.

## 9. Recent Protests and their Perceptions

Over the past ten years, Uganda has witnessed four major political protests, namely the Mabira forest protest, the Buganda riots, Walk to Work, and the Black Monday Movement, as well as more numerous strikes, or suddenly erupting riots (see Salehyan et al., 2012). The latter however have remained short-lived and small-scale, touching only comparably few people. The former, on the other hand have had a bigger media coverage and especially in Kampala people have been affected by the demonstrations, even if they may have remained bystanders. Studying these protests allows us to better understand the context in which they evolve, the constraints put up by the regime and its mechanism of controlling dissent, the legitimacy accorded to the protests by Ugandans and the socio-demographics of those who actively participated. Albeit sometimes supportive of the cause, most Ugandans interviewed chose to abstain from any political activism. As seen in chapter 3.2.3, the willingness of the state to accept open criticism has been continuously declining. So has the motivation of the president to leave his position and to make space for a successor. The condition of democracy in the country has been criticized from various directions (see Barkan et al., 2011; International Crisis Group, 2012; Kagoro, 2016) and the likelihood of regime change through democratic elections is rather bleak. Thus, contentious uprisings have increasingly been framed not only as a critique of a particular issue, but also as a critique of the regime in power in general: by those protesting, the regime, and also bystanders, who would decide to join or not to join depending on their point of view towards the government in place. An analysis of past protests in Uganda might be revealing in that sense, as it has the potential to shed light on the issues at stake, and their perceptions by protesters, the state, and by our respondents. Looking at the attitudes from the middle income groups and their behavior concerning their own participation allows us to describe key ideas of social movements, such as perceptions of collective identity, political opportunities and repertoires of action, considered legitimate



by the middle income groups. Hence, we will discuss the most important protests of the last ten years, that have been widely debated in the public. We follow here a chronological order, starting with the earliest protest. All of these protests reveal their proper dynamics and perceptions by the public, that greatly contributed to their course.

### **9.1. “Save Mabira”: United Behind a Common Cause for Diverging Reasons**

In April 2007 Uganda witnessed what some at that time described the largest street protests of its history (Child, 2009). President Museveni had revealed plans to give one quarter of the Mabira Central Forest Reserve to a sugarcane company, Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) to use it as a sugarcane plantation (NAPE, 2016). Apparently already in 2005 meetings between the president and the owner of the Mehta group, of which SCOUL is a subsidiary were held, but plans for the de-gazettement became public only after the first multiparty elections, won by Museveni (Child, 2009, p. 246 f). Since the first public announcement, mobilization to preserve the forest started. The forest reserve, that covers over 30 000 hectares of land has important ecological implications, as ecosystem for several species, but also as a water catchment area for the river Nile (NAPE, 2016, p. 12). Initially starting in the internet through petitions and blog posts, the mobilization quickly spread to the real world. Environmental NGO's like the National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) and groups of university students brought petitions to parliament, and international donors increased pressure (Child, 2009, p. 247 f). The EU withdrew funding from SCOUL, the Norwegian government announced that it would decrease aid flows to Uganda if the government realized the plans, and the World Bank argued that this decision would go against an agreement made in 2001, and as a result the bank would not fund the construction of the Bujagali hydro-electric dam<sup>33</sup> (ibid.). Despite these protest, the government

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<sup>33</sup> Due to its function as water catchment area, reducing the forest could risk reducing the water levels of the Victoria Lake and Victoria Nile, and with reduced water levels the dam could risk to not function properly (Executive Director, NAPE)

maintained its plans and in March 2007 the cabinet agreed to the President's demand. This decision led to aforementioned street protest in April, when several thousand people demonstrated to maintain the Mabira Forest Reserve. The scope of the protests is quite remarkable, and this was mainly due to a broad-based coalition of environmental and civil NGOs, donors, religious leaders, the Buganda kingdom, Kampala traders, academic institutions, and the politicians. Those came mainly from the opposition, but representatives from the ruling party and national agencies were equally present. The protest, which was planned as peaceful, however turned violent. For one, the police used live bullets and teargas to disperse the crowd that quickly grew, but demonstrators were also involved in looting, vandalism and xenophobic attacks on people of Indian origin (Mahendra Mehta, the owner of SCOUL, is Ugandan of Indian descent), leaving four dead, several wounded and numerous people arrested (Rice, 2007). However, eventually the president withdrew his plans and in 2007 the forest was not de-gazetted. Yet, illegal logging apparently continues (Hönig, 2014, p. 56) and the issue resurfaced in 2011 and 2016, always shortly after elections (Hönig, 2014, p. 57; NAPE, 2016, p. 13). But environmental NGOs reacted quickly and revitalized protest, leading in 2011 to two meetings with the President himself, and so far the plans have not been realized. However, NAPE itself concludes:

“For now Ugandans can say they have won the Mabira forest battle, but the war still continues. Who knows the power of money may eventually consume the widely cherished forest.”

(NAPE, 2016, p. 13)

So, while the situation may still change, the result of the Mabira forest protest can be considered a success for the protesters. While the international media focused primarily on the violence of the event (BBC, 2007; Rice, 2007), subsequent academic analysis either celebrated the active civil society in Uganda (Child, 2009; Twesigye, 2008) or criticized them for actually being used for identity politics (Hönig, 2014). However, both sides, and this is in concordance to our own findings, refer for their analysis to the multiple reasons that brought people to join the protest. That the protest was so successful, especially compared to other protests in

Uganda, is due to diverse motivations, united by a common short-term objective, make the Mabira forest protest a “poster child” for social mobilization.

In his analysis of the protest, Child (2008) identified five discourses that were present in the confrontation between the government and the protesters: On the side of the government, a *development discourse* was used, arguing for the give-away to promote job creation and higher tax revenues. The president opposed the “backwardness” of the country. Such an economic opportunity that would bring modernity through industrialization should not be missed. He invoked his plans of transforming Uganda in a middle class country: “*We, therefore, need to balance the needs of preserving the eco-system with the needs for social transformation, changing the society from peasant to middle class, skilled working class society.*” (Museveni, 2007) Thus, the protesters were framed as enemies of progress. When taking a public stance for his support of the forest give-away, Museveni argued that.

“Our ignorant traditional chiefs caused our enslavement in the past; ignorant African elites are responsible for our continued enslavement today. [...] Why should any Ugandan obstruct, harangue or inconvenience such people [that bring economic activity to the country]? What sort of disorientation is this? How can enemies of the future of the people of Uganda be allowed to thrive? [...] The delays and controversies generated by the enemies of progress and permitted to continue make us lose opportunities.”

(Museveni, 2007)

Albeit its reference to middle class, modernity, and economic development, this discourse attracted only few supporters, as skepticism about the intentions of the government prevailed. Instead, opposing discourse weighed stronger for many. On the side of the protesters, there was obviously an environmental discourse, brought forward by NAPE and other environmental NGOs, that gained wide acceptance among the Ugandan population. Child suggests that with the effects of climate change becoming noticeable for many Ugandans in the form of prolonged droughts or too heavy rainfalls, “the environment” has the potential to become a new arena for protest, that will equally be used to demand more democracy (Child, 2009, p. 241). While the environmental argument certainly appealed to many, particularly

educated Ugandans, in the case of Mabira there have been neither any other large-scale environmental protest in the last ten years, even though similar forest-give-aways have been taken place before and after Mabira (Nampewo, 2013; NAPE, 2016) nor does the environmental conscience apply to other areas, such as the widespread practice of private waste burning or the continued use of plastic bags, albeit officially declared illegal (following the Rwandan example). Additionally, as far as we know, no demands for more democracy have been made during the protest, as this would clearly but the campaign in a “political” light, something the organizers wanted to avoid. Hence, putting too much emphasis on the environmental discourse seems to fit well in an agenda by international donors, highlighting the success of civil society and environmental awareness programs brought by NGOs. However, in our opinion, it exaggerates the “official”, the environmental, aspect through which the protest was framed, and neglects other concerns, mainly identity ones.

Another opposition discourse focused on livelihood and the income local communities generated through the forest, such as charcoal or timber production, honey collection, meat provision, or eco-tourism. Thus, especially communities living in the immediate environs of the forest opposed its de-gazettement out of fear of loss of income. Promised job and wealth creation through an expansion of the factory were met with caution. One respondent explained:

“There is already too much sugar cane in that place, but are the people rich? They are not. So if you can't convince them that by cutting the third of this forest you are going to make them rich? It was not making a lot of what? A lot of sense to the people.”

Executive Director and Assistant, NAPE

On top of that, there was another discourse centered around questions of governance. While there was no proof, watchdog NGOs suspected issues of corruption accompanying this agreement behind closed doors. Mamdani in a comment on the protest observed that:

“Mabira turned into a major scandal because it symbolised a collusion between an increasingly unaccountable president and an arrogant tycoon from a racialised minority. The president had taken to treating the country as his private preserve; the grant of Mabira was simply the latest in a series of grants (of a school in one case or an information ministry facility in another) by the president, always claiming that his personal will represented the interests of ‘development’. The tycoon too claimed to be doing the country a favour — once again, ‘development’ — rather than lining his own pockets.”

(Mamdani, 2007)

NGOs criticized that protocol had not been followed for awarding tenders and reasons for choosing SCOUL lacked transparency, nourishing claims of corruption. Another governance aspect refers to the role of the Buganda kingdom. Baganda claimed that the land, in fact, belongs to the kabaka and the government had no right to simply give it away (Child, 2009, p. 252). The kabaka, who himself took sides with the protesters offered land in another area of Central region, but the Mehta group refused (Child, 2009, p. 248). Thus, for Baganda, the issue brought questions of the autonomy of the kingdom, or rather the lack thereof, to the forefront. Additionally, the forest was said to be home to the ancestors and, therefore, equally had a sacred function among Baganda. Given the significant mobilization power of the kabaka and the loyalty he enjoys among his people, it is likely that this contributed to the protest. Finally, a third aspect of the governance discourse, not mentioned by Child could have been axed on the opposition. Opposition politicians used that opportunity to criticize government policies. Beatrice Anywar, MP for the FDC invested herself in the demonstrations, she called for people to come to Mabira and she organized a boycott for sugar from SCOUL. Her actions gave her the nickname “Mama Mabira”, and it is equally possible that some protesters used the occasion to voice their discontent about the ruling government. However, most likely, the protest was successful precisely because this aspect was only subordinate. The fact that MPs of opposition *as well as* from the ruling party joined the protest gave it some credibility among Ugandans who did not feel that this was only about “politicking”. One of the organizers explained the success of Mabira, contrary to other protests, in these terms:

“But with Mabira, the leaders were not necessary opposition, like me, I was not an opposition person, I was just civil society. Religious leaders were not in opposition; cultural leaders were not opposition [...], so that was the difference.”

Executive Director, NAPE

The most controversial discourse focused on the racial violence. In the course of the demonstrations, people of Indian descent had become victims of attacks by black Ugandans. The owner of the Mehta Group is of Indian origin himself, and Indians control a large part of the Ugandan economy. This imbalance, grown since colonial times has sparked widespread anti-Asian sentiments in the population and has found its peak in the expulsion of Indians through Idi Amin (Mamdani, 2007). When Museveni came to power, he invited the Indian community back into the country and returned confiscated property. During the Mabira protest, these sentiments surfaced again and were voiced openly in calls for violence against Indians. One interviewee, now active in non-violent protest, admitted:

**Brian:** I had a rage against Indians, I must confess. So I saw an opportunity to go for them, and whatever I did I don't want to talk about it. Having worked with them, I remember how they used to treat me, so I had to pay back.

**AF:** So that was not part of your non-violent/ ?

**Brian:** No, I don't want to pronounce that I was non-violent in the Mabira riot, I was really/ and when I look back I feel sorry.

Also, another interviewee who saw himself as one of the leading organizers of the protest stated his reasons as protecting the climate and “*going against those investors who have made us suffer a lot.*” (General Secretary, UTRADA)

It is hard to tell to what extent these sentiments played into the mobilization (as it is for all the others). Hönig (2014) portrays them as “free-riders”, who co-opted “noble” causes for their interests of identity politics but we would argue that rather than a by-product, they were among the reasons that the protest succeeded. Such a distinction brings to mind Siméants assertion that scholars of civil society like to neglect “*ugly movements*”, that mobilize around questions of a religious or ethnic identity, even though they are often very powerful (Siméant, 2013).

In concordance with our analysis is Child's conclusion that the Mabira protest, unlike other environmental concerns, such as the Bujagali hydroelectric dam or the forest giveaway on Bugala Island<sup>34</sup>, was successful because of the

“[...] temporary alliance of diverse civil society organizations. [...] Individually none of the oppositional discourses examined above would have provoked enough civil society opposition to force the NRM government to withdraw its plans for the forest reserve.”

(Child, 2009, p. 253)

Not going into Child's discussion of civil society that he does at length in the article, we would like to stress here, that the alliance was successful because it was not only carried by NGOs (like the *Black Monday movement*, see p. 296), but equally touched upon questions of identity for Baganda and for black (vs. Indian) Ugandans and because it was not seen by many as a cause brought forward by the opposition, who would secretly follow its own hidden agenda (like *Walk to Work*, see p. 289). In this diversity of reasons, the Mabira protest became legitimate for the loyal Muganda royalist, as well as for the marginalized Ugandan who felt they did not have their share in the national economy, as well as for the educated who worried about effects of climate change. The organizers underlined the diversity of profiles of those demonstrating on the street, they described the protesters as mainly young, aged between 15-55 years. According to the NAPE director, the original protesters were well-off people with an employment (except for civil servants, who may have been supportive but are more cautious to go on the streets), who then had been joined by boda boda riders and the unemployed youth. However, they highlighted that “*some important people from Buganda put on their kanzus*<sup>35</sup>” (executive director, NAPE) to underline the respectability of those protesting. Others described that protesters joined regardless of their tribal affiliations and that participants were also MPs or “*middle class people*” (Brian). Given the broad reasons for which people joined, as discussed above, this observation seems plausible. As a result, the middle income groups interviewed, even those

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<sup>34</sup>The President gave forest land on Bugala Island in Lake Victoria to private investors for the production of palm oil (Nampewo, 2013, p. 528f)

<sup>35</sup> Buganda wear for men, often used for official reasons, such as cultural functions, ceremonies, etc.

who did not participate themselves, were generally in favor of the protest and supported its cause. It was an adequate projection for the very different concerns, mentioned above, which could all be equally found under the label of the middle income groups.

The protest then was met with a lot of violence from the side of the regime. Tear gas and live bullets were used, and the majority of deaths (three out of the four) was caused by police violence (BBC, 2007). Despite having undertaken the legal steps to stage a demonstration, the main organizers have been arrested and tried in court on charges of treason, terrorism, murder, theft “*and other trumped-up charges*” (executive director, NAPE). Eventually they won the case and the charges were dropped, but the case revealed the methods of the regime to deal with dissent. Hönig (2014) observes that the government does not distinguish anymore between lawful and unlawful dissent, but between loyal and disloyal opposition. Because any activism is considered disloyal opposition very quickly, activists often go at great lengths to show that their activism is not “political”, or directed against the regime, as some other cases will show.

## **9.2. The Buganda Riots: Loyalty to the Kingdom, not the Nation**

Between 10<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> of September 2009, violent riots took place in Kampala and other parts of Central Uganda, that left at least 27<sup>36</sup> people dead, several injured and over 800 arrested (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 165; Rutanga, 2010, p. 143). The street protests had been triggered by a decision from the national government to stop a planned visit from the *kabaka* to Kayunga, one district of the kingdom, which had recently declared independence from Buganda. The declaration of autonomy had been controversial among Baganda, who believed that this was a technique of the NRM government to divide the kingdom into smaller entities, in an effort to “*divide and rule*”. When plans of the *kabaka* to go to the region became known, the government argued that it could not guarantee the king’s secu-

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<sup>36</sup> This is the official number, Human Rights Watch, who did its own investigations, estimated at least 40 casualties (Human Rights Watch, 2010).



rity (to protect him from the secessionists) and, therefore, decided he should rather not go (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 122). When the *katikkiro* (the Buganda prime minister) and a group of Buganda officials were stopped on their way to Kayunga by security forces, a public outcry by Baganda followed over this restriction and quickly spread to Kampala. Protesters erected roadblocks and set tires on fire to protest the government decision (Rutanga, 2010). Accounts of looting, rioting and harassment of people perceived to come from Western regions took place. At roadblocks, people were asked to pronounce certain words in Luganda and if they failed to do so, those identified as coming from the West were beaten or harassed (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). Police and military forces responded with heavy violence, that led to an escalation of the situation and put the city in an exceptional state that lasted for three days, and made the Buganda riots, as they became known the “*most violent in Uganda’s recent history, in terms of life and property.*” (Rutanga, 2010, p. 143) The violence eventually stopped when the *kabaka* announced that he would refrain from visiting the district.

What seemed like a violent, but spontaneous, eruption rather was an expression of long built up grief and the anticipation of confrontation. Since the end of the guerrilla war, a sense of betrayal reigned among Baganda who felt that the government did not sufficiently respond to their demands for more autonomy. During the liberation war, the Baganda had been a key ally to Museveni’s insurgency and their implication had been rewarded with the restoration of the kingdom, despite objections from within the inner political circle (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 22). The re-establishment equally served as a way of appeasing opposition in a still fragile peace (Perrot, 2003, p. 232). Subsequently, however, the relation between the kingdom and the central government eroded. In the years prior to the riots, three bills had been tabled that were highly controversial and widely rejected by Baganda, as they were seen to undermine the kingdom’s autonomy (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 763). First, in 2005 the government proposed a law concerning the decentralization of the country into “regional tiers”. This was refuted by Baganda, who instead called for a federal system, generally referred to as “*federo*”, that would grant Buganda the

status of a federal state. Secondly, already in 1998 the government had passed a Land Act, with the intention to give more rights to peasants and thus limit the powers of the (often Baganda) landlords. In 2007, the Land (Amendment) Bill was tabled in parliament, emphasizing the rights of “bonafide occupants” over Baganda landlords. The bill was widely perceived by Baganda as a way for people from the West to grab Buganda land (Activist III, (formerly) Nkoba Zambogo). The framing as an occupation of Buganda by “foreigners” was one of the reasons that explained the attacks on Westerners (Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 80). Thirdly, 2009 Kampala Capital City Bill intended to expand the boundaries of Kampala, by taking Buganda land and turning it into Capital City Land. In response, in July 2009 the *lukiiko* (the Buganda parliament) instructed the regime to remove the government from Buganda soil and settle elsewhere in Uganda (Rutanga, 2010, p. 127). Goodfellow (2014) has shown that the controversial bills were used by the government as a tactic to provoke Baganda and cause resentments against them in the rest of the population, as eventually none of the bills, once passed as laws, had been implemented to the detriment of Buganda. Thus, Goodfellow assumes that the government may have foreseen upcoming protests (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 764), even though they may not have measured the amplitude. Others recall allegations at that time that the protest had been planned beforehand (Brisset-Foucault, 2013; Rutanga, 2010; Tangen, 2010), but substantial evidence seems to be lacking (Human Rights Watch, 2009). However, the account given by Activist III, presented here in the following case story, seems to support the assumption, that the rioters, too, have not been taken entirely by surprise.

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### ***Case Story: Preparing for War***

In the heightening tensions between Buganda and the central government, the Banyala ethnic group in Kayunga district declared their autonomy from Buganda in August 2009 and announced its opposition to the royal visit (Rutanga, 2010, p. 140). At this point, the Baganda student’s group *Nkoba Zambogo*<sup>37</sup> started preparing

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<sup>37</sup>Nkoba Zambogo is the student cultural group of the Buganda kingdom. It was founded in 1991 by students at Makerere University and is said to have over 100 000 active members and is present in all higher learning institutions throughout the country (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 18).

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for a confrontation, to assure that their king could continue with his travel plans as intended. Activist III was an active member of the group at the time of the riots. He explained that in his section they gathered about 800-1000 students who would travel to Kayunga one month prior to the scheduled visit, prepare the place through sweeping and cutting grass. However, they also prepared for a possible confrontation with Banyala, by cutting sticks, and gathering machetes. As he described it *“the students were ready to prepare a war”* (Activist III). On the days before the visit, he went back to Kampala, however, because *“we knew”*. The group expected that the *kabaka* would be stopped and they prepared to protest. Once the message reached him that the *katikkiro* could not continue his travel, he immediately went to Kisekka market, a downtown market dealing in used motor spare parts, got tires and started burning them at junctions all over Kampala, to stop traffic.

According to him, they were able to take the city the first day, since the government could not deploy soldiers from the Kampala army barracks, as they were all Baganda themselves. Instead, they allegedly flew in soldiers from Karamoja and South Sudan overnight, which eventually allowed them to regain some control. The protesters in the street received support from *“some big people in Buganda”*, who distributed Waragi [a local brand of gin] and Marijuana to the crowds, to keep up their morale. Activist III believes that if the protests had continued, they would have been able to topple the government. And even though peace was restored when the *kabaka* announced that he would not go to Kayunga, Activist III believes there is only the need for a spark for new protests to break out. *“Buganda is hibernating. We are told to survive in any situation, but the issues are still there.”*

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During, and even more so after the riots, the incident had been framed in very different ways. Rutanga (2010) denounced it as ethnic violence and compared the role of the media to those of the *Radio Mille Colines* in Rwanda during the time of the genocide (Rutanga, 2010, p. 142). Museveni himself, when addressing the Buganda members of parliament put the sectarian intentions of the Buganda kingdom in contrast to his own national concerns, which ignore ethnicity. *“CBS [the broadcasting service of the kingdom] promoted sectarianism, at one time talking of people with long noses [a nickname referring to people from the West]. It is not*

*our duty to measure people's noses – long or short.*” (Museveni, 2009) Such a discourse aimed at portraying Baganda as arrogant and in the desire of special treatment that they would not refrain to use violence against other ethnic groups. This perception was shared by many who were opposed to the riots, on the grounds that they did not come from Buganda.

However, Brisset-Foucault (2013) argues that:

“Nevertheless, the accusation of ‘genocide’ is fanciful: the demonstrations were not organized against civilians, the demonstrators were not all Baganda, and the victims were essentially hurt because of police retaliation [...]. This interpretation frames the events in a very specific way, presenting them as violence between royalist ‘rioters’ against civilians instead of as the result of repression by security forces. It also foregrounds an ethnic interpretation of the crisis, and, by so doing, keeps the riots from being understood in the larger context of the economic and regime crisis, and the growth of security forces’ violence against demonstrators.”

(Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 80)

Hence, for her, the riots were an expression of wider grievances shared by the urban poor and not solely by Baganda (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). This observation is supported by claims from Activist III that about 40% of the people arrested were non-Baganda, and that the argument of ethnic violence was only made because “*people want others to hate us*”. Similarly, the General Secretary of UTRADA, a driver in the transport sector, acknowledged that he joined the protests, albeit not being a Baganda himself, because “*If whatever they organize can bring change, I have to participate.*” (General Secretary, UTRADA). Similarly, Golooba-Mutebi (2011) acknowledges that Buganda and other pre-colonial institutions serve “*to fill an ideological gap*” (p.11) when dissatisfaction with the regime, public service delivery or inequality mount. Especially the violent crackdown from the government contributed to the escalation, exacerbating sentiments of injustice among the lower urban groups (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166).

The framing as ethnic violence is equally countered by arguments from Human Rights Watch. They argue that mainly the government forces were responsible for

the deaths and violence that occurred, by using unnecessary lethal force (Human Rights Watch, 2009). While maybe not necessarily ethnically motivated, the mobilizing role of the king cannot be neglected, as seen in his powers to quickly demobilize the protest. Golooba-Mutebi points out that “*The tremendous loyalty it [the Buganda monarchy] commands cannot and should not be dismissed as only a reaction to the incompetence of the central government.*” (Golooba-Mutebi, 2011, p. 12) So, while some Baganda were motivated to join, others were criticizing the tribal nature of the riots:

“I did not support them [the Baganda riots] because they were tribalistic.”

Chris

“But whereas the kabaka riots, again it turned into a tribal, where people from Western were asked some questions and if they didn't answer them properly, they could be punished. So it became it developed into a tribal kind of conflict. So the participation was reserved for Baganda much as some non-Baganda played some big role.”

Brian

“Recently, like in 2009, we had this rec/ tribalism thing, Baganda and Banyara. So many people were killed in town and so many (wares?) in so many buildings were destroyed, cars were burnt because people had started these things of Rwanda, you know, genocide stuff. But this man [the president] came up with his one word, told them, we don't depend on / Uganda is not made out of Baganda.”

Halima

Hence, identity has been a central issue in mobilization during the protest, even though it may not have been confined to it. Thus, contrary to the Mabira Forest protest, it did not manage to span a broad-based alliance between all Ugandans, but was widely perceived as a “Baganda issue”.

Beyond the immediate consequences of deaths, injuries and arrests, the riots led to an increase in police presence and equipment, and efforts on the side of the government to avoid similar events through increased repression. Additionally, the government drafted the Public Order Management Bill, a bill that foresaw a curtailment of freedoms to assemble in public. At that time it provoked international

criticism and was put on hold but resurfaced again after the Walk to Work protests (see below) and eventually was passed in the turmoil surrounding the Anti-Homosexuality Act (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 765 ff). Already during the riots, the government closed several media houses, on the grounds that they were inciting sectarianism and violence. Among them was the Central Broadcasting Service (CBS), the media station of the kingdom (Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 83; Human Rights Watch, 2010). While many of them reopened shortly after the protest, CBS remained closed for a year and eventually returned on air on renegotiated conditions what could be said on air and what could not. Similarly, the *ebimeeza*, popular interactive open-air radio talk shows, were forbidden and have not returned to the public scene in Kampala since. In her analysis, Brisset-Foucault attributed the restrictions to the fostering of a “political” instead of a mere “developmental” speech in the radio talk shows:

“The specific targeting of interactive shows is not a coincidence. They symbolize the transformation of the Kingdom, the politicization, generalization, and mass communication of its demands, and, more importantly, the existence of a popular political speech (because it targeted directly the decisions and behaviour of national elites and thus was not considered as developmental) that is detached from the institutional apparatus of the National Resistance Movement and attached to a ‘traditional institution’, promoting a mode of popular speech that contravened Museveni’s definition of citizenship and modernity.”

(Brisset-Foucault, 2013, p. 81)

This distinction between political versus non-political, or developmental is interesting insofar, as it is an often used rhetoric tool by the government as well as by activists to define their actions; with political often implying illegitimacy. This point shall be discussed later on in more detail in chapter 11.1.

In an attempt to appease the protesters, allegedly, Museveni himself called at least one of the *Nkoba Zambogo* mobilizers, to ask him “*why I was burning the city*” (Activist III). The organizers got offered money or positions as Regional District Commander (RDC) because “*their thinking was that most people who are doing this are unemployed, so we better get them jobs.*” (Activist III). The direct personal

intervention of the president fits well a pattern observed in other protests (see 9.1 and Goodfellow 2012), as well as the tendency to appease by integrating opponents in a patronage system (Barkan et al., 2011). The perception that it was mostly the unemployed youth who would protest was shared by others, like Baral and Brisset-Foucault. They attributed the frustrations to the “*classes urbaines démunies*” (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009, p. 166). Also, Rutanga argued that

“The business people attributed the riots on the redundant, unemployed youth. They argued that such activities usually became occasions for the unemployed youth to vent out their anger and frustrations through fighting, looting and destruction.”

(Rutanga, 2010, p. 150)

The role *Nkoba Zambogo* played during the protests supports the observation that many participants were youthful, as the group largely draws its members from universities. However, with these members being university students, the conclusion may be drawn that the protests were not only fueled by an urban underclass but also through young people with access to tertiary education; something that only applies to a minority of the Ugandan population. However, whereas “*the energy of the street is always youthful*” (Activist IV, Black Monday), the accounts of Activist III reveal also a supporting structure behind the protests, that did not manifest itself in the streets, but in the provision of logistic and material support. It, therefore, hints at the changing repertoires of action available to an individual, according to their income, age, and position. For the people interviewed, the decisive question whether or not they would feel concerned often depended on their ethnic affiliation. Usually, the Baganda would be supportive of the cause, even if they did not participate.

For Ibrahim, the Buganda riots were the only demonstrations he, himself a Muganda, ever participated in, and he proudly felt the protesters had achieved something:

**Ibrahim:** [I participated] because I think it [is unfair for] my cultural leader to be hesitated from going / be hindered from going to a certain part of the country, which is under his ownership.

**AF:** And did you think / or did it have an effect?

**Ibrahim:** Yes, of course, it had. [...] All things in the country, most especially in the city had to get stalled for three days. There was no business in the city for three days. There were bullets everywhere. People were shutting their homes. So, yeah, it was a big signal to the government that people love their king and they should be doing what they want.

Stephen, who earlier in the interview has emphasized his love for the *kabaka*, recalls:

“I wanted to participate in a demonstration where my kabaka was refused to visit one of the counties in Bugerere. But by the time I wanted to participate, it had become SOUR. Live bless over. I said I support you guys, but for the sake of my life, I couldn't. Yeah. But had it been a peaceful demonstration and hadn't it gone sour, I would be part of it. Because I didn't like it, the way they did it. But that turned out sour. I'm sorry to be a coward, but things were not/ [good].”

Stephen

Others may have still felt that it was wrong from stopping a Ugandan to go to some place of Uganda, as it was limiting a fundamental freedom, but did not participate. Gerald, who was not at Kampala at the time of the riots described his attitude as follows:



“Though I felt touched, I had nothing much to do. I was working in a[n internet] cafe, and just, as usual, I was on social media. [laughs] but me as a person I did not participate. Otherwise, the Buganda riot, there is one thing, some people misquote Ugandans. They say people look at this thing as if they are for a particular tribe. Buganda riot came and people from the Western, people from the Eastern, people from North said this is a Buganda issue. I think there is a way this thing needs to be looked at, the kind of that thing happened in a situation that there was a scuffle that why should I not go to one of my counties. Then the government operative are saying we have sensed danger. What danger? Unless you are the one that wants to kill me. I cannot have my own subjects kill me.”

Gerald

Thus, we do find here again a schism that goes across the lines of the income groups and divides instead along questions of age and ethnicity (young people, even educated, and loyal Baganda).

On the contrary, mainly the people from the West portrayed the riots as tribalistic and considered them to be wrong, only inciting violence. Some described harassments they had experienced during the riots and did not keep them in good memory. So, unlike Mabira, the issue was much more divisive, and due to the accrued level of violence, leading to more fatalities, many people refrained from participating, even though they may have been supportive of the cause, as the quote by Stephen shows. While the issues may have equally provoked other informal urban groups, it remained primarily a Baganda question (who also constitute the most significant part of the urban poor in Kampala, as the city is located in Buganda). Branch & Mampilly (2015) argue that the protests even managed to overcome a usually very present rural/urban divide by appealing to ethnic identities. They state:

“An alternative political and social order was being imposed in the streets, one in which the true authority, the Kabaka, was returned to his rightful place above the Museveni regime, even if only temporarily.”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 124)

And Guma highlights:

“Nevertheless, the mere fact that such an event, which to a casual observer may appear minor, could trigger riots that left dozens dead, over 800 arrested, and an immense amount of damaged property is testament to the emotive power and political fealty that kingdoms in general — and Buganda in particular — are able to command in Uganda [...]. That the King of Buganda was still able to foster social cohesion in his ethnic group in many ways calls for a rethinking of the role of traditional institutions in Africa’s quest for democracy in the present day.”

(Guma, 2017, p. 192)

Thus, while some may have used the occasion to express their dissatisfaction in general, the protest mainly drew its energy from sentiments of identity and loyalty to the king, turning it into a question of “Buganda versus Uganda”, with the Baganda protesters choosing the former over the latter. In these orientations, the protests lost appeal to many of the middle income groups, particularly if they were not Baganda. However, even among the Baganda, due to the violent nature of the protest, active participation would much depend on age, drawing its support from the young people. Older, but also wealthier Baganda, however, would be more willing to finance underlying structures.

This high mobilization potential suggests that the Buganda kingdom can be seen as an “*abeyance structure*” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). While not active at the moment, it can use its loyalties to be quickly reactivated for a cause, especially if it touches on the Baganda identity.

### **9.3. Walk to Work: a Good Cause, but the Wrong Means**

In February 2011, Ugandans went to the polls and re-elected President Museveni for another term, after him being since 25 years in power. This did not come as a surprise to many observers, who predicted a landslide win for the incumbent against his opponent Kizza Besigye. Though the elections were marked by less violence than the previous 2006 elections, the ground was not leveled. To avoid repression, Museveni resorted to co-optation and invested heavily in the pre-election

period in securing loyalty through financial means (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 25ff). As a result, the election was the most expensive one in Ugandan history, with the lion's share of the NRM campaign being drawn from the national budget (Barkan et al., 2011, p. 11). In January 2011, only seven months after the begin of the fiscal year, the parliament passed a supplementary budget of 250 million dollars, with about 100 million dollars allocated to State House (Tangen, 2011). At the end of the month, however, the minister of finance acknowledged that the government had run out of funding and thus had to concentrate spending only on a few areas with high priority. Allegedly the money of the supplementary budget had been used to buy fighter jets and military equipment, "*a classified category of purchases conveniently exempt from line-item scrutiny by parliament.*" (Izama & Wilkerson, 2011, p. 69) As a result, in the months following the election, inflation soared up, reaching a peak of 28% in August 2011, the highest since 1993 (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 32). However, even before its highest point, the inflation frustrated ordinary Ugandans who felt the effects in increased food and fuel prices. Hence, when the opposition called for middle class Ugandans to walk to work, as an expression of protest against the high fuel prices, an outlet seemed available for the resentment build up through the lost elections and the increasing struggle for daily survival (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 129).

The concept was simple: People were asked to walk to work twice a week, instead of using means of transport. Since walking was not an assembly, it did not require a specific permit by police and security forces and government politicians were ridiculed in their attempts to disallow citizens to walk, on the grounds that this was "*political walking*" (Mamdani, 2011, p. 560).

"That was the stroke of genius: to put food prices and increasing poverty at the centre of the agenda, articulated by an ostensibly independent activist group, instead of the tired message of election rigging centred around polarizing opposition politicians."

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 129)

The walking started in Kampala but quickly spread to other parts of Uganda. Branch & Mampilly attributed the resonance of the campaign to the fact that it was

not about a political issue, but about living conditions (ibid). While this may have been true in the beginning, and was a reason for many people to acknowledge the rightfulness of the protest, it quickly turned into a demonstration led by opposition politicians, with Kizza Besigye becoming the face of the demonstration, protesting against the “stolen” election (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 771f).

The government responded again with repressive measures, cracking down on protesters and opposition politicians. At the peak of the protests, Kizza Besigye was attacked and teargassed, and violently shoved under the seat of a military pick up truck, driven away for his arrest (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). However, the increasing centralization around Besigye turned the protests into a political question and eventually led to them dying out. The protests lasted for about a month and left approximately ten people dead and over 100 injured and 600 arrested (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Additionally, instances of rioting and looting took place. Thus, during and after the protest, the government was quick to frame those participating as rioters and as a threat to peace and stability in the country (Namiti, 2011). Members of the opposition refuted those claims, arguing that the government paid those looters, as a way of discrediting the opposition (Brian; Executive Director of NAPE).

The participants of the protests were largely considered coming from the urban informal groups, or the idle youth (Branch & Mampilly, 2015; Goodfellow, 2013, p. 443). So, while the protest was framed around questions of living conditions and supposed to be particularly appealing to the middle income groups, it failed to garner their support. Most respondents, even if supportive of the cause, would not embrace the form in which the discontent was voiced. There were three main concerns that stopped people from participating. One, the way in which the protest was organized would impact their working hours and most were not willing to forgo their income in an already strenuous time. Second, the affiliation with the opposition, turned the protest “political”, which is often frowned upon. Thirdly, the desire prevailed not to be associated with the protesters, because they were seen as the urban poor.

So, already the sheer setup of the protest was a hindrance to participation.

“Like I live in Entebbe, would I have to walk up to here, twice, or three times? People would walk and get tired. There are some political party leaders who actually gave up the walk and 'Ah, police take me back to my home; I'm tired.' Leaders of political parties.”

Judith

“At the end of the day, I'm like: 'OK, things are high, that's true.' But why walk to work? You see? And there are other things than walk to work. Because when I walk to work I'll be late for work and I need the work, you get it? I need the work; I need the job. Maybe it is not the best, but I need it because apparently I'm earning a living from it. You see those people down at the arcades. I showed you our middle class. They are those people in the markets; you get it? She will say: 'I walk to work and leave my stall? What will I eat at the end of the day?' You get it? She's like: 'Aaah, the leader. That guy is a wealthy man.’”

Justine

“That 'Walk to Work', the way I saw it / it was right, a right thing, though the people who were engaged in it, lost focus of reality. And the way they brought it, it was a dissatisfaction [with the commodity prices]. They had a right to walk. [...] but with me, I didn't look at them to engage myself in that. Look, I'm not the / my boss wants me at eight, how can I start walking from my place and my residency walking up to here, when you reach here you are disorganized in the brain, you're tired, you're what. Me, personally, I couldn't do it.”

Daniel

Thus, for people with regular employment it was hard to join the protests, and as a result, the demonstrators were described as the “boda boda guys”, which turned into a metaphor for the urban poor<sup>38</sup>. They did, however, receive support from the FDC and activists closely affiliated with the opposition.

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<sup>38</sup>This attribution mainly took place in 2012, shortly after the protest. Meanwhile, there seems to be a shift in recognition of motorcycle drivers, as several interlocutors in 2017 pointed out that boda boda riders often earn more than employed people.

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### **Case Story: How to Organize a Protest**

Brian explained how he was involved in the organization of the protest. He was assigned a particular region, and there he would look for groups of about five people every day, and watch documentaries with them, on the Polish revolution and other protests. This would serve as a base for explaining the principles of non-violent protest. *“What I was trying to do is to show them the power of non-violence. How non-violence works and how it has ever triumphed elsewhere and how it can help us.”* When asked how he would find the people willing to join the training, he answered: *“Like I told you, when you live with these people it is easy. Now, like for me, if I want, if I have an emergency, I jump on a boda boda. So I don't know how many boda boda riders I know in this city. If I am so hungry, I go downtown; I eat kikommando<sup>39</sup>. So these people they meet there. And when they are in this kind of meetings, you hear their pain; you hear their/ so it is very easy to go to the people you really understand.”* The FDC provided the logistics and he acted as a member of the opposition party. However, he emphasizes that the campaign appealed to many people, beyond FDC, because everyone felt the pressure of high food prices, FDC was merely giving them an option to voice their discontent.

*“Fuel was too scarce. Now before even we came to talk to them, they had this pressure daily on their households. Now, of course, this pressure, the, like I told you, Ugandans expect answers. So they started looking into a certain direction. We came in; we gave them an option.”* While it was intended for everyone, he does content though, that the protest was most present in the poor neighborhoods of Kampala, such as Kawempe, Kalerwe or Kasubi. It was also in these areas that he concentrated his recruitment, looking for people with idle time. Talking about the violence that occurred during the protests, he dissociates them from the FDC campaign, as this was against the principles they used for training protesters. *“Personally I moved into different units, teaching people please don't throw stones, it is not our campaign. Walk with your hands folded like this, so how could we be the rioters. [The rioters] were those people that we had not gone to share with them the concept of the campaign.”* Instead, he believes the regime hired “goons” and gave them FDC t-shirts to tarnish the name of the opposition and the protest.

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<sup>39</sup>A local dish consisting of red beans and chapati, a flatbread originally coming from the Indian subcontinent. It is filling and not very expensive.

Both affiliations, however, with the opposition or with the urban poor, made the issue less appealing to wider parts of the population. Ronald states that he did not support the protest because he saw them as a “*confusion between FDC and NRM government*” and felt that Walk to Work had its own hidden agenda. For him, he did not believe “*this is the solution to change the government*” and perceived his own interventions, of organizing people in a group of professionals within the same sector to overcome shortcomings of government regulations (see more on this in chapter 14.6) as more tangible.

“The walk to work (...) is still one of those activities of the pressure groups and the political parties. Like I said, they are always there to critique; they are always there to find fault [...].”

Judith

The idea that the protest had been “*hijacked*” by political parties was mentioned by several interviewees, some arguing that it was Besigye’s attempt after a lost election to seize power.

“But for them, they were using that/ they were using the economic crisis you know? But they were trying to / maybe to / they have other hidden agendas, you know? Like I think they were looking at how the Tunisian / the Tunisia [unintelligible] / Like there was this chaos, and they managed and even like this man of Libya/ they thought they could do the same here.”

Norah

For others, the participants of the protest, rather than the organizers, discredited the demonstrations. Mainly because looting was involved, those interviewees felt that the demonstrators did not actually subscribe to the cause of the protest.

“You will find that the people that are involved in such things they are the unemployed. You get it? [...] Explain it to a certain class of people, maybe to the lawyers. You think if you found lawyers protesting, would you take that lightly? Because these are believed to be the elites of the society! You get it? Find / maybe get a / get / convince the doctors, convince the teachers, convince the accountants, convince those people. Because they are THERE. When such people protest, you don't take them lightly. But a hungry fellow, who looks more miserable, if you found him protesting, first you will think: 'Maybe this person is a lunatic. Does she or he even understand why she or he/ people protest because they enjoy. Maybe because they are tired, because they are idle.’”

Justine

“You see demonstrations, and you will find boda boda guys, shouting, running, people who really don't have this agenda. I don't know. But people who / they don't have this thing at heart, they are just there because something is happening.”

Julius

Mistrusting the opposition was also fueled by the feeling that there was no clear agenda behind the protests. Goodfellow recalls a radio interview with Kizza Besigye where the opposition leader went silent for several seconds, after being asked for his objectives. The demonstrations thus were mainly guided by a sentiment of injustice concerning the conduct of the police and over the right to protest (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 772). The violence used by the police and armed forces to suppress the protests reinforced these sentiments, while they also deterred many from joining.

So, while the protest lacked ethnic undertones, as had been the case with the Buganda riots, it was mainly confined to the urban precariat and the political opposition (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 137). The increasing focus on FDC leader Kizza Besigye in addition to the lack of a pronounced political agenda and repressive government response eventually led to the movement slowly dying out, albeit no substantial concessions from the side of government had been made.



In response, the Public Order Management Bill resurged in parliament and was eventually passed in 2013, as Public Order Management Act (POMA), making political activism increasingly difficult (Goodfellow, 2014, p. 770).

#### **9.4. Black Monday: That Civil Society Thing**

While the presence of urban poor people may have refrained some from participating in the Walk to Work protest, activism led by more “respectable” civil society and clerics does not necessarily yield a better result. In 2012, an assembly of several civil society organizations (CSOs) decided to launch the Black Monday Movement (BMM), as a response to accrued cases of corruption. Uganda is considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world, occupying rank 142 out of 174 countries (Transparency International, 2017) and in the wake of the launch of BMM the office of the prime minister had been the center of attention for the embezzlement of national funds (Wamara, 2017). Thus, a group of 50 CSOs declared a week of national mourning, at the end of which the movement was born (AfriMAP, 2016, p. 82; Guma, 2017, p. 194). It called upon Ugandans to wear black clothes every Monday, as a symbol of opposition against corruption, to denounce corruption wherever encountered, to boycott those that are known to engage in corruption, to demand law enforcement from the State against perpetrators of corruption, and to raise awareness among Ugandans about the negative aspects of theft of public funds. Hence, it was conceived in a way that would make it citizen-led, by calling for the simple actions mentioned above, so that everyone could participate (Uganda National NGO Forum, n.d.).

“Then we said, ok, one is we are going to ensure that we make this campaign very personal to them. So it is not about fighting something out there, but it is about me as a citizen, seeing myself as part of this country, being part of the change I would like to see. So, in that case, we said, fine, let us have a number of very simple actions that people can take.”

Executive Director, Black Monday

In addition, the organizers published and distributed a newsletter that would highlight ongoing corruption cases and tried to relate the money stolen to the services it could have provided.


“That if, if, if a citizen reads all these bubbles and say ‘Wait a minute. You mean this money could pay a salary for a full year for 30 525 primary teachers?’ then that gets to their mind. And then they start following up.”

Activist II, Black Monday

“And we thought, yeah, how do we do it. You must make a connection between theft and service delivery. Theft and their lies on a regular basis. We make connections between a terrible school and a terrible corruption scandal.”

Activist IV, Black Monday

The newsletter publication, however, stopped in August 2016 due to the challenges its distribution encountered. The BMM activists highlight how it had become increasingly difficult to find someone who would be willing to print the newsletter, out of fear of being associated with the campaign. Additionally, the volunteers who distributed the newsletters would be arrested on the grounds of spreading “*harmful propaganda*” (AfriMAP, 2016, p. 82). Some of them captured wide-spread public and media attention, such as the arrest of retired Archbishop Zac Niringiye in February 2013, who was one of the public faces of the BMM (The Observer, 2013).



*Daily Monitor, 28.03.2014: “Bishop Zac and the Black Monday Demonstrations.” (Balagade, 2014)*

By the beginning of 2014, a little more over a year after its launch, the movement faced 28 arrests and had experienced violent suppression of the activities through the police (Guma, 2017, p. 194). And while the charges had not been prosecuted, they made the work of the activists more challenging.

“So we ended up investing our time and energy in running to police cells than doing the actual work. Now, we spend a whole year, reporting to police for police bond, making sure people are getting representation. But now we became a legal aid, whatever. Because of Black Monday.”

Activist II

At the time of the interviews (January/February 2017) no action had been going on because the organizers were rethinking the format. The intolerance shown by the regime towards the movement is evidence for the shrinking space for public action left in Uganda. Because as the BMM activists argue, they do not target specifically the government in power. Instead, they subscribe to the government’s program, which claims to fight against corruption.

“Because the way we have framed it, it is very hard to stop. The president said that he wants zero tolerance to corruption in his manifesto. So we keep using that line and say you know the president says zero corruption and we are promoting this phrase. So they say, ya, ya, ya, but you are not doing it the right direction. But they cannot tell us stop. Because stop would mean to tell us, please support corruption. And nobody wants to say that. So what do you do. You just leave us, you rubbish us, you make it look like ah, *this is political* [emphasis added], this is not about anti-corruption.”

Executive Director, Black Monday

The discursive struggle over whether the campaign is political or not has been mentioned by all three BMM activists interviewed (Activist II and IV, and the Executive Director of the NGO Forum). Thus, Activist II points out one of the challenge of activism “*Because the problem we’ve had is people mixing politics into activism. It has not yielded.*” Even though the movement highlights on their website that they are “*non-partisan, but certainly political*” in vernacular discourse, partisan and political often become synonyms. That tactic is equally used by the government, opposing political (as aligning with the opposition) and developmental (supporting the government agenda). As a result, *being political* has become a biased expression, as shall be discussed in chapter 11.1.

So, while the activists claim that the movement is alive and strategizing, there are currently no ongoing activities. One of the central discussions revolves around the question how to make the campaign more appealing to citizens again. Corruption being of a major concern to many interviewees, it seemed that a public action campaign launched to shun corruption and those involved in it, and led by public figures of the church and civil society would find good resonance. However, Pearson and Pedersen describe the attitude towards corruption as “*national apathy with deep-rooted anger*” (Pearson & Pedersen, 2016, p. 9) and indeed, the campaign has yielded little response from citizens.

“Now, there is absolutely no doubt, one of the weaknesses of the Black Monday Movement leadership was not to develop / I guess the word that I would use is vernacularization of the movement. To put it in the language of the street. [...] It is that because it was led by people within the NGO sector it suffered the pitfalls that it did.”

Activist IV

That seems to be confirmed by reactions from interviewees and in casual discussions when BMM came up. While many were sympathizing with the movement and felt the causes were justified, they did not feel concerned themselves, or convinced by their activities, brushing it off as a “*civil society thing*.” Apparently, in the beginning, it captured some attention, but for many, it died out quickly. Some felt the issue of corruption was too complex and hard to grasp, contrary for example to “*Save Mabira*”, which had a very concise issue around which people would rally. Hence, Arthur Larok, one of the main organizers explained in an interview:

“The first expectation we had was to demystify the idea of corruption. You know corruption is a corrupted concept, and this is due to the fact that the media has been awash with scandals of corruption, something that has made the public embrace it as part of life.”

(Kakaire, 2013)

“Corruption is very nebulous. So that is why it became clear to us, we need to relate corruption to the life of the people. [...] And that is something that we have really been thinking a lot about, is it actually possible to build a movement around such a broad, amorphibic [amorphous]. When you think you are touching it, it disappears. It is in education; it is everywhere. It is in agriculture, it is in procurement, it is in how roads are constructed; it is everywhere. [...] I think the fact that it is difficult to focus it on an issue, and we have been reflecting, maybe we need to identify one or two things which embodies everything we know is the enemy around corruption and focus. But if you are trying to build everything, it is difficult to build a movement around such a nebulous, amorphibic [amorphous] monster type thing.”

Activist IV

To others, however, the presence of NGOs acted as a deterrent. Gerald said he joined the movement on social media but did not participate because it was “*more*

*of civil society engagement, an elites thing.*” That lost credibility in his eyes because “*more of this civil society individuals work for accountability. That is the worst thing I hate about them.*” The General Secretary of UTRADA said he had been supportive because of its anti-corruption stance, but felt it had been little effective. “*Wearing black clothes cannot intimidate Museveni, it must bring a loss to his government. Non-violence? [smiles and shakes his head]. Museveni fears violence.*” The loss of credibility of a movement through the “NGO-ization” of protest has been known to the organizers, as the quote from Activist IV on this behalf shows. On their website they particularly dedicate a section to the “*Misconceptions about the Movement*”, addressing these problems (Uganda National NGO Forum, n.d.). It has also been discussed in the literature on the pitfalls of civil society (AbouAssi, 2014; Fisher, 1997), and is worth discussing further, as will be done in chapter 10.1. Branch & Mampilly even go as far as doubting the relevance of the term “movement”, they describe it as middle class activists denouncing corruption but without pronouncing any political allegiance.

“Civil society ‘politics’ was reduced to moral declarations of grievance, focused mainly against corruption, while the work of political organization and action was left to the parties — who in turn, were condemned as self-interested.”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 142)

The framing as “elitist” or “middle class activism” (the terms are often used interchangeably and essentially refer to those working in the NGO sector) has made the campaign less appealing to “*the common man*” (Gerald), a group the majority of Kampala inhabitants would refer themselves to. This is in stark contrast to the Buganda riots and Walk to Work, which were precisely targeting this group. Yet, this does not make it more appealing for the middle income groups, who consider themselves to be at least above the urban poor. Albeit the weight of corruption is felt by many middle income groups, again the issue fails to get their support. This is in contrast to other protests worldwide, that have been said to be triggered by the anger against corruption and led by the middle classes, such as in India, China, Brazil, or Thailand (Fukuyama, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2013; The Economist, 2011a).

It is not our intention to discuss the analysis of these other countries, we would merely like to point out that corruption did not succeed to become an issue around which middle income groups would mobilize in large masses in Uganda. Again, an explicitly political question stopped many of the middle income groups from participating. The citation above, however, points out another important aspect: with political action being delegitimized through discursive and repressive methods, and civil society action not triggering a sense of responsibility for action from the people, options for being political active become increasingly narrow.

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It is hard to measure the “success” of a protest, but in general, it can be retained that most of the demonstrations triggered little concessions from the government. The notable exception here being the “Save Mabira” campaign. As argued before, it was the broad alliance between different factions of society, in addition to pressure from donor countries, which made the issue hard to ignore for the government. If it had remained limited to the realm of NGOs, most likely it would have suffered the same pitfalls as the BMM or other environmental protests, like the forest giveaway on Bugala Island or the Bujagali-dam protest. The other protests mentioned here, however, had in common that essential parts of the population did not feel immediately concerned, even though the issues brought up may have affected them. Thus, the Buganda riots and Walk to Work aimed at urban underclasses, and in the case of the riots more particularly to an ethnic identity. As a result, the protests were discredited for people who either did not feel the same loyalty to the king or did not want to associate with those “urban poor” that were protesting. In the case of Walk to Work, the monopolization of the protest by the opposition additionally made people shun away from demonstrating. Hence, “political”, i.e., partisan activities have a bad reputation. Finally, the BMM, on the other hand, was seen as invested by civil society, hence not being something that would concern the ordinary Ugandan citizen, as it was the NGO leaders who would take care of this (see also chapter 10.1). On top of that, the violent response from the

government and everyday discourses around political activism made the environment even less conducive to join protests for many. Thus, regarding socio-demographics, it seemed that protesters were mainly from a low income background and young.

This recount of the major protests in Uganda's recent history is instructive to provide a partial answer on what makes people descend to the streets. Here, ethnic identity has been one of the prominent factors that provided mobilization power in two of the four protests. Similarly, income has played a role, as those protesting had often been described having a low income and the protests as fueled by the frustration of the challenges of everyday life (e.g., Brisset-Foucault, 2013). Branch & Mampilly term this the "*political society*" because they lack representation through institutionalized channels and, therefore, engage directly with the state through confrontation (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 20 f). However, this does not account for the university students, who had been vital in those protests as well and thus these "*urban poor*" need to be viewed in a more nuanced light. Income itself may not be a sufficient determinant, especially because the protests here are different from the violent, but brief (usually less than a day) and localized outbreaks that happen regularly in downtown Kampala, which are much more driven by the frustration of the precariat<sup>40</sup>. Finally, age is another important aspect, as the protesters have mainly been described as youthful. This is relevant for two reasons. One, Uganda has the youngest population in the world. Second, and in relation to this, older Ugandans remember the time under Idi Amin and the civil war and often prefer stability over confrontation with the government (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 133). What we can see here is that, if at all, the middle income groups rarely protest as a "class" or one group with specific interests, but rather in smaller entities, such as the young, or the university students or in reference to a particular ethnic identity. We also find that the forms of participation shift, mainly with age, from active protesting to potential material or financial support. But again, this does not happen as a class, but as individuals who identify with the groups mentioned above.

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<sup>40</sup> The database on armed conflict counts 211 riots and protests in Kampala since 2000 (ACLED, 2018)  
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Finally, the reasons why people go to the street are equally insightful to answer why some Ugandans would abstain from protesting. The framing of political activism and those who participate make the environment for protest in most cases not conducive for the middle income groups. As a result, it seems that members of the middle income groups would refrain from mobilization for political causes, considering this to be something they should avoid.

## **10. Mobilization without Protest - Protest without Mobilization**

In this chapter we look at other actors of political participation, that have already been mentioned but not discussed in detail: NGOs, religious groups, and unions. NGOs tend to channel protest into very consensual forms of mobilization and are often perceived as somewhat futile in their actions (Siméant, 2013). On the other hand, actors like unions or churches have certain visibility and often trigger a direct intervention from the President, but without necessarily achieving long-lasting structural changes (Goodfellow, 2013). Instead, we argue, that organizations, as soon as they manage to capture some attention, are co-opted into the patronage system by buying off their leaders. This has very harmful effects for the legitimacy of actors such as trade unions or religious umbrella organizations, with especially the latter having been vital during the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war (see for example Burgess, 1997; Pollack, 1990).

### **10.1. The NGO-ization of Protest**

Daniel suggests bridging the gap between the protest and mobilization literature and its neglect of the Global South through the integration of the civil society discourse (Daniel, 2016, p. 44ff). Without wanting to go into the debate of the challenges the concept entails, we focus here on the role civil society plays in mobilization or demobilization for political causes, through one of its main actors in the Global South, NGOs. Certainly, there is a lot of variation between NGOs, their internal organization and funding structures which will lead to vastly different outcomes. The gross generalizations described here serve to show some constraints that NGOs might be facing if they decide to mobilize for a particular cause and its impact on protest mobilization.

Because many NGOs are dependent on external financial resources, international donors become key players as well (AbouAssi, 2014). Also, NGOs are usually not

independent of the state nor are they controlling it, but often collaborate with the state or are co-opted by it (Daniel, 2016, p. 46). As a result, the dependence of the NGOs either on the donors, the state, or both has an impact on the reputation of protest.

First, due to the financial dependence on external donors, NGOs are limited in their freedom on how to set their agenda, even though it might alleviate their dependence from the state in some cases. In his study of three environmental NGOs in Libanon, AbouAssi has shown how the dependence on donor financing effects the strategies used by the NGOs. While he highlights that different NGOs, depending on their internal structure react differently to the same donor, he concedes that particularly the NGO which is most dependent on foreign aid for its persistence, is the most likely to adopt their program to the donor's agenda (AbouAssi, 2014). He observes that *"The tendency of NGOs to adjust its activities in accordance with donor funding has caused a distortion in its public image as a serious environmental organization."* (AbouAssi, 2014, p. 984) In her comparison between women NGOs in Kenya and Brazil, Daniel observes the higher dependence on foreign aid in the case of Kenyan NGOs, which create a tension between the goals of the organizations and the conditionalities imposed by the donors (Daniel, 2016, p. 296). As a result, NGOs become more accountable to their funders and less to the communities they are supposed to represent. Thus, a perception can arise that NGOs are mainly tools to implement Western agendas (Fisher, 1997, p. 454). In Uganda, the issue has become particularly salient in the discussion of the Anti-homosexuality bill, in which NGOs working on LGBT rights have been considered as tools promoting the spread of the "Western practice", fundamentally detrimental to "African culture" (Kalyegira, 2014; Titeca, 2014). The need for the BMM to explicitly distance itself from Western influence, albeit highly dependent on donor money, is speaking in this regard, as it shows their effort to portray the movement as an indigenous answer to the problem of public theft (Uganda National NGO Forum, n.d.).

Secondly, the access to foreign funding can lead to what Daniel has termed a “*conference mentality*” (Daniel, 2016, p. 187), that makes it increasingly hard to mobilize volunteers. With the increasing withdrawal of donors from Latin America, Brazilian women organizations strengthened their volunteer basis which had a positive impact on the collective identity of the organizations. On the other hand, Kenyan women NGOs, which are more aid-dependent, complain about the difficulties in mobilizing women to participate in their events. They are always met with expectations to pay a daily allowance and transport cost, regardless of the social origins of the participants (Daniel, 2016, p. 298). In addition, working in an NGO is an attractive career option for graduates, who thus may decide to join an NGO that promotes a specific cause, while lacking the ideological identification with that cause (Daniel, 2016, p. 299). These challenges, the influence of donors on the agenda-setting, its limited capacity to mobilize people without cost reimbursement, the reliance on paid staff, who choose the NGO as a career path, and the absence of a volunteer support structure all have a limiting effect on their potential for collective action. It is also likely that this in return affects their credibility among the local population, as an adequate tool for representing the people’s concerns, as the quote by AbouAssi above has shown. In our work this has become prominent in the respondents’ evaluation of the Black Monday Movement, which they have seen as “a civil society thing”, but nothing that would concern them directly, or demand any actions on their behalf (see chapter 9.4). This observation leads us to suggest that if an issue is taken up by an NGO, it might as well have a demobilizing and delegitimizing effect in the eyes of the wider population, if it is not backed up by other, more “credible” sources, as has been the case during the “Save Mabira” campaign (see 9.1). And it will shift protest from a confrontational to a more consensual form of political participation.

Even in cases when they are not financially dependent, NGOs are by no means as dissociated from the state as their name would make belief. They still operate in a framework that is defined by the government and are, therefore, depend on the latter for its proper functioning. Fisher, emphasizing the heterogeneity of relation-

ships between NGOs and governments, argues that nevertheless “[...] NGOs are often intimately connected with their home governments in relationships that are both ambivalent and dynamic, sometimes cooperative, sometimes contentious, sometimes both simultaneously.” (Fisher, 1997, p. 451) For example, NGOs are dependent on the public space that the government is willing to provide. In the case of Uganda, the requirement for every NGO to register with the NGO board, which is appointed by the government. The board retains the power to withdraw a license if it deems it to be in “*the public interest*” (Nassali, 2014, p. 37). Such a vague formulation, similar to the grounds on which someone can be arrested mentioned in the Anti-Homosexuality Act and the Anti-Pornography Act (see Titeca, 2014), gives considerable leeway to the government to control NGO dissent. As a result, Siméant observes, mobilization through NGOs are very consensual because if they carry out any action, they have beforehand passed through the governmental stages of approval. Protest repertoires, such as protest marches or demonstrations, deemed contentious thus turn into tools of governmental control (Siméant, 2013, p. 138). She even questions the link between mobilization and protestation:

“J’ai ainsi été amenée à réviser cet implicite qui assimile la mobilisation à la protestation en découvrant par exemple à quel point les marches qui se déploient à Bamako sont loin de posséder tous les attributs de la protestation, et renvoient à un rapport privilégié à l’État, soit du fait du statut de ceux qui défilent, soit de l’habitude de ces nombreuses journées nationales de mobilisation qui sont l’apanage de l’État, en partenariat ou non avec des organisations internationales, soit enfin du fait de l’aspect très policé de la marche. Bref, ces dernières se situent à l’intersection de l’espace formel, du monde du droit, de l’écrit et de l’État. Cela suppose de penser à la mobilisation autant comme un instrument d’État qu’une technique de protestation. Si le sens de la même pratique varie selon les contextes où elle se déploie, autant ne pas s’acharner à voir de la protestation là où s’observent surtout des techniques de mobilisation bien rodées.”

(Siméant, 2013, p. 138)

In addition, NGOs may opt for an approach of “silent diplomacy” and thus position themselves close to those in power, to be able to influence the policy process (see Siméant, 2014) which may comprise their actions in the eyes of those opposed to

the regime. Similarly, the authors underline that again the dependence on donor funding may push NGOs to take on a less controversial approach (AbouAssi, 2014; Fisher, 1997; Siméant, 2013)

It is hard to measure the impact NGOs have on the policy process, as such an assessment would need a case-by-case analysis. Branch & Mampilly are rather cynical in this regard. They come to a similar conclusion as the observations outlined above and remark:

“Donor funding has created a professional, NGO-based service sector commonly going under the name of civil society. Its sphere of political action is restricted by its financial base, as many donors forbid NGOs from involvement in overtly partisan or oppositional activities. The politics of the NGO sector are further restricted as many who seek employment in civil society view it as an opportunity for a secure lifestyle and not as part of a commitment to an opposition or even liberal politics. [...] As a consequence, when today’s self-proclaimed civil society gets involved in protest, it may have little political importance. For instance, witness the spectacle of well-ordered marchers from a Western-funded pro-democracy or human rights organization, placards aloft with clear messages referencing international protocols. If the state actually responded to their demands, it would come as a shock.”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 76)

For them, the civil society does not need any actual change because themselves they are comfortably living from the situation as it is. And knowing about its limited transformative potential, the state does not respond in the same way to an NGO organized protest march as it would to a demonstration organized by peasants or unemployed youth, which would be met with a violent reaction (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 77).

We do not want to dwell on the effectiveness of NGOs, as we believe the evaluation needs to be more complex than the general observations stated by Branch and Mampilly (2015). The point we want to retain here is the one brought forward by Siméant: the consensus pursued by NGOs tends to define “*a right kind of civil society*”, and as a result disqualifies other forms of protest (Siméant, 2014, p. 338). We would like to add, though, that on the other hand the awareness of the conditions under which NGO operates, as detailed above, dissociates the Ugandan peo-

ple from the NGO actions. It turns their mobilization into an event someone might be willing to attend, if they receive free lunch or transport allowances, but not into something that would require getting personally more involved. This default might be initial to the very set up of many NGO structures: “*Top-down planning, top-down funding, and upwards accountability negate participation.*” (Fisher, 1997, p. 455)

As a result, and as the example of the BMM in contrast to the other protests have shown, NGOs in Uganda have only limited credibility and are seen as dissociate from the rest of society. Their potential for mobilization is restricted and follows specific forms that are rather a hindrance to the collective action of Ugandans, as they feel this “*civil society thing*” belongs in the realm of professionals, but does not concern them as ordinary citizens. Thus, NGOs are not considered representatives of the society with the potential to bring social change on the behalf of everyone. It now remains to be seen whether other actors in Uganda have greater capacities to do so.

## **10.2. Religious Groups - Credibility among the Masses**

We have already shown how the democratic transitions of the 1990s in Africa were often analyzed through the lens of civil society (see p.81). In many instances, the clergy had a crucial role in managing these transitions, particular in West African states, as they would often head the National Conferences, that would set up a new constitution and a peaceful transition of power. In Uganda, however, churches are said to have had a role as mediator between state power and the Ugandan population (Okuku, 2002). This does not mean, however, that the churches, or other religious groups, lack political clout. First of all, they enjoy legitimacy among the citizens. According to Afrobarometer, 68% of Ugandans trust their religious leaders a lot – this is significantly higher than for traditional leaders (48%), the President (42%), the parliament, the district council or the police (all 18%) (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 35). Besides, they have well institutionalized lobby groups, namely the

Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) and the Interreligious Council of Uganda (IRCU) that are engaging with parliament and voice their opinion on the legislative process (Fichtmüller, 2014a). Through these bodies they have been able to influence a number of proposed bills concerned with issues of morality, such as the Anti-homosexuality Act, the Anti-pornography Act and they have lobbied against the passing of the Domestic Relations Bill. In the last decades a religious revival has happened all over the continent, that has led to a considerable gain in importance of religious ideas and affiliations (Ellis & ter Haar, 2004). For Ellis and ter Haar it is precisely the weakening of state structures that motivated people to seek for alternative sources of authority. In their view, *“the reoccupation of public space by religious movements expresses in a spirit idiom a concern with poor governance.”* (Ellis & ter Haar, 2004, p. 100) The presence in the public space manifests itself in the public display of religious slogans, the presence of religious leaders at public events, or the general acceptance that gatherings are opened or closed with a prayer, particularly if a clergy is present and regardless of the faith of participants (Fichtmüller, 2014a). The endorsement by religious leaders is equally crucial for MPs to win in their constituencies. As one respondent remarked: *“Even me, as a MP, I must have Fathers, I must have Imams, you cannot win.”* (MP I, NRM) Equally, several interviewees mentioned that to be elected in certain constituencies, one had to have the right confession, otherwise they would not stand a chance. And once elected, politicians still take into considerations religious concerns, even if it may go against their own convictions. In relation to the domestic relation bill<sup>41</sup>, one female MP mentioned:

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<sup>41</sup>The bill was aimed at reforming marriage law in Uganda, to provide more rights to women in case of divorce and heavily opposed by religious groups. Muslims considered Muslim marriage regulations threatened and Christian churches opposed it because it presented divorce as legitimate option, which they considered wrong.



“Because we all know them, we usually tow their line. Because we know the kind of damage they can make in the campaigns. It affects us greatly in that sometimes, even when you know that something is good for the nation you are forced to retreat because you do not want a war with religion.”

MP IV, Independent

Yet, the influence of religious leaders is somewhat ambiguous. While their political expression is considered acceptable for certain topics, such as the Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB) or the Domestic Relations bill, it is less so for other issues, particularly if they criticize the government too openly. Too strong criticism of corruption or the demands for more transparency have been reprimanded by the government (Fichtmüller, 2014a, p. 23). Thus, more controversial bills, which were not confined to the sphere of morality, were passed despite religious opposition. This had been the case for the Petrol (Exploration, Development, and Production) bill 2013. The bill foresaw an extensive array of executive powers given to the minister of energy, to the detriment of the parliament, thus limiting transparency on issues around oil exploitation. Despite lobbying from IRCU and UJCC, and other civil society groups, the bill was passed in 2013. As soon as religious leaders become outspoken against the government, they are reminded that politics is none of their business and they are accused of sidelining with the opposition. Recently, the constitution was amended to remove the age limit as a condition for presidency, which will allow Museveni to represent himself in the next election (otherwise he would legally be restrained, as he would have surpassed the age limit). In the debate before the vote on the amendment, one minister was quoted warning the clergy, that they may talk about politics but “*they should not forget what happened to Janan Luwum* [an Anglican bishop that was murdered due to his opposition to the Amin regime].” (Lumu, 2017)

In relation to the Churches positions in the 2016 elections, Alava & Ssentogo (2016) find that the bodies of IRCU and UJCC mainly promoted an “NGO-ized message” of encouraging people to vote, but wisely, to stay calm and abstain from violence. They suggest that these institutional bodies correspond to what Gifford describes as the “NGO-ized plane of religion” (contrary to the enchanted one).

However, such a discourse ultimately serves to legitimate those in power because “the peace narrative of Uganda’s religious leaders underemphasised the violence that undergirds Uganda’s contemporary ‘peace’.” (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016, pp. 681–684) This observation may equally be valid for other projects of democratization and good governance carried out by the bodies and funded through donors. In that sense, they are run in a way similar to NGOs and they face similar constraints, as discussed in chapter 10.1.

There is, however, also a considerable degree of self-censorship among the clergy, due to the close ties between the NRM regime and the various religious groups. In its restoration of political order after nearly twenty years of chaos the regime has relied on integrating the diverse factions of society within the same system, former opposing rebel groups as well as key members of civil society (Perrot, 2003, p. 22). The *International Crisis Group* writes:

“Museveni’s growing reliance on patronage responds to the ethnic, regional and religious division every prior regime has faced but is compounded by the decline in rule of law and rise in official corruption.”

(International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 9)

So it is not surprising that religious leaders are part of this network. Besides their institutionalization, the religious and political actors interviewed recognize the importance of direct contact with the President and of key positions in government. There are three main aspects recurrent in the different interviews showing the religious groups on the receiving end of favors: the repartition of political positions according to religious affiliation, private audiences with the president and gifts made to religious leaders. These aspects are well-known in the wider society and often considered as legitimate.

Since his arrival in power, Museveni has been vigilant to assure a religious equilibrium in the cabinet. The example evoked the most frequently is that of the vice-president: because Museveni himself is a Protestant, the position of a vice president has always been attributed to a Catholic. This repartition is not an invention of Museveni. Following the Buganda wars, a violent encounter between Catholics and Protestants for hegemony in Buganda at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the agree-

ment of 1900 already accorded different political positions to the different denominations for the sake of stability (see Welbourn, 1965, p. 7). Religious leaders are keen to assure that their religions are sufficiently represented in government. Some accounts even say that after pre-selecting his ministers, Museveni sends the list to the archbishops to get their approval.

The second channel of influences is through private auditions with the President. The general secretary of UMSC highlights how simple it is to obtain a tête-à-tête with the President. So confirms also an employee of IRCU:

“Now, as you know, faith groups don’t go to the streets to demonstrate, when things go wrong. They seek audience with the President. And often, he has allowed. And they tell him, the Council Presidents go to State House and tell him: ‘Look here, I think there is a problem. Corruption is going beyond the edges. Something must be done.’ So they also lobby at the very top-level.”

Staff, IRCU

These auditions are either held in group or with individuals, even though the President prefers to receive religious leaders one by one. This influence through personal ties should not be neglected and can also be observed in other countries. In the case of Zimbabwe, David Maxwell notes that:

“However, in Zimbabwe religious and political interactions do take a specifically local form. Given the relative weakness of civil society in Africa, the relative strength of the church (Gifford, 1995, 1998) and the limited size of the dominant elite, Church leaders can exert a direct and personal influence on politicians in a way that the complexities of the American political system would not allow.”

(Maxwell, 2000, p. 267)

The third aspect concerns gifts given to the religious leaders. The recurrent example here was the four-wheel drive given to each bishop at his ordination. The money used for such donations does not come from the national budget but the budget allocated to the State House, and it angers opposition politicians for its lack of transparency and because it is a tool for buying votes, even though the practice itself is not questioned:

“But for us in Parliament, we are saying: why don’t we say we have three main major religions: Catholics, Protestants, and Islam. Why can’t we put a vote, a line in the budget, that every after five years the head of the Church, the Bishop, should have a car? Why should you, you as a President, go as an individual, right? Because you want their votes, the Catholics, [the Protestants], you want their votes.”

MP III, FDC

It is disputed whether these gifts compromise the neutrality of religious leaders. While some may say yes, others argue that the religions are doing the state’s work and it is, therefore, legitimate that they get some state support for their work and since everyone receives the money, there is overall equality. However, the example of Zac Niringiye, the former bishop who is among the known faces of the BMM (see p. 296) shows that the clergy may indeed feel compromised to critic corruption too outspokenly. Niringiye faced criticism from other church members that he was “*desecrating the collar*” and calls to defrock him (Political Activist IV) due to his activities for Black Monday. Asked about the reluctance of bishops to respond to claims of corruption, one MP responds:

“You know, religious leaders are usually cautious of judging people. They believe in forgiveness. So, I believe they might have seen it as a very hard decision to implement, OR, maybe they did not want to part away with the monies. Because these people contribute largely to these church activities, and some may also look at that angle and say: ‘But if we blacklist so-and-so, then who will support the church because the church also needs to grow?’”

MP IV, Independent

Parish clergy remain with some leverage in their capacity to voice criticism from the pulpit. However, this wanes with increasing visibility. The proximity between religious groups and the government do not turn them into free spaces and a focal point for dissenting voices, as has been the case in Eastern Europe (Burgess, 1997) or some other African countries (Okuku, 2002). A similar pattern of integration into the patronage system, through handouts and personal intervention of the President, can also be observed among other actors, such as unions and informal interest groups.

### **10.3. Interest Groups - Corrupted Leaders and Voiceless Members?**

Mass organizations, such as labor unions, have an essential role in fostering democracy, by implying a large group of people in the process of political decision-making, through the advancement of common interests (Skocpol, 1999). In addition, their broad member base assures the representation of diverse factions of society, particularly bridging class divisions (Skocpol, 1999, p. 499). In Africa, unions are said to have been crucial political actors, particularly in the independence struggles and during the decline of one-party rule at the beginning of the 1990s (Webster, 2007). Webster sees their potential in its mobilization capacity, turning them into a voice that needs to be considered:

“Unlike advocacy groups and NGOs, their membership base and strategic location in the economy, especially in transport and key public services, gives them the capacity to mobilise and disrupt on a country-wide basis. Also, unlike advocacy groups, trade unions are not issue based. As a result, organised labour is capable of offering voice and leadership to a wide range of popular forces.”

(Webster, 2007, p. 2)

However, Webster also observes that the role of unions differ between countries, and only in some cases, they take on an active opposition role or become a vital part of the civil society. In Uganda, unions have reserved seats in parliament. However, they do lack autonomy and are not accountable to their organizations, but instead expected to follow the ruling party. As a result, the relationship between the government and union representatives can be characterized as patronage (Barya, 2010, p. 97; Webster, 2007, p. 4). In addition, Barya (2010) observes for Ugandan trade unions what we already analyzed in relation to other mobilizing groups: their emphasis on their apolitical and technocratic role. He criticizes this political and ideological demobilization, stating that

“But from Uganda’s history and, more glaringly, in the last two decades of SAPs, liberalisation and privatisation, it has become clear that the apolitical stance has been very unhelpful since the processes and policies that unions were fighting were clearly political processes that needed an articulate and organised political response.”

(Barya, 2010, pp. 96–97)

Barya evaluates the potential of trade unions to bring about labor-friendly change as rather bleak, as their capacities have been eroded through their technocratic stance, and if they become politically it is in forms of patron-client relationships, and the erosion of labor rights due to liberalization and the casualization of work (Barya, 2010, p. 104). If change has been achieved, it was due to foreign intervention from donors and thus raises questions whether the new laws will actually be implemented. These observations have been shared by some NGO leaders, who were frustrated by the close ties between the government and union leaders that hindered effective cooperation in advocating for social change (Fieldnotes 2017). Here we will look at the case of the strike of the Makerere University Academic Staff Association (MUASA), that had been upheld for two months and was finally terminated without any significant concessions shortly before our arrival for the 2017 fieldwork. This example serves to highlight the tendency to buy off leaders and to show how this erodes the legitimacy of unions truly to speak on behalf of their members and not only serve the interest of some few. We then supplement the observations with field data gathered on more informal groups, but which still hold significant political clout, due to their size, such as market vendors and the transport sector.

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### ***Case Story: MUASA and the Strike of 2016***

University lecturers, being public servants, are not allowed to unionize in Uganda. Instead, the Makerere University Academic Staff Association (MUASA) exists to represent the lecturers’ concerns to the university administration (Fieldnotes 2017). Lecturers become members by default, with the membership fee being directly deduced from their salary (Lecturer I, Makerere University). The association has been a vocal advocate for better employ-

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ment conditions since the arrival of the NRM regime, having achieved some notable concessions, particularly salary increments (Provini, 2015, p. 200). In 2013 the staff went on strike to demand a 100% salary increase. At that time government accepted to increase their salary, which partially should be paid by the university administration in the form of teaching incentives. However, these agreed upon incentives had not been paid for several consecutive months, so that at the end of October 2016, the academic staff of Makerere University decided unanimously at a MUASA general assembly to go on strike again, to pressure the administration to pay for their incentive arrears (Ndyabahika, 2016). The strike lasted for nearly two months, and very early on, the President decided to close down the university altogether, allegedly because he feared that protests would spread to students and from there expand to the city (Fieldnotes 2017). However, at the end of December, in another general assembly, the strike was called off, in a more contentious vote, dividing MUASA into two camps, because no noticeable concessions had been achieved (Niwamanya, 2016). Instead, there was an agreement to put a committee in place which should evaluate the situation and publish a report, upon which follow up decisions should be based. That is a typical pattern to end the strikes. Sometimes the reports are at the origin of the next one, if no action is taken (Mwine, 2016; Provini, 2015). The administration was said to have embezzled the tuition fees received and failed to pay their staff appropriately, and one of the main tasks of the committee is to investigate how the university funds are used. Initially scheduled for February 2017, the report had not been released by October 2017. And even if it should be published, hopes that it will bring any notable change are low. “[Q]uestions linger to whether the *Rwendeire* report will not gather dust on some government shelves like previous reports.” (Mwine, 2016) Members of MUASA were convinced the reason the executive committee of the association pressured for the strike to be suspended was due to them being bought off. As a result, the association has lost trust of its members who feel they are not represented anymore (Lecturer I and II, Makerere University). “*Those who were talking on our behalf now kept quiet.*” (Lecturer I, Makerere University)

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The case story reflects a general sentiment of disappointment and betrayal that reigned among staff members after the strike had been suspended, albeit a majority of members of the association (81 to 56) voted to take up their functions again.

Lecturer II highlighted the additional challenges the staff faced: for the majority of them it was too hard to maintain the strike for a more extended period, as they would not receive any salary at all during these two months. Nevertheless, the futility of the two-months strike contributed to the frustration towards the university administration and the MUASA executive board, for not having been able to find common grounds for negotiation.

The feeling, that the associational leadership, supposed to represent their member base, is captured by the political elite is also recurrent in other sectors, such as among the informal groups representing market vendors or the transport sector. Both areas are highly politicized because they regroup a large number of people and as such provide platforms for gaining voters and an opportunity for patronage. Conservative estimates believe that there are about 200 markets in Kampala, of whom only one quarter is gazetted by the KCCA (Monteith, 2016, p. 155). And this does not take the numerous hawkers and street vendors into account. It is equally evoked as a place of the “common man” and thus an important target for political support. The transport sector in return is estimated to employ about 100 000 people; it services even many more commuters on a daily basis and has, due to the nature of the work, a large geographical outreach. For these reasons, it is an important tool for mobilization (Goodfellow, 2017). So since both sectors have political clout and are well organized into associational structures, they appear to be important counterweights, representing the interests of the employees of their industries towards the government. A closer look, however, reveals the proximity between past and present associations with the government through co-optation of the leadership and the misappropriation of fees that should be used to develop the respective sectors. Besides, a “de-democratization” of these structures is going on by integrating their mandates into the work of the KCCA, a body controlled and appointed by the central government.



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### **Case Story: The KCCA, a New Player in Town**

The Kampala City Council (KCC) has been the body of the city government, approximately 80% of services were provided through the KCC. With the introduction of multipartyism, Kampala became a stronghold of the opposition, and the KCC has since then been in the hand of opposition parties. Among other problems, frequent interference of the President in policy decisions rendered the KCC highly ineffective (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 11). In 2010 the Kampala Capital City Act paved the way for the creation of KCCA, which was widely considered as a mechanism to restrain opposition control over the city by stripping the KCC of their executive functions and degrading the mayor to a merely ceremonial role (Goodfellow, 2017). The KCCA is an executive body appointed by and accountable to the government. Albeit still existing, interference from central government has decreased, which has also gained KCCA the reputation of being an efficient organization, particularly among middle and high income earners in the city.

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Goodfellow & Titeca (2012) have shown how urban informal groups successfully resisted regulations enforced by the KCC by calling directly upon the President for support. Drawing on their and our findings we can see a pattern where associations representing the interests of these groups often seek the proximity with the central government. This had been the case in two markets, albeit with very different outcomes: the markets of Nakasero and Park Yard. Nakasero market is situated in downtown Kampala, and the land belongs officially to the city. In the past, the city authority has attempted to lease the area to private investors, often close to the NRM themselves, which sparked the protests of the market vendors. They solicited support from the President, and in the end, the market was given to the market association, making them responsible for the modernization of the markets (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012; Monteith, 2016). In return, the market association in charge of the management decided to elect a chairperson close to NRM, in order to maintain a good connection with the government. But even though they managed to resist being gazetted through KCC, the market had eventually been taken over as a regulated market by KCCA, which received mixed responses from vendors. While some called it “*an act of betrayal*”, others welcomed the removal of the corrupt

market association. All in all, the takeover was accompanied by only a few protests (Monteith, 2016, p. 186). Park Yard was an informal market situated along Nakivubo channel, and even though the relations between the market vendor association and KCCA were strained, one representative of the association underlined the good terms on which they stand with government:

“The government listens to us; we created awareness through KCCA and the ministers of Kampala. [...] We are not disappointed, they are promising the best. Now we have fewer evictions; we meet on a roundtable.”

General Secretary, Park Yard Market Association

The allegiance with the NRM was well-known among the vendors of the market, to the point that one vendor, affiliated with the opposition, complained that the leaders would be hazy to even talk to her (Fieldnotes 2017). However, their government affiliation did not help the market association in the end, as the market has been officially closed down in February 2017, about one month after the interview with the association representative (The Spear, 2017). The closing was done under heavy police surveillance, but without any protests, which sparked allegations among the vendors that their leadership had been bought off, to prevent that they would mobilize against the ministerial decision (Fieldnotes 2017).

A similar pattern of resisting KCC order had been observed for the motorcycle taxis, the boda bodas (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012). Attempts to introduce taxation or safety regulations, such as wearing helmets and safety vests, or registering with the authorities, sparked protests and the boda boda drivers eventually called upon Museveni to intervene. Positioning himself in opposition to KCC and seizing the opportunity to gather widespread support, he stopped the proposals, calling it an “*exploitation of the poor*” (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 269). Only when KCCA took up its function, taxation and licensing eventually were introduced to the sector. Government support has also been given through material incentives, such as the mediated purchase of 120 boda bodas by states house, that was offered to the drivers through their umbrella organization, Boda Boda 2010, and another 500 that drivers could purchase through advantageous loan schemes (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012, p. 268). And on the other hand, Boda Boda 2010 is known to be closely affil-

iated with the ruling party. Having recognized the potential of capturing these urban groups, politicians from other parties have equally tried to gain support through their own associations. One representative from Boda Boda 2010 describes the current state of the sector as such:

“We have been having more than like 58 associations in the industry. But majorly, they have started then because of politics, that is one, their own interests, their own interest of getting money from other people, so that is where that people have started many associations. [...] So, these politicians, [...] they are pushing them to set an association of which it will be very easy to get these people when they are organized. [...] According to me, they are all under political groups.”

Chairman, Boda Boda 2010

However, Boda Boda 2010 is the most prominent one and currently making efforts to streamline all the other organizations under their umbrella, calling them to leave “politics” behind and to unite in order to favor the development of the industry.

“Fighting each other will not be the lasting solution of this industry. So that is the maturity that we are building now. That let us sit on a roundtable, you join that association which is in power, and then we resolve all the problems in the industry.”

Chairman, Boda Boda 2010

So far we have shown through examples from market and transport associations how on the one hand they have called for presidential interference if they considered a policy change to be unfavorable and on the other hand, how the most visible association would place themselves in proximity to the government. Either this was done out of strategic reasons, or because the leadership was rendered “cooperative” through handouts or favors. However, raising contentious issues becomes more challenging, and these behaviors provoke the anger of some association members, as we have shown through the example of MUASA. As a result, the reputation of associations to genuinely represent the interest of their members is damaged, with many perceiving communal or professional associations to mainly serve a personal gain.

Unaccounted membership fees can further such a perception, as Gombay (1994) has observed for Owino market, Monteith (2016) for Nakasero market and Goodfellow (2017) for the Taxi Drivers and Owners. In all cases, money collected from the workers, that should have been used to develop the respective places, was only partly passed on to the city and to a large extent disappeared in private pockets on the way. Again, this is a way of decedibilizing claims that these associations would present the interest of all their run-of-the-mill members.

The tendency of embezzling collected fees has led the KCCA to increase efforts to cut out the “middlemen”, as the KCCA executive herself has termed it, by circumventing these associations and setting in place their staff, directly controlling markets and the transport sectors (Goodfellow, 2017, p. 1577). Through the direct appointment<sup>42</sup> of market leaders and transport committee members the KCCA can choose a leadership at their liking, in favor of the ruling party and not accountable to those they are supposed to represent. Closing down associational structures additionally limits the capacities of the workers and vendors to mobilize against legislation they deem unfavorable and thus diminishes their possibilities to voice discontent. And despite the well-known undemocratic character of the KCCA as an institution, it has a good reputation among some interviewees. They credit it for cleaning up the city and taking street hawkers off the roads, making the streets safer and less prone to pickpockets. Others, however, while appreciating the outcome, are concerned about what will happen to the expelled people, as the institution is not offering any alternative to them.

We, therefore, suggest that the advent of the KCCA has significantly altered urban politics in Kampala. The same is true for informal groups calling for presidential intervention. In the past, the President had used his interference as a tool of gathering political support and at the same time discrediting the opposition-led KCC of not being able to govern the city. However, with the installation of the KCCA, a government body under the direct control of the national government, the initially

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<sup>42</sup> One KCCA representative argued that the market chairmen are elected democratically by the vendors (Deputy Director, KCCA). We know of at least of one market chairman, from USAFI market who has been directly appointed by the KCCA executive director. And in the case of the transport sector, elections that have been held were annulled and new ones – at the time of the interviews – had not been set up yet (General Secretary, UTRADA). However, we concede that between these contradicting statements there is room for error and suggest that the question deserves further investigation.

resisted regulations were finally passed, as any interference would mean that Museveni opposed the entities created to serve the national government's purpose. Interventions still exist, particularly around election time, but are more limited in time and scope.

While organizations to represent group interests are usually seen as a positive sign of democratic consolidation, the example of Uganda has shown that they can also have detrimental effects. If “authoritarian pseudo-representative organizations” (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 1) are controlled by elites to capture streams of rent rather than to represent the interests of their members genuinely, a vivid associational sphere can hardly be interpreted as a marker of democratic advancement. The proximity of the leadership with the government, even though vital in personalized politics to guarantee a good connection with high ranking politicians, compromises the management to act on behalf of their members. This problem of accountability is exacerbated if the leadership receives personal gains, such as gifts or handouts. Since they are often coupled with the repression of opposing points of views, the politics of the “carrot and the stick” widely used by the NRM government can also be observed in these sectors. In that light, the shift from dysfunctional to no representation, as a result of KCCA hegemony, narrows yet another possible avenue for mobilization.

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In this chapter, we have tried to look at other actors that could serve, or have in the past, or different contexts served as potential mobilizers or had a role in transitioning to democracy, such as NGOs, religious groups, and interest groups. We have highlighted the challenges they face, that turn them into less credible avenues for political participation for many Ugandans, or limit hopes that they are capable of bringing about the desired change. In the case of NGOs, we find that they may protest, but without gathering a constituency behind themselves, that could serve to mobilize. They may write communiques, organize workshops or roundtables, but without any popular political action deriving from there. They are prone to be what

one activist (and NGO staff member), describes as “*armchair activists*” (Activist II, Uganda National NGO Forum), from whom no legitimate action can be expected. From the comments made by respondents and other literature on the topic, we have seen that *civil society* is often considered as something apart from *society*, that, therefore, does not concern ordinary Ugandans. Religious groups, on the other hand, have an excellent mobilization potential, but they are somewhat cautious to use it for protest, as there are deliberate efforts on both sides to remain in good terms with the ruling government. Thus, they will most likely advocate for moral or religious issues, that touch upon their identities as faith groups, instead of voicing explicitly political demands, such as claiming better governance or more democracy (Kassimir, 1998). What we can observe here and also among the interest groups studied, is that as soon as a group gains certain visibility, there are efforts to integrate them into the patronage network and foster patron-client ties. The realms studied here are all places in which the people employed have at least a middle income position. Their methods are very consensual. However, it is not our intention here to argue that it is the consensual nature of middle income groups which renders the mobilization less contentious. Instead, we have tried to show that it is already in the structure, in which these realms are embedded with the political sphere that shapes the way the interactions take place. This does not mean that we can never expect these groups to become effective mobilizers for political issues nor that they have no capacity to influence political outcomes because as we have tried to show, they do. But we should be careful to expect them to serve as vehicles promoting more general democratic interests. Instead, they will most likely remain limited in scope. In a similar observation, Branch & Mampilly describe today’s protests as

“[...] small-scale, particularized demands for improvements in the conditions of specific constituencies, to be attained through informal negotiations with political elites who are pressured by the threat of local upheaval. Indeed, from this perspective, today’s small-scale protests are politically limited because they make only local demands from the government for marginal improvements. If such small-scale demands start to be made in a coordinated fashion across the country, however, they could become politically explosive and give rise again to the other face of protest by political society: a general uprising as seen in 2011 [reference to Walk to Work].”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 149)

So, instead of promoting democracy, these groups intervene according to the “rules of the game”, which are shaped through a patronage system. And as a result, they restrict access to politics in the ways described above.

## **11. Restricted Access to Politics**

In her work on the women's movement, Ferree & McClurg advance the hypothesis that women organize themselves rather apolitically because their access to regular political activism is restricted (Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller, 2004). Drawing on the insights gained through the analysis of the recent protests, and the stance on political protest taken up by the majority of the interviewees, this chapter aims at pointing out the mechanisms that stop many of the middle income groups from becoming politically active.

### **11.1. The Bad Reputation of Politics**

Among many respondents, politics, in general, do not enjoy a good reputation and, as a result, are often portrayed as undesirable. This is fueled by the discontent with the government, but also the dissatisfaction with the opposition. As a result, politicians enjoy little legitimacy, compared to, for example, religious or traditional leaders (Afrobarometer, 2015).

#### **11.1.1. Discontent with the Government**

There is a general dissatisfaction with the government regarding service delivery, corruption, and the regime's longevity. All are widely recognized problems in Uganda by supporters, as well as opponents of the government. Regarding service delivery, most Ugandans are not satisfied, criticizing the poor quality of roads, schools, and hospitals. *"Yes, we have good health services infrastructure. We have built health centers up to the lowest level, parish even. But there are no medicines. There are no medical personnel. These are just white elephants."* (Geoffrey) And Janet states: *"The work [done in Uganda] is like a Chinese product. Comes in flashy, doesn't last long."* This frustration finds particular expression when people condone politicians for taking their children abroad for education or health treatment: *"You are a minister, and you don't do anything, yet when your children and*



*grandchildren get sick you put them in a car and drive them abroad*” (Raphael). This dissatisfaction had been consistent among the respondents of the three years interviewed when asked about the work of the government. It is related to a problem, mentioned by nearly all respondents: corruption. Condemning the state of corruption is not necessarily related to a critical stance towards the government, but considered a problem that affects all levels of society:

“Because the corruption has become part of us, it is in our skin; you can’t get any/ even if you say you are a practicing Christian, you are a Pentecostal, whatever are your principles, you cannot get any services if you haven’t paid.”

Josephine

Arthur believes that *“now people at the lower level look at corruption as a way of life.”* Even though people concede that it happens at all levels, politicians are especially disregarded because *“they only satisfy themselves and do not consider the common man.”* (Joseph) And in one WhatsApp group members have joked that nowadays corruption has been institutionalized, by already stating in official forms the need for a *“facilitation fee”*. This criticism is ubiquitous, albeit interpretation differs according to NRM supporters or opponents.

“Fighting corruption today is fighting Museveni’s government. Why? Because it is a government that only functions through theft and lies and so on.”

Activist IV

“I trust Museveni; he made Uganda a country everyone would want to live in, but I don't trust the cabinet. He chose the cabinet in a good way, but they are the ones who are bringing the corruption.”

Pamela

Finally, a third dissatisfaction with the government lies in its reluctance to leave power and let somebody else take over, often articulated in a wish for *“change for the sake of change”*. Again, even supporters of the NRM and the president expressed this view.

“Thank God for the president now, he is a Christian; he is a believer. But he has played his role and his time is out. [...] Our president is not a bad leader, but his time is out.”

Elly

There is fatigue expressed by many “*Already ten years is too much. In marriage it is good, but not in politics.*” (Sarah), “*You leave when people still need you.*” (Richard) and a wish for a peaceful change of government, especially since Uganda has never witnessed one since independence. For some, this is the only way that this will bring meaningful transformation to the country’s situation, others, however, are not sure if viable alternatives to Museveni exist.

### **11.1.2. Discontent with the Opposition**

While government supporters may be critical of the regime’s performance, similarly the opposition lacks credibility, even among those who oppose the government (Tangen, 2011, p. 5). In many African countries where single-party systems or other forms of autocratic rule would prevail, opposition parties did not re-enter the political arena with ease, once multipartism had been established (Olukoshi, 1998; see also Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Opposition activities throughout the continent would be limited through the lack of finances, advantages of incumbents, elitism and ethnic or religious divisions (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 12). Thus, Olukoshi observes: “*Indeed, in a number of cases, the opposition parties are severely discredited before the populace and do not present a viable alternative to the electorate.*” (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 29) This is equally true for Uganda. The years under military rule and the movement system had systematically eroded the organizational and personnel base of the established political parties (Ssenkumba, 1998, p. 174 f). Beyond that, according to the NRM ideology that promoted a no-party movement:

“[P]arties have been blamed for being inimical to peace and order since they allegedly disrupt even the most fundamental of solidarities, pitting brother against brother and neighbour against neighbour. Parties are also accused of promoting a winner-take-all attitude towards political competition, disenfranchising the losers and thus creating permanent resentments and antagonisms. [...] The destructive ambition inherent in parties is held responsible for infecting the very internal structure of the parties themselves, making them not only outwardly disordering, but inwardly disorderly as well.”

(Ssenkumba, 1998, p. 183)

Additionally, there is the tendency that political parties develop or manifest themselves around personalities, rather than agendas (Olukoshi, 1998, p. 30; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 115). This, in return triggers a perception where the competition for political office is not for a greater good but a reliable way of upward mobility and access to state resources (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). In Uganda, this seems to be the case particularly with the development of the FDC, who was born out of a fall-out between Museveni and his former ally Kizza Besigye and who has since competed four times unsuccessfully against Museveni (Tripp, 2004). The lack of a publicly known agenda seems present among the other parties as well, as they have repeatedly entered in opposition coalitions to be stronger in their unity against the NRM, but with little programmatic discussion. These evolutions lead to a perception that political competition is fought between two fronts, turning it into an “us against them” fight. Thus, to many, the opposition cannot propose a viable alternative to the government, when it comes to running the country. This has earned politics the reputation of being “*a dirty game*” (Anita) or only about telling lies. Herbert for example acknowledges that most of what the NRM is doing is bad, “*but others are not better*”. Elly says that both, government and opposition have messed up, but since the opposition is just fighting, it cannot be trusted. Hence, there is a general atmosphere of distrust concerning the political leaders of the country, and the political arena is not perceived as one where meaningful change is achieved, but rather one where individual struggles for personal profit are carried out.

As a result, activists often underline their unpolitical, or non-partisan nature, to appeal to as many people as possible and not to be branded opposition by the government. This had been prominent in the Mabira Forest protests, the Black Monday Movement, and also among occasional activities, carried out by smaller groups and on a smaller scale. Thus, a group of youth activists, albeit hosted in the FDC offices, points out that their activities target the opposition as well as the NRM (Martin). Another member of the group states that:

“I am still subscribed to that party [FDC], but you see when you go into activism, especially on a national cause, you don't want people to be limited by political affiliation. Because like joblessness affects both those in other parties. That is why we created a platform where we could mix, and as a generation we, we pave a way forward.”

Brian

The quote reveals how political affiliation is diminished, while age as a uniting factor is brought to the fore.

Another activist complains about the branding as opposition, which he feels is not right. *“Because considering the perception of our government, for them they think when you always come out, to fight for that common person, they look at you as an opposition personnel, they think you are opposing them, which is wrong.”* (Joseph). As the citation shows, again an effort is made to emphasize that their activities are about issues, not about political parties. Even more explicit is the case of Ronald, who has put his mobilization in an explicitly non-political framework:

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### ***Case Story: Organizing the Motor Spare Parts Sector***

Ronald has been in the motor spare parts business since 2009, as an importer and wholesaler. However, his concerns have been growing as he noticed an increasing influx of foreign traders, mainly Asians, who before had been his suppliers into the domestic market. According to Ugandan law, they should not get concessions to trade within the country. However, appeals to the government have not yielded any success.

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Worried that they might take over the entire supply chain, he has founded in 2011 an association and started organizing round-tables, to bring motorcycle spare part dealers together. In 2017, he feels his worst fears realized: he is not selling any stock in his shops anymore because the foreign *“so-called investors”* supply his clients, and even up to village level. But the association is preparing to defend themselves. In February 2017 the executive committee went to Dubai and China to establish contacts with the manufacturers themselves and import directly from them, intending to create their own brand. During the same time, they called all spare part dealers to boycott the Chinese products and only buy from their association, to bring the Ugandans back into the business. In his activities he is very clear that he does not *“want to mix up development and politics.”* to assure the greatest coherence within his association. In a similar approach, he reprimands members of their common WhatsApp group if they make political remarks in the group. As he states, his goal is to create a self-help group, which leaves political issues aside. *“So now we are trying to see how we can build a group of patriotism people, people who can think about/ feel that Uganda is their home, is their country. People who are not political, but who feel that Uganda can be secured or rescued from the so-called investors. Uganda can be rescued by non-political people. Because politicians have done so much to put Uganda in the what/ in the hole where it can’t even easily be lifted up.”*

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The quote also reveals a sentiment that politics has little to offer in bringing about a change in the situation. In that sense, people often have the impression that they are mere bystanders in the overall direction the country is taking. As one Ugandan has described it in an informal discussion:

“It is as if you are riding a bicycle and you are passing an accident. You see the man lying on the street. It hurts you in your chest while you continue riding, but you cannot do anything. If even those in the big cars don’t stop, what can you do?”

Fieldnotes 2017

A similar attitude is revealed in the expression of many that change in leadership, for example, will come because *“nature will take its course”*, referring to the advanced age of the President.

From the paragraphs above we can hypothesize that our respondents display an intense distrust towards the political sphere and they try to keep themselves away from it. They remain rather neutral (albeit having their own points of view) and do not perceive themselves as actors capable of changing the situation. Instead, they decide to concentrate more on their private advancement and immediate issues or interests, rather than inscribing in long-term investment on broader societal change.

Thus, government's inadequate performance, the rampant corruption, but also the failure of the opposition to propose a viable agenda has earned politics a bad reputation. In a way that has affected activism as well, since it can act as a deterrent for many if it is perceived to be "*political*" or "*about politics*".

## **11.2. The Bad Reputation of Protest and Protesters Among Middle Income Groups**

Thus, *politics* itself already has little respectability among large parts of the Ugandan population. Besides, various mechanisms are at work to portray protests and protesters in a bad way, which in turn diminishes the probability for a collective identity to develop.

### **11.2.1. Governmental Framing and the Protest Paradigm**

Scholars working on the coverage of protests through mass media have often observed the so-called *protest paradigm* (Lee, 2014). The paradigm describes the fact that protests challenging the status quo are often depicted by mass media in negative terms, focusing on incidences of violence. This in return influences the public perception of the particular protest and those protesting (McLeod & Detenber, 1999). In their coverage, the media closely align the interpretation of the events with the dominant discourse led by the government. As a result, the media becomes a vanguard of the status quo. In Uganda, press freedom is limited, and the government owns the majority in one of the two big media groups of the country. We might, therefore, expect media coverage to be even more tilted in favor of the gov-

ernmental position. And while the media coverage of the protest is not the scope of our analysis here, we do find a reproduction of the government discourse that shapes public perception of the protests and protesters. The government aims at delegitimizing the opposition, through three closely related discourses: The antagonism of development (what the government is doing) and politics (what the opposition is doing), the antagonism of stability (brought by the NRM regime) and violence (if one lets the opposition act) and, more broadly, a slandering of opposition. For one, there is a government discourse, which brands any opposition activity as “politics” and considers it to be bad, as it poses a threat to social harmony. This can be found on numerous accounts. Thus, in her accounts of the interactive radio shows in Uganda and the regime’s reaction to them, Brisset-Foucault observes that in the local discourse, “*une question devient « politique » quand il y a polarisation et notamment quand l’opposition s’en mêle.*” (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 492), and that the President advises journalists to stop doing politics and concentrate on development, as they would be more useful in that sense (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 490). Similarly, a representative of the Boda Boda 2010 union recalled an intervention from Museveni, due to conflicts between various unions, competing for the claim to represent the industry: “*His [Museveni’s] directive was: I don’t want here such nonsense of politics in this industry of transport.*” (Chairman, Boda Boda 2010). In another instance, a pro-NRM market chairman reprimanded some vendors in the market after they approached the Lord Mayor of Kampala (who is a member of DP) because they were unhappy with a decision made by the chairman. He advised them not to go “*politicking*” (General Secretary, UTRADA) because politics are bad. These “bad” politics are opposed to development, as seen above in his advise to journalists, and equally in his reaction to the Mabira forest protests (see 9.1). This distinction recalls the President’s arguments that Uganda needed to develop and modernize before it could pass to multipartism (Hickey, 2005, p. 998). “Development” has been a major element of the government’s discourse, through action plans for eradicating poverty (Hickey, 2005, p. 999) or Museveni’s repeated promises to turn Uganda into a middle income country (see chapter 3.3). Thus, the

separation between “us”, the government, who are making efforts to develop the nation and “them”, the opposition, who are doing politics seems to evolve as a conclusion.

In a similar vein, the government opposes its stability to the threat of violence that the opposition presents to the regime. At the wake of the 2016 presidential elections, General Katumba Wamala, the Chief of Defense Forces said that the army would not tolerate any destabilization of the country by the losers of the election (Dominic, 2016).

But also during his public appearances, the President is keen highlighting the stability of the country. In his 2017 New Year’s speech he states:

“Uganda has been at peace for the first time in 500 years, for many years now. Uganda will remain at peace. Nobody has the capacity to disturb this, however hard they might try. Therefore, my dear Ugandans, I can confidently tell you that the future is bright.”

(Museveni, 2016)

The affirmation that no one can disturb the peace, “*however hard they may try*” can easily be read as an allusion to the opposition, whom Museveni sees as one of the main causes of violence. In an interview with BBC Africa shortly after the elections, the President explained the measures of house arrest taken against opposition leaders, saying that they had plans to incite violence through the youth, attacking petrol stations (BBC Africa, 2016). Already in the first election 1996, at that time held under the movement system, Museveni campaigned with the slogan “Me or Chaos” and stability has been a central part of his election campaigns ever since (Perrot, 2003, p. 256). These tendencies are congruent with the observation that the government does not distinguish between lawful and unlawful dissent, but frames it increasingly as disloyal opposition (Hönig, 2014, p. 70). In an interview with Al Jazeera, Museveni makes yet another antagonism, between liars and those telling the truth.



**Journalist:** Are you afraid of kind of Arab Spring happening in Uganda?

**Museveni:** No, no. We shall/ Because they tell lies, we tell the truth. So that's what we do, they tell lies using/

**Journalist:** So opposition tells lies. Government tells truth.

**Museveni:** Yes!

**Journalist:** That is what you are saying?

**Museveni:** Yes!

(Al Jazeera, 2017)

These rhetoric tactics, of branding the opposition as violent and doing politics, in contrast to the development and stability the NRM regime brings, has had an impact on the way political activism and the opposition is perceived. For one, to some interviewees, there is no difference between a demonstration and a riot, as they used the terms interchangeably during the interviews. Several mentioned that to them it is the opposition that causes violence, either by hijacking demonstrations for their interests (John) or because they incite unemployed youth to come up and take arms, without reasons, but merely “*based on assumptions*” (Ruth). She feels the opposition mobilizes the ordinary people, but they are not the one suffering the consequences.

Like the greatest opposition person, now that he is a threat, is Besigye. So when he is in a place, you see for him it may be safe and/ but the most people you find there is so much teargas, people are dying, others are hospitalized.

Ruth

Closely related to this, some people believed that the protests, particularly Walk to Work, would only serve individual interests, rather than a common good, as the quote of one deputy mayor of Kampala during a meeting on community policing and local security has shown:

“Even though I am a member of the opposition, I will never go on the street to demonstrate because it is not secure. It is for personal benefit, not for the nation.”

Fieldnotes 2017

Thus, a hegemonic framing of protest is established, that tends to equal all criticism of the government with unlawful and violent dissent, often perceived to be at a personal gain rather than a greater good. This in turn often leads to a failure of middle income groups to identify with the protesters, even if they might support their causes<sup>43</sup>, and as a result, obstructs the construction of a collective identity.

### **11.2.2. Obstacles for a Collective “Middle Income” Identity**

The framing of a protest is an essential part of establishing a collective identity, with the aim to appeal to bystanders, and to demobilize opponents (Messer & Bell, 2010, p. 854). Thus, it is not surprising that different frames exist in government and protesters’ discourses, competing for support. As it has become obvious in most of the protests, except for the *Save Mabira* campaign, the collective identities evoked were not appealing to many. For example in the Walk to Work protests, though many respondents supported the cause, a lot of them failed to identify with the people who would participate in the demonstration. There was the common understanding that the people involved in such kind of activities are idle and unemployed. This depiction was influenced by government and media presentation of the protesters. Thus, the “boda-boda guy” has become the symbol for a young, unemployed man who barely survives by taking passengers on a motorcycle. And because they are neglected by the system, they seem to have nothing to lose:

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<sup>43</sup>It is worth pointing out that there equally exists a counter-hegemonic frame of political activism, used by political activists to gather support that has not gone unnoticed among the respondents. However, since most of them abstained from any activism on the grounds given here, we are led to the conclusion that the hegemonic frame is the more prominent one and concentrate thus on this prevailing discourse.

“All those boda-bodas if you ask them and tell them that I want to start a, b, c, d, they tell you what are you waiting for? We are ready to join. They were actually waiting for Doctor Kizza Besigye to just say: 'Now, we are recruiting in this region here.' And you would see people disappearing from the city.”

Isaac

“And you know but enough, it is almost our age, who are suffering, mostly our age. This is the unemployed. And the government is not careful. Thus you see that fighting thing, you get someone of my age on the street, demonstrating. These people who go for it / who go for demonstrating on the street, what they / they / they do it because they have nothing, so whenever they go and demonstrate, they have nothing to lose.”

Francis

As already shown in the description of the protest, it is very likely that, particularly during the Walk to Work, main protesters have come from urban marginalized groups (Branch & Mampilly, 2015; Goodfellow, 2013). However, these demonstrators also work as a deterrent for others to participate. That description as idle and unemployed draws a symbolic boundary, where issues, while not of class, at least of socio-economic categories are brought to the fore. Thus, there is an intention to bring a distance between those that had been participating in the protest and the middle income groups. This dissociation is not dependent on whether the participants were economically more struggling than non-participants but rather led by the motivation of not being identified with that group of “poor urbanites” but to consider oneself more of a person “not quite there yet, but not poor”. As a result, even people who identify with the issue would not participate in Walk to Work because they felt there were different motivations between them and the demonstrators; they lacked a common ground.

The quotes from Justine and Julius on page 295 highlight a similar dimension. Because those who participate in protests are the hungry, poor or uneducated, the issues do not seem relevant to them, as they are neither. Hence, the protests become less appealing due to how the participants were depicted; as somebody, most people do not want to be associated with. So it seems that some social distinction exists, between us, the working, and them, the boda boda guys, the unemployed. But

it appears as if this consciousness inhibited rather than promoted collective mobilization.

Other factors contributing to the bad reputation of those mobilizing are their attribution to a particular ethnicity, as done in the Buganda riots. In its worst form, the protesters were considered causing sectarianism and inciting ethnic violence, a conclusion much supported by the government. Once again, participation did not feel appealing to those who would not want to be identified in these terms. The fear of causing sectarianism is deeply rooted in the Ugandan history and, therefore, can work as a strong deterrent for many. For example, the development of the major religions in the country has been accompanied by conflict (Welbourn, 1965) and questions of ethnicity have played a role in the military rules of Amin and Obote (Museveni, 1997). In response, the NRM had based its movement ideology on the idea that political parties cause sectarianism because they repeat patterns of regional or religious exclusion (Carbone, 2008). The ideological teachings of the NRM, particularly in its early years, as well as the ethnic conflicts that had happened in the region, and the fear of a too dominant Buganda made people very receptive to allegations of sectarianism and thus worked as a strong deterrent to the protests.

Age was another aspect along which participation in political protest would be determined. Norris points out that concerning political activism, age-related behavior can be explained through three distinct effects: a generational one, a life-cycle effect, and a periodic effect (Norris, 2003, p. 8). Generational effects refer to trends or societal developments that distinguish one generation from another. Thus, one could argue that the interconnectedness through the internet, as well as rising education levels, have increased the awareness among younger generations. Even the sheer size of a birth cohort has an influence in this regard (O'Rand & Krecker, 1990, p. 240). The rising youth unemployment can be mentioned here as well, as the prospects for a job of a better-educated generation are rather bleak. In response to this phenomenon, the *Jobless Brotherhood* was created, with the aim of mobilizing young people affected by joblessness. Life-cycle effects describe events that

are in general tied to a particular age, such as the entry into the workforce, marriage or childbirth. There is also evidence that this played a role in the absence of activism among older people, who would occasionally mention their social responsibilities, like caring for a family, or their obligations towards their workplace when they gave reasons why they abstained from protesting. Students, in general, do not have to bear these factors in mind. Finally, periodic effects refer to distinct historical events, which leave a profound impact (Norris, 2003, p. 8). The political regimes of Obote and Amin and the civil war can be said to have such an effect. Attitudes of respondents towards the system, its achievements and overall stability in Uganda and towards protest would differ, depending on the age of the respondents. Older people, in general, who remembered how life was during the bush wars and the Amin era were more prone to credit the regime for the pacification of the country. One respondent, 62 years at the time of the interview recalls:

“Because I/ according to my view. I lived during the colonial days. I've gone through all the regimes. Since then this has been the best regime we have ever had. [...] So, to tell you the truth, this is the (.) best (.) regime we have ever had. Apart from the colonial regime.”

Susan

In the commentary section of a recent Al Jazeera interview with President Museveni, one commenter writes: “*Respect my President you did your best for us Ugandan that's why we Love you.....i remember Uganda before you terrible. God bless you.*” (Al Jazeera, 2017)

And, on the other hand, the younger generation airs out its discontent, which goes partly along with a glorification of past regimes:

“I am as old as this government I can say because I was born a year earlier, the next year it went into power, I think. But there is nothing phy/ physical, tangible, you can say, that the government has done. Because they can tell you that the satellite in (Impoma?) it was put up by Amin. They can tell you, Uganda house was built by / The roads, Mulago Hospital, they can show you something that the past leaders did. But this present leadership, there is nothing tangible.”

Justine

So the protests are often very much driven by a generational divide as well. Branch & Mampilly come to a similar conclusion. They write:

“For instance, there is an important generational aspect to participation in protest, given the widespread perception that many older Ugandans who remembered the bloody upheavals of the pre-NRM period would rather let Museveni stay in power than risk another descent into fratricidal civil conflict and insecurity – a caution absent from the younger, post-NRM generation.”

(Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 133)

As a result, the threat of political instability has left an older generation, weary of the past conflicts, as strong supporters of the status quo. They feel the regime is not such a bad option, compared to previous presidents (we have for example seen an increase in votes for the NRM regime among those aged 45 years and older, see p. 257). Efforts to construct a collective identity sometimes frame issues as a generational question. Hence, “youth” is a collective identity, as broad and blurry as it may be, that is often invoked in political struggle. Particularly the *Jobless Brotherhood* frame their struggle as the new generation against an old elite. Martin describes his generation as “*messed up by those Bushmen [referring to those who have fought in the bush war, i.e., the political elite] who cannot understand our needs as generation.*” He strongly feels that it is time to leave the leadership of the country now to that younger generation (preferably himself).

So, the mechanisms how protests and protesters are depicted influence the development of a collective identity and can prevent solidarity that spans across broader factions of society. Especially ethnic identity and economic marginalization may be powerful mobilizers for small sections of the society. However, they diminish

the legitimacy of their protest for other parts of the population. Among these sections, we might expect to find some members of middle income groups, as the previous analyses have already shown, but motivations for participation depend more on individual reasons rather than a collectively shared class sentiment. This is not to say that such a sense of unity cannot be created, but it will first and foremost be a political narrative that streamlines individual motives behind a common cause (Bikbov, 2012, p. 23; El Chazli, 2012, p. 854). However, Bayat (2013b) points out in his analysis of the Arab Spring, that the attention on the moment when these diverse identities unite to form a movement, “*when attitudes and behaviour are suddenly transformed: sectarian divisions melt away, gender equality reigns and selfishness diminishes*” (p.48) should not divert the focus away from the question of political change. He believes that “*the focus on ‘revolution as movement’ has served to obscure the peculiar nature of these ‘revolutions’ in terms of change, with little to say about what happens the day after the dictators abdicate. It may even serve to disguise the paradoxes of these upheavals, shaped by the new political times in which grand visions and emancipatory utopias have given way to fragmentary projects, improvisation and loose horizontal networks.*” (Bayat, 2013b, p. 48) Hence, it is necessary to not only look at identities and moments in which divisions are overcome but also projects that construct an alternative, counter-hegemonic vision of society.

And while the politicization through a shared label is possible, we have also shown here that, similarly, rhetorics of “de-politicization” are at work, notably through the perception of the protest and its chances to succeed, that inhibit participation in a political movement. However, as El Chazli points out, it would be erroneous to equate “de-politicization” with apathy, or even regime support:

“[Il s’agit de] mettre en lumière le fonctionnement du mécanisme de dépolitisation. Il joue ici comme conditionnement des perceptions du possible. Mais on voit aussi l’erreur qui consiste à rendre la dépolitisation équivalente à l’apathie ou au désintéressement, et surtout, l’erreur qui consiste à tirer un principe d’(in)action qui découlerait de la dépolitisation diagnostiquée. Autrement dit, croire que les individus seraient dépolitisés parce qu’ils n’agissent pas politiquement, et vu qu’ils n’agissent pas, ils ne sont pas amenés à se politiser.”

(El Chazli, 2012, p. 857)

So, it might still be possible that the individual motives and dissatisfaction come together in times of a “*critical juncture*” (Dobry, 2009). However, for now, we have little indication that such mobilization will happen through the call for a commonly shared identity that revolves around a shared income nor that it proposes a genuine alternative to the current political system in Uganda.

### **11.3. The Fear of Consequences**

While there has been a perception linking demonstrators to the cause of the violence, many respondents were aware that the regime used excessive force cracking down on the protests. The state brutality has been a deterrent to many. But also the fear of more subtle consequences in the broader societal realm has made people cautious of becoming overtly political.

#### **11.3.1. Protest and Repression**

In the 2012 interview set, and with very recent memories of Walk to Work, the respondents often referred to the risk of “*being teargassed*”, which has become a symbol of state repression. The fear of violence was the principal reason for the 2012 respondents not to participate in activism. Salome simply said that “*I am not ready to be teargassed.*” and in similar wording, Ruth confirms: “*But I will not wake up knowing even before I walk one kilometer and I will be huddled up perhaps on a police car, or teargassed.*”



The use of force has increased over the years, particularly after the Buganda riots and Walk to Work protests (Freedom House, 2012). In January 2017 media attention was captured when the police presented its 2017/18 financial year budget to the Parliament's Defense Committee. Of the 505 billion UGX, 44 billion UGX were allocated to procure teargas (Tajuba, 2017). These tendencies have not gone unnoticed, thus, participation in demonstrations, in addition to the bad reputation of protesters, also entails the risk of being hurt or arrested. As a direct result, BMM, for example, has decided to change its tactics and refrain from street protests, and as one of the activists explains, it is among the primary reasons they fail to recruit:

“But I think the ultimate issue here is about fear. Because the current government has used fear and threats a lot. That even if you wanted people's responses and what/ fear is number one. ‘I will be shot down.’”

Activist II, Black Monday

In this regard, we can also recall the quote from Stephen, that made him eventually refrain from participating in the Buganda riots (see p.287).

The governmental response with fear and repression is by no means new, nor tied to Uganda. In his work on riots in West Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, Wiseman (1986) has similarly noticed that the government usually responded with repression and that, in general, few concessions were made. The same holds true for a preliminary analysis of the wave of contention that sub-Saharan Africa witnessed at the beginning of the 1990s. Bratton & Van de Walle (1992) observed that “*Governments responded to the initial protests with a familiar formula of threats, repression, and selective compromise.*” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992, p. 423) If the demands were explicitly political, then repression would be the preferred government reaction (ibid.). And it seems to apply particularly to semi-authoritarian regimes, that face real competition from the opposition, but have a wider array to control dissent than democratic regimes (Carey, 2009, p. 17). But Davenport points out that the relationship between conflict and repression is consistent, and withstands scrutiny over time and country. He suggests this to be a “*Law of Coercive Respon-*

siveness.” (Davenport, 2007, p. 8) Therefore, it seems not surprising that the government of Uganda responds to protest with repression.

However, while these individual accounts testify how fear of repression has stopped people from participating, the academic literature is not unanimous in that regard (Carey, 2006). Davenport (2007) ascertains that the causality between conflict and repression is strong. However, the same cannot be said if the relationship is inversed. Analyses investigating how oppression affects dissent yield highly inconsistent results (Davenport, 2007, p. 8). And indeed, those already political active usually relativized that fear. Martin, who subscribed to non-violent activism, states that: “*Museveni is a dictator, but as long as you do not touch his guns, you will not remain in jail.*” Joseph, himself arrested several times, explains why people still join the protests they organize: “*The police will not arrest everybody in a protest, but only the known faces, the ringleaders.*”

Others accept that the violence is part of the activism and the inconveniences caused, including incarceration or torture, for the fight for the greater good. “*If you ever see a rat running to hide in fire, you must bear in mind that whatever is chasing the rat is worse than fire.*” (Martin) Indeed, observations show that the frequency of protest has increased over the last 15 years, despite an increasingly repressive environment (see ACLED, 2018). Carey (2006) calls this a “*tit-for-tat*” strategy, as the government’s response to protest with violence is likely to increase violent protest in return. And Goodfellow (2013, p. 442) argues that the rioting has become an accepted way of communication between the government and the city dwellers because the government only seemed to respond to demands made by market vendors or boda boda drivers if they used “noise” to capture the government’s attention. He describes the government response as “*a paradoxical language of violence and small favours.*” (Goodfellow, 2013, p. 444) However, the analysis from Goodfellow mainly concentrates on locally defined riots, voiced by specific groups who demand some specific policy change. He does, however, apply his estimation of the situation to the Walk to Work as well:

“It was therefore always doubtful that the ongoing protests would escalate into anything like an ‘Arab Spring’. The riots built on existing urban discontent but the scale of the protests remained within certain bounds, as did the government response in the sense that Besigye was not permanently confined and the clampdown on public space was limited. Rather than escalating into more transformative and revolutionary events, the “walk to work” episode represented what had come to be normal politics in Kampala, in which noise played a central part, writ large.”

(Goodfellow, 2013, p. 444)

Thus, it seems, while the repression may act as a deterrent for some, it equally increases frustration and thus incites others even more.

### **11.3.2. Beyond the Immediate Realm of Protest**

Yet, the fear of consequences goes beyond the immediate realm of the protest. On several accounts, respondents have iterated how they already have experienced disadvantages. Others explain how they fear being disadvantaged if they voice their opinion. Martin described how he had been expelled from the university for an activism he had done, on the accounts that he was tarnishing the university’s name. Also, he has trouble selling a book he has published because bookshops refuse to display it in their shops. Another persistent fear is not getting a job, as had happened to Gerald, who believes he was the best qualified for a job advertisement, that he did not get due to his activism. Joseph had a similar experience. The caution also manifests itself in the reluctance of people to discuss political matters in public spaces. Andrew feels there is no possibility to voice criticism, and even though in office they talk about politics, he is usually cautious when on the street. On several accounts, interlocutors have lowered their voice when they felt politically sensitive topics were touched.

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#### ***Case Story: The Shopping Mall of the First Lady***

In 2017 during an excursion with Kato and his family, we were driving in a *special hire*, as the private taxis in Uganda are called, through Entebbe. On our way, we passed Imperial Mall, a luxurious shopping mall that had not been completed at the time of the inci-

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dent. On inquiry to whom the Mall belongs, the driver, as well as, Kato said they did not know. Upon remarks that it bears a lot of resemblance to Acacia Mall in Kampala, which is said to belong to the Janet Museveni, the wife of the president, both, the driver and Kato laughed but did not say anything; and while Kato nods affirmatively, he signals me nonverbally to be silent. Asked later about the situation he says you never know whether this will bring you a disadvantage, but before we were able to elaborate further, he trails off again as a waiter comes to our table to serve the drinks.

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The BMM activists mentioned the difficulties they had to find people willing to print their newsletter, out of fear to be associated with them. *“So it is really, a resource again, it is related to the first point I made to you. Where a state, a regime, captures the economy. Nobody is able to give any money to a local cause.”* (Activist IV) In a similar vein, the organizers of an elite discussion platform, the *State of the Nation* (STON) platform<sup>44</sup>, highlight the openness of their discussions, which at times tend to be highly critical of the government, yet they are not met with repression because *“the government does not fear conversation, that is in-house.”* (former Executive Director, ACODE). They concede though that with an increasingly narrow civil space people would start censoring themselves in the discussions.

“Some of them are looking for opportunities, including from government. If you are hoping that, if you are a business person [...] and you are looking at winning a tender, who wants to speak badly about the regime when there is an informer there?”

former Executive Director, ACODE

Stephen, a banker that has been categorized as UMC, is a party member of DP. He states that his party support is mainly in monetary terms:

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<sup>44</sup>See p. 382 for details

“What we normally do, although the government / they don't want us to get in politics, but we do support our parties. Like if, say my president is going to stand, Norbert Mao, from DP, in one way or another, I may contribute towards his campaign. Although not openly. It would be (...) secret because once they get to know you are the kind of people who give in towards the political activity or something like that, oh, they may follow you wherever you are to see at least the political party loses strength. Because once there is no money it can't carry out its activities. So you do it quietly. And that's what we do mainly, like myself, that's how we support the party.”

Stephen

These statements must be relativized, though. Political discussions still take place, even in public places such as minibuses or bars. People also have been quite willing to discuss political matters with a stranger like me, and political persecution of individuals is still quite targeted on those that become publicly known. The political atmosphere thus cannot be compared to countries like Ethiopia or Rwanda. However, it seems that there is a rise of caution on what is said and to whom. The general fear is also expressed in messages circulating in social media:

“Museveni has added himself to most whatsapp [sic] groups mbu he wants to know what people say about him... I know he is in this group ... let me say my point at once Muzei twesasile.... Gwe ne wenger mutuleke [Old man, have mercy on us and leave us].”

WhatsApp, 01.09.2017

“Don't forward any posts or videos etc., u receive regarding politics/present situation about Government/PM etc.

Police have put out a notification termed ..Cyber Crime ... and action will be taken...just delete...inform your friends & others too.

Writing or forwarding any msg on any political & religious debate is an offence now....arrest without warrant...

This is very serious, plz let it be known to all our groups and individual members as group admin can b in deep trouble.

Please take note of this seriously.”

WhatsApp, 17.03.2017

The messages are likely hoaxes. For one, It is doubtful whether Museveni himself will follow various WhatsApp groups. In the second case, the use of the word “cyber crime” in reference to political content is indicative, whereas it is usually applied in a context referring to crimes such as hacking, property infringement, online child abuse, online fraud, etc (see Tushabe & Baryamureeba, 2007, p. 377). Nevertheless, the repeated reposting in WhatsApp groups reveals that people believe it at least possible that the government of Uganda would target such messages and as such testifies a general sentiment of fear.

#### **11.4. Money and Activism — Determinants of a Repertoire of Action**

We can find on several levels the intertwined relationship between money and activism. The literature suggests that financial resources are among those that need to be mobilized for political activism (Oberschall, 1973). On the other hand there is the assumption that those who have access to money have less reason to challenge

a status quo (J. D. Wright, 1976). Hence, money, or the lack thereof, will shape the form of activism taken.

### **11.4.1. Activism needs Money**

Political activists are often constrained in their activities by a lack of resources. Obviously, there is the need for providing the logistics of a mobilization such as buying airtime to facilitate communication or the placards that can be held up. Elijah describes their mobilization as:

“We always know ourselves. We know who has money, who does not have. [...] We always try to identify someone who is financially able to come and fund the activities on behalf of the what? The rest of the members.”

Elijah

In other cases, certain activities have not taken place or stalled because of a lack of funds. A recent example at the time of the 2017 fieldwork was the strike of lecturers at Makerere University. After nearly two months of strike over salary disagreements, the lecturers returned to work without any notable concession achieved. Since they did not receive any salaries during the time of strike, many felt they could not sustain it any longer. This also brings up the question of co-optation. On several accounts activists have told stories how the regime has co-opted opponents into the system. Similarly, money that comes from donors can equally be seen as co-opted because it may be perceived that a local agenda is given up for a foreign one. One particular challenge activism faces is to counter the costs of repression, such as the provision of legal support and bail for those activists who have been arrested. This involves also the opportunity costs that activism may cause. Elijah describes the activism of the “*working class men*” as going to a bar, watching news together and discussing them. “*They cannot go beyond that, they fear losing their job is they go to the street, they cannot be detained for 48 hours.*” (Elijah) Thus, the failure to generate income, which is perceived as vital for the maintenance of everyday life increases the cost of activism. The General Secretary of UTRADA, who mobilizes in the transport sector says that most drivers are reluctant to join because they need to provide financial support to their families. This has been a

prominent reason for people not to join Walk to Work, as discussed above. Those who were working would not participate because they felt constrained by their obligation towards the workplaces. The self-employed, unemployed and students were less restricted in that sense, even though material considerations may have played a role as well. A boda boda driver for example, who is self-employed still would have to decide to forgo the opportunity of earning money by participating in protest. Thus, it is hard to determine how far money is a constant variable in the participation of protests. This is also reflected in the literature as some authors argue that the truly marginalized are too busy to make ends meet and will therefore not engage in activities other than those assuring their own economic survival (Huntington, 1972, p. 52; Oberschall, 1973, p. 135f). A useful distinction here is offered by Miller & Krosnick: resources alone are not sufficient to determine someone's political participation, instead they are an indicator of the *potential*, however eventually *motivation* will be decisive (Miller & Krosnick, 2004, p. 508). They do concede though, that *what* people will do, regardless of their motivation, is shaped by the resources they have at hand (Miller & Krosnick, 2004, p. 509). This leads us to the question of the behavior of those who do have money.

#### **11.4.2. Money does not need Activism**

Some people with money or in certain work positions are more reluctant to openly engage in or support activism, out of fear that this will bring them a disadvantage. One, there is the fear of material loss. Shopowners disapprove of riots because they risk being looted and are forced to close for the day. Rocca noted in this regard in the case of China: “*A class that owns fears change.*” (Rocca, 2008), a statement that recalls the assumptions of the *status panic theory*, according to which the lower middle class is the most afraid of losing an acquired status and hence actively supporting the status quo (Mills, 1953; cf C. S. Rallings & Andeweg, 1979). Secondly, there is the fear to lose out on income opportunities, already mentioned above. That problem becomes even more exacerbated through the close ties between the state and the economy in Uganda. In a society where the economy and the state are closely linked, and a large part of white collar jobs are in the civil ser-



vice sector, the government maintains considerable leverage over the hiring and firing of employees and through awarding tenders, since the public sector is the most solvent client for many private enterprises. But even the private sector is penetrated by state officials. Privatization and liberalization of the Ugandan economy have provided ample opportunity for political patronage, as many formerly state-owned enterprises had been given to allies of the president, who would often also share a common ethnic background (Lindemann, 2011, p. 404). Another example is illustrated by the case of the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), which was officially supposed to represent the interests of all taxi operators and drivers in the transport sector (Goodfellow, 2017). Because the industry represents such a large number of people and also generates vast benefits, the association was quickly captured by government interests to assure a stream of rent to state officials. However, over time they became so strong that they, in return could exert pressure on the government.

“By the end of the 2000s UTODA was neither effectively representing its membership nor fulfilling its obligations to the state, yet was so closely imbricated with political power as to be unassailable from either above or below.”

(Goodfellow, 2017, p. 1569)

That link between the state and the economy suggests that those in economically powerful positions often have other means to influence political outcomes. Hence, people better endowed with resources may either be content with the status quo or have more effective ways of determining political decisions. In a similar observation, Wright observes for the case of the US: “[...] *those most able to do something about their discontent are also the least discontented.*” (J. D. Wright, 1976, p. 151)

That statement equally applies to another area: the individual action taken to address discontent. With rising income, a greater variety of solutions can be employed. Higher revenue allows for people to redirect their demands and seek answers elsewhere than in government action. This tendency is most obvious in the case of education and healthcare, where private facilities attract many people, as they are considered more efficient than government institutions. Hence, service de-

livery, a source of discontent for many Ugandans, is often addressed by turning away from the state and to private institutions. Given the wide range offered, this option is viable even for those with only little disposable income, who will go an extra mile to put their children into private schools.

The data gathered is not sufficient to state a clear causal relationship, as some of the activists have high profile positions. There is, however, a common pattern: as observed by others, people demonstrating in Walk to Work or the Buganda riots were predominantly young and marginalized. The less confrontational and less violent activism of BMM was led by activists with higher education, and stable professions in NGOs. Others refrain from any open action because they fear disadvantage and try to seek solutions without voicing demands towards the government. Thus, we may conclude that the resources at hand shape the way in which people *can* participate in the political process; however, it cannot answer the question whether they *will* do it.

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In this part III, we have tried to analyze what determines forms of political participation and what are reasons for its absence among many individuals, particularly the middle income groups interviewed. First, we have looked at so-called “*citizen-oriented*” activism, such as voting behavior and democratic attitudes, but beyond that also interaction with political officials. We have found that while being inclined towards democracy and seeing its current state in Uganda rather critical, little action beyond “conventional” political participation is taken. Indeed, support for the opposition is strong among the respondents; it reflects a tendency that can be observed all over Kampala and thus cannot be linked to “middle-class characteristics”, such as higher income, better education, or stable employment, per se. A question arises that we have already touched upon in part II: in how far are these characteristics, frequently mentioned regarding the middle class mere reflections of urban phenomena? And where do the fault lines lie? To fully answer these ques-

tions, a detailed study of urban stratification is necessary, including poor as well as better-off groups.

Looking at experiences with and expectations of political officials, we see how these change with income. Those respondents who are more financially unstable are more reliant on financial support, thus becoming tied into a patron-client relationship with politicians. With rising income, the need for such handouts diminishes. Does this mean we can find here evidence that evolution towards middle income does promote democracy, simply because it offers a possibility to opt out of a patronage system? Maybe, and we cannot answer this question conclusively. But perhaps only the forms of patronage change. A higher income may allow access to elite networks and to bring advantage through personal connection, rather than financial support itself. Thus, we can consider again an in-between area: for those, who are financially less dependent, but who do not have the same access to personal networks as higher placed people. Again, no decisive answer can be given, but as already mentioned (see chapter 6.4), establishing a network that reaches higher up is a priority for many respondents, as the benefits it can provide are well-known. And it also raises the questions of what is a legitimate and useful repertoire of action for the middle income groups in Uganda today? Is it different from the rest of the Ugandans? From the observations mentioned here, we can at least suggest that their access to politicians and their expectations of them change with income.

While seeking personal connections with politicians is considered legitimate, it is less so for contentious political activities. We turned to an analysis of recent protests and reasons why people would join them. It suggests that several mechanisms contribute to a declined probability of people becoming active in protest. These mechanisms relate to the framing of protests and protesters, which equally prevent a collective identity from developing. Immediate and more diffuse ways of repression act as a deterrent and increase the cost of action and finally the resources at hand determine how people can interfere in the political process. By looking at other vectors that could be used for mobilization, such as NGOs, reli-

gious groups or interest groups we have tried to highlight similar constraints that affect their credibility as being voices for the mass of people. Hence, we argue that if there is some activism, it does not necessarily follow democratic channels. People know how to play by the rules in an undemocratic state; and this is not by pushing for democracy, but by trying to get ad-hoc benefits and maintain a good stance with the government. But this comes to the detriment of a mass movement that seeks to represent as many as possible.

All these mechanisms result in the feeling among many, that political activism is not an accessible and acceptable option for them, making them return more localized or private engagement. In such a context our respondents were more likely to act for a specific, material interest, as in the case of Ronald (p. 331) than for a broader cause like Walk to Work, that, in addition, is deemed to be “political”.

Braud observes in this regard:

“Insatisfactions et mécontentements peuvent demeurer ‘sans suite’ sous l’influence de divers facteurs comme le sentiment d’impuissance ou l’exposition à une culture politique qui inculque avec succès l’acceptation de l’ordre des choses. Les religions ont souvent joué ce rôle mais aussi un conservatisme social qui souligne les coûts du changement et valorise au contraire les bienfaits de la stabilité, voire de l’immobilisme [...]”

(Braud, 2011, p. 373)

One of the possible solutions to such situations are strategies of individual exit (ibid.). These conclusions bear a striking resemblance to the case study led by Bennani-Chraïbi (2003) on neighborhood associations in Casablanca. In her analysis of life stories of political activists, Bennani-Chraïbi has come to the conclusion that all of them eventually concentrated their activism in local initiatives. This retreat was borne out of the disappointment what the political sphere can offer and the sentiment that it is not an adequate relay to solve national problems, as politicians merely follow their interests and are concentrated on internal struggles. She postulates that the associations develop because they offer an alternative to institutionalized politics, which is widely seen as illegitimate (Bennani-Chraïbi, 2003). Such an observation we can link to the argument made above that the middle income

groups will not mobilize as one big entity, but (if at all) through diverse different identities, with their specific motivations and methods which are fostered precisely in the smaller groups and associations that Bennani-Chraïbi, for example, talks about. Following a similar approach, we will turn to the leisure activities of the middle income groups in the next part, to better comprehend the spheres in which and what kind of “we-intentions”<sup>45</sup> (Ludwig, 2007) are formed.

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<sup>45</sup>See p. 102ff

***Part IV:***

***Forms of Social  
Participation: Looking at  
Leisure***

After having focused on forms of political participation in the third part, we have found that many ways of politically participating are blocked and that for the middle income groups a multitude of reasons exist not to mobilize politically. We have equally seen, that there is a vital interest in political affairs among many and respondents often have quite pronounced opinions. Nevertheless, this does not seem to lead to any accrued efforts to participate politically nor to voice demands for more democracy. Thus, is it right to conclude, as some authors do that these middle income groups are the most conservative in a given society (see for example J. Chen, 2013; Rocca, 2008)? We agree with authors like Siméant (2013) that it is not sufficient to look at mobilization *outcomes*, such as social movements, but that we have to consider *processes*, personal as well as structural. To fully understand what brings an individual to protest, Siméant suggests following individual trajectories, to see the continuity of practices:

“Que ce soit sous le registre du passage au politique, de la politisation ou des réseaux dormants, c’est bien le problème de la continuité ou pas entre les pratiques d’avant et d’après qui se pose. Suivre les individus pour comprendre comment ils se trouvent eux-mêmes confrontés à la continuité de leurs pratiques en situation autoritaire et dans un processus lu peu à peu comme révolutionnaire est une des façons stimulantes de comprendre la politisation dans et par l’événement. Cela n’interdit évidemment pas d’articuler vie quotidienne, résistances et mobilisations, pour peu qu’on le fasse avec prudence, [...] et en montrant le lien que peuvent entretenir clientélisme et mobilisations collectives.”

(Siméant, 2013, p. 139)

Not having been able to follow individuals and their activities in times of authoritarianism and revolution, we chose a proxy that we hope can be revealing in terms of preferences and values, by turning to the free time activities of individuals. If we can find the continuity in politicization, as suggested by Siméant, we should be able to see some aspects thereof beforehand. Such a politicization does not have to be necessarily democratic or virtuous; Siméant also reminds us that the “*ugly movements*” of religion or ethnicity are often among the most prone for mobilization because they successfully create common identities (Siméant, 2013, p. 130).

The social mobilization literature has shown that becoming active largely depended on the settings in which people were embedded. Hence, from looking at the leisure we might see whether we can identify such an environment. However, Petrovic et al. point out that not all environments support mobilization, some might even be explicitly anti-protest (Petrovic, Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2014, p. 414). Thus, we should also be able to discern patterns of *de*-politicization, as not all leisure activities are equally prone to mobilize. Looking at leisure may help us answer two distinct sets of questions: first, is there a link between leisure and “class”, or leisure and income? Can we discern “typical middle class leisure activities”? And second, do the activities reported by respondents and assisted by the researcher reveal anything that had been missed by the mobilization literature, by turning to more subtle forms on a less organized level, in the sense of community engagement, street politics, etc.? This second set of considerations is guided by the literature that encourages political scientists to look at less visible forms of what could be “political” (for example Bayart, 1992; Bayat, 2013a; D.-C. Martin, 1989; Scott, 1990). It draws strongly on the ideas outlined in chapter 2.3 and the table in chapter 2.4, that is supposed to visualize that there is much more to mobilization than just a social movement. In the first part, we give some more theoretical foundation for our turn towards free time activities. We then turn to introduce the leisure reported by our respondents, in which we partly assisted. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the middle income groups we work here on a case-by-case basis, to show the varieties of leisure activities, but also values and identities transmitted, that exist. This is followed by a brief analysis of the activities and the values they negotiated. We then look at the often practiced retreat into a private sphere and the focus on self-improvement and eventually conclude what this might mean for the potential of democratization that might come from these groups. This analysis can serve us as a reminder that there is more to the analysis than what can be quantified in surveys or treated with statistical regression, even if this comes at the expense of generalizability.



## 12. Insights through Leisure

In the previous chapters we have tried to show how the mobilization of the middle income groups is challenged through several instances. On the one hand, “classical” channels of mobilization are discredited through a discourse that emphasizes stability and development over change, and on the other hand there is a lack of a common cause, that would unite these groups beyond more particularistic identities, such as ethnicity, religion, or age. Due to the heterogeneity of the middle income strata, we cannot expect one big “middle class” group to organize. And indeed, in part III we have seen that there are very divergent reasons that bring people to act, and in general on particularistic interests, even though many of them share common grievances. But, as we have shown in our table (see p. 102), there are many other points of entry that might build up or feed into a wider movement. One of the central elements is that people do not mobilize in a vacuum, but in relation to the environments in which they act (for an analysis of how people were drawn into the protests at Tahrir Square, see for example El Chazli (2012)). Because interests, values and norms are discussed, formed, negotiated and renegotiated on a personal level, in the family, at work, and also during leisure time. Thus, Martin for example suggests that media consumption, music, but also sports are promising avenues for detecting *unidentified political objects* (D.-C. Martin, 1989, p. 805). And we believe that we can enlarge this scope even more by focusing on leisure more broadly. Hence, we turn here to see in what kind of leisure time our respondents participate. First, we see how leisure might foster a class identity, that transcends other, aforementioned identities, and second, we reiterate how this helps to form a common ground and around which issues.

### 12.1. Leisure and Resources

Leisure theories have initially focused on its opposition to paid work (Rojek, 1995) but has increasingly turned its focus towards ideas of self-expression and self-ful-

fillment on an individual basis (Sönmez, Shinew, Marchese, Veldkamp, & Burnett, 1993). In such a perception, leisure has often been seen as a free and undirected choice. This assumption cannot be upheld, however, as leisure is subject to social conditions which have a structuring effect on the leisure activity carried out (Rojek, 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that leisure has often been linked to social status and social situation, with the assumption that a certain status will have an effect on the chosen leisure activities (Settle, Alreck, & Belch, 1979). However, in terms of quantity, they give little indication on the availability of leisure time and how this is distributed among different factions of society. It turns out that the most relevant correlation can be found between leisure and life cycle (Settle et al., 1979; Wilson, 1980). So, far more than income or occupation, demographic factors will be determining how much free time a person has and how they will use it. Especially the young, unmarried and childless and the elderly have an abundance of free time. When entering into the labor force, that amount of time will considerably decrease, and even more so with marriage and the arrival of children in the household. On the contrary, married, working women with children are most likely to have the least free time (Meisel, 1978; Shaw, 1999, p. 272; Wilson, 1980, p. 206) So while social class itself does not say anything about the availability of leisure time, it does indeed structure the type of leisure done. Money can serve as an entry barrier to many activities. Related to this, spatial mobility or the lack thereof can impact the accessibility of free time activities. Similarly, a particular activity can serve as a form of social distinction, in the sense of Bourdieu. But social class is only *one* structuring aspect, others include gender, age, education or race (Makhanya & Maree, 2012; Settle et al., 1979; Shaw, 1999). For example, black South Africans have reported feelings of “*being out of place*” when pursuing leisure activities that are formally open and affordable to them now, but have historically been associated with white South Africans (Makhanya & Maree, 2012). Hence, Kelly (1983) concludes that:

“And while leisure may not be ‘determined’ by social position, age, or sex, its choices and environments still exist within social systems that differentiate rewards, opportunities and customs. [...] Ethnic and subcultural identification and communities remain powerful influences. The similarities in leisure among different occupational or religious groups should not be allowed to obscure significant varieties in leisure styles.”

(J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 45)

This makes the study of leisure in the context of Uganda’s middle income strata so intriguing. If time is a resource, and maybe even a scarce one, it is revealing to see how people decide to spend it. On what grounds and in which kind of groups do they choose to associate. How do structural constraints manifest themselves in their choices? And does this allow to draw any conclusions concerning allegiances, with whom do people like to associate? Because much more than occupation (which is often treated as a determinant of social class (Settle et al., 1979)), leisure activities express a person’s identity, which in turn will influence the social structure around them (Parker, 1975, p. 93).

## **12.2. Leisure and Mobilization**

Albeit constrained, leisure has substantial impacts on the self-identity of a person, according to leisure sociologists. Through leisure, interests are formed, which in return affect the perception one has of themselves. And while a leisure activity, in order to be chosen, needs to relate to a person’s life, it will in return modify the person (Meisel, 1978, p. 210). Through a similar argumentation, Shaw describes the effect of leisure on gender roles:

“The impact of leisure on gender is both individual and collective. At the individual level, leisure experiences, self-expression, and the development of self-identity through leisure often involve the expression of attitudes and beliefs about femininity and masculinity. This expression leads to attitudinal reinforcement and internalization. In addition, interactions with others during leisure, including interactions with people of the same as well as the opposite gender, also reflect, reinforce, and sometimes challenge ideas about appropriate behaviors for women and men. These microlevel outcomes of leisure, though, also have broader societal implications. This is because individual attitudes and beliefs function collectively in the construction and reconstruction of gender ideologies and gender relations in the broader society.”

(Shaw, 1999, p. 276)

However, she adds:

“Leisure activities, of course, do not always function to reproduce dominant views. Indeed, because leisure is often freely chosen and self-determined, the potential for resistance to dominant ideologies is probably greater in this area of life compared to work, employment, or household labor.”

(Shaw, 1999, p. 277)

These citations show how leisure can be used to reproduce dominant norms, but may equally provide a space to question them. Recalling the literature on social mobilization (see chapter 2.3) we see that many social movements draw their participants from smaller groups that have provided a space to develop a collective identity and a space to challenge existing norms. Similarly, Meisel sees leisure groups as a potential tool for mobilization, even though he concedes that little research in this regard has been carried out (Meisel, 1978, p. 203). Hence, we want to overcome this lack by some exploration of the leisure groups in which our respondents participate.

To avoid an over-glorification of the virtues of leisure, it needs to be pointed out that not all leisure is equal. Difficulties to find a common definition beyond the commonly shared distinction of free choice and in opposition to work are increased by the influence of context. Same activities may have different meanings to different people, and different activities may have the same meaning for different people, and same activities may have different meanings for the same person, depend-

ing on the circumstances (J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 2). Hence, while going to church maybe an invigorating experience for a fervent believer, it might be a burden for someone who does so due to social pressure. A dedicated soccer player may have the same feeling after a match as the churchgoer after prayer. And even for the believer, it might be a difference to go for prayer nights or a regular service. Besides, activities vary in intensity and social interaction. Finally, it needs to be kept in mind that since the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in most of Europe and the US watching television has been the most prominent leisure activity (J. R. Kelly, 1983, p. 15). And now in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, social media and internet at least partially contest this first place (Rideout, Foehr, & Roberts, 2010). Thus, not all leisure is equally prone to lead to mobilization or at least the contesting of established norms. Through studying the leisure activities of the middle income groups in Uganda, we may be able to get a glimpse into where such potential might lie and under which circumstances.

## **13. The Leisure of the Middle Income Groups in Uganda**

Some statistical insights on the role of leisure in Uganda can be drawn from the Afrobarometer (2015), and from the World Value Survey (WVS) (2001). Thus, in the WVS, 80.3% of Ugandans report that leisure is very or rather important to them (even though interpretations, what leisure is, may vary from one person to the other, as the survey did not propose a definition). And similar to findings from other studies, spending time with friends and family seems to be among the most common activities (World Values Survey Association, 2001). Again, the surveys confirm findings from elsewhere, that women engage in fewer leisure activities than men, as they reported doing less of the mentioned activities and a smaller percentage being a member of any group or association. A different picture arises when looking at TV consumption. Watching TV has a big priority. According to the survey, 72.2% of Ugandans watch TV for at least one hour per day, with women indicating significantly more often to watch three or more hours per day (17.8% to 4.7%). Besides, women were more active than men in the attendance of religious services, but they would still report a lower incidence in religious group membership (World Values Survey Association, 2001). These findings provide some indication on the role of women: their leisure time is more confined to the domestic space or church/mosque attendance, while it is more appropriate for men to participate in a broader range of activities.

Being part of a religious group was reported as the most common group membership in the WVS, as well as the Afrobarometer survey, concerning half of the Ugandan adult population (Afrobarometer, 2015; World Values Survey Association, 2001). This result is not surprising, as no other organization has such a widespread presence, reaching even to remote areas. According to the Afrobarometer, a similarly large number of people would be part of a community group or a voluntary association (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 16). There is very little difference between rural and urban responses, which underlines earlier mentioned findings that

money is not directly linked to whether or not someone is participating in a group in their free time. The survey cannot account for less structured forms of free time activity, such as dining out, going to a bar, or the movies, meeting with friends, activities with children and the like.

Despite the little variation between rural and urban population, it is for us interesting to see how the picture looks when focusing on the middle income groups. How do leisure activities change with income? In which groups do they gather? This is relevant because, as Wilson points out, too often sociologists

“[...] have ignored the fact that leisure is typically enjoyed in groups and that it is a form (perhaps a special form) of symbolic interaction in which distinct meanings emerge and are displayed.”

(Wilson, 1980, p. 36)

Hence, in the following chapter we will look at the leisure of the middle income groups under two aspects: can we recognize any stratification in their leisure activities? And secondly, do these activities provide a forum for the emergence of distinct meanings and identities, which may raise the potential for mobilization, or, on the contrary, act as a deterrent?

In this chapter, we categorize and describe the leisure activities that we have participated in or been told about. We then proceed with a preliminary analysis of some themes we have seen emerging recurrently in the leisure descriptions or during participation. The analysis then can serve as a basis to make some interpretations about the potential for mobilizations around a commonly shared group identity in the next chapter.

In the questionnaire, people had a set of choices to indicate what they usually do in their free time. The answers were repartitioned as such:




Figure 39: Usual Free Time Activities

The two strongest points mentioned here were church and relatives, and the miscellaneous category of other.

In the narrative interviews, we asked 23 respondents more in detail about their pastime. A summary of the activities mentioned by the participants can be found in the annex (p. 575). Upon probing, it turned out that many activities were either carried out irregularly, or have not taken place for a long time. Thus, if asked, people are inclined to indicate leisure activities, even though they might not be genuinely reflecting their current schedule. This was one of the blind spots the qualitative analysis could shine some light on. Thus, in the discussions, fifteen of the 23 respondents indicated to be part of a religious and/or any other association. Hence, roughly two-thirds could be considered active in the sense asked for by the Afrobarometer. But even six of the other eight cases would regularly meet with friends or do some sports by themselves. One respondent would every once in a while take her children out to the beach but did not indicate any interaction with other friends, and one respondent stated that she did not have any money to pursue any free time activity. Since all respondents reported possessing a TV, it is safe to assume that this is part of everyone's free time activity.



### **13.1. Religious Groups**

Religion plays a pivotal role in the life of most of the respondents. All interviewees stated to belong to a religion, one Muslim and 22 Christians. The fervor with which they attended church varied greatly though. 13 out of 23 would attend service on a weekly basis, three others on a more irregular basis, and only three stated that they were not attending service. For the others, data is lacking. In any case, religious activity was the most commonly mentioned leisure activity. Six respondents would attend church meetings beyond the service. That was apparently the case for Elly, the pastor of a born-again church. In his case the distinction between leisure and professional attendance is blurred, but for the other five (four women and one man), going to church has become an important part of their free time. This confirms statistical findings that women will more likely be participating in religious activities, one of the few avenues for leisure available to them. As will be detailed below, for Josephine this means her implication in Mother's Union and for Herbert with the Watoto Cell group. Other respondents would participate in the choir, be part of door-to-door evangelism, Sunday school or the like. The most extreme case being Nicole, who would attend church 4-5 times a week, on various services and meetings. She did not, however, get closely in contact with other worshipers, but was mainly focused on exchanging with the pastors of the church, who were her role models and support in case of difficulty. Spending time in the church beyond Sunday service was most strongly pronounced among the Pentecostal Christians. Four of the six mentioned are born-again, in addition to one Anglican and one Catholic. Such an observation is in accordance with the literature on PCCs, as it suggests that the church often tries to fulfill a wide range of social functions for its attendants, including being a surrogate for the family (Meyer, 2004, p. 461). As shown in various research, the church (including all denominations) is an crucial social space, beyond the mere religious function. Thus, for example, Campell, Gibbs, and Skovdal suggest that churches play a vital role in the creation or prevention of stigma surrounding people living with HIV/Aids (2011), others have looked at the role of Eastern European churches at the end of the Cold War (see for

example Burgess, 1997; Hall, 1986; Pfaff, 2001) or during the Civil Rights Movement in the US (Oberschall, 1973; Polletta, 1999). It is not the aim here to draw an exhaustive list of the multiple functions a church can serve, but rather to attract the attention to the fact that the dynamics at play go beyond preaching the gospel. This has also been the case in our observations for some Ugandans.

### **13.1.1. Mothers' Union**

Josephine is a regular attendant of Mothers' Union at the Anglican church of All Saints Cathedral in Nakasero (the city center of Kampala). The meetings take place once a week on Fridays and are dedicated to mothers of all ages, even though during one meeting one woman described the Union as a group for old women, feeling herself (in her thirties) too young for the group. The Union has about 300 members. The reunions are well attended, drawing a crowd of maybe 100 women at each meeting, who are also member of the parish. The parish, placed in the center of Kampala is one of the more prestigious ones, even the president is going for service there, and this is also reflected in the socio-economic status of the women attending Mothers' Union. According to the chairperson, most of them are from a well-to-do background, reaching at least a "*middle class status*", with a university degree. During the meetings one of the members makes a presentation of about 20 minutes, then time remains for discussion. The executive committee chooses different topics to be discussed, and each committee member is responsible for one month, to select the different speakers. English is used throughout the gatherings. The atmosphere is relaxed, births and death of family members of the women are announced, and trips are planned to pay condolences or visit sick members and the like. The end of the meetings is also an occasion for the women to sell various products, homemade lotions or peanut butter, scarfs and tissues, etc. Here the purpose of the meeting diverges and also becomes about advancing business opportunities, thus being once again an occasion for diversifying income, an element so crucial to most of our respondents. Mothers' Union is a common way to associate. At All Saints, there exist similar groups for fathers and the youth, and the same format is often used in other parishes as well.

Usually, topics include issues like domestic violence, parenting, rights of women, prayer, or cooking. They seem to be full of moral guidance for the women on how to be a good spouse, mother, woman, and Christian, and on behavior one should avoid. At one of the meetings, a middle-aged woman gave a personal testimony on the difficulties she had at the beginning of her marriage because she was too assertive, challenging the place of her husband as the head of the household. She warns younger women not to make the same mistakes as her and to accept that getting married means to live a sacrificial life, recognizing that your freedoms are restricted. Hence, you cannot choose anymore to cook or not to cook dinner in the evening or to go where you want without justification. She recalls: “*When I married, the first years were difficult because I wanted to take over the man’s role. Until I joined Mothers’ Union, then I learned about my place.*” During the meetings the women are often addressed in their identity as members of Mothers’ union, reinforcing that identity of Christian women from All Saints Cathedral.

Because the group is rather big, the Union also divides into various cell groups with 20-30 members, according to the place of living. However, the cell groups are more or less active. In the case of Josephine, it turned out that she did not participate in the cell group close to her living place, but one which she found to be more lively. About 15 members met at the home of one of the members and learned how to cook several dishes which they would share to eat at the end of the meeting. The host provided for most of the ingredients, in the end, a small contribution was asked of the participants but which would not cover the expenses. Ethnicity had not been an issue so far, and all meetings in the general group were held in English. However, at the cell meeting Runyankole (a language spoken in the West of the country) was commonly used and it turned out that all members of the cell group came from the Western region.

The case of Mothers’ Union gives some important insights into the social stratification of leisure. First, it shows how a church congregation can have a segregating effect beyond denomination. All Saints is a church in the city center of Kampala, situated on top of a hill, next to State House. This is not a residential area, and

many of the members of Mothers' Union do not live nearby; even though for some of them the church is close to their place of work. Thus, being a member of this particular parish involves an active choice, coupled with some costs, such as a distance to commute, but which are apparently outweighed by the benefits. This choice already has a structuring effect, as it may act as a deterrent to people for whom the transport becomes too costly, or who are not working nearby. Especially in urban areas, where, even for one denomination, several churches exist, residency is not the sole criteria for choosing a parish (see also Kroeker, 2017; Niechoj, 2016). In her work on spatial mobility of youth from low and middle income households, Gough has shown how physical mobility is linked to social mobility, since mobility "*is clearly a resource to which not everyone has equal access.*" (Gough, 2008, p. 244) and a similar process can be observed here. Therefore, it is likely, particularly for the bigger churches who draw their members from all over Kampala, to have structuring criteria beyond religious affiliation. In the case of Mothers' Union, group membership is also controlled through a membership fee of 60 000 UGX per month (at the time approximately \$24). Given that the average household income is 980 000 UGX (\$392) in Kampala, that sum would comprise 15% of a households monthly budget (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014a, p. 97).

A second structuring effect occurs through the use of English as vernacular during the meetings. Again, it is a conscious choice not to use Luganda, which is the lingua franca of Kampala nor Runyankole, albeit most, even though not all members of the parish come from the West (this is discussed in more detail below). We observe here, similar to the born-again churches in the city center the framing of a particular target group, namely educated women who master the language sufficiently well to communicate with ease. This choice, in return, leads to the exclusion of less educated women, who would be severely limited in their interaction during the meetings.

A third structuring effect, less visible at first sight, is the common regional origin of most of the parish members. Bearing in mind that the President, another member

of the parish, himself comes from the West, too, it seems that the church provides a point of encounter for affluent Ugandans from the West.

There are also certain hierarchies recognizable during the meetings, which seem to revolve mainly around questions of age, with the elder women being more established in the group, as they would sit in the front row, speak more frequently, and be well-known by other members.

Obviously the meetings are equally structured along gender lines, as they are targeted specifically for women and a man would be considered to be “out of place”. Nevertheless, the all-women group is not used for contesting established gender norms, quite on the contrary, the speeches given often underline the subordinate role of the woman in the house and her primary function as caretaker and house-keeper. These themes are well in tune with its original objectives at the time of creation of the first Mothers’ Unions in 1906, namely “*promoting Christian principles of marriage, upbringing of children and Christian living.*” (Tripp, 2000, p. 34) Tripp in her work on women in politics points out that the chapters of Mothers’ Union indeed had at times become political, in anti-colonial resistance or in the reformation of marriage, divorce and inheritance laws in the 1950s and 60s, making her describe these women associations as having

“both limiting and empowering dimensions. These organizations, even the religious ones, played a critical role in giving women the necessary skills for political action on issues that were of concern to women.”

(Tripp, 2000, p. 36)

And finally, taking up responsibility within the Union has helped some women to prepare for leadership roles in other areas (Tripp, 2000, p. 74). While the participants of Mothers’ Union in All Saints indeed were often in leadership roles in their professional lives (in the case of Josephine she would even earn more than her husband), they still underlined the need of being assertive to their husband at home. At least during the time of the field research thus, questions of morality weighed stronger than those of women’s rights. This perception of the women’s role has not been unique to Mother’s Union but was shared by nearly all respondents. Martin suggests however, that this should not be interpreted as subordination:

“It is women who understand the difference between formal arrangements conceding headship to the male and informal realities conceding effective power to the female, and engendering mutuality rather than subjection.”

(D. Martin, 2005, p. 146)

Such an observation would at least explain the seeming contradiction between Tripp’s analysis on Mother’s Union and the dominant narrative we observed during the meetings. And indeed, it also confirms the rather dominant positions these women would occupy in their daily lives. We would still take it with a grain of caution, however, as this “official subordination” is most likely only one way in which male dominance is asserted.

To sum up, parish members and the mothers of the Union make a conscious choice to attend these meetings and the church, even though it may not be the most conveniently placed for them because they can interact with people from a similar socio-economic background, education, and regional origin. Hence, in such a context religious identities are coupled with ethnic and socio-economic ones. It is likely that a similar pattern can be found in other churches, which do not primarily draw their congregation from the neighborhood. For example, once a month there is a mass at the university campus that is held for Batoro living in Kampala and therefore serves as a way to (re)connect with people, in addition to their religious (in this case: Catholic) affiliations, on the grounds of their shared regional origin. Turning it the other way around, we can argue that among the middle income groups we find people anchored in a Christian committed milieu, that also seeks proximity with others from their home regions.

For the participants of Mothers’ Union, the meetings fulfill diverse functions. Relationships in the general assembly are cordial, there is laughter, chatting and mutual support. In case of a wedding, birth, or the burial of a family member, union members, in general, organize contributions and visits to the member’s home, even if this implies traveling to the village. Not all women attend all these functions, but it is assured that a delegation will be there. In prayers and testimonials, members share personal details and give each other guidance. Josephine states that she en-

joys being part of the union because of the possibility to exchange with women in similar situations. “*We share so many different things, we learn from one another, we share skills, pray and so on.*” The union also serves as a place of networking and for the acquisition of potential clients. For example one of the guest speakers, a member of the Union, is a personal trainer and fitness adviser and some group members are her clients. For others, the meetings become a platform to advertise their products which they usually sell at the end of the meetings. However, due to the large number of attendants and the general set up, in which the biggest part of the meeting is conducted in a lecture-listener-setting, the intimacy has its limits. Not all members know each other personally, instead smaller groups have formed during the meetings. This becomes evident when put in contrast with the cell group meeting, which conveyed a much more intimate atmosphere. For one, the setting in one of the cell group member’s house creates closer ties. The smaller group size and the fact of doing something together changed the dynamic from frontal teaching to more activism, in which small, personal discussions became easier. A relevant indicator for the more intimate setting was the shift of language. While the general meetings are without exception held in English, the shift to Runyankole happened quickly (albeit not from the beginning, as general explanations were still made in English) and expanded from smaller groups, who started discussing in their mother tongue to the rest of the group. As Juillard has shown, in a plurilingual setting the chosen language reflects a chosen identity as well (Juillard, 2007). Calvet (1994), in reference to John Gumperz, has called this identitary aspect of the language the “we-code” and the “they-code”, particularly prone for a minority language (Runyankole) towards a majority language (English or Luganda). It unites its speakers and creates cohesion among their social group. “*Car ne pas parler comme l’autre c’est ne pas être comme lui, et parler comme son pair c’est affirmer sa solidarité avec lui, son identité.*” (Calvet, 1994, p. 72) Spronk (2012) has observed the tendency among young urban professionals to use English, Kiswahili or Sheng instead of their local language in discussions, which implies a breaking up of communal identities for a more commonly shared, urban ones. So,

here, in contrast, we seem to have a milieu which is closely attached to their regional origins, in addition to a shared economic well-to-do background. In how far age plays a role as well, as most of the women would describe themselves as middle-aged, cannot be conclusively answered.

Albeit being more intimate, not all members of the cell group know each other equally well, since a group size of 30 still leaves the potential to choose whom to interact with during a cell group meeting.

From our description of the union we can see how it serves as a way to forge shared identities, as good wives (be submissive to your husband and keep your house tidy), good mothers (keep your children disciplined) and good Christians (read from the bible, and follow the teachings; stand up against homosexuality). Beyond this, however, the group through subtle mechanisms of ex- and inclusion is also stratified along socio-economic and ethnic lines. And particularly the last one gains importance the more intimate the group setting gets. The prevailing identity will change according to the context, setting, time, etc. (Calvet, 2005). Hence, a prediction to which one might be the strongest or dominant one is at least daring. We do observe, however, that the norms established do not raise questions about democratic governance, or even politics, but center on issues of morality. Therefore, it seems likely that mobilization through such a group will occur in the interest of the latter or, as Tripp (2000) has shown, in the realm of women's rights.

### **13.1.2. Watoto Cell Group**

Watoto is one of the most prominent Pentecostal churches in Uganda, with more than 20 000 members. The motherchurch is in central Kampala, but affiliated ministries can be found all over the country. The main services on Sundays draw several thousand participants and are held in English. Similar to Mother's Union, the parish encourages its members to meet once a week on a smaller basis, in cell groups of five to ten people, for the members to "*do life together, know one another better and help one another to grow spiritually*" (Herbert). If the cells become too big (more than ten people), they give birth to another cell, so that the



cells remain personal. The main church gives out a guide for the cell group leaders on which issues should be discussed and which bible readings serve as a basis. The meetings always follow the same pattern: they start off with an icebreaker, then worship and bible readings, as an introduction. In the main part discussions on the issues defined by the church take place and finally the meetings are closed off with announcements.

Herbert is a member of Watoto and regularly attends the cell group meetings. Similar to Mothers' Union, the cell groups are supposed to regroup people of the same area, which seemed to be the case. From Herbert's home, it is a walking distance to the cell host's house. The area is marked by either single houses or three to four housing units within closed compounds. Agewise, the cell group is diverse, some of them are young, in their twenties, others, usually referred to as "aunt" or "uncle" are middle-aged. Due to the age difference, incomes within the group vary as well, since some members are already well-established, others are still "*constructing themselves*" as Herbert described his life situation. But even the younger ones seem to be from a well-to-do background, attending school thanks to the financial support of their parents.

All meetings take place at the house of the cell host, a young woman aged around 30, with a main job at Watoto Church and selling second-hand clothes as a side income. She lives in a two bedroom house within a guarded compound, together with her siblings. During the cell meeting, in the beginning, lengthy private discussions took place while the attendants waited for late-comers to arrive. Six people and one child attended the meeting. The conversations revolved around the new car of the cell host, issues of security in their neighborhood, which would later become part of their prayers, and around work, one member received a promotion, another started a new business, and someone else was hoping for his investments to take off. The cell meeting itself was rather short, the host left for the kitchen to prepare tea and snacks for everyone, and would spend most of the time there, accompanied by another female cell member. When she came back, everyone talked shortly

about their week, prayer requests would be made and soon after the meeting was over.

One time, the group decided to meet for a goat roasting. The members contributed money, according to their ability, to buy a goat which was then roasted during a barbecue. The atmosphere was very cheerful, members joking and discussing lively, mostly private issues, the families of the members were present as well, hinting at a close relationship between the members. As Maxwell (1998) argues, the re-socialization taking place in Pentecostal churches aims at centering the social life around the church. And indeed, Herbert acknowledges that his faith influences his leisure activities. The young man is still friends with people of different denominations, and for him this is not a contradiction, as he considers these as opportunities to tell others about his faith. However, Herbert restricts their meetings to settings that do not contradict his beliefs. Thus, if his peers decide to go to a bar, he will not join. He also listens solely to gospel music and says these are the only concerts he would attend. Albeit not completely, his leisure time is structured by his denomination, thus it emphasizes his identity as a born-again over others. And the cordial relationship among the cell group members, which are considered as a form of family and addressed in such a way (“auntie”, “uncle”) reinforce these ties, as they are not based on kinship, but religious affiliation. The habit of addressing each other in family terms has been described as typical for PCCs elsewhere (see Meyer, 2004, p. 461). We also observe a structuring along income lines, however, as all attendants would be from a well-to-do background, even if they did not have their own income yet. Indicators of financial well-being could be seen in the presence of cars, smartphones, the housing of the cell host, and of Herbert, both within guarded compounds, the fact that all cell members are either studying at university or have a regular income and that all of them have had some tertiary education. The language used during the meetings was English (as is the case of service in Watoto church), and contrary to Mother’s Union the members came from different regions of the country.

The small membership and the regular meetings make the cell group an intimate space, with dense personal networks between the participants. Identities that are reinforced here are the ones of being a good Christian and of economic achievers, as discussions would frequently evolve around earning, investment opportunities, or material possessions. Contrary to the Mothers' Union meetings, material questions seemed to be of greater importance. With regard to the literature on PCCs, it is easy to see a connection with the prosperity gospel, a central element of born-again theology (Gifford, 1990; Maxwell, 1998; Meyer, 2004). For some analysts of born-again Christianity, this emphasis is inherently dangerous, as it takes responsibility from institutions, suggesting that obtaining wealth is a question of merit and personal morality, rather than depending on structural conditions (Gifford, 1990). Thus, change is sought through self-improvement rather than through the change of other conditions (see also Maxwell, 1998, p. 365), as shall be discussed in chapter 14.6.

### **13.2. Debate Clubs**

In Habermas' conceptualization, the public space has been vital for the development of civil society and thus the advancement of democracy, as it provided a place of discussion where citizens defined political realities through discursive practices (Brisset-Foucault, 2011). Brisset-Foucault (2011) in her work on the Ugandan *ebimeeza*, popular live radio talk shows in the first decade of the millennium, has shown how these debate clubs contributed to challenging NRM hegemony and reformulate ideas of citizenship, but within a controlled and regulated framework. As a consequence of the Buganda riots in 2009, these talk shows have been banned, and at the same time, the freedom of press has been considerably curtailed (see chapter 9.2 for details). Since then, opportunities for people to come together and express their points of view in a public setting have become rare. However, during the research we have attended two different kinds of debate clubs, the Pan African Club and the State of the Nation Platform.

### 13.2.1. Pan African Club

Pan African Club is, according to his organizer, Oliver, “*the only debate club in Kampala, and if we are the only debate club in Kampala, then we are the only debate club in this country*”<sup>46</sup>. It is supposed to be a fortnightly meeting on topics of political and social concern. However, since the time of the first interview with Oliver in 2014, the frequency of the meetings has decreased, as he has been occupied with issues of different concern, and as he emphasizes, the club is not his priority. The chairperson invites various speakers, some of them with high positions in government or opposition, and known by the public. In two mailing list with about 500 subscriptions each and per text messages members are invited to the discussions. The attendance varies according to the topic, and the guest speakers, but usually ranges between 30-100 people. Most of them are young men from the university. The debate would start at 7 pm, with keynotes on the topic by the guests followed by some time for public discussion. It usually closes at around 9 pm and members quickly part. The debates take place in a restaurant sited on Kira Road, entry is free, and everyone receives a non-alcoholic beverage. The club tries to remain non-partisan, by not relying on any government or NRM funding. Thus, it is financed mainly through the occasional contributions of one benefactor but faces challenges every once in a while to conduct the meetings because it cannot raise the fees to pay for the venue. Its members are mostly students who could not afford to pay membership, so there are no fees to join the club. Topics deal with regional or continental issues, such as the crisis in Burundi or with questions of national governance and particularly around youth issues.

Some more prominent guests have been, among others, senior government officials, or renowned researchers such as Mahmood Mamdani, as well as several members of Parliament and former and current ministers. Due to the limited funds of the association, they do not receive any gratification but come because they are invited by the chairman who knows many of them personally. Oliver believes they agree to attend for various reasons, such as sharing their knowledge but also hav-

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<sup>46</sup>There used to be numerous debate clubs, but they have been shut down after the Buganda riots in 2009. Cf Florence Brisset on the Ebimeeza.

ing a platform from which to share their point of views and influence young people (this bears a resemblance to the way the opposition uses the STON meetings, as will be discussed below). He believes, however, that the modest environment in which the club functions hinders it from being taken more seriously and attract guest speakers of a higher profile.

During the meetings there is little interaction between the participants, it seems not many know each other, as composition and number of attendants change from one session to another. People gather to listen to the guest speakers, discuss and leave shortly after the meetings.

In the Pan African debates it is harder to delimit one socio-economically homogeneous group. For example, Gordon, Alex, and Arthur all three have been attendants of the meetings, but have different income and education levels. For Gordon, who has been financially struggling at the time of the interview, the meetings were one way of cheaply enjoying leisure. Since he lived nearby, he did not have to pay for transport and in addition, received a free non-alcoholic drink during the meeting. He was also the most frequent of the attendants, as the others were more tied up in other responsibilities.

Also regarding religion or region, the group is composed heterogeneously. The most uniting factor might be the age range, even though this can equally differ, as the oldest regular participant is in his seventies. But the bulk of attendants are in their twenties or early thirties. And as the example of Alex and Arthur shows, attendance diminishes as age advances. This is in concordance with many leisure studies which underline the structuring effect of the life cycle on the quantity of leisure time (Parker, 1975; Rojek, 1995; Shaw, 1999). Concerning education, most participants have at least completed A-level, and often also some tertiary education. The nature of the discussion and the use of English as a common language aims at a better-educated target group, with interest in public affairs.

Since the discussion is public, there is always the possibility of surveillance by the government. According to the organizer, this is the case; therefore self-censorship is a possibility for discussants. Nevertheless, criticism of the government is still

voiced, and through the vivid discussions ideas are exchanged and consensus on the various topics established. The issues raised depend strongly on the general theme of the debate, but often evoke criticism of Western imperialism, the current government, and politics in general, or underline the need for panafricanism. The main contributors take on a role of giving guidance to their young audience.

Contrary to the religious groups, religion, and especially Christianity sometimes evokes criticism, as it is brought in connection with colonialism and the quest of the continent. Hence, one guest speaker once remarked: *“If the solution was worshipping, how come you Africans who worship most are also the most backward?”* (Fieldnotes), which can be interpreted as a criticism of the prosperity gospel, which precisely suggests the link between wealth and prayer. In return, we find more often positive mentioning of African traditional religion. In relation to this, one of the discourses repeatedly held during meetings emphasizes the glorious past of Africa. Its unity, well-being, and harmony was destroyed through colonialism and gave rise to the neo-colonial states, that would prefer foreign investors over their citizens. It also brought “modernity” that spoiled Africans through its harmful effects, such as nightclubs and bars, homosexuality or miniskirts.

“Before the outgoing generation, people were truthful, honest and had compassion but in today’s generation, we are deceitful, we steal, we are dishonest and when doing all these, we think we are bright! [...]

Regarding morals, Dr. Simba concurred with the earlier speakers that there is a big problem today. He revealed that about three years ago, a study was made and the findings were that the said fathers of 30% of the people in Kampala are not the true fathers!”

#### Pan African Minutes

However, at the same time, Uganda’s backwardness is frequently highlighted, especially in comparison to other countries which have managed to elevate themselves over a similar time span.

Because participants do not know each other personally, they do not connect on a very personal level. And this despite the fact that many of them share a common background as university students or recent graduates. But notably, their mailing

list provides linkages to various sub-groups, and is sometimes used for mobilization. In 2017, for example, Pan African Club members formulated a position on the Biotechnology Bill and were invited to parliament to voice their concerns over the legislation of genetically modified organisms. The list was used to encourage members to join the delegation going to parliament so that they would be as numerous as possible. Also, different NGOs or activists use the mailing list to distribute their points of view, such as the Africa Institute for Energy Governance, the Organization for Pan African Movement, or the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs. However, besides sharing their point of views and newsletters, they do not contribute to the increased interaction between the participants, and rarely debates take place on the issues shared through the platform (at least not on the mailing list).

Thus, Pan African Club provides a space to formulate and test opinions, but because of its anonymity, a certain distance between members is maintained. The organizer, for example, mentioned that women, already in the minority in attendance, would rarely speak in the discussions. Brisset-Foucault has observed a similar phenomenon during the *ebimeeza*, which she attributes to the fact that the meetings were held in a bar, a place long time considered as non-desirable for respectable women, even though now customs are changing (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 552).

### **13.2.2. The State of the Nation Platform**

A gathering of a very different nature is the State of the Nation (STON) platform. The think tank *ACODE* (Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment) organizes a monthly breakfast meeting discussing issues of contemporary public policy and governance. The guest speakers are usually high ranking politicians and attendance is upon invitation only. The meeting takes place at Protea hotel, one of the luxurious hotels in Kampala, and the choice of venue is not accidental.

“People would come and say: but why do you do Protea? Protea is an expensive place, I can tell you, our design was that this is supposed to be expensive.”

ACODE, former director

The same holds true for the choice of participants, which the former director describes as “*self-selected and exclusive*”. The intention behind creating the platform was to provide a space of influence and networking for people who will in a few years occupy key positions in politics. Topics cover a wide range of public policy issues, and different keynote speakers give inputs while the participants eat breakfast together. Then there is room for discussion, often with the reminder that “*what happens at STON stays at STON*”, encouraging participants to speak freely. The atmosphere is somewhat light as there is a lot of joking taking place. Indeed, criticism is voiced, but the former director does not exclude the possibility of self-censorship, particularly from business people who rely on tenders issued by the government. Among the participants are some high ranking opposition politicians, which use the discussion forum for contributions. Here, again, we can see a parallel to how opposition politicians have used the *ebimeeza*: some of them would participate weekly in at least one of the talk shows, not as a guest speaker, but as a commentator. This participation allowed them to gain space for voicing their opinion in a media landscape tilted towards the government (Brisset-Foucault, 2011, p. 405). From the way comments were made during the STON platforms, it suggests that opposition politicians seize this opportunity for expression in an environment which is even more restricted than it had been at the time of the *ebimeeza*.

In concurrence with popular discourse, the STON moderator reminds people to leave political affiliation behind and not to engage in politicking during the discussions. Again, the virtues of being political, but non-partisan are underlined. The platform is financed through contributions from international NGOs to ACODE and serves as an elite network for exchanging. Its creator sees STON in opposition to activism, which he believes has its place as well, but not in these circles:



“If you want to do an activism, you take your ebimeeza downtown, get all these young people, boda boda and whatever.”

ACODE, former director

Instead, the network helps to establish a direct link to decision makers, knowing that if a participant has a problem, he can pick the phone and knows whom to call. And that these connections, in turn, will help to make policy decisions that will benefit everyone. In that sense, the platform is a medium of exchange, but not of change, as it aims at working within the given conditions rather than thinking about how to change them. This is not surprising since most of its members are in positions in which the current conditions are favorable for them, even if they are from the opposition. All in all the platform provides a space in which criticism of the regime can be voiced, but within the limits of the media space defined by the NRM government, and as long as they do not lead to any visible action.

### **13.3. Sports**

Many of the respondents have shown to be health conscious, manifested in their eating habits (usually avoiding or limiting the number of times eating meat per week) and in exercising. To maintain themselves, five respondents would jog regularly, and three go to the gym. Jennifer used to go swimming, but stopped due to money shortage. Most of the time respondents stated that they would do these sports in solitude, with little or no interaction with others. They raise questions which cannot be conclusively answered here: are the growing popularity of these sports and gym clubs a sign for a growing individualism within the society? Can they be interpreted as a lifestyle choice distinguishing a middle class? Abbas (2004) suggests that this is the case, as running contributes to the individualization of society, but sees it also as a particular middle class leisure activity, through the bodily aesthetics it promotes, and the proclaimed appeals to a healthy lifestyle. She argues: *“The ability to engage in the reflexive making of oneself from available resources is an important aspect of individualization that has been particularly associated with the middle-classes.”* (Abbas, 2004, p. 171) In our case, jogging would

also be enjoyed by poor respondents, precisely because it did not require any money to do. However, it did appeal to the health consciousness of the individual respondents, as reducing body fat and maintaining general fitness were emphasized. Relating these findings to a study done on gyms in Kenya, it seems that the importance of bodily aesthetics can be found among all gym goers. The type of gym attended would differ, however, according to gender and income (male inhabitants of informal settlements would often work out in neighborhood gyms, not attractive for women as they did not offer any cardio activities or aerobic courses) (Hammerschmitt, 2016). Among the sports which would turn into social gatherings regularly playing football was mentioned by three interviewees. This was especially popular because it did not require money, therefore, making it a sport easy to access for the floating and poor classes. Usually, in those meetings Luganda is used as the language of communication, even though the groups might be ethnically diverse. Because Luganda has acquired the status of a lingua franca, especially in Kampala, this usage is not surprising. The groups are of about 40 people, and according to Gordon there is some, but rather little, talking going on, mainly focused on small talk and not as much on personal issues. So the members of the football teams might greet each other but would not go out together or give each other calls on more personal issues. Because here the entry barrier is low, this becomes an affordable leisure activity for those not so well off. The question is whether there remains still a socio-economic homogeneity because being attractive for poor people may make it less interesting for those newly emerging, who are eager to distinguish themselves from the urban poor. Two of the three players in our sample struggled financially. Finding a field to play on remained a challenge, however. LC1 II explained how the maintenance of the fields sometimes limited the offers the community would provide for their inhabitants. This short example reveals the limited role of government structures in providing an environment for leisure, particularly for those who cannot afford it otherwise. The same holds true for the availability of public recreational areas, such as parks. The only exceptions are few public beaches around the shores of Lake Victoria. Thus, because the state does not

offer leisure opportunities for its citizens, the choice of leisure is even more dependent on individual constraints.

Other, explicitly social sports activities were going to the sauna and playing golf, as mentioned by three respondents. However, as discussed in chapter 6.4 these were mainly used for networking. In the case of the sauna, the respondents also underlined the health benefits, especially for the heart. The fifty-year-old Richard, for example, explained that he hoped for the positive cardiovascular effects of sweating since he did not feel fit enough to engage in other sports such as playing football. However, the social aspect of regularly meeting friends and chatting was always present.

In the case of sports, the activities are strongly gendered and often exclusively male, as playing football or golf were considered male sports, and even in the sauna men would be among themselves. Women, if at all, would go jogging, swim or exercise in the gym, but in all cases, the sports were done in solitude and involved little interaction with other women.

Due to the different nature of the sports, it is hard to generalize how they may or not play into social mobilization. We suggest that sports carried out in solitude reinforce individualization, and they turn the attention towards self-improvement.

### **13.4. Political Commitments**

Four of the 23 interviewees have shown some political commitments, even though some others have stated that they plan at one point of their career to go into politics, but they felt the time was not ripe yet. All of those who said so, or who are active in politics, are men. However, many the respondents do not pursue the activities mentioned actively, but go there only rarely or did so before but stopped because of time constraints. Three are members of a political party. Nelson was active in NRM, trying to run as a candidate in the upcoming elections, Arthur a silent member of UPC, and Oliver had established his own party. However, they have failed to register with the electoral commission due to the lack of funding. The party seems to be inactive at the moment.

Besides that, Nelson is also attending a forum called “Parliament out of Parliament”. Participants are aspiring to become Members of Parliament but have not (yet) managed to do so. They follow the procedures of parliament and the topics to discuss but see whether they come up with similar or different decisions from those taken in the actual parliament. He is not regularly attending though. Nelson also initiated the NRM Media Activist Forum, a platform for all NRM members that are going to be presented publicly, to streamline NRM opinions, to prepare their contributions, and to get ready answering attacks from the opposition. Even though he helped to create the forum, he remains a member but is not as active anymore.

It is striking, once again, that nearly all respondents have expressed interest in politics, some even harbor intentions to become active themselves in campaigning, but most of them feel that the environment as it is today is not conducive to be politically active.

### **13.5. Communal Activities**

There had been several communal activities that respondents were involved in. Many of them consisted of “*giving back to the community*”, as one person described it. This was more pronounced among the wealthier of the respondents, but not exclusively. Thus, Abdul, a wealthy lawyer, was a legal advisor to a youth savings group in his home village. Joy, who worked herself up to what the AfDB would consider upper class organized a yearly charity to get donations for the village. George, an IT expert with his own firm, helped a befriended pentecostal pastor to set up his NGO, by giving his technical expertise. Andrew, a university lecturer, owns a school in the village in his home region and tries to keep school fees as low as possible to make it affordable for the village children. He would also be actively involved with the Catholic Church and the Kolping society, doing conflict mediation in the village, on questions of land disputes or domestic conflicts. Since our last interview, his situation has changed, however. As his contract with the university expired and was not renewed, he created an NGO (mainly for tax reasons,

otherwise it is run like a business) on conflict mediation and now charges the church for the work he has before been doing for free.

These cases show how being financially stable allows for support beyond the immediate family (which, as discussed earlier, is not tied to being financially stable, but only better off). Andrew's shifting income conditions illustrate this particularly well since his deteriorating revenues made him stop his volunteering to pursue the same activity with the Catholic Church, but this time as paid work. The support given is not entirely miscellaneous, especially if it is tied to the region of origins of the respondents. This allows them to establish their standing within the local community and to live up to expectations from others of giving back. The tendency of focusing on communities well-known to the respondents seems logical, as links are established through existing networks and needs can be identified more easily. However, all respondents mentioned above have in common that they have experienced financial struggles at some point during the time of growing up, either because they were raised by single mothers or because their parents would earn only little money.

It seems tempting to link such an observation to Maslow's hierarchy of needs or Inglehart's postmaterialist values (cf Hofstede, 1984; Inglehart, 1971). Without going into the criticism discussed in relation to the two concepts, we still argue that such a relation would be too far-fetched, as there have been as well other financially stable respondents who did not take up any volunteering or communal activities, even with others coming from a poor background as well. Hence, similar dispositions (being wealthy) do not necessarily lead to the same positions (helping others). Similarly, helping others is not reserved for the wealthy. Jude has used all his money to start an NGO, and Elly plans on starting one. Both are poor and come from a poor background, and they feel their motivation stems from having lived through hardships, the desire to avoid this for others and the belief to know what is needed. However, particularly in the case of Jude the NGO is not for mere altruism, but also with the hope of assuring his own financial survival. This brings to mind Neubert's description of "*local brokers*" and the NGO-economy in East

Africa (Neubert, 2000). He argues that with the shift of international aid towards the promotion of self-help groups and NGOs, sometimes these were created with the expectation of tapping into developmental aid streams rather than because of a felt need by the local population. In this process, the role of local brokers became vital, who would connect such an NGO or group with external funding. Regardless of the motivation for the creation of the NGOs mentioned by Jude and Elly, it seemed at least as if they were calculating to reach the point of attracting external funding that would provide an income source for themselves. During the research, this had happened on other occasions as well, when discussants would casually drop during a conversation their concern with orphans or the like when it did not seem exactly related to their projects. We interpreted this as the use of a discourse to meet expectations of foreigners, that would help them secure financial support. Thus, in these cases, the researcher felt that efforts were made to turn herself into some broker. In these particular activities, we see the close link between volunteering and the hope of generating new streams of income. They could, therefore, be seen as what Ugandans sometimes describe as “*hustling*”, continuous efforts to tap into new resources. Hence, the description of these kinds of leisure might as well be placed into the section on diversifying income (chapter 6.2). It underlines one of the central characteristics of this process of emergence: the consolidation of revenue sources, which also occupy a large part of the free time. There have also been several neighborhood initiatives among the communal activities, although their set up, the time invested, and the participation of members would vary. Most of them were focused on issues of improving and securing the neighborhood in which they lived, as the example from John shows:

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***Case Story: “If we don’t do it ourselves...”***

John’s neighborhood is an affluent one, with many, recently built and rather big estates. One of the issues they faced was the dire condition of the roads. Because they knew they could not expect much from Kampala City Council Authority, they decided that everyone would contribute some money. They would tarmac the road themselves and acquire street lights to ensure proper light-

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ening and enhance security in the area. They also organized someone to pick up their garbage and bring it to the main road because the garbage truck would not pass through the quarter. Because they had many cases of burglary, they took things once more in their own hands. One night they managed to catch one of the burglars, and they let him choose, to either go to the police with him or to employ him: he would be the security guard in the area, but whenever a theft would occur, the neighbors would hold him accountable. He decided to become a guard, and since then no other incidents of burglary occurred. All these actions would require a substantial amount of money, but because these people could afford the contributions, they decided not to bother with the long, and in John's eyes, utterly useless bureaucracy, but would just put their own money to use to improve their situation. It shows how people lower their expectations of governance and instead try to find other ways to achieve the ends they want. However, talking to him again in 2017 revealed that the need for the continuous effort had slowed the motivation of the neighbors, in addition to turnovers of inhabitants of the quarter. Thus, in the long run, their initiative was not sustainable and failed to replace government structures.

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Often, insecurity was a problem that brought people together to act. Politically supported, people were incited to develop models of community policing (Baker, 2006; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017). In general, local councilors would be in charge of setting up a program. This would entail asking for a contribution from parish members which were then used to train local youth, equip them and have them patrolling at night. Results were mixed though and longevity not given as they would again demand continuous financial contributions. The most successful seemed to be the case of the affluent neighborhood of Kololo, which, according to one of its councilors has many offices not used overnight and which were happy to pay for additional security. They set up a WhatsApp group with the heads of households, and they repaired and staffed a police post which was previously abandoned. They would also provide fuel for the police motorcycles and lunch, to give an incentive to police officers to patrol around the area. The financial advantage becomes visible and turns the public services of police into nearly a private service

for those who can offer the little extra to them. These initiatives, led by local politicians, however, would ask for little engagement of the community other than money. Hence, ties within the groups would remain rather weak, and the watch itself would take on the form of a service provider, rather than a community-driven activity.

Finally, other types of community engagement evolve around kinship activities. The role culture plays in the life of the respondents varied a lot. General tendencies seemed to indicate that it is more pronounced with Baganda, and to a lesser extent from other monarchies. However, every respondent attended cultural functions, like weddings, introductions or burials. These are important social gatherings, and if one chooses to abstain too much, they will be frowned upon. Some of the respondents even mention them explicitly in their budget, as attending these functions can become costly. But such activities could also entail other responsibilities. Raphael, for example, would organize a clan soccer tournament, where different clans of Buganda would compete against one another. His responsibility was to reserve a playground and buy water for the players. While sometimes ethnic affiliations “shine through” other leisure activities, such as religious or social gatherings, albeit not being officially described as those, purely ethnic associations have rarely been mentioned. In the later research, it became obvious that many Ugandans were part of ethnic associations during their tertiary education. However, the intensity in which the different associations were active would vary. While Nkoba Zambogo, the student organization for the Baganda, played a primordial role in the organization of the Buganda riots (Baral & Brisset-Foucault, 2009), others summarized the activity of their association as “*a gala in the end of the year, where everyone would come in their own traditional ethnic dresses*” (Fieldnotes 2017). For others again, the association provided a place to socialize with people from the same region and a point of reference in an otherwise unknown environment. However, in the 2012 and 2014 interviews, these activities were seldom mentioned. This might be because of the low intensity in which people participated or due to a lack of probing by the researcher. Regardless of whether affiliation extends to the ethnic



group, at least it can be said that the family is among the important hubs of socializing, particularly for married women (see also chapter 14.5).

### **13.6. (Social) Media**

In the introduction to this chapter, we have already briefly mentioned TV consumption. According to the WVS, it is a quite popular pastime in Uganda. In that case the country is no exception to elsewhere; observations indicate that while leisure time has gone up, the time spent watching TV has increased as well (J. R. Kelly, 1983). And while the reception of TV content is often a social endeavor and a communicative process (Böhme, 2016, p. 241), especially if one TV set is shared with several people, in the case of our respondents it remains primarily confined to the realm of family, or a solitary activity as all of them have at least one TV in the household. Obviously, this does not exclude the possibility of them watching TV elsewhere, for example in a bar. This is quite popular, notably when watching soccer, as some respondents confirmed. However, on the nature of the setting in which TV is watched, we can only make limited observations, as this was not dwelled on much during the interviews. Regarding content, many indicated to watch primarily news, either on the national channel, but among those able to afford, BBC and CNN were popular as well. Some, mainly women, would also watch shows with religious preaching and praying.

Local or international soap operas enjoy some popularity as well. Elsewhere, their potential to shape and challenge norms and material aspirations has been pointed out (Basten, 2009; Hyll & Schneider, 2013). Certainly, this would be a worthwhile area to explore in Uganda, particularly in the context of “middle class” aspirations portrayed in these series. However, this has not been in the scope of the study here. Paying for digital TV subscription, available in different packages is a regular part of the budget and has become mandatory since the abolishment of antenna transmission. Non-payment leads to a temporary suspension of the TV service.

Among the solitary leisure, people also frequently mentioned reading books (about half of the 2014 respondents). This hobby was more prominent among the men in-

interviewed than the women. Here, self-help books and biographies of famous people were quite popular, as well as business guides. Only few indicated to read fiction. Women would more often state to read the bible, and in some cases, novels.

The presence of self-help books is also noticeable in the bookshops and among the street vendors who spread used or illegally reproduced copies out on a blanket in front of them. Topics frequently include some guidance, on becoming rich quickly, on relationship advice, or self-discipline. In the type of books chosen and the motivation expressed once again the idea of self-improvement became visible.

In contrast to these somewhat solitary media consumption stands social media interaction. Like everywhere, this has increased strongly in Uganda over the past few years. For one, there would be the Ugandan blogging community. Caroline Valois (2015) has shown how the blogosphere is used by homosexual Ugandans to overcome restrictions of the public space and provide an alternative to dominant narratives. For her, these are acts of resistance: *“Online forms [sic] are reconceptualised as sites of ‘resistance’ to hegemonic conceptions that reinforce heteronormative sexuality within the public sphere.”* (Valois, 2015, p. 150) Who is writing blogs, and who is reading them, however, is not thoroughly researched. Bearing in mind that internet coverage, especially through personal computers (needed when blogging about sensitive topics) is still confined to a minority of the population, we might assume bloggers to come from an educated, urban background. However, similarly to the civil society, the freedom the internet offers does not necessarily have to yield to an objection of the dominant discourse. The website of the Ugandan blogging community lists 34 bloggers in the areas: spirituality, food, travel, creative writing, fashion and lifestyle, and business (UgBloc Directory, 2018). Nearly half of the bloggers are found in the creative writing section (16), followed by fashion and lifestyle (9). While behind the creative writing may be a multitude of blogs, as the definition is somewhat loose, none of these blogs seems to treat any controversial issues or those that could not be dealt with in a public sphere or lifestyle magazine. Among the 23 respondents of our sample, Alex was writing a blog and Joy was planning on starting one. Both of them are at the end of their 20s,

beginning 30s, with tertiary education and belonging to the financially most stable of the interviewees. Joy intended to write her blog around issues of African hair.

“I have been doing a lot of experimentation with hair and skin; I have a facebook page which is not active yet on how to take care of our African hair. For me, I believe we can still hold our African identity because it is very hard to maintain. So I am trying out a lot of things with my hair. I want to start a blog and last round I want to actually produce, make products and sell them to people who can't really do it themselves. Using organic oils, pure avocado oils, I try to mix and see what works. I am hoping to earn some money from it in the future.”

Joy

Similarly to what Valois (2015) has noted on the LGBT bloggers, Joy, too, wants to challenge a dominant narrative, embraced by many Ugandan women: of fake or straight hair. For her, embracing and maintaining her natural curls is a way of reclaiming an African identity, in contrast to the general tendency of women to straighten their hair, to make it look more like the hair of white people, or to replace it by fake hair. We can see here opposition to dominant views influenced by Western standards. This bears a resemblance to the reiteration of “Africaness” and “African tradition” in contrast to Western modernity that has been recurrently emphasized in the Pan African Club debates.

The second interesting feature of her quote lies in her intention to turn the blog into an income generating activity, again as a desire to reach more financial stability, especially since she feels she has none so far. Intending to make money from a blog, however, is nothing unusual, as many blogs all over the world foster similar hopes of at least generating a side income – even though this is true only for a lucky few (Friedman & Calixte, 2009, p. 95).

Alex has maintained his blog over several years, although he is not posting regularly. Being himself a firm believer of Anglican denomination, a lot of his posts focus on issues of spirituality and his interpretation of the bible. He also gives his views on various national and international political issues, and, being a lawyer, sometimes on legal interpretations. He is not hesitant to pronounce his views and also openly criticizes the government, all while using his real name on his website.

In a post about rising insecurity in Kampala he notes that this is due to rising inequality and feels that primarily the middle class is suffering, as they are the “*buffer zone between the few haves and the too many and wretched have-nots.*” He states:

“Every measure should be taken to ensure equitable distribution of resources among all people in different socio-economic classes. One absolutely necessary measure is regime change, since changing those in charge of allocating public resources and devising public policies, will facilitate and ultimately translate into income re-distribution in Uganda.”

Alex on his blog [retrieved 05.01.2018]<sup>47</sup>

However, as he proceeds to demand more security, he gives a fitting example of how opposition to the current regime by a white collared lawyer with tertiary education does not necessarily come along with democratic virtues such as the respect of the rule of law:

“Plus, I call upon the people of Kampala, and Uganda at large, to revive their vigilance against such inconveniences as theft. A few years ago, it was well known that if a person is nabbed stealing in Kampala, and in most other surrounding areas, he or she (usually *hes*) would be thoroughly beaten and burnt to death with car tires. Consequently, security was very high. I am tempted to endorse and encourage the re-introduction of such radical measures. Much as I am a lawyer, well knowing the legal niceties of *presumption of innocence* and the like, when the security of my person and property is out rightly impaired, undermined and negated, then such legal niceties inevitably count for so little.”

Alex on his blog [retrieved 05.01.2018]

He has about 3000 followers. However, his site has been visited only 515 since its conception in 2015 (he lost the access to his older blog, which was active at the time of our interview in 2014 and therefore created a new one). Posts, in general, remain without comment, thus estimating the outreach of his writings to be rather limited. In addition, his output of 3-5 posts per year, with the last one being nearly one year old (in January 2018) again supports the impression that his blog is not viral. Without going into a more in-depth analysis of his posts, we find little chal-

<sup>47</sup>Citing his blog makes Alex identifiable for those who would wish to. This goes against our attempt to ensure the data is anonymized, but here we have his specific consent for using the extracts from his blog.

lenging of established norms, but instead a public diary that allows the reader to participate in the experiences and thought processes of the author and that sometimes offers some researched analysis on various topics.

Finally, there are other social media sites, easier to access and use than the setting up of a blog. Facebook is a popular site among young people, and the rising popularity of WhatsApp was particularly noticeable in the intervals of the research from 2012 to 2017. A journalist dates their popularity to around 2014. “Social media bundles”, prepaid data options that allow only for the use among social media websites make these services affordable to a large part of the urban population, given that they can afford a smartphone. WhatsApp has become an efficient mean of communication with large groups at a low price so that all kinds of gatherings and associations often have a virtual WhatsApp group as well. Similar to real life association, the nature of the group and the composition of its members do not make them equally prone to mobilization. Having participated in five WhatsApp groups over different periods of time, we were able to get an understanding of the different natures of the group, but also its similarities. One was a Christian religious group, and its members were principally praying together and sharing religious messages. Another one discussed politics of the East African region and was the only group in which the principal language used was not English but Kiswahili. It comprised members from all of East Africa and thus was not bound to Uganda. Another group was based on the association created by Ronald for the organization of the motor spare parts sector (see p. 331). The group was mainly composed of motor spare parts sellers, and he intended to use it for networking and uniting, as “*unity is strength*” (Ronald). However, members would mainly use the group to share miscellaneous information and religious messages circulating on WhatsApp, and only rarely use it for the purposes of the association. If Ronald, who was also the administrator of the group, thought there was a transgression in what somebody said, he would usually call them to order. This was mainly done in relation to politics, or when offensive content was shared. The most active group was one of entrepreneurs, who under the administration of a business consultant discussed busi-

ness opportunities and challenges of being self-employed (and its merits), but also current political affairs. We analyzed equally one chat extract from a group of a neighborhood association.

Concerning the composition of the group, it is hard to make any generalized statements, due to the anonymity of the members. The groups are rather big, some reaching close to their capacity of 250 members. Here, we will oppose mainly two groups, of the entrepreneurs and the spare part association as we have the most extensive material on both of them.

Religion was a recurrent topic in most groups, even in those with no particular religious background. It was accepted that a pastor would send daily prayers through groups not related to the topic and religious references to be made. A significant share of the messages would consist of nurturing relationships, such as wishing a good month or sharing inspiring stories, or messages that would call for being forwarded to other people. Equally, demands for contributions to burials, weddings, or the like were sometimes made. Similarly, sharing opportunities or asking for help, like getting the contact of the right people were common, and most frequent in the group of entrepreneurs. This was one of their stated purposes, and thus the group made rather good use of it. However, not all members of the group are equally active. Around 30-40 core members participate in regular discussions, others are silent or only use the platform on advertising days (restricted to the weekend). Discussions are usually light-hearted and sometimes even flirtatious between the members of opposing sexes.

Between the two groups, a difference in education is noticeable on several levels: for one, the amount and quality of the English used is higher in the entrepreneur group, whereas the other group more frequently resorts to Luganda. Secondly, much misinformation, so-called *internet hoaxes* are shared. This happens much more frequently in the association group than among the entrepreneurs, and if it happens in the latter group, the sharer of misinformation gets called out quickly, as the example below shows:

A: URGENT WARNING! Be careful not to take the paracetamol that comes written P / 500. It is a new, very white and shiny paracetamol, doctors advise that it contains "Machupo" virus, considered one of the most dangerous viruses in the world, with a high mortality rate. Please share this message, with all people on your contact list as well as family, and save a life or lives ....I've done my part, now it's your turn ... remember that God helps those who help others & themselves! Forward as received.

B: But I have been taking it since childhood 33years back so what are you talking about?

C: Perhaps u can explain further about the machupo virus

A: 33 years is not that much time, besides it's not that you have it as a meal on a daily basis. I think it's just like cancer develops over time from the things we eat. [...] I don't know either. I forwarded as received

C: These things [forwarding as received] should have stopped last year.... [...] This year we shouldn't be sharing half baked information.

D: Social media can damage one's or a business's reputation in just minutes of sharing. Let us avoid just forwarding unverified information.

WhatsApp 08.01.2018

On the contrary, misinformation in the other group usually do not get challenged or are even thanked for sharing. They would also be more likely to share salacious videos and pictures, such as of people being executed or involved in deadly accidents.

Criticism of the government happens in both groups, but among the spare part association is right away reprimanded, as the example of the person below, who shared a list of Ugandans in key government positions, all coming from the western region of the country:

A: Charles Rwomushana would call this NRA occupation...I don't know what you think. Look at this..... 1. Museveni Yoweri, president, CIC- Westerner 2. Bert Katureebe, C.J- Westerner 3. Ruhakana Rugunda, Prime Minister- Westerner 4. [...] 164. Jack Mucunguzi - O.C Makerere 166 [sic] Kuzaara Robert -O.C Kiira Division To be continued.....Are we fools Add to the list

B: MASEREKA! by posting that list on this forum you are a fool. We say UMOSTA is about unity and unity is power yet for you you are preaching division.

A: Unity is about solving problems, looking at things that divide people, things that may look different from what others do or have so please it's after having all these at table and the[n] we see how we can create peace and unity. we can't be united be united [sic] when others are suffering while others are well off so please mind your words before i shut down.

B: Don't be offended by me using the word fool. I used it because of the question at the end of your list. So what can UMOSTA do about changing the look of your list? You could have your own reservation with that list but what does it add to the UMOSTA cause? Other than sowing seeds of hatred.

In the group of entrepreneurs, such kind of remarks receive less criticism and sometimes lead to more serious conversations about the topics. Often, they are humorous comments or pictures on daily affairs. When it was revealed that the Bank of Uganda spent 125 million UGX (\$ 34 000) to buy 350 pens (Watchdog Uganda, 2017), the group was full of pictures assuming what kind of pens that could have been. The group was also vital promoting messages not to touch the constitution when the debate about the constitutional amendment was held that would remove age limit and thus allow President Museveni to run again for another term in 2021. However, while raising awareness, this was not followed by any calls for action. Moreover, as discussed before (see chapter 11.3) there were also messages circulating that showed the fear of surveillance, hence a feeling of insecurity was prevailing. In addition, the exchange of new ideas is limited because of what has become known as *filter bubbles*, or, as the journalist interviewed would say: “*The best thing about social media: you only include people that you share something with.*”



To sum up, social media and the internet have become an essential pastime activity, particularly for the younger factions of the population. We find a difference in use determined by the availability of smartphones and personal computers and also knowledge of English, as only few offers would exist in Luganda or any of the other local languages (S. Kelly, Cook, & Truong, 2012, p. 540). So while there might be some stratifying effects, still social media is available to many, as one youth councilor asserted: “*There is no any youth that can go a day without opening WhatsApp*” (Youth Councilor Kololo). And for another woman, social media nowadays has taken up the role of social gatherings, as it is used for day to day communication and even starts to replace personal contacts. Similarly, Josephine feels that

Before, we would meet with friends, but now we just chat on Skype or WhatsApp. [...] I take a really long time to meet with my friends unless they are in a bad place. Before these smartphones came, you would always make sure / [...] Even you can be in the same room, I am with my husband, and everyone is on their phone, texting.

Josephine

Indeed, and as we tried to sketch here, WhatsApp communication, the one we focused on here, is used in multiple ways. For maintaining personal contact, facilitating group meetings, sharing information deemed important among networks, as access to a vast support network, and so on. The intensity of usage seems to vary with age, but due to its convenience, particularly WhatsApp would also appeal to elderly. Thus, the 52-year-old Sarah would use WhatsApp as well to communicate with her daughter.

Examples of the Arab spring or other uprisings have shown the facilitating role of social media in mobilization (for example Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). This has not gone unnoticed by governments. Hence, the Ugandan government was keen on making social media unavailable during the last election or at the moment of uprisings, such as the Walk to Work protest or the Buganda riots (S. Kelly et al., 2012, p. 537). Indeed, in case of need, social media can reveal to be an adequate mobilizing tool. From what we have seen, however, these discussions are not used to de-

bate or shape democratic virtues or imagine alternative futures for the Ugandan society. This correlates with criticism of social media as a capable agent of change made by some. While it does indeed increase communication, the weak ties created are not strong enough to result in long-term commitment (Gladwell, 2010).

### **13.7. Friends, Families and Personal Networks**

We have already talked about networks extensively in chapter 6.4. Maintaining personal networks, arranging meetings or staying in contact with people are considered beneficial. The same applies to meeting friends; however, the number of friends and the frequency of meetings would differ from one person to another.

Friends and acquaintances play an essential role in shaping opinions. As the analysis of conscious networking has shown, most respondents use their networks to secure some financial stability or access better economic opportunities. This is especially true with more distant acquaintances and mentors. Friends can also serve as a more personal support network, as some indicated since they would call their friends in case of personal problems. However, friends are not solely made based on a rational consideration of the benefits they bring. Friendships are also established because of shared history, interest, or situation. And often the two cannot be strictly separated. All respondents confirmed that they had friends. When asked more specifically about close friends, the number would range from two to six. In general, people stated that their friends were ethnically diverse, but with similar education status, income (or they were at a level that the interviewees yet hope to attain) and in general of the same gender, due to questions of morality and appropriateness. As Nelson said: *“As a male, it is tricky to have female friends.”* How the interaction with friends took place would vary. Some would be visited at their workplace; this was especially true for shop owners who could rarely leave because that meant they had to close down their shop. Others would meet at home (especially women), and others again would go out to meet, in restaurants, bars, clubs, cafés. These outings remained privileges of the wealthier interviewees, and mainly of men or couples. In the case of Aida and Joy, there were also routinized

befriended families meeting, whereby social gatherings would take place according to a fixed schedule and would usually contain some sharing of food or drinks, and money contribution for various activities. Others again would rarely meet with their close friends because they would be too far away or too busy; instead, they would converse over the phone, WhatsApp, per mail or facebook.

Region and religion played less of a role when choosing friends; however they would gain importance when choosing a spouse, showing how they relate to more personal spheres of life. That said, however, inter-religious or inter-ethnic couples were still common and nothing that was frowned upon by society.

In the realm of family, leisure often involved traditional ceremonies such as weddings and burials, or trips to the village, for the children to “*know their roots*”. Sarah has parted on bad terms with her in-laws after her husband died; however, she still maintains contact with them so that her children know where they come from and to whom they belong. Clan affiliation gains importance in relation to questions of belonging, even for those to whom it does not matter much in daily life.

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### ***Case Story: Absent Fathers***

Andrew during a conversation once mentioned the child of his sister. His sister was left by her husband and since had struggled to bring up her child. His whole family supported her, paid for school fees, gave pocket money or paid for clothing. However, once the child was well-educated and started working, the clan from her husband came to claim the allegiance to the child. Grudgingly, they accepted, because they felt that they did not have a choice, as this is where the child belongs.

Joy was in a similar position as the child Andrew mentioned. Her father was absent for many years of her childhood, and her mother struggled to raise the children. She eventually decided to seek work in Abu Dhabi and left the children with their father. He, however, refused to take care of them; it was only through the support of a friend of her mother that they were housed and fed during that time. Her father also sold their house and when her mother eventually returned she had to start from scratch. This has left marks on Joy: “*My father never made any contribution for my*

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*education. I last saw him when I was 14 and I next saw him when I was 25, he only saw me because, maybe I was 21, I was still in university. Of course, he didn't recognize me, and he only tried to see me because he heard that one of his daughters was doing a good course at university. So he appeared out of nowhere and said oh, I'm your dad, blah, blah, blah. Of course, I am bitter and I can't lie that I can never love him again. I can't. Have I forgiven him? Yes, I let go. I talk to him, I help him even once in a while, give him some money, but love, never."*

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Many respondents harbored some resentment towards their absent fathers. Joy's example is particularly telling in the sense that albeit not having been helped, and now, in return, she has to help him, she was not willing to cut him out of her life completely. These examples show how family allegiance is persistent, regardless of the income class. It might gain in importance with age, as Spronk (2012) suggested. In her work on Kenyan young urban professionals, Spronk describes how the affiliation with the extended family is situational, with increasing age her respondents started taking up more clan responsibilities (Spronk, 2012, p. 276). Besides, advanced age and even more so the increasing likelihood of death appeals to remember one's roots (most evident in the plans of building a house in the home village for retirement or at least a plot for burial) (see Englund, 2002). This remains true also among born-again Christians (such as Joy), of whom is sometimes said to cut the ties with their families as they are replaced with their religious family. However, as others have pointed out, even these Born-again remain social beings for whom it is difficult to shut non-believers entirely out of their lives (Lindhardt, 2010, p. 266).

In addition, there can also be a change observed on how the nuclear family is viewed. Here, age seems decisive for the kind of relationship parents hoped to have with their children, with several of those in their thirties claiming that they hope to have a more affectionate and less authoritative relation with their children. Raphael, who has no children so far, intends to hug and kiss them and not send them to boarding school because he wants to be close to them. Aida, a mother of five, gave a similar reason why she did not send her children to boarding school.

“I don't want to do these mistakes. There are a lot of mistakes I saw from/ into my father. I am trying as much as possible to run away from those and / not even to run away but to strategically see that I don't commit those mistakes.”

Aida

“Of course you know they [own parents] love you but of course they won't show it. They won't give you affection; they won't hug you, they won't kiss you.”

Josephine

“I want to be a dad that listens, a hero for my children.”

Alex

Others express in the interviews how they prefer to spend time with their kids, and their desire to be close to them. The quality of the childhood experience is emphasized, often concerning family planning and the explanation why the respondents prefer a limited number of children. In its shift towards the importance of nuclear family this tendency can be considered another indicator of a growing individualization, albeit the extended family remains relevant, even if the sentiments towards the latter may be somewhat ambiguous.

\* \*

\*

Turning back to our initial question whether we can discern typical middle class leisure activity, we attempt an answer. From the empirical evidence gathered we could at least refute a correlation posed by scholars of the new social movements that people will become more concerned about postmaterial issues, once their material needs are covered (Inglehart, 1977). No clear-cut picture emerges when we look at the distribution of leisure time. We can not say, for example, that the middle income groups would be more likely to have time as a resource to mobilize, as suggested by some authors who see the middle class as proponents of democracy (see p. 69). Similarly, from the descriptions mentioned above, the richer are not per se more likely to become active on postmaterialist grounds. While we do find some of those better off becoming involved in communal activities, this is equally true for some more indigent respondents. The correlation does not seem to be that lin-

ear. There is, however, a link between the amount of money one has and what they do in their free time or for leisure:

For those who are unemployed, the distinction is not as apparent, as they might spend a big part of the day strolling around, looking for opportunities, yet not working directly. For the self-employed shop owners, who are still at the lower end of the income line, every minute not spent in their shop means a potential loss of income, leaving them with little time away from work. They do have, however, the liberty to receive friends, read, or watch TV during hours with few customers. During the interviews, this has been the most pronounced with Pamela, who has her shop open every day of the week from around 8 am to 11 pm. Sometimes her sister will take over for her, but the majority of time she is present, also doing her cooking and washing at the shop (which is linked to the room she is renting). So it is not surprising that her last outing had been two months prior to our interview.

As mentioned before, money might also become a reason for the choice whom to be friends with. The same holds true the other way around: the lack of money may lead to the loss of friends, in our case especially friends that are better off than the respondents. Elisabeth and Nelson both told how friends have become hazy to pick their calls for fear that they might ask them for money (which might not be entirely unfounded), making it virtually impossible to call just to greet. Elisabeth even explicitly said that she could not go out because she has no money, so she will sit at home or sleep during her free time: *“When you don’t have money, association is not easy.”*

Money shortage will also limit mobility because one would carefully consider each expenditure for transport. Then meeting with friends in restaurants or bars will not be an option but leisure time activities will be chosen in a way to assure that they will not cost any money, as Gordon has done by playing football once a week.

Finally, having left the state of vulnerability, people become more able to allocate a part of their budget towards leisure. This can be in the form of entrance or membership fees, but also by according themselves the luxury of buying books or films or paying for regular outings. However, there is no straightforward separation be-

tween those with money and those without. Even impoverished people may spend some money for their leisure, for example in the form of internet bundles that allow them access to social media. The amount spent, however, changes with income. Thus, we can see, as already observed elsewhere, that leisure can turn into a form of boundary work (Spronk, 2014, p. 217).

These findings are not surprising or uncommon in other contexts or countries. But they point out one of underlying factor: being socially emergent, having more time and money to spend on leisure, will affect the places one frequents, the people to be in touch with and therefore also affects with whom to create a shared identity.

## 14. Expressing and Reinforcing Attitudes through Leisure

While chapter 13 focused (in the spirit of part II) primarily on the leisure activities observed and narrated to the researcher, here, we want to take the analysis a step further and decipher some attitudes and values, which have become visible in the leisure interaction or recounting. The diversity of leisure mentioned already points at the heterogeneous nature of the groups and brings to mind the attention drawn by Neubert & Stoll (2015) on the different milieus in which members of the same income stratum can interact. Indeed, as we shall see in the analysis of the leisure activities, we find attitudes that we can attribute to certain milieus<sup>48</sup>. However, not all respondents are always equally strong inclined to the various attitudes mentioned here, and sometimes even directly opposed to it. Hence, the traits described here will most likely never appeal to all.

### 14.1. Efforts of Distinction

We could find some efforts of distinction from other groups during the fieldwork. This was for one, in the person of the rioter, depicted as the urban poor (see chapter 11.2), but also in other areas, such as the effort to network with the *right* kind of people. The most evident example witnessed, however, came from the way in which the women in the Mothers' Union repeatedly talked about their housemaids or -boys, service personnel, or guards. This was often expressed as a deep mistrust towards these people, a feeling that they would try to betray them or steal money. In the case of the maids, the members of MU warned each other that their maids would start blackmailing them (by asking for a pay rise) if they became too dependent on them. But also during interviews respondents would suspiciously watch waiters, assure that they brought the change before handing over the bill. More generally, better-off Ugandans would also frequently warn the researcher about the

<sup>48</sup>Without wanting to establish a sketch of the different milieus existing in Uganda, as Neubert & Stoll (2015) have done for Kenya.



boda boda drivers. Road safety aside, many deemed it not safe to take a driver, particularly if it was dark outside and would themselves not do so (in the case of women, mainly). These kinds of distinction came from a suspicion towards people with less income than the respondents themselves and hence focused on economic status. The reinforcement of one's financial well-being was also transcended through the use of status symbols, such as cars, smartphones or references to travels abroad. The TV consumption can equally be seen as such an effort, as respondents would name TV channels and shows with a certain prestige, mainly news or information formats, emphasizing an aspect of education. In the case of women also religious TV shows were mentioned, here appealing to a religious identity. On the other hand, telenovelas or daily soaps, albeit quite popular, were at least not mentioned, probably to the lower prestige associated with them. Other forms of distinction noticed included the speaking of Runyankole by the Mothers' Union members in their cell group. Albeit this was not excluding anyone in the ethnically homogeneous group, it did create, in the sense of Calvet a "we" and an absent "they" (Calvet, 1994). This phenomenon is not confined to economic distinction, but refers to all spheres of life: taste and behavior are determined by the habitus, which in return is shaped through the availability of different types of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). This need for distinction becomes even more pronounced with those who find themselves in proximity to the lower classes. The tendency of distinction is not specific to income groups, however. In their work on two working class neighborhoods in Great Britain, Elias and Scotson write:

"Almost everywhere members of established groups and, even more, those of groups *aspiring* [emphasis added] to form the establishment, take pride in being cleaner, literally and figuratively, than the outsiders [...]."

(Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxvii)

These efforts of distinction also help to form collective identities, precisely because of the "we" and "they" they generate. These identities in return are important factors in mobilization for common causes. In the contexts we have observed, however, they cannot easily be channeled into demands for more inclusive governance or accountability. If at all, they might give rise to small, localized and indi-

vidualized micro-contentions, in the form of individualistic demands upon the government, for marginal improvements (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 149).

## **14.2. Moral Compliance**

In lack of a better term, we shall describe here many normative prescriptions brought forward, often in the realm of religion, as moral compliance. The assertion of certain norms are used to conserve a dominant moral narrative, which at least in the leisure activities we have witnessed is not challenged but find rather widespread support. This involves the role of women, what it means to be a good Christian, wife, and mother and is principally brought forward by Mothers' Union, as we have detailed above. But it also transcends in commonly shared points of views on homosexuality or the role of women. Such a compliance functions on the division between good and bad, which, at least in discussions, is easily made; whether they are lived up to their standards in practice is another question. Because questions of morality are often backed up by the religious institutions of the country, they have political clout and can easily be mobilized around (Fichtmüller, 2014a). Here we find similarities to the Christian religious milieus described by Neubert & Stoll for Kenya (Neubert & Stoll, 2015, p. 11f). The link to the Kenyan milieus also reminds us that not all of our respondents equally exhibited these conservative tendencies. Instead, they would play a more or less central role, depending on the personal choices by the respondents.

## **14.3. African “Tradition” and Western “Modernity”**

At various points, we have seen a complex and ambiguous relationship between what is perceived as “*African*” and as “*Western*”. One of its consequences is the divide between civil society and society, which we have discussed in chapter 10.1. It is a tension, between criticizing the state of Africa today of not being like Eu-

rope, while at the same time refusing Western hegemony and imperialism and glorifying an imagined African past (see also Spronk, 2014, p. 219ff).

So, on the one side, a narrative is used blames Africans for not being at the same level of development like Europe, or other, formerly underdeveloped nations. In that context, the parallel between Singapore and Uganda was frequently drawn by respondents. Both countries apparently were at the same level of development fifty years ago, nowadays Singapore is a highly developed country while Uganda is still among the least developed countries. This is often attributed to “*African vices*”, such as illiteracy, polygamy, big families, corrupt leaders, or their belief in superstition. On the other side, Whites are accused of taking advantage of this to continue their domination over Africans.

This message, which has been circulating on WhatsApp several times during our fieldwork, illustrates this ambiguous nature:

“A White man said: ‘BLACK PEOPLE ARE STILL OUR SLAVES’. We can continue to reap profits from them without the effort of physical slavery. Their IGNORANCE is the primary weapon of containment. A great man once said, 'The best way to hide something from Black people, is to put it in a book.' They have the opportunity to read any book on any subject through the efforts of their fight for freedom, yet they refuse to read. Few read consistently, if at all. GREED is another weapon of containment. Last year Blacks spent 10 billion dollars during Christmas, out of their 450 billion dollars in total yearly income (2.22%). We can use them as our target market, for any business venture we care to dream up, they will buy into it. They function totally by greed. They continually want more, & hardly save. [...] They'll continue to show off to each other while White communities improve with the profits from our businesses that we market to them. SELFISHNESS is one of the major ways we continue to contain them. There are segments of their culture that has achieved some 'form' of success but they didn't read that the talented 10% was responsible to aid The Non-Talented 90% in achieving a better life. Instead, that segment has created another class that looks down on their people or aids them in a condescending manner. [...] They do not understand that they are no better than each other because of what they own, as a matter of fact, most of them are but one or two pay cheques away from poverty. All of which is under the control of our pens in our offices and our rooms. Yes, we will continue to contain them as long as they refuse to read, continue to

buy anything they want, and keep thinking they are 'helping' their communities by paying dues to organizations which do little other than hold conventions in our hotels. By the way, don't worry about any of them reading this, THEY DON'T READ!! -----

Prove them wrong. Please pass this on! After Reading. We MUST rise from this post traumatic slavery disorder. ”

(WhatsApp 09.04.2017)

Particularly the phrase that “*If you want to hide something from an African, put it in a book*” was mentioned several times during the discussions with respondents. The quote above also highlights the perception of the “*white man*” mentioned: scrupulous, greedy, and exploitative, but smart enough to do so, while the “*blacks*” are claimed to be too stupid to notice their exploitation, let alone rise against it. The quote also paints a rather critical picture of what can be understood as the African middle class, it decries its consumerism and selfishness, and highlights its economic vulnerability, by being “*only one or two pay cheques [sic] away from poverty.*”

At the same time a resistance towards this narrative evolves, that tries to challenge the persistent denigration of what is considered African, such as Joys effort of embracing African hair and understanding it as part of her identity. It is strongly asserted in the Pan African Club meetings, by calling for African unity and evoking a past in which Africa was not yet divided, before colonialism. At one discussion on the topic of “*The Software of Imperialism and its Effects on the African Condition*” one discussant cited a paragraph that Lord Macaulay, a member of the British Parliament allegedly said in 1835:

“I have travelled across the length and breadth of Africa and I have not seen one person who is a beggar, who is a thief, such wealth I have seen in this country, such high moral values, people of such caliber, that I do not think we would ever conquer this country unless we break the very backbone of this nation, which is her spiritual and cultural heritage and therefore I propose that we replace her old and ancient education system, her culture for if the Africans think that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their self-esteem, their native culture and they will become what we want them, a truly dominated nation”

Pan Africa Minutes

The quote has also been circulating on WhatsApp. However, as details of the quote do not line up, it is suggested to be a hoax (Mitra, 2017). Also, in an earlier version, the quote referred to India instead of Africa. The longevity of the message and its alteration to adapt to an African context are speaking, as they paint a picture of a once flourishing Africa, destroyed through colonialism, and now, albeit formally independent, dominated by their lack of self-esteem and native culture, and because they embrace everything foreign as good. Hence, there is an implicit call for precisely cherishing these traits again and refusing Western material and ideological imports. In essence, these tendencies are reflections of the general ideas of post-colonialism:

“Le postcolonialisme joue le plus souvent sur ce double registre. Celui du retour sur soi, sur le patrimoine matériel et immatériel des peuples anciennement colonisés pour le comprendre dans sa spécificité, et celui de la haine (d’ailleurs teintée de fascination) de tout ce qui d’une manière ou d’une autre est censé représenter l’Occident.”

(Zarka, 2017, p. 4)

At times, the presence of the researcher herself would trigger such a discourse. At one Pan African Club meeting, one member of the audience would deliberately speak in Luganda as a way of expressing his attitude that a white person should not be included. He however immediately got reprimanded by others who felt that he had violated another value, the much cherished Ugandan hospitality. Often in interviews the respondents, when reflecting about the role of tradition and modernity in

their lives mentioned that they embraced exposure to other ideas and influence, as long as it would not go against African values, referring to homosexuality.

“Our culture is aligning to the west, if I hadn’t been educated I would be a peasant farmer living in the village, so cultural change is good, globalization is positive and negative, but more positive. [...] Negative is that Western cultures want to make homosexuality a law here, as a religious man I feel this is not proper.”

Abdul

Spronk notices a similar tension among the young professionals whom she studied:

“The heart of the matter is that, as ‘agents of transformation’, their desire to act out a contemporary lifestyle often coincides with certain Western modes, while they also react against this so-called ‘westernization’ as new imperialism; they are therefore living a reality that is inherently contradictory. Young professionals use the concepts ‘African’, ‘Western’ and ‘traditional’ as reified notions that comprise a discursive field of practices.”

(Spronk, 2012, p. 79)

This tension might have a mobilization power<sup>49</sup>, but these efforts will rather *not* be focused on modeling a political system as it is so frequently pushed for by the West; instead, they will serve as a justification precisely for refuting Western ideas and claiming a model of “*African democracy*” or “*African solutions to African problems*”. Through this lens, we can also understand the idealization of Idi Amin, beyond the mere generational divide. Contrary to Museveni, Idi Amin is portrayed as someone who loved his people and would not act in the interest of other nations, but of Ugandans, for example by expelling the Indians. Thus, it may be turned against current leaders if they are perceived to be too close to their Western donors and too little accountable to their African populations. But it might as well become a justification for authoritarian leadership, in particular when mentioned in the context of authoritarian “success stories”, such as Rwanda or Ethiopia (see Cheeseman, 2018; Collier, 2010; Routley, 2014, p. 164ff). Again, this contradiction was not present among all respondents in the same manner, suggesting, once more, the presence of different milieus among the respondents.

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<sup>49</sup>However, from what we have observed, the activity remains restricted to the realm of discussion, not translating itself into any political action.

## **14.4. The Need for Security**

The need for security was also among the recurrent themes. Manifested in the prayers of the Watoto cell group, the discussions about insecurity among Mothers' Union, the setting up of and paying for various initiatives to maintain the security in different neighborhoods, the illiberal stance taken by Alex on his blog if he feels his own security is threatened, or the frequent warnings issued from Ugandans concerning their less well-off compatriots, the need describes a general sentiment of mistrust. Insecurity is strongly related to economic inequality (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002), and if the prevailing feeling is that insecurity has risen, it may be because income inequality has become more visible. This, in turn, may increase instability, as the tunnel-effect, discussed below, suggests (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). As we have already seen, this need for security is for one translated into accrued efforts to stabilize their own economic position. It can also be expressed as a need for political stability, even if this comes at the expense of democracy (Neubert & Daniel, 2014, p. 156). In our cases, this was expressed when respondents said the only expectations they had of the government was to provide stability and a safe environment for them to act.

## **14.5. Retreat into the Private Sphere**

What has been a thread that crossed several accounts of leisure is a retreat into the private sphere. This can be seen in the importance attributed to the family or the clan, often manifested in the attendance of social functions, but also in the relevance gained for the nuclear family. Here, the personal life cycles play a role, as the time allocated to the nuclear family will depend on the needs of the children, and will be more significant for the mothers than the fathers. Thus, especially for women, the family is an important social hub for leisure. But also solitary leisure, such as certain sports, reading, or watching TV are signs of this retreat. The private sphere does not necessarily have to be solitary nor does this mean that it cannot

take place in public (jogging or swimming could be such examples, as they require a public place to exercise them for most people), but rather that the individual by carrying out these activities only interacts with a very limited number of people. This brings to mind warnings of the erosion of social capital and civic trust, that may turn out to be detrimental to democracy, such as in the theses advanced by Putnam (2000), which received much attention at its time of publication, in 1995. However, while critics point out, among other theoretical and empirical problems of his study<sup>50</sup>, that he fails to account for shifting forms of associational activity (Norris, 2007) our own brief analysis finds little evidence of activities that would allow building social trust going beyond religious or family connections. Authors like Giddens (1998) or Beck (2002) argue that an individualized lifestyle actually contributes to the demise of social class as an identity. However, in our case it remains doubtful, whether we can talk of a social class to begin with; hence there should not be too much interpretation into its demise through an individualized lifestyle.

#### **14.6. Focus on Self-Improvement and Self-Efficacy**

In an institutional environment that provides little support, solutions are sought outside the public realm because the latter seems dysfunctional (e.g., private schools, private health, private transport, etc.). The same applies to leisure, triggered by the absence of leisure structures provided by the state (such as playgrounds or parks), and the privatization of public services (such as paying the police to focus more on a specific neighborhood). In such a setting, self-efficacy becomes a crucial value. It becomes apparent for example in the belief that one will make it, as long as they are hard-working enough, if they *hustle*. Hence, the solution lies within the individual and can be sought through self-improvement. By being hard-working, punctual, focused. This, on the other hand, takes responsibility away from other actors, such as the state. Thus, a blogger challenged his readers to employ at least five Ugandan youth, who would otherwise turn to criminal activi-

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<sup>50</sup>For an exhaustive critique of Putnam's work see Helmbrecht (2005).



ties. He remarks: *“The criticism of poor service delivery and compromised quality may exist but it is our duty to help our people get better.”* (Wire, 2018) One discussant at the Pan African Club pointed out: *“[...] today, the State restricts itself to creating an enabling environment and then it is individuals to take care of their welfare.”* This attitude is also reflected in the answers of the respondents, with many claiming the government has no role in their lives, or only a restricted one, as provider of security and sometimes macroeconomic stability.

Hofstede (1984) shows how in individualistic societies individual success, achievements, and self-actualization are relevant. These values, typically found in capitalist societies, become prominent here among the respondents with a focus on their self-improvement, particularly among the entrepreneurs. However, in Uganda this focus does not, for many, replace the feeling of responsibility for the extended family; hence it cannot be interpreted as a sign of growing individualism.

To be more self-efficient, self-improvement is sought, for example in the form of self-help books, or counseling groups and advice giving, such as in the Mothers' Union. Also, a focus on health issues and sports aimed at improving fitness can be read in such a light. Hence, Abbas in her study observes that for example even bodily defects are relegated to the individual responsibility because through running the individuals should be able to overcome them (Abbas, 2004, p. 161)

Such a belief in one's self-efficacy is particularly present among the entrepreneurs' WhatsApp group but has also been manifested in the Watoto cell group, with the difference that in the latter self-efficacy can be increased through praying. Also, it has translated into very concrete actions, in the case of the motor spare parts association (see the case story on p. 331) and the neighborhood initiative (see p. 389). In both cases, the respondents felt that the government would not act on their behalf and thus decided to become active themselves. However, as the case of the neighborhood initiative has shown, while it used to be efficient in the beginning, constraints made it difficult to maintain. In the case of the spare parts association, the effectiveness of the efforts remains to be seen, as the retail sellers have to be convinced to buy items at a higher price for the sake of expelling Chinese whole

and retail sellers from the market. While an industrial policy would have made this choice for the individuals, in the present set up, the retail sellers have to make every time a conscious choice against a short-term gain (buying at a lower price) for the sake of an uncertain, long-term goal. Despite these uncertainties, however, Richard and his colleagues were willing to mobilize for this effort, investing considerable amounts of time and money to convince other traders nationwide, due to their belief in their self-efficacy. Such an attitude is guarded by the belief that one can make it from rags to riches, only through their efforts. Hirschman & Rothschild have pointed out that in an atmosphere of economic growth an initial euphoria exists, as people wait for the growth to reach them. They liken this to being stuck in a tunnel in a traffic jam. If the other lane moves, one will first be happy and await their turn. If this is not happening (since the growth might not be inclusive), it creates frustration and leads to risky maneuvers to change lane and be among those who move (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973). For the authors, this results in a changing tolerance for income inequality during times of economic growth and can ultimately affect political stability. Although, the authors concede that the model is not apt to make predictions, as circumstances vary too much from one context to another (Hirschman & Rothschild, 1973, p. 556). We would add here, that the focus on the individual may also lead towards greater efforts of self-improvement, as the failure to advance in the lane is not sought in the structural conditions but rather the individual merits, and as such ultimately undermining demands for political change. In our observation, maybe the precarious situation of many youths could challenge this narrative of self-improvement. In an environment in which a university degree cannot promise the job security of salaried employment, calls for state accountability are voiced. Here, the government is perceived as having failed to provide the necessary conditions. The government, on the other hand, is quick to return this criticism and blame it once more on individual efforts, as these people are “*job seekers, not job creators*”, a narrative well-internalized by many, even among the youth.

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Admittedly, this list of attitudes is not exhaustive and the nature in which the data was collected aleatory. We agree with Martin on this challenge that he described concerning his unidentified political objects:

“Qui peut prétendre avoir lu toute la littérature, entendu tous les discours, écouté toutes les musiques, assisté à toutes les fêtes et sur quelle période de temps ? On peut, en revanche, tenter par empathie et imagination théorique de tirer le meilleur parti de moyens limités. Cela est pas toujours très satisfaisant ; cela pourtant permet avancer collectivement ; à condition que les limites un tel travail soient clairement énoncées et il soit entendu il ne peut jamais être vraiment achevé.”

(D.-C. Martin, 1989, p. 814)

These randomly gathered observations, however, have the merit to give us an insight into very different milieus, and, derived from this, different values, that exist among the middle income groups. Yet, strikingly, in the areas explored, while we do find criticism of the government and the current political conditions, we do not find any discussion around alternative visions for the political future of Uganda and no real challenge of the status quo. In some instances, these challenges are immediately reprimanded by others, by using a narrative that emphasizes unity over division (through different points of view on politics) and stability over instability. While part III has looked at the “explicit” forms of social mobilization, the ones that are depicted in our representation as the more institutionalized ones (see p. 105) in this part we focused more on the implicit forms, the “*mundane practices*” (Bayat, 2013a, p. 17) and the “*free spaces*” (Polletta, 1999) to get an idea on the values that emerge, the ties that are fostered, the dominant views that are challenged ... or not. Our findings show what critics of a glorification of civil society or Putnam’s social capital have pointed out: not all social capital (to remain with Putnam’s words) will be used in a sense that it is inherently positive for democratic advancement (Helmbrecht, 2005, p. 65f). In a similar vein, discussing politics is not equal to political action, even though it may be a critical step towards it. We find a discourse that embraces stability and individual advancement rather than un-

certainty and more inclusive governance. It is possible that a discourse challenging the dominant narratives exists, hidden, confined to the very intimate realm or held in local languages and that it has remained undetected in our research. On the other hand, identities that evolve around ethnicity and religion manifest themselves and still maintain a high potential for mobilization. From our analysis, we can state that we found little evidence that the middle income groups in Uganda are concerned to contribute to the democratic advancement of the country, especially not as a social class. We find discontent, and withdrawal and lowering expectations into the state. We have also seen that a similar socio-economic position does not in itself structure interests, as these positions are heterogeneous, too, and the strategies of differentiation hinder one clear-cut identity from emerging, and ultimately for the advocacy of common interests. Thus, these interests fail to provide a viable, commonly shared, alternative vision of the state and society in Uganda.

## **Conclusion**

When the recent debate about the African middle classes picked up momentum, it raised so many hopes. That Africa has finally left poverty to catch up with the rest of the world, that the Africans with newly acquired wealth would be eager to translate their status into material possessions and thus turn the continent into a promising market for consumer products at a time when consumption in other parts of the world has stalled, and that these middle classes, due to their education and their embracing of civil values would finally demand their authoritarian governments to become more democratic. The label “middle class” seemed seductive, a promising prescription for Africa’s woes. Now, eight years later, these hopes still seem unfulfilled and the “African middle class” is slowly losing its magic aura. In the realm of the economists, who brought the topic to the fore, its validity is being questioned now (Rosen, 2015). The political scientists, anthropologists and African scholars who remain dedicated to the subject caution its use (Daniel, Müller, Stoll, & Öhlschläger, 2016; Melber, 2016c; O’Kane, Kroeker, & Scharrer, 2017). This work has positioned itself in a similarly cautious way by proposing a qualitative microanalysis of the lives of those who are supposed to belong to this African middle class and particularly to see whether there are any indications that they could fulfill the democratic expectations projected on them by some authors. We have deliberately chosen, for one, a country that is not one of the top African economies, but a rather “average” performer, and second, an approach where we tried to capture the diversity of those united under the middle class label, instead of focusing on one smaller subgroup or community. The result is a sometimes miscellaneous collection of life stories, living conditions, and leisure. While this has made the analysis at times challenging, to us, however, it accurately depicts the story behind the “African middle class”: a label merely uniting an agglomeration of individual situations, but not a self-conscious collectivity. This is not to say that similar socio-economic dispositions will not give rise to similar positions, or life chances, as Weber has termed it (Weber, 2002, p. 632). In our analysis in part II,

we have shown that we can witness indeed similar patterns, such as the tendency to mitigate the own financial vulnerability, and the possibility of choice: for better housing, better education, different means of transport, cooking or banking. However, two points need to be retained here: first, the structuring effect of available income in itself does not allow speaking of a class. Instead, we witness here an economic income stratum (hence, our choice to describe our sample as the middle income groups), from which we cannot deduct any other typical characteristics, such as the embodiment of liberal values, or a particular modernist or Western orientation. Second, and in relation to this, these differences that arise from their socio-economic position do not make their goals fundamentally different from other, particular lower socio-economic groups, it merely gives them different or better capacities to pursue the goal. If we take education as an example: it is often said that the middle class particularly values education, and our data seems to confirm this. Yet, this is equally true for the poorest among our sample; simply their means for turning this value into something tangible for themselves or their children are much more limited. Thus, what may make these middle income groups different from their less fortunate compatriots is the possibility of choice. This, however, is not best depicted within the rigid boundaries of class. It does not reflect reality to assume that there are no choices for the poor and that once someone is middle class options become many. Instead, such changes are much more gradational and grow as income grows.

Interests, ambitions, attitudes and values are not solely determined by income, even though this might play a role as well. They are equally dependent on the age, gender, profession, education, biographic background, ethnicity, religion, as well as the local political, historical, and societal context. And this list is most likely not even exhaustive yet. As a result, any attributes given to such a vastly heterogeneous group can either only be so broad and unspecific that they provide little additional explicative value, or so generalized that they fail to paint a realistic picture.

Thus, in response to our first research question, we can state that our data suggest that the recent economic transformations did not lead to the development of a self-conscious collectivity. Maybe this is merely a question of time and an iteration over several generations. At the moment, the number of people positively affected by economic upward mobility is still, compared to the entire Ugandan population, insignificant, and many of them remain at the risk of downward mobility. Hence, we find that the people are very much concerned with mitigating their financial vulnerability, by diversifying their income and constructing social safety nets, while at the same time upholding financial obligations towards the less wealthy parts of their social networks, often extended families from rural areas. Therefore, we cannot observe processes of boundary work particularly towards lower classes because at the same time the widespread family relations still bridge these boundaries.

After having refuted the existence of a self-conscious middle class collectivity in Uganda, the second question, whether we can observe specific forms of political activity seems somewhat redundant. How can a group that does not exist as an entity have its specific forms of mobilization? However, the answers are nevertheless revealing because they bring to the fore some mechanisms that push people into activism, or on the contrary prevent them from doing so. The attempt to shine a light on the process of how these middle income groups contribute to democracy also has the merit of questioning mechanisms that are too often only implied when the link between democracy and middle class is suggested. How exactly does a middle class advance democracy? By solely thinking that democracy is “good”? By wanting free and fair elections and the rule of law? But what is done to make these desires come true in an environment which is apparently not conducive? By demanding more accountability from the state (Birdsall, 2007, p. 599)? How can an undemocratic state be held accountable? How does regime transition come about? Through protest, revolution, reform? There is more than one answer to these questions and they always strongly depend on the context. But they are worth being asked.

We attempted an answer by looking at different levels that can influence the mobilization of an individual. While only very few individuals eventually participate in a social movement, we believe that all these levels have a substantial impact, because they push the individuals away or draw them into social movements. In general, we can say that we have seen little indication that the middle income groups were particularly likely to promote a democratic transition. Dobry, in his critique of the “*transitology*” has pointed out that the scholars who studied the political transitions towards democracy had a tendency to neglect the negative results, i.e., the countries in which such a transition did not happen, even though they might be the most revealing (Dobry, 2000, p. 588). In a similar vein, we believe that our “negative” conclusion is revealing as well. On the one hand, we found reflections of wider societal discourses about the value of political stability over conflict, but also strong criticism of the regime among the respondents. Albeit never shared by all, these views allowed us to make some generalizations about political protest and what mainly deterred people from participating. Here the analysis of the major protests that Uganda has seen in the past ten years, through the reflection of the respondents has been useful to bring to these “middle income group” views to the fore. And these views have revealed a divide that does not follow class lines but turns around generations. Older generations are more critical of protest and more likely to credit the current regime for upholding peace and stability than younger generations, who have not witnessed the civil war and do not know any regime other than the current one. Such observations reveal once again the diversity within the middle income groups which are not solely differentiated through income, but other factors as well. This heterogeneity was even more visible among the leisure activities of the respondents, where we have been able to discern, what Neubert & Stoll (2015) have called different milieus. However, these observations are in its infancies in our case, and the data cannot be developed into a full-fledged typology of different milieus. These findings show once again that we do not deal with a homogeneous entity, but rather with a multitude of individual actors.



Again, maybe this is merely a question of time and size; maybe the middle income groups in Uganda need to become numerically stronger and maybe enter into a second or third generation to replace vertical ties with horizontal ones, that they will draw boundaries with other classes and create allegiance within their own. So maybe, once they are numerically strong enough, they will truly be willing and capable of demanding more accountability and democracy from the state. However, from what we have observed now, these are by no means any automatism that will be triggered once “critical thresholds” are reached. For now, we have no indication that “being in the middle” will substantially alter the way how people estimate their capacities to demand change. It does have, however, an effect on what to expect from the state and how to cope with its deficiencies. This refers to an aspect already mentioned above: the possibility for the middle income groups to choose, and therefore, to “opt out” if they consider it suitable. We find that a general, prevailing sentiment consists of expecting little from the state<sup>51</sup>, mainly to provide security and stability – which it does, even if this is happening through coercion and a powerful, authoritarian framework. Here another important aspect concerning the democratic demands of the middle classes becomes visible: the status quo in the current regime. If a regime, like in the Ugandan case, is not democratic, but stable, it remains uncertain if large parts of the middle income groups are willing to trade this stability for the uncertainty of a potential conflict. As shown above, this is even more exacerbated among older generations who have already lived through such times of uncertainty.

Hence, for many members of the middle income groups, it seems more accessible to “opt out”, and to seek solutions in the private realm. This becomes obvious in the choice for private education, healthcare schemes (partially, this coverage is far from common among the middle income groups, seen as “*gambling*” as one respondent called insurance, since you may pay but not need it after all) and a

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<sup>51</sup>However, expectations of the state depend on much more than solely its performance. What a state is supposed to deliver and what not is shaped once again by national and historical factors, and differ even among Western nations, as Esping-Andersen (1990) has shown. The question of the state in Africa and its legitimacy has been topic of extensive academic debate, one we do not intend to extend here. In the case of Uganda, even the question of security and justice (Baker, 2006) or market regulation (Monteith, 2016) are sometimes fulfilled by other actors. This does not necessarily have to be coupled with a loss of legitimacy if the citizens do not expect the state to perform these functions.

shared feeling of self-efficacy. Narratives like being hard-working move the responsibility of wealth creation towards the individuals. Someone remains poor because they are idle or a job-seeker instead of a job-creator. Thus, the poor are at fault, rather than a state that fails to create the necessary environment.

Lowered expectations of the state, together with an authoritarian environment that sanctions political opposition do not provide positive motivation for political action. Instead, goals are set on an individual basis with responsibility for the close social networks but not society as a whole<sup>52</sup>.

The turn towards individual circumstances becomes visible when we look at the forms of mobilization that do exist. Since most of the respondents were not politically active, we turned to the private activities of leisure. Leisure has the potential to show motivation of people that might happen prior to political mobilization. It gives an indication of the milieus people frequent, and from this observation, we might deduce whether these milieus are conducive to a discourse that supports mobilization for democratic change, indifferent, or maybe even explicitly de-mobilizing. Our results have shown that the respondents turn towards the family and close friends for the exchange of ideas and problem-solving. They gather in community groups, savings cooperations, meet with religiously like-minded people or their ethnic peers, they embrace some values and refute others. Moreover, the groups frequented and the values embraced change even within the middle income groups, showing its internal heterogeneity. While they are structured through disposable income, they are not solely determined by it, making class boundaries less distinct and other boundaries, such as religious affiliation, age or gender more visible.

Hence, we can answer our second research question by suggesting that there are no specific forms of political activity pursued by the middle income groups. Instead, individual actors pursue individual interests. They retreat into the private sphere and focus on self-help and self-efficacy. Networks are of great importance in solving problems and its construction and maintenance is something the respondents consciously pursue. These personal connections allow circumventing institutional

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<sup>52</sup> Here we find a distinction from the urban poor, who do not have the means to seek solutions elsewhere and therefore pressure the state for particularized improvements through localized, small-scale upheavals (Branch & Mampilly, 2015, p. 149).

structures, and they are not randomly distributed across the society. Better education and higher income will open different doors, as the example of the STON meetings have shown. Thus, once more we can witness how a higher position within the income groups opens the possibility for more *choice* of options to pursue, or people to contact.

Therefore, we can say that our material shows that these middle income groups are a mass capable of acting, who have learned to play according to the “rules of the game”, by respecting the political opportunity structure, and who form their lives with what they have. We have not seen, however, any elaborations of alternative visions that would seriously challenge the status quo and insist on more democracy.

Apparently, if sought for, it is possible to detect a politically active milieu among the middle income groups, but such a milieu is far from constituting a majority. And neither are the middle income groups at the core of these mobilizations. Which finally raises the question whether observations of middle class implication in protest are not prone to a particular bias. Studies have shown that higher income increases political participation in leadership roles (Verba et al., 1987, p. 290). Hence, the analysis may have a distorting effect, simply because certain groups of middle class people are the most visible in protest. Yet, such an analysis may neglect the majority of people who choose to remain at home, and the diversity of the groups who are protesting. Therefore, O’Boyle already suggested in 1966, to use middle class as an explanation for change only in the long-term perspective:

“To describe [...] long-term changes [...], the term ‘middle class’ can be justified as economical and accurate. The question probably reduces itself to a matter of time perspective. It is when shorter periods of time are involved that ‘middle class’ becomes, not wrong, but simply unhelpful because it obscures the complex relations among the various groups within the middle class.”

(O’Boyle, 1966, p. 827)

With his observations O’Boyle adequately describes the challenges that we have run into during our effort to analyze the forms of mobilization of the Ugandan middle income groups. On the other hand, such long-term perspectives – and O’Boyle

talks of periods between 50 and 100 years – will be even more prone to the distortions just mentioned. This raises the question whether a positive link between middle class and democracy can only be established by historians? Nevertheless, we hope that this work has succeeded in contributing to the contemporary debate by unveiling and questioning the trends that govern the current middle class discussion.

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**11. Who paid for your school fees**

	parents	extended family	myself	sponsor	government	other
in SS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
in higher education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**12. Which religion do you practice?**

- None 1
- Catholic 2
- Muslim 3
- Anglican 4
- Born Again 7
- African traditional 6
- other 9

**13. How often do you attend church/mosque?** \_\_\_\_\_ per Year Month Week**14. What is your main job?** \_\_\_\_\_**15. Your status?**

- employee 1
- civil servant 2
- self-employed 3
- jobless 4
- retired 5

**16. Do you have**

	yes	no
another job	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
other sources of income	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
other working members in your household	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**17. Amount income 1** \_\_\_\_\_**18. Amount income 2** \_\_\_\_\_**19. Amount income 3** \_\_\_\_\_**20. Amount income 4** \_\_\_\_\_**Your Childhood**

21. What was your father's job (when active) \_\_\_\_\_

22. What was your mother's job (when active) \_\_\_\_\_

**23. What was their status**

	employee	civil servant	self-employed	jobless
father	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
mother	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**24. What was their education**

	primary	O-Level	A-Level	university	other	none
father	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
mother	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**25. Where did you live as a child?**

<input type="checkbox"/> countryside	1
<input type="checkbox"/> small town	2
<input type="checkbox"/> big city	3

**26. How do you judge the economic condition of your family, while you were growing up?**

<input type="checkbox"/> poor	1
<input type="checkbox"/> fair	2
<input type="checkbox"/> well off	3

**Your Children****27. What is your priority for your children** \_\_\_\_\_**28. Where do your children go to school?**

<input type="checkbox"/> private	1
<input type="checkbox"/> public	2
<input type="checkbox"/> other _____	3

**29. Cost per month per child in USD** \_\_\_\_\_**30. Who else do you pay school fees for? How much?** \_\_\_\_\_**Consumption and Expenditure****31. How do you judge your income?**

<input type="checkbox"/> low/small	1
<input type="checkbox"/> enough	2
<input type="checkbox"/> more than enough	3

**32. Do you have**

	yes	no	details
a bank account	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
pending loans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
some investments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
manage to save some money	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

**33. if yes, do you save**

- on a bank account
- with a club/society
- mobile money
- other system

**34. What are your main shopping places for**

	on the street	small shop	shopping mall	local markets	abroad	small supermarket
food	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
clothes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
appliances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
cosmetics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
technology	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**On average, how much do you spend per month on**

- 35a. rent** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35b. electricity/water** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35c. food** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35d. ITC** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35e. transport** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35f. loans/savings** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35g. health** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35h. househelp** \_\_\_\_\_
- 35i. support** \_\_\_\_\_

**36. How many meals do you have per day?** \_\_\_\_\_

**37. How often do you eat meat?** \_\_\_\_\_

**38. What is your main transport mode?**

- car 1
- by foot 2
- special hire 3
- taxi 4
- bike/moto 5
- Boda boda 6

## Leisure

39. Please check the frequency in which you engaged in the following activities in the past two months

- |                                     |            |                          |                          |                          |                          |                          |            |
|-------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------|
| a) watching television              | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| b) reading books for pleasure       | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| c) using the internet               | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| d) WhatsApp                         | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| e) Facebook                         | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| f) playing team sports              | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| g) doing an individual sport        | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| h) going on a family outing         | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| i) going out (drinks/entertainment) | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |
| j) attending a cultural function    | very often | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | not at all |

40. In which groups in social media are you active?

41. For each type of group or association, please indicate whether you are:

	active member	inactive member	former member	never been a member
investment/ saving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
religious	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
cultural	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
sport	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

42. On average, how many hours per week do you spend on leisure?

\_\_\_\_\_

43. As rough estimate, how many Ugandan shillings per month do you spend on leisure? (Including transport costs, bills in restaurants and bars, membership fees, entry fees, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**Political Views**

**44. Do you/ Did you**

	yes	no	which party
have a party membership card	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
have interest in politics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
trust the current political leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
vote in the last presidential election?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
plan on voting in the next presidential election?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____

**Please rate for the following protests whether you actively participated; supported, but not participated; had no opinion; opposed it somewhat; strongly opposed it**

- 45a. Mabira Forest Protest      actively participated ---- strongly opposed
- 45b. Buganda Riots              actively participated ---- strongly opposed
- 45c. Walk to Work                actively participated ---- strongly opposed
- 45d. Black Monday                actively participated ---- strongly opposed
- 45e. Other \_\_\_\_\_            actively participated ---- strongly opposed

**46. Who do you turn to when you have a problem that needs to be solved?**

**47. How do you see today's society in Uganda?**

	yes	no	where do you locate yourself
Do you think there is a middle class in Kampala?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Are you part of it?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Do your friends have the same lifestyle as you?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
And your family?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

## **Annex 2**

### **Interview Guideline 2012**

Thank you very much for agreeing to make this interview with you. Through these interviews I want to learn more about whether a middle class exists in Uganda and their relation to politics. So before I will ask you some more statistical questions and then let's get into deeper discussion.

The informations you provide will rest purely confidential, only I have access to the data. I'm not here to judge and there are no wrong answers, as I am interested in your special point of view.

So, do you have any questions before we start?

Let me just ask you: do you mind if I record this interview. It will help me afterwards to analyze what you said?

#### INTERVIEWGUIDE

Thank you, you already gave some very insightful answers. Now I'm interested in some more detail. Let us start with your personal life. Can you tell me...

1. How pleased are you with your situation?
2. What, if anything, helps you achieve the goals you have?
3. And what, if anything, hinders you?
4. What role, if any, plays the government in your personal life? *Corruption?*
  
6. How pleased are you with the work of the government? (*good things/bad things*)
7. What is your opinion on political parties? *The opposition, Kiiza Besigye*
8. What do you think about the institutions in your country? *Parliament, ministries, university, military, court, police, media*  
Any other institutions?
9. What's your opinion on democracy? (*probe: and in Uganda*)
10. What do you think about elections? (*probe: and in Uganda, debate on term limits*)  
*So, who for you would be the best president?*
11. How do you see the role of the kingdoms in the country? (*more or less power?*)
  
12. Tell me about the political situation in your country! How did it evolve during the last five years?
13. How do you judge the next five years?



14. What, if anything should change?  
*If even the opposition in power will not change anything: what can be done about this?*  
*How can change be achieved?*
15. What do you think about political activism? (*Activists for Change*)
16. So, what did you think about the “walk to work”?
17. How would you define yourself in this regard?
18. What political activities do you pursue? (*political parties, demonstrations, speaking out in the streets, riots...*)  
*Why/Why not?*
19. Why, if ever, have you taken part in a demonstration? When? Why/Why not?
20. What about participation in a strike? When? Why/Why not?

Thank you very much for your helpful information. We are nearly done. Just some last general questions in the end.

21. What motivates you in life?
22. What do you fear?
23. What do you wish for the future of the country?

## **Annex 3**

### **Interview Guideline 2014**

Thank you very much for your participation in this interview. As I told you, I intend to find out about the recent social and economic transformations in Uganda and how they have changed peoples lives, the opportunities they brought but also the difficulties they encountered. During the interview I would like to discuss about your life trajectory in general, your current situation, but also your attitudes and values, and your vision of society and politics in Uganda. The interview should take about one hour. The information you give will be strictly confidential, I will not mention any names anywhere. However, to make analysis easier for me, would it be OK for you if I record our discussion?

General	Specific	Details, Remarks	Probing
<b>Please give me some general biographic information</b>		Age, religion, family situation, ethnicity	Can you expand a little on this?
<b>Tell me about your life trajectory, maybe starting from childhood</b>			
Childhood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Place of growing up</li> <li>• Work of parents</li> <li>• Economic situation at home</li> <li>• schooling</li> <li>• Trajectory, spatial mobility</li> </ul>	Difficulty to pay school fees Within UG and K'LA	Can you tell me anything else?  Can you give me some examples
<b>Please, tell me about your life now. How did you reach where you are now?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What life chances/opportunities</li> <li>• What life shocks</li> <li>• What are your aspirations in life</li> </ul>	Difficulty to reach, optimistic, pessimistic?	
<b>Can you describe to me your current living conditions</b>			
Living conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where</li> <li>• What type</li> <li>• Rent or property</li> <li>• infrastructure</li> <li>• Household equipments</li> </ul>	Apartment, house, etc.  Condition of roads, electricity, water access  What, for how long, functioning or not, how often use it	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial mobility</li> </ul>	How long have you lived there? Where before? Conditions?	
Job and income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main source of income</li> <li>• What jobs before?</li> <li>• Other jobs?</li> <li>• Other sources of income</li> <li>• Assets you own</li> </ul>	<p>How much, how long have you had it, how got it</p> <p>How much, how long have you had it, how got it</p> <p>Formal, informal</p> <p>Cattle, land</p> <p>Changes over the last years</p>	<p>Anything else</p> <p>Anything else</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Job of partner</li> <li>• Any other source of income of the partner</li> <li>• Who depends on your income</li> <li>• How do you manage household expenditure distribution</li> <li>• Satisfaction with income/sufficient</li> </ul>	Who pays for what	<p>Can you expand a little on this?</p> <p>Can you tell me anything else?</p> <p>Can you give me some examples</p>
	<b>How is your general economic condition? Please explain in detail.</b>		Changes over the last years
Economic condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of money</li> <li>• Safety nets/personal securities</li> <li>• Expectations from extended family</li> </ul>	Bank account, loans, savings, donations	<p>anything else</p> <p>Can you expand a little on this?</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expectations of extended family</li> </ul>		Can you tell me anything else?
Consumption and spending	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budget distribution</li> <li>• Spending of money</li> <li>• Consumer goods</li> </ul>	<p>Rent, health, education, transport, food</p> <p>What, where, how often, utility or pleasure</p> <p>Car, telephone, electronic appliances, how many,</p>	Can you give me some examples

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eating habits</li> <li>• Use of computer, Internet, telephone</li> <li>• Media exposure</li> </ul>	<p>what type, when bought (for the first time or not)</p> <p>How often, what on a regular day, special treats (how often)</p> <p>How much do you spend on it</p>	
<b>Please, tell me in as much detail as possible what do you do when you have free time?</b>			
Leisure time and socialization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What do you do?</li> <li>• How often?</li> <li>• What kind of people?</li> <li>• Who do you meet with regularly apart from close family and colleagues</li> </ul>	<p>meeting friends, neighbors, go out in bars, clubs, sport, social engagement, political engagement, visiting relatives, part of an association, visiting communal centers (youth clubs, church centers, etc.), visiting events, concerts, theater, museums, church, trade unions</p> <p>How often? Tell me more about these people: age, gender, religion, ethnicity, social status What do you do, what issues do you discuss</p>	<p>Tell me more about that</p> <p>Anything else?</p> <p>Other contacts? (not personally, but regularly) Diaspora</p>
<b>Now let's talk a little bit about your attitudes and values. What do you value?</b>			
Attitudes and Values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family values</li> <li>• Role of religion</li> <li>• Role of culture</li> <li>• Role of traditions</li> <li>• Role of men and women</li> <li>• What should an ideal partnership look like for you?</li> <li>• Role of ethnic identity</li> <li>• Role of education</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p>In how far do these views differ from or correspond with the views of your partner? Your parents? Other family members? Friends?</p>	<p>Can you expand a little on this?</p> <p>Can you tell me anything else?</p> <p>Can you give me some examples</p>

<b>How do you see today's society in Uganda?</b>			
View of Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evolution over the last 15 years</li> <li>• Community prosperity now and then</li> <li>• Prospects about the future</li> <li>• Existence of a middle class</li> <li>• Where do you see your own position in society?</li> </ul>	<p>How would you define it?</p> <p>Differentiation with other classes</p>	<p>Can you expand a little on this?</p> <p>Can you tell me anything else?</p> <p>Can you give me some examples</p>
<b>How do you see today's politics in Uganda</b>		Opinion on political issues, satisfaction with democracy in the country	
View of politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interest in public matters</li> <li>• Approval with government</li> <li>• Trust in political leaders</li> <li>• Own political participation</li> <li>• Contact with public officials</li> <li>• Expectations of the state</li> </ul>	<p>Elections (who did you vote for), party affiliation</p> <p>Local government councilor, MP, govt official, political party official → how often, when, why</p> <p>Attitude towards welfare state</p>	Anyone else?
<b>To finish off with, let us talk a little bit about your self-perception. In what terms would you describe yourself?</b>		"I am ..." "I feel like a ..."	
<b>Thank you for your valuable insights. We have covered a vast range of topics. Now, before concluding, is there anything that you would want to add, that you consider to be relevant?</b>			

## **Annex 4**

### **List of Income-Groups Interviews**

<b>N°</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Alias</b>	<b>Tran-script*</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Matrimo-nial status</b>	<b>N° of children</b>	<b>of Education</b>	<b>Job</b>	<b>Income**</b>	<b>AfDB Category</b>
I 1	2012	Michael	yes	male	36	married	2	tertiary	program officer	540	UMC
I 2		Janet	yes	female	30	cohabiting	1	tertiary	human resources	62,5	FC
I 3		Jesca	yes	female	37	married	3	tertiary		267	LMC
I 4		Mark	yes	male	41	cohabiting	2	tertiary	IT project management	600	UMC
I 5		Musa	yes	male	43	married	5	tertiary	student	348	UMC
I 6		Judith	yes	female	36	married	4	tertiary	economic officer	260	LMC
I 7		Denis	yes	male	36	married	3	tertiary	businessman	59	Poor
I 8		Samuel	yes	male	31	cohabiting	0	tertiary	businessman	110	FC
I 9		Susan	yes	female	62	married	5	tertiary	senior officer	103	FC
I 10		Doreen	yes	female	34	single	2	tertiary	lawyer	1233	UC
I 11		Justine	yes	female	27	single	0	tertiary	cashier		
I 12		Salome	yes	female	32	married	1	tertiary	manager	225	LMC
I 14		Anthony	yes	male	37	married	2	A-Level	photographer		
I 15		John	yes	male	42	single	2	tertiary	business owner	327	UMC
I 16		Agnes	yes	female	25	single	0	tertiary	receptionist	278	LMC
I 17		Lucy	yes	female	27	single	0	other	accountant		
I 18		Anita	yes	female	26	single	0	tertiary	secretary		
I 19		Ibrahim	yes	male	39	married	3	A-Level	driver	96	FC
I 20	2012	Ruth	yes	female	29	single	0	tertiary	receptionist	88	FC

N°	Year	Alias	Tran-script*	Sex	Age	Matrimo-nial status	N° of children	Education	Job	Income**	AfDB Category
I 21		David	yes	male	34	single	0	tertiary	clerk	880	UC
I 22		Geoffrey	yes	male	40	married	1	tertiary	senior research officer	500	UMC
I 23		Stephen	yes	male	37	married	2	tertiary	head of finance	747	UC
I 24		Sarah	yes	female		single	1	tertiary	help desk personnel		
I 25		Christopher	no	male	35	married	4	other	painter	33	Poor
I 26		Patrick	yes	male	34	cohabiting	0	O-Level	store man	85	FC
I 27		William	no	male	32	single	0	A-Level	constructor	239	LMC
I 28		Francis	yes	male	29	single	0	A-Level	electrician	196	LMC
I 29		Solomon	no	male	45	cohabiting	2	tertiary	artist	55	Poor
I 30		Daniel	yes	male	38	single	4	other	secretary	32	Poor
I 31		Norah	yes	female	34	married	2	tertiary	accountant	280	LMC
I 32		Julius	yes	male	36	cohabiting	3	tertiary	journalist	232	LMC
I 33		Halima	yes	female	25	single	0	tertiary	receptionist	76	FC
I 34		Robert	yes	male	35	cohabiting	3	O-Level	security	12	Poor
I 35		Peter	no	male	67	married	11	O-Level	cook		
I 36		Reagan	yes	male	30	single	0	tertiary	banker	181	LMC
I 37		Betty	yes	female	38	married	3	tertiary	academia	1680	UC
I 38		Rebecca	yes	female	41	married	2	tertiary	lecturer	146	LMC
I 39		Lawrence	yes	male	45	married	4	tertiary	senior lecturer	160	LMC
I 40		Gideon	yes	male	42	married	3	tertiary	lecturer	286	LMC
I 41		Evelyn	no	female	36	married	4	tertiary	administration	517	UMC
I 42	2012	Isaac	yes	male	31	married	3	tertiary	tour operator	120	FC

N°	Year	Alias	Trans-script*	Sex	Age	Matrimo-nial status	N° of children	Education	Job	Income**	AfDB Category
I	43		no (SAQ)	male	20	single	0	tertiary	driver	200	LMC
I	44		no (SAQ)	male	25	single	4	A-Level	chauffeur		
I	45		no (SAQ)	male	24	married	1	A-Level	security officer	27	Poor
I	46		no (SAQ)	female	22	married	2	tertiary	business woman		
I	47		no (SAQ)	male	26	married	2	O-Level	businessman	17	Poor
I	48		no (SAQ)	male	43	cohabiting	7	O-Level	carpenter	32	Poor
I	49		no (SAQ)	male	41	married	2	tertiary	Ph.D. student	67	FC
I	50		no (SAQ)	male	29	married	0	tertiary	Ph.D. student	370	UMC
I	51		no (SAQ)	male	54	married	4	O-Level	driver	159	LMC
I	52		no (SAQ)	female		married	3	tertiary	accountant	250	LMC
I	53		no (SAQ)	male	49	single	0	tertiary	pastor	30	Poor
I	54		no (SAQ)	male	28	cohabiting	2	tertiary	architect	75	Poor
I	55		no (SAQ)	male	28	cohabiting	0	tertiary	designer	160	LMC
I	56		no (SAQ)	female	35	married	0	tertiary	student	216	LMC
I	57		no (SAQ)	male	28	single	0	tertiary	tour operator		
I	58		no (SAQ)	male	30	married	2	tertiary	sales manager		
I	59		no (SAQ)	female	24			A-Level			
I	60		no (SAQ)	male	35	married	5	tertiary	business	60	Poor
I	61		no (SAQ)	male	30	single	0	tertiary	military		
I	62		no (SAQ)	male	29	married	2	tertiary	assistant lecturer	193	LMC
I	63		no (SAQ)	male	37	married	2	tertiary			
I	64	2012	no (SAQ)	male	30	single	0	tertiary	architect	780	UC



N°	Year	Alias	Transcript*	Sex	Age	Matrimonial status	N° children	of Education	Job	Income**	AfDB Category
I 65			no (SAQ)	male	20	single	0	tertiary			
I 66			no (SAQ)	female	28	single	0	tertiary		(>231)	LMC
I 67			no (SAQ)	male	28	single	1	O-Level		100	FC
I 68			no (SAQ)	female	28	single	1	tertiary	accountant	150	LMC
I 69			no (SAQ)	female	24	single	2	A-Level	none		
I 70			no (SAQ)	male	28	single	1	tertiary	assistant lecturer	390	UMC
I 71			no (SAQ)	female	48	single	4	A-Level	secretary	175	LMC
I 1	2014	Andrew	yes	male	37	divorced	1	tertiary	university lecturer	1310	UMC
I 2		Raphael	yes	male	31	single	0	tertiary	project manager	1120	UMC
I 3		George	yes	male	31	married	1	tertiary	IT	867	UC
I 4		Alex	yes	male	29	single	0	tertiary	lawyer	800	UC
I 5		Gordon	yes	male	28	single	1	A-Level	data	100	Poor
I 6		Oliver	yes	male	35	single	0	other	civil society activist	120	Poor
I 7		Abdul	yes	male	34	married	1	tertiary	lawyer	1059	UC
I 8		Pamela	yes	female	24	single	0	A-Level	shop owner	60	Poor
I 9		Josephine	yes	female	31	married	2	tertiary	lecturer	350	UMC
I 10		Herbert	yes	male	27	single	0	tertiary	lawyer	200	LMC
I 11		Rose	yes	female	30	cohabiting	2	tertiary	network marketing	96	FC
I 12		Aida	yes	female	36	married	4	tertiary	network marketing	813	UC
I 13	2014	Elisabeth	yes	female	54	married	4	other	network marketing	159	FC

N°	Year	Alias	Tran-script*	Sex	Age	Matrimo-nial status	N° of children	Education	Job	Income**	AfDB Category
I 14		Jennifer	yes	female	30	single	1	other	insurance	132	LMC
I 15		Nelson	yes	male	37	married	3	tertiary	civil servant	128	FC
I 16		Innocent	yes	male	45	married	4	tertiary	civil servant	463	UMC
I 17		Elly	yes	male	30	single	0	other	pastor	7	Poor
I 18		Arthur	yes	male	33	married	2	tertiary	bank	162	LMC
I 19		Jude	yes	male	27	single	0	tertiary	NGO	80	FC
I 20		Nicole	yes	female	35	married	2	O-Level	2nd hand clothes	46	Poor
I 21		Joy	yes	female	30	cohabiting	1	tertiary	IT	713	UC
I 22		Sarah	yes	female	52	widow	2	O-Level	tailor	334	UMC
I 23		Kato	yes	male	40	cohabiting	2	tertiary	airport ground handling	96	FC
I 1	2017	Umar	no	male	38	married	5	primary	builder	58	poor
I 2		Marwa	no	female	38	married	5	primary	shopkeeper		
I 3		Lillian	no	female		single	1	tertiary	tour guide		
I 4		Edgar	no	male	40	single	4	tertiary	lecturer	130	LMC
I 5		Bennon	no	male	33	single	1	other	baker	35	poor
I 6		Brian	yes	male	37	single	2	other		24	poor
I 7		Gerald	yes	male	27	cohabiting	0	tertiary	volunteer	27	poor
I 8		Martin	no	male	30	cohabiting	2	tertiary		80	FC
I 9		Ronald	yes	male	45	married	6	O-Level	trader	98	FC
I 10	2017	Benjamin	no	male	24	single	0	tertiary	environmental scientist		

<b>N° Year</b>	<b>Alias</b>	<b>Tran- script*</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Matrimo- nial status</b>	<b>N° children</b>	<b>of Education</b>	<b>Job</b>	<b>Income**</b>	<b>AfDB Category</b>
I 11	Chris	no	male	24	single	0	tertiary	student	454	UMC
I 12	Goretti	no	female	25	single	0	other	hotel administration	240	LMC
I 13	Elijah	yes	male	24	single	0	A-Level	photographer		
I 14	Joseph	yes	male	29	single	0	tertiary	broker/errands		
I 15	Taibu	no	male	26	single	0	tertiary	dentist	2600	UC
I 16	Richard	no	male	50	married	5	O-Level	shop owner		

\* If no transcript was made, only the questionnaire was used for analysis in SPSS

SQA = self-administered questionnaire; if not stated, the interview was administered by the interviewer

\*\* Income refers to the per capita monthly income, derived from total household income; it is calculated in US \$ at an exchange rate of 1:2500

## **Annex 5**

### **List of Expert Interviews**

<b>N°</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Tran-script*</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Institution</b>
E 1	2014	yes	Religion and Politics	Pastor	Pentecostal Church
E 2		yes	Religion and Politics	Staff	Uganda Joint Christian Council
E 3		yes	Religion and Politics	CSO Activist	HALEA Uganda
E 4		no	Religion and Politics	Party Member, Academic	UPC
E 5		yes	Religion and Politics	Party Leader	Forum for Integrity of Leadership
E 6		yes	Religion and Politics	Member of Parliament I	NRM
E 7		yes	Religion and Politics	Member of Parliament II	NRM
E 8		yes	Religion and Politics	Member of Parliament III	FDC
E 9		yes	Religion and Politics	Member of Parliament IV	Independent
E 10		yes	Religion and Politics	Staff	Inter-Religious Council Uganda
E 11		yes	Religion and Politics	Legal Counsel	Uganda Episcopal Conference
E 12		yes	Religion and Politics	Secretary General	Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
E 13		yes	Religion and Politics	Traditional Priest	Buganda Kingdom
E 14		yes	Religion and Politics	Staff	National Fellowship of born-again Pentecostal Christians
E 1	2017	no	Mpigs Protest	Political Activist I (also I8-2017)	Jobless Brotherhood

<b>N°</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Tran-script*</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Institution</b>	
E	2	yes	Black Monday	Director	Uganda National NGO Forum	
E	3	no	Leisure in Local Communities	LC1 I	Local Council 1 Level	
E	4	yes	State of the Nation Platform	Former Director	ACODE	
E	5	no	Market Associations	General Secretary	Park Yard Market Association	
E	6	no	State of the Nation Platform	Current Director	ACODE	
E	7	yes	Housing Market Evolutions	Lawyer	Real Estate Company	
E	8	yes	Black Monday	Political Activist II	Uganda National NGO Forum	
E	9	yes	Supermarkets in Kampala	Accountant	Nakumatt Supermarket	
E	10	no	Local Community Initiatives	Chairwoman	Women SACCO	
E	11	no	Leisure in Local Communities	General Secretary	Local Council 1 Level	
E	12	yes	Mabira Forest Protest	Executive Director and Assistant	NAPE	
E	13	no	Local Community Initiatives	Youth Councilor	Kololo	
E	14	no	Local Community Initiatives	LC1 II	Local Council 1 Level	
E	15	no	WhatsApp Groups as Leisure	Journalist	not affiliated	
E	16	no	Makerere Lecturers' Strike	Lecturer	Makerere University	
E	17	no	Buganda Riots	Lawyer/Political Activist III	formerly Nkobo Zambogo	
E	18	no	Ugandan Transport Sector	General Secretary	UTRADA	
E	19	no	Uganda Teachers' Strike	Former Director	UNATU	
E	20	yes	Middle Class in Uganda	Economist	Kyambogo University	
E	21	no	Market Associations	Chairman	Usafi Market	
E	22	yes	Makerere Lecturers' Strike	Lecturer	Makerere University	
E	23	2017	yes	Ugandan Transport Sector	Chairman	Boda Boda 2010

<b>N°</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Tran- script*</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Institution</b>
E	24	yes	Black Monday	Political Activist IV	not affiliated
E	25	yes	Kampala City Development	Deputy Director	KCCA
I	6	yes	Recent protests in Uganda	Brian, Political Activist V	Jobless Brotherhood
I	7	yes	Walk to Work	Gerald, Political Activist VI	FDC
I	9	yes	Business Initiative	Roland, chairman	UMOSTA
I	13	yes	Political Activism	Elijah, Political Activist VII	Parish Youth Leader
I	14	yes	Political Activism	Joseph, Political Activist VIII	National Youth Council

\* If no transcript exists (usually due to the absence of voice recording), notes of the discussions have been made

## Annex 6

### Coded Categories 2012

Cat.		Frq	Text examples
2. Cor- rup- tion	Problem in the country	### ### 	31, 9, 26, 19, 16, 42, 39, 38 (selfish politicians and civil servants), 28, 34, 25, 11, 13, 10
	Affects work of the government: institution (esp. health and education) program implementation work in the sectors	### ### ### ### 	31, 9, 26, 42, 36, 33, 32, 30, 23, 25, 6, 5, 4, 7, 8, 15, 21, 14, 2, 13, 10, “Corruption has been like a worm eating through, you know, and it has effected the country, both politically and socially and economically also.”(6;3) 5: “The public servants who work in government schools TRY [fort emphasis] and / possibly because they don't have an opportunity for corruption there. They cannot sell the chalk.” “[...] Sometimes we call it me and my stomach, because people are in those places as long as they are satisfied they don't care about who is the low man.” (2;4;39) “The work [done in Uganda] is like a Chinese product. Comes in flashy, doesn't last long.” (4;3;29) “I'm not pleased with the work of the government because corruption has eaten us like a cancer.” (39;2;21)
	Get jobs through corruption		33, 4, 20
	Due to poverty		38, 33, 6
	You get what you want if you pay		13
	Staying too longer in power	###	37, 36, 28, 23, 14, 13
	Brings poverty		34, 13, 22 “So this high level inequitable distribution of resources has brought so many widespread poverty over 26 years.” (13;3;19 24:26”),
	Oil will increase corruption		13

Cat.			Frq	Text examples
3. Work	good	Development		38, 34, 20, 2
		Freedom of expression	###	19, 18, 36, 30, 34, 20,

of the gov-ern-ment	Freedom, peace	###	19, 18, 42, 38, 33, 34, 20, 2
	Is trying, but many chal-lenges	###	31, 9, 26, 33, 6, 3 “Of course, government is trying within their available means, but it is really, really challenging.” (6;2)
	UPE	### ###	9, 26, 19, 16, 39, 23, 15, 20, 3, 22
	Teach against corruption		20
	women		23
	Agricultural reforms		20, 34
	Work effectively		33
	Put their manifesto into ac-tion		33
bad	Failure to deliver (health, infrastructure, education)	### ### ### ###	31, 26, 17, 16, 42, 39,38, 37, 36, 32, 23, 12, 25, 11, 7, 15, 21, 14, 10, 22 “Yes, we have good health services infrastructure. We have built health centers up to the lowest level, parish even. But there are no medicines. There are no medical personnel. These are just white elephants.” (22;5;39)
	No convincing results		11, 22
	Oppression of civilians		23 (freedom of expression), 34
	No proper planning		18, 11, 22
	Human rights violation		31, 42, 8 “If he [Museveni] doesn't run, he knows he is going to end up in The Hague. The Congo Saga, the Amucra incidence, where six hundred people were put in a wagon and burnt.” (42;4;49)
	unemployment	###	19, 36, 28, 15, 21
	Budget spending	###	17 (too much on teargas), 32, 5, 21, 3 (no loans), 10
	People surrounding Museveni are bad	###	31, 9, 33, 32, 23, 25 “So and at that time the government, the president, let's say was faced with several challenges. And it is at that point that he failed to curtail his boys these days from engaging in corrupt tendencies.” (32;4;37) “For me, I think the government is ok, it is just about the people who are in the government, those are the wrong people.” (33;3;17)
inflation		42, 30, 23, 15, 20 “Prices are going up every day and to a bigger extent you find the literate and the middle class as may seem you may not feel it so much. But class down feel the sugar prices it's almost a necessity. And food stuff. You really go beyond. For example like sugar stated at 1500, I find it shot up to 5000.” (20;3;28)	



Category		Frq	Text examples
4. Institutions	They are there	###	39, 3,13, 22, 10
	But not working effectively	### ###	31, 39, 5, 4, 3,2, 12, 13, 22, 10
	Institutions not independent from president	### ### 	31 (parliament sabotaged by cabinet) 19, 37 (personalized), 32, 11, 5, 4, 8, 20, 14, 12, 13, 22 “All our institutions relate around personalities, individuals. The president of the republic is the institution. He can decide anything. He overrides the decisions made by the police department, he can override decisions made by the justice system, he can override decisions made by ANY other institution.” (13;2;14) <b>(22;6;48)</b>
	They are doing a good job		18, 33
	No generalization possible		10
	Parliament	The 9th parliament is trying	### ### 
NRM majority hinders bringing up issues		###	19, 42, 23 (EALA),11, 4, 14, 13
Some MP's do good work, others don't			18, 33, 34
MP's selfish (salary increase, cars)		### ###	18, 17, 39, 38, 36, 37, 30, 28, 5, 20
Multipartism is better			21
Accountable now			15, 21
Don't conclude debates			17, 36 (ineffective), 20
judiciary	they are trying	### ###	26, 19, 37, 36, 28, 8, 15, 21, 14, 10 “Justice is trying. Because regardless of opposition or pro-government, they try to be balanced when they are giving their judgment. Me, the entire institution I will give credit is the justice. The justice is fine, it is beyond fifty percent.” (15;5;44)
	Corruption	###	26, 42, 38, 37, 4,10
	Not independent	###	19, 38, 36, 33 (not fair), 23, 6, 20, 12, 13 (Buganda riots)

			<p>“Like you find the judiciary, there are cases which would have been passed, but they are being influenced. Because one feels I'm a government supporter or if I rule against the government, perhaps I will suffer the consequences.” (20;5;36)</p> <p>“They are just there because they are there. The government wants – what they call it, for them they say the government but to me I think it is the judiciary.” (33;6;37)</p>
	Constrained by lack of facilities		21
	Overtaken MP's election		38 (but too late, as point of criticism), 28, 8
po- lice	Oppressive, excessive force (teargas)	<p>###</p> <p>###</p> <p>###</p> <p>    </p>	<p>31, 26, 19, 16, 42, 36, 33, 30, 23, 34, 6, 11, 7, 20, 2, 21 (have reason for being rough), 10</p> <p>“The police naturally has been very brutal in the last two years and there is always that question (laughs): what is an army man doing leading the police? And that tends to brutalize the institution as it where.” (37;4;21)</p> <p>“The police compared to the Sixties, during Amin's time, they were neat, they were learned, they were really professionals. Today you see what is happening, what the gay and lesbian activists. You are bundled up on a pick up, teargased. 'Walk to Work', I think you have read about it, is that really freedom of expression? [...] Police has failed to understand its role.”</p>
	corruption		38, 30, 5, 7
	uneducated		33
	Taking only care of pol oppression		23, 2
	No more trust by people		8
	Manhandles woman opposition leader		9, 36, 12
	Not independent from army	###	<p>42, 36, 33, 23, 13</p> <p>“Police now in Uganda today is being led by the army. [...] And what happens is that he [the commander of police] is used to being in the army, he knows things are done in the army way and police is supposed to do it in a different way. But he will introduce his army way doing things in police.” (23;3;32)</p>
	Doing good job	###	31, 26 (good and bad), 38, 10 (compared to other countries), 21
arm y	Will not accept new leader		36 “[...] because this army is so loyal to this guy, that I think even if he won, he lost an election, some of the leaders, top army leaders would not accept the new guy as their boss. It is possible that there could still be a coup.” (33;8;38)
	Commit crimes during war		26
	disciplined	###	31, 19, 42, 38, 36, 30 (repeats it 4 times in one answer), 23, 7

Category		Frq	Text examples	
5. Pol. parties	weak		38, 4, 22, 10	
	Personalization of parties	###	31, 37, 36, 6, 15, 22	
	Only fighting, no solution	###	31, 9,17, 37, 4, 15	
	Need for cooperation		17, 12	
	Create division		15	
	selfish		9, 32, 30	
	oppo- sition	Besigye is a threat		31, 37 (for some people), 23 (to the govt), 20
		Ineffective (internal fighting, no agenda)	### ### 	31, 16, 42, 36, 28, 23 (bcs of oppression) 11, 5, 20, 22, 10 “They have the ideas, but since they are poor financially, they are easily bribed by money, and divided of course” (19;34;3)
		No alternative to the govt	###	9, 16, 37, 33, 6, 11, 4 “So even if we go/ have a chance, whatever political party will come, it will not come to bring common interest.” (9;4;33)
		opportunism		18, 33 (copy NRM agenda), 11
		Does not accept defeat		9, 33, 34
		Causes riots	###	31, 9, 37, 33, 15, 34, 20, 21, 2 “The riots that take place, you find most of them are really based on assumptions, or just on a few individuals who disguise the main unemployed youth to come up and take arms. ... (20:1:10) (20;8;58)
		Promising: Mao, Mafabi, Kadaga		31, 26, 7
		Can be an alternative	### ### 	19, 17,39, 38, 36, 32, 30, 28, 22, 8, 21, 14, 13 “Uganda will be the best place to live in! [if opposition rules]” (8;5;58 28':20"), “Yeah, I think, you know, they are doing a good job and we hope that maybe in the future they will convince the population, to rally behind them and you know, maybe they come to power, hopefully.” (21..)
		Need to develop		
Govt hinders their devlpt	### ### 	39, 38 (no financial base) 37, 36, 30, 23, 6, 4, 8, 15, 21, 3, 13, 22 “But then the other thing is, you know, the control of resources, you get it? Like being in government they have the resources to do, you know all they come to do what to remain in power.” (21;4;35) “They say that they let the political space free, but every party is free to mobilize and do campaigns or something like that, but it is not the case. Like if DP wanted to hold a rally in Kampala here, well there will be a lot of teargas and that kind of stuff, although on paper they say, political parties are		

			free.” (23;3;28)
		Challenge govt to do better	### 26, 18,36, 14, 12

Cat.			Frq	Text examples
6. king- doms	bad	No use	###	42, 38, 33, 6, 7, 3, 13, 22 “Only the return of the kingdoms somehow made the civil society quiet. Somehow people are busy in their kingdoms. People have something else to do than looking only at the government position. Some are busy working in the kingdom. Working hard on that. So it makes them busy.” (38;4;25)
		Divides people	### 	26, 37, 36+33 (want to own the city), 32, 6, 15, 20, 14 “So what is the point of having different small administrative units within the central government? With time, the work of the kingdom begins to undermine some of the decisions of government, ok? They even start becoming a threat.” (6;7), 14, 15, 20 “There is that scenario that if they [Buganda kingdom] are given so many powers, they will act beyond. So there is that instance where they will say 'we need all foreigners off, if you are a Mtoro, go back to your land, if you are an Alur, go back to your kingdom', so it would, but it would be better if they worked hand in hand with the government, not to be given sole powers over their subordinates.” (20;7;56)
Good, but not in poli- tics		Developmental role		16, 37, 30, 23, 5
		Mobilization power of the king	###	32, 30, 11, 5, 4, 15, 10 “I would think the kingdoms may work better in mobilizing, say, when it comes to health, when it comes to education, when it comes to some few things like that, it can work.” (15;6;52)
		But two distinct roles		10
		Cultural reasons	###	36, 30, 4, 7, 21, 3, 2, 10 “I don't think they are doing anything to change or to play a role in the direction of this country.” (4;6) “Well, I wouldn't support it. I wouldn't support it, because a traditional king basically is supposed to be traditional and the highest authority in terms of cultural recognition. And culture and politics, as much as they are kind of complementary, because you can go with politics in culture, but in terms of national politics, they shouldn't.” (21;7;51)
More to say in poli- tics		Structure for governance there	###	19 (leaders too), 23 (federalism), 11, 13, 10
		More legitimacy than govt	###	19, 17, 28, 23, 34, 11, 8
		Land issues by kingdom		18, 25
		Cooperation btn govt + king		34, 11
		No peace w/o solving that question		13

Cat.			Frq	Text examples
Democ- racy	yes	Need for more	### ##	31, 18 (freedom of expr), 36, 33, 6, 8, 20, 12 (30%), 13, 10 ( <b>10;6;52</b> )
		Young leaders are coming up: hope		17, 42, 37, 36 “The present government has been in power for 26 odd years, yes, about 26 years, so within this time there has come a younger generation who have now made their way into parliament and they are demanding change.” (37;3;17)
	no	Loss of legitimacy of law-enforcing bodies		38, 11
		No freedom of expression		42, 23
		Unbalanced development		33
		Dependence thr/ funding, business		22
		Civil society not free		6
		Constraint by govt		39, 5, 13
		No democracy	### ## ###	9 (needs to be practiced everywhere), 19, 17, 16, 42, 30, 28, 23 (the tiniest), 4, 7, 15, 14, 3, 2 “Well, they say we have democracy. That's what they say. I only comment that.” (2;4;44)  “We have rulers masquerading as leaders. I think if we were democratic enough, we would be having leaders, not rulers.” (14) “There is no real democracy. Democracy is just in favor of some. Because someone tell you: if you don't vote me, chaos is coming back. Will that be democracy? You will just vote that person so that you have rid chaos. Period. But not your own free will.” (15;5;46)
	Democracy not good, military govt better		32 (need a dictator), 22	

Cat		Frq.	Text examples
8. Ele- c- tion s	fraud	### ### ### ### 	19, 18, 17, 42, 39, 38, 37, 36, 32, 30, 28, 23, 6, 11, 4, 7, 8, 20, 3, 2, 12, 13, 10, 22 “So that's why you have seen ever since we went into elections in February you have seen demonstrations, all this. If this government really was voted into power, why/ where do the demonstrators come from?” (7;3;40 19':42") “[...] I told you we pray very hard, still they don't cheat us. Because this time wrong, I'm ready to fight.” (12;4; 42 24':49"), (13;6;43) “Yes, it [elections] has to be there, for every country in this world, there have to be elections. But for us here in Uganda they are meaningless.” (30;3;32)
	Registration process not proper		31, 36, 11
	Voter's bribery	###	38, 32, 6, 15, 10
	False promises	###	18, 36, 30, 28, 6, 4, 12, 10
	Useless to vote		42, 37, 36, 23, 13 “Because they feel, even if they vote, they can't change anything. So they are getting frustrated, saying no, what's the essence of voting? And if I give a vote, and the results, somebody wants them to be in another way, they may be turn out to be in another way.” (23;5;46) “That's interesting, I don't vote. I only voted once. Because for some reason I think, I just know that the votes are going to be rigged, the elections are not going to be free and fair. So my vote is useless. I'd rather sit home and read a book with the children.” (42; 8; 41)
	Results predetermined		23, 4, 15, 14 “Because really, it is like doing something when you know the end result. So you do a formality, but you know the end result. So, there was no need for that.” (15;1;12)
	Commission not independent		37, 36, 8, 22
	Opposition didn't mobilize		15
	Fair elections		9, 33 (33;8;45 – personal testimony)
	Responsibility to vote (for change, citizens duty)	###	9, 38, 30, 23, 7, 22 “You must look for a way forward to pull out our country, otherwise it is rotting.” (12;2;18 14':41"), “Yeah, it would discourage me, but I have the strong feeling that I still need to exercise my right. And you/ definitely there is some small hope that one day things will become right, we cannot fool things always.” (22;3;33)
	On local level no fraud		19, 11, 5, 20
	No trouble 2016		21 “Because of those people [possible trouble makers] the police is always there to get them.” (21;9;61)
	Opposition starts convincing intimidation		21 37

Cat			Frq	Text examples
9. Changes	past	Idi Amin was good		36,11 “Amin was / I think, yes, there was a lot of human rights violations, and all. But I think one of the coun/one of the leaders who truly loved this country was Amin.” (36;6;30)
		Milton Obote was good		36 (obote I was best), 32 (good institutions),11
		Amin bad		23
		improvement now		9, 33, 25, 6 “Because I/ according to my view. I lived during the colonial days. I've gone through all the regimes. Since then this has been the best regime we have ever had. I'm telling you, I lost an uncle, his sons over cer/ certain regimes. So, to tell you the truth, this is the (.) best (.) regime we have ever had. Apart from the colonial regime.” (9;2;19)
		Never peaceful change		5
		Insecurity before		36, 33, 23, 3 “When it came to Obote, there was no security. At all. He never wanted to pay the soldiers. He used to tell the soldiers: 'You mean you can't make your own salaries? I give you a gun then I also give you your salaries.’” (23;7;56)
		No competition		2
		No globalization		2
		War hindered development		25
	Previously (10/15 years) good, now bad	### ### ###	19, 16 (two last years) 42, 39, 37, 36, 28, 23, 6, 7, 8, 15 (up to 2011), 20, 14+31(since multipartism), 13, 22 <b>(22;2;15)</b> “There are many things, yes, they have done. And every Ugandan can acknowledge that there are so many changes this government has brought to better the situation of the people in this country. [But] it is not possible that you can do RIGHT things for 26 years and you are doing only the correct things for 33 million.”(13;4;27) But in the first ten years he had done the best. But when the idea came of becoming a life president, in quotations, to have a tight grip on power, I think this is where mistakes are.” (39;4;33)	
present	People are getting aware: want roads, education, pol. maturity		37, 36, 21 “Now, my parents, my mother for example would say: 'Ah, you guys you don't know what it meant for us to go through this. So, yes, these guys may not be doing it all right, but at least we have our peace. And, things are improving, we have / we have things in shops and buy something. Then you didn't have money but you could not buy from somewhere, so you guys should accept.' Now there is that change from that thinking to: 'Ok, hold on, we put you there because you wanted to do this. You are not doing this, that is not right.' So then they were holding us a (drama?) of saying 'I gave you this, stick with me, or I let you go back to that.' So, the more / if more	

			people come to see this, and we have a system where we hold our leaders accountable, and say that, we want you to do this, if you don't do it, get out.” (36;8;36)
	Situation is getting worse (diff. reasons)	### ###	26 (no peace right now), 42, 32, 28, 11, 4, 7 , 20, 14 “If I'm bad off / because before, before I used to talk with my granny, the elders, so they used to talk of those ancient days of Amin, Obote, what. 'Actually you know, you never saw anything, for us we used to to sleep on the bush, what. But these days, at least you can sleep peacefully.' So, me I was used to tell my mum that granny, that you continue sleeping, but you see this (laughs) you continue with your sleeping, but this thing of / can I call it, no, I won't call it freedom, improvement of a kind, anything to be improved on, by the government, it can't be gotten on a silver plate. That is something you have to work for, or fight for. So they are like: 'Ah, your age, you never saw anything. Trust me, if you lost / if you lost what what.'” (28;7;64) “Ah, these are demonstrations / demonstrations are as a result of an incontentation [sic]. If people are not contented, with what is happening, they are most likely to demonstrate. But if people are happy, you never see demonstrations. Some ten years back there were no demonstrations, because people were happy and contented. But since they have seen that things are going the wrong way, they started to do it.” (19;5f;68)
	Loss of popularity of the president		6, 8
	Stability now	###	39, 30, 5, 7, 3
	Food / fuel prices up		17, 28, 20, 12
	Increase in riots		
	development	###	18, 42, 33, 30, 25, 2 “Though people are saying, now, you know, people are saying Museveni did nothing and has not build anything, Obote has build Mulago hospital [...] But if there were no hospitals, I think that would be the first thing Museveni would do: to give us the big hospital. But if it is there, he will only do to maintain it.” [33;10f;61]
	Gap rich poor widens		36
	No change		18, 38
future	No common mobilization possible bcs no common interest		11
	No more political stability	###	19, 23, 5, 14(increase riots), 3 “Because, the way things are going, people are loosing hope, and leading a society that has lost hope is really, really dangerous. That's what I'm (go on?). Anything can happen. So, I don't see light in the next five years. You may find we may go back to war, how will it come? Because, you can't see (5) the level of strikes, nowadays, it's different from what used to happen in the last ten years when the government has just come in power. These days



			<p>it is very difficult to pass a street in Kampala, which is without policemen, without soldiers. So that means, for the government to stay in power, there must be soldiers? Policemen? Taking control of the city.” (23, 9; 64)</p> <p>“The next five years may not be very stable. Because people are fighting. There is a power struggle and everybody wants to be a boss, so everybody want to lead, so that has remained cause of some problems. That’s why we have teargas, gunshots, we have demonstrations here and there.” (3;5)</p> <p>“But I think we have now got to a point where it is irreversible. It really is irreversible. And there is a sense that in 2016 people are expecting the state to escalate, in terms of violence towards the locals.” (37;5;29)</p> <p>“And also now we have a crucial element to it, in the sense that there is a generation of people who do not know what war is. My generation lived through the overthrow of Idi Amin. We lived through the Obote days were we hidd under beds and there were bullets all over the place. So we fear. Some of us fear to force a change, because they don't want to go back to those days. They don't want the children to live this. But now you have a generation which has grown up seeing only one president and they have not seen the ugly side of war.” (37;6;29)</p>
	Ppl from outside will come back, bring new influences		2
	Will become worse	###	31, 38, 23, 7 (if M7 runs again), 12 (no change if no govt change) “Yes, they are my tribe mates, but they are cocooning. There are few people in this cocoon that are enjoying. Then the rest are left to suffer. So if this cocoon is not broken, they are not going anywhere.” (12;6;56 ) “The opposition will continue to be impation. Very impatient. And I think they will look towards disrupting this government many times. I think that’s the tactic they have taken up. They will just continue agitating, agitating. Until the government is a bit / really, to make discomfort.” (38;5;33)
	Pol maturity		4, 21
	Benefits from oil (employment etc.)		32 (only infrastructure, nothing else!!), 25
	NRM is on the right track, bright future		33
	No change		9 (even if govt changes), 32 “You can take a person out of the village, but you cannot take the village out of the person.” (9;3;27)
Need to	Implement existing laws		10
	Fight corruption		34, 20, 10
	Improve health, infrastructure, education, inst.	###	37, 8, 15, 21, 13, 10

Ppl political education: election, rights		11, 15, 22, 10 “There should be systematic political education. [...] Right from primary. Yes, this is a country where they are not teaching for their kids about rights. [...] So how do you have a future in politics in that kind of country?” (22;9;70)
Change leadership	### ### ###	31, 9, 26, 17, 42, 36, 32, 28, 6, 5, 7, 14, 13, 22 “There are so many other visionary people, he calls himself visionary, but I think he just has ambitions, because ambitions are not visions. He has an ambition, not a vision. But there are some people down there with a vision, but they don't give them a chance to show it.” (14;5;59) “And you can see people are increasingly getting tired. And that's why you see the riots. Coming up in the country. This country used not to have riots. The police are now engaged throughout the country. Because of / I think there is some bit of discontent.” 22 “Because me, ever since I was born, I'm seeing only one leader. So I would say, I like there to be changes. If it is – they may five years, then five years is a lot – another leader comes in. So that's what I mostly want.” (28;2;16) “ [...]one thing that I think about that can change is electing another leader but we no longer elect nowadays.” (17;4;49) “It can be possible if people are willing to change. Cause you find like some people are not (.) / are not willing to change. They feel like if I am like this I should stay like this. If I was born like this I should stay like this. Or if someone is like this he feels like "let me be". Some people are afraid of the change cause they don't know what might come. Yeah. But if people can change their perspective, take risks (.) maybe we can prosper in one way or the other.” (18;7;86) “So it needs a whole revamping, the whole country. And it needs like a new face. I don't know where that savior is going to come from. Maybe. Because even if the current, maybe Mao, maybe, the DP president, but with Besi-gye coming there, I think we will still be heading for disaster. Because we give the old government will try to fight and we might even plant back into war. Which I don't want. So, let's wait and see what happens.” (31;10;79)
Create civil society		5
Reform policies		23
Term limits	###	42, 32, 7, 20, 13 “So a situation like this it is only because [of the fact] that the presidency has a lot of power and authority installed by virtue being president of the republic, it is therefore important that such powers must have limit of some sort. Unfortunately in this country we don't have that as well. So we have got a presidency with absolute power – forever.” (13;2;19)
Close gap rich-poor		30, 20, 10
Free and fair elections		12
Improve agriculture		32, 28, 20
Fight unemployment		31, 26 (and better pay for those working), 18, 20

		Listening to people's views		17
		To have ppl with a vision		36
Own role		Give advice	###	31+18+30 (but not considered), 34, 5, 13, 22, 10 “Me, as a person, I feel I should do much for my country, genuinely, but they don't consider me of use when it comes to that big house, the parliament, and all, any other position [...] We said to us, they are running in a wrong direction, but since you have no say, (4) you just let that a side, come to your home, do some work [...] and life goes on like that.” (30;7;64)
		Civil servants = neutral	###	9, 6, 21, 22, 10
		Educate children		11, 2
		Overseeing program implementation		21
		People's political education		9 (teaching human rights), 32
		vote	###	42+36+4+12 (but didn't), 19
		Develop tourism		33
		Overcome govt shortcomings		15 (disadvantaged)
		Don't bribe		16
		Community engagement		38, 37

Ca	t.		Frq	Text examples
10.	goo	A good idea	### 	26, 18, 17, 5, 7, 8, 20,10 “I wouldn't (.) I wouldn't say it is a bad idea (..) but (..) my problem comes on (..) how they conduct it (..) Because the police is clear/ tells whoever wants to protest inform them. But if (.) the activists inform the police/ but still the police goes ahead to intervene in their demonstration, yet it is peaceful. That is really not good. And they even apply harsh (..) ways of handling them.” (17;5;57)
pol	d	Freedom of expression needs to		36 (inspires the country, someone like Mandela, Gandhi) 4, 10
.				
ac				
tivi				
sm				

	be protected		
	Govt not taking things f/ granted	### 	26, 16, 38, 32, 20 (Helps govt to revise some things)3, 13, 10 “Mmh, it [pol. Activism] is good. It gets the state thinking. It / you know, for every situation in politics they need to hear, you know, so many voices. They need to know where they are going wrong. And if it is not there, then they get too comfortable and that leads to dictatorship, so it is good to a certain extent, but they should also be very careful (laughs). Because for all security agencies around the world, especially in Africa, it is – you know, there is a threat to it.” (10;4;34) “So indeed, my view is that it was a correct indicator to the government. Unfortunately the government of Uganda did not READ properly to understand what people are saying. [...] Cracked very hard on them, instead of listening to them.” (13;10;67)
bad	They are selfish		19 (make you help achieve what they want, but nothing for you), 33, 11
	Dangerous, esp. in Africa		14, 3, 13, 10 “There is a power struggle and everybody wants to be a boss, so, everybody wants to lead, so that has remained cause of some problems. That's why we have teargas, we have gunshots, we have demonstrations here and there.” (3;5;)
	Will not change anything		9 (W2W)
	Better dialogue than protest		34, 20, 21, 22 (think tank)
W2 W	They have a cause	### ### ### 	19, 18, 17, 39, 30, 28 <b>(28;6f;62)</b> , 3, 25, 5, 4, 8, 15, 20, 14, 2, 13, 10
	whole world concerned		31, 37, 33, 6
	People are looting, riots	### ### 	31, 39, 38, 37, 33, 34, 6, 11, 4, 20, 21, 2, 10 “And for fear of loosing out [the business men and women] close down the shops, businesses and so. Ah, four ourself that is not good. Let's not open up. And you find these are the wrong elements in those people who want to come and maybe grab some valuables from the shop and run away.” (21;10,71)
	Concept inappropriate (late for work, tired)		30, 6, 11
	idlers and unemployed participating	### ### 	31, 26, 39, 33, 32, 28, 25, 6, 11, 4, 20, 3, 2, 13 “And you know, but enough, it is almost our age, who are suffering, mostly our age. This is unemployed. And the government is not careful. Thus you see that fighting thing, you get someone of my age on the street, demonstrating. These people

				<p>who go for it – who go for demonstrating on the street, what / They do it because they have nothing, so whenever they go and demonstrate, they have nothing to loose.” (28;7;64)</p> <p>“You see demonstrations and you will find boda boda guys, shouting, running, people who really don't have this agenda. I don't know. But people who / they don't have this thing at heart, they are just there because something is happening.” (32;10;73)</p>
	Not credible			37, 33, 11
	Crushed by govt			32, 20, 13 “I would say, it was good they [the government] ruled them off, though in a ruthless way. Because the moral like if it was 'Walk to Work' and a bigger group forms, it will end up in destruction of poverty.” (20;10;66)
	exaggerated	### 		9, 39, 38, 30, 5, 15, 3, 2
	Causes violence	### ###		31, 26, 18, 39, 25, 20, 21, 14, 3, 2 “But (.) in the main course it was our suffering. Cause us who are using taxis, when these activists started, they started firing with teargas. And it was us who are getting hurt. Yeah. And those people were just continuing. Because for them they have a main cause as to why they are doing their walk to work. And why they/ (.) they are not like us. They have their money but I think they had a better aim than us who are looking at it like it is just a walk to work.” (18;6;68)
	just walking	###		26,16, 30, 7, 20, 14, 15
	Demos hijacked by parties			31, 22, 4 (govt) 15 (FDC) “Demonstrations are always hijacked by those political parties. Those demos might be of a cause, but a certain political group may come and hijack it on the way.” (15;8;70), “But for them they were using that/ they were using that the economic crisis you know? But they were trying to (...) to (...) maybe to (..) they have other hidden agendas you know? like i think they were looking at how the Tunisian the Tunisia (unint.) and different war, like there were this chaos and they managed and even like this man of Libya/ they thought they could do the same here.” (31;3;29)
Own en- gag- e- me- nt in- ac- tive	ac- tiv- ity	Debate helping dis- advantaged party support demonstra- tion Buganda riots	         	8, 13 15 33 (election propaganda), 23 (financial) 26 + 42 (once) 19, 28, 23 (intention to participate) “I wanted to participate in a demonstration where my kabaka was refused to visit one of the counties in Bugerere. But by the time I wanted to participate it had become SOUR. Live bless over. I said, I support you guys, but for the sake of my life, I couldn't. Yeah. But had it been a peaceful demonstration and hadn't it gone sour, I would be part of it.” (23;13;86)
	ppl watching, but			37 (need involvement by intelligentsia), 23, 4, 10

	no action		
	Fear to loose what you have	###	26, 23 (your name gets tarnished), 2, 5, 10 “The major reason [for not publishing papers] is that (...) it could disadvantage me in a very bad way in Uganda currently. You will be noted and believe me, the state will take interest in you. Some opportunities might be consequently denied to you. And if you are too bad, it could even endanger your life. Yeah (more silently), it could even endanger your life.” (5;9)
	Feeling nothing will change		18, 30, 4, 10 “Dealing with it? I just think about it, mediate about it and just let it go. [...] For the expenses, when things go up we have to bear the situation, because you have nothing to do, you have to maintain at least the necessities [...].” (30:9:78) “So you feel like (.) where the elephants fight is the grass to suffer. So you find like you are suffering because of the consequences of the big people yet at the end you won't gain anything as you the local one(.). Cause when (.) like (.) goods are coming up.” (18;5:62)
	Not my character	###	39, 38, 37, 6, 5
	Not organized		4
	People are not into fighting		42
	Too much violence	### ### ### 	9, 18, 38 (fears crowds), 37, 36, 33, 30, 11, 8, 20, 14, 2, 12 “I'm not ready to be teargased.” (12;6;64) “But I will not wake up knowing even before I walk one kilometer and I will be huddled up perhaps on a police car, or teargased, or.. !” (20;10;70) “‘Walk to Work’ was just an expression of dissatisfaction of a few issues in government or in the country. But you see how it turned sour? Kibokos and teargas, like my fellow colleague, FDC leader president, Doctor, retired Colonel Kizza Besigye, I don't know if it was shown on the CNN the way he was manhandled around Mulago roundabout here. I'll never forget that. I've never seen it before. It really scared me away from politics. I can't openly participate in it.” (23;12;80) “No I don't [participate in demonstrations]. And even my children, I always tell them at school, never to [stop] themselves from working. Even if you say you are not satisfied, you end up in problems.” (30;9;76) “If you get arrested none of this politicians will come to safe your life. Oh we are in this thing together, let me help you out. They won't. They just leave you there. And for that one who get have problems or is hit by something they goes to Nairobi. For you, you stay here in Mulago without any treatment. Now, whats the point there.” (18;6;72)
	No benefit		3 “I don't see the benefits of being politically active. If I have the infrastructure I need from my government then I find no point running around.” (3,6)
	No cause at heart		20, 2
	No time	### 	26, 19, 42, 32, 28, 34, 25, 7, 8

Cat			Frq.	Text examples
11. role of the state	pos	Political stability		26, 34, 5, 10
		security	###	42, 4, 20, 14, 2, 10
		Macroeconomic stability		5, 20, 14
		career		21
	neg	corruption		37, 11, 2
		Lack of service delivery	###	17 (tuition increase), 33 (no soldier's pension), 23 (has to support his family members), 7, 8, 15
		Taxes	###	18, 37, 11, 8,15
		No fair competition		4
		inflation		31, 30
		No role	###	19, 38, 15, 3,2+6(pos), 13 “And when you go to the government referral hospitals, you find it is the lowest classes of people. The people at the grass roots are the ones that strive to go there because, well, they are clinging onto the government. And they are the ones who at the end of the day get frustrated because where government has failed to meet their demands.” “But socially, I have lived without this government, and I don't think this government has anything to help me.” (13;11;73) (37)

Category			Freq	Text examples
12. Goals and obstacles	goals	parents	###	16, 23, 11, 13, 10
		God		17, 16, 10
		Perseverance	### ### 	19, 18, 17, 33, 30, 6, 11, 4, 8, 20, 10
		education		33, 5, 15, 21, 13
		finances		3, 2
		honesty		26, 7
		independence		31, 33, 20

		sharing		20
		Being adventurous		14
obstacles		No merit system, connection		18 (social life hinders to mingle with others) 4 “They call it in Uganda 'technical know-who' [sic]. Whom do you know. Out there. If you don't know anybody, sorry, you're not good enough. Yes.' (4;2;17)
		finances	###	31, 26, 30, 5, 8, 20, 14, 3, 2
		corruption		2
		dishonesty		7
		High taxes		8
		Bad decisions		16
		unemployment		19
		family	###	31, 17, 30, 15, 20

Category		Freq	Text examples
13. Future	Political parties to develop		6
	democracy		5, 4, 2
	Transparent society	###	42, 39, 30, 6, 4 “I hope that we will have a transparent society. I hope that the society where our children are growing in will be a free and fair society to everybody who will have a chance to do what they can.” (6;9)
	Stability, peace	###	31, 9, 26, 16, 37, 30, 25, 7, 3 “Yeah, actually there is [a threat to peace for the country]. There is. If people are moving on the street, that 'Walk to Work', those are the / the [strain?] to the country, of course. [...] Yeah, we believe there is no peace. But if that walking to work thing stops, then there is peace, yeah.” (25) <b>include note book notes for 37</b> “Apart from the recent two years really. (..) There has been peace in Uganda. (..) Could be comfortable in this country and not thinking about going anywhere. Because I love this country and (...)/ its where I want to be forever (...). I like till I die/ I really need the peace to come back to normal.” (
	employment		3
	accountability		37, 30, 13, 22
	Equal development		18, 33, 21, 13
	Government change		26, 17, 13 (13;12;79) “I wish it would be like South Africa or Mandela's regime. (.) A leader comes in and resigns when we still need him.” (17;7;77)



	Patriotism		23, 14
	Service delivery		11, 4, 8
	Good governance		18, 39
	Better education		33, 15

Category		Freq	Text examples
14. Poli-tics	Too violent		42, 25, 13 “Actually, you know, the whole politics of Uganda here, when you get involved, it can easily, sometimes you can even loose your life. Because I have seen many of my relatives have lost their life in such kind of politics in Uganda. [...] Amin was there, Obote was there and actually the President Museveni was also involved in it.” (25;1;7-11) “You don't life long in Africa (...), if you are involved in politics, you don't live long.” (42;1;7)
	About telling lies		12, 31+26+18, “[politics] It's a dirty game.” (18;1;5), 30, 14, 15
	Change in attitude necessary		11, 10
	About religion		9
	Should be caring for the ppl		34

Cat.		Fre	Text examples
oth-ers	Challenges to the govt: civil war, army expenditure on uprisings and foreign intervention, refugees coming in the country, population increase, illiteracy		6
	Buganda riots		33 (president solved it, <b>33;9;53</b> ) 8+13 run badly by the govt
	Political strategy not to develop middle class, they are aware of their rights		13
	Govt hinders change		“And they keep showing you, that without it, there is no way out, you are trapped. You, you are doomed without it. So that's where the masses always have the fear to change something. And they came up with the slogan of 'No Change'. So they / people fear change.” (15;3;32)

Middle class (hier eigtl. Elite) benefits from the government		15
Masses are ignorant		15
People being chased out of their stalls, creating thieves		18 (but good, no more crowds, no more pickpockets), 17, 23
Donors are not giving enough money		21
Ppl vote M7 because he has been around for so long		21
Strike = riot		31, 33, 30
Nice roads but no economic activity		15, 32
<p>“Exactly that's what I told you. If you really get anot/ if like now, for instance, before elections begin, what the government does, it is tightening the security, so when the civilians see military moving around town, who wants to die? You see that? No one wants to die. You really sit behind and think why should I demonstrate? I have food, I can go to work, these military they cannot touch me if I don't violate.” (33;11;65)</p>		
Sense of impunity because of bush war		36 “And two, something that's see, this government was taking over by a military coup. Now, the group that feel that they brought this government to power, belief they need to be paid back for their sacrifice. And so, most of those who did that feel that whatever we have now, we owe it to them. So, because famously one of them [...]was minister of health then, actually, during the trial he stole the / he told the principal judge of the high court. He asked him: 'Where were you when we were fighting in the bush?' when asked about the money. So you see that kind of it gives you / goes around these hard untouchables in the government who feel that all of this is because of them.” (36;2;10)
Tribalism as problem		36
Boda-boda guys to mobilize		42 (42;11;113)

## **Annex 7**

### **Coded Categories 2014/2017**

List of Categories:

1. Growing up
2. Sponsors / Scholarships
3. Family
4. Emergence
5. Education
6. Extended Family
7. Loans
8. Financial Conditions
9. Networks and mentors
10. Tradition and Modernity / Role of Culture
11. Youth
12. Religion
13. Gender
14. Politics
15. Experience / Expectations with Public Officials
16. Political Activism
17. Repression/Fear
18. Tribalism
19. Health and Nutrition
20. Middle Class
21. Leisure
22. Good Life
23. Hard Working
24. Poverty
25. Money and Socialization

## 1. Growing up

In poor conditions	
1-2014	Father primary teacher, mother at time of his schooling unemployed, four children at home, would work to earn money for school fees in primary; growing up in poor economic conditions in the village
2-2014	From polygamous family, father over 30 children, mother died when he was 7, raised by stepmother, growing up in village in Masaka, Doing many house chores, economic conditions fair, could barely survive,
5-2014	Born in the village, very poor conditions, parents subsistence farmers, no one is educated, father stopped P2, mother in P1, parents in his village the poorest, eleven kids, nine are still alive, after primary no school fees for secondary, run away to KLA, lived on the streets around Kalerwe, doing small jobs, found myself 200 000, joined S1, then S2 dropped out for four years,
6-2014	From poor family, below one dollar, subsistence farmers, with lack of land, not sure even for him to finish P7, convinced father to send him to secondary, S5 father sold piece of land to support him,
7-2014	Grew up in the village in Western Uganda, from mother's side 10 children, at the beginning life was good, we had a lot of land, cows, banana plantation, when I reached S6 things started changing, dad did not love us anymore, around 2010 wouldn't give care to children, went to live with another woman, divorced mother, then came back again, but he is still with the other women, parents are not working, farmers in the village,
14-2014	Born in family of seven, biological father left, grew up with stepfather and mother in a place called Kazoo, I am first born, childhood wasn't bad, mother dealing in second-hand clothes, father mechanical work, father paid fees up to S3, then got very sick, before issues with my mum, had another lady, around S4 he passed on, had two more children outside marriage we did not know off, his family wanted that we share our land with them, mother sold it quickly before funeral arrangements, bought ready built house with the money in Bwaise, we did not have money, mother had stopped working to take care of sick person (father), house in bad shape, we were in abject poverty at that time, mother also got sick, was HIV positive but had a vision, God showed her that she was healed and he would build a house for us, got a visitor later who built a new house for them on the ground, put everything inside, someone from Watoto, we never knew who he was,
15-2014	Born in 1976 in peasantry farmer, father polygamous with seven wives, mother was fifth, father not working, grew up in a family of scarcity, from mother's side four children, started schooling in 1984 in primary, dropped out in p5 for school fees, from then started doing casual jobs, completed p7 in 1991, started working full scale in masonry, in 1998 to go back to school, agreed with headmaster to sit for O-Level exams, in 2000 joined A-Level, working on school farm and repair school buildings in order to pay fees, mother never went to school, father stopped in P7
16-2014	Coming from humble family background, family of ten, father adopted another four, I am ninth out of ten, parents aging when he was growing up, father re-

<b>In poor conditions</b>	
	tired civil servant when I went to ss, father had to sell land in order to educate the children “Because our father had retired, there was scarcity of resources, so in other words you were subjected to the deed of a hard environment, and for which you had also to become more serious, than / to ensure that you work your way out of that environment.”
17-2014	Born in 1984, grew up with father, took me away from mother, I hated her, life with step mum was not easy, too much work, dad forced me to work, separated when I was in primary, very poor father left for three weeks looking for a job, left him alone in the house with nothing, failed to come back because of lack of money, father died in 2001 when I was in Form IV, someone brought me back to school, I was on the verge of dying, started working with construction company, did not stop schooling but worked during breaks,
19-2014	Parents used to live in the village but now mother is here, father was a painter, did not go to school, mother was doing small business, they separated, I was on the street,
20-2014	Grew up in family of many children, father had five wives but wedded with mother, at age of four, five, mother died, during primary stayed with grandmother, when finished came back, the same year got saved. Father did not want born-again, stayed home for one year because he had put condition to leave aside faith – break with father
21-2014	Father business man, mother house wife, four children from mother’s side, father two other wives, childhood generally good, infancy, good, age of 11 father got job problems, stopped supporting us, mother went to Abu Dhabi to work, father would not take care of them, stayed with a best friend of mother, after one year mother missed children, came back, had to start from scratch, no home, father had sold the house, did small jobs, like selling mandazi,
8-2017	From a family of twelve, father was UPDF officer up to now, joined NRA in 1983, but to now third lowest rank, other people joined later, like son of president, he is saluting them now, so much injustice, motivated me to become an activist; I have seen people suffer so much, if someone tells me I’m hungry, I’ve been chased from home, I know. Not sure to get meal or fees to go to school
E18-17	Mother gave birth to him in jail, father was in exile, grew up with uncle
E4-2017	Have a history that people succeed not because of the system, but in spite of it → traditional family setting, polygamy, many children, only got education because uncle picked interest and paid his school fees, qualified for university, was last year that this was paid by govt

<b>In good conditions</b>	
3-2014	From Fort Portal but growing up in KLA, raised by his mother, father left the family when he was around 10 years, a family of four children, mother is a civil servant, secretary to the minister of internal affairs, would have some other business like a shop, that’s how she managed to raise four children, relying on extended family, Nakasero primary, next to state house, study university from

<b>In good conditions</b>	
	India, some other four diplomas after returning here
4-2014	Grew up in KLA, father UPDF captain, joined 1985 in Luwero, mother with small kiosk, economic situation at home decent enough, first born of five children, other brothers at university, grandfather was a miner, very rich, very influential under British, parents at one time difficulties, father was dismissed because suspected to ally with a particular army commander who fell out with the regime, but got off the hook, dismissed by court marshal, grown up with peace and security, God has been merciful
10-2014	Growing up in KLA, parents worked hard, father lecturer at Makerere Business School (MABS), mother at central bank, parents emerged socially and economically, strong believe in God, are born-again, never difficulties paying school fees for their six children,
13-2014	Grew up in the village in Central, but in good conditions, father working for coffee board, farmer, trading in coffee, life was good: school buses would bring to school, we had electricity far in the villages, uniforms, shoes given by school, from the village you could go to the best high schools, life was not harsh; mother was house wife, economic situation at home good, father never crying for school fees
18-2014	Father was agricultural officer in Moroto, Acholi by tribe, mother Karamajong, did not go to school, mother was doing farming at home, father catered for us, he had 11 wives, mother was the last one; economic situation at home was good, food was there did not lack anything; father was killed in 1990, mistaken for a rebel by NRA, mother taking care in primary, died in 1995

## 2. Sponsors / Scholarships

1-2014	for SS scholarship of Catholic church in Jinja, A-level in Kenya, Nairobi.
2-2014	Sponsor from Germany for SS, govt scholarship for Makerere, Masters DAAD stipend in Germany
5-2014	one person gave him money that brought him up to S6,
6-2014	starting from S3 got a scholarship through a white catholic priest, would work on church land as contribution, reached high marks in S4, as no one else had done before, S5 father sold piece of land to support him, well-wisher at school convinced board to give scholarship to best performing student so he got paid until S6, got scholarship for Uganda College of Commerce, finally accepted but was academically devastated because wanted to do politics
14-2014	Pastor paid for schooling
15-2014	sisters got married to affluent people, could support me, university paid by govt,
17-2014	father, paid school fees up to S3, then director of the school financed him up to S6 because he was a good student, someone agreed to finance university, but ended up in second year because of school fees
19-2014	found an organization who paid for schooling, KLA In uni applied, went for interview, got it,
20-2014	pastor came and asked father to take her to secondary, brought her to KLA, grace ministries, studied in Mengo S1-S4, stopped in S4,
21-2014	went to missionary school one sister from UK got a sponsor for me up to S4, by then she had left, I wrote her asked if she could help me out, because I performed well she supported me up to S6, then got scholarship for university, did computer science
E4-2017	Uncle paid school fees, university paid by government scholarship

### 3. Family

1-2014	One child (can't afford more), want to be good parent
2-2014	"I don't want to do these mistakes. There are a lot of mistakes I saw from/ into my father. I am trying as much as possible to run away from those and / not even to run away but to strategically see that I don't commit those mistakes." I3:3:32; Want a good family, just one wife, few kids, against polygamy, best life for his children, distancing from his father and own growing up, hugging and caring, would want kids to be religious so they wont get roadblocks, don't want kids to be in boarding, want them close by, no authoritative education, would hug and be very affectionate
3-2014	With marriage everything changes, old life left behind new one to start, party going not so much of my thing, with marriage a responsible person now, living up to expectations of society, Gods comes first, family second, career third, want four children, because I believe in strong populations
4-2014	come from a loving, caring family, parents provided everything, want to be a dad that listens, a hero for my children as my parents are, because they provide for me, wife should be a partner, not subordinate,
5-2014	Want children to be close to me, want to provide for them, with future wife should have same values
6-2015	values of parents will be transferred to children, family is important in shaping the child; if you are from a poor family very hard to make it,
7-2014	family i most important, not too much focused on career because I have family, want good relationship with my children, relationship with my mother is very good, very close, with wife we are partners
8-2014	want four children, want permanent relationship with my children, have to be God fearing, same for husband first of all, also wealth, handsome, strength,
9-2014	Family, children are very important, raise them god fearing, be part of their live, be affectionate, relationship with husband based on mutual understanding, difference with couple of parents is communication mainly; "Of course you know they [own parents] love you bout of course they wont show it. They wont give you affection, they wont hug you, they wont kiss you." I9:4:26
10-2014	family very important to me, relationship with my parents is friendly, we nearly talk about everything, I respect them but we are like peers, want the same for my children
12-2014	my kids not in boarding school, not like me, want them to be close to me, I honor my mum would never want to disappoint her
13-2014	decision making you should sit down and discuss, even include children if they are big enough
14-2014	Man has to be a born-again, because word of God changes a person, no smoking, drinking, clubbing because of religion, my life is church, maybe school, my son. with son very good relationship, I explain him everything; relationship with husband should be loving, kind of relationship of our parents not good, we discuss and agree; marriage, family is very important, to have a child changed every-



	thing for me,
18-2014	family is important, teach you true meaning of love, my father was dominating when married, but in our current relationship there is consensus rather family in quality terms than quantity, with wife now using family planning, later maybe one or two more children,
19-2014	simple family with three children, not ten, that you cannot manage, that is what I learned from my kind of life
22-2014	relationship with children is good, especially with daughter, I love her so much, discuss everything with her; in marriage man and woman should be equal, have to tell each other everything, my husband sometimes would tell, sometimes wouldn't but he would not quarrel with me, he kept quiet, he would drink but not quarrel, In a good society men have respect for women and the other way around, no hiding anything
23-2014	A bit rough on communication, through bringing up, but I love my lady; would not want my lady to be working though it is good, but if she works it should be for a good organization, why working for 200\$ and going to KLA every day, rather stay with kids, At home speak English with children and among themselves, sometimes Luganda, Lutoro;

#### 4. Emergence

1-2014	Optimistic about future: “I see myself as a young man that is out to achieve my potential to the fullest” (I1:6:54)
2-2014	good prospects for my own future, I have evolved, built up networks “You can see now, life progresses, you leave a village, you go to some fair school, come to a quite/ not very good but better high school than to the best university in the country” I3:3:22, I progress, I am like MDGs, I have socially and economically evolved, I don’t cook, eat at work or in restaurants, can’t use firewood anymore “At least out of thirty days I can survive 26 days. [laughs] And the last three days I am like broke as a mouse”
4-2014	Want to be a millionaire, about to establish myself, have plans: agriculture: growing, processing, value adding, own position is getting increasingly better, I see myself become more relevant in society, contributing in terms of ideas and materially with wealth “I am establishing myself as any other man at my age should be doing.” I4:2:11
5-2014	Don’t drink, don’t associate with wrong people; I need a brake through, just need a brake through
7-2014	“I think my life has been progressing, I must say.” I7:1:7
15-2014	“This is a person, five years or six a P7 nobody, [...] with some tools building in town there, but after seven years he is now a graduate, having / with the capacity to attract a graduate and even to go to church and wed. So this was a fundamental transformation.” I15:1:3
10-2017	No interest in politics, other priorities: “I don’t have time for that, I am focusing on more income generating activities.”
15-2017	“A car is an extra cost for money I don’t have”
6-2017	“As far as education is concerned, from my family’s point of view, I should be the first person who as gone a little bit further.”

## 5. Education

E7-2017	Education system is not producing innovators
16-2017	Children in private schools for proximity reasons, considers public education better
E4-2017	“Because normally I see people who try to fight poverty, and I am like I can’t understand how you try to fight poverty. Because for me the only thing you need to change in a household is make sure that the kids get an education. Because I have seen what I have been able to do personally in my uncle’s household, in my parent’s household, which have changed in a way you can never imagine, from the time that I entered university.”
9-2017	We are not even educated, we are of low standard education levels. Want my children to get practical education, not only to be degree holders; public schools have no standard, they have to go to private
6-2017	We are not producing innovators, but interpreters and typists
19-2012	Producing job seekers, not creators in university
Blog	How university education does not necessarily bring you a good job, ex of a plumber earning much more <a href="https://acramist.wordpress.com/2017/07/03/the-reality-of-a-university-graduate/">https://acramist.wordpress.com/2017/07/03/the-reality-of-a-university-graduate/</a>

## 6. Extended Family

As financial strain	
1-2014	Many responsibilities: wife's family, mine, his father, all the time asked to give money; but also happiness from charity (supports two girls he met at the market) "I just felt pity for them. I imagined what their life would be like if they never got a chance to go to school. (11:2:14)
2-2014	Support two brothers, a little bit the girlfriend (she works also), stepmother, other family "You have to learn how to disappoint people here."(13:5:51) owes his emergence to his family: obedience, respect for family has made me what I am
3-2014	Helping other members of the family so that they will not "disturb" you later on by remaining dependent
4-2014	no one depending on my income, I contribute to some family obligations, social functions, important not to forget own personal development over expectations of extended family, in order to avoid you do not attend so many social functions "And actually if one is not careful he may end up being too much invested in the social and even forget your personal development" 14:4:32
5-2014	on income depends one brother and another young one whom I help to pay school fees, family expect much from me by the way I look and that I don't bother them send me this, send me this, I give when I have but at times I don't have, Should be planning for children but I have to take care of my family
7-2014	I feel their expectations to help but it is not a pressure
8-2014	don't feel happy when family asks for money, but I cannot say no when I am not willing, only when I really don't have, unless I know it is not a serious issue, but not if someone's life is depending on it
9-2014	family in KLA does not expect to share money, but those in the village, per month it can be not more than 100 000
12-2014	from my account I support my relatives,
15-2014	School fees for one adopted child, helped many of extended family to connect young boys to foreign company, has helped me to reduce pressure on me: instead of looking at me they look at them for support
16-2014	"I have to make that sacrifice [of supporting ext. family] because there were others who did sacrifice for me." 116:1:1 fail to count how many people depend on my income, at any moment more than ten, relatives I am paying school fees for, Not using mobile money on phone because it makes it too easy to send money
17-2014	extended family is helpless, have turned him down before, was digging for uncle but he never paid, disintegration of the family, some members of my family ask me now for money, I help them because it is godly
18-2014	uncle paid my fees up to S4, s5-6 supported by cousin brother; brothers paid university, took cheaper course
21-2014	Life was hard, I had to see my sibling through school, mother couldn't, she got

<b>As financial strain</b>	
	arthritis, last one is still in school; “I hate this social responsibility, I hate it. I feel like it is one of the things that has kept us Africans in poverty.” I21:4:16
22-2014	paying school fees for three children of her sister, all in secondary, will take them to course for less than one million, one nephew staying with her, he is studying in MakU, I pay transport, cater for his lunch, sometimes I meet burial expenses, no safety “We have many relatives and most of us we are very poor.” “If I was alone, if I didn’t have those extended family, when I am by myself, that money could maintain me. Except the problem expensive relatives, those extended family, they are difficult.” I22:3:10
9-2017	It is too much, mother is lame, too many hospital bills, wish I had taken insurance for her
6-2017	They expect from me, but I don’t live up to it, mother expects, but I’m living tight life, I feel a lot of pressure, they deserve my hand
7-2017	“In a situation like family, you find that you have so many either followers, where you need to take care of some of their needs, yet you also don’t have.”
FN 2017	In the office: “We are prepared” when going to the family, buy 50 kg sugar and rice, everyone gets a kilo, also refuses, like her grandfather who calls her regularly, she gives him every three months, feels these obligations keep her back, if she hadn’t to pay education for her brothers maybe she would have already bought a plot of land for construction or agriculture

<b>As help</b>	
3-2014	“so of course there were financial pressures, but because of / as I was saying / because of the extended families that helped us/ groomed us, would find ourselves working and earning for ourselves.” I3:1:5
10-2014	No dependencies, sometimes pocket money to younger siblings, not happy with my economic conditions, I want to be self-sufficient, no pressure from extended family, parents help out
22-2014	if my daughter has money she can bring me some
6-2017	don’t try to bother them, they struggle, sold land to give him money to buy boda

<b>Misc</b>	
13-2014	disappointed by extended family, turned away when she was in financial difficulties only with her when she was supporting them, family cannot imagine you do not have money,
14-2014	in Buganda can have a hard time when having child w/o marriage, people frowned on me, but now they see I can take care of me and him, not a burden to the family, living a good lifestyle, so now it is seen as positive, not having a child at 40 is negative;
15-2014	extended family is a product of repression, of dispossession; want to live inde-

	pendent live from family, they feel woman has taken him, he is no longer a man
17-2014	“So everyone has to fight for his own. You don’t feed, no one wants to know. They are chasing you out of the house. When they are chasing you, people can laugh.”
19-2014	“Right now I am the only hope of the family, if I do something wrong I am failing the family and I am failing myself.”
22-2014	want to construct another place from my mothers side, family from my husband’s side gave me a hard time when the man died, gave everything in the house to his former wife and their four children, I didn’t say anything, didn’t want to quarrel
15-2017	“I don’t support anyone because they don’t know how much money I make”

## 7. Loans

1-2014	Has two: mortgage for a commercial house in KLA, one for car of the father
2-2014	no loans because one bad experience
3-2014	trying to avoid loans “I fight so much to make sure that we never get a loan again.” I3:4:28
7-2014	no loans; interest rates are too prohibitive (30%)
8-2014	business is not developing well but paid back loan [from the village]
9-2014	Two loans, one with bar, one with university to acquire the land, in total 14 million, pay back 1.2m per month, will be finished by the end of the year
13-2014	got loan from centenary, to boost business in general merchandise, but interests went up, installment became higher, failed to pay, got a friend who cleared the loan with bank but then came and took her house
20-2014	“We don’t have a loan because when you go for a loan those people want a lot of profit and this profit could have worked for our what/.” I20:2:9
21-2014	got a loan because dream to build a house for the mother, but had a bad boyfriend stole all the money, still failed to construct, still have to pay the loan and tuition “I would rather save and never take a loan again.” I21:3:11
22-2014	avoid to go to the bank and borrow loans, gives you sleepless nights
E10-17	Bank loans are too prohibitive, because they want collateral “They come and photograph your house, your TV, your chicken”
9-2017	“I tell you, I regretted [getting a loan], because I had to sell part of my land to clear the loan because the profit was much flying every now and then. [...] It is not advisable to get a loan when your business is not moving smoothly.”
6-2017	“I am planning to get a loan but what I am hearing from banks nowadays is discouraging me to go for a loan.”
7-2017	Loan with Youth livelihood program, used it to improve house of parents, and pay school fees, took land title as liability, did not manage to repay, so they still hold the land title until loan is cleared
E25-17	Criticism of microfinance, because no coordination people get many microcredits to serve loans on other microcredit facilities, interest rates are still quite high, because market oriented The future is not going to be in petty trade, we have to arrest it now

## 8. Financial Conditions

<b>Vulnerability</b>	
1-2014	“I don’t see myself getting to the lowest level of the poverty line” (I1:3:25)
2-2014	safety nets are friends, little protection through job but still feel vulnerable
7-2014	safety net is firm, other than that nothing tangible, but don’t feel economic vulnerability, as I am progressing, in case of problem I could not turn to my family,
8-2014	safety net to call a friend or relative to help me
12-2014	No vulnerability because network company will always be there
15-2014	safety net is not yet constructed, a lot of risks surrounding my life, I am just building, I am just building
16-2014	Even if money is not there you know you will not collapse; in case of problems family helps out
17-2014	Safety net: the lord
18-2014	safety nets plots of land, but almost not there, sometimes I could turn to ext. family, assured with bank for health, that is no problem,
19-2014	no safety nets because family is lower,
21-2014	can rely on social networks when myself I have financial difficulties
22-2014	Support through her own children
8-2017	I am simply surviving, that is the best word “Nothing is as bad as living a life of uncertainty, that is the definition of suffering.”
9-2017	Declining, no income from shops but only surviving on rent and land sales “I don’t have income. Actually it is a survival.”
6-2017	“Personally, I went in the experience of finding a job. And as I am seated right now, I don’t have one.” <i>but has income</i> , → <i>what does it mean to be unemployed? Status of job</i> ; no safety nets “We live by the mercy of the divine creator, nothing much.”

<b>Diversifying Income</b>	
1-2014	Poor but not in situation where not able to have money to run home, shares will always be there, houses will always be there
3-2014	Diversification of income because of interest but also because of economic benefit, just salary not sufficient to sustain family, safety nets through diversification of income “they helped the most because some of those incomes are daily, some of these are daily incomes, coming every day and you find that at least you are able to sustain a home a period of time” I3:1:8
4-2014	during the time father was not working, 2008-10 no salary, only living from other investments put in place, parents have many houses, I want to do so too.
9-2014	Safety net through bar



10-2014	but so far concentrated money on investments butiki investment group, contributing 100 000 per month, want to do some big investment after a year and a half, but just started [oct 2015: just about to acquire land]; about to register a company with a friend; have to see how these projects are evolving, maybe doing some other things as well
15-2014	Invest in business, there are better returns (instead of saving with bank)

## 9. Networks and mentors

1-2014	Older sister also scholarship in Kenya, later moved to Netherlands, pulled other sister who was following her
2-2014	<p>father influential and dominant, even though poor, was head teacher in primary school, went to school because he was his son, got sponsor from Germany until age of 18, not because they were the most in need, but because father was most influential</p> <p>have so many friends, thinking on social, economic, political terms: those to borrow money from, this one to talk about relationships etc., similar social and economic status, older friends for mentoring “Sometimes we are selfish. You will think of if I have a problem like I need a 500 000 whom do I talk to? So I need to get friends in that caliber.” I3:7:70</p> <p>going to church more about community involvement than praying, society divided among economic lines, all about where you come from, what religion you are, who you associate with, which family you come from, especially political, society is not cohesive, not easy to brake these barriers, e.g. not easy to proceed for Muslims</p>
3-2014	visiting friends, in the process you find ventures, meet for a coffee maybe twice a week, friends of all ages, a lot of them older, to pick from their experiences “That is why I use them/ok, not using them but/ that is why I make them my friends, that is why they are my friends because they have been where I am, so they guide and say ok, so where is the problem?” I3:5:36
4-2014	was job seeking for one month, got it through personal networks, friends of all ages, mine and what I call seniors, older to learn from them,
5-2014	I try to meet people I admire to get advise from them, but it is hard to reach them,
7-2014	one brother who studied in Germany was his mentor, took him to London, after law school went to Harvard Law School, he paid partly for it maybe two close friends, talk about how to bring career forward, personal things not so much to discuss
8-2014	those who are down cannot be helped, sponsors are there but in the end only the family of the organizer is helped with money
12-2014	Job at Kenya Airways through uncle; in the savings group there are people who have properties, we learn for them, and they are our customers, “So we look at them and focus on this so we can also achieve what they have achieved. And they encourage us. Many of them are our customers, they bus from us, the have supported us a lot.” I12:2:10
15-2014	go to sauna and steam bath every Sunday, costs 10 000, you meet, sweat, you meet high profile people, ministers, officers, police, civil servant “You meet people who matter and I also wanted it as a platform, my economic ground for my company.” I15:6:32
16-2014	A lot of family members (including 3-2014) are working in ministries; pay full membership at Entebbe golf club, used to go and greet the old men, to learn from them

18-2014	entering bank (job) was easy but no promotion for three years, someone passed me because he is a Munyankole
21-2014	lot of weddings to contribute to, sometimes you do it out of strategic thinking to get something back, association at old school, wanted to help out girls in difficulty, like a network, we meet once a month try to connect each other in getting jobs
23-2014	Going out with friends every day, not main purpose drinking, but because I believe I can learn from them
9-2017	Meets on roundtables with other traders, interacting, sharing ideas, to help knowing what to do
7-2017	Meet with politicians and activists every day, to build capacity, "You have to link with so many people because the fact is that in such an economic situation you need economic backup of various people in order to sustain at the struggle
13-2017	When someone joins and no one knows this person they will be detained in Luzira, no one can follow up on them
E24-17	We connected with leaders from Tahrir square, watched videos of MLK jr, deliberately building network (but not directly inspired by Arab spring)

## 10. Tradition and Modernity / Role of Culture

1-2014	rejecting of Western influence, against homosexuality brought by Westerners, deterioration of morality, loss of local languages, modernity as negative, deterioration of society
2-2014	feeling societal pressure to have children, but not yet there, delayed through staying in Germany clan life important, "I know my roots", follow traditions, greeting, respect, future wife does not need to be Muganda but show similar respect, cultural change as necessity, need to have a house to be called a man here, "so stupid society"
3-2014	culture very important, our identity, should not give up on culture, not accept modernity as such, negative influence of "Western cultures", change of dressing negative, turn away from agriculture negative, no traditional medicine anymore as negative, abandon of cultural practices like circumcision, good, that is bad, going against own cultural customs by inviting his mother to his function, because she was it that raised him should not blindly adopt another culture, still beware your own identity
4-2014	a lot of time disagreement with father, he is more authoritarian "There is nothing much I can do about him, because he is my dad, he is my senior, but there is also nothing much he can do about me, because I am now a full equal man." I4:6:40 Against homosexuality, sees it as a crime, don't like the concept, not dislike the individuals, Europe and America should learn from Uganda and criminalize homosexuality Culture is a given, it is good as long as it is ungay culture, it is not stagnant, it needs to change, but change must be constructive and meaningful;
5-2014	value my parents to 30%, they produced me, raised me, worry about me, welcome modernity, no problem with changes as long as they don't inflict with human thinking, like men having sex with men
6-2014	Wrong expectations of society: pressure to have a car, expensive wedding, big positions; I am considered unsuccessful in my village because I have no car and because I have not produced, need to make many children for the Clan; don't see anything good that kingdoms have brought to Uganda, cultural change is welcome; we need service delivery, it will not come through cultural practices, have contributed to our backwardness "But I have thought that this is not Africa's problem. I don't think Africa's problem is that I have not produced." I6:5:37
7-2014	our culture is aligning to the west, if I hadn't been educated I would be a peasant farmer living in the village, so cultural change is good, globalization is positive and negative, but more positive, negative that western cultures want to make homosexuality a law here, not proper as religious man
8-2014	cultural change is good, we learn different things, but other things are bad, like miniskirts: people have copied from other culture but abused to the extend of being naked, modernization is good because people have friends, connections, jobs which were not there before,
9-2014	culture some traditions I don't like, like kneeling, but I will teach them to my

	children, now you can meet with father in law, these changes are good. Modernization is ok, but sometimes negative, before we would meet, now only on WhatsApp, Skype; people have become more individualistic; but what I love about modernization is internet, you can find there everything; education is very important, helps people understand,
10-2014	culture not a very big role, some cultural practices are repugnant;
13-2014	culture comes first because it brings people together, I like my kabaka very much, king is above everything; modernity is good because you have to go by the situation, no longer polygamy, no circumcision, bad changes decline of role of kingdoms,
14-2014	culture is important, different cultures do different things, important respect, to kneel, going to your auntie, I don't appreciate believe in witchcraft, goes up to the Kabaka; modernity is good, especially technology, internet,
15-2014	culture gives me a sense of belonging, it is important, but culture has to change when environment changes; "And it is not possible to divorce me from where I come from, I am entirely owned by the clan." I15:9:46
16-2014	Elitist women forget true meaning of African tradition, dowry is not to buy a woman but to show that you value her; respect for mother in law; educated ladies dismiss these customs but society values them, cultural change is largely positive, but should not trash away everything, ulture very important, some things unacceptable like homosexuality, people do it in private but not promoting it, it should not be imposed on us by Western donors, if you leave it it would eventually come with cultural change, but not if people feel it is imposed on them, ex. If we would teach you to introduce polygamy
17-2014	culture not a big role, many things I don't go for like polygamy, taken positive part of culture left negative; system of man and woman should not be changed, freedom, equal right between man and woman in marriage, inequality is old culture stuff; change has to be there
18-2014	culture is dynamic, polygamy ceased because of economic conditions, culture is dynamic, aspects are good, others like beating the wife are outdated
20-2014	culture not so important, grew up from another side, in families children are not respecting elders because the parents don't respect the leaders
21-2014	Marriage difficult, it is all about society, marrying becomes very expensive; in Africa parents don't explain children anything [why father has left]; culture gives a sense of belonging and values, need to understand partner culturewise but also learning from different cultures (husband also Muganda)
22-2014	family keeps the line going, that is why I don't cut off with my husband's family, my children must know where they come from, culture makes you remember your roots, where you come from, not so much in my daily routine, cultural change is ok, some things to maintain, others not like women circumcision, bride price should be maintained;
23-2014	I am not even Ugandan, don't speak local languages
6-2017	Some practices that have come through influence of foreign cultures, like betting, drugs, other funny stuff as a result of globalization; culture still a very im-

	portant role, people pretend to be excessively modern, but at one point in life you get back in touch with traditions; the way we dress has changed, women these days walk almost naked
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## **11. Youth**

I8-2017	Need to convince fellow young people we can lead the country ourselves when Besigye has a rally, young people there, some educated, some aren't young people are exploited, not protected by policies, but desperate so they accept
E11-17	“In Kampala one of the biggest challenge for the youth is that they have nowhere to go. They end up in bars and video halls.” Drug abuse among youth, smoking weed Youth Development Fund, youth group received money but they were not sensitized and the initiative collapsed
E13-17	“There is no any youth that can go a day without opening WhatsApp” use it for mobilization, MBs come with Pakalast = affordable
14-2017	We are the leaders of tomorrow, and that tomorrow begins today
E8-17	Young people are doing the real activism

## 12. Religion

1-2014	pentecostal churches only for money and material benefits, practicing Catholic, church every Sunday
6-2014	religion as guidance to stop doing things that would destroy you, sometimes goes to church, pray with Banakole because of dancing
8-2014	religion is important, helps me calm down when I stressed out, keeps me disciplined when you fear sin
10-2014	Religion: pivotal role, you should decide whether to be hot or cold, don't want to balance things (e.g. not going to bars even if I just take soda), things I do or cannot do due to religion,
14-2014	religion to keep me on track, determines people I associate with
16-2014	religion is important but moderate Catholic, they have good values justice, equality, respect for elders, don't go to church every Sunday, don't go to sacrament;
18-2014	religion more for life after death, but above all religious values are good
19-2014	four things of importance: Church, relationship with friends, study to improve myself and God
20-2014	go to church 4-5 times a week, have a lot of responsibilities there, spend a lot of time with pastors, other people in church not so much, want to know more about God
22-2014	go to church but it is a bit far, so sometimes I pray from Bwaise pentecostal, sometimes I don't go because I work from Monday to Saturday, Sunday is the day I wash, clean, cook, if I want nice food I eat it on Sunday, church group meetings I attend once in a while on Tuesdays, when I go I stay the whole day, last Friday of the month is overnight, I make sure I don't miss that one, even if I don't pray whole month, I have to go there; religion guides you in what you are doing, originally I was Anglican, shifted to PCC because they do more counseling, children praying with PCC since long time;
23-2014	I like church, just because I don't go doesn't mean I don't like church. I am Catholic, but if I was to change religion become a 7 <sup>th</sup> day adventist, like their style, have never heard anything dirty about them, religion is just a factor to control humanity, don't like PCCs taking religion as a business, I hate hypocrisy
6-2017	I am traditionalist, I go Sunday twice a month for prayer, when I am not busy, people who say that it is backward, at night they come, to me it is more relevant than anything else, God gave me wisdom to achieve through my own language, my own cultural practices etc.

Religious leaders	
9-2017	Met with religious leaders, complained about it, national meeting they joined
E24-17	Pressure, they should defrock me because I was desecrating the collar, dismissed out of meeting from the UJCC



### 13. Gender

1-2014	role of men and women different but complementing “I have allowed her to make decision”,
2-2014	cooking as a woman’s job, any Ugandan man will say that, men to provide for home, paying rent, paying school fees, make everything available, women to supplement, in decision making no full equality, man to have last word, it is 49:51, can’t be 50:50
3-2014	women still too marginalized here “You can be a leader in the society as a female, ok, but it does not mean that when you get back home you should step on your husband.” I3:8:54
4-2014	wife should be a partner, not subordinate, but as in society you always need a leaders, so is in family, and bible says that should be the man. As long as husband is not making illogical proposition, wife should go with it for the sake of peace “So, I think, you know, patriarchy has generally been abused, but it is not entirely bad. Because patriarchy tends to establish basic tenants of leadership. There must be a reason why all religions for instance emphasize that the man is the head of the family.” I4:6:43
6-2014	women and men cannot be equal, because women are weaker, only into weddings, social gatherings, but not social, economic and political. “Nobody can put you in an inferior position without your consent.”
8-2014	husband is head of family, should run bigger part of expenses, unless I am better off than I can’t let family down, in case of disagreement I come down as a woman;
9-2014	earns more than husband, depends on situation who has the last say, he is the head of the household, I do the things around house, iron his clothes, do food, etc, but no predefined roles
10-2014	men and women should be equal, of course man is head of household but that does not mean that he should be dominant, should be complementary; have not seen my mother being beaten, but involved in running the house
13-2014	Husband should provide everything in the house, lady at home; boys don’t cook,
14-2014	later working for Securix as a technician, but issues with a male supervisor, and a driver who wanted a relationship with her, stopped to have peace of mind, man (future husband) has to be financial stable, don’t want him to be a burden to me “He, he can be the head of the family, because that is what the bible says, because the bible tells us to submit to your husband. You submit to your husband but that does not mean that he should be boss of everything.” I14-10-37
15-2014	there is a lot of injustice for women; gives example of how his family feels his wife dominates him – for him it is equal partnership (one of the few to say husband and wife should be fully equal)
16-2014	“These men started detesting the highly educated women, they go for women who have some level of education and whom they can be able to talk to and be listened to than somebody who claims to be equal.” elitist women undermine man’s authority in the home, difficult for men because nature has provided that

	a man guides the home, man is not a dictator, should be consensus in decision making; surely I cannot beat my wife, confidence is substantial for successful marriage: love justice and equality; women should have freedom, I tell my wife you have the freedom to achieve your competencies, when marriages break there is a lot of unfairness towards women, but you should not create environment where people are going to marry with the option of divorce;
18-2014	man should be leader of the house but not too much power over women, there must be negotiation

## 14. Politics

Service delivery	
2-2014	No expectations of government, bad politics, corruption, lack of service provision, hospitals in bad shape
3-2014	democracy not our thing, we adopted it but before kingdoms worked, now we can't go back, it is about politics of abuse, not politics of development, when competition for leadership no facts are discussed but only insults, immature politics NRM not 100% perfect but have done a lot of good
4-2014	Sympathize with FDC, don't like NRM, "Poverty is not just in the material, as long as I feel disempowered, you know, I cannot / I feel I cannot do anything about a given situation however much I want, that is a form of poverty." I4:8:56
5-2014	Govt has failed to do for the future generations, poor planing, govt should give capital to the youth but I never got any, politics heading in bad direction, not about developing but just personal riches, trust political leaders 50:50, "Government has completely failed to do for us what it should do for the future generation." I5:1:4
7-2014	Problem of corruption, but govt not efficient, e.g. NADS, politicians are too old, yet majority of the country are youth, trust leaders but not 100%, was politically dormant but will vote in next election, somebody young; a functioning state should provide core aspects: health and education
8-2014	if it was better maybe I would have got a sponsorship for free education, you get nothing in the gov
10-2014	most of things NRM are doing is bad, but others are not better; right now need from state atmosphere to carry out my work, no wars, free of terrorists, economy growing steadily
13-2014	"I rent it to this regime, it is a bad one. They have taken all the wealth from certain tribes into their hands." Now everything is worse, land for digging is scarce, with regime economy went down, quality of life has gone done, When regime came in, deliberate efforts to destroy coffee industry, I believe wanted to erase our tribe, all offices is one tribe now; no service provision, regional imbalance; hospitals in bad shape but politicians fly their kids out of the country for treatment; we are heading to another genocide, because everything is owned by one tribe, those who cry are many, those who have are few
14-2014	no interest in politics, God chooses leader, I leave everything take its course; I vote because there has to be a leader, last time Besigye, don't trust political leaders, I have mercy, govt not considering small people, authority comes from above, LC on the ground cannot do anything but implement; people from the govt are the ones with guns
16-2014	No longer possible to get govt scholarships for University; visited more than 30 African countries, there is a structural problem, economy not structured to the benefit of citizens, independence never fully achieved, policies designed

<b>Service delivery</b>	
	by colonial regime remain, politicians can't do better, but they also don't want to. main challenge to put governance right, need for peaceful transitions, things are there we are not organized to use them properly, more accounting to donors than to citizens; for the time being have to trust those in power
17-2014	Have to believe in leader, don't fight him, if you want change you introduce yourself what is good, if the leader doesn't change, the people will change, change will force him to change. I am training a generation Good changes: good roads, easy to turn maize into flour these days, bad changes: people fighting for nothing, both opposition and govt messed up, some I trust. opposition is just fighting
18-2014	In good society should be equality, based on merit, not nepotism, in Uganda a lot of unfairness, promotion because related to manager in the bank, a lot of tribalism, institutions are abused, institutional weaknesses, I don't trust political leaders;
19-2014	Politics is kind of circus, right now UG not sustainable, don't trust political leaders, 80:20,
20-2014	Politics is a dirty game, full of lies, leaders are put their by God so I trust anyone who is in leadership, I trust current leaders so much, people are misusing freedom of speech, talking bad about leaders, not respecting them
23-2014	Govt is rocketing some people while bringing others down as deliberate strategy, reached a point where I fail to identify with my country;
8-2017	Country messed up so much, better we mess it up ourselves than getting messed up by those who have done it for the past years expired things in supermarket, drugs in pharmacies are bad, metaphor of parent who has lost respect of child because MPs are not living up to their role, providing services for the country
E11-17	"If there is a pothole, why to wait for state council? You pay the money and we fix it."
16-2017	Lack of service delivery
E2-2017	"A medical facility should have medicine, if it is a school, it should have teachers." on expectations of MC on service delivery
6-2017	University, hospital, police in 2014 strikes for higher salaries were denied, but MPs got a lot of money during that time
14-2017	Common man pays taxes, but at the end no cancer machine in the hospitals, where to taxes go Police not independent, is serving ruling government, not considering all Ugandans in parliament, President decides laws, not looking at interest of common man, parliament is after money
13-2017	Growing up in a slum, service deliver is not good, sanitation is bad, health centers lacking
E25-17	Education service delivery taken over by private sector, if you want a good

<b>Service delivery</b>	
	school, it has to be private → KCCA effort through PPP to have some good public schools ( <i>as means of generating income, I guess</i> )
E8-2017	Exhaustion is on everyone's face, they are tired of everything, in hospital material is lacking

<b>Corruption</b>	
2-2014	corruption
4-2014	don't like corruption, fight it whenever I sense it, gives examples
5-2014	Money is being eaten
6-2014	MPs are bribed
7-2014	Problem of Corruption
8-2014	Too much corruption
9-2014	now corruption too bad, we are in chaos, everyone is doing what he wants, boda bodas don't respect traffic laws, people struggle to make ends meet, crime rate is high, "but now, the corruption has just eaten everything." I9:1:2 "Because the corruption has become part of us, it is in our skin, you can't get any / even if you say you are a practicing Christian, you are a pentecostal, whatever are your principles, you cannot get any services if you haven't paid." I9:1:3 future for country bleak, corruption too high; Everyone who supports the big man cannot be touched, all money on supporting the big man instead of bringing services; Kagame in Rwanda stamped out corruption;
10-2014	In a good society people are supportive, it is free of corruption
14-2014	corruption a big problem;
15-2014	church is not helping because they glorify the corrupt leaders, giving them front seats
16-2014	Corruption is the most annoying thing, all the money in Swiss banks and busy developing these countries,
18-2014	but too much corruption, right from top, now people at lower level look at corruption as way of life,
19-2014	Corruption
22-2014	When we got retrenchment the world bank payed all those, but money was mis-managed, so we got very little, we got a lawyer, but he was paid off and said "your case is very difficult, we cannot handle", too much corruption
8-2017	Wanted to join police, dismissed because of corruption
E11-17	LC1 has eaten a lot of the money, e.g. from plot sales, contributions for road constructions, for garbage truck from KCCA to come you have to bribe the driver
E19-17	Govt deletes payroll to clean up, corruption at district level [teachers on payroll but non-existent]

<b>Corruption</b>	
E21-17	KCCA bought USAFI from private person for 39bn, this is too much, there has been corruption
10-2017	Explains how he has bribed to get a job as civil servant, paid about 1 million, in the end failed
E2-2017	People bribe because out of necessity, to get medicine, secure their living after retirement, etc. “It is a moral economy that emerges out of the crisis of neoliberalism.”
9-2017	Corruption because Asians pay indirect bribes, have less taxes etc., Asians are bribing politicians to penetrate East African market
6-2017	In some places you have to bribe to get a job, like in Mukwano industry, had to bribe someone to connect me; for girls it is worse, and often you don't get a job
14-2017	Officials only want to satisfy themselves, do not consider common man
E25-17	Corruption at KCC too much, at point that even no capacity to mobilize funds
E24-17	“Because to fight corruption is to fight the government. And the government knows it, it is obvious. Fighting corruption today is fighting Museveni. Fighting corruption today is fighting Museveni's government. Why? Because it is a government that only functions through theft and lies and so on.”

<b>Elections</b>	
1-2014	waste of time to vote, don't see benefits
4-2014	election results are not credible, 9 billion invested for M7 campaign but only 5 billion for poverty alienation for youth; vote because of civic responsibility
9-2014	last election I voted FDC, next election will not waste my time, votes are rigged;
10-2014	next ten years no change because of vote rigging, using state resources to campaign, I vote, last time I was prevented, tried three different polling stations it was not possible, intended to vote for Norbert Mao, this time again unless Mbabazi stands
13-2014	used to participate in elections, but tired of rigging, voted for Besigye
22-2014	voted for Besigye last time, I will vote if current president does not stand, because otherwise my vote will be wasted
23-2014	why should I elect, I stopped voting because I can already predict the results, I was voting for DP. I rather go to the beach and get some fresh air.
E11-17	Because LC1 elections approaching, do not talk politics in the office, as compete for different parties, encourage citizens not to engage in violence: metaphor of men competing for a girlfriend
15-2017	“It is a waste of time. They are going to rig, what the heck”
16-2017	Hopefully we have new candidates
9-2017	Vote buying

<b>Elections</b>	
7-2017	We wouldn't be having Museveni if Ugandans were serious
14-2017	Our democratic principles are not respected, in some constituencies voter intimidation through guns, tortured and forced to vote
FN 2017	YOU, the people, are the problem, vote for small bribes

<b>Museveni</b>	
2-2014	He is 80 [thus over legal right to stand for presidency] not 70
8-2014	I trust M7, but not the cabinet, the people he is surrounding with are bad, too corrupt
9-2014	don't trust political leaders, president was good, but then went against his own principles so had to drop everyone who disagreed, now surrounded by hungry people who are selfish.
10-2014	not a bad man but surrounded by bad people,
11-2014	Politics is always the same since I was born, all about individual benefits, that is why President says no one can take over his shoes, at least under him the country has been developing, I have only been voting Museveni, the only president I have seen, because no one else is there to administer the country
15-2014	believe in unity and don't believe in visions
17-2014	President is not the problem but ppl surrounding him, thank God for President now he is a Christian, a believer, but he has played his role and his time is out (comparison to Saul in the bible), yet voted for him in 2011
18-2014	M7 and govt don't want to change because only way for them to survive,
22-2014	M7 not managing youth unemployment
23-2014	president as individual not bad, people around him, he is misguided
8-2017	No difference between Museveni, Besigye, Mugisha Muntu, all still believe in NRA ideology people not passionate about change because of what Museveni has done, can walk freely,
16-2017	Voted NRM because Museveni was the best candidate
2-2012	In 2017: voted Museveni, even though many things are bad, but no alternative, I rather remain with the thief I already know."

<b>Leadership transition</b>	
1-2014	one person too long in power, comparison with Libya, Congo, need term limits "There will be need for revolution again. There will be need for second revolution." (I1:5:45)
2-2014	30 years in power no one else a chance,
4-2014	don't like NRM especially thinking that there is only one man with a vision,

<b>Leadership transition</b>	
	wants to make family successor
6-2014	Museveni overstaying,
10-2014	Need change in leadership, starting from the president, if not by ballot than change through fate, old leaders will die, next ten years
15-2014	most fundamental challenge now peaceful transitions, because so far transition of power only through coups
16-2014	“Another issue is the regime longevity. [...] most of the regimes, when they have just come in power, they performed so well, but when now they have ambitions of longevity, to stay as long as possible, they are totally diverted. They shift from the development focus.” I16:4:25
17-2014	being in leadership for years and doesn’t want to leave, that is ignorance; regime concerned to maintain status quo, change comes either by forces of nature or one day people will answer that man
19-2014	an ideal system the president leaves after some time, peaceful change of leadership
22-2014	cannot trust political leaders, so many have overstayed, should leave place for younger ones in 2017: “Already ten years is too much. In marriage it is good, but not in politics.”
23-2014	failure to groom a successor, in Rwanda genocide because of that problem, democratically we are still infants, TZ is a good example of peaceful transition; “I wouldn’t mind a leader leading for 20 years, 30 years, 40 years, but is he taking care of what is necessary? Hospitals, social services, like roads, are they good? Or is wealth distributed equally over the country?” I 11:4:15 “There is just one man who has a vision. So when one man dies, what happens? Everybody goes blind?” 5:26
8-2017	My generation to change the country, has been messed up by Bushmen, cannot understand our needs as generation
E18-17	“Unless Museveni leaves power, nothing will change” change will come because he is old
16-2017	A lot has been achieved, but no maturity thinking, may start as a good leader, but if you stay too long, you make mistakes “You leave when people still need you”
9-2017	95% of Ugandans want change, but not through W2W, you go on the ground and convince people to vote for somebody else (but believes votes are bought)
6-2017	Opportunities non-existent, unless we get change in leadership, this is why I network here, to find a way of replacing this kind of leadership with someone who serves interest of the people “We are blessed that the regime is crumbling. It has now more problems than it has ever had before. Thanks to some of us who have come up and add a [...] So I am seeing a better day coming, not so far away from me.”
7-2017	Joined FDC because Besigye has portrayed a signal, if we don’t get rid of this



<b>Leadership transition</b>	
	person today, he will be a problem of this country tomorrow; need for Museveni to leave so that we can rebuild this country
13-2017	Current president is a freedom fighter, went to bush to liberate the country, why would he love to take it back to where it was? We've grown up, we've been born in Museveni's regime, but we have said, enough is enough. It is high time to at least give chance to another leader. Fighting for peaceful transition, no militia change of government
E8-2017	"Uganda is ripe for a change and it is not far. It is not far."
51-2012	In 2017: no more change, development because overstaying in power, Museveni has been there for too long <i>with lowered voice</i>

<b>Stability</b>	
1-2014	Stability yes, but no chance for institutions to develop
4-2014	Museveni brought stability but built structures that cannot persist without him
7-2014	first years of M7 was chaotic, now stabilizing,
8-2014	Govt has brought peace first and foremost
10-2014	Museveni disciplined army, but other than that? No tangible developments,
15-2014	brought stability, revolutionary forces different from divisions of the past; balancing out between regions;
18-2014	Now there is peace, that is the most important, "But anyway what I can say that there is peace. What has changed is that there is peace because the time I was growing up, guns were in wrong hands, people were being killed." I18-2-5
22-2014	as long as Museveni is there, we are secure, because along military lines he shines off,
11-2017	"I am not yet academically qualified to handle chaos. So I needed him." [why voted for NRM]
16-2017	At least now we have security, before that was a problem
7-2017	"And I am always someone who believes that we can always have temporary instability if it guarantees permanent stability."
13-2017	"Actually, they always tell us at police stations, when they detain us, what are you after? We fought for this country, do you want to take it back where it was? There is a patriotic causes that they want to always teach Ugandans, the youth and all Ugandans that being patriotic is being silent to such issues."

<b>Past presidents</b>	
7-2014	Obote was more organized, govt programs were implemented,
10-2014	Uganda under Obote the best, had all 22 districts at heart in development;

<b>Past presidents</b>	
	roads, hospitals were built,
13-2014	under Idi Amin it was good, brought things back to the natives, Obote was good because there was no corruption, he had spirit of the country, was disturbed by so-called rebels;
18-2014	Not during interview but in our first meeting explained me at length what a good leader Obote has been
22-2014	first govt of Obote was best, during Amin was killing, indiscriminately, but economically it was not bad, some commodities were lacking, like salt, sugar;
23-2014	Amin ruled for nine years but laid foundation of what is there today, M7 in 30 years nothing tangible, ok, killing is not there, but they will bring you down;
E18-17	Father was soldier under Amin, now in exile, did a lot for this country but now cannot stay a second here, I was jailed for the wrongs my father did
15-2017	Amin has built Serena hotel, in 21 <sup>st</sup> ct you are saying you're building roads.
E2-2017	You wonder how did people survive under Amin, but one of best education systems, because people circumvented state, parent teachers association, resilience and self-reliability
9-2017	In 1970's Amin chased Indians, that is the reason we are here, they have tried several times to penetrate the market

<b>State and economy</b>	
8-2017	KLA belongs to few people, Sudhir Ruparelia owns 50% of buildings, rich people use government money to build all these, rich men are seasonal, finished if fall out with government
E24-17	Link between free enterprise and democracy, but in our context those in charge of state power capture the economy → no free enterprise in classic sense "One of the first things that in many of our countries, those who capture state power very, very deliberately embark on a process of capturing the economy. And they use state power essentially to capture the economy. And therefore kill private enterprise in its classic sense." → e.g. Sudhir

<b>Opposition</b>	
6-2017	FDC has a party manifesto, like economy not in the hand of foreign investors, want to bring back PPP, more public investment; people outside political spectrum do not understand, see it was petty things Museveni against Besigye
E8-2017	There are no political parties yet; democracy: we are just trying

## 15. Experience / Expectations with Public Officials

5-2014	public officials refuse to pick phone think you call for money yet you seek advice, promise to call you back but then will not answer your calls
6-2014	Panafrica members invited to parliament to present their petition on GMO bill, but he is convinced that it is just a formal procedure, and will not yield anything if it is against the interest of the government
8-2014	contact with govt officials: one relative is a lawyer in govt, but don't know much about him, in village chairman stood with mother and children when father wanted to sell off their land
9-2014	one time I interacted with public official, LC, wanted bribes, was not helpful, what about our taxes?
10-2014	contact with influential judges because personal friend of the family, talked about how you need to bribe to make your file advance, maybe did not stop it but rang a bell
14-2014	never contacted public officials, what will they do? Even police bad experience, someone stole her chairs and money, she went to the police, he just bribed them and left, same story in other police stations
17-2014	I have some personal access to official but not so many because my ministry is young, talked to one MP of the East, talked to LC in my village that he should not sideline but lead all people: born-again, Muslims, Cath.
18-2014	current minister of foreign affairs, their village about 16km from our home, promised me to connect me to someone to pay for university, but did not assist me much, so brothers stepped in;
22-2014	one politician was helping me with brother in laws son, paid his school fees;
E11-17	LC1 is voluntary work, of group of ten only three active, we have tried to train crime preventers, it is a challenge, bulungi bwansi as community volunteering, fixing potholes etc.
E18-17	Transport sector does not benefit from govt programs on HIV, youth livelihood, adult education
11-2017	Rarely Ugandans ask regime for something, because they know they are corrupt
16-2017	Can turn to LC1, but rarely get solutions
E23-17	Through association want to increase security, make background checks on new riders, call for more security organs within the sector; support with accidents, for orphans, support to go back to school, sensitization for HIV/AIDS <i>a lot of developmental issues, maybe also because hope to access foreign funding, thus repeating donor agendas?</i> Not see themselves as trade union, but as how to get funds and facilities from govt and NGOs, access to loans
E4-2017	Policy makers not in the habit of reading, known fact here → ACODE for implementation, not only writing papers; STON: direct connection w/ govt, if I want something done, I just pick the phone and call

9-2017	Petitioned govt on Chinese, but nothing was done, feels ignored by politics, controlling bodies are not on the ground S: govt organs to give advice and visas, but we don't want money KACITA: cannot do anything for us, problem is too specific Govt has failed to protect us, let Asians penetrate our market
6-2017	We petitioned parliament, wrote proposals to tackle problem of unemployment, but ended in waste basket, concepts, letters, sought meetings, no one paid attention, met some ministers, they ask what is your personal problem as you? Concern not the country, but security, tell us we want to cause insecurity
13-2017	Petitioned parliament when they disagree, it is constitutional right, but they try to stop you
E8-2017	Even if you write recommendations, they ignore it
FN 2017	DRCC: poor seeking government intervention to get out of poverty, give it personally (transport, school fees, medical costs), wealthier: on land issues, landlords seeking to evict tenants, etc., MC how to access loan schemes, inform about govt programmes
19-2012	No [the government has no effect], because I / everything I do, I pay for it. There is nothing free that I get, as a result of being helped by the government. It does not help me pay for school fees, it does not help me to pay my medical bills or my family, it does not help me to anything. So I don't feel anything like an effect. I stand on my own
Pan-africa	Before state played a positive role in ppls life, now more of enabling environment and individuals take care of their own welfare

<b>KCCA</b>	
8-2017	For whom are you cleaning the city? Expelling hawkers, not providing an alternative, do it gradual, build markets first
E5-2017	Relationship with KCCA, can't say it is the best, wanted to write us off the list of KLA markets, but we are legally here, have a MoU with the owner <i>finally got closed one month later</i>
E13-17	Request to KCCA for street lights in Kololo, slashed also bushes, repaired road damages, now road is open, better visibility
E16-17	KCCA took over from UTODA, streamlined into one fee, plus loading fee, got them to court on that one, won, but one month later minister came back with fee; in case of strike KCCA used extra force, brought pioneer buses to obstruct strike law to make loading along the roadside illegal sold taxi park to an investor, we are in court other this, would have bought the land ourselves
E23-17	Banning BB's in the city will never happen, only threat so that they will eventually pay taxes, as BB 2010 we support the tax, s it does something for the industry, hope to receive a contribution from that

<b>KCCA</b>	
13-2017	KCCA passed resolution with lord mayor for hawkers to sell from 5-10pm, when shops are closing, but technical wing refused
E25-17	Banning hawkers to support shop owners from KACITA; compares protest by hawkers to protest from thieves if you put a police on the door; only city where the rich do not pay property tax, hard to change law because MPs staying in the city, no interest in changing the law

## 16. Political Activism

Political Activism	
2-2014	comes from political family, not mainstream political thinking, ideologically member of a party but remain non-partisan for now, at status quo better in opposition, but risk to be killed if perceived as a political threat, I have evolved politically, have better analysis now
3-2014	“Totally my area of interest can never go into politics.” I3:6:44
4-2014	no political ambitions right now but in the future I will contest
5-2014	don’t involve myself in politics, fear of disadvantage if I show support for a party, I need much help and don’t know who I get it from,
6-2014	<p>earned 20 million used it to build some capacity for his own party now volunteer at Panafrica, depend on good will of colleagues, I am with civil society, but I don’t believe in CS, it is more about getting money and security is harassing them, first I retreated to NRM now I retreated to civil society “We are the only regular debate forum in this town. And if you are the only regular debate forum in KLA, then you are the only regular debate forum in this country.” I6:4:20</p> <p>I want change, issues with other political parties as well, politically active, organized youth conference on oil, wanted to protest for greater transparency in oil exploitation, but this kind of activism does not work here, regime always gets what it wants, we need to act otherwise, no democracy, “I don’t see the reason why to go to parliament, where if you make good laws they will not be implemented”</p> <p>people fear disadvantages so they don’t openly join, last year stopped talking publicly because fear of harassment, keeping low profile;</p>
8-2014	I would like to have opportunity to become a minister, change things,
10-2014	I intend to join politics at an advanced age;
14-2014	don’t like political activism because usually there are problems, chaos, running up and down “Because I believe me as I feel, there are even others who feel the same way, I can’t change anything.”
15-2014	in 2009 job with ministry of defense in marketing, but in 2010 decided to contest for MP, as civil servant you have to be non-partisan, Parliament outside Parliament, NRM Media Activist forum Went into politics because I consider myself the best, near to those people, know their problems
16-2014	love politics but don’t practice, rather be kingmaker than king, contribution in my way through working for ministry
18-2014	if I establish business that can sustain myself outside my job then I may come into politics, maybe 2021, but not 2016 “In 2011 I wanted to leave the bank to participate [in politics], but when I saw the environment I withdraw.” I18:8:42
8-2017	<p>Do not fight to be known, activism and articles bring more trouble than publicity, fight for the rights of people</p> <p>“If you ever see a rat running to hide in fire, you must bear in mind that whatever is chasing the rat is worse than fire.”</p> <p>“This is my war, the haves vs the havenots. Haves are very few, but are orga-</p>

<b>Political Activism</b>	
	nized, they have sources, networks, we the havenots are very many but we are disorganized, we are poor and we no network. My plan is to organize them, network, and lead them towards a common cause.”
E11-17	Village council meeting every 2-3 months, about 200 people attend
E17-17	“Buganda is hibernating, we are told to survive in any situation, the issues are still there.”, need for a spark
15-2017	“I am a coward, I like things easily.” but sees benefits: “You need something like that [BR, W2W] so that those in power can think clearly.”
E2-2017	“Many people come here and wonder why aren’t we shouting so much about everything that is wrong in this country. But that is because people, when people have all these hardships around them, they find coping mechanisms, and one of the coping mechanisms is let me improve myself, let me self-preserve.” → retreat into private sphere, entrepreneurship as an example, private schools, also in health sector, even churches and mosques, because when people have these problems they have recourse in celebrating life He is active because he doesn’t want his children to face the same problems in 20 years
E4-2017	If you want to do an activism, you take your ebimeeza down town, get all these young people, boda boda and whatever.” → STON as opposed to activism
E12-17	“For the last fifteen years, there has been some fatigue against the ruling government. And people are always looking for an opportunity to protest against the establishment. So I think that is also an important factor that is in. We have this group of annoyed people. People who are annoyed. Who see the current regime as doing things which are very wrong for the country. So those ones also joined, actually, because they were seeing a particular face of the person who is giving away the forest.” also campaigning anti-GMO, but very complex issue, hard to break down for people
6-2017	Another activism: mourning for our country, funeral for our country because young people went abroad and were killed there; 49 participants, all got arrested; want to intensify in politics because want to change leadership; want to contest in upcoming election; “We are in a society where people think some people will come and do things for us. People will come and liberate us, people will come and bring the goodness of/ I had to go to these political caravans and tell them, look guys we are too old to wait for a savior we better get up ourselves and start pushing this thing. The change we want must come initiated by us, always.” → many people have shown interest in this kind of responsibility <i>similar to Michael</i> recruitment through facebook page, we go to where they are and they admire our courage
7-2017	Believe it is upon us to change the situation
14-2017	Want to run for parliament in 2021; youth councilor, he and 13-2017 are political activists, identify issues and speak out on behalf of the common man, have a group, distribute tasks, stage an activity, first call media to let them now

<b>Political Activism</b>	
	majority of people on the streets are young
13-2017	Working class men go to bar, have beer, debate latest news, but cannot go on beyond that, fear losing job if going to the street, cannot be arrested and detained for 48 hours
E8-2017	People who have read and understand constitution paid a deaf ear to the call for action. “And that is when you produce things like armchair activists. Come on, I just sit in my chair and write a few things and think I am contributing to my country.” to get MC to participate actively is still a struggle, don’t want to bite the hand that feeds them, only when it comes to issues that affect them directly, like oppressive laws or policies, then they will ask for people to come on board but see shifting trend, more people are becoming concerned, talk more about politics
E8-2017	There is fragmented activism when it concerns us; people don’t perceive themselves as actors
FN	<p>“It is as if you are riding with a bicycle and you are passing an accident. You see the man lying on the street. It hurts you in your chest while you continue riding, but you cannot do anything. If even those in the big cars don’t stop, what can you do?”</p> <p>H: came to activism because Owino was burnt down, destroyed her property, her friend Z. became an activist, even though coming from comfortable background close to NRM, early activism, at one point chose a party so people know where you stand, so chose FDC</p> <p>deputy mayer of KLA central: “Even though I am a member of the opposition, I will never go on the street to demonstrate, because it is not secure. It is for personal benefit, not for the nation.”</p>

<b>Jobless Brotherhood</b>	
8-2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Idea to protest against what was taking place in this country, pig as metaphor for selfishness and greed, doesn’t even bother about own kids → MPs lived up to this</li> <li>• 2013 idea of founding the jobless brotherhood, took 8 months to study dynamics of parliament, security, detail how we work → June 17<sup>th</sup> 2014 Mpigs “our activism has [made us] become used to jail”</li> <li>• believe in non-violent means, to make police look ridiculous chasing pigs</li> <li>• training in Tunisia, contacted on social media from ActionAid Denmark, Solidarity Uganda, Beautiful Trouble</li> <li>• 5000 members countrywide</li> <li>• recruitment centers in Universities, critical thinking (other than villagers) and know they will join in joblessness after graduation</li> <li>• meetings at FDC office, had office but closed for lack of cash</li> <li>• three more pig activities, another yellow, one in all colors for MPs, recently dead pigs thrown at parliament</li> <li>• thinking of rebranding in brotherhood movement, to include also those</li> </ul>



<b>Jobless Brotherhood</b>	
	with jobs, brotherhood because God created man, ratio 3:7 for women
6-2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not registered, formed after realizing that many of our age, educated but not employed</li> <li>• MPigs as way to capture attention of ruling class, context 2014 a lot of strikes, at uni students and lecturers and non-teaching staff, medial workers at hospital, national referral hospital was not functioning, protest from wives of policement, wanted salary increment, but was denied; same year 36 billion for remodeling parking space at parliament, 3 billion to purchase iPads for MPs, brand new presidential cars</li> <li>• pigs as symbol for ugly animal that overeats</li> <li>• “So we went together with [8-2017] and/ we wanted to have the pigs on the floor of parliament, meaning that the ministers and the MPs who meet in this building, all they do is to eat and eat and sleep and eat, yet they are eating at our expense. Our children are not getting quality education because we are buying them cars.”</li> <li>• unintended consequences: security budget for parliament was increased, because that could have been terrorists</li> <li>• media has given us good coverage, even though sometimes misrepresent the message</li> <li>• inspired by guys in Egypt, wondered what could bring us together, as people of our age? Joblessness</li> </ul>
7-2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joined after a series of other activism, in charge of research and lead publicity team</li> <li>• MPigs made it three times (<i>now four</i>)</li> </ul>

<b>Walk to Work</b>	
8-2017	Campaign premature, lacked script, Besigye vs M7 has personalized the struggle, not certain what campaign should achieve
E17-17	Not everybody believed vote was stolen, therefore harder (than BR) to join
E18-17	“For me, I am not a politician, but when I saw the objectives of W2W, I convinced my fellow drivers to join.”
10-2017	Support the idea, but deviate from the means
11-2017	Did not trust Besigye, he is not genuine
9-2017	Did not support because of confusion between FDC and NRM government, W2W hidden agenda, don't think this is the solution to change the government, fail to see point why walk to work
E12-17	Only played on a political basis, political sentiments, challenging status quo, so supporters of the govt trying to shun w2w
6-2017	Participated, organized, was in charge of one division, would take groups of people and explain them power of non-violence. Everyone was feeling the pressure of high prices, concerned everyone. Regime hired goons to tarnish name of the campaign and FDC, but we insisted that we followed non-violent ap-

<b>Walk to Work</b>	
	proach; protesters were middle class and poor people, teachers, medical workers, police officers, but mostly poor, famous in Kalerwe, Kawempe, Kasubi, Kireka, not in Ntina, Bugolobi, Nakasero; it was mainly economical, so no middle aged person, only youth, the economically and politically disadvantaged
7-2017	It was good, good intentions, answered some questions, about high prices, it was good, but some were affected, blessed and dead “But to me, all that is good to expose a dictatorial state. It is always good that a dictator is exposed and at the moment he is exposed to a level that even his own or her own people can no longer associate with him or her.” Included all classes, MPs were on pick ups because they left their vehicles at home, business men, what failed w2w was lack of programming, people thought it was a political, not economic affair
E8-17	Walk to work a powerful campaign, but govt cannot handle this amount and volume of protest, so they interrupt them from the beginning
FN 2017	Too much dominated by politicians, who follow their own interests “You don’t even know anymore who is working for Uganda. One day they are on the street, the other they pass their tax exemption.”
19-2012	100% supportive, Given a chance, if I was not being employed somewhere, I would have joined them, of course. Just to add my voice to theirs, of course.
5-2012	Initially supported, but later became skeptical about intentions

<b>Buganda Riots</b>	
E17-17	Mobilization did not start the day of the riot, but months prior; background of the BR basic right to move freely was restricted, when first announced NZ started preparing: a month before arrival, prepared place, cut sticks, got machete in case Banyala stop king from attending, students ready to prepare a war, in his section about 800-1000 students, went back to KLA because knew kabaka would be stopped and prepared to protest, when katikkiro was stopped went to Kisekka to get old tires, burnt them at every junction, stopped traffic during day able to take the city, because nearby army all Baganda, over night flew in army from Karamoja, then South Sudan, for two days no control over the city, NZ in ever uni, used for mobilization, people from the West feared, ran away to Nairobi, in the end 200 land titles returned to kabaka, now free to move Case is still in court, but govt doesn’t want it to be heard, out of fear for new protest 40% of people arrested were not Baganda, framing as ethnic violence to tarnish Baganda, brushes of attack on Westerners Issue was in our heart, everybody believed it was unconstitutional at Kisekka market Baganda leadership for informal sector, this is why we went there, since then market sold off to investors
E18-17	Participated, because “If whatever they organize can bring a change, I have to participate.”

<b>Buganda Riots</b>	
11-2017	Did not support, because they were tribalistic [himself from the West], funded by Mbeki of RSA
9-2017	Supported, but did not participate, was not around
E12-17	Similar effect than Mabira, promoted by Baganda, but because in this region it was effective
6-2017	Participated, but not on an organizational basis like in W2W, it was organized by Nkoba Zambogo, it was too much, you just find yourself in the mix, would write Manila charts, was a tribal thin, with Westerners asked a question, if they couldn't pronounce it properly they were punished, mostly reserved for Baganda
7-2017	Did not participate; it was framed as Buganda issue, but I think it is wrong, because everyone should be free to go where they want
23-2012	Wanted to participate, but by that time it had turned sour
19-2012	Because I think it has an unfair from my cultural leader to be hesitated from going / be hindered from going to a certain part of the country, which is under his ownership. All things in the country, most especially in the city have to get stalled for three days. There was no business in the city for three days. There were bullets everywhere. People were shutting their homes. So, yeah, it was a big signal to the government that people love their king and they should be doing what they want.
33-2012	President solved it
8-2012	Run badly by the government
13-2012	Badly managed by government

<b>Mabira Forest</b>	
E18-17	Main organizer, blocked one road, protect climate and against investors who have made us suffer a lot (taxipark sold off to them, will not employ us)
9-2017	Supported but did not participate
E12-17	In 2007 govt wanted to give away 1/3 (21 000 ha) of Mabira to Metha Group to use for sugar cane plantation, forest has many virtues, economically for people living there, ecologically to balance climate, rain, etc. and culturally for Baganda; mobilized Buganda kingdom, local communities, churches, IRC prayed at beginning of demonstrations, NGOs and CBOs, traders (KACITA), academic institutions, donor community, parliamentarians from both parties, to have peaceful demonstrations, brought petition to parliament, but too many people, some looting and vandalism, organizers went for two weeks to prison, on trumped up charges like terrorism, murder, theft, accused to topple the government, eventually won the case. Media played a big role in mobilizing, even leaders have been overwhelmed by number of people to join on the street (say it were 100 000), became a national issue, also question of race because of Ugandan of Indian origin → not sup-

	<p>ported by NAPE, but always people on the ground who appropriate a cause for their own intentions, king proposed to give them land elsewhere, but they did not accept; boda bodas, unemployed youth joined also → protest against govt; civil servants supportive but cautious to go on the street, original demonstrators were well off, not unemployed, leading in the meetings; young protesters 15-55, also important people from Buganda who put on their kanzus, World Bank put also pressure because it would diminish the water levels in the Nile that were supposed to keep Bujagali running (WB financed); Indian community also joined</p> <p>Now status: have put it off the table for now, but issue can come back, maybe if President buys more cannons, and guns, he may think people are too afraid to protest</p>
6-2017	<p>Had a rage against Indians, I must confess, saw an opportunity, I don't want to talk about it, having worked with them I remember how they used to treat me, so I had to pay back, don't want to say it was non-violent, and when I look back I feel sorry, I come from Mukono, I have grown up in forests, "When I came to the city the shops were closed and there were some warnings over the radio, and the message was clear. The problem is Indians." I knew where the Indians were, those illegal immigrants from India/ I had to participate in one way or the other</p> <p>Mabira people participated regardless of their tribal affiliation, not only youth, but even MPs, middle class people</p>
7-2017	<p>Fully engaged, from Jinja, organized debate on virtue of forest, then went there, threw logs on the street, it happened thrice, 2007, 2011, last year after election, I don't know why always after election, to divert peoples attention maybe</p>
E24-17	<p>Save Mabira focused on a particular issue, corruption is more vague</p>
E8-2017	<p>An MP is leading, bunch of elites under civil society and youth rallying behind, they are constant</p>

<b>Black Monday</b>	
E18-17	<p>Supported, because anti-corruption, but wearing black clothes cannot intimidate Museveni, it must bring a loss to his government. Non-violence (smiles and shakes head), Museveni fears violence</p>
E2-2017	<p>Started at time of big corruption scandal in prime ministers office, what can we do? Make a campaign that appeals to everyone, where everyone can participate, very personal "So it is not about fighting something out there, but it is about me as a citizen, seeing myself as part of this country, being part of the change I would like to see." → wearing black t-shirts every Monday, simple action; publish a newsletter every month, detailing corruption scandals, call to shun businesses involved in corruption</p> <p>arrests, media coverage, gave them nationwide attention, also one public action, like going to school if headmaster was not scared</p> <p>one challenge: seen as an NGO thing, something that NGOs are pushing, others to feel that corruption is too big to fight, even though many thought it was useful campaign</p>

<b>Black Monday</b>	
	its been three, four years now, haven't stopped; but right now no public action <i>perception of people that it is something of the past</i> framed in a way that it is hard to stop, because zero tolerance against corruption also NRM policy, don't want to say that they don't support → make them look as if it is political
9-2017	It didn't work, put on black, no one refused them, but it got finished like that
E12-17	Corruption is like GMO, very complex for people to understand, Black Monday because centering on corruption people could not easily join, remained something of civil society mostly and eventually died out
7-2017	Did not participate actively, only promotion on social media, more of civil society engagement, an elites thing, for me I love a campaign which is for a common man.
E24-17	Beginning of BM with NGO leaders; one of the problems: failed to develop a vernacularization of the movement, failed because led by people within NGO sector, me different because I come from the church; key objective not to stop corruption, but to make it risky also other public action, like free and fair election campaign "The energy of the street is always youthful" and women are very active
E8-2017	Black monday documenting corruption scandals and asking citizens actions, follows NRM manifesto for zero tolerance for corruption, stopped for a while, but starting again next month; monday is the day when decisions are made, so the idea is once you're in the office and you're the boss, make sure to think about corruption right now undergoing review, because of civic space and operating environment, how to be effective without wasting time to run from one police station to another has been branded as rebel activities, as political, so that you cannot mobilize people around them, achievements: the anti-corruption act, to protect whistleblowers, make corruptions risky, recognition through the response of the state, at local levels people ask for accountability we sit and strategize, make a backup team, coordinating activities, activists mainly young, students, and from civil society, genderwise balanced, more men on the street, women in backup
FN 2017	In the office: in the beginning it moved something, but died out quickly, because of repression and people are not off badly enough, and problem of NGOization of the protest

<b>Strike</b>	
1-2014	MUASA strike bought off, regime prefers to deal with individuals on a day to day basis
E16-17	MUASA strike about teaching allowance not paid by university, no conflict with govt because they increased salary, public reaction always negative, misunderstanding with govt because thought that staff demanded more salary → closed university, when misunderstanding was cleared could not just open it

<b>Strike</b>	
	again, leaders have been bought off by management = disunity lost confidence in MUASA, only hope is government and committee we will strike again, but after discussing with government
E18-17	Organized “shutdown strike” in 2010 to stop fees, UTODA was banned, KCCA took over
E19-17	Since 2010 three strikes about salary increasement, govt promised but did not live up to, lead to Public Service Collective Bargaining and Machinery Act 2008, but not operationalized since, we work with govt to fight corruption, negotiation council is there, but it takes long and “it is cosmetic”
9-2017	Striking doesn’t make sense, especially in a country where there is no democracy.”
E24-17	KACITA organized, closed shops for three days to protest against pre-inspection cost, after three days, Museveni calls them one by one, puts millions of shillings to individuals same MakU strike, paid most of the executive

<b>Activism and Money</b>	
8-2017	No activity with all members because cannot fundraise cash bail we need more resources than in ten years able to chase old generation
E5-2017	Looking for avenues to get funds, to uplift Park yard market
E17-17	Big people in business, Baganda, gave Waragi and Marijuana to motivate the crowd
E13-17	To mobilize people tell them lunch and beer is there
E16-17	Lecturers came back because ran out of money
E18-17	Face problem of paying law fees, can’t afford → little activism in the transport sector: “When I try to organize, they say ‘Ah, [E18] you want to take us to prison? We have families, we don’t have money.’”
13-2017	“We always know ourselves. We know who has money, who does not have. [...] We always try to identify someone who is financially table to come and fund the activities on behalf of the what? The rest of the members.”
14-2017	Politics in Uganda has become commercial, not about what you speak but how much you have in your pocket <i>asks for support from funding their campaign</i>
E24-17	Because of state capture of economy, no one wants to give money for legal support, public action, etc.
E8-17	Hard to find someone to print black monday newsletter, because in corporate world no one want to associate with it Some people say: “It is about today’s food, [...] do I have today’s food?” worry about taking kids to school, have a good house, but no one realizes if parliament is not there you cannot enjoy what you have; used own money to file case against the six billion handshake

<b>Cooptation</b>	
8-2017	Jobless Brotherhood as an independent identity, that fights for an independent cause, not become someone's boys some members compromised by govt because they are desperate and need money
E17-17	Got money offered to stop BR, but he refused; after 2011 offered a job as deputy RDC "their thinking was most people who are doing this are unemployed, so we better get them jobs." others accepted, e.g. Mpanga advocates now handles oil deals phone call from president
E16-17	MUASA leaders have been bought off, is always the case, but no one turned against them, no alternative "We decided to leave them, we understand their problems."
E18-17	Met Museveni in 2015, he told KCCA to create stages, stop loading fees, but nothing happened, Museveni is not genuine "because in my knowing, if the president says so it is an order, I think he is calling them back after we have gone, says you leave it." hard to meet with him, until he hears you are organizing, then he says, call them, let them meet with me
E2-2017	In the beginning, people were expecting to be given black t-shirts, they refused
E23-17	Taxis went to see the president directly, told them to redo the election, intervened after riders complained about KCCA to him, power struggle with union (UTRADA) and KCCA
9-2017	Colleagues got money from govt, failed because politicized H: KACITA might also be bought off by big manufacturers
E12-17	President himself tried to silence, called us to state house, but he couldn't manage
6-2017	Government wanted to give handouts, did not want to hear our solutions to unemployment, created what I call "patronage fund", to access Youth Livelihood Program you had to be doctored about NRM, and be a sympathizer <i>contradicted by Augustine</i>
7-2017	People demonstrate for monetary values, hope to be bought off if they go shouting on the street, for me, you will go back with your money
13-2017	President has divided constituencies to get the number, then invites them to Kyankwanzi for a meeting, they eat first then he tells them what to do so they tow his line some activists do activism for getting money, to be called for a dialogue, e.g. NRM Poor Youth
14-2017	"Because one thing I should tell you is, in this activism, that we are speaking about, if we wanted to get jobs from the government, some of us would be so comfortable, we would be employed because we have got phone calls, we have got opportunities [...]."

<b>Cooptation</b>	
E24-17	State invests heavily in co-opting civil society, for example religious sector, churches, mosques and labor unions, all part and parcel of the Museveni patronage machinery. Bishops are getting car, only two bishops over the last 15 years didn't get one, big pentecostal leaders has good ties with them, because rely so much on charisma of their leaders, M7 identifies the big blokes, woos them; for PCC beneficial, because they lack the stand in our society

<b>NGOs</b>	
6-2014	Civil society only interested in profit, did not understand the system
E2-17	BM seen as an NGO thing
E4-2017	People in govt feel that NGOs promote interests of donors, our model different: we approach donors with our project, do not design projects according to their interest, a lot of work done NGO-style, only short-term interest of project implementation, that is it
7-2017	[in ref to BM] "Because more of this civil society individuals work for accountability. That is the worst thing I hate with them."
E24-17	NGOs are not associational, depend on a small group on the board, especially the executive director; but more aspect of civil society because they gather the elite that are not included in patronage "NGOs themselves can be the enemy of positive citizen led change."
E8-17	"So most of my colleagues have fallen into that trap. Busy writing donor reports, busy doing what. And there is no direct focus on what you can do for your country."

<b>Non-partisan, unpolitical</b>	
E16-17	Opposition tried to bandwaggon on strike, got chased away, "I personally as LC3 contacted government officials and told them 'there is no politics, no political leader is involved in this.'" only between management and lecturers
E18-17	Allegedly supporting Besigye, thus not allowed to associate, true, many support Besigye
E21-17	Some vendors went to Lord Mayor because unhappy with chairman's decision, he told them not to go "politicking" not to bring politics in, because politics are bad
E2-2017	"Because in this country, and I don't know how much you know about the politics, but the politics is that there is a pre-occupation that is trying to stop any street protest. Why? Because that has been used before by the opposition political parties. So anybody who does a street protest is seen as being part of the opposition." Nobody wants to say they support corruption, "So what do you do? You just leave us, rubbish us, you make it look like ah, this is political, this is not about



<b>Non-partisan, unpolitical</b>	
	anti-corruption.”
E23-17	“His [Museveni’s] directive was: I don’t want here such nonsense of politics in this industry of transport.” In industry despite different political interests harmony, because we are all UGs, want all the best
E6-2017	“I don’t know any other institution [except ACODE] that has the power to convene controversial [from politically opposed sites] under one roof. [...] We are political, but non-partisan.”, select from various parties to balance, so no accusation of being partisan
9-2017	don’t want to be politicized, not to mix up development and politics, chairman of 100 districts, some opposition, other NRM, “So there is a business language we can talk which is not so much political.” “So now we are trying to see how we can build a group of patriotism people, people who can thing about/ feel that Uganda is their home, is their country. People who are not political, but who feel that Uganda can be secured or rescued from the so-called investors. Uganda can be rescued by non-political people. Because politicians have done so much to put Uganda in the what/ in the hole where it can’t even easily be lifted up.”
E12-17	“But with Mabira, the leaders were not necessary opposition, like me, I was not an opposition person, I was just civil society. Religious leaders were not in opposition, cultural leaders were not opposition [...] so that was the difference.”
13-2017	For NRM no difference between resistance and opposition
E8-2017	“Because the problem we’ve had is people mixing politics into activism. It has not yielded.” I am non-partisan
FN 2017	STON: moderator reminds audience that discussion is free of political affiliation, don’t attack each other, attack the issues like Ebimeeza: platform for opposition to be heard: Mugisha Muntu, Norbert Mao speak FGD KLA central: USAFI market did not allow politicking of lord mayor

## 17. Repression/Fear

Repression/Fear	
1-2014	No possibility to voice open criticism, only in intimate atmosphere, in their association they talk politics in the bureau, but not when they are in the field
8-2017	People fear, even book shops refuse to sell my books “Museveni is a dictator, but as long as you do not touch his guns, you will not remain in jail.” much surveyed, home searched, phone bugged I don't fear because I am non-violent got expelled from University because of Mpigs, said he's tarnishing their name
E15-17	No fear of harassment in WA groups, other than in open spaces
E16-17	“The government is a different area, it is nothing that you deal with easily” <i>understands question as how to influence things to change government</i>
E18-17	Harassment and beating of drivers by UTODA <i>others referred to them as mafia</i> , got jailed for six months without court for obstructing fee, drivers feared UTODA because it was an upper hand of government officials misusing money got beaten up by crime preventers at stage, last time but in Mulago mortuary was tortured to the extent of removing my nails, tried to burn family
E19-17	Govt threatening with army, after few days call for negotiations, govt blocks them to use radio, switches off phones so no strike
E2-2017	A few friends distributing newsletter were arrested, saying they are circulating seditious material stopped demonstrations because of security risk, too many arrested Bishop Zac already activist, participation in BM one reason for state to harass him
E4-2017	Govt does not fear conversation that are in-house, but with increasing closing of open spaces you could see people censor themselves, “Some of them are looking for opportunities, including from government. If you are hoping that, if you are a business person [...] and you are looking at winning a tender, who wants to speak badly about the regime when there is an informer there?”
E12-17	Teargassed, sprayed with water, beaten, spent two weeks in prison POMA does not change much, because demonstrations will break rules and regulations, nothing will change that, same if you touched Kabaka, does not matter whether there is a law or not “So for me, whether there is a law or no law, people don't mind, as long as they are convinced that the only way of solving the problem is through demonstration, they will go for it. It doesn't matter how many teargas canon you have, and those equipments, the guns you have, they will not mind about that.”
6-2017	Went to jail for activism
7-2017	Did not get job where he was best qualified because of political activism; I feared, and my family was never supportive of my decision, I feared but I said no “I have believed that it is upon us to change this situation. I have always believed this.”

<b>Repression/Fear</b>	
	we have been imprisoned, for a whole month sometimes
14-2017	Police will not arrest everybody in a protest, but only known faces, ring leaders; self-employed, not getting a job because blacklisted as opposition
E24-17	I: "But, I mean, your actions don't involve so much that kind of going on the street and protesting." "Well, one of the reasons was when we did a lot of street actions, I told you about how the state uses fear. And at that time they detained many of us, all of us. And the/ we hadn't built enough capacity to provide legal support. So it is really, a resource, again, it is related to the first point I made to you. Where a state, a regime, captures the economy. Nobody is able to give any money to a local cause."
E8-2017	"And the other side tries to do this. Tries to label people, activists, and whatever as opposition, as bad people so that whoever associates themselves with them they are labeled in that way." "But I think the ultimate issue here is about fear. Because the current government has used fear and threats a lot. That even if you wanted people's responses and what / fear is number one. I will be shot down." arrested by government, detained, later they say we have no case against you; civic space is shrinking, every Monday over 200 people arrested, we were running to make sure to get bonds and representation have to be careful about your security, time of movements, it is very porous
FN	Imperial Mall in EBB, I ask to whom it belongs, they say they don't know. I remark that it resembles Acacia mall in Kololo and that it is said it belongs to the first lady. 23-2014 nods ferociously, but tells me to be quiet, later I ask him whether you cannot say so publicly and he says that you never know whether this brings disadvantage 22-2014 becomes silence talking about Museveni overstaying when her neighbors come closer Z. tells from how she has been tortured, went for treatment in Kenya, Besigye wants her to seek asylum in Kenya
23-2012	What we normally do, although the government / they don't want us to get in politics, but we do support our parties. Like if, say my president is going to stand, Norbert Mao, from DP, in one way or another, I may contribute towards his campaign. Although not openly. It would be (...) secret, because once they get to know you are the kind of people who give in towards the political activity or something like that, oh, they may follow you wherever you are to see at least the political party loses strength. Because once there is no money it can't carry out its activities. So you do it quietly. And that's what we do mainly, like myself, that's how we support the party. <u>00:56:06-9</u> R: And, and do you/ do you attend regular party meetings or such kind of things or how does your party engagement look like? <u>00:56:15-3</u> I23: Openly no. Secretly yes. <u>00:56:23-2</u>

## 18. Tribalism

E17-17	<p>“Most of those who are leading us are refugees from Rwanda, Tutsi, the president, the army commander, Mugisha Muntu...”</p> <p>9000m<sup>2</sup> land not distributed by the British were given to those from the West, though it should belong to the kabaka</p> <p>District Police Commander: out of 112, 80 are from the West, Bank of Uganda, URA, Head of Electoral Commission, Finance → all to Banyarwanda (!), Baganda left out, even if majority</p>
E2-2017	<p>State never wanted to create better conditions for people, all about enriching himself and his people</p>
6-2017	<p>cannot find a job here, you must be connected to the ruling family or nearby circle, if there is a job opening it is a whisper, tell a friend, once they have filled the spot they advertise, you walk and they tell you, come back tomorrow until you get tired</p> <p>tribe matters a lot, under this regime some tribes have been glorified or down-trodded, tribal fiction is there, where certain groups are highly privileged, others not</p>
E25-17	<p>Many tenders awarded to own people, for example hotels constructed towards Kyoga, he or people in his regime are involved</p>

## 19. Health and Nutrition

2-2014	I jog regularly
3-2014	eating habits: nice breakfast, no dinner, early lunch, fruits and juices, 1.5l water per day → health conscious, reduced weight for health from 96 to 78kg, jogging for my health (problems with Asthma)
4-2014	breakfast in the morning, no lunch because gained too much weight, supper at five, full meal, don't like meat a lot maybe once a week
5-2014	run at least 7-10 km per day
7-2014	eat local food, no breakfast, sometimes lunch, buying food from local market and small supermarkets, limit eating because of weight control, meat four times a week
9-2014	morning plain black tea with fruits, lunch sometimes I have, sometimes just fruits, I struggled with baby weight but more about not getting diabetes or hypertension, meat three times a week, fish once
13-2014	talking about how to keep in good lives because we are aging,
20-2014	When I got married discovered I had some disease, had to undergo 5 surgeries, gone through a lot, cannot do much work, never spend a coin on operations because case so special, eat on condition because of diseases, only protein and veges, local food, meat maybe twice for health (but can afford daily), three meals, have to take them in time
21-2014	enjoy jogging 3 times a week, eat local food, treats are imported foods like pizza, no eat meaters, maybe chicken once a month
22-2014	in a month maybe 50 000, for going to the hospital, don't know how much I spend on medical bills, I do no longer sports, weight is too much now and no time, eat meat every day, Most important in life: health, money,

## 20. Middle Class

2-2014	“I can see that I am middle class now because I go to shopping malls.” I2:6:59 in 2017: these are those that can survive despite an external shock, does not count himself in that class
3-2014	Economically live the life of an average Ugandan
4-2014	“We are not peasants and not millionaires, we can afford comfortable living, in economic terms we are the so-called middle class.” I4:1:3
7-2014	economic situation: middle, middle, middle class, no income is sufficient, but it is ok
8-2014	middle class is there but I don't know where I am
9-2014	today's society is structured on income, I am middle class
10-2014	“My own position, currently I am below middle class. I am not exactly a pauper, I am not in the middle class.” I10:9:52
13-2014	there is no middle class in Uganda, because they are reducing to the stage of paupers, like me
14-2014	social inequality is high, it evolves in a positive way because you start slowly by slowly; very low percentage of middle class, biggest percentage is poor, next rich, middle are those that can afford necessities, myself I am middle class, someone earning between 500 000 to 2 million is middle class
15-2014	I see a middle class society emerging
16-2014	In terms of education I am middle class, in terms of income I am on the boundary between the poor, to be middle class you must be able to predict your income; Uganda very far from having a middle class because the class that is emerging is not emerging out of hard work but out of corrupt things, "You are just at the boundary there, oscillating."
19-2014	somehow middle class, don't know how to describe that
22-2014	many have prospered but many are still low, middle class, yes they are there, those working in govt, and who are doing other businesses, but if you are down, it is very hard to pass in the middle, I am in the middle, if you go to the village, these people are poor, I am not poor like this
E11-17	Legislations passed: no loud speakers in front of bars, no shrines for witch doctors
10-2017	“I am not middle class, I am just penetrating.”, characterized by spending per year and meals you take; buying in supermarkets is cheaper, quality is better
E2-2017	“You may not find a sustainable or stable middle class, you will even find people who oscillate between being middle class and being other things. But I think you will find a number of people, who because of the incomes that they have been able to get over time, have developed certain tastes, that would like to see/ that would like to see certain demands being met by the state.”
E9-2017	Middle income earners = mostly govt employees, ministers, lawyers, judges go to supermarkets SM are really new in UG, Nakumatt arrived 2009, people not used to, even

	though less expensive. Lifestyle choice to go, because someone might fear if he sees lights everywhere, first class clothes
6-2017	“But I want to say that coming to the city is also addictive, like I am struggling to go back to the village. I have tried to go back but I find myself a misfit there, I can’t. So that is why I am stuck here so now I am resolved and try and make life happen here.” <i>in-betweenness</i>
E20-17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• When President of TZ came, Museveni showed him naguru hill, said these are my middle class people → perception of the president, but everyone has a different perception and no one know how to define them</li> <li>• shifting definition, depending on the economic situation of the country, heterogeneous class with entry point is <i>somebody lives comfortably</i>, renting an apartment with two BR, has transport or a vehicle, can send children to school and is able to meet his bills, pays accommodation and has convenient life</li> <li>• size: about 1.x %, very small (350-500 000 people), counting people subscribing to NSSF, and those working in govt</li> <li>• no wonder supermarkets are struggling if you have such a small group</li> <li>• of the 98% that rest, not all are poor, but they are vulnerable and not sustainable in their consumption</li> <li>• is not voting, angry about the govt, dissatisfied, but no incentive to vote, because they can still take care of their needs; not a group interested in seeking votes, only want stable lifestyle, govt is aware and is not wasting time with them</li> <li>• most indebted group, only less vulnerable because of stable job</li> <li>• silent mc of traders in owino, no conspicuous consumption</li> </ul>
E25-17	<p>“I am not saying we shouldn’t mind about the fall offs. The fall offs are our critical clients. But presenting the city as a practical place for investment, you need to make sure that policies that favor the fall offs, but are not incentives to attract investment, we tend to switch.”</p> <p>“[...] for me, the emergence of the middle class is a good point, but study it critically. You are going to find that it is actually [...] a liquidation of the asset base that increases the economic purchasing power. I have my land, I sell it off, I get money, I come to town where I buy eggs, I buy wine. It is not based on generations out of productivity. And to me, if you are liquidating your asset base, that does not speak on the economic matters.”</p>
E24-17	“President Museveni, one of his stated goals for the economy was to create a middle class. But how did he create a middle class? He created a middle class by using state, public resources, public enterprises, so it is not really this middle class, this middle class created is not a middle class that comes out of an organic process of wealth, generation wealth creation. No! It is about state capture. So you have a middle class that has captured the state. Or a state operates, a Museveni state that has captured the economy.”
E8-2017	So then I ask myself so what category of people [...] / class of society are we in? We are the elite, we are blunt, we have the knowledge. But at the same time we are not completely there, we cannot/ you know, you cannot compare our disposable incomes to those other guys, so I don’t know whether we are even in

	the middle income, but we are somewhere between that. And then the lower citizen, the lowest person cannot afford a meal. So there is just/ and I think this is now the generation, that's where a lot of activism is. The bunch that have not upgraded to middle income status, neither are they at the first level. They are within. The youth who are unemployed and few individuals who are really, who are really bothered. About what is happening.”
FN 2017	MU: bad reputation of maids, will blackmail you if you become too dependent similar depreciation of Boda boda drivers, service personnel, watchmen → mistrust lower class on supermarkets: people not buying because not used to buy in bulks, buy small amounts on credit, closer, lowering transport cost, it is too expensive, better buy in wholesale shops or local markets, supermarket as special treat for kids
Blog	The challenge, and need, to maintain a MC lifestyle to keep your prestige (Acramist blog)
WA YT	People going to the supermarket to show off a false middle class

<b>Salaried employment vs. self-employment</b>	
5-2017	Diploma in education, but not working as teacher due to “meager pay. It would be meager, if they were paying it.” instead became self-employed entrepreneur
E23-17	People with a degree driving a boda boda, it has become an industry People are selling their vivanja plots to buy motorcycle → eroding asset base
6-2017	Formally unemployed, but I have small, small things to survive → renting out boda boda; searched job for three years then heard someone talk about mindset, have to change direction of thinking = eye opener, “I said no more applications, I never walk again. If it is to work, I must employ myself.”
E20-17	In Owino many traders as middle class, is emerging; self-employed an unsuspected but promising avenue to wealth, instead of salaried employment
E25-17	Boda boda lucrative industry, “Petty trading is not a solution, it is actually disguised unemployment.”
Blog	See education



## 21. Leisure

<b>Leisure</b>	
13-2017	Working class men go to bar, have a beer and conversations, watch news and then react and discuss it
FN 2017	In Zaana: at university part of student association of Toro kingdom, met wife there, once a month go to pray from St. August where all Batoro meet in general being part of a cultural association at university very common for many In the office: social media has replaced informal gatherings for leisure

<b>Community life</b>	
E11-17	Village council meeting every 2-3 months, about 200 people attend, cultural functions playgrounds (Sportplätze) not enough, players competing for space, used to be a dramas club but not anymore for lack of funds, drama club for disabled, but turned into a family business, mourners club, poetry club and black born actors were given money → collapsed
E5-2017	NATIDA = voice of park yard, supports with problems of eviction, fire outbreaks, 1/3 of PY vendors registered with association, one time fee of 20 000, then 3000 per month, association mediates, e.g. when failure to pay, every three months general meeting with about 1500 members wanted to develop the market but landlord refused central government wants to relocate, but they prefer to develop the land we are not disappointed, government listens, promises the best
E13-17	Kololo Neighborhood Watch (KNW) project of councilors after election, on WA with DPC and OC of Kololo station, members communicate through head of family with police, make a budget, parish councilors pay contribution, not the members, they have no interest because have their own guards, 900 people in WA group, about 50 come to meetings, pressure not so much because neighborhood not so congested
E18-17	Organized first DACCA, then UTRADA, both banned by government, we want freedom of association but this is not recognized, UTRADA 4000 members, transport sector over 100 000 people
E19-17	UNATU 2003, registered, joined with UG Natinoal Union, with help of donor unions, biggest union, 162 000 subscribing members, subscription deducted: 1% from salary, about 600 Million per month → not enough, use to pay salaries, offices, teachers action for girls, teachers and AIDS sensitization group, training on best teaching subjects, World Teachers Day, lawyer support if deleted from payroll; relationship with govt not so bad, but no govt wants a trade union, with trade unions you are always at war
E21-17	USAFI market association, chairman got appointed from KCCA (Musisi)
E23-17	Boda boda association, many started because of politics, rent-seeking, to have someone to mobilize easily; all boda boda associations under political groups, BB 2010 as umbrella, other associations created in their opposition; from mem-

<b>Community life</b>	
	bership pay office, leader allowance, ambulance, contributing to functions in case of wedding/death
E6-17	STON: since 6 years now, idea to nurture leadership, according to review highly effective, members chosen selectively, supposed to be youthful, with a strategic position, people discuss freely, no self-censorship
E4-2017	STON my idea to build a new generation of leaders, create space of influence, network for people who in few years will occupy key political positions “So, yeah, essentially my idea was to build/ get this platform, where people come, have breakfast, enjoy themselves, talk about contemporary public policy issues. But the objective is to build these as centers of influences. Because in another five to ten years they will be occupying key political positions, members are educated a more advanced version of Ebimeeza: “People would come and say: but why do you do Protea. Protea is an expensive place, I can tell you, our design was that this is supposed to be expensive. [...] Is was an elite version of Ebimeeza, and it was deliberate.” self-selected and exclusive, but work done would also benefit the poor; now more like a regular workshop, deterioration since he is not there anymore, topics on contemporary issues, people know each other well
9-2017	UMOSTA: association of traders of spare parts, lubricants and rubber, in 2011 founded, after realization that Asians are taking over distribution chain, organized roundtables throughout the country, brought dealers together, called them to boycott Chinese products, went to China and Dubai in February 2017 to make direct deals with factories and import and brand their own product, membershipfee of 100 000, but system of buying shares, will be proportionally paid out profits
E25-17	We support sweat-equity: we give the materials, people give work, that is fine, but it does not work if it is not agreed upon with the municipality, because then people only serve their interest, not broader picture, e.g. road built by people is lacking visibility, recipe of disaster, but no one would be willing to compensate if someone is affected by that; but citizen initiatives not very common
FN 2017	sensitization meeting: Neighborhoodwatch Kololo renovated Airstrip police station, brought police back their, fueled motorcycle’s, assure transport to the working place, but police is not on the post; have two WA groups to communicate, costs: 150 000 per month, mainly offices in Kamwokya I, willing to pay that money, in Kamwokya and Kawempe turnover is bigger, hard to establish such structures, also many diverse ethnic groups
19-2012	On trade unions: I would think about it, but the end result is the leaders of the unions have also / just (basically?) by other sources and other powers / foreign powers then the end result is / for them they achieve what they want and they are making you as ladders and just a pressure. Help them achieve what they want and for you, you just stay the same. So, I don't see why I should join them.

<b>SACCO</b>	
E11-17	Started SACCO, mobilized 450 people, LC1 stood chairman, got 7 million funds = end of it
E5-17	Form own SACCO, but people fail to contribute
E10-17	Leader of a Women SACCO, explains how the SACCO functions, it is more than just saving, if you loose someone the women can come and do the cooking Money mainly used to pay for school fees “We reduced the literacy level”
E19-17	UNATU started also a SACCO
15-2017	“You have to choose people from the same economic status, definitely”
9-2017	UMOSTA is a SACCO, buy shares in it

<b>Vacation</b>	
1-2014	budget for going on vacation once a year
3-2014	“One of the things a tradition I want to get in my family is a / get a holiday time. Whether it is in the middle of the year, whether it is in the beginning of the year. It should be assured / I should make sure that we get that holiday time. It is something / we've not yet done it, but [...] because it is our first year as a family, it is something we would want to put forward.” I3:5:32 Wants to establish holiday time outside of Uganda for his family, 2-3 weeks per year,
7-2014	As outings going to national park
16-2014	I have to do some vacation, everyone must save for vacation
21-2014	every Christmas destination for holiday 27-31st

<b>Whats App Groups</b>	
E15-17	Have become popular like three years ago “The best thing about social media: you only include people that you share something with.” NRM youth easy to reach consensus on social media, a lot of people agree on many things from opposite parties not only for civic activities, but also self-help, raise money to pay for school fees, weddings, etc more cautious on FB, easier for surveillance, considering future employers, visa applications...
E13-17	No youth to go WA for a day

## 22. *Good Life*

2-2014	“I need to have a good life[...]. I need to sleep well, I need to eat well, I need to walk well, I need to drive well. [...] I tasted what good life is in Germany [laughs] I don't live a miserable life, never. No, not anymore.” I3:4:39
4-2014	sometimes go out eat in best places like Sheraton even though Matoke is always Matoke, “And I must have a good life, I must enjoy because you only life once.” I4:4:34
18-2014	interest is only to bring up a good family, children to have a good life, not to go through what I have gone through.

### **23. Hard Working**

10-2014	role model one hard working uncle, was very determined and focused, leaving office at around nine pm; others are parents very hard working and never divorced
12-2014	“People are complaining: government has not done what, what. I know it is through hard work, if you have an opportunity, you got to use it.” I12:3:13
8-2017	Most businesses go out of business after six months (minimum rental period)

## 24. Poverty

1-2014	Do not earn a lot of money, I am poor, not more than one child because I cannot afford “It has a lot to do with the economic conditions, really. [...] Because even having kids and taking good care of them. And when my financial and economic abilities don't permit that than I am not happy to do so.” 00:12:12-3 (I1:1:6)
5-2014	Very poor, but don't sleep hungry, tried to look for job in Juba, Nairobi, Kongo, Rwanda, I fail, come back,
6-2014	Living conditions are not good, I just survive, live in a bad slum, Barely surviving, I am poor, no income, got evicted from one place because history of paying rent is bad
13-2014	I'm a pauper, life is a torture to me, sees it as failure not to have house at her age
15-2014	“You are in Ramadan by condition” I15:5:26
23-2014	“I am living in this lousy place, I don't even have a car.” I23:3:11 I am a poor man but send my kids to one of the best schools, not at school right now because cannot pay school fees, don't manage to save
8-2017	80% of youth have no job, boda boda industry: people with a master's degree ride a boda boda, youth exploitation, through prostitution, drug trafficking have and have nots, small class intermarries, remains in power, will lead to genocide “because this group of havenots will look at those who have gained from their suffering.” high inequality will increase with time Betting companies are full by midday
E17-17	Drought, hard to believe that in Uganda someone could starve
16-2017	Gap between rich and poor is widening, bad economic situation due to govt policies
E23-17	Boda Boda industry started off as for criminal people who have run away from somewhere
6-2017	Betting houses are full at noon
14-2017	Justice favors rich against poor, not independent; Regime has “Metternich” policy: suppress the masses in poverty and rule them more
E25-17	Urban poverty a displacement of rural poverty, rural poor comes to city, lacks skills needed, struggle to survive; USAFI market as pro-poor policy
E8-2017	Inequality metaphor that Ugandans are not sleeping

## **25. Money and Socialization**

6-2014	don't attend social functions because too costly
10-2014	Doing law with children of very rich, very influential people in UG, first intimidated, could not be with very poor, but not with very rich either, was there in abeyance, later took confidence, rich people would choose him as friend, but I did struggle, it was very expensive;
13-2014	Sleeping during free time, I cannot go out because I don't have money "When you don't have money, association is not easy." I6:5:24
15-2014	"But they [friends] have now turned me down because some of them I have them overstretched, overdisturbed, to the point that even when I call they don't pick my phone." I15:8:40

# **Annex 8**

## **The Leisure Questionnaire**

### **Survey on Leisure Activities**

Welcome to this survey. My name is Anna Fichtmüller and I am doing my Phd at the university of Bordeaux in France. As part of my research I want to find out more about leisure activities carried out by Ugandans here in Kampala and to understand how this is influenced by certain demographic characteristics. Please take the time to fill out this short survey. I appreciate your help.  
*For further information you can contact me at 0758 861726 or [anna.fichtmueller+uganda@gmail.com](mailto:anna.fichtmueller+uganda@gmail.com)*

1. What year were you born?

\_\_\_\_\_

2. What is your gender?

female    male

3. What is your religion?

Catholic    Anglican    Muslim    Born again    African Traditional    Other

4. Which region are you from?

Central    Western    Northern    Eastern    not a Ugandan

5. What is your marital status?

single    married    cohabiting    divorced    widow

6. How many children do you have?

\_\_\_\_\_

7. What is your highest education?

none    primary    O-Level    A-Level    university    diploma    other: \_\_\_\_\_

8. What is your current employment status?

student    employed    self-employed    unemployed    retired    other: \_\_\_\_\_

9. How many people live permanently in your household?

\_\_\_\_\_

10. Considering your total monthly household income, in which income group do you belong?

- less than 150 000 USh/month  
 150 000 - 299 000 USh/month  
 300 000 - 749 000 USh/month  
 750 000 - 1 499 000 USh/month  
 1 500 000 - 3 000 000 USh/month  
 more than 3 000 000 USh/month



11. Please check the frequency in which you engaged in the following activities in the past two months

- a) watching television                      very often ———— not at all
- b) reading books for pleasure            very often ———— not at all
- c) using the internet                        very often ———— not at all
- d) playing team sports                      very often ———— not at all
- e) doing an individual sport                very often ———— not at all
- f) going on a family outing                very often ———— not at all
- g) going out for drinks/entertainment    very often ———— not at all
- h) attending a cultural function            very often ———— not at all

12. For each type of group or association, please indicate whether you are:

	active member	inactive member	former member	never been a member
investment/ saving	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
religious	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
cultural	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
sport	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
business	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. On average, how many hours per week do you spend on leisure?

\_\_\_\_\_

14. As rough estimate, how many Ugandan shillings per month do you spend on leisure? (Including transport costs, bills in restaurants and bars, membership fees, entry fees, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for your time. This is a very valuable insight. It might be interesting for me to discuss your leisure activities more in detail with you. If you agree on a follow up interview, please leave a contact opportunity here.

# Annex 9

## Leisure Activities

Daily
weekly
fortnightly
monthly
quarterly
annually
irregularly
rarely
not attending

ID/Code	AFDB	Age	Gender	Leisure Activities							Close Friends, similar:					Reading
				Church	Sport	Going out	Sacco	Professional	Communal	other	Income	age	region	religion	education	
01-14	UMC	30	M	mess		beer on Saturdays		MakU Staff, Academic board of peace institute, US peace board		Kolping Soc., Peace and justice dept, own school	School board member	yes	no		yes	yes
02-14	UMC	30	M	service for community involvement				MakU Convocation		Clan activities	Panafrica, Uganda German Cultural Center, Governance Network International					yes, current affairs
03-14	UC	30	M	Sunday Service	Jogging					Kabalagala Born Again Christians						
04-2014		20	M	Sunday Service		restaurants, clubs				organizing debate club	Panafrica, blogging	yes	no	no	no	
05-14	Poor	20	M	Sunday service	jogging			daily contributions, twice a year pay-out			Panafrica					
06-14	Poor	20	M	Sunday service		women					Panafrica organizer school board					yes, a lot
07-14	UC	30	M		gym	Concerts (alone)		legal advisor of youth sacco	law society			yes	yes	no	no	yes
08-14	Poor	20	F	Service		Wandegeya Restaurant						Talking on the phone, many different friends				yes, bible
09-14	LMC	30	F	Mother's union, MU Cell	Gym (2x Week)						research	no	yes		no	yes
10-14	LMC	20	M	Service, Watoto Cell	Football	Restaurants, Hotels, Cinema	Investment group					no	yes		no	yes
11-14	FC	30	F	Service		family to beach										

daily weekly fortnightly monthly quarterly annually irregularly rarely not attending

ID/Code	AfDB	Age	Gender	Church	Sport	Going out	Sacco	Professional	Communal	Other	Close Friends, similar:					Reading	
											Income	age	region	religion	education		
12-14	UC	30	F			Family Group	Humble Servants										
13-14	FC	50	F					FLP		No money for leisure		yes	no				
14-14	Poor	30	F	Choir Service (2x week) Evangelism	Swimming							yes	yes		yes	yes	bible, assessment, academic
15-14	FC	30	M	Service Fathers Union	Sauna and Steam Bath			Presenting Papers		Panafrica PoP NRM Media Activist Forum		no	yes				philosophy, politics, intl relations, etc.
16-14	UMC	40	M		Golf Club	family to the beach, visit relatives	SACCO-Friends		Rotary			Yes	Yes	Yes			yes
17-14	Poor	30	M					want to start NGO				No	No	Yes	(work together)		business, leadership
18-14	LMC	30	M	Service		with work family (visiting, swimming pool)	with work			silent Member UPC		Yes	Mostly				business, relationship, politics
19-14	FC	20	M	Service	Jogging Football				own NGO (microcredit)	Old Student association							
20-14	Poor	30	F	Service 2x Choir (3x), womens dept (2x) Married meeting	Aerobics	beach, eating fish and chips											bible
21-14		30	F		jogging 3x	Dance, bar Vacation with child: Naalia, Garden city			charity in the village befriended families meeting	Old School association want to start blog		Four close friends, know each other from high school, different backgrounds, meet often at her office					Self-empowerment, improvement, novels (Adichie)
22-14	UMC	50	F	service Overnight			The other women's group					no			yes		Novels, newspapers
23-14	FC	40	M			Bar			Red Cross			every day at bar					
1-17	Poor	38	M						Mourners Group								
4-17	LMC	40	M				Sacco for traders (leader)										
10-17		24	M		watch from the bar		with colleagues, same region										
11-17	UMC	24	M		handball swimming gym	KFC cappuccino				Holidays		No	No				
12-17	LMC	25	F							NRM group							
15-17	UC	26	M		Football		friends, save for investment			Nkobo Zambogo at uni holidays							
16-17		50	M	Service Christian Men's fellowship	Sauna and Steam Bath		Sacco for people from the same region										