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From the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika: non-state armed actors in the Congo crisis, 1960-1967

Stephen Rookes

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THÈSE

En vue de l'obtention du

DOCTORAT DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE

Délivré par l'Université Toulouse – Jean Jaurès

Présentée et soutenue par

Stephen Edward ROOKES

Le 16 octobre 2018

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THÈSE

Pour obtenir le grade de
DOCTEUR DE L'UNIVERSITÉ

Spécialité

Langues, Littératures et Civilisations du Monde Anglophone

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To Thomas Edward Rookes (1932-2014)

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Abstrait

Alors que la République Démocratique du Congo devient indépendant en juin 1960 seulement quelques semaines après le pays va connaître une crise politique et sociale qui va durer sept ans. Cette "crise du Congo" qui durera sept ans voit l'arrivée de mouvements sécessionnistes, de rébellions populaires et des forces militaires externes. Dans le cas de la province de Katanga, le moteur économique de la DRC, ces forces militaires externes sont composées de mercenaires européens, sud-africains et/ou rhodésiens embauchés et payés par les sociétés minières belges.

Bien que les Nations unies obligent le départ des mercenaires et arrivent à restaurer l'intégrité de la DRC, dès leur départ en 1963 le pays sombre de nouveau dans le désordre. En effet, une rébellion rurale d'inspiration marxiste et soutenue par la République Populaire de Chine gagne deux tiers du pays. Pire, en juillet 1964, la deuxième ville de la DRC, Stanleyville, est capturée par les forces rebelles et ces Simba menacent la vie de quelques centaines d'Européens, la plupart des citoyens belges.

Pour les Etats-Unis qui tentent depuis quatre ans de faire régner la stabilité au Congo, les Simba représentent un vrai danger du fait de leur soutien par la Chine et d'autres pays africains radicaux. Aux yeux des Etats-Unis ce soutien signale que le communisme risque de prendre pied dans l'Afrique centrale. En respect des idéologies telles que de Containment et de l'Effet Domino ce n'est pas une situation qui peut perdurer.

En manque de forces armées capables de lutter efficacement contre les rebelles tout en gardant leur intervention secrète, les Etats-Unis forment une alliance avec la Belgique et une Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) renforcée par le retour de centaines de mercenaires blancs. D'ailleurs, les Etats-Unis fournissent leurs propres forces clandestines constituées d'exilés cubains recrutés par la CIA. Ces exilés ont participé dans un nombre d'opérations clandestines montées par la CIA et, notamment, l'invasion de la Baie des Cochons qui

visait à déposer Fidel Castro. En participant à ces opérations en avril 1961, ils rejoignent la liste de combattants anti-communistes utilisés par la CIA en Chine, et au Guatemala.

Composé de pilotes d'avion et aussi d'une petite force commando, ces Exilés nommées collectivement le *Makasi* contribuent aux opérations qui visent à libérer Stanleyville et vaincre la rébellion. D'ailleurs, à partir de septembre 1965, une force navale composée d'Exilés va aussi mener des opérations sur le Lac Tanganyika. Ces opérations consistent à empêcher l'arrivée dans les zones rebelles des vivres et de munitions nécessaires pour la suite de la rébellion. Fournies par les pays tels que la Chine et l'Algérie, les forces rebelles reçoivent de l'aide de la part de Che Guevara. Envie de provoquer une révolution populaire en Afrique, Guevara restera au Congo que six mois. Sa présence dans ce pays ayant été vite détectée par les Etats-Unis, les Exilés cubains en sont avertis et considèrent que la guerre au Congo leur offre la possibilité de prendre une revanche sur Castro et la défaite à la Baie des Cochons.

Mots clés: Crise du Congo / exilés cubains / CIA / mercenaires

Abstract

Whereas the Democratic Republic of the Congo became independent in June 1960 within a very short space of time the country will be torn apart by a series of secession and rebellions. In Katanga, secession is supported by the arrival of a mercenary army and the United Nations is sent to restore order by ridding the Congo of these foreign forces.

The UN mission complete and its forces having been withdrawn by July 1963, the Congolese government will then be confronted by a popular rebellion in rural areas of the Congo. Supported by the People's Republic of China and radical African nations this

communist-inspired rebellion makes rapid progress and soon two-thirds of the Congo is in the hands of the Simbas, the name adopted by the rebels. By August 1964 the Simbas have reached Stanleyville, the Congo's second largest city, and threaten to kill hundreds of mainly Belgian hostages. With the Congolese National Army being unfit to defeat the rebellion alone, it is reinforced by hundreds of white mercenaries. Seeing the rebellion and its communist support as a threat to its ideologies of Containment and the Domino Theory, the United States also provides military assistance in the shape of an air force and a small commando unit. Known collectively as the *Makasi*, these US covert forces comprise of Cuban Exiles recruited and paid by the CIA. Many of these Exiles took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. These Exiles join the list of CIA covert forces who have taken part in secret operations in China and in Guatemala. They will be joined by more veterans of the failed invasion in 1965 when a naval force is created to patrol Lake Tanganyika. It is from here that rebel forces are being supplied with food and weapons provided by communist-bloc nations and supporters. Moreover, from April 1965, the rebel forces will also be joined by Che Guevara who has hopes of starting up a popular revolution in the heart of Africa. Guevara's presence in the Congo being rapidly detected by the US, the Exiles are informed and see the Congo as an opportunity to gain revenge for the Bay of Pigs.

Key words: Congo Crisis / Cuban Exiles / CIA / mercenaries

Résumé

A la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, époque où l'Ancien Monde cède sa place au Nouveau Monde, les Etats-Unis se trouvent face de nouveaux défis qui les obligent à chercher une nouvelle orientation par rapport à ses politiques intérieures et extérieures. Sans doute le plus gros défi s'agit du début de la Guerre froide, une guerre combattue non pas directement en se servant d'armes, mais indirectement tout en développant les moyennes de mener une guerre d'idéologies. Confronté, en effet, avec la réalisation que l'Union soviétique cherche à étendre son influence dans le monde, les Etats-Unis tourne le dos au système westphalien et cherche activement à intervenir dans les affaires internes d'un Etat-nation afin d'éloigner le communisme qui est perçu comme une menace la liberté. Ils le fait en soutenant les chefs d'Etats qui sont supporteurs de leur idéologie et, en cas de besoin, en fournissant des armes et matériaux nécessaires pour une lutte contre des forces armées soutenues par l'URSS. Dans l'optique de pouvoir opérer clandestinement dans un pays étranger, en 1947 le gouvernement américain renforce sa politique étrangère en créant la Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Pendant les années 1940 et 1950 la CIA cherche à influencer la politique intérieure des pays européens tels que la France, l'Italie ou l'Albanie, des pays au Moyen-Orient tel que l'Iran ou le Liban, et des pays situés plus près des frontières des Etats-Unis comme le Guatemala. Si des interventions clandestines s'étendent dans les années 1960 et que la CIA tente, sans succès, de déposer Fidel Castro au Cuba, l'indépendance de plusieurs pays de l'Afrique subsahariennes après 1957 présente un nouveau défi. Effectivement, alors que des pays comme le Ghana ont pu effectuer la transition entre la colonisation et l'indépendance dans la paix, d'autres pays comme le Congo Belge connaissent un bouleversement politique et social énorme et celui-ci va mener le pays vers une période de sept ans d'instabilité et de guerre civile. Cette période est connue sous le nom de la Crise

du Congo. Pour les Etats-Unis sa politique extérieure réside sur la maintenance de la stabilité. Pour eux, l'instabilité telle que l'on trouvait dans le nouvellement renommé République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) ouvrait la porte aux Soviétiques. Croyant que si un pays tombait sous leur influence d'autres pays suivront-la théorie des dominoes- les Etats-Unis se trouvent obligés d'intervenir de nouveau et le gouvernement se tourne vers la CIA afin que cette agence monte une opération clandestine.

Le titre que j'ai choisi pour cette thèse *-De la Baie des Cochons au Lac Tanganyika: les acteurs non-étatiques dans la Crise du Congo, 1960-1967*, contient trois éléments qui ont pour objectif d'apporter une clarté à mon argument centrale et la méthodologie avec laquelle je compte mener ma recherche. En effet, l'inclusion de *De la Baie des Cochons au Lac Tanganyika* suggère qu'il y a un lien entre deux lieux géographiques qui n'ont, à première vue, aucun. Ce que cette thèse montrera c'est que ces deux lieux sont inextricablement liés par des événements qui ont eu lieu pendant la Guerre froide du fait qu'ils ont été la scène de deux opérations clandestines montées par la CIA.

Chacune des deux parties de cette étude contient trois chapitres. Intitulée *De la décolonisation à la crise du Congo*, le but de la première partie est de présenter la logique de l'intervention américaine. Nous évoquons des thèmes tels que la décolonisation de l'Afrique subsaharienne; la Guerre froide; l'intérêt stratégique du Congo pour les Etats-Unis; les différentes positions politiques des acteurs congolais, avant et après l'indépendance, et nous parlons de l'indépendance du Congo elle-même. Présentant le contexte de l'intervention, cette partie trouve son importance du fait qu'elle sert de plateforme d'étude. La première partie contient, aussi, une étude portant sur un contexte plus spécifique et la période entre 1960 et 1963. Nous voyons la position des Etats-Unis quant à la nomination de Patrice Lumumba en tant que premier ministre; le coup d'Etat qui le dépose; l'assassinat de Lumumba et, pour terminer un deuxième chapitre, nous étudions

la réaction de l'Union soviétique et nous verrons comment une guerre civile qui est jusqu'alors limitée aux frontières du Congo devient un théâtre de la Guerre froide. Le troisième chapitre de cette première partie porte sur l'utilisation des acteurs armés non-étatiques et nous focalisons sur la période qui débute en janvier 1964. Un nombre de différents rebellions voient le jour pendant ce mois et il semble important de comprendre pourquoi ces rebellions ont eu lieu aussi bien que leur impacte sur la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis. En effet, nous verrons que la situation au Congo devient si grave et si menaçante pour cette politique et que le gouvernement américain décide de lancer une opération militaire clandestine. De 1960 jusqu'au début de 1964, les Etats-Unis se sont contentés d'intervenir politiquement ou en fournissant un entraînement aux forces nationales congolaises.

Dans le premier chapitre de la deuxième partie, nous voyons comment les Etats-Unis ont pu être en mesure d'intervenir militairement. Pour cela, le deuxième chapitre de cette partie nous mène aux débuts de la CIA et le développement du dispositif conçu pour faire une guerre de façon clandestine. Nous voyons ce développement par le biais d'une étude qui porte sur l'intervention militaire américaine au Guatemala, une réussite, et une autre étude sur l'intervention ratée qui a eu lieu au Cuba en avril 1961. Ce chapitre est un élément essentiel à notre étude puisqu'il nous permet d'établir le lien entre l'Amérique centrale et l'Afrique. D'ailleurs, en créant ce lien, nous sommes en mesure de se rendre compte qu'il ne faut pas voir la Crise du Congo comme une autre guerre africaine. Effectivement, la Crise a fait partie d'une série d'interventions militaires américaines qui, certes, ont eu lieu dans différentes parties du monde mais qui, en même temps, sont liés intrinsèquement.

Ensuite, nous retournons dans le Congo afin d'étudier les opérations militaires qui ont été organisées afin de mettre fin aux rebellions. Alors que cette partie nous permet de

comprendre la coopération entre différents groupes d'acteurs armés non-étatiques, aussi verrons-nous combien ces groupes différents ont été efficaces sur le plan militaire. L'étude de ce thème continue dans le sixième chapitre où nous voyons l'arrivée de Che Guevara dans le Congo et les moyens mis en place pour lutter contre ce qui est perçu comme une nouvelle menace pour les forces soutenues et armées par les Etats-Unis.

Notre conclusion consiste en une discussion qui porte sur les acteurs armés non-étatiques et leur utilisation éventuelle dans le contexte moderne.

Les doctrines de l'Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) qui fut créé en 1946 renforcent la notion que les peuples vivant encore sous le joug colonial avaient le droit à l'auto-détermination. Alors que cette auto-détermination est accordée à certains pays encore colonisés dans des conditions paisibles et par la voie de la diplomatie, la réticence de quelques pays colonisateurs face aux demandes des nationalistes dans d'autres pays a pour conséquence que des mouvements nationaux se trouvent obligés de se tourner vers les armes afin de faire partir des administrations étrangères. C'est le cas en Malaisie où les forces armées britanniques luttent contre des insurgés communistes; en Indochine où la France est confrontée par un cas pareil; au Maroc, en Algérie et en Tunisie où, encore, la France se batte contre des forces nationalistes; ou en Indonésie, pays dans lequel les forces néerlandaises restent jusqu'en 1949 et l'indépendance de ce pays dans le Pacifique.

C'est Harold Macmillan, le Premier ministre britannique, qui énonce en 1960 que les Vents du changement soufflent sur le continent africain. Trois ans plus tôt, en 1957, Macmillan a assisté à la cérémonie d'indépendance qui a vu le Gold Coast devenir le Ghana. Ce pays dans l'ouest de l'Afrique est le premier pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne à accéder à l'indépendance. Le premier président de ce pays nouvellement indépendant est Kwame Nkrumah. L'un des fondateurs du mouvement nommé le panafricanisme, Nkrumah croit que les Africains en Afrique et ceux dont les ancêtres étaient des africains

partageaient une Histoire commune bien différente de celle des Européens. Pour cette raison, Nkrumah proposait que les nations africaines nouvellement indépendantes devaient rejeter le modèle utilisé par ces mêmes Européens et se servir de cette Histoire commune pour en construire d'autres.

L'idéologie qui est le panafricanisme s'est construite petit à petit depuis l'aube du 20ème siècle. Parmi ses adeptes nous trouvons Jomo Kenyatta, le Kenyan qui inspire le mouvement des Mau-Mau dans les années 1950 et, plus importante dans l'optique de notre étude, Patrice Lumumba. Ce jeune congolais issu d'une famille modeste reçoit une éducation dans des établissements scolaires et professionnels mis en place par l'administration belge depuis 1908. Employé dans l'administration belge dans les années 1950 c'est à cette époque où il commence à s'intéresser à la politique. Créant en 1957 le Mouvement national congolais (MNC), Lumumba est très active dans les négociations sur l'indépendance du Congo (la Table ronde belge-congolaise) qui ont lieu entre les autorités belges et les représentants congolais à Bruxelles en 1960. Suite à l'indépendance, c'est Lumumba qui est nommé Premier ministre par le nouveau Président du Congo Joseph Kasavubu.

Pour les Etats-Unis, cette nomination n'est pas forcément la bienvenue. Du fait que Lumumba s'est inspiré du panafricanisme et que les Etats-Unis voient cette idéologie comme une menace potentielle, ce nouveau chef politique est surveillé de très près par la CIA. Très tôt, le chef de station de la CIA au Congo, Larry Devlin, sera impliqué dans un complot qui vise à ôter le pouvoir des mains de Lumumba. Parmi les conspirateurs se trouve le chef des forces armées, Joseph Mobutu, homme qui, par la suite, joue un rôle crucial dans l'Histoire du Congo.

La peur de la "menace rouge" et tout ce qui s'approche du communisme apparait aux Etats-Unis dès la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. Depuis, les autorités américaines

se sont relayées ayant pour objectif l'élimination de cette menace. Pour atteindre cet objectif, des administrations américaines successives renforcent le panorama législatif en créant et en impliquant des mesures de plus en plus anti-communistes. Un exemple est le Conseil de sécurité national (NSC) établi en 1947. La création de ce conseil suit un avertissement donné par George Kennan dans le *Long Telegram*, et un discours livré par le Président Truman qui expose l'intention des Etats-Unis de contenir la progression du communisme. La Doctrine Truman de 1947 servira de base pour toute future mesure américaine en matière de la politique étrangère dans les années 1950 et 1960. Pour empêcher la progression du communisme dans le monde, les Etats-Unis sont prêts à accepter la présence de régimes minoritaires blancs en Afrique du Sud et en Rhodésie de Sud car cette présence est la garantie que l'Union soviétique n'établira pas de base dans l'Afrique subsaharienne. La même chose est vraie pour les pays colonisateurs comme la Belgique.

Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Belgique commencent dès la Première Guerre mondiale. Extrêmement riche en minerais tels que le cuivre, ce métal jaune est exporté vers l'Europe en grande quantité et elle sert dans la fabrication des armements utilisés sur les champs de bataille du conflit mondial. Plus tard, dans les années 1930, c'est un autre minéral trouvé au Congo, l'uranium, qui sera prisé par les Etats-Unis. Une variété de ce minéral sera utilisée dans la fabrication des bombes atomiques larguées sur le Japon en 1945.

La peur de ne plus avoir accès à ces minéraux congolais (ou la peur de voir les soviétiques s'en emparer) est une autre raison qui explique l'intervention américaine dans l'Afrique centrale. En effet, les Etats-Unis ont tout intérêt à ce que la stabilité règne dans le Congo. Pour eux, s'il y a cette stabilité et s'il ya un chef d'Etat congolais qui n'est pas

hostile envers les Américains, ils peuvent continuer à maintenir cet accès. Sinon, il faudrait envisager d'autres solutions.

L'indépendance du Congo arrive le 30 juin 1960. Pourtant, pour les forces armées congolaises qui sont toujours commandées par des officiers belges, la décolonisation n'a rien changé. Bien qu'il ya eu des manifestations contre les Belges juste avant l'indépendance, la mutinerie qui commence début juillet 1960 ouvre la voie à une violence anti-Belge qui voit des milliers de Belges quitter le pays en catastrophe. La violence est si grave dans certaines zones que les autorités belges se trouvent obligé d'envoyer des avions afin d'évacuer leurs ressortissants et des parachutistes belges ouvrent le feu sur ceux qui cherchent à tuer ou à violer ces ressortissants. Bien que ces opérations sont, *a priori*, des mesures humanitaires, Lumumba les perçoit comme une forme de néocolonialisme et fait appel aux Nations unies afin de faire partir des forces que Lumumba considère des envahisseurs.

Bien que la question de ces forces soit rapidement résolue, vont surgir dans les prochains jours d'autres problèmes infiniment plus grave pour l'avenir du Congo. En effet, le Katanga et le Sud Kasai, deux provinces congolaises, déclarent leur sécession. Dans une tentative faite pour restaurer l'ordre dans le Sud Kasai, Lumumba envoie des troupes congolaises. C'est une erreur. Des milliers de civils congolais sont massacrés par ces troupes qui sont, de plus, transporté dans des avions prêtés par l'Union soviétique.

La notion tenue par les Etats-Unis que Lumumba est un communiste est, pour eux, confirmée en août 1960. On donne l'ordre à la CIA de chercher les moyens nécessaires pour éliminer Lumumba. En septembre Kasavubu qui est horrifié par le massacre vire son Premier ministre et quand celui-ci refuse de partir, c'est Mobutu qui ordonne la suspension du parlement congolais et il se sert de l'armée pour maintenir l'ordre dans Léopoldville, le capital du Congo.

Ce n'est pas longtemps avant que Mobutu ordonne l'arrestation de Lumumba. A partir de la mi-septembre 1960 cet ancien Premier ministre se trouve sous la garde des soldats des Nations unies, eux aussi envoyés au Congo un mois auparavant pour calmer la situation.

En même temps, les supporters de Lumumba décident de partir vers le nord-ouest du pays où, à Stanleyville, ils créent un nouveau gouvernement en opposition à celui de Kasavubu. Pour ce nouveau régime, Kasavubu est sous les ordres des Etats-Unis et par conséquence les chefs du mouvement se tournent vers l'URSS pour qu'il vienne leur assistance.

Jusqu'au années 1950 et le début de la décolonisation de l'Afrique subsaharienne, les Soviétiques ne s'en intéressaient pas beaucoup : du fait de la présence coloniale, les analystes du Politburo considéraient que cette partie du monde était impénétrable et par conséquence l'URSS a concentré ses efforts ailleurs. C'est à partir de 1955 et la Conférence à Bandung en Indonésie que l'URSS développe une politique visant l'expansion de son influence en Afrique. La Chine, rival communiste de l'URSS, assiste à la Conférence et cet acte convainc les autorités russes que, dorénavant, il faudrait montrer aux mouvements nationalistes africains qu'ils avaient leur soutien. Sur les années à venir, l'Union soviétique va, donc, fournir des munitions à des pays tels que l'Egypte. Il établira des relations diplomatiques avec d'autres comme l'Algérie, le Mali ou le Ghana et, à partir de 1961 et la création du Bloc de Casablanca, va envoyer des conseillers afin qu'ils aident ces pays à établir des systèmes socialistes.

Avant et après l'indépendance de la RDC, la présence de l'URSS s'accroît. Lumumba lui demande des conseils en matière de propagande en 1959 et les autorités soviétiques sont présentes lors de la cérémonie d'indépendance en juin 1960. Comme nous avons vu dans le premier chapitre, les avions russes transportent des troupes congolaises

vers le Sud Kasai, et c'est le sentiment que l'URSS cherchait à s'établir une base en Afrique que la CIA décide d'éloigner Lumumba. Lorsque Lumumba est viré en septembre 1960, Khrouchtchev se trouvait obligé de fournir une réponse. En fin septembre 1960 il arrive à New York et aux forums des Nations unies il dénoncera l'intervention des Etats-Unis. Le soutien donné par l'URSS aux supporters de Lumumba n'est pas simplement d'une nature diplomatique. Selon certaines sources, elle fournirait des avions de combat et des munitions au gouvernement de Stanleyville mené par Antoine Gizenga. L'assassinat de Lumumba en janvier 1961 provoque une vive réaction partout dans le pays. Plusieurs rebellions saisissent le Congo en même temps et dans le viseur se trouvait le Katanga, province sécessionniste et province dans laquelle Lumumba est tué.

Depuis près de mille ans le Katanga est connu pour ses richesses en matière de minérales. Quand les Belges arrivent au Congo vers la fin du 19ème siècle, c'est dans le Katanga qu'ils vont ouvrir des mines afin de retirer ces richesses du sol et de les transporter vers l'Europe. Au début du 20ème siècle une société anglo-belge voit le jour. Appelée l'*Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* (UMHK), peu à peu cette société va devenir l'une des plus grandes au Congo belges et, de ce fait, elle a une influence significative dans la vie politique du pays.

Cette influence ne va pas être diminuée par l'indépendance de la RDC : elle apporte un soutien financier à Moïse Tshombe, le chef de CONAKAT, un parti politique pro-belge et pro-européen; et lors de la sécession de la province en août 1960 elle financera le recrutement d'une armée composée de mercenaires venus de l'Europe, l'Afrique du Sud et la Rhodésie du Sud.

Ne voulant pas céder les richesses du Katanga à Lumumba, le gouvernement belge a aussi joué un rôle très important dans la défense de Katanga. En juillet 1960, il établit le MISTEBEL, une mission technique, et c'est par le biais de cette mission que le Katanga va

pouvoir se doter d'une force terrienne, la FTK, mais également d'une force aérienne, la FAK. A partir du début de 1961, ces forces katangaises composées en partie d'étrangers mais aussi de Congolais fidèles à Tshombe (les Gendarmes katangaises) sont confrontées par un nombre de forces ennemies. Ayant pour rôle le maintien de la province, ces forces doivent faire face non seulement à des rebelles congolaises supporteurs de Lumumba, mais aussi à des forces armées envoyées par les Nations unies pour mettre fin à la sécession katangaise. Bien que les soldats de Tshombe arrivent à résister aux rebelles dans le nord de la province, ils n'arrivent pas à résister l'avance des forces des Nations unies. Au bout d'une guerre qui durera jusqu'en décembre 1962, Tshombe et son armée de mercenaires sont obligés de quitter le Katanga et le Congo retrouve son intégralité.

La fin de la sécession du Katanga apporte l'espoir que le Congo connaîtrait, enfin, la paix. Cependant, cet espoir disparaît très tôt, et dès juin 1963 un mouvement mené par Pierre Mulele menace de nouveau la stabilité politique et sociale du pays. C'est un mouvement radical basé sur les doctrines du Maoïsme et il trouve son soutien dans les zones rurales telles que le Kwilu, province située dans le centre du Congo. En général, les supporteurs de ce mouvement sont des paysans. Pour eux l'indépendance n'a rien changé en ce qui concerne leurs conditions de vie et ils considèrent que ceux qui ont bénéficié le plus du départ des Belges sont les *évolués*, l'élite congolaise qui maintenant dirige le pays.

Ce n'est pas la première fois qu'il y a une protestation rurale au Congo. En effet, la période durant laquelle les Belges sont au Congo est ponctuée de révoltes rurales qui visent, généralement, à créer plus d'opportunité aux habitants de la campagne ou d'obtenir des prix justes pour les cultures récoltées. Naturellement, la production agricole est largement contrôlée par des Belges ou par des congolais éduqués (les *évolués*).

Des réformes mises en place par les autorités coloniales et la présence de missionnaires catholiques mènent dans les années 1920 et 1930 à la création d'un nombre

d'écoles primaires secondaires ou professionnelles. Il y a eu même, en 1954, l'établissement d'une institution pour l'enseignement supérieur, l'Université Catholique du Louvain.

Pierre Mulele est issu, lui-même, de l'une de ces écoles primaires. Ensuite, il poursuit son éducation dans un lycée professionnel à Leverville, et c'est ici où il va rencontrer un nombre de personnes qui seront très actives dans l'organisation de la révolution rurale de 1963-1965. C'est aussi à Leverville que Mulele se radicalise : ses convictions politiques sont renforcées par des écrivains congolais tels qu'Antoine-Roger Bolamba, écrivain avec lequel Mulele travaille lorsque ce dernier devient ministre de l'Education au sein du gouvernement de Lumumba.

En quittant l'école de Leverville Mulele s'engage dans les forces armées du Congo Belge, la Force Publique, et c'est ici qu'il apprend les rudiments de la vie de soldat. Aussi, à l'insu de ses supérieures, il a accès à un nombre de documents classifiés portant sur les tactiques employées par les forces armées pour la répression d'une révolte éventuelle. En 1952, Mulele quitte la Force Publique et avec Théodore Bengila, un ancien de l'école de Leverville, il établit l'*Union des anciens élèves de la mission Leverville* (Unamil) et se base dans la région de Kwango-Kwilu.

En 1958, Mulele fait partie d'une délégation congolaise qui est invitée à l'Exposition Universelle à Bruxelles. C'est en Belgique où il a accès à une littérature qui est interdite dans le Congo Belge et il lit des ouvrages de Staline ou de Mao Tsé-toung. Mulele s'intéresse de plus en plus à l'idéologie communiste, y compris l'étatisation de l'industrie, et c'est en 1959 qu'il crée le Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), parti qui diffère d'un nombre d'autres parti politiques congolais dans la mesure où il accepte la diversité ethnique et tribale. De nature populiste, le parti vise, parmi d'autres mesures, l'établissement de plus

d'écoles; l'éducation pour tous; et la création de collectivités paysannes. Le PSA a, donc, un programme qui ressemble aux doctrines appliquées en Chine ou dans l'URSS.

En 1961, Lumumba a été remplacé par Cyrille Adoula. Considérant qu'Adoula est à la tête d'un régime fantoche installé par les Etats-Unis, c'est en 1962 que Mulele part en Chine où, avec Bengila, il va apprendre les stratégies militaires développées par Mao Tsé-toung. Convaincu que le Congo est de plus en plus dirigé par une hégémonie capitaliste, a son retour au Congo en 1963 Mulele décide qu'il faut déposer le gouvernement de Léopoldville et il entame l'organisation d'une révolution populaire. Celle-ci sera menée en créant des milices, et ceux-là opéreront dans différentes zones géographiques du Congo. Ces partisans attaqueront des installations militaires isolées dans les zones rurales et, petit à petit, ils prendraient contrôle de zones plus larges. Le but final est d'avancer sur le capital et d'instaurer un régime populaire. Nombrant environ 5 000 partisans fin 1963, et connus sous le nom "La Jeunesse", les premières incursions des rebelles de Mulele ont lieu dans les régions centrales du Congo. Malgré des contre-attaques de l'Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), en janvier 1964 les partisans avancent sur Kikwit dans le nord-ouest du pays et contrôlent un territoire d'une longueur de 300 kms et d'une largeur de quelques 120 kms.

Bien que le régime de Léopoldville pense gagner la bataille, une autre révolte située cette fois-ci dans l'est du Congo, est entamée par des supporters de Christophe Gbenye et de Laurent Désiré-Kabila. Visant le contrôle des richesses du Katanga, ce dans le nord de cette province que des attaques sont menées. Les *Simbas*, le nom adopté par ces forces, ont eux aussi identifié les Etats-Unis comme ennemi et ils ont juré de faire tomber Adoula et Kasa-Vubu. Officiellement, l'Armée populaire de libération (APL), cette force attaque des installations militaires et policières situées dans le Kivu, et imbibé d'une potion administrée par un docteur-sorcier et appelée une *dawa*, ils sèment la panique dans les rangs d'un ANC

dont les membres croient fortement dans le pouvoir de la magie noire. Portant des déguisements étranges comme des peaux de singes, des abat-jour, ou des culottes de femmes trouvées dans des maisons de Belges saccagées, les Simbas avancent rapidement sur le territoire et arrivent à Stanleyville en juillet 1964. L'avance est facilitée par le retrait des forces des Nations unies qui a vu son mandat finir ce même mois. La ville de Stanleyville est la deuxième du Congo. Située sur le fleuve du Congo, l'un des plus longs du monde, cette ville est depuis longtemps un centre commercial important. Un grand nombre de Belges et ressortissants d'autres nations européennes y habitent et ils mènent une vie plutôt paisible qui consiste à profiter des privilèges accordés aux blancs.

Egalement, il y a avait eu des développements à Léopoldville ce juillet de 1964 : Adoula, considéré trop faible pour faire face à la rébellion populaire est remplacé par Moïse Tshombe. Après un bref séjour en Espagne, en effet, cet ex-leader politique de la province de Katanga rentre au Congo où il espère refaire une vie politique. D'ailleurs, il est très fortement soutenu par les Etats-Unis.

A Stanleyville la situation s'empire pour les autochtones : des centaines de noirs considérés comme des opposants à Lumumba sont massacrés au pied d'une statue érigée en son honneur et les blancs sont tabassés ou menacés de mort. Parmi les blancs qui résident dans la ville se trouve un petit nombre d'Américains. Personnel consulaire ou membre de famille de ce dernier, en début juillet 1964 une majorité quitte Stanleyville à bord des avions afin d'éviter l'arrivée des Simbas. Pourtant, Michael Hoyt, le consul américain, a décidé de rester. Quand le consulat est pris par les Simbas début août, avec quatre de ses collègues Hoyt sera capturé et retenu en otage. Au mois de septembre, il est rejoint par plus de mille autres étrangers qui sont détenus dans des hôtels situés dans la ville ou dans un camp militaire autrefois utilisé par l'ANC.

La détention de ces otages et le fait que leur situation s'aggrave de jour en jour inquiètent beaucoup les autorités belges, américaines et congolaises. Même si une opération de sauvetage a été envisagée pour libérer les Américains en début août, c'est maintenant des centaines de vies qui sont menacées et il faut envisager une attaque beaucoup plus conséquente. Le problème avec lequel les autorités sont confrontées c'est que les forces congolaises sont considérées nulles et incapables de monter une attaque efficace. Il ne reste qu'une seule solution : il va falloir importer des mercenaires et faire venir les forces belges.

Comme nous avons vu, un dispositif qui a permis les Etats-Unis d'intervenir clandestinement a été conçu dès la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Actif sous d'autres formes avant cette guerre, la CIA se compose d'un réseau humain dont les tentacules s'étendent à travers le monde et d'un dispositif qui comprend des institutions financières secrètes; des marchands d'armes; des lignes aériennes et toutes sortes de contacts qui restent anonymes des yeux du publique. C'est en se servant de ce réseaux que les Etats-Unis ont pu monter des opérations clandestines en Chine durant la guerre civile dans ce pays et où ils soutiennent les forces de Tchang Kaï-chek; au Guatemala où, durant une tentative de déposer Jacobo Arbenz, ils fournissent le financement, la propagande, les avions, et les hommes; et au Cuba où la CIA organise l'entrainement d'une armée composée d'exilés Cubains opposants à Fidel Castro. Ces exilés vont participer à l'invasion qui a eu lieu à la Baie des Cochons en avril 1961.

C'est la peur de voir la porte s'ouvrir au communisme en Amérique centrale qui fait réagir les autorités américaines. Actionnaires dans des sociétés américaines telles que la *United Fruit Company*, certains membres du gouvernement américain s'inquiètent devant la possibilité que Arbenz procède à une étatisation de ces sociétés. Mais les considérations financières ne sont pas les seules raisons pourquoi le gouvernement d'Eisenhower décide

de monter une opération clandestine courant 1954. La chasse aux communistes est entamée dans les années 1940 et elle prend de l'élan au début des années 1950. Considérant qu'il vaut mieux installé un non-communiste comme le Colonel Castillo Armas à la tête du régime guatémalien, la CIA conçoit l'Opération PBSUCCESS. Pour atteindre cet objectif, les Etats-Unis vont faire appel à leurs alliés en Amérique centrale et Trujillo de la République dominicaine et Anastasio Somoza du Nicaragua sont parmi les chefs d'Etats qui seront impliqués dans le complot.

Le succès de cette opération convainc la CIA et le gouvernement américain qu'il est possible de remplacer n'importe quel chef d'Etat vu comme un opposant à l'idéologie prônée par le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à cette époque. Pour cette raison, quand Fidel Castro s'empare du pouvoir au Cuba fin 1959, la CIA entame une série de manœuvres visant à discréditer le leader cubain aux yeux de la population. L'identifiant comme communiste aux débuts des années 1960, la CIA va ensuite chercher à développer des liens avec la communauté cubaine exilée dans des villes telles que Miami. Elle financera des opérations anti-Castro menées par ces exilés et, en 1961, la CIA organise des camps d'entraînement aux Etats-Unis et au Nicaragua, et fournissent des avions aux forces exilés. Durant l'invasion la Brigade 2506, le nom adopté par les forces exilées, est portée par des bateaux de guerre américains et certains des avions qui participent au bombardement des installations militaires cubaines sont pilotés par des membres de la *National Guard*. Deux de ces pilotes y laisseront la vie.

Si l'invasion de la Baie des Cochons est un échec et des centaines de combattants du côté de la Brigade 2506 sont tués ou mis en prison, le désir de déposer Castro et de lutter contre le communisme est très fort chez les exilés. C'est le Président Kennedy qui offre à ces exilés la possibilité d'intégrer les forces américaines régulières en 1962. Kennedy, qui redoute une expansion du communisme dans les Caraïbes est alerté par la

possibilité que l'URSS installe des missiles sur le sol cubain. Afin de contrer cette menace il va lui-même menacer d'entamer une guerre nucléaire contre l'Union soviétique. Cette Crise des missiles de Cuba met plus ou moins fin aux ambitions des exilés : bien qu'ils continuent de recevoir un financement qui leur permet des mener des attaques contre Castro, celles-ci ne sont rien de plus qu'un gêne sans importance pour un leader soutenu fortement par les Soviétiques et vu comme un exemple à suivre pour d'autres mouvements radicaux.

Si l'expansion de l'influence du communisme semblait s'arrêter aux frontières du Cuba, dans d'autres zones de la planète cette idéologie et ses dérivatifs montait en popularité: en Asie du sud est le Vietnam du Nord, le Cambodge et le Laos avaient tous les trois adopté le communisme comme modèle politique et en Afrique subsaharienne des pays comme la Tanzanie, le Sénégal ou le Mali s'inspiraient du marxisme afin de construire de nouvelles sociétés.

Dans l'objectif de pouvoir intervenir là où le communisme menaçait les intérêts américains, et là où il était impossible d'envoyer des forces régulières américaines, courant 1963 Kennedy, et ensuite Johnson, décide de créer une force aérienne capable d'intervenir clandestinement dans différentes zones géographiques. Notamment le Congo. Ne voulant pas que l'identité de cette force soit découverte, la CIA se tourne de nouveau vers les exilés cubains : ils ne sont pas encore naturalisés et sont, *a priori*, toujours de nationalité cubaine.

Bien que le contexte soit relativement calme au Congo fin 1962, le gouvernement congolais est à court de moyens dans la lutte contre les forces katangaises. En juillet 1962 le gouvernement américain tente d'apporter une assistance militaire au gouvernement congolais en envoyant le Colonel Greene. Son rôle est de mettre en place un programme d'entraînement pour l'ANC qui jusqu'alors ne s'est pas illustrée dans les combats contre les forces mercenaires au Katanga. Si l'inefficacité des forces terrestres congolaises est

adressée par cette initiative, dans les airs les Congolais sont totalement absents : certes, il possède certains avions de combat mais le problème est qu'il n'y a personne pour les piloter.

C'est le nouveau président des Etats-Unis et ses conseillers qui voient la solution à ce problème plutôt délicat : une présence aérienne américaine soulèverait sans doute des soupçons que les Etats-Unis cherchaient à augmenter leur influence en Afrique centrale et confirmerait d'autres soupçons qui voyaient les Américains contrôler les décisions militaires du gouvernement congolais. Fin 1962 les premiers pilotes cubains arrivent au Congo. Recrutés clandestinement et envoyés à Léopoldville, leur rôle est de montrer à la population congolaise que son gouvernement est bien présent et qu'il s'inquiète du bien-être de son peuple. Malheureusement, ce n'est qu'une démonstration de force que de nom, la Force aérienne congolaise (FAC) puisque les avions ne sont pas armés.

Alors que les avions de la FAC seront armés courant 1963 et participent dans des opérations contre les rebelles, le nombre de pilotes et d'avions restent une échelle réduite. Ce n'est qu'en août 1964 que cette force aérienne recevra des renforts et cette augmentation dans les effectifs coïncide avec l'avancé des rebelles sur Stanleyville. Ce n'est pas que la force aérienne qui est renforcée : à partir de fin juillet 1964, le sol congolais voit l'arrivé la trace des bottes portées par des centaines de mercenaires européens et Sud-africains dont certains étaient déjà venus trois ans plus tôt. Cette fois-ci la différence est qu'ils se trouvent au Congo pour se battre pour le gouvernement congolais et non pas contre.

L'Irlandais, et ex-officier de l'armée britannique, Mike Hoare est désigné comme commandant d'une une unité militaire appelée 5 Commando. Basée de nouveau dans le Katanga, ce groupe composé de centaines d'hommes sera bientôt rejoints par d'autres groupes parmi lesquels des mercenaires commandés par Jean Schramme, un Belge, et Bob

Denard, un ancien de l'armée française. Tous les deux se trouvaient au Katanga entre 1960 et 1963.

Ces forces composées de mercenaires ne sont pas les seules qui se battront contre les forces rebelles à partir d'août 1964. Du fait que des centaines de ressortissants belges sont tenus en otage à Stanleyville, un officier de l'armée belge, le colonel Vandewalle arrive lui aussi fin août au Congo. Son rôle est de concevoir un plan militaire dont l'objectif est la libération des otages. Appelé l'*Ommegang*, ce plan sera mis à effet fin novembre. Entre temps, les différents groupes de mercenaires se battent contre les rebelles afin de reprendre le terrain qui a été cédé depuis janvier 1963. Se rapprochant progressivement vers Stanleyville, l'objectif de ces petits groupes qui se trouvent dans le nord-ouest, le nord-est et le centre du Congo c'est de se regrouper autour de ville où ils rejoindront une force plus large menée par Hoare.

Dans la ville de Stanleyville la situation s'aggrave encore. Des rumeurs comme quoi une force de mercenaires est en route sème la panique parmi les Simbas : ils accélèrent le nombre d'exécutions de civils, le nombre de viols, et le nombre de menaces de mort contre les ressortissants étrangers. Le fait que Nicolas Olenga, le chef des forces rebelles à Stanleyville, croit que les forces ennemies sont composées d'Américains ne fait qu'empirer une situation déjà gravissime. Michael Hoyt, le consul américain qui est retenu en prison depuis près de trois mois se trouve maintenant menacer de mort.

Alors que l'*Ommegang* composé de mercenaires avance dans les zones tenues auparavant par les rebelles, les menaces de mort lancées contre les otages font avancer le plan conçu pour la libération de Stanleyville. En effet, appelée l'Opération Dragon Rouge, ce plan consiste à faire parachuter des troupes belges sur l'aéroport Simi-Simi de Stanleyville pour qu'ensuite ils avancent à pied sur la ville elle-même.

Ce plan implique la coopération d'un nombre de pays différents. Montant à bord des avions militaires américains en Belgique avec une escale en Espagne pour se ravitailler en combustible, les parachutistes belges attendront sur les îles britanniques situées dans l'océan Atlantique jusqu'à l'ordre de sauter sur Stanleyville. Avant le parachutage de ces troupes, l'aéroport à Stanleyville et ses environs seront attaqués par des avions pilotés par les exilés cubains. Cette force qui a adopté le nom *Makasi* est très active depuis le mois d'août et elle a mené des opérations régulières contre les rebelles.

L'opération qui est lancée le 24 novembre 1964 affole les rebelles qui se trouvent toujours à Stanleyville. Olenga et un grand nombre d'officiers quittent la ville dès que l'attaque commence et il ne reste que des Simbas avides de tuer les otages. Le massacre des otages débute dès que les Simbas entendent le bruit des avions. Des Belges qui avaient été retenus dans des hôtels sont regroupés dans la rue et les Simbas les alignent avant d'ouvrir le feu avec des mitrailleuses. Femmes et enfants sont coupés en deux par les balles de ces armes et ceux qui ne sont pas encore morts sont tués à coup de machette.

C'est une scène d'horreur qui accueille les soldats belges. Ils ont rapidement pris contrôle de l'aéroport et ils ont avancé quasiment sans résistance dans les rues de la ville. Après quelques accrochages avec les Simbas et après sauver la vie de la majorité des otages, ces troupes retireront vers l'aéroport à peine deux heures plus tard. A 11 heures du matin, 5 Commando arrive à Stanleyville. Sous l'ordre ne pas attaquer avant cette heure-ci, les mercenaires de Mike Hoare nettoient les zones périphériques de la ville. Eux aussi horrifiés par ce qu'ils découvrent, ils n'épargnent pas les Simbas qui sont tués sans pitié. Dans les jours qui ont suivi l'Opération Dragon rouge, les Opérations Dragon vert, noir et blanc viseront elles aussi à libérer des ressortissants étrangers détenus otages dans des petites villes dans le nord-est du Congo.

Alors que la grande majorité des exilés cubains au Congo pendant la crise servent au sein de la FAC, présent aussi à Stanleyville est une force terrestre d'exilés cubains composée de quelques seize hommes. Arrivant eux aussi pendant le mois d'août, il a été d'abord envisagé que ces hommes participent dans une opération américaine qui visait à libérer le consul à Stanleyville. Même si ce projet n'a pas vu le jour, ces hommes seront impliqués dans une opération de sauvetage dans une mission religieuse dénommé Kilometre 8. Ici, le même jour que les opérations dans Stanleyville, ils montent dans deux jeeps et traverse la brousse congolaise pour venir au secours de trois missionnaires chrétiens et leurs familles.

Si les opérations de sauvetage et la libération de Stanleyville ont été bien accueillies par les nations concernées directement par la prise de ses ressortissants en otage les pays radicaux africains ainsi que l'URSS et le Cuba s'en réjouissaient bien moins. Pour les pays comme l'Algérie, l'Egypte, le Ghana ou la Tanzanie, l'intervention ne consistait pas à une opération humanitaire mais à une invasion poussée par des considérations néocolonialistes. D'ailleurs, le président algérien Ben Bella a déclaré qu'il continuerait à fournir des armes aux mouvements rebelles congolais afin qu'ils puissent poursuivre la lutte.

Pendant que les récriminations politiques et diplomatiques occupaient les gouvernements de chaque côté de l'Atlantique, au Congo les rebelles menés par Laurent Kabila concentraient leurs efforts dans la zone nord-est de Baraka-Fizi. Recevant des renforts en hommes du Rwanda et recevant des armes de l'Algérie et de la Chine, le Département de l'Etat américain estimait que si les rebelles ne sont pas dénichés de cette zone et qu'ils reçoivent le même genre de soutien des Etats radicaux, il y avait la possibilité qu'ils lancent une contre-attaque qui les mènera aux portes du capital congolais. En dépit de l'indignation autour de l'usage de mercenaires, et dans la mesure que l'ANC se montrait

aussi inefficace contre les attaques, le Directeur de la CIA, John McClone, ne voyait pas d'autres solutions que de continuer à utiliser des soldats de fortune.

Un objectif majeur dans la lutte contre les rebelles consiste à limiter la circulation d'armes qui arrive dans le port tanzanien de Dar-Es-Salaam et qui sont acheminées vers les positions rebelles. Traversant le Lac Tanganyika, des bateaux affrètent non seulement des armes mais aussi des vives nécessaires pour nourrir les forces rebelles quasiment coupées du reste du Congo. A cette époque, comme cela a été avec une force aérienne, le Congo est totalement dépourvu d'une marine. De ce fait, durant les premiers mois de 1965, la CIA tente d'établir une force navale qui opérait sur le lac afin d'empêcher l'acheminement des provisions depuis la Tanzanie. Se dotant de deux vieux bateaux de pêche congolais et recrutant un équipage composé de membres de 5 Commando, les deux vaisseaux seront ensuite armés de mitrailleuses et de canons. La Force navale congolaise (FNC) sera ensuite renforcée par l'arrivée de six bateaux de patrouille fournis par les Etats-Unis. Le rôle des deux anciens bateaux de pêche est de transporter les mercenaires le long de la cote du lac afin de monter des attaques sur les positions rebelles et portés vers Baraka en avril 1965 les mercenaires de Mike Hoare ont pu avancer vers l'intérieur du Congo. Vers la fin de mai 1965, ces mercenaires ont pris la ville de Watsa et de Dungu et ils ont capturé une mine d'or situé à Durba dans le nord-est. La vente d'or de cette mine servait aux rebelles pour acheter encore plus d'armes. Avant août 1965, Hoare a quasiment atteint tous ses objectifs militaires : aidé encore par les avions pilotés par des exilés cubains *du Makasi*, dans une opération nommée "Banzi", Hoare arrive à nettoyer la zone située jusqu'au nord de Katanga. Si ce nettoyage continu sans beaucoup d'accrocs, il a remarqué que certains soldats des ennemies semblent mieux entraînés qu'auparavant. Il en déduit que ces soldats reçoivent un entraînement donné par une armée beaucoup professionnel. Ses soupçons seront confirmés après une attaque rebelle sur le fort militaire de Bendera dans le Sud-Kivu.

L'un des mort du coté des rebelles porte un passeport cubain et à l'intérieur de celui-ci des traces que ce rebelle est passé par la Tchécoslovaquie et par le Pékin. En fait, cette présence cubaine a été détectée par un bateau espion américain qui sillonne la côte de l'Océan Indien depuis quelques temps. Chaque jour, à la même heure, l'opérateur de radio d'une force cubaine transmet des messages vers la Havane afin d'informer Fidel Castro des développements militaires et de demander plus d'armes ou de vives en cas de besoin.

Depuis quelques années le Cuba de Fidel Castro fournit des armes aux mouvements révolutionnaires en Afrique. A partir de décembre 1961, l'Algérie en bénéficie de ces armes et celles-ci seront utilisées dans les luttes contre les forces françaises pendant la guerre d'Algérie ou elles seront acheminées vers la Tanzanie en 1965.

L'un des plus grands supporters des mouvements radicaux en Afrique c'est Che Guevara. Il critique de façon très virulent les opérations de sauvetage à Stanleyville et dans un discours prononcé à Santiago de Cuba fin novembre 1964 où il dénonce ce qu'il voit comme la "bestialité de l'impérialisme". Un discours pareil est donné aux représentants qui assistent à un forum des Nations unies en décembre 1964 où Guevara parle de la lutte de différentes nations africaines et les peuples du pays tels que l'Afrique du Sud ou la Rhodésie. Il rêve de former une alliance avec ces peuples et pense que dans le Congo peut être le centre et le point de départ d'une révolution à l'échelle mondiale. En janvier 1965, Guevara part sur un trajet qui le voit visiter un nombre de pays africains. En février, il rencontre un nombre de chef d'Etats qui ont adopté le socialisme radical comme modèle politique et, le même mois, il expose devant la Conférence Afro-asiatique à Alger un projet qui consiste à aider tous pays qui lutte contre "l'ennemi impérialiste".

Lors de sa tournée en Afrique Guevara a pu rencontrer Laurent Kabila à Dar Es Salam. Impressionné par ce dit jeune révolutionnaire, Guevara lui promet d'envoyer une trentaine d'hommes dont le rôle serait de former ses forces. C'est vers la fin de janvier 1965

que des hommes de l'Armée Révolutionnaire Cubaine (ARC) seront sélectionnés et informés qu'ils vont bientôt partir vers l'Angola (pour se battre contre les Portugais) ou vers le Congo. A la fin du mois de mars 1965, Guevara lui se prête à partir, lui aussi, vers le Congo et, dans l'intérêt de rester caché des yeux de la CIA, il se déguise en homme d'affaires.

Guevara arrive en Tanzanie le 19 avril 1965. Kabila n'est pas au pays mais doit être de retour d'ici peu. L'une des fondations sur lesquelles Guevara espère monter sa révolution en Afrique réside en ses recrues se portant comme des professionnels. Cependant, il n'est pas longtemps avant que Guevara découvre que ses troupes s'intéressent plus à boire de la bière ou de voler les maigres vives des paysans ils sont censés représenter. Il découvre également qu'il y a un manque d'unité parmi des recrues venus du Rwanda et les Congolais. Cela rendait la tâche de former une armée ayant un objectif commun plus difficile ; son commandant en second Victor Dreke estimant même qu'il était impossible de réunifier des Africains de nations différentes tellement il y avait de l'animosité entre eux.

Alors que les attaques des rebelles et les Cubains n'étaient pas d'une grande efficacité, le Département d'Etat américain s'inquiéter toujours car les armes à l'intention des rebelles continuaient à être transportées à travers le Lac Tanganyika. Fin août, alors, la CIA décide de renforcer sa présence sur le lac en recrutant un équipage plus expérimenté en matière de la guerre navale. En effet, les membres de 5 Commando recrutés à cet effet quelques mois plus tôt manquent sérieusement d'expérience dans ce domaine.

Tout en gardant les mêmes vaisseaux navals, la CIA se tourne de nouveau vers la communauté d'exilés cubains à Miami. Depuis l'invasion à la Baie des Cochons, cette communauté continue à lancer des attaques contre le Cuba et une force de choc s'entraîne au Nicaragua pour une éventuelle invasion du pays de Castro. Cette force possède deux

bateaux appelés des *Swift boats*. Rapides et solides, ils sont parfaitement adaptés aux besoins de la CIA et la décision est prise de les faire naviguer à la Louisiane où ils seront découpés en morceaux puis acheminés vers le Congo à bord des avions de transport américains.

L'équipage choisi pour cette mission est composé lui aussi d'exilés cubains. La majorité est composée de vétérans de l'invasion ratée d'avril 1961 et au moins deux d'entre eux avaient été emprisonnés suite à leur capture par les forces de Castro. Se portant volontaires pour la mission, les membres d'équipage savent très bien que Guevara se trouve au Congo. Ils n'attendent que l'occasion de prendre une revanche et sont des anti-communistes fervents. La mission de ces marins ne durera que l'espace de quelques semaines. Empêchant très efficacement le transport des armes vers le Congo et capturant une large quantité de ces armes et de renforts en hommes, ils arrivent à convaincre Guevara que jamais sa révolution au cœur de l'Afrique verra le jour. Guevara quitte le Congo début novembre ; se réfugie en Bolivie ; et trouve la mort quand il est fusillé en 1967 sous les ordres de la CIA.

Quand un coup d'Etat permet à Joseph Mobutu de prendre la tête du pays en 1965, le Congo semble être sur la voie de la stabilité. Mobutu est un homme fort ; il a le respect de l'ANC ; et même si depuis des années il est vu comme un ami des Etats-Unis, il a envie de voir le Congo indépendant et a envie que le pays retrouve "une authenticité". C'est à dire que le pays devient "plus africain". Pour cette raison, Mobutu promet ce qu'il appelle le Mobutuism. Cette idéologie qui rend aux Congolais une identité forte n'est pas au goût de tous. Face à l'instabilité économique qui saisi le Congo, en juin 1966 Mobutu édicte la Loi Bakajika. Elle prévoit de retirer tous les droits accordés aux sociétés étrangères en matière de l'exploitation des forêts et des mines. Dans le viseur de cette réforme sont des sociétés telles que l'UMHK.

Ce n'est pas que l'instauration de nouvelles lois qui fait que Mobutu se trouve malaimé. Jean Schramme, un mercenaire qui s'est battu aux cotés de Tshombe au Katanga puis aux cotés de Mike Hoare se trouve dans une position où il risque la perte de ses terres dans la province du Kivu. D'autres opposants à Mobutu sont les forces katangaises. S'étant battues contre les forces gouvernementales lors de la sécession de la province de Katanga quelques années auparavant, les reformes de l'armée nationales mises en place par Mobutu font que maintenant ces Katangais doivent perdre une partie de l'identité en étant intégrés dans l'ANC.

Avec la complicité de mercenaires français, y compris Bob Denard ; de mercenaires belges ; et de 2 000 hommes de l'armée katangaise, en juin 1967 ces forces attaquent celles de l'ANC dans un épisode de la Crise au Congo appelé "la Révolte des mercenaires". Concentrée dans le nord-ouest du Congo et autour de Stanleyville, la révolte ne durera que l'espace de quelques semaines. L'ANC assisté par le *Makasi* arrive à supprimer cette nouvelle menace.

L'usage de mercenaires dans les conflits armés est un sujet qui bien contesté car depuis longtemps ce type de combattant est vu comme un intrus qui n'a pas sa place sur les champs de bataille. Il ne s'intéresse qu'à l'argent ; ne respecte pas les "règles" de guerre ; et, il peut commettre des atrocités.

Pour éviter ce genre de jugement le terme "acteur armé non-étatique" est utilisé dans cette thèse. Comme les éléments du terme indiquent, le terme fait référence à toute personne qui a porté des armes au Congo et qui ne représente pas l'autorité de l'Etat. Ce terme fait référence, alors, aux mercenaires qui se trouvaient au Katanga de 1960 à 1963 ; aux différents groupes de rebelles, y compris celui mené par Che Guevara ; les parachutistes belge déployés dans la libération de Stanleyville ; et, surtout, les exilés

cubains qui ont constitués la FAC, la FNC, et un groupe de commandos aussi présent à Stanleyville.

Comme j'indique ci-dessus, ce terme est employé dans le but de porter et de garder une objectivité quant à la question des mercenaires dans les conflits armés. La méthodologie choisie est celle de la description des événements ; de les présenter en évitant tout commentaire personnel ; et de présenter les événements en se servant d'un grand nombre de documents de source primaire. Le lecteur peut alors procéder à la formulation de ses propres conclusions sans l'intervention de l'auteur de cette thèse.

Pour présenter l'argument qui ne faut pas automatiquement voir les mercenaires d'un mauvais œil, le contexte choisi est celui de la Crise du Congo de 1960 à 1967. La thèse est divisée en deux parties et en six chapitres dans lesquelles des aspects tels que la décolonisation, le néocolonialisme, la Guerre froide et la guerre clandestine, sont examinés. Alors que cette thèse observe la composition et les activités de différents groupes d'acteurs armés non-étatiques, ce sont les exilés cubains qui reçoivent une attention particulière. La raison pour laquelle cette thèse focalise sur ce groupe en particulier est que, comme Che Guevara, il s'est battu au Congo non pas pour l'argent mais pour une idéologie. Nous nous éloignons, donc, du concept populaire. Dans l'optique de présenter les mercenaires d'un autre point de vue, en se servant du contexte de la crise, cette thèse peut aussi se pencher sur la question de l'efficacité militaire. En effet, en montrant que l'ANC n'était pas en mesure d'assurer son rôle est d'apporter une stabilité nous avons vu que le seul recours est l'utilisation d'une force étrangère composée de soldats qui, pour la grande majorité entre eux, avaient reçu un entraînement militaire dans des armées beaucoup plus professionnelles.

Cette démonstration se sert de base pour la question que nous posons dans la conclusion : dans le cas où l'armée d'un Etat n'est pas apte à assurer la sécurité de ses

frontières où n'est pas en mesure d'assurer la sécurité intérieure d'un pays, peut-on imaginer que cet Etat embauche une Société militaire privée (SMP) ? Un nombre d'Etats africains sont actuellement menacés par les activités militaires de groupes radicaux tels que le Boko Haram, l'Al Shabaab, ou l'Al-Qaïda au Maghreb. Ces groupes terrorisent des pays comme le Mali, le Cameroun, le Niger et le Nigéria et face aux attaques menées par ces groupes et face à l'incapacité de ses troupes de les opposer, le Président Ali Bongo Ondimba du Gabon a lancé un appel aux nations de l'ouest demandant qu'elles interviennent. Par conséquence, tout comme dans la Syrie ou dans le Kurdistan, des forces spéciales américaines, britanniques ou françaises ont été déployées dans certaines zones menacées de terrorisme afin d'apporter une assistance aux armées locales. Ces mesures sont bien coûteuses aux nations qui fournissent ces forces spéciales et la question est de savoir si les nations de l'ouest peuvent continuer à fournir ce genre d'aide sur le long terme. Une autre solution serait de déployer les forces des Nations unies, mais, comme les armées africaines, ce type de force est souvent vu par les populations locales comme une force d'invasion. Dans la République centrafricaine on a constaté de nombreux cas de viols sur la population commis par les forces de l'ONU.

Plutôt que de voir un conflit se prolonger sans la possibilité d'une résolution, ne serait-il pas envisageable d'utiliser une SMP comme *Executive Outcomes* ? Une SMP sud-africaine, elle a résolu un conflit au Sierra Léone en neuf jours. Le conflit sierra léonaise a duré des années avant l'arrivée de ce SMP et il a repris après son départ...

INTRODUCTION

Whereas World War II brought an end to the old world order, the challenges presented by the new world order meant that the United States would find itself obliged to realign its domestic and foreign policies. Undoubtedly the most significant challenge of all was the ideological battle known as the Cold War in which the United States believed that the notions of liberty on which it was founded were under threat from the forces of international communism. Confronted with the reality that a given nation's experimentation with communism might lead the United States to losing the ideological battle in one area of the world, in the 1940s and 1950s America turned its back on the Westphalian concept of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a country and actively sought to influence elections and/or to provide support for national leaders who were favourable to American ideals. Although these efforts could be made on an open and diplomatic level, on occasions the influencing of the outcome of a given situation called for US intervention to be made more surreptitiously. This was the role of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Created in 1947, throughout the coming decade the CIA influenced the outcome of communist-backed industrial strikes; it influenced local, national and presidential elections; and when it had succeeded in doing so, or when a national leader unfavourable to American interests was in power, the CIA put in place the means to overthrow this leader and replace them with another. This was the case in Iran, in Guatemala and, whereas the CIA was to fail to overthrow Fidel Castro of Cuba, the election of Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo presented a new opportunity to test the effectiveness of US foreign policy in Central Africa and also the efficiency US intelligence services.

Indeed, following independence the Congo rapidly descended into severe social and political upheaval. If this kind of national instability continued, the US State Department

feared that the Congo would act as a gateway for the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in Central Africa. Once this goal had been achieved, it would then, the US believed, seek to spread its influence beyond the borders of the Congo bringing the Domino Theory to this part of sub-Saharan Africa.

Scope and objectives of the thesis

From the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika: Non-State Armed Actors in the Congo Crisis, 1960-1967: the title chosen for this thesis contains three elements which, I believe, help to clarify both the scope and the method which I have used throughout. To begin with, the core of the argument and much of its originality, are present in the prepositions: *from the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika*. *From ... to ...* suggests a relationship between two apparently disparate and indeed distant places. Of course, both place-names are used, metonymically, to refer to crucial events in the Cold War. The Bay of Pigs 1961 is a well-known episode of the Cold War, whereas what happened on Lake Tanganyika in 1965 is much less well-known, but it will be the concern of this study to show how they can be related, and how knowledge of that relationship can shed new light on the military dynamics of the Cold War. Indeed, the objective of this thesis will be to demonstrate that the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, operations carried out in and around Stanleyville in 1964, and operations on and around Lake Tanganyika in 1965 are inextricably linked. Furthermore, were it not for the presence of US proxy forces in these two areas of northern and eastern Congo, efforts by military units such as 5 Commando, and those made by the Congolese National Army to quell different rebellions may well have ended in defeat. Ultimately, these same proxy forces would then be used as a means of providing social and political stability to the Congolese government thus removing the threat of communist infiltration.

Secondly, the title announces the perimeters of space and time within which my argument will run. We will focus on a series of events which took place in a particular part of Africa between 1960 and 1967 and which are usually referred to as the "Congo Crisis". Since the 'Congo' is a notoriously hazy term, it might be helpful, at this introductory stage, to clarify the geography of the area that we will be concerned with.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo covers over two million square miles of Central Africa. Bordered by South Sudan (714 kilometres of border), Central African Republic (1,747 kms. of border), Republic of the Congo (1,229 kms. of border) Tanzania (479 kms. of border), Zambia (2,332 kms. of border), Rwanda (221 kms. of border), Burundi (236 kms. of border), Uganda (877 kms. of border), and Angola (2,646 kms. of border), the DRC has a 23-mile long western outlet onto the Atlantic Ocean. Other than this waterway, the DRC possesses a number of navigable rivers including the River Congo (4,700 kms. long), the Lomami (1,280 kms. long), the Tshuapa (1,000 kms. long), the Kasai (2,153 kms. long), the Kwango (1,770 kms. long), and the Sankuru (1,200 kms. long).¹ The country has four lakes in its interior -Lakes Tumba, Mai-Ndombe, Mweru, and Bangwelo- and it also has borders with Lake Tanganyika, and shares borders with Lakes Edward, and Albert.

Slightly less than a quarter of the USA's land mass, the DRC's terrain is variable: mountains and high plateaux which form the landscape of the Albertine Rift in the east of the DRC cover the North Kivu, and the South Kivu provinces as well as Maniema and eastern Katanga. The DRC shares this mountainous eastern landscape with Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, and Tanzania. In Central DRC, dense rainforests cover vast swathes of land and are to be found in the Central Basin and in the Bas-Congo. This dense

¹ The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo", <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>, accessed 21 January, 2018.

forest also spreads to the west of the country and includes swamp regions. In the center and to the east of the country, the landscape changes. In the Orientale, Equateur, Katanga, and Kasai provinces dry forest and savannah can be found.² In terms of climate, the DRC is hot and humid in the areas around the equatorial river basin; cooler and drier in the southern highlands; cooler and wetter in the eastern highlands. The wet seasons are also variable: north of the equator from April to October, and south of the equator from November to March.

Administratively, the DRC is currently (2018) divided into 26 provinces. This said, over the years the administrative composition of the country has changed several times: on becoming the Belgian Congo in 1908, the country was divided into 22 districts under direct administration of the colonial government; in 1932, a reorganisation saw the creation of six larger provinces; and in 1963 the DRC was again reorganised into 22 districts.³

From a demographic point of view the population of the DRC is currently (2018) just over 84,000,000 making it the fourth largest African country in terms of the number of people. Historically, there has been a steady increase in the DRC's population with increases of over 2.44% since 1960 when the figure stood at 15,248,251.⁴ Since 1960, the country has had a consistently high fertility rate of just under or over 6% and its population has a median age which has decreased over the same period -from 18.2 years of age at independence in 1960 to 16.8 years of age in 2018.⁵

² Augustin M. Mpoyi, Floribert B. Nyamwoga, Felicien M. Kabamba, Samuel Assembe Mvondo, "The Context of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Drivers, Agents and Institutions", Occasional Paper 94, *Center for International Forestry Research*, 2013, 4.

³ Statoids, "Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", <http://www.statoids.com/ucd.html>, accessed 21 January, 2018.

⁴ Worldometers, "DR Congo Population", <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-population/>, accessed 21 January 2018.

⁵ Ibid.

With an urban population of nearly 34 million in 2018,⁶ the principal urban areas of the DRC are the capital, Kinshasa, (formerly Léopoldville) with a population of over 13 million people; Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabethville) with a population of 1,786,397; Mbuji-Mayi (formerly Bakwanga) in the Kasai-Oriental Province with a population of 1,680,499; Kananga (formerly Luluabourg), the capital of the Lulua Province with a population of just over 1,000,000; and Bakuvu (formerly Costermansville) with a population of just over 1,000,000. Other large urban areas include Goma in the North Kivu; Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) in the Tshopo province; Tshikapa in the Kasai District; Kolwezi in the Lualaba Province; and Likasi (formerly Jadotville) in the Haut-Katanga Province.

From an ethnic point of view, the DRC has over 200 groups of which the majority are Bantu-speakers. The largest of the Bantu-speaking groups are the Luba, Kongo, Mongo, and Lunda. Linguistically-speaking, the DRC's population uses a wide range as *Figure 1* below illustrates. In terms of literacy, meaning that a person is aged over 15 and can read or write French, Lingala, Kingwana, or Tshiluba, around 77% of the population fall into this category. On the other hand, there exists a disparity in literacy rates when it comes to males and females. If 88.5% of the male population are considered literate, this figure falls to 66.5% for females.⁷ Another area which needs improvement is income. Indeed, 63% of Congolese live below the poverty line (figures for 2012).⁸

With a civil law system based primarily on Belgian law and tribal customary law in place, the President of the DRC is Joseph Kabila who took up office on the death of his father Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Since his arrival in 2001, Joseph Kabila has overseen a dramatic increase in the DRC's economic position. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "CIA World Factbook", *op.cit.*

⁸ Ibid.

was nearly \$32 billion according to the World Bank, a fall on the previous year's historical high of just over \$36 billion.⁹ The DRC's labour force of just over 31 million can be found working in all three sectors of business. Although the exact figure for those working in the primary sector is unknown, many Congolese work in the mining of copper, gold, diamonds, coltan, zinc, tin, and tungsten. In respect of its cobalt, the DRC is the world's largest producer of this mineral and the country's production accounts for 53% of all cobalt mined on a global scale.¹⁰ Otherwise, primary sector activities in the DRC include the production of coffee, sugar, palm oil, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa, quinine, cassava, bananas, and peanuts.

Figure 1. Languages spoken in the Democratic Republic of the Congo¹¹



⁹ The World Bank, "Congo, Dem. Rep.", <https://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep>, accessed 21 January, 2018.

¹⁰ Cobalt, Investing News, "Democratic Republic of the Congo", <https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/critical-metals-investing/cobalt-investing/top-cobalt-producing-countries-congo-china-canada-russia-australia/>, accessed 21 January 2018.

¹¹ <http://vintagecongo.tumblr.com/post/139095053858/do-luba-people-only-speak-tshiluba-sorry-if-this>.

In addition to this general presentation and in view of the theme of this study, something needs to be said about the DRC's military position, a position which sees the DRC lying in 49th place when it comes to military expenditure (1.34% of GDP in 2016).¹²

With military forces including an army, the *Forces d'Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC), the DRC also possesses naval (*La Marine Nationale*) and aerial forces (*Force Aérienne Congolaise*, or FAC). Figures produced for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) put the number of active service personnel in the DRC's military forces at between 144,000 and 159,000.¹³ The involvement of these forces in national and regional wars has been perpetual since the country's independence and inception in 1960. Following the Congo Crisis which lasted from 1960 to 1967, when known as Zaire (1971-1997), the DRC's forces were deployed in the Angolan Civil War (1975-1979); Shaba (Katanga) I in 1977¹⁴; Shaba II in 1978;¹⁵ the Chadian-Libyan Conflict (1983-1987); the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1991); and the First Congo War (1996-1997). From 1997 to 2018, the DRC has been involved in the Congo-Brazzaville War (1997-1999); the Second Congo War; the Kivu Conflict (2004-2009);¹⁶ the LRA Insurgency (2005-);¹⁷ the Dongo Rebellion (2009);¹⁸ the Katanga Insurgency (2011-);¹⁹ the M23 Rebellion (2012-2013);²⁰ the ADF Insurgency (2013-);²¹ the Séléka Rebellion (2013-) during the Central African Republic Civil War (2012-2014); and the Kamwina Nsapu

¹² CIA World Factbook, *op.cit.*

¹³ "Chapter 4: Sub-Saharan Africa", *IISS Armed Conflict Survey*, May 2017, 163-216.

¹⁴ A short-lived war involving around 2,000 Katanganese veterans of the Congo Crisis fighting under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC).

¹⁵ A second attempt made by the FNLC to invade Zaire.

¹⁶ An ongoing (2018) war between the FARDC, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), and the March 23 Movement, also known as M23 and the Congolese Revolutionary Army.

¹⁷ An ongoing campaign waged by the Lord's Resistance Party (LRA) since 1987 in the east of the DRC.

¹⁸ A small-scale conflict centred on the town of Dongo on the left bank of the Ubangi River in the north-west of the DRC.

¹⁹ A continuation of the war for Katanganese independence which started in 1960.

²⁰ An armed rebellion in the North Kivu.

²¹ An ongoing (2018) conflict which started in 1995 waged by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda against the DRC.

Rebellion (2016-). Paradoxically, given the conflict we are about to study, this last rebellion is being fought in the provinces of Kasai-Central, Kasai, and the Kasai-Oriental. The rebellion involves a militia made up of mainly Luba people, and is being fought in an area roughly corresponding to that from which conflict started in 1960.

The conflict we shall be dealing with here falls within the time-frame 1960-1967. In popular perception, the Congo Crisis is often reduced to the overthrow of Patrick Lumumba in September 1960 but this study will return to and go beyond that dramatic event in the light of other conflicts and interventions, such as those in Guatemala and Cuba. More generally, it will be argued that the Congo Crisis is more easily understood if it is placed within the larger framework of a certain stage of American aims and strategies during the Cold War.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the title contains the term *non-state armed actors* (NSAA). The thread connecting the Bay of Pigs to Lake Tanganyika is the presence of non-state armed actors: it is this presence which is at the heart of this study, and which will be discussed throughout, first within the larger contexts of decolonization and the Cold War, and then in detail. A word needs to be said about the term itself. Why is the term non-state armed actor preferable in certain cases and can it be applied to the CIA-sponsored military units? Though the pages of this study will serve as an illustration of why it is preferable to avoid the term "mercenary" when describing the CIA forces, it is worthwhile looking at the definition of the non-state armed actor to provide more clarity for the reader.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can be described as the following:

- 1) NSAAs are willing and capable to use violence to pursue their objectives;
- 2) NSAAs are not integrated into formal state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special forces;

- 3) NSAAAs possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure;
- 4) They may, or may not, be supported or instrumentalised by state actors either secretly or openly. This is often the case with militias, paramilitaries, mercenaries, or private military companies, and can be extended to include narcotics cartels, and popular liberation movements;
- 5) There may be direct or indirect involvement by state officials and/or agencies with non-state armed actors. This can be for ideological reasons, for personal reasons, or for monetary reasons.²²

At first sight it would seem that CIA-sponsored forces do not fall into the category of non-state armed actors. If we look at point 2, for example, we should note that the forces in question by dint of their signing contracts with the Congolese government were integrated into the country's national forces and constituted the Congolese Air Force and the Congolese Naval Force. In this respect they cannot be considered as NSAAAs.²³ However, if we take a closer look at the definition, we will also note that NSAAAs *possesses a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure*.

As we will discover in this study, it is this point which validates the application of the term to the CIA groups. Despite their fighting under contract with the Congolese state we will see that this was to protect the real identity of the employer.

The term "non-state armed actor" (NSAA)²⁴ is convenient in that it will enable us to discuss the nature and activities of almost all of the different armed groups who took part in the events we are about to describe. This is an important element of our study as their presence in the Congo was one of the main reasons the context in the Congo was described

²² Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, "Engaging non-state armed in state- and peace-building: options and strategies", *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 93, Number 883, September 2011.

²³ Nor can they be considered as auxiliaries. An auxiliary provides support for an armed force but is not integrated into those forces, and is not armed itself.

²⁴ The term "non-state armed group" is also used.

as a crisis. However, the term non-state armed actor has not simply be chosen for this convenience: the need for its use has arisen from the desire to avoid using weighted terms such as "mercenaries" to describe the CIA-sponsored military forces even though the forces would sometimes describe themselves as such.²⁵ In order to explain the hesitation to use a given term more fully, it would be useful to turn to an overview of mercenary activities through history and the questions that have been asked surrounding the nature of mercenariat.

When approaching the question of mercenaries, it should firstly be understood that their deployment in armed conflict is not a recent phenomenon: it dates back to the very origins of organised war. An indication of for what length of time mercenary forces have been used in warfare is provided by the fact that the term 'mercenary' finds its roots in Latin. The etymology of the term "mercenary" is taken from *mercedes* meaning "pay", "reward", or "wages"), and from *mercenarius*, the Latin for "one who does anything for pay." It is not purely by chance, then, that mercenariat has often been referred to as the world's second oldest profession. Just as the prostitute has been willing to sell her (or his) services through the centuries, the mercenary soldier can also be found offering his services for monetary reward. During the Classical antiquity, for example, the Peloponnesian Wars some four hundred years before the Common Era were seen as "a catalyst for mass mercenary service".²⁶ The frequency with which wars were fought and the number of soldiers needed to fight the innumerable battles being waged across Central and Eastern Europe were also catalysts. Alexander the Great would rely on mercenary forces in his wars against the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great and, in turn, this empire also known as the Achaemenid Empire would itself become associated with a reliance on

²⁵ One of the pilots, Reginaldo Blanco, was nicknamed "Le Petit mercenaire".

²⁶ Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries: From Late Archaic Period to Alexander*, (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), 58.

mercenary forces.²⁷ Two centuries or so later in his wars against the Carthagian Empire, Hannibal had up to 15,000 mercenaries to thank for his victories.²⁸ His men hailed from countries as diverse as Libya, Spain, Liguria, Greece or Carthage.²⁹ As well as the Turkish mercenaries who formed the backbone of Genghis Khan's Khwarazm army during his conquest of China in the thirteenth century, we find in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the *condottieri*, another term used to describe modern-day mercenaries -the English for *condottieri* being "contractors". The *condottiero* or *condottiere*, the singular for *condottieri*, were the leaders of the euphemistic "free companies" contracted by Italian city-states and the Papacy. Although very rich entities, both the city-states and the Vatican were small in size and consequently possessed small armies with which to defend themselves.

Just as the Hundred Years' War had an influence on the number of soldiers willing to sell their services to a sovereign or legitimate authority other than their own,³⁰ the breakup of the Western Roman Empire, and its division into smaller units led to a series of internal and external revolutions which required the use of armed forces. For example, in 1363, the Battle of Canturino opposed the forces of the Marquisate of Montferrat and the Duchy of Milan. What is particular about this battle fought between two northern Italian entities, is that it was fought by armies of mercenaries under the command of Sir John Hawkwood who led the White Company made up of English, German, Hungarian, and Genoese troops, and the Great Company under the command of German Count Konrad von Landau. His troops being mainly Hungarian and German, this battle constituted near

²⁷ Christopher Tuplin, "Mercenaries and Warlords in the Archaemenid Empire", in Toni Naco del Hoyo, and Fernando Lopez Sanchez, (eds.), *War, Warlords, and Interstate Relations in the Ancient Mediterranean (Impact of Empire)*, (BRILL, 2017), 17.

²⁸ Luc Mary, *Hannibal, l'homme qui fit trembler Rome*, (Paris, L'Archipel, 2013), 283.

²⁹ G.T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1935), 222.

³⁰ See, Article 1 of the "International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries", United Nations 72nd Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1989.

fratricide. Further battles would be fought in 1364 at Cascina between Pisan and Florentine mercenary forces; and at Montichiari in 1373 between mercenary forces representing the Papal League of Gregory XI and the Visconti of Milan.³¹

Throughout the early centuries of the second millennium Italy's northern neighbour Switzerland had also been the scene of attempts to take control of the mountain passes and other trading routes which by the thirteenth century had already made it a prosperous country. Over the course of the next century, realising that unity between the different cantons, or districts of Switzerland would provide security from potential invading forces such as the Austrians, the Swabians,³² or the Burgundians, a Swiss Federation was formed after the Covenant of Sempach in 1393.

Through military victories such as that over Charles the Bold at the Battle of Morat³³ in 1476, or the Battle of Nancy the following year, the Swiss gained a reputation for being a highly effective fighting force. Also, the rewards on offer for those taking part in the fighting led to many more Swiss to look for wars in which to fight. After the Battle of Nancy, as well as capturing military supplies, the Swiss soldiers helped themselves to more than a million gold florins, silver vessels, tapestries, religious icons, jewels, and one of the largest diamonds in Europe.³⁴ The same reputation gained during this period also enabled Swiss mercenaries to be appointed as guards to the Vatican in 1505. As such, the Swiss Guards are the longest serving mercenary unit still in activity.

The second half of the second millennium was very much similar to the first half: European nations fought for supremacy over land and sea, and the Age of Expansion and

³¹ For more on the series of Italian battles see, William Caferro, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006).

³² The Swabians are an ethnic German people.

³³ A battle during the Burgundian Wars (1474-1477) between Charles the Bold (Duke of Burgundy) and a Swiss Confederate army.

³⁴ Michael Lee Lanning, *Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Today's Military Companies*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 54.

religious conflict created further opportunities for the adventurous to sign up to foreign armies short on manpower. The 17th century, for example, saw the appearance of the "Wild Geese",³⁵ a mercenary army made up of Irish troops first formed to fight as a unit of the Spanish Army of Flanders during the Eighty Years' War in the 1580's. Raised by an English Catholic named William Stanley, the Wild Geese would return to Ireland. After being defeated by Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army in 1653, over 30,000 Irishmen fled the country.³⁶ During what is known as the Flight of the Wild Geese, these Irish regiments were then enlisted by France into the Royal French Regiments (along with regiments from Switzerland, Germany, and Wallonia), and also by Spain where the Irish fought as the *Irlanda* Regiment, the *Ultonia* Regiment, or the Hibernia Regiment.³⁷

By the eighteenth century, fighting for the causes of nations other than one's own had become somewhat of the norm in a geopolitical context where the "rules of war" had yet to be written, or at a time when the notions of *Jus Ad Bellum* (the right to go to war), *Jus In Bello* (the right conduct in war), and *Jus Post Bellum* (the right conduct after war), i.e., "Just War" were still being developed, or integrated by military theorists. Indeed, while Spain, France, Prussia, and Great Britain fought over who would dominate Europe, the Caribbean, Asia, and North America, it has been estimated that mercenaries accounted for half of the British, a third of the French, two-thirds of the Prussian, and a quarter of the Spanish armies. Those doing the fighting as mercenaries included the rank and file, and

³⁵ As well as being used to describe Mike Hoare's group of mercenaries in the Congo, *The Wild Geese* was also the title of a British adventure film directed by Andrew V. McLaglen and released in 1978. The film tells the story of a group of mercenaries sent to rescue Julius Limbani, the leader of a Southern Africa nation. Limbani is being held captive by a certain General Ndofa, and is guarded by soldiers known as 'Simbas'. This is an obvious reference to the context in the Congo that we will describe in this study. Mike Hoare served as a military and technical adviser in the making of the film.

³⁶ Brendan Jennings, "Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders", Stationary Office for the Irish Manuscripts Commission, 1964, 72.

³⁷ René Chartrand, *The Spanish Army in North America, 1700-1793*, (Paperback, 2011), 17.

also high-ranking officers.³⁸ On the subject of mercenaries fighting for the British, it is estimated that up to 30,000 Hessian soldiers fought on their side during the American Revolutionary War. These men of the *Leibregiment* represented a quarter of all British forces sent to North America.³⁹

It was no doubt the emergence and concretisation of the concept of the nation-state that gradually curtailed mercenary participation in armed conflict. The arrival of national identity and loyalty to a given sovereign authority also spurred the creation of highly-organised and well-trained national armies. With these national armed forces being based in set garrison locations, with strict codes of military discipline playing an increasing role in soldiering and with the structure of these military forces being organised by an administrative hierarchy, the need for professional soldiers from other nations i.e., mercenaries, decreased. This said, and with France seeking to expand its influence abroad but balking at the idea of using its own citizens to do the actual fighting for new territories, in 1831 King Louis Philippe created the French Foreign Legion. Composed of seven battalions, most of the volunteers known as "legionnaires" originated from Germany, Italy, Poland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The Foreign Legion was to distinguish itself in France's wars in Southeast Asia, in North and sub-Saharan Africa, and as a still active force remains synonymous with adventure and the opportunity for self-reinvention. Great Britain also has what could be labelled (as we will discuss later) as a mercenary force in the shape of the Brigade of Gurkhas. Serving as part of the British Army since 1815, this force has played a role in every conflict in which British forces have been involved for over two hundred years.

³⁸ Michael Lee Lanning, *op.cit.*, 78.

³⁹ Alan Axelrod, *Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies*, (New York: SAGE Publications, 2013), 66.

Although the wars of the twentieth century were fought along more conventional lines -the term "conventional" meaning respecting the notion of *Jus Ad Bellum*- and, as a consequence wars were fought between regular national forces, the changes to the geopolitical context brought on by the European decolonisation of Asia and Africa, in particular, were to result in the reemergence of the mercenary métier. Partly due, as we shall see in this study, to the fact that the respective national armies of the newly independent African nations were incapable of assuring security, and partly due to private, second-state or former colonial entities wishing to retain power and/or influence, the mercenary forces that congregated in the Congo from 1960-onwards have influenced the way in which wars are fought even today; the previously mentioned Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts being prime examples.

While we will return to the question of the Congo mercenary in the pages of this study, the transformation of the mercenary from being considered as an unwelcome addition in armed conflict -as demonstrated by the amount of international legislation limiting mercenary activity- to being a seemingly publically accepted necessity in modern warfare is also a question that requires some attention.

The length of time and the regularity with which the mercenary soldier has been used in conflict has provided, over the years, the scope for many possible areas of enquiry. What, exactly, is a mercenary? Is he (or she) a "soldier of fortune", a "hired gun", a "legionnaire", a "contract killer", a "wild goose", a "private contractor", a "corporate warrior", a "surrogate", a "whore of war"? Is the mercenary motivated purely by financial gain, or does the mercenary's personal motivation come through other channels? That is, can there be a "good mercenary, as Lynch and Walsh propose.⁴⁰ Has the mercenary

⁴⁰ Tony Lynch, and A.J. Walsh, "The Good Mercenary?", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2000, 133-153.

become somewhat of a norm in International Relations and, subsequently will he form part military landscape for many years to come?⁴¹

It is important that this type of question is answered especially when dealing with the issue of popular perception: if one were to stop the man in the street and make enquiries into his views of the mercenary, a description of an unscrupulous, yellow-eyed, cold-blooded killer would likely follow. In all fairness, these are not epithets based merely on fantasy, or on portrayals of the mercenary found in the popular media, literature, or films intended for the masses: Costas Georgiou had no hesitation in testing the effectiveness of weapons by blowing off the heads of the very Angolans he had been hired to help. Captured prisoners were thrown from bridges and vicious beatings were handed out over several days on disobedient soldiers in his unit.

Although any mercenary activity of this kind deserves to be fully condemned and punished by law, perhaps we should remind ourselves of certain "mitigating circumstances". Firstly, in warfare, the objective is to defeat the enemy by hook or by crook; and, secondly, regular forces, i.e. those forces that fight wars "legitimately" are also more than capable of committing atrocities. For example, where should we stand on the question of the incendiary bombs dropped on the civilian population of Dresden by the Royal Air Force? Where should we stand on the question of the massacres committed at My Lai and My Khe during the Vietnam War? Where should we stand on the brutally cruel treatment of prisoners by Japanese regular forces during World War Two, that given by the French to prisoners during the Algerian War, that given to prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq or at Guantanamo Bay? Finally, where should we stand on the question of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or the Nazi concentration camps operated by "regular" forces of the Third Reich?

⁴¹ Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Undoubtedly, the answer lies somewhere in between what is termed as the "dehumanising effects of warfare" and the question of image. Indeed, as indicated above, when it comes to the mercenary soldier he is faced with the problem of "legitimacy". In the context of war, that is, the mercenary is seen as not conforming to recognised (and somewhat arbitrary) standards or rules laid out by various Geneva Conventions.

Just as it would be wrong to tar every single soldier of World War Two or, indeed, of any member of the regular armed forces with the same brush used to describe war criminals, it is also entirely wrong to believe that every mercenary is a ruthless killer with no compassion for anyone but himself. As this study will attempt to illustrate, the "mercenary" is capable of fighting for political or religious convictions, of respecting the order of war, and is not necessarily motivated by financial gain.

Two things seem inconceivable when it comes to the question of defining the mercenary. One, modern-day perceptions appear to be based on a treatise dating back nearly five hundred years and, two, no wholly satisfactory definition has yet been provided. Worse still, as far as the second element is concerned, the appearance of Private Military Companies (PMCs) at the end of the 1980s further complicated matters by throwing highly-trained and ethical former members of one country's military forces into the mix. Moreover, the company in question (Executive Outcomes) showed that with the right men and machinery, an African conflict could be resolved within days.

Among the attempts to define the role of the mercenary, and the mercenary himself, Machiavelli's *The Prince*⁴² is possibly the earliest. In a general analysis of how to acquire and keep political power, written at a time when Charles VIII of France was increasing the frequency of his attacks on Italy and, at a time when Italy's nation-states and regions were about to wage war on one another, one of Machiavelli's goals was to win the favour of

⁴² Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (The Project Gutenberg EBook, 2006).

Lorenzo Di Piero De Medici, the then governor of Florence, to whom the treatise is dedicated.

With initial chapters of Machiavelli's work focusing on defining Principalities, and the role of the state, it is his examination of the types of armies which is most relevant to our study. Listing four types of army, and declaring that a country's native forces are the best option in times of war, the mercenary (and auxiliaries) are seen as "useless and dangerous ... ambitious, not united, without discipline, unfaithful, brave in front of friends and cowardly before enemies". Mercenaries had "no fear of God, and if a prince were to "hold his state based on these arms", he would "stand neither firm nor safe".⁴³

A far more recent, and arguably a more measured attempt than Machiavelli⁴⁴ at defining the mercenary comes from Françoise J. Hampson. Writing for the *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* in 1991,⁴⁵ and quoted in Uwe Steinhoff's 2008 study,⁴⁶ Hampson proposes that mercenaries appear to possess three essential characteristics: they are foreign; they are motivated principally by financial gain; they use force but not as regular members of the armed forces of a State. To develop her argument, Hampson explains that being foreign distinguishes the mercenary from members of the indigenous population who has joined his country's forces for reasons of financial gain; that by taking up arms purely for financial gain, the mercenary distances himself from those joining armed conflict for ideological reasons, or for a sense of adventure; and that (a

⁴³ Ibid., Chapter 12.

⁴⁴ That Hampson's definition is more "measured" takes nothing away from Machiavelli's definition. The question of historical perspective is crucial to understanding Machiavelli's interpretation as it should be remembered that at the time he wrote his thesis, mercenaries were far less likely to respect military codes of conduct on, or off, the fields of battle. This is not the case with mercenaries in the Congo, for example, who had to submit to a strict set of rules and regulations regarding their behaviour.

⁴⁵ Françoise J. Hampson, "Mercenaries: Diagnosis Before Proscription" *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 22, 1991, 5.

⁴⁶ Uwe Steinhoff, "What are mercenaries?" in Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), *Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military relations*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 19-30.

characteristic which answers a question posed earlier in this introduction), a mercenary distinguishes himself from the armed forces of a given State if he is not serving as an integral part of those forces. In respect to the latter, neither the Foreign Legion nor the Gurkhas can be considered as mercenaries.

Although Hampson's definition is interesting in that, in some respects, it joins Machiavelli's analysis; unfortunately, it leaves more questions unanswered than answered. For example, what is the position of the surrogate in an armed conflict? What is the position of a local recruited by a foreign army as is the case with the Hmong in Vietnam? What is the position of the hundreds of foreigners who joined the Rhodesian Army and wore its uniform? In which way(s) are these men labelled "mercenaries" by the media different from the Foreign Legion or the Gurkhas? Finally, what is the position of those recruited by a secessionist State which has not been, or has yet to be, recognised by the United Nations? A point in case is Katanga's army which contained many units of men wearing the uniform of the State and whom, even now, continue to be labelled as "mercenaries"?

This overview of the mercenary throughout history has demonstrated that the use of the term "mercenary" is fraught with pitfalls and is not a term that can be easily applied to every single foreign soldier employed to fight in the Congo. If we were to use it, not only do we run the risk of misunderstanding the motivations of a given group, for the sake of convenience we also risk falling into the trap of believing that a foreign soldier fighting in a foreign country is there to undermine the state structure. What we will see is that the so-called "soldier of fortune" can be used by the state as a branch of its own regular forces, and can be used to provide a positive outcome for the aforesaid.

The Congo Crisis in Literature

In this section I will give a critical overview of the current state of the literature on the Congo Crisis, while also suggesting the main primary and secondary sources I have used. The Congo Crisis has provided the grounds for a relatively substantial literary focus. Although studies relating to the period of the Congo's history are infrequent, the fact that many of the intricacies are still to be fully revealed means that the Crisis still holds a great deal of interest not only for the general public but also for the researcher. As for the fields of research to which the Crisis is relevant, Conflict Studies, International Relations, and Geopolitics are just three areas which can be used as examples.

From a general point of view two aspects of the Congo Crisis have generated the most literary attention: the political dynamics, and the military dynamics. The first of these two aspects has tended to attract the most constant focus due to events such as the assassination of the Congo's first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, Soviet and US political intervention in the Congo, and the Crisis becoming a theatre of the Cold War. Notable studies carried out on these aspects include De Witte (2000),⁴⁷ Weissman,⁴⁸ Kalb,⁴⁹ Mahoney,⁵⁰ Laidi,⁵¹ or Schraeder.⁵² The tendency when studying the Congo's political dynamics has been to examine the shifts, adaptations and theoretical considerations which arose from such a turbulent period.

Although recent works by Namikas,⁵³ Othen⁵⁴ or Hudson⁵⁵ demonstrate that the military dynamics of the Crisis still retain some degree of academic interest, most of the

⁴⁷ De Witte, Ludo, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (Brussels: Karthala, 2000).

⁴⁸ Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974).

⁴⁹ Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa - From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

⁵⁰ Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: ordeal in Africa*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

⁵¹ Zaki Laidi, *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

⁵² Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁵³ Lise Namikas, *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013).

attention given to armed operations has come from non-academics. One particular dimension of these military dynamics has been the study of mercenary participation. Monographs by Hoare (1967)⁵⁶ or studies carried out by members of the armed services such as Dodenhoff (1969)⁵⁷ show that this feature is of interest to the wider public and for the purpose of military training. Whereas these two examples address the more practical nature of mercenary soldiering, studies have also been led to examine the motivations and ideologies of mercenaries serving, or having served in the Congo. Studies by St. Jorre⁵⁸ (1967) and Clarke (1968)⁵⁹ are just two examples. Another way in which mercenary activities in the Congo have been used is in wider studies of the mercenary such as that by Mockler (1969),⁶⁰ or in more recent studies on Private Military Companies (PMCs). The use of PMCs in Iraq or in Afghanistan and the debate surrounding their use in conflict has generated new interest in the Congo Crisis and in other areas which saw mercenary intervention; the Congo mercenary being used as the basis for a number of studies on this subject. Research carried out by Avant,⁶¹ Kinsey,⁶² or Pelton⁶³ are noteworthy examples. Others are Fabre (2010)⁶⁴ who argues that there is nothing inherently objectionable about

⁵⁴ Christopher Othen, *Katanga 1960-63, Mercenaries, Spies, and the African Nation that Waged War on the World*, (Stroud, UK: The History Press, 2015).

⁵⁵ Andrew Hudson, *Congo Unravalled: Military Operations from Independence to the Mercenary Revolt, 1960-68*, (Helion & Compnay, 2012).

⁵⁶ Mike Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary's Personal Memoir*, (Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, 1989), and Mike Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, (London: Hale, 1967).

⁵⁷ Colonel George H. Dodenhoff, "The Congo: A Case Study of Mercenary Employment", *Naval War College Review*, April 1969.

⁵⁸ John St. Jorre, "Looking for Mercenaries (and some Pen-Portraits of Those We Found)", *Transition*, No. 33, Oct.-Nov., 1967, 19-25.

⁵⁹ S.J.G. Clarke, "The Congo Mercenary: A History and Analysis", *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, Johannesburg, 1968.

⁶⁰ Anthony Mockler, *Mercenaries*, (London: Macdonald, 1969).

⁶¹ Deborah Avant, *Mercenaries*, *Foreign Policy*, No. 143, July-August, 2004, 20-28, and Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁶² Christopher Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Security Companies*, (Abingdon, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁶³ Robert Young Pelton, *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror*, (New York: Crown, 2006).

⁶⁴ Cécile Fabre, "In Defence of Mercenarism", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 2010, 539-559.

using privately-employed force in this type of conflict, and Coady (2008),⁶⁵ who contends that the problem with using private security forces resides in the definition of the term "mercenary", and its inherent link to financial considerations.

The question of the morality of mercenaries is an appealing theme which has attracted academics such as Lynch and Walsh (2000).⁶⁶ Focusing on the question of whether examine the question of whether mercenaries are capable of acting accordingly in conflict, Lynch and Walsh are joined in this behavioural approach by Baker (2008).⁶⁷ The latter points out that, so far, relatively little philosophical examination has been carried out on the question of mercenary ethics. This has resulted in the public's perception of mercenaries being incorrect, or inaccurate.

The use of mercenaries in conflict has also raised debate on the state of African armies. For example, Howe (2001)⁶⁸ enquires whether African national armies are up to the task of fulfilling their role of maintaining national security and asks, given his conclusions, if the effectiveness of African forces may worsen, rather than cure, the current problems of instability faced by African nations.⁶⁹

From this brief overview it can be seen where the originality of my own thesis lies. Whereas the examples given above have tended to focus on the activities of armed groups such as Hoare's 5 Commando, relatively very little time has been devoted to the study of CIA-sponsored non-state armed actors in the Congo. This is regrettable for two main reasons: the decision to use one particular type of proxy force was the result of the success and failure of military operations in Central America; the use of these proxy forces had a

⁶⁵ C.A. J. Coady, *Morality and Political Violence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁶⁶ Lynch, and Walsh, *op.cit.* 15.

⁶⁷ Deane-Peter Baker, "Of Mercenaries' and Prostitutes: Can Private Warriors Be Ethical?", in *Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations*, edited by Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina Capriani, (Abingdon, UK, and New York, 2008), 30-42.

⁶⁸ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2001).

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 6.

significant impact on the dynamics of the Congo Crisis and, therefore, the Cold War in Africa as a whole. Though recent studies by Villafaña (2007),⁷⁰ and Hawes and Koenig (2018)⁷¹ have gone some way to provide our understanding of the nature of these proxy forces, the two objectives noted above have yet to be fully approached.

While at a later stage it may be possible to use the information contained in this study for more theoretical questions, it should be understood that the purpose of this current study is not to make a reflection on the mights and maybes of a given situation. Its purpose is to assemble a series of documented and undocumented events in order to provide a plausible account of another event. In this case, the descriptive narrative is considered to be the most well-adapted as it will allow the reader to draw their own conclusions.

The assembling of these documented and undocumented events required the use of sources which can be described as reliable or not reliable. Naturally, when dealing with undocumented sources such as personal interviews, we must exercise a certain degree of caution as the recollections of events may be tainted by the passage of time, by political ideologies, by personal sentiment or, in the case of veterans of a covert operation, by the desire to protect the identities of people and places. In this last respect, not revealing the full extent of an operation or the use of a pseudonym was a frequent occurrence. Insofar as the question of reliability of undocumented information is concerned, when and where possible it has been cross-referenced using other official sources in order to determine its plausibility. A similar degree of caution should also be exercised when dealing with published autobiographical accounts. For example, whereas personal narratives provided by Mike Hoare are deemed by other military veterans to be faithful depictions of battles

⁷⁰ Frank Villafaña, *Cold war in the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960-1967* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007).

⁷¹ James Hawes, and Mary Ann Koenig, *Cold War, Navy Seal* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2018).

and, furthermore, are documented in other "more reliable" sources, the use of other autobiographical accounts as reliable was rejected due to the author's objectives being linked to self-promotion. This is the case with Jerry Puren of the Katangan Air Force.⁷²

As far as other primary sources are concerned, the reader will note the frequent use of recently declassified US government documents which can be found in the archives of the US Department of State, the US Department Defense, the National Security Council, the CIA, or the United Nations. Released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), an example of documents relating to US foreign policy can be found in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. Published under the auspices of the US Office of the Historian, this collection contains the records of presidential memorandums, conversations, diplomatic cables, or governmental reports dating back to the nineteenth century. Each volume of the series corresponds to a given geographical location or to a given President, and it should be noted that *Volume XIII, Congo, 1960-1968* declassified in 2013 was of immense help in the building of the narrative framework found in this study.

The construction of the narrative was also aided by the use of a substantial quantity of secondary sources available online or in physical libraries or bookshops. These range from studies which have been published in academic reviews and made available on platforms such as *Jstor*, to monographs, biographies, and newspaper articles from reputable sources such *The Times*, *The Guardian*, the *Miami Herald*, and the *New York Times*.

The decision to use newspaper articles was not taken out of convenience: many of the articles were reports on the developments of the Congo Crisis prepared by war correspondents such as Lloyd Garrison or Paul Hoffman. Garrison spent much time

⁷² Puren, Jerry and Pottinger, Brian, *Mercenary Commander*, (South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1986).

travelling across the Congo meeting mercenary units or rebel forces, and he was to be a witness to several armed encounters. As a neutral participant in the Congo Crisis Garrison's accounts provide a highly reliable source of information.

The presence of personal blogs on the internet and the creation of pages on the social media platform www.facebook.com have provided an unusual but relatively productive source. As well as providing amateur historians with the means of presenting their research, reputable historians such as Jean-Pierre Sonck have created their own blogs. Naturally, when consulting this type of amateur source, a certain degree of caution should be exercised. In this respect, all references that may or may not have been used were cross-checked with other sources. The same can be said of social media platforms.

While the researcher must be careful when evaluating the degree of reliability when dealing with a source which may be jaded by the passing of time, or influenced by personal or political considerations, equally, it would be unfair, or even churlish, to completely dismiss accounts provided by the active participants of a given event. This applies to autobiographical accounts which have been published as well as to primary information obtained from veterans of the Crisis through interviews, telephone conversations, or through written correspondence. In efforts to ensure that any information obtained from these sources was as reliable as possible, interviews with veterans carried out in Miami in 2015 were done so in the presence of other veterans. In cases where the individual account may, or may not have been influenced by other factors, collective memory acted as a form of confirmation of the plausibility of events. Similar considerations were taken with one-to-one correspondence: any information was cross-checked with existing references, with authors such as Frank Villafaña, with other historians such as Walter Bruyère-Ostells, or with those involved with the organisation of operations, i.e. the CIA's James Hawes and his network of contacts.

Organisation of the argument

The study is divided into two parts each containing three chapters. In Part One, *From Decolonisation to Crisis in the Congo*, in Chapter One the reader will find information relative to understanding what motivated the United States to intervening in the Congo. This chapter presents and discusses themes such as the decolonisation of sub-Saharan Africa, the Cold War, the importance of the Congo to US strategic interests, the various standpoints presented by Congolese political leaders in the period before the decolonisation of the Congo, and the independence of the Congo itself. This chapter being mainly contextual, it finds its importance through the presentation of some of the political actors and considerations that would play a leading role in the events that will unfold throughout the study.

While this first chapter deals mainly with the period covering 1945-1960, Chapter Two takes us into the specific context of the Congo and examines events which took place between 1960 and 1963. It discusses aspects such as the US position and action in the face of political developments such as the arrival and assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the intervention of the Soviet Union in support of a breakaway government which had been established in Stanleyville, and the support provided by western powers to the secessionist Katanga province. In this respect, it is a continuation of a discussion on the dynamics of the Cold War, and the non-state armed forces which were used to fight the proxy wars which took place inside the Congo.

The discussion on the use of non-state armed actors continues in Chapter Three where the focus will be brought on to rebellions which started in January 1964. As well as analysing the reasons why these rebellions came about, we will also discuss their mechanics, and their implications for the United States. Indeed, it was with the rebellion

having spread to Stanleyville, and the conclusion that Congolese state armed forces were not capable of putting down this rebellion that the US realised it would have to mount some form of military intervention. We explain why overt military intervention was not seen as feasible thus prompting the use of covert forces.

The first chapter of Part Two entitled *Meeting the Military Challenges of the Cold War* describes how the CIA was able to meet this requirement. Taking us back to the creation of the CIA, Chapter Four is a discussion which focuses on the development of the US covert war apparatus. This chapter is an essential element of the study as a whole as it serves to demonstrate that the success and failure of covert operations in Central America acted as a catalyst to intervention in Central Africa. The establishment of this link therefore enables us to stress the notion that the Congo Crisis should not be viewed as a purely localised African affair. Chapter Four helps us to understand that US intervention in the Congo was part of a series of interventions which took place in different areas of the globe but which, at the same time, were intrinsically linked in their objectives. This global aspect is reinforced by the identity of those who fought the CIA's proxy wars.

Chapter Five takes us back to where we left the Congo in 1964. It discusses the return, reinforcement and role of western-backed non-state armed forces up to, during, and after military operations in and around Stanleyville. While we see that these operations became symbolic of the fight between eastern and western ideologies, their study also enables us to examine the extent of the cooperation between different sets of non-state armed actors acting in the interests of the Congolese state and their effectiveness in the face of armed threat from opponents of the same state. This is a theme which will continue in Chapter Six which examines the nature of further threats to state authority. While, again, we will be able to underline the international nature of the Congo Crisis through the arrival of Che Guevara into the context, we will also see in which ways Guevara's previous

encounters with anti-Castro Cubans at the Bay of Pigs were to have an important influence not only on military activities on Lake Tanganyika but also on the future stability of the Congo. We will conclude with a discussion of the use and effectiveness of non-state armed forces in conflict which will lead us to discuss their employment in modern-day conflicts.

The annexes to this study have been carefully selected. They act as a platform for further study on the theme of non-state armed actors in conflict, and serve to substantiate the main tenets of this thesis. The documents found in the study were obtained from a variety of sources, and in some cases, appear for the first time in published form. This is the case for the copies of contracts and personal photos obtained from American and British military veterans who served in different units of Katangese and Congolese forces.

Having thus defined the scope and aims of this thesis, having reviewed the previous literature on the subject, and having set out the order in which the activities of a number of non-state armed actors in the Congo Crisis will be examined, we can now set the scene for the series of conflicts which were played out against the backdrop of decolonization and the Cold War.

PART ONE

FROM DECOLONISATION TO CRISIS IN THE CONGO

1. Changes and Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa
2. The Cold War comes to the Congo
3. Congolese Non-State Armed Actors in the Kwilu and Beyond

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Since the argument developed in this first part involves a certain amount of moving backwards and forwards in time, the reader is reminded that **Annex 1** (pp. 339-342) offers a chronological account of the Congo Crisis.

CHAPTER ONE. Changes and Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa

1.1. The Decolonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 2. The Decolonisation of Africa⁷³

⁷³ Source: <https://selfstudyhistory.com/2015/01/25/decolonisation-of-africa/>



Though the tenets of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Organisation (UN) had reinforced the notions that all peoples could choose the form of government under which they lived and granted them the right to self-government, progress in the field of decolonisation was a relatively slow process, punctuated in some cases by bloody and

prolonged military conflict as Asian and North African nations sought to determine which political doctrine would be used as a basis for post-colonial construction.

In Malaya, (now Malaysia) British Commonwealth forces battled out guerilla warfare against the communist-backed Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) between 1948-1960; France was bogged down in Indochina in a war against the communist Viet Minh until 1954, while in North Africa France also faced challenges to its hegemony in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The Netherlands and the British Commonwealth forces also fought a war against nationalist forces in Indonesia until the country's independence in 1949. Although independence for Asian and North African nations came at a steady pace during the period between 1946-1956, what British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan termed as the "Wind of Change" only arrived in sub-Saharan Africa after Great Britain and France saw their colonial ambitions dashed in 1956.

It is fitting that the Gold Coast was the first sub-Saharan nation to gain its independence. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the West African nation now known as Ghana from March 1957 had long been a proponent of the concept of Pan-Africanism, and the idea that Africans living in Africa, and those of African ancestry, had a common identity, and a common history. These aspects of African identity, Pan-Africanists argued, were far different from those of the Europeans. For this reason, emerging African nations should use them as the basis for the construction of new societies.

Separate African societies far distant from European influence had existed for many centuries before the arrival of European explorers to the Atlantic coasts of the African continent. Advanced and highly organised societies and civilisations with separate cultures had been established in Ancient Egypt, Nubia, Axum, or in Mali while Ghana itself had formed part of an Ashanti Empire which covered much of the southern part of West Africa.

Finding its theoretical base in the writings of Trinidadian Henry Sylvester Williams, the foundations of the Pan-Africanist movement can be said to have been laid with the creation of the African Association in 1897. On leaving Trinidad in 1893, Williams had headed for Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. After a year training as a lawyer, Williams then left for Rutgers College in New Jersey but his experience with racism in the United States led him to leave for London in 1897 where he was admitted to Gray's Inn later that year.⁷⁴

In September 1897, and dismayed at the manifestations of British imperialism of the late 20th century, Williams convened a meeting in order to "encourage a feeling of unity, and to facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general, and *"to promote and protect the interests of all British subjects claiming African descent, wholly or part, in British colonies and other places especially in Africa"*.⁷⁵ After becoming the first black lawyer to be called to the British bar in 1900, Williams strengthened the foundations of the African Association in July of that year by organising a Pan-African Conference at Westminster Town Hall, London. Although the African Association was a short-lived affair, what became known as the "Dream of Unity" between those of African heritage led to the creation of other movements intended to promote the political, cultural and intellectual dimensions of Pan-Africanism. In Great Britain, Williams embarked on a political career and was elected to the Marylebone Borough Council as a representative of the Fabian Society, Pan-Africanism also found favour further afield through activists as diverse as African-American writer and founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples (NAACP), William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, singer Paul Robeson, author George Padmore, and Marcus Garvey. In 1919, the latter founded the

⁷⁴ Jonathan Schneer, *London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 213.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 215.

Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and in the same year the second Pan-African Congress was convened in Paris in 1919. Further congresses were held in 1921, 1923 and 1927 in cities such as London, Brussels and New York while in France the *Négritude* movement saw its beginnings in Paris in the 1930's with the support of African and Afro-Caribbean intellectuals such as Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, of Martinique, and Léon-Gontras Damas of French Guyana. The objective of the *Négritude* movement was to reassert the value and contribution of African culture.⁷⁶ Somewhat of a turning point in regards to modern-day independence movements in sub-Saharan Africa came with the Fifth Pan African Congress held in Manchester, England from the 15-21 October, 1945. Organised by Kwame Nkrumah, it was significant by the fact that for the first time it was attended by Africans from the African continent and that it included leaders of political parties fighting for independence.⁷⁷

Nkrumah had started his career as a teacher in the early 1930s in the Gold Coast. However, encouraged to continue his studies, Nkrumah first travelled to London and then to Lincoln University, Missouri. While in London in 1935, he had caught news of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and this event was to become a defining moment in the conception of his political philosophy.⁷⁸ Becoming more preoccupied with the state of the African continent and becoming increasingly committed to the idea of a United States of Africa,⁷⁹ Nkrumah set about preparing the independence of the Gold Coast during further studies at Pennsylvania University in 1939. Here, he spent the next six years studying

⁷⁶ Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976), 94-96. See also Lamine NDiaye's unpublished 2017 thesis, *Les idées politiques de Julius Nyerere : un projet panafricaniste revisité*, Université de Toulouse 2 Jean Jaurès, dir. Helen Goethals.

⁷⁷ For example, Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikwe (Nigeria), Peter Abrahams (South Africa), and Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya).

⁷⁸ Ama Biney, *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 13.

⁷⁹ Marika Sherwood, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad, 1935-1947*, (Freedom Publications: Vermont, 1996), 34.

philosophy, political science and history.⁸⁰ Describing himself as a 'Non-denominational Christian and a Marxist Socialist,'⁸¹ Nkrumah listed his political influences at the time as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Giuseppe Mazzini, and works such as the *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*⁸² were to have a significant influence on Nkrumah's future political career. It was also around this time that Nkrumah started to put his political philosophy to paper and early works on the subject of independence include *Towards Colonial Freedom*, (1946), *What I Mean by Positive Action* (1950), *I Speak of Freedom* (1957) and *Ghana* (1957). The latter is an autobiographical account of his successful attempt at gaining independence from the United Kingdom.

Leaving the USA in 1945 and enrolling as a PhD student at the London School of Economics (LSE), Nkrumah's political activities took on a greater dimension when he was elected chairman of the West African Students' Union (WASU). Along with members of the Pan African Federation (PAF), Nkrumah campaigned in support of a Nigerian port workers' strike in 1945.⁸³ Later that year, in October 1945, as mentioned above, Nkrumah co-chaired the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester adopting, as Nkrumah would later write '*African nationalism— a revolt by African nationalism against colonialism, racialism and imperialism in Africa— and it adopted Marxist socialism as its philosophy*'.⁸⁴

The Fifth Pan-African Congress took place in what was a worrying context for the United Kingdom in terms of its imperial ambitions. Indeed, in spite of growing criticism of its statesmanship, a debt of some £18 billion pounds and heavy material and financial

⁸⁰ Ibid, 26.

⁸¹ Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, (Bedford: Panaf Books, 2002), 10.

⁸² Amy Jacques-Garvey, ed., *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, or Africa for the Africans*, Volumes I and II, (Dover, USA: The Majority Press), 1923.

⁸³ Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, (Bedford: Panaf Books, 1962), 24.

⁸⁴ Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana, op.cit.* 44.

losses incurred through fighting the Second World War, policy-makers in the UK continued to see their country as a world power. This was an attitude that was to continue for the next two decades, an attitude reinforced by the idea that while commitments overseas were costly, the expense was necessary in order to maintain access to raw materials and position troops in areas where the Soviet Union might attempt to make political or military inroads.⁸⁵ A jungle war fought against communist-backed insurgents in Malaya from 1948 confirmed that the threat to British interests in Asia was, indeed, real. The lack of any organised anti-colonial force in sub-Saharan Africa had meant that large numbers of British citizens saw post-war South Africa and Rhodesia-Nyasaland as their future. They were to join the 62,000 or so white British that had made the highlands of Kenya their home.⁸⁶ Much was to change in post-war Kenya and Jomo Kenyatta, another African politician, would play a central role in convincing the British that their colonial presence in another part of the world was also coming to an end.

Kenyatta, also present at the Fifth Congress in Manchester, had been one of its most high-profile delegates. Like Nkrumah, Kenyatta had spent time overseas honing his philosophical thought into political activism. After joining the League Against Imperialism, and after visiting Moscow, Kenyatta wrote a number of important articles about the problems of Kenya⁸⁷ and returned to East Africa in 1946. A year later he became leader of the Kenyan African Union (KAU). Ostensibly, the KAU had peaceful intentions that Kenyatta was to outline in a speech given at Nyeri in 1952. This vision consisted in a

⁸⁵ Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind*, (London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2009), 12.

⁸⁶ "Kenya (White Highlands)", *Hansard Records*, Volume 594, 30 October 1958.

⁸⁷ Eric Masinde Aseka, *Jomo Kenyatta: a biography*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1992), 19.

Kenya where Kenyans owned the land they farmed, where farm labourers would earn the same wages as a European and where political corruption was a thing of the past.⁸⁸

Underlying the peaceful means, and one from which Kenyatta distanced himself at Nyeri, lay a violent, tribal-based organisation. Operating from bases in the Rift Valley, the Mau Mau saw armed incursions as the only way to fight against British colonists and attacked white settlers in areas known as the White Highlands. Composed of members of the Kikuyu tribe, the Mau Mau (otherwise known as the Land Freedom Army) swelled, at one point, to a force of over 30,000. The Mau Mau waged guerilla warfare against British colonial rule until 1956 but was finally defeated by superior military forces. Despite this, what the Mau Uprising demonstrated to the British was that Kenyans were prepared to fight and die for their land. As a direct result of the rebellion, the British government began planning for Kenyan independence under majority rule.⁸⁹

1.2. The United States, Containment, and Decolonisation

Given that the United States had witnessed phenomenal economic growth in the 1950s, it is perhaps understandable that decisions taken on US foreign policy from 1945 onwards were centred on maintaining contemporary standards of life and distancing any perceived threat. In 1941, the US had abandoned its policy of non-interventionism to fight Nazi Germany, and at the end of World War Two, it demonstrated that it was more than willing to counter the threat posed by the USSR and the spread of Communism.

Things had not always been this way, of course. Both the US and the USSR had recognised that the Third Reich had ambitions of world dominance and had joined an

⁸⁸ "Speech at the Kenya African Union Meeting at Nyeri, 26 July, 1952", from F. D. Cornfield, "The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau", *Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1959-1960*, (Nairobi: 1960), 301-308.

⁸⁹ James Mulli, *Mau Mau*, in Penny M. Sonneburg, *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural and Political Encyclopedia*, Volume 1, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 373.

alliance which sought to frustrate Adolf Hitler. However successful this alliance was in its objectives it was, for some commentators a "marriage of convenience riddled with tension, mistrust and suspicion."⁹⁰

The first signs that all was not well with this diplomatically fragile relationship had been seen during the Yalta Conference of February, 1945. With Nazi Germany on the road to defeat, the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR gathered in the Crimea to present their respective visions of a post-war Europe. These discussions continued at Potsdam, Germany in July and August, 1945. Speaking on behalf of the USSR, Stalin demanded that Germany pay ten billion dollars in reparations for the damage caused to the Soviet economy. US President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill (and later Clement Attlee) argued, on the other hand, that reparations enforced on Germany after the First World War had led to the grievances which caused a second global conflict. They also argued that the economic recovery and future prosperity of Western Europe depended on an economically vibrant Germany.⁹¹

A few days after negotiations had concluded at Potsdam, Truman approved the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although this would bring an end to Japanese participation in the Second World War, the use of atomic weapons did nothing to improve the mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, questions arose over conflicting interests in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Soviet role in Manchuria. Even if compromises were made during subsequent meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1946 marked the end of a U.S-Soviet alliance and the beginning of the Cold War.⁹²

⁹⁰ Robert McMahan, *Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 16.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 23-24.

⁹² *Ibid.* 25.

That direct confrontation had been transformed into indirect did not escape the attention of politicians and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and in March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill warned of Soviet intentions from the Baltic to the Adriatic seas and concluded that an 'Iron Curtain' had fallen across eastern Europe. Warnings about Soviet intentions had also come from US historian and diplomat, George Kennan. As a member of the U.S. Embassy staff in Kiev, Kennan had been asked to examine why the Soviet Union was so unsupportive of the newly created World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, on 22 February 1946, he pessimistically replied that he believed the USSR was still living in what he describes as an antagonistic capitalist encirclement and, as such, in the long run there was no hope for peaceful existence. Moreover, and echoing Churchill's statement a month later, Kennan declared that due to international revolution, the world would become bipolar: one inclined towards socialism and the other towards capitalism.⁹³

In response to this 'Long Telegram' from Moscow in which Kennan advised against direct war but advocated 'relentless battle against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad'⁹⁴, its recipient George Marshall requested that Kennan set up an advisory body to State Department. The Policy Planning Staff, headed by Kennan himself, was thus created with a mission 'to take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance US interests and American values'.⁹⁵

Kennan's suspicions of Soviet ideology and ambitions seemed to be confirmed when President Truman received an appeal from the Greek government for assistance in its

⁹³ "George Kennan's 'Long Telegram', February 22, 1946", https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf, accessed 14 September, 2016.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ "Policy Planning Staff, Mission Statement", <https://www.state.gov/s/p/>, accessed 20 July 2016.

fight against the communist-inspired Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). It is probable that civil war in Greece had come at the right moment for the US president as it gave him the opportunity in March 1947 to demonstrate through the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine that the United States was prepared to extend its help on a global scale. Elsewhere in western Europe, communist-led political actions were also reported to be destabilising both the French and Italian governments⁹⁶ and, having stated that he would 'support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures', Truman enacted the European Cooperation Act (ECA) and the European Recovery Programme (ERP) (aka, the Marshall Plan) which came into operation from April 1948 onwards. Although the principle intention of the ERP was to provide financial assistance to European countries for the rebuilding of industrial and domestic infrastructures, the removal of trade barriers and increasing prosperity in war-torn regions was a way in which the spread of communist ideology and influence in Europe could be stemmed. During a period which would come to be known as "Pactomania", in 1949, the geographical scope of the ERP was extended to Asia: up to 1949 \$2.9 billion dollars in military and economic aid had been provided to the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT),⁹⁷ \$2.2 billion dollars in aid was given to Japan,⁹⁸ and the Philippines and Iran were also to receive substantial funding. In addition to these financial initiatives, over the coming years Truman's administration took a number of measures either to tighten or to create military alliances. Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949, the Mutual Defence Assistance Act on November 1949 saw the creation of the Defence,

⁹⁶ "Reported Communist Drive to Seize Power in France and Italy", *CIA Daily Summary Excerpt*, 1 December 1947, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/5563bod2.pdf>, accessed 13 September 2016.

⁹⁷ Chinese nationalist had been receiving aid since 1941.

⁹⁸ "Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 1940-1951", *United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics*, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1952).

Financial and Economic Committee (DFEC), and the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB). The role of the two agencies was "to recommend ways and means of increasing available supplies when they fell short of military requirements and to promote more efficient production of military equipment."⁹⁹ In April 1950, one of the most important statements of US Cold War policy, NSC-68,¹⁰⁰ led to even tighter military pacts with certain Asian countries that had been identified as post-war allies. Officially entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", NSC 68 would be followed by the signing of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This piece of legislation provided the framework for the provision of financial and military support to Chinese nationalist forces in Formosa (Taiwan). South Korea was also a beneficiary due to increasing communist activity in the north of the Korean peninsula.

Towards the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the United States had elected a new head of state. As was the case for Harry Truman, his successor Dwight D. Eisenhower was a veteran of the First World War. Underneath the image of a kindly grandfather projected by Eisenhower lay a ferocious anti-communist committed to quashing Soviet ambitions. As a demonstration of his Cold War intentions John Foster Dulles was appointed Secretary of State. His brother, and fellow anti-communist, Allen Dulles, was appointed Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

To demonstrate that the US was taking a more aggressive stance against what Dulles called "Godless terrorism",¹⁰¹ in 1953 plans were drafted to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran. Concluding after the nationalisation of Iran's oilfields that Mossadegh had communist sympathies, and having received encouragement

⁹⁹ "NATO: the first five years", <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/3.htm>, accessed April 2017.

¹⁰⁰ NSC 68 called for a massive increase in military support. See, "A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 68)", <https://www.trumanlibrary.org>, accessed April 2017.

¹⁰¹ Gary B. Nash, et al., *The American People, Concise Edition: Creating a Nation and a Society*, Combined Volume (New York: Longman, 2007), 829.

from Great Britain's MI6, the CIA put in place Operation Ajax which saw Mohammad Reza Pahlavi become the Shah of Iran. John Foster Dulles was also one of the architects of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Signed by a number of countries including the US, Australia, France, the UK and South Korea, this treaty provided for a collective response to aggression. Membership of this organisation was to draw the US into the Vietnam War some years later. John Foster's brother Allen would again be involved in a plot to overthrow a foreign leader when Operation PBSUCCESS brought down the government of Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954. This operation had been carried after Eisenhower's National Security Council Memorandum 5412 of 1954 which reaffirmed the Central Intelligence Agency's role in conducting covert and psychological warfare to ward off potential threats.¹⁰² The mention of this operation is important as it will later be a focus of this study.

In a radio address given later 1954, Foster Dulles was to give a speech which would become known as the Dulles Doctrine. Warning that Communist agitators were devoted to infiltrating public and private organizations,¹⁰³ Dulles promised to meet this threat through the use of local defences which would be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.¹⁰⁴ Strengthening US resolve to ward off the spread of communism in Central and South America, in March 1954 as a member of the Organisation of American States (OAS), Dulles signed the Caracas Declaration. This declaration drew the United States into military involvement should any of the members of the OAS come under threat. Economic assistance was also provided by the United States to Latin American countries

¹⁰² "Note from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council, Washington, 15 March 1954", Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records. Top Secret.

¹⁰³ "Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, Radio Address, 1954", http://www.umbc.edu/che/tahlessons/pdf/historylabs/Guatemalan_Coup_student:RS07.pdf, accessed April 2017.

¹⁰⁴ "Evolution of Foreign Policy: text of speech by John Foster Dulles", Secretary of State before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 21, 1954, Department of State, Washington, 1954.

through the creation of initiatives such as the Inter-American Development Bank. As a consequence of this type of resolve, Dulles would be associated with the concept of "brinkmanship", the art or practice of pushing a situation or confrontation to the limit of safety, especially to force a desired outcome.¹⁰⁵ Another nationalisation of a country's industrial assets, this time in Egypt with the Suez Canal, was to bring the United States back into affairs in the Middle East in 1956. This year, which was the eve of decolonisation in large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa, was also the year in which the United States was presented with a certain moral dilemma, and a new challenge to its Cold War policies.

As an ardent supporter of the 1941 Atlantic Charter and its tenets, which included self-determination to those deprived of it, the United States was also an avid supporter of Chapter XI, Article 73 of the United Nations Charter regarding non-self-governing territories. Its support of the aspirations of these non-self-governing territories continued even in the face of warnings which underlined the possible impact of the breakup of colonial empires on US Cold War policy. A case in point is a 1948 report drafted by the CIA which concluded that the USSR was "effectively exploiting the colonial issue and the economic nationalism of the underdeveloped areas as a means of dividing the non-Soviet world [thereby] weakening the Western powers, and gaining the goodwill of colonial and former colonial areas", Soviet influence over the colonial question, and the rapid break-up of the European empires in Asia and the Middle East also meant that these Western powers could "no longer rely on large areas as assured sources of raw materials, markets and military bases".¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ See, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/brinkmanship>.

¹⁰⁶ "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security", Central Intelligence Agency, ORE-48, 3 September, 1948, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001166383.pdf, accessed 2 May, 2015.

Although neither Eisenhower nor Dulles were supporters of British and French colonial ambitions, both had concerns that the withdrawal of these countries' diminishing influence in the region might lead to the creation of a power vacuum which the Soviet Union could exploit. This was particularly true of Egypt in October/November 1956 when British and French forces failed in an attempt to regain control of the Suez Canal and to remove Egyptian president Gamal Abder Nasser. Eisenhower's response to the Suez Crisis and the threat that the USSR would exploit any power vacuum in newly independent countries came shortly after, in January 1957. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic and/or military assistance if it was being threatened by another state. In what was a veiled warning to the USSR, Eisenhower stated that the United States was committed to "protecting the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, which requested such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism".¹⁰⁷ A sign that the United States would honour this word was to be seen during Operation Blue Bat of July 1958 which provided military support to President Camille Chamoun of the Lebanon in the face of threats mounted by the United Arab Republic.

Faced with the kind of criticism made by the then Senator John F. Kennedy of Republican policy towards the Algerian War, "the most critical impasse to United States foreign policy since the crisis in Indochina",¹⁰⁸ according to the future president, in February 1957 Eisenhower's Vice-President Richard Nixon embarked on a three-week long good-will visit to countries which included Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Sudan. Nixon's main stop on the tour was to be a four-day stopover in the Gold Coast where on 6 March

¹⁰⁷ "The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957", available at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine>, accessed 14 June, 2016.

¹⁰⁸ "Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy in the Senate, Washington DC, 2 July, 1957, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/United-States-Senate-Imperialism_19570702.aspx, accessed 29 January, 2018.

he attended the independence ceremony which saw the Gold Coast become Ghana.¹⁰⁹ If Nixon's visit demonstrated to some extent that the US did, indeed, support nationalist ambitions in sub-Saharan Africa, it could not be said, however, that this area of the world had previously been a priority in terms of US foreign policy. The consensus at the State Department was that sub-Saharan Africa was a "political backwater",¹¹⁰ and was an area in which U.S. policymakers were told to consult with colonial powers on any U.S. initiatives and to avoid any actions "likely to cause serious misunderstandings" between Washington and the European metropolises.¹¹¹

Though a certain degree of indirect dealings with sub-Saharan countries had been made to satisfy US mineral requirements in the First and Second World wars, due to the presence of European colonial powers in these countries, the only direct form of US diplomatic relations had been with the never-colonised Liberia in 1942. In this case the US signed a defence pact with Liberia, and the United States developed military bases at Roberts Field in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, and other areas of the West African country. The US also financed the modernising of Liberia's industrial infrastructure.¹¹²

During the post-war period, a more important concern for US foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa was one that would prove to be an uncomfortable bed-fellow when it came to the US position in the United Nations. In 1948, South Africa's National Party introduced *apartheid*, a system which made racial segregation a comprehensive legislative project. Although the first legislation of the modern apartheid era was not enacted until 1950 with the Population Registration Act, successive legislation throughout the previous fifty or so

¹⁰⁹ "Nixon Flies to Visit Africa as US Good-Will Emissary", *Cornell Daily Sun*, 1 March 1957.

¹¹⁰ Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 51.

¹¹¹ "US Policy Toward South Central and East Africa", National Security Council (NSC) 6001, January 19, 1960, 2-3, as quoted in Schraeder, *op.cit.*, 52.

¹¹² Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (eds.), *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations* (Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2008), 24.

years had deprived Asians and black South Africans of representation in Pretoria. Moreover, in the Cape region, blacks were even erased from electoral rolls.¹¹³

With the United States still heavily reliant on the supply of minerals to support its war effort and its economic development, South Africa had become an important factor within overall US strategies for Africa. Securing a regular supply of high-grade uranium for its nuclear programme was a particular concern at the time, and the US was to finance the building of mining plants in order to extract uranium from South Africa's gold deposits.¹¹⁴ This concern led to the United States welcoming the arrival of Daniel F. Malan's National Party and, therefore, becoming an indirect supporter of apartheid. Described by the CIA as "major stronghold of western ideology in the southern hemisphere",¹¹⁵ South Africa would be considered by supporters of the Domino Theory to be a member of the nations who represented a bulwark against communism. As well as being the 'only independent state of European traditions and of substantial power and stability south of the Equator', according to the CIA, the US also needed access to South Africa's naval bases and deep-water ports.¹¹⁶ These were to be found at Saldanha Bay on the Atlantic Ocean and Simon's Town, Durban on the Indian Ocean.

If Communism was being contained in South Africa through such measures as the banning of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1950, we should remind ourselves that another threat to the political stability required by U.S. strategists was growing in strength. In South Africa, in the colonial empires that formed the 'bulwark' mentioned in CIA reports and on a domestic level, calls for greater political representation

¹¹³ Daniel Ethan Chapman (ed.), *Examining Social Theory: Crossing Borders/Reflecting Back*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2010), 196.

¹¹⁴ "Memorandum from Edmund A. Gullion to J.K. Gustafson Regarding US Policy towards South Africa," May 17, 1948, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*, National Archives at College Park, 21.79 South Africa.

¹¹⁵ "Political situation in the Union of South Africa", ORE 1-49, 31 January 1949, *Central Intelligence Reports*, Intelligence File, President's Secretary's Files: Box 215. HSTL.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

for blacks in European colonies came with the rise of African nationalism. As the calls grew stronger, so did military support from the Communist bloc and political support from anti-apartheid and civil rights activists in the United States.

As far as U.S. strategic interests in East Africa were concerned, official sources demonstrate that Kenya held an important place. In the scope of the Mau Mau Rebellion and the subsequent political upheaval it caused, officials at the State Department's Office of African Affairs called for the reopening of the U.S. Consulate in Mombasa following its closure to the public on August 7, 1953. Indeed, it was underlined that Mombasa was the largest commercial port in East Africa and that American imports of strategic materials from Uganda, the eastern Belgian Congo, and northern Tanganyika flowed through it. For this purpose, two American shipping lines maintain regular schedules between Mombasa and east coast ports in the United States and another operating from Gulf Coast ports also stops here from time to time. From a military point of view, Mombasa was Britain's principal naval base during World War Two and it provided a geographical situation from which the Indian Ocean could be patrolled by ships. Logistically, the recently reactivated East African Command was headquartered in Nairobi and as such this allowed it to secure a two-thousand mile stretch of coastline from South Africa to Ethiopia. The base was being expanded in view of the expected loss of the Suez base area (at a time when Nasser of Egypt was negotiating the withdrawal of British troops) and the East African Railways and Harbors system was, in part, being funded by the U.S.¹¹⁷

U.S. officials considered the Mau Mau to be terrorists, and a year after the rebellion in Kenya had started were worried about its effects, especially regarding the 'racial hatred generated by the Mau Mau as it was believed the rift would take many years to heal.

¹¹⁷ "Memorandum by the Director, Office of African Affairs (Utter) (to the Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Moore), Washington, September 9, 1953", FRUS 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, vol. XI, part 1.

Moreover, and more worryingly for officials, the racial discord in Kenya was not an isolated case: throughout the entire area south of the Sahara there was a very marked increase in racial tensions leading to political and economic stability. Naturally, this was an opportunity for Communists to exploit the context and so it was believed that the U.S. would have to increase its role in Africa and represent the 'Free World'. Any further deterioration in racial tensions in the enormous area covered by Sub-Saharan Africa would be very adverse to the interests of the United States.¹¹⁸

1.3. The Question of the Congo's Minerals

If the Cold War theories, doctrines and pacts of the 1940s and 1950s indicate that US intervention in the Congo was due mainly to the desire to implement the containment of communism, we should be aware of the theory which contends that US intervention was sparked by what Nkrumah called "neocolonialism", i.e. the practice of using capitalism, globalisation, and cultural imperialism to influence the way in which a country develops as opposed to using military force or indirect political control. Although the study of the dynamics of the Congo Crisis tends to give a good deal of credence to this theory, it is not the intention of this current study to focus on the question. Instead, we shall use the existence of the debate to discuss the nature of US reliance on the Congo's mineral reserves. Our doing so will also enable us to gain a clearer understanding of the importance of central and southern Africa not just from a strategic point of view as seen in the previous section, but also from military and economic points of view.

When considering the question of containment as a threat to national security, what we should bear in mind is that the successful containment of communism did not boil

¹¹⁸ "Memorandum Prepared by the Officer in Charge of West, Central, and East Africa Affairs (Feld), Washington, August 17, 1953", FRUS 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, vol. XI, part 1.

down to a simple matter of developing a strategic framework. Indeed, any theoretical strategy needs to be complemented by the means with which it is to be implemented. In simpler terms, this signifies putting in place a military deterrent and in the 1950s this deterrent consisted of tactical nuclear weapons, jet aircraft, and ballistic missiles. The construction of all three of these deterrents depended on maintaining access to the Congo's reserves of strategic minerals, as did the development of America's economy which relied on what are known as critical materials.

By the time innovations in jet and weapons technology were being made in the 1950s, the United States had long since put in place governmental structures that would assist it in acquiring minerals such as those mentioned above. In 1917 and with its involvement in World War I in 1917 it was noted that the United States was deficient in certain elements of great importance, particularly in war time.¹¹⁹ In view of the shortages in strategic minerals, in 1922 the newly established Army and Navy Munitions Board of the US War Department drew up a list of fifteen strategic minerals considered essential to national defence which were to be found partly or entirely outside the United States. Fifteen critical minerals¹²⁰ were also added to this list.¹²¹ With the increasing threat that imports of strategic and critical materials would be lost as a consequence of Japanese expansion in the Pacific,¹²² and the threat of war in Europe, the 1939 Strategic Minerals

¹¹⁹ John Davis Morgan, Jr., "The Domestic Mining Industry of the United States in World War II: A Critical Study of the Economic Mobilization of the Mineral Base of National Power, 1949 in "A Stockpile History", *Managing Materials for a Twenty-first Century Military*, National Research Council, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences (The National Academies Press, 2008).

¹²⁰ The U.S. Geological Survey defines 'critical' minerals as those being vital to the economy whereas a 'strategic' mineral is one that is important to the nation's economy but particularly necessary for defence issues. A strategic mineral does not have any replacements and primarily comes from foreign countries. The term implies that the U.S. is reliant on the supply of strategic minerals and that measures need to be taken when necessary to ensure their supply. See, "Going Critical: Being Strategic with Our Mineral Resources", http://www.usgs.gov/blogs/features/usgs_top_story/going-critical-being-strategic-with-our-mineral-resources/, accessed 17 May, 2016.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and, later, southeast Asia was prompted by its need for rubber, tin, petroleum, rice, and vegetable oils. Italy also invaded Ethiopia in 1936 for similar reasons.

Act authorised a \$100 million budget for the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Army and Navy Munitions Board to purchase strategic and critical minerals needed for wartime production. This included the procurement of ferroalloys, chromite, manganese, natural rubber, and tin.¹²³ World War II did much to change US dependence on the import of materials necessary to its war effort.¹²⁴ The sinking of Allied ships led to stockpile shortages of materials such as copper, chromite, lead, manganese ore, tungsten and zinc concentrates, and the loss of skilled labour, meaning that mining equipment could not be sufficiently maintained, meant that the stockpile of these minerals was severely affected.¹²⁵

In post-war America, the 1939 Strategic Minerals Act was supplemented by the 1946 Strategic and Critical Minerals Act, and the National Security Act of 1947 which created the National Security Resources Board. In addition to its advisory role to the President, this act also provided for the creation of "policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material".¹²⁶ Importantly, on the question of US intervention in the Congo, and when we take into consideration the creation of the CIA through the same act, the National Security Act also stresses that policies will be created for the "conservation of these resources" and that the National Security Resources Board "shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government".¹²⁷ In respect to this last remark, the activities of an agency named the Advisory Committee on Uranium (ACU) illustrates perfectly how the government was able to procure materials which were essential to the development of weapons in World War II.

¹²³ D.H. Snyder, *Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1966) in "Managing Materials for a Twenty-first Century Military", *op.cit.*

¹²⁴ Between 1942 and 1944, the United States imported up to 100% of metals and minerals such as asbestos, cobalt, diamonds, nickel, palladium, radium, tantalum and zircon. See, John Davis Morgan, Jr., "Strategic Materials in World War II", *Bureau of Mines*, 1 December, 1983, 2.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ "National Security Act of 1947", available at <https://archive.org/details/nsact1947>, accessed 12 July 2018.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

At the time when the Manhattan Project was being developed, and when scientists at the Pupin Physics Laboratories at Columbia University were attempting to create a nuclear chain reaction, the intervention of Leslie R. Groves of the ACU had an essential role to play in the creation of the nuclear bomb. In 1942, Groves was to learn of the presence of a quantity of high-grade uranium that had been shipped to the United States, and was now to be found in a warehouse on Staten Island. This uranium had been shipped across the Atlantic Ocean by Edgar Sengier, an employee of the Union Minière Haut-Katanga (UMHK) who was fearful that Nazi Germany would attempt to procure the stock. Manhattan Project administrator Colonel Kenneth D. Nichols was to approach Sengier, and was to purchase all 1,250 tons of the uranium ore.¹²⁸ Two-thirds of the uranium used in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs came from the Congo.¹²⁹

The case of uranium is just one example of how, over the coming years, the United States would sign international agreements in an attempt to maintain its supplies of strategic materials and, as we have seen with its relations with South Africa, the quest to maintain access to metals such as gold would often present the United States with a moral dilemma. A similar situation would later arise on the question of chromite ore imported from Rhodesia. UN sanctions imposed on this southern African country banned the import of a metal which was a key component to the production of stainless steel. However, the United States, which respected this embargo, relied on Rhodesia to supply around 40% of its requirements. With the US government also importing chromium from the USSR, Senator Harry Byrd successfully argued that the US government should be prohibited from banning the imports of strategic minerals from a non-communist country if an import from

¹²⁸ K. D. Nichols, *The Road to Trinity*, (New York: Morrow, 1987), 44-47.

¹²⁹ Tom Zoellner, *Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock that Shaped the World*, (New York: Viking Publishers, 2009), <https://www.economist.com/media/management/uranium-zoellner-e.pdf>, 3, accessed 17 January, 2017.

communist countries was not also prohibited. In 1971, Byrd's proposal led to an amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act known as the Byrd Amendment.

Inasmuch as the Belgian Congo was concerned, the requirements for strategic minerals such as uranium and cobalt also led the United States to put aside its moral stance on the issue of self-determination for non-governing territories. Three years after the US signed the Atlantic Charter, it signed the Tripartite Uranium Accord. This agreement made in 1944 stipulated that Belgium could only sell its uranium to the United States or to Great Britain, and its existence gave some reassurance to Belgium that its colonial presence in the Congo could be maintained.¹³⁰ While maintaining access to a regular supply of uranium in the 1940s and 1950s was essential to US weapons development, when it came to the delivery of these weapons, cobalt proved to be another highly important mineral. An example of the need to maintain access to cobalt can be seen with the development of jet engines. The first generation of jet propulsion systems was made of steel. However, the main problem with this metal is that it cannot resist the extremely high temperatures at which jet engines operate for long periods of time. This placed severe restrictions on how jet fighters could be used in long-distance combat operations. It was discovered that this problem of over-heating could be solved by using superalloys, a group of nickel, iron-nickel, and cobalt alloys which were capable of withstanding temperatures of up to 950-1300°C for long periods of time.¹³¹ This discovery allowed for the development of the type of jet engine that would be used in the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, a long-range strategic bomber which first flew in 1952; the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, a transport aircraft first

¹³⁰ Tom Zoellner, *Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock that Shaped the World*, (New York: Viking Publishers, 2009), 3.

¹³¹ D. Klarstrom, "Cobalt Alloys: Alloying and Thermomechanical Processing", in A. Sharif, "Reference Module", *Materials Science and Materials Engineering*, 2007.

used in 1954; the Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker, a refueling aircraft first used in 1956; and the Lockheed U-2, a high-altitude spy plane first used in 1955.

The development of such aircraft was vital to the planning of strategic defensive measures. As a report from the National Security Council to Eisenhower demonstrates, concerns had been raised that the USAF had a "limited capability to defend the Western Hemisphere against air attack, owing chiefly to a shortage of all-weather jet interceptors." In Korea, following the onset of war, it was considered that the Air Force would have difficulty in carrying out measures "for the defense and maintenance of essential lines of communication" and, in the Far East it also had limited capability for carrying out a strategic offensive.¹³² Along with the development of anti-aircraft systems capable of firing missiles to altitudes up to 60,000 feet, plans were made for the development of jet fighters capable of intercepting Russian bombers.¹³³ By 1957, in addition to those aircraft mentioned above, according to Butler (1966)¹³⁴ the USAF had produced just under 10,000 jet engines used in around 2,100 F-86 Sabres¹³⁵; 760 F-84 Thunderjets;¹³⁶ 315 FH Banshees;¹³⁷ 600 B-47s,¹³⁸ 792 F-100 Super Sabres;¹³⁹ and 516 F-102 Delta Daggers.¹⁴⁰ This aircraft manufactured by Convair was designed to intercept Soviet aircraft such as the Tupolev (Tu-95) strategic bomber which had entered into service in 1952. To give some idea of US requirements in cobalt in the 1950s, according to Burrows (1971), the manufacture of jet engines required around 100 lbs of cobalt. This meant that the military

¹³² "Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the President, Washington, 5 November 1952", FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Files, Vol. II, Part 1, Doc. 32.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Hartman L. Butler, Jr., "Aerospace Fundamentals and Industry Analysis", *Financial Analysts Journal* 22, No.1, January-February, 1966.

¹³⁵ A transonic turbo jet fighter manufactured by North American Aviation.

¹³⁶ A turbojet fighter manufactured by Republic Aviation.

¹³⁷ A single-seat jet fighter manufactured by McDonnell Aircraft.

¹³⁸ A high-altitude strategic bomber manufactured by Boeing.

¹³⁹ A supersonic jet fighter manufactured by North American Aviation.

¹⁴⁰ An interceptor aircraft manufactured by Convair.

aircraft industry alone needed around just under a ton of this mineral.¹⁴¹ As for the US industry as a whole, from 1961-1965 this figure would reach nearly six tons.¹⁴²

If we return to the question of the United States maintaining access to supplies of strategic minerals in the 1950s, although in 1952 wartime requirements for many of the minerals could be met by domestic production, the Interdepartmental Stockpiling Committee had placed six minerals (beryl, cobalt, columbite, nickel, tantalite and tungsten) in the Band 1, thus making them as the most urgently needed. By 1958, in an African context in which total American investment in the sub-Saharan amounted to \$500 million (and the majority of which was in the Union of South Africa), access to cobalt, asbestos, columbite, corundum, industrial diamonds and tantalum still remained an issue.¹⁴³ As Figure 3 (overleaf) shows, the Congo is particularly rich in cobalt, coltan (a mix of columbite and tantalite), diamonds, and manganese that were so needed by the United States. As we can also see, these reserves were to be found mainly in the east of the Congo and, in particular, in the provinces of Katanga,¹⁴⁴ the Kasai, and the Kivu.

As we will see in the pages of this study, control of these three provinces became one of the major objectives for the different state and non-state groups operating in the Congo from 1960-1967. Indeed, the struggle to determine who controls access to these areas and what are now termed "conflict minerals" is still being played out.

When we consider the question of whether the US intervention was motivated by the quest for minerals we should note that by the early 1960s America was in a position to declare that it had enough fissile material for its weapons requirements.¹⁴⁵ On the other

¹⁴¹ James C. Burrows, *Cobalt: An Industry Analysis* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1971), 60.

¹⁴² "Cobalt: Policy Options for a Strategic Mineral", Special Study, Congressional Budget Office, September 1982.


¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ A presentation of Katanga's mining industry can be found in Chapter 2 of this study.

¹⁴⁵ "Governing Uranium in the United States", A Report of the CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program, 6 March, 2014, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/governing-uranium-united-states>, accessed 18 May, 2016.

hand, while this dependence on the supply of uranium was no longer an issue, the US need for Congolese minerals such as cobalt, copper and diamonds continued to grow throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The United States also had mining interests in South Africa; in Northern Rhodesia where US mining company American Metal Climax (AMAX) owned a majority share of the Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited;¹⁴⁶ or in Angola where Gulf Oil had been prospecting in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda since 1954 and by 1972 had become the largest US investor in Portuguese Angola with figures reaching \$209 million.¹⁴⁷

Figure 3. Minerals in the Congo¹⁴⁸



We should also remind ourselves that the US tended to distance itself from the question of white minority rule and continuing colonialism when it came to the question of

¹⁴⁶ Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 33.

¹⁴⁷ "Letter from William Cox, Gulf Oil Corporation to Edward Hawley, April 4, 1973", as quoted in, "Why We Protest Gulf Oil in Angola", American Committee on Africa (ACOA), *Africa Action Archive*, New York, June 1973.

¹⁴⁸ "Democratic Republic of the Congo's Mineral Resources", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2018.

strategic minerals. Indeed, the importance of maintaining relations with Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portugal to US strategy in southern Africa was underlined by President Richard Nixon in National Security Memorandum 39, *aka* the "Tar Baby" option. Although apartheid and colonial rule were considered an unpleasant reality, from a pragmatic point of view, the US should in the late 1960's and early 1970's seek to maintain the *status quo*.¹⁴⁹

Were these requirements in strategic minerals and US business interests in sub-Saharan Africa sufficient enough for the United States to mount a military operation? The intervention was certainly influenced by considerations linked to these aspects, as was US intervention in Iraq or in Afghanistan. On the other hand, full-scale wars in Korea and Vietnam were not motivated by the desire to control a region's mineral resources and neither, as we shall see, were small-scale interventions in Guatemala or Cuba.

Perhaps the most rational explanation when it comes to the question of the Congo's minerals can be seen in Edgar Sengier's transporting of uranium to the United States in the early 1940s. Sengier was fearful that Nazi Germany would use the Congo's uranium for its own nuclear programme, and the same considerations should perhaps be applied when we look at the development of weapons and arms technology from the 1950s onwards. As part of the overall strategy the United States wanted to limit Soviet access to the Congo's minerals so that it would not be in a position where it could gain military superiority. It would seem, as Stephen Weissman points out, that "access rather than investment was perhaps the most material incentive for American involvement in the Congo."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ For more information on the "Tar Baby" option see, for example, Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*, (New York: Colombia Press, 1976).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 160.

1.4. Towards the Independence of the Belgian Congo

Although British and French ambitions of empire were already on the decline through a mixture of international pressure and wars of liberation, Belgium had adopted a different strategy in order to maintain some form of control over its African colonies. In 1946, for example, in the face of growing UN criticism of Belgium's colonial policy, the Belgian Christian-Democrat Party (PSC-CVP) set up a commission whose mission was to elaborate a new colonial strategy. The Christian-Democrats believed that the colony's black and white populations should be brought closer together and that Congolese institutions should be reformed. Other Belgian political parties also started to show an interest in reform in the Congo, and while the Belgian Socialist Party (BSP) recommended autonomy for the Congo, the Belgian Communist Party advocated complete independence for the colony.¹⁵¹

For the Congolese themselves, although some had obtained a certain degree of representation through groups such as the Association of Middle-Class Africans, or *Association des Classes Moyennes Africaines* (ACMAF), most found themselves largely excluded from the type of lifestyle enjoyed by Europeans and a rigid policy of racial segregation was enforced by both law and social convention. Hotels, bars, theatres, restaurants and many shops were segregated and although black Congolese worked in all of these places, they were not welcomed as guests.¹⁵² While most Congolese were referred to as *macaques* (monkeys), there was also a group of black Congolese referred to as "*évolués*". In the main, these were men that had been educated in Catholic missions and who had evolved to being considered as 'civilised', and who formed part of a 'black bourgeoisie' or what has been termed as the "*bourgeoisie nationale*". Typically these

¹⁵¹ Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885-1980*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84-85.

¹⁵² Robert B. Edgerton, *The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 177.

Congolese ran or owned businesses such as sawmills, garages, hotels or construction firms and employed other Congolese. In 1958, there were 21,683 of these 'indigenous firms'.¹⁵³ Although these figures demonstrate that European attitudes towards Congolese were evolving Edgerton argues that this section of the Congolese population was an artificial creation designed to maintain social cohesion in the Congo by opposing any major disruption to the European way of life.¹⁵⁴ In 1956, hope that this situation would one day end was provided by a report published by Anton Arnold (Jef) Van Bilsen. Here, this Belgian academic put forward the idea that Belgium should leave the Congo. Unfortunately, he also specified that independence should only be granted after a transitional period of thirty years.¹⁵⁵

The rise of African nationalism was to inspire many in the Congo to seek greater political representation for the Congolese and, if the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Conference demonstrated that there was worldwide support for self-determination, resistance to colonisation was finding wider support within African states themselves. An illustration of this support is the All African People's Conference which was held in Accra, Ghana in 1958. One of the delegates at the Conference was Patrice Lumumba, a representative of the Congolese National Movement, or the *Movement National Congolais* (MNC).

Born in 1925 in Onalua in the Kasai Province, Lumumba's father named him Isaïe Tasumbu. On leaving Onalua in the early 1940s he changed his name to Lumumba, or 'crowd that moves' on the suggestion of a cousin and moved to Stanleyville (now Kisangani) where he obtained work with the postal service. From 1944 to 1956, to

¹⁵³ "Révolution Congolaise: Lumumba-Mulele- Kabila", <http://www.deboutcongolais.info/revcongo-01-complet.pdf>, 3, accessed 17 September 2016.

¹⁵⁴ Edgerton, *op.cit.*, 179.

¹⁵⁵ A. A. J. Van Bilsen, *Vers l'indépendance du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi*, (Kinshasa, Presses Universitaires, 1977), 296.

authorities he seemed to be nothing more than a humble servant of the Belgian Congo. However, Lumumba had long held feelings that were anti-colonial and anti-authority, particularly since his expulsion from two missionary schools as a teenager. Moves to consolidate these sentiments were first made when Lumumba joined two socio-cultural movements whose aim was to promote greater understanding between the Congolese and the Belgians. He was to transform these groups into political movements and in early 1956 he was invited to Brussels to meet King Baudouin. Lumumba had prepared the meeting well and carried with him a list of suggestions for the improvement of living conditions for the Congolese. Following a short term in prison, having allegedly misappropriated government funds, in 1958 Lumumba joined the MNC.¹⁵⁶ By then, Lumumba's will to build cooperative ties with Belgium had transformed into the desire to obtain independence. As Lumumba put it in a speech made to the participants of the All-African People's Conference held in Accra, Ghana in 1958, the Congolese also realised that the 'winds of freedom' were blowing across Africa. His presence at the conference meant that the MNC's reputation in the scope of the African liberation struggle increased significantly.¹⁵⁷

Lumumba's political momentum was to increase firstly with the independence of the Gold Coast in 1957 and during the visit of Charles de Gaulle to Brazzaville in the French Congo¹⁵⁸ on August 21, 1958 where the French president offered the possibility of a referendum on independence. Events moved quickly in the Belgian Congo from that moment, when Governor-General Léo Petillon announced that he was appointing a commission to examine the question of Congolese independence. Debate continued at the Conference of Accra held on December 5, 1958, but, when other prominent politicians

¹⁵⁶ Emmanuel K. Akyeampong and Henry Louis Gates, *Dictionary of African Biography*, Volume 6, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 525-526.

¹⁵⁷ "Patrice Lumumba, Speech at Accra, 1958", <http://www.blackpast.org/1958-patrice-lumumba-speech-accra>, accessed 16 September 2016.

¹⁵⁸ Now the Republic of the Congo (ROC).

such as Joseph Kasa-Vubu -the leader of the *Association des Bakongo pour l'unification, la conservation et l'expansion de la langue kikongo* (ABAKO) - failed to attend, Lumumba as an official of the MNC and the Congo's highest-ranking representative became the spokesperson for the Congo's international affairs. Seen as a successor to the Pan-African Congress meetings of the 1940s, the All-African People's Congress brought together 300 delegates representing 65 organisations from 28 African countries. Strongly represented countries included Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria -three countries in North Africa which had won, or were in the process of obtaining independence, while West, East and Central African countries all had significant delegations.¹⁵⁹

With momentum gathering pace and violent protests against Belgian authorities in Léopoldville taking place in January 1959, the Conference of Luluabourg in the Kasai province held in October of that year also demonstrated that deep divisions existed within the Congolese community itself. Indeed, two years previously decades-old antagonism between the Lulua and Baluba tribes was exacerbated in December 1957 when the Baluba won a major victory in municipal elections in Luluabourg. Fearing that the Baluba would gain too much influence in local affairs, in 1959 the Lulua regrouped and won victories in provincial legislative elections. With this, Lulua political leaders then put forward the notion that the Baluba should be moved back to their homelands in the south of the province. The reaction from the Baluba was violent, and conflict between the two tribes which again broke out in early October, 1959 would continue long after independence had been obtained.

A further sign that the Congolese were unsure of what form the country should take after independence came at the Round Table Conference held in Brussels in December 1959. Following Patrice Lumumba's decision to support the Lulua in the Kasai, Albert

¹⁵⁹ George M. Houser, "A Report on the All African People's Conference Held in Accra, Ghana, December 8-13, 1958", *American Committee on Africa*, New York.

Kalonji, a Baluba and associate decided to set up his own branch of the MNC and named it the *Mouvement National Congolais-Kalonji* (MNC-K). Now, in Brussels, along with ABAKO and the *Parti Solidaire Africain* (PSA), or African Solidarity Party, Kalonji opposed Lumumba's concept of a unitary state governed from Léopoldville and, instead, argued that the Congo should be a loose federation of separate states.¹⁶⁰ In spite of the differences in opinion, participants at the Conference nevertheless agreed that independence should be set for the 30 June, 1960 and that provincial and legislative elections should be held a month earlier.

In an endorsement of his popularity in the Orientale, Kivu and Kasai provinces, it was Patrice Lumumba that was to emerge triumphant in these elections. Obtaining thirty-three of a possible 137 seats available, and well ahead of Kasa-Vubu and Kalonji, Lumumba now found himself the most influential and powerful man in Congolese politics. While news of the returns in the elections brought joy to Lumumba's supporters, for Europeans in the Congo the results cemented pre-election fears that they would become the target of anti-colonial sentiment. Indeed, in Lumumba's stronghold of Stanleyville, some Europeans were insulted and stoned, leading them to describe the leader of the MNC as 'most dangerous'.¹⁶¹ In other parts of the Congo, after similar scenes took place, many Europeans were reported to be sending their wives and children away from the Congo after lists of Europeans and their residences were published in African newspapers. Allegedly, this was even the case in Katanga, a province hostile to Lumumba.¹⁶²

Sharing the opinion that Lumumba in a position of power was dangerous, and believing that Lumumba would seek to impose himself on Congolese Cabinet affairs, the

¹⁶⁰ Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: from Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 19-20.

¹⁶¹ Homer Bigart, "Lumumba Victor in Congo Voting", *New York Times*, 1 June, 1960.

¹⁶² "Belgian Congo Threats Spur European's Exodus", *New York Times*, 2 June, 1960.

Belgian officials sent to oversee the transition from colony to independence were nevertheless wary of attempting to exclude Lumumba from any government formed through the provisions of the recently drawn up constitution.¹⁶³

This type of political maneuvering continued throughout June 1960 with, on the one hand, Lumumba attempting to form a government and, on the other, Joseph Kasavubu talking of establishing a separate Mukongo province. Moïse Tshombe of Katanga also threatened to secede immediately if an amendment giving the province greater representation in the Congolese parliament was not added to the draft constitution.¹⁶⁴ In turn, in northeastern Katanga, Jason Sendwe of the *Association Générale des Baluba de Katanga* (BALUBAKAT) was also declaring its determination to set up a separate state, one that would act in opposition to Tshombe's *Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT).¹⁶⁵ Here, the political situation was worsened when tribal conflict between the Lulua and Baluba tribes led to a state of emergency being declared on 14 June. Further political wrangling continued over the next few days as political rivals jockeyed for position in the Congo's upper and lower houses. This included Lumumba opponent Joseph Ileo being elected head of the Congolese Senate over the Lumumba-supported Alexandre Mahamba. Despite opposition to his own candidates, in a sign of magnanimity Lumumba continued in his efforts to form a broadly based Cabinet that included rivals. Lumumba, whose party had gained control over the House of Representatives, was then invited by Walter Van der Meersch to form a government. Political compromise was reached through the composition of Lumumba's first Cabinet. On 23 June, with Lumumba holding the dual role of Prime Minister and Defence Minister, concessions were made to CONAKAT by putting this party in charge of the Ministry of Economics. As for other

¹⁶³ "Rhodesia to Bolster Border", *New York Times*, 1 June, 1960.

¹⁶⁴ "Emergency Declared in Katanga", *The Times*, 14 June, 1960.

¹⁶⁵ Harry Gilroy, "Divisive Efforts Spread in Congo", *New York Times*, 14 June, 1960.

appointments, Lumumbists Justin Bomboko became Foreign Minister and Thomas Kanza was named as the Congo's United Nations delegate. The composition of the Congo's first government was completed with the election of Joseph Kasa-Vubu as Head of State on 24 June and to all appearances the country could now look forward to officially gaining its independence less than a week later. Below this surface of optimism though lay simmering tensions which were soon to throw the Congo into chaos.

Refusing to accept that the Congo had fallen into the hands of extremists wishing to impose a unitary structure over the country and having seen BALUBAKAT political rival Jason Sendwe appointed State Commissioner for the province, Moïse Tshombe flew back to Elisabethville on 23 June. The same day, Tshombe declared that he was withdrawing his support for Lumumba.¹⁶⁶ With fears that Katanga would secede, on 28 June, Lumumba had met with *Force Publique* chief Lieutenant General Janssens and, in the scope of article 250 of an agreement put in place between Congo and Belgian governments,¹⁶⁷ it was decided that Katanga would be brought into the union through force if necessary.¹⁶⁸ Secondly, during an impromptu speech given by Lumumba in the *Palais de la Nation* on Independence Day itself, Lumumba launched into a violent denunciation of Belgian rule in front of representatives from Asian and African countries as well as the world's press. This, for Madeleine Kalb in *The Congo Cables* was where "trouble started", and the Congo Crisis began.¹⁶⁹

1.5. Independence and the Beginnings of Crisis in the Congo

¹⁶⁶ "Tshombe, Moïse-Kapenda", *Biographie Belge d'Outre-Mer* (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-mer, Tome VII-A), 462-476.

¹⁶⁷ Article 250 of the Fundamental Law of 19 May, 1960.

¹⁶⁸ "New Congo State to Enforce Unity", *The Times*, 28 June, 1960.

¹⁶⁹ Madeleine Kalb, *op.cit.*, 3.

When King Baudouin of Belgium arrived in Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo named after his great uncle, he was taken through the streets in an open-topped car and was met by cheering Congolese celebrating the handover of power. For a moment, it appeared that some Congolese were not so welcoming and as a man dashed from the crowd and drew the king's sword from its scabbard many believed an attempt on Baudouin's life was going to be made. Instead, in a moment which seemed to symbolise an end to European colonial power and a return to native African power the supposed assailant simply danced his way alongside the row of limousines.¹⁷⁰ Another visible, and far more controversial sign that power was being transferred, came after King Baudouin had described the Congo's independence as the culmination of the work carried out by the Belgians over the previous eighty years. This included freeing the Congo Basin from the slave trade; uniting the Congo's different ethnic groups; and leaving the Congolese a moral and material heritage. For this, said Baudouin, the Congolese should be grateful. Observers such as Belgian historian Ludo de Witte point out how much the Belgian monarch's speech was 'rather humiliating' for the hosts and how much Baudouin seemed to have misjudged the atmosphere in a building which had once served as the residence of the Governor General.¹⁷¹

In response, and after a speech by President Joseph Kasavubu, Lumumba rose from his place alongside Belgian Premier Gaston Eyskens. Displaying Belgium's highest decoration, the Order of the Crown, an award that he had received the night before the ceremony, Lumumba gave his own version of Belgian colonial rule. Instead of the illustrious work described by Baudouin, Lumumba spoke of how the Congolese had been

¹⁷⁰ Jihan El Tahri, *Cuba: An African Odyssey*, DVD, (Paris: Arte Editions, 2007), 4.06.

¹⁷¹ Ludo de Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (Brussels: Karthala, 2000), 36.

involved in a "day-to-day fight", a fight "to put an end to the humiliating slavery" which had been imposed by force.¹⁷²

Whereas Lumumba was to go some way in repairing relations with a toast to Belgian rule at a dinner given after the ceremony of independence, and with Lumumbists such as Placide Kitungwe, a member of Lumumba's first cabinet, believing that the speech was exactly what the Congolese wanted to hear,¹⁷³ many also believed that Lumumba had overstepped the mark and that the speech had been unnecessarily inflammatory.

Despite what can be considered as a bad start to independence, neither the Belgian nor the Congolese authorities wished to see a disorganised handover of power. This was reflected in the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Cooperation, an agreement signed between the Congo and Belgium on 30 June which, however, was never ratified by the Congolese parliament.¹⁷⁴ However, it soon became clear that this spirit of cooperation in administrative circles had yet to be extended to the Congo's armed forces composed of just over one thousand Belgian officers commanding 23,000 non-commissioned soldiers.¹⁷⁵

On 1 July, the commander of these armed forces Emile Janssens convened a meeting of non-commissioned officers at the headquarters of the *Force Publique* at Camp Léopold II in Léopoldville. Rather clumsily, Janssens demonstrated through the use of a blackboard that no change was to be forthcoming within the structure of the army. This was done by writing in chalk, 'Before Independence = After Independence'. This followed an instance where many Belgian officers had told the Congolese troops that independence

¹⁷² "Patrice Lumumba, First Prime Minister of the Congo, June 30, 1960", <https://africanlegends.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/patrice-lumumba-speech.pdf>, accessed 6 September, 2016.

¹⁷³ El Tahri, *op.cit.*

¹⁷⁴ Vanthemsche, *op.cit.* 254.

¹⁷⁵ Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), 120.

only concerned civilians. For a rank and file which had hoped to see better pay and promotion in an army where only seven Congolese had attained the rank of sergeant-major this return to colonialism and a continuation of white rule was unacceptable. Groups of soldiers and NCOs unbuttoned their uniforms and began to roam the streets of Léopoldville. Several Europeans were attacked and cars were turned over. Next, on 6 July, armed soldiers tried to force their way into the Congo parliament building. Unsuccessful, these soldiers later appealed to Lumumba but were outraged when the Prime Minister refused their demands. Instead, Lumumba insisted that white officers would command his armed forces and that Belgians would be appointed to important posts in matters of defence.¹⁷⁶ Faced with continued rioting on 7 July and panic among both whites and blacks, resulting in a near shutdown of Léopoldville, Lumumba was forced to backtrack on his previous decisions: Janssens and the entire corps of white *Force Publique* officers were dismissed whereas Victor Lundula was appointed commander-in-chief of the newly-named *Armée Nationale Congolais* (ANC), or Congolese National Army. In an act of political naivety, Lumumba also appointed Joseph Désiré Mobutu as colonel and chief of staff. As far as the latter is concerned, and as Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja notes, while refusing to listen to apparently well-founded rumours of Mobutu's links to Belgian and American intelligence services, Lumumba had unwittingly chosen his own Judas.¹⁷⁷

Moves intended to quell the rioting did not bring reassurance to Europeans whose homes and businesses continued to be attacked by mutinous soldiers. Many Europeans left the Congo by road or rail and fled to neighbouring Angola or crossed the River Congo into Brazzaville and in Northern Rhodesia there was talk of forming rifle commandos to rescue

¹⁷⁶ Edgerton, *op.cit.* 186.

¹⁷⁷ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 67.

those Europeans fleeing neighbouring Elisabethville.¹⁷⁸ As we shall see, the social context in Katanga was incomparable to that which was developing in Léopoldville.

Caught up in the mutiny was the newly-arrived Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Chief of Station Larry Devlin. Arriving on 10 July, Devlin had seen the brutality the mutinous soldiers had exacted on white settlers and, after being mistaken for a Flemish Belgian, Devlin was taken prisoner, made to kiss the boots of his captors and threatened with execution.¹⁷⁹ Similar tales of violence can be found on a number of French-speaking social media forums on which former residents of the Belgian Congo describe their experiences.¹⁸⁰ One such experience was told by Jean-Marie Nicolas, then a sixteen-year-old schoolboy who had been looking forward to the coming holidays which he would spend with his father André, the Chief Adjutant in the *Force Publique* unit based at Camp Hardy.

On learning of news of the mutiny, Jean-Marie had been reassured by his father that as Thysville was around 100 miles from the capital the prospect of violence was far off. However, on 4 July, troops seized the armory and confined officers to their quarters. By the 10 July, Jean-Marie found himself captive and being beaten daily by drunken Congolese soldiers. Other Belgians had their possessions stolen while the wives and daughters of Belgian officers were raped.¹⁸¹ Elsewhere, elements of the *Force Publique* based in Kongolo in northern Katanga had threatened Belgian officers and had mutinied at Camp Massart in Elisabethville; Congolese civilians in nearby Kabalo had attempted to stop the departure of a train to Elisabethville carrying 250 Europeans and riots involving native Congolese had taken place in the mining towns of Shinkolobwe and Kolwezi. In

¹⁷⁸ "Army to be Commanded by Congolese", *The Times*, 9 July, 1960.

¹⁷⁹ Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), introduction, xiii-xv.

¹⁸⁰ One such forum is <http://www.memoiresducongo.be/historique/>.

¹⁸¹ Personal correspondence with Jean-Marie Nicolas, September 2016.

response to these atrocities in Katanga, many Europeans chose either to fight back or leave and while many chose to cross the border into the neighbouring Republic of the Congo, or Northern Rhodesia. Others organised themselves into fighting units especially around Jadotville, a town situated to the north of Katangan capital, Elisabethville.¹⁸²

The threat to the lives of its nationals was to provoke a sturdy response from the Belgian government. In Katanga, on 10 July after the deaths of six Europeans and an appeal from Moïse Tshombe, around 800 Belgian paratroopers and commandos were flown into Elisabethville where they fought mutinous Congolese soldiers.¹⁸³ Belgium also launched Operation Mangrove where its warships bombarded Matadi, and warplanes from the Kitona military base attacked mutineers from the air. Tshombe also made an appeal to Britain for help but this was rejected by Harold Macmillan on the grounds that the request had come from a provincial, and not a national, government.¹⁸⁴

With one British official in Léopoldville declaring, "The Congo is falling apart" and describing the country as "a body without a head",¹⁸⁵ the situation in the Congo meant that conditions were chaotic, with transportation, mail and communications severely disrupted. With reports of food being in short supply and Lumumba losing a tenuous control of this situation, the Congolese Prime Minister was then greeted on 11 July with the news that Katanga had announced its immediate secession and that it had become independent from the Congo. This came as a massive blow for Lumumba: not only had the Congo's economic powerhouse been lost, Lumumba feared that the secession of one state would lead to other states also declaring their independence. These fears were to become

¹⁸² Andrew Hudson, *Congo Unravelling: Military Operations from Independence to the Mercenary Revolt* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2012), 20.

¹⁸³ "Belgium's Forces Fight Congolese to Quell Risings", *New York Times*, 11 July, 1960.

¹⁸⁴ "Britain Rejects Congo Troop Bid", *New York Times*, 11 July, 1960.

¹⁸⁵ "Belgium's Forces Fight Congolese to Quell Risings", *New York Times*, 11 July, 1960.

reality less than a month later as political and tribal divisions threatened the integrity of the Congo.

After trying in vain to regain control of the mutinous troops of the ANC, Lumumba also made an attempt to negotiate with Tshombe on the question of the Katanga. However, with the Prime Minister's plane being refused permission to land by Tshombe ¹⁸⁶ by 12 July the Congolese Prime Minister felt he had no choice but to appeal to the United Nations. Lumumba's request was answered by Dr. Ralph Bunche who stated that the UN would give the new republic as much assistance as possible.¹⁸⁷ UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was also quick to react and following a meeting of its Security Council (UNSC), on 14 July 1960 the UN issued Resolution 143. This called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo but to provide military assistance until the Congo's own forces were capable of regaining control of the country.¹⁸⁸ The first of a force of 20,000 military and civilian personnel from thirty different states including Ireland and Sweden, arrived in the Congo on 15 July,¹⁸⁹ but it was not long before another threat to the Congo's territorial sovereignty appeared on the horizon.

While Tshombe sought to form a federation with the Kasai and Kivu provinces, Albert Kalonji accused Lumumba of leading a 'communist dictatorship'¹⁹⁰ and declared that the mining region of South Kasai would become an independent country. With Kalonji then turning to Tshombe for support, Lumumba's dreams of creating a unified, socialist state in the heart of Africa were rapidly disappearing. Lumumba again appealed to the United Nations for help in reintegrating the South Kasai. However, it appears that how

¹⁸⁶ Anicet Kashamura, *De Lumumba aux colonels*, (Paris: Broché, 1966), 96-97, as quoted in Kalb, *op.cit.*, 7.

¹⁸⁷ "Katanga Premier in Congo Secedes; Asks Belgian Aid", *New York Times*, 11 July, 1960.

¹⁸⁸ "The Congo Question", accessed April 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁸⁹ "ONUC Case Study", https://www.polity.co.uk/up2/casestudy/ONUC_case_study.pdf, accessed 7 September, 2016,

¹⁹⁰ "New Secession Rejected", *New York Times*, 10 August, 1960.

Resolution 143 was interpreted by Lumumba and Dag Hammarskjöld differed wildly. Drawing on the resolution's mention that the Security Council authorised Hammarskjöld "to provide the Government (of the Republic of the Congo) with such military assistance as may be necessary" and that this assistance was to be provided "in consultation" with the Congo government, Lumumba believed that the role of the United Nations was not to act as a neutral organisation but one which would put all its military resources at the government's disposal.¹⁹¹ The Secretary-General, on the other hand, had a different view. Hammarskjöld considered that the role of the UN in the Congo was not to join forces to wage war in an alliance against the secessionists but to protect peace and preserve international security. In this respect the UN security forces could only use military force if they came under attack.¹⁹²

At this point, the frustrated Lumumba decided to take matters into his own hands and this decision would prove to be catastrophic. Using weapons brought in from Poland in mid-July 1960,¹⁹³ transported by Soviet planes manned by Soviet technicians, backup crews and interpreters¹⁹⁴, 200 men of the ANC left Ndjili Airport for Luluabourg on 25 August.¹⁹⁵ With unconfirmed reports of being led by Czech and Guinean officers and bolstered by the arrival of 600 more troops, ANC forces were quick to regain control of Bakwanga (now, Mbuji-Mayi) and moved southwards towards Tshimbulu and Mwene Ditu on their way to the border with Katanga.¹⁹⁶ With Kalonji appealing for his Baluba warriors to fight back against the ANC, Lumumba's troops reverted to particularly brutal methods to put down any resistance: around 1,200 civilians were massacred at Benzola;

¹⁹¹ "From a letter to Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General, August 14, 1960", <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/lumumba/1960/08/umgensec.htm>, accessed 27 January, 2015.

¹⁹² Eric S. Packham, *Freedom and Anarchy*, (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1996), 54.

¹⁹³ "Polish Arms Ship Sent to Congo", *New York Times*, 17 July, 1960.

¹⁹⁴ "US Mission at the United Nations Cable", Nos. 560 and 566, 1 September, 1960, as quoted in Kalb, *op.cit.* 69.

¹⁹⁵ "Congo Troops Fly to Kasai to Stop Secession Effort", *New York Times*, 24 August, 1960.

¹⁹⁶ "Mr. Kalonji Flees and Declares war on Mr. Lumumba", *The Times*, 28 August, 1960.

5,000 were massacred at Kasengulu, and there were many other examples of the indiscriminate killing of unarmed individuals.¹⁹⁷

While UN forces were deployed to assist the 120,000 or so displaced by the rampage of ANC forces and with war continuing between the Baluba and the Lulua, an incident where eight United States Air Force (USAF) crewmen were almost beaten to death by the same ANC forces in Stanleyville on 29 August led US Ambassador Clare Timberlake to declare that the Congolese government had no control over the country and was attempting to regain this control through the use of 'armed savage bandits'.¹⁹⁸ With the Congo being described as a "more unholy mess than ever"¹⁹⁹ on 5 September, President Kasa-Vubu invoked his constitutional powers and dismissed Lumumba. Appointing fellow ABAKO member and president of the Congolese Senate Joseph Ileo to replace Lumumba as Prime Minister, Ileo also became commander of the Congo's armed forces.²⁰⁰

Unsurprisingly, Lumumba's response to the verbal attacks was virulent and quick to come. Dismissing Kasa-Vubu in a show of his own constitutional powers, Lumumba then accused Kasa-Vubu of being "a lackey of imperialism and Flemings".²⁰¹ The United Nations also came under attack and this organisation was accused of working in conjunction with Kasa-Vubu to overthrow him. Taking his case to the Congo's lower house of Parliament on 7 September, Lumumba again criticised UN officials such as Andrew Cordier who Lumumba saw as one of the main conspirators against him. Following his speech Lumumba won an important victory with the Assembly voting to annul Kasa-Vubu's decision to dismiss Lumumba and to annul Lumumba's decision to dismiss Kasa-

¹⁹⁷ "Congo-Zaïre: l'empire du crime permanent: le massacre de Bakwanga", *Le Phare*, 23 July, 2013.

¹⁹⁸ "Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, Leopoldville, August 29, 1960", *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIV*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 192.

¹⁹⁹ "Defiant Reply Broadcast by Prime Minister" *The Times*, 5 September, 1960.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

Vubu.²⁰² The next day, Lumumba also won the support of the Senate. With this kind of parliamentary support Lumumba now turned his attention to the UN. Following Kasa-Vubu's ousting of Lumumba, and coordinating with ONUC officials, the president planned to close down all radio stations and to close all airports. Denied the means of addressing the population and denied the means to transport his troops, Lumumba also accused the United Nations of interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo and declared that criticisms directed against him were all part of a fascist campaign to get rid of him.²⁰³ For this reason, on 8 September victories in the lower and upper houses spurred Lumumba into demanding that UN forces be withdrawn immediately if it did not put an end to its "occupation" of the airports and the radio station.²⁰⁴

With the airports now open, the next week saw Lumumba fly to his headquarters in Stanleyville in spite of a warrant for his arrest which Joseph Ileo's government insisted was still valid. Watching events unfold was newly-appointed ANC Commander Colonel Joseph Mobutu. Sometime before the 14 September 1960, this former sergeant-major in the *Force Publique* stood in the doorway of Larry Devlin's office in Léopoldville and declared that he was "anxious" to speak to the CIA's Chief of Station. Mobutu was concerned about what he termed as Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu's "political games" that were not the way to create a "strong, independent, democratic Congo".²⁰⁵ Concerned also about the presence of Soviet troops on Congolese soil and producing Soviet propaganda leaflets, Mobutu informed Devlin of an earlier conversation with Lumumba warning the Prime Minister to keep the Soviets away from the Congolese army. Claiming to have the support of his area

²⁰² Jules Gérard-Libois and Benoît Verhaegen, *Congo 1960*, Tome 2, (Brussels: CRISP, 1963), 828-850, as quoted in Kalb, *op.cit.* 75.

²⁰³ "Mr. Lumumba Demands End of Interference", *New York Times*, 9 September, 1960.

²⁰⁴ Henry Tanner, "Lumumba Bids UN Give Up Controls or Face Ouster", *New York Times*, 9 September, 1960.

²⁰⁵ Devlin, *op.cit.* 76-77.

commanders Mobutu then informed Devlin of his intention to 'neutralize' Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu in an army *coup d'état* and replace them with an educated government of technocrats. The only condition was that the United States had to provide Mobutu with support.²⁰⁶ This news was greeted as a blessing for an Eisenhower administration which had grown increasingly wary of the potential for Communist-bloc intervention in the Congo.

CHAPTER TWO. The Cold War Comes to the Congo

2.1. Removing Patrice Lumumba

Communist ideology had held much attraction for African nationalists: from an economic point of view the Soviet Union had shown what could be achieved in a relatively short space of time, and its condemnation of Western imperialism in sub-Saharan Africa corresponded with the tenets of Pan-Africanism. As such, Pan-Africanism itself came to be considered as a threat to US interests both on international, and on domestic levels. Indeed, at a time when racial tensions and calls for civil liberties for African Americans were on the increase, the Mau Mau Rebellion of the 1950s came to be considered by many in the United States as "bloody retribution for the centuries of slaving and colonialism that Europeans had visited upon Africans", and it created the fear in Washington that the stark scenes of violence witnessed in Kenya would soon grip the United States".²⁰⁷

As the introduction to Volume XXIII, *Congo, 1964-1968* points out, the US held concerns that Lumumba held communist sympathies and, therefore, would not sufficiently represent US interests and goals in the sub-Sahara. This consideration had led to the creation of a political action programme designed to support pro-Western candidates in the

²⁰⁶ Devlin, *op.cit.* 78.

²⁰⁷ Gerald Horne, *Mau Mau in Harlem?: The US and the Liberation of Kenya*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3.

legislative elections of May 1960 in order to "marginalise Marxist groups" in the Congo.²⁰⁸ Although there is no evidence to suggest that any political action had an effect on these results, in the two months following the independence of the Congo it became increasingly clear to US national security policy-makers that Lumumba had managed to set up a situation in which he held substantial political strength. Moreover, this position was being reinforced by the Soviet Union. Although Larry Devlin, the CIA Chief of Station in Léopoldville, did not believe that Lumumba himself was a communist, he was convinced that the Congo's Prime Minister was being manipulated by the Soviets and that sooner or later Lumumba would fall under their control.²⁰⁹ This is confirmed by a cable sent to CIA headquarters on 18 August in which the US embassy and the CIA in the Congo believed the country was "experiencing [a] classic communist effort [to] takeover (sic) [the] government".²¹⁰ Devlin reiterated his concerns as Soviet planes and crews flew ANC soldiers into battle against Albert Kalonji's secessionist forces. Records show that Devlin - using the pseudonym 'Hedgman'- and the Administration considered Lumumba as a "stalking horse for what appeared to be a Soviet effort to take over the Congo."²¹¹ US Envoy to the UN Ralph Bunche denounced Lumumba as "crazy" and having a "particularly violent character"²¹² and, with some observers referring to Lumumba as Africa's Castro,²¹³ Devlin advocated Lumumba's removal lest the Congo become another Cuba.²¹⁴

²⁰⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIII, *Congo, 1960-1968*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), introduction, xxxi.

²⁰⁹ Devlin, *op.cit.* 79.

²¹⁰ CIA Cable, "Leopoldville to Director", 18 August, 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, Document 421.

²¹¹ "Alleged Assassination Plots", *op.cit.* 18.

²¹² "National Security Council Meeting" Washington, 25 July 1960, Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79R00890A, Box 13, Folder 1, NSC Briefings, July 1960. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

²¹³ Weiner, *Legacy of the Ashes*, *op.cit.* 162.

²¹⁴ CIA Cable, *op.cit.* 18 August, 1960.

Whether or not US perceptions of Lumumba's character were correct,²¹⁵ from mid-August 1960 the CIA started to draw up operational plans of which the objective was the removal of Lumumba, his supporters and their replacing with a pro-Western group. This plan was outlined in a cable sent to Larry Devlin by Bronson Tweedy, the Chief of the Africa Division of the CIA's clandestine services.²¹⁶ Several days later, Devlin reported back to Tweedy stating that anti-Lumumba leaders had approached President Kasa-Vubu with the plan but that on the grounds that nobody else in the Congo had Lumumba's political stature, Kasa-Vubu had refused to give his consent.²¹⁷ Following this cable, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles called a meeting of the Special Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for the planning of covert operations. Here, on 25 August, the Special Group agreed that no measure should be ruled out when it came to the question of removing Lumumba. The next day, Lumumba's fate seemed to be sealed when Allen Dulles himself became involved in the assassination plot. Addressing a cable to Larry Devlin, Dulles concluded that if Lumumba continued to hold high office, at best the result would be chaos for the Congo and, at worst, this would pave the way for a communist takeover. Lumumba's removal for Allen Dulles was an urgent and prime objective that should be a high priority for covert action. Dulles also authorised the²¹⁸ expenditure of up to \$100,000 to achieve the objective.²¹⁹ Although these records from

²¹⁵ A number of works contradict these perceptions of Lumumba. Although not entirely at ease with Lumumba's political leanings they saluted his stand against what was considered as continuing Belgian exploitation of the Congo. Lumumba's struggle for Congolese unity and his refusal to accept independence with "strings attached" made him somewhat of a martyr and a even a 'saviour' of Africa in the eyes of some. See, James Hunter Meriwether, *Proudly We Can be Africans, Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961*, (North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 233. For further analysis of how black Americans related to Africa's fight for independence see, James Hunter Meriwether, *The African Connection and the Struggle for Freedom: Africa's Role in American Life* (Los Angeles, University of California, 1995).

²¹⁶ CIA Cable, *op.cit.* 18 August, 1960.

²¹⁷ CIA Cable, "Leopoldville to Director", 24 August, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, 1960, Document 427.

²¹⁸ CIA Cable, "Dulles to Station Officer", 26 August, 1960, CIA Cable, "Leopoldville to Director", 24 August, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIV, 1960, Document 429.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

the US Senate²²⁰ indicate that Devlin had a highly influential role in the decision to remove Lumumba, from a moral point of view and believing that the best way to implement a change in government was through legal or parliamentary means, he made no serious attempt to physically kill Lumumba and, as such, defied the orders of his superiors.²²¹ Instead, Devlin was to find the answer to his own personal dilemma in the shape of Mobutu.²²²

On 7 September 1960, the CIA was to make its first contact with Mobutu at the Presidential Palace. Here, according to archival sources,²²³ he complained bitterly about Lumumba's use of the army to solve political issues (in South Kasai and Katanga). Although Devlin disputes the date and states that he met Mobutu two days before,²²⁴ what is important is that Mobutu declared his willingness to use military force to overthrow Lumumba if he received the support of the United States.²²⁵ As we saw earlier, Devlin refused to commit himself fully to the plan. However, as Tim Weiner points out in *Legacy of the Ashes*, the National Security Council came to the conclusion that Mobutu was the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness.²²⁶ With political wrangling continuing over the next week or so -but safe in the knowledge that the Congo's armed forces would support him- on 14 September Mobutu announced that he was replacing the government with what was later to be known as the College of Commissioners. What is more, in a

²²⁰ "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders", Vol.3-8, (15-17).

²²¹ Scott Shane, "Lawrence R. Devlin, 86, CIA Officer who Balked on a Congo Plot, is Dead", *New York Times*, 11 December, 2008.

²²² Aged thirty in September 1960, Mobutu had led a varied career. From serving in the *Force Publique* to writing for *L'Avenir*, a newspaper based in Leopoldville, he had become friends with Lumumba and had joined him in the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) in the 1950s.

²²³ Editorial Note to "Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo", Washington, 19 September, 1960, Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78-00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 3.

²²⁴ Devlin, *op.cit.*, 76.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 77.

²²⁶ Weiner, *op.cit.*, 163.

move that was sure to please the US officials, Mobutu also ordered the Soviet and Czechoslovakian Embassies to close, giving them forty-eight hours to leave the country.²²⁷

To ease tensions, to demonstrate his 'Christian clemency' and that he was taking a more neutral position in the dispute between the two political rivals, on 24 September, 1960 Mobutu released Antoine Gizenga and Maurice Mpolo,²²⁸ two close collaborators of Lumumba. The day before, Gizenga and Mpolo -the Minister of Youth- had attempted to organise a mutiny in the army garrison in Léopoldville. Major Vital Jakasa, an officer of the ANC who had tried to assassinate Mobutu a few days earlier was also released. In spite of Mobutu's efforts, and in a context that was to typify the Congo's political arena for many years to come, Lumumba's supporters did not see the situation in the same way. Several believed that Mobutu's objective was to divert attention away from restlessness within the ranks of the country's armed forces. These same supporters also believed that Lumumba was about to make a return as Prime Minister, an idea that was dismissed out of hand by Kasa-Vubu. In other areas of the Congo Lumumba's possible return also came under attack. Albert Kalonji, for example, supported Kasa-Vubu and denounced the former prime minister for being at the root of the Congo's present divisive state. To show his support for Mobutu's strong arm tactics, Kalonji also ordered his supporters to cease combat against the Congo army. Similar opposition came from Moïse Tshombe in Katanga. His differences with Lumumba were described as 'beyond repair'. Finally, with many Africans dismayed at Lumumba's appeal to the Soviet Union for help in reigning in the two secessionists, Lumumba's supporters including the African diplomats accused Kasa-Vubu

²²⁷ Henry Tanner, "Lumumba Staff Men Arrested - Soviet Aides to Leave", *New York Times*, 17 September, 1960.

²²⁸ Mpolo and Vice President of the Congolese senate Joseph Okito were killed alongside Lumumba in Katanga.

and Mobutu of overstepping the mark in dismissing Soviet personnel and believed this measure had been taken in an effort to increase NATO and UN intervention.²²⁹

With Lumumba continuing to be considered as a threat by the CIA, its officers met with Congolese contacts known to be willing to assassinate the Congolese Prime Minister. Although the 'permanent disposal' of Lumumba was encouraged,²³⁰ the day after Mobutu's coup Devlin informed his superiors that he was serving as an advisor to eliminate Lumumba due to a fear that Lumumba's position might have been strengthened by his own placing under UN custody. In the same cable, it was concluded that the only solution to this was to remove Lumumba from the scene at the 'soonest' possible opportunity.²³¹

Sometime during discussions at the highest levels of the CIA, Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell asked Bronson Tweedy to examine the possibility of assassinating Lumumba and asked CIA scientist Joseph Scheider to intervene. On this request, Scheider obtained what was referred to as 'toxic biological materials'.²³² Bissell's contact with the scientist was followed by a cable authorising the assassination.²³³ On 19 September Devlin received a cable from headquarters telling him that a certain 'Joe from Paris' would arrive in Léopoldville on 27 September. Though Madeleine Kalb indicates that 'Joe' was in reality named Sidney Gottlieb,²³⁴ it is probable that Scheider and Gottlieb²³⁵ are the same person, pseudonyms being a prominent feature in safeguarding the identity of CIA agents. Although Devlin claimed surprise at being told of the plot to kill Lumumba and stated that unseating him through parliamentary means was his preferred

²²⁹ Henry Tanner, "Comeback by Lumumba Hinted; Mobutu Acts to End Congo Rift", *New York Times*, 25 September, 1960.

²³⁰ "Alleged Assassination Plots", *op.cit.* 17.

²³¹ CIA Cable, "Leopoldville to Director", 15 August, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, *op.cit.* Document 419.

²³² "Alleged Assassination Plots", *op.cit.* 19.

²³³ CIA Cable, "Director to Leopoldville", 19 August, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, *op.cit.* Document 422.

²³⁴ Kalb, Congo Cables, *op.cit.* 102.

²³⁵ This is the same Sidney Gottlieb who had devised ways to discredit Fidel Castro.

option, he was told that Eisenhower himself had ordered Lumumba's assassination.²³⁶ Having earlier prepared hypodermic needles, rubber gloves, and gauze masks that were to be used when handling what was described as "pretty dangerous material",²³⁷ Scheider / Gottlieb handed over several poisons. One contained in a tube of toothpaste was intended to make it appear that Lumumba had died from polio. Devlin was told that he was free to use any method he considered effective; the only proviso being that the method used could not be traced back to the US government.²³⁸

Along with Devlin's belief that the plot to kill Lumumba was "both wrong and stupid, a desperate plan that could easily go awry and devastate American influence in Africa",²³⁹ Devlin's having other priorities at the time no doubt spared Lumumba from death through intoxication. Furthermore, as Devlin states, he was "working closely with Mobutu and many of the new ministers to provide them with advice and guidance while obtaining intelligence on their plans and objectives".²⁴⁰ This included consultations with Victor Nendaka, the new director of the *Sûreté Nationale*, and Justin Bomboko, the chairman of the College of Commissioners and future Foreign Minister. Along with Mobutu, the latter formed part of what became known as the Binza Group, a group named after a district of Léopoldville where most of its members lived. Other members included Cyrille Adoula, a future prime minister, Damien Kondolo,²⁴¹ Mario Cardoso²⁴² and Albert Ndele.²⁴³ The Binza Group operated in many ways including giving advice to President

²³⁶ Devlin, *op.cit.* 95.

²³⁷ "Alleged Assassination Plots", *op.cit.* 21.

²³⁸ Devlin, *op.cit.* 95.

²³⁹ Scott Shane, "Memories of a CIA Officer Resonate in a New Era", *New York Times*, 24 February, 2008.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Deputy Commissioner for the Interior.

²⁴² Deputy Minister of Education in an early Lumumba government.

²⁴³ Finance Commissioner and later governor of the National Bank.

Kasa-Vubu. In some respects, as Devlin states, unofficially it was the "power behind the presidency".²⁴⁴

After being held under house arrest by UN forces, Lumumba's death would come about just a few months later on 17 January 1961 when, after days of brutal beatings, he was shot by Katangan soldiers allegedly under the orders of Moïse Tshombe. That he was in effect a prisoner of the United Nations and had been sidelined from Congolese politics meant that Soviet presence had also been severely weakened in an area which had been identified by Soviet Politburo officials such as Karen Brutens as a "hunting ground with no fixed borders, no master" and where the Soviets could "gain influence".²⁴⁵

2.2. The Soviet Union and Patrice Lumumba

Soviet interest in Africa was not the direct result of the decolonisation of this continent in the late 1950s and 1960s. Russian Czars had taken steps to gain a greater understanding of Africa²⁴⁶ and in the mid-19th century, a particular interest was taken in Ethiopia where Russia sought to make links between the orthodox churches of the respective countries. Later that century, in 1869 and with the opening of the Suez Canal, the Russians attempted to threaten the positions of their main European rivals. These were mainly Britain and France. At the end of the 19th century, South African Boers also received Russian sympathy in their fight against the British Empire forces and Russia provided 'practical support'. Undermining Britain and France in Africa became a focus of attention after the Russian Revolution of 1917. While in the main the objective of Soviet leaders was to counter exterior intervention, Lenin considered colonial areas as

²⁴⁴ Devlin, *op.cit.* 99.

²⁴⁵ El Tahri, *op.cit.* 13.43.

²⁴⁶ John Barrat, "The Soviet Union and South Africa", *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, (SAII: Bramfontein, May 1981), 2, and Keir Giles, "Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa", *The Letort Papers*, *Strategic Studies Institute*, (US Army War College Press: Carlisle PA: July 2013), 2.

imperialism's under-belly. Through Comintern, the beginnings of nationalism, the USSR sought to exploit anti-colonial sentiment to its own ends. This included attempting to infiltrate Marcus Garvey's Pan-Africanist movement. The sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 brought about a change in communist theory at a time when the signs of an economic crisis were starting to appear. From then onwards, the USSR adopted a more aggressive revolutionary policy designed to take advantage of popular discontent created by the depression. A policy of forming a 'united front from below' and a 'fighting front' led by a Marxist 'proletariat' included making overtures to communist parties in Europe and to George Padmore of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUC-NW). Padmore was later to be linked to leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah.²⁴⁷

With the rise of fascism and the Second World War bringing greater focus onto Soviet ambitions in Europe, interest in Africa was not to be renewed until the early 1950s. Here, in 1951, the declaration "Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism" adopted at the First Congress of the Socialist International held in Frankfurt, Germany included criticism of 'imperialist' expansion and promised that 'democratic socialists' would fight the 'oppression or exploitation of any people'.²⁴⁸

The death of Joseph Stalin and the arrival of Nikita Khrushchev brought about a change of strategy in Soviet political circles. As was the case with US geopolitical strategists, Politburo theorists had considered most of Africa to be impenetrable due to the presence of European colonial powers. The Bandung Conference of 1955 seems to have been the point at which this change was made and, although not represented at the meeting of African and Asian leaders in April of this year, the presence of a Chinese delegation in

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Julius Braunthal, *Yearbook of the International Socialist Labour Movement, 1956-1957*, (London: Publishing Company Limited, 1956), 44, as quoted in Vladimir Bushin, (translated into English by Vladimir Gordon), *Social Democracy and Southern Africa*, (1960s-1980s), (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), 9.

the Indonesian city alerted Soviet policy-makers of the need to take a more active interest in a burgeoning nationalist movement. With Sino-Soviet relations becoming strained and the Soviet Union wishing to limit Chinese influence, from 1955, and over the coming ten years, the Soviet Union began transferring weapons to Egypt and had established diplomatic ties with Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Morocco and Libya. In October 1961, these countries known as the 'Casablanca Bloc' were invited to the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Here, leaders of the Casablanca Bloc countries were told how they could adopt a socialist system of government under the guidance of the USSR.

The collapse of Britain and France as superpowers following the Suez Crisis along with independence for the Gold Coast and Guinea under the leadership of Bandung attendees Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Touré convinced Khrushchev that Marxist-Leninist concepts of equality could make headway into areas which had led successful liberation campaigns against European colonial powers.²⁴⁹ By January 1960, the Politburo's Central Committee had strengthened its policy towards Africa and the Kremlin started to pay greater attention to 'local African communists'. Their policy included measures to 'considerably increase' Soviet influence in Africa south of the Sahara.²⁵⁰ As for Soviet influence in the DRC, the riots in Léopoldville of January 1959 were to substantially increase interest in Soviet media such as *Pravda* and to lead to meetings between Lumumba and Soviet officials in Conakry in April of that year. Later, in October 1959, Lumumba was to ask for Soviet help in how to produce propaganda and prepare political activists.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Namikas, *op.cit.*, 5.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 20.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.* 40-41.

Victory for Lumumba in legislative elections, his appointment as prime minister and independence from Belgium reinforced relations between the DRC and the Soviet Union. Lumumba authorised Soviet diplomatic representation and the Soviet ambassador attended celebrations on June 30. Soviet influence was to increase again after Lumumba had made an unsuccessful attempt in asking for American military assistance following Katanga's secession and, with Dag Hammarskjöld refusing to commit UN forces to assist the ANC, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union. Soon after, Soviet aid transported by the merchant ship *Leninogorsk* arrived at the port of Matadi on August 10.²⁵² This was followed a few days later when Ilyushin-14 cargo planes began transporting Soviet armory, technicians and military advisors into Matadi airport in Stanleyville,²⁵³ and by 100 trucks and spare parts which were delivered by the *Arkhangelsk*, another merchant ship on the 22 August, 1960. These military provisions were transported by barge up the Kasai River to Port Franqui and then overland to Luluabourg where Lumumba was to launch his offensive against Kalonji's forces.²⁵⁴ With the means in place to transport his ANC troops, Lumumba then ordered General Victor Lundula to attack Kalonji's troops in late August. High on Indian cannabis, Lundula's forces massacred hundreds, if not thousands of unarmed Baluba at Bakwanga.²⁵⁵

The arrival of Soviet diplomats and technicians in the Congo had led to much suspicion from Belgian and US authorities as to just what the USSR was planning for the future of the Congo. The arrival of Soviet aircraft had prompted Larry Devlin to cable on

²⁵² Sergei Mazov, "The Congo Crisis, 1960-1961: A Critical Oral History Conference", The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Cold War International History Project and Africa Program*, Sponsored by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 23-24, 2004.

²⁵³ Devlin, *Chief of Station*, 65.

²⁵⁴ Mazov, *op.cit.* 12.

²⁵⁵ Colonel Jean Schramme, *Le Bataillon Léopard: Souvenirs d'un Africain Blanc*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969), 61.

18 August 1960 that he believed the Soviet Union was preparing a 'classic communist [...] takeover'.²⁵⁶

With the overthrow of Lumumba, Khrushchev now found himself under increasing pressure to provide an appropriate response to what the Soviets considered as a *coup d'état* manufactured by colonial powers. After learning of Lumumba's dismissal, Khrushchev decided to air his anger to United Nations summit talks. Sailing from the port of Kaliningrad, the Soviet ship *Baltika* carrying the leaders of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Belorussia and the Ukraine²⁵⁷ arrived in New York, docking on the 19 September to the sound of anti-Soviet demonstrations and surveyed by New York police helicopters.²⁵⁸ On 23 September, following an appeal from Kwame Nkrumah for the United Nations to support the Congo's central government and remove all 'private armies' from Katanga, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics rose to his feet to address representatives of nearly one hundred States gathered in front of him. After a denunciation of America's 'treacherous invasion' of Soviet airspace,²⁵⁹ and a denunciation of America's role in Cuba, the Soviet leader then turned his attention to the Republic of the Congo.²⁶⁰ Comparing Belgium's military intervention to British and French intervention during the Suez Crisis, Khrushchev said he believed that the actions carried out by Belgian paratroopers were motivated not by humanitarian considerations but by the need to defend the 'tangible interests of powerful monopolies that had established themselves on Congolese soil'. These interests included raw materials for nuclear weapons such as cobalt, uranium and titanium. In order to maintain control over

²⁵⁶ Quoted in "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities", *Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC, GPO, 1975, (53).

²⁵⁷ "Baltika Enters the Atlantic", *New York Times*, 14 September, 1960.

²⁵⁸ Edward A. Morrow, "Premier Watches Pickets in Harbor", *New York Times*, 20 September, 1960.

²⁵⁹ Here, Khrushchev is referring to the U-2 incident in which a spy plane piloted by Gary Powers crashed in the USSR after performing an aerial reconnaissance mission in May 1960.

²⁶⁰ The Republic of the Congo became the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 1 August, 1960.

the Congo, the colonists had then resorted to every means of overthrowing [Lumumba's] government and establishing a 'puppet' regime. According to Khrushchev, this was done using 'crude methods and direct interference' while at the same time using Hammarskjöld and his staff to do the 'dirty work'. Moreover, the presence of UN troops, their occupation of airfields and their controlling of radio stations had paralysed the work of a lawful government and had facilitated the acts of 'puppets in Katanga'.²⁶¹

After denying accusations by colonialists and their 'servile supporters' that Lumumba was a communist, Khrushchev refused to accept allegations that the USSR had suffered a set-back in its objectives in the region stating that [the USSR] opposed any interference by 'imperialists' in the domestic affairs of countries emancipating themselves from colonial dependence. No doubt in reference to Mobutu's overthrow of central government -something described by Khrushchev as a 'Pyrrhic victory'- would be countered by a popular struggle which could not be 'slowed down or checked'. As for the Soviet Union, it welcomed this struggle for independence and would provide colonial peoples with 'moral and material assistance in a just fight'.²⁶²

With Khrushchev distinguishing himself through what is known as the 'shoe-banging' incident during the 902nd Plenary Meeting on 12 October,²⁶³ by September 30, wary of the tensions building up between the Soviet leader and President Eisenhower, Nkrumah, Jawaharlal Nehru, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Nasser and Josip Tito of Yugoslavia sent a letter to Hammarskjöld expressing their fears and proposing a five-power resolution²⁶⁴ which would bring together the leaders of the superpowers.

²⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Official Records, 869th Plenary Meeting, New York, 23 September, 1960, (points, 94-143).

²⁶² Ibid. (points, 144-151).

²⁶³ This followed a speech by Philippine delegate Lorenzo Sumulong. The latter had denounced Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe.

²⁶⁴ This refers to a resolution made by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Eisenhower's refusal to negotiate delighted Khrushchev as he saw the American president's decision as a sign that the US was an aggressor and that Eisenhower was indecisive.²⁶⁵ Eisenhower's refusal also put pressure on Hammarskjöld as strong support from the US for ONUC undermined the UN's supposed neutrality in the Congo. Discussions with Nasser were to reassure Hammarskjöld to some extent. However, with Nasser affirming that African states resented the UN's dependence on US support, he also wanted the UN to take a firmer stance on ridding the Congo of the Belgian presence.²⁶⁶ Discussions such as this were to lead to United Nations Resolution 161 of February 1961 which authorised peacekeeping forces to use direct military force against those of Katanga.

If Patrice Lumumba lost direct political influence in the affairs of the Congo, many of his allies were prepared to ensure that the former prime minister at least had some form of indirect representation and continue his legacy. This included representation in the UN in the shape of Khrushchev and pressure from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Republic (UAR) whose diplomats encouraged President Kasa-Vubu to make peace with Lumumba and retain him in the office of premier. Even Mobutu, the man who had ousted Lumumba, made efforts at seeking reconciliation between the President and his Prime Minister. This would be done by force, if necessary.

2.3. Soviet Support for the Stanleyville Government

At the heart of the movement to see Lumumba reinstated in his former position was Antoine Gizenga, a man described as 'very quiet', 'almost subdued', 'smart' and 'ruthless'.²⁶⁷ Aged 41, Gizenga had advocated taking 'drastic measures' to rid the Congo of its enemies. Here, the Deputy Prime Minister made an appeal to Nkrumah to send Ghanaian forces to

²⁶⁵ Kalb, *op.cit.* 124.

²⁶⁶ Namikas, *op.cit.* 111.

²⁶⁷ "The Congo's 'Quiet Man', Antoine Gizenga", *New York Times*, 15 February, 1960.

assist in ridding the Congo of Belgian presence after their arrival on the 9/10 July 1960.²⁶⁸ Restrained by Lumumba, Gizenga was persuaded to take part in discussions at the UN in July and August 1960 where he showed his disdain for Dag Hammarskjöld. Preferring UN policy to be administered by a committee of African and Asian nations, Gizenga showed further disdain for western institutions when he returned to Léopoldville on a Soviet plane.²⁶⁹

A member of the openly left-leaning PSA, and a member of the Mutende tribe, after attending a missionary school in Kinzambi and working as a monitor in a Roman Catholic mission school in Léopoldville, Gizenga was then to receive training in Moscow and attend the Prague Institute for African Affairs in Czechoslovakia, at the time a satellite state of the USSR.²⁷⁰ Gizenga's association with leaders like Nkrumah or Sekou Touré, visits to East Berlin and again to Czechoslovakia around the time of the Brussels Round Table Conference cemented the idea that Gizenga was a 'communist'. Although this has been denied by Thomas Kanza,²⁷¹ the United States had identified Gizenga as a potentially dangerous force in Congolese politics. US officials were even to urge that with Lumumba, Gizenga should either be arrested or disposed of permanently.²⁷²

Tensions between Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba supporters were to be renewed at the end of September 1960 when Mobutu revealed that European communists had 'infiltrated' the Congo and that his soldiers had seized radio equipment used even since the closure of the Czechoslovak Embassy. Moreover, soldiers had also found a letter allegedly from Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai addressed to Lumumba a week after his dismissal on the 5

²⁶⁸ Kalb, *op.cit.*, 14.

²⁶⁹ "The Congo's 'Quiet Man', Antoine Gizenga", *op.cit.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Thomas Kanza was Lumumba's first ambassador to the United Nations. Later a member of Laurent Kabila's government, in 2004 he was the DRC's ambassador to Sweden.

²⁷² "Report on Alleged Assassination Plots of Foreign Leaders", *op.cit.* 18.

September. Replying to a request made by Gizenga, the People's Republic of China offered nearly three million dollars to aid Lumumba and was considering the appeal made for arms and ammunition. China also stated that it refused to send volunteers due to the vast difference separating the two countries and the 'confused situation in the Congo'. With China supporting the Congolese government in "its fight against the aggression and military intervention by imperialism which has the United States as its head under cover of the United Nations flag",²⁷³ further criticism of UN objectives also came from Lumumba. Believing that the intervention was an attempt by Kasa-Vubu to promote his own agenda of destroying national unity and creating a confederation of Congolese states, Lumumba put forward evidence to a news conference that his view was shared by one hundred other members of the Congolese parliament.²⁷⁴

Still optimistic of a rapid return to power, on 9 October 1960, having been released from house arrest, Lumumba took to the streets of Léopoldville where, reportedly, he was to address both foreigners and Congolese alike gathered at a café terrace. Here, he renewed his denunciation of the United Nations, United States, Great Britain and what he described as a 'dishonest Western world'. Despite a self-proclaimed comparison to Gandhi and what, according to Paul Hoffman of the *New York Times*, could be considered as a "demonstration of arrogance",²⁷⁵ Lumumba's speech also demonstrated that his popularity remained strong amongst many Congolese and especially amongst Congolese parliamentarians. The same was true for thousands of troops of the Congo's armed forces who, under directions from Antoine Gizenga, attempted to organise a mutiny towards the

²⁷³ "Army Chief Says Reds Sent Letter: Message, Allegedly Signed by Chou, Promised Funds and Possible Arms Help", *New York Times*, 1 October, 1960.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Paul Hoffman, "Lumumba Bounces Back: Unpredictable Deposed Congo Premier Manipulates Crowds as He Continues to Maneuver for Power", *New York Times*, 16 October, 1960.

end of October 1960.²⁷⁶ Displeasure at Lumumba's removal also came from local military police forces that had begun to run riot and, on 12 November dissatisfaction turned to violence when local officials of the Congolese government were arrested and anyone suspected of holding pro-Mobutu sympathies was savagely beaten.²⁷⁷ Fears in Léopoldville that the Congo's armed forces were turning against Mobutu were also confirmed in late November when General Victor Lundula, the deposed chief of the Congolese Army promised his support for the regime in Stanleyville.²⁷⁸ For all intents and purposes, by early December, the capital of the Oriente Province had become the centre of opposition to Kasa-Vubu's government, and by mid-December a revolutionary triumvirate composed of Gizenga, Lumumba's private secretary, Bernard Salumu, and Lumumba's brother, Louis, believed it was in a strong enough position to declare to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet delegate to the UN, that the 'lawful government' had been moved to Stanleyville,²⁷⁹ and that the Free Republic of the Congo had been created. Other members of Lumumba's government attempted to join Gizenga in Stanleyville including Minister of Youth, Maurice Mpolo; Minister of Information, Anicet Kashamura; former Minister of the Interior, Christophe Gbenye, and Pierre Mulele.

Being fully aware that any serious attempt at overthrowing Kasa-Vubu and removing Mobutu would require further support -if necessary from external quarters- the Stanleyville regime turned to the Belgian Communist Party. Having been strong supporters of Lumumba's bid to become Prime Minister, and having supplied Lumumba with material for his political campaign, Belgian Communist Party official Jean Terfve was to become

²⁷⁶ "Stanleyville Troops Mutiny", *New York Times*, 26 October, 1960.

²⁷⁷ "Terror Reigning in Stanleyville", *New York Times*, 13 November, 1960.

²⁷⁸ Paul Hoffman, "Lumumba Backer Escapes Regime", *New York Times*, 27 November, 1960.

²⁷⁹ Paul Hoffman, "Pro-Red Lumumba Aide Claims Authority to Rule", *New York Times*, 14 December, 1960.

one of Lumumba's chief advisors, and was reported to be now providing advice to Gizenga.²⁸⁰

The gravity of the threat from Stanleyville was by no means underestimated in Léopoldville: Mobutu admitted that his own forces neither had the forces nor the transportation to meet the challenge the government in Léopoldville was facing,²⁸¹ and there were fears that diplomatic efforts being made by the regime's Foreign Minister, Pierre Mulele, would soon result in the regime being supplied with funding and weapons from communist-bloc and radical African state supporters.²⁸² This support would be added to that already presented by 6,000 ANC forces loyal to Lumumba as well as the potential for support from the Bambala, Lulua and Kanioka tribes. Traditionally, these tribes were allies of Lumumba's own tribe, the Batetela.

Whether military assistance from Soviet or other sources became reality is difficult to substantiate. Whereas Paul Hoffman of the *New York Times* reported on 15 December that an Ilyushin-14 cargo plane had transported weapons and other material into Stanleyville,²⁸³ there is also enough evidence to suggest that no Soviet weapons were delivered directly to the Stanleyville government. Indeed, Kalb suggests that Khrushchev had become wary of supplying military aid to the Congo,²⁸⁴ the United States, for its part, had taken moves to ensure that supply routes through Sudan were blocked.²⁸⁵ Attempts by other sympathisers to supply Gizenga's government with weapons and advisors were also thwarted: firstly when Nasser refused to allow a Czech delegation cross Egyptian air space, and secondly when a Soviet consignment of weapons that was due to be sent through

²⁸⁰ Drew Middleton, "Reds Said to Spur Efforts in Congo", *New York Times*, 25 November, 1960.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ghana and the UAR both recognised the Stanleyville government on 15 February, 1961.

²⁸³ Paul Hoffman, "Lumumba Group to Get Arms", *New York Times*, 15 December, 1960.

²⁸⁴ Kalb, *op.cit.* 172.

²⁸⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, *Africa*, Vol. XIV, Document 630, as quoted in Sergei Mazov, "Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in Russian Archives", *Cold War History*, Vol. 7, No. 3, August 2007, 6.

Ghana never arrived.²⁸⁶ Around this time, Nkrumah had been making attempts to raise funds for the Volta Dam project and was making appeals to the USA. If Soviet weapons were not -in all probability- delivered to Stanleyville, there are plenty of sources, on the other hand, that confirm Khrushchev did supply financial aid. In January 1961, financial assistance came in the shape of payments amounting to \$500,000 to pay Gizenga's soldiers, in the interest of paying the same wages as those in Mobutu's forces.²⁸⁷ Larry Devlin also claimed that another \$500,000 payment was intercepted by agents in Sudan. This money was to end up in the general fund of the US Treasury.²⁸⁸

As far as rebellions in the Congo are concerned, that which started militarily in Stanleyville at the end of December was relatively short-lived. On 26 December, Gizenga's troops marched into Bukavu on the southern tip of Lake Kivu before heading south to join with Jason Sendwé's BALUBAKAT guerillas in Northern Katanga. In early January, rebel forces had reached the mining town of Manono where they would join forces with rebels loyal to Laurent-Désiré Kabila. We will see shortly how this military threat was countered.

While the rebellion was to reach its greatest geographical extent by the end of February 1961, rebel forces having reached Goma in the Northern Kivu region, and Luluabourg in the western Kasai,²⁸⁹ diplomatic efforts with the goal of bringing peace to the Congo began in March 1961 with the visit of Cléophas Kamitatu to Stanleyville. These efforts continued in the Congolese capital in mid-June 1961 and on the 19 June delegates from both the Stanleyville and the Léopoldville governments signed an agreement to hold a conference at the University of Lovanium in order to discuss the Congo's future. Both

²⁸⁶ Othen, *op.cit.*, 91.

²⁸⁷ This would have been around 2,000-6,000 Congolese francs. See, "Transcript of the talk between Deputy of Foreign Minister of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov and Minister of Education and Arts of the Republic of Congo, Pierre Mulele, 8 March 1961", as quoted in Mazov, *op.cit.*, 433.

²⁸⁸ "The Congo Crisis, 1960-1961, A Critical Oral History Conference", *op.cit.* 38.

²⁸⁹ Young, *Politics in the Congo*, *op.cit.*, 331.

governments signed a truce on 27 July, and in a new government which was formed in August 1961, Cyrille Adoula named Antoine Gizenga as one of his deputy prime ministers. For Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's integration into the Léopold government was a sign that the government in Léopoldville was now being controlled by the west.

As we shall see in Chapter Three, Mulele was to inspire a popular rebellion that would lead to the end to Adoula's premiership and which would see the pro-western Moïse Tshombé become Prime Minister in July 1964. How Tshombé came to be considered for such a position is the subject of our next section.

2.4. Understanding the Secession of Katanga

When the idea of independence for the Congo was first mooted by Van Bilsen in 1956, it is little surprise that those who had financial stakes in the country's economy pre-1960 would seek to ensure that these interests would be represented at negotiations which would take place in Brussels in 1959. However, before we turn to the question of who exactly had been chosen to act as the representative of Belgian interests, we should firstly give ourselves an idea of what Katanga represented to the Congo as a whole and why this province was such a highly contented area in political and military struggles post-independence.

2.4.1. Katanga: The Cradle of the Congolese Economy

From an historical point of view Central Africa had first been explored by the Portuguese. In search of new trading routes during the 15th century, a time known as the Age of Discovery, explorers such as Nuno Tristão and António Gonçalves made their way across the Atlantic or sailed down the coast to western Africa. Another explorer was Diego Cão. Dispatched by John II of Portugal in 1482, Cão was the first European to reach the

mouth of the Congo river. From here, Co continued his journey southwards where he explored Angola and the region into which Namibia now falls.

Following in Co's footsteps, and in those of the Arab and Chinese traders who had reached the heart of Africa from the eastern coast of Africa, David Livingstone, Henry Wissman and Henry Morgan Stanley made their way through Tanganyika or Nyasaland where they would reach the outer limits of the Congo's still unfixed geographical borders. This is testified by the naming of a settlement in his honour, Stanleyville, or Kisangani, now a large city found in the Oriental Province of the DRC in which many of the events described in this thesis took place.

In accounts of their respective voyages, explorers such as Livingstone related tales of immense mineral riches which were to be found in areas of the Congo such as Katanga.²⁹⁰ Katanga, with its borders with Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, has a history of mining dating back over 1,000 years²⁹¹ and the region was reputed all over central Africa for its copper mines long before the arrival of Europeans²⁹². Copper was taken from the Katanga in the shape of St. Andrew's crosses, rings, axes, lances and different ornaments by Arab and black Portuguese traders where it would be transported to ports on the Indian and Atlantic oceans, no doubt destined for sale in Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Indeed, in his work *The Last Journals* published in 1874 David Livingstone speaks of coming across a caravan of Arab traders near Lake Mweru²⁹³ carrying more than five tons of copper such was its value. Later, other explorers such as Verney Lovett Cameron, Joseph Thomson, the geologist who inspired Haggard's *King Solomon's Mines*, and Wissman were to mention traces of gold in accounts of their travels through what Joseph

²⁹⁰ David Livingstone, *The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa*, (New York: Harper and Brothers Limited, 1875).

²⁹¹ Daniel Crawford, *Thinking Black: 22 Years without a Break in the Long Grass*, (George H. Doran: New York, 1912), 15.

²⁹² Arm Bethune, *Le Katanga, Province Belge*, (Paris: Broché, 2010), 72.

²⁹³ Situated between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.

Conrad would describe as the heart of darkness. Others like Lieutenant Verney Lovett Cameron whose letter to the Earl of Derby was published in the *New York Times* told of how these riches such as copper, gold and ivory were to be found entirely in the hands of Arab traders living nearly entirely by plunder, taking inhabitants of areas such as Manyema²⁹⁴ as slaves to transport the goods to Ujiji.²⁹⁵ Those who did not wish to become slaves were killed indiscriminately.²⁹⁶ Lovett's reports of his travels were later sent to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), a London-based professional body founded in 1830. In turn, in 1883 the RGS appointed Joseph Thomson to explore a route from the eastern coast of Africa to the northern shores of Lake Victoria. This voyage was made in light of the advances into Katanga of German naturalists Paul Reichard and Richard Böhm. Sent to central Africa by the German branch of the International African Association (IAA), *Afrikanische Gesellschaft in Deutschland* (AGD), their quest had been to locate the source of the River Lualaba. During his search for this source, Reichard visited copper mines in Luishia and Kamwale.²⁹⁷

Some years before these British and German-led expeditions, King, Léopold II of Belgium had also started to take an interest in African affairs. It was Léopold who had called for an International Geographic Conference to be held in Brussels in 1876 which led to the establishment of the IAA. Léopold also learnt of Katanga's riches through his employing of Stanley in the 1870s and his interest in capturing the business opportunities presented by the region were to prove crucial at the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885 whereby Belgium was granted control of an area covering nearly one million square miles of central Africa.

²⁹⁴ Now Maniema.

²⁹⁵ Situated on the eastern banks of Lake Tanganyika.

²⁹⁶ "Lieut. Cameron in Africa", *New York Times*, 5 January, 1875.

²⁹⁷ Paul Reichard, *Biographie Colonie Belge*, (Brussels: Institut Royale de le Colonie Belge, Tome II, 1951), Col. 803-806, 1951.

Known as the Congo Free State, further expeditions were made during the last decade of the nineteenth century. These included attempts to gain territory not covered by the General Act of the Berlin Conference, areas believed to be under the jurisdiction of the British South African Company (BSAC) and included visits from explorers such as Captain William Stairs and Captain Omer Bodson. Both were to discover the harsh realities of Katanga when Stairs died through illness contracted in the region and when Bodson was killed by natives. In what became known as the 'Scramble for Katanga', Stairs, Bodson and the Marquis de Beauchamp had been employed by the Belgian Katanga Company (BKC) following earlier references by David Livingstone to the presence of gold, copper and quicksilver near Lakes Macro and Bangweolo.²⁹⁸

Later ventures to capture Katanga's riches included the arrival of subsequent Belgian expeditions. For example, led by Alexandre Delcommune of the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie* (CCCI) and Lieutenant Paul Le Marinel who was given the task of occupying establishing Belgian authority over the Katanga. In order to further dissuade British ambitions, in 1891 the Company of Katanga (CK) or *Compagnie du Katanga*, was set up to finance expeditions and to conclude treaties with tribal chiefs. In 1894, Belgian sovereignty was recognised when the border between Nyasaland and Katanga was recognised by the British. With Katanga's borders being particularly hard to define, in 1900, King Léopold and the Katanga Company created the Special Committee of the Katanga, or *Compagnie Spéciale de Katanga* (CSK) whose mission was to carry out additional surveys of the Katanga's riches.²⁹⁹

In spite of this Belgian presence, and with Rhodes determined to gain a share in Katanga's riches, he and other British investors set up Tanganyika Concessions Limited

²⁹⁸ "Stairs Ill-fated Party: The Death of the Leaders of the Katanga Expedition", *New York Times*, 24 July, 1892.

²⁹⁹ "Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville), The Province of the Katanga and Congolese Independence", *Document Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Number 1, January, 1962.

(TCL) or TANKS. In 1891, negotiations with the Katanga Company led to the signing of a convention which granted TCL permission to carry out mining surveys. Here, TCL discovered the richest deposits of copper in the world in terms of their size and value per ton of mineral extracted.³⁰⁰ Next, a merger between TLC and the Katanga Company saw the birth of the Mining Union of Haut-Katanga, or the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* (UMHK) in 1906. Finance for the venture was provided by the *Société Générale de Belgique* (SGB) and by private subscribers.

CK mining company was awarded rights to exploit minerals in the region for ninety-nine years³⁰¹ and, with further geological reports showing the presence of copper in mines such as those at Kambove, Kitulu, Kamaia, Kimbui and Kioabana, three more mining companies, the UMHK, the *Société Forestière et Minière du Congo* (Forminière) and the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga* (BCK) were all awarded concessions by the Belgian government.

It was not long before Katanga's mineral wealth including copper, diamonds, tin and silver encouraged Europeans to leave for the Katanga to claim a share in the province's prosperity. More modern industrial and military uses of Katanga's sources of cobalt, tungsten, zinc and uranium meant that between 1906 and 1959 the number of white inhabitants in the Congo as a whole grew from 2,500 to just under 112,000.³⁰² As for Katanga, one of the least populated provinces of the Congo, its 1,654,000 population represented only one-eighth of a total approaching 13 million inhabitants. Of those

³⁰⁰ R. Brion and J-L Moreau, *De la mine à Mars: La Genèse d'Umicore*, (Brussels: Lannoo, 2006), 69 as quoted in "Les Géants du Cuivre: Leçons tirées des Entreprises Etatiques Minières en RDC et en Zambie", *Natural Resource Governance Institute*, undated, 15, https://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_nmc_french.pdf, accessed April 2017.

³⁰¹ Robert Harms, "The End of Red Rubber: A Reassessment", *The Journal of African History*, Volume 16, Issue 1, January 1975, 73–88.

³⁰² Figures from the *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique* quoted in Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Table 4, 279-280.

Europeans present in Katanga one-fifth resided in the province.³⁰³ Working as civil servants, as missionaries, for the mining companies, or as independent traders they lived in large towns such as Léopoldville (Kinshasa), Stanleyville (Kisangani) and Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) or in the garrison towns which served as bases for the *Force Publique*. They included British nationals as well as nationals from Greece, Italy, Portugal and Russia and the United States.

The growth in the use of copper had a particular effect on Katanga's prosperity. With the province supplying the copper used in casings for ammunition, the requirements of the First World War meant that production of this metal by Katanga's largest mining company, the UMHK, grew from 2,000 tons in 1912 to an average of 86,000 tons in the 1920s. By 1960, this figure had reached over 300,000 tons and UMHK was supplying the world with over 8,000 tons of cobalt. UMHK, a company whose growth seemed endless, represented an excellent investment for those wishing to buy a stake in the Congolese economy.

As for UMHK's contribution to the Congolese economy, in export duties alone the mining giant brought 1,250 million francs into the Congolese treasury. This figure is increased to nearly three billion francs when taxes were added.³⁰⁴ In 1960, UMHK produced 70% of the Congo's hard currency. It also contributed massively to the colonial budget providing around 25% of the total required for the running of the Congo.³⁰⁵ In 1960, the capital of UMHK amounted to some eight billion francs and shares in the company were divided between TCL (14.5%); SCK which held just over a quarter of the shares; the CK (1.5% in addition to its shares in the SCK), and the SGB (4.5%).³⁰⁶

³⁰³ "Republic of the Congo: The Province of Katanga and Congolese Independence", *op.cit.* 3.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ "Les Géants du Cuivre: Leçons tirées des Entreprises Etatiques Minières en RDC et en Zambie", *op.cit.*

³⁰⁶ "Republic of the Congo: The Province of Katanga and Congolese Independence", *op.cit.* 3.

2.4.2. Moïse Tshombé: The Stalwart of Western Interests in the Congo

The man seen as the most likely to represent Belgian financial interests in the Congo was, himself, one of the Congo's first black millionaires. Born in Musumba, Katanga in 1919, Moïse Tshombé was the son of a highly successful businessman. Tshombé's first venture into politics came in 1951 when he was elected as a member of the Provincial Council of Katanga. After becoming a member of the *Conseil du Gouvernement* in 1953, six years later Tshombe became leader of the CONAKAT, a confederation of tribal associations representing the more than 600,000 members of Tshombe's tribe, the Lunda.³⁰⁷ In the 1957 communal elections saw victories for the BALUBAKAT led by Jason Sendwe and Remy Mwanda. These victories by a party representing Baluba people from Kasai who had settled in Katanga saw many Baluba appointed to important posts in the public and private sectors and posed a threat to indigenous Katangans who considered themselves as the 'authentic' occupiers of the province.

It was with the threat of seeing the Baluba in a position of political dominance which saw the emergence of CONAKAT on 4 October, 1958. From its inception, and although its mandate was to promote tribal interests, CONAKAT was quick to receive public declarations of support from European settlers in the Congo. These latter included Achille Gavage, the president of the Union for the Colonisation of Katanga, or *Union pour la colonisation du Katanga* (UCOL), an organization founded in 1944 whose goal was to promote European emigration to Katanga. By 1958, and encouraged by UCOL's success in

³⁰⁷ At its origin, the CONAKAT also included representations from the following ethnic and tribal groups: the *Association des Bahemba de Kongolo* (ASSOBAKO); the *Association des Batabwa ou Bena Marungu du Katanga* (BBK); the *Association des Basonge du Katanga* (ASSOBAKAT); the *Association des Originaires du Luapala Moero Katanga* (ALMOKAT); the *Association des Tshokwe du Katanga et de Rhodésie* (AKTAR), the *Union des Bwami des Basumbwa-Bayeke* (UBWAKA), and the *Fédération des Tribus du Haut-Katanga* (FETRIKAT). The confederation also included Jason Sendwe's BALUBAKAT.

the communal elections of December 1957, Gavage then formed the Katanga Union, or *Union Katanganaise* (UK). This was a party comprising mostly Europeans whose programme promoted the breaking up of the Congo into autonomous regions and the forming of a federation which included the six Congolese provinces and Belgium. Failing this, some of the Katanga Union's leaders advocated a federation with South Africa and Rhodesia.³⁰⁸

When it became clear that indigenous Katangans would oppose any such move, the Katanga Union then turned to the CONAKAT with the belief that through this tribal organization the Union could influence the future of the Congo. Signs that the Katanga Union was influencing CONAKAT's political leanings came with the publication of its constitution on 30 October 1958. Included was the demand for the establishment of a federal system between Congolese provinces and Léopoldville.³⁰⁹

With Belgium unable, or unwilling, to reach unanimity over the question of the Congo's independence, its hand was forced by the riots which took place on 4 January, 1959. Some officials in Léopoldville wondered what might happen if independence was not granted. With this consideration in mind, on 13 January, the Belgium government issued a statement declaring the introduction of universal suffrage into the Congo. The declaration also provided a legislative context whereby the Congolese would be represented by a House of Representatives and a Senate.

While debate on whether the Congo should opt for a unitary system or a federation of provinces in the months following the declaration, the divisions which would characterise the context of the Congo post-independence became clear during a congress of Congolese political parties held in Luluabourg in April 1959. Here, the MNC argued

³⁰⁸ Romain Yakemtchouk, "Aux origines du séparatisme katangais", Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, *Mémoires in-8*, Nouvelle Série, Tome 50, Fasc. 1, Brussels, 1988, 88.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 89.

against a balkanisation of the country, an idea supported by Albert Kalonji. In an indirect denunciation of Tshombe's plan for a federation Kalonji protested against "the moral pressure put on certain tribal chiefs in an effort to oppose the emancipation movement".³¹⁰

The CONAKAT was firm in its objective to secure some form of independence for Katanga. In its manifesto of May 1959, ideas were put into words with the declaration that Katanga should be an autonomous state in which political power was in the hands of authentic Katangans. The latter included any person demonstrating, or having demonstrated the will to see Katanga develop and attain the rapid freedom of the province.³¹¹

While this debate was to dominate the Round Table Conference held in Brussels, from March 1960 tensions between different Katangan tribes and tensions between 'authentic' and 'non-authentic' Katangans paved the way for renewed intervention of UMHK into the province's political scene. Here, with the Balubakat now opposing federalism and leaving the Conakat, UMHK provided financial assistance to Tshombe in the shape of a loan of some 1,250 million Belgian francs.³¹²

At the same time, offers of joining the Rhodesian Federation came from Sir Roy Welensky in an interview with British newspaper the *Daily Express*. Although Tshombe was to dismiss this idea out of hand, in an article for the news agency *Reuter*, Tshombe was to suggest the possibility of forming an alliance with Belgium.³¹³ Tshombe's public declaration would have come as good news for mining companies such as the UMHK and, indeed, it showed its optimism for a Tshombe victory in the May elections by announcing that it would be investing nearly \$21 million to extend its plants. This was in the face of

³¹⁰ Ibid., 100.

³¹¹ Ibid., 102.

³¹² Romain Pasteger, *Le Visage des affreux mercenaires Katangais*, (Paris: Broché, 2004), 6.

³¹³ "Surprise at Sir Roy Welensky's Remarks", *The Times*, 7 March, 1960.

reports indicating a flight of Europeans anxious about the coming independence.³¹⁴ Indeed, other reports told of an 'exodus' of Europeans in which 17,000 passages by air had been booked out of the Congo.³¹⁵

2.5. Non-State Armed Actors in Katanga

Over the previous sections we have seen that the portentous ideological divisions that existed between the leaders of the Congo's main political parties before 30 June 1960 were to manifest themselves, post-independence, in the shape of events that were far more ominous in nature: both Katanga and the South Kasai seceded from Léopoldville; ANC troops had massacred, tortured and raped thousands of civilians in Bakwanga in government retribution for the secession of South Kasai; Patrice Lumumba was removed in September; and a breakaway government supported by the Soviet Union was established in January 1961. In an attempt to bring order to this chaos, United Nations peacekeepers had been sent to the Congo in August of the previous year. However, while ideological and political divisions contributed greatly to the context witnessed in the aftermath of independence, we should not forget that the foundations of these political and ideological divisions sometimes resided in tribal affiliations that preceded the independence of the Congo by many decades. As has been the case in modern-day Iraq or in the Maghreb following the so-called "Arab Spring", once a unifying structure has been removed - however loathsome it may be- the power vacuum created by the departure of this unifying structure provides the context for ancient rivalries to be reignited. As far as the Congo Crisis is concerned, the decision to allow the creation of Congolese political parties in 1958 only served to accelerate this reigniting. In order to fully understand why non-state

³¹⁴ Homer Bigart, "Europeans Quit Congo Province", *New York Times*, 3 May, 1960.

³¹⁵ "Doubts as Congo Africans' First Election Approaches", *The Times*, 20 April, 1960.

armed actors were brought into Katanga from July 1960 and, in some respects, to partially refute Kwame Nkrumah's notion that these groups were simply an instrument of white imperialism, and neo-colonialism,³¹⁶ it is vital that we return to the origins of the Lulua-Baluba conflict which was to resurface in 1959.

Although the Congolese had other nations based on certain peoples or nationality groups composed of culturally or linguistically related tribes, all available evidence suggests that there were significant cultural and linguistic differences between the Lulua and the Baluba before the arrival of Europeans in the Congo.³¹⁷ However, it was during the period between 1880 and 1890 when the Belgian colonial authorities sought to reorganise the Congo along economic and administrative lines that differences started to appear. At the time of this reorganisation of Congolese society, the Luba, or Baluba Empire that had existed since the late sixteenth century was being torn apart by the demands of the ivory trade led by Belgium and the slave trade led by Arab-Swahili chiefs such as Tippu Tip, or M'Siri.³¹⁸ To escape the threat of being taken slave, thousands fled to areas of safety including Kananga and Luebo in the Kasai. In order to adjust to their new homelands, the Baluba quickly made themselves available for work, and attended the schools and churches provided by the Belgian colonial administration and Belgian missionaries.³¹⁹ During the reorganisation of land policies made by the Belgian authorities in the 1920s, in light of their perceived industriousness the Baluba were moved into separate villages on Lulua land in Northern Katanga. As they took over these lands, they came to be considered by the Lulua as the "usurpers of immemorial prescriptive rights, and were treated as such".³²⁰

³¹⁶ Kwame Nkrumah, "Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism", *Science and Society*, Number 31, 1967, 78-81.

³¹⁷ Rene Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Congo* (University of California Press, 1964), 206.

³¹⁸ Thomas Q. Reefe, *The Rainbow and the Kings: A History of the Luba Empire to 1891* (University of California Press, 1981), 3.

³¹⁹ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, (London: Zed Books, 1988), 103.

³²⁰ Lemarchand, *op.cit.*, 206.

When the first elections took place in Luluabourg in 1958, they were entirely dominated by hostility between the two tribes.³²¹ Tensions were worsened in 1959 when plans to relocate Baluba farmers back to southern Kasai were discovered. Violent demonstrations against this plan in August 1959 led to Baluba ethnic chief Albert Kalonji being imprisoned. Despite a split having occurred in the *Movement National Congolais* between Kalonji and Lumumba shortly before, Lumumba was to make a successful appeal to have Kalonji released.³²² As we saw earlier, the motivation behind Lumumba's decision to send the ANC into South Kasai was, in part, a political one. On the other hand, as Lumumba was a member of the Batetela tribe, a traditional ally of the Lulua, it is also clear that tribal rivalries lay behind this decision. This also explains why Lumumba's support in the lower Congo city of Léopoldville was weak and why Kasavubu, a member of the Bakongo tribe received such strong support.

The situation for the Baluba who had remained in northern Katanga was improved by his creation of the BALUBAKAT in 1957, and in February 1959 this association joined Tshombé's CONAKAT. By late 1959, however, Sendwe has grown concerned about Tshombé's close links to Belgium, and also by what he perceived as Tshombé's xenophobia towards tribes which were not native to Katanga.³²³ Consequently, Sendwe withdrew the BALUBAKAT from the CONAKAT.³²⁴

This already tense situation between Sendwe and Tshombé was worsened in July 1960 when Tshombé declared the independence of Katanga. By then Lumumba's State commissioner for Katanga, Sendwe had hoped that he could persuade Tshombé not to

³²¹ Young, *op.cit.*, 251.

³²² Nzongola-Ntalaja, *op.cit.*, 104.

³²³ Emmanuel Gérard, and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 132.

³²⁴ Lemarchand, *op.cit.*, 241.

continue with secession. After rejecting Tshombé's offer to become vice-president of the new state, Sendwe was considered by Tshombé of being too close to Lumumba and relations between the two Katangan leaders broke down.³²⁵ In Sendwe's political strongholds in northern Katanga opposition to Tshombé grew throughout July. With Sendwe also enjoying significant popular support in the areas around the Katangan capital, Elisabethville, this posed a substantial threat to Tshombé.³²⁶ In late July, this threat had turned to into armed revolt and "a ragtag army of Baluba warriors armed with shotguns, bows and arrows, and a few modern rifles",³²⁷ crossed the Luvua River and seized the mining town of Manono. From here they hoped to launch an attack on Elisabethville.³²⁸

The creation of a Katangan state cemented Moïse Tshombé's desire to set up a Weberian entity in order to maintain independence from Léopoldville. However, resisting the threat to what he considered as Katanga's legal authority required the rebuilding of Katanga's armed forces. In addition to the Baluba rebellion, Lumumba wanted to use the contingents of Tunisian, Moroccan, Ghanaian and Malian troops as a private army to force Katanga back into the Congolese fold. Assistance which would allow Tshombé to maintain independence first in the shape of a team of experts known collectively as the Belgian Technical Mission (MISTEBEL). Having received reports that Soviet military equipment and Czechoslovak technicians had arrived in Stanleyville, and fearing that the Cold War had arrived in the Congo,³²⁹ Belgium dispatched Count Harold d'Aspremont Lynden to Katanga. In July 1960, MISTEBEL was to provide 200 serving members of the Belgian Gendarmerie, regular army officers, and former members of the colonial administration.

³²⁵ Gérard and Kuklick, *op.cit.*, 132.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Mike Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata*, (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2008), 32.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Luc De Vos, Emmanuel Gérard, Jules Gérard-Libois, and Philippe Raxhorn, *Les secrets de l'affaire Lumumba* (Bruxelles: Editions Racine, 2005), 62.

These men were to act as civilian advisors to the Katangan government, or be assigned to roles in the Katangan police, or to district administrations.³³⁰

Although Katanga could now count on Belgian support, what it lacked was a military force which was capable of assuring Katangan state security. With feelings that there was an under-representation of indigenous leaders in the new institutions set up in Katanga, Secretary of State Odilon Mwenda-Mukanda-Bantou intervened and asked his cousin Godefroid Munongo to encourage native-Katangan participation. Munongo, Tshombé's right-hand man in the CONAKAT party, and Minister of the Interior in Katanga, was the brother of Antoine Mwenda-Munongo, the chief of the Bayeke tribe.³³¹ This tribal link was to see Bayeke tribesmen join 90,000 members of the Baluba,³³² members of the Bazela tribe,³³³ as well as 300-400 members of the former *Force Publique* loyal to Tshombé,³³⁴ in what was to become the Katangese Gendarmes.³³⁵ However, as was the case with the *Force Publique*, this indigenous military force would be led by a white officer, Major Jean-Marie Crèvecoeur. While some Katangese Gendarmes would be based at Camp Simonet in Elisabethville, others would find themselves sent to garrisons in

³³⁰ Hudson, *op.cit.* 22.

³³¹ Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, (Princeton University Press, 1965), 193.

³³² These were Baluba warriors led by Kasongo Nyembo, an opponent of another Baluba leader, Jason Sendwe. See, Othen, *op.cit.*, 57.

³³³ Miles Larmer, "Of Local Identities and Transnational Conflict: the Katangese Gendarmes and Central-Southern Africa's Forty-years war, 1960-1999", in Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins (eds.), *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 164.

³³⁴ Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 142, quoted in J.J.G. Clarke, "The Congo Mercenary: A History and Analysis", *The South African Institute of International Affairs*, Johannesburg, 1968, 21.

³³⁵ The intentions of this study do not include the study of the Katangese Gendarmes in the Congo Crisis. For a detailed analysis of the role played in the Congo and Angola see, Erik Kennes and Miles Larmer, *The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016).

Kaminaville, Kabongo, Manono and Kabalo.³³⁶ Their first task was to mobilise against the rebellion in Northern Katanga.³³⁷

When it comes to the question of non-state armed actors in the Congo, the case of the *Force Aérienne Katangaise* (FAK) is interesting for two main reasons: like the *Forces Terrestres Katangaises* (FTK) it was multi-national, and ethnically-mixed; it was the predecessor to the CIA-sponsored air force which would appear in the Congo a short time after. Also known as Avikat, the FAK was one of Moïse Tshombé's first initiatives in the creation of an armed force. Created one day after Katanga's secession on 10 July 1960, Belgian pilot Victor Volant was asked to take command of a unit which would be based mainly at Luano Airfield in Elisabethville or in Kolwezi. Its role was to provide air cover for ground forces which were carrying operations in Northern Katanga and, later, to attack UNOC forces. It was operational until 15 January, 1963 when its planes were destroyed by UN peacekeepers.

As noted above, the FAK was a multi-national force. Along with Volant and other Belgians such as Joseph Delin, or José Magain, this small air force would be composed of two Polish pilots (Jan Zumbach³³⁸, and Witold Lanowski) a Hungarian (Sandor Gyurkits), a South African (Jerry Puren³³⁹), a native Katangan (Jean-Marie Ngosa), and a Trinidadian named Hubert Fauntleroy Julian. Nicknamed the "Black Eagle of Harlem", he had been

³³⁶ Jean-Pierre Sonck, "L'Armée privée de Kasongo Nyembo", <http://www.albertville.be/kasongo-nyembo-01.html>, accessed 27 May, 2017.

³³⁷ Larmer, *op.cit.*, 165.

³³⁸ Zumbach was a World War Two fighter pilot who had flown with the 303rd Polish Fighter Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Later, Zumbach's career in aviation would continue as a member of the Biafran Air Force (BAF). See, Philip Jowett, *Modern African Wars: The Nigerian-Biafran War*, (London: Osprey Publishing, 2016), 67.

³³⁹ Jeremiah Cornelius Puren joined the South African Air Force (SAAA) as a navigator during WWII and flew on missions over North Africa and the Middle East. After the war he joined the Royal Air Force and in March 1961 was contacted by Charles Huyghe. After expulsion from the Congo Puren took part in a failed attempt to overthrow the government of the Seychelles (see, "Report of the Security Council Commission of Inquiry Established under Resolution 496 (1981)", Security Council Official Records, United Nations, 1982) and, in 1986 he wrote his memoirs, see, Jerry Puren and Brian Pottinger, *Mercenary Commander*, (South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1986). This work has not been used in this study due to its unreliability as a source.

given this name in 1921 by Marcus Garvey at a meeting of the Negro Improvement Association. Julian had flown aircraft for Haile Selassie, had taken part in operations against Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and had flown for Batista's forces against Fidel Castro.³⁴⁰

The FAK's thirty-plane force was divided up into four squadrons. The origin of these planes says much about Katanga's allies at this time as the graph below demonstrates: Initially, Katanga's limited military forces were able to maintain a certain degree of stability over Katangan territory. However, with the fight against the Baluba placing Katanga on the back foot and UN Resolution 143 meaning all official Belgian military personnel would be forced to leave by late August 1960, in the South Kasai the situation had taken a turn for the worse and the ANC had run amok killing, torturing, and raping over 5,000 local inhabitants at Bakwanga.

Figure 4: The Aircraft of the *Force Aérienne Katangaise*³⁴¹

Aircraft	Origin	Type	Model	Number in service
T-6 Texan	United States	Counter-insurgency attack aircraft	AT-6	8
Piper PA-22	United States	Utility		5
Fouga Magister CM 170	France	Attack		3
Dornier DO 28	Germany	Utility/Transport		5
De Havilland 104 Dove	United Kingdom	Transport		5
De Havilland 114 Heron	United Kingdom	Transport		1
Alouette II	France	Utility/liaison		1
Sikorsky H-19 Chickasaw ³⁴²	United States	Utility/Transport		1
Piper PA-18	United States	Trainer		1

³⁴⁰ David Shaftel, "The Black Eagle of Harlem", *Air & Space Magazine*, December, 2008.

³⁴¹ J-P Sonck, and Daniel Despas, "L'Aviation Katangaise", *Avions*, No. 34, 35, 36, 1996.

³⁴² A multi-purpose helicopter.

The reaction of many in Brussels to these events, and reports in Belgian newspapers of the rape and killing of Belgian nationals was one of disbelief. Many former members of the Belgian forces who frequented cafés such as the Tanganyika in the Brussels district of Etterbeck, or the Edelweiss on the rue du Brabant, believed that the means to provide other forms of military support should be found. As supporters of King Léopold III, these *Léopoldistes* had become more and more disillusioned with the policies of Léopold's son and successor, King Baudouin. In their opinion, Baudouin was responsible for Belgium's downfall in the Congo. In response to an apparently continuing threat to Belgian nationals in the Congo, the *Léopoldistes* therefore decided to put political pressure on the Belgian government to intervene in the Congo by forming the *Comité d'action et de défense des Belges d'Afrique* (CABDA). Shortly after, with a planned putsch against Baudouin failing to gain enough support, CABDA joined forces with another *Léopoldiste* group called the *Corps Franc Roi Baudouin*. This group created on 12 July also had the intention of defending the honour of Belgium in Africa. In order to reestablish Belgian influence, CABDA made appeals for Belgian volunteers to travel to Katanga and fight inside a military unit named the Tshombe Brigade.³⁴³

For the recruitment of these Belgian volunteers, the commander of the *Corps Franc Roi Baudouin*, Count Arnold de Looz Corswarem, made contact with Jean Cassart, a former military attaché in The Hague and a former member of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Cassart, another Belgian devastated at the news coming from the DRC was also member of a group of former military parachutists called 'Cosmos'. Through word of mouth, Cosmos recruited around thirty men within a month and these veterans of the Korean War, former Legionnaires and paratroopers were offered a renewable six-month contract and a salary of up to 15-25,000 Belgian francs per month depending on their rank

³⁴³ Pasteger, *op.cit.* 11-13.

inside Tshombe's forces.³⁴⁴ Another recruiter was Charles Lambert, the owner of the Café Edelweiss, was able to recruit a further twenty men for the Tshombe Brigade.³⁴⁵ In the first few weeks of Katanga's independence, recruitment such as this meant that in a short time some 1,500 volunteers had made their way to the Congo and were ready to fight to defend Katanga.³⁴⁶

As far as efforts to recruit forces made directly by Katanga, on 18 September 1960, Tshombe sent a special mission to Brussels to recruit 180 mercenaries, officers and NCO's.³⁴⁷ With MISTEBEL being withdrawn on 12 October, by November Katangan forces had initially lost valuable territory to the Balubas. At Manano, a column of Katanganese Gendarmes had been overrun on the 5 September and 800 Baluba warriors were then planning their next attack.³⁴⁸ An increase in the number of *Les Affreux*³⁴⁹ was therefore seen as a priority and by December another 500 Belgian volunteers and large-scale military equipment had arrived in Katanga. The latter included Fouga Magister jets delivered from Toulouse in France, and South African De Havilland H Vampire bombers.³⁵⁰

By February 1961 mercenaries who had been deployed in small numbers known as *Groupes Mobiles* were coming under gradually increasing attacks offered by the Baluba and ANC forces. This had included clearing rebel nests in Kabalo, Manono, Malemba-

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

³⁴⁵ Ibid, and Christopher Othen, *Katanga, 1960-1963: Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that waged War on the World*, (Stroud: The History Press, 2015), 82.

³⁴⁶ S.J.G. Clark, *op.cit.* 22.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. 23.

³⁴⁸ Pasteger, *op.cit.* 19.

³⁴⁹ This name is believed to have been given to mercenaries at the end of September 1960. Colonel Crevecoeur, then chief of the Katanganese Gendarmes was reportedly looking over the CV's of those soldiers of fortune being sent to him. On seeing that many had criminal records and/or held sympathies with Nazi Germany, Crevecoeur stated that these were not soldiers, they were "awfuls". Pasteger, *op.cit.* 25.

³⁵⁰ Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: Scourge of the Developing World*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 2.

Nkula, Luena and Bukama in October 1960.³⁵¹ By the end of December 1960, the threat from the Baluba had been strengthened by Antoine Gizenga's revolutionary army. After advancing through the Kivu province, Gizenga's forces known as the *Jeunesse* and led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila had made their way south along Lake Tanganyika into northern Katanga.³⁵² A counter offensive was organised by the Katanganese forces and, now with Belgian Colonel Frédéric Vandewalle at their command, operations *Banquise*, *Mambo* and *X-Ray* took place from 10 February-6 May 1961.³⁵³ Vandewalle's arrival in Katanga on November came as a blessing for many in the Katangan and Belgian governments. Internal disputes between Crèvecoeur and defence advisor André Grandjean were worsened by Moïse Tshombe's belief that indigenous troops in his force of Katanganese Gendarmes were ill-disciplined, were becoming increasingly involved in tribal disputes, and were mistrustful towards white officers.³⁵⁴ For this reason Tshombe agreed to recruit a company of men composed entirely of whites.

The man identified as a potential leader of this new force by Katangan Defence Minister Joseph Yav was French Colonel, Roger Trinquier. A veteran of WW2, the First Indochinese War and the Algerian War, Trinquier had been commander of the *3ème Régiment de parachutistes coloniaux* and had been a leading figure in the May 1958 coup that had brought De Gaulle back to power.³⁵⁵ Known as a specialist in counter-insurgency theory and author of *La Guerre Moderne*,³⁵⁶ Trinquier received a letter on January 5, 1961 informing him that the State of Katanga wished to recruit a high-ranking French officer.

³⁵¹ Jules Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, *Congo 1960*, (Brussels: Dossiers du CRISP, 1961), 173-174, as quoted in Clark, *op.cit.*, 25.

³⁵² Othen, *op.cit.* 91.

³⁵³ Colonel E.R. Vandewalle, *L'Ommegang : Odyssée & Reconquête de Stanleyville, 1964* (Brussels: Le Livre Africain, 1970), 15-16.

³⁵⁴ Ludo de Witte, *L'Assassinat de Lumumba*, (Paris: Broché, 2000), 175.

³⁵⁵ Anthony Mockler, *Mercenaries*, (London: Macdonald, 1969), 159.

³⁵⁶ Roger Trinquier, *La Guerre moderne*, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961).

Also, signed by Georges Thyssens, another Belgian advisor to Tshombe, the letter requested the recruitment of around one hundred French and German NCOs.³⁵⁷

Resigning from the French Army, Trinquier arrived in Elisabethville on 25 January 1961 accompanied by Commander Roger Falques and Colonel Yves Godard,³⁵⁸ another veteran of three wars and a former member of the *Organisation de l'armée secrète* (OAS).³⁵⁹ After gaining an overview of the situation in Katanga, Trinquier submitted his first report to Tshombe in February 1961. In the report Trinquier confirmed Tshombe's fears and stated that he believed the Baluba would soon turn to urban warfare. His recommendation was the recruitment of French mercenaries with experience of tactics used by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) in Algeria. Although Trinquier made efforts to recruit mercenaries in Paris, it would seem that internal fighting within the French government on the subject of France's involvement in the Congo rapidly put an end to Trinquier's ambitions. Moreover, Belgian opposition to French involvement meant that by March 1961 Trinquier was unwelcome in Katanga. However, of the twenty or so officers that were recruited, many such as Falques stayed on and fought against UN forces later in the campaign.³⁶⁰

In spite of this setback, Tshombe's plan to recruit a company composed entirely of whites came to fruition through the creation of the *Compagnie Internationale* or the 'White Legion'.³⁶¹ Primarily recruited either by another of Tshombe's Belgian advisors, Charles Huyghe,³⁶² or by Roderick Russell-Cargill,³⁶³ these mercenaries from the United Kingdom,

³⁵⁷ Pasteger, *op.cit.*, 98.

³⁵⁸ Mockler, *op.cit.*, 159.

³⁵⁹ Major Hervé Pierre, *Gathering of Human Intelligence in Counter-Insurgency Warfare: The French Experience during the Battle of Algiers, (January-October, 1957)*, (USA: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015).

³⁶⁰ Othen, *op.cit.* 100-101 and Mockler, *op.cit.* 160-161.

³⁶¹ A list of those known to have served with the *Compagnie Internationale* can be found in Annex 9 of this study.

³⁶² It is strongly rumoured that Huyghe killed Lumumba in a fit of rage after Lumumba claimed to have raped his wife. Personal correspondence with correspondent who wishes to remain anonymous, 20 January, 2015.

Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Greece, Italy, Portugal and other European nations started arriving in Katanga after having seen advertisements in mainly South African newspapers.

Among those recruited in March 1961 was Nigel Osborn.³⁶⁴ Born in London in 1937 and having joined the British Army aged 17, Osborn served in the 13/18 Royal Hussars. A brief spell in Germany saw him patrolling the borders between East and West Germany in the early 1960s and, on leaving the British forces, at 23 Osborn found himself living in Johannesburg. A newspaper advert calling for volunteers to carry out 'policing duties' in Katanga prompted Osborn to send off detail of his army service and, shortly afterwards, he was invited to attend an interview given by Russell-Cargill, Huyghe and two newly-appointed officers, Richard Browne and Jimmy Stewart. A subsequent medical examination saw Osborn offered a six-month contract which was to start from March 1961. With pay of just over £100 per month plus danger money and an insurance allowance, Osborn met other volunteers at a hotel a few days later. With media interest in the recruitment of volunteers for Katanga increasing, Osborn and his fellow recruits were informed by Browne to leave for the airport in small groups of three to four. At the airport, Osborn boarded a regular Sabena flight and was flown into Elisabethville.³⁶⁵

Fitted out in the uniform of the Katanganese Gendarmes and based in the mining town of Shinkolobwe, the policing duties of the *Compagnie Internationale* were carried out in Mitwaba, Piano, Kongolo, Kabalo and other small villages in north-eastern Katanga. Handed the task of seeking out Baluba warriors opposed to Moïse Tshombé, of the various groups of foreign nationals recruited to serve in Katangan forces, the *Compagnie*

³⁶³ See, Terry Aspinall, <http://www.mercenary-wars.net/congo/list-of-congo-soldiers.html>.

³⁶⁴ A copy of Nigel Osborn's contract signed by Charles Huyghe is to be found in the Annex 10 of this study.

³⁶⁵ A number of photos relating to the activities of the *Compagnie Internationale* can be found in Annex 14 of this study.

Internationale was, without doubt, the most short-lived. Indeed, with UN Resolution 161 of 21 February 1961 calling for all foreign personnel not under UN Command to withdraw from the Congo,³⁶⁶ it was not long before Nigel Osborn and his comrades had either been arrested by Ethiopian peacekeepers, or had been repatriated by their respective embassies. Some of those who were to leave in March/April 1961 had been in Katanga for barely a month.³⁶⁷ However, this was not the end of English-speaking recruits to Tshombé's forces.

In the study of non-state armed actors, the case of Mike Hoare is an interesting one. He has been both the author and subject of several works³⁶⁸ dealing with the intervention of non-state armed actors in conflict and, as we will see in subsequent chapters of this study, was to become an important figure in the Congo Crisis. In addition to the Congo, Hoare led an effort in 1981 to depose President France-Albert René of the Seychelles. On this mission he was joined by many of those who were to serve in his units in the Congo including 5 Commando.

A veteran of the Second World War having served as an officer in India and in Burma, in February 1961 Hoare had left his life as a chartered accountant in Durban and having spent time organising safaris in the Kalahari Desert, Hoare now found himself in Katanga in charge of 4 Commando, a military unit composed of around 120 officers and men.³⁶⁹ One of the Hoare's first tasks after having been awarded the rank of captain was to stamp his own brand of military discipline on his recruits which included banning beards. Interestingly, when we consider the traditional view of mercenaries, or a mercenary force, Hoare made it clear to his unit that it was not to behave in the same manner as *Les Affreux*:

³⁶⁶ "United Nations Resolution of 21 February 1961", available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/171/68/IMG/NR017168.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 17 June 2017.

³⁶⁷ A list of those arrested can be found in Annex 11 of this study.

³⁶⁸ Mike Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata, op.cit.*, Mike Hoare, *Congo Mercenary* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2008); Mike Hoare, *The Seychelles Affair* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1987); Mike Hoare, *Congo Warriors* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1991).

³⁶⁹ A list of those known to have served in 4 Commando can be found in Annex 12 of this study.

the collective name given to Belgian and French volunteers who had arrived from July 1960-onwards, and whose behaviour had been much maligned in the press.³⁷⁰ Having earlier described these men as "crapulous, foul-mouthed, and unnecessarily armed", Hoare also winced at their "unsoldierly" behaviour which consisted of swaggering from bar to bar dressed in what Hoare called "fancy dress". This consisted, in Hoare's words of "camouflaged jump jackets, indecently short shorts, shoes instead of boots, socks rolled down to the ankles, and four-day stubble".³⁷¹

To break away from this image Hoare insisted, for example, that the men should wash and shave everyday without fail and regardless of the difficulties, and that his troops should maintain "proper soldierly appearance".³⁷² For Hoare this was an essential ingredient if his unit were to impart the confidence to the civilian population who were depending on his unit, and to those who were paying their wages.³⁷³ As we shall see in Chapter Five, the type of military discipline that Hoare expected of his troops was to become a feature of his future involvement in the Congo in 1964 with 5 Commando.

On the question of terms of employment, a private in 4 Commando was typically contracted to serve in Katanga for a period of six months. Paid \$150 per month plus another five dollars per day in danger money, Hoare notes that the total amount of \$300 per month was roughly twice what a qualified artisan could earn in South Africa at the time.³⁷⁴ Although it seems evident that many of those serving in 4 Commando for financial reasons, Hoare's observations on the differences between someone who has been conscripted or enlisted into the armed services and someone who has volunteered for duty

³⁷⁰ Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata, op.cit.*, 22.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

is interesting when it comes to the question of the efficiency: conscription or forced enlistment through lack of any other option is a feature of many African national armies.³⁷⁵

Noting that the volunteer knows why he has volunteered, and knows that he can break his contract whenever he wishes, it is easier to focus on the role in hand, to get fitter, to train better, and to concentrate his mind on the fight which is to come. In turn, this creates an impetus, an exciting atmosphere, and develops a spirit of camaraderie. These are elements which Hoare considered were "vital to the success of small unit warfare", and which made a small well-paid volunteer professional army preferable to a large conscripted army. The latter disrupts the economy, and serves only the purpose of forming a reserve army. On the other hand, the "smaller fixed establishment puts an end to empire building, the inevitable consequence of ambitious unit and departmental commanders [found in regular armies].³⁷⁶ The question of using smaller, highly disciplined, and highly professional military units as opposed to using larger conscripted forces is one to which we shall return in Part Two and in the conclusion to this study.

The extent of 4 Commando's operations in the Congo was very limited and the mixture of World War Two veterans, former members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), or ex-members of the Israeli Army (Issy Bernstein) were only to spend a limited time attempting to push back the advance of the Baluba. As had been the case with the White Legion (*Compagnie Internationale*), 4 Commando was forced out of Katanga in August/September 1961 by members of the UN's peacekeeping forces. In this instance, it was Malaysians who were doing the chasing.

³⁷⁵ Conscription into the armed forces is mainly carried out in the northern half of Africa, in the Sahel, and in the Horn of Africa. It is noticeable that these are the areas into which Islamist terror groups are currently making incursions. See, "Understanding African Armies", *EU Institute for Security Studies*, Report No. 27, April 2016, 34.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 16.

Although we will see that Hoare returned to Katanga in a military role some three years later, it is worth noting on the subject of non-state armed actors that two other groups grew to prominence during the early years of the Congo Crisis. Respectively speaking, these groups were led by Jean Schramme, a Belgian owner of a plantation in the Congo, and Robert 'Bob' Denard, a veteran of the First Indochina War, and the Algerian War. Whereas we will see more of Schramme and Denard later in this study, accounts of their activities during the Katanga secession can be found either in Schramme's *Le Bataillon Léopard: souvenirs d'un African blanc*³⁷⁷ or in Walter Bruyère-Ostells' account published in 2014.³⁷⁸

As for the other groups of Tshombé's forces that had still managed to escape the attentions of UN peacekeepers, we now turn to a short study of how efforts to bring stability and integrity to the Congo was brought about by the intervention of UN peacekeepers.

2.6. The Battle for Katanga and Early US Military Aid to the Congo

Shortly before John F. Kennedy prepared to take over the reins of the presidency in January 1961, the news that Patrice Lumumba had been assassinated took the Congo to the point of complete disintegration. This news, the secessions of Katanga and South Kasai, and the formation of a breakaway Lumumbist government in Stanleyville created fears in the State Department that the Soviet Union and its allies would seek to exploit the context.

As Kennedy reiterated in diplomatic correspondence to Kwame Nkrumah shortly after assuming his role as Chief of State, the traditional position of the United States [in terms of its foreign policy] was one of favouring self-determination. This, Kennedy assured, was the manner in which his administration would conduct its relations with the

³⁷⁷ Jean Schramme, *Le Bataillon Léopard: souvenirs d'un African blanc*, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969).

³⁷⁸ Walter Bruyère-Ostells, *Dans l'ombre de Bob Denard*, (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2014).

rest of the world and, in particular, with the African continent.³⁷⁹ Practicing a far more hands on approach to the Third World as a whole, Kennedy and his advisors believed that the Eisenhower Administration had shown little imagination and missed too many opportunities in its relations with this area of foreign policy and intended to bring about change. Moreover, in the interest of establishing new links in order to establish this change, Kennedy planned to reach out to leaders such as Nasser, Nkrumah, and Sekou Touré³⁸⁰ and build on his earlier attempts to convince African leaders of his goodwill.³⁸¹ Even after Lumumba's assassination and suspicions that the US had played a role in Lumumba's assassination, Kennedy continued to make attempts to demonstrate US neutralism in Africa. An example of this neutralism is the construction of Ghana's Volta Dam which was funded in part by the USA.³⁸²

While this approach may seem magnanimous in nature, Kennedy's openness was not carried out purely in the interest of showing goodwill and reassuring Third World leaders that the US would not seek to interfere in their internal affairs. During his presidential campaign, Kennedy had underlined his commitment to protecting US interests abroad while, through showing more transparency in its affairs, it was hoped that non-aligned nations would take a favourable view of US foreign policy.³⁸³

Insofar as the particular context of the Congo was concerned, although Kennedy believed that the country was for the time being "unable to advance toward normal political and economic life", US policy was based on the assumption that Congolese

³⁷⁹ "John F. Kennedy to Kwame Nkrumah", 2 February 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Countries, Congo, General, 1959-1960, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-114-006.aspx>, accessed 17 December 2017.

³⁸⁰ Kalb, *op.cit.* 200.

³⁸¹ See, Papers of John F. Kennedy, *op.cit.*

³⁸² See, Kurt X. Metzmeier, "John F. Kennedy, Ghana and the Volta River project: a study in American Foreign Policy towards neutralist Africa", *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Paper 967, <https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/967>, accessed 19 June, 2016.

³⁸³ Kalb, *op.cit.* 201.

independence could best be advanced through a two-point approach: the provision through the United Nations of the economic, technical and military assistance so badly needed by the Congo, and that there would be no outside interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. Although this notion of non-interference was extended to include the United Nations, it was believed that the UN could be used to avoid direct confrontation between East and West.³⁸⁴

While Kennedy's administration maintained this position in official circles, unofficially, the State Department and the CIA had every intention of ensuring that the political and economic direction of the Congo went in their favour.³⁸⁵ Indeed, in June 1961, the Special Group met to discuss a programme of covert action of which the objective was to strengthen the position of Kasa-Vubu's Central Government by assisting members of the current parliament to gain a working majority. This, in turn, would offset the political actions of the Gizenga regime whose goal was to dominate parliament when it reconvened. If this goal was not met, there was a "real danger" that the country would come under the control of the Stanleyville government.³⁸⁶ Consequently, with Gizenga receiving Soviet diplomatic support and military assistance, the Congo was wide open to the spread of communism.

With Cyril Adoula being seen by the Special Group as the candidate who would best represent the interests of the United States after the elections in August 1961, it was recommended that the Chief of Mission (Larry Devlin) be authorised to provide support to "key friendly elements" of the Congo government. In addition, "reliable contacts" would be used to influence youth groups, trade unions and tribal organisations. These actions

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ See footnotes to "Memorandum for the Special Group, Washington 5 June 1961", FRUS, Congo, *op.cit.* Document 82.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

would be taken after the opening of parliament so as not to reveal to Gizenga that his efforts at negotiation were "fruitless".³⁸⁷ Adoula's victory in the elections brought moderate optimism that the situation in the Congo would improve. However, a series of setbacks including the early failure to end secession in Katanga and the general feeling that control of the situation was slipping from the UN's grasp only served to compound the idea that the UNOC force did not have any clear objective in the Congo.³⁸⁸

In the corridors of the State Department, and at CIA headquarters in Léopoldville, US officials continued to provide support for Adoula. In an effort to restore a semblance of order to the Congo's armed forces, for example, in July 1962, the Department of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs sent a Special Military Advisory Team led by US Colonel M.J.L. Greene to the Congo in July 1962 and recommended that the Congo's armed forces should be modernised and receive training under the authority of the UN.³⁸⁹

While Kennedy agreed to station US transport planes in Léopoldville following Hammarskjöld's death, and also offered to provide fighter jets in the scope of National Security Action Memorandum No. 97, the latter was made on the proviso that they were not to be used in attacks on Katangan forces. Also, these fighter jets were only to be deployed if no other nation made this type of aircraft available.³⁹⁰ In the event, the UN obtained air power through the Swedish, Ethiopian and Indian air forces.³⁹¹ Despite the arrival and use of these forces from October 1961, UN operations in early 1962 were

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Hudson, *op.cit.* 27.

³⁸⁹ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, Washington, 25 October 1962", FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XX, *Congo Crisis*, Document 318.

³⁸⁹ Editorial note to, "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, Léopoldville 26 October 1962", FRUS, Congo 1960-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 123.

³⁹⁰ Editorial note to, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, Washington, 25 October 1962", *op.cit.* in "Memorandum from the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Tweedy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, Department of State (Eisenberg)", Washington, 25 August, 1961", FRUS, *Congo*, 1960-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 96.

³⁹¹ Memorandum, "Command and Control – Fighter Operations Group", 13 October 1961, in UN Archives, New York, DAG-13/1.6.5.8.3.0:1 6600/F-OPS Policy. October 1961–March 1963.

largely ineffective in reaching the objective of reintegrating Katanga into the Congo. This is explained by the cost of UN operations and the lack of success of the ANC. Although the Plan of National Reconciliation, the U Thant Plan of August 1962, received a positive response from Katanga and the Congolese government, an increase in the level of hostilities in the following months and Tshombe's political manoeuvrings meant that once again the future of the Congo and its fledgling government was under threat. To bolster Adoula and provide further air support for the ANC, it was thought by State Department officials that the presence of planes flying not the colours of the UN but that of the government might provide a "psychological and political lift out of all proportion to the military value of the aircraft".³⁹² One major problem when it came to the question of putting together an air force in such short notice was that nobody in the DRC's armed forces was qualified to fly planes. This is the point where the CIA's relations with the Cuban Exile community became vital to Kennedy's ongoing efforts to shore up Cyrill Adoula's premiership, and his political legitimacy.

Nearing the end of February, 1961, the Congo's political differences continued to be settled through the use of bloody retribution. In South Kasai, for example, six 'Lumumbist politicians' were executed by Baluba people out for revenge for the massacre of thousands during the violent repression of the state's secession,³⁹³ at the same time that Antoine Gizenga's forces sought revenge for the killing of Patrice Lumumba a month earlier. Alongside this, the increase in the number of mercenaries appearing in Katanga provided evidence that Tshombe was preparing for battle.

The stalemate between UN and Katangan forces was to finish at the end of August 1961 when, with an estimated 13,000 Katangan Gendarmes opposing them, the United

³⁹² Editorial note to, "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, Léopoldville 26 October 1962", *op.cit.*

³⁹³ "Baluba Tribe's Revenge on Lumumba Supporters", *The Times*, 20 February, 1961.

Nations firstly launched Operation Rumpunch on the 28 August 1961 and Operation Morthor on 13 September. Swedish, Irish, Indian and Ethiopian peacekeepers quickly made ground and in the coming weeks large numbers of mercenaries were captured and expelled after suffering heavy defeats. This said, Katangan forces had attacked Irish peacekeepers at Jadotville. Thirty Irish troops were injured during what is known as the Siege of Jadotville.

In order to negotiate a ceasefire, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld flew to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia to meet with Tshombe. However, in circumstances which remain unclear, the DC-6 on which Hammarskjöld was flying never reached its destination. Along with seventeen others Hammarskjöld was killed outright and became the first UN Secretary General to be killed in the line of duty. Events surrounding his death are the subject of a recent work by Susan Williams.³⁹⁴

The secession of Katanga ended in January 1963 after the UN's Operation Grand Slam of December 1962 had forced Moïse Tshombé into exile in Spain and the last remaining members of his mercenary army to return to Europe, South Africa, or to flee over the border into Angola. However, this was not the last time Katanga, or the Congo as a whole, would see foreign troops on its soil. Far from it, within months of the departure of this type of military force, further political and social upheaval would lead to mercenary recruitment on a far larger scale than we have already seen. What was different the next time was that mercenary forces would be assisting rather than fighting against Congolese government forces. In this respect, they would demonstrate their usefulness as a military tool.

³⁹⁴ Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?: The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2011).

CHAPTER THREE. Congolese Non-State Armed Actors in the Kwilu and Beyond

3.1. The 'Second Independence' of the Congo

An end to the Katangan secession had temporarily brought the hope that the country as a whole might find some kind of stability and unity. However, the realisation that political and social disorder would continue for the time-being came very shortly after Moïse Tshombe boarded the plane that would take him into exile and sent his mercenary forces into neighbouring countries or return to Europe in early 1963. If some semblance of geographical unity had been restored by the reintegration of Katanga and the South Kasai, political and social unrest simmered under the surface. Indeed, while newly-constituted Congolese elite was enjoying the trappings brought on by political and social elevation, the vast majority of the Congo's populace had seen little positive change in their fortunes. This was particularly true for those working in areas linked the agricultural sector of the Congo's economy, areas which had been affected by the rapid departure of the Belgians in that crops such as palm nuts or manioc could be grown and harvested but could not be sold, processed or transported. With large portions of the population becoming disaffected, as Welch points out in his 1980 study on the nature of popular rebellion, it was not surprising the *coupeurs* (crop harvesters) of the Kwilu province in central DRC would play a prominent role in the political violence of the following months.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁵ Claude Emerson Welch, *Anatomy of a Rebellion*, (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1980), 68.

As we shall see, the same *coupeurs* had demonstrated their willingness to use violence as a means of political action some thirty years previously. However, with the weight of the rural population this time fully behind them, and through the leadership of rural radicals such as Pierre Mulele, localised revolt rapidly transformed into a country-wide rebellion which culminated in the capturing of two-thirds of the Congo from government forces, and resulted in the perception that the communist-bloc was behind the movement and was planning a takeover. In turn, this led to an increased presence of covert forces and mercenaries recruited to bolster national armed forces which many Congolese saw as the enemy and the cause of many of their woes. This time, independence meant not getting rid of the colonial yoke but getting rid of a corrupt elite interested mainly in self-aggrandisement. In order to understand some of the principle reasons which lay behind the rebellion(s)³⁹⁶ which started during the course of 1963 we should, at first, briefly examine the social and political system gradually developed by the Belgian colonial administration from an early stage.³⁹⁷

What Martens refers as the *bourgeoisie monopoliste*³⁹⁸ held a strong political and economic influence over the affairs of the Belgian Congo. With their headquarters in Belgium, the companies³⁹⁹ which formed this monopolistic economy created a social elite composed of a so-called 'Colonial Trinity': company directors; high-ranking civil servants; and church dignitaries. On a second level in the colonial structure came the *bourgeoisie*

³⁹⁶ We will see that there were two interlinked rebellions which both had similar goals.

³⁹⁷ Far more in-depth analyses of the causes of the Kwilu Rebellion can be found in Ludo Martens, *Pierre Mulele, ou la seconde vie de Patrice Lumumba*, (Antwerp: Editions EPO, 1985); Renee C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and Jean-Marie Ribeaucourt, ""The Second Independence": A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 1965, 78-109; or in Mark Traugott, "The Economic Origins of the Kwilu Rebellion", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1979, 459-479.

³⁹⁸ Martens, *op.cit.*, 30.

³⁹⁹ The companies in question include financial institutions such as Société Générale, Brufina, a group with links to the Bank of Brussels. Mining enterprises included *Union Minière*, *Forminière*, or *Symétain*, while the *Huileries du Congo belge* (HCB) controlled the palm oil industry. *Unilever* also held significant commercial interests in the Belgian Congo.

moyenne. Belgians with business interests in areas such as agriculture or those who worked in the civil service identified themselves as belonging to these middle-classes. They played an important role in maintaining the social and economic *status quo* of the Belgian Congo as, according to Martens, they were able to obtain a wealth and social standing that was out of their reach in their native country.⁴⁰⁰ Then there came the European *bourgeoisie*. White, and holding important positions within business administration or owning shops, restaurants, and other forms of commercial enterprises, these Greek, Portuguese, and other European nationals also held a position of privilege in the colonial system.

As far as the native Congolese were concerned, Léopold II had soon realised that power over the Congolese population could be established and consolidated through the use of tribal chiefs. In return for their cooperation in Léopold's scheme, a scheme which continued thereafter, these chiefs were rewarded with honorary titles; they became civil servants; they received annual payments from Belgian authorities; and they received a percentage of the head tax levied by these same sources.⁴⁰¹ The existence of this *bourgeoisie noire* and of a head tax, or poll tax, led, in part, to the 1931 rebellion mentioned earlier in this section.

While this elite composed of black and white bourgeoisies took full benefit of the ample and fertile lands in rural areas such as the Kwilu, the peasant population responsible for the harvesting of the crops or the mining of raw materials lived, for the most, in abject poverty. With commercial traditions dating back hundreds of years, it is unsurprising that there was a rejection of a colonial system which stymied their lifestyle and forced them into propping up through their manpower and taxes, a foreign regime. The underlying civil unrest which had been a feature of the Congo Free State and which had manifested itself

⁴⁰⁰ Martens, *op.cit*, 33.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

during the Batetela Rebellion between 1895 and 1908 was, again, to lead to civil unrest at a time when the effects of the Great Depression started to be felt in Central Africa. While prices for palm oil dropping by 80% of their 1928 levels by 1934, members of the Pende tribe which constituted the majority of the workforce involved in cutting the palm nuts still found themselves required to pay the same amounts in head tax despite their earnings falling by 50-60%.⁴⁰² During the violence which was a result of this peasant unrest over one thousand lives were lost. The years after World War Two saw Belgian colonial authorities attempt to address racial inequality in the Congo, and by 1960 a new class of educated Congolese known as *évolués* worked as administrative assistants, secretaries, accounts clerks, etc. Numbering in their hundreds of thousands, *évolués* who had attended state schools or who had received the opportunity to attend the Catholic University of Louvain established in 1954 were also employed as teachers or in hospitals. On the other hand, these *évolués* were not paid the same salary as a white performing a similar function, and the chances of promotion were very limited.⁴⁰³

Independence and the subsequent and rapid withdrawal of the Belgian civil servants should have led to the *évolués* seeing their salaries and chances of promotion improve dramatically from June 1960 onwards. However, talks at the Belgian-Congolese Round Table Agreements of 1959 had provided for the re-engagement in the new Congolese administration of all Belgian civil servants in the Congo, be this in the administration itself, in services such as transport or in the *Force Publique*. The agreements were made between Belgian officials and those Congolese who it was believed would form the backbone of any future Congolese political class, and these Congolese made sure that their respective personal interests were represented. In these respects, and with an administrative hierarchy

⁴⁰² Welch, *op.cit.*, 67-68.

⁴⁰³ Martens, *op.cit.*, 40.

resembling that of pre-independence, the *évolués* who had hoped to rise through the ranks by default still found themselves unable to *evolve*.⁴⁰⁴

The mutiny at Camp Hardy against the white officers of the *Force Publique* a few days after independence forced Congolese officials including Patrice Lumumba to reevaluate a system which remained essentially the same in nature but which was under threat of further revolt. While the *Force Publique* was disbanded and became the *Armée Nationale Congolaise*, the Congolese political structure underwent a complete Africanisation. If, however, the transition from white rule to black rule was seemingly complete, it would also be fair to say that this transition was reactionary in nature and not, as had been promised, revolutionary. As former professor at the University of Lovanium, Jules Gérard-Libois reminds us, it would be extremely naive to believe the promises that were made to the Congolese masses, and that they would benefit from independence and the departure of the Belgians. Also, he reminds us that it would be equally naive to believe that the Congolese political class was united in its conception of equality between the classes.⁴⁰⁵

That the Congolese political elite was divided along lines such as this had already been highlighted at the Brussels Round Table Conference at which Tshombé, Lumumba, Kasa-Vubu *et al*, had each presented their own personal vision of the Congo post-independence. Even inside a particular political party division and fragmentation were to be observed as the split -and subsequent war- between Lumumba and Kalonji of the MNC illustrates.⁴⁰⁶ Moreover, as the jostling for positions of power continued into September

⁴⁰⁴ Jules Gérard-Libois, "The New Class and Rebellion in the Congo", *The Socialist Register*, 1966, 267-268.

⁴⁰⁵ *Idem*, 269.

⁴⁰⁶ In his study of the *Parti Solidaire Africain*, Herbert Weiss makes an interesting observation on the nature of the MNC affirming that if the *Mouvement National Congolais* had devised a "modern strategy" for the development of the Congo post-independence, its ambitions went beyond its means since the party did not represent the masses of the Congolese. On the other hand, ABAKO enjoyed far more solid support and had - as noted earlier in this study- envisaged the separation of the Bakongo from the national unit. See, Herbert F.

1960, we can remind ourselves that Lumumba's former ally Mobutu not only turned against the prime minister and forced him to resign his position, Mobutu also suspended the activities of the Congolese parliament due to its divisiveness and its failure to reach common agreement on matters important to the Congo's future.

Although the arrival of Adoula sought to address this question of division, the separation between the reactionaries and the revolutionaries of Congolese politics could not be greater: the PSA's Antoine Gizenga had established a short-lived revolutionary government in Stanleyville which had been recognised by a number of countries including the Soviet Union; and both South Kasai and Katanga had seceded. Though these political divisions were soon to be resolved through the intervention of the UN, on a social level there existed even greater divisions: with a considerable percentage of the State budget being used to strengthen the army, expenditure for social services and development represented less than 10%. In a country where nearly half the population was under fifteen years of age, expenditure for youth and sports was a quarter of that for prisons, a half of that for the Prime Minister's office, and a third of that for the two houses of parliament.⁴⁰⁷ In view of this situation, perhaps the question should not be centered on why the Kwilu Rebellion came about, but rather why this type of rural uprising had not eventuated long before.

3.2. Pierre Mulele and the *Parti Solidaire Africain*

Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 20.

⁴⁰⁷ Idem, 271.

Born in 1931 in the Kwilu district of the Congo, like many of his political counterparts Mulele was educated at a Catholic mission⁴⁰⁸ and had received primary schooling at Kikwit *Sacré-Coeur*. From here, Mulele moved to the Jesuit school *Petit Séminaire* in Kinzambi before receiving further education at the Catholic mission in Leverville (now Lusanga) which he joined in 1946. Although Mulele's mother, Ignace, had not received any education and worked as a cleaner, his father, Benoit, had trained as a nursing assistant and as such was considered to be an *intellectual*, a term which should be interpreted in its broadest sense as it was used by the rural Congolese to refer to anyone who could read and write.

It was at Leverville that Mulele was to form a bond with a number of those who would later be involved in the organisation and execution of the Kwilu Rebellion, and along with Théodore Bengila, Fernand Nima, Patrice Matuku, and Urbain Mafalu, it was here that Mulele's interest in politics would bud. One of Mulele's favourite themes, as Martens notes, was the hypocrisy of religion,⁴⁰⁹ and school friend, Théophile Bula-Bula, notes that Mulele would rail against the paternalism demonstrated by the Catholic priests who taught at the mission. According to Mulele, the priests' behaviour when meting out punishment was no different from other whites in the Congo. Through the persuasion of a whip, they were able to exploit pupils in the same way the Congolese were exploited on plantations, in the building of railroads, roads, and in the mining industry.⁴¹⁰ As well as condemning practices which were commonplace in the Belgian Congo, Mulele began to take an interest in the wider scope of colonisation and his thoughts turned to how the Congo could regain its independence. His political convictions on this subject were

⁴⁰⁸ For a discussion on to what extent Catholic and Protestant missions influenced various Congolese politicians see, Marvin D. Markowitz, "The Missions and Political Development in the Congo", *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 1970, 234-247.

⁴⁰⁹ Martens, *op.cit.*, 44.

⁴¹⁰ Théophile Bula-Bula, *Pierre Mulele et le maquis du Kwilu en RD Congo*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2010), 14.

reinforced through reading articles by Congolese writer Antoine-Roger Bolamba which appeared regularly in *La Voix des Congolais* (The Voice of the Congolese). Later, as Minister for Education in Lumumba's government, Mulele would work alongside Bolamba when the latter became Minister of State for Cultural Affairs and Information.⁴¹¹

On leaving the Catholic mission in Leverville, the next stage in Mulele's education took place at the Yaeseke School of Agriculture in the Bumba Territory of the Equateur Province. It was here that Mulele, again, showed that he rejected the preordained agricultural destiny reserved for many Congolese in the Belgian Congo. Instead, Mulele took the somewhat surprising decision to join the *Force Publique*, the militia which the Congolese considered as the main tool of colonial repression. Arriving at Coquilhatville military camp sometime in 1951, Mulele's superiors soon took notice of his relative intelligence in relation to many of the recruits in the lower ranks of the *Force Publique*. As a consequence, it was not long before Mulele was promoted to the rank of Corporal and he was to find himself working as deputy-secretary to the commanding officer: the first time a Congolese recruit had been entrusted with such a responsibility. It was an appointment proved to be a godsend for the future leader of the Kwilu rebellion as, igniting his interest in military history, Mulele took every opportunity to delve into the archives at the camp and to study reports on the quelling of different rebellions by the colonial armies. In particular, Mulele analysed how these forces had put down a revolt which had taken place at the Luluabourg camp in Elisabethville on 20 February 1944. This was the first organised effort by the Congolese to gain political control and represents an important episode in the development of Congolese nationalism.⁴¹² Mulele concluded that the only reason the *Force*

⁴¹¹ Bolamba would also serve as Minister of Information in Cyril Adoula's government. In 1960, Bolamba took part in negotiations with Moïse Tshombe on the question of the Katangan secession.

⁴¹² See, for example, Crawford Young, *op.cit.*, 442-443, and Bruce S. Fetter, "The Luluabourg Revolt at Elisabethville", *African Historical Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1969, 269-277.

Publique existed was to crush any move towards independence. Mulele's interest in military history began to take a turning point at this stage and self-education became a means by which Mulele could plan any future uprising. He studied maps, the localisation of different units of the *Force Publique* and the tactics it had used to maintain peace. He even drew up a plan which involved taking over the camp at Coquilhatville.⁴¹³

Leaving the *Force Publique* in 1952, Mulele became far more politically motivated. By the end of that year, along with the help of former classmates such as Théodore Bengila, Mulele had set up the *Union des anciens élèves de la mission Leverville* (Unamil), one of the first organisations of *évolués* in the Kwango-Kwilu region. Employed as a secretary at the headquarters in Léopoldville from the beginning of 1953, Mulele intensified this political activity and by 1955 had become vice-president of *Unamil*. 1953 turned out to be somewhat of a landmark in the fight for Congolese independence as it was in this year that Patrice Lumumba created the *Association du personnel indigène de la colonie* (Association of Indigenous Personnel of the Colony) or (APIC).

The hopes for Congolese independence were lifted by the Suez Crisis in 1956 and Nasser's stance against British and French attempts and failure to oust the Egyptian leader gave Mulele new impetus. By 1957, the year of independence for the first sub-Saharan nation, Ghana, progressive international literature has started to filter into the Congo. Mulele was able to keep himself up to date with events in the colonised and decolonised worlds and it was in 1957 that the first issues of the quarterly cultural, political and literary magazine *Présence Africaine* appeared in Léopoldville. Founded by Senegalese Alioune

⁴¹³ Martens, *op.cit.* 47.

Diop in 1947 in Paris, this magazine became highly influential in the Pan-Africanist movement and the birth of the *Négritude* movement.⁴¹⁴

It was from 1957 onwards and the publication of Nkrumah's thoughts on African conscience in *Présence Africaine* that the idea of colonial reform for the Congo began to take shape. The opportunity to reinforce the arguments for reform came in July/August 1958 in Brussels where the Universal Exhibition was being held. Several hundred Congolese *évolués* were given permission to attend the exhibition. In Brussels, these *évolués* were able to rub shoulders with Belgian progressives, and the first Marxist literature made its appearance in Léopoldville shortly after. For Mulele, Bengila and fellow Unamil member Fernand Nima, this presented the chance to read works such as Joseph Stalin's *The Foundation of Leninism*,⁴¹⁵ or the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*.⁴¹⁶ In 1958, Mulele was to meet Vasilis Bouras of the Greek Communist Party and was learn certain elements of Marxist doctrine. For example, after having asked how the Soviet Union had overcome Nazi occupation, they were told that in the USSR the interest of the collective came before the interests of the individual and that the workers controlled the means of production. Mulele was reminded of how Lever controlled the palm oil industry in the Congo and how *Union Minière* controlled the mining industry. Mulele vowed to nationalise these industries if ever the Congo became independent,⁴¹⁷ and in early 1959 following the Léopoldville riots he set up the *Parti Solidaire Africain*, or African Solidarity Party.

⁴¹⁴ The founders of the *Négritude* movement set up in the 1930's were mainly francophone intellectuals such as Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and Léon Damas.

⁴¹⁵ Joseph Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism*, first published in Russian in 1924.

⁴¹⁶ Martens, *op.cit.*, 52.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

As Weiss so rightly observes, political parties in Africa tend to begin with elites operating in urban centres.⁴¹⁸ The PSA was no different: in a similar way to the MNC it had ambitions of gaining national support but contrarily to the MNC it was to find its support not in urban areas but in the rural districts of the Kwango-Kwilu. This was perhaps the strength of the PSA as it was able to avert accusations of being an elitist party and could garner the support of rural populations by promising to bring change to the lives of those who saw the urban elite as mere reactionaries. Also, it is interesting to note, as Weiss points out, that the PSA was different from other political parties in that it espoused the ethnic diversity of the Kwango-Kwilu districts. Another strength of the PSA was that it was prepared to welcome members from other organisations. This included welcoming members of the *Action Socialiste*, a study group based in Léopoldville headed by Antoine Gizenga, and this inclusion differs from political rivals such as the MNC in that an effort was made to coordinate ideas instead of seeking to form breakaway parties when ideologies clashed.

Structured using three organs (the National Congress; the National political Bureau; the National Central Committee), the latter of these organs was responsible for the administration of the party. With Gizenga as President, and Mulele as Secretary-General, in total this committee was made up of six members. Mulele's school friend Ferdinand Nima was a member of the National Political Bureau, and he was joined by thirteen others whose role was to validate party policy. As noted above, the PSA embraced ethnic diversity and members of these organs belonged to the Bapende, Bambala-Bangongo, Bambunda, Bambala, Bayanzi, Badinga, Bapindi, Basuku, and Bangongo tribes. The main aim of the PSA as stated in their programme was the emancipation of Africans in all domains -the inclusion of this term demonstrating the racial, and not purely national,

⁴¹⁸ Weiss, *op.cit.*, 76.

nature of the movement- and secondly, independence should be obtained in stages.⁴¹⁹ On a national level, its programme was populist in nature promising to end unemployment; build more schools and provide free education in rural areas; increase salaries; provide better housing in rural areas; and provide free medical care to all non-salaried citizens. It also advocated a non-alignment with European powers as well as a socialist programme based on peasant collectives or traditional communal farms.⁴²⁰ In this respect, the PSA's programme drew on Stalinist and Maoist doctrine as a source of inspiration.

With independence for the Congo being set for the 30 June, 1960, the first occasion for the PSA to put its policies to the test came during the elections held in May. The party fared reasonably well, proving to be the Congo's third most popular party, but due to none of the other dozen or so parties putting forward candidates were able to obtain a majority in the number of seats, as we earlier, a coalition government was formed.

As we already know, with Lumumba being replaced by Joseph Ileo, and with Ileo being replaced by Adoula, the sentiment held among those in rural areas such as the Kwilu, but also in large urban areas, was that the 'first' independence of the Congo had resulted in utter failure. As an illustration, if in 1958 52% of the indigenous population of Léopoldville worked the building and construction trades, between 1960 and 1962 there was virtually no building or construction work of any size. To add pressure to an already high level of unemployment, the number of people coming to the capital from rural areas grew massively and, at the end of 1961, it was estimated that 51% of the male labour force was without work.⁴²¹ On the other hand, independence for those fortunate enough to have

⁴¹⁹ The MNC's programme called for immediate independence, and the sudden transition from colony to independent nation is seen as one of the reasons for the subsequent disorder in the Congo.

⁴²⁰ See, Stephen L. Weigart, *Traditional Religion and Guerilla Warfare in Modern Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 51.

⁴²¹ Jaques Lavry and Paul Raymaekers, "Conjonctures socio-économiques à Léopoldville", 5e Bulletin, Situation au 15 Décembre 1961, *Notes et Documents*, Vol. II, n° 2/SE-2, (Léopoldville: Université Lovanium, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales), décembre 1961.

received an education meant that more white-collar employment was available. This was especially true for those working in the higher echelons of bureaucracy, and if national revenues barely covered the cost of paying the high salaries of members of Parliament, lower-grade government employees such as the police were forced into corruption.⁴²² For revolutionaries such as Pierre Mulele, the growing dissatisfaction with a regime which was seen as being propped up by capitalist power and western institutions such as the United Nations, provided the perfect opportunity to implement his vision for the Congo, and to use the rural population as a tool with which this vision would be executed. Mulele could count on widespread support in the Kwilu, the PSA having gained 13 of the 14 parliamentary seats, and in April 1962 along with Théodore Bengila had received lessons in Maoist politics and military strategy.⁴²³ In addition, as an ambassador for the revolutionary government in Stanleyville having maintained contact with other African socialist leaders, Mulele knew that international support for his movement was also available.

3.3. The Inception of the Kwilu Rebellion

Returning to Léopoldville from China on July 1963, with the objective of starting a popular insurrection, Mulele set up camp in the Kwilu province in western Congo from where he invited like-minded revolutionaries to join him.⁴²⁴ With a final objective which consisted in establishing a popular socialist government, Mulele preached to his followers that neo-colonists sought to impose a new form of domination over the Congolese people through the intermediary of what Mulele termed in June 1963 as his "corrupt, treacherous brothers who were reactionaries of the bourgeoisie".⁴²⁵ Furthermore, Mulele believed that

⁴²² La Fontaine, *City Politics: A Study of Léopoldville*, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), 50-51.

⁴²³ Révolution congolaise, *op.cit.*, 7.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.* 8.

⁴²⁵ Martens, *op.cit.* 134-136.

in the eyes of the world the Congo was at the mercy of an 'international capitalist hegemony', and that its objective of 'deliberately raping' the Congo of its sovereignty and independence had to be stopped immediately.⁴²⁶

Having studied Mao's political doctrine during his visits to China, Mulele would have been aware of the idea that revolutionary war involved organising contingents of the population into militias.⁴²⁷ From a military point of view, Mao's strategy involved attacking small isolated pockets of enemy forces then moving on to larger forces while taking control of extensive rural areas, and small and medium-sized cities.⁴²⁸ This method, "A Chinese Method in the Heart of Africa",⁴²⁹ called for the Congo to be divided into geographical zones where each would have an operational base. Training of 'partisans' was to be carried out in forests and by the end of August they numbered 580, including 150 young girls, with recruitment in the centre and in the north of the Congo, by the end of December 1963, the number of partisans had grown to more than five thousand.⁴³⁰

While Mulele organised his supporters known as 'Mulelists' into guerilla groups, another form of rebellion against central-government authority had started to take shape in January 1962. This had come after the arrest of Antoine Gizenga by Congolese authorities and his detention on the island of Bula Bemba in the mouth of the River Congo. His arrest came after the purported discovery of letters and telegrams sent to Egyptian president Gamal Abder Nasser. In this correspondence, Gizenga had requested military assistance, arms and shipments of gold to support the Stanleyville secession. One letter was dated 10

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ See, "Mao Tse Tung in an interview with a Hsinhua News Agency correspondent, 29 September 1959", and "Mao Tse Tung: Quotations from Mao Tse Tung", Chapter 8. People's War", <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch08.htm>, accessed 20 October, 2016.

⁴²⁸ "Mao Tse Tung, *On Protracted War*, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, May 1938", https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm, accessed 20 October 20.

⁴²⁹ *Jeune Afrique*, numéro 172, 24 février, 1964.

⁴³⁰ *Révolution Congolaise*, *op.cit.*, 8.

August 1961, just over a week after Cyrille Adoula had been named Prime Minister and had appointed Gizenga as his deputy. In May 1962, Gizenga was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and put on trial for having organised the Stanleyville secession.⁴³¹

Gizenga spent the next two years in prison, only to be released in July 1964.⁴³²

With parliamentary opposition to central government authority gradually being quashed through this type of repressive measure, an already potentially explosive situation was worsened by the dissolution of the Kasa-Vubu-Adoula government on 25 September 1963. This was followed by the banning of the MNC-L and the PSA-Gizenga (PSA-G). In essence, all political power was now in the hands of a few and deprived the opposition of exploiting any remaining legislative avenue. In response to the dissolution, several deputies then formed an alliance and crossed the River Congo into Brazzaville. Here, in the former French Congo, these deputies such as Gbenye of the MNC-L, Bocheley-Davidson, Thomas Mukwidi and Gaston Soumialot formed the National Council for Liberation, or the *Conseil National de Libération* (CNL) on 3 October 1963. Denouncing a government characterised by 'fascism, the abuse of power and fraud' what is noticeable about the CNL's programme is that unlike previous attempts at overthrowing central government, the United States was clearly identified as an enemy. Subsequently, the CNL's agenda called for an end to 'submission to the United States and a fight against 'yankee oppression and its agents'.⁴³³

On the military front, Mulele had started to translate political doctrine into military action. Applying Maoist guerilla theory, the Congo would be divided up into geographical zones, each having an operational base. Next, as far as the actual fighting was concerned,

⁴³¹ Lloyd Garrison, "Congo Opens Way for Gizenga Trial", *New York Times*, 7 May 1962.

⁴³² In December 1961, fellow secessionist Albert Kalonji of the South Kasai had suffered a similar fate. Having been sentenced to five years in prison, a few weeks later Kalonji escaped and, like Tshombe, sought refuge in Spain.

⁴³³ Ludo Martens, *op.cit.* 166.

contingents of local militias would attack small, isolated pockets of enemy forces.⁴³⁴ From here, with positions established and the population indoctrinated, larger revolutionary forces would then move on to attack more substantial forces and take control of extensive rural areas and, eventually, small-sized cities.⁴³⁵ The training of 'partisans' was to be carried out in camps well away from the eyes of government authorities.

Mulele's recruitment in the Kwilu province met with much success. By the end of August 1963 those receiving training numbered around 580 members and, at by the end of the year, this number had swelled to well over 5,000.⁴³⁶ From the point of view of military action, Mulele's first incursions were carried out in early September 1963. Concentrating on three areas: Lukamba in the Gungu territory; Yassa-Lokwa in the Idiofa territory; and Imbongo in the Kikwit territory, control of these areas was facilitated by their inhabitants belonging to the Bambunda tribe of which Mulele was a member. While this tribal affiliation encouraged village chiefs to collaborate with Mulele, he knew, however, that the Bambunda alone could not conquer the Congo. With this in mind, Mulele formed an alliance with Antoine Gizenga's tribe, the Bapende. With what had been localised revolt now gaining much broader support, Mulele was now to move onto the next phase of his rural rebellion.

3.4. The Spread of Popular Rebellion in the Congo

The next phase of operations could be said to have started on New Year's Eve 1963. Here, two members of the police were killed after a Molotov cocktail was used against a

⁴³⁴ "Mao Tse Tung in an interview with a Hsinhua News Agency correspondent, 29 September 1959", <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch08.htm>, accessed 30 May 2016.

⁴³⁵ "On Protracted War, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, May 1938", https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm, accessed 30 May, 2016.

⁴³⁶ *Révolution Congolaise*, *op.cit.* 8.

school near Kikwit and, throughout January 1964, further attacks were made against Portuguese-owned industrial installations. Other attacks were carried out against administrative buildings, churches, industrial centres, the police, teachers and government employees.⁴³⁷ With the revolt now spreading eastwards into the provinces Kwango and Kasai, reports linking Mulele to China led one Western diplomat to describe the situation in Kwilu as a 'textbook version of a Communist rebellion'.⁴³⁸ Fears that this was the case and that westerners including missionaries would be the target of attacks were confirmed when three Roman Catholic priests were killed in the Kwilu. This followed an attack on a US Protestant mission after which nine Americans were evacuated by UN helicopters.⁴³⁹

To counter a rapidly deteriorating and increasingly violent situation, on 18 January President Kasa-Vubu sought to control the rebellion by ordering the setting up of a state of exception in the region. This order also authorised the ANC to fight against the rebels. In spite of an intervention which included ANC commandos flown in from Elisabethville, by the end of February 1964 and using groups of 100-200 rebels, a territory 300 kilometres long and 120 kilometres wide had come under rebel control in the west of the Congo.⁴⁴⁰ By March, with further attacks on religious missions and against perceived symbols of colonialism, the effort of battalions of ANC forces encircling the Kwilu in order to contain the rebellion started to pay off. Officials in Léopoldville were even in a position to declare that victory over Mulele's forces was certain.⁴⁴¹

At this point, there was no reason not to believe that this was the case: the advances of Mulele's forces were being held back and, in Brazzaville, the CNL had started implode. Internal opposition between the leaders of the MNC-L and the PSA-Gizenga meant that by

⁴³⁷ Gerard-Libois and Verhaegan, *op.cit.* 11-14.

⁴³⁸ "Congo Rebellion is Said to Have Spread", *New York Times*, 25 January 1964.

⁴³⁹ "U.S. Missionaries Rescued in Congo", *New York Times*, 25 January 1964.

⁴⁴⁰ Révolution Congolaise, *op.cit.* 9.

⁴⁴¹ Libois and Verhaegan, *op.cit.* 25.

February 1964, Gbenye had been expelled from the movement. But as with most splits in Congolese politics, Gbenye was soon to announce that he was setting up his own branch of the *Conseil*, the CNL-G in opposition to the CNL-B(Bocheley). Although the two groups had similar objectives, the two leaders had different ideas on how these objectives were to be achieved and began to publish separate communiqués.⁴⁴²

In the face of a faltering Mulelist rebellion which had been supported by the CNL, from February 1964 Bocheley-Davidson⁴⁴³ turned towards a more ideological approach to the revolution. On the other hand, believing that he had the support of the MNC-L, the BALUBAKAT and another pro-Lumumbist group, the *Centre de Regroupement Africain* (CEREA), in January 1964, Christophe Gbenye opted to join Mulele's military effort in the Kivu and sent two of his military commanders to Northern Katanga and to the Kivu province in order to open up new fronts in the revolutionary war.⁴⁴⁴

Separated from Rwanda, Burundi, and the then Tanganyika by the natural borders of the River Ruzuzi and Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, what was then known as Central Kivu is situated in the east of the Congo. With a population of around 1.2 million in 1963,⁴⁴⁵ pro-Lumumba groups had recognised this area as important to their strategy and through political action had made it into somewhat of a Lumumbist stronghold. Having played a role in this process after being appointed district commissioner for the Kindu district of the Kivu, forty-year-old Gaston Soumialot was identified by Gbenye as someone able to garner enough support from the local population which, it was hoped, would form a militia. In Northern Katanga, a similar role was given to Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a man who

⁴⁴² Gérard-Libois and Verhaegan, *op.cit.* 32.

⁴⁴³ Bocheley-Davidson's first name is unknown.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 33.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 54.

according to Che Guevara "realised perfectly well that the main enemy was North American imperialism".⁴⁴⁶

In the central Kivu, the first signs of serious disorder came on 2 May 1964 when ANC troops clashed with groups of youths near Uvira, a small town situated on the northern extremity of Lake Tanganyika. Using firearms and wearing hand-written signs showing their loyalty to Mulele (now seen as the figurehead of the revolution), these 'Jeunesse' were said by some to number as many as 5,000, and were said to have links with the Kabare people whose tribal king was opposed to the provincial government in Bakuvu, the capital of the Kivu. The attacks on ANC forces came two weeks after an attack on a police camp in the capital where 42 people were killed.⁴⁴⁷ The same day, on 15 April, youths attacked police stations in Luvungi, Lemera, Mulenge and Kiliba.⁴⁴⁸

From February 1964, these *Jeunesse* from the Congo's central regions aged anywhere between 12 and 20, had gradually been making themselves known to authorities through their tracking down, interrogation and indoctrination of ANC soldiers. Making their way in absolute silence, and armed with bows, arrows, machetes or any other sharp object deemed to be a weapon, these youths, officially part of the *Armée Populaire de Libération* (APL) and also known as the Simba, or lion, wore a variety of clothing including animal skins and leaves from banana plants. Later on in their campaign, having ransacked the homes of European settlers, many would take to wearing women's dresses and underwear. Some even took to wearing lampshades as hats.

Despite their some hat bizarre appearance, the Simba's belief in witchcraft and superstition made them a formidable opponent. According to mercenary Mike Hoare, these

⁴⁴⁶ Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo*, (London: The Harvill Press, 2000), 6

⁴⁴⁷ "Troops in Congo Fight Ambushers", *New York Times*, 3 May 1964.

⁴⁴⁸ Gerard-Libois and Verhaegan, 58.

aspects of African tradition were deeply rooted in the subconscious mentality of all Africans, be they educated or not.⁴⁴⁹ Having studied methods on how to indoctrinate local populations, Mulele tapped into these tribal beliefs by convincing the youths that the taking of a potion known as a *dawa* before going into battle would render them invincible to enemy bullets. Having taken this potion administered by the local witch doctor, the *dawa*, aka Mai Mulele, or Mulele's water, also gave them superhuman powers. Certain conditions were attached to the guarantee of this protection but, to opposition ANC forces also convinced of the power of witchcraft, the cry of Mai Mulele, or Mulele's water was enough to persuade them to lay down their weapons and run. In certain cases this affected entire garrisons of soldiers. However, as Hoare explains, the taking of a *dawa* when mixed with the marijuana they also smoked made them easy targets for the machine guns they were later to face.⁴⁵⁰

In spite of Hoare's reservations on their ability to wage war under the influence of such debilitating drugs, with virtually no resistance to their advance being offered, these rebels made rapid progress through rural and urban areas of northern and eastern Congo.⁴⁵¹ Moreover, such was their strength that by 11 July 1964 Soumialot ordered APL forces under the command of 'General' Nicolas Olenga to march on Stanleyville (Kisangani), the Congo's third largest city. Although deemed to be well protected by six hundred military police and over a thousand ANC commandos,⁴⁵² as one of the Congo's largest trading ports and a stronghold of Lumumbism, the capture of Stanleyville was considered as a major objective for rebel forces. With a portion of Stanleyville's troops having been sent to

⁴⁴⁹ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 20.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. 21.

⁴⁵¹ "Rebels Hold in Katanga", *The Times*, 26 June, 1964 / "Rebels Seize Congo Town on Border with Burundi", *New York Times*, 18 May, 1964 / "Kivu Rebels Rout Troops of Congo", *New York Times*, 1 June, 1964.

⁴⁵² Gerard-Libois and Verhaegan, *op.cit.* 227.

reinforce the ANC's efforts in the Bakuvu over the previous days, resistance to rebel attack soon collapsed. From 5 August 1964, Stanleyville became the latest urban area to come under rebel control and by the end of this month almost half of the Congo including the Great Lakes region was under rebel control. (See *Figure 5* below).

Although over the previous four years the US had managed to maintain its objective and stave off communist infiltration in the Congo, the 'critical' point⁴⁵³ of the threat presented by the Kwilu and Kivu rebellions appeared at a particularly difficult time in many regards. To summarise: Cyrille Adoula was considered to be weak, ineffective, indecisive and unable to plan ahead in the face of the growing threat;⁴⁵⁴ United Nations peacekeeping forces were completely withdrawn in June 1964 leaving only the ANC to fight against the rebellion; the ANC was widely considered to be "an almost useless instrument";⁴⁵⁵ US involvement in Congolese affairs had to be hidden in order not to give the impression of setting up a 'puppet' regime;⁴⁵⁶ US involvement in Vietnam was increasing and the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred on 2 August 1964: three days before the fall of Stanleyville; US policy dictated that its own troops would not be used in Africa in any circumstances.⁴⁵⁷

Whereas replacing Adoula with Moïse Tshombe as prime minister on 30 June 1964 went some way into providing solutions to the Congo's problems, the fall of Stanleyville led State Department officials to deliver the ominous warning that, unless stopped, the

⁴⁵³ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium", Washington, 6 August 1964, *FRUS*, Congo, 1964-1968, Document 283.

⁴⁵⁴ For example, see "Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State", Paris, 2 April 1964, *FRUS*, Congo 1964-1968, 231 / footnotes to "Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency", Washington, 18 May 1964, *FRUS*, *op.cit.* 242.

⁴⁵⁵ "Memorandum from the Joint Strategic Survey Council: The Situation in the Congo", Washington 25 June 1964, *FRUS*, *op.cit.* 259.

⁴⁵⁶ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, Washington, 26 May 1964", *FRUS*, *op.cit.* 245.

⁴⁵⁷ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, Washington, 6 July 1967", *FRUS*, *op.cit.* 738.

rebellion would reach Elisabethville and Léopoldville. Not only would this lead to a possible total collapse of the Congo's new regime, it would also destabilise central Africa and provide 'fertile ground for Communist infiltration'.⁴⁵⁸ In light of points 2-6, this presented an enormous problem.

More or less from its inception, the troops of the *Force Publique*/ANC had been known as anything ranging from a "rabble"⁴⁵⁹ to "*Armée non contrôlée*" (uncontrolled army) and to "*Assassins nationaux du Congo*" (national assassins of the Congo).⁴⁶⁰ Whereas the last of the ANC's sobriquets is illustrated through its massacre of civilians at Bakwanga in August 1960, its continual shortcomings in the face of enemy advances had left the Congo wide open to attack. While Mobutu's "vanity and irresponsibility" appeared to US officials to have "contributed significantly to [ANC] ineffectiveness and disarray",⁴⁶¹ it is also apparent that when it came to a willingness to fight the fault lay in a combination of cowardice and fear of witchcraft.

Figure 5: Maximum Extent of Rebel Advance⁴⁶²


⁴⁵⁸ FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968, op.cit.*, Document 283.

⁴⁵⁹ FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968, op.cit.*, Document 291.

⁴⁶⁰ Vandewalle, *op.cit.* 53.

⁴⁶¹ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, Washington, 26 May 1964", FRUS, *Congo 1964-1968*, Document 245.

⁴⁶² George H. Dodenhoff, "The Congo: A Case Study of Mercenary Employment", *Naval College Review*, April 1969, 45.



3.5. The Siege of Stanleyville

As we saw earlier this study, by July 1964 and the withdrawal of UN forces, the integrity of the Congo was once again under threat. Arguably, this threat, the Simba Rebellion, was far greater than that posed by Katanga's secession some four years earlier. With this rebellion having spread throughout most of the central and northern portions of the Congo, by 5 August 1964, one of the Congo's largest cities and home to a substantial foreign population was under attack. Gradually, a hostage situation involving this foreign population of mainly Belgian nationals would develop.

As a matter of pure coincidence, on 5 August 1964 the CIA produced a report entitled "Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo".⁴⁶³ Its intentions were to examine the prospects for the Tshombe government during the coming

⁴⁶³ "Short-Term Prospects for the Tshombe Government in the Congo", Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 65-64, 5 August 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 195.

six to nine months.⁴⁶⁴ As with his predecessors, this former leader of the Katanga secession was faced with enormous difficulties: political dissidence and violence had reached serious levels and the central government faced the threat of a total breakdown in its authority. In this context, the views of the CIA were bleak and Tshombe was given a 50 percent chance of being able to survive the period in question. Tshombe's chances of survival were increased by his close contacts with Belgium and by the fact that his presence would be acceptable to "Black Africa" if he was able to provide a solution to the Congo's problems. If, on the other hand, Tshombe's government fell, the CIA believed that extremists would likely gain increased influence in Léopoldville and the Congo would once again be open to widespread disorder.⁴⁶⁵ Unfortunately for the CIA whose analysts had falsely concluded that the rebellious groups were generally unorganised and weak, these theories would be put to the test sooner than later.⁴⁶⁶ One of the biggest challenges to Tshombe as he assumed the role of Prime Minister in June 1964 was the state of his armed forces and, although Tshombe and Mobutu were working together to strengthen the ANC, the performance of the latter when confronted by rebel forces had left much to be desired. In fact, they were far worse than the CIA had imagined.

One of the first indications that the Simbas were approaching Stanleyville⁴⁶⁷ writes former roving editor for *Reader's Digest* David Reed came from Michael Hoyt, a career diplomat who had just been appointed US Consul in Stanleyville. After hearing reports of the rebel's advance, he contacted a Belgian officer on loan to the ANC to investigate the

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Stanleyville was named by King Léopold II in honour of Henry Morton Stanley after his voyage along the River Congo in 1883. Rising in prominence due to its geographically strategic position which allowed the transport of ivory, palm oil, and rubber from the depths of the Congo, the city of Stanleyville inspired writers such as Joseph Conrad. In 1951, film-maker John Huston used Stanleyville as a base when making *The African Queen*, and the films leading actors Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall stayed at Stanleyville's Hôtel Pouquoi Pas?

claims. Later, the Simbas were to tell Hoyt how they had killed and eaten the officer in question.⁴⁶⁸ While it is easy to dismiss this type of account as hyperbole, there are many examples of captured enemy forces and children suffering ritual forms of torture before being devoured by the Simba. It is no wonder, then, that the impending attack on Stanleyville by the Simba was dreaded by the city's inhabitants.

The majority of ANC forces supposedly protecting the city having surrendered or having fled their positions, soldiers of the APL (Simbas) and their sorcerers began to appear in the streets of Stanleyville. With Hoyt refusing to board the last American evacuation plane out of the city, he and consulate officials David Grinwis,⁴⁶⁹ James Stauffer, Ernest Haule and Donald Parkes were ordered by US Ambassador to the Congo McMurtrie Godley to remain in Stanleyville in order to keep the US flag flying over the consulate.⁴⁷⁰ They joined around twenty-five other Americans -mainly missionaries and their families- who had also refused to leave the city. In total, 500 Belgians, 700 people of other nationalities, 400 Indians and Pakistanis remained.⁴⁷¹

On 5 August, the situation took a turn for the worse when Hoyt and his staff found themselves under attack from Simbas. Avoiding the bullets that smashed the glass doors and windows of the consulate, Hoyt, his four colleagues and a small number of Congolese staff managed to barricade themselves in vaults used to house communications equipment or consulate paperwork. The Simbas were unable to penetrate the thick doors of the vaults, and after several hours cowering in the near darkness, Hoyt opened the door to find that they had left. By then, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State William H. Brubeck had been wondering whether it might be possible to evacuate the consular staff. With State

⁴⁶⁸ David Reed, *111 Days in Stanleyville*, (London: Collins, 1966), 5.

⁴⁶⁹ Grinwiss was a CIA officer using the title of Vice-Consul as cover.

⁴⁷⁰ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 94.

⁴⁷¹ Reed, *op.cit.* 8.

Department officials requesting that the Commander in Chief, United States Strike Forces (CINSTRIKE) evaluate this possibility, it was concluded that any immediate rescue operation was not feasible due to the lack of availability of a landing place for helicopters in Stanleyville or in the surrounding areas. Nevertheless, however impractical this plan might have been, the rescue operation, or Operation Flagpole, was authorised shortly after. This involved bringing in a platoon or a company of US troops by helicopter to secure the area around the consulate while the rescue was being carried out.⁴⁷² The all-clear for the operation to begin would be given by Hoyt who would park a green car in front of the consulate.⁴⁷³ As the rescue force made its way eastwards from Lisala, Operation Flagpole came to a halt on 7 August when Simbas stole two vehicles belonging to members of the consulate staff that had been parked in front of the consular building. In addition, Hoyt was forced at gunpoint to hand over the keys to his own car. There were also fears that reprisals would be taken out against missionaries in the case of the rescue operation being successful.⁴⁷⁴ The Simba attack on Stanleyville could not have come at a worse time for President Johnson. On 2 August 1964, the *USS Maddox* on an intelligence mission had fired upon three North Vietnamese torpedo boats resulting in a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which would massively increase US participation in South East Asia; and on 5 August, the *New York Times* held reports of race riots which had taken, or were taking, place in Jersey City, Harlem, Brooklyn and Rochester.⁴⁷⁵

Although sporadic resistance from the few remaining ANC was provided in the days following, their attempts to counter Simba rebels proved futile in the face of

⁴⁷² "Evacuation of US Consulate Representatives at Stanleyville, Mem. from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Lang) to the Deputy Secretary of Defence (Vance)", Washington, 6 August 1964, FRUS Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 198.

⁴⁷³ Reed, *op.cit.* 21.

⁴⁷⁴ Fred E. Wagoner, "Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo", (Washington DC: National Defense University Research Directorate, 1980), 21.

⁴⁷⁵ "Jersey City's Riots", *New York Times*, 5 August 1964.

overwhelming numbers of Olenga's soldiers who were intent on ransacking the residences and businesses of Stanleyville's white and Asian populations. To negotiate their safety, Belgian diplomat Baron Patrick Nothomb contacted General Olenga at Camp Ketele, the former base of the ANC in Stanleyville. Dressed in an oversized uniform, at first Olenga was sympathetic to Nothomb's protests concerning the behaviour of the invading army. Olenga's mood and that of the Simbas congregated in the camp quickly changed when the question of possible American military intervention arose. Olenga declared amongst other denunciation of US activity that his forces were fighting against thousands of American soldiers and that his troops had captured a hundred of them. These delusions continued as he accused Belgium of dropping an atomic bomb on a Congolese town killing 100,000 people in the process.⁴⁷⁶

In fairness to Olenga, there was an element of truth in his accusations. From January 1963 to May 1964, American military support to the Congolese government in its efforts to subdue rebel activities had increased significantly. As we will see later in greater detail, this assistance included providing pilots and providing maintenance crew for the upkeep of their Harvard T-6 aircraft. In February 1964 as a result of the Kwilu revolt the Department of State changed its Congo military strategy from one of psychological warfare to one of active combat and, in April 1964, Johnson approved a recommendation that would see six T-28 Trojan light attack aircraft and ten H-21 helicopters⁴⁷⁷ to the Congolese Air Force through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). This programme was phased in from the 30 January 1964 in order to retrain the Congolese National Army.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁶ Reed, *op.cit.* 29-31.

⁴⁷⁷ The Piasecki H-21, a multi-mission helicopter, came to be known as the 'Flying Banana'.

⁴⁷⁸ See "Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, 30 January 1961, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 158.

While the next few days in Stanleyville were relatively quiet by Simba standards, from 11 August the mood changed dramatically for the American consulate officials and for the hundreds of foreign nationals. Hoyt and his colleagues were the victims of a savage beating and American flags were forced into their mouths while this continued. Belgian nationals were also the victims of beatings.⁴⁷⁹ Just over a week later with radio reports falsely claiming Olenga had been killed in Bakuvu, a city to the south of Stanleyville, this commander of the Simba forces ordered the immediate arrest of all Americans in the Congo. There were, in his words, to be "judged without pity".⁴⁸⁰

If the situation in Stanleyville had taken on dramatic tones for the city's small American contingent and those US citizens living in areas controlled by the Simba, life for the remaining Belgian and foreign nationals was also gradually becoming far worse. Even an intervention by the Red Cross in late September failed to evoke any sympathy from Lumumbists such as Christophe Gbenye and Gaston Soumialot. These leaders of the revolutionary movement had arrived in Stanleyville shortly before.

Although personal accounts of their experiences may seem anecdotal in a study of this type, those given by survivors of the Stanleyville hostage crisis such as Belgian national Michèle Timmermans-Zoll⁴⁸¹ serve a double purpose: to underline the gravity of the situation for hostages, a gravity which intensified throughout the four-month period that Stanleyville was under siege, and to underline the feeling of hopelessness which dominated any attempt to negotiate with rebel leaders. Ultimately, these hostages became mere bargaining tools in a far more wide-reaching context which encapsulated the proxy wars between communist and western ideologies.

⁴⁷⁹ Reed, *op.cit.* 46-67.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁴⁸¹ See, page 238 of this study.

When examining this particular episode of the Congo's many wars, it is difficult to find a more succinct and accurate evaluation of the situation unfolding in Stanleyville than that given by William Brubeck to President Johnson on 6 August 1964. With this stronghold of Lumumbism now firmly in the hands of forces led by the self-appointed General Olenga, the assessment provided by the NSC was that in the following days all of the eastern portion of the Congo and its capital would fall to the same fate. This would lead to the central government collapsing and leave a power vacuum exploitable by Communists.⁴⁸²

The strategic aspect of the United States' traditional approach to warfare having been decided upon, finding the means and the ways to implement such as strategy was the cause of much debate for members of the NSC.⁴⁸³ Effectively, in spite of the vast quantities of financial, technical, and military assistance provided by the US, Belgium and, to a lesser extent Israel,⁴⁸⁴ the perennial problem affecting the Congolese government's ability to bring any semblance of order to a chaotic context was the inability of its armed forces to do so. Although these forces existed, they were not considered to be "useable" by the NSC. In August 1964, in the face of such a dilemma the question was how an army capable of defeating the Simba could be found with such short notice.

The alternatives, in a context in which UN peacekeepers had been withdrawn shortly before, were very few and presented their own problems: Belgium was reticent to take action lest reprisals be taken against its nationals in rebel held areas; an even greater reticence was shown by other European countries; a force comprised of troops from

⁴⁸² "Memorandum from William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson", Washington, 6 August 1964, *Congo*, FRUS, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 199.

⁴⁸³ For more information on the strategy of ends, means and ways, see Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1976.

⁴⁸⁴ According to Warren Bass, the latter's efforts stemmed from a desire "to break its regional diplomatic isolation by reaching out to postcolonial Africa. See, Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance*, (New York: OUP, 2003), 70.

African nations would take too long to organise and would oblige Tshombe into making compromises to an OAU which had been critical of his appointment as Prime Minister; the US would have to request the return of UN forces. This, however, meant coming to an agreement with the anti-UN Soviet Union. The "best practical prospect", according to William Brubeck of the NSC, was for the US and Belgium to help Tshombe "organise and equip a force of Katangan ex-gendarmes led by white mercenaries".⁴⁸⁵

To all intents and purposes, it would appear that the option to use mercenaries was rapidly evaluated and approved. Moreover, diplomatic correspondence demonstrates that this approval came from the highest level of the State Department, Dean Rusk. On the same day as Brubeck had supplied his alternatives and recommendations the US embassy in Léopoldville was informed that in order to maintain government control and contain rebel advances Tshombe should be urged to establish a gendarmerie-mercenary unit which included the employment of Belgian officers already serving as military advisors in the Congo. Once this unit was in place, the US declared that it was prepared to provide "friendly nations" with "transport, communications and other reasonable requirements needed [by] such a force". Efforts on the diplomatic front should include garnering internal support and convincing other African leaders of the need for a foreign force to intervene.⁴⁸⁶

The dangerous situation in Stanleyville, to which we shall return, provides a convenient point on which to end Part I, which has been concerned with, first, the general contexts of the Cold War and decolonization in Africa, and, secondly, with the dramatic political and military events in the Congo which affected the US government's perception of its rôle in an unstable and war-torn area. In Part II we shall first turn our attention to

⁴⁸⁵ "Memorandum from William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson", *op.cit.*

⁴⁸⁶ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo", Washington, 6 August, 1964, FRUS, Congo, *op.cit.* Document 200.

interventionist policies that were developed in other parts of the world, before returning to their implementation in the Congo and to the question, once again, of the multiple uses of non-state armed actors.

PART TWO

MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE COLD WAR: COVERT OPERATIONS FROM CHINA TO KATANGA

4. The US Covert War Apparatus
5. From Katanga to Stanleyville
6. Putting an End to the Congo Crisis

Introduction to Part Two

In the first part of this study we saw that in the twenty years or so after World War Two the United States had to adapt relatively quickly to a changing geopolitical context: the requirements of the Cold War, and the decolonisation of vast areas of the globe meant a realignment of global policies and economic strategies that had been formulated and adapted to the pre-war era.

We have also seen that the changes which affected the Congo in 1960 had potentially dire consequences for recent global and economic strategies developed by US policy planners. From an economic point of view, access to the Congo's abundant supplies of valuable minerals was critical to powering US economic and military development, while in geostrategic terms, the Congo's dominant central position in Africa and its borders with nine other countries meant that it slotted perfectly into the logic of the Domino

Theory. Having an influence over who controlled the Congo post-independence thus became a priority in Washington.

Although the CIA had helped engineer the dismissal of Patrice Lumumba, the Pan-Africanist Prime Minister considered by the US as a threat to its Cold War strategy, the assistance given to the Congo's new leader Cyrille Adoula did not achieve the objective of stabilising the Congo, the prerequisite that the US considered was needed to stop Soviet expansion. Though military assistance given to the United Nations had contributed to bringing Katanga back into the Congolese fold, and potential communist infiltration had been kept at a distance through negotiations with Antoine Gizenga's breakaway government in the Oriente Province, popular and /or communist backed/inspired rebellion which erupted in the Kwilu Province in January 1964 was once again considered as a threat to Congolese political integrity. What made the rebellion led by Pierre Mulele different this time was the combination of several factors: three other anti-American movements led by Gaston Soumaliot, Nicolas Olenga, and Laurent Désiré Kabila were receiving funding and weapons from China; the UN forces which had defeated Tshombé's and Gizenga's forces had left the country; the Congolese national forces were badly trained, badly equipped, and disloyal to the Congolese cause. The realisation that some form of increased military involvement was made even more complicated by three further considerations: racial tensions on the domestic front could be exacerbated by waging war in an African nation; and Cold War tensions already present in sub-Saharan Africa could be heightened; in August 1964, the threat of an increase in the scale of the Vietnam War loomed over the heads of US military planners. The option of sending regular US forces to fight an open and direct war to bring stability to the Congo was, therefore, dismissed.

It is with these considerations in mind that we now move on to the second part of our study. Here, we will see that despite the restrictions that had been placed on US

military intervention in the Congo it was able to put down rebellion and, once again, obtain representation for its interests in the Congo. In addition to the US successfully negotiating this threat, it managed to do so in such a way that it was in a position to deny any direct involvement in military operations. This is what CIA Director Allen Dulles referred to as "plausible deniability". The principal objective of this second part, however, is to illustrate in which way(s) military operations carried out by the US in Central America are intimately linked to those which took place in Central Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR. The US Covert Warfare Apparatus

4.1. The Development of the Central Intelligence Agency

While the most widely known efforts to stem the potential for subversive activity in the United States are those carried out by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in the 1950s, attempts at curtailing acts against the government have long been a feature of the US legislative landscape. Effective ways of staving off threats often meant staying one step ahead of a potential enemy, and this was achieved through the gathering of information and assessing its relevance to national security.

On a domestic level, the role of gathering information fell to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an organisation which found its roots in the United States Secret Service (USSS), the National Bureau of Criminal Identification (NCBI) and the Bureau of Investigation (BOI). While this type of organisation was set up to meet internal threats

such as the so-called ‘Red Scare’,⁴⁸⁷ the increase in the number of external threats to US national security such as those posed by foreign powers in pre- and wartime-America created the need for closer cooperation between intelligence services. The Duquesne Spy Ring, Operation Pastorius and Operation Magpie were attempts made by Nazi Germany to undermine US security through the gathering of intelligence and the spreading of propaganda.⁴⁸⁸

Several months before America would be drawn into direct conflict with Axis powers, World War One veteran and Medal of Honor recipient General William Donovan had been sent to London by President Roosevelt to assess Great Britain's ability to defend itself after the capitulation of France. Here, Donovan was to meet the head of the British Secret Intelligence Services (BSIS), Colonel Stewart Menzies and it was suggested that the United States also equip itself with an organisation responsible for the gathering of military intelligence and carrying out covert operations. On 11 July 1941, Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and appointed Donovan as its head. However, differences between Donovan and American playwright Robert Sherwood on the best ways to spread propaganda and government information would lead to a splitting of the functions in June 1942. Two new agencies were created: Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Office of War Information (OWI).

Assigned to conduct espionage, sabotage and morale operations against the Axis powers and to carry out research and analysis on the enemies' capabilities,⁴⁸⁹ at its peak, the OSS was to employ almost 13,000 men and women. Of them, around 7,500 served

⁴⁸⁷ See, for example, Regin Schmidt, *FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919-1943*, (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2000).

⁴⁸⁸ For more information on these operations see, Glenn P. Hastedt, *Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage*, (ABS-CLIO, 2011).

⁴⁸⁹ "A Look Back... Gen. William Donovan Heads Office of Strategic Services", <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/gen.-william-j.-donovan-heads-oss.html>, accessed 1 September, 2016.

overseas and operated in China, Burma, North Africa, India and Europe.⁴⁹⁰ However, just as the First and Second World wars had changed America's perspective on the gathering of intelligence, the Cold War also brought about the realisation that the OSS was not adapted to the changing requirements and the fear that a new war could break out at any moment. After the disbanding of the OSS in September 1945, high-level discussions now focused on how to deal with the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As had been the case with Nazi Germany, US Joint Chiefs of Staff began to fear that the Soviet Union would also seek to expand its influence throughout Europe. From here, they concluded, the USSR would then seek to gain influence in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, northern China, and Korea. It was also concluded that any open attempt to stop this expansion could lead to war.⁴⁹¹ The development of covert means was thus seen as necessary and the means which were the best adapted to the context.⁴⁹²

The first attempt at setting up an agency whose principal role was to deal with the Soviet threat came in January 1946 and the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Given the mission of correlating "all relevant information available to the US government on any given issue of national security",⁴⁹³ developments in the Mediterranean would have a resounding impact on US foreign affairs, and on the need an intelligence gathering service endowed with specific missions.

In February 1947, British authorities informed their American counterparts that in view of its commitment to the rebuilding of the United Kingdom following World War Two it was withdrawing aid provided to financial support to Greece and Italy. With fears

⁴⁹⁰ "The Office of Strategic Services: The Forerunner of Today's CIA", <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/office-of-strategic-services.html>, accessed 1 September 2016.

⁴⁹¹ Tim Weiner, *Legacy of the Ashes: The History of the CIA*, (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 11.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ "The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA", <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-beginning-of-intelligence-analysis-in-cia.html>, accessed 6 June 2017.

having been expressed on the possibility of Soviet expansion, and with fears of a second 'Red Scare' being expounded by Senator Joseph McCarthy, on 12 March 1947 President Harry S. Truman made a speech to a joint session of Congress giving warning of the danger now faced by the United States. Indeed, as well as the Soviet threat in Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union had failed to withdraw its troops from northern Iran in respect of the 1943 Tehran Declaration; had made 'frequent attempts "to coerce and intimidate Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria";⁴⁹⁴ and had rejected the 1946 Baruch Plan which called for international control over nuclear weapons. Following what became known as the Truman Doctrine and its promise "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures",⁴⁹⁵ in late June 1947 President signed the National Security Act 4-A which, in turn, created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), and the National Military Establishment (NME).⁴⁹⁶

Its mission was to advise "the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security"; making "recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security". Moreover, and in addition to its role of correlating and evaluating intelligence, in what is an acknowledgement of the perceived need to take a more proactive approach towards intelligence gathering the CIA was authorised "to perform such additional services of common concern" and to "perform such other functions and duties

⁴⁹⁴ "Truman Doctrine: President Harry S. Truman's Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947", http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp, accessed 6 June 2017.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ The act also recognised the US Air Force (USAF) as independent from the army.

related to intelligence".⁴⁹⁷ The "additional services" and "other functions and duties" are, of course, an implicit reference to types of activity: covert and clandestine.⁴⁹⁸

One of the first opportunities to test the effectiveness of these types of activity came shortly after the creation of the CIA. In France, a country with a strong socialist tradition, the interwar years had seen the growth of an alliance of left-wing movements which included the French Communist Party (PCF), the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) and the Radical Party led to the creation of the Popular Front. Holding wide public support for its ideals such as democratic socialism, social democracy, social liberalism and communism, in 1936 the Popular Front won legislative elections which saw Léon Blum elected Prime Minister.

Ceasing to exist in 1938, the Popular Front had nevertheless managed to proceed with many social reforms during its short time in office and, while this ensured a political legacy evident in French society today, it was its stance against the rise of Nazi Germany and Vichy regime collaborators which meant that its influence over French politics continued in the post-war years.⁴⁹⁹ With a highly unstable political and military situation developing in France, the left and right-wing spectrums of French politics fought to decide who would carry the Fourth French Republic through the ordeals of having to fight a colonial war in Indochina, and reuniting a French people deeply divided along political

⁴⁹⁷ "The National Security Act of 1947-July 26, 1947", Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758.

⁴⁹⁸ In regard to these two terms, and in view of their similarity in meaning, it would seem judicious at this point to clarify just which activities are deemed as being 'covert' and those which are deemed as 'clandestine'. While both signify that activities should be hidden from the public eye, covert activities are defined by the US Department of State as being 'operations that are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor'. This was the case in the Congo where surrogate troops carried out the work which, traditionally, would be carried out by regular forces of a given nation/state/sovereign entity. On the other hand, clandestine activities are operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. See, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/, accessed 17 December, 2017.

⁴⁹⁹ For further information on this episode in France's history see, for example, Julian Jackson, *The Popular front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934-1938*, (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1998).

lines. Resistance to the type of pre-war social reforms advocated by the Popular Front came from business leaders in the post-war years.

Strong popular support for socialist ideals expressed in elections held in 1946, led contemporary US intelligence to believe that the PCF could seize power whenever it wanted. Worried by the potential of seeing a communist regime on its doorstep, UK intelligence services also started to devise plans to counter the communist threat. With this consideration, and working in conjunction, US and UK authorities created the Blue Plan: a project intended to stop the PCF from coming to power through the possible use of a surrogate army. Blue Plan agents secretly contacted wealthy industrialists with the aim of funding a secret war. These included the Peugeot brothers and the heads of other leading car manufacturers who had been affected by a long series of strikes initiated by powerful unions. Later, in June 1947, and in the face of continued communist-backed industrial action, the CIA, MI-6 and French paramilitaries had even gone to the point of planning a coup d'état.⁵⁰⁰ While this drastic measure was never put into force, a further CIA plan given the name '*Paix et Liberté*' (peace and freedom) provided funds and propaganda to anti-communist elements in order to stop communist parties from gaining a foothold through further industrial strife.⁵⁰¹

With the number of areas threatened by possible Soviet infiltration increasing on a global scale and covert activities becoming more aggressive in nature⁵⁰², the realisation that these activities would require greater organisation led to a recasting of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) and the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) in

⁵⁰⁰ Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 87-88.

⁵⁰¹ *Paix et Liberté* had branches in several European countries and carried out psychological operations such as printing anti-communist posters, broadcasting anti-communist propaganda on the radio, and organising anti-communist demonstrations. See, Daniele Ganser, *op.cit.* 103.

⁵⁰² These activities include the organisation of a military coup in Iran in 1953; flying relief supplies to Chinese nationalist forces using CIA front company Civil Air Transport (CAT); the evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationalists to Taiwan using the same means; and flying military supplies to French forces at Dien Bien Phu.

1948. Headed by Frank Wisner, the OPC specialised in psychological operations and paramilitary actions. The Korean War which saw both the Soviet Union and China provide help to North Korean forces once more led to a growth in the need for the increased provision of reliable intelligence, and the need for more weapons in the battle against communist influence. In respect of these considerations, the 4 April 1951 saw the setting up of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) through National Security Council directive 10/2. Given the task of weighing up the "desirability and feasibility" of proposed covert programmes and major covert operations,⁵⁰³ the PSB also specialised in what were to become known as 'PsyOps', i.e., attacking communism through winning the 'hearts and minds' of populations in areas under threat. It also included convincing the American public that its way of life was in danger and that a common approach to the threat was needed. The formulating of this consensus would be achieved through the publishing of anti-communist propaganda; through the use of buzzwords such as 'containment' to persuade populations of the evil nature of the enemy's intentions; and through radio stations such as *Voice of America* (VOA). Extensive broadcasts by VOA were to be heard in Eastern Europe and in Latin America with audiences being promised that they might hear 'bad news' but, at least, it was the 'truth'.⁵⁰⁴

4.2. Early CIA Support to Anti-Communist Non-State Armed Actors

Though the CIA made several unarmed attempts to subvert communist activity in Europe (in France, but also in Italy and Albania), the realisation that Asia, too, was open to communist takeover led to the creation of a network which would enable the CIA to intervene militarily and indirectly in a number of conflicts. If early support given to non-

⁵⁰³ "Coordination and Policy Approval of Covert Operations", Washington, February 23, 1967, FRUS, Congo 1964-1968, Document 263.

⁵⁰⁴ "VOA Through the Years", 3 April 2017, <https://www.insidevoa.com/a/3794247.html>, accessed 7 June 2017.

state armed groups on this continent did not involve -for obvious reasons- the CIA itself, it is worth our while to take a closer look at covert operations in China as they provided a model for later CIA intervention.

The signing of an agreement between the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1936 had targeted an end to Japanese occupation of the country. However, with this objective achieved and Japanese forces surrendering in August 1945, these two opposing Chinese factions reignited a dispute which had seen them come face to face in a war that took place from 1927-1937. Confronted with the news of rapid territorial gains made by the CCP, as early as September 13, 1945 US military officials had toyed with the idea of deploying forces to key points in China to 'aid order restoration'.⁵⁰⁵ By the end of the month, consideration of the plan had transformed into realisation and on 30 September, the US First Marine Division entered Tientsin in northern China. In a city made famous during the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901, newspapers speculated on the identity of those who had carried out attacks on the Communist Eighth Route Army in August.⁵⁰⁶ In November, with speculation continuing, further reports told of how US troops were now in direct military confrontation with communist forces and were said to be collaborating with the KMT.

On October 31, for example, heavy machine guns had been used against communist troops and, earlier, American spotter planes had been used to direct KMT forces.⁵⁰⁷ With these regular forces being among the first of up to 50,000 marines deployed to protect key infrastructural installations in China,⁵⁰⁸ they had been joined in efforts to stem communist advances by another aerial force calling itself the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or

⁵⁰⁵ "US Garrison Duty in China Forecast", *New York Times*, 13 September 1945.

⁵⁰⁶ "Tientsin is Joyous in Hailing Marines", *New York Times*, 30 September 1945.

⁵⁰⁷ "China Reds Charge US. Active Help to Chiang in Strife", *New York Times*, 5 November 1945.

⁵⁰⁸ William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II*, (London: Zed Books, 2023), 20.

'Flying Tigers'. Reinitiating efforts which had seen combat against Japanese forces in WWII, and operating under the auspices of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), the Flying Tigers of CNRRA Air Transport (CAT), now found themselves flying highly dangerous missions in order to provide support to nationalist-held positions. This included flying goods and ammunition into affected areas and airlifting wounded troops out of combat zones.⁵⁰⁹

The appearance of CAT in the Chinese conflict was an interesting development as far as the provision of support to non-state armed groups is concerned. Formed in 1946 after General Claire J. Chennault had entered into a partnership with former special assistant to the US Department of Justice, Whiting Willauer, both were looking for a business venture following at the end of WWII. It was Chennault who came up with the idea of starting a new airline in China,⁵¹⁰ and, with legal advice being provided by Thomas Gardiner Corcoran,⁵¹¹ and financial support from Robert Prescott, the president of the US-based Flying Tiger Line, Chennault used his friendship with Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of nationalist forces, to obtain a franchise to operate flights.

With this financial support being withdrawn shortly after, Chennault and Willauer obtained a loan from a Chinese bank and set about purchasing aircraft in respect of a contract signed with CNRRA. The subsequent purchase of over twenty C-46 and C-47 cargo planes from the Philippines and from Honolulu⁵¹² meant that CAT was able to provide essential supplies to nationalist forces. Flights were often carried out in the face of attacks from communist forces and a number of pilots were taken prisoner.⁵¹³

⁵⁰⁹ Christopher Robbins, *Air America: The Explosive True Story of the CIA's Secret Airline*, (London: Macmillan, 1979), 36.

⁵¹⁰ Alfred T. Cox, "Civil Air Transport (CAT): A Proprietary Airline, 1946-1955", *Clandestine Services Historical Paper*, No. 87, Volume I of IV, (SO Division, April 1969), 4.

⁵¹¹ A former advisor to Roosevelt.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*

⁵¹³ Robbins, *op.cit.* 36.

When CAT found itself forced to leave the Chinese mainland towards the end of 1948, having lost seventy-three planes through the retreat it now found itself in dire financial straits. However, with the CIA realising what an effective tool the essentially private venture CAT had been in the fight against communism, in 1949 the intelligence agency stepped in. The newly-named Civil Air Transport was to become the first on a long list of proprietary airlines and was to form part of what was known as Air America.

The creation of proprietary airlines such as Air America was a valuable asset the CIA as it allowed the United States to intervene in foreign conflicts while maintaining a certain degree of secrecy. On the other hand, with Air America not constituting in itself a fighting force, the CIA now found it necessary to create a network of military forces that would carry out this role. This complex clandestine network in which the true identities of its participants was sometimes unknown included aircraft pilots, weapons technicians, arms dealers, disaffected leaders and, in the cases we are about to study, those who found themselves disaffected through the arrival of a new political regime. The study of CIA operations in Guatemala known as Operation PBSUCCESS is an essential step in understanding in which ways subsequent covert interventions were organised, and understanding the motivations of those who would take part. As US intervention in Guatemala was its first full-scale attempt at overthrowing a foreign leader, our next section will be far more extensive in its detail.

4.3. Containing Communism in Central America

Since the earliest developments in US foreign policy Latin America had held a special place: the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt's Corollary both providing forewarnings on attempts by European powers to stray into areas under US influence. Without this influence, as underlined by President Richard Nixon some years later, the United States

"could not expect to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world."⁵¹⁴ After 1944, and a popular revolution in the Central American country of Guatemala, the US backed dictatorship of Jorge Ubico Casteñada had been replaced by a socialist regime led by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. At a time when socialism was akin to communism in the minds of State Department officials and the Domino Theory dominated geopolitical thinking, the arrival of Arbenz generated fears that countries neighbouring Guatemala would follow its lead and turn towards experimentation with Soviet Bloc ideology. In some way this had to be prevented.

In similar circumstances to those which had led to Belgium colonising the Congo, in 1844 King Léopold I had set about acquiring land in the region of Izabal in eastern Guatemala. Operating under the Belgian Colonisation Company, this acquisition gave him the right to exploit the area's natural resources.⁵¹⁵ Several years later, it was Germany's turn to expand its territorial and economic interests when it also set up coffee plantations in Guatemala's northern regions. Its extended foray into this part of Central America explained the presence of many Guatemalans of German origin. These included future president, Jacobo Arbenz. Before long, with the United States becoming dominant in Central America after its defeat of Spain in 1898, Minor Cooper Keith of the United Fruit Company (UFCO) was to expand his own business interests to Guatemala after being invited to run the country's postal service.⁵¹⁶ UFCO's expansion continued with the acquisition of 50% of British company Elders and Fyffes' banana plantations in Guatemala and also with the acquisition of 50% of the Vaccaro Brothers' interests. The Vaccaro Brothers were involved in the shipping of fresh produce from Central America to the US.

⁵¹⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Hopes and Prospects*, (London: Penguin, 2010), 37.

⁵¹⁵ F. Gunther Eyck, *L'Expansion Belge sous Léopold Ier (1831-1865): Recueil d'Etudes*, (Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Brussels, 1965), 293.

⁵¹⁶ "Chronology of the United Fruit Company", <https://www.unitedfruit.org/chron.htm>, accessed 8 June 2017.

With the United States making its own territorial and influential expansion in Central America through an invasion of Nicaragua in 1909 and subsequent interventions in Cuba, Panama and the Honduras, UFCO's business interests continued to grow. Its business activities were expanded to Jamaica, Cuba and the Dominican Republic and, in South America, the company had acquired large portions of Colombia and Ecuador. In Europe, domination of the banana market came with its fleet of one hundred refrigerated ships, the largest private navy in the world.⁵¹⁷ Despite a substantial loss in profits caused by the Great Depression and a loss of productivity brought on by Nazi activity in Caribbean shipping routes, UFCO possessed massive tracts of Guatemalan farming land and has made mergers and agreements giving it substantial influence in Guatemalan affairs. Indeed, while it was estimated that UFCO controlled over 40% of Guatemalan farming land, the company was exempt from paying taxes and import duties.⁵¹⁸

In 1944, UFCO's fortunes were to change radically as far as its Guatemalan operations were concerned. Jorge Ubico Casteñada, the president of Guatemala and dictator of a country labelled a banana republic, was deposed in a revolution which saw Juan José Arévalo Bermojoa come to power. Classing himself as a 'spiritual socialist',⁵¹⁹ Arévalo set about introducing social and economic reforms such as the establishment of a minimum wage and the development of Guatemala's agrarian-based economy. His policies were a far call from those of Ubico who opposed industrialisation, and forbade the use of terms such as "communist", "trade union", "strike", and "labour rights".⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁷ Peter Chapman, "Rotten fruit", *Financial Times*, 15 May, 2015.

⁵¹⁸ Walter La Feber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, (Cornell University: Norton, 1993), 120-121.

⁵¹⁹ For a definition of 'spiritual socialism' see Vaneesa Cook, "Bernie Sanders and the Spiritual Case for Socialism", 25 November 2015, accessed 7 June 2017, <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/bernie-sanders-spiritual-socialism-debs-wallace>.

⁵²⁰ Marcelo Bucheli, "Good dictator, bad dictator: United Fruit Company and Economic Nationalism in Central America in the Twentieth Century", (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006), 15.

Soon after the introduction of reforms, UFCO started to grow concerned at the Guatemalan government's empathy for workers: new labour laws enabled them to set up representative bodies and demand higher wages. UFCO saw itself as being particularly targeted by the reforms and, in some respects, even suffering from a form of discrimination. Matters were not helped when strikes over pay and conditions at two UFCO plantations - Bananera and Tiquisate- led to significant losses in production. These two plantations covered hundreds of square miles of Guatemalan land and employed up to 40,000 Guatemalans.⁵²¹ In this context of growing industrial unrest throughout the late 1940s, US officials' apprehension towards possible communist interference in Guatemalan affairs also grew. For the State department, greater political freedom and the creation of labour unions were sure signs of subversion.

Whereas the *Partido Acción Revolucionaria* (PAR), or Revolutionary Action Party, had seen little opposition after the Guatemalan revolution, from 1947 a small number of political groups began to dispute the position of Arévalo and Arbenz's relatively conservative movement. Little by little, these groups such as the *Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala* (CGTG), the *Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala* (CNCG), the *Sindicato de Trabajadores de Educacion de Guatemala* (STEG) and the *Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social* (IGSS) were all perceived by the intelligence services as having undergone some degree of communist infiltration. By 1952, according to reports, these organisations representing workers in agriculture, education and the government social security agency had put themselves into a position whereby they could dominate the administrative machinery. This would allow these groups to gain a heavy influence over the law-making procedure. Furthermore, while presenting themselves

⁵²¹ For further information on this aspect of UFCO's business activities in Guatemala see: Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 91-94.

as representatives of a "People's Democracy", what was perceived by US analysts as the true communist objective behind penetration into the machinery was the disruption of Guatemala's internal mechanisms. This would reduce the western world's influence to a minimum and, as a consequence, the provision of protection by western forces would be weakened.⁵²²

As far as this law-making process was concerned, one Act of parliament in particular had been seen as removing the west from positions of influence in Guatemala. This was the Agrarian Reform Law, or Decree 900. The intention of this law passed in June 1952 was to redistribute unused lands greater than 224 acres in size to local peasant farmers. In all, around 100,000 Guatemalan families benefitted from the reforms.⁵²³ In return, land owners were awarded government bonds.

The forced appropriation of land greatly angered UFCO. It stood not only to lose what was an ever decreasing influence in Guatemalan political affairs but also substantial financial involvement. Land reforms upset an already fragile social context too. Without proper enforcement of the law, conflict broke out among peasants eager to make claims to land and between the peasants and landowners. As a result of suits brought by the latter, in early 1953 Guatemala's Supreme Court declared Decree 900 illegal and put an end to appropriations. In turn, Arbenz dismissed the court and found himself in an alliance with the unions. Having legal pathway to oppose Arbenz's decisions, landowners now took to attacking peasants with violence.⁵²⁴

⁵²² "Letter from the Ambassador to Guatemala (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong)", Guatemala City, 13 February 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, *Guatemala*, Document 34.

⁵²³ "Comite Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA), Tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio-economico del sector agricola: Guatemala", (Washington, D.C.: Union Panamericana, Secretaria General de la Organizacion de los Estados Americanos, 1965), 41.

⁵²⁴ Jim Handy, "The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution": The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform, 1952-54, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Duke University Press, 1988, 693.

Of the political groups which had come to prominence during debates on land reforms and having benefitted the most from Arbenz's political magnanimity was the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT), or the Guatemalan Party of Labour. Founded in 1949 by José Manuel Fortuny, it had participated in the seizing of land and had vastly increased its popularity in rural areas. Overtly declaring itself to be communist in its political orientation, the PGT had long been considered by the CIA as a vector through which the Soviet Union could establish a beachhead in Guatemalan affairs and, indeed, in South America as a whole.⁵²⁵ Although PGT activists only numbered around two hundred and had failed to infiltrate the army, railroad and teachers' unions,⁵²⁶ by March 1952 its influence had grown in such a way as to warrant increasing attention from CIA analysts. In this respect, National Intelligence Estimate 62 (NIE-62) provided an interesting summary of the situation.

Exercising an influence far out of proportion to their numerical strength, communist activity was seen as adversely affecting US interests and constituted a threat to US security. The success in question derived from the ability of communists and others to identify themselves with the Revolution of 1944. Any opposition to communism lacked leadership and organisation and, as yet, the Guatemalan administration's own propaganda had succeeded in fending off all criticism of communist ideology.⁵²⁷

As for future political developments, these depended on the outcome of the conflict between the Guatemalan government and the United Fruit Company. Should UFCO submit to demands for land reforms, Arbenz would find himself in a stronger position politically.

⁵²⁵ Nicholas Cullather, "Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954", History Staff, *Center for the Study of Intelligence*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 1994, 16.

⁵²⁶ Cullather, *op.cit.* 21.

⁵²⁷ "National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-62)", *Present Political Situation in Guatemala and Possible Developments during 1952*, Washington, 11 March, 1952, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/iv/20208.htm>, accessed 8 June 2017.

Worse still, should UFCO withdraw all together, Guatemala's economic situation would deteriorate and the subsequent political instability would open the door to government organisation of the economy and, therefore, increased communist influence. As a consequence of this increase in influence, anti-communist forces would find their capability to oppose communism made more complicated.⁵²⁸ As far as the latter were concerned, from the moment when Arbenz completed plans for his land reforms the CIA began to look at the possibility of providing support to his opponents. These included the Catholic Church, Guatemalan business leaders, a large proportion of university students, and railway and teachers' unions. However, for reasons explained above, the CIA also began to look at the possibility of recruiting foreign leaders to support its cause.

4.4. US-Sponsored Non-State Armed Actors in Guatemala

The CIA's initial efforts to provide support for anti-communist opposition concentrated on the exiled Colonel Castillo Armas. Part of a previous but unsuccessful coup against former Guatemalan leader Jean José Arévalo, Armas now found himself in the Honduras. On 17 March 1952, a report was sent to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms. It revealed that conversations had taken place with Armas four days earlier and that the colonel was seen as being capable of overthrowing Arbenz but lacked plans and resources. While this analysis of the situation was confirmed a day later, on a positive note Armas was seen as having possible support from ex-President Tiburcio Carias of Honduras, current Honduran president Manuel Galvez, President

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and from President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.⁵²⁹

With this type of international support available, the next step in the CIA's plan to overthrow Arbenz came in the form of a psyops operation intended, if possible, to remove Arbenz through non-violent means. Setting up a similar anti-communist movement to that used in France -*Paix et Liberté*- some five years earlier, the Free Guatemalan Committee (FGC) was seen as a means of generating anti-communist sentiment inside the country itself. Using what was referred to as a 'PW' campaign,⁵³⁰ the State Department considered the spreading of propaganda as a way of 'forestalling any premature attempt to take over the government by force'.⁵³¹ This consideration was no doubt linked to over blowing the importance of the communist movement in Guatemala and therefore presenting a situation whereby the 'elephant was shaking with alarm before the mouse'.⁵³² For reasons unknown, however, and although the Department of State's position became official US policy, the CIA's own assessment of the Guatemalan context led to the development of a covert action programme known as Operation PBFORTUNE.⁵³³

The decision to use military means to overthrow Arbenz was made shortly after a visit to Washington by President Somoza in April 1952. Promising that that if he were supplied weapons, with help from Castillo Armas he could achieve the aims. Carlos Castillo Armas, the former Director of Guatemala's military academy had long been

⁵²⁹ "Guatemalan Situation", Memorandum from the Acting Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, March 17, 1952, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7.

⁵³⁰ "Elements of a Nonviolent Action Campaign", <http://www.cpt.org/files/Campaigns.pdf>, accessed 7 June 2017.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Gerald K. Haines, "CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954", *CIA History Staff Analysis*, June 1995, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/docs/doc01.pdf>, accessed 7 June 2017.

⁵³³ PBFORTUNE, sometimes written PB/FORTUNE is an example of a code word or a code name referred to by the CIA as a 'cryptonym'. In turn, these cryptonyms can refer to operations, countries, persons, etc. In the case of PBFORTUNE, one may speculate that this is a reference to José Manuel Fortuny, the leader of the PGT.

identified as pro-American. Born in 1914, this man of short stature and slight build was seen as having a strong personality, being serious, hard-working, studious, possessing an analytical mind, and being a light drinker.⁵³⁴ With only six years of primary school education and two years at a technical school behind him, Armas had embarked on a military career at a young age. Entering military academy aged 18, Castillo Armas quickly rose through the ranks of commissioned officers and by June 1944 had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. In the meantime, he had served as First Chief of Expeditionary Force for the Defence of the Atlantic Sector and, before being appointed Director of Military Academy, had served on the General Staff. During his time on the General Staff he had attended courses at Fort Leavenworth military base in Kansas and, he had also cooperated with US missions and the US Military Attaché to Guatemala.⁵³⁵

Seen as a supporter of Colonel Javier Arana⁵³⁶, (an *Aranista*), in August 1949 Castillo Armas was forced to resign his commission. Not hiding his opposition to Arbenz, in early November 1950 he led an attack on a military base and was subsequently arrested. After his escape, Castillo Armas started to plan his revenge from Honduras.⁵³⁷ With the man for the job having been identified by the CIA, in March 1952, it was agreed that Castillo Armas "must be contracted" [to the CIA] to be part of future operations.⁵³⁸ Next, with the revolutionary needing to be armed, moves were made in June 1952 to purchase enough arms for 650 men. These arms included 500 hand grenades, 180 machine guns, 500 automatic rifles and around 600,000 rounds of ammunition. Although only identified in

⁵³⁴ "Guatemalan Situation", *op.cit.*

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ Arana was one of the three leaders of a military junta that ruled Guatemala from October 1944-March 1945.

⁵³⁷ "Guatemalan Situation", *op.cit.*

⁵³⁸ "Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station [place not declassified]", Washington, March 22, 1952, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Secret.

CIA documents as a person of "utmost confidence",⁵³⁹ it can be speculated that the supplier of weapons was arms dealer Sam Cummings. A former US Army weapons specialist at Fort Lee, Virginia, Cummings became a CIA employee in June 1950. Over the coming years and posing as a Hollywood producer, Cummings bought surplus German weapons which were shipped to Chinese Nationalist forces in Taiwan. Also, seeing how much money could be made from such deals, Cummings founded the company Interarms in 1953. Later, he obtained contracts to supply weapons to Fulgencio Batista among others.⁵⁴⁰

With weapons supplies guaranteed, Castillo Armas's forces would be provided air support in the form of flying boats piloted by Nicaraguans and Hondurans.⁵⁴¹ Armed with flame throwers and machine guns,⁵⁴² air cover was also to be provided to separate groups of professional gunmen ready to eliminate a prepared list of "Category I" and "Category II" communists. In this respect, Dominican Republic President Trujillo had also promised to supply military aid to the project in return for the killing of four Santo Dominicans residing in Guatemala.⁵⁴³ With the chances of PBFORTUNE succeeding being put at 50%, and with the overall objective seeking to set up a military junta, it was also thought that if a Guatemalan military supposedly loyal to Castillo Armas decided not to support the coup the chances would be much lower.⁵⁴⁴ With approval for PBFORTUNE being given in September 1952, this type of speculation on the outcome of the operation was soon to be

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Tim Weiner, "Samuel Cummings, 71, Trader in Weapons on a Grand Scale", *New York Times*, May 5, 1998. For more information on Sam Cummings' activities see: Patrick Brogan and Albert Zarca, *Deadly Business: Sam Cummings, Interarms, and the Arms Trade*, (New York: Norton, 1983). For more information in French, see: Daniel Provence, *Sam Cummings: "Je suis un marchand d'armes"*, (Paris: Editions Alain Lefevre, 1979).

⁵⁴¹ Haines, *op.cit.* 19.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ Ibid, 3.

⁵⁴⁴ "Telegram from the CIA Station [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency", June 25, 1952", Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 1.

irrelevant. In October, Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of the CIA at the time, was informed that the project had been uncovered and immediately terminated all operations.⁵⁴⁵

The exact circumstances in which the plan to overthrow Arbenz was discovered remain unclear. This said, and as Haines suggests, the discovery had come through a combination of security leaks and boasts from General Somoza about his role in operations.⁵⁴⁶ Secretary of State Dean Acheson also feared that the discovery of US implication in operation would destroy the Good Neighbour policy⁵⁴⁷ and draw criticism for its failure to support the terms of the 1947 Rio Pact.⁵⁴⁸

Although the decision to shelve operation PBFORTUNE gave Arbenz a temporary stay of execution, State Department apprehension about his alliance with Guatemalan communists meant that by early summer 1953, the question of his removal was once more the subject of discussions in official circles. Resolve hardened over the next two months or so and on September 11 of that year a new programme to forcibly remove the Guatemalan president was on the table. This was followed on 18 September by a plan referred to as the "General Plan" which laid out just how the CIA intended to prepare and finance the "extremely difficult and sensitive operation" over the coming eight months.⁵⁴⁹ With a preliminary budget amounting to some \$3 million, those responsible for finding an appropriate cryptonym for the operation had come up with PBSUCCESS. This gave an indication of the level of confidence of those involved. Again, with the objective of firstly creating internal insurrection and destabilising the government, the second phase of the

⁵⁴⁵ Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 120-122.

⁵⁴⁶ Haines, *op.cit.* Footnotes, 10.

⁵⁴⁷ The so-called 'Good Neighbour' policy called for the non-intervention of the US into Latin-American affairs.

⁵⁴⁸ More commonly known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Rio Pact agreed that an attack on a member of the Organisation of American States (OAS) would be considered as an attack on all of its members.

⁵⁴⁹ "Memorandum for the Record: PBSUCCESS", Washington, September 18, 1953, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret.

operation would involve paramilitary invasion with the complicity of US allies. In short, these were the classic characteristics of a CIA covert operation.⁵⁵⁰

As far as the first phase of the operation was concerned -the psychological aspect-, the effect of actions carried out among the farming and student populations were to be measured and evaluated in what was termed as a 'psychological barometer' report. Other moves included the drawing up of a list of the twenty-five most dangerous Guatemalans in order to subject them to character assassination abroad, the publishing of pictures of comparisons between the living conditions of leaders and the "peons". This was considered to be of special value insofar as morale was concerned.⁵⁵¹ Another interesting technique, one also used during operations against Cuba some years later,⁵⁵² was the broadcasting of anti-government propaganda through radio stations such as *Radio Internacional*⁵⁵³ or *La Voz de la Liberación*. The latter, calling for resistance to communism and support for Castillo Armas,⁵⁵⁴ gave broadcasts from Miami in an operation known as SHERWOOD. As such, its activities echoed those of Robin Hood and his fight against a tyrannical leader.

With 'black' propaganda operations continuing through the pasting of over 100,000 anti-communist stickers on buses and trains, and with anti-government graffiti and slogans being painted on walls,⁵⁵⁵ a crackdown on student activities and the feeling that the revolution was being carried out on a purely intellectual level led to Operation PBSUCCESS moving from its propaganda phase to its paramilitary phase in May 1954.

⁵⁵⁰ Fabian Escalante, *The Secret War: CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-62*, (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995), 29.

⁵⁵¹ "Tasks for Chief of Station, Guatemala", Washington, September, 25, 1953, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. Secret.

⁵⁵² In 1960, the Gibraltar Steamship Company, a CIA front company, established Radio Swan and operated from Swan Island in the Caribbean. From here, it broadcast anti-Castro propaganda in an attempt to discredit the Cuban leader. See, Tom Kneitel, "Inside the CIA's Secret Radio Paradise: Part II", *Popular Communications*, December 1985, 18-22.

⁵⁵³ Cullather, *op.cit.* 46.

⁵⁵⁴ Cullather, *op.cit.* 55.

⁵⁵⁵ The '32' campaign, for example, consisted in painting the number 32 on walls. This was in protest at Article 32 of the Guatemalan constitution which banned international political parties.

On occasions, those who were to be involved on a military level also participated in the spreading of propaganda. This can be seen through Castillo's dropping of leaflets on Guatemala City from an aircraft in February 1954.⁵⁵⁶

In preparation for paramilitary intervention, in March 1954 CIA director attended the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela. With the successful overthrow of Mohammed Mosaddegh of Iran in August 1953 having been achieved, as Max Gordon states Dulles's intention in Caracas was to "marshal and crystallise" Latin American opinion in order to destroy the Arbenz regime.⁵⁵⁷ In receiving support from a number of Latin American countries such as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, and thus gaining some form of international legitimacy, Dulles's case was further strengthened when it was discovered that a shipment of weapons from Czechoslovakia had reached Guatemala. This gave the former lawyer the excuse to supply Nicaragua and Honduras with weapons on the pretext that these two countries faced invasion.⁵⁵⁸

By the end of March 1954 with plans for military intervention in Guatemala under way, another string to the bow of CIA operations headquarters in Florida was the addition of a small air force which would be used to intimidate Guatemala's armed forces. Given the cryptonym PBCABOOSE,⁵⁵⁹ Civil Air Transport pilots transferred from operations in the Far East were offered \$2,000 per month to take part in missions.⁵⁶⁰ Recruited by Whiting

⁵⁵⁶ See, "Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida", 30 January, 1954, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by J.D. Esterline.

⁵⁵⁷ Max Gordon, "A Case History of US Subversion: Guatemala, 1954", *Science and Society: An Independent Journal of Marxism*, Volume XXXV, Number 2, Summer 1971, 143.

⁵⁵⁸ Gordon, *op.cit.* 144-145.

⁵⁵⁹ "Memorandum for Chief of Project, Control of PBSUCCESS Black Flights Through Panama Air Traffic Control", 8 April 1954, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000916573.pdf, accessed 7 June, 2016.

⁵⁶⁰ Cullather, *op.cit.* 51.

Willauer of CNRRA Air Transport fame, these pilots flew a dozen aircraft⁵⁶¹ -some purchased by Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza- and were based at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, the same air base which was used for operations during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

From the point of view of the personnel used during PBSUCCESS, it is interesting to note that many of those involved in operations in Guatemala would also be involved in later operations in Cuba and in the Congo. William 'Rip' Robertson is one example. From an early stage, this former US Marine had been involved in the Executive Action programme⁵⁶² and as far as Guatemala was concerned, Robertson had unsuccessfully attempted to attack a train carrying weapons to support Arbenz's regime.⁵⁶³ Later, after working as an advisor for Anastasio Somoza, Robertson would command Cuban Exile ground forces during the Bay of Pigs operation⁵⁶⁴ and, in the Congo, this man nicknamed the 'Alligator' would lead a unit of Cuban Exile commandos in operations against Simba rebels.⁵⁶⁵ Similar involvement by others including Ricardo Chavez, or 'El Mejicano' will be discussed as this study progresses.

By May 1954, with plans for paramilitary invasion still in the preparatory stage, as seen above, the delivery of Czech weapons in Puerto Barrios was to underline the need for speedy intervention if Arbenz's armed forces were to be successfully defeated or 'contained'. If attempts by the CIA to destroy the shipment of arms before its arrival in Guatemala had failed, what they had demonstrated to Arbenz was that the US State

⁵⁶¹ The aircraft used in Operation PBSUCCESS were three C-47 Cargo planes; six F-47 Thunderbolt fighter bombers, one P-38 Lightning fighter plane, one Cessna 180 and one Cessna 140. See, Cullather, *op.cit.* 50.

⁵⁶² The name given to the programme to remove foreign leaders.

⁵⁶³ Burton Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA*, (Tree Farm Books, 2001), 344–346, quoted in Larry Hancock, with Stuart Wexler, *Shadow Warfare: The History of America's Undeclared Wars*, (Counterpoint: Berkeley, 2014), 87.

⁵⁶⁴ W. Thomas Smith, Jr., *Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency*, (New York: Facts on File, 2003), 194.

⁵⁶⁵ Villafaña, *op.cit.*, 85.

Department was now intensifying its efforts. At the end of May, for example, US ships and submarines patrolled the seas around Guatemala and the Panama Canal zone in order to stop possible further shipments of arms. Although this violated international maritime laws through instances such as the illegal boarding of French and British freighters, Operation HARDROCK BAKER achieved its intimidatory aims.⁵⁶⁶ With Castillo Armas's warplanes also making threatening flyovers above the Guatemalan capital, by the beginning of June the population of Guatemala City was expecting an invasion any day. And, in spite of efforts by Arbenz to broker some sort of peace deal, on 15 June 1954, 480 of Armas's troops gathered in Honduran towns bordering Guatemala from where an attack was to be launched

Insofar as the actual invasion is concerned, there is a saying in Latin America that a revolution must succeed in forty-eight hours or it is doomed.⁵⁶⁷ In the case of Guatemala, this part of Central America was no exception to the rule. Despite reports of defeats suffered by rebel forces "on all fronts", but particularly at the main landing point of Puerto Barrios, the port where Castillo Armas had planned to land material for his revolution,⁵⁶⁸ by the evening of the 27 June 1954 Arbenz had stepped down from his role as president and a military junta led by Armas had taken over the reins of the government.

Although the role of the United States in the overthrow of Arbenz was met with heavy criticism in the press, and later at the UN General Assembly in October 1954, PBSUCCESS had, for all intents and purposes, achieved its aim of ridding Guatemala of a "Communist regime and Communist apparatus which [was] definitely linked to

⁵⁶⁶ Cullather, *op.cit.* 62.

⁵⁶⁷ "Guatemala Puzzle", *New York Times*, 27 June, 1954.

⁵⁶⁸ "Defeat of Rebels Affirmed", *New York Times*, 26 June, 1954.

Moscow".⁵⁶⁹ One, in the words of Frank Wisner, which gave "imperial Communism [...] a tactical command post in Central America within a few miles of the Panama Canal and in a position to undermine neighbouring states".⁵⁷⁰ With Castillo Armas in place, these aims found representation through the suspension of the 1945 Constitution and the setting up of the CIA-sponsored National Committee for Defense against Communism. Established on 19 July, this gave unlimited powers of arrest, made criticism of the government and the president illegal, and suspended *habeas corpus* rights. Within its scope, many Guatemalans were executed and thousands imprisoned.⁵⁷¹ In agricultural matters, the abrogation of the Agrarian Reform Law also saw United States' economic interests in Guatemala renewed and almost all lands expropriated from UFCO were returned to their owners. In this respect, a 1965 report by the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA) concluded that almost all gains made in this area under the Arbenz regime had been nullified.⁵⁷² To ensure the survival of regimes such as that of Castillo Armas, in its fight to keep communist influence out of Central America, over the next five years the United States provided direct financial assistance totalling more than \$110 million. This guaranteed that its firms would no longer be subject to what are considered "punitive labour and government legislation."⁵⁷³

While PBSUCCESS was considered far more successful than any of its predecessors, and had come relatively cheaply and quickly, as scholars such as Nicholas Cullather have pointed out, victory in Guatemala confirmed the belief among many in the Eisenhower administration that covert operations were an effective and inexpensive

⁵⁶⁹ "Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency in [place not declassified]", Washington, 27 June 1954, Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; Urgent. Drafted by Wisner.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Gordon, *op.cit.* 149.

⁵⁷² Ibid, 150.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.,151.

substitute for the use of armed force in "resisting communist inroads in the Third World."⁵⁷⁴ However, as other scholars also point out, the CIA's failure to recognise the specificity of the Guatemalan situation lulled Agency and administration officials into a complacency that would prove fatal at the Bay of Pigs: ⁵⁷⁵ the United States' next attempt to subvert a regime which was considered as a threat to its interests in the region.

If Operation PBSUCCESS had, indeed, been successful and had seen a pro-American and pro-Western leader put in place in Guatemala, Operation PLUTO, more commonly known as the Bay of Pigs invasion was to all intents and purposes an unmitigated failure. As we will see later, this failure had a direct impact on the decision taken by the US to intervene in the Congo.

4.5. The United States and the Cuban Revolution

An island of sugar cane plantations, rum and cigars, in the 1950s Cuba gained a reputation as a playground for the rich and famous that frequented hotel casinos such as the Riviera, the Capri, and the Havana Hilton. Underneath the glitz of the type of lifestyle enjoyed by visitors to the island such as Frank Sinatra and Ava Gardner, there lay, however, a culture of corruption, the involvement of America's Mafia, and drug trafficking. As far as these gangsters were concerned, Al Capone made regular visits to the island during the Prohibition-era and in 1946, Charles 'Lucky' Luciano attended the so-called Havana Conference where he was to discuss mob activities with the Sicilian Mafia, or the *Cosa Nostra*. The instigator in the development of Cuba's tourist trade was President Gerardo Machado. Seizing the opportunity that US Prohibition laws offered, in the 1920s Machado hoped to draw North American business interests away from the traditional

⁵⁷⁴ Cullather, *op.cit.* 9.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

gambling playgrounds such as Reno and Las Vegas. An admirer of the typical American way of life in the 1920s, after his election in 1925 Machado even had the Cuban capitol building rebuilt in the exact likeness of the US Capitol in Washington, DC.⁵⁷⁶

With diplomatic relations with the United States having eased since the war with Spain at the end of the nineteenth century and since the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, Machado's position as leader seemed to be secured through Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Drawing away from the fiercely protectionist economic policies that had worsened the effects of the Great Depression, policies such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930), at his inaugural address in March 1933 this distant relation of Theodore Roosevelt emphasised the role of cooperation and trade rather than military force to maintain stability in the hemisphere. For Roosevelt, who considered the United States to be a good neighbour to surrounding countries, "the neighbor who resolutely respects himself [...] respects the rights of others."⁵⁷⁷ Later that year, in Montevideo, Uruguay, Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull extended the remits of the Good Neighbour policy in stating that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another" and, openly declaring the United States' intention to henceforth isolate itself from international conflict, a stance which kept the US out of WWII until the end of 1941, Roosevelt also declared that, "The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention".

As far as much of the Cuban population was concerned, the timing and intentions of the Good Neighbor policy could not have come at a worse time: from 1928 and the beginning of Machado's second term as president opposition to his violent rule was

⁵⁷⁶ Peter Russo with John H. Esperian, *Offshore Vegas: How the Mob Brought Revolution to Cuba*, (Bloomington, iUniverse, 2007), 7.

⁵⁷⁷ "Good Neighbor Policy, 1933", <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor>, accessed 10 July 2017.

repressed by the dictator's secret police, the *Porra*. By the summer of 1933 the Cuban context had deteriorated hugely: riots in Havana on 7 August left twenty-six dead and 166 injured and martial law was declared to restore order.⁵⁷⁸ A month later, at one of Cuba's principle military bases, Camp Columbia, the so-called "Sergeants' Revolt" saw a group of non-commissioned army officers take command of the islands' military forces. Led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, the revolt was quickly joined by students in Havana. Before long revolt had turned into revolution and the new government of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes also found itself obliged to step down.

Over the coming months, a government headed by Ramon Grau attempted to maintain its control over Cuba's affairs: several abortive revolts were put down and, in order to gain international legitimacy, Grau's regime established diplomatic ties with a number of Latin American nations. In spite of this support, by January 1934 it had become apparent that the United States was unwilling to recognise Grau as Cuba's president. Now a colonel and remaining in charge of the island's military, Batista then oversaw the arrival of a succession of Cuban presidents whose respective tenures lasted as little as a few hours as was the case with Manuel Marquez Sterling, to nearly four years as was the case with Federico Laredo Bru. By 1940, the year when Batista himself became president, Cuba had seen no less than seven presidents in seven years.

Although Grau returned to the presidency in October 1944 and was succeeded in 1948 through the election of Carlos Prío Socarras, by 1952 Batista once again found himself at the head of the government after mounting another military coup in March 1952. The return of Batista signaled an end to nearly twenty years of political instability. It also brought hope to those who had witnessed Batista's earlier efforts to bring equality to Cuba's population. In his first term, for example, Batista legalised trade unions, introduced

⁵⁷⁸ Gustavo Reno, "Troops Fire on Mob: Machado Refuses to Quit", *Chicago Tribune*, 8 August 1933.

land distribution and had set up welfare programmes for the island's poor.⁵⁷⁹ Like Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala, Batista had even legalised the communist party and tolerated communist control of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, or *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* (CTC). Such tolerance was to be rewarded through the head of the CTC's public support for Batista after the *coup*.⁵⁸⁰

Shortly after the start of Batista's second term, however, it became increasingly apparent that his policies would favour Mafia friends Batista had made during a period of retirement in Florida. Financial institutions such as the International Bank of Havana became major sources for the laundering of money, and the Cuban government granted concessions such as the waiving of import duties and corporate taxes. With an underground economy developing quickly, a minority became fabulously wealthy while, according to the 1952 memorandum, "the majority became disenfranchised."⁵⁸¹

Keeping a watchful eye on developments in Cuba, although Department of State officials "deplored" the way in which the Batista coup was brought about, and were apprehensive about its effect on neighbouring Latin American countries, by and large the belief was that as an anti-communist Batista would act in the interest of the United States. This was important at a time when America held a "very special position in Cuba" which included large amounts of capital investment, a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, and an agreement to provide bilateral military assistance.⁵⁸² Consequently, with at least ten other Latin American countries having announced that they would continue diplomatic ties with Batista, the United States recognised the new Cuban regime towards the end of March

⁵⁷⁹ Russo, *op.cit.* 8.

⁵⁸⁰ "Continuation of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba", Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, 24 March 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, *The American Republics*, Volume IV, Document 327.

⁵⁸¹ Russo, *op.cit.* 16.

⁵⁸² "Continuation of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba", *op.cit.*

1952. In doing so, the United States continued a tradition of providing support for a right-wing dictator in the interest of creating a bulwark of anti-communist states. This argument is laid out in far more detail in works by David F. Schmitz⁵⁸³ and Thomas G. Paterson.⁵⁸⁴

Political opposition to Batista was mainly organised around political parties which had been denied any representation in the government after the 1952 coup d'Etat. Of these parties, the *Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Autentico)* led by Socarras, and the *Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)* led by Eduardo Chibas were the most valid contenders to Batista's regime. As a newly qualified lawyer and soon-to-be revolutionary, Fidel Castro was a member of the *Ortodoxo*. After having made attempts to dislodge the increasingly despotic Batista through legal avenues, Batista having cancelled elections which were due to be held in 1952, Castro created a clandestine cell system called "The Movement". With his brother Raul, and around 165 men, Castro's revolutionaries first attacked the Moncada army barracks on 26 July, 1953. This was supposed to be the start of a popular insurrection but, instead, ended in failure with almost half of the attackers killed in action. Although the Castro brothers were captured and imprisoned after the attack, a general amnesty declared by Batista in 1956 saw them released. Over the next eighteen months, Castro hardened his resolve to overthrow Batista's regime and, having been joined by Ernesto Guevara, launched a second attack from Mexico on 2 December, 1956.

Although this second attack in Cuba's Oriente province also ended in failure, Castro's small group of men set up base in the Sierra Maestra Mountains from where they planned the next stage in their revolution. This revolution was to start in the summer of 1958, and Castro's forces under the leadership of Guevara won a decisive battle in Santa

⁵⁸³ David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

⁵⁸⁴ Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Clara forcing Batista's troops to surrender. Next, Castro's column of troops captured Santiago, and by 1 January, 1959 Fidel Castro was in a position to declare the victory of the Cuban revolutionaries.⁵⁸⁵

4.6. The CIA and Miami's Cuban Exile Organisations

As the name suggests, the Little Havana district of Miami, Florida is -at least in the minds of Cubans- a part of Cuba transposed onto an area covering parts of SW 12th and SW 17th Avenues. And, while Cuban businesses stretch off onto *Calle Ocho*, on the link between SW 13th Avenue and Memorial Boulevard, the eternal flame on the Brigade 2506 bears witness to the sacrifice made by over 1,700 men who took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion. A little further, on SW 9th Street, Miami, the Bay of Pigs Museum is also a testament to the dead and living veterans of the failed attempt to retake Cuba from the hands of a still very much detested regime.

While Cuban immigration to the United States is not a recent phenomenon, and successive waves of Cubans arrived in America in the early nineteenth century, Department of Homeland Security records show that migration from Cuba increased significantly from 1950-1959. Indeed, whereas nearly 26,000 Cubans made the short journey separating the two countries from 1940-1949, the next decade saw this figure jump to over 73,000. From the beginning to the end of the 1960s and the arrival of the Castro era, migration became somewhat of an exodus which saw just over 200,000 Cubans leave the Caribbean island.⁵⁸⁶ Many settled around the streets of Little Havana, others moved to Miami's richer suburbs such as Hialeah or Coral Gables.

⁵⁸⁵ Gary Prevost, "Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution", *Headwaters: The Faculty Journal of the College of Saint Benedict and St. John's University*, Volume 24, Article 4, May 2012, 20-21.

⁵⁸⁶ "2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics", United States Department of Homeland Security, (Washington, DC, 2008), 8.

Among those arriving in 1959 was a young physician named Manuel Artime.⁵⁸⁷ In 1957, along with university professor José Ignacio Rasco, Artime had formed the Radical Liberal Party, a movement of which the intention was to oppose Batista. Towards the end of 1958, Artime had joined the rebellion in the Sierra Maestra and had attained the rank of lieutenant in the revolutionary army. Not long after, this devout Catholic and conservative was appointed head of Castro's agrarian reform programme in the Oriente Province. Becoming aware that Castro was turning further towards communism, Artime began publishing anti-communist material and, with support of the Association of Catholic Universities (ACU) began to militarise his political thought. Along with Humberto Sori Marin, Carlos Prio Socarras, Tony Varona, Aurelio Sanchez Aranga and other members of a group calling themselves the *Autenticos*, Artime began to organise a counter-revolution. The plan was to create an uprising in the Manzanillo area of Cuba where they would bring in weapons and supplies.⁵⁸⁸

Within a short while, the activities of the anti-Castro rebels drew the attention of the CIA. Alerted, as in Guatemala, to a scenario whereby the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) began infiltrating the military, the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA), other government bodies and Castro's 26th of July Movement, the CIA was also wary of Raul Castro and Guevara's "long records of association with Communists and a marked affinity for Communist economic and political concepts". Although the CIA did not believe that the Cuban leaders were communists themselves, they believed that they were "strong pro-Communists".⁵⁸⁹ Before long, through the use of US Embassy officials, contact had been made with the former head of the Cuban Air Force Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz. In turn, Lanz

⁵⁸⁷ Full name, Manuel Artime Buesa.

⁵⁸⁸ Escalante, *op.cit.* 31-33.

⁵⁸⁹ "Communist Influence in Cuba", *Special National Intelligence Estimate*, Number 85-60, 22 March 1960, 2.

contacted a certain Frank Sturgis, an old friend with a particularly colourful past and an even more colourful future.⁵⁹⁰ Lanz and Sturgis then formed the Anti-Communist Brigade. An organisation, they claimed, which would "rescue the true ideals of the Cuban revolution". With presidential elections then approaching, in the manner of Castillo Armas in Guatemala some years earlier, on 21 October 1958, Lanz and Sturgis took to the skies above Havana and, from a CIA aircraft, dropped thousands of anti-Castro and anti-communist leaflets over the capital. Two days later, Manuel Artime declared his anti-communist stance and, with help from the CIA, defected to the United States.⁵⁹¹

With counter-revolutionary action now starting to gain momentum, Sturgis was, reported to have been involved in attempting to bring weapons into Cuba from the United States. On 8 December 1958, a news cable spoke of how, in November, a plane had made a forced landing in Mexico and that the crew included Fiorini (Sturgis).⁵⁹² However, any attempt to subvert Castro's revolution was in vain as his forces of the Revolutionary Directorate made their way from the Sierra Maestra in the south of the island, to Santa Clara in the centre and then on to Havana which lies on the northwest coast. By 2 January, Batista's forces had fled along with Batista himself.

⁵⁹⁰ Born Frank Fiorini in Norfolk, Virginia in 1924, Sturgis joined in the US Marines in 1942 and served in the Pacific. After leaving the military, Sturgis worked as a police officer and also as the owner-manager of a nightclub in Virginia. In 1956, Sturgis moved to Cuba but also spent time in a number of Latin American countries such as Mexico and Guatemala. Moving in circles which included high-ranking Mafia officials, Sturgis was involved in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. In 1963, Sturgis met with Lee Harvey Oswald after the latter had attempted to infiltrate the Anti-Communist Brigade and, along with three other anti-Castro exiles and a former member of the CIA in June 1972, he was to take part in an attempted burglary at the Watergate apartment block in Washington, DC. It is rumoured that Sturgis was also involved in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. For further biographical information see, <http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKsturgis.htm>.

⁵⁹¹ Escalante, *op.cit.* 36-37.

⁵⁹² "From Legal Attaché, Havana to Director, FBI, (subject: Frank Anthony Sturgis)", *Office Memorandum, United States Government*, December 15, 1958. NARA Record Number: 124-10302-10223, Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC).

As mentioned above, although Castro was not considered to be a communist and did not consider himself a communist,⁵⁹³ the United States' decision to remove him from power came very shortly after the establishment of Castro's first government. With a number of US officials holding business interests on the island, and these interests potentially under threat from reforms, an added problem was that of Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Born in Argentina in 1928, after completing a degree in medicine Guevara embarked on a journey across several Latin American countries where he honed his Marxist ideology. Already having established links with members of the Jacobo Arbenz regime, Guevara arrived in Guatemala on Christmas Eve 1953 and within the coming months had met one of Fidel Castro's closest aides, Nico Lopez, the principal Cuban exile in the country. It was in Guatemala that Guevara's hatred for 'Yankee imperialism' grew and, it was United Fruit that embodied all that was wrong with America's political system.⁵⁹⁴ After the resignation of Arbenz and after having taken refuge in the Argentine embassy in Guatemala City, in mid-September 1954 Guevara found himself in Mexico City where, again, he met Nico Lopez. In the summer of 1955, Lopez introduced Guevara to Raul Castro and, in turn, Guevara was invited to meet Raul's brother Fidel.⁵⁹⁵

The military coup against Arbenz convinced Guevara that armed struggle was the only way for Latin American peoples to put an end to poverty and political oppression and, having joined Castro's invasion of Cuba in December 1956, Guevara served as a doctor and military commander in the fight to depose Batista. With the revolution complete, Guevara was appointed to several important positions in Castro's revolutionary government. In 1959, as well as representing Cuba in diplomatic and commercial missions

⁵⁹³ "Cuban Revolution: 1959 in Review", *United Press International*, 1959.

⁵⁹⁴ Daniel James, *Che Guevara: A Biography*, (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 79-80.

⁵⁹⁵ Valerie Bodden, *Che Guevara: Political Activist and Revolutionary*, (Minnesota: Abdo Publishing Company, 2011), 49.

abroad, he was appointed head of the Cuban National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform.⁵⁹⁶

As it was agrarian reform in Guatemala that had drawn the attention of the State Department, it was inevitable that those envisaged in Cuba would soon come under scrutiny from those with vested interests in the country's economy. Indeed, whereas both Cubans and Americans with interests in sugar plantations felt that Cuba lacked the technological and administrative skills to successfully implement the reforms which started in May 1959,⁵⁹⁷ Castro's plan to redistribute 50,000 *caballerias*⁵⁹⁸ of American-owned land was the cause of "great consternation" to plantation owners, was seen as "confiscatory", and as "disastrous for the sugar industry of Cuba".⁵⁹⁹

Among those with business interests on the island were William Pawley and Joseph Caldwell King. King was the chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and Pawley had worked closely with Claire Lee Chennault of Flying Tigers fame. He was a close friend of both President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles, and had played a role in Operation PBSUCCESS.⁶⁰⁰ Mafia figures such as Meyer Lansky, Santos Trafficante and Joe Colombo also maintained important investments in Cuba. With these interests mainly concerned in gambling and prostitution, both of which were made illegal in 1959, Castro's government was starting to face opposition from several quarters.

⁵⁹⁶ Helen Delpar, *Encyclopedia of Latin America* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Hugo Gambini, *El Ché Guevara* (Buenos Aires: 1968), quoted as sources in "Ernesto "Che" Guevara, (1928-1967)", <https://www.unitedfruit.org/guevara.htm>, accessed 14 July 2017.

⁵⁹⁷ "Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, Havana, May 19, 1959", Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5-1959.

⁵⁹⁸ A *caballeria* is an ancient Spanish land measure. In Cuba, one *caballeria* corresponded to around thirty-three acres.

⁵⁹⁹ "Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, Havana, May 22, 1959", Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5-2259.

⁶⁰⁰ Anthony R. Carrozza, William D. Pawley: The Extraordinary Life of the Adventurer, Entrepreneur, and Diplomat Who Cofounded the Flying Tigers, (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2012), 24.

With CIA Chief of Station in Havana James Noel having been asked by King in November 1959 to prepare an analysis of the situation on 11 December 1959, the CIA chief of the Western Hemisphere was in a position to declare in a memorandum to Allen Dulles that a "far left" dictatorship now existed in Cuba. If permitted to continue, [Castro's actions] would encourage similar actions against US holdings in other Latin American countries.⁶⁰¹ To face this threat, King recommended that "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro" in order to "greatly accelerate the fall of the present government".⁶⁰²

With Dulles and CIA Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell Jr. both approving the recommendation, on 13 January 1960 a meeting of the Special Group⁶⁰³ discussed a covert programme of which the aim was to overthrow Fidel Castro. Stating that in the long run the US would not be able to "tolerate" the Castro regime, the plan to remove the Cuban leader would be put in place over a period of time with actions "designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold".⁶⁰⁴ The codename given to the programme was Operation 40 due to the number of CIA case officers and Cuban dissidents who would head an invasion task force. Eventually, with Vice President Richard Nixon overseeing the operation, over two hundred CIA agents and Cuban Exiles would be involved in the planning of the invasion. Many of those involved such as David Atlee Phillips, Jacob Esterline, E. Howard Hunt,⁶⁰⁵ David Sanchez Morales⁶⁰⁶ and Tracey

⁶⁰¹ Alleged Assassination Plots of Foreign Leaders, *op.cit.* 92.

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ The Special Group, or the NSC 5412/2 Special Group was a subcommittee of the United States Security Council. Created through Presidential Directive NSC 5412/2, its role was to coordinate covert operations. In June 1964, the group was renamed the 303 Committee after National Security Memorandum No. 303 and, in 1970, it was succeeded by the 40 Committee. In 1976, 40 Committee was replaced by the Operations Advisory Group and, in 1977, Jimmy Carter created the NSC Special Coordination Committee. Under Ronald Reagan, this committee was replaced by the National Security Planning Group.

⁶⁰⁴ Alleged Assassination Plots of Foreign Leaders, *op.cit.* 93.

⁶⁰⁵ Everett Howard Hunt was another of the Watergate burglars.

Barnes had taken part in Operation PBSUCCESS. Inevitably, this group also included Frank Sturgis and Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz.⁶⁰⁷

By 16 March 1960, the Special Group / 5412 Committee had prepared a paper entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime". Approved by President Eisenhower the next day, the purpose of a series of actions targeted the replacement of the Castro regime with one "more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the US." The programme -one which Eisenhower felt should be a more aggressive project moving beyond "pure harassment"-⁶⁰⁸ was to be carried out in such a manner as to "avoid any appearance of US intervention and actions would be carried out by selected groups of Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba who would be expected to act on their own initiative." Containing four major courses of action, the programme required the creation of:

- 1) a "responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition located outside of Cuba, 2) psychological warfare of the type used in Guatemala whereby a propaganda offensive could be initiated⁶⁰⁹, 3) the creation of a covert intelligence and action organisation within Cuba, 4) the development of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba. In the latter respect, a first phase would consist in training carefully screened recruits to become instructors and, in a second phase, these instructors would train forces in locations outside the US capable of launching an armed offensive against Castro. To infiltrate

⁶⁰⁶ David Sanchez Morales is quoted in many sources as having a predominant role in the assassination of President Kennedy.

⁶⁰⁷ Nick M. Nero, *JFK: Assassination Rehearsal*, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2014), 35-36.

⁶⁰⁸ Gray to Don Wilson (Assistant Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library), 3 Dec. 1974, i, (introduction), Gray Papers, box 2, DDEL, quoted in Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, February 1995, 4.

⁶⁰⁹ As mentioned in the footnotes on page 127 of this study, David Atlee Phillips set up Radio Swan for this purpose.

operatives into Cuba, the CIA planned to use one of its many secret airlines and, in order to establish the programme, a period of six to eight months was required.⁶¹⁰

The Cuban Project, Operation Pluto, or the Bay of Pigs invasion was under way.

4.7. The CIA, Cuban Exiles and the Bay of Pigs

The inclusion of a "responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition located outside of Cuba was a highly important aspect of the US plan to overthrow Castro. As had been the case with PBSUCCESS and Castillo Armas's forces, what was needed for Operation Pluto was a group that had demonstrated its commitment to fighting communism wherever it appeared. It was this consideration that led the CIA into making contact with the many Cuban anti-Castro organisations which were established principally in Miami but also in other large US cities and towns. Of these groups, Manuel Artime's MRR presented particular interest to the CIA agents operating out of offices in the Coral Gables district.⁶¹¹ Not only was its leader Manuel Artime a respected figure in the Cuban exile community, his credentials in opposing Castro through armed insurrection from the moment of the MRR's inception made it the perfect by way through which the CIA could get access to thousands of men to fight its wars. Moreover, with a majority of these exiles still waiting to obtain US citizenship, if required the United States was in a position to provide plausible deniability in future operations should its involvement ever be questioned.

⁶¹⁰ "Paper Prepared by the 5412 Committee", *A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime*, Washington, March 16, 1960, Eisenhower Library, Project "Clean Up" records, Cuba.

⁶¹¹ Ann Louise Bardach, *Without Fidel: A Death Foretold in Miami*, Havana and Washington, (New York: Scribner, 2014), 104.

From a base of twenty-eight men that included figures such as Rogelio Gonzalez Corso, Rafael Rivas Vazquez, Carlos Rodriguez Santana, Jorge Sotus, Sergio Sanjenis⁶¹² and Rafael Quintero, the movement's military planner, the MRR had rapidly established itself as one of the most hard line groups based in Miami. Subscribing to an "*ideario*" of which the main intention was to overthrow Fidel Castro, Arttime described the MRR as a group whose objective was to "permanently fight for an ideology of Christ; and for a reality of liberating our nation treacherously sold to the Communist International".⁶¹³ On this subject, MRR's commitment to Catholicism could be seen through the wearing of an arm patch featuring the Catholic Trident.⁶¹⁴

With its appeal extending beyond Cuban and US borders, and support for its objectives being provided by groups such as Mexico's Society of Friends of the Free Cuban People,⁶¹⁵ around 250 members of MRR operating in Cuba carried out attacks against government installations.⁶¹⁶ In Miami, and with the element of creating a paramilitary force outlined by the 5412 Committee, around Miami the CIA set about providing financial support and weaponry. Being told that the source of the finance was an anonymous millionaire, but quickly referring to their benefactor as "Uncle Sam",⁶¹⁷ Cuban Exiles sympathetic to the cause were rallied and recruited through appeals made through different associations, through friendships and by word of mouth. Many were married,

⁶¹² "The Bay of Pigs Invasion/Playa Giron: A Chronology of Events", <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/bayofpigs/chron.html>, accessed 17 July 2017.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ For more information on the symbolism of the Trident Cross see, <http://www.seiyaku.com/customs/crosses/trident.html>, accessed 17 November, 2017.

⁶¹⁵ "Society of Friends of the Free Cuban People", 11 May 1960, JFK Assassination System Identification Form, 6 May 1998.

⁶¹⁶ See, "Organised Opposition to the Cuban Government in Holguin, Oriente Province, 1 August 1960", *Information Report*, Central Intelligence Agency, 22 August 1960.

⁶¹⁷ Haynes Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1964), 37.

many had no military experience⁶¹⁸ and some, like William Muir, the current curator of the Bay of Pigs Museum, had barely turned 17 years old.⁶¹⁹ Another seventeen year old was Frank de Varona, now a writer and a former Associate Professor at Florida International University.

From the point of view of preparing for the military side of the invasion, in June 1960 the CIA began the training of 300 guerillas in the US, and in the Canal Zone. Two months later, after an agreement had been reached with President Ydígoras of Guatemala, the men of the newly-named Brigade 2506 found themselves in the mountainous region of Retalhuleu. By this time the MRR had been joined by four other dissident exile groups⁶²⁰ leading to the creation of the *Frente Revolucionario Democrático* (FRD), or Democratic Revolutionary Front, still with Artime as its director. The FRD was to morph into the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) just before the invasion was launched in April 1961. In terms of this invasion and its preparation, we now turn to a report made by the CIA's Grayston Lynch.⁶²¹ Lynch was one of the two Agency officers who commanded Brigade 2506. As such, and as a veteran of several overt and covert operations, Lynch's account of the Bay of Pigs invasion entitled "After Action Report on Operation" and prepared just a few weeks following the failed attempt is one of the most credible and, logically, one of the most often cited sources used in academic research.

⁶¹⁸ This included Rogerio Zayas-Bazan who, at 24 years old, was working as a draughtsman in North Hollywood, California. Contacted by phone by his brother Eduardo who had joined the brigade, Rogerio flew to Miami to enlist.

⁶¹⁹ Private correspondence with William Muir, 16 July 2017. On 31 March 1961, Muir was assigned to the 5th Infantry Battalion of Brigade 2506.

⁶²⁰ The *Triple A* group led by Aureliano Sanchez Arango; *Montecristi* led by Justo Carillo; *Rescate* led by Antonio (Tony) de Varona; and Dr. José Ignacio Rasco of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC). In March 1961, a month before the invasion, the State Department pressured the group into accepting the *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo* (MRP) into its ranks. See, "FBI Airtel to Director from SAC", *Sergio Archacha Smith Black Line File*, New Orleans, December 12, 1960, HSCA (JFK document 012691), quoted in "Cuban Revolutionary Council: A Concise History", HSCA, Vol. 10, AC 4, CRC, Hist.

⁶²¹ "A Report by Grayston Lynch of the Central Intelligence Agency, 4 May 1961", National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, *Paramilitary Study*. Secret; Eyes Only. Lynch prepared the report for the investigative committee chaired by General Taylor.

Lynch explains that on 28 March 1961 the Landing Craft Infantry's (LCI) *Blagar* and *Barbara J.* left Stock Island, Key West, Florida. Commanded respectively by Lynch and Robertson, another veteran of World War Two and an experienced counter-intelligence officer, the two landing craft reached Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua on 2 April 1961, just over two weeks before the planned invasion. Here, the two men were told to await instructions given by a team sent from Washington. Lynch and Robertson were informed that the assault consisted of a multi-pronged attack on three landing areas: Playa Giron (code-named Blue Beach), Playa Larga (Red Beach), and Caleta Buena Inlet (Green Beach). After landing two battalions of Brigade 2506, tanks, trucks and other military vehicles would then provide support. A second phase involved landing two further battalions of troops. These reinforcements would be transported on a cargo ship named the *Houston* and would land at the Bay of Pigs. Anchored some miles out to sea, the aircraft carrier *USS Essex* carrying platoons of US Marines waited to provide more support should Cuban military resistance be difficult to overcome by Brigade 2506. Airborne troops were also to be dropped inland using USAF C-46 transport planes.⁶²²

Further preparations continued in the days preceding the attack during Operation Puma. This consisted of Exile pilots making bombing raids on key Cuban installations. Flying B-26B Invaders carrying the markings of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), attacks were made on airfields at San Antonio de Los Baños, at Ciudad Libertad, and at Antonio Maceo International Airport. The intention of the attacks was to destroy Castro's air force and to eliminate any airborne threat to Brigade 2506.⁶²³ A day before the invasion itself, the ships *Caribe*, *Atlantico*, *Barbara J.*, *Houston* and the *Rio Escondido* joined the *Blagar* before heading off towards the respective landing points. However,

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Robert Clayton Buick, *Age of Inquiry*, (Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2010), 31.

hampered by problems such as damaged propellers and coral reefs, progress was slow. Overcoming these setbacks, on the morning of 17 April, the different battalions of men moved ashore. Within thirty minutes, it became evident that the objectives of Operation Puma had not been reached. Within the space of twenty minutes, and with Castro's forces waiting for the landing forces, Brigade 2506 was attacked by a Cuban Air Force B-26, Hawker Sea Fury fighter aircraft and T-33 jets.⁶²⁴ To add to the Brigade's woes, both the Houston and the Rio Escondido were hit and were reported to be sinking. This came as a severe blow as these ships carried the vital military hardware needed to back up the ground forces.

The situation for the invading forces did not improve during the day. Air cover that had been promised failed to materialise, and troops were forced to take on a defensive rather than an attacking role under protection of the trees and swamps lining the beaches. The next day, Castro's MIG fighter jets were joined by over 20,000 members of his armies. Within the next 48 hours, any resistance to these attacks had faded. Despite some incursions made inland by paracommandos and despite an attempt by pilots of the Alabama National Guard to launch a counter-attack, by 21 April 1961 sixty-eight of the invading forces lay dead and a further 1,209 had been captured. Those killed included Thomas "Pete" Ray and his flight engineer Leo Baker.⁶²⁵ These Americans were shot to death after their plane was forced to make a landing. For those captured, over the following months in Cuban prisons they were to suffer torture and beatings at the hands of prison guards who considered them as traitors. After going to trial, some were sentenced to death and were executed by firing squad while those lucky enough not to suffer the same fate were sentenced to up to thirty years in prison.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Mark Fineman and Dolly Mascarenas, "Bay of Pigs: the Secret Death of Pete Ray", *Los Angeles Times*, 15 March 1998.

In order to understand what had led to the invading forces being so overwhelmed, and something which underscores Kennedy's disappointment (or perhaps, guilt) in the failure, the morning after the surrender of Brigade 2506, Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor to establish a committee whose role was to examine the whys and wherefores of the debacle. Preliminary findings were presented to Kennedy on 16 May 1961, and for the purposes of this study, we draw on a review of the Taylor Committee's findings which was declassified at the end of December 1984.⁶²⁶

Drawing on testimonies of a number of organisers and escapees of the invasion, blame for the failure was laid rather harshly on a portion of Brigade 2506 described as "more lovers than fighters". Indeed, during the 72-hour battle, less than 150 of Castro's forces were killed in action. Even more unkindly, given the conditions which awaited Brigade 2506, was the suggestion that some of its members had reverted to cowardice once it was realised that Castro maintained control of Cuban air space.⁶²⁷ That they had done so, and refuting the suggestion that there was insufficient ammunition provided for the invasion, was also the conclusion of a Cuban publication from August 1961 entitled "*Playa Giron: Derrota del Imperialismo*". Here it was indicated that substantial quantities of munitions were abandoned in the face of Castro's advancing forces that had the "mercenaries" of Brigade 2506 show more "spirited resistance", and had they fought "more courageously", then they could have held their territory for a greater length of time.⁶²⁸ A more realistic, and possibly the most accurate evaluation of Brigade 2506's performance came from Fidel Castro himself in an article which appeared in the *New York Times* of 17 June 1961. Here, the Cuban leader was reported as saying that the invading forces fought

⁶²⁶ Jack B. Pfeiffer, *CIA Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Volume IV, The Taylor Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs*, (New York: Military Bookshop, 2011).

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.* 199-202.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

"very well as long as they thought they had air cover. After it failed, it was an easy matter to get them to surrender".⁶²⁹

With Grayston Lynch drawing a similar conclusion in his own monograph published in 1998,⁶³⁰ Kennedy's failure to authorise sufficient air cover was seen as being the principle cause of the failure. Moreover, with Kennedy also failing to authorise the intervention of the US Marines aboard the USS *Essex*, the perception was that that in the interest of avoiding a full scale war with Cuba, it appeared to many that the 35th president had abandoned the Exiles to their own fate. In doing so, Kennedy rapidly became a hate figure in the Cuban Exile community as John Avlon notes in an article for the *Daily Telegraph* published fifty years after Kennedy's assassination.⁶³¹ If conspiracy theories are to be believed, there are many examples which go as far as implicating Cuban Exiles in the shooting which occurred in Dallas on 22 November 1963.

Whether the reasons behind the failure can, indeed, be put down to a lack of air support and what many see as a lack of commitment by Kennedy to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy's further efforts to do so from April 1961 suggest a far more sympathetic position in supporting the Exile's cause than many still believe. To make restitution for what Manuel Artime's daughter put down to human error,⁶³² these efforts included giving a speech to released prisoners at Miami's Orange Bowl stadium on 29 December 1962,⁶³³ and with his brother Robert devising plans to eliminate Castro through Operation Mongoose, and through what Lamar Waldron terms as the C-Plan, or the Plan for a Coup in Cuba which was due to start on 1 December 1963. Also, Kennedy's aversion

⁶²⁹ "Taylor Committee Report", *op.cit.* 204.

⁶³⁰ Grayston L. Lynch, *Decision for Disaster: The Battle of the Bay of Pigs* (New York: Pocket Books, 1998).

⁶³¹ See for example, John Avlon, "A beloved icon in death, in life Kennedy was hated by many", *Daily Telegraph*, 23 November, 2013.

⁶³² Lamar Waldron with Thom Hartman, *Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the Plan for the Coup in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK*, (London: Constable, 2005), 147.

⁶³³ The majority of prisoners were released on 21 December 1962 in exchange for \$53 million in food and medical aid for the Castro regime.

to communism in general and his refusal to allow the Soviet Union to gain any foothold in the Caribbean was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This had pitted the wits of both JFK and RFK against those of Khrushchev and, according to Waldron, had left the Kennedy brother's with "a sense of unfinished business" and the "need for a permanent solution to the problem of Cuba".⁶³⁴

While other efforts made by the CIA to ridicule the Cuban leader had included plans to make his beard fall out, or to spray Castro's television studio with LSD to make the Cuban leader seem disorientated and undermine his authority in the eyes of the Cuban public,⁶³⁵ Kennedy's best hope of removing the threat presented by Castro still lay with his contacts within the Cuban Exile community. However, if Kennedy were to opt for an overt style of action it would be seen as US aggression and would provide Castro with the valuable propaganda he needed. On the other hand, Kennedy could revert to the use of covert action and use Cuban Exiles. This type of action would provide the type of plausible deniability required by the Kennedy administration at a time when US-Soviet tensions were on the increase.

4.8. From the Bay of Pigs to Léopoldville: The Creation of the *Makasi*

As Kennedy publicly distanced himself from attempts at removing Castro following the Cuban Missile Crisis, a policy which drew more criticism from the Cuban Exile community,⁶³⁶ as we saw above, his administration continued in their efforts to depose

⁶³⁴ Lamar Waldron with Thom Hartman, *Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the Plan for the Coup in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK*, *op.cit.* 21.

⁶³⁵ "Alleged Assassination Plots", *op.cit.* 72. These plans were conceived by Sidney Gottlieb of the CIA's Technical Services Division (TSD), the same Sidney Gottlieb who delivered poison to Larry Devlin in Léopoldville in September 1960.

⁶³⁶ Waldron demonstrates that criticism of this policy is ill-founded. In November 1962, instead of making a pledge not to invade Cuba, what Kennedy actually said was that he would provide assurances against an invasion of Cuba only when adequate arrangements for UN verification had been made. See, Waldron, *op.cit.* 21.

Castro through the use of one of its greatest assets in the fight against the spread of communism: the same Cuban Exile community. As we saw earlier, since its formation in late 1959, the MRR had long been recognised as having the leader and the support necessary for the organisation of an operation such as the Bay of Pigs invasion. Many of those who participated in the failed attempt belonged to, or were affiliated to this group.

Following their release from prisons in Havana or on the Isle of Pines in December 1962, according to a section of a report by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) established in 1976, many members of the Brigade returned home "bewildered, still in a state of shock at their sudden liberation,, still nursing a bitter sense of betrayal at the manner in which they were sent ashore and abandoned, still torn between trust and cynicism, [and] still in awe at the power of an American government [that could obtain their release so quickly]".⁶³⁷

Although it appears contradictory, and whether or not this sense of betrayal was still felt a week later by some of the veterans of the invasion interviewed in the scope of this study, as indicated above feelings against Kennedy were so high that a planned presentation of the Brigade's flag to the president almost never took place. Even Kennedy's assurance to Brigade members that they were the "bravest men in the world" did little to dispel the belief that Kennedy's speech was a display of political hypocrisy.⁶³⁸ Despite their feelings towards Kennedy, veterans of the Bay of Pigs remained loyal to the CIA. This would be a determining factor when it came to implementing Kennedy's policies overseas.

With Brigade 2506 being disbanded in December 1962, and with the Kennedys intent on fomenting a popular uprising in Cuba, from January 1963, Ted Shackley ordered

⁶³⁷ "Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations", US House of Representatives, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979), 65.

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

CIA agents operating out of Building 25, or JM/WAVE on the campus of the University of Miami to sound out the ways and means such an operation could be put together. Of the various exile groups active at the time the most notable were Alpha 66⁶³⁹ led by Antonio Veciana Blanch⁶⁴⁰ which also received CIA-backing; *Unidad Revolucionaria* (UR),⁶⁴¹ *Movimiento Revolucionaria del Pueblo* (MRP),⁶⁴² *Rescate Democratico Revolucionario* (RDR),⁶⁴³ and the *Movimiento Democrata Cristiano* (MDC).⁶⁴⁴ With many exile organisations such as these being perceived as not having enough popular support, or as is the case with Alpha 66 as being too violent, it was noted that the MRR was the most disciplined and best organised. It had demonstrated capability in propaganda, in infiltration, in exfiltration, in limited guerilla warfare, and had usually "worked well under US

⁶³⁹ Founded in Porto Rico sometime after April 1961, the intention of Alpha 66 was to carry out armed attacks to "maintain the fighting spirit of the Cuban people after the Bay of Pigs invasion", (cf. Davy Argandona and Antonio Mestre, Alpha 66 Records, n.d., 1958-2003, University of Miami Heritage Collection, Miami, Florida, USA). Consisting of 66 men who had also opposed the Batista regime -a common feature of the Cuban Exile community- the groups' first attacks were made on ports at Isabela de Sagua and Juan Francisco Beach in 1962. Other raids, made in conjunction with Commandos L, or Commandos Liberty, included the blowing up and sinking of the Soviet merchant ship Baku docked at the time at a Cuban port. These attacks were led by Tony Cuesta, the military leader of Alpha 66 and Commando L, and Santiago Alvarez, an exile with military training in the US Army and whose uncles had been murdered by soldiers of Gerardo Machado in 1932, (Interview with Santiago Alvarez, Hialeah, Miami, 27 October, 2015). Veciana states that he was recruited by Maurice Bishop, aka David Atlee Phillips, a CIA agent with links to PBSUCCESS and, allegedly, to Lee Harvey Oswald, see, HSCA, 135, *op.cit.*

⁶⁴⁰ Shortened to Antonio Veciana in most documents.

⁶⁴¹ *Unidad Revolucionaria*, or Revolutionary Unity was formed in Cuba in December 1960. It was composed of around twenty groups and used the Catholic fish as its symbol. An anti-Castro and anti-communist group, it called for the return of seized property to its owners, Castro to be overthrown, and Cuba to return to free enterprise. "6-6 Cuba: Counter Revolutionary Handbook", Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General Papers, Attorney General's Confidential File, 10 October 1962-21 January 1963.

⁶⁴² The *Movimiento Revolucionaria del Pueblo*, or Revolutionary Movement of the People was formed in Cuba in May 1960. Lead among others by Manuel Ray Rivero, also an anti-Batista activist, the MRP was a decidedly socialist organisation. It called for nationalisation of the economy and agrarian reforms. Described as a "hard-hitting guerilla and sabotage outfit", the MRP was virtually nonexistent after October 1961. *6-6 Cuba: Counter Revolutionary Handbook, op.cit*, 97.

⁶⁴³ The *Rescate Democratico Revolucionario*, or Revolutionary Democratic Rescue (aka, Rescate) was formed in Cuba in February-March 1960. Described as middle-of-the-road in its political alignment, this group was led by Manuel Antonio de Varona. "Emphatically anti-socialist", this group was part of the Cuban Revolutionary Council with Varona as its deputy leader. Varona was also seen as one of the driving forces behind the Bay of Pigs invasion. *6-6 Cuba: Counter Revolutionary Handbook, op.cit*, 98.

⁶⁴⁴ The *Movimiento Democrata Cristiano*, or Christian Democrat Movement, was created by José Rasco in Havana in April 1960. Protesting against Castro's economic policy and communism, this group was considered largely ineffective due to its lack of means for sabotage operations. *6-6 Cuba: Counter Revolutionary Handbook, op.cit*, 100.

sponsorship".⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, with a membership of some 1,500 in addition to an estimated 5,000 members imprisoned in Cuba, it remained popular with those Cubans still fleeing a regime with ever-increasing ties to the Soviet Union.⁶⁴⁶

After being ransomed from a Cuban jail for \$500,000 dollars, the CIA's 'Golden Boy' Manuel Artime looked for new ways in which he could take the fight to Cuban shores. By October 1963, with support provided by both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, Artime had established four bases (two in Costa Rica and two in Nicaragua) and had recruited a 300-strong force composed mainly of veterans of Brigade 2506. As for military hardware, this included two large ships, eight small vessels, two speed boats, three planes, more than 200 tons of weapons and armaments and about \$250,000 in electronic equipment.⁶⁴⁷ Although JM/WAVE chief Shackley states that support for the MRR was gradually phased out after Kennedy's assassination,⁶⁴⁸ the MRR's attacks against Cuban installation continued well into 1964. These attacks included blowing up a sugar mill in Puerto Pillon in the Oriente Province, as reported by the FBI⁶⁴⁹ and the mistaken shelling of a Spanish merchant vessel, the *Sierra Aranzazu*, on 1 September 1964 off the coast of the Bahamas. This was an attack which was denied both by the MRR and the other leading Cuban Exile group at the time, the *Junta Revolucion Cubana* (JURE).⁶⁵⁰

While CIA covert support for attacks on Castro was seen as one means of thanking the Cuban Exile community, another came through an initiative set up by President Kennedy in May 1961. The Cuban Volunteer Program gave many veterans (and newly-

⁶⁴⁵ 6-6 Cuba: Counter Revolutionary Handbook, op.cit, 93.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Helga Silva, "Manuel Artime profile", *Miami News*, 2 July, 1977.

⁶⁴⁸ Ted Shackley with Richard A. Finney, *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA*, (Virginia, Potomac Books, 2005), 71-72.

⁶⁴⁹ JFK Assassination System Identification Form, 124-10222-10130, FBI, 13 May 1964, <https://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/cia/russholmes/pdf/104-10406-10110.pdf>, accessed 5 August, 2016.

⁶⁵⁰ "Secret Organisation of Continental Action (OSAC)", Federal Bureau of Investigation, Miami, 17 September, 1964, JFKAC, HSCA Subject MRR, Box 2, Memorandum for the Record by Orville Bathe.

arrived Exiles) the opportunity to become members of the US armed forces, and it was an important stage in their acquiring full US citizenship through naturalisation. Indeed, as documents in Annex 5 of this study demonstrate, many of those who had taken part in the Bay of Pigs invasion or covert missions inside Cuba remained foreign nationals until the late 1960s. Naturally, with the US military now having recruits with whom it had no apparent link, the State Department also benefitted from the recruitment by being able to place itself in a position where it could deny its involvement. This 'plausible deniability' was pointed out in a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. On 5 May, 1961 he was to write the plan was to provide for recruiting "in such a way as to avoid any implication that they would participate in an invasion of Cuba", and to "identify the Cuban volunteers in such a way as to permit their consolidation into a Cuban unit, should the need for such a unit ever develop".⁶⁵¹ Although some sources indicate that 4,000 Cuban Exiles were to be integrated into the US military,⁶⁵² according to others who were to take part in the programme, this number could be as high as six thousand.⁶⁵³

Whereas most of those recruited would find themselves as members of the lower ranks of the US forces, others who were considered to be officer material were given the opportunity to become commissioned officers in the US regular army. Those who were selected as such were sent to train at Fort Knox, Kentucky or to Fort Jackson, South Carolina while others were sent to the infantry school in Fort Benning, Georgia. One of those who were to go to Georgia was Felix Rodriguez. Later, having subsequently been

⁶⁵¹ "Memorandum from Secretary Defense McNamara to His Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky), Washington, 5 May 1961", FRUS , 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 207.

⁶⁵² US Department of Defense documents indicate that the 'Brigade' of 4,000 Cuban refugees would consist of 3,000 Army, 500 Air Force and 500 Navy. See, Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto, *From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the US, 1959-1995*, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 48.

⁶⁵³ Personal correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 21 September 2014.

recruited by the CIA, Rodriguez was given the mission of tracking down and capturing Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967.⁶⁵⁴

The US Army was not the only division of the US forces to benefit from the arrival of Cuban Exiles. Experienced pilots and Bay of Pigs veterans such as Max Rojas were integrated directly into the US Air Force (USAF), and budding pilots such as Reginaldo Blanco also took advantage of the Cuban Volunteer Program. As we will see, both these Exiles were part of program which constituted a reserve of pilots who would later take part in operations in the Congo.

Another initiative came from Luis Cosme. This pilot who Chief of Operations at the Bay of Pigs, and who had flown B-26 bombers during attacks met with officials in Washington in December with the idea of obtaining valid US pilot licenses for Cuban Exiles.⁶⁵⁵ With the knowledge that small units of aircraft could be used to great effect in covert operations such as those in Guatemala in the 1950s, (see, section 3.2.), the CIA agreed to provide Cosme with \$25,000 for the training of around 20 pilots at Embry Riddle School of Aviation in Miami.⁶⁵⁶ The CIA's George 'Jerry' Sohl was appointed to act as liaison officer with the Cuban Exiles and recruitment was handled by Roberto (Bob)

⁶⁵⁴ As part of a special infiltration team sent to Cuba days before the Bay of Pigs invasion with the task of assassinating Castro, after its failure Rodriguez was then, nevertheless, able to avoid capture and was brought back to Miami. Offered the chance of joining the Cuban Volunteer Group, the name given to Kennedy's programme, Rodriguez accepted a commission as second lieutenant. At Fort Benning, just before the end of his training, Rodriguez was to be approached by Artime and Quintero, another founding member of the MRR and a member of Operation 40. Rodriguez was asked to join the effort to overthrow Castro from MRR bases in Nicaragua and, resigning his commission from the US Army in October 1963, he would join Artime's group of 300 men. Andrea Billups and Kathleen Walter, "On Anniversary of Che Killing, CIA's Felix Rodriguez Remembers, *Newsmax*, 8 October, 2013. From then, his career consisted, like Quintero, of being a 'shadow warrior', the title chosen for his biography, and Rodriguez would be involved in dozens of covert operations organised by the CIA including some in Vietnam during Operation Phoenix and in Nicaragua where America supported the Contras. See, Felix Rodriguez and John Weisman, *Shadow Warrior: The CIA Hero of a Hundred Unknown Battles*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989).

⁶⁵⁵ Leif Hellström, "The Instant Air Force: The Creation of the CIA's Air Unit in the Congo, 1962", *3rd Term Paper*, Advanced History Course, Autumn Term, 2005, 32.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Medel.⁶⁵⁷ Also a veteran of the Bay of Pigs, Medel set about the task of seeking out possible candidates for training out of offices situated on NW 36th Street, Miami.⁶⁵⁸ Operating under the name Caribbean Aero Marine Corporation (CARAMAR),⁶⁵⁹ a CIA front company, selection was carried out with the help of Luis Cosme. Of those recruited, some had flown with the Cuban Air Force or Cuban Naval Aviation, and some had been commercial pilots with *Cubana Airlines* or *Aeropostal*.⁶⁶⁰ As Captain Antonio Soto's contract shows, pilots were recruited for a one year period and during the first six months of their contract were paid \$800 per month plus expenses and indemnities in the event of their death. After six months pay would rise to \$900 per month.⁶⁶¹

In reaction to bombardments carried out by Katangan Air Force (FAK) and the UN either unwilling or unable to provide more air cover, in October 1962, Congolese Chief of Staff Mobutu expressed its surprise that the United States had not done more to provide military aid to a nation which was friendly to its interests but now which was under threat of seeing an unfriendly regime come to power. With the budding Congolese Air Force in possession of five Harvard trainer and four transport aircraft, one major obstacle was that the Congolese government had nobody to fly them.⁶⁶² To address this problem, on 29 October, 1962, Mobutu asked the United States to supply "five jet fighters and their

⁶⁵⁷ Escalante, *op.cit.* 19-20. A staunch anti-communist Medel was a well respected member of the Exile community. Born in 1940, and nicknamed the 'Cuban Ghost', Medel was a former commander in the White Rose group which carried out a series of attacks against Castro's forces inside Cuba. Escalante refers to 'Claudio', and not Roberto Medel. Contacts with the Exile community have confirmed that they are the same person.

⁶⁵⁸ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 37.

⁶⁵⁹ Caribbean Aero Marine joined a list of CIA front companies set up for specific purposes. Another was the Double-Chek Corporation. Supposedly set up by wealthy Cubans and Miami lawyer Alex Carlson, and operating under the cover of a New York insurance firm, Double-Chek gave bi-weekly payments of \$225 to all widows of men killed at the Bay of Pigs. First payments were received in July 1961. Personal correspondence with Janet Joy Ray, 20 July 2017.

⁶⁶⁰ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 37.

⁶⁶¹ See Annex 6.

⁶⁶² Editorial note to, "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, Léopoldville 26 October 1962", *op.cit.*, Document 124.

mercenary pilots together with several transport aircraft".⁶⁶³ Despite impressions that the US government would not take the risk of supplying this aid -the UN banning bilateral assistance- at a meeting between CIA and State Department officials on 29 October, 1962, Joseph W. Scott of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research recommended that the programme to supply aircraft and their pilots be approved: the CIA stating that the "most readily available pilots were refugee [*less than one line not declassified*]".⁶⁶⁴ Around two weeks later, on 15 November, the identity of these "refugees" became clearer when a telegram sent by the US Embassy in Leopoldville mentioned "Adoula's 6 Cuban pilots from Caribbean Aero-Marine Corps (*sic*)."⁶⁶⁵ Ten days later, on 25 November, Scott was to inform Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson that the Congolese government wanted the aircraft for reconnaissance and combat missions over Katanga. In spite of the CIA indicating that issues connected to personnel and supply would restrict any mission to the area around Léopoldville, it was suggested that the Congolese Air Force (*Force Aérienne Congolaise*) be provided with combat capability.⁶⁶⁶ This matter was handed over to the Special Group for its consideration.⁶⁶⁷

Although it is not clear precisely when the first five pilots⁶⁶⁸ arrived in the Congo, the CIA noted in a report entitled "*Assistance to the Congolese Air Force*" that on 7 December, 1962 that the five Harvard trainers of the FAC were now being piloted by [...] pilots supplied by the CIA, and that Mobutu had requested more pilots and ground

⁶⁶³ "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, Leopoldville, 26 October, 1962", Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78-00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 12, [*cryptonym not declassified*] Operations. Secret; Rybat; [*cryptonym not declassified*]; Priority. Received at 1921Z.

⁶⁶⁴ Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Congo, Sept. 1962-Dec. 1963.

⁶⁶⁵ National Security Files, Congo, Box 33, Telegram 1133, "US Embassy, Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 15 November, 1962".

⁶⁶⁶ Editorial note to, "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, Léopoldville 26 October 1962", *op.cit.*

⁶⁶⁷ The Special Group was to become the 303 Committee in June, 1964. Its role was to analyse the plausibility of covert operations.

⁶⁶⁸ Antonio Soto Vasquez, Luis Cosme, Eduardo Herrra, Mario Ginebra, Rafael Garcia Pujol, Alfredo "Pavo" de la Maza.

crews.⁶⁶⁹ After leaving Miami and making their way to Léopoldville, the pilots who had now signed contracts with the Congolese government (see Annex 7) were based at N'Dolo Airfield just outside the Congolese capital. At first, with the T-6 aircraft they flew not being armed, there was not much to do except fly around Léopoldville in an effort to show their presence.⁶⁷⁰ In fact, according to the CIA's Ed Dearborn, "the Cubans weren't doing any flying but just sat around drinking beer all day long".⁶⁷¹ Whether Dearborn's observations reflect reality or not, it was not long before the Exile pilots had made an impression on the local Congolese population. Soon, the Exile pilots would become known as the *Makasi*, a word taken from the Lingala language and applied to something which possesses strength, power, vitality or resistance. Later in the Congo campaign, the *Makasi* would adopt the logo of a beer made in Paulis⁶⁷² in the Congo. For this reason, it is tempting to agree with Dearborn's version of events.

By the time the *Makasi* became operational in November/December 1962 the efforts of UN forces in the scope of Operation Grand Slam had begun to bring about the collapse of the Katanga secession: Kamina Air Base was overrun by Swedish troops on 31 December; Jadotville came under UN control in early January 1963; and Kolwezi fell shortly after on 21 January. Tshombe was there to welcome the UN forces.⁶⁷³ The battle for Katanga now over and the Congo Crisis proper having come to an end, all operations of the Congolese Air Force were cancelled. The first batch of *Makasi* pilots had not made an enormous contribution to ending the Katanga secession nor, indeed, had they fired a shot in

⁶⁶⁹ "Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 7 December, 1962", Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 81-00966R, Box 1, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only.

⁶⁷⁰ Hellström, *op.cit.* 34.

⁶⁷¹ Robbins, *op.cit.* 89.

⁶⁷² Now renamed Isiro. For a list of the name changes of Congolese towns and cities, see Annex 2 of this study.

⁶⁷³ Weissman, *US Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964*, *op.cit.* 191.

anger. All that was to change some months later when a popular revolt broke out in the Kwilu.

CHAPTER FIVE. From Katanga to Stanleyville

5.1. The Return of Mercenaries to Katanga

Whereas the State Department documents indicate that the mercenary option had not been decided upon until 6 August, Tshombe had taken the decision to use a mercenary force to end the strife in the Congo some months before Simba rebels arrived in Stanleyville. Tshombe's return also meant that Belgium's role in Congolese political affairs was to increase significantly and the most visible sign of this role came through the return of MISTEBEL. From August 1964, its mission was to supply ANC forces with training, weapons and ammunition as well as running military bases at Kamina and controlling operations from Léopoldville. To advise Tshombe, Belgium had sent Colonel Frédéric Vandewalle who promptly established the Fifth Mechanised Brigade. This was a unit which was to be comprised of foreign volunteers, Katangan Gendarmes and soldiers of the ANC. Counting on the United States to provide the rapid equipping of the Fifth Mechanised Brigade, the plan was to march on Stanleyville as quickly as possible.⁶⁷⁴

The recruitment of foreign volunteers was facilitated by Tshombe having kept in close contact with many of those who had played a leading role in Katanga's efforts to secure its secession. In October 1963, for example, Jean Schramme was reported to have met Tshombe in Madrid while the latter was still in exile.⁶⁷⁵ The relationship between the two led to over 15,000 ex-Gendarmes known as the *Forces Katangaises Libres* (FKL) crossing over to the Congo from Angola on 11 July 1964.⁶⁷⁶ Many of these gendarmes would serve in the mainly French-speaking units 9 and 10 Commando. Including mercenaries from European countries such as Belgium, Greece, Austria or Hungary, 9

⁶⁷⁴ Moïse Tshombe, *My Fifteen Months in Government*, (Texas: University of Plano Press, 1967), 31.

⁶⁷⁵ Clarke, *op.cit.* 37.

⁶⁷⁶ Clarke, *op.cit.* 41-42.

Commando was led by Lieutenant Charles Gardien whereas 10 Commando was led by Lt-Colonel Jean Schramme. Almost half of 9 Commando's total of twelve men were killed in action in 1964 or 1965.⁶⁷⁷ A smaller mercenary unit led by Bob Denard was also to arrive in the Congo during the same period. Denard's troops formed 6 Commando.

While these two units were relatively small in terms of the number of men, 5 Commando,⁶⁷⁸ a unit headed by Mike Hoare was much larger. In Katanga's war against the UN, the ANC and the Baluba, Hoare had been the commanding officer of 4 Commando. His involvement in the mercenary recruitment that took place in 1964 was brought about by Jerry Puren who, as we have seen, was a pilot⁶⁷⁹ in the Katangan Air Force. Puren's own account of his time in the Congo can be found in *Mercenary Commander* published in 1986.⁶⁸⁰

According to Hoare, the plane transporting him from Durban to Ndjili Airport on the outskirts of Léopoldville landed at the end of July 1964.⁶⁸¹ From here after meeting with Alistair Wicks, another veteran of the Katangan campaign, Hoare was to meet Tshombe, his lieutenant Godefroid Munongo, and Mobutu at the Memling Hotel in Léopoldville. It was here that Hoare heard of Mobutu's plans to retake areas of the Congo under the control of the rebels. These areas included Manono, Albertville, Fizi, and Uvira. For the operation, Mobutu estimated that 200 men based in Kamina would be needed immediately. Another 300 men would then be needed to join existing mobile groups, and a

⁶⁷⁷ See, Terry Aspinall, "Congo 1960/68", <http://www.mercenary-wars.net/congo/list-of-congo-soldiers.html>, accessed 31 May, 2016.

⁶⁷⁸ For a list of those known to have served in 5 Commando, see Annex 8 of this study.

⁶⁷⁹ Puren's claim to having been a pilot is disputed by Nigel Osborn, a mercenary pilot who served in 1961. According to Osborn, Puren was a member of the back-seat crew who, through self-promotion, managed to persuade the Belgians into putting him in charge of the Katangan Air Force. On Tshombe's return in 1964, Puren "weeded his way" into Tshombe's favour. Comments made by Nigel Osborn on 5 Commando and Katangan History Group, (Closed group), <https://www.facebook.com/groups/226514834084577/search/?query=puren>, accessed 28 July 2017.

⁶⁸⁰ Jeremy Puren and Brian Pottinger, *Mercenary Commander*, (South Africa, Galago Publishing, 1986).

⁶⁸¹ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, op.cit., 17.

further 500 volunteers acting in conjunction with ANC forces would be required for an attack on Stanleyville.⁶⁸² At the request of Tshombe, Hoare then set about using recruitment methods very similar to that used in 1961 for recruitment into the *Compagnie Internationale*. Adverts were placed in newspapers such as the *Johannesburg Star* and called for 'any fit young man looking for employment with a difference'.⁶⁸³ The salary offered was £150 per month, plus £5 per day extra if in combat, and an additional £2 per day spent in an 'Insecurity Zone'.⁶⁸⁴ A similar recruiting campaign was led in Rhodesia where men were recruited in Salisbury (now Harare) to serve with "special white units" of the Congolese National Army. *The Times* (London) reported that the recruits would be flown to Kamina Air Base by a Rhodesian commercial airline. On board a Rhodesia Air Services (RAS) Skymaster that flew to the Congo via Jan Smuts airport some days later were thirty-six South Africans, Rhodesians, Italians, Belgians and Germans. They had been told by recruiters that the "old idea" of having European officers and black foot soldiers did not work as the "blacks were only too willing to retreat in sticky places". As such, the "new idea" was to form all white units of men.⁶⁸⁵ The *New York Times* reported that while recruitment in South Africa was carried out by Major Jacques C. Puren (sic),⁶⁸⁶ Alistair Wicks, a former pilot with Rhodesian Air Services was responsible for recruitment in Rhodesia.⁶⁸⁷ Another report in *The Times* of 24 August spoke of how a group of thirty Belgians and Frenchmen had arrived in Léopoldville on a flight from Brussels and how a South African Air Force (SAAF) C-130 transport aircraft had also been used to bring in

⁶⁸² Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 29.

⁶⁸³ "The Congo: Help Wanted", *Time*, 4 September 1964.

⁶⁸⁴ Clarke, *op.cit.* 42.

⁶⁸⁵ "Men from Many Countries", *The Times*, 23 August 1964.

⁶⁸⁶ "South Africans Recruited by Congo as Mercenaries", *New York Times*, 24 August 1964.

⁶⁸⁷ "Rhodesians Signing Up", *New York Times*, 24 August 1964. The identity of the recruiter in Southern Rhodesia is given by Hoare as one 'Patrick O'Malley'. See Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, *op.cit.* 33.

mercenaries.⁶⁸⁸ (A list of those who served in 5 Commando can be found in the annexes of this study).

5.2. *Makasi* Reinforcements Arrive in the Congo

In the early stages of 1963 *Makasi* operations were limited to flying over jungle areas with the intention of "scaring" any potential enemy.⁶⁸⁹ Although this idea may seem ridiculous, Mike Hoare had learnt during the previous mercenary campaign in the Congo that the African mind associates great noise with great power.⁶⁹⁰ In any case, the *Makasi* pilots who arrived during the first half of 1963⁶⁹¹ had no other option than to use scare tactics as the planes they flew at the time were not armed.

The attempts to ward off any further disruption to the Congo's fragile peace soon came to an end when the Mulelist rebellion in the Kwilu was joined by revolts led by Gaston Soumialot in the eastern areas of the vast country. The rapidity with which the revolt spread seemingly caught US and Congolese authorities off-guard. At the beginning of April, for example, after a visit by Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, the Congolese rebellion was seen as being no more than a "potentially explosive situation".⁶⁹² By 24 April, the upcoming withdrawal of UN forces in June 1964 had, however, brought the realisation that more military assistance should be provided to the Congolese Air Force. Along with this new influx of hardware which included T-28s and H-21 helicopters supplied through the MAP, the tenets of the mission changed from being one of scaring the enemy through the use of non-combative psychological warfare to one of "active combat

⁶⁸⁸ "'Mercenaries' Arrive in Congo", *The Times*, 24 August 1964.

⁶⁸⁹ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 69.

⁶⁹⁰ Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata*, *op.cit.*, 19.

⁶⁹¹ Nildo Batista, Raul Solis, Ernesto Peyno Inclan, César Luaices Sotelo.

⁶⁹² "Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security Council", Washington, 3 April 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 165.

participation".⁶⁹³ The aim of the expansion of the CIA's programme was to "provide the CAF with a combat air capability in order to support the Congolese Government's efforts to quell the current as well as possible future insurgency".⁶⁹⁴

As far as moving towards an active combat role was concerned, it was not long before US weapons technicians fitted the *Makasi's* T-6s with .303-calibre machine guns, 2,500 rounds of ammunitions, rocket tubes and rockets.⁶⁹⁵ Neither was it long before this new firepower was put to use. On 5 June, J. Anthony Lukas in a special report to the *New York Times* told of how rebels had fired at a Beechcraft reconnaissance plane piloted by Major Harry Asbury, an assistant military attaché with the US Army⁶⁹⁶, and on June 11, 12, and 13, despite an earlier cable limiting them to this type of reconnaissance role, US pilots under pressure from the Congolese "exceeded their authority and flew operational missions in the Kivu area. These 'civilian' pilots under contract to the Congolese government had also flown sorties over the last few days."⁶⁹⁷

It is evident that the Americans who took part in these early combat missions were far from being 'civilians'. Those in question were Air America pilots Ed Dearborn and Don Coney, as well as CIA and Intermountain⁶⁹⁸ pilot John Merriman who oversaw all of the *Makasi's* operations. Arriving in the Congo on 17 July 1964, Merriman was to be killed later that month when his T-28 was shot down by Simba rebels while attacking a convoy near Kabalo. Although Merriman survived the crash, he was so badly injured that he died

⁶⁹³ "Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency", *Status Report on CIA Assistance to the Congolese Air Force*, Washington, 5 May 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 168.

⁶⁹⁴ "Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency", *Assistance to the Congolese Air Force*, Washington, 22 May 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 171.

⁶⁹⁵ Segisberto Fernandez in a conversation with Villafaña, 19 October, 2007, quoted in Villafaña, *op.cit.* 70.

⁶⁹⁶ J. Anthony Lukas, "Rebels in Congo Fire at US Plane", *New York Times*, 5 June 1964.

⁶⁹⁷ "Rebels in Congo Fire at US Plane", *op.cit.*

⁶⁹⁸ Another CIA proprietary company.

some weeks later.⁶⁹⁹ Another US 'civilian' was Leighton 'Mish' Mishou. Although it is unclear whether this CIA operative took an active role in combat missions, Mishou served as an Air Ops Officer from 1963-1965.⁷⁰⁰ As such, Mishou was in charge of Reginaldo Blanco's group which was based at Kamina Air Base.⁷⁰¹

At a time when US participation in the Congo remained unofficial, the use of Cuban Exiles to fly in what was later to be termed as the CIA's 'Instant Air Force'⁷⁰² was the perfect solution: the exiles could continue to fight communism wherever it appeared (their main motivation as we will see); and by using stateless persons who would not acquire US citizenship until much later,⁷⁰³ the United States had just the right alibi it needed should any pilot be captured or killed. That the Exiles were to deny any involvement with the US government was impressed on Reginaldo Blanco when embarking on the flight that was to take him to the Congo in August 1964. Asked by a CIA agent who he was working for, and replying that he worked for the US government, Blanco was told in no uncertain terms that he should keep in mind never to reveal the identity of his employer. This was the case if ever Blanco was captured: the US was not coming to rescue him and he was told rather bluntly that he was 'on his fucking own'.⁷⁰⁴

While this solitary and frightening aspect of the Cuban Exile pilot's life in the Congo proved in many respects to be the case whilst he was in the field of battle, daily life while training or living on the air bases used by the CIA was supported and regulated by a whole host of different personnel responsible for the running of operations. This was

⁶⁹⁹ Personal correspondence with Jon Merriman (John Merriman's son), April 2015. See also, John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 234 and Ted Gup, *The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and deaths of CIA Operatives*, (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 131.

⁷⁰⁰ Personal correspondence with Leighton Mishou's son, Peter, 25 January 2015.

⁷⁰¹ Personal correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 31 January 2016.

⁷⁰² "How CIA Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo", *New York Times*, 26 April 1966.

⁷⁰³ Radio operator in the Cuban Exile Navy Roberto Pichardo Snr. obtained US citizenship only in August 1969 having resided in Miami since 1960. See, annexes to this study.

⁷⁰⁴ Personal correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 19 June 2017.

especially the case after the creation of the Western International Ground Maintenance Organisation (WIGMO), a CIA front company registered in Lichtenstein. Employing mainly Scandinavian and British aircraft technicians responsible for the maintenance of aircraft, by April 1965, WIGMO had become a well-oiled structure in which Senior Air Officers, Chief Air Officers,⁷⁰⁵ Chief Pilots and Station Pilots governed every aspect of the pilot's daily routine while he was on duty.⁷⁰⁶ On occasions, the imposition of authority spilled into the pilot's off-duty time too. For example, a gun was pulled on Leighton Mishou by a Cuban Exile after the former had again 'exceeded his authority'.⁷⁰⁷

With the *Makasi* contingent being reinforced by the arrival of pilots such as Gustavo Ponzoa, René Garcia just after, and due to, the taking of Stanleyville on 5 August, by the 19 of the same month ANC forces in Bakuvu had shown that they had teeth and had pushed back an attempt by rebel forces to capture the town. Defended by a force of around 650 ANC troops under the command of Colonel Léonard Mulamba, a soldier described by Mike Hoare as a "fearless leader",⁷⁰⁸ as the Simbas approached Bakuvu, three Americans (Colonel William A. Dodds, Colonel Donald V. Rattan and Lewis R. McFarlane) attached to the MAP set off to inspect ANC positions. Although they avoided direct contact with the Simbas, later that day ANC forces were overcome forcing Bakuvu's white residents to flee the city into neighbouring Rwanda. However, supported by Cuban-piloted T-28s making strafing runs over the Simba, Colonel Mulamba's ANC forces managed to repel further

⁷⁰⁵ One of the Chief Pilots was Ksawery "Big Bill" Wyrozemski, a Polish fighter pilot who flew Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires in the Polish Air Force in WW2. As a contract pilot of the CIA's Development Projects Division (DPD), it is probable that Wyrozemski flew missions in the agency's support in the Bay of Pigs invasion. See, Warren A. Trest, *Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America's Secret Air Wars*, (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 83. In the Congo, Wyrozemski served as an airfield commander. He was killed in a road accident near Albertville in February 1967.

⁷⁰⁶ See, "Regulations for Pilots / Crewmen", Leopoldville, 20 April 1965, in annexes to this study.

⁷⁰⁷ Personal correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 31 January 2016.

⁷⁰⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 166.

attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.⁷⁰⁹ According to Segisberto Fernandez, one of the Cuban exiles flying T-28s in the attacks on Simba positions, "COMISH, the CIA and the ANC all believed that holding Bakuvu was vital for crushing the Simba rebellion and the eventual rescue of the hostages" [in Stanleyville].⁷¹⁰

While this victory heralded somewhat of a turning point in the battle against a previously unrelenting Simba advance, the extent and importance of Chinese assistance given to these same rebels was a subject of great concern for the Department of State's Special Group. Convened on 21 August,⁷¹¹ reports that Léopoldville itself would come under attack were of particular concern.⁷¹² In response to this threat, on 24 August, the 303 Committee⁷¹³ approved a proposal [put forward by the CIA] to expand its support for Congolese air operations and to create WIGMO.⁷¹⁴ It also included supplying the Congolese Air Force with B-26 bombers, and providing the pilots to fly them. These were reconditioned WW2 bombers which were loaned to the Congolese and repainted with the colours of the Congolese Air Force.⁷¹⁵

As noted earlier, one of these pilots was Reginaldo Blanco, honourably discharged from the USAF in October 1963, but still a member of the MRR. Aged 17, Reginaldo Blanco had taken part in MRR activities in Tegucigalpa, Honduras some time before the Bay of Pigs invasion. These activities consisted in gathering intelligence from Nicaraguan, Guatemalan and US sources. After crossing into Guatemala where he hoped to join

⁷⁰⁹ Reed, *op.cit.*, 81.

⁷¹⁰ Villafaña, *op.cit.*, 77.

⁷¹¹ The 21 August, 1964 was also the day that the first batch of Mike Hoare's Commando arrived in the Congo, and the same day that American officials held hostage in Stanleyville were sentenced to death by Simba leaders.

⁷¹² "Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone", *Special Group (CI) Meeting*, Washington, 21 August 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 232.

⁷¹³ The 303 Committee was the successor to the 5412/2, and was created on 2 June 1964.

⁷¹⁴ Footnotes, Special Group (CI) Meeting, *op.cit.*

⁷¹⁵ Wagoner, *op.cit.* 34.

invasion forces training at Retalhuleu, but being stopped at the border, Blanco then travelled to the United States to renew his efforts to join the invasion force. On being told that he had arrived too late, in 1962, Blanco was one of the first to join the Cuban Volunteer Programme. Being accepted and having been sent to Lackland, Blanco became aware of a programme in the Congo in which other Cuban exile pilots were taking part. In August 1964, with just nine hours of flying B-26 bombers under his belt, Blanco and three other Exile pilots took a Pan Am flight from New York to Léopoldville to take part in the fight against Simba rebels.⁷¹⁶

Having also trained on T-28s at the CIA facilities at North Perry airport in Florida, Reginaldo Blanco had little experience of flying B-26s. Nevertheless, when learning that the CIA was in desperate need of pilots for this aircraft, "*Le Petit Mercenaire*" as he would become known, offered his services. Recruited around July 1964, after asking friends to put him in contact with the recruiter, Blanco arrived on 12 August some ten days before the CIA produced its official report to provide assistance. In doing so, it demonstrated that recognition of its 'official activities' was often preceded by its 'unofficial activities. On the subject of concealing its activities, the US State Department was also guilty of not providing any official recognition of its military support for Tshombe's regime until 1 October 1964.⁷¹⁷

Having received further training on B-26s at Lackland, in the Congo further training was provided at Kamina by a Second-Lieutenant of the First Air Commando Group from Eglin Air Force Base in northern Florida. Joined by Fausto Gomez, Castor Cereceda Coira (both veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion),⁷¹⁸ Tristan Garcia and Tony

⁷¹⁶ Correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 21 September 2014.

⁷¹⁷ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 80.

⁷¹⁸ See "List of Participants of The Bay of Pigs Invasion", http://cuban-exile.com/doc_026-050/doc0035.html, accessed 29 July 2017.

Blazquez, Blanco would eventually fly over 150 combat missions over most of the Congo, and would see hand-to-hand combat in Kabalo and Katanga. As we shall see, these missions included playing an important role in the Stanleyville rescue operations of November 1964 where Blanco would provide air cover for 5 Commando. Some of the men who served in this unit became personal friends of Blanco during his time at Kamina air base.⁷¹⁹ In September 1964, this group of pilots was joined by Ignacio (Max) Rojas who was interviewed in Miami, Florida in October 2015 in the scope of this study.

As far as the recruitment of the pilots of the *Makasi* was concerned, Roberto Medel of the MRR played a significant role. The link between agents operating out of JM/WAVE in Miami and militant members of the Cuban Exile community, without Medel's involvement and contacts within a group which attempted to maintain secrecy it is difficult to imagine how any such force could have been put together. On the other hand, and although Kennedy had become a hate figure in the exile community, working in conjunction with the CIA remained the MRR's most viable option when it came to reaching its objective to overthrow Castro and to defeat communism in any area of the world which came under threat of a communist takeover.

As is the case with all the Cuban Exiles interviewed, either on a one-to-one basis or by e-mail, not one put forward financial gain as the primary motive for volunteering to go to the Congo.⁷²⁰ Without exception, these men saw (and still see) the spread of communism as the greatest threat, something underlined by their self-proclaimed devotion to the Catholic faith. These men also followed a code of conduct laid down by their

⁷¹⁹ Correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 12 January 2015.

⁷²⁰ American veterans of the Rhodesian Bush War were also interviewed in order to gain a greater understanding of what motivates someone to fight for another country. Those interviewed include Colonel Joseph Columbus Smith, a former Green Beret, veteran of the Vietnam War, and a member of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR). As is the case with the 300 or so Americans who fought in the Bush Wars, the 'Crippled Eagles' as they became known were not considered mercenaries. Integrated into Rhodesian Army units, these men earned the same wage as other Rhodesian soldiers and list their primary motivation as helping in the fight against communism. For further information on US nationals in the Rhodesian War see, Robin Moore, *The Crippled Eagles*, (New York: Condor Publishing Company, 1977).

employers, as did Mike Hoare's 5 Commando. In order to get a better understanding of the profile and motivations of the Cuban exile in the Congo, let us now return to the interview with Max Rojas.

Ignacio 'Max' Rojas was born in Santa Clara, Cuba in 1935 and moved to Havana at a young age. His father was a Communist sympathiser and his brother a supporter of Castro. Qualifying as a pilot in Cuba he joined the Cuban Naval Air Force and, in 1958 was sent to Pensacola, Florida where as part of an agreement between the US and Cuban governments, he received training on T-34s and T-28s. Returning to Cuba after the overthrow of Batista, Rojas then flew for the navy in Castro's newly-formed armed forces. One of thirteen pilots who received special privileges in Castro's Revolutionary Navy, Rojas was responsible for flying officials such as Castro and Guevara to meetings around Cuba. It was during this time that Rojas realised that Castro was 'truly Communist' and he was approached by another pilot to discuss the possibility of overthrowing the new regime. After applying for a visa to visit the US, Rojas was finally dismissed from the navy in the summer of 1960 after planning to steal an aircraft to escape Cuba and go to the US. He arrived in the US on the 3 October 1960 for his honeymoon after being married the previous day. During his honeymoon around the Miami Beach area, Rojas was joined by five other pilots from the Cuban Revolutionary Navy (Paul Lazo, Demetrio Perez, Raul Vasquez, Tomas Afont and Octavio Soto). On October 12, 1960 they were flown by the CIA in a DC4 to training camps in Retalhuleu, Guatemala where they would train for the Bay of Pigs invasion programmed for April 1961.

Rojas was then sent to Nicaragua where plans to destroy Castro's air force were made. A B-26 pilot, Rojas' mission at the Bay of Pigs was to bomb airports over a two-day period. Although sixteen pilots were due to take part in the raids, President Kennedy ordered that the bombing be stopped. According to Rojas, this was the greatest

contribution to the failure of the invasion. After the Bay of Pigs Rojas flew non-military aircraft up to 1963. However, after learning of Kennedy's plan to integrate Cuban Exiles into the US forces, Rojas enlisted in the U.S. Navy as a pilot with the rank of ensign. He was based firstly in Kansas before moving to Port Mugu Naval Base in California. It was here in July or August of 1964 that he (along with other Cuban Exile pilots) was contacted by Roberto Medel and was told to meet in a restaurant in Los Angeles. Although happy as a pilot in the US Navy, when Rojas was informed that there was a Communist threat in the Congo, and that he and the other pilots would be serving the US, Max agreed to sign up for the mission. Based at Kamina, Rojas flew B-26s for a period of 6 months which he renewed until October 1965.⁷²¹ He remains proud that he served with the *Makasi*, is still virulently anti-Castro, and at over eighty years of age still attends Bay of Pigs veterans meetings.

While it is common for the mercenary to be seen in some way as amoral and be motivated purely by financial gain, the *Makasi* pilots' strong desire to overthrow what they perceived as an evil ideology and their own code of conduct goes some way to dispelling many of the preconceived ideas associated with mercenaries. Indeed, personal correspondence and one-to-one interviews have shown that the prime motivation in going to the Congo was to fight communism and to take revenge against Fidel Castro. As for being motivated by money, as professional pilots these men would have earned far more if they had stayed in the US. As we have seen, this includes Max Rojas and those others recruited at the time. The majority of pilots were serving members of the US Navy (USN) or Air Force and as such would not need to seek financial security abroad.

Objectively, it would be unreasonable for any pilot to work for nothing. This is especially true in the Congo where pilots risked their lives each time they went on a

⁷²¹ Interview with Max Rojas, 25 October 2015 at the residence of Janet Joy Ray, Miami, Florida, USA.

mission. However, with some zones of the Congo being far more dangerous than others, pilots operating out of Léopoldville earned less money. For example, those flying out of the capital were paid \$550 per month while those flying from other Congolese airports saw their salaries increase to \$850 per month. In addition to this, the pilots were paid \$300 per month danger money, and extra money could be earned for reconnaissance and when flying in a combat zone, (\$10 and \$20 per hour, respectively). On top of this, if a pilot was killed in a combat zone the CIA would provide a life insurance payment of \$40,000, whereas if killed in a non-combat zone this figure decreased to \$20,000.⁷²²

5.2.1. Interlude: A Day in the Life of a *Makasi* Pilot⁷²³

Operating under an organisational structure headed by the Senior Air Officer, the Chief Air Officer (Léopoldville), the Chief Pilot, and the Station Pilot, all detachment pilots and crewmembers were met at Ndjili Airport by the Chief Pilot or his representative. After passing rapidly through customs (most pilots as stateless persons carried no form of identification), the following day in Léopoldville was spent providing information for administrative purposes and the signing of a contract with the Congolese Government. Next came a briefing given by the Chief Pilot on such things as operations. With the briefing over, the next step was being supplied with a uniform and equipment from the WIGMO stores. As this equipment was valuable, any loss would have to be paid for from the pilot's salary. On the question of salaries, from a general point of view each pilot

⁷²² Oscar A. Carol, a Cuban exile payroll officer for WIGMO in an interview with Frank Villafaña, Miami, 26 July 2006 and May 2007. See, Villafaña, *op.cit.* 81.

⁷²³ In late October 2015 I was fortunate enough to interview five Cuban exiles who had served in the Congo, ('Max' Rojas, Roberto Pichardo Snr., Felix Toledo, Eulogio 'Papo' Reyes, and Frederico Falquer). In the scope of these interviews, I was handed a document by Janet Joy Ray. To my knowledge, the contents of this document have never appeared in any published, or unpublished material. This document of which the original source is Jack Varela (Chief Pilot) is dated 20 April, 1965. With two of the document's 8 pages missing, it seems probable that it was generated through the need to harmonise flying procedures and pilot behaviour during flights. This suggests that some pilots may have been slightly 'gung ho' during operations.

would be paid on the 30th of every month of the six-month contract. If operating in the field of combat, salaries were to be paid in cash on the 15th of the month.

As regards personal correspondence, due to the highly secretive nature of the CIA operation and through the fear that information could be leaked, all pilots were advised to use discretion when making phone calls or when writing letters. This applied in particular to "operational matters, missions, target locations, target areas, damage, casualties, etc." Personnel were warned not to make themselves look like a hero by writing what was termed as "garbage" as this could affect the pilot's family or those of the pilots "mates". This aspect of security also applied to photos. Whereas photos of the pilots, the aircraft and the Congo were permitted, photos of air strikes, missions and targets were forbidden. Any violation of this regulation would result in personnel being sent home. Transportation to and from Ndjili was provided by VW buses supplied by WIGMO's motor pool. Where transport was not available, pilots were advised to contact WIGMO-6062.

As far as pilot training was concerned, the first step was to assign the trainee to a type of aircraft. This was carried out by the Chief Pilot and Chief Air Officer at Léopoldville. Assignments were made according to the pilot's experience, his flight background, and the current and anticipated requirements in terms of field detachment. When starting training at Ndjili, the trainee was provided with a handbook for the aircraft to which he had been assigned and, prior to flight training. This was followed by a written examination covering the aircraft to which the pilot had been assigned. Flight schedules were provided each day and, provided by the Admin Officer and Chief Pilot, they were to be posted in three locations: 1) The WIGMO bulletin board outside the WIGMO supply

depot; 2) The Sabena Apt. (this could refer to the Sabena Guest House on Avenue Olsen, Léopoldville); 3) the River House.⁷²⁴

With pilot training organised by WIGMO and conducted by the Chief Air Officer or his representative, in cases where a pilot was not considered adequately qualified for operational flying", he could be given 30 days' notice before being repatriated. Retraining also applied to those on 'R and R' (rest and recuperation) so as to provide a "standardization" of flight procedures in the field. Pilots returning from the field and on 'R and R' would carry out one flight per day.

On completion of his training, a pilot would be assigned to one of the field detachments. Here, the pilot would be briefed on operations by the Station Chief Pilot, and pilots would be made to understand what was required of them when flying missions. Particular attention was to be given not to adopt "bad flying habits and a non-professional approach" as this could lead to the loss of an airplane or the pilot's life. With operations generally taking place over thousands of square miles of dense jungle, the pilots were also warned that to increase their "longevity" in the Congo they must not become bored with the scenery. According to Varela, this was the time pilots could take a "few arrows in the can". Lastly, pilots were cautioned not provide a running commentary of their operations while in the air. During the previous months briefing had been carried out while the pilots were in the air and this had led to them resembling a discussion. Radio communication had been "non-existent" and talk between planes had been like a running commentary. "Continual chatter" was thus forbidden as this could lead to the enemy monitoring the progress of operations. On this note, concerning the discipline of the pilots, in the past it

⁷²⁴ When in Léopoldville, Cuban exile pilots were either housed in small apartments or in the larger accommodation blocks used by the Congo's Parachute Brigade. According to Reginaldo Blanco, this was handy as the *Makasi* lived in an area where they could dine at restaurants or go for a beer. The Sabena Apartments were located almost within the perimeter of Ndjili Airport but, after a mortar attack on the apartments, the pilots moved to the Victoria Hotel in the centre of the capital. Correspondence with Reginaldo Blanco, 9 August 2017.

had been found that unauthorised passengers and cargo had been transported by the pilots. In Varela's view, this showed some laxity on the part of the Admin Officer and the Pilot-in-Command.⁷²⁵

5.3. The Evolution of the Counterinsurgency

Some days following his arrival in Kamina on board a USAF-crewed C-130, Mike Hoare met up with Major Alain Blume of the Belgian Air Force (FAB). Blume was part of the *Force Aérienne Tactique Congolaise* (FATAC), a unit which had been formed to fly in ammunition to ANC troops around the Congo, and to carry out reconnaissance. US technicians maintained the FATAC's aircraft.⁷²⁶ At Kamina, Hoare was shown a map of the ANC's forward positions and where there had met enemy resistance. The forces in question were advancing from Kongolo (between Kabalo and Kasongo in northern Katanga (see *Figure 5*) to Albertville situated on the banks of Lake Tanganyika.

Having learnt from Blume that the ANC was showing little desire to face the enemy, Hoare then met with Belgian Vice-Consul Pierre Guillot in Elisabethville. Guillot was extremely worried about a large number of Belgian civilians and priests in Albertville and feared they would be killed by Soumialot's forces if action was not taken quickly. These fears were confirmed on the night of 12/13 August 1964 when a fishing boat bearing the inscription 'Tanganyika Yacht Club' arrived in Burundi carrying Belgian and Greek refugees. These refugees confirmed that exactions had been taken out against monks and that two had been killed.⁷²⁷

⁷²⁵ Parts concerning "Flight and hazard pay"; "Maintenance"; "Contract conditions"; "Check out prior to departure"; and "Arriving home" are missing from the document.

⁷²⁶ Jean-Pierre Sonck, "La Force Aérienne au Congo", <http://www.congo-1960.be/LaForceAerienneTactiqueCongolaise.html>, accessed 28 July 2017.

⁷²⁷ Jean-Pierre Sonck, "L'échec de l'opération "Watch Chain"", <http://www.congo-1960.be/OperationWatchChain.html>, accessed 28 July 2017.

With the idea of providing the Congolese with a demonstration of force, and showing them that the rebels could be defeated Hoare conceived a plan to launch a waterborne attack on Albertville. With reconnaissance of the area having been made and permission for the attack having been given by Mobutu, the next step was to find the necessary equipment. In another demonstration of Belgian government-mercenary cooperation, this problem was solved by Colonel Guillaume Logiest of MISTEBEL who agreed to provide sixteen fibreglass boats.⁷²⁸ Hoare estimated that around 100 men would be required for the job in hand. However, the first plane to arrive in the Congo from Johannesburg on 21 August 1964 carried only thirty-eight men who had come to offer their services in the fight against the rebels. To make Hoare's situation worse, nine men decided to withdraw on the grounds that the risk of being killed or wounded had not been fully explained during the recruiting process. Of the remaining twenty-nine some hardly spoke English and had evidently not received any military training. Nevertheless, Hoare selected around a dozen men and appointed four of them to provide training to the others. These men were Pat Kirton from South Africa; Eric Bridge, a former Royal Marine Commando and veteran of the Mau Mau campaign; Norman Grant, a former member of the Black Watch, a winner of the Military Medal, and a veteran of the previous campaign in Katanga. The last was Siegfried Mueller, a forty-two year old former sergeant in the German *Wehrmacht*.⁷²⁹ Throughout his time in the Congo, Mueller wore the Iron Cross he had gained for his actions in WW2.

The plan named Operation Watch Chain and which consisted in attacking attack the airfield at Albertville with reinforcements provided by FATAAC was launched a few days later. Flying in to Moba on the southern banks of Lake Tanganyika, Hoare's men then

⁷²⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 44.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid*, 45.

headed northwards by boat to the town of Malembe after hearing of a threat made by Soumialot to kill sixty priests being held in a prison in the town. On the way up, Hoare's forces stopped at Cape Rutuku and it was here that 5 Commando first met the Simbas. In a quick exchange of fire, several rebels imbued with cannabis were killed by Dutchman Van de Hoek and other 5 Commando soldiers including Frenchman Claude Chanu, a member of Hoare's earlier Katangan mercenary force, 4 Commando.⁷³⁰ Further encounters with the Simbas followed and, in the face of having suffered several wounded and the death of two German mercenaries over the coming days, the small group of 5 Commando was compelled to retreat. Hoare, regretful of the fact that he had not been able to save the priests, put this failure down to sending inexperienced men into battle.⁷³¹ Better news came on 30 August when troops of the ANC led by Colonel Gaetan Kakudji were able to defeat rebels in Albertville and free twenty-eight European employees of the Filtisaf textile works who had been held hostage by rebels led by Soumialot.⁷³²

With assistance from Vandewalle in making Kamina operational after months of neglect, Hoare was reassured by the arrival of a second batch of recruits from South Africa. Their recruitment had been facilitated by South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd who declared that his country was working towards and desired a legitimate government in the Congo.⁷³³ To train them, Hoare appointed Regimental Sergeant-Major Arthur Lindsay (Jack) Carton-Barber. From now on, this South African would use strict British Army precedents to train and drill the men of mostly Afrikaner origin. To instill discipline, the men of 5 Commando were issued with a code of conduct. The first rule (Pray to God daily),

⁷³⁰ See photo pages, Hoare, *The Road to Kalamata*, *op.cit.*

⁷³¹ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, *op.cit.*, 59.

⁷³² J. Anthony Lukas, "Katanga Capital Appears Retaken", *New York Times*, 1 September 1964.

⁷³³ Vandewalle, *op.cit.* 169. Vandewalle also insinuates that Brigadier-General H.H. Robertz of the South African Army also played an active role in this recruitment.

underlines the anti-communist nature of the unit.⁷³⁴ As for 5 Commando's NCO's, these were former soldiers that had served in the British Army or the colonial police such as John Peters.⁷³⁵ Peters, a sergeant in Hoare's forces, would later become Commanding Officer of 5 Commando after Hoare's departure from the Congo in December 1965. Among those mercenaries arriving in September 1964 and putting pay to the commonly-held belief that all of Hoare's forces were South African or Rhodesian was Briton Gary Cooper. Aged 50 in 1964, Cooper was the eldest of those recruited.⁷³⁶

Never numbering more than two hundred men,⁷³⁷ (or 300 according to Hoare),⁷³⁸ and after a 'cleansing operation' he sent "alcoholics, drunks, booze artists, bums and layabouts" as well as homosexuals back to South Africa,⁷³⁹ Hoare then reorganised 5 Commando into units of approximately thirty to forty men commanded by two officers. These units were known as 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 Commandos. As Mockler notes, each of the units acted independently of one another and operated under different commands.⁷⁴⁰ With Hoare having overall command of the units, this command was often 'remote and occasionally nonexistent'. This led the men to criticise Hoare for taking undue credit for military successes. Despite this, Hoare remained a well-respected leader.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁴ 1) Pray to God daily. 2) Make a fetish of personal cleanliness, take pride in your appearance. Even in the midst of battle, shave daily. 3) Clean and protect your weapon always. They must be bright clean and slightly oiled. Examine your ammunition frequently. Check and clean your magazine springs and clips. 4) Soldiers in pairs; look after each other; be faithful to your mate. Be loyal to your leaders. 5) Tell no lies in battle. All information must be accurate or your unit will suffer. Exaggerate to your girlfriends later, but NEVER, NEVER in battle. 6) Be ready to move at a moment's notice; mark all your equipment; keep it handy at all times; at night develop a routine for finding it. 7) Look after your vehicle; fill it with petrol before resting; clean it; do not overload unnecessarily. 8) Take no unnecessary risks. 9) Stand-to dawn and dusk. At night have confidence in your sentries; post as few as the situation demands. 10) Be aggressive in action - chivalrous in victory- stubborn in defence. See, Terry Aspinall, "5 Commando's Rules of Battle", <http://www.mercenary-wars.net/congo/commando-rules-for-battle.html>, accessed 28 July 2017.

⁷³⁵ Mockler, *op.cit.* 175.

⁷³⁶ Terry Aspinall, *op.cit.*

⁷³⁷ Mockler, *op.cit.* 175.

⁷³⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary, op.cit.* 66.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ Mockler, *op.cit.* 175.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

As the situation developing in Stanleyville took on a decidedly more deadly tone - for Americans, in particular- some 7,000 miles away in Washington DC, the primary concern after the failure of Operation Flagpole was finding a way to rescue the twenty-five or so US citizens being held captive by Simba rebels who were threatening to kill them. A memorandum from General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted to solve the dilemma which provided the choice between the US having its covert operations uncovered or seeing consulate representatives and missionaries put to death.

Two courses of action appeared, therefore, available: the overt use of a joint task force⁷⁴² which would entail the dropping of airborne troops supported by US aircraft into multiple drop zones and securing Stanleyville airfield; or the covert use of military forces which would be parachuted into an area west of Stanleyville, and which would then make their way into the town by rubber boat or on foot. With the guards being overpowered by these forces, the hostages would be rescued and taken to another area where they could be airlifted out of Stanleyville by helicopter or by a US C-46 transport plane. With both courses of action being seen as possibly infeasible by Wheeler, this due to not knowing the exact whereabouts of US personnel, a third option was also presented: the capture of Stanleyville and the rescue of all foreign 'personnel'. At first, the option to use covert

⁷⁴² Joint Task Force LEO was an airborne platoon of US Army soldiers. It operated around Léopoldville and was transported by CH-34 helicopters maintained by US Army technicians. See, Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo*, *op.cit.* 31. According to Lowell Hamilton, *Men, Wars and Sex of the 60's*, (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2017), 383, and Sam McGowan, *Anything, Anywhere, Anytime*, (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2011), 290, Task Force Leo was a US Strike Command (STRICOM) task force consisting of five Tactical Air Command C-130s from the 464th Carrier Wing based at Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg in North Carolina. These planes were given protection by two platoons of paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division. The TALKING BIRD communications system on board the C-130s allowed for radio communication between STRICOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House.

forces was considered as the best adapted to the circumstances.⁷⁴³ But, in the end, Operation Low Beam using Rip Robertson's team of Cuban Exile commandos was abandoned as it was feared that local inhabitants would inform rebels through the use of jungle drums.⁷⁴⁴

With further plans for the rescue of the hostages being put on hold for the time being, US strategy consisted in employing methods which had been, were, and would continue to be, a common feature of its foreign policy. Overtly, for humanitarian reasons the US made attempts at finding a solution to the hostage crisis through diplomatic overtures to international bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Red Cross, but, at the same time, its covert foreign policy was one of ensuring that a regime in which it had a vested interest remained in power. If necessary, these objectives would be achieved -as had been the case in Guatemala- through cooperation with mercenary forces. If this cooperation were to be discovered, it would create an adverse reaction among the US public and jeopardise "general African policies and programs".⁷⁴⁵

In the event, diplomatic difficulties meant that the US had little choice but to revert to the use of military support to maintain Tshombe in his position as Prime Minister. Ambassador Godley had attempted to convince Tshombe that presenting his point of view to the OAU would be beneficial. However, after Tshombe's expelling of all nationals of Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, and Burundi for subversive activities, the Congolese Prime Minister had grown suspicious of the motives of the OAU. A degree of mutual suspicion came through Tshombe's use of mercenaries in Katanga and his close association with

⁷⁴³ "Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara", *Evacuation of US Personnel*, Washington, 12 September 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, Document 255.

⁷⁴⁴ Sean Kelly, *America's Tyrant: the CIA and Mobutu of Zaire*, (Washington DC: American University Press, 1993), 142.

⁷⁴⁵ "Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (Loram) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)", Washington, 19 September, 1964, FRUS Congo, 1964-1968, Document 260, and "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Kenya", Washington 22 September 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, Document 261.

South Africa. In addition, after Tshombe had been persuaded to attend an extraordinary session of the OAU on 5 September held in Addis Ababa it was agreed that Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya should head a special conciliatory commission in the Congo. US officials predicted that Kenyatta would recommend that the OAU adopt a position of neutrality as regards the Congolese conflict. Instead, he opted instead to offer a seat on the commission to a delegation of the *Conseil National de Libération*. Kenyatta also called for a ceasefire and an end to Belgian and American support for Tshombe.⁷⁴⁶

As US State officials in Washington attempted to make their way through this diplomatic minefield, in Léopoldville Colonel Vandewalle had been given the task of developing a plan to retake Stanleyville, and bring a degree of political and social stability to the Congo. On 13 August, after meeting with fellow former officers of the *Force Publique*, Guillaume Logiest and Louis Marlière, Vandewalle sat down in front of a typewriter in the Belgian embassy in Léopoldville and wrote the following to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.

"The situation of an exceptional seriousness can only be improved by taking the following measures:

- 1) The role of the Commander-in-chief should be eased by providing him with a special headquarters from which he can direct operations to reestablish order. These headquarters should be entrusted to a military advisor to the Commander-in-chief who would, in turn, be assisted by a small number of Congolese advisors and officers in charge of their own sections.
- 2) A "small packet" policy should be avoided at all costs: a fire cannot be put out by throwing cups of water at it. What is needed is a plan whose results can only be seen in several weeks' time.
- 3) A reserve made up of the best available troops (ex-Katanganese Gendarmes) must be put in place. This reserve which will receive intensive training has to be stationed

⁷⁴⁶ Major Thomas P. Odom, "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965", Leavenworth Papers, Number 14, *Combat Studies Institute*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1986.

in the zone where offensives moving to the north will start. At least ten companies of soldiers are needed.

4) Using this reserve, its airborne support, foreign volunteers and technicians, offensives will be carried out according to a plan drawn up by the operational headquarters and the Commander-in-chief.

5) Foreign volunteers should be 'handled solidly' (sic).

6) [...] It is impossible to hope to turn around a situation as serious as this in 24 or 48 hours. We should take advantage of the next fortnight to prepare the offensive which will bring certain success. Airfields, road and train hubs will be the principal objectives. The rest [of the Congo] does not matter. Léopoldville and Haut-Katanga must be held at all cost as well as communication links between Léo[poldville] and E'ville."⁷⁴⁷

With the details of the plan having been looked over by Tshombe, Mobutu, G. Mennen Williams, and Colonel Frank Williams of COMIS,⁷⁴⁸ on 24 August 1964 Foreign Minister Spaak signed the Ministerial Order giving Vandewalle the authorisation to lead the mission in the Congo. This was quickly followed on 28 August by an order signed by General Mobutu and Tshombe which gave Vandewalle the responsibility of coordinating ground and airborne operations.⁷⁴⁹ The question of ways put in place, Vandewalle now turned his attention to the means with which the *Ommegang*⁷⁵⁰ would be implemented.

From a general point of view, the plan drawn up by Vandewalle called for the division of the Congo into four parts in which different battalions would operate: Group One (51 Commando) would be responsible for the area which comprised Luluabourg; Group Two (52 Commando) for a large portion of western Congo which included Léopoldville, Coquilhatville and Lisala in the north-west; Group Three (53 Commando) in the area covering territory between Bakuvu and Bunia; and Group Four (54 Commando) which would operate in the area north of Elisabethville. The forces used in these operations

⁷⁴⁷ Vandewalle, *op.cit.*, 148-149.


⁷⁴⁸ US Mission Congo.

⁷⁴⁹ Vandewalle, *op.cit.*, 172.

⁷⁵⁰ The term *Ommegang* means 'to walk around' in Dutch. Over time, it has come to refer to a traditional Dutch or Flemish festival of folklore activities held annually in Belgium.

would be two groups of three battalions which would become operational before the 15 October and the 15 November respectively. The objectives of the plan were to retake the Kivu by the 30 October using three battalions, and to gain control of Stanleyville by 15 December.⁷⁵¹ The four groups were then divided in two and were given the names Lima 1 and Lima 2. They were supplied with equipment from the United States⁷⁵² and commanded more than 150 trucks, armoured cars and jeeps.⁷⁵³ Both groups were to be supplied with air cover provided by the *Makasi* pilots.

Figure 6. Pacifying the Congo: The Strategy⁷⁵⁴



⁷⁵¹ Vandewalle, *op.cit.* 218-219.

⁷⁵² According to *Time Magazine*, 27 August 1964, United States aid to the Congo in August 1964 was four C-130 transport planes; three B-26 bombers; ten C-47s; seven F-28s (Fokker short-range airliner); ten helicopters; seventy jeeps; and 250 trucks. According to Wagoner, *op.cit.* 76, seven more B-26s arrived in the Congo in early September 1964.

⁷⁵³ Clarke, *op.cit.* 47.

⁷⁵⁴ Clarke, *op.cit.* 46

Figure 7. Division of the Fifth Mechanised Brigade ⁷⁵⁵

<u>Lima 1</u>	<u>Lima 2</u>
300 mercenaries (5 Commando's seven companies plus Cuban commandos.	One armoured unit
Belgian regular forces.	350 Baluba tribesmen.
300 ANC.	8 Commando (a logistics team and three infantry companies under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lamouline).
7 Commando (a logistics team, three infantry companies).	9 Commando or Force Papa (a logistics team, an infantry company and a battalion of ANC commanded by Major Protin).
A unit made up of Balemba tribesmen.	10 Commando led by Jean Schramme.
6 Commando led by Bob Denard (six platoons numbered 61 to 65 and a platoon of paratroopers commanded by Lieutenant Topor).	

As far as the actual advance on Stanleyville was concerned, all the forces were to assemble at Kamina, Katanga in mid-September 1964. From here, elements of Vandewalle's Fifth Mechanised Brigade⁷⁵⁶ would retake Kabalo in northern Katanga in order to clear the path for the advance on Stanleyville. Concurrently, companies of 5 Commando would be flown to different areas of the Congo in order to put down any threat of a counter-attack by rebel forces, and to make their way to Stanleyville. 51 Commando under British Lieutenant Gary Wilson was to be transported to Coquilhatville and then on to Gamena further north where they joined a column headed by Major Genisse. Here, they were also joined by nine men from 'Rip' Robertson's 58 Commando, units from Bob Denard's 6 Commando, and a company of the ANC. With the objective of this column being to reach Paulis in the north-east of the Congo before making its way to Stanleyville, after Bumba had been taken, 51 Commando and Robertson's men would be flown to Kindu to join the spearhead column. In the meantime, 52 Commando under Captain Siegfried

⁷⁵⁵ Clarke, *op.cit.* 47 and Hudson, *op.cit.*, 36.

⁷⁵⁶ The collective name given to the forces.

Meueller⁷⁵⁷ also flew to Coquilhatville to join a column led by Major Lemercier which also included 10 Commando, units of the ANC, and 54 Commando. These forces would make their way eastwards where they would march on Ingende, Bikili, Boende and Ikela. From here, 52 Commando would join up with Major Genisse's column in Bikili while 54 Commando continued onto Opala and then onto Stanleyville. As for 53 Commando, and the remainder of Robertson's forces, they would be flown to Uvira on Lake Tanganyika before making their way northwards to Bakavu, Goma and Beni. From here, they would march on Mambasa before joining in with attack on Stanleyville. 53 Commando was led by South African Lt. Jack Maiden who was seconded by George Schroeder from Durban.⁷⁵⁸ After the liberation of Bakuvu, the contingent of nine Cuban commandos who had taken part in the attack would then join up with Robertson's unit and what was called the 'Stan Column' in Kindu. This column which was to spearhead the attack on Stanleyville had been flown in to Kongolo on 31 October 1964 before advancing northwards to Kibombo, Kindu, Punia and Lubutu. From here, they would advance on Stanleyville. With military command of the Column given to Hoare, 55, 56 and 57 Commando (commanded by British Captain Ian Gordon) joined up with the Cuban Exile ground forces.⁷⁵⁹

5.4. Early Mercenary and Makasi Cooperation

Despite still receiving training, 51 Commando was sent from Ndjili to Gemena to support the ANC. In early September 1964 these forces attacked and easily defeated over 1,000 enemy soldiers armed with machine guns and bazookas at Lisala, a key Congo River port some 350 miles from Stanleyville. With ANC units in support, 51 Commando found

⁷⁵⁷ At Bikili on 12 October 1964, Mueller was relieved of his command and Hoare appointed Rhodesian Ben Louw to replace him. See, Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, *op.cit.* 81.

⁷⁵⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, *op.cit.* 82-83.

⁷⁵⁹ Clarke, *op.cit.* 45-48, and Villafaña, *op.cit.*, 85-86.

witch doctors hopping up and down holding palm fronds, and rebels wearing khaki camouflage and monkey skins. Armed with only automatic rifles, Wilson's men walked slowly up the hill on which the rebels were situated and fired as they went. With the rebels in the open and with no fear of death, according to Wilson, the ensuing battle was like a "shooting gallery". Killing at least thirteen rebels, in all 160 enemy soldiers were killed at Lisala.⁷⁶⁰ This enabled Hoare's forces to conclude that the enemy was 'greatly overrated' and that the ANC would fight if 'properly led'.⁷⁶¹ Writing in the *New York Times Magazine* two months later, Lloyd Garrison describes Lisala as the 'perfect illustration of why the mercenaries have been imported'.⁷⁶² Shortly before the end of October, 51 Commando mercenaries including Rhodesians Roy Whitehead, 'Butch' Schoerman and Joe Wepener; 'Mike', an ex-lawyer from Nairobi; and Barry Hobbins from Canada, move on to Aketi, and Bumba. In Bumba, a town also situated on the Congo River, the group of mercenaries described as the most consistently successful of all the commandos demonstrated their brutality in shooting six rebel prisoners. Justification for this act was provided through the explanation that the ANC would use far more cruel methods. Indeed, rebel prisoners would be shot first in the feet, then the shins, knees, thighs and the head.⁷⁶³

Sixty miles to the east of Coquilhatville on 10 September 1964, mercenary forces under the command of Mueller attacked Ingende. Here they defeated rebel forces and marched on Boende. In this town on the River Tshuapa, one member of 52 Commando was killed and four were wounded. Withdrawing to Bikili, 52 Commando successfully repulsed an attack by enemy forces. Volunteer Nel was killed.⁷⁶⁴ Despite this success under the leadership of Mueller, on 12 October twenty-four South African mercenaries

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁶¹ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 76.

⁷⁶² Lloyd Garrison, "White Mercenaries on a 'Rabbit Hunt'", *New York Times Magazine*, 15 November, 1964.

⁷⁶³ Lloyd Garrison, "Tshombe Gains in Battle Against rebels", *New York Times*, 25 October, 1964.

⁷⁶⁴ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 76-77.

mutinied against his leadership accusing Mueller of 'incompetence', being 'too soft', and of being indecisive in combat'.⁷⁶⁵ Mueller would shortly be replaced by Lt. Ben Louw.

Joining Colonel Mulamba's ANC unit the role of 52 Commando was to attack rebel forces around Uvira, Lubero and Butembo before consolidating its positions in the Great Lakes region.⁷⁶⁶ On 7 October, it was reported that forty 'South African' mercenaries and twenty Congolese troops captured the lakeside town of Uvira. In what was considered the Congolese Government's biggest victory since the beginning of the rebellion five months previously, 53 Commando cut off the road to Bujumbura. Reaching Uvira, thirty Europeans, (mainly Italians) were rescued and evacuated by USAF transport planes.⁷⁶⁷ Previous successes for 53 Commando at Bakuvu and Kabare led to Hoare describing 53 Commando as "some of the best material we had at Kamina". Unsurprisingly given this view, on 28 October, this unit took Butembo and was ordered to wait here until it received orders to move forward with the Stan Column. This spearhead of the advance on Stanleyville left Kongolo on 1 November, 1964.⁷⁶⁸

After flying to assist the ANC in Yakoma on the Uele River, 54 Commando repelled an enemy attack but could not manage to save Dr. Paul Carlson, an American medical missionary who was captured on 20 September. Carlson, 36, was arrested for 'spying', for allegedly being a Major in US forces, and taken to Stanleyville for trial by a 'military tribunal'. A communiqué issued by Gbenye telling of Carlson's arrest came three days after the death of William Scholten. This American missionary also accused of spying died on 25 September 1964 in a jail in Aketi after receiving severe beatings from rebels.⁷⁶⁹

⁷⁶⁵ Lloyd Garrison, "Mercenary Group Mutinies in Congo", *New York Times*, 13 October, 1964.

⁷⁶⁶ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 88.

⁷⁶⁷ Lloyd Garrison, "White Mercenaries Help Retake Key Port in Congo from Rebels", *New York Times*, 8 October, 1964.

⁷⁶⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 82-83.

⁷⁶⁹ "Rebels in Congo Seize US Doctor", *New York Times*, 29 October 1964.

As for these Simba rebels, they had suffered many setbacks since the beginning of the mercenary offensive in early September, they were far from defeated. Moreover, Olenga's army of rebels sought to strengthen their position in Stanleyville through shipments of Communist-bloc weapons. On one occasion, an Ilyushin-18 transport plane reported to have taken off in Algeria flew to Arua in northwest Uganda from where its cargo was transported into the Congo.⁷⁷⁰ As far as the hostages were concerned, their situation took on a more dramatic dimension from early October when, in the face of airborne attacks against his forces, Simba commander Nicolas Olenga threatened to kill US citizens in reprisal. In mid-October, the Congolese Government also reported that it had intercepted a rebel radio message from Colonel Opepe to Olenga requesting permission to execute "a certain number of Europeans and Americans held in Stanleyville." Up to that point, while the rebel government felt that its position was secured, the Belgian consul's brief telegrams had not indicated that any hostage had been harmed in Stanleyville itself.⁷⁷¹

While the Congo Government made appeals to the rebels on humanitarian grounds declaring that the killing of hostages would be a "shocking violation of the Geneva Convention", and an act that "would constitute a shameful stain on the national honor of the Congolese people",⁷⁷² for the DDP Richard Helms in a memorandum to Averell Harriman, the threat to the lives of its nationals was worsened by the "mercurial temperament of the Congolese" and the "specific anti-Americanism of the Stanleyville rebels". This was a result of the conviction that the US was responsible for Tshombe's attacks against the rebels and, with the probability that rebel troops would suffer further reversals as Tshombe's forces moved towards Stanleyville, and the conclusion was that as

⁷⁷⁰ Reed, *op.cit.* 129.

⁷⁷¹ "Congo Rebels May Kill Hostages", *New York Times*, 15 October, 1964.

⁷⁷² Footnotes to "Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Reed) to the President's Special Assistant for Security Affairs (Bundy)", *op.cit.*

the advance continued the lives of Americans were in "grave danger" and that the "vulnerability of American hostages will sharply increase".⁷⁷³

Since 21 August 1964 and the passing of the death penalty on Americans, Ambassador Godley had been urging Washington to intervene with the use of US troops to rescue the hostages. As we have seen, attempts at doing so such as Operation Low Beam had been shelved due to the impracticability of such a rescue. In early October, the question was once again on the table of the Congo Working Group (CWG), a sub-section of the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs. In order to alleviate the immediate threat to American lives, efforts were made to ensure that T-28 fighters and B-26 bombers on loan to the Congolese Air Force did not make unnecessary attacks on rebels forces and were "under adequate control and following current guidance" on their use.⁷⁷⁴ The Department of State then ordered the suspension of all flights by T-28s and B-26s as well as suspending the use of official or US controlled aircraft over rebel territory. Without informing Tshombe of this decision, and without making him feel that he was under US control, the Congolese Prime Minister was to be requested to suspend flights for 72 hours.

As much of this depended on whether Tshombe would agree to these suggestions, on the same day (15 October), the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that CINSTRIKE take measures to implement one of the two plans that had been prepared to evacuate US hostages. In reply, CINSTRIKE stated that neither of the plans was appropriate at the time but that a new plan (OPLAN 514) or "Ready Move 3" was to be forwarded.⁷⁷⁵ This plan involved seizing and securing Stanleyville; evacuating non-Congolese and turning the city

⁷⁷³ "Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)", *Stanleyville*, Washington, 14 October, 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.*, Document 284.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁵ This plan was drawn up by General Paul D. Adams who, in January 1964, had drawn up OPLAN 515 (Ready Move). Ready Move II, or OPLAN 515/1, was revised and became Ready Move III.

over to a friendly government. With a large force needed to overcome a reinforced rebel army, it was thought that a small strike force and an airborne battalion would be required to carry out the initial stages of the operation. A second battalion of US troops would be ready to provide support if needed. The operation would be launched from Wheelus Air Base in Libya just over two days after being given the order, and use Roberts Field Air Base in Liberia, and the Ascension Islands as staging points. US forces under the type of alert needed for this type of operation (DEFCON 4)⁷⁷⁶ consisted of two battalions of soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division; sixteen F4C fighter aircraft;⁷⁷⁷ 60 C-130 aircraft; and 20 KC 135 SAC⁷⁷⁸ Tanker aircraft.⁷⁷⁹

As Major Thomas Odom pointed out in a paper prepared for the *Combat Studies Institute*, a paper which has become somewhat of a reference for the study of the Stanleyville rescue operations, these separate US rescue plans would have been far too difficult to coordinate, would have required greater communications support, and greatly increase the need to refuel aircraft.⁷⁸⁰ General Paul Adams of CINSTRIKE also pointed out that such an operation would require a minimum of two weeks to plan and that by that time it could be too late.⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁶ DEFCON 4, or dense readiness condition 4, refers to the levels of readiness of different strike forces and depends on the severity of a military situation. See, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, https://web.archive.org/web/20091108082044/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed 4 August 2017.

⁷⁷⁷ McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II. This is a long-range supersonic jet fighter.

⁷⁷⁸ The Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker was used for aerial refuelling.

⁷⁷⁹ "Memorandum from Arthur McCafferty of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)", *Planning for evacuation of US personnel from Stanleyville*, Washington, 15 October, 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit*, Document 285.

⁷⁸⁰ Odom, *op.cit*. 16.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid*.

5.5. Murder in Stanleyville

While the pros and cons of different tactics to be used in future rescue operations continued to be weighed up by State Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the beginning of October Colonel Vandewalle's plan was being nourished by the arrival of fresh intelligence concerning current circumstances in Stanleyville. On 2 October, an Israeli trader by the name of Narcisse Aldaheff was able to leave the besieged town. Travelling *via* Bunia and Kampala, Aldaheff was to reach Léopoldville some six days later. On his arrival in the Congolese capital he was picked up by the *Sûreté civile et militaire*, the Congo's intelligence services where he provided vital information on the strength of Simba forces inside Stanleyville. While Gaston Soumialot had set up his headquarters in the US Embassy and Colonel Opepe had taken over the *Hôtel des Chutes*, over 5,000 rebel soldiers had seemingly been left to their own devices. Without any instructions from their commanders, and showing themselves to be idle, disorganised and ill-disciplined, the rebels wandered around the city dressed in animal skins. At every passing of an aircraft, these Simba started to panic, and in order to protect themselves from aerial attack a witch doctor had administered a 'dawa' tattoo on their foreheads. This panic, according to a report drawn up by the intelligence services, made the simultaneous airborne and ground attack the most viable means to defeat the enemy and to save the lives of the hostages. If airborne and ground forces did not act in conjunction and only considered an aerial bombardment, the lives of a large number of hostages would be in danger.⁷⁸²

As Vandewalle correctly deduced, this intelligence report greatly interested authorities in Belgium and in Washington.⁷⁸³ Within a very short space of time General Adams had put forward another rescue plan named OPLAN 519, or Operation High Beam.

⁷⁸² Vandewalle, *op.cit.* 255-256.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

This was a plan to use F-4 fighter bombers and an airborne assault by a battalion of paratroopers. Provided with air cover, companies of men would make their way into Stanleyville after having been dropped in various areas around the city, and would attack areas where the Simba were known to be positioned. If needed, a second battalion would then provide reinforcements, and proceed to evacuate Americans and other non-Congolese. As Odom again underlines, Operation High Beam was more than just an evacuation plan. As with the Vandewalle Plan, the intention was to put an end to the rebellion by arresting Soumialot, Olenga and any other rebel leader.⁷⁸⁴

While the State Department's Congo Working Group still remained hesitant in the use of military force to end the hostage situation,⁷⁸⁵ the whys and wherefores of any plan under consideration were modified on 28 October through an announcement by Colonel Opepe ordering the arrest and imprisonment of all Belgians, Catholic priests and nuns, Protestants and Americans,⁷⁸⁶ circumstances which were worsened by restrictions which had been placed on the use of air power and which, according to CINSTRIKE,⁷⁸⁷ presented the rebels with the possibility of countering any use of air power with propaganda. If such a situation was to continue, this would result in the weakening of the Congolese forces to the extent that they would not be able to defeat rebel forces, and that restrictions would lead to a "long drawn-out indecisive undertaking" with future complications that cannot be estimated.⁷⁸⁸

While CINSTRIKE's telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff underlines the important role of *Makasi* pilots in the Congo, it was imperative that no attempt be made to bombard

⁷⁸⁴ Odom, *op.cit.*, 17.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁶ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium", Washington, 28 October 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 304.

⁷⁸⁷ The headquarters of US Strike Command was situated at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Several of the Cuban Exile pilots had received training at this base.

⁷⁸⁸ "Telegram from the Headquarters, US Strike Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff", Washington, 30 October 1964, FRUS, Congo, 1964-1968, *op.cit.* Document 305.

Stanleyville itself: a communiqué "obviously dictated under duress", Belgian consul Patrick Nothomb asked in the name of the 5,000 Belgians living in "liberated territories" to forbid any attacks [on Stanleyville] by air. In Nothomb's view, the liberation of those held in the city depended on it.⁷⁸⁹

With Hoyt and his fellow Americans now being kept in isolation, at the end of October the anger of the Simbas turned more and towards Stanleyville's Belgian population as Gbenye became convinced Belgian troops were fighting against his forces. This was not an unfounded belief as many Belgian officers had been loaned to the ANC.

As for the progression of the *Ommegang*, after being flown into to Kongolo on 1 November 1964, Vandewalle's first strategic objective was to take Samba, an important rail terminus some sixty miles to the north. The attack on Samba was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liegeois and carried out by 5 Commando who travelled in Swedish Scania-Vabis armoured cars left behind by UN peacekeepers. The name of this piece of military equipment not being pronounceable by the English-speaking mercenaries, these armoured cars were soon to be known as "Sons of Bitches", an apt nickname given their eight-ton weight which made them so cumbersome. The pathfinder⁷⁹⁰ for the group was a Frenchman named De la Michelle, or "Frenchy" and within an hour three units of 5 Commando (55, 56, and 57 commando) had stormed into the town, having met with little resistance. Next, on 4 November, as reported in the *New York Times*, the ANC spearheaded by a force of some 300 white mercenaries captured Kibombo. However, this was not before Olenga's retreating rebel forces had taken a number of European hostages with the intention of imprisoning them in Stanleyville.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸⁹ Wagoner, *op.cit.* 86-87.

⁷⁹⁰ A pathfinder is a soldier dropped into a zone which has yet to come under friendly control. His role is to report back to the main group and give information on enemy presence in the area.

⁷⁹¹ "Congo Troops Push North Towards Rebels at Kindu", *New York Times*, 5 November, 1964.

As for the situation of other Europeans in the Congo, *The Times* reported in its edition of 9 November that two Northern Irish missionaries from Belfast, Mr. and Mrs. James Grainger, had witnessed the cruelty of the rebels from their mission in Yumbi, situated some 200 miles north of Kindu. Having seen an African pastor and a young African nurse killed in front of their eyes by rebels, they had also seen the local *jeunesse* rob the missionaries of their transport, money and their radio. Along with twenty-four other Europeans from Punia, a city situated halfway between Stanleyville and Kindu, the Graingers were taken to Kindu in an open lorry and still bore the marks of severe sunburn by the time they were rescued by Hoare's forces. On one morning of their five-day captivity, a rebel captain had ordered the execution of the Belgians. However, after having been beaten, these Europeans were also saved by the advancing mercenaries.⁷⁹² Having learnt that forty-eight Belgian priests were being held captive in Kalima, a hundred kilometres to the north-east of Kindu, the mercenary force made its way across the Lualaba River and through small townships and villages. Here, they were astounded to see villagers raising their arms and giving a salute to Lumumba in their belief that the mercenaries were Russians or Chinese.⁷⁹³

With even the most cautious observers now believing that rebels were on the verge of collapse, as stated the *New York Times* correspondent Lloyd Garrison on 6 November,⁷⁹⁴ the capture of Kindu represented the Congo Government's largest victory since the beginning of the rebellion some months earlier. Referred to as the "Congolese Army" in most of Garrison's reports, 5 Commando made rapid progress along a northward axis towards Stanleyville. This progress had been assisted by *Makasi* T-28 and B-26s which had also been used to attack Albertville and Uvira in the east of the Congo.

⁷⁹² "Missionaries Tell of Congo Ordeal", *The Times*, 10 November, 1964.

⁷⁹³ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 97.

⁷⁹⁴ Lloyd Garrison, "Congolese Seize Major Rebel City", *New York Times*, 7 November, 1964.

5.6. The Dragon Operations and the Liberation of Stanleyville

While the advance of the mercenary force supported by the CIA's air unit liberated the Congo's Europeans from areas once occupied by rebel forces, the fate of those held in Stanleyville and the increasing threat to their lives became a question of growing concern for the US Department of State. For example, in a telegram addressed Dean Rusk,⁷⁹⁵ and G. McMurtie Godley,⁷⁹⁶ George Wildman Ball⁷⁹⁷ would talk on the 9 November of the "deep concern which is felt at the highest levels of the Government with the safety of the American community at Stanleyville".⁷⁹⁸ Having been in discussions with Paul-Henri Spaak, Ball was convinced that a programme to free the hostages would "undercut the morale and disrupt the unity of the insurgents" while "enhancing the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Stanleyville problem and at the same time contributing to a better atmosphere in which to undertake the gigantic tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation which face the Congo".⁷⁹⁹

While in retrospect Ball's vision of how the Congo's future would develop demonstrates a certain degree of naivety on his part, his position as a major dissenter against the escalation of the Vietnam War gives an indication of how the position of the "doves" in the government differed greatly from that of the "hawks" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, no mention of any peaceful outcome is made in a telegram sent by General Wheeler to Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO on 11 November.⁸⁰⁰ In this telegram, Wheeler speaks of how high-ranking US Army officers in

⁷⁹⁵ US Secretary of State.

⁷⁹⁶ US Ambassador in the Congo.

⁷⁹⁷ The Under Secretary of State.

⁷⁹⁸ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo", 9 November, 1964, FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968*, Volume XXIII, Document 317.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ "Telegram from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Lemnitzer), 11 November, 1964, FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968*, Volume XXIII, Document 318.

civilian clothing would be sent to Brussels without delay to discuss plans for an armed assault using American planes and Belgian paratroopers.⁸⁰¹

Among those who were to participate in the planning of the operation was Brigadier General Russell E. Dougherty. As the deputy director for plans and operations at the headquarters of US European Command (USEUCOM) in Paris, on 11 November at the US Embassy in Brussels, Dougherty and other officers met several officials from the Belgian Defence Ministry. During these meetings, former commander of the Kamina Air Base Colonel Robert Louvigny described how this military installation opened in 1949 could be used for the launching of a possible attack. Next, accompanied by General Vivario, the Secretary to the Belgian Minister of Defence, Dougherty met with Colonel Charles Laurent, commander of the Belgian Parachute Regiment. An experienced paratrooper having made several jumps onto Stanleyville airfield during aerial demonstrations in 1959, in the presence of US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II who had joined the meeting, Laurent laid out his plans for the recapture of Stanleyville airport and how he would employ paratroopers dropped into the landing zones.⁸⁰²

In the United States, with the meetings concluded, the State Department declared that it was not "predisposed towards intervening militarily" and that the purpose of the planning was a contingency measure should Stanleyville's European community come under imminent danger.⁸⁰³ On 15 November, the NSC's William Brubeck informed presidential advisor McGeorge Bundy that Belgian and US military planners had indeed developed a detailed plan. This involved using men from the 1st Parachute Battalion based

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² Jean-Pierre Sonck, "Opération Dragon Rouge", http://www.congo1960.be/Operation_Dragon_Rouge.htm, accessed 22 August 2017.

⁸⁰³ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium", 13 November, 1964, FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968*, Volume XXIII, Document 319.

in Diest in Belgium⁸⁰⁴ twelve US C-130s which would fly a battalion of 545 Belgian paratroopers from Brussels to Stanleyville *via* Spain, the Ascension Islands and Kamina military base. Although the plan was seen as being costly on a political level, and meant that, potentially, US access to bases in Africa would be lost or restricted, the plan would be implemented if violence began in Stanleyville in the next 10-15 days, if Vandewalle's forces had not reached Stanleyville. These were conditions laid down in order to minimize reprisals against the Europeans and Americans being held hostage.

As the risk that the plan would be uncovered was considered "very great" (clearances for flights over France and Spain would be required and a large force of paratroopers would leave Brussels), something which potentially endangered the lives of the hostages, political moves continued to be made whereby Moïse Tshombe would persuade President Kasa-Vubu to agree to a 'reconciliation manifesto'. This involved offering amnesty to rebel leaders and promising participation in elections. The possibility that rebel leaders would be given money and safe conduct to exile was also an option under consideration.⁸⁰⁵

With hopes of avoiding armed intervention being faint, on 16 November Arthur McCafferty of the US National Security Council Staff unveiled the 22-page long USEUCOM⁸⁰⁶ OPLAN 319/64, otherwise known as *Dragon Rouge*, or Red Dragon.⁸⁰⁷ In addition to *Dragon Rouge*, *Dragon Noir* (Black Dragon) was to liberate Isiro; *Dragon Blanc* (White Dragon) was to liberate Bunia, and *Dragon Vert* (Green Dragon) was to liberate Watsa. Essentially the same as the contingency plan described above, instead of the 10-15 days previously considered, Red Dragon had now been programmed for the 24

⁸⁰⁴ Jean-Pierre Sonck, *op.cit.*

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁶ United States European Command.

⁸⁰⁷ The name of the operation was chosen by Colonel Laurent. See Sonck, *op.cit.*

November, just over a week later. Belgian paratroopers would be dropped onto Simi-Simi airfield, some three kilometres outside Stanleyville using US transport planes. These forces would then seize control of Stanleyville airport, occupy the air control tower and the Sabena Guest House, and clear the airfield. These objectives achieved, the paratroopers would then make their way into the centre of the city to free the hostages.⁸⁰⁸

Once the Belgian side of operations had seemingly been settled, it fell to the United States to provide the means of transport. To understand how this issue was overcome, we turn to Sam McGowan's ⁸⁰⁹*Anything, Anywhere, Anytime*⁸¹⁰ published in 2011 and Lowell Hamilton's, *Men, War and Sex of the 60s* published in 2017 (see previous footnote). As Africa fell within the operational responsibility of the US Military Air Transport Service (MATS) it was therefore responsible for providing the aircraft needed for the Congo mission. At Evreux-Fauville Air Base some 100 kilometres from Paris, two wings⁸¹¹ of the US Tactical Air Command (TAC) were serving as rotational squadrons. Rotational squadron A, or 'Rote Alpha' was made up of personnel from Pope Air Base who flew a newer version of the Hercules, the C-130E while 'Rote Bravo' rotational squadron flew the older C-130A. As McGowan points out, the distances involved required the use of the newer version and so the mission was handed over to crews from Pope Air Force Base.⁸¹² On 14 November, the commander of the 322nd Air Division at Evreux-Fauville Brigadier General Robert D. Forman contacted Colonel Burgess Gradwell, the commander of a sub-

⁸⁰⁸ "Memorandum from Arthur McCafferty of the National Security Council Staff to Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff", 16 November, 1964, FRUS, *Congo, 1964-1968*, Volume XXIII, Document 321.

⁸⁰⁹ McGowan trained with the 464th Troop Carrier Wing at Pope Air Force Base as an airplane general mechanic. Later, having become a pilot, McGowan served with the 779th Troop Carrier Squadron and served in the Vietnam War. An almost word-for-word account of the episode described appears in Lowell Hamilton's *Men, Wars and Sex of the 60's*, *op.cit.* Lowell Hamilton is the pseudonym used by a 'young world traveler' according to a presentation of the author. It is not clear whether McGowan and Hamilton is the same person or if Hamilton's work is plagiarism.

⁸¹⁰ McGowan, *op.cit.*

⁸¹¹ The 317th Troop Carrier Wing based at Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio, and the 464th Troop Carrier Wing based at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina.

⁸¹² McGowan, *op.cit.* 293.

division of the 322nd, Detachment One who was given overall responsibility for gathering the planes. Sometime after the 14 November, Gradwell began to call back crews from other missions being carried out in Europe, and on the 17 November each navigator was handed a manila envelope. The first crew which included Gradwell and Captain Donald Strobaugh of the 5th Aerial Port Squadron (APRON) took off from the air base at 1800 hours and had been given orders to open the envelope only when the aircraft had reached an altitude of 2,000 feet. Inside the envelope, orders were found to fly to Kleine Brogel Air Base situated just outside of Brussels.

On arrival at Kleine Brogel, Belgian paratroopers were then loaded on to the US aircraft along with the eight jeeps and twelve motorised tricycles called for in the plans for *Dragon Rouge*. From here, a first refuelling stop saw the aircraft land at Morón Air Force Base located in southern Spain.⁸¹³ Departing for Ascension Island having obtained the permission of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the C-130s were to stay on what was then a British Overseas Territory for three days awaiting joint permission from both Belgian and US governments to proceed to Stanleyville.⁸¹⁴

With fears still continuing that the secrecy of the mission would be compromised, and that Paul-Henri Spaak's cover story of a training mission organised by the two nations was "so transparent as to blow security",⁸¹⁵ a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara provides us with an interesting insight into how the political hand was being played at a time when increasing numbers of US troops were being sent to Vietnam, and when American geopolitical influence was being jeopardised on multiple fronts. In the face of a warning by McNamara that the danger of

⁸¹³ McGowan, *op.cit.* 293-294, and Hamilton, *op.cit.*, 386-387.

⁸¹⁴ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium", 16 November, 1964, FRUS, Volume XXIII, *op.cit.* Document 325.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*

carrying out the mission was less than the danger of not carrying it out, and in the face of opposition to the mission from State officials such as Averell Harriman, Johnson's irritated reply was firm and punctuated with vocabulary that reflected his Texas roots:

"We've got to stand up and not let the Afro-Asians run over us. And I just took this position when these folks talked to me about it, and I said I'm just damn tired of a bunch of folks like this, and they've got a right to kill American people and we haven't got a right to furnish a plane to try to get them out and so forth".⁸¹⁶

Whether Johnson's ire had any influence on the launching of the rescue operations remains unclear and undocumented. However, as for the logistics of the rescue operation itself, in the second phase of this operation, the Belgian paratroopers were to be flown across the 2,405 miles which separated them from Kamina Air Base in Katanga. From here, a third phase also consisting of three parts saw forces of the 1st Parachute Battalion flown 550 miles north to Stanleyville where they would be dropped from five C-130's onto a golf course to the northeast of the city. Two C-130's would then drop the jeeps and other equipment and, after thirty minutes, a company of the 2nd Battalion would be dropped to act as reinforcements.⁸¹⁷

On the subject of logistics, concerns had been raised of how to evacuate the Belgian paratroopers once they had completed their mission. Another question was whether a relatively small number of men could hold the airport while others searched for hostages inside the city itself. To counter these potential pitfalls it was therefore necessary to ensure that Vandewalle's force's arrived at around the same time as the airborne troops. Vandewalle was sure of his unit's abilities to do so and, as Villafaña points out, the

⁸¹⁶ "Notes of a Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara", 17 November, 1964, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 330. Governor Harriman's objections might possibly have been linked to the necessity of minimising the military and political overtones of the operation and emphasising its humanitarian aspect.

⁸¹⁷ Wagoner, *op.cit.* 134.

commander of the Fifth Mechanised Brigade had even suggested that Stanleyville could be taken without the help of airborne forces.⁸¹⁸

As far as the advance of the mercenary force was concerned, after securing control of Kindu Mike Hoare's next step along the road to Stanleyville was to seize Punia some 170 miles to the north before moving on to Wanie-Rukula located around 50 miles to the south of Stanleyville. Concurrently, 52 Commando would advance on Aketi and Paulis in the north; 53 Commando would advance from Beni in the east onto Mambasa; and 54 Commando would attack Ikela and Opala in the west. With air cover provided by mercenary and Exile forces that were now operating out of Kindu, Hoare was sure that all these objectives could be achieved.⁸¹⁹ On the other hand, in a sign that the rebels had received the military help of Communist countries and thus still presented a threat to the advancing forces, the mercenaries were reported by Lloyd Garrison to have found several hundred rounds of Chinese-manufactured 50-calibre cartridges in Mali, a small village some twenty-seven miles from Kindu. Observers believed that the ammunition had been transported across the border from Arua in Uganda while other reports spoke of the landing in Kindu of a Russian Ilyushin-18 piloted by Algerians. It was thought that the captured ammunition may have come from Algeria itself as their forces had received Chinese weapons during the country's fight against the French. During the fighting for control of this village, it is also notable on the subject of mercenary - CIA cooperation that Hoare's forces maintained permanent radio contact with the Cuban Exiles of the Congolese Air

⁸¹⁸ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 94.

⁸¹⁹ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 103.

Force.⁸²⁰ These pilots had made strafing runs and had destroyed nine of the rebels' eleven trucks.⁸²¹

Despite setbacks which included the loss to a sniper of 56 Commando leader Jeremy Spencer, and the danger of ambush, Hoare's unit of the *Ommegang* made its way steadily along the mud-bound tracks that snaked their way through the equatorial forests of central Congo. By 20 November, as the *New York Times* reported, Hoare's Fifth Mercenary Brigade (sic) had captured Punia having faced little resistance. The Exile-piloted Congolese Air Force B-26's and T-28's had provided constant air cover over the column and had destroyed four truckloads of rebels.⁸²²

With this new victory over rebel forces providing Vandewalle with the means to rejoice at progress which put the column a day ahead of schedule, *United Press International* reported that in Stanleyville fears for the safety of the hostages rose as the city's rebel-controlled radio station announced that "600 Belgian and 60 Americans" had been moved to an "unknown destination". Their removal stoked doubts about whether any whites would still be in Stanleyville when the troops arrived.⁸²³

As conditions for the hostages worsened, Gbenye continued to make wild accusations to Belgian Consul Patrick Nothomb. Meanwhile, that afternoon, the Simbas had roamed around the city in trucks arresting any Belgians they could find and had confined 365 of them to the *Hôtel des Chutes*.

Although Olenga was clearly not of sound mind, he was lucid enough to realise that moving hostages to an unknown destination would have taken his bargaining chips away

⁸²⁰ The FM radios used in the aircraft had a maximum operational radius of around two miles. This meant that the pilots could communicate with each other without the fear of their messages being intercepted. Reginaldo Blanco in conversation with Frank Villafaña, Madrid, 2005, cf. Villafaña, *op.cit.* 112.

⁸²¹ Lloyd Garrison, "Congolese Find Chinese Ammunition Left by Rebels", *New York Times*, 18 November, 1964.

⁸²² "Rebel Resistance Light", *New York Times*, 21 November, 1964.

⁸²³ "Rebels in Congo, Near Showdown, Shift Prisoners", *United Press International*, 22 November, 1964.

from the gambling table and would have deprived him of a massive advantage as the mercenary advance drew closer. As the days passed, the number of his trump cards increased as American missionaries were brought in to Stanleyville from surrounding districts. As we have seen, these missionaries included Paul Carlson and he had been joined by Clifford Schaub from Pittsburgh, and Phyllis Rine from Mount Vernon. Schaub and others were being held at Camp Ketele where, to the amusement of the Simbas, they had been ordered to dance the cha-cha-cha and, in another sign of the Simba's limited grasp on reality, had been ordered to remove their spectacles lest they attract enemy aircraft.⁸²⁴

On a more serious note, it is important to underline that these hostages remained in grave danger. This was also true for the Congolese themselves. In Kindu, for example, the Simbas had killed more than eight hundred Congolese at the local monument to Lumumba. Many had been burnt alive, and the mercenary force showed their contempt for any place acting as a place of worship to the defunct leader by blowing it up.

In Stanleyville beatings were frequent and the threat of execution from a drunken or drugged rebel potentially lay seconds away. Missionaries who had been captured at Kilometre Eight, the headquarters of the Unevangelised Fields Mission lived through similar experiences. Among those captive here were Americans Alfred Larson, Charles Davis, Canadian Hector McMillan and Northern Irishman Robert McAllister. The Central Prison in Stanleyville had also become home to a number of European and American captives. Dr. Carlson as well as Hoyt and four other consular officials were being held here as was the Italian Consul, Raoul Massacesi.⁸²⁵ With hostages being held in various parts of Stanleyville, the task of locating them before any type of revenge could be exacted was a worrying prospect for those who would leave Kamina on the 24 November, 1964.

⁸²⁴ Reed, *op.cit.* 160.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, 168-170.

With the areas around Stanleyville now firmly under the control of western-backed forces, Vandewalle, Hoare and American Colonel Volney Rattan of COMISH awaited their orders. In Washington and Brussels last gasp attempts at negotiation were made in order to secure a peaceful resolution to the hostage crisis. On the 23 November, for example, US Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood met with Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, and APL representative Thomas Kanza in Nairobi to discuss a ceasefire. However, these discussions were to fall through due to the Kenyatta and Kanza's insistence that mercenaries leave the Congo, their denunciation of Tshombe's dependence on the US and Belgian support,⁸²⁶ and what the US State Department described as the "totally unacceptable" use of "outrageous threats against the lives of innocent civilians as blackmail to achieve a military objective". For this reason, the decision to implement *Dragon Rouge* was taken.⁸²⁷ With Tshombe and Mobutu having given their authorisation for the attack on the 21 November,⁸²⁸ *Dragon Rouge* was to be launched at 0400 hours on 24 November.⁸²⁹

On Thursday 19 November in a message to the Embassy in Belgium, Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined the instructions which would signal the start of operations, The telegram stated that in the case where Belgium had decided to implement the operation, the codeword "Punch" would be sent to Ambassador Godley, the US Ambassador in Léopoldville. As far as the United States was concerned, President Johnson's government had reserved the right to give the final go ahead. For this reason, its codeword authorising US involvement would be "Go". Johnson himself would give this authorisation. For

⁸²⁶ "Telegram from the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State", 23 November, 1964, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 350.

⁸²⁷ See footnotes to previous document.

⁸²⁸ "Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State", 21 November, 1964, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 345.

⁸²⁹ Footnotes to FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 350.

security reasons, it was also decided that US channels of communication (Talking Bird), would be used exclusively for the consultations between the two governments and for the communication of decisions.⁸³⁰ The codeword "Blue Fish" was to be used in the case where the operation had been cancelled. The decision to do so lay with either Washington, Brussels, Léopoldville or Colonel Laurent.⁸³¹

In the late evening of Monday 23 November, an aircraft carrying Colonel Burgess Gradwell arrived at Kamina air base. Expecting further instructions from Washington - codenamed "Fireman" for the purposes of the operation- Gradwell was to hear his onboard Talking Bird system give the order to stand by. Next, with the C-130's having left Ascension and having landed at Kamina on 21 November, Gradwell and Colonel Clayton Isaacson, the overall commander of the US participation to *Dragon Rouge*, were to receive notification for the operations to begin.

At 0230 hours on the morning of Tuesday 24 November in Kindu, Reginaldo Blanco was handed a weather report. This had been made by Colonel Isaacson a day before. Being notified that weather conditions over Stanleyville were clear, Blanco was then given navigational charts and aerial photos taken the day before by a specially-equipped Boeing C-97 Stratofreighter. Joined by Belgian Colonel Avi Bouzin in the cockpit of his B-26, Blanco was then handed a flight plan which instructed him to head northwest to Isangi, then to Stanleyville. Bouzin had been given the mission of coordinating the parachute drop, the attack by the two Lima columns, and the attacks to be made by Cuban-piloted bombers and fighter planes.⁸³² Arriving at Isangi just as the sun appeared over the horizon, the plan also included leaving two minutes ahead of the C-130's in order to make strafing runs over

⁸³⁰ "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium", 19 November, 1964, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 333.

⁸³¹ Wagoner, *op.cit.* 148.

⁸³² Bouzin worked with COMISH personnel and the CIA in coordinating the attack. See, Villafaña, *op.cit.* 98.

Simi Simi airfield in Stanleyville in order to clear the paratroopers' landing zone.⁸³³ At 0545,⁸³⁴ Blanco, Castor Cereceda Coira, Thomas Afont, and Francisco Alvarez then attacked the airfield and disabled the Simba defences.⁸³⁵ With the successful elimination of ground artillery, the path was now clear for the arrival of the USAF C-130's.

Departing at 0245⁸³⁶ the same morning, the first five C-130's with their load of Belgian paratroopers first flew to Basoko to the northwest of Stanleyville where they were to rendezvous with the *Makasi*. At 0600, and having received the green light from the C-130's dispatchers, the USAF planes numbered Chalk 1 to Chalk 5⁸³⁷ started the drop of 320 elite commandos onto their designated landing zone. Being equipped with tracking radar, the pilot of Chalk, Captain Warren 'Huey' Long, was able to drop the first batch of men led by Colonel Laurent with almost pinpoint accuracy onto the airfield and golf course which lay on the airfield's perimeter. While in the air, as Sonck states, these paratroopers were shot at by Simbas armed with Soviet Degtjarev DShK M38 heavy machine guns and Browning machine guns captured from the ANC. The Simbas also made futile attempts to bring down the aircraft with rifle fire and caused slight damage to four of the five Lockheed C-130s.⁸³⁸

With the landing of the troops completed in around eighty seconds, the next step was for Colonel Laurent to regroup his men and to start securing and clearing the landing

⁸³³ Reed, *op.cit.*, 234.

⁸³⁴ There is some confusion over the exact time of the arrival at Isangi. Although Blanco states that he arrived at 0600, Villafaña states that Blanco was already making strafing passes over Stanleyville airfield at 0545. Some leeway should be accorded when attempting to remember events which took place over fifty years previously. To add further confusion, Belgian historian Jean-Pierre Sonck indicates that the Cubans left Kindu at 04.00, cf. Sonck, "Dragon Rouge", *op.cit.*

⁸³⁵ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 98.

⁸³⁶ This is also disputed by McGowan, *op.cit.* 294, who gives the take-off time for the C-130's as 0245.

⁸³⁷ The twelve C-130's aircraft were named Chalks 1-12. While Chalks 1-5 were configured for parachute drops, Chalk 6 carried the unusual cargo of brooms. These were to be dropped onto the airport runway so that troops could sweep up any broken glass and avoid puncturing the tyres of the jeeps that would take the attacking forces into Stanleyville. It is testament to the detailed planning carried out before the launch of the operation. As for Chalks 7-11, these were to transport more troops and the motorised tricycles. Chalk 12 acted as a hospital ship and carried medical doctors as part of its crew. See, McGowan, *op.cit.* 294.

⁸³⁸ Sonck, *op.cit.*

zones. This had been littered with vehicles and other detritus which made the landing of military hardware problematical. With the C-130's having dropped their cargos of weapons, jeeps, tricycles and brooms (see footnotes on previous page), Company 11 of the airborne forces were ordered to attack the airport's control tower and the Sabena Guest House. Encountering only light resistance from the rebel-held positions, within forty-five minutes this mission had been completed. Now that the path was clear, Chalks Seven to Nine landed and quickly unloaded more paratroopers onto the airfield. Having learnt that hostages were being held in places such as the Hotel Victoria, Company Eleven was then given the task of rescuing them.⁸³⁹ Advancing through enemy fire along the Avenue Monseigneur Grison and the Avenue de Gaulle, it was on the corner of the Avenue de l'Eglise where the Belgian paratroopers were met by a petrified white man. The men of Company Eleven were told to hurry as murder was being committed.⁸⁴⁰

With all flights over Stanleyville having been stopped for some time, the noise of airplane motors over the city had become an unusual noise. In the Hotel Victoria, its US residents such as Donald Parkes, James Stauffer, and Ernie Houle wondered what reaction would come from the Simbas.⁸⁴¹ The answer was provided at 7 o'clock that morning as the Simbas in their manes of monkey furs and feathers came to the hotel and forced 250 hostages into the street.⁸⁴² Forty-eight other hostages hid on the roof of the building or in cupboards. Those now stood in front of Colonel Opepe included Patrick Nothomb, his Vice-Consul Paul Duqué, US Consul Michael Hoyt, Vice-Consul David Grinwiss, and Dr. Carlson. They were joined by fellow Americans and US Embassy radio operators Parkes,

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁰ Reed, *op.cit.* 248.

⁸⁴¹ Reed, *op.cit.* 249.

⁸⁴² "Africa: The Congo Massacre", *Time*, 4 December, 1964.

Stauffer, and Houle as well Phyllis Rine, Mrs. Schaub and her two children.⁸⁴³ Michèle Peneff,⁸⁴⁴ her husband Marco and her children also joined those who were then ordered by Opepe to form ranks of three and marched off towards the airport where the rebels intended to use them as human shields. This family of Belgians had now been held hostage for four months and had lived frightening episodes such as having a child hold an automatic weapon to the heads of the children.⁸⁴⁵

As the column of hostages reached the junction of Avenue Sergeant Ketele and the Avenue Lothaire, the group then heard loud bursts of gunfire coming from the Belgian paratroopers who were making their way along Avenue Monseigneur Grison. With Radio Stanleyville having earlier broadcast the message "Ciyuga! Ciyuga! Kill them all! Men, women and children", twelve Simbas armed with automatic rifles opened fire on the hostages killing or injuring those crouched or lying on the road. One six-year-old girl was immediately cut in half by bullets.⁸⁴⁶

Another involved in the massacre was Michèle Timmermans-Zoll who would be hit by gunfire in the chest where a bullet would lodge in her lung. Her husband who had been calling for the rebels to stop shooting was also hit. Despite Michèle Timmermans-Zoll's efforts to stop the bleeding from the hole in his temple she was unable to save him.⁸⁴⁷ Her husband was to join was to join Dr. Carlson and Phyllis Rine among the dead.⁸⁴⁸ Worse still, some of those who had managed to survive the shooting were then hacked to death with machetes. In all, twenty-two hostages were to be killed on 24 November and, a few

⁸⁴³ Reed, *op.cit.* 253.

⁸⁴⁴ Now Michèle Timmermans-Zoll.

⁸⁴⁵ Michèle Timmermans-Zoll, "Mon mari a été abattu sous mes yeux", in "Ce jour-là, 24 novembre 1964: nos paras sautent sur Stanleyville", *Paris Match*, RTBF série, 23 August 2003. Also, personal correspondence with Michèle Timmermans-Zoll.

⁸⁴⁶ "Africa: The Congo Massacre", *op.cit.*

⁸⁴⁷ Michèle Timmermans-Zoll, *op.cit.* and correspondence with Michèle, 15 January 2016.

⁸⁴⁸ The survivors included Adolf Martin Bormann, the missionary son of the German Nazi leader. See, "10 Britons Brought Back to Safety", *The Times*, 25 November, 1964.

days later, on the left-bank of the Congo River, twenty-eight hostages including four Spanish nuns were also killed by the rebels.⁸⁴⁹ Carlson joined another American missionary, William Scholten who, after also being accused of being a spy, had died on 16 September from exposure and lack of medical attention while held in a Simba prison in Aketi, some 180 miles to the north of Stanleyville.⁸⁵⁰ Among those rescued were Charles E. Davis, his wife and two children, Stephen aged four, and Beth aged twenty months. Some months later, Beth was to feature on the cover of *Paris Match* where, after her rescue, she is pictured in the arms of a 5 Commando mercenary.⁸⁵¹

5.7. Makasi Commandos at Kilometre 8

Whereas the bulk of the actual street fighting in Stanleyville was carried out by Belgian paratroopers,⁸⁵² -the reason for which they were honoured on their return to Brussels- the contribution made by other elements of the rescue forces cannot be underestimated. While units of 5 Commando were handed the job of securing Stanleyville and clearing the way for the evacuation of survivors, one group of mercenaries, in particular, distinguished itself with the rescue of hostages at the Unevangelised Fields Mission at Kilometre 8.

Arriving in Stanleyville at around 11 o'clock in the morning, *Makasi* commandos under Rip Robertson were approached by Al Larson, an American missionary who had just been liberated. Larson informed the troops that included the CIA's 'Mitch' and US Lt-Colonel Arthur Garza that twenty-five mostly American citizens including women and

⁸⁴⁹ Lloyd Garrison, "28 More White Hostages Found Slain in Stanleyville", *New York Times*, 28 November, 1964.

⁸⁵⁰ Reed, *op.cit.* 112.

⁸⁵¹ Front cover of "Nos Reporteurs au Congo: La Tragedie des Otages", *Paris Match*, No. 817, 5 December 1964.

⁸⁵² For a more detailed explanation of events in Stanleyville, see Odom, *op.cit.* Wagoner, *op.cit.* For versions in French, see Patrick Nothomb, *Dans Stanleyville, journal d'une prise d'otage*, (Brussels, Duculot, 1993), and Eddy Hoedt, *L'année du Dragon. Congo 1964*, (Brussels: Masoin, 2014).

children were being held at the mission situated some five miles out of Stanleyville. Robertson and his group of commandos agreed to free them. The circumstances of the mission were detailed in a documentary produced by BBC Television and entitled *A Deadly Mission: Belfast to Congo*,⁸⁵³ in an interview with Northern Irish missionary Robert McAllister for BBC Northern Ireland,⁸⁵⁴ and in an article which appeared on the British online magazine in 2017.⁸⁵⁵

With McAllister having arrived in the Congo in 1954, over the next eight years, they would have three children, and at the time of the Stanleyville operations these were aged 12, 10 and four. Believing that they were protected by God, and having no fear of the rebels, on the morning of the rescue operation after four months under house arrest, the Simbas lined up the hostages and prepared to shoot. After second thoughts, the majority of the missionaries and their families were spared leaving only McAllister and Canadian missionary Hector McMillan. The two men were taken into the forest where McMillan was shot and killed. His family witnessed the shooting. Feigning death after being hit by a bullet, McAllister survived to see the arrival of the *Makasi* commandos shortly after.⁸⁵⁶ The Cubans had set off with little explanation from their commanding officer Robertson. As Angel Manuel Benitez explains, "That's always the way with the CIA, they don't tell you much".⁸⁵⁷ Setting off in two jeeps on the five-mile trip, the commandos came under

⁸⁵³ "A Deadly Mission: Belfast to Congo", BBC Television Productions, 2 August, 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b063qj86>, accessed 22 August, 2017.

⁸⁵⁴ "Belfast family return to Congo to honour friends murdered in 1964 Simba rebellion", <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-33612442>, accessed 22 August, 2017.

⁸⁵⁵ Graeme Cousins, "Danger does not deter NI family from Congo work", *News Letter*, 25 March, 2017, <http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/danger-does-not-deter-ni-family-from-congo-work-1-7883595>, accessed 22 August, 2017.

⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁷ Glenn Garvin, "Anniversary recalls Congo rescue by Miami Cubans", *Miami Herald*, 15 November, 2014.

fire from the start. During a short journey that would eventually take one hour due to rebel attacks, Ricardo Morales (Navarrete)⁸⁵⁸ was hit in the back.

At a reunion which gathered around 250 CIA veterans, former hostages and their families, -a reunion organised by Janet Joy Ray which took place on 14 November, 2014 in Miami- surviving members recalled how men such as Juan (El Negro) Tamayo had dispatched the rebels in a short space of time.⁸⁵⁹ Those with vivid memories of the rescue include David McAllister. Aged 10 at the time, and describing himself as scared, yet excited, McAllister recalls being "mesmerised" by the professionalism of the commandos: Robertson's group quickly established a perimeter around the mission and laid down fire into the forest around them. As the empty casings fell to the floor McAllister picked them up. He also helped the commandos reload their weapons. The mission completed, the missionary captives and their families were then put onto vehicles and taken back to Stanleyville.

We close this part of our study with another of McAllister's anecdotes. At the end of the battle, with the smell of cordite still floating in the air, McAllister recalls the calm figure of Tamayo first approaching him, opening his ammunition pouch, and handing the ten-year-old a Hershey bar with the words, "Here kid. You're safe now".⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁸ Ricardo Morales was a member of Operation 40. Nicknamed 'The Monkey', Morales lead a colourful career after the Congo. According to Harper's magazine, Morales would become one of Miami's biggest drug dealers. See, John Rothschild, "Meet the biggest dealer in Miami's biggest industry", *Harper's*, January 1982, 29-39.

⁸⁵⁹ Glenn Garvin, "Anniversary recalls Congo rescue by Miami Cubans", *op.cit.* Glenn Garvin, "Rescue Reunion: Cuban -American CIA team meets Congo hostages in Kendall", *Miami Herald*, 16 November, 2014.

⁸⁶⁰ Correspondence with David McAllister, 29 August, 2017.

CHAPTER SIX: Putting an End to the Congo Crisis

6.1. Communist-bloc Reaction to the Dragon Operations

The deterioration of the situation in the Congo was a source of dismay for those attending the OAU's Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Movements in Cairo from 5-10 October, 1964. Reiterating some of the points made at the organisation's First Conference held in July of that year, again in Cairo, a call was made for the continuation of support for the efforts being made to "bring peace and harmony" to the Congo at a time when the DRC's relations with Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi were worsening. Seeking an African solution to an African problem, OAU called for a ceasefire to enable national reconciliation, and made an appeal for all "foreign powers at present interfering in the internal affairs of the DRC, particularly those engaged in military intervention in that country, to cease such interference, which infringes the interests and sovereignty of the Congolese people and constitutes a threat to neighbouring countries." Importantly, given that the US and Moïse Tshombé considered mercenaries as the means of imposing peace and unity by force, the OAU called upon the Tshombé to discontinue the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel them from the country.⁸⁶¹ With his refusal to attend either of the conferences, Tshombé demonstrated that he was distancing himself from radical leaders such as Kwamé Nkrumah, Julius Nyrere, Sekou Touré, and President Ben Bella of Algeria. The OAU demonstrated that, equally, it was distancing itself from Tshombé: after the Congolese prime minister had accepted an invitation to attend the conference, he was confined to a Cairo hotel room while the conference took place.⁸⁶² In

⁸⁶¹ "2nd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Cairo, Egypt, October 1964", available at http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/2nd_Summit_FD_Cairo_Declaration_1964.pdf, accessed 24 June 2018.

⁸⁶² Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig, *The Congo: Plunder and Resistance* (London: Zed Books, 2006), 106.

choosing to continue relations with Western powers and rejecting the OAU's 'African solution', Tshombé had, wittingly or not, placed himself firmly in the camp which the OAU interpreted as being aligned to South Africa. Tshombé's doing so led to the OAU's Liberation Committee choosing to support rebel movements and, after mercenary operations at Stanleyville, Algeria's Ben Bella and Egypt's Nasser promised to supply weapons to rebel movements in the Congo.⁸⁶³

While the rescue operations at Stanleyville were hailed as a success in many quarters, extensive media coverage of the events only served to reaffirm suspicions that the US was supplying large amounts of military assistance to Tshombé's government and to cementing the belief that the Congolese leader was nothing more than a puppet of the West. In December 1964, for example, Nikolai Fedorenko, the Soviet Union's Permanent Representative to the United Nations speaking at a meeting of the UN's Security Council, accused western powers of using Tshombé to "transfer the Congo to the imperialists", and intervening in the Congo purely for financial gain. In his view, the Tshombé regime was "illegal", and held the Congolese prime minister responsible for the death of Patrice Lumumba.⁸⁶⁴

Diplomatic criticism of western intervention in the Congo was not restricted to the west, and neither was the form it took: Kennedy's former Ambassador to Guinea and to Kenya, William Attwood, was to write that dozens of rebels were killed by the rescue forces and that the latter had done nothing to put an end to the "orgy of looting and killing" carried out by Tshombe's forces,⁸⁶⁵ whereas further criticism of US intervention came in the shape of public protest in Africa. In Nairobi, Kenya protestors held placards declaring

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ "Soviet Sees Plot by West in Congo; Tells UN Council Tshombe is Puppet of 'Monopolies - Accuses US Banks", *New York Times*, 18 December, 1964.

⁸⁶⁵ William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 218.

"Hang President Johnson", while in Cairo students from the sub-Sahara aided by Egyptians overran the US Embassy and set fire to a library belonging to the US Information Service. In Moscow, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, China, and Indonesia attacks were made on the American, Congolese, Belgian and British embassies and from Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta declared that he was "appalled" by the intervention of western forces in Stanleyville. Kenyatta was joined in his denunciation by Julius Nyrere of Tanzania who saw Stanleyville as another "Pearl Harbour" and by Kwame Nkrumah who considered that the rescue mission was a "flagrant act of aggression against Africa".⁸⁶⁶

In the face of the growing criticism directed against the United States, the Department of State felt compelled to send a 'Circular Telegram' to African Posts in which Dean Rusk spoke of the deep concern that the objectives of the missions in Stanleyville and Paulis were being "distorted". In his view, the criticism "tended to ignore the humanitarian aspect" of the rescue missions and the fact that "intervention had saved the lives of hundreds of innocent Congolese and Europeans from death or torture". Instead, according to Rusk, in Africa there was a "prevalence of assumption" that the missions were a form of "political imperialism". For these reasons it called on African leaders to express opposition against the rebels and to denounce the atrocities committed by these forces against the Congolese.⁸⁶⁷ Colonel Vandewalle himself was drawn into the argument stating that the US had no need to join operations and that his forces alone could have saved the lives of those in Stanleyville.⁸⁶⁸ Although this is a view that was shared by Tshombé,⁸⁶⁹ it is not clear which forces Vandewalle considered as his "own".

⁸⁶⁶ Reed, *op.cit.* 269-270.

⁸⁶⁷ "Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain African Posts", 27 November, 1964, FRUS, *Congo*, Volume XXIII, Document 364.

⁸⁶⁸ Vandewalle, *op.cit.* 410-142.

⁸⁶⁹ See, Weissman, *op.cit.* 253.

6.2. Operation White Giant and the Creation of the Congolese Naval Force

While tit-for-tat recriminations continued to dominate the political aspects of the Congo Crisis, if the retaking of Stanleyville had dashed rebel aspirations in the northern Oriente Province, the effort to overthrow Tshombé through military means had shifted its focus to the east of the Congo. How the United States saw this development was summed up in a report Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council submitted to McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. In this report dated 26 January, 1965,⁸⁷⁰ "to counter all the gloom" that had been "purveyed", Komer states that, finally, he can express his optimism, and that he can see "blue sky in the Congo". This optimism had been fermented by the East Africans and OAU wanting to organise political reconciliation [among the Congo's warring factions]. If during a meeting of the OAU on 29 January an agreement can be reached, the US would then persuade its "friends" to support OAU proposals. This was in the interest of "seeing an African way to reach an African solution to an African problem". The most important consideration for Komer was to "get the fighting stopped" before a rebel counter-offensive put the US "back in the soup".⁸⁷¹ Unfortunately, by 25 February, 1965, the situation in the Congo had deteriorated and Harold H. Sanders of the National Security Council Staff reported to President Johnson that the "rebel counter-offensive [they] feared may have begun".⁸⁷² With the ANC and mercenaries so far containing rebel incursions, Congolese rebels were being supported by regular forces of the Ugandan Army in northeastern Congo while intelligence that had been received indicated that the Ugandan president (Edward Mutesa) had issued a

⁸⁷⁰ Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 26 January, 1965, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Congo, Vol. X, Cables, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/64, Secret.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid.

⁸⁷² Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 25 February, 1965, Johnson Library, National Security File, Congo, Vol. XI, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/65-9/65, Secret.

call for Chinese and Algerian planes to fight off attacks allegedly made [by the FAC] on border towns in Uganda. Furthermore, arms shipments from Algeria and from the UAR were swelling rebel arms caches, and rebel fighters were being trained by "Arab mentors in East African safe havens". Saunders considered that Tshombé's forces would be no match for a "well-run rebel push supported from outside", and that the US did not want to face this kind of escalation.⁸⁷³ While other unconfirmed reports spoke of Chinese and Soviet weapons being supplied to Congo-Brazzaville,⁸⁷⁴ for Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, as far as US policy in the region was concerned at the beginning of 1965 there were very few options: there was no alternative to Tshombe, and so the US must help him win; the number of mercenaries in the Congo should not be increased and, in the interest of African unity Tshombe should dispense with South African mercenaries. However, the option of getting rid of these soldiers of fortune altogether was dismissed by McCone due to his belief "the ANC were practically worthless unless led by mercenaries".⁸⁷⁵ As indicated through the comments of various actors mentioned in this study, a lack of belief in the capability of the ANC to defeat the rebels created the need to revert to better trained exterior forces.

With a coalition of mercenary forces, US intelligence services, and Belgian officers again coordinating their efforts to put down rebellion in the northeastern portion of the Congo, attention was now directed firmly towards attacking forces led by Laurent Kabila, and cutting off routes through which the rebels were being supplied with weapons. These weapons were Chinese-manufactured and included land mines, machine guns, 76-mm cannons and a "good supply of "bamboo bazookas", the Chinese equivalent of the

⁸⁷³ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁵ "Memorandum for the Record", FRUS, Volume XXIII, 26 January, 1965, Document 392.

American rocket launcher".⁸⁷⁶ Local intelligence had identified that these Chinese weapons were being shipped into the Congo from Yei in the Sudan,⁸⁷⁷ or into the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam from where they would then be transported along former Arab slave trading routes to Ujiji, a Tanzanian port which lay on Lake Tanganyika. Otherwise, these weapons would be taken to Kigoma from whence they would be ferried up river to rebel enclaves situated on the eastern shores of this vast stretch of water. The final destination was the rebel stronghold of Fizi-Baraka in the South Kivu province. Whereas the coalition strategy of mounting some form of waterborne attack on rebel bases, and stopping rebel supplies from Tanzania was tactically sound, how this strategy was to be implemented when the Congo possessed neither naval vessels nor naval forces posed quite a substantial problem.

The task of assembling a navy at such short notice was handed to the CIA's 'Jordy McKay'.⁸⁷⁸ Assigned to Albertville by Thomas G. Clines⁸⁷⁹ and Bill Hamilton⁸⁸⁰ of the CIA's Maritime Branch of the Special Operations Group, a Special Activities Division (SAD) responsible for covert operations, 'McKay'⁸⁸¹ held regular meetings with Mike Hoare to discuss how the new navy, the *Force Navale Congolaise*, would be created. It

⁸⁷⁶ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 239.

⁸⁷⁷ Dodenhoff, *op.cit.*, 61.

⁸⁷⁸ A pseudonym used by Hawes and Koenig in *Cold War, Navy Seal, op.cit.*

⁸⁷⁹ Clines was a highly-decorated veteran of the Korean War, Clines was involved in covert operations in Cuba between 1961-1962, and had worked with Ted Shackley, David Atlee Phillips, and David Morales at the CIA's JM/WAVE in Miami. According to Trento, Clines also had close ties to Nicaragua's President Somoza, and it was the friendship between the two which had enabled the CIA to train anti-Castro Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Later, when a revolt threatened Somoza's regime, anti-Castro Cubans were used to put it down. See, Joseph J. Trento, *Prelude to Terror: Edwin P. Wilson and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network* (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, 2005), 134.

⁸⁸⁰ While correspondence with James Hawes has revealed that pseudonyms have been used to refer to CIA operatives such as 'Jordy McKay', Bill Hamilton appears to be the real name of the person referred to in his 2018 publication: *Cold War, Navy Seal, op.cit.*). Indeed, the 2016 publication *Night Fighter: an Insider's Story of Special Ops from Korea to Seal Team 6* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2016), was co-authored by Charles W. Sasser, and Captain William H. Hamilton. The latter is described on the front cover of the publication as "the Father of the Navy Seals".

⁸⁸¹ It is possible that 'Jordy McKay' is the 'Jaques Noel' referred to by Hoare in *Congo Mercenary* (240). Hoare speaks of Noel being assigned to G3 (operations) in Léopoldville, and tells of how Noel outlined the tactical picture in the Fizi-Baraka pocket. The G3 section of military staff is responsible for operations and training. Equally, it is possible that Hoare, too, has used a pseudonym to protect the identity of the person in question.

was decided that members of 5 Commando would navigate two old, but seaworthy, boats to carry a force of 300 mercenaries and their vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Maintained by Belgian engineers, the first of the vessels was named the *Ermans* commanded by Sergeant Ian Peddle.⁸⁸² This was a cargo ship which was converted into a gunship and it was armed with .50 calibre machine guns, and an array of other weapons. The second vessel, the *Urundi*, mounted also with machine guns but also with ramps would act as the supply boat. Its cargo included the armoured trucks, jeeps, and armoured cars known as "Ferrets" that would be used by the mercenary force. In addition, to these two large ships, greater manoeuvrability was provided by six US Patrol Torpedo (PT) boats.

In a first military operation labelled "White Giant", the overall plan was for ground forces of mercenaries⁸⁸³ and around 1,000 ANC soldiers led by Hoare to advance on the rebel stronghold of Nioka, located in the eastern province of Maniema. Air cover for Hoare's troops would be provided by the *Makasi*. The Congo's aerial forces had recently been bolstered by the arrival of more pilots, and new equipment such as Bell F47 helicopters. These helicopters would be used for purposes such as the evacuation of wounded mercenaries,⁸⁸⁴ and on at least one occasion the helicopters were used to carry high-ranking ANC officers such as General Louis Bobozo into battle zones.⁸⁸⁵ One of the pilots was a French national who will be referred to in this study only as 'Bob'.⁸⁸⁶

⁸⁸² Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 244.

⁸⁸³ Mercenary commanders in 5 Commando at this time included Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) Samuel 'Jock' Cassidy', Lieutenant Peter Ross-Smith from Rhodesia, Lieutenant Sam Smallman from South West Africa, and Lieutenant Gerry Schroeder from South Africa.

⁸⁸⁴ See photo annex 15.

⁸⁸⁵ See, Hoare, *Congo Mercenary, op.cit.*, 267. That this was the case was confirmed by 'Bob' during an interview carried out on 23 January, 2015.

⁸⁸⁶ A veteran of the Algerian War, 'Bob' also flew helicopters in Laos under the auspices of the International Control Commission (ICC). He was contacted and interviewed in Brussels by Congolese military attaché Colonel Bouzin in March 1965, and it is highly probable that his recruitment occurred at a time when the CIA was considering the gradual phasing out of its air operations in the Congo. Glen Fields, the CIA's Chief of the Africa Division was to evoke this subject in a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for African

Meanwhile, the *Ermans* and the *Urundi* moved northwards in order to launch attacks on Port Mahagi situated just south of the Congo's border with Uganda.

By 11 May, 1965 the coalition of forces had destroyed a bridge on the road which linked Aba in the Congo to Dimo in the Sudan. In this respect they had cut off the supply route along which rebels were receiving a quantity of their weapons. Attacks were also made on Watsa and Dungu in the Orientale Province and these towns were taken towards the end of May, 1965. While these attacks sealed off the Congo from Uganda, the attack on Watsa was important as it enabled the mercenaries to take control of the Durba Mine. Gold taken from this mine was used by the rebels to finance the purchase weapons for rebel forces.⁸⁸⁷ Following 5 Commando's capture of Watsa and Dungu, in June 1965, Bob Denard's 6 Commando was handed the task of securing the Orientale Province, and the borders with Sudan and Uganda, while to the west Jean Schramme's 10 Commando secured the border with Congo (Brazzaville) from which troops and weapons were also being supplied to boost rebel efforts.

As Hoare neared the end of his service in the Congo, a final objective for the coalition of mercenaries, Cuban Exile pilots and the ANC was to attack the Fizi-Baraka axis in an operation known as Banzi. As mentioned above, this city situated on the shores of Lake Tanganyika had been identified as the headquarters for rebel activity. Its taking would be that the organisational structure of the rebel regime would be decapitated, and that a concentration of rebel forces would be dispersed into smaller units. In turn, this would facilitate the clearing of the area of most rebel operations. Although Operation

Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, on 28 April, 1965. Fields had previously recommended to Bouzin that Belgian pilots be recruited and that they should be assigned to the 21st Squadron of the *Force Aérienne Congolaise* (FAC). This was the unit in which 'Bob' served. See, "Memorandum from the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Fields) to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)", 28 April, 1965, Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 76-00366R, DDO/ISO Files, Box 1, Folder 8, Congo, 1960-1969, Part II, Secret.

⁸⁸⁷ Villafaña, *op.cit.*, 109.

Banzi achieved its objectives in August 1965, by his own admission Hoare found that the resistance put up by rebel fighters was much stronger than he had faced in previous encounters with the Simba. Indeed, instead of "melting away into the hills" as they had done in previous encounters, this time opposing forces had stood and faced their enemy. Hoare suspected that these enemy soldiers had undergone some sort of professional military training. His suspicions were confirmed after rebels had attacked military installations at Bendera in the South Kivu province on 29 June, 1965. Identity papers found on one of the enemy dead included a Cuban passport and a personal diary which noted that the dead soldier had travelled from Havana *via* Prague and Peking. As well as this discovery, radio messages in a type of Spanish used by Cubans were intercepted by one of Hoare's Spanish-speaking signalers⁸⁸⁸ and by the USNS *Private Jose F. Valdez* (T-AG-169). This was a listening ship carrying crew fluent in either Russian, French, Spanish, or Portuguese which would sail up and down the Indian Ocean in the hope of intercepting enemy radio communications. The NSC already knew that Castro was communicating with Dar es Salaam, and that his messages to Cuban guerillas were being relayed from the Tanzanian capital. Every day at 8.00 am, at 2.30 pm, and at 7.00 pm, Cuban radio operators based in Kigoma on one side of Lake Tanganyika would receive updates on the situation, and requests for supplies from Cuban troops on the other side. The leader of the Cuban troops, Che Guevara, was aware that overly frequent use of the radio would expose the Cubans to detection and he even gave instructions that the frequency of these communications be reduced.⁸⁸⁹ These precautions would be taken in vain.

⁸⁸⁸ Hoare, *Congo Mercenary*, 239-240.

⁸⁸⁹ James Bamford, *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency* (First Anchor Books, 2002), 159-160.

6.3. Cuba in Africa

Given its recent history of providing support for different liberation movements in Africa it is unsurprising that the most virulent criticism of western involvement in the DRC came from Cuba. After deposing Batista, Castro's revolutionary movement quickly turned its attention to Africa: Che Guevara and Raul Castro travelled to Cairo in June 1959 and in July 1960, while in September 1960 Fidel Castro castigated France over its war in Algeria, and promised Cuba's support for the Algerian people, the "remaining colonial peoples in Africa" and the "Negroes who are discriminated against in the Union of South Africa".⁸⁹⁰ From December 1961, Cuba began supplying weapons to Algeria's FLN: in that month, the *Bahia de Nipe*, a Cuban vessel, left Havana and transported its cargo of 1,500 rifles, more than thirty machine guns, four US-made 81 mortars, and a large quantity of US-made mortar rounds.⁸⁹¹ These weapons and ammunition had been captured from Brigade 2506 at the Bay of Pigs.⁸⁹² In addition to its support for Algeria, in 1961 Cuba allegedly supplied weapons to rebel movements in Zanzibar in 1961, and from early 1964 Cuban military personnel accompanied Algerian weapons shipments to Tanzania. Cuba also sent shiploads of weapons including tanks to Algeria during its brief conflict with Morocco in October 1963.⁸⁹³

As for the Congo, while the Stanleyville rescue operations were taking place Guevara had left Cuba, and had headed to Moscow where he was to attend celebrations to mark the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the opening of the new "Soviet-Cuban Friendship House", the inauguration of which he was to co-host with Soviet

⁸⁹⁰ "Speech of Dr. Fidel Castro at the UN General Assembly, September 1960", available at <http://www1.lanl.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600926.html>, accessed 23 June 2018.

⁸⁹¹ Piero Gleijeses, "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1996, 160.

⁸⁹² Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig, *op.cit.*, 106.

⁸⁹³ "Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in '61: Havana's Part in Revolution Outlined in Washington - Guerilla Course Cited", *New York Times*, 2 January, 1964.

astronaut, Yuri Gagarin. As John Lee Anderson underlines in his study of the Argentine revolutionary,⁸⁹⁴ the last months of 1964 were a good time to test Cuba-Soviet relations: China was encouraging support for its Maoist form of communism in South America, and in 1964 Peru's Communist Party had been weakened by the departure of a pro-Peking group; in Bolivia and Colombia there were similar factional splits; and, in Guatemala, a Trotskyite faction was emerging that would soon split the Cuban-backed Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). Through Guevara's discussions with various Politburo officials, it became apparent that the Soviet Union no longer supported Cuban ideology on its armed struggle in Latin America. Guevara left the impression that he was determined to carry on the struggle; distrusted the Soviet policy of peaceful existence; and as far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned "he was on the Chinese side".⁸⁹⁵

The first public indication of Guevara's dissatisfaction with the Soviet line was given during a speech in Santiago de Cuba on 30 November, 1964, less than a week after the Stanleyville intervention. Preferring not to attend the Communist Party Congress being held concurrently in Havana, Guevara castigated "imperialist" wars in Algeria, Vietnam and Laos. After promising to provide continued support for struggles in Portuguese Guinea, Guevara's focus turned to the Congo and the recent rescue operations. For Guevara, the "storming" of Stanleyville by Belgian paratroopers and their slaughter of a large number of citizens under the statue of Professor Lumumba (*sic*) demonstrated two things: the "bestiality of imperialism", a bestiality that has no fixed borders, and that it is in the "very nature of imperialism to demean men to their wildest impulses, to turn them into blood-hungry beasts, willing to slaughter, to murder, to destroy until the last picture of a revolutionary, a supporter of a regime that fell under their boot, or who fights for his

⁸⁹⁴ John Lee Anderson, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (London: Bantam Press, 1997).

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 615.

freedom".⁸⁹⁶ Ignoring the fact that Lumumba had overseen the ANC massacre of thousands of Congolese citizens at Bakwanga in August 1960, Guevara promised to rebuild the statue of this "martyr of the revolution of the world".⁸⁹⁷

Guevara's denunciation of the United Nations in the same speech, and the insinuation that it was in some way complicit in Lumumba's assassination, did not stop him travelling to New York as Cuba's representative at the 19th General Assembly of the UN held on 11 December, 1964. Dressed in his customary olive-green uniform, Guevara wasted no time in welcoming the representatives of Zambia, Malawi, and Malta. Expressing the hope that these newly-independent countries would join the "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism", Guevara also hailed the appointment of Ghana's Alex Quaison-Sackey as president of the assembly as the sign that an "historic stage of resounding triumphs for the peoples of Africa" had begun, and that colonialism was witnessing its final hour.⁸⁹⁸

In repeating much of the content of the speech given in Santiago de Cuba, the second half of Guevara's speech in New York was devoted to the question of the Congo. From the repetition of this content, and his evocation of support for "peoples in conflict" with "white colonial"⁸⁹⁹ oppression in Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa or in Swaziland, it would seem that Guevara's focus had turned away from struggles in Latin America and that his focus now lay on sub-Saharan Africa. That this is the case is confirmed by a number of things: Castro's plans for spreading the Cuban revolution to South America seemingly unfavourable in the eyes of the Organisation of American States

⁸⁹⁶ "Ernesto Guevara speech in Santiago de Cuba, 30 November, 1964", available at <http://www.politique-actu.com/dossier/ernesto-guevara-discours-historique-anniversaire/1702290/>, accessed 3 June 2018.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁸ "Ernesto Guevara's speech of 11 December, 1964 at the 19th Assembly of the United Nations in New York", *The Che Reader*, Ocean Press, 2005.

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

(OAS);⁹⁰⁰ the belief that the export of revolution as "essential to justify and protect the Cuban revolution itself";⁹⁰¹ the fact that Guevara did not return to Cuba preferring, instead, to embark on a three-month tour which would take him to Africa, China, France, Ireland and Prague. Acting as a goodwill ambassador for Fidel Castro, Guevara saw Africa as part of his dream to form a "Tricontinental" alliance against the West.⁹⁰²

With the objective of making this strategy become reality through establishing and consolidating Cuban relations with radical African governments and liberation movements, Guevara left Cuba in December 1964. His first port of call was Algiers to discuss the Congo with Ben Bella, Cuba's closest friend on the African continent, and a nation with which Cuba had formed a 'brotherhood'.⁹⁰³ On 14 January, Guevara arrived in Ghana where he was greeted enthusiastically by waiting crowds,⁹⁰⁴ and after meeting Kwame Nkrumah, Guevara was led on a tour of the development projects being put in place in the Ghanaian capital, Accra.⁹⁰⁵ The tour also included visits to Mali, to Guinea, to Dahomey (now Benin), and to Congo-Brazzaville where Guevara would meet Alphonse Massamba-Débat (Congo-Brazzaville),⁹⁰⁶ and Angola's Agostinho Neto.⁹⁰⁷ Following a meeting with leaders of the Congo's CNL in Dar es Salaam on 11 February 1965, the contents of which

⁹⁰⁰ Cuba had been formally expelled from the OAS on 14 February, 1962. See, "OAS Expels Cuba After Delegates Stalk Out", *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 15 February, 1962.

⁹⁰¹ John Dumbrell, *President Johnson and Soviet Communism*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 146.

⁹⁰² Anderson, *op.cit.*, 619.

⁹⁰³ See letter from Roberto Gonzales Gomez, 7 July 1994, in Gleijeses, "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965, *op.cit.*, 161.

⁹⁰⁴ "Guevara Receives Rousing Welcome", *Ghanaian Times*, 16 January, 1965, in Dennis Laumann, Che Guevara's Visit to Ghana, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, New Series, No. 9, 2005, 61-74.

⁹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹⁰⁶ According to British historian Richard Gott, for many years the *Guardian's* correspondent in Latin America, and an historian who met Guevara in Cuba in 1963, Massamba-Débat had asked Guevara to provide Cuban military assistance to Pierre Mulele. See Richard Gott's introduction to Ernesto "Che" Guevara, *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo* (London: Harvill Press, 2001).

⁹⁰⁷ It was during meetings with the latter that Guevara promised support for the MPLA through the provision of military advisors who would operate from the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. It was the beginning of Cuban intervention in Angola which would last for over two decades. For Gleijeses a detailed account of Cuba's involvement in Angola see *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 2003).

we will discuss shortly, Guevara's continent-wide odyssey was to take him to Algiers where on 24 February, 1965 Guevara was to give speech at the Afro-Asian Conference.

Attended by no less than sixty-three representatives from Asian and African countries as well as representatives from nineteen national liberation movements, as a member of the conference's presiding committee,⁹⁰⁸ the meeting provided an ideal platform for Guevara to present his vision of the Tricontinental Alliance. Undoubtedly with events in the Congo in mind, Guevara called for the creation of an alliance between the "underdeveloped peoples and socialist countries" to be used in the fight against the United States, or any other "imperialist enemy".⁹⁰⁹ Although Guevara offered praise for the Soviet Union and the Republic of China in that both had offered military aid to liberation movements, he was to castigate the USSR, albeit implicitly, through the mention of "mutually beneficial trade based on prices forced on the backward countries by the law of value and the international relations of unequal exchange that result from the law of value". "How", Guevara argued, could it be "mutually beneficial" to sell at world market prices the "raw materials that cost the underdeveloped world immeasurable sweat and suffering, and to buy at world prices the machinery produced in today's big automated factories?"⁹¹⁰ As Anderson notes, it was clear to all who were listening that Guevara was making a clear attack on the Soviet Union.⁹¹¹ in Havana, Guevara had been very vocal in his denunciation of what he saw as Soviet "profiteering" in its trading relations with developing nations. Furthermore, Guevara chastised the USSR for not demonstrating "unconditional solidarity"

⁹⁰⁸ "Ernesto Guevara's speech at the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria", 24 February, 1965, *The Che Reader*, Ocean Press, 2005, reproduced by <https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/02/24.htm>, accessed 29 August, 2017.

⁹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹¹ Anderson, *op.cit.*, 625.

with North Vietnam, a country which had been the target of recent bombardments by the United States.⁹¹²

Observers of Cuban politics such as Edward George suggest that Guevara's speech in Algiers and his condemnation of the Eastern bloc made Guevara's position in Havana untenable: Guevara's demonstration of sympathy for China in his speech was in direct contradiction to Fidel Castro's denunciation of China's recent split from the Soviet Union, and it was thought that Guevara should move on to pastures new.⁹¹³ Other observers, however, note that any dispute between Castro and Guevara has been exaggerated, and that nothing more than "strong words" would have been exchanged between the two.⁹¹⁴ This is due to Castro's earlier criticism of the Soviet socialist model, and the indirect indication that Cuba would not accept Soviet attempts to impose this model on the island. Guevara's speech in Algeria did, however, make Castro's task of defending him from accusations that he was a Maoist more complicated,⁹¹⁵ and it was suggested that Che be sent to lead a group of Cubans already in training for a mission in the Congo.

6.4. Che Guevara's Failed Rebellion in the Congo

A revolutionary with Guevara's experience and knowledge should have known when and where to continue his brand of activism. Unfortunately for Guevara, it would appear that the Soviet Union's decision not to support armed struggle in Latin America (see page 310-311 of this study) had rather forced his hand, and he found himself obliged to seek out revolutions in other areas of the world. Given US involvement in Central Africa,

⁹¹² "Ernesto Guevara's speech at the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria", *op.cit.*

⁹¹³ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuavale* (New York & London, Frank Cass, 2005, 25.

⁹¹⁴ Anderson, *op.cit.*, 627.

⁹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

and Guevara's deep-rooted hatred of what he called 'Yankee imperialism', the Congo presented a perfect opportunity.

During his tour of Africa, Guevara had met many of the leaders he hoped would support his efforts to continue the revolutionary struggle. As we have seen, he met with Ben Bella, with Nasser, with Nkrumah, and had promised his support for independence movements in Angola through his meetings with Angola's Agostinho Neto. But it was while in Tanzania that Guevara had also had the chance to meet Laurent Désiré Kabila and his deputy Gaston Soumaliot who were residing in Dar es Salaam. Kabila made an "excellent impression" on Guevara: he had made a "clear, specific, and resolute" presentation of the situation in the Congo and realised that "the main enemy was North American imperialism". What Guevara failed to recognise was that Kabila was more or less alone in thinking along these lines, and that other 'Freedom Fighters', as Guevara referred to them, did not hold the same point of view. These other leaders of the Congolese rebel movements merely saw rebellion as a means of getting rid of Tshombé: they did not share Guevara's view that the fight in the Congo was part of a larger struggle against an enemy common to both the Congolese and the Cubans.⁹¹⁶ Despite early warning signs that Africa had a long way to go before it reached "real revolutionary maturity",⁹¹⁷ and despite warnings from Nasser,⁹¹⁸ Guevara promised Kabila that he would provide a group of 30 instructors to help train Congolese rebel forces. On Kabila's insistence, these instructors would be black so as not to arouse suspicion of Cuban help.⁹¹⁹

⁹¹⁶ Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo* (London: The Harvill Press, 2000), 5-7.

⁹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁹¹⁸ Nasser told Guevara that he should not become directly involved in the Congo conflict. In Nasser's view, if Guevara thought he could be like "Tarzan, a white man among blacks, leading and protecting them", he was wrong. See, Anderson, *op.cit.*, 623.

⁹¹⁹ Anderson, *op.cit.* 622.

Towards the end of January 1965, Victor Dreke (Cruz)⁹²⁰ received an order from the Cuban Army High Command to start the recruitment of men for an assignment which could last for a period of up to two years. Not yet being informed of where the mission would take place, Dreke selected men from the Cuban Revolutionary Army (FAR) and began training at the Piti 1 Camp in Pinar del Rio. At some point during the next two months, it was decided that a force totalling nearly 500 recruits would be divided into two units named *Columna 1* and *Columna 2*. The 113 men of the first unit would be assigned to Kabila's forces and travel from Dar es Salaam to the Fizi-Baraka area of the Congo whereas the second unit *Columna 2*, or the Patrice Lumumba Battalion, would be sent to Congo-Brazzaville to carry out a number of missions. Although this unit's primary function was to act as a reserve for *Columna 1*, its other missions were to fight alongside MPLA guerillas in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, and to protect the Republic of the Congo's border to the DRC.⁹²¹

The training of Cuban troops and the destinations of their respective missions were, naturally, a matter of extreme secrecy.⁹²² For this reason, since Guevara's return from Africa on 15 March, 1965 he had been somewhat elusive, making only one public appearance in the weeks that preceded his departure for the Congo. In the interest of this secrecy and to avoid the detection of Guevara's movements, at the end of the month Guevara was to undergo a physical transformation that would make him unrecognisable even to former comrades such as Victor Dreke. In a television documentary made for the

⁹²⁰ Dreke had fought alongside Guevara most notably in the battle to take control of Santa Clara on 31 December, 1958. Two years later, and after three days of fighting, he was captured by members of Brigade 2506 at the Bay of Pigs, only to be released at the end of the failed invasion. See, "Victor Dreke Cruz: Cuba's history man still talks of revolution", *The Independent*, 17 April, 2011.

⁹²¹ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London & New York, Frank Cass, 2005), 25.

⁹²² According to Anderson, *op.cit.*, 639, Castro had already informed Alexander Alexiev, the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, of the mission. Castro swore Alexiev to secrecy and asked him not to communicate this information to the Kremlin but, as George notes (*op.cit.*, 308), Castro would have been in little doubt that the ambassador would do so.

French-German television channel *Arte*, in 2007,⁹²³ Dreke explained how Castro had invited him to dinner. In the presence of Raul Castro and a few friends, Dreke was then asked to identify a clean-shaven man wearing glasses and a homburg hat. Unable to do so, Dreke was told amid roars of laughter that the person in the photo was Guevara. To complete the disguise, the French-speaking Guevara would travel under the assumed name of Ramón Benitez, and would be introduced to the Congolese as a doctor and translator.⁹²⁴

Guevara's goodbye to Cuba would come in the shape of a farewell letter. Addressed to Fidel Castro and dated 1 April, 1965, Castro was to read aloud in front of Cuban television cameras. Guevara averred that he felt he had fulfilled his duty that tied him to the Cuban revolution, and in wishing his comrades well for the future, he declared that "other lands of the world summoned" his "modest efforts of assistance" and that he would "carry the faith" taught by Castro into new battles. Guevara's letter expressed his revolutionary spirit and the sense that his most sacred of duties was to fight imperialism.⁹²⁵ Leaving Havana on the same day, Guevara arrived in Dar es Salaam on 19 April and had hopes of meeting Kabila. Unaware that Guevara would be joining the fighting in the Congo, Kabila was in Cairo with other members of the CNL where, paradoxically, as things would turn out, he was to discuss areas such as combat unity and the constitution of the revolutionary organisation.⁹²⁶ After the arrival of the first batch of Cuban troops on the 20 April, Guevara travelled to Kigoma before crossing Lake Tanganyika and set up his headquarters at Kibamba some 30 kilometres inland. In the Congo Guevara would be known as 'Tatu' (Swahili for the number three), Dreke would become 'Moja' (one), while

⁹²³ Jihan El Tahri, *Cuba: une odyssée africaine*, Editions Arte, 2007.

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.27 - 29.00.

⁹²⁵ "Farewell letter from Che to Fidel Castro" 1 April, 1965, available at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/04/01.htm>, accessed 23 June 2018.

⁹²⁶ Guevara, *African Dream*, op.cit., 10.

Jose Maria Martinez Tomayo (Dreke's second-in-command) would become 'Mbili' (two).⁹²⁷

The strategy that Guevara hoped to adapt to the type of asymmetric warfare⁹²⁸ he would find in the Congo would later be known as *Foco*, or Focoism. Its tenets being developed by Guevara in the 24-page booklet *Guerilla Warfare: a Method* published in 1961,⁹²⁹ this theory of *Foco* advocated the principle that it was not necessary to wait for conditions to be right in order to start a revolution.⁹³⁰ Instead, a small band of revolutionaries acting as a vanguard could launch small-scale guerilla warfare to serve as the *focus* and inspiration for a more general uprising. With the Congo bordering nine other countries, it presented to ideal opportunity to put this theory to the test.

One of the foundations of Guevara's strategy relied on the "unity of people's forces in order to counter the unity of repressive forces".⁹³¹ However, he was soon to realise that his own willingness to share the hardships of the peasant farmers in the Congo were neither matched by rebel leaders who spent most of their time in Dar es Salaam nor by members of the rebel forces who would pilfer food from the peasants and steal what luxuries they possessed.⁹³² This lack of unity extended to the Rwandan forces sent to support the Congolese and Guevara notes that the "Rwandans"⁹³³ and the various Congolese

⁹²⁷ George, *op.cit.*, 26.

⁹²⁸ Asymmetric warfare is warfare between forces of different sizes and different capabilities. Ostensibly smaller or weaker military forces will use unconventional tactics to overcome what is perceived as a larger or stronger force. An irregular form of warfare, 'asymmetric warfare' can be used to describe guerilla warfare or insurgencies.

⁹²⁹ Ernesto Che Guevara, *Guerilla Warfare: A Method* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1964).

⁹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

⁹³¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁹³² *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹³³ The Rwandans in question were members of the Bafulero tribe. In 1965, this tribe which had settled in the South Kivu region of the Congo and which supported Mulele was opposed to Tshombé as a result of ANC reprisals. Taking advantage of the anger of the Bafulero, the CNL offered its support in the Bafulero's tribal conflict with another Rwandan tribe residing in the Congo, the Banyamulenge. See Odom, *op.cit.*, 7, and René Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction", Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, September 2001, 57. The issue of integrating "foreign" troops into an armed force is further complicated by this type of ethnic rivalry which is commonplace in Africa. Should these "foreign" forces residing within the limits of one nation's recognised

tribes treat each other as enemies, and the frontiers between the ethnic groups are clearly defined".⁹³⁴ It was to make Guevara's task of creating a regional union to fight a common enemy extremely complicated, and it was a phenomenon that was repeated all over the Congo. In his own account of the Congo mission, Victor Dreke was to conclude that it was not possible to bring together Africans from other countries to form a consolidated unit.⁹³⁵

If the creation of some sort of unity and common purpose was of primary concern for Guevara, when it came to the question of the individual elements which were to constitute a complete rebel force, the concern was no less important. From the outset, Guevara was dismayed at the behaviour of his troops who, many of them, had contracted venereal disease in the brothels of Kigoma. A second problem was that drunkenness was widespread: the consumption of *pombe*, a spirit distilled from the juice of corn and manioc, caused havoc when, imbibed with this potent liquid, Guevara's army spent its time brawling and causing general mayhem.⁹³⁶ Whereas frequenting brothels and getting drunk are part and parcel of service in the armed forces,⁹³⁷ when coupled with a strong belief in tribal traditions such as taking a *dawa* to ward off enemy gunfire, it would prove to be a disastrous combination: if one soldier was seen to have been killed or injured by a bullet which was supposed to be deflected through protection from this potion, others involved in a battle would flee believing the *dawa* to be faulty. In an attack on the town of Katenga on 30 June, 1965, for example, out of 160 men 60 were to desert the ranks.⁹³⁸ Another problem linked to tribal beliefs was that the Congolese would not dig trenches (for the

international borders be considered as mercenaries? If so, their situation is no different from the Cuban Exiles discussed in this study.

⁹³⁴ Ibid., 22.

⁹³⁵ Victor Dreke, *From Escambray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution* (Pathfinder Press, 2002), 141.

⁹³⁶ Guevara, *African Dream, op.cit.*, 18.

⁹³⁷ As a member of the British Army, one of my first lectures during the induction period consisted of how to avoid venereal disease.

⁹³⁸ Guevara, *African Dream, op.cit.*, 43.

Congolese, trenches were holes, and holes were for dead bodies), and were incapable of closing one eye so as to aim a weapon.⁹³⁹ At Katenga, most Congolese opened fire nearly always shooting into the air, and kept on firing until their ammunition ran out. While doing so, they were decimated by enemy fire.

The inability of Congolese rebels to mount any kind of coordinated attack was extremely disheartening for Guevara and his fellow Cubans. By the end of June 1965, Guevara had reached the conclusion that if the behaviour of the Simba off and on the battlefield did not change, Guevara's dream of creating an epicentre for widespread revolution was a very optimistic target. In Guevara's own words, "the possibility of this happening seemed more remote with every passing day".⁹⁴⁰

While morale amongst the Congolese was to improve on 7 July with the visit of Kabila, to add to the fragility of Guevara's military situation Guevara was to learn that political events inside and outside of the Congo were to play an important role in determining the outcome of operations: in Algeria, Houari Boumedienne had overthrown Ben Bella on June 19, 1965, causing friction between Cuba and its North African ally; and on the Congolese front, further friction between leaders of the CNL meant the promise of further disunity and, potentially, factitious conflict. One source of reassurance came through the continuing arrival of Chinese weapons, but even this positive aspect was countered by the fact that shipments brought in from Tanzania were missing firing pins or ammunition or, more significantly, as Guevara would point out in a letter in which he would summarise the situation:

"If the Yankees have learnt the lessons of other revolutions, now is the moment they should strike hard and take pre-emptive measures such as the neutralisation of the lake

⁹³⁹ Ibid., 25-28.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., 68.

[Tanganyika]: that is, to do everything necessary to close our main route for supplies of all kinds."⁹⁴¹

As we saw in the previous section of this study, the CIA was already making attempts to put together a naval force to address this supply of weapons. As we shall see in the next section, the arrival of new naval personnel was to add conflict of a more personal nature to the one that was being fought. Whereas Guevara believed that the struggles in Vietnam and Santo Domingo were somewhat "tying the hands" [of the United States],⁹⁴² he was wrong to believe that some would seek revenge for past defeats at the hands of his forces.

6.5. Cuban Exile Naval Operations on Lake Tanganyika

Despite criticism of US policy in the Congo, and its support of Tshombé's government, State Department officials were highly aware that the discontinuation of this support could have serious consequences for its global policy of promoting stability in the region. If we were to take Robert Komer's view of the US position when faced with international criticism, it would appear that the National Security Council considered it is a minor annoyance. His view was that the Africans were beginning to accept the Kasavubu-Tshombé partnership and that Tshombé had to continue to be considered as a "legitimate" leader in order to protect US involvement in the Congo. Furthermore, Tshombé would interpret US refusal to finance his regime as a sign that the US was withdrawing its support.⁹⁴³ Concerns over the Kasavubu-Tshombé partnership continued throughout 1965. The author of a report sent to the 303 Committee believed that open confrontation would

⁹⁴¹ Ibid., 33-34.

⁹⁴² Ibid.

⁹⁴³ "Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for Security Affairs, Washington, 26 March, 1965", Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Congo, Vol. XI, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/65-9/65, Secret.

harm attempts to subdue rebellion in the Fizi-Baraka area, the last centre of organised rebel activity. If not subdued, the report pointed out, the Congo's Central Government could be severely threatened, Congolese rebels would be heartened, and radical African States [would be] encouraged to return to their policy of active interference in Congolese internal affairs. If Tshombé were forced out, there was a chance that he would return to Katanga and secede. This would have disastrous consequences on the Congo's fragile administrative and economic structure.⁹⁴⁴

As seen in section 6.2. of this study, the addition of a small US-sponsored navy crewed by mercenaries had made a contribution to overall efforts to quash rebellion in the area surrounding Lake Tanganyika. Effectively, military operations which began in March 1965 were so successful that by late August of that year US National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy optimistic message to President Johnson was that the "back of the rebellion [had] been broken."⁹⁴⁵ A note of pessimism was, however, to be raised by Peter Jessup of the National Security Staff. He noted a month after Bundy that Cuban trained rebels were continuing to receive Soviet and/or Chinese weapons that were being transported across Lake Tanganyika.⁹⁴⁶ Entitled "*US Covert Support for Congolese Government on Lake Tanganyika*", Jessup's report also raised concerns over the effectiveness of the 5 Commando naval force noting that "mercenary adventurers and various Congolese that had thus far proved disastrous as to discipline and ability to carry out their missions, to say nothing of maintaining the equipment". With intelligence reports indicating that the Russians were supplying power launches to the rebels, and with

⁹⁴⁴"Memorandum for the 303 Committee, 24 September, 1965", National Security Council, Intelligence Files, Congo 1960-1965, Secret; Eyes Only.

⁹⁴⁵ "Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 25 August, 1965", Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Congo, Vol. XI, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/65-9/65, Secret.

⁹⁴⁶ "Memorandum for President Johnson, 29 September, 1965", National Security Council, Intelligence Files, Congo 1960-1965, Secret; Eyes Only.

diplomatic efforts to persuade Tanzania not to help rebels having failed, Bundy's recommendation was that the crews of the current naval force be replaced with far more experienced crews from Europe.⁹⁴⁷

Curiously, and something which gives us an idea of the way the very high echelons were sometimes informed of operations on a 'need to know' basis, by the time Johnson had been informed of these developments in late September, the wheels that would lead to the creation of a more professional, more disciplined naval force had already been set in motion. During discussions which took place on 30 August, 1965, the Country Team⁹⁴⁸ which dealt with Congolese affairs had recommended that two 50-foot Swift boats⁹⁴⁹ be sent to the Congo to patrol Lake Tanganyika. The boats would be manned by 20-25 [not declassified]⁹⁵⁰ who were familiar with boat operations and specifically with the Swift. If this suggestion were agreed to [5 Commando]⁹⁵¹ would be replaced with [not declassified] crews as quickly as such crews could be recruited, trained and dispatched".⁹⁵² In reference to these suggestions, on 23 September, 1965, the 303 Committee approved the purchase, transport by air, and armament and manning of six additional boats (two Swifts and four Seacraft).⁹⁵³

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁸ CIA officers were assigned to different Divisions i.e., the Africa Division. These Divisions were broken down into Country Teams whose role was to focus activities in one particular country.

⁹⁴⁹ The Patrol Craft Fast (PCF) or Swift Boat. Conceived by the Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (NAVADGRP MACV), this was an aluminium boat made by Sewart Seacraft of Berwick, Louisiana used for patrols along the coastal and interior waterways of Vietnam.

⁹⁵⁰ Although parts of this document still remain classified, in his report to President Johnson, Jessup refers to "the only available nucleus of reliable covert boat operators". We can deduce, then, that those in question are Cuban Exiles. See, "Memorandum for President Johnson, 29 September, 1965".

⁹⁵¹ This line remains classified but the identity of those in question is clear.

⁹⁵² "Memorandum from the Chief of the Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Fields) to the Deputy Director for Plans (Fitzgerald)", 30 August, 1965, Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78-03805R, DDO/IMS Files, Box 3, Folder 11, US Govt.-Dept. of State, Secret.

⁹⁵³ "Memorandum for President Johnson, 29 September, 1965", *op.cit.*

The person who was chosen to coordinate the new version of the FNC was James Hawes. A US Navy SEAL who had recently served in Vietnam, in July 1965⁹⁵⁴ Hawes had a series of meetings in Washington DC with Bill Hamilton and Colonel Bruce Cheever of the Special Operations Division (SOD) to discuss possible recruitment into the CIA and the Congo mission. Having accepted the mission, Hawes was then sent to Marana Airpark,⁹⁵⁵ in Tucson, Arizona where he would familiarise himself with events taking place in Central Africa. This two-week "OpsFam" course finished, in August 1965 Hawes boarded a United Trans-Atlantic flight from Paris to Léopoldville carrying \$2,500 and morphine.⁹⁵⁶

While Hawes was to meet a number of high-ranking US Embassy and CIA officials during his first few days in the Congo, in the United States the next step for Bill Hamilton was to supply the two Swift boats and their crews. After meetings to arrange the transportation of the boats to the Congo with Fred Sewart, the owner of the Sewart Seacraft company that made the Swifts, the next step was to locate the boats. As head of the Maritime Branch of the Special Operations Group, Hamilton knew that the CIA had provided two Swifts to the MRR, and that this Cuban Exile organisation had recently been using them to carry out raids against mainland Cuba (see section 4.3. of this study). Named the *Monty* and the *Gitana*, (see photos annex), and having operated around the Caribbean Sea, these two boats were now to spend around eight months patrolling the waters of Lake Tanganyika. How these two 50-foot craft were to be transported to the Congo is an

⁹⁵⁴ The date of this meeting tells us that plans to replace the mercenary naval force had begun some time in advance of the meeting held in August 1965.

⁹⁵⁵ Now known as Pinal Airpark. Marana Airpark acted as a main base for Air America, and Continental Air Services. Both airlines were proprietary companies of the CIA operating in Southeast Asia.

⁹⁵⁶ Hawes, and Koenig, *op.cit.*, 32.

operation that resembles Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Spicer-Simson's plan some fifty years earlier during the Battle for Lake Tanganyika in 1915-1916.⁹⁵⁷

For the 1965 version of the battle to determine who controlled the waters between Tanzania and the Congo, it was decided that the two Swift boats would be taken from Monkey Point to Louisiana. With Chavez steering the *Monty* and Alvarez steering the *Gitana*, the two craft made their way up through the Gulf of Mexico where they would be cut into parts. From Louisiana, these parts were taken to the Congo on C-124 Globemaster and C-130 aircraft. Once in the Congo, employees of Sewart Seacraft were to reassemble the boats which were then fitted with three 50-calibre machine guns, one 30-calibre machine gun, and 57mm recoilless cannon. Each Swift carried enough fuel to carry out a 720 kilometre patrol.⁹⁵⁸

When it came to the question of crew members for the Swifts, Hamilton and his deputy Thomas Clines decided that the boats' current crews would be ideal for the role in the Congo: according to Hawes, they were "well trained, disciplined, and devoted to combating communism across the globe".⁹⁵⁹ In order to understand the motivations of three of these men it is worth our while to take a brief pause from our narrative of events in order to summarize evidence from interviews.

Born in 1942 to a devout Catholic family living in Pedro Betancourt, Cuba, Felix Toledo's first contact with the MRR had been in the late 1950s in the unusual shape of a Catholic priest who had once been a member of Francisco Franco's nationalist forces

⁹⁵⁷ On this occasion, and in order to secure Lake Tanganyika from German forces, two motor boats named HMS *Mimi* and *Toutou* were transported from Cape Town to Lukuga. This journey involved taking the boats by train to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia, then to Elisabethville in the Congo. From here, Congolese carriers, oxen and mechanical tractors would drag the boats through nearly 150 miles of dense bush. The boats then sailed down the Lualaba River before crossing Lake Kisale and arriving at Kabalo on 22 October, 1915. See, Giles Foden, *Mimi and Toutou Go Forth: The Bizarre Battle for Lake Tanganyika* (London: Penguin, 2005), 241-245.

⁹⁵⁸ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 149.

⁹⁵⁹ Hawes and Koenig, *op.cit.*, 57.

during the Spanish Civil War. Father Francisco "opened Toledo's eyes to the dangers of the communist ideals which were beginning to take root in Cuba after the overthrow of Batista, and advised him to travel to the United States. Having spent his eighteenth birthday in a Cuban prison due to his sympathies with the MRR, in 1960 Toledo fled the island and travelled to Miami in 1960. In July 1962 Toledo took advantage of President Kennedy's initiative to give Cuban Exiles the possibility of joining US military forces (see section 4.3. of this study). Undergoing initial training at Fort Wayne, Indiana, Toledo was under the strong impression that he and fellow Cubans in the US Army were being trained for a specific purpose. This notion became clearer in December 1962 when he was sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky where over 1,000 Cuban Exiles had been posted, and clearer still when he was sent to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Here, over 5,000 men were being prepared for a renewed attempt at overthrowing Fidel Castro. In 1963, after Kennedy had agreed with Khrushchev not to invade Cuba -an agreement that Toledo saw as a second betrayal- Toledo was again contacted by the MRR. In December 1963, he was sent to Costa Rica where he would be trained in communications (probably by Edwin Wilson), and throughout 1964 he would take part in raids on Cuba from Monkey Point in Nicaragua. A man who was proud of his anti-communist activities and a man who never considered himself to be a mercenary, in the early 1980s Toledo returned to Central Africa where as part of a medical team based in Miami, he put his experience in the Congo to use by providing help to UNITA rebels in Angola. Later, as part of his continuing commitment to defeating communism, he would return to Nicaragua where he would become a weapons instructor for the Contras, and he would visit anti-rebel forces in El Salvador. His biggest regret, in his own words is that, "You can't shoot communists anymore".

The second person interviewed was Eulogio 'Papo' Reyes. Born in Colón in Cuba's Matanzas Province in 1933, Reyes joined the MRR in 1960 and became one of the

organisation's most trusted and fearless operators. After arriving in Miami in August, 1961, Reyes was to take part in several covert missions on the Cuban mainland in 1963 and 1964 alongside fellow crew members, Generoso Bringas, Serapio Cepedo.¹ A quiet man in his early eighties when interviewed, the reaction of fellow Exiles to his death in 2017 was testament to the esteem in which this man was held. Many of the operations in which Reyes was to take part are yet to be revealed.

The third member of those who volunteered for the Congo is Roberto Pichardo Snr. Born in 1936, and having taken part in the Bay of Pigs invasion as a member of Brigade 2506, this highly-skilled radio operator had been captured soon after Exile forces landed, and spent the next two years in a Cuban prison. Released in December 1962 and present at Kennedy's speech given at the Orange Bowl later that month, it was while working in a radio shop in Miami that Pichardo was contacted by Luis Cosme. Although married and the father of two boys, Pichardo saw the Congo mission as a continuation of the Bay of Pigs and a way in which he could avenge the defeat.⁹⁶⁰ According to Hawes, this was a common feeling held by crew members.⁹⁶¹

Aware of the rumours circulating around the Exile community that Guevara was in the Congo, it was on the understanding that they would be working for a CIA front company named Oceanus Cargo Line, that the men were recruited by Ricardo Chavez. With their salaries paid into accounts held in Miami banks, in September 1965 the crews of

⁹⁶⁰Interviews carried out in Miami, 24 October, 2015.

⁹⁶¹Hawes also notes that among the [anti-Castro] Cubans there was "a fundamental belief they were different from mercenaries". Those who served in the Congo thought of themselves as a "professional military force operating within certain moral and ethical lines". They had been staunchly anti-Communist since Castro had taken control of Cuba, and they were paid modestly for their services. They did not go to the Congo to "get rich", or that their contribution would win their country back. See Hawes and Koenig, *op.cit.*, 72. As for the question of whether Cuban Exile forces can be considered as mercenaries or not, it should be noted that the air and naval crews had not yet gained US citizenship, and were contracted to the Congolese forces. In this last respect, the Cuban Exiles fought in the Congo on similar terms as mercenaries who signed up for the *Compagnie Internationale* in 1961, or those who fought alongside Mike Hoare in 5 Commando. The CIA was, in some ways, a mere vector for the Exiles just as Charles Huyghes, *et al.* had acted as Tshombé's recruiters.

the two Swift boats travelled to Léopoldville in small groups on commercial Pan Am flights *via* New York and Dakar, Senegal. From the Congolese capital, the next part of the journey consisted in taking a plane to their base in Albertville and, in the interest of maintaining secrecy surrounding their presence the crew members⁹⁶² were under strict instructions not to drink late into the night and not to mix with 5 Commando mercenaries. This order did not stop Roberto Pichardo forming a friendship with Samuel 'Jock' Cassidy, the hardened Regimental Sergeant Major of 5 Commando. Indeed, while the Exiles had been recruited primarily to crew the Swift boats, another of their roles was to train selected members of 5 Commando who would man other vessels in the FNC.⁹⁶³ Cassidy was recruited by Hawes to maintain discipline whereas John Peters of 5 Commando (another friend of Roberto Pichardo) showed the arrivals how to navigate Lake Tanganyika. CIA operative Marcell Rene "Gooch" Gough acted as the liaison officer between the agency and 5 Commando and who was in charge of coordinating joint operations involving the two forces.⁹⁶⁴

As we saw earlier, the role of the two Swift boats, now with the codenames *Lobo-1* and *Lobo-2*, was to patrol the shores of Lake Tanganyika in an attempt to stem the flow of weapons into rebel hands. The boats were not allowed into the Tanzanian waters of the lake which stared half way across. While Roberto Pichardo Snr. remained in Albertville and coordinated radio communications between the CIA and 5 Commando, the crews of the two boats intercepted a variety of weapons shipments. Using Belgian-made FALs,⁹⁶⁵

⁹⁶² A list of the Cuban Exiles who served in the Congo can be found in the annexes to this study.

⁹⁶³ Other craft used by the FNC were the *Ermans*, the *Kivu*, a boat which became the barracks for the navy, were the *Ulindi*, a tugboat, *Uvira*, a long barge, and *Crabbe*, a flat-topped boat used for cargo.

⁹⁶⁴ Gough was a veteran of WW2 and a retired Navy frogman. During the war, he was a member of the US Navy's Underwater Demolition Team (UDT). Gough was killed in a car crash in the Congo in November 1965. See, Tom Archdeacon, "Arch: CIA to award Navy operative highest honor", *Dayton Daily News*, 21 May, 2016.

⁹⁶⁵ The FAL (*Fusil Automatique Léger*) is a battle rifle which was used by many NATO countries.

British-made Sten guns,⁹⁶⁶ captured AK-47s, or 50-calibre machine guns mounted on the front and rear of the Swifts as a deterrent, it was not long into their mission that Chavez's crew had an encounter with what they first thought was floating vegetation. Coming under intense fire from the direction of what appeared to be a mixture of trees and bushes, Felix Toledo realised that five small boats were making their way across the lake. While four of the boats continued to engage the FNC patrol, a fifth veered away and headed towards the safety of Tanzanian waters. The amount of protection the fifth boat had been given, and the rapidity at which it had motored off from the confrontation raised the spectre that one of its passengers had been Che Guevara. Although it was never confirmed that this was the case, Toledo believed that Guevara had, indeed, been on the boat and 5 Commando was later to find documents showing that Cubans had been aboard.⁹⁶⁷

As we saw in the previous section, pressure on Che Guevara to give a boost to a flagging rebellion had been mounting fast since his arrival in April 1965. His efforts to do so had been hampered by the many failings of the Simbas, and Guevara had averred that the rebellion could be brought to a halt if supplies being brought in across the lake were stopped. The effectiveness of the FNC in stemming the transfer of goods and weapons can be seen in a telegram to Cuba dated 10 November, in which Guevara wrote: "Enemy pressure increasing and attempt to block lake continuing".⁹⁶⁸ By 14 November, a tone of desperation had set in to Guevara's telegrams and he was to write: "Indispensable that they (i.e. the boats) come today, we are starving and encircled".⁹⁶⁹ Eventually, on 20 November, Guevara was forced to concede defeat and he was to leave the Congo.

⁹⁶⁶ A submachine gun.

⁹⁶⁷ Interview with Felix Toledo, *op. cit.*, and Hawes and Koenig, *op.cit.*, 93.

⁹⁶⁸ Guevara, *African Dream*, 192.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 200.

If Guevara's attempts to inspire rebellion had been defeated by a combination of different problems, in ensuring that supplies to rebel bases from Tanzania were cut down to a trickle, the *Force Navale Congolaise* played a major role in bringing rebel activity in the east and northeast of the Congo to an end. Although, the mission of the Cuban Exile version of the FNC was to also end, this time in February 1966, and the Congo Crisis was to continue into 1967 and beyond, as James Hawes declares "Guevara and his ill-fated band were run out of the Congo [...] They were sent packing by the combined efforts of the *Force Navale Congolaise*, the mighty *Makasi* Air Force, and the 5 Commando mercenary army."⁹⁷⁰

As stated in the introduction to this study, our main objective has been to demonstrate how these forces and those of the *Armée Nationale Congolaise* came to be combined, and shaped into an effective fighting force. What we will show in the course of the next chapters is that when a new threat was to appear in the form of rebel mercenaries, the CIA's covert forces were to be used as a tool to safeguard the internal security of the Congo. That they did so adds weight to the argument that we will develop in the conclusion to this study: mercenary and/or auxiliary forces do not necessarily mean enemy forces. They can be used to support national forces, and can act out of respect for an ideology.

6.6. America's Man in the Congo: Mobutu

While the Fizi-Baraka axis was brought under the control of governmental forces and the CIA's navy, in Léopoldville a fierce political battle was taking place between President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe. In March 1965, general elections were held in respect of a new constitution promulgated on 1 August 1964. On

⁹⁷⁰ Hawes and Koenig, *op.cit.*, 115.

offer in these elections were 167 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The political manoeuvrings which had characterised previous elections in the Congo would manifest themselves soon after the elections had begun. That this was the case was a cause of concern for the CIA's Frank Carlucci,⁹⁷¹ a veteran of the agency's programme in the Congo. His concerns surrounded the possibility of Kasa-Vubu appointing a new prime minister. Jealous of Tshombe's widespread popularity, any split instigated by Kasa-Vubu was seen as "undermining the pacification campaign" currently taking place. Worse still, distancing Tshombe from central government power raised the spectre of a renewed Katanga secession, and a return to the chaos of the post-independence period.⁹⁷²

Taking advantage of this widespread popular support, a coalition of political groups was merged into a political party led by Tshombe. Created on 20 February and called the Congolese National Convention, or *Convention Nationale Congolaise* (CONACO), Tshombe's intention was to form a nationally-based political party represented by leaders of the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT). In the elections, CONACO won 122 of the 167 available. This represented 73 percent of the votes. These results being made public, it was not long before other candidates started to contest them and asked the Court of Appeals to intervene. The results in six districts were taken into consideration by the court, and declaring the results to be null and void, voters were asked to return to the polling stations in these areas in August 1965.

In September 1965, the Congolese parliament opened its doors to the newly elected members. Its first job was to verify member's eligibility and to set up committees. In the voting that followed, CONACO was given the presidency and vice-presidency of the Lower House while the Upper House was awarded to opposition parties. As the CIA had

⁹⁷¹ Frank Carlucci became Political Officer at the US Embassy in Léopoldville in 1960.

⁹⁷² "Telegram from the Dept. of State to the Embassy in the Congo", 12 April, 1965, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 THE CONGO.

feared, Kasa-Vubu then appointed Evariste Kimba of the BALUBAKAT as Prime Minister. This appointment was opposed by the Lower House and the new government was forced to resign. With Kimba's reappointment on 15 November, renewed constitutional deadlock of the type witnessed in September 1960 between Kasa-Vubu and Patrice Lumumba brought around a similar result: on 24 November 1965, Mobutu organised a *coup d'état*, removed Kasa-Vubu and Kimba, and suspended the activities of all political parties.⁹⁷³ One thing that differentiates the coups of 1960 and of 1965 is that this time Mobutu declared himself president.

Although the CIA's role in this political *imbroglio* has been played down by Larry Devlin⁹⁷⁴ State Department archives indicate that, as in September 1960, Devlin had close contact with Mobutu from the 19 November onwards.⁹⁷⁵ This should come as no surprise as Devlin had served as Mobutu's unofficial advisor five years previously, and was considered as a friend of the Congo's new president. Beforehand, on 19 November, possible American involvement in the political plotting that took place some days before the overthrow can be seen through a meeting over lunch between high-ranking US military officers and counterparts of the ANC⁹⁷⁶ and, on 23 November, in a CIA memorandum to the 303 Committee it was recommended that Mobutu be given \$100,000 to be used to secure the loyalty of his fellow plotters. One day after the coup d'état, and despite Mobutu already having become president, this recommendation was approved as the 303 Committee deemed that the overthrow "did not alter the need for the program".⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷³ Emizet François Kisangani, *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, (New York: Rowmand & Littelfield), 166.

⁹⁷⁴ Devlin stated that he first learned of the *coup d'état* through the radio on 25 November, 1965. See, Devlin, *op.cit.* 234.

⁹⁷⁵ "Telegram from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency", FRUS, Volume XXIII, 19 November, 1965, Document 446.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁷ "Memorandum for the 303 Committee", FRUS, Volume XXIII, 23 November, 1965, Document 450.

Although relations between Mobutu and US Ambassador McMurtrie Godley became strained following an incident where one of Mobutu's mistresses was allegedly insulted by the US diplomat,⁹⁷⁸ the CIA station in Léopoldville believed that Mobutu's *coup* represented the "best possible solution to a problem which placed ODYOKE's⁹⁷⁹ objectives in Africa in serious jeopardy". Mobutu was moderate, "pro-west in his outlook", and was "generally willing to accept advice".⁹⁸⁰ Moreover, as the CIA, the US Embassy, Belgian and Congolese observers had concluded, Mobutu's government represented the last hope for the West in the Congo, and possibly throughout "Black Africa". If Mobutu failed to establish power, the CIA believed that the Congo would then split into smaller political units and that they would be susceptible to Communist bloc influence. For this reason, the CIA recommended that the US federal government do everything possible to ensure the success of the Mobutu regime.⁹⁸¹ Opposition to Mobutu's regime was to come from expected and unexpected quarters.

Over the next two years the Mobutu's position was to improve remarkably with, according to the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, "an approach to government which derived from the African traditions of chieftainship liberally interspersed with ideas of his favourite political theorist, Machiavelli."⁹⁸² Mobutu's strategy to consolidate his power included banning all political activity; publically hanging former prime minister Evariste Kimba and three other ministers on charges that they had conspired against the president; bringing charges of treason against Moïse Tshombe, a move which resulted in this former prime minister seeking exile in Spain. In late 1966, it transpired that Tshombe was once

⁹⁷⁸ Devlin, *op.cit.* 238-240.

⁹⁷⁹ The cryptonym for the US federal government.

⁹⁸⁰ "Dispatch from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency", FRUS, Volume XXIII, 13 December, 1965, Document 459.

⁹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸² "Mobutu and the Congo", *Special Report: Weekly Review*, Directorate of Intelligence, 23 June, 1967, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000680536.pdf, accessed 1 September, 2017, 1.

again making plans to depose Mobutu. The *New York Times* of 15 November, 1966 reported on a campaign to recruit South African mercenaries on Tshombe's behalf, and told of 600 Katanganese soldiers commanded by "Frenchie" Delamichel who were preparing to invade the Congo in January 1967.⁹⁸³ To counter any further threat from Katanga Mobutu replaced Godefroid Munongo with a military officer and, in March 1967, Tshombe was sentenced to death *in absentia*.⁹⁸⁴

Having eliminated potential political threats to his position, the next part of Mobutu's strategy consisted in disposing of provincial political power. This was carried out through a new constitution which was approved by 97.8 percent of voters in June 1967.⁹⁸⁵ The new constitution put an end to the limit on the number of years a president could serve. As far as relations with his African neighbours were concerned, Mobutu made a considerable effort to undo the damage done by Tshombe in this area through the latter's recruitment of South African mercenaries. With Nkrumah's influence over African politics eliminated through the military overthrow of the Ghanaian leader in February 1966, and because establishing and maintaining good relations with countries which had supported rebellions was in Mobutu's interest, the Congolese president found himself assuming the role of inter-African statesman. As a mediator for African problems, Mobutu offered his help in Nigeria where the secessionist claims of Biafra resembled the Katangan secession; participated in tripartite talks in 1967 involving President Kayibanda of Rwanda and President Micombero of Burundi when tensions broke out between the two. Mobutu's increasing role in African affairs even prompted him to attempt to move the seat of the

⁹⁸³ "Tshombe Linked to Troop Hiring in South Africa", *New York Times*, 15 November, 1966.

⁹⁸⁴ On 30 June 1967, Tshombe was kidnapped and delivered into the hands of the Algerian government. His death sentence was never carried out and Tshombe died (allegedly of a stroke on June 29, 1969. For more information on Tshombe's kidnap see, Burkard Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg, *Abduction and Death of Moïse Tshombe*, (World View Publications, 2001).

⁹⁸⁵ Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich (eds), *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 291.

OAU from Addis Ababa to Kinshasa. Other moves intended to demonstrate Mobutu's commitment to Africanism included the 'Congolisation' of place names such as changing the name of the Congolese capital in 1966. This was formalised in the N'Sele Manifesto issued on 20 May, 1967; a forerunner to the June 1967 constitution whose aim was to put a stop to the political infighting that had led to the secessions of Katanga and South Kasai in 1961. This manifesto also called for "positive neutralism" in world affairs, economic independence for the Congo, and the promotion of social and economic development for the Congolese people.⁹⁸⁶ More than anything, what Mobutu termed as a "return to authenticity" was an attempt at creating a Congolese national identity which, in theory, was unique to Africans. This idea which transmuted into 'Mobutuism' cemented Mobutu's place as the so-called "Father of the Nation". These philanthropist ideals were seemingly limited to himself, however, as over the years of his presidency Mobutu amassed a fortune estimated by French newspaper *Libération* to have amounted to some 81 billion francs in 1997.⁹⁸⁷

While Mobutu's relations with the United States remained more than cordial, and the US continued to provide assistance to Mobutu in his effort to quell potential threats to his presidency, those with Belgium became increasingly strained as Belgian economic interests in Katanga continued to dominate the Congolese economy. In a relationship described by Belgian scholar Jean-Claude Willame as 'cyclothymic',⁹⁸⁸ although Mobutu recognised the need to maintain Belgian technicians and, therefore, made concessions to Belgian companies, he also believed that companies such as the UMHK had the intention of cheating and stealing from the Congo.⁹⁸⁹ Despite its having a globally positive view of

⁹⁸⁶ Kisangani, *op.cit.*, 480.

⁹⁸⁷ "Fortune de Mobutu: les banques suisses trouvent 20,5 millions", *Libération*, 4 juin, 1997.

⁹⁸⁸ Vanthemsche, *op.cit.* 219.

⁹⁸⁹ "Mobutu and the Congo", *op.cit.* 6.

Mobutu as president, this mixture of euphoric and depressive episodes in Congo-Belgian relations lead to the CIA concluding that Mobutu had done little to alleviate the Congo's chronic woes and that the country, as always, was only "one step away from anarchy".⁹⁹⁰ It also concluded that continued Belgian assistance was vital to the functioning of the economy, but that Mobutu was conducting a "clumsy vendetta" against the Belgians in the name of independence. If Mobutu's "impulsive" and "rash" actions led to Belgian withdrawal altogether or drastically reduced it, Mobutu would then turn to the United States and other sources for aid. The result of this would be a further weakening of the Congo's "rickety" political structure.⁹⁹¹

On 7 June, 1966 Mobutu issued the Bakajika Law by which the Congo "retakes the full and free disposition of all land, forest and mining rights conceded or granted prior to June 30, 1960." The purpose of the law was not to cancel the rights of those owning concessions, but to give the Congolese government the opportunity to review these rights and either to reaffirm them, modify them, or nationalise them.⁹⁹² Beneath this symbolism of Congolese national empowerment lay the question of UMHK's mineral concessions in Katanga. This was an issue which had had direct repercussions in the month following Congolese independence, and an issue which had led to white mercenaries defending western interests. In this respect, the events that followed in 1966-1967 were frighteningly similar.

⁹⁹⁰ Special Memorandum No. 12-66, "Implications of the Latest Congo Crisis", *CIA Office of National Estimates*, 4 August, 1966, LBJ Library, Africa, Congo, Box 85.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹² Jeswald W. Salacuse, "The National Land Law System of Zaire", A Report to the University of Wisconsin in Land Tenure Center and USAID/Kinshasa, May 1985, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAT376.pdf, accessed 2 September 2017.

6.7. The End of the Crisis: The *Makasi* and the Mercenary Revolt

For Jean Schramme, the arrival of Mobutu marked a strange turnaround: those who were once his military leaders had become his political leaders. This was not just the case for Mobutu himself, but also for the ANC's General Mulamba who had been appointed Prime Minister. To Schramme's surprise, the leader of the Lumumbist revolution Antoine Gizenga had even been made a senator. Despite his reservations and his lack of reassurance by Mobutu's presence, Schramme was a soldier and had to follow orders.⁹⁹³ As the self-appointed governor of an area around Yumbi in the Bandundu Province Schramme had created a State within a State and had banned all political activities from taking place within it. The mercenary leader's circumstances were soon to change. In May 1966, Schramme was drawn out of what he described as a vegetative state to clear the roads between Lubutu and the newly named Kisangani (Stanleyville) and prepare the way for business between the Kivu region and Katanga to reopen. This task accomplished without opposition, 10 Commando marched into Kisangani and were welcomed, as in November 1964, as heroes.

In other parts of the Congo such as Katanga, relations between Katangans and other Congolese were as bitter as they had ever been. Resentment had increased when Katanganese armed forces were integrated into the ANC. The spearhead of Katanga's forces, the Baka Regiment, a unit of 2,000 men, was put under the command of Colonel Tshipola. He had taken part in fighting against anti-Katangan forces some four years earlier and had taken refuge with Schramme in Angola. Like Schramme, Tshipola returned to the Congo in 1964 after Tshombe's appointment as prime minister, and also like Schramme, remained a fervent supporter of autonomy for Katanga. The regiment was made up of four units of commandos led by a Katanganese officer. In the absence of

⁹⁹³ Schramme, *op.cit.* 222-223.

MISTEBEL officers who were being gradually withdrawn from combat zones, mercenaries filled the role of second-in-command and the role of 'operational commanders'. 11 Commando was led by Belgian Major Wauthier; 12 Commando by Frenchman Lieutenant Gouault; 13 Commando by another Frenchman, Captain Bruny while 14 Commando was led by Germany's Commandant Wilhem. Each unit consisted of twenty to thirty European mercenaries. The Baka Regiment was not the only military presence stationed in the Orientale Province: Bob Denard's 6 Commando was also stationed around Kisangani and was comprised of *1er Choc* led by Belgian Major 'Bob' Noddyn. A second unit, *2e Choc*, was led by Spaniard Major Carlos de Velasco. This unit's role was to secure areas along the border with the Central African Republic. Finally, the region's security was assured by a battalion of the ANC led by officers of MISTEBEL. Until the end of 1965, overall command of these forces had been given to General Mulamba.

At the end of 1965 and with Mobutu's overthrow of Kasa-Vubu, certain changes were made in the structure of the overall command of the ANC to which these units of foreign soldiers were attached. With General Mulamba now being appointed Prime Minister, command of the ANC was given to Colonel Joseph Damien Tshatshi. As Schramme states the new commander was hated by everyone. This was especially the case for Katangan forces against whom Tshatshi had taken a "certain number of disciplinary measures enforced by a company of the Congo's Military Police."⁹⁹⁴ On top of this, there were issues concerning back pay. In what was already a tense situation between the Katangans and the ANC, on 22 July 1966 11 Commando's Commander Major Wauthier was shot and killed by accident by one of his own officers. The next morning, with the mercenaries being blamed for the death and threatened with being arrested, the *New York*

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid. 227.

Times reported that violent disturbances had broken out between the two forces.⁹⁹⁵ This fighting spread to the airport and Juan Perón as well as Jorge Navarro of the *Makasi* became unwittingly involved. While carrying out routine reconnaissance in the area, they had landed at Kisangani unaware that the airport was in the hands of the mercenaries. Fortunately for these two pilots, the mercenaries recognised that the Cuban Exiles were not the enemy and they were taken to the Victoria Hotel where they remained for nearly a week.⁹⁹⁶

As well as fighting in Kisangani which had involved heavy weapons such as cannons and mortars, and which had left six dead among Katangan forces, 150 kilometres away on the road to Bafwesende, 12 Commando had also turned their weapons against the ANC. This unit was joined by 14 Commando based in Watsa on the border with Sudan with Major Wilhem's troops who were involved in a major confrontation with the ANC at Isiro (Paulis) on their way to Kisangani. Wilhem was killed in the fighting. With Mulamba attempting to negotiate with the rebellious forces on 24 July and a ceasefire having been agreed, Schramme himself was asked to go to Kisangani in order to continue negotiations. After two months' stalemate, the Katangans were finally rewarded with the promise of an amnesty and that they would receive their back pay. The different units of Katangan forces would be integrated into the ANC at the end of 1966. In an effort to promote national reconciliation, former Simba rebels were also given the chance to join the ranks of Mobutu's army.

⁹⁹⁵ "Congo Says Troops Fight Mercenaries", *New York Times*, 24 July, 1966.

⁹⁹⁶ Villafaña, *op.cit.* 181.

As far as Mobutu's efforts to consolidate the Congo's economy were concerned, members of Mobutu's inner-circle of advisors, the Binza Group⁹⁹⁷ devised and implemented the Bakajika Law. This was at a time when tensions between the Congolese government and UMHK had raised the price of its copper exports without consulting the Congo government. Mobutu castigated UMHK's decision by declaring that the mining company could not act as a State within a State and promptly raised export taxes. He also placed restrictions on the amount of minerals UMHK could export, and ordered 10 percent of its minerals to be delivered to the state as a strategic reserve.⁹⁹⁸

As noted above, the Bakajika Law required all companies having been granted concessions by the Congolese government to comply with review regulations by 1 January, 1967. As this deadline neared, and with UMHK's owners not willing to relinquish full control of the mining company, the value of some 150,000 tons of already exported copper proved to be a stumbling block. For UMHK, these minerals with a value of \$150 million would be used to finance the new Union Minière-Belgium, a move which was unacceptable to the Congolese. On 8 December, the Congo government ceased negotiations and announced that UMHK would have to move its headquarters to Kinshasa. This move was refused by UMHK. As confrontation between the mining giant and the Congolese government continued, Mobutu's next move was to temporarily freeze mineral exports, seize UMHK's bank accounts and appoint a board of Congolese officials to run the company.⁹⁹⁹ Finally, with UMHK also refusing to make a contribution to the government stockpile, violating Congolese tax, foreign exchange, and exports laws, the Congolese

⁹⁹⁷ The Binza Group took its name from a district of Kinshasa. This was a district populated by Congo's rich and influential. It included people such as Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, Minister of the Interior Victor Nendaka, Finance Minister Litho Maboti, and future Prime Minister Bernadin Mungul Diaka.

⁹⁹⁸ Crawford Young, and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 291.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid.

government nationalised the country's copper industry, and created the *Société Générale Congolaise de Minerais*, also known as GECOMIN.¹⁰⁰⁰

As the CIA pointed out in its *Weekly Review* of 23 June, 1967, Mobutu had "demonstrated little ability to handle the mechanics of economics".¹⁰⁰¹ Despite filling key positions in his government with university graduates, GECOMIN quickly ran into trouble through a lack of Congolese technical expertise. Problems for GECOMIN increased when UMHK threatened to sue any company that traded Congolese copper,¹⁰⁰² and with reserves of copper in the Congo diminishing fast, Mobutu's regime soon found itself in troubled financial waters. Supply and transport problems hampered economic growth, food shortages and high prices all led to the CIA concluding that short-term prospects for the Mobutu government were "not especially good".¹⁰⁰³ While this understatement suggests hesitancy on the part of the CIA to criticise its own man in the Congo, the spectre of Tshombe which floated over relations within Mobutu's armed forces meant that by mid-1967 the possible return of the former Prime Minister was once more on the table. Watching events unfold in the Congo, in exile in Madrid Tshombe believed that he alone was capable of reconciling the different political factions, of bringing together tribal chiefs and reestablishing confidence between blacks and whites.¹⁰⁰⁴

In the Congo, in March 1967, Jeremy Puren of the former Katangan Air Force arrived at Jean Schramme's plantation at Yumbi. Discussing the current situation in the Congo, and with Schramme indicating that if the whites left the country it would die, Tshombe's confidant Puren offered his help through the provision of 300 South African

¹⁰⁰⁰ David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 167.

¹⁰⁰¹ "Mobutu and the Congo", *op.cit.* 7.

¹⁰⁰² Gibbs, *op.cit.* 167.

¹⁰⁰³ "Mobutu and the Congo", *op.cit.* 7.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Schramme, *op.cit.*, 260.

paracommandos, and fifty fighter-bombers.¹⁰⁰⁵ Towards the end of April, Schramme was also visited by Bob Denard. Despite Schramme's dislike of Denard, a dislike engendered by the latter's close association with Mobutu these mercenary leaders were to spend two to three days together. Denard finally revealed that the objective of his visit was to tell Schramme of Mobutu's intention to destroy the *Bataillon Léopard* by any means. The president had no doubt heard of Schramme's association with Tshombe. Enquiring of Denard whether he too was against Schramme's 10 Commando, reassurance came with the guarantee that Denard would always choose to fight with him. For the Frenchman, Europeans had to work hand-in-hand. With their differences resolved, Denard was to pay Schramme another visit on 22 June, 1967. During this meeting Schramme was to learn that Mobutu was on the verge of attacking his forces. Fortunately for Schramme, he was also to learn that Major Robert Noddyn, Belgian Major Couck, and Denard all possessed companies of white and black troops in different parts of northern and eastern Congo ready to counter-attack. Schramme then laid out his battle plan. Using Yumbi as a base, this plan involved launching three simultaneous attacks on Kisangani, Bakuvu, and Kindu. Taking control of these three objectives, Denard's troops would then arrive to provide support. With Kisangani, Bakuvu, and Kindu under control, the next step would be to descend into Katanga before moving onto the capital, Kinshasa.¹⁰⁰⁶

In spite of doubts raised by Denard on the feasibility of an attack on Kisangani (a battalion of ANC arriving to honour the defunct Colonel Tshatshi the same day) the mercenary revolt started at 6 a.m. on 5 July, 1967. Fired by the thought of their families massacred by Mulelists following their retreat into Angola in early 1964,¹⁰⁰⁷ the key to Schramme's attack was speed and surprise. At first results were positive for Schramme's

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid. 263.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Schramme, *op.cit.*, 270-276.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

men. At Camp Ketele where the ANC battalion was based, up to 900 men were killed by machine-gun fire, grenades and rifles. No prisoners were taken. By 6.30 a.m., Kisangani had been taken, Denard's troops were due to arrive and, in Bakuvu, another group of mercenaries was due to start its phase of the operation.

It was at 8 a.m. that circumstances started to turn against Schramme. Due to leave Kisangani and return to Yumbi at midday, his plans were disrupted by the failure of Denard's 1,600 troops to turn up. They were never to arrive. At 10.30, ANC paratroopers were dropped. They were quickly overcome by Schramme's forces leaving scores of dead on the landing zone. Further attacks on Schramme's positions were launched by another battalion of ANC based at the police camp in Kisangani. Now in command of the left bank of the River Congo, and with the ANC nearly a mile away on the right bank, Schramme's forces were joined by an attack aircraft piloted by a Belgian resident of the city. Named Peppone, this pilot proceeded to attack ANC positions near reserves of two million litres of petrol. These were destroyed and in the explosion that followed ANC soldiers in the vicinity were burnt alive. Perhaps as many as 300 ANC were then to suffer a similar fate when tankers carrying petrol were destroyed by 10 Commando at a nearby garage.

Although wounded in the leg, at the end of the first day of the revolt Schramme found himself in a relatively strong position: his troops had captured more weapons than they could handle; four DC3's and two T-28 attack planes had also been captured; hundreds of ANC had been killed with the loss of only a few men. The injured included Denard who had received a head wound.¹⁰⁰⁸

In Bakavu, and in Kindu, on the other hand, the day had been a catastrophe. Amidst heavy fighting, wrote the *Chicago Tribune*, two hundred mercenaries were said to have

¹⁰⁰⁸ Schramme, *op.cit.* 285-293.

been encircled by three battalions of the ANC with a fourth making its way from Uvira.¹⁰⁰⁹ In Kindu, Schramme's forces were also encircled by Mobutu's troops and found themselves in a seemingly hopeless position. Within days the mercenaries were forced to leave suffering several casualties. In the face of the news of these defeats, and with two out of three strategic objectives having not been met, by the 12 July, 1967 the mercenary revolt was almost over. With the injured including Denard evacuated to Salisbury (Harare), Rhodesia by a captured *Makasi* pilot¹⁰¹⁰ Schramme's forces then made their way out of Kisangani and headed for Wanie Rukula to the south. The mercenary forces were then to join others in Bakuvu where they remained for three months.

While Schramme busied himself with preparing the next stage in his revolt, in Kinshasa Mobutu wasted no time in seizing the mercenary attacks as a means to promote his own brand of nationalism and African unity. Appealing for help from other African nations to repel "foreign aggression" from "imperialists with a Machiavellian plan", regular radio bulletins announced stringent security measures: all the borders with the DRC were to be closed; nobody, including foreigners was to be allowed to leave the country; flights out of the DRC were cancelled as were flights into the country; firearms permits for foreigners were cancelled; and a dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed. Anyone not respecting the curfew risked six months in prison and expulsion from the Congo.¹⁰¹¹

Whereas Moïse Tshombe's kidnapping in June 1967 by persons unknown had been the source of much speculation in CIA circles, Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko's message to new US Ambassador in the Congo Robert McBride of 6 July had now reached the attention of President Johnson. Warning of a situation that could "compromise not only the

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Hear Congo Troops Gain on Mercenaries", *Chicago Tribune*, 7 July, 1967.

¹⁰¹⁰ Denard was transported to Harare by Cuban Exile pilot Francisco 'Panchito' Alvarez. His aircraft having been captured, he was forced at gunpoint to fly out wounded mercenaries and their families. See, Villafaña, *op.cit.* 183.

¹⁰¹¹ "Congo's Borders Shut by Mobutu; Invasion Charged", *New York Times*, 6 July, 1967.

tranquility (sic) of the Congo, but also peace in all Central Africa", as the people of the US were the "champions of international solidarity", Bomboko asked McBride to make available the "necessary men and material to permit us to rid ourselves once and for all of this group of brigands".¹⁰¹² The same day, Mobutu had also requested that three C-130's be made available by the US in order to launch a counter-offensive against attacks backed, in his view, by "Belgian financial interests".¹⁰¹³

On the subject of these Belgian financial interests Mobutu had long suspected that UMHK was behind the plot to bring Moïse Tshombe back to the Congo with the objective of overthrowing the current regime. For this reason, as stated earlier, Tshombe had been sentenced to death for treason in his absence and now found himself languishing in an Algerian prison. Mobutu's recent disputes with the mining giant did nothing to dispel his suspicions. Although there is no definitive proof that UMHK was behind the revolt - Schramme making no indication of any financial motivation- a number of factors indicate that there was, indeed, a degree of UMHK involvement. UMHK had long-standing ties to Tshombe and had provided financial backing for the 1960 secession; UMHK received political backing from Tshombe at the Round Table Conference; UMHK's ties with Belgium had led to the recruitment of mercenaries; many mercenaries remained loyal to Tshombe and had returned to the Congo to assist in the fight against the Simba. Finally, while Tshombe was in prison American conservative activists had formed the Tshombe Emergency Committee in 1967. This group included supporters of the former Congolese Prime Minister such as anti-communist and *laissez-faire* supporter William Buckley; long-time Tshombe supporter and Belgian, Michel Struelens; publisher of the conservative *National Review*, William Rusher; African-American and anti-communist activist, Max

¹⁰¹² "Telegram from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas", Washington, 6 July, 1967, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 504.

¹⁰¹³ "Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State", Kinshasa, 6 July, 1967, FRUS, Volume XXIII, Document 505.

Yergan; and conservative activist and anti-communist, Marvin Liebman. As David Gibbs points out, Tshombe's links to UMHK were underlined by this group's support for him during the early 1960's.¹⁰¹⁴

Whether or not UMHK financed the revolt, it is clear that Mobutu's nationalisation of the company was an attempt to eliminate all forms of economic and political threat to his regime. Once this had been achieved, he hoped that the US would help him militarily speaking to finish the job. Ironically, in view of its previous cooperation with mercenary outfits such as Mike Hoare's 5 Commando, the *Makasi* were once more to play a leading role in putting down any threat to the Congo's internal security. Among pilots who were to carry out attacks on Bakuvu was Frederico Flaquer. This Cuban Exile had been recruited in 1966 after public interest in the CIA's role in the Congo had increased after the publication of articles in the *New York Times*. One of these articles was entitled "How CIA put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo".¹⁰¹⁵ Later, in the 1980s, he would be recruited to for Jonas Savimba's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in its fight against Agostinho Neto's People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Cuban and Soviet-backed regime which defeated Portuguese and South African objectives in Central Africa.¹⁰¹⁶

Although Flaquer has expressed his reservations about being ordered to attack mercenary positions in Bakuvu, and with the US having expressed the wish to gradually withdraw from the Congo, Flaquer and eleven other Exile pilots were to continue their presence in the Congo. This was a presence which finally led to Schramme crossing the border into Rwanda, and his forces surrendering their weapons on 5 November, 1967. With that event our study of the rôle of non-state armed actors comes to an end.

¹⁰¹⁴ Gibbs, *op.cit*, 170.

¹⁰¹⁵ *New York Times*, 26 April, 1966, *op.cit*.

¹⁰¹⁶ Interview with Frederico Flaquer, Miami, 24 October, 2015.

CONCLUSION

The first part of this study consisted in explaining what brought the US to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Chapter One we saw that decolonisation had presented many challenges to US foreign policy in respect to the Cold War and, in particular, that the decolonisation of the Congo resulted in the creation of a context that was perceived as a threat to US economic and strategic interests in Central and Southern Africa.

In Chapter Two, we increased our knowledge of what was termed the Congo Crisis. We saw that the US was unfriendly to the appointment of Patrice Lumumba and how it was implicated in his removal from power. This led us to a discussion of increased Soviet political and military intervention which in turn meant that the crisis had become a theatre of the Cold War. In addition, our examination of the secession of Katanga and its support from state and non-state armed actors helped us to gain a better understanding of the wider international aspect of the crisis.

It was within this wider international context that we placed our understanding of the motivations that lie behind someone becoming a mercenary. Understanding the non-patriotic motives of non-state armed actors is, we argue, crucial to the study of the mercenary *métier*. Equally crucial is the context within their deployment occurs. As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, the US bolstering of the Congolese government by providing military support in the form of training and weapons was done in the interest of creating a stable environment at a time when Congolese national armed forces were proving themselves to be incapable of securing peace. Seen within a wider African context, the instability that intervention was intended to resolve was partly due to the highly complex rivalries between different tribes in the Congo. We would therefore argue that the

mercenary activities we have been studying here are not merely a particular case, but contribute to a more general understanding of the complexities of nation-building in the post-colonial world.

Continuing with the theme of nation-building in post-colonial Africa in Chapter Three, we saw that decolonisation and the subsequent creation of a new political structure did not benefit large parts of the Congolese population. Faced with the reality that decolonisation was not to bring about the changes they had hoped for, those who were dissatisfied with the Congolese government went on to lead a succession of communist-inspired rebellions. Part One ended with the spread of rebellion throughout most of the Congo and with a potentially life-threatening situation developing in Stanleyville. The very complexity of these rebellions is in itself a reflection of the complex dynamics of the Cold War in Africa.

The objective of Part Two was to examine the ways in which the United States sought to put an end to the Congo Crisis. Coming to the conclusion that formal assistance was not working because the ANC was not in a position to defeat rebellion by itself, the United States government decided to provide more substantial covert military assistance. The decision to use covert forces came all the readily in the context of the development of the US Central Intelligence Agency and, more particularly, the operations it had carried out in different parts of the world, especially Central America. We saw how the CIA's covert war apparatus had been constructed over the years; how a network of clandestine contacts, proprietary companies, and weapons suppliers fitted into this apparatus; and how this apparatus was used to great effect in Guatemala to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz. The discussion of operations known as PBSUCCESS was an important stage in making the link between CIA covert activities in Central America and those carried out in Central Africa. We saw how the US was able to strengthen its position in Central America by providing

political and financial support to friendly regimes and, at the same time it was able to gain access to geographical areas from which it could launch future covert operations against unfriendly regimes such as the one led by Fidel Castro in Cuba, with friendly countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras providing training bases for the CIA's covert forces.

In addition to our shedding light on the development of the military side of CIA covert operations, an overview of the Cuban revolution and the Bay of Pigs invasion provided us with the means of consolidating the link between Central America and Central Africa. Firstly, we were able to see how operations in Guatemala related to attacks carried out by Cuban Exiles on industrial installations in Cuba and, secondly, we saw how the CIA's support for these operations would result in the creation of a large reserve of covert forces. This was achieved through an examination of the CIA's relations with the Miami's Cuban Exile community. We then saw how this reserve was used to launch an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The next phase in meeting what was the main objective of this study came through a demonstration which consisted in showing how Cuban Exiles came to be integrated into US regular military forces. Though one reason for the creation of a Cuban Volunteer Force was to give exiles the opportunity to fight communism in other parts of the world, almost inadvertently Kennedy created a third-nation military force that could be used in covert operations to provide the notion of plausible deniability. We then saw how the US put itself in a position to deny that it was providing military assistance to the Congolese government thus averting a worsening of Cold War tensions, despite the arrival of Cuban Exile pilots in the Congo in December 1962 falling within the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In Chapter Five we again saw how the US was able to deny that it was undertaking military action against unfriendly forces in the Congo. While this was done by showing why more Cuban Exiles volunteered for service as pilots in the Congo, this part also

enabled us to continue our discussion on the nature of the mercenary by examining the recruitment and activities of 5 Commando, and the pilots known collectively as the *Makasi*. In order to meet the objective of underlining the importance of the *Makasi* to overall military operations, we then showed how this force was used to provide air cover for ground forces marching on Stanleyville. This contributed not only to our understanding of how non-state armed actors can be used in the context of war, but also helped us to understand how the use of different groups changed the dynamics of the Cold War. Indeed, by eliminating the rebel stronghold in Stanleyville, the US virtually closed the door on all ambitions to overthrow a government friendly to US interests.

In Chapter Six, the creation of the Congolese Naval Force and its cooperation with and opposition to other non-state armed actors opened up new perspectives on the relationship between state and non-state armed actors. Spurred on by the presence of Che Guevara, many of the Cuban Exiles who were implicated in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion would make reappearance on Lake Tanganyika. On the one hand, the Cuban naval force made an essential contribution to efforts to control the supply of military equipment and men coming across Lake Tanganyika from Tanzania, and participated in efforts to finish what remained of rebel forces in eastern Congo; while on the other, *Makasi* pilots played an important role in defeating the so-called mercenary revolt of 1967. This chapter demonstrated, once again, how non-state armed actors can be used to the benefit of state armed actors and to the state itself.

Whereas it is hoped that this study has made a contribution to our understanding of the military dynamics of Congo Crisis and of the Cold War, it must be admitted that the intervention of non-state armed actors acting in the interests of the Congolese state raises a sensitive and controversial question, one that we touched upon in the introduction. To what extent are African state armies capable of ensuring their own national security? On this

point, we will remind ourselves that the ANC was not considered fit for the purpose and that Guevara's plans for armed revolution in Africa failed because of the military ineptitude of the forces he hoped to use.

Although this thesis has provided other examples of military ineptitude, and also provided indications of why this is so, we believe that our understanding of the military aspects of the Congo Crisis would be enriched by further studies which focus purely on this matter. Such studies run the risk of impinging upon racial and cultural sensitivities, but such a risk is worth taking in light of the fact that a number of Congolese political issues remained unresolved at the end of the Congo Crisis. This failure to resolve key issues resulted in prolonged military confrontation which some sources estimate to be upwards of 5.2 million for the Second Congo War alone.¹⁰¹⁷

Whether we are dealing with the massacre of civilians at Bakwanga by the ANC in 1960 or the rape of 48 women *per hour* by Congolese forces in 2006,¹⁰¹⁸ the issue at stake is the national training, discipline and control of its own armed forces. Such an important issue could be considered to require examination in terms that go beyond national borders.

In addition to this issue of national security, the growth in militant Islamism and the emergence of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), or al-Shabaab continues to point up the inability of African national armies to deal with threats of a more international nature. In order to assist African governments to overcome this type of threat leaders such as Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba have made calls

¹⁰¹⁷ B. Coghlan, R.J. Brennan, P. Ngoy, et al., "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: a Nationwide survey", *Lancet*, No. 367, January 2006.

¹⁰¹⁸ "Rape is being used to terrorise the population, says DRC gynaecologist", *Guardian*, 22 May 2015.

for western nations to intervene.¹⁰¹⁹ This has resulted in US and French Special forces being used to fight terrorism in Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon.

Although much larger international forces such as UN peacekeepers could be considered as an option, it does not appear that this would provide any radical solution to Africa's security problems. In fact, according to Dionne Searcey writing for the *New York Times*, with African nations currently contributing nearly half of UN forces committed to peacekeeping operations, their presence was considered as a factor which worsened the levels of abuse against local populations. In the Central African Republic, cases of rape and sexual exploitation have been reported by the charity Human Rights Watch.¹⁰²⁰

Is there no solution to the violence of state armed forces? As we have seen, the Congo Crisis was brought to an end precisely through the use of regulated, vetted, and disciplined forces. Why, then, would it not be feasible to revert to this type of tactic to face the challenges brought on by militant Islamism, and why can we not consider integrating privately or publically-funded groups of former soldiers into second-nation armies?

This type of force already exists, of course, in the shape of modern-day PMCs. However, our age-old conceptions of the "mercenary" mean that this type of organisation continues to be the subject of legislative measures to restrict its activities. This seems a pity. Through the banning, and not the regulation, of independent military forces, we are, perhaps, missing an opportunity to exploit skills obtained through years of training and through fighting wars. Stability was brought to the Congo, to Sierra Leone, and is currently addressing the shortfall of trained national personnel in the Middle East. Is not it now the moment to leash, but not unleash, the "whores of war"?

¹⁰¹⁹ David Pilling, "Gabon leader calls for western help to combat terrorist threat", *Financial Times*, 16 May, 2016.

¹⁰²⁰ Dionne Searcey, "UN Peacekeepers Accused of Rape in Central African Republic", *New York Times*, 4 February, 2016.

Although recent studies have suggested that the use of mercenaries or PMCs has become somewhat of a norm in modern-day conflicts in the Middle East, there is still much scope for further research on the question of the use of PMCs in Africa. It is a delicate question: the legacy left by ill-disciplined groups such as those led by Costas Georgiou in Angola, or the use of mercenaries in illegal overthrows has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many of those legislating against the use of private armies. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that as organisations such as ISIS switch their focus from the Middle East on to Africa more research will be necessary in order to address the woes of a continent which seems to be constantly at war and which to all intents and purposes lacks the military manpower and expertise needed to ward off new types of threat. It might, indeed, be suggested that African armies themselves have been the threat, rather than the solution.

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ANNEX 1. Timeline of Events

The Democratic Republic of the Congo pre-independence

1870s: King Léopold II of Belgium provides a private venture to colonise the region known as Kongo.

1874-1877: British explorer Henry Morton Stanley explores the Congo River.

1879-1887: Stanley is commissioned by Léopold II to establish trading posts and to establish the King's authority in the Congo basin.

1884-1885: The Berlin Conference sees Léopold's authority over the Congo basin recognised.

1885: Léopold establishes the Congo Free State.

1891: The Belgians begin to colonise Katanga.

1902: Joseph Conrad's *The Heart of Darkness* throws light on the brutality of Léopold's regime.

1908: Following mass-killings and other atrocities, the Congo is annexed by the Belgian State. This creates the Belgian Congo.

1940s: The emergence of labour strikes in the Belgian Congo see Belgian authority contested. This leads to a loosening of labour laws on the question of forced labour.

1950s: The emergence of Congolese national parties such as ABAKO and MNC.

1955: Van Bilsen publishes his thirty-year plan for the independence of the Belgian Congo.

1959: Riots against Belgian authority take place in Léopoldville (Kinshasa).

1959: Talks are held in Belgium at the Round Table Conference to discuss the decolonisation of the Belgian Congo.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo post-independence

June 1960: The Democratic Republic of the Congo gains its independence.

July 1960: A mutiny by Congolese soldiers against officers of the Force Publique leads to widespread social unrest. A number of Europeans are killed in the rioting.

July 1960: Katanga secedes from the DRC and calls on Belgium for military assistance.

July 1960: The first groups of mercenaries arrive in Katanga.

August 1960: South Kasai secedes from the DRC. Lumumba reacts by appealing to the US, the USSR for help and finally asks for assistance from the UN. Peacekeeping forces arrive soon after.

September 1960: Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba is removed from power by President Joseph Kasa-Vubu who supported by Joseph Désiré Mobutu, the commanding officer of the newly-formed ANC.

December 1960: Antoine Gizenga establishes a breakaway government headquartered in Stanleyville (Kisangani) which vows to continue Lumumba's legacy.

January 1961: Lumumba is assassinated after being brutally beaten.

January 1961: More mercenaries arrive in Katanga. These include Mike Hoare's 4 Commando, and the *Compagnie Internationale* or White Legion.

9 February, 1961: Joseph Ileo is appointed as Prime Minister of the DRC.

2 August, 1961: Cyril Adoula becomes the new Prime Minister of the DRC.

13 September, 1961: UN forces launch Operation Morthor to rid the Congo of mercenaries. The Siege of Jadotville sees Irish peacekeepers captured by Katangan forces.

September 1961: A plane carrying UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld is shot down killing all aboard.

Late 1962: The first group of Cuban Exile pilots arrives in the Congo.

Early 1963: Katangan leader Moïse Tshombe goes into exile. Katanga is reintegrated into the DRC.

Early 1963: The bulk of UN peacekeeping forces and mercenaries leave the Congo.
The Simba Rebellion

July 1963: Pierre Mulele returns from China and starts a popular revolution in the Kwilu region of the DRC.

August-September 1963: The establishment of the *Conseil National de Libération* (CNL).

January 1964: A state of emergency is declared in the Kwilu.

May 1964: Rebel forces led by Gaston Soumialot capture Uvira and Fizi, two towns on the northern banks of Lake Tanganyika.

June 1964: Soumialot's forces take Albertville (Kalemie).

30 June, 1964: Moïse Tshombe returns to the Congo and is appointed Prime Minister.

July 1964: Mercenary units led by Mike Hoare, Jean Schramme, and Bob Denard return to the Congo at Tshombe's request.

Mid-late July 1964: Rebel forces led by Nicolas Olenga capture large portions of areas in the north and the north-west of the DRC.

Early August 1964: Olenga's troops capture Stanleyville (Kisangani). They take US diplomats hostage.

21 August, 1964: the *Makasi* flies their first B-26 combat mission in the Congo.

September 1964: The Fifth Mechanised Brigade divided into Lima I and Lima II under the command of Belgian Colonel Vandewalle begins operations to put down the rebellion. Forces include Hoare's 5 Commando, Schramme's *Bataillon Léopard*, Denard's 6 Commando, the *Makasi*, and the ANC make their way up through the Congo from bases in Katanga.

Early September 1964: *Makasi* commandos led by 'Rip' Robertson arrive in the Congo.

15 September, 1964: Denard's forces and the *Makasi* take Lisala in the north-west.

24 October, 1964: Hoare's forces and the *Makasi* take Bumba in the north-west.

28 October, 1964: Olenga orders the arrest of all Americans and Belgians in Stanleyville.

1 November, 1964: the Stanleyville Column advances northwards to Kindu.

18 November, 1964: Belgian paratroopers arrive in Ascension to prepare for rescue operations.

21 November, 1964: The rescue operations are authorised by Congolese authorities.

22 November, 1964: The *Dragon Force* arrives at Kamina air base.

Stanleyville Rescue Operations, 24-25 November, 1964

05.45: *Makasi* forces attack rebel positions at Stanleyville aeroport.

06.00: Belgian paratroopers are dropped on Stanleyville by US C-130 transport planes.

07.00: The control tower and runways are cleared and secured by Belgian troops.

07.30: Belgian troops make their way into Stanleyville.

07.45: The Simba start to shoot hostages.

By 11.00, Hoare's commandos have reached Stanleyville and start clear up operations. Shortly after, *Makasi* commandos rescue hostages at Kilometre 8.

25 November, 1964: *Dragon Noir* operations free hostages at Isiro.

29 November, 1964: Belgian paratroopers leave for Ascension.

1965 - 1967

January 1965: Operations White Giant and *Violettes Impériales* bring rebel operations to a standstill.

April 1965: Che Guevara arrives in Tanzania.

August 1965: The *Makasi* naval force begins operations on Lake Tanganyika.

November 1965: Guevara's campaign comes to an end.

24 November, 1965: A military takeover sees Mobutu become President of the DRC.

July 1967: The mercenary revolt led by Jean Schramme and Bob Denard sees defeat by ANC troops supported by the *Makasi*.

ANNEX 2. Acronyms used in this study

AARC (Assassination Archives and Research Center). A digital archive collection relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

ABAKO (*Association des Bakongo pour l'unification, la conservation et l'expansion de langue kikongo* / Bakongo Association for the unification, the conservation, and the expansion of the Kikongo language). A Congolese political party founded in 1955 by Joseph Kasa-Vubu.

ACMAF (*Association des Classes Moyennes Africaines* / Association of Middle-Class Africans). An association of Congolese traders and farmers founded in 1954.

ACU (Advisory Committee on Uranium). Also known as the Uranium Committee, this evolved into the S-1 Executive Committee in 1941. The ACU acted as an advisor to President Roosevelt.

ADF (Allied Democratic Forces). A rebel group fighting in Uganda and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

ACCU (Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities). Founded in 1899 to promote and strengthen the mission and character of Catholic higher education.

AEC (Atomic Energy Commission). Created in 1946 as an advisory body under President Truman.

AGD (*Afrikanische Gesellschaft in Deutschland* / African Society in Germany). Organisation founded in the 1870's with the goal of creating interest in Africa.

AID (Agency for International Development). An early version of USAID.

AKTAR (Association of Tshokwe of Katanga and Rhodesia). A tribal association created in the 1950's.

ALMOKAT (*Association des Originaires du Luapala Moero Katanga* / Association of Luapala Moero from Katanga). A tribal association created in the 1950's.

AMAX (American Metal Climax). A US mining company founded in 1887 in New York.

ANC (*Armée Nationale Congolaise* / Congolese National Army). Founded in 1960 after the independence of the Congo.

ANMB (Army and Navy Munitions Board). A board created in 1922 with the goal of coordinating army and navy munitions procurement.

APIC (*Association du personnel indigène de la colonie* / Association of Indigenous People of the Colony). Association created in 1955 by Patrice Lumumba.

APL (*Armée Populaire de Libération* / Peoples' Liberation Army). Created in the Congo in 1963.

APRON (Aerial Port Squadron). A branch of the United States Air Force (USAF) which provides logistical services to military units assigned to ports.

ASSOBAKO (*Association des Bahemba de Kongolo* / Association of the Bahema of Kongolo). A Congolese tribal association created in the 1950's.

ASSOBAKAT (Association des Basonge du Katanga / Association of the Basonge of Katanga). A Congolese tribal association created in the 1950's.

AVG (American Volunteer Group). Also known as the "Flying Tigers", this was a group of pilots sent by President Roosevelt to help Chinese nationalists in 1941.

BAF (Biafran Air Force). An air force made up of foreign pilots created in 1967 whose purpose was to support the secession of the Nigerian region of Biafra.

BALUBAKAT (Association des Baluba de Katanga / Baluba Association of Katanga). A Congolese tribal association created in the 1950's.

BBK (*Association des Batabwa ou Bena Marungu du Katanga* (Association of the Batabwa or Bena Marungu of Katanga). A Congolese tribal association created in the 1950's.

BCK (Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga). A Belgian company set up in 1906 to create a rail network in the Congo.

BKC (Belgian Katanga Company / *Compagnie du Katanga*). A concession company of the Congo Free State.

BOI (Bureau of Investigation). A forerunner to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

BSAC (British South African Company). A British mining company owned by Cecil Rhodes created at the turn of the 20th century.

BSP (Belgian Socialist Party / *Parti Socialiste belge*). A Belgian political party which existed between 1945 and 1978.

CABDA (*Comité d'action et de défense des Belges d'Afrique* / Action Committee for the Defence of African Belgians). A defence group set up in 1960 to protect the interests of Belgians in the Congo.

CARAMAR (Caribbean Aero Marine Corporation). A Central Intelligence Agency shell company.

CAT (Civil Air Transport). A Nationalist Chinese airline created in 1946 by the Central Intelligence Agency. Its role was to assist in covert operations.

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). The US foreign intelligence service created in 1947.

CCCI (*Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie* / Company of the Congo for Business and Industry). A Belgian company set up in 1886 to aid the economic development of the Congo.

CGTG (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala). A Guatemalan workers union.

CEREA (*Centre de Regroupement Africain* / African Regroupment Centre). A Congolese political party created in 1958.

CIDA (Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development). A committee established in 1961 at Punta del Este, Uruguay.

CIG (Central Intelligence Group). A forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency created in 1946.

CINSTRIKE (Commander in Chief, United States Strike Forces).

CNCG (*Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala*). A union of peasant workers formed in Guatemala in 1944.

CNG (Chinese Nationalist Government). Also known as the Kuomintang of China, this party was the main opposition to the Chinese Party of China during the Chinese Civil War.

CNL (*Conseil National de Libération / National Council for Liberation*). A Congolese political party created in 1964 to oppose the official government of the Congo.

CNL-B (Conseil National de Libération-Bocheley). A branch of the CNL.

CNL-G (Conseil National de Libération-Gbenye). A branch of the CNL.

CNRRA (Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). An organisation set up by the government of the Republic of China (ROC) to distribute relief aid from 1945 to 1947.

COI (Office of the Coordination of Intelligence). A forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency set up in 1941.

COMISH (United States Military Mission, Congo). An advisory team created by the US government in 1963 to assist Congolese military authorities.

CONACO (*Convention Nationale Congolaise / Congolese National Convention*). An alliance of Congolese political parties created to participate in elections in the Congo in 1965.

CONAKAT (*Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga / Confederation of Katangan Tribal Associations*). A tribally-based political party created in 1958 by Moïse Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo.

CPC / CCP (Communist Party of China / Chinese Communist Party). A Chinese political party founded in 1921 by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao.

CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). A political party created in 1912 by Vladimir Lenin.

CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council). A group of Cuban Exiles formed in 1961 with CIA assistance to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro.

CSK (Comité Spécial du Katanga / Special Committee of the Katanga). A privately-owned Belgian company set up in 1900 which operated in the Congo Free State.

CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba / Confederation of Cuban Workers). A Cuban union of workers established in 1939.

DCI (Director of Central Intelligence). The head of the CIA from 1946 to 2005. Replaced in 2005 by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as head of the intelligence community, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) as head of the CIA.

DDP (Deputy Director of Plans). An official of the CIA responsible for overseeing clandestine operations. Replaced in 2005 by the Directorate of Operations (DO).

DFEC (Defense, Financial and Economic Committee). A branch of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Republic of the Congo was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 1 August, 1964.

DSE (Democratic Army of Greece). An army created by the Communist Party of Greece during the Greek Civil War, 1946-1949.

ECA (European Cooperation Act). Also known as the Marshall Plan, or Foreign Assistance Act, this provided for the economic redevelopment of postwar Europe.

ERP (European Recovery Programme). Another name for the European Cooperation Act.

FAB (*Force Aérienne Belge* / Belgian Air Force).

FAK (*Force Aérienne Katanganaise* / Katanganese Air Force)

FARDC (*Forces d'Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*). The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

FATAC (*Force Aérienne Tactique Congolaise*). Created in June, 1964, this air force was made up of ex-US military aircraft.

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation).

FETRIKAT (*Fédération des Tribus du Haut-Katanga* / Federation of Tribes of Haut-Katanga). An organisation of tribal groups created in the 1950's.

FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale* / National Liberation Front). An Algerian socialist political party founded in 1954.

FP (*Force Publique*). A gendarmerie and military force in the Belgian Congo dispersed after the independence of the Congo in 1960.

FRD (*Frente Revolucionario Democrático* / Democratic Revolutionary Front). An organisation made up of anti-Castro Cuban Exiles which was founded in Mexico in 1960. The military wing of the FRD was Brigade 2506, which took part in the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

GVC (Grupo Voluntario Cubano / Cuban Volunteer Group). The name of Cuban exile air force later to be known as the *Makasi*.

HSCA (House Select Committee on Assassinations). A Representatives Select Committee set up in 1976 to investigate the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.

IAA (International African Association / *Association Internationale Africaine*). Established at the Brussels Geographic Conference of 1876 which was hosted by King Léopold II of Belgium.

IGSS (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social / Guatemalan Social Security Institute).

IMF (International Monetary Fund). Established in 1945 at the Bretton Woods Conference. It plays a central role in assisting countries in the management of their balance of payments deficits.

INRA (*Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* / National Institute of Agrarian Reform). An agency of the Cuban government set up in 1959 to oversee land reforms.

ITUC-NW (International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers). An organisation founded in 1928 which was part of the Red International of Labour Unions.

JURE (*Junta Revolucion Cubana* / Cuban Revolutionary Unity). A leftist group created in Puerto Rico by Manolo Ray Rivero. It opposed the USA but wanted its help in overthrowing Fidel Castro.

KAU (Kenya African Union). Founded in 1942 as the Kenya African Study Group. Its objective was to obtain independence for Kenya from the United Kingdom.

KMT (Kuomintang). See, Chinese Nationalist Army.

KKE (Communist Party of Greece). Founded in 1918, this is the oldest Greek political party still active.

LCI (Landing Craft Infantry). Several classes of amphibious assault ships used to land troops.

LRA (Lord's Revolutionary Army). A rebel group operating in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

LSE (London School of Economics). A public research university founded in 1895.

MAP (Military Assistance Program). This was a part of the United States security assistance programme authorised by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

MATS (Military Air Transport Service). An element of the United States Department of Defence Unified Command activated on 1 June, 1948.

MISTEBEL (*Mission Technique Belge au Katanga* / Belgian Technical Mission). A Belgian agency whose role was to coordinate Belgian activities in post-independent Katanga.

MNC (Mouvement National Congolais / Congolese National Movement). A political party set up in 1958 by Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Ileo and Cyrille Adoula.

MNC-K (Mouvement National Congolais-Kalonji). A separate branch of the MNC led by Albert Kalonji.

MNC-L (Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba). A branch of the MNC led by Patrice Lumumba.

MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola). An organisation set up in 1956 with the goal of obtaining independence for Angola.

MPSB (Military Production and Supply Board). Established in November 1949, the role of the MPSB was to review the supplies of military material, and recommend ways of increasing these supplies.

MRP (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo). This was a splinter group of the *Partido Revolucionario Cubana- Autentico* (PRC-A).

MRR (*Movimento de Recuperacion Revolucionario* / Movement for Revolutionary Recovery). Created in mid-1959 by Manuel Artime. The objective of the organisation was to depose Fidel Castro.

NARA (North American Research Archive). An online database containing archives of the US government.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). An international organisation established in 1949 to provide mutual defence for its member states.

NBCI (National Bureau of Criminal Investigation). A predecessor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

NCO (Non-commissioned officer).

NSC (National Security Council). A group established in 1946 whose role is to advise the President of the USA on matters of national security and foreign policy.

NRSB (National Security Resources Board). A board created by the National Security Act of 1947. Similarly to the NSC, its role is to advise the President, and its area of expertise was how to mobilise natural and human resources in times of war.

OAS (Organisation de l'armée secrète). A clandestine political and military organisation created in February 1961 to protect French interests in its colony of Algeria.

OAS (Organisation of American States). A continental organisation created in April 1948 and headquartered in Washington DC whose role is to promote regional cooperation and solidarity amongst its member states.

OAU (Organisation of African Unity). Established in May 1963 and disbanded in 2002, the OAU acted as a continental authority whose role was to represent the interests of its member states in matters of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. It has now been replaced by the African Union (AU).

OPC (Office of Public Coordination). Now known as the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), the role of this US government body is to inform the American and global publics on matters such as US foreign policy or national security.

ORSD (Office of Scientific Research and Development). An agency of the US federal government created in May 1941 to coordinate research for military purposes.

OSP (Office of Special Projects). A branch of the CIA responsible for the coordination of clandestine activities, and the gathering of information.

OSS (Office of Strategic Services). A forerunner to the CIA, this US agency was responsible for clandestine activities during World War Two. It was disbanded in September 1945.

PAF (Pan-African Federation). This was an organisation founded in Manchester, England in 1944. Its role was to promote the interests and unity of African peoples, and to promote independence for African nations.

PAR (Revolutionary Action Party). A leftist political party founded in 1945 in Guatemala.

PCF (*Parti Communiste Français* / French Communist Party). A French political party formed in December 1920.

PCF (Patrol Craft Fast, or Swift Boat). Aluminium boats used notably during the Vietnam War. These 50-foot long boats were used for patrolling rivers and coastlines.

PRC (People's Republic of China).

PSA (*Parti Solidaire Africain* / African Solidarity Party). A Congolese political party formed after riots in Léopoldville in January 1959. Its leaders included Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele, and it disappeared from the Congolese political scene in 1965.

PSA-G (*Parti Solidaire Africain-Gizenga*). A branch of the PSA led by Antoine Gizenga.

PSB (Psychological Strategy Board). Formed in April 1951, this committee of the US executive coordinated and planned psychological operations.

PSC-CVP (Belgian Christian Democrat Party). A Belgian political party active from 1945 to 1968.

RAF (Royal Air Force). The United Kingdom's aerial warfare force created in 1918.

RAS (Rhodesia Air Services). A commercial airline operating in Southern Rhodesia from 1960 to 1965.

RDR (*Rescate Democrático Revolucionario*). A political party made up of Cuban Exiles and created in February-March 1960. This party was the driving force behind the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961.

RGS (Royal Geographical Society). A British society created in 1830 for the advancement of geographical sciences.

ROC (Republic of the Congo). The name under which the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was known until August 1964.

SAAF (South African Air Force). The aerial forces of South Africa founded in 1920.

SAISS (South African Institute for Strategic Studies). A South African think-tank.

SFIO (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* /French Section of the Workers' International). A French socialist party founded in 1905 and replaced in 1969 by the *Parti Socialiste* (PS).

SGB (*Société Générale de Belgique*). Founded in 1822 by William I of the Netherlands, this organisation provided funds for commercial ventures in Belgium and the Belgian Congo.

SIS (Secret Intelligence Service). British intelligence services founded in 1909. It is more commonly known as MI-6.

SOE (Special Operations Executive). A British secret service created in July 1940 whose role was to provide support to different resistance forces in Europe. It was disbanded in June 1946.

STEG (*Sindicato de Trabajadores de Educacion de Guatemala*). A Guatemalan union for workers in education.

STRICOM (United States Strike Command). Established at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida in 1961, this was a unified command capable of responding to crises around the globe. It was active from 1961 to 1972.

TAC (Tactical Air Command). An organisation operated by the United States Air Force (USAF), this aerial force was created in March 1946 and was based at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Its role was to oversee operations carried out by United States aerial forces.

TCL (Tanganyika Concessions Limited). A British mining company created in 1899 and operating principally in Southern Rhodesia. In 1906, along with the *Société Générale de Belgique* (SGB), it established the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* (UMHK).

UAR (United Arab Republic). A state which existed from 1958 to 1961, and which was a union of Egypt and Syria.

UBWAKA (*Union des Bwami des Basumbwa-Bayeke* / Union of Bwami Basumbwa-Bayeke). A Congolese tribal organisation.

UCOL (*Union pour la colonisation du Katanga* / Union for the Colonisation of Katanga). A group formed by mainly Belgian inhabitants of Katanga in 1944. Promoting Katangan independence, UCOL strongly influenced Moïse Tshombe's decision to declare Katanga's secession from the DRC in 1961.

UFCO (United Fruit Company). A United States corporation that traded in tropical fruits, and which was founded in 1899. UFCO controlled vast tracts of land in Latin America.

UK (*Union Katanganaise* / Katanga Union). A group affiliated to UCOL.

UMHK (Union Minière du Haut-Katanga). The largest mining company in the Belgian Congo and later in the DRC. Created in 1906 by Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL) and the *Société Générale de Belgique* (SGB).

UN (United Nations). An intercontinental organisation created in October 1945 with the purpose of preventing global conflicts such as World War Two.

UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). An Angolan political party founded in 1966.

UNOC (United Nations Operations in the Congo). The name given to peacekeeping operations in the DRC from 1960 to 1964.

UNSC (United Nations Security Council). An organ of the United Nations (UN) whose role is to oversee peacekeeping operations.

US (United States).

USA (United States of America).

USAF (United States Air Force). The aerial and space warfare branch of United States military forces. It was created in September 1947 under the National Security Act of the same year.

USEUCOM (US European Command). One of the Unified Combatant Commands of the United States military.

USN (United States Navy). The naval forces of the United States. The USN was created in 1775.

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). A coalition of Marxist-Leninist republics which existed from 1922 to 1990.

USSS (United States Secret Service). A federal law enforcement agency created in 1965.

VOA (Voice of America). A news source funded by the US government and established in 1942.

WASU (West African Students' Union). Founded in 1925 in London, this was an association of students from West African countries studying in the United Kingdom.

WIGMO (Western International Ground Maintenance Organisation). A CIA front company set up in Lichtenstein to maintain the aircraft and boats used by United States covert forces in the Congo.

ANNEX 3. Name Changes of Congolese Cities and Towns

Current Name	Name circa 1960
Bandandu	Benningville
Bakuvu	Costermansville
Ilebo	Port-Francqui
Isiro	Paulis
Kananga	Luluabourg
Likasi	Jadotville
Lubumbashi	Elisabethville
Kinshasa	Léopoldville
Kisangani	Stanleyville
Kalemie	Albertville
Kindu	Port de Kindu
Lusanga	Leverville
Mbandaka	Coquilhatville
Mbanza-Ngungu	Thysville
Mbuji-Mayi	Bakwanga
Moba	Baudouinville

ANNEX 4. List of Cuban Exiles who served in the Congo (Pilots, technicians, administration).

*Afont Rodriguez, Tomás¹⁰²¹

*Alvarez, Francisco "Panchito"

*Balboa Alvarado, Jose

Baro, Cesar,

Bartes, Francisco

*Batista Hernandez, Nildo (1956)¹⁰²²

Blanco, Reginaldo

Bernal Fernandez, Gaston (1941)

Blazquez del Pozo, Antonio "El Pedrusco"

Bringuier, Jorge

Brito Garcia, Orlando (1956)

Cadena, Enrique

*Cantillo Huget, Amado (1957)

*Carol Armand, Oscar Alfonso

*Castellanos Reyes Gavilan, José Manuel "Memel" (1943)

Castillo Leyva, Rafael "Propela"

Castresana, Elpidio

*Cereceda Coira, Castor

Chabau, Sosa

Cordo Lugo, Oscar

*Cosme Toribo, Luis (1947)

Cross Quintana, Raul (1948)

De La Guardia, Luis

¹⁰²¹ * Denotes veteran of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

¹⁰²² A year within brackets denotes year of leaving Cuban Air Force Academy.

Despaigne Perez, Ernesto

Diaz, Manuel

Entriago Telleo, José (1955)

Fernandez, Segisberto

*Fernandez Ardois-Anduz, Luis

Filpes, Claudio

*Flaquer Carballal, Frederico

*Garcia Acosta, Tristan

*Garcia Fernandez, René (1948)

*Garcia Pujol, Rafael (1957)

Garcia Tuñon, Juan (KIA, Bunia, Congo, 17 February, 1965)

*Ginebra-Groero Perez, Mario (KIA, Albertville, Congo, 1964)

*Ginebra-Groero Perez, Francisco "Chiqui"

*Gomez Gomez, Fausto (KIA, Bunia, Congo, 17 December, 1964)

Gonzales Molina, Guillermo (1957)

Guitierrez, Alberto "Dr. Kildare"

Hernandez Rojo, Angel Manuel

*Hernandez Reyes, Hector "Moropo"

*Herrera Cabrera, Gonzalo

*Herrera Perez, Eduardo (1957)

Intriago, Jorge

*Izquierdo Ramirez, Orlando (1955)

Landazuri, Ramiro

*Lopez Dominguez, Angel

*Luaices Sotelo, César

*de la Maza Barrios, Alfredo (1957)

Mendez Acosta, Santiago (1956)

*Navarro Rodriguez, Jorge "El Puma"
Organvidez Dominguez, Hernan
*Padron Sanchez, Cecilio
Pedrianes, Angel
*Pedroso Amores, Acelo
*Pellon Blanco, José Leonardo
*Perez Menendez, José
*Perez Sordo, Alberto (1957)
Peron Sosa, Juan C. "Titi"
*Peyno Inclan, Ernesto
Piedra, Armando
*Piqué Fernandez-Coca, Aturo (KIA, Congo)
*Ponzoa Alvarez, Gustavo
Quintero, Jorge "Toto"
Ramos, Mario
Rodriguez Rendueles, Gaston
*Rojas Gonzales, Ignacio "Max"
*Roque, Luis
*Salas Baro, Antonio (1956)
*Seda Reyes, Leonardo (1952)
*Solis Sariol, Raul
*Soto Vasquez, Antonio (1953)
Travesio Pla, René
Tuya, René
*Valdez Campaneria, or Companel, Fausto
Varela, Joaquin "Jack"
Verdaguer, Guillermo

*Whitehouse Inzua, Eduardo

Yabor Justiz, Carlos

Ground Forces

*William "Rip" Robertson, Commanding Officer

Lt. Colonel Garza, Arthur (US Army)

"Mitch" (USAF/CIA)

*Arguelles, Santiago

Benitez, Angel

Calas, Alicia

Fernandez, Alfredo "Calviño"

Fuentes, Felix "Felo"

Garcia, Orlando

*Gonzalez Castro, José Angel "El Chino"

Hernandez, José "Juan Roque"

Lazo, Guillermo

Martinez, Raimundo

*Morales Navrette, Ricardo "El Mono"

Perez, Alberto

Rivero, Manuel "El Gallego"

Rodriguez, Jorge

Romero, Andres

Silva Cadebra, Jorge "Fotingo"

*Tamayo Cordovi, Juan "El Negro"

Cuban Exile Naval Force

SWIFT Boat: Monty

Alvarez, Anael

Arroyo, Jorge

Cao, Roberto

Cepero, Serapio

Chavez, Ricardo

Salcedo, Justo "Papa"

Toledo, Felix

SWIFT Boat: Gitana

Arce, Remigio

Borges, Domingo

Bringas, Generoso

*Fernandez, Luis

Hernandez, Gumersindo

Ramirez, Pedro

*Reyes, Eulogio "Papo"

Sanchez, Andres

Radio/Radar Technician: Pichardo, Roberto*

ANNEX 5. US Naturalisation Papers of Roberto Pichardo and Eulogio Reyes

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 43-R083.10.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

43,998
No. _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

ORIGINAL
(To be retained
by Clerk of Court)

PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION

To the Honorable
The District Court of the United States at Miami, Florida

This petition for naturalization, hereby made and filed under section 316 (a), Immigration and Nationality Act, respectfully shows:

(1) My full, true, and correct name is Roberto Augusto Pichardo

(2) My present place of residence is 100 W. 28th Street Apt. 9 Florida MIAMI

(3) I was born on Jan. 19, 1936 in Havana Cuba

(4) I am not married, and have two living children.

(5) I was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on October 28, 1960 and have not abandoned such residence.

(6) My present nationality is Cuba ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. A-13 312 095

(7) I have not heretofore made a petition for naturalization.

(8) I pray that my name be changed to None

(continued over)

AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESSES

The following witnesses, each being severally, duly, and respectively sworn, depose and say:

(1) My name is Armando Medina
I reside at 7715 N. W. 3rd Avenue, Miami, Florida and

(2) My name is Manuel F. Lorenzo
I reside at 130 N. W. 11th Street, Miami, Florida

I am a citizen of the United States of America; I have personally known and have been acquainted in the United States with the petitioner named in the petition for naturalization of which this affidavit is a part, since at least 8-1-64 to my personal knowledge the petitioner has resided, immediately preceding the date of filing this petition, in the United States continuously since the date last mentioned; that the petitioner has been physically present in the United States for at least 31 months of that period; and that the petitioner has been a resident in the State in which the petition is filed during at least the last 6 months. I have personal knowledge that the petitioner is, and during all such periods has been a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States, and in my opinion the petitioner is in every way qualified to be admitted a citizen of the United States.

I do swear (affirm) that the statements of fact I have made in the affidavit to this petition for naturalization subscribed by me are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. SO HELP ME GOD.

Armando Medina (Signature of Witness) Manuel F. Lorenzo (Signature of Witness)

WHEN OATH ADMINISTERED BY CLERK OR DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT WHEN OATH ADMINISTERED BY DESIGNATED EXAMINER

Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me by above-named petitioner and witnesses in the respective forms of oath shown in said petition and affidavit, and filed by said petitioner, in the office of the clerk of said court at _____ this _____ day of _____ A.D. 19____

Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me by above-named petitioner and witnesses in the respective forms of oath shown in said petition and affidavit at Miami, Florida this 13th day of August, A.D. 1969

I HEREBY CERTIFY That the foregoing petition for naturalization was by petitioner named herein filed in the office of the clerk of said court at Miami, Florida this 13th day of August, A.D. 1969

By _____ Clerk. By Joseph I. Begart Designated Examiner.

By _____ Deputy Clerk. By Jerry [Signature] Clerk.

[SEAL]

Form N-405 (Rev. 4-10-67)

ORIGINAL (To be retained by Clerk of Court)

Petition No. 247006

A.R. No. A12 444 408

To the Honorable JUDGES, DISTRICT Court for the SOUTHERN DISTRICT at MIAMI, FL.

This petition for naturalization, hereby made and filed under section 316
Immigration and Nationality Act, respectfully shows:

- (1) My full, true, and correct name is EULOGIO AMADO REYES (Full, true name, without abbreviations)
- (2) My present place of residence is 1120 NW 7 ST #4 (Apt. No.) MTAMT (City or Town)
DADE (Country) FLORIDA (State) MIAMI 33136 (ZIP Code)
- (3) I was born on 9/13/33 in CUBA
- (4) I request that my name be changed to NONE
- (5) I was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence and have not abandoned such residence.
- (6) [If petition filed under Section 316(a).] I have resided continuously in the United States for at least five years and continuously in the States in which this petition is made for at least six months, immediately preceding the date of this petition and after my lawful admission for permanent residence, and I have been physically present in the United States five at least one-half of such five year period.
- (7) [If petition filed under Section 319(a).] I have resided continuously in the United States in marital union with my present spouse for at least three years immediately preceding the date of this petition, and after my lawful admission for permanent residence, during all of which period my said spouse has been a United States citizen, and I have been physically present in the United States at least one-half of such three-year period. I have resided continuously in the States in which this petition is made at least six months immediately preceding the date of this petition.
- (8) [If petition filed under Section 319(b).] My present spouse is a citizen of the United States, in the employment of the Government of the United States, or of an American institution of research recognized as such by the Attorney General, or an American firm or corporation engaged in whole or in part in the development of foreign trade and commerce of the United States, or subsidiary thereof, or of a public international organization in which the United States participates by treaty or statute, or is authorized to perform the ministerial or priestly functions of a religious denomination having a bona fide organization within the United States, or is engaged solely as a missionary by a religious denomination or by an interdenominational mission organization having a bona fide organization within the United States, and such spouse is regularly stationed abroad in such employment. I intend in good faith upon naturalization to live abroad with my spouse and to resume my residence within the United States immediately upon termination of such employment abroad.
- (9) [If petition filed under Section 328.] I have served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States for a period or periods aggregating three years. I have never been separated from the Armed Forces of the United States under other than honorable conditions. If not still in service, my service terminated within six months of the filing of my petition.
- (10) [If petition filed under Section 329.] While an alien or noncitizen national of the United States, I served honorably in an active-duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States during either World War I or during a period beginning September 1, 1939, and ending December 31, 1946, or during a period beginning June 25, 1950, and ending July 1, 1955, or during a period beginning February 28, 1961, and ending October 15, 1978, or I was discharged after five years of service under the Act of June 30, 1950 [P.L. 597, 81st Congress]. If separated from such service, I was separated under honorable conditions. At the time of enlistment, reenlistment, or induction I was in the United States, the Canal Zone, American Samoa, or Swains Island. If not in any of these places, I was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence subsequent to enlistment or induction. I was never separated from such service on account of alienage. I was not a conscientious objector who performed no military, air, or naval duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform. I have not previously been naturalized on the basis of the same period of service.
- (11) I am not and have not been, within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, for a period of at least 10 years immediately preceding the date of this petition, a member of or affiliated with any organization proscribed by such Act, or any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate or subdivision thereof, nor have I during such period believed in, advocated, engaged in, or performed any of the acts or activities prohibited by such Act.
- (12) I am, and have been during all the periods required by law, a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
- (13) It is my intention in good faith to become a citizen of the United States and take without qualification the oath of renunciation and allegiance prescribed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to reside permanently in the United States. I am willing, when required by law, to bear arms on behalf of the United States, to perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States, and to perform work of national importance under civilian direction [unless exempted therefrom].
- (14) I am able to read, write, and speak the English language [unless exempted therefrom], and I have a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of the history, and of the principles and form of government of the United States.
- (15) Wherefore I request that I may be admitted a citizen of the United States of America. I swear [affirm] that I know the contents of this petition for naturalization subscribed by me, and that the same are true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that this petition is signed by me with my full, true name, So help me God.
- (16)

Eulogio Amado Reyes
(Full Name, Without Abbreviations)

When Oath Administered by Clerk or Deputy Clerk of Court
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me by above-named petitioner in the respective forms of oath shown in said petition and affidavit, and filed by said petitioner, in the office of the clerk of said court at

this _____ day of _____, 19 _____
Clerk.
Deputy Clerk.

[SEAL]

Form N-405 (Rev. 06/03/87) Y

When Oath Administered by Designated Examiner
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me by above-named petitioner in the respective forms of oath shown in said petition and affidavit at MIAMI, FL this 13TH day of OCTOBER, 19 88

Robert M. March
Designated Examiner.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing petition for naturalization was by petitioner named herein filed in the office of the clerk of said court at MIAMI, FL this 13TH day of OCTOBER, 19 88
ROBERT M MARCH
Clerk.
Deputy Clerk.

ANNEX 6. Antonio Soto's Contract with Caribbean Aeromarine, 1963¹⁰²³

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

THIS CONTRACT, made and entered into this 18th day of October, 1963, by and between Caribbean Aeromarine Co., a Florida corporation, hereinafter called employer, and Antonio Soto, hereinafter called employee, witnesseth:

The term of this agreement shall be for a period of one (1) year from October 18, 1963. During the first six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by the employer at any time by thirty (30) days written notice in advance to the employee. During the last six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by either the employee or the employer by thirty (30) days written notice in advance to the other party.

The employer agrees to employ the said Antonio Soto as an aircraft pilot at a basic, all inclusive, salary of Eight Hundred (\$800.00) Dollars per month during the first six month term of this agreement. During the last six month term of this agreement, the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Nine Hundred (\$900.00) Dollars per month. This basic salary is on the basis of forty flying hours per month, and the employee shall be paid an additional Ten (\$10.00) Dollars per flying hour each month, for all flying hours in excess of forty flying hours per month.

The employer shall pay round trip tourist class air transportation costs from Miami, Florida, to destination, and return, and all other expenses directly relating to the travel involved.

The employer shall not be responsible for any local tax problems of the employee, and the employee accepts all responsibility for local taxation, if applicable.

The employee shall have a two month minimum salary guarantee under this agreement. However, in the event the said employer is unable to place the said employee within the two month minimum salary guarantee period, and the employee is released from the terms of this agreement to accept employment comparable to his last position of employment, then, this guaranteed salary will cease, effective as of the date said employee accepts such re-employment.

The employer agrees to provide for said employee during the term of this contract:

a. a monetary benefit of \$10,000 in the event of his death

¹⁰²³ Source: As noted on document.

- from any cause whatever during the term of this contract;
- b. An additional monetary benefit of \$10,000 in the event of his death by accidental means while aboard a tested aircraft while operating in a non war risk area and engaged in the performance of services under this contract, PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident;
- c. An additional monetary benefit of \$30,000 in the event of his death by accidental means while engaged in the performance of services under this contract aboard an aircraft being tested as to its airworthiness or when the aircraft is operating in a war risk area, PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident;
- d. That in the event the employee receives an injury or disability while directly engaged in the performance of services under this contract, he will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the employer is proper, PROVIDED said benefits shall not exceed a total of \$20,000 for the same injury or disability.

In the event, at the termination of this agreement, the employee accepts employment with an employer other than Caribbean Aeromarine Co., then the travel expenses and return transportation costs as hereinabove set forth shall not be paid said employee.

In the event, during the term of this agreement, the employee should enter into a contract of employment with the Congolese National Government, then this contract shall terminate and shall be of no further force or effect.

Witness our hands and seals at Miami, Florida, on this 18th day of October, 1963.

Caribbean Aeromarine Co.

By _____ (Seal)
President

 (Seal)
Antonio Soto

Annex 7. Contract between Pilots and Congolese Government, 1966¹⁰²⁴

*6 mois, vacances de 30
jours payés -
Possibilité de payer man. ticket*

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
QUARTIER GENERAL DE L'ARMEE
NATIONAL CONGOLAISE
FORCE AERIENNE

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

This agreement by and between the Government of the Republic of the Congo, hereinafter referred to as the Employer, and Mr. _____ hereinafter referred to as the Contractor:

WITNESSETH

In consideration of the mutual terms, covenants and conditions herein contained, the parties hereto agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1 - DUTIES

The Employer hires the Contractor as a licensed pilot to fly any and all aircraft of the Congolese Government for which he is qualified. He shall make such flights and accomplish such missions as ordered and directed by the Employer or its duly authorized Representative, and shall take orders from, and undertake missions for, no one else.

ARTICLE 2 - PILOT QUALIFICATIONS

The Contractor must be able, at any time to satisfactorily pass an examination, oral, written, or flight, with respect to tactics, instrument flight procedures, emergency procedures, or overall flight procedures. This qualification will be with respect to the type of equipment flown and pilot position assigned. Up or downgrading of pilot positions will be solely at the discretion of the Employer or his Representative based upon demonstrated qualifications of individual pilots as determined by the Employer. Failure to meet standards as established by the Employer will be sufficient cause for immediate termination of this Contract.

ARTICLE 3 - COMPENSATION

a. Initially, the Contractor will be paid a basic salary according to his duties assigned, as follows:

¹⁰²⁴ Source: Janet Joy Ray.

- (1) \$500 per month for co-pilots;
- (2) \$600 per month for single-engine aircraft pilots and captains of multi-engine aircraft;
- (3) \$1000 per month for rotary-wing pilots.

Basic salary shall continue at the initial rate for a period of six (6) months from the date of the Contractor's arrival in the Congo. Thereafter, the Contractor's basic monthly salary shall be increased by \$100 per month for the duration of his employment hereunder. At the completion of one year's continuous satisfactory service, the Contractor may be recontracted for an additional year with an increase of \$100 per month in basic salary.

In addition to basic salary, the Contractor will receive \$10.00 as a pilot and \$7.50 as a co-pilot per flying hour. Furthermore, the Contractor will receive an additional \$5.00 per flying hour for all flights designated as hazardous by the Employer or his Representative. This additional compensation shall be computed and paid on a calendar month.

d. Payment of taxes on income earned hereunder is the personal responsibility of the Contractor.

ARTICLE 4 - METHOD OF PAYMENT

All monies due to the Contractor will be forwarded to any bank designated by the Contractor. Any monies due the Contractor and requested by the Contractor in cash in the Congo will be paid in Congolese Francs at the then current rate of exchange as established by the Brussels Currency Exchange.

ARTICLE 5 - TRAVEL

The Government will pay transportation costs and approved incidental travel expenses from _____ to the Contractor's place of assignment in the Congo and return, via tourist-class air, except as otherwise provided in Article 3 below.

ARTICLE 6 - SUBSISTENCE

The Contractor will be provided lodging during his period of employment in the Congo when in Leopoldville, and meals and lodging will be provided when performing assigned duties in the Congo outside Leopoldville.

ARTICLE 7 - EQUIPMENT

Special clothing or equipment will be provided by the Government, if necessary.

ARTICLE 8 - BENEFITS

a. Insurance Benefits

The Contractor shall be enrolled in the Government's group insurance program for which the Government pays the total premium. The insurance program provides death, disability and medical benefits for the Contractor substantially as follows:

(1) \$10,000 payable in the event of the Contractor's death from any cause whatsoever during the term of this agreement.

(2) \$20,000 payable in the event of the Contractor's death from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, provided death occurs within one (1) year from the date of the accident. This benefit is in lieu of (1) above and is also reduced by any payments made under (3) below for the same accident.

(3) Temporary and permanent total and permanent partial disability benefits plus medical expenses for injuries or disablement to the Contractor arising out of and in the course of his employment. Said benefits are paid in accordance with the terms and limits of said insurance coverage and the maximum payable thereunder is \$40,000 for the same injury or disablement.

b. Continuance of Pay and Allowance

(1) In the event the Government determines the Contractor to be missing in action, the authorized designee of the Contractor will receive his basic salary plus an additional 25 per cent thereof for a period of up to six (6) months. If, at the end of the missing in action period, findings indicate that the Contractor is deceased, the appropriate insurance benefit provided for above will be paid to the Contractor's designated beneficiary.

(2) If the Contractor is captured and imprisoned, his authorized designee will receive the Contractor's basic salary plus additional 25 percent thereof for the duration of his confinement. In addition, the appropriate death benefit insurance provided for above will be paid if the Contractor dies during said confinement.

ARTICLE 9 - TERM

This agreement shall become effective upon signature of the parties hereto on _____ and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year from the date of the Contractor's arrival in the Congo unless sooner terminated:

- a. At any time, by mutual consent of the parties hereto, or
- b. Upon thirty (30) days' actual notice from one party to the other, or
- c. Without prior notice by the Government in the event the Contractor violates 12 b. below or otherwise renders himself unavailable for acceptable service.

This agreement may be extended for additional periods, if mutually agreeable. If the Contractor terminates the contract under b. above for reasons unacceptable to the Government or if the Government terminates the contract under c. above, the Contractor will not be entitled to return travel to _____.

ARTICLE 10 - LEAVE

At the completion of one (1) year unbroken satisfactory service, and if the Contractor elects, with approval of the Employer, to recontract for an additional year, the Contractor may take a maximum of thirty (30) days leave-without-pay and still retain his seniority including eligibility for the next \$100 month step increase in basic salary per Article 3 a. All travel to and from any leave destination will be at Contractor's own expense.

ARTICLE 11 - STATUS DURING TRAVEL

During the Contractor's travel from _____ to the Congo he will be on a retainer fee, the amount which will be determined by the Government's representative in _____. However, all contract benefits shall be in effect during the transit period. Upon arrival in the Congo, salary payments shall begin and the retainer fee discontinued.

ARTICLE 12 - SPECIAL CONDITIONS

- a. At the request of the Government's representative, the Contractor agrees to undergo a medical examination within five (5) calendar days after his return from the Congo.

b. By virtue of the Contractor's employment hereunder, he will become privy to information which affects the national security of the Republic of the Congo. The Contractor herein agrees to keep forever secret all such information unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation. It is specifically understood and agreed that any revelation whatsoever of such information will constitute a breach of this agreement. In addition, the Contractor will forfeit any and all benefits which have or would otherwise have accrued to him hereunder, including the benefits specified in Article 3 above.

In witness whereof the two contracting parties have hereunto subscribed their signatures and affixed their seals in _____ on this _____ day of _____ 1968.

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO

(Seal) BY _____ (Seal)

WITNESS

WITNESS

ANNEX 8. Regulations for *Makasi* pilots, 1965¹⁰²⁵

20 APRIL 1965
LEOPOLDVILLE

REGULATIONS FOR PILOTS/ CREWMEN

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Source: Jack Varela

¹⁰²⁵ Source: "Jack" Varela via Janet Joy Ray.

I. REPORTING TO THE CONGO

1. ARRIVAL

UPON YOUR ARRIVAL AT N'DJILI AIRPORT, LEOPOLDVILLE YOU WILL BE MET BY THE CHIEF PILOT OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THIS INDIVIDUAL WILL EXPIDITE YOUR PASSAGE THRU CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATIONS AND WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH TEMPORARY LODGING UNTIL A PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT CAN BE MADE FOR YOU WHICH USUALLY IS THE FOLLOWING DAY.

2. CHECK-IN PROCESS

THE DAY FOLLOWING YOUR ARRIVAL YOU WILL REPORT TO THE CHIEF PILOT OR THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICER AT 0800 FOR PROCESSING. YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED QUARTERS DURING YOUR TRAINING IN LEOPOLDVILLE. YOU WILL FILL IN AND COMPLETE PERSONEL INFORMATION PAPERS, ARRANGE FOR SIGNING OF YOUR GOVERNMENT OF THE CONGO CONTRACT AND WILL BE BRIEFED BY THE CHIEF PILOT/ ADMIN OFFICER ON GENERAL INFORMATION, OPERATIONS, PILOT POSITION, ETC. YOU WILL MEET THE CAO AT N'DJILI OPERATIONS AND DRAW FLIGHT AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT AT WIGMO SUPPLY DEPARTMENT. IN REGARDS TO THIS EQUIPMENT: YOU WILL SIGN FOR AND BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CUSTODY OF ALL EQUIPMENT DURING YOUR STAY IN THE CONGO. THIS GEAR WILL BE RETURNED TO WIGMO UPON COMPLETION OF YOUR CONTRACT. ANY EQUIPMENT LOST OR NOT ACCOUNTED FOR WILL BE CHARGED TO YOU AND DEDUCTED FROM YOUR PAY AT A RATE THAT WILL BE TWICE THE COST SINCE THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT READILY ACCESSABLE IN THE CONGO. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS DURING THE CHECK-IN PERIOD CONSULT THE ADMIN OFFICER FIRST AS HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE. THE CHIEF PILOT CAN ALSO BE CONSULTED IF THE ADMIN OFFICER IS IN THE FIELD.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION

12E


NORMALLY YOUR PAY WILL BE DEPOSITED INTO YOUR BANK ABOUT THE 30th OF THE MONTH. FIELD PAY WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICER ABOUT THE 15th IN CASH AND YOU WILL RECEIVE A RECEIPT FOR THIS MONEY. MAIL IS TAKEN CARE OF BY THE ADMIN OFFICER AND IS NORMALLY GOTTEN TO THE FIELD LOCATIONS PROMPTLY. YOUR RETURN ADDRESS IS:

JOSE LOPEZ
BP 2175
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO

ALL PILOTS ARE CAUTIONED TO USE DISCRETION WHEN WRITING LETTERS OR MAKING LONG DISTANCE PHONE CALLS. OPERATIONAL MATTERS, MISSIONS, TARGET LOCATIONS, TARGET AREAS, DAMAGE, CASUALTIES, ETC, WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED OR DISCLOSED IN LETTERS OR BY PHONE. DO NOT TRY TO MAKE YOURSELF LOOK LIKE A HERO BY WRITING THIS GARBAGE AS IT COULD HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON YOUR FAMILY OR YOUR FLYING MATES FAMILIES. PHOTOGRAPHS OF YOU OR YOUR FELLOW PILOTS, THE AIRCRAFT CONCERNED, THE COUNTRY ARE ACCEPTABLE; HOWEVER PICTURES DEALING WITH

WITH STRIKES, MISSIONS OR TARGETS ARE FORBIDDEN. VIOLATION OF THIS REGULATION CAN RESULT IN YOUR BEING SENT HOME. TRANSPORTATION IS NORMALLY PROVIDED FOR BY 2-3 VW BUSES SUPPLIED FROM A MOTOR POOL. THESE BUSES WILL BE RUN ON A SCHEDULE MADE-UP BY THE ADMIN OFFICER AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR PILOTS IN TRAINING IN LEO, R AND R PILOTS, PILOTS REQUIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT, ETC; DUE TO THE FLEXIBILITY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS THERE CANNOT BE A FIXED AND DEFINITE SCHEDULE; BUSES WILL GENERALLY BE UTILIZED FOR TRIPS TO N'DJILI TO MEET SCHEDULED FLIGHTS. PILOTS COMING INTO LEO ON R AND R, FERRY FLIGHTS, MEDICAL OR FOR ANY OTHER AUTHORIZED REASON WILL INFORM THE AO AT HIS STATION SO THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO HAVE TRANSPORTATION AWAITING YOUR ARRIVAL AT N'DJILI AIRPORT. IN CASE OF NO TRANSPORTATION CALL WIGMO-6062 AND THEY WILL USUALLY BE ABLE TO GET YOU INTO TOWN. IN THESE INSTANCES DO NOT EXPECT A SPECIAL CAR OR BUS FOR YOURSELF AS WIGMO RUNS A MOTOR POOL FOR THEIR OWN PERSONNEL AND YOU WILL BE EXPECTED TO MEET THEIR SCHEDULE. THE ADMIN OFFICER WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SERVICING AND MAINT. OF THE VEHICLES ASSIGNED TO THE PILOTS. A MEDICAL DOCTOR IS HIRED BY WIGMO AND IS ON DUTY AT THE AIRPORT OFFICES FROM 0900-1200 EACH DAY; HE IS ALSO GENERALLY AT THE FIELD IN THE AFTERNOON; IF YOU HAVE ANY MEDICAL TREATMENT REQUIRED YOU WILL FIRST CONSULT HIM FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT. IN CASES OF PILOTS BEING GROUNDED THE DOCTOR WILL ISSUE YOU A GROUNDING CHIT WHICH WILL THEN BE TURNED IN BY YOU TO THE ADMIN OFFICER. DURING OFF-DUTY HOURS OR IN CASE OF EMERGENCY YOU CAN VISIT THE DOCTOR AT WIGMO HOUSE "FOX TROT" OR CALL 9165 AND ASK THAT THE PARTY GET THE DOCTOR FOR YOU. DO NOT HESITATE TO UTILIZE THIS DOCTOR.

ORGANIZATION



III. PILOT TRAINING—LEOPOLDVILLE

PILOT ASSIGNMENT WILL BE MADE BY TYPE AIRCRAFT BY THE CHIEF PILOT AND CHIEF AIR OFFICER AT LEO. AIRCRAFT ASSIGNMENT WILL BE MADE ACCORDING TO YOUR EXPERIENCE, FLIGHT BACKGROUND AND PRESENT AND ANTICIPATED FIELD DETACHMENT NEEDS.

WHEN YOU COMMENCE TRAINING AT LEO YOU WILL BE GIVEN STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) AND LOANED A PILOTS HANDBOOK FOR THE TYPE AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED. PRIOR TO FLIGHT TRAINING YOU WILL BE GIVEN A WRITTEN EXAMINATION COVERING THE AIRCRAFT YOU ARE ASSIGNED. EACH DAY A FLIGHT SCHEDULE WILL BE PREPARED BY THE ADMIN OFFICER AND APPROVED BY THE CHIEF PILOT. THIS SCHEDULE WILL BE POSTED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

1. WIGMO BULLITIN BOARD OUTSIDE WIGMO SUPPLY
2. SABENA APT.
3. RIVER HOUSE

IT IS THE PILOTS RESPONSIBILITY TO BE ON TIME FOR FLIGHTS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE READY FOR FLIGHTS AT LEAST 30 MINUTES PRIOR TAKE-OFF TIME. PILOTS IN TRAINING ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOGGING FLIGHT TIME INCLUDING DUAL TIME; FLIGHT LOGS ARE KEPT IN THE WIGMO LOG OFFICE. REGARDING THIS OFFICE, IT IS NOT TO BE USED AS A "READY ROOM" . WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A SPACE FOR THE PILOTS TO USE TO STORE FLIGHT CLOTHING AND PERSONAL GEAR WHILE FLYING, BUT LIKE ALL THINGS IT TAKES TIME.

YOUR FLIGHT INSTRUCTION AND SYLLABUS WILL BE DEPENDANT UPON YOUR FLIGHT PROGRESS AT LEO. GENERALLY THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE CHIEF PILOT WHEN HE IS IN TOWN; IN HIS ABSENCE THE CHIEF AIR OFFICER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE WILL CONDUCT FLIGHT TRAINING. THE FIELD ASSIGNMENT WILL BE MADE AFTER YOU FINISH THIS TRAINING. IN CASES WHERE THE PILOT IS NOT CONSIDERED ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED FOR OPERATIONAL FLYING THE PILOT WILL BE GIVEN 30 DAYS NOTICE AND TERMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COG CONTRACT.

RETRAINING WILL ALSO BE CONDUCTED FOR PILOTS COMING IN ON R AND R TO ENABLE THIS ORGANIZATION TO BE COMPLETELY STANDARDIZED IN THE FIELD. PILOTS ON R AND R WILL GENERALLY BE SCHEDULED FOR 1 FLIGHT PER DAY DURING THE R AND R PERIOD. A RETRAINING SYLLABUS WILL BE PUBLISHED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

IV. FIELD ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

AFTER COMPLETION OF TRAINING AT LEO YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED TO ONE OF THE FIELD DETACHMENTS. YOU WILL REPORT TO THE STATION CHIEF PILOT WHO HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS SUCH BY THE CHIEF PILOT. THE STATION CHIEF PILOT WILL BRIEF YOU ON LOCAL OPERATIONS, CONDITIONS, ETC. THE SCP WILL BE YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISOR AND YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE TO HIM AND WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS FROM HIM. THE SCP SHOULD BRIEF YOU ON SOPS FOR THE AREA OF OPERATIONS, RADIO AIDES, GENERAL PREVAILING WEATHER CONDITIONS, TERRAIN, NAVIGATION, OPPOSITION, GROUND FIRE EXPECTED TO BE ENCOUNTERED, ETC. HE WILL ALSO ASSIGN YOU A POSITION IN THE FLIGHT DETACHMENT. THE SCP IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE DETACHMENT AIR OFFICER AND WILL ACCEPT FLIGHTS AND MISSIONS FROM THE AO ONLY. THE AO AND THE SCP SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO INSURE THAT THERE IS A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING IN ALL FLIGHT OPERATIONS AND THAT THE SCP AND OTHER PILOTS UNDERSTAND WHAT IS REQUIRED OF THEM ON EACH MISSION. THE AO AND THE SCP HAVE AUTHORITY TO GROUND ANY PILOT FOR DISCIPLINARY, FLIGHT OR MEDICAL REASONS;

V. GENERAL AIR OPERATIONS

ALTHOUGH THIS OPERATION COULD BE CONSIDERED A "BUSH WAR" IT IS EVIDENT THAT PILOTS AND PLANES CAN BE LOST. BAD FLYING HABITS AND A NON-PROFESSIONAL APPROACH CAN BE THE CAUSE OF LOSING A PILOT OR AIRCRAFT AND THIS ORGANIZATION CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE EITHER. THE TACTICAL TRAINING YOU RECEIVE IN LEO HAS BEEN PROVED IN OTHER COMBAT SITUATIONS AND IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT IF YOU UTILIZE THESE TACTICS THAT YOUR LONGEVITY WILL BE INCREASED. DUE TO THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS THE FLYING CAN BECOME ROUTINE AND A BORE AND THIS IS THE TIME THAT YOU CAN TAKE A FEW ARROWS IN THE CAN.

1. SCHEDULED FLIGHTS

TRAINING, OPERATIONAL, TEST AND FERRY FLIGHTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS PER THE SCHEDULED TIME. TARDINESS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.

2. AIR DISCIPLINE

IT IS THE FLIGHT LEADER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO BRIEF HIS FLIGHT PRIOR TO ANY AND EACH FLIGHT OR MISSION AND THEN DEMAND THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS BE CARRIED OUT. IN THE PAST BRIEFING HAS BEEN DONE IN THE AIR; MORE LIKE A DISCUSSION. RADIO DISCIPLINE HAS BEEN NON-EXISTENT AND TALK BETWEEN PLANES RESEMBLES A RUNNING COMMENTARY. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR THIS CONTINUAL CHATTER AND IF PROPERLY

AIR DISCIPLINE--CONT.

BRIEFED YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO FLY MOST MISSIONS WITHOUT OPENING UP ON THE AIR. IN THIS MATTER YOU MUST REALIZE THAT MOST OF OUR PLANES ARE OPERATING ON 118.1 AND THAT IN CASES OF EMERGENCY IT COULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO GET IMPORTANT MESSAGES ON THE AIR. IT IS ALSO PROBABLE THAT MOST OF OUR TACTICAL FREQUENCIES ARE BEING MONITORED AND WITH DF EQUIPMENT YOU WOULD BE PIN-POINTED EVERY TIME YOU OPEN UP. PROPER AND ADEQUATE BRIEFING CAN DO AWAY WITH 95% OF THE RADIO CHATTER.

3. FERRY FLIGHTS

THE APPROVED FERRY ROUTES IN THE CONGO ARE LISTED ON THE MAP IN THE CAO OFFICE AT N'DJILI AND YOU ARE EXPECTED TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THESE ROUTES. T-28 FLIGHTS WILL TAKE THE LISALA-COQ-LEO ROUTE WHEN COMING AND GOING AND WILL ALWAYS REPORT INTO STAN AS LONG AS WE ARE OPERATING THERE. B-26 AND C-46 AIRCRAFT WILL NORMALLY OPERATE ON DIRECT ROUTES DURING FERRY; NATURALLY PILOTS MUST CONSIDER WEATHER CONDITIONS, DARKNESS, ETC. BUT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY DO NOT ALTER YOUR ROUTE AS IN CASE OF EMERGENCY WE WOULD AT LEAST HAVE A GOOD IDEA AS TO YOUR LOCATION. AIRCRAFT BEING FERRIED TO LEO FOR INSPECTION WILL FLY VFR ONLY.

4. TEST FLIGHTS

TEST FLIGHTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT AFTER EACH INSPECTION AT LEO. PILOTS DEPARTING LEO ON FERRY FLIGHTS SHOULD TEST FLY THE AIRCRAFT THE DAY BEFORE DEPARTURE TO ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO DISCREPANCIES.


5. TRANSPORT FLIGHTS

THE TRANSPORT SECTION WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CAO AT LEO. HE WILL SCHEDULE ALL TRANSPORT (C-46) FLIGHTS ORIGINATING FROM N'DJILI. IN THE FIELD THESE AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE UNDER THE AO AND THE AO WILL KEEP LEO ADVISED AS TO UTILIZATION AND LOCATION OF TRANSPORT PLANES. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF OUR OPERATIONS ONLY AND THE AOS IN THE FIELD SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO COORDINATE ON FLIGHTS SO THAT MAXIMUM UTILITY CAN BE MADE OF THESE PLANES AND THEIR TRIPS. THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND WILL INSURE THAT IN ALL OPERATIONS THAT SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT. THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT ONLY THE AIRCRAFT, BUT ALSO THE PASSENGERS AND CARGO ABOARD HIS PLANE. REGARDING PASSENGERS AND CARGO: IN THE PAST IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT UNAUTHORIZED PASSENGERS AND CARGO HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED BY OUR AIRCRAFT WHICH SHOWS SOME LAXITY ON THE PART OF THE AO AND THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND.

ANNEX 9. List of persons known to have served in the *Compagnie Internationale*

<u>Name</u>	<u>D.O.B.</u>	<u>Place of birth</u>
Athanasiou, John	15.04.38	Istiaia, Greece
Bellotto, Primo	01.01.35	Gorisia, Italy
Botes Viotz, Lourons	20.02.24	Vlakspruit, S. Africa
Browne, Richard William	21.02.26	Blandford, U.K. (Captured by UN and expelled)
Cargil-Russell		First Recruiter for Tshombe, and later for Mike Hoare
Carton-Barber, Arthur Lindsay	28.03.28	Johannesburg, S. Africa
Clark, John Walter	17.09.17	Durban, S. Africa
D'Annunzie Luigi	31.10.35	Casalanguida, Italy
D'Oliverira (?)	31.12.33	Durban, S.Africa
Dupreez, Thomas Hofmeyr	14.02.34	Krugoradorf, S.Africa
Gordon, Ian Graham	10.05.33	Woking, U.K.
Grant, Donald Norman	22.04.24	
Grant, John Mawer	19.07.25	Detroit USA
Hopkins, Thomas Harry	17.09.19	London, U.K.
Legg, Donald Robert	04.10.34	Blundol Sand, U.K.
MacArthur, William	20.02.26	Scotland
Mackintosh, Derek Donald	19.08.32	Durban, S. Africa
Osborn, Nigel	19.10.37	London, U.K. (Captured by UN and expelled)
Orsmund, Gilbert John	03.10.16	Krugersdorf, S. Africa
Quinn, Nicholas Johannes	10.10.14	S. Africa
Whitehorn, Leslie Harold	14.01.38	Johannesburg, S. Africa
Wood, Gerald Edward	03.07.41	Stockton, U.K.

ANNEX 10: Nigel Osborn's Contract with the *Compagnie Internationale*, 1961¹⁰²⁶



¹⁰²⁶ Courtesy of Nigel Osborn.

ANNEX 11. A List of Mercenaries Arrested in the Congo: March/September 1961.¹⁰²⁷

<u>NO.</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
1.	BROWNE, William, Richard,	21 Feb. 1926	Blandford, England	British
2.	GORDON, Ian, Graham	10 May 1933	Woking, England	British
3.	MacARTHUR, William B.	20 Feb. 1926	Bridge of Allen, Scotland	British
4.	OSBORN, Nigel	19 Oct. 1937	London, England	British
5.	HOPKINS, Thomas, Harry, Innes	17 Sep. 1919	London, England	British
6.	WOOD, Gerald, Edward	3 July 1941	Stockton-on-Tees, England	British
7.	MacINTOSH, Derek, Donald	19 Aug. 1932	Durban, S.A.	South African
8.	CARTON-BARBER, Arthur, Lindsay	28 Mar. 1928	Johannesburg, S.A.	British
9.	D'OLIVEIRA, Cyril	31 Dec. 1939	Durban, S.A.	South African
10.	QUINN, Nicholas, Johannes	10 Oct. 1914	South Africa	British/South African
11.	BELLOTTO, Primo	1 Jan. 1935	Gorizia, Italy	Italian
12.	KEENE, Alexander, James	7 Aug. 1914	Boksburg, S.A.	British/South African
13.	BOTES, Wietz, Lourens	20 Feb. 1924	Vlakspruit, S.A.	South African
14.	ORSMOND, Gilbert, John, Victor	3 Oct. 1916	Krugersdorf, S.A.	South African
15.	ATHANASIOU, John	15 Apr. 1930	Istiaia, Greece	Greek
16.	DUPREZZ, Thomas, Hofmeyr	14 Feb. 1934	Krugersdorf, S.A.	South African
17.	CLARK, John, Walter	17 Sep. 1917	Durban, S.A.	South African
18.	WHITEHORN, Leslie, Harold	14 Jan. 1938	Johannesburg, S.A.	South African
19.	GRANT, Donald, Norman, Bruce	22 Apr. 1924	Detroit, U.S.A.	South African U.S. by birth
20.	D'ANNUNZIO, Luigi	31 Oct. 1935	Casalanguida, Italy	Italian
21.	LEGG, Donald, Robert, Lovell	4 Oct. 1934	Blundel Sand, England	British

¹⁰²⁷ Courtesy of Nigel Osborn.

<u>NO.</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>
22.	RAGGAZZI, Mario	23 Oct. 1935	Chiesa Val Malenco, Italy	Italian
23.	BUTLER, Michael, Thomas	26 Oct. 1937	Capetown, S.A.	South African
24.	VAN DER WALT, Philip, Stephanus	26 June 1927	Durban, S.A.	South African
25.	MASON, Unwin, Collyer	22 July 1935	Johannesburg, S.A.	South African
26.	NEL, Christian, Phillipus	1 Jan. 1917	Zeerust, S.A.	South African
27.	KEMP, Johan Christo	28 Jan. 1920	Aberdeen, S.A.	South African
28.	GRANT, John, Mawor	19 July 1925	Detroit, U.S.A.	British (Rhodesian)
29.	KOEKEMOER, Johannes, Andries	16 Sep. 1919	Boksburg, S.A.	South African
30.	SHER, Harry	22 March 1931	Gwelo, S. Rhodesia	British/Israel:

ANNEX 12. List of persons known to have served in 4 Commando, Congo 1961-1963.¹⁰²⁸

<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Other information</u>
Ashton, Tom		
Barvaux, (?)		Killed in Katanga
Bernstein, (?)		
Bond, Peter		Wounded by U.N. forces
Butler, Michael Thomas		
Cremer, Andre		Hired to assassinate U.N. personnel
Cruz, C.A. de Olivier	Portugal	
De Clary, Michel	France	Captured at Jadotville
Delin, Joseph	South Africa	Pilot Katangan Air Force
Donaldson, Simon	U.K.	Captured by Baluba and eaten
Faulques, Robert (René)	France	
Feriera, (?)	Portugal	
Gyurkits, Sandor	Hungary	Pilot Katangan Air Force
Hedges, Jimmy	U.K. or South Africa	Ex-RAF and SAAF. Hedges was later to take part in the Stanleyville evacuation where two RAF aircraft rescued 143 refugees. ¹⁰²⁹
Hoare, Michael	Ireland	
Huyghe, Carlos	Belgium	Recruiting agent for Tshombe
Keene, Alexander James	South Africa	
Kemp, Johan Christo		
Koekemoer, Alexander		
Koekemoer, Johannes Andries		
McKay, Ted		Captured by Baluba and eaten
Mason, Unwin Collyer		

¹⁰²⁸ Source: Terry Aspinall, www.mercenarywars.net.

¹⁰²⁹ Source: <http://www.mercenary-wars.net/congo/jimmy-hedges-article.html>, accessed 12 August, 2016.

McKechnie, Ewen		
Oglethorpe, Vic		
Naismith, Jock		
Nel, Christian Phillipus	South Africa	
Pretorious, Connie		
Prontin (?)	Belgium	
Raggazzi, Mario	Italy	
Rosez, Victor, E.	Belgium	
Schramme, Jean	Katanga	
Sher, Harry	Southern Rhodesia	
Stewart, Jimmy		
Trinquier, Roger	France	
Van de Walt, Phillip	South Africa	
Vandewalle, Frédéric	Belgium	Took overall command of Stanleyville operations
Vermeutyn, Geordie		

ANNEX 13. List of persons known to have served in the units of 5 Commando

<u>Name</u>	<u>D.O.B.</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Year</u>
Ackerman, Jack		S. Africa	53 Commando	
Agget-Griffin, Neville			53 Commando	
Alexiou, George		Greece		
Allison, T.J.			Force Oscar	
Amberleigh, Frank	1932	S. Rhodesia		1965
Andreka, Ron*		Germany	52 Commando	1965
Bartlet, B.			Force Oscar	1965
Basson, Freddie*			57 Commando	1964
Bayoud			Force Oscar	
Beal, Ivan			53 Commando	
Beer, Colin			53 Commando	
Beer, Vic de			54 Commando	1965
Belloto		Italy	5 Commando	
Belstead			Force Oscar	1965
Bezeuinhout, 'Ginger'		S. Africa	53 Commando	1964
Bishop, Jimmy			5 Commando	1965
Blottnitz, Gerd von			Payments office	1964-65
Borman, Reiner*			52 Commando	1965
Botuschofsky, Peter	1943	E. Germany		1964
Bouve, Raymond		Belgium	5 Commando	1964-65
Boycott, Geoff			5 Commando	1964
Bradbury, Jonny			5 Commando	1964
Bradshaw, Harry			5 Commando	
Bradshaw, Frank		Rhodesia		

Brady, Jim				1965
Braghieri, Angelo		Italy		1966
Braham, David		Kenya		1964
Branter, J.			Force Oscar	1965
Brenhardt, Joseph	1920	Germany	Doctor	1965
Bridge, Eric		UK	5 Commando	1964
Brock, Cyril*				1964
Burger, S.W.L.			5 Commando	1965-66
Calistrat, Ferdinand		Romania	55 Commando	1964
Carta, Antonio	1928	Italy	5 Commando	1964-65
Carter, Alan		UK	57 Commando	1964-65
Carton-Barber, Arthur	1928	S. Africa	55 Commando	1964-65
Carter, Howard		UK	5 Commando	1964
Cassidy, Sam		UK	5 Commando	1964
Cathcart, A.			Force Oscar	1965
Cayles, C.A.			Force John	1965
Challener, D	1945		53 Commando	1965
Chaloner, Davy*	1941			1965
Chanu, Claude		France	5 Commando	1964
Coetzee, F.G.		S. Africa	54 Commando	1964
Coleman, 'Skinny'		S. Rhodesia	Force Oscar	1964
Cooper, Gary	1914	UK		1964
Corbett, Jim		S. Africa		1964
Crispi		Italy		1964
Demetriou		Cyprus		1964
De Laurier		UK		1965
De Murville, Couve	1934	France		1964

Douglas-Holdern, Norrie		UK		1965
Duke, Charles		USA		1964
Dyk, Gary		S. Africa	5 Commando	1966-67
Etheridge, Eddie*		UK	53 Commando	1965
Fabri		Italy	57 Commando	1964
Florence		Australia		1964
Gaffenka		W.Germany		1965
Gay, Alexander	1940	UK	57 Commando	1964-65
Glyn, Brian*				1964
Gordon, Ian	1933	UK	57 Commando	1964
Grant, Donald	1924	UK	5 Commando	1964-65
Griffin, 'Lucky'		Kenya	51 Commando	1965
Grobbelaar, Murry		S. Africa	Force Oscar	1965
Hagen		Germany	Force John	1965
Harrison	1916	Australia	Quartermaster	1964
Hoare, Mike	1919	Ireland	5 Commando	1964-65
Houldsworth, Bob	1940	UK	5 Commando	
Howard, Willis*			53 Commando	1964
Jacqmain, Maurice		Belgium	5 Commando	1964
Johnstone, Peter		UK	5 Commando	1964
Karavidas, Georges		Greece	5 Commando	1964
Kenny, Donald		UK	5 Commando	1964-65
King, Sandy*		UK	5 Commando	1964
Kirton, Pat		S. Africa	5 Commando	1964
Köhler, Bernard*		E. Germany	52 Commando	1964
Kotteritsch, Fritz*	1935	W. Germany	52 Commando	1964
Koukoulis		Greece	Force Oscar	1965

Krahl, Goerg		W. Germany	52 Commando	1964-65
Krumme, Peter*			52 Commando	1964
Kyriakis* (drowned Baraka)		Greece		1965
Larson, Roy		Sweden	57/58 Commando	1964
Latinis Armand, François		Belgium		1964
Linde, Van Der Duck		S. Africa	53 Commando	1964
Linton		S. Rhodesia	53 Commando	1964
Lord, Dougie		UK		1964
Louw, Ben		S. Rhodesia	52 Commando	1964-65
Maiden, Jack	1919	S. Africa	53/56 Commando	1964
Mandy, George		S. Africa		1965
Masy, Charles	1925	Belgium	52 Commando	1965
McCabe, Edward		S. Africa		1965
McIntosh, John	1919	UK		1964
McRory, Mark		USA	57 Commando	1965
Meyer, Jacobus		S. Africa		1964
Minsk		W. Germany	5 Commando	
Moggach, Gerry		UK	53 Commando	
Morgan		UK	52 Commando	1964-65
Morgenster, Jethro 'Jet'		USA		1964
Nestler, Walter*		W. Germany		1964
Nolte*				1965
O'Mally			Recruiter	
Osthuizen*				1964
Parkinson		UK	51 Commando	1964
Patterson, John		S. Africa	53 Commando	1965
Peters, John		UK	Various	1964-65

Rademeyer*				1965
Rall*				1965
Regazzi, Mario		Italy		
Richter-Nel, Hendrik		W. Germany	52 Commando	1964
Roets		Kenya	57 Commando	1964
Rohwein, Peter		S. Rhodesia	Force Oscar	1964-65
Sachs, Jerry		Israel	53 Commando	
Saeyns, 'Joey'		Belgium		1965
Sarsfield, Patrick	1940	Ireland		1965
Schindler, Wilfred		W. Germany	53 Commando	
Schmitt, Fritz		W. Germany	52 Commando	1964-65
Schricker		S. Africa	52 Commando	1964-65
Schoeman, Boet		Kenya	57 Commando	1964
Schroeder, Georg		S. Africa	Various	1964-67
Shoesmith, Samuel		USA		1965
Smallberger*		S. Africa		1965
Smallman, Sammy*				1964
Spencer, Jeremy*		UK		1964
Springboks		S. Africa	51 Commando	1964
Stevens, Alan		S. Rhodesia	56 Commando	1964
Stubbe, Peter		W. Germany	57 Commando	1964
Ulmer, Allan*			52 Commando	1965
Van de Hoek		Netherlands		1964
Van der Westhuizen*		S. Africa	Cook	1964
Van Oppen, Hugh		UK	Various	1964
Wepener, J.F.*		S. Rhodesia	51/54 Commando	1964
Wettangel, Heinz*		Austria	52 Commando	1964

Wicks, Alistair		UK	Various	1964-65
Williams, 'Taffy'		UK	Force Oscar	1965
Williams, L.H.		USA		
Wilson, Gary	1940	UK	51 Commando	1964
Young *			51 Commando	1964

* Denotes killed in action

ANNEX 14. Photo Album

1) Members of the *Compagnie Internationale*, Congo, 1961. Nigel Osborn, standing sixth from left.¹⁰³⁰



2) Members of *Compagnie Internationale*, Congo, 1961.



¹⁰³⁰ Photos courtesy of Nigel Osborn.

3) Jean-Marie Crèvecoeur (left) and Guy Weber.



4) Crèvecoeur and Weber aboard a helicopter of the Katangan Air Force



5) United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Congo (probably Swedish).¹⁰³¹



6) Mike Hoare, Commanding Officer of 4 and 5 Commando.¹⁰³²



¹⁰³¹ Photo courtesy of Tommy Nilsson.

¹⁰³² Photo Alamy.

7) Bob Denard, Commanding Officer of 6 Commando.¹⁰³³



¹⁰³³ Photo Alamy.

8) Jean Schramme of the *Batallion Léopard*.



9) Reginaldo Blanco (left) with Padre O' Farril and Ignacio Padilla, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, circa. 1963.¹⁰³⁴



¹⁰³⁴ Photo courtesy of Reginaldo Blanco

10) From left to right: Jorge Miguel Gonzales, Reginaldo Blanco, unknown, Padre O' Farril, and Pedro Garcia, Lackland Air Force Base, circa. 1963.¹⁰³⁵



11) From left to right: Sosa Chabau, Gonzalo Herrera, Alberto Guiterrez "Dr. Kildare", Reginaldo Blanco (crouching), René Garcia, Mecanico Quintero. Kamina Air Base, Katanga, Congo, circa 1965.



¹⁰³⁵ Photo courtesy of Reginaldo Blanco.

12) Reginaldo Blanco with CIA Operations Officer, Panchito Alvarez, Belgian Air Force liaisons Officer, and Major Avi Blume (Wing Ops. FATAAC).¹⁰³⁶



13) Reginaldo Blanco (right) with Francisco "Panchito" Alvarez, in front of T-28, Stanleyville, circa. 1964-1965.



¹⁰³⁶ Photos 4, 5 and 6, courtesy of Reginaldo Blanco.

14) Reginaldo Blanco (right) with Francisco "Panchito" Alvarez, at controls of B-26, Uvira, Congo, circa 1964-1965.¹⁰³⁷



15) Reginaldo Blanco at wheel of jeep with from left to right: "Tony" Blazquez, "Panchito" Alvarez, Quintero Mendez, Thomas Afont, Castor Cereceda Coira, Macaco Bernal, and Valliciergo, Stanleyville, Congo, circa. 1964-1965.¹⁰³⁸




¹⁰³⁷ Photo courtesy of Reginaldo Blanco.

¹⁰³⁸ Photo courtesy of Manny Pichardo.

16) Makasi B-26 bomber, Congo.¹⁰³⁹



17) Makasi Helicopter (note stretcher).



¹⁰³⁹ Photo courtesy of Tony Blazquez.

18) The Stanleyville Column, November, 1964.¹⁰⁴⁰



19) 5 Commando members inspect captured Soviet weapons¹⁰⁴¹



Alamy A6T21 G

¹⁰⁴⁰ Photo courtesy of Alamy


¹⁰⁴¹ Photo courtesy of Alamy

20) Members of 5 Commando.



Alamy BHK3KB

21) 5 Commando in African village.



Alamy CPH1G3

22) Simba rebels.



23) Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville airport. (Note USAF C-47 transport plane).¹⁰⁴²



¹⁰⁴² Photos, Alamy

24) Belgian paratroopers take the control tower at Stanleyville airport.



25) Belgian paratroopers offloading from USAF C-47 at Stanleyville during *Dragon Rouge*.¹⁰⁴³



¹⁰⁴³ Photo courtesy of Getty Images.

26) Belgian troops offload equipment at Stanleyville airport. (Note USAF C-47).



27) Belgian paratroops fight their way through Stanleyville. The bodies of several Europeans killed by Simba rebels lie on the ground.



28) *Makasi* commandos make their way to Kilometre 8. Juan Tamayo (front left), Al Larson (standing in jeep).



29) 5 Commando after capture of Stanleyville¹⁰⁴⁴



¹⁰⁴⁴ Photo courtesy of Alamy.

30) Survivors of the Stanleyville massacre arrive in Brussels, November 1964.¹⁰⁴⁵



31) The MRR's Manuel Artime, Ricardo Chavez (leader of *Makasi* naval forces), and Rafael 'Chi Chi' Quintero.¹⁰⁴⁶



¹⁰⁴⁵ Courtesy of Getty Images.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Courtesy of Alamy.

32) MRR leaders.¹⁰⁴⁷



33) The *Makasi* Navy. Jim Hawes, CIA, top left, Ricardo Chavez, middle row, third from left), Roberto Pichardo (crouching centre), "Papo" Reyes (crouching left).¹⁰⁴⁸



¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Photos courtesy of Roberto Pichardo.

34) The *Makasi* naval force, Albertville, 1965.¹⁰⁴⁹



35) The SWIFT Boat *Gitana*, Lake Tanganyika, 1965.¹⁰⁵⁰



¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Courtesy of Roberto Pichardo.

36) Cuban Exile naval force, Lake Tanganyika, circa. 1965-1966.¹⁰⁵¹



37) Eulogio "Papo" Reyes (left) with member of 5 Commando (naval crew), Lake Tanganyika.¹⁰⁵²



¹⁰⁵¹ Photo courtesy of Manny Pichardo.

¹⁰⁵² Ibid.

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'Bob' (French helicopter pilot, Congo)

Reginaldo Blanco (Cuban exile pilot, Congo)

Jesus Couce (Bay of Pigs veteran)

Frederico Falquer (Cuban Exile pilot, Congo)

Jim Hawes (Central Intelligence Agency, Congo)

Eddie McCabe (Member of 5 Commando, Congo)

Jean-Marie Nicolas (Son of *Force Publique* Chief Adjutant, Camp Hardy, Congo)

David McAllister (Survivor of Kilometre 8, Congo)

Andy McNeil (Central Intelligence Organisation, Rhodesia)

Jon Merriman (Son of John Merriman, Intermountain pilot, KIA, Congo)

Peter Mishou (Son of Leighton Mishou, Central Intelligence Agency, Congo)

William Muir (Bay of Pigs veteran)

Tommy Nilson (Member of United Nations peacekeeping force, Congo)

Nigel Osborne (Member of *Compagnie Internationale*, Congo)

John E. Padbury (Special Branch, Counterinsurgency, Rhodesia)

Juan Peron (Cuban Exile pilot, Congo)

Roberto Pichardo (Bay of Pigs veteran, and member of Cuban Exile Naval force)

Rafael Quintero (Cuban exile naval force, Congo)

Janet Joy Ray (Daughter of Pete Ray, killed at Bay of Pigs)

Juan Rocha (United States Marines, US Embassy guard, Congo, 1965)

Ignacio Rojas (Bay of Pigs veteran, and Cuban Exile pilot, Congo)

Eulogio 'Papo' Reyes (Bay of Pigs veteran)

Victor Rosez (Member of 10 Commando, Congo)

Colonel Joseph C. Smith (US veteran of Vietnam War and Rhodesian Bush War)

Michèle Timmermans-Zoll (Belgian survivor of Stanleyville massacre)

Felix Toledo (Bay of Pigs veteran, and member of Cuban exile Naval force)

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