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# Defending the ottoman capital against the russian threat : late eighteenth century fortifications of Istanbul

Hümeyra Bostan

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**DE L'UNIVERSITÉ PSL**

Préparée à l'École Pratique des Hautes Études  
Dans le cadre d'une cotutelle avec l'Université d'Istanbul Şehir

**Défendre la Capitale Ottomane Contre la Menace Russe :  
Les Fortifications d'Istanbul à la fin du XVIIIe Siècle**

Defending the Ottoman Capital Against the Russian Threat:  
Late Eighteenth Century Fortifications of Istanbul

Soutenue par

**Hümeyra BOSTAN**

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


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## ABSTRACT

### DEFENDING THE OTTOMAN CAPITAL AGAINST THE RUSSIAN THREAT: LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FORTIFICATIONS OF ISTANBUL

Bostan, Hümeyra.

PhD. in History

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Engin Deniz Akarlı

Thesis Co-Advisor: Prof. Dr. Nicolas Vatin

January 2020, 377 pages.

This dissertation examines the fortification of the Bosphorus meant to help defend Istanbul against the growing Russian threat at the end of the eighteenth century. The adaptation of new construction techniques, the development of an administrative system to run and maintain the defenses effectively, and the organization of the military personnel and munitions in the fortresses are the sub-themes of the dissertation.

The Ottomans recognized the importance of fortifying the Black Sea Strait in view of the threat posed by Russia and its rising military power. They accelerated their efforts to take security measures by establishing new fortresses and batteries along the shores of the Bosphorus. The creation of a “Superintendency of the Bosphorus” as a new administrative unit is an indicator of the Ottoman attention to the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea.

This dissertation uses a holistic approach to address different but interrelated issues, including fortress construction, administration, and military organization. Keeping in mind the broader issue of the Ottomans’ responses to the technological and political challenges they faced at the end of the eighteenth century, this study sheds light on new techniques introduced by French engineers and on the Ottoman adaptation to innovation, including new techniques of organization. The dissertation also discusses the Ottoman efforts to find solutions to the problems of

finding qualified men, establishing discipline, and maintaining effective organization in the construction projects.

This research employs rich archival material from the Ottoman State Archives and the French Military and Diplomatic Archives, as well as the memoirs of French engineers and Ottoman and French maps and plans. A comparative analysis of these sources indicates that the Ottomans were decisive in adopting innovative defensive techniques in collaboration with French engineers. Yet this was no mere imitation of European forms or crude Westernization. The Ottomans were active decision-makers and participants who localized and adapted the available technical knowledge of the era for their own purposes and to meet their own ends.

Keywords: Istanbul, fortification, defense, Bosphorus, Ottoman Empire, Russian threat

ÖZ

RUS TEHDİDİ KARŞISINDA OSMANLI BAŞKENTİNİ SAVUNMAK: ONSEKİZİNCİ  
YÜZYILDA İSTANBUL'UN İSTİHKÂMI

Bostan, Hümeýra.

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Ocak 2020, 377 sayfa.

Bu tez on sekizinci yüzyıl sonunda Karadeniz’de artan Rus tehdidi karşısında Osmanlılar’ın İstanbul Boğazı’nı istihkamını incelemektedir. Yeni inşa tekniklerinin benimsenmesi, İstanbul Boğazı’nın güvenliğini daha etkin bir şekilde sağlayabilmek için idari bir birim kurulması ve kalelerdeki askeri personel tezin alt başlıklarını oluşturmaktadır.

Osmanlılar Rusya’nın ve yükselen askeri gücünün oluşturduğu tehdidi öngörerek Karadeniz Boğazı’nın istihkamının önemini fark etti. Bunun üzerine İstanbul Boğazı ya da Osmanlılar’ın deyişle *Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı* sahillerine yeni kale ve tabyalar inşa ederek güvenlik tedbirlerini artırdı. Ayrıca “Boğaz Nazırlığı” adında yeni bir idari teşkilat kurdu.

Bu tez kale inşası, mühendislik teknikleri, Boğaz güvenliğinin idaresi ve askeri organizasyonu gibi birbirinden farklı fakat ilişkili meseleleri kapsamlı bir yaklaşımla ele almaktadır. On sekizinci yüzyıl sonunda Osmanlılar’ın dönemin teknolojik, ekonomik ve siyasi tehditleri karşısında Fransız mühendislerin getirdiği yeni teknikleri algılayış ve adaptasyon sürecini incelemektedir. Bununla beraber kale inşa süreçlerinde ortaya çıkan vasıfsız insan (*kaht-ı ricâl*), düzen ve disiplin sağlama ve etkin yönetim geliştirme gibi sorunları ve Osmanlılar’ın bulduğu çözümleri tartışmaktadır.

Arařtırmada Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi, Fransız Askeri ve Diplomasi Arřivleri ile Fransız mhendislerin hatıratları yanında Fransız ve Osmanlı harita ve planlarından yararlanılmıřtır. Bu kaynakların mukayeseli analizi sonucunda Osmanlılar'ın Fransız mhendislerle iřbirlięi halinde modern istihkam tekniklerini benimseyerek kendilerine mal ettikleri ve Avrupa'da yaygınlařan mhendislik eęitimini kendi sistemlerine entegre etmede kararlı oldukları anlařılmaktadır. Ancak bu sreç, literatrde yaygın olan kanaatin aksine Batılılařma ya da Avrupa'yı taklit etme gibi bir motivasyon ya da yntemle yapılmamıřtır. Osmanlılar karar mercii ya da bizzat çalıřanlar olarak dnemin teknik bilgisini yerelleřtirmiř, kendi amaçlarına uygun olarak benimsemiř ya da reddetmiř ve ihtiyaçlarını karřılamanın pratik ve etkili yollarını bulmaya çalıřmıřtır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstanbul, Boęaz, kale, istihkam, savunma, Osmanlı İmparatorluęu, Rus tehdidi



## RÉSUMÉ

### DÉFENDRE LA CAPITALE OTTOMANE CONTRE LA MENACE RUSSE : LES FORTIFICATIONS D'ISTANBUL À LA FIN DU XVIII<sup>e</sup> SIÈCLE

Bostan, Hümeýra.

Thèse d'histoire

Directeur de thèse : Prof. Dr. Engin Deniz Akarlı

Co-directeur de thèse : Prof. Dr. Nicolas Vatin

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Cette thèse porte sur la fortification du Bosphore pour la défense d'Istanbul contre la menace russe à la fin du dix-huitième siècle. L'adaptation de nouvelles techniques de construction, la mise en place d'un système administratif permettant de gérer et de maintenir efficacement les défenses, ainsi que l'organisation du personnel militaire et des munitions dans les forteresses sont les sous-thèmes de la thèse.

Les Ottomans ont estimé important de fortifier le détroit de la mer Noire face aux menaces russes et à la montée en puissance de l'armée russe. Ils ont accéléré leurs efforts pour prendre des mesures de sécurité en établissant de nouvelles forteresses et de nouvelles batteries le long des rives du Bosphore. La création d'une nouvelle unité administrative sous le nom de « Surintendance du Bosphore » témoigne de la prise de conscience de la gravité de la menace par les Ottomans face à la montée de la menace russe en mer Noire.

Cette thèse aborde des questions différentes mais interdépendantes telles que la construction, l'administration et l'organisation militaire des forteresses avec une approche holistique. Gardant à l'esprit le problème plus général des réponses ottomanes aux défis technologiques et politiques auxquels ils ont été confrontés à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, cette étude examine les nouvelles techniques apportées aux Ottomans par les ingénieurs français, l'adaptation des Ottomans à l'innovation, des

facteurs tels que le manque d'hommes qualifiés, de discipline et d'organisation dans les projets de construction.

Cette recherche est fondée sur une grande variété de sources. Ainsi, une riche documentation d'archive provenant des Archives d'État ottomanes et des Archives militaires et diplomatiques françaises, ainsi que des mémoires d'ingénieurs français, de cartes et de plans ottomans et français ont été étudiés. Une analyse comparative de ces sources indique que les Ottomans ont joué un rôle décisif dans l'innovation dans leurs techniques de défense en collaboration avec des ingénieurs français, non dans un souci d'occidentalisation ni pour imiter les pratiques européennes, comme le supposent la plupart des auteurs de la littérature actuelle, mais en tant que décideurs et participants actifs, adaptant localement les connaissances techniques qu'ils choisirent d'adopter.

Mots-clés : Istanbul, fortification, défense, Bosphore, Empire Ottoman, menace russe

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Writing a dissertation on history is a daunting task that requires the careful consideration of a variety of sources, methods, and approaches. It is also one that demands consultation and cooperation with various individuals at different levels.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

TDV DİA: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi

Ed: Editor

Ibid.: In the same source

MEB: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı

TTK: Türk Tarih Kurumu

## NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS AND DATES

All translations belong to me unless stated otherwise.

The Hijri dates are presented with their Gregorian equivalents either in the text or in the footnote. If a document includes a date, it is referred. If the document is undated, then the approximate dates provided by the Ottoman archival catalogues are not referred.

Abbreviations for the primary sources are provided in the Bibliography.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This dissertation examines the Ottoman fortification of the Bosphorus in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—a period of crisis, war, reform efforts, and transformation. It explores the defensive strategies the Ottoman Empire employed along the Bosphorus against the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea. Its sub-themes include the Ottoman adaptation of new construction techniques, development of an administrative system to run and maintain effective defenses, and organization of military personnel and munitions in the Bosphorus fortresses.

The dissertation is not a military history. It does not focus on military strategies or on defensive or offensive tactics, although it occasionally makes note of them where sources evidently point to such details. Instead, the study deals with the organization and institutionalization of Istanbul's defenses against Russian intrusion from the Black Sea, focusing on the construction of fortresses, batteries, and redoubts along the northern shores of the Bosphorus, their administration under the newly established Superintendency of the Bosphorus, and the military organization of their personnel and munitions.

This study also sheds light on new techniques introduced by French engineers and on how the Ottoman Empire adapted to these innovations, including new techniques of organization. The dissertation also discusses the empire's efforts to find solutions to the problems of finding qualified men, establishing discipline, and maintaining effective organization in its construction projects.

This research also aims to reveal the difference between city and frontier fortification and strait fortification in the case of Istanbul through a study of the administrative and military organization of the Bosphorus fortresses. How did the seven Bosphorus fortresses coordinate their operations? What were their different



tasks? What was the Ottoman Admiralty's place in the organization of the Bosphorus defenses?

This is a modest attempt to understand the military, technological, and architectural reforms experienced in the late-eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire in the context of the Bosphorus defense system. A study of the efforts to strengthen the defense of Istanbul against Russia will shed significant light on the Ottoman reform era.

### **1.1. A Brief History of the Ottoman Black Sea**

Immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman navy under the command of Grand Vizier Mahmud Paşa sailed to the Black Sea, taking Amasra from the Genoese in 1460. Then, they incorporated the İsfendiyaroğlu Emirate (Sinop and its surroundings) and the Empire of Trebizond in 1461.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Ottomans annexed some important cities and ports from the Genoese, including Caffa and then Crimea in 1475.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, "the Black Sea was transformed into an 'Ottoman lake,'<sup>3</sup> and through the sixteenth century the empire enjoyed the economic benefits deriving from relatively easy control of this rich region."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Theoharis Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453–1474)*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 128.

<sup>2</sup> Halil İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 276-280. See also Halil İnalçık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea I: The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487-1490*, ed. by Victor Ostapchuk, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Ostapchuk elaborates on the use of the term "Ottoman lake" during a period of intense Cossack pirate raids that challenged the Ottomans' authority in the Black Sea. For this discussion, see Victor Ostapchuk, "XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıl Kazak Deniz Akınları Karşısında Osmanlı Karadeniz'i", *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. by İdris Bostan and Salih Özbaran, (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2009), 241-253. Other articles that also discuss the use of such terms as "inland sea," "inner lake," and "Ottoman lake" for the Black Sea include the following: Dariusz Kolodziejcki, "Inner Lake or Frontier? The Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires en mer Noire, (XIV- XXI siècles), études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, (Musée de Braïla, Editions Istros, Braïla, 2007), pp. 125-141; Anca Popescu, "La mer Noire Ottomane: Mare clausum? Mare Apertum?", in *Enjeux politiques, économiques et militaires en mer Noire, (XIV- XXI siècles), études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, Musée de Braïla, ed. by F. Bilici, I. Candea, A. Popescu, (Editions Istros, Braïla, 2007), pp. 141- 171.

<sup>4</sup> Victor Ostapchuk, "Five Documents from the Topkapi Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639)" *Journal of Turkish Studies*, (no. 11, 1987), 49.

The imperial capital of the Ottoman Empire heavily depended on provisions coming from the northern Black Sea, including wheat, meat, salt, honey, and fish. The easiest and cheapest way of transporting these goods was sea transportation via Black Sea. Crimea alone supplied one ton of salt to Istanbul per year. The Don and Danube rivers supplied thousands of barrels of fish. The northern steppes of the Black Sea region became an integral part of the Ottoman economy with their livestock and wheat.<sup>5</sup> The import of slaves from the Black Sea region was economically important as well.<sup>6</sup> Ottoman control of the Black Sea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also allowed passage up the Danube as far as Buda, which was of great strategic importance. As a result, the Black Sea region and Istanbul became mutually dependent on each other's trade and markets.

As the Ottomans solidified their dominance over the Black Sea and its surroundings, the region gradually became closed to international trade.<sup>7</sup> The Ottomans began to prohibit most foreign vessels from passing the straits and sailing in the Black Sea. The letter of Sultan Mustafa II sent by Sultan Ahmed III to Tsar Peter the Great indicates the Ottoman perception that the Black Sea "was totally in the possession of the Ottomans and others had no concern with it. No foreign vessel had the right to sail in the Black Sea according to the pact."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Karadeniz'de Kazaklar ve Rusya: İstanbul Boğazı Tehlikede", 62; Halil İnalçık, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea Under the Ottomans", *Archeion Pontou*, (Vol: 35, Athens 1979), pp.74-110.

<sup>6</sup> Mikhail B. Kizilov, "The Black Sea and the Slave Trade: The Role of Crimean Maritime Towns in the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries" in *The Black Sea and the Slave Trade: The Role of Crimean Maritime Towns in the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2017).

<sup>7</sup> Halil İnalçık, *The Customs Register of Caffa*, 110. For other interpretations of the closing of the Black Sea, see Kemal Beydilli, "Karadeniz'in Kapalılığı Karşısında Avrupa Küçük Devletleri ve Miri Ticaret Teşebbüsü", *Bellekten*, (Vol. 214, Ankara, 1991), 687-755.

<sup>8</sup> İdris Bostan, "Rusya'nın Karadeniz'de Ticarete Başlaması ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1700—1787)", *Osmanlı Deniz Ticareti*, (İstanbul: Küre, 2019), 96; Cemal Tükin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Üniversite Matbaacılık, 1947), 37: "...Karadeniz bi'l-küllîye kabza-i tasarruf-ı hüsrevânemizde olup kimesnenin alâkası olmamağla ahidnâme-i hümâyunum muktezâsinca âhardan bir kayığın Karadeniz'e çıkmasına mesâğ olmayup..." BOA, NH. nr. 6, p. 37. Another Ottoman source that shares a similar perception of the Black Sea is the *Tevârih* of Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, written in the nineteenth century. There, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa writes that the Black Sea was a kind of Ottoman lake of sorts: "Vaktiyle Karadeniz Devlet-i Aliyye'nin bir havzı mesabesinde iken Rusyalı Kırım'ı istila ile...", Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, III. Cilt. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 138.

Russia received the right of free commercial navigation on the Black Sea with the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, but it was obliged to use Ottoman vessels. Then Russia gained the right to engage in merchant shipping with their own vessels with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.<sup>9</sup> Later, it annexed Crimea and signed the Treaty of Commerce with the Ottoman Empire in 1783.<sup>10</sup> All these developments weakened the Ottoman supremacy in the Black Sea.

The question of supremacy in the Black Sea is directly related to the issue of the Straits. As Halil İnalçık puts it, “historically, that the state which controlled the Straits has ... always striven to establish control over the Black Sea. And in fact, those states ruling over the mainland on both sides of the Straits, the Byzantines and the Ottomans, did achieve this. Conversely, those states which were dominant on the Black Sea, and those which were a naval power in the Mediterranean, have endeavored to extend their control over the Straits, as did Venice, Genoa, Russia and England.”<sup>11</sup> On this interpretation, the loss of Ottoman supremacy in the Black Sea and the rise of Russia as a commercial and then political rival to the Ottoman Empire posed a threat to the Straits and Istanbul.

## **1.2. The Rise of Russia vis-à-vis the Ottomans**

The rise of the Romanov dynasty in Russia in 1613 marked a turning point in Russian history. Under the Romanovs, who ruled until the revolution of 1917, Russia transformed from a duchy into an empire. Crucial to this transformation were the

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<sup>9</sup> The trading rights of Russia were amended in the Convention of Aynalıkavak in 1779.

<sup>10</sup> Tukin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, 48, 50; Adrian Tertecel “The Russian-Ottoman Peace Treaty of Belgrade (1739) and Its Consequences” in *Enjeux politiques économiques et militaires en mer Noire XVe-XXIe siècles: études à la mémoire de Mihail Guboglu*, ed. by Faruk Bilici, Ionel Candea and Anca Popescu, (Braila: Muse de Braila, Editions Istros, 2007), 228; Bostan, “Rusya’nın Karadeniz’de Ticarete Başlaması”, 104.

<sup>11</sup> Halil İnalçık, “The Question of the Closing of The Black Sea Under The Ottomans”, *Archeion Pontou*, (Vol: 35, Athens 1979), 74.

military and naval reforms carried out under Peter the Great (r. 1689-1725).<sup>12</sup> At the start of Peter's reign, Russia's armed forces were poorly equipped, untrained, and undisciplined. By the time of his death, Russia had an army of at least 200,000 soldiers, uniformed, efficiently provisioned, and equipped with improved Russian-made artillery.<sup>13</sup>

Russia also adopted an expansionist policy during the eighteenth century,<sup>14</sup> seeking protection against hostile states, control over natural resources and agricultural plains, and most importantly control over the riverways and their connections to the sea.<sup>15</sup> However, reforming the army was insufficient to secure these goals. To navigate the rivers and to access the Black Sea, Russia needed a well-organized navy, so as to be able to confront the Ottomans, who had centuries of naval and maritime experience.<sup>16</sup> Thus, one of Peter's major projects was founding a new arsenal and a navy. First, Peter built a fleet on the rivers with the help of Dutch shipmasters from Amsterdam. Then, he moved the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg, a city on the shores of the Baltic Sea in the north of Russia to which he gave his name. There he founded a new arsenal and constructed the first Russian fleet.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For a close reading of the Petrine era, see Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Lindsey Hughes, "Petrine Russia" in *A Companion to Russian History*, ed. by. Abbott Gleason, (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 165-179; Paul Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671-1725*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014), 267-291. For a detailed overview and analysis of reforms implemented in the reign of Peter the Great, see James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Culture*, (Harvard University Press, 2004).

<sup>13</sup> Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, 64.

<sup>14</sup> For a details on the eighteenth-century Russian Empire, see Aleksandr Borisovich Kamenskii, *The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for a Place in the World*, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

<sup>15</sup> Abdurrahim Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations Between the Years 1774-1787", (MA Thesis. Bilkent University: 2008), 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> On Ottoman maritime power, see İdris Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: Deniz Politikaları, Teşkilat ve Gemiler*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2017); Daniel Panzac, *La marine ottoman: de l'apogée à la chute de l'Empire (1572-1923)*, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2009); Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*, (State University of New York Press, 1994).

<sup>17</sup> James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Culture*, (Harvard University Press, 2004), 17, 83; Lindsey Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter the Great*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 21, 63.

The new Russian navy posed a threat to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian river fleet sailed via the Don River and in July 1696 succeeded in taking the Ottoman port of Azov, which is on the northern extension of the Black Sea and linked on the south by the Kerch Strait.<sup>18</sup> The Karlowitz Treaty of 1699 constituted the first symbolic success of Russia by proving that the Ottomans were not the sole dominant power in the Black Sea.<sup>19</sup> However, the Ottomans defeated Russia's forces at the Battle of the Pruth,<sup>20</sup> thereby forcing the Russians to surrender Azov in 1711. Although the Russians were able to build a fleet on the Black Sea in the meantime, most of Azov had to be surrendered after the "Ottoman catastrophe," as Carol Stevens puts it.<sup>21</sup> Still, the Russians had managed to gain a brief foothold on the Black Sea and thereafter would continue to fight for more permanent one.

As Halil İnalçık puts it, "Russia became a major European power while the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate and Poland suffered from the drastic change in the balance of power in favor of their age-old enemy. Russia was now the dominant power in eastern Europe. The Crimea itself and the Ottoman Black Sea possessions fell under the threat of a Russian invasion."<sup>22</sup> As a consequence of this drastic change, the Ottoman and Russian Empires fought three major wars during the eighteenth century, from 1735 to 1739, 1768 to 1774 and 1787 to 1792.

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<sup>18</sup> "Sea of Azov" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed via <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sea-of-Azov> on 23 September 2019.

<sup>19</sup> Faruk Bilici, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Karadeniz'de Osmanlı-Rus Mücadelesi", in *XVIII. Yüzyıl Başından XX. Yüzyıla Kadar Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. by. Zeki Arıkan and Lütfü Sancar, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2009), 28.

<sup>20</sup> For more information on the Battle of the Pruth, see Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı 1123 (1711)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953); Hakan Yıldız, *Haydi Osmanlı Seferi! Prut Seferinde Organizasyon ve Lojistik*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006).

<sup>21</sup> Hughes, *Russia in the Age of Peter*, 82; Carol B. Stevens, *Russia's Wars of Emergence, 1460-1730*, (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2007), 219-253, 265-268; Brian Davies, *Warfare, State and Society in the Black Sea Steppe*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 183-187; Tükin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, 19-40; Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great, 183-186*, 306.

<sup>22</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature", in *Passé-turco-tatar, présent soviétique: Études offertes à Alexander Bennigsen*, ed. Chantal Lemerrier-Quellejey, et al. (Louvain and Paris, 1986), 206-207.

### 1.2.1. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1735-39

In the first war, Russian armies entered Crimea, where they captured Bahçesaray and destroyed Hansaray (the palace of the Crimean Khans). They also captured Ochakov (Özi) Fortress and Yaş (Jassy). The war was concluded on 3 October 1739 with the Treaty of Niş (as an annex to the Treaty of Belgrade), which claimed neither a defeat nor a victory for either side. The Russians accepted renouncing their claim to Crimea and Moldavia, while the Ottomans allowed them to build a port at Azov on the condition that the fort be demolished and no fleet enter the Black Sea.<sup>23</sup>

### 1.2.2. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74

Russia consolidated its power and posed a stronger threat to the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Catherine II (r. 1762-1796).<sup>24</sup> She turned the mission of reaching the shores of the Black Sea and taking Istanbul into an important state policy.<sup>25</sup> The Russian war of 1768-1774 proved to be a turning point for both sides.

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<sup>23</sup> Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations", 9-10; Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi*, 296; Tükin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, 41-49. See also İlhami Daniş, "1736-1739 Savaşlarında Karadeniz'de Osmanlı Donanması", (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 2007). To read the Russo-Ottoman War of 1735-39 from an Ottoman chronicler, see "İfsâd-ı Bilâd an Cânib-i Moskov ve Tahrik-i Re'âyâ" in *Osmanlı Rus İlişkileri Tarihi: Ahmet Câvid Bey'in Muntehebâtı*, prep. by. Adnan Baycar, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2004), 216-227. For the treaty articles, see *Osmanlı Rus İlişkileri Tarihi*, 239-243. "Azak kal'ası bi'l-küllîye hedm olunup tarafeynden murâd olunan sulh-ı mü'eyyedîni nizâm u takrîri için bin yedi yüz ya'ni on üç târîhinde olan hudûd ile tarafeynin tasarrufundan ihrâc ve hâliyetü'l-hâliye beyne'd-devleteyn fâsıla kala. [...] Ve Moskov Devleti tarafından Azak Denizi'nde ve Karadeniz'de sefâ'in ve ceng gemileri ihdâs ve icrâ olunmaya."

<sup>24</sup> For detailed information on the personality and reign of Catherine the Great, see Vasili Osipovich Kliuchevsky, *A Course in Russian History: The Time of Catherine the Great*, (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great*, (London: Phoenix, 2003); William Tooke, *View of the Russian Empire During the Reign of Catharine the Second and to the Close of the Eighteenth Century*, 3 vols, (London, 1800).

<sup>25</sup> See Hugh, Ragsdale, 'Evaluating The Traditions Of Russian Aggression: Catherine II And The Greek Project' *Slavonic and East European Review*, 1988 66 (1), pp. 91-117. The Russian motivation to take Istanbul, which is known as "the Greek Project," will be discussed in detail in the third chapter.

The Ottoman Empire pursued a peaceful foreign policy until Sultan Mustafa III's critical decision to declare war on Russia in October 1768.<sup>26</sup> The grand vizier Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa opposed this decision and wanted to postpone the war, because the Ottomans lacked the necessary defense structures and the military was disorganized and lacked equipment. However, Mustafa III and the majority of the empire's bureaucrats insisted on going to war, with dire consequences for the future of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>27</sup>

Ahmed Resmi Efendi, the Ottoman statesman and chronicler of the era, considered Sultan Mustafa III's decision to declare war on Russia a mistake, a choice neither inevitable nor advisable, while Mikhail Vorontsov, a foreign policy advisor, believed the disputes between the two empires could be resolved by diplomacy instead of war.<sup>28</sup> Russian historian Brian Davies explains the Ottoman insistence on declaring war as a result of Sultan Mustafa III's perception that recent Russian operations had damaged the security of northern frontiers: "the balance of power in the northern Caucasus had tilted away from the Crimean Tatars; the Nogai hordes were beginning to defect to the Russian Empire; the Russian army was more solidly entrenched in Ukraine than ever before, poised again to attack Crimea and Bucak; Wallachia and especially Moldavia were restless again; large numbers of Russian

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<sup>26</sup> For more detailed information on the personality and reign of Sultan Mustafa III, see Kemal Beydilli, "Mustafa III", *TDV DİA*, 31 (2006); B. S. Baykal, "Mustafa III" *M.E.B. İslam Ansiklopedisi*; J. H. Kramers, "Mustafa III", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol VII (1993); Mustafa Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011), vol. V, pp. 2552-2603; Nicolas Vatin, "Mustafa III", *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman*, (Fayard, 2015).

<sup>27</sup> For an analysis of the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia and the conditions of the Ottoman army, provisioning, and war preparations, see Metin Bezikoğlu, "The Deterioration of Ottoman Administration in the Light of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774", (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2001), 37-53. See also Abdurrahim Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations Between the Years 1774-1787", (MA Thesis. Bilkent University: 2008), 16-19. Özer lists the reasons for declare war as follows: the feckless policies of the high officials; certain dignitaries' wish to gain the favor of the sultan; French diplomatic pressure and the efforts of the French ambassador in Istanbul, Saint-Priest; and the Polish question.

<sup>28</sup> Brian Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 46. See also Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783*, (Leiden: Brill, 1995).

troops were again stationed in Poland and were likely to remain for years; and the Russians had begun subverting even the Morean Greeks and Montenegrins.”<sup>29</sup>

The unexpected Russian attack on the Ottoman navy at Çeşme on 5-7 July 1770 shocked the Ottomans. The Russians brought their fleet all the way from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar with British help, and burnt down almost the entire Ottoman fleet at Çeşme in 1770, just as British Admiral Elphinston attempted to acquire a military base in the Dardanelles. In addition, the Ottomans lost lands such as Bender, Ismail, Kilia, and Akkerman to Russia in the war.<sup>30</sup>

Sultan Abdulhamid I succeeded to the throne during the war after his brother Mustafa III's death on 21 January 1774.<sup>31</sup> He had no choice but to sign the disastrous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca to end the war. The treaty further undermined the Ottoman control of the Black Sea. The Russians forced the Ottomans to grant independence to the Crimean Khanate. They also gained a strong presence in the Black Sea through the acquisition of several fortresses, including Kılburnu, Kerc, Yenikale, and Azak. And they secured commercial privileges for Russian merchants, including unrestricted access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via sea and overland routes. Furthermore, the treaty permitted Russia to open consulates in

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<sup>29</sup> Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War*, 48.

<sup>30</sup> M. Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011), vol. V, 2580-1; Bezikoğlu, “The Deterioration of Ottoman Administration”, 69-74; Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz*, 65-66.

<sup>31</sup> For more information on the life and reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I, see Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)*, (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001); Münir Aktepe, “Abdulhamid I”, *DiA* 1 (1988); M. C. Baysun, “Abdulhamid I”, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol I (1986); M.ustafa Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011, vol. V, pp. 2604-2659; Frédéric Hitzel, “Abdulhamid I”, *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman*, (Fayard, 2015).



any place in the Ottoman Empire in addition to their permanent embassy in Istanbul.<sup>32</sup>

The Ottomans lost prestige and power and were saddled with a huge economic burden as a consequence of the Russian victory and territorial gains. All these new Russian opportunities and rights caused apprehension for the Ottomans. The Ottomans recognized and accepted the new presence of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. They were forced to accept that they had lost their hegemony in the Black Sea and had to share it with Russia. The end of the war initiated a new phase in Ottoman-Russian relations. While the Porte remained defensive and struggled to preserve the status quo, Russia adopted an aggressive expansionist policy.<sup>33</sup> The Ottomans considered military and fiscal reforms more seriously. They also began to consider the strengthening and fortifying of the Ottoman borders in the Black Sea upon the loss of Bender, Ismail, Kili, Ibrail, and Akkerman during the Russo-Ottoman wars.<sup>34</sup>

### 1.2.3. The Rivalry over the Crimean Khanate

Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire were concerned and occupied with the issue of Crimea in the post-war period. From the Russian point of view, the Crimean Khanate posed a significant danger to Russia because according to the 1762 memorandum of the Russian prince Mareshal Vorontsov, the Crimeans made

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<sup>32</sup> Kahraman Şakul, "Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca" in Ágoston, Gábor, and Bruce Masters, eds. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, 317-8; Bilici, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Karadeniz'de Osmanlı-Rus Mücadelesi", 32-36; Bezikoğlu, "The Deterioration of Ottoman Administration", 91-103; Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations", 26-32. For the treaty articles, see also. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, Vol. I, (Princeton, 1956). For the Turkish version of the treaty, see Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri* vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953), pp. 121-137.

<sup>33</sup> Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations", 35.

<sup>34</sup> Mustafa Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011, vol. V, 2575, *Vâsıf Tarihi* vol. 2, s. 107; Victor Ostapchuk and Svitlana Bilyayeva, "The Ottoman Northern Black Sea Frontier at Akkerman Fortress: The View from a Historical and Archaeological Project" in *The Frontiers of the Ottoman Word*, ed. by. A. C. S. Peacock, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

frequent raids into Russian territory, captured many Russian subjects, and plundered Russian estates.<sup>35</sup>

Vorontsov's memorandum identified some threats from the Khanate but also considered the Khanate's military power to be declining, thus creating an opportunity to detach the Khanate from the Porte. As translated by B. Davies, Vorontsov said, "As long as the Khanate remains subject to the Turks, it will always be a terror to Russia; but when it is placed under Russian rule, or no longer dependent of anyone, then not only Russia's security would be reliably and firmly confirmed, but Azov and the Black Sea would be under her [Russia's] power, and the nearer eastern and southern lands would be under her guard, which would inevitably draw their commerce to us."<sup>36</sup> With this goal in mind, the Russians tried to develop their influence on the Crimean border, supported the independence of certain groups, and established a Russian consulate at Bahçesaray for the purpose not only of mediating disputes but also of collecting useful intelligence on the state, politics, military, and economy of the Crimean Khanate.<sup>37</sup>

In the post-war period, Russia continued to intervene in Crimean politics to make Şahin Giray the khan of Crimea. Şahin Giray was previously a military assistant (*yâver*) in Tsarine Catherine II's court in 1777. The Ottoman Empire and Russia struggled for influence in Crimea. They favored their own candidates for the khanate, but the Ottoman government proved unsuccessful in this rivalry. The Ottomans protested the Russianization policy of Şahin Giray in Crimea and began to

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<sup>35</sup> Brian Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 38. For the history of the Crimean Khanate according to the Ottoman Topkapı Palace sources, see Alexandre Bennigsen, *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı*, (Paris: Mouton Éditeur, 1978).

<sup>36</sup> Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War*, 42.

<sup>37</sup> Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War*, 42. See also O'Neill, Kelly Ann, "Between subversion and submission: The integration of the Crimean khanate into the Russian empire, 1783-1853," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2006); Seher Karakuş Özvar, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Çöküşü ve Kırım Topraklarının Rus İşgali Altına Girmesi," (M.A. Thesis, İnönü University, 2001).

prepare for war.<sup>38</sup> Despite the fact that the Ottoman government was forced to recognize the Khanate of Şahin Giray, Russia would evacuate its army from the Crimean peninsula and Kuban with the Aynalıkavak Convention on 21 March 1779.<sup>39</sup> The power struggle in Crimea indicated to the Ottomans that another war with Russia was quite likely in the near future.

#### 1.2.4. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-92

Catherine II recognized the incapability of Şahin Giray to govern the Khanate and she was also surrounded by policymakers, especially Potemkin, who supported the Russian annexation of the Crimea. First, the operation began with certain invasions presided over by Potemkin. Then, the khan's authority was actively undermined, leaving him a lame duck. In March 1783, Russia reported to the Porte that Şahin Giray had virtually no authority over the affairs of the state and that the Russian general de Balmain was in control. Finally, Catherine II signed a manifesto annexing the Crimea, the Kuban, and the Taman on 19 April 1783, and the Ottomans had no choice but to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea on 8 January 1784, despite the opposition of the *ulema*.<sup>40</sup>

Although the Ottoman government was not prepared to declare war on Russia immediately after the annexation, it was aware that this shift in the balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would soon result in another war. The Ottomans took several precautions to fortify their borders and to reform the military army. The cooperation between Russian Empress Catherine the Great and Austrian Emperor Joseph II and their visit to the Russian bases on the Ottoman

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<sup>38</sup> Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations", 36-51; Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 2011), vol. V, pp. 2620-2626; İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 1978), Vol. 4:1, 446-453; Feridun Emecen, "Şahin Giray", TDV DİA.

<sup>39</sup> For more about the Aynalıkavak Convention, see Abdurrahim Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations Between the Years 1774-1787", (MA Thesis, Bilkent University: 2008), 52-54; Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehasinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 11. For the Turkish version of the Aynalıkavak Convention, see Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1953), 151.

<sup>40</sup> Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations", pp. 58-72; Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine*, 390; Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, pp. 25-29, *Osmanlı Rus İlişkileri Tarihi: Ahmet Câvid Bey'in Müntehebâtı*, prep. by. Adnan Baycar, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2004), pp. 519-522. See also Alan Fisher, *Annexation of the Crimea*,

Black Sea frontiers pushed the Ottoman government to act. At last, in August 1787, Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Paşa and his supporters, with the consent of the *şeyhülislam*, dragged the Ottoman Empire into a new war against Russia.<sup>41</sup>

In January 1789, a few months after the loss of the Fortress of Ochakov (Özi), the most strategic Ottoman base in the Black Sea, Sultan Abdulhamid I died and Sultan Selim III came to the throne.<sup>42</sup> The diplomatic attitudes of some European countries, including Britain and Prussia, and their desire to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire compelled the Russians to seek out peaceful negotiations. These negotiations were drawn out over two more years of war, since Russia insisted on conditions unfavorable to the Ottoman Empire, which refused to accept them. Finally, on 10 January 1792, the parties signed the Treaty of Jassy, with the Ottomans accepting the surrender of the Fortress of Ochakov to Russia and recognizing the rivers of Dniester and Kuban as the borders between the Russian and the Ottoman empires.<sup>43</sup>

### **1.2.5. Threats to Istanbul and the City's Fortification**

For centuries, Istanbul served as the capital of the Eastern Roman and Ottoman empires. It was also surrounded by states that longed to take control of it. It is thus perhaps no surprise that Constantinople's defenses against its many besiegers have

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<sup>41</sup> Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged*, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 161; Zülfiye Koçak, "1787-1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Değişen Dengeler ve Yaş Antlaşması", in *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, (XXXII/2, 2017), 463.

<sup>42</sup> For general information on the reign of Selim III, see S. J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: the Ottoman Empire Under Selim III, 1789-1807*, (Harvard University Press, 1971); François Georgeon, "Selim III", *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman*, (Fayard, 2015); Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923*, (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 383-412; Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.), *History of the Ottoman State, Society, and Civilisation*, (Istanbul: İrcica, 2001), v. 1, pp. 63- 77; Virginia Aksan, "Selim III" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second ed.), vol. 9, pp. 132-134; S. Shaw, "The Transition from Traditionalistic to Modern Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839)"; F. Babinger, "Nizam-I Djedid" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second ed.), vol. VIII, pp. 75-76; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Nizam- Cedid" in *MEB İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6, pp. 309-318.

<sup>43</sup> Kolçak, "1787-1792 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında", 483.

long been a subject of interest for historians.<sup>44</sup> What is surprising, however, is that most of this interest has focused on the city's defenses up through its conquest by the Ottomans in 1453 while ignoring much of the Ottoman period. This neglect is arguably because the city did not face a major threat until the end of the eighteenth century, at which point scholars begin to take up the study of the city's defenses again.<sup>45</sup> As narrated above, the Ottomans achieved nearly full control of the Black Sea by complementing the conquest of Istanbul with the conquest of the Pontus Rum Empire, the Crimean Khanate and the shores of Moldova and by ending the Genoese presence in such important port cities of the Black Sea as Kefe and Amasra by the 1580s.

The uniqueness of Istanbul was its strait, which made the city a strategic sea passage connecting the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. The Ottomans called the strait of Istanbul as the *Bahr-i siyah boğazi*, *Karadeniz boğazi*, and more rarely *Kostantiniyye boğazi*.<sup>46</sup> The major European states always nourished the aim of retaking Istanbul from the Ottomans. For example, in the seventeenth century, Cardinal Mazarin and his devoted student King Louis XIV considered plans to take Istanbul and prepared reconnaissance reports about the city,<sup>47</sup> though whether these plans were ever treated seriously is an open question.<sup>48</sup> Catherine II was also concerned with the Christians in the Ottoman Empire and desired to implement the so-called Greek Project, which proposed the revival of Byzantium in its own capital in Istanbul. The idea began in the reign of Peter the Great with the conquest of the

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<sup>44</sup> Semavi Eyice, *Bizans Devrinde Boğaziçi*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2007); Byron C. P. Tsangadas, *The Fortifications and Defense of Constantinople*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Buket Bayoğlu, "Yoros Kalesi: Anadolu Kavağında Ceneviz Kalesi", BA Thesis. (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi SBE, 1980).

<sup>45</sup> For the nineteenth-century fortifications, see V. A. Ulianitskii, *Dardanelly, Bosfor, i Chernoe more v XVIII veke* (Moscow: A. Gatsuli, 1883); Kassim Kassimoff, *La Russie et les détroits*, ([Paris]: L'imprimerie de Lagny, 1926); Sergeï Mikhaïlovich Goriâinov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles: étude historique sur la question des détroits*, (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910).

<sup>46</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, II. Cilt, pp. 400-402.

<sup>47</sup> Faruk Bilici, "XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Türk-Fransız İlişkileri: Gizli Harpten Objektif İttifaka", *Osmanlı*, 480-492; Faruk Bilici, *XIV. Louis ve İstanbul'u Fetih Tasarısı - Louis XIV et Son Projet de Conquete D'Istanbul*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004).

<sup>48</sup> Géraud Poumarède, *Pour en finir avec la Croisade; Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs au XVI<sup>e</sup> et VII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, (Presses Universitaires de France, 2009).

Black Sea port of Azov in 1696; and a soldier and intimate of Peter's last years, Count Münnich, claimed in 1762 that "from the moment of the first attack on Azov until the hour of his death, [Peter's] grand design ... had always been to conquer Constantinople, to chase the infidel Turks and Tatars out of Europe, and thus to reestablish the Greek monarchy."<sup>49</sup> Then, in the reign of Catherine II, Grigory Potemkin, who was an influential Russian general, expansionist policy-maker, and statesman, became one of the important supporters of the Greek project around the 1780s.<sup>50</sup>

Yet the first significant threat to Istanbul came not from Russia but from Cossack pirates in the early seventeenth century. Cossack raids interrupted the security of the Black Sea and forced the Ottomans to look into fortifying the Bosphorus. Various sources note that Cossack pirates came from the Black Sea on numerous occasions to raid and sack the shores and some suburbs of the Bosphorus, such as Sarıyer, Tarabya, İstinye, Büyükdere, and Yeniköy. Major Cossack incursions into the Bosphorus took place in 1615, 1617, 1621, and finally 1624. The last of these raids came in three separate waves and was particularly devastating.<sup>51</sup>

Many eyewitness accounts, reports, and chronicles of the era speak of the raids of the Cossack pirates. A report to France, dating 24 July 1624, from Gédoyen le Turc, the French consul in Aleppo, gives the following information: "On 19 July 1624

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<sup>49</sup> Hugh, Ragsdale, 'Evaluating The Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II And The Greek Project' *Slavonic and East European Review*, 1988 66 (1), 93. See also Kahraman Şakul, "Kentın Laneti ve Güncel Siyaset" *Osmanlı İstanbullu Uluslararası Sempozyum*, 2013.

<sup>50</sup> Ragsdale, 'Evaluating The Traditions of Russian Aggression', 110. Even though the project perhaps never left the drawing board, it is significant for the light it sheds on the motivations behind the Russian political agenda. Russian sources agree that the Russians were not militarily prepared to implement the Greek Project in 1787, and the project was suspended with the onset of the Russian-Ottoman war of 1787-92.

<sup>51</sup> Victor Ostapchuk, "The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids", *Oriente Moderno* 20 (81), (no. 1 (2001): 23-95), 64; Halil İnalçık, "Karadeniz'de Kazaklar ve Rusya: İstanbul Boğazı Tehlikede", 61; Gizem Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus: A Historical Survey of the Upper Bosphorus and a Proposal for a Sustainable Heritage Management Plan", (M.A. Thesis, Koç University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, 2010), 127. For a detailed analysis on the Cossack pirate activities in the Bosphorus, see Victor Ostapchuk, "The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628", (unpubl. PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 1989) 78-83.

Friday, 70 *chaikas* [boats,] each holding 50 people, Cossack and Russian[,] arrived in Yeniköy and sacked, pillaged and burned the town. Before the guards arrived[,] they left with more than a million gold pieces. The soldiers and officers followed them but could not catch them.”<sup>52</sup> Evliya Çelebi’s travelogue also mentions this important raid of three hundred *şaykas*,<sup>53</sup> which happened at the time of Sultan Murad IV’s accession to the throne at the age of eleven.<sup>54</sup> According to the report of French Ambassador de Césy, Sultan Murad IV watched the attacks anxiously from the palace, and Istanbul was in fear and terror.<sup>55</sup>

It then became necessary for the Ottoman government to mobilize local forces and even send the imperial fleet to protect the Bosphorus, as it was an important supply route for military provisions to the Hungarian front and for grain, meat, and fish bound for Istanbul.<sup>56</sup> Evliya Çelebi states that Sultan Murat IV called for an imperial council meeting after this incident. The grand vizier Kapudan Receb Paşa and Kuzu Ali Ağa advised this council of the need to build two fortresses on each side of the Bosphorus as a precautionary measure. Consequently, Sultan Murad IV—or rather his mother, Valide Kösem Sultan, as his guardian—ordered the construction of two fortresses across from each other at the mouth of Bosphorus, one in Anadolukavağı and the other in Rumelikavağı, in 1624. The construction of the fortresses was completed in one year.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Dörter, “A Future for the Upper Bosphorus:”, p. 265, note 92.

<sup>53</sup> A *chaika* or *şayka* (in Turkish) is a shallow, lightweight draft galley that moves rapidly, making it easy to maneuver quickly.

<sup>54</sup> Ostapchuk, “The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier”, pp. 46-47.

<sup>55</sup> İnalçık, “Karadeniz’de Kazaklar ve Rusya: İstanbul Boğazı Tehlikede”, 61; Ostapchuk, “The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea”, 64, 80.

<sup>56</sup> Victor Ostapchuk, “The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids”, *Oriente Moderno* 20 (81), (no. 1 (2001): 23-95), 64-65.

<sup>57</sup> Dörter, “A Future for the Upper Bosphorus”, 129; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: 1. Kitap: İstanbul Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini*, prep. by Orhan Şaik Gökyay (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996) p. 197, “258. Fasil ... Murâd Hân asrında bu boğazdan içeri küffâr-ı âk Kazak girüp Yeniköy ve Tarabya kasabası ve Büyükdere'yi ve Sarıyâr kasabaların nehb [ü] gâret etdüğü Murâd Hân-ı Râbi'e mün'akis olup tîz cümle a'yân-ı dîvân ile meşveret edüp ve vezîri Kapudan Receb Paşa'nın ve Kuzu Alî Ağa'nın re'y [ü] tedbîrleri ile bu boğazın ağzında iki tarafa birer Kiledü'l-Bahr-i Siyâh kal'aları inşâ olunması fermân-ı şehriyârî sâdir olup sene (---) şehrinde mübâşeret edüp bir senede iki kal'a-i hisn-ı hasîn ve sedd-i metîn kal'ateyn tamâmeyn oldular.”

Evliya Çelebi states the fortresses were built at a narrow part of the strait and were half a mile apart. Moreover, it was possible for the people on each side to hear each others' voices when they were speaking with a loud voice; but he adds that the distance between the fortresses was not insignificant, stating that arrows could not stop the ships sailing down Bosphorus like thunderbolts.<sup>58</sup>

According to Evliya Çelebi's records, the Fortress of Rumeli Hisarı on the Rumelian side was a strong rectangular building measuring 1,000 steps in perimeter. It had an iron gate facing the *qibla* (the direction of Mecca) on the southeast, 60 rooms for soldiers, one mosque dedicated to Sultan Murad, two storage depots for wheat, an ammunition depot, 100 cannons, one fortress commander, and 300 soldiers who were on duty at this spot. There were also houses of soldiers outside the fortress, but no other public houses, bathhouses, markets, or mosques were in the vicinity.<sup>59</sup>

Evliya Çelebi states that the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı was a strong rectangular structure built by the sea on a large, flat, level area, with a door facing the *qibla* on the southeast, a perimeter of 800 steps, and wall height of 22 *arşın*, 80 rooms to house the fortress commander and 300 soldiers, one mosque, two wheat storage

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<sup>58</sup> Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", 130; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, p. 197. "258. Fasil: ...Bu kal'alar Karadeniz'in bir dar boğazı ağzında vâkı' olmuşdur. Mâbeyne hümâları nisf mîldir. İki cânibin halkı birbirleri ile savt-ı Dâvûdî ile kelimât edüp istimâ' ederler. Ammâ bu boğazdan Karadeniz aşağı doğru Akdeniz'e eyle cereyân eder kim ubûr eden gemilere ok erişmez, berk-i hâtif gibi ubûr ederler."

<sup>59</sup> Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", 130; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, p. 197. "258. Fasil: ...Eşkâl-i kal'a-i Kilidü'l-Bahr-i Siyâh-ı Rûmeli: Leb-i deryâda şekl-i murabba' bir binâ-yı metîndir. Kibleye nâzır bir demir kapusu var. Dâ'iren-mâdâr cirmi bin adımdır. İçinde altmış aded neferât hâneleri ve Sultân Murâd Hân'ın bir câmi'i ve iki buğday anbârı ve cebehânesi ve yüz aded sağır ü kebîr topları ve dizdârı ve üç yüz neferâtları vardır. Hâkim-i şer'i bunun dahi Galata nâ'ibi ve dizdârı hâkimdir. Ve bostâncıbaşı dahi hükûmet eder. Kal'adan hâric neferât hâneleri vardır. Ammâ hân ve hammâm ve çârsû-yı bâzâr ve gayrı imâret yokdur. Ammâ dağlarında bâğları çokdur. Ve bu boğaz ağzından taşra bi-emrillâh Karadeniz vâsî'dir kim bâlâda evsâfi tahrîr olunmuşdur."



depots, and 100 long-range cannons that can fire up to 10 miles toward the Rumeli fortress across the Strait and the entrance of the Bosphorus on the Black Sea.<sup>60</sup>

The French traveler Thévenot, visiting Constantinople in 1655, wrote that these Kavak fortresses that were built to stop the Cossack raids were also used as prisons for senior officials.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the Kavak regions on both sides served as customs bureaus to inspect and control the vessels passing through the straits.<sup>62</sup>

The second time that the Ottoman government needed new defenses for the Bosphorus was the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74. The loss of important cities and the Çeşme incident challenged the security of Istanbul. The Ottoman government felt the need to take precautions to protect Istanbul, which was the heart and the capital of the empire.<sup>63</sup> When the Ottomans recognized that the clashes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would probably cause a war, they began to construct, repair, and renovate the fortresses at the Black Sea end of the Bosphorus, the gateway to Istanbul.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", 130-1; Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, p. 198, "259. Fasıl: ...Anadolu Kilidü'l-bahr kal'asın beyân eder. Bunu dahi sene (---) târîhinde Murâd Hân-ı Râbi' binâ etmişdir. Leb-i deryâda bir düz vâsi' zemînde şekl-i murabba' bir binâ-yı metîn kal'a-i üstüvârdır. Dîvârının kaddi yigirmi zirâ'dır. Ve kibleye nâzır bir demir kapusu vardır. Dâ'iren-mâdâr cirmi sekiz yüz adımdır. İçinde seksen mikdârı neferât hücreleri vardır, dizdârı ve üç yüz neferâtları vardır. Ve dahi Sultân Murâd Hân'ın bir câmi'i ve iki buğday anbârı ve yüz aded topları vardır. Cümle karşı Rûmeli kal'asına ve Karadeniz Boğazı'na nâzır toplardır. Herbiri onar mîl alur balyemez topları kirpi gibi zeyn olmuşdur. (---) Ve bu kal'anın cenûb tarafında (---) adım ba'fd kasaba-i Kavak leb-i deryâda bir liman-ı azîmin sâhilinde sekiz yüz hâneli bâğ-ı İremli serâpâ müslim hâneleridir. Câmi'i ve yedi mescidi ve bir hammâmı ve iki yüz mikdârı [139a] dükkânları ve bekârhân[e]leri ve mekteb-i sıbyânı ve bir çeşmesârı ve âb-ı hayât suları var bir kasabacıdır. Halkı cümle keştîbân ve bâğbân ve neccârdır. Ve cümlesi Anadolu hâkidir. Hâkimleri Üsküdar mollâsının nâ'ibi ve kal'a dizdârı hükûmet eder ve şeb [u] rûz bostâncıbaşı kayıkları ile gezüp hükûmeti serbestdir. Ve limanında şitâ ve sayfda iki yüz, üç yüz pâre gemi eksik değildir. Zîrâ eyyâm-ı muvâfik olmasın gözedüp eyyâm oldukda her bir keştî bir cânibe revâne olurlar."

<sup>61</sup> Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", 131.

<sup>62</sup> Reyhan Evrim Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul Teknik University, 2003), 22-23.

<sup>63</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonraki Durum İcabı Karadeniz Boğazının Tahkimi", *Belleten*, vol. XXIV/175, 1980, 512.

<sup>64</sup> Cemal Tukin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü, 1947), 61.

The Ottomans not only repaired the old surviving fortresses but also constructed new fortresses and batteries in this critical zone. In addition to the Fortresses of Anadolu Kavađı, Rumeli Kavađı, Anadolu Hisarı (Güzelcehisar), and Rumeli Hisarı (Boğazkesen), Sultan Mustafa III ordered the construction of four new fortresses and some redoubts along the northern shores of the Bosphorus in 1772-73. The fortification of the Bosphorus continued in the following reigns of Sultan Abdulhamid I and Sultan Selim III. New fortresses were constructed in Anadolu Feneri on the Anatolian side and in Rumeli Feneri on the Rumelian side, both of which were constructed in the mouth of the Istanbul strait, *boğazađzı*. The third fortress was in Garibçe, and the fourth was in Poyraz Limanı. The fifth fortress was in Kilyos (Bađdadcık) on the European side, and the sixth was the fortress of Irve (Revancık) on the Anatolian side. When the protection offered by these fortresses was deemed inadequate, the battery of Liman-ı Kebir was also constructed. Thus, the number of fortresses reached seven, and they started to be known as “kılâ’-ı seb’a” as a whole. Some other batteries and redoubts were also constructed in the meantime. This dissertation focuses on the above-mentioned late-eighteenth-century fortifications of the Bosphorus in detail.

### **1.3. Sultan Selim III and the “New Order” (1792-1807)**

The significant consequence of the last war of the eighteenth century with Russia had been that the Ottomans had to accept the superiority of the Russian Empire. Long-distance, prolonged, and unsuccessful military campaigns on their northern borders, especially with Russia, made military and fiscal reform essential for the future of the Ottoman Empire. These reforms quickly came to encompass many other areas of governance. The embassy reports as well as reform tracts penned in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played an important role in envisioning both the boundaries of reform and the concepts for legitimizing it.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Kemal Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Tanzimat’a İslahat Düşünceleri,” *İlmi Araştırmalar* 8 (1999): 55; Kahraman Şakul, “Nizâm-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme,” *Dîvân İlmi Araştırmalar* 19, no. 2 (2005): 121-123. Şakul makes a classification and analysis of around thirty reform pacts written at the time and their relationship with the tradition of writing political treaties.

Consequently, the Ottoman government conducted a reform project that is called *Nizam-ı Cedid*—literally, the “New Order.”<sup>66</sup>

Starting in 1792, the reformers began to take action starting with the old military order. Under the new regulations, *timar* holders were summoned to their provincial centers for thorough inspection; the statuses of absentee *timar* holders were cancelled; and governors were given new leverage to expand their armies. The Ottoman government asked the janissaries to learn new military tactics and the use of state-of-the-art rifles.<sup>67</sup> The reform and modernization attempts of the military also took place in the Ottoman navy in a very methodical way.<sup>68</sup>

The Ottoman government also founded the Imperial Engineering School in the Imperial Arsenal, where European, especially French, engineers shared their expertise with the Ottomans. Ottoman military reform offered opportunities for men to acquire and share expertise in military sciences, military architecture, and medicine. Many European experts, including royalists who fled the French Revolution, and many technical envoys, freelance military engineers, and inventors from Prussia, Russia, Austria, Spain, Sweden, and Britain found positions in the Ottoman New Order as advisors of the New Army or, less often, as professors at the schools.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> For a multifaceted analysis of the New Order from the reorganization of Sultan Selim III’s government to the technological and fiscal reforms and diplomatic and political affairs of the New Order, see *Nizam-ı Kadim’den Nizam-ı Cedid’e III. Selim ve Dönemi: Selim III and His Era from AncienRregime to New Order*, ed. by. Seyfi Kenan, (İstanbul, TDV İSAM Yay., 2010).

<sup>67</sup> Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 47.

<sup>68</sup> For the modernization of the Ottoman navy, see Tuncay Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008); İdris Bostan, “Osmanlı Bahriyesinin Modernleşmesinde Yabancı Uzmanların Rolü, 1785-1819” and “Osmanlı Bahriyesinde Modernleşme Hareketleri-I Tersanede Büyük Havuz İnşası, 1794-1800” in *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2015), pp. 207-220, 221-246.

<sup>69</sup> See Mustafa Kaçar, “Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında Meydana Gelen Değişmeler ve Mühendishanelerin Kuruluşu” (PhD. Diss. İstanbul Üniversitesi SBE, 1996); Kemal Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane: Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)*, (İstanbul: Eren Yay. 1995); Kemal Beydilli, “Savaş Eğitiminde Okullaşma (1775-1807)” in *XVIII. Yüzyıl Başından XX. Yüzyıla Kadar Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. by. Zeki Arıkan and Lütfü Sancar, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2009), pp. 269-283.

The reformers considered the “printing press as a vehicle to serve the interests of a state that needed to modernize. Printing would allow for the easy dissemination of regulations, legal documents on various facets of governance, and educational textbooks.”<sup>70</sup> Translations of technical books made the latest writings on European military science available in the library of the Imperial School of Engineering.<sup>71</sup> The reformist bureaucrat Mahmud Râif Efendi proudly presented Ottoman achievements to European military engineers’ “republic of letters” in his *Tableau des nouveaux reglements de l’empire ottoman*, published in 1798 by the New Imperial Engineering School in Istanbul.<sup>72</sup>

Kemal Beydilli classifies foreign experts according to their areas of employment and their channels of procurement. In regard to their areas of employment, they were engineers, officers to teach modern warfare, qualified workers in various disciplines, and doctors and physicians. In regard to their channels of procurement, they were provided by the embassies of foreign states in Istanbul, by the Ottoman ambassadors resident in foreign states, and by the initiatives of Ottoman statesmen, and in some cases, there were those who entered Ottoman service on their own.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Ayşe Tek Başaran, “The Ottoman Printing Enterprise: Legalization, Agency and Networks, 1831-1863”, (PhD. Diss., Boğaziçi University, 2019) p. 8-9.

<sup>71</sup> See Ceyda Özmen, “Translating Science in the Ottoman Empire: Translator-educators as “Agents of Change” in the Ottoman Scientific Repertoires (1789-1839)”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 48 (2016): pp. 143-170; Muhammet Yılmaz, “Tercüme-i Risâle-i Fenn-i Harb (Mütercim Konstantin İpsilanti)”, (M.A. Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2005).

<sup>72</sup> For more information on the content and Turkish translation of the book and its significance in understanding New Order Reform movement, see Kemal Beydilli and İlhan Şahin, *Mahmud Râif Efendi ve Nizâm-ı Cedid’e Dâir Eseri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu); Kahraman Şakul, “Nizâm-ı Cedid Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami Modernleşme,” *Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar* 19, no. 2 (2005): pp. 125-127.

<sup>73</sup> Kemal Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane: Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)*, (İstanbul: Eren Yay. 1995), 85. For a general overview of European experts serving the Ottoman Empire, see Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, “The Recruitment of European Experts for Service in the Ottoman Empire (1732-1808)” in: *Ottoman Empire and European Theatre II-The TIME OF JOSEPH HAYDN: From Sultan Mahmud I to Mahmud II (r.1730–1839)*, Michael Hüttler-Hans Ernst Weidinger, Eds., Hollitzer, Wien, 2014, pp. 33-57. For the role of foreign experts in the modernization of the Ottoman navy, see Tuncay Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), pp. 77-109.

The most significant proposal of the reform party was the foundation of a new army parallel to the janissaries in 1794 on the European model with Western-style uniforms, equipment, and—most significantly—military discipline. The concept combined newness with orderliness. The new army was organized as a provincial militia force rather than a professional standing army in the Western sense; by 1807, it included more than 23,000 troops. Soldiers and commanders were to be hierarchically ranked and organized into regiments. The reorganization of the arsenal and the gunpowder works, the construction of the first modern military barracks on the outskirts of Istanbul, and the construction of about 45 state-of-the-art warships are among the successes of the reform program.<sup>74</sup>

As part of the late-eighteenth-century reform projects of the Ottoman government, the Imperial Engineering School was founded for two purposes: to educate experts and engineers on shipbuilding and fortification. Despite the fact that the engineering as a profession began based on these two fields, historians have not paid much attention to the fortification education and activities in the Age of Reform.

#### **1.4. Writing the History of Ottoman Fortifications in the Age of Reform**

Most states underwent processes of military and fiscal reforms as a response to the developing artillery techniques and changing economic systems in the eighteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was no exception.<sup>75</sup> The lack of qualified military men, fiscal problems, especially as a result of Russo-Ottoman wars of 1768-74, 1787-92, and 1806-1812, the diffusion of political power from the center to the

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<sup>74</sup> Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, 41; Kahraman Şakul, “Nizam-ı Cedid” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, (Facts on File, 2008), pp. 434-436.

<sup>75</sup> For a critical approach to the discourse of reform and transformation of the Ottoman Empire as a new paradigm replacing the decline paradigm, see Olivier Bouquet, “Du déclin à la transformation: Réflexions sur un nouveau paradigme en histoire ottoman”, *Revue d’histoire du XIXe siècle*, vol: 53, 2016/2, pp. 117-136. Akşin Somel offers a similar discussion on the issue of transformations within the Ottoman Empire in a forthcoming book prepared in honor of Metin Kunt.

periphery, and other factors all led to a crisis.<sup>76</sup> However, eighteenth-century Ottoman history has arguably received relatively little attention.<sup>77</sup> Most studies on this period of Ottoman history reflect the prejudgments of nineteenth-century specialists. Studying the defense systems of Istanbul against Russia first and foremost reveals the organizational capacity of the late-eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In addition, studying these defense systems makes it possible to analyze the military and technological reforms of the Ottomans in the late eighteenth century and their understanding of the “Russian threat” in regard to their efforts to fortify their capital.

Attempting to write a history of Ottoman fortresses is a difficult task because of a number of problems in the field. First, there is still no systematic periodization of the Ottoman fortresses and no analytical classification of the Ottoman fortress types.<sup>78</sup> We know almost nothing about the designers and architects of the hundreds of Ottoman fortresses that were built throughout centuries. How were these architects educated, and what was the rationale behind their architectural

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<sup>76</sup> See Betül Başaran, *Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Between Crisis and Order*, Volume 56 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014). See Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). See Hümeýra Bostan, “Ali Yaycıoğlu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions,” *Divan: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi*, August 21, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.20519/divan.335625>.

<sup>77</sup> For the history of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 4, 2 parts (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995-2003), Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* vol. 4 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, pp. 235-415, Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300- 1923*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 321-412, Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 223-258, M. Sertoğlu, *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2011), vol. V. For the social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire, see Yücel Özkaya, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumunu* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadî Tarihi 1500-1914* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005) pp. 131-177, Bruce McGowan, “Âyanlar Çağı, 1699-1812,” in Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* vol. 2 (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2006), pp.761-865.

<sup>78</sup> David Nicolle's humble attempt to analyze the design and development of Ottoman fortifications is valuable but remains very basic and encompasses only the early modern period. See David Nicolle, *Ottoman Fortifications 1399-1710*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010). Burcu Özgüven also attempts an architectural analysis of Ottoman fortifications of Sultan Mehmed II's age. See Burcu Özgüven, “Barut ve Tabya: Rönesans Mimarisi Bağlamında Fatih Sultan Mehmed Kaleleri”, (PhD. Diss., İstanbul Teknik University SBE, 1997). On the medieval Ottoman fortifications, see also Albert Gabriel, *Chateaux Turcs du Bosphore*, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1943).

decisions? The inability of the existing literature to answer these questions necessitates a multifaceted inquiry into Ottoman fortification.

Second, writing the history of Ottoman fortification in a period of reform and “military acculturation”<sup>79</sup> offers extra challenges. On the one hand, without knowing the previous norms, it is difficult to measure the extent of change that took place in the reform era. At the same time, it is difficult to assess the role and contribution of foreign experts without knowledge of the previous implementations of Ottoman architects and master-builders.

A third and related challenge concerns the Bosphorus fortresses specifically. The strategic location of the straits meant that fortifications there likely bore unique characteristics that distinguished them from border forts and city walls. Yet it is difficult to determine the particularities of strait/maritime fortresses without knowing about the characteristics of other fortress types.<sup>80</sup> Hence this study attempts to shed light on a hitherto unexplored area of history with a profound awareness of its own limits, most of which are due to a lack of sufficient secondary research. Consequently, this study limits itself to asking some questions not necessarily to conclusively answer them, but rather for the more modest end of providing a basis for further research.

François Baron de Tott (1733-93) was an aristocrat and French military officer involved in the reform efforts for the Ottoman military and building fortifications on the Bosphorus. His account of the long years he spent in the Ottoman Empire, *Memoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turc (Türkler ve Tatarlara Dair Hatıralar)*, offer

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<sup>79</sup> This is a term borrowed from Gabor Agoston. See Gabor Agoston, “Military Acculturation” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Agoston and Masters, (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 379-382.

<sup>80</sup> Despite the fact that there is not an analytic examination of Ottoman straits fortifications, studies on marine fortifications of other straits and gulfs make it possible to have a comparative ground to discuss similarities and differences and characteristic features of strait fortifications. For example, see *Battre le littoral: histoire, reconversion et nouvelles perspectives de mise en valeur du petit patrimoine militaire maritime*, ed. by Nicolas Meynen and Émilie d’Orgeix, (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2014).

his observations on a number of topics: the construction of new fortresses, the difficulties he faced dealing with “ignorant and lazy” people, Ottoman conflicts with Russia in the Black Sea, Turkish strategies and precautions against the Russian threat, and the Ottomans’ weaknesses in the face of their enemies. Because of the dearth of research on the fortifications of Istanbul and similar issues, the one-sided interpretations of French military men such as Baron de Tott define our perceptions of eighteenth-century Ottoman military and technological history. The aim of my dissertation is to complement their accounts with additional information in light of which we can develop a fuller understanding of these issues. Understanding the shortage of engineers or expert technicians in a comparative context will be an important part of the challenge.

The Ottomans have usually been identified with an expansionist policy because of their military activities, especially their territorial expansion and defense of their frontiers. The study of the Bosphorus fortresses, however, demonstrates a policy shift in the Ottoman Empire from an expansionist to a defensive position in the Straits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Fortification is an excellent field to observe technological developments in any state and era. It serves as a valuable vantage point through which to assess how different techniques were transferred and adopted by others. It also presents an excellent case study to observe the terms of technology transfer and the contribution of foreign experts.

Above all, while the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul has been the subject of numerous studies, the defense and protection of the capital over the following centuries has not been deemed as equally worthy of scholarly attention. And while architectural historians, for instance, have examined the Bosphorus forts in terms of



their buildings, preservation, and modern restoration,<sup>81</sup> we still lack an architectural and structural analysis of the Ottoman fortresses in general and the Bosphorus fortresses in particular. Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this research, this study will provide a basis for further architectural analysis. Other historians who have studied Ottoman fortifications simply covered archival registers without critically questioning the construction techniques, the changing conceptualization of fortification, and the reasons behind the Ottoman preference of location and style.<sup>82</sup> The amount of effort needed to decipher and make sense of Ottoman documents and registers makes it immensely difficult to go beyond the classical documentation of archival sources.

A study on the construction and architecture of fortresses demonstrates how closely the Ottomans followed and adopted technological developments in other states. In addition, it sheds light on the organizational ability of the Ottoman state to sustain the construction process. Following the construction of the Bosphorus fortresses for almost thirty-five years enables us to determine the entire span of Ottoman architectural organization and construction during this period, from decision making to implementation.

While an architectural and engineering analysis of the Bosphorus fortresses requires professional expertise and is therefore beyond the scope of this dissertation, this study does aim to offer some insight about the structure of the Bosphorus fortresses based on their plans and techniques. These observations

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<sup>81</sup> Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", (Koç University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Master Thesis, 2010); Reyhan Evrim Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2003); Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2012); Sevgi Parlak, "Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 17-19. Yüzyıllarda İstanbul Boğazı'nın Savunma Ağı", (*İstanbul Araştırmaları Yıllığı*, vol. 6, 2017), pp. 79-110; Sevgi Parlak "İstanbul Boğazı'ndaki Riva (İrva/Revancık) Kalesi" in *XIV. Ortaçağ ve Türk Dönemi Kazıları ve Sanat Tarihi Araştırmaları Sempozyumu Bildirileri, Konya Türkiye*, (20-22 October 2010, vol 14), pp. 483-507; Kutgün Eyüpgiller and Yeşim Yaşa, *İstanbul Boğazı Kale ve Tabyaları*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2019).

<sup>82</sup> See Ali Boran, "Osmanlı Dönemi Kale Mimarisi", *Osmanlı*, (Vol: 10, Ankara, 1999), pp. 347-363; Yusuf Acioglu, "Çanakkale Boğazındaki Kaleler" (Master thesis, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, SBE, 2006); Mahir Aydın, *Vidin Kalesi: Tuna Boyu'ndaki İnci*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 2015); Osman Ülkü, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Savunma Sistemi Olarak Tabya Mimarisi", *Atatürk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, (vol. 27, Erzurum, 2007), pp. 245-270.

might provide a basis for understanding the characteristics of marine or strait fortification in the context of the Bosphorus. Moreover, this dissertation intends to introduce novel archival sources presented with a cross reading of French archival documents. As such, it hopes to overcome the conflicting and errant information circulating about the Bosphorus fortresses resulting from random and uncritical engagement with the archival sources.

### **1.5. Historiography on Ottoman Fortification**

The only Ottoman historian to have paid attention to the fortification of the Bosphorus is İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı. Uzunçarşılı's article "Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonraki Durum İcabı Karadeniz Boğazının Tahkimi," published in *Bellekten* in 1980, is the only study that calls attention to the fortification of the strait of Istanbul specifically in the field of Ottoman history.<sup>83</sup> In the article, Uzunçarşılı uses a small selection of archival documents to summarize why the Ottomans felt the need to construct new fortresses, the position of the fortresses, and their building process. However, even a simple archival search would indicate that this topic has a broad pool of archival documents. Besides, while these fortresses are closely related to many other topics, Uzunçarşılı's article has a very restricted framework. It does not include detailed information about the fortresses; instead, it discusses the fortifications along the shores of Istanbul in general, their administration, and the number of soldiers, cannons, and guns kept in them, in addition to offering transcriptions of some relevant archival documents.

Uzunçarşılı's article has the distinction of being the first and the only work addressing the issue of the defense of Istanbul's gateway to the Black Sea directly on the basis of primary sources. Yet a number of interesting new contributions to the study of the Bosphorus fortresses have recently been made by scholars outside the field of Ottoman history, architects especially. The most significant and comprehensive such contribution came from Gizem Dörter in 2010.<sup>84</sup> Dörter's

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<sup>83</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonraki Durum İcabı Karadeniz Boğazının Tahkimi", *Bellekten*, vol. XIV/175, 1980, pp. 511-533.

<sup>84</sup> See Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus".

master's thesis, entitled "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus: A Historical Survey of the Upper Bosphorus and a Proposal for a Sustainable Heritage Management Plan," prepared a basis to see the history of the Bosphorus defenses from early ages to modern times with a concern to propose a cultural heritage preservation project.

Kemal Kutgün Eyüggiller, again in the field of architecture, also produced some articles on the Bosphorus fortresses and advised students to write master's theses on the field.<sup>85</sup> Reyhan Evrim Karadağ's master's thesis, entitled "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi (The Restoration Project for the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri),"<sup>86</sup> and Yeşim Yaşa's master's thesis, entitled "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi (The Restoration Project for the Fortress of Poyraz),"<sup>87</sup> mainly focused on restoration work in the case of specific fortresses, though they also provide some historical background about the construction of these with the use of selective archival documents.

Two books by Ali Soysal give information about the construction of the Anatolian and Rumelian Lighthouses: *Anadolu Feneri: Tarihten Gelen Işık* and *Kara Deniz Beyaz Işık: Rumeli Feneri*, published in 1997 and 2004, respectively. Both of these works stand out as detailed works on two of the Fener fortresses. They are not only about the fortresses but also about the village and historical buildings around the fortresses and the lighthouses. The book also offers general information about the geographical conditions, demography, and social and economic conditions of the villages and the lighthouses, as well as discussions of their importance and administration, their historical development, and the construction history of the fortresses, fountains, and mosques that accompanied the fortresses.

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<sup>85</sup> Kemal Kutgün Eyüggiller, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Üzerine Ön Araştırmalar", (*Yapı*, vol. 250, Sept 2002), pp. 138-144; Kemal Kutgün Eyüggiller, "The 18th-Century Fortifications of the Bosphorus and İstanbul, Turkey", (*Fort*, Vol. 35, 2007), pp. 91-102, 132-139.

<sup>86</sup> Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 22-23.

<sup>87</sup> Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2012).

Sevgi Parlak's article "Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 17-19. Yüzyıllarda İstanbul Boğazı'nın Savunma Ağı (The Defence Network of the Bosphorus in the 17th-19th Centuries in the Light of Archival Documents)" is another recent attempt to historically locate the Bosphorus defenses with a modest use of selective documentation.<sup>88</sup>

Frederic Hitzel's master thesis, entitled "Le Role des Militaires Français a Constantinople (1784-1789) (The Role of French Military Men in Istanbul [1784-1789])" and submitted in 1987 at the Paris-Sorbonne University,<sup>89</sup> focuses on the influence and role of the French military men on Ottoman military reform and politics in the late eighteenth century. This dissertation partly reveals, through the use of selective French archival documentation, that the Ottoman fortresses constructed in the eighteenth century were built under the supervision of some French military officers.

The most comprehensive and recent contribution is Eyüpgiller's and Yaşa's collaborative book, *İstanbul Boğazı Kale ve Tabyaları* (The Bosphorus Fortresses and Batteries).<sup>90</sup> The book documents all the forts and batteries on the shores of the Bosphorus built from the early ages to the twentieth century one by one with short historical information on their construction. The book is valuable for providing many plans, drawings, and historical and modern photography of the buildings.

An important study contributing to this research is *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi* (The Straits Question in the Age of the Ottoman Empire), written by Cemal Tukin.<sup>91</sup> This book deals with fortresses generally, in relation to their role

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<sup>88</sup> Sevgi Parlak, "Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında 17-19. Yüzyıllarda İstanbul Boğazı'nın Savunma Ağı", (*İstanbul Araştırmaları Yıllığı*, vol. 6, 2017), pp. 79-110; Sevgi Parlak "İstanbul Boğazı'ndaki Riva (İrva/Revancık) Kalesi" in *XIV. Ortaçağ ve Türk Dönemi Kazıları ve Sanat Tarihi Araştırmaları Sempozyumu Bildirileri, Konya Türkiye*, (20-22 October 2010, vol 14), pp. 483-507.

<sup>89</sup> Frederic Hitzel, "Le Rôle des Militaires Français a Constantinople (1784-1789)", (M.A. Thesis, Paris: Universite de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), 1987).

<sup>90</sup> Kemal Kutgün Eyüpgiller and Yeşim Yaşa, *İstanbul Boğazı Kale ve Tabyaları*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2019).

<sup>91</sup> Cemal Tukin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Üniversite Matbaacılık, 1947).

in the straits question. Cemal Tukin claims that the Istanbul strait and its fortification had no significance until the emergence of the question of the Straits. This argument conflicts with the findings of this Ph.D. dissertation.

### **1.5.1. Secondary Literature on Various Ottoman Fortifications**

Mark Stein's *Guarding the Frontier: Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe* is an important book about Ottoman border fortresses that deals specifically with the cases of Kanije and Uyvar.<sup>92</sup> This book explains the star-shaped fortress system or the so-called *trace italienne* that the Ottomans adopted in the seventeenth century, in keeping with radical worldwide changes in military technology at the time. In addition to this, the book investigates the Ottomans' ability to besiege and defend besieged positions as well as their development in gunpowder weapons and their siege craft with advanced fortifications. The book uses primary sources to explain Ottoman military terms and siege and defense tactics, much of which involves specialized terminology that would otherwise be difficult to understand. This book is thus helpful for understanding fortification systems and related issues and terminology.

This dissertation benefits from secondary sources about Ottoman fortifications in the Balkans and the northern Black Sea as well. Andrew Peacock's edited volume on *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World* includes many articles written on fortifications on the Ottoman frontiers.<sup>93</sup> Although the fortification of a frontier and the fortification of a strait are different from each other, these studies will enable me to understand the differences in a comparative perspective.

This dissertation owes its greatest debt to Caroline Finkel and Victor Ostapchuk's article "Outpost of Empire: An Appraisal of Ottoman Building Registers as Sources

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<sup>92</sup> Mark L. Stein, *Guarding the Frontier: Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe*, (Tauris Academic Studies: London, 2007).

<sup>93</sup> A.C.S. Peacock (ed. by.), *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

for the Archeology and Construction History of the Black Sea Fortress of Özi.”<sup>94</sup> In this article, the authors use historical material as a source to “rebuild” an Ottoman fortress. This article is helpful methodologically for showing how to decipher Ottoman archival sources. This is the only source that pays attention to the similarity of Ottoman fortresses to the Vauban system of fortification.

Cengiz Fedakar’s Ph.D. dissertation at Mimar Sinan University, entitled “Anapa Kalesi: Karadeniz’in Kuzeyinde Son Osmanlı İstihkâmı (1781-1801) (The Anapa Fortress: The Last Ottoman Fortification in the Northern Black Sea [1781-1801]),” is related to my research topic in two respects.<sup>95</sup> The Anapa Fortress was located on the Black Sea and built in the late eighteenth century against the Russian threat. This study includes information not only on the construction of the fortress and its fiscal and military organization but also on the historical context through its discussion of Ottoman-Russian political relations and wars.

Hakan Engin’s master’s thesis, “1787-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sirasında İbrail Kalesi (The Braila Fortress of the Time of the Ottoman-Russian and Austrian Wars of 1787-92),” complements Fedakar’s research.<sup>96</sup> Engin describes the Ottoman Empire’s policy of fortification and strengthening its borders as a response to Russia’s expansionist policy. The Braila Fortress had a special place because of its location at the defense line of the Danube during wars with Austria and Russia. This study focuses both on the repair and reinforcement of the fortress and its military organization and architectural evolution.

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<sup>94</sup> Caroline Finkel & Victor Ostapchuk, “Outpost of Empire: An Appraisal of Ottoman Building Registers as Sources for the Archeology and Construction History of the Black Sea Fortress of Özi”, (*Muqarnas Online*, 22(1), 2005), pp. 150-188.

<sup>95</sup> Cengiz Fedakar, “Anapa Kalesi: Karadeniz’in Kuzeyinde Son Osmanlı İstihkâmı (1781-1801)”, (PhD. Diss., Mimar Sinan University, 2010).

<sup>96</sup> Hakan Engin, “1787-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sirasında İbrail Kalesi”, (M.A. Thesis, Trakya University, 2013).

## 1.6. Sources and Methodology

The main questions raised in this dissertation are the following: What drew the Ottoman attention to the issue of fortifying the Bosphorus? How and to what extent did they manage to fulfill their goals in this regard? What were the main difficulties that the Ottomans faced and how did they overcome these problems? I try to answer these questions with an eye to the broader issue of Ottoman responses to the technological and political challenges they confronted at the end of the eighteenth century. In this context, it is necessary to examine how the Ottomans followed and applied the skills of professional engineering, which became indispensable for fortress construction worldwide in the eighteenth century. Rather than drawing generalized judgments, this study contends that the success or failure of the Ottomans in catching up with world trends should be determined based on specific case studies.

In order to conduct this project and to answer the above-mentioned questions, I relied largely on Ottoman documents housed at the Turkish Presidency's Ottoman Archives (BOA) in Istanbul. Considering the subject of this dissertation, most of the materials come from the Cevdet Askeri (C.AS.), Hatt-ı Hümayun (HH.) and Ali Emiri (AE.) collections, as well as various registers in the Maliyeden Müdevver (MAD.d.), and Bâb-ı Defteri Baş Muhasebe (D.BŞM.d.) collections. Among these collections, Cevdet mostly includes petitions penned by the superintendents of the Bosphorus and the construction officials of the fortresses, whose accounts are valuable for following the chronology of the constructions. The collections of imperial decrees available in the Hatt-ı Hümayun, Ali Emiri, and Topkapı Palace collections enable us to see the will, reasoning, and approach of three different sultans of the period under examination. I also employ file collections (*dosya tasnifi*) of the Chief Finance Office (DBŞM), which helps fill in the gaps.

Above all, this research relies heavily on appraisal registers (*keşif defteri*). Appraisal registers were prepared by Ottoman architects before they planned the construction of a building. Usually the head architect, or another architect appointed by him, inspected the location of construction alongside the construction

official and/or master builder. They recorded the prospective components of the building, their architectural measures in height, width, and length (in the measure of *mimari zirâ'*), and their expected expenditures. The register prepared before the construction was called the first appraisal register (*keşf-i evvel defteri*), while the register prepared to inspect the building after its completion was called the second appraisal register (*keşf-i sani defteri*). In some cases, such as when additions and improvements were required to the completed building, they also prepared a third appraisal register (*keşf-i sâlis defteri*). These registers are available in various collections, including the Maliyeden Müdevver Defterleri (MAD.d.), Cevdet (C.), and Baş Muhasebe Kalemi Defterleri Bina Eminliği (DBŞM.BNE.d.).<sup>97</sup>

In addition to Ottoman documents, this dissertation also employed a number of other sources. Of these, the most noteworthy are drawings and plans housed in the Topkapı Palace Museum Archive (TSMA) in Istanbul, as well as some manuscripts of certain chronicles and fortification treatises housed in the Topkapı Palace Museum Library (TSMK) in Istanbul.

This dissertation has also made use of chronicles, which offered many details about the Bosphorus defenses. It utilizes the chronicles from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including those of Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, Enveri, and Taylesanizade, all of which provide many details about the Ottoman perception of the rising Russian threat, state efforts to defend and fortify the imperial capital, and the military and administrative organization of the Bosphorus defenses.

In addition, I employed documents from the French Military Archives in Vincennes, Diplomacy Archives in La Courneuve, and French National Archives in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. Service Historique de la Défense (SHD, Château de Vincennes) preserved

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<sup>97</sup> For a discussion on the nature of appraisal registers, see Caroline Finkel & Victor Ostapchuk, "Outpost of Empire: An Appraisal of Ottoman Building Registers as Sources for the Archeology and Construction History of the Black Sea Fortress of Özi", (*Muqarnas Online*, 22(1), 2005), pp. 150-188. See also Mahir Aydın, *Vidin Kalesi: Tuna Boyu'ndaki İnci*, İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 2015, 104; Burcu Özgüven, "Barut ve Tabya: Rönesans Mimarisi Bağlamında Fatih Sultan Mehmed Kaleleri", (PhD. Diss., İstanbul Teknik University SBE, 1997), 56-7.



several reports of the French military engineers who served in developing Ottoman defenses, as well as their drawings and plans of fortresses and their daily journals. There are different classifications in Vincennes. The most relevant for this study was the Archives Technique du Génie (Engineering Archive), which had the classification of "Série GR V." This series included the following sections: GR 1 V: archives du dépôt des fortifications; GR 2 V: archives de la section technique du génie; GR 3 V: archives des inspections; and GR 4 V: archives des directions des travaux du génie. From this series, I used the following folders: 1 VM 81; 1 VM 275; 1 VM 276; 1 VN 7; and 1 VM 81 Tablettes.

The other important series was Série M: Archives de la Guerre (War Archive). This included the following sections: GR 1 M: mémoires et reconnaissances; GR 2 M: fonds du dépôt de la Guerre; GR 3 M: correspondance géographique de dépôt de la Guerre; GR 4 M: historiques manuscrits de régiments; and GR 5 M: copies de documents des archives départementales. From this series, I used the following folders: 1 M 1616; 1 M 1617; 1 M 1618; 1 M 1619.

The other series about the biographies of the military personnel was Série Y: Archives Collectives et individuelles de Personnel (Collective and Individual Archives of the Personnel). This series included the following section: Série YD: Dossier d'Officiers Généraux de l'Armée de Terre et des Services. From this series, I used the following folders: 4 YD 2900 (Baron de Tott); 7 YD 699 (Gouffier); 8 YD 26 (Lafitte-Clave); 13 YD 274 (François Kauffer).

In addition to the Ottoman and French archival material, this dissertation also utilizes the memoirs of French engineers and officers who were employed by the Ottoman government in the construction of the fortresses, which offer details beyond the scope of the archival material.

The Service Historique de la Défense has a manuscript library called Bibliothèque Site de Vincennes (Vincennes Library). This library preserves the memoirs and journals of French military officers who visited Istanbul in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries. Some of the important manuscripts are the following: N.167. *Journal d'un Voyage Sur Les Cotes de la Mer Noire du 28 Avril au 18 Sept par Lafitte*; N.168. *Journal de son Séjour en Turquie 1784 Lafitte*; N.169. *Lafitte Lettres écrites pendant son Séjour en Turquie 1784 a 1786*; N.170. *Journal d'un Voyage de Constantinople a Brouse Nicée et Nicomedie en 1786*; SH.219. *Voiage de Paris a Constantinople de Constantinople à Jerusalem*; and N.458. *Mémoires de Fortification*. In addition to those preserved in Vincennes, there are two journals of Gabriel Joseph de Monnier in the Library of Bourg-en-Bresse: *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille a Constantinople en 1784* (Ms. 63) and *Journal de mon voyage de Paris à Constantinople* (Ms. 65).

The Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAÉ, La Courneuve) is a diplomacy archive in Paris, France, that preserves several correspondences between the French and the Ottoman governments and the reports of the French ambassadors and consuls. There are three catalogues that contain information related to the subject of this research: *Mémoires et Documents* (the folders: 50MD-7, 14, 15, 17, 30, 111, 113); *Correspondance Politique Turquie* (the folders: 133CP - 159, 161, 162, 164, 169, 170, 171, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 197); and *Dossier du Personnel* (the folders: Personnel 17 [Gouffier], 40 [Kauffer], 67 [Tott]).

### **1.7. A Glossary for Ottoman Terminology of Fortification**

I recognized soon after my research began that writing the history of Ottoman fortification is a challenge compounded by the lack of good-quality analytic sources on the field of Ottoman military engineering and architecture. Above all, the historiography of Ottoman fortification lacks a glossary of certain basic terms. The time period on which this research focuses was a period of change and transformation. Ottoman architects, in collaboration with French engineers, tried new fortification techniques. This collaborative work brought new terms to the language. In addition, the strait fortification had its unique characteristics and terminology as well. The use of old terms with new connotations and the use of new terms for new techniques created obscurity that complicates the work of scholars today. This research aims to contribute to the field of Ottoman military

architecture with a preparation of three-language (Turkish-English-French) glossary of fortification terms. Although much remains to be accomplished, the glossary provides a starting point upon which other scholars may later build.

The lack of such a glossary up to this point has fed into a number of possible misinterpretations in the literature. For example, the French military engineer Gabriel Joseph de Monnier wrote in his journal that he prepared a document on the nomenclature of fortification in French and Turkish with the assistance of the dragoman Testa and the former chief-architect Hafız Efendi. The use of “nomenclature” by Monnier generated the idea (shared by Arcelin and Hitzel) that they created new Turkish equivalencies for some French technical words which were missing in Turkish. However, this interpretation seems to be misleading. All the words listed in the nomenclature prepared by Monnier had existed in Ottoman Turkish with the same meaning for centuries. They were basic terms for fortification that had long existed in both Turkish and French. The authors of the document probably wanted to have a common list of terminology in order to prevent any confusion in their writing, the courses they taught, etc.<sup>98</sup> The list of equivalencies is also of questionable value. According to the nomenclature that Monnier and the architect Hafız Efendi prepared, the equivalent of “bastion,” for example, was *tabia/tabya*; yet the French mostly referred to the buildings that the Ottomans called *tabya* as “redoubt” or “battery.” Thus, contemporary glossaries of this sort or later dictionaries, such as that of Şemseddin Sami, will not solve the problem. The meanings of terms need to be considered according to the context, and this present research aims to help to determine the late-eighteenth-century meanings of the terms.

### **1.8. Chapter Outlines**

This dissertation is composed of seven chapters. Having set the stage for the late-eighteenth-century Russian threats to the imperial capital in the Introduction, the following three chapters propose a periodization for the construction of the

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<sup>98</sup> Arcelin, 17; Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille a Constantinople en 1784* (Bib. Bourgen-Bresse, Ms. 63), 4 August 1784, p. 47-49.

Bosphorus defenses. Each chapter deals with a separate period in a chronological order. Chapter Two focuses on the hasty efforts of the Ottoman government to develop new defense systems in the Bosphorus in the last stage of the Russo-Ottoman war between 1772 and 1774 under the direction of Sultan Mustafa III. The unexpected Russian victories served as a trigger for the Ottoman government to improve defenses in order to counter possible Russian threats earlier. I shall mainly deal with the construction of new fortresses and redoubts on the shores of the Bosphorus on the Anatolian and Rumelian sides. The chapter will also try to shed light on the capabilities of the Ottoman architects in the field of fortification. It also discusses the employment of the French military official Baron de Tott amid technological and organizational challenges in the Bosphorus fortification as a part of “military acculturation” projects.

Chapter Three turns to the second phase of the constructions, where the Ottomans adopted a much more comprehensive and deliberative approach in 1778-88. The agency of Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa, as the first and longest-serving authority official charged with the security of the strait and the Black Sea, was an important determinant of the fate of the Bosphorus. Several actors, including Sultan Abdulhamid I, the grand admiral, grand viziers, and French engineers, played important roles in the development of this relatively systematic approach. Hasan Paşa provided for the maintenance of the fortresses, improved the Bosphorus defenses by consulting with French engineers, and administered the construction of new forts and batteries in the Bosphorus. French engineers that came to Istanbul were professionally educated in the field of military engineering, in contrast to de Tott, and they were under the protection of the grand admiral in many respects. The Ottoman approach to the Russian threat also changed in this phase, which affected the nature of their preparations.

Chapter Four is a complementary part that deals with the construction of the Bosphorus defenses in the new environment of the New Order reform movement of Sultan Selim III. It explores the third phase of the constructions. Ultimately, this dissertation deals with a period of reform and change. The third phase is ironically

both a product of preliminary efforts and their internalization and a challenge and resistance to the dynamics of new reform projects.

Having started the dissertation with the construction of the defenses, I proceed in Chapter Five to demonstrate the administrative organization of the Bosphorus defenses and the foundation of a superintendency designed for the security of the Bosphorus. The chapter presents positions such as the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırlığı*) and the Guardianship of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Muhafızlığı*), both of which were new creations.

Chapter Six turns to the military organization of the Bosphorus defenses. The chapter offers a different periodization than the one used in the second, third, and fourth chapters. The periodization of the military organization is divided into three: before the Superintendency, after the creation of the Superintendency and the “New Order” era. The Ottoman government reorganized the military personnel of the fortresses in each period. The government also supplied artillery in increasing numbers in relation to the increasing capacity of the forts and batteries over time.

The conclusion summarizes the research findings and the main arguments of the dissertation. It then discusses their historiographical implications and offers suggestions about future research prospects.

## CHAPTER 2

### HASTY EFFORTS TO GUARD THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL (1772-1774)

#### 2.1. Introduction

After a series of Austrian and Russian attacks on the frontiers, the Ottomans managed to take back Belgrade and signed the Belgrade Peace Treaty in 1739. The Ottoman Empire pursued a peaceful foreign policy until Sultan Mustafa III's critical decision to declare war upon Russia in 1768. The grand vizier Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa opposed this decision and wanted to postpone the war, because the Ottomans lacked the necessary defense structures and the military was disorganized and needed equipment. However, Mustafa III insisted on his decision, with dire consequences for the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 resulted in an Ottoman defeat and the loss of important territories, above all Crimea.<sup>99</sup>

The Sublime Porte recognized the importance of the defense and fortification of the Straits of the Mediterranean (Akdeniz Boğazı) and the Black Sea (Karadeniz Boğazı) in view of the growing seriousness of the threat posed by Russia and its rising military power. The loss of Ottoman lands such as Bender, Ismail, Kilia, and Akkerman to Russia in the war accelerated the Ottoman sense of urgency regarding the protection of the straits. In addition, the unexpected Russian attack on the Ottoman navy in Çeşme on 5-7 July 1770 shocked them. Russians brought their fleet all the way from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar with British help, and burnt down of almost the entire Ottoman fleet at Çeşme in 1770 just as British Admiral Elfinston attempted to acquire a military base in the Dardanelles. The Ottomans accelerated their efforts to take security measures both

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<sup>99</sup> For an analysis of the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia and the conditions of the Ottoman army, provisioning, and war preparations, see Metin Bezikoğlu, "The Deterioration of Ottoman Administration in the Light of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774", (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2001), 37-53. See also Abdurrahim Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations Between the Years 1774-1787", (MA Thesis. Bilkent University: 2008), 16-19.

by establishing a new navy and by establishing new fortresses along the shores of the straits.<sup>100</sup>

The sultan's decision to declare war upon Russia was not well thought out, planned, and organized, and the Ottoman efforts to take new measures to improve their artillery and fortifications were similarly haphazard.<sup>101</sup> As a consequence of this lack of organization in the Ottoman governmental and military structures, the fortification of the Bosphorus emerged as a hasty reaction to uncalculated emerging threats. Because of this lack of organization and planning, these preliminary efforts were not really perceived within the realm of reform by scholars. Even though Mustafa III did not lead a large-scale and systematic reform effort, as his son Selim III would later do, he initiated the construction of new fortresses, the reorganization of the arsenal, and the building of new ships, especially with the technical support of a Frenchman of Hungarian origins, Baron de Tott.<sup>102</sup>

This chapter will reveal the hasty efforts of the Ottoman government to develop new defense systems in the Strait of the Black Sea to counter possible Russian threats earlier. I shall mainly deal with the construction of new fortresses and redoubts on the shores of the Bosphorus on the Anatolian and Rumelian sides. The chapter will also try to shed light on the capabilities of the Ottoman architects, such as the chief architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa, in the field of fortification. It will also

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<sup>100</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 4, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1978), pp. 365-427; Mustafa Cezar, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 2011, vol. 5), pp. 2580-86; Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300- 1923*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 321-412; Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 223-258.

<sup>101</sup> For some analysis and discussions on the disorganization of the Ottoman government, see Bezikoğlu, "The Deterioration of Ottoman Administration".

<sup>102</sup> About the life of Baron de Tott, see. Géza David, "Baron de Tott, Français", TDV DİA, vol. 5, pp. 83-84; Ferenc Tóth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Français en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime: La Carrière de François Baron de Tott (1733-1793)*, (Istanbul: ISIS, 2011); Virginia Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830.", *The International History Review*, (24, no. 2, 2002), pp. 253-277; Virginia Aksan, "Enlightening the Ottomans: Mustafa III and Tott", in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. by A. Çaksu (Istanbul: 2001), pp. 163-174; Auguste Boppe, "La France et le 'militaire turc' au XVIIIe siècle", *Feuilles d'histoire* (1912), pp. 386-402, 490-501.

discuss the employment of the French military official Baron de Tott amid the technological and organizational challenges in the Bosphorus fortification.

## 2.2. Setting the Ottoman Program for Fortifications

The Ottoman government appointed Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa as the chief admiral (with the rank of vizier) in 1770 as a consequence of the above-mentioned unexpected incidents in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.<sup>103</sup> He was responsible for the protection and security of the Strait of the Mediterranean, the Morea zone, and the shores of the Mediterranean.<sup>104</sup> The vizier Halil Hamid Paşa was also appointed as the Seraskier of the Black Sea (*Karadeniz seraskeri*)<sup>105</sup> in 1185/1772.<sup>106</sup>

When the Ottomans entered war with Russia in 1768, the only existing castles were those of Anadolu Hisarı and Rumeli Hisarı (built in 1395 and 1452, respectively) and Anadolu Kavağı and Rumeli Kavağı (built in 1624 to protect Istanbul against incursion from the Black Sea). While the Ottoman government gathered funds to build new fortresses, it immediately started to strengthen these older fortresses and equip them with new ammunition and equipment. It equipped particularly the castles of Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı (Yenice-i Göksu) with a great quantity of black gunpowder, some construction materials, and fire engines.<sup>107</sup> It also equipped

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<sup>103</sup> “Zikr-i bakiyye-i ahvâl-i Bahr-i Sefid ve vefât-ı Hüsâmeddin Paşa ve Kapudân-ı derya şoden-i Cezayirli Hasan Paşa bâ-rütbe-i vezâret...” Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, “Vekayinüvis Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774)”, (Marmara Üniversitesi SBE, 2000), 173; *Târîh-i Enverî*, SK, Yahya Tevfik Efendi, nr. 253, p. 145a.

<sup>104</sup> For the *berat* of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa’s appointment as grand admiral, see. BOA. C.BH. 8/353, 10 Z 1183/6 April 1770. “Bu def’a müceddeden rütbe-i vezaret ile derya kapudanlığı kendüye tevcih ve ihsan-ı hümayunum olan vezirim Hasan Paşa’ya hüküm ki... Fi Evail-i zilhicce sene 1183.”

<sup>105</sup> BOA. C. AS. 952/41373, 3 Ra 1186/4 June 1772.

<sup>106</sup> “Reften-i Halil Paşa be-Âsitâne-i saâdet ve serasker şoden-i o be-donanmâ-yı bahr-i siyah ve zikr-i ba’zı ez-tecvîhât ve îrâd-ı me’mûriyyet-i ba’zı ez-vüzerâ...” Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, “Vekayinüvis Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774)”. (Marmara Üniversitesi SBE, 2000), 295-296; *Târîh-i Enverî*, SK, Yahya Tevfik Efendi, nr. 253, p. 252b-253b. Also see. *Osmanlı-Rus Harbi Esnasında Bir Şahidin Kaleminden İstanbul (1769-1774)*. Prep. by. Süleyman Göksu. (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2016), 30. Halil Hamid Pasha was the “Chief Admiral of the Black Sea” and sailed to the Black Sea with the imperial navy on 16 May 1772/13 Safer 1186.

<sup>107</sup> For examples, see BOA. C.AS. 1008/44138, 23 B 1185/1 November 1771; BOA. C.AS. 1010/44237, 7 M 1186/10 April 1772.



the Kavak fortresses with black gunpowder (20 *kantars* each for the Anadolu and Rumeli Kavađı fortresses, 40 *kantars* in total) in Ramazan 1185/December 1771.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, it appointed twenty-five gunners to the Kavak fortresses (Anadolu Kavađı and Rumeli Kavađı) in order to provide for the security of the area.<sup>109</sup> At the same time, the Ottoman government immediately decided to build new fortresses along the Bosphorus. These efforts represented a new era of defenses for the Bosphorus, one that would continue into the twentieth century.

The lack of organization and planning in the government can be observed to some extent in the lack of contemporary wartime archival documents regarding decisions and plans, such as appraisal registers. Because the sultan and the viziers held their consultations and examinations orally, it is rare to find written records of their preliminary decisions about the Bosphorus fortifications in this period, in contrast to the following decades. Therefore, there is no archival record of the early decisions to develop the new security systems and to build new fortresses and redoubts. Nevertheless, the process and its chronology can be traced through other relevant archival material and Baron de Tott's memoir. The deficiency of the archival evidence has also resulted in the circulation of incorrect information about the Bosphorus fortresses in the scholarly literature today.

The Ottomans faced an unexpected Russian threat in the Black Sea region, and they were unprepared to meet it. Thus, it seems that the forts and redoubts were built precipitately, without a well-established plan and organization. Consequently, it is difficult to establish the order of the constructions or to write their history in a chronological order. Some of the constructions built in the beginning did not have specific names, and documents did not specify their exact locations. For this reason, writing the history of early fortifications yields a somewhat blurred picture.

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<sup>108</sup> BOA. AE.SMST.III. 318/25599, 23 Ra 1187/14 June 1773.

<sup>109</sup> BOA. AE.SMST.III. 349/28014. 9 § 1186/5 November 1772. Before the construction of the Fener forts, the Ottoman government appointed fifty artillerymen to the Kavak forts (twenty-five to each). These artillerymen were later moved to Fener forts when they were completed.

From a retrospective point of view, the Ottoman government probably decided to build two fortresses and two redoubts, one each on the Anatolian and the Rumelian sides of the Bosphorus. Even though it is difficult to specify the location of the redoubts, the Ottoman architects built the fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri in addition to the redoubts between the Kavak and Fener fortresses on both sides.

The construction of public, military, or important private buildings was under the authority of chief architects (*hassa ser-mimar*) in the Ottoman Empire. The chief-architects or their deputies were responsible for designing the buildings, preparing an appraisal register (*keşif defteri*), and supervising their construction. As for the imperial constructions, they usually prepared a model (*mücessem resim*) to present to the sultan for his opinion. In addition, a construction official (*bina emini*) was appointed to each construction site to arrange for the procurement and transportation of the building material, to keep accounts of their expenditures, and to supervise the workers in the construction.<sup>110</sup>

The chief architect at the time was Mehmed Tahir Ağa, and he designed these buildings, while a Greek *kalfa* (master builder) accompanied him in the fieldwork. Mehmed Tahir Ağa not only served in Istanbul but also traveled through vast lands of the Ottoman Empire in order to fortify Ottoman cities ranging from Salonika and Edirne in Rumelia to İsmail and Rusçuk on the northern shores of the Black Sea, and from Mousul and Quds in Arab lands to Erzurum and Kars in Anatolia. He emerged as one of the leading architects of the Ottoman Empire in the field of fortification. Moreover, he was an important actor in the reinforcement of the defense systems of Istanbul and the Dardanelles. He repaired and strengthened the fortresses of Sultanhisarı and Sultaniye in the Dardanelles in 1778 (1192) and 1782 (1196),

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<sup>110</sup> Selman Can, "Osmanlı Mimarlık Teşkilatının XIX. Yüzyıldaki Değişim Süreci ve Eserleri ile Seyyid Abdülhalim Efendi", (PhD. Diss: İstanbul: İstanbul University, 2002), 9.

respectively.<sup>111</sup> In Istanbul, he built the fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri in the mouth of the Black Sea, as will be narrated below.

The process of building new forts and redoubts started in 1186/1772. Topçubaşı (head gunner) Mustafa Ağa supervised the construction of the new fortresses according to retrospective references in an archival document<sup>112</sup> and Baron de Tott's memoirs.<sup>113</sup>

### 2.3. Construction of New Redoubts

According to the earliest archival record,<sup>114</sup> a redoubt had been built between the fortresses of Rumeli Kavağı and Rumeli Feneri by 1186/1772. The name and location of this redoubt is not specified in the documents. However, it could possibly be the Redoubt (*Tabya*) of Havantepe or Papaz Burnu, according to historical maps. The Ottoman government appointed twenty *bostancı* soldiers to this redoubt. These locations were far from the center of Istanbul and uninhabited, which made housing and supplying the soldiers difficult. There was no kitchen in the first constructions, and military rations had to be carried daily to the fortresses from Istanbul. We learn from the request letter of a military commander (*usta*) of Kavak who was responsible for the first military settlements that he asked for the appointment of a boat in order to carry the military rations allocated to the soldiers

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<sup>111</sup> See BOA. MAD.d. 3162 for the appraisal registers of several fortresses built by chief architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa; Muzaffer Erdoğan, "Onsekizinci asır sonlarında bir Türk san'atkarı Hassa Başmimarı Mehmed Tahir Ağa: Hayatı ve mesleki Faaliyetleri".

<sup>112</sup> "... Topçubaşı sâbık müteveffa Mustafa Ağa'nın hâl-i hayatında memur-i inşası olduğu sevâhil-i bahr-i siyahda vaki kılâ'..." BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652, 19 Ra 1192/17 April 1778.

<sup>113</sup> Baron de Tott also refers to a head gunner who accompanied him in his examination of the Fener forts, which will be discussed later in detail: "Le maître canonier, ajouta-t-il, m'assure qu'il les a déjà vu se croiser." Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 183. This head gunner must have been Mustafa Ağa, who was initially responsible from the construction of the fortresses.

<sup>114</sup> BOA. C.AS. 382/15772, 29 Ra 1186/30 June 1772.

protecting the redoubt.<sup>115</sup> Even though we cannot trace the name of the architect of this redoubt in the archival records, we may suppose that it was the chief architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa, who also built the military constructions on the opposite side of the Bosphorus, Anatolia, at the same time.

The chief architect of the period, Mehmed Tahir Ağa, was responsible for the construction of new coastal fortresses in the Bosphorus, and he built two redoubts (*tabya*) and the fortress (*palanka*) of Anadolu Feneri on the Anatolian shore in 1772. Even though earlier Ottoman archival documents do not give specific names of the redoubts and fortresses, guesses can be made from the descriptions of their location. For example, Mehmed Tahir Ağa refers to redoubts and a fort in front of the Anatolian Lighthouse in a written petition.<sup>116</sup> In another document, the military commander (*usta*) of the Kavak fortress, el-Hâc Mehmed, refers to redoubts built between the Kavak and Fener forts.<sup>117</sup>

One of these redoubts must have been the Filburnu Redoubt, which is located between the Kavak and Fener fortresses. P. Minas Bijişkyan, who was born in Trabzon in 1777 and then became a priest, was tasked by the Patriarch to travel the shores of the Black Sea to write its history and geography. Bijişkyan traveled all the shores of the Black Sea between 1817 and 1819 and wrote his observations in a book: *Karadeniz Kıyıları Tarih ve Coğrafyası* (History and Geography of the Shores of the Black Sea). Despite the fact that he does not refer, he employed historical sources as well. He writes in his book that Filburnu was constructed in the era of Sultan Mustafa III.<sup>118</sup> The plural expression used in the documents<sup>119</sup> indicates that

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<sup>115</sup> BOA. C.AS. 382/15772, 29 Ra 1186/30 June 1772. Upon the commander's request, the soldiers were assigned three *gurus* daily for transportation and other needs in Rebiülevvel 1186/June 1772. The daily expense of rations transportation was 3 *guruş*, and the total amount for a month was 90 *guruş*. The *bostancı* soldiers continued to stay in this redoubt in the following months and were allocated the same or an equivalent amount of money for the following months. BOA. C.AS. 1035/45418, 11 L 1186/5 Ocak 1773. The monthly expense of *tayinat* transportation was 90 *guruş*, and it was paid in Şevval. For the month of Şaban, 87 *guruş* was paid.

<sup>116</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39440, 2 Za 1185/6 February 1772.

<sup>117</sup> BOA. C.AS. 945/41028, 11 L 1186/5 Ocak 1773.

<sup>118</sup> P. Minas Bijişkyan, *Karadeniz Kıyıları Tarih ve Coğrafyası (1817-1819)*, (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1969), 18.

there was another redoubt as well. This redoubt was probably the one built on the seaside of the Anatolian Lighthouse, which was attached to the fortress of Anadolu Feneri and later considered as a part of it.

Immediately after their construction, the Sublime Porte appointed twenty *bostancı* soldiers to the redoubt on the Anatolian side (probably to Filburnu) in the summer of 1186/1772.<sup>120</sup> At the same time, the military commander (*usta*) of Kavak, el-Hâc Mehmed, who was responsible for the protection of redoubts on the Anatolian side, asked for their daily wages, which he and other soldiers in the redoubt needed for the boats they used to get their provisions and for other expenditures.<sup>121</sup>

The locations of the new redoubts were uninhabited, and the construction of a new fortress or a redoubt meant the construction of new roads, jetties, and bridges around them. The sultan did not authorize the construction of a new road in the vicinity of Anadolu Kavağı at first so as to prevent settlements there. However, the demand for such infrastructure increased over time and was ultimately recognized.<sup>122</sup> The construction of the Filburnu Redoubt on the Anatolian side necessitated a new alternative route for boat. For example, the former Head-Armorer (*cebecibaşı*) Mustafa Ağa was tasked with the construction of two stone jetties (*taş iskele*) to facilitate this alternative route on 8 Zilkade 1187/21 Ocak 1774.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39440; C.AS. 945/41028.

<sup>120</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/207, 10 Ra 1186/11 June 1772.

<sup>121</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/206, 4 L 1186/29 December 1772; BOA. D.BŞM. 5536/459, 21 R 1186/22 July 1772; BOA. C.AS. 945/41028, 11 L 1186/5 Ocak 1773. The daily wage of twenty soldiers was 3 *guruş*. The same amount of 90 *guruş* for the transportation of military rations was paid for the months of Ramazan and Şevval 1186 as well.

<sup>122</sup> BOA. TSMA.e. 708/28, 8 Za 1187/21 Ocak 1774. The people of Anadolu Kavağı demanded the construction of an alternative route, especially needed in the winter seasons. However, the sultan rejected this demand because easy transportation would have resulted in an increase of people and housing in the region.

<sup>123</sup> BOA. TSMA.e. 788/26, 8 Za 1187/21 Ocak 1774.

## 2.4. Construction of Fener Fortresses

The chief architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa supervised the construction of two fortresses facing each other on the two sides of the mouth of the Black Sea Strait near Rumeli and Anadolu Lighthouses in 1185-1186/1772.<sup>124</sup> There were two lighthouses across from each other at the mouth of the Bosphorus (*boğazağzı*).<sup>125</sup> The new Fener fortresses built by Mehmed Tahir Ağa on both sides were built very close to the lighthouses.




Figure 2.1. Ottoman Map of the Bosphorus (İÜ.NE. 92580)

Mehmed Tahir Ağa was one of the important actors of the Bosphorus fortifications. He served as the chief architect of the Ottoman Empire for some twenty years,

<sup>124</sup> Mehmed Tahir Ağa wrote that the construction of the Anadolu Feneri Fortress and some redoubts around there were assigned to him in a document dated to 1185/1772: "Bâ-ferman-ı âlişân binasına me'mûr olduğum Bahr-i Siyah Boğazında Anadolu Feneri pîşgâhında müceddeden inşâ ve ihyâsına irâde-i seniyye buyurulan kârgir tabyalar ve palanka için mevcut cebehâne-i âmireden şimdilik iktiza eden eşyanın defteridir ki zikr olunur. Fi 2 Zilkade 1185. Bende Mehmed Tahir Sermimarân-ı hâssa." BOA. C. AS. 913/39440, 2 Za 1185/6 February 1772.

<sup>125</sup> Ğugios İnciciyan writes in his historical chronology of Istanbul in the eighteenth century that the Rumeli Lighthouse was a two-storied building with a stair of 150 steps. Both levels of the lighthouse were covered with clear glass to protect the flames of their oil lamps, which were lit from sunset to sunrise on each floor in copper bowls that contained four *okes* of oil and eight wicks. İnciciyan reports that the light of the lighthouse was visible from one hundred miles away, even if dimly. P. Ğ. İnciciyan, *18. Asırda İstanbul*, trans. by Hrand D. Andreasyan, (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1976), 121.

during the reigns of Sultan Mustafa III and Sultan Abdulhamid I.<sup>126</sup> Unfortunately, there is a lack of information about the life and works of Mehmed Tahir Ağa even though he was one of the leading architects of the empire. The silhouette of the city of Istanbul started to change toward the end of the eighteenth century, and Mehmed Tahir Ağa contributed a great deal to that change.<sup>127</sup>

The references in the current literature to the construction date of the Fener forts vary and are incorrect. Barbié du Bocage writes that the Fener forts were built in 1769 according to the plans of a Greek architect.<sup>128</sup> No other contemporary source indicates the date of construction to be as early as 1769, and all secondary sources on the matter refer to Bocage for the construction date of the Fener forts.<sup>129</sup>

However, the Ottoman archival sources show the construction year as 1772, as will be indicated below. In addition, Bocage's information about the Greek architect was

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<sup>126</sup> His date of birth is not certain, but it is known that he joined the Russo-Austrian campaign with his father in 1737-1738 at the age of twelve. Mehmed Tahir Ağa became the chief architect three times, with short intervals in between. Even though the exact years of his position as chief architect are not certain, some dates can be determined. He became the acting chief architect for the first time in 1760 (1173) and then the principal in 1761 (1174). After a very short interval, he took the position back again within the same year, in 1761, and served until 1767 (h. 1174-1180). He retired from the position for an unknown reason and then returned to it from 1770 to 1775 (1183-1189). For the last time, Mehmed Tahir Ağa served as the chief architect in 1777-1784 (1191-1198). We cannot tell yet the exact reasons of his retirements but it is clear that he did not abandon his work as an architect and that he continued to serve at least as an inspector of architectural constructions even in his old age. His date of death is not yet known. Muzaffer Erdoğan, "Onsekizinci asır sonlarında bir Türk san'atkarı Hassa Başmimarı Mehmed Tahir Ağa: Hayatı ve mesleki Faaliyetleri"; Ahmet Vefa Çobanoğlu, DİA "Mehmed Tahir Ağa".

<sup>127</sup> Several fires and earthquakes destroyed many of Istanbul's buildings in the first half of the eighteenth century. Finally, the great earthquake of 22 May 1766 destroyed and damaged many buildings in Istanbul, necessitating reconstructions and public improvements. Consequently, Mehmed Tahir Ağa, as a long-term chief architect of the era, was responsible for repairing the damaged buildings and constructing new ones such as mosques, bridges, and fortresses. Muzaffer Erdoğan, "Onsekizinci asır sonlarında bir Türk san'atkarı Hassa Başmimarı Mehmed Tahir Ağa: Hayatı ve mesleki Faaliyetleri".

<sup>128</sup> Barbié du Bocage, "Plan Topographique du Bosphore de Thrace" in *Voyage Pittoresque de Constantinople et des Rives du Bosphore D'après Les Dessins De M. Melling*, (Paris: Treuttel, Würtz and Pierre Didot, 1819), unnumbered page.

<sup>129</sup> The construction date of the Fener forts was given as 1769 in some sources written about the Bosphorus fortresses: Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", p. 34; Dörter, "A Future for the Upper Bosphorus", 142; Kutgün Eyüpgiller and Yeşim Yaşa, *İstanbul Boğazı Kale ve Tabyaları*, (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2019), 41, 197. These sources gave the construction date as 1769, likely based on the earliest reference to the Fener forts in the document summaries of the Ottoman Archives, dated 1183/1769-70 (C.AS. 976/42534). However, the date in the summary is mistaken, and this mistake seems to have misled researchers. The original date of this document is 9 R 1187/30 Haziran 1773.

probably taken from Baron de Tott, who refers to an Ottoman-Greek *kalfa* (master builder) as one of the two architects who designed the Fener forts.<sup>130</sup> One of these “two architects” should be Mehmed Tahir Ağa, introduced above. A Greek *kalfa* (probably Yorgi) supervised the construction of the Fener forts under him.

There is also an inscription on the fortress of Anadolu Feneri that offers the date of 1186/1772, while announcing that it was a new fortress built by Sultan Mustafa III to protect the Black Sea Strait:

*Padişâh-ı bahr ü berr şehinşâh-ı İskender eser  
Şevketlü Sultan Mustafa Han İbn-i  
Sultan Ahmet Hân-ı Sâlis Hazretleri  
Bahr-i Siyah boğazını muhafaza için  
Bina buyurdıkları kal'a-i cedîddir. 1186.*<sup>131</sup>

Literally can be translated as follows:

This is the new fortress constructed by His Majesty Sultan Mustafa Khan,  
the Sovereign of the Sea and the Land,  
the King of Kings of the Legacy of Alexander,  
and son of Sultan Ahmed the Third to guard the Black Sea Strait. 1186.<sup>132</sup>

Earlier sources about the construction of the Fener fortresses are rare. One of the earliest documents, dating back to 1186/1772, indicates that in order to cut the black stone for the construction of the fortress of Anadolu Feneri, they requested

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<sup>130</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 179-180: “Ils étaient confiés à l’intelligence de deux architectes aussi peu instruits des lignes de défense, que des règles de Vitruve.” There are some references to a Rum Yorgi *kalfa* in Ottoman archival documents related to Black Sea fortifications. See BOA. AE.SABH.I. 211/13984.

<sup>131</sup> Ahmed Nezih Galitekin, *Beykoz Kitabeleri*, (İstanbul: Beykoz Belediyesi, 2008), vol. 1, 117; Ali Soysal, *Anadolu Feneri: Tarihten Gelen Işık*, (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 1997), 58.

<sup>132</sup> Translated from Turkish to English by. Prof. Dr. Engin Deniz Akarlı.



ten *kantars* of black gunpowder from the Chief Treasurer (*defterdar*).<sup>133</sup> Information provided by the architect Reyhan Evrim Karadağ about the construction materials of the Fener forts seems to bear this out.<sup>134</sup> According to her findings, a variety of materials were used in the construction of the Fener forts. Even though we cannot be sure exactly when they were used in the building, builders used pitch-faced stone in the corners of all the walls, and both pitch-faced stone and rubble in between. They also used sandstone (*kumtaşı*), basalt, and bricks.<sup>135</sup> (see Fig. 2.3. and 2.4. for Ottoman plan of Anadolu Feneri fortress at the end of the chapter)

Even though the sources and a modern field analysis indicate that the buildings of the Fener fortresses were made of masonry, the Mehmed Tahir Ağa's description of them as *palanka* rather than *kal'a* (fortress) is remarkable. The definition of *palanka* as an Ottoman military-architecture term varies according to context and time. *Palanka* is generally known as a wooden fortress on riverine or military routes. Evliya Çelebi describes "palanka as a fortress, a small settlement surrounded by a wooden enclosure, or as a masonry technique. Generally, palankas were built from wooden material."<sup>136</sup> According to the findings of Burcu Özgüven, *palankas* usually had simple rectangular or regular plans. Surrounded by a ditch (*şarampo*), the *palanka* had an entrance guarded by a watch tower (*ağaçtan lonca köşkü*), which was covered by a roof. The entrance was connected with a bridge over the ditch. There were four bastions at the corners; some had a round plan and some angular, with guns and cannons. Within the *palanka* there were probably houses or barracks for the soldiers. *Palankas* were usually considered small versions of larger forts or

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<sup>133</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5535/264, 24 Ra 1186/25 June 1772. "Binasına irade-i seniyye buyurulan bahr-i siyah boğazında Anadolu Feneri pîşgâhında vaki palankada testih-i duvarlar için seng-i siyah kat'ına on kantar barut-ı siyaha dahi muhtac olduğumuz ma'lûm-ı inayetleri buyuruldukda saadetlü defterdâr efendi hazretlerine hitaben emr-i âlişân i'ta buyurulmak bâbında emr u fermân devletlü inayetlü efendim sultanım hazretlerindir."

<sup>134</sup> For a detailed architectural analysis of Rumeli Feneri Fort, see Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 36-64.

<sup>135</sup> Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 44.

<sup>136</sup> Burcu Özgüven, "The Palanka: A Characteristic Building Type of the Ottoman Fortification Network in Hungary", (*EJOS*, IV (2001): No. 34), 3.

citadels.<sup>137</sup> Thus, it can be concluded that *palankas* were sometimes made of masonry, like Fener fortresses. In addition, Mehmed Tahir Ağa's choice of the term *palanka* to describe these forts might be due to its small size, relative to the ones he worked on in Ismail, Sultaniye, Ruse (Ruşçuk), Salonika (Selanik), and Ochakov (Özi), where the Ottomans had large military settlements. It is still open to discussion whether the meaning of the word in this context was the same as on the Hungarian border in the 16th century. It seems that the Ottomans used the terms of *kal'a* and *palanka* interchangeably. Still, it should be considered that the Bosphorus fortresses were not large citadels with bastions and towers, instead, they usually had battery-like structure and Mehmed Tahir Ağa's choice of this word might be intentional to imply that we do not envisage large and extensive constructions.

Contemporaneous Ottoman archival documents do not provide much detail about the decision-making processes behind the construction of the Bosphorus fortresses. Estimations registers are the most critical documents in the history of architecture for understanding the structure and components of buildings and their possible expenses. However, I have not been able to locate the appraisal registers of the initial states of the Bosphorus fortresses. One cannot trace the discussions on choices of location, the techniques preferred for the buildings and their process of drawing plans, or their priorities.<sup>138</sup> However, Baron de Tott's memoirs provide some insights into what was happening in the background, although his narrative appears to be biased in certain respects.

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>138</sup> The historical record becomes clearer only later, especially in the era of Sultan Selim III, when documents offer several discussions about fortress locations and technical preferences.

Baron de Tott was a French military man of Hungarian origin who lived in Istanbul for several years as a part of diplomatic missions.<sup>139</sup> Upon the burning of the Ottoman fleet at Çeşme, the Ottoman government assigned him the task of strengthening the defenses of the Dardanelles against possible attacks of the Russian navy in 1770. In this capacity, he helped the Ottoman military defend the Dardanelles against Russian Admiral Orlov. Then he returned to Istanbul and attempted to affect some military reforms, introducing new techniques for casting cannons, establishing a corps of rapid-fire artillerymen, opening an engineering school in the Golden Horn, and constructing new fortresses in the Bosphorus. Although he remained in French service, the Ottomans contracted him sporadically until 1775.<sup>140</sup>

Baron de Tott wrote a famous book called *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs et les Tartares* (Amsterdam 1785) about the life of the Ottoman Turks and Crimean Tartars, and the book was influential in shaping the image of the eighteenth-

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<sup>139</sup> François de Tott was born in the village of Chamigny in France on 17 August 1733 as a son of a Hungarian military officer and nobleman, André Tóth, who took refuge in France. Baron de Tott, or "Tot Beyzade," as he was called by the Ottomans, visited Istanbul for the first time in 1755 with his father, acting as a secretary for Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, who was assigned as an extraordinary envoy in 1755, and later as the ambassador of France to Istanbul in 1756-1768. His main task was to learn Turkish, to understand the conditions of the Ottoman Empire, and to gather information about Crimea in order to take over his father's secret missions in the Orient after his retirement. He lived in Istanbul for eight years and returned to Paris in 1763. He had a short mission in 1767 in Neuchatel, Switzerland. He was appointed as the French consul in the Khanate of Crimea in 1767 in order to observe the conditions in Crimea and to provoke Tatars to rise against Russia. After the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war in 1768, he returned to Istanbul. The French government assigned him to inspect French trade centers in the Mediterranean in 1777, but his real task was to gather information about the Straits, the shores of Egypt and Syria, and the Aegean and Black Seas. By doing so, he would provide topographic information about strategic places in case France needed this information in a military campaign. He visited all the important coastal cities of the Mediterranean, such as Alexandria, Aleppo, Smyrna, Salonika, and Tunis, and made some examinations about opening a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. After the French Revolution in 1789, he fled to Switzerland and then to Hungary upon the remit of the Hungarian government. He died in Hungary on 24 September 1792. Géza David, "Baron de Tott, Français", TDV DiA, vol. 5; Ferenc Tóth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Français en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime: La Carrière de François Baron de Tott (1733-1793)*, Istanbul: ISIS, 2011; Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında."

<sup>140</sup> Géza David, "Baron de Tott, Français", TDV DiA, vol. 5; Ferenc Tóth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Français en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime: La Carrière de François Baron de Tott (1733-1793)*, Istanbul : ISIS, 2011; Virginia Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron De Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830." *The International History Review*, (24, no. 2, 2002), 259.

century Ottoman Empire in Europe.<sup>141</sup> According to the writings of Baron de Tott in his *Mémoires*, Sultan Mustafa III consulted with him about developing defense systems of the Black Sea Strait. In response to the sultan's query, Baron de Tott recommended the construction of two fortresses towards the mouth of the Black Sea, and he was tasked with the inspection of this project. However, Baron de Tott later thought that this project was abandoned, because the Ottomans constructed two fortresses alongside the Anatolian and Rumeli Lighthouses instead of constructing them in the places he suggested earlier (he probably had suggested Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı, for he built fortresses in those spots later).

De Tott also asserts that he was kept at a distance during the construction of the fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri. These fortresses were built under the supervision of Mehmed Tahir Ağa. Strikingly, Baron de Tott claims that the Fener fortresses “were entrusted to the intelligence of two architects, who were as little educated about the lines of defense, as those of Vitruvius.”<sup>142</sup> Here, he is probably referring to Mehmed Tahir Ağa and the Ottoman-Greek master builder (*kalfa*)<sup>143</sup> who assisted him. By saying that the Ottoman architects do not know the rules of Vitruvius, Baron de Tott probably implies that they had no theoretical training in architecture. While the importance of French aid is underlined, he especially opposes the technicality of engineers trained in schools in the West to that of Ottoman architects trained in the field empirically.

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<sup>141</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, (Amsterdam, 1785). More on Baron de Tott and his memoirs, see. Virginia Aksan, “Enlightening the Ottomans: Mustafa III and Tott”, in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, éd. A. Çaksu (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 163-74; Auguste Boppe, 'La France et le "militaire turc" au XVIIIe siècle', *Feuilles d'histoire* (1912), 386-402,490-501; Frédéric Hitzel, *Relations interculturelles et scientifiques entre l'Empire ottoman et les pays de l'Europe occidentale 1453-1839*, (Ph.D. dissertation, Paris-Sorbonne, 1995).

<sup>142</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 179-180. “Ils étaient confiés à l’intelligence de deux architectes aussi peu instruits des lignes de défense, que des règles de Vitruve.”

<sup>143</sup> There are some references to a Greek/Rum Yorgi *kalfa* in Ottoman archival documents related to Black Sea fortifications. See. BOA. AE.SABH.I. 211/13984. Tott himself also refers to a Greek *kalfa* in the construction of Fener forts.

Baron de Tott did not think highly of the Fener forts. He claimed that the consequence of these two architects' work was "some ill-built towers and a few dry walls to contain the artillery," which had the range of a thirty-six-pound. The whitewashing of the fortress walls enabled the viziers to announce their completion to Sultan Mustafa III.<sup>144</sup> This piece of information lends credence to a later drawing of the fortress of Rumeli Feneri depicting it with two large towers and entrenched batteries of guns on the seashore (see Figure 2.5. for Ottoman plan of Rumeli Feneri fortress at the end of the chapter).

According to de Tott, when the viziers informed Sultan Mustafa III about the completion of the Fener fortresses, he noticed de Tott's absence and asked why Baron de Tott was not involved in the construction of the new forts. The viziers answered that they did not know that they were meant to consult with Baron de Tott. Thereupon, the sultan delegated to Baron de Tott the authority to inspect the new fortresses, to decide whether they were functional, and, accordingly, whether to keep or to demolish them. With this authority, Baron de Tott went to inspect the Fener fortresses accompanied with the Reis Efendi (*Reisülküttab*/the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the Başdefterdar (the Chief Treasurer).<sup>145</sup>

It is thought-provoking why Reis Efendi and Defterdar Efendi accompanied de Tott since those will not be involved in any inspection tour in the following years as can be observed in the next chapters. The accompany of Reis Efendi might be because Baron de Tott was a respected foreigner known as *Beyzade* (son of a prince) among the Ottomans and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was probably closely interested in

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<sup>144</sup> Tott, *Mémoires*, Part III, 180. "On vit bientôt à l'ouverture du canal, et hors de la portée des boulets de trente-six, s'élever de mauvaises tours, et quelques murailles seches qui devaient contenir l'artillerie; une couche d'eau de chaux, en blanchissant le tout, mit bientôt les Ministres en état d'annoncer au Grand-Seigneur la perfection de cet ouvrage."

<sup>145</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 180-181.

his affairs. Defterdar Efendi accompanied them probably because he was the head of the finances and his presence was obligatory while making a prospective plan.<sup>146</sup>

De Tott's main concern was the location of the new fortresses, since they seemed to be excessively distant from each other, in contrast to the location he suggested before. According to de Tott, if the location did not suit the purpose, there was no need to inspect the buildings further. Their functionality was dependent on the suitability of their respective locations, as their purpose was to keep a hostile vessel under crossfire. Thus, he wanted to test if cannon shots from the two fortresses could keep a passing vessel under effective crossfire. Both architects and the Head-Gunner (probably Topçubaşı Mustafa Ağa) assured de Tott that they had already performed tests using cannons placed on the seaside and obtained successful results. In response, de Tott wanted to test shooting not from the seaside but from the towers, which were at a higher altitude and thus more distant from the centerline of the strait. That cross-shooting test from the tower failed. Consequently, de Tott proclaimed that the Fener fortresses were dysfunctional and announced that there was no need to inspect the fortress buildings further.

He told the Reisülkütab and the Başdefterdar that the construction of new fortresses in Garibçe and Poyraz harbors was necessary, as he had suggested earlier. (See Figure 2.2. for the entrance of the strait to locate the Fener, Garibçe and Poyraz locations on the map.) They agreed, but de Tott heard nothing from the Porte about the forts for the next six months.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> This might be an indicator of some kind of problems in the operation of bureaucracy at the moment. In prospective examples, the Defterdar or the Reisülkütab did not join in the tours in order to inspect the military structures and to decide for future plans. Instead, it was mostly the grand vizier, grand admiral, architects and engineers who made inspections. Then they reported their opinions and observations, where the defterdar declared his opinion on the official report. It seems that the Ottoman government made most of the decisions orally at that time instead of following a bureaucratic correspondence procedure which worked very effectively in the reign of Sultan Selim III.

<sup>147</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 182-185.



Figure 2.2. Locations of the fortresses indicated on Ottoman Map (TSMK. H1858)

Baron de Tott's views about the Fener fortresses are repeated in modern scholarship uncritically and without verification. Even though it can be concluded from de Tott's account that the Fener fortresses were dysfunctional, it seems that the Ottomans continued to use and strengthen these fortresses in the following decades. Despite Baron de Tott's conclusion that the functionality of the fortresses depended on the effective range of crossfire cannon shooting from the fortress towers, the Ottomans might have had some reasons behind their choices. Several reasons come to mind: for one, the Ottomans might have found seaside crossfire sufficient at the time, since the Bosphorus fortresses generally functioned as coastal batteries.

Besides, the Ottomans probably used the fortresses also for the purpose of monitoring the Black Sea. Indeed, according to a later regulation, the responsibility for stopping an enemy entrance to the strait rested with the gunners of the Kavak fortresses. According to the same regulation, if the sentries saw the silhouette of a vessel or a sign from the Black Sea, the fortress of Rumeli Feneri was expected to

notice it first.<sup>148</sup> In addition, according to an architectural analysis of the fortress of Rumeli Feneri carried out by architect Reyhan Evrim Karadağ, the east tower of the Rumeli Feneri Fortress included the armory, and it functioned as a watchtower because it had a clear view of the mouth of the Black Sea Strait.<sup>149</sup>

The topography and the nature of possible threats coming from outside could have been a determinant as well. The topographical features of a place and the existence of harbors and rivers in the location might have influenced Ottoman preferences. For example, all new Bosphorus fortresses were built in places where there existed almost no prior housing or public works. The Anatolian and Rumeli Lighthouses were exceptions probably because it was much easier and faster for the Ottomans to build in areas already opened to settlement. In contrast, they encountered many difficulties in Riva, for instance, because it was surrounded by wild forests.

The Ottomans' later preferences for building fortresses right outside the mouth of the Bosphorus, such as the fortresses of Riva and Kilyos, may indicate that they wanted to confront incoming threats as early as possible. Also, they may have expected the threat from the Black Sea to come not directly from the middle of the strait but from along the shores.<sup>150</sup> Thus, it would be more reasonable to meet the threat near the lighthouses. Their knowledge of the winds and currents of the region and the equipment of Russian ships and their consequent route preferences may well have determined the Ottomans' choice of location. Reliance of the modern scholarship on this narrative without considering these possibilities is simplistic. If nothing else, the fact that the Ottomans continued to use the Fener fortresses as strategic outposts indicates that they, at least, did not consider them dysfunctional.

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<sup>148</sup> Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, Prep. by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 214-216: "...ecânib tarafından sefâine müteallik sevâd ve alâmet zâhir olduğundan cümleden evvel Rumeli feneri kal'ası tarafından meşhûd olacağı zâhir olmağla der-akab kal'a-i mezbûre yeniçerileri ihbâr için barut kaldırup heva-yi fişek atup...." This regulation will be discussed in the military organization chapter.

<sup>149</sup> Karadağ, "Rumelifeneri Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 46.

<sup>150</sup> The vessels traversing the Istanbul Strait from the Black Sea would follow the shoreline instead of the middle of the strait.



Notwithstanding Baron de Tott's opinion that the Fener fortresses were dysfunctional, the Ottomans continued to equip and use them as part of their developing defense system. The Ottomans began to equip them with necessary guns and other equipment while their construction was still under way. The Director (*nâzır*) of the Imperial Arsenal (Tophâne-i Amire), Mehmed Ağa, ordered ninety-eight new guns of various dimensions (*kebir* and *şahi*) to be prepared for use at the new fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri.<sup>151</sup>

When the construction of the Fener forts neared completion by the fall of 1186/1772, soldiers were appointed to man them in November 1772.<sup>152</sup> Then the Ottoman government appointed new soldiers, armorers, *bostancı* soldiers and gunners to the fortresses in 1774.<sup>153</sup>

## **2.5. Construction of Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı Fortresses**

As discussed in the previous section, Baron de Tott suggested the construction of new fortresses in the promontories of Garibçe and Poyraz. Sultan Mustafa III ordered these be constructed, but six months after de Tott's inspection, when the sultan inquired about the state of the construction, it became evident that de Tott's project had not been carried out. The sultan then placed Baron de Tott directly in

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<sup>151</sup> BOA. C.AS. 648/27247, 29 Ca 1186/28 August 1772; BOA. C.AS. 766/32360, 29 Ca 1186/28 August 1772; BOA. C.AS. 913/39440, 13 Ra 1187/4 July 1773.

<sup>152</sup> BOA. C.AS. 845/36103, 7 Ş 1186/3 November 1772; BOA. C.AS 1200/53738, 3 N 1186/28 November 1772. The details of the military personnel and their salaries will be discussed in Chapter 6.

<sup>153</sup> BOA. C.ML. 519/21227, 22 Zilkade 1187/4 February 1774.

charge of the project and ordered that the work begin immediately the following day.<sup>154</sup>

Almost one year after the construction of the Fener fortresses, Baron de Tott completed the construction of two fortresses, one in the Promontory of Garibçe on the Rumelian side and the other across from it on the Promontory of Poyraz Burnu<sup>155</sup> on the Anatolian side in 1187/1773. The Promontories of Garibçe and Poyraz were opposite each other at one of the narrowest points in the Bosphorus. The name of the Poyraz fortress is derived from the Turkish word for the fierce northeast wind which howls down the Bosphorus in winter. Garipçe (meaning strange or lonely in Turkish), on the other hand, was a strangely shaped and craggy point.<sup>156</sup> The topographic conditions must have made the building process difficult for builders. Still, the basic construction was completed in almost six months.

Baron de Tott writes that he was involved in the drawing of the plans<sup>157</sup> while the vizier consulted the astrologers (*müneccim*) to find the most suitable day and time

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<sup>154</sup> "Sultan Mustapha, qui venait souvent à la Porte conférer avec ses Ministres, & se faire rendre compte de leur gestion, était venu le matin ; bien informé sans doute que la construction des nouveaux Châteaux n'était pas commencée, il convoqua ses Ministres avec précipitation, son début les fit trembler. Vous êtes des traîtres, leur dit-il ; vous avez déjà ébranlé mon Trône ; vous ne travaillez qu'à le détruire: la colere éclatait dans ses yeux : son auditoire était interdit. Ismaël Bey, plus hardi que les autres, parce qu'il était plus sûr de la faveur de son Maître, osa seul prendre la parole pour le supplier de nommer le traître. Vous-même, lui répliqua le Sultan; où sont les Châteaux que Tott devait construire depuis plus de six mois ? Il a décidé l'emplacement convenable ; lui avez-vous fourni les moyens de poser la première pierre ? Les Ministres opposerent pour leur justification, qu'ils n'en avaient pas reçu l'ordre. L'Empereur assura qu'il l'avait donné, & l'on ne parvint à le calmer, qu'en lui garantissant que les ouvriers y seroient le lendemain. Nous convînmes de l'heure à laquelle nous nous y rendrions, pour y donner seulement quelques coups de pioche: formalité que les Ministres exigeaient, afin de pouvoir garantir à leur Maître, en sûreté de conscience, que le travail était commencé." Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 186-187.

<sup>155</sup> The Ottomans refer to the promontory as Pilav burnu in some of the earlier documents. See BOA. C. AS. 670/28149; BOA. D.BŞM. 5585/470

<sup>156</sup> Hilary Sumner-Boyd and John Freely, *Strolling Through Istanbul*, revised ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 446-449.

<sup>157</sup> See Appendices 1 and 2 for the French Plans of Poyraz Limanı Fortress and Appendix 3 for the French Plan of Garibçe Fortress.

to lay the first stone.<sup>158</sup> It is difficult to see what role the Ottomans played in the planning phase of the project because of the lack of sources in this regard. So we are stuck with de Tott's words, which thrust to the forefront and underplay the role played by the Ottomans by linking them to the astrologer. This might be a misrepresentation since the Ottomans had their own working procedures as will be observed in other cases with the available sources. (see Fig. 2.6. and 2.7. for the plans of Poyraz limanı fortress and Fig. 2.8. and 2.9 for the plan of Garibçe fortress at the end of the chapter).

According to the French ambassador Comte de Saint Priest, the construction of the fortresses started on 16 February 1773 under the supervision of Baron de Tott.<sup>159</sup> The Ottoman government provided the construction materials and equipment as well as ammunition for the fortresses in February 1773 and then the work force in March 1773.<sup>160</sup> Considering the difficult topographical conditions, the distance of the locations from the center of the city, and the unpopulated and rural location of the buildings, some questions arise: How did the workers lived in these unpopulated and distant regions? How did the workers communicate with Baron de Tott, both linguistically and technically? Did de Tott expect them to use new techniques, and if so, to what extent did the workers meet such expectations?

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<sup>158</sup> "Il me fallait, pour l'entreprendre, un préalable plus utile, & je m'occupai des plans dont le site était susceptible, tandis que le Visir consulta les astrologues, afin de connaître le jour & l'heure la plus favorable pour poser la première pierre. Ils venaient d'en fixer l'époque & j'allais partir pour me rendre à cette cérémonie, lorsqu'un Turc, suivi de plusieurs tchoadars, arrive chez moi, & se fait annoncer de la part du Grand-Seigneur." Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 187-188.

<sup>159</sup> "M. de Tott a été envoyé hier par la Porte mettre la première pierre aux nouveaux châteaux sur le canal de la mer noire dont il a indiqué le site et donné les plans. Le grand seigneur luy avoit prescrit l'instant précis, indiqué par ses astrologues pour le premier coup de marteau. Cette extravagance se pratique avec quelque espèce de rite et il n'est presque aucun Turc qui n'y mette une grande importance." Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 17 Fevrier 1773) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 48 p. 181-182), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 121. This reference is also available at Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AMAÉ), 133 CP/Turquie, 159, f. 45-46 (17 fev. 1773). Saint Priest writes in his letter of 17 February that Tott had been sent by the Porte the day before to lay the foundation stone for the new forts on the Black Sea Strait, and that he had indicated the site and submitted the plans before.

<sup>160</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1177/52424, 26 Za 1186/18 February 1773; BOA. C.AS. 50/2347, 3 C 1187/22 August 1773.

It is difficult to answer these questions, but some documents provide us clues. For example, the officers and workers needed eight tents, probably for the purpose of accommodation, and the Imperial Corps of the Military Band (Mehterhane-i Âmire) sent eight tents to the harbors of Garibçe and Poyraz.<sup>161</sup> This crumb of information might indicate that the workers stayed and spent time in the tents in their leisure times. Two of these tents were kitchen tents (*hayme-i matbah*), which also indicates that the workers ate their provisions and probably cooked basic things there. The water supply must have been the most significant issue both for the needs of the workers themselves and for the construction of the buildings. Thus, they also requested a forty-fathom water hose and several bottles and buckets.<sup>162</sup>

Following de Tott's narrative, they put the first stone in place at the most suitable time as decided by the astrologers, and thus the construction of the Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı fortresses began. Baron de Tott writes in his *Memoirs* about what he did after the placement of the first stone as follows:

My first task was to break ground, in order to level it and extract materials from it for the building of the forts. This could not be done by means of gunpowder, from the quality of the rock, which consisted of a bed of porphyry. I assembled barracked in the vicinity of the works, about fifteen hundred Macedonians, who are the Auvergats of Turkey.<sup>163</sup>

A modern architectural analysis of the fortress of Poyraz Limanı bears out de Tott's account. The stone used in the fort building was procured by digging up rock from the vicinity of the fort. According to the field analysis carried out by architect Yeşim Yaşa, the building was a masonry structure built of face stone (*kesme taş*). The

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<sup>161</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5585/470, 26 Zilkade 1186/18 February 1773. Mehterhane-i Amire provided the following: two *muşambalı hayme*, four *ikişer direkli sekbân çergesi*, and two *hayme-i matbah*.

<sup>162</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1006/44044, 21 Z 1186/15 March 1773.

<sup>163</sup> "Mon premier travail devait être d'attaquer le sol, afin de l'aplanir & d'en tirer les matériaux nécessaires à la construction des Châteaux. Cette opération ne pouvait s'effectuer avec de la poudre dans un roc vif, dont la qualité était une matrice de porphyre. Je rassemblai & fis barraquer auprès des travaux quinze cents Macédoniens, qui sont les Auvergnats de la Turquie." Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 192.

stone used in the building was green colored, a kind of tuff, resembling the rock style of the region.<sup>164</sup>

An important point here is that Baron de Tott's foundational excavation served two purposes. The first was to level/equalize the ground and, the second was to use the excavated stone and earth as a construction material for the forts. However, the strong rocks of the ground, including porphyry (*somaki*), made excavation very difficult. The rocks corroded even the best-sharpened materials. Nevertheless, the Macedonian workmen overcame these difficulties thanks to their indefatigable arms:

The leveling of the rock furnished us with stones, but the masses of porphyry they contained, resisted the best sharpened instruments, and rendered them very difficult to cut. However, the indefatigable exertions of the Macedonians surmounted every difficulty.<sup>165</sup>

This passage also gives an idea about the identity of workmen. Fifteen hundred Macedonian workmen (*amele*) worked in the fortresses. Why did they employ Macedonians? Was this a trend in the construction sector at the time? Did the architects or de Tott himself explain the new techniques or new tools to the workmen, or were these workmen already trained particularly for the purpose of building a fortress?

Tott writes that his frequent navigation between the Artillery School (Topçuluk Mektebi), the Foundry (Dökümhane), and the new fortresses created a need for easy transportation, and the Bostancıbaşı provided him a boat from the Palace, the

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<sup>164</sup> Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 54-56.

<sup>165</sup> "... mais si l'aplanissement du rocher plaçait les pierres à côté du travail, les masses de porphyre que ces pierres contenaient, en résistant aux outils les mieux acérés, en rendaient la coupe difficile. Cependant les bras infatigables des Macédoniens surmonterent ces difficultés." Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 194.

expenses of which were covered by the Public Treasury, that was kept along with the sultan's felucca in the Arsenal.<sup>166</sup>

Baron de Tott writes that he announced Sunday as free day for workmen, contrary to the sultan's order (we cannot tell why the sultan did not allow for any holiday, but the sultan probably wished the construction works did not fall behind). While the workers on the Anatolian side (workers of the fortress of Poyraz Limanı) spent their free day in the neighboring villages (probably Poyraz village), the workers on the Rumelian side (at the fortress of Garibçe) enjoyed their time at Fenerköy.<sup>167</sup>

There seems to be a very clear tension between the Ottoman officials and de Tott as a foreign military man. This tension probably explains why some Ottoman officials tried early on to keep him away from the fortification business and also makes one ask who continued to involve him in the process. Was it the sultan himself, or were there certain viziers or officials who protected him? It seems that the Ottoman architects and officials on the ground did not want to recognize this foreign military man as superior to them and tried to keep him away or to make him their dependent. It was mostly the sultans and some of the senior statesmen who supported cooperation with foreign military experts.

The French ambassador Comte de Saint Priest also writes about his impression of the opposition to artillery reform in one of his letters: "It is apparent that the Grand Seigneur alone wants to reform his artillery but that all other intermediaries refuse to do as much as they can."<sup>168</sup> This attitude of Ottoman officers is observable in their resistance to Baron de Tott's suggestions about building fortresses in the Bosphorus area twice, although Sultan Mustafa III ordered otherwise.

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<sup>166</sup> Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 192-193.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 194-195.

<sup>168</sup> « Il est évident que le Grand Seigneur seul veut la réforme de son artillerie et que tous les intermediaries s'y refusent tant qu'ils peuvent. » Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 3 Mai 1771) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 46 p. 229), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 119.

Baron de Tott's *Memoirs* shaped not only the contemporary European perceptions of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire but also those of the modern historians and readers. His arrogant and humiliating tone appears to have found acceptance without critical reflection. Yet there have been dissenting voices. Louis Charles de Peyssonnel, a French consul in the Crimea and later in Izmir, was one figure who tried to refute de Tott's ideas immediately after the publication of his memoirs. Peyssonnel published a critique of de Tott's *Memoirs* where he criticized Tott for misrepresenting the Ottomans' military technology.<sup>169</sup> Even though recent scholarship, including Virginia Aksan's article on "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott,"<sup>170</sup> has challenged his biased attitude and the reliability of the information he provides, the impression that de Tott's writing created about Ottoman military and technological backwardness in the eighteenth century remains. Despite his biased approach, Baron de Tott's account offers us glimpses of the process of decision-making, the tension between the local and foreign officials, and the working procedures in the construction of fortresses.

As indicated above, Baron de Tott himself was neither an engineer nor an architect. We still need to explain how he was able to build fortresses on both Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. His education is not well known, but from the documents available at Chateau de Vincennes (SHD), it can be concluded that he never enrolled in either a school of engineering or a military school but that he acquired military training while working for his father at a very young age. His

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<sup>169</sup> The second English edition of *Memoirs of Baron de Tott* included Peyssonnel's criticism as an appendix called "Strictures and Remarks on the Preceding Memoirs" (161-287). Peyssonnel noted in his critique the following: "I cannot believe it to be throughout, such as it is published, by Baron de Tott, because there are faults that could not have been committed by a man of his education and parts who has so long and so advantageously seen the Turks ... The Turks have no iron cannon, and do not know how to make them, or disdain to; all their artillery is of brass ... if some pieces of iron are found in their places of war, and merchantmen, they have been taken from the enemy ... It is, as such, most surprising that in their foundries they should have only furnaces particularly appropriate to the casting of iron, as a prodigious number of brass pieces have been brought, and come every day from their foundry at Tophana, at Constantinople, of middling, large and enormous bores, very fine, very good, and long since brought to perfection, after the proportions and models of the European artillery. Rows of them have been continually seen all along the flat of Tophana, often two and three deep, and these sometimes of double and treble ranks; and one cannot, without injustice, accuse the Ottomans of a total ignorance in the art of founding cannon." Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron De Tott", 262.

<sup>170</sup> Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott", pp. 253-77.

father retired from the military service as a lieutenant colonel, and Baron de Tott joined the army through the influence and patronage of his father at the age of nine as a *corvette* to Marechal de Bercheny. He bypassed a formal military education and attained the rank of lieutenant colonel at the age of fourteen in 1747.<sup>171</sup> Thus, it can be concluded that de Tott's military career started as an apprentice and he probably underwent practical and informal training. Accordingly, this might indicate that Baron de Tott would not have been authorized to construct fortresses in his hometown in France because he lacked the formal and proper education others received at the École Royale du Génie de Mézières (Mezieres Royal Engineering School). Yet the Ottoman lands provided him a good opportunity to use his practical knowledge in foreign lands.

There is evidence to indicate that some of de Tott's operations were his first trials. For example, Saint Priest's letter to Aiguillon indicates that the Chief-Treasurer was astonished by the capability and success of Baron de Tott, who was able to accomplish so much, even though he had little training. Baron de Tott built a furnace, an *alézoire*, and molds, and he cast seven pieces of cannon for the first time in his life.<sup>172</sup> In addition, the fortresses that he supervised first in the Dardanelles and then in the Bosphorus were probably his first experiences. When Baron de Tott recognized the possibility of having a role in the fortification of the straits of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, he probably felt the need to deepen his and his counterparts' knowledge of the field. He managed to bring many books from France on the art of fortification, attack and defense, and artillery and mining,

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<sup>171</sup> SHD, GR 4 YD 2900. This folder from the Military Archive at the SHD includes information and correspondence about the military life of Baron de Tott.

<sup>172</sup> Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 17 Juin 1773) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 48 p. 280), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 122. "Ce ministre a marqué de la joye du succès de la fonte des canons de M. de Tott. Rien n'est en effet plus extraordinaire que la faculté qu'a cet officier de tout faire même ce que jamais il n'a eu occasion de pratiquer. Il a construit un fourneau, un alézoire, des moules et fondu sept pièces de canons pour la première fois de sa vie."



as well as a dictionary and an encyclopedia on the field.<sup>173</sup> The fortification books translated from French to Turkish at the end of the century were probably the ones brought by Baron de Tott. Therefore, it seems that these operations both in Dardanelles<sup>174</sup> and in Bosphorus were de Tott's first experiences in the field, or at least the first experiences that he led.

The construction of the Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses that Baron de Tott directed neared completion in Safer 1187/May 1773. Their seaside batteries were finished, and the entire work would be completed with the placement of twenty-four large carriages (*kebir kundak*) for the cannons of the seaside redoubts (*leb-i deryada olan tabya topları*) upon the request of de Tott. Half of the carriages were ready, but the other half were still being prepared. Seyyid Mustafa Efendi asked for the procurement of the necessary timber for joists and cannons, which were to be supplied by the attendant of the Imperial Mint (*Darbhâne-i Âmire emini*) Mehmed İzzet Bey. Once all the carriages were ready, they would be installed in their places.<sup>175</sup>

According Comte de Saint Priest's letter to Aiguillon on 9 June 1773, the construction of the two fortresses advanced under de Tott's direction. At the time,

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<sup>173</sup> Claude-Carloman de Ruhliere, *Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne: et du démembrement de cette république, suivie des Anecdotes sur la Revolution de Russie en 1762* tome III, (Paris 1807, p. 515) quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 115. « Aussitôt que Tott eut senti le rôle ou la fortune pouvait le conduire, il se pressa de faire apporter de France tous les livres qui traitent de tous ces différents arts; tous ces excellents traités composés par les Français, sur les fortifications, sur l'attaque et la défense des places, sur l'artillerie, sur l'art du mineur, sur le jet des bombes, le Dictionnaire même de l'Encyclopédie, car de nos jours la guerre embrasse presque tous les arts. Tott allait se trouver au milieu de Constantinople humiliée par ses défaites, comme autrefois le Lacédémonien Xantippe s'était trouvé dans Carthage vaincue. »

<sup>174</sup> For his operations on the Dardanelles, see Ferenc Toth, *La Guerre Russo-Turque (1768-1774) et la Défense des Dardanelles: L'extraordinaire mission du Baron de Tott*, (Université de Nantes, Paris, Economica, 2008), pp. 70-90.

<sup>175</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1084/47820, 25 S 1187/18 May 1773.

he was finalizing his first artillery casting, while being preoccupied with an infinite amount of intermediate work.<sup>176</sup>

Upon the placement of these cannons in the seaside redoubts, Tophane-i Amire Nazırı (Superintendent of Tophane) el-Hâc Selim Ağa asked for the newly cast cannons to be placed in these new forts and their enclosures (*çit*). For example, they cast ninety-six cannons in various dimensions (*kebir*,<sup>177</sup> *dalyan*, and *şahi*) in four grand ovens (*fırın*) and forty-five furnaces (*ocak*) of the Arsenal (Tophane) to be used in the fortresses of Garibçe and Poyraz. These cannons were probably iron cast, so far as we tell from reports that the Armory (Cebehane) sent 170 scales (*kantar*) of raw iron to the Arsenal.<sup>178</sup> In addition, the Corps of the Imperial Armory (Cebehane-i Âmire Ocağı) appointed two armorer regiments to the fortresses of Garibçe and Poyraz in September 1773.<sup>179</sup>

While it is unclear how long the construction of the Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses lasted, de Tott's *Memoirs* and certain archival documents indicate that the buildings were completed within five or six months. An entry in the records of the Office of the Chief of Finance (Baş Muhasebe) dated 1189/1776 indicates that Baron de Tott asked for the payment for the workers employed in the construction of the Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses under his supervision in 1187. The Office of the Chief of Finance paid the workmen 10,513 guruşes in seven separate instalments in return for their 159 days of work (approximately five and a half months). The Office of Finance made the last payment on 23 Zilhicce 1189 (4 February 1776).<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 9 Juin 1773) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 48 p. 264-265), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 122. « Les deux fortresses s'avancent sous sa direction et il est au moment de terminer sa premiere fonte d'artillerie, outre une infinité de besogne intermédiaire pour les quelles on a recours à luy. »

<sup>177</sup> BOA. C.AS. 744/3130.

<sup>178</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1112/49277, 13 Ra 1187/4 June 1773.

<sup>179</sup> BOA. AE. SMST. III. 314/25235, 19 C 1187/7 September 1773; BOA. C.AS. 1185/52884, 22 Ş 1187/8 November 1773.

<sup>180</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 3162, p. 1, 23 Za 1189/15 January 1776. See Appendix 4 for the original document and its transcript.

This piece of information suggests that the construction of Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses lasted approximately five and a half months. It also suggests that the payment of the workers' wages was delayed for about two years. The fortresses were built in 1187, but Baron de Tott received the last instalment of his payment in Zilkade 1189/January 1776. He probably asked for the last payment before he left Istanbul, as he returned to Paris on 27 June 1776.<sup>181</sup>

Sultan Mustafa III greatly appreciated Baron de Tott's services to the Ottoman Porte, and the French government at the Court of Versailles and Louis XV commended his achievements. The King of France rewarded his services by appointing him as a brigadier general. As a mark of high distinction, the Sublime Porte also clothed him with a sable pelisse (*samur kürk*),<sup>182</sup> which the Reisülküttab tasked the Caimacam (deputy of the grand vizier) to bestow upon him at a ceremony at the new fortresses he had built.<sup>183</sup> However, they could not go to the forts because of bad weather, and the ceremony instead took place at the Artillery School on 25 October 1773 on the occasion of the foundation of a new corps of artillerymen.<sup>184</sup> The Ottoman Treasury paid 600 *guruş* for this sable pelisse.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Ferenc Tóth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Français en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime: La Carrière de François Baron de Tott (1733-1793)*, (Istanbul: ISIS, 2011), 147.

<sup>182</sup> Even though Comte de Sainte Priest wrote that the pelisse was made of ermine (*kakım*), the Ottoman document refers it as sable (*samur*), which was the most precious type of fur.

<sup>183</sup> "J'ai fait part à la Porte de la grace que le Roy a faite à M. de Tott en luy conférant le grade de Brigadier. Faveur que j'ai fait envisager comme l'effet de la satisfaction qu'elle m'a chargé de lui témoigner de la conduite de cet officier. Ce grade n'ayant point de rapport au militaire turc, je n'ay pu le faire connoître que comme un avancement dans cette carrière. Le Reis Effendy pour marquer du coté de la Porte de la consideration à M. de Tott a déterminé le Caimakam à se rendre aux travaux des châteaux neufs où il revêtira M. de Tott d'une pelisse d'hermine." Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 17 Septembre 1773) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 48 p. 325), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 122-123.

<sup>184</sup> Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 3 Novembre 1773) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 48 p. 376), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 123. "M. le Baron de Tott a été invité le 25 du mois passé a se rendre à l'Ecole d'artillerie par le Caimakam qui l'a fait revêtir d'une pelisse d'hermine. Ce qu'il a accompagné de complimens très flatteurs et de prières de continuer au Grand Seigneur ses utiles services. Le projet, comme je vous l'ai mandé avoit été de faire cette ceremonie aux châteaux qu'on construit; Mais le mauvais tems ayant empeché de s'y rendre, on a saisi l'occasion de la création d'un corps de canoniers si long tems annoncée et qui va avoir lieu pour en recommander l'instruction au zèle de M. de Tott."

<sup>185</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 291/19581, 20 Z 1189/11 February 1776.

## 2.6. End of Baron de Tott's Employment amid Criticism and Disappointment

The death of Sultan Mustafa III in January 1774 had an impact on the works and position of Baron de Tott. The French ambassador Comte de Saint Priest frequently complained about the difficulties that the Ottoman Empire encountered and how these affected their missions. For example, even though the fort projects initiated by Baron de Tott started in a good way with much energy, the sultan's death hindered their successful continuation. Comte de Saint Priest wrote about his dissatisfaction with the fate of the new forts in a letter dated 2 April 1774:

I do not have the same satisfaction regarding the work done at the new forts for they tend to finish gross modo without obeying the plan. Because they made to the Sultan the nice observation that it is shameful to be reduced to fortify the capital.<sup>186</sup>

Comte de Saint Priest's reports indicate that people around the new sultan Abdulhamid I did not support the continuation of the fort projects because the Ottoman-Russian war had ended with the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and the Ottomans did not expect an active threat coming from the Black Sea at the moment. This situation might have changed their earlier enthusiasm.

Even though the fortresses supervised by de Tott were built within five and six months under intensive efforts, their final completion lingered on for a few years because of the receding support of the Ottoman government after the end of the Russo-Turkish war in July 1774. In his letter of 14 November 1774, the French ambassador wrote that the Ottoman ministers enthusiastically promise to do what

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<sup>186</sup> « Je n'ai pas la meme satisfaction sur le travail des chateaux neufs qu'on incline a finir grosso modo sans s'assujeter au plan, par ce qu'on a fait faire au Grand Seigneur la belle observation qu'il est honteux de paroître réduit a fortifier la capitale. » Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 2 Avril 1774) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 49 p. 241-242), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 127.

needs to be done but nothing goes well because the smallest dispute leads to long-lasting stagnation.<sup>187</sup>

Although Baron de Tott was appreciated during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, the compliments did not continue thereafter. Baron de Tott faced severe criticism from several high-level Ottoman dignitaries from the end of 1775 onwards.<sup>188</sup> Upon these criticisms, the French ambassador Comte de Saint Priest asked the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for de Tott's recall to France on 16 October 1775. Comte de Saint Priest urged the necessity of his recall for three reasons:

Three important considerations must result from this state of affairs. The first is that it would torment both parties inappropriately to take away from the Porte the advantage of doing it a useless favor; the second is that it becomes indecent to the eyes of Europe to hire a brigadier-to-the-King to perform such a sham. And finally, the third is that it will be much worse if the Porte itself would cancel his mission. But what bothers me most about all this is the certainty that the Turks will never recover since they know how to do it and neglect to do so.<sup>189</sup>

Comte de Saint-Priest was surprised at the lack of Ottoman interest in de Tott's departure; even those officials who had favored him before had no objections to his

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<sup>187</sup> Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 14 Novembre 1774) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 49 p. 403-404), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 128. "Les Ministres Ottomans promettent toujours de la faire avec vivacite et rien ne va parce que la plus petite diffculte arrete des mois entriers. Telle est la molesse et l'indifference de ceux qui gouvernement."

<sup>188</sup> Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 4 Decembre 1775) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 50 p. 371), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 129. It seems that there had been some accusations directed against Baron de Tott, including by the Attendant of the Imperial Dockyard (*Tersâne Emini*). According to Comte de Saint Priest, even though Tott defended himself against the accusations and persuaded the *reis efendi*, the *kapudan paşa*, and other ministers, the rumors spread through the Porte and he was forced to leave. AMAÉ, 133 CP/Turquie, 161, f. 364-366 (le 16 Octobre 1775).

<sup>189</sup> « Il doit naitre de cet état de chose trois réflexions importantes. La première, que d'arracher à la Porte l'avantage de lui rendre un service inutile, c'est se tourmenter respectivement fort mal à propos. La seconde que l'emploi d'un Brigadier des armées du Roy à un pareil simulacre, devient indécent aux yeux de l'Europe. La troisième enfin que ce sera bien pire si son travail est décommandé par la Porte elle même. Mais ce qui me froisse plus que tout cela c'est la certitude qu'il en résulte que les Turcs ne se relèveront jamais, puis qu'ils en connoissent les moyens et les négligent. » AMAÉ, 133 CP/Turquie, 161, f. 364-366 (le 16 Octobre 1775). English translation belongs to Prof. Emilie d'Orgeix.

departure. The ambassador explained that his leaving was facilitated and debts he was owed were paid.<sup>190</sup> This information explains why all the records of payments to Baron de Tott in Ottoman account books date to January and February 1776.<sup>191</sup> It seems that all the payments, including the payment of the cloth given to Baron de Tott, were made right before de Tott's departure from Istanbul at the end of February 1776. The grand vizier of the period, Derviş Mehmed Paşa, wrote a formal letter to the French minister of foreign affairs, Comte de Vergennes, who had also been the former French ambassador (1755-1768) to the Ottoman Empire, about their satisfaction with de Tott's service to the Sublime Porte.<sup>192</sup>

Upon the new sultan's accession to the throne and the departure of Baron de Tott, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa supervised the completion of the forts. According to one archival record, the fortress of Garibçe, which had been constructed under the supervision of Baron de Tott, or "Tot Beyzade," was completed under the supervision of Gazi Hasan Paşa.<sup>193</sup>

## 2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the construction of the Bosphorus fortresses during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III. It has narrated the establishment of the first fortifications of the eighteenth century in a chronological order and considered the influence of several actors that played significant roles in this activity, including the

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<sup>190</sup> « Il n'est presque pas croyable combien peu de sensation a fait la chose. Il n'y a pas eu de la part des gens en place la moindre objection tendante à le retenir; Tout a été facilité; Les payemens arriérés ont été mis en règle; Enfin il a été aisé d'y reconnoître jusqu'a de l'empressement. » Lettre de Saint-Priest à Aiguillon (Constantinople, le 17 Fevrier 1776) CADN, (Constantinople série A, fonds Saint-Priest 51 p. 414-415), quoted in Ferenc Toth, *Un Diplomate Militaire Française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Regime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 129.

<sup>191</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 3162, p. 1, 23 Za 1189/15 January 1776; AE.SABH.I. 291/19581, 20 Z 1189/11 February 1776.

<sup>192</sup> « En portant à votre presence les assurances les plus sincéeres de la pureté et de la cordialité de nos sentimens, nous vous informons amicalement que le Baron de tott un des chevaliers de France qui depuis quelques années avait ête employé à divers services de la Porte, nous ayant fais pars qu'il etoit obligé de passer en France pour y régler quelques affaires pour ensuite revenir ici, Nous profitons de cette occasion pour vous donner des assurances de notre amitié et en même tems pour vous faire connoitre que la Sublime Porte est contente et satisfaite du susdit de Baron de Tott. » AMAÉ, 133 CP/Turquie, 162, f. 46-47. (1776)

<sup>193</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39425, 1 Safer 1193/18 February 1779.

sultan, viziers, Ottoman architects such as Mehmed Tahir Ağa and his Greek-Orthodox aid, the French military man Baron de Tott, and workers.

This chapter has offered new information on the construction of some of the Bosphorus forts and their architects, some of which forces us to revise certain assumptions in the scholarly literature. For example, the construction date of the Fener fortresses is commonly accepted as 1769, but this needs to be revised to 1772 according to the new archival evidence I have presented here. Moreover, the design of the Fener fortresses was attributed to an unknown Greek architect. The source of this attribution was probably Baron de Tott's reference to a Greek *kalfa* working in the construction of these fortresses. But this interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, we should not confuse the architect (*mimar*) with the master builder (*kalfa*). Second, we need to recognize that the architect of the Fener fortresses was a significant person, namely, the chief architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa, and that the Greek *kalfa*, whose name was probably Yorgi, was actually the master builder who accompanied him on the ground.

A close analysis of the sources has also indicated that the construction of the first military buildings took about six months but that these only included urgent military constructions such as the towers, batteries that carried the necessary amount of guns, and soldier barracks, kitchens, and other buildings that would meet the needs of soldiers stationed in the fortress. Thus, these were compact, target-oriented, and practically built structures.

This chapter also had a specific focus on the services of a French military man in the construction of the Bosphorus forts. Baron de Tott, who was already in Istanbul and engaged in reforming the Ottoman artillery, constructed the fortresses of Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı in 1773-4. Analyzing the role of Baron de Tott in the fortress constructions provides an insight into the Ottoman age of reform. First of all, the age of reform, which is mostly associated with the reign of Sultan Selim III, should be set earlier, to the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, according to the findings of this study. In the context of Bosphorus fortresses, it can be observed that the Ottoman

defeat against the Russian army in the 1768-1774 war prepared the ground for urgent reforms.

The reforms initiated by Sultan Mustafa III with this sense of urgency were primary precautionary measures directed against Russia, not the organized and systematic reforms of the following decades. Nevertheless, the Ottomans sought to improve their military conditions and defensive structures. Sultan Mustafa III was aware of the deficiencies of officials and others working on the ground, but he did not have sufficient time to improve these conditions and to come up with a more systematic reform plan. One of the main sources of information for the military reform efforts of the government of Sultan Mustafa III was the writings of Baron de Tott. This chapter has also challenged the contribution, knowledge, and capacity of Baron de Tott in the field of fortification, similar to what Aksan has done regarding de Tott's contributions to the field of artillery.







Figure 2.3. (left): Ottoman Plan of Anadolu Feneri fortress: "Anadolu Feneri Kal'ası" (TSMA. 9444, 1838)

Figure 2.4. (right): Layout Plan of Anadolu Feneri fortress. (Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 26.)



Figure 2.5.: Ottoman Plan of Rumeli Feneri fortress: “Rumili Feneri Kal’ası” (T.S.M.A. 9444, 1838)




Figure 2.6. Undated plan of Poyraz Limanı fortress in the Ottoman Archives (BOA/PLK.p. 685). The note on the figure reads as follows: “Garibçe burnunda ve Poyraz burnunda ale’s-seviyye bina olunacak kal’anın resm-i sûtetidir ki kal’a binası emr olundukda râsim hâze’r-resm nezâretiyle kalûben vücûda getirilür.”<sup>194</sup>




Figure 2.7. Ottoman Plan of Poyraz Limanı fortress: “Poyraz Kal’ası” (TSMA. 9444, 1838)

<sup>194</sup> It is not clear whether this plan is the one used by Baron de Tott or whether it is a plan used by later Ottoman architects. This plan is somehow different from the French plan in the French archives (Appendixes 1 and 2).




Figure 2.8. Ottoman Plan of Garibçe fortress: “Garibçe Kal’ası” (TSMA. 9444, 1838)




Figure 2.9. Layout Plan of Garibçe fortress. TSMA. 9444, 1838. (Yeşim Yaşa, “Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi”, 26)

## CHAPTER 3

### CEZAYİRLİ GAZİ HASAN PAŞA AND LARGE SCALE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SECURITY OF THE BOSPHORUS (1778-1788)

#### 3.1. Introduction

The Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 prompted the Ottomans to take precautions against Russian incursions into the Bosphorus. They hastily constructed some redoubts and the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı as discussed in the previous chapter. The Ottomans suspended their efforts to fortify the Bosphorus and to provide the maintenance of the fortresses with the end of war in 1774 until another tension occurred between the Ottoman Empire and Russia over Crimea around 1778. The tension over Crimea posed the possibility of war and the Ottomans were in continuous preparations for a decade.

This chapter deals with this second phase of the Ottoman efforts to reinforce and develop the fortifications of the Bosphorus in order to protect Istanbul in 1778-1788. The Ottomans adopted a much more comprehensive and deliberative approach in this phase. Several actors, including Sultan Abdulhamid I in the first place, the Grand Admiral Cezayirli Hasan Paşa, grand viziers, and French engineers, played important roles in the development of this relatively systematic approach. Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa who was the grand admiral at the time became responsible for the general security of the Black Sea and the strait. He had a decisive character and he followed the maintenance of the fortresses, improved the Bosphorus defences by consulting with French engineers and administered the construction of new forts and batteries in the Bosphorus. French engineers that came to Istanbul were professionally educated in the field of military engineering in contrast to de Tott and they were under the protection of the grand admiral in many respects. The Ottoman approach to the Russian threat also changed in this phase which affected the nature of their preparations.

### 3.2. The Russian Threat

Sultan Abdulhamid I succeeded to the throne during a war with Russia upon his brother Mustafa III's death on 21 January 1774. He had no choice but to sign the disastrous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca to end the Russo-Ottoman war. The status of Crimea, and Russian interventions in Crimea, the clauses concerning the Straits, and the status of Orthodox Christians emerged as issues that kept causing conflict between the Porte and Russia. After the end of the war with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottomans suspended their efforts to fortify the Bosphorus for a while due to lack of an immediate threat. However, the Ottomans soon understood that the Russian threat was not temporary with the rising Russian dominance in Crimea.

From the Russian point of view, the Crimean Khanate posed a significant danger to Russia because according to the 1762 memorandum of Russian prince and marshal Vorontsov the Crimeans made frequent raids, captured many Russian subjects and plundered estates. In addition, Brian Davies analyzes the dependent relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate as follows: "the Ottoman control over Crimean coasts and ports made the Black Sea "the Ottoman lake" and Istanbul, the Ottoman Balkans, and the Anatolian coast became dependent upon the Khanate's exports of slaves, lumber, grain, wax, silk, butter salt, fish, cattle, and sheep."<sup>195</sup>

Vorontsov's memorandum identified some threats from the Khanate but also considered the Khanate's military power to be declining and an opportunity emerging to detach the Khanate from the Porte. "As long as the Khanate remains subject to the Turks," he wrote, "it will always be a terror to Russia; but when it is placed under Russian rule, or no longer dependent of anyone, then not only Russia's security would be reliably and firmly confirmed, but Azov and the Black Sea would be under her [Russia's] power, and the nearer eastern and southern lands would be under her guard, which would inevitably draw their commerce to us."<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Brian Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 38.

<sup>196</sup> Davies, *The Russo-Turkish War*, 42, quoted from: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova, XXV, 309.

Having this objection in mind, the Russians tried to develop their influence in the borders, supported the independence of certain groups and established a Russian consulate at Bahçesaray not only for the purpose of mediating disputes but also of collecting useful intelligence on the state, politics, military and economy of the Crimean Khanate.<sup>197</sup>

Russia continued to intervene in Crimean politics to make Şahin Giray the khan of Crimea. Şahin Giray was previously a military assistant (yaver) in Tsarine Catherine II's court in 1777. The Ottoman Empire and Russia struggled for influence in Crimea. They favored their own candidates for the khanate but the Ottoman government proved unsuccessful in this rivalry. The Ottomans protested the Russianization policy of Şahin Giray in Crimea and began to prepare for war.<sup>198</sup> While, the Ottoman government recognized the Khanate of Şahin Giray with the Aynalıkavak Convention on 21 March 1779<sup>199</sup>, the power struggle in Crimea indicated to the Ottomans that another war with Russia was quite likely in the near future. Indeed, war was declared against Russia and Austria as a result of the insistences of the grand vizier Koca Yusuf Paşa in 1787 and which continued until 1792.

As a part Russia's Greek project as mentioned in the Introduction, Russia began to increase its interest for the Istanbul strait. The Russian Navy's successful expedition in the Mediterranean evoked that their superiority would allow them a naval assault against Istanbul. However, in order to embark in such an enterprise, Russia needed large-scale hydrographical charts of the Bosphorus. Both land mappers of the War Office and naval cartographers tried to produce the maps of the Straits either by trying to visit Istanbul with various pretexts or by using the printed

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<sup>197</sup> See also. O'Neill, Kelly Ann, "Between subversion and submission: The integration of the Crimean khanate into the Russian empire, 1783-1853," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, (Massachusetts, 2006); Özvar, Seher Karakuş, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Çöküşü ve Kırım Topraklarının Rus İşgali Altına Girmesi," Master's Thesis, İnönü University (Malatya, 2001).

<sup>198</sup> M. Sertoğlu, *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 2011), vol. V, pp. 2620-2626; İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 1978), Vol. 4:1, 446-453; Feridun Emecen, "Şahin Giray", TDV DİA.

<sup>199</sup> For more about the Aynalıkavak Convention, see. Abdurrahim Özer, "The Ottoman Russian Relations Between the Years 1774-1787", (MA Thesis, Bilkent University: 2008), 52-54.

European maps. N. V. Repnin prepared a chart of the Straits produced in March 1776 showing the fortresses on the shores (see Fig. end of the chapter for the chart). On the other hand, the Grand Admiralty also received a chart of the Bosphorus as a consequence of the efforts of Lieutenant Gavriil Glotov, a diligent cartographer and his navigator Larion Yadvovtsev.<sup>200</sup>

While the Russians turned their eyes to Istanbul with some political agenda and preparations, the Ottoman government reconsidered the fortifications of the Bosphorus under the supervision of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa as of 1778.

### **3.3. The Ottoman Survey of Fortresses in 1778**

In 1778, the Ottoman government found itself caught up in war conditions again. While both Russia and the Ottoman Empire tried to bring their favored khan to the throne in Crimea, a group of Crimean Tatars attacked and killed some of the Russians who protected Şahin Giray. As a response to this attack, the Russians dispatched a force to Crimea. Despite his resistance, Selim Giray, who was supported by the Ottoman government, had to flee Crimea defeated.<sup>201</sup> The Ottomans did not want to enter a war in wintertime and without the necessary preparations but the government decided to go to war in April 1778. Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa sailed to the Black Sea with the imperial navy.<sup>202</sup> The decision of war coincided with a new effort to strengthen the fortifications of the Bosphorus. Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa enjoyed extensive authority to rehandle this task. He initiated a new period of renovation and repair.

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<sup>200</sup> Bulatov, Vladimir E. "Eighteenth-Century Russian Charts of the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles)." *Imago Mundi* 52 (2000): 98, 101.

<sup>201</sup> Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr 1774-1779 (H. 1188-1193)*, prep. by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014), 103, 104, 107-109.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.



Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa was one of the most famous Ottoman grand admirals who also served as Commander of the Straits and later as grand vizier.<sup>203</sup> He enlisted in the Janissary corps in 1738, during the Ottoman-Russian wars and proved his bravery and military talent in battles and sieges. He was dismissed from the grand admiralty upon the death of Sultan Mustafa III but he once again held the office of grand admiralty after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and kept it for fifteen years. Hasan Paşa organized and led the rebuilding of the fleet, which had been destroyed at the battle of Çeşme, and he reorganized the navy with the help of foreign experts. In addition, in his capacity as the commander of the Black Sea and the Straits, he organized the construction of new defense structures at the mouth of the Bosphorus.<sup>204</sup>

According to an archival document dated to Rebiülevvel 1192/April 1778, Head-Gunner (Topçubaşı) Mustafa Ağa who was responsible for the construction of forts and redoubts in the Strait of the Black Sea, died. As a result, the Sublime Porte charged the Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa and the Chief-Architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa with the task of inspecting the forts and redoubts on the shores of the Bosphorus. The appointment of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa to the position marks the beginning of a new era for the defense of the Bosphorus because Hasan Paşa would be responsible for the security and defense of the strait of the Black Sea from this time onwards.<sup>205</sup> In April 1778, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa and Mehmed Tahir Ağa inspected the forts, determined their deficiencies and how to address them in the best way possible.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> He was probably of Caucasian origin, enslaved in Iran in his childhood and was taken to Tekirdağ. His name *Cezayirli* derives from his time in Algiers where he was welcomed by the *Dayis* of Algiers and appointed as the military governor of Tlemcen. However, his fame brought rivalry and opposition as well. He escaped from Algiers, returned to Istanbul and entered the service of the navy in April 1761.

<sup>204</sup> M. Aydın, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa", *DİA* 7 (1993); J. H. Mordtmann-[E. Kuran], "Djeza'irli Ghazi Hasan Pasha", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol II (1997); F. Sarıcaoğlu, *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)*, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2001; Daniel Panzac, *La marine ottoman: de l'apogée à la chute de l'Empire (1572-1923)*, (Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2009).

<sup>205</sup> BOA. C.BH. 8/353.

<sup>206</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652, 19 Ra 1192/17 April 1778.

Their inspection led to the preparation of an appraisal register (*keşif defteri*)<sup>207</sup> enumerating the needs of the existing fortresses and redoubts. This record indicates the condition of the Bosphorus fortifications in 1778 on the verge of the war with Russia.

According to the register<sup>208</sup>, there was a masonry redoubt (*kargir tabya*) near by the Anatolian Lighthouse and a *palanka* nearby the European Lighthouse. These are the Fener Fortresses built by Mehmed Tahir Ağa as summarized in the previous chapter. The architect also indicated in the register the need to construct a masonry guardhouse (*kargir karakolhane*), masonry dock (*kargir rıhtım*), masonry armory (*cebehane*), a complete (*mükemmel*) gate and a staircase and a water reservoir (*su hazinesi*) of stone for the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri. It seems that the fortress of Rumeli Feneri was in better condition and did not require additional construction. Thus, they only projected the construction of a house for the fortress commander (a *dizdarhane*) for the latter. They recommended a single-floor house that should be furnished with a kitchen and have an outdoor toilette.

A fort and a seaside redoubt had been built by Baron de Tott on the promontories of Poyraz and Garibçe respectively as summarized in the previous chapter. There were a fort and a redoubt at the same place on the Cape of Eşme, near the harbour of Poyraz. It seems that the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı was not well built and was in need of significant repair. According to the register, most of the walls of the Poyraz Fortress were in need of repair. In addition, the architect proposed the construction

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<sup>207</sup> Appraisal register: This is the register that the Ottoman architects prepared before they plan the construction of a building. Usually the head-architect or another architect appointed by him, inspected the location of construction accompanied with the construction official and/or master builder. They record the possible components of the building, their architectural measures in height, width and length (in the measure of *mimari zirâ*) and their possible expenditures. The register prepared before the construction is called the first appraisal register (*keşf-i evvel defteri*) while the register prepared after the completion of the building to inspect the building was called the second appraisal register (*keşf-i sani defteri*). In some cases that the buildings lack some parts and necessitate some additions and improvements, they also prepare a third estimation register (*keşf-i sâlis defteri*). These registers are available in various catalogues in the Presidency Ottoman Archive such as Maliyeden Müdevver Defterleri (BOA. MAD.d.), Cevdet (BOA. C.) and Baş Muhasebe Kalemi Defterleri Bina Eminliği (BOA. DBŞM.BNE.d.).

<sup>208</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652. For a detailed list of constructions and a documentation of the appraisal register, see Appendix 5.

of a guardhouse above the complete gate with a cooking stove (*ocak*) and a staircase. Another important suggestion was the construction of soldier barracks as an annex to the fortress. They also suggested the construction of a roof truss (*harpuşte*) above the barbettes. Finally, a complete iron gate and a solid/massive dock (*som iskele*) were added to the plan.

Apart from the fortress, the redoubt on the seaside of Poyraz needed additional work such as the repairs of walls, the construction of a drawbridge (*asma köprü*), a complete iron gate, a stone staircase, a stone dock (*kargir rıhtım*), twelve archins large firing bases (*çapa kirişli on iki arşun kebirinden top döşemesi*), two guardhouses, a masonry cistern, and a covered sewer (*tathir lağım ma'a kapak*).

There was a fort and a redoubt on the cape of Garibçe as well. The Fortress of Garibçe (as in the case of Rumeli Feneri) was in better condition in comparison to its counterpart on the Anatolian side in Poyraz. In addition to a few repairs on the walls, they proposed the construction of a padlocked iron gate for the armoury (*asma kilidli demir kaplı cebehane kapısı*) and a perfect iron gate, as such, two iron gates for prison and redoubt (*zindan ve tabya kapısı*). They also proposed the completion of all missing parts of the buildings such as windows, doors, cupboards and other components of the fort. Similar to the redoubt of Poyraz, they proposed settlement of twelve archin large firing bases (*çapa kirişli on iki arşun kebirinden top döşemesi*) and a renewal of a perfect columned and beamed mosque.

As for the redoubt of Garibçe, they proposed the construction of a masonry dock, a masonry water reservoir with a turncock/faucet, a masonry toilette, armory with iron gate and a staircase, three masonry guardhouses and a perfect iron gate with a bridge in front of the gate, a roof truss and a walled sewer (*duvarlı lağım*). There probably was a kitchen built before and now they proposed the construction of a passageway to that kitchen from the redoubt.

Finally, the most significant part of this survey is that it indicates the completion of a newly built *palanka* near by the river of İrve (Riva). This will be later called the

Fortress of Riva (Revancık). The fortress was constructed in 1778 and it was manned with the necessary amount of soldier (one commander, one second in command, and twenty guardsmen) as of September 1778.<sup>209</sup> They proposed the construction of a wooden mosque, a masonry guardhouse, another guardhouse at the side of Şile, a masonry armoury, a latrine and a wooden hose for the commander, a masonry storage, an iron gate, a stone staircase, a drawbridge (*asma köprü*) in front of the fort gate, and finally a passageway to the kitchen.<sup>210</sup>

All the repairs and constructions proposed in the register would cost a total amount of 44.872,5 guruşes. However, it is not possible to follow through the archival evidence whether these proposed repairs have been carried out according to the inspection or not. There is only information in the archive about the repairs that took place in the fortress of Garibçe.

The Commander of the Fortress of Garibçe was el-Hâc Ali in 1779. He submitted a report (*arz*) to the Sublime Porte on 1 Safer 1193/18 February 1779, where he explained that the wall under the soldiers' barracks was not made of stone or brick by Baron de Tott and was therefore worn out by severe winter conditions and was on the verge of collapse. The wall of the barracks as well tended to fall apart as a result. The commander informed the authorities about the need for repair and renovation. Upon receiving this information, the grand vizier ordered the chief-treasurer and the chief-architect to prepare an estimation about the cost of fixing the problem but with due consideration of the capacity of the state treasury.<sup>211</sup>

Mehmed Tahir Ağa made the necessary examinations on site and prepared estimation on 5 Şaban 1193/18 August 1779. The total cost of the necessary repairs and renovations was 3556 guruşes. They would rebuild a brick wall and the barracks. In addition, they proposed to add two private rooms (*harem binası*) and a kitchen to the commander's house. Even though Mehmed Tahir Ağa suggested the

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<sup>209</sup> BOA. C.AS. 125/5594, 24 Ş 1192/17 September 1778.

<sup>210</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652.

<sup>211</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39425, 29 Şaban 1193/11 September 1779.

construction of a boathouse on the coast of Garibçe, the treasurer and the grand vizier preferred not to approve this proposal in order to avoid expenses. They also appointed the supervision of the repairs and renovations to the commander of the fortress instead of the head-architect for the same reason, that is to save money.<sup>212</sup> The commander was already staying in the fortress and he could have additionally overseen the job but the architect should have specifically visited the fortress, which would cause another expense.

Both the first inspection of Cezayirli Hasan Paşa and Mehmed Tahir Ağa and the second inspection for the Garibçe fortress proposed only some repairs and renovations but no significant changes or additions to the first constructions that had taken place in the time of war with Russia in 1772-73. The Ottoman government would take new and solid measures almost a decade later.

#### **3.4. Solid Measures to Improve the Bosphorus Defences**

With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 19 April 1783, the Ottomans' understanding of Russian threat began to change. The Ottoman government discussed the rising Russian threat and necessary precautions that should be taken by soliciting the counsel of high-level officials. For example, Süleyman Penah Efendi<sup>213</sup> responded as follows in 1784/1198:

“This time the [threat] does not resemble the earlier ones. The coasts of the Black Sea are in the hands of Russia. We hear that there are one hundred and fifty small and large Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov, Kerş, Yeni Kale and the Sea of Ochakov. Russian soldiers are waiting ready for a signal in the frontiers. The outbreak of a war with Russia is evidently imminent. What if the

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<sup>212</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39425, 29 Şaban 1193/11 September 1779.

<sup>213</sup> Süleyman Penah Efendi was the Attendant of the Imperial Kitchen (Matbah-ı Âmire Emini) at that time. However, he was participated in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-74 and then he became a senior accountant and Anatolian Accountant. He is famous with his booklet: *Esbâb-ı Tedbîr-i Nizâm-ı Ekâlim*, which was a political treatise. This shows that the Ottoman government asked his opinions on political matters. For more information about his booklet, see Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: (XVIII. yy'dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih)*, (Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), pp. 142-145; Yavuz Cezar, “Osmanlı Aydını Süleyman Penah Efendi'nin Sosyal ve Mali Konulardaki Görüş ve Önerileri”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 42, 1988, pp. 111-132 .

enemy vessels attack [Istanbul] through the Black Sea and the Russian soldiers cross the frontiers? If thirty or forty days of cereals and necessary provisions did not come to [Istanbul], a great trouble would come upon us and we would be preoccupied with our own troubles. People already complain that breads are black and that they cannot find wood and coal even when we do not face such a trouble directly right now. We do not have sufficient vessels to confront the enemy vessels in the Black Sea. What if a few enemy vessel, suddenly enter the Bosphorus and shoot a few cannons across its suburbs, a great clamor would arise and people fall upon each other, bewildering us. This is why I said that the situation now is unprecedented to the past ones. There was not a Muscovite navy in the Black Sea in the past. I think we should not open the ways of war ourselves and we should try to extend negotiations by giving only vague answers to the Russian envoy.”<sup>214</sup>

Later, Süleyman Penah Efendi expressed the same views upon being asked in another colloquy.<sup>215</sup> These opinions are considerable to see how the Ottomans’ perceptions of Russian threat began to change and how they recognized their unpreparedness for such a war.

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<sup>214</sup> "Bu sefer evvelki seferlere kıyâs olunamaz. Karadeniz’in sahilleri Rusyalılar’ın yed-i tasarruflarında ve istima’ olunduğuna göre yüz elli pare sagir u kebîr gemiler Azak Denizi ve Kerş ve Yeni Kal’a ve Özi Suyu içinde mevcut ve askerleri hudud başlarında ve taburları serhadler karşularında işârete muntazır olmalarıyla, Moskov elçisine cevâb-ı kat’î verilüp de devletine avdet eylediği gibi harb tahakkuk eyleyeceği zâhirdir. Düşmen gemileri Bahr-i Siyâh’a ve askerleri serhadlerimize cerâd-ı münteşir gibi hücum ettiklerinde hâl neye varır? Bu şehre otuz kırk gün zahire ve levâzım-ı zar’uriyye gelmese başımıza kıyamet kopar ve kendü derdimize düşeriz, henüz bir gâile yoğiken ekmekler siyahtır ve odun ve kömür bulunmuyor deyü halk neler söylüyorlar? Karadeniz’de düşmen gemilerinin önüne çıkacak bir gemimiz yoğ iken ale’l-gafle a’dânın birkaç teknesi boğazdan taşralarda birkaç top atsa İstanbul’a gulgule düşüp ahâlisi birbirine girerek cümlemizi şaşururlar. İşte bu sefer evvelki ile kıyâs olunmaz dediğimin sırrı budur. Geçen seferde ve eslâfda evvelki ile kıyâs olunmaz dediğimin sırrı budur. Geçen seferde ve eslâfda Karadeniz’de Moskov’un donanması yoğ idi. Benim akl-ı kâsırına kalur ise def’aten ceng kapuları açılmamağa sa’y olunmak vâcibdir ve mükâleme meclisinde Rusya elçisine cevâb-ı kat’î verilmeyerek tekrar bir müşavereye bırakılmak lazımdır." Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, vol. 3, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), pp. 35-36.

<sup>215</sup> 'İşte düşmanlar böyle ve Devlet-i Aliyye’nin za’f-ı hâli meydanda iken bunlara cevab verildiği halde adem-i mukâvemet ve sâir gavâil şöyle dursun, maazallahu teala düşmanın birkaç kıt’a gemisi Karadeniz Boğazı’nın hâricine gelip birkaç top atsa ve İstanbul ahâlisinin zahiresi Karadeniz’e münhasır olmakla, zahiremizi kat’ etse İstanbul’un hâli neye münce olur? Böyle vakt-i hâzarda zahire pey-â-pey gelmekte iken ekmekler siyah idi, şöyle idi böyle idi diye İstanbullu türlü türlü kıl u kâl ihtirâ edebilirler. İyâzen billahi teala ol vakit gavâil-i seferiyyeyi bırakup İstanbul zahiresini fikr etmeli. Benim bildiğim bunun hayırlısı bu işi sulhle bitirmektir.’ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, III. Cilt. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 42.

Another consultancy council met to discuss the defense of the Black Sea strait in 1784/1198. According to the suggestions of this council, one thousand gunners were selected from the Janissary corps immediately and they started to practice shooting as much as needed. The council approved the extreme necessity of the construction of new fortresses (probably Kilyos and Karaburun) in the exterior of the Black Sea strait and the construction of a shipyard in “Karataş altı”. This council met secretly. The grand vizier made its participants swear not to disclose their discussions in order to secure the confidentiality of the meetings.<sup>216</sup>

French ambassador Comte de Saint Priest also emphasized in his writings in 1784 that the situation of Crimea was a turning point for both sides and that Russia changed its offensive system accordingly: “Instead of carrying their armies with immense expense and lengthy and difficult communications, on the banks of the Dynester, it became much simpler to transport army corps [...] on the Black Sea where the canal of Constantinople begins. This means that the Russians were masters of this sea and the provisions and the recruits could reach their army.”<sup>217</sup> This created a more serious threat for the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman historian of the nineteenth century Ahmed Cevdet Paşa wrote a voluminous history the Ottoman Empire, *Târih-i Cevdet*, in which he gave some information about the security of the Bosphorus and its defences despite the fact that he does not indicate his references. Cevdet Paşa explains the necessity of a new defense system for the late eighteenth century in his. He wrote that the Black Sea was a kind of Ottoman lake of sorts but ever since the Russia had conquered

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<sup>216</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, vol. 3, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 76.

<sup>217</sup> « Instruction que M. L’ambassadeur de France a remise a M. de Bonneval de Vernon et de Lafitte-Clavé », SHD, 1 VM 275, 13bis. « [...] On ne peut se dissimuler que la Russie Maitresse de la Crimée ne change désormais son ancien Système d’offensive contre l’empire Ottoman. Au lieu de porter ses armées avec des frais immenses et des communications longues et difficiles, sur les bords du Niester, où d’ailleurs vu le voisinage des Etats Autrichiens, une attaque donneroit de la jalousie a la Cour de Vienne. Il est bien plus simple de transporter un corps d’armée entre la chute des montagnes de l’Hèmus dans la mer nommée par les Turcs, le Balkan et l’extrêmité de l’Europe sur la mer Noire où commence le canal de Constantinople, cela suppose cependant que Les Russes fussent maitres de cette mer, afin que les vivres et les recrues pussent parvenir a leur armée. Il faudroit aussi qu’ils fussent assures du seul port qu’il y ait sur cette cote, afin d’y mettre les vaisseaux en sureté.[...] » . See Appendix 6 for the original document and its transcript.

Crimea, they strengthened their navy and took charge of many beautiful ports in the Black Sea region. Indeed, the hostility between the Ottomans and Russians would eventually turn into to a new war. Consequently, the defense and the fortification of the Strait of the Black Sea acquired urgency at that time and the renovation and reconstruction of the older and new fortresses inside and right outside of the Black Sea Strait began in 1785.<sup>218</sup>

After due consultations and discussions, the Ottoman government resumed the efforts to improve the defense organization of the Strait of the Black Sea in 1785 and Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa, the Grand Admiral of the Black Sea was in charge. The organizational aspects and consequences of these efforts will be described in detail in the chapter related to military organization. Another important consequence of some consultations, namely the construction of soldier barracks for the newly appointed soldiers and the decision to construct two new fortresses right outside of the Bosphorus, however, falls within the scope of the present chapter.

#### **3.4.1. Building Soldier Barracks**

There was no major building activity in the Bosphorus fortresses until 1783 except for small repairs such as the repair of some water conduits in 1783.<sup>219</sup> One of the first solid measures that the Ottoman government implemented in the fortresses was the construction of soldier barracks for the Bosphorus fortresses.

The Sublime Porte ordered the construction of soldier barracks (*kışlak*) for the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe and Poyraz for the Janissary, armorer and gunner regiments which were going to be stationed in the said fortresses. Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa again supervised this operation and upon his request, a former architect Hafız İbrahim Ağa prepared an appraisal register for the planned soldier barracks on 7 Zilhicce 1196/13 November 1782. According to this register, barracks for janissaries (*kışlak-ı yeniçeriyan*), barracks for

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<sup>218</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, vol. 3, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 138.

<sup>219</sup> BOA. C.AS. 283/11782, 29 Za 1197/26 October 1783.



cebecis (*kışlak-ı cebeciyan*), barracks for gunners (*kışlak-ı topçıyan*), bakery ovens (*fırın-ı nân-ı aziz*), a small bathhouse (*sağır hammam*), water ducts (*su yolları*), drains (*lağımlar*) and pavements (*kaldırım*) would be constructed for the four fortresses. The total cost of all constructions estimated in the register is 18,696 guruşes and 20 paras.<sup>220</sup>

The *Usta* of Anadolu Kavağı el-Hâc Mehmed was appointed as the construction official (*bina emini*) to the fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Poyraz Limanı, both of which were on the Anatolian side. On the European side, Başyasakçı İsmail Efendi who was the Head-Bostancı of the Janissaries (*dergâh-ı âli yeniçerileri serbostancısı* İsmail) of the Garibçe fortress, was appointed as a construction official to the fortresses of Rumeli Feneri and Garibçe. The job of the construction officials, who were appointed by the Head-Treasurer, was the procurement of materials and the supervision of the constructions according to the approved specifications of the inspection register. The Chief-Treasurer ordered the construction officials not to leave any required task incomplete and to do their best to make the buildings solid, strong and properly fortified. He decided to pay the construction officials a total of 10,000 guruşes for the soldier barracks, five thousand each for the Anatolian and Rumelian sides.<sup>221</sup> At the end of the project, the Office of the Head-Finance paid 11,000 guruşes to the construction officials in total.<sup>222</sup>

The construction of soldier barracks was completed in 1784/1198 and upon their completion, janissaries, head-gunners, and four armorer regiments were stationed in the four Bosphorus fortresses (Rumeli Feneri, Anadolu Feneri, Garibçe, and Poyraz). The military officials were transferred to the forts from İstanbul/Ahırkapı

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<sup>220</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 3162, pp. 552-553. See Appendix 7 for the appraisal register and its transcript.

<sup>221</sup> BOA. C.AS. 915/39550, 3 Z 1196/9 November 1782; BOA. C.AS. 224/9536, 7 Zilhicce 1196/13 November 1782; BOA. C.BH. 59/2786, 21 Z 1196/27 November 1782.

<sup>222</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 3162, pp. 552-553; According to this appraisal register, the Office of Chief Finance paid 5000 guruş on 21 Zilhicce 1196/27 November 1782 to the construction official for the constructions of the European side and the Office also paid 6000 guruş on 27 Şaban 1197/28 July 1783 to the construction official for the constructions of the Anatolian side.

via caiques designated by the steward of the boatmen. As the previous soldiers, they were also allocated daily rations.<sup>223</sup>

### 3.4.2. Constructing New Fortresses: Kilyos and Karaburun

The second measure that comes forth through archival evidence is the construction of new fortresses right outside the Bosphorus in Kilyos and Karaburun. As I explained in the section above, the Sublime Porte ordered the construction of two new fortresses as a consequence of some consultations right outside of the Bosphorus on the Rumelian side in the summer of 1784/1198.<sup>224</sup> It was again the Chief Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa who monitored these fortresses as he did the rest of them.<sup>225</sup>

Despite the fact that the planning process of these two fortresses are not well documented, one of the documents mention that a French engineer suggested the construction of a twenty-five forts and batteries in different areas of the Bosphorus including Kilyos and Karaburun and the Kilyos fort was going to be constructed according to his plan.<sup>226</sup> It is not clear whom does the French engineer mean but he might be Chabaud de la Tour or Lafitte-Clavé who was tasked with the Bosphorus defenses in 1783 and 1784 respectively. Contradictorily, a retrospective reference from Lafitte-Clavé indicates that Architect Hafız Efendi traced Kilyos and Karaburun forts.<sup>227</sup> It might be probable that a French engineer recommended the

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<sup>223</sup> A group of documents about the appointments in 1784/1198 see. BOA. C.AS. 325/13459, 26 Ra 1198/18 February 1784; BOA. C. AS. 1069/47044, 29 R 1198/22 March 1784; BOA. C.AS. 1158/51535, 10 C 1198/1 May 1784; BOA. C.AS. 1111/49203, 29 C 1198/20 May 1784; BOA. C.AS. 780/33034, 17 N 1198/4 August 1784; BOA. C.AS. 946/41032, 24 N 1198/11 August 1784; BOA. C.AS. 1104/48805, 15 Z 1198/30 October 1784; BOA. C.AS. 1043/45809, 29 Z 1199/13 November 1784; BOA. C.AS. 1177/52450, 22 M 1198/17 December 1784; BOA. C.AS. 479/19996, 29 M 1198/24 December 1784.

<sup>224</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, III. Cilt. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 76.

<sup>225</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 71-72.

<sup>226</sup> BOA. A.AMD. 24/186. An undated imperial decree.

<sup>227</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 278. « Toussaint nous a dit que le Grand visir avoit fait abandonner la construction du mauvais Fort que les Turcs avoient commencé, il y a deux ans à Karabouroun sur la côte de la Mer noire, et qu'il en a fait cesser les travaux. On continue celui de Kilia ou Eski Fanari: tous deux ne valent rien et ont été tracés par le Maimar Affis Effendi. »

construction of forts in these locations but the plan was entrusted to the Ottoman architect then.

The construction of a new fortress in Eski Fener alias Fener-i Atik (Old Lighthouse) in Kilyos started in or around 10 Şaban 1198/29 June 1784. The name of this fortress was uncertain in the beginning. The earlier archival documents refer to it under different names such as Fener-i Atik, Eski Fener, Karadeniz Feneri and so on. Later, it was named as the Fortress of Kilyos-ı Bağdadcık.

At the same time, the construction of another new fortress began in Karaburun.<sup>228</sup> The construction official of the Fortress of Kilyos was Kapıcıbaşı Ali Abdalbaki Ağa<sup>229</sup>, and the construction official of the Fortress of Karaburun was former Bostancıbaşı el-Hâc Hüseyin Ağa.<sup>230</sup> Even though Ali Abdalbaki Ağa was paid a daily wage for his job as the construction official of the Kilyos Fort for duration of eighteen months and seven days, its construction took a much longer period from 10 Şaban 1198/29 June 1784 to the beginning of Ramazan 1200/June 1786.<sup>231</sup>

However, it seems that the Kilyos fort was not completed within this time period and the constructions continued under the supervisions of other names at later times. According to two imperial decrees, both Ali Abdalbaki Ağa and Hüseyin Ağa were concerned with serving themselves but not the construction of the forts as solidly and effectively as they should.<sup>232</sup> The government recognized that these two ağas were inadequate in their positions as construction officials and they estimated that the construction of Kilyos and Karaburun forts would be delayed into the next year. Consequently, the government dismissed the two ağas and appointed the

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<sup>228</sup> For the appraisal register of the fortress of Karaburun, see BOA. D.BŞM.BNE.d. 16042.

<sup>229</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1059/46564, 20 N 1199/27 July 1785. Abdalbaki Ağa was a Head-Sergeant (Çavuşbaşı) under the grand vizierate of Yeğen Mehmed Paşa. BOA. A.AMD. 24/186.

<sup>230</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1167/51945, 28 Şevval 1199/3 September 1785.

<sup>231</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 319/21497, 1 Za 1200/26 August 1786. According to this document, Ali Abdalbaki Ağa was paid 8205 guruş from public treasury (emval-i miriye) for his service in the construction of Kilyos fort.

<sup>232</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 11/952 and BOA. AE.SABH.I. 15/1340.

Attendant of the Imperial Shipyard (Tersâne-i Âmire Emini) el-Hâc Selim Ağa as construction official to the Fortress of Kilyos and the former Overseer of the Imperial Shipyard İzzet Mehemmed Beğ to the Fortress of Karaburun as construction officials in August 1786/Şevval 1200<sup>233</sup> in order to manage their completion until November.<sup>234</sup> At the same time, Mahmut Ağa was appointed to the Fortress of Kilyos (alias Bağdadçık) as commander with a daily wage of 150 akçes.<sup>235</sup>

The Chief Finance Office paid 7500 guruşes to the construction official of the Fortress of Kilyos, el-Hâc Selim Ağa, for his expenses in 1786.<sup>236</sup> Moreover, Hacı Selim Ağa acquired the necessary materials for the building of the Kilyos fort from the Imperial Armory and the Imperial Military Band.<sup>237</sup>

According to Lafitte-Clavé<sup>238</sup>, the construction of Karaburun and Kilyos fortresses began in the summer of 1784 but had to be stopped because of bad weather conditions as he wrote in February 1785. Lafitte-Clavé seems to have been a little upset because of not accompanying the Grand-Admiral who visited the new fortresses twice for inspection. Instead of the French engineers, the French ambassador accompanied the Grand Admiral and the ambassador assured the

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<sup>233</sup>Taylesanizade Abdullah Efendi. *İstanbul'un Uzun Dört Yılı (1785-1789): Taylesanizade Hafız Abdullah Efendi Tarihi*. Prep. By Feridun Emecen. (İstanbul: TATAV Yayınları, 2003), p. [44b]-161. The date is taken from Taylesanizade because the archival documents relevant to this topic do not have dates. However, Taylesanizade writes that El-Hâc Selim Ağa was appointed as construction official to both fortresses of Kilyos and Karaburun on the contrary to the information given in the archival document that mentions two separate names for the two fortresses.

<sup>234</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 15/1340; BOA. AE.SABH.I. 11/952; BOA. AE.SABH.I. 11/961. Most of the hatt-ı hümayuns of Sultan Abdulhamid I do not include precise dates, thus, most documents that are a part of Ali Emiri tasnifi have estimated dates, which are often misleading.

<sup>235</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 6/603.

<sup>236</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 342/23851, 15 L 1200/11 August 1786.

<sup>237</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 347/24242, 21 L 1200/17 August 1786.

<sup>238</sup> Lafitte-Clavé was a French military engineer who came Istanbul as a part of French mission. Details about his activities in the Ottoman Empire will be given in detail below.

engineers that he would forward their opinion about the forts to the Admiral.<sup>239</sup> According to Lafitte-Clavé's diary entry on 3 September 1785, the Grand Admiral was in discontent with the work done in Eski Fener and Karaburun because of the poor quality of the mortar they used.<sup>240</sup>

In 1786, the Ottoman government abandoned the project of building a fortress in Karaburun and the construction activities came to an end in Karaburun. However, they kept the Fortress of Kilyos, which continued to function as a part of Istanbul's defense system in the long term. On 28 June 1786, Toussaint reported to Lafitte-Clavé that the Grand Vizier abandoned the construction of Karaburun fortress which began two years ago and did not progress well. Whereas, the Grand Vizier kept the Kilyos fort in use. According to Lafitte, both forts were worthless and have been traced by architect Hafız Efendi.<sup>241</sup>

According to an undated imperial decree of Sultan Abdulhamid I, the sultan went to the fortresses of the Black Sea Strait for inspection. Even though the document does not include a date, this visit probably took place in Şevval 1201/July 1787 judging by the information provided in the Journal of Taylesanizade.<sup>242</sup> All fortress officers must have been prepared to welcome the sultan and the officers would be

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<sup>239</sup> « Le mauvais tems a fait cesser les travaux de Karabourun et d'Eski-Fener commences l'ete dernier par les Turcs pour la defense de la cote d'Europe voisine du Bosphore. Le Capitan Pacha est alle les visiter deux fois depuis son retour de l'archipel. Il auroit ete naturel que nous y eussions ete avec lui et on le lui a represente de la part de M. l'ambassadeur, qui s'est engage d'y aller lui-meme avec nous, si cela etoit necessaire. Il a repondu que des qu'on reprendroit les travaux et de lui en dire notre avis. » (pp. 71-72)

<sup>240</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 117.

<sup>241</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 278. « Toussaint nous a dit que le Grand visir avoit fait abandonner la construction du mauvais Fort que les Turcs avoient commencé, il y a deux ans à Karabouroun sur la côte de la Mer noire, et qu'il en a fait cesser les travaux. On continue celui de Kilia ou Eski Fanari: tous deux ne valent rien et ont été tracés par le Maimar Affis Effendi. »

<sup>242</sup> “Şevval 1201, Biniş-i kal'alar: Ve yine mâh-ı Şevvalin on üçüncü cum'aertesi günü Boğaziçi'nde müceddeden binâ olunan kal'alara biniş olup ibtid'a Büyükdere'de yemeklik olunup ba'dehu karadan kal'a-i mezbûrlardan ve önünde otaklara nüzul ve seyr ü temâşa ve toplar ve kumbaralar ve neferât-ı kal'alar alay gösterüp ba'dehu Büyükdere'de akşam namazını edâ ve mehtâb ederek safâlar eylemişlerdir. Hakk teala safâlarını müzdâd eyleye, âmin. [60b]”, Taylesanizade Abdullah Efendi. *İstanbul'un Uzun Dört Yılı (1785-1789): Taylesanizade Hafız Abdullah Efendi Tarihi*. Prep. By Feridun Emecen. (İstanbul: TATAV Yayınları, 2003), 213.

given tips.<sup>243</sup> After his inspection, the sultan reflected on the new fortress (*cedid kale*), which must have been the Fortress of Kilyos because Kilyos was newly built at the time and the sultan referred to Abdulbaki Ağa who was the first construction official of Kilyos. The sultan observed that some parts of the fortress and its armoury were leaking. Gun placements of the bastions (*burç*) were also defective. There were also shortcomings in ammunitions, guns and other warfare materials. Thus, Sultan Abdulhamid I ordered the correction of the problems immediately and the completion of the fortress.<sup>244</sup>

Indeed, according to the report (*takrir*) of Humbaracıbaşı Resmi Mustafa Ağa dating 14 Şevval 1201/30 July 1787, the sultan's visit and orders led to the placement of twenty bombshells (*humbara havanı*) and twenty-one mortars (*havan topu*) to the fortresses of Anadolu Kavağı, Rumeli Kavağı and Kilyos.<sup>245</sup>

Even though the pipes for clear water in the fortress of Kilyos-ı Bağdadçık had been repaired and renovated before upon the report (*arz*) of Mustafa Bey, the Superintendent of Bosphorus, the pipes had become corrupt and destroyed soon after. Consequently, the flow of clear water to the fortress was interrupted and the soldiers (*müstahfizan*) had a serious difficulty. Thus, they asked for the renewal of the water conduits by the same person who repaired them previously. The chief-architect el-Hâc Ebubekir and the Director of Water Conduits (Su Yolları Nazırı) Mustafa prepared an appraisal register (February 1788) for the renovation of the conduits which points to an expense of 6587,5 guruşes.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 19/1639; BOA. AE.SABH.I. 19/1651. Because Monday was the religious feast day of the Jews, it was decided that the sultan's inspection tour took place on either Saturday or Sunday.

<sup>244</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 2/213. "Benim vezirim, Cedîd yapılan kal'aya vardım. Nâzırı mevcut bazen âhar mahalleri ve burçlarda top mahalleri ve sâir kusurunu buldum. Cebhanesinde âhar mahalli Abdulbâki yaptırdıkda öyle bırakmış deyü söylendi. Top ve sâir mühimmat nâkis. Kal'adan meram top ve mühimmat ve âlât-ı harbtir, gayrisinde ta'rif hacet değildir. Bayrak yerine burcuna Hama şalı tersîm âvize etmişler. Gayrı iktizasınca tetimmât-ı kal'a ve sâir yapılacak yerleri tekmiil etdirilmesi kat'î emr-i hümâyûnumdur. "

<sup>245</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 342/23879, 14 L 1201/30 July 1787; BOA. C.AS. 1112/49227, 6 Z 1201/19 September 1787.

<sup>246</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I 312/21004, 4 C 1202/12 March 1788. The document includes the appraisal register.

### 3.4.3. Constructing Macar and Dalyan Batteries

The third solid measure that the Ottoman government took in 1783 to improve the Bosphorus defences was the construction of new batteries across each other in the interior of the Bosphorus. In the summer of 1783, the former chief-architect Hafız İbrahim Ağa was tasked for the construction of new batteries nearby the Kavak forts in the strait of the Black Sea. The one that was close to Anadolu Kavağı was called Macar<sup>247</sup> Battery in the location called Macar garden in the Anatolian side. The other that was close to Rumeli Kavağı was called (Telli) Dalyan<sup>248</sup> Battery in the Rumelian side. Hafız İbrahim Ağa asked for 5000 guruşes in addition to the previous payments made earlier for the necessary materials and workers.<sup>249</sup>




Figure 3.1. “Plan du Canal de la Mer Noire par Antoine Mercenier, 1783” (SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 13)

<sup>247</sup> Macar derives from “mâ-i câri” which means running water in Turkish.

<sup>248</sup> Dalyan means fishery in Turkish and there were fisheries in the region that the battery was constructed.

<sup>249</sup> BOA. C.AS. 85/3942, 29 § 1197/30 July 1783. “Ba ferman-ı ali müceddeden bina ve inşasına memur olduğum bahr-i siyah boğazında vaki kavak hisarları pişgâhında tabyalar binasına amele ve sair eşya masrafı için bu defa dahi alelhesab beş bin guruş kerem ve i'ta buyurmaları için emr-i âlileri ısdarı babında emr u ferman devletlü inayetlü merhametlü efendim sultanım hazretlerindir. Bende Hafız İbrahim sermimar-ı sâbık.”

However, the construction of these batteries was delayed for an unknown reason. The construction which started in 1783 was completed in 1788. Barbié du Bocage mentions in his essay "Plan Topographique du Bosphore de Thrace ou Canal de Constantinople" that Toussaint, a French master carpenter, also worked in the construction of these batteries.<sup>250</sup> The map of Istanbul prepared by Antoine Mercenier in 1783 indicates that the new batteries located in the Gardens of Macar and the Cape of Dalyan were built by Toussaint Petit de Saint Tropez.<sup>251</sup>

It is difficult to access the role of Toussaint in these constructions since he does not have any writings or reports in French archives and the Ottoman archival material does not refer to him in this time period.<sup>252</sup> It also seems that the Ottomans decided to construct these batteries in 1783 but that the project was delayed. Toussaint worked as a carpenter in the construction of the Redoubt of Büyük Liman according to the memoirs of Lafitte-Clavé.

Laffite-Clavé's Journal offers information about these new batteries.<sup>253</sup> He wrote on 16 July 1785 that Mimar Agha Affis (Hafız) Efendi went to the Bosphorus region in order to make surveys regarding the planned Bosphorus forts (probably to prepare an appraisal register). Toussaint, a French master carpenter, helped him in these surveys. According to the architect's estimations, the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri would cost 75,000 piastres; the Redoubt of Anadolu Feneri would necessitate 40,000 piastres; and the other projects, which were smaller, would cost 35,000 and 30,000 piastres. There was also the Battery of Büyük Liman. Toussaint reported

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<sup>250</sup> Barbié du Bocage, "Plan Topographique du Bosphore de Thrace" in *Voyage Pittoresque de Constantinople et des Rives du Bosphore D'après Les Dessins De M. Melling*, (Paris: Treuttel, Würtz and Pierre Didot, 1819), unnumbered page.

<sup>251</sup> SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 13. "Plan du Canal de la Mer Noire par Antoine Mercenier, 1783".

<sup>252</sup> Some Ottoman documents refer to him in the era of Sultan Selim III.

<sup>253</sup> There will be detailed section below about the French mission and French engineer officer Lafitte-Clavé.



these estimations to the Capitan Pasha and the Pasha promised to give him all the necessary workmen.<sup>254</sup>

The Batteries of Macar and Dalyan, which were planned to carry eighteen cannons, were still under construction in 1787. The former head-architect Hafız Ağa was in charge. The master mason Yorgi Kalfa and some other masons builders assisted him. The seaside walls of the redoubts were of large cut stone (*kebir yonma taş*) and loopholed (*mazgallı*). Hafız Ağa estimated that the rest of the work to be done in the construction of the two redoubts would cost 15,000 guruşes in total, 7500 guruşes for each. The Treasury paid 2000 guruşes in advance in August 1787.<sup>255</sup>

According to an appraisal register dated to 1787, most of the construction in the Macar and Dalyan Batteries was completed but some additions such as *hisarpeçe*, stone firing bases (*top tahtına taş döşeme*), barracks for the commanders and soldiers and armoury were planned to be built.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 96-97. "Le Maimar aga Affis Effendi y est allé aujourd'hui de la part de la Porte pour faire une estimation des Forts; on lui avoit remis pour cela la grande Carte; mais il n'a pas jugé à propos de se transporter sur les lieux, comme il lui étoit enjoint, à cause du Ramazan; et il s'est fait aider par Toussaint pour cette estimation, attendu qu'il n'entendoit pas même comment dévoient se faire ces ouvrages: à la fin de son calcul, il a dit à Toussaint que nous étions très habiles dans ces sortes de choses, et que nous ne différons avec lui que d'une Bourse en plus ou en moins. Il a porté le Fort de Fanarakı à 75 mille piastres, la Redoute du Fanal d'Asie à 40 mille piastres; les autres qui sont plus petites à 35 et à 30 mille: il y a compris aussi la Batterie de Buyuk Liman. Toussaint a rendu compte de tout cela au Capitan Pacha qui l'a prié de ne pas nous en parler non plus qu'à M. l'ambassadeur, Affis Effendi lui a fait aussi la même prière. Le Capitan Pacha a promis à Toussaint qu'il lui feroit donner des ouvriers et qu'on comenceroit incessamment les Forts. Il l'a chargé aussi de dire à M. Grégoire de se trouver demain à l'arsenal et de lui amener les fondeurs: un Tchaoux du Capitana Bey étoit déjà venu ici pour le lui dire."

<sup>255</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 250/16767, 14 Za 1201/28 August 1787.

<sup>256</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 211/13984, 1 Ca 1202/8 Şubat 1788.




Figure 3.2. Ottoman plan of Macar Battery. “Bahr-i siyah boğazında Macar Tabyası ta’bir olunan Yuşa kal’ası”.<sup>257</sup> /TSMA.e. 900/100)



Figure 3.3. Ottoman Plan of Macar Fortress (TSMA.e. 9444/1)

<sup>257</sup> This plan of Macar Redoubt was prepared later in the period of Sultan Selim III (sometime in 1222/1807) where the redoubt was enlarged with two additional batteries. This is only the earliest form of the redoubt and see next chapter for the enlarged version of it.

#### 3.4.4. Maintenance of the Five Fortresses

The inspection of Mehmed Tahir Ağa and Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa had led to some repairs and constructions in the Bosphorus fortresses in 1778-79, and the addition of soldier barracks to four of them in 1783. However, another extensive project of repairs and new constructions became necessary in 1199/1785.<sup>258</sup> According to the appraisal register of 23 Cemaziyelahir 1199/3 May 1785 prepared by the chief-architect of the age Hafız İbrahim, a new house would be built for the Superintendent of the Five Fortresses (Kılâ'-ı Hamse Nazırı). In addition, roof tiles, ceilings, window panes, window casements, drains, plasters, floorings, stoves, doors, firing bases, toilets and gatehouses needed repair or renovation in the fortresses of Poyraz, Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri and Garibçe and a bridge should be constructed for the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri.<sup>259</sup> The total cost of the constructions and repairs was 9663 guruşes (the house of the superintendent alone would cost 3500 guruşes).<sup>260</sup>

After the completion of these renovations and repairs, there was another request for repairs at the Fortresses of Garibçe, Rumeli Feneri and Revancık by Mustafa Ağa, the Superintendent of the Five Fortresses. Aside from some repairs, his most important request concerned the building of a boat-house with a capacity of six row-boats in the fortress of Rumeli Feneri. The *Kancabaş* caique of Mustafa Ağa, remained exposed to heavy rains and elements. There was an urgent need for a boathouse to protect the boat. In addition, the water reservoir of the Fortress of Garibçe was in need of repair because it was poorly built at the beginning and was destroyed in time.<sup>261</sup>

Upon the approval of the Superintendent's request, architects Hacı Ahmed Nurullah and Seyyid Mustafa prepared an appraisal register on 21 Rebiülahir 1200/21

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<sup>258</sup> BOA. C.NF. 12/551.

<sup>259</sup> BOA. C.NF. 12/551, ff. 2-3-4, 23 C 1199/3 May 1785.

<sup>260</sup> The other document attached to the appraisal register gives the total cost as 9659 guruş.

<sup>261</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1179/52578, ff. 2, 11 R 1200/11 February 1786.

February 1786.<sup>262</sup> This register projected the building of a boathouse, some repairs and renovation of the firing bases in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri, renovations and repairs of a water reservoir, soldier barracks, gun loopholes and stone cover floorings in the Fortress of Garibçe, and repairs and renovations of firing bases and some other places such as roof tile and wooden windows in the Fortress of Revancık. The total cost of these repairs and constructions was estimated as 3585 guruşes. However, the workmen faced some difficulties when they began to dig the ground for the boathouse and the Superintendent stopped the workers and asked the responsible architect whether they would continue if the cost would be higher than the estimate. The architect approved the continuation of the work for the boathouse believing that a way would be found to meet the additional expenses<sup>263</sup> and at the end of the project, architect Osman Efendi added 820 guruşes to the total raising it to 4405,5 guruşes.<sup>264</sup>

### **3.5. The First Mission of French Military Engineers (1783-1788)**

In 1783, the Ottoman Porte decided to put itself in a state of alert against possible threats of Russia. Halil Hamid Paşa, who became the grand vizier on December 1782, was aware of the tensions in the Ottoman frontiers with Russia and Austria and he knew that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was in reality only a cease-fire, which would be followed by another war in the near future. He realized the need for military reform and for the renovation of the defense structures especially after the losses of important Muslim lands. He took immediately action toward these ends. His first task was to initiate improvements in the military and technical corps and to keep them properly trained according to the needs and conditions of the age. He recruited many foreign experts, especially French, in order to utilize their knowledge and experience in the re-organization of the corps of rapid-fire artillerymen, the improvement of the corps of miners and bombardiers, the re-

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<sup>262</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1179/52578, ff. 3.

<sup>263</sup> 'Müşkile mani değildir, sen binaya mübaşeret eyle, bi-mennihi te'âla tekmi line tekrâren keşf ederiz. Ziyâde sarf olan mahalleri i'lam ederim.' BOA. C.AS. 1179/52578, ff. 1.

<sup>264</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1179/52578, ff. 3; BOA. AE.SABH.I. 354/24817, 29 Za 1200/23 September 1786. The payments for the repairs were made in periods to the Superintendent Mustafa Agha.

organization of the School of Engineering, the construction and amelioration of new fortresses along the Russian frontiers and the Straits, and the preparation of a fleet ready for a possible war.<sup>265</sup>

The solicitations of the French ambassador Comte de Saint-Priest were also effective in accelerating the process. Halil Hamid Paşa asked from France two artillery masters to help to renew the rapid-fire artillerymen of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>266</sup> In response to the Ottomans' request, the French government sent the artilleryman sergeant Antoine Charles Aubert<sup>267</sup> assisted by two artillerymen. In addition, the French government created a team of almost twelve French officers and experts composed of artillerymen, gunners, designers, surveyors, topographers and naval engineers to be sent for a military mission to Istanbul. The newly appointed French ambassador Choiseul Gouffier, led the mission and stayed in Turkey just over five years.<sup>268</sup>

### 3.5.1. Chabaud de la Tour

Ambassador Saint-Priest presented the Ottoman request to the Palace of Versailles as a good opportunity to increase French influence in the Ottoman state. Hence the French offered a much more extensive support than the Ottoman requested. Firstly,

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<sup>265</sup> Even though Halil Hamid Paşa had a long-term reform plan, he did not have enough time to realize his reforms because of his unexpected and sudden dismissal upon the imputation of a plot to dethrone the sultan. He was accused of trying to put prince Selim on the throne and he was executed in Bozcaada on 27 April 1785. K. Beydilli, "Halil Hamid Paşa", *DİA* 15 (1997); İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, "Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Cilt 5 (1936), s. 213-269. For more information on the French experts in the Ottoman Empire, see Darina Martykanova, "Les ingénieurs entre la France et l'Empire ottoman (XVIIIe-XXe siècles): un regard mosaïque pour une histoire croisée", *Quaderns d'història de l'enginyeria*, 2016-2017, vol. XV, p. 159-182; Darina Martykanova, *Reconstructing Ottoman Engineers: Archaeology of a Profession (1789-1914)*, (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2010); Frederic Hitzel, "Relations interculturelles et scientifiques entre l'Empire Ottoman et les pays de l'Europe occidentale, 1453-1839" (Universite de Paris - IV, 1995).

<sup>266</sup> Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires francais", 21; AMAÉ, 133 CP/Turquie, 169, f. 312-313 (10 November 1783).

<sup>267</sup> Aubert also accompanied Baron de Tott to educate the corps of rapid-fire artillerymen in Istanbul between 1774-1776 (Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires francais", 26, 57).

<sup>268</sup> Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 69 and Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires francais", 15. For a general overview of European experts serving to the Ottoman Empire, see. Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, "The Recruitment of European Experts for Service in the Ottoman Empire (1732-1808), pp. 32-57."

the French government sent lieutenant colonel Antoine Chabaud de la Tour, alias Chevalier de Cerville to the Ottoman court. He was a military engineer. Grand vizier Halil Hamid Paşa received de la Tour on 8 October 1783 and he requested from him to examine the Ottoman defense systems in the Black Sea and to develop new projects for better protection. Chabaud de la Tour embarked on the task with the help of marine geographer-engineer Eynard. He wrote several reports on the fortresses of Oczakow and Khotin and prepared projects for the defense of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. However, the French Ambassador Comte de Saint Priest hampered Chabaud de la Tour's projects.<sup>269</sup>

### **3.5.1.1. Chabaud de la Tour's Reports on the Bosphorus Defences in 1783**

Chabaud de la Tour's reports on the defense structures of the Bosphorus help us to understand the situation of the fortresses and batteries at the end of 1783 and to see what had been done so far. Even though Chabaud de la Tour did not have a chance to act on his observations because his mission ended abruptly, his observations are valuable. Based on his inspections in the Bosphorus, Chabaud de la Tour wrote three reports: "Visite des Châteaux et batteries d'Europe et d'Asie sur le canal de Constantinople" (Visit to the European and Asian Castles and Batteries of the Canal of Constantinople)<sup>270</sup> is dated 16 December 1783. His "Rapport sur la visite des Château et Batteries qui défendent le Canal de la Mer Noire " (A Report on the visit to the Castles and Batteries that defend the Black Sea Canal)<sup>271</sup> dated

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<sup>269</sup> Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 17; Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 69.

<sup>270</sup> This is an unnamed report in SHD, Archives du Genie, with a title "Visite des châteaux et batteries d'Europe et d'Asie sur le canal de Constantinople" (SHD, 1 GM 1616) which dates back to 16 December 1783. The archival staff of SHD, Chateau du Vincennes attributed this unnamed report to Lafitte-Clavé. However, it is impossible since Lafitte-Clavé arrived Istanbul on the March of 1784. There is also the information that Chabaud de la Tour took the order to write a report on the Black Sea forts from grand vizier Halil Hamid Pasha on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October. Chabaud probably prepared this report upon this order within two months as he indicated the date range on the report from 20 October to 16 December 1783. In addition, the handwriting of this manuscript does not match with the handwriting of Lafitte-Clavé. Lastly, the information given in this unnamed report completely matches with the information given in the other report written and signed by Chabaud. Thus, it can be concluded that this unnamed report does not belong to Lafitte-Clavé but to Chabaud de la Tour. See Appendix 8 for the transcript of the report.

<sup>271</sup> There is a report and a map written and drawn by Cerville de la Tour: "Rapport sur la visite des Château et Batteries qui défendent le Canal de la Mer Noire " See. SHD, 1 VM 275, 10 and Carton 10. See Appendix 9 for the report and the map.

from 24 December 1783. Finally he wrote the “Mémoire sur les défenses Ottomanes au débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la Mer noire” (Memoir on the Ottoman defences at the Mouth of the Canal of Constantinople in the Black Sea).<sup>272</sup>

The first report gives a detailed overview of all the existing military structures that defend the Strait of the Black Sea. Baron de Tott’s writings and the Ottoman archival sources provide useful information about the construction of new forts and batteries along the straits as indicated above but Chabaud de la Tour’s first report gives a more concrete and detailed overview.

In summary, the first impression of Chabaud de la Tour was that the forts on the European and Asian sides were entrenched batteries not closed by the gorge (rear entrance),<sup>273</sup> and their construction and accessories did not reflect that well from a point of view of military. According to Chabaud de la Tour, their constructors should have perceived that the more they deployed artillery fire at the entrance and the passageway of the strait in order to prevent the penetration of the enemy ships, the more they would force out the enemy to turn their attention to the land, with the intervention to attack and to take out these forts from their rear entrances or by cutting off their supply of water and provisions to starve their garrisons.

The position seemed to be chosen without [pre]determined objectives. Their gorge walls were rather a rampart without a parapet or a banquette. They did not have strolling spaces as their gates were uncovered by parapets that should have embrasures for cannons and banquettes where riflemen could stand more or less at the level of the natural ground. Without these precautions it becomes easy to enter

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<sup>272</sup> This report written by Chabaud and submitted to Marechal de Segur on April 7, 1784 is a summary of his observations and his critical comments about the defense systems of Istanbul. “Memoire sur les défenses Ottomanes au débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la Mer noire.” See SHD, 1 VM 275, 11. See Appendix 10 for the transcript of the report and the map.

<sup>273</sup> See glossary for the meaning of “gorge”. To be closed by gorge is a technical term used in the defense of forts. In the bastioned architecture, the forts whose gorge is not equipped with any parapet are considered: open by the gorge. Those whose gorge is defended are considered: closed by the gorge.

inside. Their water comes from the countryside by pipes that could be easily located and cut off. They lacked any food stores or a bakery thus obliging the carrying garrisons' subsistence to these posts on a daily basis. Large barracks located very close to the fortresses near their gorges provide the enemy with secure and convenient covers to approach the fortresses for an attack.

Detailed descriptions of each fortress follow these general observations.

Rumeli Feneri (Château du Phare en Europe): Chabaud de la Tour begins with a description of the location of the fort. It was located on the European side, more than 300 *toises*<sup>274</sup> north of the Lighthouse (Rumeli Feneri), which was placed at another interior point of the strait. Chabaud de la Tour criticizes the Ottomans for their positioning of the fort. He shares de Tott's criticisms that the fortress' location was not good to protect the entrance of the strait, which was more than 2200 *toises* wide. The location was also not suitable because the fires of the fortress were bristled with rocks, which make it unapproachable even in the calm and quiet weather.

Chabaud cannot understand why the Ottomans preferred this rocky promontory and not the one where the lighthouse stood. The promontory of the lighthouse was 300 *toises* closer to the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri (Lighthouse of Asia) and it defended two adjacent coves in the interior where troops could disembark. However, Chabaud tries to understand the possible reasons behind this choice and offers two suggestions. First, if the authorities had chosen to locate the fort where the Lighthouse stood now, they would have been obliged to demolish most of the houses of the village, which covered a large part of the promontory. Second, they might have chosen this position because of the availability of a considerable volume of water at the enclosure of the fortress. However, Chabaud believes this advantage would be a major consideration in building a country house; but regrettable in the

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<sup>274</sup> 1 *toise* is approximately 1.98 meters.



case of a fortified post, where cisterns should be favored upon water pipes for the enemy could easily break the pipes to prevent water from reaching its destination.

Chabaud's astonishment applies to all high level batteries of the strait, that the upper redoubt of this fort, is not made of a "*barbette*" instead of using embrasures. All that exceeds the height of the knee-pad (*genouillère*) or the Barbette, in other words, two and a half pieces in the parapet of the upper batteries, are not only useless, but also harmful. They are harmful because of the high expense in construction, in maintenance and in emergency. In addition, these merlons prevent, by interval, the cannon to aim at the object it should shoot. Finally the shock of the compressed air due to the affect of the explosion of the powder at the moment of the firing, might shake and destroy even the masonry of the lateral faces (*joues*) of the embrasures, even though it is cladded with cut stone, as the experience proves it.

A large new barracks building built very closely at the side of the entrance to the fort disrupts it in the sense that it offers a potential cover for a possible force where they could use it to organize a brisk attack.

Garibçe (Château intérieur du Dessein de M.r de Tot.): According to Chabaud, this fortress was very well located across from counterpart in the Asian side (Poyraz). The two fortresses could bring a hostile ship under effective crossfire. It had three batteries; two of them were in the open-air. The third one was covered by good masonry work and placed at a convenient distance to have easy access to [artillery] pieces. However, it had the usual disadvantage of similar structures, one or two shots of cannon would suffice to fill them with smoke and blind the cannoneers, and thus, putting them out of service for at least a few minutes.

Batteries in the open-air had platform locations that required backfilling. The decking of the existing ones were covered and in bad condition. The parapet should have been filled and indented with crenels and not with embrasures since the latter could only be defended by riflemen. A large mound on the side of its entrance door

dominated the fortress very closely. This mound itself was commanded by the little redoubt built on the nearby height. Consequently, the attackers could not take advantage of the mound before seizing the redoubt.

Chabaud criticizes the bridges of the fortress as well: the “dormant” bridge (*cisir*) and the entrance drawbridge (*asma cisr*) were worth nothing, not because they were decrepit but because of the inadequacy and the poor quality of their wooden assemblage. Indeed, the bridge was shored up by necessity and the drawbridge was decked because it had neither a chain nor wooden arrows<sup>275</sup> and lower-holds.

Anyone could approach the wall or even its vaulted passage under cover and easily broke its locking device because the front door was not flanked. It should be protected by a masonry drum [sluice] of the same design of the kind proposed for the Lighthouse fortress but now using two-sided masonry screen. The water of the fort’s fountain came from the countryside through a partially open-air aqueduct. An attacker could easily break it and divert the water. Therefore, keeping a reserve tank was recommended. The barracks blocked the fortress’ entrance similarly to the situation in the Rumeli Feneri Fort. The barracks provides a cover and a convenient place for the besieger.

Anadolu Feneri (Chateau du Phare en Asie): Chabaud’s observations about the fortresses begin with detailed descriptions of their locations and physical properties. In the case of the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri, he notes in astonishment that it was indeed a lighthouse with a beacon. Probably he was surprised that a military station could expose itself as lighthouses do by blinking lights. He adds that its distance from the corresponding castle on the European side was over 2200 *toises*. The fort possessed two batteries and a dungeon (*donjon*). The platform did not bear a cannon but one could be placed on it once the height of its parapet was two and a half feet in order to transform it into a barbette battery. It would be

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<sup>275</sup> Wooden arrows (*flèches*) are long beams integrated on the wall at the upper level of a draw-bridge on the entrance side. They allowed lifting the bridge thanks to chains attached to the mobile platform. They were called arrows because from far away they looked like two long arrows sticking out from the entrance door.)

necessary to protect the dungeon's entrance door, which also led to the fort, with a drum [wooden sluice] and a loophole (*meurtrière*) to provide it with vertical defense because its emergency exit door lacked laterals [loopholes] and masonry screens (*masques en maçonnerie*), similar to its counterpart across the Bosphorus strait.

As for the batteries immediately below the dungeon, it was necessary to conceal [usually with wooden planks or screens called "portières"] the three corner embrasures on the eastern side of the battery because the platform space was not sufficient at all to place canons. As for the lower battery, because its parapet lacked a banquette, it could not be defended neither by riflemen nor in any other way. It should raze down to the level of the intrados of the "portières" arches or covered embrasures. Regardless of the absence of a banquette, this parapet is important because it would obstruct the fire of the canon of the upper battery. The platforms and gun carriages of these two batteries should be rebuilt.

In addition, he noted in the case of the Anadolu Feneri Fortress as well that the range of its guns could not keep an approaching hostile vessel under cross fire. Consequently, the fortress had no other purpose than to enclose and to protect its lighthouse. It would undoubtedly be very appropriate to put lighthouses or beacons at the disposal of military commanders in order to grant or to deny ships, depending on the circumstances, the light that indicates the entrance of the strait. However, this purpose could be achieved less expensively. Nothing was arranged for the lighthouse located on the European promontory, which was protected sufficiently thanks to its neighboring fortress.

Poyraz Limanı (Chateau intérieur de M. de Tott en asie): Chabaud observes that this fortress had four batteries built upon each other. In between was a casemate (*kazamat*) or underground. The upper platform did not have a cannon but Chabaud thought that they could place some, as soon as the height of the parapet was reduced to two and a half feet on it in order to create a barbette battery. The underground battery had the same inconvenience as Garibçe fortress across

the strait, namely that cannon shots would fill it with so much smoke that it would take several minutes to dissipate the fumes and to return to work to re-fire the guns]. Furthermore, this was an unfinished fortress. The wall that closed it by its gorge was not as high as it should be; it was a six feet two inch thick rampart with no banquette or parapet. There was also a “dormant” bridge (*cisr*) and a drawbridge (*asma cisr*), which were out of use and needed to be reconstructed.

There was also an upper battery located immediately below the platform. Again, Chabaud proposed the removal of its embrasures and to lower its parapet to 2 ½ ft in order to transform it into a simple barbette battery which was always more convenient because the cannoneer would not have to fear the enemy’s musketry or the cannonry. In other words, there was no need to create a complicated and hence costly defensive system since the enemy could not fire from above. The gun carriages, however, needed to be replaced because they were poorly manufactured to start with and now almost all of them were out of use.

The lower battery of the Poyraz fortress as well was pierced with embrasures and its parapet should be lowered to two and a half feet according to Chabaud, in order to create the same barbette battery as in the upper battery, so that its position would prevent the cannoneers from being hit by the enemy’s musket or canon fire. In addition, the rock on the wall’s outside front should also be removed. The gun carriages as well called for renewal for they were in the same poor state as those of the upper battery. The Poyraz fortress as well as its counterpart in Europe (Garibçe) were overlooked by a small masonry redoubt built in a fortress that was used as a sentinel post.

Chabaud wrote his observations also about the Kavak batteries both on the European and Asian sides in addition to the Genoese Castle (Yoros), which was inactive at that time as a defensive structure. However, he proposed to use the Yoros Castle as a communication post to between the inner castle and the Kavak battery on the Asian side.

Batteries of Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı (Batteries de Carip-bourou ou Cap Pauvre en Europe et de Poiras limani ou Port du Nord en Asie): Chabaud noted that these batteries were nothing else than “loose” elements erratically placed on natural ground on the banks of the strait below warehouses located at the foot of ancient forts, and therefore useless to defend the Canal. The landward side of the one on the European side might be useful for another project. As for the batteries themselves, however, Chabaud’s considerations regarding the Kavak fortresses applied to Garipçe and Poyraz as well, except that the latter had many large-caliber pieces of artillery whereas the former had only field pieces, that is light artillery that was easier to carry during “field campaigns”. Twenty of these pieces were on the European side and seventeen of them on the Asian side including three pieces whose firing devices were out of use. In other words, these batteries were practically useless for the defense of the Strait.

Chabaud, however, would not propose new battery locations, first because they could not keep hostile vessels under crossfire no matter where they were placed and, second, because that the Strait would be sufficiently defended by the batteries built under de Tott. So long as they were repaired as necessary and supplemented by two new fortresses to be built above the two Kavak forts. These defenses would probably deter the enemy from sending war vessels from the Black Sea into the strait until they retrenched these batteries beforehand by attacking them from the landward side, by overwhelming force. Considering the current state of the existing batteries, the enemy could disembark cannons to use them in an attack. Certain precautions were necessary in addition to those almost mentioned above. Thus, the powder and the regular cannon balls whose calibers are mixed up or damaged by rust should be checked and corrected. Furthermore, each battery should be supplied with a few double-headed shots, rope levers and a small lifting crane (*chèvre*).

### **3.5.1.2. Overview of Chabaud’s Observations**

Chabaud de la Tour made not only descriptive observations but also some suggestions for improvement of the defenses of the Bosphorus. I do not include

them here (see App. 8 for the full report) because the Ottomans did not implement them. Chabaud summarized his observations in a final report and there, his observations in general indicate that the Fener forts and the Garibçe and Poyraz forts were actively in use at that time. However, there were also several small and large, upper and lower batteries in and around the fortresses defending the Bosphorus.

Chabaud found only two forts (which are probably Garipçe and Poyraz built by Tott) and two batteries on the European side that served the purpose relatively well. He thought that the constructors of the fortresses probably lacked experience of war. These forts were little more than entrenched batteries and vulnerable to attack from their gorges. As we have said, Chabaud drew attention to the fact that, the stronger the defenses against maritime approaches would be by the quantity of artillery intended for them, the more the enemy would tend to take out that artillery power by attacking fortresses from the land. There were several easy landing points in the vicinity and nothing was easier than to cut water and food supplies to all these posts. Besides, none of them were safe from successful surprise attacks.

Their locations had been chosen randomly and without any clear object. They contained neither magazine for food and bakeries, nor cisterns. Their garrisons' subsistence was brought in there on a daily basis. Their water came from the countryside by pipes, which could be disrupted easily. Their gorges were without flanks, pit, parapets, or benches. When there are drilled embrasures at the ground or lower level, they offered all the possible access to enter the fortress. The gates were not properly protected. Barracks were built very near the gorges in all of them and without tusks, that could give them safe and comfortable cover. He observed these faults in all of the fortresses.

Chabaud tells us that he provided a detailed memorandum to the Porte about what should be done at each place, in terms of repairs, improvements, the betterment of cannons, platforms and ammunitions. In conclusion, he remarks that "tout y'est en

très mauvais etat” (everything is in a very bad condition).<sup>276</sup> Chabaud de la Tour also prepared a map of the Bosphorus defences attached to his report.<sup>277</sup>

Another detailed map of the Bosphorus and fortresses is attached to the Memoire of Comte de Saint-Priest, the French ambassador in Istanbul. This source is important for locating the forts and redoubts on the map.




Figure 3.4. A Detail from “Plan du Canal de la Mer Noire par Antoine Mercenier, 1783” (SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 13)<sup>278</sup>

### 3.5.2. Lafitte-Clavé and Monnier Courtois

Major Chabaud de la Tour overstretched and asked the French government to send a second engineer to help with the tasks at hand. The French government sent

<sup>276</sup> “Memoire sur les défenses Ottomanes au débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la Mer noire.” See. SHD, 1 VM 275, 11.

<sup>277</sup> Carte du Canal de la Mer Noire Relative a la Visite de ses Chateaux et Batteries d’Europe et d’Asie, 1783. SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 10. See Appendix 9. The same map is available at SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 11 as well.

<sup>278</sup> See Appendix 11 for full map.

Lafitte-Clavé to Istanbul to help Chabaud but because of the difficulties he had with the former ambassador Saint Priest, he asked for his recall.<sup>279</sup> Lafitte-Clavé replaced de la Tour, meanwhile, the French Minister of Defence Maréchal de Ségur employed Monnier Courtois to assist Lafitte-Clavé on 26 March 1784.<sup>280</sup>

Lafitte-Clavé was a French engineer, and the son of a noble family several members of which served the monarch. When he was sent to Istanbul as a Commander of Engineering Corps, he made two inspection tours: one in the Black Sea in 1784 which lasted for six months, and the second along the coasts of Asia Minor in 1786. He strengthened the Fortress of Kilburun against the Russian military forces. His mission was to draw maps and plans of the Black Sea, particularly the Strait of Istanbul and its European and Asian coasts, with the aim of strengthening the existing forts and building new ones in order to defend Istanbul in the future if needed. He stayed in Istanbul from March 1784 to June 1788; he founded and developed the School of Mathematics (Hendesehâne), where he taught fortification techniques to Ottoman students. Upon his return to France, he became colonel and became the director of fortifications in Valenciennes. He died on 11 February 1794 at the age of 54.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 14; Paviot, "Les Voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier (1745-1818)", 79.

<sup>280</sup> Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 69, 71; C.P. Turquie, 171/52, 21 July 1784. The common point of all three French engineers who came to Istanbul as a part of this mission is that they were educated at Ecole du Génie de Mézières (Mézières Engineering School), which was a prestigious military school in France at that time. Hitzel writes for this school as follows: "Ecole du Génie de Mézières was founded in 1748 and it became one of the most remarkable creations of the Ancien Régime. It formed a considerable number of valuable scientists and held a prominent place in science education in France in the eighteenth century. There, Chabaud de la Tour, Monnier de Courtois and Lafitte-Clavé acquired a very advanced scientific culture and a taste for research. Competent in different fields of the military art, they believed in the success of their mission. By sending to Constantinople these men of quality, the Court of Versailles wished to enrich their scientific knowledge of the Ottoman world and to evaluate the Russian danger in order to divert a possible advance of the troops of Catherine II via the Black Sea." (Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 25)

<sup>281</sup> A. Blanchard, *Les Ingénieurs du "Roy" de Louis XIV a Louis XVI: Étude du Corps des Fortifications*, (Montpellier, 1979), 415-420; *Dictionnaire des Ingénieurs Militaires (1691-1791)*, (Montpellier, 1981), 407; D. Anoyatis-Pelé, *Journal d'un Voyage sur les Côtes de la Mer Noire du 28 Avril au 18 Septembre 1784 par Lafitte- Clavé, Istanbul: ISIS, 1998.*



As a second engineer and assistant to Lafitte-Clavé, Joseph Gabriel Monnier, came to Istanbul as well. Monnier was born on 29 March 1745 at Bourg-en-Bresse, France. He had a great interest in mathematics and graduated as a second-level lieutenant from the École de Mézières (Royal Engineering School). He had a successful military career rising to higher ranks. He was sent to Istanbul in 1784 for a military mission for the purpose of strengthening Ottoman frontiers. Monnier's task was to assist his senior, Lafitte-Clavé in establishing a school of fortifications (1784-88). Then he returned to France and Belgium for other missions. He was sent to Istanbul for another mission between 28 December 1793 and 30 March 1797. He became a colonel and the director of fortifications in Nice in 1797. He retired in 1806 and died on 30 January 1818 at the age of 73.<sup>282</sup>

Lafitte-Clavé reached Istanbul on 16 March 1784 as part of a French missionary team.<sup>283</sup> Grand vizier Halil Hamid Paşa asked the Ambassador of France Saint-Priest in April 1784 for his support to find a competent person who could develop a topographical recognition of places, that had strategic importance on the European and the Asian coasts of the Black Sea. The French ambassador recommended Lafitte-Clavé who was one of the French military engineers in Istanbul at that time. Lafitte-Clavé started the topographical study of the Bosphorus and the coasts of the Black Sea. Immediately, Comte de Bonneval, the commander of the ship *Vernon* that was in charge of the nautical observations, and Poirot, a draftsman accompanied Lafitte-Clavé.<sup>284</sup> Lafitte-Clavé wrote a report based on his observations about the defenses of the Black Sea strait entitled as "Mémoire sur les moyens qu'on pourrait employer pour forcer le passage du Canal de la Mer noire ou pour débarquer des Troupes sur les Côtes voisines d'Europe et d'Asie et sur les précautions a prendre pour s'y opposer." He added two maps, (one of the Bosphorus and the other is the Black Sea) and the sketches of forts of Rumeli

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<sup>282</sup> A. Blanchard, *Dictionnaire des Ingénieurs Militaires (1691-1791)*, (Montpellier, 1981), 545; Jacques Paviot, "Les Voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier (1745-1818)," *La Nouvelle Annales de l'Ain*, 1982.

<sup>283</sup> Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 22.

<sup>284</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 11-12; Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 22.

Feneri, Anadolu Feneri, Riva and Garibçe to the report and presented the file to Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa on 22 April 1784.<sup>285</sup>

In his “Memoire”, Lafitte-Clavé describes the general conditions of the defense structures in the Bosphorus area. In his opinion, a superior enemy who attempts to enter Istanbul strait would succeed under the present conditions and he makes suggestions about strengthening the straits by taking some defensive precautions to oppose any offensive approach effectively. According to him, the Bosphorus was naturally convenient for defence and provided favorable locations for placing artillery pieces, but it also offered good anchorage. Although the Ottomans spent considerable sums to build a favorable defense system, the result still called for significant improvements.

This detailed and long report will be discussed later in detail while reviewing the logic of defenses and the mentality behind it. Pointing to the general idea should suffice here. The general idea was to increase the number of small batteries at different levels and on different points on the European and the Anatolian sides of the strait of the Black Sea in order to prevent the landing of enemy troops. The sketches of the Bosphorus forts drawn by Lafitte-Clavé, and attached to the report were as follows:

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<sup>285</sup> Hitzel, “Le Rôle des militaires français”, 22. For the original documents, see. The report: SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a; the maps: SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 14a; the sketches: SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a, 1-2-3. There is also another report written by Bonneval, Vernon and Lafitte as a part of the same journey which is entitled as: « Mémoire sur la Défense du passage par le Canal de la Mer noire et celle des parties des cotes d’Europe et d’Asie qui y sont adjacente. » SHD, 1 VM 275, 14bis.




Figure 3.5. Lafitte's Plan of Rumeli Feneri Fortress. "Plan Figure a vue du Chateau et fanal d'Europe a l'entree du Canal de la Mer Noire" (SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a, N. 1)




Figure 3.6. Lafitte's Plan of Anadolu Feneri Fortress. "Plan Figure a vue du Château et fanal d'Asie a l'entree du Canal de la Mer Noire" (SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a, N. 2)




Figure 3.7. Lafitte's Design of Riva Fort. "Dessein ou Croquis a vue du Château de Riva en asie" (SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a, N. 3)



Figure 3.8. Lafitte's Design of Garibçe Fortress with a New Battery. "Dessein à vue du nouveau Château d'Europe de M. de Tot, avec la nouvelle Batterie ou redoute circulaire pour en défendre la Gorge, de la construction de M. Toussaint" (SHD, 1 VM 275, 14a, N. 4)

Later, Lafitte-Clavé and his team took another and more extensive trip to the Black Sea, in order to understand the geography, to examine the Ottoman defense systems there and to help the Ottomans develop new defense systems for the straits of the Black Sea. Lafitte-Clavé followed the following route in his trip: Tarabya, Soğucak, Anapa, Gelincik, Caffa, Crimea, Hocabey, Akkirman, Ozcakow, Dniester, the Strait of Sunne, Kara Hirman, Gulf of Mesembrie, Port of Varna, Çingene İskelesi, Sizibolu, Sinop, Gerze, İnebolu, Amasra and Tarabya.<sup>286</sup> Lafitte-Clavé also wrote down his observations throughout this voyage in *Journal D'un Voyage sur Les Côtes de la Mer Noire du 28 Avril au 18 Septembre 1784*.<sup>287</sup> The ambassador of France in Istanbul explains Lafitte-Clavé's principal aim in this voyage as follows:

“The principal object of the reconnaissance ordered by his Majesty at the mouth of the Black Sea canal which leads to Constantinople is that he should be able to assess the means of attack that the enemy might employ against the capital and the means of defense that could oppose such attack. This is the twofold job that this party is ordered to fulfil.”<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Tarabya is the starting and ending point of the voyage because the French ambassador's summer residence was located there.

<sup>287</sup> This manuscript is preserved in Château de Vincennes, at the Library of SHD: Bibliothèque SHD, Nr. 167. See Appendix 12 for the cover of the original manuscript. Dimitris Anoyatis-Pelé edited and published it. Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal D'un Voyage sur Les Côtes de la Mer Noire du 28 Avril au 18 Septembre 1784*, published by Dimitris Anoyatis-Pelé. Istanbul: ISIS, 1998. Anoyatis-Pelé also published in the same book a supplementary piece of document written by Lafitte-Clavé at around the same time and preserved in SHD, Archives du Genie, with a title « Mémoire Topographique sur Les Côtes de la Mer Noire » (SHD, 1 VM 275, nr. 19).

<sup>288</sup> « Le principal objet de la reconnaissance ordonnée par sa Majesté, à l'embouchure de la Mer noire dans le canal qui conduit a Constantinople, est de mettre en état de juger des moyens d'attaque que l'ennemi pourroit employer de ce cote contre la capitale et de ceux de défense qu'on pourroit y opposer. C'est sur ce double aspect que paroît devoir se diriger le travail ordonne en cette partie. » D.A.P., Introduction to *Journal D'un Voyage sur Les Côtes de la Mer Noire*, 2 ; « Instruction que M. L'ambassadeur de France a remise a M. de Bonneval de Vernon et de Lafitte-Clavé », SHD, 1 VM 275, 13bis. See Appendix 6 for the original document and its transcript.

The operations were carried on with so much intensity that before the end of 1784, Lafitte-Clavé was able to prepare ten memoirs, three maps, and thirty-five plans, containing the complete system of operations.<sup>289</sup>

Monnier arrived at Istanbul on the same year, 16 July 1784 to assist Lafitte-Clavé. Monnier as well made a trip through the strait of the Black Sea. The former architect accompanied Monnier in this first trip. Monnier observed the construction of two new small quadrilateral fortresses (probably those in Kilyos and Karaburun) to prevent the approach of vessels and he found their location satisfactory and sufficient for defensive purposes.<sup>290</sup>

Lafitte-Clavé as a head engineer and Monnier as his second founded the School of Fortification (*İstihkam Mektebi*) located in the Haliç Shipyard.<sup>291</sup> They started giving fortification lessons on 28 October 1784<sup>292</sup>. Monnier gave one hundred and forty seven lessons by 18 August 1786<sup>293</sup> and Lafitte gave one hundred and eighty two lessons by 29 December 1786<sup>294</sup>. Lafitte-Clavé in his *Journal d'un officier Français à Constantinople en 1784-1788*<sup>295</sup> and Monnier in his *Journal de mon voyage de*

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<sup>289</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 11-12; Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 23. For the original documents, see. SHD, 1 VM 275, 16-21; SHD, GR 1 M 1616, 10-38, 40-43.

<sup>290</sup> Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 71; AMAÉ, 133 CP/Turquie, 171, f. 75 (19 Aout 1784).

<sup>291</sup> For more about Lafitte-Clavé and the information he provided about *Mühendishane*, see. Beydilli, "Savaş Eğitiminde Okullaşma (1775-1807).", pp. 275-279.

<sup>292</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 44; Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille à Constantinople*, 92: "28 Octobre 1784, Premier leçon de la nouvelle école. Ce jour-là nous avons été à l'arsenal où nous [avons] donné à 10 ou 12 turcs une première leçon sur le tracé d'un front de fortification sur le papier. L'intelligence de quelques-unes et le zèle de tous pour cette partie sont d'un bon augure pour leur instruction."

<sup>293</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 17.

<sup>294</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 332.

<sup>295</sup> Lafitte-Clavé's diary journal is preserved in Château de Vincennes, at the Library of SHD as a manuscript: "Lafitte Journal de son séjour en Turquie", Bibliothèque SHD, N. 168. There are also his letters written from Istanbul to mostly French authorities: "Lafitte, Lettres écrites pendant son séjour en Turquie 1784 à 1786", Bibliothèque SHD, B. 169. See Appendices 13 and 14 for the covers of the manuscripts. Both of these manuscripts had been edited and published by Dimitris Anoyatis-Pelé in the form of a book. See Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français à Constantinople en 1784-1788*, published by Dimitris Anoyatis-Pelé. Thessalonique: University Studio Press, 2004. My references are to the published version and not the original manuscripts.

*Marseille a Constantinople en 1784*<sup>296</sup> provided information about their day-to-day activity and narrated briefly what they taught and what they encountered at *Mühendishane* in their fortification lessons and the consequences of their lessons.

It is necessary to underline here that Lafitte and Monnier, who were educated military engineers, provided much more reliable and technical information about the Ottomans and their working manner than de Tott. The difference is evident in the sources of information they generated and left for us. Baron de Tott's memoirs differ from the journals of Lafitte or Monnier. Baron de Tott wrote his memoirs for a broad audience in Europe. However, Lafitte and Monnier wrote their Journals in a daily routine for the purpose of recording their memoirs. They were not addressing a specific audience for a specific reason. Most of their notes were personal as is evident in their occasional inclusion of personal family matters in their writings. They also included technical details about the fortification jobs and their lessons, which provides a basis for a comparison of the French contribution and Ottoman understanding of it.

The French officers were tasked with observing the conditions and functionality of the Bosphorus forts in defending the Ottoman capital. They were also charged to construct a new battery in Büyük Liman (Liman-ı Kebir). Lafitte's diary provides detailed information about the process of constructing this new fort.

Lafitte-Clavé's writings indicate that he was an educated military man who made formal and objective observations about the Ottomans, their institutions and education systems in contrast to Baron de Tott. It also seems that the senior Ottoman officials (including the Grand Admiral and Reisülkütab and others) appreciated Lafitte-Clavé's efforts and respected his expertise in the field of fortification.

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<sup>296</sup> Monnier's diary journal is being preserved at Bibliotheque de Bourg-en-Bresse, Ms. 63. For an extensive research about the voyage of Monnier to Istanbul and the content of his journals, see. Jacques Paviot, "Les Voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier (1745-1818)," *Les Nouvelles Annales de l'Ain*, 1982, pp. 75-124.

In Lafitte Clave's letter to M. de Fourcoy on 19 February 1785, he wrote that after his observations about the defense systems of the Ottoman Empire against Russians, he advised the Ottoman government about the immediate necessity of the improvement of defenses as quickly as possible, beginning with the Bosphorus.<sup>297</sup>

According to Monnier's journal diary entry on 28 February 1785, the Grand Vizier summoned Lafitte Clavé and Monnier, and asked them to bring their plans and maps. They went to the palace of the grand vizier, accompanied by their draftsman, M. Poirot, their dragoman, M. Grégoire, and M. Fonton, the first dragoman of France. The vizier received them with much kindness. He seated them and they were served according to Turkish custom, jams, coffee, sherbet, rose water, and perfumes. Then, the master of ceremonies, after having put on the pleats of his fine tail, slipped delicately gauze and muslin handkerchiefs embroidered with gold between their shirt and their jacket. Poirot and Gregory each received a bag of piastres and were dressed with *kérekés*<sup>298</sup>. During these ceremonies, the vizier complimented them and the ambassador, in the most gracious words. After fifteen minutes of conversation, they returned to Pera and discovered that their embroidered handkerchiefs contained enameled gold snuff-boxes covered with diamonds of great value.<sup>299</sup>

While Lafitte-Clavé was chiefly occupied with plans for the defense of the Black Sea, his colleague Monnier's mission was to organize a school that taught fortifications, applied mathematics, and topography at the Arsenal. The Grand Vizier and the Capitan Pasha were very much in favor of this enterprise and did their utmost to promote its accomplishment. A room was assigned to theory courses in the Arsenal.

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<sup>297</sup> « J'ai terminé ce travail par des observations sur l'offensive et la défensive des cotes de la mer noire, afin de prouver au Gouvernement Turc la nécessité de se mettre en état de défense le plus promptement qu'il sera possible en commençant par le Bosphore. » (p. 71)

<sup>298</sup> *Kérekés* is probably *kerrâke*, which means a kind of upper coat or cloak of camlet.

<sup>299</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 13; Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille a Constantinople en 1784* (Bib. Bourg-en-Bresse, Ms. 63), 169-176, (28 février 1785, visite au grand vesir").



Aynalı Kavak, a coastal region very close to the arsenal in Haliç, was chosen for a site to build a relief of fortification. Finally, Monnier prepared a nomenclature of fortification with the assistance of the dragoman Testa, and the former chief-architect Hafız Efendi in order to show the equivalencies of French and Turkish terms of fortification.<sup>300</sup>

Other members of the French mission in addition to the two engineers Lafitte-Clavé and Monnier were M. Poirot, draftsman who assisted the engineers and M. de Verne, an ensign in charge of nautical operations. In addition, M. le Roy, a marine engineer oversaw the construction of a vessel of 74 guns and several gunboats as a

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<sup>300</sup> Arcelin, 17; Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille a Constantinople en 1784* (Bib. Bourgen-Bresse, Ms. 63), 4 August 1784, p. 47-49. The use of “nomenclature” by Monnier generated the idea (i.e. shared by Arcelin and Hitzel) that they created new Turkish equivalencies for some French technical words, which were missing in Turkish. However, this interpretation seems to be misleading. All the words listed in the nomenclature prepared by Monnier already existed in Ottoman Turkish with the same meaning. They were the basic terminology of fortification existed both in Turkish and French for so long. They probably wanted to have a common list of terminology in order to prevent any confusion in their courses and writings. Here is the original text:

“...Nous avons pris la nomenclature turque de tous les mots de fortifications que nous avons pu tirer de Hafız Effendi par le secours de Mr. Testa notre drogman.

Nomenclature turque de quelques mots de fortification.

Grandes places de guerre >> cala

Place moyenne >> chaus

Petite place >> palanga

Château ou forteresse >> cala pitché [hisar/kale peçe]

Tour >> coulley [kule]

Bastion >> tabia

Face >> yüz

Flanc >> yan

Courtine >> perde

Fossé >> hendek

Tenaille >> siper

Demi-lune >> yarım ai

Chemin-couvert >> charampo

Glacis >> charampo siperi

Lunette >> un tabia

Place d’armées du chemin couvert >> charampo sürdami

Communication >> sipehan”

part of the same mission. M. Tondu who was a geographer, carried out the surveys and astronomy operations and M. Aubert who was an artillery officer commanded an artillery school. M. de Saint-Rémi was specially charged with the construction of a furnace for the melting of bombs and cannonballs. But after having spent more than 25,000 piastres, he failed completely in his task. His failure had a rather bad effect on Ottomans, and nearly eroded the credit that the French officers working for the Porte enjoyed in Istanbul.<sup>301</sup>

### **3.5.2.1. Construction of the Büyük Liman Battery**

Based on his observations about the defendability of the Bosphorus, Lafitte-Clavé proposed the construction of a battery and a shipyard in Büyük Liman, which is located very close to Garibçe.<sup>302</sup> Lafitte-Clavé probably wanted this place to serve as a base to control and improve the defense systems of the Bosphorus. They built a shipyard in Büyük Liman along with a battery probably to build new ships for the purpose of preparing the navy for battles against Russians. The Ottomans built a new shipyard (Yeni Tersane) in Büyük Liman, specified as *Karataşaltı mevkii*, in and around 1785.<sup>303</sup> After the construction of a shipyard there, the Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa employed Lafitte-Clavé, Toussaint and Monnier to build a battery there. Lafitte-Clavé was in charge of the project, Monnier drew the plans of the battery, and Toussaint who worked at the naval arsenal for long time worked as a head carpenter (*maître charpentier* François) in the construction process.

The Büyük Liman Battery is the only Bosphorus fort, the details of the construction of which are available to us thanks to the reports and diary entries of Lafitte-Clavé. Toussaint gave periodical reports about progress of the work in Büyük Liman to Lafitte-Clavé and he noted them in his diary. If they ran into any problem in the construction process, it was Lafitte-Clavé who solved it by negotiating with Capitan Paşa.

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<sup>301</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 18.

<sup>302</sup> Lafitte-Clavé mentioned his suggestions in his letter to M. de Fourcroy (29 June 1785), p. 80.

<sup>303</sup> See. BOA. AE.SABH.I 14/1215; C.AS. 23/1027.

Certain discussions and problems emerged about the material and accordingly the technique to be used in the building in the beginning of the project.<sup>304</sup> First of all, Hasan Paşa requested from Lafitte-Clavé the preparation of a project of a battery with a capacity of twelve cannons and two mortars. Upon this request, Monnier drew a plan of a battery on June 11, and Lafitte-Clavé made some revisions on it considering the tight economic conditions.<sup>305</sup>




Figure 3.9. The French Plan of Büyük Liman Battery. “Plan de Buyuk Liman situe sur la cote d’Europe avec les ouvrages que l’on y fait actuellement par ordre de Hassan Pacha grand Amiral de l’Empire Ottoman, 1785” (SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 9)

Upon the pasha’s approval, the construction of the battery started under the supervision of the French military engineers, Lafitte-Clavé, Monnier and Toussaint.

<sup>304</sup> Even though Lafitte-Clavé intentionally excluded some private matters in his memoirs, he mentioned some of them in his private letters. In his letter to M. de Fourcroy (29 June 1785) he mentioned a problem about deciding whether to construct the battery with masonry or earth and saucissonage.

<sup>305</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal D’un Officier Français*, 80; Lafitte-Clavé’s letter to M. Fourcroy on 29 June 1785.

The construction official of the battery on the Ottoman side was Ali Efendi.<sup>306</sup> Even though the Ottomans wanted the battery to be made with *maçonnerie en parapet*<sup>307</sup> (masonry parapet) as Kavak and other Bosphorus forts were, Lafitte-Clavé proposed to make it of a mixture of earth and saucissonage.<sup>308</sup> He explained his project as follows:

“One had proposed to do it with masonry parapet as in the case of those in Kavak [forts] as well as others [locations] on the canal; I suggested [alternatively] to make it of earth and *saucissonage*. In order to protect the rock’s excavation from the very steep height at the foot of which it is placed, I indicated a backfilling in the sea to create there a sort of dike made of thrown stones forming a gentle slope, which would procure space for the economy that would result from the means I gave.”<sup>309</sup>

Following Lafitte-Clavé’s orders, Toussaint began to excavate to set stones for a foundation under bad weather conditions on 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of June. However, news spread that the sea removed all the stones because of bad weather conditions. When the news reached Hasan Paşa, he changed his mind and decided to use masonry in the building (favoring the construction official’s proposal). Lafitte-Clavé was surprised by this rumor and the Pasha’s decision change since Toussaint was on

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<sup>306</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal D’un Officier Français*, 150.

<sup>307</sup> Parapet: istihkâm siperi, köprü ve sairenin etrafındaki parmaklık veya duvar korkuluk; en maçonnerie: duvar kaplama. (Ş. Sami, Dic. Fra-Tur)

<sup>308</sup> Saucissonage was a new term that started to be used in the field of fortification. It means: Revêtement des talus intérieurs d’une fortification et des embrasures des batteries à l’aide de saucissons, espèces de fascines. This was a new technique French started to use in the eighteenth century. It was much better in contrast to early masonry style forts against the destructive effects of huge cannons. Professor Émilie d’Orgeix was kind enough to explain the term as follows: “A “sausage” was made of several fascines assembled together (each fascine was 2 meter long and 30 cm in diameter) to give them more length (thus the term sausage). They were used to build stable foundations and ramparts. “Sausages” were originally build with wood sticks, compressed earth, grass and sometimes stone (“ballasted fascines”). Bundles of long sticks were intertwined together and filled with material to “arm” the earth (that is make it more solid and create a strong often circular basket (the fascine). In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, authors such as Lucuze refined the principle using sand, brick, water in order to get heavier and stronger foundations. The process gave birth to the term “saucissonage” which can be tentatively translated as “sausaging”.” (8 August 2018)

<sup>309</sup> «On s’étoit proposé de la faire avec parapet en maçonnerie de même que celle des Cavacs et autres qui son sur le canal ; je donnais l’idée de la faire en terre et saucissonage. Afin de ménager le déblai du rocher de la hauteur fort roide au pied do laquelle elle est placée, j’indiquai un remblai dans la mer, en y formant une espèce de digue de pierres jettées et à pente douce, ce qui procuroit de l’espace de l’économie qui résultoit des moyens que je donnois. » Lafitte-Clavé, p. 80.

the worksite on the evening of the 25<sup>th</sup> of June and saw no problems regarding the stones. Lafitte-Clavé went to Büyük Liman and observed that the stones were there without any damage. He also learned from the workers that no Ottoman authority had come to the site to check. The story about the stones was made up to change the Pasha's opinion. According to Lafitte, "the true motive of this lie was perhaps the jealousy and especially the greed of earning more money with work that is costlier."<sup>310</sup> Lafitte immediately reported this case to the French ambassador and then to Hasan Paşa, who was astonished for being deceived by "ingrats" (ungrateful men). Consequently, Hasan Paşa authorized the French officials to go ahead with the project as they preferred and to complete it at the earliest possible time as the sultan desired.<sup>311</sup>

Even though the decision had been made and the French officials resumed the work in Büyük Liman, the same issue reemerged. According to Lafitte-Clavé's journal entry on 1 July 1785, Toussaint had some difficulties with the "Bina Emini" about the same matter. The Construction Official told Toussaint that the battery should be made of masonry in order to prevent the bad effects of heavy cannon fire on the walls. They were aware that the masonry walls were not enduring against new style large cannon shots. However, the construction official claimed that he had a solution in getting rid of the negative effects of the new cannons on masonry walls because he discussed these matters with a person named Baron d'Upch<sup>312</sup> and found a solution. Lafitte does not mention the nature of the solution but he writes that Mimar Ağa Affès (Hafız) Efendi also approved the construction official's idea. The construction official strengthened his position as the Grand Admiral and the Grand Vizier, who supported Toussaint and Lafitte before, now approved of using masonry. Grégoire and Toussaint went to Ortaköy to see the Chief Admiral in order to learn the reasons for the change of their mind. The Pasha assured them of his

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<sup>310</sup> « Mais que le vrai motif de ce mensonge étoit peut-être la jalouse et surtout la cupidité de gagner ou de voler plus d'argent dans un ouvrage de plus de dépense. » Lafitte-Clavé, p. 81.

<sup>311</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal D'un Officier Français à Constantinople en 1784-1788*, 81.

<sup>312</sup> I cannot trace the identity of Baron d'Upch but from the information available in Lafitte's journal, he was a merchant residing in İstanbul/Büyükdere. Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 86 and 114.

confidence in their job and opinion but because of the dearth of funds, he had to change his position. At the end, however, the Chief Admiral told them that he would tell the construction official to do his job as specified, that the battery should be made of earth, since woods and fascines had already been ordered to support them and wheelbarrows were procured for rolling the lands.<sup>313</sup>

This is another case of tension between Ottoman architects and officials, on the one hand, and foreign engineers on the other. Both sides tried to implement their own proposal. In this case, it was the foreigners whose proposal was favoured by the higher Ottoman authorities. Still, this problem of authority gives some clue about the business manner of the Ottomans. In principal, the Ottomans managed the projects while the French engineers worked on the ground and shared their opinions. The construction official (*bina emini*) was the top responsible in the construction of a fortress even if French engineers were involved in constructions as respected consultants. For example, French engineers had to convince the construction official or the Superintendent of the Bosphorus when they wanted to do something new or different. If the construction official was not convinced, their proposal could be declined. Either they had to convince higher Ottoman authorities such as the grand admiral or the grand vizier that they could have direct contact in cases of need.

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<sup>313</sup> « Toussaint est venu ce soir me rendre compte des difficultés que le Nazir ou Bina Emini lui a faites à Büyük Liman d'où il ne fait que d'arriver. Ce Nazir lui a dit qu'il étoit sûr qu'on feroit la Batterie en maçonnerie et qu'il avoit un moyen sûr pour empêcher les mauvais effets des murailles lorsqu'elles étoient battues par le canon ; qu'Affès Efendi Mimar Ağa l'avoit approuvé et avoit été étonné de son intervention, et lui avoit demandé d'où il l'avoit appris ; qu'il avoit souvent des conférences avec le Baron d'Upch ; etc. ; enfin ce Bina Emini s'est opposé à ce que Toussaint vouloit faire en lui disant que le Capitan Pacha et le grand visir devoient y venir incessamment et ordonner qu'elle fut faite en maçonnerie. D'après cela j'ai anvoyé M. Grégoire et M. Toussaint à Ortakeuie demander au Capitan Pacha, s'il avoit changé d'avis au sujet de sa Batterie, depuis que nous avons eu l'honneur de le voir, et lui raconter ce qui venoit de se passer. Le Capitan Pacha, a été fort étonné de les voir, et leur a dit de nous faire mille complimens, qu'il avoit toujours la même confiance en nous, qu'il n'avoit point de faire sa Batterie, que ces Nazirs étoient des chiens, qu'il étoit essentiel qu'elle fût faite avec économie, attendu qu'ils n'avoient point d'argent ; qu'il lui donneroit ses ordres pour la prompte exécution de cet ouvrage, que lui seroient nécessaires ; que ce Bina Emini auroit dû savoir qu'on feroit cette Batterie en terre puisqu'on avoit commandé des bois et fascines pour les soutenir et des Brouettes pour le roulage des terres. Enfin le Capitan Pacha paroît avoir bien pris sa résolution. » (p. 85-6)

The construction of the Büyük Liman Battery advanced very slowly because of the decrease in the number of workmen in Ramadan, a month of religious fasting, and the laxity of the construction official. In addition, the one hundred and thirty number of workers who worked in the construction of Büyük Liman on the average<sup>314</sup> were not used to building a battery in French style which differed from the Ottoman approach in certain respects. Thus, the workers sometimes complained while trying to meet the expectations of the French military engineers and resisted them.<sup>315</sup> Both Toussaint and Lafitte-Clavé frequently expressed their discontent with the slowness of the work. However, the Grand Admiral had determined attitude towards the construction of this battery and for other defence structures proposed by the French military engineers for the Bosphorus.

The Chief Admiral was interested in these fortifications and frequently contacted the French engineers or directly conducted on-site inspections. Lafitte-Clavé's journal entries indicate that the admiral wanted the battery to be built with the saucissonage method, which necessitated wood sticks (çubuk). Upon the request of the French engineers, the Chief Admiral asked the Superintendent of the Straits of the Black Sea, Mustafa Ağa, to demand 100 *yüks* of wood stick, where 300 *yüks* of wood stick that were transferred before from and around the Bağçe and Belgrad counties remained insufficient.<sup>316</sup> In another incident, the admiral wanted to have a dock fountain built in Büyük Liman. Lafitte prepared a plan and a profile for the dock fountain (Fontaine de l'aiguade). The Pasha reviewed the plan and the profile during his visit to Büyük Liman on 29 July 1785. He wanted the tank to be built on a smaller scale than the one Lafitte drew.<sup>317</sup> The fountain of Büyük Liman was going

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<sup>314</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 100.

<sup>315</sup> For example, according to Toussaint's report on 26 September 1785, the workers did not want to tire themselves and they did not want to adopt the method used in France in rolling the land, which French engineers showed them, because they said that they never take a rest. The Ottomans' method was to let the chargers rest as long as the wheeler comes and goes and they retired in its turn while loading their wheelbarrow. The wheelbarrows were made of the style of M. de St. Remi, but with green wood, thus, they would not last two days unless they were armed with iron. *Journal d'un officier Français*, 129.

<sup>316</sup> BOA. C.AS. 23/1207, 14 L 1199/20 August 1785; Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 102.

<sup>317</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 102.

to be built at the Pasha's expense as a charity. He wanted it to be seven archins in length and five in width.<sup>318</sup> (See the location of the fountain below on the figure.)




Figure 3.10. Lafitte's Plan of Büyük Liman. "Plan de Buyuk Liman situé sur la cote d'Europe avec les ouvrages que l'on y fait actuellement par ordre de Hassan Pacha grand Amiral de l'Empire Ottoman, 29 Juin 1785" (SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 9)

The Pasha visited the site of Büyük Liman on 19 September 1785 as well to examine the progress of the constructions. Lafitte consulted with him about the fountain and the Pasha finally decided to have three taps on the fountain, one of which would be used for the leather pipe and the other for the barrels. The Capitan Pasha also wanted to put a stone on this fountain, that is to say, on the platform on terrace that must cover it, which headed south to Mecca to mark the direction for prayers.<sup>319</sup>

<sup>318</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 103.

<sup>319</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 124.



The plan of Büyük Liman Bridge was presented to the Pasha on 22 November 1785. The Pasha found it satisfactory but he said that it was the Superintendent (Nazır) Mustafa Ağa who was obliged to pay the expenses, which he judged to be 2,000 piastres.<sup>320</sup>




Figure 3.11. French Plan of a Bridge for Büyük Liman. “Plan Profils et Elevation d’un Pont à faire à Buyuk Liman.” (SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, N. 5)

### 3.5.2.2. Ottoman Discontent with Büyük Liman Constructions

The construction of the Büyük Liman Battery was finally completed on 12 June 1786. All that remained was to carry the twelve pieces of cannon and a mortar to their marked places. The masonry bridge was about to be completed as well.<sup>321</sup> Upon the completion of the battery, the Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha visited Büyük Liman with the Construction Official (bina emini) Ali Efendi and the Superintendent of the Black Sea Strait Mustafa Ağa on 19 June 1786. According to Toussaint’s

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., 272.

report, the vizier was in a bad temper and he found the embrasures too narrow, the masonry bridge well done and other things ridiculous. The Superintendent Mustafa Ağa told the vizier that a masonry battery would have cost less than this one and the grand vizier Yusuf Paşa asked Toussaint if this was true. Toussaint answered that the earth battery should cost only one-twentieth of a masonry battery but the great expense of this construction resulted from the clearing of rock which was necessary in this location in order to set a proper foundation.<sup>322</sup>

Lafitte-Clavé also drew plans of a powder magazine and a landing place for the Büyük Liman Battery. Upon his observations, the Grand Vizier ordered the construction of a powder magazine conforming to Lafitte's drawing (see Fig. 3.12.). However, the vizier wanted it to be done with rough stones and brick vault.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 275.

<sup>323</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 275-6.




Figure 3.12. French Plan of Gunpowder Magazine. “Plan et Profil d’un Magasin à Poudre à construire à Buyuk Liman 1786” (SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, N. 6)

As for the landing place, Lafitte prepared the plan shown below (see Fig. 3.13.). The vizier found it too disjunctive and wanted it to have only two or three fathoms and that was made with small stakes. He did not want the cannon to be brought in before the powder magazine was completed and he commissioned Mustafa Ağa to order them as soon as the battery was completed.<sup>324</sup>




Figure 3.13. French Plan of Landing Place. “Plan d’une Cale de débarquement projetée à Buyuk Liman 1786” (SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, N. 7)

<sup>324</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d’un officier Français*, 275-6.

The construction of the powder magazine and the landing place started according to the plans by the end of June. Lafitte went to Büyük Liman on 25 September 1786 for the construction of the powder magazine and he observed that the pieces of cannon brought to the battery were mounted on very bad carriages but they were not yet in the embrasure.<sup>325</sup>

Lafitte notes that the Grand Vizier visited Büyük Liman incognito on 12 October. He found the Battery badly placed, the cannon on the hill too slow to fire and the carriages poorly made.<sup>326</sup> These criticisms continued. Lafitte went to Büyük Liman on 11 December to see if the criticisms had any reason since the Battery was very degraded. The grand vizier argued with Toussaint who had undertaken these works and the argument led to the rumors that the Büyük Liman Battery was in ruins.<sup>327</sup> This note seems to be the last reference to the Battery of Büyük Liman in Lafitte's journal. It seems that the Ottomans were dissatisfied with the work done in Büyük Liman while Toussaint, Lafitte-Clavé and others blamed the Ottomans for the weak parts of the construction. In this case as well the Ottomans and the French appear to have seriously disagreed on the ground because of different usages, military approaches and mentality similar to what happened in the case of Baron de Tott regarding his constructions of Garibçe and Poyraz.

### **3.5.2.3. Fortress Projects Proposed by Lafitte-Clavé**

The Capitan Pasha tasked Lafitte-Clavé with developing some new projects to strengthen the defences of the Bosphorus against a possible Russian threat. In Lafitte's letter to M. de Fourcroy on 10 May 1785, he wrote that they spent almost a month at Fenerköy (Rumeli Feneri) in order to draw a map of the Bosphorus, to observe the earlier fortresses and to decide the best location to build additional defensive structures. Because the Ottoman government was in a hurry and asked for quick response, Lafitte-Clavé drew a fortress project for Fenerköy and made the necessary levels to adjust the scroll. He also proposed to construct four or five

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<sup>325</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 304.

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, 326.

redoubts or entrenched batteries along the coasts of the Bosphorus.<sup>328</sup> First of all, he drew a large and detailed map of the Bosphorus, and marked the existing as well as the proposed forts and redoubts on it.<sup>329</sup> Then, he drew the plans and profiles of each proposed construction separately.<sup>330</sup> In addition, he wrote down a report that explained the necessity and function of these proposed projects.<sup>331</sup> The *Divan Efendisi* (as mentioned by Lafitte-Clavé) translated his report into Turkish, which the Pasha presented to the Grand Vizir and the Sultan for their information.<sup>332</sup>

According to Lafitte's journal entry of 10 July 1785, the Pasha sent an envoy (a çavuş) to the French Ambassador to inquire how much the six new forts that the French engineers (Lafitte-Clavé and Monnier) indicated on the map would cost. The French Ambassador asked Lafitte-Clavé to offer an estimate and Lafitte immediately prepared a brief cost report. Then all of them met with the Admiral. The Pasha told them that he visited the sites along the Bosphorus together with the Grand Vizir who approved the projected forts. The Pasha drafted a report of his own in addition to Lafitte's notes and plans. All of these documents were presented to the sultan. The sultan approved the plans agreeable but wanted to know their possible cost in

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<sup>328</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 78.

<sup>329</sup> SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 1, "Carte d'une Partie du Canal de la Mer Noire avec Projets Relative au Memoire du 20 Mai 1785."

<sup>330</sup> SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 2, "Plan du Chateau du Fanaraky ou du Fanal d'Europe 1785."; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 3, "Plan du Chateau du Fanal d'Asie et de la Redoute qui renferme ce Fanal"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 4, "Plan du Fort de Karipché en Europe 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 5, "Plan du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 6, "Plan d'une Redoute près du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 7, "Plan d'un Fort Projette à Fanaraky 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 8, "Plan d'une Redoute Projettée 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 9, "Plan de Buyuk Liman 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, N. 1, "Plan de Nivellement du Fort Projetté à Fanaraky en 1785"; SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, N. 2, "Plans particuliers du Fort Projettée à Fanaraki et des cinq Redoutes ou Batteries Projettées à Karipche, à Buyuk Liman Cote D'Europe à Anadoli Fener, à Poiras Liman et à Fil Bouroun Cote d'Asie pour la Defense du Canal en 1785." See Appendix 15 for the map and plans.

<sup>331</sup> SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Carton 1, "Memoire sur la défense du Bosphore ou Canal de la Mer Noire". An important point here is that the reason Lafitte-Clavé is urging to build a fortress might be somehow related to his desire to advance in his professional career. For example, Comte de Saint Priest's letter to Lafitte-Clavé on 8 March 1784 indicates that Saint Priest had some efforts to gain the rank of Major for Lafitte but he could not have succeeded. Saint Priest advised Lafitte that he should have some pieces of fortification in Turkey in order to have an opportunity for advancement. (Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 78)

<sup>332</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 88.

advance before he decided on their implementation. Upon this request, the Ambassador handed to the Pasha the translation of Lafitte's cost report, according to which, the cost was up to 130.000 guruşes. The Pasha was surprised at the modesty of this sum and promised to do his best for a hasty decision.<sup>333</sup>

On 16 July 1785, Mimar Ağa Hafız Efendi went to the Bosphorus in order to make estimations for the projected forts and redoubts (probably to prepare an appraisal register). Toussaint helped him in these estimations because they were going to be done in a different style than the one to which the Ottoman architects were accustomed. According to the architect's estimations, the Fort of Fenerköy/Rumeli Feneri necessitated 75,000 piastres; the Redoubt of Anadolu Feneri necessitated 40,000 piastres; and the smaller ones (the names of which were not given), necessitated about 30,000 and 35,000 piastres. Toussaint reported these estimates to the Pasha who promised him to give all the necessary support.<sup>334</sup>

After the presentation of the projects for the new defense structures to the Porte. There is no reference to them in Lafitte's notes for almost two months. While the first impression was good and supportive, the climate changed later. Lafitte's journal entry on 18 September 1785 indicates that the Porte did not think the construction of the planned Bosphorus forts necessary at all. Most of the Ministers said they were useless, and since there had not been an attack through the Bosphorus so far, there was no need for additional constructions. Only the Chief Admiral asked for the execution of the plans, but the others said that he is a madman who got this idea in his head and does not surrender.<sup>335</sup> Lafitte-Clavé's

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<sup>333</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 93-94.

<sup>334</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 96-97.

<sup>335</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal d'un officier Français*, 123. "Il paroît que la Porte ne songe point du tout à exécuter les Forts du Bosphore. La plupart des Ministres disent que cela est inutile, et que puisqu'il n'a pas été attaqué jusqu'à présent, il faut le laisser dans l'état où il est; il n'y a que le Capitan Pacha qui sollicite leur exécution, mais ils disent que c'est un fou qui a mis cette idée dans sa tête et qui n'en veut pas démordre. Chacun des Ministres de la Porte en particulier à qui M. l'ambassadeur fait faire des représentations, lui fait répondre qu'il a raison, que ses confrères sont des imbécilles; que lui tout seul ne peut rien, etc. d'où on peut conclure que ce Gouvernement est fort mal conduit et que tôt ou tard cet Empire sera la victime de la lenteur, de l'inactivité et surtout de l'avarice de ses Ministres."

journal makes no mention of this matter after September 1785, indicating the Council of Ministers (Divan-ı Hümayun) rejected the project. Thus, most of the plans and profiles available in the French Archives (Archives Nationales and Chateau de Vincennes) remained only as projects. This was a failure for Lafitte-Clavé's professional career while he was seeking promotion.

### **3.5.3. The End of the First French Mission**

France and Russia signed an agreement of friendship and non-aggression on 11 January 1787. Tsarina Catherine II was planning to wage war against the Ottoman Empire and she was uncomfortable with the activities of French officers in Ottoman lands, especially for the purpose of defending the empire. After this agreement, the Russians put pressure on the French government to recall their officers from Istanbul.<sup>336</sup>

Grand Vizier Yusuf Paşa declared war against Russia in the name of the Ottoman Empire on 19 August 1787. Austria declared war against the Ottoman Empire in 1788. Thus, the Ottomans had to fight with both Russia and Austria in two separate fronts. The Ottomans signed the Zistovi agreement on 4 August 1791 with Austria by returning to the pre-war frontiers and the Jassy agreement with Russia on 10 January 1792 by leaving Bug and Dniester to Russia.<sup>337</sup>

When the French government sent a French mission to the Ottoman Empire in 1784, it was part of the policies of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Comte de Vergennes. He aimed to protect the power balance in the Mediterranean by stopping the expansion of Russia and Austria to the East Mediterranean as well as to gain the right to cruise freely in the Black Sea and commercial advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean in return for supporting the Ottoman Empire.<sup>338</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 79.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., 79-80.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 80.

After the death of Comte de Vergennes, however, there was no French who would defend the value of assisting the Ottomans in their conflicts with Russia or Austria. Instead, the French sided with Catherine II and France, and Louis XVI recalled the military officers in Istanbul on 27 October.<sup>339</sup> The political reason behind the recall of Lafitte was that the Emperor of Austria, Joseph II, was siding with the Russians and had just declared war on the Ottoman Empire while the Queen of France, Marie Antoinette, was the sister of Austrian emperor. Consequently, the French officers who served for the Ottoman Porte had to be recalled. On the 28th of January 1788, all the members of the military mission embarked on board the corvette *La Fleche* to be repatriated.<sup>340</sup>

Thus the French mission in the Ottoman lands ended. Lafitte-Clavé received an order from the Ottoman government to return to Istanbul from Oczakow together with Dabancour, Grégoire and Grandpère, who had accompanied him there. The Porte congratulated him for his operations in Oczakow and the sultan gave him eleven pieces of cloth and 6,000 livres<sup>341</sup>, which enabled him to buy a rich gold sword in Paris.<sup>342</sup>

### **3.6. Conclusion**

Several new batteries and forts were constructed in the second phase of the Bosphorus fortification. The construction of the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı in the first phase of 1772-74 was followed by the construction of the Fortress of Riva, soldier barracks to these new five fortresses, Macar and Dalyan batteries near-by the Kavak forts, Kilyos and Karaburun fortresses outside the Bosphorus on the Rumelian side and Büyük Liman

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<sup>339</sup> Hitzel, "Le Rôle des militaires français", 48.

<sup>340</sup> Arcelin, "Une Mission Militaire En Turquie (1784-1788)", 24.

<sup>341</sup> Livres: takriben yüz elli dirhem (beş yüz gram) ile müsavi eski bir vezn-i ratl. Frankın eski ismi. Lira. (Ş. Sami, Dic. Fra-Tur)

<sup>342</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Marseille a Constantinople en 1784* (Bib. Bourg-en-Bresse, Ms. 63), 28 December 1787, p. 482. "Le grand seigneur à fait présent a Lafitte d'onze pièces d'étoffés destinées et de 6000 livres pour lui faire .. à Paris une riche épée en or."



battery. These constructions created the basis of the Bosphorus defences in the long run.

The grand admiralty of Cezayirli Hasan Paşa and his position to provide the security of the Black Sea and its straits created a turning point for the history of the Bosphorus defences. The Ottomans built forts and batteries without a well-planned and a long-term agenda in their mind as a quick response to the defeats in the war with Russia in the first phase. The lack of organization both in architecture and administration of the defences was observable in the beginning. They also did not provide the maintenance of the fortresses with the end of war. However, Cezayirli Hasan Paşa began the task of fortifying the Bosphorus with a plan in his mind in the second phase. The Ottoman government with his guidance did not only manage the construction of several redoubts and forts, but also planned the integration of French engineers to observe and adapt their methods and technics. They also organized the administration of the fortresses by establishing the position of superintendency and defined the military organization of the forts which will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. All these factors indicate that the Ottomans approached the issue of the security of Istanbul more seriously and with a long-term reform plan in mind. Cezayiri Hasan Paşa's foresighted plan seemed to work that the preparations for a possible war with Russia was completed in the meantime and the Ottoman government declared war upon Russia in order to get Crimea back in 1787 which continued until 1792.<sup>343</sup>

We can see that the second phase of the Bosphorus fortification provides another opportunity to see how the age of reform must be traced to an earlier period. The attempts of the Ottoman government to reform was much more well-planned in the reign of Abdulhamid I in comparison to the hasty efforts of the government of Mustafa III.

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<sup>343</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1130/50183: An imperial order to Grand Admiral Cezayirli Hasan Paşa to take Crimea back in Şaban 1202/May 1788; İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara: TTK, 1978), pp. 519-595.

Sultan Abdulhamid I took over a defeated, slow-moving, and chaotic empire. Even though he acted with hesitations in the beginning, he then started to form a much more organized project to reform the military and to improve the defensive structures by collaborating with a powerful figure of his era, vizier and grand admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa. Sultan Abdulhamid I also had to face the loss of Crimea first by accepting its independency in 1774 and then its annexation by Russia in 1783. The loss of Crimea created uneasiness at the empire and resulted with a more deliberate and contemplated approach to the defense of Istanbul.

It seems that the precautions and reforms that took place in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I prepared the ground for a systematic and organized reform project called the New Order aka *Nizam-ı Cedid* undertaken under his successor Sultan Selim III. By pointing to the operations that took place in the pro-Selim III era, this chapter offered findings that traces the age of reform to earlier periods. Secondly, this was the first time that the Ottoman government asked for the integration of French military officers in the Ottoman reform projects and invited the French officials to Istanbul as a mission.

Analyzing the French mission and the service of the French officials in the Ottoman defensive structures contributed to discussions about the discourse of European foreign aid. This close analysis of the process, character and scope of the French engineers' role in the Bosphorus fortifications enabled to develop an analytic and more grounded approach. It becomes clear that the French engineers were more acknowledged in the field of military engineering and had experiences of war in contrast to Ottoman architectures building these fortresses. The reports of Chabaud de la Tour indicate several missing parts and inconsideration in the construction of fortresses. Still, it is necessary to consider that we lack Ottoman sources that explain their reasons of choices and logic of defense. It is interesting to see that non of the Ottoman authorities accompanied French military engineers in their observation tours to fortresses to explain their reasons and logic. Instead, French engineers speculated about the Ottoman reasons behind their choices like we do today.

There was some kind of a mutual dissatisfaction between the Ottomans and the French engineers. The French engineers criticized the inconsideration of Ottoman architects while the Ottomans expressed their discontent both in the case of de Tott and the constructions of Lafitte and Monnier in Büyük Liman. The Ottomans managed the projects of fortification and observed the know-how of French engineers in their constructions. Some of the projects proposed by French engineers were rejected by Ottoman authorities. This probably derived from their different cultures of know-how, expertise and the way of thinking and they will succeed to work in harmony only in the third period, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The problem of organization and management continued in the second phase as well since construction officials were not competent and responsible in their jobs as can be observed in the cases of Kilyos, Karaburun and Büyük Liman. Most of the constructions continued for long time because of this lack of organization and the laxity of construction officials. Even though higher authorities especially Cezayirli Hasan Paşa had a more decisive and reformer position, low degree officials were not prepared for such a reform and did not have the feeling of urgency and importance of their job.




Figure 3.14. The Fortress of Garibçe and the Tower of Hasan Pasha from Gabriel Aristizabal's travel to Istanbul in 1784. (Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 27.)




Figure 3.15. The Fortress of Garibçe and the Tower of Hasan Pasha from J. Velazquez, 1790. (Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 27.)




Figure 3.16. The Fortress of Poyraz Limanı and the Tower of Hasan Pasha from Gabriel Aristizabal's travel to Istanbul in 1784. (Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 27.)



Figure 3.17. The Fortress of Poyraz Limanı and the Tower of Hasan Pasha from A. Aquado and J. Velazquez, 1790. (Yeşim Yaşa, "Poyraz Kalesi Restorasyon Projesi", 27.)



Figure 3.18. The Russian Chart of Istanbul Strait in 1776. (Bulatov, "Eighteenth-Century Russian Charts of the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles)", 113)

## CHAPTER 4

### A DISTINCTIVE METHODOICAL APPROACH TO FORTIFICATION UNDER THE NEW ORDER

#### 4.1. Introduction

During the reign of Sultan Selim III, the Ottoman's approach to planning fortresses and batteries along the Strait of the Black Sea experienced major changes and became more methodical. The sultan himself and his viziers took much more deliberate, definite and organized measures to defend the Bosphorus while the administrative and military organization of the fortresses improved. The Superintendency (Nâzırlık) also functioned more effectively: military buildings were repaired, renovated, and/or constructed according to an updated construction scheme, while several new batteries were settled along the Bosphorus thanks to the collaboration between French and Ottoman engineers. This period was also marked by the consequences of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-92 and the Treaties of Sistovo and Jassy, which accelerated the New Order movement.

This chapter addresses and analyzes the building activities led in the Bosphorus during three successive periods of the reign of Sultan Selim III. In the first, running from 1789 to 1793 (1203-1207), Ottoman architects continued to strengthen defensive works by reinforcing them with new constructions while insuring the maintenance of existing fortresses. This was a transitional period for the new government which fully acknowledged the Russian threat and the weakness of the Ottoman defensive network and starting thus to plan large-scale measures for the near future.

In the second period, spanning from 1793 to 1797 (1208-1211), the Ottoman government's approach to the Bosphorus defense became better organized and more methodical as part of the long-term measures taken by the New Order (*Nizâm-ı Cedid*) administration. The government created new positions, such as the Building Superintendency (Ebniye Nâzırlığı), and reorganized the responsibilities

among officers in order to improve the management of construction works. In addition, the government sought the cooperation of French engineers, such as François Kauffer and Gabriel Joseph Monnier, with Ottoman architects and engineers in order to build new forts and batteries along the Bosphorus under the supervision of Reşid Mustafa Çelebi Efendi. A close analysis of the construction of Kilyos and Karaburun Fortresses reveals that the Ottomans experienced new building techniques, such as grass batteries, which will be later discussed and analyzed in detail later in the chapter.

The third period, going from 1806 to 1808 (1220-1223), witnessed the construction of new batteries and the enlargement of existing ones such as the Batteries of Papaz Burnu, Filburnu, Kireç Burnu and Macar. The Ottoman engineers, who had been educated in the Imperial Engineering School and who had been working on-site with French engineers during the second period, remained the main actors of this last phase of construction. The chapter sheds light on the work accomplished by the Ottoman government to organize the strait fortifications build along the Bosphorus.

## **4.2. The First Period: The Urgency of War Conditions (1789-93)**

### **4.2.1. The Bosphorus Guardianship of Seyyid Mustafa Paşa and Kolçak Mustafa Ağa**

In 1789, rumors about Russian attacks coming from the Black Sea alarmed the Ottoman government engaging it to strengthen the defenses of the capital and to protect the Bosphorus. The Kaymakam Paşa (the head of the government on the spot when the Grand Vizier being absent) consulted with the Grand Admiral about the defense of the Bosphorus. In his response, the Admiral in Chief pointed out the need to reinforce the fortresses by supplying them with an adequate number of soldiers, guns, cannons, and armoury, a measure that was immediately adopted. According to the official report written by Caimacam Paşa, the Ottoman government decided to perform all works with a great effort and without any defect. Concomitantly, the Bosphorus Guardian (Boğaz Muhafızı), Mustafa Caimacam Paşa, was tasked to check and to prepare his soldiers, guns, armoury and

ammunitions. Caimacam Paşa also decided to visit all forts and batteries both to inspect and to advise military officers. In addition, Sultan Selim III ordered to prepare two galleons, which, hidden in the sea behind the fortresses, would be swiftly ready to respond to attacks.<sup>344</sup> This imperial decree initiated a new period in the history of the Bosphorus fortification.<sup>345</sup>

From 1789 to 1793 (1203-1207), no significant changes were made on the Bosphorus forts with the exception of the construction of a few additional buildings and maintenance works. They aimed at fixing the weaknesses of the forts and redoubts and set the ground for the large-scale projects, which would be engaged in the following period. The most important projects undertaken during this early phase were the construction of a private apartment for the commander in the fortress of Anadolu Feneri, the renewal of firing bases and water conducts, and the repairing of functional buildings such as soldier barracks and gunpowder armory, as explained below.

Two important repair and restoration projects regarding the Bosphorus forts were also performed during this period. Seyyid El-Hâc Numan Bey (the Superintendent of the Five Fortresses), el-Hâc Memiş Efendi (the Construction Official for all the Bosphorus forts) and El-Hâc Ebubekir (the Head-Architect) oversaw the first project in 1789-1790. Working as a team, they inspected the denominated Nine Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Tis'a) built on the entire length of the Black Sea Strait (namely the Batteries of Yuşa Burnu, Liman-ı Kebir and Telli Dalyan as well as the fortresses of Anadolu Kavağı, Poyraz Limanı, Anadolu Feneri, Revancık, Kilyos, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe)<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>344</sup> BOA. HAT. 1391/55511. "Yarın inşaallah gidesin ve bir eyuce tenbih idesin ve akçeyi defterdardan alasin. Benim de hatırıma bir şey gelür. Buradan iki kalyon donadub asker ile hazır müheyya kal'alardan beriye gelseler güzel olur. Bunu da söyleyesün."

<sup>345</sup> Most Sultan Selim III's imperial decrees are undated and it is therefore difficult to place them precisely in a chronological timeline. They can be located historically by determining specific names and events by comparing them with other Ottoman archival material and in some cases by using French memoirs of French officials that were written on a day-to-day basis.

<sup>346</sup> These names should indicate that there were ten fortresses in total even though they were called "The Nine Fortresses". The Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı was not usually included in the Nine Fortresses and was considered a part of the Four Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Erbaa) appendant to the Corps of Bostancı but was probably included in the project because of its need for repair.



and delivered an “appraisal register” on August 1789.<sup>347</sup> This comprehensive document was meant to propose some repairs, replacements and construction works.<sup>348</sup>

Table 4.1. Proposed Replacements and Repairs for the Defensive Works on the Anatolian Side (BOA. D.BŞM.d. 5750)

<b>The Battery of Yuşa Burnu</b>	Replacement of roof tiles of the mosque; Replacement of roof tiles and windows of the officer barracks; Repairs of the staircase; The jetty; Ordnance depot (koltuk cebehanesi)
<b>The Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı</b>	Minor repairs of the 146ootpaths; Construction of a barrack for gunners.
<b>The Fortress of Poyraz Limanı</b>	Repair works on roof tiles of the barracks for gunners, janissaries and armorers; Construction of a lead-to-roof ( <i>sundurma</i> ) above the door of the mosque; A gatehouse ( <i>kapıcı odası</i> ); Replacement of the armory door and the bridge of the fortress gate; Replacement of some other doors and several other large and small repairs.
<b>The Fortress of Anadolu Feneri</b>	Replacement of roof and roof tiles of the Commander house; Renewal of paintings and roof tiles of other buildings; Replacement of its oven ( <i>fırın</i> ), jetty ( <i>som iskele</i> ) and road.
<b>The Fortress of Revancık</b>	Replacement of roof and roof tiles of the guardroom (nöbetçiyan mahalli); Repair works on the Horasani roof tiles of the police station (karagolhane) outside the fortress; Replacement of roof tiles of the mosque outside the fortress.

<sup>347</sup> BOA. DBŞM.d. 5750.

<sup>348</sup> The Ottomans had sought to construct a military defensive structure in Kilyos during the reign of the previous sultan. However, Abdalbaki Ağa who had been appointed to Kilyos as a construction official, had not work effectively and the buildings had remained incomplete. They were planned to be completed in the 1790s. The Ottomans wanted to repair and strengthen the fortress of Kilyos (aka Bağdadçık). They performed a certain amount of urgent repairs in the armory (cebehanesi) and some other places in 1203/1789. Seyyid El-Hâc Numan Bey (the Superintendent of the Five Fortresses), Memiş Efendi, and the head-architect prepared an appraisal register for the repairs, which indicated that the repairs would cost 3,050 guruşes in total. Memiş Efendi was appointed as a construction official in order to supervise the repairs in 28 Şaban 1203/24 May 1789. (BOA. C.AS. 908/39168). However, the implementation of this project was not done until August 1790 when it was combined with the comprehensive plan to repair the Bosphorus forts. See. BOA. D.BŞM.d. 5750, pp. 9-10. “Berâ-yı Keşf-i İnşâ-yı Cebehanesi-i Kebir der Kal’a-i Kilyos nâm-ı diğer Bağdadçık”.

Table 4.2. Proposed Replacements and Repairs for the Defensive Works on the Rumelian Side (BOA. D.BŞM.d. 5750)s

<b>The Fortress of Kilyos Bağdadcık)</b>	Replacement of roof tiles of the prayer hall inside the fortress; Roof and wood panels of the <i>imam</i> 's room; Roof and roof tiles of the commander's room; Construction of the armory.
<b>The Fortress of Rumeli Feneri</b>	Repair works and replacement of roofs and roof tiles of the barracks for gunners, janissaries, and armorers, the armory, the tower (kule) and the commander room; Replacement of cannon embrasures (top mazgalı); Other small and large repairs.
<b>The Fortress of Garibçe</b>	Replacement of roof and roof tiles of the Commander's room, the barracks both inside and outside the fortress, the mosque, and the gatehouse; Repair works on latrins, and other repairs of miscellaneous sizes.
<b>The Battery of Büyük Liman</b>	Replacement of roof and roof tiles of the barracks; Replacement of walls and flooring of the imam's room; Renewal of the flooring and the footpath of the black gunpowder armory; Repairs works on the windows of the commander's room; Construction of an ordnance depot ( <i>koltuk cebehane</i> ), a police stations ( <i>karagolhane</i> ) and a jetty ( <i>som iskele</i> ); Miscellaneous minor repairs.
<b>The Battery of Telli Dalyan</b>	Replacement of roof tiles of the mosque and of the soldier barracks; Construction of a room for the <i>imam</i> ; Replacement of roof and roof tiles of the armory; Replacement of the jetty ( <i>iskele</i> ) and some walls; some miscellaneous small repairs.

As obvious in the lists, most of the restorations proposed in this inspection concerned the comfort of the personnel living in the garrisons. The military buildings were equipped with rooms for the commanders, barracks for different types of soldiers, and mosques.

The total cost of all these repair works and replacements amounted 13,212.5 guruşes 253 akçes. With the addition of the construction of a new armory in the Fortress of Kilyos (3.230,5 guruşes), the total estimated cost rose to 16,445 guruşes 37 akçes. El-Hâc Ebubekir, the Head-Architect, checked and endorsed this final sum.<sup>349</sup>

The appraisal was made in August 1789. Hacı Memiş Efendi immediately started to conduct construction works in order to be able to manage, at least, the urgent ones before the end of the construction season in November. He started with some repairs in the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Büyük Liman.<sup>350</sup> According to another inspection report, the works that needed the most urgent attention were the replacements of roof tiles and the fixing of clay pipes in the officers' quarters and the soldiers' barracks of Anadolu Feneri Fortress. In the officers' quarters and the soldiers' barracks of Büyük Liman Battery, damaged walls and some repair works also called for attention before the season ended.<sup>351</sup>

Early in the first months of 1790, the Head-architect el-Hâc Ebubekir reported to the government that El-Hâc Memiş Efendi had completed all repair works and constructions planned for the previous year.<sup>352</sup> Memiş Efendi was paid 10,000 guruşes in advance for the work before. The rest of the amount, minus 426 guruşes,

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<sup>349</sup> BOA. D.BŞM.d. 5750, pp. 2-10. The breakdown of the estimated cost of repairs for each fortress is as follows: The Battery of Yuşa Burnu: 3359 guruşes and 48 akçes; the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı: 1290,5 guruşes and 9 akçes; the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı: 979 guruşes; the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri: 1311 guruşes and 7 akçes; the Fortress of Revancık: 276.5 guruşes and 51 akçes; the Fortress of Bağdadçık: 446 guruşes and 42 akçes; the Fortress of Rumili Feneri: 169.5 guruşes and 58 akçes; the Fortress of Garibçe: 1,021 guruşes; the Battery of Liman-ı Kebir: 2,466.5 guruşes and 8 akçes; the Battery of Telli Dalyan: 368 guruşes and 30 akçes.

<sup>350</sup> BOA. C.AS. 111/5017, 26 S 1204/15 November 1789. According to the statement (*takrir*) of the defterdar, the Superintendent of Five Fortresses, Seyyid el-Hâc Numan Bey informed that the walls of the commander's room and of the soldier barracks of the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri and some parts of the Redoubt of Büyük Liman which had been destroyed by heavy rains and were in need of repair. If they were not repaired immediately and properly, they would not outlast the winter. He proposed that the repairs of these places should be immediately entrusted to Memiş Efendi. The estimated cost of the proposed repairs and renewals was 1.435,5 guruşes.

<sup>351</sup> BOA. C.AS. 661/27774.

<sup>352</sup> BOA. C.AS. 661/27774. (21 Rebiülahir 1204/8 January 1790)

that is, 6,000 guruşes were paid to him by the Office of Finance on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 1790.<sup>353</sup>

It is important to underline, at this point of the dissertation, that the Ottomans were strictly following building seasonal cycles. They only conducted construction works between May and November, a period known as the “construction season” (*mevsim-i bina*). It is clearly expressed in one of the documents that they had to wait for the end of the short winter days, rainy weather conditions and sea swelling and only start working in the early spring which initiated the construction season.<sup>354</sup>

Further repair works were undertaken during the following construction season as well.<sup>355</sup> According to an official note of the Head of the Finances (Defterdar Efendi), the estimated expense was low and should be carried out. He also suggested that construction works should be conducted under the supervision of the Superintendent Mahmud Ağa instead of the Head-Architect who was then in charge of other buildings and had to navigate between different sites by boat which would increase the expenses. However, the grand vizier rejected his proposal because he considered that supervising repair works was not part of the duties of the superintendents and alternatively ordered the appointment of another suitable official for the task on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 1790.<sup>356</sup> It is interesting to underline that the Head of the Finances took into consideration the hierarchical relationships and expertise of each position.

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<sup>353</sup> BOA. D.BŞM.d. 5750, p. 12.

<sup>354</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 150. “...*be mevsim-i binâ der evvel-i bahâr-hüceste-âsâr ez ân sebeb ki bâ takrîr-i hümayûn eyyâm-ı şitâ ve aksâr-ı eyyâm ve telâtüm-i bahr tekmîleş...*”

<sup>355</sup> BOA. C.AS. 592/24924, p. 2. The Fortresses of Rumeli Feneri, Anadolu Feneri and İrve (Revancık) were in need of some repairs. Architect Seyyid Mustafa prepared an appraisal register in the presence of the commander of each fortress and other officers and soldiers in 21 Ramazan 1204/4 June 1790. He estimated the total cost of the necessary repairs of these three fortresses to be 1,414.5 guruşes. (The estimated cost of Rumeli Feneri Fortress was 858 guruşes, of Anadolu Feneri Fort was 319 guruşes and of Revancık Fort was 237,5 guruşes.)

<sup>356</sup> BOA. C.AS. 592/24924, p.3, 11 Zilkade 1204.

Meanwhile the Bosphorus Guardian (Kolçak) Mustafa Ağa informed that the fortresses' artillery carriages needed to be replaced. They planned to replace them probably following the concept of the French carpenter Toussaint with the state-of-the-art sliding carriages (*kızaklı nev-icad kundaklar*). Thus, the grand vizier ordered the replacements to be done under the supervision of Mustafa Ağa and Toussaint (*Tusim* in Ottoman texts) along with other repairs in the Fortresses of Garibçe, Poyraz Limanı, Kilyos, Büyük Liman, Yuşa Burnu, and Telli Dalyan.<sup>357</sup>

#### 4.2.2. The Bosphorus Guardianship of Seyyid Ahmed Paşa

An imperial decree assigned Mustafa Ağa as the Bosphorus Guardian (Boğaz Muhafızı) to supervise repair works of the Bosphorus forts.<sup>358</sup> He could not fulfill this job, however, probably because he was called sick and died no longer after. Seyyid Ahmed Paşa<sup>359</sup> was appointed to replace him.

Three months after his appointment, Seyyid Ahmed Paşa provided to Sultan Selim III with a report listing the needs of the Bosphorus fortresses for soldiers, ammunition, cannon, hardtack (*peksimet*) and some other provisions. In this document, he proposed to entrust to Sekbanbaşı Ağa the organization of the soldiers stationed in the fortresses and to the Head-Architect the task of replacing the cannons and firing bases as well as the repair works of water conducts. He also asked permission for providing additional ammunitions and provisions. The sultan's response to this query indicated his displeasure about the slowness of the

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<sup>357</sup> BOA. C.AS. 598/25218, 9 Z 1204/20 August 1790. "Kılâ-ı tis'a için mukaddemâ emr-i âli inşa olunan kızaklı nev-icad kundaklar cemî' edevat ve levazımı ile ol hilâlde mahallerine nakl ve vaz' ile tamamen teslim olunmuş olub lakin bir müddetten berü edevât-ı mezkurenin bazısı rahne-gîr-i fenâ-pezir olması ihtimal olmağla vakıa kesr u noksanlarını tamir ve tekmil mukteziyât-ı vakt u hâlden olmakdan nâşi edevât-ı lâzimesinin noksanları ekall ve topların kundaklarına vaz'ı emr-i sehl olduğundan bir kaç yüz guruş ile râbıta-pezir olur mevâddan olmağla hâlâ kıla-ı tis'a nâzırı ağa bendeleri ve mühendis Tusim [Toussaint] nâm kulları nezaret ve marifetleriyle tesviye ve tanzim etdirilmek hususu menût-ı re'y-i âlîleridir. Lakin Garibçe kalesinin orta katında top kundakları tahtına müceddeden bast ve inşa olunmasını istidâ eyledikleri döşeme ve Bağdadçık-ı Kilyos kalesine vaz ve ta'biye için matlub etdikleri on aded kızaklı kundakların müceddeden inşası mesârif-i kesireyi mûcib olacağı muhât-ı ilm-i devletleri buyuruldukda ne vechile emr u irade-i aliyeleri taalluk iderse ol bâbda emr u ferman devletlü inayetlü sultanım hazretlerindir. "

<sup>358</sup> BOA. HAT. 1399/56274.

<sup>359</sup> The next chapter gives detailed information about the Bosphorus Guardians.

operations. He found inadequate the number of gunners sent to the fortresses by Ahmed Paşa and ordered a proper reorganization of the fortresses.<sup>360</sup>

The deputy Head-Architect, either together with Seyyid Ahmed Paşa or later upon his request, inspected the Bosphorus forts.<sup>361</sup> According to his official report, the firing bases of Poyraz Limanı, Garibçe and Büyük Liman Forts would have to be replaced, the armory of Rumeli Feneri Fort would be rebuilt and some water ducts would be repaired. The estimated the cost of all these repairs and replacements was 3,782 guruşes. The sultan ordered that the water conducts and firing bases should be built swiftly. The deputy head architect was tasked with the repair works and paid 500 guruşes in advance.<sup>362</sup>

In September 1791, the Bosphorus Guardian Seyyid Ahmed Paşa, his steward İsmail Ağa, the Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses Kapıcıbaşı Mustafa Ağa, Arif Beğ, Kamili Mustafa Efendi and Dökücübaşı Ağa inspected the Bosphorus fortresses as a team to discuss the details of necessary repair and construction works. An appraisal register, based on their observations, deemed the renewal of the water ducts at the Kilyos Fort; the black gunpowder armory of the Rumeli Feneri Fort and; the firing bases of the masonry redoubts of the Fortresses of Poyraz and Garibçe. It also urged the construction of a new firing base at Büyük Liman Battery. The total cost of these constructions and replacements was estimated 10,585.5 akçes. Aside those works, the water ducts of the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı were also in need of repair. In addition, the commander and soldiers of Rumeli Kavağı Fortress asked for the construction of footpaths and firing bases for the cannons as well as an armory.

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<sup>360</sup> BOA. HAT. 208/11091. "Boğaz kalelerinin defterini gördüm. Üç mâhdır çalışıyorsunuz ve ademler memur eylediniz. Ne yapıldı? Ve kendiniz gittiniz, niye kaleler evvelki takım ile duruyor? Beş on topçu göndermişsiniz, ânın dahi biri firar eylemiş defterde yazıyor. Elbet buldurup ibret-i alem için tertib-i ceza oluna. Ahmed Paşa'nın matlub ettiği kadar yetmez, elden o kadara asker bulunamaz. Toplara göre adem göndermek lazımdır. Münasibi üzere nizâm verile."

<sup>361</sup> Even though the dates of the documents were not precisely given and we cannot be sure when Seyyid Ahmed Paşa inspected the Bosphorus forts, this probably took place in and around August 1791.

<sup>362</sup> BOA. C.AS. 866/37149, 18 Zilhicce 1205/18 August 1791; BOA. C.AS. 583/24546, 4 Z 1205/4 August 1791. There is also another appraisal register for the repairs of water conducts of the Kilyos fort in 1791. (BOA. C.BLD. 78/3852.)

Following this query, probably the Head of the Finances<sup>363</sup> decided not to build water ducts but to approve the construction of other firing bases and the armory.<sup>364</sup>

It seems that the early years of Sultan Selim III's reign passed with recognizing the significance of the defenses of the Bosphorus and with finding a suitable person to manage and supervise seriously enough the fulfillment of the needs of the Bosphorus fortifications. Both Bosphorus Guardians, Mustafa Ağa and Seyyid Ahmed Paş, did not complete their work as effectively as desired. Consequently, only a few repairs were completed during this first period such as repairing and renewing waterways, artillery carriages and firing bases. The only person who continued to serve in the defenses of the Bosphorus was Hacı Memiş Efendi as a construction official. The experiences and observations of this period prepared a ground for the re-organizations and collaborations of the New Order. It was an important period to reorganize the service of fortifications and to shape the ground for an administration of fortifications.

#### **4.3. The Second Period: The Beginning of the New Order (1793-97)**

The 1793-97 years witnessed the most important, organized and systematic efforts of Sultan Selim III's reign, to repair and reshape the Bosphorus forts. Following the signature of the Treaties of Sistovo and Jassy, the Ottoman government became engaged in a significant reformation project under the leadership of the sultan. These efforts aimed at building a New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedid*). This commitment to reform affected significantly the Bosphorus fortifications as well. One of the important figures of the New Order era was Mustafa Reşid Çelebi Efendi, Head of the New Revenue Department (*İrad-ı Cedid Defterdarı*).<sup>365</sup> He was also assigned to

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<sup>363</sup> The decision on each proposed item in the register is indicated above it in red ink. There is no name or signature that indicated the author of these decisions. It was probably the *defterdar* (the chief of the finances) who formulated them because the *defterdar* made such fiscal decisions normally.

<sup>364</sup> BOA. C.AS. 577/24293. Even though there is no date indicated in this register, 11 Muharrem 1206/10 September 1791 appears in the notes formulating the proposed decisions and added to the report by the *defterdar* (chief finance official).

<sup>365</sup> Kemal Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane: Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)*, (İstanbul: Eren Yay. 1995), 87.

supervise the Bosphorus defenses as the highest authority undertaking a role similar to that of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa in the era of Sultan Abdulhamid I.

Mustafa Reşid Efendi believed in the significance of new reforms. He organized and firmly controlled the efforts to reinforce the Bosphorus defenses. Stemming from the same project, the Ottoman government hired French military engineers such as Joseph Gabriel de Monnier (1745-1818) and François Kauffer (1751-1801) to support fortification works. Kauffer (1751-1801, a French technical expert in cartography, military construction and engineering, had been at the service of the Ottoman Empire for many years.<sup>366</sup> Along with Reşid Efendi, the Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa was directly responsible for the military defenses of the Bosphorus. He was the one to hold this position in 1208/1794 when French officials came to Istanbul. The involvement of new and qualified actors and a more systematic and well-disciplined organization improved constructions processes.

#### **4.3.1. The Second French Mission (1794-1796)**

As part of the New Order project, The Ottoman government employed several foreign experts from France, Britain, Sweden or Poland to master new European technical developments in artillery, military construction and shipping. To work for the Ottoman government proved to be very advantageous for foreign experts who earned higher salaries in contrast to their domestic jobs and to local Ottoman engineers. Consequently, Istanbul became a center of attraction for foreigners and the employment of foreign experts turned into a competition, which gave the Ottoman government a chance to select the most skilled and qualified experts.<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> Mitia Frumin, "François Kauffer (1751-1801): Le destin d'un cartographe français au service de l'étranger", *CFC*, No: 207, pp. 95-106; Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçinkaya, "The Recruitment of European Experts for Service in the Ottoman Empire (1732-1808)" in: *Ottoman Empire and European Theatre II-The TIME OF JOSEPH HAYDN: From Sultan Mahmud I to Mahmud II (r.1730-1839)*, (Michael Hüttler-Hans Ernst Weidinger, Eds., Hollitzer, Wien, 2014), 47.

<sup>367</sup> Tuncay Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), pp. 164. See also Daniel Panzac, *La Marine Ottomane : de l'apogée à la chute de l'Empire (1572-1923)*, (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2009).



This is how, the *Sublime Porte* sent a letter to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 10, 1793 asking for the support of officers and technical experts, through the intermediary of Florenville, a French merchant, and Mouradgea d'Ohsson, a dragoman attached to the Swedish embassy. The Sublime Porte expressed in this letter, the will to employ officers and experts including six naval officers, two engineers, two infantry officers, one cavalry officer, two artillery officers and one warship builder. It also specified the qualifications of the officers that the government wanted to employ. All officers had to be high talented and of sound character and morality. They would be employed for a period of at least three years with annual salaries of reasonable amounts (generally 500 guruşes salary for each engineer). The Ottoman government would require the French officers to wear Ottoman uniforms and to be capped with a Tartar bonnet, which would be provided by the government. In addition, the officers would reside nearby the Admiralty and would have little contact with other Europeans living in the city.<sup>368</sup>

Following this request, the French government sent four officers: two engineers: the battalion commander Joseph Gabriel Monnier de Courtois, the artillery captain Mazurier<sup>369</sup>, and two artillery officers: the commanders Aubert and Cuny.<sup>370</sup> Among

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<sup>368</sup> Frederic Hitzel, "Le rôle des militaires français à Constantinople (1784-1789)", (M.A. Thesis, Paris: Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), 1987), 55; Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey", (Journal of World History 1, July 1953), 110; AMAE, C.P. 184, f. 355-358 (10 Mai 1793) and AMAE, C.P. 185, f. 130 (8 Aout 1793). For the Turkish translation of this text, see. Enver Ziya Karal, "Osmanlı Tarihine Dair Vesikalar", (*Belleten*, IV (1940)), p. 182-183.

<sup>369</sup> The engineer Captain Mazurier died shortly afterwards. The Committee of Public Safety chose another engineer, Lazowski to succeed Mazurier on the 28th Frimaire Year III (December 18, 1794). The same day, the commission approved the choice of four other officers who were to accompany him: two infantry officers, La Roque Monteil and Ranchoux, an engineer officer, Legou, and a cavalry officer, Albert Tursky known also as "the Sarmatian". They embarked in Toulon, and arrived at Constantinople in the spring of 1795, except for the infantry officer, La Roque Monteil, who changed his mind at the last moment and remained in Paris. (Hitzel, "Le rôle des militaires français", 57.)

<sup>370</sup> Hitzel, "Le rôle des militaires français", 56; AMAE, C.P. 185, f. 153-154 (8 Aout 1793) and AMAE, C.P. 188, f. 119-121 (21 Prairial An II); Jacques Paviot, "Les voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier (1745-1818) : Un Officier du Génie Bressan à travers quelques évènements de la fin du XVIIIème siècle", in *Les Nouvelles Annales de l'Ain*, 1982, 107-110.

these French officers, Monnier's main task was to provide assistance regarding the fortifications of the Bosphorus. They left Paris on December 28<sup>th</sup>, 1793 and arrived in Istanbul on March 29<sup>th</sup>, 1794 after a long journey via land crossing Europe and the Balkans.<sup>371</sup>

Immediately after their arrival, the French officers were invited and interviewed by Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi, who was the Supervisor and Treasurer of the New Military Organization, on 3 April 1794. Monnier summarizes his encounter with Reşid Efendi:

Obert, Mazurier, Dantan the first dragoman of France, and I visited Mustapha Chilibi Effendi in Constantinople. This supervisor and treasurer of all the new military establishments asked us questions on various subjects related to our mission.<sup>372</sup>

After the meeting, the French officers were assigned their tasks: Monnier was to be in charge of defensive works along the Bosphorus:

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Monnier kept a journal of his travel from Paris to Istanbul, which includes some details related to his mission regarding the Bosphorus fortifications and some of his observations. His "Journal de mon voyage de Paris à Constantinople" is kept at the Library of Bourg-en-Bresse, Médiathèque Elisabeth & Roger Vailland, Manuscript 64. It is also available online via: <http://www.bourgendoc.fr/gsd/cgi-bin/library?e=d-01000-00---off-0cntgfngm--00-1--0-10-0---0---Oprompt-10---4-----0-1|-11-fr-50---20-about---00-3-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&c=cntgfngm&cl=CL1.3> reached on 8 April 2019. This does not have page numbers so all the page numbers that I give in this work are the online page numbers.

8 Nivose II, « Nous sommes partis de Paris, les citoyens Obert et Cuny, chefs de bataillon d'artillerie, Mazurier, capitaine du génie, avec mon domestique Martin Cornevod, pour nous rendre à Constantinople d'après les ordres du Comité du Salut Public et du conseil exécutif afin d'y être utile à la Porte ottomane, chacun dans le genre de service militaire qui lui est propre. » (Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 5 ; Paviot, "Les voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier", 111.) It should be underlined that this took place in the middle of the professional reformations of the French Revolution.

<sup>371</sup> They traveled by land because the port of Toulon was occupied by English forces from 27 August to December 19<sup>th</sup>, 1793. J. G. Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Paris à Constantinople*, (Bibliothèque Bourg-en-Bresse, Ms. 64), p. 31. « Mon arrivée à Constantinople le 9 Germinal de l'an 2 de la République française une et indivisible. » Monnier uses the revolutionary calendar in his journal and emphasizes frequently that this mission was a part of the new Revolutionary ideal.

<sup>372</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 31. « Le 14 Germinal [an II], Obert, Mazurier, Dantan premier drogman de France et moi nous avons été faire visite à Mustapha Chilibi Effendi, à Constantinople. Cet intendant et trésorier de tous les nouveaux établissements militaires nous a questionnés sur différens objets relatifs à notre mission. »

(14-17 May 1794) Feyzi Effendi [Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi], established *nazir* or commander-in-chief of the defense works to be carried out on the Bosphorus, two *Bina Eminis* [construction officials], the citizen Brun, the marine engineer builder Kauffer, Smith, and I, we surveyed the works to be done on the the European and Asian coasts of the Black Sea strait and we agreed together on what should be done to bring about a good defense of the strait and to prevent the entrance of an enemy squadron.<sup>373</sup>

The Ottoman government appointed Monnier to the position of the Engineer of the Bosphorus Fortresses (the Ottoman sayings were: “*Mühendis-i Kılâ-ı Tis’a der Boğaz-ı Bahri Siyah*”, “*Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı Mühendisi*”).<sup>374</sup> The Ottoman government rented a house for Monnier in Rumeli Feneri for the length of his contract as engineer of the fortresses in Istanbul.<sup>375</sup> In addition, the Ottoman government provided Monnier and his team (a dragoman and a scribe) with the necessary means of transportation. The Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa hired them one rowboat with three pairs of oars at a cost of 120 guruşes per month. However, Monnier and his team needed horses as well because of the complexity of navigating by boat in adverse weather conditions. Thus, Monnier requested to be paid 100 guruşes per month in order to hire boats and horses himself depending on

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<sup>373</sup> Paviot, “Les voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier”, 113; Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 34-35. « 25, 26, 27 and 28 floreal [an II], Feyzi Effendi établi nazir ou commandant en chef des travaux de défense à exécuter sur le Bosphore, deux Bina Emini, le citoyen Brun ingénieur constructeur de la marine, Kauffer, Smith et moi nous avons été reconnaître les ouvrages à faire tant sur le canal que sur les cotes de la mer noire en Europe et en asie et l’on [a] est convenu ensemble de ceux qu’il convenoit de faire pour opérer une bonne défense sur le canal et en empêcher l’entrée, à une escadre ennemie. »

<sup>374</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 152.

<sup>375</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, P. 152. The annual rent of the house was 120 guruşes in 1210 and 130 guruşes in 1209. “Bahr-i Siyah boğazı mühendisi Munye’nin geçen sayfda Fener’de sakin olduğu hane icaresi için Rumili bina emini Aziz Efendi tarafından yüz otuz guruş ita ve hazineye idhal olunduğunu mühendis-i mersum inha ve bu sene-i mübarekede dahi sakin olduğu hanenin icaresi olan 120 guruş sâbıkı mucebince ita olunması kılâ-ı tis’a nazırı Ahmed Azmi Efendi’ye ba takrir inha etmeğin geçen sene boğaz kılâında rumili canibi bina emini Aziz Ali Efendi’nin rü’yet olunan hesabında mühendislerin hâne kirası olmak üzere 138 guruş dahil idüğü baş muhasebeden ba’de’l... badehu bina emini İsmail efendinin rü’yet olunacak hesabına mahsub şartıyla baş muhasebeye kayd olub bu mahalle tarafından itası için suret verilmek ferman buyurulmağın mucebince meblağ-ı mezbur 120 guruşun emin-i mumaileyh tarafına ita ve teslim ve sureti verilmiştir. 29 Rebiülahir 1210.”

the circumstances, thereby enabling the Treasury to save twenty guruşes each month.<sup>376</sup>

The Ottoman government employed two Ottoman engineers, Resmi Mustafa Ağa and Abdurrahman Efendi, to work with French engineers on the Bosphorus fortresses. Le Comte Ramsay Campell known as [Kampel] Resmi Mustafa Ağa was Scottish officer. He had specifically worked with the Baron de Tott to train the corps of artillery. He converted to Islam under the name of Mustafa and had later continued to work for the Ottoman government. The Porte promoted him as a generalship (*paşalık*) rewarding his achievements in the formation of the artillery corps and his services in the casthouse.<sup>377</sup> In the 1790s, he was also working for the Ottoman government as a construction engineer (*ebniye mühendisi*) on the Bosphorus fortifications.<sup>378</sup> Abdurrahman Efendi had been educated by French engineers (i.e. Lafitte-Clavé) who had been teaching in the Engineering School of the Imperial Arsenal in 1784-88. Sultan Selim III created a New Engineering School in 1793 as part of the New Order's reform projects where Abdurrahman Efendi became as well an instructor as well.<sup>379</sup> Thus, he was a pure product of the array of reforms initiated by Sultan Abdulhamid I and Grand Admiral Hasan Paşa.

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<sup>376</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 10. "Bahr-i siyah boğazında vaki kılâ-ı tis'a ebniyesi nâzırı saadetlü es-seyyid Feyzullah Efendi hazretlerinin takdim eylediği takrîri mefhûmunda kıla-ı mezkûre ebniyesi hakkında müstahdem mühendis Munye ile maiyyetinde bulunan tercüman ve kâtibin zevâyitleri için kılâ-ı tis'a nâzırı dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşlarından Mehmed Ağa marifetiyle şehriyye 120şer guruş ücret ile üç çifte bir aded kayık isticâre ve istihdam birle ücret-i mezkûre beher şehir cânib-i mîrîden verilmiş olub ancak mühendis-i mersum havaların muhalefetinden bahisle her bâr kayık ile azîmet ve avdet mümkün olmayub bazen lüzumu mikdarı bârgirler ile ve bazen dahi hava müsaid oldukça kendü tedarük eylediğimiz kayık ile azîmet ve avdet eshel olmağla hâlâ ... salifü'z-zikr üç çift kayık def'a ve şehriyye-i mezkûre dahi kat' olub kendü tedarik edeceğimiz bargir ve kayık ücretleri için tarafımıza şehriyye 100'er guruş ... olur ise cânib-i mîriye şehriyye 20 guruş nef' hâsıl.... 11 Ramazan 1209 [1 April 1795]." For the government's boat payment to Monnier, see also. AE.SSLM.III. 3/111.

<sup>377</sup> Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, "The Recruitment of European Experts for Service in the Ottoman Empire (1732-1808)" in: *Ottoman Empire and European Theatre II-The Time of Joseph: From Sultan Mahmud I to Mahmud II (r.1730-1839)*, (Michael Hüttler-Hans Ernst Weidinger, Eds., Hollitzer, Wien, 2014), 49.

<sup>378</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, sf. 48, 15 Zilkade 1210.

<sup>379</sup> Kaçar, "Osmanlı Devletinde Bilim ve Eğitim Anlayışında", 83-95.

Repair works, reconstruction and renovation on all the Black Sea Strait fortresses started in May 1794. These operations were organized by Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Paşa and conducted by French engineers Monnier and Kauffer along with the Ottoman engineers, Abdurrahman Efendi and Resmi Mustafa Ağa, under the superintendency of Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa and the building superintendency of Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi. All plans had been designed by the Head-Architect el-Hâc Nurullah.<sup>380</sup> The first construction works led by this new team was two new redoubts, one in Yuşa on the Anatolian side and another in Telli Dalyan, on the opposite side across Yuşa.

#### **4.3.1.1. The Batteries of Yuşa (Macar Fort) and Telli Dalyan**

As summarized in the previous chapter, architect Hafız Ağa, master-builder Yorgi Kalfa and carpenter Toussaint had built the two Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan between 1783-1788. According to an official note by Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi, Aziz Efendi, in May 1794, two construction officials of both sides, the former architect Arif Efendi, the architect Ağa, along with the Superintendent Mehmed Ağa, the French engineer Kauffer and a team of three other engineers (including probably Monnier, Resmi Mustafa Ağa, and/or Abdurrahman Efendi) made an inspection tour of the Bosphorus fortresses. This tour gave them the opportunity to prepare an appraisal register for the Battery of Yuşa<sup>381</sup> on the base of which Sultan Selim III ordered the construction of the batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan.<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>380</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 11. "Mübaşeret bûde. Bina ve inşâ ve ta'mirât-ı tabya ve kılâ' ve palankahâ-yı Telli Tabya ve Kavak hisarı ve Liman-ı Kebir ve Garibçe ve Fenar ve Kilyos nam-ı diğêr Bağdadçık der Boğaz-ı Bahr-i Siyah der canib-i Rumili ki bâ-irade-i hümayûn bâ-resm-i mühendisîn bâ nezâret-i Hazret-i Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi et-Tevkii be ma'rîfet-i Aziz Ali Efendi an Hâcegân-ı divân-ı hümayûn emin-i tabya ve palanka kılâ'hâ-yı mezbur bina ve inşâ ve tekmileş mübaşeret kerde. Ve suret dâde fermûde. El vaki der sene 1208 ber muceb-i defter-i keşf el-Hâc Nurullah ser mimarân-ı hassa tekârir-i nâzir-ı müşarunileyh ve hatt-ı hümayun-ı şevket makrun ve fermân-ı âli 22 Şevval 1208. bâ-fermân-ı şerif."

<sup>381</sup> BOA. HAT. 1404/56755; BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 11, 24 Şevval 1208/25 May 1794; BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 21, 24 Şevval 1208/25 May 1794.

<sup>382</sup> BOA. HAT. 1404/56793. "Heman Yu'şa burnu ve Telli tabyadan binaya bed' eylesunler. Gayet dikkatlu ve ihtimamlı et. Kışla ve nazır konağı misillü yapılacak ahşab binalar dolma divar olmasın. Taş duvarlı metin ve fi'l-cümle kâgire müşabih olsun. Mimar ağaya beş bin guruş ve harc-ı rah viresin. Heman mahall-i me'mûresine gitsün. Sa'y ü dikkat eylesün."

According to Monnier's journal, a large team composed of himself, along with Mazurier, his engineer colleague, Mercenier, the draftsman, Riva and Sommaripa, their dragomans, settled in the village of Yeni Mahalle (in Sarıyer today) on the European coast of the Bosphorus on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1794 to watch the new works that were being carried out at the Batteries of Telli Dalyan and Yuşa. They also estimated what still needed to be done to prevent the entrance of hostile forces on the Bosphorus.<sup>383</sup>

The Construction Official in charge of the Battery of Yuşa was the former architect Arif Efendi. Construction works were undertaken under his authority from July 1794 to September 1795 (Zilhicce 1208 to Rebiülevvel 1210). He received a monthly salary of 500 guruşes taken from the funds of the Imperial Mint, which were earmarked specifically for the expenses of the Bosphorus fortresses (*ebniye-i kılâ' akçesi*).<sup>384</sup>

According to Monnier's journal entry, Mustafa Çelebi Reşid Efendi made an on-site visit on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 1794 in order to evaluate the number of gunnery available in the Batteries of Yuşa, Telli Dalyan and two Kavak Fortresses.<sup>385</sup> A month later, on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 1794, Vizier Melek Mehmed Paşa along with the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Paşa, the Mufti, the Defterdar, the Reisülküttab, Çavuşbaşı, Çelebi Mustafa Efendi, Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi and other officials in large numbers visited again the

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<sup>383</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 36-37. "14 prairial [an II], Le capitain pacha a pris congé du Gd Sgr [grand seigneur] et dans cette cérémonie d'usage il a été revêtu de la pelisse d'honneur. Le même jour les citoyens Mazurier mon camarade Mercenier dessinateur, Riva et Sommaripa drogman et moi, nous nous sommes établis au village d'Yéni Mahalé situé en europe sur le Bosphore pour y surveiller de plus près les nouveaux travaux qui s'exécutent aux Batteries de Téli tallian et de İücha Tabié ainsi que ceux qui doivent encore s'exécuter sur le Bosphore pour en interdire l'entrée."

<sup>384</sup> BOA. C.AS. 179/7798. The Ottoman government earmarked funds in the Imperial Mint to make the payments for the construction of several important fortresses such as Belgrade, Ada-i Kebir, Bender, Ismail, Anapa, Akkerman and the Bosphorus fortresses. From 8 April 1792 to 5 July 1795, the Imperial Mint paid 2,458.887 guruşes 13 akçes from this fund for the construction, repair and renewal of several fortresses. This fund continued to be actively used in the following years as well. For further information, see Ömerül Faruk Bölükbaşı, *18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darbhâne-i Âmire*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013), 148.

<sup>385</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 37. "13 Messidor, Chilibi Effendi est venu faire une tournée sur les Batteries d'İücha tabie et téli tallian et les deux cavacs pour y prendre des informations sur le nombre de bouches à feu de ces batteries."

Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan and the Fortresses of Anadolu Kavağı and Rumeli Kavağı. Upon this occasion, Monnier was presented a sable pelisse in testimony to the satisfaction of his services by the Porte while his dragoman Sommaripa was rewarded with a sum of fifty piasters in this visit.<sup>386</sup>

The vizier Melek Mehmed Paşa also reported on the inspection tour to Sultan Selim III in the same general terms than Monnier although mentioning, in addition, the Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa.<sup>387</sup> According to the vizier's official report, they took great care during their visit to examine, one by one, all batteries and buildings. Even though the Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan were near completion, some defects were still remaining. The vizier noted that the construction officials were urged to complete them within fifteen days; a query to they replied that they could barely finish them within a month because of poor weather conditions.<sup>388</sup>

The redoubts in Anadolu Kavağı were also nearly completed except for a few small imperfections as well as the new redoubt in Rumeli Kavağı. However, the slits of five embrasures (*top mazgalı*) were too narrow. When guns would fire from these embrasures, from the Fortress of Rumeli Kavağı, they would only hit the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı, on the opposite side, or the surrounding houses. They thus questioned both the construction official and Monnier, the engineer in charge, about this technical defect. Monnier replied that the four loopholes/embrasures had not been carefully planned before and proposed to enlarge them. However, Vizier Melek Mehmed Paşa did not fully trust his expertise and asked the engineer

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<sup>386</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 53-54. « Le 24. [Thermidor] Le vésir Melek Méhemet Pacha, accompagné du Cuzuk Hussein Capitan Pacha ; de muphti, de Defterdar, de Reis Effendi, du Tchaous Bachi, de Tchilibi Effendi, de Feysy Effendi et autres en grand nombres a fait la tournée des forts et Batteries de iucha tabié, anadoly kavak, Romily kavak et téli tallian. De là il s'est rendu à la prairie du Gd. Seigneur pour y diner et passer la journées en Béniche (ou en cérémonie), pour se rendre de là le soit à Constantinople à anadoly kavak j'ai été revêtu d'une pelisse d'hermine en temoignage de satisfaction de mes services pour la Porte ottomane et mon drogman Sommaripa a eû pour gratification la somme de cinquante piastres. »

<sup>387</sup> In this takrir, Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi is mentioned as "ebniye-i kıla' nazırı Tevki'i Feyzullah Efendi" and kıla-ı merkume nâzırı dergâh-ı âli kapucu başılarından Mehmed Ağa.

<sup>388</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/25.

Kauffer and Mustafa Reşid Efendi to go and examine them together and to give their own advises about the resolution of the problem.<sup>389</sup>

The vizier also explained that he had donated funds to several people working on the fortresses, in various degrees, to encourage them and to emphasize the importance of building a strong defensive network against the enemy. In this response, Sultan Selim III ordered the completion of all four redoubts before the end of the winter.<sup>390</sup>

This document indicates that the Ottomans did not trust Monnier as much as Kauffer. Indeed, both usually had conflicting opinions and the Ottomans tended to appreciate and to favor Kauffer's opinions, as one can see in other matters as well. It tends to prove that the Ottomans were gradually gaining more confidence in their own expertise and that, by opposition to previous French missions, they now asked various opinions before making their final decision.

On this occasion, it is either the sultan or the vizier who made the final decision after having pondered all advises. It is necessary to pay attention as well on the fact that the Ottomans asked several opinions before making their own decision. Sultan Selim III also kept his eyes on the ongoing works either by asking for regular reports

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<sup>389</sup> "...Rumili kavağında dahi müceddeden inşa olunan tabya eğerçi teknil olur lakin beş aded top mazgalları gayet diyk ve Anadolu kavağının ve memleketin karşularına tesadüf eylemekden nâşi lede'l iktiza atılan top Anadolu kavağı kalesine ve yahud memleketin evlerine isabet edeceği cümle indinde zâhir olduğuna binaen gerek bina emini ve gerek mühendisden zikr olunan mazgalların böyle diyk olmasının illeti ne idüğü sual olundukda mühendis-i mersum cevâbında mahzûr-ı mezkura sebeb mukaddema dört aded mazgalların hîn-i inşasında dikkat ile mûlahaza olunmadığından neş'et eylediğini ifade eyledikten sonra zikr olunan mazgalların iki taraflarından tevsî' ile mazarrat-ı merkumenin indifâ'ını eğerçi taahhüd idüb lakin anın kavline itimad külli olunmadığından mühendis Kofer bendeleri Mustafa Reşid Efendi kullarıyla varub ol mazgalları ve mahâl-i sâireyi gereği gibi muayene ve zararı def ile ber vech-i matlub tanzimi suretini ifade eylemeleri tenbih olunmuş..."

<sup>390</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/25. "Benim vezirim, Gitdiğiniz mahzûz oldum. Reşid Efendi ile Kofer Beğzade varub görsünler. Mukaddema verdiği resimlere mutabık mıdır binalardan başka vaz olunacak top ve mühimmat mukaddema defter olmuş idi. İşbu tekmiş olunan dört kaleye muktezi toplar vaz olunub çapına uygun kızdırmağa gelür güller ve bârut ve sair her nev' levâzımât vaz olunub çürütmeyerek mahfuz mahallere hıfz u hîn-i hâcetde gülle kızdırmak için fırınlar dahi yapılub ve neferat talim ve hıfz-ı hiraset olunarak şöyle ki düşmen zuhûruna hâzır gibi olsunlar velhâsıl bu kış içinde işbu dört tabyanın her levazımı ve askeri teknil olub gerüye bir şeyi kalmasın. İnşallah bahâra başkalarına şuru' eyleyiz."



or by visiting them occasionally. For example, on August 19<sup>th</sup>, 1794, he visited *incognito (tebdil)* Yuşa and Telli Dalyan Batteries as well as the two Kavak Fortresses probably upon the adjustment of their technical defects. The Sultan was satisfied and gave gratuity to Monnier, his dragoman Sommaripa, and Mercenier (the draftsman) as a testimony of his satisfaction for their services.<sup>391</sup> In February 1795, soldiers and officers were immediately posted in the fortresses.<sup>392</sup> All construction works were completed by the end of 1795.<sup>393</sup>

#### **4.3.1.2. The Reconstruction of Kilyos and Karaburun Fortresses**

##### **4.3.1.2.1. An Exploration Tour to Kilyos and Karaburun**

Monnier and Feyzullah Efendi also provided information about the team who made on-site inspections of the Fortresses of Kilyos, Karaburun and İğneada and estimated reconstruction works. It was composed of Monnier, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi, Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa, the Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses, Abdurrahman Efendi, an engineer, and Arif Efendi, a former architect and the Construction Official of the Anatolian side. In addition, a *Çuhadar* and one hundred soldiers escorted them. Monnier wrote that, on July 25<sup>th</sup>, of 1794 (26 Zilhicce 1208), they surveyed the positions of two redoubts: one in Ozoun bournou<sup>394</sup> [*Uzunya*

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<sup>391</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 55. « 2 Fructidor, Le grand Seigneur est venu Teptil ou incognito visiter les Batteries du Yucha tabié, teli tallian et les deux kavaks, dont il a paru satisfait. Il a donné des bakchis à Sommaripa, Mercenier et moi en témoignage de sa satisfaction de nos services; de là il s'est rendu sur le canal à ... İok sou [Göksu] pour y diner et passer le reste du jour. »

<sup>392</sup> BOA. DYNÇ.d. 34747. (2 Şaban 1209/22 February 1795). The military organization of the fortresses will be discussed in detail in the sixth chapter.

<sup>393</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 65. However, within a short period of time, in May 1796, there emerged a need to repair the soldier barracks and the quarters of chief officers (zabitan) in the Four Fortresses (the Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan and the Fortresses of Anadolu Kavağı and Rumeli Kavağı) because of the damages inflicted by bad weather conditions and severe winds. They were repaired under the supervision of Hacı Memiş Efendi, the Building Superintendent. See. BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 25, 17 Zilkade 1210.

<sup>394</sup> Uzunya burnu is a cape located before the cape of Kilyos.

*Burnu*] and the other in Kilyos.<sup>395</sup> Once the survey completed, Mustafa Reşid Efendi and his escorts returned back to their bases the French team, having been supplied four horsepacks by the Ottoman government, camped in the area for the following twelve days to complete their inspection.<sup>396</sup>

On July 26<sup>th</sup>, 1794, the French team camped in Karaburun where they assessed the need to repair the Kilyos fort that was in poor condition and to strengthen it thanks to the construction of a small redoubt located on a dominant height between Kilyos and Karaburun. In addition, they determined the possible positions of four or five redoubts that could prevent landing on Kilyos shore. The Fortress of Karaburun was about 100 feet high above the sea level.<sup>397</sup>

On July 29<sup>th</sup>, Monnier and his team travelled with their six-rower boat to the Northern shores of the Black Sea from Karaburun to Midia (Midye, today's Kiyıköy), eleven hours away from Karaburun. On the next day, they went from Midia to İğneada, sixteen hours away from Karaburun. According to Monnier's journal, Kiyıköy was a village of 200 houses located on the height between the mouths of

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<sup>395</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 39-40. « 7 Thermidor, Avec Chilibi Effendi, Mehemet Agha Nazir des châteaux, Abdurraman Effendi mühendis, Arif Effendi Bina Emini des travaux en Asie et une escorte en Tchoadar et soldats de cent personnes et après avoir parcouru la côte et reconnu la position de deux redoutes l'une à Ozoun bournou et l'autre à Kilios. Nous avons été coucher au village de Agashik voisin de là côte et à 6 heures de distance de Fanaraky. »; BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 23. "Bi-inâyetillahi teala evvel-i baharda ta'mir ve tecdîdlerine mübâşeret olunacak Kilyos nâm-ı diğer Bağdadcık kal'asıyla Karaburun ve İğneada kal'alarının mahallerinde müşâhede ve iktizâ eden malzeme-i ebniyenin tedarüküne bakılıp tahmin ve takdimi için saadetlü Mustafa Reşid Efendi re'y ve tarifleriyle bina eminleri mahallerine irsâl olunub ve maiyyetlerine hâlâ ebniye-i miriyyede istihdâm olunan mühendis Munye dahi terfik olunmağla cümlesi mahallerine varılıb itmam-ı umurlarıyla avdet etmeleriyle... »

<sup>396</sup> The government paid one hundred and four guruş for thirteen days (two guruş per horsepack). BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 23. "...mühendis-i mersûm ve tercümân ve âdemleriyle rûkûbları için beher re'si yevmiyye ikişer guruş ile isticâr olunan dört ruûs bargirin varub gelince on üç günde ücretleri yüz yigirmi dört guruşa ... meblağ-ı mezbûrun Hazine-i Âmire'den itâsını hâlâ tevkii Divan-ı Hümayun saâdetlü es-Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi hazretleri bâ-takrîr inhâ etmeleriyle meblağ-ı mezbûr hesabına mahsûb şartıyla Aziz Ali Efendi tarafından verilmek üzere baş muhasebeye kayd ve suret verile deyu ferman buyurulmağın ... suret verilmişdir. 8 Rebiülahir 1209/2 November 1794."

<sup>397</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 40. « 8 Thermidor, Nous avons suivi la côte en cheminant un peu dans les terres et nous avons campé à Kara bouroun. Nous y avons reconnu la nécessité de finir le mauvais fort [en] terre commencé et de le protéger par une petit redoute sur une hauteur qui le domine de très près entre Kilios et Kara Bournou. Nous avons désigné la position de 4 a 5 redoutes pour empêcher le débarquement sur cette plage. Le fort de Kara Bournou est élevé de cent pieds à peu près au dessus du niveau de la mer. »

two rivers, which only formed two poor ports or anchorages and about which the vestiges of the old city walls remained. There still were three cannons on the heights to beat upon the port's alleyways to the North. Sandbanks obstructed the mouths of the rivers that surrounded Midia on the North and the South.<sup>398</sup> As for İğneada, there are a dozen houses along with a "poor Turkish fort" or octagonal tower on the beach, surrounded by a bad covered path or *charampo* with four pieces of cannons in three places of arms [parade grounds] of the covered way.<sup>399</sup> They completed this exploration tour, which lasted for twelve days traveling either by sea or by land.<sup>400</sup> Upon their return, they prepared the following list of recommendations for the Ottomans to improve the defensive structures. Their recommendations were as following:

A redoubt needed to be built between Fanaraky (Rumeli Feneri) and Kilyos in addition to five or six redoubts on the hills near the beach between Kilyos and Karaburun. The fortress of Karaburun should also be completed and a small redoubt on the nearest height should be built to protect the fortress. Two redoubts could be built at Podima (Yalıköy) beach and another one at İğneada. However, the anchorage in this harbor being very poor, the coast offering no resources or food supplies and the distance from there to Istanbul being 30 lines through woods and

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<sup>398</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 42. « 11 Thermidor, Nous nous sommes embarqués en bateau à six rameurs pour nous rendre en suivant la côte a Midia distant de 11 h. de Kara Bouroun, midia est un Bourg de 200 maisons situé sur une hauteur entre les embouchures de deux rivières qui y forment deux mauvais ports ou mouillages. L'on y voit encore les vestiges de l'enceinte qui entourait cette ville. Il y a trois canons sur la hauteur pour battre les allés du port au nord. Les rivières qui entourent au nord et au sud midia ont leurs embouchures à la mer obstruée par des bancs de sable. »

<sup>399</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 42-44. « 12 Thermidor, Nous avons continué de suivre en bateau la côte pour nous rendre à ennia distant de 16 h. de Kara Bouroun et à 30 lieues de Constantinople. Ennia ne présente qu'une rade foraine de plus de 4 lieues d'ouverture; où cependant les vaisseaux peuvent mouiller à 300 toises de la côte par 12 à 15 brasses d'eau tant seulement à couvert des vent de nord par le cap d'ennea qui se prolonge de l'ouest à l'est de 15 à 1800 toises de longueur. Mais ils sont exposés à tous les autres [t]rombes de vent dans ce mouillage. Ennea est un lieu d'embarquement pour les charbons de bois qui se font dans les environs et pour les fers de Samakof, village à 4 heures dans les terres et à l'ouest d'ennea. Ennea contient une douzaine de maisons avec un mauvais fort à la turque ou tour octogone située sur la plage, entourée d'un mauvais chemin couvert ou charampo avec 4 pièces de canons dans trois places d'armes du chemin couvert. Ce lieu offre un chantier assez considérable pour les bois de construction des édifices civils les chemins pour aller de là à Constantinople fort très mauvais. »

<sup>400</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 47. « 17 Thermidor, Notre reconnaissance sur la côte avec le tems de notre retour à été de 12 journées de voyage tant par mer que par terre. »

land but by deep cliffs difficult to cross, they concluded that it would not be unsafe not to build a fortress to defend İğneada's anchorage.<sup>401</sup>

They observed that the whole coast from Rumeli Feneri to İğneada was a rough wilderness so much uncultivated that it would made an uneasy access to the enemy. However, from Çiftlikköy and Kalfaköy on, the region was less hilly and the villages less sparse, the roads were more convenient and the countryside was relatively cultivated. These conditions facilitated the access to Istanbul.<sup>402</sup> Thus, those regions, which might provide easier access to Istanbul should be better defended and protected with military structures.

Monnier also remarked that Tergos' lake and beach that Kauffer had added to the map prepared by Lafitte-Clavé were very poorly drawn and misleading. He wrote:

“This lake which then splits in two tongues of water is more than a league deep. At the endpoint of its junction to the east is the old castle of Terkos and the village of Baklaly Chiflik [Baklalı Çiftlik]. Half a league from this village is that of Taia Kadın [Taya Kadın]. The southern and western parts of the pond are surrounded by mountains which are partly wooded. The north and east parts of the lake are surrounded by sands. On the north-eastern edge are some woods and the chif[t]lik or the farm of a grand lord where we rested for two hours. To reconnoiter this lake, the boat was bartered by the sand bar that obstructs the mouth of a river

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<sup>401</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 47-49. « 17 Thermidor, Il en résulte que nous avons reconnu la nécessité d'une redoute entre Fanaraky et Kilios d'une autre tout près de Kilios. de cinq à six autres redoutes située sur les hauteurs voisines de la plage entre Kilios et Kara bournou et de finir le fort turc de Kara bouroun et de le protéger par une petite redoute sur la hauteur la plus voisine. de faire si le besoin l'exige une où deux redoutes pour empêcher le débarquement sur la plage de podima et enfin de faire une redoute à Ennea située entre le cap et la visible tour. Cependant comme le mouillage dans cette rade est très mauvais que la côte n'offre fort au loin aucune ressource aux subsistances que la distance de là à Constantinople est de 30 lignes à travers des bois et un pays coupé de ravins de montagnes difficiles à franchir nous pensons qu'on pourroit sans risque, les dispenses de faire aucun établissement de forteresse quelconque pour défendre le mouillage d'ennea. »

<sup>402</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 49-51. « 17 Thermidor, Dans notre tournée nous avons reconnu que toute la côte depuis Fanaraky jusqu'à Ennea sur une bande de 4 à 5 lieues étoit un terrain âpre, inculte sauvage et de difficile accès à l'ennemi pour tous les trois ports que longues. Mais depuis Chiflik Keui à Kalfa Keui, le pays est moins montueux, les villages moins clairsemés, les chemins plus commodes et la campagne moins sauvage et par conséquent les accès plus faciles sur Constantinople. »

twenty fathoms in width, which the pond exchanges with the sea. After having followed the windings from this river in three quarters of an hour we arrived in the middle. We headed at the junction to the east until the Castle of Tergos Kalesi. From there we returned to the chiflik or the farm of the grand lord and from there we got on our horses to continue this reconnaissance until Karaja-Keui [Karaca köy].<sup>403</sup>

Monnier's critics about Kauffer regarding the description of this lake seem to indicate a tension between them. The tension gradually increased partly because Monnier was a Republicanist and Kauffer a royalist, supporting the *Ancien Regime*. Probably because of these divergent political views, they usually ended up having conflicting opinions. The Ottomans usually favored Kauffer's opinions more than those of Monnier probably because Kauffer entered into the Ottoman service earlier and gained confidence of Ottoman authorities.

#### **4.3.1.2.2. Consultations on the Structure of the Fortresses: *Çim Tabya* and *Şans***

The Ottomans were often unclear when writing about modern fortifications. They tried to adapt and to translate appropriately their own technical concepts so that they could be used by foreign experts. Two examples to point out are the Ottomans' use of *çim tabya* and *şans*. Oya Şenyurt discusses the origins of these two concepts and their possible meanings but without reaching a clear conclusion.<sup>404</sup> Below is another attempt to explain the meaning of these concepts

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<sup>403</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 49-51. « 17 Thermidor, Avant de finir cette reconnaissance nous sommes obligés de dire que l'étang et la plage de Tergos que le Sieur Kauffer a ajouté à la carte levée par Lafitte sont très mal figurés et très faussement exprimés. Cet étang qui se bi fourche a plus d'une lieue de profondeur. Au fond de la corne à l'est est le vieux château de Terkos Kalisi et le village de Baklaly Chiflik et à une demi lieue de ce village ci est celui de Taia Kadın dans toute la partie du sud et de l'ouest l'étang est entouré de montagnes quelquefois un peu boisées et dans la partie du nord et de l'est il est environné de sables sur le bord nord est se trouve quelque Bois et un chiflik ou ferme de grand seigneur où nous avons reposé pendant deux heures. pour reconnaître cet étang, l'on a fait franchir à notre bateau la barre de sable qui obstrue l'embouchure d'une rivière de 20 toises de largeur que de l'étang se décharge à la mer. après avoir suivi les sinuosités de cette rivière pendant ¾ heures nous sommes arrivés en plein étang, nous avons dirigé sur sa corne à l'est jusqu'à Château de Tergos Kalesi; de là nous sommes revenus débarquer au chiflik ou ferme du grand seigneur et de là nous avons repris nos chevaux pour continuer la reconnaissance jusqu'à Karaja-Keui. »

<sup>404</sup> See Oya Şenyurt, "III. Selim Döneminde İnşaat Ortamını Yönlendiren İki Fransız Mühendis ve Kale Tamirleri", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* (28/2, 2013), pp. 487-521.

through a comparative analysis of French and Ottoman texts in the context of the construction of the Fortresses of Kilyos and Karaburun.

On October 18<sup>th</sup> 1794, Sommaripa and Monnier went to Kilyos to discuss the work to be done with the Construction Official Mustafa [Rif'at] Efendi. They agreed to do the following:

“1. Build a redoubt from 15 to 20 toises high on the *Dalyan* height near the new Kilyos windmill; 2. Replace the pavement of the old fortress's remparts in order to prevent the infiltrations into the underground tunnels; 3. Replace all the fort's parapets using brick and build banquettes, to be able to put the musketry between the cannon embrasures; 4. Demolish the damaged bastion and build anew it with its underground tunnels; 5. In place of the front gate of the fortress, make a 10 to 12-foot wide *fausse braye* with a parapet; 6. Make a ditch of five to six toises long [and] eight to ten feet deep in front of this *fausse braye* and parallel to the front wall; 7. Along this ditch, make a covered path of a width of four toises with banquettes, palisades and a front glacis; 8. Make a drawbridge (*pont-Levis/asma cizr*) in the middle of the fixed bridge (*pont-dormant*); 9. On the opposite front facing the sea, make a low battery with earth parapet (*parapet en terre*); 10. On the other two fronts of this fortress, reinforce the earth by a terrace wall with parapet and glacis forward; 11. Make doors, window and chimney in the front walls (*murs de face*) of all the underground tunnels to make them livable for the garrison; 12. Make a retaining wall all around the rampart; 13. Enlarge the gunpowder magazine (*baruthane*) or Kiosk above the gate of the fortress; by means of all these arrangements, in addition to the building of a nearby redoubt, the Fortress of Kilyos would become a fairly good defense and fulfill its objectives on the coast of the Black Sea.”<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 62-66.

These are Monnier's recommendations regarding the Fortress of Kilyos according to his journal entry. Monnier also presented them to the Building Superintendent Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi, who in turn prepared a report based on Monnier's recommendations to inform the sultan. Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi wrote in his official note that he had discussed the matter with Monnier and wrote his recommendations for the construction of the Fortresses of Kilyos, Karaburun, and İğneada.

According to this official report, when Feyzullah Efendi had asked Monnier about repair works to be done at Kilyos Fort, Monnier had replied that the Dalıyan Burnu redoubt needed to be rebuilt anew up from the foundations because it was almost entirely ruined and there were infiltration problems in the cistern's basement which had absorbed its water. It was in need of being completely torn down to its basement and reconstructed in better stone. The embrasures of the fortress were also damaged and they needed to be completely demolished and rebuilt with thicker and better-quality bricks. Ditches needed to be excavated on three sides on the landside of the fortress. Following this work, they should build a *charanpoo* road with a rifle-hole. Since a ditch could not be excavated on the seaside, it should be replaced by a grass redoubt (*çim tabya*) equipped with five mortars or *humbaras*. If permission was granted for such a construction, the means of defense

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« 27 vendémiaire, Somma Ripa et moi nous sommes parti de Yéni Mahalé à cheval pour nous rendre à Fanarky et de là à Kilios où nous avons trouvé le Bina Émini Mustapha Effendi pour les travaux à faire dans cette position et nous sommes convenus de ce[ux] qui sont ouvrages à faire à Kilios. 1. une redoute de 15 à 20 toises de cote sur la hauteur de tallian proche le nouveau moulin à vent de Kilios ; 2. renouvelles le pavé de rempart de l'ancien fort pour garantir les souterrains des infiltrations ; 3. Renouvelles en Brique tout le parapet de ce fort et y pratiquer des Banquettes poser la mousqueterie entre les embrasures à canon ; 4. démolir le Bastion lézardé et le reconstruire à neuf ainsi que son souterrain; 5. devant le front de fort, où est la porte pratiquer une fausse braye de 10 à 12 pieds de largueur avec parapet ; 6. en avant de cette fausse braye et parallèlement au front pratiquer un fossé de 5 à 6 toises de largeur 8 à 10 pieds de profondeur ; 7. Le long de ce fossé faire un chemin couvert de 4 toises de largeur avec banquettes, palissades et glacis en avant ; 8. faire un pont levis au milieu de pont dormant ; 9. sur le front opposé à la mer pratiquer une batterie basse avec parapet en terre ; 10. sur les deux autres fronts de ce fort soutenir les terres par un mur de terrasse avec parapet et glacis en avant ; 11. faire des murs de face avec portes, fenêtre et cheminée à tous les souterrains poser les rendre habitables à la garnison ; 12. faire un mur d'ap[ui] tout autour du rempart ; 13. agrandir la [b]arout hané ou Kiosk au dessus de la porte d'entrée du fort au moyen de tous ces arrangemens et sur tout de l'établissement d'une redoute voisine le fort de Kilios pourra etre d'une assez bonne défense et remplir sa destination sur la côte de la mer noire. Le même soir nous sommes venus coucher à Domus déré. »

would have been strengthened. A wooden jetty was also needed. All the repair works and constructions should be built according to Monnier's project.<sup>406</sup> It was also very important to establish a quadrangular *şans* equipped with as many cannons as possible to command the height of the Dalyan Burnu. This *şans* was necessary under all circumstances.<sup>407</sup>

A comparative analysis of Monnier's journal entry and the Ottoman official document summarizing his recommendations about Kilyos Fort allows to better understand the meanings of "*çim tabya*"<sup>408</sup> and "*şans*",<sup>409</sup> both imprecise terms employed by the Ottomans. These comparative readings of Ottoman and French texts indicate that "*şans*" means parapet and "*çim*" means grass. *Şans* made of *çim* means earth/grass parapet/redoubt. The Ottomans' choice of the "grass" makes sense because the earth used in military constructions was planted with all kind of plants (sainfoin, clover, alfalfa, barley...) which the roots reinforced and maintained the structure. Earth parapet or "*parapet en terre*" thus formed a small earthen wall

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<sup>406</sup> For the drawing of the fortress of Kilyos, see. HAT. 143/5978.

<sup>407</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/10. "...evvelen Kilyos kal'asının tamiratı keyfiyetinden suâl olundukda kal'a-i merkûmenin Dalyan burnu tarafında olan tabyası cümlemin bildiği veçhile külliyyen harab ve zirinde olan mahzen hâlâ su ile memlû olmağla temellerine dahi neşf ve sirâyet etmiş olduğundan beher hal esasına dek hedm olunub a'lâ taştan müceddeden inşaya muhtacdır. Ve kal'anın hala mevcut olan top mazgalları dahi harab olmağla cümlesi hedm olunub kalın ve a'lâ tuğla ile yapılsa taştan iyü olur. Ve elbette tuğla ile inşa olunmak icab ider. Ve kal'anın kara canibinde üç tarafına hendek hafrine muhtacdır. Hendek hafr olunub ve tüfenk mazgallu bir şaranpu yolu yapılub ve onların da vüs'atı olan mahallerine şu şaranpu dizilür. Ve derya tarafına hendek hafr olunamayub beş top yahud humbara vaz'ıyla çimden bir tabya inşası muktezidir. Eğer bu veçhile inşasına ruhsat virilür ise tamam esbab-ı muhafaza kuvvet bulmuş olur. Ve sahile ahşabdan bir iskele lazım olub ve kal'anın ma'ada tamir ve tecdîd olunacak mahalleri derdest olan resme göre yapılmak iktiza idüb ve ba'de't-tekmîl resm-i mezbûr görüldükde cümlesi malum olur. Ve Dalyan burnu bâlâsına bir aded şans inşa olunmak mühimm olub ve mahallin vüs'atına göre çâr köşe ve tahammülü mertebe top vaz'ıyla çimden bir şâns olacaktır. Ve bu şâns beher hâl muktezidir deyu cevab ider."

<sup>408</sup> The sentence in the Turkish text reads: "Ve derya tarafına hendek hafr olunamayub beş top yahud humbara vaz'ıyla çimden bir tabya inşası muktezidir." The equivalent of this sentence in the French text is: "Sur le front opposé à la mer pratiquer une batterie basse avec parapet en terre." Thus, the equivalent of "*çim tabya*" expression is the "*parapet en terre*" or earth parapet.

<sup>409</sup> The Turkish text is: "Ve Dalyan burnu bâlâsına bir aded şans inşa olunmak mühimm olub ve mahallin vüs'atına göre çâr köşe ve tahammülü mertebe top vaz'ıyla çimden bir şâns olacaktır. Ve bu şâns beher hâl muktezidir deyu cevab ider". The equivalent sentence of this concept in the French text is: "Une redoute de 15 à 20 toises de cote sur la hauteur de Tallian [Dalyan] proche le nouveau moulin à vent de Kilios."



which protected the artillery and soldiers and which grains could be used to feed men and horses.<sup>410</sup>

A close analysis of their writings about Karaburun Fortress uncovers similar observations. According to Monnier's journal dating from October 19<sup>th</sup>, 1974, the engineers' team went to Karaburun to meet with the Construction Official, İsmail [Taif] Efendi and to discuss the work to be done there. They agreed on the following:

“1. Regarding the fort in progress, where only rough foundations exist, it is necessary to lower the site's ground by two or three *archins* in order to raise its three bastions, which are too low; 2. Raise the entire fort up to the same level in order to add earthen ramparts with brick or stone parapets; 3. Make ditches to gain the necessary earth to create the rampart; 4. Make a *fausse braye* all around the fort at the foot of the escarp with the exception of the foundations on the sea front where we can make a lower battery with an earthen parapet; 5. Construct a small redoubt or a lunette on the height dominating the fort, according to the drawing that will be provided; 6. Build a *Dizdar* [Commander] house and all other necessary buildings in the intermediate position indicated between the two forts so as not to obstruct the shooting of their cannons.”<sup>411</sup>

Feyzullah Efendi's official note summarized these recommendations. Regarding the Karaburun Fortress, Monnier considered that since the vestiges of the existing fortress' foundations still stood, it would be more convenient to build the new

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<sup>410</sup> Based on a personal consultation with Professor Emilie d'Orgeix on June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

<sup>411</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 66-69. « 28 vendémiaire, Nous sommes arrivés à Karabournou à 1 heure après midi où nous avons trouvé İsmail Effendi Bina Émini des travaux à faire dans cette position et après avoir parcouru le terrain nous sommes convenus des ouvrages suivants. 1. au fort commencé et dont il n'existe à peu près que les fondations il faut baisser le sol de la place de deux ou trois archins pour relever trois bastions qui sont trop bas ; 2. élever tout le fort au même niveau faire les remparts en terre avec des parapets en brique ou pierre ; 3. faire des fossés pour avoir les terres nécessaires à former le rempart ; 4. faire une fausse braye tout autour du fort au pied de l'escarpe ; les fondations excepté sur le front de la mer où l'on pourra faire une batterie inférieure avec parapet en terre ; 5. élever une petit redoute ou lunette sur la hauteur qui domine le fort dont le dessin sera fourni ; 6. construire la maison de disdar et tous les autres batimens nécessaires dans la position intermédiaire indiqué entre les deux forts et de manière à ne pas offusquer le feu de leurs canons. après être convenus de tous les arrangements nous avons rétrogradés d'une lieue pour venir coucher au village de Tergos ou İeni Keuie à ½ heure de la côte. »

fortress directly upon them. Even though its construction was planned in earth and grass (*çim*), it became soon evident that using *çim* would not be functional. An earth and grass structure would be too narrow, only accommodating two cannons and leaving almost no place for artillerymen. Alternatively, if it were built with stone, it would be possible to locate six cannons and make its inside more spacious. If good quality stone was used, it would also be more spacious and better. However, it was decided to build a pentagonal *şans* made of grass fit to house twelve cannons and equipped with rifle holes (*tüfenk mazgallı*) on the hill commanding the fortress. This *şans* should be built of grass and not of stone. In addition, the fortress dilapidated water conducts should be repaired. A wooden jetty with its own road was also needed.<sup>412</sup>

Another comparative analysis of French and Turkish texts<sup>413</sup> leads to a similar conclusion, namely, that the Ottomans used the word “*şans*” as the equivalent of “small redoubt” or *lunette*.

The use of “*çim tabya*” and “*şans*” in Ottoman documents increased in time and it seems that they both meant earthen parapet. The same term was coined in another text as following: “*çim kıt’alardan masnu’ tabya*” which means literally a battery made of grass pieces.<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/10. “Karaburun kal’ası keyfiyetinden suâl olundukda kal’a-i merkûmenin esâsı mevcûd olmağla esâs-ı kadîmi üzerine bina olunacaktır. Esâs-ı merkûmdan eğerçi bir mikdârı noksandır lâkin mahalli ma’lum olmağla üzerine inşâ olunur. Esâs-ı merkûmdan el-yevm en yüksek yerine değîn inşâ ve üzeri düzlenüb ve mukaddem çimden inşâsı müzâkere olunmuş ise dahi çimden mümkün olamadığı ma’lûm oldu. Zira çim olsa derûnu gayet diyk olur ve tabyasına iki top vaz’ı ancak mümkün olabilir. Lakin taştan olur ise altı top vaz olunub derûnu dahi vâsî’ olur. Bu kal’aya sarf olunacak taş a’lâ olmağla taşdan yapıdırılır ise vâsî’ce ve a’la bir kal’a olur ve kal’a-i merkûma nâzır tepeye beş köşeli ve on iki top vaz’ına mütehammil ve tüfenk mazgallu çimden bir şâns inşasına muhtacdır. İşte bu şâns taştan olmayub çimden olmaludur. Ve kal’a-i merkûme suyunun mecrâsı harab olmağla evvel emirde su yolları tecdîd ve sâhile ahşâbî bir iskele inşâ ve yolu küşâd olunmağla muhtacdır diyu cevab ider.”

<sup>413</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/10. The Turkish text reads: “...kal’a-i merkûma nâzır tepeye beş köşeli ve on iki top vaz’ına mütehammil ve tüfenk mazgallu çimden bir şâns inşasına muhtacdır. İşte bu şâns taştan olmayub çimden olmaludur.” The equivalent of this sentence in the French text is: “elever une petit redoute ou lunette sur la hauteur qui domine le fort dont le dessin sera fourni.”

<sup>414</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 27. “Divan-ı hümâyûndan Aziz Ali Efendi ma’rifetiyle Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı’nın Rumili cânibinde kâin Telli Tabya ile Kavakhisarı kal’ası ve hâricinde vâki’ çim kıt’alardan masnu’ tabyaya ve müştamilât-ı sâiresi tekmîl olduğu inhâ olduğuna binâen Mi’mar Ağ’a’ya havale olunub..... 14 Z 1209.”

The hybridization of a French technique and the invention of a new terminology constitutes a good example of how the Ottomans refined a French technique both in their language and in its application.

Monnier also made some recommendations regarding the construction of a fortress in İğneada. The same French team went to Kiyıköy and found the construction official, Vuslati Mehmed Efendi, who was responsible to İğneada works to be done. A few days later, they marked out on the ground the plan of İğneada redoubt making an outside front of about 100 archins lengs (40 toises) and 18 archins width ditch. They also indicated the places of the commanders' houses and of the Échelle [du Levant] headquarter.<sup>415</sup> According to Feyzullah Efendi's report, Monnier suggested the construction of a grass structure, as indicated on his drawing.<sup>416</sup> It was large enough to accomodate twelve cannons on the two seaside fronts and three or four cannons on the two-landside fronts. The ditch and the wall as well as some other locations would be built according to the drawing's design. These works also included the building of a wooden jetty to carry cannons.<sup>417</sup>

Monnier's recommendations were presented by Feyzullah Efendi to the sultan for information and approval. If he would approve them, construction officials would also be charged of initiating the process. However, at the end of the report, Feyzullah Efendi recalled that the construction could only begin in the following spring. Consequently, Feyzullah Efensi suggested that there was enough time to ask

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<sup>415</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 69-71, « 30 Vendémiaire [an III], Après avoir diné à Podima, nous sommes venus coucher à Midia où nous avons trouvé Méhémet Vuslati Effendi Bina Emîni des travaux à faire a Ennéada. » ; « 4 Brumaire, Nous avons été tracer la redoute d'ennéada qui aura 100 archins ou 40 toises à peu près de côté extérieur, sept toises de largeur de fossé et quatre cotés. Nous avons aussi marqué l'emplacement des maisons des commandants et celui de l'échelle. »

<sup>416</sup> Monnier's drawing for İğneada's fort could not be found.

<sup>417</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/10. "İğneada kal'asının keyfiyetinden sual olundukda mukaddem yapılub bina emini efendiye verilen resim üzere kal'anın her tarafı kırkar taraz ve çîmden olacaktır. Derya canibini ki kal'anın iki tarafıdır on ikişer top ve kara taraflarına üçer dörder top vaz'ı kâfidir. Ve hendek ve duvar ve sair mahalleri resme göre inşa olunub zâbitân evlerinin mahalleri dahi bina emini efendiye gösterilmekle öylece inşa olunur ve sahile ahşabdan bir iskele inşa olunub top nakli için tarik küşâdi iktiza ider deyu cevab ider."

for a second opinion to Kauffer upon his return from İsmail (Tuna) to expertise Monnier's proposal.<sup>418</sup> The Sultan approved it.<sup>419</sup>

Accordingly, Mustafa Reşid Efendi showed Monnier's drawings of the Fortresses of İğneada, Karaburun and Kilyos and the redoubt on Dalyan Burnu to Kauffer. Kauffer approved his design for İğneada Fortress but suggested that it could be 25 *zirah* wider. He also agreed with the one for the Fortress of Karaburun including his proposal to build a *şans*/redoubt located on a hill commanding the fortress.

However, Kauffer rejected most of Monnier's recommendations for Kilyos Fort and even travelled himself on the spot to inspect the remaining foundations of the ruined fortress. He also produced two reports listing the necessary operations to be completed. He also regused several other propositions made by Monnier, arguing that the construction of a redoubt in Dalyan Burnu was unnecessary since it could be later built when needed. He also stated that if the sultan approved the immediate construction of a redoubt, it should not be quadrangular (*çâr-köşe*), as proposed by Monnier, but pentagonal (*muhammesu'ş-şekl*).

This was another occasion of conflict between Kauffer and Monnier. The Ottomans were conscious of the conflictual situation, which probably created a lack of confidence toward French engineers. Mustafa Reşid Efendi explained to the sultan

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<sup>418</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/18. "Bâlâda bast ve beyân olunduğu üzere mühendis Munye kullarının takrir ve ifadesi ma'lûm-ı âlîleri buyurulur ancak işbu kal'alara bimennihi teala evvel-i bahâr ve mevsim-i bina hulûlünde mübâşeret olunacağı dahi ma'lûm-ı devletleridir. Bu takdirce mukaddema mimar ağa kullarıyla mean İsmail (Tuna) cânibi ve ol havâlîye irsâl olunan mühendis Kofer kullarının avdeti mesmû'-ı âcizânem olmağla eğer mersûmun avdeti sahih ise bina eminleri kulları bina işlerine mukayyed olmaları şartıyla mersûm Kofer dahi geldikde kılâ'-ı merkûme ebniyesine bakub Munye'nin kavî ve ahbârına muvâfakat ve mugâyereti zâhir ve ma'lûm olduktan sonra kangısının kavî ve ahbârı itibara şâyan görülür ise evvelce karar verilmesi dahi hâtır-ı âcizâneme hutûr etmekle ol bâbda dahi ne veçhile fermân-ı âlîleri olur ise emr u fermân men lehu'l emr hazretlerindir."

<sup>419</sup> BOA. HAT. 1458/21. "Benim vezirim Feyzi Efendi'nin takriri mucebince şürû' oluna. Kofer geldiği vakitte ol dahi baksun."

that since Monnier was a Republican and Kauffer a Royalist, they kept refuting each other.<sup>420</sup>

Mustafa Reşid Efendi finally reached a solution. Some drawings showed a ditch (*hendek*) and an entrenchment (*metris*) on the seaside front. However, since they were only necessary on the landside front, their construction would be deferred. The Sultan approved Mustafa Reşid Efendi's proposal and ordered the construction works to be started in the following Spring.<sup>421</sup>

Leading a comparative analysis of Ottoman and French documents on the structure of the fortresses is pivotal to understand the decision-making processes. First, they seem to follow a highly hierarchical process. The first stage involved an inspection tour performed by a joint team of Ottoman and French architects and engineers in order to determine the places where the fortresses were to be built. During the second stage, Monnier and his team drew plans, which were then evaluated by Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi, the Building Superintendent before being discussed and re-expertised by Kauffer. Ultimately, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, evaluating all proposals, made the final decision. When Sultan Selim III approved them, Ottoman architects would provide an appraisal register according to the chosen project. It becomes more obvious here that there was a collaboration of the parties and a hierarchical decision-making process.

The same type of hierarchy applies, to some extent, to the previous French mission. It was the Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa who made the final decision which is quite usual (the technicians made proposal but the decision was always entitled by the politicians according to available funds). As discussed in the previous chapters, the construction officials as building contractors forced their limits and

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<sup>420</sup> BOA. HAT. 202/10374. "...Mühendis Munye cumhur tarafdarı ve Kofer kral tarafgiri olmağla beynlerinde 'adâvet-i kâmile derkâr olduğundan daima birbirlerinin işlerini tekzib kaydına düşmüş olduklarını..."

<sup>421</sup> BOA. HAT. 202/10374. "Benim vezirim, Bu resimler hıfz olunsun. İnşaallahu teala eyyamu'l-baharda kemâl-i keremiyet ile binalarına şürû' eyleyiz. Şimdilik derdest olan dört aded tabyaların noksanları tekmil ve levazımları itmam olunsun."

challenged the idea of being imposed by the foreigners in the previous time. The hierarchical decision-making procedure was not well-established and not bound by a working bureaucratic system. It was not organized systematically in order to eliminate possible on-site conflicts.

A close examination of the collaborative work led between French and Ottoman engineers on construction sites sheds light on the fact that, as opposed to previous conflictual situations and resistances between French officers, Ottoman architects and construction officials during the reigns of Sultan Mustafa III and Abdulhamid I, the Ottomans had now reached a more self-confident position in organizing and managing construction works. They sought for the expertise of French engineers but, once their proposals had been expertised, it was generally Mustafa Reşid Çelebi and the sultan himself who made final decisions. This *modus operandi* limited possible conflicts and discussions that could occur on the field.

#### **4.3.1.2.3. The Reconstruction of Kilyos Fort**

As mentioned above, the Ottoman government decided to conduct large-scale construction works on the Bosphorus fortresses. After having consulted all engineers, the Head-Architect el-Hâc Nurullah, produced an appraisal register along with a plan which he formally presented to the Sultan on May 23<sup>th</sup> 1794. Below is reproduced Kilyos Fort's plan that the Ottomans prepared after having studied Monnier's recommendations.<sup>422</sup> It is a four-bastion shaped fort with firing bases (*etrâf-ı erba'asının top döşemeleri*) built on the Cape of Kilyos. Three sides give on the seafront and one on the landside. There is a ditch (*hendek*) with a drawbridge (*cisr*), a *charanpoo* road and a gate of the fortress on the landside. A soldier barrack (*kışlak-ı neferât*) is located in the middle of the central courtyard.

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<sup>422</sup> BOA. HAT. 143/597. There is also a draft plan of the Fortress of Kilyos including many calculations and technical details: BOA. TSMA.e. 497/20. See Appendix 15 for the draft plan.




Figure 4.1. Plan of Kilyos Fort: “Bağdadçık nâm-ı diğer Kilyos kal’asının resmidir.” (BOA. HAT. 143/597)

The engineers and architects amended the plan on site and submitted a final assessment and estimations including some revisions. For example, the previous appraisal register, which mentioned the construction of a soldier barrack inside the redoubt, was considered insufficient. Alternatively, they recommended the addition of an extra floor for the living quarters of the infantry. In addition, the appraisal register indicated that a parapet made of grass (*çim kaplı siper duvarı*) with six embrasures on the redoubt’s landside needed to be built. Furthermore, they

decided to build another stone barrack with rifle-holes for the cavalry. Finally, they underlined the need for a stable for the horses.<sup>423</sup>

It is important to underline here is that the fort construction in Kilyos was founded on the remnants of the old fort. There was already on the spot the vestiges of a fortress and of redoubts, which dated from the reign of Abdulhamid I, when Abdülbaki Ağa was the construction official. However, since Abdülbaki Ağa had not proven to be an efficient and effective official, the building had remained unfinished. They thus recommended the refurbishing and re-equipment of some of these earlier buildings.<sup>424</sup>

It was first planned that Kilyos, Karaburun and İğneada defensive networks would be built in the early 1795 spring.<sup>425</sup> However, some Ottoman officials questioned the urgency of this rushed schedule leading Ramiz Efendi, the Superintendent of the

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<sup>423</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 13. "Kilyos nâm-ı diğer Bağdadçık kal'asının ilave olunacak ebniyesi: 1. Kilyos nam-ı diğer Bağdadçık kal'asının cümle mühendisânın karar verdikleri üzere kal'a-i mezkuru derya tarafından muhafaza ve takviyesi lâbüd ve lâzım olmağla Karaburun tarafına nâzır tabya yüzünden fener cânibinde vaki diğer tabya çıkmasına mansab oluncaya kadar tabya-yı mevcut ila 9 zira ba'de bedel-i vüstâ altı kıt'a top mazgallı şiv tarafı ve top mazgalları çim kaplı siper duvarı; 2. Kal'a-i mezkurda ilave olunan diğer tabyaya gelince tabya-i mezkurun taraf-ı tentesi olan kara tarafına kala kapusu pişgahı üç kıt'a top mazgallı keşide kılınacak şaranpo; 3. Kale kapısı pîşgâhına parmak kapu inşası; 4. Kala dahilinde vaki kışlaklar tahrir olunacak neferâta kâfi olmadığından eğerçi resm olunan haritada hâric-i kal'adan keşide olunacak duvar dahilinde resm olunmuş olub ancak mühendisân-ı mersumânın müşarunileyh efendi hazretleri nezdinde duvar-ı mezkûru terk ve mevcut kal'ada dokuz zira' bûdunda keşidesine karar verdiklerine binâen kale dâhilinde mevcut kışlakların üzerine piyâde neferâtı sâkin olmak için bir kat daha kışlak binası isteyüp ve dâyinlerini mübeyyin kışlak-ı mezkûrun üzerlerinde ..tahtalarını? ref' ve mevcut sütun ve tabanlara metanet ve istihkam verilerek üzerine bir kat dahi mükemmel kışlak bina ve ilavesi; 5. Haric-i kal'ada süvari neferatı sâkin olmak için etrafı taş duvarlı ve tüfenk mazgallı ve derzli döşemeli ve tavanlı ve ocaklı ve üzeri kiremid pûşide sakıflı mükemmel kışlaklar binası; 6. Bu mahalde süvari neferatı hayvanları için üzeri sakıflı derzli tahtalı mükemmel ahurlar binası; Kala-i mezkure gülle kızdırmak için demir iskara."

<sup>424</sup> BOA.MAD.d. 8953, p. 17. "Keşf-i Ta'mirat-ı Kilyos nam-ı diğer Bağdadçık Kaleleri."

<sup>425</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, P. 23. "Evvel-i baharda tamir ve tecdidlerine mübaşeret olunacak Kilyos nam-ı diğer Bağdadçık kal'asıyla Karaburun ve İğneada kal'alarının mahallerinde müşahede ve iktiza eden malzeme-i ebniyenin tedarüküne bakılıp tahmin ve takdimi için..."



Imperial School of Engineering, to discuss the issue with engineers.<sup>426</sup> Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi, the Building Superintendent, informed later the sultan that Kauffer and some other engineers (probably Monnier and Resmi Mustafa Ağa) had made some consultations and proposed to postpone repair works at Kilyos Fort and the construction of Karaburun Fortress while going ahead with the remaining construction works on the Bosphorus fortresses. However, if Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi agreed with the recommendations made about Karaburun and İğneada, he refused to postpone works at Kilyos Fort.<sup>427</sup> In addition, the lack of appropriated workers and limestone for these constructions brought reluctance to implement the plans fully. If they did not prioritize some plans over others, they would run out of resources and the entire project would be left incomplete.<sup>428</sup> Thus, with the approval of the sultan, Karaburun's project was postponed while repair and construction works began at Kilyos Fort along with some other construction works.<sup>429</sup>

A year later during the 1796 Spring, when the construction season started, the new Building Superintendent Azmi Efendi<sup>430</sup>, along with the Superintendent of the

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<sup>426</sup> BOA. HAT. 121/4940. “[...] Mühendishane Nâzırı Ramiz Efendi kulları marifetiyle mühendisler tayin ve keşf ve mesaha etridilmiş olmağla [...] kale-i merkumenin mevkii ve mevziine nazaran lüzum ve adem-i lüzumu cihetleri ne vechiledir ve kılâ’ ve hedmi ve yahud teknil ve tahkimi şıklarında vech-i mercih nedir mühendislerden tahkik ile ifade eylemesi hususu mumaileyh Ramiz Efendi kullarına şifahen tenbih olunmuş olduğu tve akrir-i mezkurunda kale-i merkume ebniyesinin ikmâli mesarif-i külliyyeye muhtac olacağı ve Kilyos kalesinin hasbe’l-mevki kifayetden başka Karaburun kalesi ba’de’l ikmâl ... kalur ise mahzûrdan sâlim olmayacağı suretlerini beyan etmiş olmağla bu suretde kale-i merkumenin kangı ve yahud ikmali menût-ı irade-i seniyyeleri idüğü ve Örke taşı ile kıla-ı sairenin tamirâtı bahara tehir olunmak hususu dahi hatt-ı hümayunlarına cevab olarak defterdar efendi kulları bir kıta takririyle inha ve keşf-i defterleriyle mimar ağa kullarının memhûr takririni dahi isrâ etmekle kezalik merfû’ pîşgâh-ı cihândârieleri kılındığı malum-ı hümayunları buyuruldukda emr u ferman şevketlü kerametlü mehabetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım hazretlerindir.”

<sup>427</sup> BOA. HAT. 1403/56707.

<sup>428</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 151, 26 Şaban 1209/18 March 1795.

<sup>429</sup> BOA. HAT. 1403/56707.

<sup>430</sup> At that juncture, the Building Superintendent changed. Monnier noted on 28 January 1795 that (Ahmed) Azmi Efendi, the former Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, replaced Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi as the Building Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses because the latter was going to Mecca for pilgrimage. Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 76: “9 Pluviôse, J’ai été à Constantinople avec le cit. descorchés et nos drogmans faire visite à Hasimi [Azmi] Effendi ci-devant ambassadeur à Berlin et remplaçant maintenant Feyzi Effendi comme nazir ou intendant des travaux de defense sur le canal de la mer noire. Feyzi Effendi va au Pélerinage de la Mecque.”

Bosphorus Fortresses Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa, the former architect Arif Efendi, the engineer Resmi Mustafa Ağa and the engineer Monnier went to Kilyos to inspect the fort and to establish priorities. According to their report, the construction of both the fortress and the soldier barracks necessitated about three to four hundred workers and a large amount of money. Thus, the sultan, in response to Azmi Efendi's query, only ordered the construction of the soldier barracks, which was of pivotal importance. In this case, Kilyos Construction Official, Mustafa Rif'at Efendi should have been paid five thousand guruşes monthly.<sup>431</sup>




Figure 4.2. Plan of Kilyos Fort (TSM.A.E. 9444/1)

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<sup>431</sup> BOA. HAT. 183/8489. As the constructions in Kilyos continued, the Ottoman treasury continued to pay large sums to meet the necessary expenses. For example, even though they made payments based on earlier estimations, the remarked money was completely spent and Mustafa Rif'at Efendi, the Construction Official, asked for an additional sum of 12,500 guruşes in August 1796. The Grand Vizier responded in a way to emphasize the urgency and importance of the completion of the work within the current year. He insisted on the need to meet the requests made by the construction officials in due order. Then, the Construction Official was paid 10,000 guruşes on 22 August 1796 from the funds earmarked specifically for the repair and construction of the fortresses in the Imperial Mint. BOA. C.AS. 159/7001, 5 Safer 1211/10 August 1796.

Once the soldier barracks were completed, construction works were engaged on the fort. It had been planned that it would be built on the remaining foundations of the ruined fort but this early project was not followed. Alternatively, reconstruction orders involved the use of the available stone on site along with white and black stones that would be provided. Thus, the construction of the large entrance gate with firing bases and the placement of new large stones should have proceeded according to the appraisal register. The Grand Vizier tasked the Construction Official Mustafa Rif'at Efendi and the Building Superintendent Hacı Memiş Efendi with this reconstruction on September 2<sup>nd</sup> 1796.<sup>432</sup> Ten thousand gurus were paid for the expenses on 7 April 1797.<sup>433</sup>

#### **4.3.2. The End of the Second French Mission**

On October 2, 1796, Aubert Dubayet came to Istanbul as the Ambassador of the French Republic. He brought along "a company of horse-drawn cannons and several French officers to work for the Sublime Porte." Among these officers was captain of engineering Morio, who would soon replace Monnier.<sup>434</sup> Monnier's mission ending on December 31<sup>st</sup> 1796, and he delivered back to his successor Morio, the mathematical instruments and other objects belonging to the French government.<sup>435</sup>

Monnier embarked at the end of January 1797 and returned to Toulon on February 16<sup>th</sup> 1797. When waiting in quarantine before entering France, he wrote a letter to the Ministry of War informing his hierarchy of his arrival and evaluating his mission in the following general terms:

"It pleased the Sublime Porte to dismiss all the French officers sent [to them] at different times either to instruct soldiers or to

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<sup>432</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1177/52455; D.BŞM.d. 6527. (28 Safer 1211)

<sup>433</sup> BOA. C.AS. 131/5828; MAD.d. 8953, p. 150. (9 Şevval 1211)

<sup>434</sup> Paviot, "Les Voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier", 116.

<sup>435</sup> Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage*, p. 101. "31 Decembre 1796, ou 11 nivose [V], J'ai remis au cit. Morio Capitaine du Génie, mon successeur, les instruments de mathématique et autres objets appartenant au gouvernement français et j'en ai retiré une décharge."

strengthen borders. Whatever their motives may be, whether about the economic context, the Russian terror or confidence in their means, they accepted with difficulty and [only] tentatively the good company of light artillery and a small part of the artists of Pampelone.”<sup>436</sup>

Monnier seemed to be dissatisfied with his dismissal also implying the resistance of the Ottoman government to accept without reserve the given advices. His displeasure with the Ottoman government’s reluctance might be rooted in the way because Kauffer’s opinions over his had been expressed in several cases, thus limiting his sphere of influence.

Kauffer, a royalist who had fled to the Ottoman Empire and had not been officially part of the French mission, was also dismissed. In June 1800, his salary was cut out, and due to the political situation in France, he took refuge in the Ottoman Empire to pursue cartographic works.<sup>437</sup>

Frederic Hitzel stated that the French Revolutionary Government intended to serve its own interests by sending these civil servants to the Ottoman Empire. Some of these officers acquired a good knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and mastered their languages.<sup>438</sup> The French also probably obtained more easily private information about the Ottoman Empire, its political and economic conditions. However, the Sublime Porte sent most of the French officers back to France in 1796 after the death of Russian tsarina Catherine II, because of the momentary relieve of the Russian threat.<sup>439</sup> In the first six months of 1798, most of the French officers had left the shores of the Bosphorus except for some shipbuilding engineers.<sup>440</sup>

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<sup>436</sup> Paviot, “Les Voyages de Joseph Gabriel Monnier”, 116. “J’ai l’honneur de vous prévenir que parti de Constantinople le 11 Pluviose, je suis arrive ici le 28 du meme mois. Il a plu à la Sublime Porte de congédier tous les officiers français envoyés à différentes époques soit pour instruire son militaire ou pour renforcer ses frontières. Quelques (sic) soient ses motifs, économie, terreur des Russes ou confiance dans ses moyens, elle n’a accepté qu’avec peine et provisoirement la belle compagnie d’artillerie légère et une faible partie de celle des artistes de Pampelone.”

<sup>437</sup> Beydilli, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane*, 88.

<sup>438</sup> Hitzel, “Le Role des Militaires Francais”, 57-58.

<sup>439</sup> Hitzel, “Le Role des Militaires Francais”, 83-84.

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

#### 4.3.3. An Overall Assessment of the Bosphorus Fortresses in 1795-97

After long negotiations, the conception of several projects, and busy meetings between the officials to improve the defense systems of the Bosphorus, the Sultan sought to know about the fortresses' state of completion. The Building Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses Azmi Efendi reported about works done, future plans, the appointments to key positions and payments for the expenditures. Reşid Efendi and the Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa also gave an account on soldiers and military provisions issues in an official report. Reşid Efendi, Azmi Efendi, Mehmed Ağa, former architect Arif Efendi and the engineer Resmi Mustafa Ağa met to discuss every issue in detail.

According to this report, the Yuşa Battery and its soldier barracks, officer houses and grass mortar (*humbara*) battery, the guardhouses, Imperial Pavilion (*Kasr-ı Hümayun*) and other buildings had all been completed. The Construction Official Arif Efendi still had to be paid thirty-nine thousand guruşes. The barracks for soldiers and bombardiers and all other important and necessary buildings in Rumeli Kavağı Fortress had been completed under the supervision of the Construction Official of the Rumelian Side, Mehmed Emin Efendi. Thus, nothing had been left missing in the Four Fortresses (*Kılâ'-ı Erba'a*) and no debt remained to be paid to Mehmed Emin Efendi.

In addition, the grass embrasures and firing bases made of solid cut stone (*yonma som taş*) and other buildings in the Battery of Büyük Liman had been completed under the supervision of the Construction Official Emin Efendi. Only remained incomplete the soldier barracks and officer houses which would be terminated in the spring.

The construction of a grand soldier barrack and a drill field (*talim meydanı*) outside Rumeli Feneri Fortress had also been completed. Small soldier barracks and guardhouses had been built and some ruined places repaired inside the fortress. However, the outbreak of plague in Fener had prevented the completion of the officer quarters. The government owed the construction official five to six thousand

guruşes for his expenses so far for the completed buildings. In addition, the cannon embrasures made of wood needed to be replaced. If wood was used again, it would be less costly but more prone to short time destruction through the impact of elements, winter rains and summer heat. Thus, using hard cut stone (*som yontma taş*) in Büyük Liman Battery was suggested in order to make them stronger and long-lasting.

The construction of a grand soldier barrack and a mosque inside Kilyos Fort as well as an Imperial Pavilion (*Kasr-ı Hümayun*) and pavements had been completed under the supervision of the Construction Official Mustafa Rif'at Efendi and all the necessary payments made. However, some late repairs and modifications became necessary. The fortress had originally been built with soft stone and its grass walls on the eastern side had begun to crumble. Thus, cannon banquettes/remparts (*top seğirdmes*) on this side slid toward the arches and needed to be rebuilt. The other sidewalls of the fortress also made of soft stone and having been exposed to winter rains, leaked and would probably quickly collapse. Accordingly, all the grass walls had to be demolished and rebuilt anew. The engineers, the Superintendent Ağa, the Head-Architect Arif Efendi went to inspect it and produced a drawing on which they proposed to raze half of the walls (five to six *ziras*) and to replace them by a redoubt with cannon embrasures. This was the only way to fix the problem of durability. (See Fig. 4.3. below for the drawing.)

They also reported about the appointment of necessary construction officials. For example, the former Construction Official of Anadolu Kavağı, Arif Efendi was appointed to Poyraz Limanı Fortress. The Construction Official of the Rumelian Side Mehmed Emin Efendi went to Büyük Liman Battery and Garibçe Fortress. Mustafa Rif'at Efendi continued to be employed in Kilyos Fort. İsmail Efendi, who was the Construction Official of the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri, was appointed to oversee the Fener Fortresses in general. A new construction official needed to be hired for the İrve Fortress which was outside of the strait and distant from other defensive works.

The Ottoman government still had to pay about eight to nine hundred pouches (*keses*) of *akçe* for the construction of some soldier barracks, officer houses, mosques, roads and jetties in the Fortresses of Garibçe, Poyraz Limanı, Anadolu Feneri and İrve.




Figure 4.3. Plan of the Reconstruction of Kilyos Fort from its foundation by razing half of its walls. “İşbu kırmızı mahal aşağıda keşide kılınan siyah hatta gelince hedm olunub işbu sarı mahalle müceddeden top mazgalları inşa olunacaktır ve bu sûretde kal’anın beş arşun irtifâ’ı hedm olunur.” (BOA. HAT. 143/5978.)

Regarding military provisions, they suggested that it was necessary to replace the artillery carriages in all of The Seven Fortresses. Twenty carriages from the Armoury (Tophane) should be enough. The needed ammunition would be provided and delivered when all the buildings and armoury of the Seven Fortresses would be completed. The ammunition needed in the Four Fortresses had already been delivered except for a part of the necessary gunpowder, which would be entirely supplied by the end of the summer. The mortars located in the Battery of Yuşa and the mortar redoubts (*humbara tabya*) of the Kavak Fortresses were not numerous but after having cast cannons for a newly built galleon of the Imperial Arsenal, they

would cast mortars either for Yuşa and Kavak batteries or for the Fortresses of Ismail, Bender and Hotin, according to the sultan's choice.

As a response to this report, the sultan recalled the significance of paying the construction officials promptly and meeting their needs fully. The Imperial Armoury should cast cannons and mortars night and day in order to finish them by Spring for the Frontier Fortresses (the ones in the Black Sea region mentioned above).<sup>441</sup>

Constructions works were pursued in Büyük Liman under the supervision of Mehmed Emin Efendi.<sup>442</sup> The construction of a soldier barrack in Rumeli Feneri started in the summer of 1794 under the supervision of İsmail Efendi and kept on being conducted until the following summer.<sup>443</sup> Sadık Emin Efendi supervised the on-going construction works in Poyraz Limanı to complete the previous ones and to build new soldier barracks.<sup>444</sup>

Musa Efendi was nominated as construction official to İrve Fort. He initiated the work in May 1796.<sup>445</sup> However, construction continued slowly in Riva first because Musa Efendi ran out funds (He was paid five thousand guruşes on August 18<sup>th</sup> 1796,<sup>446</sup> and then he fell seriously ill causing construction works to stop during the rest of the summer of 1796. In the middle of autumn, Hacı Memiş Efendi asked the Ottoman government for permission to resume the work in Riva. They appointed an

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<sup>441</sup> BOA. HAT. 143/5977. "Benim vezirim, Bu hususlara dikkat eyleyüb bina eminlerine akçe verilmede sâir hususlarda kusûr olunmasın. Ve Tophane'de gece gündüz sa'y olunub toplar isâga olunsun ve serhaddât topları bahara erişdirilsün. Velhâsıl hiçbir şeyi gerüye kalmasin. Hasköy dökümhanesi ve demirhanesi işliyor mu? Ve ne suret kesb eyledi? Şu maddelere gayet sa'y u gayret edesin. Göreyim seni."

<sup>442</sup> BOA. C.AS. 110/4944. Mehmed Emin Efendi who was the construction official of the Rumelian side was paid 2500 guruş before and he was paid 5000 guruş this time again in order to complete the buildings in Büyük Liman much more quickly. 10 Ra 1210.

<sup>443</sup> BOA. C.AS. 670/28161. This is the appraisal register of the constructions made in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri by İsmail Efendi during the season of 1210/1795.

<sup>444</sup> BOA. C.AS. 179/7798. Sadık Emin Efendi was put on a 500 guruş monthly salary by 21 Şevval 1210 from the beginning of Zilkade until its completion. The payments were made from the specific akçe for fortresses from the Imperial Mint.

<sup>445</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 168, 15 Zilkade 1210.

<sup>446</sup> BOA. C.AS. 128/5701, 13 Safer 1211.



architect in order to manage the work and Musa Eendi would pay the necessary expenses and salaries out of the funds he was allocated according to a decision made on October 13<sup>th</sup> 1796.<sup>447</sup> However, Musa Efendi died and some elements of the Fortress of İrve remained incomplete.<sup>448</sup> A year later in September 1797, construction works were conducted again at İrve. After Musa Efendi's illness and death, Yani Kalfa became responsible for İrve's construction works such as soldier barracks, wooden buildings, bridge, armoury, walls, jetties as well as a bathroom.<sup>449</sup>



Figure 4.4. Plan of İrve Fort (TSMa.e. 9444/1)

The Head-Architect and the Superintendent Ağas reported that the soldier barracks and wooden buildings would be completed by mid-November it would take an

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<sup>447</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 167. 10 Rebiülahir 1211.

<sup>448</sup> See the Appraisal register in BOA. C.AS. 335/13901 for the parts completed by Musa Efendi.

<sup>449</sup> BOA. C.AS. 335/13901; MAD.d. 8953, p. 167. The Architect Ağa calculated the amounts of woods and stone that were needed for building the fortress and tried to reduce the costs in order to re-organize the budget. Consequently, the building of İrve necessitated 58,109.5 guruşes without including the cost of the necessary munitions. The Imperial Mint (Darbhane-i Amire) made the necessary payments from the specific funds earmarked for the fortresses on 5 Rebiülahir 1212/27 September 1797 and the amount of money remained from Musa Efendi was also added.

additional thirty days at least to achieve the firing bases. Even though the construction official did his best to complete Kilyos Fort, the great amount of remaining works to be conducted delayed its completion until the next year. The Sultan appreciated hard work but urged to sustain the efforts to complete the project and to swiftly equip the fortresses. It was too much work, which would postpone its completion to the following year.<sup>450</sup> Thus, mandatory construction works continued in the fortresses through April 1796.<sup>451</sup>

In conclusion, all the authorities seemed to be on their guard. They kept an eye on all ongoing construction works in the Bosphorus fortresses. The sultan and his senior officials kept asking for progress reports and called for special attention to the completion of the planned prospects.<sup>452</sup> Hacı Memiş Efendi, the Building Superintendent, promptly paid the funds due to the construction officials for their expenses. According to the Head of the Finances' report, the construction officials appointed the previous years were lazy and sluggish, causing delays in the ongoing work. Thus, Mustafa Reşid Efendi appointed new and more reliable construction

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<sup>450</sup> BOA. HAT. 197/9936: "Benim vezirim, İşte böyle daima üzerinde olasin." or HAT. 205/10684: "Benim vezirim, Gidüb göresin bostancılarda olan kaleler bir mikdar benzedi lakin taşrada olanlar ne keyfiyettedir ve binalar nasıldır ve neferatları tekmiil midir nazırları hasta imiş. İşte anlar gayet dikkat et. Biz kavaktan görüp verâsını bilmeyoruz. Göreyim seni şunların nizam ve rabıtalına ve kâffe-i levâzimatları tekmiil olmağa ikdâm idesin." or BOA. HAT. 177/7798: "Benim vezirim, İsabet eylemişsin. Şu serhaddâtda ve kilâ'ın bir gün evvel gerek binaları ve gerek sair levazimatları tekmiiline ikdam edesin. Zira şürû' olunalı altı seneye varıyor. bu sene tekmiil etdirdesin."

<sup>451</sup> Reşid Efendi and the Superintendent Ağa's report informed that the Building Superintendent Hacı Memiş Efendi, the engineer Resmi Mustafa Ağa, the Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa and the construction officials went together to inspect and examine the needs of the fortresses. An appraisal register prepared on 21 Şevval 1210/29 April 1796 shows the findings of this tour. They suggested that doors, a stone staircase, firing bases, a bridge before the gate and over the ditch, a furnace, laundry, armory, jetties and a guest room had to be built in the Fortress of İrve aka Revancık. The page on the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı is partly rended. We learn that some improvements and additions were made in this fortress but cannot tell the suggestions of the inspectors for further improvements. For the Battery of Büyük Liman, they recommended the construction of a furnace, new doors, a staircase, a jetty, a guest room, a water reservoir, a fountain, better sewers, a laundry room, a wooden jetty and a minaret for the mosque. They made estimations for the costs of improvements in the Fortresses of Garibçe and Kilyos as well. All these constructions would cost 149,411.5 guruşes in total, the report estimated. BOA. C.AS. 761/32135.

<sup>452</sup> See BOA. HAT. 197/9936; BOA. HAT. 187/8823; BOA. HAT. 187/8856; BOA. HAT. 205/10684; BOA. BOA. HAT. 177/7798. The official dates of these imperial decree documents are not known. Because of these reasons, it was not possible to determine the exact chronology of these documents but all of them include information about the significance of constructions, paying great attention to them and having progress reports.

officials to the fortresses at the eve of the following construction season.<sup>453</sup> It is not surprising that the Ottoman government attached great importance to the works essential to the security of the capital.

#### **4.3.4. The Completion of the Bosphorus Fortresses (1797)**

It is noteworthy that the Ottoman authorities, the sultan himself, Mustafa Reşid Efendi and the Head of the Finances closely followed the ongoing works done in the fortresses and they prepared reports each year. For example, in October 1796, the Defterdar Efendi, Reşid Efendi, Memiş Efendi, The Head-Architect Ağa and Yani Kalfa made a joint inspection tour of the Bosphorus fortresses. The Head-Architect Ağa prepared a report summarizing all the construction activities led in the 1796 summer and the latest state of the fortresses.<sup>454</sup> In the same way, they also continued to monitor the completion of the constructions in the following year.

The Ottoman government started again in March 1797 to complete some of the construction works, which had been postponed to the next construction season. The Grand Vizier immediately asked the Defterdar Efendi to report on the latest situation of the fortresses and what needed to be done to complete them in the current year. He also inquired about the number of soldiers and ordnances posted in the fortresses.<sup>455</sup> Defterdar Efendi also produced, with the support of Seyyid Efendi, a new report detailing one by one, the state of each fortress.

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<sup>453</sup> BOA. HAT. 187/8856.

<sup>454</sup> BOA. C.AS. 112/5062; D.BŞM.d. 6536. This is the appraisal register documenting the constructions made in the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı during the season of 1796; BOA. C.AS. 335/13901. This is the appraisal register documenting the constructions made in the Fortress of İrve during the season of 1796.

<sup>455</sup> BOA. C.AS. 833/35534. "İzzetlü efterdar efendi, Bahr-i siyah boğazında inşaları tertib olunan kalelerin geçen sene itmam ve ikmâlleri matlûb-ı hümâyun iken kılâ-ı merkûmenin tekmilleri müyesser olamadığından bu sene-i mübâreke de bâ-avn-i bâri keremiyet ve ikdâm olunarak noksan olan mahallerinin itmâmı ve neferât ve top ve mühimmatları keyfiyyâtının tahkiki murâd-ı mekârim-i 'itîyâd-ı mülûkâne olmağla imdi sâlifü'z-zikr boğaz kalelerinden geçen sene ebniyesi tekml olmayan kaleler kangılarıdır ve noksan olan mahalleri nedir ve bu sene-i mübâreke de cümlesinin tekmlisi ne makûle harekete mütevakıfıdır. Ve neferât ve top ve mühimmâtları keyfiyyeti ne gûnedir izzetlü Reşid Efendi ve Kapudan ve sair iktiza edenlerden serian tahkik ve rikâb-ı hümâyûna arz için her bir maddesini bend bend izah ederek takririniz ile acâleten ifadeye himmet eyleyesiz deyu buyuruldu. 11 N 1211."

The Grand Vizier presented Defterdar Efendi's report to the sultan for review and approval who examined it carefully and ordered its execution on April 6<sup>th</sup> 1797.<sup>456</sup>

Rumeli Feneri Fortress was completed under the supervision of İsmail Efendi. Meanwhile, Anadolu Feneri Fortress was also largely completed save for its redoubt bases and some walls restoration, which had been delayed. It was agreed to contract these renovations to another official and to pay twenty-five thousand guruşes for the necessary expenses. The new Construction Official in charge of the Anadolu Feneri construction works was also assigned to İrve. He would supervise hereo the construction of officers' quarters and guest rooms in addition to repairing its mosque, a task which required the allocation of seven thousand and five hundred guruşes. Remaining works in Poyraz Limanı Fortress remained under Sadık Efendi's responsibility. Evaluated twenty thousand guruşes, it involved the construction of redoubt bases, a few other works and the excavation of a ditch.

Emin Efendi was the Construction Official of the Fortresses of Büyük Liman and Garibçe. Since he was considered negligent and ineffective, the report advised to replace him. Some of the remaining construction works (the mosque, guest rooms and the excavation of the mountain at the back of the soldier barrack) in Büyük Liman Battery necessitated approximately fifteen thousand guruşes. Other works (guest room, mosque, road repair, redoubt bases and some small repairs) in Garibçe Fortress necessitated twenty-five thousand guruşes. Mustafa Efendi was the Construction Official at Kilyos Fort in 1796. The government decided to replace him and to prepare a new appraisal register for the work that remained to be done there.

Reşid Efendi and Defterdar Efendi replaced the construction officials who were ineffective and inadequate. Reşid Efendi also indicated that Yuşa and Telli Dalyan Batteries were already completed and that all necessary military personnel and

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<sup>456</sup> BOA. C.AS. 833/35534. "İzzetlü defterdar efendi, İşbu takririniz huzûr-ı hümâyûna arz olundukda tamam vakti olmağla gayet dikkat olunarak takrir mûcebince mübâşeret oluna diyu hatt-ı hümayun-ı şevket-makrun şeref-yâfte-i sudûr olmağla ber-mûceb-i hatt-ı hümayun amel ve harekete himmet eylesesiz diyu buyuruldu. 8 Şevval 1211."

materials were already in place. However, the cannons, artillery carriages, and ammunition stocks were still scarce in some fortresses and had to be supplemented. In response to this report, the Grand Vizier appointed on April 20<sup>th</sup> 1797, the new construction officials Reşid Efendi had selected to take care of the remaining supplies.<sup>457</sup>

Seyyid Efendi and Reşid Efendi organized the appointment of new construction officials and the payment of the necessary funds to provide workers and materials. These sums were added to the fifteen thousand guruşes for the Fortresses of the Rumelian side and fifteen thousand guruşes for the Fortresses of the Anatolian side. The total amount of thirty thousand guruşes was paid out of the special fund for the Bosphorus Fortresses in the Imperial Mint (Darbhane-i Âmire) on May 3<sup>rd</sup> 1797.<sup>458</sup>

All fortresses of Kilyos, Garibçe, Büyük Liman, İrve and Poyraz Limanı were completed in 1797 except for a few minor works in the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri that were only completed after November. Reşid Efendi reported on these achievements and required to put necessary military equipment in the fortresses, a query which was approved by the Sultan.<sup>459</sup>

When all construction works, repairs and renovations in Bosphorus fortresses were finally put to an end, the Ottoman government tasked the Head-Architect Mehmed Arif Ağa to lead a general expertise, the supervision of Mustafa Reşid Efendi as of March 1798, on the structural improvements and the organization of the Bosphorus fortresses defensive network.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>457</sup> BOA. C.AS. 833/35534. "Anadolu tarafında vaki Poyraz limanı ve Anadolu feneri ve İrve kalelerinin bakiyye binaları atûfetlü îrâd-ı cedid defterdarı efendi hazretleri tarafından ve Rumili sâhilinde vâki Liman-ı kebir tabyasıyla Garibçe kalesi ve Kilyos kalesinin bakiyye-i binaları tarafımdan mutemed âdemler tayiniyle inşa ve tekml olunmak diyu baş muhasebeye kayd olunub tarafeyne başka başka mübâşeret için sûret verile. 22 Şevval 1211."

<sup>458</sup> BOA. C.AS. 100/4560, 6 Zilkade 1211.

<sup>459</sup> BOA. HAT. 1412/57551. "Tanzim olunsun."

<sup>460</sup> BOA. C.AS. 669/28124. This register includes only the operations on the Anatolian side but the register of the Rumelian side could not be found. The total amount of expenditure made for the Fortresses of Poyraz Limanı, Anadolu Feneri and İrve was 113.768,5 guruş.

Once this period of intensive constructions and repairs was completed, no other significant building activity was undertaken for a long time in the fortresses except for their maintenance, which involved, in 1800, the replacement of some embrasures and the repair of the fortress, battery walls, water reservoir and waterways in the Four Fortresses.<sup>461</sup> Some minor repair works were also conducted in 1802 in the Nine Fortresses where roof tiles, glasses, glass frames and plasters were replaced.<sup>462</sup> Architect Mehmed Efendi also restored the waterways of the Seven Fortresses in 1804.<sup>463</sup> However, no significant operations were led on the Bosphorus fortresses, which remained operational and well maintained from 1797 to 1805.

#### **4.4. The Third Period: Preparations for the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12**

Despite of peaceful relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Russia from 1792 to 1805, the intrusion of Russian military forces in Moldavia and Wallachia, both under Ottoman control for centuries, engaged Sultan Selim III's to declare a war against Russia in 1806. This event initiated a new stage of war preparations and the construction of new batteries along the Bosphorus such as Papaz Burnu, Filburnu and Kireç Burnu.

At the end of the reign of Sultan Selim III, a significant event took place in the Bosphorus fortresses. On February 1807, Reisülküttab Mahmud Râif Efendi who was entitled with the construction of these Bosphorus batteries replaced Reşid Mustafa Efendi who had been in charge of the security of the Bosphorus. However, he was killed in Sarıyer in 17 Rebiülevvel 1222/ May 25<sup>th</sup> 1807 during the Kabakçı Revolt which broke out in Rumeli Feneri Fortress.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>461</sup> BOA. C.AS. 158/6996; BOA. C.AS. 235/9947; BOA. C.AS. 799/33880. ( 15 Safer 1215/8 July 1800).

<sup>462</sup> BOA. C.AS. 83/3882. (27 Şaban 1216/2 January 1802)

<sup>463</sup> BOA. C.AS. 899/38737.

<sup>464</sup> Kemal Beydilli, TDV DiA "Mahmud Râif Efendi".

#### 4.4.1. The Batteries of Papaz Burnu and Filburnu

In 1794 as a part of their large-scale plans to reinforce defenses of the Bosphorus, the Ottomans planned to construct two twelve cannons batteries<sup>465</sup>, one on Bazirgan Kayası (between Büyük Liman and Garibçe) and the other on Papaz burnu (near Rumeli Feneri) on the Rumelian side.<sup>466</sup> However, the construction of the Papaz Burnu was delayed during almost twelve years. It was only in January 1806 that the Sultan ordered the construction of the Papaz Burnu and Filburnu batteries. However, it was during wintertime and the sea transportation of materials would be difficult. It was thus decided to assemble the necessary cannons and to wait for better weather conditions to place them in the batteries. On January 14<sup>th</sup> 1806, the Grand Vizier ordered swiftly the preparation of ten cannons for each battery (twenty in total).<sup>467</sup>

Upon the request of the former Reisülküttab Mahmud [Râif] Efendi, the architects who were responsible for the construction of the new batteries were paid fifteen thousand guruşes in total in advance on December 7<sup>th</sup> 1806.<sup>468</sup>

According to the Head-Architect Mehmed Emin Efendi's report and its December 28<sup>th</sup> 1806 appraisal register, architect Mir Ali Rıza Beğ, began to build the Papaz Burnu Battery on the Rumelian side. According to its plan, it could accommodate ten cannons protected with earth gabions (*toprak siper sepetli*), and bear a one-floor fifty soliders barrack, a police station, an ammunition depot, an extra armoury in the underground as well as an entrance gate. The estimated cost of all these

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<sup>465</sup> For the appraisal register of the batteries, see. BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 13. "Rumili Sahilinde Fenar dahilinde Büyük Liman ile Garibçe kalesi beyninde Bazirgan kayası ve fenar haricinde Dalyan burnu nam mahallerde başka başka mantuk-ı resm üzere inşa olunacak üç kıt'a ve pîşgâhlarında ihdas olunacak üç kıt'a on ikişer top vaz'ına mütehammil tabyaların ve derûn-ı ebniyede inşası lazım gelen ebniye-i sâirenin keşfidir. 22 Şevval 1208 [12 May 1794]."

<sup>466</sup> BOA. HAT. 1404/56755.

<sup>467</sup> BOA. C.AS. 859/36785. "İzzetlü defterdar efendi İktiza edenleriyle bi'l-muhâbere ser'an irsâli hususunun İktiza-yı nizâmına mübâşeret eylesiz diyü buyruldu. 23 Şevval 1220."

<sup>468</sup> BOA. C.AS. 749/31536, 26 Ramazan 1221.

buildings was 34,122 guruşes.<sup>469</sup> After the head-architect made an estimation tour, an engineer was assigned to inspect the construction. Both informed the authorities jointly about the progress of the construction work. They also recommended reinforcing the earth gabions with stones.

The Architect Seyyid Mehmed was responsible for the construction of the Filburnu Battery. He reported that Seyyid Mehmed Efendi (Darbhane Nazırı), Süleyman Sabit Efendi, Abdülhay Efendi, the Architect Ağa, Foti<sup>470</sup>, Komyanor, Todori and Yorgi *kalfas* had inspected the battery and prepared a joint report on the completed buildings. According to his register, the total cost of the battery amounted 39,238 guruşes. The Architect Seyyid Mehmed requested to be paid his remaining debt, which was 15,738 guruşes. However, the Office of the Head of the Finances paid only 2000 guruşes in advance on September 21<sup>st</sup> 1807 deciding only to pay the rest of the sum in installments.<sup>471</sup> The architect Seyyid Mehmed also pointed out other works such as small battery repairs, which he urged to be done in October before the end of the construction season.<sup>472</sup>

The Grand Admiral Paşa presented the sultan a map of the Bosphorus fortresses and batteries, which had been drawn by an engineer of the Engineering School (Mühendishane). It also detailed some of the requirements of the Bosphorus defenses, cannon-ball range between opposing forts and the placement of naval vessels in necessary locations. The sultan ordered the completion of Filburnu and Papaz Burnu Batteries as well as the construction of a battery in Kireç Burnu.<sup>473</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> BOA. C.AS. 262/10890, p. 2, 17 Şevval 1221. The second page includes an appraisal register prepared by the Head-Architect Mehmed Emin Efendi.

<sup>470</sup> Foti kalfa worked in different constructions in the late eighteenth century according to some records. See Oya Şenyurt, 48) "Onsekizinci Yüzyılın Sonlarında Bilinmeyen Bir Bina eminine Ait İnşaat Defteri", *Arşiv Dünyası*, (Vol: 12, 2009), 96, 101.

<sup>471</sup> BOA. C.AS. 181/7856, 18 Receb 1222.

<sup>472</sup> BOA. C.AS. 76/3574. (19 Şaban 1222/22 October 1807)

<sup>473</sup> HAT. 35/1773. "Resmi alıkoydum. Fil burnu ve Papaz burnu tabyaları tekmi ve Kireç burnu tabyasına mübaşeret olunub itmamlarına gayret ve cemî' levâzımâtları tetmîmine dikkat olunub muhafazaları için teksir-i neferât ve nizâm ve râbitalarına ihtimam oluna."






Figure 4.5. “Alay Burnu Kal’ası” (left)<sup>474</sup> (TSMA.E. 9444)

Figure 4.6. “Papaz burnu Tabyası” (right) (TSMA.E. 9444)

#### 4.4.2. The Construction of Kireçburnu Battery

After having consulted with the Grand Admiral Paşa, Sultan Selim III ordered the construction of Kireçburnu Battery<sup>475</sup>, located in the southeast of other Bosphorus forts and batteries in order to prevent any possible intrusion into Büyükdere port.

<sup>474</sup> The name of this fort is only referred to as Âlây burnu in this map but its location and structure indicate that it is Filburnu.

<sup>475</sup> HAT. 35/1773. “Resmi alıkoydum. Fil burnu ve Papaz burnu tabyaları tekml ve Kireç burnu tabyasına mübaşeret olunub itmamlarına gayret ve cemî’ levâzımâtları tetmîmine dikkat olunub muhafazaları için teksir-i neferât ve nizâm ve râbitalarına ihtimam oluna.”



Figure 4.7. Location of Kireçburnu Battery on an Ottoman map (TSMA.e. 9444/1)

The construction in Kireçburnu began around February 1807 when Mustafa Reşid Efendi transferred his duties to Mahmud Râif Efendi.<sup>476</sup> Abdulhey Efendi as a construction official became responsible for the construction of a single floor soldier barrack in Kireçburnu Battery.<sup>477</sup>

<sup>476</sup> BOA. C.AS. 127/5678. The Head of the Finances paid 7500 guruşes for the construction of the Battery of Kireçburnu on 25 Zilkade 1221/3 February 1807.

<sup>477</sup> BOA. C.AS. 517/21590, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807; MAD.d. 10444.




Figure 4.8. Plan of Kireçburnu Battery (TSMA.e. 9444/1)

#### 4.4.3. The Enlargement of Macar Fortress (Yuşa Battery)

Yuşa Battery was already built on the road named Macar road or where the slopes of the Yuşa Mountain led to the sea. It had been built during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I in the 1789s and then had been strengthened in the beginning of the reign of Sultan Selim III in the 1795s. In 1807, the Ottoman government decided to extend it by adding two new twenty-five guns batteries. One of the batteries would bear a “*çim tabya*” (grass parapet) and the other a “*sepet tabya*” (gabion

parapet).<sup>478</sup> Mahmud Râif Efendi was tasked to supervise the construction of Macar Fortress, the building of which was commissioned to Seyyid Mehmed and Selim Sâbit Efendis. The construction included, in addition to the two batteries, a police station, an ammunition depot, masonry works, wooden bases, as well as several other minor buildings.



Figure 4.9. Location of the Macar Fortress on the Ottoman Map (TSMA.e. 9444/1)

After the completion of the buildings, Mahmud Râif Efendi, made a joing inspection tour in Yuşa, along with Selim Sâbit Efendi, Abdulhay Efendi, and the Head-Architect Hafız Mehmed Emin, and Foti, Komyanor and Todori *kalfas*, to inspect the buildings. On May 13<sup>th</sup> 1807, the Head-Architect Hafız Mehmed Emin produced an appraisal register pointing out the few structural defects that should be repaired during the

<sup>478</sup> BOA. C.AS. 358/14829. This is the official report of Mahmud Raif Efendi. p. 1. “Bahr-i siyah boğazında kâin kılâ’ın istihkâmı zımında çâkerleri nezâreti ve Seyyid Mehmed Efendi ve Selim Sâbit Efendi marifetleriyle bina ve inşaları irâde buyurulan Yuşa kalesi ittisalinde yigirmi beş topu müstemil iki aded çim ve sepet tabya...”

remaining construction season.<sup>479</sup> He was unfortunately killed in twelve days during the Kabakçı Revolt.)

The fortress' name "Macar" was also subject to several discussions. Ferenc Toth, author of a biography on the Baron de Tott, relied on Paloczy's *Baro Toth* to suggest that Macar Fort (literally "Hungarian" in Turkish) had been named after the baron's although there is no evidence that Tott had built Macar Battery.<sup>480</sup> The name actually comes from "*mâ-i cârî*" which means running water and was probably given to the fortress because of a stream running by.

During the third period running from 1806 to 1808 (1220-1223) new ten to twelve cannons batteries were built along the shores of the Bosphorus. Their main builders still remained the Ottoman engineers who were educated in the Imperial Engineering School and had collaborated on-site with French engineers during the previous period. The distinctive character of this period is that the Ottomans preferred construction of marine batteries that can carry ten to twelve cannons in contrast to the fortresses built by Mehmed Tahir Ağa and Baron de Tott in the 1770s.

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<sup>479</sup> BOA. C.AS. 358/14829. p. 3, 5 Rebiülevvel 1222; BOA. C.AS. 358/14829. p. 2: The buildings overseen by Seyyid Mehmed Efendi costed 64,372.5 guruşes while those supervised by Mahmud Raif Efendi costed 22,720 guruşes.

<sup>480</sup> Ferenc Toth, *Un diplomate militaire française en Europe Orientale à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime*, (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 2011), 123.



Figure 4.10. Macar Fort. “Bahri siyah boğazında Macar Tabyası ta’bir olunan Yuşa kalası” (TSMA.e. 900/100)

#### 4.5. Conclusion

At the end of the reign of Sultan Selim III, most of the Bosphorus fortresses and batteries were completed and reinforced.<sup>481</sup> In 1808, a list of the fortresses mentioned Rumeli Feneri, Revancık, Kilyos, Anadolu Feneri, Poyraz Limanı, Garibçe and Büyük Liman called “the Seven Fortresses” (*Kılâ-ı Seb’â*). Another network of fortresses, known as the “Four Fortresses” included Rumeli Kavağı, Anadolu Kavağı, as well as the Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan. In addition to these, the Batteries of Papaz Burnu, Filburnu and Kireç Burnu need to be mentioned.<sup>482</sup>

In the 1790s, many additional barracks were built inside or nearby the fortresses. The addition of barracks is noteworthy. According to an imperial decree, the previous soldiers were lodged in barracks but those recruited according to the New Order did not. This led Sultan Selim III to order new constructions.<sup>483</sup>

In the 1790s, the administrative organization of the Bosphorus forts also improved. The Ottoman government created new positions and shared responsibilities among officers. For example, while the Bosphorus Superintendent had been the only responsible for both supervising construction works, military personnel and managing amunitions, in the New Order era his functions were now assigned to new positions.

The Superintendent remained the highest authority over all Bosphorus affairs. In addition, the Superintendent of the Buildings (*Ebniye Nâzırı*) became responsible for

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<sup>481</sup> For a general overview of the Bosphorus fortification, see Ottoman map of Istanbul strait and plans of the forts and batteries from Istanbul University Rare Manuscripts Collections in Appendix 17.

<sup>482</sup> BOA. TSMA.e. 753/10.

<sup>483</sup> BOA. HAT. 1366/54121. See also Oya Şenyurt, “Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında III. Selim'in Askeri Alandaki Kararlarının İstanbul'da Kent Mekanının Kullanımına Etkileri”, *Bilig*, Vol: 78, 2016, pp. 199-229. Şenyurt claims in this article that the visual image of Istanbul changed with the decisions of Sultan Selim III and his government related to the military in the late eighteenth century. She notices that this military appearance contrasts with the pleasure-oriented, westernized image of Istanbul identified with the waterside palaces of the Bosphorus and picnic areas that increased in the eighteenth century. Not only the construction of several military buildings such as dockyard, armory, fortresses but also the construction of new barracks for the soldiers of the New Army and drilling places on the northern side of Istanbul added a military appearance to the capital.

all the construction activities related to the Bosphorus fortresses. Building Superintendents were annually appointed and paid five thousand guruşes annually.<sup>484</sup>

Furthermore, a more systematic approach to management was adopted. In earlier times, a single construction official was entitled the supervision of one or sometimes two fortresses across each other. For example, the Fener fortresses were under the responsibility of a single construction official. During the New Order period, two construction officials were appointed to Rumelian and Anatolian sides. This was probably because it was easier for a construction official to circulate between the fortresses and batteries of either the Anatolian or the Rumelian side. The formation of such Ottoman bureaucratic posts that would steer the construction and management since it was a further sign for owning this technology and making it both official and local.

It is possible to underline that the reformations led by Sultan Abdulhamid I brought only results in the following one of Sultan Selim III. Ottoman engineers who were educated in the Imperial Engineering School began to work along with the French engineers and Ottoman architects in the construction works. This period also witnessed the first experiments by the Ottoman engineers as members of a new profession. It is necessary to point out that the construction of a fortress underwent a shift from being a craft to a semi-scientific pursuit as in other fields of engineering in the late eighteenth century and engineering as a newly developing profession did not have the modern implications of the term yet.<sup>485</sup>

An analysis of the employment of the French officials such as Monnier and Kauffer along with Ottoman architects, engineers and construction officials, proved that there was a real collaborative process active between them. The Ottomans were

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<sup>484</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 10. "...nâzır-ı sabık Ahmed Azmi Efendi beş bin guruş ve bazı mesârifatı için elli guruş verilmiş olmağın baş muhasebeden derkenâr ve takrir huzûr-ı hümayuna arz ile Memiş Efendi'ye beş bin guruş gönderilmek... 25 Zilkade 1210."

<sup>485</sup> Tuncay Zorlu, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), 160.



not passive receivers of French fortification techniques, as assumed in the present literature but were active decision-makers, who fully participated to the “military acculturation” process. The third and last period of Sultan Selim III era, after the dismissal of French officials also indicated that the Ottomans adapted some French fortification techniques into their systems and began to apply them such as grass parapets and gabion parapets.

To sum up the distinctive methodical approach led by the Ottoman government in the Bosphorus fortification. First, they hired French engineers to built new works. This had indeed been already done, but differently this time, to innovate and modernize fortification, shipbuilding, artillery and other technical fields. Second, they created a systematic organization to manage construction works such as appointing a Building Superintendent and construction officials on the Anatolian and Rumelian sides instead of appointing a construction official to each fortress. Third, they adopted a hierarchical method of consultation in order to avoid any possible conflicts that might arise on site between Ottoman architects, French engineers, Ottoman engineers, and Ottoman construction officials. They also defined their roles, which had frequently overlapped previously. As discussed in the previous chapter, they had encountered conflicts and problems before. In conclusion, this hierarchical method avoided conflicts in addition to allowing the consideration of various opinions and been able to reach the most appropriate final decision. In addition, the methodical approach included the formulation of a new budget earmarked for the Bosphorus defenses (*ebniye-i kılâ' akçesi*) in the Imperial Mint. Consequently, the new hierarchical administration and division of roles in the constructions, a specific budget for the constructions, and consultation method defined the distinct character of the fortification of the Bosphorus under the New Order.

## CHAPTER 5

### A PERMANENT MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE BOSPHORUS

#### 5.1. Introduction

In the previous three chapters, I discussed the construction of the fortresses and batteries along the Bosphorus within three periods concerning the changing nature of the Russian threat in the Black Sea. As is evident from the density of several military structures along the Bosphorus in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the security of the Bosphorus became an issue to be handled independently and institutionally. Consequently, the Ottoman government created a new institution of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırlığı*), which was responsible for organizing the security of the Bosphorus, the construction and maintenance of the defences and the military personnel and munitions. Such an administration did not exist before the late eighteenth century because there was no permanent threat to the Bosphorus from the Black Sea except some attacks of the Cossack pirates in the beginning of the seventeenth century. The formation of a new institution to provide the security of the Bosphorus was a new attempt in response to the rising Russian threat.

This chapter focuses on the Ottoman efforts to establish a permanent military administration for the security of the Bosphorus. It first reveals the authority of the *Bostancıbaşı* in the Bosphorus shores until 1780s. Then, it discusses the formation of a new position, the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırlığı*) and its realm of authority. Then, it presents another new position, the Bosphorus Guardianship (*Boğaz Muhafızlığı*), which emerged only in times of war and emergency. Finally, this chapter gives a chronological list of the superintendents and guardians of the Bosphorus in a period under research here which comprises the last quarter of the eighteenth century until the end of the reign of Sultan Selim III in 1807.

## 5.2. The Security of the Bosphorus before the Superintendency

As the Ottomans recognized the necessity of strengthening the defense of the Straits, they also developed a new administrative system in the course of time. Before the Ottoman-Russian war, there were already four fortresses on the Bosphorus: Rumeli Hisarı, Anadolu Hisarı, Rumeli Kavağı, and Anadolu Kavağı. The administration of these fortresses and the general security of the Bosphorus were entrusted to the *bostancıbaşı*, who was the head of the *Bostancı Ocağı*.<sup>486</sup>

*Bostancı* literally means “gardener,” but the *Bostancı* Corps was one of the imperial guard corps of the Ottoman Empire. Their duties included protecting the sultan’s palace and its premises, rowing the sultan’s barge, and acting as imperial gardeners. They served in the sultan’s gardens inside and outside of the palace. The boatmen among the *bostancı*s provided transportation for the court members, mothers of sultans, and sultans. *Bostancıbaşı* was responsible for the protection and military discipline of the shores of Marmara, Haliç and the Black Sea Strait. In addition, his permission was required for the construction of all the waterside palaces and other buildings along the water.<sup>487</sup> The Ottoman government entrusted the general security of the Bosphorus to *Bostancıbaşı* probably because the northern shores of the Bosphorus were mostly composed of green areas, hills, mountains and dairy farms, which were probably identified as the sultan’s gardens.

In the first period of the construction of the Bosphorus fortresses in 1772-74 during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, the organization of the Bosphorus defences belonged to the *Bostancı* Corps. When the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774 started, the responsibility of the Corps of Imperial Guards increased. The Ottoman government increased the number of *bostancı*s in the Hisar and the Kavak

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<sup>486</sup> The Hisar Fortresses were not originally attached to the Corps of Guards. After a serious Cossack attack in the July of 1624, the gunners of both Anadolu and Rumeli Hisarı Fortresses were incorporated into the Corps of Guards. In addition to the protection of the Hisar fortresses, the Ottomans organized a force of Jannisaries in Yeniköy (a district on the Rumelian shore of the Bosphorus). As a precaution, the Jannisaries also pitched their tents in the Fortress of Terkos and in the meadow (*çayır*) of Uskumru for six months to provide added security. See Murat Yıldız, *Bahçivanlıktan Saray Muhafızlığına Bostancı Ocağı* (Istanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2011), 143.

<sup>487</sup> See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarlı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı* (Ankara: TTK, 2014), 451-460.

fortresses. Under the *Bostancı* Corps, the administrative chiefs of the Kavak fortresses were called *usta*.<sup>488</sup> *Usta* is the title of the senior officers of the *bostancı* affected outside the Palace. The use of the word *usta* can be explained by the fact that the *bostancı* corps are part of the staff of the Palace, which had its own hierarchy and vocabulary.<sup>489</sup> For example, the *ustas* of the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı from 1186 to 1189 was el-Hâc Mehmed<sup>490</sup> and the *usta* of the Fortress of Rumeli Kavağı in 1772 were Salih and Murtaza.<sup>491</sup> The *ustas* of the Kavak fortresses were tasked with securing the necessary equipment<sup>492</sup> and soldiers (*bostancı*)<sup>493</sup> for the newly constructed Fortresses of Fener, Garibçe, and Poyraz Limanı.

As a response to the rising Russian threat in the war of 1768-74, the Ottomans constructed new batteries between the Kavak and Fener fortresses in 1772, and the Sublime Porte placed twenty *bostancı* soldiers in these batteries in the summer of 1186/1772.<sup>494</sup> Concordantly, the *Usta* of Kavak, el-Hâc Mehmed, who was responsible for protecting the batteries on the Anatolian side, and providing the daily wages of the soldiers for the expenditures of boats that they used to get their military rations (*tayinat*) and other expenditures.<sup>495</sup>

In addition, the *bostancı* soldiers were appointed to the newly completed Fener forts in November 1772.<sup>496</sup>

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<sup>488</sup> Tayyip Gökbilgin, "Boğaziçi", *MEB. İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, 683.

<sup>489</sup> Abdülkadir Özcan, "Bostancı", TDV DİA, 1992, pp. 308-309.

<sup>490</sup> BOA. C. AS. 945/41028; BOA. C. AS. 47/2159.

<sup>491</sup> BOA. C. AS. 382/15772; BOA. C. AS. 1035/45418.

<sup>492</sup> BOA. C. AS. 47/2159, 17 S 1189.

<sup>493</sup> BOA. C. AS. 945/41028; BOA. C. AS. 382/15772; BOA. C. AS. 1035/45418; BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/207; BOA. D.BŞM. 5536/459.

<sup>494</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/207; BOA. C.AS. 382/15772; BOA. C.AS. 1035/45418; BOA. C.AS. 952/41374.

<sup>495</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/206, 4 Şevval 1186/29 December 1772; BOA. D.BŞM. 5536/459, 21 R 1186/22 July 1772; BOA. C.AS. 945/41028, 11 Şevval 1186/5 Ocak 1773.

<sup>496</sup> BOA. C.AS. 845/36103, 7 Ş 1186/3 November 1772: The Grand Vizier approved the names of the soldiers selected by the *Bostancıbaşı*; BOA. C.AS 1200/53738, 3 N 1186/28 November 1772. They appointed one *dizdar*, one *kethüda*, and twenty soldiers to each of the Anadolu and Rumeli Fener Fortresses.

The construction of new forts and batteries in the first period from 1772 to 1774 was supervised by the former head-gunner (*topçubaşı*) Mustafa Ağa.<sup>497</sup> The employment of Mustafa Ağa might indicate that the *bostancı* corps constituted the garrisons, but were not solely responsible for the forts.

### 5.2.1. The Administration of the Imperial Dockyard

The supervision of the Bosphorus fortresses was given to the Imperial Dockyard (Tersâne-i Âmire). Even if the exact date of this transition is not certain, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı gave the date of transition as 1780.<sup>498</sup> However, it seems that this transition should have taken place earlier since grand admirals<sup>499</sup> were the highest authority to manage the security of the Bosphorus and its fortification. For instance, Vizier Halil Hamid Paşa was tasked with the security of the Black Sea region as the Seraskier of the Black Sea (Karadeniz seraskeri)<sup>500</sup> or Chief Admiral of the Black Sea

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<sup>497</sup> "... Topçubaşı sâbık müteveffa Mustafa Ağa'nın hâl-i hayatında memur-i inşası olduğu sevâhil-i bahr-i siyahda vaki kılâ'..." BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652, 19 Ra 1192/17 April 1778. Baron de Tott also refers to a head-gunner who accompanied him in his examination of the Fener forts which will be discussed later in detail: Le maître canonier, ajouta-t-il, m'assure qu'il les a déjà vu se croiser. Baron de Tott, *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur Les Turcs et Les Tartares*, Troisième Partie, (Amsterdam, 1785), 183. This head gunner would have been Mustafa Ağa who was initially responsible for the construction of the fortresses.

<sup>498</sup> Uzunçarşılı, "Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonraki", 516.

<sup>499</sup> The delegation of grand admirals with the security of the Bosphorus should not be surprising since grand admirals were charged with the inspection of maritime fortresses in the Black Sea shores in previous decades. For example, the Ottoman grand admirals were sent to Ockahow (Özi), Kılburun or Azov Fortresses to inspect and supervise their reconstruction and renewal. See Taş, M. & Tunç, M. N. (2019). "18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Donanmasında Kaptan Paşalık", *International Social Sciences Studies Journal*, 5 (33): pp. 1977-1996.

<sup>500</sup> BOA. C. AS. 952/41373, 3 Ra 1186/4 June 1772.

Karadeniz Kapudan Paşası) in Safer 1186/May 1772.<sup>501</sup> Then Vizier Mehmed Paşa became the seraskier of the Black Sea as of 1187/1773.<sup>502</sup>

After the supervision of Halil Hamid Paşa in the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa as the grand admiral took the authority in providing the security of the Bosphorus and organizing the needs of the fortresses and fulfilled this duty for a long time in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I.

Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa obtained the title of Gazi with the rank of vizierate as a reward for his success to lift the Russian blockade on the Strait of the Mediterranean and he became grand admiral of the Ottoman Empire in October 1770.<sup>503</sup> However, he was discharged from this position with the death of Sultan Mustafa III. Then, he was reappointed to the Grand Admiralty for the second time after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in Rebiülahir 1188/July 1774<sup>504</sup>. He served for the Ottoman Empire as Grand Admiral for the next fifteen years.<sup>505</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> “Reften-i Halil Paşa be-Âsitâne-i saâdet ve serasker şoden-i o be-donanmâ-yı bahr-i siyah ve zikr-i ba’zı ez-tecvîhât ve îrâd-ı me’mûriyyet-i ba’zı ez-vüzerâ.” Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, “Vekayinüvis Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. Cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774)”. (Marmara Üniversitesi SBE, 2000), 295-296; *Târîh-i Enverî*, SK, Yahya Tevfik Efendi, nr. 253, p. 252b-253b. Also see. *Osmanlı-Rus Harbi Esnasında Bir Şahidin Kaleminden İstanbul (1769-1774)*. Prep. by. Süleyman Göksu. (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2016), 30. Halil Hamid Paşa was the “Chief Admiral of the Black Sea” and sailed to the Black Sea with the imperial navy on 16 May 1772/13 Safer 1186.

<sup>502</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 349/24480, 14 S 1188. Askerlerin tayinat masrafları ve donanmanın malzemelerinin masraflarına sarf olunmak için Boğaz hisarları defterdarına Boğaz seraskeri vezir Mehmed Paşa aracılığıyla hazine-i amire’den 40.000 guruş veriliyor. C.BH. 161/7618: Karadeniz boğazı seraskeri Vezir Mehmed Paşa. 1188. See. BOA. TSMA.e. 791/70, 19 L 1186; BOA. TSMA.e. 520/44, 8 Za 1187.

<sup>503</sup> There is an uncertainty about the appointment date of Cezayirli Hasan Paşa to the grand admiralty. Even though Cezayirli Hasan Paşa was appointed to the Grand Admiralty as of Zilhicce 1183 according to an archival document, C.BH. 8/353: “Bu def’a müceddeden rütbe-i vezaret ile derya kapudanlığı kendüye tevcih ve ihsan-ı hümayunum olan vezirim Hasan Paşa’ya hüküm ki... Fi Evail-i zilhicce sene 1183”, his admiralty was precluded this time according to *Gazavat-ı Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa*: “Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa hazretleri vakt-i merkûmede Kapudâne-i Hümayun sancağı mutasarrafı olup Kapudân-ı deryâ nasb olunması mertebe-i vücûbda ehemm ü [elzem olduğunu eğerçi] irâde [vü] tasmîm olunmuş iken [lâkin] ba’zı hâ’in-i dîn ü Devlet-i aliyye-i ebediyüü’l-karâr olan hussâd bir takrîb men ü def’ eyledikleri hasebiyle [yerine] ümerâ-yı deryâdan Hüsameddin Paşa Kapudân-ı deryâ nasb olunup...” Tevfik Temelkuran, “Gazavat-ı Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa”, p. 41. Chronicler Enveri and Uzunçarşılı gave his appointment to the grand admiralty approximately as Receb 1184/October 1770.

<sup>504</sup> Temelkuran, 56.

<sup>505</sup> Mahir Aydın, “Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa”, TDV DiA.

According to the earliest archival record, the Fortress of Garibçe, which was constructed by Baron de Tott, was completed under the supervision of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa in February 1779.<sup>506</sup> In addition, Hasan Paşa organized the construction of new soldier barracks to the Bosphorus fortresses in November 1782.<sup>507</sup> Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa also supervised the construction of the Battery of Büyük Liman by the French engineers including Lafitte-Clave in 1785.<sup>508</sup> French engineers were obliged to discuss all matters with Hasan Paşa and they were in close contact with him.<sup>509</sup>

It could not be determined yet whether Cezayirli Hasan Paşa was discharged from this position at some point or he served until his death. According to the Journal of Lafitte-Clave, they continued to consult matters with Hasan Paşa as far as possible but because Hasan Paşa went to Egypt in June 1786 for a period of one and a half year to suppress some riots, Hasan Paşa was not always actively participated in the Bosphorus matters. He died at the age over eighty on 14 Receb 1204/30 March 1790 in Şumnu (in today's Bulgaria).<sup>510</sup> However, it seems possible that as of 1199/1785, Cezayirli Hasan Paşa shared his duties with a Superintendent of the Bosphorus (Boğaz Nâzırı), which was a new position, created at that time.

According to the writings of Ottoman historian Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi dating back to 1784, the execution of the rules and regulations of the administrative organization of the Bosphorus defences was tendered to grand admirals (derya kapudanları). The grand admirals had to visit to inspect the Bosphorus fortresses once each fifteen days. If the grand admirals were not present in the season of summer, then the

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<sup>506</sup> BOA. C. AS. 913/39425, 1 Safer 1193/18 February 1779.

<sup>507</sup> BOA. C.AS. 915/39550: "...bâ-hatt-ı hümayun-ı şevketmakrun müceddeden binalarına irade-i seniyye taalluk eden kışlakların ebniyeleri hususuna dair saadetlü kapudan paşa hazretleri taraflarından takdim-i hâk-i devletleri kılınan takrirleri bâlâsına sadır olan ferman-ı alileri mucebince..."; BOA. C.AS. 224/9536: "...kışlakların hala kapudan-ı derya vezirim Gazi Hasan Paşa edâmallahu teala iclalehunun inzimam-ı re'y ve marifetiyle keşf ve defter olunduğu üzere..."; BOA. C.BH. 59/2786: "... vezîr-i mükerrerem saadetlü Kapudan Paşa hazretlerinin işbu takrirleri ve bâlâsına sâdır olan fermân-ı âlileri mûcebince...".

<sup>508</sup> BOA. C.AS. 23/1027.

<sup>509</sup> See also Journal of Lafitte-Clave for their close communication with Grand Admiral Hasan Paşa.

<sup>510</sup> Mahir Aydın, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa", TDV DiA.

Attendants of the Imperial Dockyard (Tersâne-i Âmire Emini) act for them and visit the fortresses in their name.<sup>511</sup>

The Bosphorus forts were probably entrusted to the *bostancı* or to the fleet managers because these were the bodies that have boats, essential for quick communications and transporting equipment.

### 5.3. The Formation of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus

Even though the *Bostancı* Corps would remain important in the defence and security of the Bosphorus, the administration of the newly built fortresses was given to the Imperial Dockyard (Tersâne-i Âmire) and its inspection passed from the *Bostancıbaşı* to the *Boğaz Nazırı* in the 1780s.<sup>512</sup> The administration of the Four Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Erba'a) continued to belong to the *Bostancıbaşı*, but the new fortresses, which were grouped under different names in different times as the Five Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Hamse), the Seven Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Seb'a) and the Nine Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Tis'a), belonged to the Superintendent of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırı*).

In the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid I, it was not the Corps of *Bostancı* to supervise the construction and organization of the new fortresses and batteries. Instead, the position of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nezareti*) began to be established. The Superintendents were mainly tasked with organizing the needs of fortress buildings such as repairs, renewals and constructions, supplying the

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<sup>511</sup> Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, Prep. by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), p. 215. "...ve bu şurût-ı mer'iyyenin îfâ ve icrâsı ve esbâb-ı nizamının istikrar ve ibkâsı derya kapudanlarına tefviz ve ihale ve her onbeş günde bir def'a bi'n-nefs kal'alara varup yoklamak ve derya kapudanları hâzır olmadıkları mevsim-i sayfda vekilleri bulunan Tersane-i amire emînleri vech-i meşruh üzere hareket ve Tersane-i amire'de zikr olunan şurût bir mahalde mukayyed ve mazbut olup lede'l-hâce müracâ'at ve ahkâmı düstûru'l-amel olmak ve nizâm-ı mezkûrun bakâsı ve boğazların muhafazası vezir-i müşarun-ileyh tarafından ta'ahhüd olunduğuna binaen (159-a)..."

<sup>512</sup> Uzunçarşılı, "Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonraki," 516.



necessary ammunition to the fortresses, providing the necessary amount of soldiers and finally assigning salaries to either military or construction personnel.<sup>513</sup>

Ottoman historian Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi summarized the responsibilities of superintendents as following: “They should punish without showing any neglect the soldiers who behaved against the rules and regulations. They had to make the soldiers to practice firing cannons and shooting muskets. They also had to report the ammunition shortcomings of the fortresses. Finally, they had to chastise/punish those who left their positions in the fortresses and to find and organize new soldiers in their places. [...] The Ottoman government also assigned a salary of two thousand and five hundred (2500) guruşes to the superintendents to be paid in three installments from the Waqf of Sultan Mehmed Han.”<sup>514</sup>

A retrospective reference in a *mühimme* register summarized the administrative organization of the Bosphorus fortresses as follows:

The *Bostancı* Corps administered Rumeli and Anadolu Kavağı fortresses in the Strait of the Black Sea and below them the Batteries of Yuşa Burnu, Telli Tabya and Kireç Burnu. The others

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<sup>513</sup> One of the task defitions made in one of the documents for the position of superintendency was as following: BOA. TSMA.e. 805/72: “... kılâ-ı malumeye ulufe ile ma’a zâbitân topçu ve mustahfiz neferâtı tertib ve tedarik ve yerli yerine vaz ve iskân ve neferât-ı merkûmeye ve top ve mühimmat ve levâzım-ı sâireye dâimâ nezâret eylemek üzere...”

<sup>514</sup> Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu’l-Âsâr ve Hakâ’iku’l-Ahbâr* [Osmanlı Tarihi (1209-1219/1794-1805)], Prep. by. Hüseyin Sarıkaya, (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2017), 199-200: “Şurût-ı mezkûrenin hilâfı üzere hareket eden neferât bilâ-ihmâl te’dib olunalar. Ve daima kal’alardan top ve dâhil ü hâric-i kal’ada tûfeng atdırmak ve mühimmât-ı kılâ’ın noksanını haber vermek ve terk-i hidmet edenleri te’dib ve yerlerine âharları tedarük ve tertib etmek Kılâ’ Nâzırı’nın vazifesi olmağla, bu maddelere kemâl-i sadâkat ile nezâret eyleye. Ve bu hususların cümlesine nâzırlar her ne dikkat eyleyecekleri melhuz ise dahi, Kapudan Paşa hazretleri [s. 199] Tersane’de oldukça her on beş günde bir kerre varup, nezâret ve seferber olduklarında vekilleri olan ümenây-ı Tersâne her on beş günde bir bi’n-nefs nezâret ile işbu nizâm ilâ-mâ-maşaallah câri olup, hilâfına dâyir hareket vâki’ olmamasına sa’y ü gayret eyleyeler. Ve Nâzır olanlara Ebu’l-feth Sultan Mehmed Hân Gazi Vakfi fazlasından üç taksit ile iki bin beş yüz guruş maaş tahsis olunup...”

the nine fortresses] were administered and protected by the Superintendent of the Bosphorus [*Boğaz Nâzırı*].<sup>515</sup>

Despite the fact that it is not clear when this division between former Four Fortresses and latter Five/Seven/Nine Fortresses emerged, this probably happened sometime in 1780s. It is also possible to speculate that this division occurred when the Ottoman government appointed the first superintendent to the Bosphorus fortresses in 1785 as will be discussed in detail below. It can be concluded that the *bostancı* kept their hand on the rulers, who traditionally depended on them, but that the new forts go to the Superintendent of the Bosphorus.

The title of the Superintendent also changed according to time and context, with various alternatives including the Guardian of the Black Sea Fortresses (*Kaleler Muhâfızı*), the Superintendent of the Black Sea Strait (*Karadeniz Boğazı Nâzırı*), the Superintendent of the Fortresses (*Kaleler Nâzırı*), and the Seraskier of the Straits (*Boğaz Seraskeri*). The Superintendent also had a Treasurer (*Boğaz Defterdarı*).<sup>516</sup>

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<sup>515</sup> BOA. A.DVNS.MHM.d. 227, p. 84. “Bahr-i siyah boğazında vaki kal’alardan Rumili ve Anadolu kavakları ve aşağısında vâki Yuşa burnu ve Telli tabya ve Kireç burnu tabyası Bostancı ocağı neferâtiyla idâre olunub ma’dâsı boğaz nâzırları marifetleri ve neferât ve zâbitan mertebesiyle idâre ve muhafaza olunur iken zâbitasına halel gelüb râbita ve nizâmları muhtell olmağla bu def’a nâtik ve’l ikbâl cülûs-ı hümâyun-ı hayriyet-makrûnum vâki olub mehâmm-ı saltanat-ı seniyye ve hidemât-ı devlet-i aliyemin yerlü yerince merkez-i lâyıkında idâresi ve her umûr ve hidmetin ehli-lâyıkına tefviz ve ihâlesi murâd-ı hayr-î’tiyâd-ı şâhânem muktezâsından idüğü ve cüz’i ve küllî her bir maddede sadriazam ve vekil-i mutlak sadâkat-i alemim düstûr-ı vezirim Mustafa Paşa [dâme] iclâlehu ve iktidârehunun taraf-ı hümâyunumdan istiklâl tâm ve ruhsat-ı kâmile ve istibâdi? olduğundan boğaz nuzzârına hamîyyet ve sadâkat erbâbından ve zâbita-i neferât ve râbita-i zâbitânî yoluyla istihsâle muktedir olacak dârendegândan birinin boğaz nezâretine memuriyeti lazım gelüb şöyle ki kavak kal’aları ve aşağısında olan tabyalara bostânî neferâtı tertîbiyle olan âdât ve muhâfazalarına kemâ fi’l evvel bostancı ocağından i’tinâ olunmak üzere bostancıbaşı dâme mecduhûya buyuruldu isdâr olunmağla sen dahi yukarı kılâ-ı sâireye nâzır tayin olunmuşsundur. İmdi boğaz nâzırlarının makarrı olan mahalde ikâmet edüb boğaz nâzırlarının nezâretinde olan kal’aları yegân yegân muayene ve her birinin neferâtını ...cısından olmayarak iktizâsına ve her bir kal’anın tahammülüne göre tahrir ve tertîb ve zâbitânî kâideleri üzere tanzim-birle defterlerini takdime mübâderet edüb vech-i lâyık ve üslûb-ı muvâfık üzere müşîrâne-i hüsn-i râbita ve nizâmlarını istihsâle velhâsıl boğaz kal’alarının emin olunacak vechile istihkam ve neferâtını istikmâle sarf-ı makderet ve bostancıbaşı mumailiyh ile dahi iktizâsına göre muhâbere ve ittihad ederek sûret-i nizâmını i’lâm ve iş’âra müsâra’at eylesin. göreyim seni. Sadriazamım müşarunileyhin sana vaki olan ve olacak emir ve tenbihi üzere hareket ederek hâtîrhâh-ı mülûkâneme muvâfık olacak vechile kılâ-ı merkûmenin zâbita-i müstahsene ve istihkâmât-ı lâzimesi istikmâl ve icrâya bezl-i makderet eylemek bâbında fi Evâsıt-ı Cemaziyelahir 1223.”

<sup>516</sup> Gökbilgin, “Boğaziçi”, 691; BOA. C.AS. 130/5810.

### 5.3.1. The First Superintendent of the Bosphorus: Mustafa Ağa

The first Superintendent appointed to the Bosphorus fortresses was Mustafa Ağa. Even though it was planned to appoint Yusuf Ağa who was a gate-keeper of the imperial court (*dergâh-ı âli kapıcıbaşısı*), the Grand Admiral wanted to keep Yusuf Ağa in his private service because of his extreme need for him. Consequently, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa favored the appointment of Mustafa Ağa who was his personal gate-keeper (*kapıcılar kethüdası*) to the position of the Superintendency. Thus, the sultan appointed Mustafa Ağa as *Nâzır* with the assignment of *zeâmet*. Mustafa Ağa, as is all other following Superintendents, had to reside always in the region of the Bosphorus fortresses. In addition, Yusuf Ağa was tasked to supervise the needs of Bosphorus fortresses by visiting them once or twice a week.<sup>517</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> The undated imperial decree of his appointment: BOA. TSMA.e. 805/72. "Benim vezirim, Kapudan paşanın tezkiresi mucibince râbitası verilse paşa-yı mumaileyhe infial etmez ve boğaz dahi yine tarafında olmak üzere hoş olur mülâhaza ederim. gayri ne vechile münâsib ve müstahsen ise yine arz idesin." "Şevketlü kerametlü mehabetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım. Malûm-ı hümayun-ı şâhâneleri olduğu üzere Karadeniz boğazında vaki kilâ-ı malumeye ulufe ile ma'a zâbitân topçu ve mustahfiz neferâtı tertib ve tedarik ve yerli yerine vaz ve iskân ve neferât-ı merkûmeye ve top ve mühimmat ve levâzım-ı sâireye dâimâ nezâret eylemek üzere mukaddem ve mu'ahhar şeref-rîz-i sudûr olan emr-i hümayun ve hatt-ı şerîf-i şevket-redifleriyle büyük mirâhorluk payesi ilâvesiyle kapudan paşa kullarının kapı kethüdası Yusuf Ağa kulları nâzır tayin ve memuriyetini nâtık beyaz üzerine bir kıt'a buyuruldu isdar ve muşarunileyh mumaileyhe şifâhen tenbih eylesesini mutazammın taraf-ı çâkeriden bir kıt'a tezkire dahi tahrir olunub gönderilecek buyuruldu ve tezkirenin ayları atebe-i ulyâ-yı mülûkânelerine ba'de'l-arz manzûr-ı hümayunları buyurulmuşdu. Elhâletü hâzihi mumaileyhe nezâret-i merkûme için hil'at ilbas olundu mu diyu su'al-i hümayun buyurulmuş manzûr-ı hümayunları olan buyuruldu te'hir ve tezkire-i çâkeri ol gün taraf-ı muşarunileyhe irsâl olundukda muşarunileyh kulları merkum Yusuf Ağa'nın hizmetinde eşedd-i lüzumu ve sefer ve hazerde umûrum muhavvel-i uhdesi olmak hasebiyle kapıcılar kethüdam olan Mustafa Ağa ol havalide daima sakin olmak ve mumaileyh Yusuf Ağa dahi haftada bir veya iki defa varub nezaret eylemek ve evvel düşen zeâmet merkum Mustafa Ağa'ya ihsan olunmak rica ve istid'âsı mazmûnlarında bir kıt'a tefâsil-i tezkire tahrir ve divan kâtibi Ahmed Efendi kulları yediyle irsâl etmekle tezkire-i mezbûre lede'l mutala'a istidâlarına müsaade olunmakda kat'a zarar melhûz olmayub yine tamamca matlub hâsil olacağı cihetden istid'âsı üzere evvel düşen zeâmet merkûm Mustafa Ağa'ya vaad ve tahriri vechile buyurulduğu mezbur tebdil olunmağla irsal olunmak üzere idüğü ve muşarunileyh kullarının zikr olunan tezkiresi manzûr-ı hümayunları buyurulmak için ma'rûz-ı rikâb-ı hümayunları kılındığı malum-ı âilileri buyuruldukda emr u ferman şevketlü kerâmetlü mehabetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım hazretlerindir."; Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, prep. by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 215.

According to a retrospective document, Mustafa Ağa was appointed to this position on 4 Ramazan 1199/11 July 1785.<sup>518</sup> Lafitte-Clave also mentioned Mustafa Ağa for the first time in his journal entry dates back to 13 July 1785 with a title of “Commandant of Fortresses”.<sup>519</sup> This shows that Mustafa Ağa went to inspect the fortresses and the buildings under construction immediately after his appointment.

Another archival document dates back to 14 Şevval 1199/20 August 1785 indicates some kind of a delegation of duty between Grand Admiral and the Superintendent of the Five Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Hamse Nâzırı). Vizier Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa informed the Porte that an imperial decree should be sent directly to Mustafa Ağa in order to provide the wood needs of a new redoubt to be built in Büyük Liman.<sup>520</sup>

Mustafa Ağa worked as the Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses from 1785 to 1788, having the title of the Nâzır of the Five Fortresses (Nâzır-ı Kılâ’-ı Hamse)<sup>521</sup> or the Nâzır of the Nine Fortresses (Nâzır-ı Kılâ’-ı Tis’a)<sup>522</sup> or the Nâzır of the the Fortresses of the Strait of the Black Sea (Nâzır-ı Kılâ’-ı Boğaz-ı Bahr-i Siyah)<sup>523</sup>.

In August 1787, the Ottoman government assigned Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa to serve in the Russian front during the Ottoman and Russo-Austria war.<sup>524</sup> However, the Ottoman government always wanted to have someone with

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<sup>518</sup> BOA. C. AS. 215/9193. “Berâ-yı ta’yînât-ı Mustafa Ağa Nâzır-ı kılâ’ der boğaz-ı bahr-i siyah ki beher yevm îñ kadar tayinat an cânib-i serkassâbân ve emîn-i Matbah-ı Âmire dâde fermude. El vaki der sene 1199. Ber müceb-i takrîr-i vezîr-i mükerrem Hasan Paşa kapudân-ı derya ve derkenar ve telhis ve fermân-ı âli fi 4 Ramazan sene 1199 ve bâ fermân-ı şerif. An canib-i matbah-ı âmire dâde fermude. Suret dâde. 5 Ramazan 1199.”

<sup>519</sup> Lafitte-Clavé, *Journal D’un Officier Français à Constantinople en 1784-1788*, 95. “Toussaint est revenu ce matin de Buyuk Liman où les ouvrages vont fort lentement, malgré les ordres du Capitan Pacha. Mustafa aga comandant des forts a vû Toussaint à Buyuk Liman et lui a demandé si les bois étoient arrivés; il lui a répondu qu’il n’y en avoit encore que 23 charges de cheval et que ces bois n’avoient que 5 ou 6 pieds.”

<sup>520</sup> BOA. C.AS. 23/1027. 14 Şevval 1199/20 August 1785. (“Haslar kâdisına ve Karadeniz Boğazı’nda Kılâ-ı Hamse nâzırı Mustafa zîde mecduhûya hüküm ki...”)

<sup>521</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1179/52578; BOA. C.AS. 648/27243.

<sup>522</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1094/48294; BOA. C.AS. 1140/50667.

<sup>523</sup> BOA. AE.SABH.I. 47/3372.

<sup>524</sup> Mahir Aydın, “Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa”, TDV DiA.

the title of Pasha to supervise the security of the Bosphorus. With the assignment of Cezayirli Hasan Paşa to the Russian front, Mustafa Ağa remained low in rank to supervise the Bosphorus alone. As a solution, the Ottoman government promoted Mustafa Ağa to a higher rank and assigned him brigadier (*mirliva*) in Şevval 1201/August 1787.<sup>525</sup>

This indicates that the Ottoman government constituted a new administrative unit for the defense of the Bosphorus as of 1787. It became obligatory henceforth to have an official with the title of Pasha to supervise the Bosphorus defenses.

### 5.3.2. A Superintendency Residence

The position of Superintendency gained in importance around 1790s. In order to supervise the security of the Black Sea Strait and the construction activities in the fortresses more effectively, the Superintendents began to reside in the village of Rumeli Feneri. First, the Ottoman government rented a house for the Superintendent in Rumeli Feneri. The Superintendent of the time was Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa. At the same time, the Ottoman government planned to construct a

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<sup>525</sup> BOA. C.AS. 418/17321. "Karadeniz boğazında kılâ-ı hamse nâzırı Mustafa dâme izzahuya hüküm ki, Sen ki mîr-i mûmaileyhsin, senin meyâne-i ümenâlikden?... intihab ve kılâ-ı mezkûreye nâzır nasb olmakdan ve badehu kadr u itibarın mîrlivalık rütbesiyle terfi ve tayin kılınmakdan maksûd kılâ-ı mezkurenin kâffe-i nizam ve esbab takviye ve muhafazalarını istikmâl ve itsihâl birle ale'd-devâm bekâ-yı nizâm ve muhâfaza ve hirâsetlerine bezl-i mechûd eylemek kaziyyesi olub geçen havâli-i mezkureye bizzat teşvik-i hümayûnum vukû'unda muktezâ-yı me'muriyetin üzere her hususa dikkat ve şerâyet-i nizam-ı kılâ'a bezl-i makderet üzere olduğun meşhûd-ı şâhânem olan âsârdan istidlâl olunmakdan nâşi umûr-ı memuriyetine sâdikane hareketin karîn-i tahsîn-i şehriyârânem olmuştur. Hemîşe berhurdâr ve hân-ı amîmu'n nevâl li tâc-dârânemde behredâr olasin. Fi mâ ba'd dahi himmet ve ikdâmına bir vechile fûtûr ve kesl getirmeyüb mechûl ve mahbûl olduğun sadâkat ve istikâmet ve hamîyyet ve dirâyet muktezâsınca kâffe-i umûr-ı kılâ'ın vech-i merğûb üzere ber vefk-i merâm te'diye ve temşiyetlerine ikdâm eylemek fermanım olmağın hâssaten işbu emr-i âlişanım isdar ve ... irsal olunmuştur. İmdi kılâ-ı mezkureye sen nâzır olman mülâbesesiyle cüz'î ve külli kâffe-i umûrları senden matlûb-ı dâverânem olduğun ve hüsn ve kubhu tarafına râci olacağı malumun oldukça göreyim seni zamirinde merkûz cevher-i sadâkat ve kiyâset ve himâye-i isâbet dârâyda muktezâ üzere kılâ-ı mezbûrenin her birinin dizdar ve zabitan ve neferâtı ve daima hidmet-i me'mûrelerinde kıyam ve birisini menkûb? ve noksan olmamak ve top ve sâir edevât-ı harbiyye ve mühimmât-ı sâireleri mükemmel ve zâbitan ve neferâtı re'y ve irâdene muvâfakat ve re'yinden hâriç hareketden mubâ'adet etmek ve sâilini dâima istihsâl birle gereği gibi takviye ve istihkâmlarına ve hidmet-i memûrelerine tekâsül eder olur ise o makûle gerek keyfiyetlerini bilâ ketb der aliyeme bildirerek nizâm-ı kılâ'ı halelden vikâye ve rûz-ı bâl müteyakkızâne ve mütebassırâne hareket velhâsıl nâzırlığına müteferri kâffe-i mehâmmin ber vefk-i matlûb te'diye ve temşiyetlerine ve sende me'mul ve şimdiye dek meşhûd üzere gayret ve hamîyyeti her hissedârın sarf u kudret ve ednâ ve kusur ve gafletten tehâşi ve mücânebet eylemek bâbında fi Evâhir-i şevval 1201."

prestigious residence (*konak*) for the Superintendent close to Papaz Burnu near Rumeli Feneri. However, the Building Superintendent Azmi Efendi suggested that the construction of a new residence would take at least two years and cost at least forty to fifty pouches of akçe. Azmi Efendi informed the Ottoman government that it could buy the rented residence instead in return for four thousand guruşes and they would spend on additional sum of one thousand guruşes for its repair in order to make it a residence suitable for a superintendent. The owner of the house was willing to sell it because he did not have the means to fix it. The Ottoman government considered this suggestion and decided to buy the house, repair and make it the residence of the Superintendents of the Bosphorus in 1795. The Imperial Mint (Darbhane-i Âmire) paid five thousand guruşes to the owner out of the special fund reserved for the Bosphorus Fortresses (ebniye-i kılâ'a muhtass akçe).<sup>526</sup>

However, the residence that was rented by the Ottoman government for superintendents had ruined in 1808. Consequently, the Ottoman government decided the construction of a new residence for Superintendents. Thus, the Head-Architect Hafız Mehmed Emin was dispatched to Rumeli Feneri to inspect this dilapidated mansion and the Fener tower and other buildings that were also in need

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<sup>526</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 150. "Be cihet-i baha ve mesarif-i tamir-i konak der fener-i Rumili sâkin-i Mehmed Ağa serbevvin-i dergâh-ı âli nâzır-ı boğaz-ı bahr-i siyah ez an sebep ki piş ez in der mahall-i Papaz burnu müceddeden konak inşa şude. irade-i aliyye taalluk kerde. ve hala konak-ı mezkur el mahsus be nâzır-ı boğaz-ı merkum ba irade-i aliyye an cânib-i miri mübayaa şude fermude. el vaki der sene 1210 ve bera-yı baha ve mesarif eş in kadar meblağ an akçe-i mahsusa-i ebniye-i kıla an canib-i darbhane-i mamure be mumaileyh ita ve be sergi-i hazine-i amire irad ve masraf şude fermude. tezkire-i hazine nuvişte takrir-i emin Azmi Efendi nâzır-ı ebniye-i kıla-ı tis'a ve telhis ve ferman-ı ali 14 muharrem 1210 ve bâ ferman-ı şerif. guruş 5000."; "Bahr-i siyah boğazında olan kılâ' ebniyesi nazırı saadetlü Azmi Efendinin bab-ı aliye takdim eylediği takririnde muharrer bulunduğu üzere bahr-i siyah boğazında kâin Papaz burnu nâm mahalde ... musammem bulunan kal'a derununda boğaz nazırına mahsus eğerçi bir konak binası hususu irade-i keramet-ifade-i şahaneye mutaalık olub tasmin olduğu üzere inşasına mübaşeret olunsa dahi takmili iki seneye mütevakkıf ve elhaletü hazihi boğaz nazırı Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa'nın Rumili fenerinde icar ile sâkin olduğu konağının binasına vehn tarihi ve sahibinin tamire kudreti olmadığından fûruhta râğıb olduğuna binaen bahası canib-i miriden verilerek dört bin guruş iştır ve tamirine bin guruş sarf olunsa el vereceği ve cânib-i mîri mesarif-i rû'yetden vareste olacağı ve müceddeden konak inşa olunduğu suretde kırk elli kese akçe ile ancak vücuda geleceği zâhir olmağla bina ve tamiri için nazır-ı mumaileyhin beş bin guruş itasını inha etmeğin nazır-ı mumaileyh el yevm Rumili fenerinde icar ile sâkin olduğu konağının nazırlara mahsus olarak cânib-i miriden mübayaa olunmasına irade-i aliyye taalluk eylediğinden konak-ı mezkurun baha ve mesarif-i tamiri için itası muktezi olan beş bin guruş ebniye-i kıla' fûrû'atından olduğuna binaen ebniye-i kıla'a muhtass olarak darbhane-i amireden mevcut olan akçeden verilmek üzere baş muhasebeye kayd ve tezkire ve sureti ita olunmak babında....15 M 1210."

of repair or renewal. He went to do these inspections accompanied by a group of the assistant architects and kalfas. His report, presented in Şevval 1223/November 1808, proposed the reconstruction of a new residence for superintendents in the village of Rumeli Feneri.<sup>527</sup> The choice of Rumeli Feneri for the residency of the Bosphorus Superintendent was probably because it was a control point of the entrance to the strait that was at stake and the surveillance of the open sea that was at stake.

#### 5.4. The Formation of the Bosphorus Guardianship

Another new position formulated by the Ottoman government as a reflection of their concerns regarding the security of Istanbul was the Bosphorus Guardianship (*Boğaz Muhafızlığı*). Guardians of the Bosphorus were the highest authority with the title of vizierate certainly appointed in times of wars and urgencies.

The position of the Bosphorus guardian can be compared with that of the commander-in-chief of the navy (*donanma serdârı*) in military expeditions. Both were temporary positions filled only in times of special need. In the case of the latter, for example, the grand admiral was normally the highest-ranking officer in the Ottoman imperial fleet; however, in cases where an expeditionary fleet included naval forces from the Ottoman provinces or allied foreign states in addition to the Istanbul fleet, the Ottoman government appointed a commander-in-chief of the navy above the grand admiral to temporarily take command of the entire fleet. Such examples likely served as historical precedents in the creation of the position of the guardianship of the Bosphorus.

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<sup>527</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1028/45080. “Sâdır olan fermân-ı âlileri mucebince bahr-i siyah boğazının Rumili sâhilinde vaki fenar kurbünde nâzır ağalara mahsus münhedim olan konak ebniyesi ve fenar kulesi ve inşa olunacak ebniye-i sâireyi muayene için bi’n-nefs çâkerleri ve çend nefer hulefâlar kullarıyla varılıb muayene ve mesâha olundukda mahall-i mezkurda kâin ber-mûceb-i resm inşa olunacak dâhiliye ve hariciyeyi kebir konak ebniyesi kârgir duvarlar ve muhterik olan firun ve cami-i şerif ve bir aded zâbitan hanesi ve kapu akhisarında diğér menzil ebniyesi ve müştêmilât-ı sâiresiyle münhedim olan fenar kulesinin kadîmi üzere inşası ve Papaz burnu tabyasında harab olan mahalleri tecdid ve tanzimi ve karye-i mezkûrda hammâmın tamiri ve camekân ebniyesi inşa olunmak vechile mahallinde bi’t-taharri keşf ve mesâha-birle dört bendi müştemiş terkîm ve takdîm olunan defteridir ki zikr olunur. gurre-i Şevval 1223. [Keşif Defteri] Bende Hafız Mehmed Emin Sermimarân-ı hassa.” For the long estimation register, see. C.AS. 1028/45080, p. 1.

The grand admirals who were appointed as seraskiers of the Black Sea in times of war served to a similar purpose before the creation of the Bosphorus Guardianship. For instance, during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, Halil Hamid Paşa was appointed as the highest authority to supervise the fortification and military affairs of the Bosphorus as were Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa during the reign of Abdulhamid I and the New Order Treasurer (İrad-ı Cedid Defterdarı) Mustafa Çelebi Reşid Efendi during the reign of Sultan Selim III. Even though they did not hold a specific title in this position, they functioned as supervisors and decision makers. The Superintendents and construction officials had to consult them on all matters concerning the construction and repair of the defensive structures, the military personnel and provisions of the fortresses and any problem that might occur in the fortresses between workmen and/or soldiers.

The beginning of Ottoman-Russia war of 1787-1792 created a new period of threat to the Strait of the Black Sea and the Ottoman government increased its measures of defense. Consequently, they created a new position of the Bosphorus Guardianship (*Boğaz Muhafızlığı*) and divided the roles and positions of the guardianship and the superintendency. The guardianship was not permanent but created only in cases of urgencies. The first Bosphorus Guardian was appointed with the beginning of Ottoman-Russian war in 1787 and he was discharged from this position when the war ended with the signing of Yaş Treaty in 1792.

The Bosphorus Guardians were selected from among the viziers.<sup>528</sup> Even though the superintendents were only responsible for the Seven or Nine Fortresses excluding Four Fortresses under the authority of *Bostancıbaşı*, the Bosphorus Guardians were responsible for all of them.

The responsibilities of a Bosphorus Guardian was narrated in one of the sultan's commission order in detail. According to this imperial decree, the Guardian should stay in an appropriate place somewhere in the Bosphorus. The Guardian should

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<sup>528</sup> BOA. C.DH. 227/11309. "Ber muktezâ-yı vakt u hâl Karadeniz Boğazı muhafazasında vüzerâ-i izâmımın kârgüzar ve istikâmet-şîârlarından birinin vücûdu elzem ve ehemmi-umûrdan idüğü zâhir..."



inspect and control the order in the Bosphorus Fortresses and should periodically examine their missings and necessities. In addition, the Guardian should warn loungers in their services accordingly. The Guardians should also make the Commanders to meet any shortcoming of the fortresses. The artilleries, the carriages and rounds of the guns (top yuvarlağı) and any other armory ammunitions should have been complete, perfect and in order. If there was anything in need of repair, it should be reported to the authorities. The gunners should have waited present by the guns night and day. The guardsman should have waited in the police stations (karakol) in nights. The authorities should ever never make a mistake in following the procedure of caution and alert. This sensitivity should not be exclusive only to the Bosphorus and its fortresses but also the Guardian should also inspect and supervise the shores in both sides out of the Bosphorus. The Guardian was also responsible for the protection of the shores from Şile to Sinop on the Anatolian side and from Karaburun to İğneada on the European side.<sup>529</sup>

### 5.5. The Chronological List of Superintendents and Guardians of the Bosphorus

Sometime between 1788 and 1789, The Superintendent Mustafa died and his child took over his position with zeâmet.<sup>530</sup> In addition, the Ottoman government made a reform in the administrative organization of Bosphorus at that time and appointed a Guardian for the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Muhafızı*) who held a higher rank than the

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<sup>529</sup> BOA. C.DH. 227/11309. "... İmdi boğaz-ı merkurda bir münasib mahalde ikamet ve Rumili ve Anadolu kılâ'ına nezaret ve nizamlarını aralık aralık ale'd-devâm yoklayub mevcut ve nâ-mevcutlarını bilerek ve hizmetlerinde tekâsül edenleri iktizâsına göre tedib ederek ve nâ-mevcutlardan birisi nâkis olmamak üzere dizdarlarına derhal tekmil etdirterek istikrâr-ı nizamlarını ihtimam ve dikkat ve kıla-ı merkûmenin top ve kundak ve yuvarlak ve mühimmat cebhaneleri mükemmel ve muntazam olmak ve kundak ve top tahtalarından muhtac-ı tamir olanları var ise derhal bildirmek ve her kalenin topçuları gece ve gündüz fitil derdest toplar başlarında müheyya olmak ve gecelerde karakol bekletmek hususlarına ve merâsim-i teyakkuz ve intibâha mugâyir zinhar ve zinhar bir gûne kusur ve kûsur vukua gelmemek hâlâtına sarf-ı makderet ve meymûniyetin yalnız kılâ ve boğaza münhasır olmayub boğazdan taşra cânibeyn sevâhiline dahi aleddevam nezaret ve bundan mukaddem Kocaili sancağının sevâhil-i kazalarından bâ evâmir-i şerîfe tertib olunan neferâtın defteri tarafına gönderilmekle anların dahi memur oldukları vechile alâ tariki'l münâvebe Şile'den Sinop'a varınca sevâhil muhafazasında kıyâm eylemeleri nizâmının idâme ve ibkası hususuna bezl mâ hasal miknet ve leyl ü nehâr iki sahile tarafından âdemler tayin edüb geşt ü güzar ve ıyâzen billahi teala düşman seffinesini zuhûr etmek lazım gelür ise birbirlerini âgâh ederek ve beru kalâlara ve tarafınıza derhal haber vermelerini ve ale'd-devam âgâh ve muteaykkız olunmalarını tenbih ve te'kid ve min-küllî'l-vücuha esbâb ve levazım hıfz ve hirâseti istikmâle ve hizmet-i memurelerinde ednâ kusur edenlerin lâyük oldukları te'dibâtın icrâsına daima dermeyân gayret..."

<sup>530</sup> BOA. C. AS. 215/9193. "...ba'de'l-vefat yerine sabî oğlu nazır tayin olunalı..."

Superintendent. Mustafa Paşa (not to be confused with the above-mentioned Superintendent, whose name was Mustafa as well) was appointed as the Guardian of the Bosphorus with the title of vizier at some time probably in 1202/1788.<sup>531</sup> Mustafa Paşa was the sultan's son-in-law (*dâmâd-ı şehriyârî*)<sup>532</sup>, former armorer (*silahdar*) and later would be caimacam (*rikâb-ı hümayun kaymakamı*)<sup>533</sup> who would be removed from this position in Cemaziyelahir 1203/March 1789 because of his incapacity to perform his duties and because of bread being very black.<sup>534</sup>

The deputy of the former superintendent's child was not competent to perform the task of Superintendency as well.<sup>535</sup> Consequently, the Ottoman government decided to appoint Seyyid Numan Bey to the superintendency in Şaban 1203/May 1789 while the son of Superintendent Mustafa had to be contented with only the zeâmet of his father.<sup>536</sup>

This had been the first time that a guardian and a superintendent served together. The delegation of duty between the guardian and the superintendent was explained as follows: Superintendent Seyyid Numan Bey was tasked with the organization and provision of soldiers, guns and other ammunitions while Bosphorus Guardian Vizier Mustafa Paşa was tasked with the supervision of Bosphorus in general. The Superintendent had to ally and comply with the guardian in all respects.<sup>537</sup>

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<sup>531</sup> BOA. C.AS. 84/3916.

<sup>532</sup> Vizier Silahdar Mustafa Paşa married to Beyhan Sultan who was the daughter of Sultan Mustafa III. Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, Prep by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: TTK, 1994), 138.

<sup>533</sup> *Rikâb-ı Hümayun Kaymakamı* is the deputy of the grand vizier when the grand vizier joined in the military expedition.

<sup>534</sup> Taylesanizade, 343, 405.

<sup>535</sup> BOA. C. AS. 64/3032.

<sup>536</sup> BOA. C. AS. 215/9193. "...Karadeniz Boğazı'nda vâki kılâ' nezâreti bir çocuğun üzerinde olub yerine vekil olan şahsın nâ-ehil olduğu mesmû-ı şâhâne olmakdan nâşi sabî-i mezbûr babasının zeâmetiyle kanaat eylemek ve nezâret-i mezbûre Seyyid Numan Bey'in me'mûriyetine ilave ve uhdesine ihâl olunmak mazmûnunda şeref-yafte-i sudûr olan hatt-ı hümayûn-ı kerâmet-makrûn mücebince..."

<sup>537</sup> BOA. C. AS. 215/9193. "...nezaret-i mezbûre Seyyid Numan Bey'in memuriyetine ilave ve uhdesine ihale olunsun. Kal'aların neferat ve top ve mühimmatına gereği gibi nezâret ve dikkat ve hâlâ boğaz muhafızı vezir Mustafa Paşa umumen nezarete memur olmağla onunla min külli'l-vücûh ittifak ve riâyet eylesün. 17 Şaban 1203."; BOA. HAT. 192/9385.

The Bosphorus Guardian Mustafa Paşa became caimacam and in the place of Caimacam Mustafa Paşa, the former Caimacam El-Hâc Salih Paşa was appointed to the Guardianship of Bosphorus in Zilkade 1203/August 1789 with the distinction of Rumeli and then the governorate of Kocaeli.<sup>538</sup>

Salih Paşa did not held this position for a long time since he was employed in the imperial army and the Ottoman government replaced him with Seyyid Mustafa Paşa in December 1789.<sup>539</sup>

Parallel to this, Kapıcıbaşı Seyyid Numan Bey was appointed to the Bosphorus fortresses as the second superintendent so far in the spring of 1203/1789.<sup>540</sup> He worked in this position only for a year where he usually used the title of the Superintendents of the Black Sea Strait (Karadeniz Boğazı Nazırı), the Superintendent of Five Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Hamse Nâzırı) and the Superintendent of Nine Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Tis'a Nâzırı).<sup>541</sup>

Next year, Seyyid Numan Bey was employed in the imperial army and the Commander of Kilyos (Bağdadçık) Fortress Mahmud Ağa deputized him. Then, the Chamberlain of the Imperial Dockyard (Tersane Kethüdası), Ahmed Bey was appointed as the new Superintendent with the rank of the governorate of Cezayir [-i Bahr-i Sefid].<sup>542</sup> Ahmed Paşa probably worked for a few months or such a short period in this position.<sup>543</sup>

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<sup>538</sup> BOA. HAT. 265/15404; Taylesanize, 406. "(Zilkade 1203/August 1789) Ve yine kaimmakâm-ı sâbık Elhâc Salih Paşa hazretlerini hâlâ Kaimmakâm Mustafa Paşa hazretlerinin yerine Boğaz muhafazasına tayin buyurulmuşlardır."; BOA. HAT. 267/15505; Taylesanizade, 418. "(Muharrem 1204/September-October 1789) Kaimmakâm-ı sâbık Elhâc Salih Paşa'ya Kocaeli eyaleti tevcih ve Boğaz muhafızı olmuştur."

<sup>539</sup> BOA. C.AS. 572/24065.

<sup>540</sup> BOA. C. AS. 215/9193; BOA. C.AS. 212/9081.

<sup>541</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1157/51456, BOA. C.AS. 908/39168, BOA. C. AS. 111/5017.

<sup>542</sup> BOA. HAT. 1391/55446; BOA. C.HR. 114/5653.

<sup>543</sup> BOA. C.AS. 951/41304, 16 Cemaziyelahir 1204/3 March 1790; AE.SSLM.III. 201/12028: According to this document, Ahmed Paşa organized the prices of ammunition and the wages of workmen in 22 Şaban 1204/7 May 1790.

However, Ahmed Paşa's appointment was cancelled sometime in Ramazan 1204/June 1790 because his duties in the Imperial Dockyard prevented him to perform the task of superintendency properly and thoroughly<sup>544</sup> Thus, the Commander of Kilyos Fortress Mahmud Ağa who was also the former deputy of Seyyid Numan Bey, was appointed to the Superintendency in Ramazan 1204/June 1790.<sup>545</sup> Mahmud Ağa worked as the new Superintendent of the Bosphorus fortresses from the summer of 1204/1790 with the title of "Nâzır-ı Kılâ'-ı Tis'a" until 1206/1792.<sup>546</sup>

In the spring of 1790, Seyyid Mustafa Paşa was the Guardian of the Bosphorus in Ramazan 1204/May 1790.<sup>547</sup> However, the Ottoman government decided to change the Guardian of the Bosphorus Seyyid Mustafa Paşa because of being poor in his health. Thus, the Ottoman government first planned to appoint the Guardian of Misivri Ferhad Paşa to the Bosphorus. The grand vizier objected to this opinion because of severe necessity to a vizier in Misivri where any disorder and irregularity would damage the security and order there.<sup>548</sup> After long discussions between Sultan Selim III and the grand vizier<sup>549</sup>, they decided to discharge Mustafa Paşa from

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<sup>544</sup> BOA. C.HR. 114/5653. "... mukaddema Karadeniz boğazında vaki kılâ' nezâreti Cezayir beylerbeyliği payesiyle tersane-i amirem kethüdası olan Ahmed Paşa dâmet ma'liyehü uhdesine bâ-emr-i âli egerçi ihale kılınmış idi. Lakin elhâletü hazîhi paşa-yı mumailiyh tersane-i amirem kethüdası olmak mülâbesesiyle kethüdalığa müteferri emrin rü'yeti kılâ-ı mezbure nezaretinin merâm üzere idare-i rüyetine mâni olmağla boğaz-ı mezkurda olan kılâ'ın nezâreti hususu erbâb-ı dirâyet ve iktidardan birinin uhde-i liyakatına ihale kılınması ehemmi mühimm-i lazımu'l ihtimamdan olduğu zâhir..."

<sup>545</sup> BOA. C.HR. 114/5653; HAT. 1395/55853: "Kaimmakam Paşa, Kal'alara nâzır Mahmûd Ağa'yı idersin. Şevketlü kerametlü mehabetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım, Karadeniz boğazı kalaları nezaretinin Tersane kethüdasından nez'î ve idaresine muktedir birine ihâlesi irade buyurulduğundan kalaların ve neferâtın keyfiyyâtına vâkıf ve nâzır-ı esbak müteveffa Mustafa ağa dikkatinde ekser kılâ' umûrunun idâresinde müstahdem yine kılâ-ı merkume dizdarlarından Mahmud ağa kulları boğazda ikâmetim esnasında çâkerlerinin mücerrebim olmağla irade buyurulur ise nezaret-i mezkure mumailiyhe ve kendü üzerinde olan dizdarlığı karındaşına ihale olunur. bu suret nezd-i şâhânelerinde müstahsen olur ise hil'ati ilbâs olunmak iktiza edeceği..."

<sup>546</sup> BOA. C.AS. 592/24924, 11 Zilkade 1204/23 July 1790; BOA. C.AS. 598/25218, 3 Zilhicce 1204/14 August 1790; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 136/8223, 21 Ra 1204; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 142/8571, 21 Ra 1205; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 136/8247, 21 Ra 1206; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 221/12954, 29 Z 1206; BOA. AE.SSLM.III.274/15866, 21 Ra 1206.

<sup>547</sup> BOA. C.HR. 114/5653.

<sup>548</sup> BOA. HAT. 1395/55853.

<sup>549</sup> BOA. HAT. 1396/56011; BOA. HAT. 1395/55877; BOA. HAT. 1397/56139; BOA. HAT. 1396/55932.

the Bosphorus Guardianship by downgrading (tuğları ref') him and allowing him to live in his palace in Eyyüb as a pensioner. In addition, they decided to appoint Kolçak Mustafa Ağa who knew the conditions of the Bosphorus because of being *Bostancıbaşı* before. Even though Bosphorus Guardians were selected from among mir or vizier in rank or were promoted to higher ranks, they kept Kolçak Mustafa Ağa with the title of head-gatekeeper.<sup>550</sup> Consequently, Kolçak Mustafa Ağa became the Guardian of the Bosphorus in Zilhicce 1204/August 1790.<sup>551</sup>

When Seyyid Numan Bey returned from his employment in the imperial army next year, he returned to his position in the defense of the Bosphorus as well. Mahmud Ağa continued to be the superintendent but Kolçak Mustafa Ağa had to share the Guardianship with Seyyid Numan Bey. Seyyid Numan Bey became responsible for the protection of the shores from the Bosphorus to its extents until İğneada sometime around Ramazan 1205/May 1791. A significant variation here is that the Ottoman government tasked Kolçak Mustafa Ağa with the Guardianship of the Bosphorus fortresses as well as with the security of the Anatolian shores out of the Bosphorus while Seyyid Numan Bey were responsible only for the European shores out of the Bosphorus.<sup>552</sup> Thus, it seems that there were two Bosphorus guardians having different realms of authorities at the same time. Seyyid Numan Bey was appointed as the Chief (başbuğ) of soldiers who were employed for the defense of

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<sup>550</sup> BOA. HAT. 1397/56089. "Kaimmakam Paşa, Tahrir mucebince tanzim oluna. Lakin Kolçak Mustafa Ağa'ya bir eyü tenbih eylesün, gözünü açsun."

<sup>551</sup> BOA. C.AS. 598/25218, 3 Z 1204. He served as the Bosphorus Guardian in the summer of 1205/1791 as well: BOA. C.AS. 951/41283, Zilkade 1205/July 1791; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 8/371: Boğaz Muhafızı Mustafa Ağa. (5 Receb 1206/28 February 1792).

<sup>552</sup> BOA. HAT. 196/9805: "Kolçak Mustafa Ağa ke'l-evvel boğaz muhafızı olarak Anadolu muhafazası kendine ihale ola. Ancak boğaz kal'alarının cümlesine yine Mustafa Ağa nezaret ve muhafazasına bakmak lazımdır. Zira Numan Beğ sevâhîle memurdur. Kal'alara değildir. Sadrazamın yazması böyle idi. Ana göre nizam viresin ve Misivri'ye varınca Numan Beğ nezaret eylesün ve askerlerine ve sair levazımâtına bakmak için iktizasına göre her mahalle âdemlar irsal eylesin kendine yazasın. 1205."; BOA. C. AS. 82/3840: "Dergâh-ı muallâm kapucubaşlarından olan hâlâ Karaburun ve İğneada ve Terkos ve havâlisi muhafazasına me'mûr olan es-Seyyid el-Hâc Mîr Nu'mân dâme meciduhûya ... hüküm ki"; BOA. C. HR. 111/5544: "...İğneada'dan Boğaz'a gelince vâki sevâhilin muhafazası emr-i ehemmine bi'l-istiklâl me'mur olan Seyyid el-Hâc Numan Bey..."; BOA. C.AS. 363/15056: "Bahr-i siyah boğazından İğneada'ya varınca vâki olan sevâhilin muhafazasına memur dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşlarından El-Hâc Numan Bey...".

the shores of İğneada in case of any possible Russian attack.<sup>553</sup> He was sometimes entitled as the Guardian of Misivri (today's Nesebar) and/or Karaburun.<sup>554</sup>

The appointments of both Seyyid Numan Bey and Mustafa Kolçak Ağa were temporal until a competent and appropriate Paşa took the authority. Seyyid Ahmed Paşa was discharged from his position of the governorate in the Morea in order to be employed as the Bosphorus Guardian because the protection of the Strait of the Black Sea became more important than anything else in the spring of 1791 since war with Russia continued. Until his successor governor İsmail Paşa arrives in the Morea in three months and then Seyyid Ahmed Paşa arrives in Istanbul within a month, Seyyid Numan Bey continued to keep his position as guardian in the Bosphorus.<sup>555</sup>

Then the Ottoman government appointed Seyyid Ahmed Paşa as the Bosphorus Guardian in Zilkade 1205/July 1791.<sup>556</sup> Immediately after Seyyid Ahmed Paşa arrived in Istanbul, the Ottoman government informed him with his new task as the Bosphorus Guardian.<sup>557</sup> Upon the coming of Seyyid Ahmed Paşa, there was no more need for Kolçak Mustafa Ağa as a guardian and he returned back to Istanbul.<sup>558</sup>

Seyyid Ahmed Paşa began his active duty immediately and inspected the equipment and ammunition shortcomings of the Bosphorus fortresses in August 1791.<sup>559</sup>

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<sup>553</sup> BOA. C. HR. 111/5544.

<sup>554</sup> BOA. C.AS. 608/25629; C.AS. 921/39829.

<sup>555</sup> BOA. HAT. 198/9994. "...ber muktezâ-yı vakt u hâl şu günlerde Karadeniz boğazı ve sevâhilinin muhafazası cümle umûra akdem olub muşarunileyh Ahmed Paşa'nın muhafaza-i mezkûreye vürûdu halefinin Mora'ya vürûduna mütevakıf olmakdan nâşi..."

<sup>556</sup> BOA. C.DH. 227/11309. "...sen ki vezir-i muşarunileyhsin maktur? olduğun kârgüzâri ve dirâyet muktezâsınca senin bu misillü hidemâtı rızâ-yı hümayunum muvafık ve vakt u hâl iktizasına mutabık olarak te'diye liyâkat ve iktidârın nezd-i şâhânemde bedîhi ve bâhir olmakdan nâşi boğaz-ı merkûm muhafızlığı uhde-i dirâyetine ihale ve tefviz olunmak hususuna irade-i aliyyem taalluk etmeğin memuriyetini havi rikâb-ı hümayunumda hassaten işbu emr-i âlişanım ve tarafına ile irsâl olunmuşdur."

<sup>557</sup> BOA. HAT. 208/11090.

<sup>558</sup> BOA. HAT. 194/9611.

<sup>559</sup> BOA. C.AS. 951/41306.

Seyyid Ahmed Paşa was at the same time Governor (Mutasarrıf) of Ankara<sup>560</sup> and he continued to serve in this position until 1792.<sup>561</sup> It is interesting to note that the household of Seyyid Ahmed Paşa was very large and probably the Superintendency residence remained insufficient. For this reason, his household lived in tents provided by Mehterhâne-i Âmire.<sup>562</sup>

The Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792 ended with signing the Treaty of Jassy in 10 January 1792. Next month in February 1792, the Ottoman government discharged Seyyid Ahmed Paşa from the Bosphorus Guardianship and appointed him to the Governorate of Erzurum because Bosphorus was not in need of urgent protection anymore.<sup>563</sup> For almost ten years, the Ottoman government did not appoint a guardian and the Superintendents only supervised the defences of the Bosphorus.

Superintendents were normally selected from the officials who held the title of head-gatekeeper or the rank of Pasha as discussed above. However, when the government appointed a guardian in times of war, superintendents were mostly selected from among the commanders of the fortresses since guardians were more competent and authorized in the security affairs.

For instance, Superintendent Mahmud Ağa was the former Commander of the Kilyos (Bağdadçık) Fortress and he remained incapable of managing the Bosphorus fortresses where some detrimental people appeared and brought insecurity to the

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<sup>560</sup> BOA. C.AS. 950/41270, 17 Z 1205.

<sup>561</sup> BOA. C.BH. 69/3279, 29 R 1206: Karadeniz boğazı muhafızı Vezir Ahmed Paşa maiyyetindeki iki piyade kayıkları neferatının iki yüz kuruş maaşlarının verilmesi.

<sup>562</sup> BOA. HAT. 208/11088.

<sup>563</sup> BOA. TSMA.e. 784/35; “Şehr-i Recebü’l-ferdin hilâlinde [24 Şubat 1792-Cuma] Selanik sancağı Ahmed Paşa’ya Pazarcık muhâfızlığı Vezîr el-Hâcc Abdi Paşa’ya ve Hanya muhâfızlığı sâbıkâ deryâ kapudanı olan Vezîr Giridî Hüseyin Paşa’ya ve Erzurum eyâleti Bahr-i siyâh boğazı muhâfızı Seyyid Ahmed Paşa’ya ve Mora muhassıllığı rikâb-ı hümâyûn kaymakamı Vezîr Silâhdâr Mustafa Paşa’ya tevcîh ü ihsân” (Bayram, Enveri, 885)

region.<sup>564</sup> Thus, the Ottoman government discharged him and Hacı Ali Ağa who was the Commander of the Garibçe Fortress became the Superintendent of the Nine Fortresses (Kıla-ı Tis'a Nâzırı) in the spring of 1206/1791.<sup>565</sup> Hacı Ali Ağa wrote in his official petition that he did not have any salary from somewhere else and he asked for the appointment of a military ration (*tayinat*) as given to former superintendents. He was appointed a military ration of ten pair of bread (nân-ı aziz), two *vukiyye* clarified butter (revgan-ı sade), three *vukiyye* rice (erz), three *vukiyye* meat (guşt) and two kilogram barley (şa'îr).<sup>566</sup>

The removal of the Bosphorus Guardianship with the end of war in 1792 made the effectiveness and respectability of the superintendency significant again. The Ottoman government paid attention to the character, capacity and hierarchical position of the superintendents. For instance, they appointed a superintendent with the title of head-gatekeeper again.

*Kapıcıbaşı* Mehmed Ağa became the Superintendent of the Bosphorus probably in 1208/1794.<sup>567</sup> Mehmed Ağa was called as Guardian (*muhafız*)<sup>568</sup>, the Superintendent of Seven Fortresses<sup>569</sup>, and mostly as the Superintendent of Nine

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<sup>564</sup> BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 209/12408 (Evasıt-ı Şevval 1206/June 1792): "...Bağdadçık kal'ası dizdarı Mahmud bir vechile idâreye kudreti olmadığından etraf ve eknâfta zuhûr eden eşhâs makûlesinin şürûr ve mazarratlarından etraf fukaralarının emniyetleri meslûb ve mutemed ve kârgûzar birinin tayini lâzimededen olduđu..."

<sup>565</sup> BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 209/12408.

<sup>566</sup> BOA. C.AS. 550/23055, Şevval 1206 (June 1792).

<sup>567</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 10: "Karadeniz boğazında inşa olunacak kılâ ebniyesi nazırı ve hala Tevkii Es-Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi hazretlerinin irsal eylediği bir kıt'a tezkiresi mealinde mühendisler için tedarük ve isticâri lazım olan piyadenin iki çifte olmasına gerek mumaileyh ve gerek muhafız Mehmed Ağa taraflarından bilmaiyye..." 15 Şevval 1208/16 May 1794; p. 10: "...kılâ-ı tis'a nâzırı dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşlılarından Mehmed Ağa marifetiyle.... 11 Ramazan 1209 [1 April 1795]"; BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 48, 80, 168: 15 Zilkade 1210/22 May 1796; p. 11: "Bâ-fermân-ı âli nezareti uhdesine ihale olunan bahr-i siyah boğazında Rumili ve Anadolu sahillerinde vaki' kılâ' ve tabya-i matlûbenin tamir ve termim ve tersiline irade-i seniyye taalluk etmekle resm olunduđu üzere mimar ağa Rumili cânibi bina emini hâcegân-ı divan-ı hümayundan Aziz Efendi ve Anadolu tarafı bina emini mimar-ı sabık Arif ve Kılâ-ı Tis'a Nâzırı Mehmed Ağa ve mühendis Kofer..." 24 Şevval 1208/25 May 1794. See also. BOA. HAT. 1404-56755.

<sup>568</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 10.

<sup>569</sup> BOA. C.AS. 820/34863, 17 S 1211.



Fortresses<sup>570</sup>. Mehmed Ağa was also a *silahşör* (the first rank cavalry)<sup>571</sup>, *Dergâh-ı âli gediklisi* (holding a special prescriptive right)<sup>572</sup>, and head-gatekeeper (*kapıcıbaşı*)<sup>573</sup>.

Mehmed Ağa became superintendent in a critical time period and he became one of the important superintendents since he served in many respects. During his superintendency, French engineer and cartograph officers came from France and worked collaboratively with Ottoman engineer and architects. Mehmed Ağa was also the first to organize the rental and later the construction of a special residence (*konak*) for Superintendents, which will be narrated in detail at the end of the chapter.<sup>574</sup>

Superintendent *Kapıcıbaşı* Mehmed Ağa was discharged from his position in 1797 because of his illness. The Grand Vizier informed the sultan that he visited the Bosphorus fortresses and even though the superintendent was warned to pay significant attention to the military training of the soldiers, he became ill and he could not coddle with their training perfectly. The Grand vizier observed that Mehmed Ağa does not seem to recover and to be able to perform his duty soon. Consequently, someone else eligible should have replaced him. Despite the fact that superintendents were selected from among the head-gatekeepers, the Grand vizier wrote that someone eligible from among the head-gatekeepers did not occur to his mind. Instead, he proposed the appointment of İsmail Ağa who was the sealer/private secretary (*mühürdar*) of Hayri Efendi who was a *Dergâh-ı âli gediklisi* (holding a special prescriptive right). Sultan Selim III approved the appointment of Seyyid İsmail Ağa to the Superintendency in 1211/1797.<sup>575</sup> Tirsiniklizade Seyyid İsmail Ağa was also the provincial notable of Ruse (*Ruşuk*) and he was promoted to

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<sup>570</sup> BOA. C.BH. 271/12492, 12 Ca 1208; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 410/23601, 29 Z 1209; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 379/21712, 29 Z 1210; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 53/3140, 29 Z 1208,

<sup>571</sup> BOA. C.AS. 941/40824, 27 M 1208; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 325/18896, 29 Z 1208.

<sup>572</sup> BOA. C.AS. 50/2323, 26 M 1208.

<sup>573</sup> BOA. C.DH. 51/2545, 9 B 1208; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 340/19634, 29 Z 1208.

<sup>574</sup> BOA. MAD.d. 8953, p. 150: 14 Muharrem 1210/31 July 1795.

<sup>575</sup> BOA. HAT. 205/10727: "Erbâbı ise olsun."

the title of head-gatekeeper in 1212 probably because it became a precedent that superintendents should have this title.<sup>576</sup>

Seyyid İsmail Ağa worked as the Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses from 1797 to 1801.<sup>577</sup> Seyyid İsmail Ağa was concerned with many issues from the repairs and renovations of the buildings to the organization, drilling and payments of the soldiers. He was mostly called as the Superintendent of the Black Sea Strait (Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı Nâzırı) or the Superintendent of Seven Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Seb'â Nâzırı). Seyyid İsmail Ağa was also employed to suppress the mountainous bandits somewhere in Tırnova.<sup>578</sup> Through the end of his position, he became occupied mainly with the issues related to bandits and then he was discharged from the superintendency in 1801.<sup>579</sup>

Hüseyin Ağa from Abdipaşa who was a *silahşör* (the first rank cavalry) and a *gedikli* of the imperial court was appointed as the new superintendent on 13 October 1801 and he probably served in this position for a year.<sup>580</sup>

Then, Ahmed Bey became the new superintendent next year and remained in this position until 1804.<sup>581</sup> Ahmed Bey was a chamberlain of the Imperial Dockyard and

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<sup>576</sup> Ahmed Vâsif Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakâ'iku'l-Ahbâr [Osmanlı Tarihi (1209-1219/1794-1805)]*, Prep by. Hüseyin Sarıkaya, (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2017), s. 269.

<sup>577</sup> BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 120/7308; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 329/19083; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 409/23542; BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 61/3632; BOA. C. AS. 764/32286; BOA. C.ML. 226/9407; BOA. C.AS. 1061/46683.

<sup>578</sup> BOA. C.AS. 101/4587; C.NF. 53/2612.

<sup>579</sup> BOA. C.AS. 794/33671.

<sup>580</sup> BOA. C.AS. 794/33671. "Arz-ı bendeleridir ki, Bundan akdem bahr-i siyah boğazı nazırı olan dergah-ı âli gediklilerinden İsmail Ağa azl olunub hassa silahşörlerinden ve dergâh-ı âli gediklilerindein Abdipaşalı Hüseyin Ağa kulları nazır nasb ve tayin olunmuş olduğu divan-ı hümayun derkenârından ve boğaz-ı mezkur nâzırı olanlara merhum ve mağfurun leh Sultan Mehmed Han tâbe serâhu hazretlerinin evkâfi fazlasından senede üç taksit ile mütevellileri tarafından iki bin beş yüz guruş maaş verilü geldiği baş muhasebe derkenârından müstebân olmağla sâbıkları üzere maaş-ı mezkûrun kendüye dahi itası hususuna müsaade buyurulmasını mumaileyh Hüseyin Ağa kulları işbu takiriyle istid'â eder. Bu suretde sâbıklarına verildiği vechile mezkûru'l-mikdâr maaşın mumaileyh dahi i'tâsı iktiza eylediği malum-ı devletleri buyuruldukda mücebince baş muhasebeye kayd olunub Haremeyn muhasebesine ve vakf-ı şerif mütevellisi taraflarına başka başka ilm u haberleri i'tâ olunmak bâbında emr u ferman devletlü saadetlü sultanım hazretlerindedir."; Cabi Ömer Efendi, *Cabi Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani) Tahlil ve Tenkidli Metin*, Prep by. Mehmed Ali Beyhan, Vol. I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 35.

the commander of a *çekdiri* vessel before.<sup>582</sup> He was mostly referred to as the Superintendent of the Seven Fortresses (Kılâ-ı Seb'a Nâzırı).

A Mehmed Bey without further information about his career served as a superintendent for a year in 1805.<sup>583</sup>

The beginning of war with Russia in 1806 which will continue until 1812 created another emergency for the Ottoman government and the position of guardianship came to the fore again. İnce Mehmed Bey/Paşa became the new Superintendent of the Bosphorus and Guardian of the European shores until Varna on 24 December 1806 with a promotion to *mirmiranlık* with the title of Rumeli governorate and then with Kocaeli governorate.<sup>584</sup> İnce Mehmed had a huge household composed of one hundred and fifty person. When he was appointed to this position, he was guaranteed to have a suitable and complete place to reside his whole household and to have increased military rations than given to previous superintendents. He was appointed daily ration of fifty pair of bread, ten *kıyye* meat (*lahm*), Egyptian rice (*erz-i misri*), ten *kıyye* clarified butter (*revgan-ı sâde*) and eight kilogram barley (*şâ'ır*) with increases.<sup>585</sup>

Then Mahmud Râif Efendi became the Superintendent of the Bosphorus in 1807 while İnce Mehmed continued to be the Bosphorus Guardian.<sup>586</sup> The superintendency of Mahmud Râif Efendi was significant for the implimentation of the reform projects of the New Order performed by the government of Sultan Selim III in the Bosphorus fortresses. Mahmud Râif Efendi was tasked with supervising the

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<sup>581</sup> BOA. AE.SSLM.III. 143/8634; AE.SSLM.III. 219/12815; AE.SSLM.III. 238/13889; AE.SSLM.III. 393/22728; AE.SSLM.III. 28/1611; C.AS. 989/43206; C.AS. 993/43396.

<sup>582</sup> BOA. C.BH. 46/2159.

<sup>583</sup> BOA. C.AS. 862/36944. "...boğaz-ı mezkûr nâzırı Mehmed Beğ kullarına hitâben memuriyeti zımında sûret i'tâsı bâbında emr u ferman devletlü inayetlü sultanım hazretlerindir...20 Cemaziyelahir 1220 [15 September 1805]."

<sup>584</sup> BOA. C.DH. 247/12341; BOA. C.AS. 155/6841; BOA. C.AS. 481/20084; BOA. C.DH. 247/12341.

<sup>585</sup> BOA. C.AS. 155/6841.

<sup>586</sup> BOA. C.AS. 358/14829; BOA. C.AS. 133/5927: "Boğaz nazırı sâbık Reisülküttab devletlü Mahmud Efendi hazretlerinin vusûl-ı cevâbı".

construction of some new defences in the Bosphorus in February 1807. In addition, he paid attention to the increase of trained-soldiers according to the New Order in the fortresses. However, some soldiers murdered Halil Ağa of the Macar Battery and Mahmud Râif Efendi in an occasion which is known as the Rebellion of the Bosphorus soldiers took place at this time.<sup>587</sup> Mahmud Râif Efendi was killed in Sariyer on 17 Rebiülevvel 1222/ 25 May 1807.<sup>588</sup>

Kabakçı Mustafa led a rebellion against the Ottoman government and Sultan Selim III was dethroned and replaced by Sultan Mustafa IV. After the Kabakçı Revolt and the murder of Mahmud Râif Efendi, Turnacıbaşı Kabakçı Mustafa became the superintendent of the Bosphorus in 1222/1807.<sup>589</sup> The dethronement of Sultan Selim III and the murder of a superintendent and a commander in the Bosphorus fortresses suspended the administrative and military organization of the Bosphorus defences for some time. The military personnel of the fortresses were restored to its previous state.

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<sup>587</sup> BOA. HAT. 23/5028. The details about the rebellion will be discussed in the next chapter.

<sup>588</sup> Kemal Beydilli, TDV DiA "Mahmud Râif Efendi".

<sup>589</sup> BOA. TSMA.e. 716/7.

Table 5.1. A List of the Superintendents of the Bosphorus

Name	Previous Position	Appointment Date	Dismissal Date	Promotion of Rank	Next Position
Mustafa Ağa	Personal Chamberlain of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa ( <i>kapıcılar kethüdası</i> )	11 July 1785		Promoted to brigadier ( <i>mirliva</i> ) in August 1787	Died in 1788
Mustafa Ağa's son		1788	1789	He held a fief ( <i>zeamet</i> ) of his father.	-
Seyyid Numan Bey	Gatekeeper of the Porte ( <i>dergâh-ı âlî kapıcıbaşı</i> )	Spring of 1789	Spring of 1790		Appointed to the Imperial Army
Ahmed Bey/Paşa	Chamberlain of the Imperial Dockyard ( <i>Tersâne Kethüdası</i> )	(appointed for a very short period of time, maybe a month in May 1790)	June 1790	Promoted to the rank of Algeria governorship ( <i>Cezayir Beylerbeyliği</i> ).	Returned to the previous position as Dockyard Chamberlain.
Mahmud Ağa (deputy) Kapıcıbaşı	Commander of Kilyos Fortress	Summer of 1790	August 1792		-
Mehmed Ağa	Head-Gatekeeper, <i>silahşör</i>	Spring of 1794	1797		Dismissed because of his poor health.
Seyyid İsmail Ağa	Sealer, <i>gedikli</i> Provincial notable of Ruse	1797	1801	Promoted to the title of Head-Gatekeeper	Appointed to suppress rebels in Tirnova
Hüseyin Ağa of Abdipaşa	<i>silahşör, gedikli</i>	13 October 1801	1802	-	-
Ahmed Bey	Chamberlain of the Imperial Dockyard and Commander of a war vessel	1802	1804	-	-
Mehmed Bey	unknown	1804	1805	-	-
İnce Mehmed Bey/Paşa		1806	1807	Promoted to <i>mirmiranlık</i> , held Rumeli and Kocaeli governorates	Appointed as the Bosphorus Guardian
Mahmud Râif Efendi	Former Head Clerk ( <i>Reisülküttâb</i> )	1807	25 May 1807	-	Murdered

Table 5.2. A List of the Guardians of the Bosphorus (During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1787-92)

Name	Previous Position	Appointment Date	Dismissal Date	Rank	Next Position
Mustafa Paşa	Sultan's son-in-law, former armorer, vizier	1788	March 1789	-	Caimacam
El-Hâc Salih Paşa	Former Caimacam	August 1789	December 1789	The distinction of Rumeli and the governorate of Kocaeli	Appointed to the imperial army
Seyyid Mustafa Paşa	Vizier, appointed to Sofia but called back for this position.	December 1789	August 1790	Downgraded after his dismissal.	Dismissed because of his poor health.
Kolçak Mustafa Ağa	Head-Gatekeeper	August 1790	July 1791	-	Returned to Istanbul, probably his former position.
Seyyid Numan Bey (shared duties with Kolçak Mustafa Ağa)	Former Superintendent, appointed to the Imperial Army	May 1791	July 1791	Appointed as the Chief of the Soldiers ( <i>Başbuğ</i> ) and Guardian of Misivri	
Seyyid Ahmed Paşa	The Governor of the Morea	July 1791	February 1792	Governorate of Ankara	Governorate of Erzurum

## 5.6. Conclusion

The positions of superintendency and guardianship of the Bosphorus were new formations of the Ottoman government as a response to the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea. These two positions created the administration of the Bosphorus security. Neither these positions nor the administrative and military organization of the Bosphorus defences has been studied until now. It was an obscurity who the superintendents and guardians were, what roles they had in the protection of the Bosphorus and what criteria the Ottoman government had in selecting them.

This chapter revealed that most superintendents were selected from among the head-gatekeepers of the imperial court or from among those with the title of Pasha.

The Ottoman government appointed a Guardian to the Bosphorus in times of war with Russia, which had a similar role to the Seraskier. The Guardians were selected from among the viziers and they were the highest authority in supervising and organizing the Bosphorus defences. The superintendents were usually selected from among the commanders of the Bosphorus fortresses if there was a Bosphorus Guardian and their authority was decreased and restricted in order not to have a conflict of authority with the Guardian.

Moreover, this chapter provides a chronological list of Superintendents and Guardians of the Bosphorus from 1780s to 1806. This list can also be found as a prosopographic table at the end of the chapter. Having this list at hand, it is possible to observe other improvements at the Bosphorus defences such as constructions, military trainings and the organization of the military personnel in parallel with the legacy of superintendencys. For instance, some figures come to the forefront as superintendents and guardians such as Superintendent Mustafa Ağa, Guardian Mustafa Paşa, Superintendent Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa and Guardian İnce Mehmed Paşa with their distinctive contributions.

A chronological analysis of these two positions makes it possible to see how these positions improved and became more organized in time. The organization and operational capacity of guardians and superintendents increased in time. More significant figures became either superintendent or guardian. This created the problem of residency for them and their expanding households depending on their line of hierarchy. The Ottoman government solved the problem of residency first by renting a house and then by constructing a large *konak* for superintendents in the village of Rumeli Feneri.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE BOSPHORUS FORTRESSES

#### 6.1. Introduction

Chapters Two, Three and Four depicted a detailed history of the construction of new fortresses and batteries along the shores of the Bosphorus against the rising Russian threat from 1768 until 1808. Chapter Five presented the establishment of a new military administrative unit for providing the security of the Bosphorus which was called “the Superintendent of the Bosphorus” in addition to the formation of Bosphorus Guardianship in state of emergencies.

This present chapter is about the military organization of the Bosphorus fortresses, the composition of the military personnel and their changing conditions through the years with regard to the new dynamics at play. The issues raised in this chapter include the following questions: What kind of soldiers were stationed in the forts and batteries? How were they trained? What was the division of their roles? How and where did they take shelter until the completion of their barracks? What was the military organization that they were bound to? In addition to their vital needs such as alimentation, quartering and bathing, this chapter has the intention to pay due attention to the significance of human factors regarding the socio-cultural life in the fortresses. These fortresses constituted the living space to hundreds of soldiers. They ate, slept, socialized, prayed and lived as a community in these fortresses. While social lives of the military personnel stationed in the Bosphorus fortresses should be a sub-theme of this chapter, the archival sources provide only limited information about it. Still, the chapter will try to point out them if the sources allow.

This chapter offers a different periodization for the military organization of the Bosphorus than the periodization offered for the construction works. The military organization can be examined in three periods. The first period is from 1772 to 1785. The period began with the hasty efforts of the Ottoman government during



war with Russia until the formation of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırlığı*). The second period is from 1785 to 1792. The creation of a permanent military administration for the Bosphorus affairs constituted a turning point since the imposition defined rules and a more systematic follow through. The third period is from 1792 to 1808. This period had its unique characteristics because of the implementation of new regulations imposed by the Ottoman government according to its “New Order” movement and the appointment of new style soldiers to the fortresses. The period ends with the rebellion of the former soldiers to the new organization.

## **6.2. The First Military Organization of the Bosphorus Forts and Batteries**

The beginning of Ottoman-Russian war in 1768 evoked the Ottoman government to overcome the deficiencies of the Hisar and Kavak fortresses by equipping them with necessary ammunition and extra soldiers and gunners as well as fixing some of their equipment. In the beginning, the administration of these fortresses and the general security of the Bosphorus was under the authority of *Bostancıbaşı*, who was the head of the *Bostancı Ocağı* as discussed in the previous chapter.

Until the construction of the Fener Fortresses, the Ottoman government had appointed fifty (twenty-five to each) gunners to Kavak fortresses (Anadolu Kavağı and Rumeli Kavağı) in order to provide the security of the area. The Kavak Fortresses did not have barracks for the appointed gunners. Thus, the Head-Gunner es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin hired four rooms to provide a shelter for the gunners of the Fortress of Rumeli Kavağı nearby.<sup>590</sup>

The Ottoman government also appointed twenty *bostancı* soldiers to the first redoubt built between the Fortresses of Rumeli Kavağı and Rumeli Feneri sometime in 1772. The Administrative Chief (*Usta*) of Rumeli Kavağı reported the need for a boat to carry the military rations of these soldiers to the redoubt. Upon his request, they were assigned three *guruşes* daily for their needs of transportation and others

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<sup>590</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5536/224, 26 R 1186/27 July 1772. For a five month rent, they paid 20 *guruşes*.

in June 1772.<sup>591</sup> The *bostancı* soldiers continued to stay in this redoubt in the following months and they were appointed the same or equivalent amount of money for the following months.<sup>592</sup>

Immediately after the construction of redoubts on the Anatolian side including Filburnu, the Sublime Porte appointed twenty *bostancı* soldiers to the redoubt on the Anatolian side in the summer of 1772.<sup>593</sup> Concomitantly, the Administrative Chief (*Usta*) of Anadolu Kavağı, el-Hâc Mehmed, who was responsible for the protection of redoubts on the Anatolian side, asked for their daily wages. *Usta* and the soldiers asked for this daily wage to use it for the payments of boats that carried their military rations and for other expenditures. The daily wage of twenty soldiers was three *guruşes*.<sup>594</sup>

The Ottoman government appointed soldiers to the Fener fortresses in November 1772 upon the completion of their construction. The Grand vizier approved the names of the soldiers selected by *Bostancıbaşı*. They appointed one fortress commander (*dizdar*), one second in command (*kethüda*) and twenty guardsmen (*müstahfız*) to each of the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri on 3 November 1772. *Bostancıbaşı* met all the military personnel one by one in Yalı Köşkü (a kiosk of Topkapı Palace on the Galata side) and observed that they were all competent to be employed for the protection of the fortresses. The daily wage of the commander was 90 akçes, the daily wage of the second in command was 40

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<sup>591</sup> BOA. C.AS. 382/15772, 29 Rebiülevvel 1186/30 June 1772. The daily expense of military rations transportation was 3 *guruşes* and the total amount for a month was 90 *guruşes*.

<sup>592</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1035/45418, 11 L 1186/5 Ocak 1773. The monthly expense of military rations transportation was 90 *guruşes* and it was paid in Şevval. For the month of Şaban, it was paid 87 *guruşes*.

<sup>593</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/207, 10 Ra 1186/11 June 1772.

<sup>594</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5528/206, 4 Şevval 1186/29 December 1772; BOA. D.BŞM. 5536/459, 21 R 1186/22 July 1772; BOA. C.AS. 945/41028, 11 Şevval 1186/5 Ocak 1773. The same amount of 90 *guruşes* for the transportation of military rations was paid for the month of Ramazan and Şevval 1186 as well.

akçes and the daily wage of each guardsman was 25 akçes. The total daily wage of military personnel in a fortress was 630 akçes.<sup>595</sup>

In addition to this, twenty-five gunners, who were previously appointed to each Kavak Fortress (fifty in total), were transferred to Fener Fortresses by Topçubaşı Ağa (the Head-Gunner) with the same register of military rations on 5 November 1772.<sup>596</sup> Most of the Bosphorus fortresses had battery-like structures and several guns were placed at their shores. In order to make use of those cannons, gunners were naturally needed.

Hence two armorer (*cebeci*) regiments were appointed to each Fener Fortress and some of the personal equipment they needed, including rugs (*kilim*), taps (*musluk*), lysterbags (*su tulumu*), knives (*bıçak*), dining tray (*sofra*), spoons (*kaşık*) were issued to them in June 1773.<sup>597</sup> The Corps of the Imperial Armoury (*Cebehane-i Âmire Ocağı*) also appointed two armorer regiments to the Fortresses of Garibçe and Poyraz in September 1773.<sup>598</sup> The responsibility of the armorers was the transportation of weapons, their distribution to the Janissaries and the

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<sup>595</sup> BOA. C.AS. 845/36103, 7 Ş 1186/3 November 1772; BOA. C.AS 1200/53738, 3 N 1186/28 November 1772; BOA. C. AS. 1120/49619 18 Zilhicce 1187. The military personnel of the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri: *Dizdar* Mehmed Osman, *Kethüda* Mustafa Abdullah, Ahmed Mehmed, Osman Ali, Hasan Mehmed, Ahmed Mehmed, Mahmud Mustafa, Hüseyin Mustafa, Mahmud Veli, Hüseyin Mehmed, İsmail Ali, Mustafa Abdullah, Seydi Mustafa, Feyzullah Mustafa, Hamza Hasan, Ahmed Mustafa, Osman İsmail, Mustafa Hüseyin, Ahmed Mustafa, İbrahim Ömer, Mustafa Musa, Halil Musa. The military personnel of the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri: *Dizdar* Seyyid Mustafa bin İbrahim, *Kethüda* Abdülkadir Süleyman, Ömer Mehmed, Mehmed İbrahim, İsmail Mehmed, Süleyman Mehmed, Hasan İsmail, Ali İsmail, Arif İsmail, Ahmed Safi, Osman Salih, Mustafa Ahmed, Hasan İbrahim, Mustafa Ahmed, Halil Mehmed, Mehmed Süleyman, Ali Mehmed, Mustafa Mehmed, Halil Abdullah, Ali Mehmed, İbrahim Kadri, Hasan Hüseyin. Their salaries were supplied from the Jizya tax of Istanbul.

<sup>596</sup> AE.SMST.III. 349/28014. 9 Ş 1186/5 November 1772. The military rations of the soldiers were: 50 pairs of bread, 10 kıyye rice, 2 kıyye clarified butter, half kıyye salt, 10 kıyye mutton.

<sup>597</sup> D.BŞM. 5628/349, 7 R 1187/28 June 1773; C.AS. 976/42534, 9 R 1187/30 Haziran 1773. Their *tayinat ruzmerre* included the following: Nan 50 çift, Erz 10 kıyye, Revgan-ı sade 2 kıyye, Tuz yarım kıyye, Lahm-ı ganem 10 kıyye.

<sup>598</sup> BOA. AE. SMST. III. 314/25235, 19 C 1187/7 September 1773; BOA. C.AS. 1185/52884, 22 Ş 1187/8 November 1773.

maintenance of armoury and gunpowder in the fortresses. They were also responsible for the manufacturing, storage and repair of the weapons.<sup>599</sup>

Consequently, the Ottoman government had organized the appointment of new *bostancı* soldiers, gunners and armorers to the fortresses by 1773, as can be seen in the table below.

Table 6.1. The Military Personnel of Four Bosphorus Fortresses (Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe and Poyraz) in 1773.

Military Personnel	The number of Personnel	Daily Wage
Commander ( <i>Dizdar</i> )	1	90 akçes
Second in Command ( <i>Kethüda</i> )	1	40 akçes
Guardsmen ( <i>Müstahfiz</i> )	20	25 akçes
Gunner ( <i>Topçu</i> )	25	-
Armorer ( <i>Cebeci</i> )	1 regiment	-

This organization of the military personnel continued to some extent in the following years except for gunners and armorers. In February 1774, the government recalled gunners and armorers back due to two reasons: the military rations (*tayinat*) were costly and they were not needed during the winter season. The government only kept the guardsmen (*yerli neferat*) in the fortresses until the next season.<sup>600</sup> It seems that after the recall of gunners and armorers in the winter of

<sup>599</sup> Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları II (Cebeci, Topçu, Top Arabacıları, Humbaracı, Lağımçı Ocakları ve Kapukulu Suvarileri)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984), 12.

<sup>600</sup> Murat Yıldız, *Bahçivanlıktan Saray Muhafızlığına Bostancı Ocağı*, (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2011), 144; BOA. C.ML. 519/21227, 22 Zilkade 1187/4 February 1774: “İzzetlü defterdar efendi, takririniz mucebince bimennihi teala vakt-i hulûlüne değın yine tayin olunmak şartıyla verilen tayinatlarının kat’î nizamını dahi tanzime mübaderet eyleyesüz deyu buyuruldu. 22 Za 1187. Bahr-i siyah boğazında bundan akdem iradeye binaen müceddeden inşa olunan kal’alar muhafazalarına müceddeden tahrir olunan yerli neferatı kalateyn-i mezbureteyn muhafazalarında ibka ve cebeci ve topçu ve bostaniyan neferatı tayinat mesarifleri külli olub fasl-ı şitada lüzumu olmadığı bedihi olmağla mevsim hulûlüne dek tehirleri mirinin o gûne mesarifden siyânetini müstelzim olduđu ma’lûm-ı devletleri buyuruldukda emr u ferman devletlü saadetlü sultanım hazretlerindir.”

1774, the government did not appoint them again. For example, in 1777, the Head-Bostancı el-Hâc Mehmed prepared a register of soldiers in the Fener Fortresses where one fortress commander with a daily wage of 90 akçes, one second in command with a daily wage of 40 akçes and twenty five guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 25 akçes watched for the fortresses. The annual salary of the military personnel of the Fener fortresses (forty-four in total) amounted to 3,737 guruşes and their salary was supplied from the jizya (poll-tax) of Istanbul.<sup>601</sup>

The same military organization presented above for Fener, Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses was also applied to the newly constructed Fortress of Riva. According to the register prepared by Head-Bostancı Mir Ali, there was one fortress commander with a daily wage of 90 akçes, one second in command with a daily wage of 40 akçes and twenty five guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 25 akçes in the Riva fortress and their annual salary which was 1,850 guruşes in total was also supplied from the jizya (poll-tax) of Istanbul.<sup>602</sup> The names of the military personnel of Revancık fortress were also provided in the register.<sup>603</sup> It seems that the government met the expenses only from the non-Muslims.

The Ottoman government appointed an officer to inspect the military personnel of the Bosphorus fortresses through the end of 1779. The officer visited the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri and Revancık. He prepared a register of the present and non-present personnel positions in the fortresses on 14 December 1779.<sup>604</sup>

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<sup>601</sup> BOA. C. AS. 439/18264, 19 Zilkade 1191/19 December 1777.

<sup>602</sup> BOA. C.AS. 125/5594, 29 Şevval 1192/20 November 1778.

<sup>603</sup> BOA. C.AS. 125/5594, p.4. The list of the military personnel of Revancık fortress according to the register dated to 24 Şevval 1192/15 November 1778 was as following: *Dizdar* Hasan bin Mehmed (90 akçes), *Kethüda* Mustafa bin Mehmed (40 akçes), and the list of *müstahfiz* (each 25 akçes): Mehmed bin Osman, İbrahim bin Salih, Osman bin Mehmed, Süleyman bin İsmail, Osman bin Osman, Mehmed bin Süleyman, Abdullah bin Ali, Mehmed bin Hasan, Halil bin Mustafa, Mehmed bin Osman, Ömer bin Mehmed, Mehmed bin Osman, Ali bin Halil, Ahmed bin Mehmed, Mehmed bin Hüseyin, Ahmed bin Mehmed, Hasan bin Halil, Ali bin İsmail, Ahmed bin Mustafa, Ahmed bin Abdi.

<sup>604</sup> BOA. C.AS. 716/30021, 5 Zilhicce 1193.

In the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri, there were one fortress commander with a daily wage of 90 akçes and fifteen guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 375 akçes.<sup>605</sup> In the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri, there was one fortress commander with a daily wage of 90 akçes and fourteen guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 350 akçes.<sup>606</sup> In the Fortress of Revancık, there was one fortress commander with a daily wage of 90 akçes, one second in command with a daily wage of 40 akçes and eight guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 200 akçes present.<sup>607</sup> The total number of personnel was forty-one soldiers with a daily wage of 1235 akçes in total. Their annual expense in total amounted to 3642 guruşes 30 akçes.

Besides, there were some military personnel who were not present in their positions. For example, in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri, one second in command with a daily wage of 40 akçes and five soldiers with 125 akçes were not present. In the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri, one second in command with a daily wage of 40 akçes and six soldiers with 150 akçes were not present. In the Fortress of Revancık, twelve soldiers with a daily wage of 300 akçes were not present. There were twenty-five military personnel who were not present in their positions and their annual cost in total was 1932 guruşes.

The register also revealed several excuses of the military personnel who were not present in their positions. For example, the second in command of Rumeli Feneri

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<sup>605</sup> The Present Military Personnel of the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri: Ahmed Velid Mehmed [dizdar] 90 akçes, İbrahim ser kethüda 40 akçes, Hasan Osman, Osman Ali, Hasan Mehmed, Ahmed Mehmed, Mahmud Mustafa, Hasan Mustafa, Mahmud Veli, Hüseyin Mehmed, Mustafa Aydan, Fezullah Mustafa, Ahmed Mustafa, Osman İsmail, Ahmed diğer Mustafa, Mustafa Musa, Halil Mustafa. The annual cost of these present personnel was 1371,5 guruşes 30 akçes.

<sup>606</sup> The Present Military Personnel of the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri: Seyyid Mustafa bin İbrahim Dizdar-ı kale, Hüseyin b. Hasan Kethüda, Ömer Mehmed, İsmail Mehmed, Süleyman Mehmed, Hasan İsmail, Ali İsmail, Arif İsmail, Mustafa Ahmed, Mustafa Mehmed, Halil Mehmed, Mehmed Süleyman, Mustafa Mehmed, Halil Aydan, Ali Mehmed, Hasan Hüseyin. The annual cost of these present personnel was 1298 guruşes.

<sup>607</sup> The Present Military Personnel of the Fortress of Revancık: Hasan bin Mehmed Dizdar, Mustafa bin Mehmed Kethüda, Mehmed b. Osman, İbrahim b. Salih, Mehmed Süleyman, Mehmed b. Hasan, Halil b. Mustafa, Ömer b. Mehmed, Mehmed b. Hüseyin, Ahmed b. Abdi. The annual cost of the present personnel was 973,5 guruşes. According to the opinion of the inspector officer, these soldiers did not look like a soldier but as if collected workers from the farms around the fortress at the moment when they heard about the inspection tour.

Fortress Mustafa b. Abdullah had to reside in Istanbul for some reason and he could only visit the fortress every one or two months because of adverse weather conditions. Another soldier in Rumeli Feneri had gone to Varna for trade affairs. Another was exiled in the Fortress of Seddülbahir because of a quarrel he was involved in. The second in command and three soldiers of Anadolu Feneri Fortress were unknown and did not come to the fortress, while the Usta of Anadolu Kavağı claimed their salaries.

There can be two hypotheses to explain the absent positions: they had been absent with the agreement of their superiors, in which case one wonders why no temporary replacements were sent. The second possibility is that they left without warning and it can be deduced that the discipline is very bad, if one must wait for the next inspection mission to be aware of the situation and take the necessary measures. Such flippancy might also suggest that the authorities did not consider the risks significant or Bostancıbaşı had too many other tasks to properly deal with this one.

The register of the Head-Bostancı was presented to the Grand Vizier and he responded that two personnel should be selected from among the fortress soldiers for the two vacant second in command positions. As for the vacant soldier positions, either new soldiers were to be appointed or they were to remain vacant if not necessary.

The information provided in this register indicates that the organization of the military personnel in the fortresses were not well-disciplined and there was not a strict control over the military personnel at the time. These problems indicate that the Ottoman government and the commanders of the fortresses did not pay sufficient attention to the task of providing security and protection of the Bosphorus in times of peace. The Ottoman government had a lack of follow-up over the military organization of the Bosphorus fortresses. The supervision of the Head-Bostancı probably remained insufficient and such disorganization necessitated the establishment of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus in 1785.

According to the last register before the foundation of the Superintendency prepared by Tevfik Ahmed Efendi on 5 February 1780, it seems that the Head-Bostancı organized the military personnel according to the orders of the Grand Vizier. There is no more non-present second in command in the fortresses. The number of soldiers does not seem to have increased probably because of the lack of need.<sup>608</sup> The military personnel of the Five Fortresses was as following in 1780:

Table 6.2. The Military Personnel of the Bosphorus Forts in 1780.

Five Fortresses	Commander	Second in command	Soldiers	Total Personnel
Rumeli Feneri	1 (90 akçes)	1 (40 akçes)	15 (375 akçes)	17 (505 akçes)
Anadolu Feneri	1 (90 akçes)	1 (40 akçes)	13 (325 akçes)	15 (455 akçes)
Revancık	1 (90 akçes)	1 (40 akçes)	8 (200 akçes)	10 (330 akçes)
Garibçe	1 (70 akçes)	1 (40 akçes)	8+ 1 (repairmen of water conduits (200+25 akçes))	10+1 (310+25 akçes)
Poyraz Limanı	1 (70 akçes)	1 (40 akçes)	9 (225 akçes)	11 (335 akçes)
				63 military personnel = 42 old soldiers (1290 akçes) + 21 new soldiers (670 akçes) = 693,840 akçes = 5782 guruşes

### 6.3. Transportation of Soldiers and Military Rations

In the first period between 1772 and 1785, the construction of fortresses improved very slowly and quartering and alimentation was difficult for the soldiers of the Bosphorus fortresses. Until the government managed the construction of barracks and kitchens, the government found some solutions to the problem of sheltering. It was possible to hire rooms for the soldiers of the Kavak fortresses because there were settlements in the Kavak regions. However, Garibçe, Poyraz and Fener were not quite settled areas. Consequently, some of the military personnel stayed in

<sup>608</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1077/47468, p. 5, 29 Muharrem 1194/5 February 1780. "Tevfik Ahmed Efendi an hulefa-yı mektubi-i hazret-i sadr-ı ali yoklama şude. 29 Muharrem 1194/5 February 1780."



tents near the forts. The officers and workers needed eight tents probably for the purpose of accommodation and the Imperial Corps of Janissary Band (Mehterhane-i Âmire) sent eight tents to the harbours of Garibçe and Poyraz. This crumb of information might indicate that the workers stayed and spent time in the tents in their leisure times. Two of these tents were kitchen tent (*hayme-i matbah*) which also shows that the workers eat their appointed provisions and probably cooked basic things in here.<sup>609</sup> However, most were on the move between the city center and their stations in turn. The armorers and gunners were carried to the fortresses daily from the dock of Ahırkapı in the city center to the fortresses with boats, usually with “*ateş kayığı*” and sometimes with “*mavna*”.<sup>610</sup> The organization of their transportation was assigned to the Steward of Boatmen (*Ateş Kayıkçıları Kethüdası* and *Mavnacılar Kethüdası*).

The first armorers appointed to the Fener fortresses were carried from the dock of Ahırkapı to fortresses and from fortresses to Ahırkapı back with four boats (with a round trip) in 1773.<sup>611</sup> They were carried from Ahırkapı probably because the central barracks of the armorer regiments were located around Ayasofya and Ahırkapı (in the old city center of Istanbul).<sup>612</sup> The armorers and janissaries to be sent to the Bosphorus forts probably walked down the street from Ayasofya to the dock of Ahırkapı and embarked to the boats in order to quickly transport to their stations.

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<sup>609</sup> BOA. D.BŞM. 5585/470, 26 Zilkade 1186/18 February 1773.

<sup>610</sup> *Ateş Kayığı* (literally fire boats) is a large kind of a three or four pair-oared row boat mostly used by fire brigades to carry fire engines quickly. These boats were also used in the eighteenth century for the purpose of carrying people and some stuff between Eminönü and Boğaziçi. For more information, see İdris Bostan, *Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri*, (İstanbul: Bilge Yayınları, 2005), 262. *Mavna* is a barge, an ancient kind of sailing ship used by the Ottoman navy until the eighteenth century. For more information, see Bostan, *Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı Gemileri*, 221-24. It seems that some of the *mavnas* of the navy which became dysfunctional in the eighteenth century continued to be used in transportation of soldiers in between Eminönü and the fortresses.

<sup>611</sup> BOA. C. AS. 343/14205, 29 Ca 1187. The expense of four boats was eight guruşes.

<sup>612</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları II (Cebeci, Topçu, Top Arabacıları, Humbaracı, Lağımçı Ocakları ve Kapukulu Suvarileri)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984), 10-12.

In the following years, the transportation of janissary, armorer and gunner regiments usually necessitated eight to eleven boats for a round trip and the daily transportation usually costed 20 to 25 guruşes until 1785.<sup>613</sup>

In addition, the forts did not have kitchens in the beginning. As a consequence, the government appointed military rations (*tayinat*) to the soldiers.<sup>614</sup> These military rations had to be carried to the fortresses daily with boats in the same manner from the dock of Ahırkapı (*Âsitane*) to the fortresses.<sup>615</sup> The practice of carrying the military rations with boats continued until 1785.<sup>616</sup>

The composition of a ration depended on the position of the personnel. For example, Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was the former Jizya (Poll-Tax) accountant, became responsible for supervising the construction of fortresses from the Black Sea strait until Varna and his daily ration was as following: fifteen pairs of bread (*nân-ı aziz*), seven and a half vukiyyes of meat (*guşt*), five vukiyyes of rice (*erz*), one and a half vukiyyes of clarified butter (*revgan-ı sade*) and five kilograms of barley (*arpa*).<sup>617</sup> Seyyid Abdullah, who was one of the architects under Mehmed Emin Efendi, had a daily ration of one guruş wage, one and a half pair bread, one vukiyye of meat, one vukiyye of rice and half kilogram of barley.<sup>618</sup>

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<sup>613</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1069/47044, 29 R 1198; BOA. C.AS. 1104/48805, 15 Z 1198; BOA. C.AS. 1158/51535, 10 C 1198; BOA. C. AS. 1177/52450, 22 M 1198; BOA. C. AS. 325/13459, 26 Ra 1198; BOA. C.AS. 780/33034, 17 N 1198; BOA. C.AS. 946/41032, 24 N 1198; BOA. C.AS. 1043/45809, 29 Z 1199; BOA. AE.SABH.I. 138/9317, 13 C 1199; AE.SABH.I. 140/9426, 25 L 1199. There are several more registers as such.

<sup>614</sup> For the general definition of "*tayinat*", see. Sarıcaoğlu, 105. BOA. C. AS. 869/37275, 2 Za 1187.

<sup>615</sup> There are several records about carrying military rations with boats in the Ottoman archives. For some examples see BOA. C. AS. 382/15772, 29 Ra 1186/30 June 1772; BOA. C. AS. 945/41028, 11 Ş 1186/5 January 1773.

<sup>616</sup> BOA. C.AS. 1111/49203, 29 C 1198 (306 guruşes for 59 days); BOA. C.AS. 479/19996, 29 M 1198 (300 bread appointed to the janissary and gunner regiments of the Four Fortresses daily); BOA. C.AS. 1046/45951, 11 B 1199 (200 bread appointed to the armorer regiments of the Four Fortresses daily).

<sup>617</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1118/49552, 12 C 1191/18 July 1777.

<sup>618</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1201/53786, 4 R 1191/6 October 1777.

#### 6.4. The Military Organization After the Bosphorus Superintendency

According to the imperial decree dated 1785<sup>619</sup>, which was published by Ahmed Vâsif Efendi in his *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr* and used by Ahmed Cevdet Paşa in his *Târih-i Cevdet*, the strait of the Black Sea was in need of defense at the time and the Sublime Porte decided to renovate and reconstruct the older and newer fortresses in the interior and exterior of the Bosphorus and to appoint sufficient number of soldiers to them. Upon this decision, some falconers (*şahinci* and *çakırcı*)<sup>620</sup> were appointed to the fortresses as guardsmen (*müstahfiz*).<sup>621</sup> However, as narrated in *Vâsif Tarihi*, because of their lack of knowledge about defending a fortress, they were discharged and returned to their previous jobs. In order to replace these falconers, Chief Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa prepared a register of competent and skilful *bostancı* soldiers to be appointed to the Bosphorus fortresses.

The military personnel of the Fortresses of Anadolu Feneri, Revancık, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı with their salaries included: one commander with a daily wage of 125 akçes, one second in command (*kethüda*) with a daily wage of 80 akçes, one head-gunner (*topçu-başı*) with a daily wage of 80 akçes, one armorer (*cebehaneci*) with a daily wage of 60 akçes, thirty-seven guardsmen (*müstahfiz*) with a daily wage of 50 akçes each and thirty-four gunners (*topçu*) with a daily wage of 50 akçes each.

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<sup>619</sup> The exact date of this imperial decree is 11 Rebiülevvel 1199/22 January 1785 as indicated in an archival document: BOA. C.AS. 84/3916.

<sup>620</sup> There was an institution of falconry in the Ottoman Empire. The job of falconers was to raise hunting birds in order to be used in hunting. There were four group of falconers in the Ottoman Palace who were called as *şahinci*, *çakırcı*, *doğancı* and *atmacacı* according to the name of the hunting bird that they raised. In addition, falconers also kept guarding with their falcons in the night in the Ottoman Palace. Kıran, Batuhan İsmail, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Doğancılık", *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi*, (Cilt: 2 Sayı: 5, Mayıs 2015), pp. 148-164; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014), p. 299, 405-407; Nicolas Vatin, "Fauconnerie", *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Fayard, 2015, p. 441.

<sup>621</sup> BOA. C.AS. 893/38403, 20 Safer 1199/2 January 1785. This is a document about the appointment of falconers to the Bosphorus fortresses in order to increase the number of guardian soldiers there.

All these soldiers appointed to the fortresses had to be *bostancı* and their daily wage had to be paid by their chief (*ağa*). The Imperial Treasury (*Hazine-i Âmire*) would pay their salary payment (*ulufe*) every three months.

Table 6.3. Proposed Military Personnel for the Five Bosphorus Fortresses in 1785

<b>Military Personnel</b>	<b>The Number of Personnel</b>	<b>Daily Wage</b>
Commander ( <i>Dizdar</i> )	1	125 akçes
Second in Command ( <i>Kethüda</i> )	1	80 akçes
Head-Gunner ( <i>Topçubaşı</i> )	1	80 akçes
Armorer ( <i>Cebahaneci</i> )	1	60 akçes
Guardsmen ( <i>Müstahfiz</i> )	37	50 akçes
Gunner ( <i>Topçu</i> )	34	50 akçes
<b>Total:</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>400 akçes</b>

It should be underlined that the decree issued to set up this arrangement for the first time specifies the traits of the soldiers as well. For example, the sentry (*nöbetçi*) and gunners was to be strong and enduring to the war conditions, brave, wholeheartedly committed to their duty of protection. There had to be a stable order in the fortresses. The commander would select four sentries for each day; two of them would watch until midnight and the other two from midnight to morning in the guardhouse in rotation.

The procedure would be as follows that if the sentries see any silhouette of a vessel on the Black Sea, the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri was expected to notice it first. Thus, the jannissaries of the Rumeli Feneri Fortress would immediately inform other fortresses by preparing the gunpowder and setting off the firework. When the commander and sentries of the Fortress of Revanlık in the exterior of the Bosphorus recognized this signal, they would also declare a state of emergency and wait prepared. The other fortresses would inform one another by setting the

firework as well.<sup>622</sup> The military personnel of the Fortresses of Rumeli and Anadolu Kavağı would prepare the laniards of the guns and wait prepared.

If any vessel attempted to pass the strait, the sentries would try to stop the vessel by setting the fire and shooting from the Kavak fortresses. However, if the vessel persisted to pass, the gunners would bombard the vessel with cannon drops and try to sink it. Even if the vessel did not persist and stopped in the region known as “Karataşaltı”, the gunners would still act with caution and keep the laniards of the guns prepared. The guardsmen also had to help the gunners and support their organization. The duty of the guardsmen was to serve the gunners; likewise the salary of the gunners and the guardsmen were calculated equal.

According to this imperial decree, the Grand Admiral was responsible for the organization of the Bosphorus fortresses, supervision of their maintenance and stability. The Admirals (*derya kapudanları*) or the Attendant of the Imperial Shipyard (Tersâne-i Âmire Emini), if they deputized the admirals in the summers, had to go to the fortresses every fifteen days and make a roll call. The vizier (nominately the Chief Admiral) guaranteed the defense of the straits and determined their organization.<sup>623</sup>

Upon the same imperial decree dated January 1785, the military personnel of the fortresses was reorganized in February 1785.<sup>624</sup> However, the implementation diverged from the imperial decree to an extent, because they took the needs of fortresses into consideration. According to the register of the soldiers and their salaries prepared by the Grand Admiral, they decreased the number of sentry (*bekçi*) due to lack of need and instead raised the number of guardsmen.

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<sup>622</sup> This fire information system was an old system. For centuries, the arrival of pirates and other enemies on the Mediterranean shores had been on the watch with this method.

<sup>623</sup> Ahmed Vâsif Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, Prep. by. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994), 214-216: "Zikr-i istihkâm-ı sugr-ı Bahr-i siyâh ve tertîb-i neferât-ı kılâ"; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, III. Cilt. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 138. See Appendices for the original texts.

<sup>624</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1077/47468, 29 Ra 1199/9 February 1785.

Table 6.4. The Military Personnel of the Fortresses of Revancık, Anadolu Feneri and Rumeli Feneri in 1785

Military Personnel	The Number of Personnel	Daily Wage
Commander	1	120 akçes
Second in Command	1	80 akçes
Head-Gunner	1	80 akçes
Armorer	1	60 akçes
Guardsmen (23) with sentries (4) and gunners (24)	51	2550 akçes (each 50 akçes)
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>2890 akçes</b>

Table 6.5. The Military Personnel of the Fortresses of Poyraz Limanı and Garibçe in 1785

Military Personnel	The Number of Personnel	Daily Wage
Commander	1	120akçes
Second in Command	1	80 akçes
Head-Gunner	1	80 akçes
Armorer	1	60 akçes
Guardsmen (33) with sentries (4) and gunners (34)	71	3550 akçes (each 50 akçes)
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>3890 akçes</b>

Table 6.6. The Military Personnel of the Fortress of Rumeli Kavağı in 1785

Military Personnel	The Number of Old Personnel ( <i>Tertib-i Atik</i> )	The Number of New Personnel ( <i>Tertib-i Cedit</i> )
Gunner	20	25
Guardsmen	77	29 (4 sentries)
Pensionner ( <i>mütekaid</i> )	3	-
<b>Total:</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>54</b>

Table 6.7. The Military Personnel of the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı in 1785

Military Personnel	The Number of Old Personnel ( <i>Tertib-i Atik</i> )	The Number of New Personnel ( <i>Tertib-i Cedit</i> )
Gunner	20	25
Guardsmen	86	29 (4 sentries)
Pensionner ( <i>mütekâid</i> )	14	-
<b>Total:</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>54</b>

In August 1785, the sultan gave an order to the Head of Janissaries (*Dergâh-ı Muallâm Yeniçerileri Ağası*) Ahmed Ağa about increasing the number of soldiers in the Bosphorus fortresses since the existing soldiers remained insufficient. In addition to the previously appointed janissaries and gunners and other guardsmen to the fortresses, the sultan ordered the appointment of additional five hundred soldiers. These new soldiers had to be supplied not from Anatolia and Rumelia but from the Janissaries of Istanbul since it would take time to collect soldiers from the provinces. In addition, provincial soldiers would not be well-disciplined and trained as Istanbul janissaries. In case of need, these five hundred soldiers would go to their appointed position in the Bosphorus fortresses and the fortress officers were to be warned to supervise them.<sup>625</sup>

### **6.5. The Military Organization of the Bosphorus Fortresses under the New Order**

With the rise of Sultan Selim III to the throne, the Ottoman government appointed new gunners to the fortresses. The Superintendent of the Bosphorus Seyyid Numan Bey reported sometime in 1789-90 that more than one hundred and sixty guns were placed in the nine fortresses. It was obligatory to have one gunner for each gun while there was only one gunner in each fortress or battery. Consequently, the

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<sup>625</sup> BOA. C. AS. 1059/46594, 29 Ramazan 1199. "Bilfiil dergâh-ı muallam yeniçerileri Ağası Ahmed Ağa'ya hüküm ki, Elhaletü hazîhi Bahr-i siyah boğazının yemin ve yesarında müceddeden inşa olunan dokuz aded kılâ-ı malume muhafazası için bundan akdem tertib ve tayin olunan yeniçeri ve topçu ortaları ve sair neferat-ı müstahfizîn ile istihkamı emrine dikkat olunub ancak hîn-i iktizada neferat-ı mezkûre kifayet etmeyüp her birlerine neferat-ı mürettebelerinden başka beşer yüz nefer dahi vaz olunmağla muhtaç olmakdan naşi tayini lazım gelen neferat-ı merkumenin şimdilik her ne kadar azm-i lüzumu zahir ise dahi lede'l hâce matlûb olan neferat-ı merkume Anadolu ve Rumili caniblerinden tez elden tedarik ve tayininde suûbet derkâr ve mümkün olsa dahi dergâh-ı muallâm yeniçerileri neferatı misillü başı bağı ve yollu erkânlı yoldaşlardan olmamaları hasebiyle müteferrik ve perişan olub kılâ-ı merkume muhafızından tehî ve hâli kalacağı âşikâr olmağla bu mahzur-ı azîmin fi ma ba'd gâilesi bertaraf kılınmak için dergâh-ı muallam yeniçerileri ortalarından kılâ -ı merkumenin beherine beşer yüz nefer yeniçeri neferatı ve çorbacı ve zabitan-ı saireleri ile hemen şimdiden intihâb ve tayin ve vakt-i hâcetde her beş yüz neferi kılâ-ı merkûmeden kendülere mahsus kılınan kaleye varub emr-i muhafazasına ikdam etmeleri üzere zabitanına tenbih ve te'kid olunmak hususuna irade-i aliyem taalluk eylediği sen ki bilfiil dergâh-ı muallam yeniçerileri ağası mumailleyhsin şifahen sana ifade ve tenbih olunmağla bâlâda muharrer ortalar neferatından donanma-yı hümayunum kalyonlarıyla derya seferine eşer yoldaşlarından başka kara seferine tayin ve memur kılınacaklarından Bahr-i siyah boğazında inşa olunan kılâ-ı tis'anın her birine zabitleriyle ma'an harb u darba yarar beşer yüz nefer tertib ve tayin ve hâcet hisseylediği gibi irade-i aliyem taalluk eylediği vechile derhal hareket ve doğru kalesine varub ve girüp hizmet-i muhafazasında kıyâm eylemek üzere hemen şimdiden tenbih olunmak için divan-ı hümayunum kalemine kayd ve iktizasına göre emr-i âlişânım isdâr ve ocağ-ı amirem tarafına irsali hususunu hâvi takdim olunan bir kît'a takririn... Fi evahir-i Ramazan sene 1199."

Ottoman government decided to appoint one hundred and twenty gunners with monthly salaries of fifteen guruşes each.<sup>626</sup>

However, the appointment of gunners was not enough because they lacked talent and experience. The Bosphorus Guardian Kolçak Mustafa Ağa sometime in 1791 recognized that the gunners of the Kavak Fortresses were relatively experienced and competent in contrast to the gunners and soldiers of the Nine Fortresses, who remained insufficient in their positions. Thus, he asked for the approval of Sultan Selim III for the Ağa of the Kavak fortresses to take one or two gun masters to the Nine Fortresses and train shooting five to ten guns twice a week. The sultan approved.<sup>627</sup>

Sultan Selim III inquired about the military conditions of the Bosphorus fortresses to the Superintendent of the Bosphorus Mehmed Ağa probably sometime in 1794 and 95. Mehmed Ağa prepared a register of the military personnel of the Nine Fortresses as can be seen in the table below. This register also indicates that most of the fortress commanders and some second-in-commands had *timars* in different parts of Anatolia instead of being paid a salary.<sup>628</sup>

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<sup>626</sup> BOA. HAT. 180/8138; BOA. HAT. 1385/54937.

<sup>627</sup> BOA. HAT. 1399/56317.

<sup>628</sup> BOA. HAT. 256/14639.



Table 6.8. The Military Personnel of the Bosphorus Fortresses in 1794

The Fortress	The Number of Military Personnel	Daily Wage of Total Personnel
The Fortress of Bağdadçık	1 Commander + 79 personnel	3250 akçes
The Fortress of Revancık	1 Commander + 51 soldiers	2690 akçes
The Fortress of Rumeli Feneri	1 Commander + 60 personnel	3070 akçes
The Fortress of Anadolu Feneri	1 Commander + 60 personnel	3140 akçes
The Fortress of Garibçe	1 Commander + 81 personnel	4120 akçes
The Fortress of Poyraz Limanı	1 Commander + 79 personnel	4020 akçes
The Fortress of Büyük Liman	1 Commander + 24 personnel	1310 akçes
The Battery of Yuşa	1 Commander + 30 personnel	1220 akçes
The Battery of Telli Dalyan	1 Commander + 31 personnel	1220 akçes
<b>Total</b>	9 Commanders + 499 Personnel (3 repairmen of water conduits and a scribe)	24,345 akçes

However, Sultan Selim III found the number of military personnel in the fortresses inadequate. He indicated that the number should be raised to at least two thousand.<sup>629</sup>

The Ottoman government undertook a reform project called the “New Order” starting in 1792, as discussed above in the Introduction. The above-mentioned consultation probably took place just before the implementation of the New Order regulations in the Bosphorus fortresses. It indicates that the consultative methods of Sultan Selim III’s government, were discussed in Chapter Four were deliberate and planned. The pre-New Order period of Sultan Selim III’s reign defined the composition of the following military reforms.

The most significant implementation of the New Order regulations was the foundation of a new army parallel to the Janissaries in 1794 on the European model

<sup>629</sup> BOA. HAT. 256/14639. “Benim vezirim, Defteri alıkoydum. Bunlardan ma’da kavakların kuyûdu şurûtu ve bu yevmiyyeler nasıl maldan verilür ve bu kalelerin mecmu’unda hala mevcut ne kadar top vardır. Nazırdan ve kuyûdâtıdan sual idüb arz idesin. Bu neferat gayet azdır. Hiç olmaz ise iki bine iblâğa muhtacdır. İnşallah tedricen tanzim ideriz ve talim etdiririz.”

with Western-style uniforms, equipment, and—most significantly—military discipline. The army included more than 23,000 troops and soldiers and commanders were to be hierarchically organized and divided into regiments.<sup>630</sup> At this point, the superintendency of Mahmud Râif Efendi was significant for the implementation of the new military reforms of the New Order in the Bosphorus fortresses.<sup>631</sup>

As a part of this large-scale reform project, the Ottoman government also reorganized the military personnel of the Bosphorus fortresses beginning in February 1795.<sup>632</sup> In addition, Mahmud Râif Efendi wrote a book about the reforms accomplished by the Ottoman government entitled *Tableau des Nouveaux Reglements de l'Empire Ottoman* in 1798. Even though the book was probably first written in Ottoman Turkish, it became widely popular in its French version.<sup>633</sup> Mahmud Râif Efendi described the new military organizations of previous institutions such as the organization of janissaries, bombardiers, gunners, the organization of gunpowder, the organization of the Imperial Dockyard. He further summarized the military organization of the Bosphorus Fortresses.

According to Mahmud Raif Efendi, there were two types of fortress organization in the Bosphorus. The first was the Organization of the Seven Fortresses in the Strait of the Black Sea (*Bahr-i Siyah Boğazi'nda Vâki' Kılâ'-ı Seb'a Nizâmı*) and the second was the Organization of the Four Fortresses in the Strait of the Black Sea (*Bahr-i Siyah Boğazi'nda Vâki' Kılâ'-ı Erba'a Nizâmı*).<sup>634</sup> Even though the names of the fortresses were not listed in the regulation, the implied Seven Fortresses were Anadolu Feneri, Rumeli Feneri, Garibçe, Poyraz Limanı, Büyük Limanı, Riva and

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<sup>630</sup> Yayıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, 41; Kahraman Şakul, "Nizam-ı Cedid" in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by. Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, (Facts on File, 2008), pp. 434-436.

<sup>631</sup> Kemal Beydilli, TDV DİA "Mahmud Râif Efendi".

<sup>632</sup> BOA. A.AMD. 34/66, 25 Receb 1209/15 February 1795. "Kıla-ı erba'a neferatı şurût-ı nizamlarına dair ferman."

<sup>633</sup> Kemal Beydilli ve İlhan Şahin, *Mahmud Râif Efendi ve Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e Dâir Eseri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001), 1-20.

<sup>634</sup> *Ibid.*, 58-60.

Kilyos while the Four Fortresses were Anadolu Kavađı, Rumeli Kavađı, Yuřa and Telli Dalyan.

To start with the Organization of the Seven Fortresses, the primary object of this organization was the appointment of a Superintendent of the Bosphorus (Bođaz Nazırı) selected by the government from among competent people with a high salary and a military ration covered by the government. Then, the previously appointed soldiers to the fortresses were to be reinforced with new ones. New officers (*zâbit*) were also appointed. The tasks expected from military personnel of all ranks were redefined. It became obligatory for soldiers to be drilled and trained in firing guns and rifles according to new and scientific methods. In order to employ these soldiers more effectively, the appointment of a Corporal (*onbařı*) for each ten soldiers became mandatory in addition to the appointment of commander (*dizdâr*), second in command (*kethüda*) and other officers (*zâbit*). The selection of Corporals was assigned to the Superintendent and officers. The corporals served as chief to the rest of nine soldiers under their authority. Four guardsmen selected by the officers would be on guard duty each night. The officers would ensure that all soldiers kept guard in rotation. The military personnel of the fortresses would always be on their duty in the fortresses night and day. Two selected guardsmen would be on guard until midnight and the other two guardsmen would guard from midnight to morning in their sentry rooms.

If these guardsmen saw any shadow of a ship at night in the Bosphorus, this was expected to be seen first from the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri. The soldiers in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri then had to set off fireworks in order to give signal to the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri. Similarly, the soldiers in the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri had to give a sign to the Fortress of Garibçe and from there to the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı, and from there to the Fortress of Rumeli Kavađı and from there to the Fortress of Anadolu Kavađı respectively. Laniards of guns had to be always kept ready to set fire in these aforementioned fortresses. In this way, if any unknown vessel attempted to pass the strait, the first fortresses that saw the vessel would fire guns off to the bow and the poop of a vessel in order to stop it. If the vessel

attempted to proceed into the Bosphorus, then these fortresses would keep firing warning shots and stop it. The arrested vessel would be searched and interrogated. The Superintendent of the Bosphorus would report the incident to the authorities of the Imperial Dockyard.

If such a vessel insisted on sailing via the strait passage despite all warning shots, it would be sunk by bombarding. Even if the vessel accepted to wait somewhere between the fortresses or in a location called “*Karataşaltı*” near the Battery of Büyük Liman, the soldiers of the Bosphorus fortresses would be on alert and keep the guns ready to fire because of the possibility of the vessel’s sailing. If any unknown vessel tried to pass the strait in the daytime, a similar procedure would take place.

While the supervision of the forts and batteries was assigned to the Superintendents of the Bosphorus, and the Grand Admirals were also expected to inspect these fortresses in person when they were in the capital city. If the Grand Admirals were on a campaign, then the Attendant of the Imperial Dockyard (Tersâne-i Âmire Emini) would fulfill this duty on behalf of the Grand Admirals.<sup>635</sup>

The provisions outlined above indicate that a code (*kanunname*) defined and organized the rules and regulations of the Bosphorus Fortresses. The officials tried to implement it to the best of their efforts. Despite the fact that the organization and the discipline were modified, on the other hand, the procedure of control of the passage of the strait coming from the Black Sea remained unchanged.

The second regulation was about the Organization of the Four Fortresses. These Four Fortresses were Kavak fortresses, which were built in the seventeenth century in the reign of Sultan Murad IV against the Cossack attacks coming from the Black Sea and the Batteries of Yuşa and Telli Dalyan which were built in the late eighteenth century. Previously, *Ustas* had been appointed to these fortresses from

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<sup>635</sup> A rough draft of this regulation is available in the Ottoman archives. See BOA. HAT. 1434/58934.

the *Bostancı Ocağı* as a military chief and guardsmen from the same corps (*bostancı*). When new batteries were built around them and new large guns were placed in front of them, the Ottoman government reorganized their administration and military personnel.

The appointment of military personnel to these four fortresses and batteries attached to them continued to be controlled by the *Bostancı Ocağı* as before. The Head-*Bostancı* was tasked with arms drilling and training of the soldiers in the Four Fortresses with diligence and attention. The government was to appoint a Superintendent selected from among the state officers and a scribe was to be given to his service. The duty of the Superintendent was to ensure that soldiers were organized to cooperate with each other and to receive their salaries. The duty of the *Ustas* in the Four Fortresses, who were equivalent to Commander (*Dizdar*), was to pay attention to the training of soldiers. The soldiers in the fortresses would be assumed as a separate unity. Each gun master (*top ustası*) and each bombardier master (*humbara halifesi*) would manage their own guns and bombardies with their own soldiers. Then, they would also help others and others would help them in return which would create a mutual solidarity. Even if the state was in time of peace, a gun master would keep guard in the night until the morning in the guardhouses. If any warning shots were fired from the Seven Fortresses, the guardsmen had to inform all the officers and soldiers and they had to prepare the laniards of the guns and wait prepared.

Each gun master would clean and brush all the guns under their responsibility and they would ensure that every component of a gun was perfect and complete without missing a nail and having any broken part. If guns had any broken part, the gun master had to report it to the *Ağa (usta)* who would see to their repair or replacement. In addition, the soldiers had to be trained in firing (*top-endazi*) and aiming (*nişan almak*) both inside the battery and in the square outside the battery. They had to be trained to fire rifles as a body as the trained-soldiers did in Levend

Çiftliği and they had to become more skillful. These regulations settled the military organization of the Four Fortresses.<sup>636</sup>

This organization was also outlined in *Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya* with additional details about the number of the military personnel and their salaries. The Superintendent Ağa had to be paid an annual salary of 2500 guruşes with a daily ration of twenty pairs of bread, four vukiyyes clarified butter (*revgan-ı sade*) and rice (*erz*), five vukiyyes mutton (*lahm-ı ganem*) and three kilograms barley (*şar'îr*).<sup>637</sup>

Five hundred more soldiers were added to the fortresses as well. One commander with 600 guruşes salary, one second in command with a daily wage of 86 akçes, one head-gunner and ten soldiers, one of them being a corporal were appointed to the Seven Fortresses. The personnel of the fortresses were composed of armorers with 66 akçes, corporals with 60 akçes, soldiers with 56 akçes, thirteen boatmen with 56 akçes, three repairmen with 39 akçes, one repairman of water conduit (*su yolcu*) with 39 akçes and one scribe with 106 akçes. The number of personnel in each fortress was as following: in the Fortress of Kilyos (Bağdadcık) 168 personnel, in the Fortress of Riva (Revancık) 73 personnel, in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri 144 personnel, in the Fortress of Anadolu Feneri 102 personnel, in the Fortress of Garibçe 145 personnel, in the Fortress of Büyük Liman 59 personnel and in the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı 162 personnel.<sup>638</sup> The total personnel of the fortresses were 853 according to this list.

As for the Four Fortresses, the *Usta* of the Four Fortresses were equivalent to the Commander in the Seven Fortresses and they had 600 guruşes annual salary in the same manner. Second in command and a head gunner with a daily wage of 86 akçes were appointed to each Four Fortress. Twenty-four gunners with 66 akçes and one trainer corporal with a daily wage of 76 akçes, one head-armorer with 66 akçes,

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<sup>636</sup> Beydilli and Şahin, *Mahmud Râif Efendi*, 58-60.

<sup>637</sup> Abdullah Altun, "Said b. Halil İbrahim'in 'Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya' Adlı Eseri (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)", (Master Thesis, Erciyes Üniversitesi SBE, 2006), 157.

<sup>638</sup> Altun, "Said b. Halil İbrahim'in 'Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya'", 158.

three armorers and two janissary band (*mehter*) with 56 akçe, a scribe with 50 akçe and twenty-four bombardiers with 56 akçe were appointed to the Fortress of Rumeli Kavağı. Twenty-five gun masters, Seventy-five gunners, one head-bombardier and his second, ten bombardier master and thirty bombardiers to the Fortress of Anadolu Kavağı. Thirty-one gun-masters, Ninety-three gunners, one head-bombardier and his second, ten bombardier masters, thirty bombardiers were appointed to the Battery of Yuşa. Finally, twenty-three gun masters, sixty-nine gunners were appointed to the Battery of Telli Tabya.<sup>639</sup>

According to the New Regulations, the soldiers stationed in the Bosphorus Fortresses in the past and new had to be trained in using guns and rifles. An interesting consequence of this training was that the soldiers were injured in drill. The regular training of the soldiers began in 1795 with along the new organization. From this time onwards, physicians as well were appointed to the fortresses. There were usually two physicians appointed to the Seven Fortresses probably one for the Rumelian side and the other for the Anatolian side and one physician appointed to the Four Fortresses. Mehmed Efendi, Corci, Zaharya, Mehmed Usta, Mıgırdıç and İsmail Halife served as a physician through the next ten years. The monthly salary of a physician was approximately 31 guruşes, it was raised to 70 guruşes in 1805.<sup>640</sup>

In addition, while fortresses had enough soldier barracks for the former soldiers, the quartering of the newly appointed soldiers turned into a problem. They sheltered in tents in good weather, while the Ottoman government ordered the construction of new barracks for them before the coming of the winter season.<sup>641</sup>

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<sup>639</sup> Altun, "Said b. Halil İbrahim'in 'Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya'", 158-59; A.AMD. 34/66, 25 Receb 1209/15 February 1795.

<sup>640</sup> BOA. C.AS. 607/25596, 29 Za 1209; BOA. C.AS. 389/16099, 2 S 1211; BOA. C.AS. 645/27121, 9 S 1211; BOA. C.AS. 886/38065, 25 Ca 1211; BOA. C.AS. 822/34974, 9 C 1211; BOA. C.AS. 347/14395, 10 C 1215; BIA. C.AS. 823/3500, 12 Za 1215; BOA. C.AS. 495/20684, 28 M 1216; BOA. C.AS. 274/11378, 24 L 1216; BOA. C.AS. 1224/54973, 19 Z 1220; BOA. C. AS. 456/19039, 14 C 1221; BOA. C.AS. 781/33042, 14 Ra 1222.

<sup>641</sup> BOA. HAT. 1366/54121.

Table 6.9. The Changing Number of Personnel in the Seven Fortresses

	25 Receb 1209/25 February 1795 <i>Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya/A.AMD. 34/66</i>	1210/1796 (D.BKL.d. 32687)	7 Rebiülevvel 1222/15 May 1807 (D.BKL.d. 32734)	(TSMA.e. 753/10)
<b>The Fortress of Rumeli Feneri</b>	144	164	165	207
<b>The Fortress of Garibçe</b>	145	165	187	190+65
<b>The Fortress of Büyük Liman</b>	59	68	116	104+61
<b>The Fortress of Kilyos</b>	168	191	205	193
<b>The Fortress of Anadolu Feneri</b>	102	117	139	193
<b>The Fortress of Riva</b>	73	84	98	97
<b>The Fortress of Poyraz Limanı</b>	162	182	?	283
<b>Total Personnel</b>	853	971+22 (mosque janitor, scribe, boatmen etc.) = 993	910	1393

As can be observed in the table, there is a gap between 1796 and 1807. The Ottoman government created a new regulation for the military organization of the Bosphorus fortresses. However, they remained on paper until the beginning of a new war with Russia in 1806. The Superintendent of the Bosphorus İnce Mehmed Beğ reported to the sultan that the new regulations were not followed strictly and the soldiers stationed in the fortresses left their places and strolled around in Istanbul. Thus, he asked for permission to take a count of the soldiers, call them back to their stations, to pay them salaries and then not allow them to leave the fortresses. The Sultan granted permission to İnce Mehmed Beğ. In addition, he ordered the grand vizier to show ultimate attention to the protection of the Straits.



The soldiers had to be trained to fire cannons and the war vessels had to be placed in the Bosphorus to be able to fire and sink a ship when needed.<sup>642</sup>

### **6.6. The End of the New Order with the Revolt of the Bosphorus Soldiers**

The new military organization that the government undertook to establish in the Bosphorus fortresses as part of the New Order reforms did not last for long. The standing corps of Janissaries resisted the new military order. A rivalry emerged between the new and the old order soldiers appointed to the Bosphorus forts. The coming of the British fleet to Istanbul in February 1807<sup>643</sup> concerned the Ottoman authorities. They increased the measures to enhance the security of Bosphorus and decided to incorporate all soldiers in the Bosphorus fortresses into the new military organization. Mahmud Râif Efendi, who was one of the leaders of the New Order, became Superintendent of the Bosphorus Fortresses in February 1807. Superintendent Mahmud Râif Efendi and the Head-Bostancı Şakir Bey were trying to acclimate the *bostancı* (*yamaks*) and other soldiers of the old order into the new organization. They were planning to blend soldiers of the old and the new orders. Some of the high-ranking Ottomans were not willing to support the New Order. Köse Musa Paşa, the deputy grand-vizier vizier of Sultan Selim III, was one of them. He and Şeyhülislam Topal Atâullah Efendi provoked the *yamaks* against their commanders by spreading rumors that Mahmud Raif Efendi and *Usta* of Macar

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<sup>642</sup> BOA. HAT. 249/14117. The Sultan's response: "Benim vezirim, Bu tedbirler güzeldir. İcra olunsun. Boğazlara pek ihtimam lazımdır. Tophanede kızgın gülle atmasını bir vakit meşk etmişler idi. Boğaz'daki topçulara kızgın gülle atmasını öğretsünler. Fersûde kayık ve gemi misillü boğazlarda bulunmak lazımdır. Boğaz ağzına iktiza etdikde batırmak gibi ve ateş virüb gemi gelürse yakmak gibi böyle şeylere dikkat olmalıdır. Akdeniz boğazına bir mühendis irsâl idesin. İstihkâmına bakıp takrir eylesün. Karadeniz boğazına dahi bir mühendis bakıp takrir eylesün."

<sup>643</sup> See Fatih Yeşil, *Trajik Zafer: Büyük Güçlerin Dağı Akdeniz'deki Siyasi ve Askeri Mücadelesi (1806-1807)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2017).

Battery Halil Haseki were tasked with clothing all Bosphorus soldiers with the uniforms of the New Order.<sup>644</sup>

On 17 Rebiülevvel 1222 (25 May 1807), the soldiers of Riva, Anadolu Feneri and Garibçe<sup>645</sup> Fortresses rose in rebellion by arriving to the Battery of Yuşa (Macar) and provoked soldiers by claiming that new uniforms had arrived to the house of their Ağa. Even though Usta Halil Haseki Ağa and the Commander Ağa tried to ensure them that it was not true and no new uniforms had come to the fortresses, they insisted and claimed that the coming of new trained soldiers was its proof. While Halil Haseki tried to persuade them, they did not listen to him, fired their

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<sup>644</sup> Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. 8, (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1309), 153-154; Cabi Ömer Efendi, *Cabi Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani) Tahlil ve Tenkidli Metin*, Pred by. Mehmed Ali Beyhan, Vol I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 100; Kemal Beydilli, "Kabakçı İsyanı Akabinde Hazırlanan Hüccet-i Şer'iyye", *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, IV (İstanbul 2001), pp. 33-48; Kemal Beydilli and İlhan Şahin, *Mahmud Râif Efendi ve Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e Dâir Eseri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2001), 58-60; Ahmet Özcan, "Kethüda Said Efendi Tarihi ve Değerlendirmesi", Unpublished MA Thesis, (Kırıkkale University, 1999); Songül Çolak, "Kethüdâ Mehmed Said Efendi'nin Karadeniz Boğaz Yamaklarının İsyanına Dair Notları", (Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol: 20: 1, 2010), pp. 401-426; Târih-i Cevdet, Vol: VIII, pp. 153-160.

<sup>645</sup> This event took place on the Anatolian side and even though the document says Garibçe fortress, there is a possibility that it was the Fortress of Poyraz Limanı which was located on the Anatolian side as others.

rifles and murdered him.<sup>646</sup> Mahmud Râif Efendi tried to run away when he heard of this murder, but the rebels tracked him down and murdered him in Sariyer.<sup>647</sup>

İnce Mehmed Paşa was the Guardian of the Bosphorus at the time. In addition, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa became responsible for the Fortresses on the Rumelian side and Arnavut Ali Ağa became responsible for the Fortresses on the Anatolian side. However, Kabakçı Mustafa later led a rebellion against the government, which turned into an open revolt with the joining of the Janissaries who demanded the disbanding of the New Order army.<sup>648</sup> The year after Kabakçı was murdered by Hacı Ali Ağa in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri in his superintendency residence in 1808.

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<sup>646</sup> BOA. HAT. 123/5064. "İrva ve Anadolu Feneri ve Garibçe kal'aları neferâtı bu gece Anadolu Kavağı kal'asına ve ondan Yuşa tabyasına gelüb neferâta sizin haberiniz var mıdır bu tarafa muallim asker esvabı gelmiş ve kavak ağasının konağında imiş. Eger siz ol esvabı telbîs ider iseniz bize dahi telbîs etdirecekler dediklerinde neferât-ı mezkûrenin ba'zısı tasdik ve birazı dahi şindiden sonra cümlemiz yarın Hünkâr iskelesinde vâki' Umûr yerine gider ve meşveret idüb bu tarafa gelen muallim askeri içimizden çıkarırız deyüb ba'dehu sabaha karîb Yuşa tabyasından geçüb Umûr yerine gittiklerinde Kavak Ağası Halil Ağa kulunuza gelüb şunlara söz anladalum diyerek beraber kalkub yanlarına vardık ve merâmınız nedir deyü sual eyledik esvâb gelmiş biz anı istemeyiz dediklerinde biz dahi yoldaşlar bunun aslı yokdur eğer aslı olsa biz bilür idik deyü ifade eylediğimizde eğer meram böyle olmasa bu tarafa muallim asker gelmez idi. Bir gün saat sekizde cümlemiz bir yere gelüb size haber göndeririz deyü bizi def' etdiklerinde merkûm Halil Ağa nush u pend ideyim der iken tüfenkler endahit iderek merkûm Halil Ağa'yı i'dâm eylediler. Ve beni Yuşâ tabyası neferâtı ber takrîb kayığa bindirüb halâs eylediler. Ben dahi doğru bu tarafa geldim deyü takrir ider."

<sup>647</sup> Cabi Ömer Efendi, *Cabi Tarihi (Tarih-i Sultan Selim-i Salis ve Mahmud-ı Sani) Tahsil ve Tenkidli Metin*, Prep by. Mehmed Ali Beyhan, Vol I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 126-138; Kemal Beydilli, TDV DİA, "Mahmud Râif Efendi"; HAT. 123/5028. "Şevketlü kerametlü mehâbetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım, Kaleler neferâtı kavak ağası Halil Ağa'yı idam etmiş olduklarını Yuşa tabyası dizdarı takrir etmekle takrir-i mezkûr surh işaretiyle huzûr-ı cihândârilerine arz olunmuşdu. Vak'a-i mezkûreden sonra Mahmud Raif Efendi kayığa süvâr ve Âsitâne'ye doğru gelür iken haşerât-ı merkume verâsından yetişüb efendi-i mumaileyh dahi idam eyledikleri şimdi taraf-ı çâkerâneme ihbâr olunmuş olduğundan şikk-ı sâni defterdârı efendi celb olunub İbrahim Nesim Efendi ve Reşid Efendi'nin dahi heman bâb-ı âliye gelmeleri için tezkireleri tahrir olunmağla mürûrlarında bu husus müzâkere birle ne veçhile müzakere olunur ise hâk-pây-i hümayunlarına iş'âr olunacağı ve suhûletle .... nizâ'a mübâderet eylemesi bâbında Boğaz Muhafızı İnce Mehmed Paşa kullarına şimdi fermân-ı âli gönderileceği malum-ı âlîleri buyuruldukda emr u fermân şevketlü kerâmetlü mehâbetlü kudretlü velinimetim efendim padişahım hazretlerindir." The Sultan's response to this telhis was as follows: "Kâimmakam Paşa, Bu maddeyi bir hoşça tutub telaş eylemeyerek etrafının muhafazasına dikkat ve teskin-i fesâda ihtimam ve gayret eylesin. Tersane tarafına dahi dikkat eyleyüb İstanbul ve Galata ve Üsküdar dahi muhafaza olunsun. Cümle zâbitlere tenbih olunsun. Hele şimdi güzel tedbir eylesin. ... Tersane defterdarı dahi bulunsun. Zira ânlarla müte'allıktır. Ne tedbir eylesin sen bana yazasın."

<sup>648</sup> Kahraman Şakul, "Nizam-ı Cedid", *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by. Gabor Agoston, Bruce Masters, (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 436.

Consequently, the military and administrative organization of the Bosphorus fortresses returned back to its former state.<sup>649</sup>

### **6.7. Conclusion**

This chapter analysed the military organization of the Bosphorus defences in three periods. In the first period from 1772 to 1785, the Ottoman government was not well prepared for war with Russia and Istanbul being caught-off-guard, was vulnerable to serious Russian threat resulting in expedited efforts to fortify the capital and to equip the defences with necessary soldiers and gunners. However, neither the military structures nor the military personnel were sufficient to protect the city. The appointed soldiers and gunners did not have quarters to stay, they either stayed in tents or shuttled with boats between the city center and the Bosphorus. In the meantime, some barracks for soldiers were built but they always remained inadequate with the supply of an increasing number of soldiers.

In the second period from 1785 to 1792, the creation of a new position as the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (*Boğaz Nâzırlığı*) improved the military organization in the fortresses. Not only the number of soldiers increased but also the division of roles among different military personnel were explicitly defined and a more systematic supervision and control over the personnel was established. The training to fire cannons effectively became a part of the weekly routine of the military personnel. The problem of shuttling between the city center and the Bosphorus broadly ended in this period with the completion of the construction of necessary quarters to stay, kitchens to cook and mosques to pray.

The third period from 1792 to 1808 posed a significant change for the military personnel of the Bosphorus fortresses both in terms of their quantity and their quality. The Ottoman government implied a new military organization with the appointment of five hundred soldiers with Western-style uniforms, equipment, and military discipline. Those newly appointed soldiers, who wear new style uniforms,

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<sup>649</sup> Gökbilgin, "Boğaziçi", 692.

had to practice arms drilling as the soldiers of the New Army did in the Levent Çiftliği. However, this period ended with the murder of Mahmud Râif Efendi by the bostancı soldiers of the fortresses who resisted to the integration of new soldiers into the military organization of the Bosphorus and to wear new style uniforms. The murder of Mahmud Râif Efendi followed by the Kabakçı Revolt against the government to demand the disbanding of the New Order army ended the New Order movement and its implications of the Bosphorus military organization.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the fortification of the Bosphorus to defend Istanbul against the growing Russian threat at the end of the eighteenth century. The dissertation explored the Ottomans' capacity to organize and manage the construction of military structures, the Ottoman responses to the technological and political challenges they faced at the end of the eighteenth century, their adaptation to innovation and new techniques introduced by French engineers, and their capacity to organize a military administrative unit to supervise the security of the Bosphorus.

The main questions raised in this dissertation are the following: What drew the Ottomans' attention to the issue of fortifying the Bosphorus? How and to what extent did they manage to fulfill their goals in this regard? What were the main difficulties that the Ottomans faced, and how did they overcome these problems? The answers to these questions constitute the main conclusions of this dissertation, and they can be summarized under six main headings. I address these headings below, before closing with a final word on directions for future research.

#### **7.1. Marine/Coastal Fortification**

First, this dissertation analyzed the structural changes in Ottoman fortification style in the eighteenth century. The most significant outcome of this analysis is that the Bosphorus fortresses should be considered as a specific type of fortification, strait/marine fortification, that arose following the military revolution and the ensuing advances in gunpowder and artillery. In contrast to the bastioned fortresses and citadels of the early modern age, such as Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı in the Strait of Istanbul or Kilitbahir and Kal'a-i Sultaniye in the Dardanelles, most of the forts and batteries of the Bosphorus in the late eighteenth century had a battery-like (*tabyevi*) structure, carrying ten to twenty cannons on the shore. Each fort or battery could sound the alarm upon an enemy incursion by setting off

fireworks. In addition, because the forts and batteries were located in a strait, they were designed to work in concert with one another rather than independently. Each fort or battery had a partner on the opposite shore, with the pair designed to be able to lay down crossfire across that entire portion of the waterway and thus check any waterborne advance.

## **7.2. Reform Efforts**

Second, this dissertation has sought to contribute to the literature on the Ottoman Empire's efforts to modernize its military and military education system, and thereby to the study of Ottoman reform more generally. Studying Ottoman defense systems made it possible to analyze the military and technological reforms of the Ottomans in the late eighteenth century. According to the outcomes of this analysis, the Ottomans were decisive not just in adopting but also in adapting innovative defensive techniques in collaboration with French engineers. This was no mere imitation of European forms or crude Westernization. The Ottomans were active agents who localized and adapted the available technical knowledge of the era for their own purposes and to meet their own ends. They did not only adapt foreign techniques but also transformed their traditional and local expertise by blending the experience of Ottoman architects with the knowledge of new Ottoman engineers in the New Order era.

This dissertation argues that the beginning of the Ottoman age of reform, which most studies associate with the reign of Sultan Selim III, should be set earlier, to the reign of Sultan Mustafa III. In the context of the Bosphorus defenses, it can be observed that the Ottoman defeat against the Russian army in the 1768-1774 war laid the ground for urgent reforms. The reforms initiated by Sultan Mustafa III with a sense of urgency were primarily precautionary measures directed against Russia, not the organized and systematic reforms of the following decades. Nevertheless, the Ottomans sought to improve their military conditions and defensive structures. The main source of information for the military reform efforts of the government of Sultan Mustafa III is the account Baron de Tott offers in his *Memoirs*. As Aksan did for de Tott's contribution in the field of artillery, this study has also questioned the

reliability of the information de Tott provides and challenged the contribution, knowledge, and capacity of Baron de Tott in the field of fortification.

Sultan Abdulhamid I took over a defeated, slow-moving, and chaotic empire, but he soon embarked upon an organized effort to reform the Ottoman military and improve its defensive structures in collaboration with a powerful figure of his era, the vizier and grand admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa. This was the first time that the Ottoman government sought to integrate French military officers in its reform projects and to bring French officials to Istanbul for that purpose. It was these steps and reforms that prepared the ground for the systematic and organized reforms of the New Order under Abdulhamid's successor, Selim III.

While the seeds of reform were planted under Sultan Abdulhamid I, it was not until the reign of Sultan Selim III that they bore their most visible fruits. It was in this period that the Ottoman engineers who were educated in the Imperial Engineering School began to work alongside French engineers and Ottoman architects in construction projects. It was this period that witnessed the first experiments by the Ottoman engineers as members of a new profession. The distinctive character of this era's reforms was that it concerned the entire organization and, above all, they are intended to be systematic.

### **7.3. Engineering as a New Profession and French Missions**

This study also proved that the foundation of the Imperial Engineering School (Mühendishane) was directly related to the empire's fortification needs. The Imperial Engineering School had two educational focuses: ship-building technology and fortification. The first courses that the French engineers taught in the school were fortification lessons. Tuncay Zorlu traced the modernization of the Ottoman navy in his book, *Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy*. In a similar manner, this dissertation has traced the modernization of fortification techniques in the Ottoman Empire. The engineering of the forts and batteries of the Bosphorus in the reign of Sultan Selim III proved a parallel conclusion to Zorlu's—namely, that shipbuilding (in his study)



and fortification (in this study) began to undergo a shift from being a craft to a semi-scientific pursuit in the late eighteenth century.

French engineers took part in Ottoman fortress construction on three separate occasions. First, Baron de Tott, who was already in Istanbul and engaged in reforming the Ottoman artillery, constructed the fortresses of Garibçe and Poyraz Limanı in 1773-74. Second, the French military engineers Lafitte-Clavé and Gabriel Joseph Monnier came to Istanbul and served in the construction of the battery of Büyük Liman and the establishment of the Engineering School (Mühendishane-İstihkam Okulu) between 1784 and 1788. Third, François Kauffer, who was already in Istanbul serving the Sublime Porte, and Gabriel Joseph Monnier, who came to Istanbul for the second time as a part of the French mission, were involved in several consultations and worked on the construction of the Kilyos fort between 1794 and 1797.

In the first two periods, under Sultan Mustafa III and Sultan Abdulhamid I, even though the French engineers shared their opinions and worked on the ground, it was always the Ottomans who were managing the projects. The construction official (*bina emini*) was the top official responsible for the construction of a fortress even when French engineers were involved in constructions as respected consultants. For example, French engineers had to convince the construction official or the superintendent of the Bosphorus when they wanted to do something new or different. If the construction official was not convinced, their proposal could be declined. They had to convince higher Ottoman authorities such as the grand admiral or the grand vizier if they felt the need to report to them directly.

However, in the third period, that of Sultan Selim III, the Ottoman government created an organized system to manage construction works. They adopted a hierarchical method of consultation in order to avoid any possible conflicts that might arise on site between Ottoman architects, French engineers, Ottoman engineers, and Ottoman construction officials. They also defined their roles of these different actors, which had frequently overlapped previously. This hierarchical

method avoided conflicts and allowed various opinions to be considered in order to arrive at the most appropriate final decision. An analysis of the employment of French officials such as Monnier and Kauffer and Ottoman architects, engineers, and construction officials proved that there was a real collaborative process active between them in the third and last period. The Ottomans were not passive recipients of French fortification techniques, as assumed in the existing literature, but were instead active decision makers who fully participated in the “military acculturation” process.

#### **7.4. Lack of Organization and Qualified Men**

The dissertation also discusses the Ottoman Empire’s efforts to find solutions to the problems of finding qualified men, establishing discipline, and maintaining effective organization in its construction projects. While initial efforts to fortify the Bosphorus remained weak and unorganized, the creation of a Superintendency of the Bosphorus as a new administrative unit solved the problem of a lack of organization in some respects. Still, it was the New Order government that solved the lack of organization with its consultative method and hierarchical and defined division of roles among multiple actors. The Ottomans’ development of an administrative system to run and maintain the Bosphorus defenses led to more effective organization and supervision of construction work, the maintenance of military structures, and the military itself.

#### **7.5. Fear of Russians**

Studying the defenses of Istanbul contributes to understanding whether “the fear of Russia” that exists in eighteenth and nineteenth century Ottoman history writing reflects a reality or a myth. The Ottoman efforts to fortify their capital and their creation of a new military administrative unit to supervise the security of the Bosphorus are indicators of the Ottoman attention to the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea. Several consultations regarding the Russian threat took place in the Porte and their concern and disquiet over the security of the Bosphorus increased in time and became more serious.

Ironically, this fear and disquiet caused by Russia and Ottoman preparations in collaboration with French against the Russian threat was interrupted when French invaded Egypt in 1798. The Ottomans established a joint navy with British and Russia to fight against the French in the Mediterranean. The forts and batteries, which were built for the purpose of avoiding the passage of Russian forces from the Bosphorus, watched silently the sailing of Ushakov's fleet through the strait in 1798.<sup>650</sup> This time, it was the Porte itself that gave written guarantees of safe return to the Black Sea without which the Russian fleet refused to enter the Straits.<sup>651</sup>



Figure 7.1. Ivanov Mihail Matveevich, Russian Fleet Passing the Bosphorus<sup>652</sup>

It should be underlined at this point that the Bosphorus fortresses did not encounter any Russian threat throughout the period under examination here. The Ottomans made preparations and developed strategies for possible Russian intrusions and amphibian operations. However, it still requires further research with the employment of Russian archives if Russians did not intend to attack

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<sup>650</sup> For the composition of the Russian Black Sea fleet, see Kahraman Şakul, "An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant", (PhD. Diss., Georgetown University, 2009), pp. 96-205.

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>652</sup> Accessed via <http://petroart.ru/art/i/ivanovMM/img/2.jpg> on 27 April 2019. Thanks to Prof. Faruk Bilici for drawing my attention to this painting.

Istanbul from the Black Sea just because the Ottomans defended the straits effectively or because European powers such as French and British also supported the Ottomans against Russia to avoid their existence in the Straits.

## **7.6. Periodization**

The dissertation offered two periodizations, one for construction works and the other for military organization.

For the periodization of the construction works, the first period, from 1772 to 1774, covers the Ottoman government's hurried, even hasty, efforts to have the Ottoman architect Mehmed Tahir Ağa and French officer Baron de Tott build fortresses and redoubts. The biggest problem of this period was the lack of organization and planning, as in the saying "make it up as you go along" (in Turkish: *kervan yolda düzülür*). The second period, from 1778 to 1788, witnessed a much more comprehensive and deliberative approach towards the construction works. Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa played the most significant role in developing a relatively more systematic approach. Hasan Paşa, as a representative of the Ottoman government, provided for the regular maintenance of the fortresses, consulted with French engineers in a more effective way, and was more target oriented. This period also saw French engineers work to implement some new techniques through trial and error, despite some resistance. The third period, from 1792 to 1808, was marked by the distinctive methodical approach of the New Order, rooted in the development of a hierarchical method of consultation, strictly defined and separate roles, and government follow-up procedures over the construction works.

In a similar manner, the periodization of the military organization is divided into three: The first period is from 1772 to 1785. This period began with the hurried efforts of the Ottoman government during war with Russia and lasted until the formation of the Superintendency of the Bosphorus (Boğaz Nâzırlığı). The second period is from 1785 to 1792. In this period, the creation of a permanent military administration for Bosphorus affairs marked a turning point, since it enabled the

imposition of defined rules and more systematic follow up. The third period is from 1792 to 1808. This period had unique characteristics because of the implementation of new regulations by the Ottoman government as part of its “New Order” movement and the appointment of new-style soldiers to the fortresses. The period ended with the rebellion of the older-style soldiers against the new organization.

### **7.7. Further Research**

This study is a humble initial step in the field of Ottoman fortification history, one that I hope will offer a foundation for further research in the field. Most importantly, the history of the Bosphorus fortifications should be analyzed from the late eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. This will offer researchers a panoramic view of the modernization of Ottoman strait fortification and a basis for broader analysis. In addition, a comparative study of the straits of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is obligatory, as the Ottoman Empire managed both straits interdependently but each served the same purpose: protecting Istanbul.

Although I initially intended to offer a fiscal analysis of the Bosphorus fortifications, the issue of construction took the lead in the dissertation and the timing did not allow me to deal with more than a small portion of the wealth of data on finances. The Bosphorus fortifications were a significant fiscal burden on the state treasury because of the construction expenditures, labor costs, salaries of the military personnel, and the cost of ammunition and other supplies. How did the government cover these expenditures? How did the taxpayers bear and react to the new tax burdens? Further study is needed to answer these important questions, which have the potential to contribute a great deal to our knowledge of Ottoman fiscal conditions in the late eighteenth century. Similarly, one needs to look into how these sums were raised, the means by which they were collected and channeled to their intended purpose, and who (which social groups and specific segments of the population) shouldered the burden.

This study can be developed in some other directions as well. First, it can be developed through an analysis of Ottoman engineering techniques with further comparisons. Second, it can be developed through an examination of Ottoman architectural organization and capacity in the late eighteenth century. There are several untouched appraisal registers in the Ottoman archive which seem to have the potential to challenge many assumptions about late Ottoman architecture. Third, it can be improved through a prosopographical analysis of superintendents and guardians of the Bosphorus over time, which would detail the largely unknown history of an important Ottoman official post. Fourth, the study of the Bosphorus defenses is directly related with the urban development of the larger city of Istanbul. The northern shores of the Bosphorus had almost no settlements. In the long run, it was the fortification of the strait that brought those wild and woody regions cultivation and urbanization.

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**Cevdet Askeri (C.AS):** C. AS. 1035/45418; C. AS. 1059/46594; C. AS. 1069/47044; C. AS. 1077/47468; C. AS. 111/5017; C. AS. 1118/49552; C. AS. 1120/49619; C. AS. 1177/52450; C. AS. 1201/53786; C. AS. 215/9193; C. AS. 325/13459; C. AS. 343/14205; C. AS. 382/15772; C. AS. 439/18264; C. AS. 47/2159; C. AS. 64/3032; C. AS. 764/32286; C. AS. 82/3840; C. AS. 869/37275; C. AS. 913/39425; C. AS. 913/39440; C. AS. 945/41028; C. AS. 952/41373; C.AS 1200/53738; C.AS 1200/53738; C.AS. 833/35534; C.AS. 100/4560; C.AS. 1006/44044; C.AS. 1008/44138; C.AS. 101/4587; C.AS. 1010/44237; C.AS. 1028/45080; C.AS. 1035/45418; C.AS. 1043/45809; C.AS. 1046/45951, 11 B 1199; C.AS. 1059/46564; C.AS. 1061/46683; C.AS. 1084/47820; C.AS. 1094/48294; C.AS. 110/4944; C.AS. 1104/48805; C.AS. 111/5017; C.AS. 1111/49203; C.AS. 1112/49277; C.AS. 112/5062; C.AS. 1130/50183; C.AS. 1140/50652; C.AS. 1140/50667; C.AS. 1157/51456; C.AS. 1158/51535; C.AS. 1167/51945; C.AS. 1177/52424; C.AS. 1177/52450; C.AS. 1177/52455; C.AS. 1179/52578; C.AS. 1179/52578; C.AS. 1185/52884; C.AS. 1185/52884; C.AS. 125/5594; C.AS. 127/5678; C.AS. 128/5701; C.AS. 131/5828; C.AS. 133/5927; C.AS. 155/6841; C.AS. 155/6841; C.AS. 158/6996; C.AS. 159/7001; C.AS. 179/7798; C. AS. 456/19039; C.AS. 1224/54973; C.AS. 181/7856; C.AS. 212/9081; C.AS. 224/9536; C.AS. 23/1027; C.AS. 235/9947; C.AS. 262/10890; C.AS. 274/11378; C.AS. 283/11782; C.AS. 325/13459; C.AS. 335/13901; C.AS. 335/13901; C.AS. 347/14395; C.AS. 358/14829; C.AS. 363/15056; C.AS. 382/15772; C.AS. 389/16099; C.AS. 418/17321; C.AS. 479/19996; C.AS. 481/20084; C.AS. 495/20684; C.AS. 50/2323; C.AS. 50/2347; C.AS. 517/21590; C.AS. 550/23055; C.AS. 572/24065; C.AS. 577/24293; C.AS. 583/24546; C.AS. 592/24924; C.AS. 598/25218; C.AS. 607/25596; C.AS. 608/25629; C.AS. 645/27121; C.AS. 648/27243; C.AS. 648/27247, C.AS. 661/27774; C.AS. 661/27774; C.AS. 669/28124; C.AS. 670/28161; C.AS. 716/30021; C.AS. 744/3130; C.AS. 749/31536; C.AS. 76/3574; C.AS. 761/32135; C.AS. 766/32360; C.AS. 780/33034; C.AS. 780/33034; C.AS. 781/33042; C.AS. 794/33671; C.AS. 794/33671; C.AS. 799/33880; C.AS. 820/34863; C.AS. 822/34974; C.AS. 823/3500; C.AS. 83/3882; C.AS. 84/3916; C.AS. 845/36103; C.AS. 85/3942; C.AS. 859/36785; C.AS. 862/36944; C.AS. 866/37149; C.AS. 886/38065; C.AS. 893/38403; C.AS. 899/38737; C.AS. 908/39168; C.AS. 908/39168; C.AS. 913/39440; C.AS. 915/39550; C.AS. 921/39829; C.AS. 941/40824; C.AS. 945/41028; C.AS. 946/41032; C.AS. 950/41270; C.AS. 951/41283; C.AS. 951/41304; C.AS. 951/41306; C.AS. 952/41374; C.AS. 976/42534; C.AS. 989/43206; C.AS. 993/43396.

**Cevdet Bahriye (C.BH):** C.BH. 161/7618; C.BH. 271/12492; C.BH. 46/2159; C.BH. 59/2786; C.BH. 69/3279; C.BH. 8/353.

**Cevdet Belediye (C.BLD):** C.BLD. 78/3852.



**Cevdet Dahiliye (C.DH):** C.DH. 227/11309; C.DH. 247/12341; C.DH. 51/2545.

**Cevdet Hariciye (C.HR):** C.HR. 114/5653; C. HR. 111/5544.

**Cevdet Maliye (C.ML):** C.ML. 226/9407; C.ML. 519/21227; C.ML. 519/21227.

**Cevdet Nafia (C.NF):** C.NF. 12/551; C.NF. 53/2612.

**Hatt-ı Hümayun (HAT):** HAT. 121/4940; HAT. 123/5028; HAT. 123/5064; HAT. 1366/54121; HAT. 1366/54121; HAT. 1385/54937; HAT. 1391/55446; HAT. 1391/55511; HAT. 1395/55853; HAT. 1395/55877; HAT. 1396/55932; HAT. 1396/56011; HAT. 1397/56089; HAT. 1397/56139; HAT. 1399/56274; HAT. 1399/56317; HAT. 1403/56707; HAT. 1404/56755; HAT. 1404/56793; HAT. 1412/57551; HAT. 143/5977; HAT. 143/5978-2; HAT. 1434/58934; HAT. 1458/10; HAT. 1458/18; HAT. 1458/21; HAT. 1458/25; HAT. 1458/25; HAT. 177/7798; HAT. 180/8138; HAT. 183/8489; HAT. 187/8823; HAT. 187/8856; HAT. 192/9385; HAT. 194/9611; HAT. 196/9805; HAT. 197/9936; HAT. 198/9994; HAT. 202/10374; HAT. 205/10684; HAT. 205/10727; HAT. 208/11088; HAT. 208/11090; HAT. 208/11091; HAT. 23/5028; HAT. 249/14117; HAT. 256/14639; HAT. 265/15404; HAT. 267/15505; HAT. 35/1773.

#### **Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (TSMA), İstanbul**

E. 900/100; E. 901/5; E. 531/33.

#### **Topkapı Saray Müzesi Kütüphanesi (TSMK), İstanbul**

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#### **Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), Château de Vincennes**

**(Série GR V):** GR 1 V: archives du dépôt des fortifications; GR 2 V: archives de la section technique du génie; GR 3 V: archives des inspections; and GR 4 V: archives des directions des travaux du génie. From this series, I used the following folders: 1 VM 81; 1 VM 275; 1 VM 276; 1 VN 7; and 1 VM 81 Tablettes.

1 VM 275, 10: "Rapport sur la visite des Château et Batteries qui défendent le Canal de la Mer Noire."; 1 VM 275, 11: "Memoire sur les défenses Ottomanes au débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la Mer noire."; 1 VM 275, Carton 11; 1

VM 275, Carton 13: "Plan du Canal de la Mer Noire par Antoine Mercenier, 1783"; 1 VM 275, 13bis.: "Instruction que M. L'ambassadeur de France a remise a M. de Bonneval de Vernon et de Lafitte-Clavé."; 1 VM 275, 14bis.: "Mémoire sur la Défense du passage par le Canal de la Mer noire et celle des parties des cotes d'Europe et d'Asie qui y sont adjacente."; 1 VM 275, 19: "Mémoire Topographique sur Les Côtes de la Mer Noire."; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 1, "Carte d'une Partie du Canal de la Mer Noire avec Projets Relative au Memoire du 20 Mai 1785."; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 2, "Plan du Chateau du Fanaraky ou du Fanal d'Europe 1785."; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 3, "Plan du Chateau du Fanal d'Asie et de la Redoute qui renferme ce Fanal"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 4, "Plan du Fort de Karipché en Europe 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 5, "Plan du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 6, "Plan d'une Redoute près du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 7, "Plan d'un Fort Projectée à Fanaraky 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 8, "Plan d'une Redoute Projectée 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 9, "Plan de Buyuk Liman 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, N. 1, "Plan de Nivellement du Fort Projecté à Fanaraky en 1785"; 1 VM 275, 22, N. 2, "Plans particuliers du Fort Projectée à Fanaraki et des cinq Redoutes ou Batteries Projectées à Karipche, à Buyuk Liman Cote D'Europe à Anadoli Fener, à Poiras Liman et à Fil Bouroun Cote d'Asie pour la Defense du Canal en 1785."; 1 VM 275, 22, Carton 1, "Memoire sur la défense du Bosphore ou Canal de la Mer Noire".

**(Série M):** Archives de la Guerre (War Archive): GR 1 M: mémoires et reconnaissances; GR 2 M: fonds du dépôt de la Guerre; GR 3 M: correspondance géographique de dépôt de la Guerre; GR 4 M: historiques manuscrits de régiments; and GR 5 M: copies de documents des archives départementales: 1 M 1616; 1 M 1617; 1 M 1618; 1 M 1619.

SHD, 1 GM 1616: "Visite des châteaux et batteries d'Europe et d'Asie sur le canal de Constantinople".

**(Série Y):** Archives Collectives et individuelles de Personnel (Collective and Individual Archives of the Personnel): Série YD: Dossier d'Officiers Généraux de l'Armée de Terre et des Services: 4 YD 2900 (Baron de Tott); 7 YD 699 (Gouffier); 8 YD 26 (Lafitte-Clavé); 13 YD 274 (François Kauffer).

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N.168. *Journal de son Séjour en Turquie 1784 Lafitte.*

N.169. *Lafitte Lettres écrites pendant son Séjour en Turquie 1784 a 1786.*

N.170. *Journal d'un Voyage de Constantinople a Brousse Nicée et Nicomedie en 1786.*

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Gabriel Joseph de Monnier, *Journal de mon voyage de Paris à Constantinople* (Ms. 65).

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133 CP/Turquie, 159, f. 45-46 (17 fev. 1773); 133 CP/Turquie, 161, f. 364-366 (le 16 Octobre 1775); 133 CP/Turquie, 162, f. 46-47. (1776); 133 CP/Turquie, 169, f. 312-313 (10 November 1783); C.P. Turquie, 171/52, 21 July 1784; 133 CP/Turquie, 171, f. 75 (19 Aout 1784); C.P. 184, f. 355-358 (10 Mai 1793); 133 C.P/Turquie, 185. f. 130 (8 Aout 1793); C.P. 185, f. 153-154 (8 Aout 1793); C.P. 188, f. 119-121 (21 Prairial an II).

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## APPENDICES


### Appendices for Chapter 2

#### Appendix 1: The Plan of Poyraz Limanı Fortress Constructed by Baron de Tott



**PLAN et Elévation du nouveau Château construit en Asie à l'embouchure de la Mer noire sous la direction de M. Le Baron de Tott.  
(SHD, Château de Vincennes, 1 VM 275, 3)**


**Appendix 2: Another Plan of Poyraz Limani Fortress Constructed by Baron de Tott**



(SHD, Château de Vincennes, GR 1 M 1617 2.5 )


**Appendix 3:**

A Plan of Garibçe Fortress Constructed by Baron de Tott



(SHD, Château de Vincennes, GR 1 M 1617 2.7)

**Appendix 4:** A document about the payment made to the workers who worked in the construction of Garibçe and Poyraz fortresses upon the request of Baron de Tott, the manager of the construction.



**Transcript:**

Tot beyzâde marifetiyle Karadeniz Boğazı'nda müceddeden bina ve inşa olunan kal'a-i cedidlerin amele ücreti için alel hesab bin beş yüz guruş ita olunması takririyle inhâ eylemeğin sâdır olan fermân-ı âli mucebince baş muhasebeye kayd olunub meblağ-ı mezbur bin beş yüz guruş verilmek bâbında bâ-telhis fermân-ı âli sâdır olmağın mûcebince tezkire verilmiştir. 23 Za 1189

İcârât-ı amelehâ

Berâ-yı kal'ateyn-i cedideyn der zaman-ı boğaz-ı bahr-i siyah ki be marifet-i Tot beyzade müceddeden bina ve inşa ve tekmil şude fermude. El vaki der sene 1189. Ve an icarat-ı alel hesab ân kadar meblağ an hazine-i amire dâde fermude ber muceb-i takrir-i beyzade-i mesfûr. Ve telhis ve ferman-ı âli 23 Ca 1189 ve bâ ferman-ı şerif

ale'l-hesab

[Toplam] 9000 guruş.

\*\*

Be cihet-i icârât-ı amelehâ ve mesarif-i sâire lâzım be-tamirat-ı kal'ateyn-i cedideyn der boğaz-ı bahr-i siyah be marifet-i Tot beyzade tamir ve tekmil şude fermude. El vaki 1189 ila 25 Za nüvişte der sene-i mezbur ân kadar meblağ be hazine-i amire dade fermude. Tezkire-i hazine nüvişte be marifet-i defter-i memhur an ... mesfur.

Der-kenar ve telhisat ve fermân-ı âli Zilhicce sene 1189 ve bâ fermân-ı şerif fi 19


Eyyam 159

10513 guruş-9000 guruş 19 akçe (Mukaddem bi'd-defa'at ale'l-hesâb dade.)= 1513 guruş

Tezkire dâde. 23 Zilhicce sene 1189.

Appendices for Chapter 3

Appendix 5: A Comprehensive Appraisal Register of the Bosphorus Fortresses in 1778. (BOA. C.AS. 1140/50652)



Transcript of the Appraisal Register:

1. Poyraz limanı kurbünde Eşme burnu üzerindeki kalenin noksan olan mahallerinin tekmili

Açıklama	Aded	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbili	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kale-i mezkurun mevcut duvarları üzerine kargir hisarbeçe teccidi		120 zira	3 zira	2 zira		36 zira	684 zira	240 akçe	164.160 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir duvar teccidi		11,5 zira	1,5 zira	2,5 zira		12 zira	31 zira	180 akçe	5580 akçe
Bu mahalde mevcut duvar üzerinde beğlik tuğladan havale duvarı		23 zira		1 zira				180 akçe	4140 akçe
Duvar-ı mezkura muttasıl kargir duvar		16 zira		2,5 zira			40 zira	180 akçe	7200 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir duvar teccidi		3,5 zira	2,5 zira				8,75 zira	180 akçe	1575 akçe
Cebehane tarafına kargir duvar		6 zira		2 zira			12 zira	180 akçe	2160 akçe
Duvar-ı mezkur üzerine beğlik çarşudan tolos		6 zira			2,5 zira		15 zira	300 akçe	4500 akçe
Mevcut hazine üzerine cedid kiremid ve derununa büken?? kalay		9 zira	6 zira				54 zira	120 akçe	6480 akçe
Bu mahalde mevcut duvar üzerine müceddeden kargir duvar		34 zira	3 zira				102 zira	180 akçe	18360
Bu mahalde tahtı kemerli ve toloslu fevkani kapu üzerinde mükemmel kargir karakolhane /ma'a ocak ve nerduban		15 zira	5 zira				75 zira	480 akçe	36.000 akçe
Bu mahalde tuğla havale duvarı		8,5 zira		1 zira				180 akçe	1530 akçe

Bu mahalde sütunlu ve kirişli üzeri sakıflı tavan ve döşemeli pencere kapu ve dolaplı tahtani zabitan ve neferat sakin olacak mahal teccididi		53 zira	8,5 zira					450,5 zira	520 akçe	234.260 akçe
Derya tarafında top siperleri üzerine kârgir harpuşte		72 zira	3 zira					216 zira	200 akçe	43.200 akçe
Su yolu için altı yolluk künk me'a harpuşte			Tula ni 330 zira						120 akçe	39.600 akçe
Bu mahalde beş/baş üstüne kurşun boru	29								320 akçe	10.440 akçe
Kal'a-i mezkurda kebir tak söğeli semerkandlı ve kilitli samovili biraz daneli temyor kaplı kale kapusu	1		3,5 zira	5 zira				17,5 zira	1200 akçe	21.000 akçe
Bu mahalde mevcut duvara derz		12 zira		10 zira				120 zira	30 akçe	3600 akçe
Bu mahalde türab imlâsı		40 zira	38 zira					2720 zira	10 akçe	15.200 akçe
Bu mahalde som iskele teccididi		20 zira	6 zira	2 zira				240 zira	600 akçe	144.000 akçe
Ücret-i mavna ve küfe kürek ve alat ve mesarîf-i saire										155.536 akçe
YEKÛN										934.121 akçe
Be hesab-ı gurus										7784 gurus 41 para



## 2. Bu mahalde müceddeden bina olunan tabyanın etraf kârgir duvarları

Açıklama	Aded	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbil (Alan)	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Bu mahalde müceddeden bina olunan tabyanın etraf kârgir duvarları			2 zira	7 zira	100 zira	30 zira	1370 zira	240 akçe	328.800 akçe
Kapu önünde kargir duvar		10 zira	1 zira	2 zira			20 zira	180 akçe	3600 akçe
Duvar üzerinde seray mânesından asma cisr		5 zira	2,5 zira				12,5 zira	240 akçe	3000 akçe
Kebir taş söğeli demir kaplı mükemmel kapu	1		2 zira	3 zira			6000 zira		
Bu mahalde kargir nerdübân		4 zira	4 zira				9000 zira		
Kapu üzerinde çarşu tuğladan tolös ve üzeri taş döşeme		8 zira			6 zira		48 zira	300 akçe	14.400 akçe
Mustahfizan sakin olacak mahal tarafeyninde kargir duvar		112 zira		2 zira			224 zira	180 akçe	40.320 akçe
Duvar üzerinde bir buçuk tuğladan tolös tecdidi		56 zira			6 zira		336 zira	300 akçe	100.800 akçe
Mezkur tolös üzerinde kargir rihtim		56 zira	6 zira	18 zira			252 zira	180 akçe	45.360 akçe
Bu mahalde çapa kirişli on iki arşun kebirinden top döşemesi		48 zira	6 zira				288 zira	240 akçe	69.120 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir karakolhane	2 aded							6000 akçe	12.000 akçe
Bu mahalde turab imlâsı		15 zira	10 zira	2 zira			300 zira	10 akçe	3.000 akçe
Kargir sıhrınç tecdidi		4 zira	3 zira				12 zira	720 akçe	8.640 akçe
Bu mahalde tathir lağım me'a kapak ve tarafeyn duvar		Tulani 25 zira						240 akçe	6.000 akçe
Ücret-i mavna küfe-i kürek ve alat ve mesarîf-i saire									126.260 akçe
YEKÜN									777.740 akçe
Be hesâb-ı guruş									6481 guruş 20 para

3. Anadolu feneri ittisalinde müceddeden inşa olunan tabyanın etraf kargir duvarları

Açıklama	Aded	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbil (Alan)	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Anadolu feneri ittisalinde müceddeden inşa olunan tabyanın etraf kargir duvarları			2 zira	8 zira	137 zira	60 zira	2130 zira	240 akçe	526.080 akçe
Duvar-ı mezkur gönye burunlarında yonma taşdan devr-i sütun	8			6 zira	1,75 zira		84 zira	240 akçe	20.160 akçe
Kargir karakolhane	2							6000 akçe	12.000 akçe
Mustahfizan mahalli tarafında kargir duvar tecdidi		80 zira		2 zira			160 zira	180 akçe	28.800 akçe
Duvar üzerine bir buçuk beğlik çarşudan tolos		80 zira			7 zira		560 zira	300 akçe	168.000 akçe
Tolos üzerine kargir rihtim		80 zira	6,5 zira	1 zira			520 zira	180 akçe	93.600 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir cebehane		10 zira	4,5 zira				45 zira	720 akçe	32.400 akçe
Demir kapu	1								9000 akçe
Bu mahalde mükemmel kale kaptusu		3 zira		3,5 zira			10,5 zira	[1200] akçe	12.600
Kapu üzerinde kezâlik tolos		10 zira			8 zira		70 zira	300 akçe	21.000 akçe
Kapu tarafında kargir duvar		28 zira		3 zira			84 zira	180 akçe	15.120 akçe
Bu mahalde yonma kebir taşdan nerduban		12 zira	5 zira				60 zira	240 akçe	14.400 akçe
Bu mahalde turab imlâsı		40 zira	5,5 zira	3 zira			660 zira	10 akçe	6.600 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir su hazinesi		4 zira		3 zira			15 zira	180 akçe	2.700 akçe
Ücret-i mavna ve küfe kürek ve alat ve mesarif-i saire									184.280 akçe
YEKÛN									1.143.500 akçe
Be hesab-ı gurus									9529 gurus

#### 4. Rumeli feneri kurbündeki palanka dizdarı hanesi

Açıklama	Aded	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbii (Alan)	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Rumeli feneri kurbündeki palanka dizdarı sakın olmak için etraf şütnülü duvarlı tavan döşemeli pencere ve kapulu musandaralı mükemmel tahtani dizdar hanesi		20 zira	10 zira				200 zira	600 akçe	120.000 akçe
Haricde olan taş duvar ve matbah ve memşa									12.000 akçe
Ücret-i mavna ve mesarîfât-ı saire									13.200 akçe
YEKÛN									145.200 akçe
Be hesab-ı guruş									1210 guruş

## 5. Garibçe burnundaki kal'a derûnunda olan noksanlarının tekmili

Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbli (Alan)	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kal'a-i mezkurede mevcut duvar üzerine kargir hisarpeçe		190 zira	1,75 zira	2,75 zira		120 zira	794 zira	240 akçe	190.560 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir tabya duvarı		33 zira	1,25 zira	4 zira			140,25 zira	180 akçe	25.245 akçe
Tabya-i mezkur derûnuna türâb doldurması		20 zira	10 zira	4 zira			800 zira	10 akçe	8000 akçe
Cebehane üzerinde kaygan ferşi		20 zira	12 zira				240 zira	120 akçe	28.800 akçe
Bu mahal üzerine türâb imlâsı		40 zira	20 zira	2 zira			1600 zira	10 akçe	16.000 akçe
Bu mahalde cebehane tarafına kargir tolos		10 zira			4 zira		40 zira	300 akçe	12.000 akçe
Asma kilidli demir kaplı cebehane kapusu	1								9.000 akçe
Bu mahalde seray mânesinden demir kaplı mükemmel kale kapusu	1	5 zira		6 zira			30 zira	1.200 akçe	36.000 akçe
Kezalik demir kaplı zindan ve tabya kapusu	2							9.000 akçe	18.000 akçe
Bu mahalde sütunlu ve kirişli tavanlı mükemmel cami-i şerif tevdidi		15 zira	10 zira				150 zira	600 akçe	90.000 akçe
Bu mahalde mevcut binaların pencere ve kapu ve dolap ve sair noksanlarının tekmili		50 zira	8 zira				400 zira	300 akçe	120.000 akçe
Çapa kirişli on iki arşın kebirinden top döşemesi		10,30 zira	6 zira				62 zira	240 akçe	14.640 akçe
Bu mahalde türâb imlâsı		8 zira	4 zira	2 zira			64 zira	10 akçe	640 akçe
Ücret-i mavna ve küfe kürek ve mesarif-i sâire									113.396 akçe
YEKÛN									682.281 akçe
Be hesab-ı gurus									5685 gurus
									21 para

6. Garibçe burnu üzerinde müceddeden inşa olunan tabyanın kârgir duvarı

Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	AzğıE (n)	Kadd (Yükseklik)	Devr (Çevre)	Mazgal	Terbli (Alan)	Fl (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Garibçe burnu üzerinde müceddeden inşa olunan tabyanın kargir duvarı			2,5 zira	7 zira	79 zira		1.406,5 zira	240 akçe	337.560 akçe
Müstahfizan sakin olacak mahal etrafına kargir duvar		100 zira	18 zira	4 zira			300 zira	180 akçe	54.000 akçe
Bu mahal üzerine beğlik çarşı tuğladan tolol tecdidi		50 zira			6 zira		300 zira	300 akçe	90.000 akçe
Tabya derûnunda kârgir rihitim		63 zira		4 zira			252 zira	180 akçe	45.360 akçe
Bu mahalde su hazinesi me'a musluk	1								6.000 akçe
Etraf kargir duvarlı memşâ	1								1.800 akçe
Demir kapulu mükemmel cebehane me'a taş nerdubân		5 zira	4 zira				20 zira	720 akçe	14.400 akçe
Bu mahalde kargir karakolhane	3							[600] akçe	18.000 akçe
Taş sökeli mükemmel kapu	2							1.200 akçe	2.400 akçe
Tabya-i mezkurda demir kaplı mükemmel kapu			2,5 zira	3 zira			7,5 zira	1.200 akçe	9.000 akçe
Tabya kapusu önünde cisr		4 zira	2,5 zira				10 zira	240 akçe	2.400 akçe
Cisr-i mezkûr tahtına kârgir duvar		16 zira		2,5 zira			40 zira	180 akçe	7.200 akçe
Bu mahalde beş/baş üzerine kurşun boru		Tulani 20 zira						180 akçe	3.600 akçe
Bu mahalde su başına varınca keزالik mea harpuşte		Tulani 160 zira						120 akçe	19.200 akçe
Bu mahalde tarafeyni kargir duvarlı lağım		Tulani 20 zira						120 akçe	2.400 akçe
Tabya-i mezkurda matbah tariki		800 zira	3 zira				1600 zira	10 akçe	16.000 akçe
Ücret-i mavna ve küfe kürek ve mesarif-i säire									113.192 akçe
YEKÜN									697.156 akçe
Be hesab-ı gurus									5.792,5 gurus
									52 para

**TOPLAM YEKÜN: be hesâb-ı gurus 44.872,5 gurus.**  
**Bende Mehmed Tahir ser-mi'mârân-ı hassa**

**Appendix 6:** The French ambassador explains their mission to Bonneval and Lafitte in taking a voyage to the Coasts of the Black Sea.

Constantinople  
1784.  
N<sup>o</sup> 13bis  
C<sup>m</sup> 1

instruction que M. L'ambassadeur de France a remise a M<sup>rs</sup> de Bonneval, de Vernon et de LaFille, relativement à la Reconnoissance du Canal de la mer noire, et des cotes voisines d'Europe et d'Asie. en avril 1784.

par M. de F. prieur

Le principal objet de la Reconnoissance ordonnée par Sa Majesté, à l'embouchure de la mer noire dans le canal qui conduit à Constantinople, est de mettre en état de juger des moyens d'attaque que l'ennemi pourroit employer de ce côté contre la capitale et de ceux de defense qu'on pourroit y opposer. c'est sur ce double aspect que paroit devoir se diriger le travail ordonné en cette partie.

On ne peut se dissimuler que la Russie maître de la Crimée ne change esormais son ancien système d'offensive contre l'Empire ottoman. au lieu de porter ses armées avec des frais immenses et des communications longues et difficiles, sur les bords du Nilster, ou d'ailleurs vis le voisinage des États Autrichiens, une attaque donneroit de la jalousie à la Cour de Vienne. il est bien plus simple de transporter un corps d'armée entre la chute des Montagnes de Thémus dans la mer nommée par les Turcs, le Balkan et l'isthme de l'Europe sur la mer noire ou communé le canal de Constantinople. Cela suppose cependant que les Russes fussent maîtres de cette mer, afin que les vivres et les secours pussent parvenir à leur armée. il faudroit aussi qu'ils fussent

(SHD, Château de Vincennes, 1 VM 275, 13bis)

**Instruction que M. L'ambassadeur de France a remise a M. de Bonneval de Vernon et de Lafitte relativement à la Reconnaissance du Canal de la Mer Noire et des Cotes voisines d'Europe et d'Asie. En Avril 1784.**

Le principal objet de la reconnaissance ordonnée par sa Majesté, à l'embouchure de la Mer noire dans le canal qui conduit a Constantinople, est de mettre en état de juger des moyens d'attaque que l'ennemi pourroit employer de ce cote contre la capitale et de ceux de défense qu'on pourroit y opposer. C'est sur ce double aspect que paroît devoir se diriger le travail ordonne en cette partie.

On ne peut se dissimuler que la Russie Maitresse de la Crimée ne change désormais son ancien Sistème d'offensive contre l'empire Ottoman. Au lieu de porter ses armées avec des frais immenses et des communications longues et difficiles, sur les bords du Niester, où d'ailleurs vu le voisinage des Etats Autrichiens, une attaque donneroit de la jalousie a la Cour de Vienne. Il est bien plus simple de transporter un corps d'armée entre la chute des montagnes de l'Hèmus dans la mer nommée par les Turcs, le Balkan et l'extrêmité de l'Europe sur la mer Noire où commence le canal de Constantinople, cela suppose cependant que Les Russes fussent maitres de cette mer, afin que les vivres et les recrues pussent parvenir a leur armée. Il faudroit aussi qu'ils fussent assures du seul port qu'il y ait sur cette cote, afin d'y mettre les vaisseaux en sureté. Les Turcs le nomment Chinguené Skalessy, et c'est celui qu'au tems du bas Empire on nommoit Misembrie. Il est sans défense quant a présent, et offre a l'ennemi une très bonne position pour y établir les dépôts qu'entraînent nécessairement des armées de terre et de mer.

Entre Chinguené Skelessy et le canal, il y a un petit port auprès de Midia où l'on va charger du charbon pour la capitale. Il est a environ 25 lieues du canal et asses près du point ou les empereurs grecs avoient élevé un retranchement qui alloit jusqu'à la mer blanche non loin d'Heraclee, mais le dit port n'est propre, dit-on, que pour des barques à charbon. Toute la côte delà au canal est une plage sabloneuse et basse et fort dangereuse par les vents de Nord qi règnent le plus ordinairement dans la mer noire surtout en été.

D'après cet expose, il n'y a pour une entreprise en grand par mer du côté de l'Europe de ressource pour les Russes que d'occuper Chinguené Skelessy; et si ce point étoit en sureté, l'ennemi seroit forcé de former son attaque par le Niester suivant l'ancien sistème. Mais il tenteroit probablement par mer un coup de main qui n'exigeroit pas un point d'apui aussi solide, et des forces médiocres aidées de l'intelligence avec les Grecs qu'il lui seroit aisé de former pourroient mettre la capitale en danger.

Il suffiroit de porter quatre ou cinq mille hommes sur des bâtimens de transport escortes d'une escadre légère vers l'embouchure du canal dans la mer noire, et tentant aux environs un débarquement, prendre a revers les chateaux qui défendent l'entrée, la quelle si cette attaque réussissoit, deviendroit libre aux frégates. Le point assuré l'ennemi mesureroit ses opérations sur les mouvemens des Grecs, et au pis aller pourroit attendre de pied ferme des renforts de Crimée.

Il s'agit donc pour éclaircir cet objet, d'examiner si la côte d'Europe sur la mer noire peut admettre un débarquement de ce genre, sous la protection des frégates mouillées à la distance que le fond permet. On a lieu de croire d'après les notions qu'on a, que ce projet est impraticable ; mais s'il en étoit autrement, le point où l'on pourroit l'exécuter, mérite d'être examiné ainsi que sa distance de la pointe d'Europe sur l'entrée du canal, et celle du village de Domusdéré, d'où il y a jusqu'à Constantinople un grand chemin voyé d'environ cinq lieues qui passe au travers de la forêt de Belgrad et par conséquent dans un local de chicane et susceptible de cacher le petit nombre de tropes Russes. D'ailleurs de ce pays partent les aqueducs qui abreuvent la capitale, et elle souffriroit beaucoup s'ils étoient coupés par l'ennemi.

Quant au côté de l'Asie, on ne voit aucun port jusqu'à Sinope qui est à cinq cent milles de distance du canal, il n'y a aucune possibilité à l'ennemi d'y établir une offensive en grand par le manque de point d'appui rapproché de Constantinople.

On a lieu de croire qu'un coup de main seroit plus facile de ce côté que de l'autre ; à dix milles de la pointe d'Asie sur l'ouverture du canal est un village nommé Riva sur l'embouchure d'une petite rivière. Il paroît que le débarquement n'y seroit pas impraticable et que les frégates légères pourroient approcher assez près de la cote pour le protéger. Les Turcs y ont bâti un fortin très insignifiant. Delà au fanal d'Asie, le terrain s'emble praticable pour la marche des troupes avec du canon de campagne. Le Château le plus avancé de ce côté ne feroit aucune résistance. Celui qu'a bâti Mr. De Tot en l'état actuel n'est pas défilé et seroit aisément pris ; des lors l'entrée du canal et le mouillage de Kavac deviendroit libre aux frégates, qui n'auroient à essuyer que le seul feu du château d'Europe de Mr. De Tot, et l'accès à une armée navale seroit assuré. Il faut ajouter que de Riva à Acbala village situé à une lieue de la mer vis-à-vis Tarapia, il y a un chemin frayé de cinq lieues qu'on dit propre aux voitures et conséquemment à l'artillerie. Mais il faudroit toujours revenir delà sur les forts du canal pour en ouvrir l'entrée aux frégates. D'ailleurs un débarquement du côté de l'Asie exigeant le passage du canal pour venir à Constantinople joindre les Grecs soulevés, n'offriroit pas à l'ennemi autant de commodité qu'en l'exécutant en Europe.


On croiroit essentiel de bien mesurer la distance de l'Europe à l'Asie entre les deux fanaux, et l'on pense qu'un vaisseau en passant au centre du canal, auroit peu à craindre de l'artillerie de ces châteaux ; mais qu'il n'en seroit pas de même à ceux de Mr de Tot ou le canon traverse de l'un à l'autre.

Les troisièmes châteaux en dedens ne sont d'aucune défense. On y a fait récemment des batteries à fleur d'eau qui auroient besoin d'être soutenues par des batteries supérieures contenues dans des redoutes ou fortins. On estime enfin qu'au-dessous du vieux château dit des Génois, on devoit placer une pareille batterie.

Tous ces points du canal ont bon fond pour les vaisseaux de force, mais il n'y a d'abri qu'à Kavac depuis l'ouverture jusqu'à Buyukdéré ou l'on peut mouiller une flote. On ne parle pas des quatrième châteaux, parce les autres pris, l'ennemi a un abri pour ses forces navales et peut agir avec celles de terre à champ libre.



Appendix 7: Appraisal Register of the Bosphorus Fortresses in 1196 (MAD.d. 3162, pp. 552-553)



MAD.d 03162

(MAD.d. 3162, pp. 552-553)

## 1. Kal'a-i fenâr der canib-i Anadolu

Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Terbii	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kışlak-ı yeniçeriyân		60 zira	13 zira	780 zira	480 akçe	374.000 akçe
Kışlak-ı cebeciyan		60 zira	12 zira	720 zira	480 akçe	345.400 akçe
Kışlak-ı topçıyan		40 zira	10 zira	400 zira	480 akçe	196.000 akçe
Fırın-ı nân-ı aziz	1					120.000 akçe
Sagir hammam	1					60.000 akçe
Bu mahallerde cibalden cereyan eden sel yolları ve lağımlar ve kışlak önlerine munkazi kaldırım						30.000 akçe
YEKÜN						1.121.800 akçe
Be hesab-ı guruş						9.347 guruş 4 para

## 2. Kal'a-i Poyraz Limanı der Anadolu

Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Terbii	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kışlak-ı yeniçeriyân		60 zira	13 zira	780 zira	480 akçe	374.000 akçe
Kışlak-ı cebeciyan		60 zira	12 zira	720 zira	480 akçe	345.400 akçe
Kışlak-ı topçıyan		40 zira	10 zira	400 zira	480 akçe	196.000 akçe
Fırın-ı nân-ı aziz	1					120.000 akçe
Sagir hammam	1					60.000 akçe
Bu mahallerde cibalden cereyan eden sel yolları ve lağımlar ve kışlak önlerine munkazi kaldırım						30.000 akçe
YEKÜN						1.121.800 akçe
Be hesab-ı guruş						9.347 guruş 4 para

**TOPLAM YEKÜN: 2.243.600 akçe**  
**Be hesab-ı guruş 18.696 guruş 20 pare.**

### 3. Kal'a-i fenâr-ı Rumili


Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Terbii	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kışlak-ı yeniçeriyan		60 zira	13 zira	780 zira	480 akçe	374.000 akçe
Kışlak-ı cebeciyan		60 zira	12 zira	720 zira	480 akçe	345.400 akçe
Kışlak-ı topçıyan		40 zira	10 zira	400 zira	480 akçe	196.000 akçe
Fırın-ı nân-ı aziz	1					120.000 akçe
Sagir hammam	1					60.000 akçe
Bu mahallerde cibalden cereyan eden sel yolları ve lağımlar ve kışlak önlerine munkazi kaldırım						30.000 akçe
YEKÜN						1.121.800 akçe
Be hesab-ı guruş						9.347 guruş 4 para

### 4. Kal'a-i Garibçe der Rumili

Açıklama	Ad ed	Tul (Uzunluk)	Arz (En)	Terbii	Fi (Birim Fiyatı)	Toplam
Kışlak-ı yeniçeriyan		60 zira	13 zira	780 zira	480 akçe	374.000 akçe
Kışlak-ı cebeciyan		60 zira	12 zira	720 zira	480 akçe	345.400 akçe
Kışlak-ı topçıyan		40 zira	10 zira	400 zira	480 akçe	196.000 akçe
Fırın-ı nân-ı aziz	1					120.000 akçe
Sagir hammam	1					60.000 akçe
Bu mahallerde cibalden cereyan eden sel yolları ve lağımlar ve kışlak önlerine munkazi kaldırım						30.000 akçe
YEKÜN						1.121.800 akçe
Be hesab-ı guruş						9.347 guruş 4 para

**TOPLAM YEKÜN: 2.243.600 akçe**  
**Be hesab-ı guruş 18.696 guruş 20 pare.**

**Appendix 8:** Chabaud de la Tour's Report on the Bosphorus Forts and Batteries: "Visite des châteaux et batteries d'Europe et d'Asie sur le canal de Constantinople" (SHD, 1 GM 1616)



First page of the report.

## Visite des Châteaux et batteries d'Europe et d'Asie sur le canal de Constantinople

**20 et 29 Octobre et 16 Décembre 1783**

Les châteaux dont il s'agit tant d'Europe que d'Asie, sont des batteries retranchées et fermées par la gorge, mais dont la construction et les accessoires n'annoncent pas des vues bien militaires. Leurs auteurs auroient dû s'apercevoir que plus ils parvenaient à déployer de feux d'artillerie à l'ouverture et dans le passage du canal pour en empêcher l'entrée aux vaisseaux ennemis, plus ils obligeoient l'ennemi à tourner ses vues du côté de la terre, pour chercher à attaquer et à emporter ces châteaux par leurs gorges ou en affamant leurs garnisons par le manque d'eau et de vivres.

Cette manière suppose à la vérité un débarquement sur les deux côtes de la part de l'ennemi; mais ce débarquement seroit très faisable, si on n'y mettoit obstacle, surtout sur la côte d'Asie qui présente à 8 et 900 Toises du château du phare d'Asie, plusieurs points de descente, que des vaisseaux embossés très près de la côte pourroient protéger sans être vus ni incommodés non plus que les troupes de débarquement par les feux du château.

Il falloit donc mettre ces châteaux à l'abri d'un coup de main et forcer l'ennemi, supposé qu'il réussit à surmonter les obstacles qu'on opposeroit à son débarquement à mettre à terre du canon, au moins du calibre de douze, à la ... feux de l'escarpement difficiles à gravir et à le mettre en batterie hors de la portée du mousquet, pour parvenir à faire brèche ou même tenir à l'ouvrage qui couvriroit la porte d'entrée du Château et à son mur de gorge et marcher ensuite à l'attaque de ces brèches à Corps découvert sur une longueur d'environ 200 toises. Si il vouloit éviter ce moyen dangereux et meurtrier en passant d'une place d'armes couverte couverte par des terres remuées qui fut proche de la Contrescarpe, il lui faudroit ouvrir la tranchée pour arriver à Couvert jusqu'à ce point et pour pouvoir former cette place d'armes ce qui seroit un siège en forme et lui feroit perdre un temps considérable mais il ne seroit point obligé d'y venir là, dans l'état actuel des châteaux qu'on peut considérer comme de simples postes à enlever soit par surprise, soit de vive force.

Des choix de position sans objet déterminé un mur de gorge ou plutôt un rempart sans parapet et sans banquette, tous les murs de gorge dépourvus de flâner ainsi que les portes qu'aucun ouvrage ne couvre de parapets couper par des embrasures de canon, tandis que leurs banquettes ne peuvent recevoir que des fusiliers des embrasures au niveau ou si près du Terrain naturel extérieur qu'elles offrent une entrée libre dans l'intérieur des châteaux; des fontaines dont l'eau arrivant de la campagne, peut être coupée et déterminée en un instant; nul magasin pour mettre en couvert quelques vivres; nulle Boulangerie; d'où la nécessité de portes chaque jour en ces postes la subsistance de leurs garnisons; de grands corps de Casernes placés très près des châteaux vers leurs gorges offrant des Couverts surs et commodes à l'ennemi pour déboucher de près et formes des attaques.

Voilà ce qu'on en observé dans les visites dont le détail est cy-après.

### **Château du Phare en Europe**

Ce château est situé à la pointe d'Europe, formée par le Canal et par la Mer Noire, à plus de 300 Toises au nord du Phare ou fanal placé sur une autre pointe dans l'intérieur du Canal.

Dans le choix qu'on a fait de la position de ce Château on n'a pu se proposer, ni la défense de l'entrée du Canal dont l'ouverture à ce point est de plus de 2200 Toises, ni celle de la côte dont les parties à la portée des feux du Château sont hérissées de rochers qui même dans le calme la rendent inabordable, par la seule secousse de la masse des Eaux qui de la Mer se portent dans le Canal et sur les parties latérale de la Côte comme dans un Gouffres. On ne conçoit pas comment on n'est pas préférè la position de la pointe du Phare qui est plus près d'environ 300 Toises du Château du Phare d'Asie et qui défend deux anses voisines dans l'intérieur du Canal où il seroit possible que des Troupes pussent débarquer a moins qu'on ait Craint en plaçant le Château sur cette pointe d'être obligé de démolir les plûpart des maisons du village qui occupe une grande partie de cette pointe ou qu'on ait été peut-être déterminé au choix de cette position par la facilité qu'on est en de conduire un volume d'Eau considérable dans l'Enceinte du Château; considération déterminante, sans doute pour une maison de campagne mais très fort et regrettées l'ors qu'il s'agit d'un poste fortifié, ou des citernes sont a préférées, en ce que l'Ennemi ne peut pas l'en privées, au lieu qu'il peut toujours rompre une conduite d'Eau et Empêcher quelle n'arrive à sa destination.

Le mur du coté de l'entrée n'a d'autre flanc qu'une fenêtre dont, par hazard une ... à gauche sans autre ouverture, se trouve percée; et cette entrée est une simple porte sans fossé. Il est donc à propos de percer cette tour d'un couple de créneaux au dessous la fenetre, de couvrir la porte d'un Tambour en maçonnerie entourré d'un fossé de 8 ou 9 pieds de longueur sur autant de profondeur qu'on passera sur des madriers Volantes on établira une barrière sur l'une des faces des Tambours, qui d'un Côté joindra le mur de gorge du Château et de l'autre côté l'angle extérieur de la maison Voisine sur les quatre côtés de la quelle on percera des créneaux; on fermera pareillement par un mur le passage qui Existe entre cette maison et le mur du château.

Le tambour sera fermé d'un mur de 7 pieds et demi de hauteur sur 20 pouces d'Épaisseur, avec une banquette de 1? de hauteur et de trente de largeur également en maçonnerie. On y ménagera des créneaux dont le bord inférieur sera à 4 pieds 4 pouces au dessus de la banquette. On élèvera à la même hauteur que ce mur, celui qui doit fermer le passage entre la maisons le château, en y ménageant également des Créneaux indépendamment de ces mesures, pour défendre l'accès de la porte, on la couvrira d'une meurtrière, qui, comme on sait est une défense verticale. On la Composera de trois faces d'une Brique d'Épaisseur, portant sur une Entre toise et sur deux salles de charpenter, celles-ci encastrées dans la banquette et en rez de son plan.

Le parapet de l'enceinte ne pouvant être défendu que par le Mousquet et non par le Canon, puis qu'il n'est accompagné que d'une banquette ordinaire, il est à propos de masquer par de la maçonnerie les Embrasures dont il est coupé et d'y espacer des Créneaux de quatre pieds de Distances de l'un à l'autre. au moyen de ce changement, le parapet pourra être garni d'un plus grand nombre de fusiliers; et ils seront à Couvert des coups de fusils du dehors. Une partie des portières où embrasures couvertes, du flanc gauche de la batterie, pouvant donner une entrée facile et l'Ennemi dans l'enceinte du Château, puisque quelques une sont au niveau naturel extérieure et que les feux de ce flanc qui ne battent que des rouchers inaccessibles sur la Côte de la Mer, sont par cela même très peu important et même inutiles, il faudra masquer en bonne maçonnerie, toutes celles de ces portières dont le seuil est élevé de moins de neuf pieds au dessus du terrain extérieur et rétablir à neuf les fermetures de toutes les autres qui sont tombées ou qui tombent de vétusté et de pourriture. Il faudra masquer Également la porte de secours, non seulement comme inutile, mais encore Comme dangereuse et pouvant favoriser une surprise, étant dépourvue de flancs ainsi que le mur dans lequel elle est percée. Tous les affuts de châteaux sans exception, ont besoin d'être renouvelés ainsi que le plûpart des plate-formes. La Construction des unes et des autres est vicieuse. Les 1ère par le peu de Diamètre et le massif de leurs Rouages; les 2èmes parce qu'elle ne sont composées que de Gites jointifs sans planches, ce qui forme un lit très inégal et ne peut que nuire au service des pièces pour les remettre en Batterie.

On a lieu de s'étonner, et cette observation s'applique à toutes les batteries hautes du Canal, que la batterie supérieure de ce Château, n'ait point été faite à barbete au lieu d'Embrasures, parce que les Merlons qui divisent celle-cy, n'ayant pour objet que de mettre à couvert du Canon et de la Mousqueterie du Dehors le Canonier; il est certainement hors d'atteinte du feu de ces dernier, par l'Éloignement de l'une et par l'impossibilité de pointes l'autre de bas en haut à la hauteur nécessaire, sur un affut très bas et à travers le Sabou (?) d'une batterie de Vaisseau. Ainsi tout ce qui excède la hauteur de la genouillère ou de la Barbette, c'est à dire 2 pièces 1/2 dans le Parapet des batteries supérieures, est non seulement inutile, mais nuisible d'abord par l'Excès de la dépense dans la Construction et dans l'entretien; en secours lieu, parce que ces Merlons dérobent au Canon, par intervalle, la vue de l'objet qu'il doit battre et enfin parce que le choc de l'aier comprimé par la force de l'Explosion de la poudre au moment de l'Explosion, ébranlé et détruit même la maçonnerie des joues des Embrasures, l'ors même quelle est parementée de pierre de Taille, ainsi que l'Expérience le prouve.

Le Côté de l'entrée du Château est offusqué de très près, par une assez grand corps de Cazernes nouvellement construit, et C'est un couvert vu l'ennemi se rendroit et d'où il déboucherait commodément pour une attaque brusque et de vive force, tel qu'il pourrait la faire avec espérance de succès file château demeurerait dans l'État où il est.

### **Château intérieur du Dessein de M.r de Tot.**

Ce château est fort bien placé par rapport à son correspondant en asie; avec les feux duquel les siens se croisent à merveille. Il a trois batteries, dont 2 à ciel ouvert et une souterraine. Celle-ci est d'une bonne maçonnerie quant à l'intérieure, et un recul suffisant pour le service des pièces; mais elle a l'inconvénient de celles de son Espèce; C'est qu'il ne faut qu'un ou deux Coups de Canon pour les remplir de fumée, et pour aveugler les Canonniers de manière à ne pouvoir faire le service au moins de pendant quelques minutes; ce qui mérites ici d'auteure plus de considération que les objets à battre sont mobiles et passagers.

Les Batteries à ciel ouvert ont des Emplacement de Plates-formes qui demandent à Être remblayés; les Planchers de celles qui existent sont coerts et en mauvais état, ainsi que quelques affuts de même construction que ceux du Château du Phare. Le Parapet devrait être plein et percé de Créneaux et non coupé d'Embrasures puis qu'il ne peut être défendre que pas des fusiliers. Le château est dominé de très près par une grande bute [butte] du coté de sa porte d'entrée; mais cette Bute étant commandée Elle-même par la petite redoute qu'on a construite sur une hauteur voisine, l'attaquant ne sauroit s'en prévaloir, qu'il ne se soit emparé de cette redoute.

Le pont dormant et le Pont-Levis de l'entrée ne valent rien, non par vétusté, mais par la faiblesse et la mauvaise qualité des bois de leur assemblage, puisqu'on a été obligé d'Etançonner l'un et le Tablier de l'autre, qui n'a ni chaine, ni flèche, ni bascale. On supprimera le pont dormant en lui substituant une culée qu'on formera d'un Cofre en maçonnerie qu'on remplira de blocailler et l'on rétablira à neuf le Pont-Levis dont il sera délivré un dessein.

Comme la porte d'entrée n'a point de flanc et qu'on pourroit rompre la fermeture à Couvert, une fois qu'on servit par venu au mur et encore mieux sous son passage vouté, on la couvrira d'un Tambour en maçonnerie, ainsi qu'on l'a proposé pour la porte du Château du Phare, mais composé deux faces seulement.

L'Eau de la fontaine de ce Château lui venant de la Campagne par un aqueduc en partie découvert il seroit aisé à l'attaquant de le rompre et d'en détournée l'Eau. Il conviendrait donc d'avoir une citerne en réserve. L'entrée du Château est ofusquée par un Corps de Cazernes, pareil à celui du Château du Phare, et située de même et par conséquent formant un Couvert et un débouché commodes pour l'attaquant.

### **Chateau du Phare en Asie.**

Ce château renferme véritablement un Phare ou fanal dans son enceinte. Sa distance à son correspondant en Europe est ainsi qu'on l'a dit de plus de 2200 toises. Il a deux batteries et un Donjon dont la Plate-forme n'a point de Canon et pourroit en recevoir, après avoir réduit à deux pieds et demi la hauteur de son parapet pour en faire une Batterie à Barbette. Il faudra couvrir la porte d'entrée de ce donjon qui est en même temps celle du château, d'un Tambour et d'une meurtrière pour lui



procurer une défense verticale; au défaut de latérales et masques en maçonnerie sa porte de secours, par les raisons déjà alléguées, au sujet de celle du Château correspondant en Europe.

### **Batteries immédiatement au dessous du Donjon**

Il faut masquer les trois Embrasures de l'angle à l'est de cette batterie comme n'ayant pas à beaucoup près un Emplacement suffisant de plate-forme pour y placer du Canon.

### **Batterie inférieure**

Le Parapet de cette batterie étant sans banquette et ne pouvant par conséquent être défendu par des fusiliers, ni d'aucune autre manière doit être rasé jusqu'à l'entraîdos des Ceintres des portières ou Embrasures couvertes indépendamment du défaut de banquette, ce parapet intercepte le feu du Canon de la Batterie supérieure. Les plateformes et affuts de ces deux batteries ont besoin d'être renouvelés.

Au reste on ne voit à ce Château, vu son grand Éloignement de son Correspondant en Europe avec les feux duquel, les siens à beaucoup de près ne sauroient se croiser pour défendre l'entrée du Canal, d'autre propriété que d'envelopper et protéger son Phare. Il est très à propos sans doute que les Phares ou fanaux soient à la disposition des Commandant Militaires pour accorder ou refuser aux Navires selon les Circonstances, la Lumière qui indique l'entrée du Canal, mais cet objet pouvoit être rempli avec moins de Dépenses. On n'en a fait aucune pour le Phare de la pointe d'Europe, qui se trouve à la vérité suffisamment protégé par le Voisinage du Château de Cette partie.

### **Chateau intérieur de M. de Tott en asie**

Ce Château a quatre batteries les unes sur les autres, dont une Cazematée [kazamat] ou souterraine, y compris la platte-forme supérieure qui n'a point de Canon été où l'on pourra en mettre, dès qu'on aura réduit à deux pieds et demi, les hauteur du parapet, pour en faire une batterie à Barbette. La batterie souterraine à le même inconvénient que celle du Château correspondant en Europe, qui est qu'un ou deux coups de Canon la rempliront tellement de fumée, qu'il faudra plusieurs minutes pour la dissiper et pour reprendre le service des pièces. Du reste ce Château n'est point achevé. Le mur qui le ferme par sa gorge n'est point à sa hauteur; C'est un rempart de 6 pieds deux pouces d'Épaisseurs qui n'a ni banquette ni parapet. On lui procurera en même tems l'un et l'autre, en y Élevant un parapet de six pièces et demi de hauteur, sur vingt pouces d'Épaisseurs, moyennement quoi il restera 4 pièces et demi pour la largeur de la Banquette. Le parapet sera Crénelé de quatre en quatre pieds.

On a laissé subsister sur le devant de la Porte d'entrée du Château et jusqu'à sur le bord. Extérieur du fossé, une masse de terre mêlée d'un roc tendre s'environ vingt-

cinq pieds de hauteur à Compter du seuil de la porte. Du haut de cette masse l'ail plonge dans tout l'intérieur au château. Le parapet de 6 pieds et demi de hauteur prescrit ci-dessus, diminuera d'autant ce commandement: mais il est bien à propos de l'anéantir entièrement en déblayant toute, cette masse, jettant les matières de droite et de gauche et les arrangeant en Glacis, sur les deux rampes de la Montagne. On couvrira la porte d'entrée d'un Tambour avec fossé et barrière, ainsi que d'une meurtrière, pour laquelle on laissera une ouverture de douze pieds, en élevant le parapet prescrit à dessus.

Comme le Pont Levis et le pont dormant sont hors de service, on rétablira à neuf le premier suivant le modèle dessiné qui sera délivré à cet effet, et l'on supprimera le pont dormant, en lui substituant une Culée composée de trois murs formant un Coffre qu'on remplira des matières de la masse a déblayer. Comme en faisant ce Déblay, on sera obligé de déplacer le tuyau de Conduite de la fontaine du Château que descend le long de cette masse dans le fossé qu'elle traverse et remontent le long du mur de Gorge, va s'appliquer contre celui du Pignon du magasin à poudre, pour y dégorger des Eaux dans une Espèce de Niche, il sera très a propos de le porter sur le mur de Gorge, dont l'Épaisseur est assez forte recevoir la niche. Le mur du magasin à poudre sera délivré par la de ces Eaux qui l'ont déjà dégradé et les poudres ne courront plus le risque d'en être gâtées. Il y a beaucoup d'Embrasures d'en deux batteries à ciel ouvert qui fort tellement offusquées par les terres du Dehors, qu'il seroit aisé par leurs moyen de l'introduire dans le château. Il est donc indispensable de les déblayer, en toute qu'elles demeurent à 9 pieds au dessus du bord extérieur de la plongée de ces Embrasures.

### **Batterie Supérieur immédiatement au dessous de la Plate-forme**

Il faudra supprimer les Embrasures de cette batteries et réduire son parapet à la hauteur de deux pieds et demi, pour n'avoir qu'une barbette toujours préférable, lorsque le Canoniers n'a à craindre, comme dans la position dont il s'agit, ni la mousqueterie ni le Canon de l'Ennemi: Les affuts sont presque tous hors de service, indépendamment de leur construction vicieuse et il est indispensable de les renouvelles.

### **Batterie Inférieure**

Le Parapet de cette Batterie qui est coupé d'embrasure sera également réduit à la hauteur de deux pieds et demi et couverte en barbete, le Canonier devant y être à l'abri du mousquet et du Canon Ennemis, ainsi qu'à la batterie au dessus. Il faudra déblayer le roc qui s'élève jusqu'à quatre pieds près du bord Extérieur des embrasures et l'abaisser au moins jusqu'à neuf pieds. Les affuts sont de la même construction et en aussi mauvais état que ceux de la batterie supérieure. Ce château ainsi que son correspondant en Europe en dominé par une petite redoute en maçonnerie placée sur une château ou elle lui tient lieu de vedette.

### **Batterie de Kavac d'Europe et de Kavac d'Asie.**

Ces batteries situées aux deux villages de Kavak l'un en Europe, l'autre en asie sur le Canal de Constantinople, sont parties casematées, parties en pièces volantes placées sur le terrain naturel sous l'avant-toit de Corps de Gardes et partie en Ciel ouvert avec Embrasures en pierre de tailles nouvellement construites. Les feux de ces batteries sont volantes; et on ne pourroit sans doute en attendre qu'un très bon effet, si ces batteries avec leurs servants ne devoient pas se trouver en bute à des batteries supérieurs en force, telles que sont celles des vaisseaux de ligne; et si les bordées d'un premières vaisseau ne parvenant point à les détruire ou à les éteindre, un 2. ou un 3. vaisseau pourroient n'y plus réussir, vû la supériorité constante de leurs feux. On sent combien sont à préférer des batteries qui battent et ne peuvent être battues, et dont le service est par conséquent plus sur et plus facile. Telles sont par exemple les batteries élevées depuis 40 jusqu'à 80 pieds au dessus de la surface de l'Eau qui porte les vaisseaux. On n'aura point lieu de se récrier contre cette dernière hauteur si l'on considère que le vaisseau qui est ici l'objet de la Batterie, lui présente sur la longueur toutes les parties qui sont hors de l'Eau, depuis la flotaison jusqu'aux extrémités des mâts qui peuvent se trouva au niveau et même au dessus de la position horizontale des pièces dont le feu se trouve ainsi rasant par rapport aux mâts aux Vergues aux huniers, aux voiles, à une partie des cordages, etc. tandis que les batteries du vaisseau conservant la distance verticale qui est entre elles et la batterie de leurs et étant obligées de pointer de leurs en haut pour lâches d'atteindre celle-ci, ou ne le peuvent pas la petitesse du rouage de leurs affuts, et de l'ouverture des sabors, ou si elles y parviennent, ce ne peut être qu'en effleurant la Crête extérieure du parapet de la batterie sans portes ni sur les affuts des pièces ni sur les Canoniers. Il faut observer de plus que les Batteries de terre Elevée, ne voit pas seulement les mâts et agrets du vaisseau, mais more le pont et une partie du flanc, qui se projettent sur un plan auquel la ligne de Tir est perpendiculaire. On n'hésite donc point à proposes de profites des beaux Emplacements qui se présentent au dessus des Batteries des deux Kavacs, pour y établir des batteries a barbette et transporter les pièces des batteries à Embrasures, ainsi que les pièces volantes, laissant subsistes si l'on veut les batteries Cazematées avec leurs pièces.

#### **Ancien château des Génoise sur le Canal de Constantinople en asie.**

On a cru devoir visiter ce château pour pouvoir proposer ou de l'occuper simplement comme poste de communication entre le château intérieur et la Batterie de Kavac en asie, ou d'achever de la détruire au point que l'ennemi ne pût pas l'occuper lui-même, s'il parvenoit à descendre sur la côte. C'est pour ce dernier parti qu'on s'est déterminé, d'après le visite qu'on en a faite.

Il s'agira de déchirer et d'ouvrir les deux tours, et la Courtine qui les lie, lesquels demeurent sur pied du côté de l'Est qui est le plus accessible. on Employera à cet effet quelques journées de terrassiers albanois qui sont au fait de ce genre de travail et quelques livres de poudre.

#### **Batteries de Carip-bourou ou Cap Pauvre en Europe et de Poiras limani ou Port du Nord en Asie**

Ces Batteries ne sont entre chose que des pièces volantes placées sur le terrain naturel, au bord du canal sous des hangards situés aux pieds d'anciens châteaux, dont il n'est guère possible de se prévaloir pour la défense du Canal. Celui d'Europe pourrait être utile du côté de terre relativement à un autre projet. Quant aux Batteries même, on peut leur appliquer les observations qu'on a faites sur celles des Kavacs, avec la différence que celles-ci ont beaucoup de pièces de gros Calibres, au lieu que les premières n'ont que des pièces de Campagne, dont 21 du Côté d'Europe et 17 en Asie, dont 3 de feu hors de service. Ces batteries peuvent donc être regardées comme n'exister point pour la défense du Canal, et l'on ne proposera point de nouvelles positions de batteries pour cette partie, en première lieu parce qu'aux points où l'on pourroit les placer leurs feux ne se croiseraient pas avantageusement; En second lieu, parce qu'on regarde le passage du Canal, comme suffisamment défendu par les batteries de M. de Tott, réparées comme on le demande, jointes aux deux que l'on propose de construire au dessus des deux Kavacs. Moyennant cela, l'ennemi ne tentera pas probablement d'introduire des vaisseaux de Guerre de la mer Noire dans le Canal, si au préalable il n'a forcé le retranchement de ces batteries en les attaquant du côté de la terre, soit de vive force à quoi il ne pourroit guères manquer de réussir dans l'état présent des batteries existantes, soit en débarquant du Canon pour l'employer dans son attaque, ce dont il ne pourroit se dispenser si l'on exécute ce qui est proposé. Indépendamment de la poudre et des boulets ordinaires dont les Calibres sont ou mêlés ou altérés par la rouille et qu'il est par conséquent à propos de vérifier, il faudra approvisionner chaque batterie de quelques boulets ramés, de Leviers de Cordage et d'une Chèvre.

Il faudroit aussi établir dans chaque château une citerne, un petit magasin pour des vivres et une boulangerie.

Dans la visite qu'on a faite de ces postes, on n'a pu voir l'intérieur des magasins à poudre, parce qu'on a défendu n'en avoir pas les clefs.

On suppose qu'ils renferment un approvisionnement raisonnable de poudres et qu'ils y sont à l'abri des accidents du feu et de l'humidité.


Si aux différentes mesures proposées, on ajoute celle de former deux camps l'un sur la côte d'Europe, l'autre sur celle d'Asie, au cas que les circonstances deviennent telles qu'on ait lieu d'y craindre une descente et que ces camps par les différentes positions qu'ils pourront prendre conservent une communication libre avec les châteaux et les Batteries, on a lieu de croire que l'ennemi ne sera aucune tentative particulière sur le Canal de Constantinople du Côté de la mer Noire et qu'il embrassera cet objet dans un plan d'opération plus importantes et plus étendues, dont il ne sera qu'un accessoire avec les Châteaux et les Batteries.

Ce plan qu'on ne peut se dispenser de présenter aux puissances qui même cent cet Empire et dont l'exécution est plus ou moins prochaine, suivant qu'un accommodement entre lui et la Russie aura lieu ou non, conduit à des vues


générales de défensive, qui demandent un mémoire particulier.

Termine le 24 (Xbre) Décembre à M. le Comte de S. Priest pour Être expédié à Smirne, d'où un Navire Marseillois doit partir dans les 1<sup>ere</sup> jours de Janvier, Remis dis-je en un seul paquet en renfermant deux, dont un pour M. le Comte de Vergennes contenant une lettre de moi, la Carte du Canal de Constantinople avec Copie des présentes d'observations, l'autre pour M. le Marechal de Ségur contenant même pièces; de plus une lettre pour M. de Fournerois et une autre pour M. le **Sanquier** qui en contenoit une pour mon Epouse. même Enveloppe.

**Appendix 9: A Report and a Map written and drawn by Cerville de la Tour (SHD, 1 VM 275, 10 and Carton 10)**




**The first page of the report.**



The Map of Chabaud de la Tour

Appendix 10: Chabaud's report on the Bosphorus defenses submitted to Marechal de Segur on April 7, 1784. (SHD, 1 VM 275, 11)



The first page of the report.



## **Memoire sur les défenses Ottomanes au débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la Mer noire**

**Xbre 1783**

**Remis au net a M. la Marechal de Segur pour le Roy le 7 Avril 1784 avec la carte.**

Le débouché du canal de Constantinople dans la mer noire, ainsi que la partie du nord et de ce canal, sont défendus par deux Châteaux successifs et deux autres batteries sur la cote d'Europe et autant sur celle d'Asie. Mais les auteurs de la plupart de ces postes n'avaient pas probablement l'expérience de la guerre. Ces châteaux ne sont que des batteries retranchées et très mal fermées par leurs gorges. On devait penser en les construisant que plus on rendrait formidable leur approche maritime par la quantité d'artillerie que l'on y destinait, plus on ferait naître à l'ennemi l'idée de les attaquer par terre. Les cotes voisines lui présentent plusieurs points de débarquement auxquels il ne rencontrerait nul obstacle: rien n'est plus aisé que de couper l'eau et les vivres à tous ces postes: aucun d'eux n'est à l'abri d'être enlevé soit par surprise soit de vive force.

Les positions de ceux de ces postes qui sont anciens ont été choisies comme au hasard, et sans objet déterminé. L'intérieur de tous ne contient ni magasin pour aucuns vivres, ni boulangeries, ni citernes: on est obligé d'y porter journellement du dehors la subsistance de leurs garnisons: ils n'ont d'eau que des fontaines venant de la campagne, et que l'on peut détourner en un moment. Leurs murs de gorges sont sans flancs, sans fosse, sans parapet, sans banquettes. Quand ils se trouvent percés d'embrasures, elles sont ou au niveau de terrain, ou si basses qu'elles offrent tout l'accès possible pour entrer dans le château. Les portes n'en sont couvertes par aucun ouvrage; et vers toutes ces gorges l'ennemi trouverait de grands corps de casernes très voisins et sans défenses qui lui donneraient des couvertures et très commodes, où il se formerait, et dont il déboucherait de fort près pour son attaque. Tels sont les vices communs à tous ces Châteaux.

### **Château du Phare d'Europe**

Il est situé à plus de 300 toises au nord du Phare, qui occupe une autre pointe dans l'intérieur du canal.

On ne conçoit pas ce qui a pu déterminer l'emplacement choisi pour ce Château. Ce ne peut pas être la défense de l'entrée du canal, qu'il ne voit pas sur sa droite, et dont l'ouverture à ce point est de plus de 2200 toises. Ce n'est pas non plus la défense de la cote: toutes les parties de cette cote à la portée de ses feux sont hérissées de rochers et brisants qui la rendent inabordable. On devait préférer le point du Phare, comme plus voisin du Château correspondant d'Asie: il aurait défendu plus voisin du Château correspondant d'Asie: il aurait défendu plus voisin du Château correspondant d'Asie: il aurait défendu de la deux anses de l'intérieur du canal où le débarquement serait possible. Mais il aurait fallu d'une part démolir une grande partie du village de Fanaraqui; peut-être de l'autre n'aurait-on

pas pu facilement conduire dans ce château le volume d'eau considérable qui y arrive; et chez les Turcs des motifs de cette espèce sont très capables de l'emporter sur tous les inconvénients militaires, qu'il ne connaissent pas.

Ce château, outre tous les défauts tant intérieurs qu'extérieurs de dont on a parlé abondamment, en a encore dans ses batteries à la mer. Le flanc gauche de sa batterie basse porte sur un terrain fort accessible: il a des embrasures par les quelles il est fort aisé d'entrer dans la batterie; et les feux de ce flanc ne battent que des rochers inaccessibles. Il faut masquer en bonne maçonnerie ces embrasures, et toutes celles dont le seuil n'a pas 9 à 10 pieds de hauteur au dessus du terrain extérieur: il faut en reparler beaucoup d'autres qui tombent de vétusté. Il faut de même masquer la porte du secours, très inutile et fort dangereuse.

La batterie supérieure, ainsi que toutes les autres batteries hautes du canal, a le grand défaut d'être construite en embrasures au lieu de l'être à barbette. Les merlons sont nécessaires à une batterie pour préserver les affûts du canon de l'ennemi qui est au même niveau ou supérieur et les canonniers de la mousquetaire et du canon, ou d'être battus latéralement. Mais lors qu'une batterie se trouve ou trop éloignée des fusiliers, ou ne pourroit être atteinte par le canon que de bas en haut, alors les affûts, marins surtout, ni les hommes ne sont pas vus par ce canon; la batterie doit être à barbette, non seulement à cause de l'inutilité des merlons, mais aussi parce qu'ils empêchent de pointer le canon sur une partie de l'horizon en avant. L'expérience prouve ailleurs que les joues des embrasures en maçonnerie, et même en pierre détaillée sont bientôt détruites par l'explosion de la poudre. Il faut donc par toute sorte de raisons s'en tenir à barbette les batteries hautes de ces châteaux est y prendre les précautions relatives à leurs autres défauts.

#### **Château du Phare d'Asie.**

Le phare est renfermé dans l'enceinte de ce château; il conviendrait fort qu'il en fut de même du phare d'Europe, afin que tant tous deux également à la disposition des commandants de ces Châteaux ils puissent de même accorder ou refuser aux navires qui se présentent les feux qui leur sont nécessaires pour entrer de nuit dans le canal.

Ce château a deux batteries montées, et une troisième sur le donjon qui pourrait recevoir du canon, en la mettant à barbette. mais attendre la grande distance entre ce château et son correspondant d'Europe, leurs feux ne peuvent pas se croiser à l'entrée du canal. Il n'a donc guère d'autre propriété que de protéger son phare.

Les deux batteries montées ont des défauts. Le parapet de celle d'embas n'a point de banquette; il ne peut servir à des fusiliers: il est trop élevé et intercepte le feu de la batterie supérieure. Celle-ci a dans son angle à l'est trois embrasures qu'il faut masquer, n'y ayant pas de place intérieurement pour y placer le canon. Il faut masquer aussi la porte du secours inutile et dangereuse.

## **Châteaux d'Europe et d'Asie construits par M. de Tott**

C'est sans doute l'insuffisance des deux châteaux dy dessus pour l'entrée du canal qui a engagé M. de Baron de Tott a construire ceux cy. Ils sont très bien places, et leurs feux se croisent parfaitement.

Celui d'Europe a trois étages de batteries, dont une souveraine cette dernière, dont l'intérieur est bien conditionné, et en bonne maçonnerie, aurait l'inconvénient de toutes celles casematées, savoir la stagnation de la fumée, qui y aveugle les canoniers et leur ôte la respiration pendant au moins plusieurs minutes a chaque décharge; ce qui mérite ici d'autant plus d'attentions que les navires sont des objets mobiles et ne font que passer. Ce château est dominé de fort près vers sa porte d'entrée par une grande butte, qui est elle même commandée par une hauteur voisine occupée par une petite redoute; ce qui procure que l'on a pensé a l'attaque des châteaux possible par terre, quoi que l'on y ait négligé toutes les précautions indispensables en conséquence. L'ennemi ne pourrait se prévaloir de la grande butte sans s'être emparé de la redoute, qu'il faut mettre en bon état. Le château reçoit comme les précédents ses eaux du dehors, n'a point de citerne, et est offusqué par un corps de casernes extérieur fort contraire a sa sûreté.

Le Château d'Asie de M. de Tott a quatre étages de Batteries, dont une casematée, sur la quelle on ne doit pas beaucoup compter, comme on l'a dit cy dessus, et celle du sommet qu'il faut réduire a barbette. Celle au dessus du sommet doit être réduite de même n'ayant pas plus a craindre pour ses affuts et ses canoniers. La Batterie inférieure est assise sur un rocher qui s'élève jusqu'a quatre pieds près de ses embrasures. Il faut absolument recouper ce rocher de cinq a six pieds de sa hauteur. Le canon en est encore assez élevé pour n'avoir aucun besoin de ses merlons.

Ce château n'est pas achevé le mur de gorge qui a plus de six pieds d'épaisseur est sans banquette et sans parapet. Il faut l'élever encore de six pieds et demi, mais sur vint pouces seulement d'épaisseur; il s'y trouvera a lors une banquette de quatre pieds et demi, et on formera au mur de vint pouces des créneaux de quatre en quatre pieds.

On a laissé subsister sur le devant de la porte d'entrée et jusqu'au bord de son fossé, une masse de terre qui s'élève d'environ 25 pieds, du haut de la quelle on plonge tout l'intérieur de Château. Le mur de gorge ne sauvera qu'une partie de ce défaut; il n'en faut pas moins effacer cette hauteur, et en répondre les terres sur les deux penchant de la montagne. Il faut a cette partie un tambour, et une meurtrière pour lui tenir lieu de flancs. Il a aussi sa fontaine venant du dehors, et point de citerne. Il est dominé comme son correspondant par une petite redoute en maçonnerie qui lui sert de vedette, et qu'il faut mettre en état.

## **Batteries de Kavac**

Les deux batteries des villages de Kavac d'Europe et d'Asie sont en parties

casematées, et partie en pièces volantes placées sur le terrain naturel, les unes sous l'avant toit des corps de gardes, les autres a ciel ouvert avec embrasures de pierres de taille sont nouvellement faites. Ces batteries sont razantes, et ne pourroient faire qu'un bon effet si le canon et ceux qui le servent n'y estoient par conséquent exposes a l'artillerie bien plus nombreuse des vaisseaux et a la mousqueterie de leurs hunes. C'est ce qui devrait proscrire pour toujours les batteries razantes de terre contre des vaisseaux de guerre. On sert donc combien sont préférables les batteries plongeantes, qui voient ces vaisseaux. et ne peuvent en être battües. Elles jouissent de cet avantage depuis 40 pieds jusqu'a 80 d'élévation au dessus de l'eau.

On ne trouvera pas cette dernière excessive si l'on considère que le vaisseau de guerre, qui est l'objet de la batterie dans le canal, lui présente sur sa longueur toutes ses parties qui sont hors de l'eau depuis sa floraison jusqu'au haut de ses mats, et alors le haut des mats se trouve au niveau, et même supérieur autre horizontal de la batterie. Le feu de la batterie se trouve donc razant, ou a peu près relativement aux mats, hures vergues, voiles et toutes les manœuvres du vaisseau, tandis que l'artillerie du vaisseau conserve toujours son infériorité de 80 pied au dessous de la batterie de terre, et ne peut pointer a cette hauteur tant a cause de ses rouages d'affuts trop bas, qu'a cause de l'ouverture de ses sabords. Si l'on pouvoit parvenir a y pointer, il est toujours évident que le boulet ne pourrait qu'effleurer la crête extérieure de ces barbettes élevées, sans jamais pouvoir blesser ni les affuts ni les canonniers, qui sont fort en arrière. On doit encore remarquer que ces hautes batteries voient aussi tout le pont du vaisseau et ses flancs interieurs, qui se projettent nécessairement sur un plan auquel la ligne du tire de la batterie est perpendiculaire.

C'est en conséquence de ces réflexions que l'on n'a pas hésité a proposer de profiter des beaux emplacement qui se présentent aux dessus des batteries razantes des deux villages de Kavac, pour y construire des batteries a barbettes, c'y transporter toutes les pièces d'embat sans exception.

On a visité en même temps les vestes de l'ancien Château des Genoïs très voisin de Kavac d'asie, pour reconnoitre si l'on pouvoit en tirer queulqu'utilité. Ce qui en subsiste ne pouvoit servir que d'épaulement a l'ennemi pour insulter la batterie. Il faut donc en déchirer les deux tours et le mur de courtine qui les lieu du cote de l'Est; ce qui est l'affaire de quelques livres de poudre et journées de rocassiers albanois, qui sont fort qu fait de ce genre de travail.

### **Batterie de Carip-brounou, ou Cap-Pauvre en Europe; et de Poiras Limani, ou Cap nord en asie**


Ces batteries sur les deux vives et au bord du canal sont loin des Kavac vers Constanitnople. Ce ne sont que des pièces volantes au pied d'anciens chateaux dont on ne peut tirer aucun parti pour la defense du canal. On pourroit leur appliquer tout ce que l'on a dit cy dessus sur les batteries rasantes des Kavac: mais on ne propose pas d'en faire le même usage dans les positions plus élevés, 1. par ce que le local ne

leur permétoit pas de croiser avantageusement leurs feux; 2. parce que ce canal sera suffisamment défendre si l'on exécute aux batteries et Château cy dessus ce qu'on y propose. Il serait alors impossible a l'ennemi de forces par ses vaisseaux le passage dans le canal, a moins de d'être rendu maitre de tous ces postes par l'intérieur des terres. Il ne manquerait probablement ni a l'entreprendre ni a y réussir si les choses demeuroient a cet égard dans l'état ou elles sont aujourd'hui.

On a fourni a la Porte un mémoire détaillé de tout ce qu'il convient de faire a chacun de ces postes, en reparations, améliorations, canons affuts et plate-forme de meilleurs madones munitions etc. Tout y'est en très mauvais etat.  
Xbre 1783.




Appendix 11: A Draft Map of Antoine Mercenier, 1783



"Plan du Canal de la Mer Noire par Antoine Mercenier, 1783". SHD, 1 VM 275, Carton 13



**Appendix 12:** The Cover and First Page of Lafitte-Clavé's Journal of the Black Sea Coasts preserved in Château de Vincennes.



« Journal d'un Voyage sur les Côtes de la Mer Noire du 28 Avril au 18 Septembre 1784 », Bibliothèque SHD, N. 167.




**Appendix 13:** The Cover and First Page of Lafitte-Clavé's Journal of His Stay in Istanbul (1784) preserved in Château de Vincennes.




“Lafitte Journal de son séjour en Turquie”, Bibliothèque SHD, N. 168.

**Appendix 14:** Lafitte’s Letters During His Stay in Istanbul from 1784 to 1786 preserved in Château de Vincennes.




“Lafitte Lettres écrites pendant son séjour en Turquie 1784 a 1786”, Bibliothèque SHD, N. 169.


**Appendix 15: Fortress Projects Proposed by Lafitte-Clavé in 1785**




**SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 2, "Plan du Chateau du Fanaraky ou du Fanal d'Europe 1785."**



SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 3, "Plan du Chateau du Fanal d'Asie et de la Redoute qui renferme ce Fanal"



SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 4, "Plan du Fort de Karipché en Europe 1785"





SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 5, "Plan du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"

# Plan et profil

Deux Redoutes semblables construites par le Sult Soultan petit  
De St. Tropez, l'une en Europe contenant 9 pièces de canons,  
et l'autre en Asie contenant 10 pièces de canons.




Profil pris sur la ligne AB



Echelle de 3 lignes pour pied.




SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 6, "Plan d'une Redoute près du Fort de Poiras Liman en Asie 1785"



SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 7, "Plan d'un Fort Projecte à Fanaraky 1785"





SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 8, "Plan d'une Redoute Projetée 1785"



SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 9, "Plan de Buyuk Liman 1785"

French Map of a Part of the Black Sea Strait with Projects, 1785. "Carte d'une Partie du Canal de la Mer Noire Avec Projets 1785." SHD, 1 VM 275, 22, Feuille 1.

In addition to the list of fortresses and batteries of the Black Sea Strait, this map indicated the projects that Lafitte-Clavé offered for their constructions:

- A. Chateau de Fanaraky en Europe, construit en 1769 par un Architect Grec (Voyes le Plan Feuille 2)
- B. Casernes des Janissaires au dehors de ce Chateau
- C. Fanal d'Europe construit par un Sultan et entretien sur les revenus des Mosquées
- D. Balon des signaux que le Capitan Pacha a fait élever cet hiver
- E. Chateau du Fanal d'Asie construit aussi en 1769. Feuille 3.
- F. Redoute que renferme le Fanal d'Asie construite par ordre du Capitan Pacha, par le Sieur Toussaint ver l'année 1778. le Grand Vizir Kiuperli a fait bâtir le Fanal entretenu sur le revenu d'un Kan fonde a Constantinople par ce meme Visir. Feuille 3.
- G. Casernes des Janissaires.

H. Fort de Karipche construit en 1773 sur le Plan de sous la direction du Baron de Tott. Feuille 4e. Casernes des Janissaires.

I. Casernes des Janissaires.

K. Fort de Po[i]ras Liman construit aussi en 1773 par le Baron de Tott. Feuille 5.

L. Casernes des Janissaires.

M. Redoute circulaire construite par ordre du Capitan Pacha par le Sieur Toussaint en 1778. Feuille 6.

N. Redoute semblable a la précédente construite aussi dans le meme tems.

**Ouvrage Projettes en 1785**

O. Fort projeté et tracé a Fanaraky le 19 avril. Feuille 7.

P. Redoute près du Fanal d'Asie.

Q. Redoute près du Fort de Karipché.

R. Redoute près du Fort de Po[i]ras Liman

S. Redoute près de Buyuk Liman.


T. Redoute de Fil Bouroun.

V. Magasin de marine et Logemens avec la Batteries, quai et Fontaines que l'on construit actuellement a Buyuk Liman par ordre du Capitan Pacha. Feuille 9.


X. Batteries des Cavacs d'Europe et d'Asie construites par ordre du Capitan Pacha, par le Sieur Toussaint en 1783.

Appendices for Chapter 4


Appendix 16: Ottoman Draft Plan of Kilyos Fort (BOA. TSMA.e. 497/20)




**Appendix 17: Ottoman Map of Istanbul Strait and Plans of Forts and Batteries from 19th Century, Istanbul University Rare Manuscript Library (İÜ.NE. 92688)**




**“Bahr-i siyah boğazında kâin Kılâ-ı Hâkâniyye topları çaplarını iş‘âr için İngiltere zâbitânından Simson nâm kapudânın tersim eylediği haritadan ihrâc olunub Mekteb-i Bahriyye-i Şâhânedede tersim olunmuş haritadır. Fi 11 Ca 1270.”**



“Rumeli Feneri Kal’ası”




“Garibçe Kal’ası”




“Büyük Liman Kal’ası”






“Rumili Kavağı Kal’ası”




"Telli Tabya"






“Anadolu Feneri Kal’ası” - “Poyraz Kal’ası”



“Alay burnu [Filburnu] Tabyası”





“Macar Kal’ası”

## Appendices for Chapter 6

### Appendix 18: The Military Organization and Working of the Bosphorus Fortresses According to Târih-i Vâsîf

#### Zikr-i istihkâm-ı sugr-ı Bahr-i siyâh ve tertîb-i neferât-ı kılâ' (sene 1199)

Bahr-i siyah boğazının iktizâ-yı vakt ü hâle göre muhafazası ehemmi-i umurdan olduğuna binâen dâhil ve hâricinde vâki' olan kılâ'-ı atîka ve cedîdenin ta'mir ve termîmi ve iktiza eden neferâtının tertîb ve tetmîmi esbabına bu esnâda teşebbüs olunup mukaddema müstahfız nâmiyle tayin olunan şâhinci ve çakırcı neferâtının emr-i muharedede kemâ-yenbagî iktidarları olmadığı lede't-tecrübe ma'lum olduğundan cümlesi ihrâc ve hidemât-ı sabıklarına icrâ ve iâde ve merkumlara cânişîn olmak üzere kâr-güzâr-ı neferâtın tertibi irâde olunmağla hâlâ deryâ kapudanı vezir-i mükerrem Gazi Hasan Paşa tarafından mukaddemâ takdim olunan defter mucibince hâric-i boğazda Anadolu cânibinde vâki' Fener ve Revancık kal'alarıyla Rumeli boğazında vâki' cedîd Fener kal'alarına yüzyirmibeşer akçe ile bir nefer dizdâr ve seksener akçe ile birer nefer kal'a kethüdâsı ve seksener akçe ile birer nefer topçu başı ve altmışar akçe ile birer nefer cebehânci ve ellışer akçe ile otuz (158-a) yedişer müstahfız ve otuzdörder topçu neferâtı ve diğere Rumeli boğazında vâki' Garibce kal'asıyla Anadolu cânibinde boğaz dahilinde Poyraz limanı kal'alarına dahi yüz yirmişer akçe ile birer nefer dizdâr ve seksener akçe ile birer nefer kethüdâ ve birer nefer topçu-başı ve altmışar akçe ile birer nefer cebehaneci ve ellışer akçe ile otuzyedişer müstahfız ve otuzdörder topçu neferâtı tertîb olunub neferâtı dahi bostanî olmak ve el-yevm mevcûd ve mukayyed olan neferâtın melhuz olan miktara iblâğ ve yevmiyelerinin ağalarına tedarük etdirilmesi ve ibtidâları yedlerine teslim ve her üç ayda bir defa müstahikk oldukları ulûfeleri Hazine-i amire'den kabzına memura i'ta ile mahalline îsâl ve zâbitleri marifetleriyle tevzi' ve taksim ve tarik-i hizmet olanların esâmeleri ref'iyle iktifâ olunmamak ve tertîb olunan müstahfızân ve topcuyan darb ü harbe kâdir tevânâ ve bâhâdır olup leyl ü hizmet-i muharazada cansipâr ve kal'alarda dâimâ pâ-ber-câ-yi merkez-i istikrâr olmak ve müstahfızândan her gece dörder müstahfız münâvebe tarikiyle nevbet-hanelere tayin ve nisfu'l-leyle dek ikisi ve nüsfu'l-leyleden sabâha dek ikisi beklemek üzere zâbitleri tenbîh ve telkin olunub ecânib tarafından sefâine müteallik sevâd ve alâmet zâhir olduğundan cümleden evvel Rumeli feneri kal'ası tarafından meşhûd olacağı zâhir olmağla derakab kal'a-i mezbûre yeniçerileri ihbâr için barut kaldırup heva-yi fişek atup ve bu işaretden hâric-i boğazda olan (158-b) Revancık kal'asının dizdâr ve müstahfızânı müteyakkız ve müteheyyi bulunmak ve sâir kılâ' müstahfızları alâim-i mezkûre vuku'unda yekdiğere işaretler ile ilâm-ı keyfiyyet etmek ve Rumeli ve Anadolu kavağı kal'alarında olanlar fitil derdest hâzir ve müterakkib olup o makule sefâin mürur murâd eyledikleri halde ancak kal'ateyn-i mezkûreteynden top atılıp men'ine takayyüd ve isrâr ve ta'annüd zuhurunda top danelerini yağdırup gark-ı sefâin îcâbına ihtimâm ve gayret etmek ve eğer mürur murâd etmeyüp Karataş altında tevakkuf ederler ise gaflet olunmayup kezalik fitil-i derdest hâzir bulunup müstahfızân makuleleri 'biz müstahfızız top umuruna karışmazız' demeyüp lede'l-iktiza topçulara î'ânet ve ittihâd-ı derûn ile topları i'mâle sarf-ı miknet etmeleri



meşrut ve müstahfızların hidemâtı topçu neferâtı hizmetleri misillü İmak lazım geldiğinden iki fırkanın dahi yevmiyelerinde tesâvî ihtiyar olunduğu ve bu şurût-ı mer'iyenin îfâ ve icrâsı ve esbâb-ı nizâmının istikrar ve ibkâsı derya kapudanlarına tefviz ve ihâle ve her onbeş günde bir def'a bi'n-nefs kal'alara varup yoklamak ve derya kapudanları hâzır olmadıkları mevsim-i sayfda vekilleri bulunan Tersane-i amire emînleri vech-i meşruh üzere hareket ve Tersane-i amire'de zikr olunan şurût bir mahalde mukayyed ve mazbut olup lede'l-hâce müracâ'at ve ahkâmı düstûru'l-amel olmak ve nizâm-ı mezkûrun bakâsı ve boğazların muhafazası vezir-i müşarun-ileyh tarafından ta'ahhüd olunduğuna binaen kapu-kethüdası olan Dergâh-ı âli kapucu başlarından Yusuf ağa dahi husûsat-ı mezkûreye takayyüd ve ihtimam edüp kapucular kethüdâsı olan Mustafa Ağa'nın dahi ba-emr-i âlî memuriyyeti hasebiyle tanzim-i neferât-ı mezkûreye takayyüd ve ihtimâm edüp kapucular kethüdâsı olan Mustafa Ağa'nın dahi bâ-emr-i âli memuriyyeti hasebiyle tanzim-i neferât (159-a) ve tekmil-i levâzımât emrinde bazı-i celli iktidar etmek bâbında vezir-i müşarun-ileyhe hitâben bâlâsı hatt-ı hümayın-ı şevket-makrûn ile müveşşah ve müzeyyen kat'iyü'l-medlûl ve mufassal ve meşruh bir kıt'a emr-i celilü's-şân şeref yâfte-i sudur ve esbâb-ı âdiyeden ma'dud olan işbu tedbir-i dil-pezîrin îkâ'ıyla sedd-i sugûr ve tahsil-i emniyyet ve âsâyîşe sa'y-i mevfûr kılındı.

Source: Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi, *Mehâsinu'l-Âsâr ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbâr*, [1196-1201/1782-1787], Prep. By. Mücteba İlgürel, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994). pp. 214-216.

**Appendix 19:** The Military Working of the Bosphorus Fortresses According to *Târih-i Cevdet*

Sene 1199, Vaktiyle Karadeniz Devlet-i Aliyye'nin bir havzı mesabesinde iken Rusyalu Kırım'ı istila ile Karadeniz'in en güzel limanlarına mâlik olarak günden güne donanmasını teksîr etmekte olup bu hılâlde ise devleteyn beynindeki bürûdet nihayet müntic-i sefer olacağı gelüb göründüğünden Karadeniz Boğazı'nın istihkâmı emr-i ehemmiyet olmağla, dahil ve haricinde vâki' kılâ-ı cedide vü kadîmenin ta'mîr ve termîmi ve muhafazalarının tertîb ü tanzîmi hususuna bu esnada mübâşeret ü ihtimam olunmuştur. Şöyle ki: mukaddemâ mustahfiz nâmiyle ta'yîn olunmuş olan şahinci ve çakırcı neferâtının emr-i muhafazada layıkıyla işe yaramayacakları lede'l-tecrübe malûm olduğundan, cümlesi ihrâc ve hidemât -ı sâbıklarına iade vü irca' ile anların yerine kâr-güzâr neferâtının ta'yini irâde olunmağla Kapudan-ı derya Gazi Hasan Paşa tarafından tanzim olunan defter mucebince haric-i Boğazda Anadolu canibinde vaki Fener ve Revancık ve Rumeli Boğazı'nda vaki' cedid Fener ve Garibçe ve Anadolu canibinde Boğaz dahilinde vaki Poyraz limanı kal'alarına vezaif-i mu'ayyene ile birer nefer dizdar ve kethüda ve lüzumu kadar müstahfiz ve topçu ve cebahaneci neferâtı ta'yîn olunub Rumeli ve Anadolu Kavakları, Bostancılar Ocağı'ndan ustalık olarak neferâtı dahi bostancı olmak hasebiyle yalnız noksanlarının ikmalıyla nizam verildi.

Ve her gece nevbet beklemeleri ferman olunub haricden bir sefine zuhurunda en ibtida Rumeli Feneri Kal'asından meşhûd olacağı cihetle der-akab kal'a-i mezkûre bekçileri hâric-i Boğaz'da olan Revancık kal'asının dizdâr ve müstahfizânını âgâh etmek üzere barut kaldırması ve hava-yı fişenk atması ve bu işaretler vukû'unda sâir kılâ' mustahfizleri dahi yek-diğere işaretler ile i'lâm-ı keyfiyyet eylemeleri ve Rumeli ve Anadolu Kavağı kal'alarında olanlar fitil derdest hâzir ve müterakkib olup o makûle bir sefine geçmek murad eylediği halde ancak bu iki kal'adan toplar atılarak müruruna mümana'at kılınması ve dinlemeyip de ısrar edecek olur ise gülle ile gark ve şikest olunması ve eğer geçmek murad etmeyüb de Karataş altında tevakkuf eyleyise, gaflet olunmayub hemen fitil derdest bulunulması ve müstahfizler, 'biz mustahfiziz, top umuruna karışmayız' demeyüb lede'l-iktizâ topçulara i'âne ve ittihad-ı derûn ile topçuları i'mâle gayret etmeleri ve bu cihetle mustahfizler topçularla hizmette müşterek olacaklarından iki fırkanın dahi yevmiyelerinde tesâvî bulunması nizâma rabt olunarak îfa vü icrâsı kapudan paşalara ihale birle her on beş günde kendüleri ve mevsim-i sayfa vekilleri bulunan Tersâne-i Âmire eminleri kal'a-i mezkûreye varub yoklama usûlünü icra etmek babında Kapudan Paşa'ya hitâben hatt-ı hümayun ile müzeyyen bir kıt'a fermân-ı celîlü'l-üvân isdâr olundu.

Source: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târih-i Cevdet*, Vol.3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2018), 138.

Appendix 20: Ottoman Map of Istanbul Strait (TSMK. A3624)



## GLOSSARY

**Banquette: fr.** D'infanterie ou d'artillerie, se sont des élévations de terre ou de gazon au-dessus du terre plein. Le défenseur monte (ou s'allonge) sur la banquette pour tirer à couvert par dessus le parapet d'un bastion, d'une courtine ou du revers d'une tranchée. Permet à l'artillerie de tirer "à barbette".

**en.** bench.

**tr.** piyade kademesi.

**Bastion: fr.** ouvrage bas, rempli de terre, de plan pentagonal faisant saillie sur l'enceinte d'une place forte.

**Bastion: en.** Four-sided work protruding from a curtain wall to provide flanking fire.

**Bastion: tr.** Burç. (Tabyevi usulüyle resm olunan bir istihkâmın kısm-ı malumundan ibarettir.) (bastionné: burçlu, bastiyonlu, tabyevi.)

**Barbette: fr.** C'est la manière de tirer au-dessus d'un parapet réparé dépourvu d'embrasures, de créneaux ou de meurtrières, plus qu'un terme d'architecture militaire. On peut toutefois appeler ainsi la surélévation du terre-plein d'un ouvrage fortifié. En artillerie, une barbette est un blindage complet entourant une arme et ses servants. Il s'agit d'un mur de blindage fixe, en forme de cône, sur le pont d'un navire de guerre, en débord, ou en porte à faux, sur la coque, au fuselage d'un avion ou au bâti d'une fortification. L'arme y est montée sur un pivot et l'opérateur tourne avec elle. Pour des raisons évidentes, la barbette est à ciel ouvert, afin de laisser à l'arme un débattement optimal. La formule de la barbette, testée à la fin du XIXe siècle, fut abandonnée au profit de la tourelle, plus maniable et offrant une meilleure protection.

**tr.** barbata.

**Bastille: fr.** dans l'architecture médiévale, ouvrage renforçant une enceinte, généralement devant une porte.

—**tr.** Münferit kale, muttasıl kule. Müteharrik kule.

**Bâtardeau: fr.** digue en maçonnerie limitant la partie en eau d'un fossé.

—**tr.** Bir çayın suyunu tutmak veya diğer bir tarafa çevirmek için kazık ve çamurdan yapılan set. [as.] Hendek, su bendi, batardo.

**Batterie : fr.** emplacement aménagé pour recevoir un groupe de canons tirant dans une direction commune.

—**tr.** Dövüşme, muzârebe. [as.] Batarya.

**Boulevard: fr.** terme générique désignant un ouvrage porteur d'artillerie ajouté en avant d'une fortification plus ancienne.

--**tr.** Kale meydanı. Bir kıtayı hücum-ı hariciye karşı muhafaza eden kale, memleketin kilidi.

**Capitale** : fr. axe principal d'un ouvrage. La capitale d'une tour est perpendiculaire à sa gorge. La capitale d'un bastion est la bissectrice de son angle saillant.  
—tr. Hatt-ı aslî ki bir burcun veya herhangi bir istihkâmın cephe hatları beyinde teşekkül eden zaviye-i haricenin hatt-ı nâsıfıdır.

**Caponnière**: fr. ouvrage bas adosse à l'escarpe, servant à flanquer le fossé ; par extension, ouvrage casemate assurant la communication du corps de place à un ouvrage extérieur.

**Caponniere**: en. An elongated casemate built across a ditch to give flanking fire.  
—tr. Kaponyer denilen siper ki şimdiki isti'maline göre istihkâm fennince ya hendeklerde tesis-i muvâsalaya hizmet eder üstü açık bir binadan veya istihkâmât-ı cesîme hendeklerini yan müdafaasına almaya mahsus kazamat şeklinde bir binadan ibarettir. **Caponnière double** : iki taraflı endaht darbelerinden setr ve muhafaza eden kaponyer. **Caponnière simple** : Yalnız bir cihetten barındıran kaponyer, tek kaponyer.

**Casemate**: fr. chambre voûtée à l'épreuve de l'artillerie.

**Casemate**: en. A vaulted masonry shelter for men, guns, or stores, usually dug into the rear of a fortress rampart. Sometimes includes firing apertures to the exterior of the rampart.

—tr. Kazamat, kale bodrumu, izbe, mahzen. (Kazamatlar topçu ateşinden mahfuz olmak üzere insanlar için ikametgâh, cephane ve mühimmat için mağaza, mahzen makamına kaim olur).

**Cavalier**: fr. ouvrage portant de l'artillerie, dominant l'ouvrage (courtine, bastion) à l'arrière duquel il est établi et dont il double les feux.

**Cavalier**: en. A redoubt on top of a bastion to obstruct grazing fire and provide a more elevated gun position.

—tr. Kavalier (kavalierler muhit-i asliye hakim bulunan istihkâmlardan ibarettir).

**Cavalier de tranchée**: fr. cavalier construit par l'assiégeant afin de dominer l'enceinte de la place assiégée.

—tr. İç hendek kavalieri.

**Chemin-couvert**: fr. circulation à ciel ouvert établi sur la contrescarpe et défilé par un parapet pour battre le glacis.

—en. 'Covered way' between the moat and the glacis.

—tr. Râh-ı mestûr.

**Chemin des Rondes**: en. Protected infantry walkway at the top of the masonry facing of the scarp.

**Circonvallation**: fr. tranchée fortifiée protégeant les positions des assiégeants, leur évitant d'être pris à revers par l'arrivée d'une armée de secours.

—tr. Taht-ı muhasarada bulunan bir mevkiin hariçle turuk-ı ihtilâtını kesme. [ligne de - : muhit-i mukabil. - fortifiée: müstahkem muhit-i mukabil. – continue: muttasıl, mütemadi muhiti mukabil.]

**Citadelle:** fr. fort ou forteresse commandant une ville; le plus souvent construite à cheval sur l'enceinte même de la place.

—tr. İç kale. Hisar, hisn.

**Contre-garde :** fr. ouvrage extérieur bas protégeant a distance les faces d'un bastion tout en doublant la ligne de feu.

—en. 'Counterguard', an arrow-shaped detached work to protect a bastion.

—tr. Muhafaza sütresi.

**Contrescarpe:** fr. mur extérieur d'un fossé, du côté de la campagne.

—en. The 'counterscarp', or outer wall of the moat, facing inwards towards the scarp and carrying the covered way.

—tr. Hendeğin dış tarafındaki mâil duvar. Kapalı ve muhafazalı yol; astar mukabili.

**Contrevallation:** frç tranchée fortifiée creusée par les assiégeants tout autour de la place assiégée.

—tr. Muhasara altında bulunan kalenin etrafında muhasırlar tarafından yapılan hendek, mukabil hendek. [ligne de – muhit-i ma'kûs]

**Corps de place:** fr. enceinte principale d'une place.

—tr. kalenin ana askeri bölgesi.

**Corps de garde. fr.**

en. a guard-house, a police-station.

tr. karakolhane.

**Couronne:** fr. ouvrage extérieur formé de deux fronts bastionnés. Une double-couronne comprend trois fronts bastionnés et une demi-couronne, un seul front.

—tr. Taç tabya.

**Courtine :** fr. pan de mur compris entre deux bastions.

**Courtine:** en. The 'curtain' wall (or rampart) between two bastions.

—tr. Perde hattı. [- à tenaille : makas tabyalı perde hattı. – de château : hisar perde hattı.]

**Cunette:** fr. canal établi au fond d'un fossé sec pour drainer les eaux pluviales, pouvant ménager un obstacle supplémentaire.

**Cunette:** en. Small ditch or trench dug in the middle of the main moat.

—tr. İstihkam hendeklerinde açılan su kanalı, künet.

**Défilé :** cache aux vues et aux coups de l'ennemi.

--tr. Resm-i geçit. Askerin birbiri arkasına dizilerek geçmesi, geçit. Düşmanın mermiyatından muhafaza eden istihkâm havalesi, siper-i havale.

**Dehors:** fr. désigne tous les ouvrages qui, sans être rattachés au corps de place, sont construits dans le fossé. S'oppose à l'ouvrage avancé construit au-delà du chemin-couvert.

—**tr.** Harici istihkamlar.

**Demi-lune:** **fr.** ouvrage, à deux faces formant un angle aigu, entouré d'un fossé et placé au-devant de la courtine d'un front bastionné.

**Demi-Lune or Ravelin:** **en.** 'Half moon' triangular detached work placed in the main ditch. Usually synonymous with a 'ravelin'.

—**tr.** İstihkam ve hendek önünde yapılan nısf ay tabya. Demi lune dahi denilir.

**Dizdar (tr.):** **fr.** Commandant d'une forteresse.

**en.** Commander of a fortress.

**Échauguette:** **fr.** Petit ouvrage en surplomb, de plan masse, contenant une petite pièce. Ne pas confondre l'échauguette avec la tourelle et l'oriel qui ont plusieurs étages.

**Echanguette or Guerite:** **en.** A one-man stone or timber sentry box set in front of a rampart.

—**tr.** Bekçi kulübesi, nokta kulübesi; **Cihannüma:** Binanın en üstünde sakfindan mürtefi yapılan etrafı pencereli kule veya oda.

**Embrasure:** **fr.** ouverture pratiquée dans un mur ou un parapet pour permettre le tir, au fusil ou au canon.

**en.** reveal of a door or window.

—**tr.** Top siperinden açılan mazgal. Lombar deliği. Kapı ve pencere için duvarda açılan delik. Top mazgalı.

**Enceinte:** **en.** The total main outer wall of a fortress, but often used to distinguish the wall around a civilian town from its all-military citadel (or final stronghold).

—**tr.** Sur ve duvar. Sur ve duvar veya hendekle ihâta olunmuş mahal. Vasi' divanhane. İstihkâm cidârı, duvarlar, hâit.

**Epaulement :** **fr.** retranchement en terre destiné a s'abriter du canon ennemi.

**Epaule or Orillon:** **en.** Recess for artillery set back behind the flank of a bastion, where it meets the courtine, and hence covered from fire from the front.

—**tr.** Toprak tabya, metris. Tabya siper koltuğu.

**Escarpe:** **fr.** mur intérieur d'un fossé, du cote de la place.

—**tr.** Kale hendeğinin dâhili astarı.

**Face :** côté d'un ouvrage exposé à l'ennemi.

**en.** face, façade.

—**tr.** Yüz, vech, çehre, cephe.

**Fanal:** **fr.** Lanterne employée pour le balisage des côtes.

**en.** Lighthouse.

—**tr.** Fener. Sahil feneri.

**Fascine:** **fr.** fagot de branchages servant à retenir les terres d'un remblai.

—**tr.** Hendek doldurmaya mahsus çalı yığını. Esna-yı harpte bazı hafif istihkâmatta kullanılan çalı demeti.

**Fausse-braie:** **fr.** enceinte basse enveloppant une partie ou la totalité du corps de place. Contrairement a la braie, la fausse-braie est remparée.

**Fausse-braye:** **en.** A minor parapet and musketry position set at the base of the main rampart, for defence of the main moat.

—**tr.** (braie : kale kapısı önü varoşu)

**Flanc:** **fr.** côté d'un ouvrage en retour sur une face, une courtine.

—**tr.** Koltuk hattı.

**Flèches:** **fr.** poutres de bois faisant partie de la bascule du pont-levis, auxquelles les chaînes sont attachées.

—**tr.** Kule veya minare külâhı, alem.

**Gabions:** **fr.** paniers cylindriques sans fond qui, remplis de terre, forment parapet de protection.

—**tr.** Tabya ve metris sepeti. (- roulant : yuvarlak tabya sepeti.)

**Glacis:** **fr.** plan faiblement incliné raccordant la crête du chemin-couvert au niveau naturel du terrain qui environne la place.

**Glacis:** **en.** The gentle slope upwards from the level ground outside the fortress to the crest of the covered way.

—**tr.** Az mâil bayır. Şiv-i sahra.

**Gorge:** **fr.** partie d'un ouvrage placée du côté le moins expose, vers l'intérieur de la place.

**Gorge:** **en.** The rear entrance to a bastion, which will be wide if the frontal angle of the bastion is wide (or obtuse) or narrow if the angle is acute.

—**tr.** Boğaz, iki dağ arasındaki dar geçit, derbent. Kalenin arka girişi.

**harpuşte:** **tr.** makaslı dam veya çatı. Muhafaza duvarlarının üzerine büyük taşlardan veya tuğladan iki tarafa akıntılı yapılan sath-ı mâil ki buna (semer) dahi denir. Zir-i zemindeki künkleri muhafaza için üst taraflarına taş ve harçla yapılan örgü.

**fr.** ferme. espèce de construction de toit; toiture en forme de dos de poisson.

**en.** roof truss. Anything ridged or shaped like an ass's back; a ridged roof, a camel's hump.

**iskele:** **tr.**

**fr.** port, échelle.

**en.** a landing place, a wharf. a seaport town.

**kargir (tr.):** **fr.** en pierre, en briques (édifice).

**en.** a building of masonry. (yarım kargir: half masonry and half timber.)

**Kethüda (tr.):** **fr.** Commandant en second.



en. Second in command.

**Ligne de défense :** fr. distance entre le flanc d'un bastion et le saillant du bastion qu'il défend, donnée par la portée maximale de l'arme portative (ou du canon).  
tr. hatt-ı müdafa.

**Lunette:** fr. ouvrage ayant le même plan qu'une demi-lune, mais projeté en avant d'un front bastionné.

**Lunette:** en. A small ravelin, often in an advanced position on the glacis.  
—tr. Ay tabya. Bazı büyük binaların önünde ve bahçelerde yapılan daire veya nisf-i daire şeklinde meydanlık.

**Mâchicoulis:** fr. balcon construit au sommet des tours ou des remparts, dont le sol est percé d'ouvertures pour le tir fichant.

—tr. Kurûn-ı vüstâda kalelerin çıkık bedenlerinin yukarıdan aşağıya humbara ve sair atıp kale duvarının dibini muhafaza etmeğe mahsus mazgalları.

**Magistrale:** fr. ligne théorique suivie par le sommet des escarpes et matérialisée par le cordon. Ce qui est en dessous est défilé aux vues de l'assaillant.

—tr. (ligne - : hatt-ı esasi, ateş hattı).

**Merlon:** en. Solid masonry or brick parapets into which artillery embrasures might be cut.

--tr. İstihkâmın iki mazgalı arasındaki siper.

**Meurtrière:** fr.

en. loophole.

tr. mazgal deliği

**Mur d'appui:** fr.

—en. retaining wall

—tr. istinat duvarı

**Ouvrage à corne:** fr. ouvrage extérieur forme d'un front bastionné, relié par des ailes à l'arrière.

**Ouvrage a Cornes 'Hornwork':** en. a detached work made of two half bastions, and possibly reinforced (or 'crowned') by a crownwork.

—tr. Boynuz tabya. [görseli var.] (ouvrage a double flancs : iki yanlı köşe, bir nevi istihkam köşesidir.)

**Palanka (tr):** fr. Fortification en terre et en bois entouré d'une fossé. Village entouré d'une telle fortification ou d'une fossé.

**Parallèle:** tranchée, parallèle au front attaqué, réunissant deux attaques et servant de place d'armes.

—tr. Muhasara olunacak vak'a mütevaziyen yapılan hendek.

**Parapet:** **fr.** simple mur ou véritable massif de maçonnerie défilant les emplacements de tir à ciel ouvert.

—**en.** breastwork of fortress, guard rail, parapet.

—**tr.** Siper, istihkâm siperi. Köprü ve sairenin etrafındaki parmaklık veya duvar, korkuluk.

**Palissades:** **fr.**

**Palisades:** **en.** Fence of posts with 3in. gaps between each. Used, for example, on the covered way or in a dry moat.

—**tr.** çit.

**Poterne:** **fr.** Une poterne est une petite porte qui est intégrée aux murailles d'une fortification, de façon discrète et qui permettait aux habitants du château de sortir ou rentrer à l'insu de l'assiégeant. Placée dans le bas des courtines, au niveau des fossés, elle était généralement sous la protection des meurtrières d'une tour proche ou d'une bretèche.

**en. posterne.**

—**tr.** Bir hendeğe açılır gizli istihkam kapısı ve yolu.

**Pied :** sixième de la toise, soit 0,3248 mètre.

**Place:** **en.** Word use for the totality of a fort or fortress. Thus, instead of saying 'Vauban built a fortress' on the Lys canal, we might say he 'built a place' there.

—**tr.** Place forte : müstahkem mevki.

**Place d'armes :** **fr.** espace laissé libre afin de permettre le rassemblement de la troupe, soit a l'intérieur de la ville, soit au niveau du chemin-couvert pour tenter une sortie.

**Place d'armes:** **en.** Defended areas on the covered way where troops could gather for sallies, counter-attacks, etc. *Plan Relief* Literally a 'relief map': the name applied to the detailed 1:600-scale architectural models that began to be collected by Louis XIV in the 1660s. The collection grew until 1870 and parts of it may be inspected today in Les Invalides in Paris, and in the Musée des Beaux Arts in Lille. Other individual models may also be found in particular fortresses, e.g. at Belfort and Neuf Brisach.

—**tr.** Meydan-ı harb.

**Plate-forme:** **fr.**

**tr.** Düz çatı, taraça. Topların vaz'ı için toprak tabya.

**Pont-dormant:** **fr.** Il s'agit d'une œuvre d'architecture défensive, intégrée à une structure fortifiée, dont il est généralement un des rares accès possibles et pouvant être facilement contrôlé. Il peut être soit : un pont établi sur un fossé et qui est fixe, contrairement au pont-levis, ou la partie fixe du pont à laquelle est rattaché le pont-levis. Sa position est dite dormante. L'appellation dormant ou dormante fait donc référence à l'immobilité de cette structure d'accès, par opposition à la mobilité du

pont-levis. Il doit nécessairement se trouver sous les feux des bastions ou des caponnières.

**tr. cısr, köprü.**

**Pont Levis: fr.**

**en.** Drawbridge.

**tr.** Asma cısr/köprü: İstenildiği gibi kaldırılıp indirilebilen köprü, müteharrik köprü. Kale ve kasırlarda istenildiği vakit kaldırılıp hendeğin diğer tarafıyla ittisali kat' edilen ve zincirlerle tahrik olunan köprü.

**Redoute: fr.** ouvrage extérieur, de plan souvent quadrangulaire, servant de réduit et de batterie d'artillerie.

—**tr.** Küçük münferid istihkam tabya, redut. (- cercle : daire-i redut).

**Réduit: fr.** ouvrage construit à l'intérieur d'un autre ou l'on peut se retrancher ; une citadelle sert de réduit à une place forte.

**Reduit: en.** A 'redoubt', or small, fully enclosed work (normally square) which might be placed on a larger work or on the covered way, or might stand independently.

—**tr.** Büyük bir istihkam siperinin içindeki küçük siper ki lede'l hâce asker oraya rüc'at eder, rüc'atgâh.

**Rempart: fr.** enceinte formée par une levée de terre dont la poussée peut être retenue par un mur de soutènement a contreforts.

**en. rampart.**

—**tr.** Toprak tabya, siper, kale bendi. Vasıta-i müdafaa.

**seğirdim (tr.): fr.** chemin couvert dans l'intérieur des fortresses; rempart.

**en.** a banquette in fortification.

**su hazinesi (tr.).**

**fr.** cabinet d'eau.

**en.** water reservoir.

**Talus: fr.** face d'un mur ayant un fruit très accentue pour accroître sa stabilité à la poussée des terres du rempart.

—**tr.** Şiv, meyl. Sath-ı mâil.

**Tenaille: fr.** ouvrage bas placé devant la courtine formé de deux faces en angle rentrant, généralement dans le même alignement que les faces des bastions.

**Tenaille: en.** A small, low work placed before a curtain wall between two bastions.

—**tr.** Makas tabya, makras tabya.

**Terre-plein: en.** Literally the 'flat ground' on top of the rampart where the defensive artillery could be deployed behind a parapet.

—**tr.** Bir mahallin tesviyesi için nakl olunmuş toprak, dolma. Sath-ı zemin. İstihkâm seğirdimi.

**Traverse** : **fr.** mur épais ou massif en terre barrant perpendiculairement un chemin-couvert ou un terre-plein pour éviter qu'il ne puisse être pris par un tir en enfilade.  
**Traverse: en.** Earth mound set at right angles to the line of a parapet or covered way, to limit the damage caused by enfilade fire. May also be used as an infantry position or retrenchment to block an enemy's advance sideways along the parapet.  
—**tr.** Tulani girişleri takviye için arzen konulan kiriş, kuşak. Duvar hâtılı. Demir yol inşaatında müsta'mel taban ağacı. Travers.

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## RÉSUMÉ SUBSTANTIEL EN FRANÇAIS

### **Sujet de recherche**

Cette thèse constitue une modeste tentative pour comprendre les réformes militaires, technologiques et architecturales vécues dans l'Empire ottoman de la fin du dix-huitième siècle à partir de l'exemple du système de défense du Bosphore. L'étude des fortifications ottomanes du Bosphore à la fin du dix-huitième siècle et au début du dix-neuvième siècle doit en effet tenir compte du contexte particulier de l'époque - une période de crise, de guerre, d'efforts de réforme et de transformation.

La thèse étudie les stratégies défensives mises en œuvre par les autorités ottomanes le long du Bosphore pour contrer la menace russe croissante en mer Noire. Le sujet a amené à s'intéresser à l'adaptation ottomane de nouvelles techniques de construction, au développement d'un système administratif et au maintien de défenses efficaces, ainsi qu'à l'organisation du personnel militaire et des munitions dans les forteresses du Bosphore.

Cette étude s'efforce de mettre en lumière les nouvelles techniques introduites par les ingénieurs français, mais aussi et la manière dont les Ottomans se sont adaptés à ces innovations, notamment la façon dont ils ont réagi aux nouvelles techniques d'organisation auxquelles ils étaient confrontés. La thèse analyse également les efforts que la Porte déploya pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes suscités par ces innovations : difficulté à trouver des hommes qualifiés, à établir la discipline nécessaire et à maintenir une organisation efficace dans les projets de construction.

### **Contexte historique**

Les Ottomans s'assurèrent un contrôle presque total de la mer Noire en complétant la conquête d'Istanbul avec la conquête des rivages anatolien et des côtes moldaves, en imposant leur suzeraineté au khanat de Crimée et en mettant fin à la

présence génoise dans des villes portuaires importantes de la mer Noire comme Kefe, Sinope et Amasra dans les années 1580.

Pourtant, la première menace importante pour Istanbul ne vint pas de la Moscovie mais des pirates cosaques au début du XVIIe siècle. Les raids cosaques interrompaient la sécurité de la mer Noire et forcèrent les Ottomans à envisager de fortifier le Bosphore. Diverses sources notent que les pirates cosaques vinrent de la mer Noire à de nombreuses reprises pour piller les rives et certaines banlieues du Bosphore, telles que Sarıyer, Tarabya, İstinye, Büyükdere et Yeniköy. En conséquence, les Ottomans construisirent des forteresses des deux côtés du Bosphore pour empêcher ces attaques de pirates (*Kavak hisarları*).

Le gouvernement ottoman eut à nouveau besoin de nouvelles défenses pour le Bosphore à l'occasion de la guerre russo-ottomane de 1768-1774. La perte de villes importantes et la défaite navale de Çeşme ayant remis en cause la sécurité d'Istanbul, le gouvernement ottoman éprouva le besoin de prendre des précautions pour protéger la ville, cœur et capitale de l'empire.

Les Ottomans non seulement réparèrent les anciennes forteresses subsistantes, mais également construisirent de nouvelles forteresses et batteries dans cette zone critique. Outre les forteresses d'Anadolu Kavağı, Rumeli Kavağı, Anadolu Hisarı (Güzelcehisar) et Rumeli Hisarı (Boğazkesen), Mustafa III ordonna la construction de quatre nouvelles forteresses et de quelques redoutes le long des rives septentrionales du Bosphore en 1772-1773. La fortification du Bosphore se poursuivit sous les règnes suivants d'Abdulhamid I et Selim III. De nouvelles forteresses furent construites à Anadolu Feneri du côté anatolien et à Rumeli Feneri du côté européen toutes deux construites à l'embouchure du détroit d'Istanbul, *Boğazağzı*. La troisième forteresse était à Poyraz Limanı et la quatrième se trouvait à Garibçe. La cinquième forteresse était à Irve (Revancık) du côté anatolien, et la sixième était celle de Kilyos (Bağdadçık) du côté européen. Lorsque la protection offerte par ces forteresses fut jugée insuffisante, la batterie de Liman-ı Kebir fut également construite. Ainsi, le nombre de forteresses atteignit le chiffre de sept, et

elles commencèrent à être connues sous le nom commun de «*kılâ'-ı seb'a*» (« les sept forteresses »).

### **Aperçu des chapitres**

L'étude comporte sept chapitres. Le premier constitue une introduction exposant la nature des menaces russes pesant sur la capitale ottomane à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Les trois chapitres suivants proposent une périodisation de la construction des défenses du Bosphore. Chacun traite d'une période distincte dans un ordre chronologique. Le chapitre deux se concentre sur les efforts précipités du gouvernement ottoman pour développer de nouveaux systèmes de défense dans le Bosphore au cours de la dernière étape de la guerre russo-ottomane entre 1772 et 1774 sous la direction de Mustafa III. Les victoires russes inattendues servirent de déclencheur poussant le gouvernement ottoman à améliorer les défenses afin de contrer plus tôt les éventuelles menaces russes. J'y traite principalement de la construction de nouvelles forteresses et de redoutes sur les rives anatoliennes et européennes du Bosphore. Ce chapitre tente également d'évaluer les capacités des architectes ottomans dans le domaine de la fortification. Il aborde enfin l'emploi du baron de Tott, militaire français confronté aux défis technologiques et organisationnels de la fortification du Bosphore.

Le chapitre trois se tourne vers la deuxième phase des constructions, en 1778-88. Les Ottomans ont alors adopté une approche beaucoup plus globale et systématique. Les activités du grand amiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa eurent un impact déterminant sur le sort du Bosphore. Plusieurs acteurs, dont le sultan Abdulhamid I, le grand amiral, les grands vizirs et les ingénieurs français (Lafitte-Clavé et Monnier), jouèrent un rôle important dans le développement de cette approche relativement systématique. Hasan Paşa assura l'entretien des forteresses, améliora les défenses du Bosphore en consultant des ingénieurs français et administra la construction de nouveaux forts et batteries sur le Bosphore. Les ingénieurs français venus à Istanbul avaient une formation professionnelle dans le domaine du génie militaire et étaient sous la protection du grand amiral à bien des

égards. L'approche ottomane de la menace russe changea également au cours de cette phase, ce qui affecta la nature de leurs préparatifs.

Des baraquements pour les soldats furent ajoutés à ces cinq nouvelles forteresses. Des batteries de type *Macar* et *Dalyan* furent construites à proximité des forts dit Kavak hisarları, de même que des forteresses de Kilyos et Karaburun à l'extérieur du Bosphore du côté européen et des batteries à Büyük Liman.

Les rapports de Chabaud de la Tour indiquent plusieurs pièces manquantes et une absence de réflexion dans la construction des forteresses. Les ingénieurs français critiquaient ce défaut des architectes ottomans tandis que les Ottomans exprimaient leur mécontentement à l'égard de la construction de Lafitte et Monnier à Büyük Liman. Les Ottomans gèrent les projets de fortification et observèrent le savoir-faire des ingénieurs français dans leurs constructions. Certains des projets proposés par les ingénieurs français furent rejetés par les autorités ottomanes.

Le chapitre quatre est une partie complémentaire qui analyse la construction des défenses du Bosphore dans le nouvel environnement du mouvement de réforme du Nouvel Ordre (*Nizam-ı Cedid*) du sultan Selim III. Il explore la troisième phase des constructions. En fin de compte, cette thèse traite d'une période de réforme et de changement. Ironiquement, la troisième phase est à la fois le produit des efforts préliminaires et de leur appropriation par les acteurs ottomans et un défi et une résistance à la dynamique des nouveaux projets de réforme. Dans les années 1790, l'organisation administrative des forts du Bosphore s'est également améliorée. Le gouvernement ottoman a créé de nouveaux postes et réparti les responsabilités entre les officiers.

Une analyse de l'emploi des spécialistes français tels que Monnier et Kauffer ainsi que des architectes, ingénieurs et responsables ottomans de la construction a montré qu'il existait un véritable processus de collaboration entre eux. Les Ottomans n'étaient pas des récepteurs passifs des techniques de fortification françaises, comme on l'a souvent écrit, mais des décideurs actifs, qui participèrent



pleinement au processus. La troisième et dernière période, sous le règne de Selim III, après le limogeage des spécialistes français, montre également que les Ottomans adaptèrent certaines techniques de fortification françaises dans leurs systèmes et commencèrent à les appliquer : c'est le cas des « parapets en terre » et des « parapets en gabion ».

À la fin du règne de Selim III, la plupart des forteresses et des batteries du Bosphore ont été achevées et renforcées. En 1808, une liste des forteresses mentionne Rumeli Feneri, Revancık, Kilyos, Anadolu Feneri, Poyraz Limanı, Garibçe et Büyük Liman appelées « les sept forteresses » (*Kılâ-ı Seb'â*). Un autre réseau de forteresses, connu sous le nom des « Quatre forteresses », comprend Rumeli Kavağı, Anadolu Kavağı, ainsi que les batteries de Yuşa et Telli Dalyan. Les batteries de Papaz Burnu, Filburnu et Kireç Burnu doivent encore être mentionnées.

Ces trois chapitres sur la construction des défenses sont suivis de deux autres plus spécifiquement consacrés à l'organisation du travail. Le chapitre 5 traite de l'organisation administrative des défenses du Bosphore et de la fondation d'une surintendance conçue pour la sécurité du Bosphore. Ce chapitre s'intéresse notamment à deux nouvelles créations, la surintendance du Bosphore (*Boğaz Nâzirliği*) et la tutelle du Bosphore (*Boğaz Muhafızlığı*).

Le chapitre six, qui porte sur l'organisation militaire, propose une périodisation – différente de celle utilisée dans les deuxième, troisième et quatrième chapitres – divisée en trois : avant la Surintendance, après la création de la Surintendance, enfin l'ère du « Nouvel Ordre ». Le gouvernement ottoman a réorganisé le personnel militaire des forteresses à chaque période. Il a également fourni de l'artillerie en nombre croissant par rapport à l'augmentation de la capacité des forts et des batteries au fil du temps.

La conclusion résume les résultats de la recherche et les principaux arguments de la thèse. Elle discute ensuite de leurs implications historiographiques et propose des suggestions sur les perspectives de recherche futures.

## Conclusion

Tout d'abord, cette thèse a analysé les changements structurels dans le style de fortification ottomane au XVIIIe siècle. Le résultat le plus significatif de cette analyse est que les forteresses du Bosphore doivent être considérées comme un type spécifique de fortification, la fortification détroit/marine, qui a vu le jour après la révolution militaire et les progrès qui ont suivi dans la poudre à canon et l'artillerie. Contrairement aux forteresses et citadelles bastionnées du début de l'ère moderne, telles que Rumeli Hisarı et Anadolu Hisarı dans le détroit d'Istanbul ou Kilitbahir et Kal'a-i Sultaniye dans les Dardanelles, la plupart des forts et batteries du Bosphore à la fin du XVIIIe siècle avaient une structure semblable à une batterie (*tabyevi*), transportant dix à vingt canons sur le rivage. Chaque fort ou batterie pouvait donner l'alarme lors d'une incursion ennemie en déclenchant des feux d'artifice. De plus, comme les forts et les batteries étaient situés dans un détroit, ils étaient conçus pour fonctionner de concert les uns avec les autres plutôt que de façon indépendante. Chaque fort ou batterie avait un partenaire sur la rive opposée, la paire étant conçue pour pouvoir faire des tirs croisés sur toute cette partie de la voie navigable et ainsi vérifier toute.

Deuxièmement, cette thèse a cherché à contribuer à la littérature sur les efforts de l'Empire ottoman pour moderniser son système d'éducation militaire et son armée, et donc à l'étude de la réforme ottomane en général. L'étude des systèmes de défense ottomans a permis d'analyser les réformes militaires et technologiques des Ottomans à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Selon les résultats de cette analyse, les Ottomans montrèrent la ferme volonté non seulement d'adopter mais aussi d'adapter des techniques défensives innovantes en collaboration avec des ingénieurs français. Ce n'était pas une simple imitation des formes européennes ou une occidentalisation grossière. Les Ottomans étaient des agents actifs qui adaptèrent à leurs propres fins en fonction de la situation locale les connaissances techniques disponibles de l'époque. Non seulement ils adaptèrent les techniques étrangères, mais ils transformèrent également leur savoir-faire traditionnel et local en associant l'expérience des architectes ottomans à la connaissance des nouveaux ingénieurs ottomans à l'époque du Nouvel Ordre.

Une conséquence de ces résultats, de plus large signification, est qu'il apparaît que le début de l'ère de la réforme ottomane, que la plupart des études associent au règne du Selim III, devrait être fixé à une date antérieure, sous le règne de Mustafa III. Dans le contexte des défenses du Bosphore, on peut observer que la défaite ottomane contre l'armée russe lors de la guerre de 1768-1774 montra l'urgence de réformes et amena à en jeter les bases. Les réformes lancées par Mustafa III avec un sentiment d'urgence furent principalement des mesures de précaution dirigées contre la Russie, et non les réformes organisées et systématiques des décennies suivantes. Néanmoins, les Ottomans cherchèrent à améliorer leur situation militaire et leurs structures défensives. La principale source d'information sur les efforts de réforme militaire du gouvernement de Mustafa III est le récit que le baron de Tott propose dans ses Mémoires. Comme Aksan l'a fait pour la contribution de Tott dans le domaine de l'artillerie, mon étude s'interroge sur la fiabilité des informations fournies par Tott et remet en question sa contribution, ses connaissances et ses capacités dans le domaine de la fortification.

Abdulhamid I hérita d'un empire vaincu, lent et chaotique, mais il entreprit rapidement un effort organisé pour réformer l'armée ottomane et améliorer ses structures défensives en collaboration avec une figure puissante de son époque, le vizir et grand amiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa. Pour la première fois le gouvernement ottoman cherchait à intégrer des officiers militaires français dans ses projets de réforme en les faisant venir à Istanbul. Ce sont ces étapes et ces réformes qui préparèrent le terrain pour les réformes systématiques et organisées du Nouvel Ordre sous le successeur d'Abdulhamid, Selim III.

Alors que les graines de la réforme ont été plantées sous Abdulhamid I, ce n'est que sous le règne de Selim III qu'elles portent leurs fruits les plus visibles. C'est à cette période que les ingénieurs ottomans formés à l'École impériale d'ingénierie commencent à travailler aux côtés d'ingénieurs français et d'architectes ottomans dans les projets de construction. Durant cette période qui a vu les premières expériences des ingénieurs ottomans en tant que membres d'une nouvelle

profession, la construction de forteresses passe du statut de métier artisanal à celui d'activité semi-scientifique, en ligne avec la professionnalisation croissante du métier d'ingénieur à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Le caractère distinctif des réformes de cette époque est qu'elles concernent l'ensemble de l'organisation et, surtout, qu'elles se veulent systématiques.

Des ingénieurs français ont participé à trois reprises à la construction d'une forteresse ottomane. Tout d'abord, le baron de Tott, qui était déjà à Istanbul et engagé dans la réforme de l'artillerie ottomane, construisit les forteresses de Garibçe et de Poyraz Limanı en 1773-1774. Deuxièmement, les ingénieurs militaires français Lafitte-Clavé et Gabriel Joseph Monnier sont vinrent à Istanbul et participèrent à la construction de la batterie de Büyük Liman et à la création de l'école d'ingénieurs (Mühendishane-İstihkam Okulu) entre 1784 et 1788. Troisièmement, François Kauffer, qui était déjà à Istanbul au service de la Sublime Porte, et Gabriel Joseph Monnier, venu à Istanbul pour la deuxième fois dans le cadre de la mission française, participèrent à plusieurs consultations et travaillèrent à la construction du fort de Kilyos entre 1794 et 1797.

Au cours des deux premières périodes, sous les règnes de Mustafa III et ~~sultan~~ d'Abdulhamid I, même si les ingénieurs français partagent leurs opinions et travaillaient sur le terrain, ce sont toujours les Ottomans qui gèrent les projets. Le responsable de la construction (*bina emini*) est le principal responsable de la construction d'une forteresse, même lorsque des ingénieurs français sont impliqués dans la construction en tant que consultants respectés. Par exemple, les ingénieurs français devaient convaincre le responsable de la construction ou le directeur du Bosphore lorsqu'ils voulaient faire quelque chose de nouveau ou de différent. Si le responsable de la construction n'était pas convaincu, leur proposition pouvait être refusée. Ils devaient convaincre les autorités ottomanes supérieures telles que le grand amiral ou le grand vizir s'ils ressentaient le besoin de leur rendre compte directement.

Dans la troisième période, celle du règne de Selim III, le gouvernement ottoman créa un système organisé pour gérer les travaux de construction. Il adopta une méthode de consultation hiérarchique afin d'éviter tout conflit éventuel pouvant survenir sur le site entre architectes ottomans, ingénieurs français, ingénieurs ottomans et responsables de la construction ottomans. Ils définit également les rôles de ces différents acteurs, qui s'étaient souvent chevauchés auparavant. Cette méthode hiérarchique permit d'éviter les conflits et de prendre en compte diverses opinions afin de parvenir à la décision finale la plus appropriée. Une analyse de l'emploi de spécialistes français tels que Monnier et Kauffer et des architectes, ingénieurs et responsables de la construction ottomane montre qu'il existait un véritable processus de collaboration entre eux au cours de la troisième et dernière période.

La thèse traite également des efforts de l'Empire ottoman pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes de la recherche d'hommes qualifiés, de l'établissement de la discipline et du maintien d'une organisation efficace dans ses projets de construction. Alors que les efforts initiaux pour fortifier le Bosphore sont restés faibles et non organisés, la création d'une surintendance du Bosphore en tant que nouvelle unité administrative a résolu le problème posé par le manque d'organisation à certains égards. Pourtant, c'est le gouvernement du Nouvel Ordre qui a trouvé une solution au manque d'organisation avec sa méthode consultative et sa division hiérarchique et définie des rôles entre de multiples acteurs. Le développement par les Ottomans d'un système administratif pour gérer et entretenir les défenses du Bosphore a conduit à une organisation et à une supervision plus efficaces des travaux de construction, à l'entretien des structures militaires et aux militaires eux-mêmes.

L'étude des défenses d'Istanbul contribue à comprendre si « la peur de la Russie » chez les Ottomans aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles est une réalité ou un mythe. Les efforts ottomans pour fortifier leur capitale et leur création d'une nouvelle unité administrative militaire pour superviser la sécurité du Bosphore sont des indicateurs de l'attention ottomane à la menace russe croissante dans la mer Noire. Plusieurs

consultations concernant la menace russe eurent lieu à la Porte et l'inquiétude des responsables quant à la sécurité du Bosphore augmenta avec le temps.

Il convient de souligner à ce stade que les forteresses du Bosphore ne furent pas confrontées à une menace russe pendant la période considérée ici. Les Ottomans firent des préparatifs et développèrent des stratégies pour d'éventuelles intrusions russes et des opérations amphibies. Cependant, seules des recherches dans les archives russes pourraient permettre de déterminer si les Russes s'abstinrent d'attaquer Istanbul depuis la mer Noire simplement parce que les Ottomans avaient défendu efficacement le détroit ou parce que des puissances européennes telles que la France et le Royaume Uni apportaient leur soutien aux Ottomans contre la Russie pour éviter leur présence dans le détroit.

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Bostan, Hümeyra. Book Review: "Ali Yaycioglu. *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions*", *DİVAN Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 22/42, 2017/1, pp 154-158.

#### PRESENTATIONS

2010 "Türkiye'de Çocuk Edebiyatı Araştırmaları: Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını."

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2014 “Institutionalizing Justice in a Distant Province: Ottoman Judicial Reform in Yemen.” Paper presented at Middle Eastern History and Theory (MEHAT) Conference organized by University of Chicago in Chicago, IL.

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## RÉSUMÉ

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Cette thèse porte sur la fortification du Bosphore pour la défense d'Istanbul contre la menace russe à la fin du dix-huitième siècle. L'adaptation de nouvelles techniques de construction, la mise en place d'un système administratif permettant de gérer et de maintenir efficacement les défenses, ainsi que l'organisation du personnel militaire et des munitions dans les forteresses sont les sous-thèmes de la thèse.

Les Ottomans ont estimé important de fortifier le détroit de la mer Noire face aux menaces russes et à la montée en puissance de l'armée russe. Ils ont accéléré leurs efforts pour prendre des mesures de sécurité en établissant de nouvelles forteresses et de nouvelles batteries le long des rives du Bosphore. La création d'une nouvelle unité administrative sous le nom de « Surintendance du Bosphore » témoigne de la prise de conscience de la gravité de la menace par les Ottomans face à la montée de la menace russe en mer Noire.

Cette thèse aborde des questions différentes mais interdépendantes telles que la construction, l'administration et l'organisation militaire des forteresses avec une approche holistique. Gardant à l'esprit le problème plus général des réponses ottomanes aux défis technologiques et politiques auxquels ils ont été confrontés à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, cette étude examine les nouvelles techniques apportées aux Ottomans par les ingénieurs français, l'adaptation des Ottomans à l'innovation, des facteurs tels que le manque d'hommes qualifiés, de discipline et d'organisation dans les projets de construction.

Cette recherche est fondée sur une grande variété de sources. Ainsi, une riche documentation d'archive provenant des Archives d'État ottomanes et des Archives militaires et diplomatiques françaises, ainsi que des mémoires d'ingénieurs français, de cartes et de plans ottomans et français ont été étudiés. Une analyse comparative de ces sources indique que les Ottomans ont joué un rôle décisif dans l'innovation dans leurs techniques de défense en collaboration avec des ingénieurs français, non dans un souci d'occidentalisation ni pour imiter les pratiques européennes, comme le supposent la plupart des auteurs de la littérature actuelle, mais en tant que décideurs et participants actifs, adaptant localement les connaissances techniques qu'ils choisirent d'adopter.

## MOTS CLÉS

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Istanbul, fortification, défense, Bosphore, Empire Ottoman, menace russe

## ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the fortification of the Bosphorus meant to help defend Istanbul against the growing Russian threat at the end of the eighteenth century. The adaptation of new construction techniques, the development of an administrative system to run and maintain the defenses effectively, and the organization of the military personnel and munitions in the fortresses are the sub- themes of the dissertation.

The Ottomans recognized the importance of fortifying the Black Sea Strait in view of the threat posed by Russia and its rising military power. They accelerated their efforts to take security measures by establishing new fortresses and batteries along the shores of the Bosphorus. The creation of a "Superintendency of the Bosphorus" as a new administrative unit is an indicator of the Ottoman attention to the rising Russian threat in the Black Sea.

This dissertation uses a holistic approach to address different but interrelated issues, including fortress construction, administration, and military organization. Keeping in mind the broader issue of the Ottomans' responses to the technological and political challenges they faced at the end of the eighteenth century, this study sheds light on new techniques introduced by French engineers and on the Ottoman adaptation to innovation, including new techniques of organization. The dissertation also discusses the Ottoman efforts to find solutions to the problems of finding qualified men, establishing discipline, and maintaining effective organization in the construction projects.

This research employs rich archival material from the Ottoman State Archives and the French Military and Diplomatic Archives, as well as the memoirs of French engineers and Ottoman and French maps and plans. A comparative analysis of these sources indicates that the Ottomans were decisive in adopting innovative defensive techniques in collaboration with French engineers. Yet this was no mere imitation of European forms or crude Westernization. The Ottomans were active decision-makers and participants who localized and adapted the available technical knowledge of the era for their own purposes and to meet their own ends.

## KEYWORDS

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Istanbul, fortification, defense, Bosphorus, Ottoman Empire, Russian threat