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# How International News is Constructed: The Case of Arab Spring

Sawsan Atallah Bidart

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Université Bordeaux Montaigne

**École Doctorale Montaigne Humanités (ED 480)**

Laboratoire MICA (EA 4426)

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT EN « SCIENCES DE L'INFORMATION  
ET DE LA COMMUNICATION »

**How International News is Constructed-  
The Case of the Arab Spring**

Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 29 mars 2019 par

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DOCTORAL THESIS IN “INFORMATION COMMUNICATION  
SCIENCES”

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*I dedicate this thesis to my family;  
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my husband, Arnaud, for his unwavering support and desire for the best in me,  
and my children, Leila and Nour, for making me persevere.*



## **Abstract**

This thesis uses a grounded theory approach, by building a corpus of 252 news videos, broadcast by Al Jazeera English, Press TV English, Euronews English and France 24 English, on events of the Arab Spring, to answer three questions: [RQ1] how did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? [RQ2] how were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories? And [RQ3] how was contributed material used to construct international news stories?

The news videos from the corpus are analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis, therefore the discourse analysis is complemented by literature, and empirical research in form of interviews, on the dominant information institutions of events of the Arab Spring, including the aforementioned news channels as well as the news agency AFP and the UGC agency Crowdspeak. Additionally, the information and media landscape of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen between 2011 and 2013 has also been studied using existing literature. It was found that all countries had strict laws against information access or publication, especially if the information was related to authorities, religion or security, leading to strict acts of censorship and threats, which further instilled self-censorship in local and international news actors.

This research found that most events of the Arab Spring were represented using footage in the event location, with minimal international representatives and with frames of peaceful demonstrations during the uprisings of Egypt, Syria and Yemen, and frames of violent riots in the Bahraini and Tunisian uprisings. Frames featuring destruction or explosions were observed in countries that experienced some kind of conflict, namely, Libya and Syria. Images of death and suffering were minimal and only evident in news representing the death of Gaddafi and the Ghoutta chemical attack. Majority of news interviews gave a voice to relevant event actors, as opposed to topic experts.

The critical discourse analysis produced theories on the usage of various content in international news, namely: interviews, amateur content, figures and percentages, quotes and state TV content.

**Keywords:** international news construction, Arab Spring, Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews, France 24 English, interviews, amateur content, figures and percentages, quotes, State TV



## **Acronyms**

AFI: Agence Française Indépendante

AFP: Agence France Press

AJ: Al Jazeera

AJE: Al Jazeera English

AU: African Union

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CNN: Cable News Network

CPJ: Committee to Protect Journalists

EN: Euronews

EU: European Union

F24: France 24

GCC: Gulf Council Cooperation

GLBT: Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered

GT: Grounded Theory

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MLDI: Media Legal Defence Initiative (of Bahrain)

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-governmental Organisation

NTC: National Transitional Council

OFI: French Information Office

PTV: Press TV

UGC: User Generated Content

UN/O: United Nations Organisation



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# I. Introduction

Many years from today, people living outside the Arab World will remember the events of the “Arab Spring” in a series of sounds and flashes of images coming from their television, computer and smartphone screens. Whether these people were sitting comfortably in their dining rooms in France as they watched the news as a family, or whether they were sitting in their student dorm room in Singapore flicking on the news on their tablet, all of these people’s memories of the Arab Spring are there because international media broadcast a representation of the events that took place sometime between 2010 and 2013 in parts of the Arab World. When events take place in locations that are inaccessible to certain audiences, anything and everything faraway audiences know about such events will be limited to the information broadcast about the events.

The news stories broadcast from the Arab World during this time frame, grouped by international media into one large event, the “Arab Spring”<sup>1</sup>, sometimes referred to as the “Arab Uprising” or even the “Arab Awakening” did not become the news automatically. The process, whereby events become news, includes framing methods that allow for events to be mediated so as to represent stories encompassing regions, peoples and conflicts. Several events took place in the Arab World between 2011 and 2013; some framed as the Arab Spring, some not, some not even broadcast. Our research takes some of these events that were framed as part of the Arab Spring, or at least, the immediate after-effect of the Arab Spring, and tries to understand the ways in which the events were processed so as to become international news, which reached international audiences.

On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian man by the name of Mohammed Bouazizi, sets himself on fire, to protest in front of a government building in Tunisia. Bouazizi’s protest was carried on by other Tunisians, leading to the downfall of President Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. Within weeks, the first mass protests were held in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, this time against the Egyptian government and by February 11, 2011, Egypt’s President Mubarak, had met his downfall. A few days later, in Libya, people began their protest against the Libyan regime. Libya’s uprising quickly turned into a battle involving Gaddafi forces, rebels and international

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<sup>1</sup> It is our belief that what one considers to be representative of the events of the “Arab Spring” may not be accepted by others. As a consequence, we have decided to introduce the term “Arab Spring” in quotation marks. Although it is our conviction that this term can have several connotations, and since we have already stated so, we will not necessarily carry on using quotation marks around the term Arab Spring or other terms representative of events of the Arab Spring in this thesis.

intervention, leading to the capture and killing of Gaddafi on October 20, 2011. During this time, a popular uprising had also begun in the Arabian Gulf in Bahrain, where Saudi intervention was requested by the Bahraini government. Protests continued well into 2014 but did not lead to the downfall of the government. Also during this time, further north in Syria, popular uprisings had begun, on March 15, 2011, eventually turning into a civil war with various international actors, still ongoing in 2018. In Saudi Arabia, brief spells of protests were quelled with the government announcing women's right to vote. In neighbouring Yemen, people also took to the streets to protest, leading to an attempted assassination of President Saleh, compelling him to flee the country, return in September 2011 and then flee again, this time to the US in January, 2012, before finally handing over power in February, 2012.

These carefully selected events constitute our purpose-built news corpus on news stories from the "Arab Spring", which allows us to specifically look at how they were presented by international news channels. These news stories will therefore be used as an example, or rather, sample of news stories that have been represented internationally to audiences worldwide. Our news corpus also focusses on four specific international media channels that have published their news on the Arab Spring onto online platforms, specifically YouTube or their official news websites. These channels, Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English, all broadcast their news in English to audiences worldwide via television and the internet, with two of the channels representing international mainstream media from the Middle East and the other two representing international media from the West, specifically based in France.

## **I.1. Aims and Objectives**

This thesis focusses on the problem of representation of international events as news stories to worldwide audiences, by studying how news is produced in the context of the events of the Arab Spring. We have identified the representation of international news events to be a problem, because international audiences cannot access these events themselves. On the other hand, because of accessibility challenges, representation has also always been the solution that allows for audiences to know about events occurring in faraway places; therefore representation will always be a key element to media studies. Accessibility to locations of international events can be problematic for at least three reasons. Firstly, accessibility is challenging due to audiences

being in faraway locations and therefore, it is both costly and time-consuming to access the locations. Secondly, accessibility has obstacles due to often dangerous and tense situations in the event location that do not allow for easy-access. Thirdly, due to language and cultural barriers grossly interlinked with the socio-political and economic histories of the region, accessibility, or rather, comprehension, of events becomes complicated even for those who are willing to go to these locations.

Through this thesis, our primary aim is to understand how the events of the Arab Spring were represented by mainstream media to international audiences, whilst also understanding how news is constructed. In order to fulfil this aim, our objective was to identify specific research questions resulting from hypotheses on news representation, all of which will be presented in the following sections.

### **I.1.1. Research Questions**

While recognising representation to be a worldwide problem, our objective through our research is to seek answers to the following questions:

#### **RQ1: How did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring?**

Our research aims to inquire about the various institutions and actors of information in each of the countries studied. Our curiosity into the media context, with regards to freedoms of speech and information access, in each of the countries covered in the news stories in our corpus, enable us to pinpoint and understand the various actors or sources of information, contributing to the news flow. Included in our study of the various actors of information, are governments, local professional and amateur media, news agencies and international mainstream channels, specifically those in our corpus. The answers to this question can be found in Chapter 3.

#### **RQ2: How were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories?**

We are particularly interested in the various frames used by international media channels to report the news stories of the Arab Spring. In order to answer this question, our research objective is to identify the voices and images of the Arab Spring, by identifying news format preferences, ranging from lives to interviews and prepared documentaries (reportages). Our research also aims to identify the various footage used to depict the different events in our corpus, whilst also detecting journalist and footage location. In addition, we study the use of interviews to tell the stories of the Arab Spring, by identifying the different types of questions

used in interviews, whilst also noting the different types of interviewees. We also seek for international representation in the stories of the Arab Spring. The answers to this question can be found in Chapter 3.

### **RQ3: How was contributed material used to construct international news stories?**

This question looks at various contributed material, ranging from footage derived from local State TV channels or amateur media contributors, to figures and percentages provided by other actors and quotes and citations of relevant event actors, and studies the ways in which these contributed materials come together to make the final news output. This study therefore tries to understand the role of contributed material in the final construction of the news stories on the Arab Spring and therefore proposes theories on how our findings can be applicable to international news in general. The answers to this question, can be found in Chapter 4.

## **I.1.2. Research Hypotheses**

Our research questions are the result of presuppositions made at the starting point of our research. One could say that it is our hypotheses that inspired our curiosity into this large research topic.

**H1:** With regards to RQ1, our presupposition was that events go through various stages of perception, before being represented in the news as news stories. It was also presupposed that news production could be represented in form of a flow diagram that is circular, whereby audience members can and will also be informers, feeding information to news professionals, who would then broadcast news to audiences. The stance that perception is unique inevitably meant that interpretation of an event would also be unique, and that information in the news flow could be affected each time it was transmitted to another actor. The news flow and the actors within the news flow, as well as the various perceptions, resulted in RQ1.

**H2:** Our second hypothesis is related to our first. Because our first hypothesis states that that news perception and interpretation are unique, therefore, in our second hypothesis, we presumed that different media would report same events differently. Also, because each of the events in our news corpus had different contexts with varying dominant institutions of information, media would treat each of the events differently, and therefore represent it with different frames.

**H3:** Our third hypothesis is rooted in our second, and states that mainstream media can frame events by using material derived from actors within the news flow, whereby each type of content can have different roles to play in the representation of events as news stories. Our belief is that there is a contribution of information, rather than a co-construction of the final news product, because the various actors in the news flow are not necessarily aware of how their contributed information or material will be used by the mainstream news channel that buys or uses their material. It is for this reason that we ask how the contributed material is used in framing events.

### **I.1.3. Research Approach and Methods**

In order to answer our three main research questions, a Grounded Theory approach has been adopted. Our objective with such an approach was to use our findings, grounded in data, to propose theories applicable to international news production even outside of the events of the Arab Spring. Chapter 2 describes the research approach implemented whilst also pinpointing and detailing the methods of Content Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis, which guided both our corpus construction and then our corpus deconstruction so as to analyse the texts in our corpus. As critical discourse analysis also calls for an analysis into the dominant discourse producers, Chapter 2 also details how interviews with news professionals were conducted, with the primary aim of facilitating text comprehension through an understanding of the dominant institutions.

## **I.2. Research Justification**

Our belief is that good research can test or even contribute to existing knowledge. In order to test existing knowledge, researchers can explore the existing knowledge so as to know what should be tested, and then test it against a different dataset. In order to contribute to existing knowledge, researchers need to identify what has not been seen by other researchers in the same or different datasets. And in order for the research results to prove useful, they should have an impact- even a small impact- on existing knowledge and society (van Dijk 1993).

Much of what international audiences today know about the events of the Arab Spring, comes from what they saw or heard on international news. It is therefore of essence that we study how

events become international news stories. It is also important to take a step back from the constant information overload we live in today, to dissect the news and understand how the events of the Arab Spring were represented by international news outlets to the world. It is important that worldwide audiences understand events in faraway locations for what they are, despite obstacles in news production (ranging from censorship and security to journalist knowledge and experience), whilst also understanding that the news is only one representation of reality on the ground. Therefore, it is hoped that our research will serve on the one hand, to raise awareness in society on how news is framed, and on the other hand, in newsrooms on the media effects narratives have on both audiences and history records.

### **I.2.1. Contributing to Existing Literature**

In an attempt to understand how international news is produced, the context of the Arab Spring was selected. Whilst exploring research related to both news and the Arab Spring, we identified gaps in the literature on how the events of the Arab Spring were represented by international media. For example, Alexa Robertson from Stockholm University, studied the various narratives of resistance by comparing global news coverage of the Arab Spring. Robertson conducted an empirical analysis so as to explore the way culture affects news production, specifically in the newsrooms of Al Jazeera English and BBC World (Robertson 2012). Also, Ahmed K Al-Rawi studied how the popular uprising in Bahrain was framed to be sectarian by Bahraini activists online and audiences involved in the reframing or *counterframing* [sic] process; his study focusses on YouTube commentators (Al-Rawi 2015). Unlike our research, which does not search for one frame in particular, Al-Rawi's study searches for sectarianism frames in particular and highlights these frames with YouTube commentators. Noura Alalawi studied media coverage of the events of the Arab Spring by comparing Fox News and Al Jazeera's coverage. But unlike our study, which uses a corpus of news stories to build theories in news production, Alalawi's comparative study is conducted by reviewing independent sources' criticisms on the channels (Alalawi 2015). Banu Dagtas from Anadolu University in Turkey also studied the news discourses of the Arab Spring in Turkish newspapers using critical discourse analysis, and unlike our study, which looked at various elements in the news, Dagtas' fascinating study specifically examines the news actors by looking at their use of quotation, lexicalisation and syntactic preferences (Banu 2013). Another study found in the literature shows how Rusi Jaspal explored the events of the Arab Spring to understand how they were represented in two specific English language newspapers of Iran (Jaspal 2014). Jaspal's study

focusses on written articles rather than videos used in our study. Also, Jaspal's objective was to understand the dominant themes in the Iranian press on the events of the Arab Spring, proving different from our objective, which also aims to understand the various influences of and on the dominant institutions of information and to build theories related to the role of contributed material in the news on the Arab Spring. Zainab Abdul-Nabi's brilliant research focussed on Al Jazeera's coverage of Bahrain's uprising and Syria's chemical attack of 2013, by seeking frames of peace journalism, but her study found war journalism frames in both cases (Abdul-Nabi 2015). Her study is different from ours as she focusses on two main events whilst seeking specific frames; our study looks into the data to discover the frames. Andrea Guzman studied the evolution of news frames during the 2011 Egyptian uprising by using critical discourse analysis on Fox News and CNN's websites. Whilst Guzman's study uses critical discourse analysis, similar to ours, her study is on one specific uprising and its coverage on two American news channels, therefore results in an understanding into how news presentation of an event evolves over a short period of time (Guzman 2016). In his PhD thesis, Ezzedine Abdelmoula uses grounded theory to understand Al-Jazeera's democratising role in the Arab World during the events of the Arab Uprising (Abdelmoula 2012); his interesting research is grounded in interviews with journalists rather than analysis of the news broadcast by the channel.

Outside the context of the Arab Spring, we can learn from other significant research on event representation in the news, specifically so as to adopt appropriate research methods. For example, Van Dijk's study of how international press covered the assassination of Lebanon's president-elect Bechir Gemayel in 1982 remains exemplary in critical discourse analysis of international news (van Dijk 1988). In her PhD thesis, El-Ibiary uses content and critical discourse analysis to do a comparative analysis of Al Jazeera and CNN's coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq (El-Ibiary 2006); her work also serves as an interesting example in combining both content and critical discourse analyses on international news. Great lessons can also be learnt from Damome and Kambaja's research on Kiswahili in television media in Lubumbashi (Damome & Kambaja 2012). Also, Abi Karam's study of Lebanon's national press coverage of the Lebanese environmental crisis is an additional example of using quantitative and qualitative analysis to understand representation in the news (Abi Karam 2014). These are only some of the research on representation of events by the media.

Much research related to the Arab Spring and media is tied to how social media platforms were used to both diffuse the news locally and internationally and to organise local protests. Aday et al analysed the role of social media in the Arab Spring protests of 2011-2012 whilst using a framework for studying the role of new media in political movements (Aday et al. 2012). Alhindi et al also studied the role of modern technology in the Arab Spring (Alhindi et al. 2012). A study by Wolfsfeld et al attempts to prove that the role of social media in protests can only

be studied in correlation with the political context and that social media use will increase protest activities (Wolfsfeld et al. 2013). Allagui and Kuebler studied the role of ICTs in the Arab Spring (Allagui & Kuebler 2011), while Russell studied the information flow in Egypt using social media during the 2011 uprising (Russell 2011). Bruns elaborated a study on social media audiences of the Arab Spring (Bruns et al. 2013). Jamali explored social media use during the uprisings in the Arab World (Jamali 2014). Fenniche studied how social media platforms, as public spaces of construction, allowed for disintermediation in the case of the Tunisian uprising (Fenniche 2013). Also, Ben Amor studied online citizen journalism, providing an insight into the relationship between mainstream media and Facebook in the Tunisian revolution (Amor & Amor 2013). Another study, by Rigoni et al shows how mainstream media and social movements can collaborate (Rigoni et al. 2015). Lim studied how various media, forming a hybrid network, created narratives on Bouazizi in Tunisia (Merlyna Lim 2013). Much has also been written about the Arab Spring, social networks and networked society by Manuel Castells (Castells 2015). These are only some of the studies that have focussed on the use of social media in the Arab Spring; there are countless others (Tudoroiu 2014; Howard et al. 2011; Brouwer & Bartels 2014; Lynch et al. 2013; Al-Jenaibi 2016).

Other research axes related to the Arab Spring exist; for example we were also able to find research on censorship during the events of the Arab Spring (Greenwald 2012). Al-Saqaf studied internet censorship circumvention tools in the Syrian uprising (Al-Saqaf 2016). Some researchers have also studied the impact of the Arab Spring; for example, Sharobeem studied the impact of the Arab Spring on a specific university in Egypt (Sharobeem 2015), while others have studied how journalism has a role in writing or re-writing history; for example, Jorndrup studied how the Danish press coverage of the Arab Spring makes historical references to the European revolutionary history (Jorndrup 2012).

Our research aims to contribute to the literature on international news representation by proposing theories grounded in significant, unique and representative data. Also, our research aims to add to the research on the representation of the events of the Arab Spring by searching for how several events from several countries were represented over a time frame surpassing the first uprisings that took place. For example, our corpus goes beyond the downfall of Mubarak in Egypt; it also covers the election of Morsi, his endeavour for more power and his downfall after another uprising. Also, the news corpus does not only focus on the uprising of people in Libya against their regime; it also covers the international conflict that took place up until the capture and death of Gaddafi. Our news videos on Syria do not only focus on the uprising of the Syrians, but also on other key moments; such as when Assad makes his first speech to the world post-uprisings in 2011, the resignation of the cabinet, the declaration of

civil war and the chemical weapon attack in Ghoutta in 2013. Other events such as women's right to vote in Saudi Arabia and coverage of Yemen, Bahrain and Tunisia are also included. These events are further elaborated on in the methodology chapter. Whilst we understand that the events of the Arab Uprisings are each unique, and therefore also provide dedicated analyses in the following chapters, we also recognise the need for studies to group information on the various countries in one document, so as to seek patterns and show existing similarities.

## **I.2.2. Corpus Creation and Research Methodology**

We were unable to find already created corpuses featuring news videos by Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English, with coverage of the events outlined for this thesis. Our unique corpus of news events is therefore another contribution to research on international news that can be used by other researchers for other projects. The methods used to construct our news corpus are also outlined in our methodology chapter, and will hopefully serve to help in corpus constructions for future or further studies. The research methodology used, based on grounded theory, is also outlined, using both content and critical discourse analyses. The methodology will also hopefully be exemplary for further studies.

In conclusion, our thesis is of essence because of the research approach and combined methodological analyses applied to a unique corpus so as to:

1. Understand how events of the Arab Spring were framed into international news stories and
2. Propose news theories that can be applicable to international news production



## **II. Methodology**

As the previous chapter has already presented the subject of our thesis along with our main questions and hypotheses, we will now outline our methodology by presenting the various tools used to construct our thinking, which framed our research and resulted in our findings.

Firstly, this chapter will present and discuss our research approach, which steered us towards the identification of our main problem, along with our main hypotheses and questions. This research approach guided us in the research journey to our analysis and eventual results. This first section dedicated to our research approach also gives a general overview of the research process, before applying methods to each part of our research design.

Secondly, this chapter will outline the quantitative and qualitative analysis methods used to construct an empirical research framework used together with the research approach first outlined. Consequently, we show how this empirical research framework was applied to our analysis and results.

After outlining our research approach and methods, this chapter will then detail theoretical framework upon which our research analysis was founded. The theoretical framework is subdivided into three main sections, (1) perceiving reality, (2) interpreting reality, and (3) constructing the news.

The theoretical framework is then followed by a section on research development, which details the steps followed in our research, by highlighting how the corpora were constructed, by going into details of the different types of data collected to build not only a news corpus, but also a ‘corpus’ of the dominant information institutions we were concerned with, in terms of both local and international information institutions.

Hence, this chapter is broken down into four main sections, so as to share the research process and methodology within a structured and logical trail that can be comprehended, adapted and further developed by other researchers.

### **II.1. Research Approach**

Our research approach, Grounded Theory (GT), proposed by Glaser and further developed by Strauss and Corbin (Glaser 1967; Strauss & Corbin 2008) is an inductive research reasoning that encourages the use of systematic procedures in the identification and arguably also the verification of theories. The theoretical research is decided upon based on data that the researcher collects from the field of interest, with the objective of discovering patterns leading

to a theory that could be applied to the various configurations of the dataset or even other datasets in the same field. Such an approach was chosen, because our research topic was initially only an interest, which rather than highlighting specific problems, highlighted *news* as a research interest. Therefore, at the offset of the research, there was no particular bias with regards to how events of the Arab Spring were represented. Consequently, it was decided that the most logical way of finding interesting theories about news in the context of the Arab Spring, would be to identify theories based on significant, unique and representative data. An inductive approach would allow us to make broader generalisations as opposed to specific observations in our topic in order to detect patterns, regularities or outstanding elements that could be further explored in our research.

Glaser described GT as an “approach to theory building” through “emergence”, whereby “the design, like the concepts, must be allowed to emerge during the research process” (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.33). Because theories emerge from the data rather than in the head of the researcher, based on previous research or experience or perceptions, one of the many benefits of using a grounded theory approach is that researchers are forced to examine any basic assumptions and their perspectives (idem). Odis Simmons, a fellow from the Grounded Theory Institute (GTI) recommends that the stages in GT be sequential and yet conducted concurrently (idem). Data analysis and collection take place almost simultaneously with back and forth iterations (Cohen & Crabtree 2006), because “we wish to be as sure of our evidence as possible, and will therefore check on it as often as we can” (Glaser 1967, p.23). The stages of the GT process as established by Simmons are preparation, data collection, analysis, memoing and sorting and theoretical outlining (Christiansen & Simmons 2014). Glaser and Strauss maintain that Grounded Theory is more practical than other research methodologies because theory based on data cannot be easily dismissed or replaced by new theories and will therefore be enduring theories<sup>2</sup>. Also, unlike ungrounded research, which trains researchers to look for facts or rather examples of theories being proven, research grounded in data trains researchers to explain facts so as to build new theories. The “examplifying” process that researchers of ungrounded methodologies undertake in searching for examples to prove a hypothesis or assumption may lead the researcher to be biased in the collection of their data so as to further develop their hypothesis into a theory, but Glaser and Strauss forewarn that a theory not grounded in data will “...obtains a richness of detail that it did not earn” (Glaser 1967, p.5).

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<sup>2</sup> Glaser and Strauss cite examples of theories linked to data that have proved to last over a long period of time; such examples are Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and Durkheim’s theory of suicide, which unlike “logically deduced theories based on ungrounded assumptions” are able to inspire further research so as to develop these existing theories (Glaser 1967, p.4).

## Applying Grounded Theory to Media Studies

Although the concept of Grounded Theory initially stemmed from the field of sociology (Glaser 1967, p.2) and carries on being used by sociologists today, it is widely applied today by various disciplines (Faggiolani 2011, p.4592E–7) and not limited to research in sociology. It is therefore appropriate to apply the Grounded Theory approach to our media communications' research methodology and analysis. Barrie Gunter (2002) notes that “Media communication research is characterised by quite a variety of different research perspectives” and “That fact stems from the hybrid nature of this field of empirical inquiry, in which investigative approaches have been derived from longer established academic disciplines in the social sciences. Anthropology [...], sociology have all contributed theories and methodologies for studying the impact of media” (Jensen 2012). One can therefore propose that studying the news through GT is an acceptable research approach for the study of media.

Also, this is not the first research project in the media studies discipline to use Grounded Theory. Other studies that use the GT approach can be cited to further show how it has already been applied to research in media studies. For example, in 2010, Jessica Pugh used GT to conduct a qualitative study of Facebook and the construction of an identity on the social platform (Pugh 2010). Digital media in the Egyptian Revolution was also researched through unique data sets in a research conducted between the UNDP and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (Wilson & DUNN 2011). Ezzeddine Abdelmoula also used GT in his PhD thesis to understand the role of Al Jazeera in the Arab uprising, by using a qualitative methodology via interviews he conducted with Al Jazeera's staff (Abdelmoula 2012). Daniel Perrin also used GT to explore the linguistics of newswriting (Perrin 2013). Many more research projects in the media communications discipline use empirical data, but of greatest interest to us is the fact that discourse analysis, deeply encrusted in the field of media communications and qualitative research, is “grounded in the data” (Tavakoli 2012, p.171). The ways in which our research applied discourse analysis is explained in the Analysis Methods and Research Development sections of this chapter.

### *Grounded Theory applied by Newsmakers*

Another interesting element worth considering on the validity of GT approach in media studies research is the application of GT by mainstream media. Journalists and news producers go out

in search of grounded theories to present in the news with the material they are able to collect. Journalists are able to test already existing theories about a topic, event or ideology in the data they are able to collect. Once the data is collected and analysed, they are able to find out whether the theories still stand or are only failed hypotheses. Of course, one can also argue that the media go out in search of data based on already existing presumptions or generalised interpretations about a particular topic, event or ideology and therefore may only find what they seek and therefore miss the bigger picture.

### Theory Construction using a GT Approach

The GT sociological methods of research in 1967 focussed on how data could be collected and how an already established theory could be tested against this data. Additionally, GT, focusses on “how the discovery of theory from data- systematically obtained and analysed in social research- can be furthered” (Glaser 1967, p.1). According to Glaser and Strauss, previous works on social research methodology had studied how to verify already thought up theories, whereas Grounded Theory concentrates on how to actually discover concepts or hypotheses relevant to the research. Glaser and Strauss also stressed on the view that many sociologists had the desire to verify theories instead of developing new theories and therefore the art in the generation of theories itself was lost; they go so far as to say that many sociologists diverted from the truism that generating theory and verifying the theory should go hand in hand (Glaser 1967, p.2). In the same way, GT as an approach can be used to validate other media studies’ theories, but also go a step further in constructing new theories.

According to Glaser and Strauss, sociology theories should have five capabilities. Theories should enable prediction and justification of a particular behaviour, whilst also contributing to theoretical advances in the field, so as to be used in practical applications and provide a perspective on behaviour as well as propose a research style on particular areas of behaviour (Glaser 1967, p.3). Similarly, we believe that media theories should also enable prediction and justification of particular characteristics in the media output, whilst also contributing to theoretical advances in media studies, so as to be used by newsmakers, news audiences and news researchers in practical applications and provide a perspective on the news as well as a style for research on the news. In order to generate a theory that fulfils all these uses, Glaser and Strauss insist on the necessity of deriving it from data. Glaser and Strauss also go so far as to say that theories that fit and work, after having been derived from data examination, will not only be understood by academic experts in the field, but also by professional laymen working in the field. We can therefore be confident in the usability and usefulness of theories generated

using Grounded Theory as an approach as they will not be exclusive to academics alone, but also be applicable to professionals in the specified field of work and perhaps even news spectators.

The Glaser and Strauss general method of comparative analysis encourages researchers to generate grounded theories born out of comparison logic. Comparing figures in a data set is a good way for researchers to validate facts<sup>3</sup>. “Sociologists generally agree that replications are the best means for validating facts” (Glaser 1967, p.23). Glaser and Strauss insist on the importance of factual data in the generation of grounded theories, therefore the constant checking and comparing of data in one’s research is of importance to grounded theory methodology<sup>4</sup>. This is why for example, that on researching the media context of the countries involved in the Arab Spring, for this research project, we had to use several sources, ranging from reports produced by a country, to reports produced by international and human rights organisations. Also, the news video corpus had to be checked several times to ensure that the information recorded from the corpus into a database was accurate and truly representative of the text.

The GT researcher may collect a multitude of data but does not need to use all collected data in the analysis. Indeed, as part of exploratory research for this thesis topic, news videos were initially collected, from various platforms, and after looking at the data, the selection criteria was narrowed down so as to focus on specific news formats from specific news channels. The data initially collected has not been discarded and therefore can be used in to study media representation in future studies.

Despite the importance of using accurate data, Scott & Glaser (2006) suggest that data that is not entirely accurate is not necessarily problematic to the research. Firstly, it is challenging enough to come across completely accurate data, and secondly, the researcher does not only use the data to generate grounded theories. Generation of grounded theories also rely on a “conceptual category”. Indeed, a concept may be derived from only one fact, and this fact is only one of the possible indicators for the concept. Although facts may change because of

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<sup>3</sup> They propose that, for example, a researcher could verify that the number of beds in a hospital provided by the hospital administration is correct by cross-checking the figure with documentation published by the World Health Organisation and the Town Hall.

<sup>4</sup> Scott and Glaser provide examples of how comparative analysis was used in Grounded Theory so as to ensure data is accurate (Scott & Glaser 2006, pp.25–26). Paul Cressey for example, painstakingly compared taxi-dance halls with other dance halls prior to actually commencing his analysis. Also, Martin Trow and James S. Coleman compared the political nature of the ITU with the political nature of other unions. And Louis Wirth compared the Chicago ghetto with the European ghetto. Coleman also compared the different types of high schools on numerous dimensions.

inaccuracies or simply because of an evolution in data sets, this does not necessarily mean that concepts will change. The concept will most certainly be relevant to the given data set, and may even remain valid when some of the accurate facts change (Scott & Glaser 2006, p.23). In the media communications discipline for example, some studies have elaborated on a conceptual category that there is misrepresentation of Arabs in the media<sup>5</sup>. A change in the evidence, may prove that Arabs are ‘rightly’ presented in the media, but the actuality of misrepresentation of Arabs in the media will remain a conceptual category for the media in general.

Theory discovery is of utmost importance to the GT approach outlined by Glaser & Strauss, but there are other interpretations of the GT approach. For example, Kathy Charmaz states that “neither data nor theories are discovered. Rather we, are part of the world we study and the data we collect. We *construct* our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices”. Charmaz’s version of Grounded Theory is that the approach gives researchers the possibility of portraying one interpretation of the “studied world”, and therefore our “finished grounded theories- are constructions of reality” (Charmaz 2006, p.10), and I would add that such reasoning resembles our journalists’ representations of worldwide events. Charmaz is right when she states that the theories we develop from Grounded Theory are only one representation of the world, because we only use samples of data. Therefore, if the researcher does not carefully explain that the theories developed are only pertinent to a specific data set, we also run the risk of making generalisations on our world. And although working on the basis of generalisations may cloud a researcher’s viewpoint, it can also be a good basis for research, especially when one cannot study an entire population or in our case all the news on all the events of the Arab Spring. Glaser and Strauss state that comparative studies are used to establish empirical generalisations and our news corpus construction is representative of this recommendation. The news corpus is made up of two Western based media channels and two Middle Eastern based media channels so as to gather data that would be a representation of both Western and Middle Eastern international media channels. Of course, a representation is not a replica of reality but it can be an illustration of reality. Just as some generalisations are used in terms of sociology and culture, this can also be true for the media and media audiences of different cultures. The media of each culture has already been analysed by social psychologist Geert Hofstede, whose study resulted in the six dimensions of a national culture. These six dimensions are indeed only generalisations of

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<sup>5</sup> Examples of studies that found misrepresentation of Arabs in the media: *Television representation of the “war on terror”*: comparative analysis of Al-Jazeera and CNN in covering the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Rasha El-Ibiary, 2006), *The image of Saudi Arabia in the British press, with particular reference to Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Mission* (Taleb Al-Ahmady, 1995), *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Jack G. Shaheen, 2003), *Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis* (2016), etc...

national cultures, and yet they are generally accepted in the field of sociology and by students and researchers of cross-cultural communication. We are able to use Hofstede's generalisations on national cultures<sup>6</sup> in our choice of media organisations to generalise media as per geographic location and therefore build a data set that represents two large cultures. Also, it is important to note that while our data set of news stories may not be entirely equivalent to the news stories of events of the Arab Spring, they are significant because they are news stories that have already been broadcast to an international audience. Glaser and Strauss also breached the topic of empirical generalisations, explaining that the necessity in the use of comparative studies is to establish the boundaries of a fact that has been generalised. In generating a theory, one must also establish the boundaries of applicability so as to also further broaden the theory by providing explanations and predictability of the theory. "By comparing where the facts are similar or different, we can generate properties of categories that increase that categories' generality and explanatory power" (Scott & Glaser 2006, p.24). We will see how for example, it was discovered through interviews with some journalists, that training was not provided by their employers and we wondered if this was in fact an empirical generalisation applicable to all international correspondents. Therefore, although this was not the central problem of the thesis, it was then deliberately included as a question in following interviews with journalists, so as to discover how reliable the generalisation was, and if it was applicable to all journalists. More about the interviewing methods and processes will be discussed in the Research Development section.

## A GT Approach to Literature

According to Christiansen & Simmons, in researches following the GT approach, there is no preliminary literature review, instead, there is a general research topic, but no predetermined research "problem" (Christiansen & Simmons 2014). Corbin and Strauss also assure researchers that it is unnecessary to review all literature beforehand so that the researcher is not "stifled" by the literature (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.49). One can argue that if a researcher does not commence a research with a clear conscience- that is no beliefs, opinions or stance- then the validation of their theory may indeed become tarnished with knowledge from their conscience. Theories should not be clouded with previous knowledge, experience or

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<sup>6</sup> Hofstede found that collectivist societies had less press freedom as opposed to individualist societies that were found to have more press freedom. While studying the societal culture dimension of individualism/collectivism, Hofstede defined individualism to be "a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after self and immediate family only". Hofstede defined collectivism to be "a society in which individuals from birth onwards are part of strong in-groups (tribe, extended family, villages)"(Hofstede 2014). He found Arab countries to be collectivist and many Western European countries and America to be individualist.

prejudices. However, Jensen argues that there may be problems in the “foundations” of Grounded Theory because GT researchers may commence research without background theoretical knowledge on the subject they are researching. Poor foundations in a research topic could result in a poor understanding of the topic, further resulting in uninteresting theories or even a complete inability to produce theories. In terms of epistemology, some academics find this method of entering research to be “dubious” as some researchers may be tempted to justify their lack of readings on the prescribed methods of GT (Jensen 2012). This concern for lack of literature and its application on empirical research was shared by Corbin and Strauss who breeched how literature can be applied to data analysis; they clearly state that knowledge, if used wisely, in an objective manner allows for a better comprehension on the part of the researcher. Corbin and Strauss (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.47) cite Dey (1993, p. 63)<sup>7</sup>, “The issue is not whether to use existing knowledge, but how”. Strauss and Corbin explain that literature can indeed be used in analysis if the researcher uses the literature in “theoretical terms” so as to “provide a rich source of events to stimulate thinking about properties and for asking conceptual questions” (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.47). For example, a researcher can compare concepts revealed in the data to concepts discussed in literature. It is mainly for this reason that this study also includes a critical discourse analysis that goes beyond the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Scott and Glaser also state that although their “emphasis is on generating theory rather than verifying it, we take special pains not to divorce those two activities...” (Scott & Glaser 2006, p.viii); for verification to take place, a researcher must know about the theory that needs to be verified.

On the other hand, in a talk published on YouTube, on the use of a literature review in GT, Glaser discusses the irrelevance of a literature review in GT, explaining that one would gather lots of information of what other researchers had found, but that this information would be irrelevant to coming up with grounded theories. He explained that reviewing literature is a “waste of time if you’re going to do grounded theory and discover what’s really going on”. But Glaser goes on to say that a literature review should be done, but only after data has been collected and looked at, so as to know what literature to actually search for (Glaser 2010). In all frankness, this particular research project started off with the intention of building a literature review, but it was discovered after some time that without a clear focus, it was in fact a “waste of time”, just as Glaser warns of in his talk, because readings on the Arab Spring and news in general were simply too wide and leading nowhere in particular. It was only after looking at our data that I was able to focus on literature related to our research analysis. Therefore, rather than having a literature review in this thesis, we have injected literature we have used in our

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<sup>7</sup> Dey, I. (1993); *Qualitative data analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

methodology and analyses throughout the thesis. Charmaz argues that it is necessary to have a literature review, so as to apply it to one's grounded theory along with the theoretical framework so that it can be used to "direct how you critique earlier studies and theories and to make comparisons with these materials" (Charmaz 2006, p.164). Charmaz also points out that delaying our literature review, as suggested by the classic Grounded Theory, with the aim of keeping the researcher neutral, cannot fulfil such an aim, because researchers will always have unique backgrounds and different experiences resulting in different perceptions of their data sets, whether they like it or not. We agree with Charmaz that the information in the literature review can be applied to our grounded theory, but we also agree with the classical Grounded Theory in that doing a literature review too early in the research process is irrelevant. We have therefore combined both methods of thinking, by doing data collection first and then after iterative checks between analysis and the data itself, we were able to focus on specific items that we decided to further explore so as to build a theoretical framework, rather than building a traditional literature review. The introduction of our thesis, for example, has listed the various research conducted on news production and the Arab Spring, so as to show our knowledge in the topic and "strengthen (y)our credibility" (Charmaz 2006, p.166), furthermore, our research on how the Arab Spring was represented will allow us to "strengthen (y)our argument", as advised by Charmaz.

The adopted research approach of Grounded Theory has been explained in this section. The following section will detail the analysis methods adopted in our research, by detailing both content and discourse analysis and explaining the ways in which a critical discourse analysis framework was also constructed.

## **II.2. Analysis Methods**

Having highlighted and described the application of Grounded Theory as the research approach adopted in our research, we will now describe the analysis methods used in our research framework. This section identifies and explains the ways in which content and discourse analyses were adopted by detailing quantitative and qualitative aspects of our analyses. Under the qualitative discourse analysis, we explain our choice of critical discourse analysis in our research.

## **II.2.1. Content and Discourse Analyses**

This section is further subdivided into two other sections respectively entitled Quantitative Analysis and Qualitative Analysis. The Quantitative Analysis section provides our understanding of content analysis as a quantitative analysis approach, specifically adapting it to a GT research approach, while highlighting examples of how it was applied to our research. This section also notes the drawbacks of quantitative content analysis, which eventually led us to apply discourse analysis to our research.

### **II.2.1.1. Quantitative Analysis**

Content analysis in the media can be traced back to at least 1910 when Max Weber suggested monitoring press coverage of politics (Gunter 2012, p.220). This research method was put into practice regularly to research various media related issues and was eventually used to study themes such as representation and public perceptions of reality. According to Gillian Rose, content analysis continues to be used in studies of mass media because of its ability to generate “objective data” and also because it allows for researchers to deal with large amount of data (Rose 2014, p.82). Krippendorff in 1986 contributed to the definition of content analysis, defining it as “a method of studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective and quantifiable manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (idem). Gunter explains that his preference with the latter definition is because it is representative of quantitative research of media outputs in the sense that it involves media sampling and it aims to focus on data to get results rather than the researcher’s previous knowledge or perceptions prior to seeing the data. This clearly complements our GT research approach because researchers using GT are advised to focus on data rather than their previous knowledge and readings. Similarly, Gillian Rose describes content analysis as a method founded on “rules and procedures” that require rigorous dedication on the part of the researcher so as to analyse both images and text. The rules and procedures need to be set for all parts of the analysis, from the selection of media to coding the data and finally to the quantitative analysis.

Quantitative Content Analysis was applied to our news corpus so as to be able to study the media output produced by the TV channels in our media corpus. Jensen (2012) describes the term “quantitative content analysis” as “content analysis” and argues that the “main advantage of quantitative content studies is that they can serve to confirm or disconfirm intuitive impressions by performing a systematic description of a large set of media discourses through

numbers that express the frequency and prominence of particular textual properties” (Jensen 2012, p.102). Our interpretation of Content Analysis is that we are analysing various content types within a media text, rather than only focussing on the textual descriptions or speech. The content could be text, meaning words, or a string of sentences, or specific choices of text, but it could also be information surrounding the actual text, for example, listing the actual participants in a news video or the location featured on a news video or even the footage featured on a video. Rather than including all the text in our content analysis, we decided to select specific elements of the videos that we were interested in analysing so as to be able to answer our research questions.

In following through with GT, we wanted to use a systematic approach to study the news videos in our corpus and therefore took the position that it was necessary to quantify elements of interest to us so as to be able to reach conclusions representative of quantitative data, rather than reach conclusions based on impressions we had based on watching a few news videos. Jensen also discusses the earlier methodological reflections of content analysis by citing Bernard Berelson who said that (1952, p. 18) “Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” and then highlights Berelson’s recommendation that it is necessary to distinguish between ‘knowledge’ and ‘interpretation’ [of media content]. Although Berelson agreed “that the end goal of research is to make interpretations of the media, and of their relationship with either the intentions of senders or the consequences for the attitudes and behaviors [sic] of recipients, Berelson stipulated that such interpretation must not be mixed into the analytical process proper<sup>8</sup>” (Jensen 2012, p.103). Lutz and Collins (1993) also suggest that content analysis eradicates any bias that a researcher may have when commencing their study and analysis (Rose 2014, pp.85–86); such thinking goes hand in hand with the process of Grounded Theory. Given this information and based on experience on this research project, it is indeed necessary to distinguish between knowledge and interpretation. For example, while constituting the news corpus, as a spectator, I had the impression that the story of Yemen’s President leaving the country was one that was considered newsworthy by many outlets and therefore decided to include it in my corpus. However, after scanning the news videos covering the events whereby the Yemeni President left Yemen, it was found that the news story only appeared a fraction of times. My impression as a spectator and my knowledge as a researcher, based on content analysis, did not match. Also, once we had compiled the data, yielding in results, synonymous with knowledge, analysis still had to take place for the knowledge to be interpreted and then applied to construct theories.

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<sup>8</sup> Berelson, 1952, p. 18

The other added benefit of using content analysis on our news corpus is that we were analysing 252 news texts. As much as qualitative findings provide valuable insight into media studies, they are unable to analyse large amounts of data found today on sites like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Also, some authors today agree that content analysis does not have to be exclusive to quantitative findings and can also provide qualitative interpretations. Our section entitled *Research Development* shows how we also incorporated qualitative elements into our content analysis, and later also applied qualitative analysis to our research as a whole, so as to enrich our research.

Rose recommends the following steps in content analysis: finding the images, coding the selected images and finally analysing the results of these codes. Gunter states that in sampling media content, “researchers must sample a subset of content from the total universe, since it is too large to be analysed in full” (Gunter & Jensen 2012, p.221). This study uses only a representation of news stories covered during the events of the Arab Spring. It in no way attempts to portray all stories covered during the events of the Arab Spring, nor does it attempt to portray all media channels that covered the events of the Arab Spring. In selecting the media corpus, one had to make selections and decide to stop after it was felt that enough data had been gathered in order to discover theories. In terms of image, or in this case video selection of news stories published on YouTube by the selected news channels, videos were selected using a *random* sampling strategy, defined by Rose to be the choosing of “a random number table to pick out a significant number of images to analyse” (Rose 2014, p.89). Having said this, the selection method was also somewhat systematic in that there was a general rule that videos over ten minutes long not be used so as to be able to analyse as many videos as possible for this research project.

In terms of building the content analysis structure, Rose asserts that there are three sites that provide meaning to the visual image: “the site(s) of the production of the image, the site of the image itself, and the site(s) where it is seen by various audiences”(Rose 2014, p.19). For these reasons, our content analysis noted the location of the journalist, the location of the footage and the location of any participants in the news video; the content analysis also notes the location of the news video, as broadcast by the news channel. The *Research Development* section describes in more detail how our corpus was constructed and then analysed using content analysis.

Although content analysis has its benefits, there are some drawbacks. These draw backs were noted both in experience while working on this thesis, and also by Jensen. Jensen argues that the “draw-back” in content analysis “is the inevitable reduction of complexity that follows from the decontextualization [sic] of meaningful elements (Jensen 2012, p.102). As we began to record information from our news corpus into a database, so as to quantify the information, it

was noted that our database had limits; complex text significations could not be recorded quantitatively. And it was for this reason, that we thought our research would not be complete without a complementary qualitative analysis. The following section explains, in detail, why we applied a qualitative analysis to our research method.

### II.2.1.2. Qualitative Discourse Analysis

As stated in the previous section, it was found that it was either difficult or impossible to include some complex data into our quantitative content analysis. It was for this reason that we thought that it would be necessary to explore qualitative analysis methods. From Jensen, we know that the ‘qualitative’ form of content analysis of media texts is more appropriately referred to as ‘textual’ or ‘discourse analysis’ (Jensen 2012, p.103). Content analysis has been further developed with the aim of being “able to document a close relationship between the linguistic details of media texts and the production of ideology and, by implication, to substantiate that media ideology contributes to the reproduction of a social order founded on inequality and oppression” (Jensen 2012, p.103).

Mikhail Bakhtin’s work on linguistics and literary studies and the theory of genre, the dialogical properties of texts and intertextuality, proposed that texts are linked together and therefore transform one another (1986) therefore contributing to critical discourse analysis. Also, Bakhtin’s concept on “dialogism” focusses on the relationship of anything that has been said with all other dialogue. In other words, all signs “acquire their meaning in relation to other signs, past as well as present” (Jensen 2012, p.187).

In discourse analysis, researchers are not limited to the documentation of language alone. Instead researchers endeavour to understand the relationship between the language of a text and its role in producing or reproducing ideology. Our research has therefore applied both content analysis and critical discourse analysis, meaning that both the news videos and their producers have been included in our analysis so as to provide a critical discourse analysis. The following sections will describe the multidisciplinary approach of CDA, the researcher’s role in CDA and how we identified the dominant groups to study in our CDA.

## Critical Discourse Analysis as a Multidisciplinary Approach

Our research methodology is framed in Critical Discourse Analysis, as a form of discourse analysis which has its roots in Western Marxism, concerned with the “role of cultural dimensions in reproducing capitalist social relations” and with a “focus on meaning (semiosis) and ideology as key mechanisms” (Van Dijk 1998, p.360). The term ‘critical’ when traced to Marxists and Frankfurt School’s critical theory refers to “critique”, which “is the mechanism for both explaining social phenomena and for changing them” (Van Dijk 1998, p.358)<sup>9</sup>. Van Dijk points out that the particularity of CDA is its socio-political stance that seeks out dominance relations between specific elite social groups or institutions over others within any given society. The relationship between power and discourse is a focal point of CDA, whereby the discourse analyst seeks patterns of public discourse amongst different social groups, such as media organisations; CDA’s main domain is inequality in social structures. Van Dijk proposes that CDA should therefore “contribute to a theoretical, descriptive, empirical and critical framework in which discourse analyses and socio-political analyses are deeply integrated...” (van Dijk 1993, p.252). Consequently, Van Dijk prescribes that CDA analysts first focus on “discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice and inequality that result from it” (Van Dijk 1993, p.252), recommending that discourse analysts question and understand the role of discourse in the “reproduction and challenge of dominance” within a society<sup>10</sup>. Dominance in a society can be defined as “the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality” (Van Dijk 1993, p.249-250). Critical Discourse Analysts should therefore be in search of what “structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction of communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (idem). There is always a primary source of discourse production within a society resulting in inequality of social groups within society. With CDA, one can go further and seek out the reproduction of these discourses therefore leading to the normalising of such discourse within a society<sup>11</sup>. The problems of

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<sup>9</sup> The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory was initially established with the aim of interpreting texts so as to understand social problems mediated by both ideology and power relationships (McGregor 2013). Critical Theory, a paradigm developed over the past three decades, through the Frankfurt School proposed to go further than simply understanding society, by critiquing and then changing society as a whole.

<sup>10</sup> Gillian Rose also presents a form of CDA, which she calls ‘Discourse Analysis II’, which focusses on the practises of institutions rather than their produced visual images or verbal texts. Rose explains that it is specifically used to study “issues of power, regimes of truth, institutions and technologies” (Rose 2014, p.195). This method of analysis has been mainly used to study how institutions of power use images to communicate. It also focusses on the sites of production and ‘audiencing’. ‘Discourse analysis II’ is significant to our study as it focusses on the policies and practices of the media institutions chosen for this research, which will lead to both theoretical and empirical conclusions.

<sup>11</sup> When “groups” such as politicians and the media use a specific rhetoric, then groups in the “bottom” of a society’s pyramid such as a country’s citizens may feel that they too can use such rhetoric and even enact it.

representation of the events of the Arab Spring can be studied using CDA, whereby the domain of inequality can be noted among two groups- mainstream media and governments- who have more power over others – the people of the Arab Spring, in reporting their stories to another group that could encompass audiences based both in locations of events or internationally. The *Research Development* section will detail the ways in which the information institutions were studied. CDA is a multidisciplinary approach to studying texts and text producers, therefore we have gathered approaches from various disciplines into our CDA framework.

As our research asks whose stories from the events of the Arab Spring were shared by mainstream media and by whom, our research therefore looks into news values and questions their validity during international news events that may include conflicts that could lead to a group's rights being infringed. Habermas recommends that discourse analysis rely on three validity-claims because social coordination can only be reached when speech-acts are “true, righteous and sincere” (Corradetti 2018) and critical researchers should “consider the historical context in which linguistic and social interactions take place” (Van Dijk 1998, p.361). Our research questions, focussing on how dominant institutions of information affect international news flow, how events of the Arab Spring were represented and how contributed material was used to frame events, guided us in the search for validity-claims made by mainstream media on the events of the Arab Spring. Habermas recommends that researchers understand “the threefold relationship” involved in every discourse, the speaker's intention, the relationship between the speaker and hearer and an expression of something real (Habermas 1983, p.24). Our analysis takes this threefold relationship into account, by studying the broadcast media, the relationship between the media and their audience and the message; therefore applying Habermas' validity claims. Cukier et al explored the possibility of applying the Habermas communicative rationality to CDA so as to provide an explicit and ethical standard for CDA (Cukier et al. 2004, p.234) and found that despite CDA being “focused [sic] on exposing the deep structures that underlie discourse, particularly power...Foucault's approach leaves little room for normative or ethical analysis” and “Habermasian discourse ethics<sup>12</sup> offer a strong and unique conceptual framework for understanding communication distortions and for improving practice (Forester 1983)” (Cukier et al. 2004, p.236). Furthermore, the discourse model developed by Habermas, adds empathy into reasoned agreements, because he prescribes that everyone in a society put themselves in the shoes of the other and publicly discuss proposed

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<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Habermas, who was somewhat close to Kantian tradition, asked “How should I (or one, or we) live”? (Habermas 1983, p.vii Introduction by Thomas Mcarthy) And using moral theory, in the aim of resolving conflicting interests, proposed to resolve issues by simply judging “what is right or just” (Habermas 1983, p.vii Introduction by Thomas McCarthy).

norms for their society. Habermas proposes that each discourse participant has the freedom to agree or disagree with proposals for norms (Habermas 1983, p.x–xi, 202) and that agreement is reached based on shared facts. Habermas also says that without empathy, no solutions will be reached<sup>13</sup>. Based on Habermas principles we were able to decode the intended messages of our news videos so as to understand the planned media effects on audiences and therefore understand the role of various material used in the news videos.

Gramsci's contribution to CDA was that "maintenance of contemporary power rests not only on coercive force but also on 'hegemony' (winning the consent of the majority)" and this emphasis on hegemony leads to a focus on ideology "and how the structures and practices of ordinary life routinely normalize capitalist social relations" (Van Dijk 1998, p.358). Gramsci, influenced by Marxist thinking, believed that rather than governments forcing opinions on society, instead "hegemony" is produced and then reproduced in public sphere through public institutions so as to manufacture majority's consent (Heywood 1994, pp.100–101). Hegemony can be described as a situation whereby the dominant groups of a society are able to keep their power through what Strinati describes as "spontaneous consent" of the general public, and this consent is secured through a "negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus" incorporating "both dominant and dominated groups" (Strinati 2004, p.153). Reproducing news stories in a hegemonic way can produce and reproduce political and ideological consensus and searching for hegemony through quantitative content analysis may help in identifying specific ideologies of news outlets.

Likewise, Althusser's (1971) contribution to the theory of ideology exposed how ideologies are "embedded in social institutions", whereby people positioned as social 'subjects' had little power (Van Dijk 1998, p.358). Althusser's theory of ideology argues that societies are constructed with relationships between the various structures present in societies. Ideology for Althusser, is built upon these structural relationships, rather than their expressions (Strinati 2004, p.136). These structural relationships, or "the place of ideology in the structure of capitalist societies" also known as the "base of a society" or the economy, is the "superstructure model" of a society and also of significance to Marx. Althusser differentiated between what he

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<sup>13</sup> Of course, one could argue, that it is often the more powerful that has to compromise, not because of facts of morality, but because of the fact of their weakness and lack of support. Richard Rorty, for example, argues that "when a dialogical process is grounded on universalisable claims to validity, employment of discourses can lead to a privileging of one voice over others" (Snyder 2000, p.291). The weaker force having to make more compromises can be noted in wars, whereby the more powerful army has its say. One could say that Habermas is prescribing the discourse for an ideal realm that would reflect a world of peace, equality and empathy; almost a utopia. The question is not whether Habermas' prescription for discourse ethics would lead to a peaceful world, it most certainly would, but one questions how to ensure that people with power empathise with those without power. For example, how do countries at war achieve peace with their enemies without infringing on the rights of their enemies? More interestingly for our thesis, when it comes to news ethics, how do news channels go from reporting the news of the more powerful to the news of the less powerful people, especially when it comes to reporting popular uprisings?

called the “ideological state apparatuses” such as the “religion, education, the family, trade unions, the mass media and popular culture” and “repressive state apparatuses”, such as “the military, the police, the prisons and the courts” (Strinati 2004, p.139) and the ideological state apparatuses reproduce production relations through ideology. While building a ‘corpus’ on the dominant information systems of the Arab Spring, we were able to include both ideological state apparatuses (the media) and repressive state apparatuses (the legal context in the countries vis-à-vis freedom of expression and freedom to access information).

Goffman explains that frame analysis usually takes place from an individual’s point of view, therefore revealing information that may not be found if another individual analysed the same subject from another point of view. Goffman focusses on “what it is about our sense of what is going on that makes it so vulnerable to the need for these various rereadings” (Goffman 1974, p.10). In order to understand “what is going on”, Goffman identifies *primary frameworks* or *schemata of interpretation*, which allow us to observe the different ways in which people organise their experiences so as to see “what is going on”. Goffman notes that the schemata of interpretation vary in terms of how they are organised, for example, some schemata of interpretation will be a system with rules, while most others will be a perspective or an approach on a topic and they can be broken down into natural and social frameworks (Goffman 1974, p.21). Goffman defines the natural framework as being concerned with events that are not determined or affected by human discourse, such as “the state of the weather as given in a report”. The social framework on the other hand, the one which we are most concerned with for our thesis, refers to events and their discourse, which can be designed and further affected by human factors, such as the events and the discourse of the events of the Arab Spring. In order to apply Goffman’s frame analysis to our study, we had to first isolate some frames of reference such as the various events and countries covered in our news corpus so as to understand specific events. Also, while Goffman’s first framing studies focussed on a mainly textual analytic approach, by analysing the text’s semantic structure, more modern studies have come to also focus on empirical research<sup>14</sup>. As our research is primarily concerned with how international

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<sup>14</sup> In a study on the 2003 US –Iraq war demonstrations, framing was used because researchers Luther and Miller believed that “journalists rely on ‘framing’ to generate news stories and despite the journalist integrity in trying to report the news in objective manner, the systematic process of organising news material in an efficient manner leads to framing and this construction of frames will inevitably lead to events whereby “journalists simplify, highlight, and make more salient certain aspects of reality, while obscuring others” (Luther & Miller 2005, p.79). The problem is encountered when “certain frames as consistently adopted”, because “they become a part of the news repertoires and are elevated to thematic levels” (idem) and Luther and Miller found that framing analysis researchers such as Ryan, Carragee, and Meinholder<sup>14</sup>, have already recognised the role of power relations and other social actors in such adopted frames, with political and economic elite frames being favoured. Luther & Miller cite mass communication research that focussed on words and their combinations so as to select frames, for example, Andsager observed pro-life rhetoric versus pro-choice rhetoric in newspaper coverage on abortions, by using an IT clustering tool that focussed on co-occurrence of abortion-related terms in the news. Also, Jaspersen, Shah, Watts, Faber, and Fan used a computer-based method to search for word combinations related to the US federal budget of 1996<sup>14</sup>. Luther and Miller also focussed on words in their research on the coverage of pro-war and anti-war groups (Luther & Miller 2005, p.73). In order to come up with the words and their combinations (their frames), rather than searching for particular words their “goal was to allow the frames to come forth in a

news is produced, we tried to understand the various roles of different types of material in our corpus, ranging from amateur footage and interviews to citations and figures.

Bourdieu's work (1991) on the "relationship between language, social position and symbolic value in the dynamics of power relations", also influenced CDA (Van Dijk 1998, p.360). Bourdieu developed a language critique constructed with linguistic theories from Saussure and Chomsky as well as the theory of speech-acts by Austin. Bourdieu argues that language is not just a means of communication, but can also be a medium of power. Bourdieu prescribes studying the "habitus" of people in an event when analysing texts (Fairclough 2003, p.29). According to Bourdieu, the habitus, or behaviours, attitudes, tastes, mannerisms and perception schemes of individuals has an effect on an individual's position in the social structure and will be further reproduced by several individuals in society leading to the actual social structure. In our CDA, those with symbolic power, the media, and various actors presented by the media, are therefore identified. For example, we looked at the symbolic powers that the media used to report events, specifically if there were representatives from the US, France, Iran, Russia and Turkey. We also looked out for the types of people included in interviews, so as to see whether the voices of event participants were broadcast more often than the voices of topic experts. Now that we have understood that CDA has roots in various disciplines, we can explore the role of the CDA researcher in a CDA analysis.

### The Researcher's Role in CDA

Because of the requirement of "multidisciplinarity" [sic (Van Dijk 1993, p.253)] in CDA, as outlined in the previous section, there are challenges. The analyst must truly understand the relationships between "text, talk, social cognition, power, society and culture". Observing, describing or even explaining are not success features of CDA (Van Dijk 1993, p.252), instead the success of the analysis will be measured by both its effectiveness and relevance, or its "contribution to change". In essence, if there are injustices in society, critical discourse analysts will make a contribution to change by simply researching these injustices, because their

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systematic manner from the texts of the pro-war and anti-war groups" (idem). Miller and Riechert<sup>14</sup> stated that frames can be found in both the presence and absence of keywords and it was Luther and Miller's desire to apply this approach to their research. Their corpus was made up of texts from websites of demonstration and rally organisers, as well as texts from pro-war groups. Using VBPro Alphabetizer, a computer software, the software proposed lists of words along with their frequency occurrence, before finally proposing 40 substantive words for each stakeholder group.

research proves that the injustices exist and their work will try to find out the role of discourse in the reproduction of these injustices.

Also worth noting is that CDA studies require an approach from the point of view of the victims of injustices in society. And therefore academic scholars need to state clearly if racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination in society exist, based on their findings. Van Dyke reminds scholars that they are not politicians and therefore, rather than being diplomatic in their findings, they should boldly state their findings on a society's hardships and these findings, grounded in data, will make it acceptable for the public to believe and accept the society's injustices. It is the fact that academic scholars recognise injustices that makes it acceptable for the public to express that there are indeed injustices and this is the marginal contribution that academic scholars make with their critical discourse analyses. This contribution that academic scholars make to society is "ultimately political" because critical analysts will hope to "change through critical understanding" (Van Dijk 1993, p.252). The dominant discourse in the news is produced by news outlets, and in the case of the events of the Arab Spring, those suffering from the dominance of the newsmakers are the uprising Arab people. Rather than focus solely on immediate issues of today's society, with a structural understanding, researchers should strive to make more general insights and long-term analyses of society's issues.

Now that the role of the critical discourse analyst in the research project has been outlined, it is important to understand how dominant groups within a society were identified.

## Identification of dominant groups for Critical Discourse Analysis

In order to identify dominant groups with power in societies over weaker groups, Van Dijk defines groups with power as having some kind of control over those of other groups. Dominant groups will exercise their power by limiting either the physical or mental freedom of others, therefore taking both active and cognitive forms of control. Physical freedom for example, can be limited when a group of people are not allowed to move freely in a country and mental freedom can be limited when one group influences the minds of people in a society. An example of physical power involving action during the events of the Arab Spring could be the crackdown on demonstrators by governments and the state police, which involved both physical barriers and the setting of curfews. Van Dijk describes the cognitive form of power<sup>15</sup> to be more

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<sup>15</sup> An example of cognitive power through discourse is the term 'Arab Awakening' used by some media outlets to describe the events of the Arab Spring. The term can be described as somewhat derogatory of Arabs, who to awaken, must have been asleep and inactive in the first place. Therefore indirectly, the term informs audiences that there was an Arab Slumber until 2011 and that Arabs are finally awakening from their slumber. The term 'Arab Spring' itself can be also studied; whereby 'spring' is usually used to describe the rebirth of everything

effective because it is enacted through “persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation”, so as to “change the mind of others in one’s interests” (van Dijk 1993, p.254). Why this type of power needs to be analysed is because it is “enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear ‘natural’ and quite ‘acceptable’. In identifying power and dominance, Van Dijk notes that they are usually “organized and institutionalized [sic]”. This means that dominance in discourse is often “jointly produced” and enacted by various individuals in a group and sometimes even supported by other groups. There is therefore a hierarchy of power whereby each group has different roles in enacting the dominant discourse. For example, the dictators of the various Arab countries during the Arab Spring had a special discourse that was then in some cases relayed and reiterated by local press and then enacted by the police and armed forces by cracking down on protestors. There is indeed evidence that just as power and dominance may be institutionalised via “organised access” to discourse “via press officers, press releases, press conferences, PR departments, and so on” (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978), “the same is generally true for the control of public opinion” (van Dijk 1988, p.256) and this is where social cognition comes in.

There are two main structures of discourse; one that produces the discourse and the other that reproduces the discourse. In discourse production, context is highly relevant; the discourse producer’s discourse has a different meaning because of who they and their audiences are as well as the setting of their discourse. In discourse reproduction<sup>16</sup>, one can note that there is tolerance of one group over another, whereby the group that reproduces a discourse states that there are no discriminatory problems and that the other social group is accepted and allowed to be themselves but Van Dijk warns that saying that one is tolerant and sympathising with other groups as “the other” is demeaning and makes “the other” inferior (van Dijk 1993, p.263).

In conclusion, the dominant information institutions identified for our research were the media and the public institutions, with the media being represented by the news channels in our news corpus as well as press agencies and the public institutions being represented by the information laws in each of the countries covered in the news corpus. Because news flows from countries

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natural after a winter that killed much of nature. Therefore, it can also have an underlying meaning that there was an ‘Arab Death’ and that Arabs are now back to life. But it contains an especially positive image of Arabs springing up, as flowers would after winter. Finally, the term ‘uprising’ from the Arab Uprising, also communicates an image of people rising up, therefore, showing that they were once sat down. But in all cases, the ‘Arab Awakening’, ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Arab Uprising’, communicate that the Arab people are taking some form of positive action.

<sup>16</sup> In some cases, it is not what is said by the dominant group but rather what is not said. The ‘Arab Awakening’ does not contain the word “asleep” but because there is an awakening, we understand that there was a long sleep. One can also compare this to the Arabic term ‘intifadah’, which also means ‘uprising’ or ‘rebellion’. The term ‘intifadah’ was used to represent the uprising of Palestinians against the Israeli occupation in the 1980s and is still widely known as ‘the intifadah’, rather than an uprising. One could argue that by representing the Palestinian uprising as an ‘intifadah’, audiences will not associate the events to a positive ‘uprising’. Based on this, researchers using CDA need to seek out “discursive strategies that legitimise control, or otherwise ‘naturalize’ the social order, and especially relations of inequality” (Fairclough, 1985) (van Dijk 1993, p.254). Indeed journalists and analysts that use the expressions ‘Arab Awakening’ or ‘intifadah’ may not be producing dominance discourse; rather they would be reproducing it and therefore could be blamed for naturalising the expression.

where events take place through to journalists who send on their news to international newsrooms, we felt it was necessary to study these two types of dominant institutions in the news flow.

## Conclusion

This section has described our approach in applying critical discourse analysis to our inductive research. The following section, our theoretical framework, discusses communication and information theories that were used in our thinking while analysing our data.

## **II.3. Theoretical Framework**

Our three thesis questions focus on news representation of the events of the Arab Spring, primarily: how dominant institutions of information affected international news flow, how events were represented internationally and finally, how contributed material was used to construct international news stories. In order to answer these questions, three main subsections will discuss how events in reality are perceived, then how they are interpreted and finally how they are constructed into the news.

### **II.3.1. Perceiving Reality**

This section has been written with two complementary pedestals in mind; one that tells us that “humans are storytelling animals and that the story, the narrative, is central to the recounting of facts (in the news)” (Watson 2016, p.97), and the other which states that “Every perception already involves a first level interpretation of reality...the treatment of news in itself, going from the editorial team and passing by the locution and finally the broadcasting teams, suffer a process, which make it even more relative. What the news programmes really report is the vision their authors have about these reports” (San Miguel et al. 2010, p.6). Therefore, although journalists will perceive the story they recount, they will only be able to recount the story in the way in which it was perceived by them.

We are concerned with the way in which the storyteller experiences an event before they begin narrating their experience of it. It can be suggested that the storytelling process is initiated when the narrator begins to experience the event to be narrated and therefore, reality construction – or perhaps even news construction- is triggered at this very early stage. Interpretation of events

is a crucial part of news making, with particular focus on international news events, because one of the journalist's roles is to relay information about events to audiences that have not experienced the event directly and therefore the audiences rely on the journalist's perception and interpretation of the event. Perceiving or experiencing an event is the act of comprehending or decoding the event in subjective ways that we as individuals are confined to.

Although events of the news are nonfictional and therefore considered to be "real", news stories are still just "stories" that depict different versions of reality. According to Wilbur Schramm, Shannon and Weaver's information theory can be applied to mass communications (Schramm 1955). Schramm argues that the nature of information theory can be looked at as a "theory of signal transmission", whereby the focus is "the entropy or uncertainty of sequences of events in a system or related systems". Schramm defines a *system* as "any part of an information chain which is capable of existing in one or more states, or in which one or more events can occur", for example, "the vibrating metal diaphragm of a telephone or microphone", "the radio frequency amplifier circuit of a radio receiver", "a telegraph wire", but also non technological parts of an information chain, such as "the air which carries the pulsations of sound waves", or "the basilar membrane of the ear", or "the optic nerve", because all these systems are capable of assuming different states and can be "coupled" along with other systems so as to form a "communication chain" (Schramm 1955). The coupling of systems is necessary to communication because information needs to be transferred from one point to the other, therefore causing a change in state of one of the systems. Schramm explains that systems can be identified as being coupled if "the state of one system depends to some degree on the state of the system that adjoins it", for example, "when a microphone diaphragm is depressed so as to cause a coil to cut magnetic lines of force and generate a current in a wire" or when "light frequencies strike the eye and cause discharges in the optic nerve" (idem).

### Communication and Information Theory in Perception

Since systems need to be coupled for communication to take place, one can also take the example of two humans; when one human being speaks to another, the state of the other changes based on the information they receive. Coupled systems are not forever coupled and when they break apart, the transfer of information is of course impossible. In the case of our thesis, the information system of the news of the Arab Spring forms a very long chain of coupled systems made up of several networked systems such as witnesses, journalists, agencies, news channels and audiences, functioning on all these communicator tasks: "decoding, interpreting, storage and encoding" (Schramm 1955). In the same way, when events are perceived, they can change

the state of the perceiver. Schramm suggests that human communication chains are not just *structural*, as had been previously proposed by Claude Shannon, but also *functional* in that one state – the human- can and will learn and this is proven because the human state depends on “its own past operation”. This is what makes perception so unique.

## Mnemic Phenomena in Perception

Bertrand Russell looked at the influence of past history on present occurrences in the living. He argued that “the response of an organism to a given stimulus is very often dependent upon the past history of the organism, and not merely upon the stimulus and the HITHERTO DISCOVERABLE [sic] present state of the organism” (Russell 1921, p.43). He hypothesises his thinking by providing the example of a child who once burnt will always fear fire even if the fire leaves no physical memorable traces. He uses the term “mnemic phenomena”<sup>17</sup> to represent the responses of organisms that are brought about “under casual laws by including past occurrences in the history of the organism as part of the causes of the present response” (Russell 1921, p.43).

Russell categorizes six ways in which the mnemic phenomena is evident. Our (1) “acquired habits” are the first ways in which mnemic phenomena is evident as proposed by Russell. Russell’s hypothesis is not specific to human beings, but rather to all living organisms and he proves this by providing examples of animals in some cases. He focusses on the caged animal who after coming out of a cage or maze once is able to do so much more quickly in future attempts, therefore relying on acquired habits rather than their instincts alone. This example shows that one’s history with a particular element- be it an object or a theme in the news- is significant in our reaction to it. Russell refers to this history as (2) “habitual knowledge” consisting of acquired habits and therefore falling under mnemic phenomena. (Russell 1921, p.44). The habitual knowledge that one has of the country of Egypt often differs to another person’s habitual knowledge of the country of Egypt and therefore, they will most probably have different perceptions of happenings in Egypt. To go even further, the habitual knowledge that audiences have of protests in Arab countries probably encouraged many, including the media (as noted by Marine Olivesi, France 24 freelancer when I interviewed her (Olivesi 2017)) to expect the downfall of Assad in Syria shortly after the Syrian Uprising and this affected the way the Syrian uprising was initially framed by journalists.

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<sup>17</sup> Russell explains that the term “mnemic phenomena” was initially proposed by Semon “Die Mneme, Leipzig, 1904; 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1908, English translation, Allen & Unwin, 1921; “Die mnemischen Empfindungen,” Leipzig, 1909 (Russell 1921, p.44)

Russell also discusses the concept of (3) “images”, referring to them as “copies of past sensations” (Russell 1921, p.45). The images we visualise in our minds are based on our previous experience with objects, material or otherwise. Indeed, when one says the words ‘Arab Spring’, spectators of news of the Arab Spring will conjure up images in their mind related to what they had seen on the news. What is especially interesting about mental images’ mnemonic characteristics is that one can further assume that mental imagery plays a role in our thinking. This also led Russell to another mnemonic phenomenon that he labelled (4) “association”. One is able to associate certain objects- material or otherwise- with others based on previous experience. For example, the images of the Egyptian Uprising on the news may have left everlasting mental pictures of people waving Egyptian flags in Tahrir Square and therefore, the Arab Spring may now be associated with Egypt. The various anti-government protests broadcast from the Arab World could also trigger an association between the Arab Spring and a people frustrated with their governments.

Russell also draws on (5) “non-sensational elements in perception”, and this is of key importance to us too. He proposed that “when we perceive any object of a familiar kind, much of what appears subjectively to be immediately given is really derived from past experience”(Russell 1921, p.45). Russell explains that in learning how to draw- how to represent things- this is done through sensation rather than through perception. The artist tries to depict what it is like to touch the object being represented in their artwork. In order to ensure the truest representation of the chosen art work, the artist will reach into their sensational core within perception.

If we accept Russell’s proposition on representation, then it is inevitable that the same news event will be represented differently by journalists who have had different experiences with uprisings, but also different experiences with Arabs or the regions of the Middle East and North Africa in general. Because people from the same culture tend to have the same or similar experiences, it can therefore be suggested that they have will have the same or similar perceptions and will therefore represent their perceptions similarly. Some news outlets will choose to have international correspondents based on location to perceive an event directly, so that they can report it. In our research, not only do we choose news outlets based in both the Middle East and the West, but we also try to identify news videos with journalists based on the location of the event. This allows us to know if they have perceived an event directly as witnesses, or if they had to perceive an event through information from another party.

Another example of mnemonic phenomenon as proposed by Russell is our (6) “memory as knowledge”, because certain memories are only called upon at certain points in our lives due to our past experience (Russell 1921, p.45). The present acts as a stimulus of that memory and

one of course needs to have experienced a particular event in the past in order to have that memory.

A final example offered by Russell that is characteristic of menmic phenomenon is “experience”. He states that the “essence of ‘experience’ is the modification of behaviour produced by what is experienced. We might, in fact, define one chain of experience, or one biography, as a series of occurrences linked by menmic causation” (Russell 1921, p.47).

All these menmic phenomenon categories overlap forming the argument that our past experiences will always affect our perceptions and therefore perceptions will be unique to people and contexts. This is why using CDA as a research method in media studies is justifiable; researchers will be studying texts as well as the audiences and text producers.

### Gestalt Theory in Perception

Like Russell, Schramm, Devèze and Moles believed that message perception is essential to individual perception and proposed that perception be understood through Gestalt theory. Schramm, Devèze and Moles (Schramm 1955; Devèze 2004) proposed that spatial messages, such as TV news be expanded in time by scanning, so as to “decompose” the message into “sequences” which is essential to individual perception based on Gestalt theory. The Research Development section describes how news videos were watched to spot specific footage so as to identify the role specific footage played in the news representing events of the Arab Spring.

The Gestalt Theory of perception has five laws that we can apply to news and these perception laws are very much related to how the human brain experiences and then understands reality. The first Gestalt law is that of *similarity*, which states that items that are similar are grouped together by the human brain which tends to naturally recognise patterns. If we apply this law to the similar protests of the Arab Spring that flashed on our television screens, it can be said that all the protests of the Arab Spring were grouped together by both mainstream media and then audiences, so as to understand that they all formed part of the Arab revolution.

The second principle of Gestalt is *Pragnanz*, which states that reality is often reduced to the simplest form possible so that we can easily comprehend reality. This perception law can also be applied to the narratives of the Arab Spring. During our interviews with journalists, we learnt that it was easier for a freelance journalist to sell news stories on the various Arab uprisings that had a similar patterns of the people toppling their dictators, than it was to sell news stories of Syria, where the middle and the ending of the narrative were very different to that of the other Arab uprisings.

The law of *proximity* tells us that objects that are close in proximity are grouped together by the brain so as to simplify our reality and this too can be applied to the Arab Spring's narratives. One can suggest that the law of proximity applies to both geographical and cultural proximity. For example, a country like France, which has a certain history of presence in Arab countries and which has a significant percentage of residents of Arab origin, may feel closer in proximity to the stories from the Arab Spring than a country like Australia, further placed from Arabs in terms of geography and demographics. Also, through our interviews with international channels with various languages, it was noted that news was selected, presented and therefore distributed differently to different regions, based on the geographical or cultural proximity of their audiences.

The fourth perception law labelled *continuity* states that lines are seen as following the smoothest path (Reinhart 1984, p.804), and the human brain tends to trace connecting lines between different elements, even if those lines are not present. This brain tendency may allow humans to perceive reality as something slightly different and is similar to the Pragnanz law in that our brain simplifies or reduces reality to be more easily comprehensible, such as for example the expectation that that Syrian uprising would lead to the downfall of Assad, or whereby uprisings of each Arab country are reduced to 'the people against the dictator', whereby news stories tend to take the angle of the people, rather than the angle of the regime. Finally, the law of *closure* states that objects grouped together are perceived as whole by our brains (Sahyouni 2015) also tells us that "the more 'closed' the area is, the easier it is to interpret it as a figure" (Reinhart 1984, p.804) and this can guide journalists in narrating news stories in a way that can satisfy their expectancies; for example, if an uprising is reported, then the downfall of the leader should also be reported.

### **II.3.2. Interpreting Reality**

Now that we have understood how humans perceive information, we will discuss how the perceived information is then interpreted.

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Interpretation

Schramm agrees that because the way the human system "codes and decodes information" is "on the basis of past experience", this unique, developing and learning state is "one of the

pitfalls in the way of applying information theory mathematics to human communication” (Schramm 1955, p.134). Schramm identifies the two system states as being corresponding, meaning capable of existing in identical states, such as the sound of a message through a telephone, or non-corresponding, meaning incapable of existing in identical states, such as a bright light that causes someone’s eyes to squint. It is through corresponding systems that Schramm proposes that information theory is in fact communication, because “Communication occurs when two corresponding systems, coupled together through one or more non-corresponding systems, assume identical states as a result of signal transfer along the chain” (idem). Schramm further explains that “Unless the sound that goes into the telephone is reproduced by the sound that comes out of the telephone at the other end of the line, we do not have communication. Unless the concept in the semantic system of Mr. A. is reproduced in the semantic system of Mr. B., communication has not taken place” (Schramm 1955, pp.132–133).

#### Interpretation Resulting in a Vicarious Experience

Abraham Moles also looked at human communication systems as being functional and corresponding, resulting in a change of state. According to Moles, “the behaviour of any individual- given his heredity and his history- is determined by his environment...” (Moles 1968 translated by Joel E. Cohen). Moles suggested that the individual is transmitted over time and space through messages and that messages such as motion pictures, or the news in our study, have two spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension. This experience that a receptor undergoes within a message, whereby communication is defined as the “the transfer or a modification of the immediate environment of the receiver from that of the transmitter using what both initially have in common (ideas of code, directory, culture)”, is referred to by Devèze as a “vicarious experience” (“l’expérience vicariale”) (Devèze 2004, p.191 translated from French).

During the interpretation of events, Goffman states that a tale or anecdote is a replay of events and not just the reporting of an event already passed. According to Goffman, narrations are “couched from the personal perspective of an actual or potential participant” and this participant replays the event so that “listeners can empathetically insert themselves into, vicariously re-experiencing what took place”, conclusively, the replaying of an event does not merely report an event, it “recounts a personal experience” (Goffman 1974, p.504).

## Language as a Tool to Interpret Reality

Unlike Goffman, Devèze and Moles, Hall does not believe that messages would go so far as to transform one's reality. Instead, looking specifically at language, Hall proposes that language is to be regarded as a tool to describe reality and therefore news messages are relayed using the tool of language. With regards to images, Hall stated that what one sees on television is not reality itself. One can see the sufferings of a war-torn country, but will not feel the sting of the fire when they watch a bomb explode on a screen. To quote Hall, "Reality exists outside language, but it is constantly mediated by and through language: and what we can know and say has to be produced in and through discourse" (Hall 1973, p.95).

Hall also argues that messages are polysemic, meaning that media texts are ambiguous and also interpretable in several ways. The fact that audiences have a role to play in the interpretation of the journalistic narrative could lead to a full appreciation of the Active Reception Theory. Hall's encoding/decoding model of communication proposes that the audience of a message does not simply receive a message passively. The concept of audience reception being active is highlighted; not just in interactions, but this time in interpretations of narratives put forth by journalists. Audiences, just like journalists, tend to interpret a message in their own unique way because of their own unique experiences and backgrounds. Each person will see multiple signs and symbols as they read/watch a media text that others may or may not see. Hall also uses the notions of denotation and connotation, borrowed from linguistic theory, and adapts them for message comprehension. He explains that messages are produced with a dominant or literal meaning and this can be referred to as the denotation of a message. The connotations of a message are the associate meanings that one may generate from the produced message based on their background and unique experiences. This can also be applied to the news, whereby one headline's denotation can come with various connotations, depending on the audience.

According to Hall, messages are not only polysemic, with various interpretations, but also with interpretations subject to misunderstandings. This is a concern shared by television producers who worry about the "effectiveness" of their communication. Hall identified the following factors resulting in message incomprehension of news texts in audiences: unfamiliarity with used terms, inability to follow complex narratives, unfamiliar with language, inability to follow alien concepts. These factors result in viewers' inability to comprehend the 'dominant' or 'preferred' code, resulting in 'systematically distorted communication' (Hall 1980, pp.99–100).

Hall identified three different types of decodings when it comes to televisual discourse which stem from his argument that encodings are not always related to their decodings. The first of these is the *dominant-hegemonic position*, which takes place "when the viewer takes the

connoted meaning” therefore decoding the message using the common reference code, so the viewer is “operating inside the dominant code” and resulting in a “perfectly transparent communication” (Hall 1980, p.101). But even though the viewer may take on the connoted meaning and decode the message using the same reference code as the message producer, Hall indicates that the encoding and decoding of a message will never match 100 percent, therefore resulting in the polysemic message.

The second decoding position identified by Hall is the *negotiated code*, whereby “majority audiences probably understand quite adequately what has been dominantly defined and professionally signified” (Hall 1980, p.102). Hall’s third decoding position the “*oppositional code*” is when a viewer who comprehends both the literal and connotative meanings of a particular message decides to decode the message in a completely different manner (Hall 1980, p.103). In essence, Hall does not believe that there can ever be 100 percent comprehension of a message as intended by the message decoder.

Because Hall agreed with Russell in that messages are interpreted by each audience member based on their background and experiences, one could further analyse this to mean that the meaning of a text is not found in the text itself, but rather in the relationship between the text and its reader. Hall focussed on television to explain how messages are produced and diffused. He argued against traditional theories of communication critiquing them for being too linear and focussed on the level of message exchange therefore not offering a structural understanding of the links between each phase in communication. Therefore, he proposed the following “moments” in communications: “production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction” and proposed that they were all related (Hall 1973, p.91). Hall even draws on Philip Elliott’s expression that the audience is both the ‘source’ and the ‘receiver’ in communications and that feedback is of importance in the production of a message. Although Hall concludes that both production and reception of a television message are related, he is clear in that they are not identical.

Philip Elliott has expressed this point succinctly, within a more traditional framework, in his discussion of the way in which the audience is both the ‘source and the ‘receiver’ of the television message. Thus – to borrow Marx’s terms – circulation and reception are, indeed, ‘moments’ of the production process in television and are reincorporated, via a number of skewed and structured ‘feedbacks’, into the production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television message is thus also a ‘moment’ of the production process in its larger sense, though the latter is ‘predominant’ because it is the ‘point of departure for the

realization' of the message. Production and reception of the television message are not, therefore, identical, but they are related: they are differentiated moments within the totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole.

(Hall 1973, p.93)

## Translating the Meaning of Perceptions

Following Russell's fundamental theory of perception, Hall's vision on the role of language in reality perception and even Schramm's proposal that humans are ever changing in state based on past experiences, Jakobson too suggested that in order to understand any subject of matter through language, one would have had to have experienced the matter in the first place. Jakobson uses the example of the object "cheese", initially proposed by Russell (Jakobson 1959, pp.113–118, Russell 1949, p.1219), saying that people from a cheese-less culture would probably not understand what cheese meant. They may indeed understand that cheese is a food made of pressed curds, but they will not understand cheese in the same way a person who has experienced cheese does. People from cheese-less cultures will only have a linguistic acquaintance with cheese. And therefore "an array of linguistic signs is needed to introduce an unfamiliar word" (Jakobson 1959). Jakobson proposes that for effective communication to take place, unknown objects should be described with the known. In other words, one should use familiar language to describe the unfamiliar, therefore highlighting the significance of redundancy in communication. This could of course be applied to international journalists, whereby the journalist tries to explain the unseen and the unknown as well as the unfamiliar to the audience by using language and imagery that they are already familiar with. For example, so as to give an understanding of just how bad the situation in Syria had become, *Foreign Policy's* headline compared the violence to that of Iraq, a war many viewers had already watched on the news: 'Syria is more violent than Iraq at its worst' (Kenner 2012).

Jakobson's interpretation of communications is different to that of Shannon and Weaver as he takes into account the message that is being sent; in other words, the context of the communication taking place is of great relevance to Jakobson, whereas Shannon and Weaver were mainly focussed on the technicality of the sending of a message. It could be argued that Jakobson found language to be more essential to our reality, more so than Hall's prescription of language as a simple tool. Jakobson stated that "language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions" (Jakobson 1960, p.353) and also identifies the factors present in verbal communication.

According to Jakobson, in addition to the context of the message, a code – or a language that is shared by both parties is also of importance so as to transmit the message. A contact- or “a physical channel and psychological connection” is also of necessity to ensure that the addresser and addressee “enter and stay in communication” (idem). Jakobson argued that if one analyses language by solely looking at the information, they would be misinterpreting the messages; instead he proposed six functions of language. The *emotive* or expressive function, for example is necessary on behalf of the addresser so as to understand his/her feelings about the topic they are discussing. The meaning of a sentence or even a simple phrase could change when voiced with different “expressive tint[s]” (idem). Another language function, labelled the *conative* function, by Jakobson, refers to the way in which the addressee is addressed by the addresser. For example, declarative and imperative sentences can both leave very different effects on the addressee (idem, p. 355). Jakobson also introduces the *poetic* function in language. Jakobson insists on the importance of the poetic function explaining that it represents how eloquently one chooses to speak. Jakobson also makes mention to the *referential* language function, which is related to describing or rather, referring to objects in life. Finally, the *metalingual* function is related to analysing language, using language to explain language. It is possible to seek for all these functions in news analysis so as to better understand the intended message and even the perceived message of different audience types.

Jakobson goes a step further in defining the essence of language in understanding any object by stating that “any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign, especially a sign ‘in which it is more fully developed’”, making reference to Peirce<sup>18</sup>.

Jakobson prescribes interpreting verbal signs through the three classes of interpretation already proposed by linguist. *Intralingual translation*, *interlingual translation* or *translation proper* and *internsemiotic translation* or *transmutation* respectively represent the translation into other signs (vocabulary) in the same language, the translation into another language and finally the nonverbal translation using a system of symbols. Based on these classes of translation, one can see how easy it may be for the meaning, the true essence of a statement to get lost in translation. For example, if one were to take perhaps what may seem to be the simplest form of translation, *intralingual translation* and test it against the word ‘Islamist’, one can see how the meaning may indeed be lost. Intralingual translation suggests that one use other words such as synonyms or circumlocutions to translate it to an English speaker. The word ‘Islamist’ is defined by Oxford Dictionaries as “An advocate or supporter of Islamic militancy or fundamentalism: radical Islamists”. Yet, Oxford Dictionaries fails to provide a synonym for this noun.

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. John Dewey, «Peirce’s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning,» *The Journal of Philosophy*, XLIII (1946), 91.

Synonym.com defines the same noun 'Islamist' as "an orthodox Muslim" and "a scholar who is knowledgeable in Islamic studies" and also provides the following nouns as synonyms: "students, scholarly person, bookman and scholar". Evidently, not all students and scholars are Islamists. Also, two dictionaries believe the word "Islamist" to mean two very different things. One associates "Islamist" with aggressiveness and the other associates "Islamist" with knowledgeability.

One can also find examples whereby meaning is lost in translation by using interlingual translation. For example, the word "lobster" in English is translated by Harraps Dictionary into French as *homard* or *langouste* (spiny lobster), when in fact these two animals are very much distinguished in France by both the French language and the price tag plastered on them by the fishing industry. Jakobson insists on the fact that in order to translate any instance of any given language, one will have to examine the "mutual translatability" into the chosen language of translation:

Any comparison of two languages implies an examination of their mutual translatability; widespread practice of interlingual communication, particularly translating activities, must be kept under constant scrutiny by linguistic science. It is difficult to overestimate the urgent need for and the theoretical and practical significance of differential bilingual dictionaries with careful comparative definition of all the corresponding units in their intention and extension. Likewise differential bilingual grammars should define what unifies and what differentiates the two languages in their selection and delimitation of grammatical concepts.

(idem)

## Redundancy and Entropy in Perception and Interpretation

If we agree that perception can be affected by several factors then Schramm's initial definition of communication whereby he states "Unless the concept in the semantic system of Mr.A. is reproduced in the semantic system of Mr. B., communication has not taken place", can be questioned. Schramm himself noted "Begging the question of whether a meaning as seen by one individual can ever be reproduced exactly by another individual" (Schramm 1955). Information Theory, therefore, although largely related to communication cannot be quantified through communication, which seems to require a transfer of meaning, but rather through information, which Mackay defines as "that which adds to representation" (Moles 1968, p.54).

Moles suggests that messages be measured by the quantity of information which is original in the message and that “information is a *quantity* essentially different from *meaning* or *signification*” (idem). The more a message influences the behaviour of a person, the more valuable it is, because it brings about modifications in the person. Today, news audiences can be researched using online insights with various metrics, which help us construct news target groups and ‘news consumer personas’ with the knowledge audiences already have. Our findings will note how some mainstream media organisations were selective of the information they would share with different audiences, so as to ensure not to give irrelevant information.

Shannon and Weaver’s information theory introduce two basic terms allowing us to measure information in a message, *entropy* and *redundancy*. Redundancy is “that which is predictable or conventional in a message” (Fiske 1990, p.10), “a measure of certainty or predictability” (Schramm 1955) and an essential part of communication. Schramm explains that the more redundant a message is, the less informative it is and yet, the more chaotic the result. Although “redundancy” seems to originate from “redundant” and although predictability is not necessarily useless in any form of communication especially that of verbal communication, in fact, redundancy is an essential part of communication. Greetings for example are redundant or rather predictable – messages. However, they are necessary in communication. Smiles too are redundant – or rather predictable – messages. Fiske states that 50 percent of the English language is predictable and therefore redundant, meaning that deleting 50 percent of the English language would leave us with a “usable language capable of transmitting understandable messages” (Fiske 1990, p.10). Redundancy plays a technical role in a message in that it helps with both the accuracy and decoding of the message. When during a news report about the coalition launching airstrikes over Libya, a Euronews journalist states “Despite that, Washington has made it clear it wants to take a back seat and is calling on others to take command of the operation” (Transcript, Coalition launches further air strikes over Libya, Euronews English, 23 March, 2011), one can see that he followed convention by using the word *Washington*. The audience can decode this message to mean that ‘The American Government has made it clear that it wants to take a back seat and is calling on others to take command of the [airstrike on Libya] operation’. Therefore, it is conventions like *Washington* and *operation* that can be decoded by the public. Also, as the journalist has already said that “...it wants to take a back seat”, it is redundant to then say “...is calling on others to take command of the operation”. Redundancy may also combat any noise within a channel of communication, be it a technical noise, or elements that disturb or create confusion to a message. All the TV channels used in this thesis for example, published textual headlines that could be read by the audience in addition to voiceovers that can be overheard by the audience. These headlines sometimes re-

iterated elements that were already said out loud during the news report such as the headline “Crowds cheered outside parliament in support of President Bashar Al Assad” (Transcript, Syrian president fails to lift emergency laws, Al Jazeera, 30 March, 2011).

The opposite of redundancy, *entropy*, or a message with low predictability and “the lower the redundancy, the higher the relative entropy” (Schramm 1955). Entropic messages carry information and reduce the receptor’s uncertainty. Therefore, the more new items we have in a message, that more valuable it is in terms of information, however to introduce completely new information, we will have to dig into a repertoire of known items, such as the language that we may have in common. In same news report on Assad, by Al Jazeera, one slightly hears cries in the background of footage of the Syrian president waving, but the audience does not actually see a crowd, nor do they know if their cries are in protest or support towards the Syrian president. The footage then shows the president entering parliament with a crowd behind him, but without the journalist’s commentary, one is unsure of the crowd’s sentiment towards the President because they are quite far away from the camera shot. Later on in the news report, one sees footage of people cheering within the parliament itself, but there is no actual footage of “supporters” cheering outside of parliament when the president himself arrives to the parliament. There is also footage of supporters outside of parliament, while the president is in the parliament. The fact that the crowd outside parliament is made up of supporters and these supporters greet the Syrian president plays an important role in the message being broadcast by the journalist and this is probably why it is reiterated in form of a redundant message via headlines. It is also reiterated, not just to combat the noise provided by the camera shot that fails to capture a cheering crowd simultaneously with the Syrian president, but also to emphasise the entropic message that the president of Syria, a man whose father ruled Syria since 1971 (Britannica 2016), actually has supporters. This is an entropic message as it is highly unpredictable to a Western audience- that one could argue would have a generally negative image of the regime. Redundancy therefore, plays an extremely important role when the message is aimed at a wider audience, made up of people from different backgrounds, with different information about the Syrian regime and its people or the revolutionaries. And therefore, repeating certain information in footage, text and then verbally may seem redundant, but it in fact ensures that the audience understand this unexpected message. In fact, one notices that it is the first sentence uttered by Al Jazeera’s newsman as soon as the footage begins: “He was greeted by thousands of cheering supporters as he arrived at parliament” (Transcript, Syrian president fails to lift emergency laws, Al Jazeera, 30 March, 2011). This sets the mood for the audience so that even before seeing any supporters in front of the parliament, they have an understanding that the crowd is made up of Assad supporters.

Jakobson's reasoning of redundancy within a message is specific to our social relationships and this has nothing to do with having noise in a message. He labels this *phatic communication* and it is listed amongst the six functions of verbal language that he proposes in *Linguistics and Poetics* from 1960. Jakobson uses phatic communication to refer to the "first verbal function acquired by infants" (Jakobson 1960, p.356). Fiske also notes that with *Phatic* language, Jakobson refers to "acts of communication that contain nothing new, no information, but that use existing channels simply to keep them open and useable" (1990). And therefore, one can deduce that the phatic language function uses redundancy in social situations because they are audience or receiver-centred and want to keep communication channels open.

The phatic language function can be seen in the news, such as in the corpus of this thesis, for example during the interview between Press TV anchor and Saeed Shehabi from the Bahrain Freedom Movement in August 11, 2011. The anchor keeps referring to his guest as "Mr. Shehabi". This is politeness that shows utmost respect for the guest on the show. The anchor also thanks the guest both at the beginning and the end of the show. This manner of respect towards guests on Press TV seemed to be the rule of thumb, but interestingly enough first names or full names were used by other TV Channels within the corpus.

Shannon and Weaver had also pinpointed the problems of constant interpretations of meaning in their mathematical theory of communication: "explanations which (a) are presumably never more than approximations to the ideas being explained, but which (b) are understandable since they are phrased in language which has previously been made reasonably clear by operational means (Shannon and Weaver, p.5).

## Narrative Theory in Interpretation of Texts

Roland Barthes identified different narrative codes that readers use to decode texts and believed that readers have an active role in creating meaning, sometimes originating from culturally formed expectations, and therefore the construction of the text is not just worked on by the narrator, but also the narrator's audience. A follower of Saussure, Barthes carried Saussure's studies on signs a step further, according to his belief "that the same sentence may convey different meanings to different people in different situations" (Fiske 2011, p.81). Barthes set up a systematic model to understand the way in which meaning is conveyed by not only focussing on the language used in a sentence, but rather on the way it related to the reader/receiver of the message. Barthes' theory "envisaged meaning as being a process of negotiation between writer/reader and text" (idem). In his narrative theory, Barthes highlights "the interaction that occurs when the sign meets the feelings or emotions of the users and the values of their culture" (idem, p 81). Barthes proposes that meaning begins to take on a subjective stance and in order

to interpret a text, the interpreter is influenced by both the content of the text and the interpreter of the text. To go further, Barthes argues that narratives are interwoven with five specific codes that allow for better interpretation. Barthes proposed the hermeneutic code to describe unexplained elements of a narrative, which form an enigma or mystery to readers/audiences. Barthes proposes the use of the term *hermeneutic code* or HER. to represent "...all the units whose function it is to articulate in various ways a question, its response, and the variety of chance events which can either formulate the question or delay its answer; or even, constitute an enigma and lead to its solution" (Barthes et al. 1990, p.17). Of course, because the news is in fact reported only after it happens, it is usually an enigma. News analysts and topic experts may be called on news programmes to explain how they think events may develop, but nothing of their premonitions are sure and therefore, their premonitions will leave audiences with an enigma about some events.

Barthes introduced the *semantic code* or SEM or *seme* and defined it as the "unit of the signifier" in any text serving to represent elements in a narration that could be open to several interpretations resulting from connotations (Barthes et al. 1990, p.17), whereby a connotation is defined by Barthes as a "determination, a relation, an anaphora, a feature which has the power to relate itself to anterior, ulterior, or exterior mentions, to other sites of the text (or of another text)" (Barthes et al. 1990, p.8). Furthermore, Barthes states that "connotation are meaning which are neither in the dictionary nor in the grammar of the language in which a text is written..." (Barthes et al. 1990, p.8). Barthes warns that connotations are not to be confused with the "association of ideas" as "connotation is a correlation immanent in the text, in the texts; or again, one may say that it is an association made by the text-as-subject within its own system". Barthes also notes that "Functionally, connotation, releasing the double meaning on principle, corrupts the purity of communication: it is a deliberate 'static', painstakingly elaborated, introduced into the fictive dialogue between author and reader, in short, a counter communication" (Barthes et al. 1990, p.9).

Barthes also identified the *symbolic code* also referred to as SYM. used to organise semantic meanings of opposite or antithetic terms. Using opposites, contrast of terms are shown so as to give them more meaning. We have already seen how through language, we are able to identify what something is through what it is not and here Barthes carries this on into narrative theory when comprehending a text.

Barthes proposed the *proairetic code* (ACT.) to refer to actions that imply that there is more to come from the narration so as to build suspense or interest in the audience or reader. Just like the *hermeneutic code*, it is usually aligned with a temporal order, meaning that one would decode a text from beginning to end, and therefore, actions in the text would lead the reader to wonder what would happen next. This is seen in the news for example, when an interview is

scheduled with someone of interest, and therefore the audience awaits the interview. A press conference may also be scheduled and therefore the audience awaits the press conference. But it could of course also be events that are unplanned but perhaps foreseen by analysts or correspondents, such as the outcome of a demonstration or the consequences of NATO's involvement in Libya's revolution.

Finally, Barthes also identified the *referential code*, also labelled *cultural code* or (REF.) to designate elements within a narrative that point to "a science or a body of knowledge" (Barthes et al. 1990, p.19), or rather shared knowledge about our world that readers and narrators share. The cultural code that Barthes refers to is not necessarily a national culture, but could be in reference to properties that are "physical, physio- logical, medical, psychological, literary, historical, etc" (idem). As the cultural knowledge is so wide, it could also look at audiences' morality and ideology, so deeply encrusted in a society, that they cannot be challenged and are assumed to be the truth. Barthes also referred to the cultural code as being the *gnomic code*, in that it can refer to proverbs or normative conventions familiar to a specific culture (Oxford Dictionaries n.d.).

The five narrative codes identified by Barthes are grouped into a narrative to "constitute a braid (*text, fabric, braid*: the same thing); each thread, each code, is a voice; these braided- or braiding- voices form the writing: when it is alone, the voice does no labor, transforms nothing: it expresses; but as soon as the hand intervenes to gather and intertwine the inert threads, there is labor, there is transformation" (Barthes et al. 1990, p.160).

To conclude, the way in which humans perceive stories, events or realities, is dependent on several factors, ranging from our background and experiences to language and context. Humans' unique pasts, education, interactions and the way in which information is processed before being presented to them will have an effect on the different perceptions of reality they encounter, even if they encounter this reality at the exact same time. One could say that the unique human perception leads to the existence of several realities. Furthermore, one could also argue that perception is what proposes new realities and therefore, those who have the power to share their perceptions, such as the press or authorities, are able to propose dominant realities. The next step is to study how events that are perceived and then interpreted are then constructed into news stories by the media.

### II.3.3. Constructing the News

As has been noted earlier, the job of an interpreter lies not only in understanding a text, but also in explaining it to those who do not have either the ability to decode the text or access to the text itself. Looking back at how one perceives reality, as per Russel and Hall, it can be argued that each newscaster would perceive a news event differently. Their unique perceptions would therefore frame their interpretation of the news story to their audiences. Therefore, interpretation also plays a role in narration of events and Jensen states that a “narrative derives its distinctive character not only from its presentation of various events and characters to the audience, but also from the specific ways in which information about these events and characters is organized, and how the audience is addressed” (Jensen 2012, p.131). Although the news is a narration of real events, we believe that news is constructed, and therefore it is a constructed reality. The news may be *constructed* from events that take place in reality, but it is simply that- a *construction*. As news must be constructed, there are processes that take place before events reach the news. Our narrator, is in fact, our storyteller. Narrative theories help us analyse the way different types of media communicate meaning about events, and as we are concerned with the meaning behind information broadcast by the news, we are also interested in the meaning behind the information.

What is News?

If we are to study the news, it is important to understand the actual meaning of news. Several contributions have been made to the definition of news. Nossek states that news is “a genre of mass media content resulting from journalists’ information gathering and editors’ decisions and following professional practices and norms”, meaning that news is the “product of teamwork in media outlets” (Nossek 2010, p.1). According to Harrison, “news is what is judged to be newsworthy by journalists, who exercise their news sense within the constraints of the news organizations within which they operate” (Harrison 2005, chap.1).

According to Harrison, “news belies its highly contested meaning” (Harrison 2005, chap.1) and similarly Nossek states that “the main critical question regarding news is whether there is a consensus on how news is defined and who creates and controls news production and news content” (idem). While Nossek credits the news product to the collaboration between news actors such as journalists, editors and outlets, other theories propose that the organisation and its social environment are the result of the news product, whereby some theorists propose that news actors will do their best to produce news despite environmental constraints, while others will identify deliberate bias in news actors who use the news to promote their own interests.

Harrison notes that there are differences in what people believe the news should be, born out of people's position with regards to the news. For example, those who consume the news will have a different outlook on news from those who study the news (Harrison 2005, chap.1). In terms of news truthfulness, Harrison states that one of the major precepts of news is its orientation towards a truthful recounting of events. Cook also notes that despite nobody knowing what news is, "it should be accurate" (Cook 1998, p.72).

News, according to Nossek, can be defined from the following four perspectives: (1) audience-needs perspective, (2) journalists as professionals perspective, (3) intellectuals perspective and (4) academic-theoretical and research perspective. Audiences are concerned with what news should be and how it should meet the needs of the public, whereas journalists are concerned with the production process from the professional perspective. Intellectuals make proposals on what news should be so as to meet social needs by insisting that the media provide news to the public and critique the government. The academic and research perspective is to either complement or refute the other three perspectives using research (Nossek 2010, p.2). Our thesis takes on an academic research perspective so as to understand how news is produced.

## The Narrators

In conducting a critical discourse analysis, we aimed to not only analyse the texts, but also the producers of the text, also known as the dominant institutions in a society. These are not all the narrators of the text, but they do contribute to international news flow. As we are primarily interested in how news flows, we need to understand the various actors in the flux of information. Galtung and Ruge's 'chain of news communication' model helps us understand that events go through some kind of selection distortion, after which they are presented in form of some kind of media for people to perceive and people's perception is also subject to selection distortion before people build a personal image of international news (Galtung & Holmboe Ruge 1965, p.65). Galtung and Ruge propose a list of actors in the news flow<sup>19</sup>: (1) the journalist in the field in the news-sending country, (2) the local press agency bureau (3) the district bureau, (4) the central bureau of the press agency, (5) the district bureau on the receiving end, (6) the local bureau in the news-receiving country, (7) the news editor in the receiving newspaper and (8) the layout man. If the news organisation has a correspondent, then the chain becomes shorter and the news flow will then move from the event to the correspondent and

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<sup>19</sup> See these actors of news explained by Galtung and Ruge in: *Presentasjonen av utenriksnheter* (Oslo: PRIO stencil no. 14-1, 1962), pp 71-78

finally to the news editor. Ostgaard indicated problems with short chains that were related to political motivations and biased loyalties whereby journalists were seen to take preference over their own nations. In our research, based on the news organisations we have selected, we are particularly interested in the relationship between the sources, foreign correspondents and head offices. We have also included the presence of relatively contemporary agencies in charge of checking the accuracy of information received from amateurs. It is also important to note at this stage that the current news media landscape requires updated studies into international news flow. One such study that we can refer to is that of Maxwell Hamilton & Jenner, who propose to redefine foreign correspondence specifically. They note that today's media landscape has (1) traditional foreign correspondents, (2) parachute journalists, (3) foreign foreign [sic] correspondents, (3) foreign local correspondents, (4) in-house foreign correspondents, (5) premium service foreign correspondents and (6) amateur correspondents (Maxwell Hamilton & Jenner 2004, p.314). We tried to establish interviews with correspondents and were specifically able to focus on interviews with foreign correspondents, which we have labelled as international correspondents, and independent international correspondents, which we sometimes refer to as freelancers, because they do not have permanent contracts with the media organisations.

The flow of news has evolved since Galtung and Ruge first studied international news. Van Leuven and Heinrich studied foreign news coverage and sourcing practices in contemporary newsrooms by looking at sources of Belgian newspapers and TV news coverage of the Egyptian, Tunisian and Syrian uprisings of 2011. Their study found that Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings were covered using traditional sourcing practices, whereas the Syrian uprising was covered using more "on-the-ground, non-mainstream sources that circumvented the restricted information access by means of digital networks and social media platforms" (Van Leuven et al. 2015, p.1) and they suggest that the "gates of information flows formerly controlled by mainstream media have become permeable" (Van Leuven et al. 2015, p.3). Van Leuven et al propose that the change in news flows, a result of digital networks, allows for "connection, interaction and collaboration between professional informants such as journalists, just as well as various alternative information providers, including Twitterers or bloggers" (idem). Castells introduced the idea of a 'network society' (Castells 2011; Castells 2015) and Van Leuven et al build on this idea to propose "the paradigm of 'network journalism', which they describe as a "shared information space" made up of "an interconnected system of information nodes and journalistic organizations [sic] that have become just some network nodes among many" (Van Leuven et al. 2015, p.4). When studying news flows, sourcing is key, because it is the sources in the news flow who provide journalists with information they are then able to produce as news to audiences. Each node in network journalism is able to provide one kind of information or the

other to the news flow and with nodes all over the world, some news organisations are able to receive news from parts of the world without having any staff on ground.

### Co-constructed News or Contributed Information

According to Jacoby and Ochs, co-construction refers to “some nonspecified [sic] joint activity of creation, deliberately leaving one in the dark as to who (or what) might be acting in concert and what exactly is being jointly created” (Jacoby & Ochs 1995, p.172). Jacoby and Ochs define co-construction as “the joint creation of a form, interpretation, stance, action, activity, identity, institution, skill, ideology, emotion, or other culturally meaningful reality” (idem) and insist that although the ‘co’ prefix in co-construction represents some sort of interaction (collaboration, cooperation, and coordination), “co-construction does not necessarily entail affiliative or supportive interactions” (idem).

To understand co-construction as a concept, one can refer to literary theory from the Bakhtin Circle, which explains that texts, even those produced out loud by individuals, are the result of various previous dialogues with other interlocutors (Jacoby & Ochs 1995, p.173). One can also refer to studies into how children utterances are the result of co-construction with their parents and care-takers (Ferguson 1964; Brown 1977; Cross 1977). There exists also the concept that humans construct meaning based on a “co-constructed external flow of interactional events” (Jacoby & Ochs 1995, p.176). Some studies have also shown how interactional moments are also co-constructed by people outside of the interaction, for example, Marjorie Goodwin (Goodwin et al. 2002) studied interactions amongst Latina girls and how they are framed with competition, co-constructed by their parents. Also, Carolyn Taylor (Ochs et al. 1993) studied the co-construction of an affective relationship between siblings built in response to their parents’ fighting. More recent studies have studied co-construction in building knowledge; for example, Bordage compared socioconstruction of knowledge in elementary and secondary classrooms through the following dimensions: linguistic, sociocognitive and socioemotional. Bordage found that socioconstruction could be improved in classrooms if teachers would “foster the expression of learners’ opinions” (Bordage 2010).

Similarly, Diakhaté and Akam examined the use of Facebook in the co-construction of knowledge in students (Diakhaté & Akam 2016). Using a hybrid method with online questionnaires and semi-directive interviews, their results reveal how students construct knowledge on the social media platform. Diakhaté and Akam’s study argues that once knowledge is decontextualized, it then becomes information, which subject to being published on the internet will lead readers to cross-check the information and further develop their knowledge. According to Diakhaté and Akam’s article in French: « *Dans un contexte de*

*politisation de l'information, cette dernière peut viser à convaincre, à tromper, à manipuler, à mobiliser... En outre, la prolifération des contenus sur Internet et principalement sur les réseaux sociaux favorise souvent la parcellisation de l'information et amène le lecteur, généralement seul, à recouper, à contextualiser, à remettre en cause l'information reçue. Vu sous l'angle des réseaux sociaux, les compétences de recherche, d'analyse et de traitement de l'information restent fondamentales dans le processus de développement de connaissances »* (Diakhaté & Akam 2016, p.4). In other words, Diakhaté and Akam propose a *processus du développement de connaissances* (process of knowledge development), which shows not only the sender's role in knowledge construction by the knowledge they share online, but also the receiver's role in knowledge construction by decoding the message by using their previous knowledge and interacting with other people or other related knowledge. Their study concludes that although students' online interactions do lead to a "dynamic construction of knowledge", knowledge construction on Facebook cannot replace knowledge construction in universities. In another study, Akam argued that "common knowledge construction" is a requirement for sustainable development and yet many developed states refuse to contribute knowledge for the benefit of developing nations. Despite Akam's argument that shared knowledge is a necessity for sustainable development, he also states that "the developing countries will probably try to find out their own ways" (Akam 2011) and this highlights the existence of an independent individual role in constructing knowledge.

Another interesting study in co-construction by Karamagioli, Laborderie and Meimaris focussed on the potentials of digital storytelling in "enhancing" civic dialogue. Students were trained and asked to build personal digital stories on specific civic themes and it was found that digital storytelling "proved to be a technological enabler for constructive dialogue, unleashing students' creativity and developing their self-expression" (Karamagioli et al. 2018).

In our understanding of co-construction, we also turn to Fairclough, who expanded on the notion of casual effects of narratives by looking at 'social constructivism' - "the claim that the (social) world is socially constructed. Fairclough explains that the basis of social constructivism is constituted on "the role of texts (language, discourse) in the construction of the social world". Having said this, he also admits that such theories are most often "idealist" as opposed to "realist" and warns that social constructivists tend to interchange the terms 'construction' and 'construal', when in fact we tend to construct (build) what we have construed (imagined) (Fairclough 2003, p.8). Fairclough explains that one casual effect of texts that is of interest to critical discourse analysts is that of maintaining or changing ideologies (this view of Fairclough is also shared by Eagleton 1991, Larrain 1979, Thompson 1984 and Van Dijk 1998).

These studies, especially those of Bakhtin (Bakhtin 1981; Bakhtin 1984; Bakhtin 1986), seem to be stating that every single utterance or text produced is the result of co-construction or in

Fairclough's argument, the result of construal, even if the co-constructors are unaware of their direct participation to the construction of the text. Jacoby and Ochs caution that the acknowledgement of co-construction is the conviction that every participant in the co-constructed interaction is equally responsible for the produced text. If we apply this to news, and define news as a co-constructed event, then we are inevitably also acknowledging that everyone in the news flow is equally responsible for the final news product presented to audiences and this can be dangerous because it takes away the journalist's accountability in news validation. Should information given to journalists be accurate? Of course. But will it always be factual? Of course not. Therefore, it is still necessary to place the accountability on one group of professionals. And if journalists are to present a co-constructed news story and want to be relieved from their responsibility of providing factual news, then they should be explicit in their sources of information. It is for this reason that our research includes an in-depth study into news videos that have been built with information from various sources. A comprehensive study into news videos featuring amateur content, facts and figures, quotes and citations as well as state TV footage is conducted so as to identify the ways in which such contributed material is integrated into the news videos, whilst also identifying their role in the news videos.

Jacoby and Ochs' argument that co-construction is "historically and culturally situated", means that in all the studies of co-construction, the final author has had some kind of cultural or historical interaction with the co-constructors, leading to a direct or indirect influence on the final text. Therefore, for the purpose of our thesis, despite the evident role of several actors in news production, we shall take caution in the use of the word "co-construction". For example, we have noted that there are several contributors to the news production process, ranging from the first person who has witnessed the event, to the citizen journalist and informer, all the way to the news agencies and news outlets who present the information the public. All parties who contribute information (images, footage...) to the news outlets shall not be recognised as co-constructors of news. Instead, they will be the information contributors. We do not think it is fair to implicate them in the final constructed news, because they are not included in decision making at news production level. Through our interviews, we will note that amateurs provide information as well as images and footage, but are not aware of how their information will be used. Journalists on the other hand, such as correspondents, have to package their news, including various images, footage and their voice, before sending it to the newsroom, which broadcasts it, therefore journalists who work for a news outlet will be considered co-constructors of news along with their colleagues at work. News agencies are also not aware of how their news (headlines, text, footage, images) will be used by news outlets, and therefore, they too cannot be considered to be co-constructors of news, but rather, they are news

contributors. This of course does not negate that there is a co-construction of meaning in the human mind of audiences who understand the world as it is because of the various productions and reproductions of power relationships that exist in various domains of society.

## News Production and News Values

In defining news, it is important to define news production, because traditionally, news and journalism have been tied to the media institution and the production of news (Domingo et al. 2008). Even while the lines between audience and journalist blur in the age of User Generated Content, the gatekeeper role of professional journalists can be upheld and enforced when newsmakers adhere to professional routines in the aim of ensuring neutral and accurate journalism (Domingo et al. 2008). Becker and Vlad define news as “both an individual product and an organizational product” (Becker & Vlad 2009, chap.5)<sup>20</sup>. If we accept the fact that news production is a necessity in resulting in news, then we will also accept the argument that news, rather than reflecting reality, is a “constructed reality” (Pinto 1997, p.13). Gaye Tuchman also notes the fact that “news *is* a product – manufactured, sold, and consumed daily” (Tuchman, Gaye Jensen 2012)<sup>21</sup>.

News as a process, can be studied from Domingo’s model of news production, which proposes five stages of news production that can be applied to public communication in small communities, in institutions with complex societies and finally in postmodern societies with institutions that have recalled social networks: (1) access and observation; (2) selection and filtering; (3) processing and editing; (4) distribution; and (5) interpretation (Domingo et al. 2008). These five stages of news production were further categorised by Hanitzsch and Hoxha, so as to be outlined a three-step circular model (Hanitzsch & Hoxha 2014) outlining: (1) story ideation, (2) story narration and (3) story presentation. The story ideation, initially suggested by Bantz, McCorkle and Baade (Bantz et al. 1980, p.52)<sup>22</sup>, represent the four ways in which stories become news. Journalists can be *proactive* or reactive to the news, by either investigating a story out of journalist curiosity or by *reacting* to a story initiated by a person or organisation outside of journalism (eg: press conferences, press releases). Journalists can also act in *follow-up* of their colleagues’ work by covering a story that has already been covered in the news.

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<sup>20</sup> *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, 2009, Chapter 5 by Lee B. Becker and Tudor Vlad

<sup>21</sup> Chapter 5 in *A Handbook of Media and Communication Researcher: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies* (2012)

<sup>22</sup> Bantz, McCorkle and Baade proposed the News Factory Model, which highlighted Story Ideation as the first step in news production. This was followed by Task Assignment, Material Assembly and Newscast Presentation. These features of news production are still applicable but mainly represent local news stories rather than international news events of today whereby international correspondents or freelancers are on location with required necessary devices.

Finally, story-ideation can also be *event-driven*, whereby events are of such significance that the newsroom identifies it as being of value to news. We have explored the question of story ideation in our interviews with journalists and news editors so as to complement our main focus of this thesis, which is story narration and presentation.

The second step in Hanitzsch & Hoxha's news production, story narration, represents the story narrative process leading the journalist to the story they recount. In other words, there are always several parts of a story to tell, the question journalists have to ask themselves is which story to tell. According to Hanitzsch & Hoxha, there are three elements of story narration: (1) the central narrative or 'story' (2) the story angle or perspective and (3) the story framing or building the story in an "established interpretative framework" (Hanitzsch & Hoxha 2014, p.4). Narratology is a study which has been contributed to by various researchers; Levi-Strauss (1949) studied how various myths, with different stories actually told the same narratives. Todorov's study of Henry James' tales (1971) also found that all the tales revolved around a common narrative. Also, Vladimir Propp's (1968) work on narratology with a detailed study of 100 folktales identified that a large range of tales share the same system of narrative motifs/functions. This list of basic components found in stories in the same interpretative framework were labelled "narratemes" by Berger (Berger 1997, p.25). Becker and Coffey proposes media analysis through a sociological stance by studying both "content and form as a result of cultural conventions of one society at a specific time" (Becker & Coffey 2004, p.7). Schudson also notes that the news is operated by people who operate within a cultural system (Schudson 1999). Gans noted that journalists will seek stories that are either interesting or important, or both when seeking frames for their news narratives (Gans 2013, p.147). According to Gans, stories should also be "familiar enough" to attract audiences "but also novel and thus unfamiliar enough to be deserving of the name news" (Gans 2004, p.50) and this takes us back to communication and informations theories already elaborated in the sections Perceiving and Interpreting Reality.

The third step of Hanitzsch & Hoxha's news production circular model is news presentation and this only takes place once the central narrative has been agreed upon. We are of course also concerned with news presentation because the news videos that constitute our news corpus are the actual presented news. Hanitzsch & Hoxha identified four elements that are necessary in news presentation: selection, emphasis, links and references, and cues (Hanitzsch & Hoxha 2014, p.5). 'Selection' is the choice of information including facts, images, footage, sources and soundbites that will be covered in the actual broadcast. 'Emphasis' refers to the pieces of information that will be presented as most important to the news story. Hanitzsch & Hoxha note that it is through emphasis that analysts can study biases or selected narratives because although journalists are required "to give voice to all sides of the story", emphasising on one aspect of

the story will not be a professional violation. The importance of ‘links and references’ in news presentation lies in the fact that “news accounts do not exist within a narrative vacuum” (Hanitzsch & Hoxha 2014, p.5). Journalists will often make reference to previous coverage thereby creating links so as to build narratives; our analysis also looks at links and references in form of figures and percentages and other forms of citations made by the news organisations in our corpus. Finally, ‘cues’ will link news accounts to events from the real world so as to “establish an intuitive relationship between the story narrative and an established interpretative framework” (idem).

Although we have shown how Harrison argues that journalism aims to broadcast messages of truth, we have also shown how narratives are built through processes in news production. It is therefore necessary to explore the various influences on news production, which inevitably affect news narratives.

More recent work has shown that the autonomous journalist is limited by various influences. Voaks has researched existing influences on journalists’ decision making in ethical situations, and his findings, which identified seven social influences (individual, small group, organisational, competition, occupational, extramedia and legal) contest prior research that states that journalists are autonomous and act independently (Voakes 1997). Kurt Lewin’s gatekeeping theory<sup>23</sup>, which studied how items pass through channels, and initially applied to social change post-World War II, has also been applied to news flow. For example, as early as 1950, David Manning White<sup>24</sup> studied the selection process of a newspaper editor. Shoemaker et al define gatekeeping as the “process by which the vast array of potential news messages are winnowed, shaped, and prodded into those few that are actually transmitted by the news media” (Shoemaker et al. 2001, p.233). They further elaborate that gatekeeping is made up of a “series of decision points at which news items are either continued or halted as they pass along news channels from source to reporter to a series of editors” (idem). Although it sounds as though gatekeeping is synonymous with news selection, Shoemaker et al argue that it also includes news presentation and distribution; therefore encompassing news production as a whole. Shoemaker et al studied the ‘forces’ of news events or issues allowing or disallowing them from passing through the gatekeeping process, noting that forces will have varying degrees of

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<sup>23</sup> See psychiatrist Kurt Lewin’s proposal of gatekeeping in sociology, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change (June 1947), “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research,” *Human Relations* 1 (November 1947), *Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers* (NY: Harper, 1951).

<sup>24</sup> See David Manning White’s application of gatekeepers to mass communications in “The ‘Gate Keeper’: A Case Study in the Selection of News,” *Journalism Quarterly* 27 (fall 1950)

“intensity” or “polarity” (idem). Although their study was primarily on newspapers, we can apply their results to our methodology. Their results noted that routine forces played a larger role in gatekeeping than individual forces did.

Cook writes about the “unspoken procedures, routines, and assumptions” in newsrooms that influence news production and claims that despite journalists being “authors” of their words, news making is a collaborated effort (Cook 1998, p.71). Cook argues that because journalists are expected to exclude their personal opinions from their coverage then organisational factors will influence the news more than individual journalists will. Indeed, especially in television news, individual reporters “have to collaborate with producers, camera crews, tape editors and the like to come up with a single isolated report” (Cook 1998, p.72)<sup>25</sup>. Cook also rightly notes that reporters and editors need to share “basic common conceptions of the news and of where it is likely to happen, the ensuing conflict and confusion would make it difficult to generate the news on a daily basis” (idem). These shared conceptions, Cook states, is not related to political preferences of the organisation. Instead, Cook believes that the shared conceptions between journalists and others in the newsroom are the result of the daily routines followed both in the newsroom but also outside of the newsroom by correspondents whose job it is to report back to their organisation with news stories. These routines, allow for what “Tuchman termed, ‘strategic ritual’ of objectivity: deferring to expertise, presenting both sides of the story, providing intuitively persuasive supporting evidence, and generally obscuring the reporter’s own hand” (Cook 1998, p.74). The other organisational factor, which prevents news production from being a solely individual effort, is the fact that news needs to be sold, therefore if journalists want to grow in their careers, then they need to be able to convince their superiors that the story they are after will sell.

The organisational factor in the result of a product, in this case news, is not only present in journalism; Choquet and Vieira stated that “The governance of a company or organisation, public or private, is intended to provide strategic direction, to ensure that objectives are achieved, risks are managed appropriately and resources are used in a responsible spirit” (translated from French. Choquet & Vieira 2011).

Gans also states that “news organizations [sic] can thus be compared to factories” (Gans 2004, p.50) because the news manufacturing process usually involves assignment editors choosing the stories to be reported and stories that are reported will be checked, by editors, producers and managers, before being broadcast. Gans also noted the saleability need of news, based on high competition leading to regular updates, not only on television and newspapers but also internet

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<sup>25</sup> Cook notes that there is a difference between the level of autonomy a print and TV journalist can have for the simple reason that print journalists will require fewer resources to cover stories. Despite this truth, newspapers must rely on other resources to produce complete coverage.

updates of what Gans called the “perpetual news cycle” (idem). Gans also argued that “news, like bread, is perishable” and therefore, speed has always been a factor affecting news production. Due to the requirement of speed and saleability, routines need to be adhered to if outlets want to be efficient in “creating a product cheap enough to serve the audience and advertisers but profitable enough to attract entrepreneurs and investors” (idem). Gans proposes that the “basic ingredients” of news, which is a result of how the organisation operations, is the organisation’s sources. As the sources are the basic ingredients of news, they will inevitably affect the way in which news is produced. Sources need to be credible but also reliable in providing news on time. Gans argued that preferred news sources are high-government officials and that these sources “have the power and staffs to create newsworthy events [...] or statements [...] regularly and quickly” and “Their power and authority make them credible [...] or more credible to editors and other news executives than sources with less authority and status” (Gans 2004, pp.50–51). This aspect of news production has been studied in our analysis, whereby we look at the role of State TV footage in international news channels as well as citations of officials and interviewee profile. Theories on these notions have been proposed in the results section. Despite Gans’ argument that news production is mainly affected by organisational elements, he also notes that “breaking news” allows for the individual journalist to report events from their perspective, therefore one can propose journalist influence on news production is highest when the news is reported as it happens. This is of course the case in many of the news videos in our news corpus, for the simple reason that several of the events in our corpus constituted breaking news. It is during breaking news that journalists become more “creative and unusually exciting, making the adrenalin flow, and enabling them to obtain professional fulfilment” (Gans 2004, p.51). Gans also noted that journalists will stand out most when they cover breaking news as they will be noticed by other news organisations and therefore, news organisations “have rarely had trouble recruiting war reporters” (idem)<sup>26</sup>.

Klaus-Dieter Altmeyen echoed Gans and Cook in their approach to understanding news production, whereby he stated that “News coverage is not the result of work of individual journalists” (Altmeyen 2008, p.52). Altmeyen admits that the individual analysis and role perception are important in news production at a journalist level, but despite this, the individual journalist “is always embedded in organizational [sic] patterns, which, as prearranged structures, influence the journalist’s work and behavior [sic] in every newsroom” (idem). Altmeyen proposed three levels of organisational research in journalism: (1) the relationship between the individual journalist and the newsroom, which seeks to understand the expectations

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<sup>26</sup> Indeed, in our interview with an independent war correspondent, it was found that many journalists agree to cover war zones so as to build up their CV and be noticed by other media organisations.

of journalists and their organisations (salary and job satisfaction), (2) the relationship between news organisations, which seeks to expose media competition and journalism PR with newswires and (3) the relationship between news organisations and society, which seeks to understand the influence of society on journalism and vice versa (Altmeyden 2008, p.53).

Shoemaker and Reese built a theory of news content, which proposes five levels that influence news production: (1) individual media workers, (2) media routines, (3) organisation, (4) extra-media and (5) ideological levels (Shoemaker & Reese 1996). We will only entail the influential factors that our thesis covers in our research. In describing the first level of influence in news production, Shoemaker and Reese noted that journalists who have degrees related to media communications would produce content different to those who had other degrees. In essence, it was found that the journalist background would affect the content they produce, for example women journalists would cover women differently than men would; similarly Hispanics' coverage of Hispanic communities would be different to coverage by a non-Hispanic journalist. Personal attitudes of journalists would also affect their coverage, whereby journalists can select the words and visuals to be included in a story. Also, journalists' role conceptions affect news production because their vision of their role is translated into the type of coverage they provide. Finally, individuals will not take part in unethical actions, but each individual's understanding of what is unethical may be different and this will therefore affect news production. The newsroom environment is also of interest to us in news production, because some researchers have found that it affects journalists' professional views and will therefore inevitably affect news production. Hanitzsch for example, studied journalists in Indonesia and found that despite sharing some professional principals with their counterparts in the globe, such as seeing the journalism profession as "neutral disseminators of news", they also had specific influences from their environment (Hanitzsch 2005, p.505). Despite these findings, Hanitzsch was not quick to apply the same factors influencing news production in Indonesia to all or even parts of Asia, because generalising news production factors of influence of one country to a continent rich in diversity would be overgeneralising and underestimating the situation; there were however similarities found in different countries across the globe. Hanitzsch found that the cultural background (ethnicity) of journalists played a role in journalists' personal opinions of their profession (and some of the findings have also been found among other cultures). For example, it was found that bribery was commonly practised by journalists in Indonesia, and because this common practice had already been found by Peters in many developing countries (2003, page 52), Hanitzsch was able to find an environmental link. The common link was that most journalists who accept or give bribes do so, not because they are living in harsh conditions, but rather because they do not believe they will be caught. When bribery becomes common practice amongst sources and journalists, working outside of this practice can be challenging for

journalists. Therefore, giving or accepting bribes in journalism affects news production to the point whereby news will not be neutral, because journalists will be hesitant in reporting against their source. We are unable to know the background of the journalists in our news corpus, but we are able to include their location while reporting the news and we believe that their location may indeed probably have an influence on news production. This element is further discussed in the analysis chapter.

To link the first and second level of influence in news production, Shoemaker and Reese noted that the longer media professionals work for an organisation, the more they will understand and follow the organisation's routines in news production, therefore making them less likely to apply their own opinions to the processes. In essence, when journalists adhere to the organisation's routines, the likelihood of their content being used increases, and consequently, respect from colleagues increases as well. To further develop on how media routines influence news production, Shoemaker and Reese stated that events applied to media routines would be most covered by an organisation. Also, events would be covered more than issues would because issues are too ambiguous. We are unable to study the duration journalists spend at the news organisations in our corpus. But, through our interviews with the news organisations of our corpus, we are able to understand the routines put in place by the news organisations. In essence, events that apply to the organisation's news values would be covered and this is covered in our analysis. It was also noted that news organisations preferred similar coverage rather than coverage that stood out, therefore consciously adapting news production to similar narrative framework. Shoemaker and Reese were also able to link the significance of routines to organisational influences, firstly, by noting that larger organisations (mainly TV and radio) had less influence on professional routines, but were more concerned with economical aspects affecting the organisation's goals. This means that journalists working for elite organisations, representing an elite background were also noted to be more liberal. This also means that upper-level media management mainly represented backgrounds in economics rather than communications to the point whereby media owners and managers have connections with businesses and work in boards of other businesses. Also, middle-level media management would be able to bring in sources for reporters so as to ensure that the organisation met its business goals. But it also means that editorial routines were noted to sometimes conflict business goals, with the editorial goals given lesser consideration by management. Thirdly, Shoemaker and Reese also noted extra-media influences on news production, for example, the more powerful a source, in terms of politics or economics, the more likely it is that the source will influence news reports. It was noted that official sources will be used to report stories about issues, because issues are ambiguous; therefore the official point of view will be presented. Also, sources critical of media coverage will most likely be self-censored by the media.

Advertisers were also noted to influence media content because preferred content by advertisers would be offered by media so as to please the advertisers. So much so that some advertisers have actually withdrawn support from content they dislike. It was also noted that government control in form of “media financing, laws, regulations, court cases, licenses, taxes, manipulation of the release and availability of information, and direct communication of a government official” affects news production, especially when the media organisation is critical of the government. Because our thesis studies international news production, we were inclined to study the state of the media in the various countries of our interest.

Finally, when looking at the ideological levels that influence news production, Shoemaker and Reese recommend that “deviant people or events”, will be included in the news as forms of stereotypes. We are particularly interested with this influence on news production, because the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of several events stereotyped as an “Arab Uprising”. We explore this issue in our interviews with journalists and also in our content analysis by seeking for similarities in how each of the events were represented.

Other models have yielded similar propositions on the factors affecting news production. For example, the models of Ettema, Whitney & Wackman (1987) as well as Whitney, Sumpter & McQuail (2004) elaborate on news production influence from an individual, organisation and institutional level. Also, Preston et al (2009) proposed a “five-fold explanatory frame” which groups the different cluster of influence of news, (as inspired by Gans 1979, Gitlin, 1980/2003, Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, Reese 2001, Schudson 2000 and Whitney et al 2004): political-economic factors, organisational influences, individual influences, media routines and norms and cultural and ideological power (Preston 2008).

## News Construction

Events happen all over the world all the time, but only some events will make the news, also, only some events will make international news. Specifically, with the events of the Arab Spring, there too, some events reached international audiences, while others did not. It is important to understand the flow of news so as to understand what structures (visible or otherwise) shape international coverage of events. Much research on international news selection has taken place, starting with Schramm’s 1959 study which found that the global coverage of a country did not correspond to its population or size. Also, Galtung and Ruge’s study of three international crises in four Norwegian newspapers found 12 values identified as news values, a framework that acts as the criteria required for events to become news: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, compositional balance, elite nations/regions, elite people, personification and negativity (Galtung & Ruge 1965). Indeed,

the events of the Arab Spring were valuable to the news because of the frequency of similar events occurring in countries within a region. This allowed for the media to continuously build unambiguous news stories for a period of time. Our thesis does not test these news values on our corpus, but will make some observations.

According to Wu, research on international news values contradict other studies because of “different sampling methods, time frames, definitions...” therefore resulting in “no solid theories” (Wu 2000). He stated that one ways of examining discrepancies between what he calls “the real world “ and the “news world” is to examine the news gathering and distribution processes by also looking at the gatekeepers’ application of traditional news values. He also stated that such studies have generally shown that news outlets will select news, which similar to Galtung and Ruge’s values, “reflects unexpectedness, proximity, conflict, discrepancy, and prominence”, (Wu 2000). Following Hopkins & Wallerstein (1996), Wu proposed another approach to understanding news selection at international level; by examining whether information flow reflects the larger global system of the world we live in. According to Wu, international news “continues to reflect the earlier imperial system” and news gathering resources are distributed strategically with correspondents and bureaus in regions with “traditional and current links’ to the outlet’s home country (idem). Other “systemic factors” of news coverage explored by Wu are “trade, territorial size, cultural ties, communication resources, and physical distance”. Wu defined ‘systemic factors’ as the “distinctive traits of individual nations, as well as the magnitude of interaction between any two nations in the context of the global system” and proposes that the systemic factors of international news flow are based on three variables: firstly, “national traits, such as population and degrees of press freedom”; secondly, “interactions and relatedness”, such as trade and shared language; and thirdly, “logistical factors of news gathering and distribution” (idem). Wu found that trade was the “leading predictor of news coverage” in most countries (Wu 2000, p.122) and that “presence of international news agencies” was a second predictor of news coverage (Wu 2000, p.124), while press freedom was noted to be a “minor determinant of foreign news volume” (Wu 2000, p.125).

According to Stig Hjarvard, research on international news can be conducted from two perspectives: that of ‘news selection’ and that of ‘news construction’ (Hjarvard, Stig Jensen 2012, chap.6). These two perspectives are then paired with micro and macro distinctions, whereby (1) the micro-level and selection perspective focusses on the chain of gatekeepers from the reporting of an event in one location to the news editor in another location, (2) the macro-level and selection perspective is research on the news flow by counting individual news items so as to make general propositions on the structure of international news, (3) the micro-level and construction perspective is research on news content, news agency organisations and

foreign correspondents, and (4) macro-level and construction perspective is research that proposes theoretical contributions related to international news. In our thesis, we attempt to understand how the news of the Arab Spring was constructed by different news channels and using that information, we also attempt to propose theories applicable to international news. In other words, we try to understand the role of every selected information in the final product. Our thesis, specialising in media communications is mainly interested in how the news works. The 'construction' perspective, focusses on news as the 'social artefact' so as to understand how "social conventions and practices, specific values, and the allocation of material resources work together to produce a particular outcome: the news" (idem). Hjarvard noted that "social institutions constituted the primary variable; the form, content, and volume of foreign news" (idem). Indeed, our analysis does focus on the form, content and volume of foreign news.

Despite our research being primarily concerned with how news is constructed, we also appreciate that news flow has an effect on what is finally constructed, and it is for this reason that we have approached journalists, to understand and explain news processes, which Hjarvard noted is usually left unexplained (idem).

Wien stated quite rightly that "Journalism derives a great deal of its legitimacy from the postulate that it is able to present true pictures of reality....Concepts such as 'truth and 'reality' cannot be separated from the concept of objectivity" (Wien 2005, p.1). But it is difficult to define objectivity. Walter Cronkite from *60 minutes* on the CBS stated, "We are trying to reach an objective state, we are trying to be objective. We have been taught from the day we went to school, when we began to know we wanted to be journalists, integrity, truth, honesty, and a definite attempt to be objective. We try to present the news as objectively as possible; whether we like or don't like it. Now *that* is objectivity" (Efron 1972, p.2). If objectivity is simply stating the facts, without bias, the question is how to go about this while still remaining human and stating the truth. In discussing news construction, we will revisit the notion that news is the truth by visiting theories of news representation that show that the truth has many faces and can therefore be told using different narratives.

Peter Larsen noted that narratives are "both mental" and "specific" texts and as mental "tools", narratives "function as a fundamental interpretative frame", whereby narratives are built so as to "make their world intelligible" (Larsen 2012, chap.8). There is a relationship between narrative thought and its output, narrative discourse. According to Larsen, narrative, defined by its content, is a representation of events in time and space, which are "organised in a series of causes and effects" (Larsen 2012, chap.8). According to Entman, "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993, p.52). Gitlin defines

frames as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin 1982, p.6). Shoemaker & Reese (1996) identify what they find to be the most significant factor that shapes news: dominant ideology of the culture of the news producer.

Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model proposes that news organisations “base their discourse and interpretation and definition of what is newsworthy” on the following filters: (1) media organisation size and wealth, (2) advertising income, (3) reliance on sources (4) ‘flak’ the media get (5) anti-communism (Herman & Chomsky 1988, p.12). Herman & Chomsky also note that “It is much more difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media are private and formal censorship is absent” (Herman & Chomsky 1988, p.11). Following Herman & Chomsky’s model, one can safely say that any media organisation is vulnerable to the propagation of propaganda. The study of the news can contribute to a better understanding of media vulnerabilities to propaganda and further raise awareness of news narratives in audiences, whilst also exerting some kind of quality control on the media.

An excellent study by Edith Efron in 1972 identified at least 33 rules in what she refers to as “network editorializing”, which allow networks to “support either side of a controversy”, therefore leading to news subjectivity. These rules, ranging from news selectivity glamorisation to other miscellaneous techniques, were found to lead to network editorialising (Efron 1972).

Branigan also seemed to state that news is perceived differently based on the narrator. He proposed the terms “non-diegetic and diegetic narrators”, whereby journalists based in newsroom studios narrating stories they perceive from afar are non-diegetic and international correspondents, who are based on the field of the news event, are “diegetic narrators” (Jensen 2012; Branigan & Buckland 2014). The narrative hierarchy is evident in the visual code of television news, proposed by Larsen, where one notes that all journalists and anchors based in the studio or on the field, will “address the audience directly, thus simulating face-to-face communication”. In contrast, the interviewees both in the studio and in the field have to address the interviewer” (Larsen P, edited by Jensen 2012, pp.131–132). Larsen states that the presence or lack of eye contact shows audiences “who has the right to address the viewers, and to interpret the world for them” (idem). It is true that some channels opt not to allow eye-contact between their interviewees or guests and their audiences, but this seems to only be true when the guests or interviewees are physically with the journalist or anchor, such as in the studio or on the field. However, it must be noted that many interviews also take place with guests or interviewees, who are not physically present with the journalist or anchor, and therefore, they address the journalist or anchor, by facing the camera, and therefore, this can be construed as making eye-contact with the viewers. Indeed, as audiences today, we expect narratives to

recount events in a particular order so as to present problematic situations first leading up to the stable situation: “the presentation of a situation, a setting, the principal characters, the general state of affairs...” and this shows that Propp’s finding on narratives was not specific to Russian folk-tale (Larsen 2012, chap.8). Larsen explains that narratives can be studied from two standpoints, the first is by studying ‘what’ the event actually is (the narrative/story signified) and second is by studying ‘how’ (the text/discourse and signifier) the event is told. In our thesis, we are primarily concerned with ‘how’ the events are recounted and this is why we focus on discourse.

Since we are studying how international news was produced by looking at a case from the Arab World, we have also taken into account representation in form of orientalism, defined by Edward Said as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in the European Western experience” (Said 1978, p.1). According to Said, Orientalism is a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1978, p.3). Said also explained that one must study orientalism as a discourse so as to understand the “systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage- and even produce- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically...” (idem). Said identified certain representations of Arabs in the media post-1973 Arab-Israeli war. He noted that “the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures” and Arabs are presented as one culture in the news (Said 1978, p.287). More recent studies have defined representation of Oriental subjects using four dominant Orientalist categories: “(a) potentially dangerous, (b) irrational, (c) backward and (d) members of a collectivity, as opposed to the non-aggressive, modern and progressive West with its rational individuals” (Trivundza 2004). Since the Arab Spring, some have questioned whether ‘neo-orientalism’ is more appropriate a term to describe the representation of Arabs in the media. El-Mahdi (El-Mahdi 2011) for example proposed that the old-fashioned Orientalism of Arabs being incapable of democracy was replaced by “Arab Awakening”, but the fundamental pillars of orientalist understandings of Arab societies, based on othering and ‘romanticization’ and ‘exotization’, still stand, and universalist-Eurocentric judgement is also added. El-Mahdi noted, for example that in Egypt, the narratives depict a “youth, non-violent revolution in which social media are champions”, whereby the middle-class of Egypt are “educated” and “not terrorists” and therefore share the same values and social networks as the democratic West. On the other hand, other recent studies have found the narratives of the Arab Spring to be striking examples proving that Edward Said’s orientalism is still present. For example, Ventura found that the narratives of the Arab Spring were built with “stereotypes and

abstractions about Arab countries” (Ventura 2017), whereby the narratives refer to the Arab world as a whole. Ventura also found that such narration depicts a society that is “finally” reaching “modernity” and that there is a distinction of the Arab World before and after the revolutions, whereby the Arab World was represented to be stagnant prior to the revolutions and then democratic and efficient after the uprisings, with democracy being underlined. It is therefore of interest to us to know who has defined the stories of the Orient during the uprisings, at least in the international news channels of our corpus. Were the stories framed by Europeans and other westerners or were Arabs able to tell their own stories through the news organisations? Our research identifies the main narrators in the news discourses.

We are also interested in how protests and revolutions in general are represented in the news. We are particularly interested in how social movements are portrayed and therefore framed in international news.

But before looking at how protests are portrayed, we are interested in their value according to news values of news rooms. According to Wouters, “Protest actions are communicative acts staged to signal situations of injustice” (Wouters 2013). We are interested in protests because the uprisings covered in 2011 and even after included small and mass protests. But according to Wouters, protests are not generally high on the wish list of journalists, therefore protesters need to work hard to get the attention of media groups<sup>27</sup>. Wouters compared police archive data for Brussels to newscast data of Belgium’s commercial station and found that only 11% of protests are covered by the media.

Wouters found that certain protest sizes and disruption by protests would increase the likelihood of protests being covered. Also, journalists would be encouraged to cover protests when they had received press releases along with available soundbites from prominent participants. Wouters recommended that social movements “adapt to such news routines” by sending press releases and keeping in touch with journalists (Wouters 2013). However, Wouters noted that others like Sobieraj (2010) found that “activists who try to be professional, quotable and credible do not fit the schema journalists have of political-outsider news sources and therefore will be ignored” (Wouters 2013). Instead, activists need to be “authentic”, because “journalists prefer them to possess an amateur status” (idem). Sobieraj notes that activists “bend over backwards to be media-friendly, which they perceive as professional, quotable, and credible,

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<sup>27</sup> Wouters notes that according to Gamson, 2004 and Koopmans, 2004, media attention is key to protesters because media coverage of protests will inevitably get the attention of political elites. For extensive reading on protest coverage leading to political elite attention, read: Gamson, William. 2004. “Bystanders, Public Opinion and the Media.” Pp. 242-261 in *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing and Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. “Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Sphere.” *Theory and Society* 33(3-4): 367-91.

but ironically these studied attempts to conform to the norms of routine political reporting make them less appealing to journalists” (Sobieraj 2010).

McLeod & Detenber provide an interesting insight into the contributions made to protest coverage studies (McLeod & Detenber 1999). For example, in order to understand how protests are presented in the news, we can look at the protest paradigm, first introduced by Chan & Lee in 1984. The paradigm provides a model for constructing news stories out of protests. McLeod and Hertog (1998) then proposed the following categories for the protest paradigms: (1) narrative structures, (2) use of official sources (3) invoking public opinion and (4) techniques that delegitimise, marginalise and demonise (McLeod & Detenber 1999). Several researchers found that rather than using debates to frame news narratives of protests, journalists would frame protest narratives with images of violent clashes between protesters and security (Cohen, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Murdock 1981; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). For example, Gitlin (1980) found that the media presented the anti-Vietnam war protesters as radical in their “appearance, language, beliefs, and goals”(McLeod & Detenber 1999). Quotations marks were also noted to be used to delegitimise groups. McLeod & Detenber noted Gitlin’s (1980) example “from the Vietnam war protest coverage that used quotation marks around the term “peace march” and Lipari’s (1996) observation of stance adverbs such as ‘obviously, supposedly or allegedly, “to connote the legitimacy of information and foster preferred interpretations” (McLeod & Detenber 1999). Based on these protest paradigms, we have searched for specific footage depicting violence, military or peaceful demonstrations in the narratives of the Arab uprisings. Our analysis also studies how journalists introduce citations by providing a citation modus. The next section will detail the research development chronologically.

## **II.4. Research Development**

Our research was developed using two corpora made up of both a news corpus and a corpus of our dominant institutions. The purpose of this research project was to propose possible theories in international news production in the context of the Arab Spring. This section will give a chronological description of our research development, which was guided using an inductive approach. Due to our research approach, we will show how rather than do a literature review, we began by gathering data to build our corpora so that our findings be based in our data rather than in any previously read literature. Having said this, as a researcher, I was of course influenced by some of my experiences in life. For example, when searching for a context for

my research on international news in 2013, I chose the events of the Arab Spring and this was a direct influence from having been a keen spectator of the events of the Arab Spring on international television channels. Indeed, as Charmaz indicates, no researcher truly comes onto a research project without any biases of their own (Charmaz 2006).

After choosing the context, of the Arab Spring, I then had to decide which international channels to collect data from. Including more than one international news channel in the media corpus would allow us to see differences in news production due to the different management policies of each channel, sprouting from geographical location, ideological and cultural preferences.

The choice of two Middle Eastern based news channels and two Western based news channels, was made in the hope of reflecting two different cultures and governing styles, while taking caution in not generalising channels according to their culture. Another criteria for our research was that the channels would broadcast in English. The language of broadcast being in English was a significant element to the corpus as the aim was to ensure that these “international” channels were accessible to the West and not just via the means of technology, but also via the means of a language that is generally accepted to be universal. One could argue that English is an international language (Hammond, 2014) and that although not everyone in all countries in the West speak or understand English, those that go a step further to researching the news themselves, will not only seek for the news in their mother tongue, but also in English.

### Middle Eastern International Channels

To represent the Middle East, Qatar’s Al Jazeera English and Iran’s Press TV were selected. Selecting Al Jazeera English was of interest because of their prominence internationally amongst viewers from different countries. Press TV, however, was selected warily, because their license to broadcast was revoked by Ofcom in early 2012, meaning that although they had been broadcasting internationally via television and satellite up until 2012, they were limited to broadcasting online to Western audiences as of 2012. Taking Press TV out of the selection would mean having to look for another Middle Eastern news channel that broadcast news in English internationally. The only other Middle Eastern news channel to broadcast news 24/7 in English, i24, was only launched in 2013 and therefore had missed out on many of the stories that the other channels would have been able to cover and therefore, a corpus with i24 on the Arab Spring would not have been representative. Consequently, although Press TV no longer had a license to broadcast via Television in Europe, it was still accessible via the Internet by those interested and based in West. Furthermore, very little academic research had focussed on Press TV, so this would be an opportunity to contribute to studies on the Iranian channel.

## European International Channels

Selecting the two Western based international channels so as to have a balance between two different culture groups and geographical locations was challenging, due to lack of accessible material. Deliberations were made over different channels, such as CNN, Sky News and the BBC, but at the corpus construction phase, access to footage by CNN and the BBC proved to be extremely difficult and contact with these channels attested to be even more of a blocking factor. After much research for corpus constitution, it was decided to focus on France 24 English and Euronews English. The two channels, with headquarters in France, had covered the events of the Arab Spring extensively in English and had included news videos of their coverage online. Although both channels are based in France, and therefore could be said to represent a more European perspective, rather than a “Western” perspective, it was preferred to build a more detailed corpus rather than an insubstantial one. It was therefore concluded that that news channels of our corpus would be: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English. This meant that the geographical location of the selected channels was also narrowed down to the Middle East and Europe.

### **II.4.1. Corpora Construction**

The corpora built for our research include: (1) a news corpus, (2) a dominant institutions corpus made up of (2a) international media organisations and (2b) public information institutions. The news corpus can truly be referred to as a data corpus because this corpus includes already broadcast news videos. However, the corpus on the dominant institutions is more of “additional information” than a data corpus, allowing us to better understand the data corpus. We have however labelled the two to be corpus, for the simple reason that we use all the information gathered in both to reach our conclusions. Indeed, despite the importance of data in GT, Scott and Glaser do not deny that theory generation is not specific to data, and explain that “...most hypotheses and concepts not only come from the data, but are systematically worked out in relation to the data during the course of the research” (Scott & Glaser 2006, p.6). Therefore, the source of some of the concepts discovered in one’s research project may arise from places other than the data collected in the field, however, the researcher must find a link between these found concepts and the data used. This notion has been applied to our research, whereby we do not solely focus on data included in our news corpus; we have also gathered information through both field work (interviews) and desk research so as to better understand the data in our news

corpus in correlation to dominant information institutions, consequently allowing us to apply critical discourse analysis.

The following section will describe the way in which the entire corpus was constructed along with the objectives of each corpus.

### II.4.1.1. News Corpus

This section will describe the chronological steps taken to build our news corpus. It will serve to help researchers understand the processes underlying our research and also guide researchers who wish to follow a grounded theory approach in building a corpus to be used for theorisation purposes. The objective of building a news corpus was to be able to answer both (RQ2) how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories and (RQ3) How contributed material was used to construct international news stories.

This section is further subdivided into five sections: (1) sourcing the news videos, (2) selecting events to be included in the corpus, (3) searching and storing data in the corpus, (4) transcribing news videos and (5) data coding of news videos.

#### Sourcing the news videos

As the news videos featuring coverage of the events of the Arab Spring had been broadcast about two years prior to this research project, we were unable to simply record the news as it was broadcast. There were five arenas to sourcing the news videos that would constitute our news corpus:

1. **Sourcing news videos from news outlet physical archives:** This method was attempted so as to get the most original form of news videos that had been broadcast; it would of course be the most ideal method to source news videos. But after several phone calls and emails leading to no concrete information, it was decided to pursue another venue. It was found that the challenges related to accessing physical news archives are very much related to security and knowing the right people in each organisation.
2. **Sourcing news videos from selected TV channels' websites and online archives:** This method was explored because it was expected that getting material straight from the source would be most accurate. However, it was found that not only did the different channels not have detailed archives online, but when they did feature news videos, they did so differently from one another. Had our research aim been to understand how news was presented online by different news channels, this option may have been selected.

However, we were in need of news videos that had not been tampered with after being broadcast and that would allow for comparisons to be made using content analysis methods. Sourcing the news videos from different platforms would limit our content analysis comparison possibilities.

3. **Sourcing news videos from national public platforms such as university libraries, city libraries and INA (*Institut National l'audiovisuel*):** This method was explored because libraries and the national audio-visual institute of France tend to keep archives. Unfortunately, none of these public institutions had archived news from our research' selected news outlets.
4. **Sourcing news videos by purchasing previously aired news clips:** The news organisations I contacted in the hope of accessing their archives suggested that I purchase previously aired news videos, which had been turned into documentaries for sales. This turned out to be extremely expensive and would not necessarily apply to our research as these news clips were re-produced into formats that would be saleable
5. **Sourcing news videos from online video platforms (YouTube, DailyMotion, Shiianet):** It was found that all our selected news outlets had created channels on YouTube, the video sharing platform, with the aim of reaching online audiences. Using YouTube to compile the corpus made sense because of the large number of users. The fact that YouTube is the world's second largest search engine, after Google, was interpreted to mean that news published on YouTube became international, therefore fitting well with the research objective of understanding international news. The other added benefit of using YouTube, other than it being freely accessible, was that in terms of Content Analysis, setting up a systematic analysis model would be possible, even with a variety of channels. Studying channels posted on YouTube, would also allow us to take into context the production of news by mainstream media on User Generated Content channels. News videos not found on YouTube were searched for on DailyMotion and Shiianet.

### Selecting Events to be included in the Corpus

Studying the news of the events of the Arab Spring would be interesting because it allowed for the news corpus to be constructed with not just one event, but several events that were similar in nature, in that there was always a popular movement against a regime, taking place at what seemed to be a domino effect rate in countries that shared nuances of culture and geographic location. This therefore allowed for the possibility of studying the news representing several

countries, which although seemed to be categorised as one big event, portrayed differences even before looking at our data<sup>28</sup>.

We took the research stance that the context of the events of the Arab Spring was too vague to build a news corpus. Therefore, the context was narrowed down by selecting specific events from the Arab Spring. This was necessary so as to know what news videos to search for on YouTube. But, following a Grounded Theory approach meant that we did not want our research on the events to cloud our research analysis and therefore research on what events to include in our corpus is not based on extensive desk research, instead, the research approach was to try and cover the stories which seemed to stand out in the media. This method of research applies to the preparation aspect of research following the Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).

In order to find out what events were most discussed by the media during the Arab Spring, recommendations were taken from the BBC news website on the top ten key moments of the Arab Spring. This was not a systematic research that checked for number of viewers per story per news story per channel. The focus on this thesis was not to see which news story of the Arab Spring was the most influential in terms of attracting larger audiences, and therefore it was unnecessary to do a thorough analysis on this aspect of the research project. Instead, what was interesting, was simply what mainstream media decided were the most important news events of the Arab Spring, because mainstream media had probably applied the same news selection procedures during news production. Therefore, different news websites with sections dedicated to the major events of the Arab Spring were looked at briefly<sup>29</sup>. Consequently, rather than selecting all the countries touched by the Arab Spring in equal proportion, it was decided that the events that were perceived to be highlighted by some mainstream media be selected<sup>30</sup>. The news stories, in alphabetical order, are as follows:

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<sup>28</sup> Moreover, studying what seemed to be several connected events over a period of three years could also leave room for future research on news flow, news evolution and the speed at which news travelled.

<sup>29</sup> Reuters (Reuters 2012), BBC World (BBC World 2012) and Al Jazeera (Naar 2013) were some of the websites looked at to find the most key moments of the Arab Spring according to mainstream media. Not all websites are still accessible at writing of thesis.

<sup>30</sup> One event labelled by some as part of the Arab Uprising was purposefully taken out. This was the event of the Palestinians pressing for UN vote on full statehood. The story, labelled by The Guardian as the “Palestinian Spring” was not at all overlooked (Sherwood 2011) it was a deliberate decision not to be included in the corpus of the Arab Uprisings. The argument here was that events related to the Palestinian strife were much more deeply rooted to generations of occupation, wars, intifadas and uprisings quite dissimilar to those of the other countries that participated in the Arab Spring. Granted, each country has its history, conflicts and issues that may have led to their people’s uprising, however it can be disputed that the Palestinian/Israeli’s history, conflicts and issues merit a more intense dedication rather than being grouped with several other events that happen to have taken place in the same region.

1. Bahrain- Saudi troops enter Bahrain (17/02/2011-21/03/2012)	8. Syria- Cabinet Resignations (25/03/2011-08/03/2012)
2. Egypt- Morsi grants himself unlimited powers and then coup (03/01/2011- 13/07/2013)	9. Syria- Declaration of civil war (08-06/2012-13/06/2012)
3. Egypt- Tahrir square seized by the people (02/02/2011-21/11/2012)	10. Syria- Ghoutta sarin attack (07/12/2012-05/12/2013)
4. Libya- Gaddafi killed (20/10/2011-24/10/2011)	11. Tunisia- Mohamed Bouazizi (05/01/2011-21/04/2011)
5. Libya International Conflict (07/03/2011-19/07/2011)	12. Tunisia- President Ben Ali flees (14/01/2011-20/06/2011)
6. Saudi Arabia- Women right to vote (25/08/2011-26/09/2011)	13. Yemen- President Ali Abdullah Saleh leaves (29/03/2011-16/08/2011)
7. Syria- Assad makes first speech to Syria and the world (30/03/2011-31/03/2011)	

Table 1 List of News Stories in Corpus

The date range for each news event was uncovered based on the news videos, because it was found that some news outlets produced news videos on certain events later than when the event actually took place. Each of these events are further described below:

***Bahrain- Saudi troops enter Bahrain (17/02/2011-21/03/2012)*** - This was considered to be an important story for the data set because the media had not highlighted Bahrain’s uprising as much as it had that of other Arab nations and therefore not as many people were aware that Bahrain’s people participated in the uprising. In 2011, an article by Andrew Hammond in Reuters highlighted the fact that media coverage of the Bahrain uprising was in fact poor when it came to Bahrain’s spring: “Scant coverage was given to protests in the Gulf Cooperation Council member and to the ensuing crackdown by its Sunni rulers, who called in Saudi and Emirati troops in March under a regional defence pact (Andrew Hammond 2011; Hammond 2011a; Hammond 2011b). Including this story in the corpus was motivated by research questions surrounding media coverage of Bahrain’s uprisings. Studying the Bahraini uprising’s coverage in comparison to that of other countries that received more coverage would be an interesting point to look at.

***Egypt- Tahrir square seized by the people, Egypt - Morsi wins and Egypt- Morsi grants himself unlimited powers & then coup (03/01/2011- 13/07/2013)*** - Three main interconnected events in Egypt were also added to the corpus. The world watched via media coverage how Egyptians – like Tunisians- steered anti-government demonstrations, leading to the departure of their dictator. But the Egyptian Revolution proved that revolutions are not restricted to the downfall of a regime. The media carried on with their coverage of Egypt after the downfall of Mubarak to feature elections of their new leader Morsi and then continued their coverage on Egypt as the world watched in confusion when Egyptians went to the streets yet again less than a year after voting for President Morsi, to topple him and seek yet another new leader.

***Libya- international conflict (07/03/2011-19/07/2011) and Libya- Gaddafi killed (20/10/2011-24/10/2011)*** - The uprisings in Libya took on yet another turn of events. Unlike the very national Egyptian Revolutions, this time audiences noted the physical role of other countries in the weakening of the regime of Libya. The dictator in this case did not step down; he was reported killed. Therefore the news of Libya was not simply of an uprising, but rather of a conflict. But it was still considered Libya's uprising. The focus for these two events was therefore not the actual uprising of the Libyans, but rather international intervention followed by the death of Gaddafi.

***Saudi Arabia- Women granted right to vote (25/08/2011-26/09/2011)*** - What is interesting about this event is that in the country with arguably the least rights for women, the uprising seemed to focus on the rights of women specifically, whereas the news events representing other countries' Arab Uprisings seemed to focus on national rights generally speaking rather than highlighting the rights of women. This major event in Saudi Arabia was included in the data corpus because it was categorised as being part of the Arab Spring, and yet did not include weapons, police, army or protests; it therefore depicts a different picture of the Arab Spring.

***Syria- Assad makes first speech to Syria and the world (30/03/2011-31/03/2011), Syria- Cabinet resignations (25/03/2011-08/03/2012), Syria- Declaration of civil war (08-06/2012-13/06/2012) and Syria- Ghoutta sarin attack (07/12/2012-05/12/2013)*** - Just like Egypt and Libya, it seems that the turn of events were not predictable by Syrians, journalists or audiences worldwide. From peaceful street demonstrations, there was suddenly talk of the regime against their people. There was also the issue of international media not being allowed into the country or at least into specific regions. The first speech Assad makes to the world and the Syrian people was interesting in that it was a speech awaited for by the world after a considerable amount of time filled with demonstrations and 'hush-hush' talk of violent crackdowns by the government

on their people in parts of Syria that did not allow international media access. The resignation of the cabinet is also an interesting event in the Syrian revolution as it shows the revolution may have indeed caused changes in the government. Yet, each media outlet reports the reasons for changes in the government slightly differently. When news stories are judged as too ambiguous to report to audiences unaware of the country's history and politics, how does the media react? Ultimately, the Syrian Revolution is transformed into a Civil War, meaning the uprising of the Syrians has officially turned into the Syrian Winter. Eventually the first revelation of chemical weapons' usage brings Syria to the headlines again. All these news stories, although each complicated in its own right, are intertwined and therefore were deemed necessary to the corpus in order to be able to capture the evolution of the media coverage on the Syrian Uprising.

***Tunisia Mohamed Bouazizi (05/01/2011-21/04/2011) and Tunisia- President Ben Ali flees (14/01/2011-20/06/2011)*** - a corpus on the Arab Spring could not be complete without the event that is said to have literally and practically ignited the flame across the other Arab countries. What is most remarkable about this event is that the young man who sparked the revolution in Tunisia and perhaps even other countries, was not actually covered by local or international media initially. The story of a young man frustrated with a complicated legal system and trying to make a living, who burnt himself in front of a government building, spread like a fire across the Arab world, before eventually being reported to the West (Fisher 2011). No footage of this story by international channels was found, and yet it remained significant, therefore news stories later produced that were related to Bouazizi were included in the corpus. Included in the corpus were also news videos of the Tunisian leader's eventual downfall.

***Yemen- President Ali Abdullah Saleh leaves (29/03/2011-16/08/2011)***- Including Yemen in our news corpus allowed for the inclusion of two countries in North Africa (Tunisia and Egypt, categorised with Syria further north in the Middle East) and three countries in the Gulf (Yemen, Saudi, Arabia and Bahrain). The main event focussed on in Yemen was the departure of the Yemenis' leader post demonstrations. However, the media was able to cover different points in time when Saleh left Yemen and these coverages are included in the news corpus.

In conclusion, the events selected for our corpus cover various events of the Arab Spring but also encompass the aftermath in some countries. Where one should draw a line between the country's uprising and the aftermath is not necessarily agreed upon by everyone. For example, some may consider Egypt's spring to only be the downfall of Mubarak, whilst others may say that Morsi's downfall was part of the same spring, which only took longer to occur. Also, in Libya, the conflict may be regarded as an international one by some, whereas others may

consider the rebels in the conflict and the capture and killing of Gaddafi to be part of the Libyan uprising. Therefore, though we title our corpus to be representative of events of the Arab Spring, we are conscious that some of the events may be considered as repercussions of the events of the Arab Spring.

### Searching and Storing Data in the Corpus

Once the criteria for the corpus was set, then the search for the selected events began. Videos of the listed events were downloaded from YouTube using the software iLivid so as to store them onto an accessible drive. Although YouTube and Google belong to the same company, YouTube did not share the same usability features on its search engine meaning that searching possibilities were quite limited. For example, we were unable to search by date and had to rely on keywords alone when searching for videos within the specified channels on the platform. Anyone can create a channel on YouTube and upload videos to that channel. News outlets have therefore also created official channels on YouTube. Therefore another search option was to go through playlists that our chosen news outlets had included in their YouTube channels. It was also necessary to conduct general searches on YouTube, without drilling into the news channel, because news outlets sometimes did not publish all broadcasts onto YouTube, but some YouTube users had uploaded news videos of our interested outlet onto their own YouTube channels for free access. In other cases, general searches on Google and other search engines yielded better results. General searches on other search engines led to discovering whether a story was covered by the news outlet in form of articles, photos or videos and perhaps only posted on their website or another platform rather than on YouTube. This was rare, but it was encountered. Unfortunately, videos on websites other than YouTube could not be recorded onto another hard drive due to technical boundaries. But transcriptions of these videos were still made and included in the news corpus.

With regards to the selection made out of the videos found per news story of interest, it was decided to focus on news videos that featured news headlines, brief reports, including live reports and short interviews. It was decided to stay away from long (over 10 minutes) news videos that included a lot of unplanned discourse or silence. Documentaries and debate programs aired by the channels were also avoided as much as possible. This allowed for a systematic selection process, also used in Grounded Theory. The aim was to gather as many videos as possible, but it was also important that the news stories could be analysed using limited resources and time dedicated to our research.

With regards to Press TV, it was realised that short reports could not be the only focus as it was found that the channel had a tendency to integrate analyst or expert opinions in much of their

headlines. Therefore, even though a systematic approach was desired, the fact that each channel had different production content, meant that one would have to be flexible in the selection procedure. Already, even prior to analysing the corpus, it was clear that not all channels covered the news in the same manner and this would be represented in the news corpus. Despite data collection being a research phase which can be outsourced by the researcher, we take the stance that researchers should participate in the data collection phase, as this is where our familiarisation of the data begins. Selection criteria that once seemed realistic to the corpus also changes based on what can be found.

Each news video was saved into an appropriately named folder labelled by channel and then by event. This way, it was easy to find the videos and transcribe them systematically. The news corpus therefore was designed as such: \Corpus\Video Corpus\Euronews\Videos Bahrain Saudi Troops enter Bahrain\Feb 22 2011 Army and police join Bahrain protesters. The news corpus was stored on several devices to ensure it was kept safe and is provided in the digital appendix submitted along with this thesis.

## Transcribing News Videos

Transcribing the news videos was a necessary step in Content Analysis. So as to conduct a systematic analysis of the videos collected, it was necessary that these videos were transcribed in methodically. After researching and trying various transcription software, which would automatically transcribe the news videos, it was discovered that automated transcription is never completely accurate and that software that included fancy tools such as slowing down the speech on the video took up a lot of temporary memory on the computer, therefore slowing down the computer. Therefore, the method used was to play the videos directly from their location on the internet. The news videos sometimes featured an automated transcription that could be activated in form of subtitles- including mistakes. However, it was not possible to simply copy the transcript/subtitles and just edit it. Methodically, a YouTube window and another Microsoft Word window were opened, side by side for the transcription process. They were set up on opposite sides of the PC screen so that they each had equal space on the screen to work on simultaneously. This could work even better if one had an extra computer screen. There was then constant toggling between the pause and the play buttons on YouTube while transcribing word for word, sometimes with the aid of the YouTube transcriber. It has to be said that video publishers on YouTube are expected to check and fix the subtitle transcript, which is automatically provided by YouTube, because there are often several mistakes. However, news outlets did not always review the YouTube transcriptions and using unverified video subtitles proved to be more of a disadvantage than an advantage sometimes, because of the fact that there

were several accents and speaking mannerisms that could not be properly captured by the transcribing software. Researchers also have the option of outsourcing the transcribing phase of the project to transcribing experts who are very professional and quick, therefore speeding up research limited in time. The downside of using transcribing experts is that they can prove costly to research projects and are not always reliable. However, as stated earlier, the corpus construction phase is of essence to begin familiarising oneself with the data. Researchers who also choose to transcribe the text will further familiarise themselves with the video content, allowing them to make better project decisions. For example, during the transcription phase, it was found that several selected videos had been misinterpreted after having been selected based on their YouTube titles alone (and the preview image featured online). Therefore, the news video was discarded from the corpus and another was searched for to replace the one taken out. Had a transcriber simply transcribed the videos, they would not have informed the researcher that the news videos did not represent their selection criteria. Also, while transcribing the videos, notes were taken on a side document to include elements that stood out in the way the news was presented, therefore allowing for the analysis process to begin using our adopted grounded theory approach.

Transcribing the videos took on a systematic approach, whereby a Microsoft Word template was created and this template was used to create one transcription per news video, which was then included in the same folder of the news video of the corpus. The template included specific fields that had to be entered each time a news video was transcribed, for example: video title, channel, date, headlines, length, the actual transcript, etc. The transcription template also requested that the following information be including for each transcription: person speaking, in voice over or to the camera, whether it was an interview, the location of the journalist, the footage description and whether a language other than English was overheard. Such information was included in addition to the actual words spoken by the news video participants. Transcription meta-data, such as the speaker's tone or hesitations, was not included in our research. Because we wanted to build a corpus that included as much data as possible, we also included other elements that would be researchable in future related projects. These items were also noted in our database, but were not included in our analysis for this particular research project<sup>31</sup>. It should be noted that because manual video transcriptions took place, this allowed for better coding of data in the next stage of the research.

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<sup>31</sup> For example, screenshots of metadata, such as specific statistics offered both by YouTube or the website on which it was published were also taken and included in the transcript: number of likes, dislikes, shares, and speed at which audience reached peak. Screenshots were opted for in this case as graphs of statistics were actually provided by YouTube and these graphs did not include exact numbers, but it was thought that they could be interesting at the analysis phase. Also YouTube user comments, if any, were copied and pasted into the document and also into a separate text document in case they would be of interest to this or future studies.

## Data Coding of News Videos

Once all the data was transcribed, the data had to be analysed, and in order for analysis to begin, coding of the data had to take place. In terms of devising the categories for coding, Rose defines coding as “attaching a set of descriptive labels (‘or categories’) to the images” (Rose 2014, p.90). Rose insists that the coding categories should be *exhaustive, inclusive* and as suggested by Slater (1993: 236) *enlightening*, in that all image aspects should be covered by categories, these categories should not overlap and these categories should provide classifications of the image so as to be able to provide interesting and coherent analyses (Rose 2014, p.91). The coding of the images with the devised categories was done in such a way that it would be replicable by any other researcher with the same data set. Rose suggests that to have replicable coding of images, one must come up with straightforward coding categories that are clearly defined (Rose 2014, p.96). It is for this reason that definition of each code was clarified prior to coding the videos, as can be seen in the Analysis chapter. During the coding of the videos, it was noticed that certain codes were ambiguous and so they were redefined. It was decided to record the coding onto a computer spreadsheet, using Microsoft Access, so as to be able to make quantitative analysis easier and more easily identify interesting data from the data once brought together or looked at from different angles.

Using Grounded Theory, it was thought necessary at this stage, to gather as much information from the transcripts as possible into a quantitative database. Gunter (2002) discussed the use of *concepts* in quantitative research that have been applied to this research. This study for example tried to identify *concepts* – defined as “an abstract idea that embodies the nature of observable phenomena” (Jensen 2012)– by looking at various elements in the news videos published by news outlets online. It was then decided to combine several concepts so as to come up with constructs for the videos studied. In order to quantify these concepts, variables (or fields) were created for each concept and each variable was further divided into attributes. The Content Analysis for this research had both dependent and independent variables. Fields were specified into a database so as to extract information from the transcripts into a format that could be analysed quantitatively. Fields included: channel, country, video length, coverage type, footage of...etc. The field responses were pre-defined for analytic purposes with specified codes, except for fields with varying entry possibilities such as “video length”. For example, the field “channel” could only have one of the following responses: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, France 24 English or Euronews English. Also, some field entries allowed for multiple responses, for example “Footage” could yield several responses, such as “Military and Demonstrations”. Following is a detailed list of all 31 fields/codes (variables) and their possible attributes/codes:

<b>Content Analysis variables and their attributes for the News Video Corpus</b>	
<b>Variables</b>	<b>Attributes</b>
1. TVChannel	AlJazeeraEnglish or EuronewsEnglish or France24English or PressTV
2. OnlinePublisher	YouTube or TVChannel Website or Other
3. WebsiteChannel	Enter data
4. UploadedBy	TV Channel or Other User
5. VideoTitle	Enter data
6. DateUploaded	Enter data
7. ListHeadlines	Enter data
8. VideoLength	Enter data
9. CoverageType	Headlines, Interviews, Live, Reportage
10. Interview(s)	Yes or No
11. InterviewType	Relevant Event Actor, Topic Expert, Correspondent
12. JournalistLocation	Same city/country of event, neighbouring country of event, studio, UK, US, France, Other, location undisclosed
13. Language	Arabic, English, French, Other
14. NoOfComments	Enter data
15. NoOfShares	Enter data
16. CommentsAre	Allowed, Blocked
17. NoOfViews	Enter data
18. NoOfLikes	Enter data
19. NoOfDislikes	Enter data
20. NoOfSubscriptions	Enter data
21. QuestionTypes	Questions unheard on video, questions with/out background information, what, why, who, where, how questions
22. JournalistPresentation	Voiceover, presented to camera, no journalist
23. ApproxSpeedtoReachPeakInDays	Enter data
24. ViewersPeakReached	Yes, No
25. Emotions*	Crying, frightened, suffering, laughing, no emotion detected <i>*This field was later omitted because it proved difficult to identify the emotions in all news videos.</i>
26. NewsPresentation	Internally presented video footage, text headlines, external video footage without sources, amateur photos, figures with/out sources, percentages with sources, photos with/out sources, quotes, statement with/out sources, video footage (amateur source un/disclosed), video footage state/international TV
27. Country (of event)	Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya
28. Event	Enter data
29. Footage of	UN/Human Rights rep, British/French/Iranian/US/Russian rep, dead/death, destruction, explosion, violent riots, peaceful demonstrations, public speech, press conference, military equipment
30. ApproxSpeedtoReachquarterofViewsinDays	Enter data
31. Footage in	Bahrain, Egypt, France, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, US, Yemen, Unknown, other African/European/Middle Eastern country, other

Table 2 Content Analysis variables and their attributes for the News Video Corpus

Once the database was completed using Microsoft Access, the information was then copied into Microsoft Excel<sup>32</sup>, so as to run queries using PivotTables. Results of the analyses can be found in chapters 3 and 4.

#### II.4.1.2. Dominant Institutions Corpus

As noted earlier, Content analysis does have its limitations, for example Gunter indicated that Content Analysis that is purely quantitative has been challenged because quantitative may mean that the “hidden meanings conveyed by media texts (see Merten 1996)” may be missed by the researcher who focusses only on numbers, rather than a more qualitative aspect (Jensen 2012). Indeed, this limitation, was felt early during the coding process and it is for this reason that it was decided over the course of the research to go further than the Content Analysis of the news videos. Consequently, it was decided to also do a Qualitative Discourse Analysis on the news videos.

Fairclough sees discourse as a representation of the elements in the world we live in and states that discourse is “ways of representing aspects of the world- the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs..., and the social world” (Fairclough 2003, p.26), therefore discourses are only representations of our perception of reality (Fairclough 2003, p.124). Based on this outlook on discourse, it is therefore necessary to compare different discourses of real events and try to understand the relationship between the various discourses of the same life event, as is done for the thesis by comparing various representations of the Arab Spring by various international media<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) such as Atlas.ti and Alceste are often recommended for a GT approach as these tools will often identify the common themes that researchers will want to explore in theory building. We explored the use of Tropes and AntConc as well as Word Cloud generators, findthehashtag (for tweets) and NVIVO but found that these tools which were powerful in detecting themes in a text but could not take over the role of the researcher especially in multimedia texts like ours. Certain elements would sometimes be overlooked, such as: sarcasm, tone, irony, grammatical mistakes in international news videos containing people speaking different languages and the essence of language in addition to images in a screen. Using Excel and Access allowed us to do necessary factorial analysis through the use of queries, filters and pivot tables.

<sup>33</sup> Discourse can be identifiable in “dialogue, argument and narrative” (Fairclough 2003, p.68). The narrative genre is of particular interest to our research as we are interested in how different narrators present the same story in different ways. Fairclough introduces the concept of texts having “casual effects”, as they contribute to changes in society. Studying discourse can therefore enable us to study ideologies, because knowledge can be changed using different discourse and therefore have an effect on society’s beliefs, attitudes and even values, so much so that Fairclough stated that “texts can also start wars, or contribute to changes in education, or to changes in industrial relations...”(Fairclough 2003, p.8). Just like discourse, “ideologies are representations of the world” and they contribute to “maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination...”, therefore ideology can be perceived as a “modality of power”, as opposed to a “descriptive” perception which sees ideology as “positions, attitudes, beliefs, perspectives... of social groups without reference to relations of power and domination between such groups”. Based on Fairclough’s view of ideologies being representations that affect social relations of “power and domination”, textual and discourse analysis should be built around social analysis of power and domination. It is for this reason that this thesis does not study the texts alone, but also the text producers.

As stated earlier, in following with critical discourse analysis, rather than only build a corpus of news videos (produced texts), we also built a ‘corpus’ of dominant text producers. This ‘corpus’ identified the dominant discourse producers as all the possible institutions that had an influence on the news that was produced in our news corpus. Basing our results on content analysis alone would limit our findings to the way in which the news was presented. Understanding these dominant discourse institutions would allow us to complement our content analysis with an understanding of the text producers. We divided the dominant discourse institutions into two fields: (1) international media organisations and (2) public information institutions.

### International Media Organisations

The objective of studying the international media outlets in detail would allow us to answer (RQ1) how the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring.

The first dominant media intuitions studied were the ones that produced the news videos in our news corpus: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English. In order to build data on these institutions, specific information was searched for on each of the news outlets. It was however noted that some of the news outlets had very limited information about them; this was therefore complemented using semi-directive interviews.

	Organisation Structure	News Gathering Process	Arab Spring Coverage	Staff Training & Security
Al Jazeera English	X	X	X	X
Press TV	X		X	
Euronews English	X	X	X	
France 24 English	X	X	X	X
AFP	X	X	X	
Crowdspark	X	X	X	X

*Table 3 Research on International Media Organisations*

As stated earlier, basing our research only on the news output news outlets had produced would be very limited and this is why we thought it was necessary to understand the organisation structure, the news gathering process and coverage during the events of the Arab Spring. As analysts, we cannot take on journalist roles and presume to understand the choices made by journalists, until we have taken the time to know the journalists and the organisations they represent. This information would enable us to understand ‘why’ news outlets decided to present the news in certain ways.

To go even further, we also included other media organisations in our research of dominant institutions. AFP was taken as an example of how other professional news agencies work and CrowdSpark was taken as an example of how news agencies with user generated content work. Similarly, we tried to gather information on the organisation structure as well as the newsgathering process, coverage of events of the Arab Spring and any training. There are of course other dominant institutions which have entered the new journalism model, notably news agencies that verify news from citizen journalists, but we decided to limit our media institutions to AFP and CrowdSpark.

After gathering as much information as possible on the media institutions, we then attempted to establish interviews with the dominant institutions, so as to ask questions to which we could not find answers from our desk research.

#### *Interviews with Media*

Early on in the qualitative discourse analysis, questions began to arise as to why certain decisions were made by mainstream media. Rather than answer these questions from the point of view of an outsider to the news videos produced, it was thought that it would be best to get an insider's point of view, by speaking to professionals from mainstream media. As stated earlier, it was decided to focus on organisations that take part in news production, from the professional media agency to the citizen journalist agency all the way to the news outlet itself. Studying news flow was not the basis of this study, however it proved to be informative with regards to how news moved from one organisation to the next before finally being presented to the news audience. The aim was not to understand the perspectives of these individuals working for media organisations, but rather to understand how news was sourced, presented and diffused to audiences worldwide.

We can refer to our interviews as *respondent interviews*, whereby the interviewee is indeed a representative of an organisation, rather than an individual speaking for themselves only. Jensen explains that respondent interviews are used in qualitative studies with individuals who will represent a certain social group (Jensen 2012). In the case of this research, the social group is not per se a social group but rather an organisation and our interviewees represent journalists from different types of media organisations. Wengraf states that the "...'semi-structured depth interview' normally involves the interviewer in a process of both model-building and model-testing, both theory-construction and theory-verification, within the same session or series of sessions" (Wengraf 2001, p.4). This applies perfectly with a grounded theory approach that involves the search for a grounded theory. Semi-structured interviews must be very well-

prepared and therefore require input from the researcher before the interview so that the interview is successful. A large number of questions had to be prepared before the interview. In some cases, questions had to be improvised during the interview based on the narration or responses of the respondent. Jensen advises that there are three main elements of interest to researchers when conducting interviews for qualitative studies: duration, structure and depth (Jensen 2012). The duration of our interviews varied from interviewee to interviewee lasting between thirty minutes up to one hour long.

**Interview 1 Euronews:** This first interview held with the Bureau Chief, Stephen Gilet, of Euronews based in Lyon, France, took place on the phone in French. The objective was to gather information from Euronews with regards to how they sourced their news, how they edited the news, how they presented it and finally how they diffused the news. An interview with Euronews was necessary so as to understand how news events were perceived by Euronews journalists, selected and packaged, before finally being presented to audiences; four main aspects of news representation. Particularly interesting with Euronews is the fact that it is a multi-language set of channels and therefore, it was interesting to understand how Euronews English differentiated itself from its sister channels in news production.

The interview lasted thirty minutes long at the request of the respondent. Reaching out to Euronews took place via email and yielded positive results after an intern replied the interview requested and provided me with the email address of the news team. The head of the news team was interested in participating in the research and therefore contacted me to do the interview over the phone. The interview was successful in that the respondent explained very clearly how Euronews as an organisation worked in relation with its various language channels when it came to news production<sup>34</sup>.

**Interview 2 AFP Bordeaux:** The news agency has a very significant role in the news gathering process of news outlets and therefore in order for us to understand how news is gathered, it was important for us to go to one of the large professional sources in the news industry.

Establishing contact with AFP Bordeaux was done easily via email, as the Bureau Chief was happy to respond to research questions. This second interview took place in French in AFP Bordeaux offices with the AFP Bordeaux Bureau Chief, Pierre Feuilly, who had previously worked in different parts of the world with AFP as a journalist and also as a Bureau Chief. As

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<sup>34</sup> Post interview, I tried to get in touch with other departments in Euronews, such as those in charge of distributing news online, so as to understand the process of online news distribution/production during the Arab Spring, but was unsuccessful at establishing any further interviews. It is important to note that what guided our research was the information we were able to access.

the Bureau Chief was accessible in terms of visiting the AFP office for a physical interview, the meeting was quite relaxed and therefore lasted over an hour long. The interview was informative in that the respondent shared detailed information on the way AFP works, specifically with regards to how news stories were sourced for this particular news agency. However, specific information about coverage of the events of the Arab Spring was not shared, as the Bordeaux office had not been directly involved in covering the events of the Arab Spring. My contact in AFP Bordeaux kindly shared the contact of AFP Beirut's Bureau Chief who was in charge of news in both Syria and Lebanon.

**Interview 3 AFP Beirut:** Speaking to AFP Beirut's Bureau Chief and international correspondent Sammy Ketz, was made possible via my contact in AFP Bordeaux. Our objective was to learn how international correspondents of AFP perceived news events during the Syrian Uprising, before then representing their perceptions to AFP's Middle East bureau in Nicosia. The interview was conducted over the phone in English as the person was based in Beirut. The interview which lasted about 45 minutes long was rich with information for our thesis in terms of news production from the point of view of a news agency's international correspondent. The objective of this interview was to understand how AFP gathered news for their clients during the Arab Spring, especially from countries such as Syria who had banned international journalists<sup>35</sup>.

**Interview 4 CrowdSpark/Citizenside/Newzulu:** Once we had gathered information from a professional news agency, it was thought that it would be important to understand the working methods of media agencies working with amateur citizen journalists. We recognised the significant role of citizen journalism in both activism and the flow of news, especially when mainstream journalists could not access some areas. Such events had called for the need of citizen journalism news agencies. Our objective was to understand how citizen journalist agencies gathered material for mainstream media from amateurs around the world.

I was able to speak with Laura Placide, the Editor in Chief of Citizenside/Newzulu (now Crowdspark). The interview took place in English over Skype and lasted thirty minutes long at the request of the respondent. The interview was beneficial to our research as we learnt about the news gathering and production methods of the agency.

**Interview 5 former International Correspondent, Al Jazeera English:**

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<sup>35</sup> I tried to establish other interviews with AFP's photojournalists, so as to understand how the material selection procedure of AFP, and also the Middle East AFP Head Office, so as to understand how they gathered news from the Arab World, before finally distributing the final packages to their clients, but was unsuccessful.

The objective of interviewing an international correspondent for AJE was to understand how news was perceived by a mainstream channel's international correspondent and then understand how news was packaged and delivered to their head office. Still thinking about news flow, it was important for us to understand the role of news agencies such as AFP, and other news sources, when there was already a journalist on location. After having learnt through AFP's international correspondent and Citizenside, that some places were simply inaccessible to journalists, the question of journalist training in zones of conflict and censorship was of interest and therefore we attempted to answer these questions in the interview.

Speaking with Al Jazeera was extremely challenging. After trying to get in touch with the Paris office, I was told on several occasions by the same individual that there was so no one in the office to speak with me, eventually no one picked up on the phone, and at one point the phone number was taken out of service. I also tried speaking to Al Jazeera in London, who told me I would have to speak to Qatar directly, which I tried several times, only to be sent to an answering machine. I tried contacting several journalists via Twitter, Facebook and email, but most ignored my requests. Eventually, I was able to get in touch with Al Jazeera's former Senior Analyst for Social Media, who shared some information on how the staff were trained to use social media, but was unwilling to do a full interview. I was also transferred to the current person in charge of social media at Al Jazeera, but he too was unwilling to speak to me. Eventually, after the story of the Al Jazeera journalists imprisoned in Egypt for over 400 days caught my interest, I decided to contact the imprisoned journalists that had been released. One of the three journalists I tried contacting, Peter Greste, who had been imprisoned in Egypt, responded to my request for an interview via Skype. He was able to give me information on his job as an international correspondent, his relationship with the Al Jazeera English newsroom in Doha and how he managed his safety in a tense country.

**Email Interview 6 Head of News Gathering, Al Jazeera English:** The second person who agreed to give me information on news gathering from AJE was Heather Allan, the former Head of News Gathering from Qatar. Although we were unable to set up an interview, questions were sent and answered via email. The objective was to fill in the blanks between what the international correspondent had shared with me as a journalist sending news to Qatar, and the actual airing of a news package from Qatar, once the news was received from on-location journalists.

**Interview 7 former Freelance International Correspondent, France 24:**

Our objective in speaking to a freelance international correspondent for France 24, based in Libya during the Libyan Uprising and then at the death of Gaddafi was of interest to us as the

journalist was able to guide us through her news sourcing procedures as a freelancer, explaining how news was perceived, verified and finally presented on France 24. Questions of training and censorship were also of interest to us.

Getting in contact with France 24 was quite challenging. I sent several emails to various departments and journalists at France 24 and also tried contacting several journalists on social media. I also tried calling France 24 and was told to send an email request, which was sent several times, but unfortunately I did not hear back from the head of news production in France 24. Instead, using my news corpus, I sought the names of journalists in the France 24 videos and searched for them online. One freelancer, Marine Olivesi, responded to my request and kindly dedicated over 120 minutes of her time to an enriching interview with me. The freelancer who spoke to me was able to answer many of our questions on news production and the roles of various actors in international news flow. She was also able to put me in touch with a permanent France 24 international correspondent.

### **Interview 8 International Correspondent, France 24:**

Our objective in speaking to a permanent international correspondent for France 24 was to understand whether there were any differences in news produced from a permanent staff and freelancer's point of view.

Speaking to the David Thomson was interesting to our research, as we were able to fill in the blanks with regards to head office news production that the freelancer was unable to fill in. We were also able to compare the differences between being an independent and permanent international correspondent for France 24.

The questions selected for all the interviews replicated our research questions and were as follows:

- i. What was the sourcing and selection process of news stories by *[your organisation]* during the Arab Spring?
  - a. Informers?
  - b. Press agencies? Citizen journalism press agencies?
  - c. Citizen journalists directly?
  - d. How do you verify these sources? (software, direct contact?)
  - e. Other channels (eg: Al Jazeera)
- ii. What was the production process of news stories by *[your organisation]* during the Arab Spring?
  - a. How did you decide what to use in terms of footage, images in terms of image angles but also image content (violence, etc)

- b. How did you decide how to present the news to your audience and your clients?
- iii. How was news diffused amongst media channels during the Arab Spring? (news agencies, social media, apps, client dashboards, how was this decided...).
- iv. Do you know what the sourcing, selection and production process of news stories by international channels during the Arab Spring was? (e.g.: Al Jazeera English, France 24 English, Euronews English and Press TV)
- v. How has international journalism evolved with Web 2.0?
  - a. In terms of news production (sourcing, selecting, producing and diffusing news)
  - b. In terms of news consumption by the audience
  - c. In terms of the relationship between journalists and the audience
  - d. In terms of the role of journalists (for example, correcting of false information, educating the public)
- vi. What challenges does international journalism encounter with Web 2.0 and how are these challenges counteracted?

*Table 4 Planned Questions for Semi-Directive Interviews with International News Organisations*

These questions evolved after delving deeper into the research (by speaking to some journalists, by looking at the corporal data and by reading about both the media institutions and the media context of the countries) so as to include the following questions:

1. What type of training, if any did you as a journalist for this organisation receive?
2. What type of training, if any, do you give your journalists/freelancers/activists?
3. How do you ensure your safety as a journalist?
4. How did you deal with issues of censorship and self-censorship by either the country you were reporting from or the institution you were reporting for?
5. How did you deal with ensuring the full story of the Arab Spring got coverage?
6. Why did event simplification take place in the Arab Spring?
7. Why did event ambiguity take place in the Arab Spring?

*Table 5 Interview Question Evolutions in Semi-Directive Interviews with International Media Organisations*

The interviews were all recorded and transcribed so as to be analysed by looking for specific themes of interest related to international news in the context of the Arab Spring.

The main challenge all the journalists brought up in the interviews were barriers put in place by the countries where they worked in. The barriers were related to the media context in terms of freedom of speech and press as well as security. It was therefore decided that we would look upon each of the countries covered in our news corpus as public information institutions and study them doing thorough desk research.

Public Information Institutions

The ‘corpus’ created on the public information institutions was created in the objective of answering (RQ1) how they affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring.

Each of the countries covered in our news corpus was included in this data corpus so as to understand the information and communication context as well as the country’s freedom of access and speech context and finally the local press of the country. The following table outlines the information included in the public information institutions’ corpus.

	Information and Communication Context	Freedom of Access and Speech	Local Press- Professional and Amateur
Bahrain	X	X	X
Egypt	X	X	X
Libya	X	X	X
Saudi Arabia	X	X	X
Syria	X	X	X
Tunisia	X	X	X
Yemen	X	X	X

Table 6 Information Gathered on Public Information Institutions

Information gathered for this corpus was done using desk research primarily. Reports by international organisations on the press and media landscape of the various countries were researched, read thoroughly and compared for veracity so as to gather and then analyse each country’s: information and communication context, freedom of access and speech as well the country’s local press. The results can be found in chapter 3.

**II.4.2. Corpora Analysis using CDA**

The analysis of our corpora was conducted in the aim of answering our three research questions: RQ1: How did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? RQ2: How were the events of the Arab Spring represented in

form of news stories? RQ3: How was contributed material used to construct international news stories?

In order to answer RQ1 and RQ2, we used the qualitative corpus on dominant institutions so as to understand the various dominant institutions of information in the various countries covered in our corpus. This allowed for an understanding of the media context of each of the countries and any existing barriers to information flow during the events of the Arab Spring. We were also able to study the news outlets from our news corpus as well as news agencies so as to understand their news gathering processes. Additionally, we were able to study the ways in which each of the news outlets presented the events of the Arab Spring by analysing our news corpus. To answer RQ2, we were primarily concerned with how the events of the Arab Spring were presented, based on the information in our news corpus. Therefore, through content analysis, we were able to refer to our database, which included all the codes transferred from each of the news videos. This allowed us to easily find out the number of news videos per channel as well as the news video publication platforms. Also through our content analysis database, the countries represented in the news videos were noted. The events represented in the news videos were also noted. We had also noted the coverage type per news video, allowing us to understand whether there was a preference for pre-packaged stories, live coverage or interviews. Our content analysis database also allowed us to understand the voices and the pictures of the Arab Spring. For example we were able to identify the international voices present in each of the news videos, ranging from Iranian and Russian representatives to British and French Representatives as well as American representatives used to report the stories of the Arab Spring. We felt this was important based on orientalism so as to understand whether the stories of each of the 'oriental' countries were told by them or by others and therefore this helps us understand if the stories of the people in the 'oriental' countries are properly represented. In our content analysis, we had also taken into account the location of the footage in the news footage and tried to identify whether events were covered with footage from the location of the event or from other locations. Looking deeper into the footage, our content analysis was also able to note the different types of footage per event, ranging from violent riots and peaceful demonstrations to public speeches and press conferences. We also noted footage featuring military equipment, destruction and death or suffering. This allowed us to better understand how the events of the Arab Spring were represented, for example, were they presented as violent conflicts or peaceful uprisings? Our analysis then attempted to explain the results of our qualitative and quantitative content analysis by referring to information we had gathered on and from the dominant institutions of information.

Through content analysis, our research also noted the use of interviews so as to understand who was being interviewed and how they were being interviewed so as to cover events from the Arab Spring. For example, we looked at interviewee types, ranging from correspondents to relevant event actors and topic experts. When analysing the interviews in our news videos, we decided to look further than a content analysis. We were also interested in the ways in which each interviewee profile's interview was presented in the news video. In order to do this, we had to conduct discourse analysis by following Gillian Rose's recommendations, which are representative of Foucauldian notions of discourse with power. Rose uses her own terminology to break down Foucauldian notions of discourse and distinguish them into two methodologies she entitles *discourse analysis I* and *discourse analysis II*. In discourse analysis I, Rose prescribes first looking at material with fresh eyes so as to "forget all preconceptions you might have about the materials you are working with", consequently "...the material may offer you insights and leads that you would otherwise have missed" (Rose 2014, p.210). As prescribed by Rose, we looked at news videos with fresh eyes, several months after having transcribed and built the corpus. This allowed us to look at the material with fresh eyes so as to be "immers[ed] ...in the material" (idem), watching the videos several times, sometimes with the help of the transcription to ensure no information was missed out. Once we decided to identify the "key theme" of interviews, it was easy to find the news videos that contained interviews as well as the news videos that contained interviews with a specific interviewee profile, because our content analysis had been very well prepared. In fact, our content analysis framework enabled us to identify some trends that we were able to use to reach some analysis results. But because we wanted to go further and identify trends in the news videos containing interviews so as to propose theories in interview presentation, grounded in data, we decided to also use discourse analysis. Using discourse analysis, by watching the news videos several times, enabled us to "recognise both the visible and invisible" (Rose 2014, p.218). For example, the absence of the journalist in an interview can be construed as working to ensure that audiences focus on the interviewee and lose sight of the fact that the news reportage is a production that has been prepared for audiences. Watching the news videos several times, even after building a content analysis framework therefore enables us to "pay attention to the details" (idem). Finally, the analysis also focussed on the question types, ranging from 'how' and 'why' questions to 'what' and 'who' questions, as well as questions with or without background information or simply unheard questions. This information was analysed both individually and then collectively within the news corpus and also complementarily with the corpus of dominant information institutions to reach valid conclusions. The results of our analysis can be found in chapter 3. In order to answer [RQ3] how contributed material was used to construct international news stories, we focussed primarily on the corpus of news videos referring first to the content analysis

framework and then building on critical discourse analysis. As already stated, Van Dijk proposes that analysts take a standpoint and not be neutral in critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1993, pp.270–274). The standpoint we took was that material was contributed to media outlets and media outlets constructed the news with contributed material. The other research standpoint is that contributed material is constructed in a news video to give a specific media effect in audiences. Therefore, our analysis of the news videos searches for specific media effects of the contributed material. For example, we searched for news videos containing contributed material from amateurs and we identified the role of each of the contributed material. What was its significance to the news video? What would change in terms of media effects if the contributed material was taken out? We also sought for trends in which the amateur material was presented so as to propose a theory. We were also able to look at other contributed material in the same way, for example: contributed quotes, contributed figures and percentages and material from State TV.

The consecutive analysis chapters are broken into two chapters so that the first provides the analysis and results of RQ1 - how the dominant institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, and RQ2 - how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories. The second analysis chapter provides the analysis and results of RQ3 - how contributed material was used to construct international news stories?

## **II.5. Methodology Conclusion**

Through our methodology chapter, we have highlighted how, with a carefully constructed corpus of already broadcast news videos on events of the Arab Spring, we were able to answer our research questions, while also proposing theories grounded in data. Similarly, another carefully constructed corpus on dominant information institutions, including desk and field research of mainstream news organisations (Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English, France 24 English, AFP and Crowdspark) and the public information institutions of the seven countries covered in the news videos from our corpus, also enabled us to answer our research questions. The objective of the Methodology chapter was to outline the research approach adopted throughout our research, while also highlighting and explaining the analysis methods selected and adapted to our study, before outlining our theoretical framework and then detailing how our research evolved from exploratory research into detailed findings based on collected data. In essence, this chapter served to help readers understand what tools were used in

conducting our research whilst also giving a detailed explanation of how the tools were used and why they were used. In order to achieve these objectives, the Methodology chapter was segmented into four large sections: (1) Research Approach, (2) Analysis Methods (3) Theoretical Framework and (4) Research Development. The chapter outlined the ways in which the three research questions were answered: [RQ1]: How did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? [RQ2]: How were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories? [RQ3]: How was contributed material used to construct international news stories? This methodology conclusion serves to summarise the most significant elements of each of the large sections of the Methodology chapter so as to guide the reader in their journey throughout our research.

## Research Approach

Our adopted research approach of Grounded Theory, initially proposed by Strauss and Glaser (Glaser 1967; Strauss & Corbin 2008) is an inductive research reasoning that encourages the use of systematic procedures in the identification and arguably also the verification of theories. Such an approach would enable us to identify any problems in the news based on significant data. Taking on the Grounded Theory “approach to theory building” through “emergence” whereby “the design, like the concepts, must be allowed to emerge during the research process” (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.33), would enable the theories to emerge from data we had collected, rather than base theories on previous biased perceptions.

Although the Grounded Theory concept is well rooted in the sociology field (Glaser 1967, p.2), it is widely applied by various disciplines, (Faggiolani 2011, p.4592E–7), including media communications. Also, other media communications research project have also used Grounded Theory (Pugh 2010), (Wilson & DUNN 2011), (Abdelmoula 2012). One can also propose that Grounded Theory is applied by journalists, who go out in search of grounded theories to present in the news with the material they are able to collect.

Theory construction using a Grounded Theory approach enables researchers to both validate existing theories and search for news theories so as to develop theories.

The general recommendation to Grounded Theory research is that there is “no preliminary literature review” and “no predetermined research ‘problem’”(Christiansen & Simmons 2014) so that the research is not “stifled” or rather, biased, by the literature (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p.49). Corbin and Strauss, however, recommend that researchers do use literature, but they should use knowledge in specific ways. In our research, we followed Charmaz’s recommendation and did a literature search after having looking at our data so as to “strengthen

(y)our argument” and “credibility” (Charmaz 2006, p.166). This enabled us to inject literature throughout our thesis, whereby the literature serves as tools to construct our thinking.

## Analysis Methods

Since we would be building a news corpus, and following the Grounded Theory approach, it was decided that both quantitative and qualitative analyses be conducted on our corpus so as to generate “objective data” from a large amount of texts (Rose 2014, p.82). Therefore, quantitative content analysis was applied to our news corpus, so as to be able to study the media output produced by the international news channels in our news corpus. Content Analysis enables us to focus on various content types in a media text, rather than only focussing on speech. Therefore, we were also able to extract information surrounding our texts to include in our content analysis, such as the participants in a news video or even the footage featured in a news video

In following Rose’s recommendations on content analysis, the texts were first sought, then we coded the selected texts before finally analysing the results of these codes (Rose 2014). Our news corpus uses only a representation of news stories covered during the events of the Arab Spring by our four mainstream channels: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English. Certain criteria was decided upon in selecting news videos to include in the news corpus and these have been further elaborated upon in the Research Development section. We have however, also noted some shortcomings to content analysis. Specifically, we were unable to record complex text significations into our content analysis tables and had to provide complementary qualitative analysis. Jensen (Jensen 2012, p.103) refers to the ‘qualitative’ form of content analysis as ‘discourse analysis’ and this has been further developed into critical discourse analysis (CDA) so as to also study the relationship between the language of a text and its role in producing or reproducing ideology. In our research, we recognised that dominant relationships existed in the countries that had uprisings, whereby the governments and the media had more power over the people in representing the events of their revolutions. This explains why our corpus also covered the information institutions (dominant institutions) of the Arab Spring.

## Theoretical Framework

In order to understand how reality is perceived, we considered several theories stemming from communication and information theory, starting with Schramm’s proposal that human communication chains are functional because humans will learn and therefore perceive

everything based on their previous knowledge, therefore making perception unique (Schramm 1964). Our theoretical framework also includes Russell's recommendation that our past history has influences on the way in which we perceive current events. Russell's identification of six 'menmic phenomena' that represent human responses based on their history, ranging from acquired habits and habitual knowledge to images and association, as well as non-sensational elements in perception and memory as knowledge (Russell 1921, p.45), certifies that perception is unique and specifically based on previous knowledge and experiences. Devèze and Moles (Schramm 1955; Devèze 2004)also believes that perception is unique and can be understood through Gestalt Theory.

In order to interpret reality, one needs to first perceive it. We also include Moles proposition that humans are determined by their environment (Moles 1968 translated by Joel E. Cohen) and suggestion that people are transmitted in time and space through messages, such as the news, which have two spatial and one temporal dimension. The experience that a receptor undergoes when watching the news is a modification in the receptor's environment as they are transmitted into the environment of the transmitter; this experience is referred to as the vicarious experience by Deveze (Devèze 2004, p.191). Goffman's belief (Goffman 1974, p.504)that narrations enable participants to "vicariously" experience the narrator's story also supports Moles and Deveze's proposals.

On the other hand, we have also included Hall's insight, which states that messages do not transform realities, but messages can mediate realities (Hall 1973, p.95) and furthermore, messages are polysemic and can therefore have various media effects on different audiences. This leads us to recognising the Active Reception Theory, which puts forward that audiences, just like journalists, are active in their unique perception of events. Similarly, Jakobson suggests that to encourage effective communication, familiar language should be used to introduce new concepts and this too should be applied to news production.

Narrative theory is also included in our theoretical framework. For example, Barthes' different narrative codes can be used to decode texts and he also suggested that meaning is a negotiation between narrator and audience (Fiske 2011, p.81).

Our theoretical framework also goes out of the field of communications to understand the perception of reality using Berger and Luckman as well as Watzlawick and Von Glaserfeld. Berger & Luckman claim that reality is subjective to each person (Berger & Luckman 1989) and Watzlawick proposes that the way we see things is a result of our understanding of the world (Watzlawick 1984).

News is firstly defined as team effort of processes resulting in a narration, which is the product. We argue that although news is supposed to be a reflection of reality (Harrison 2005, chap.1;

Cook 1998, p.72), news will also be constructed to deliberately promote certain interests (Herman & Chomsky 1988; Benson 2006).

Our theoretical framework identifies the different news narrators by referring to Galtung and Ruge's international news flow, whereby they identify (1) the journalist in the field, (2) the local news agency, (3) the district bureau, (4) the central news agency, (5) the receiving district bureau, (6) the receiving local news agency bureau, (7) the news editor of the news outlet and (8) the newspaper layout person (Galtung & Ruge, 1962). Our theoretical framework also notes changes in news narrators in the news flow according to Maxwell Hamilton & Jenner which today includes (1) foreign correspondents, (2) parachute journalists, (3) foreign foreign correspondents, (5) premium service foreign correspondents and (6) amateur correspondents (Maxwell Hamilton & Jenner 2004, p.314). Van Leuven has since introduced the idea of the information gates being permeable (Van Leuven et al. 2015, p.3) due to the 'network society' that Castells proposes (Castells 2011; Castells 2015). Van Leuven et al develop the 'network society' so as to understand the 'paradigm of network journalism', whereby journalists are simply information nodes in a 'shared information space', along with other information nodes, such as bloggers, tweeters and other informers (Van Leuven et al. 2015, p.4). Our aim with this information was to understand the news flow actors proposed in previous studies so as to compare them to our retracing of the news actors in the news flow during the events of the Arab Spring.

Our theoretical framework also argues that despite all the news actors –or nodes- in news flow, one cannot call news a co-constructed product. News is a product made up of several contributed information, but the contributors of the information do not work together to produce a specific narrative. In order to build this argument, we first define co-construction through Jacoby & Ochs, who state that there is a "joint creation of a form" (Jacoby & Ochs 1995, p.172). We also note that co-construction, according to literary theory from the Bakhtin Circle, states that texts are the result of previous texts and hence we provide an insight into various studies of co-construction. For example, some research has been conducted on children utterances and how they are a result of co-construction with their parents and care-givers (Ferguson 1964; Brown 1977; Cross 1977). Also, some research has been dedicated to interactions in human beings and how humans construct meaning based on co-constructed interactional events (Goodwin et al. 2002), (Ochs et al. 1993). Similarly, Diakhaté and Akam examined the use of Facebook in the co-construction of knowledge in students (Diakhaté & Akam 2016). There is in fact a claim that the world is socially constructed. However, we note that Fairclough warns that the terms 'construction' and 'construal' are sometimes interchanged. And in fact, the world is socially construed, but not socially constructed (noting that we tend to construct what we construe) (Fairclough 2003, p.8). Jacoby and Ochs also caution that acknowledging co-

construction is inevitably placing the same level on construction responsibility on every participant in the narrative construction. Our problem with placing the same level of responsibility on each participant in the news flow is that it takes away the journalist's accountability in news validation. Unfortunately, not all information given to journalists will be accurate, and therefore we believe that it is the role of the professional journalist/organisation to ensure that information is accurate before it is broadcast. We also believe that all contributed material should be labelled with sources so that audiences can have accurate perceptions. For this reason, our research includes an in-depth study into news videos with contributed material, whereby we identify the ways in which contributed material is integrated into the news videos, whilst also identifying their role in the narrative.

Because our theoretical framework defines news to be the product of news processes, we also seek to understand news production (Tuchman, Gaye Jensen 2012)<sup>36</sup>. We include Domingo's five-stage model of news production, starting from observation and selection to processing and editing as well as distribution and interpretation (Domingo et al. 2008).

Although in our news definition, we state that news is a reflection of reality, we also note that there are some influences on news production, which will affect news narratives. Shoemaker and Reese also proposed a theory of news content with five levels of news production influence, ranging from individual media workers and media routines to organisation, extramedia and ideological levels.

News narratives function as "interpretative frames" to make the world "intelligible" (Larsen 2012, chap.8). We also follow Entman's recommendation that "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text" (Entman 1993, p.52). Our theoretical framework therefore also includes Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, which proposes that news organisations select news on specific filters ranging from the media organisation's size and wealth as well as the advertising income, to the source reliability, flak and anti-communism. They warn that it is more challenging to spot propaganda when the media are private bodies and "formal censorship is absent" (Herman & Chomsky 1988, p.11). We include Edith Efron's study on selection procedures in 1972, which identified 33 rules to "network editorialising", ranging from selectivity glamorisation to miscellaneous techniques (Efron 1972). Also, Branigan identified different narrator types in the news resulting in different news perceptions (Jensen 2012; Branigan & Buckland 2014). Larsent also proposed a narrative hierarchy the televisual news, depending on where journalists

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<sup>36</sup> Chapter 5 in *A Handbook of Media and Communication Researcher: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies* (2012)

were located and how they addressed audiences on the news (Larsen P, edited by Jensen 2012, pp.131–132).

In studying international news representation of the events of the Arab Spring, we have also included Edward Said's Orientalism in our theoretical framework, whereby Said defined orientalism as a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in the European Western experience" (Said 1978, p.1). Said had noted specific representations of Arabs in the media post-1973, which are of interest to our research. For example, he noted that Arabs were always shown in groups, rather than as individuals, also, Arabs are presented as one culture and always appear to be raging (Said 1978, p.287). More recent studies have confirmed that orientalism still exists in the news, for example, Trivundza found that Arabs were represented as potentially dangerous, irrational, backwards and in groups (Trivundza 2004). Studies post-Arab Spring have discusses the possibility of neo-orientalist representations of Arabic sin the news, whereby the Arabs in the uprisings were romanticised as educated champions who are not terrorists and who use social media just like the democratic West (El-Mahdi 2011). But other studies of narratives of the Arab Spring, have also found Said's orientalism, with frames featuring "stereotypes", generalisations and the Arab society represented as "finally" reaching "modernity" (Ventura 2017). Based on Said's definition of orientalism, we conducted an in-depth study into the voices of the Arab Spring by identifying the main narrators in the news discourses so as to know whether the stories of the Arab Spring were narrated by Arabs or by Westerners.

We have also added protest representation theories to our theoretical framework. We have looked at definitions of protest actions by Wouters, whereby she defines protests as "communicative acts to signal situations of injustice" (Wouters 2013). Protest paradigms, as proposed by Chan & Lee are considered as they provide a model for constructing news stories out of protests (McLeod & Detenber 1999). McLeod and Hertog also proposed categories for protest paradigms, including: narrative structures, official source usage, using public opinion and techniques to delegitimise (McLeod & Detenber 1999). Much research has noted that protests are framed as violent clashes, rather than narratives that try to hear the protesters' point of view (Cohen, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Murdock 1981; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Our research findings on how the events of the Arab Spring, some of them protests, were presented, can be compared to these findings.

## Research Development

In order to study how international news is produced, using an inductive approach, it was decided that a corpus of already broadcast news videos would be built. To narrow down

international news stories, the events of the Arab Spring were selected to constitute the context of our research. The events of the Arab Spring were selected firstly because I had been a keen spectator of the events televised on international channels, and therefore the events were of interest to me as a researcher; and as Charmaz indicates, no researcher truly comes onto a research project without any biases of their own even if literature is not consulted (Charmaz 2006). Studying similar events within the same period of time, spanning between 2011 and 2013 and covering countries that shared similar cultures and geographic regions would also constitute an interesting corpus for our research.

Rather than focussing on the news output of one particular international channel, we decided to build a corpus made up of four international channels. We did not want to base our findings on how international news was built based on the way only one international channel produced news. Therefore, it was decided to focus on international channels that broadcast in English with head offices in both the Middle East and the West. It was of course also significant that the news channels had broadcast the events of the Arab Spring. With regards to news outlets based in the Middle East that broadcast events of the Arab Spring internationally in English, there was not a wide selection to choose from; the selected channels Al Jazeera English and Press TV, enabled our research to include news videos internationally broadcast from Qatar and Iran, respectively. When searching for two international channels with head offices in the West that broadcast events of the Arab Spring in English, the choice was narrowed down based on accessibility to previously broadcast news videos, leading our research to focus on two news channels with head offices in France: Euronews English and France 24 English.

The aim of our news corpus was to be able to answer both (RQ2) how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories and (RQ3) How contributed material was used to construct international news stories. Our Methodology chapter outlines and details five phases in constructing the news videos: (1) sourcing the news videos, (2) selecting events to be included in the corpus, (3) searching and storing data in the corpus, (4) transcribing news videos and (5) data coding of news videos.

Up to five arenas to sourcing the news videos were explored, ranging from trying to get access to physical or online archives to public platforms such as libraries. The option of purchasing broadcasts was also explored. All these arenas had their limitations in that buying broadcasts proved to be very expensive, public platforms did not have any recordings of the news outlets of our research and getting in touch with news outlets to get access to their archives was challenging. Most of the news videos in our news corpus were sourced from YouTube, the video sharing platform that both individuals and media corporations use. Other news videos were found on the official website of the news outlets and few were found on DailyMotion and Shiaanet.

In building the news corpus, the “Arab Spring” as a context was too large and too vague. It was decided that specific events from different times and different countries should be selected based on what some media (Reuters 2012) had stated to be the most significant events of the Arab Spring. Very limited literature research was conducted prior to selecting the events to be included in the corpus, so as not to cloud our research perspective. The news stories selected for the corpus are: (1) Bahrain- Saudi troops enter Bahrain (17/02/2011-21/03/2012), (2) Egypt- Morsi grants himself unlimited powers and then coup (03/01/2011- 13/07/2013), (3) Egypt- Tahrir square seized by the people (02/02/2011-21/11/2012), (4) Libya- Gaddafi killed (20/10/2011-24/10/2011), (5) Libya International Conflict (07/03/2011-19/07/2011), (6) Saudi Arabia- Women right to vote (25/08/2011-26/09/2011), (7) Syria- Assad makes first speech to Syria and the world (30/03/2011-31/03/2011), (8) Syria- Cabinet Resignations (25/03/2011-08/03/2012), (9) Syria- Declaration of civil war (08-06/2012-13/06/2012), (10) Syria- Ghoutta sarin attack (07/12/2012-05/12/2013), (11) Tunisia- Mohamed Bouazizi (05/01/2011-21/04/2011), (12) Tunisia- President Ben Ali flees (14/01/2011-20/06/2011) and (13) Yemen- President Ali Abdullah Saleh leaves (29/03/2011-16/08/2011).

It should be noted that the dates of these news events do not necessarily cover the actual event, but rather the date that a news broadcast was published by the news channel, for example, in some cases, news channels covered an event through its aftermath. It is not always clear what constitutes the “Spring” and the “Aftermath” of a country and therefore we are conscious that some of that some of the news events in our corpus may go beyond the actual “Spring”.

In order to search and store news videos to include in our corpus, detailed searches took place on YouTube by drilling into the news outlet’s YouTube channel, looking through their playlists and using the YouTube search engine, which although is part of the Alphabet company, does not share the advanced shared options of Google’s search engine. Videos found on YouTube could be downloaded using the software iLivid, but videos found on other platforms could not be downloaded and therefore these were simply transcribed, but may no longer be accessible online.

In terms of the news video selection criteria, required by a Grounded Theory approach for a systematic selection process, it was decided to focus on short news videos under 10 minutes long including headlines, brief reports and short interviews. The aim was to gather as many news videos as possible that would be analysable using the limited resources and time dedicated to this project. Each news video was saved into an appropriately named folder labelled by channel and then by event. The news corpus therefore was designed as such: \Corpus\Video Corpus\Euronews\Videos Bahrain Saudi Troops enter Bahrain\Feb 22 2011 Army and police join Bahrain protesters.

Transcribing the news videos was a requirement of Content Analysis and therefore the news videos were transcribed manually using a transcription template. Various transcription software were explored and it was concluded that they would never be completely accurate, because of the various accents and grammatical mistakes found in international news videos with participants from all over the world. Also, the transcription phase kicked off a pre-analysis exercise enabling us to take notes of interesting elements in our corpus that were later used in our analysis. Furthermore, some news videos were noted as not representative of the research criteria only after having watched them and this allowed for the news video to be eliminated from the corpus so that it could be replaced. Relying on search engines alone to build a corpus is not enough; news videos need to be watched as well. For example, some video titles posted by online publishers do not always reflect the video contents and including data in our corpus that was irrelevant to the research criteria and then using it in our analysis would have contributed to inaccurate results.

The transcription template included fields such as the video title, channel, date, headlines, length, the actual transcript, etc. and also included instructions to transcribe the person speaking, in voice over or to the camera, whether it was an interview, the location of the journalist, the footage description and whether a language other than English was overheard. The manual and detailed transcriptions enabled us to carry on with the next phase of the research process, data coding.

Rose's data coding was followed by "attaching a set of descriptive labels ('or categorises') to the images" in the corpus (Rose 2014, p.90). Following grounded theory approach, the coding phase tried to gather as much data as possible from the transcripts so as to know what the analysis could focus on, because the analysis could only be determined based on the available data. The content analysis coding framework used 31 dependent and independent variables with possible attributes/codes specified into a Microsoft Access database so as to be able to extract information from the texts in our corpus into a format that could be analysed quantitatively. The variables, ranging from TV Channel, Date uploaded and interview type to journalist location, news presentation format and footage location and content are noted in the Methodology chapter.

In addition to the news corpus, a dominant institutions corpus was also constituted. This 'corpus' of the 'dominant text producers' was built to firstly identify the dominant discourse institutions that had an influence on the news that was produced in the news corpus. Working with only a quantitative content analysis would have limited the findings to only understanding how news is presented, whereas understanding dominant discourse institutions would enable us to complement the analysis with an understanding of the text producers. Therefore, the

dominant discourse institutions identified are (1) international media organisations and (2) public information institutions.

The objective of building a corpus on international media organisations was to answer (RQ1) how the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring. The dominant media organisations were categorised into news producers of the texts in our news corpus (Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews English and France 24 English) and news agencies. Specific information was sought to understand the news producers of the news videos, including the organisation structure, the news gathering process, their coverage of the events of the Arab Spring and information on staff training and security. The data gathering approach used initially only focussed on the organisation structure, the news gathering process and the coverage of the events of the Arab Spring. The data gathering approach included both desk research on the dominant institutions and this desk research was further complemented with semi-directive interviews with people representing the organisations. During the semi-directive interviews, it was found that the topic of staff training and security was of essence to news production and therefore this was included in the analysis phase. The semi-directive interviews initially planned to focus only on news production questions, ranging from the sourcing and selection process of news stories to the production and news distribution processes of the organisation. These questions then evolved to ask about the type of training the journalists received prior to working in dangerous zones. Questions about safety, censorship and event simplification or event ambiguity were also asked based on information provided by some journalists during the interviews.

In order to answer the noted questions, eight established contacts were made with journalists representing the dominant institutions of information. Six semi-directive interviews were held, while two informal questionnaires by email were used so as to gather information from the dominant institutions of information. One interview was held with Euronews France's editor in chief, Stephen Gillet, who discussed the various news production procedures of the international news outlet. Also, interviews were held with two France 24 international correspondents, with different contracts: one, Marine Olivesi, was a freelance journalist and the other, David Thomson, worked fulltime for France 24. Both journalists were able to highlight the different working procedures of the news outlet, which had notable differences depending on the journalist's contract with the outlet. They both also highlighted issues of story simplification and ambiguity in news production. Another interview was held with Al Jazeera English's former international correspondent, Peter Greste, who explained the role of an international correspondent working for AJE in a dangerous zone. Also an email interview was held with former Head of News Gathering from Doha, Heather Allan, who explained the news gathering procedure in AJE's newsroom. Furthermore, Al Jazeera's Senior Analyst for Social

Media provided me with information on how Al Jazeera put social media in place. We were unable to set up any interviews with Press TV. However, it was decided that to further understand the news flow, it would be necessary to speak to news agencies as well and therefore an interview was held with the AFP editor in chief of the Bordeaux and Beirut offices. Bordeaux's Feully provided information on the news gathering and production process of AFP in general, whereas Beirut's Ketz provided detailed information on news gathering during the events of the Arab Spring from Syria. An interview was also held with Citizenside's (now CrowdsparK) editor in chief of the Paris office, Laura Placide, who explained how the agency gathers news from citizen journalists around the world. All interviews were transcribed for analysis purposes.

All the journalists interviewed agreed that the main challenges in news production were related to freedom of speech and press and also pointed out security barriers mainly rooted in the countries they were reporting from. It is for this reason that it was deemed necessary to also study the public information institutions of the various countries covered in the news corpus.

The 'corpus' created on the public information institutions was created in the objective of answering (RQ1) how they affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring. Each of the countries included in the news videos: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, were studied via desk research so as to understand the information and communication context as well as the context regarding freedom of access and speech and the environment of the local press, including both professional and amateur press.

The methodology outlined was used to answer the three research questions, [RQ1] How did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? [RQ2] How were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories? [RQ3] How was contributed material used to construct international news stories? The Analysis chapters are broken into two chapters so that the first provides an analysis and the results of RQ1 and 2, whereas the second provides the analysis and results of RQ3.

Both RQ1 and RQ2 were answered using the qualitative corpus of the dominant institutions of information. Studying the dominant institutions of information enabled us to study the ways in which each of the news outlets from our news corpus had presented the events of the Arab Spring. In order to answer RQ2, content analysis using our news corpus database enabled us to find out the number of news videos per channels as well as the news video publication platforms. Content analysis provided information on the events represented in the news videos as well as coverage type per news video so that we could understand news outlet preferences in terms of pre-packaged stories, live coverage or interviews. Our research analysis also identified the international voices present in each of the news videos, whereby Iranian, Russian, British, French and American representatives were pinpointed in the news videos so as to seek

for frames of Said's orientalism. To further seek frames of orientalism, the analysis also focussed on the footage and journalist location. Still looking at the footage, the analysis also sought for different frames of the Arab Spring ranging from violent riots and peaceful demonstrations to public speeches and press conferences.

Content analysis also enabled us to understand the use of interviews in international news, whereby we were able to note the interviewee profile preferences as well as preferred question types. Discourse analysis, by watching the news videos several times along with transcriptions so as to recognise elements of importance, such as trends to propose theories in interview presentation, grounded in data.

In order to focus on answering [RQ3] how contributed material was used to construct international news stories it was necessary to do content and discourse analysis using the news video corpus and then expand the research to a critical discourse analysis by also studying the dominant information institutions so as to complement the content and discourse findings. The standpoint taken was that all news is produced with material contributed from various sources of information. Therefore, our thesis researched the different roles of various contributed material ranging from contributed quotes and amateur footage to figures and percentages as well as State TV footage.

The consecutive analysis chapters are broken into two chapters so that the first provides the analysis and results of RQ1 - how the dominant institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, and RQ2 - how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories. The second analysis chapter provides the analysis and results of RQ3 - how contributed material was used to construct international news stories?

# **III. The Dominant Institutions of Information**

As per Van Dyke, cited in our methodology section, a critical discourse analysis must also study the dominant institutions in a society. Therefore, we took a conscious decision to study the different ways in which the chosen channels from our news corpus reported the various news events of the Arab Spring so as to understand how each channel reported the news. Of course other dominant institutions existed during the events of the Arab Spring, for example, governments and leaders as well as opposition factions including activists and/or rebel fighters. One could also study the schools, universities and cultural institutions of a country such as theatres, galleries and the film industry, as all these establishments contribute to building discourse and supporting ideologies in a society. However, we are primarily concerned with how news is constructed by international media and therefore, based on collected data, we are able to study how the international news channels in our news corpus have constructed the events of the Arab Spring. But our analysis is not solely grounded on data from our corpus, which is of course limited in the number of news videos per channel. Rather, we have decided to complement our data with desk research on our main channels: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews and France 24. The desk research on these channels allows us to understand the ways in which these organisations are set up and the ways in which they report the news. In addition to the desk research on our dominant institutions, we have also carried out interviews with journalists from AJE, France 24 and Euronews. No interviews could be conducted with Press TV despite promises from the Press TV newsroom to respond to my request. However, interviews were also conducted with AFP and Crowdspark.

Furthermore, there is also a consecutive section dedicated to desk research on the various countries covered in the news corpus, whereby the state of the media and information and freedom access are also taken into account in international news flowing from the countries.

# **III.1. The Dominant Media Institutions of Information**

The following section details the corpus of data we were able to collect on the dominant media institutions of information in the Arab Spring, by gathering desk and field research in form of interviews and news videos from our news corpus. This section is followed by a corpus of data on the dominant public institutions of information covered in our news corpus, before finally providing an analysis into: RQ1 - how the dominant institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, and RQ2 - how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories.

This section is subdivided into six main sections: (1) Al Jazeera English (2) Press TV English (3) Euronews English (4) France 24 English (5) Professional News Agencies and (6) Citizen Journalist News Agencies.

## **III.1.1. Al Jazeera English**

### **III.1.1.1. Al Jazeera Organisation and Structure**

Al Jazeera English was launched in Doha, Qatar in 2006, as part of the Al Jazeera Media Network, which at the time was made up of over ten channels and divisions, the first of which, Al Jazeera Arabic, was founded in 1996 after the closure of BBC World's Arabic language channel. In a region, where much of the media was owned or co-owned by diverse political parties and despite being a state-financed broadcaster, similar to the BBC, AJ Arabic proudly claimed to be the first and only independent news channel in the Arab world. The channel was respected by many who knew the broadcasters and anchors from BBC Arabic. Also, unlike many rather respectful and polite Arabic news channels, Al Jazeera's journalists dared to be critical and demanding in their questions to both political and religious leaders. Marc Lynch describes Al Jazeera as being a key catalyser in the "transformation of the information environment in the Arab world", which opened up "a news space for political communication, breaking the ability of states to control the flow of information, and producing a new kind of Arab public sphere" (Lynch 2011). Today, in 2019, Al Jazeera owns over 70 bureaus around the world, broadcasting with a team of over 3,000 people representing over 70 nationalities to

over 310 million households in over 100 countries<sup>37</sup> and the network now has up to 20 channels<sup>38</sup>. Shawn Powers describes the AJ Network as “a hybrid of East and West, North and South, old and new, global and local, private and public” (Powers 2010).

Despite AJ’s success as a broadcasting corporation and the respect they received from many, the corporation also received criticism. According to Stebbins (2008) “Qatar’s decision to go global by launching Al Jazeera English in 2006 is the single largest down payment—approximately \$1 billion – in international broadcasting history” (Powers 2010). The principal financier being the Emir of Qatar, some have analysed the opening and maintaining of the broadcasting corporation to be politically strategic with the aim of granting Qatar an international role (Nishapuri 2011).

Western audiences who remember watching Al Jazeera between the late 90s and early 2000s associate Al Jazeera with Osama Bin Laden, the founder of Al-Qaida, because the channel agreed to broadcast video tapes from Bin Laden himself. This led many officials to criticise Al Jazeera for being anti-American and also encourage “Islamic militancy” (Kafala 2003). So much so that Al Jazeera was actually targeted by US weaponry on several occasions, and can therefore be said to be regarded as an enemy by the US. Al Jazeera grew in popularity as they were the only outlet receiving and broadcasting videos of Osama Bin Laden post 9/11 and they also broadcast the US invasion of Afghanistan; Al Jazeera was the only media outlet that had any access to the Taleban in Afghanistan (BBC News 2001). In 2011 a US missile hit the Al Jazeera offices in Kabul as well as the homes of some Al Jazeera employees during the US invasion of Afghanistan. In 2003, the Al Jazeera’s electricity generator in Baghdad was bombed by a US missile, killing reporter Tareq Ayyoub and wounding a member of staff. In 2005 a memo was leaked to the press including minutes to a discussion between US President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair; whereby Bush suggests bombing Al Jazeera’s headquarters in Qatar, but is persuaded by Blair not to act on these suggestions, but all allegations by the press were denied by the White House in a Press Briefing (The White House President George W. Bush 2005). In 2003, AJ covered the US/British invasion of Iraq, which

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<sup>37</sup> AJE is accessible via satellite and cable providers around the world and also provides access via their mobile news platform app available on both iPhone and Android OS. AJE is also accessible on Smart TVs and various consoles ranging from Apple TV and XBOX to Virgin media and Amazon fireTV, to name a few. AJE news can also be accessed via global partners such as Apple news, Yahoo News and AOL, among others. AJE can also be accessed on sound apps such as Soundcloud and Audionow and publish on social media including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Finally, AJE also publishes newsletters sent to interested audiences (Al Jazeera, 2017).

<sup>38</sup> Some of the TV Channels under the AJ Network include: AJ Arabic, AJ English, AJ+, AJ+ Araby, AJ Balkans, AJ Mubasher, AJ Documentary. The network has also established the AJ Media Training and Development Center as well as the AJ Center for Studies. AJE has three main news dedicated programmes, which include live, in-depth news or analysis of news events with experts or other interviewees: Newshour, News, Inside Story and Newsgrid. In addition to these news programmes, AJE also airs TV shows related to difference news events: The Stream, The Listening Post, Talk to Al Jazeera, The Big Picture, Counting the Cost, Upfront, earthrise and Empire. AJE English also produces documentaries broadcast on the following programmes: Witness, AJ World, 101 East, People & Power, Fault Lines, My Tunisia, Al Jazeera Selects, Al Jazeera Correspondent and Rewind.

the US had dubbed as “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (El-Ibiary 2006). Former PM Tony Blair and the UK Forces Gulf Commander criticised Al Jazeera for broadcasting pictures of dead British soldiers, warning journalists against being part of “the Iraqi propaganda machine” (The Guardian 2003). The US also criticised Al Jazeera for airing footage of American soldiers who were captured or killed. But Al Jazeera responded that the US and UK media faced challenges in reporting on the war; AJ’s London Bureau Chief, Yosri Fouda, noted that for the first time Arab news networks had greater access to the news as they could access parts of Iraq that Western networks could not and therefore they enjoyed larger audiences than Western broadcasters<sup>39</sup>.

But Al Jazeera’s reputation has never been black or white in terms of governments and audiences. Al Jazeera’s General Director, Wadah Khanfar, in 2005, wrote an open letter to Bush and Blair, in which he noted the various rumours surrounding the channel. For example, because Al Jazeera was the first Arab channel to broadcast Israeli speakers, some Arab audiences said that the channel served to improve “Israel’s standing in the Arab world”, whereas others said that it was “a CIA mouthpiece designed to disseminate western culture among the Arabs”. Some said that Al Jazeera was “an international conspiracy to break up the Arab world by means of stirring up discord and creating problems for the Arab regimes” (Khanfar 2005)<sup>40</sup>. It seemed as though people from all sides were accusing the network of contradictory conspiracies.

One big critic of Al Jazeera in the Arab world has been Saudi Arabia and in turn Al Jazeera has been critical of the Saudi Arabian government. In 2017, Saudi Arabia and many other countries in the Arabian Gulf as well as Egypt abruptly cut off any diplomatic relations with Qatar and blocked access to Qatari news agencies including Al Jazeera. Saudi Arabia even shut down the local office of Al Jazeera Media Network (Youssef 2017).

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<sup>39</sup> Fouda also explained that pictures that AJ broadcast of the war was “a side of the war that they don’t want projected because it may affect public opinion in their country negatively” and that “western media is highly sanitised. You are not seeing what war, this war, is actually like”. Fouda also pointed out that here were double standards in what could be reported, because AJ had not been “criticised for showing pictures of Iraqi dead and captured”. Also, Al Jazeera referred to US and UK forces in Iraq as “invading forces”, whereas other Arabic stations, including the Iraq’s, referred to them as “forces of aggression” (Kafala 2003; Harman 2003). Indeed, in *Al-Jazeera and US War Coverage*, Samuel-Azran studies how AJ footage is re-used by American television channels since 9/11. Samuel-Azran found that US news networks “self-censored all counter-hegemonic news material from Al-Jazeera, without regard to the principles of objectivity and impartiality”, for example, the Afghanistan war was “framed as a targeted attack on the Taliban’s terrorists regime” (Belair-Gagnon 2011, pp.189–190).

<sup>40</sup> Khanfar also wrote of the notion that Al Jazeera being used as a mouthpiece for Bin Laden and the Taliban and said that some rumoured the channel to be financially supported by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and strangely enough, the channel has been condemned and criticised by both Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Donald Rumsfeld (Khanfar 2005)

## News Gathering Process

I had the opportunity of interviewing Heather Allan via email so as to learn about AJE's newsgathering process. Allan, former Head of News Gathering to AJE based in Doha during the events of the Arab Spring (who became AJ America's Senior VP in 2015), was able to give the newsroom perspective to our research. She explained that AJE news division is divided into News Gathering and News Output, whereby News Gathering is in charge of global coverage, the field teams and the foreign bureaus, and was in charge of bringing all news into Doha. News Output on the other hand, was the in-house news production team made up of writers, editors, in-house producers and reporters that prepared the shows and news to be aired from Doha. Allan explained that this set up is similar in the BBC, ITN and CNN, but with headquarters based in country of channel origin. This information has been translated into a news production flow of information diagram:




Table 7 Flow of News in Al Jazeera

Allan explained that in terms of sourcing information, Al Jazeera English worked with all press agencies and news professionals, such as AP, Reuters, AFP, BBC, NYT, The Guardian, local Arab Press Agencies, social media such as Twitter and Facebook and they also had their “own people” on the ground searching for news stories. She explained that Al Jazeera English did not use Citizen Journalism Press Agencies during the time of the Arab Spring, instead, they had their own bureaus staffed with their own journalists, who had their own sources on the ground. In terms of news verification, Heather Allan explained that this was done “on the ground and by the news desk in Doha, as well as the interview bookers/producers who booked guests for

air” (Allan 2017). In addition, Al Jazeera used an independent service called Storyful, which is used by many mainstream media outlets today.

In terms of media selection for broadcast, Heather Allan said that Al Jazeera English did not want to show “gratuitous violence, but we also needed to be sure we were showing the truth of what was happening on the ground”. In the end, the “cutting producer and editor” under “News Output” were the ones who would decide how the actual material would be edited in house. Also, to be noted is that field reports would arrive to News Gathering already edited by correspondents. It was also up to the News Output Senior Producer to decide what each news hour should look like, meaning if the news would be presented by a correspondent, in studio, with a journalist facing the camera and so on. The selection of lead stories would also be made by News Output and how these stories were edited in-house was decided by News Output. Therefore, if a field reporter or correspondent was required for a specific news programme, it was set up by News Output. Heather Allan did say however that packaging in-house was very rare as most news was received in Doha already edited by the international correspondent.

In terms of news distribution by Al Jazeera English during the Arab Spring, Allan explained that most material that came to Al Jazeera English was used only on Al Jazeera English. However all the AJ channels, websites and social media teams had access to AJ English’s material and could use it without taking permission. Also, field teams could publish material directly to the various social media platforms and websites. Allan explained news distribution was not the responsibility of only one person. Instead, there were three regular meetings daily attended by senior staff of all outlets and entities so as to communicate on what was happening or not happening in the newsgathering world. These meetings were the place to ask questions to discuss issues regarding coverage, logistics and usage rights. Other than these meetings, there is constant dialogue enabling for information to flow easily so that all players are aware of the news gathering world.

In my Skype interview with Peter Greste, former AJE international correspondent, based in Egypt at the end of the Arab Spring and then arrested in Egypt for his involvement with Al Jazeera, I was given details as to how AJE’s correspondents worked locally to produce international news. Greste explained that prior to going live on AJE, he would have a pre-conversation with the AJE’s head office in Doha to understand what the story focus would be. Having said that, Greste is adamant that the “words that come out of my mouth are my responsibility, and so I would never have discussed or agreed a particular set or form of words, or a particular position or policy” (Greste 2017). Greste, as the AJE correspondent on location, would however give the questions he was comfortable answering to the presenter in Doha, and there were cases when the presenter proposed the questions. But as far as Greste was concerned, there was no “editorial direction” in terms of how he would answer the presenter’s questions.

Greste explained – just as Heather Allan from News Gathering at AJE- that it was the reporters who would give story pitches to Doha, because of the simple fact that the reporters were on the ground; Doha could of course raise any issues they had with story pitches. But Greste explained that Doha’s power over a story getting done was just as powerful as his as a journalist covering the story: “But, again, because as a reporter it is my voice that goes on, I’ve got to be happy with that first and foremost. It’s up to me to deal with that. So, there are two sources of veto – the editor has a veto over it and I have a veto over it as well. If either of us decides that we don’t like what’s being offered or what’s being suggested then the story doesn’t get done” (Greste 2017, p.3). Greste explained that the next step after agreeing to a story pitch would be to go and gather the material for the story. After gathering all material, sometimes they found that some material was missing, but that would not block the journalists because they had other options: they could ask for library or agency material or they could even ask Doha to bring in interviewees to add to the story. For example, because the Muslim Brotherhood were labelled as terrorists after their downfall, journalists were not allowed to speak to them in Egypt. Therefore, if Al Jazeera wanted to get the Muslim Brotherhood’s side of the story, they had to ask AJE Doha to contact people from the Brotherhood on Skype. Questions to the Brotherhood over Skype would be provided by the Cairo based correspondents but the questions would be asked by AJE journalists in Doha via skype. The interview would then be sent from AJE Doha to the Cairo office for the Cairo team to include in their story package. Greste explained that reporters have a “script approval process, so the reporter writes the script, the script gets sent off to Doha, the script editors have a look at it, approve it and the approved script then goes back to the reporter who edits the story and sends it back” (Greste 2017, p.3).

Greste explained that due to his positive relationship with Doha, he tended to rarely have big changes to his scripts and therefore he would write the script and edit at the same time, so that when he got Doha’s feedback, he would only have to make a few “syntax” changes to the script and final package. The information gathered from the interview with Greste has been included in the AJE news flow diagram, which now covers the news flow between local and head office.




Table 8 News Output in AJE

In terms of news distribution, although Peter Greste was not involved in news distribution after having packaged and sent the news stories to News Output, he also confirmed Heather Allan’s stance that news produced for AJE would be accessible by the entire AJ network for use and to broadcast. Greste said that if any AJ services wished to use packaged material, “...they could translate them and re-broadcast them”. Greste explained that Egypt had banned Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera’s Mubashr Misr and therefore the AJE Cairo office “specifically asked several times to make sure that any of the stuff we produced for Al Jazeera English from Cairo

was not re-broadcast on either Al Jazeera Arabic or Mubashar Misr (also known as Egypt Live, which despite being shut down in Egypt continued to broadcast live online to Egyptians). That was because we were aware that those channels had been banned, and we didn't want to re-broadcast our material back on those networks" (idem). Indeed, broadcasting material from Egypt on those channels would show that Al Jazeera Arabic and Mubashar Misr had staff working without a permit in Egypt, especially because the material sometimes contained interviews with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Greste admitted that despite repeated warnings from the AJE Cairo Bureau, advice was not followed by the AJ network: "It is one of those things where what happens in principle ought to be quite straightforward, but sometimes that Wall of China, if you like, was breached and we complained about that quite a lot. What happens is that all of the material goes into the central servers and technically they are ring-fencing some stories off from other parts of the network, but it isn't as straightforward as it should be. I don't really understand the mechanics of it back in Doha. I do know that we asked for and it was generally agreed that it shouldn't happen, but sometimes it did" (Greste 2017, p.4). This breach of trust between the AJ network and AJE is what some have labelled as the reason behind the AJ journalist arrests in Egypt<sup>41</sup>.

## Staff Training and Security

In my interview with AJE's former Head of News Gathering, Heather Allan also noted that Al Jazeera English put in place training programmes for new staff, which included both new hires and freelancers, meaning that "as much as possible they [journalists] are given hostile environment training, and time in Doha to meet all the people they will work with and for" (Allan 2017, p.3). However, she also explained that freelancers come with a variety of different skill sets and therefore each freelancer would be handled differently. Of utmost importance to Al Jazeera English, in Allan's opinion, was the safety of their journalists. Therefore, story pitches from journalists/freelancers had to be approved by Doha before getting clearance to proceed. Risky deployments had to undergo risk assessment before any decisions were made on going forward. And this is why Allan explains that camera angles were not part of what they were "micro managed" to do. Furthermore, Allan explained "...the majority of our camera people including freelancers are professionals. They do what they do best without being micro

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<sup>41</sup> For further reading on the Al Jazeera arrests in Egypt, the reader can refer to:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/peter-greste-arrest-footage-leaked-al-jazeera-propaganda>

[https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/africa/egypt-releases-and-deports-al-jazeera-journalist-from-australia.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/africa/egypt-releases-and-deports-al-jazeera-journalist-from-australia.html?_r=0)

<https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/feb/18/peter-greste-bbc>

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/peter-greste-arrest-footage-leaked-al-jazeera-propaganda>

managed about how to shoot. Safety [was] always very important and we definitely had no-go areas and times” (Allan 2017, p.3).

According to Allan, there were various challenges in covering the various unique Arab Uprisings. For example, she explained that Al Jazeera English covered Bahrain “extensively, until we were totally banned and our staff threatened with immediate arrest and jail”. When it came to Egypt, Allan explained that AJE had a “fully staffed and functioning AJE bureau in Cairo, in addition we staffed up with many extra teams from around the world”. But Allan explained that safety was a big issue, whereby AJ staff experienced constant harassment from the Egyptian authorities including office clampdown and arrests. In Libya, AJE went in to the country “with many teams, both from the east, and from the west”. With regards to Saudi Arabia, AJ could “never get into Saudi to cover anything ever except the Haj and that would be extremely limited” (Allan 2017). Allan said “We covered Saudi like everyone else, from outside the country” (Allan 2017). When it came to Syria, AJE covered the uprising through Lebanon, but as the fighting escalated, “Syria was an absolute no-go zone for AJE....we would never be given a visa for Damascus although we tried often” (Allan 2017). The uprising in Syria had to be covered through other means as they could not have AJ E staff on the ground. Tunisia was the country with the least challenges to cover. When it came to Yemen, AJE had staff in the country to cover the uprising.

In my Skype interview with Peter Greste, former international correspondent for AJE who was arrested in Egypt for his work with AJE, he explained that he had already gone through a “hostile environments’ training” with Al Jazeera prior to coming to his mission in Egypt, for other missions in East and Southern Africa. He was also given a copy of the editorial guidelines of AJE. Greste explained that the training and editorial guidelines and policy were also given to him when he worked for the BBC. Greste explained that as AJE’s staff mainly came from the BBC and that AJE’s editorial approach was very similar to that of the BBC, the training and integration of new staff was also very similar to that of the BBC. Also, as Greste had never worked in Egypt and therefore had no deep understanding of Egyptian politics, he was asked to work closely with local AJE staff, such as Mohamed Fahmy and Baher Mohamed (who were also arrested at the same time as Greste in Egypt), but “also several of the other local producers and fixers...and always worked with their guidelines, their guidance and direction around where we should go and what we should be doing” (Greste 2017). In terms of journalist safety, Greste explained that in his opinion, “our role on the battlefield is as observers, not participants. If you carry weapons you really become a participant, even if that’s not the way you see things” (idem). He was therefore, very much against the idea of having to work with bodyguards, even though he had to in some conflict zones in Africa or even Baghdad, for example, where he explained even unimportant people would have to have bodyguards. Greste spoke of Canadian

journalist Amanda Lindhout and cameraman Nigel Brennan, who were kidnapped in Somalia when working without a bodyguard, and cameraman Mark Madler was shot in the back of the head while filming a political demonstration; Greste explained that such tragic examples were convincing enough on the need of bodyguards in certain zones when reporting the news. But despite these tragic cases, Greste said it was not automatically accepted by Doha for journalists to have bodyguards. Hiring bodyguards for journalists did not only involve serious change of policy, it was also seriously expensive. More importantly, as far as Greste was concerned, having a bodyguard tail you would have a huge impact on how you worked as a journalist, after all, you could not really work undercover, and you would be looked at differently by people on the ground who may have perhaps been willing to speak to you had you not had a bodyguard standing behind you. Greste did say that bodyguards were sometimes accepted by AJE, but it really was a process that required being “discussed at the very highest level...because it changes the nature of the journalism” (Greste 2017, p.6).

Greste explained to me that the challenge with working in Egypt as a journalist who mostly covered conflict zones, was understanding that unlike conflict zones, there were no “physical front lines, but there were ideological lines that made it very difficult for us to go into some areas” (Greste 2017, p.2). Indeed, working in Egypt in 2014, meant understanding that much of the pro-Government agents and supporters “...were anti-Al Jazeera and so it was very difficult for us to go into those areas and similarly we obviously couldn’t go into the middle of some of the protests- the anti-Government protests- and so we would always rely on those so-called citizen journalists” and Greste made it clear that in his experience citizen journalists were not neutral journalists and so they had to be careful about the information they used from the “so called citizen journalists”. He explained that citizen journalists are sometimes “embedded in one side of the other...and at the very least have a particular bias. Greste explained that the AJE Bureau in Cairo had come to build a network of contacts that they could rely on over time and for example worked with a news organisation called Rust, which was close to the Muslim Brotherhood. The AJE Cairo Bureau found that Rust’s images were “pretty solid” as they would always double check their news with other sources, either on social media or other news agents and always found Rust’s images to be factual. Greste explained that generally speaking, AJE would acknowledge the source of footage coming from citizen journalists.

### III.1.1.2. Al Jazeera Reporting events of the Arab Spring

Marc Lynch described AJ as a platform that “fuelled political protest movements, which used the Qatari television station to spread their messages, to break through domestic censorship, and to protect themselves from the worst of regime repression” (Lynch 2011). And Lynch says that although much of the protests of the Arab Uprisings were organised online using social media platforms, the revolutionary events of the Arab Uprising were “shaped by older media such as al-Jazeera” (Lynch 2011). Lynch also noted that AJ was ever present on Egypt’s streets to upload “videos of police brutality” so as to expose the abuse and tyranny of the Mubarak regime. Furthermore, Lynch notes that “The televised unleashing of government-backed thugs on Tahrir Square on February 1, 2011, may have ultimately cost the Egyptian regime more in international outrage than it gained in intimidation” (Lynch 2011). Lynch further insists on the significance of AJ in the Arab Uprisings when he states that “...almost every Arab country saw protestors adopting similar language and protest methods and competing for the same al-Jazeera cameras” (Lynch 2011).

Noura Alalawi writes of the significant role of Al Jazeera in Egypt’s first uprising (Alalawi 2015). Alalawi suggests that AJ’s 24-hour and real-time coverage, through their television channels, website and Twitter account did not only allow for the coverage of the Egyptian protests, but rather the coverage was able to “move past simple news presentation to becoming the representative of protestors, and the ‘organizer’ of the crowds coiling in the city of Cairo...” Alalawi also states that AJ reporters were dispatched to specific parts of Egypt where Mubarak had protestors, such as Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, so as to document and feature the voices of those against Mubarak on air (Alalawi 2015, p.22). It was also suggested by Yigal Carmon, the president of the Middle East Media Research Institute and former chief counterterrorism advisor to Israeli Prime Ministers Yithak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir that “Without Al Jazeera there would not be an Arab spring....It would have been killed if citizens in Tunisia and Egypt didn’t see what was going on” (Essaif et al. 2012). According to Galtung and Ruge’s international news values, the media first reports the words and actions of elite persons like the president of a country (Galtung & Ruge 1965). In a country, where the government is on the brink of no longer being official or at least not being considered elite by the mass, international media then begins to report the voices of the people.

Post-Mubarak Egypt did not take kindly to AJ’s presence and according to Khanfar, AJ was immediately banned in Egypt post-revolution. The AJ office was closed and correspondents were not allowed to move around Egypt. Even the AJ satellite channel covering Egypt was dropped from NileSat (Khanfar 2012, p.2). In 2013, Aktham Suliman spoke out about why he

quit working for AJ, saying that prior to the beginning of the Arab Spring, AJ was known as being “a voice for change”, but that this changed during the events of the Arab Spring and he felt that AJ had become “a platform for critics and political activists throughout the region. Now, Al Jazeera has become a propaganda broadcaster”. Suliman also explained that during the Egyptian protests against Morsi, AJ was often critical of protesters and claimed that Al Jazeera’s executives had “ordered that Morsi’s decrees should be portrayed positively and his opinion was that in Egypt, Al Jazeera was the “palace broadcaster for Morsi” (Kuhn et al. 2013). Kuhn et al also quotes a former unnamed Al Jazeera correspondent, "Al-Jazeera takes a clear position in every country from which it reports -- not based on journalistic priorities, but rather on the interests of the Foreign Ministry of Qatar" (idem). Suliman was not the only one complaining about Al Jazeera’s coverage. In July 2013, twenty two members of Al Jazeera’s staff in Egypt resigned for reasons related to the channel’s “biased coverage” in Cairo. Al Jazeera’s correspondent, Haggag Salama, who worked with Al Jazeera since 2003, resigned live on Dream TV (Arabic Channel), explaining that he was resigning because Al Jazeera was “inciting civil strife among the Egyptian people” and he wanted to “spare” his country and his “dignity and professionalism” by resigning (Dream TV 2016). Karem Mahmoud, an AJ anchor also resigned and told Al Arabiya “I felt that there were errors in the way the coverage was done, especially that now in Egypt we are going through a critical phase that requires a lot of auditing in terms of what gets broadcasted,” (Altuwaijri 2013).

Al Jazeera Arabic (AJ) was not the only channel of the network making the headlines. Al Jazeera English (AJE) also made the headlines in 2013 when three of their journalists in Egypt were arrested and accused of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in 2011 when their very own Mohamed Morsi was elected president of Egypt after Mubarak’s downfall, but after mass protests forced him to step down one year later, the new government labelled the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, not to be dealt with by any individual or establishment in Egypt. One of the arrested journalists, who I was able to interview, Greste, explains in a letter from prison in Egypt why the journalistic trade is so imperfect; what was once the elected ruling government party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, had suddenly been declared a “terrorist organization” [sic] by the new ruling government. This meant that AJE’s discourse had to change overnight, because “...even talking to them becomes an act of treason, let alone broadcasting their news...” Greste also provides a similitude with George Bush’s rhetoric post-9/11 “you are either with the government or with the terrorists” (Greste 2014). Greste hits the nail on the head with these words, highlighting an ever-present problematic in international journalism today. How are journalists expected to represent reality to their audiences if the perimeters of reality are predefined by governments and then changed by new governments? What once was the ruling government, is now the

terrorist. And because they are terrorists, communicating with them is treason. But how can society decide for themselves if this organisation should be deemed terrorist if they are not represented in the media? Greste further explained that handing out leaflets of the Muslim Brotherhood or even participating in anti-government protests would lead to imprisonment in Egypt for “spreading terrorist ideology”. Greste notes that despite being blamed for increasing violence in Egypt, post-elections, the Muslim Brotherhood remained the “single largest and best organized [sic] social and political force in Egypt. What then for a journalist striving for “balance, fairness and accuracy?” How do you accurately and fairly report on Egypt’s ongoing political struggle without talking to everyone involved” (Greste 2014)? In my interview with Greste, he told me that he thought governments were using “national security to chip away at freedom of the press”. He explained that “Anything that is a threat to ‘national unity’, can be defined as ‘terrorism’, and of course that often includes criticism or questioning of government policies. Greste explained to me that he felt that self-censorship had become a bigger problem than official censorship, because rather than governments censoring the press these days, they tend to use intimidation or terrorism charges so that journalists begin to censor themselves in fear that they will be reprimanded for sharing the truth (Greste 2017, p.8).

Egypt was not the only country to have issues with AJ during the Arab Spring; Tunisia too tried to suppress AJ’s coverage by shutting down their website for a long period of time and it was also difficult for AJ’s correspondents to move freely in both Tunisia and Libya (Khanfar 2012, p.7). Khanfar paid credit to the role of social media during such times, stating “these guys saved us. The images that started coming through YouTube, and started coming through Facebook, and their blogs, provides us with not only enough material but a new kind of material, material that looks more authentic, although we were reluctant to cover or to carry this material” (idem). Khanfar explains that the network was originally reluctant about sharing footage from online activists because of poor quality footage in terms of image quality of photos or shaky videos taken on mobile phones, but then he says that “I felt that the public like it more than they like the classic, traditional, beautiful shots of our cameramen and women”. Khanfar also noted the special advantage of using social media platforms meant that newsrooms were able to tap into “maybe tens and sometimes hundreds of videos of an event that is still happening. So you can cover this event at the same moment and at various angles...So definitely that saved us from the lack of video and the lack of presence or correspondents in various cities” (Khanfar 2012, p.8).

In fact, AJ had set up its citizen journalism portal [sharek.aljazeera.net](http://sharek.aljazeera.net) back in November 2008 and had since been receiving video footage, images and news from parts of the world where AJ could not easily access and had already tried using their citizen journalism platform along with Ushahidi, a platform allowing for organisations and individuals to gather data distributed by

SMS, email or web, in at least one conflict zone; the reporting of the Gaza War in December 2008 (M. Lim 2013, p.929). I communicated with AJE's former Senior Media Analyst, Boutaina Ezzaouia-Azzabi, so as to better understand how AJ used social media, but could not get a dedicated interview. I was however, informed that through Sharek, anyone could upload videos or photos, which could then be used for television broadcast by the Al Jazeera network. But Sharek was stopped in February 2011 just after the downfall of Egypt's Mubarak. Apparently, the content being submitted during the Egyptian uprising was too overwhelming to deal with. By 2011, nearly 56,000 videos were received, which meant that there were about 150 video uploads on a daily basis. Al-Jazeera staff were able to moderate all videos uploaded before sending usable videos to the newsroom; there are no indications as to how many were actually used by Al Jazeera. The highest number of visitors per country were: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Egypt and the United States and most visits are referrals from other sites. I was also informed that trainings were put in place in November 2010 by AJE's Social Media team so as to equip their newsrooms as well as their web departments. The trainings involved giving an overview of social media tools in a television and web broadcast environment and trained journalists on how to find sources and leads using tools and blogs like Flickr and Twitter. Staff were also trained on how to track events online in real-time by following specific people and building networks of resources. Media distribution via social media is also part of the training offered by Al Jazeera to their teams. Finally, the Al Jazeera teams were also trained on crowd sourcing and crisis mapping. By December 2011, at least 90 AJE staff had been trained on social media.

In an interview with Chatham House, AJ's former director, Wadah Khanfar admitted that traditional media was taken by surprise at the beginning of the uprising, so much so that he described AJ's coverage of Tunisia in the first few days of the uprising as being "very soft". Khanfar says that the media did not expect the protests to turn into a revolution because there had been protests in the past (Khanfar 2012, p.7). Due to Al Jazeera's extended network, they were able to get their hands on images of Tunisia's Bouazizi's self-immolation from Facebook. In Lim's documentation of the media coverage of Tunisia's uprising (Lim 2013, p.930), she found that that after footage and images of the immolation were posted on Facebook by Ali Bouazizi, AJ Mubasher broadcast the first reportage of the immolation (in Arabic) on December 17 in 2010, one day before Reuters delivered its first breaking news on the immolation (in English). Al Jazeera English then broadcast their first story on the situation in Tunisia three days later on December 20 and their reportage incorporated videos posted on YouTube by citizen journalists. On January 4 of 2011, Bouazizi died and the Tunisian Bar Association announced a general strike; AJ distributed a "massive number of smartphones" to people of Sidi Bouzid (Lim 2013, p.931) and also stayed in contact with citizen journalists in Tunisia

including Ali Bouazizi and Mehdi Horchani (Lim 2013, p.933). On January 5 when Bouazizi's funeral was held amidst government blockades, videos of the funeral were posted online by participants and then broadcasted by AJ. When the internet was shut down in various countries of the Arab Spring, AJ got their news through text messages and sound-bites. Mobile phones were also used in in Algeria after massive protests took place in Thala and Kasserine. "Activists put memory cards inside sneakers and threw the sneakers over the border to Algeria. From here, these cards were transported to Tunis to be uploaded online by activists in the capital and some eventually got to Al Jazeera's news desks (Ammar, 2011)" (Lim 2013, p.934).

With regards to the Libyan uprising and conflict, Noura Alalawi noted that AJ gave 24-hour coverage of all riots in Libya since February 2011 and then documented "Gaddafi's violent efforts to suppress these riots" as well as the internet blackout, and also presented the rebels' Libyan National Transitional Council and finally the conflict itself. Alalawi suggests that AJ's "extensive coverage" on Libya's uprising and conflict was "the product of the influence on the network of the Qatari's government's position of a clear support of the Libyan rebels", so much so that the Libyan regime "denounced" AJ's coverage as "political interference" and stated that AJ was selective in the groups and people they featured (Alalawi 2015, p.7). In an interview with DW.com, Aktham Suliman, who resigned from AJ, talked of his impressions of Al Jazeera's coverage of the Libyan conflict, where he felt that Al Jazeera did not highlight the killing of Gadhafi as being "unacceptable on human rights grounds...." Instead, he felt that Al Jazeera "...stressed the necessity of a revolution in Libya and the humanity of the revolutionaries, but said nothing about the murder of a dictator" (Allmeling 2012). Aryn Baker, Middle East Bureau Chief from Time interviewed Al Jazeera America's CEO, Al Antsey, on the choices made regarding news produced during the Libyan uprising. Baker asked why Al Jazeera used the rebel tricolour flag to mark its coverage on Libya instead of the official Libyan flag, which was only green at the time. Baker suggested that using the rebels' flag was a "loaded symbol", but Al Anstey replied "We chose the tricolor [sic] because it illustrates the dynamic of the story. There are so many people challenging the authority of a dictator who has been in power for 42 years, and using the old flag is a symbol of the challenge to that regime" (Baker 2011).

Baker points out that despite three months of pro-democracy uprisings in Bahrain with brutal crackdowns by the monarchy on the largely Shia protesters, "Al Jazeera has been largely limited to brief mentions and a backstage examination of why the world's media has been so slow to cover the events there". Baker asks if there is a "double standard effect", because similar uprisings in Libya and Egypt were given much more coverage time by Al Jazeera. Baker reminds us that "Qatari troops are in Bahrain, part of a Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council effort to squash any notions of democracy in a region defined by Sunni monarchies. And Al

Jazeera is largely funded by Qatar's Sunni ruling family" (Baker 2011). Noura Alalawi also noted that AJ as a network was very "silent" about the Bahraini uprising allowing for the Qatari government's "propaganda and misinformation". Alalawi explains that AJ's inactivity in Bahrain was due to the Qataris not wanting to have tense relations with Saudi Arabia (Alalawi 2015, p.3). To be fair, AJ's journalists Bilal Randeree and Soraya Lennie were denied entry into Bahrain- as had many other journalists during the Bahrain Uprising. Al-Jazeera's website was also blocked in Bahrain and AJ offices in Bahrain were almost shut down (Bahrain Press Association 2011).

The AJ offices in Yemen were also closed down after being accused of "spreading false news about the situation in Yemen". Yemen's Ministry of Information stated that AJ presented tortures in Iraqi prisons as though they had taken place in Yemen and this led to the network's Sanaa offices being invaded by 20 armed men who closed the offices and discredited the journalists (Alalawi 2015, pp.3-4).

In Syria, AJ's war correspondent, Ali Hashem, resigned to protest over bias reporting of the Syrian crisis and wrote against AJ's coverage of Bahrain in *The Guardian*: he said that the way in which Al Jazeera had "dealt with the uprising in Bahrain...It was clear that Gulf-financed stations were more interested in regional security than Bahrainis' dreams of democracy and freedom and their revolt against tyranny" (Hashem 2012b; Hashem 2012a). Hashem also spoke up against Al Jazeera's coverage in Syria, because the channel refused to air footage he was able to get for them; footage that he believed was of utmost importance to the Syrian Uprising. Hashem explained that he was able to get footage of "gunmen fighting the Syrian regime on the borders between Lebanon and Syria". Hashem went on to say that he saw "tens of gunmen crossing the borders in May last year [2011] – clear evidence that the Syrian revolution was becoming militarised". Hashem explained that this significant piece of information was not relevant to Al Jazeera because it "didn't fit the required narrative of a clean and peaceful uprising, and so my seniors asked me to forget about gunmen", but rather than blaming AJ's news production teams or executives for the editorial line and news selection procedures, said that "It was clear to me, though, that these instructions were not coming from al-Jazeera itself: that the decision was a political one taken by people outside the TV centre – the same people who asked the channel to cover up the situation in Bahrain" (Hashem 2012b). Hashem also shared his opinion on Arab media in general, stating that they are divided because "media outlets have become like parties", where "politics dominates the business" and "people can't really depend on one channel to get their full news digest. It is as if the audience have to do journalists' homework by cross-checking sources and watching two sides of a conflict to get one piece of news" (idem). Hashem insists that media channels are not lying, the problem is the reasons behind the selection processes of channels when deciding on the angle to feature a story

from. Hashem says that “Media organisations are giving the part of the story that serves the agenda of their financier, so it's clear that only part of the truth is exposed while the other part is buried. What is obvious is that the investment in credibility during the past two decades has been in vain. The elite are once again dealing with Arab news channels the way they used to do with Arab state media” (Hashem 2012b). But Heather Allan from AJE Newsgathering department insisted that she saw no influence from the Qatari government in the editorial management of the channel when covering the Arab Spring. However, she admitted that it was a challenge to cover Qatar itself on Al Jazeera English, but she did not encounter any challenges on covering the Arab Uprisings that came directly or indirectly from the Qatari government.

It is important to reiterate that Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera English are not equivalent. What is broadcast on Al Jazeera is not necessarily broadcast on Al Jazeera English and vice versa, therefore the editorial lines are not the same. However, what has been gathered as material by AJE can be used by AJ and vice versa, therefore, they tend to affect one another's reputation amongst audiences and also governments. Correspondents that gather material and package news for AJE or AJ are not aware if and how their packages will be used by the sister channel. In an article published by Salid Essaif, Dalal Mawad and Anna Irrera Irrera on [globalnewsroom.org](http://globalnewsroom.org) on May 2012, the authors noted the differences between AJ (Arabic) and AJE (English) are evident and stated that they should not be grouped under the same editorial line just because they belong to the same network, even when it came to the coverage of the Arab Uprisings or post-uprisings. For example, AJ (Arabic) broadcasted the conflict in Syria as “Freedom Revolution”, which gives off a very different connotation to its coverage on AJE with a much more “neutral label: Syria: The War Within” (Essaif et al. 2012). Essaif et al. present the two AJ channels as having two “separate identities, missions and target audiences” and therefore this results “in differences in defining what events are newsworthy and how the news should be framed”. Essaif et al. stated that AJ's (Arabic) “estimated audience of 40 to 50 million is only about one-fifth the audience reach” of AJE, for the simple reason that AJ is primarily watched by Arabic speakers, whereas AJE is a much more international channel watched by the much more numerous English speakers of the world. Author of books on AJ, Hugh Miles, suggested that AJE pitches to “a very sophisticated, English-speaking audience” and in order to satisfy this sophisticated audience, AJ has “to cover in depth regions of the world that are neglected by Western media” and according to Mohamed Elmenshawy who heads the Languages and Regional Studies Program at the Middle East Institute at Washington D.C, AJE is very careful about not using terms that they use more freely on AJ (Arabic), such as “resistant people or “freedom fighters” to describe Palestinians. Miles was also quoted for his opinion on the emir's reasoning behind the AJ project, saying that AJ was very personal to Sheikh Hamad

bin Khalifa Al Thani; the creation of the channel was not only “strategic” to the emir but also “religious”. Miles likened the emir to a “man on a mission from God” who wanted to use his wealth “to show a responsible Muslim faith to the world that is different from the Saudis...He wants to show that you can be a conservative Wahhabi Muslim and also contribute to the world community” (Essaif et al. 2012). Although the Qatari government has supported the Arab uprisings, “it sees unrest in Bahrain- just next door to Qatar- as a threat to stability” (idem). Although there was some coverage of the Bahraini uprising on the English channel, the Arabic channel was lacking in coverage and when they did cover Bahrain, they were “never very critical of the government” (idem). According, to Dave Marash, former anchor at AJE, “Al Jazeera Arabic has seriously damaged its brand in the Middle East by taking a dive on Bahrain, and basically following the dictates of the Saudi government and broadcasting only from the Bahrain royal family point of view”. As stated earlier, AJE did in fact cover Bahrain, so much so, that a documentary entitled “Shouting in the Dark” was produced by the channel with the aim of looking at the anti-government protests of Bahrain and this documentary went on to receive awards, but it was not aired on the Arabic channel.

In an article published in the *New Global Studies* journal, Alexa Robertson shares the results of a study she conducted on the global news coverage of the “Arab Awakening” of 2011 (Robertson 2012). Robertson found that for the period of 1 – 31 January 2011, AJE dedicated 18 percent of their content to the Arab Spring. Robertson also noted some similarities and differences between AJE and the Arabic Al Jazeera channel, for example, as already stated, both AJ and AJE are financed by the Emir of Qatar and commercial revenues. For the month of January 2011, AJE broadcast 12 hours a day from its Doha headquarters and four hours a day from its regional centres in Kuala Lumpur, London and Washington. Robertson also observed that AJE journalists were “unusually cosmopolitan” even for the demographics of a global newsroom, and the journalists report in “heavily accented English, flavoured by the part of the world from which they are reporting (as well as journalists who speak English like natives)” (Robertson 2012, p.9). Robertson also noted that much of AJE’s news anchors and reports are familiar to English speakers because they come from other English speaking newsrooms such as ITN and CNN (idem).

Robertson analysed the use of non-journalists in recounting the events of the Arab Spring on AJE during the month of January 2011 and found that 76 percent of the sources speaking were men, 52 percent were activists and 38 percent were elites. This shows that AJE gave people the microphone more often than to government officials.

Robertson also analysed whether events of the Arab Spring were reported by an anchor along with a reporter and whether then reporter was on site from January 10 – January 30 in 2011. Robertson published that 44 percent of the Arab Spring items were filed by a reporter and that

91 percent of the reporters were on the site of the event. Also, 36 percent of reporters were women. Although most reporters were on the site of the event, it is important to note that AJE anchors told viewers regularly that they would no longer disclose the names or location of their journalists so as to protect their safety (Robertson 2012, p.13). The deliberate omission of journalist names and locations and even faces was noted by Fahmy, one of the AJE arrested journalists in Cairo, in his book *The Mariott Cell* (Fahmy et al. 2016). Robertson also noted AJE's use of activist footage from social media, and the repeated importance of Facebook and Twitter in their narratives.

A study by Michael Bruce in 2014, on the framing of the Arab Spring conflict, analysed visuals of the coverage on five transnational Arab news channels including Al Jazeera English. Bruce found that visuals of foreign authorities were absent from both AJ Arabic and AJE and stated that these findings were consistent with other research. Bruce also found that only 13.3percent of shots on Al Jazeera included officials such as the government, politicians, police and military authorities (significantly lower than Alhurra) (Bruce 2014).

A study conducted by Zeina Abdul-Nabi into the AJ's coverage of the Arab Spring, applied Peace Journalism as a source of evaluative criteria to AJ's coverage of Bahrain's uprising and Syria's chemical attack (Abdul-Nabi 2015). Abdul-Nabi found that the coverage by both AJ Arabic (AJA) and Al Jazeera English of Bahrain and Syria was dominated by war journalism framings, rather than peace journalism<sup>42</sup> framings. Abdul-Nabi also found that the coverage of the Al-Ghouta chemical attack was "propagandistic in favour of the GCC's foreign policy, as well as the Syrian opposition and its allies". Also, it was found that Bahrain's uprising was not framed as an "uprising". Finally, there was also a notable difference between both AJA and AJE coverage. AJA's coverage of Bahrain "conformed to GCC foreign policy", while AJE's coverage was framed as "anti-GCC" (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.275). The study concluded that only 2.5 percent of AJE publications framed the Shia protesters of Bahrain as "pro-democracy or anti-government protesters", whilst none of the publications reported the discrimination faced by Shias in Bahrain (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.286). Also, AJE quoted officials and opposition equally (31%), whilst AJA prioritised officials (47.2%) and victims, civilians and activists were not given a voice. Also, 50 percent of AJE videos called protesters "hardliners", without quoting them (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.287). With regards to Syria's chemical attack in Ghouta, the study found that 100 percent of AJA and AJE coverage was "framed as propaganda-oriented", by reporting "the claims, accusations and propaganda of both sides without presenting a non-

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<sup>42</sup> Johan Galtung classified war and peace journalism based on four orientations: peace/war, truth/propaganda, people/elites and solutions/victory. Lynch and McGoldrick (2000) developed the Peace Journalism Model by defining Peace Journalism as a "broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories" so as to "create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.223).

propagandistic analysis from military or chemical weapons experts (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.288). Also, none of the examined articles by AJA and AJE quoted the UN report stating that both sides committed human rights violations. Also, the coverage did not give background information on geopolitical interests of the opposition and regime, therefore mainly focussing on claims and accusations (idem). Section III.4 will detail our findings of AJE's coverage of the Arab Spring based on our collected data.

## **III.1.2. Press TV English**

### **III.1.2.1. Press TV Organisation and Structure**

#### *News Gathering Process*

Researching Iran's Press TV was a challenge because no single academic study was found on the channel. Therefore, much of the information on this section comes from the Press TV website, other press publications on Press TV and of course the data from our news corpus, made up of news videos produced by the channel. This thesis is therefore an opportunity to bring together all significant information appertaining to Press TV in one document. It is safe to say that there is definitely a gap in any research on Press TV. On contacting Press TV, I was told that I could use any of their material published online, such as their videos on YouTube and Shia.tv and after requesting an interview several times, I was never granted one.

Press TV broadcasts in English 24 hours a day from their headquarters based in Tehran, Iran. Press TV was launched on July 2007 and claim that they have "asked the questions that the BBC and CNN will never ask" and they have "interviewed the people that major western broadcasters never touch" and have "tackled the topics that the western media consider too hot to handle" (Press TV 2009b). Press TV is state-funded and part of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which is independent of the Iranian government, although its head is appointed by the supreme leader and close to the country's conservative political faction, the elite Revolutionary Guards (Kamali Dehghan 2014). Press TV is a sister channel to Al-Ahlan News Network, an Arabic news channel that also broadcasts from Iran and is also owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and has bureaus in Tehran, Beirut and Baghdad. When Press TV was first launched in 2007, an article in the New York Times also predicted that it would compete with Al Jazeera by focussing on developments in the Middle East and the United States. The same New York Times article also cited that the Press TV website mentioned having "400 staff members, and 26 reporters worldwide" (Fathi 2007). The New

York Times article also quoted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's vision of Press TV's objectives, "Broadcasting the truth immediately, providing precise analysis and exposing the plots of propaganda networks of the enemy is among your duties" (Fathi 2007). Mediachannel.org said that the Iranian government planned on using "Press TV to counter what it sees as a steady stream of Western propaganda against Iran as well as offer an alternative view of world news" (Mostaghim & Daragahi 2007). Press TV describes their objective as "embracing and building bridges of cultural understanding" and "encouraging human beings of different nationalities, races and creeds to identify with one another" (Press TV 2014) and they refer to themselves as the "Voice of the Voiceless". Shahab Mossavat, Press TV's spokesman in 2007 said that the channel had correspondents in Washington and New York who were not easily accredited due to tensions between the US and Iran. Mossavat also said that Press TV tries to covers "human rights violation in Europe and the U.S." (Mostaghim & Daragahi 2007). Critics of Press TV noted that the channel "provided little or no coverage of Iran's domestic troubles, including economic hardship stemming from inflation and stagnant wages" (Mostaghim & Daragahi 2007).

Press TV is accessible in English, Arabic and French on their website [presstv.com](http://presstv.com), and also communicates with audiences via an official Facebook Page as well as a Twitter account and use Instagram and Google+ to share information. Pinterest is also used by Press TV to share quotes on pictures. Press TV can also be accessed via a free app compatible with iOS, Android and Windows Mobile. Press TV can also be watched live on: [presstv.com/live.html](http://presstv.com/live.html) and [livestation.com/en/press-tv](http://livestation.com/en/press-tv). Two other YouTube channels are managed by Press TV, *Press TV Documentaries* and *Iran Program Presstv*. Press TV also manages a UK channel on YouTube entitled *PressTVUK* and a French one entitled *Press TV Français*. It is worth mentioning that in 2014, Press TV announced on their YouTube channel, that their previous YouTube channel was suspended "without prior notice"; their current YouTube channel is entitled *Press TV News Videos* and was set up in February 14, 2014. On accessing the former *PressTvGlobalNews* YouTube channel, the following notification covers the top bar of the page "*! This account has been terminated for violating Google's Terms of Service*" (Google/YouTube n.d.).

Press TV dedicates three programmes to sharing the news and documentaries: *World News in Full*, *On the News Line*, and *Round the World with Reporters*. But the majority of programmes broadcast on Press TV are not necessarily related to reporting news, for example: *Islam and Life*, *A Simple Question*, *The Debate*, *We the People*, *Press Plus* and others. Despite the large number of analytic programmes hosted by Press TV in 2017, the Deputy Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Mohammad Sarafraz had said in May 2009 that Press TV would cut down on their news analysis programmes so as to feature more newscasts (Press TV 2009a).

## Press TV Controversies

Press TV faced a lot over controversies since their establishment. As early as 2007, the Canadian weekly Maclean's critiqued Press TV for not being the most reliable source. Maclean's stated that Press TV was part of a "media campaign to bolster its image abroad – and stifle dissent at home" (Petrou 2007). The article also noted that "Press TV's website closely follows the government line and criticism of the regime is largely absent" and that "The network's analysis is also marred by conspiracy theories and anti-Western paranoia". The Maclean's article does state that "Most of Press TV's news reports are factually accurate", but it gives examples of "errors, presumably intentional", which "are also published", such as Press TV's "claims that the Lebanese government is trying to convert the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp into an American military base, but provides no evidence to back up this allegation" (Petrou 2007).

In 2009, the BBC reported that Ofcom, the British broadcasting regulator found that Press TV "broke broadcasting rules on impartiality" when covering the Gaza conflict on two TV shows hosted on Press TV by Respect Member of Parliament George Galloway, who was accused of not giving enough coverage to pro-Israeli views on the shows. Ofcom ruled that "a matter of major political controversy is being discussed, as here, the broadcaster must ensure that an appropriately wide range of significant views must be included" (BBC 2009).

In 2010, Indian Kashmir banned Press TV "after it broadcast images of a small group of Christians ripping the Koran in Washington" (AFP 2010). Footage of the Koran being ripped apart caused anger leading to demonstrations in Kashmir and the demonstrators clashed with security forces, who shot dead twelve of the demonstrators. The State Chief Secretary S.S. Kapur was quoted on sify news for warning people not to "heed unverified reports about the alleged desecration of the Holy Koran which have only been aired by Press TV and no other television news channel in the world" (AFP 2010). An article by Time noted that "Government officials believe Iran's Press TV, which is popular among Kashmir's Shia, played a major role in instigating the violence" (Jameel/Srinagar 2010). Press TV responded to the ban saying "the channel's popularity in Kashmir over the past three months has made Indian authorities nervous".

In 2011, Ofcom again found that Press TV breached UK broadcasting rules, this time because the channel aired an interview obtained forcefully with the Newsweek journalist Maziar Bahari who was arrested for covering the Iranian presidential elections in 2009. It was in fact Maziar Bahari who filed a complaint with Ofcom for the conditions under which the interview was obtained; Bahari said that he was led to believe that he was suspected of espionage and would face the death penalty if he did not make a "televised statement about the role of the western

media in the post-presidential election demonstrations”. In response, Press TV had said that it took Bahari “some 166 days after the broadcast” to file the complaint, and that this was actually in violation of the Ofcom complaints procedure, which requires that complaints of broadcasts are filed within twenty days of a broadcast and proceeded to relabel Ofcom as the “OFFice of MIScommUnicatioN” (Viewpoints 2015; Mortimor n.d.; Press TV 2010; Press TV 2009a). Press TV was fined £100,000 for having aired the interview with Bahari that was found to have been conducted under duress (Foster 2011; Posser 2012).

Then in 2012, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), based in the US and Israel to “stop the defamation of Jewish people” (ADL) accused Press TV, in a report, of broadcasting anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and opinions to the English speaking world. An ADL article in 2015 accused Press TV of providing “a platform for American anti-Semites to spread hateful conspiracy theories, starting 2015 with news reports that Jews are behind all that is wrong with the world”. The article also labelled Press TV as a government “propaganda tool” and published that Press TV “serves as a mouthpiece for American anti-Semites, conspiracy theorists, and Holocaust deniers, who help amplify the Iranian regime’s hateful messages”. The ADL article also said that Press TV showed news reports in 2015 stating that Israel was behind the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris as well as the creation of Daesh (ISIS), the Norway attacks of 2011 and the 9/11 attacks in the US (ADL 2015). The ADL has published articles criticising Press TV’s approach to news since 2013 and continues to publish such articles in 2017.

In 2012, Ofcom pounced on Press TV again, this time revoking the Press TV license so that they would not be allowed to operate from their London offices. Ofcom said that if Press TV’s editorial management did not move to London from Tehran, that they would be in breach of the UK’s broadcasting license rules. It is reported on theguardian.com that Ofcom sent an official letter to Press TV in November 2011 to warn them of the breach in licensing rules and proposed two possible solutions to the Iranian channel: the first and most obvious, being to transfer all editorial control of Press TV’s programming to the UK and the second to transfer their broadcasting license to Tehran. Ofcom also made a request for Press TV to “name on its licence the person, or body who controls the UK-based operations” (Later & Woodes 2012). By January 2012, Press TV had not yet responded to Ofcom’s request and therefore, Ofcom asked the satellite broadcaster BskyB in the UK to remove Press TV from its broadcast packages (Sweeney 2012). On checking OfCom’s list of channels under the jurisdiction of licensing in 2017 in the MAVISE database, Press TV was not yet back on the list. However, two other Iranian channels were on the list: Iran Farda, and Iran International (MAVISE 2017).

Finally in 2013, Press TV along with other Iranian channels were removed from several European and American satellites. It was challenging to find any documentation about the removal of Iranian media from Western satellites. One article, written by Press TV and

published on theiranproject.com explained that Press TV and other Iranian channels “have come under an unprecedented wave of attacks by European government and satellite companies since January 2012” (Press TV 2013). The article also stated that Intelsat reported receiving orders from the US government to avoid their broadcasting license because of a decision “made in accordance with US sanctions against the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting” (Press TV 2013). The article also states that Press TV and other Iranian channels were no longer being broadcast in several Western countries such as Britain, France, Germany and Spain. A few months later Hong Kong’s AsiaSat also removed all Iranian channels off air in East Asia.

### III.1.2.2. Press TV Reporting events of the Arab Spring

A study by Rusi Jaspal was conducted to study how the Iranian press covered the Arab Spring, namely The Tehran Times and Press TV (Jaspal 2014). However, rather than looking at news videos, the study focusses on articles published online by Press TV during 2011. The results of the study on the two media organisations are combined so as to represent the “Iranian press”, therefore, we cannot be sure what aspects only cover Press TV. The study found that most articles from their corpus “Islamicized” the events of the Arab spring by referring to them as the “Islamic Awakening” or stating that it was “the spread of Islamic Awakening ideology in the Arab world”. Islamic beliefs of Arab Spring organisers and demonstrators are insisted upon so as to present evidence of the “Islamic nature of the Arab Spring” (Jaspal 2014, p.429). Jaspal even states that from his corpus “there is a sense that secular government is inherently destructive to democracy, given the alleged supremacy of Islamic ideology in safeguarding democracy” (Jaspal 2014, p.430). Jaspal found through his corpus that the Iranian press used the events of the Arab Spring to justify and promote the beliefs of Iran’s ideology and to further support its strategic interests in the Arab world. The Iranian press was also found to use the Arab Spring to report any threats from the US or Israel. Finally, Jaspal also found that most sources used by Iranian press on the Arab Spring were from Iran.

No other studies on how Press TV covered the Arab Spring was found. Therefore, our analysis in section III.4 will fill the gap on how Press TV covered the Arab Spring.

### III.1.3. Euronews English

#### III.1.3.1. Euronews Organisation and Structure

Launched in 1993 in Lyon, France, Euronews is a 24/7 television news channel that grew to broadcast in twelve languages via twelve dedicated television channels to report the news in: Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Turkish and since 2017, Euronews became a Glocal brand, meaning that each of their twelve channels have content tailored to each audience (Dobbie 2017). The Euronews team encompasses over 500 journalists from thirty different countries and is broadcast to over 430 million homes in 166 countries (Euronews 2018a). Also, since NBC acquired 25% of Euronews, NBC's TV and digital platforms are now co-branded as EuronewsNBC (Euronews 2018a). In 2017<sup>43</sup>, Euronews also launched a sister channel, Africanews, based in the Republic of Congo and dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa.

On creation, some compared Euronews to Europa-TV (Machill, Schwarzkopf), a media group that broadcast from Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal, in 1985, with the aim of broadcasting all over the European Union and with contributions from the European Commission<sup>44</sup>. Schwarzkopf argued that "If it is acknowledged that television in Europe has the task of contributing to European integration, a channel which follows the model of Europa-TV is particularly suited to performing such a contribution to integration (Schwarzopf)" (Machill 1998, p.428). Machill joined Schwarzopf's argument in that the "European Parliament demanded a joint television..." (Machill 1998, p.428); this demand was especially promoted by the fact that "Europe had to protect itself from inundation by television images from the USA (Machill, 1997)" and this desire was especially worked on by the French government, who built a defensive strategy, in the news sector, against US dominance of the news, by promoting the creation of Euronews as being the "European answer to CNN" (Machill 1998, p.429). Polonska-Kimunguyi et al (2012) also contributed to the argument that, in accepting

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<sup>43</sup> As of 2018, Euronews is owned by twenty-six shareholders, including: Media Globe Networks (60%), Universal Studio Limited (NBC News) (25%) and the following public shareholders and local authorities (15%): CT (Czech Republic), CyBC (Cyprus), ENTV (Algeria), ERT (Greece), TT (Tunisia), ERTU (Egypt), France Télévisions (France), NTU (Ukraine), PBS (Malta, RAI (Italy), RTBF (Belgium), RTE (Ireland), RTP (Portugal), RTR (Russia), RTVSLO (Slovenia), SNRT (Morocco), SSR (Switzerland), TVR (Romania), TV4 (Sweden), YLE (Finland), Métropole de Lyon (France), Département du Rhône and Région Rhône-Alpes (France).

Today, Euronews distributes its content on various digital platforms such as Android and iPhone apps, Euronews RADIO on tuniin, vTuner, comfm, AllZIC radio, Radionline, liveradio and radio, all accessible online, and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and YouTube, to name a few. The channel has also made itself available on university campuses such as the University of Cambridge, Harvard Business School, IHECS and Vesalius College of Brussels, as well as several others. Distribution of Euronews content also extends to airline partners such as Corsair, Aer Lingus, Emirates and Etihad, as well as maritime partners, such as Cosa, MSC Cruises and Marlink. The Euronews channels are also accessible via satellite internationally (Euronews 2018b).

<sup>44</sup> Europa-TV was forced to stop broadcasting after it had spent its entire budget only one year later (European Commission 2017; Reuters 1986; University of Calgary. Graduate Program in Communication Studies. 1999)

EU funding and by broadcasting in non-European languages “to target non-European audiences, Euronews has transformed itself from a public service-type broadcaster with an internal focus to an instrument of the EU’s transitional public diplomacy” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.107).

Today in 2019, Euronews is regarded as much more of a global media network, which surpasses the borders of Europe. Euronews has been “regarded as Europe’s most experimental and successful pan-national broadcaster” and its programmes “...no longer concentrate on Europe. ‘Going global’ is the channel’s news motto” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.105). Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. (2012) argue that Euronews “oscillates somewhere between the national and transnational (European) spheres, but officially trying to avoid both” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.106).

### News Gathering Process

I had the opportunity of speaking to Euronews’ Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Stéphane Gillet, who prior to his fifteen years at Euronews worked as a journalist at Canal +, France 2 and Libération. Gillet explained to me that his job as Deputy Editor-in-Chief at Euronews meant that for four days and four nights of every week, he is responsible for all news that is broadcast. In order to fulfil his responsibilities, Gillet has to set up the editorial priorities on a daily basis for all incoming stories and therefore is in charge of the selection of news that is broadcast and the way in which it is broadcast. Gillet explained to me that prior to news arriving at his desk, the Euronews department labelled Forward Planning, would plan ahead in anticipation of events that needed to be covered, by ensuring that journalists were on location.

Gillet explained to me that in order for Euronews to be able to broadcast via thirteen channels, in thirteen different languages, Euronews had to put in place thirteen newsrooms. Having said that, the Euronews channels share the same material in terms of images and videos, but not the same narratives, because the writing of the stories are done differently for each channel in each language. Gillet explained that for example, the information on Euronews English, Arabic and French, would most often be the same, but it would be produced differently from the beginning of Euronews’ news production; that is, when the news story was pitched to the journalist. For example, as Euronews Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Gillet would ask a Euronews edition’s editor to produce a story on a specific event from a specific angle, but the edition’s editor would always be granted the editorial freedom to produce the story as they wished, therefore leaving room for the same news on the different Euronews editions to be produced differently. Each edition’s editor would put produce their news package with the various images and videos sent in by Euronews and agency correspondents. In addition to material coming in from Euronews

correspondents, each edition's editor also has access to written news coming in from twelve press agencies, such as AFP, and is able to use their news to produce their news packages. The final news package produced by the said Euronews edition would then be shared with the other Euronews editions, their editors and journalists. Therefore, journalists from the other Euronews editions are able to use the news packages to produce their own edition's news package, by replacing the original reporter's voice with their own voice and their own words, which would better apply to their audience, in terms of the language, but also the general cultural perception. We are also able to get an insight into how the news is presented on Euronews through a study on TV Discourse by Narsisca Gales, where she already noticed that Euronews as a channel stood out from other news media organisations (Gales 2009) largely due to the way in which the news was presented. In her study, Gales found that Euronews would select the most important news of the day and repeat them over 24 hours, after which, business would follow with its own headlines, European Affairs and its own headlines, Sports headlines and finally the weather forecast.

In their evaluation of how Euronews produces news, Polonska-Kimunguyi et al (2012) maintain Gillet's claim, stating that "Journalists from all language sections admit that their job is not to simply translate one text into the twelve stories that accompany the same visual message". Interviews conducted by Polonska-Kimunguyi et al (2012) with Euronews journalists in 2011, tell us that the Euronews journalist's job is to "write their own accounts". One journalist, Fariba Mavaddat, from Euronews Iran, is quoted for stating that: "There is absolutely no text with a few exceptions, we receive a pool of information from respected news agencies, the editors provide us with a film and then we do our research on our own with access to multiple sources: Persian, Turkish, French...you name it...Once the story is ready, we just voice it over the film". Another journalist, Galina Polonskaya, from Euronews Russia, states "Everyone treats the story in their own way. We have the information, we have the main news, the data, the sound bites...we go to our desks and write the scripts on our own" (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, pp.112–113). Polonska-Kimunguyi et al state that Euronews as a media corporation "...produces little of its own content. The majority of the channel's programming comes through the Eurovision Exchange, from programming of its twenty one stakeholders- public service broadcasters from Europe, Russia, Middle East and North Africa – as well as from major press and TV news agencies. There is no newscaster, a face that could read the news in each language. There is an image sequence accompanied by twelve language stories" (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.111). Each edition's journalist is also able to use information from local press agencies to write the text for the news package, and this therefore means that the news of each edition will inevitably reflect the country's perception on the news story. Gillet had articulated to me that the information on all thirteen Euronews channels will most probably

be identical, but the information will also most probably be presented with different perceptions and definitely different languages. According to Gillet, Euronews strongly believes that having different perceptions does not mean that the information changes, in fact, Euronews' editorial line emphasises on the fact that they are able to present stories from different perceptions (Gillet 2017, p.2). The Euronews website clearly states that "Euronews offers a unique perspective on world events. It empowers people to make up their own mind by delivering factual analysis and a diversity of viewpoints. Because all views matter, Euronews is "All Views" (Euronews 2018a). Gillet also notes that due to certain cultural filters, it is of essence that news stories be reviewed and translated per culture, rather than be translated word for word into another language, for example, it may be more important to describe the political situation in an Arab country to a French audience, but it would probably be irrelevant to describe it to an Arab audience that is already familiar with the background of a political situation in their region.

The importance of perspective in the various languages of Euronews is emphasised by Polonska-Kimunguyi et al (2012) who argue that the European perspective is actually only observed in some of the Euronews programmes, and that different "reporting styles and professional values amongst the journalists from the channel's multiple language sections reflect the values that can be found in Europe's various national journalistic cultures" and also "...it is mostly the variety of languages and national journalistic practices that enforce the stylistic and interest-oriented national focus of news (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.106). This means that Euronews is not only bound by the culture of their audience, but also the journalistic culture in each newsroom in each unique country they operate from. Polonska-Kimunguyi et al were also able to interview Sergio Cantone, the Euronews Programming Manager from the Brussels office in 2011, who stated in an interview that: 'We are a chorus, not a soloist...we have a cover song that is played and sung by many singers with different music, but the song is the same...' (idem). But Polonska-Kimunguyi et al claimed that it was "sad" that Euronews did not extend the "European" feature so as to impose European "Journalistic cultures, values and approaches" on their journalists worldwide, because journalists trained in different countries "may have a very different understanding of journalism, its practice and purpose. For example, the existing literature suggests that journalists from the Anglo-Saxon model put more pressure on objectivity and impartiality, while taking sides and open advocacy is commonplace in Mediterranean states. Eastern Europe and the Arab world, from which Euronews has recently recruited staff for its newest language services, enjoy yet another set of values, not necessarily consistent with that of liberal democratic journalism" (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.112). Although Polonska-Kimunguyi et al found this to be a negative approach, my understanding from Gillet while interviewing him was that it was necessary to give journalists this freedom to report stories

from their chosen angle so as to be able to give their audiences a well-rounded perspective of the world.

In a paper by Roberto Gretter entitled *Euronews: a multilingual speech corpus for ASR* (Gretter 2014) (Automatic Speech Recognition), data is collected from the Euronews portal from both web and television so as to build a corpus with 10 languages (Arabic, English, French, German, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Turkish). The paper gives us an insight into how news is broadcast by Euronews at least in 2013 “Euronews stores in its portal videos and text describing the main news of the day. These latter are some of the news that are broadcasted via TV. The text associated with a news is sometimes a summary, sometimes a complete transcription, sometimes a partial transcription of the content of the news. By exploiting some information, it is possible to link a video to the same news in several languages” (Gretter 2014, p.2635). Indeed this supports Gillet’s claim that the news is not entirely different for each language channel, rather there is only a difference in perspective. However, while building their corpus Gretter also observed that the Polish channel was “under-represented: it is currently not broadcasted via TV and the number of videos produced is less than 6 per day. This means that Polish data are different from other languages” (Gretter 2014, p.2635). Another observation made was that there were “segments of foreign speech (e.g. Arabic speech in the Italian data), quite common in Euronews data” (Gretter 2014, p.2637). In terms of news presentation, Gretter observed that news boundaries by Euronews were marked by silence (idem).

Despite these nuances in perspectives of journalists from each Euronews channel, sometimes even related to the national journalistic practices and even the nation states they broadcast in, Polonska-Kimunguyi et al were convinced through their interviews with Euronews that the media outlet “makes neutrality of news its official policy” and ensure neutrality through “tough supervision from chiefs of each language service, and careful employment policies are also in place to avoid recruiting political activists” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, pp.113–114). Furthermore, in interviews with Euronews programme editors, Polonska-Kimunguyi et al recounted their emphasis that the channel was not influenced by Foreign Ministers and to argue their point, the editors gave the example of the coverage of Dominiq Strauss-Khann’s arrest in 2011, whereby the French media “participate in the political competition in order to attack either the Socialists, or the Right, or to open up a discussion in France about politicians and sex as a national problem and a problem of society. We [*Euronews*] give the facts that Dominiq Strauss-Khann was arrested, that it might affect his political future and the future of France and that’s it” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.114 Interview with euronews). Having said this, Polonska-Kimunguyi et al raise an interesting point on the seemingly “structural contradiction” in Euronews, whereby the channel promotes “All Views”, yet the staff are “not to express their

national views”, which is challenging, considering “the only sources available for their news production are national news agencies” (idem).

## Euronews Sourcing and Verifying the News

In terms of receiving news alerts from around the globe, Gillet explained to me that Euronews mainly relies on news agencies in various languages based in various countries, so as to be aware of all the significant news events and have a permanent viewpoint of the world’s global events that needed covering. Gillet explained that working with news agencies allowed for that extra needed reliability when covering news stories; possible because Euronews would await confirmation of news events from at least two news agencies before reacting to the news broadcast as a news channel. Gillet explained that for a second news agency’s report of the same news event to be considered as a confirmation, the agency would have to have a different source of information from the first news agency, and this allows for Euronews to cross-check their information. Gillet explained that news verification was of utter importance to Euronews, much more so than Euronews competitors, to the point that they preferred to report the news late, rather than be inaccurate (Gillet 2017, p.2).

Gillet also states that Euronews also uses direct sources of information, which are their journalists, who are based in various locations around the globe including their head office in Lyon, France. Journalists, Gillet explained, who have experience with a part of the world and a language, are more capable of comprehending the intricacies of an event from a part of the world that they have experienced, better still, they are able to identify and confirm locations on photos or video footage, therefore, Euronews relies greatly on the expertise of their international journalists, so as to verify their news stories.

According to Stéphane Gillet, Euronews first experienced working with citizen journalists in 2009, during the Green Revolution of Iran, also referred to as the Persian Awakening or the Persian Spring. As the Iranian government was not allowing international media into Iran, the only images, including video footage from Iran, that Euronews- and other news agencies- were able to gather, came from citizen journalists based in Iran. Although not called citizen journalists at the time, at least not at Euronews, Gillet described the people as activists who sent in photos or videos taken with their smart phones or small cameras. Gillet termed this period of citizen journalism as being problematic, due to the fact that although Euronews “felt” that the images were “genuine”, they were unable to verify incoming photos and video footage with professional news companies (Gillet 2017, p.2). Gillet admitted that despite Euronews also having an Iranian edition that broadcasts in Persian, all the news on the Persian revolution of 2009 that was broadcast on Euronews Iran, came from amateur videos. The problematic behind

channels such as Euronews accepting photos and video footage from amateurs remains the verification of the incoming news. Channels are unable to verify the news with a professional establishment and therefore the risk is that the channel reports inaccurate events. Gillet explained that Euronews today, will accept amateur images and video footage, if they come in through image press agencies. Important to note is the fact that some images and video footage coming in even through image media agencies are not verified, in fact press agencies will specify any content that they have been unable to verify. Therefore, whether news channels use an agency to source amateur content or not, the problem of authenticity remains the same. Therefore, Euronews, and many other news channels, now subscribe to a news agency called Storyful whose journalists have the responsibility on investigating all incoming images from amateur sources so as to determine their authenticity, find out if they are fake images, or if they can be used. Therefore, today, Euronews and many other news channels, now await the green light from storyful; Gillet disclosed that in his entire experience with storyful at Euronews, they have always been accurate<sup>45</sup>. Gillet noted that authenticity was not the only issue that media companies have with content coming in from amateurs; the other big issue was propriety of the image or footage. Gillet explained that many media companies were embroiled in lawsuits for using images that did not belong to them. storyful, according to Gillet, has also been able to provide image propriety details for Euronews and other clients, therefore allowing media companies to both verify the authenticity of the content and also the content owner (Gillet 2017, p.3).

## Euronews News Selection Procedure

Polonska-Kimunguyi et al note that there is a “common” “European” feature in Euronews, and this view is shared by some Euronews journalists, such as Fariba Mavaddat, from the Persian section, and Galina Polonskaya, from the Russian section. In an interview with Polonska-Kimunguyi et al in 2011, they claimed that they have the freedom to cover the stories they wish, from anywhere in the world, so long as the stories covered are “relevant to the day-to-day life of the Europeans and European governments, the European citizen...event topics which appear to be exclusively national are placed in a transnational context” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.112). Therefore, although the stories are covered in a multitude of perspectives, in order for the stories to be selected, they have to have to be related to Europe, and Polonska-

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<sup>45</sup> storyful, a company based in Ireland describe themselves as a “social intelligence and news agency that sources, verifies and acquires social content and insights for media and brand partners”. storyful is also able to analyse real-time social activity on various web platforms using “journalists, research analysts and content strategists to contextualize and verify content” (storyful 2018). Storyful has a newswire that is fueled by a global 24/7 newroom, giving clients access to incoming content; clients are able to see when content has been verified by storyful.

Kimunguyi et al observed that in 2012, seventy percent of Euronews news stories are “Europe-related”.

Gillet defined the Euronews charter for reporting violence, stating that they are very strict, for example, Euronews does not show people dying. They may however show explosions, which may lead to people’s deaths, but the actual person dying with not be shown. Euronews also forbids showing any images of children being subjected to violence. Similarly, Euronews warns viewers of violent or sensitive images prior to showing the images so that the audience has a choice on viewing such material. Dead bodies are not shown on Euronews either and corpses are not shown close-up. These are rules that Euronews has decided upon as a media company, and therefore they have not been imposed by any country laws and Gillet insisted that Euronews follows these rules very closely, so much so that France’s Conseil Supérieur de l’audiovisuel has never given Euronews a warning on broadcasting violence. But Gillet admitted that even with such strict policies, there were sometimes exceptions. Specifically, during the Syrian Uprising, Gillet recounted having to decide whether or not to show a close-up of the lined bodies of people who had been killed with their hands tied behind their backs, showing that they were in fact executed. Gillet explained that not showing this footage would have been a professional misconduct, even under the pretext of not shocking his viewers (Gillet 2017, p.4). Gillet explained that when the scenes of violence would teach your audience something about an event, then it is necessary to show them these scenes; in fact, at Euronews, teaching your audience through broadcasts is a rule that surpasses the rule not to show violence. Gillet affirmed that Euronews also showed Gaddafi when he was dead. And Gillet drew on the famous photograph from 1972 by AP photographer Nick Ut, that showed children running down a road, one naked, and followed by armed men, as an example of an image that although shocking and heart-breaking, had to be shown (Gillet 2017, p.4).

## Euronews and News Presentation

With regards to how Euronews presents the news, Gillet explains that the programme “No comment” exists to show an event in a raw format, without influences or interpretations from a journalist. Gales also noted in her publication *Considerations on TV Discourse* (2009) that unlike other Anglophone news channels, with Euronews, there is “the *invisibility* of the human presence behind the screen”. Gales provides an interesting analysis as to why the reporter is visually absent from the news features; she states that this *invisibility* makes audiences feel left alone in “the fundamental opposition” (Hartley 1982), where there is an “us” and a “them”. Gale proposes that according to Hartley, “us” is the “news institution, the culture, the nation, the audience”, and “they” represents “the foreign countries, the faith, the voiceover (Gales

2009). Gale accurately notes that Euronews presents their news with hidden voices, that of the narrator and that of the correspondent, who she also refers to, respectively, as “announcer” and “reporter. If we look specifically at news stories presented on the Euronews programme *No Comment*, we see that the invisibility of both the correspondent and the reporter may be able to leave the audience totally alone with TV pictures, unaccompanied by speech, so as to be able to watch the news in total neutrality. But Marcel Machill from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University provides another explanation for the programme *No Comment*; indicating that the genre was “born of a shortage of staff” (Machill 1998, p.427), which may indeed be a valid explanation that eventually led to the audience feeling “alone” and in a “fundamental position” (idem), therefore both Machill and Gales analyses could be applied to the reasons why the *No Comment* programme has no one commenting on the footage. Today, in addition to the *No Comment* programme, Euronews runs other programmes ranging in topic from news and Europeans affairs to lifestyle and knowledge, for example: *Aid Zone* focusses on the struggles of refugees of conflicts and disasters, *Brussels Bureau* reports the latest news along with an analysis on the EU, *Metropolitans* focusses on a city’s tourism, economy and energy issues, *Sci-tech* focusses on Europe growing out of crisis and *The Global Conversation* is question time with heads of state and other world influencers (Euronews 2018c).

Euronews also has debates, but as Gillet informed me that they had chosen to limit the debates due to the fact that they would have to be translated into several languages for their other channels. Also, Euronews presents news from the newspaper with 50 seconds to one minute and a half snapshots into selected stories. There is also a dedicated team at Euronews that analyses news stories so as to present them from a given perspective. Having a correspondent on location of an event that is being covered on the news is of course a big plus for Euronews and Gillet admits that as Editor-in-Chief he selects events in locations that his correspondents are based as he knows that his correspondents will be able to present a news story, that has already been covered by news agencies, with even more richness because of the fact that the international correspondent is able to report the news story after experiencing it ‘first-hand’ (Gillet 2017, p.4).

## Euronews and International Audiences

The difficulty of sharing news that is balanced for an international media company like Euronews that reports to thirteen different cultures in thirteen different languages is a big part of news production, according to Gillet. Gillet explains that due to the different cultures of their different audiences and journalists, there are of course different points of views; and Euronews strives to report on the two blatant sides of every coin, for example when reporting on “the

conflict between Israel and Palestine...the Syrian conflict...the conflict in Ukraine and Russia. Our journalists are required to give the two versions that are in opposition. This is a permanent concern” (Gillet 2017, pp.4–5)<sup>46</sup>. Staff at Euronews, according to Gillet, are commissioned with checking online comments and feedback on news Euronews broadcast online, and deduce that if the channel is criticised from both sides of a conflict, then they must be reporting news in a fairly balanced manner (Gillet 2017, p.6).

Although Euronews monitors their audiences online on a regular basis, the monitoring does not take place on a daily basis, and Gillet admits that the monitoring of online reactions does not include a complete review of the feedback, and therefore, the online feedback does not affect how news stories are produced on a daily basis. Gillet acknowledges that the source, or rather location, of incoming feedback is of essence, so as to judge how important a comment may be, especially if the comment criticises the Euronews story broadcast for sharing inaccurate information. Therefore, although comments on news posted online are not monitored on a daily basis and not summarised into reports, they may sometimes alert journalists in the newsroom and encourage further investigation on a news event so as to rectify any information that may be imprecise (Gillet 2017, p.6).

#### Euronews News Distribution

In terms of news diffusion and distribution channels, Gillet asserted that the importance of distribution platforms changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring, at least for Euronews. Prior to the Arab Spring, television was the main priority and therefore news was broadcast via the thirteen television channels of Euronews and then published online. Since the start of the Arab Spring, however, Euronews noted a changed in news consumption, whereby audiences do not only watch the news on television, but rather may watch the news on their connected devices, such as their laptops, but also on their portable devices such as their mobile phones and tablets, and because of this change in the consumption of news, Euronews first broadcasts news online, via their website, and social networks, namely their YouTube channels, which amount to over a dozen, and Twitter, before broadcasting via television. Gillet’s rationalisation that YouTube became a significant platform for Euronews in news distribution is correlated to the high number of viewers that Euronews enjoys on YouTube. Gillet explains that although the news broadcast on YouTube is of significant importance, it is not produced differently from what is broadcast on the Euronews television channels. However, Gillet notes the importance

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<sup>46</sup> The French interview with Stéphane Gillet of Euronews has been translated into English when quoted in this thesis.

of the Euronews website that, unlike television, is not limited in time, and therefore the Euronews website allows for in-depth analyses and questions into current events, that may not be possible on the Euronews TV channels. Also to be noted is that because Euronews priorities are evolving towards digital platforms, dedicated journalists now work on producing content specifically for digital platforms such as Twitter. Therefore, Gillet admits that although the content does not change, the presentation will have to be adapted to the different media used (Gillet 2017, p.6).

Based on the detailed information provided by Gillet and the documentation found on Euronews, we are able to propose the following news production model used by Euronews as of 2018:




Table 9 The Flow of News in Euronews

### III.1.3.2. Euronews Reporting events of the Arab Spring

Very little literature has been found on Euronews and their coverage of the Arab Spring, therefore, there is a gap in the research conducted on Euronews and the Arab Spring specifically. There is also very little on Euronews as a media corporation, therefore our thesis helps to fill the gap and our data on Euronews' coverage of the Arab Spring will be of interest to researchers in news production interested in Euronews as a corporation and their coverage of the events of the Arab Spring.

We are however able to apply Machill's content analysis on Euronews (Machill 1998) to the way in which the events of the Arab Spring were produced by Euronews. Machill compared the same news story in five of Euronews' channels and concluded that "there were in fact considerable variations in the design of news items" (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.113). Also, Polonska Kimunguyi et al were able to check the exactitude of Machill's conclusion in an interview with Euronews journalists in 2011 during the events of the Arab Spring, who just like Gillet informed me, also explained the need to give journalists the freedom to report as they saw fit for an audience "...whilst the image sequence remained the same for all language formats, it was supplemented by different texts. Journalists admit that this situations [sic] holds today. Different amounts of background information are required for different audiences; different treatment for the key actors, events and statements is also apparent" (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.113). Specifically, with regards to the Arab Spring and the differing views on intervening in Libya during the uprising, Polonska Kimunguyi et al were able to interview Sergio Cantone, the Euronews Editor in charge of the Brussel's office at the time, who admitted in 2011 that:

The French are in the position they don't want to negotiate with Gadaffi, and the Italians have a position that they do want to negotiate with Gadaffi... actually they are doing it secretly... Of course, the Italian journalist will mention this fact and the French will mention the other fact more... The journalists should always give the information that is of concern to their audience and their language .... But we try to make sure that the Italian section doesn't say that the French are there to get the oil.

(Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.113)

Polonska Kimunguyi et al maintain that “As national bias influences *how* news is reported through varying linguistic approaches, they occasionally influences [sic] *what* is being said by *Euronews*” (idem). Nevertheless, Polonska Kimunguyi et al maintain that the Euronews channels do not only have differences in “linguistic styles”, but also in “national journalistic practices, goals and preferred ways of thinking” (idem). The world perspective is of essence to Euronews because it is an international news channel with audiences around the world. Therefore, it is of essence that the channel broadcasts in several languages. When it comes to the Muslim world, Sergio Cantone, Editor of the Brussels office in 2011 explained the importance to “soft power projection” to Polonska Kimunguyi et al:

It's about soft power projection, it's about talking to other people, neighbours of Europe, the Arabic people for example. There are important things happening there at the moment: the Arabic revolutions....We think that there is a growing demand from these countries for support from the European countries and from the European Union... But there are also commercial reasons. It's about competition and media competition...for instance we have Al-Jazeera which is broadcasting in English, we have BBC that broadcasts in Arabic, so we should also broadcast in Arabic, we should also broadcast in Persian...

(Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.115)

Fariba from the Euronews Persian channel, says that Euronews, unlike other culture imposing international news channels, is respected by the Iranians and this is partly due to the European identity of Euronews:

Unlike most international broadcasters in Iran, we're very lucky...We are not accepted by the government...it's illegal. But I've seen the picture of Tehran from above. It's like a mushroom field with all the satellite dishes. Everybody has one. And the government knows, tolerates it...We [Euronews] have a degree of respect, from the people and from the government itself....They [Iranians] used to welcome Americans back in Iran but now they have their doubts...they don't trust them. With Europeans it's different. They view Europeans as level-headed and sensible although they have their doubts about the intentions of the British and the French governments. On the whole, they think Europeans can handle the situations more sensibly than the Mullahs as doing now, and the Americans will ever do in the future, it at all...

(idem)

The Euronews Brussels editor also believes that the Arab communities of Europe “like Euronews very much...They do appreciate that we are part of pluralism in the Arab world...we have our position, we try to be objective and transparent. Our position is less fractious and partisan than that of other media. We’re not the voice of Foreign Ministers” (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.116).

Our findings on the Euronews coverage of the events of the Arab Spring, based on our collected data, can be found in section III.4.

### **III.1.4. France 24 English**

#### **III.1.4.1. France 24 Organisation and Structure**

On December, 2006, France 24 was launched worldwide via the internet in both French and English. One year later, in 2007, France 24 was launched in Arabic for only four hours of programmes per day, which then increased to 24/7 in 2010. In 2018, France 24 broadcasts 24 hours a day on four separate channels: France 24 French, English, Arabic and since 2017 in Spanish as well. The channels work together to distribute news on the television, but also via their websites, available in French, English, Arabic and Spanish. The 24 hour news channels broadcast to 250 million TV households in 177 countries, via nineteen satellites and also via cable, ADSL, mobile phones, tablets and connected TVs. France 24’s newsroom, which is based in Paris, is where the channel’s 400 journalists from over 35 nationalities work. France 24 also works closely with hundreds of international correspondents based in different parts of the world. The France 24 channels, together with the international radio station RFI and the Arabic-language radio station Monte Carlo Doualiya, all fall under France Médias Monde, which is a shareholder and partner of the French channel TV5Monde (france24 n.d.). France 24 was initiated by former French President Jacques Chirac, who wanted to share the French vision of the world with the world as early as 1987, but the channel become reality only twenty years later, when the former CEO of Havas, was named President of France 24. Alain de Pouilhac, was also President of France Médias Monde from 2008 to 2012 (BBC n.d.; Debuté 2012).

RFI, Radio France Internationale, broadcasts internationally through various means: 156 FM frequencies, thirty different satellite signals, over a thousand radio partners, online and via mobile apps in fourteen languages as well as French on both French and international current affairs. The radio station has its editorial team based in Paris that work with 400 international correspondents and boasts a radio audience of over 40 million listeners from 150 countries,

along with over 15 million unique visitors online. Monte Carlo Doualiya broadcasts in Arabic from Paris and various countries in the Near and Middle East, which include: Mauritania, Djibouti and South Sudan. MCD broadcasts on FM, via satellite and partner stations to provide cultural news. It has a listenership of around seven million listeners in eighteen countries. It is also accessible online and has over 2 million visitors to its online platform.

In 2014, France 24 also began broadcasting live on YouTube. In addition, today, France 24 is presented on Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Dailymotion, Foursquare and Soundcloud. The France 24 English shows are numerous and cover a range of topics, from current affairs to culture, food and fashion (France24 2018).

## News Production

Through my interviews, I was able to get a better understanding of the role of two types of international correspondents at France 24: the fulltime correspondent (David Thomson) and the freelance correspondent (Marine Olivesi). The fulltime correspondent was in charge of getting the information, constructing it into a narrative along with their words and images provided by the France 24 photographer and then sending it to Paris to be broadcast. This is very similar to the way in which Al Jazeera produces their news, as recounted by Peter Greste and Heather Allan. Olivesi also added that F24 correspondents who were not bilingual worked in pairs with another journalist who would use the same narrative in another language so as to be able to broadcast the news package on their other channels. Thomson explained that France 24 international correspondents who were bilingual usually worked for both France 24 English and French. International Correspondents who chose to report in only one language, would however, have their footage used on the other F24 channels with a translated script. However, Thomson noted that the editorial line between F24 English and French were not always the same, and especially F24 Arabic, which he found to be sometimes inaccurate (Thomson 2017, p.5).

While working with Thomson, Olivesi explained that she would shadow him in English. Thomson would work with a camera man to report a story in French and he would produce it before packaging it and sending it to France 24. Olivesi as a freelancer was not involved in the production of the packages. Olivesi described her role as the F24 freelancer to be the person who would pick up the phone from both F24 producers and F24 editors. Producers and editors would contact her after seeing headlines on newswires that they considered to be newsworthy. They would ask Olivesi if she could confirm the story and talk about it on air. If she could not confirm the story, they would ask her to investigate and then call her back to cover the story. Olivesi explained that she usually knew the stories on the newswire because most journalists

including AFP and Reuters journalists were travelling around the country together. As the F24 Freelancer for Libya, she knew that the focus was Sirte and therefore, she would be sure to be in Sirte every day. Due to the conflict in Sirte, Olivesi explained that journalists could not sleep in Sirte and therefore would usually be based in Misrata and drive two hours into Sirte every morning together. Therefore, news coming in from F24 would usually complement what she was seeing with her own eyes, or at least would allow her to know what was happening in a city she was not physically in.

## France 24 and News Verification

In terms of news verification, Olivesi walked me through her day as a freelancer for F24 on the day Gaddafi's death was announced. She explained she and her fellow journalists heard an explosion while driving into Sirte, and once they arrived to Sirte, they noticed that there were no longer the clear front lines that had been clearly drawn out for journalists on previous days. Instead, on the day Gaddafi was killed, the journalists could hear fighting in places previously considered safe; "it was a kind of mayhem...it felt indeed like something big ....something big was happening" (Olivesi 2017, p.3). To further understand what was happening, she and her fellow journalists went to a field hospital to interview people and ask what could be happening. Olivesi explained that when an ambulance arrived at the hospital, many people said that Gaddafi had been caught and he was inside it, but she was not ready to believe it. Her cautiousness was due to the sheer number of times Gaddafi had been rumoured dead in Libya. Olivesi told me that "It would be interesting to count how many times Mutassim, for instance, Mutassim Gadaffi had been announced captured or killed during the revolution....unless you've got eyewitnesses, you get footage....you can't take that [the truth] for granted....you can't [report it]" (Olivesi 2017, pp.3-4). Olivesi explained that no one could see who was actually in the ambulance, therefore she was not ready to report his death or capture.

It was later in the day that Olivesi received some kind of proof of Gaddafi's death. The rebels she was hitching a ride with to another hospital to seek out Gaddafi showed Olivesi footage they had on their cell phones. Olivesi explained that the footage they showed her was "some of the footage that we saw on the news, on the TV ...maybe an hour later...of basically Gaddafi still alive but being beaten up, dragged...bloodied, and they had some of that footage, so clearly they were there during the capture of Gaddafi and they had themselves recorded that footage, and it had happened maybe half an hour an hour earlier...". Olivesi further said that she owed her certainty of the video authenticity to the fact that she was watching them on very old mobile phones, and therefore it was pretty clear that they had not received the footage via the internet. Still at that moment, Olivesi decided not to break the news. None of her journalist colleagues

at AFP or Reuters had shared any confirmation of Gaddafi's capture or death on the newswires, and Olivesi was not ready to share the information based on the fact that all she had was "very bad cell phone footage. Olivesi confirmed to me that as a Freelance journalist, she did not actually have to wait for newswires to confirm the news, she herself could have broken the news, but she did not want to risk breaking news that just may not have been true or was too blurry to describe, Olivesi explained "...you've got a massive scoop, the question is, how do you tell the news knowing that you haven't seen him, and it's all very blurry and newswires are also trying to figure out how to report it". Olivesi explained "...with news like that, it is so massive, you'd be silly not to at least mention what's happening...it might not be confirmed, but at the same time I was also a lot more comfortable getting into that news knowing that I'd seen some footage. If I hadn't seen the footage, it would have been trickier, it would have just been a rumour". Olivesi emphasised that "there's no other footage going around of Gaddafi in that state, it's not like it could have been a fake one, and he was clearly Gaddafi as well..." The question Olivesi had to ask herself, was how to report the news knowing that she had not actually seen Gaddafi with her own eyes. Olivesi decided to broadcast that "there's been a rumour that Gaddafi has been captured, there's video circulating on cell phones of Libyan fighters where we can see someone that really looks like Gaddafi" (Olivesi 2017, p.7). Olivesi explained that AFP broadcast the confirmation everyone was awaiting some minutes after her announcement on France 24. Olivesi explained that AFP had made the confirmation with a photo of footage on a phone from another fighter and that the reason why it took them longer to publish it to their newswires, was related to photo rights: "...it's a picture that our [AFP's] photographer had taken out of second hand material [a rebel's phone]...is it fair to put out that picture as AFP knowing that we're taking a picture off a camera that wasn't gathered by any of our reporters"? (Olivesi 2017, p.8).

The regime opposition, the National Transitional Council, had announced that Gaddafi was dead. Repeating the words of an 'official' organisation and citing the organisation was a way for journalists to report the news without implicating themselves if the news turned out to be inaccurate. Despite the announcement of Gaddafi's death, he was not to be found in any of the hospitals Olivesi searched; all the footage pouring out of rebels' phones showed that he was hurt but alive, and so everyone expected him to be at a hospital. No Gaddafi meant that she was not able to confirm Gaddafi's location or state from a doctor. For Olivesi, as a journalist, she was unable to confirm the most "official" message coming from Libya. Indeed, the words of the NTC had become official because the regime had fallen. Olivesi explained "... apart from the NTC saying he's dead, there's nothing. There's no doctors to interview, there's nobody to see, no one had taken pictures...as far as we were concerned, they're [the NTC officials] being fed information from the rebel fighters on the ground, they're not there themselves, there hasn't

been a guy dispatched from the NTC to check his body and confirm he's dead, and again there's no doctor, there's no hospital..." (Olivesi 2017, p.9) and therefore, during her live broadcasts on France 24, Olivesi noted that although the NTC confirmed his death, she pointed out that no doctor had actually pronounced him dead. It was not until Olivesi had seen Gaddafi's body along with that of his son Mutassim, both hosted at a rebel sponsor's garage, that she was able to confirm to and on France 24 that he was indeed dead (Olivesi 2017, p.10). But Olivesi was unable to share photos or footage, because she had no photographer. Her colleague, a photographer apparently took the first photos, but he did not post them online before the AFP photographers who arrived after him. Olivesi explained that the first photo shared is usually the ones that "sticks. With newswires, that's the one that circulates..." (Olivesi 2017, p.11).

Despite the added cost of having correspondents or freelancers based on location, Olivesi told me that it was significantly important to have someone on site to actually verify the news being broadcast on international channels to audiences worldwide. Olivesi shared an example she was able to witness with the BBC, who she said only came back into to Libya when Gaddafi was officially announced dead by all newswires. Olivesi explained that she overheard an interview between a BBC journalist and a rebel commander who was in the same car as Gaddafi on the day of his capture and death. According to Olivesi, the rebel told the BBC in his interview that "...we didn't stop at the field hospital because it was so crowded, there were no beds available, there were hundreds of people surrounding the ambulance, it was not safe, so we decided to go to the second field hospital, and by then he was dead". But the rebel's excuse of the crowded hospital not being an ideal place for Gaddafi to be attended to by medical personnel did not resonate well with Olivesi, who had been at the hospital and she was able to confront the rebel after his interview, noting that "...there were like two people in there [the first field hospital] who were being treated at that point, the hospital was not at all overcrowded, and there were free beds, and no, there were not hundreds of people surrounding the ambulance". Olivesi admitted to me that "...in a case like that, you're so much better off as a journalist being able to tell them that's bullshit, but you can only do that when...[you've actually been there]" (Olivesi 2017, p.11)

Thomson echoed Olivesi, stating that he too was not ready to broadcast any news he received until he could see it for himself in Libya. Also, because the internet was shut down very quickly in Libya, there was one less medium of communication for journalists to use. On the other hand, when Thomson worked as an international correspondent in Tunisia, in February 2011, just some months before going to Libya, he worked very closely with different types of sources: "political sources, activist sources, you had official sources, you had demonstrations every day in the streets, so you could also talk to people in the streets who were just demonstrating. You had the official guys- so you had plenty of sources in Tunisia." (Thomson 2017, pp.3-4).

Furthermore, many of Thomson's sources in Tunisia had become trustworthy as he had established a relationship with them over time.

## France 24 Selecting the News of the Arab Spring

In terms of selecting the angle of their story, Olivesi explained that as a journalist, she was generally spending subsequent time with rebels, who took her from one place to the next and who were willing to answer her questions, therefore, it was almost inevitable that the story of the rebels be told, rather than that of the regime. Olivesi explained that the Libyans "understood that part of the war was also an 'information war', and they made it [news] available to journalists very fast, but in terms of security in general, they were more than welcoming, and one of the reasons of course [was that] they kind of saw us- and it's something that we had to struggle with because of course you don't want to be the mouth piece of one group of a conflict- but they saw us as ...we were the journalists, we were on the ground, and there was NATO in the sky, and we were all part of the same team. Because the narrative was so much anti-Gaddafi in the international community, the French, the Americans, the Brits, were pounding the Gaddafi holdouts [...] journalists were documenting in a lot of cases especially at first, Gaddafi, the human rights violations, and war crimes, and this and that, the story was very one-sided up until at least later in the revolution when there was an uglier side of the Libyan fighters and the revolution that sort of emerged at some point..." (Olivesi 2017, p.5). Olivesi also admitted that as journalists "...we were biased", but explained that this was related to what they could access in terms of information as journalists (Olivesi 2017, p.14). Accessing Gaddafi's regime as a freelance journalist was practically impossible and had its limitations too. According to Olivesi, "To go to the Gaddafi regime's side, first of all as a freelance journalist, you couldn't, you had to be sponsored by a big news organisation [...] And second of all, it was very expensive, and news organisations would pay for a week or two weeks, because it gave them the side from Tripoli and so on, but third of all ...it was even more biased because...journalists who had been on those trips...reported being put a Minder on" (Olivesi 2017, p.14). As stated by Olivesi, Gaddafi's Minders would be designated people who would follow journalists to ensure they do not speak to "the wrong people" and would "intimidate the people on the street to talk to them to make sure they don't say anything against the regime". Reporting from the regime's side also meant that you were probably "...not even allowed to go out of the hotel without being on 'those big tours' that the Gaddafi regime was organising- every morning they would go to see the new NATO bombing site, and see how much damage NATO was creating..." (Olivesi 2017, p.14).

Thomson confirmed Olivési's comments on the challenges involved in covering the Libyan regime. Thomson said working with the regime, meant really working under a dictatorship that was building what he called "old-fashioned propaganda" that was also comical (Thomson 2017, p.5). Thomson recounted his experience trying to cover the revolution from the regime's angle. He and other interested French journalists were lodged in a motel by the regime; their movements were restricted by a minder that was assigned to each journalist, who would even sleep in the motel next to their room. The journalists were rounded up by the regime to visit pre-approved locations in a "Gaddafi bus". The locations the journalists were taken to seemed to have pro-Gaddafi loyalists on the street cheering the journalists on with red and green flags and pictures of Gaddafi with pro-Gaddafi slogans, but Thomson was wary about broadcasting information from these locations, because after some time, he noticed that the same people in certain locations were spotted in other locations, as though the Gaddafi regime had been planting actors in locations they were taking international journalists to (Thomson 2017, p.5). When it came to F24's editorial line, other than getting shots of the combat, an editorial line that came from F24 Paris, Thomson explained that story pitches were decided together with F24 Paris and him as a correspondent. He explained that it was generally agreed that he would follow the Libyan rebels as they moved against Gaddafi's forces daily. Therefore as the international correspondent, he would follow the rebels on a daily basis, interview them and basically tell the story from their stand point. Thomson explained however that the work of a correspondent is sometimes frustrating, because when working with editors in F24 Paris, he would sometimes be asked to comment on an event that would be taking place in a different part of Libya. For example, if he was based in Sirte, he would not be able to comment on the situation in Benghazi, because of the sheer distance between the two cities. But F24 Paris was not satisfied with this answer as Thomson was expected to cover Libya as a country. Thomson would therefore have to resort to commenting on the situation in different parts of the country by simply reading press agency stories.

In terms of the news format, Thomson explained that the French preference of reporting the news, with both F24 and other French television channels, was to have a reporter narrating the news on voice over, together with footage representing his discourse, and that the journalist would only appear on the broadcast at the end of his narration, to provide a conclusion to the viewers.

When I asked Thomson how F24, a state channel, was able to maintain its independence from the French government, he explained that as an international correspondent during the Arab Spring, he was not involved in any talks between the government and the channel and therefore, although Thomson presumed that there probably were talks with between F24 and the French Foreign Affairs Minister, he was not aware of any direct influence from the French government.

On the other hand, Thomson also specified that most French journalists were covering the revolution and involvement of the international community, notably France, on a positive note, as being pro-democratic; Thomson said "...at the time, I think the vision of French journalists was quite the same as the French Government", and therefore, "It was not necessary to try to give direction to the journalists" (Thomson 2017, p.6).

As stated earlier, international journalists sometimes work with fixers to find stories. As fixers were not journalists, Olivesi explained that journalists using the fixers would have to train them. Other possible issues with volunteer fixers was that they may refuse to translate word for word or even change the meaning of discourses during translations. Olivesi explained the remedy to having independent fixers was to ensure that they were paid, as she had experienced in Syria, a country that experienced a much more long-lasting conflict than Libya. Syria's uprising, just like Libya's grew into a conflict, but then lasted for years. This means that "...you have a sort of a professionalised Fixers' Guild that emerged where its people are being paid, which is a lot more [practical]...if you think about it, ... 'I paid you, you're not helping me out, volunteering for your cause, you're doing it because it's a job and I pay you'. So that's the way to guarantee their independence, or unbiased [sic], which is not perfect but it's at least...a job" (Olivesi 2017, p.14). Olivesi believed that a very good fixer would also pitch stories to journalists, because they would know what was happening in the country. Therefore, fixers were sometimes not the problem when it came to reporting the Libyan war's different angles. Olivesi recounted that her husband was a fixer in Libya and he had told her of times when his pitches were refused by journalists because they were stories Gaddafi loyalists were the victims: "...he had that one example, he'd heard that there were bodies, that it was possible to go see them, it was very fishy, it was probably Gadaffi loyalists who had been executed...and he asked them [journalists] 'do you want to go?' and apparently they were like 'well, no, it's not really a story we want to cover' ... there were probably a few occasions where journalists turned a blind eye, but I wouldn't... generalise it" (Olivesi 2017, p.16).

Olivesi did not feel that they missed big stories by not following the Gaddafi regime during the revolution. She said to me that "I honestly think most of us did the best we could". But Olivesi explained that things got ugly with the rebels after Gaddafi had died. She recounted the first incident post-Tripoli's liberation, where she felt as a journalist that she had a negative story to report against the rebels. Olivesi explained that she and other journalists noticed that all black people were being arrested by the rebels and accused of being mercenaries, "...even though it was mostly a false charge". When the rebels were confronted by Olivesi and her fellow journalists, their reaction according to Olivesi was "What's the big deal? The enemy is Colonel Gaddafi", but Olivesi had to explain to them that as the rebels were "in charge" and Gadaffi was no more, it was the rebels who had to be answering the journalists' questions (Olivesi 2017,

p.15). Olivesi pointed out another example post –Gaddafi’s death: there was looting and burning of houses as well as the unexplained executions in Sirte. Olivesi pointed out that these horror stories from the Rebels’ side were reported. Tawergha, the small town with black Libyans who are an ethnic and tribal minority, was the target of angry Misratis for accusing them of participating in Misrata’s siege during the revolution, and the Misratis reportedly burnt down the town and Olivesi says that “all of these stories I think were told when there was a chance for us to have access to them, to witness them” (Olivesi 2017, p.16).

In terms of the news production schema for France 24, the information gathered when speaking to the F24 correspondents encouraged us to believe that the processes were very similar to that of AJE. We were however, also able to detect notable differences between fulltime correspondents and freelance correspondents (visible in tables 11 and 12).




Table 11 F24: News Production with Independent/Freelance Correspondent on Location




Table 12 F24: News Production with Fulltime Correspondent on Location

## Staff Training and Security

Marine Olivesi was fresh out of journalism school, with only about a couple years of Freelance experience, when she agreed to report for France 24 from Libya to cover the conflict of 2011; unknown to her at the time, she would also break the news of Gaddafi’s death. Olivesi was awarded with the Bayeux-Calvados War Correspondent Award for a feature from Deir Ezzor in Syria that aired on CBC’s Radio One (Courret 2013; Olivesi 2018).

One of the first things Marine Olivesi clarified with me on our interview was the fact that she was not France 24 staff and that her relationship with them only lasted a “couple of months”,

where she initially filled in for the English-speaking correspondents, but was not involved in the production of their packages. Olivesi was called on-board France 24 by David Thomson, who worked for F24 French as a correspondent from Libya and needed an English speaking journalist to report the stories for F24 English. Olivesi explained that correspondents usually worked in pairs so as to be able to cover both English and French versions of the channel. Therefore, Olivesi's main job was to fill in for all live reporting from Libya after Tripoli had fallen into the hands of rebels in 2011.

But Thomson's time in Libya had grown lengthy and Olivesi explained that France 24 wanted him to take a break; it seemed like the best time to take a break because "the battle for Sirte was dragging on" and there was little to report. Olivesi was therefore left to report on the conflict on her own with a phone to receive calls from F24 and no camera man. She explained to me that she was "never expected to shoot videos and produce packages", because "it was just a matter of time before everyone expected the conflict to be over and the regime to lose power. Olivesi explained that for F24 they simply needed "to keep someone in Sirte that they could phone in several times a day, whenever there'd be new developments" and indeed F24 would contact her by phone for live reporting two to three times a day on a slow day (Olivesi 2017, pp.1-2). Olivesi explained that this was not unique to F24, in fact, there were only about a dozen journalists that she could see still based in Libya towards the end of the conflict. Olivesi emphasised that "there was a Reuter's team, there was an AFP team...3 of 4 freelance photographers, myself, a couple of other people and that was it". Olivesi explained that "it cost a lot of money for newspapers...or for radio stations to keep staffers in a place like that, and even freelancers..." and Olivesi pointed out that there were upcoming elections in Tunisia, so it was a more important story than the ongoing Libyan conflict, so many freelancers decided to go where the story was (Olivesi 2017, p.2).

In terms of safety, Olivesi explained to me that working in Libya was an excellent place for her to get her experience covering conflicts because "...in Libya you had almost zero risk of kidnapping or anything nasty happening, if you were away from the frontline. In terms of rebel fighters and how they were, you knew nothing bad, pretty much, would happen to you. There were a few journalists who were killed either in Misrata on the frontline or because they went further that the frontline and ran into Gaddafi loyalists. But as for reporting from the rebel-held side, to my knowledge, there had not been any incidents or kidnapping..." (Olivesi, 2017).

Olivesi explained her role has a Freelance Journalist, even though she was a trained and qualified journalist, whether it was with France 24 or any other media organisation, she had no work contract tying her to them, she explained "I never signed anything!" (Olivesi 2017, p.20). Not having a contract meant that the media organisation would not be legally responsible for the journalist. As a freelance journalist for F24 in Libya, although she felt relatively safe there,

she was not actually asked by F24 if she had passed Hostile Environment First Aid Training<sup>47</sup>. She was not given a bullet-proof vest, helmet or satellite phone until David Thomson, who she was working with, left the country, so she was able to use his equipment and then had to give them back to the channel after covering Libya. F24 did not provide Hostile Environment Insurance for Olivesi, as a freelance journalist either.

Olivesi explained that as a young and inexperienced freelance journalist, building her CV was important and one of the great ways to show media organisations what she was capable of doing, while getting experience, was to go to areas most journalists were not willing to go and this meant going to war zones, without any experience. And media organisations were willing to send inexperienced journalists to danger zones, to cover complicated international stories, because they had little choice.

International journalists, Olivesi said, often work with Fixers, people usually from the country being reported on, people who speak the local language, people who have good connections in the country and who "...instead of fighting, they decided to help journalists, to facilitate..." (Olivesi 2017, p.13). Olivesi admitted that having a Fixer as a journalist in a conflict zone made her work as a journalist much easier in the logistical aspects "...they were taking us, driving us, and all the journalists...as drivers, as translators, sometimes, they would take us to their families to sleep, to stay the night, because there were no hotels. So they were really the people that we relied on, who we would be telling, 'Look, I'm trying to do a story about Gaddafi, think of who we could interview, take us there, translate the interview'..." (Olivesi 2017, p.13). But there was a catch when it came to using Fixers; Olivesi explained that Fixer is "...not really a job" and at the beginning of the Libyan conflict, Fixers decided to become Fixers to help the revolution, because they recognised that they were waging an information war alongside the physical war, and due to their allegiance to their revolution, they refused to be paid by journalists or media organisations, and instead preferred to volunteer their services. This of course meant that Fixers were only able to or at least only willing to share connections who would tell their side of the revolution. Olivesi noted this during her journalism field work in Libya and she told me "...you rely on people...that aren't journalists, that also have their heart in a specific place when it comes to that conflict...when I'm telling you that most of them, it was either join the rebel forces or ...help the journalists, ....it tells you these were not independent people. A good fixer is supposed to ideally...have contacts in both sides, but it wasn't practical in Libya, it was impossible. You couldn't ask your fixer in Benghazi to have contacts from [another location] they were all, for their safety as well, working, operating within one side" (Olivesi 2017, p.14).

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<sup>47</sup> <http://hostileinsurance.com/>

In terms of safety, even as F24 staff, David Thomson, permanent staff aimed to work in the African Francophone countries as an international correspondent. Thomson first worked for RFI as a radio broadcaster before being dispatched to Ivory Coast, where he worked at the F24 news desk and was then sent to Tunisia to begin his career<sup>48</sup> in international correspondence during the Tunisian uprising. Even as permanent staff in F24, Thomson explained that he first went into Tunisia and Libya without a bullet-proof vest, and faced some dangerous situations where he had to avoid bullets. After realising how dangerous the situation was in Libya, he then requested bullet proof vests, which were then provided by F24. Thomson explained that even as F24 staff, he was not insured when working in Libya.

Working as an international correspondent in Tunisia and Libya, for Thomson, meant that his office was where he slept, because F24 did not have bureaus in Tunisia and Libya. Thomson built his news crew team by calling on friends he knew who were qualified and looking for work as freelancers. Thomson found that because working in Libya meant that he was working in a conflict zone, he sometimes had to beg people to come in to shoot footage, but it was risky business because he could not provide insurance for his freelancing news crew and people who came to work in Libya without prior conflict zone experience sometimes got frightened and walked away from the job. It did not make matters easier for Thomson when his Paris editors asked him to get good close shots of the actual battle. Thomson expressed his shock in his editor's request to "see the war", rather than telling his only correspondent in Libya to be careful. Therefore, because there were times where no camera man was willing to go too close to the combat, Thomson found himself sometimes having to pick up the camera and shoot footage himself; therefore he had to write, film, package and do the broadcasts.

Despite the act of going close to a battlefield sounding alarming or even terrifying, Thomson echoed Olivesi's feeling of "safety" while working in Libya amongst rebels. Thomson explained that the rebels were "welcoming" to the French and would yell "Vive Sarkozy! Vive la revolution" (Thomson 2017, p.4), allowing him to be able to follow them very closely and even allow him past the front line with them. Thomson also noted that the Libyan conflict was made up of rebels, inexperienced with war, and therefore, the combats themselves were completely disorganised, with rebels not drawing clear battle lines or even being aware where the front line was.

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<sup>48</sup> Thomson further specialised his knowledge and research on Jihadism by making both documentaries and books *Les Français jihadistes* (2014) and *Les Revenants* (2016) on French people who took to off to fight what they called a holy war. In 2013, he received the Ilaria-Apli award and later on went to receive award from l'Express, BFM TV and the Grand Prix of International Press in 2016 and finally the Albert Awar from London in 2017.

### **III.1.5. International News Agencies**

As can be noted whilst studying the news channels from our corpora, the flow of news is made up of several actors. One of the significant actors in international news production is the international news agency. International news agencies have a multitude of responsibilities, but the main one is to broadcast news on newswires to their clients who happen to be mainstream media. The news that agencies provide to their clients can come in form of text, photos or video footage and thanks to their global presence the information they publish is almost always considered to be accurate. In addition to providing news, today's agencies go a step further, working with citizen journalists and activists so as to gather news from places that professional journalists cannot access. These agencies all constitute part of the dominant institutions that play equally significant roles in the flow of news. Our research identified Agence France-Presse to be a leader of international news agencies and therefore conducted desk research on the organisation along with interviews with the editors-in-chief of the AFP Bordeaux and Beirut offices. Additionally, editor-in-chief of CrowdsparK (previously Citizenside/Newzulu) was also interviewed to understand how this news agency gathers news from citizen journalists.

#### **III.1.5.1. Agence France-Presse**

##### *AFP Organisation and Structure*

Agence France-Presse chaired by Emmanuel Hoog is a global network of 201 bureaus expanding over 150 countries. The AFP bureaus are operated with over 2,000 collaborators representing 80 nationalities from all over the world, making the agency both multilingual and multicultural. Charles Havas initially set up the agency as Agences Feuilles Politiques in 1835, run by trains and homing pigeons that brought news to Paris from both France and other European countries. It came to be known as the first ever international news agency that operated with a network of correspondents and translators. In 1859 an agreement between the three major agencies, Reuter in London, Wolff in Berlin and Havas in Paris allowed for division of roles in terms of collection and dissemination of information. In 1940, under the German forces of WWII, the news section of Havas was nationalised, therefore making it a government agency. Also, the Advertising branch- Havas- and the news branch – state property under the name French Information Office (OFI) was formed. Agence Française Indépendante (AFI) was then founded in London by Paul-Louis Bret in 1944 in the hope of keeping an independent French press for public opinion. In the same year, OFI was renamed Agence France-Press when a group of journalists in the French Resistance seized the OFI bureaus and issued a first dispatch

from the liberated city under the name “Agence France-Presse”. In 1957, the French government adopted the AFP Statute allowing for “editorial independence, global presence and financial autonomy” so that the CEO could be elected by a Board of Directors. A little over 10 years later in 1969, the Arabic service of AFP was launched and just two years later, AFP began transmitting news with its first satellite. In 1972 when AFP announced the death of Israeli hostages in the Munich Olympics, the agency proved its ability to both receive and broadcast news at least one hour before anyone else. In 1983, AFP was able to provide news summaries, music and news reports on local radio in France and two years later AFP launched an international photo department. Three years later, AFP published content on Minitel, the French online service accessible through telephone dial up and considered to be one of the world’s most successful pre-WWW services. The AFP Arabic service was supported with the opening of regional Arabic desk based in Nicosia, Cyprus. By 1988, AFP began reporting the news two hours before anyone else. The first AFP website was launched in 1995 and its first multimedia Internet Journal is published in French. By 2011, after the establishment of several more international offices, AFP began building cutting-edge technology to produce and distribute news in form of text, image and video. Also, the international market proved more fruitful to AFP than the domestic market in terms of revenues. In 2018, AFP produced around 200 news videos daily in seven languages and nine different technical formats ranging from web and tablet to mobile and broadcast, delivered via Satellite, FTP and their download platform.

## AFP Sourcing and Verification of News

I had the opportunity of interviewing AFP’s Pierre Feuilly who heads AFP Bordeaux’s bureau, covering the South West of France since 2013<sup>49</sup>. In order to further understand AFP’s role in news production, specifically in the Arab Spring, an interview was also conducted with the editor-in-chief of Beirut and Damascus offices, Sammy Ketz, who covered the Syrian Uprising and then the conflict that broke after the uprising from both Lebanon and Syria<sup>50</sup>.

Feuilly explained that as far as AFP was concerned, the Arab Spring did not ‘spring out’ from nowhere; it had been building up for some time and this was known by AFP journalists because

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<sup>49</sup> Pierre Feuilly, a journalist at AFP since 1970 also worked for Radio Télévision Publique Française from 1966 to 1968. Feuilly had headed the department of General Information in AFP for seventeen years, where he was in charge of news on the Arab world in the eighties and early nineties. Feuilly also headed AFP’s German office for ten years before heading the Vienna office for six years. Feuilly explained that although he was not directly involved in covering the Arab Spring, as he was based between Germany and Austria at the time, news of the Arab Spring was of importance to Germany, a principal actor within the European Union and Austria, which has been home to OPEC’s headquarters since 1965. Feuilly explained that news of Libya, home to Africa’s largest oil reserves, was followed closely in Vienna.

<sup>50</sup> Ketz, a journalist for AFP, has been based in the Middle East for some thirty five years and therefore understands the ins and outs of how Lebanese and Syrian politics works, along with the complicated history of the region.

AFP's offices, journalists, photographers and videographers have been in the Arab World for dozens of years. Historically, AFP has had a strong presence in the Arab world, long enough to understand that although the Arab world has long been undemocratic, opposition has always been present in form of civil, civic, democratic, violent or armed opposition. Ketz re-affirmed the locations of AFP bureaus in the MENA region: one in Tunisia, one for Yemen in Dubai, one in Egypt and one in Libya so as to cover the stories from each respective country. AFP's news hub for the Middle East is based in Cyprus, so that journalists can work with all Middle Eastern countries, including Israel. The Beirut office is made up of six journalists, reporting in French, Arabic and English, and these journalists send news stories to the Nicosia office, which in turn checks the news before sending it to their media clients. AFP's relationships with governments and opposition leaders have been established over a long period of time, giving the agency an insight into the events in various countries. AFP has also established relationships with Human Rights' organisations as well as associations and non-governmental organisations. The relationships between AFP and their informers further amplified during the Arab Spring. Also to be noted is the fact that AFP's many journalists are of Arab origin and therefore speak Arabic and have a clearer insight into the way the respective countries function; many have family and friends in the countries they report on and therefore have contacts worthy of being witnesses or sources of information or at least worthy of granting interviews to AFP with certain people in the country. Another source of information used by AFP during the Arab Spring were ambassadors of the implicated countries. According to Feuilly, it is worth remembering that AFP has been broadcasting news in the Arabic language to an Arab audience for over seventy years now. In terms of news sources, Feuilly can be quoted for stating *"On [l'AFP] a beaucoup de contacts directs parce qu'on est presents sur le terrain. On est là. Depuis toujours"* (English translation: *We have a lot of direct contacts because we are present on the field. We are there, and have always been*).

As most countries have their own national press agency, often run by their government, AFP set up contracts, agreements and networks allowing for the exchange of information or at least cooperation with local media. AFP has agreements with all these national press agencies, from the Saudi and Tunisian national press agencies to the Algerian and Egyptian national press agencies, and they have had these agreements in place for a long time now. Just as AFP work with local press, in turn, local press tend to use AFP to verify news and then to receive training post-Arab Spring<sup>51</sup>. Many local Arab press agencies that worked under their respective

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<sup>51</sup> According to Feuilly: AFP was called to train the Tunisian press agency, Tunis Afrique Press or TAP, which changed management after its uprising. AFP has also taken on the role of training journalists in Yemen, Iraq and Egypt.

governments prior to the Arab Spring saw a need to learn how to work independently post-revolutions.

Ketz, in Beirut, explained that AFP journalists had to choose which side of the Syrian Uprising they would cover, and as he had been in the region for decades now, he had a working relationship with the Syrian regime, going back to the reign of Hafez Al Assad<sup>52</sup>. As Ketz had been covering the regime for several years now, he continued gathering news from the Syrian regime as a primary source, whilst other AFP journalists and informers covered the news from the angle of the rebels.

AFP had already been working with citizen journalists prior to the events of the Arab Uprisings and therefore had already built some trustworthy contacts among citizen journalists in the Arab world over the years. When asked if validating information from citizen journalists proved to be challenging, Feuilly answered that whether content is provided by a professional or amateur journalist, AFP would still have to validate the facts before publication. Feuilly explained that everyone is at risk of being lied to, influenced or manipulated by one group or organisation and therefore fact checking is of essence even when working with professional journalists. Feuilly explained that even news from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights is not published by AFP until it is verified by one of their staff or trusted informers. News verification and validation has always been of utmost importance to AFP, even before the era of “fake news” whereby information is disseminated online by people or even organisations before verification. Feuilly insisted that AFP has not just suddenly realised the importance of news verification as a result of the era of Web 2.0. In fact, news verification is what gave AFP the credibility<sup>53</sup> required of an independent press agency referenced by international sources. Feuilly further emphasised that citizen journalists and journalists have one thing in common: they are both citizens. And as citizens of a country, everyone is entitled to their point of view on the governance of the country, everyone can also be influenced by one faction or group and therefore, according to Feuilly, it is necessary to do repetitive checks on the information received from all types of sources.

Ketz explained that just because AFP was no longer sending journalists to Syria (March, 2016) did not mean that they were no longer gathering news from the rebel side. AFP worked with both journalists on their payroll and also with activists and citizen journalists who were not on

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<sup>52</sup> Despite the Western media largely avoiding Assad since the Syrian Uprising, it is interesting to note that the relationship between the media and the Assad family has not always been so cold. Bashar Al-Assad’s father, Hafez Al-Assad, the previous president of Syria, was quoted by “Western statesmen as a man of peace” (Telegraph 2000) and peace in the Middle East was even envisaged through Bashar Al-Assad (Karim 2009).

<sup>53</sup> Feuilly pointed out for example, that AFP was the only independent press agency in North Vietnam and therefore when AFP broke the news that the first American bomb hit the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam, it was believed by audiences all over the world, for the simple fact that the news was announced by AFP and everyone believes AFP, as opposed to the North Vietnamese government or even the American government who may have not announced the bombing had it not been already reported by AFP.

their payroll. This meant that citizen journalists or even activists sometimes provided information to AFP on an event without AFP staff being on location to witness the event directly. Ketz explained that it was very important for AFP that they mentioned their sources on their newswire; it was especially crucial that they would differentiate their sources between those on their payroll and those not on the payroll. This had become especially important to agencies after Reutergate, a scandal on Reuters, whereby it was found that photos taken by a Reuters freelancer on the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon were manipulated before going public (Cooper 2007).

Ketz told me that AFP often worked with many activists, especially at the beginning of the Syrian uprising, and that many of these activists wished to remain anonymous. AFP also worked closely with Human Rights organisations so as to be able to balance their stories between the information provided by the regime and the activists. In Syria, AFP also worked with SANA, the Syrian Arab News Agency, because SANA is the official press news agency of Syria, meaning that the regime would make official announcements via SANA so as to be broadcast publicly. Ketz also confirmed that AFP had their own sources within the Syrian regime. Indeed with all these sources, Ketz informed me that they sometimes gathered contradictory information and that there came a point in time during the uprising and then of course during the Syrian conflict, whereby it became challenging to trust some of their sources and identify what was true from what their sources shared. After a while and after experiencing the quality of information coming from their various sources in Syria, AFP decided to use the Observatory of Human Rights organisation in Syria as their main source, for the simple fact that they found them to be the most trustable. Ketz said that AFP received a lot of criticism for using the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights organisation, but after some time even AFP competitors turned to the Observatory for information, as it became clear that their information could be trusted, due to the large number of sources used by the Observatory.

According to Ketz, in order to verify incoming information from various sources, they had to do what he called “cross information”. For example, when covering the siege of the old city of Homs, AFP Beirut was in contact with an activist based in Homs, who spoke to the AFP Beirut journalists on the phone on a daily basis with news and updates on the situation. AFP found this particular activist to be trustworthy because he was providing news that matched what other sources were saying on a daily basis; his recounts of events would be cross checked with information being broadcast by the Observatory. Ketz explained that they had no visual or physical contact with some activists who provided them with information on a daily basis, but because they worked together on a daily basis over the phone for such long periods of time, sometimes for over a year, they nurtured a trust in their relationship. On the other hand, Ketz admitted working with activists who turned out to be not so professional, therefore AFP would

use them for cover, rather than for information. Some Syrian activists were found via Syrians who moved to Beirut, who would share contacts with the AFP office of Beirut, of people back home who would be willing to speak to them. Ketz explained that the living conditions under which some of the activists they spoke to were very harsh, for example, some were blocked under a siege, others had to move and became displaced, others left Syria, some disappeared and some died. But for those who survived, when possible, they carried on talking to AFP, so as to share the news of their homeland with the rest of the world. Many of the activists who fled Syria to Beirut later met up with the AFP staff that they had been corresponding with on the phone. Ketz explained that corresponding with the activists was part of their job, but long lasting relationships were also built at times.

Verification of news takes place via the various people and teams that AFP has on location along with informers allowing for fast verification. Feuilly insisted that unless the information was seen by one of their human informers, AFP would not report it. For example, the Sarin attacks on Ghoutta in Syria was a news event that AFP could not break because they did not have any journalists or informers on the ground. Feuilly confirmed that some of the footage seen on the internet and on television was in fact footage from citizen journalists. AFP was only able to provide footage after the gas attack when the UN was given access to verify the location of the chemical attack. In terms of the verification of information sent in to AFP from citizen journalists, Feuilly confirmed that human verification involved looking for specific elements in the images. For example, when images are sent in from Syria, journalists look for information in the images that represent Syria, such as the Syrian flag or pictures of Assad or street signs. However, Feuilly also said that it was very rare that false information was actually sent to AFP, unless it was actually propaganda, which is easily identifiable and then discarded.

Ketz pointed out inaccurate information published by several media outlets in 2016, which turned out to be propaganda, for example the release of a list of 20,000 named people who were allegedly members of Daesh. After checking the list, AFP found out that the list including many repeats of names, resulting in only 1,700 names, which were not written in the Daesh style that they had come to know well. AFP ran a story on this alleged list so as to correct wrong information that had already been broadcast by other international media. Ketz pinpointed that one issue related to inaccurate news is commissioning inexperienced and unqualified journalists to zones they are unfamiliar with. Ketz said "I don't like to say that but most of the media coming to Syria don't know the history of the country, I mean they are thinking that the story of the country starts the day they arrived in the country and finishes the day they are leaving the country and this is not true, the history of the country started much longer before they came and will continue after they leave, so if you are not reading about the country, if you are not

looking about it, if you are not understanding the system of the country, it's very difficult for you to have an idea of what's going on" (idem).

## AFP and Journalist Safety

In terms of journalist safety and security, Feuilly explained that despite having an office in Damascus, staff are required to take precautions. Therefore, journalists may sometimes be asked to leave the Damascus office and be moved elsewhere. AFP staff in Aleppo were also forced to leave at one point. Feuilly also explained that timed missions in specific locations are often set up for specific teams made up of a journalist, a photographer and a videographer and such missions last between three weeks and one month long. Feuilly also confirmed that AFP had a permanent team based at the Turkish-Syrian border and that AFP journalists also reported from Kurdish locations during the battle for Kobane. As mentioned earlier, Ketz also explained to me that covering the Syrian news from the side of the rebels had become so dangerous that AFP stopped sending staff from Paris or other regions to Syria to cover the news from the rebel side.

In 2014, AFP's Global Director, Michèle Léridon, wrote "Our challenge is to strike a balance between our duty to inform the public, the need to keep our reporters safe, our concern for the dignity of victims being paraded by extremists, and the need to avoid being used as a vehicle for hateful, ultraviolent propaganda" (Léridon 2014). Léridon also states clearly that due to journalists becoming targets in Syria, AFP "no longer accept work from freelance journalists who travel to places where we ourselves would not venture" (idem).

## AFP News Selection Procedure

In terms of news selection, Ketz explained that it was certain that they would report on what was "hot news" such as the rebels taking on a very important position of the regime or vice versa. At the beginning of the uprising, Ketz's team would release alerts on each person killed in Syria. However, Ketz explained that "when you arrive to 1,000 we are not giving anymore for each death"...and when you had 10,000 deaths then AFP would only report on larger number of deaths. Ketz explained that the number of deaths in Syria would be first reported by the Observatory and that AFP would usually echo their number. With regards to daily news coming in from Syria, Ketz explained that the bureau would look at all the information and try to ensure that they had a fair share of political stories but also human stories. For example, during the week of the first cease-fire in two years, AFP tried to do a few stories on the cease-fire by covering both sides of the spectrum. AFP decided to cover the ceasefire in Aleppo and

also in Damascus with the regime. There was also a story on the soldiers in Syria who had nothing to do during the ceasefire and finally there was also a story about the doctors. Ketz told me that it was important to cover the human stories of Syria for audiences worldwide, because it is only through the human stories that you are able to give a better understanding of what living in a war is all about. Ketz compared Aleppo to Germany in 1945 or Beirut in 1975, whereby a city is broken down into two; the regime side of Aleppo and the rebel side of Aleppo and he thought it would be important to show the differences of the two sides of Aleppo to AFP audiences. Therefore, a story was made by Ketz and another AFP journalist on life in the two sides, showing that what once was a journey of fifteen minutes prior to the war now extends to a seven hour journey that includes an itinerary passing through groups like Jubrat al Nusra and Daesh as well as criminals in the desert. Ketz said that it was very difficult to pinpoint news selection guidelines of the Syrian uprising or conflict as everyday they would focus on stories they felt needed highlighting. Stories ranged from ceasefires to sickness in Aleppo and refugees in Beirut; such stories would be covered if there was no breaking news that involved deaths, sieges or power from exchanging hands amongst rebels and the regime.

In terms of censorship of information by AFP related to government laws, although AFP is an independent organisation, Feuilly explains that they would not broadcast news that could help criminals, such as propaganda. Feuilly explained that AFP is very cautious about what they decide to broadcast so as not to come between crime and justice for example.

Ketz also confirmed Feuilly's stance regarding sharing of information from Daesh; he said that if they had to report on an announcement by Daesh, they would never quote them, instead, they would paraphrase, so as not to provide any publicity for the organisation. Also, any material containing violence must be approved by the bureau de chief, even if taken directly by one of AFP journalists. Footage of hostage executions are almost always unaccepted by AFP because these hostages are often civilians who have families that may not even be aware of their whereabouts, let alone if they were kidnapped or killed. AFP also took a stance to not distribute footage from Daesh's website, especially footage of hostage executions. With Gaddafi on the other hand, AFP journalists in Libya took photos of Gaddafi's body and it was immediately clear that AFP would broadcast these images so as to show proof that the Libyan leader had died.

AFP Global News Director also states clearly in the online publication AFP Correspondent that "Our first instinct, when we receive a video of a hostage being beheaded, would be not to move it to our clients to avoid spreading IS's bloody propaganda. But from the moment the images contain information, as a news agency we have a duty to use them... Secondly, we do not broadcast staged scenes of violence. That is why AFP did not provide its clients with any of the recent videos showing hostages being beheaded" (Léridon 2014). Léridon discusses the

importance of informing and also giving victims some dignity in death by showing them prior to their murder. As deciding whether to show some footage can be difficult, AFP opened the topic to suggestions with their senior editors and international counterparts such as BBC, Reuters and AP. According to Léridon, some organisations have simply decided not to broadcast any such footage. But this too is problematic because it covers up a violence that is reality. Those that prefer to publish atrocities will state “Let no one say they did not know” (idem).

## AFP and News Presentation and Distribution

In terms of news production, Feuilly explained that news production takes place via AFP bureaus, and although AFP’s head office is in Paris, there are various regional bureaus, such as the Bureau in charge of the Near and Middle East, based in Nicosia, Cyprus. All news content related to the Middle East is sent to Nicosia, re-verified and then distributed around the world. In terms of the AFP audience, Feuilly explained that although AFP’s primary clients are media clients such as newspapers, TV channels and radio stations, AFP does not lose sight of the fact that their end audience constitutes newspaper readers, TV viewers and radio listeners, and therefore AFP must also have a didactic and educational approach in their final material. Thus, AFP explains the context, history and background of each news feature they distribute, with the understanding that beyond their journalist clients, they have an audience of civilians around the world. In fact, AFP does not only work by distributing content over their newswire as they used to in the past. Today, AFP publishes content online as well via large online networks such as Google, Yahoo! MSN and on social network platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, where audiences worldwide can access their news directly. According to Feuilly, AFP shares news with their clients first on the newswire before sharing the news on the internet with a larger audience on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. AFP attentively observe online feedback and interaction regarding AFP content. Of utmost importance are the retweets and shares of stories and comments with further information are also taken seriously and studied; AFP sometimes respond to critical or informative comments.

Although AFP has a large audience, Feuilly explained that the news produced by AFP is not customised per audience. Feuilly identified AFP as a news wholesaler. All AFP clients receive the same news from AFP. However, formats of news received may be different depending on what the AFP client has subscribed to. For example, some AFP clients may subscribe to the AFP’s video wire so as to search for news content and will purchase news items on a selective basis. The AFP Forum gives clients access to videos that they can view before making a request to purchase the video content. AFP clients may also subscribe to specific news themes or

specific regions. Therefore, AFP has put in place the option of filters so that clients only receive what is relevant or of interest to them. Feuilly explains that the effect of a web audience did not have an impact on news verification, but rather on news preparation in the sense that writing for web audiences obliges the writer to take on a more direct approach than for newspapers, with shorter sentences, whereby the story or the information in the story is not changed, rather, there are only changes in the form and presentation of the information in the story. Feuilly also explained that the demand for images and videos has grown with the internet era, specifically by television channels, because of the simple fact that people on the streets carry mobile devices capable of capturing and sending events. Therefore, this makes image and footage selection all the more time consuming for news agencies who have to go through piles of photos and videos in order to choose the right one to broadcast.

## AFP and Social Media

Feuilly admitted that the presence of independent media like Twitter and Facebook leads to a competitive atmosphere in newsrooms like that of AFP, hoping to verify the news quickly so as to be able to publish it. Facebook and Twitter users tend to publish information not being 100 percent sure that it is in fact news and that it has indeed happened, and usually publish information without any background information.

AFP uses Twitter to get news from heads of states and other official establishments. Feuilly explained that the press in general, including AFP and other press agencies such as Reuters and Associated Press were obliged to adapt to getting news from Twitter over the past few years. Feuilly is certain that without Twitter, AFP would certainly discover events to turn into news but that it would take longer.

Initially, as with many in news production, news agencies were dubious and reluctant about news published online by amateur journalists on blogs or even citizens on social media; news agencies did not immediately embrace social media as a platform for sharing their news. There was however a radical change in news agencies' approach towards social media and amateur journalists in the late 2000s when news agencies began launching their own Facebook pages. Although AFP was a late comer compared to other news agencies on the social media scene, such as AP and Reuters, AFP published both a French and English Facebook page used to feature its multimedia production during the 2011 Cannes film festival. AFP also opened its first account on YouTube in 2006 so as to share video content with YouTube users and then launched a DailyMotion account in March 2010, also to share video content. AFP finally opened its first Twitter account on July 2011 and this was followed by the publication of "guidelines for using social media" shared with all AFP journalists (Palmer & Nicey 2012).

The AFP guidelines for using social media was updated in a publication in 2013, which “strongly encourages journalists to open accounts with popular social networking sites” (AFP 2013) notably Twitter and Facebook, but Google Plus, LinkedIn and Tumblr are also noted as platforms with influence. The document also highlights how AFP journalists can become active on such social networks and provides information on managing a social media identity as an AFP journalist. AFP journalists should include disclaimers on their social media profiles such as “The views expressed here are my own. Links and re-tweets are not endorsements” (AFP 2013, p.2). AFP journalists who wish to have a private account should make a separate private account that has no reference to AFP. AFP journalists are encouraged to post observations, along with any photos or short videos, so as to build their follower base and network. Journalists are also reminded to remain neutral when commenting on any news, because refraining from neutrality even when on a social platform “could harm the agency’s image to impartiality” (AFP 2013). AFP journalists are also warned that re-tweeting information is “considered a sympathetic recommendation” and therefore re-tweeting should be done with care. Also, AFP journalists are warned not to “post or tweet alerts” without having checked with the bureau, to ensure that AFP has reporters on the news site. AFP journalists are also encouraged to make corrections to any erroneous posts, rather than deleting them (AFP 2013, p.4).

Ketz explained that in the era of the internet, AFP journalists are very cautious about what they broadcast as news. For example, news of Bashar Assad’s brother being injured in an explosion broke over social media before AFP could verify it. Ketz said that AFP did not cover this story, because they had no proof of it and after further investigation they found out that it was not even true. Ketz said that he felt very few journalists from other media organisations were fact-checking and this meant that false news was often broadcast to international audiences, but as far as AFP was concerned, at least two sources had to confirm the same information for it to be broadcast. Ketz said that he preferred to be late and accurate than to broadcast false news before his competitors. Ketz said that because of platforms like Twitter and Facebook, it was impossible to be the first to break the news today, therefore AFP had to focus on having the most accurate information.

With regards to the web 2.0 era, Ketz said he felt that although news seemed to be more abundant and accessible today, audiences have become more and more selective in the news they search for, keeping away from information contradictory to their opinion and searching for information similar to their opinion.

It is due to such challenges that AFP decided to become a shareholder in Citizenside (now Crowdspark). Feuilly explained that AFP has always appreciated the importance of material coming from people based in an event of interest, but one of the challenges has been figuring

out how to share images or videos coming from unknown people; therefore, image or video ownership and copyright of photos and videos is a crucial aspect of news production. Based on the information we were able to gather from AFP, we can propose the following news production model representative of AFP in 2018:




Table 13 The Flow of News in AFP

Agence France Presse and Citizen Journalism

As stated earlier, Agence France Presse has embraced citizen journalism and it has become part and parcel of their news production methods. In early 2018, Christian Chaise, AFP’s Director for Middle East and North Africa, published an article entitled “Behind AFP’s Syria coverage”, where he describes the role of citizen journalists in informing the world on Syria post-uprising

during the conflict (Chaise 2018). Chaise explains that AFP have a “network of stringers that we built over the course of several years” (idem) that AFP have been building since 2013, when they realised that “it was no longer a realistic option to continue sending reporters...” (idem). The first training workshop by AFP took place in Turkey in mid-2013 to a group of citizen-journalists who had no experience with photography. Many of these citizen-journalists have since died or left the country, but “finding stringers was the easiest part of the job” (idem). Training encouraged citizen journalists to ensure that photos met AFP standards with aesthetic value that would be representative of facts on the ground. Chaise states clearly that working with citizen journalists with limited training and under challenging conditions does not mean that “the standards for accuracy and impartiality” have changed during Syria’s coverage. Journalists still “take turns editing, verifying, and authenticating every photo and video that we publish” (idem) and the process is “punishing on a psychological level” because images feature violence on people including children. So horrendous are the images that pour in everyday, that Chaise calls the editors who support the stringers “unsung heroes in this type of coverage” who go through post-traumatic stress.

In his article, Chaise describes the process put under place between AFP and their stringers. After taking photos or videos, stringers send content to AFP via email. Once AFP editors receive the content, they must verify its authenticity. Editors can identify the date the image/footage was taken by looking at the metadata on the file received. In addition to the date, using meta-data, journalists can identify the device used to take the image/footage, including the camera or lens and this is checked against the list of equipment that AFP stringers in Syria have. So significant is the meta-data that, according to Chaise, files without metadata are simply not accepted by AFP. Stringers can be contacted using WhatsApp to get further information, and to ask them to resend photos. AFP editors can confirm the location of the citizen journalists if they know there are sieges on cities and people are not allowed out of certain cities. Material can also be cross-checked against other material AFP has received from other sources or sent to a photo lab in Paris for further verification. Finally, AFP editors can also use technical tools such as Google Maps to identify the location shot on the photo or video or even the software TunGstene<sup>54</sup>, owned by only a few media outlets. After verifying material received from citizen journalists, AFP editors then need to select the ones to post. Chaise states that “the goal is not to shock or sensationalize, but to inform. And that means to show, within certain limits, the impact of the conflict on people who live in rebel zones or regime-controlled areas. Not to do so would amount to taking away the victims’ humanity” (idem).

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<sup>54</sup> TunGstene, developed by eXO maKina is used by AFP and the French Ministry of Defence to detect false images: [http://www.exomakina.fr/eXo\\_maKina/Tungstene.html](http://www.exomakina.fr/eXo_maKina/Tungstene.html)

### III.1.5.2. Crowdsark

#### Crowdsark Organisation and Structure

Crowdsark - previously known as Citizenside/Newzulu and Scooplive – was launched in 2006 in France (Proactiveinvestors.com.au 2017) with the aim of organising user-generated images for professional media platforms to access. The news gathering challenges faced by journalists after the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, during which media professionals experienced a flood of content coming from citizens, but lack of actors to collect or verify the content, was one of the driving forces behind the creation of Scooplive. In 2018, Crowdsark is headquartered in New York, with offices in Toronto, London, Paris and Sydney. Crowdsark is not only in partnership with AFP, but also with Press Association, Videoplugger, Belga News Agency, Canadian Press and Australian Association Press, to name a few (Crowdsark 2018). In an interview conducted with Citizenside’s Editor in Chief for the Paris bureau, Laura Placide presented the agency as a “crowdsourced newswire” that works with both professionals and amateurs who send “content, footage and videos, exclusively, both spontaneously and on request”. News is sent via the agency website or via a mobile app so that content is posted on a platform to be verified before being sold.

#### Crowdsark Sourcing and Verification of News

Crowdsark is able to develop appropriate tools for content verification (Palmer & Nicey 2012, p.12) by asking for original unedited material so as to be able to track material data that may appear suspicious. Palmer & Nicey (2012) reported that the agency developed community management in two main ways: by alerting its contributors on nearby events and by then asking contributors to give accounts of specific events. Content contributors are also advised on improving their content in terms of their written descriptions but also in terms of footage taken. Palmer & Nicey (2012) suggest that contributors not be called “amateurs” but rather “semi-professionals”.

Today, media professionals are able to geo-locate users on a map so as to get content quickly. The agency’s tools also allow for management and curation of information by giving media professionals the possibility of setting up assignments through an administration interface. Submitted assignments can then be managed on the interface also allowing for content to be moderated, filtered and even promoted on Facebook and Twitter.

News content verification is achieved by both technical and human resources, whereby the technical verification is done through “IP tracking, meta data matching, making sure that

everything is correct on the file front...”(Placide 2016) and human verification takes place by the agency journalists who question “did that happen where it was supposed to happen at the time it was supposed to happen? What happened exactly? who was there and so on” (Placide 2016).

Placide explained that content verification is of utmost importance to agency and that content does not become news “until it is actually verified by someone with a journalism degree, someone that has journalism background that [sic] understands the news that [sic] verifies everything” (idem). According to Placid, the difference between Twitter, Facebook and such platforms is the verification process put in place by Citizenside so as to prevent people from sharing hoaxes online. Placide explained that for content to become news it had to be sourced, verified and then turned into journalistic content.

Thus, information received from content providers would be manipulated into journalistic content. Placide explained that sometimes during human verification of news content, the agency’s journalists would note that “...sometimes it lacks that slight angle...or...just a small thing to be journalistic content” (Placide 2016). When I asked how they could confirm incoming news content from citizens worldwide with journalists based only in certain parts of the world, she firstly insisted that the agency would “never distribute a content if we’re not 90 – 95% sure of its authenticity”. The agency taps into a large “community of dozens of thousands of people” that they know well. Placide said that their community was largely used for verifying news during the Arab Spring; “There were people that we knew well and trusted that help us verify the content”. Placide admitted that “because it was a really biased conflict, you have to be really careful with your sources, because they obviously had an opinion”. She was adamant that the agency’s role, even though it was to give the crowd perspective, was not to “distribute opinions” but rather to “distribute facts”, and in order to do this they would fact check with several sources, including non-journalists who formed part of their community. Placide also talked about using storyful, the accuracy checking agency also used by Euronews and other mainstream media. Placide said that although storyful has no community, they have what she called source crowds and agencies as well as mainstream media tended to use them for verifying news content.

Placide explained that content providers, both professional and amateur come to the agency directly, however, the agency may also search for some citizen journalists on social media or via other methods, but Placide also said that “we don’t target a specific type of people” (Placide, 2016). The only criteria to be able to submit content is to have a device that takes photos.

The agency then shares content turned news on their platform and also on YouTube, where their videos are open to comments from viewers around the world. Placide explains that the comments are of importance to the agency “because those people that are commenting on

stories are also potential contributors” and therefore the agency has dedicated staff who screen the comments. Also, comments found to be inappropriately offensive, and specifically racist, to staff or contributors are moderated by the agency.

As most of the content received during the events of the Arab Spring came from amateurs, it was deemed necessary to tap into their communities to verify the content. Placide noted that internet connectivity was weak and intermittent in countries of the Arab Spring and in some cases, many of the countries that had uprisings blocked internet access. This meant that the agency would receive content in a multitude of ways: most of the information received during the uprisings were received through their website, but some were also received via their smartphone app and very few were received via email and other means. This meant that the agency had to sometimes upload the content themselves after receiving it. According to Placide, much of the content they received had already been manipulated or edited, therefore verifying the content before sharing it was necessary. Knowing the source was also of essence, because people from all sides during the uprisings were trying to get their voices heard (Placide, 2016). As stated earlier, Crowdspark allows for live streams of news directly from the locations of the events to client media. Placide says that “technical verifications” are used in order to verify the live streams. Firstly, the people reporting are known by the agency, therefore the location of the user is also known. Also, the agency commissions someone to “cleaning the incoming streams” so as to “prevent anything that might have nudity or profanity or anything of the kind to our partners or our clients that might receive the streams”. The agency’s journalists in newsrooms are also able to identify the location of the content provider from the images streamed in. In terms of technical checks on live streams, GPS trails are made on the location of the content provider, because the content provider would be on a smartphone.

### Crowdspark Citizen Journalist Training and Safety

Citizen journalists submit contributions to the agency’s editorial team, who then vet the content and publish it so that is made simultaneously available for licensing to media clients through their newswire. Some of the content is also published through affiliate partners, such as the Agence France Presse newswire, and the Australian Associated Press. The agency’s sales department is in charge of selling individual stories that have “high news value for specific publication” and “contributors are paid the full fee minus a percentage taken by Newzulu, which varies according to the news value” (Citizenside n.d.). The former Citizenside website states that a payment within sixty days after sale is made via PayPal. It is also noted that exclusive stories released before any others are those that sell the most (Citizenside n.d.). Therefore, contributors are advised to upload their content as soon as they have them along with captions

including keywords to represent the content so that media buyers can find them easily and then buy them.

Guidelines were included on the Newzulu/Citizenside website prior to merging it with the Crowdsparc website. For example, on submitting photos or videos, contributors must give information about “where and when it happened, who was involved, and why it’s relevant”. Contributors are also asked to submit “original, high resolution files” and specific file formats are requested. Also, contributors must provide information of who is in the photo or video, explain what they are doing, where and when the event took place, as well as why it is newsworthy. Such information is used for content buyers to find the content once it has been broadcast by the agency. The agency also provided guidelines on taking photos. Contributors were advised to caption photos so as to show the location, the weather and the time. Also, variety is important and therefore contributors were advised to take as many photos as possible from “different angles, different framing and vary the number of people shown”. The agency also advised that most scoops should include three to ten photos and a maximum of 20 photos per image series. Images from one scoop sent to Citizenside cannot be shared with other media outlets, as this would be breaching the Terms and Conditions; meaning that the agency sells on the basis of material being exclusive. Also, contributors are advised to film from a close angle and stay still while filming or walk backwards as they film, so as to focus on the action taking place. Different shots are possible: close-ups, mid-shots, full length, wide angles, panoramic left to right or down to up. Also videos may be cut if necessary. Guidelines on interviewing were also published, such as the need to ask both sides of the stories, the necessity of asking open-ended questions so as to ensure that the interviewee provides more detail, and never cutting an interviewee off when speaking. Also, contributors are advised to hold interviews in the “environment of the interviewee” so as to share the event context with viewers. The previous website also provided guidelines to article contributors on how to write by paying close attention to structure and language. Catchy headlines and informative introductions that entice readers were strongly encouraged.

By 2016, at the time of my interview with Citizenside’s Placide, she informed me that Citizenside had already around forty-thousand news contributors and that the agency was in touch with many of these contributors on a daily basis so as to give advice on “producing more saleable content” that is better produced and more efficient in terms of providing content that matched client requests. The agency provides tutorials on producing saleable material but also tries to “teach them about safety” and also “might deliver accreditation” to content contributors facilitating access to certain events such as political events or press conferences. The agency may also write media letters to those based in conflict zones so as to give contributors in conflict zones “some kind of security” (Placide, 2016). Also worth noting is that the previous

Newzulu/Citizenside website warns contributors that “No photo is worth getting hurt over or hurting someone else in the process” (Citizenside n.d.).

## Crowdspark and News Presentation and Distribution

Placide informed me that once content is verified by both technical and human checks, then it is “packaged for distribution”, by being published on the agency site first and then for distribution via third parties such as AFP in France, Associated Press and local news wires such as Press Association in the UK, the Associated Press in Australia and the Canadian Press, all forming part of the agency’s network. Placide indicated that sold content granted the content contributor fifty percent of the sale; agency website accessed in 2017 further elaborated that the percentage contributors receive can depend on the news content type. Media clients who buy content from the agency have to credit both the agency and the contributor, unless the contributor chooses to remain anonymous. Placide confirms that the agency has a mention on most of their partner platforms that the content is UGC and “it’s in all of our agreements that they have to credit the author of the content”.

Once material is approved by the agency, their clients are then able to gather approved material via desktop or mobile. It is also possible for media professionals to pull content from Instagram #hashtags, accept and process content via email and batch upload content including metadata for massive files of up to 50GB.

Just as content can be published on social networks, the agency also allows for the publication of content to other web platforms, TV, print and web. Media professionals are also able to track and measure the outcome of their news publication online (Newzulu 2017). The agency also has tools for crowdsourcing live coverage, which allows for the receipt, management and broadcast of live streams from a global audience and reporters’ network. Placide explained that “We’re not going to send a different caption for a Russian partner or an American Partner. They just receive the exact same caption because it’s objective and factual, so we don’t have to change anything”. When I asked Placide if she found working for Citizenside to be a lot easier during the time of the Arab Spring because they had only one client, AFP, she was not convinced. She said that “It changes in terms of revenue, but it doesn’t change much, the fact that we have one or twenty partners. For us it’s the same distribution, because, . . . , we send the same content. And then, it’s just the technology that we have that enables us to distribute to all of those people [media clients] rather than just one”.

Placide explained to me that because various types of content was being received during the Arab uprisings, from people on all sides of the uprisings, the agency decided to not only vet all incoming material, but to also edit them, including additional information before distributing

them on the platform to their clients. The additional information the agency would include mentioned the ‘source bias’ of every content shared and also agency journalists would modify the content “caption, the description, the copy that went with the article, the content” (Placide, 2016). Placide explained that content was modified so as “to be purely factual” so as to be “journalistic content”. For example, a story with the title “Assad is killing his people” would be changed to “An attack happened at that time in that city”. Placide explained that the objective of the agency was to “distribute content with the facts” and because they are a newswire, they cannot be biased or owned by any political party. Despite the fact that all journalists have their own political opinion, “that has nothing to do with the job”. Placide insisted that “the aim is really to give the facts to the media that are going to buy the content so they are able to do whatever they want with the content” (idem). Thus, point of views shared by contributors during the events of the Arab Spring were removed when unnecessary and graphic content was never distributed “if it’s not necessary to the story”. She was clear that “If it isn’t the story itself or it’s not absolutely necessary to the story” that the agency would not publish the footage. Placide explained that “You can tell the story of a murder without having to show the body”. Having said this, Placide does say that sometimes “you had to show the really graphic content to depict the horror of what was going on”, for example in Egypt....”you had to show police brutality or the army” so “it’s really on a per story basis”.

According to Placide, UGC demand by mainstream news has grown, especially for breaking news. She says that today “media organisations rely on the people to be the first witnesses of the event and that you get the news as fresh as it can be”. The role of UGC is to bring unplanned news events to viewers’ screens, such as the Brussels airport attack of March 2016, whereby the first images of the event that broke on people’s screens were videos and photos by travellers. News professionals were only able to access the scene after the attack and show footage of ambulances and police after the event actually took place (Placide, 2016).

Based on the information received from Laura Placide in 2016, the information posted on the previous Citizenside and Newzulu websites as well as the current Crowdspark website, we are able to propose the following model for news production based on news sourced from citizen journalists via specialised agencies:




Table 14 News Flow in Citizen Journalist News Agency

## **III.2. The Dominant Public Institutions of Information**

We have now looked at the various international press institutions available at the time of the Arab uprisings, therefore, we have been able to study the governance, structure and methods of working of these media institutions. Based on our Critical Discourse Analysis framework, we also believe that it is necessary to study the public information institutions of the various countries whose events appear in our news corpus. Therefore, the next section will highlight countries' freedom of speech and information access during the events of their respective uprisings. The following sections present the following elements of each of the countries covered in our news corpus: (1) the information and communication context, (2) freedom of access and speech and (3) local press- professional and amateur.

### **III.2.1. Bahrain**

#### **III.2.1.1. Information and Communication Context**

The UN eGovernment Readiness report of 2010 ranked Bahrain as a leader in the Middle East in terms of their telecommunications infrastructure. Also, the International Telecommunication Union reported a rapid rise in internet penetration from 28 percent in 2006 to 77 percent in 2011. Bahrain enjoyed internet access via mainly mobile broadband and wireless connections and a few ADSL connection, with rare dial-up connections. By 2010, Bahrainis could access the internet in several public areas, ranging from schools and universities to shopping malls and cafes. By 2011, the ITU reported that the mobile penetration rate in Bahrain went up to 128 percent (Freedom House 2011a). The latest date available from 2016 from Bahrain, by the ITU only shows that these figures have gone up. For example, 216 percent of the population have mobile-cellular subscriptions and 98 percent of households have internet access at home. Therefore, it is clear that Bahrain's issue with accessibility is not their telecommunications infrastructure, but rather one of government policies.

### III.2.1.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

Although Apple's iPhone is popular amongst both individuals and companies, BlackBerry messages with news bulletins were banned in 2010 (Toumi 2010).

The Freedom House found both the Internet and the Press of Bahrain to be "Not Free" in 2017. By 2012, post-uprising, the Freedom House found Bahrain's Press status to be "Not Free" because of many of the events that took place during the uprising. The Shiite majority in Bahrain had taken to the streets in protests on February 14, 2011, calling for a "Day of Rage" against being economically disadvantaged. The government cracked down on protesters and declared martial law in March, meaning that Bahrain law was put on hold and replaced by military law. The government also invited military from allies such as neighbouring Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The media themselves "were subject to violent suppression, as journalists, photographers, and bloggers covering the demonstrations faced beatings, arrest, and torture, leading to the death of two journalists and a dramatic decline in overall press freedom" (Freedom House 2012a). The government referred to the 2002 Press Law to clamp down on the rights of the media in 2011. The 2002 Press Law of Bahrain makes punishable by up to five years of prison criticism of Islam or the King, advocacy of government reforms and any actions that weaken the state's security. Furthermore, the 2002 Press Law gives courts the right to fine journalists up to 2,000 dinars (5,300USD). The appointed upper chamber of Bahrain's National Assembly put forth proposals to reform the harsh elements of the 2002 Press Law in 2008, but conservatives from the elected lower chamber have always refused to consider the proposals.

During the uprising, Bahrain had no freedom of information act, therefore the Information Affairs Authority of Bahrain had the right to both censor and clamp down on the distribution of both local and foreign publications. Newspapers could also be shut down with court proceedings, books and movies could be banned, websites could be blocked and individuals could be prosecuted. The government had also frequently use terrorism laws to restrain the actions and discourse of opposition groups.

The Freedom House reports that although controversial issues such as "sectarian tensions, relations with surrounding countries, government corruption, demonstrations, and human rights violations" were avoided by Bahrain's press, local coverage of news and politics in Bahrain prior to 2011 was "more critical and independent than reporting in most other Gulf countries" (Freedom House 2012a). However, it must be noted that although YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were accessible, some pages on these platforms were often blocked. Also, the popular online forum bahrainonline.org was blocked since 1998 and the regional portal and blog-hosting service Al-Bawaba was blocked since 2006 and all online newspapers, with the

exception of the state owned Bna.bh, are not allowed to publish audio or video reports by order of the Information Affairs Authority in 2010 (Kelly et al. 2012, pp.67–68). It is specifically during Bahrain's Uprising that the government began exercising increased legal pressure on their press. For example, many live broadcasting websites ranging from bambuser and ustream to justice.tv and twitcasting.tv, popular amongst protesters in Bahrain were blocked and the chatting service used to communicate about political topics with large online audiences, PalTalk, was blocked in June 2011.

The editors of the independent daily newspaper Al-Wasat's and its co-founder Mansour al-Jamri were forced to resign for publishing "false information" and "inciting the public" and the paper was shut down in April of 2011. The paper was allowed to re-open in August of the same year and although al-Jamri was allowed to return as editor in chief, all the other editorial staff had to be replaced as per the state's demands. In October, al-Jamri and three colleagues were fined 2650USD for "publishing news that defamed the image of Bahrain abroad". In punishment for their coverage of Bahrain's Uprising, Al-Wasat's journalists and photographers were fined and arrested, some were also beaten and tortured. Finally, the co-founder Abdul Kareem Fakhrawi arrested for "deliberate news fabrication" was reported dead by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), on April 12. He had been in the custody of the Bahrain National Security Agency. The CPJ had also reported the killing of Zakariya Rashid Hassan al-Ahiri, a writer and moderator of the Bahraini website of Al-Dair; he was charged with inciting hatred and spreading false information on April 2<sup>nd</sup> and then died on April 9<sup>th</sup> while still in custody. Also journalists working for international channels were reported tortured in the Bahrain Uprising. For example, Nazeeha Saeed, a Bahraini correspondent for France 24 and Radio Monte Carlo Douliya was reported detained, beaten and tortured "for allegedly participating in demonstrations that she was covering" (Freedom House 2012a). On the Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI) website, Nazeeha Saeed published an article, where she describes her ordeal with the Bahrain police as "humiliation", where she was "blindfolded, beaten and had electric shock treatment" (Saeed 2013). In 2016 her request to renew her press license was refused by the state of Bahrain (RFI 2017). The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that in September of 2011, Hamad Mohamed Iqbal, a Reuter's cameraman had to be hospitalised after being shot in the neck by Bahraini security forces and three months later, he was hit with tear gas (Ibrahim 2012). International journalists trying to get into Bahrain were not granted entry and those in the country were ordered to leave. For example, there are reports from the CNN crew, including journalist Amber Lyon, sent to Bahrain to produce a documentary in March 2011, that their sources were either threatened and that they were violently detained. Interviewees and fixers of the crew suffered recriminations; one human rights activist, Nabeel Rajab, was charged and a doctor, Saeed Ayyad, who arranged meetings

and tours for the crew had his house burned to the ground. The CNN crew was forced to the ground by “20 heavily-armed men...covered with black ski masks”, detained and only released after they deleted images and video footage from their confiscated cameras and interrogated them for six hours<sup>55</sup>. Also, Bilal Randeree, journalist for Al Jazeera English, was refused entry into Bahrain in February<sup>56</sup>. Chatham House research fellow, Jane Kinninmont, was also denied entry into Bahrain on March 2011<sup>57</sup>. One day later, CNN correspondent Mohammad Jamjoom was expelled from Bahrain by the Ministry of Information, while the rest of the CNN news team was able to stay in the country<sup>58</sup>. Another journalist, Omar Chatriwala, for Doha News was denied entry a day after being told that he would be granted entry into the country<sup>59</sup>. At around the same time, Hussain Jamal of AlHurra news channel was denied entry to Bahrain and forced to return back to Kuwait<sup>60</sup>. Dima Hamden, a BBC reporter, was also kept for 20-hours at Manama airport and denied entry into the country (bbc.co.uk 2011). A few days later, Iran’s Press TV freelance journalist John Miller and his crew were interrogated and deported after being held during a Press Conference; their equipment was also destroyed (PressTVUK 2011). Kuwaiti businessman and media owner of Al Dar newspaper and Al Adala TV channel was also denied entry to Bahrain; reasons cited by the Bahrain authorities were that he had launched a malicious campaign tarnishing the leadership and people of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Al Wasat 2011). A month later, in April of 2011, we continued to see reports of journalists banned entry into Bahrain; with the Al Jazeera English’s freelance correspondent Soraya Lennie denied entry at the Bahrain airport (Bahrain Press Association 2011). Al Jazeera English’s film maker May Ying Welsh was held at the airport for interrogation and informed she was blacklisted before she left the country; she had been filming undercover to produce award-winning “Shouting in the Dark” (Cinevue 2012; Safdar 2012). In May of 2011, restrictions carried on in Bahrain, when Monica Prieto, a reporter for Spain’s El Mundo newspaper was denied entry into Bahrain (Prieto 2011) and Reuters correspondent Frederik Richter, who had been based in Bahrain since 2008, was given a week to vacate the country by Bahrain’s Ministry of Information (Reuters Staff 2011a). Even after the state of emergency was reportedly lifted on

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<sup>55</sup> The one-hour documentary, entitled “iRevolution: Online Warriors of the Arab Spring” cost over 100,000USD, higher than usual for CNN, and only a 13-minute segment was aired on CNN’s domestic outlet in the US. CNNi (International), the most watched English-speaking news channel, did not broadcast the documentary for their Middle East based viewers. Reports from several CNN employees including Lyon, show that CNN was practising self-censorship amidst pressures from the Bahraini government (Greenwald 2012). The thirteen-minute segment aired by CNN USA can also be access on YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zB2DeZBgTEk>

<sup>56</sup> See tweet by Bilal Randeree: <https://Twitter.com/bilalr/status/38178824772395008>

<sup>57</sup> See tweet by Jane Kinninmont: <https://Twitter.com/janekinninmont/status/47055396535410688>

<sup>58</sup> Watch CNN news video with CNN correspondent, Mohammed Jamjoom: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8finbCuAdn0>

<sup>59</sup> See Doha News’ Omar Chatriwala’s tweet: <https://Twitter.com/omarc/status/48071167591976960>

<sup>60</sup> See tweet by Bahrain Human Rights group on Bahrain’s denial of entry to Al Hurra channel’s journalist: <https://Twitter.com/BahrainRights/status/48075226646450176>

June 1<sup>st</sup> of 2011 (Hammond 2011a), more reports of press not being granted entry were published, for example, Finian Cunningham, an Irish freelance journalist on a tourist visa in Bahrain, but an active commentator of the activities in Bahrain, was given 48 hours to leave the country (Reporters without Borders 2011b) and reports of journalists being denied entry carried on at least a year later, when Al Jazeera English's Gregg Carlstrom tweeted he was denied entry into Bahrain for Bahrain's one year anniversary of its uprising on February 14, 2012<sup>61</sup>. BBC Middle East producer, Cara Swift<sup>62</sup>, tweeted a similar message, AFP echoed (Agence France Presse 2012) the journalists' tweets and so did the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Japanese TV NHK and reports of denial of entry carried on for much of that year (Reporters without Borders 2012). In addition to denying reporters access into the country, Bahraini authorities have also denied entry to representatives of international organisations such as human rights organisations and freedom press organisations and today authorities still have a tight grip on who is granted entry into Bahrain (Bahrainwatch.org 2013).

### III.2.1.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

The Freedom House reported that although no newspapers are owned by the Bahraini government, members of the media "have reported being contacted directly by government representatives and warned not to report on subjects related to the prodemocracy demonstrations or sectarianism" (Freedom House 2012a). The Freedom House does note that the government has a monopoly on broadcast media and "private operating licenses are not awarded".

All websites set up in Bahrain have to be registered with the Information Affairs Authority of Bahrain. Also, both religious and political content is not just overseen but also "heavily censored" (Freedom House 2012a). Bahrain's main telecommunications company, Batelco, is owned largely by the government. Batelco both monitors and filters email and internet content by "routing traffic through proxy or cache servers". Website administrators "are subject to libel laws" and therefore responsible for any content posted on their website. Prior to 2012, thousands of websites had already been filtered by Batelco and controversial bloggers were arrested. The Freedom House reports that despite these restrictions on online content, by 2012, Bahrain had "at least 200 blogs". It was therefore, not only professional journalists who suffered at the hands of the government for publishing news. Bloggers and opposition activists had their

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<sup>61</sup> See Gregg Carlstrom's tweet from Al Jazeera English, after he was denied entry to Bahrain: <https://Twitter.com/glcarlstrom/status/166921282175250433>

<sup>62</sup> See Cara Swift's tweet from the BBC, after she was denied a visa into Bahrain: <https://Twitter.com/cswift2/status/166882076111544320>

share of problems with the government. For example, Abduljalil al-Singace, a blogger and activist was detained in 2010 then released in 2011 before being arrested in March, only to be convicted with a life sentence in June of 2011 for his anti-government publications. On this same day of June in 2011, the Committee to Protect Journalists condemned the Bahraini court for finding guilty “21 bloggers, human rights activists, and members of the political opposition...of plotting to topple the monarchy” (The Committee to Project Journalists 2011). The CPJ also announced that 2011 was “the worst year for press freedom in Bahrain since the island declared its independence in 1971” from the British.

When it came to social media, the Freedom House reported that officials hacked Facebook and Twitter pages to post publications that were pro-government. Some Bahraini Facebook pages set up during the uprising continue to be active in 2018, such as Occupy Bahrain, accessible on [facebook.com/Occupy.BH](https://facebook.com/Occupy.BH), with over fifty thousand likers and just under fifty thousand followers. Towards the end of the year of the revolution in 2011 Facebook enjoyed a 45 percent penetration of Bahraini users from both civil society and government. Around 3,500 Bahraini entities had set up a Facebook page. Twitter was also popular amongst Bahrainis with about 62,000 active users by March 2011, with the word “Bahrain” trending in hashtags of the Arab region. Also, using a monitoring tool, Al Jazeera found Bahrain to be more active on Twitter than any other regional country during the Arab Spring (Kelly et al. 2012, p.67).

The Freedom House published a report in 2012 that noted that Bahrain (along with Pakistan and Ethiopia) registered the greatest decline in terms of internet freedom restrictions (Kelly et al. 2012). The decline in Bahrain was registered due to “intensified censorship, arrests, and violence against bloggers” (Kelly et al. 2012, p.6). The first arrest of an internet user in Bahrain was as early as 1997, when the Galal Alwy was accused of sending information to the opposition group the Bahrain Liberal Movement (Kelly et al. 2012, p.70; Openarab.net n.d.).

The Freedom House report of 2012 also found that the Bahraini authorities employed “hundreds of ‘trolls’ whose responsibility is to scout popular domestic and international websites, and while posing as ordinary users, attack the credibility of those who post information that reflects poorly on the government” (Kelly et al. 2012, p.7). The Freedom House report of 2012 also reports that the government shut down the internet in parts of Bahrain during the anti-government protests of 2011 (Kelly et al. 2012, p.7) and many websites with political content, including social media, were blocked in Bahrain. Information about the internet shutdown in 2011 cannot be found other than on the Freedom House report, however, several reports related to the longest internet shutdown in the world, in the Bahraini village of Duraz, were found. “An investigation by Bahrain Watch published in August 2016 found that ISP’s were deliberately disrupting both fixed-line and mobile data services in the village between 7PM and 1AM everyday [sic]” (Amana Tech 2017). The investigation concluded that two Bahraini ISPS,

Batelco and Zain “are likely disabling their 4G and 3G networks in Duraz, and turning off mobile data services (GPRS/EDGE) on their 2G mobile networks” and “while phone calls and SMS text messages are possible during the disruption, no type of mobile data service is available on Batelco and Zain” (AmanaTech 2016). According to Freedom House, all ISPs in Bahrain are “indirectly controlled by the government through orders from the TRA [Bahrain’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority]” (Kelly et al. 2012, p.69).

Furthermore, international public relations firms were hired by the Bahraini government to spread pro government information online, while diffusing negative information about activists (Kelly et al. 2012, p.12). PR Watch reported in 2012 that a total of 18 Western PR companies received “payments or contracts” amounting to 32.5 million USD. Included in these 18 firms are two companies with a track record for signing PR contracts with repressive governments: London-based Bell Pottinger and Washington DC-based Qorvis Communications (Bahrain Watch 2012) and listed in their responsibilities as noted by Bahrain Watch, are activities ranging from “writing and placed op-ed pieces supporting the Government in Western media outlets, while exerting legal pressure on outlets that publish critical pieces” and “Contacting Western journalists about the political situation in Bahrain” to “Creating seemingly independent websites and social media accounts to influence public opinions” and “Arranging meetings with influential Western government officials” (Bahrain Watch 2012). The International Business Times also noted that the PR firm M&C Saatchi was hired by the Bahraini government, as well as Dragon Associates, G3, Gardant Communications, New Century Media and Big Tent Communications (Mezzofiore 2014) and the investigation by PR Watch for Bahrain Watch was posted on their website on 2013, listing all the PR companies working for the Bahraini government, as well as scans of contracts and bidding process by the PR companies (PR Watch 2012; Desmukh 2013).

The Freedom House publication of Internet Freedom in 2012 listed all the different methods in which the internet was controlled for various countries. Bahrain’s government checked for all the following internet controls between January 2011 and May 2012: web 2.0 blocked, notable political blocking, localised or nationwide ICT shut down, pro-government commentators manipulate online discussions, blogger/ICT user arrested for political or social writings, blogger/ICT user physically attacked or killed (including in custody) and technical attacks against government critics (Kelly et al. 2012, p.17).

## **III.2.2. Egypt**

### **III.2.2.1. Information and Communication Context**

Egypt, the Arab world's most populous country with approximately 82 million people prioritised the development of a strong ICT sector as early as the late 90s. The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, established in 1999, invested both financial and human resources so as to expand the country's infrastructure (Kamel et al. 2009). The Egyptian government in 2005, with the mission of developing the country's ICT sector, established the Information Technology Industry Development Authority and their Information Society Initiative stated that in terms of eReadiness, the country would have "Equal Access for All", enabling all citizens to have affordable access to ICT. Although the internet was first introduced in Egypt in 1993 through the Egyptian Universities Network and then made accessible to the public as early as 1995 by the Egyptian cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), users only became active in 2002 after the government "Free Internet" initiative granting the public internet access at only 0.15USD per hour.

By 2011, Egypt had 214 internet service providers and there were no reports of any ISPs being denied licenses. eReadiness, or "the degree to which a community is prepared to participate in the networked economy" is measured by "assessing a community's relative advancement in the areas that are most critical for ICT adoption and the most important applications of ICT" (Kamel et al. 2009). The United Nations E-Government report first released in 2001 to benchmark countries, found Egypt to have "medium E-gov Capacity" at 1.73, because of "the commitment to an effective and efficient e-gov program" (UNDESA/ASPA 2001). Since 2008, the report has been updated by the UN on a biennial basis. In 2010, the report found that Egypt was the third leading country in Africa in E-government development, with Tunisia leading (United Nations 2010). And by 2012, post revolution, Egypt (0.4611) had "declined in rank substantially...because their improvements did not keep pace with those of other countries around the world" (United Nations 2012, p.15). Egypt in 2012 was ranked at number 5 rather than number 3 in terms of e-government developments and its global ranks declined to 107<sup>th</sup>. In terms of online consultation tools such as social media, however, Egypt caught up with developed countries as one of the e-leaders, sharing the 7<sup>th</sup> global position with Canada, Norway and Sweden (United Nations 2012, p.43).

### III.2.2.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

Prior to the Arab Spring, there were many platforms for activists to share their news across the Arab world. News websites established by activists and citizen journalists were set up to share news from their corner of the world, differently to the news shared by professional international journalists. For example, in 2007, an Egyptian blogger by the name of Abdel Kareem Nabil, who blogged under the name Kareem Amer, aged only 22, was jailed for insulting Islam and the president of Egypt. Amnesty International called Nabil a “prisoner of conscience” who took to the web to express his views in a peaceful manner, but the judge decided to crackdown on the young student as part of a campaign against upcoming bloggers in Egypt at the time. The blogger had apparently referred to his university as a “university of terrorism” and said that it was an institution that suppressed free thought and he referred to Egypt’s president at the time as a “symbol of dictatorship”. Amer was freed in 2010 only to be rearrested by the Minister of Interiors and detained for 11 additional days, during which he later stated that he was tortured. Amer participated in the Tahrir Square protests of 2011 and was arrested by the Egyptian Army on February for 3 days without any charges (The Guardian 2007; Radsch n.d.; Reporters without Borders 2016; Zayyan & Carter 2009, p.87).

Although in 2011 there were no laws that regulated internet use and access in Egypt, the government was able to crack down on internet activism with their “Emergency Law”, effective since 1981 (and later expired on May 2012 (Othman Dalia 2012)). At the beginning of 2011, low levels of internet access in Egypt were a result of illiteracy and high broadband prices in a country made up of a generally poor population; one fifth of Egyptians in 2011 lived on 2USD a day. Freedom house found that in 2011, the mobile penetration rate in Egypt was up to 67% of the country, aided with the presence of Global Positioning System (GPS) available in Egypt since 2009.

User generated content sites such as YouTube and other social networking platforms ranging from Facebook and MySpace to Twitter as well as others were accessible by Egyptians in 2011, in fact, Egypt was the leading Facebook user in the Arab world in 2011. It was only in the middle of mass demonstrations in 2011 that the government began blocking sites like Twitter, Bambuser and some Facebook pages. With regards to publication of content on the web, it was only in 2010 that individuals calling for political change started having their content banned from the web. The National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA) decided that permission had to be granted by the mobile phone regulator for anyone to send group newsfeeds via short message service (SMS). Mass messaging was heavily used by such groups to communicate with their members and therefore NGOs and other civil society organisations were affected by this law.

Also, two Facebook groups, with over 200,000 members, “We Are All Khaled Said” and a support group created to denounce police violence and government corruption- both used to organise demonstrations during the revolution, were temporarily removed in 2010. It is actually Facebook who claims having temporarily removed the groups due to the fact that the group administrators used pseudonyms rather than their true identities online. However, according to Freedom House, many still suspect that the groups were removed under the request of the Egyptian government at the time.

The Press Law passed in 2006 criminalised the distribution of “false news”. Also, the criticism of Egypt or any country’s head of state was deemed a crime. And in 2008, Egypt put forth a charter for Arab Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab League meeting in Cairo, paving the way for most Arab countries, except for Qatar and Lebanon, to adopt the charter.

The Egyptian constitution states that the media is free but within the limits of society, meaning that the government has the right to intervene in the media’s freedom of expression if they feel that they need to keep public order.

The Egyptian government censored five Muslim Brotherhood websites and published “Denial-of-Service (DoS) messages to the following media portals: Al Jazeera, BBC Arabic, and Al Arabiya. Also, other news sites reported slow networks and cut-offs, for example, Al Youm7 and Al Dostor. Even as early as 2010, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) reported that websites communicating democratic reforms were being blocked (ANHRI/IFEX 2010).

Egypt has been in the “internet enemies” list published by Reporters without Borders since 2006 and the Committee to Protect Journalists in 2009 listed Egypt as one of the top 10 worst countries to be a blogger. Government officials are able to monitor the online activity of political activists on public sites such as Facebook and Twitter. The government has been known to apply “offline punishments” to monitor online activists, ranging from phone call warnings to violently cracking down on these activists in public demonstrations. Activists’ communication records are also collected from ISPs, internet cafes and phone companies. One activist, interviewed for this thesis, Esraa Abdel Fattah, creator of the Facebook group calling for a general strike on April 6, was detained for two weeks. Another, Hany Nazeera, was detained for 21 months after posting a link to a book considered anti-Islam by the government. Also, Ahmed Mostafa, a civilian who wrote about the Egyptian army’s alleged abuses, was detained and then tried before a military court.

Bloggers, citizen journalists and activists are not the only ones reported to have suffered at the hands of the Egyptian government for speaking out. There are also reports of professional journalists being assaulted and arrested. US-Egyptian journalist Mona Eltahawy a writer for the Guardian and the Toronto Star reported physical sexual assault by security officials resulting in

two broken wrists. A Spanish photographer, Guillem Valle, was reported taken to hospital after being arrested and assaulted by security forces (Beaumont & Trew 2011). Ahmed Bajano, an Al-Arabiya correspondent and his camera crew, were reported beaten by men in plainclothes while covering a pro-Mubarak demonstration. A female Al-Arabiya journalist, who wished to remain anonymous, also reported that she had been beaten by plainclothes police. The Al-Arabiya office in Cairo was also targeted and its windows were broken (CPJ 2011b). CNN's Anderson Cooper and his crew were also attacked by pro-Mubarak supporters. Associated Press correspondents also reported being assaulted and the BBC reported that their correspondent Rupert Wingfield-Hayes was detained by secret police agents after his car was pushed off the road. CNN also reported that the Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman, on State TV talked of his negative impressions of international journalists in Egypt during the revolution, "I actually blame certain friendly nations who have television channels, they are not friendly at all, who have intensified the youth against the nation and the state...They have filled in the minds of the youth with wrongdoings, with allegations, and this is unacceptable" (Martinez 2011). Danish media reported that Steffen Jensen, senior Middle East Correspondent of TV2 was beaten by pro-Mubarak supporters as he reported live on the phone (CPJ 2011b). Several other accounts of abuse and assault on journalists in Egypt during its uprising by security forces or secret police dressed in plain clothes have been recorded by the Committee to Project Journalists. These accounts can be referred to on the CPJ website. Mohamed Abdel Dayem, the MENA Program Coordinator of the Committee to Protect Journalists said "The government has resorted to blanket censorship, intimidation, and today a series of deliberate attacks on journalists carried out by pro-government mobs" (CPJ 2011a). The reports drew criticism from the US government (Martinez 2011) and even President Obama spoke out "First, we continue to be crystal clear that we oppose violence as a response to this crisis. In recent days, we've seen violence and harassment erupt on the streets of Egypt that violates human rights, universal values, and international norms. So we are sending a strong and unequivocal message: Attacks on reporters are unacceptable, attacks on human rights activists are unacceptable, attacks on peaceful protesters are unacceptable" (Obama 2011). By January 30 of 2011, Al Jazeera announced that the Information Minister had ordered Al Jazeera bureaus in Egypt to be shut down and revoked accreditation of all network journalists (Al-Jazeera.com 2011). The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that both Al Jazeera and Al Jazeera English continued reporting on Egypt from other locations and that viewers based outside of Egypt could view the network's Arabic channel only on satellites out of the control of the Egyptian authorities (CPJ 2011a).

The Freedom House ranked Egypt's freedom on the net in 2011 as "Partly Free", because although no web applications were blocked when the study was established, bloggers and online

users were arrested, detained and beaten at times. One year later, Freedom House still granted “Partly Free” as the status to Egypt’s online freedom, however, they note that web applications were blocked. In 2012, Freedom House noted that despite the 214 ISPs in Egypt, the country’s bandwidth was controlled by only 4 providers (Egypt Telecom, Internet Egypt, Vodafone/Raya Etisalat Misr, and TE Data), and although privately owned, they were monitored by the government and controlled through strict rules and regulations, for example, internet access was blocked in under one hour on January 27, 2011. According to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), 88% of Egyptian internet access was successfully shut down by the government, preventing Egyptians from accessing any websites, crippling Tor, the anti-censorship tool used by activists to access social media. An article published by the Telegraph on January 2011 noted that the “Egyptian government’s action is unprecedented in the history of the internet. Countries such as China, Iran, Thailand and Tunisia have cut off access to news websites and social networking services during periods of unrest, as Egypt when it cut off Facebook and Twitter...The ongoing attempt by the Egyptian government to shut down all online communication is, however, a new phenomenon...The action puts Egypt, temporarily at least, in the company of North Korea, which has never allowed its citizens access to the internet [valid in 2011]” (Williams 2011). When the internet was blocked, Egyptians communicated with contacts abroad via SMS and other mobile applications to be further broadcast from abroad. Also, Sweden offered modem connections to produce content. Google and Twitter set up a voice tweet systems allowing people to call a foreign number and leave messages that were instantly posted on Twitter under “#egypt”. The “Speak to Tweet” service was set up so as to allow Egyptians to remain connected. Google-owned YouTube also chose to highlight videos from Egypt on its news channel, CitizenTube, inviting users to submit their own footage and allowing Al Jazeera to stream live coverage. Finally, Google also created a “Crisis Response” page that listed the links to the “Speak to Tweet” tool, CitizenTube, Google Maps of locations in Egypt with protests and emergency telephone numbers (Lefkow 2011; Phys.org 2011).

In terms of the online platforms used by activists in Egypt in 2011 and 2012, an array of activities were organised online ranging from online debates to the sharing of personal experiences on online news sites, blogs and vlogs and well as YouTube, podcasts, Facebook, Twitter, SMS and mobile phone web publishing. Surveys from between 2010 and 2011 amounted to 13,500 active citizen news journalism websites in Egypt. Sam Gustin from wired.com thinks that the “sheer speed with which the regime fell – 18 days” is due to the “potent impact” of modern communications technology (Gustin 2011). He quotes Rafat Ali, founder of PaidContent, in explaining the different roles of Facebook and Twitter in the Egyptian uprising; Facebook was used to organise activists inside the country, whereas Twitter was used to get the message outside of Egypt. Ali is quoted by Wired.com for saying that

Facebook "...acts like an accelerant to conditions which already exist in the country. Twitter and YouTube serve as amplification for what's happening on the ground. And they directly affect Western media coverage". Ali also explains that because the people in government were aged in their "60s, 70s, and 80s" and have never used Facebook or Twitter, the power of these technologies was underestimated by them.

### III.2.2.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

According to Freedom House, Egyptian news websites are some of the most visited in the Middle East, with almost 50% of Arab world news content originating from Egypt. For example, Forbes rated the Al Youm7 news portal as the most visited news site in the Middle East in both 2010 and 2011. Private and independent media began using content from citizen journalist websites since about 2007, when Egyptian bloggers began to collect and diffuse any information about activists' arrests and any acts of torture by the regime. Egypt's blogosphere became more lively and diverse in the mid-2000s; bloggers became media celebrities and even won international awards, for example, Wael Abbas received the Knight International Journalism Award in 2007 and by 2008, the number of blogs from Egypt was estimated to be up to 160,000. Other media celebrity bloggers include Alaa Abdel Fattah and Asmaa Mahfouz, who also had their work recognized by challenging the limits to freedom of expression in Egypt. In 2011, diversity online began with the army bribing online commentators to join online discussions and steer opinions in favour of the Egyptian regime. Pro government bloggers such as Abdallah Kamal also joined bloggers online with their own Twitter and Facebook accounts. Also, political parties such as Freedom and Justice and Al Nour parties are reported to have numerous micro-bloggers disseminating pro-government information online. In Egypt, the government did not stop at blocking internet access or online content, they were also accused of manipulating online content on independent outlets such as Youm7 and El Badil.

Despite Egypt being recorded as such a dangerous country to report from, citizen journalism thrived in the Arab Spring. Hany Shukrallah, the editor of Ahram Online, described Citizen Journalism as "...the new media, the people's media, that exposes the truth" (Abdel Kouddous 2011). Hossam El Hamalway, another journalist and activist in charge of the '3arabawy" blog, explained that it was citizen journalists who broke the press silence in Egypt, "When us bloggers began to post videos, that gave courage to traditional journalists to cover the story as well". Abdel Kouddous noted that the professional press began to cover stories that they were usually silent about, but rather than cover the stories directly and put themselves in danger of being arrested, "newspaper journalists would cite bloggers who posted the videos, thus absolving

themselves of direct responsibility for the story”. Popular platforms set up by Egyptians either by citizen journalists or activists during or before the Egyptian Spring include *Manal and alaa’s bit bucket free speech from the bletches* accessible on manalaa.net, *Cairo Live* accessible on cairolive.com, *Freedom for Egyptians* accessible on freedomforegyptians.blogspot.fr and *Stamp of Authority*, which used to be accessible on the weekly Ahram page, weekly.ahram.org.eg, that gave information on the crackdown on street protests on a weekly basis. The *Arabist*, launched in Cairo in 2003 by Issandr El Amrani was set up to be a window into domestic politics in the Arab World, but then gained a more international readership during its coverage of the Arab Spring and the transition post-Mubarak. *Baheyya*, another citizen journalist blog was set up in 2005 and carried on up until 2016; its author gives an analysis on Egyptian politics and culture from the point of view of an Egyptian citizen. *The Skeptic*, another blog by a journalist and human rights activist Elijah Zarwan, today links from elijahzarwan.net/blog to various articles and photos he has published online. *Piggipedia*, a Flickr page was set up in 2008 to profile former president Mubarak’s members of the Ministry of Interior involved in any form of human rights abuse or related acts. The page carried on in 2011 to post photos of the army’s crackdown on people. These are but a few of the online platforms for expression created and fed by Egyptian citizens during the time of the Egyptian Arab Spring.

### **III.2.3. Libya**

#### **III.2.3.1. Information and Communication Context**

Libyan state institutions first had access to the internet in the mid-1990s during a time of sanctions against the country, following the Lockerbie bombing<sup>63</sup>. The Libyan people finally gained internet access in 1998, but because of high prices, a priority was given to international companies, those close to the government and some internet cafes (Freedom on the Net 2012). In 2000, Gaddafi began to promote IT so as to improve the economic opportunities for young Libyans and restrictions were almost unheard of for the first couple of years or so. Gaddafi’s

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<sup>63</sup> The Lockerbie bombing refers to the Pan Am Flight 103 from London to New York that exploded 31,000 feet over Lockerbie, Scotland, just 38 minutes after take-off from London on December 21, 1988. All 259 people aboard along with 11 people on the ground were killed. One year later, US and British investigators indict two Libyan men accused of being Libyan intelligence agents, on 270 counts of murder. The UN Security Council, on 1992, imposed sanctions on air travel and arms sales because Libya refused to deliver suspects for trial, and these sanctions against Libya stay in place until 1999, when the suspects were finally taken into Dutch custody and officially charged with the bombing (BBC Scotland 2015).

son, who managed the state-run telecom operator, also reduced internet access prices and also invested in the country's fibre-optic network and expanded DSL, WiMAX as well as broadband technologies (Budde Comm 2017), resulting in the average price of 1LYD (0.75 USD) per hour in internet cafes between 2004 and 2011. Due to these investments, even most conflict-torn Libya, the country remains more advanced than most African countries in terms of telecommunications and the internet (Budde Comm 2017). Having said this, the internet access price for individuals, especially from their homes, remained high in 2011, with dial-up internet subscription costing up to 7USD per month and 10GB of WiMax costing up to 30USD per month after the initial set up fees. Such internet rates are very high for Libyans who were at the time earning only 195USD if they worked for the public sector (a large percentage) (Freedom on the Net 2012). Post Gaddafi's death, from November 2011 up until March 2012, internet access via ADSL or WiMax was made free of charge in Eastern Libya and then throughout the country. The pricing returned on March 2012. In addition to high internet access costs, Libyans also faced the obstacle of computer literacy being very low. General literacy in Libya was almost 90 percent, whereas computer literacy was very low (Freedom on the Net 2012).

The country enjoys one of the highest market penetration rates in Africa in terms of mobile communications in 2016 with a mobile SIM penetration of 119.7 percent. By 2011, SIM cards costs around 4 USD and these SIM cards could be topped up with minutes of talk time that were "generally affordable" and since 2008, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been freely accessible to Libyans (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Despite the infrastructure investments by the Libyan government pre-uprising, Budde Comm also reports that "virtually the entire telecom and internet sector was in government hands" (Budde Comm 2017) and the three government-owned mobile networks competed with one another. In 2006 Moammar Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam led reformist initiatives to make Libya's internet more free, leading to the launch of websites communicating critically of the government (Freedom House 2012c); these websites were accessible by the Libyan public. But by 2009, Saif al-Islam's reform initiatives ended when several of the privately owned outlets linked to him were nationalised and cyber dissidents were arrested (Freedom House 2012c).

It is interesting to note that Saif al-Islam was also the president of the Gaddafi Institution for Development, and criticised media freedom and democracy in his country in 2006, saying that "In all frankness and transparency, there is no freedom of the press in Libya; actually there is no press, even, and there is no real 'direct people's democracy' on the ground" (Committee to Protect Journalists 2008).

In 2011, the state-run General Posts and Telecommunications Company (GPTC) began to distribute internet service provider licences to subsidiaries such as to Libyan Telecom and Technology and several other companies set up as subordinates to Libyan Telecom and

Technology, such as Modern World Communication and Bait Shams. The GPTC in 2011 also owned the two mobile phone providers, Almadar and Libyana. Out of the 6.5million residents of Libya, only a mere 17 percent had internet access in 2011 (this number rose to 20% by 2016 (ITU-D 2016)).

### III.2.3.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

The Freedom House reported that Libya's freedom on the net was "partly free" in 2011, (Freedom on the Net 2012). No studies were made by the Freedom House on Libya prior to 2012, therefore, we are unable to make a comparison with the state of internet freedom in preceding years. The report actually states that it looks at "three radically different periods<sup>64</sup>: a highly restrictive environment under Qadhafi [Gaddafi], a partial internet and telephone blackout for much of 2011, and a relatively open online information landscape since the rebel victory in October 2011" (Freedom on the Net 2012).

The Gaddafi regime suppressed internet freedom by "maintaining monopoly control over the internet infrastructure, blocking websites, engaging in widespread surveillance, and meting out harsh punishments to online critics" (Freedom on the Net 2012). The internet was slowly shut down between February and March 2011 in response to the uprising of the Libyans, and it remained shut down for 171 days, until Tripoli was taken over by the rebels in August 2011, just two months before the death of Gaddafi. To celebrate the return of the internet, the Libya Telecom and Technology website published online "Congratulations, Libya, on emancipation from the rule of the tyrant" (Tsukayama 2011). Libya post-Gaddafi, still faces obstacles to internet access, ranging from "...periodic electricity outages, residual self-censorship, and weak legal protections..." (Freedom on the Net 2012). Mobile communications were not reliable during this time either. The internet shut down during Libya's uprising was not exactly the same as that of Egypt's; one blogger on dyn.com explains that "From a technical standpoint, it's clear that this is a very different strategy than the one used by Egypt in the last days of the Mubarak regime". On March 5, 2011, the blogger explained that the Libyan Internet was actually "still alive" even though most of the traffic was blocked and that the regime's strategy was similar to "turning off a tap, the stream of traffic was slowed to a trickle, and then to a few drips" (Dyn Guest Blogs 2011), therefore making it more difficult to detect by the international

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<sup>64</sup> For background information, 2011 was the year of political uprisings against Muammar al-Gaddafi, a leader who had reigned for over 40 years in Libya. This uprising grew into an armed conflict between rebel groups and Gaddafi's government and there was international military intervention from an international coalition including NATO taking a stance with the rebels against the regime. The slow downfall of the regime in the summer of 2011 led to the establishment of the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was appointed as the interim government after Gaddafi's fall in October 2011 (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica n.d.).

community. The internet blockage led to many internet cafes closing down and this meant that more people, mainly working for foreign companies, began accessing the internet from their home and work places (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Under Gaddafi, people were required to show their identification if they wanted to purchase a SIM card. Also, internet café owners had to agree in writing that they would allow authorities to monitor all internet access content, including the installation of software, in the café. The Gaddafi regime used cutting edge monitoring equipment from the French company Amesys to “collect massive amounts of data on both phone and internet usage” (Freedom on the Net 2012; Aikins 2012; Global Voices 2011). Also, Freedom House reported that the Libyan government recruited Chinese and Eastern European hackers to stop opposition content from being diffused online; in some cases malware was generated so as to take over activists’ computers (Freedom House 2012c). Authorities even listened in on Skype and VSAT conversations as well as Thuraya satellite phones, a UAE established company.

During the 2011 uprising, a black market for SIM cards emerged when illegal immigrants and expats who wanted to leave the country began selling their SIM cards because mobile phone were “confiscated or stolen at checkpoints” (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Restrictions on content disseminated on the internet began around 2003 when Moussa Koussa, the head of the Libyan Intelligence Agency and close to Gaddafi took the responsibility of “monitoring and restricting the influence of opposition websites” (Freedom on the Net 2012). Instructions were imposed on internet cafes by the government and they posted stickers beside computers warning users not to visit websites that “might negatively impact so-called national security or public morals”, therefore instilling fear in users and “prompting them to self-censor political discourse” (Freedom on the Net 2012). By 2004, it was clear that websites were being intermittently blocked by the government, specifically in the Arabic language and then later in European languages.

Blogging in Libya had first emerged in 2003, but the percentage of contributions made to the Arab blogosphere by the Libyans was considerably small compared to that of other Arab countries and did not increase until the start of the revolution on February 2011. At the time, even Muammar Gaddafi contributed to Libya’s blogosphere with his very own blog: alqathafi.org. Today the Gaddafi blog has been taken over and the home page features “OFFICIAL SITE OF MUAMMA AL-GATHAFI IS DESTROYED BY ENEMY” in red uppercase letters. Libyan blogs under the Gaddafi regime were mainly in Arabic and focussed on poetry and stories and these received a few thousand visitors between 2003 and 2007 at a time when blogging was not as popular in Libya as it was in other countries in the Middle East. Some English blogs were also created by Libyans, but the largest acclaimed only 76 visitors, and many of these English blogs were set up by Libyans based in the UK who had fled Libya

in the 1970s and then decided to share their views on domestic politics via the web. Initially these English blogs set up by Libyans were visited by Libyans in Europe and the US, but then they began to gain readership in Libya as well (Gazzini 2007; Freedom on the Net 2012). During the revolution, it was mainly the diaspora and the Libyans based in eastern Libya who contributed content online, because of the internet shut down in much of the rest of Libya. Freedom House reports that Libyan bloggers practised self-censorship during the time of Gaddafi's regime and that after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime in 2012, the "environment loosened considerably and freedom of expression was flourishing". Freedom House also notes that self-censorship continued to be practised by Libyan bloggers and that sensitive topics such as rape, tribal conflicts and especially any content critical of the 2011 revolution tend to be avoided in 2012 (Freedom House 2012c).

With regards to social media sites, the Gaddafi regime had blocked YouTube as early as January 2010, prior to the Libyan uprising and therefore the video sharing site Bambuser was used, but this too faced account closures as per a CPJ report (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011a). Digital Trends reported that the first activist groups in Libya's 2011 uprising began communications on Twitter and Facebook, where they called for Libyan reforms and also voiced their support for the Egyptian's digital revolutionaries- many of these activists were later arrested (McHugh n.d.). Al Jazeera reported that one online group took to Facebook and Twitter, for example, to organise a "Day of Anger", reaching several thousand Libyans. The February 17 "Day of Anger" that launched the Libyan revolution was further communicated upon on Facebook, when a "large number of Libyans inside the country responded, changing their surname on Facebook to "Libya" so as to protest the Gaddafi regime (Freedom House 2012c). By April 2011, Libya had 64,000 active Twitter accounts and almost 200,000 Facebook accounts (Freedom House 2012c). By April of 2012, Freedom House reported a growth in Facebook accounts in Libya doubling the accounts to 400,000 and making it the number one visited site of Libya. In 2012, Facebook in Libya became a news tool, where people would learn about upcoming events (Freedom House 2012c).

### III.2.3.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

The Freedom House report of 2012 on Libya states that although there was no notable political censorship, Web 2.0 applications were blocked, bloggers and ICT users were arrested and therefore the Press Freedom status was set to "partly free" for 2011 in the 2012 report. "Partly free" is an improvement from "Not free" in 2010 and the Freedom House explains that this is due to significant improvements in media freedom and access to information due to Gaddafi's

control crumbling in 2011. Also, Freedom House reported a “boom of media outlets, particularly in the east, with a diversity of viewpoints” and says that journalists are freer in covering the news during the uprising than during the regime rule (Freedom House 2012b).

Freedom House reported that the Gaddafi era was a period whereby “Libya’s media environment was among the most tightly controlled in the world” (Freedom on the Net 2012). There were indeed several laws allowing for freedom of speech such as the 1969 Libyan Constitutional declaration and the 1988 Green Charter for Human Rights, which guarantee freedom of speech and opinion but also build barriers around these freedoms, therefore restricting freedom of speech and opinion in Libya. More worth of noting are the laws authorising “harsh punishments for those who published content deemed offensive or threatening to Islam, national security, territorial integrity, or the reputation of Qadhafi (Freedom on the Net 2012)”. To go even further, the penal code allowed for the imprisonment or even the death penalty for those convicted of sharing state information or information related to Gaddafi. The Publications Act also allowed for fines to be slapped or up to two years of prison if one committed libel, slander or questioned the aims of the regime and the collective punishment law gave authorities the right to punish entire families, towns or even districts if one individual was convicted. Up until 2011, all these laws could be applied to any form of speech, ranging from the internet platforms such as blogs and social media to mobile phones and more traditional media such as newspapers, radio and television (Freedom on the Net 2012)<sup>65</sup>.

Under Gadhafi, the government was not only strict with press laws; they also targeted the press for either diffusing or accessing information. Freedom House reports that internet users and online journalists were arrested and sometimes killed even prior to the country’s uprising in 2011 (Freedom on the Net 2012). Many reports of the press being the target of different actors in Libya have been published, for example, Daif al-Ghazal a journalist who worked for a pro-government newspaper before he began writing stories critical of the Libyan government for London-based Libya Al Youm was abducted and then tortured before being shot in the head; his body was found on June 2, 2005, twelve days after being kidnapped. The Reporters without Borders article on rsf.org describes the horrific shock in receiving the autopsy report of al-Ghazal, which showed that his body was barely identifiable; “his fingers had been severed, and the body had multiple bruises and stab wounds” (Reporters without Borders 2005). On February 2011, Atef Al-Atrash, an Al Jazeera reporter, disappeared after just reporting about journalists that had been detained in Libya. Also, James Foley was detained for up to six weeks in April.

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<sup>65</sup> In 2012, the NTC of Libya-post Gaddafi, drafted a new article allowing for “freedom of opinion for individuals and groups, freedom or scientific research, freedom or communication, liberty of the press, printing, publication and mass media” (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Al Jazeera English reported that the Libyan government blocked Al Jazeera's TV signal in the country and that there were also reports that the network's website was inaccessible (aljazeera.com 2011). Some international reporters were invited to Tripoli by the regime to cover the conflict and they were followed; also their reporting was limited to only focussing on pro-government demonstrations and they were not allowed to leave their hotel (Freedom House 2012b). The France 24 journalists I interviewed for our research talked about the comical conditions of covering the regime in the sense that journalists were closely monitored and that it was surreal because the international journalists noted that there were actors placed by the government to share their story, therefore, they were cautious about sharing information that seemed clouded in what seemed to be a pre-planned narrative.

Taqi al-Din al-Shalawi, the director of the independent news site Irassa, and the site's editor-in-chief, Abdel Fattah Bourwaq, were interrogated on February 2011 (Freedom on the Net 2012; Committee to Protect Journalists 2011a). The following month, Qatari cameraman, Ali Hassan al-Jabar, who worked for Al Jazeera was shot to death in an ambush by unknown fighters after covering protests in Benghazi (Al Jazeera 2011). On April of 2011, American photographer, Chris Hondros was killed along with documentary filmmaker Tim Hetherington by a mortar bomb in Misrata. In the same month, the freelance journalist Anton Hammerl was also killed in Libya. In total, there were five recorded journalist fatalities during 2011 in Libya and this made it one of the most dangerous countries for journalists to work in. Having said this, it is important to note that there were more reports of deaths occurring because journalists were "caught in the fire" rather than being specifically targeted. Also, in an interview I conducted with Marine Olivesi and David Thomson, who reported for France 24 from Libya during the Libyan uprising, they both stated that considering they were in a conflict zone, they did not feel scared while reporting from Libya, certainly not while moving around the country with the rebels.

Authorities targeted both professional journalists and activists from spreading information. For example, in February 2011, Mohamed al-Hashim Masmari, a writer and blogger who had published video content online and participated in interviews with non-Libyan media, was arrested after having his mobile phone and computer confiscated by the authorities. Another citizen journalist, Mohammed al-Nabbous, who launched Libya al-Hurra TV, a livestream online broadcast, was killed by snipers in March 2011, while reporting live via phone on a battle near Benghazi. His death provoked an uproar with both the local and international journalist community as well as within his audience made up of people who actually watched him die while sharing news to them. Libya al-Hurra had nine cameras that streamed live 24/7 since it was set up on February 17, 2011. Many described Nabbous as the "face of citizen journalism" as his aim was to give international coverage to Libya's unrest (NPR 2011; Committee to

Protect Journalists 2011c). Ghaida al-Tawati, an online activist who earned a reputation for being openly critical and outspoken from within Libya, posted that she would self-immolate as Tunisia's Bouazizi if Libyans failed to turn out for the February 17 protests. Al-Tawati aroused the curiosity of Gaddafi so much that he invited her for a meeting, in which she requested that Libya become more open to the concept of freedom of speech. Al-Tawati also informed Gaddafi to his face that she had been harassed since she began blogging in 2007; emails she had privately written were leaked onto the internet, Facebook hate pages had been created against her to give her a negative reputation (Aikins 2012).

Amidst the kidnappings, the deaths and the blockage of information in 2011, Libya's activists and entrepreneurs launched hundreds of news platforms. Benghazi alone for example, had up to 800 media outlets by October 2011, the month of Gaddafi's death. Other media outlets were set up in other parts of Libya such as Misrata, Tripoli and even the Nafusa Mountains, "where the Amasigh minority established newspapers as well as television and radio stations in their own language" (Freedom House 2012b) and this was a first because Gaddafi had banned the Amasigh language during his reign. Also, a first English-language radio station was established; Tribute FM.

The General Press Corporation and state-owned newspapers functioning under the Gaddafi regime were dissolved. Prior to the February 2011 revolution, all TV channels were state run, but by the end of 2011, there were up to 20 television channels and dozens of radio stations, mainly managed by independent individuals.

## **III.2.4. Saudi Arabia**

### **III.2.4.1. Information and Communication Context**

The Saudi population was only granted internet access in 1998 and by 2011 internet penetration reached under 50 percent of the population. Internet accessibility was very slow with up to 20 percent still accessing the internet on dial up modems, whereas the rest were using mobile or fixed broadband connections. Accessibility is mainly constricted to major cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah, whereas residents from the poorer provinces like Jizan in the south or Ha'il in the north do not connect to the internet as much (Freedom House 2012d).

In 2011, broadband services cost between 11USD and 89USD per month and connection speeds in 2012 ranged between 724Kbps and 1.22Mbps depending on whether DSL broadband or High Speed Packet Access networks were used and this could be further affected because of

“excessive filtering” by Saudi authorities. By 2012, Saudi Arabia accessed the internet through two main data-services providers, the Integrated Telecom Company and Bayanat al-Oula for Network Services and it is these providers who offered licenses to ISPs; the number of ISPs in 2011 was 36 (idem).

Both Broadband and mobile phone services were provided by the three largest telecommunications companies in the Middle East: Saudi Telecom Company, Etisalat based in the United Arab Emirates, and Zain based in Kuwait. In 2012, Saudis were already accessing the net from home, work and internet cafes. The home option became the most popular when people realised that internet cafes did not have secure internet access. As with many of the Arab countries studied in this thesis, mobile penetration is huge, having increased 191 percent in 5 years by 2012 with 4.6 mobile lines per household. WiMax, allowing for wireless internet access via a USB modem is widely used in Saudi Arabia because of affordability and anywhere anytime access. By 2012, Saudis already had third generation (3G) and fourth generation (4G) mobile networks and they could also access the internet via satellite (idem).

In terms of devices, no communications devices were actually banned, but specific smart phones such as the iPhone and Galaxy tablets were banned in security organisations, because the government feared that they would be hacked. Also, although Blackberry devices were not banned in Saudi Arabia, the Blackberry service for the devices was banned in August 2010 when authorities found out that they could not monitor Blackberry messages, because they were encrypted. The ban on the Blackberry service was later lifted after Blackberry complied with Saudi authorities, giving authorities access to devices’ encrypted messages.

### III.2.4.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

In a nutshell, the Freedom House rated Saudi Arabia’s internet in both 2011 and 2012 as “Not Free”, with reports of obstacles in accessing information, limitations on content and violations of user rights. Although no web applications were blocked at this time in Saudi Arabia, there was notable political censorship and bloggers and ICT users were arrested in Saudi Arabia. The political landscape of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, during the Arab Uprising, was nowhere near as catastrophic as that of other Arab countries such as Libya, Egypt or even Syria, in terms of the number of victims produced or physical damage inflicted on the country. Yet, it must be noted that Saudi Arabians did take to social media, just as their neighbours did, to voice their political opinions against their government. The difference between the Saudi uprising and that of their neighbours, was that the Saudi government reacted quickly in response to the online uprising, by issuing warnings and banning protests either directly or through the thousands of

government supporters and online influencers that they had hired to warn internet users against protest participation. The government took a clear stance by actually using the internet to communicate with Saudis; the government emailed reminders to Saudis stating that protests were banned in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the government also warned BlackBerry users via MMS that should they participate in any protests, there would be repercussions and the government also used their supporters to spread online messages against protests. Authorities did not only communicate, they also acted quickly by detaining and intimidating political activists and internet users and everyone in the Kingdom was subject to being monitored on their internet usage (Freedom House 2012).

Saudi authorities monitored telephone and internet service providers including internet cafes. In fact, the Ministry of Interior had enacted a law on April 16, 2009 that obliged all internet cafes to have hidden cameras installed in their internet cafes and to provide records of all their customers. They also barred anyone under the age of 18 from accessing internet cafes and the internet cafes had to be closed by midnight.

In 2011 and 2012, social media sites such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were freely accessible by Saudis, but specific pages on these platforms or specific content would be instantly blocked if it was politically oriented or covered controversial topics in a critical or questioning manner such as religion or human rights. The Constitutional Monarchy page on Facebook, founded by Ali Ashmlan in March of 2011, for example, was blocked. Freedom House reported that Ashmlan used the Facebook page to call for constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia and this being a taboo topic in Saudi Arabia, may be the reason why it was blocked. Another Facebook page, “I want my rights...I don’t want to drive”, was also blocked in Saudi Arabia. The page was created to raise awareness to the fact that women in Saudi Arabia in 2011 could not use public transportation, travel freely or make many decisions alone, let alone drive. The page served to raise awareness for the other lack of rights women in Saudi Arabia encountered for people who thought the only misfortune of women in Saudi Arabia was not being able to drive. Therefore, this is another sensitive topic in Saudi that had activists trying to voice their requests. Despite internet filtering and the low penetration rate in Saudi Arabia in 2012, Saudis were recorded as the largest Twitter users, with 38 percent of all Arab tweets originating from Saudi Arabia. Facebook, is also quite popular with Saudis, with 4.9million users as of early 2012 (idem).

As stated earlier, any content on social media sites calling for an uprising or for street protests in 2011 were blocked by the Saudi authorities. Content calling for reforms in political, social, economic, or even basic human and civil rights were also blocked by the Saudi authorities. Furthermore, sites containing any information considered by the Saudi authorities to be “harmful”, “illegal”, “anti-Islamic” or “offensive” were routinely blocked (Freedom House

2012d). This means that content criticising the kingdom, the royal family or even other Gulf States would be blocked and also any information online about drugs, alcohol, gambling or terrorism would be blocked. The Saudi authorities have also blocked human rights websites such as Article19.org, Amnesty International, Reporters without Borders and Freedom House because of content they found to be critical of or harmful to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 2008, the government was victim to a series of hacking attacks and these attacks had led the Ministry of Labour in Saudi Arabia to put in place laws that criminalised many internet-based actions such as hacking emails or websites “to deface, destroy, modify, or deny access” (Freedom House 2012d), and publishing or accessing any information that was considered “contrary to the state or its system” (idem).

Although Saudis are avid Twitter users, the Saudi blogosphere is not very mature and in 2012, the estimated 10,000 Saudi bloggers were considered to be micro bloggers in that they contributed to online discussions on social media platforms, rather than initiating content themselves. Also, according to Freedom House, most bloggers are female and focus on personal issues as opposed to political issues (Freedom House 2012d), but this is perhaps due to self-censorship among Saudis and the blocking of sites by Saudi authorities, and therefore the content is not truly representative of what was actually published or even of Saudi opinions.

The Saudi government is also very active in online communities, and has been known to influence discussions in online forums either through the thousands of people they hire to propagate their opinions online or through various financial support given to online publishers. News sites such as Sabq.org for example received financial support from Saudi authorities in exchange for agreeing to work with the authorities on content moderation; sabq.org is still in operation in 2017. Other news organisations on the other hand, such as Al-Saha al-Siyasia, had to close down their website because their site was often blocked by the government. With the site blocked, the site could not have any visitors and this led to financial ruin. On the other hand, the Freedom House reports that the Saudi King actually turned to online discussions to better understand the demands and needs of the people and sometimes even responded to these demands. For example, the introduction of a monthly stipend for the unemployed in KSA were requests that were initially posted on Al-Saha al-Siyasia (Freedom House 2012d); such requests caught the King’s attention and he agreed to respond to them.

Also, in terms of more international social networking platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, the government partnered with Saudis posting on these platforms to respond to some issues facing Saudis that were propagated on these platforms. For example, the second major floods in Jeddah in 2011 that led to several deaths, encouraged Saudis to use YouTube to publish amateur videos of the floods that they had taken with their mobile phones. These videos caught the King’s attention and he ensured that flood victims were immediately

compensated by the government. Saudis also used Facebook to set up rescue efforts during the floods, and these were of course openly accepted by the government and even acted upon. The government it seems was happy to help Saudis in times of need, especially due to natural disasters. However, they did not like content that gave Saudi Arabia a poor reputation in terms of using drugs, living in poverty or lacking human rights and therefore they destroyed or blocked all such content.

### III.2.4.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

The Freedom House has always found and reported the press status of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to be “not free” and in 2011 and 2012 it remained among the most repressive in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of 1992 does not actually allow for freedom of the press and authorities are given the power through this law to prevent any press activities that could lead to disunity or criticism against the monarchy.

The 2000 Press and Publications Act in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia addresses issues related to freedom of expression and it treats both online and offline publishers of information equally as journalists. This means that bloggers, online commentators and even those writing anonymously are monitored as closely as licensed professional journalists. According to the Freedom House, online contributors have been arrested and detained without any specific charges. Also, press violations are punishable with fines and imprisonments.

The Saudi monarchy in 2011 issued a decree related to the Press and Publications act to ban reporting of any news that would contradict Sharia or religious leaders. News that threatened national security or promoted foreign interests was also banned. The Press and Publications law was also amended to allow lifetime bans on journalists and fines of up to 133,000USD for violations of this or any other law. The official media policy of Saudi Arabia defines the press as a tool to educate the population, propagate the government’s opinion and encourage national harmony and unity. Therefore, any news doing otherwise is considered punishable by authorities.

An antiterrorism law was also proposed in 2011, which allowed for sentences of at least ten years, for any form of dissent, including requests for political reform or the exposure of corruption in the Saudi government. Also in 2011, at the start of the Arab Spring, the Ministry of Culture and Information passed a law imposing all bloggers obtain a license from the Ministry so as to be able to publish online, even if they were not professional journalists. This meant that all legal bloggers in Saudi Arabia could no longer remain anonymous. Indeed, many online bloggers or commentators were imprisoned for criticising government officials or

members of the Royal Family. Feras Bughnah for example, produced a video on poverty in Riyadh and published it on YouTube as part of the critical journalism series on YouTube entitled “Maloob Alaina” (We have been cheated), with up to 1.7m viewers by the end of 2011. He and his colleagues Hosam el-Deraiwish and Khaled al-Rasheed were immediately detained for two weeks. The video of poverty of course was considered by authorities to shed a negative light on one negative reality of Saudi Arabia that they wished to keep away from the international arena.

Saudi channels on YouTube have however been successful when taking a comical approach and although a few comical episodes were taken down due to criticism being too severe or controversial, most channels remained popular and accessible in Saudi Arabia. Some of these comic channels on YouTube that address sensitive issues in Saudi Arabia are: “3al6ayer,” “La Yekthar,” “Quarter to Nine,” “Sa7i,” “Masameer,” “Eysh Elly,” “Fe2aFala,” and “Hajma Mortadda.

Critical journalism that touches on controversial topics without any humour have not been accepted by the Saudi government. For example, when Manal al-Sharif in May 2011 posted a video on YouTube of herself driving, she was immediately detained for ten days by the Saudi authorities. Her video was part of a campaign to grant women in Saudi Arabia the right to drive. (The right for women to apply for a driver’s license in Saudi Arabia was granted in 2017 for the first time).

Many Facebook groups that were launched in 2011 such as the “National Campaign for Supporting Detainees in Saudi Arabia” and “Prisoner Until When” published hundreds of names of political activists still imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. Because many people were arrested without any formal charges, this meant that many of those detained could not secure legal representation. Fadhel Makki Al Manasif an activist who operated both on and offline was also arrested on May of 2011 for taking part in peaceful demonstrations. Al Manasif had also both documented and written about human rights violations for two years prior to his arrest and focussed particularly on violations against Shiite Saudis (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Hamza Kashgari, a writer, poet and journalist, also caught authorities’ attention when he posted tweets considered by many to be offensive comments about the Prophet Mohammed. Thousands on social media actually called for his execution, leading him to flee to Malaysia, but he was arrested in Malaysia and deported back to Saudi Arabia, where he was imprisoned and finally freed almost two years later in 2013 (Knickmeyer 2013; Toumi 2012).

Fahd al-Juhani, an editor at the newspaper Al-Watan was charged for defamation because he published an article in 2009 in the news website Al-Weeam accusing the Environmental Health head of the town al-Huta for abusing his position by pressurising over 200 shop owners into paying contributions to the annual municipality banquet marking the end of Ramadan.

Defamation was made illegal in a vague law in 2008 by the Ministry of Labour, so as to make punishable any act that was considered harmful to someone or the country's reputation.

Al-Jazirah, a daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, lost their reporter Fahd al-Jukhaidib for two months when he was sentenced to prison and 50 lashes for "inciting the public to protest against a series of electric power reductions" (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010b).

The Saudi government has censored both local and international media. For example, in December 2011, the news editor of Okaz, a Saudi newspaper, Muhammad al-Tunisi, was dismissed from his position by authorities because he published an investigative report that was an eye opener into consumption of the drug Khat, in Jazan in southern Saudi Arabia.

Although there were only few reported cases whereby journalists were physically harassed, authorities did arrest activists so as to prevent the uprising from taking over Saudi Arabia. No journalist arrests were reported in 2011. There was however, very little local coverage of Saudi's "Day of Rage" in March 2011 and therefore one could conclude that the press practiced self-censorship. Having said that, reports do state that the Day of Rage in Saudi Arabia was largely unsuccessful as only few turned out for the protest partly due to the government's blocks and filters of the calls to protest and the heavy road patrolling by the police. Reuters' Senior Correspondent based in Riyadh, Ulf Laessing, had his press credentials withdrawn by Saudi authorities and was forced to leave the country when he tried to cover the street protests as part of the Saudi Uprising. The Saudi authorities said that his coverage was inaccurate without providing information as to what was inaccurate and Reuters stood by the reporting. Saudi authorities in 2011 also indefinitely banned three columnist working for the daily newspaper Al-Watan, without providing any reasons, but according to the Committee to Project Journalists (CPJ), the columnists, Amal Zahid, Ameera Khasghari and Adwan al-Ahmari wrote about political unrest in the region (Committee to Project Journalists 2011). Three Saudi journalists were also arrested in 2012 for covering protests. Habib Ali al-Maatiq, a photographer who supervised the news website Al-Fajr Cultural Network was arrested on February 2012 at his work place. Also, Hussein Malik al-Salam, the site manager and also a photographer, was arrested by security forces while attending his university. Both these journalists were held in prison without any charges and the website, which covered pro-reform protests in predominantly Shiite parts of Saudi Arabia, was taken down. Jalal Mohamed al-Jamal, website manager of Al-Awamia, who covered pro-reform demonstrations, was also arrested in February of 2012 and taken to an unknown location. No official charges have been placed on him. The Saudi Arabian government has obstructed local and international journalists from entering the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where political reforms in favour of the country's Shiite minority took place (Committee to Protect Journalists 2012). Mohamed al-Abdulkarim, the editor-in-chief of the online magazine Mutamar Al-Umma and an Islamic law professor and

human rights activist was arrested in 2010 after writing critically about the Saudi royal family (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010c). Female journalists in Saudi Arabia face even more difficulties when trying to do their job, specifically due to discriminatory laws against women in Saudi Arabia; they earn less, they are discouraged from working as freelancers and the topics they are able to report news on are mainly limited to women, family and children.

Although no journalists were killed between 2011 and 2012, the Committee to Project Journalists did report one journalist murder in 2004 not inflicted by the government. Simon Cumbers, a freelance camera operator for the BBC was shot dead by Al-Qaeda gunmen in Riyadh. Frank Gardner, a BBC security correspondent who was with Cumbers was also attacked and although he lived partly paralysed (Committee to Protect Journalists 2004).

The Saudi authorities blocked a website that focussed on the mistreatment of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. Also, the online version of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar was blocked because it published reports about protests in Bahrain, a Gulf ally to Saudi Arabia (Freedom House 2011a). Al-Akhbar also published US diplomatic cables that were originally published by WikiLeaks and was reported to have been hacked on the CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010a). Among the news reported by Al-Akhbar from the US cables were translations involving Arab leaders in parties organised under the patronage of Saudi princes with alcohol and drugs. Another independent website, Elaph, also published these cables and the CPJ reported that Saudi officials blocked access to the site. Amnesty International's website was even blocked because they published an article that criticised the antiterrorism law of Saudi Arabia.

All thirteen daily newspapers in Saudi Arabia as well as the London based Saudi dailies Asharq al-Awsat and Al-Hayat are privately owned but controlled by people affiliated to the royal family in one way or the other.

Broadcast media in terms of television and radio are all owned and controlled by the government, including the international 24-hour news channel Al-Arabiya. Satellite television is also widespread despite the fact that satellite dishes in Saudi Arabia are illegal. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has invested quite a lot on many pan-Arab satellite television channels such as MBA, based in the UAE. Despite these investments, the Saudi authorities continue to tightly monitor the media environment (Alqudsi-ghabra et al. 2011).

## **III.2.5. Syria**

### **III.2.5.1. Information and Communication Context**

The internet was first introduced in Syria as late as 2000 and it only touched 30,000 users for this first year. Over one-fifth of the Syrian population had internet access by the end of 2010, just before the Syrian uprising, which began in February 2011. The telecommunications infrastructure of Syria is actually one of the least developed of the Middle East. For example, broadband connections were noted by budde.com as the most difficult and expensive to acquire before the Syrian uprising. The International Telecommunications Union estimated that only 22.5 percent of Syrians had accessed the internet. Broadband subscribers were only a mere 121,300 and mobile phone users were up to 63 percent by the end of 2011 (Freedom House 2012f). And this reality only worsened post-uprising due to inflation and electricity outages in a country of instability with protests and governmental repression that then grew into a full scale civil war. Cities like Homs for example, in western Syria, had their communications infrastructure very badly destroyed due to shelling.

As of 2009, 3G was provided to Syrians and by 2010 there were only 80,000 subscribers due to high prices (25USD for only 4MB of data or 200USD for unlimited data), and one of the main two providers, MTN, made available the 3G service only in main cities, meaning that a large percentage had to connect to the internet using dial-up connection with speeds of only 256 kbps during low-peak. Broadband ADSL connection to the internet in Syria was limited due to lack of or poor communications infrastructure and high costs of up to around 30USD per month (Syrian Computer Society 2012) , considered a luxury in a country where the average monthly wage in 2012 was only 200USD. By 2012, Syria had up to fourteen Internet Service Providers; but they were all under strict control by the government's Syrian Information Organisation (SIO) and the state owned Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE), which owned all fixed-line infrastructure. This means that although the ISPs were providing internet connections to the international internet, they were under strict surveillance and therefore could be censored at any time. Private companies providing internet access for have to sign a Memorandum of Understanding so as to be able to connect to the international internet, which was controlled by the Syrian Information Organisation. All ISPs need a license to operate, which can be provided from the Telecommunications Department after being approved by the Security Services. Also, the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment needs to approve any opening of Internet Cafes, after which, the Internet Cafes are subject to monitoring by the Minister of Interior and obliged to monitor their own customers by recording their Internet Café activities.

With regards to mobile communications, the mobile phone providers also had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Syrian Information Organisation so as to provide internet access to their customers, and in 2012 there were only two main mobile phone service providers, MTN, a subsidiary of the South African company and Syriatel, owned by President Bashar al-Assad's cousin, Rami Makhlouf. All mobile phones purchased in Syria must be registered, meaning anonymity can prove to be difficult in Syria. Freedom House reported that activists began using the SIM cards of their friends who had been killed in clashes (Freedom House 2012f).

### III.2.5.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

In terms of freedom on the net, the Freedom house reported Syria as not being free in 2012; no reports on internet freedom on Syria were published prior to 2012. This report score is due to the fact that web applications were blocked, there was notable political censorship and bloggers and ICT users were arrested (Freedom House 2012f) and an untold number were killed, leading to Syria "emerging as one of the most dangerous countries in the world for citizen journalists and bloggers" (idem).

The Freedom House reported that since early 2011, the Syrian government repeatedly used its centralised power over the internet infrastructure to block internet access and/or mobile phone networks either in specific zones or even throughout the country. For example, the internet was shut down for one full day on June 2011 and there were localised internet curfews in various other regions: Kurdish regions in September 2011, Aleppo in November 2011 and Homs in January 2011. Daraa, a city in the south of Syria had its entire electrical grid shut down for several hours by the Syrian authorities, meaning that internet communications were definitely out of the question. On June 27, 2011, an article published in The Telegraph online and then in The Henry Jackson Society website written by journalist Michael Weiss shows that he was able to get his hands on a leaked document that showed that it was the Syrian government behind the banning of internet access and satellite phones. The scanned document by the Ministry of Telecommunications' Committee of Security Planning with a date stamp of May 2011 shows that it was decided that the Internet be "completely disconnected in Daraa, Homs and the eastern provinces starting on Wednesday at 14:00". The document also states that "Upload packet size to be reduced in all other areas" (Weiss 2011).

Anonymous activists who spoke with Freedom House also said that broadband was "reduced to a crawl and 3G services are shut off" when pro-regime forces began besieging specific cities so as to disrupt communications (Freedom House 2012f). This made it difficult, if not

impossible, for people to communicate with the outside world on what was happening in those regions within Syria.

Other than the setting up of internet curfews via blocks and electricity cuts, the Syrian government also filters websites containing content "...related to politics, minorities, human rights, and foreign affairs" (Freedom House 2012f). Even prior to the 2011 demonstrations in Syria, the OpenNetInitiative found that websites as far back as 2008 and 2009 were blocked and these websites either contained information from oppositions to the Assad regime and human rights groups or the Muslim Brotherhood and activism for Kurds. Even international news sites such as Lebanese newspapers against the Syrian influence in Lebanon as well as other international Arabic newspapers based in London such as Al-Quds al Arabi and Al-Sharq al-Awsat and the entire Israeli domain ".il" were restricted in Syria. This censorship only worsened in 2011, when both activists and internet users reported that they were unable to access many sites and they were also unable to communicate online anonymously. Some websites, set up to mobilise activists for protests such as the Local Coordination Committees, or to raise awareness on the Syrian uprising, such as the Mondaseh website were blocked (Freedom House 2012f).

The Syrian Telecommunication Establishment used software such as ThunderCache and other surveillance software and devices manufactured by the US firm Blue Coat Systems to monitor internet users' web based activities. The Blue Coat device logs showed that after advertising, the number one online activity censored in Syria was social networking, followed by the use of software technologies. Also, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2011 that Blue Coat admitted to sending at least 13 of their monitoring devices to Dubai, but these were then redirected to Syria and that Blue Coat's logs showed tens of thousands of monitoring or censoring events when users tried to access opposition websites or any online forums that covered the Syrian uprising (Freedom House 2012f; Valentino-DeVries et al. 2011). Even prior to 2011, the Syrian government had contracted an Italian surveillance company called Area SpA in 2009 to have the necessary tools to scan and collect all internet communications including via mobile and email applications that took place both within Syria and also between Syria and other countries. A Bloomberg report published in November 2011 shows that employees of Area SpA visited Syria throughout 2011 to begin setting up their surveillance system (Freedom House 2012f; Elgin & Silver 2011). The Freedom House reported however that as of May 2012, it was unclear as to whether the equipment was actually functioning and being used by the Syrian government. Also, in March 2012, there were reports of phishing and malware attacks that specifically targeted online activists. However, no actual evidence pointed to the Syrian government being behind these attacks (Freedom House 2012f).

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, an American organisation, reported that specific malware, called Darkcomet RAT and Xtreme RAT was found on activists' computers could track and capture events such as web cam activity, keystrokes and credential entries and send the data to the one specific IP address (Galperin & Marquis-boire 2012b). The foundation also reported a fake YouTube page asking users to enter their YouTube credentials to access content and then users were given an alert to update their Adobe Flash players, which installed malware. This YouTube page has since been taken down (Galperin & Marquis-boire 2012a; Freedom House 2012f).

The Syrian government's special unit known as Branch 225 was also reported to have monitored and then filtered or even completely blocked mobile phone text messages, around the dates of planned protests. Bloomberg for example, reported that Branch 225, using technology bought from Ireland, ordered all mobile phone providers to block all text messages that contained specific words, such as "revolution" or "demonstration" (Elgin & Silver 2012; Freedom House 2012f).

Blocking access to social media platforms was not something due to the Syrian uprising. In fact, sites like Facebook and Twitter that allowed Syrians to interact with others based outside of Syria, had been blocked since Bashar al-Assad took over his father's role in 2000. Facebook and other social networks were still accessed from within Syria, but only through the use of web proxies so as to bypass the government blocks. In fact, it is only in 2011, the year of the Syrian uprising, that Syrians noticed that they no longer needed web proxies to access social networks that were once blocked by the government. But activists reported that this was only a ploy by the government so as to encourage activists to communicate on a platform that could be tracked by the Syrian government. Indeed, this move of unblocking communication platforms in Syria also enthused support in many Syrians who came to the streets in show of government support despite the uprising against the government. Therefore, both opposition activists and supporters of the government took to social media to voice their differing opinions by commenting, creating pages and sharing content online. Therefore content online during the Syrian uprising was specifically related to opinions and information on what had already happened, as opposed to what would be happening, unlike the Tunisian or Egyptian revolutions, where social media was used to plan protests. One activist, told Reuters that although there were Facebook groups to organise the protests, no one would give the location or time of the protest until the very last minute, because activists feared that hackers would find this out and share with government supporters or even send the police to stop the demonstrations from taking place or worse, harass or detain the demonstrators. Therefore, the activists tried to organise demonstrations by word of mouth or other instant messaging programs that they

believed were harder to track. It is worth noting that Syria's protests actually started in the rural provinces of Syria where internet penetration was very low (Reuters Staff 2011b).

Human rights activists did use the internet to give international coverage to Syria, especially because as the previous section showed, foreign correspondents were barred from accessing Syria. However, the activists who published articles on blogs or videos of demonstrations on YouTube, did so anonymously. The Reuters article points out that pro-government Syrians worked to discredit many of the videos uploaded onto YouTube by anti-Assad activists and it was eventually discovered that some of these videos turned out to be videos from Iraq or Lebanon and not of Syria. This of course discredited information "coming" from Syria, however, to gain the trust of the international viewers, Syrian activists began filming protests and publishing them live as they occurred, especially featuring protests that were peaceful so as to show that the Syrians did not want to engage in violence. One anonymous blogger and activist told Reuters that the internet was shut down or slowed on days where protesters were killed by government forces (Reuters Staff 2011b).

One article from the New York Times by Jennifer Preston states that according to many activists they had spoken to, the Syrian authorities cracked down on social media users in Syria by "demanding dissidents turn over their Facebook passwords and switching off the 3G mobile network at times". Some activists released from custody and interviewed by the Freedom House also reported that security agents forced them to hand over any online credentials used to communicate, publicise and share information, such as Facebook and Gmail or Skype, which could be circumvented with the right tools (Freedom House 2012f).

The Syrian Electronic Army took to social media to discredit anti-government activists (Preston 2011). The Syrian Electronic Army spammed popular Facebook pages, such as that of presidents Obama and Sarkozy, with pro-Assad comments (Freedom House 2012f) but also western websites that were commercial (Noman 2011). A report published by Helmi Noman of the University of Toronto, states that Syria was "...the first Arab country to have a public Internet Army hosted on its national networks to openly launch cyber attacks [sic] on its enemies" (Noman 2011). Noman found that the Syrian Electronic Army did not work alone as they had the support of local media. Noman reports that the Information Warfare Monitor research found connections between the Syrian Electronic Army and the Syrian Computer Society, which was headed by current president Bashar al-Assad in the 1990s.

Social media was still able to play a role in the 2011 uprising of the Syrians, for example, the Facebook page, "Syrian Revolution 2011" had half a million members from both Syria and abroad by mid-2012, and was used as a crucial source of information for anti-government activists. Also, by March 2012, activists and citizen journalists had already posted over 40,000

videos to YouTube, many of which were then reused and broadcasted by professional news channels such as Al-Jazeera, CNN and BBC (Freedom House 2012f).

The Syrian Electronic Army also tried creating Facebook pages that were almost systematically disabled by Facebook (Noman 2011). In fact, their first known page on Facebook was created on April 2011, only days after the Syrian protests spread around the country. It was disabled by Facebook shortly after its creation. In 2011 Norman noted that fourteen Facebook pages were created by the group and all were disabled almost immediately, leading the group to publicly criticise Facebook and their complaint was echoed by government run newspapers al-Thawra, al-Wehda and Syria Now. The Syrian Electronic Army finally shared a screenshot that supposedly was sent to them by Facebook before shutting down their pages. The alleged Facebook message stated that the Syrian Electronic Army's page was removed for "violating our Terms of Use" and that pages that are "...hateful, threatening, or obscene are not allowed" and that Facebook will not accept pages that "...attack an individual or group..." (Noman 2011). It was easy for Noman and Facebook to find the pages set up by the Syrian Electronic Army as they all had the same naming convention with a number added at the end: <https://www.facebook.com/ses.syrian>. The Syrian Electronic Army also tried to use Twitter, by setting up the Twitter account @syriansoldier, and this too seemed to have been taken down by Twitter, because the army then began using @syriansolider1 (Noman 2011). The Syrian Electronic Army did not just stop at spamming leaders' Facebook pages with pro-Assad comments. On May, 2011, they also announced that over fifty websites were hacked but that they did not destroy these websites. Instead, these websites were defaced. For example, the [news.syriaforums.net](http://news.syriaforums.net) was defaced because "it spread[s] fabricated video clips of anti-regime protests in Syria" (Noman 2011) (As of 2017, this forum is no longer active as it redirects users to another forum). Asalah Nasri, a Syrian singer also had her website hacked and defaced with text describing her as a traitor. The Royal Leamington Spa Town Council's site in the UK was also hacked and defaced with a message in English stating that reason of hacking is "...British Government actions and attitudes against Syria and its interfering in the Syrian internal affairs" (Noman 2011) (in 2017, this site is now accessible as the Royal Leamington Spa Ton Council site). Two Italian websites <http://windcam-news.it/usato/s> and <http://aguide2italy.com/> were also hacked and defaced with messages and these sites are inaccessible in 2017. The Syrian Electronic Army went further targeting Facebook pages of the European Parliament, the European Union, the White House, the US Department of State, ABC News, Oprah Winfrey, Human Rights Watch, Al-Jazeera TV Channel, Al-Arabia TV Channel and the page of the religious scholar Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi. Harvard University's website was also hacked and defaced (Coughlan 2011) and the LinkedIn official blog was made to redirect users to a Bashar al-Assad supporter site (Holt 2012). Also, the Reuters Twitter account was hacked and

false tweets about Syria were sent from it (Reuters Staff 2012). Other entities were also targeted including Microsoft, CNN, Time, The Daily Dot, E!Online, NASA, US Marine, the Onion, and Associated Press and by 2016 the FBI had added the Syrian Electronic Army hackers to their most wanted list and three of their members were charged with multiple accounts of hacking and unlawful as well as unauthorised access to computer systems (Temperton 2016; Khandelwal 2016). The Syrian Electronic Army's website [www.syrian-es.com](http://www.syrian-es.com) is no longer online.

In terms of accessibility, it was not only websites that were made inaccessible by the Syrian authorities. Web 2.0 applications were also made inaccessible in Syria during the uprising such as the blog-hosting platform Blogger and the VoIP service Skype, with intermittent blocks on the Arabic blog-hosting platform Maktoob that was later made available in May 2012. Bambuser, the video-streaming service and WhatsApp, the mobile messaging service were also blocked (Thomas 2012). Other messenger services such as Ebuddy, Nimbuzz and MiG-33 were also blocked at different points in time. Also, due to economic sanctions, some US based service providers were inaccessible from Syria, such as Google maps and Google's photo-sharing software Picasa. But in May 2012, Google posted an announcement on their official blog explaining that despite the fact that the US export controls and sanctions programs, therefore prohibiting Google, an American company, from offering certain software downloads in sanctioned countries, Google were making available Google Earth, Picasa and Chrome for download in Syria (Google 2012).

The Freedom House reported that government decisions in Syria regarding online censorship are not made public by the department of security of the Branch 225 of Syria, therefore it is unknown which websites are banned, nor how they are banned. What is clear, is that users trying to access blocked websites receive error messages informing the user that there are technical problems rather than deliberate bans put in place by the government.

Although the Syrian constitution allows for freedom of opinion and expression, certain topics ranging from criticising President Assad and his father, the military or the ruling Baath party and their relatives engaging in corruption are off limits in Syria. The 2001 Press Law allows for the arrest of internet users who threaten the national unity of the country by defaming the Syrian government or anyone related to them. Therefore, many Syrians practise self-censorship by not engaging in discussions –on or off line- related to the afore mentioned topics. Many Syrians also avoid publishing information of any issues related to religious or ethnic minorities in the country. Not only are these actions avoided by many Syrians in their own speeches or online posts, but Syrians are also careful not to access such content online so as to avoid government surveillance. Another law, passed in February 2012, for the regulation of networked communication against cyber-crime does not allow for online anonymity. Owners

of all online platforms or websites are required by law to save copies of their content and traffic data so as to track all contributions to their website. Websites and online platforms not complying with this law may lead to the blocking of the website and owners may be slapped fines ranging from just under 2,000USD and 9,000USD. Deliberate violations of the law could lead to more strict punishments including three months to two years of imprisonment along with fines of between around 3,400USD and 17,000USD. Freedom House does however note that these regulations were not being enforced by authorities in May 2012 (Freedom House 2012f).

Since protests broke out in February 2011, Syrian authorities have detained hundreds of internet users, bloggers and citizen journalists (Freedom House 2012f). The arrests have been so arbitrary, that people have feared the publication of anything online, “even the simplest online activists- posting on a blog, tweeting, commenting on Facebook, sharing a photo, or uploading a video- if it is perceived to threaten the regime’s control” (Freedom House 2012f). Cases of such arrests can be noted, for example, blogger Ahmad Abu al-Khair was detained in February 2011 and released after a week, but then arrested again for twenty-four days for “inciting demonstrations” despite not having seen a judge about his case. After his release, he went into hiding, but the authorities detained his brother twice, the second time for up to two months, so as to threaten al-Khair to turn himself in.

Also in February of 2011, a young university student and blogger Tal al-Mallouhi was convicted to five years in prison by the Damascus Security Court for sharing information with a foreign state. Tal al-Mallouhi denied the charge and no evidence was brought to the court; in fact she did not even have a reputation for being active on the political front; she had simply posted some poems and comments on socio political issues on her blog (Freedom House 2012f). Another blogger, Anas Maarawi, was held for around two months in July 2011, and was released after pressure on the government from an online campaign that called for his release. In February 2012, Syrian authorities also raided the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression and arrested iconic blogger Razan Ghazzawi and Mazen Darwich, the centre’s head, as well as twelve others including Darwich’s wife (The Telegraph 2012; Al Arabiya and Agencies 2012). Ghazawi and six other detained females were finally released after several days, but were still charged.

Activists who were live-streaming the bombardment of Bab Amr in Homs in February 2012 found themselves to be the target of the army’s fires. One prominent activist, Rami al-Sayed who run a live stream posting over 800 YouTube videos was gravely injured by the targeted shelling and his injuries led to his death (Freedom House 2012f).

Freedom House did not only report on internet users being charged and detained, there were also reports on an unknown number of detainees suffering torture sometimes leading to their

deaths while in custody. Some of these detainees had been caught filming protests or abuses and posting them onto YouTube.

### III.2.5.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

It was seen earlier that self-censorship was practiced by activists, and this extends to journalists reporting on Syria as well.

The Syrian constitution actually allows for freedom of opinion and expression, and Article 38 of the Syrian constitution specifically provides for freedoms of speech of the press, but these freedoms have not been put in practice by the Syrian government, as it has been noted that freedom of both opinion and expression are restricted, both on and offline. Other laws in Syria contradict with the constitution allowing for freedom of opinion and expression; for example, both the penal code and the 1963 State of Emergency Law, as well as the 2001 Press Law, allow for the controlling of traditional law as well as the arrest of both journalists and internet users if they are seen to threaten national unity. Syria's State of Emergency Law put in place in 1963 grants authorities the power to arrest journalists who threaten "national security". Defamation is also punishable as a crime, one can be sentenced to time in prison between six months and one year, if the defamer targets the Syrian President or any government officials such as judges, the military or any civil servants. And although there is a penal code, the judiciary is not independent and decisions can be arbitrary, in fact some civilians have been tried in military courts. The 2011 Press Law allows the state to control all print media and also forbids the press from broadcasting any information that could be harmful to the national security or unity. Anyone who violates this Press Law can face up to three years in prison and be fined any amount between around 10,000USD and 20,000USD (Freedom House 2012e). Journalists must request their press licenses from the Prime Minister, who may reject the request for reasons "concerned public interest" (Freedom House 2012e). Also, articles 9 and 10 of the Syrian law state that all foreign publications must be approved by Syria's Ministry of Information, therefore, such publications may be banned if they are thought to go against Syria's national sovereignty and security (Freedom House 2012e). About a year prior to the 2011 uprising in Syria, the government shut down Italian ANSA news agency bureau in Damascus, because they tried to cover the arrests of certain civil society representatives (Freedom House 2011b).

In August 2011, amidst the Syrian uprising, Bashar al-Assad approved changes to the country's media law in response to some of the people's demands, however, although the media law gave an impression of giving the media freedom, it had many negative traits, so much so that Reporters without Borders labelled it a "schizophrenic media law" (Reporters without Borders

2011a). The media law changes, part of the government reforms proposed by Assad to end the wave of national protests, opposes monopoly in the media sector, gets rid of prison sentences for press offences and underlines freedom of expression as the fundamental right while putting a stop to officials denying access to information. Attacks on journalists are considered “an attack on a Syrian government official”. Contradictorily, article 12 imposes “responsible” freedom of expression by banning any the broadcast of any information that could provoke violence, sectarian divisions or threaten national unity. News reports about armed forces and the army are also banned (Reporters without Borders 2011a). Any of these actions by journalists, spokespeople and editors in chief are punishable by fines of up to 1million Syrian pounds (Freedom House 2012e). The law is quite vague and as the Freedom House points out, “There is no clear definition of this phrase, leaving room for the law to be used to crack down on journalists” (Freedom House 2012e).

The Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression, based in Damascus, in 2011, denounced the Syrian government by stating that they had called for a “formal declaration of war on the media” and due to their forceful restriction of coverage of the protests as well as broadcasting false news on state-run television stations. The Freedom House noted that “Propaganda and falsehoods are common on state-run outlets”, and that “...due to the near-complete absence of media that were not linked to the government in someway- even prior to the protests-the only independent local source of information has been citizen journalists, who managed to provide foreign outlets with video recordings of protests and atrocities during the year. However, the authenticity of these recordings is difficult to determine, and they have been labelled ‘fake’ by the regime” (Freedom House 2012e).

It is not uncommon in Syria for news websites and other online forums to have government guidelines imposed on them when covering specific events. The Syrian government has also been known to support specific news sites that cite the official news agency SANA and “publish pro-government materials” so as to “popularise the official version of events” (Freedom House 2012f).

Most newspaper publishing houses are owned by the Syrian president’s political party. The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and the National Guidance take it upon themselves to censor both domestic and foreign news; Kurdish-language publications are banned in Syria. Privately owned media such as Al-Watan, Al-Iqtisad and Al-Khabar work closely with the government. The government actually disseminates domestic and foreign political news and analysis to news outlets, especially when it comes to television and radio stations. Content from private outlets do not have to be screened by the government, but it is expected that they should not cover political topics; instead they focus on news related to culture

and entertainment. Therefore, self-censorship is most certainly practised by the private outlets so as to avoid being shut down or arrested (Freedom House 2012e).

As stated earlier, government run newspapers al-Thawra, al-Wehda and Syria Now supported the Syrian Electronic Army's complaints against Facebook for shutting down their pages. Members from the electronic army have also been interviewed by both the state TV channel and a radio station, even though these members remain anonymous (Noman 2011).

The Syrian government's internet law of 2010 grants authorities the right to enter office premises of both bloggers and official online journalists to seize their material and prosecute them. In fact, online journalists and bloggers, by law, have to submit their news stories to the government prior to posting them online.

News reported against the Syrian government is often discredited by the Syrian government. For example, at a news conference in Damascus on March 2011, the Syrian president's adviser Bouthaina Shaaban criticized the BBC and CNN for using YouTube footage posted by activists. Shaaban even said that as the events were taking place in Syria, they should rely on the Syrian government's press for credibility as other media did not tell the truth (Mackey 2012).

Journalist Paul Conroy filed a video report from the besieged district of Baba Amr in 2012, where he described the situation as "a massacre". Syrian authorities tried to discredit him, saying that the massacres did not happen and then even broadcast photos of him with an Islamist militant so as to appear as an ally to radical fighters. Videos of Conroy appealing for help after being wounded in Homs, were also broadcast in the aim of associating him with Al Qaeda (Mackey 2012) .

The Freedom House reported that most foreign journalists were expelled from Syria in 2011 and then banned from entry. For example, Jordanian journalist and head of Reuters in Damascus, Khaled Yacoub Oweis, had his press credentials revoked by the Syrian government. Also, Al-Jazeera reporter Dorothy Parvaz was detained at the Damascus airport in April 2011 and then deported to Iran; she was only able to return to Qatar by mid-May. Although she did not report being tortured, she reported "hearing screams from other detainees being tortured" when detained in Syria. Parvaz later said that she was detained because a scan of her luggage "...revealed that I had a satellite phone and an internet hub with me", and this coupled with her "American passport" and the "Al Jazeera-sponsored visa, sealed the deal" (Parvaz 2011).

Just as activists and citizen journalists encountered torture and sometimes even death in custody with the Syrian authorities, professional journalists too were reported to have suffered in custody. For example, in November 2011, after being arrested, the freelancer journalist and photographer Ferzat Jarban from Homs was then killed. He had just filmed a demonstration in al-Qasir; "his body was mutilated and his eyes gouged out" (Freedom House 2012f). The Committee to Protect Journalists and Al-Jazeera also reported that his body was found in the

middle of a main road in Al-Qasir. Based on records that the CPJ has been keeping on Syria since 1992, Jarban was reportedly the first journalist killed in connection with his work; much of the footage he managed to gather was used by several Arabic news networks (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011b).

The Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression documented up to 114 violations against media workers between the months of March and October 2011. For example, the freelancer and Al-Hayat contributor, Amer Mater, was arrested twice and tortured in 2011 for covering the protests. Mater was also the co-founder of Al-Schhari (the street), an organisation that fought for press freedom and development and he began documenting the Syrian Uprising on film in 2010. His work was broadcast on Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and France 24. He also wrote articles for Annahar, a Lebanese newspaper forbidden in Syria. He was involved in the making of documentaries of the Syrian Uprising that won distinctions and awards. Matar now lives in exile but continues to write about Syria (PEN-Zentrum 2017).

Another freelancer Wael Yousef Abaza was held incommunicado on October. Two other journalists, freelancer Jihad Jamal and British Channel 4 reporter Sean McAllister were also arrested on October 2011. McAllister was released after six days. Jihad Jamal was released and then arrested several times again. In May 2012, Jamal's case was transferred to a military court and there are reports that he waged a hunger strike to protest his detention. A report by the Committee to Protect Journalists, also posted on [refworld.org](http://refworld.org) for the UNHCR, stated that in 2016, there was still no information of the whereabouts of Jamal (Committee to Project Journalists 2016).

Syrian Arab News Agency's (SANA) director Alaa al-Khod was arrested in November 2011 after he had resigned in protest of the regime's violations of human rights (Freedom House 2012e). Numerous other arrests and disappearances of journalists in Syria can be found on the Syrian Centre for Media Freedom website: [scm.bz/en](http://scm.bz/en) or on the website of the Committee to Project Journalists.

At time of writing in 2018, the Syrian Uprising is still suffering the post-uprising conflict, and the Committee to Project Journalists has reported that since 1992, 123 journalists have been killed, 18 of which were targeted for murder and 18 of which were murdered with impunity. Most of the journalists killed took place in 2012, with 31 journalist deaths recorded, followed by 2013 with 29 journalist deaths recorded and then 2014 with 17 journalists deaths recorded. The number of journalists killed in 2018 has dropped to 7 (Committee to Protect Journalists 2017).

## **III.2.6. Tunisia**

### **III.2.6.1. Information and Communication Context**

Tunisians first started using the internet in Tunisia in 1996 and almost ten years later broadband internet connection was made possible. In a country that censors its media quite strictly (see section on press freedom in Tunisia), Tunisians turned to the internet to voice their political and social concerns even holding debates online.

In terms of hardware, the Tunisian government encouraged computers in households as early as 2004 with an initiative entitled the Family PC that got rid of custom fees on PCs. Furthermore, a price cap was set on computer hardware and loans were made possible with low interest rates for families. The Family PC initiative allowed for each PC bought to come with an internet subscription. The number of computers bought increased from 9.6 per inhabitant in 2008 to 12.3 in 2010 and banks did grant Tunisians computer loans, however the initiative was not as successful as hoped, because computer prices still remained approximately three times the average Tunisian salary (Freedom House 2011d).

Freedom House quoted internet user figures from a document initially published by the International Telecommunication Union but this document is no longer accessible, stating that there were 3.5 million internet users in Tunisia in 2009 with 414,000 broadband subscribers. By 2010, Tunisia boasted thirteen different Internet Providers, six of which were privately owned: Planet Tunisie, 3S Globalnet, Hexabyte, Topnet, Organge, and Tunet. The publicly owned Internet Service Providers, although sometimes only partially public, were tasked with extending internet access to public institutions rather than private individuals.

By 2010, Freedom House reported that although many Tunisians were unable to access the internet from their home, the Tunisian government stated in a document released for March 2010 of the internet status in Tunisia, that “universities, research centers [sic], laboratories, and high schools have a 100 percent connectivity rate, and that 70 percent of primary schools are connected” (Freedom House 2011d). Also, many people accessed the internet using cybercafés, known in Tunisia as publinets.

Tunisie Télécom in 2011 was the only landline telephone provider, and as one needs a landline before being able to subscribe to the internet, all internet subscriptions had to go through Tunisie Télécom. The price range of internet access in 2011 via Tunisie Télécom was between 15USD per month for connection speeds of up to 1 Mbps and 38USD per month for connection speeds of 4megabits per second. Other Internet Service Providers provided the same internet speeds at cheaper rates. All Internet Service Providers have to obtain a license from the Ministry of

Communication Technologies and purchase their bandwidth from the ministry's Tunisian Internet Agency (Freedom House 2011d).

Mobile phone penetration, as with many of the other countries of the Arab Spring is high and on the rise. In just five years, from 2005 to 2010, the number of mobile phone subscriptions doubled to 10.7million subscriptions. Internet on mobile phone is provided by ISPs and the costs are inaccessible by most Tunisians, therefore internet usage on mobiles in 2011 was quite low. By 2011, there were three mobile-phone companies in Tunisia and one of them provided internet to subscribers via a USB plug-in device costing Tunisians a one-off 129 dinars with a follow up of 30 dinars every month (Freedom House 2011d).

### III.2.6.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

Although internet penetration in Tunisia by 2011 was only a meagre 34 percent, the government noticed people's participation online and therefore set up a strict online censorship system. Freedom House found the internet freedom in Tunisia from 2012 up to 2016 to be "partly free" (Freedom House 2012h; Freedom House 2013; Freedom House 2014; Freedom House 2015; Freedom House 2016), an improvement from the 2011 study (Freedom House 2011d) and the only other study made prior to 2011 in 2009, whereby Tunisia's internet freedom was found to be "Not free" (Freedom House 2009). The 2011 study showed Tunisia's internet freedom to be "not free" due to only 34 percent of internet penetration which encountered blocks on web 2.0 applications with substantial political censorship, whereby bloggers and online users were arrested. The internet censorship and monitoring police of Tunisia under Ben Ali, were known as the cyberpolice or Ammar 404 (Freedom House 2012g). By 2012, Tunisia's internet freedom had improved because web 2.0 applications were no longer blocked, nor was there any political censorship recorded, however, bloggers and ICT users were still arrested (Freedom House 2012h).

Freedom House reported that in 2011, "anonymity and the right to privacy are nonexistent in Tunisia" (Freedom House 2011d). As noted earlier, there are private ISPs in Tunisia, however, these ISPs must share with authorities a list of their subscribers on a monthly basis. As noted earlier, Publinets are also popular amongst Tunisians and these too are watched closely, meaning that cyber café owners impose strict conditions on their customers on internet activities. For example, posters reminding users not to access pornographic content, or other taboo topics, would be placed around internet cafes. Customer activities are also monitored by the publinet managers as they must present their identity cards and may be asked to show what they are doing online.

Freedom House noted for the arbitrariness of the censorship decisions taken by the Tunisian government between 2009 and 2010 when censorship was not constrained to political or pornographic content; even other content totally unrelated to such controversial subjects were filtered. Freedom House reported that up to 100 blogs were blocked in addition to several online applications such as Flickr for at least a period of time in 2010 (Freedom House 2011d). The blogs blocked in 2010 include but are not limited to the following blogs which criticises the government's censorship policy: [amchafibled.blogspot.com](http://amchafibled.blogspot.com), [trapboy.blogspot.com](http://trapboy.blogspot.com), [antikor.blogspot.com](http://antikor.blogspot.com), [arabasta1.blogspot.com](http://arabasta1.blogspot.com), [yatounes.blogspot.com](http://yatounes.blogspot.com), [abidlmifi.blogspot.com](http://abidlmifi.blogspot.com), [ounormal.blogspot.com](http://ounormal.blogspot.com), [carpediem-selim.blogspot.com](http://carpediem-selim.blogspot.com), [bent-3ayla.blogspot.com](http://bent-3ayla.blogspot.com), [artarticuler.blogspot.com](http://artarticuler.blogspot.com) and [blog.kochlef.com](http://blog.kochlef.com). Tunisian blog aggregators were also blocked such as [tuniblogs.com](http://tuniblogs.com) and [tunisr.com](http://tunisr.com). All these blogs at time of writing in 2019, post Tunisia's revolution, are still live and at least one of them, [antikor.blogspot.com](http://antikor.blogspot.com) is only open to invited readers and the aforementioned blog aggregators are no longer online. The activist website Yezzi Fock Ben Ali (Enough is enough, Ben Ali), launched in 2005, was blocked for eighteen hours after its launch and then it was hacked in 2007; the site now exists as a simple Facebook page (Ben Gharbia 2010).

Other applications in 2010 were also blocked, such as Dailymotion, YouTube and Wat TV. VOIP services such as Skype and Google Talk in 2010 were prohibited but accessible. Facebook was also temporarily blocked prior to 2010 in 2008. In terms of social networking, some Twitter accounts were also blocked. Specific Twitter and Facebook accounts were targeted. [Blip.tv](http://Blip.tv), [metacafe.com](http://metacafe.com) and [vidoemo.com](http://vidoemo.com) were also blocked (Freedom House 2011d; Ben Gharbia 2010).

It was easy for Tunisian authorities to limit access online because internet traffic all goes through the gateway controlled by the ministry. Therefore, they were able to use the software SmartFilter to either filter the information trickling in through the Tunisian gateway or even block entire domains. Freedom House also explains a second method used by Tunisian authorities to control internet content called "*postpublication* censorship", which involved the deletion of blog entries almost immediately after they were posted or shutting down entire blogs via hacking (Freedom House 2011d). A third internet controlling strategy of the Tunisian authorities between 2007 and 2011 was "proactive manipulation", which involved groups of people visiting online forums to influence opinions. Some groups were instructed to create blogs and other webpages to insult online activists that criticised the government (Freedom House 2011d). Another form of proactive manipulation can be done by misinforming the public on planned street protests. For example, in May 2010, after requesting a permit to rally against censorship, police detained two of the organisers, Slim Amamou and Yassine Ayari, for twelve

hours. The organisers were forced against their will to make videos to announce the cancellation of the rally (Freedom House 2011d).

When Mohamed Bouazizi, the fruit vendor, set himself on fire in front of a government building on December, 2010, in protest of the harsh conditions he had to endure as a Tunisian in his own country, his exasperation could not be caught on film by press or even by citizen journalists and activists, simply because it happened so unexpectedly. Bouazizi's older cousin however, Ali Bouazizi, an activist for some time was always looking for opportunities to expose the Tunisian government, and he was contacted by his uncle on the day of Bouazizi's self-immolation to come and film the scene. By the time Ali Bouazizi arrived to the scene, the younger Bouazizi was already being taken to the hospital with third-degree burns. It was not over however, Bouazizi had lighted a flame and even though he was lying in a hospital, the Tunisians were spreading his flame in form of protests, so Ali Bouazizi filmed the events and by December 17, 2010, he had already posted his footage onto Facebook with the title "The Intifada of the People of Sidi Bouzid". Tunisian authorities tried to arrest Ali Bouazizi but he managed to escape. His video had enraged Tunisians in other cities and led to more protests and on January 4 of 2011 the young Mohamed Bouazizi had died in hospital. Ali Bouazizi also filmed his funeral and shared it online, provoking even more protests and he was finally caught by Tunisian authorities on January 10 2011 and arrested. He was beaten on his head, hands and back until he passed out, but only four days later it was reported on international media that Tunisia's leader of twenty three years had fled Tunisia (Lageman 2016; Mackey 2011).

Tunisians began contributing to the blogosphere only in 2006 and by 2010, amidst an atmosphere of censorship and content manipulation, there were only about 500 active blogs. In 2008, bloggers posted information on the labour riots that took place in the Gafsa mining area; an event that was ignored by the traditional press because it was considered to be too taboo to cover. In 2010, bloggers shed light on the imprisonment of students who had participated in a protest for the rights of female students. Bloggers who found their sites blocked learned to open other blogs so as to keep their content accessible.

In terms of the internet accessibility and usage laws put in place in Tunisia, Tunisian law granted authorities the right to "block or censor internet content that is deemed absence or threatening to public order, or is defined as "incitement to hate, violence, terrorism, and all forms of discrimination and bigoted behaviour that violate the integrity and dignity of the human person, or are prejudicial to children and adolescents" (Freedom House 2011d).

The antiterrorism law of 2003 defined terrorism suspects as anyone "inciting hate or racial or religious fanaticism whatever the means used" and suspects of terrorism can be tried in court. Then in 2010, the Chamber of Deputies approved a change to the penal code that made

punishable contact or communication with foreigners who harm Tunisia's economic security and interests.

Other laws unrelated to internet usage or accessibility have been applied on bloggers and journalists alike, such as for example, sexual harassment and other criminal charges. Freedom House noted that between 2005 and 2007 several activists were sentenced for up to one year for charges ranging from defamation to public morality violations (Freedom House 2011d).

Some internet users were detained and questioned with no particular links to specific laws. For example, blogger and former political prisoner, Abdallah Zouari, was detained and questioned for eight hours in September 2009, with regards to his contributions to the banned website Tunisia Online. Fatma Riahi, a blogger and theatre teacher, known as Fatma Arabicca online, was also detained and questioned for five days in November 2009; her computer was also confiscated and she was asked questions about her online activities (Freedom House 2011d).

### III.2.6.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

The Freedom of Press reports published by Freedom House in 2011 and then in 2012 bear striking differences. For example, the 2011 Press Freedom report of Tunisia stated that the Press Status was not free, whereas the 2012 score for Tunisia was set to be "Partly free". The reasons, as supplied by the Freedom House, were related to the "dramatic transformation" in Tunisia's media environment post-President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. Once Ben Ali left, professional and citizen journalists could more freely and media outlets could sustain themselves through advertising. Between 2010 and 2011 however, there were no remarkable changes noted by the Freedom House. Even though Ben Ali was ousted as early as January in 2011, it took time for the country to work on changes they wanted integrated into their approach towards the press (Freedom House 2010; Freedom House 2011c; Freedom House 2012g).

Freedom House noted that in 2010 and 2011, Tunisia's constitution and press code did not properly define the freedom of the press what was defined in terms of freedoms of press was not respected by Tunisian authorities. Also, between 2010 and 2011, Tunisia did not have a freedom of information law. The Press code in Tunisia defines libel and defamation as a crime; therefore committing libel and/or defamation could result in punishments ranging from fines to imprisonment of up to five years, with the strictest punishments being given to those who offend the president (Freedom House 2010; Freedom House 2011c).

By 2010, Tunisia had eight major daily newspapers, two of which were owned by the government and two of which were owned by the ruling party. The Tunisia External Communication Agency supports the pro-government newspapers and makes journalism

difficult for opposition media by not providing any support, controlling distribution and denying access to information and areas. Newspapers in Tunisia up until 2010 did not need a license to operate, but the government demands that newspapers request an annual copyright registration (Freedom House 2010).

All broadcast media in Tunisia are regulated by the Tunisian Frequencies Agency, from which licences and frequencies should be obtained. Tunisians in 2010 could watch several foreign satellite stations, however, Freedom House reports that in 2010 some channels were blocked by the government (Freedom House 2010).

In 2010, the Freedom House described government censorship in Tunisia as being “routine”. For example, authorities were able to put pressure on opposition weeklies, such as Al-Mawkif, to limit their distributorship in Tunisia for a specific issue in March 2009, by only delivering two copies (Freedom House 2010). Apparently, the issue featured a petition that was signed by five female judges in protest against harassment and as a call for Tunisia to up its judiciary standards. Controlled distribution was also enacted for February issues of the paper.

Freedom House also noted that the government had also banned a March issue of As-Sada, a weekly United Arab Emirates magazine, because it featured an article that highlighted the increase in wealthy Tunisians committing adultery since the polygamy was prohibited (Freedom House 2010).

Also, the Committee to Protect Journalists noted in 2009 that restrictions had been set on opposition newspapers, whereby authorities prevented the distribution of the October 31 issue of the weekly newspaper, Attariq al-Jadid, belonging to an opposition movement, Attajdid Movement (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d).

Also, foreign media outlets in December 2010 covering the protests, post-Bouazizi’s self-immolation at the end of 2010, were heavily censored, such as Al Jazeera, the BBC and France 24 (The International Freedom Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) 2010). But even before Bouazizi lit himself up in protest, there are reports of the Tunisian government monitoring foreign media strictly. Al-Jazeera’s Tunisia-based correspondent, for example, was not given accreditation to work in Tunisia. Le Monde’s correspondent, Florence Beauge, was also denied entry into Tunisia, due to her “aggressive position on the country” (Freedom House 2010). In July, 2011, the Tunisian government restricted an issue of the Economist, which covered the poor state of human rights in Tunisia (Freedom House 2012g). Amongst online content blocked by the Tunisian government in 2010, was websites of “news outlets that posted confidential cables from the U.S. Embassy, originally published by the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks, which described deeply-rooted corruption and excessive lifestyle by President Zine El Abidine Bin Ali, his wife, and their inner circle” (Freedom House 2011d; Black 2010).

Online magazine Kalima, hosted in France, was hacked in October 2008 and eight years of the online archives were destroyed (Freedom House 2010). The site had already been inaccessible to internet users in Tunisia. Kalima's editor-in-chief, Sihem Bensedrine, said that the only beneficiary of such an attack was the Tunisian security services. Bensedrine, also a spokesperson for the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia, received the 2006 Index on Censorship/Hugo Young Journalism Award, the 2008 Danish Peace Award and the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression 2004 award (Jayasekera 2008), and she was victim to physical and verbal abuse in Tunis in a separate incident.

As stated previous section, Internet Freedom in Tunisia, laws unrelated to press freedom, internet usage or accessibility have been applied on bloggers and journalists alike, such as for example, sexual harassment and other criminal charges. In October 2009, Taoufik Ben Brik, a dissident journalist, was arrested and sentenced to six month in jail for assault, property damage, and violating public order (Freedom House 2011d; Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d). Ben Brik was finally released from prison in April of 2012, but he continued receiving threats and being the targets of the government's harassment (Freedom House 2012g).

A correspondent for Assabil Online, Zouhair Makhoulf, was also arrested and sentenced to four months in prison, for publishing a news report about environmental pollution in a coastal town of north-eastern Tunisia, and he allegedly did not have permission to film. But Makhoulf denied these charges, stating that "his online video report was part of the activities of the Democratic Progressive Party – a legal party of which he is an active member- to investigate [sic] social, economic and environmental issues in the area of Nabeul, adding that he didn't film any sensitive areas prohibited by the law and accusing the investigator of politicizing the case" (Ben Gharbia 2009).

Another online journalist, Mouldi Zouabi, was arrested and charged for assaulting a politician Khalil Maaroufi from the ruling party, but Zouabi claimed that he was the one assaulted by Maaroufi and that he had even filed a complaint for having Maaroufi call him a traitor and seize his driver's license, press card and voice recorder (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d).

Another journalist, Slim Boukdhir, known for his criticism of the Tunisian leader and his family, was arrested in 2007 and then kidnapped in 2008 just after an interview with the BBC about the reflection of Ben Ali and a newly published book that criticised the president's wife. He was also beaten and his clothes, wallet and phone were confiscated by his kidnappers who then left him naked and bruised in Belvedere Park in Tunis (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d; Freedom House 2010). Boukdhir had also written about former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's visit to Tunisia that led her to criticise the country's poor state of human rights.

Al-Jazeera journalist, Lotfi Hajji, faced verbal assault and threats from plainclothes police, at Tunis Carthage International Airport on arrival from Qatar and then again on his way out of Tunisia to Beirut (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d).

Lotfi Hidouri, Radio Kalima journalist, had his two copies of the Committee to Protect Journalists' annual report, confiscated from him on February 2010. His colleague, Mouldi Zouabi was also harassed and assaulted by the police on various occasions (The International Freedom Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) 2010).

The National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists announced in 2008 that they would not endorse Ben Ali's 2009 elections and in a report they released on May 2009, they criticised media freedom in the country. Pro-government journalists organised a threatening campaign against the syndicate's executive board, leading to the resignation of four board members and new elections, from the Democratic Constitutional Rally party. But plainclothes police surrounded the offices one month later to remove staff. Neji Bghouri, the newly elected president was beaten by the police. Bgouri also reported receiving phone threats and he had been under police surveillance for at least five years. He was also barred by pro-government journalists from "fully presenting a report on World Press Freedom Day" in 2009 (The International Freedom Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) 2010).

Journalist and blogger Zied El Heni has had his blog blocked by the government in 2010 and he reported receiving threatening insulting phone calls from Egyptian and Algerian numbers. Other journalists also complained about such calls, for example, Kalima Radio's editor-in-chief Neziha Rejiba, received such calls and also described being "under a 24-hour siege", because her phone were constantly tapped and she was under constant police surveillance (The International Freedom Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG) 2010, p.19). Radio Kalima's director, Omar Mestiri, was also attacked, by unknown people, in November 2009, but he had been "repeatedly threatened by the Tunisian police and others in the past" (Freedom House 2010).

Fahem Boukadous, a TV correspondent, was sentenced in January 2010 to four years in prison, because he reported on violent labour demonstrations in 2008. He was not able to justly defend himself in a fair court, because his trial lasted only ten minutes, after which, he was pronounced as "belonging to a criminal association" and "spreading materials likely to harm public order". His family also expressed their concern over his poor treatment in prison, whereby his recurrent asthma attacks were left unattended (Freedom House 2011c).

There have also been reports of journalists losing their job or even their Tunisian nationalities. The Tunisian authorities were known to also take extreme measures with journalists they did not like, such as extraditing them from Tunisia. The National Syndicate of Tunisia Journalists

reported that since Ben Ali's presidency in 1987, "more than 100 Tunisian journalists have been forced into exile" (Freedom House 2010).

With laws not providing for the protection of journalists in 2010 and 2011, censorship was not only practised by the Tunisian government, journalists have also practised self-censorship. The Freedom House reported that many Tunisian journalists waited for the government's Tunis Afrique Presse agency to broadcast a news story, before they dared to cover the story.

After Ben Ali's overthrow in early 2012, "jailed journalists, bloggers, and activists were released and gained the ability to operate with much less fear of harassment or imprisonment" (Freedom House 2012g). Although a transitional government was set up post-Ben Ali, the country continued to see protests for various issues throughout 2012. Finally, in October 2011, there were elections for a new Constituent Assembly, whose objective was to write a new Tunisian constitution, meant to be free and fair. The transitional government of Tunisia in 2011 also passed a draft press code bill in November 2011, giving journalists free access to information and journalist would no longer be required to seek authorisation from the Ministry of Interior in order before featuring news stories. The draft press code bill of 2011 also reduced public authorities' right to protection, specifically when it came to news articles published about them or the government.

### **III.2.7. Yemen**

#### **III.2.7.1. Information and Communication Context**

Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the Arab world has suffered its share of tragedy ranging from ottoman and British colonisation, civil wars, and an earthquake, all before its uprising, and Yemen continues to suffer in a civil war with international intervention today in 2018. One could possibly also resonate Yemen's poor infrastructure and developments, a country with 27.5 million people, with its newness as a country with only few periods of stability. South Yemen gained independence from Britain as late as 1969, and Marxists took over renaming the country to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, pushing thousands of Yemenis to migrate in fear to the north; border clashes between North and South Yemen for several years. Yemenis also experienced a terrible loss of 3,000 people when an earthquake struck in 1982. North and South Yemen only united in 1990, only to be engulfed in yet another civil war in 1994, which defeated the southern separatist forces (BBC 2017). In 2000, Al Qaeda became prominent in Yemen and this led to a period of terrorism and further instability in the country. Finally, in 2011, people took to the streets in Yemen to demonstrate against their President Ali

Abdallah Saleh, presiding in North Yemen since 1978, who agreed to hand over his power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi<sup>66</sup>. With a low literacy rate of only sixty percent in 2009 for Yemenis above the aged of 15 (OpenNet Initiative 2009b), Yemenis did not queue for the internet when it was introduced in 1996 through TeleYemen and the Public Telecommunications Corporation; the spread of internet accessibility across the country were very slow. For example, in 1997, there were under 1,000 internet subscribers in all of Yemen and this number dropped one year later to an even smaller number of 840 subscribers later in the year and then mounted to 2,000, before leaping to 150,000 in 2004. In 2004, Yemenis started contributing to internet content with 248 registered websites, about fifty of which were governmental, fifteen of which were news sites, twenty-four of which were for organisations and embassies, about ninety for private companies, about twenty for education, under ten for banks and insurance companies and under ten for forums. A survey by al-Hayat newspaper in 2005 revealed that over three-quarters of the users were male, and over half of Yemen's internet users had a bachelor's degree and most users were aged between 21 and 30 years old (Al-Zurqa 2005). By 2005, the Ministry of Telecommunications Corporation reported that there were 220,000 users (Al-Zurqa 2005). The Open Net Initiative indicated that by 2009, internet penetration was at ten percent of the Yemeni population and the digital opportunity index out of 181 country was set at 128 for Yemen (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). Fixed line broadband penetration in Yemen, by the end of 2007, was recorded at a PC penetration rate of less than 3 percent, by the International Telecommunications Unions, due to high prices of equipment and services required for internet access (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). By 2011, internet penetration in Yemen was just under fifteen percent (International Telecommunication Union 2011).

Yemen's two Internet Service Providers, YemenNet, part of the government's Public Telecommunication Corporation, and TeleYemen's Y.Net, also part of the government but managed by FranceTelecom, provide internet to Yemenis (OpenNet Initiative 2009b). All ISPs are required to request an ISP license from Yemen's Ministry of Telecommunication and Information Technology. The ISPs are in charge of setting internet service restrictions on their subscribers and may include details in their terms and conditions.

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<sup>66</sup> The BBC explains that President Hadi struggled post uprising, because he had to deal with al-Qaeda attacks, a separatist movement in the south, continued loyalty to previous president Saleh, corruption, and unemployment and food insecurity. Finally, in 2014 the situation in Yemen grew even worse when Houthi rebels, from Yemen's Zaidi Shia minority, who tried to protect former president Saleh during the uprising, decided to exploit the new leader's inexperience and take over the Northern Province Saada. The Houthis got support from those not happy with the transitional government and they were able to take over the capital Sanaa, leading to a civil war. In 2015, the government proposed a draft constitution, but this was rejected by the Houthis, which appointed a presidential council to replace President Hadi, who then fled to Aden in southern Yemen (BBC 2017a). Because of the Houthi's quick rise to power, Saudi Arabia feared that the Shiite group was militarily supported by Shiite dominant Iran, a regional adversary to Sunnite dominant Saudi Arabia, and they let a military intervention with eight other mainly Sunnite Arab states into Yemen in 2015, with US, British, and French logistic and intelligence support (BBC 2017b). At time of writing in 2017, the UN has reported that two million Yemenis are internally displaced, while 180,000 Yemenis have fled from Yemen (BBC 2017b).

### III.2.7.2. Freedom of Access and Speech

The Open Net Initiative published a report on Yemen on August of 2009, where it was stated that internet filtering targets pornography, GLBT content and content critical of the Muslim religion. Political and news websites had also been included in the government's filtering of web content in 2009, however, internet filtering was inconsistent and therefore not all users experienced censoring while browsing the web (Noman 2011).

In terms of arbitrary interferences with individuals' right to privacy and correspondent, the U.S. Department noted that although Yemeni law prohibits any interferences, Yemeni police forces "routinely searched homes and private offices, monitored telephone calls, read personal mail and email, and otherwise intruded into personal matters for alleged security reasons" (U.S. Department State 2008).

Since as early as 2009 Yemeni authorities imposed physical restrictions on cyber cafés in Yemen. This is of significant interest, because most Yemenis access the internet through the cyber cafés. The Ministry of Information certain rules on all internet cafés, such as the removal of any partitions between internet workstations and ensuring that all computer screens were made visible to the internet café manager. Also, customers have to submit personal information before being able to use the internet. Also, some internet cafés used computer monitoring software so as to track their customers' online activities so as to block undesirable sites by the ministry on demand (OpenNet Initiative 2009; Mareb Press 2008; Al-Omari 2009).

Based on the Open Net Initiative tests on Yemen's two ISPs in 2009, they were able to find a significant increase in online political filtering. The Open Net Initiative was able to find out that websites such as the Yemeni Socialist Party ([aleshteraki.net](http://aleshteraki.net)), al-Shora ([al-shora.net](http://al-shora.net)) and al-Ommah ([newomma.net](http://newomma.net)) as well as opposition and independent websites such as the news aggregator site Yemen Portal ([yemenportal.net](http://yemenportal.net)) and the sites of Shabwah ([shabwahpress.net](http://shabwahpress.net)), Nass Press ([nasspress.com](http://nasspress.com)), Al-Mostakeloa Forum ([mostakela.com](http://mostakela.com)), and al-Hadath ([alhadath-yemen.com](http://alhadath-yemen.com)) as well as forums such as [al-yemen.org](http://al-yemen.org), were all filtered or blocked. The Open Net Initiative also found that in March 2008, [maktoobblog.com](http://maktoobblog.com) was blocked for an entire week in Yemen, meaning that the largest blogging community of the Middle East and North Africa was banned and therefore inaccessible by Yemenis (OpenNet Initiative 2009). Sites blocked by the Yemeni government are done so used Blue Coat software from the US, and blocking is not blatant and transparent; users are given error messages when they try to access blocked sites, instead of being told that the site is inaccessible in Yemen (OpenNet Initiative 2009).

In February 2011, the day declared as Yemeni's day of rage", when a large protest was organised, was also the day where several government websites were no longer accessible, including the websites of both the president and the parliament of Yemen. Al-bab.com noted that this may be due to an attack by the hacking group Anonymous. Al-bab.com also stated that Twitter and Facebook did not have a huge role to play in the protests, due to poor internet penetration (al-bab.com 2011). Al-Bab was set up as early as February 1998, to represent the Yemen Gateway.

### III.2.7.3. Local Press- Professional and Amateur

Although Yemen's constitution during its uprising guaranteed for freedom of speech and of the press, restrictions are also set. Yemen's Press and Publications Law from 1990 states that both publications and broadcast media can be subject penalties, because although "The press shall be independent and shall have full freedom to practise its vocation", it must do so "within the basic principles of the Constitution, and the goals of the Yemeni Revolution and the aim of solidifying of national unity" (Yemeni Government 1990). Article 5 of the Yemeni constitution also states that "The press shall be free to print what it pleases and to gather news and information from their sources", but then it states that the press "...shall be responsible before the law for what it prints. Article 6 then states that the Yemeni law "assures the protection of journalists and authors, and it provides the legal guarantees necessary for them to the practise their profession, to enjoy freedom of expression and immunity from interference so long as they do not contravene the provisions of this law" (Yemeni Government 1990). Indeed, the Open Net Initiative reported that, "...journalists have been threatened, harassed, beaten, and detained; newspapers have been shut down; the issuing of certain newspapers has been prevented; and text message news services have been suspended" (OpenNet Initiative 2009) and crackdown on the press and public gatherings increased. Despite Yemen's severity with their press, Yemen's press is actually considered to be one of the freest in the Arab World.

A new draft of the Yemeni Press law as proposed in 2005 and it was denounced by the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate for being more repressive than the 1990 law, because it "ignored the question of electronic media freedom, putting an end to the state ownership and monopoly over broadcast media. Rather, it went on controlling the websites just like print media" (OpenNet Initiative 2009). The OpenNet Initiative noted that this new draft law was in fact used to prosecute journalists and even shut down publications.

The Specialised Criminal Court, established in 1999 for terrorism and privacy cases, expanded its jurisdiction to also hearing "crimes against state security and serious economic and social

crimes”, allowing for the prosecution of journalists. A second court, the Specialised Press and Publications Court, established in 2009, allowed judges to choose amongst the press law, the penal code or any other law. By 2011, the Press court had already handled over one hundred cases (Freedom House 2011e).

Also, although Yemeni law prohibits acts of “torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment”, the U.S. Department State and Freedom House noted that human rights organisations as well as former detainees, authorities have tortured detainees (Freedom House 2011e; U.S. Department State 2008).

Yemen increased pressure on the press in 2009 due to “increased activity by the terrorist network Al-Qaeda within its borders”....and “As a result, journalists in in 2010 faced the worst legal and administrative restrictions in decades” (Freedom House 2011e). Yemen saw more and more journalists prosecuted under terrorism charges instead of the press law. For example, Muhammad al-Maqaleh, the editor of Al-Eshteraki website, the Socialist opposition party, was abducted by authorities in September 2009 and then held incommunicado, tortured and made to experience mock executions for around four months, with no family contact whatsoever (Freedom House 2011e). Freedom House also reported that he was charged by both the Specialised Criminal Court and the Press and Publications Court, and that these charges were probably due to the fact that he reported on military strikes in Saada that resulted in eighty-seven deaths.

In 20 May 2010, in commemoration of the reunification of Yemen’s twentieth anniversary, the president pardoned all journalists, convicted of non-political charges, leaving detained, arrested and sentenced journalists free but unsure of their legal status (Freedom House 2011e). In addition to Muhammad al-Maqaleh’s suspended judicial proceedings, Reporters without Borders also reported the release of other journalists: Fouad Rashed, Salah Al-Saqladi and Hossein Al-Leswars (Frontières 2010).

But later in the year of 2010, another journalist, Abdullah Haider Shaye, was abducted for interrogation in July. Then in August 2010, authorities arrested him; like al-Maqaleh, he was tortured and held incommunicado. Freedom House noted that Shaye, who had reported for Saba news agency on Al-Qaeda and terrorism in general, was notorious for an interview with Al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki in 2009. In September 2010, Shaye was charged by the Specialised Criminal Court with “planning to carry out terrorist acts, providing media support to Al-Qaeda, and conspiring to overthrow the government” (Freedom House 2011e). Due to pressure from tribal leaders, activists and other journalists, President Saleh pardoned Shaye in 2011. But, US President Obama’s intervention by expressing concern over Shaye’s release, slowed down the pardon, and Shaye was only released in July 2013 (McCarthy 2013; The White House President Barack Obama 2011).

In 2006, Al-Nahar journalist Abed al-Osaily, was killed while in custody (U.S. Department State 2008). The U.S. Department State further noted that security forces detained “journalists for publishing articles deemed controversial by the government” (U.S. Department State 2008). In April 2008, the Ministry of Information threatened to revoke the press license of the independent weekly Al-Wasat for publishing an article that the ministry considered to be a violation of the press law. The case was taken to court and the newspaper was given a fine and got to keep their license (Noman 2011). In 2011, the media law of Yemen obliged news outlets to apply for annual licenses, only granted if the outlet had at least “3,200USD in operating capital, an editor in chief with at least eight years of experience, and the name of three future employees” (Freedom House 2011e) . The government is very strict about who gets licenses and even after being granted, they can be revoked. For example, according to the Yemeni Observatory for Human Rights, the Yemeni government closed or at least influenced the closure of up to twenty newspapers in 2009, and some of these publications were even pro-government (Freedom House 2011e). In May alone, for example, eight independent newspapers were no longer allowed to operate: Al-Nida, Al-Shari’, Al-Masdar, Al-Watani, Al-Diyar, Al-Ayyam, Al-Ahli, and Al-Mustaqilla. Production suspension of Al-Ayyam, one of Yemen’s oldest and most popular newspapers, inspired journalists to demonstrate at Al-Ayyam’s headquarters; the government responded with machine guns and grenades on the protesters and arrested the Al-Ayyam’s editor-in-chief Hisham Bashraheel and his two sons for several months for “forming an armed gang” (Freedom House 2011e).

Post uprising, as stated before, Yemen got engulfed in yet another war, as a consequence, the BBC states that the press “has suffered more than any other media sector from the effects of the war”, leading to the closure of several outlets and the suspension of print editions. Due to illiteracy, newspapers are mainly limited to cities, whereas TV and radio are more influential in other parts of Yemen. Newspapers that survived Yemen’s warfare have Facebook pages. There are five main newspapers in Yemen, three of which are in Arabic and controlled by the Houthi movement or loyalists, and two which are private and in English. Journalists have complained that due to government restrictions, they have to practise self-censorship (BBC 2016; Freedom House 2011e). But this climate of fear and intimidation that journalists have had to live in in Yemen was also noted during and before Yemen’s Uprising. For example, journalist Muhammad al-Rabou’e, who reported for the monthly Al-Qahira, was murdered. Yemeni journalists were not alone in experiencing this climate of fear in Yemen; foreign journalists and international media outlets were also “subject to scrutiny for covering politically sensitive topics” (Freedom House 2011e). In 2010 alone, three American journalists were deported from Yemen and at least fifty international outlets were banned from even entering Yemen (Freedom House 2011e). In February 2011, Dubai-based satellite television station Al-

Arabiya, was the target of attacks by pro-government forces. Other news outlets including Britain's The Guardian, was also attacked and one of Al-Jazeera's bureaus was shot down (Freedom House 2012i).

Indeed, Yemen's uprising in 2011 only made the government act out even more severely on the press by "seizing thousands of copies of newspapers at checkpoints, blocking websites, beating and arresting journalists, and creating a hostile environment [meant to] stifle freedom of expression (Freedom House 2012i)". Freedom House noted that the "Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate reported that more than 300 assaults on journalists had occurred during the year 2011- the highest rate in the history of the country. Two journalists and one media worker were killed, including a photojournalists who was killed by police when they opened fire on protesters in March, and a cameraman who was shot in the face by a sniper while covering anti-government protests in September" (Freedom House 2012i). The Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate was shut down by authorities after being stormed and the headquarters of Al-Saeedi's television station were set on fire when pro and anti-government forces clashed in October 2011 (Freedom House 2012i).

Freedom House also noted that the Yemeni government tried to control both print and broadcast media and cited Women Journalists Without Chains in reporting that the government controlled "30 newspapers; another 162 were independent, 59 were linked to political parties, and 50 were associated with civil society organisations ... the government controlled 22 magazines, while only 6 were independent, 4 were affiliated with political parties, and 33 were run by civil society organisations..." (Freedom House 2011e). Also, the "government maintained its complete monopoly on broadcast media in 2010 through the Yemen General Corporation for both Radio and Television, with 4 television channels and 2 national and 10 regional radio channels" (Freedom House 2011e). The Yemeni government in 2010 was still "selecting items that are to be covered during newscasts" (Freedom House 2011e).

### **III.3. International News Funnel of the events of the Arab Spring**

Based on the information found on the various Arab countries studied for this thesis, some common themes have been found in terms of the communications context in 2011. The context in most of the countries is not poor internet access infrastructure, but rather, disturbing communication laws that put a damper on internet exploitation in communication. Despite similar laws in many of the countries prohibiting communicating against the government or

religion or defaming officials or even the country itself, most, but not all, of the countries studied turned to the internet to make their voices heard, with varying degrees. Public social networks that were used range from popular social platforms like Facebook and Twitter, to less popular ones like Bambuser. It was also found that many activists in several countries would turn to video posting sites like YouTube to share footage of their countries. Communication apps such as Whatsapp were used to communicate and email was also used to share files. Media companies like Twitter, Google and Al Jazeera put in place processes and software allowing for information to flow more easily. When the internet was shut down, although news flow was affected, people carried on using SMS, voice recording and the smuggling of SIM and memory cards across borders to spread the news of their countries. The internet was not the only means of communication, for example in Yemen, where the internet was barely used or other countries like Libya and Bahrain that experienced long periods of internet shut down, people used traditional forms of journalism to print or broadcast opposition views either from the country or from other countries.

Despite local and international media being clamped down on via various methods ranging from denying entry into the country to arresting, torturing and even killing journalists, news still travelled. One main source of information was of course the governments themselves, who share official news through press conferences and their State controlled media, ranging from newspapers and websites to television stations. Another source of information were activists and opposition groups such as rebels, who sometimes ran their own media. There were also some privately owned and managed media. Amongst these sources are informers who provide information to the press on the events they deemed newsworthy.

International press when present in a country were present either as independent freelancers or contracted correspondents for a news agency or mainstream channel and are known to work with local informers to gather their news. Citizen journalist international agencies also exist by commissioning locals to gather news and send to them via specialised websites, apps or simply email. Although locals are commissioned by these international agencies, there was no indication of the agency bearing any responsibility for the safety of these local amateur journalists. We did however learn about the case of AFP workshops set up in Turkey to train Syrian-based journalist-aspirers on the type of material that AFP was seeking.

In addition to censorship methods applied by governments during the uprisings, we also learnt of various self-censorship policies taken up by mainstream media, even after leaving the country of the uprising. For example, CNN's refusal to air their documentary on Bahrain's uprising on their international channel is a method of self-censorship. We also learned from various journalists that material provided by Daesh or other terrorists would not be broadcast, so as to avoid feeding into terrorist-propaganda, unless the material provided useful information

to audiences. Additionally, many journalists spoke about not sharing violent scenes or scenes of death. We learnt that some journalists, following laws in the country, refused to interview certain people who were banned from being interviewed.

The following diagram shows the international news funnel representative of international news produced from the events of the Arab Spring to worldwide audiences.



Table 15 The International News Funnel of the Events of the Arab Spring

The section analysed the different local, international, professional and amateur information institutions that contributed to informing international audiences about the events of the Arab spring. The following section will question the ways in which the events of the Arab Spring were represented by the four channels in our news corpus, therefore the results of the following section will be grounded in data representative of news actually produced and distributed to international audience by international mainstream media. Based on our desk research and

interviews conducted with journalists, we will be able to go a step further an attempt to explain the reasons for which events were represented in certain ways.

## **III.4. Coverage of the events of the Arab Spring**

The previous section focussed on the information context in each of the countries represented in our news corpus so as to show the different information institutions worked to deliver information to an international audience. The results of the previous section are the product of both desk research and interviews with professionals, which highlight both the country context, the media context and their ways of working. The previous section also attempted to highlight some of the policies of the media channels, but are not necessarily representative of the news actually broadcast. It is for this reason that we have decided to dedicate an entire section to the ways in which the events of the Arab Spring were represented by the four channels in our news corpus, by mainly looking at how the news was presented. Our results will be grounded in data representative of news actually produced and distributed to international audiences by international mainstream media. Previous desk research and interviews will complement this section in an attempt to explain the reasons for which events were represented in certain ways. This section therefore uses narrative theory to understand the way the stories of AJE, Press TV, F24 and Euronews allowed international audiences to understand the Arab uprisings.

### III.4.1.1. Total videos by Channel




Table 16 Total videos per Channel in News Corpus

Euronews English had the highest percentage of news videos in the entire corpus- 33 percent, followed by Al Jazeera English, 28 percent, France 24 English, 23 percent and finally Press TV accounting for only 16 percent of all news videos. It was learnt through our study of the various institutions that Euronews and Al Jazeera seemed to be the most professional networks out of all those studied and it is probably for this reason that they are more consistent in uploading news videos online. As described in our methodology section, the objective of the news corpus was to find news videos representative of specific events from the Arab Spring. News videos were chosen with very little discrimination- the news video had to have been produced by one of our news channels and it had to represent an event that our research was focussing on. This meant that video titles were scanned and sometimes when video content was not obvious from a title, they would be watched or also scanned. The actual studying of the news videos did not begin until the corpus was complete. Of course this meant that we would sometimes encounter news videos that were not relevant to our chosen events, but then they would simply be discarded from our corpus. It quickly became obvious that we would not be able to have an equal amount of news videos per news channel, per event, therefore although this study will have some comparative elements, it is not our aim to compare the coverage of one channel to that of another, just as it was not our aim to compare the state of information in one country to

that of another. We must try to understand that just as audiences do not usually watch only one news channel, representations of international events will not usually be constructed from one international news channel, but rather from various sources of information. What must also be taken into account is that the corpus itself is only a mere representation of how our chosen channels have represented some events of the Arab Spring online. Some news videos aired on TV may not have been distributed online. Also, some news videos may have been lost. For example, we have already noted that Press TV complained about having their YouTube channel shut down, therefore, one can presume that lots of the news videos uploaded by the channel were therefore lost along with the closure of their account. It is also true that some channels clear up their online archives from time to time and therefore may not have all their content online. Some channels, specifically not included in our corpus, such as BBC News and CNN, do not seem to have news videos of Arab uprisings on their YouTube accounts. Once we had 252 news videos in our news corpus, it was decided that we would stop searching for more videos as the number was considered to be feasible to conduct a PhD research on.

### III.4.1.2. News Video Publication Platforms




Table 17 Platforms where News Videos were Sourced for Corpus

It was sometimes difficult to find news videos of a certain news event on YouTube and therefore research was made elsewhere online for such videos. Although 92 percent of the news texts were sourced from YouTube, 7 percent were sourced from the news publisher website [AJE, F24, Euronews, Press TV] and a mere 1 percent was sourced from other sites.

### III.4.1.3. Countries represented in news videos




Table 18 Countries Represented in News Corpus

Events from seven nations were specifically chosen to be included in our news corpus. News texts covering events in Egypt represented 39 percent of the total news texts, followed by Libya and Syria, which represented 20 percent of the total news texts, Tunisia and Bahrain represented 9 and 8 percent respectively and Saudi Arabia and Yemen represented 3 and 1 percent of the total analysis respectively.

### III.4.1.4. Events represented in news videos




Table 19 Events Represented in News Corpus

The events from the seven countries represented can be broken down into fourteen separate events, in which we can observe that most of the content represents the story whereby Egypt's Morsi granted himself unlimited powers, leading to his downfall; around 25 percent of the videos in the corpus represent this event. This news event is followed by Libya's Tripoli being bombed by NATO and the coalition, representing around 15 percent of all news videos. The news event of Syria's Ghoutta Sarin Attack represents 12 percent of the total corpus. News videos on Saudi troops entering Bahrain represents around 8 percent of the total corpus. We

were also able to include news stories from when Egypt’s Tahrir Square was first seized by the people and these stories represent around 18 percent of the news texts in the corpus and this is followed by the news story when Egypt’s Morsi wins elections as well as the death of Gaddafi. Ten percent of the news videos cover the departure of Yemen’s president, followed by the departure of Tunisia’s president and finally the resignation of the Syrian cabinet at 8 percent. Representation of Tunisia’s Bou Azizi represents only 7 percent of the news corpus, along with Assad’s first speech to Syria and the world after the first uprisings in 2011 and the news story on Saudi Arabia granting women the right to vote. The declaration of Syria’s uprising as a civil war is represented only 4 percent of the news texts in the corpus. As stated in the methodology section, although the selection of these specific events was made prior to searching for them, it was sometimes difficult to find news stories representing the events, and therefore it is not deliberate in our research that some significant stories, such as Tunisia’s Bou Azizi be represented so poorly.

### III.4.1.5. Coverage Format of News Channels in Corpus




Table 20 Coverage Format of News Channels in Corpus

The chart shows the breakdown for each news channel studied so as to understand the preference in news presentation for the Arab Spring. In some cases, a news report would be

both live and include interviews, but only one “format” was recorded to each news text. If the news text was primarily made up of an interview, then it was labelled as “interviews” and if it was a long reportage that included one or two interviews, it was labelled “reportage”. As indicated earlier, the selection criteria was that the news videos, if possible, would be reportages and we can note that “reportages” make up majority of the news video formats for AJE and Euronews English. Press TV had one more news story presented in form of headlines than it did in form of reportages and France 24 English tended to mainly have live interviews.


The format of the news text is of essence to us in representation because of the change in effect that the news report could have on audiences as a result of the format.

**Headlines:** An anchor presenting the news without the help of a correspondent on location or an interviewee would be registered as a headline. Only brief information is given about the topic, yet it informs the audience on the important news of the day.

**Interviews:** A topic expert or event participant answering questions in a studio or in another location so as to report on the event would be constituted as an interview. They can give audiences further information about a topic from a non-journalist point of view depending on who they are and what types of questions they are answering to.

**Live:** Live reports are not pre-planned packages like reportages and can be said to give audiences a sense of urgency.

**Reportage:** Reportages are usually constructed by correspondents with an editorial line and pitch idea in agreement with the newsroom. Interviews may be included in such packages. They serve to remind audiences why a topic is newsworthy and further inform them about the event.



*Table 21 Coverage Format of News Videos in Corpus*

### III.4.1.6. The Voices and Pictures of the Arab Spring

Our corpus allows us to delve deep into the various headlines, interviews, live videos and reportages covering the events of the Arab Spring, and extract the voices of the Arab Spring. What we were deliberately seeking was to understand who was really telling the stories of the Arab Spring, through the international media. Our corpus allows us to identify the global voices of the events of the Arab Spring, whilst also looking specifically at the locations featured in the news videos, whether the journalist is based in the location of the event or otherwise and the profiles of our interviewees.

When looking at the global representation of the international voices of the Arab Spring, we can see that the percentage of videos containing international representatives is quite low.




Table 22 International Representation in News on the events of the Arab Spring

We also looked at international representation per event and found that the event with the highest international representation was Syria’s Ghoutta Sarin Attack, but it was still quite low with only 20% of news videos featuring US representatives and 6% of news videos featuring Russian and British representatives. Coverage of Libya’s coalition intervention included US representatives in 19% of news videos, British representatives in 10% of the news videos and French representatives in 8% of the news videos. Coverage of Saudi troops entering Bahrain included US representatives in 14% of news videos and 4% of news videos featured Iranian representation. When Syria’s cabinet resigned in 2011, French representation was included in 12% of news videos from our corpus. Also, coverage of Egypt under Morsi showed US representation in 5% of the news videos in our corpus. All other news events from our corpus did not have any international coverage.





Table 23 Representation of the Events of the Arab Spring by International Participants

We were also able to study the location of the footage in our news videos. Please note that some news videos included footage from more than one country and it is for this reason that the percentages added up do not equal 100.

The data from our corpus tells us that the footage location in all events is mainly in the country of the event. The event with the least footage in its country is the Syrian chemical attack in Ghoutta. For obvious reasons, it was not possible for journalists to be on location to film the aftermath; firstly, it was too dangerous for them. But another reason was that of censorship, because Syria's government was not allowing people in at the time. Therefore, most of the footage was in the US, or countries not listed in our corpus. It should also be noted that the footage location in some videos was unknown. Footage from the US was mainly used to cover events in Bahrain and Syria. Footage from Britain was only slightly used to report the events of Bahrain. Footage from Turkey was mainly used to cover events in Syria. Footage from Saudi Arabia was mainly used to cover events in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen.



*Table 24 Footage Location in Event Coverage*

The data from our corpus also allowed us to identify what type of footage was used to represent the various events of the Arab Spring.

The chart below shows that the most popular images across all events of the Arab Spring, noted in our corpus, were images of peaceful demonstrations. Images of peaceful demonstrations show a popular uprising that is peaceful, in a region usually represented with chaotic images. However, the other most popular form of images in our news videos of the Arab Spring was that of military equipment such as tanks or soldiers carrying guns. The image of the military usually represented the regime’s control in the country despite and in spite of the peaceful uprisings. This was closely followed by footage of press conferences, which are planned public events of dialogue that allow officials to make statements to the popular uprisings through the press. Despite the images of peaceful demonstrations dominating the

media sphere, 32% of the footage featured destruction or explosions of some sort, showing that despite peaceful uprisings, the results were often destructive. Only 17% of the footage featured violent riots and 11% of the footage featured death or victims suffering. This echoes what many journalists informed us, that they did not lightly share images of death or suffering.

If we look closely at the various events included in our corpus, we can note that violent riots were mainly featured in the coverage of Tunisia's Bou Azizi. It is important to note that the news videos found of this event were taken much later than the actual event of Bou Azizi committing suicide. Therefore, the footage also includes amateur footage taken by Bou Azizi's family at the time of his burial for example. Violent Riots were also noted in coverage of Bahrain's uprising, which also featured the largest amount of military footage. Public speeches were mainly noted in the event of Assad's first speech to the world since the first uprisings in 2011, which also included the highest percentage of press conferences amongst all events in our corpus after Saudi Arabia and Yemen's event coverage. Peaceful demonstrations were mainly featured in Yemen, Syria and Egypt. Military equipment was also featured in Syria, Libya and Bahrain. Destruction and explosions were mainly noted in Syria and Libya. Death/Suffering was featured to cover the events of Gaddafi's death in Libya, but not the Libyan conflict. Also, news videos on Syria's Ghoutta Sarin attack featured death or suffering.

Bahrain- Saudi Troops enter Bahrain: This event was covered with footage of military equipment (67%) and then violent riots (38%) and peaceful demonstrations (38%). The footage on Bahrain also features destruction (24%) as well as press conferences (14%) and suffering (14%).

Egypt Morsi: the news videos covering Egypt during Morsi's time mainly featured peaceful demonstrations (55%) but also featured press conferences (34%) and violent riots (26%). There was also footage on public speeches (15%) and destruction/explosions (15%).

Egypt Mubarak: the news videos covering Egypt during the uprising that brought Mubarak down mainly featured peaceful demonstrations (67%). There was also footage of violent riots (28%) and military equipment (28%). There was very little footage (6%) of public speeches, destruction and death.

Libya- Gaddafi Killed: the news videos covering Libya since Gaddafi's capture and death mainly featured death (64%) and destruction (64%). There was also footage of military equipment (43%) and only 6% of news videos featured public speeches.

Libya Conflict- the news videos covering Libya's conflict, including international intervention, mainly featured military equipment (73%) and destruction/explosions (65%). There was also considerable footage of press conferences (49%). There was little footage on peaceful demonstrations (8%), death/suffering (5%) and public speeches (3%).

Saudi Arabia Women Right to Vote: the news videos covering Saudi women's right to vote, mainly featured press conferences (86%). We were unable to find footage of riots, demonstrations, military equipment, destruction or death in the remaining videos.

Syria, Assad makes first speech: the news videos covering Assad's first speech mainly featured peaceful demonstrations (71%), press conferences (57%) and public speeches (43%). There was also some footage showing violent riots (14%).

Syria, Cabinet Resigns: the news videos covering the resignation of Syria's cabinet mainly featured peaceful demonstrations (63%) but also featured destruction in 38% of the news videos. Press conferences were featured in 25% of the news videos and military equipment was featured in 13% of the news videos.

Syria, Declaration of Civil War: the news videos covering the declaration of civil war in Syria mainly featured destruction/explosions (75%). We were unable to detect violent riots, public speeches, press conferences, peaceful demonstrations, military equipment or death/suffering in any of the other news videos.

Syria, Ghoutta Sarin Attack: the news videos covering the sarin attack in Ghoutta, Syria, equally (37%) featured press conferences, military equipment and death/suffering. Peaceful demonstrations and destruction were also featured in equal amount of news videos (3%).

Tunisia, Bouazizi: the news videos covering Bouazizi of Tunisia featured violent riots and destruction/explosion equally (43%) and peaceful demonstrations are featured in 29% of news videos. We were unable to detect any footage of public speeches, press conferences, military equipment or death/suffering.

Tunisia, Ben Ali Flees: the news videos covering Tunisia's Ben Ali fleeing featured military equipment and destruction/explosion equally (44%). We were also able to note footage of violent riots (33%) and peaceful demonstrations (33%). Also, 11% of the news videos featured footage of press conferences. We were unable to detect any footage of public speeches, press conferences or death/suffering.

Yemen, President Ali Leaves: the news videos covering Yemen's President Ali leaving mainly featured peaceful demonstrations (80%) and press conferences (60%). Footage of military equipment (20%) was also featured, as well as public speeches (10%) and destruction/explosion (5%). We were unable to note any footage of death/suffering.

## Footage representing events of the Arab Spring




Table 25 Footage Representing the Events of the Arab Spring

### III.4.1.7. Interviews in News Videos

We have decided to study the interviewing process in our news videos because interviews play a role in news discourse. Previous studies have studied how interviews play a role in neutrality or holding people accountable (Clayman, 1992 and Ekstrom, 2001). Montgomery (2008) looks at the different types of news interviews and proposes that the accountability interview with public figures should not be the main type of interview. Montgomery identifies some characteristics in generic interviews, stating that firstly, they work well for an overhearing

audience (based both in the studio and at home). A second characteristic of the media interview is the fact that we will always have an interviewer and an interviewee; these roles are pre-defined and understood by the interviewer, the interviewee and the audiences. Interviewers will always represent the news corporation they work for and therefore be in charge of the questions and the timing of the interview. The interviewee on the other hand should have earned their position to be an interviewee, and “the nature of this entitlement is always ‘evidenced’ or constituted in practice within the interview: in other words, witnessing, ‘celebrity-ness’, or ‘documentary-ness (Corner, 1995) is an outcome of the kind of interrogation pursued within the interview” (Montgomery 2008). Ekstrom and Lundell (2011) tell us that “News journalists do not ask questions for their own sake; they ask them for an imagined public and as representatives of an institution/profession” (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.173).

It was found that 69 percent of all news texts in the corpus included at least one interview.




Table 26 News Videos Containing Interviews

This can further be broken down into TV channels studied:




Table 27 Use of Interviews by News Channels in Corpus

### Question Preferences in Interviews




Table 28 Question Types Identified in News Videos with Interviews

The above graph shows that 67 percent of the news videos including interviews did not feature the questions in the news videos and therefore these interviews could not be analysed for question type. It is also important to note that the table shows the number of news videos containing interviews, and not the number of interviews. One should therefore also note that news videos may have included more than one interview and interviews could contain more


than one type of question and therefore categories do not total 100 percent. Questions were unheard in 71 percent of all AJE news videos containing interviews, 93 percent of all Euronews English news videos containing interviews, 53 percent of F24 English news videos containing interviews, and 49 percent of all PTV English news videos containing interviews.

It is clear from the above chart that the preferred question type in our news corpus on the Arab Spring are questions loaded with background information. This is followed by ‘what’ questions and ‘how’ questions as well as questions not loaded with background information. The least preferred questions by journalists are ‘why’, ‘who’ and ‘where’. If we look closely at the preferred questions per channel, one can see that AJE did not feature their interview questions in 71 percent of news videos. Out of those heard on the news video, AJE had a preference for questions loaded with background information (87%), followed by ‘what’ (73%) questions. AJE featured ‘why’ questions 27 percent of the time and ‘how’ questions 20 percent of the time. Questions asked with no background information and ‘where’ questions were asked by AJE 13 percent of the time, while ‘who’ questions were never used.

Press TV did not feature their interview questions in 49 percent of news videos. Out of those heard on the news video, PTV had a preference for questions loaded with background information (89%), followed by ‘what’ (47%) questions. PTV featured ‘why’ questions 26 percent of the time and ‘how’ questions 11 percent of the time. Questions asked with no background information were featured 21 percent of the time and ‘where’ questions were asked by PTV 11 percent of the time, while ‘who’ questions were never used.

France 24 English did not feature their interview questions in 53 percent of news videos. Out of those heard on the news video, F24 had a preference for questions loaded with background information (75%), followed by ‘what’ (40%) questions. F24 featured ‘why’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions in 5 percent of their news videos. Questions asked with no background information were featured 10 percent of the time, while no ‘where’ questions were asked.

On Euronews, up to 88 percent of the news videos containing interviews did not feature their questions. Out of those heard on the news video, Euronews had an equal percentage (40%) of news videos using ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions which were loaded with background information forty percent of the time and not featuring background information for also 40 percent of the time.



*Table 29 Question Types to Specific Interviewee Profiles as Identified in Corpus*

One can see from the chart above that questions are largely unheard on interviews. In interviews with relevant event actors, up to 87 percent of the news videos are unheard. In interviews with topic experts, 55 percent of the questions are unheard. Our results show that questions to correspondents are made audible most of the time with only 27 percent of the news videos not including questions. Our analysis on the types of questions asked is based on the news videos containing interviews with audible questions. Background information is generally included in questions featured in interviews with correspondents and topic experts. However, only 7 percent of news videos featuring questions to relevant event actors are loaded with background information. Question type ranging from ‘how’ and ‘what’ to ‘why’, ‘who’ and ‘where’ questions were sought but it was noted that not all questions could be categorised under such questions because journalists would not necessarily ask these questions. They would sometimes simply give background information, without actually asking a specific question, but rather putting out the information for the respondent to comment on.

‘Where’ questions are not used much in our news corpus; only 9 percent of news videos featuring interviews with topic experts feature ‘where’ questions and the number is lower for interviews with relevant event actors and correspondents.

It was found that ‘why’ questions were asked to topic experts in 30 percent of news videos featuring questions to topic experts. Only 14 percent of news videos featuring interviews with relevant event actors asked ‘why’ questions and the number was lower in videos featuring interviews with correspondents.

‘What’ questions are largely (57%) asked to correspondents and topic experts and relevant event actors are asked ‘what’ questions in only 4 percent of the news videos.

It was found that ‘how’ questions were asked to correspondents in 29 percent of news videos featuring questions to correspondents. Only 17 percent of news videos featuring questions with topic experts used ‘how’ questions. Finally, ‘who’ questions were only barely (7%) used to interview relevant event actors.

### **Interviewee Profile**

This analysis shows the representation of participants in interviews so as to see who recounted news events to international communities. It was found that news channels had the following choices when it came to interviewing people on events: interview with correspondent, interview with topic expert or interview with relevant event actor. Each of these profiles are necessary to give a well-rounded coverage of an event. A correspondent is significant as they are able to investigate events before not only creating a reportage but also answering further questions on an interview. A topic expert will analyse the significance of an event, make predictions and perhaps also make recommendations. But one must note that topic experts can have opposing views and therefore are not necessarily accurate. They are there to represent the “facts” as seen by an expert and be neutral, but some experts have their personal opinions and will share them. Relevant event actors are the people involved in an event and will share the concerns of the people on the ground, which is useful in terms of even representation. However, some event actors will quite naturally only share their own concerns, without sharing the concerns of others in a conflict. As we can see, all three actors are of essence to news stories. One could propose that a balanced representation of news events should be made by an equal number of these profiles per event. For example, if a news story is reported in 33% of cases by a correspondent, then 33% of cases by a topic expert and a further 33% of cases by relevant event actors, then the most crucial angles of the story will have been broadcast. However, this is not necessarily true, because lack of interviews with a correspondent can be made up for with news videos which are reportages that have been built by correspondents. Also, rather than having an interview with an event actor, the TV channel could instead feature a press conference by the event actor. Therefore, what is of essence is that the news channel dedicates enough time to the voices of these 3 profiles, whether in form of interviews, press conferences or reportages.

Montgomery proposes that there are four main sub-genres of broadcast news interviews: interviews with correspondents, interviews with people affected, or involved, in an event, interviews with experts and finally, interviews with public figures, who bear some responsibility to the event (Montgomery 2008, p.262). It is important to identify the profile being interviewed as the profile will dictate the “contribution to the interview” (idem)<sup>67</sup>. The following table, by Montgomery identifies the interview types, which are characterised in reference to their “affiliation, knowledge, agency and audience alignment” (idem).

	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Knowledge</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Audience alignment with interviewer</b>	<b>Audience alignment with interviewee</b>
Accountability interview	–	(of)	+	+	–
Experiential interview	–	(of)	–	+	+
Expert interview	–	(about)	–	+	–
Affiliated interview	+	(of/about)	–	–	–

(idem)

Ekstrom and Lundell (2011) also identified different profiles of interviewees for the news: the politician or elite interview, the expert or factual interview, the case or ordinary interview, and the opinion interview (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.176).

For the purpose of our research, we are particularly interested in identifying interviews with correspondents, topic experts and relevant event actors. Our relevant event actors are an amalgamation or both experiential/witness interviews and accountability interviews as well as Ekstrom & Lundell’s opinion interviews. The reason for this is that because our research preference has been using a grounded theory approach, we identified the codes of our news videos while watching them. Each time a profile was identified, it was added to our database. Very few cases of public figures being interviewed were noted and when they were noted, for example with UN representatives, it was decided that these were participants of events as they were indeed event actors. Local and international public figures were mainly present in form of press conferences. In the cases whereby international representatives are present in the news video, we have also noted this and therefore included this element in our analysis.

Ekstrom and Lundell (2011) studied how interviews are used in three phases of news production: “(1) the studio-based live interviews, (2) ‘sync interviewing’ (i.e. taped interview

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<sup>67</sup> According to Montgomery (2008), the interviewee profile most researched has been that of the public figure, so as to mainly focus on news neutrality and holding public figures accountable (Blum Kulka, 1983; Clayman, 1991, 1992; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Fetzer, 2002; Fetzer and Weizman, 2006; Harris, 1991; Hutchby, 2005, 2006; Lauerbach, 2006)

sequences for the production of quotes in edited news stories), and (3) research interviewing<sup>68</sup> (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.173) and noted that studio interviews, especially live studio interviews “enhance[s] liveness and a sense of the here-and-now (Bourdon, 2000; Kroon Lundell, 2009; Scannel, 1996)” (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.176). Ekstrom & Lundell also identified the types of studio interviews as: “doing a debate”, “doing a direct” and “doing a commentary” (idem). Ekstrom & Lundell’s propositions arise from a study on Swedish news and they found that debate interviews were popular with Swedish news stations so as to present conflicting identities. According to Ekstrom & Lundell, interviewees are selected “on the basis of their interactional predictions”, whereby “lame” interviewees are dropped because news makers “want the guests to be angry” (idem). The news presenter will usually use resources to create a confrontation with the debate participants. For example, the opinion of one person will be stated and used in form of a confrontation question to an interviewee so as to get their probably opposing point of view on the subject. We deliberately did not include debates in our corpus because we wanted to be able to analyse as many news stories as possible and therefore preferred to focus on short news reportages/live commentaries or interviews, rather than having long debates. This therefore does not mean that long debates do not encompass the coverage of the events of the Arab Spring; they simply do not encompass our corpus.

The second type of in-studio interview identified by Ekstrom & Lundell (2011) is ‘doing a direct’ and is comparable to Montgomery’s (2008) ‘live two-way’, whereby the in-studio anchor asks questions to a correspondent. In some cases, the correspondent who has just been interviewed will then interview someone else on location. This type of interviewing technique is “oriented towards the presenting of live reports in settings outside the studio” (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.177) and the “spatial linkage” is usually established by both the words of the in-studio anchor and the contents on the screen. For example, the in-studio anchor will use terms such as “we shall now to go” (idem) or in the case of our corpus, “Our correspondent in Egypt...” and images of both the in-studio journalist as well as the correspondent on location will also show their different locations. As our news videos are only excerpts that have been uploaded onto YouTube, we did not note any direct interviews conducted by correspondents in our corpus, but we did have correspondents responding to questions by anchors (“doing a commentary”) and also noted the use of captions that introduce the correspondent and their location. Ekstrom & Lundell note that in direct interviews, there is a short Q&A dialogue between the anchor and the correspondent and then the camera zooms out so that focus is made on both the correspondent and his/her interviewee on location.

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<sup>68</sup> Research interviews have not been identified in our corpus as these are interviews that take place prior to producing a news video. Using a corpus allows us to primarily focus on the final output of the news which is presented to audiences.

The “doing a commentary” type of interview noted by Ekstrom & Lundell is a dialogue between a news presenter and another journalist. We did note such interviews in our corpus, whereby our correspondent is treated as an expert on a topic and therefore interviewed by the in-studio anchor. Ekstrom & Lundell noted that interviewing other journalists is easy because other journalists understand studio objectives in terms of content and time limitations, more than topic experts or witnesses do. It was also noted by Ekstrom & Lundell that interviews with other journalists (of the same corporation) are researched, pre-planned and even rehearsed (Ekström & Lundell 2011, p.178). Whereas, in interviews with experts, who are non-affiliated, questions will usually be sent to the interviewee simply to ensure that they are able to answer the planned questions, but no rehearsals will take place. A different approach is also taken on interviews with politician guests, who will not receive questions ahead of the interview, because the journalist’s job when interviewing a politician is to “make the politician lose his/her allegedly polished façade” (idem).

Ekstrom & Lundell also highlight interviews labelled as a “sync”, which are interviews that are taped; “small segments are cut out and inserted into the news story” (idem). “These segments may contain a Q&A-sequence between the journalist and interviewee but most often single quotes are extracted” (idem). Therefore, interviewees are usually made aware that the entire interview will not be used and so they may interrupt the interview, which is filmed as though live, so as to ask questions or clarify something, or even to request that something is not recorded.




Table 30 Interviewee Profiles Identified in Corpus

Out of the 252 news videos in our corpus, 176 news videos contained interviews (70%), meaning that 76 of the 252 news videos did not contain any interviews. The news videos that did use interviews, did so in at least one of three ways: interviewing the correspondent, interviewing topic experts and/or interviewing relevant event actors. Some news videos may have used two or three methods of interviews. For example, the AJE news video entitled *Symptoms indicate chemicals use' in Syria* (April 26, 2013) uses interviews with both a correspondent and a relevant event actor within the same news video. Therefore, the news video has been counted once for using interviews with a correspondent and then counted another time for using interviews with a relevant event actor.

**Interview Use per TV Channel Studied**

We are able to break down the use of interviews per channel in our news corpus, so as to better understand our reasoning.




Table 31 Interviewee Profiles identified in AJE News from Corpus

**AJE:** 53 out of 70 of the news videos contained interviews (76%). Six news videos contained interviews with correspondents (12%), 17 news videos contained interviews with topic experts (26%) and 37 news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors (70%). This means that AJE showed a preference for reporting the events of the Arab Spring through relevant event actors.




Table 32 Interviewee Profiles identified in PTV News from Corpus

**Press TV:** 39 out of 41 of the news videos contained interviews (95%). No news videos contained interviews with correspondents, 19 news videos contained interviews with topic experts (49%) and 25 news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors (64%). This means that only 10 percent of Press TV news videos did not use interviews at all. It also means that Press TV showed a preference for reporting the events of the Arab Spring through relevant event actors, closely followed by a keen preference in interviewing topic experts.




Table 33 Interviewee Profiles identified in Euronews News from Corpus

**Euronews:** 41 out of 83 of the news videos contained interviews (49%). One news video contained an interview with a correspondent (2%), seven news videos contained interviews with topic experts (17%) and 35 news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors (42%). This means that 51 percent of Euronews news videos did not use interviews at all. It also means that when Euronews did conduct interviews, they showed a preference for reporting the events of the Arab Spring through relevant event actors.




Table 34 Interviewee Profiles identified in F24 News from Corpus

**France 24:** 43 out of 58 of the news videos contained interviews (74%). Up to 26 news videos contained an interview with a correspondent (60%), eight news videos contained interviews with topic experts (17%) and 12 news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors (28%). This means that 25 percent of Euronews news videos did not use interviews at all. It also means that when France 24 did conduct interviews, they showed a preference for reporting the events of the Arab Spring through correspondents.

Below are the preferences per channel on interview profiles:

TV Channel	Videos Containing Interviews with Correspondents	Videos Containing Interviews with Topic Experts	Videos Containing Interviews with Relevant Event Actors
All channels	19%	29%	62%
AJE	12%	26%	70%
PTV	0%	49%	64%
Euronews	2%	17%	85%
F24	60%	17%	28%

Table 35 Interviewee Profile per News Channel from Corpus

One can clearly see that based on our corpus of news videos, all our news channels used interviews to tell the stories of the Arab Spring from the point of view of relevant event actors- the people in the uprising, except for France 24, which used interviews mainly to recount the stories of the Arab Spring from the point of view of correspondents.

**Interview use per Event**

We are also able to break down the use of interviews per event in our news corpus, so as to better understand how the events were covered using interviews.




Table 36 Use of Interviews per Event in Corpus

One can clearly see that based on our corpus of news videos, nine out of 13 events of the Arab Spring used interviews to tell the stories of the Arab Spring from the point of view of relevant event actors- the people in the uprising. These nine events include the uprisings from Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, as well as the declaration of civil war in Syria. Interviews covering Bahrain’s uprising were also conducted with topic experts, but no correspondents.

Based on the clampdown on journalists in Bahrain, we are not surprised that newsrooms were unable to contact correspondents on location to cover the uprising in Bahrain. Interviews covering Egypt's second uprising were also conducted with correspondents and topic experts. But interviews covering Egypt's first and prime uprising which led to Mubarak's downfall were only conducted with relevant event actors and correspondents- no interviews whatsoever were conducted with topic experts. The same is true for the event of Gaddafi's death; although interviews were conducted with relevant event actors and correspondents, no experts were interviewed to recount the death of Gaddafi. There is a fear that when no topic experts are interviewed, that news stories are recounted from the 'popular' point of view, with no real analysis on what has taken place. The Libyan conflict however, did use interviews with topic experts, including correspondents and relevant event actors. Stories on both Tunisia's Bouazizi and Tunisia's President Ben Ali fleeing used interviews with relevant event actors only; therefore only taking the popular point of views. And finally, stories on Yemen's President Ali Abdullah leaving used interviews with both relevant event actors and topic experts to recount the events.

#### III.4.1.8. Interviews with Correspondent profile

Interviewing the channel correspondent allowed for in-studio anchors to interview international correspondent on location. An interview with a correspondent would usually take place from the studio. The international correspondent however, would be based either on the location of the event or in a nearby city or country, or they had visited the scene of the event prior to the interview so as to be able to comment on it. It was discovered through our interviews that although such interviews could not be planned to the last detail, news producers based in the studio would try to establish contact with the correspondent on location prior to the live interview so as to establish the topics of discussion in the interview. It was however noted that sometimes correspondents had to go live before having a "planning discussion" with the producer, and therefore would have to guide the anchor based on the information deemed necessary.

As a reminder, only 19% of the news videos in our corpus actually featured interviews with a correspondent, meaning that correspondents were not used much in interviews to recount the stories of the Arab Spring. Only 12 percent of AJE news videos had interviews with correspondents. Press TV news videos did not contain any interviews with correspondents. Only 2 percent of news videos produced by Euronews in our corpus included an interview with

a correspondent. The only news channel from our corpus that seemed to show a preference for interviews with correspondents was France 24, which featured interviews with correspondents in 60 percent of their news videos. Based on our interviews and our desk research, it was found that having correspondents on location can be very costly for news media organisations in terms of both money and safety. Therefore, some organisations pull their staff out of a location once they feel it is no longer necessary to be based there, or if there is reason to worry for their safety. Also, it was found that some organisations would hire freelance or independent correspondents to cover specific events.

There are of course benefits to having a correspondent on location. The correspondent can give their media company information on the event, the atmosphere and the situation in the location. They can also confirm whether events reported by other media organisations or individuals are indeed factual. And finally, they can also, if equipped with a team or at least equipment, provide footage from the area.

Via our corpus, we found six main ways of interviewing correspondents, which can be grouped into two categories:

### **1. Interviews with correspondents on location**

- a. Interviews with correspondents can feature both the interviewer (in-studio anchor) and the interviewee (on-location correspondent) facing the camera, speaking directly to each other, but also addressing viewers directly.
- b. Interviews with correspondents can also only feature the voice of both the in-studio anchor and the on-location correspondent.
- c. Interviews with correspondents show the in-studio anchor face the camera and feature the on-location correspondent on voice-over


### **2. Interviews with correspondents not on location**

- a. Interviews with correspondents show both interviewing anchor and interviewee correspondent in-studio
- b. Interviews with correspondents can take place when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event
- c. Interviews with correspondents can take place live when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event
- d. Interviews with correspondents can when the correspondent is in a neighbouring location to that of the main event

The following section elaborates on each category and subcategory.

**1. Interviews with correspondents on location**

Our corpus found that 61 percent of our news videos on the Arab Spring contained interviews with correspondents who were on location. This does not mean that other news videos did not contains correspondents on location; it simply means that the other videos with the correspondent on location were not interviews, but rather reportages. The following chart shows the percentage of news videos, by TV channel, featuring interviews with correspondents which had correspondents on the location of the event.



*Table 37 Interviewed Correspondents on Location*

The following chart shows the percentage of news videos, by event, featuring interviews with correspondents which had correspondents on the location of the event.




Table 38 Events with Correspondents on Location

The chart above shows that correspondents were on the location of the event in most (50% - 100%) of the news videos that featured an interview with a correspondent to cover events of the Arab Spring. We have defined ‘on location’ to be the city or country of the event.

- a. **Interviews with correspondents can feature both the interviewer (in-studio anchor) and the interviewee (on-location correspondent) facing the camera, speaking directly to each other, but also addressing viewers directly.**

It was noted that some news videos would include an interview between an in-studio anchor and on-location international correspondent, with both facing the camera. For example, the Euronews video entitled *Euronews correspondent describes Tahrir Square* (February 6, 2011), features the in-studio anchor, based in Lyon, speaking to the correspondent based in Cairo.



*News Video Screenshot 1 Euronews correspondent describes Tahrir Square (February 6, 2011)*

It is worth noting also that this news video, originally in Spanish, even though the anchor is in France, has been voiced over with an English interpretation. From our interviews and desk research, we discovered that Euronews would re-use their news from their other channels if it was relevant to Euronews viewers of another channel. One can still hear the Spanish discourse, as it is not completely muted. The in-studio anchor begins by introducing the correspondent to viewers: “Luis Carballos is the Euronews correspondent who spent the day in Tahrir Square in Cairo, and seen for himself what’s happening in Egypt, right now” (idem). The anchor then asks a question loaded with information, “The anti-government protesters continue to defy calls from the authority to disperse. Can they continue”?

The backdrop of the journalist does not provide anything significant in terms of information. The correspondent is probably inside a building with large windows, rather than being in the middle of a live event. But it is interesting to note that the correspondent is unshaven and looks scruffy in his casual clothes, whereas the anchor looks very formal in a clean suit. This shows the difference between the job of a journalist anchor based in the studio and that of the journalist correspondent who reports from the location of events.

While the correspondent speaks, the live image of the anchor is sometimes replaced by footage related to the event, therefore showing some scenes from an event despite the correspondent speaking from a quiet environment.



News Video Screenshot 2 Euronews: correspondent describes Tahrir Square (February 6, 2011)

**b. Interviews with correspondents can also only feature the voice of both the in-studio anchor and the on-location correspondent.**

It was also noted that some interviews would correspondents would only feature the voices of the anchor and correspondent, rather than show their faces. For example, the AJE news video entitled *Violence breaks out in Cairo's Tahrir Square* (20/11/2011) features scenes of Tahrir square whilst the in-studio anchor introduces and interviews the on-location correspondent. One assumes that the correspondent is on location because of the introduction of the in-studio anchor: "We're taking you live to Cairo. We are looking at images of the streets in Cairo, following clashes between protestors and riot police. Our correspondent Sherine Tadros is on standby overlooking the scenes that we're just watching right now. Sherine, tell us what's led to this latest clash between police and protestors" (idem).

The response of the on-location correspondent, also tells viewers that she is on location. Her voice is slightly out of breath and she is shouting over noises on location to make her voice heard. It also gives a sense of urgency to viewers who will understand that this news is breaking as the correspondent shares the news. The correspondent also interprets the live images on our screen, therefore giving further information than is requested by the interviewer (anchor). As the on-location correspondent describes and elaborates the images and sounds on the live footage, this gives viewers a certainty that she is indeed on location. For example:

**Correspondent describing live footage in voice-over live interview with in-studio anchor**

...they're in full riot gear, they have batons,

...as you can probably hear...they are firing into the air.

I believe that is the sound of tear gas being fired into the air. It could also be rubber-coated steel bullets which has also been a tactic they have been using

But you can see just the utter chaos

I don't know if you can see now...the cameraman should be showing you someone has actually been set on fire

You can hear what the people are saying, I'm just going to let you hear that for a second: they're saying "the people demand the overthrow of the regime"

Therefore, although the in-studio anchor has prepared some questions loaded with information, she has also left her questions open, in form of comments, for the correspondent to be able to carry on with her elaboration of events. For example:

**Anchor from Studio:**

And this Sherine follows a day or two of sit-ins in Tahrir Square. The people trying yesterday to clear the square of protestors trying desperately to get the situation under control before the parliamentary elections that are scheduled in about a week or so. How much force is the police using though? And yesterday they were said to be clearing the square themselves. Today they seem to be back and forth.

(idem)

The question by the anchor is really "How much force is the police using", but it is loaded with background information and then some commenting, allowing for the correspondent to comment on what happened yesterday, as per the anchor's indication, and then comment on the scenes that are difficult to decipher, because they are shot from afar during what seems to be chaotic riots. Without the journalist's description, one would not be able to see that shots are actually fired or understand what people are chanting or even that people are being beaten or burnt (see Transcript).

In addition to the anchor and correspondent's description and the live footage, AJE also provides headlines to further emphasise the details of the event. Each headline reminds viewers of the location of the event, *Egypt, Tahrir Square, Egyptian Capital, Centre of Egyptian Capital*. Also the actions recounted by the correspondent are noted: *Security Forces Clear Tahrir Square, Tear Gas and Rubber Coated Bullets Shot at Protesters, Police attacking people* (idem).

It is also interesting to note that the on-site correspondent does not address her viewers. Rather, she addresses the in-studio anchor. For example: "Yes, if you can hear me Ghida, what you're

seeing...” (idem). The in-studio anchor however addresses both the viewers and the correspondent, for example, “We’re taking you live to Cairo” and “Sherine, tell us what’s led to this latest clash between police and protestors” (idem).

**c. Interviews with correspondents show the in-studio anchor face the camera and feature the on-location correspondent on voice-over**

It was also noted, especially on France 24 live interviews between in-studio anchors and correspondents on location that the interview would take place via audio communication only. Therefore, viewers would see the anchor but only a photo of the correspondent on location. When this was the case, France 24 would show footage related to the event while the correspondent recounted information about the event. The F24 news video entitled *Libya conflict Gaddafi dies of wound suffered in capture* (October 20, 2011) features a live interview between the in-studio anchor and the correspondent, Marine Olivesi, on location. The entire interview has not been published onto YouTube and therefore we cannot hear the opening introduction by the anchor. Instead, viewers can see a map being zoomed on to identify the location of the journalist, in Sirte, Libya. The photo and name of the correspondent also appear on the left hand side of the screen, so as to dedicate the right hand side of the screen to footage.



News Video Screenshot 3 F24: *Libya conflict Gaddafi dies of wound suffered in capture* (October 20, 2011)

From our interview with Olivesi, we know that she did not have any camera equipment or filming crew with her and therefore the shots we see on the screen are not live shots. Instead, F24 features old footage of Gaddafi, some with unclear headlines in Arabic and some completely unlabelled. There are also some shots of rebels celebrating on the streets, but one cannot be sure when this footage was taken.

The in-studio anchor faces the camera but does not address viewers. Instead, she addresses the correspondent with her question: “So, do we know to what point Marine, NATO bombed Gaddafi’s convoy”? (idem).

In the correspondent’s answer, one can hear chaos in the background, and this gives a feeling of urgency to the viewers who have heard that she is “standing right now in the middle of Misrata hospital... waiting for Gaddafi’s ambulance” (idem). The correspondent shares a confusing context from Libya, stating that “Nobody knows exactly where and when he died...the question is why was he already dead when he arrived....Or did he die later on”? Her discourse is actually filled with more questions than answers. This therefore communicates to viewers that nothing is really known for sure, or confirmed.

There are two headlines that appear during the interview: *BATTLE FOR SIRTE Reuters: NTC say Gaddafi is dead* and *LIBYA CONFLICT: NATO confirms strikes on pro-Gaddafi vehicles*. The headlines do not confirm what the correspondent has said. Instead, as the correspondent is unable to confirm the death of Gaddafi or the NATO strikes from her location, F24 have quoted Reuters and NATO in their headlines, therefore giving additional information. Unfortunately, this information is not voiced out by the anchor to the correspondent on site, therefore leaving the correspondent without confirmed information provided by Reuters and NATO. One must notice though that the confirmation of Gaddafi’s death is not aired confidently by Reuters. The quote is: NTC say Gaddafi is dead. This means that Reuters must communicate official information even if they are unsure if the official information is accurate. France 24 have followed in line and stated what Reuters have stated.

The essence of using a correspondent by F24 in this case is to go to the location of a breaking event and deliver the news from the source on location.

## **2. Interviews with correspondents not on location**

### **a. Interviews with correspondents show both interviewing anchor and interviewee correspondent in-studio**

Some news videos featured both the anchor and the correspondent in the studio, with the anchor getting the news from the correspondent. The correspondent is placed as an expert on the news and is asked to comment on either on what other press have reported or on actual events that they have witnessed. Only 3 such news videos were found in our news corpus and they were

all produced by France 24. Questions<sup>69</sup> in interviews by anchors to correspondents in the studio include background information and are therefore also a source of information to viewers.

One news story by France 24, *The Brotherhood's worst enemy may be itself- IN THE WORLD PAPERS 04/07/2013* (July 4, 2013) features both the anchor and correspondent in the studio, with the anchor asking the correspondent to comment on Egyptian local press stories. Both address the audience and one another. For example, the correspondent says “Hi to you Cyril and hi to everybody”, looking at both Cyril the anchor and then at the screen when he addresses viewers, but then faces the anchor when answering his questions (idem).

During the interview, images of the press stories the correspondent comments on appear on the screen beside the correspondent or take over the entire screen at times. Quotes are used often by the correspondent as he is in fact a journalist. One headline is used for the entire news interview: “INTERNATIONAL PRESS REVIEW” is placed above the words EGYPT COUP, which in turn is placed above President Morsi ousted by Egyptian army. The news of Morsi’s ousting is therefore being covered in an in-studio interview with a correspondent commenting on press coverage on the topic.

**b. Interviews with correspondents can take place when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event**

It was noted from our news corpus that interviews with correspondents sometimes took place with correspondents based in locations significant to an event that took place elsewhere. Two such videos were found in our corpus, both by France 24 and covering Syria’s chemical weapons.

The first *Syria conflict a UN investigation to be conducted on 3 alleged chemical incidents* (August 1, 2013) features the correspondent in New York. The correspondent is discussing the UN team being allowed to investigate the Syrian chemical weapon usage and therefore it is relevant that he is stood before the UN head office in New York. The excerpt of the news video features the location of the journalist on the map, as is typical of France 24 interviews, however we are unable to hear the journalist’s questions. We know it is an interview because the location of the correspondent is shown and he speaks straight to the camera. As the correspondent speaks to the camera, one can make out the all too familiar UN flag and building behind him and he is introduced as NICK HARPER above NEW YORK, United States.

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<sup>69</sup> The questions in one of the news videos could not be qualified as the questions were unheard on the part of the interview uploaded to YouTube.



News Video Screenshot 4 F24: Syria conflict a UN investigation to be conducted on 3 alleged chemical incidents (August 1, 2013)

The headlines support the journalist’s discourse, for example: SYRIA CONFLICT, UN team allowed to investigate chemical weapon use (idem). And the image of the correspondent is resized so as to also feature footage from the actual event, victims suffering from the chemical attack.

The second news video featuring the journalist in a significant location, but not the location of the event is entitled *Syria chemical weapons claim an insult to common sense, says Assad* (France 24, August 25, 2013). In this news video, the correspondent is pinpointed on a map, showing he is based in Moscow, Russia. In the same style as the other news video, his location is also indicated under his name. The location is of essence, despite the focus being the use of chemical weapons in Syria, because the correspondent reports on the Russian message to the international community on chemical weapons.

In this news video, the footage that appears from time to time when the correspondent speaks, on the side of the screen focusses on the UN in Syria and then of Bashar Al Assad on Lebanon’s Al Manar channel. The headlines do not represent the Russian claims, instead, they all begin with “SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM” and are then followed by messages from the West and Assad. Therefore, they do not support the messages of the correspondent:

- SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM –UN launches probe of alleged poison gas attack
- SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM – UK’s Hague: Possible to act without unanimous UN backing
- SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM – Western powers say UN probe comes “too late”
- SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM – Assad: Chemical attack allegations an “insult to common sense”
- SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CLAIM –Assad warns United States of failure if it attacks

In this news video, we are also able to identify the questions of the anchor as being loaded with background information; they are also ‘what’ questions. For example: “Bashar Al Assad has

been speaking to the media about the claims that he used the chemical weapons. What's the details there in that interview"? Such questions provide information to the viewer, whilst also leaving room for the correspondent to elaborate his answers.

**c. Interviews with correspondents can take place live when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event**

It was noted through our corpus that a correspondent could also be interviewed live by the in-studio anchor when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event.

For example, the Al Jazeera English news video entitled *Live Update UN confirms Syria gas attack* (September 16, 2013) features a live interview between the in-studio anchor and the correspondent based in New York. The location, the UN in New York, is of essence to the Syrian gas attack, because the UN has just released a report on the attack.

The in-studio anchor addresses viewers when he introduces the correspondent, stating that the "...diplomatic editor James Bays who joins us live from New York..." (idem). He then addresses the correspondent, whilst still facing the camera, to ask his first question "James, the secretary said the report makes for chilling reading. You've also read the report James, what more did it have to say"? (idem). The questions asked are loaded with background information, but there are also 'what' and 'where' questions, allowing for the correspondent to elaborate on his answers.

Despite the news video being an excerpt of the live programme on AJE, one can tell that the live programme has been featuring the UN's statement on the report when the correspondent states: "There's a great deal of detail in this report that you've heard Bank Ki-Moon speak about in the last few minutes" (idem). As the correspondent quotes from the report, one can note that he is in standing in front of the several international flags and the familiar UN building, but there are no headlines to re-confirm this.

Interviews with correspondents can take place live when the correspondent is in a significant location other than that of the main event

**d. Interviews with correspondents can when the correspondent is in a neighbouring location to that of the main event**

It was also found through our corpus that interviews with correspondents would sometimes take place with the correspondents based in a location close to that of the main event. In all three such cases, the news story was on Syria; twice with France 24 covering the cabinet resignations

of Syria from Beirut, Lebanon, and Antalya, Turkey and once with AJE covering the Ghoutta chemical weapons attack of Syria from Gaziantep, Turkey.

We know from our study on the media context in Syria that being a journalist in Syria was not easy because of government clampdowns. Also, covering the chemical weapons attack from Syria was not possible or safe for international correspondents. Therefore, situating correspondents in neighbouring countries allowed for them to gather their news whilst being out of danger.

### III.4.1.9. Interviews with Topic Expert profile

Interviewing a topic expert allowed for in-studio anchors to interview experts on a topic or event so as to get an outsider and specialist point of view. The significance of interviewing topic experts is that they are expected to be knowledgeable on the topic, the region or the event itself so as to be able to give a specialist point of view to viewers. Specialists on the news should also be able to explain complicated matters to lay audiences. Finally, specialists are not expected to be involved in the event and therefore they really should be neutral. This does not mean that they are always neutral. It is of course possible that specialists have their own beliefs and convictions that may be completely different to that of other specialists, meaning that no one, not even specialists, are neutral. Also, we noted in our corpus that some topic experts interviewed were not topic experts; this can be noted in our analysis. Montgomery proposes that the expert interview “is designed to elucidate the event or topic of the news by providing ‘background’ through eliciting supplementary information, clarifying unfamiliar concepts, spelling out the implications of a development or providing independent comment” (Montgomery 2008, p.270).

An interview with a topic expert would usually take place from the studio. The topic expert could be based in the studio or in another location, facing the camera or only heard through audio. The topic expert does not need to be in the location of the event. In his research on broadcast interviews, Montgomery noted that “On several occasions during the interview a formulation offered by one party is re-formulated by the other” (Montgomery 2008, p.273) (idem). This reformulation allows for the interviewer to summarise the words of the expert for their audience. Montgomery also notes the paradox about expert interviews, that despite them being about evidence or scientific facts, “they may well incorporate or build to a definite view in favour of one position on an issue or another” (idem). As stated earlier, questions will usually be sent to topic experts prior to the interview, so as to ensure that topic excerpts are actually

able to answer the questions. Interview rehearsals are not usually done, however, because interview experts have the questions at hand, they are of course able to prepare for the interview. As a reminder, 29 percent of the news videos in our corpus actually featured interviews with a topic expert, meaning that topic experts were the second most used interviewees in the interviews conducted in our corpus on the events of the Arab Spring. Similarly, 29 percent of AJE news videos had interviews with topic experts (also second most used interviewees in the interviews conducted by AJE to cover the events of the Arab Spring). Press TV news videos with interviews dedicated 49 percent news videos to interviews with topic experts (also the second most used interview profiles in our Press TV corpus). Only 17 percent of news interviews conducted by Euronews included interviews with topic experts, but this too was the second most popular type of interviews with Euronews. France 24 also featured interviews with topic experts in 17 percent of their news videos (also the second most popular profile for France 24). Press TV was the single channel in our corpus to use topic expert profiles in over 40% of their news videos.

Via our corpus, we found two main trends in interviewing topic experts:

- 1. Questions aimed at topic experts are usually unheard on the news video and those heard are loaded with background information**
- 2. Interviews with topic experts are presented with internally presented news footage & text headlines as well as amateur and State TV footage**

The following section elaborates on each category.

- 1. Questions aimed at topic experts are usually unheard on the news video and those heard are loaded with background information**

It was noted that some questions targeted to topic experts were either unheard on the news video and or loaded with background information.

The excerpt below from AJE entitled *Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive* (June 4, 2013) shows how interviews with experts can be introduced despite viewers not hearing the question.

## In-studio Anchor:



News Video Screenshot 5 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)

So, just what is Sarin gas? Well, the nerve agent was originally developed as a pesticide but was then turned into a weapon by Nazi scientists during WWII. Sarin is a colourless and tasteless liquid that can be released as a vapour. Large doses can cause loss of consciousness, convulsions, paralysis, respiratory failure and eventually death. But its use is very difficult to prove. Weapons inspectors need soil samples from the scene of an attack and blood, urine or tissue from victims.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is an expert on chemical weapons and a former commander of British counterterrorism forces specialising in chemical biological and nuclear threats. And he says the next step is for the UN to find a way to verify the evidence.

## In-studio pre-recorded interview with Hamish de Bretton-Gordon:



News Video Screenshot 6 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)

Well, I've just returned from the region myself and have seen a lot of it first-hand. I think the French evidence is very very important step forward. It's the first time and I think it's based on the Le Monde story that came out last week. It's the first time when actually, as James was saying, we have a decent chain of evidence. [Youtube.com amateur footage Saraqeb, April] So it appears we know where it came from in Saraqeb, I'm very familiar with that part of it.

(Al Jazeera, June 4, 2013)

The excerpt above shows how the in-anchor journalist, whilst facing the camera, opens up an analysis into the topic of sarin gas. Viewers can see her reporting from her in-studio desk and background images. She gives some background information into sarin gas, its origination and

its uses in the WWII as well as the deadly after effects. She then introduces the expert interview by simply stating the name of the expert, his expertise and his experience, before citing him. At the end of her citation, viewers no longer see the anchor as her image is replaced by that of the expert. The expert is sat before a screen and a backdrop of the US capitol building in Washington. Viewers can only see the expert from his chest up and the video is captioned “WASHINGTON DC”. Also, the expert’s name and expertise are noted on the caption of the news video. In addition, AJE features quotes from the French foreign minister in the headlines, for example: “FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS TESTS CONFIRM SARIN GAS WAS USED IN SYRIA” and “FRANCE ACCUSES SYRIAN ‘REGIME AND ITS ACCOMPLISES’ OF USING THE NERVE AGENT” (idem). The in-anchor journalist was addressing her viewers, whereas the expert seems to be addressing no one and everyone in particular. We presume that when the excerpt of his interview was taken, he was addressing a journalist by camera, but viewers will also feel as though he is addressing them, because he is facing the camera. He does not actually make any reference to the anchor or the viewers. He speaks specifically about his experience and what he knows. While he speaks, amateur footage showing victims of the chemical attack is also featured by AJE.

The excerpt below from Press TV entitled '*NATO violates UN decree in Libya*' (July 19, 2011)<sup>70</sup> shows how in-anchor journalists asks questions loaded with background information.

**Homa Lezgee, Anchor from Studio, Press TV, (to camera):**



*News Video Screenshot 7 PTV: 'NATO violates UN decree in Libya' (July 19, 2011)*

Starting off from Libya where NATO warplanes have attacked Tripoli’s International Airport, destroying its radar antenna. Airport officials say 2 people have been injured in the attack. They say the radar was used for civilian purposes such as guiding flights by

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<sup>70</sup> The news video is no longer accessible on YouTube, but can be accessed from the corpus of the thesis.

the UN and relief agency organisations. However, NATO says the system is being used by regime forces to attack its aircraft. [...]

Well, let's discuss the war in Libya now with Mr. Abayomi Azikiwe, an editor of Pan-African News Wire, joining us live from Detroit. Thanks so much sir, for being with us. NATO, we've just heard, has been, has rather destroyed the radar antenna of the international airport in Tripoli. Now, it's already been accused of overriding the UN resolution, and now the attack on the airport is being called a violation of international law. Is NATO going too far?

(Press TV, July 19, 2011)

The Press TV in-studio journalist faces the camera whilst speaking. Her name has been included for viewers to see as a caption and one can note that she is based in the studio with her laptop partially visible. She begins the news programme by highlighting the first headline, the NATO attack on Tripoli's airport. She then introduces the topic expert by stating clearly that there will be a 'discussion' with him, rather than an interview; his name is included, as well as the fact that he is an editor to a news wire<sup>71</sup> and he is currently in Detroit; we are also told that it is a live discussion. The 'expert' is thanked and then background information is given on the NATO attack before the question "Is NATO going too far"? A clear position has been taken against the NATO attack in Libya and the expert is called in to ask if he is going too far. The 'expert' speaks for 83 seconds without any interruption from the anchor and is then asked another question loaded with information:

**Homa Lezgee, Anchor from Studio, Press TV, (to camera):**

Let's go to the role of the United States now. We know that the attacks rather started with the US before it handed over command of the operations to NATO. Now, a US State Department Official, has confirmed talks between US officials and Gaddafi representatives. The Gaddafi side is saying this is the first step in repairing ties. Washington says, it was asking Gaddafi to step down. Why do you think this meeting was held in the first place?

(idem)

The second question by the Press TV anchor is not only loaded with background information and citations of unnamed officials, but it also asks a "why" question. In other words, the journalists is not asking what has happened or what will happen, but rather, is telling the expert what has happened and then asking why it has happened, therefore seeking some kind of analysis and insight into the cited events. The second question also results in an 82 second long answer from the 'expert', which is eventually interrupted so that the journalist can ask another information-loaded question:

**Homa Lezgee, Anchor from Studio, Press TV, (to camera):**

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<sup>71</sup> We have not studied the different types of topic experts than news channels can use. However, through simple observation, it was noted that Press TV would sometimes interview lawyers or journalists or even research interns as though they were experts. What makes someone an expert should be their specialisations on a particular topic, either in form of research or direct work experience in which they are involved. A person's lack of specialisation in a topic can lead to misinformation on topics being discussed in the news.

If I could just refer to that question, to the issue you just raised now, and that is with relation to recognition of that council. Briefly if you can before we leave you. I'd like to raise that issue as well. A lot of questions have been asked about what's going to happen to the frozen Libyan assets once that council has been recognised. People are saying that those large numbers of, those monies and funds could be falling into the wrong hands, because we're not very sure, are we, who members of this Benghazi Council are and what the situation is exactly looking like.

(idem)

In this question as well, the journalist cites unnamed people so as to justify her question (“A lot of questions have been asked...”, “People are saying...”). But no question is asked really. In fact, the “question” is just a string of statements and the journalist wants the ‘expert’ to comment on them.

In conclusion, questions loaded with information seem to be the perfect way to call in an expert for the simple reason of comforting the channel’s point of view.

## 2. Interviews with topic experts are presented with internally presented news footage & text headlines as well as amateur and State TV footage




Table 39 Footage during Interviews with Topic Experts

It was also noted that interviews with experts would be presented along with either internally presented news footage or text headlines, as well as amateur and State TV footage. Out of all the news videos in our corpus containing interviews with topic experts, 94% included footage that was presented as though internally produced. Text headlines appeared in 61% of the news interviews with experts and 25% showed local State TV footage, whereas only 16% featured

amateur footage and even fewer (6%) featured footage from other international TV channels. If we look more closely at these per channel, AJE featured footage that was presented as though internally produced in 88% of all news videos including an interview with a topic expert, whilst featuring amateur footage in only 35% of such news videos and local state TV footage in 41% of news videos containing interviews with experts. Only 12% of news videos containing interviews with experts featured international TV footage and up to 65% of the news videos containing expert interviews featured text headlines. Press TV featured footage that was presented as though internally produced in 100% of all news videos including an interview with a topic expert, whilst never featuring amateur footage in such news videos and local state TV footage in 5% of news videos containing interviews with experts. Only 16% of news videos containing interviews with experts featured international TV footage and up to 89% of the news videos containing expert interviews featured text headlines. Euronews featured footage that was presented as though internally produced in 100% of all news videos including an interview with a topic expert, whilst featuring amateur footage and local State TV footage in 14% of such news videos. None of the news videos containing interviews with experts featured international TV footage or text headlines. It must be stated that none of the news videos from Euronews found on YouTube contained any text headlines and this is very surprising. It may be that the channel lost their headlines as they uploaded the videos onto the YouTube platform; one cannot be certain.

#### III.4.1.10. Interviews with Relevant Event Actors profile

As mentioned earlier, interviewing relevant event actors are of importance to newscasters so as to ensure that they spread the message of the people affected by an event. This was by far the most popular profile interviewed in the news videos from our corpus. Unlike topic experts, relevant event actors do not need to be well-spoken. They need to be representative of the community the journalist wants to give a voice to, therefore some news stories will feature interviews with relevant event actors who make grammatical mistakes even if it is part of the news, so as to try to represent the reality on the ground. As a reminder, 42% of the news videos in our corpus featured interviews with a relevant event actors, meaning that relevant event actors were the most used interviewees in the interviews conducted in our corpus on the events of the Arab Spring. Similarly, 70 percent of AJE news videos in our corpus had interviews with relevant event actors (also most used interviewees in the interviews conducted by AJE to cover

the events of the Arab Spring). Press TV news videos with interviews dedicated 56% news videos to interviews with relevant event actors (also the most used interview profiles in our Press TV corpus). Up to 42% of news interviews conducted by Euronews included interviews with relevant event actors, and this too was the most popular type of interviewee with Euronews. Up for 21% of France 24 news videos included interviews with relevant event actors (also the second most popular profile for France 24). France 24 was the single channel in our corpus not to mainly use relevant event actors in their interviews.

Via our corpus, we found trend main trends in interviewing relevant event actors:

- 1. Interviews with relevant event actors would be mainly included in prepared reportages rather than live on location or in the studio.**
- 2. When news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors, the journalists were mainly based in the country of the event.**
- 3. When the relevant event actor being interviewed represents an international organisation or institution/government, the questions of the journalist are most often unheard.**

The following section elaborates on each trend.

- 1. Interviews with relevant event actors would be mainly included in prepared reportages rather than live on location or in the studio.**

It was noted that interviews with relevant event actors would be mainly included in prepared reportages rather than live on location or in the studio. This is due to the obvious reason that most event actors will be on location. Of course, it is also possible to interview event actors live from the studio, but this was not noted to be popular by the news channels in our corpus. We were able to note 4 types of news videos: (1) reportages, (2) live, (3) interviews and (4) headlines. We identified all news videos that contained a prepared package by a journalist correspondent to be reportages. Reportages will usually contain footage from the location of the event, including interviews and the correspondent's discourse. As correspondents have the role of piecing together different types of content into one package that will be broadcast, they are able to prepare or use pre-recorded interviews in their package. Live news videos are identified as those which include very little preparation because an event is breaking live and the journalist is commenting on it. Interviews are news videos that only include an interview, rather than any other pre-recorded reportage. Finally, headlines are the news are recounted by the in-studio anchor and will not include live or pre-recorded interviews or reportages.

It was noted that 81% of the news videos containing interviews with relevant event actors were included in reportages. Only 11% of the news videos containing interviews with relevant event actors were included in headlines, 7% being only interview news videos and only 1% were live

interviews. If we break this down by channel, one can note that AJE had 92% of their news videos, containing interviews with relevant event actors, in form of prepared reportages. Press TV featured their interviews with relevant event actors in their reportages mainly (60%) but also in a few headlines (28%). Also, Euronews featured 94% of their interviews with relevant event actors in reportages and France 24 also featured the majority (50%) of their interviews with relevant event actors in their reportages, whilst featuring 25% in interview news videos and 25% in their headlines.




Table 40 Format of News featuring Interviews with Relevant Event Acors

The excerpt below from the Euronews video entitled *Burned Salah set to return to Yemen as unrest continues* (June 26, 2011) shows how interviews are included in news reportages:

**Reporter Voiceover:**

Injured Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh looks set to return to the country within the next 48-hours. The man who has ruled Yemen for over 30 years was injured in a bomb blast at the presidential mosque on June 3 and has been receiving medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. He is said to have suffered severe burns:



*News Video Screenshot 8 Euronews: Burned Salah set to return to Yemen as unrest continues (June 26, 2011)*

**Ahmed al-Sufi, Saleh's senior advisor [translated from Arabic to English for the purpose of the Euronews English report]:**  
"The president will appear within the next 48 hours despite our fear that the burns on his face and all over his body will be difficult for us,"

**Reporter Voiceover:**

As Yemen remains gripped by protests against the regime, it's thought that Saleh is to offer two scenarios to end the unrest. The first is to shift power to parliament to remain as a figure head. The second is to form a coalition government, then hold presidential elections and retire.

Opponents are unlikely to believe a word he says. After months of violence across Yemen, tens of thousands have taken to the streets to call for Saleh's sons to leave the country. His son Ahmad, a Republican Guard and his brother Khaled is an army commander.

Euronews, June 26, 2011

The news reportage does not feature the journalist at any time, which is conventional of Euronews reportages that have the 'invisible' correspondent (as noted earlier). The correspondent's voice is heard over the footage of President Saleh initially labelled as 'archives'. The footage is then replaced by that of a man seated at an office desk. His name and position are noted for viewers to see: Ahmed al-Sufu, Saleh's senior advisor. He is speaking in Arabic and no questions are overheard on the news video. Instead, viewers can note the journalist pause in his speech and then appear to interpret the words of the senior advisor. After interpreting the excerpt of the interview into the reportage, the journalist carries on reporting, whilst showing other footage.

**2. When news videos contained interviews with relevant event actors, the journalists were mainly based in the country of the event.**

As most interviews with relevant event actors were included in reportages constructed by out of studio journalists, it is also not a shock that most of these news videos featured journalists on the location of the event. The location of the journalist was undisclosed in most (49%) of the news videos containing interviews with relevant event actors. One cannot be sure why the

location was undisclosed for each of the news videos; there can be a variety of reasons. The first reason is related to censorship and security. We already noted in our study of the various media and countries that some channels like AJE were banned from working in some countries, such as Egypt and therefore to keep working in the country, AJE decided to withhold the names, locations and even faces of their correspondents from their news videos. Another reason could be related to the irrelevant location of journalists. For example, it was noted that Euronews correspondents would create reportage packages from already produced reportage packages, by simply adding their voice to the package, from a location completely unrelated to the location of the event. We are therefore not able to study these 49% of cases. However, what we are able to study is that 33% of news videos containing interviews with relevant event actors, featured a journalist on location and a further 3% were in a neighbouring country. Only, 10% were based in the studio and 8% were based in other countries. We can also look at this breakdown per channel. Whilst 32% of news videos containing interviews with relevant event actors did not disclose the location of their journalist, 51% were in the country of the event and a further 5% were in a neighbouring country. On Press TV, we found that 44% of journalists were based in the country of the event, with a further 4% in a neighbouring country and equal amounts (24%) based in the studio and in other locations. In the case of Euronews, most (92%) news videos featuring interviews with relevant event actors did not disclose the location of the journalist, whilst only 8% featured journalists on location. Finally, France 24 news videos featuring interviews with relevant event actors, also did not disclose the journalist location for majority of cases (66%) and in all remaining cases, the journalist was based in the studio.




Table 41 Journalist location in News Videos featuring Interviews with Relevant Event Actors

The following news excerpt features how the journalist, on location, asks interviews relevant event actors, in the AJE news video entitled *Gaddafi's last moments* (October 20, 2011).

**Journalist Voiceover:**

*(images of alleged Muammar Gaddafi, bloody and dead on the ground)* Captured on a mobile phone, the body of Libya's former leader Muammar Gaddafi bloody on the pavement. He's reported to have died of wounds suffered after he was shot having been captured in his hometown of Sirte. NTC fighters say they attacked a convoy of cars around 8 o'clock in the morning. NATO also confirmed targeting two vehicles in the area.

There are reports he was hiding in these drain-pipes. *(Image of drain pipes)*. Later, mid-day, these fighters claimed to have caught the former leader.

**Assumed Rebel Fighter speaking in Broken English:**



News Video Screenshot 9 AJE: *Gaddafi's last moments* (October 20, 2011)

He was sleeping here and make some bodyguards around the place.

We make by strong body... *(unclear)* and somebody shot him by gun 9 mm (loud celebratory shooting in the background).

**Journalist Voiceover:**

News of his fall was greeted by jubilation in Sirte. In Benghazi, NTC (National Transitional Council) leaders also welcomed the news.

**Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, NTC Vice Chairman** *(Live translation from Arabic into English)*

We will announce to the world, that Muammar Gaddafi has been killed. On the hands of the revolutionaries, and Gaddafi's tyranny and dictatorship has been finally ended and this chapter has been closed for Libya and all the world.

**Journalist Voiceover:**

Crowds gathered too on the streets of the capital, Tripoli. An outpour of joy and relief.

**Woman from streets of the capital being interviewed:**



News Video Screenshot 10 AJE: Gaddafi's last moments (October 20, 2011)

Very, very happy. I can't express my feeling. From the morning, I'm following the news, you know. I didn't believe in the beginning, but then when I saw the picture, it's 100%, I believe it! We are free 100% we are... destroying this...you know...I cannot call it ...I cannot name it...

**Al Jazeera English Journalist:**

Would you have preferred that Gaddafi had not been killed, that...?

**Woman from streets of the capital being interviewed:**

No, it's better, its better killed.

**Al Jazeera English Journalist:**

Why?

**Woman from streets of the capital being interviewed:**

If it's captured, we will have you know...different of opinions...then it's going to create a hazard.

**Al Jazeera English Journalist:**

Don't you think some of the secrets will go to the grave with him?

**Woman from streets of the capital being interviewed:**

We don't care about the secrets anymore. You know...we don't care about it...you know...as long as we get rid of him, we are free now.

**Man from streets of the capital being interviewed:**



News Video Screenshot 11 AJE: Gaddafi's last moments (October 20, 2011)

I am so proud now. It's a new era...you know. This day it's a new era in whole world... look to our eyes, you know, you will find the happiness and the peace finally. I can't find the words, really, I am so happy.

**Al Jazeera English Journalist:**

How long have you been fighting for?

**Man from streets of the capital being interviewed:**

About 2 months.

**Al Jazeera English Journalist:**

Will you be putting down your weapons now? What happens now?

**Man from streets of the capital being interviewed:**

No I don't know, we need to hide the weapons now...you know...I will surrender my weapons, ok?

**Journalist Voiceover:**

The corpse of Gaddafi's defence minister (*picture of corpse with face blurred out*) Abubakr Yunis, was filmed being taken from Sirte. Gaddafi's body too is reported to have been taken to Misrata, where it's being placed in a Mosque. His 42 years of rule have come into an ignominious end.

Tarek Bazley, Al Jazeera

(AJE, October 20, 2011)

Only one headline is used throughout the news video: GADDAFI KILLED. There is no introductory headline to the journalist or his location. There is no introductory headline to the interviewees either. One can presume that the first interviewee is a rebel because of his combat outfit, and the journalist refers to the interviewee and the people around him as 'these fighter'. His name or ranking in the combat is not deemed relevant to viewers by AJE, despite him being a relevant event actor. The voice of the journalist can be heard in the background while the rebel speaks and therefore one assumes that the journalist was on location. The journalist also notes his name at the end, but does not state his location.

In the second interview, viewers see a woman in the crowds and hear her expressing her joy that Gaddafi is no more. In this case, the headline simply states "GADDAFI KILLED The former Libyan leader is dead" (idem) and are not told who the woman is. We understand the woman to be representative of the Libyan people, at least those who are happy that Gaddafi is no longer in charge. In this case, viewers can hear the discussion between the journalist and the interviewee. Deliberate "why" questions are asked so as to get a deeper understanding of what Libyans feel about Gaddafi's death, which AJE has announced as a "killing". The third featured interview is one with a man in the crowds. Based on the overheard journalist questions, one can tell that he is a fighter. The interviews in this news video frame the downfall of Gaddafi as equivalent to freedom. Through the interviews, viewers can note happiness; celebratory gun fire can be heard above the voices of the interviewees and Libyan flags are being waved freely

amongst the crowds symbolic of a free Libya without Gaddafi. The words of the interviewees invite viewers to see freedom in Libya: “new era”, “happiness”, “peace”, “we are free 100%”. Even when the first rebel describes how Gaddafi was killed, we hear celebratory gunfire in the background.

**3. When the relevant event actor being interviewed represents an international organisation or institution/government, the questions of the journalist are most often unheard.**

Out of all the news videos from our corpus featuring relevant event actors representing an international organisation or institution, only one featured the journalist’s questions<sup>72</sup>. Therefore, interviews with international event actors are pre-recorded and only their responses are used in the news videos. The following is an excerpt from the AJE news video *US calls for political solution in Bahrain* (April 15, 2011).

**Journalist voice over**

That has been about the extent of US criticism. It has chastised the protestors for instigating violence but cause for restraint from government forces and it hasn’t said that Saudi troops should leave.

**Hilary Clinton US Secretary of State**



*News Video Screenshot 12 AJE: US calls for political solution in Bahrain (April 15, 2011)*

But I said the very same thing to the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia that I’ve just said now. I said that the security challenges cannot be a substitute for a political resolution.

**Journalist voice over**

A message both secretaries Gates and Clinton hope to deliver in person during a visit to Saudi Arabia. But both visits were cancelled, US officials citing health concerns of the Saudi ruler. Experts say Saudi Arabia is sending a clear message to the United States.

(Al Jazeera, April 15, 2011)

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<sup>72</sup> The AJE news video *Symptoms indicate chemicals use’ in Syria* (April 26, 2013), features the AJE journalist interviewing a doctor in Antakya, Turkey. The doctor had treated 13 victims from Syria’s chemical attacks. The question is stated in a comment the correspondent makes to the in-anchor studio before the actual interview is featured, in which the question is not actually heard.

As can be noted from the above excerpt, it seems as though the Secretary of State is being interviewed post-press conference. However, the journalist's question is not audible and therefore, viewers can only hear the US representative's message.

### III.4.1.11. Dominant Institution Analysis Conclusion

This chapter analysed and reach conclusions on [RQ1] how the dominant institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, and [RQ2] - how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories. Our conclusions are the result of studying two corpora (a) the dominant media institutions of information, namely Al Jazeera English, Press TV English, Euronews English, France 24 English, AFP and Crowdspark and the second representing and (b) the public information institutions of information, namely in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. We will provide concluding remarks on the lessons learnt from our two corpora of dominant institutions of information, before summarising how these organisations presented the news based on news videos in our news corpus. The context and working methods of each organisation as presented in the thesis will also be summarised.

#### Al Jazeera English

In addition to the news corpus constructed with news videos by Al Jazeera English, and the literature construction on Al Jazeera English, the research also devised interviews with representatives of Al Jazeera so as to learn more about Al Jazeera English from representatives who had different roles within the organisation. One interview was held with a former international correspondent for Al Jazeera English, while another was held with the former Head of News Gathering. We were also able to consult with the former Senior Social Media Analyst at Al Jazeera English.

We were able to map out the news flow process in Al Jazeera English, between their local bureaus and newsroom in Doha, Qatar. Al Jazeera English as a news channel, have a newsroom in their head office, which communicates with their international correspondents who are based in different parts of the world. The international correspondents, sometimes based in an AJE bureau work in news teams including producers and camera people to create news packages to be sent to the news room. The newsroom has two main departments: News Gathering and News Output. News Gathering is in charge of gathering the news from their international

correspondents based in different parts of the world. They work together with international correspondents, on the phone, to decide on stories to produce into news. Decision making is usually mutual, whereby correspondents are able to tell Doha what is going on in their location and Doha is able to confirm stories to be selected. The discourse of the journalist must be approved by News Gathering in Doha before the journalist records their voice over the news videos packaged and sent to be broadcast from News Output, also based in Doha. The News Output department is in charge of deciding how long the news programme will be, how much time is dedicated to specific topics, the order of the news stories, whether the anchor will present the stories alone or with the correspondent, via interview or with a prepared reportage. According to the AJE's former head of news gathering, micromanaging of correspondents from Doha, for example, instructing them on what camera angle to use, is not done at AJE.

Al Jazeera Arabic and Mubashr Misr were both banned in Egypt after the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], who were then declared a terrorist organisation, meaning that journalists could not interview them in Egypt. AJE did have an office in Cairo, but could not approach the MB directly. Instead, interviewing anyone "off limits" had to be done through the Doha office via teleconference so that the organisation would not get in trouble. When the situation in Egypt became tense, AJE took the decision to take their journalist names and faces off their news packages, citing safety as the reason. But AJ had access to AJE material in the network's repertoire and despite warnings from AJE staff not to air their material on the AJ Arabic channels, the network has access to all material in the repertoire and airing footage from Egypt proved that they were present in Egypt and several AJ staff were then arrested.

In terms of journalist safety, AJE ensure that journalists received hostile environment training and were placed with teams who could advise on the political situation and the dos and do nots. Journalists only request bodyguards when the situation is extremely dangerous, so as not to scare off witnesses willing to talk and requests had to go through senior executives at the network because they cost a lot of money and could affect the news produced. Having said this, risky deployments had to pass risk assessments before journalists were given missions.

Also, AJ as a network, just like news agencies, have contacts in places where they are banned from. Therefore, to overcome censorship in places where AJE is not able to freely work, Doha is able to contact various kinds of informers to get the news out of the location via safer means not risking correspondents on location. AJE tapped into their citizen journalism platforms Ushahidi and Sharek to receive material from activists on location. Journalists were also trained to use social media like Facebook, Twitter and Flickr, to communicate with activists and sometimes activists put memory cards in sneakers to pass information from one border to the next (Lim 2013, p.934).

Through our research, we learnt that Al Jazeera played a role in fuelling the protests and were present on the streets especially in 2011, giving protesters a voice against their regimes (Lynch, 2011; Alalawi, 2015) and some have even gone so far as to state that without Al Jazeera, “there would not be an Arab spring” (Essaif et al. 2012). While Al Jazeera was extremely present during the first months of the Arab Spring, it became less popular during the aftermath, so unpopular that several journalists even resigned blaming the Arabic channel for bias, for example being pro-Morsi in Egypt (Kuhn et al. 2013), or being pro-revolution in Libya (Allmeling 2012) yet being very quiet about the Bahraini uprising (Baker 2011) and very selective about the news gathered from Syria (Hashem 2012b; Hashem 2012a). Some also tried to stop AJ from broadcasting, such as in Egypt but also Tunisia shut their website down and Bahrain and Syria denied entry to AJ journalists (as they did to other journalists). Also, AJ offices in Yemen were closed down on the claim that they were reporting inaccurate stories (Alalawi 2015, pp.3–4). Al Jazeera English, which has a different editorial line to that of Al Jazeera suffered from the negative reputation of their mother company. There are notable differences, such as AJ reporting the Syrian conflict as a Freedom Revolution and AJE reporting it as “Syria: The War within” (Essaif et al. 2012). Also, AJ’s audience is made up of Arabic speakers, whereas AJE’s audience is a sophisticated English speaking audience, therefore AJE is more careful about using vocabulary that they tend to use freely on AJ, for example: “resistant people” or “freedom fighters” are terms used to describe Palestinians on AJ but not AJE (Essaif et al. 2012). Also, although AJ was very quiet on the Bahraini uprising, AJE’s exclusive documentary on the uprising, entitled “Shouting in the Dark” received awards. AJE dedicated 18 percent of their content to the events of the Arab Spring (Robertson 2012) and their journalists are usually cosmopolitan and speak with accents from the regions they are covering, or they speak English like natives. We also learnt that majority of speakers of sources used to report the events of the Arab Spring were male and more often than not, AJE interviewed activists rather than politicians or other elites (Robertson 2012, p.9). Also, most events were reported with a reporter on the site of the event, but locations of journalists were often omitted from the news (Robertson 2012, p.13). We also learn from Abdul-Nabi that AJE’s coverage of Syria’s Ghoutta attack was dominated by war journalism frames, whereby all AJE coverage was “framed as propaganda-oriented” by reporting claims or accusations of both sides (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.288). Abdul-Nabi also found that Bahrain’s uprising was not framed as an uprising because protesters were only represented as pro-democracy 2.5 percent of the time (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.286). For example, Bahraini protesters were synonymous with “hardliners” and not quoted 50 percent of the time (Abdul-Nabi 2015, p.287).

Our news corpus data on AJE is made up of 70 news videos, accounting for 28 percent of all the news videos in our news corpus. Most of the AJE news videos in our corpus were presented as reportages, with few interviews and headlines, followed by fewer live videos. In terms of international representation in the news videos on the Arab Spring, only 12 percent of AJE news videos featured US personalities, while Russians and British accounted for only 1 percent, therefore showing that most of the news videos showed local representatives. Having said this, AJE was the channel with the highest amount of international representatives in our corpus.

We were also able to study the use of interviews in our news video, by analysing stand-alone interview news videos as well as interviews included in live, headline and reportage news videos. In total, 76 percent of AJE news videos included interviews. AJE did not include their interview questions in 71 percent of news videos, meaning that viewers could only hear interviewees' answers most of the time. Out of those heard on the news video, AJE had a preference for questions loaded with background information (87%), followed by 'what' (73%) questions. AJE asked 'why' questions 27 percent of the time and 'how' questions 20 percent of the time. Few questions 'where' (13%) questions were asked and only 13 percent of news videos containing interviews featured questions with no background information by the interviewer. Also, AJE did not ask any 'who' questions in the news videos containing interviews. AJE showed a preference for interviewing relevant event actors (70%) over topic experts (26%) and correspondents (12%), therefore opting that the people of the Arab Spring build their narratives. Having said that, 24 percent of AJE's news stories did not include interviews at all and therefore were news stories constructed by AJE. Sixty-seven percent of AJE's news videos featuring interviews with correspondents featured the correspondent on location of the event. If we look specifically at interviews with relevant event actors, AJE mainly presented the interviews in reportages (92%) and only included interviews with relevant event actors in news videos categorised as stand-alone interviews 5 percent of the time. Additionally, interviews with relevant event actors were featured in live news videos only 3 percent of the time. While interviewing relevant event actors, the AJE journalist was in the same country of the event 51 percent of the time. For 32 percent of the time, the AJE journalist interviewing the relevant event actor was in an undisclosed location, further echoing the fact that AJE chose not to disclose the location of their journalists for safety reasons. In few cases (8%), the AJE journalist interviewing a relevant event actor was in a location other than the location of the event or the studio. In fewer cases (5%), the journalist was located in a neighbouring country and in almost no cases (3%) was the journalist based in the studio. In news videos with topic experts, AJE featured footage that appeared to be internally produced 88 percent of the time along with text headlines 65 percent of the time; also, State TV footage was featured 41 percent of the time.

## Press TV

Desk research on Iran's Press TV was limiting and it was noted that there is a large gap in the literature leading to a poor understanding of how the mainstream channel functions. The Press TV website and other press articles note that the mainstream channel, launched in 2007, which broadcasts in English 24 hours a day from Tehran, often interview people not to be found on western mainstream news and also ask questions usually unheard on western mainstream news. Although the channel is state funded, just like Al Jazeera, France 24 and the BBC, they claim independence from the Iranian government. Some have noted that Press TV acts to "counter... Western propaganda against Iran" (Mostaghim & Daragahi 2007).

Jaspal studied Press TV's coverage of the events of the Arab Spring on their website via articles, and found that the events were "Islamacized" and the events were referred to as the "Islamic Awakening" and "secular government" is described as being "destructive to democracy" (Jaspal 2014). Also, it was found that Iranian press, including Press TV used the events of the Arab Spring to promote Iranian ideology and Iran's strategic interest in the Arab World by reporting threats from the US or Israel.

No other information on Press TV was found and our attempts to interview someone representing the organisation did not materialise even after several attempts at contacting the newsrooms and former representatives of the organisation. Therefore, our research relies on our news corpus with news videos from Press TV to fill the gap in literature on Press TV.

Our news corpus data on Press TV English (PTV) is made up of 41 news videos, accounting for 16 percent of all the news videos in our news corpus. Most of the PTV news videos in our corpus were presented as headlines (18) and reportages (17), with few interviews (5) and live videos (1). In terms of international representation in the news videos on the Arab Spring, only 9 percent of PTV news videos featured US personalities, while Russians and British accounted for only 2 percent of the news videos, therefore showing that most of the news videos showed local representatives. PTV featured the second highest amount of international representatives in our corpus after AJE.

PTV had a heightened preference for using interviews; up to 90 percent of their news videos contained interviews, meaning only 4 of their news videos did not contain interviews.

Eighty-nine percent of the questions asked in interviews by PTV were questions loaded with background information. The questions were actually used as a mechanism for reporting some news that had not been reporting in a reportage, live or headline; only 21 percent of questions were not loaded with background information. PTV opted for 'what' questions 47 percent of

the time, followed by ‘why’ questions 26 percent of the time and ‘how’ and ‘where’ questions were asked 11 percent of the time. It must also be noted that although questions to interviewees were unheard up to 49 percent of the time, this percentage is lower than that of any of the other news channels, therefore showing again that PTV aims to report news in form of questions more than the other news channels who prefer that viewers focus on the interviewee’s answers. Also, PTV did not ask any ‘who’ questions in the news videos containing interviews. PTV showed a preference for interviewing relevant event actors (64%) and topic experts (49%) with no interviews whatsoever held with correspondents (0%), who appeared to be used mainly to send in prepared reportages to be broadcast. This shows that although PTV gave a voice to relevant event actors, they also tended to bring in the views of topic experts quite often. Topic experts brought into the studio or contacted by telephone to confirm information and support PTV opinions. Sometimes topic experts were interviewed as part of a reportage as well. Topic experts ranged in profile, from journalists and researchers to lawyers and representatives of organisations, without detailing their actual position at the organisation.

If we look specifically at interviews with relevant event actors, PTV mainly presented the interviews in reportages (60%). PTV also included interviews in what appeared to be headlines from the studio (28%) and 12 percent of news videos appeared to be stand-alone interviews with relevant event actors. No interviews with relevant event actors were featured in live news videos. While interviewing relevant event actors, the PTV journalist was in the same country of the event 44 percent of the time. In other news videos, the PTV journalist was based either in the studio while asking questions or in another location (24 percent). The PTV journalist was rarely (4%) based in an undisclosed location while asking questions. In news videos featuring interviews with topic experts, PTV featured footage that appeared to be internally produced all the time and international TV footage was featured in 89 percent of news videos.

## Euronews English

We were able to gather information on Euronews via an interview with Lyon’s editor in chief and also via various literature on the organisation. Euronews as a network launched in 1993 has grown to broadcast in twelve languages via twelve dedicated channels transcending European languages. The “glocal” brand tailors their content for their audiences with their 500 journalists based in thirty countries (Dobbie 2017; Euronews 2018a). The Euronews project has been likened to Europa-TV, a European media group that broadcast in 1985, in the aim of contributing to European integration so as to combat against US media (Machill, 1998). But even though Euronews receives EU funding, the corporation broadcasts all over the world, even

outside of Europe. And despite receiving public funds, Euronews argues that they are not influenced by foreign ministers and note that the coverage of Euronews France for example is not identical to that of French media (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.114 Interview with euronews).

Each newsroom sets their daily editorial priorities to broadcast for the day (Gillet, 2017) and repeats these news stories over 24 hours followed by headlines, European Affairs, Sports headlines and the weather forecast (Gales, 2009). News selection is made based on the story having some kind of significance to Europe or Europeans (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, p.112). The Euronews charter is strict and does not show people dying or children being subject to violence, unless they feel it is necessary to sharing the full truth, such as showing Gaddafi's corpse or the first executions in Syria's uprising. Prior to sensitive images being shown however, audiences are warned.

News verification at Euronews takes place through journalists on the ground, news agencies and citizen journalists or informers also on location. In addition, the organisation uses news verification agencies like Storyful to verify the news.

The Forward Planning department at Lyon tasks journalists, based in one of thirteen global newsrooms, on the stories that need to be covered. Like Al Jazeera, the Euronews newsrooms have access to a repertoire of information, also including material from 12 news agencies, which they can use in building their news videos. Despite often using the same material, the newsrooms produce different narratives of news stories based on their audiences and story angles requested from the head office. Therefore, although some news packages are reused by other Euronews channels, rather than giving an exact translation of the narrative, journalists usually interpret the story for their specific audiences (Polonska-Kimunguyi et al. 2012, pp.112–113).

As there is a gap in the literature of Euronews English coverage of the events of the Arab Spring, our news corpus analysis aims to fill the gap.

Our news corpus data on Euronews English (Euronews) is made up of 83 news videos, accounting for 33 percent of all the news videos in our news corpus. Most of the Euronews news videos in our corpus were presented as reportages (95 percent), with few headlines (4%) and only 1 percent interviews. None of the Euronews news videos were live videos. In terms of international representation in the news videos on the Arab Spring, only 7 percent of Euronews news videos featured US personalities (third lowest US representation amongst all news channels from our corpus), while French and British accounted for only 2 percent of news videos, despite the news channel being European. This therefore shows that despite the channel being European, European perspective is not necessarily predominant. In fact, the predominant

representation of the news of the event of the Arab Spring was specifically local representatives of the news videos showed local representatives. No Russian representatives were noted in any of the Euronews news videos and only 1 percent of their news videos included Iranian representation.

We were also able to study the use of interviews in our news video, by analysing stand-alone interview news videos as well as interviews included in live, headline and reportage news videos. An almost equal amount of Euronews videos contained interviews (49%) as those that did not (51%). Euronews did not include their interview questions in 93 percent of news videos, meaning that viewers could only hear interviewees' answers most of the time. Out of those heard on the news video, Euronews had preference (67%) for questions loaded with background information as opposed to questions asked without any background information (33%). There was an emphasis on 'how' questions (67%) and 'what' questions were used 33 percent of the time. Euronews did not ask any 'why', 'who' or 'where' questions. Euronews showed a preference for interviewing relevant event actors (85%) over topic experts (17%) and correspondents (2%), therefore opting that the people of the Arab Spring build their narratives. Having said that, almost half of Euronews news stories did not include interviews at all and therefore were news stories constructed by Euronews. All Euronews news videos featuring interviews with correspondents featured the correspondent on location of the event. If we look specifically at interviews with relevant event actors, Euronews mainly presented the interviews in reportages (94%) and in the headlines (6%). Euronews did not feature interviews with relevant event actors in live sequences, nor did they dedicate news videos to stand-alone interviews with relevant event actors. While interviewing relevant event actors, the Euronews journalist was in the same country of the event only 8 percent of the time. For the remaining 92 percent of news videos including interviews with relevant event actors, the journalist's location was undisclosed. In interviews with topic experts, Euronews featured footage that appeared to be internally produced in all news videos. Additionally, Euronews also featured local state TV footage (14%) in news videos featuring interviews with topic experts.

## France 24 English

Set up in 2006 as part of France Médias Monde, France 24 in 2018 broadcasts through four language channels, English, French, Arabic and Spanish including via social media platforms. We were able to conduct interviews with a permanent international correspondent for France 24 France based in Tunisia and Libya during the events of the Arab Spring as well as a freelance international correspondent based in Libya during the Libyan conflict of 2011. These interviews

enabled a better understanding in the news production methods of France 24 which changes depending on the contract of the journalist on location. The France 24 fulltime correspondent on location explained that their role is to pitch story ideas to the France 24 newsroom, who in turn may amend news stories prior to production. The fulltime correspondent on location is in charge of seeking and preparing material for a story by conducting interviews on location and also gathering material in terms of images and footage. The Paris news room would provide further material using their library of material. The on location journalist, in charge of writing the script for each news reportage writes it in the language they are able to report in and sometimes France 24 journalists are asked to work in pairs so that each one would provide the script in the language they are fluent in. Scripts are then approved in the Paris newsroom, before the on location journalist packages the entire story to be sent to Paris so as to be broadcast. Fulltime journalists on location are sometimes given camera people to work with, but in the case of our interviewee, he had trouble finding people willing to film in danger zones and eventually had to prepare packages alone, meaning that the fulltime correspondent was filming, speaking and editing the entire package broadcast on France 24. Independent journalists on the other hand are asked to work with a telephone, which they answer when the France 24 anchor is ready to go live with questions, therefore there is no news package that is produced beforehand. Instead, the on-location freelancer and the Paris newsroom communicate on the phone prior to going live to go over questions and storylines. Both freelancer and producer mutually agree on the questions to be asked, based on information the freelancer is able to confirm. The freelancer is on location to observe the events and ask questions to verify information, so that when France 24 receives news on a news wire, they are able to further confirm the events with their freelance journalist on location. Therefore, when the anchor speaks to the freelancer, footage from other sources are featured.

Through our interviews with the France 24 correspondents, we learnt that news verification takes place by cross checking information with various official and unofficial sources ranging from doctors and hospitals to human rights organisations, military organisations and official spokespersons on location as well as unofficial actors on location such as rebels and fighters. Physical evidence is also of essence, and therefore journalists try as much as possible to visit the location of an event to see victims, bodies, explosions with their own eyes.

The freelance correspondent we spoke to was hired to broadcast the news from a conflict zone after only two years of radio experience. No training was given prior to the mission and no work contract was even signed.

In terms of managing freelance correspondents, it was found that journalists with little experience and no organisation training be hired for missions in zones of conflict with no work

contracts signed therefore relieving the media organisation from any responsibilities. The journalist we spoke to had not passed the Hostile Environment First Aid Training and was not insured by France 24. Furthermore, she was not given a bullet-proof vest or helmet until her colleague – a permanent France 24 journalist- left the country and kindly shared his protection gear with her. But it was found that even permanent France 24 staff sometimes worked without bullet-proof vests and therefore faced dangerous situations and they too were sometimes uninsured. Similarly, camera crew are not insured, making it difficult to find staff to work in conflict zones. International correspondents sometimes have to work out of their hotel room or make-shift temporary home, because mainstream media do not necessarily have offices all over the world.

While on location, journalists work with fixers, local people who facilitate the news gathering process for journalists because they speak the language, understand the culture, know the country well and have contacts. Through our interviews, we learnt that although fixers were helpful in news gathering in conflict zones and some journalists simply cannot work without them, they tend to guide journalists to gather their side of the news, because they usually have contacts on one side of the conflict.

Our news corpus data on France 24 English (F24) is made up of 58 news videos, accounting for 23 percent of all the news videos in our news corpus. Most of the F24 news videos in our corpus were presented as live narratives (4%), with 24 percent standalone interviews, 19 percent headlines and 17 percent reportages. In terms of international representation in the news videos on the Arab Spring, only 1 percent of news videos features Iranian, French or US personalities and no Russian personalities were noted (the lowest international representation amongst all news channels from our corpus). This therefore shows that despite the channel being European, European perspective is not necessarily predominant. In fact, the predominant representation of the news of the event of the Arab Spring was specifically local representatives of the news videos showed local representatives.

We were also able to study the use of interviews in our news video, by analysing stand-alone interview news videos as well as interviews included in live, headline and reportage news videos. Seventy-four percent of F24 news videos contained interviews. F24 did not include their interview questions in 53 percent of news videos, meaning that viewers could only hear interviewees' answers most of the time. Out of those heard on the news video, F24 had preference for questions loaded with background information (75%). There was an emphasis on 'what questions (40%) with few 'how' and 'why' questions. Other questions asked did not fall into the categories outlined for this research. F24 showed a preference for interviewing correspondents (85%) over relevant event actors (28%) and topic experts (17%), therefore

opting that journalists build the narratives of the Arab Spring. F24 correspondents were in the location of the event while being interviewed on 58 percent of news videos. If we look specifically at interviews with relevant event actors, F24 mainly presented the interviews in reportages (50%) and in the headlines (25%) as well as standalone interviews (25%). While interviewing relevant event actors, the F24 journalist was either in the studio (33%) or in an undisclosed location (67%). When interviewing topic experts, F24 featured footage that appeared to be internally produced 88 percent of the time. F24 also featured text headlines in 36 percent of news videos featuring interviews with topic experts. Local State TV footage was featured in 25 percent of news videos featuring interviews with topic experts and amateur footage was featured in 13 percent of news videos by F24 featuring interviews with topic experts.

#### AFP

With a head office in Paris, the over a century old agency also has regional offices around the world, with the bureau in Nicosia acting as a news hub reporting and broadcasting news from the Near and Middle East. The news hub is fed by news incoming from bureaus set up in various countries in the region, with over 15 offices in the Middle East alone, including in Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria, to name a few.

In areas where the agency does not have a bureau, they commission teams made up of a journalist, a photographer and a videographer to work on three to four week missions in areas that needed coverage but were too dangerous to be based in permanently. The news agency works with sources in networks they have been building over several decades in the Middle East, constituting local country officials but also opposition members, human rights organisations and associations and informers as well as citizen journalists and local press and local press agencies. Reporting the news from areas of conflict that ban or cracks down on journalists, such as Syria, obliged AFP to add additional sources to their news gathering framework during the events of the Arab Uprising, including new activists involved in the uprisings and associations such as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which according to AFP proved to be a reliable source on multiple occasions. Because the information gathered from activists will usually be biased, AFP must also cross-check and supplement information gathered by communication with various sources in a location. Additionally, AFP builds long-lasting relationships with activists they do not meet by communicating with them on a regular, if not, daily basis.

As part of their stance on journalist safety, AFP have warned freelancers against sending material from places too unsafe for their journalists to be in, so as to discourage freelancers from risking their lives. The result is that few experienced journalists will dare to go to locations that they are explicitly told to avoid by their managers. Therefore, one problem with the news on the Middle East, according to AFP is that journalists report news stories that have not been verified properly and some journalists working in zones of conflict are inexperienced and lack historical knowledge of the region and the country they are in. A solution to this problematic was attempted in the after-math of the Arab Spring in Syria with AFP training people who were already residing in Syria – Syrians – on gathering material to be broadcast internationally, rather than commissioning people to go to places of danger. AFP set up workshops on the Turkish-Syrian border, where they trained Syrian stringers to gather material from Syria to send to them. Stringers were given equipment and trained on photo type images and quality expected from the agency. In turn, AFP journalists would verify images using both technical means (such as checking file meta-tags) and human resources (such as requesting complementary information from the stringer via WhatsApp). According to AFP, everyone including journalists are citizens and therefore every piece of information that comes into the agency, whether it is from a citizen journalist or a professional AFP journalist on payroll, must be cross checked at the national and then regional bureau before being broadcast.

In terms of news selection, AFP works on trending stories, because they are demanded by their clients, the mainstream media. Additionally, changes in trending stories are also broadcast so as to report any changes in a rebel or regime held land for example. Every single casualty in a conflict is first and as the numbers reach 100, then every 100 are reported and as the numbers reach 1,000, then every 1,000 are reported. Because the number of casualties do not really report conflicts, AFP also try to construct news stories of human beings, so as to report what it is like to live in an area of conflict. Information they consider to be terrorist propaganda, especially featuring the killing of hostages are almost never featured in AFP news so as respect the loved ones of victims. Also, any information by terrorist organisations are usually paraphrased so as not to function as a mouthpiece for such criminal organisations. On the other hand, visuals they feel are necessary and informative to the story being constructed have been included; for example photos of Gaddafi's body taken by AFP journalists in Libya were broadcast. One problematic of not broadcasting brutal footage, even featuring terrorists, is that it covers up a violence that although sometimes staged, like the executing of people, is in fact a reality.

Because AFP, as a news wholesaler, produces news for clients who are mainstream media with various editorial lines, their news stories should only feature facts with no specific angle featured in the news construction, which would discourage some clients from using their products. This means that news stories are made available for all clients to choose from, rather

than news being customised on a per-client basis. In addition to preparing their news packages for their clients, mainstream media, AFP constructs their news stories with the final audience in mind, and therefore ensures that their material should have a didactic and education approach, by explaining the context, history and background of events in the news features they distribute. AFP first distributed news to their clients before then distributing the news online for final audiences via Google, Yahoo! MSN and social networks like Facebook and Twitter. Although AFP clients can subscribe to specific news themes or regions via the AFP newswire, these are simply filters that affect what news they receive, as opposed to what news AFP produces. Additionally, today's web audience has not affected AFP's news verification methods, instead it has had an impact on the news format, whereby although the news is the same, its format today includes more photos and videos along with shorter text.

Despite news travelling fast due to social media today, therefore making newsrooms ever-competitive, AFP notes that it is almost impossible to be first to share news today. Instead, they must focus on being the most accurate. And although news is discovered on social media platforms, by tracking official accounts for official statements, AFP was a latecomer on social media and only began tweeting in mid-2011. Since then, AFP journalists have been trained on social media and even encouraged to use social media, notably Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Tumblr. AFP journalists are also asked to include disclaimers on their social media profiles stating that expressed views and shared content are not endorsed by AFP. AFP journalists are also asked to remain neutral and check with the bureau before broadcasting any information, because the information may turn out to be false.

Because the keys of the broadcasting gates are not only in the hands of professional media, an overflow of news has broken open the broadcasting gates, leading to abundant information at the fingertips of audiences. But according to AFP Beirut's editor-in-chief, instead of resulting in a more knowledgeable audience, it has resulted in a fussy audience that picks the news that will justify their opinions about events and pushes away news that contradicts their ideologies. To conclude, the AFP news flow begins when an event takes place. The event will be witnessed by an AFP informer, activist or journalist on location, who will inform the local AFP staff, who in turn will cross-check the information with other sources. Once the information is verified, news is produced and packaged before being sent to the regional office in Nicosia. In turn, Nicosia will cross-check the information with other sources before broadcasting the information by distributing it on their newswire to their clients and then on other platforms to audiences.

## Crowdspark

Crowdspark, the citizen journalist news agency initially set up in France in 2006 under the name Scooplive (which then evolved into Citizenside and Newzulu) to organise user-generated images for professional media to access, works specifically with news contributors around the world who send in news contributions in form of photos, videos, interviews and articles to be used by mainstream media in their news. Contributors post news on the Crowdspark platform to be verified and turned into journalistic content for their media clients to then select and use. The agency has built a community of content contributors by allowing their clients to alert contributors to gather material on events in their location. Technical verification takes place just like AFP through meta-data information but also IP tracking, GPS trails and working in collaboration with the news verification agency, storyful, as well as human journalists from the agency who request complementary information from contributors. Verified material is then converted into what the agency calls “journalistic-content”, by removing biases in captions and adding information about locations and other neutral facts as well as including the source-bias on the caption so that media clients understood the contributor’s point of view.

Like AFP, Crowdspark also takes a stance against showing brutally violent images, but will show graphic images if they are necessary to sharing the true story being reported.

The agency packages verified and modified content for their clients to access on their various platforms and revenues made from content are distributed between the agency and the news contributor.

Content contributors are not directly trained, but rather guided with information on how to contribute material and tips on gathering content that will be saleable. The guidelines put in place a selection procedure that content contributors adopt if they want their content bought quickly: content should be exclusive, uploaded immediately after taken, even posted live and have high resolution. Also, contributors are advised to show locations in the photos they take, feature various angles and explain why the photo is significant. Contributors are also instructed to conduct interviews with significant people in their environment. They are told to ask open ended questions and not interrupt the interviewee as they speak. Although the agency does not provide any insurance or security of any sort to the contributors, they provide tutorials on safety and might deliver accreditation to their contributors so as to facilitate location access. Contributors are also warned in the guidelines against putting themselves in danger.

To conclude, the Crowdspark news flow begins when a news contributor signs up to become a content contributor on the agency’s platform. Media clients also sign up to purchase material on the agency platform or specifically alert content contributors to send material from neighbouring locations. The content contributor gathers content of an event, then uploads the

content to the agency platform. This content is verified, filtered or altered so that it becomes journalistic content by Crowdspeak, before accepting its publication on their platform for media clients to select. Approved content can be purchased by agency clients so that the agency is paid for the material. The agency in turn ensures that the content contributor gets paid for the content. The media client must include a reference to the agency and the content provider (unless anonymity is requested) in the instance that they use that material in any other productions.

After studying the way in which the dominant media institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, we also studied the ways in which the dominant public institutions of information influenced international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring. The information gathered on the various countries represented in our news corpus is the result of desk research based primarily on press articles and publications by international organisations.

## Bahrain

In Bahrain, it was found that although the country had the highest internet connectivity, including internet access in public areas and a very high mobile penetration rate, the laws did not encourage information publication or access, to the point that the country was recorded as being 'Not Free' by the Freedom House both in 2012 and all the way up to 2017 (Freedom House 2011a). The country, a monarchy, follows martial law, which led to protester and media crack down during their uprising. There are reports of protesters, individuals and the media being detained, arrested, beaten, tortured and even killed. Even international organisations were banned from entry in 2011. The press law of 2002 clamped down on media rights, whereby critics of Islam, the King or any government reforms can be prisoned and fined. Also, during their uprising, because of no freedom of information act, the government could censor and shut down both local and foreign media. Newspapers have been shut down, books and movies have been banned, websites have been blocked and even individuals have been persecuted. Also, strict terrorism laws have been used against any political groups in opposition to the government (Freedom House 2012a). Although social media was accessible, specific pages on social media were often blocked.

Bahrainis have been recorded to be the most active tweeters during the Arab Spring. But live broadcasting sites were blocked along with online chatting services specifically used for political discussions, such as Paltalk. In addition to the clamp down on private media, it was also noted that the government tampered with information coming out of Bahrain (PR Watch

2012; Desmukh 2013). There are reports of the Bahraini government hiring international public relation firms to spread pro-government information and negative information about activists and opposition (Bahrain Watch 2012). Additionally, trolls were hired to attack the credibility of users posting anti-government comments online (Kelly et al. 2012, p.7).

Our corpus of news videos covering Bahrain represent 8 percent of all news videos, with a focus on the Bahraini uprising and the Saudi intervention in the country. The events were represented in news videos featuring 4% of Iranian personalities and 14 percent of US representatives. Saudi Arabia was of course also present, but the percentage is unknown as Saudi Arabia was not sought for in our corpus analysis of non-Arab international representatives. The footage location on news videos covering the Bahraini uprising were mainly (90%) in Bahrain, with some videos also featuring Saudi Arabia (14%), the US (14%), Iran (5%) and other (5%) locations<sup>73</sup>. The footage featured in the news videos on Bahrain range from military equipment (67%) and peaceful demonstrations (38%) to violent riots (38%) and destruction (24%). The news videos on Bahrain also featured press conferences (14%) and suffering (14%). Ninety percent of news videos on Bahrain include interviews and stories are recounted by relevant event actors (57%) and topic experts (48%) only. No correspondents are interviewed to report the events in Bahrain and this is not surprising given the crackdown on journalists.

## Egypt

In Egypt too, it was noted that there were specific barriers to communication related to the communication laws put in place by the government. By 2010, just one year before the Egyptian uprising, the UN registered Egypt as the third leading African country in e-readiness and their position dropped to number five one year later in the aftermath of the revolution. In 2011, Egypt had over 200 internet service providers (United Nations 2012, p.15) and Egyptians were broadcasting their news to the world using news websites set up by activists and citizen journalists.

The Egyptian government has been cracking down on individuals or journalists who insult Islam or the Egyptian President since at least 2007 due to the 2006 press law that makes it illegal to distribute false news or criticise the president, religion or country. Also, the Egyptian constitution paves the way for the government to intervene in the media so as to enforce public order. In fact, Egypt was listed as one of the worst countries to blog from because of violent

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<sup>73</sup> Footage location sought in our analysis include: Unknown, Other, US, UK, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Israel, Iran, France and the same country.

crackdown on bloggers. Individuals, amateur and professional journalists have been threatened, detained, arrested, and assaulted - including sexual assaults - tortured and killed by both plain clothes police and the military are numerous (Martinez 2011, CPJ 2011a, CPJ 2011b).

Despite poor internet access, Egyptians were the leading Arab users of Facebook in 2011. The Egyptian government did not block social media until sometime in the middle of the 2011 uprising; however, two Egyptian Facebook groups with large subscribers were blocked. Bloggers in Egypt became so active around 2008 that they became media celebrities and even won international awards. The army bribed people to comment positively about the Egyptian government online and they changed content on independent media outlets.

Websites of the opposition such as that of the Muslim Brotherhood were blocked as well as official sites of international Arab media such as Al Jazeera and BBC Arabic as well as Al Arabiya. Smaller Arab media sites have also been the target of slow networks and cut-offs (ANHRI/IFEX 2010). In addition, offices of professional media, such as that of Al Jazeera, were shut down.

Our corpus of news videos covering Egypt represent 39 percent of all news videos, with a focus on the Egyptian uprisings during both Mubarak and Morsi's time in office. The first uprising is solely represented with Egyptian representatives while the second featured US representatives in a minimal percentage (5%) of videos. Both events are mainly represented with footage from Egypt, with Egypt's first uprising being represented with 100 percent of the footage from Egypt and the second uprising is represented with 89 percent of news videos featuring footage from Egypt. Additionally, there is also minimal footage in the US (3%), Palestine (3%), other (5%) and unknown (5%) locations. Egypt's first and second uprisings are largely represented with footage of peaceful demonstrations (67% and 55% respectively). The first uprising is also represented with footage of violent riots (28%), military equipment (28%) and with minimal features of public speeches (6%), destruction (6%), and suffering (6%). The second uprising similarly is also represented with few images of violent riots (26%) and military equipment (24%). There are however, more representations of public speeches (15%) and a significantly higher percentage of press conferences (34%) and destruction (15%). There is also a lower number of images representing suffering (3%). Both uprisings are largely represented using interviews (83% and 73% respectively) with a preference for interviews through relevant event actors (56% and 46% respectively). The first uprising is also represented via interviews with correspondents in 28 percent of news videos, whereas the second uprising is only represented with correspondent interviews in 14 percent of the news videos. Finally, while the first uprising is not at all represented via topic experts, the second uprising is represented in 19 percent of the news videos via a topic expert.

## Libya

In Libya, people were slow to gain internet access and accessibility was expensive; because of sanctions, post-Lockerbie bombing. Despite IT being promoted by the government with few restrictions as of 2000, accessibility was still expensive in 2011 for most Libyans (Freedom on the Net 2012). High internet prices and low SIM card prices increased the use of mobile phones among Libyans, but both telecoms and internet was managed by the government leading to a restrictive communications environment under Gaddafi with much of the 2011 conflict being under a communications' blackout in terms of internet and telephone communication (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Chinese and Eastern European hackers were commissioned to stop the distribution of anti-government content. Also, the government spied on online and telephone conversations using French and UAE software Offline, there are reports from Freedom House (2012b) and journalists we have interviewed, that international reporters were invited during the 2011 conflict to report the news from the regime side in propaganda-style. Reporters were surveyed, told where they could go and who they could talk to.

In terms of information access, internet cafes instructed customers not to visit websites that could harm the "national security" or "public morals" (Freedom on the Net 2012).

Blogging was not as active as in other Arab countries prior to 2011 and did not focus on political content except for those set up by Libyans living in other countries (Gazzini 2007; Freedom on the Net 2012) and during the conflict, political blogging increased in the diaspora and also began in eastern Libya.

The 1969 Libyan Constitutional Declaration and the 1988 Green Charter for Human rights guaranteed freedom of speech and opinion whilst limiting it simultaneously. Therefore, just like Bahrain and Egypt, Libya's laws made it punishable (up to the death penalty) for any individual or professional to threaten the religion, national security and the government or even to access information that threatened religion, national security and the government (Freedom on the Net 2012). There are reports of journalists that have been abducted, tortured and killed as well as news channels like Al Jazeera being blocked (Reporters without Borders 2005, [aljazeera.com](http://aljazeera.com), 2011, Freedom on the Net 2012; Committee to Protect Journalists 2011a).

Our corpus of news videos covering Libya represent 20 percent of all news videos, with a focus on both the Libyan conflict and the death of Gaddafi. The death of Gaddafi has minimal international (British and US) representation (7%) and the Libyan conflict is represented with marginally higher US representation (19%) as well as British representation (10%) and French representation (8%) despite it being an international intervention. The footage in the news

videos on Gaddafi's death is largely held in Libya (93%) with minimal footage in either unknown (7%) or other (7%) countries. The Libyan conflict on the other hand has less footage in Libya (only 70%) with minimal footage (3%) in France, 19 percent in other countries and 14 percent in undisclosed locations. The footage of the conflict mainly features military equipment (73%) and destruction (65%) as well as press conferences (49%) and few peaceful demonstrations (8%) along with minimal images of suffering (5%) and public speeches (3%). The death of Gaddafi mainly features images of suffering or death (64%) and a similar percentage of destruction to the conflict (64%), but features fewer images of military equipment (43%), much fewer press conferences than images of the conflict (14%). The news videos on Gaddafi's death also feature few representations of press conferences (14%) and fewer images of public speeches (7%). The conflict was represented using interviews in a little over half of the news videos (54%), with a particular preference for interviews with relevant event actors. The death of Gaddafi is represented with interviews in 71 percent of news videos, also with a preference for relevant event actor profiles. Both events are also marginally represented using correspondent interviews.

## Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia, people gained internet access, like Libyans, only in 1998, with poor provinces having poor access. Because of high internet costs, similar with the other countries studied, Saudis turned to mobile use and therefore by 2012 mobile penetration was up to 191 percent (Freedom House 2012d).

No communication devices were banned in Saudi Arabia, except to security organisations. Also, the blackberry service – not device- was banned in 2012 until the government was given permission to access encrypted messages.

Although the political landscape in Saudi Arabia in 2011 was nowhere near as catastrophic as that of other Arab uprisings, Saudis criticised the government on social media and bloggers and IT users were arrested and the government issued warnings on and offline whilst also banning protests. People were hired to warn people online against being critical of the government, online or in a public demonstration. And although the government blocked content that destroyed the Saudi reputation, such as showing poor areas online, they also monitored online discussions by citizens to understand their needs. For example, victims from the floods in Jeddah in 2011 were compensated after the King saw videos of the floods online.

Everyone was monitored both on and offline; therefore activists were detained and intimidated (Freedom House 2012). Like in Libya, internet cafes were monitored; in addition to providing

customer records to authorities, internet cafes also had to install hidden cameras to monitor customers and only adults could access internet cafes and curfews were put in place.

The highest Arab tweets originate from Saudi Arabia but pages critical of politics, religion or human rights, including women's right to drive, were made inaccessible. The anti-terrorism law of Saudi Arabia sentences offenders for at least ten years for all forms of rebellion against the government, including even requesting political reform. Saudis contributed to online discussions rather than creating blogs themselves, leading to a high number of micro-bloggers (on social media) not reflected in the number of bloggers, which are mainly female and do not create political content, perhaps being the result of self-censorship.

Websites containing such content as well as content in addition to information about illegal topics such as alcohol, drugs, gambling or terrorism, were also blocked. The country has criminalised the act of hacking emails or websites "to deface, destroy, modify, or deny access" and publishing content that criticises the government (Freedom House 2012). News sites were also funded to reflect the government opinion, while those who refused to reflect the government opinion were shut down. Saudi Arabia's Basic Law of 1992 does not allow for freedom of press. The Press and Publications Act of 2000 treats individuals and professionals who publish any type of content equally, requiring all publishers to have a publishing license, even bloggers who wish to remain anonymous. There have been reports of detainments and arrests without charges and punishments ranging from fines to lifetime imprisonments and executions (Knickmeyer 2013; Toumi 2012; Committee to Protect Journalists 2010b; Committee to Protect Journalists, 2011). Criticising religious leaders is banned and the press is regarded as an education tool, which should act as a government mouthpiece and has the role of ensuring national harmony and unity. So far, the only effective way to discuss controversial topics in Saudi Arabia, has been through satire, or comical videos posted on YouTube.

Our corpus of news videos covering Saudi Arabia represent only 3 percent of all news videos, with a focus on women's right to vote in Saudi Arabia. This Saudi event featured no international personalities present in the news videos. The images in the news videos are all based in Saudi Arabia (100%) with 14 percent of the news videos also featuring footage from other countries. The footage of the Saudi event mainly features press conferences (86%) and other footage types not included in our analysis. The event was represented using interviews in 71 percent of news videos, with a preference for topic expert interviewees (71%) and some relevant event actor profiles (29%).

## Syria

In Syria, the telecommunications infrastructure is one of the least developed in the Middle East and by the end of 2010, only one-fifth of the population had internet access. Between 2010 and 2011, all fourteen ISPs of Syria were state owned, surveyed and censored. Any private internet companies had to request licenses to operate and internet cafes were monitored by the government. Like the other countries we have studied for our thesis, mobile penetration was much higher than internet access, whereby mobile phones were used by around 40 percent more of the population in 2010 (Freedom House 2012f) (This reality was worsened post-uprising with the war, which has destroyed much of the communications infrastructure). So as to remain anonymous during the uprising, activists used SIM cards of killed friends (idem).

In early 2011, the Syrian government was blocking internet and mobile networks in parts of the country or the whole country for certain periods of time, with curfews set in certain regions and limits on the amount of packets that could be uploaded using the internet (idem, Weiss 2011). Websites were also filtered and blocked if they contain political or human rights information, just like in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the Syrian government blocked websites about minorities such as Kurds and groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Even international sites against the Syrian influence in Lebanon based abroad the Israeli domain “.il” were restricted. Sites created by activists in 2011 were also blocked (Freedom House 2012f). And similar to other countries studied in our thesis, the Syrian law makes it illegal to criticise the government, the army and the relatives of authorities. This has led to self-censorship, whereby Syrians also avoid publishing information about religious or ethnic minorities. Websites are censored by the government and breaking the law leads to high fines. In 2011, there were reports of hundreds of internet users, bloggers and citizen journalists being detained and arrested, sometimes for simply commenting online or sharing a photo or video that would be anti-regime. There are also reports of internet users being tortured and even killed (Freedom House 2012e). Since 1992, 123 journalists have been killed in Syria, 31 of which were recorded in 2012; the number has reduced to 7 in 2018 (CPJ 2018).

Aside from it being punishable for journalists to publish anything against the government or country, the 2011 Press Law also allows the state to control all media and even international media have been controlled and shut down prior to the uprising (Freedom House, 2011b). The media law, reformed in 2011 in response to the uprising, is referred to as the schizophrenic media laws, because although it makes room a media sector that is not monopolised and removes prison sentences for press offences, while stating that attacks on journalists are considered to be attacks on Syrian official, the article also imposes the responsibility to ban any publication that can negatively affect the country's security on anyone using their right to

freedom of expression. Those who do not fulfil their responsibility are punishable by high fines (Reporters without Borders 2011a; Freedom House 2012e). It was also noted that propaganda is common on all media as most are either run by the government or at least controlled by authorities and most of the amateur content found on international media is labelled as fake by the Syrian regime (Freedom House 2012c).

Social networking and certain software were also censored using Italian and American surveillance software (Freedom House 2012f; Valentino-DeVries et al. 2011). Social networking had been censored in Syria since 2000 and Syrians had to use web proxies to access any content on social media until 2011, when activists noted that the government wanted to entice people to communicate online so as to be able to monitor activists' strategies. It worked, because both opposition activists and government supporters took to social media in 2011 to voice their opinions (Reuters Staff 2011a). Human rights activists also tried to use social media anonymously during the uprising. Blogging, VoIP and messaging apps were also blocked intermittently by the Syrian government (Thomas 2012). Consecutively, economic sanctions on Syria also made US service providers unable to provide services to Syrians, ranging from Google's photo sharing software Picassa to Google Maps for a period of time (Google 2012). It was also noted that pro-government content uploaded with the aim of discrediting content against the government was uploaded from Iraq or Lebanon (idem). Just like in the previous countries studied for our thesis, the Syrian's government commissioned content creation. The Syrian Electronic Army, the first ever Arab internet army, now under the FBI's most wanted list, was ordered to discredit any anti-regime content and also to spam popular social media pages with pro-Assad content (Preston 2011; Noman 2011). In turn, the pages they tried to open on Facebook and the accounts they tried to open on Twitter were immediately shut down Facebook and Twitter. The army went further and hacked well known Syrian websites and then even British and Italian websites as well as Facebook Pages of the EU, the White House and other known people or organisations, changing manipulating the content and sometimes making it inaccessible (Noman 2011; Coughlan 2011; Holt 2012; Reuters Staff 2012).

Our corpus of news videos covering Syria represent only 20 percent of all news videos, with a focus on 4 events: the first Assad speech after the first demonstrations, the resignation of the Syrian cabinet, the official declaration of the civil war in Syria and the sarin attack in Ghoutta. In terms of international personality representatives in news videos covering these events, the event of the cabinet resignation has international representation, with 12 percent of the news videos featuring French representatives. Also, the Ghoutta attack featured US personalities in 20 percent of the news videos, Russian and British representatives in 6 percent of the news videos and French representatives in only 3 percent of the news videos. The images in the news

videos are all mainly based in Syria, with the Assad event featuring images in Syria in 86 percent of news videos, as well as Saudi and US footage in 14 percent of the news videos. The Syrian cabinet resignation is also represented with images from Syria in 86 percent of the news videos. Additionally, 13 percent of the news videos feature images from Turkey and a further 13 percent feature footage from undisclosed locations. In news stories which reported the Syrian conflict's evolution into a civil war, 100 percent of the news videos featured images from Syria and an additional 5 percent featured images in either undisclosed locations or other locations not included in our analysis. The four Syrian events were represented using different images. Assad's speech was reported along with images of peaceful demonstrations for 71 percent of the time. Additionally, 57 percent of the news videos featured press conferences, 43 percent of the news videos featured public speeches and 14 percent of the news videos featured violent riots. Shortly after, the cabinet resignation was also represented using images of peaceful demonstrations (63%), but also featured images of destruction (38%) with fewer press conference images (25%) and the introduction of military equipment in the scenes (13%). The declaration of civil war in Syria was represented mainly showing images of destruction and explosions (75%). There were no images of riots, speeches, press conferences, peaceful demonstrations, military equipment, death or suffering; other images did not fall into our analysis categories. Images of press conferences (37%), military equipment (37%) and death/suffering (37%) were mainly used to represent the Ghoutta sarin attack. Additionally, there was also minimal representation of destruction (3%) and peaceful demonstrations (3%).

In terms of interviews, the event of Assad's speech was represented via interviews in only 14 percent of the news videos, of which there was a preference for correspondent profiles (100%). The cabinet resignation was represented using interviews in 63 percent of news videos, with a preference for correspondent profiles (40%) and relevant event actor profiles (40%). All news videos on the declaration of civil war used interviews with both correspondents (50%) and relevant event actors (50%). None of these events featured interviews with topic experts. The Ghoutta attack was represented using interviews in 67 percent of all news videos, of which, the topic expert profile was most preferred (67%), but interviews with relevant event actors (33%) and correspondents (24%) were also included.

## Tunisia

In Tunisia, the government introduced the internet to its citizens in 1996 and reduced hardware costs in early 2000, encouraging internet connectivity to the point that Tunisians voiced their political concerns online. Both public and private ISPs provided internet access to Tunisians as

well as schools, universities, research centres and internet cafes but all internet subscription went through the national phone company. As with other countries studied for our thesis, mobile penetration was even higher than internet connection with few people using the internet on their phone due to expenses in 2011 (Freedom House 2011d).

By 2011, 34 percent of Tunisians were connected to the internet, but those connected faced political censorship by the cyberpolice under Ben Ali and bloggers and online users were arrested and it was impossible to be anonymous or have a right to privacy. We learned how Ali Bouazizi filmed his cousin's self-immolation and funeral, sharing both videos online only to be arrested and beaten by authorities before fleeing the country (Lageman 2016; Mackey 2011). Journalists were also targeted by Tunisian authorities, whereby they were threatened, arrested, assaulted or forced into exile, leading to self-censorship (Ben Gharbia 2009) (Committee to Protect Journalists 2010d; Freedom House 2010)

Although internet cafes were popular, like in the other countries studied, they were also monitored closely, with strict instructions on content that could not be accessed such as political and pornographic content. Customers also have to provide their ID cards and may be asked to show their online activities to café owners. Up to 100 political blogs were blocked by the government intermittently in 2010, including blog aggregators and some posts would be deleted after publication. Like the other countries studied, the Tunisian authorities also manipulated content online by instructing groups to create pro-government content online, sometimes even forcing rally organisers to create false videos cancelling rallies to post online and sometimes hacking online media to change the content (Freedom House 2011d). Additionally, application for video content ranging from Dailymotion and YouTube to WatTV were blocked. VoIP services were prohibited, but accessible and social media such as Facebook and Twitter were temporarily blocked, with specific accounts being targeted (Freedom House 2011d; Ben Gharbia 2010). Resembling the other countries studied for our thesis, it was punishable and censorable in Tunisia to publish any content that incited hate, terrorism, public disorder, racial or religious fanaticism as well as the dignity of anyone, Tunisia as a country and the president (Freedom House 2011c; Freedom House 2011d).

Although Tunisia had some independent press, authorities controlled media distribution by ensuring only pro-government newspapers had access to some areas. Broadcast media had to obtain licences from the government and although foreign satellite was accessible, Freedom House noted that some TV channels were blocked by the government in 2010. International media that covered the Tunisian protests in December 2010 or printed material showing poor human rights in Tunisia were heavily censored (Freedom House 2010).

Our corpus of news videos covering Tunisia represent only 9 percent of all news videos, with a focus on 2 events: the story of Bouazizi and the downfall of Ben Ali. In terms of international personality representatives in news videos covering these events, none of the news videos feature international personalities. The images in the news videos are all mainly based in Tunisia, with 86 percent of all news stories on Bouazizi featuring footage from Tunisia and 14 percent of the news stories featuring unknown/undisclosed locations. With regards to the downfall of Ben Ali, all (100%) news videos feature footage in Tunisia and 11 percent of news videos also feature a location not included in our analysis. The news videos about Bouazizi feature scenes of violent riots and destruction equally (43%) in addition to peaceful demonstrations (43%). The news videos about Ben Ali's downfall feature military equipment and destruction equally (44%) in addition to violent riots (33%) and peaceful demonstrations (33%). Also, some images of press conferences (11%) are featured. The stories of Bouazizi are recounted using interviews 71 percent of the time, while the stories of Ben Ali's downfall are only recounted using interviews in 44 percent of news videos. When interviews were used, both news stories were recounted using relevant event actors all of the time.

## Yemen

Finally, in Yemen, one of the poorest Arab nations, due to conflicts and natural tragedies, the poor infrastructure and low literacy rate made internet usage unpopular since its introduction in the mid-90s with only 15 percent of Yemen connected to the internet in 2011. Despite this low connectivity, the government filtered various content, similarly to the other countries in our research, such as content critical of the Muslim religion and pornography, and also filtered GLBT content. Additionally, some political and news websites were filtered intermittently, with an increase of filtering taking place as of 2009. Opposition and independent websites as well as forums were specifically targeted by the government. Yemeni law also allows police in the guise of ensuring security to search homes and offices as well as monitor online and phone communications (U.S. Department State 2008). Similar to other countries studied for our research, the government controls all internet cafes by ensuring all screens are visible and monitoring software may be used to track and block certain activities (OpenNet Initiative 2009; Mareb Press 2008; Al-Omari 2009).

Despite the Yemeni constitution stating that the press is free, the press is responsible for following the law (Yemeni Government 1990) and journalists have been threatened, harassed, beaten, tortured and murdered. International journalists have been either deported or simply banned from entry (Freedom House 2011e) and some international outlets have even been attacked (Freedom House 2012i). Also, newspapers have been shut down and news services

have been suspended. There has also been crackdown on both the public and the press (OpenNet Initiative 2009). Despite the law appearing to be freer than that of other countries, websites are actually controlled just like print media (OpenNet Initiative 2009). Due to increased terrorist activities in Yemen in 2009, the press was prosecuted under terrorism rather than press laws and journalists have been abducted and tortured (Freedom House 2011e). In 2011, the government upped the obstacles in operating news outlets in Yemen, requiring owners to have several years of experience and a large capital to operate; additionally, several outlets were shut down (Freedom House 2011e). In 2011, the government owned several media companies or at least controlled them, whilst others were affiliated with other political parties or run by civil society organisations.

Our corpus of news videos covering Yemen represent only 1 percent of all news videos, with a focus on President Saleh's repeated departures from the country between 2011 and 2013. No international representatives are featured in any of the news videos on Yemen. The footage in the news videos is mainly held in Yemen (90%) but also in Saudi Arabia (40%) and other undisclosed locations (10%). The footage features peaceful demonstrations in 80 percent of all news videos, as well as press conferences (60%), military equipment (20%), few public speeches (10%) and almost no destruction (5%). Interviews are used to recount the stories of Yemen in 80 percent of news videos, with a clear preference for interviewing relevant event actors (75%) and few topic experts (25%).

#### Concluding Remarks of Dominant Institutions' Analysis

The information gathered from the dominant institutions of information as well as the public institutions of information highlight specific elements about the countries involved in the Arab Spring. The first being that infrastructure was not the main challenge in accessing or publishing information but rather strict communication laws put in place by regimes led to not fully exploiting the internet as a communication tool. Similar laws against defaming officials, the country or religion were noted in all the countries in our news corpus, which all such actions being punishable with fines and prison sentences.

Additionally, all the countries in our corpus practiced strict surveillance and censorship decrees on content accessed and published in the country, either by putting in place physical police or armies who would take records of people's actions online or by installing cameras in public internet cafes. Sites and applications being blocked were noted in all the countries studied and in some cases, curfews were imposed upon internet cafes. To further censor publishers and broadcasters, media organisations were shut down, in some cases, distributorship of newspapers

was managed by the government and certain international media were made inaccessible to the country. International journalists were sometimes deported or simply not allowed entry into the country and local as well as international journalists and citizen journalists faced detention, arrests, torture and sometimes even death by authorities. The clampdown on all kinds of publishers- local or international, professional or amateur- was so severe that many professional and amateur journalists were forced to practice self-censorship.

Despite the clampdowns, it was noted that many of the countries used social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter to communicate either amongst themselves or with the rest of the world. Other services like Skype and Bambuser were also used to communicate live stories to the world. Additionally, SMS, group messages and media recording onto memory cards were also some of the means of communication practiced during the Arab Spring.

Material selection also took place at a conscious level so as to report the human stories of the Arab Spring, rather than focus on sensational images that could offend or shock people. Also, many international outlets refused to be share propaganda, by not systematically sharing terrorist or even regime information. Additionally people labelled terrorists in a country were not approachable by journalists as it was a crime to communicate with them. Selection decisions made by journalists and strict terrorist laws may have inevitably contributed to creating 'black and white' narratives of the Arab Spring from the perspective of the 'revolutionaries' in each country.

Notwithstanding press restrictions, organisations like the AFP and Crowdspeak communicated with activists to collect information and gather material from their locations, inaccessible to professional journalists, using both human and technical verification methods.

All countries had under 20 percent international representation and most of the footage was in the country being reported on. The only event with less than 70 percent of footage from the country being reported on is the Ghoutta sarin attack and this is understandable because of inaccessibility. The footage used to represent the events of the Arab spring range from peaceful demonstrations and military equipment to press conferences and destruction. Interviews are used to report most of the events of the Arab spring with a preference for relevant event actors, but there are also some interviews with topic experts and fewer with correspondents.

This analysis chapter has answered [RQ1] how the dominant institutions of information affected international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring, and [RQ2] - how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories. The next analysis chapter focusses on how contributed material was used to construct international news stories?



# **IV. Theorising the Role of Contributed Material in International News**

This chapter answers our third and final research question, “how contributed material was used to construct international news stories”. We have identified and selected four main types of contributed material in our news corpus: amateur content, figures and percentages, quotations and State TV content. This is not to say that other contributed material was not identified, such as agency material or international TV content, nevertheless, a selection of four types of contributed material was made so as to be able to propose theories in news construction with specific types of contributed material. Hence, this chapter is split into four main sections, namely (1) Usage of Amateur Content, (2) Usage of Figures and Percentages, (3) Usage of Quotes and (4) Usage of State TV Content. Each of the sections defines the type of material and then proposes a theory based on how the material was used in the news corpus. The research objective was to find out how mainstream media incorporate contributed material to their news and also to understand the role and function of contributed material in the news.

## **IV.1. Usage of Amateur Content**

### **IV.1.1. Definition**

Historically, amateur photography began being used by mainstream media as early as the late 1800s when George Eastman’s Kodak invention reached out to the wider public to encourage them to use a simple yet professional camera, leading to the kodakers or first amateur photographers (Jenkins 1975). The kodakers were accepted by the New York Times which included content on amateur photographers in its Monday editions (Mensel 1991, p.28). In 2011 in Libya, it was not Kodak but rather various versions of smart phones that were used by the general public to take photographs.

Allan et al (Allan et al. 2011) note that citizen journalism did not just happen on its own; instead, professional journalists played a role in bringing citizen journalism to the limelight. They note

that “Established media organisations are in many cases struggling to adapt to a changed environment – even though, paradoxically, they have driven many of the changes themselves” (Allan et al. 2011, p.1). Peter Horrocks, head of the BBC World Service in 2009, referred to internet-based journalism as a transformation that would lead to the “end of fortress journalism” (Horrocks et al. 2009) or journalism whereby “the consumption of journalism was through clearly defined products and platforms- a TV or radio programme, a magazine or a newspaper”. In the blended world of internet journalism, all those products are available within a single platform and mental space, whereby the reader may never be aware from which fortress (or brand) the information has come (Horrocks et al. 2009, p.7). Similarly, international television outlets provide news sourced from amateurs, citizen journalists and activists alike to audiences not completely aware of how the news was sourced. The BBC, one of the pioneer media corporations to incorporate footage from eyewitnesses, has been doing so since at least 1999 with the following events: 1999 earthquake in Turkey, 2001 9/11 attacks in USA, 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 2005 7/7 attacks in England, 2006 Hussein execution in Iraq, 2007 monk uprising in Myanmar, 2008 attacks in Mumbai and the 2009 Green Revolution of Iran, to name a few. The list of events has been added to with other news corporations and agencies agreeing to accept amateur material into their news features.

#### **IV.1.2. Presence in News Corpus**

Our news corpus identified only 28 (11%) news videos, whereby amateur content was clearly used. This does not go to say that amateur content was not used in more of the news videos; but simply that it was not clear even with an analytic eye. All the news organisations we spoke to told us that news provided by amateurs was clearly labelled unless amateurs requested to remain anonymous. Some footage that appeared to be amateur due to the shaky and low quality image was clearly not provided by a professional journalist and yet the footage was not labelled. Our news corpus shows that Al Jazeera English had the largest usage of amateur content (50% of entire corpus of amateur content and 20% of AJE corpus) followed by Euronews (39% of entire corpus of amateur content and 13% of Euronews corpus) and France 24 (11% of entire corpus of amateur content and 5% of F24 corpus), while Press TV news videos did not feature any amateur content, showing that the news channel was wary of news provided by amateurs.

It is already known that mainstream media turned to social media to collect updates on the protests in the Arab Spring. For example, Russell notes that “Global news organizations like CNN, NPR, AL Jazeera, BBC, and *The Guardian* curated Egypt Twitter feeds, cherry-picking what they saw as the most credible and relevant tweets and pushing those out to the world on

their own platforms. The tweets rolled across the bottom of video and scrolled along the side of website posts. Journalists working the story did the same with video- and photo-sharing sites like Twitpic, Flickr, Demoxi, and YouTube” (Russell 2011, p.1242). Such reports already told us that international journalists were using social media to search for sources of information. Therefore, our interest was not in whether amateur content was used by professional media, instead, our interest lied in understanding two things:

**Analysis Objective 1:** How do mainstream media incorporate amateur content into their news?

**Analysis Objective 2:** What is the role and function of amateur content in the news?

### **IV.1.3. Findings and theory proposal**

In order to achieve analysis objectives 1 and 2, we watched all the videos in our news corpus containing amateur footage, still or moving, and observed the way in which the content was incorporated into the news video. We were particularly interested in seeing the way in which mainstream media presented the footage. Furthermore, we tried to understand the role that the amateur content played in the news video. What would happen if we removed the amateur content? Would the message in the news video change? What exactly was the impact of the amateur content to the news video? Based on our observations, coupled with analysis from Chapter 3, we were able to reach conclusions that allow us to answer the two analysis objectives. All in all, we were able to identify 14 different ways of presenting amateur content which also highlighted the different functions of amateur content in international news. These functions and roles were then grouped into the following 3 categories:

## Use of Amateur Content in International News Videos

### **1. To construct propaganda machines for governments of international news outlets**

- a. Using a mix of amateur content and content from State TV so as to show objectivity
- b. Using amateur content to disguise bias or inability to take a neutral stance
- c. Using an already produced news video from a partner channel that has incorporated amateur footage content to simply translate or reword the content for different viewers
- d. Using amateur footage content with or without a brief silence so that the audience identifies and empathises with the victims of a tragic event
- e. Using amateur footage as exclusive content when there is rare footage of an event
- f. Using amateur content in a news report to shock and/or entertain audiences

### **2. To construct censored news and**

- a. Using amateur content to situate the viewer when using non-local people to represent a news story
- b. Using amateur content when the event location is inaccessible by journalists, either because journalists are banned or because it is too dangerous
- c. Using amateur content to represent events that journalists would face ethical and legal implications over
- d. Using amateur footage content while someone is being interviewed over the phone so as to show footage of the location

### **3. To construct a democratic transparency into news making**

- a. Using a series of amateur videos constructed with a recount of events to visually construct the narration
- b. Using amateur footage content along with descriptive journalist voiceover in order to present evidence to audiences
- c. Using amateur content in a news report to highlight the significance of User Generated Content (UGC) in today's world
- d. Blending amateur content in one news report along with footage presented as though internally produced so as to appear transparent in construction and show their presence on the field

*Table 42 Use of Amateur Content in International News - Sawsan Atallah Bidart*

These categories will be further developed and broken down into the 14 roles of amateur content in international news.

#### **IV.1.3.1. To construct propaganda machines for governments of international news outlets**

What must be understood about international media is that despite being international, the broadcasting channel will also have a base in a particular country and therefore inevitably be influenced by the government in the country of their base. For example, Press TV is based in

Iran, France 24 and Euronews are based in France and Al Jazeera is based in Qatar. As international channels, governance may be expected to be independent of national governments, but in some cases, it is difficult to separate media outlets from their roots.

There is a very fine line between news writing for a cultural audience and the construction of propaganda (Paul & Elder 2004, p.8) and because propaganda has a very “negative connotation (suggesting deception or distortion), few news writers would admit that the word applies to their stories” (idem).

Using amateur content to construct propaganda machines for governments of international news outlets can be done in the following ways, as has been found through our news corpus:

- 1. Using a mix of amateur content and content from State TV so as to show objectivity**
- 2. Using amateur content to disguise bias or inability to take a neutral stance**
- 3. Using an already produced news video from a partner channel that has incorporated amateur footage content to simply translate or reword the content for different viewers**
- 4. Using amateur footage content with or without a brief silence so that the audience identifies and empathises with the victims of a tragic event**
- 5. Using amateur footage as exclusive content when there is rare footage of an event**
- 6. Using amateur content in a news report to shock and/or entertain audiences**

These six categories of amateur use in propaganda have been further elaborated.

Using a mix of amateur content and content from State TV so as to show objectivity

Amateur content is shown in context with State TV content so as to show objectivity. Generally, the narrative of the Arab uprisings were built around the narrative whereby the people were against the government and vice versa. In the news video *UN Chemical experts push for access to Syria* by AJE, the amateur video footage shows dead children and adults who are victims of chemical weapons, along with the journalist voice over “Some experts say not only Assad has access to chemical agents”. The footage then changes so as to feature content from Syrian State TV, under the Syrian regime, while stating “Syrian State TV is reporting that military have found chemical weapons in rebels controlled tunnels in the Damascus neighbourhood of Joba” (AJE 2013).

The Euronews news video entitled *Syrian activists accuse Assad forces of nerve gas attack* (euronews (in English) 2013c) is a construction of both State and amateur footage on the nerve

gas attack in Syria in 2013. The news video starts off with poor image quality footage labelled “amateur video” by Euronews, which shows people attending to what seem to be lifeless people on the ground. There is also footage of what appears to be numerous lifeless children covered in white sheets on the ground. This footage is presented along with the journalist’s voiceover: “Syrian activists say as many as 650 people have been killed in nerve gas attacks launched by government forces. The toxic assaults took place at rebel held positions on the outskirts of Damascus”. This presents the activist side of the story; we note for example that the journalist does not report the killing of the 650 people without stating the source. So as to show the other side of the accused, Euronews then features State TV with an army official denying the allegations.

Using amateur content to disguise bias or inability  
to take a neutral stance

Journalism as a profession is under pressure to be accurate and in order to be accurate, there is another added pressure to only state facts and therefore be objective and neutral in their reporting of the news. However, some journalists have recently come forth with their outlook of the profession, which attempts to share a different regard on neutrality in journalism<sup>74</sup>.

Some of the events of the Arab Uprising turned into ugly conflicts resulting in victims and it can be assumed that it was difficult for some media to turn a blind eye and yet remain objective.

For example, AJE’s news video titled *UN Chemical experts push for access to Syria* and posted on YouTube on August, 2013, features distressing images of dead children on an amateur video. After featuring an internally produced interview with a US representative, the reportage features once more, amateur content from a Syrian contributor. The top left of the video features a logo with the words *Jobr District, in Damascus* in Arabic along with the colours of the Syrian flag, but the journalist does not tell us where the video content actually comes from. However the

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<sup>74</sup> Award-winning journalist and Middle East Correspondent for The Independent newspaper, Robert Fisk, shared his views on neutrality reporting, in a talk he gave at Georgetown University: “Fifty-fifty journalism... that’s okay if you’re reporting a football match... it’s okay if you’re reporting a public inquiry on a new motorway [...] but the Middle East is not a football match. It is a bloody tragedy and our job as journalists, I believe, should be to be neutral and unbiased on the side of those who suffer”. Award-winning journalist and Chief International Correspondent and anchor at CNN also shared her view on neutrality reporting when she accepted her Burton Benjamin Award in 2016, by recalling the state of the press during the 2016 US campaign elections: “It also appeared that much of the press, much of the media, was tying itself in knots trying to differentiate between balance, between objectivity, neutrality, and crucially, the truth. We [the press] cannot continue the old paradigm, we cannot, for instance keep saying like it was over global warming [...]. I learned a long long time ago when I was covering the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia never to equate victim and aggressor, never to create a false moral or factual equivalence, because then if you do particularly in situations like that, you are party and accomplice to the most unspeakable crimes and consequences, so I believe in being truthful not neutral. And I believe, we must stop banalising the truth” (Amanpour 2016).

video features several dead children laid down side by side, while the journalist on voiceover says “The United State says it needs more *proof* that chemical weapons killed these people”, as if to say “here is your proof” or almost as though to take a stance a show the video with the bodies despite the US government not believing the contents of the video.

Using an already produced news video from a partner channel that has incorporated amateur footage content to simply translate or reword the content for different viewers

The news video by Euronews entitled *Assad forces accused of killing hundreds in nerve gas attack* (euronews (in English) 2013a), begins with amateur footage of smoke rising from buildings in Syria. We note that the video was initially produced by amateurs as we can see a logo at the top left of the video in illegible Arabic with the Syrian flag colours in the texture of the font. But we are also able to hear reporting over the footage in Arabic, and then notice the Euronews logo that appears both at the top and bottom of the screen, showing that the amateur footage has already been used by Euronews Arabic to produce and air a news package. As the voice of the journalist for Euronews English begins to narrate the images in English, the voice of the journalist in Euronews Arabic is then muted. Therefore, we are not sure if it is a translation of the words of the Euronews Arabic journalist, an interpretation or even an adapted narration for an English speaking public. We presume, based on our analysis on Euronews that the narration is an adaptation or near interpretation of the words, rather than a direct translation.

The Euronews (in English) news video entitled *Women get the vote in Saudi Arabia* (euronews (in English) 2011c) reports the changes in women’s voting rights in Saudi Arabia. The news video is a reportage that is a construction of both State TV footage and amateur footage, along with the journalist’s voiceover. The news video ends abruptly with the journalist’s words: “They’re [women] also barred from driving, which led to this defiant protest back in June”. The voiceover is heard over internally presented footage of traffic in what we presume to be Saudi Arabia; and the journalist’s words make us think the traffic is a sign of protest, but when we look closely, the drivers are all male, so this footage does not coincide with the words of the journalist. But the footage then switches to show a veiled driving woman who is also speaking in Arabic; the woman has been filmed from inside her car and the video’s subtitles refer to women wanting “change in the country”, but the journalist voiceover does not pause during this footage, nor during the subtitles, during which the journalist concludes their reportage: “There

is intense debate in the country about the role of women in society and it's hoped this decision will help ease some of the tension". It is therefore a news video that seems to lack direction in terms of the footage usage and the actual storyline. It is representative of Euronews news videos that tend to have one video package that is translated by its partner channels into other languages.

Similarly, the news video *Syrian president prepares speech to quell* (euronews (in English) 2011a) *protests* also uses previously packaged news video that has already incorporated amateur footage content to simply translate or reword the content for another audience. The news video also incorporates State TV footage showing the Syrian president in meetings and begins with this footage before turning to amateur footage of demonstrators tearing down a large banner of the president from a wall. This footage is labelled "Amateur video" by Euronews and takes up only a portion of the screen, showing it was probably taken using a smartphone, and the audio of the footage is unmuted so that we can hear the shouts of the demonstrators in the background. This footage is also presented along with the voiceover of the journalist "More than 60 people have been killed during the wave of political unrest. Protests of the scale seen over the last two weeks are unprecedented in Syria", which describes the footage of the demonstrations as being one of many in the past couple of weeks. There is more amateur footage later in the news video, also featuring mass demonstrations, this time more colourful with flags, and more numerous, also including different religious figures. This footage, which also seems to come from a mobile phone, is not labelled as amateur footage, but it is voiced over by the journalist "There've also been mass rallies in the capital, as well as the north western city of Latakia. Despite Assad making it known he was considering scraping the emergency laws, arbitrary arrests in large numbers have continued across the country. Assad still has strong support however, as yesterday's massive demonstration in the capital, showed", who explains that the protests on the footage are pro-government.

The Euronews news video entitled *Syria accusations fly over 'chemical weapons' attack* (euronews (in English) 2013b) presents footage by State TV that features scenes with people being treated in a hospital. State TV footage is followed by Euronews footage of the Syrian opposition in an interview. The news video is then concluded with footage from State TV of a missile being shot. The footage is then replaced by similar war-like scenes that appear from an amateur. The footage has the word "*Al Kaseer*" posted on it in Arabic, and this is not translated for the Euronews English audiences. The footage shows small fires across a field and a smoky sky and is accompanied with the journalist's voiceover: "Reuters is reporting that many people have been suffering breathing problems, and the smell of chlorine has permeated the Aleppo air". This is therefore a news video that has been co-constructed with footage from

State TV, Euronews, amateur footage and finally quotes from a press agency. It is unclear why the final footage was used as it was not at all defined by the journalist. We can therefore assume it was part of the initial package<sup>75</sup> produced by Euronews for other Euronews journalists.

Using amateur footage content with or without a brief silence so that the audience identifies and empathises with the victims of a tragic event

The AJE news video entitled *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons*, is a reportage that begins by featuring distressful amateur video content of Syrian victims of chemical weapons. The video is labelled at the top of the screen with the text 'YOUTUBE.COM/ACTIVIST VIDEO' for the entire duration of the amateur video. The video features victims on hospital beds that appear to be suffering as they foam from their mouths.

Another AJE news video on the chemical attacks in Syria, titled *UN Chemical experts push for access to Syria* and posted on YouTube on August, 2013, begins with distressing amateur footage of a man carrying dead children in his arms as he cries in despair in Arabic. The video is left to run for 10 seconds without interference from the AJE's journalist voice, almost so that audiences are made to feel the suffering of the man for at least 10 seconds. The words of the journalist translate the shocking images on our screens as well as the man's words: "The two tiny bodies hung limp in his arms. 'What will I do now' cries their father. A man who's destroyed by grief.... Pictures like these of many men, women and children being discriminately killed by what all evidence suggests was chemical weapon attacks, continue to shock the world" (AJE 2013). The video footage, we understand to be amateur content, simply because it has illegible Arabic text at the top left with the foreground of the Syrian flag that has been underlined with images of weapons. We can assume that the amateur video was provided by a Syrian rebel group but cannot be sure and AJE does not share their content provider. The video carries on for 40 seconds to show more distressing images of children being laid to rest, before

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<sup>75</sup> When speaking to David Thomson from F24, he explained that his video packages, although initially produced for F24 Français, would also be used for F24 Arabic and English. Also, in an interview with Stéphane Gillet, the editor-in-chief of Euronews based in Lyon, he explained to me that the news on all the Euronews channels are almost always the same, but treated differently. The operational process at Euronews, according to Gillet is that local editors-in-chief are contacted by him from the Euronews head office to construct a story on a specific theme with a specific angle, but the editors-in-chief are given the editorial freedom to process this news story as they wish. The channel's editor-in-chief will construct their news video with images and footage shared by correspondents and information accessible through the different newswires they subscribe to. This means that international correspondents along with camerapersons send in packages that can then be used by any of the Euronews editions. This was a very different process from that of AJE, which asked their correspondents to send in their news packages ready to air. Heather Allan, former Head of News Gathering at AJE, who was based in Doha at the time of the Arab Spring, explained to me that international journalists were asked to send in field reports to Doha already edited. Having said that, Allan also noted that the cutting producer and editor in Qatar would decide how the actual material was edited in house. Allan explained that "By and large most of our material was used only on AJE but other AJ channels were certainly able to access our material and use it" (Allan 2017).

very contrasting video footage by AJE shows calm and clean scenes of the Four Seasons Hotel and UN jeeps, to show the presence of the UN inspectors. Again, video footage turns to dreary images of dead people lying in rubble, with their faces blurred. We are unsure if these images have been taken by AJE or an amateur; there is no accreditation on the footage whatsoever. And yet, it would be strange that AJE had access to the location of the attacks as the journalist tells us that “The Syrian government still refuses access to UN inspectors...” (AJE 2013).

Using amateur footage as exclusive content when there is rare footage of an event

Some events failed to capture the media’s attention and only captured the attention of a few amateur photographers or perhaps only the attention of witnesses. These events cannot be found on mass media in general, nor on social media platforms. Therefore, when it finally catches the attention of mass media, the mainstream channel concerned requests exclusivity of the material from the owner so as to be able to feature it in a reportage.

The AJE news video entitled *Suicide that sparked a revolution* (Al Jazeera English 2011f) is a reportage on the Tunisia’s Bouazizi, the man who self-immolated in front of a local municipality building in form of protest, and is said to have sparked the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The news video features a photo of Bouazizi whose source is unidentified, but it is clear that the photo was provided by someone outside of mainstream media. The news video also features blurry footage of violence on the streets and is labelled as ALJAZEERA EXCLUSIVE accompanied by the journalist voiceover: “His closest friends, anguished by Mohamed’s actions, took to the streets and began a popular uprising that lasted for weeks before it toppled the 23 year old rule of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali”. The journalist voiceover tells audiences that the footage represents the start of the popular uprising set in Tunisia’s streets, but we are not told where the video has been sourced from. The final amateur footage featured on this AJE news video, labelled ALJAZEERA EXCLUSIVE, is a blurry one, showing people carrying a casket in a cemetery, followed by hundreds of mourners who seem to be mourning in form of demonstration. This video is accompanied by journalist voiceover explanation “... cell-phone video given to Al Jazeera by his family, shows hundreds of mourners risking a police crackdown to escort the body from burial”. We are therefore given an explanation to the video content as well as the source. The use of the word “exclusive” tells us that the video, although initially taken by Bouazizi’s family, now belongs to AJE and can therefore not be used by other mainstream media. The exclusive label and source of this video tells viewers that this video will not be found elsewhere and therefore it is worth watching on AJE, who went through lengths to get the footage.

Using amateur content in a news report to shock and/or entertain audiences

In our corpus, we noted that some news stories seemed to be sensationalised with amateur footage that showed shocking scenes. For example, the AJE news video *NTC plans secret burial for Gaddafi* (Al Jazeera English 2011d) set in the aftermath of the NATO bombing in Sirte the day after Gaddafi's capture and death, describes the way in which Gaddafi was stopped, captured and then killed. As the journalist narrates the events by pointing to different areas on the movie-like scene, half of news video screen is used to reveal amateur footage of Gaddafi's capture. The blurry footage is taken by someone moving at a very fast rate and therefore it is difficult to focus on what is actually taking place in the footage and this also gives viewers a sense of the urgency and fast pace of the people in the amateur video. It features Gaddafi's bloody face and people around him, at least one is holding a hand-gun; we can also see men- perhaps rebels who are armed- that seem to be leading him to a car. The footage lasts for only 16 seconds, and this is quite short, considering the news video was actually 6 minutes and 33 seconds long. The video was not labelled, nor is its source identified in the journalist's discourse, but viewers who had been watching the news since October 20 in 2011, already know that such footage was supplied by rebels from their mobile phones. As the amateur footage is featured, the journalist who is facing the camera carries on his recount of the events: "We are told at that at that point he was not wounded. Of course, we're being told that on the way to Misrata, he died and that may be as a result of cross-fire. But according to Human Rights investigators, they are questioning that account of what happened". The video certainly shows why Human Rights investigators are questioning what actually happened. The video shows confusing movements, very rushed and very blurry. The video certainly shows that Gaddafi was captured, and although the video reveals a hand gun and other armed rebels, we do not see Gaddafi being shot, or at least it is not evident to the naked eye. Therefore, one could say that this footage was primarily shared to shock or even entertain viewers, going in line with the movie-like scene that the journalist is reporting from.

#### IV.1.3.2. To construct censored news

The subject of censored news came up in the analysis laid out in Chapter 3, both with the journalists interviewed and the desk research on the state of the media in all the countries in our corpus.

Censored news describes news that is constructed under strict censorship laws and clampdowns making it impossible for journalists to report from the location of the event. Using amateur content to construct censored news, as has been found through our news corpus through our researched news outlets, can be done in the following ways:

- 1. Using amateur content to situate the viewer when using non-local people to represent a news story**
- 2. Using amateur content when the event location is inaccessible by journalists, either because journalists are banned or because it is too dangerous**
- 3. Using amateur content to represent events that journalists would face ethical and legal implications over**
- 4. Using amateur footage content while someone is being interviewed over the phone so as to show footage of the location**

The following sections further explain how censored news used amateur content in our corpus:

Using amateur content to situate the viewer when using non-local people to represent a news story

The Euronews news story entitled *UN 'Strong suspicions' that Syrian rebels have used sarin nerve gas* (euronews (in English) 2013e), reports that Syrian rebels may be using chemical weapons. In order to present the story, they refer to evidence in form of an interview with a UN Human Rights Investigator. But the interview alone, based in a comfortable looking setting, is not representative of Syria in 2013. Therefore, Euronews also features footage from amateurs of Syria's rebels in combat. The footage, with a logo at the top left of the screen, features the words *Liwaa Aasifat Lazaz al Shmal* in Arabic, illegible to non-Arabic speakers. The objective of amateur footage in this case is to situate the viewers in Syria in 2013, a country torn by conflicts.

Also, the Euronews news story entitled *Turkey claims wounded Syrians show signs of chemical attack* (euronews (in English) 2013d), focusses on the Turkish representation of Syrians by featuring the Turkish Foreign Minister speaking publicly to the press. A Turkish official cannot represent the facts in Syria alone, and therefore, the video begins with amateur footages from

Kafr Batna, identified by the reporter as “unverified footage”. Therefore, the reporter prefers to show unverified footage of what audiences believe to be representative of Syria, rather than simply showing the Turkish FM. The footage shows people running in chaos for safety as they are being shelled and has the logo of *Kafr Batna* in Arabic and English at the top left hand side of the screen. In addition, Euronews has also added the text “amateur video” in bold beside the *Kafr Batna* logo. Kafr Batna is also a location near Damascus noted by the reporter in the video that “appears” to be shelled by the Syrian government. Another amateur footage (without a logo but labelled as amateur video in bold by Euronews) follows the Turkish FM’s discourse at the end of the news video, showing what appear to be Syrian refugees on a small boat, headed to what we believe is Turkey, and this is the connection with the Turkish FM’s discourse on the Syrian conflict. In addition, the journalist’s voiceover refers to the amateur footage of the people on the boat as such: “The use of chemical weapons can only intensify the plight of civilians trying to escape the violence”.

The AJE news video entitled *UN chemical inspectors submit Syria report* (Al Jazeera English 2013e) is overwhelmingly represented by international and Syrian officials seemingly based outside the Syrian zones of conflict; such as the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, the Syrian Information Minister, the US Secretary of State and finally footage of the Syrian President that the journalist’s discourse voices over. As all these international or even Syrian representatives are filmed in calm, official areas seemingly untouched by the Syrian conflict, AJE starts the video with amateur content of *Zamlaka*, showing half undressed people suffering on the floor. The logo of *Zamlaka* is featured on the first video. But a second amateur video is also shown, but this one has its logo blurred out and instead, we see the text YOUTUBE.COM/AMATEUR VIDEO.

Using amateur content when the event location is inaccessible by journalists, either because journalists are banned or because it is too dangerous

The AJE news video *Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt* (Al Jazeera English 2012a) begins with amateur footage of what seem to be violent riots in Egypt. The video has not been labelled by the amateur, but rather by AJE as AMATEUR VIDEO/YOUTUBE.COM in bold as well as the location DAMANHOUR. AJE later features footage of people celebrating in Cairo and the witness accounts are event taken on camera. The footage by AJE also features tear gas canisters exploding, and therefore we can tell that the

journalist was able to access the Cairo demonstrations. It is possible that the journalists were unable to reach Damanhour, but it is also possible that journalists were instructed against accessing Damanhour, either by AJE for their safety or by Egyptian officials (Chapter 3 notes that AJE was eventually banned in Egypt and therefore, journalists were not always able to cover events).

Similarly, videos sharing footage of chemical or other attacks for example, in other countries, were mainly taken by amateurs, because mainstream media was either banned from the area by authorities or because mainstream media decided it was too dangerous to risk their journalists' lives.

Using amateur content to represent events that journalists would face ethical and legal implications over

AJE's news video entitled *Gaddafi's final moments* lasted a little over 3 minutes long and begins with shaky and blurry footage on the ground featuring someone from waist-down in army trousers standing next to the face of someone laying seemingly lifeless on the ground. The camera zooms on the seemingly-lifeless person's face and pauses so as to create and then feature a still image of Gaddafi's bloodied face for a brief moment. The journalist's voice over tells us "Captured on a mobile phone, the body of Libya's former leader Muammar Gaddafi bloody on the pavement. He's reported to have died of wounds..." (Al Jazeera English 2011c). Although the journalist does not tell us that the image was captured on their own mobile phone, audiences can presume that the image comes from an amateur's mobile phone, perhaps one of the rebels' standing around the bloodied person. Later in the video, the journalist also presents an image of large drain pipes and states that "There are reports he was hiding in these drain-pipes" (idem) and therefore audiences may also presume that this image too was taken by an amateur. Therefore, AJE has used amateur photos and has explained that they were taken on a mobile phone, admitting that these images do not belong to the network. However, they do not give credit for their source. Is the amateur an event participant, for example a rebel or a Gaddafi supporter? Or is the amateur a passer-by or even a local amateur activist who was sharing images from Libya? In all cases, the international community is unable to implicate anyone over these images or videos, because the photographer is simply unknown to the public.

The news reportage also featured internally presented footage, showing that the channel too had their own teams on the ground. For example in the video covering the death of Gaddafi, we are

able to watch interviews with rebels on the ground conducted by an AJE correspondent. This shows that despite the journalists being present in the country, they were not involved in simply watching Gaddafi be captured or even worse be killed- as their headline states.

Using amateur footage content while someone is being interviewed over the phone so as to show footage of the location

The 50 second news video published on YouTube by France 24 English entitled *Syria conflict: West weighs military intervention to secure chemical weapons*, is an excerpt of what seems to be a live phone interview (France 24 2012). As the interview takes place part of the footage features large blurry Arabic text on the video. The muted footage features smoke in the distance on building sites, which appear to be the result of a targeted explosion. The way in which the video is credited is that the blurry Arabic text on it has not been removed.

France 24 does not have the images of the person being interviewed and therefore so as not to appear too much like a radio station, they have to show some footage.

The F24 news video *SYRIA - Syrian opposition vows 'to bring down the regime'* (France24 2011) uses amateur footage, whose source is unidentified by the channel, while the journalist reports via telephone from Turkey. On the one hand, the channel has decided to show footage of the location of the event because it is being represented by a journalist off location, but on the other hand, one can also say that because the reporting takes place over the phone, the channel made the choice to compensate for lack of images through available amateur content. Although the footage has not been identified as “amateur, we can safely presume that it was not taken by a professional journalist due to its poor image quality and the cameraperson’s inability to have a steady focus on the subjects being filmed, despite the camera angle being taken from what seems to be a safe distance in terms of longitude and latitude from the subjects. The subject of the footage is in fact a large seemingly energetic crowd. Much like most telephone reports on F24, the journalist’s face and location are placed on the left hand side of the screen and the footage appears on the larger right hand side of the screen. It is also important to note that when reporting via the telephone, F24 tends to use up only around three-quarters of the space on the screen and therefore images seem to be of lesser importance to them, even when using amateur sources. The journalist’s discourse is not necessarily tied to the footage. The journalist on the phone is saying “He said that the harder the economic conditions become, the more radicalised people will get. More people will be joining the ranks of the protest

movement”, while we see large crowds on the footage, they do not seem to be protesters, but rather less than 100 people coming out of a meeting. Therefore, it is clear that the footage we are seeing on our screen has not been planned by a crew based on location.

I had the opportunity of speaking to freelancer Marine Olivesi, who worked for France 24 in Libya during the Libyan conflict up until the death of Gaddafi. She explained to me that she was took on a role to work side by side with international correspondent, David Thomson, who was reporting for F24 Français at the time, while she was reporting in for F24 English. David, the international correspondent was on location with a cameraman, but when Thomson was transferred from Libya, Olivesi was left alone without a cameraperson or any crew for that matter. Olivesi, from a radio background, did not own any equipment of her own, but was left with the F24 phone so that she could do “live stand ups” or “phoners”, whereby F24 would phone Olivesi for updates, and Olivesi pointed out that she was not involved in preparing any news packages for F24. Olivesi explained to me “it goes both ways, it's both producers or editors calling you when they see things on newswires that matter and they want you to [...] confirm what do you have to say, what you saw on the ground depending on where you are and then they can think ‘Oh, okay, so that’s great, you've got enough to talk about it from where you are, so we'll phone you in and you'll answer a few questions live” (Olivesi 2017). Olivesi even admitted that she had “never seen the footage” of the news she broke from Libya, and therefore was not in any way involved in the choice of footage to air while she reported live. Thomson, who was a permanent international correspondent for F24 at the time, had a different experience. Due the fact that he was reporting from a zone of conflict, he explained that it was difficult to find journalists willing to film in a dangerous location, therefore he would subcontract cameraperson roles to his friends and sometimes would end up alone and have to take on two roles: reporting and filming. He would then send his news package to the Paris office to be aired (Thomson 2017).

#### IV.1.3.3. To construct a democratic transparency into news making

It was revealed that amateur content in news videos can be used to construct a democratic transparency into news making. The following categories have been identified as ways of incorporating amateur content in news videos so as to construct a democratic transparency.

- 1. Using a series of amateur videos constructed with a recount of events to visually construct the narration**
- 2. Using amateur footage content along with descriptive journalist voiceover in order to present evidence to audiences**
- 3. Using amateur content in a news report to highlight the significance of User Generated Content (UGC) in today's world**
- 4. Blending amateur content in one news report along with footage presented as though internally produced so as to appear transparent in construction and show their presence on the field**

We can look further in detail into our news corpus so as to further understand how amateur content was used to construct a democratic transparency into news making.

Using a series of amateur videos constructed with a recount of events to visually construct the narration:

The AJE news video *Birthplace of Tunisia's revolution* (Al Jazeera English 2011b) also uses a series of amateur footage to show the uprisings that began in Tunisia while the journalist narrates the background of the footage “Just a month ago, dozens of protesters had brought the busy intersection to a standstill. The local residents were angered by the death of their own, a young produce vendor who set himself on fire in despair”. But provider of the footage is unsourced; in fact AJE presents it as their own footage. But one can note that the footage has very poor quality in terms of audio and graphics compared to the rest of the news video.

The Euronews news video entitled “The last moments of Muammar Gaddafi” (euronews (in English) 2011b) features an interview with a rebel describing the events that took place prior to the capture and killing of Gaddafi. Unique to this video is how the interview is co-constructed to play over other amateur content featuring Gaddafi's last moments. It can be presumed that this amateur footage was used because of the newsworthiness found in the content being shared by the rebel. A logo with the Libyan Flag featuring *Libya Al Hurra* (Libya the Free) is a sign that this video was provided by amateur photographers. The footage turns to another of Gaddafi being pushed around violently, but the video has no logo or creditation; it is presented as though it was shot by Euronews. But the video is blurry and of poor quality, most possibly taken on a mobile phone. A third video footage now replaces the unidentified video with a logo of GlobalPost from PRI on it but we are not told how GlobalPost got their hands on the content. The footage then goes back to the interview of the rebel still recounting the scene of events. Finally, video footage reveals Gaddafi seen “alive, dazed, and bloodied from his wounds”. The journalist also tells us that this footage is “graphic video filmed by someone in the crowd” (idem).

Using amateur footage content along with descriptive journalist voiceover in order to present evidence to audiences:

After showing distressful amateur content in the AJE news video entitled *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons*, the first words of the journalist, on voice over, accompany the footage to inform viewers “The video taken by medical staff at the hospital near Aleppo provides what they call compelling evidence...” (Al Jazeera English 2013d). The journalist basically tells the viewers that the video was made by doctors and that the reason why it is being shown is to show compelling evidence. The journalist carries on to describe the footage “One man is filmed foaming at the mouth and nose, a symptom of the nerve agent Sarin”. One can safely state that the impact of this news video with the grave words of the journalist, without the actual footage by the activist would not have been the same. The news reportage is centred on the amateur video provided by the activist. A specialist being interviewed also makes reference to the activist’s video stating that “The video is horrendous and it does indicate that there was probably chemical weapons use....” (idem). The journalist makes reference to the video again by interpreting a quote from the British Prime Minister to mean that “the video was evidence of a war crime” (idem).

The news video by Euronews entitled *Assad forces accused of killing hundreds in nerve gas attack* (euronews (in English) 2013a) shows footage from two amateur sources and switches between the two sources revealing images of people suffering from what the journalist tells us may be chemical attacks. One of the amateur channels has an illegible logo, while the other clearly reads Douma City in Arabic and English. The purpose of constructing a news video with two different sources is a way of showing evidence of chemical attacks from more than one source. When the footage from Douma City comes on, the journalist states “The assault on rebel held areas on the outskirts of the capital Damascus left over 200 people dead according to medical sources”. Usage of footage from Douma City may give viewers more confidence that this video is accurate, because it was taken by someone based in the location of the event.

The news video entitled *Al Jazeera talks to Ralf Trapp about chemical weapons in Syria* (Al Jazeera English 2013a) asks a chemical weapons expert whether he thinks the images coming in from Syria in August of 2013 are signs of chemical weapons being used. In order to get his opinion, AJE shares distressful amateur footage of people foaming from the mouth and who appear to be suffering. But the source of the video is undisclosed. In fact, AJE has added a

header to the video: YOUTUBE.COM/ ACTIVIST VIDEO. Another similar video in our news corpus tells us that this video was provided by a doctor on location, but this actual video makes no reference of the video source. YouTube, of course is not a source, it is simply a publisher platform free for billions to use and therefore it cannot be said that the source was given. The footage in this case functions as evidence for the interviewee to comment on.

Similarly, the AJ news video *Chemical weapons expert on alleged use of Sarin gas in Syria* (Al Jazeera English 2013b), uses amateur video sourced from YouTube to support an expert's representation of chemical usage in Syria. As the expert speaks of the investigations into Sarin usage in Syria, the video footage of patients being treated is shown. Therefore, this amateur footage also functions as a backup to an outsider's representation on the country. AJE has also noted the location of the footage, Saraqeb as well as the month April, which has been included in the expert's discourse as well.

Another AJ news video, *Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive* (Al Jazeera English 2013c), has been constructed in almost the same way, but this time taking an opposing point of view and it is worth pointing that these videos were posted on the same day to YouTube by AJE. Just like the previous news video, AJE begins by explaining what Sarin Gas is, before delving into an interview with an expert who represents Sarin Gas in Syria to AJE viewers. The amateur news video, labelled as YOUTUBE.COM and with the location and date, SARAQAEB, APRIL, is identical to the news video *Chemical weapons expert on alleged use of Sarin gas in Syria*.

The AJE news video *UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war'* uses amateur footage to share evidence with viewers on the state of affairs in Syria in 2012. Evidence is presented first, and labelled by AJE as YOUTUBE.COM/ACTIVIST VIDEO along with the location BABA AMR. The footage also has a logo on the top left of *Thawar BabaAmroo* in Arabic, illegible to English viewers of AJE. The footage features poor quality footage of smoke and we can hear helicopters and fire exchange in the background. This footage is presented along with the journalist voiceover explaining why the conflict in Syria can effectively be called a civil war "Syrian forces in attack mode, surrounding opposition strongholds and according to the UN using helicopters against civilians". This footage is then co-constructed with footage labelled by AJE as HOMS/UN VIDEO, showing a woman and children fleeing together. This video provided by the UN is presented along with the journalist voiceover "The opposition is also on the offensive. The fighting is so bad, the Red Cross says it can't get to all the people in need" (Al Jazeera English 2012b). The co-construction of these two videos shot by non-media professionals is used as evidence to explain why it is worth presenting the conflict as a civil war. It is interesting to note that the news video is entitled UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war' and that one of the videos used to make up this news video is a video provided by the UN.

However, the journalist's voiceover "On Tuesday, when the head of UN peacekeeping was asked if Syria was now there, he replied 'Yes'. His spokesperson confirmed that the conflict had shifted", and the news video title tell us that the UN has referred to the conflict as a war. Yet, AJE does not have a video of the Head of UN Peacekeeping referring to the Syria conflict as a civil war. There is no actual evidence of this and therefore, AJE has to feature some kind of evidence of civil war in terms of footage. The news video also presents activist video labelled by AJE as DEIR EL ZOUR/ACTIVIST VIDEO which features shaky video of injured people lying down on hospital beds and then we note that the filmmaker loses focus and films the floor for a few seconds. The shaky footage, although featured for only a few second by AJE, shows disorganisation in a hospital, representing war-like conditions in a hospital. The journalist voiceover makes reference to the medical elements seen on the footage by telling viewers that "It traditionally falls to the International Committee of the Red Cross to label conflicts" and therefore the civil war labelling by the UN is not of legal significance. In order to bring in the ICRC into the news video, AJE has shown what seems to be a hospital with patients who seem to be injured from war-like repercussions.

Using amateur content in a news report to highlight the significance of User Generated Content (UGC) in today's world

Our news corpus on stories of the Arab Spring featured amateur content sometimes used deliberately, with the objective of showing the role that activists played alongside social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter during the uprisings. For example, the AJ news video *Wither Twitter in Tunisia?* starts off with amateur footage of someone demonstrating alone in the streets. The journalist voiceover describes the images as "...an uprising that was inspired by images like this. A man breaking the government curfew, protesting alone outside the Interior Ministry" (Al Jazeera English 2011g). The amateur footage is not labelled, but the journalist makes reference to it as such "Abd Naceur Laouni had no idea this video would be uploaded and spread around the world". Viewers associate the word "uploaded" with the internet and some kind of social platform. The journalist later explains to the camera "For the first time, Tunisians were able to upload important footage and pictures onto sites like Facebook, an incredible tool". Therefore, we are still unsure where exactly the video was initially uploaded to or even where it was extracted from by AJE, but it has been used to highlight the importance of user generated content.

Blending amateur content in one news report along with footage presented as though internally produced so as to appear transparent in construction and show their presence on the field

Most of the news videos in the corpus that feature amateur content, also feature content presented as internally produced, therefore attempting to fulfil at least two functions. The channel appears to be willing to co-construct their news along with actors on the ground and this makes them appear transparent and democratic to their audiences worldwide. The channel also appears willing to show what people on the ground are showing but balance the effect by showing their own content, so as to show that they have journalists on the ground investigating the situation. In the battle between professional media and amateur media, professional media are required to show the benefits of their profession. The main benefit of the professional journalist's role in news production is providing unbiased and accurate facts based on professional and transparent investigation. Another great responsibility of journalists is to be able to break down events and present them to their audiences using not only images but also narratives.

#### **IV.1.4. Concluding Remarks on Amateur Content in International News**

Out of the 27 (11%) news videos whereby amateur content was clearly used, AJE had the largest usage of amateur content (48% of entire corpus and 19% of AJE corpus) followed by Euronews (41% of entire corpus and 13% of Euronews corpus) and France 24 (41% of entire corpus and 5% of F24 corpus). Press TV did not feature any content identifiable as amateur sourced. It is possible that some amateur footage was not labelled and therefore not identifiable.

It is worth noting how mainstream media source and verify amateur content. We noted for example, that out of the videos using amateur content, not all were presented as amateur content. For example, some were presented as “amateur video”, whereas others were presented as “activist video”, sometimes including the actual platforms, such as YouTube, from which it was sourced, and in some cases the broadcast channel did not label the footage. We noted instances whereby the logo of the amateur was left on the video, making it evident to audiences that the footage did not belong to the channel, but not evident whether it was footage from a local channel or an amateur. We also noted a case whereby the amateur's logo was blurred out.

In essence, amateur content was used to integrate (1) propaganda into the news, whereby, we noted that (i) both amateur content and State TV content would be used in the same news video so as to portray objectivity. Also, (ii) amateur content was sometimes used to disguise bias or the journalist's inability to take a neutral stance on sensational events. (iii) Amateur content already in<sup>2</sup>ted by news outlet partners or subsidiaries in their news videos would be kept by sister channels, whereas the narrative would be adapted for different audiences (for example Euronews France and Euronews English). It was also noted that (iv) the journalist would not record their voice over parts of amateur footage so that the audience identifies and empathises with the victims of a tragic event. Amateur footage was also (v) used as exclusive content when there is rare footage of an event. Finally, (vi) amateur content was also noted to be used in news reports so as to shock and/or entertain audiences.

A second category identified in usage of amateur content in news reports is (2) to construct censored news. Our analysis in chapter 3 portrayed the crackdown on freedom of speech and press in all the countries in our corpus and how this resulted in censored news. This category identifies four ways how journalists attempted to portray the existence of censorship via their news reports. It was noted that news channels would (i) use amateur content to situate the user when using non-local people to represent a news story. Similarly, (ii) amateur content was used when the event location is inaccessible by journalists, either because journalists are banned or because it is too dangerous. It was also noted that (iii) amateur content was used to represent events that journalists would face ethical and legal implications over, such as the filming of an assault or a death. Finally, it was also noted that (iv) amateur footage content was used while someone is being interviewed over the phone so as to show footage of the location. All these uses of amateur content also point out that the news channel was not on location to take the footage themselves and this therefore indirectly portrays the problem of censorship in the location of the event.

## **IV.2. Usage of Figures and Percentages**

As part of our research into the construction of news, we extracted the news videos that integrated figures or percentages into the narration. It was our belief that the use of numbers in

journalism is an element of constructing the news with external information because numbers are usually provided by some kind of external source.

### **IV.2.1. Definition**

The literature on using numbers in the news led us to two main topics: data and precision journalism (Bell 2015) as well as the way in which data was found to be presented to audiences (Sunne 2016). Precision journalism, which was also found to have begun as early as the 1800s, “refers to the application of social science methodology- primarily surveys- to the gathering of data for journalistic stories” (Bowers 1976, p.738). McCombs et al describe precision journalism as an attempt by “journalists to use careful, often quantitative, approaches to answer precise questions about their communities and government” (McCombs et al. 1987). Data allows for audiences to analyse the situation themselves from afar, without the need for external experts to analyse the situation. Various tools exist today to facilitate data presentation by journalists: Datawrapper (used by the New York Times, NPR, Deutsche Welle, Bloomberg and ZEIT Online), OpenRefine, Carto and Google Trends.

What appears to be missing from the literature on numbers in the news is the actual role numbers play in international news stories and how they were presented in news on the events of the Arab Spring.

### **IV.2.2. Presence in News Corpus**

Few videos used figures and percentages in our news corpus; three were produced by Euronews (figures with no sources) and one was produced by AJE (figures with sources).

### **IV.2.3. Findings and theory proposal**

We were able to identify 5 functions of figures and percentages in international news videos and these have been grouped under 2 main categories as outlined in Table 43:

## Use of Figures and Percentages in International News

1. Using figures and percentages (dates, durations) in international news to present educational news videos
  - a. **Using figures and percentages to present dates and number of nations that have signed a convention**
  - b. **Use figures and percentages to produce educational news videos**

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2. Using figures and percentages (crowd sizes, census info and casualties) in international news to present environment context so as to gain viewer trust and/or inform on the political interest or insecurity of the region
  - a. **Using figures and percentages to round up numbers when the actual number is unknown due to lack of official sources**
  - b. **Using figures and percentages to present the number of casualties so as to emphasise the dangerous environment**
  - c. **Using figures and percentages to present facts about a region so as to share the context of the story and regain viewers' trust**

Table 43 Use of Figures and Percentages in International News Videos- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

These functions are further detailed in the following section.

### IV.2.3.1. Using figures and percentages (dates, durations) in international news to present educational news videos

Using figures and percentages to present dates and number of nations that have signed a convention

The Euronews news video entitled *Sarin use and origin (May 27, 2013)* uses figures to state the date of the United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 and further presents the number of countries that have actually signed the convention, while also stating the number of countries that did not sign the convention. This information is stated by the journalist on voice over images that emphasise the statement: “Then, under a United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, sarin and other such materials were banned after 1997, and stores were ordered destroyed. The convention was signed by 162 countries. Israel and Myanmar did not

ratify this. Six countries have not signed: Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria” (idem).



News Video Screenshot 13 Euronews: Sarin use and origin (May 27, 2013)

In addition to the date of the convention, the journalist states the date of the “striking use of sarin”, which “was in an attack in 1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan...killing 13 people and injuring thousands” (idem). The journalist’s report, which also details the number dead and injured (without sources) is played over archived images from the 1995 aftermath in Japan.


Use figures and percentages to produce educational news videos

The Euronews news video entitled *Sarin use and origin* (2013) uses figures such as dates and number of casualties to give produce an educational news video that is very documentary-like in style, so as to share information about the background of sarin. For example, “Sarin gas is one of the most toxic chemicals ever invented, hundreds of times more so than cyanide. A German chemist looking for new insecticides developed it accidentally in 1938. The Nazis in World War Two put it in artillery shells but never used it. The US produced it later, for a time” (idem), these statements by the journalist played over black and white images that appear to be archives (but at not labelled) from the 1930s, use numbers to explain the extent to which Sarin gas is dangerous and also state the date at which it was invent.

Dates are also used in a chronological fashion so as to educate the viewer on the use of sarin over the years; 1988 in Iran-Iraq war and 1995 in Japan.

The news video also uses figures that are not voiced by the journalist. For example, as the journalist states “Colourless and odourless, sarin is highly volatile, meaning it spreads quickly through the air or water, and, unless an antidote is given, it is deadly within minutes when inhaled or absorbed through the skin, even at low concentrations. Suffocation, mucus secretion,

blindness, vomiting, uncontrollable defecation and urination and muscular convulsions end when the heart stops” (idem), the news video features the following screenshot:



*News Video Screenshot 14 Euronews: Sarin use and origin (May 27, 2013)*

Although the journalist does not repeat this information on voiceover, the information states that only 50mg of Sarin gas could kill someone is plus or minus 10 minutes. The journalist’s voiceover this image with figures states “sarin is highly volatile, meaning it spreads quickly through the air or water, and, unless an antidote is given, it is deadly within minutes when inhaled or absorbed through the skin” (Euronews, 2011). Therefore, although the narration does not repeat the image, it echoes the image with the words: “deadly” and “within minutes”.

#### IV.2.3.2. Using figures and percentages (crowd sizes, census info and casualties) in international news to present environment context so as to gain viewer trust and/or inform on the political interest or insecurity of the region

Using figures and percentages to round up numbers when the actual number is unknown due to lack of official sources

News events from some regions do not have official sources of information and official sources of information in some regions do not agree with news shared by unofficial sources of information, such as activists and perhaps even medical personnel. Therefore, news channels may choose to only report news sourced from official sources of information whilst ignoring

unofficial sources, or they may decide to share information sourced from unofficial sources, because these unofficial sources have witnessed or experienced the event in one way or the other. The question of what makes an information source official must be asked. As discussed earlier, State TV is an official source of information on the state, especially in many Arab countries, because it is usually the mouthpiece of the state. But State TV cannot be the official source of information for the opposition or opposition parties. In countries like Lebanon, where many political parties own – or partially own- TV channels, one will find a TV channel for the opposition but also for the ruling party(ies). However, in countries like Syria, which has had the same ruling government for generations, there has always only been one State Television channel. During the uprising, several activist channels sprang up, but these were regarded as amateur content for our thesis rather than official content. In August 2013, when activists accuses the government of using chemical weapons to kill Syrians, the news was not initially broadcast on Syrian State TV. This means that international media had the choice of ignoring the opposition claims or investigating further so as to be able to report the news as it came in. The Euronews news video entitled *Assad forces accused of killing hundred in nerve gas attack* uses amateur/activist footage of victims that appear to be suffering or to have died from chemical weapons. The journalist states that “Syrian activists have accused the forces of President Bashar al-Assad of killing hundreds of people in a nerve-gas attack” (Euronews, 2013). Viewers are told who has made the accusation- the Syrian activists, but we are not told how many people have actually died. This means that the number is most probably unknown. This is a crucial piece of the information that has not been focussed on by Euronews. One could argue that the fact that the number of dead have simply been rounded up as though they were presenting the number of visitors to an event, could leave a feeling of indifference in viewers. It would have perhaps been more proper for the journalist to state the facts more clearly, by stating for example that “we are unable to find the number of those killed but activists are stating that there are at least 200 people who have been killed...” or “State TV has refused to comment on this accusation”.

In the same news video, the journalist states “The assault on rebel held areas on the outskirts of the capital Damascus left over 200 people dead according to medical sources” (Euronews, 2013). In this case, the source is “medical sources”, but we are unsure if these medical sources are official or even neutral organisations. The Euronews journalist does however state that “The reports [...] could not be independently verified....” (idem), therefore being cautious about the information they are broadcasting. The journalist concludes by stating that the war “has left 100,000 people dead and forced over 2 million to leave their homes” (idem). In this case, the journalist is very confident about the numbers being broadcast as facts, but the sources are still not included.

Another news video by Euronews, entitled *Sarin use and origin* (2013) also rounds up figures so as to show the extremeness of a situation. But in this case, the figures rounded up are not deaths, but rather how much Sarin is more dangerous than cyanide. The journalist gives background information on the chemical weapon by telling viewers that “Sarin gas is one of the most toxic chemicals ever invented, hundreds of times more so than cyanide” (Euronews, 2013). But the same video also rounds up figures to share the number of deads in the Iran-Iraq war: “Iraq's Saddam Hussein, it is claimed, used sarin among other nerve agents, in 1988, on the ethnic Kurdish city of Halabja, in the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War. Thousands of civilians were killed” (idem). These words play over archived images of dead bodies presumably from the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

Using figures and percentages to present the number of casualties so as to emphasise the dangerous environment


The Euronews news video entitled *Egypt Deadly pre-election clashes in Tahrir Square* (2011) uses figures to emphasise the violence in Egypt at the end of 2011, several months after the dictator Mubarak was toppled by uprisings and only months before planned elections. The news video features violence on Egypt's streets whereby clashes are taking place between security forces and demonstrators in various labelled cities across the country. To further emphasis the violence, the journalist states “At least 11 people were reported killed in Cairo's Tahrir Square on Sunday, four shot by live bullets according to medical sources” (Euronews, 2011). This statement tells viewers the number of deaths and the reason for some of the deaths. The statement is also unofficial as the statement is “according to medical sources”, but we are not told which medical sources, and therefore we do not know how this count has been reached.

The journalist also tells us that “within an hour, thousands had returned to reclaim the birthplace of the revolt...” (idem). This number is also broadcast without sharing the source. It serves to explain that there are a large number of people participating in demonstrations and further emphasises that Egypt is a no-go zone at the moment of broadcast. However, it does not tell us if the figures are an estimate that was reached by simply looking at the people stream into the square or if this is according to officials. One would expect official information, such as State TV to be used to share information that is expected to be official, but Euronews have simply included the information on voice over.

The journalist resumes the violence as such: “The overall death toll stands at least 13, with more than a thousand people injured” (idem). Again, this information tells us that thousands have been injured and 13 have lost their lives, further emphasising that the situation is not only tense, but unsafe and out of control. However, Euronews does not share their sources with us and therefore Euronews becomes the official source for viewers.

Using figures and percentages to present facts about a region so as to share the context of the story and regain viewers’ trust

The AJE news video entitles *US calls for political solution in Bahrain (15 March, 2011)* makes reference to percentages at the very beginning of the news story. The percentages are not just stated in the journalist’s discourse, but also presented on the screen for users to see after having heard the journalist introduction: “Bahrain, this tiny island nation is turning into one of the biggest areas of concern for President Barak Obama” (AJE, 2011). Indeed AJE may need to explain why “this tiny island” is of concern to the US. Therefore, the journalist then explains the context while sharing the percentages on the screen “Home to the US fifth Fleet, the fear is that this will be a staging ground for proxy fight between Iran where 92% of the country is Shiite and Saudi Arabia a majority Sunni country now looking towards Bahrain where the Sunni monarchy rules Shia majority” (idem).





*News Video Screenshot 15 AJE: US calls for political solution in Bahrain (15 March, 2011)*

The figures on the screen give a clear picture of possible chaos in a region with two main peoples and a country where the minority is the ruling monarchy. Sources of all figures are noted on the screen so as to appear both neutral and factual, of necessity to AJE, a channel that faced a lot of criticism on their news production methods on the Bahraini uprising. Both sources: Pew Research Center and CIA World Factbook are American organisations, therefore trustworthy to Americans, but perhaps not so much by AJE’s Arab audiences. It may also be questioned why the channel did not revert to figures from international organisations such as the United Nations.

In 2011, the Middle East Bureau Chief for TIME, Aryn Baker argued that Bahrain was “voiceless”. Baker asked if there was a “double standard effect”, because similar uprisings in Libya and Egypt were given much more coverage time by Al Jazeera (Baker 2011). Also, Ali Hashem, a former Al Jazeera war correspondent, who resigned to protest over AJ’s bias reporting of the Syrian crisis also had issues with the way in which Al Jazeera chose to report on the Bahraini uprising. In an article he wrote for The Guardian; he said that the way in which Al Jazeera had “dealt with the uprising in Bahrain...It was clear that Gulf-financed stations were more interested in regional security than Bahrainis' dreams of democracy and freedom and their revolt against tyranny” (Hashem 2012b; Hashem 2012a). But Hashem shifted the blame from AJ’s news production teams and executives to politicians when it came to the

editorial line and news selection procedures of the channel. Hashem said that “It was clear to me, though, that these instructions were not coming from al-Jazeera itself: that the decision was a political one taken by people outside the TV centre – the same people who asked the channel to cover up the situation in Bahrain” (Hashem 2012b). An article by Essaif et al on [globalnewsroom.org](http://globalnewsroom.org) also explains that according to analysts, although the Qatari government had supported the Arab uprisings, “it sees unrest in Bahrain- just next door to Qatar- as a threat to stability” (Essaif et al. 2012). It must be noted that the editorial line on al-Jazeera English and Arabic are different, because although there was some coverage of the Bahraini uprising on the English channel, the Arabic channel was lacking in coverage and when they did cover Bahrain, they were “never very critical of the government’. According, to Dave Marash, former anchor at al-Jazeera English, “Al Jazeera Arabic has seriously damaged its brand in the Middle East by taking a dive on Bahrain, and basically following the dictates of the Saudi government and broadcasting only from the Bahrain royal family point of view”. As stated earlier, al-Jazeera English did in fact cover Bahrain, so much so, that a documentary entitled “Shouting in the Dark” was produced by the channel with the aim of looking at the anti-government protests of Bahrain and this documentary went on to receive awards, but it was not aired on the Arabic channel.

Ahmed Al-Rawi also showed how Al-Jazeera did not give much coverage to the uprisings in Bahrain and Syria, in an article for *Global Media and Communication*, entitled *Sectarianism and the Arab Spring*:

It is noteworthy to mention that the Qatari-owned Al-Jazeera Arabic channel under-reported the Shiite protests. The channel was previously accused of favouring Sunnis and inciting them against Shiites in other countries such as Iraq (Lynch, 2006: 198). The under-reporting of Shiite protests in Bahrain is supported by televised interviews with over four ex-Al-Jazeera employees who resigned as a protest against the biased coverage, like Ghassan Bin Jadu and Hassan Shaaban (Russia Today, 2012). Furthermore, Ali Hashem (2012), another journalist who worked for Al-Jazeera and resigned, revealed to *The Guardian* that ‘[i]t was clear that Gulf-financed stations were more interested in regional security than Bahrainis’ dreams of democracy and freedom and their revolt against tyranny’. Ironically, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which supported many Arab Spring protests, exerted the fiercest opposition against online dissent inside their own countries, which indicates their double standards (Codrescu, 2012), including other Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Murphy, 2013).

(Al-Rawi 2015)

To be fair Bahrain was also a country that banned many international journalists and was also considered unsafe. For example, al-Jazeera's journalists Bilal Randeree and Soraya Lennie were denied entry into Bahrain- as had many other journalists during the Bahrain Uprising. Al-Jazeera's website was also blocked in Bahrain and al-Jazeera offices in Bahrain were almost shut down (Bahrain Press Association 2011). Also, in an interview with Heather Allan, the former head of news gathering at AJE, during the time of the Arab Spring, Allan told me that AJE covered Bahrain ““extensively, until we were totally banned and our staff threatened with immediate arrest and jail”. When it came to Egypt, Heather Allan explained that AJE had a “fully staffed and functioning AJE bureau in Cairo, in addition we staffed up with many extra teams from around the world”. But Allan explained that safety was a big issue, whereby AJ staff experienced constant harassment from the Egyptian authorities. In Libya, AJE went in to the country “with many teams, both from the east, and from the west”. With regards to Saudi Arabia, AJ could “never get into Saudi to cover anything ever except the Haj and that would be extremely limited” (Allan 2017). Allan said “We covered Saudi like everyone else, from outside the country” (Allan 2017). When it came to Syria, AJ E covered the uprising through Lebanon, but as the fighting escalated, “Syria was an absolute no-go zone for AJE....we would never be given a visa for Damascus although we tried often” (Allan 2017). The uprising in Syria had to be covered through other means as they could not have AJE staff on the ground. Tunisia was the country with the least challenges to cover. When it came to Yemen, AJE had staff in the country to cover the uprising. I asked Heather Allan to comment on any governmental interference during her tenure with AJE. She explained that she saw no influence from the Qatari government in the editorial management of the channel when covering the Arab Spring. Allan admits that it was a challenge to cover Qatar itself on Al Jazeera, but she did not encounter any challenges on covering the Arab Uprisings that came directly or indirectly from the Qatari government.

#### **IV.2.1. Concluding Remarks on figures and percentages in International News**

We reiterate that few videos used figures and percentages in our news corpus; three were produced by Euronews (figures with no sources) and one was produced by AJE (figures with sources).

In essence, we found two main ways of using figures and percentages in international news. The first category, (1) using figures and percentages (dates, durations) in international news to present educational news videos, can be done in two main ways: (1) by using figures and

percentages to present dates and number of nations that have signed a convention and (2) to produce educational news videos. The second category (2) using figures and percentages (crowd sizes, census info and casualties) in international news to present environment context so as to gain viewer trust and/or inform on the political interest or insecurity of the region, can be done in three main ways: (1) using figures and percentages to round up numbers when the actual number is unknown due to lack of official sources, (2) using figures and percentages to present the number of casualties so as to emphasise the dangerous environment and (3) using figures and percentages to present facts about a region so as to share the context of the story and regain viewers' trust.

## **IV.3. Usage of Quotes**

As part of our research into the construction of news, we extracted the news videos that integrated quotes or citations into the narration so as to understand how newsrooms incorporate elements of external sources into international news.

### **IV.3.1. Definition**

The literature on quotes and citations in the news can be categorised into how quotes were presented by the media (Peter Clark 2015; UNESCO et al. 2012; Caldas-Coulthard 1993), who was actually quoted and finally the role of quotes in the news (Scollon 2004; Fowler 2013; Conrad 1999; Shepherd & Goode 1977; Tromp 1994; Goodell 1987; Ryan 1987; Caldas-Coulthard 1993; Jullian 2011).

Existing literature points out the importance of quotes to reduce the risk of misreporting, to show reporting transparency, to show context and explain difficult issues. Also, quotes can be used to question, be objective or leave an impact on audiences. Indeed, there has already been a lot of research conducted on quotes and citations in the news. It does seem however that very little has been said about representative discourse on televised news and this is where we hope to fill the literature gap. We also aim to provide updated information on the use of discourse representation in international media in general and specifically on the stories of the Arab uprisings.

## **IV.3.2. Presence in News Corpus**

Out of the 252 news videos in our corpus, 34 featured quotes or citations. Euronews featured 14 news videos with quotes or citations, Al Jazeera English featured 10 news videos with quotes or citations, Press TV featured 8 news videos with quotes or citations and France 24 English featured only 2 news videos with quotes or citations. As we began our analysis, we noted various forms of quotes, citations and even un-citations (see theory proposal), a result of both significant and representative elements in our corpus.

## **IV.3.3. Findings and theory proposal**

### **IV.3.3.1. Presentation and Role of Citations in International News**

We noted twelve main ways of citing in international news videos and were able to identify the roles of these methods. It is important to note that these categories are sometimes intertwined and overlap one another as citation can be done using various methods. These twelve ways have been categorised 4 main methods.

Our citation theory proposes that citations in international news videos are made through various methods, sometimes overlapping one another. (1) Citations are made with supportive material. For example, the use of (i) direct quotes (ii) indirect quotes via footage of the person speaking (iii) the journalist facing the camera (iv) citing included in the news video title and (v) citing events in a chronological timeline. It was also found that some citations were made without identifying the actual source and we called these (2) unreferenced citations. A third method of citing in international news was that rather than referring to the actual person being cited, the news channel would make (3) citations of organisations/countries and this could be done in various ways, namely (i) citing organisations/countries, (ii) citing the press, (iii) making mock citations and finally (iv) citing behaviours/feelings. Finally, the fourth way in which citations were made in the news was with (4) un-citations, meaning that the silence of a source was actually cited.




Table 44 News Citation Theory- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

The theory is displayed in a tabular form so as to show the citation methods side by side with their functionalities. A detailed analysis of the corpus is provided following the tabular summary.

Citation Methods	Functions
<b>1. Citations with supporting material</b>	
<b>i. Direct Quotes (says, termed, condemned, decided, calls, says, saying, said, calling for, released a statement saying, called for)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To make a firm (confirmed, official) statement that quotes a source rather than paraphrasing. Sometimes more than one quote is reported including paraphrasing so as to present the quotes as one. The important aspect of direct quotes is that the source is given and their words are used. Sometimes the quote is displayed on screen for viewers to perceive as an official statement.</li> <li>• To represent organisations/people being cited using consistent frames and with the same editorial line</li> <li>• To cite official statement of leaders around the world in reaction to an event</li> <li>• To cite instructions from the US to Egypt: “US Deputy Secretary William Burns ...called for a stable, democratic, inclusive and tolerant Egypt” (Euronews)</li> </ul>
<b>ii. Direct or in-direct quotes via footage of the person speaking (or relevant images, video titles or headlines including the quote ([also]says, termed, condemned, decided, call/s, saying, has/had)said (repeatedly), calling for, is satisfied, that was the message, decided, accuses, [been] accused [of], denied, use of colon “:” after source to display instructions by a source, labelling, replaced, the announcement is frustrating)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To share a firm (confirmed) statement while creating mental images of the speaker/organisation/country or show evidence of direct speech</li> <li>• To introduce a speaker or share their advice</li> <li>• To broadcast instructions by one source</li> <li>• To introduce an opposing statement</li> <li>• To share findings of tests/investigations/reports</li> <li>• To critique findings of tests/investigations/reports/announcements/statements</li> <li>• To report an action through a citation (example: The president replace the articles...)</li> <li>• To explain a news story/event through the words of another speaker sometimes done with footage of the person speaking and sometimes with an official even if the official is not introduced</li> <li>• To cite the opposition’s dissatisfaction with the president/government’s actions even if the accompanying footage does not really represent the citation. The citation may sometimes be followed up by the discourse of an opposition representative (in form of an audio interview or otherwise) which further criticises the government</li> <li>• To cite a decree/law</li> <li>• To cite supporters or protesters [in a demonstration]</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To cite what someone states they/decree/organisation/report/country will do even if they have not done it yet</li> </ul>
<b>iii. Direct quotes via social media</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To share the view of the public if the tweeter is unknown or to share the officially published view of an organisation/person/country</li> </ul>
<b>iv. Citations by journalist facing the camera or the use of interpretative headlines</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To explain something that appears complicated to viewers, or to conclude a story.</li> </ul>
<b>v. Citing in the news video title posted on online platforms such as YouTube (slams, says, calls [for], rescinds, use of quotation marks in title, assumption of powers, action polarises, our correspondent witnessed)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To act as an informative and attention grabbing introduction to the news video</li> <li>To make two citations in the title whereby one citation questions the other citation</li> <li>To report a statement that in itself is an action (example: cancel, appeal, rescinds)</li> <li>To highlight keywords that include names, contexts or citations that improve the video's SEO by increasing the likelihood of the video being found online</li> <li>To cite an instruction made by someone in government (calls for)</li> <li>To cite the action of someone assuming power because power assumption is usually announced and therefore it can be cited (without the source being declared)</li> <li>To cite the atmosphere in a country without requiring a source</li> <li>To cite the news channel's correspondent in a report, "Out correspondent in Cairo, witnessed the violence" (Euronews)</li> </ul>
<b>vi. Citing events through sources in the form of a chronological timeline with images</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To display a chronological calendar of events leading up to the major event being reported</li> <li>To simplify what has appeared to be complicated for viewers to understand</li> <li>To recapitulate a story after having reported it in an agile method (sharing only bits of the news as they come in)</li> </ul>
<b>2. <u>Unreferenced Citations</u> (a news report, the world is, people are, experts say, passive voice)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To generalise a point of view/argue a point</li> <li>To share news published by sources without sharing the significance of the source</li> </ul>
<b>3. <u>Citing Organisations and Countries</u></b>	
<b>i. Citations Organisations/Countries (it was decided, the union does not, the union has based its decision on, according to the union's Peace and Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To share a grouped decision by an organisation/country without naming the members who may have been against the statement and also without reference to the role of the members of the organisation/country</li> </ul>

<p><b>Council, officials believe, airport officials say, continued its condemnation, called for an immediate cease-fire, is satisfied with, that was the message, resolution authorises, decided, criticised, accused, adopted, insist)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To report a news event despite the insignificance of the source</li> <li>• To show that an organisation is united and stands strong in their statements and decisions and are therefore able to enforce peace and calm in the streets (for example the military)</li> <li>• To report one political party’s criticism of another and highlight the opposition of one party to another without necessarily stating the role of each party in a society</li> <li>• To feature how one member of an organisation can cite itself or its organisation without naming references deliberately so as to show a unified policy within the organisation</li> <li>• To state what an organisation is adamant about with the use of words like “insist”</li> </ul>
<p><b>ii. Citations of the Press (all press outlets everywhere in the world, this is the front page of <i>press</i>, the headlines is, they say that, they look at the events, the press’ view point, they are against, it is being called, the press was leading today, was talking, seems to be able to decide, this reference is not shared, the whole question of, has revealed, the report says, was repeated, said, ran a strident article, the newspaper likened)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To interpret the various standpoints of the press on different topics</li> <li>• To simply introduce a news topic</li> </ul>
<p><b>iii. Mock Citations- Direct or Indirect Quotes with a tone of sarcasm or irony, while sometimes featuring footage of the speaker (that changed pretty quickly, I suppose it doesn’t really flatter them, shall we take a listen to a little boo-boo that “speaker” made, let’s take a listen, offer advice to the speaker)</b></p>	<p>To mock or question the person/organisation/country being cited</p>
<p><b>iv. Citing behaviours/feelings (claims, does not accept, hoped, shying away, wouldn’t mind, wouldn’t</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To presume and then broadcast the position of a person/government/organisation</li> <li>• To provide an interpretation, sometimes in form of a conclusion to a complicated news story</li> </ul>

<p><b>have wanted, believe, suspicion grows, believes, overcome, wants to avoid, the stock market plunged)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To share an interpretation of how an organisation feels about something as well as the difficulties they are encountering, usually done by citing an expert/analyst.</li> <li>• To cite the feeling of opposition, support or polarisation in a country/organisation</li> <li>• To cite the effect of a decree/report...</li> <li>• To cite the stock market so as to evaluate the economy in a country</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Un-citations (cannot bring themselves to say, avoiding the ‘...’ word today studiously, abstain, referred to (synonym or complicated definition) so as not to use the actual words, but avoided using the words ...)</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To share what is deliberately unsaid by a person/country/organisation, because sometimes what is unsaid is more important than what is actually said and usually a decision is taken by a person/country/organisation to abstain or not comment or not use specific words</li> <li>• Sometimes un-citations can be used in self-quotes and definitions of what is unsaid are used, therefore making the news seem even more ambiguous than it is</li> </ul>

Table 45 News Citation Theory Explained- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

#### IV.3.3.2. Detailed Corpus Analysis

This section features a detailed analysis of our corpus for each of the four citation methods proposed.

##### Citations with supporting material

###### *Direct quotes*


News videos sometimes quote speakers directly by sharing exactly what was said. This gains the trust of viewers as it is clear that direct quotes are not paraphrased sentences, terms or even ideas stated by others. Direct quotes also gain the trust of viewers because they actually name the source being quoted and therefore the information appears to be official and accurate.

The AJE news video entitled *Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surman air strike (June 20, 2011)* features a direct quote from the NATO Libya Commander. The news video first describes the context in the Libyan battle, which identifies the different parties in the following order: the Libyan government and fighters, the NTC and fighters and NATO, whilst reporting the impact on civilians. Towards the end of the news story, an attack by NATO resulting in the death of civilians is reported by the Libyan government spokesman with footage and this story is finally concluded by the journalist as such:

**Journalist Voiceover:** NATO released a statement saying it had bombed a “legitimate military target- on a command and control node [the] strike will greatly degrade the Gaddafi regime’s forces’ ability to carry on their barbaric assault against the Libyan people.” (Charles Bouchard NATO’s Libya Commander).

(idem)

The journalist introduced the quoted by stating specifically that “NATO released a statement saying it had bombed a...” (idem) and this informs viewers that the statement is official and therefore although the beginning of the statement is a paraphrase using the words “it had bombed a...”, the rest is a direct quote, which the journalist reads whilst viewers can also read it at the same time on their screens. The quotation is transmitted as 2 quotations because the journalist adds “the” between the two quotes.




News Video Screenshot 16 AJE: Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike (June 20, 2011)

The quote could have fit in one screen, but because the journalist added the word “the” to the second quote, it had to be taken out of the quote. After looking at the quotes closely, it is clear that they were taken from two different statements and put together in context for viewers to

understand the “official statement” by NATO. Therefore, what is not clear from the quote(s) is the form in which the statement was released by NATO, for example, was it made in a press conference, in a press release, on a tweet, on their website, in an interview, or any other way. The way in which the statements were made is significant, because sometimes, statements can be taken out of context, for example during a conversation such as an interview or perhaps even from two different conversations or speeches so as to understand the intended meaning by the speaker.

The AJE news video *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons* (April 26, 2013) quotes the British Prime Minister directly, whilst displaying his quote on the screen for viewers to see. Firstly, the journalist summarises the quote in a simple and straightforward statement over amateur footage of victims that appear to be suffering from a chemical weapon attack: “Britain’s Prime Minister said on Friday the video was evidence of a war crime” (idem). It is probably necessary to show this footage whilst the journalist makes this citation so that viewers understand which video the British PM is referring to in his statement. Then, the journalist quotes the PM whilst showing his quote on the screen for viewers to read simultaneously. “It is very disturbing what we’re seeing. It is limited evidence, but there is growing evidence, that we’ve seen too, of the use of chemical weapons, probably by the regime. It’s extremely serious, this is a war crime, and we should take it very seriously” (idem).



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

News Video Screenshot 17 AJE: *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons* (April 26, 2013)

AJE clearly displays a photo of PM Cameron whilst showing and reading his statement. This shows that the statement is an actual quote that was not paraphrased, but rather it is displayed word for word. The statement is an accusation and it is displayed with a sub headline that cites the Syrian government’s denial to the accusation.

AJE’s news video entitled *Morsi’s assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt* (November 22, 2012) features quotes by the Egyptian president. The first quote is stated in-text by the

journalist and on voice over footage that does not even include the president. The journalist states: “In an effort to ease the crisis, **Morsi says** he’ll talk senior judges. **In a statement, he described** the decree as “a push forward for Egypt” and that’s likely to be his message to members of the judiciary (idem). This direct quote actually cites what Morsi says he will do, rather than stating what he has actually done. This is useful as it shares the president’s opinion on the matter. The journalist then says, “In a statement...” before explaining how he envisions the decree. Starting of the citation with “in a statement”, highlights the fact that it is an “official statement” released by the president and expected to be broadcast by the press; we cannot be sure if it is a direct quote or a paraphrase. Quotation marks were only added at the time of transcribing for the purpose of this research, but one cannot be sure if these are the exact words of the president. It is immediately followed by a clear direct quote, which is featured on the screen for users to read while the journalist reads it out loud.



Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt

*News Video Screenshot 18 AJE: Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt (November 22, 2012)*

As the journalist reads out his statement, she includes the words “he said”, so as to ensure that viewers understand that these are indeed his words: “This declaration is deemed necessary...” **he said** “...in order to hold accountable those responsible for the corruption as well as other crimes during the previous regime and the transitional period” (idem). This quotation appearing on the backdrop of the president and references as Mohamed Morsi EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT, informs viewers that it is a direct quote that is official in nature and therefore represents the president’s views and statement on the declaration.

The AJE news video entitled *Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)* portrays how direct citations can be used in news videos to share the official international opinion of various countries on an event. The news video focusses on the reaction of the international community (leaders and passers-by) following the military coup leading to Morsi’s downfall in Egypt. The journalist starts from Tunisia, where the Arab Spring was

ignited, to get the opinion of a passer-by on the street. It is interesting that rather than getting the government opinion, AJE chooses to share the opinion of those on the street, almost as though the Tunisian people, through their revolution, had earned a more powerful opinion to that of their government. Rather than introducing the speaker, the journalist presents the idea of “shock” in the region in reaction to the coup in Egypt. This idea is then supported by the statement of a passer-by in Egypt:

***Journalist voiceover:***

*Events in Egypt have sent shockwaves through the region. This is Tunisia, where the Arab spring began and where now the Islamist Ennahda party is in power.*



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

*News Video Screenshot 19 AJE: Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

***Passer-by on the street in Tunisia: [Translated from Arabic into English for the purpose of this Al Jazeera English report]*** The passer-by speaks as though in response to a question, unheard on the news video:

*It's a blow to the Arab revolutions and a blow to the young democracies in the Arab countries. We feel sorry for Mohammed Morsi because he is an elected president and he was overthrown by the soft coup.*

*AJE, Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions (July, 2013)*

The passer-by seems to speak on behalf of all Tunisians and Arabs as he states that the coup “is a blow to the Arab revolutions and to young democracies in the Arab country” (idem). The speaker also states “We feel sorry...” as though it is a general opinion. Therefore, this citation acts to represent the Tunisian opinion on the coup in Egypt.

In the same news video, AJE features the Turkish reaction. Again, the journalist introduces the speaker by making reference to the country they represent. In this case it is more applicable

because the speaker is actually the Turkish FM and therefore can indeed represent the official view of Turkey.

***Journalist Voiceover:***

*In Turkey, where the conservative government of President Erdogan has faced its own protest movement, there was harsh criticism of the military's actions.*

*(idem)*

The journalist also takes the opportunity to remind viewers of protests in Turkey and the fact that the military was criticised. It is not clear who the journalist is citing when they state in passive voice that “there was harsh criticism...” (idem). This introduction serves to give viewers background information on Turkey’s political situation so as to understand the context and situation the upcoming statement by the Turkish FM:



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

*News Video Screenshot 20 AJE: Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

The footage shows the Turkish FM speaking in a Press Conference as he stands before the Turkish flag.

***Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Foreign Minister [Translated from Turkish into English for the purpose of this Al Jazeera English report]:***

*No matter what the reason, it is unacceptable for a government which has come to power through democratic elections to be toppled through illicit means and even more, a military coup.*

*(idem)*

The English words seem to be a direct translation of the FM’s words and therefore will be considered a direct quote as there is no further interpretation offered by the translator on AJE.

The importance of this citation is that it shares the Turkish stance on the coup in Egypt, which in essence states that the military should not have more power than democratic rule.

The journalist goes on to share the official reaction of the Syrian regime towards the coup. The point of view of the opposition parties are not shared and nor is the reaction of the Syrian people. The statement shared is in opposition to that of the Turkish government and therefore the journalist is able to feature two opposing government reactions using the word “but” to signify a difference in opinion:

***Journalist Voiceover:***

*But in Syria, President Bashar Al Assad was quick to endorse the fall of President Morsi. He told the state newspaper that “What is happening in Egypt is the fall of what is known as political Islam. Anywhere in the world, whoever uses religion for political aims, or to benefit some and not others, will fall”.*

*(idem)*

The Syrian president’s opinion is introduced as such: “...quick to endorse the fall of President Morsi” (idem). The journalist explains why the Syrian president is judged for being “quick” in their follow up statement. “He told the state newspaper...(quote)” (idem). The State newspaper is expected to be the mouthpiece of the State and therefore it is expected that Assad sent out a statement to the newspaper so that his opinion would be published. Obliging, AJE has also broadcast his statement so as to report the reaction of Syria on the coup in Egypt. The Syrian president’s reaction is not introduced with background information on recent activities in the country, unlike the introduction to the Turkish FM’s reaction. It may be because the journalist feels that Syria has been getting enough coverage in the news already, but one cannot be certain. As the journalist reads the quote out loud, the quote is also displayed on a backdrop bearing the photo of Assad. This method of quote presentation allows viewers to read along with the journalist, whilst building a mental picture in their minds of the speaker and furthermore the picture and text communicates an “official” statement.



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

*News Video Screenshot 21 AJE: Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

The picture chosen of Assad shows him speaking in what appears to have been a press conference. The president has his right hand raised in the photo as he addresses a public. Also worth noting is that the probably Syrian flag behind him has been blurred so that viewers mainly note the “red” part, a colour representative of communism.

The message of the Syrian President is significant because it represents an official statement from the ruling government in Syria. Insight into the way Assad thinks is always of interest to international media because he rarely gives interviews and therefore this may also be insight into how he regards the uprising in his own country.

Assad’s image is blurred so as to be replaced by that of the Saudi King. The journalist introduces the Saudi King’s statement with an interpretation of the king’s statement: “In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah congratulated the Egyptian army” (idem). Just like with the reaction of the Syrian president, the journalist does not give context information on Saudi Arabia. Then the words of the king appear on the screen and the journalist reads them out loud.



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

*News Video Screenshot 22 AJE: Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

Again, the use of direct quotes that appear printed on the backdrop of a leader show that the statement is an official one, especially because the name and position of the king have been placed at the bottom of the statement. The citation is of importance to the news video as it shows that Saudi Arabia praised the Egyptian army on the coup that was necessary so as to “save” the country.

The journalist then goes on to share the reaction of Qatar: “In the Gulf State of Qatar which had supported Morsi’s government, it said: ...” (idem). Unlike the previous statements introduced by the journalist, this one gives some information on the relationship between Qatar and Morsi’s government, which is represented as positive. Also worth noting is that this is a collective statement from “the Gulf State of Qatar” rather than one particular person.

The journalist reads out the quote: Qatar’s policy has always been to stand by Egypt and the will and choices of its people” (idem), whilst also displaying it on the backdrop of an official picture, the flag of Qatar. As the speaker is unknown, one particular person cannot appear on the backdrop, instead the country’s flag is deemed more representative of the quote.



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

*News Video Screenshot 23 Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

This citation is of significance to the news video, because despite Qatar’s reported supportive relationship with Morsi’s government, the citation depicts a Qatar that is actually supportive of the Egyptian people.

The journalist carries on to introduce the reaction of the Israeli government. The introduction is made differently to that of the other countries. Footage of the Israeli PM is featured while the journalist explains on voiceover: “Israeli officials are refusing to comment in public, but what happens in Egypt matters here. Egypt and Israel enjoy a cold peace. Security is its primary concern” (idem).



Coup in Egypt generate mixed reactions

News Video Screenshot 24 AJE: Coup in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)

This statement is basically an “un-citation”, further described in under the analysis of *Un-citations*, because there is no actually statement to report. The Israeli government have “refused” to comment and this, the journalist analyses, is in relation to the “cold peace” enjoyed between Israel and Egypt. Despite Israel not making an official statement in reaction to the coup in Egypt, the journalist has decided to introduce their “un-citation” so as to represent the importance of Egypt in Israel’s security and also the fact that although the two countries are at peace, they do not have a “warm” relationship. The news video also makes reference to a statement by an analyst so as to further comment on the relationship between the neighbouring countries.

Having represented the Israeli lac of reaction, the journalist then presents that of Hamas, stating: “In Gaza, **Hamas inspired by** the Muslim Brotherhood **is also refusing** to comment. It had **hoped** for closer ties with the Morsi government. His removal brings new uncertainty” (idem). The journalist introduces the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, stating that Hamas was “inspired” by the Brotherhood. Furthermore, an un-citation is made, because Hamas has also refused to comment. But the journalist’s citation leads to an evaluation of the feeling of Hamas towards the Morsi government, and this evaluation is a form of citation on their behaviour, whilst also informing viewers on the context between the two political parties. To further elaborate on the “hopes” of Hamas or at least of Gazans, since Hamas has refused to comment, the journalist cites in form on an interview a Gaza resident:

*Nasser Al Arini, Gaza Resident [Translated from Arabic into English for the purpose of this Al Jazeera English report]:*

*We want the new regime to open the crossing for us to lift the siege and end the political agreements with Israel. When Morsi won the elections, we expected many good things for Gaza, including ending the siege. But Morsi contributed to the siege by imposing more restrictions on Gazan people.*

(idem)



News Video Screenshot 25 AJE: *Coups in Egypt generate [sic] mixed reactions (July 4, 2013)*

This statement is of significance to the news video as it shares the opinion of a Gazan despite Hamas not sharing an official statement. The statement is not a reaction to the downfall of Morsi, but rather a response to the influence of Morsi in Gaza by providing insight into restrictions put on Gaza by Morsi.

The Euronews English news video entitled *Violent chaos stalks the streets of Cairo* published on July, 16 2013 on YouTube features a direct citation of the US Deputy Secretary of State. The news video highlights the violence across Cairo as Morsi supporters clash with Egypt's police forces, blocking roads and hurling rocks at police. In response to this violence, the Euronews reporter states in voiceover "The night of protest came after US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns was in Cairo for talks; he called for a stable, democratic, inclusive and tolerant Egypt" (idem). The journalist presents the source both by name and role and the country that the official represents, therefore making it a direct quote. However, we are unsure if these are the exact words of Burns or if the journalist has paraphrased them. In addition, the context of the citation is also shared; viewers are told that the official was in Egypt for talks just before his statement, however, viewers are not told who he had talks with. Also, using the citation modus "he called for..." the citation is represented as a form of instructions towards Egypt, representing the US as an influential power in the Middle East whose words should be listened to.

The Euronews news video *Assad blames 'conspirators' for Syria protests (March 30, 2011)* features, the Syrian President is quoted as such by the journalist on voice over: "President Bashar al-Assad has blamed 'conspirators' bent on destroying Syria for pro-democracy protests in the country" (idem). This quote is considered a direct quote because the president has been named, his role has been given and his statement has been shared. Furthermore, the quote is a repeat of the news video title, which appears on YouTube, with quotation marks placed around the word "conspirators", informing viewers that this at least is the exact wording used by Assad. Footage of the president is featured while the journalist cites him.



Assad blames 'conspirators' for Syria protests

News Video Screenshot 26 Euronews: Assad blames 'conspirators' for Syria protests (March 30, 2011)

The journalist also qualifies the citation while using the words “has blamed” to introduce the statement. The journalist makes another direct quote, which is an un-citation but explored under the section of direct quotes so as to be able to explain the way in which direct citations have been used in this news video. “Despite speculation, there was no announcement about lifting Syria's emergency laws in **Assad's first public speech** since the challenge to his rule began” (idem). The un-citation and its context is identified when the journalist states “there was no announcement...in Assad’s first public speech” (idem), and this un-citation is qualified/described by the journalist, when she states “Despite speculation” (idem). The speculation referred to here is basically what the public have been saying in general and therefore is an in-direct and unreferenced citation that could represent Syrians, journalists or analysts, yet it qualifies the direct un-citation of the president. It actually explains the significance of the fact that he has made no statement regarding “lifting Syria’s emergency laws” and this is why it is significant.

To conclude the news video, the journalist makes another direct quote:

*Instead, two weeks on, he explained that Syria was the target of a plot to sow sectarian strife. The president said some demonstrators had legitimate demands and he claimed clear instructions have been given to security forces not to harm anyone during the protests in which dozens of people have died.*

(idem)

The context is given by the journalist, “Instead, two weeks on” [post-demonstrations] and then the president is identified and his statements are introduced: “he explained”, “The president said” and “he claimed” (idem). The context is qualified by the journalist when she states

“Instead” as if emphasising the unexpected citation to be introduced. Although she uses “explained” to introduce the statement “...Syria was the target of a plot to sow sectarian strife”, the initial word “Instead”, qualifies the citation as somewhat not credible. Another statement by the president, “The president said some demonstrators had legitimate demands” (idem) is also made insincere when followed by “**he claimed** clear instructions have been given to security forces not to harm anyone during the protests in which dozens of people have died” (idem). The statement’s instructions are falsified when introduced by “he claimed”, which shows that the journalist is only stating what the president has said because it is her job to report official statements, but rather than stating “he instructed the security forces...”, which would have been a statement that showed the journalist was certain of these instructions, she has only referred to a statement that he has made in form of a claim, because she herself has probably not seen the president make those instructions. Furthermore, the citation ends with “in which dozens of people have died”, as if blatantly stating that [“despite the president’s instructions not to harm any protesters, people have died”] and therefore falsifying the statement that she has just broadcasted.

*Direct or in-direct quotes via footage of the person speaking*

It was noticed that mainstream channels would sometimes show footage of organisations, countries or people that are referred to in a statement, so that viewers are reminded who is behind the statement. Footage could for example feature the speaker actually stating the words that have been reported, or they would simply show footage of the organisation and sometimes the footage would be featured along with headlines that would emphasise the statement of the organisation/country/person.

For example, the F24’s news video entitled *Syria in full-scale civil war, says UN peacekeeping chief (June 13, 2012)*, shows footage of UN vans as the journalist paraphrases statements by Kofi Annan, the UN President. The journalist states “It basically means that the Kofi Annan 6 point peace plan is dead. Not many people thought it had a chance of success. Remember just a week ago, he was talking about it not being a failure, just it needs to be implemented. We are seeing now that the opposition definitely abandoned that and upped their attacks on the fact that the Syrian government have responded is that that’s what’s leading to the declaration of civil war” (idem). The words of the journalist basically paraphrase the words of Kofi Annan (he was talking about it not being a failure, just it needs to be implemented.....leading to the declaration of civil war) and this paraphrase tells us that there has been a declaration of civil war. We are not actually told who is behind this declaration, but the headlines give us this information. The footage is featured along with headlines re-establishing the subjected: SYRIA CONFLICT

Head of UN peacekeeping force says Syria in full-scale war. In this case, the images of the UN van along with the headline featuring the citation emphasise the main message of the journalist's discourse and we are informed that it is the UN which has declared the civil war.



News Video Screenshot 27 Euronews: Syria in full-scale civil war, says UN peacekeeping chief (June 13, 2012)


It was discovered from our corpus that journalists would sometimes refer to certain persons' standpoint by simply paraphrasing their views so as to make a point, without necessarily quoting the persons. For example, in the F24's news video entitled *Syria in full-scale civil war, says UN peacekeeping chief* (2012), the journalist on voice over makes reference to the head of the UN's point of view on the Syrian peace plan, without actually sharing Kofi Annan's words. The journalist states: "It basically means that the Kofi Annan 6 point peace plan is dead. **Not many people thought** it had a chance of success. Remember just a week ago, **he was talking about it not being a failure**, just it needs to be implemented" (F24, 2012). The journalist twice interprets people's point of views, firstly when he states that "not many people thought it had a chance of success" and secondly when he states that Annan "was talking about it not being a failure..." It is therefore unclear which "people" did not think it had a chance of success. We are unsure if the journalist is referring to Syrians in general, specific politicians or even staff in the UN. However, the journalist has sent across the message that the plan was not one that could have possibly worked. The journalist does not try to comment on 6 point peace plan, nor does the journalist explain the reasons for which it may have not worked. Secondly, when the journalist refers to Kofi Annan, he informs audiences that the UN president believed that his plan could have worked if only it was put into practice, but viewers who did not have the opportunity of watching Annan's statements on the plan will only understand that it was a good plan that was not implemented. Again, the journalist does not comment on the reasons for which it may not have been implemented. In addition to these two statements and the images of the UN, the headline states "SYRIA CONFLICT Head of UN peacekeeping force says Syria in full-scale civil war".



News Video Screenshot 28 Euronews: Syria in full-scale civil war, says UN peacekeeping chief (June 13, 2012)


These images, along with the paraphrased statements and the headlines point out one main message to audiences: the Syrian uprising is no longer, instead there is a full-scale civil war. In the same news video, the journalist shares the standpoint of Hilary Clinton, stating: “Hilary Clinton is accusing Russia” (idem). We are not told what Hilary Clinton has actually said about the Russians, nor are viewers reminded that Hilary Clinton is the US Secretary of State. The Press TV news video entitled *African Union suspends Egypt* (July 5, 2013) makes reference to statements by the African Union on voiceover while showing footage of the African Union in meetings: “It was decided that Egypt’s activities be suspended in the union. The union has based its decision on the recent overthrow of Mohammed Morsi from power and military takeover of Egypt. According to the union’s peace and Security Council, the situation in Egypt amounts to a violation of the Egyptian constitution” (Press TV, July 2013). The words used to represent the African union are: “it was decided...in the union” and “According to the union’s peace and security council...”; these are direct forms of quote whereby the audience is informed on the organisation behind the decision. Having said that, the people in the organisation are not quoted directly, because it seems to be a group decision that is being reported. In addition to the statements on the decisions of the African Union, it was also noted that the journalist provided an interpretation of the decision, which is also stated in accordance with another interpretation: “It therefore, falls under the African Union doctrine on unconstitutional changes of government, which the union does not want to be associated with” (idem). The word “therefore”, is a way of showing consequential activities based on a statement and this consequential activity (falling under the African Union) is further interpreted by the journalist as something that the union does not want to be associated with. This interpretation appears to be a clear statement based on what the union has said. To back this up, footage of Admore Kambudzi from the Peace and Security Council is featured so that the words of the Peace and Security Council be heard loud and clear directly from the source in English: “As mandated by the relevant AU instruments, council decides to suspend the participation of Egypt in AU

activities and due the restoration of constitutional order” (idem). One can clearly note the footage headlines which also emphasises the name of the representative and the fact that he represents the Peace and Security Council, AU. In addition, the news video further on shows footage of Dlamini Zuma, the Chairperson of the AU Commission also stating that “nobody will sit behind the flag [of Egypt in the AU]” (idem).



News Video Screenshot 29 Press TV: African Union suspends Egypt (July 5, 2013)

Also, the Press TV news video entitled *Turkey calls Morsi’s removal (July 5, 2013)* uploaded by an unknown internet user onto YouTube, features a journalist voice over footage of Turkish Foreign Minister speaking in Turkish in a press conference. The journalist states: “Turkey says the overthrow of Egypt’s democratically-elected President Mohammed Morsi was a military coup, calling for his immediate release from house arrest” (Press TV, July 2013). The first words “Turkey says” tells viewers that this is an exact statement from Turkey, but one can also note the interpretation just after with the use of strong adjectives such as “overthrow” and “democratically-elected” as well as “military coup”. The footage begins with headlines introducing the journalist and her location and this information is placed in between the headline titled **TURKEY SLAMS COUP** and the Press TV logo. The footage of the Turkish FM, which footage from Turkish State TV, also introduces the speaker and his title and this introduction is placed between the headline title **TURKEY SLAMS COUP** and the Press TV logo.



*News Video Screenshot 30 Press TV: Turkey calls Morsi's removal (July 5, 2013)*

The Turkish FM's Turkish speech is translated into English, further emphasising the journalist's report and indeed using the words "democratically election" and "illegal removal" as well as "detention": "Turkey does not accept the removal and detention of elected leaders from power through illegal means. The democratically elected leader should only be ousted at ballot boxes" (idem).

The news video also makes reference to a Turkish NGO so as to further back up the Turkish FM's viewpoint: "In Istanbul the Turkish NGO IHH held a press conference calling for an end to the violence in Egypt" (idem). The statement "calling for an end to violence" serves to report instructions sent out by the NGO and give importance to the NGO's statements. The sharing of instructions for peace in the media can be noted by organisations of human rights such as local and international NGOs. However, the interview with the NGO VP, which follows the journalist's report does not emphasise the need for peace. Instead, he focusses on who is to blame in the turmoil in Egypt and also Syria: "There is only one common actor for all these things: it is Israel. In all these incidents, the Israeli actor and Israel is a part of this. For Egypt, for Turkey, for Syria; all of them is too much related with the security of Israel. If something is related with Israel, of course the Americans are the part of this game. Because of this, it is surrounding and it is circling around Israel" (idem). This statement in form of an interview

brings in added information to the reportage, whereby the possible cause of the problem is reported to viewers.



News Video Screenshot 31 Press TV: Turkey calls Morsi's removal (July 5, 2013)

We were able to find cases whereby someone- usually a politician- would be quoted by a journalist following a live press conference and the quotes or paraphrases used would be used in summary of the live press conference.

For example, the Press TV news video entitled “Egypt may be headed for civil war” (July, 2013) showcases the in-studio anchor speaking in voice over footage of what seems to be a press conference. The press conference footage is not labelled with any headlines, but the voiceover explains: “Well, that was a Press Conference, being held by the Muslim Brotherhood” (idem) and carries on to summarise the press conference with specific points to focus on: “The spokesman saying there that we as the Muslim Brotherhood protesters were attacked by the Republican Guard instead of the Republican Guard confronting enemies on Egypt’s borders. He said that they are killing us with our money and he said no Egyptian should remain in their homes today, that, we will all come out to the streets to condemn the Egyptian army’s head, that is, General Sisi’s actions as of today. He said that today, the 8<sup>th</sup> of July will become a decisive day and he said we shall not forget today’s crimes”. We can presume that the press conference was held in Arabic, but are unsure as we have no footage of the actual press conference and therefore the in-studio anchor is translating and perhaps interpreting for viewers. Specific verbs are used to represent the words of the Muslim Brotherhood’s spokesman: “saying” and “said”, therefore allowing us to assume that these are actually direct quotes after translation into English and not paraphrases.

The Press TV news video entitled *UN chief chooses team to investigate* (April 30, 2013) is produced to inform viewers on the constitution of the UN investigative team which will go to Syria to investigate chemical weapons usage. The journalist introduces the story as such: “UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon chose an opportune day, the UN’s day of remembrance for

victims of chemical warfare to introduce his Team Leader for his call for investigation into chemical weapons usage in Syria” (Press TV, 2013) and then states: “Ban says that Swedish scientist Ake Sellstrom has his complete confidence”. The quote is somewhat misplaced as the journalist had not said anything about a Swedish scientist, however one can presume that the Swedish scientist is the team’s Team Leader. To further explain this, footage of the UN President features Ban Ki Moon actually explaining when Dr. Sellstrom will be deployed into Syria: “Dr. Sellstrom and his team of experts remain ready to deploy to Syria within 24 to 48 hours. Our addressed team is positioned in Cyprus as you know. I have complete confidence in the integrity and the independence and the professionalism of Dr. Ake and his team of experts” (idem).



*News Video Screenshot 32 Press TV: UN chief chooses team to investigate (April 30, 2013)*

The screenshot from the footage (above) shows Ban Ki-moon speaking, along with a headline presenting him and his position as well as the label WAR ON SYRIA included on a yellow backdrop at the bottom of the screen opposite to the Press TV logo. The headline WAR ON SYRIA is strange and worth discussing because the civil war was declared in Syria in 2013 months after this news video. Also, here the headlines gives the connotation that a war was imposed on Syria from outside sources, somewhat like an invasion of another country’s forces into Syria, which was not the case. Also, this title does not represent the news story, which is the investigation into chemical weapon usage in Syria, rather than the conflict in Syria.

In the same news video (Press TV, April 30, 2013), the journalist states “At noon on Monday, Ban’s spokesman Martin Nesirky said that Sellstrom’s team is already at work investigating what he called “available information”” (idem). This message is voice over footage of who we expect to be Martin Nesirky, however the footage isn’t labelled and therefore we cannot be entirely sure. Also, this footage for some reason does not have the labelling “WAR ON SYRIA”, it is probably because Nesirky’ discourse is being voiced over in this footage.



News Video Screenshot 33 Press TV: UN chief chooses team to investigate (April 30, 2013)

Furthermore, the journalists provides an un-citation (see *un-citations*) “He wouldn’t go into details however, about what countries or what information they provided” (idem). This un-citation basically quotes what was not said by the Nesirky therefore justifying why it was not explained by the reporter. Another direct quote in this video by the journalist is: “Nesirky said that Syria hadn’t granted access to the investigation team because of differences” (idem). This direct quote explains why Syria did not give access to the US- because of “differences”, therefore we are told there have been disagreements between the UN and Syria but we are unsure what they are. The quote is followed by explanations by the journalist with regards to the reasons why there are differences between the UN and Syria and then the footage of Nesirky is unmuted so that we can hear him directly. In this case the label WAR ON SYRIA is back along with labelling of his name and role in addition to the Press TV logo.



News Video Screenshot 34 Press TV: UN chief chooses team to investigate (April 30, 2013)

The spokesman confirms what the journalist had been saying: “There are clearly still differences in the understanding of what is required to carry out the investigation. And so, that’s why the communication continues with the Syrian authorities” (idem). Press TV journalist carries on quoting Nesirky and Ban Ki-moon along with related footage, for example: “Nesirky

said that Syria hadn't granted access to the investigation team because of differences", "Nesirky returned to Ban's stated confidence in Sellstrom" and "Ban's office did issue a statement on Monday condemning the mornings' attempted assassination at Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi" (idem). One can notice a string of positive and negative statements used to cite the UN members putting emphasis on the actions behind the statements. For example: Ban's office **did** issue a statement (idem), instead of simply reporting that: Ban's office said... These terms "said", "hadn't", "did" act to give life to the statements being cited as though they are actions rather than simple statements. Indeed, the statement of some organisations or countries such as the UN or an influential country sometimes act as powerful actions and it is probably because of this that Press TV has decided to stress on statements as though they were actions.

The Press TV news video *China slams US led airstrike on Libya* (March, 2011) features a citation by the journalist representing China condemning the airstrikes on Libya. This citation is stated in voice over as the spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry begins a press conference. As the press conference starts, the journalist lets the viewers listen to the discourse of the spokesperson, translated into English. Her discourse does not actually use the word "condemn", rather she states that "We opposed the use of military actions...and once again call for an immediate cease-fire". Words of opposition can however be identified, for example, "we opposed", also the spokeswoman says that they "once again call for an immediate cease-fire", echoing the citation with renewed instructions to countries attacking Libya. In addition to this featured speech of the spokesperson, which is proof of the journalist's words and also builds a mental image in the mind of viewers, Press TV also reiterates the citation using headlines. As the spokesperson speaks and the news video carries on playing, there is the headline "China on Libya Airstrikes", which is placed just above the Press TV logo towards mid-bottom of the screen. The headline is not actually a citation, but informs viewers that the news video discusses the Chinese opinion on the airstrikes in Libya. In therefore works in line with the citations that are made in the news video.

Showing footage of a representative of an organisation/country or even domain being cited is sometimes done in the news so as to show proof of what this organisation/country/domain have said about a topic. This sometimes leads to over-simplification in the news, whereby it is assumed that a representative is equivalent to the body they represent.



News Video Screenshot 35 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)

For example, the Press TV news video entitled *China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)* features the journalist reporting a change in the voting pattern of China in the UN Security Council because the country abstained from voting with regards to Libya's no-fly zone in 2011. In order to explain this shift in voting, the journalist cites 'analysts', as such: "**Analysts say**, its shift this time, reflects greater involvement in the Middle East and deepening relations with Arab countries, some of which supported the resolution" (idem). This citation basically groups all analysts into the same group, as though all experts would analyse news in the same way. Of course, the meaning could be "some analysts say", and truthfully, the journalist did not say "all analysts say", therefore the perception of this statement may be dependent on the experiences of a viewer and also whether they are watching actively or passively. Moreover, the news video features footage of former Chinese ambassador to Yemen & Syria 'analysing' the situation. The former Chinese ambassador explains why China did not use its veto in the UN Security Council: "We did not use our veto out of consideration for the needs and positions of countries in the Arab Union. But, we had grave reservations of the no-fly zone. So, we didn't support it. The no-fly zone is there to protect civilians and should not be used as a pretext for armed intervention" (idem).



News Video Screenshot 36 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)

The citation of the “analysts” leads us to believe that the footage and words by the former Chinese ambassador are the words of an analyst. Of course an ambassador can also be an analyst, but in this case the Chinese ambassador refers to china as “we” therefore taking the stance of a Chinese civil servant rather than an analyst. By citing “analysts” just before featuring the statement of the Chinese ambassador, the news channel has however made him appear to be representative of analysts, rather than representative of China.

The Press TV news video *EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)* features the journalist in voice over citing two international organisations in one statement as such: “The European Union **is satisfied** by the UN Resolution **authorising** military action in Libya. That was the **message** of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton after meeting with the EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels” (Press TV, March 2011). This statement is a citation of both the message of the European Union and that of the UN Resolution and is done using vocabulary that personify the behaviour or feelings of both organisations: satisfied and authorising. The “satisfied” behaviour of the EU is further reinstated as a “message” so as to be clear that it is not a mere analysis on the EU that Press TV is reporting, but rather an actual citation by the EU. The citation is further detailed so as to include the actual source behind the message in the EU; her name and position is stated, furthermore, the context, which is the “meeting with the EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels” is also stated so as to report the importance of this statement. The context is of importance because it is not simply a statement that was given in an interview, which may have slipped or which may only be shared by Catherine Asthon, Instead, because the message was released after an official meeting in an organisation, it can be concluded that it was a message that the union agreed on unanimously or at least majority of the union participants agreed on the message that was communicated. To further show the context of the

citation, footage of the EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton features her stating the message which was cited by the journalist.



*News Video Screenshot 37 Press TV: EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)*

Viewers can hear the EU Foreign Policy Chief stating: “We adopt strong conclusions expressing our satisfaction with the adoption of resolution 1973 and stressing our determination to contribute to its implementation” (idem). One can note the use of ‘expressing our satisfaction’ echoed by the Press TV journalist. Reference to the UN is made through “resolution 1973”. This footage is used by Press TV to build a mental image in the minds of their viewers of the message of the EU, whilst also showing proof of the citation.

At the end of the same news video by Press TV, the journalist cites Foreign Ministers from the EU as such: “Meanwhile, in the Brussels meeting, the **Foreign Ministers decided** to expand EU sanctions against the Libyan regime” (idem). This citation made reference to the European Union by narrowing down on the foreign ministers so as to pinpoint the decision that was taken. This citation is made in voice-over while footage of the EU is featured.



News Video Screenshot 38 Press TV: EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)

The footage simply shares the context of the citation whilst also building a mental image for viewers with regards to the sanctions put on Libya by the EU.

The AJE news video entitled *Suspicion grows over Syrian chemical weapons* (April 26, 2013) features an amateur video provided by medical staff in Aleppo and then quotes the medical staff so as to convey the meaning behind the images on the screen as interpreted by people who were actually on the scene participating in the events playing before the audience's eyes, whilst also taking footage of it. The journalist's voice is heard over the amateur footage, explaining: "The video taken by medical staff at the hospital near Aleppo provides **what they call compelling evidence** of the use of chemical weapons in a nerve attack carried out by Syrian forces" (idem). The AJE journalist cannot evaluate the footage and decide whether it is evidence of use of chemical weapons. However, the medical personnel, who were on location, are more in a position to make this statement. Therefore, the journalist is unable to report that the video they are sharing is evidence, without actually citing the personnel's statement: "what they call compelling evidence..." (idem). It is understandable that medical personnel are able to identify the symptoms of chemical weapons, but it is not clear how medical personnel are in the position of identifying the source of the weapons, but the journalist does not go into such details. The journalist goes on to explain the footage, again through the words of medical experts: "Among the casualties, rescuers and hospital staff **overcome by the gas**, all displaying evidence of what **medical experts at the scene described** as typical of nerve agent poisoning" (idem). The statement shares both the feelings of the hospital staff and the description of the footage according to media experts at the scene.

Unlike other news videos in our corpus, the footage does not actually show the medical personnel echoing the journalist’s statement, instead the footage featured focusses on “the evidence” described by medical personnel through the journalist’s citation.



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

*News Video Screenshot 39 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syrian chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

As the journalist quotes medical personnel, the footage features a man foaming at the mouth, clearly suffering. The footage also indicates that the footage was provided by activists, clearly stating that AJE was not at the scene to take this footage. The date (without the year) is also included. Furthermore, the headline states clearly that the topic is: **SYRIA: THE WAR WITHIN** and the subheading is “GOVT DENIES USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS”. This is therefore, another citation, not given as a quote but actually a citation. It is presumed that GOVT represents the Syrian government. The headline also informs us that the Syrian government has been accused of using chemical weapons, because there is usually no denial without an accusation. Despite the fact that this footage is not of the medical personnel, AJE features a chemical weapons specialist speaking just after to support the statement by the medical personnel, showing that sometimes citations can be backed by others.



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

*News Video Screenshot 40 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syrian chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

The statement of the specialist is made directly by him: “The video is horrendous and **it does indicate that** there was probably chemical weapons use that was corroborated by the soil samples that were taken by **British forces apparently which** showed the by-product of Sarin” (idem). The statement is made in reference to the amateur footage shown earlier and therefore is a comment that backs up the medical personnel’s’ statement, whilst also citing evidence found by British forces.

To show the response of the Syrian government, AJE features the Syrian president speaking on what appears to be Syrian State TV. The footage is therefore an officially released one. And the journalist cites the Syrian/Assad’s statement on chemical weapons use: “**Syria’s always denied** using chemical weapons, but it has a huge stockpile” (idem). Although the journalist refers to “Syria”, rather than Assad himself, it is clear through the footage of the Syrian president that the person they are referring to in the citation is in fact the Syrian president. Having said this, viewers who do not know much about Syria may not recognise the Syrian president, especially because he is not presented in the headline.



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

*News Video Screenshot 41 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syrian chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

The citation simply re-iterates the headline which notes that the government has denied using chemical weapons.

Another direct quote is featured by AJE on the news video, this time to represent the US opinion for the second time. The journalist cites US president Obama in press conference: “President Obama **has said repeatedly** that if they were being used, that would be a red line for U.S. intervention” (idem). This citation is significant because represents possible action by the US on Syria. AJE then features footage from Obama in a press conference one year earlier re-iterating the mentioned citation.



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

News Video Screenshot 42 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syrian chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)

Obama is seen and heard stating: “We have been very clear to Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilised” (idem). The statement is very clear; what is perhaps not as clear is that the footage is from 2012, 8 months prior to this actual news video. The date is discreetly included at the top left hand of the video on a white background in small text, therefore it is possible that many viewers will presume that this is Obama’s reaction to the footage of chemical weapons.

Sometimes, news videos cite people simply before featuring a pre-recorded interview with them. Therefore, the citation acts as an introductory interpretation of the upcoming footage to be featured. For example, the AJE news video entitled *Chemical weapons expert on alleged use of Sarin gas in Syria* (June, 2013) starts off with an in-studio anchor presenting facts about Sarin gas. She then introduces a chemical weapons’ expert and then cites him so as to also share his comments on how to go forward: “And he says the next step is for the UN to find a way to verify the evidence” (idem). Just after introducing him, what appears to be a pre-recorded interview with him on AJE is featured.

The seemingly pre-recorded interview with the expert in AJE’s *Chemical weapons expert on allege use of Sarin gas in Syria* ‘(June 4, 2013) includes citations that the expert makes. Because the interview was probably done live, the speech is very informal, meaning that the speaker is very informal and tends not to refer to subjects probably mentioned in a question or previous statement that is not featured on the footage, therefore it is somewhat difficult to follow. The expert says:

“It’s the first time and **I think it’s based on the Le Monde story** that came out last week. It’s the first time when actually, **as James was saying**, we have a decent chain of evidence” (idem). The expert first cites a story from Le Monde and then also cites “James”, who we presume to be another expert being interviewed on the show, but is unfeatured on this news video published on YouTube. What the speaker seems to be stating is that the evidence (of chemical weapons) is finally clear thanks to a Le Monde story. In addition to his statement, the news video then features amateur footage of people who appear to be exhibiting symptoms of people exposed to sarin.



News Video Screenshot 43 AJE: *Chemical weapons expert on allege use of Sarin gas in Syria* ‘(June 4, 2013)

The footage of the expert speaking is not labelled and does not even include the speaker’s name or role. The expert also cites investigative results from a French laboratory, stating: “the

symptoms on the ground and at least one set of samples, the French ones we know, that had been we know sampled in what would appear to be an **authoritative laboratory in France that has confirmed** that Sarin is present in that area” (idem). This citation is necessary because it shares the results of an investigation and the investigator as well. The expert then critiques the results he has cited: “I think that’s perhaps **one of the challenges with the French results** and the British results recently, that they’re not independent...” (idem). As an expert, he is entitled to critique the various actors of an event even after citing them so as to give viewers a different outlook of events from an expert’s eye.

A very similarly constructed news video by AJE uses citations in the same way. The AJE news video entitled *Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)* cites “countries” and organisations using consecutive headlines:

- **French foreign minister says** tests confirm Sarin gas was used in Syria
- **France accuses Syrian** ‘Regime and its accomplices’ of using the nerve agent
- **French Foreign Minister:** Unacceptable to let those responsible go unpunished
- **France says** a line has been crossed with Sarin use & all options are on the table
- **Britain also says** tests it conducted on samples from Syria contained Sarin
- **Syrian Govt and opposition have accused** each other of using chemical weapons

(idem)

It is possible to look at each of these headlines and how they use citations. The first, “**French foreign minister says** tests confirm Sarin gas was used in Syria” cites by simply stating “French foreign minister says....” (idem). This informs the user on the actual person in the French government who is being cited, before finally sharing the citation: “tests confirm Sarin gas was used in Syria” (idem). The source of the statement is significant because it is the foreign minister of France and therefore the information released by him is official and most probably represents the French government’s statement. It is worth noting that the in-studio anchor introduces the news report by stating that: “**France says** it has actual evidence of its use, specifically the nerve agent Sarin. **France’s foreign minister says** it’s been used on several occasions and that test results have been passed onto the United Nations” (idem). But the headline is only shared 2 minutes and 10 seconds into the news video, while a chemical weapons expert is critiquing the findings of the French. It is interesting to note that the citation of the French FM is featured so that the expert can critique it rather than support it. This shows that in some cases, news videos will quote someone/organisation/country and show footage that will oppose it. In fact, the whole point of the expert’s presence in this news video is to critique the French statements and this is known because of the introduction to the expert made by the in-studio anchor, who just after broadcasting the French FM’s statement and explaining what sarin gas is, then introduces the expert along with a citation: “Well, Gregory Koblentz is a

chemical weapons expert and a lecturer on Middle East affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations and **he says** the French findings are far from conclusive” (idem). Therefore, rather than developing on the French findings, the expert has been cited to almost condemn them. The expert qualifies the French report as “very concerning” whilst interpreting and further citing the report, without making any actual quotes, stating that “these samples may tell you what has been used, but it doesn’t tell you who or when or where or how the chemicals were used” (idem). As the expert speaks, the other headlines with citations then appear, one after the other, whilst footage featured changes.



News Video Screenshot 44 AJE Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)

This second headline, “France accuses Syrian ‘regime and its accomplices ‘of using the nerve agent” (idem) highlights a statement of accusation made by France to the Syrian regime. The quotation marks show that ‘regime and its accomplices’ is a direct quote from the French government. However, this direct quote does not provide information on who in the French government has made this accusation. It is significantly placed within the news video, while the expert explains that French findings do not mean that they know who is behind the attack, therefore placing a doubt in the mind of viewers. One might say that AJE is sharing two angles of the story; both the French and Syrian regime’s. However, the French statement is not

elaborated upon by anyone in response to the expert’s criticism, therefore, one cannot be certain that the two angles of the story are indeed being shared.



Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive

*News Video Screenshot 45 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)*

The third citation in form of a headline appears to be a direct quote, known to viewers because of the punctuation colon “:” appears right after the source. French Foreign Minister: Unacceptable to let those responsible go punished. The colon allows AJE to make a quote without using a verb. It is clear from the colon that the statement is a direct quote from the French FM. The quote given in such a way seems to be acting as an instruction to the international community.



Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive

*News Video Screenshot 46 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)*

The fourth citation: “France says a line has been crossed with sarin use & all options are on the table” (idem) is shared with footage of people who appear to be suffering from sarin. But this headline is shared alongside an accusatory statement by the expert towards France: “The French have definitely been in the forefront among the western nations in putting pressure on the Assad regime. They led the effort to lift the EU arms embargo on the Syrian rebels, so this definitely fits into their broader strategy of trying to mobilise international community against the Assad

regime” (idem). France stating that “all option are on the table” insinuates some kind of action in Syria and the expert is explaining that France have supported the Syrian rebels and have a strategy against Assad, therefore making viewers doubt whether France’s findings are accurate.



Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive

*News Video Screenshot 47 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)*

The next citation of Britain’s tests support the French ones: “Britain also says tests it conducted on samples from Syria contained Sarin” (idem), the use of “also” tells viewers that France is not alone in its findings, but the expert does not comment on Britain’s tests.

To further report the situation in an ambiguous manner, the next headline states “Syrian Govt and Opposition have accused each other of using chemical weapons” (idem). This statement informs viewers that each side is pointing the finger at the other and therefore there might be fowl play on both sides. Again, viewers are not told who on the government or opposition side are making the accusations; this is especially unclear because the opposition is made up of more than one group.



Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive

*News Video Screenshot 48 AJE: Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive (June 4, 2013)*

Furthermore, this last headline is stated along with an accusation by the expert to the French government: “But without knowing more details about the event, it’s hard to say to what extent this is manufactured or if this is a truly legitimate finding and that other countries need to start paying attention to this as well” (idem). The expert actually suggests that the findings may be “manufactured”, therefore accusing the French government of lying or making up the findings. The AJE news video entitled *UN official calls Syria conflict ‘civil war’ (June 12, 2013)* begins with the headline “Syria: The war within, UN official says conflict is a civil war” (idem). The headline echoes the video title posted on YouTube, basically stating that the uprising, turned conflict, in Syria has been declared a civil war. To further emphasise the reality of this civil war, the news video begins with amateur footage of fighting. One can hear gunfire in the background whilst the smoky images resulting from gunfire and other weaponry play on the screen.



UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war'

*News Video Screenshot 49 AJE: UN official calls Syria conflict ‘civil war’ (June 12, 2013)*

The journalist in the news video also makes reference to the UN officials that declared civil war in Syria. The journalist states: “On Tuesday, **when the head of UN peacekeeping was asked** if Syria was now there, **he replied** “Yes”. **His spokesperson confirmed** that the conflict had shifted” (idem). In these last two citations, the member of the organisation being cited is sourced through the role in the UN, therefore sharing the significance of their statement to the labelling of the Syrian conflict. The context, an interview, is also stated, and this is noted because the UN peacekeeping was “asked” and he “replied”, therefore showing that this was not an official statement released by the UN; instead it just came out during an interview/meeting. As the information just came out in a meeting, one wonders how relevant it actually is. Is the information less significant since no official statement was made by the UN? For some viewers, perhaps the information becomes less significant.

Other named sources in this news video are Kofi Annan and Ban Ki Moon/ The journalist states: “The special envoy for the **Arab League and the UN, Kofi Annan and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon have only gone so far as warning** that civil war was imminent” (idem). The warning again, made by the UN is stated so as to question why the UN did not make an official statement. It is almost as though the journalist is justifying the reasons for not having broadcast this news before; mainly because no official statement had been made. The same AJE news video cites Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State. In order to introduce her, her statement is paraphrased for viewers: “**Speaking in Washington, the U.S. Secretary of State indicated Kofi Annan’s** peace plan was still being pursued” (AJE, June 2013). The journalist states the context: speaking in Washington and the role of Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State is stated. Then the Secretary of State is featured speaking in what appears to be a seated press conference in front of the Israeli and American flags. As it was already stated by the journalist that speech was in Washington, it can be presumed that the Israeli PM may have been visiting Washington at the time.



JN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war'

News Video Screenshot 50 AJE: UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war' (June 12, 2013)

***Hilary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State:***

*We have a time line in mind to see whether or not this effort of Kofi’s can be successful. The outer limit of that is mid-July when the Security Council has to decide whether or not to extend the mission. And certainly if there is no discernible movement by then, it will be very difficult to extend a mission.*

*(idem)*

Clinton’s statement makes no mention of civil war in Syria and it is a very hopeful message. Her message seems lost in the news video which focusses on the labelling of the conflict in

Syria. The role of the direct quote from Clinton is to show the US stance on Syria following the “civil war” labelling by the UN.

The AJE news video entitled *Egypt’s Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)* is introduced by the journalist in passive voice, therefore not stating the source of the statement: “It was annulled just as quickly as it was issued. At a late night press conference, the controversial decree giving the president unprecedented powers **was cancelled**” (idem). The “controversial decree” has been defined, but what has not been identified is the person who issued and then cancelled the decree. “The decree was cancelled” is a citation of an action that took place in form of a statement at the press conference described. One presumes that Morsi issued and cancelled the decree, simply because the title of the video stated that Morsi “rescinds” the decree, but the journalist does not actually state this. Furthermore, the journalist’s voice over Egyptian State TV footage of the Press Conference does not actually show Morsi speaking. The person speaking is not introduced.



Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree

News Video Screenshot 51 AJE: *Egypt’s Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)*

The footage has some barely visible text in Arabic, but this is not translated for the benefit of non-Arabic viewers and therefore it is not really clear who is speaking at the press conference. However, his discourse is interpreted into English for the benefit of AJE viewers.

***Spokesperson addressing the Press Conference: Translated from Arabic into English on the Al Jazeera report (Headline in Arabic):***

*The repealing and its legal context is a replacement. The president replaced the articles which caused a lot of misunderstandings with new articles to allay the fears to get rid of any of any ambiguities. The new constitutional proclamation also does not protect any powers of the president or any legal challenges.*

*(AJE, Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree, December 2012)*

The interpretation of the spokesperson's speech includes citations. For example, "the repealing...is a replacement" (idem). The "repealing" cites the actions of the government to replace the decree. Finally, the spokesperson also identifies that it is the "president" who replaced the articles and finally gave a reason for the annulment of the articles. The journalist had not explained the reason for the controversy, instead the journalist used the citation to explain to viewers the issue behind the decree. This therefore shows that citations through footage of the person speaking, are sometimes used to explain elements of a news story, despite the fact that the speaker is not identified by the news channel and despite the fact that the speaker's discourse is being interpreted into English. It is someone strange that AJE has decided to allow an unidentified official, speaking in another language, to explain the significance of a news story to their viewers. The footage may be significant as it shows officials in press conference making the announcement, but it is still unclear what was so controversial about the decree. Furthermore, listening to an interpretation voiced over another language is not the most ideal of ways to receive information representing complex matters effectively. There is therefore an element of ambiguity in this news story, despite the citation. The news story has been presented in an almost "inaccessible" manner, as if to say to viewers that "it is too complicated to get into the details". One can read the citation several times and is still unable to understand what the former decree cited and what the news decree cites.

The journalist then cites the Egyptian opposition's demands, over footage from Egypt's streets.

***Journalist Voiceover:***

*Their condition for entering dialogue was not just to annul the decree but also to postpone the December fifteenth referendum on the Constitution. That referendum is still going ahead and the main opposition groups say protests will continue. They call the latest concession meaningless.*

*(AJE, Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree, December 2012)*

The journalist's message informs viewers that the opposition (mentioned in an earlier statement by the journalist) had stated their conditions for dialogue with the president and the conditions included the postponement of a referendum on the constitution, which has not been postponed. The journalist cites the opposition to describe the opposition's dissatisfaction with the president's actions. But the footage, does not really represent the "protests" cited by the journalist.



Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree

*News Video Screenshot 52 AJE: Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)*

As can be noted from the footage above, which appears to be of the streets in Egypt, there are a few people on the streets; there is no violence and despite a few Egyptian flags, there is no protest or demonstration taking place. It appears to be a peaceful evening. Therefore, despite the opposition citation made by the journalist, the footage does not really represent what has been cited.

Despite the footage over which the journalist speaks not being representative of her discourse, an audio clip is then presented to viewers, which is an audio interview with an opposition member spokesman. The audio clip serves to communicate the citation of the opposition directly, therefore supporting the citation made by the journalist in the preceding statement.

***Khaled Dawood National Salvation Front Spokesman***

***The announcement is very frustrating. It's a continuation of the stubborn attitude that the president has been dealing with since he started since he started issuing the constitutional declaration on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November.***

*(AJE, Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree, December 2012)*

The image that appears with this statement, simply features the speaker's name, position and location.



Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree

*News Video Screenshot 53 AJE: Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)*

Indeed, the person's discourse qualifies the president's citations/action by explaining that the announcement is "very frustrating" and that these actions are a "continuation of the stubborn attitude" and viewers finally get more information on the controversial decree when the speaker explains the "constitutional declaration" was initiated by the president on November 22. This audio-clip therefore, serves to explain the standpoint of the opposition with regards to the rescinding of the controversial decree. However, once again, it does not go into details of the actual decree and why it is not supported by the opposition.

The Euronews news video entitled *Coalition strike Gaddafi towns Libyan state TV (April 2, 2011)* make reference to both Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan government spokesman, Moussa Ibrahim, whilst showing footage of Ibrahim speaking at the press conference.



Coalition strike Gaddafi towns: Libyan state TV

*News Video Screenshot 54 Euronews: Coalition strike Gaddafi towns Libyan state TV (April 2, 2011)*

The journalist's voice is played over the footage of Moussa Ibrahim:

*“Meanwhile, a ceasefire offer from the rebels has been rejected by Colonel Gaddafi. They offered to lay down their arms if Gaddafi withdrew from besieged cities in the east. Government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim dismissed the offer as a trick”.*

*(idem)*

The citation refers to statements from both the rebels and the Libyan regime. First, the rebels are cited as a unified organisation and then the regime is cited through a rejection by Colonel Gaddafi and a dismissal by Ibrahim. Use of “offered” when citing the rebels gives the impression that they are giving something from their side, almost as if they are the ‘good guys’. Whereas, citing the regime through words such as “reject” and “dismissed”, represents the regime as stubborn, angry and not willing to compromise. “Reject” and “dismissed” are action citations that give a mental image of someone forcefully pushing something or someone away. The Euronews news video entitled *Assad says Syria ‘victim of foreign conspiracy’ (March 30, 2011)* has a quote in the title itself, which we have analysed in this section so as to focus on the fact that the direct quote is re-stated in the news video itself with footage of the Syrian President speaking. The use of quotation marks does instil the fact that these are the direct words, or at least a translation of the words of President Assad. The news video itself shows footage of the president arriving to the parliament and then speaking in parliament. The journalist introduces his statement with a summary of his discourse: “In his first public comments since the start of the protests, **Bashar al-Assad told parliament he supported reform but offered no** alternative to change Syria's rigid political system. He also **accused** external forces of fomenting sectarian strife” (idem). The journalist first gives the context of the statement, which is that these statements arise from the first public speech since protests began in Syrian. The speaker is then identified as Bashar al-Assad and his statement is made: “...told parliament he supported reform but offered no alternative change” (idem). This statement tells us what the president said he felt, but this statement is falsified with the un-citation, “...but offered no alternative change” (idem). The un-citation is significant and explained in this section rather than in the un-citation section so as to explain how the direct quote along with the un-citation work together. Furthermore, the journalist states that “He accused external forces of fomenting sectarian strife” (idem). This final statement reinforces the quotation used in the video title, before showing footage of the president speaking in parliament. The footage features the president speaking and one can slightly hear his Arabic words, but they are interpreted by the journalist.



Assad says Syria 'victim of foreign conspiracy'

News Video Screenshot 55 Euronews: Assad says Syria 'victim of foreign conspiracy' (March 30, 2011)

The footage also introduces the president and his role for the benefit of viewers. The journalist states in voice over: ““Syria today is the victim of a big conspiracy”, **he said**. “The people behind this are mixing 3 elements, namely: sedition, reform and the daily needs of the people” (idem). Use of the words “he said” by the journalist instil the fact that these are the words of the president rather than the journalist’s words. This statement is of essence to the news video as it repeats the citation on the news video title and summarises the speech of the president.

The news video is summarised by the journalist giving context of the speech that was cited in the news video: “His speech comes a day after he sacked the government”, this qualification tells viewers that the speech took place once day after he had sacked the government, which seems to portray changes in the government. But this context is immediately explained as “A move seen as purely cosmetic since power is concentrated in the hands of the Assad family...” (idem), therefore making the actions of the president appear insignificant.

The Euronews news video entitled *Turkey claims wounded Syrians show signs of chemical attack* (May, 2013) features the Turkish Foreign Minister speaking at a press conference in English, so as to include his statement on Turkey’s investigation results on chemical weapons being used. The journalist introduces him as such:

***Journalist voiceover:***

*Meanwhile in the international world, momentum is growing concerning the issue of chemical weapons. **Turkey's Foreign Minister has claimed** tests show signs of use on civilians.*

*(idem)*

The journalist citation modus “claimed” repeats the news video title “Tukey claims”, because the journalist cannot verify the investigation results, which are being stated by the Turkish

Foreign Minister. Interestingly, the FM is speaking in English. In other press conferences noted in our corpus, his discourse had to be translated from Turkish. It shows the willingness of the FM to make his statement heard.

The Euronews news video entitled *Overnight unrest after Tunisia's president flees* (January 15, 2011) features Tunisia's PM making a statement on State TV. The citation is used to interpret the Arabic statement of the PM. The journalist speaks over him as one can hear him speaking in Arabic. There are no headlines introducing his name or position.



Overnight unrest after Tunisia's president flees

News Video Screenshot 56 Euronews: *Overnight unrest after Tunisia's president flees* (January 15, 2011)

***Journalist Voiceover:***

*The prime minister [overheard speaking in an address on State TV, but untranslated and unintroduced via headlines] is now caretaker president. **He** says he will meet political parties today to try to form a coalition to take Tunisia to early elections.*

*(idem)*


The role of this statement is to show who is in charge in Tunisia now that the president has fled the country. Showing footage of the PM speaking also shows that he has made an address to the public.

*Direct quotes via social media*

We noted that some journalists would paraphrase or quote statements published by various actors on social media.

For example, in the F24 news video entitled *Egypt One day on* (July 4, 2013) the correspondent states: “We have some tweets here from Sultan Al Qassemi who is one of the bit most prominent Twitter commentators on the Middle East”. This statement introduces the tweeter as the tweeter is not a public persona and this introduction further justifies the importance of their tweet. The tweet is then simply read out: “Qatar got it wrong in Libya, then Syria and now billions of

dollars could go down the pan in Egypt” (idem), while viewers get a look at the actual tweet. Interestingly, the second tweet by the same social media commentator is actually a quote and this is indicated with quotation marks in the tweet and the F24 correspondent also informs viewers that it is a quote: “He is quoting there “Can’t get enough of this: Qatar praises “the Egyptian army’s role in safeguarding Egypt’s national security”, but we are not informed who the quote source is; the Twitter image tells us that he is posting a Reuters’ article and therefore the quote may be in reference to the Reuters’ article.



News Video Screenshot 57 F24: Egypt One day on (July 4, 2013)

*Citations by journalist facing the camera*

It was noted that some news videos would refer to statements of others while the journalist faced the camera as this would give them the opportunity to develop on the statement and interpret it for viewers.

For example, in the Press TV news video entitled *African Union suspends Egypt (July 5, 2013)*, the journalist makes reference to a statement by the African Union while facing the camera towards the end of the reportage so as to conclude: “The decision of the African Union can only be reversed if Egypt elects a new President, by holding fresh elections, or as the **African Union terms it: restores constitutional order**” (idem). The use of “the African Union terms it...”) follows an explanation of the actual term “restore constitutional order”, therefore the journalist has taken the opportunity to explain what the AU means with this term. The journalist facing the camera is holding a Press TV microphone and is standing in front of the African Union emblem so as to represent her location and the term she has just shared. Furthermore, the headlines providing her name and location are placed in between the event logo, EGYPT COUP, placed on a yellow backdrop and the PRESS TV logo.



News Video Screenshot 58 Press TV: African Union suspends Egypt (July 5, 2013)

Another news video by Press TV, published on July 2013 and entitled *Turkey calls Morsi's removal* features the journalist speaking to the camera as she quotes unnamed “experts” and “Turkish officials”. The journalist states: “Experts say the events taking place in Egypt could have serious consequences for Ankara. Turkish officials also believe that the new development will change the situation in Syria” (idem). When referring to experts in a journalistic discourse, it gives audiences a feeling of comfort in the news, showing that the TV channel has researched the situation by asking experts on their opinion. However, it must be noted that the context of these experts is not given, we are unsure what they are experts of. This expression generalises the opinion of experts and the information shared is therefore masked by the term so as to gain the confidence of viewers. Furthermore, the term “Turkish officials” also masks the true personas behind the quoted “belief”, also gaining the confidence of viewers in that the news being reported is “official”. However, if one listens closely, and perhaps several times, this conclusion seems to be made up of hearsay from unknown experts and unknown Turkish officials.

In the Press TV news video *UN chief chooses team to investigate claims of chemical use in Syria* (April 30, 2013), the journalist presents information on the UN team being set up to investigate the use of chemical weapons in Syria. At one point, the journalist quotes the UN spokesman while explaining the situation to spectators as he faces the camera. The journalist quotes Nesirky: “Nesirky added that the US office of disarmament affaires had been in touch with a number of countries to solicit information”. This statement is a direct quote and explains its importance. Not only is the US in touch with other countries, the reason for which it is in touch is to get information. The journalist also explains this quote while facing the camera, as if to better explain the details of the situation to viewers. Furthermore, he states the information that was not provided “He wouldn’t go into details however, about what countries or what information they provided” (idem).



News Video Screenshot 59 Press TV: *UN chief chooses team to investigate claims of chemical use in Syria* (April 30, 2013)

The Press TV news video entitled *NATO violates UN decree in Libya* (2011) features the interviewee, a news wire editor, citing Gaddafi. He states that “Colonel Gaddafi spoke via audiotape to people inside Libya, saying that the government would not surrender, that they would not compromise with NATO” (idem). As the interviewee cites Gaddafi, footage of the airport, which Press TV has just reported to be bombed by NATO earlier in the same news video, is featured. In this case, the footage does not represent Gaddafi or his citation, instead it focusses on the events that are the main highlight of the news video. It is also worth noting how Press TV refers to Gaddafi: by his name and by the position that the Libyan leader wished to be referred as since raising his rank, after the bloodless military coup that he led in the 1970s as a captain, so as to “follow” in the footsteps of his idol President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (Asser 2011). The same news video and interviewee later makes reference to citations by other countries but does not name the speakers and one notes a difference in perception once a speaker is named. The main difference, at least in the case of Gaddafi’s citation, is that he is presented with more respect as the star of the Libyan conflict that stands alone and strong

despite the numerous countries standing against him (see *Citing an organisation/country/unnamed official so as to generalise a point of view...*).

In the Press TV news video *EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)*, after the journalist cites that the EU is “satisfied” with the UN resolution 1973 and then shows footage of an EU representative affirming this citation, the journalist then faces the camera to explain to her audience what exactly the UN resolution 1973 is along with its significance. “**UN Resolution 1973 authorises** all measures necessary for protecting Libyan civilians from the forces of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. **But there are concerns** in the Arab world as well as in Europe about the potential loss of civilian life as a result of the military intervention” (Press TV, 2011). This citation very briefly explains what the UN resolution 1973 is whilst using the word “authorises”. The journalist also makes reference to “sentiments” in the Arab world and Europe using the word “concerns”. This brief analysis by the journalist is done whilst facing the camera so that viewers get an opportunity to see the journalist as she explains a matter that seems to be complicated. The journalist is also introduced under the yellow backdrop headline LIBYA WAR, providing viewers with her name and location including an indication to Press TV. Understanding on a topic by viewers may be said to be improved if the speaker can be seen, similar to a student’s need to see their teacher speaking whilst explaining a topic in class or via a video.



News Video Screenshot 60 Press TV: *EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)*

It was noticed that Euronews would interpret the words of their international correspondents, whilst their correspondents were facing the camera. For example, in the news video entitled *Overnight unrest after Tunisia’s president flees (January 15, 2011)*, one can see the Euronews

correspondent speaking in Arabic, and hear the Euronews journalist who has been speaking on voiceover for the entire duration of the news video.



Overnight unrest after Tunisia's president flees

News Video Screenshot 61 Euronews: Overnight unrest after Tunisia's president flees (January 15, 2011)

### ***Journalist Voiceover***

***Our correspondent in the Tunisian capital says:***

*This is a new independence for people who believed in their right to freedom and dignity. This is what hundreds of Tunisians on the streets exclaimed, despite a curfew in state of emergency, expressing their delight and joy in the president's departure. He's been replaced by the Prime Minister on a temporary basis. What lies ahead for Tunisia, remains to be seen.*

*(idem)*

The journalist introduces the correspondent and simply interprets his words, rather than offering a direct translation. This is typical of many Euronews news videos as they tend to work with correspondents who upload their news packages to the Euronews repertoire to be re-used by their colleagues all over the world. Of course, the journalist could simply cut out the end of the news video that shows another journalist, but keeping the video as it is first of all shows transparency in news production to viewers. It also shows that the journalist was on location (at least the correspondent was) and it is simply more ethical to keep the correspondent's face on the news video after s/he has produced it.

### *Citing in the news video title*

Through our corpus, it was noticed that citations would sometimes begin before even clicking on a news story posted on an online platform. Most of the news videos in our news corpus were

on YouTube. News stories can appear automatically on users' newsfeeds when they go onto the YouTube homepage. The information that appears on users' YouTube front page is dependent on whether they are logged into their YouTube account or not and if they are logged into their YouTube account, then it will vary depending on the channels they follow on YouTube. Users may also search for videos that interest them by simply using the search engine bar provided on the YouTube page. Once users search for a news video with specific keywords, they are given a list of videos that have a title and a video preview including some meta-data, but what stands out most is the title. Therefore, it is this title that encourages viewers to click on it and view the video. Therefore, video titles on YouTube act as headlines on newspapers or headlines on news articles posted online, encouraging users to check out the news, it is therefore of great importance and chosen carefully by news publishers.

Citations in news video titles online are significant because they inform users that the citation and/or cited actor will be covered in-depth in the story and this is especially significant if the citation portrays some kind of action or at least an action-follow up by the cited actor.

One example noted was the Press TV news video, entitled "China slams US led airstrike on Libya" (March, 2011). The language used is quite powerful "slams" and gives the connotation that the Chinese have physically slammed something and therefore action has been taken. This powerful language is not necessarily found again in the news video, where softer language is used to represent citation of the same information. Even the headline in the news video is not as powerful, it simply stated: "China on Libya Airstrikes" (idem).

Un-citations can also be made when journalists cite a person/country/organisation's decision to abstain from a vote or comment. For example, in the Press TV news video entitled *China slams US led airstrike on Libya* (March, 2011), the journalist, whilst facing the camera states:


*When the United Nations Security Council, last week, voted on a no fly zone over Libya and the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians against the forces of Colonel Gaddafi, **China was one of five members to abstain** and they say was the first time that China, a permanent and veto-wielding member of the Security Council **had departed** from its normally rigid role of non-interference with other countries' internal affairs (idem).*

The fact that China has abstained from voting is a clear statement that they do not support the airstrike, but are not willing to state it. The fact that they abstain from voting states that they do not support the no fly zone over Libya. Furthermore, the country has "departed" from their "normally rigid role of non-interference with other countries" (idem). The un-citation's significance is explained by the journalist. For example, viewers are told that not only is China

a permanent member of the Security Council, China is also a veto-wielding member, meaning that it has the right to veto resolutions. Furthermore, the journalist explains that it is not characteristic of China to abstain from votes. The journalist explains further for the benefit of viewers: “China has never allowed a Security Council Resolution to pass, based on humanitarian concerns alone” (idem). Therefore citation of China’s abstention is to be looked at as a significant move, or lack of move. This significance of this un-citation is additionally explained by a citation that the journalist makes in reference to “analysts”: “Analysts say, its shift this time, reflects greater involvement in the Middle East and deepening relations with Arab countries, some of which supported the resolution”. This citation is necessary to explain the significance of China’s un-citation and is further explained with footage of an analyst. For more analysis on this element in the news video, please refer to the section *Direct quotes via footage of the person speaking...*

The AJE news video *Libya Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surman air strike (June 20, 2011)*, features a citation or what appears to be a direct quote in the title of the video as published on YouTube. The title first introduces the context, which is the country “Libya”, before then stating “Nato” (as a proper noun, rather than an acronym) and then quoting using inverted commas “‘killed 19 civilians’”, this quote is followed by more information on the context: “in Surman airstrike” (AJE, June 2011). The fact that the action by NATO is described using quotation marks, one can presume that this is a quote. If the statement was not put in inverted commas then it would mean that AJE was accusing NATO of killing 19 civilians. It is of course the duty of journalists to report what has happened, but journalists are expected to report the results of investigations conducted by professionals. For example, stating what doctors have listed as the number of deceased would yield perhaps more of an accurate statement on the number of deceased. Also, reporting what another army, government or official body states in terms of who actually “killed 19 civilians” would perhaps also yield a more accurate statement, rather than the news channel stating who the attacker was. What is somewhat ambiguous in this news video, is that rather than going straight into this statement, whereby NATO is the culprit and the civilians are the victims, the journalist opens with information on the situation between rebels and fighters to Muammar Gaddafi. In fact, the entire introduction does not even mention NATO: “Battles between rebels and fighters to Muammar Gaddafi. The fighting was around the town of Addafnia, west of the rebel city of Misrata. Witnesses say Gaddafi’s forces fired 3 rockets into a residential area, one of which hit this house killing a 13-year-old and wounding two other children” (idem). The journalist has opened with an introduction to Gaddafi’s attack onto a residential area, rather than opening into the NATO action on civilians. This results in a very ambiguous understanding into the situation in Libya. It is hard to believe that this was not done intentionally by the AJE team, because by 2011, I had been made privy to an internal

Annual Report by the AJE Social Media Team, which had already stated that up to 90 people in AJE had been trained on Social Media Distribution. The training specifically included “how to distribute programmes on news media platforms to create a hype” as well as “Integration of social media tools & content gathered from social sites back to the Al Jazeera website” (Al Jazeera English 2011e; E. Al Jazeera 2011). These internal documents insinuate that the AJE team had been trained on using social media as early as 2011 and therefore had instructions related to how to post news videos online. It is up to the publisher (news channel) to choose the title their wish on YouTube and therefore, this was not impose by YouTube, but rather an internal AJE decision. The only guideline impose by YouTube on video titles is that they are not “misleading” (youtube.com 2018). Therefore, it seems that the AJE distributor of the news video has deliberately chosen to focus on only one aspect of the news video into the title and this may indeed “create a hype”, but it also creates ambiguity around the story. Indeed, if one watches the news video on YouTube, they may interpret the wrong message due to the YouTube title and video text being contradictory:



*News Video Screenshot 62 AJE: Libya Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surman air strike (June 20, 2011)*

One can note from the above screenshot of the news video that the Title is: “Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surnam air strike. But the witness speaking, a Misrata Resident, is actually giving information on rockets fired by Gaddafi into Misrata! The following is a transcript from the news video:

***Journalist Voiceover:*** *Witnesses say Gaddafi’s forces fired 3 rockets into a residential area, one of which hit this house killing a 13-year-old and wounding two other children.*

*Ibrahim Daghash, Misrata Resident (Translated into English from Arabic for the Al Jazeera English report.)*

*There were 5 kids, two girls, and a mother having dinner when the rockets hit them. Their father is on the front line. He was fighting.*

*(idem)*

This is extremely confusing for someone who has specifically clicked onto a video on YouTube to understand more about the NATO airstrike, but rather hears accounts of a Gaddafi airstrike and to be frank, one might not even notice that these are victims of Gaddafi and not NATO after having already mentally prepared themselves to watch a video on NATO's airstrikes. Therefore, for those who listen closely, yes this could be a confusing video, but for those who do not listen closely, it is clear that they are watching victims of NATO.

Fifty seconds into the news video, the journalist, on voice over, finally explains the quote in the YouTube title: "And near Tripoli is what the **Libyan government claims** is the aftermath of another NATO airstrike killing 19 civilians, 3 of them children" (*idem*). This statement by the journalist explains the quote and offers a source of information, which seems to originate from the Libyan government. The use of the verb "claims" does cast a shadow of doubt in the discourse of the journalist, telling viewers that the claim has not been proven or even verified, or double checked, by other sources, other than the Libyan government. In most of the interviews conducted with professional journalists from various media networks, the main source of news verification was to always double check information given by one source before reporting it. If the information provided by a source was repeated by other sources, then journalists were pretty sure and happy to report the news, especially if these other sources had proven to be reliable and credible in the past. To be sure, the AJE journalist quotes their second source, 1 minute and 35 seconds into the news video. Their second source is none other than NATO stating that it had bombed a "legitimate military target" (*idem*) and furthermore it "acknowledged" that the death of the civilians "may have been the result of a system failure" (*idem*). The first quote by NATO is presented as text on the screen for viewers to see and more about this method of quoting can be found in the section *Direct Quotes*. Also interesting and worth noting is that the quote in the news video title is also re-iterated in the video description of the YouTube video on the YouTube video page as such: "The Libyan government said on Monday that 19 civilians were killed in a NATO air strike on the home of one of Muammar Gaddafi's top officials, a day after NATO admitted killing civilians in a separate aerial attack" (Al Jazeera English 2011a). Therefore, the ways of sourcing quotes placed in the title a news video posted online can be done first and foremost in the video description on the platform it is

published on and secondly through the journalist's discourse via the people they interview and further quotes and citations within the actual news video.

The AJE news video entitled *Expert says French findings on sarin gas far from conclusive* (June, 2013) is in itself a citation. The citation serves to communicate the subject of this news video, which is indeed a focus on an expert's criticism of the French findings and statements on sarin gas. By simply using "says" after the source, "Expert", viewers are informed that there are doubts on the accuracy of the findings or that they are incomplete. Indeed, the in-studio anchor repeats this citation whilst introducing the expert, "...he says the French findings are far from conclusive" and the expert himself critiques the findings as such: "...this newest French report is very concerning..." and "...it doesn't tell you who or when or how the chemicals were used" and finally the expert accuses the French government of foul play: "...it's hard to say to what extent this is manufactured or if this is a truly legitimate finding..." (idem). Therefore, to conclude, the citation in the video title in this case, simply summarises the subject of the news video.

The AJE news video published on June 2013 on the Syrian civil war declaration starts citation at the moment the news video is given a title for YouTube. The news video is titled: *UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war'* and states the citation source to be a UN official and the statement includes a direct quote, which is the words 'civil war'. The significance of the Syrian Uprising turned conflict, now being labelled a 'civil war' by a UN official is newsworthy for a few reasons. Firstly, it causes a hype and attracts viewers. Secondly, there is a change in connotation amongst viewers to the wording of the conflict. "Uprising", "Spring" or "Revolution" sound positive in that the possible connotations include at least the following mental images: rising of people, people standing up for their rights, colourful flags being waved in the sky, demand for change. Civil war on the other hand sounds very bleak and convokes at least the following mental images: injured people, dead people, rubble, destruction and refugees. Also, the declaration of a civil war in Syria means that the Syrian people who revolted were not successful in making the changes they so yearned in their country and this will evoke a feeling of sadness in many viewers, that unlike the other Arab countries, Syria did not get to have its revolution; an uprising yet, but not a revolution. Another reason for the declaration of civil war being significant is explained later in the news video through other citations as a mainly legal reason, whereby the laws of war would reign in Syria in terms of fighting and the UN presence in the country.

Another news video, *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree* (December, 2012) by AJE makes its citation in the video title chosen for YouTube. The title cites Egypt's Morsi, stating that he "rescinds controversial decree" (idem). The citation represents a statement that symbolises an action by Morsi; through this citation, viewers understand that a controversial

decree has been cancelled by Morsi. Morsi is introduced as “Egypt’s Morsi” so as to both introduce Morsi’s role whilst also ensuring the video can be found via YouTube and other search engines. Indeed, what today’s news consumers search for news that interests them and therefore it is of essence that news channels broadcasting on the internet ensure that their news videos are findable. The way to ensure that news videos on YouTube can be found, even by users unsure of what exactly they are seeking, is to optimise the metadata of news videos. One of the first ways to help users find video content on YouTube is to use tags, which are basically descriptive keywords that publishers can add to their videos. Prior to 2016 tags could also be used to change the format and appearance of videos on YouTube, for example to default high quality stream, zoom into an area or scale the video down (YouTube 2016). But metadata does not only include tags attached to videos published on YouTube; metadata refers to all information about a video, including the video title, video description and annotations. Because YouTube advises against using misleading metadata or including tags in video descriptions, referring to this practise as tag-stuffing which can lead to videos being removed from YouTube, the title chosen for a YouTube video is one of the key elements in ensuring users find videos. YouTube advises publishers to have clear titles and descriptions that are representative of the video content and context and are clearly relevant (YouTube 2018a). YouTube advises against using titles that “highlight the most provocative or shocking aspects” of a video (YouTube 2018b). Based on the YouTube policies and recommendations, the title of a YouTube video is of great importance for users to find video content on YouTube. Therefore, a title such as: *Egypt’s Morsi rescinds controversial decree* firstly highlights the context, Egypt, before stating Morsi and finally highlighting the subject of the news video, which highlights “controversial decree”. As the decree has been represented in the media as the “controversial decree”, such terms will probably be used by searchers to find the content related to it. News publishers have to put themselves in the shoes of their viewers and potential viewers before deciding what keywords should be included in their communication strategy on their title, tags, description and possible advertisement campaigns.

*Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead*, another AJ news video, posted on the same day (December 8, 2012) as *Egypt’s Morsi rescinds controversial decree*, seems to be a follow up video that uses some of the same footage and copy. The video title itself is a citation that highlights instructions given by Morsi: “Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead” (idem). In this case, the context, “Egypt” is not included in the title, showing that there is no specific guideline by AJE in titling videos on YouTube, or at least the guidelines are not followed by staff uploading the videos onto YouTube. The citation is clear only if the previous video had been watched, whereby the opposition had made a statement against the constitution

referendum. This video title informs viewers that the constitution [referendum] will go ahead as planned.

The AJE news video entitled *Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt* (November, 2012) also makes citations. The first citation is that Morsi has assumed sweeping powers. One can look at this 'action' as a citation because one usually announces the new powers they have assumed and therefore the title cites whoever has made the announcement. Furthermore, the action cited is cited to have polarised Egypt. Therefore, the citation is also somewhat of an evaluation into the situation in Egypt.

#### *Citing events in the form of a chronological timeline*

Through our news videos, it was observed that journalists would sometimes cite events through various sources whilst displaying the events in the form of a chronological timeline with images and brief citations. This is done to display a chronological calendar of events leading up to the major event being reported. This method of citation is also useful to simplify what has appeared to be complicated for viewers to understand. And finally, citation through a timeline can recapitulate a story after having reported it in an agile method, whereby the journalist is sharing information as it comes in, bit by bit, rather than waiting for all the information to arrive so as to be able to report the story once and for all. When journalists report big stories using the agile method it becomes necessary to recapitulate the various bits of information into one news story and doing so with images and a timeline can be a good pedagogical approach in getting the message across.

The AJE news video entitled *Morsi's fall from power (July 5, 2013)* features the voice of the journalist (who appears to be an in-studio anchor) over images of a timeline. As the journalist makes statements, the timeline and the information on it changes. For example, when the journalist stated that "...the protest organisers Tamarod then gave Morsi a July 2<sup>nd</sup> deadline..." (idem), the video features "deadlines imposed" on the timeline.



Morsi's fall from power

News Video Screenshot 63 AJE: Morsi's fall from power (July 5, 2013)

In addition to the dates and the events cited, one can also note the title “MORSI’S FALL FROM POWER”, which informs viewers what the timeline represents. There is also an image on July 1. The image is not very clear, but when one looks closely, it seems to represent a crowded protest. There is also a headline, which in itself is a citation from Egypt’s State TV. The citation here is used to provide ongoing events or breaking news to viewers from Egypt whilst they watch the timeline of Morsi’s downfall.

As stated earlier, the timeline represents the citations made by the journalist. Therefore, when the journalist states that the “The army followed by issuing Morsi 48 hours to meet the people’s demands of face and impose solution, Morsi’s opponents packed Tahrir Saquare” (idem), the timeline focusses on July 2 with the text “MORSI OPPONENTS FILL TAHRIR SQUARE” and an image of Tahrir square filled with people is featured.



Morsi's fall from power

News Video Screenshot 64 AJE: Morsi's fall from power (July 5, 2013)

The timeline moves again when the journalist cites the army: “Then on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, the army gives its solution. Egypt’s military chief announcing that Morsi has been disposed” (idem). This time,

the timeline is on July 3, with the text: ARMY DEPOSES MORSI and there is a smiling, satisfied looking Sisi in the photo.



Morsi's fall from power

News Video Screenshot 65 AJE: Morsi's fall from power (July 5, 2013)

## Unreferenced Citations

It was noted through our news corpora that news videos would sometimes make reference to statements without actually sharing their source in their citation. This act of not sharing the source or their role in an event/organisation/country generalises a point of view so that it appears acceptable by viewers. There is however, the danger of analytical viewers questioning the credibility or significance of the source. We have already noted examples whereby Press TV reported a news story based on what “a news report” published/broadcast (See *Direct or Indirect Quotes of other press with or without images so as to interpret the various standpoints of the press on different topics or simply introduce a topic*). The citation of a news report serves to justify the news being reported by Press TV without having to go into details of the news publisher.

We also noted the use of passive voice in news reports as well as in interviews so as to introduce a news story without necessarily giving credit to the source. For example, in the Press TV news video *NATO violate UN decree in Libya* (2011), the in-studio anchor is interviewing the editor of a news wire and states: “NATO, **we’ve just heard**, has been, has rather destroyed the radar antenna of the international airport in Tripoli. Now, **it’s already been accused of** overriding the UN resolution, and now the attack on the airport **is being called a** violation of international law. Is NATO going too far?” (idem). This use of citations in an interview allows for the in-studio anchor to share news whilst asking their interviewee for information. There is therefore an element of guiding the interviewee in their answers whilst also taking the opportunity to share news that was either already broadcast by the channel previously or not. The use of

passive voice allows the journalist to make citations without actually referring to the subject being cited. For example, “NATO, we’ve just heard...has ...destroyed the radar antenna”, does not actually tell us where they “heard” this information from. If we listened to the beginning of the report we may be able to attribute the source to “airport officials” from Tripoli’s international airport, but this is not entirely sure. The source has not been highlighted and given significance. On the one hand, viewers can focus on the information rather than the source. On the other hand, analytical viewers will not take in the information without the source and the lack of source or the playing down of the significance of the source may make viewers perceive the information to be not credible. The second passive statement, “It’s [NATO] already been accused of overriding the UN resolution...” (idem) tells us that NATO has been accused of overriding the UN resolution but we are unsure who has accused NATO. Some viewers may assume that only the UN can accuse an organisation/country of violating its resolutions and therefore believe the source to be the UN. However, analytic viewers may ask the question as to why the interviewee is not from the UN to elaborate on this accusation. The final citation in passive voice is “...now the attack on the airport is being called a violation of international law” (idem). We are unsure who has actually referred to the attack on the airport as a violation of international law. This is of importance because it could change the news altogether. The source is actually a game changer on the information shared. For example, if the accusers were people on the streets of Libya or France, this implies a specific public opinion in one country or the other, but not necessarily a change in the conflict in Libya. However, if the accusation comes from a government in the coalition or the UN itself, then there may be a possible change in terms of the conflict.

The Press TV news video entitled *NATO violates UN decree in Libya* (July, 2011) also features the interviewer and in-studio anchor citing “unknown” or at least “unreferenced” people so as to be able to justify the importance of her question but perhaps also guide the interviewee in his answers: “**A lot of questions have been asked** about what’s going to happen to the frozen Libyan assets once that council has been recognised. **People are saying** that those large numbers of, those monies and funds could be falling into the wrong hands...” (Press TV, July 2011). The first statement is constructed passively so as to not pinpoint the finger on who has actually been asking questions, whilst sharing the idea that there are a lot of people asking the same questions; the emphasis is put on “a lot of questions”. In her next statement, the journalist makes reference to people as such: “People are saying....” (idem). Of course we do not know who these people are but we can assume that these are the people in Libya. It is not really important who these people are, in fact what is important is the citation: that there might be lots of money that will fall into the wrong hands, and this information has been highlighted in form of a citation.

In some cases, generalisations and unnamed sources can be confusing and perhaps share the wrong information. For example, the interviewee in the Press TV news video *NATO violates UN decree in Libya* (July 2011) states: “Well, I don’t believe for 1 minute, that those 10s of billions of dollars are going to be handed over to the TNC forces. **They’ve already pledged** hundreds of millions of dollars to the opposition forces, and there’s never been any mention in regard to the accountability of what’s happened to those funds” (idem). From his statement it is not clear who has pledged money to the opposition forces and the in-studio anchor does not ask for any verification, therefore it is a statement that could share information in a very ambiguous manner. The statement is made right after the journalist has asked about money falling into the wrong hands. Therefore, one wonders how pledges have been made to the opposition forces. Has money been stolen to support the opposition forces? Or is there an outside actor that is supporting them? Or is it really a pledge, and has money been raised internally?

In the Press TV news video entitled *EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)*, the journalist cites unnamed analysts to argue against the validity of UN Resolution 1973 in protecting Libyan civilians. Rather than naming the analysts, the citation focuses on the content rather than the source: “**Some analysts** also doubt whether the assault of the western coalition, which includes the US and Canada, is the best way to protect revolutionary forces and civilians. **They fear** that the intervention might lead to a long drawn-out war as the UN resolution includes no exit strategy. What’s more, Gaddafi has vowed to fight a long and difficult battle” (Press TV, 2011). This citation refers to the source “some analysts” before stating their “doubt”. The citation is expressed as an attitude of “doubt” rather than an actual statement and this is therefore an in-direct citation based on several attitudes. In addition to the citation, the journalist concludes the argument with their own analysis of the situation in Libya: “What’s more, Gaddafi has vowed to fight a long and difficult battle” (Press TV, 2011)”. Although the citation does not have a direct source, the news feature then features an interviewee speaking to the camera. The interviewee’s name is featured by Press TV as well as “MEDEA Institute”.



News Video Screenshot 66 Press TV: EU divided on military operation in Libya (March 24, 2011)

The footage of the interviewee is supposed to represent one of the “analysts” but her role in MEDEA Institute is not shared, therefore we are unsure of the weight of her analysis. Also, her discourse or analysis is stated in a very vague sentence: “He will try to present this operation as a Western Operation with a lot of interests beneath it” (idem). One can presume that “He” is Gaddafi and the objective of this statement is to share the analyst’s doubt in the operation in Libya, but if one listens closely, it is not her doubt that she is describing, but rather the way in which she feels Gaddafi will present the operation. The second statement of the interviewee is: “But that’s true, you cannot forget that there is petrol and that western powers are interested in keeping control...” (idem). “But that’s true” may be in reference to a leading question by the journalist, which is unheard on the news video. This statement is clearer in that Libya has petrol and the Western powers wish to keep control of the country and this somewhat complements the journalist’s citation on the doubts of analysts.

The AJE news video entitled *Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)* showcases the journalist making reference to “witnesses” in general so as to be able to report a news story with a specific source. The journalist states: “Battles between rebels and fighters to Muammar Gaddafi. The fighting was around the town of Addafnia, west of the rebel city of Misrata. **Witnesses say** Gaddafi’s forces fired 3 rockets into a residential area, one of which hit this house killing a 13-year-old and wounding two other children” (idem). The journalist first presents the context, which is fighting between Gaddafi forces and rebels in Misrata. So as to go further into the news story and explain the outcome of the fighting, the journalist has decided to cite what “witnesses” on the ground have probably shared. Citing what witnesses say is basically a summary of statements given by witnesses. Journalist can of course decide which of the statements they want to include in their news video, therefore meaning that

some of the statements are not included. The fact that there is no “official” information on the rockets fired by Gaddafi’s forces, means that the journalist has to rely on witness accounts and therefore states that the sources are “witnesses”. However, viewers are not given information on how many witnesses have given this account, nor on the context of the witnesses, which could of course change viewers’ interpretation of the report. The news video does however feature a witness speaking to camera, who is identified in the headlines as a Misrata Resident, before then replacing the headlines with “BATTLE FOR LIBYA, HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS” placed to the right of the AJE logo.



News Video Screenshot 67 AJE: Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)

The witness does not actually repeat what the journalist has said, meaning that he do not reaffirm that 3 rockets were fired by Gaddafi’s forces. Instead, the witness tells viewers what the victims were doing when “the rockets hit them” (idem). The witness account, given in Arabic, is interpreted into English for the benefit of non-Arabic speaking viewers, as such “There were 5 kids, two girls, and a mother having dinner when the rockets hit them. Their father is on the front line. He was fighting” (idem). The witness account is not shared for information purposes, but rather to awaken emotions in the viewers so as to empathise for

victims, sitting at the table to eat just like any other family. The witness account is given in what seems to be a dark and gloomy place that one can presume is the aftermath of the rockets and this transfers the experience of the witnesses into the home and the hearts of viewers watching from afar and this is a classic example of Mole's understanding of communication to be the transfer of the receptor's change in environment to that of the sender whilst using something they have in common (Devèze 2004; Berleant 1967; Moles 1968). What is shared by both viewers of AJE and those in Libya is most probably family, food and the need for security, safety and comfort and these are evident in the witness's account.

The Euronews news video entitled *US dismisses Assad's conspiracy theory speech* (March, 2011) firstly qualifies the speech as a 'conspiracy theory' speech in its title, which appears on Euronews. The news video itself tries to represent the view of Syrians without identifying their sources. For example, the journalist begins with "It was not the speech **Syrian protesters calling for reform had hoped for**" (idem). The source being cited is "Syrian protesters calling for reform". This grouping of "Syrian protesters" represents Syrian protesters as unified in their aims without needing to make reference to a leader or representative of the Syrian protesters. Also, the citation is not of a statement but rather a feeling assumed by the journalist. The journalist makes reference to this feeling again in his speech: "Despite raised hopes, there was no mention of lifting nearly 50 years of emergency rule" (idem). Those with "raised hopes" are not identified, once again, but viewers can presume they belong to the Syrian protesters. This citation is made along with an un-citation representing the Syrian President: "Despite **raised hopes, there was no mention** of lifting nearly 50 years of emergency rule. Instead, he blamed the recent weeks of unrest on a foreign conspiracy" (idem). The raised hopes represent the Syrian protesters' feelings and then the president is quoted for "there was no mention of lifting nearly 50 years of emergency rule" (idem). This un-citation is significant alongside the hopes of the protesters as it shows that their hopes were not fulfilled by their president. There is another unreferenced citation that represents hopes: "Reaction abroad has been dismissive" (idem). The reaction being dismissive is the citation but "abroad" groups the reaction of all countries so that they are equalised. But this unreferenced citation is further narrowed down with a direct citation from Mark Toner, US State Department Spokesperson, who speaks as though in response to a question:

***Mark Toner US State Department Spokesperson:***

*Leaderships of many of these countries need to respond to the **legitimate aspirations of their people**. It's far too easy to look for conspiracy theories and respond in a meaningful way for the call for reform.*

(idem)

The referenced statement by Toner is significant right after the unreferenced statement “Reaction abroad has been dismissive” (idem), because it is meant to represent the “reaction abroad” even though Toner can only speak for the US. In his statement he makes reference to “legitimate aspirations of their people”, supposedly representing the people of Arab uprisings. He has therefore qualified their aspirations as being “legitimate” so as to give the US point of view. The journalist carries on citing the Syrian president and protesters: “Despite using **his speech to tell** protesters to go home, **hundreds are said** to have marched to the port of Latakia **calling for** freedom” (idem). The journalist refers to the president’s speech as such: “despite using his speech to tell protesters to go home”. Introducing his citation with the preposition “despite” tells viewers that the follow up information will be in opposition to the president’s statement. Indeed, the follow up information, “hundred are said to have marched to the port of Latakia calling for freedom” (idem), is in reference to protesters marching and “calling for freedom”. Again, protesters are represented as a united front.

Another Euronews news video entitled *Assad forces accused of killing hundreds in nerve gas attack* (August 21, 2013) also makes citations without necessarily referring to the exact source. The news video title seen on YouTube “Assad forces accused of killing hundreds...” is in itself an unreferenced citation that YouTube users see before even clicking on the news video. The title states that Assad’s forces have been accused of this crime but it does not state who is making the accusation. The reason for leaving out the source may be because the accusation has been made by several sources or simply because the journalist wants to focus on what the president has been accused of doing, rather than who is accusing him. Indeed, once the video is played, disturbing images contributed by amateurs feature people lying motionless on the ground beside other people who are suffering and exhibiting what viewers will understand to be the result of the “nerve gas attack”. It is difficult to describe the scenes as anything but utter horror and the journalist does not even attempt to describe them, because the images are enough to gain the empathy of anyone.



Assad forces accused of killing hundreds in nerve gas attack

*News Video Screenshot 68 Euronews: Assad forces accused of killing hundreds in nerve gas attack (August 21, 2013)*

The journalist begins on voiceover: “Syrian activists have accused the forces of President Bashar al-Assad of killing hundreds of people in a nerve-gas attack” (idem). His first statement makes reference to “Syrian activists” and citing that their accusation for the scenes on the screen. This citation is presented with amateur footage of the crime so as to highlight the crime that Assad is being accused of. However, the citation is not properly referenced as it refers only to the “Syrian activists” as though they represented one organisation or even a syndicate of organisations. Of course, presenting a citation as that of the “Syrian activists” does show unification amongst the Syrian activists, but it lacks in representing any kind of leadership for the activists. The journalist carries on describing the crime, over more amateur footage: “The assault on rebel held areas on the outskirts of the capital Damascus left over 200 people dead according to medical sources (idem) and this is immediately followed up by another unreferenced citation: “**The reports**, which could not be independently verified, come as a UN team is in Syria to investigate **the alleged use of** chemical weapons during the two-year civil war” (idem). The reports, i.e. the reports of the assault, which were made by Syrian activists, “could not be independently verified” and the UN team is investigating, what the journalist refers to as “the alleged use of chemical weapons”, showing that despite reporting this news given by activists in form on civilian deaths, accusations and footage, the journalist is wary in reporting the news as a fact, because no independent affirmations have been made. This means that there is also an un-citation by the UN, which is the independent organisation in Syria. The journalist stated that a “UN team is in Syria” and yet, no statement has been made by the UN team. The significance of the un-citation by the UN team is to show the UN’s lack of knowledge and influence in the Syrian conflict.

A follow-up citation is made representing both the Syrian government and the activists: “**The Syrian government denies** the use of nerve-gas. **Both sides of the seemingly endless conflict have accused** each other of having chemical weapons...” (idem). The Syrian government

definitely represents the Syrian government, but we cannot be sure who in the government has made a statement and under what context. Also, “both sides” presents the situation in Syria as though there were only 2 sides, the government and 1 opposition, very similar to the other uprisings in North Africa.

Other news videos by Euronews *Syrian activists accuse Assad forces of nerve gas attack* (August, 2013) and *Syria: Several killed by Homs gas attack* (December, 2012) use a mix of citations from activists and the Syrians government in the same way. In addition, however, the second news video also makes reference to a statement by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an NGO, so as to be able to report the deaths.

## Citing Organisations and Countries

### *Citations Organisations/Countries*

It was also noticed that mainstream channels would refer to countries or organisations in statements that were paraphrased so as to further make a point or share a story angle. Stating the source as an entire organisation or country generalises the point of view, decision taken or statement made as a common point of view or statement. When there is no reference to the members of the organisation or the country being cited, then it gives the connotation that everyone in the organisation or country is in agreement. Furthermore, when there is no reference to the role of the members in the organisation or country, it connotes that the citation is significant. Referring to an individual’s discourse as the discourse of an entire country or organisation makes their role more important than it actually is. For example, if one says: a French minister has said, this connotes the representation of the views of France, when in fact it may be a minister in the opposing government.

In F24’s news video entitled *Syria in full-scale civil war, says UN peacekeeping chief* (2012), the journalist refers to America by stating “I mean the Americans are sending real strong signals that it’s probably best [for the UN] to pull out [of Syria]”. We are not told who in the US has made a strong signal, nor are we actually told what the strong signal actually is. This statement does however indicate something else: that the US has a role to play in Syria and that the UN should listen up to the US. Therefore, the influence of the US in world politics, even international organisations like the UN is being communicated to viewers. Viewers receive the message that: the US is a great power and the UN should listen to this great power.

In the same news video, the journalist also refers to Russia by stating that “Russia is trying to get some sort of meeting together, trying to push forward something”, but the statement says nothing really, while emphasising that Russia has a role to play and will play a role in the Syrian crisis. We are not told who in Russia actually stated that they would set up a meeting, nor do

we know who will be included in the meeting. Is it the Syrians? Is it the Americans? Furthermore, who from Syria and America will be in the meeting? Also, who from Russia will be at the meeting? The journalist concludes by stating that “The world is going to have to respond in an entirely different way”. And this statement further generalises “the world”, who exactly is he calling on in the world? Having only mentioned the US and Russia, we believe that the Americans and Russia are representative of the “world” as they are communicated as the only influential countries who will have a say in the Syrian crisis. All in all, this statement also sums up the reason for including the Russian statement with no source or information: the journalist’s message is that things have turned for the worst in Syria so Russia and all influential countries will have to change tactics.

In another news video in our corpus, *US, biggest loser in Bahrain uprising* posted by Press TV onto YouTube on August, 2011, reference is also made to an unnamed official. This reference is made in relation to a media report already referenced by the in-studio anchor: “...the Washington Post reports that Bush and the Bahraini regime secretly signed the contract to 2016 back in 2001...A US official, has also hinted that the accord was extended. He says the contract’s date goes beyond October 2011” (idem). The reference to the US official simply backs up what the Washington Post has reported, however we are not told who the US official is, furthermore the official has only “hinted” on something, and this gives an impression of hearsay. The credibility of what the official hints relies on who exactly the official is. Furthermore, the unnamed official is quoted as such: “He says the contract’s date goes beyond October 2011” and this use of “he says” is a direct statement that is much clearer than a hint.

Also, the Press TV news video entitled *African Union suspends Egypt* published on July 2013 concludes with the journalist voice over stating: “Egypt claims that it has a roadmap to see fresh elections being held, but there is no certainty of when this will happen” (Press TV, July 2013). The phrase “Egypt claims” does not inform viewers who in Egypt actually made the claim, furthermore, the verb “claim” by definition is an assertion of something with no evidence; the journalist therefore is informing viewers that she has not seen any evidence of when the fresh elections will take place. Furthermore, she also states: “but there is no certainty of when this will happen”, therefore insisting on the “uncertainty”.

In the same video entitled *African Union suspends Egypt* (Press TV, July 2013) we note the grouping of statements sourced to the African Union as a collective organisation, therefore grouping statements and decisions made by the organisation. For example, the journalist states “**It was decided** that Egypt’s activities be suspended in the union. **The union has based its decision** on the recent overthrow of Mohammed Morsi from power and military takeover of Egypt. **According to the union’s** peace and Security Council, the situation in Egypt amounts to a violation of the Egyptian constitution” (Press TV, July 2013). The words used to represent

the African union are: “it was decided...in the union” and “According to the union’s peace and security council...”, these are direct forms of quote whereby the audience is informed on the organisation behind the decision. Using passive voice, the journalist cites the organisation rather than quoting the members directly so as to communicate the fact that these decisions were taken as an organisation. If there were debates regarding the decision on Egypt as a member state within the organisation, the journalist makes no reference to these. We can therefore presume as viewers that every single member of the African Union was in agreement with their fellow members.

In another news video by Press TV, entitled *Egypt may be headed for civil war* (July, 2013), the interviewee makes reference to the US congress as such: “But now you’ve got the right wingers in the US congress saying we’ve gotta cut off all aid until the right person is elected” (idem). Despite the fact that this statement does not actually name people, it tries to be specific in that the statement does not represent all of the US, not does it represent all of the US congress, it actually states that it is representative of the “right winger in the US congress” (idem). Some viewers will understand this to mean that it is the opposition (Republican Party) in the US that is demanding to cut off aid to Egypt, whilst those who do not follow the news regularly may simply understand that the US ruling government wants to cut off all aid to Egypt. Therefore, there is a danger in not specifying the actual source behind a citation.

It was also noted that officials may be named sometimes to represent citations but they would be grouped with other unknown people. For example, in the same Press TV video, *Egypt may be headed for civil war* (July, 2013), the interviewee ‘expert’ states: “...people like McCain are trying to say “look, look, a majority of the people, they wanted change, thereby justifying the military coup”?” (idem). Reference to McCain and his point of view which is cited can only communicate effectively to viewers who watch American politics closely. Spectators who do not understand internal US politics will not be aware that John McCain, a senator at the time, held very opposing views to the US government presided by Barack Obama at the time. Furthermore, “people like McCain” is a really general term that permits spectators to stereotype who they believe has the same views as McCain, or the same political position as McCain and such stereotypes may lead to ungrounded conclusions on actual US government relations with that of Egypt’s people or Egypt’s military at a time whereby they are president-less.

The interviewee makes further citations without naming the official, for example: “I can’t see the military putting him [Morsi] back in office and holding a referendum; a vote on Morsi...Although, I understand that the White House wouldn’t mind something like that” (idem). The interviewee is interpreting the feelings of the White House on something that has not taken place, therefore this is already citing without actual facts. Furthermore, the source he gives is “the White House”, rather than stating Obama. In this case, reference to “the White

House” gives importance to the government in general, communicating the fact that it is not only Obama who makes decisions, but the entire White House governing body, and therefore decisions are not taken lightly. Also, the White House is very representative of the US ruling government and therefore he is communicating what he believes to be the White House stance on Morsi’s downfall.

It was noted that journalists sometimes generalise their citations to cover “everyone” before finally focussing on one particular person. For example, in the news video *Egypt may be headed for civil war*, uploaded by Press TV in 2013, the journalist asks his guest a leading question: “...everyone is condemning today’s violence, even those who were anti-Morsi are condemning today’s violence. Even Mohammed al Barady for example. And even those who stood against Mohammed Morsi, throughout...” (idem). We can note that the journalist begins his citation with “everyone”, before narrowing down to “those who were anti-Morsi” and finally puts the limelight on “Mohammed al Barady”. This stereotyping act tells viewers that there is a general view on the ground that everyone is surprised by the removal of Morsi and therefore they are permitted to also be surprised, whether they are with or against Morsi themselves.

In the Press TV news video, *Egypt may be headed for civil war* (July, 2013), the interviewee cites actions rather than words. In reference to the Egyptian army, he states: “I think they rushed into this thing, they were too much affected with the public demonstrations, a little bit like in a different setting, that NATO and the Americans and French and the British, rushed into Libya, after there were some riots in Benghazi” (idem). He is basically comparing the situation in Egypt to that of Libya, whereby the Egyptian army were influenced by public demonstrations of the government, just as like NATO, the US, the French and the British were influenced by public demonstrations in Libya. He brings in the actions of three other countries and an organisation to cite their actions and then compare them with the actions of the army in Egypt. The Press TV news video entitled *UN Chief chooses team to investigate* (April 30, 2013) features footage of a Russian spokesman speaking at a press conference but muted and the journalist voice over states: “The Syrians and Russians apparently don't share that confidence. Sellstrom’s team is tasked to investigate all claims of chemical warfare usage in Syria including British and French claims that one Syrian minister has branded ‘bald-faced lies’” (idem). The journalist is referring to both the Syrians and the Russians in his citation of how both countries feel about the UN investigation. But we do not hear the actual words of the Russian spokesman. We know he is Russian because he is sat before some Russian media microphones; he is not given any labelling in the headlines so we are unsure who exactly he is. But then the journalist states that “Also Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that no proof had been submitted to the UN for the British and French claims”, therefore informing us that this is Russia’s Foreign Minister. The footage then turns to amateur footage of fighting in Syria before

going back to the Russian FM, this time walking towards a podium with the Russian flag and a backdrop of OTAN (NATO in French) on the wall. Finally, the footage loops back to that of Bank Ki-moon at the UN. The footage serves to portray the different actors speaking about the investigation in Syria, but only the voice of the UN is broadcast. It is possible that Press TV simply did not have access to footage of the Russian FM speaking or at least no translation of the speech.




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News Video Screenshot 69 Press TV: UN Chief chooses team to investigate (April 30, 2013)

The Press TV news story *NATO violated UN decree in Libya* (2011) features the in-studio anchor reporting that “NATO warplanes have attacked Tripoli’s International Airport, destroying its radar antenna” (idem). This news event is immediately sourced through a citation from unnamed airport officials: “**Airport officials say** 2 people have been injured in the attack. **They say** the radar was used for civilian purposes such as guiding flights by the UN and relief agency organisations. However, **NATO says** the system is being used by regime forces to attack its aircraft” (Press TV, 2011). The citation by the unnamed airport officials is used to inform Press TV viewers on the airport attack by the UN. Further information is also shared, 2 casualties and the use of the radar antenna according to both the airport officials and NATO, which happen to be contradictory. The news of the attack has been reported thanks to citations from these unidentified airport officials. NATO’s citation states the use of the radar antenna in the airport, therefore justifying the reasons for which they may have attacked it. The news may have been more credible coming from the UN and relief agency organisations, seeing that they are the neutral parties that have been reported to be using the radar.

It was also noted that the opposition in a country would be cited without reference to a particular member in the opposition and their statement would be compared to that of the ruling government. For example, the news video *NATO violates UN decree decree in Libya* (Press TV, 2011) features the in-studio anchor stating that “The opposition says it’s won the days-long battle for the oil town of Brega. They say that the bulk of the regime forces have pulled back to the nearby town of Ras Manouf” (idem). This citation from the “opposition” simply allows the anchor to report that the Libyan opposition has claimed victory. The anchor then reports the regime’s statement: “However, the Libyan government says its troops are still in full control of the city” (idem). Ending with the statement of the regime may highlight a presence of doubt in the journalist’s earlier citation by the opposition and this contradiction with the use of

“however” tells viewers that despite the citing the opposition, this news is to be taken with caution.

It was also found that international resolutions were cited in our news corpora so as to justify the significance of a news event. For example, the Press TV news video entitled *NATO violates UN decree in Libya* (2011) features an interview with a news wire editor who cites the UN resolution 1973 in his response to the in-studio anchor:

*The UN resolution 1970 and United resolution 1973 have both been violated, even according to what the Security Council had intended initially in regard to passing these resolutions several months ago. What has happened is that the French have violated the UN resolution 1970 by doing airdrops of weapons to the TNC rebel forces inside the country. And of course **1973 really called for the protection of civilians**, yet we have the bombing of civilian installations, government communication satellites, schools have been hit, ports have been hit and other commercial facilities inside the country as well as civilians.*

*(idem)*

In order to explain that the UN resolutions 1970 and 1973 have been violated, after explaining the actions of the French in Libya, he cites the resolution 1973 as a call “for the protection of civilians” (*idem*). He then goes on to explain that despite this resolution, civilians have been targeted in Libya, therefore highlighting the significance of this resolution and the fact that it has perhaps been violated. The citation of the UN resolution may also give the connotation that the accusation of violating the confrontation was actually made by the UN, when it essence it is not clear who is actually making accusations other than the interviewer and the interviewee. In the same Press TV news video, the in-studio anchor cites a “US State Department Official” for confirming that there have been “talks between US officials and Gaddafi representatives. The anchor states: “Now, a US State Department Official, has confirmed talks between US officials and Gaddafi representatives” (*idem*). This statement is preceded by an introduction into to a question: “Let’s go to the role of the United States now. We know that the attacks rather started with the US before it handed over command of the operations to NATO (*idem*). It is very clear that the in-studio anchor would like to talk about the US role and to do this she has to make reference to an action or statement by a US representative and this US representative is the unnamed Department official. One can see again that use of a statement by

an unnamed country representative can act to introduce a topic and perhaps gain viewer credibility but not from analytic viewers who will wonder who in the US made the statement. Furthermore, this citation is followed up by another citation with an unclear source: “Washington says, it was asking Gaddafi to step down” (idem). Earlier, the source cited was a US Department official and this source then becomes “Washington”. The question is whether these are the same sources. Does Washington only represent the ruling government in the White House along with the spokespersons, or are the cabinet, executive departments and agencies also included in “Washington”? It does not seem very clear and it is probably safe to say that different viewers will have different opinions. One interpretation is that Washington should represent those in power in the US and therefore any statement by Washington should be taken seriously as the statement would most probably be the predecessor to a related action. In the same interview question, the in-studio anchor refers to the “Gaddafi side” as a source, stating that “The Gaddafi side is saying this is the first step in repairing ties” (idem) but viewers are not told who on the Gaddafi “side” is being cited. The “Gaddafi side” could represent Gaddafi supporters, just as it could be Gaddafi’s spokesperson or family or even Gaddafi himself. Despite the source being unclear, the message is that Gaddafi is diplomatic and happy about “repairing ties” with the US, a tie, which through the in-studio anchor’s statement, appears to have been broken by the US.

The Press TV news video entitled *NATO violates UN decree in Libya* (2011) features the interviewee, a news wire editor, citing several countries so as to argue that there is a division within NATO: “At the same time, the NATO forces are showing divisions within its own ranks. The Dutch government said that they are going to hold their air attacks over the country. Norway has already said that August the 1<sup>st</sup> is going to be its deadline” (Press TV, July 2011). As stated earlier, when countries are cited without naming the actual source of reference, it is unclear who in the *Dutch government* or in *Norway* has actually voiced their wish to withdraw from the Libyan conflict. Therefore, analytic viewers may question the credibility of this information and passive viewers may naively not question the role of the people in the Netherlands or Norway who are being cited. Furthermore, the interviewee also states that the “US and the other Western European countries [...] gave the recognition to the Transitional National Council...at their meeting in Istanbul...” (idem) also generalising the stand point of the other Western countries but more firmly because at least the location and context of this “recognition” is stated through a meeting held in Turkey. Sharing the context of a citation gives more credibility to a statement, especially a statement that portrays some form of action or decision, therefore better representing an event and further aiding viewers in their comprehension of a news story.

The Press TV news video entitled *China slams airstrike on Libya* (March, 2011) cites China as a country in its title but then again in the headlines and finally in the introduction of the news story as such: “In Beijing, the Chinese government **continued its condemnation** of American and European airstrikes on Libya and **called for** an immediate cease-fire to end the violence” (idem). The context, Beijing, is given by the journalist before citing the government using the words “continued its condemnation”. The context firstly informs us that the journalist is most probably referring to the Chinese government and therefore the statement should be credible as it is representative of an official source. Furthermore, the citation modus “continued its condemnation” tells viewers that not only is China condemning an act, but it is renewing its condemnation or at least it has been condemning an act for some time now. Citing through powerful modus such as “condemn” communicates to viewers that a strong and powerful statement has been made against an act, so much so that the statement may be followed by some kind of action. Indeed, the journalist’s follow up citation is that the Chinese have “called for an immediate cease-fire...” (idem) and this is in fact the action taken by China in form of powerful instructions made to Americans and the Europeans behind the airstrikes on Libya. Despite the fact that the citation does not represent a named source in the Chinese government, the footage is then followed up by footage of the china’s Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson speaking in a press conference (see *Direct quotes via footage of the person speaking, relevant images...*). Journalists will sometimes make reference to statements by other organisations that are not necessarily an echo of what the journalist has interpreted and reported to their viewers, but rather, additional and perhaps complementary information. For example, in the AJE news video entitled *Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surnam air strike* (June 20, 2011), the journalist states in voice over that: “In Benghazi, more of Gaddafi’s fighters are defecting to the rebels” (idem). The message sent out that that more of Gaddafi’s fighters are joining the other side of the battle. Rather than delivering information that resonances this message through a citation, the journalist chooses to share the following: “The Opposition National Transitional Council says they travelled through Chad, which borders southern Libya, to get to them” (idem). The citation is therefore from the opposition in Libya, the National Transitional Council, therefore the source is stated as such, without going into detail of the person/rank in the organisation who has made this statement. Furthermore, the statement leaves room for the viewer to imagine who “they” in the citation refers to. It is worth looking at the journalist statements again to properly dissect the information:

**Journalist Voiceover:**

*In Benghazi, more of Gaddafi's fighters are defecting to the rebels. **The Opposition National Transitional Council** says they travelled through Chad, which borders southern Libya, to get to them.*

*(idem)*

Grammatically speaking, “they” (pronoun) should really represent a subject from the previous sentence, ‘Gaddafi’s fighters’. But ‘they’ could also represent the subject in the actual sentence, therefore meaning that representing ‘The Opposition Transitional Council’. Or ‘they’ could represent a news subject: new rebels coming into the country through Chad. It is really up to the viewer what they choose to take from this statement. In addition to these statements, the news video features a defective Libyan soldier speaking in a press conference in front of the Libyan flag.



*News Video Screenshot 70 AJE: Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)*

The soldier's Arabic discourse is interpreted into English for the benefit of AJE's non-Arabic speaking viewers. “The Gaddafi regime has lost its legitimacy and its humanitarian senses and we are here in Benghazi to put ourselves at the disposal of the NTC” (idem). This footage is not representative of the cited organisation, the NTC, because this defective soldier may not actually be accepted into the NTC even though AJE is presenting the story as though all defected soldiers of Gaddafi's forces will be automatically accepted into the NTC. The statement is not only worth sharing because it acts to echo the citation of the NTC statement by the AJE journalist, it also makes reference to “we” and therefore permits viewers to presume that the defection of this one Gaddafi soldier is not unique and there is in fact a group defection or at least numerous defections. Therefore, citing one organisation may sometimes be done in

addition to footage by someone who is not in the organisation because of the information that the speaker gives which echoes the citation made by the journalist.

In the same news video by AJE, the journalist refers to a claim by the Libyan government, as such: “And near Tripoli is what the Libyan government claims is the aftermath of another NATO airstrike killing 19 civilians, 3 of them children’ (idem). The modus term used “claims” shows a level of doubt in the journalist’s report on the Libyan government’s statement. The statement is very clear as it is packed with details: there has been a NATO airstrike, it is not the first because the journalist has stated that it is “another NATO airstrike” and finally viewers are also told that 19 civilians including 3 children have been killed. Using “killed” rather than “died” or “lost their lives” to describe the results of the airstrikes is a very clear statement by the journalist in that it was a deliberate act. Therefore, despite being careful in citing the Libyan governments “claims” the journalist defines the act of an air strike as deliberate killing. But the permission to doubt the statement by the Libyuan government is made again, when the journalist informs viewers on how the Libyan government shared their information. If we look at the journalist citation from the beginning again, one can see the use of the doubtful “claims” in relation to the follow up statement by the journalist that seems to portray a suspect government:

***Journalist Voiceover:***

*And near Tripoli is what the Libyan government claims is the aftermath of another NATO airstrike killing 19 civilians, 3 of them children.*

***Journalists were taken*** to the site of what used to be a large compound, belonging to one of Muammar Gaddafi’s top officials.

*(idem)*

The fact that journalists had to be taken by officials to the site of destruction does make the information seem unreal. Analytic viewers may ask: how come journalists or other witnesses did not notice the shelling? Why did the government officials have to take journalists to the site? Furthermore, the journalist does not actually say that this site is the remains of what was hit by NATO. Instead, the journalist simply states what is clear, that this “the site of what used to be a large compound” (idem). Furthermore, there is no apparent footage of victims being pulled out of the rubble or family mourners on the side.



News Video Screenshot 71 AJE: Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)

Libyan government, it is possible that my analysis is based on the information received in the interviews. Two journalists from F24 both stated that reporting news from the Libyan government's angle meant that journalists would be lodged in a place so that minders could keep an eye on them and they were not allowed to speak to everyone. Also, journalists would be transported by the government to specific scenes that seemed unreal or out of a movie. One journalist described the tours with the Libyan government as funny scenes that reminded them of old forms of propaganda that would sometimes include actors that would be found in other tours. The message of Gaddafi's propaganda machine has also been discussed publicly by many in addition to propaganda played out by rebels during the 2011 conflict<sup>76</sup> and based on this information, it is not surprising to see the care taken by the journalist to report the information shared by the journalist. Of course, viewers unarmed with this information may simply feel for the Libyans engulfed in a combat by Gaddafi forces, rebels and NATO. This is in fact what the news video communicates: the various battles taking place in the country.

Post footage into the compound, there is footage of the Libyan spokesperson making a statement and this is of course to represent the statement of the Libyan government.

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<sup>76</sup> For more information on Gaddafi and the rebels' propaganda machine, read: The Libyan propaganda machine by Al Jazeera English: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libyaontheline/2012/05/20125764851299935.html>, Comparing Propaganda in Libya: Qaddafi vs. the Rebels by Uri Friedman from The Atlantic: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/04/comparing-libyan-propaganda-qaddafi-vs-rebels/349520/>



News Video Screenshot 72 AJE: Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)

The spokesman speaks in perfect English: “In another crime against humanity, committed by the criminal organisation of NATO, Libyan civilian families were attacked in the early hours of this morning” (idem). This statement echoes the video title and the claim by the Libyan government that it is NATO behind the killing of civilians. The statement is both accusatory and every word seems to be deliberate with words such as:

- “another crime against humanity”: the air strikes by NATO have been described as a crime, but not just any crime, a crime against humanity. Adding “another” to “crime against humanity” very powerful states/informs that this is not the first time NATO commits a crime against humanity
- “committed by the criminal organisation NATO”: crimes are committed and that is what NATO is accused of, committing a crime. Furthermore, NATO is described as a “criminal organisation” further emphasising the “criminal act” stated earlier
- “Libyan civilian families were attacked”: Finally, the spokesman reaches out for empathy of viewers. The victims are not just civilians, which is already a big deal, but they are families. They are not just people on the streets, they are people who are loved and they had responsibilities to their families; this emphasis is very important when reaching out to the empathy of others. Also, they are Libyan. This is very important, because it shows the spokesman’s pride and wish to care for Libyans, his people. This is significant because it reveals a government that is caring of its people, very much unlike what Western organisations have communicated in the press, that the people of Libya need to be protected from their own government. AJE therefore succeeds in framing the Libyan government in a very different manner to the ways in which the Western countries and organisations have been doing so far. Of course, finally, the other word used by the spokesperson, “attacked”, reports that these Libyan civilian families were not killed by mistake, but rather that it was a deliberate attack that led to their deaths.

The deliberate use of “killing” by the journalist to represent the death of the civilians is also noted in the YouTube title posted on YouTube *Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surnam air strike* (June, 2011). But nowhere in the news video headlines is the title/citation repeated, unless the news video is played in full screen mode on YouTube, which automatically places the video title at the top of the news video. Looking at screenshots of the news video below, one can take note of this absence of the video title from the headline, even when the report turns to the topic represented in the title:

 <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>	 <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>
<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p> <p>0:04 Journalist voiceover: “Battles between rebels and fighters to Muammar Gaddafi”.</p>	<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p> <p>0:21 <b>Ibrahim Daghsh, Misrata Resident (Translated into English from Arabic for the Al Jazeera English report.)</b> There were 5 kids, two girls, and a mother having dinner when the rockets hit them. Their father is on the front line. He was fighting.</p>
 <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>	 <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>
<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p> <p>0:38 <b>Mohame Ahmed Saleh, Defecting Libyan Soldier (Translated into English from Arabic for the Al Jazeera English report.)</b> The Gaddafi regime has lost its legitimacy and its humanitarian senses and we are here in Benghazi to put ourselves at the disposal of the NTC.</p>	<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p> <p>1:16 <b>Moussa Ibrahim, Libyan Government Spokesman</b> In another crime against humanity, committed by the criminal organisation of NATO, Libyan civilian families were attacked in the early hours of this morning.</p>
 <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>	 <p>...strike will greatly degrade the Gaddafi regime's forces' ability to carry on their barbaric assault against the Libyan people.”</p> <p><b>CHARLES BOUCHARD</b> NATO'S LIBYA COMMANDER</p> <p><b>BATTLE FOR LIBYA</b> HEAVY FIGHTING AND CIVILIAN DEATHS</p>
<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p>	<p>Libya: Nato 'killed 19 civilians' in Surman air strike</p>

<p>1:30 <b>Journalist Voiceover:</b> The government claims this child was (zoom on badly hurt child laying on a hospital bed) wounded in the attack.</p>	<p>1:44 <b>Journalis Voicover:</b> NATO released a statement saying it had bombed a “legitimate military target- on a command and control node...strike will greatly degrade the Gaddafi regime’s forces’ ability to carry on their barbaric assault against the Libyan people.” (Charles Bouchard NATO’s Libya Commander).</p>
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*News Video Screenshot 73 AJE: Libya: Nato ‘killed 19 civilians’ in Surnam air strike (June 20, 2011)*

The constant headline: BATTLE FOR LIBYA... does not at all represent the news video subject. The headline uses the words “for Libya” giving the connotation that all these 3 factions are fighting in Libya for the benefit of the country. A second connotation could be that the three factions are fight for “control” over Libya. Even when the spokesman accuses NATO, the headline makes no reference to NATO and finally even when NATO is quoted for having bombed Libya, there is no headline referring to NATO. The fact that three main stories are shared in the news story with citations from the residents, the government, the NTC and NATO and the headlines do not reflect this can be somewhat confusing to viewers.

The news video makes reference once again to the government 1minute and 30 seconds into the news video by stating: “Journalists were led to a nearby hospital where corpses had been laid out. The government claims this child was (zoom on badly hurt child laying on a hospital bed) wounded in the attack” (idem). Again, the journalist uses the words “claims” to represent the words of the government, showing distrust or at least not fully trusting the words of the government. Furthermore, AJE has again indicated that “journalists were led” to the location of the victim. The journalist even states that “corpses had been laid out” in the nearby hospital, as though they were laid out deliberately as proof for the journalists to see. The footage of the injured boy is proof that he has been hurt, and there is even a zoom into the boy’s wounds but again the journalist makes reference to her source: “The government claims this child was (zoom on badly hurt child laying on a hospital bed) wounded in the attack” (idem), rather than simply stating: “This boy was wounded in the attack”. It is therefore clear that when there is an element of distrust between journalists and organisations cited, the journalists will have to present the information cited in a very careful manner by citing the source and using terms such as “claims” to portray that the statement could not be verified.

The statement by NATO’s Libya Commander is followed up by a general statement from NATO, which confirms the headline of the news video: “But they [NATO] also acknowledged on Sunday that the death of civilians in an earlier attack may have been the result of a system failure that knocked one of their missiles off course” (idem). This is a general NATO statement, therefore viewers are unsure if it is the NATO Libyan commander who has actually made this statement or if it is an official NATO statement. However, it seems to be official despite not being a direct quote. It is a citation that proves that NATO did in fact attack civilians despite it

being non-deliberate. The journalist is very vague about this statement despite it being the key to the quotation made in the news video title and despite it being the answer to the accusations put forth by the Libyan government's spokesman. There is an "acknowledgement" and therefore this is cited. But the acknowledgement is very vague: "the death of civilians in an earlier attack may have been the result of a system failure that knocked one of their missiles off course" (idem). Already, the words "killing" or "attacked" have been replaced with "death of civilians" that are no longer family or Libyan or even numbered, therefore making the victims and their deaths seem less significant. Also, the reference is made to "an earlier attack", with no specific information if this is indeed the attack referred to by the news video from the news title and the spokesperson's accusation. Therefore we are uncertain of the acknowledgement that NATO has made. Moreover, in her citation, the journalist states that this earlier attack "may have been the result of...", telling viewers again that it is unsure. Using modals like "may" represent an uncertainty in the message being stated therefore protecting the speaker if the information turns out to be false but also stating that the speaker would not like to argue if the information is true or not, therefore appearing very diplomatic. Finally, the reason for the "death of civilians" is given: "the result of a system failure that knocked one of their missiles off course" (idem). Firstly, it is clear that this reason is just a "maybe" and secondly it was not an official deliberate action by NATO. Also, it is interesting that the journalist has cited NATO's "acknowledgement" rather than "apology". One could expect "maybe" mistakes to be presented with "apologies" or at least "maybe apologies".

The AJE news video entitled *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)* identifies a citation by Syria's "rebel leaders". The journalist states: "It's not the first time that the Syrian president **has been accused** of deploying chemical weapons. In March, **rebel leaders said** 25 people were killed in an attack on a village outside Aleppo" (idem). Initially, the journalist uses a passive voice to state that the Syrian president has been accused of deploying weapons, without actually stating the source of accusation. But the follow up statement points the finger at the rebel leaders stating clearly that "rebel leaders said 25 people were killed in an attack..." (idem). Viewers can presume that "an attack" is made in reference to a *chemical* attack, but this cannot be certain. As the journalist reports this citation, footage featured is from the Syrian State TV channel and it shows people in a hospital-like setting being attended to and others being boarded onto an ambulance. It is somewhat strange to see that the footage used to back up the rebel citation is provided by the regime, in opposition to the rebels and the footage actually features medicals attending to victims.



*News Video Screenshot 74 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

It is not clear however, if the footage represents victims suffering from a chemical attack. Perhaps yes, because the personnel are wearing masks, but no one is actually seen foaming at the mouth as in the amateur footage shown earlier. The statement by the “rebel leaders” is not directly referenced as viewers are not informed on the actual people behind the accusations and footage of the rebels making the accusations is unfeatured. Also, the exact signification of “rebel leaders” is not explained to viewers not very savvy on the conflict in Syria. Even viewers who are savvy on the conflict in Syria are not able to understand “which” rebels are being referred to. This therefore makes the story appear very ambiguous and unclear in the minds of viewers.

Interestingly, the follow up footage, which does actually support the rebel statement is from the US defence secretary. The statement: “We cannot confirm the origin of these weapons but we do believe that any **use of chemical weapons in Syria would very likely have originated with the Assad regime**” (idem), is in clear support of the rebel statement and therefore shows the alliance between the US government and that of the rebels. Furthermore, the footage features Chuck Hagel himself speaking and therefore builds a mental image in the mind of viewers the US is supportive of the rebels and against the Syrian regime:



News Video Screenshot 75 AJE: *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

The footage first introduces the US defence secretary and then re-cites the Syrian government’s denial, whilst the defence secretary reverberates the accusation.

The AJE news video entitled *UN official calls Syria conflict ‘civil war’ (June 12, 2013)* features amateur footage of weapons being fired so that viewers can hear weapons being fired in the distance, whilst making reference to a statement by the UN.



UN official calls Syria conflict ‘civil war’

News Video Screenshot 76 AJE: *UN official calls Syria conflict ‘civil war’ (June 12, 2013)*

On voiceover, the journalist states “Syrian forces in attack mode, surrounding opposition strongholds and **according to the UN** using helicopters against civilians” (idem). The UN is cited for stating that Syrian forces have been using helicopters against civilians. It is clear that the footage is not from AJE and therefore one can presume that AJE was not on location and as the video was sourced from an amateur/activist videographer, it is necessary for the journalist to cite their source of information regarding the use of helicopters on civilians. The organisation is cited rather than a person in the organisation because the UN was on location at the time as a team and therefore one person’s account in the UN should really represent the UN statement. Furthermore, the journalist cites the Red Cross, “The fighting is so bad, **the Red Cross says it** can’t get to all the people in need” (idem). This statement supports that of the UN further constructing the story that explains why a “civil war” has been declared. As the footage changes to show another location that includes fighting, this time footage shared by the UN, the journalist cites the UN again.



UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war'

*News Video Screenshot 77 AJE: UN official calls Syria conflict 'civil war' (June 12, 2013)*

The journalist states: “Today, the **UN has consistently warned** that Syria was on the brink of a full-scale civil war, but **avoided using the words**. On Tuesday, when the head of UN peacekeeping was asked if Syria was now there, **he replied “Yes”**. **His spokesperson confirmed** that the conflict had shifted [end of UN video]”. The citation of the UN statement is made in form of a “consistent warning” so as to show that this labelling is not surprising and that the international community had been warned of what to expect. It is interesting that the journalist makes an un-citation next: “...but avoided using the words [civil war]” (see section 10 for analysis on un-citations, include “avoided” analysis in un-citation). And the follow-up statement further identifies the sources within the UN; therefore the identified citations are analysed in section 2, see *Direct of in-direct quotes*.

The AJE news video entitled *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)* features a citation from the Egyptian military. Its significance is explained by the journalist as she introduces the statement: "...the military issued its first political statement since the crisis began two weeks ago. It said..." (idem). The citation is made just after the journalist has described tense moments in Egypt that called for the republican guard to build barriers so as to stop protesters from getting closer to the presidential palace. The journalist's statement is not supported by the footage broadcast of Egypt's streets, as they appear to be calm with a few passers-by and one tank depicting soldiers who only appear to be standing guard.



Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree

News Video Screenshot 78 AJE: *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)*

It is perhaps for this reason that the news video then features a quote from the Egyptian military, whilst also featuring the quote on the screen for viewers to read along. The quote appears to be a direct one, especially because it is placed on the backdrop of the Egyptian flag, but in fact the name of the person in the Egyptian military and their ranking is not shared, therefore it is the organisation that has been quoted.



Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree

News Video Screenshot 79 AJE: *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)*

The journalist reads the Egyptian military's statement out loud as it is displayed for viewers to also read: "It said: Dialogue is the best and only way to consensus in the interests of the nation and its citizens, otherwise we will be driven into a dark tunnel of disastrous consequences, which will not be allowed" (*idem*). The quotation read out word for word and featured on a backdrop of the Egyptian flag along with the organisation being cited makes the statement appear very official. There is also a sense that the Egyptian military is united, unlike the country. The statement by the military also shares a sense of calm and control by the Egyptian army, further broadcasting the ability for the Egyptian military to keep calm in the country.

Another AJE news video, which seems to be a follow up and even reiteration of the video just described recycles much of the content so as to be presented in a slightly different manner, using the same journalist and even some of the same citations. The news video entitled *Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead* (December, 2012) features the journalist introducing the same military statement, with the same introduction:

*All this as the military issued its first political statement since the crisis began two weeks ago. It said:*

*"Dialogue is the best and only way to consensus in the interests of the nation and its citizens, otherwise we will be driven into a dark tunnel of disastrous consequences, which will not be allowed". (Quote by Egyptian Military)*

*AJE, Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead, December, 2012*

The statement is shared over the same backdrop of the Egyptian flag along with the quote to be read by viewers, just as in the previous video, *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree* (December, 2012). AJE is representing the Egyptian military in the same limelight, yet again appearing as being united, in control and instilling peace in the society.

Another AJE news video, using much of the same content as the just described one, entitled *Morsi called for constitution to move ahead (December 8, 2012)* features a citation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the journalist:

***Journalist voiceover:***

***Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood criticised the boycott. They called press conferences to accuse the opposition of not being interested in finding a political solution.***

*(idem)*

The citation informs viewers that the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood have criticised a boycott. It is not clear what the boycott represents but viewers may presume that it was a boycott by an opposition party because the next statement states that the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood held a press conference with the objective of accusing the opposition of not trying to find a solution. It is somewhat unclear why AJE has decided to present the Muslim Brotherhood without reminding viewers that it is the ruling party in Egypt and that the president specifically represents this party. Stating the organisation without naming the people in the organisation and the significance of the organisation gives a very ambiguous representation of the events in Egypt, especially to viewers in the west who may identify “Muslim” parties as being “Islamist”, extreme and certainly not “legally” in power, which is not the case for the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012. What is clear about this news video is that it is a cut and paste of different clips from various other clips. Therefore the editorial line is somewhat confusing. Following the citation by the journalist of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, footage of a ‘Supreme Guide’ from the Muslim Brotherhood, speaking in conference is featured.



Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead

*News Video Screenshot 80 AJE: Morsi called for constitution to move ahead (December 8, 2012)*

The footage introduced the speaker’s name and his role as the ‘Supreme Guide’ in the Muslim Brotherhood and although he is introduced, one can note from his dialogue that he actually cites the organisation he represents, as a unified group, rather than naming the people behind the citation:

***Mohamed Badie Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Translated from Arabic into English for the Al Jazeera English Report***

***The Muslim Brotherhood has adopted dialogue as the only way to deal with all opposition. But what has been happening on the streets is not the legitimate opposition, it is not a difference of opinion but corruption and criminality.***

(idem)

This statement by the ‘Supreme Guide’ shows that news videos can also feature people citing themselves, or at least the organisations they present, so as to clarify the organisation policy. This policy is cited using the verb “adopted”. Indeed, it appears very official and formal, but it also portrays a sense of unity in the party.

The journalist concludes the news video citing the opposition as such:

***Journalist Voiceover:***

***Opposition leaders say they are ready to talk but insist the president must delay next week’s referendum if he is serious about his willingness to amend the constitution. As the deadlock continues, Egypt’s political future is looking more and more uncertain.***

(idem)

This citation makes reference to “opposition leaders”, without necessarily station which opposition parties and which leaders are willing to talk with the president’s party. This represents the opposition as unified, when perhaps they may not be. Also it does not clarify who the leading opposition parties in Egypt are in 2012. The journalist also states the opposition leaders “insist” that the president must delay the referendum. The citation modus “insist” shows again that the opposition is unified against the president. But the news video has not yet explained what the referendum is for and its relationship with the constitution. Therefore, the main message communicated in this video through such citations is that there is a gap between the ruling and non-ruling parties, with regards to a referendum and the modification of the constitution. But the actual details are not given, leaving the political context in Egypt somewhat inaccessible by people based outside of Egypt.

The Euronews news video entitled *Jubilant Libyan fighters parade Gaddafi’s body* (October, 2011), features citations representing various members of the National Transitional Council and the rebels in Libya without giving their names. The reportage highlights the death of Gaddafi and looks into the possible causes of death; in order to share the varying accounts, the journalist uses citations.

***The National Transitional Council says he was caught in a gun fight between his supporters and government fighters and died from a bullet to the head. But one source from the ruling body is being quoted as saying he was killed by his captors. [End of footage from Misrata al Hurra]. There are other claims that Gaddafi, already injured in the NATO strike, was shot by one of his own guard. Another said he bled to death in an ambulance.***

(idem)

Most of the sources cited seem to represent the words of the NTC: the “National Transitional Council” and “one source from the ruling body”. But reference is also made to “there are other claims” and “another said”, therefore we are unsure if these claims are from the NTC or otherwise. Although the NTC is an organisation, varying statements represent that there is no unified and official statement from the NTC. No one is named and this may be because the journalist wants to protect the identity of those who claim they bore witness to the death of Gaddafi.

The Euronews news video entitled *Coalition allies continue Libya air strikes* (March, 2011), the journalist cites several country statements using both direct and indirect quotes.

*Libyan officials say at least 48 people have been killed in the strikes, which began on Saturday. There has been **no independent confirmation** of the death toll. But **British defence minister Liam Fox** said the coalition was only hitting military targets. **He added**, the weaponry used was designed to minimise civilian casualties. **Russia, which abstained** in the key Security Council vote, **has called** on the allies to stop the non-selective use of force in Libya. It's the west's biggest military intervention in the Arab world, since the US led invasion of Iraq 8 years ago. **Gaddafi has accused** Britain, France and the United States of terrorism and **warned that** his country would fight a long war to repel their attacks. But in the eastern town of Benghazi, these **rebels welcomed** the allies' intervention against Gaddafi's forces.*

(idem)

Libyan officials, although unnamed, are quoted so as to be able to share the number of deaths due to the airstrikes. But this statement is immediately declared as unreliable because of the un-citation by independent sources on the matter: “no independent confirmation of death toll” (idem). Furthermore, the British defence minister Liam Fox is quoted directly for stating that “the coalition was only hitting military targets” and that the weapons used were designed “to minimise civilian casualties”, therefore also destroying any credibility in the Libyan officials' statement. Russia is also cited for instructing or “calling on” the allies to stop military intervention in Libya and this statement's significance is also reduced with the un-citation that the Russians “abstained” from voting in the UN Security Council on the matter. Finally, the journalist returns to the Libyan perspective by quoting Gaddafi for accusing the coalition of terrorism, and warning that their fight would be long (idem). But this statement's significance is immediately killed off by quoting the rebels for “welcoming” the allies' intervention against

Gaddafi's forces. The citation of several countries in this report acts to represent the Libyan intervention through various angles. For each point shared, the story is first told from the view point of the Gaddafi regime and this view point is made insignificant by a follow up statement from the rebels and/or the coalition.

### *Citations of the Press*

It was noticed that journalists would sometimes make references to statements by other press so as to analyse top stories or at least share the viewpoints of the different press.

For example, the news video by France 24, entitled *Egypt, One day on (July 4, 2013)* is an in-studio video that showcases a programme whereby two in-studio journalists analyse the way in which the headlines have been covered by various media. The anchor tells us that "...all press outlets everywhere in the world have been talking about Egypt" (idem) therefore introducing the headline to be critiqued by her fellow media correspondent in the studio. This introduction does not tell us which news outlets have been talking about Egypt, nor does it inform us what exactly is being said about Egypt, but it serves to tell viewers that the media correspondent will be giving this information. To specify this news video was aired in July 2013 just after the elected Egyptian President Morsi was toppled from government. Indeed, the media correspondent shares the viewpoint of the Time magazine through an image which serves as a visual aid to his statement: "This is the front page of Time Magazine. That has been shared quite a lot around social media over the last 24hours, because **the headline is** "The most important man in the Middle East" (idem).



News Video Screenshot 81 F24: *Egypt, One day on (July 4, 2013)*

The correspondent also shares the viewpoint of the Economist with a few words of interpretation “If you move on, to the Economist, they’re a bit more, I suppose, in the moment, Egypt’s tragedy [image below displayed] and they say that **they were delighted** that after 30 years of dictatorship, Egypt was on its way to becoming a democracy and so they **look at the events** of the last three days as ....” (idem).



News Video Screenshot 82 F24: Egypt, One day on (July 4, 2013)

Again, an image of the headline of the printed press is displayed as a visual aid to the correspondent’s presentation of their headline. Furthermore, the correspondent states The Economist’s view point, whilst comparing it to other European and global press, without necessarily giving names: “They **are against** the coup and in fact, it was very interesting to look at some of the front pages across the European and global press because it was either **being called** a revolution or it was being called a coup” (idem). The significant aspect of Morsi’s downfall in terms of the news according to this message is that some press refer to it as a revolution whilst others refer to it as a coup; in other words it was either a success or a failure to Egypt.

The in-studio anchor also quotes the press in reference to the Egyptian coverage, whilst sharing her interpretation: “I saw the BBC was **leading today** with ‘a new dawn for Egypt’, which sounds quite positive, doesn’t it?” (idem). With regards to this “quote” there is no image to back up the anchor’s statement and the correspondent does not comment on it. Instead, the programme turns into a casual discussion, whereby the correspondent also shares his interpretation for Le Monde’s coverage: “Le Monde ... **was talking** about a revolution on its headline, and then in the editorial, on the front page editorial, it was talking about a coup. So,

it seems that no one **seems to be able to decide** exactly what it was” (idem). This reference to Le Monde is not shared with text or images from the actual Le Monde publication either.

In the same F24 news video, the correspondent refers to Turkish press stating:

The following words/expressions were found to be used by journalists to refer to statements or viewpoints of other media: “I’ll move to the Turkish, English language newspaper and the whole question of Islam, is it compatible with democracy”? (idem). In fact, the name of the newspaper is not shared, but a small image of the article they published online is featured as such:



News Video Screenshot 83 F24: Egypt, One day on (July 4, 2013)

The article itself is not really critiqued by the journalist. Instead, the reference to the article published by the Turkish English newspaper, is used so as to introduce the politics of Turkey, whereby the correspondent states: “The Turks are looking to Egypt, they’re looking to their own government, which is political Islam as well” (idem). The journalist seems to be paraphrasing the article when he says: “And an interesting comment. They’re saying, actually, in some ways, what we saw in Egypt, Morsi was as bad as Mubarak, so it’s not necessarily the same thing with Turkey. That the predecessors who were secular were just as bad in some respects” (idem). The expression “they’re saying” seems to represent the Turkish newspaper and his interpretation is followed by “in some ways”, telling us that this is not an exact interpretation, but only a partial one.

One news story by Press TV, entitled *US, biggest loser in Bahrain uprising (August 6, 2011)* makes reference to the media without actually disclosing their source: “A news report has revealed that a military pact between the US and Bahrain has been extended until 2016” (Press TV, August 2011). This statement by the Press TV in-studio anchor informs us that a military pact between the US and Bahrain has been extended; therefore this military pact is not new. In

order to share this information as journalists, the channel has to make reference to their source and despite the pact being one between two nations, Press TV does not have an official State source and therefore they are obliged to make reference to some other kind of source. The source in this case is “a news report” but we are not given details as to when this news report was published and by whom it was published, therefore parts of the story are missing. For example, if the source was unreliable then the news would not be considered credible by some viewers. The second news anchor then develops on the news report: “the report says that the extension took place as early as 2002” (idem). It is quite strange that this is making the news in 2011 up to 9 years after the extension took place. Reference to another news report is then made along with an interpretation of the report: “Meanwhile, the Washington Post reports that Bush and the Bahraini regime secretly signed the contract to 2016 back in 2001.” (idem). This statement by the Washington Post explains why it is newsworthy in 2011- the 2001 extension was done in secret and the secret has just been revealed to the public. Press TV further interprets the Washington Post report by emphasising that “The contract was already prolonged until 2011 in 2001” (idem).

The news video published by Press TV on July 2013: *Egypt may be headed for civil war* showcases an interviewee making reference to Press TV journalists in a citation. The interviewee is giving his opinion on the downfall of Morsi and states: “So, we’re just going to have to see, but it’s, as your excellent reporters are saying, I think it’s caught us all nearly in a condition of shock, and where it’s gonna lead, we’re just gonna have to wait and see” (idem). The interviewee actually compliments the Press TV journalists saying that they are “excellent” and agreeing with them that the removal of Morsi from office was “shocking” and the future is unclear. This complement shows a good relationship between the interviewee and the channel that is interviewing him. On the one hand some viewers would respect the channel further to hear this “expert” commending the channel. But on the other hand, some viewers would find this apparent relationship between the channel and the interviewee unacceptable, given then journalism should be about sharing all angles of the story, rather than shared angles of the story. Of course, these possible reactions to the complementing of the journalists cannot be generalised as they most probably depend on the actual spectators.

In the same news video by Press TV (July, 2013), the interviewee makes reference to the News York Times as such: “There’s argument today in the New York Times, David Brooks, a Zionist was saying: “Oh the Egyptian people, they can’t have democracy, they’re not ready, because” ...and he uses this word “they don’t have the mental capacity” (idem). The source is: “the New York Times, David Brooks, a Zionist”. This introduction is qualitative as it actually describes the person. Once the person is cited, the interviewee then blasts the citation criticising it as such: “...that’s an outrageous statement” (idem), but then carries on to apply it to the Egyptian army:

“...but I think who may not have the capacity for a democracy is SCAF, the Supreme Armed Forced Council” (idem). This is a strange use of a citation; first the interviewee cites, then he criticises the citation, then he applies it. It seems as though he is defending himself for using it by blasting the citation before using it.

The Press TV news video entitled *China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)* makes reference to other press publications to build their news report on China’s discontent with the airstrikes on Libya. For example, the journalist states:

*The day before the mouthpiece of China’s ruling Communist Party, The People’s Daily, ran a strident editorial condemning the airstrikes. The newspaper likened the assault on Libya to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, warning that armed action to end crises in sovereign, ran contrary to international law.*

(idem)

The context of the media citation is given when the journalist states the source and time of publication of what is being cited: “The day before” is in reference to the fact that the article was published one day before China’s spokesperson condemned the US airstrikes, in a press conference. This shows that the Chinese press, representing of the government, had already begun condemning the airstrikes, one day before coming public with an official statement. Furthermore, the title of the newspaper is given, *The People’s Daily* and it is represented with significant information as the “mouthpiece of China”, but not only the mouthpiece of China, but the mouthpiece of China’s ruling party and also goes so far as to inform audiences that the ruling party is “communist”. Therefore, in this case, Press TV has chosen to do a detailed presentation on the publication before they cite it. This decision certainly gives information to viewers on the ruling government in China and the fact that its press acts as a mouth piece. Having said this, the journalist also states that the publication “ran a strident editorial condemning the airstrikes” (idem). This statement qualifies the article as being very high-pitched in its condemnation further emphasising the stance of the publication. As this citation is presented by the journalist on voice-over, the news video features an article on the website [www.people.com.cn](http://www.people.com.cn) in Chinese, which is the website of *The People’s Daily*. As the article is not in English, viewers will only see what appears to be text in Chinese that is representative of the article presented by the journalist. This therefore acts so as to create a mental image of the citation, which comes from a website with the English words: people.com.cn posted.



*News Video Screenshot 84 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)*


As the journalist goes on describing the article, “The newspaper likened the assault on Libya to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq” (idem), further citing the article, the news video features scenes of destruction in Libya, so as to emphasise the state of destruction in the country post-airstrikes.



*News Video Screenshot 85 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)*

The Press TV news video (March, 2011) also makes reference to China’s Global Times so as to put forth an opinion on the reason for which western the no-fly zone is advocated by some countries. The journalist states: “The idea that western countries were using humanitarianism as an excuse to use force to further their own interests **was repeated** by the state-controlled Global Times. In an editorial, the English-language newspaper said China should unite

countries opposed to the airstrikes” (Press TV, March 2011). The citation in this case is raised as an “idea” before stating that this idea “was repeated” by state-controlled Global Times. In addition, this information is given in voice-over footage of the publication in English, which highlights a line representative of the citation “military intervention under the banner of humanitarianism” (idem).



News Video Screenshot 86 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)

“Was repeated” is used to argue a point introduced by Press TV whilst showing that other press also share this opinion/analysis/sources on the information being reported.

The Euronews news video *Violent chaos stalks the streets of Cairo (July 16, 2013)* features a direct citation by the channel’s journalist of the channel’s correspondent. As Euronews tends to work with correspondents based all over the world, news packages are recorded over by local Euronews journalists so as to adapt the news to the language and culture of their Euronews viewers. These packages usually end with the journalist leaving the correspondent to conclude. In this particular news video, the journalist, speaking in voice over introduces the direct quote of the correspondent as such: “Our correspondent in Cairo witnessed the violence” (idem). Footage of the correspondent speaking in Arabic is featured by the news channel.



Violent chaos stalks the streets of Cairo

News Video Screenshot 87 Euronews: Violent chaos stalks the streets of Cairo (July 16, 2013)

***Mohammed Shaikhibrahim, Euronews correspondent, speaking in Arabic [translated into English for the purpose of the Euronews English report]:***  
*"It looks like the final card in the Muslim Brotherhood's hand has now been played. It complicates things and puts the security and political situation back to square one."*

*(idem)*

The entire statement by the correspondent is translated into English, except for the correspondent's name at the end of the footage. This is also a form of direct quote and is also a citation by a journalist facing the camera.

The Euronews news video entitled *Coalition strike Gaddafi towns Libyan State TV* (April, 2011) cites Libyan State TV both in its YouTube title and then again in the introduction of the news video.

***Coalition forces have bombed two towns close to Libya's capital of Tripoli according to Libyan state television. The report said civilian and military areas had been hit and quoted a senior Libyan military official. The official said planes attacked the towns of Al-Khoum, 100 kilometres to the east of Tripoli, and Arrujban, which is some 200 kilometres southwest of the capital.***

*(idem)*

Libyan State TV is quoted using the citation modus "according to" after broadcasting the information being cited. Libyan State TV is quoted again using "The report said..." and then quotes the source of the State TV, "a senior Libyan military official" and then "The official said..." (idem). Whilst this report quotes other press, it is also in essence quoting a Libyan official without making reference to his name. The citations are used so as to report the

repercussions of the coalition bombing. As the media they are citing is State media, it should be sharing official information as shared by the Gaddafi regime. The news report does not cite the coalition despite the coalition being in charge of the bombs.

### *Mock Citations*

In the F24 news video entitled *Egypt, One Day On* (2013), as the journalist presents The Time's headline on Morsi one year before being toppled, which states "The most important man in the Middle East", he then ironically states with a smile: "So **that changed pretty quickly** and I suppose you can't really blame Time for that, because things really did turn around so quickly in the last 12 months in Egypt, but **I suppose it doesn't really flatter them at this point in time**" (idem). Indeed, one year later, this has changed, Morsi is no longer the most important man, and in fact he no longer has any power. Interestingly though, the correspondent does not refer to what the Time magazine states about the situation in Egypt or Morsi now that he has been toppled from government. Instead, there is only a focus on the fact that Time did not expect Morsi's power to disappear one year later. This of course tells viewers that Morsi has certainly been toppled and no longer has any influence in the country or region.

In the same news video, the correspondent makes reference to a statement by France's former president Francois Hollande to share a verbal typo in a mocking tone. The correspondent introduces the topic as such "...shall we take a listen to a little boo-boo that François Hollande made in Tunis today? He was being asked a question by the Press core about Egypt. I stress *Egypt*. Let's take a listen" (idem). A video then features the former president addressing a press conference in French, whereby his words are interpreted on voiceover: "France has taken note of what's happened in Tunisia. I'm sorry, I have also taken note of the situation in Tunisia, which itself is undergoing democratic transition" (idem). After showing the clip, the correspondent even offers advice to Hollande: "for somebody in a pretty important diplomatic role, it's better not to mix up countries in that way" (idem). This friendly and informal advice offered to the French president seems to show disrespect to the leader and further mock him in front of the F24 spectators in an almost deliberate way that sends a negative image about the leader.

Our analysis led us to some specific words that were used when quoting or referring to someone's statements sarcastically or ironically so as to mock the person/organisation/country being quoted. Such words/expression guide the viewer to distrust the person/organisation/country being cited.

### *Citing behaviours/feelings*

The Press TV news video entitled *African Union suspends Egypt (July 5, 2013)*, features the journalist expressing the sentiments of Egypt via her own words and then with the actual words of an Egyptian official: “Cairo had hoped that the African Union would treat the current situation in Egypt as a continuation of country’s 2011 Revolution that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak” (Press TV, July 2013). After the journalist’s words, further emphasis on the Egyptian point of view is shared with direct footage of the Egyptian ambassador to Ethiopia stating: “Egypt as always supportive in all fields of development, of governance, of ...in all ways...and will continue to be part of this family. This decision is not, whatever it’s going to be, will not affect the Egyptian African identity and the Egyptian African commitment”. As can be noted below, the name of the ambassador as well as the title of the ambassador are included on the screen for viewers to see. This information is included between the event logo, which features EGYPT COUP in bold upper-case on a yellow backdrop and the Press TV logo.



*News Video Screenshot 88 Press TV: African Union suspends Egypt (July 5, 2013)*

The Press TV news video, *Egypt may be headed for civil war (July, 2013)* features a citation referring to President Obama’s feelings towards Morsi in an interview with an ‘expert’. The interviewee gives some information on Morsi and then states: “Obama likes him and the establishment seems to like him, so there’s that aspect” (idem). The interviewee is analysing the place of Morsi in Egyptian politics despite being ousted. He is therefore stating that the fact that Obama and the US government like Morsi, there is a possible influence on the future of Morsi. This is a reminder of the US place and influence in world or at least Middle East conflicts. This is obviously not a direct quote, but rather a citation with regards to Obama’s feelings towards another person. Interestingly, the interviewee is referring to the US government as “the establishment”. Use of “the establishment” according to Wikipedia “generally denotes a dominant group or elite that holds power or authority in a nation or organisation” (Wikipedia 2018). Furthermore, “the establishment may be a closed social group

which selects its own members or specific entrenched elite structures” (idem). There is this idea of exclusivism and being elite and above all others. The choice of words by the interviewee shows that he believes and wishes to communicate that the Obama government is elite, exclusive, and unapproachable.

The same news video, *Egypt may be headed for civil war* (July, 2013) also features the journalist explaining the violence in Egypt post-Morsi’s ousting and the journalist concludes with “Certainly, that wouldn’t have been the kind of conclusion the military would’ve wanted”, and leaves the interviewee to respond with his expertise. The journalist is interpreting the military’s feelings towards the situation and asking his expert to share his opinion on his statement. Having said that he begins his statement with “certainly” as if to state this is an almost sure interpretation of the military’s views towards the violence. It is somewhat used to lead the interviewee in his answer.

In order to share the statements by organisations or countries, the press can also cite their voting patterns. Making reference to an official vote is used so as to not simply cite a statement, but rather a loud statement which is in fact an action with consequences. The Press TV news video *China slams US led airstrike on Libya* (March 22, 2011) features the journalist speaking to the camera, while citing the UN vote:

*When the United Nations Security Council, last week, **voted on a no fly zone over Libya and the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians against the forces of Colonel Gaddafi, China was one of five members to abstain** and they say was the first time that China, a permanent and veto-wielding member of the Security Council **had departed** from its normally rigid role of non-interference with other countries’ internal affairs (idem).*

The UN Security Council vote is basically a citation on an agreed statement amongst voters in the UN Security Council members. The journalist also explains that China abstained from voting, and this too is a form of citation in that an abstention from a vote basically states that one does not want to vote for but does not want to vote against either. This citation of abstention extends to five members on the UN, which are not named, perhaps because the focus is on China, which is also reported to have “departed” from its normal voting rhythm. The use of the word “departed” cites a change in statements made leading to votes in the UN Security Council by China (see *Un-citations to share what is deliberately unsaid...*). Although the countries have been cited in this case without reference to the actual person voting, it is not of importance, because any vote in the UN Security Council is an official vote that represents the country’s

official government, and therefore such citations do not add any additional information by referring to the actual person who votes on behalf of a nation.



News Video Screenshot 89 Press TV: China slams US led airstrike on Libya (March 22, 2011)

The above screenshot features the Press TV journalist speaking to viewers with the background of the Chinese flag and the words *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* on a board behind him. The headline, *China on Libya Airstrikes* further affirms the highlight of the news video.

The AJE news video entitled *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons* (April 26, 2013) cites a feeling in the title itself, which reflects an assumption by AJE. The citation: “Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons” shows the general feeling, which is “suspicions”, which is in relation to chemical weapons in Syria. The feeling of suspicion is not accredited to any particular source, at least not in the title, therefore viewers cannot tell who is feeling suspicious about chemical weapons in Syria just from the title alone. But the news video itself reports a news story which builds the feeling on suspicion in many people/countries/organisations and it is probably for this reason that the title does not elaborate on the source of suspicious feelings. Further into the news video, feelings are again cited several times. For example, the journalist makes reference to hospital staff to cite that there are “overcome by the gas...” (idem). The journalist speaks over amateur footage of people who appear to be suffering from the use of chemical weapons and medical personnel can be seen attending to the victims. The journalist states that “Among the casualties, rescuers and hospital staff **overcome by the gas**, all displaying evidence of what medical experts at the scene described as typical of nerve agent poisoning” (AJE, April 26 2013). The footage does look overwhelming; people are foaming at the mouth and appear to be suffering. The journalist has decided to cite the feelings of the

medical personnel, so as to show that nerve gases are not discriminative in who they affect. It is not clear if “overcome” refers to effects of the gas on the personnel or if it is the effect of watching people suffer before your eyes. Either way, it communicates a state of shock and panic in the medical facility and it is probably for this reason that the journalist decided to cite this feeling.

The AJE journalist in the same news video also attempts to analyse and then cite the feelings and behaviour of Obama with regards to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. After first featuring a year old footage of the US president stating that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a “red line” for the US, the journalist then offers their own interpretation in form of a citation: “President Obama **wants to avoid** military action in Syria. **He believes** it would be difficult, bloody and with no unified opposition, it would be hard to plan for a political aftermath. With the intelligence assessments that chemical weapons have been used **takes him a step closer** to when the US will get involved” (idem). The journalist first explains what Obama wants: to avoid getting involved militarily in Syria. Then, the journalist interprets Obama’s belief that a military action would be “difficult, bloody”, further informing viewers that there is “no unified opposition” (ie in Syria) so “it would be hard to plan for a political aftermath” (idem).



Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons

*News Video Screenshot 90 AJE: Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons (April 26, 2013)*

The footage of the various rebels depict what the journalist has described: “difficult...no unified position” and perhaps also dangerously messy. The purpose of this final citation that interprets the behaviour or feelings of the US president for their viewers serves to interpret the significance of the news story –the use of chemical weapons- to the US plan of action, whilst also concluding the news report by giving an insight into the rebels as well. Therefore, another usage of citing behaviours has been found through this video: providing an interpretation in form of a conclusion to a complicated news story.

The press can also define a behaviour or attitude by citing an analyst's expert opinion. For example, the AJE news video entitled *Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead* (December, 8 2012) features the journalist in voice over stating: “**According to one analyst**, the Brotherhood's tone is getting increasingly defensive” (idem). She uses the citation modus: “according to” so as to show that she is simply reporting and not reaching to conclusions on her own. Furthermore, an interview with the analyst is featured for viewers to see/hear the analysis.



Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead

News Video Screenshot 91 AJE: *Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead* (December, 8 2012)

The analyst is simply introduced by his name and role as an analyst, but it is not clear if the person is a journalist, writer, and consultant or where he actually works. Viewers then hear the analyst give his analysis in English:

***Mustafa Kamel El Sayeh Political Analyst***

***The Muslim brothers believe really that there is a conspiracy against them. Although it is very difficult for them to provide any evidence that there is such conspiracy. But this is ...you know...a basic feature of how they approach these things.***

(idem)

The analysis cites the Brotherhood by stating their “belief” that there is a conspiracy and also cites their “difficulty” in proving evidence about the conspiracy. As stated earlier, it would probably not be credible for the journalist to make these statements/evaluations without any evidence, therefore it is probably necessary that the information be shared by an analyst.

The AJE news video entitled *Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt* (November 25, 2012) uses a form of citation to evaluate the impact of a decree on the country. The journalist states: “**The decree** to extend Mohamad Morsi's presidential powers **has polarised opinion**. Protests in Alexandria, El Arish and here in Cairo a strong show of support”

(idem). The journalist's second statement attempts to use the protests and show of support in different parts of the country to justify her citation and then shows footage of crowds celebrating before featuring a statement from both a protester and a supporter to show the polarised views.



*News Video Screenshot 92 Press TV: Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt (November 25, 2012)*

The footage featured does indeed seem to show scenes from different places as the energy does not seem to be the same. But most significant are the footage featuring citations in form of an interview with both a Morsi supporter and then a Morsi protester.



Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt

***Mohamed Abdo Morsi Supporter (Translated from Arabic into English onto Al Jazeera Report):***

*I'm here today to support President Morsi's decisions. He should have taken these decisions when he became the president. (idem)*



Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt

***Hafez Ismaiel Anti-Morsi Protester (Translated from Arabic into English onto Al Jazeera Report):***

*Before any dialogue, Morsi has to retreat from the constitutional declaration he has announced because we don't trust his promises anymore.*

*(idem)*

*News Video Screenshot 93 AJE: Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt (November 25, 2012)*

These supporter and protester testimonials are necessary for the journalist to be able to justify their evaluation of the polarised state of Egypt, especially with regards to the new powers that Morsi has taken. The supporter makes reference to the declaration as such: “He should have taken these **decisions** when he became the president” (idem), therefore referring to the declaration as

a list of “decisions”. The protesters refers to the new presidential powers as part of “the constitutional declaration” insisting that the president “retreat” from them (idem).

Finally, the journalist also evaluates the economy of the country by citing the stock market so as to show that it had plunged, an example of an instable situation in a country. The journalist states first that: “The crisis is already hurting the country’s economy”, therefore highlighting the poor state of the economy and this is then justified by citing the stock market: “**The stock market plunged** by almost 10% on Sunday, one of the biggest falls since the days after for President Hosni Mubarak stepped down” (idem). Footage of the stock market dashboard emphasises the justification given by the stock market.



Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt

*News Video Screenshot 94 AJE: Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt (November 25, 2012)*

Journalists can also evaluation the atmosphere in a country by citing what “some” say. This does not point the finger at anyone in particular, but rather highlights a specific situation by justifying it with a citation. For example, in the AJE news story *Morsi's assumption of sweeping powers polarises Egypt* (November, 2012), the journalist evaluates the situation by making reference to what “some” say: “Sweeping new powers that make him immune from being over ruled, a situation **some say** is reminiscent of the leader he replaced.

## Un-citations

It was noted that journalists or their interviewees such as experts or those involved in an event would use un-citations in news broadcasts. For the purpose of our thesis, we define un-citations to be the act of interpreting what is not said by others while adding a priority label of importance to what is not said, whereby the media will ensure that this unsaid item is included in their

agenda-setting<sup>77</sup> plan despite something not actually happening in the news (McCombs & Shaw 2015). In fact, the act of something not happening is in itself the news that is prioritised by the media.

In the Press TV news video entitled *Egypt may be headed for civil war* (July, 2013), the ‘expert’ being interviewed (an international lawyer) states that “...Washington is shying away and the British government cannot quite bring themselves to say the four letter word. And that four letter word of course is ‘coup’ (idem). In essence, the interviewee makes reference to the fact that both the American and British governments are quiet on the toppling of the Morsi and that they refuse to use the word “coup”. He then insists that “It was a military coup”, therefore highlighting the disproportioned lack of reaction from the American and British governments. Also, footage of the International Committee of the Red Cross is also shared so as to broadcast a pre-recorded interview with the spokesman, identified on the footage. The spokesman cites his organisation’s previous statements on the Syrian context, almost as though to defend themselves and the reasons for which the ICRC did not declare the civil war first: “Well legally speaking, **we referred** to a non-international armed conflict or an internal armed conflict, which is commonly known as a civil war. For us, **we also announced** as of April, that in certain areas in Syria, the situation does indeed amount to a non-international armed conflict” (idem). This statement refers to the ICRC statement without using the words “civil war”. Instead they had defined civil war: “a non-international armed conflict or an internal armed conflict”. These are deliberate statements by the ICRC not to use the word “civil war”, because of feared repercussions of the labelling. Deliberate statements that define terms that want to be left unsaid make the news appear to be much more complicated than it actually is, therefore leaving a feeling of ambiguity in viewers. The problem of ambiguous news reports is that viewers do not comprehend a story and the less they comprehend a news story. One may even wonder if people become less inclined to watch news stories that they do not understand very well.

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<sup>77</sup> The Agenda-setting theory, with roots in Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1922), states that the media has the power to influence the priority of a world event in the minds of the public. Some may state that they are too powerful to be influenced by the media, but this theory does not state that the media will tell others what to think of a topic, rather it states that it will tell others what to think about because simply broadcasting it will tell the public that it is an important topic. Lippmann’s belief was developed by Bernard Cohen in *The Press and Foreign Policy* (1963), whereby he agreed that the world will look different to different people based on the media that they had come across. Finally, these notions were turned into a concept by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1968 when they presented empirical evidence on mass media influence on the public agenda and this concept has since been turned into a theory.

### IV.3.3.1. Findings: Citation Modus

The table below gathers the different citation modus identified in our analysis (1) to make direct quotes, (2) to emphasise citations, (3) to qualify/describe, (4) to present action citations (5) to present un-citations and finally (6) to present citations without unidentified sources.

<u>Direct Quotes</u>	<u>Emphasising Citations</u>	<u>Qualifying Citations</u>	<u>Action Citations</u>	<u>Un-citations</u>	<u>Citations with Un-identified sources</u>
Says Saying Said Released a statement Termed States According to The report says Witnessed Explained	Said repeatedly Also says Has said Has called for <i>Source</i> (:) <i>Statement</i> (use of colon between the source and statement in a headline) That was the message Insisted The headline is Added Denies	Welcomed The announcement is frustrating Satisfied They look at events... They are against... The view point is ... They seem to be saying This reference is not shared The newspaper likened Supported They ran a strident article That doesn't flatter them That (analysis cited) changed... Claims Does not accept Hoped Shying away Wouldn't mind Wouldn't have wanted Believe Suspicion grows Overcome Wants to avoid Plunged Offered Aspirations Raised hopes	Condemned Decided Calls Calling for Called for Denies Cancel Appeal Accuses Labelling Replaced Slams Rescinds Polarises Does not Has based its decision on Authorises Criticises Adopted Dismissed Rejected Offered Accused Warned	Cannot say Avoided referring Abstained from Did not comment There was no announcement He has blamed No mention of... Offered no	The reports Both sides A news report... All press outlets... The world is... People are... Experts say... Officials believe... Another claim Their people Syrian protesters calling for ... Hundreds are said... Use of passive voice

Table 46 Citation Modus of events of the Arab Spring- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

#### IV.3.3.2. Findings: Media citing media theory

Through our data, we were able to observe different ways in which the media would be cited by the media using direct or indirect quotes of other press with or without images so as to interpret the various standpoints of the press on different topics or to simply introduce a topic. For each of the ways identified in presenting a media citation unique roles for citation in the news video were also identified. It is important to note that media was cited by both journalists and people interviewed by the media channel. It was identified through our news corpus that media citations by other media publications were done in 5 main ways and each of these ways had different roles that were also recognised and included in our theory. News channels can introduce content by other media by any of the following ways: (1) summarising or highlighting a media publication (citation modus: was talking, seems to, they're saying, in some ways, was leading with, they look at, the whole question of, the newspaper likened) before stating the citation, (2) qualifying a media organisation or the author (they are against, the reference is not shared by, (3) qualifying the information published (a news report has revealed, was repeated, ran a strident article, or (4) giving a direct quote (it was being called, the media report says, image of publication broadcast, witnessed an event) (5) grouping media together (all press outlets everywhere in the world, reports say...). The roles that these introductions and their citations play are presented as follows, respectively: (1) to summarise/interpret/present what is said, to interpret an event via an analysis, to share the headline or main message/coverage of a publication, (2) to interpret a the standpoint of a publication confidently as though it were a fact, (3)to dramatically unveil news published by an insignificant unofficial source that has not been announced by an official source, to present an opinion shared by a publication (4) to share information as stated by another media organisation by quoting what a publication refers to something as and (5) to generalise the media opinion on a topic. It was also observed that media citations by the media can also act as a basis for journalists to argue a point, analyse an event or simply introduce something news that has not been reported elsewhere.

\* One last point noted in media citations of other media was that journalists would sometimes cite media analysis stories after an event has unravelled so as to criticise them for being wrong in their analysis. This is not considered a media citation *introduction*, because the citation would be shown first before critiquing it. It is therefore a way of *concluding* a media citation. The media citing media theory can be displayed in a tabular format whereby the expressions used to cite media are placed alongside their functions.

<b>Expressions to Quote/cite Media</b>	<b>Functions</b>
<b>Was talking (summarise/highlight)</b>	To summarise/interpret what was said
<b>Seems to They're saying, in some ways (interprets)</b>	To interpret via an analysis that is not fact-based
<b>[Media] was leading with (highlights)</b>	To share the headline or main message of a publication
<b>They are against (qualifies)</b>	To interpret a sure fact of one publication's viewpoint
<b>It was being called (direct quote)</b>	To quote what a publication refers to something as
<b>They were delighted (qualifies)</b>	To interpret a publication's attitude confidently as though it were a fact
<b>They look at [events]</b>	To share the coverage of a publication
<b>A news report has revealed (revelation)</b>	To dramatically unveil news published by an insignificant or untrustworthy source To dramatically unveil/report news that has not been announced by an official source
<b>[Media] reports/ The report says (direct quote)</b>	To share information as stated by another media organisation
<b>All press outlets everywhere in the world (group)</b>	To generalise the newsworthiness of an event
<b>This is the front page of "... (share images)</b>	To introduce the front page of a print publication
<b>This reference is not shared by "... (interpretation)</b>	To explain an opposing standpoint of another press when comparing two press publications
<b>The whole question of (interpret) was repeated (argue)</b>	To introduce a topic and explain the way in which it is covered by a publication To argue a point introduced by the TV channel to show that other press also share this opinion/analysis/sources on the information being reported
<b>ran a strident article</b>	To present an opinion shared by a publication
<b>the newspaper likened (interpret)</b>	To report how a publication covered a story by comparing it to another probably more well-known story so that the event is simplified for users
<b>Our correspondent...witnessed the event</b>	To introduce a direct quote from an international correspondent (Euronews)

*Table 47 Expressions used to cite the Media in the News and their Functions- Sawsan Atallah Bidart*

#### IV.3.3.3. Findings: Mocking Cited Sources Theory

Whilst studying the ways and uses of citation in our news corpus, it was found that cited sources were cited for the main reason of mocking them, through irony, whilst sometimes featuring footage of the speaker. Our analysis identified two main ways of mocking sources cited in the news: (1) presenting old media publication analyses once an event has unravelled so as to point

out that the publication was wrong (by showing pictures/videos of the publication cited and stating in a mocking and sarcastic tone: “that changed pretty quickly) and to point out that the reputation of the publication will be negatively affected due to their inaccurate analysis and stating in a mocking and sarcastic tone: “it doesn’t flatter them”) and (2) presenting speakers through a video of their speech with the specific aim of pointing out mistakes by the actor in their dialogue, whilst stating in a mocking tone “Listen to a little boo-boo that “speaker” made”). The mocking cited sources theory can be presented in a tabular format, whereby expressions used to mock the citation are place alongside their functionality.

<b>Expressions to mock a speaker</b>	<b>Functionality</b>
<b>That changed pretty quickly</b> ( <i>included in Media quoting media theory</i> )	To point out that the publication was wrong
<b>It doesn’t flatter them</b>	To point out that the reputation of a publication is affected
<b>Listen to a little boo-boo that “speaker” made</b>	To point out mistakes by a specific actor in their dialogue

Table 48 Expressions to Mock Speakers in the News- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

### IV.3.3.4. Findings: Representation via Citations Theory

We studied the ways in which countries and organisations were cited in our corpus.

#### Country Citations and Representations

We noted ways in which countries were represented through the use of citations in our news corpora. In total, sixteen countries were either cited or included in citations by others. Rather than looking at the form in which these countries were cited (images, videos, through other country), we specifically identified what was said about them (we have proposed another related theory which identifies the way in which sources are referenced). As the news channels in our corpora are very different in terms of their editorial lines and ideological backgrounds, we have also identified the news channel for each case. It must be noted that countries may have been represented in additional ways using other methods, for example images, analysis by the journalist and reporting of actions, rather than statements. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the following representations were found in the citations of our news videos alone.

Based on our analysis on how country citations are introduced in the news, the following table lists the different ways in which official citations, with direct quotes or un-citations are introduced by news organisations.

<b>Introducing Official Citations/un-citations by journalist</b>	<b>Role</b>
Shares recent changes in country	To share context of statement and To interpret the un/citation for viewers
Shares history of country	
Qualifies the official statement	
Share information about the country's relationship with the country/person/organisation they are commenting on	
Explains the importance of a topic to a country despite an un-citation	
Explains hopes of a country/organisation	

*Table 49 Introducing Official citations/un-citations by journalists and their role- Sawsan Atallah Bidart*

The following table shows the ways in which each of the 17 countries were represented using citations in our corpus.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Representation via Citations</b>
<b>America/ United States</b>	Our news video found that the following officials from the US were cited: President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Senator McCain and US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns. In cases where an official was not named, the US was referred to as US, United States, America, Washington, US Congress, US President, US Secretary of State, US Senator or US officials <sup>78</sup> . There is also footage of the US President and Secretary of State speaking. The US was represented in 6 main ways: (1) involved in collaborations with Israel leading to the Arab Spring (PTV), (2) accused of neglecting Egypt (PTV), (3) criticised for military intervention in Libya and the violation of UN resolutions (PTV), (4) represented as an influential world leader and threatening (PTV, F24, Euronews), (5) portrayed as anti-Russian and anti-Assad (Euronews), (6) portrayed as an ally to France and Britain and a NATO leader (Euronews) and (7) portrayed as supportive of the Syrian protesters (Euronews).
<b>Bahrain</b>	Represented as an ally to the US (PTV).
<b>China</b>	It was observed through our news videos that the Chinese official cited was Jiang Yu. China was referred to as China, China Foreign Ministry and they were only represented in one way (1) representing their discontent with the US led airstrike in Libya (PTV).
<b>Egypt</b>	It was observed that several actors were cited in Egypt and these actors can be categorised into 4 main parties: (1) Egypt (the country), (2) The Egyptian military, the (3) Muslim Brotherhood (including Mohammed Morsi) and (4) The

<sup>78</sup> Our theory on citation and source citations develops into the various possible viewer effects based on the way in which a country is cited.

	<p>Opposition (including Mohamed el Barady). The timeframe of our news videos on Egypt begin from the time at which Morsi was elected up until his downfall. Egypt as a collective nation is represented in only 1 way: planning fresh elections post-Morsi (PTV). This in itself shows that Egypt is represented as a divided nation in conflict. The Egyptian military is represented as powerful and in control (PTV, AJE). The Muslim Brotherhood is represented as (1) critical of opposition (PTV) (2) willing to compromise with opposition (AJE) (3) victimised by the coup (PTV). The opposition is represented as (1) critical of Morsi's concessions (AJE) and (2) critical of violence post-coup (PTV).</p>
<b>France</b>	<p>It was observed that France was referred to as either France, the French or the French president Hollande was named. French authoritative organisations such as the French laboratories which ran tests for sarin from samples from Syria and the French media were also cited. The French president (Hollande) was represented for making blunders even on international visits (F24), therefore portraying a weak and unauthoritative president. This is despite the fact that the country of France is represented as (1) professional and reliable in their investigations (of sarin) (AJE) (2) criticised for military intervention in Libya and the violation of UN resolutions (PTV) and (3) part of the NATO coalition active in Libya (Euronews).</p>
<b>Great Britain</b>	<p>Great Britain was referred to as either 'the British', or the British Prime Minister (Cameron). The country is represented as such: (1) neglectful of Egypt post-coup (PTV) (2) criticised for military intervention in Libya and the violation of UN resolutions (PTV) (3) anti-Assad (AJE), (4) professional and reliable in their investigations (of sarin) (AJE) and (5) part of the NATO coalition active in Libya (Euronews).</p>
<b>Israel</b>	<p>Israel was referred to as "Israel", "Israeli government" and "Israeli officials". There is also footage of the Israeli prime minister. Israel is represented as (1) being the cause of the Arab Uprisings in collaboration with the US (PTV) (2) being prudent about the situation in Egypt, the country they enjoy a "cold-peace with" (AJE).</p>
<b>Libya</b>	<p>Libya was represented as a divided country. The Libyan regime was referred to as Colonel Gaddafi, the Libyan government, airport officials, Gaddafi forces, government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim or regime forces. The spokesperson for the Gaddafi regime was also cited through footage. The regime opposition was referred to as TNC forces, NTC (National Transitional Council), Benghazi Council, the opposition, rebels and the ruling body. Although the NTC is an organisation, varying statements from the organisation at the death of Gaddafi represent that there is no unified and official statement from the NTC. The NTC are represented as (1) willing to compromise for peace (Euronews) and (2) welcoming of the NATO intervention (Euronews).</p> <p>The regime was represented as (1) patriotic and in control (PTV), (2) victimised by NATO (PTV, AJE), (3) losing forces to the rebels and (4) stubborn and unwilling to compromise (Euronews). The opposition was represented as (1) fundraisers (PTV) (2) overly confident about winning the battle (PTV) (3) mercenaries (AJE) and (4) gaining former Gaddafi forces (AJE).</p>
<b>Netherlands (The)</b>	<p>Only one instance of The Netherlands is cited in our news videos on the Arab Spring. They are referred as the "Dutch government" and are represented as (1) not wanting to intervene in Libya, therefore being part of the division in Europe, along with Norway (PTV).</p>
<b>Norway</b>	<p>Only one instance of Norway is cited in our news videos on the Arab Spring. They are referred as the "Norwegian government" and are represented as (1) setting an intervention deadline for their role in Libya, therefore being part of the division in Europe, along with the Netherlands (PTV).</p>

<b>Palestine</b>	Palestine is only represented once in our news videos on the Arab Spring. It is not referred to as Palestine, but rather as “Gaza” and “Hammas”. Hamas is represented as (1) being in charge of Gaza (2) being inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and (3) being prudent in commenting on the downfall of Morsi. Gazans are represented as (1) being dismayed at the lack of support to Gazans from Morsi while in government.
<b>Russia</b>	Press TV features Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in a Press Conference and represents the Russian statement as (1) having no confidence in the UN investigative team headed for Syria. Russia is also represented as (2) having influence in Syria and therefore being the reason for Syria’s unresolved conflict (F24) and (3) not being involved with either the regime or rebels in Libya but against NATO (Euronews).
<b>Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of)</b>	Saudi Arabia is only cited once and it is to represent (1) the Saudi support towards the Egyptian military (AJE).
<b>Syria</b>	Syria prior to the declaration of civil war is represented as a divided country, whereby the opposition is represented as to be made up of protesters and rebels. They are (1) the victims of the Assad regime (AJE), (2) the witnesses to crimes including the use of chemical weapons (AJE), (3) Syrian activists (Euronews); they are also (4) calling for reform (Euronews) and (5) having raised hopes and aspirations for change in Syria (Euronews). Most importantly, the Syrian opposition is represented as (6) one unified group (Euronews). Assad is referred to as the Syrian regime/government and is represented (1) as non-cooperative with the UN (PTV) (2) as the perpetrators behind chemical weapon use despite denials (AJE), (3) to be supportive of the coup in Egypt and (4) to believe that Syria is a victim of outside conspiracies (Euronews). Syria as a country is represented as (1) a divided country with two sides: government and opposition and (2) to be experiencing an uprising, then a conflict and finally in a civil war.
<b>Tunisia</b>	Tunisia is represented as (1) the place that inspired the Arab uprisings and encourages democracies (AJE), (2) for having an Islamist power in place (AJE) (3) being in turmoil after popular protests but with an army restoring calm (Euronews).
<b>Turkey</b>	Turkey’s Foreign Minister is cited in a Press Conference and his words as well as citations of others represent a Turkey with (1) political Islam (F24), (2) in opposition to the Egyptian military coup (PTV) and (3) aiding Syrian civilians (Euronews).
<b>Qatar</b>	Qatar is represented as a unified country that (1) is supportive of the choices made by Egyptians (AJE).

*Table 50 Country Representation using citations in news on the Arab Spring- Sawzan Atallah Bidart*

## Organisation Citations and Representations

We observed the ways in which organisations were represented through the use of citations in our news corpus. In total, 7 organisations were either cited or included in citations by others. The following table shows the ways in which each of the 7 organisations were represented using citations in our corpus.

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Representation via Citations</b>
<b>African Union</b>	The African Union (AU) is represented as a united union that reaches decisions unanimously. It is also referred to by citing a member of the AU's Peace and Security Council, Admore Kambudzi. The African Union is represented in 1 main way (1) united and significant to Egypt whose membership it suspends due to the coup (PTV).
<b>European Union</b>	The European Union (EU) is represented via the EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Foreign Ministers in Brussels. The EU is represented as being (1) pro military action in Libya (PTV) (2) against the Libyan regime (PTV).
<b>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</b>	The ICRC is represented for (1) having challenges providing humanitarian aid to Syrians (AJE) (2) stating the situation in Syria despite not using the words "civil war" (AJE)
<b>NATO</b>	NATO is represented as a coalition in the citations in our news videos. NATO is also represented as (1) a military organisation coalition led by the US, France and Britain, respectively (2) violating UN resolutions and targeting civilians in Libya (PTV, AJE)
<b>Local or International NGOs (in general)</b>	NGOs are represented as (1) protectors of human rights calling for peace (PTV) and (2) bearers of independent and accurate information (Euronews).
<b>Press (in general)</b>	Various press are cited by journalists in our news videos and therefore depict different representations. Our <i>media citing media theory</i> details the ways in which the media are cited. The media in china for example is represented as being (1) strident (2) the mouthpiece of the communist government whilst the media in general is represented for (3) having a point of view worth sharing or (4) being wrong in their analyses.
<b>United Nations</b>	The United Nations in the citations of our news videos are represented as the UN, Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon, the UN investigative team or the UN resolutions. The UN is represented through citations as (1) Trying but being unsuccessful in instilling peace (F24), (2) condemning acts against human rights (PTV, AJE) and (3) lacking power in Syria (PTV).

Table 51 Organisation Representation using citations in news on the Arab Spring- Sawsan Atallah Bidart

### **IV.3.1. Concluding Remarks on Usage of Quotes in International News**

To reiterate, despite only 34 news videos from our corpus featuring citations, we were able to note various forms of quotes, citations and even un-citations, leading to representative and significant results.

An analysis of the videos in our corpus led us to discover 12 main ways of citing in international news videos. These twelve ways have been categorised 4 main methods of citing in international news: (1) Citations are made with supportive material. Supportive material includes the use of (i) direct quotes (ii) indirect quotes via footage of the person speaking (iii) the journalist facing the camera (iv) citing included in the news video title and (v) citing events in a chronological timeline. Citations were also made without actually referring to the direct source and this method was labelled as (2) unreferenced citations. Indirect citations were also noted, whereby the news organisation would make (3) citations of organisations/countries and this could be done in various ways, namely (i) citing organisations/countries, (ii) citing the press, (iii) making mock citations and finally (iv) citing behaviours/feelings. The fourth citation method noted, labelled (4) un-citations, is when journalists report the lack of comment by a source.

Our detailed analysis of the corpus led us to other findings. Firstly, we were able to propose a citation modus; a table that presents six citation functions and how journalists achieve these functions: (1) to make direct quotes, (2) to emphasise citations, (3) to qualify/describe, (4) to present action citations (5) to present un-citations and finally (6) to present citations without unidentified sources.

Secondly, our analysis led to a proposal on how media introduce/cite the media: (1) summarising or highlighting a media publication, (2) qualifying a media organisation or the author (they are against, the reference is not shared by, (3) qualifying the information published (a news report has revealed, was repeated, ran a strident article, or (4) giving a direct quote (it was being called, the media report says, image of publication broadcast, witnessed an event) (5) grouping media together (all press outlets everywhere in the world, reports say...). The roles of such introductions were also noted, respectively: (1) to summarise/interpret/present what is said, to interpret an event via an analysis, to share the headline or main message/coverage of a publication, (2) to interpret a the standpoint of a publication confidently as though it were a fact, (3)to dramatically unveil news published by an insignificant unofficial source that has not been announced by an official source, to present an opinion shared by a publication (4) to share information as stated by another media organisation by quoting what a publication refers to something as and (5) to generalise the media opinion on a topic.

Thirdly, our analysis found that citations would sometimes be used to mock those cited by (1) presenting old media publications or (2) speakers, to point out mistakes.

Fourthly, our analysis focussed on representation of countries and organisations using citations, leading to specific results. Countries citations are introduced by sharing recent changes or history in/of a country, qualifying the official statement, sharing information about the country's relationship with the organisation/country/person being commented on, explaining

the significance of the an event to a country despite an un-citation and explaining the hopes of a country/organisation.

The US was represented negatively as being implicated in the Arab uprisings especially by violating UN resolutions in their military involvement in Libya, being negligent of Egypt and acting powerful and threatening. The US is also portrayed as being anti-Russian and anti-Assad, an ally to France and Britain and supportive of Syrian protesters. Bahrain is represented as a US ally in citations. China is portrayed as pro-Libyan regime and anti-US. Egypt is portrayed as a divided country with pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi Egyptians. France is portrayed as professional in sarin investigations yet criticised for Libya intervention. Great Britain is portrayed as neglectful of Egypt, being anti-Assad, being professional in their sarin investigations and criticised for military intervention in Libya. Saudi Arabia is represented as supportive of the Egyptian military. Israel, like the US is blamed for being implicated in the Arab uprisings in collaboration with the US and being prudent about the situation in Egypt. Libya is represented as a divided country, whereby the regime is represented as patriotically in charge, victimised by NATO and the rebels, yet stubborn and unwilling to compromise. The NTC on the other hands is portrayed as willing to compromise and welcoming of NATO. Russia is portrayed as untrustworthy of the UN with influence in Syria and the unresolved conflict, while being against NATO and any government opposition. Syria during the uprising is represented as a divided country whereby protesters are victims, witnesses of crime and unified. Assad/the regime is represented as non-cooperative perpetrators who believe there are conspiracies against them. Syrian regime is portrayed as supportive of the coup in Egypt. Tunisia is represented as the place that inspired the Arab uprisings, for having Islamist power in place and being in turmoil post-popular protests, but with the army restoring calm. Turkey is portrayed as Islamic, against the Egyptian coup and helpful to Syrian refugees. Finally, Qatar is represented as unified and pro-Egyptians.

The African Union represented as united and significant to Egypt. The EU is represented as being pro-military action in Libya and against the Libyan regime. The ICRC and NGOs in general are represented as advocating for peace and news accuracy. The UN is also represented as advocating for peace, but noted as powerless and unsuccessful at instilling peace in Syria. NATO is represented via the US, France and Britain and in violation of UN resolutions in Libya. The press is general is cited for being strident, the Chinese government's mouthpiece, being wrong and yet also being newsworthy.

## **IV.4. Usage of State TV Content**

Our objective was to understand how State TV content was incorporated into the international news videos of our corpus. Why and how was content from State TV incorporated into international news? Our literature research led us to reasons mainly related to the desire to gather accurate information to be broadcast to a wider audience that is newsworthy. Our field research through interviews led us to understand that first and foremost, international correspondents needed access to local sources of information and State Media filled the role of being a source of information, while allowing correspondents to gather information representing the ruling government of a nation.

### **IV.4.1. Definition**

State Media or State-owned Media by definition are the different forms of mass communications that are owned, managed and financed by the government of a state, with varying degrees of ownership, management and finance in various countries. State Media constitutes national press agencies, broadcasting television channels, state radio stations, websites and even national newspapers; we are particularly concerned with State Television. Because State Media falls under the national government and content may be controlled editorially by the State, any information sourced from State Media is expected to be official news. We have also known for some time now that journalists will prefer official sources information to non-official sources of information due to the conviction that what is official is most probably accurate or at least more reliable than unofficial sources of information. (It is also worth noting at this point that the major obstacle in using amateur content is the fact that it is not official information.) Of course we understand that what is official does not equate truth, especially when reporting events whereby official and unofficial media report opposing truths. But we also understand the need for journalists to report events using official content.

The literature on State Media usage in the news identifies State Media to be a source of information for international correspondents (Östgaard 1965, p.41).

Ostgaard also identified that “what is said and done by politicians and officials is considered more ‘newsworthy’ than what is said and done by people without political power” (Östgaard 1965, p.41). Often it is through State Media that official information is published representing the statements and actions of leaders. It is therefore necessary for international media to collaborate with State Media to know the actions, statements and whereabouts of state leaders.

(Interviews with mainstream media also confirmed that local press was in fact a source of information to mainstream international media and agencies). Essentially, to avoid biased reporting whereby revolutionaries willing to speak are given more air-time than regimes unwilling to speak, mainstream media is obliged to cover the regimes via local media.

The problem with relying on news broadcast by State Media is governments' intentional influence on news flow (Östgaard 1965, p.40), which is also referred to as "propaganda" or at least the "management of news" (Baldwin, Hanson, 1963; Desmond, Robert (1937), which can also include censorship of news, and this leads us to the question of just how accurate official news actually is. It was very quickly concluded in chapter 3 that the state of the press in all the countries in our corpus had one common denominator: they were not free.

Very little has actually been researched on the actual role of state media content in international news. State media content is a source of information mainly representing official information and international journalists are required to share information from various angles, including that of a national government, to faraway audiences. But having looked at the state of the press in the countries that faced popular uprisings in 2011, we must acknowledge the risk that journalists take when sharing information from the state, specifically related to the sharing of inaccurate or propagated news. In many cases, the information will be controlled by the government and this information will influence the final news product shared with international audiences.

#### **IV.4.2. Presence in News Corpus**

Out of the 252 news videos in our corpus, we identified State TV footage in 56 (22%) of the news videos. The channel with the highest usage of State TV content was AJE (30%) followed closely by Euronews (27%) and the channel with the lowest usage of State TV content was F24 (12%) followed very closely by Press TV (15%).

The next part of our document is a thorough analysis into all the news videos in our corpus containing State TV content followed by proposals of the role of State TV content in international news.

### IV.4.3. Findings and theory proposal

In order to understand the role that State TV content played in our news videos, we watched each video several times. We tried to imagine whether the message of the news video would change if the State TV content had not been included in the news video and this led us to an understanding of the function and the role of the State TV content. We also looked into the way in which State TV content had been incorporated by the international TV channels so as to understand the various ways in which State TV content can be used in a news video and built into a news channel’s narrative aimed at an international audience.

We were able to identify 9 functions of State TV footage in international news videos and some of these are very much related to what was initially found in the literature on the subject as noted in the previous section of this document. These functions have been categorised into 3 main functions:

<b>Use of State TV footage in International News</b>	
<b>1.</b>	<p><b>Using State TV footage to present official information</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Using State TV footage of a Press Conference to present a story angle with the words of politicians</li> <li>b. Using State TV images of a muted Press Conference along with international journalist’s voice over to present the narrative of the international channel or present news in a neutral manner by reporting the story from various angles</li> <li>c. Using State TV images to show “official” evidence of a news event</li> <li>d. Using State TV footage to show attacks on the regime despite the footage being unverified</li> </ul>
<b>2.</b>	<p><b>Using State TV footage to represent the location of the event</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Using State TV footage with the voiceover of the international journalist to emphasis the local atmosphere and event context</li> <li>b. Using State TV footage of location when an expert is being interviewed by telephone</li> </ul>
<b>3.</b>	<p><b>Using State TV footage to show inaccessible locations of a news event</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Using State TV images to show remarkable footage of an event as the journalist’s voiceover describes the footage</li> <li>b. Using State TV footage to break newsworthy events along with the voiceover of a live telephone broadcast with the international correspondent, headlines and a special logo for the event</li> <li>c. Using State TV footage to share old footage [archives] of politicians or public personalities who are deceased or whose locations are unknown</li> </ul>

*Table 44 Use of State TV footage in International News*

The following sections will explain each of the categories and subcategories by going through examples from our news corpora.

#### IV.4.3.1. Using State TV footage to present official information

Using State TV footage of a Press Conference to present a story angle with the words of politicians

It was found that State TV content is used in international news videos when the channel chooses to share press conferences led by leaders or military from the country. Press conferences are meetings set up by government to give prepared and official information to invited press, meaning that the information is official and therefore newsworthy, but also exclusive to invited press which will always include state media run by the regime, but not necessarily international media. This also means that uninvited press will have to request permission to use this information.

In the Press TV news video *Turkey calls Morsi's removal unacceptable coup* published on July 2013 onto YouTube by an unofficial user known as GrimghostMediaArabic, we can note the use of State TV content to share press conferences. The journalist's voiceover introduces the topic and the angle of the video to be "Turkey says the overthrow of Egypt's democratically-elected President Mohammed Morsi was a military coup, calling for his immediate release from house arrest" (Press TV, 2013). The journalist voice is heard over footage from Turkey's news agency, DHA (Doğan Haber Ajansı), which is currently owned and controlled by pro-government allies. The footage reveals the Turkish foreign minister addressing the camera in a press conference, while speaking in Turkish. The journalist's introduction is then followed by a translation over the Turkish discourse: "Turkey does not accept the removal and detention of elected leaders from power through illegal means. The democratically elected leader should only be ousted at ballot boxes" (idem). Without footage of this press conference, Press TV would not have been able to effectively communicate the Turkish discontentment with the removal of Morsi from Egypt's government. The words of the Turkish minister are of significance to the angle that Press TV would like to share, which is evidently a pro-Morsi attitude. The words "elected leaders" remind viewers that Morsi was in fact elected and the minister further emphasises that Morsi was a "democratically elected leader", educating viewers on the principle of democracy. Of course, Press TV could have simply quoted the minister, but the footage itself plays an added role, one that shows that the statement was made in an official gathering on a podium in front of the Turkish flag and before other members of

the press; therefore, viewers need not assume that the words were stated unofficially and the words of the minister are not to be taken lightly.

Another news video, by AJE, entitled *Saudi women given voting rights*, features the Saudi king addressing Saudis via State TV in front of microphones in what seems to be an address during parliament or a press conference. As the Saudi king speaks in Arabic, his discourse is interpreted on voice over for the benefit of AJE viewers: “We have decided that women’s participation and in the consultative council should be approved as of the next term within Sharia Islamic parameters. Second, as of the next elections, women will be entitled to run as candidates in local council elections” (AJE, 2011). This follows the in-studio’s anchor introduction of the topic “Women’s rights campaigners in Saudi Arabia are celebrating an unexpected victory...” (idem). The king’s message complements the in-studio anchor’s message and provides further details on what is being provided in terms of women’s rights. The footage is therefore informational and complementary to the topic. Post footage, AJE then interviews a topic expert from their studios.

Another news video by AJE, entitled *Syrian president fails to lift emergency laws* from March 2011, highlights the first public speech by the Syrian president after the first Syrian uprisings. The speech was awaited by many since the first uprisings in Syria and therefore the speech itself is the event and therefore of utmost importance to viewers, however the speech was only filmed by Syrian State TV and therefore it was necessary for channels like AJE to use their footage. Interestingly, the in-studio anchor and international correspondent both report that the Syrian president “warned against listening to Satellite Channels” and it is therefore not a surprise that international channels had to use State TV footage (AJE, 2011). As two different international correspondents speak to the in-studio anchor from Damascus, where the speech was held, and another city to report on the situation, there is also live State TV footage of the president showing him leaving parliament and also of supporters cheering for him outside the parliament.

Similarly, the AJE news video entitled *Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)* features a spokesperson addressing a Press Conference via Egyptian State TV footage. The words of the spokesperson are simply translated into English on voice over for the benefit of AJE viewers. The topic of the news video is the annulment of a decree that would have given the Egyptian president too many powers (AJE, 2012). The State TV footage of the spokesperson speaking in Arabic serves to explain why the decree was annulled and furthermore inform the public on the reasons given by the government spokesperson for the annulment. AJE uses the remainder of the news video to further interpret what the spokesperson has said. It must however be noted that although State TV footage was use, the heading of the footage was not

translated into English for viewers and therefore viewers cannot be sure of the person addressing the press conference.



News Video Screenshot 95 Egypt's Morsi rescinds controversial decree (December 8, 2012)

As can be seen from the screenshot of the AJE news video above, the pyramid logo of Egyptian State TV has been kept, as well as the Arabic headlines at the bottom of the screen to the right hand side of the AJE logo, however these headlines have not been translated into English.

Also, the AJE news video entitled *Egyptian president assumes sweeping new powers*, uses Egyptian State TV to feature the presidential spokesman in press conference announcing new powers to the Egyptian president. Although the spokesperson's words are not muted, they are not translated either. Instead, the journalist interprets his discourse to the public as such: "The presidential spokesman announces sweeping change as Egyptians have become increasingly critical of a president too slow to deliver a promise of the revolution" (AJE, 2012). This footage serves to break the news that the Egyptian president now has sweeping powers. The news could have been reported directly by the journalist facing the camera, but would not have had the same effect, because news from an official simply makes the news more "official". The context is further established when official footage is featured just before AJE footage showing celebration on Cairo's streets, along with the journalist's voiceover "On Cairo's streets, Mohammad Morsi's supporters hailed the news, for then this gives the president the authority he needs to sweep aside the remnants of the old regime, the ones who they believe have been stalling the pace of the reform" (AJE, 2012).

Another news video on Egypt by AJE entitled *Celebration in Egypt as Morsi declared winner (June 24, 2012)* also uses State TV in the same way, to present evidence in a factual or official manner. First, AJE uses State TV to share the way in which the presidential winner was announced to Egyptians. The words of the announcer are translated into English for the benefit of AJE viewers: "Dr. Mohamad Mohamad Morsi 13,230,131, that's 51% of the vote" (AJE, 2012). This announcement comes from an unnamed official sitting behind a microphone while

reading what appear to be official results from a paper; furthermore, he is being filmed by Egyptian State TV, making the news as official as can be, save for the lack of introduction regarding the speaker's name or position.



*News Video Screenshot 96 Celebration in Egypt as Morsi declared winner (June 24, 2012)*

As can be noted for the image above, the logo of the State channel is featured at the top of the video and the headline *Breaking News* has been kept in Arabic on the bottom right hand side of the screen on a red background opposite the AJ logo on the bottom left hand side of the screen. Indeed the images would have been even more official with some kind of headline interpreting the information on the screen as well as presenting the official stating the information. The presence of the microphone, the official, the State TV logo and Arabic information on a red background, including the voiceover translation make the information appear very official.

Secondly, the AJE news video features the new Egyptian President addressing Egyptians, officially, on official footage by State TV. In this case again, the president's words are simply translated into English on voiceover as he speaks: "We are all Egyptians both Muslims and Christians. With great civilisations and that is how we will remain. We will fight all those who will try to interfere with our unity. We will have to show the world we will have a revolution of development with peace and dignity for all Egyptians. I am willing and determined to build the new Egypt and build the new democracy and I will engage and use all my efforts to bring that. I will work hard to safeguard the security of Egypt with its roots in the Arab world and Africa" (AJE, 2012). The words of the president emit officialdom in that he uses words such as "we", "unity", "peace and dignity for all Egyptians" as well as leader-like promises such as "I am willing" and "I will engage" as well as "I will work hard". In addition, the State TV footage features the new president standing behind a podium on stage with the Egyptian flag beside him. As he speaks, one can also notice the logo of Egyptian State TV at the top right hand of the screen. Underneath the logo, unknown to non-Arab speaking viewers is the word "Live" in Arabic and the bottom hand side of the screen features the words "Breaking News", also in

Arabic, on a red background, along with headlines in Arabic on the president's speech, also in Arabic and left untranslated by AJE.



News Video Screenshot 97 Celebration in Egypt as Morsi declared winner (June 24, 2012)

This footage of the president also exudes officialdom: the president speaking before the Egyptian flag on the state channel. The fact that the text on the footage remains untranslated shows that the footage was taken locally. It is probably very significant that news on the newly elected president in Egypt in 2012 be broadcast through the State channel, considering the fact that the world had been awaiting news on Egypt's new government since 2011 when the Mubarak regime was toppled by a massive popular uprising.

Interestingly, another news video by AJE also featuring Morsi addressing the Egyptian public also incorporates Egyptian State TV footage of the president. The news video entitled *Egypt's president-elect takes 'symbolic oath'* (June 29, 2012) starts off with footage of the Egyptian crowds presented as though internally produced. However, as soon as the president appear on the screen, the logo of Egyptian State TV appears, showing us again that what is official, that is, the president, will be featured using State TV.



News Video Screenshot 98 Egypt's president-elect takes 'symbolic oath' (June 29, 2012)

The footage is presented by AJE with the name of the president as well as his title: EGYPT'S PRESIDENT-ELECT and the word "Live" is noted at the top right hand side of the screen by State TV. Again, State TV serves to share information that is official. In the footage, the president-elect can be seen addressing the public outdoors on a podium. His speech is translated on voiceover: "No institution, no authority, none, can be above this will. The will of you. Your will. You are the source of the powers. The nation is the source of the power. The nation is the one to decide and the nation is the one to give unity and the nation is the one to appoint and hire and the nation is the one to fire" (AJE, 2012). But as soon as his speech ends, the footage that is shown is no longer labelled as that of State-TV, it is unlabelled and therefore presented as internally produced footage.



*News Video Screenshot 99 Egypt's president-elect takes 'symbolic oath' (June 29, 2012)*

The unlabelled footage of the president-elect taking off his jacket does not look very official. But, it proves that AJE most probably had the footage of his speech only moments earlier and yet decided to use State TV footage. The journalist voice over tells us "At one point he even took off his jacket, showing the nation that he wasn't wearing a bullet proof vest; that he is one of them" (AJE, 2012). It is interesting that AJE decided to show this unofficial act of taking off his jacket via their own footage and yet featured State TV footage of his speech only moments earlier so as to perhaps appear more official and authentic in terms of the information being shared.

Using State TV images of a muted Press Conference along with international journalist's voice over to present the narrative of the international channel or

present news in a neutral manner by reporting the story from various angles

In the Press TV news video *Turkey calls Morsi's removal unacceptable coup* published on July 2013, we can note the use State TV images to present a story angle.

Egyptian State TV featuring a press conference with Abdel Fatah el-Sisi dressed in official army attire is featured by Press TV. The Egyptian footage provides his name as a caption introducing him in Arabic to viewers, but this caption is not translated by Press TV, nor are viewers told who they are seeing. Also, we can see el-Sisi speaking as he addresses the press on a podium in front of Egyptian flags, but rather than translate his words, the journalist voice over states “Egyptian armed forces ousted Morsi on Wednesday after one year in office” (idem). We therefore see that the press conference in this case has been used to show that the military has authority in Egypt, enough authority to hold a press conference and enough power to oust a democratically elected president. In sharing this footage along with the journalist’s words, Press TV reveals a side of Egypt that is not democratic, but rather seems to be under a military regime.

Another news video by Press TV, entitled *Egypt to face more conflict, fighting*, posted on July 2013 on YouTube, uses footage of a press conference to share the narrative of the Egyptian interim government by presenting the narrative on voice over. The video shows Adly Mansour speaking on a podium into a microphone in front of the Egyptian flag, but his voice is muted and we hear the Press TV journalist state “... Egypt’s interim president, Adly Mansour, says some elements in the country are trying to cause chaos. Mansour, pledged to restore security and protect Egypt against those who seek violence” (Press TV, 2013). Audiences are therefore introduced to the interim president and also told that the interim government is going to crack down on protestors. Prior to the State TV footage, Press TV had shared footage of peaceful pro-Morsi demonstrations and this clashes somewhat with the stern supposed words of the interim president. This same footage of Adly Mansour is used in another Press TV news video, entitled *Deadly Clashes Erupt*, this time after showing energetic demonstrations also including violence. The same footage of the interim president is also left muted and voiced over with the Press TV journalist: “As the night fell, deadly clashes erupted between supporters and opponents of ousted President Mohammed Morsi in Mansoura in Egypt’s Nile delta. The clashes left hundreds wounded. The rallies come one day after Egypt’s interim President Adly Mansour, addressed the nation for the first time. He pledged to protect the country against those who see chaos and said that the country is moving forward with the announced political roadmap” (Press TV, 2013). This voice over tells us that despite the interim president’s pledge to protect the country, chaos continues.

We noted cases whereby the journalist was on location and with a camera crew, therefore showing us events taking place behind her as she broadcast live. And yet, State TV footage was also incorporated into the news video. It was observed that the placement of State TV footage was to emphasise a point that the journalist and/or in-studio anchor were making.

For example, the news video *Egyptians gather in Tahrir Square to mark uprising (January, 25, 2012)* published by France 24 in 2012, features a live broadcast by a journalist based on Tahrir Square being interviewed by an in-studio anchor. As the international correspondent presents the news of the event to the public, audiences can hear the energy from the large gathering on the square, very well complementing the words of the journalist “It’s definitely, a mix of celebration and protests going on here in Cairo today. I mean generally people are very happy that Hosni Mubarak, his two sons and his hated interior minister are now on trial for murdering protesters and for corruption” (France 24, 2012). But when the journalist begins to explain the fact that Egypt still is under military rule, footage of al-Sisi in military attire, addressing the public via State television, is incorporated into the France 24 news video. The journalist’s words “They’re saying, you know, we’ve had these elections, the SCAF military rules promised to hand over power at the end of June after there were presidential elections” are broadcast over the muted State TV footage of al-Sisi, so that viewers can see the journalist continue to broadcast live on the left hand side of the screen and al-Sisi in military attire on the right hand side of the screen.



News Video Screenshot 100 France 24: *Egyptians gather in Tahrir Square to mark uprising (January, 25, 2012)*

Although State TV footage takes up a much larger part of the screen than F24 footage of their journalist on location, it is the words of the journalist that are broadcast, rather than the words of the subject on State TV. State TV Arabic headlines are not translated into English either, meaning only Arabic speaking viewers will understand the headlines. Therefore, we can conclude that the images of State TV are of more significance to the channel’s co-constructed

news video, whereby they are still able to voice out their narrative. Of course, hearing the word “military” and seeing a military representative before our eyes only emphasises the continued military-rule in Egypt.

The Euronews news video entitled *Syrian government expected to resign amid protests* (2011) features Syrian State TV footage of the Syrian president only after having featured Euronews footage of Syrians taking to the streets to “to back President Bashir al-Assad” (Euronews, 2011). The footage of the Syrian president is recorded over with the journalist’s interpretation of the news story “It is reported he will announce the resignation of his government today with a new cabinet set to be formed within the next 24 hours. [Syria TV footage] It follows two weeks of protests against his rule in which dozens of people are said to have been killed. [End of Syria TV footage]” (idem). The journalist narrative is contradictory of the video title. The video title tells us “Syrian government to resign”, whereas the journalist on the news video tells us that Assad “will announce the resignation of his government”, therefore it is the president that is firing his cabinet, rather than his cabinet resigning voluntarily, therefore the resignation of the cabinet will not put any type of pressure on the president. Also, the footage of the president is immediately followed by amateur footage provided by activists or opposition to the Syrian regime, of demonstrations against the Syrian government. There is therefore some kind of balance in the information presented by Euronews, between footage provided by opposition and that provided by the Syrian government.

The Euronews news video entitled *Syrian activists accuse Assad forces of nerve gas attack* (2013) presents the news on the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime by first displaying amateur labelled footage of what seems to be the aftermath of a chemical attack as we can see victims suffering or lifeless. Euronews immediately switches over to Syrian State TV while explaining “The reports, which could not be independently verified, have been strenuously denied by the regime in the capital” (Euronews, 2013). This statement explains to viewers that Euronews was unable to verify the news provided by amateur footage. Furthermore, State TV footage features a military man speaking before microphones in a press conference with the Syrian flag placed behind him. The man is identified and labelled in English as “Syrian military spokesman”, therefore informing us that he represents the Syrian regime and his words are translated for the benefit of Euronews English viewers: ““The leadership of the army confirms these allegations are completely false and are part of the dirty media war that is led by countries that oppose Syria” (idem). Euronews have therefore been presented with two sides of the story on chemical weapon usage in Syria in August 2013.

The Euronews news video entitled *Women get the vote in Saudi Arabia* (2011) features Saudi State TV showing the Saudi king making an announcement in the parliament. The Arabic headlines are not translated, nor are the words of the king. Instead, the journalists interprets

only part of the king's words and then goes on to narrate the lack of women's rights in Saudi Arabia, as such: "[Interpreted voiceover of king's Arabic discourse] The announcement was made by the Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, at the opening of a new session of the Shura council. He also said women would be allowed to join the advisory council as full members and the changes will take effect from next year. [Journalist narration on voiceover the king's words] Women in Saudi Arabia are barred from travelling, working and even having operations without the permission of a male relative. They're also barred from driving, which led to this defiant protest back in June (Euronews, 2011). The State footage of the king speaking is labelled by Euronews as "King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia", and is probably necessary because the king speaks into microphones but does not have any flags behind or beside him to show the nation that he represents. The footage is necessary as it is part of the Euronews news story which states that "women get the vote in Saudi Arabia" (idem) and the king speaking about this ultimately states that this information is official and accurate.

Using State TV images to show "official" evidence of a news event

It was also noted that State TV content was incorporated into international news videos to show evidence of a news event. For example, the news video by Press TV, entitled *News Bulletin-1600GMT*, published on YouTube on June 2012, presents the news headlines, which include the swearing in of the new Egyptian president. As the anchor explains "Mohammed Morsi has officially becomes Egypt's new president, after he took the oath of office before Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court in the capital Cairo", the State TV news video featuring Morsi being sworn as president in the Egyptian parliament is featured. The same news video also shows Morsi getting a standing ovation and speaking at a university, while the journalist states "the new President headed for Cairo University, where he gave a speech. Morsi said Egypt would never return to what he called 'its ugly past'" (Press TV, 2012).

The Press TV news video entitled *UN Chief chooses team to investigate claims use in Syria*, published on YouTube on April 2013, also shows how State TV images can be used to show evidence of a news event. The journalist voice over states "UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon chose an opportune day, the UN's day of remembrance for victims of chemical warfare to introduce his Team Leader for his call for investigation into chemical weapons usage in Syria" (Press TV, 2012). As the journalist introduces "chemical warfare", the news video features State TV images of people in hospital gowns in what seems to be a hospital, caring for victims of what we will believe to be chemical weapons. This footage educates viewers on the fact that

chemical weapons can lead to hospitalised victims. The fact that the footage has captions in Arabic also tells viewers that this footage was taken by journalists on location.

The news video *Al Jazeera talks to Ralf Trapp about chemical weapons in Syria* by Al Jazeera published on April 2013, features similar footage from both an activist and Syrian State TV. The footage by Syrian State TV is longer than the activist footage and shows victims in a hospital setting being attended to by medics. Relying on activist footage alone would perhaps leave the question of whether a chemical attack did in fact take place in Syria. Showing footage from State TV somehow makes the news official: both activists and officials in Syria are reporting that chemical weapons have been used and there are victims. In addition to this footage, AJE's in-studio anchor interviews a topic expert via a video conference and her questions are very much related to the "evidence" seen on the State TV footage. Therefore, the State TV footage is of essence because it supplies evidence to audiences and the topic expert. Similarly, another news video by AJE on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, entitled *Suspicion grows over Syria chemical weapons* and published on April 2013, also features amateur and State TV footage so as to show evidence with footage of victims exhibiting symptoms of having been affected by a nerve-like agent. The news video also turns to Syrian State TV footage of the Syrian president in an interview. The journalist's voice is recorded over the president's words to interpret for viewers: "Syria's always denied using chemical weapons, but it has a huge stockpile" (AJE, 2013). Despite having recorded the journalist's voice over the president's actual words, the footage of this interview serves to state that Syria has denied having ever used chemical weapons, but they have also stated that they are in possession of chemical weapons.

Similarly, the AJE news video *UN Chemical experts push for access to Syria* published on August 2013 also uses both amateur and State TV to show evidence from both regime and opposition, further emphasising what they both agree on: chemical weapons have been used in Syria.

Similarly, the AJE news video entitled *Morsi calls for constitution to move ahead* features Egyptian State TV, very briefly, simply to show the absence of opposition players at a meeting. The news video highlights the discontent of some in the newly proposed constitution in form of protests. The journalist explains "The so-called national-dialogue meeting happened right here in the palace. The president attended the first 30 minutes of the meeting and then he handed over to his deputy. Among those who attended were representatives of the Freedom and Justice party, the Salvation party and other parties but none of the key opposition players were present at this meeting" (AJE, 2012). While the journalist speaks, State TV footage features politicians in a meeting, and such footage shows who is present and who is absent. Therefore, the footage

serves as evidence or proof of attendees, as if to demonstrate the lack of interest amongst opposition members in discussing the contents of the constitution.

The Al Jazeera news video entitled *Mohamed Morsi sworn in as Egypt's President (June 30, 2012)* also shows the extent to which State TV footage is used to share official information with viewers. The entire part of the news video sharing footage of the news president taking his oath uses State TV footage, making it all the more official. All Arabic discourse is interpreted into English for the benefit of AJE viewers. The logo of Egyptian State TV is featured along with AJE headlines in English, but when the headline vanishes, viewers can note the untranslated Arabic headlines provided by State TV. Also part of the new president's official speech is featured using State TV. In fact, all footage with the new Egyptian president, including footage with him in a car are featured using State TV.



News Video Screenshot 101 AJE: Mohamed Morsi sworn in as Egypt's President (June 30, 2012)

AJE reverts to their own footage once they interview people on the street and then finally when the journalist reports directly to the camera. But the news video features State TV footage again at the end to feature an official ceremony in Egypt marking the handover of power from the Egyptian army to the news president. Again, this news is official and therefore represented through State TV footage.

In the same way, the AJE news video entitled *Egypt's president refuses to step down*, also features from 2013, President Morsi speaking in a press conference via State TV. The journalist states the context of the news video in voiceover the president's speech: "His message was clear: he is the legitimate leader of all Egyptians and only the ballot box will remove him from office" (AJE, 2013). The news video features the people of Egypt, clearly not officials and clearly not in power as they demonstrate on Egypt's streets for the removal of Morsi from government: this footage is not from State TV, but rather taken by AJE. Furthermore, interestingly, footage of the army is also featured via AJE footage along with the journalist's voiceover: "The embattled president also had a message for the military. He warned them not to interfere in politics, also urging those gathered on the streets across Egypt, not to allow for any conflict with the army". The journalist's narrative explains to the audience that the army is no longer in power than and therefore no longer as official as the president and therefore there is no need to share footage of them using State TV. The only time footage of people on the streets is shared using State TV is when there seems to be danger, whereby an ambulance is tending to the injured, and therefore it seems that AJE was obliged to use State TV footage to share news on dangerous scenes as AJE journalists were unable to film such scenes themselves. The AJE news video *Morsi falls and Tahrir celebrates*, taken a only a day after the previously described video shows a difference in co-construction and this is coincidental or perhaps due to a change in powers in Egypt. In this news video the journalist tells viewers that "the military was back in charge after staging the Coup d'Etat" and footage of the Army representative, Abdul Fatah Khalil Al-Sisi, addressing the public via a press conference, is featured via State TV footage. The footage is therefore official and the words of the speaker are interpreted from Arabic into English for the benefit of AJE viewers. Footage of the people on Egypt's streets remains "unofficial" in that the footage featured is presented as though filmed by AJE, rather than State TV. Although AJE has noted that there has been a Coup d'Etat, they use State TV footage to feature the toppled president Morsi addressing the public. This footage is not interpreted, instead, the journalist explains that "Morsi's whereabouts are not known, but in an audio addressed to his supporters, he said a full coup had taken place against him and the people" (AJE, 2013). It is clear that Morsi is no longer in power in Egypt at the publication of this news video and yet AJE have used an official State TV footage to represent him to viewers. One could argue that AJE is making a point that legally-speaking, Morsi is still the elected leader of the country.

Another news video by AJE, entitled *Muammar Gaddafi to be buried in secret desert location (October 24, 2011)*, highlights the fact that much about the death of Gaddafi is unsure, even while featuring people posing with his blurred dead body. AJE only uses Libyan State TV when the leader of Libya's Transitional Council addresses the public via a press conference.



News Video Screenshot 102 AJE: Muammar Gaddafi to be buried in secret desert location (October 24, 2011)

It can also be noted that the words “Freedom Day” in Arabic have been left on the State TV footage, but are untranslated for non-Arabic reading AJE viewers. The transitional leader’s Arabic speech is translated into English on voiceover: “We have indeed requested, based on international demands, that the death of Gaddafi be investigated, as he died during a clash in crossfire with his supporters” (AJE, 2011). The translation of the leader’s words are significant because it shows that the words of the leader are “official” rather than being a journalist analysis, and they are sourced from Libyan State TV.

The Euronews news video entitled *Saleh forth Yemeni president vows return* features Yemeni State TV footage of the president addressing the opposition from Saudi Arabia. The footage features the president speaking but the journalist voices over the president’s discourse so as to share information from the discourse: “But speaking on TV he invited the opposition to go to the ballot box, saying he was prepared to hand over power through elections but not a coup d’état” (Euronews, 2011). The journalist also tells viewers that “He [the Yemeni president] ended his TV address saying “See you soon, in Sanaa” (idem). The footage is featured among other footage by Euronews of Yemen’s people demonstrating on the streets of Yemen. The footage serves to make a point that despite demonstrations by opposition in Yemen and despite an attempted assassination on the president, he is still the legal president of Yemen and therefore sharing this information via official State TV further proves this point.

Also, the Euronews news video entitled *Tunisian PM to stand down after election* broadcast in January 2011 features footage of the ruling government through Tunisian State TV. The State TV footage does not really serve to give any information, other than the fact that the government is meeting, because the journalist interprets the images as such: “In an interview, Ghannouchi said like other Tunisians he too was afraid under Ben Ali's rule. He also promised reforms and said anti-democratic laws would be abolished, citing as examples, the ban on certain political parties and...” (Euronews, 2011). In the footage, we do not actually see Ghannouchi speaking in an interview, instead we see several politicians meeting and apparently discussing. Further

footage of people on the streets of Tunisia is featured using Euronews material, including “extraordinary scenes in Tunis, policemen, who barely a week ago were crushing demonstrations, stood arm in arm with protesters” (idem), as if to show that policemen are no longer officials who are part of the government, instead, they are now part of the Tunisian public and therefore do not need to be represented via Tunisian State TV.

Similarly, the Euronews news video entitled *Ovrnight unrest after Tunisia’s president flees* (2011) features State TV to show the prime minister addressing microphones in a press conference. The Prime Minister’s words are muted and the journalist voice over tells viewers “The prime minister is now caretaker president. He says he will meet political parties today to try to form a coalition to take Tunisia to early elections. But Mohamed Ghannouchi is closely linked to President Ben Ali’s rule...” (idem). It can be seen the journalist not only interprets the words of the prime minister as he speaks, but also provides an interpretation of the context. The State TV footage serves to show that the prime minister is the official in charge of the country. The Euronews news video entitled *France says sarin gas used in Syria (June 4, 2013)*, uses the French State TV *France 2* to represent the French government’s narrative on the use of sarin gas in Syria. Unlike most of the other Euronews news videos analysed in our corpus for usage of State TV footage, the words of the French minister are left loud and clear for Euronews viewers to hear along with the journalist’s translation which begins prior to showing French State TV footage. The journalist’s interpretation: “Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius says a line has been crossed and all options are on the table” is recorded over what seems to be amateur footage of people clearly suffering as they foam from their mouths. The journalist continues to translate the foreign minister’s words as French State TV footage takes over our screens: "On the one hand, we have been able to analyse samples gathered in the field by journalists from Le Monde," he said in a televised interview, "and on the other we have been able to follow the chain of events back to its origins and the lab's conclusion is clear: it is sarin gas". Unlike the headings on footage from Arabic State TV channels, this particular one has been translated into English for the benefit of Euronews English viewers. In addition to the clear translation of both the headlines and the words of the minister, one can also clearly make out the Eiffel Tower in the background. Interestingly, the French government has undergone investigations with the help of the French newspaper Le Monde, therefore emphasising that this is indeed the “French official statement”, reached after investigative collaborations between the French government and media. The news by the French government is presented in a completely unambiguous way (unlike news represented by Arab State TV); the official statement of the French government has been broadcast loud and clear: France believes that sarin gas was indeed used in Syria.



The above screenshot of Euronews featuring French State TV footage of an interview has the Eiffel Tower in the backdrop prominently expressing the views from France.




The above screenshot of Euronews featuring French State TV footage of an interview with the French Foreign minister clearly labels the interview in English for the benefit of Euronews English's viewers, despite the fact that the interview was aired on France 2, a French State channel for the benefit of French viewers.

*News Video Screenshot 103 Euronews: France says sarin gas used in Syria (June 4, 2013)*

The Euronews news video entitled *Egypt's new cabinet sworn in as violence continues* (2013) features State TV footage of the new Egyptian government being sworn in. This again shows that State TV is used to share official information to an international audience. The footage is voiced over by the journalist to explain the images to viewers: “Almost a fortnight since the military took control of Egypt, a new cabinet has been sworn in. Hazem Beblawi is the interim prime minister. The head of the armed forces, General Sisi, stays as defence minister and also becomes deputy PM. Mohammed Ibrahim Mustafa remains as interior minister” (Euronews, 2013). Now that the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in charge in Egypt, their statements are presented using Euronews footage of mass public demonstrations along with the journalist’s interpretation that “The Muslim Brotherhood has denounced the new cabinet as "illegitimate" and says it won't recognise it” (idem). This news video shows us once again that State TV footage is mainly reserved to represent “official” information.

Using State TV footage to show attacks on the regime despite the footage being unverified

It was noted that State TV footage was sometimes incorporated into news videos to highlight events that have impacted the country's government or regime. For example, the news video *NATO air strike pounds Gaddafi compound (April 25, 2011)* published by Al Jazeera on April 2011, is a reportage on the battle in Libya in 2011. The sub-headline tells us that there has been an "NATO Strike on Gaddafi Compound", therefore, viewers know that news video is showing us the destroyed Gaddafi compound that has been truck by NATO. But this news video has been taken post-strike, and therefore AL Jazeera can only show viewers destruction to the compound, and is unable to show any victims. Therefore, Al Jazeera then features what they label to be State TV footage from Libya of victims being carried out of the compound on stretchers. The footage strangely does not contain the logo of Libyan State TV, and there are no headlines whatsoever other than the AJE headlines. It therefore looks as though the footage has been handed to AJE without having been packaged by State TV.



News Video Screenshot 104 AJE: NATO air strike pounds Gaddafi compound (April 25, 2011)

The State TV footage is broadcast along with the voice over of the journalist: "Libyan state television aired pictures of what *it said* was civilians receiving treatment in a Tripoli hospital after the strike. It said dozens were injured including women and children". Despite the voiceover, the State TV footage has not been muted and we can hear some noises in the background. This footage is significant because it shows that civilians, including children, have been targeted by NATO's strikes. For international viewers who support the removal of Gaddafi from Libya's government through force, they will question the means of removing Gaddafi, therefore this footage is of significance. Note the careful words of the journalist when presenting the pictures of State TV, "Libya state television aired pictures of what *it*

*said*”...therefore, Al Jazeera is not taking responsibility for these images and cannot or has not verified these images that they are sharing.

It is important to note here, that my interviews with France 24 international correspondents, led me to question footage from Libyan State TV. I was told that only certain journalists, who belonged to large networks, were allowed to access the regime in Libya, so much so that if a journalist was able to access the regime, they were put up in a hotel and watched by a minder from the regime, who would tell them who they were allowed to speak to and also transport them to regime controlled areas. It was also revealed in my interviews that the regime would transport journalists to locations that had apparently been targeted by NATO so that the journalists would include them in their reportages of the conflict in Libya. In the words of Marine Olivesi, a freelancer who was covering the Libya conflict on France 24: “a minder is a guy just designated by the authorities to just follow you everywhere, make sure you don't talk to the wrong people, intimidate the people on the street to talk to them to make sure they don't say anything against the regime” (Olivesi, 2017). Olivesi also told me that most journalists covering the regime “were not even allowed to go out of the hotel without being on those big tours that the Gaddafi regime was organising - every morning they would go to see the new NATO bombing site, and see how much damage NATO was creating and so on” (idem). David Thomson from France 24 echoed Olivesi's description of covering the Gaddafi regime, describing working with the regime as a kind of old-fashioned propaganda that was almost comical. Thomson shared his experience on covering the Gaddafi regime with me, whereby he and other French journalists were forced to stay in a motel and only allowed to visit places the regime would send them to. Thomson recounted stories to me whereby he was taken along with other French journalists to towns that had been recaptured by the Gaddafi regime. He explained that the towns all seemed similar in that they had the same people at the entrance of each town waving Libyan flags and photos of Gaddafi in the air, while chanting supporting words of Gaddafi. It became clear very quickly to Thomson and his journalist colleagues that the people in these towns were paid actors and that it was a form of propaganda to show support for Gaddafi to international journalists.

Another news video, also by Al Jazeera, entitled *NATO airstrikes target Tripoli (June 18, 2011)* and posted on June 2011, features what AJE mentions is State TV footage, but again, there is no State TV logo, nor headlines from a channel other than AJE's; also in this case, AJE does not even include a label of *Libyan State TV* on the footage, therefore, we are unsure how much of the news video is actually from AJE. The journalist voiceover presents the images as such “Libyan state television broadcast of what it says is a 3 storey building hit by a NATO air strike shortly after midnight local time. Foreign journalists were taken to the scene by Libyan officials who described the area as residential”. Again, AJE is very careful with their words, using

sentences such as “it [Libyan State TV] says” instead of simply reporting facts. The journalist also describes the way in which “foreign journalists” were taken to the site, similarly to the journalists I had interviewed for my thesis.



*News Video Screenshot 105 AJE: NATO airstrikes target Tripoli (June 18, 2018)*

In this case, the footage is mainly of a destroyed building and rubble and the only images of victims are quite blurry. The news video features the regime’s spokesman speaking into a microphone in rage from the scene of rubble “They were destroyed...their bodies...their brains...were out...their eyes...why is this? Is this the protection of civilians? Is this really searching for peace and democracy in Libya? To attack peaceful neighbourhoods of Tripoli and kill whole families”? This footage is significant, because it is heart wrenching to hear these words while looking at the rubble and what seems to be a child victim. Viewers must question the role of NATO in Libya while watching such scenes.

The journalist’s voiceover is further cautious, stating “Among the rubble, **what looks like** a body as well as rescue and emergency workers at the scene. From the television images **it’s impossible to say with certainty** that an airstrike was behind the destruction. But the damage is clear to see”. Phrases such as “what looks like” and “it’s impossible to tell”, tells us there is doubt in the journalist’s mind of what they are actually reporting. However, the journalist explains why they are reporting something they are unsure of: “the damage is clear to see” (AJE, 2011). There is damage, it is significant in a country currently undergoing a conflict, therefore something has happened, but the journalist is unsure how it has happened. To further explain why the journalist is showing us these unverified images, the journalist gives background information on alleged NATO attacks: “The Libyans have accused NATO before of hitting civilian targets. Last month they said NATO bombs hit the supreme building in Tripoli along with the rehabilitation centre for deaf people and human rights centre for women and children. There has been no immediate reaction from NATO to these latest pictures and charges that they are behind the attack, though, they have admitted to hitting civilian areas by accident”

(idem). But the journalist concludes cautiously again, reminding viewers that this footage is unverified: “For now, the only pictures and information about this incident is coming is coming from Kernel Muammar Gaddafi’s government with no one else able to independently verify that side of the story”.

Another news video entitled *Saleh arrives in Saudi Arabia (June 5, 2011)* published by Euronews English in 2011, also features footage from State TV to show some kind of proof regarding an attack on the regime. The aim of the news report is to inform viewers that Yemen’s president was attacked and has fled to Saudi Arabia for medical treatments. Most of the news video features footage of images that have been taken by Euronews, even when sharing old footage of the Yemeni president. There is no actual “official” footage of the Yemeni president in Saudi Arabia, which would have revealed his injuries. Nor is there “official” footage of the Saudi Royal Court confirming that President Saleh has indeed arrived to Saudi Arabia. However, when the journalist explains on voice over that “Saleh was injured in an attack by rebels on his palace on Friday” (Euronews, 2011), State TV footage from Yemeni TV reveals what seems to be the interior of the destroyed palace. The journalist goes on to state that “There are reports that he was hit by shrapnel just below the heart” (idem), and the phrase *there are reports* informs us that the journalist was not witness to this event nor are they able to confirm that this event did in fact take place. The question to ask is “why make a news story on something that is unconfirmed”? One of the possible answers is the element that the president’s whereabouts are unknown and this is a fact. As this fact was known, Euronews decided to broadcast a story about it. What was unsure up until the video broadcast where the whereabouts of the president, but through the news video we understand that another fact has been established: the whereabouts of the Yemeni president have been declared by the Saudi Royal Court. Another fact is that the Yemeni president has “handed over control of the troubled state to the vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi” (idem). There is footage of the vice president speaking at a press conference, but this footage is voiced over with unrelated commentary by the journalist and the footage is not even labelled, therefore viewers may not even notice that this is footage of the vice president. Also, the news video does not feature recent footage of the Yemeni president in Saudi Arabia, nor do they feature actual footage of the Saudi Royal Court making a statement on the Yemeni president’s whereabouts, therefore Euronews have decided to investigate the reasons for which the Yemeni president would need to seek medical treatment. Therefore, the Yemeni TV footage featuring a destroyed interior clearly states that the possibility that the Yemeni leader had been attacked.



News Video Screenshot 106 Euronews: Saleh arrives in Saudi Arabia (June 5, 2011)

As can be noted by the screenshot from Yemen TV, the interior of the building has been destroyed almost as though with a bomb. But as the Arabic headlines have not been translated for the benefit of Euronews English viewers, it is impossible for viewers to tell if this building interior is in fact the interior of the president's palace. In fact the Arabic headlines state that Yemen's Muslims are becoming more radical due to bombs on mosques. Therefore, one wonders if this is footage from a mosque that has been hit, rather than the presidential palace. What is clear is that the usage of State TV footage in this news video serves to try to explain the possible attacks on the Yemeni president.

Similarly, another Euronews news video entitled *Yemen's injured President Saleh reappears on TV (July 8, 2011)* broadcast one month later uses State TV to share footage of the injured President Saleh showing that the leader had in fact been recovering from injuries. The journalist's voiceover also interprets the images as "His hands and arms heavily bandaged, Yemen's President has appeared on television for the first time since an assassination attempt a month ago" (Euronews, 2011). Interestingly, the State TV footage is not just featured by Euronews, instead, Euronews has taken the decision to focus on parts of the images featured on their footage before finally revealing the entire footage sourced by the channel. We are able to depict this because the footage starts off by zooming on the bandaged hands of the president and this does not allow for the visibility of the Yemen State TV logo, but as the camera angle widens and we are able to see the entire image, the logo of Yemen State TV is revealed; it is clear that both shots belong to the same exact footage, but Euronews has focussed on one part of the footage in one part of the clip before widening to share the entire footage as presented by Yemen State TV.





The screenshots above have been taken in chronological order of the same Yemen State TV footage. The camera first zooms on the bandaged hand therefore not displaying the Yemen State TV logo. Secondly, the camera starts to gradually aim upwards do display the rest of the president's upper torso, therefore displaying only a part of the State TV logo. Thirdly, even more of the Yemen TV logo is displayed and fourthly, we are able to see both the State TV logo and the Yemeni flag on the screen and are therefore sure that this content was sourced from State TV.

*News Video Screenshot 107 Euronews: Yemen's injured President Saleh reappears on TV (July 8, 2011)*

A very similar news story using the same Yemen TV footage by Euronews entitled *Yemen's Saleh speaks out for the first time since attack* (2011) also shows the Yemeni president speaking on Yemen TV. His words are not translated, instead, the journalist explains on voiceover that "He has not been seen in public since an assassination attempt on him in June. And the signs of the bomb attack were clear as Yemen's President spoke in a pre-recorded TV interview" (Euronews, 2011). The journalist's discourse explains that they are showing such footage so as to somehow confirm the whereabouts of the Yemeni leader and furthermore to show his injuries, therefore somewhat proving the "assassination attempt" and that the "signs of the bomb attack were clear". However, most interesting is that the journalist is unable to verify the veracity of this footage, despite the fact that it is somewhat "official" information being released by State TV. We know that the journalist has no possibility of verifying this information because she states that "Yemen's President spoke in a pre-recorded TV interview" (idem), therefore explaining that Euronews was not present at the time of the interview. The journalist also notes that the president only spoke to Yemen TV, by stating: "he **told Yemen TV** that he welcomed power sharing..." (idem).

#### IV.4.3.2. Using State TV footage to represent the location of the event

Using State TV footage with the voiceover of the international journalist to emphasise the local atmosphere and event context

It was also noted that it was of interest to an international broadcasting channel to feature State TV content so as to emphasise the local atmosphere and context in a country as the images would be more representative of the news that locals were receiving so as to more efficiently transfer the environment of the ‘faraway country’.

The AJE news video entitled *Egypt’s president asserts authority over army*, for example, is largely made up of various State TV footage, leaving only a small percentage of the news video to AJE footage. The 2 minute and 33 second news video features 1 minute and 45 seconds of Egyptian State TV footage. The footage ranges from televised images of the appointment of Egypt’s first defence minister in over 2 decades and chief of staff, to a press conference with the government’s spokesperson as well as a programme on Egyptian State TV that televises a press conference with the Egyptian president. Some of the footage is featured with the journalist’s voiceover interpretation, while others are simply translated from Arabic into English for AJE viewers. This large percentage of State TV footage from Egypt’s public channel simply shares the Egyptian environment with viewers by showing it through the eyes of State TV.

The Euronews news video entitled *NATO should do more in Libya, say Britain and France* (2011) is a co-construction of Euronews footage of an interview with France’s Foreign Minister, NATO planes taking off and rebels firing from the ground and Libyan State TV footage of demonstrators is integrated into all of this. The footage of the demonstrators on State TV is presented along with the journalist voice over “Yesterday, Gaddafi’s forces renewed their attack amid increasing concerns for the safety of civilians and the overall humanitarian situation”, therefore we presume that these demonstrators are actually Gaddafi supporters, but cannot be sure. It seems as though the State TV footage has been shared for the simple reason of communicating the local environment in Libya’s streets alongside with that of NATO planes taking off and rebels on the ground. These three footage together along with the stern words of France’s foreign minister stating that NATO is not going “enough” send a message about a tense environment that is probably going into conflict at the least and war at the worst.

Using State TV footage of location when an expert is being interviewed by telephone

The France 24 news video entitled BAHRAIN Saudi troops arrived to quell uprising - F24 110315 (France 24, 2011) features an interview between an anchor and a topic expert. Viewers are able to see the anchor, but the interviewee is only heard over the phone, while his photo is shown on the screen. To the side of his photo is footage of the location, Bahrain, which also includes a State TV snippet from Bahrain TV of the Bahraini King addressing TV viewers via the camera, while seated. This seems to be a televised speech that was prepared by the king. Although we do not hear the king's words as his voice is muted and the interviewee's voice transmits over the footage, we are able to see subtitles of the king's speech, which are words of condolences to the Bahraini victims following the popular uprisings. This footage simply shows the stance that the regime is taking amidst the popular uprisings. As the interviewee is based in Ireland, it is of essence that the channel also shows the location of the event of focus to viewers.

#### IV.4.3.3. Using State TV footage to show inaccessible locations of a news event

Using State TV images to show remarkable footage of an event as the journalist's voiceover describes the footage

International news channels will not always have footage of an event, despite the event being extraordinary, therefore it is still of essence to source footage of the event so as to share with their viewers. The news video *BRHRAIN Saudi troops as foreign occupation in Brhrain - F24* by France 24 informs viewers on the Saudi presence in Bahrain. The journalist's words "A convoy, as far as the eye can see. Armoured trucks, jeeps and other military vehicles, passing from Saudi Arabia into Bahrain to shore up a government overwhelmed by protests" (France 24, 2011) are put into context with the impressive footage of armoured trucks and military vehicles rolling into Bahrain. Prior to the reportage, the France 24 anchor describes the Saudi move into Bahrain as "tantamount to foreign occupation" and the footage puts the Saudi troops' move into Bahrain into context showing that this is an event that is certainly newsworthy and to be taken seriously. The fact that the footage is clearly from Bahrain State TV, with untranslated Arabic headlines, also tells viewers that this is local footage that has already been

aired in Bahrain and perhaps even unexpected by international media or at least inaccessible by international media as France 24 was unable to film this event themselves.

Similarly, the AJE news video entitled *US calls for constitution to move ahead (15 March, 2011)* also uses State TV to share footage of the Saudi troops rolling in. In fact, the news video which incorporates footage from Bahrain and the US is presented with the journalist's voice over reporting the news from a US point of view, as such: "Amidst the violence, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Bahrain telling reporters he was confident the royal family was ready to talk to the protestors and make big concessions. The pentagon says he wasn't told two days later *this* would happen" (AJE, 2011). And as the journalist stresses on the word "this", State TV footage shows troops rolling into Bahrain; the journalist carries on voiceover to explain the images to viewers: "More than a thousand troops pouring into Bahrain from Saudi Arabia" (idem).



News Video Screenshot 108 AJE: *US calls for constitution to move ahead (15 March, 2011)*

The Bahrain TV footage is featured while keeping the logo of the channel on the top left of the screen along with the day the footage was taken. Al Jazeera keeps their logo at the bottom of the screen as per usual along with headlines on an orange background stating: **BAHRAIN UNREST U.S. CALLS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION**. Having viewed more than one footage of the Saudi troops rolling into Bahrain, it has been noted that the footage was from Bahrain State TV, it is therefore probably safe to conclude that AJE did not have their own footage of the Saudi troops rolling into Bahrain, but because the footage was of a remarkable event, the channel had to share the news with images and therefore decided to do so via State TV material.

Using State TV footage to break newsworthy events along with the voiceover of a live telephone broadcast with the international correspondent, headlines and a special logo for the event

State TV footage can also be used to break news live, when an international channel has international correspondents on location without a camera crew or a camera crew is unable to film the event due to bans or security related issues. This allows for the anchor to ask the international correspondent questions via telephone while their responses are broadcast simultaneously over live footage of the event via State TV. The news video will sometimes incorporate headlines and even a specially designed logo for events expected to last longer than a day.

The news video *Egypt unrest very tense, violent and lethal, deadly clashes (August 16, 2013)*, posted by France 24 on YouTube breaks the news of unrest in Egypt with a studio anchor, an international correspondent connecting via phone and State TV footage of the clashes.

The international correspondent states the location of the footage and explains that they are no longer on site of the event, therefore answering the question as to why they are using State TV to break the news. The journalist also explains that “It was extremely tense down there” (France 24, 2013). The journalist also states that “... they certainly were using live ammunition” and provides insight into the gravity of the situation “One of the nurses there told us that 16 people had been killed. There was continuous and sporadic gunfire in and around the mosques that particularly coming from a police station, which had been attacked, but only by rocks and stones and the like”. The footage, which is from Egyptian State TV has untranslated Arabic headlines and shows hundreds of people running on a road. We do not actually see the violence that the journalist refers to in his reporting, however, it is clear that the situation is energetically tense. Following the France 24 style of reporting news via telephone, only the centre of the screen is used to display footage. The top and bottom of the screen are not used up to display any footage, meaning that the footage of Egypt’s State TV is quite small and some details are missed by viewers. On the other hand, the bottom part of the screen has a specially designed logo that France 24 has designed to report the breaking news in Egypt, which states EGYPT STATE OF EMERGENCY in white upper case letters on the backdrop of the rectangular Egyptian flag and this is placed beside the France 24 logo. This symbol along with State TV footage of people running across a road, with Arabic headlines in red, expresses the importance of the news currently being reported live and triggers a sense of alert in viewers’ minds. In addition to this, although the headlines on the State TV have been left untranslated, Arabic speaking viewers will immediately see “Breaking News” written in Arabic. In addition to this co-construction of

State TV, international correspondent, symbol and anchor, France 24 also incorporates headlines that give the true effect of a “state of emergency”, such as: EGYPT STATE OF EMERGENCY and EGYPT UNREST Four people killed in protests.



News Video Screenshot 109 F24: Egypt unrest very tense, violent and lethal, deadly clashes (August 16, 2013)

Also, the news video entitled *Syria accusations fly over 'chemical weapons' attack* by Euronews (2013) features footage by Syrian State TV of victims being treated in a hospital, while the journalist explains that “The government of President Bashar al-Assad says rebel forces fired a rocket loaded with chemical agents, killing at least 26 people and injuring dozens more. These pictures of the aftermath have been broadcast on Syrian State television” (Euronews, 2013). The fact that these pictures “have been broadcast on Syrian State television” tells us that Euronews have not confirmed the footage, nor have they been to the hospital to investigate the state of the victims by interviewing doctors or even patients. State TV footage is also used to present Syria’s information minister in a conference; the journalist interprets his discourse as such “The country’s Information Minister said Turkey and Qatar must also bear some responsibility, because of their support for the rebels” (idem). The remainder of the news video shares information as reported by the Syrian opposition, using both Euronews footage as well as information from Reuters. The State TV footage is somewhat remarkable in the sense that these were the first reports of chemical weapons being used in Syria since the uprising in 2011, and therefore the footage falls under newsworthy events for Euronews.

Using State TV footage to share old footage [archives] of politicians or public personalities who are deceased or whose locations are unknown

It was noted through our news corpora that State TV was used when footage of a politician or public personality was needed for the purpose of showing viewers the latest known location and actions of the person. For example, the AJE news video entitled *Minister denies Saleh has left Yemen* published on June 2011 is a telephone interview between the in-studio anchor and the Deputy Information Minister of Yemen. The interview highlights the fact that the whereabouts of the Yemeni president are unclear, because despite reports that he has left the country to treat serious injuries, the minister on the phone denies such reports. Viewers are able to hear the interview playout on voiceover as they watch footage of the Yemeni president labelled “Archive”, therefore informing viewers that this footage is old and that they are unable to share any live footage of the leader, because the channel is sceptical about his location.

The Euronews news video entitled *Syrian president prepares speech to quell protests* uses Syrian State TV footage to share images of the Syrian president in meetings prior to his long-awaited parliamentary speech. The footage is of essence as the president had been both silent and invisible since the first “anti-government demonstrations erupted...” (Euronews, 2011). This footage introduces the Syrian president to viewers who do not know him and reminds viewers in the know that the official president has not yet spoken in public. The footage is presented with the journalist’s voiceover: “The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is expected to address the nation shortly in his first speech since anti-government demonstrations erupted two weeks ago” (idem), the original Arabic headlines are not translated and the words of the president and the people he is meeting with are not translated either.

#### **IV.4.1. Concluding Remarks on Usage of State TV footage in International News**

Use of State TV footage, identified in 22 percent of the news videos in our corpus, accounted for highest usage by AJE (30%) and Euronews (27%) and lowest use by F24 (12%) and Press TV (15%).

It was found that State TV footage was integrated into international news videos to (1) present official information, by (i) using a press conference to present a story angle with the words of politicians, (ii) using State TV images of a muted Press Conference along with international journalist’s voice over to present the narrative of the international channel or present news in a

neutral manner by reporting the story from various angles, by (iii) using State TV images to show “official” evidence of a news event and (iv) by using State TV footage to show attacks on the regime despite the footage being unverified. Secondly, State TV footage was found to (2) represent the location of the event, in two ways: (i) with the voiceover of the international journalist to emphasize the local atmosphere and event context and (ii) with footage of location when an expert is being interviewed by telephone. And thirdly, State TV footage was found to be used (3) to show inaccessible images of a news event, by (i) showing remarkable footage of an event as the journalist’s voiceover describes the footage, (ii) by breaking newsworthy events along with the voiceover of a live telephone broadcast with the international correspondent, headlines and a special logo for the event and (iii) by sharing old footage (archives) or politicians or public personalities who are deceased or whose locations are unknown.

# V. Thesis Conclusion

This thesis was inspired from various agenda-setting theories, which state that the news may not tell us how to think, but will most certainly tell us what events have taken place and therefore what to think about. It is from this point that our research questioned the way in which news events are represented to audiences that do not witness events directly and are therefore required to experience events through journalist perceptions and interpretations. Providing that some world events will be inaccessible due to dangerous conflicts and as long as boundaries between space and time cannot be transcended, the need to research and optimise event representation, so that the greater part of the world understand events accurately, will never cease to exist. This final conclusion chapter provides an overview of the four preceding chapters of the thesis by highlighting our research questions and methodology by summarising our analysis methods and research development. We then share the lessons learnt from our two analysis chapters and also provide recommendations on how our research will play a role in both media researchers' and media practitioners' work. Finally, we provide insight into problems in international news representation that were observed in our research along with recommendations to solving these problems.

Chapter 1 provided an overview of three research questions highlighted in our thesis: [RQ1] how did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? [RQ2] how were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories? and [RQ3] how was contributed material used to construct international news stories? By studying international news, this thesis contributes to previous literature on international news representation, therefore emphasising the importance of news representation to faraway audiences. The primary aim of this thesis has been firstly, to build a unique corpus of already broadcast news videos by specific news channels based both in the Middle East and the West, who report internationally in English: Al Jazeera English, Press TV English, Euronews English and France 24 English, on events of the Arab Spring so as to answer the aforementioned research questions. Secondly, by building a corpus of news stories covering various events of the Arab Spring, our thesis also aimed to study how the events of the Arab Spring were framed into international news stories using specific research fields. Thirdly, our aim was to propose news theories from our data set that can be applicable to international news production.

Chapter 2 outlined the methodology used to conduct our research and answer our research questions. This chapter argued that the Grounded Theory approach, introduced by Scott and Glaser (Scott & Glaser 2006; Glaser 2010) and contributed to by Charmaz (Charmaz 2006) as

well as Strauss and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin 2008), is pertinent to media studies, in particular, our thesis, so as to build or develop theories grounded in data. The chapter also discussed the importance of Critical Discourse Analysis, a multidisciplinary approach, in conducting media studies, initially constructed by the Frankfurt School (Habermas 1983; Strinati 2004; Goffman 1974; Gramsci 1992) and further developed by van Dijk (van Dijk 1993; van Dijk 1988; Van Dijk 1998; Van Dijk 2011) and Fairclough (Fairclough 2003) and also broken down by Rose (Rose 2014), which encouraged us to not only study the texts produced but also the text producers using semi-directive interviews with the dominant information producers, data analysed from our news corpus and existing literature that we applied to our analysis.

Our theoretical foundation, also discussed in Chapter 2, was constructed using both communication and news theories so as to understand how events are perceived (Schramm 1955; Russell 1921; Devèze 2004) before being interpreted (Schramm 1955; Moles 1968; Devèze 2004; Goffman 1974; Hall 1980; Hall 1973; Hall 2009; Jakobson 1959; Jakobson 1960; Jakobson 1977; Barthes et al. 1990) and then finally being constructed into the news, whereby we studied different news definitions (Harrison 2005; Nossek 2010; Cook 1998) and the news narrators by looking at the international and online news flow (Galtung & Holmboe Ruge 1965; Maxwell Hamilton & Jenner 2004; Van Leuven et al. 2015; Castells 2011). We argued that although news is indeed a product, it is not a co-constructed product, but rather a product made up of material contributed by various actors. We defined co-construction as the result of a joint creation (Jacoby & Ochs 1995) and although various studies have shown how every utterance is a result of co-construction (Bakhtin 1981; Bakhtin 1984; Bakhtin 1986), ranging from children's utterances (Ferguson 1964; Brown 1977; Cross 1977) to interactional moments (Jacoby & Ochs 1995; Goodwin et al. 2002), relationships (Ochs et al. 1993) and even knowledge (Bordage 2010; Diakhaté & Akam 2016), we argue using Fairclough's insight that the world is socially construed (imagined) rather than socially constructed. Consequently, we argue that news should not be perceived as a co-constructed event, because although there are several sources contributing material to the news, the news is only produced by the organisation broadcasting the news. News contributors do not have a say in how the material they contribute will be used. We also argue that defining news as a co-constructed product relieves journalists from their responsibility of delivering accurate news, therefore accountability for news accuracy will cease to exist. We believe that journalists gather material contributed by various sources and choose how to build the news from the gathered material. This stance affects our analysis, which in Chapter 4 focussed on how material was integrated to produce news.

Chapter 2 defines the news to be a product of news organisations, whereby both the organisations and the individual journalist (working for the organisation) are involved in producing the news (Domingo et al. 2008; Becker & Coffey 2004; Pinto 1997; Ostertag &

Tuchman 2012). Although we argued that news is not a co-construction, we also argued that news production is influenced by various elements, ranging from the actual journalists and media routines to the organisation's ideology and culture (Gans 2004; Altmeppen 2008; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Hanitzsch 2005; Preston 2008). Consequently, the dominant information institutions of the events of the Arab Spring have been studied in Chapter 3. News selection influences, such as international news values (Galtung & Ruge 1965; Wu 2000) as well as news selection procedures (Efron 1972; Entman 1993; Gitlin 1982), including propaganda, censorship (Herman & Chomsky 1988) and orientalism (Said 1978) were also studied, whereby we also assembled recent studies on neo-orientalism in the news of the Arab Spring (El-Mahdi 2011; Ventura 2017). To extend our understanding of framing in the news, we also studied how social movements are portrayed in the news (Wouters 2013) and studied the paradigm models used to construct news stories on protests (Chan & Lee 1989; McLeod & Detenber 1999). These studies, which point out frames of violence in news on protests encouraged us to search for scenes of violence in our corpus.

Chapter 2 clearly outlined our corpus construction phase, which may be of interest to researchers seeking to build a data corpus using a Grounded Theory approach. The chapter also identified all the steps taken to sourcing, searching, transcribing and coding the news videos. The methodology adopted can be adapted to other studies and other disciplines in social sciences and humanities, and therefore is not restrictive to media researches.

Chapter 3 identified the dominant media institutions as Al Jazeera English, Press TV English, Euronews English and France 24 English. Furthermore, the news agency AFP is also identified as one dominant international news agency and Crowdfunder is identified as another dominant international news agency, which gathers user generated content. These organisations are of course only representative of the international news organisations responsible for reporting the news of the events of the Arab Spring to the rest of the world. We attempted to provide an overview of each organisation's structure, news gathering process, training and security from both desk research and semi-directive interviews, while an overview of how they covered the Arab Spring was sourced from our news corpus. The objective of this chapter was to answer the first two research questions: [RQ1] how did the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring? [RQ2] how were the events of the Arab Spring represented in form of news stories? Our study on these organisations led us to various results.

Chapter 3 outlined the coverage type of all news channels and found some similarities. For example, all news channels studied had minimal international representation in news videos on the Arab Spring and all news channels integrated interviews in majority of news videos, except for Euronews, which featured interviews in 49 percent of their news videos. In all cases,

interviews questions were not featured in the broadcast in majority of cases. AJE, PTV, and F24 featured questions loaded with background information and ‘what’ type questions, while Euronews had a preference for ‘how’ questions, followed also by questions loaded with background information. AJE, PTV and Euronews featured interviews with relevant event actors mainly, while F24 had a preference for interviewing correspondents instead. Topic experts were also interviewed by AJE (30%) and PTV (49%). Another similarity noted was that journalist locations were undisclosed in majority of interviews featured by AJE, Euronews and F24. Finally, in terms of footage presentation, all news channels presented news footage as though they were internally produced, that is to say, with no other source on the footage.

Chapter 3 also identified all the countries in our news corpus as the dominant public institutions of information, whereby (1) the information and communication context, (2) freedom of access and speech and (3) local press- professional and amateur, of each of the countries was reviewed. All of the countries revised, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, had communication and press laws allowing for freedom of speech and access, yet strict laws against information access or publication regarding government officials, religion, security or any topic considered controversial by the country allowed for crackdown on journalists, activists and those seeking information online. Censorship acts and threats instilled fear in local and international broadcasters of information, which further encouraged self-censorship. In terms of coverage of the events studied for our thesis, they were largely recounted using interviews with relevant event actors, except for the Saudi Arabian event, which was recounted using interviews with topic experts and the Sarin attack of Ghoutta in Syria, which was mainly recounted using topic experts. Also, half of the interviews recounting the declaration of war in Syria were recounted by correspondents, while the other half were recounted by relevant event actors. It would have been extremely challenging to speak to relevant event actors in Ghoutta and it was most probably necessary to have topic experts explain sarin to viewers. In Saudi Arabia, censorship on international journalists is extremely strict. Therefore, in general, we noted that the uprisings were recounted via the people of the country, almost to emphasise the popular movements behind the uprisings. Future studies may want to also study the different types of event participants by looking more closely into whether they are local or international politicians, pro or anti-government and if the relevant event participant represents a humanitarian organisation.

Furthermore, in all cases, the footage taken represents the country being described and minimal international personalities appear in the footage. The footage that represents the events in all the countries is quite diverse per event, but footage of events during uprisings (Egypt, Syria and Yemen) generally show peaceful footage as opposed to violent riots, unlike the literature on protests (Wouters 2013), which noted that violent footage was generally used to portray

protests in the news. Violent riots were only highlighted in the Bahraini (38%) and Tunisian (43% and 33%) uprisings. Military equipment were also noted in much of the coverage of the countries, mainly Bahrain (67%), Libya's conflict (73%), Libya's Gaddafi (43%), Syria Ghoutta (37%) and Tunisia's Ben Ali (44%), but one notes that military equipment is used to represent countries that encountered some kind of tense conflict and this is therefore representative of the conflict. Similarly, scenes of destruction or explosions were noted mainly in Libya's Gaddafi (64%), Libya Conflict (65%), Syria Cabinet Resigns (38%), Syria Declaration of Civil War (75%), Tunisia Bouazizi (43%) and Tunisia Ben Ali (44%). Images of death or suffering is minimal (11%), and especially noted in Libya Gaddafi Killed (64%) and Syria Ghoutta Sarin Attack (37%). It is interesting however to note that no images of death or suffering were found in the footage of Syria's declaration of civil war and the Libyan conflict is only represented by such images in 5 percent of news videos, as though there was no conflict. Future studies may want to compare the footage of various events of conflict to check for dominant frames and compare them. The Libyan conflict is largely represented by press conferences (49%) and the footage representing Syria's declaration on civil war focusses on destruction.

In Chapter 3, we also answered part of [RQ3] how contributed material was used to construct international news stories by identifying interviews as a type of contributed material. The chapter identified the ways of interviewing correspondents, which were grouped into two categories. (1) Interviews with correspondents on location was observed in three ways: (i) both the interviewer (in-studio anchor) and the interviewee (on-location correspondent) face the camera, speak directly to each other, but also addressing viewers directly, (ii) the voice of both the in-studio anchor and the on-location correspondent are featured without their faces, and (iii) the in-studio anchor faces the camera and features the on-location correspondent on voice-over, and (2) interviews with correspondents not on location was observed in four ways: (i) showing both interviewing anchor and interviewee correspondent in studio, (ii) correspondent is in significant location other than that of the main event, (iii) correspondent answers questions live from a significant location other than that of the main event and (iv) correspondent is in a neighbouring location to that of the main event. The ways in which topic experts were interviewed was also observed and it was noted that the questions aimed at topic experts were (1) usually unheard on the news video and those heard were loaded with background information and (2) presented with footage that appeared to be internally produced along with text headlines, amateur and/or State TV footage. Also, trends in interviewing relevant event actors were noted: (1) such interviews were mainly included in prepared reportages rather than live or on location or in the studio, (2) journalists were mainly on the location of the event and

(3) questions are most often unheard when the relevant event actor represents an international organisation or an institution/government.

In Chapter 4, we aimed to answer part of [RQ3] how contributed material was used to construct international news stories, by focussing on four types of contributed material in our corpus and their role in international news: amateur content, figures and percentages, quotes and State TV content. Future studies may seek for other forms of contributed content such as: international news footage and footage from news agencies. In our research, we theorised the role of contributed material in international news and found that amateur material was used in three main ways: First, to construct propaganda machines for governments or international news outlets (i) by also including State TV content to appear objective, (ii) to disguise bias or the journalist's inability to be neutral, (iii) by translating partner channel news packages with already incorporated amateur content, (iv) to show victims to empathise with, (v) to feature exclusive footage (vi) to shock or entertain. Second, amateur content is used to construct censored news: (i) to situate the viewer when the journalist is off-location, (ii) when the event is inaccessible by journalists due to bans or danger, (iii) when journalists would face ethical or legal implications by being on-location and (iv) when someone is being interviewed on the phone so as to show location footage. Third, amateur content is integrated into international news to construct a democratic transparency by (i) constructing a narration with a sequence of amateur images, (ii) adding a journalist voice over, (iii) to highlight the importance of UGC and (iv) to appear transparent in news construction. Future studies may want to look at the different types of amateur sources that exist in various countries so as to categorise them and therefore understand the different roles of these amateur sources.

In Chapter 4, we also theorised the role of figures and percentages in the news and found two main categories of functions. First, figures and percentages were used to construct educational videos. Second, crowd sizes, census info and casualties were used to present the environment context so as to gain the viewer's trust and also to inform viewers on the political interest or insecurity of the region.

In Chapter 4, the use of quotations and citations in international news videos was also theorised whereby it was observed that citations are made through four specific ways: (1) citing using supporting material, (2) citing with no references, (3) citing organisations and countries rather than specific people and (4) un-citations, defined as the act of interpreting what is not actually said by people, while explaining its importance. This chapter also provided a news citation modus extracted from our corpus to (1) make direct quotes, (2) emphasise citation, (3) qualify/describe, (4) present action citations, (5) introduce un-citations and (6) introduce unsourced citations. This chapter also outlined and explained the five ways in which the media

was cited in the news and the roles of such introductions to citations. The ways in which people or the press are mocked via citations was also observed and identified. Additionally, we studied the ways in which countries and organisations were cited by looking at the citation introduction and analysing the role of such an introduction. This chapter therefore, dissected citations of various countries and organisations so as to understand how they were represented, consequently answering part of [RQ1] how the dominant institutions of information affect international news flow during the events of the Arab Spring and [RQ2] how the events of the Arab Spring were represented in form of news stories.

Extreme anti-US and anti-Israel frames in Press TV's citations were observed. All news channels use citations to represent the importance of the US to the Middle East, with references made to NATO and the EU's role in Libya's conflict. Also, there are frames of Egypt, Libya and Syria being divided and Tunisia being in turmoil. The UN and NGOs are represented as peace advocates, but the UN is represented as powerless. Of course, future studies may seek for frames of various countries and organisations by looking further than citations, such as the journalist's discourse in general or interviews.

Chapter 4 identified and detailed three main functions for integrating State TV content in the news. First, State TV footage was used to present official information by (i) presenting a story angle with politician words in a press conference, (ii) muting a press conference and citing the politician on voice over, (iii) showing official evidence of an event and (iv) showing attacks on a regime, despite the footage being unverified. Second, state TV footage is used to represent the event location (i) by showing the State TV footage with the journalist's voiceover and (ii) by showing State TV footage while an expert is being interviewed by telephone. Third, State TV footage is used to show inaccessible locations of an event (i) by showing footage of an event as the journalist speaks in voice over, (ii) to break news along with the journalist voice over, headlines and an event logo and (iv) to share old footage or archives of deceased or concealed public personalities.

Our research into international news production does not only identify the various news actors and the ways in which they produce news, it also highlights problems encountered in representation of events, which can be categorised as both (1) organisational and (2) political. Organisational problems are found in news organisations and the ways in which they source and hire journalists. Contrary to what news organisations state, our interviews with journalists show that journalists do not always receive adequate training or insurance to work in zones of conflict. Journalists who work for or with news organisations have three main statuses: (i) permanent journalists who have contracts with news organisations and therefore fall under the payroll and responsibility of the organisation, (ii) freelancers or independent journalists who sell news stories to news organisations or work on missions with or without contracts with news

organisations and therefore do not fall under the monthly payroll and responsibility of the news organisations and (iii) news contributors who are paid per content sent to news organisations and therefore do not fall under the payroll or responsibility of news organisations. In many cases, inexperienced journalists are commissioned to working in zones of conflict, yet they are not provided with training, insurance or even security attire. The inexperienced journalist who takes on a job to build their CV in a country they are unfamiliar with will likely give an inaccurate representation of the country they know little of. Equally, the activist who is familiar with the country they provide content from will most likely over represent matters that concern them and underrepresent other matters. Both the independent journalist and the content contributor will be tied to news that will sell and therefore produce news that is saleable, leading to the simplification of events in the news. On the other hand, news ambiguity was also observed in the news in our corpus, whereby the news recounted did not seem clear or easy to understand because detailed explanations were not provided on the news broadcast. For example, it was noted that sources were either not given or not clearly stated, whether it was an interview, a quotation, a figure and percentage or simply featured footage. We recommend that sources be clearly defined, whereby interviewees and those cited in the news are disclosed using their full names and positions. Also, any footage or images not taken by the organisation should be clearly labelled with the organisation that provided the footage. Local organisations should also be clearly defined so that international viewers understand if these are pro-government organisations, opposition organisations or otherwise. When official statements are provided, it is important that audiences understand just how official the statement is; whether the statement has been provided by someone representative of the ruling government, a temporary government, an opposition to the government or some specific party. At a time when information overload has led to suspicions in news accuracy, it is important that news professionals give their audiences essential information about the news they are presenting to them so that they can reach conclusions on their own rather than have news interpreted and analysed by journalists followed by conclusions being imposed on them. Further studies on the status of journalists in various countries and organisations may be studied so as to better understand how deep the problem of representation is buried into journalist statuses. Also, it may be interesting to further study the identification of sources in news broadcasts so as to better understand exactly why many news videos do not identify their sources. Initiatives such as the WikiTribune have since been set up, whereby news sources are identified and any changes in the news reported are also made evident to the site's visitors. Studies on the effectiveness of such initiatives need to take place so as to recommend tried methods of representing events accurately.

Political problems were also observed to be the root cause of misrepresentation of various events. All the countries included in our corpus of news stories of the events of the Arab Spring proved to practise some kind of censorship by banning journalists entirely, partially or threatening them to the point that self-censorship was practised by journalists and news organisations. It was observed that the precarious political environment of the Middle East had regimes that had pre-defined the reality perimeters that journalists could legally present to their audiences and these perimeters had since been redefined by new authorities, making legal journalism a challenge. The best example of combatting censorship and self-censorship was found in the AFP stringer training model in Syria, whereby amateur residents were trained to provide quality and neutral images to AFP. The effectiveness of such practices need to be further studied and compared to that of other existing models so as to recommend tried methods of representing events accurately despite censorship and self-censorship factors.

Our research will contribute to literature on the various news organisations of our corpus: Al Jazeera English, Press TV, Euronews and France 24, as well as the news agencies AFP and Crowdspeak. Our research especially fills the literature gap on Press TV, France 24 and Crowdspeak, because little research has been dedicated to these organisations. Our research also adds to knowledge on how the various countries of the Arab spring were represented in international news, while also providing a clear state of information access and publication in the various countries studied. Our news theories will help both media researchers and media practitioners understand the role of various content in international news, whereby they will be able to refer to our theories on interview usage, interview profiles and contributed material, namely: amateur content, figures and percentages, quotations and state TV content. Finally, our research methodology, outlined as a methodical system may be used by other social science researchers so as to be adapted to other research that seeks to build theories grounded in data.



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# VII. Additional Volumes

This thesis, written in English, has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the doctorate degree of Information and Communication Sciences, along with the following required documents:

1. The thesis summary, written in French
2. A digital appendix
3. A printed appendix