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When urban transformation becomes gentrification : policies and perceptions in in(m)migrant neighborhoods of Istanbul, Vienna and Paris

Dilruba Erkan

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Quand la transformation urbaine devient gentrification :

politiques et perceptions dans les quartiers d'(im)migrants
dans Istanbul, Vienne et Paris

*

Thèse de Doctorat
en Géographie *en co-direction cotutelle*

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When urban
transformation
becomes
gentrification:

Policies and perceptions
in (im)migrant
neighborhoods of
Istanbul, Vienna,
and Paris



Author's photography, *Graffiti in Sonnwendviertel, Vienna, 2019*

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Abstract

Contemporary urban change is predominantly driven by migration and capital accumulation. Meanwhile, urban transformation typically focuses on facilitating middle classes, while (often) characterized as gentrification, which as a process is tied to global circuits of urban policy transfers. Despite the phenomenon's "global" emphasis and in contrast to the scholars that describe gentrification as a planetary process, this dissertation argues that it takes different forms worldwide. The disparity predominantly depends on local socio-spatial and politico-economic contexts mediated via policies. On the one hand, amongst the disadvantaged inhabitants that are most vulnerable to likely side effects of gentrification are lower class (im)migrant populations. On the other, the neighborhoods densely inhabited by (im)migrant populations seem to compose the neighborhood's reputation and stigmatization, which, in return, construct the opinion of potential gentrifiers. The outsider's perception ultimately contributes to determining the characteristics of the urban transformation process. Against this background, this dissertation, through comparison, investigates the consequences of mediated perceptions and policies and if (and how) they lead an urban transformation to show characteristics that resonate with gentrification.

The comparison is between Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris), which are a) neighborhoods experiencing gentrification-like urban transformation and b) examples of neighborhoods with a high density of lower-class Turkish/Kurdish populations - with various migration histories - that reside or work there. The comparison is based on analyzing policy, planning, and media archive documents, semi-structured interviews with experts and Turkish/Kurdish residents, observations, image analysis, and field mapping. The research objectives are to 1) revisit gentrification as an umbrella term, 2) conceptualize the frame of gentrification via comparison, 3) investigate the interplay between gentrification and the social composition of an (im)migrant neighborhood, and 4) understand the impact of policies on characteristics of gentrification.

In summary, this work informs us about the fluidity of terminology, and how the complexity of a term like gentrification can be utilized in order to analyze the various factors that define the main characteristics of three different cities and their transforming neighborhoods. It highlights the factors that are similar in the three case studies but also the different ways in which social perception and policies crucially shape the way in which gentrification proceeds. Accordingly, policies are fundamental at the city level, and at the neighborhood level, social composition and social ties are among the main factors affecting gentrification. Although gentrification is inevitably putting pressure on (local) residents, in an emotional and physical sense, this thesis shows that the way in which cities regulate and monitor urban transformation moving forward will make a crucial impact on the lives in the neighborhood.

Resumé

Les changements urbains contemporains sont principalement motivés par la migration et l'accumulation de capital. Dans le même temps, la transformation urbaine se concentre généralement sur les avantages de la classe moyenne, tout en étant (souvent) caractérisée par la gentrification, qui, en tant que processus, est liée aux circuits mondiaux de transferts de politiques urbaines. Dans la littérature, l'accent est mis sur la nature globale du phénomène. Contrairement aux chercheurs qui décrivent la gentrification comme un processus global, cette thèse soutient qu'elle prend des formes différentes à travers le monde. La disparité dépend principalement des contextes socio-spatiaux et politico-économiques locaux qui sont médiatisés par la politique. D'une part, parmi les résidents défavorisés qui sont les plus vulnérables aux effets secondaires probables de la gentrification figurent les populations (im)migrantes de classe inférieure. D'autre part, les quartiers densément peuplés par les populations (im)migrantes semblent composer la réputation et la stigmatisation du quartier, qui à son tour construit les vues des gentrifieurs potentiels. La perception des résidents aisés vivant en dehors des quartiers de (im)migrants contribue probablement à déterminer les caractéristiques du processus de transformation urbaine. Dans ce contexte, cette thèse, à travers une comparaison, étudie les conséquences des perceptions et des politiques médiatisées et si (et comment) elles conduisent une transformation urbaine à présenter des caractéristiques qui résonnent avec la gentrification.

La comparaison se concentre sur Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienne), et le Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris), qui sont (a) des quartiers subissant une transformation urbaine de type gentrification et (b) des exemples de quartiers à forte densité de populations turques/kurdes de classe inférieure - avec des histoires migratoires diverses - y résidant ou y travaillant. La comparaison est basée sur l'analyse de documents politiques et médiatiques, des entretiens semi-structurés avec des résidents turcs/kurdes et des gentrifieurs potentiels, des observations, une analyse d'images et une cartographie de terrain. Les objectifs de la recherche sont de 1) revisiter la gentrification en tant que terme générique, 2) conceptualiser le cadre de la gentrification par la comparaison, 3) étudier l'interaction entre la gentrification et la composition sociale d'un quartier (im)migrant, et 4) comprendre l'impact des politiques sur les caractéristiques de la gentrification.

En résumé, ce travail nous informe sur la fluidité de la terminologie. Les résultats montrent que la complexité du terme peut être utilisée pour analyser les différents facteurs qui définissent les caractéristiques clés de la gentrification dans des quartiers en transformation dans trois villes différentes. La thèse met en évidence les facteurs qui sont similaires dans les trois études de cas, mais aussi les différentes façons dont la perception sociale et la politique façonnent de manière cruciale le cours de la gentrification. Par exemple, la politique est fondamentale au niveau de la ville. Au niveau du quartier, la composition sociale et les liens sociaux sont parmi les facteurs significatifs affectant la gentrification. Alors que la gentrification exerce inévitablement une pression sur les résidents (locaux), tant sur le plan émotionnel que physique, cette thèse montre que les villes sont capables de réguler et de surveiller la transformation urbaine et d'influencer la vie de quartier.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Relatives on both my mother and father's sides, people from various other places I have called home, and many others I've known besides have all had very different problems and subsequent ways to handle them; however, one thing common for them all was a desire to buy a property in a reputable neighborhood that is clean and new both spatially and socially. Having property is often seen as the best investment opportunity as it has potential for being a worthwhile inheritance for successive generations to come, but the emphasis on a neighborhood's new physical structures and affluent social composition is assertive, considering that a particular neighborhood's notoriety is usually based on anecdotes rather than first-hand or scientific knowledge. Owning a property in a disreputable area, as deemed by its old structures and lower class inhabitants, did not sound like a safe option to my uneducated child's ears. Being an expert on housing and neighborhood transformations does not make a difference in that account.

I have seen this sentiment firsthand from Turkey to Austria to France, regardless of the region, some neighborhoods being quite similar, and others being the utmost opposite. As such, the initial curiosity for this dissertation lies in my internalized acknowledgement that reputation is a valid consideration for location based investments though it remains unclear how that directly relates to urban transformation. Some neighborhoods are physically transformed slowly, others' reputations systematically recover without much structural change. Some rise from their own ashes and decay, becoming perceivably livable and thus investable. Urban transformation, therefore, is not just a material process involving physical recovery, but rather it is a process displaying the complex relations between the perception of potential investors, the perception of current inhabitants, and the neighborhood as physical space.

My interest in urban transformations began in my childhood I grew up in a central Anatolian city (Kayseri) of ~1,000,000 inhabitants (TUIK)¹; according to European perspective, it is considered a big city; by standards I grew up in, it is only a middle sized city with limited infrastructure, hardly comparable with its European peers. Having studied in Ankara, a city of ~5,000,000 people (TUIK)²,

¹ Türkiye istatistik kurumu 2008, Population report (TUIK, 2008)

² Türkiye istatistik kurumu 2008, Population report (TUIK, 2008)

and moving around to many cities in west to southeast Turkey in pursuit of my studies, I have come into many circumstances within the same country having similar contexts on the physical and metaphorical surface level. However, many things besides the physical urban realm are experienced differently such as the language and unique dialect of relatives on my father's side (south-east Anatolia) compared to those on my mother's side (Aegean coast). From both the bombardment of cheesy tourism advertisements and my personal experience, my childhood self conceptualized Turkey as a mosaic of heterogeneous social and spatial environments. None of my close kin moved from rural to urban spaces — most have remained in the urban area for generations — unlike the population who have moved due to the automatization of agriculture, privatization of public institutes, and forced migration. These retrospective farmers and workers, the unwanted of the urban landscape, became industrial, service and guest laborers of other cities in Turkey and Europe. My idea of Turkey being a heterogeneous mosaic is one I, the transforming neighborhoods, and the nation at large are leaving behind.

During my city and regional planning studies in Ankara, a decades-long hot debate was in discussion surrounding the phenomenon of rural-urban influx, renewal of the areas occupied by the rural immigrants, and the growing, neoliberal character of the Turkish politico-economic sphere. These three processes are excellent catalysts for various urban transformation types, particularly gentrification. Although in Vienna, where I did my master's studies, the phenomenon is also terminologically defined as gentrification, the particulars were and are vastly different. The first few years I was in Vienna, I overheard discussions on segregation, urban sprawl, gentrification, and more — I could hardly take them seriously. These issues, as they argued them, all seemed to be first world problems as Vienna has very well established social housing, rent regulations and tenant protection policies³. Following my master's studies, I moved to Paris to start my PhD, again in a very different environment, bouncing back and forth from Paris, back to Vienna, back to Paris, and then to Istanbul. One thing was clear: these three cities have similar phenomena that urban researchers blanket as gentrification though the highly specific term was created for use in none of them. It made me more curious than before why this seemingly similar process proceeds in different ways: what could the reasons be and, more importantly,

³ Austrian Landlord and Tenant Act (Österreichisches Mietrechtsgesetz - MRG)

what is the more profound experience of the phenomenon? What is it that makes these highly specific events appear conceptually similar to a degree that scholars define them with the same terminology?

Urban transformation, in the end, is defined within the same frame. So many things — publications, special issues, readers, books in different languages and cases — were and are being written about gentrification with plenty more to come. The reason all these works on gentrification need a clear, common frame for the term is there is not only a vast amount of literature on the topic, but there is also a vast amount of gentrification occurring, it having spread worldwide. Once more, in this dissertation, I will repeat what has been said several times before. This is for theoretical rigor and for the sake of a clear focus; the topic, broadly, is in need of clear direction. Gentrification is a very adaptive phenomenon; it changes character through time and space, evolving as the capitalist environment it takes place in does. Like a virus mutating and multiplying, it remains relevant and fresh as a topic. It is a significant manifestation of capitalism in the urban space (Smith, 1982); it is variegated in the same vein.

Therefore, looking at singular cases, gentrification phenomena differ considerably once situated in specific cities and terms of urban transformation are defined; this is particularly relevant in the migrant neighborhoods that are typically ones with disrepute. Because regions are different regarding their distinct social, political, spatial and economic spheres, the global ideas of gentrification are interpreted differently and localized. Despite the differences, it, everywhere and always, directly affects day-to-day life in particular areas by altering the structures that make up the neighborhood. The disadvantaged inhabitants that are most vulnerable to its effects are (im)migrant groups, both socially and spatially. It re-configures their everyday life as a response to the overall changes in the neighborhood.

Against this backdrop, my dissertation aims at a comprehensive understanding of: (1) the interplay of inhabitant community, outsider perceptions, housing market, and state relations in urban transformation; (2) the impact of policies on gentrification as a particular type of urban transformation on immigrant neighborhoods with distinct context; and (3) the intricate relation between gentrification and urban areas densely inhabited by immigrant populations through a comparative analysis of

Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris). The objectives are to

1. revisit urban transformation; particularly gentrification as an umbrella term,
2. conceptualize the characteristics of gentrification via comparison, and
3. investigate the link between gentrification and immigrant neighborhoods.

Overall results should reveal that although gentrification proceeds differently, the core process remains the same; hence, the social consequences, especially on (im)migrant populations, are conceptually similar. Furthermore, by conceptualizing the different characters of gentrification and its relation to similar consequences, more elaborated policy recommendations that favor disadvantaged populations should become possible.

1.1. A chaotic concept

Gentrification

Gentrification is a worldwide phenomenon that affects millions of households. The term was coined, later than the phenomenon, in 1964 by Ruth Glass to describe the displacement of the worker class by "gentries" in the inner city of London due to the upgrading of Victorian houses. In the most generic sense, lower-class inhabitants were replaced with middle class ones due to housing market changes (Glass, 1964). With that, the phenomenon is an aggressive translation of capitalist relations into space. Cities are ever-changing, conjointly, as a result of the effort to keep them up to date to be a strategic party in global competition (Harvey, 1987). As one of the specific processes global competition generates, gentrification is a "capital led colonization of urban space" (Davidson, 2007: 493).

First, the anglophone world adopted the term, applying it broadly. Second, the rest of the world adopted the term with slight adaptations and furthered its use in specific contexts because of the variety of cases observed. The term has transformed and multiplied following the changes in the phenomenon worldwide, and as it is used now in many parts of the globe, it is a hard job to define it without overly

generalizing it, ignoring the particularities, or narrowing it down and regressing the theoretical rigor (Slater, 2006; Maloutas, 2018).

Several questions remain. What is the balance between generalization and focus? More importantly, where is the starting point to test out or produce theory? From which perspective? Then what are the limits to a theory? Maloutas (2018) argues in favor of keeping the theoretical rigor as it is significant to hold on to a generalized definition with high attention to the contextual attachments.

Therefore, in order to set a frame for theoretical coherence, I postulate a working definition which is "very general yet inclusive" for all contexts as an umbrella term, as it was defined by Eric Clark (2005).

He suggests that

gentrification is a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through reinvestment in the fixed capital (p. 262).

Given the very general and broad boundaries of this definition, it instead serves as a frame that might be categorized in three [fuzzy] differentials to work within: (1) reinvestment in fixed capital, (2) social and structural changes, and (3) displacement. These over-generalized differentials set a frame for theoretical coherence to investigate the particular neighborhood units of discussion. Nevertheless, the practical interrogation of fuzzy differentials alone can confirm many urban changes to be gentrification although the methods to measure them vary according to the unique cases. For example, the first differential, reinvestment in fixed capital, varies on the axis from renovation by individual owners to the change by corporate construction companies. The second differential, social and structural changes, varies on the axis from social mix to complete social and structural transformation. The third differential, displacement, varies on the axis from [complete] symbolic to [complete] physical displacement.

Gentrification as urban transformation

Transformation is intertwined with many aspects of the neighborhood as it is affected by the internal denizens and external factors conversely affect them. After the transformation starts, the community

often remains a mix of older and newer inhabitants before the complete transformation. Empirical studies show that gentrification goes on to increase social polarization and generate potential clashes within the neighbor communities during the temporary mixing stage (Lees, 2008). It furthermore triggers groups to compete for legitimizing their presence in the neighborhood (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Whether because of fighting/competing over new territory or the fear of economic loss gained from interaction with a stigmatized other, inhabitants who live in a changing neighborhood might avoid interaction with the othered groups. In his empirical research, Hunter (1974) claims that in the neighborhoods undergoing transition, inhabitants tend to raise awareness of their boundaries, in public space, defined through mutual exclusion and inclusion. The disadvantaged groups who are already excluded from society for various reasons might be the most affected from this process. Consequently, gentrification prioritizes the ones who have the means to be strategic actors throughout the process. The ones who cannot afford or associate with the new environment are eventually displaced even though the complete transformation might take time or never arrive.

That said, the older inhabitants are not passive elements in this process; the lifestyle, perceptions and openness of the inhabitants who already live in the area might influence the gentrification process. How potential gentrifiers perceive the area, and how safe and secure it will be for the developers, investors, and consumers, contributes to defining the frame of the prospective urban transformation. Thus, gentrification is also influenced by the social life of the neighborhood in transformation. So on one hand, inhabitants within migrant neighborhoods are excluded from the rest of the society, and on the other they are a close formation that restricts external entrance into their community. Migrant neighborhoods as decayed urban centers have a high potential value to undergo gentrification, largely held in balance by the will of the neighborhood.

(Im)migration in capitalist cities

As immigration is continuously happening on European land, its consequences are visible both spatially and socially. The fact that it is continuous implies immigrants should be regarded as permanent figures within the changing dynamic; if they are allowed to remain different or viewed as temporary, their otherness (origin-wise) should not be over-emphasized – as was done in the

multicultural model (Musterd 2005). Although some empirical studies have pointed out the effect of gentrification on social dynamics (Lees, 2008) and vice versa, the effect of social structures on gentrification was largely under-addressed. This dissertation focuses on neighborhoods that are densely inhabited by migrant communities cohesively bound together but suffering the consequences of gentrification in cities throughout Europe. Perception on migrant neighborhoods before and after gentrification is fluid, yet the phenomenon is often abandoned. Although the (im)migrants are heterogeneous socio-economically, in this study, the (im)migrant groups that suffer from the consequences of gentrification are considered the lower class. As such, the focus is limited to those lower income members of (im)migrant communities who live together in gentrifying neighborhoods.

Analyzing interrelations between gentrification and social dynamics of a neighborhood prior to the urban transformation would need a wide range of contexts in order to generalize the results universally. Although (im)migrant neighborhoods within different cities can be expected to generate gentrification quite similarly, the specific conditions within the cities should be noted for their significant and unique role as well. In order to cover a diverse range of contexts within continental Europe, Istanbul, Vienna and Paris are chosen as the case cities; albeit, the last case is less detailed than the previous two. Istanbul, Paris and Vienna contain a significant amount of (im)migrant population and are subjected to an on-going change through investment and disinvestment processes. In these cities, I will focus on Turkish/Kurdish inhabitants as people from the same geographical origin who currently have a physical connection in gentrifying neighborhoods.

As a very Eurasian city, Istanbul gets inner migration from rural areas of Turkey because the access to the labor and the housing markets are highly competitive but diverse. The migration is largely restricted to minorities such as Kurdish and Roma people. A vast amount of Kurdish and Turkish people migrated from rural areas of Turkey to the urban areas beginning in the 1950s. Ongoing conflicts between Kurdish and Turkish communities have a significant impact on people's perception of migration. This population, also living in the case neighborhood, Tarlabasi, experiences symbolic displacement due to the slowly proceeding gentrification. Gentrification (of Istanbul type) is mostly driven by the private-public firms' renovation and regeneration projects, which promote cleaning of the areas from 'terrorism' that is mostly associated with Kurdish population, like in Tarlabasi. On the one hand, the

housing market changes, typically, are pressed in a short period of time and are strong in terms of the substantial struggles they create and the reaction of inhabitants in concerned areas are heavier than in the other two cities. On the other hand, the developments are continuous and in some areas, like Tarlabasi, slow. The reasons for this slow process are mainly the pause in investments and the renewal project Taksim360 (Tarlabasi360) in the area, due to the unstable economy, recent terror attacks and military coup that seem to have scared away the investors while inhabitants continue waiting for their inevitable physical displacement.

Vienna serves as an example of a central European city, where Islamophobia is a rising phenomenon. This has had an impact on further discrimination and segregation of ethnic groups, mostly Turks and former Yugoslavs who migrated because of recruitment acts in the 1950s as guest workers. Gentrification (of Vienna type) is mainly led by state-led regeneration and renovation projects that promote cleaning and upgrading in neighborhoods. Vienna is an example of a welfare state and central European city with well-established rent regulations. State policies protect the early inhabitants' rental rights in concerned areas. Gentrification here is seemed to be soft in terms of its extent over a longer time; therefore the reaction of people to the structural changes are rather soft in comparison to the other cities. This program protects the early inhabitants' rights in concerned areas. Therefore, the reaction and the resilience of people to the changes are somewhat soft in comparison to the other cities. However, in Kretaviertel the traces (development of Sonnwendviertel, Hauptbahnhof, Anker Brotfabrik, etc.) of upcoming gentrification trigger worrisome arrangements within the Kurdish and Turkish communities who mainly migrated in the 1960s as guest workers.

Paris is an example of a west European city, where immigrants mostly include North and Central Africans from former French colonies, Chinese, Indian and Turkish peoples. Recent migration waves and reactions to the terror attacks of 2015 have an impact on further discrimination against immigrants. Paris is more of a welfare state, a west European city where the gentrification is often led by development plans and regeneration projects. Despite the social mix policies, in Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, Kurdish and Turkish people who once lived there, who had mainly migrated there because of the military coup in 1980 in Turkey, are by now physically displaced due to gentrification through renovation projects enacted by the city. The traces of a formerly migrant neighborhood remain

in retail as kebab places turned into 'gourmet kebabs' and former tea houses turned into hip bars still owned by these community members who left the neighborhood residentially but not commercially. The physical connection of Kurdish/Turkish population in Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis stays put commercially. Nevertheless, the neighborhood is still perceived as a migrant neighborhood by members of the larger surrounding community .

Besides the systematic analysis of similarities and differences of the processes in various contexts, the extent and the generators of those differences assist the theory making (Lees et al., 2016). Gentrification not only progresses differently in various cities but also within the same city; not all neighborhoods experience the same transformation even if perceived, potential values rise. To conclude, although consequences differ according to the macro and microfilters, displacement through losing one's sense of belonging remains one of the most damaging results for the ones who do not have the means to be strategic actors in the process. Whether physical or symbolic, displacement triggers symbolic competition within the groups who attempt to traverse with less harm from the process. Gentrification has been spreading because of the commodification of diversity and cities' participation and response with these types of global branding strategies while rent regulations are established to minimize the negative impact of upgrading and investment processes in the urban area.

1.2. The Gap: (Im)migrants and gentrification in a capitalist city

Agency of (im)migrants in a capitalist city

The most common disadvantaged groups in the cities are (im)migrant groups in need of protection in physical and social realms. They tend to reside near each other because of external exclusion and the need for internal support, i.e. access to information, jobs and housing. Structural discrimination often manifests itself as the loss of employment, the deficit in housing and the quality of surroundings; living close to one another becomes a coping mechanism. Because in the capitalist city, competition takes its toll on inhabitants to the degree that financial capital along with social and cultural capital is used as means of survival. To keep up to date with the competition in the capitalist city, social networks facilitate access to information about the resources and market amongst the immigrant inhabitants.

Furthermore, spatially, the immigrant neighborhood is often a location and source for employment opportunities in (im)migrant retail and businesses (Portes, 1995). Sticking together becomes a significant element in increasing — or even creating — opportunities and choices (i.e. residential, employment) of migrant individuals in the society (Lobo and Mellander, 2020). Simply put, to cope with the competition in the capitalist city, (im)migrants mostly stick together in the same geographical area. Consequently, the neighborhood the individuals live in, together with fellow migrants, influences the inhabitants' prospective economy (Lobo and Mellander, 2020; Galster, 2008) and life standards. Sticking together is not a purely self-decided preference but rather a functional necessity that the structural discrimination, lack of choice and opportunities oblige.

The living-together of migrants in capitalist cities is particularly significant; it forms a coping mechanism for those with less mobility and purchase-power, through access to social and cultural capital. Many studies show that living near each other protects the migrants because they initially face obstacles to fully participate in the new society (Hirsch and Liu, 2004). Besides the language barrier, they are often not informed of the social services available or their rights guaranteed to them as naturalized or permitted inhabitants of the host country. In terms of social capital, the space they live in provides bonding social capital to *get by*; however, the bonding experience does not bridge them into a new society to *get on*. Without certainty, sticking together can be a prospective limit for migrants to fully integrate into the host society or inhibit self-sustainability. Putnam (2000) suggests that while bridging social capital can generate broader identities, bonding social capital might reinforce a narrower, limited self. In line with this dilemma, the space provides a nest for togetherness of the immigrant inhabitants, and the extensive togetherness produces a space aligned with their beliefs and lifestyle based on their origins closed to novelties and cultural adaptations. The neighborhoods are at once a source of opportunity and a constraint (Kearn and Parkinson, 2001).

Like any other sociality, the narrative of (im)migration includes both spatial and social dimensions. Predominantly for migrants rather than for host societies, the narrative involves "a spatial reconfiguration of an embodied self" (Ahmed, 1999: 342). The spatial reconfiguration is more underlined in migration than the other social dynamics because the migrants are not necessarily detached from their countries of origin (Kaya, 2007) while living in the host country. Physically and

symbolically, migrants move back and forth, connecting and mixing the spaces in both realms visually and functionally. Schiller et al. (1992: 1) describes connected migration as "transnationalism as the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement".

Many scholars regard the space as a physical environment transformed from parts of nature by human-made artifacts and human bodies that contains a social system (Kaya, 2007; Fuchs, 2007). On the other hand, each social system occupies its own material or virtual space. Urban geography is informed by the notion that space is the concrete representation of the social relations within a physical environment that hosts a dynamic social system's activities and interactions (Fuchs, 2007). To the point that, due to the interrelation between the original and adopted environment, both the migrant and host societies' norms feed immigrant space. Migrant society creates the new space nurtured by the country of origin regarding the perpetual relation between space and the social system. In return, both the space in the host city and the migrant's place of origin (re)creates the migrant society endlessly.

Space is a production of a given social system. Migrant space is no exception. This dissertation heavily relies on Lefebvre's (1991) infamous triad - conceived, perceived and lived space - to explain the production of space. His triad conveys that space is not a stand-alone physical entity, but rather it is complex and intertwined with society at all levels. The space is physical at once but can be perceived and negotiated by the users and the organizers, i.e. planners, politicians, outsiders, developers, investors, and media; finally, space is lived where the bodies interact with the others (Lefebvre, 1991; Gottdiener, 1993). This dissertation follows the triad because the "social relations also are spatial relations; we cannot talk about the one without the other" (Gottdiener, 1993: 131). That said, social processes and relations create not only the material space but also the meaning attached to it by the people, be it inhabitants or outsiders (Ehrkamp, 2005). Migrants negotiate their existence in the space while engaged in transforming it, marking space as "a negotiated reality" (Anderson, 1991: 28) that involves symbolic and material reflections of migrants' local (with hosts and co-migrants) and trans-local connections from the place of origin (Ehrkamp, 2005). Particularly when faced with discrimination issues, migrant communities in the host country forge and assert a collective identity through reflection in the space (Castles and Davidson, 2020). In short, transnational space is a product

of the (im)migrant connection with their origin and the experiences faced in the new territory; as such, it provides them with social and cultural capital.

In a capitalist city, every product is a commodity according to Marxist theory. Following that, space is materiality as a result of a production process. Lefebvre suggests that space, like production, has its own dialectic moments though. Lefebvre dwells upon Marxist political economy and denotes both the concrete and abstract dimensions of space. With that, the Marxian dialectic gains fluidity of space and time when explaining the production of space. Because according to Lefebvre, every (various) mode of social organization produces an environment due to social relations. Thus by producing a space, the society manifests in materiality and reproduces itself relentlessly as "space is both a medium of social relations and a material product that can affect social relations" (Gottdiener, 1993: 132). According to Lefebvre (1991), advanced capitalist industrialization seeks the quantified space while the qualitative, human, aspect of space is often overlooked. However, the qualitative aspect of space re-emerges when the "spaces of consumption" diverge into the "consumption of space" (Lefebvre, 1991: 352).

Deriving from this idea, similarly, in urban neighborhoods a conversion occurs "when capitalism transforms the circulation of commodities for people into circulation of people through commodified places" (Gottdiener, 1993: 132). As explained before, the (im)migrant neighborhood is a product developed through migration narratives. Against a Marxist background, (im)migrant neighborhoods are a commodity in the capitalist city. Thus, it is expected that the consumers' perceptions change over time like their views on other produced goods, moved along by the invisible hand of the one-in-economic-power. Therefore, in immigrant neighborhoods, the successful capitalist, holding wealth and power is able to direct public perception to match consumer's desire. One can suspect that ultimately, the mediated perception determines the neighborhood's character as a commodity, whether as a no-go zone or a vibrant area over time.

Gentrification and (im)migrant neighborhoods

Gentrification is highly tied to investment and disinvestment cycles. The investment will only be made if the rent gap is sufficient for the changes in the priorly disinvested urban units. Investment and

disinvestment affect the space overall; both social and physical attributes of the neighborhood experience this. As previously mentioned, society produces space and vice versa; gentrification is an abrupt change in the cycle. Whether stay-put or newly moved, the society will be shaped accordingly. Thus, gentrification is a process characterized by a set of physical and social changes in the neighborhoods. Some argue that the neighborhoods in the capitalist city are competitive and inherently comparative entities (Kearn and Parkinson, 2001). With their neighborhood, one can claim a social status and a distinction from the others living in perceivably deprived areas. According to Galster (2001) the neighborhood is a commodity within a space that possesses content, with locational and behavioral aspects. In this regard, market-related competition is likely, and will then be in touch with all the aspects of neighborhoods, i.e. whether the location, social and spatial content are advantageous or not. The selection of where to reside is risky due to the unique characteristics of a complex neighborhood with which market mechanisms do not easily cope (Kearn and Parkinson, 2001).

Building upon Kearn and Parkinson (2001), the neighborhoods' overall reimagining and branding are inevitable for competition in the capitalist city. The imaginary is visible as well as socially created in public discourse and people's minds. For the general public, the buildings' deterioration is related to the immigrant population not attributable to the landlords and the public policies (Hanhorster, 2000). Through negative images, the boundaries between the groups are strengthened. In the case of migrants, too, their status is often equalled to the area they inhabit. The immigrant neighborhoods in many cities globally are formerly deprived, disinvested neighborhoods because they are affordable for the lower class newcomers to the city or country. Although it is often not the other way around — migrants actively depriving their living environment — they are commonly blamed for devaluing a neighborhood both physically and socially. Therefore, the migrant's objective becomes rejuvenation to establish a better reputation or perception. Migrant place-making is often public, and being in a visibly deprived neighborhood might be a catalyst for racism, as the majority group thinks aliens are taking over (Castles and Davidson, 2020). Because of this, the rejuvenation processes by public authorities often aim at building a better image of an area to create a more valuable commodity risk-free for further investment.

Galster (2001) claims that the critical futures of a desirable neighborhood from a consumer point of view can be predictable and considered constant while the others are not. Because while the price of quantifiable, physical attributes differs in the market, consumers give great attention to them to make bid offers. However, consumers need overall information about the quality of a commodity. Quality differs even more than the value of physical features while the goal is to benefit from the consumption. The social dynamics cannot be priced efficiently "because they are hard ex-ante for prospective bidders to assess" (Galster, 2001: 2115). Therefore, one can suggest that the dynamic features of the neighborhood will play a key role in determining decisions about mobility and financial investments over the long term. It might mean that, besides the physical quality of a neighborhood, its less-durable attributes such as social dynamics and reputation that dwelled upon consumers' ideas about the space will be a significant determinant of its realized market value.

Against this backdrop, gentrification requires a risk-free investment zone as a process in need of consumers of various scales. Therefore, besides the "concrete space", the "abstract space", which is a manifestation of relations (Lefebvre, 1991), remains critical to be assessed as profitable by the investors. Additionally, capitalist production tends to fragment and homogenise the space regarding the principle of reproducible and repetitive commodities (Lefebvre, 1991). It is known and experienced that the immigrant neighborhoods are unique in many ways and different from the regular neighborhoods of an urban area. Gentrification, a capitalist mechanism in the urban environment, will require a reconfiguration in the subject (immigrant) area, following Lefebvre (1991). In that context, this dissertation is built on the assumption that the unique dynamics in immigrant neighborhoods play a significant role even before the gentrification process visibly starts. Because meanwhile, presumably, the state, media and market in a collaboration give a 'good name' to those neighborhoods to compose a unit that is risk-free for investors and reproducible by the market.

However, in any country, gentrification will proceed differently regarding the uniqueness of immigrant neighborhoods and public policies, even setting aside the overall contextual differences. Consequently, it is assumed that gentrification in various countries proceeds uniquely regarding differences in their various collaborative strategies of state, market and media, leading to conflicts among different groups for a place in the neighborhood hierarchy. The consequence of gentrification appears fundamentally

similar; often, the earlier inhabitants migrant inhabitants occupy the lowest ranks of the hierarchy. So that, as a result of gentrification(s) in immigrant neighborhoods, whether displaced physically or symbolically, earlier inhabitants find themselves out of place, losing familiarity and the original narrative of their lives in the host region/country. Once the participation in everyday life is limited, i.e. social and physical ties are loosened, earlier inhabitants' sense of place would be affected deeply (Shaw et al., 2015). They might find themselves in a surrounding they are not familiar with and lose the support system that the social and spatial ties once provided.

Comparison of gentrification in divergent capitalist cities of the globe

According to Nijman (2007), globalization is a geographically homogenizing process that affects a wide range of areas in the current decade. The processes start to look alike mainly because they have been affected by the same global mechanisms. Global mechanisms such as neoliberalism, financialization etc. undeniably affect places, but it is important to note they have divergent effects in every case. Various regions and places are affected exclusively by global processes, operationalized distinctly depending on the context (Nijman, 2007). Many scholars point out that housing is developed dramatically, different in each country (Aalbers, 2017; Ronald, 2008). These phenomena are presumably produced via the same global mechanisms; nevertheless, they translate in contexts separately, so the term's boundaries blur. Contextual attachments, in this case, determine the particularities of the cases as "context matters" (Kazepov, 2008). Kazepov (2008) defines context as a

[...] set of alternatives made of constraints and enablements, within which individual (or collective) actors can or have to choose. [It] implies a classification exercise that allows actors to define events as constraining or enabling, to posit meanings and to act strategically (p. 2).

In line with globalization, the theories are homogenized in the academic world, too. However, theories coined following an abstraction in a singular time frame for a particular case are hegemonic impositions in contemporary urban studies. Because many other places experience the phenomena with significant differences, it is hard to generalize and explain them with a narrow terminology. By adopting a universalized term, gentrification, the particularities of each case would lack and the unique cases would be treated from a singular and often hegemonic perspective. In that way, terminology might be

sided and incomprehensive in taking the particularities of the phenomena and should not be taken for granted.

As also confirmed by Robinson (2011), theory-building practices reflect an Anglo-American hegemony in urban studies. Because urban research is attached to a particular time and space from the narrator's point of view, it is unavoidably deficit. In other words, the urban theories are often abstractions of a process from a specific time and space and are used decades later in divergent contexts. One of the reasons for that is, along with the phenomena, the terminology moves to diverse contexts, adopted, used and reproduced. Some are given nuances in translation to other languages, which fine-tunes the terminology considering the spatio-temporal particularities; some are taken directly, facing the risk of losing subtleties of the context. To sum up, because each case has its spatio-temporal particularities, the theories built without spatio-temporal variables exclude the possible scenarios that distinct politico-economic, socio-spatial realities would bring.

That said, terminology travels, just as the phenomena. In this dissertation, for terminology to travel efficiently, they are considered sufficiently abstract not to stick into particular geography or case — as a Grand Theory, which should ultimately guide empirical analysis of independent contexts. In the same vein, the comparative analysis in this dissertation thoroughly follows Peters (1998: 25), who points out that "to be effective in developing theory, and in being able to make statements about structures larger than an individual or the small group, the social sciences must be comparative". Often, the findings of the comparison will point to the necessity of revising the limits to the theory. That being said, the contextual attachments define the limits to a theory. Therefore, spatiotemporal attachments should ideally be investigated across cases and determine the generalization level that limits the terminology. In that sense, the *comparative gesture* inevitably exists in urban theory making, adopting or traveling.

On the one hand, every city is unique regarding the combination of socio-spatial and politico-economic realities. On the other, they are relative in comparison to the other cities. Robinson (2002: 532) has argued that there is a need to move "beyond comparative studies," and she rejects the universalism that has run through so much of Western-generated urban theory, demanding that it be made more cosmopolitan (Ward, 2008). Law-like statements reduce the singular, often unique cases into

opinionated boxes and even applying an established theory into a current case will require a level of comparison. Simply placing two cases next to each other will not yield much insight into the causal mechanisms of change in either of the two cases. That being said; comparative research does not have to become a research process devoid of context (Pierre, 2005). So every case has a) relative (i.e. relational, global) and b) particular (i.e. unique, local) positions while investigating an established theory. So the comparison goes beyond the differences, similarities and patterns and holds the cases as separate entities within the systematic network. Rather than putting two cases side by side, comparisons should be across cases, to evaluate the position they both locate within the theoretical framework.

The variables within these categories are the determinants for the position of a particular case within the larger frame, figuratively. For example, displacement in a general sense might mean exclusion from the space with or without relocating. Although the result of displacement, in any case, is discrimination and exclusion, the process and the methodology for empirical investigation of the processes would vary, respectively. In the same vein, what determines these notable differences within the framework are the context variables. These categories are the comparable elements of the research rather than the singular processes *vis a vis*. This dissertation suggests that given the generic definitions and the contextual differences, the cases cannot be compared directly, but their positions within the framework can be.

The working definition of gentrification in this dissertation, to remind, consists of three [fuzzy] differentials to work within: (1) reinvestment in fixed capital, (2) social and structural changes, and (3) displacement. These three axes from three differentials cumulatively determine the position of the unique case within the vast scope of the gentrification frame. The positioning ultimately should reveal gentrification's character via the cases that are interrogated as unique entities regarding their contextual attachments.

1.3. Research design

Urban processes proceed differently in every other context, even though they share the same conceptual core. The global ideals differ locally because of differences in their social, state, spatial, and economic sphere. Gentrification is one of those global concepts with a similar core but translatable into various urban realms differently and locally. Despite the differences, the process often affects the disinvested areas for their attractive, current - and higher potential - value they contain. However, selecting and residing in a new area is more than just a price calculation and physical analysis. The choice also requires some sort of assurance through assessment that a solid strategic actor base will invest, develop, and reside in the area as well. Therefore, the thoughts on the area and its reputation before the investments begin are vital in locational preferences of the market, state, and consumers.

It is known that among the disadvantaged inhabitants, the most vulnerable to gentrification's effects are (im)migrant groups. They are socially and spatially re-configuring their relations, and excluded by the housing market due to the overall changes. In these ways, gentrification bears a strong connection between the socio-spatial and politico-economic structures and socialities. However, the later stages of the process are not the only periods that gentrification and social dynamics in a neighborhood intertwine. Before the market changes in the area, the social composition should be a decisive element in the locational process. The reason why is, as a group, lower-class (im)migrants living close with fellow (im)migrants in the city might be one of the most stigmatized. It is also known that the deteriorations in (im)migrant neighborhoods are often thought to be, in public opinion, the consequence of the concentration of (im)migrant groups. Contrarily, although these areas are labeled no-go after investments slowly start in the area, most (im)migrants previously stigmatized will stay put, and the negative opinions about the area seem to lift in the public eye. Thus, an interplay between state, market, and media might be necessary to present the neighborhood as risk-free for investments, developments, and finally new residents. With these assumptions in mind, this dissertation aims at understanding the mentioned interplay in the (im)migrant neighborhoods through a comparative analysis of Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris). Overall results should reveal that although gentrification proceeds differently, the core idea remains the same; hence, the mediated perception and social consequences, especially on (im)migrant population, are conceptually

similar. By conceptualizing the different characters of gentrification and its relation to similar consequences, more elaborate policy recommendations should be possible favoring disadvantaged populations.

Empirical questions and hypotheses

Main question: What is the link between gentrification and (im)migrant neighborhoods?

(1) How are the preconditions play out for gentrification - especially in (im)migrant neighborhoods?

The first sub-question aims at revealing the connection between a neighborhood's social composition and its effect on desirability for the consumers as the 1) investors, 2) developers and 3) the future residents. Especially during the first stages of gentrification, potential demand on the areas is essential for the urban transformation to be turned into gentrification.

Having a very unique social composition, (im)migrant neighborhoods are an important subject. Therefore the question narrows down into "How does earlier (im)migrant population influence the gentrification the area?" in order to arrive at a wider answer for the former question. The hypotheses are as follows;

- The representation and policies do trigger major differences across cases in terms of how gentrification develops and proceeds.
- The perception of the potential newcomer will contribute to the investors, developers and prospective residents of the area — gentrifiers' desire to invest, develop, or live in the area.
- As the symbolic meaning might influence the perception of the neighborhood, which is created by the earlier inhabitants, the social composition of the area constitutes a vital aspect for the production of urban transformation as gentrification.
- The perception might be influenced by the media coverage of the area, projecting the inhabitants negatively or positively.

- Money-lender institutions are investigating a neighborhood spatially and socially; therefore, for a neighborhood with a high density of migrant population, investors are likely to have lesser credit options than other gentrifiable areas.
- The state often utilizes gentrification to rehabilitate neighborhoods both spatially and socially. While doing so, the migrant neighborhoods might be perceived and conceived variably regarding the renewal strategy in the area.

(2) How (print) media and policies differ across cases regarding the one affect mediate gentrification?

The second question aims at understanding the external endeavors in manipulating the perception of (im)migrant neighborhoods and its consequences. Given that the gentrification in the first stages is often supported by the state, the planning documents can reveal the strategy of the state on the area concerning the social composition. Often money-lender institutions form the urban fabric via the uneven distribution of credits throughout the city. Therefore this question seeks to detect any existing relation between money lenders' red/green-lining and social composition of a migrant neighborhood. The hypotheses are

- The media plays a vital role on outsiders' perception of a migrant neighborhood that the perceiver has previously not seen. The manipulation of perception has an intertwined relation with the gentrification process.
- With and after urban transformation the perception on the neighborhoods change, although most of the residents stay-put.
- Once the change of the mediated perception by media is drastic, i.e., developing from no-go to a vibrant or diverse area, the transformation of the neighborhood inclines to be gentrification. Because, where the manipulation of perception is aggressive, the process of gentrification will follow as aggressively in terms of the severity of the transformation in the neighborhood. As the gentrification is aggressive, the manipulation will compensate further, by
 - announcing the novelties in the transformed/transforming neighborhood,

- attracting further investor, developer, resident, or visitor to fill up the capacity, and
- dimming down the stigmatization of the neighborhood.
- The symbolic meaning attended through media to the neighborhood because of the earlier inhabitants will impact how the potential gentrifier perceives and desires it. Following that, the intensity and the character of the first stages of gentrification, and hence the ground to a corporate change will be differently shaped in migrant neighborhoods.
- The (local) state policies have a direct relation with the gentrification process.
- Where the policies are rather leaning towards neoliberal strategies, gentrification will be more aggressive. Policies that are socially oriented will prevent the urban transformation to show characteristics that would resonate as gentrification less.

3. How does gentrification vary across cases?

This question aims at investigating the variety in characteristics of displacement, investment, and social and structural changes in given areas. This question aims at understanding the distinct proceeding of gentrification with respect to the cases' particular context. The context here refers to the manipulated perception, their similar yet utmost distinct mediation, and the (local) state urban policies. The comparison should ultimately reveal that the combination of perception mediation and the (local) state policies in urban areas has a strong link to gentrification. Additionally, the stronger the characteristics of gentrification, the more the social dynamics will be affected. In this light, the hypotheses are as follows

- Gentrification term is an umbrella.
- The position of cases within the frame of fuzzy differentials might ultimately be the accurate way to interrogate and compare various gentrification. Given the generic definitions and the major contextual differences, not the cases, but their positions within the frame can be compared directly.
- Measurement of contextual categories detects the placement of particular cases on the fuzzy differential axes. The three axes cumulatively determine the position of the individual process

which ultimately should reveal the degree and the order of gentrification via the cases which are interrogated as unique entities.

Added value of comparison

There is a leading terminology to keep the theoretical rigor and it often does not apply everywhere. Challenging the existing theory is then an additional value to carrying out comparative research. Because the geographical categorizations are social constructs, tracing a theory on a space without the consideration of spatio-temporal context would reproduce those assumptions. The outcomes of a comparative analysis always remain alert to the new hegemonies and paradigms. The universalist categories, scientism and developmentalism, Nijman (2007) warns us about, can be overcome by comparison. The challenge of comparative urbanism, on the other hand, is to reconcile it with current theoretical developments in urban geography and related social sciences. It is crucial to understand and acknowledge the neglecting points that the previous comparative schemes and interpretations had. Law-like explanations are overlooking the particularities and interpretations that comparison can potentially utilize. However, one of the challenges of comparison is finding the right balance between simplifying the complexity and revealing the causal mechanisms vital to bring out phenomena with all its contextual richness. Another added value of comparison is that it no longer sees the cities as discrete, self-enclosed, separate entities. Rather, within a comparison they are open, embedded and relational (Ward, 2008). The particularities in the single case study are often ignored or sloppily categorized following the ethnocentric assumptions embedded in previous theory (McFarlane and Robinson, 2012). The comparison allows bringing numerous methodologies together and allows having richer and more innovative urban research than the classic single case studies. It forces the researcher to take time and space into consideration. Overall, as Pierre (2005) informs us too, comparison is the most rewarding strategy to control contextual variables and causal patterns; it brings an analysis one step closer to scientific explanation. By doing so, it challenges the terminology that was taken for granted and raises the limits of it.

Chapter 2. Methods and sources

2.1. Cases

Case selection

Gentrification as a destructive urban change went way beyond the term's point of origin and became widely varied around the globe. Nevertheless, the critical scholars agree that the conceptual essence of the process centers on the colonization of everyday lived spaces within the urban realm. Amongst the disadvantaged inhabitants most vulnerable to its effects are (im)migrant groups, both socially and spatially losing their sense of (re-identified) home and getting displaced, whether symbolically or physically, as a response to the overall changes in the neighborhood.

Gentrification patterns differ from country to country, city to city and even neighborhood to neighborhood within the same city. Istanbul, Paris, and Vienna are chosen for suitability in this study as well as the author's personal, extensive, (first-hand) knowledge of these cities. The census areas of this study are densely occupied by (im)migrants and stigmatized populations and are gentrifying. In all three areas, gentrification processes started as state-led urban transformation projects. They were advertised as diversity generators and began cleansing the areas of their marginalized population. In reality, the areas of these three respective cases actually share gentrification discouraging diversity, increasing tension and discrimination. The cities are good locations for study as they contain many (im)migrant populations, are attractive for national and international investment, and are globally recognized cities. Changes in the housing market are happening with different intensities within the three areas; this allows cross examination of not only different geographical locations, but also different temporal locations during the gentrification process.

The focus is on Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Strasbourg Saint-Denis (Paris), which are typical examples of gentrifying neighborhoods with a higher density of Turkish/Kurdish populations, while still experiencing variety in gentrification. In Tarlabasi, the process is policy-driven with private market interventions leading the inhabitants to have a constant fear and suspicion of eventual

displacement. In Kretaviertel, the process is softened by a soft urban renewal model; however, through cultural redefinition, inhabitants close themselves up within the group -even into smaller groups- and feel emotionally trapped. Finally, in Strasbourg Saint-Denis, the migrant communities have been largely displaced in the process of private sector intervention, and only the ones who own retail remain in the area. The ones who remain serve the host society in renovated shops with gourmet kebabs, making them feel alienated or subservient. Despite these differences, gentrification is leading to increasing competition over space and disturbs the support mechanisms needed within the Turkish/Kurdish (im)migrant groups in each respective city by conceptually limiting their potential agency.

As it was mentioned before, the cities were chosen from continental Europe: one from the west (Paris), one from central (Vienna), and one from the east (Istanbul). One of the challenges in comparing these three cities is the lack of available data . To tackle this challenge and collect data, a series of fieldwork was conducted. Even when the data is available, intercity comparison is problematic due to the different indices used. On the one hand, the cases are unique regarding the combination of socio-spatial and politico-economic contexts; on the other, they are interrelated. Robinson (2002: 532) has argued that there is a need to move "beyond comparative studies," and she rejects the universalism that has run through so much of Western-generated urban theory, demanding it be made more cosmopolitan.

Case description

Istanbul

The Republic of Turkey, as a successor of the Ottoman Empire, evolved from its origins, turning into a one-nation country. The mainstream state-building trend around this time , seen in France, Italy, etcetera. The change in national direction of the Republic of Turkey, and the given borders, gave the former citizens of the Empire a minority status. The whole terrain of the country used to recognize numerous ethnicities, unlike the newer counterpart that recognizes one language, nation, state and flag despite the diverse and vast amount of ethnicities within the given boundaries. Although the dilemma of minorities in Anatolia is not a recent phenomenon, the present-day migration map is shaped by the fact that Anatolia is inherently mixed in terms of origins. This became a main strategic reason to keep

people together and curate a strong and singular community feeling during the country's establishment, giving rise to a strict nationalism, i.e., the idealization of the nation as a superior entity (Adorno, 1950) more than patriotism, i.e. an attachment to ones nation with critical understanding (Adorno, 1950) in its foundations.

We can conclude that there were many people already within the newly defined borders of the Republic of Turkey, but got stuck in one nation that does not correspond to their original background, from countries like Bulgaria, Bosnia, Greece, etcetera. Many Turkish-speaking but ethnically diverse people were deported and sent back to their newly defined countries, although their geographical origins were supposedly the ones they left behind. Some people were deported from outside of the Republic of Turkey (but former lands of Ottoman Empire) and sent to the new borders of the Turkey, and some people were not deported but decidedly moved. There was also a significant amount of the population who consensually stayed where they were born and lived (inside of Ottoman borders but outside of Turkey's) in return for changing their names and citizenship documents.

Another primary migration type in Turkey, rural to urban flux, is supported by two main pillars: the ever-changing city and politico-economic ecosystem, and the decreasing agricultural importance and activity in the countryside of Turkey. To start with the former, Turkey was in a process of recovery, being a brand new country with a deprived budget following the decades after the independence war (1919-1922). After WWII, the United States of America lent money to 16 European countries, including Turkey, to recover their economies and for the helped countries to take place in international economic activity. For Turkey, this meant opening up the economy to the outside world, allowing free-market mechanisms to dominate financial activity. From then on, headquarters of international corporate companies began popping up in İstanbul. In addition, local and international white-collar workers were on the rise, allowing a service sector to slowly emerge, in tandem. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector was declining due to automation. Fewer employment opportunities in the countryside forced farmworkers into the city to become service workers. Extensive unskilled and skilled employment options attracted many people from other cities and villages to Istanbul.

Istanbul is a city where two continents come together and as such, has hosted diverse populations throughout its history. After 1923, the emergence of the nation-state, import-oriented position of the city was abandoned; with the impact of the Iran-Iraq war, civil war in Lebanon and, most importantly, end of the cold war, its role as a gateway for international merchandise was reasserted (Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, 2009). By serving as a gateway, İstanbul asserts itself as a viable actor on the stage for national and international investments.

Dökmeci and Berköz (1994) claim that İstanbul is divided into three units, so that it is a polycentric city in which each unit has its center and periphery. The upper class lives in centers, and the lower class lives in the peripheries. Exclusion and spatial discrimination in İstanbul come out of socio-economic exertions although this does not mean that the city has no ethnic tensions. There is a long history of tension between Turkish and Kurdish citizens, partly fed by the state. According to a report in 2011 by a research institute, *Konsensus Research Center*, in İstanbul, 6.6% of citizens consider themselves Kurdish. There are neighborhoods in which these citizens who share a migration history are concentrated mainly on cultivating a cohesive political voice.

İstanbul has long attracted migration from abroad as well as from rural Turkey, and Önal and Akdemir (2015) state that the (im)migrants born outside of İstanbul compose more than 60% of the city, and the rural-urban migration rate is 500,000 per year. A neighborhood in İstanbul with a high density of (im)migrant population is Tarlabasi. Tarlabasi's social structure was formed out of the rural-urban flux in the 1960s and changed in the 1990s following forced migration from Eastern Turkish cities densely inhabited by the Kurdish population. In the following years, due to the site's decaying nature, many lower-class rural-urban migrants resided in Tarlabasi, along with marginalized populations such as sex workers, refugees and Kurdish and Armenian ethnic minorities. The social and physical structure in the neighborhood has changed vastly; as a result, the data presented here is limited to earlier periods, collected through university reports and individual efforts. According to a report by Şahin (2006), Tarlabasi is populated by residents of which 98% speak Turkish, 95% Kurmancî, 3% Arabic, 2% Zazakî, and 2% Armenian, while in İstanbul overall, these rates are 88% Turkish, 9% Kurmancî, 2% Arabic, 1% Zazakî and 0.02% Armenian.

Although Ankara is the administrative capital of Turkey, İstanbul serves as the commercial and cultural capital. Both international and internal investments are focused on this "global city-to-be". As this opens up new employment opportunities, migration waves are directed here. These migration groups, looking for employment as service workers, find residence for themselves by filling the vacant lands in İstanbul through their self-made housings called *gecekond*. Some of them reside in the decaying urban centers, such as Tarlabasi. Due to its central location and high potential rent, it is highly subjected to new investors, particularly through gentrification. On the one hand, Tarlabasi is in an aggressive transformation process, both socially and physically. On the other hand, it still stands as a decayed center where the lower class (im)migrant groups inhabit. Specifically, the neighborhood is predominantly inhabited by Kurdish, Roma, and Turkish people.

Beyoğlu, an inner-city district in İstanbul, is a historical entertainment center of the city where there is a high ethnic concentration residing. This area lost more and more ethnic populations throughout its history, but parts of the neighborhood remain densely inhabited by diverse ethnic groups. Tarlabasi is a neighborhood where embassy workers once resided in Ottoman times. When the capital of Turkey moved from İstanbul to Ankara, the neighborhood lost its wealth but remained ethnically diverse. After the September events⁴ in 1955, when the Greek population was displaced mainly, the neighborhood was abandoned again (Kuyucu, 2005). After that period, Roma people and others from Anatolia filled the area until oppression in south-east Turkey in the 1990s led to the forced migration of Kurdish people, who joined settling in Tarlabasi. The neighborhood, a criminalized, no-go area, is primarily inhabited by Roma and Kurdish people. In the southern periphery of the neighborhood, there is a renewal project that will displace many people from the area and replace them with the elite population. The changes in the space affect the intergroup interactions and their usage of space.

Tarlabasi lies in the culturally European half of İstanbul, next to central Taksim Square and parallel to İstiklal Street, a highly visited touristic route (see Figure 1). The neighborhood's architecture reflects an historical Armenian style due to its former inhabitants. The narrow streets in the neighborhood reduce traffic, allowing a gathering space for the neighbors. Streets are used to extend the houses for

⁴ The violent rioting that erupted in İstanbul in 6-7 September, targeting the Greek and non-Muslim population after the pro-government paper İstanbul Ekspres released the news of Atatürk's house being bombed by Greeks in Salonica (Kuyucu, 2005).

neighboring practices such as chatting, eating, and playing collectively into public spaces. Due to its architectural and cultural value, the neighborhood is subjected to the nationwide Act. 5366 "protection of deteriorated historic and cultural heritage through renewal and re-use". In the name of this Act, 20,000m² out of 165,000m² became a site of a large-scale renewal project in 2006. The luxury, high-end development project 'Taksim360' was initiated by a private-public partnership, where 70% of the land was taken through negotiations with owners and 30% by expropriation. However, this project was only the first step in Tarlabasi's upgrading. Other bulldozer-development projects followed the private-public cooperation; the Taksim Square pedestrianization project aims to turn the area into a shopping hub, with community and art centers (such as Tarlabasi Community Center, STEP, etcetera), and numerous AirBnb's. While in Tarlabasi, the tenure structure is 33% owner-occupied, 57.5% rental, 3.5% property of relatives (paying no rent), 5% property of a foundation (paying rent), and 1% others (Sahin and Caglayan, 2006), the new luxury development, taksim360, aims clearly at affluent people. Furthermore, the area is increasingly subjected to speculative investments as investors buy buildings in the neighborhood without much action (such as renovating, selling or occupying) because of the economics stagnation that the external economic effects caused such as terrorist attacks in İstanbul and the recent global pandemic. Consequently, most inhabitants stay-put while feeling displacement pressure due to the lack of protective policies against tenants' potential evictions or sales with unjust prices.

Vienna

Vienna, Austria's capital, is located in the middle of Europe and acts as a gateway between the Balkans and west Europe. It is a hot point for immigrants looking for jobs, education, and culture or a step to western countries. Like all other cities in Europe, for Vienna, migration is one of the most critical components in social geography. Graphics from 2011 show that almost a third of the population in Vienna is foreign-born (Speringer and Bauer, 2014). Major immigrant groups in Vienna are Turkish and former Yugoslav people who have been recently living in areas with high migrant density (Giffenger, 1998). Within these groups, people largely stick together to retain their ethnic and historical heritage and maximize access to information.

In general, the neighborhoods that the immigrants dominate are perceived as undesirable by the rest of the community. The 10th district (10. Bezirk) is one of the districts with a dominant Turkish and former Yugoslav population. The area has remained a minority district where many migrant groups reside and is in the inner-city with highly profitable land. As was inevitable, the gentrification processes started with changes in the market. The Kretaviertel neighborhood seemingly has a dense migrant population, which makes it an undesirable area for Austrian habitants.

In contrast to Istanbul, Vienna experienced limited immigration after the second world war. The city's immigration mainly took place as 'guest worker' migration, coming primarily from the Western Balkan states and Turkey starting in the 1960s, and many did not return to their countries of origin later on. Many of those early immigrants found residency in neighborhoods of privately owned buildings from the founder's period⁵ (1850-1914) in western and southern Vienna outside of the 'Gürtel', a massive traffic belt; the migrant populations still dominate those neighborhoods. The 'wider' Kretaviertel is one of them (see Figure 1) and hosts one of Vienna's most significant densities of Turkish residents. In 2018, approximately 9.9% of the neighborhood's inhabitants had been born in Turkey compared to the roughly 4% born in Vienna. Compared to other migrant groups in the city, the Turkish community's average educational level is lower. In addition, their labor market positions contribute to comparably lower socio-economic statuses (see Kohlbacher and Reeger 2020: 108).

Kretaviertel long had the image of a forgotten island having been located 'behind' train stations and the traffic belt for centuries, characterized by founder's period's blocks, large-scale municipal housing estates and commercial lots. Around 75% of the current buildings are rental units, 20% are owned, and 5% are other types with only around 43% being social housing subject to rent regulations. It should be noted that the private rental market for buildings built before 1945 is usually rent-regulated. However, the introduction of limited-time contracts led to an increasingly precarious housing situation and price increases (Kadi, 2014). Data on the amount of rent-regulated apartments is not currently available at the neighborhood level.

⁵ It (Gruenderzeit in German) refers to the economic period between 1850-1914 that Germany and Austria were going through before the great stock market had crashed (Lichtenberger, 1994).

Following the Fall of the Iron Curtain, the accession of Austria to the European Union in 1995 and the city's new role in the enlarged European Union (2004), city administration began focusing on Vienna's economic competitiveness. This reorientation aimed, amongst other foci, to develop Vienna into a significant hub in the trans-European transport network (Vienna city administration, 2011). In 1993, a new central train station was built in the 10th district at the former terminus stations connecting east and south Vienna. Besides the train station, the strategic development of this key area also foresaw the development of a new and attractive neighborhood (the Sonnwendviertel) on the site of a former freight station. According to the city's plans, the Sonnwendviertel development, started in 2009 with the first apartments realized in 2013, should remove the massive barrier of the freight station and adjacent neighborhoods, like the Kretaviertel, while functioning as an impulse generator (Vienna city administration, 2015). Other piecemeal development projects that shaped neighbor relations in the Viennese case study have subsided renovation programs in 2010 and 2015 including a temporary use project of an industrial building (Am Kempelen Park, 2016). However, most notable was the opening of the 'Ankerbrotfabrik' in 2015. The Ankerbrotfabrik is a cultural hub that includes creative industry related uses, such as galleries and ateliers, lofts, co-working spaces, and a critical Viennese NGO (Caritas). With the addition of the Central European University, the recent structure of the area appeared.

Paris

Paris is one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Western Europe, and each year it attracts foreigners and immigrants. In addition to population growth through migration, the French population has a high birth rate compared to most other European countries. Increasing demographic figures for both immigration and the French population is one of the significant inputs of social change within the city. Although the migrant groups are not necessarily segregated based on ethnicity but more so socio-economic reasons, some degree of social exclusion has been seen in studies on the political participation of migrant groups (Maxwell, 2010).

Many neighborhoods of Paris are undergoing massive gentrification as visible in Paris's 10th district (10e arrondissement). Observations reveal that there is a considerably high density of migrant population at the neighborhood level. While the southern part of the district is subjected to progressive

gentrification, the middle part is partially dominated by Indian, Kurdish, and Chinese groups, with each group dominating a street. The Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is a neighborhood within the 10th district densely occupied by Kurdish, Indian and African people. The difference from other Parisian city units is that this area is gentrified but not by any newly built project.

Despite the initial plan to fully involve Paris in the comparison, during the process it was not completed. Besides an unforeseen loss of material and data along the way, the differences between the cases were humongous and did not add more than the effort to make it fit into the dissertation. For that reason, the Paris case appears in this dissertation in chapter 6 and 7 but only to set a control case and provide insights from another city concerning the topic in chapter 8. Although it was not completed, the case proves that the model works in many cities regardless of the colossal differences between cities.

2.2. Methods

The dissertation is built upon a main question interrogated by three questions. The further *support*-questions aim at guiding the analytical interrogation (4 in part 1, 2 in part 2 and 3 in part 3) of gentrification in the migrant neighborhoods from pre-gentrification to the consequences thereafter. After a literature review in chapters 3 and 4 and a revealing of the analytical toolbox in chapter 5, the questions correspond to respective result chapters: 6, 7, and 8.

Part 1: Outsider perception




Figure 2.1 Schematic representation of research design: Outsider perception (Author's illustration)

The first question is treated in Chapter 6 and aims at understanding how the image - born out of social composition - of an (im)migrant neighborhood influences the desirability of the area for the consumers. The chapter includes the pre-gentrification, gentrification and the conclusive episodes while analyzing the outsider perspectives (see Figure 2.1). The methodology aims at understanding demographics, outsider perceptions, and mass representation of the neighborhood through statistics, semi-structured interviews, and print-media archive analysis.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
What are the spatial characteristics of these areas?	Statistics Field mapping	On-line Field work	TUIK, Field report (Sahin,2006) Austria Statistik INSEE

Table 2.1 Research support-question (2.1.1).

The statistics regarding the spatial characteristics of the area involve the tenure structures and housing qualities. The field mapping concerns the social and physical infrastructure in and around the areas, transportation networks and the neighborhoods' proximity to goods, to answer the question in Table 2.1.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
What are the social compositions of these areas?	Statistics	On-line	TUIK, Field report (Sahin,2006) Austria Statistik INSEE

Table 2.2 Research support-question (2.1.2).

The statistics regarding the social composition of the area - used answering question in Table 2.2 - involve the demographics concerning languages spoken, birth country and origins, age, gender, education level, and the employment structures. Demographics of population living in the area reveal

the composition in comparison to the larger domain of the city and the country. The sources are the field reports and TUIK - Austrian statistics - INSEE data. Migration histories and types are also categorized through statistics. The immigration types will ultimately contribute to unique belongings, possessions and therefore ties. The sources used for the quantitative data originate from TUIK - Austrian statistics - INSEE; however, qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews in the field fills the blanks that quantitative data cannot provide, such as people's roots, sense and location of belongings and details of their possessions.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
How is the every day life in the case areas?	In-depth interviews Field diaries	Field work	Research stay over 2 months in each area.

Table 2.3 Research support-question (2.1.3).

The interviews are made with the inhabitants of the neighborhood from representatives of diverse groups concerning their languages spoken, birth country and origins, age, gender, education level, and the employment structures - to answer the question in Table 2.3. The diaries are taken in during the research stays and are written where necessary in boxes.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
What is the media coverage of the area?	Archive analysis	On-line archives	Library-University of Istanbul DerStandard Library-University of Sorbonne

Table 2.4 Research support-question (2.1.4).

The news about the areas within defined years are categorized into three types to answer the question in table 2.4. The first type (type I) refers to the news published regarding the criminal activity and the poor housing conditions of the areas. The second type (type II) refers to art and culture, history, and tourism related news published regarding the areas. The third and the last type (type III) concerns the news on upgraded housing conditions and investment suggestions in the subjected areas.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
What is the (potential) gentrifiers' perception?	Semi-structured interviews Field diaries	Field work	Research stay in over two months in each area.

Table 2.5 Research support-question (2.1.5).

To answer the question in Table 2.5, the interviews with the representatives of various groups are taken on-line about the perception of the areas given. From each case, twelve interviews answered the same open questions. Field diaries are provided in the text, in boxes, where necessary and serve as supportive information. The notes include the authors' perceptions as an outsider.

Part 2: Policies in-affect




Figure 2.2 Schematic representation of research design: Policies in-affect (Author's illustration)

The second question is treated in Chapter 7 and aims at understanding the role of policies in shaping the gentrification process. From pre-gentrification to its consequences the chapter investigates the related policies (see Figure 2.2). By investigating a variety of cases and their affecting policies, this part reveals the strong connection between the urban transformation processes and the (local) state.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
What are the policies in effect by case?	Literature review Policy analysis	On-line Library archives	see Table

Table 2.6 Research support-question (2.2.1).

Laws, regulations and rules in supra-national, national, sub-national, regional, and local levels of the three cases are subject to investigation (see Table 2.7). The analyses are made - to answer the question in Table 2.6 - on documents in related levels within the categorization of policy document (definition), policy review (intention), department budgets (implementation) and yearly reports (consequence). The analysis is made in 3 steps: generalscan (general understanding), primary coding (word scan), and thematic coding.

Istanbul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10th development plan 2014 - 2018 - Strategic plan 2014-2023 - Beyoğlu land-use plan (not on use) - Urban renewal law 6306 - Heritage conservation law 5366
Vienna	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - STEP 2025 - Strategy plan 2010 - Comprehensive plan 2015 - Law of rent regulations - Program of soft urban renewal

Paris	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project of housing and the development - Local urbanism plan 2006 - Orientation of housing and zoning - Protection zones - Law for access to housing and urban renewal
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Table 2.7 Policy documents under investigation

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
How do the policies influence gentrification regarding its fuzzy differentials?	Policy analysis	On-line Library archives	see Table

Table 2.8 Research support-question (2.2.2).

In order to investigate the policies in effect regarding gentrification, they were categorized into three groups. The question is posed accordingly (see Table 2.8). The first group includes the policies that mediate the displacement process. The particular policies taken for this are the policies focusing on tenant protection, expropriation, diversity, integration/(im)migration, land-use and zoning. The second group includes policies that mediate the reinvestment in the fixed capital. The policies analyzed within this group deal with tenure taxation, transaction costs, money lending, urban renewal, and private-public investment.




Figure 2.3. Policy analysis categorization (Author's illustration)

The third group is dedicated to the policies that mediate social and structural changes. Particularly, the policies related to social mix, social cohesion/adaptation, social/affordable housing, and mixed use/functional mix are under investigation. The policies in all three groups are treated within sub-divisions to simplify and allow the comparison across cases (see Figure 2.3; see Figure 2.4 for further details).

Gentrification-induced displacement

Tenant protection	Rent rise, Termination of contract, Eviction, Contract duration
Expropriation	The object of expropriation, Justification, Compensation, Objection
Diversity	Housing options for migrants, Integration programs, Naturalisation Us and them rhetoric
Integration/ (Im)migration	Politicization of diversity , Diversity in housing, Objects of diversity, Substitute of diversity discourse, Ethnic diversity, Accessibility / Participation, Overall
Land-use/zoning	Centralisation of decisions, Implementation, Density, Type

Reinvestment in fixed capital

Tenure taxation	Residential property, Property income, Tenant tax, Multiple houses tax, Value increase tax, Additional taxes
Transaction costs	Purchasing tax, Transfer tax, Administration fees, Real estate agency, VAT
Money lending	Interest rates, Giver, Receiver, Paying back options
Urban renewal	Justification, Crucial actors, Intention, Target, Areas
Private-public investment	Construction sector, Investment/development aim and climate, Main actors

Social and structural changes

Social mix	Substitution, Strategy, Action, Focus
Social cohesion/ adaptation	Substitute, Target, Goal, Action, Focus
Social/affordable housing	Actors, Finance, Goal, Target
Mixed use/ functional mix	Goal, Strategy, Action

Figure 2.4. Policy analysis focuses (Author's illustration)

Part 3: Gentrification typologies




Figure 2.5 Schematic representation of research design: Gentrification typologies (Author's illustration)

Data type(s)	Unit(s)	Variable(s)	Theme(s)
Interviews	(Im)migrant residents of the neighborhood(s). The diversity of interviewees is based on the rental status and housing category of current stay	Age Gender Educational level Occupation Place of origin The years of stay Tenure status The housing category (lf) monthly rent/m2	- The migration history - The social relations in the neighborhood - The spatial familiarity in the neighborhood - Reaction to the changes in the neighborhood
Observation	Personal field diary during the <i>extensive</i> research stay	Date Location	- Social interactions: durable engagements fluid encounters - Use of public space - Author's perspective
Image Analysis	Collected photography: self made, neighbors-made, and on-line	Date Location	- Everyday life - Eventfulness - Structural changes - Overall neighborhood aesthetics

Table 2.9. qualitative analysis overview

The third question is treated in Chapter 8 and aims at understanding how the characteristics of the transformation vary across cases considering gentrification as a three dimensional framework. By utilizing gentrification terminology as a framework to analyze and assess characteristics of the transformations it aims to establish an overall comparison between the given cases.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
How does displacement vary on the spectrum in various contexts?	Demographics statistics Land allocation statistics Expert interviews In-depth interviews Field mapping	On-line Field work	TUIK, INSEE, Stat Austria + field reports Projects reports

Table 2.10 Research sub-question (2.3.1).

This question (see table 2.10) aims at understanding the variety of displacement felt or experienced in the area and defining each locationally. The demographic statistics include education, income level, ethnic origins, and age. The land allocation statistics aim at capturing the displacement initiated directly by the state.

Expert interviews involve the project managers, planners, and local administration (such as mukhtars). In-depth interviews involve the stay-put inhabitants answering questions about their former, displaced neighbors and their situations in the area regarding the on-going transformation. All the methodology is used to create a map of the field to have a view on schematic representation of displacement types and their locations.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
How does reinvestment in fixed capital vary on the spectrum in various contexts?	Field mapping Document analysis Image analysis	On-line Field work	Field maps Google maps + booking.com + flatsearch sites + various websites Planning documents (environmental plans) Photography

Table 2.11 Research support-question (2.3.2).

This question (see Table 2.11) aims at understanding the variety of reinvestment in fixed capital in the area and defining it locationally. The field mapping involves the proximity of the cases to goods such as infrastructure, service, or developed areas.

Housing typologies based on photography and the observations collected during fieldwork are assessed, and a quality map is made deriving from the housing typologies via field mapping. For the maps, as software, QGIS and Affinity Designer are used. All the methodology is tied to a map on the field to create a schematic representation of displacement types and their locations.

Question	Method	Collection - Availability	Source
How does social and structural changes vary on the spectrum in various contexts	Demographic statistics In-depth interviews Observation Image analysis	On-line Fieldwork Field diary	Tuik + INSEE + Stat Austria, Project reports, Field reports Interviews Field diary Photography

Table 2.12 Research support-question (2.3.3).

This question (see Table 2.12) aims at understanding the variety of social and structural changes in the area and defining each locationally. The demographic statistics involve education, income level, ethnic origins, and age.

In-depth interviews are conducted with the stay-put inhabitants of representatives of various groups. Observations are based on a field diary taken during fieldwork, focusing on the social changes visible in the public space. All the methodology is tied to a map on the field to create a schematic representation of displacement types and their locations. In order to sketch the actual site and the occurring gentrification, the units' function, price, status, tenure, and the potential condominium was mapped using the actual land use plans as a base map, and elaborated through fieldwork.

2.3. Comparison

The comparison is held in three cases using gentrification terminology as a framework of comparison to investigate differences, similarities and patterns of urban transformations across cases. Gentrification is loaded with contextual attachments, especially with regards to the London case. Nevertheless, since the term gentrification originated in the 1960s, its reach has gone well beyond its birthplace. Urban theories are often the abstraction of a process from a certain time and space and are used decades

later in divergent contexts. The adoption of those theorizations lack the variables particular to the case but are significant in shaping the processes, because in the *world of cities* (Robinson, 2016) each and every case has its own spatio-temporal particularities. As such, the theories built without spatio-temporal variables exclude the possible scenarios that distinct politico-economic and socio-spatial realities would bring.

The dominant theories mostly draw on political, economic and social aspects of the American city (Pierre, 2005) in urban studies. Theory-building practices linger after a period of Anglo-American hegemony in urban studies (Robinson, 2016). They are now seen in diverse contexts; adopted, used and reproduced. Some are given nuances in translation as the language fine-tunes the terminology according to the spatio-temporal particularities; some are taken directly, facing the risk of losing subtleties in context. But what is the balance between generalization and focus? More importantly, what is the starting point to test out or produce theory; from which perspective? Then what are the limits to a theory?

Gentrification as a phenomenon arguably appears much earlier than it was terminologically named. Petsimeris (2013) suggests that gentrification-like processes already occurred with the early Romans before the emergence of advanced capitalist cities. However, the global reach of a singular and comprehensive term only happened after the process was observed in London, Islington, by Ruth Glass (1964). It is a relatively less abstract term than terms like surplus or capital, and it has a higher dependence on the local particularities. The liability of its universality is in question, and this part provides a de-contextualization of the term through linguistic differences. The parameters of the context and contextual attachment are defined in this section to be in use for the rest of the dissertation.

The term gentrification emphasizes particular elements that are embedded in its birthplace. Looking for gentrification *outside the core* (Islam, 2005) with a similar approach to the anglophone world risk reducing phenomena's particular gravity. The causalities of gentrification-like processes all around the globe are variable, highly context-related, and somewhat unique (Maloutas, 2012) contrary to the common presumption that it is attached to the same mechanisms like de-industrialization or suburbanization. Maloutas (2012) claims that the recent attempts of stretching the gentrification within

time and space are a form of de-contextualization. He says the reach of the term goes even beyond the phenomenon itself, as the term arrives to some countries in which the process is not visible (Maloutas, 2012). Some countries' academy in their native languages, on the other hand, adopted the term gentrification but gave a new translation to it. However, these translations often preserve what is embedded in the original term. On a linguistic level as well, it is possible to observe the de-contextualization. While the term also changed in the English language over the years, these changes might reveal the temporal evolution and adaptation. Nevertheless, the translation of the term in other languages provides a significant insight into the de-contextualization. The following section will briefly comment on the local linguistic equivalents of gentrification in French, Turkish and German.

Linguistic comparison

The French case is the most characteristic, as Henri Coing (1966) throws the word *renovation urbaine* for Paris, quite parallel to Ruth Glass doing so for London (1964). However, this term merely is used for gentrification-like processes. The term gentrification was hardly used in the French language before the 1980s although gentrification-like processes were only observed by the end of the 1990s (Clerval, 2013). According to Anne Clerval (2016), the process is not clearly visible because the public policies in France since the 19th century decreased the reinvestments and displacement in the cities. So the term gentrification was not in use; rather, despite its fundamental nuance, the term '*embourgeoisement*' for a long time was its French substitute. In *Dictionnaire de l'habitat et du logement* 2002 edition, *embourgeoisement* cross-references gentrification. *Dictionnaire Critique de la Mondialisation* (2012), defines gentrification as "center-periphery type spatial distribution from a historic core".

It thus refers both to a dynamic of social change and to its spatial arrangement. This *embourgeoisement* process concerns housing, public spaces, and shops. For some, more sensitive to the theme of class struggle, gentrification is defined as a process of adaptation of old urban space to the renewed state of social relations; therefore, it can only be confrontational due to the interference of various actors. However, if gentrification is now recognized as the marker of urbanization, the triggering factor of the process and the role of the actors can vary from one context to another [...] To conclude, we can say that gentrification participates in urban renewal for the benefit of the new bourgeoisie. Even if this renewal is done gradually, in return lower-income groups are forced to move away from the central districts (*Dictionnaire Critique de la Mondialisation*, 2012 - Author's translation).

Although sometimes used interchangeably, embourgeoisement and gentrification are not literal mirrors of each other. Mostly in French and English literature these two terms are evoked as literal peers; however, the former is an overall social change, almost an upward class mobilisation (les mot de la géographie, dictionnaire critique, 1993) while the latter refers to a replacement of earlier lower-class inhabitants and lower quality structures with newer higher-class inhabitants and higher quality structures.

In Turkish there are several attempts to translate gentrification. Mutenalaşma (to become chosen), iyileştirme (to become good), jantileşme (to become polite) and soylulaşma (to become gentry) are some of the translations. The translations themselves point out an amelioration process. From the given translations the one which is used the most is soylulaşma (to become gentry), which is closest to a direct translation. However, in Turkey the term 'gentry' from an English point of view does not exist. There are 'ağa' who own rural land and people who work on the Aga's farms for shelter in return. With a similar sense of humour to Ruth Glass, a full contextualization of the term would be met by ağalaştırma:

Although gentrification includes many different definitions, it can generally be defined as the changing of the residential areas on the periphery of the city center as a result of demand from the upper middle income groups. (Kayasü and Yetiskul 2014).

Besides the acknowledgement of different approaches, this definition focuses on the demand-side explanations. Work on defining the seçkinleştirme (to become exclusive) process, which is part of the transformation in residential areas, began in the 1970s. Even though it takes place in foreign literature, the work on the definition of this process emerged in the late 1980s after seçkinleştirme (to become exclusive) examples began to be observed in Istanbul. Examples of seçkinleştirme (to become exclusive) in Istanbul are increasing steadily in parallel with the importance of urban transformation projects.

After seçkinleştirme (to become outstanding) is observed, in Turkish literature, the process was named in a great variety. Cengiz Bektaş used the term "gentilizasyon" (Bektaş, 1996) to describe this process. Zeynep Enlil (2000) states that the term "gentrification" was brought to Turkish by Gönül Tankut as "gentrification." In another study, Ulusoy (1995) used the term "bourgeoisization" for this process and stated that the term "gentrification" was used, too. Çağlar Keyder preferred to define this form of transformation with the word "mutenalaşma (to

become chosen) (Keyder, 2000). "Gentrification" was mostly used in the studies carried out on the examples of the process that are observed in Istanbul in the 2000s. However, the term "seçkinleştirme (to become exclusive)" was also used in some studies, emphasizing that not only the "noble" class but also the new middle class and artists were included in this formation" (Uzun, 2006 - Author's translation).

The predominant state-role in the process is apparent in the Turkish definitions. However, the lack of agreement on a singular term reduces communication between different studies and empties the political load of the term.

Gentrification in German-speaking context is adopted through a particular point of view in the dictionary definition. *Gentrifizierung* /Gentrifizierung/ is a directly 'Germanified' version of the original term. In Lexikon der Geographie, 2002 gentrification is defined as

the social enhancement associated with the displacement of low-income populations in neighborhoods close to the city center. In contrast to the public sector reorganization, gentrification is the upgrading of inner-city areas by the 'gentrifiers' or 'yuppies' (young urban professionals, i.e., younger people with a particular lifestyle and well paid, often localized activity in the service sector). In the United States, gentrification was used in urban decay areas with historic buildings by the public sector as a tool to bring about a social shift towards a more taxable population. The area is designated as a 'historic district', which includes conservation and investment requirements and leads to the emigration of the financially weak population" (Brunotte et al., 2002 in Lexikon der Geographie - Author's translation).

The given definition is very narrow and handles the term only through a demand-side explanation. Although by definition the urban decay in the U.S. was answered via the urban planning tools (Franz, 2015), the gentrification is defined as a result of movements of affluent housing market customers.

Comparative gesture

The abstraction level of terms allows them to travel. If the abstraction level is not sufficient, the theories react to a singular case in which they become Grand Theory. In the case of sufficient abstraction of a theory, the empirical analysis is directed to isolate the contextual particularities from the theory building as a result of which the theory becomes "simplistic, bordering on the banal" (Pierre, 2005). Maloutas (2011) suggests that abstraction is, by definition, a partial loss of meaning by which the theory can be translated in different contexts. The latter suggests that many other places experience theoretically

similar processes yet with significant differences. The universal, path-related theories with high abstraction levels should not be taken for granted in each case, because universal facts might not be adequate to explain the phenomena in particular cases without the contextual attachments. The relation and difference between phenomena and theory are only explicable via the context. A theory, therefore, reveals the process in an investigation, ultimately, with the contextual attachments (Maloutas, 2011). Gentrification, like the other urban regeneration processes, are highly related to their context, in the sense that their patterns and impact are determined by the combined effect of mechanisms and institutions involving the market, the state, civil society and the specific and durable shape of local socio-spatial realities, i.e. built environments, social relations inscribed in property patterns, urban histories and ideologies.

In other words, gentrification-like processes are observed everywhere globally, yet, as Shaw (2008) claims, are different in different places while the processes are mainly affected by the local context. Kazepov (2005) defines context as a "[...] set of alternatives made of constraints and enablements, within which individual (or collective) actors can or have to choose. [It] implies a classification exercise that allows actors to define events as constraining or enabling, to posit meanings and to act strategically". Inspired by the definition of Maloutas (2017), parameters of context in an investigation of gentrification, are therefore,

- (1) *the economic* (exchange) sphere that mainly focuses on labor market conditions and market access to housing;
- (2) *the state* (redistribution) sphere that covers housing and public services allocation, as well as local regulation regimes;
- (3) *the social* (reciprocity) sphere that includes social and family networks, churches and other local voluntary organizations, and
- (4) the specific and durable shape of *local socio-spatial realities*, that is, built environments and social relations inscribed in property patterns, urban histories, and ideologies.

The context is embedded in the cases, and the given spatio-temporal attachments should ideally be investigated across cases through comparison. Even single-case studies that investigate a particular area with a concept as a starting point in mind would require a level of comparison (Robinson, 2011) with the time that the concept was observed, coined, recognized, and traveled to the time and space of the subjected area. Although the more in-depth inspection of each case is less likely to be achieved through multi-case studies, the concept at focus and the contextual particularities that make a

difference is comprehensively understood via comparison. Comparative gestures cannot be separated from urban theory (Robinson, 2016). According to Guy Pierre (2005), the comparison is

the process through which the observer assesses the defining features and significance of an object under study. Almost any observation, whether one makes it in academic research or real life, implies some form of comparative assessment, such as big-small or tall-short. Without comparison, one cannot tell whether an object is big or small (p. 454).

The following elements that were drawn by Musterd (2005) should be compared across countries first: (1) welfare state at the national level; (2) the labor market, and the economy at the regional and global levels; (3) the social networks, socialization, stigmatization processes at the local levels; and, (4) personal characteristics in the individual level.

Each case is unique, however related. Likewise, the primary trigger of a concept might be universal, related, or similar, but translation of concepts would be different in each case due to the diverse context. The core mechanisms are in an endless relation with the spatio-temporal particularities of the areas in return, which creates more of an umbrella for a concept than taken-for-granted theories. Merely placing two cases next to each other will not yield much insight into the causal mechanisms of change in the two cases. That said, comparative research does not have to become a research process devoid of context (Pierre, 2005). So every case has a 1) relative (i.e., relational), 2) particular position. The comparison goes beyond the differences, similarities and patterns, and should treat the cases as separate entities within a systematic network. Thus, the comparison should be a comparison of the position they respectively locate within the theoretical framework.

To sum up, the theories and concepts that globally used are context-related, and the degree of this dependency varies concerning their specific object. Gentrification is context-related in the sense that its principal cause and social impact are determined by the combined effect of socio-temporal variables and institutions involving the market, the state, civil society, and the specific and durable shape of local socio-spatial realities. In this manner, even a concept within the same area but in a different period requires a level of comparison.

Chapter 3. Genesis of gentrification term

This chapter sets out to illustrate the theoretical genesis of the term gentrification as it is utilized in this dissertation. At its most basic, gentrification is neighborhood change although not all neighborhood change is gentrification. The framework for gentrification in current discourse is vague and wide and, accordingly, covers a broad scope of neighborhood transformation within; hence, the term is comprehensively used to describe distinct processes that must first be parsed out. All said, as a term, gentrification is becoming an apt description for a specific type of urban change constituted in light of extensive knowledge from previous urban change models that explain similar but distinctly different urban processes. Therefore, gentrification as used in this dissertation will be defined in this chapter as an extension of neighborhood change literature.

Section 3.1 sets forth and describes the neighborhood transformation literature that paved the way for the term gentrification. Then, in Section 3.2, a classification of neighborhood transformation will bring together the common elements of prior models that brought forth gentrification terminology as used currently. Finally Section 3.3, will explore the first uses of gentrification *in situ*. Similarly to other urban processes, gentrification is very much dependent on elements in need of contextualization. The spatio-temporal context acts almost as a separate entity in constructing these phenomena; therefore, understanding gentrification as a term thoroughly is only possible once its origins are explained through the related literature and personal situation of the woman who coined the phrase, Ruth Glass.

3.1. Neighborhood transformation

Neighborhoods change with or without external forces, and there has been a vast amount of causal explanations on the subject for various types thusly. The ongoing transformation of neighborhoods and cities generate comprehensive debates and explanations in critical literature. Numerous models explain the neighborhood change, but in this section only the relevant models are revealed in contribution to the genesis of the gentrification term. This digging through the background composes a response to Johnson-Schlee's (2019) call regarding the necessary understanding of the path to a heavily weighted term that carries previous work densely in a single word. Therefore, this section will

focus on the neighborhood change models which appear to be inspirational for the construction of gentrification as a term.

Neighborhoods as ever-changing organisms

The neighborhood is one of the scholarly instrumentalized but also colloquially known words with infinite definitions. neighborhoods are particularly appealing to examine because they showcase an intersection of community, its spatial dimension, and the (local) state regulations. A focus on neighborhoods might reveal several matters, such as but not limited to the physical translation of social relations and physical artifacts' impact on social relations.

On a social account, the neighborhood is a space that enables social interactions because people that are located proximately inherently communicate, even if not verbally. In the same vein, Mumford (1954) suggests that

Neighbors are people united primarily not by common origins or common purposes but by the proximity of their dwellings in space. This closeness makes them conscious of each other by sight, and known to each other by direct communication, by intermediate links of association, or by rumour. [...] [I]n origin, neighborliness rests solely on the fact of local cohabitation (pp. 257-258)

The need for social interaction brings about social proximity; vice versa, proximity provides further means of interaction. Humans exist as social packs and live proximately in urban areas. Similarly, Mumford (1954: 257) considers neighborhoods as areas people live close by as "a fact of nature". So for him, neighborhoods naturally assemble where human beings gather to settle and organize within a defined territory as in nature. In agreement with Mumford, this dissertation considers neighborhood formation a fundamental function born from the need of association, social bonds, and a sense of community.

Neighborhood as a physical space orthodoxly draws the question of boundaries. However, the definition and meaning of neighborhood gets trickier with this very question, which many scholars with different approaches have attempted to answer. For example, Keller (1968: 89), from an ecological

point of view, describes the neighborhood as "a place with physical and symbolic boundaries". Morris and Hess (1975: 6) define it as "place and people, with the common sense limit as the area one can easily walk over". Further in regards to boundaries, Golab (1982: 72) suggests that it is "a physical or geographical entity with specific (subjective) boundaries". Finally, the National Commission on neighborhoods in 1979 defines the neighborhood as an entity "what the inhabitants think it is".

Combining these approaches by different scholars, the description of the neighborhood's boundaries can be regarded as highly tied to the social meaning of space rather than any one definitive definition of space. First and foremost, the neighborhood as a physical space enables social interactions while providing protection and production of those interactions. This dissertation, thusly, grasps neighborhood similarly—as a social entity in a physical space, where inhabitants' perception determines the boundaries.

A neighborhood is a minor urban system; a gathering of many will make a city. A neighborhood is or becomes an administrative tool to organize social, spatial and economic relations, but on a more manageable scale. Firstly, it is an organically created space where manageable social interactions are built. Then, the administrative capacity, in terms of population and area, is defined to provide meaningful interactions and face-to-face encounters within the small-sized urban unit (Kallus, 2000). Subsequently, the neighborhood becomes a tool to foster social change that can be well controlled. Finally, it becomes utilized as a politico-economic tool in zoning.

Therefore, the neighborhood definition to be used here is one recognizing both the social and spatial units of social organization this designation fills. The micro-relations (socio-spatial relations) develop with the decisions at the macro-level (plans and regulations), and this relationship changes through upper hand decisions such as zoning and planning or bottom relations such as social dynamics between the neighbors. There is no doubt that they impact one another, and on this account, there are several opinions and studies to investigate and generalize neighborhood change.

Neighborhood change models in deterministic fashion

From a nature-inspired account, ecological approaches treat the neighborhood as a system seeking equilibrium (Park and Burgess, 1925). According to the Chicago school, considered the founder of the ecological approach in urbanism, neighborhood changes are only natural. For them, neighborhood change is an urban kind of deterministic process based on rational and economic mechanisms (ibid.). Following the ecological approaches, in this dissertation, too, subsequently, *human agency is considered limited* when it comes to change in the neighborhoods because the locational preferences are made rationally as decided by the individuals participating. Therefore, following the formerly described determinist approach, neighborhood change is a natural process that economic and social forces initiate and *cannot be interrupted* by the neighborhood residents directly, as also described by Schwirian (1983).

Given ecological explanations, the invasion-succession model is one vital ancestor of the term gentrification. The invasion and succession model is inspired by an ecosystem seeking its equilibrium. Likewise, plants rotate to find a better environment that involves suitable power supplies and fundamentals. As McIntosh (1970) argues, plant fluxes from point A to B often lead to a change in inhabitants. However, the introduction of the later comer might mean the introduction of different supplements such as more shadow or waste that the former community could interpret as foreign contamination. Following this invasion, the already existent population progressively dislocates as the population structure changes until a stable climax community is established. Factors like sunlight, water, and nutrition in the soil determine the rotate of a plant. As such, the 'rotation' of human packs results from competition for the economic, locational, and social structures.




Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of invasion and succession model (Author's illustration)

The early neighborhood change model is influenced by a typical invasion process in nature, as initiated by McKenzie in 1925 to describe the influx in a neighborhood by a particular group until the social structure is wholly altered. Meanwhile the land- and the perceived value drops in time with the new social structure (see Figure 3.1). Every new element added to the environment disarranges the ecological balance to change the means in which inhabitants compete. Consequently, the population either moves in for taking advantage of a more suitable environment or moves out from the now-invaded and probably de-valored environment to another. McKenzie (1925) deems the invasion and succession model as a natural urban ecology process driven by competition in an urban area over land. The change is interpreted as a typical nature of the city experienced not only by people but also by the land use and commerce, households, density, and every social and economic sector of the neighborhood life.

Applying the invasion-succession explanation, Hoyt (1933) uses economic theory to interpret the neighborhood change rather than the plant ecology (Temkin and Rohe, 1996). His study considers that the neighborhoods mainly decay when the house owners do not maintain their property and, instead, they move to the city's outskirts, leaving a decayed neighborhood behind. As a result, depreciation proceeds; subsequently, some lower-income groups start moving in, which is called filtering. Eventually, the maintenance costs for an already decaying fixed property increase, as shown

in Figure 3.2, and fewer and fewer investments are made in the neighborhood. However, as also shown in the figure, in case of renovation, the building value might go higher than, be remaining longer at a higher peak compared to, or similar to the building value's original trajectory of change.




Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of filtering process (Author's illustration)

On the other hand, a political economy approach views neighborhood change through the complex links between politico-economic institutions and the various segments of the housing markets (Schwirian, 1983). This approach principally regards the urban as an entity for the elites to facilitate their capital accumulation. Driven from Karl Marx's *Capital*, David Harvey (1978) grants capital accumulation as the foundation of the urban process. According to him, the urban process refers to

the creation of a material physical infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange, and consumption [as] the first point of contact, then, is to consider the manner in which this built environment is produced and the way it serves as a resource system – a complex of use values—for the production of value and surplus value (Harvey, 1978: 113).

Harvey (1973) suggests that the capitalist class should not stop capital accumulation from maintaining itself; therefore, it invests in the built environment devised to accelerate further accumulation. The urban land is viewed as an entity to invest in, in case of a falling rate in the primary circuit of the economy (Harvey, 1973).




Figure 3.3: Schematic representation of political- economic approach on neighborhood change (Author's illustration)

Against this background, according to the political-economy approach, the city, dialectically, is a body with exchange and use-value. According to neo-Marxist theoreticians, an urban space hosts the contradiction between the ones who view urban land solely as a commodity to be exploited for profit (exchange value) and those who view urban land as necessary for everyday life (use-value) (Castells 1977; Harvey 1973; Lefebvre 1974). As shown in Figure 3.3, while difference between use and exchange values grow earlier lower-income inhabitants of the neighborhood leaves and more affluent new-comers arrive. Therefore, the city and neighborhood changes are formed through a coalition of elites who have the land, interest to invest, and profit. Consequently, the money-makers, so-called winners, are the rich while the poor and the minority remain the losers. According to this frame, the individuals have a limited agency next to the broader political, economic, and social drivers in determining the changes in neighborhood scale (Schwirian, 1983).

The deterministic explanations for neighborhood change emphasize slightly diverging causalities despite common patterns. Nevertheless, the thread between them all displays natural decay. It is driven by (solely and inevitably) its nature, by the preferences of landlords on maintenance, or by the changing preferences in line with households' size and wealth; however, the preferences are not determined by individuals but by the economic and political forces that be.

Human agency in neighborhood transformations

The first critique of deterministic models is their regard of the neighborhoods as standalone entities excised beyond human agency (Firey, 1945). The deterministic models consider the communities free from attachments to place, social ties, and sanction power in shaping their terrains. According to Firey (1945), *a propos*, the future of a neighborhood would also be predestined by resilient or fragmented inhabitants, because the urban realm is not free of human emotion that the symbols and images the particular place evokes. Therefore, the symbolic meaning of a place constitutes a specific attachment to the neighborhood while the social stability increases regardless of where the neighborhood falls in the ageing process and rent value drop (see Figure 3.5). Living within a coherent and robust group might also be a *rational* preference performed and experienced by the participating individuals. As such, this type of meaning contributes to a more stable and robust part of the community's socio-economic competition. Meaning in addition to structural factors, social factors such as belonging, attachments, social ties, and solidarity contribute to the decay and development patterns in an urban setting.




Figure 3.5: Schematic representation of sub-culturalist approach (Author's illustration)

With this in mind, consider the nature of social networks, level of commitment, and attachment to a community; the image and symbolic reality can form and dissolve along with the neighborhood's

transformation or tilt the transformation's character. The communities too are an essential part of the neighborhood transformations. Although the sub-culturalist models do not reflect the intricacy of communities totally, they do underline the significance of communal structures in terms of the stability of neighborhoods. The subcultural approach is substantially essential to involve in a synthetic model as it cedes community as a pillar of a neighborhood transformation.

Continuous motion in life-cycle models

neighborhood change models are essential in understanding the neighborhood's life spectrum from decay through to regeneration in an urban area. Regardless of the process, in the end, neighborhoods transition into another life that the above-stated models do not further explain. The change of a neighborhood is endless. Even when a neighborhood successively changes the social structure or is renewed by the initiative of landlords, it continues on with its life. Given that, Hoover and Vernon (1959) explain the neighborhood change in a continuous motion. The life-cycle models they initiated suggest that neighborhoods age and deteriorate unless they are taken care of or renewed.




Figure 3.6: Schematic representation of life cycle model (Author's illustration)

With their life cycle model, Hoover and Vernon (1959) claim five stages of the life-cycle of a neighborhood: (1) development, (2) transition, (3) downgrading, (4) thinning out, and (5) renewal (see Figure 3.6). According to them, stage 1 refers to a plot of open land with potential for development. This area often refers to rural land on the urban fringe with low population density. Within stage 1, residential development begins. According to the authors, during this stage, one particular ethnic or racial group occupies the neighborhood via single-family houses. In the period of stage 2, the density increases through multi-family dwellings with the group's compatriots or co-religionists (Schwirian, 1983). Development and population reach a peak during this period, and the rent and property values rise. This leads to stage 3 as the physical ageing generates a fall in rent costs and density, leading to an influx of lower-income, different ethnic, or different racial groups, and little to no new constructions are pursued. The succession follows the invasion, in stage 4. Younger people move out while the older remain behind. The housing stock ages to some degree, often creating a slum community with increasingly closed shops and stores as well as empty housing stock. In the fifth and final stage as set out by Hoover and Vernon, the neighborhood either experiences a collapse or renewal with more affluent commercial and residential use (Hoover and Vernon, 1959).

3.2. Synthetic neighborhood change model

The politico-economic incidents that form urban structures likewise form social relations on a local scale and vice-versa. In order to emphasize the inseparability of these two functions, this section aims to assemble two poles of the explanatory spectrum of neighborhood change: community and economic structures. However, neither the economic drivers nor the social composition of the neighborhood alone can explain neighborhood change. Explorations of space as a multilayer entity where the interconnections between capital, political, and social spheres happen allow us to understand neighborhood change's causalities from a comprehensive perspective.




Figure 3.7: Schematic representation of synthetic neighborhood change model (Author's illustration)

This synthesis consists of ecologists' interest in analytical consistency; the political economists' disposition toward analyzing the political, economic and social forces; the sub-culturalists' pleas for human agency and concern for the micro-relations; and the life cycle models' continuous motion in neighborhood change. Figure 3.7 shows the synthesis collectively, within the following parts it will be explained in three parts. These assets are synthesized and classified within sections as follows:

1. Birth of the neighborhood (outset);
2. Decay and devaluation of the neighborhood; and
3. Regeneration and revaluation of the neighborhood (see Figure 3.7).

Birth of the neighborhood

Aldo Rossi (1982) suggests that neighborhoods are the small urban units of which gatherings create the city; following the birth of these neighborhoods, amongst other reasons, the city grows, develops, changes, and evolves. In a contemporary city, the development of a residential buildings cluster is then subject to control and jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, on top of the neighborhood prerequisites such as

(1) people and (2) territory, the outset of a neighborhood depends on the (3) developers and (4) (local) state.




Figure 3.8: Schematic representation of neighborhood outset (Author's illustration)

Empty houses cannot compose a neighborhood. So, as shown in Figure 3.8 first buildings and rather affluent population increases, with that, so does the housing value. Essentially, Rossi (1982) argues that while a city erects, neighborhoods are formed where human packs gather to settle and arise where people gather to create necessary human contact in the urban realm. However, as political-economic accounts inform us, people cannot gather wherever they desire because the proximity to the goods and infrastructure and the natural morphology gives the land differentiated values (Harvey, 1978). Due to the uneven distribution of wealth, services, and morphology, land quality as a raw material is not homogeneous throughout the city. Even with an instinctive desire, the gathering in the capitalist city does not happen independently of the city's uneven organization and the value of the land. On the one hand, the economic class plays a role in rational locational preferences (Smith, 1983); on the other, social class and determined lifestyle define the limits of human agency when choosing where to live (Ley, 1986).

Additionally, for a neighborhood to come into being by definition, a group of shelters in any form should first be developed. That said, logically, developers are the other prerequisite for the birth of the neighborhood. The developers are categorized within this dissertation as

1. Civil: whomever individual or collective builds a systematic group of shelters to live in with or without legal authorization (therefore, as shown in figures 8 in the outset of a neighborhood, there might be unauthorized buildings that become authorized later);
2. Market: which varies on a spectrum from smaller to higher capacity companies that build a group of shelters to sell;
3. State: for low or non-profit housing.

Finally, the state is another requirement for the neighborhood, not only as a developer. Scholars consider a variety of possible roles the state fills in building a neighborhood, such as zoning: (a) to efficiently control a social population (Kallus, 2000), (b) to manage the sub-markets (Ahlbrandt et al., 1975), or (c) to find an equilibrium between production and residential areas (Benevelo, 1971). In either case, any building in the city is possible only with juridical authorization. Even an unauthorized shelter proves the existence of regulations as its being out of the norm and its unorthodoxy is the probative opposition of an enforced "normal". The state as definer and regulator of the norm (van Weesep, 1994) is another prerequisite to neighborhood birth.

Decay and devaluation of the neighborhood

Within the urban area, neighborhoods go through an ageing process that could include what Hoover and Vernon (1959) argue to be the transition period, which includes the moving in and gathering of one particular ethnic or racial group, followed by a stage in which the density of compatriot or co-religionists increases. Hoover and Vernon do not especially see these phases as decay; nevertheless, the biggest trigger for the imminent decay period is time. As time takes its toll, the ageing of the buildings leads to a decrease in value. As shown in Figure 3.9 number of buildings stabilize and housing value decreases while lower-income population increases due to the lower rent prices, meanwhile, until the number of authorized buildings stabilizes the affluent population keeps increasing; however it lowers as the

housing value goes down. The number of affluent population starts a climb again as the area gains a credible symbolic value.

Stemmed from their explanation, for this dissertation, the period of decay is an inevitable process that starts immediately after construction is finalized—only countered by the property owners' renewal and maintenance efforts. Hoyt (1933) also explained that as time passes, the maintenance costs increase leading to the decrease in effort to keep the properties in good shape.




Figure 3.9. Schematic representation of decay and devaluation (Author's illustration)

Following the teardown of housing stock, according to Hoyt (1933) (1), landlords move out to more affluent neighborhoods for various reasons. A neighborhood going through this process would then get (2) less attention from the municipal government, firms, and financial companies until the area gets red-lined by the financial intermediaries (*ibid.*). The decay is typically followed by decreased rent and valuation of the neighborhood; (3) the influx of disadvantaged inhabitants such as migrants, minorities, and other excluded groups of the lower class is thus enabled (Grigsby, 1983). In this period, it might be expected that the densification of the "unwanted" population creates more and more decrease in the value of the area. Therefore, aside from the structural decay of the neighborhood, the perceived

population decay might also contribute to the neighborhood's decrease. People may not want to be associated with particular lower-income groups due to the fear of economic loss, amongst other reasons.

So the devaluation does involve a series of social changes besides the structural ones. If the decay phase starts right after the construction period, devaluation is a perception of the inside and incoming outside population during the decay period. Subsequently, the outsider, media, and market perception might label the area as a no-go in this stage. In a devaluation period, the market does not experience investing in the area, via property owners, because the risk of investing in a perceivably no-go area is not worthwhile. As a result, over time, the housing stock and infrastructure tear down gradually, and units are abandoned to lower-income and marginalized inhabitants.

Regeneration and revaluation of the neighborhood

Regeneration is another side of the urban development spectrum in response to the decay. It is a range of interventions that intend to manage urban problems to keep the neighborhood functioning in terms of economic, physical, social, and environmental conditions (Roberts and Sykes, 2000). Shaw and Porter (2009) suggest that the term regeneration is the collection of all reinvestments by state or market in the urban area after a period of decay. During this re-transformation process, the price of the neighborhoods' housing stock might go up to such a level that the inhabitants who moved in after a dramatic decrease in the rent values, cannot afford it anymore (see Figure 3.10). According to Cochrane (2007), urban regeneration can occur in various ways as to regenerate: (1) local communities or neighborhoods—to "fix" the communal self-reliance, (2) the urban economies to maintain economic well-being and the image of citizens, (3) physical and commercial infrastructure for the economy to circulate or (4) the image of the city for marketing, and branding.




Figure 3.10: Schematic representation of regeneration and revaluation (Author's illustration)

The revaluation efforts require an investment in hard and soft artifacts to increase economic reliance in a competitive macro-urban hierarchy by building up a more substantial microenvironment. However, the efforts allow speculation as the regeneration (almost) always does not promote the lower class inhabitants, whose stay in particular neighborhoods is only possible due to decreased property prices and urban decay. Therefore, regeneration mainly works against a decayed neighborhood *community* because it does not constantly generate a positive social good with amendments in urban physical conditions.

Additionally, as Lynch (1964) informs, besides tangible artifacts such as the locational attributes and the spatial quality, the symbols attained and communal relations within the area could increase its potential value. Thus the way to present and brand might make the area more profitable and valuable. The revaluation here is used as the complete phase of giving an attractive name to a particular area to increase its potential value. The image glamorization might even be a preparation for the regeneration period. In the same vein, the stigma should be lifted, so the decaying neighborhood can be subjected to a series of interventions to attract prospective buyers to prospective housing establishments. Some

scholars around the world show that a neighborhood that the migrants densely inhabit in the revalorization period, might be called "super-diverse neighborhoods" (see Pemberton and Phillimore, 2018), "power neighborhood" (see "krachtwijken" in the Netherlands), "vibrant neighborhoods" (*in Malmo* see Anderson, 2014) or other terms glorifying diversity.

3.3. Neighborhood change in London: Gentrification

The investigation of urban processes would continue with or without catchy phrases, but words have the power to travel, teach, and warn. Some words are felt and remembered worldwide, having created a common language, allowing discussion overseas to be rigorous on particular scholarly subjects. A straightforward and playful explanation of a very complex issue is a valid departure in the quest to understand a particular area's urban process. Gentrification, as a word, is playful, understandable, and speaks for itself. Similar phenomena are observed in geographically diverse units, so the terminology follows, albeit with the risk of falling short in illustrating the complex phenomenon with their diverse and disparate components. The terminology does not explicitly focus on the phenomenon's abstract aspects so particularities of the area and its contextual attachments become fundamental to understanding the process in totality.

That said, the coinage of the term by Ruth Glass is by necessity tied to the spatio-temporal context of the given location: London, UK, in the late 50s. Therefore, the narrator and the birth context embed unique insights into the terminology's development. Firstly, the narration matters. The position of the narrator towards the subject vastly shapes the story.

Ruth Glass was "a woman ahead of her times [on] pre-feminist times" as Phillip Cohen described her in his speech in 2015. She had a unique and, at times, more radical view on London than most. She had a comprehensive way of seeing patterns, and unhesitantly, at times, acutely denoting them. Secondly, the context matters. The neighborhood transformation following the complex social, structural and politico-economic changes—although not dreadfully different than any other post-war capitalist city of the time—was transpiring as a response to the destruction of WWII in London. It can be considered an unusual time of reconfiguring a country and its cities; hence, the overall reconstructions would be fast,

vast, at times confusing, and often hard to handle. Third and lastly, wording matters. The etymology of the carefully constructed words and their meaning give away not only specific characteristics about the local context but also the universal phenomenon as components of the same system. We can get closer to comprehensively understanding what she wanted to call attention to through the wording, because the comparison is embedded in the obsolete class of gentry and its translation unto the urban realm.

*Narration matters: Ruth Glass*⁶

She was the first and only researcher around this period to refer to London as being shitty. Phil Cohen, 2015

Gentrification as a term appeared first in Ruth Glass' introduction of *London: Aspect of Change*. The perspective and nature of an eye make a difference in what one sees and describes, so exploring Ruth Glass's background and standpoint is essential. Guest in the places she studied, she never felt at ease as reported by Phil Cohen, in a talk on Glass in UCL, 2015, London. He says:

She was as a person too complex, too contrary, too moody for her achievement to be easily pigeonholed or her life summed up. She was a Jewish intellectual who fled many persecutions and death in Europe who made a second home for home but she was never entirely comfortable in her adopted country and continued to look at its social and cultural life with outsider's eyes.

In her introduction to *London: Aspects of Change*, she regards London from social, spatial, political, and economic layers. She takes the city as a totality. It enable her to define a specific type of urban

⁶ "Glass [née Lazarus; other married name Durant], Ruth Adele (1912–1990), sociologist, was born on 30 June 1912 in Berlin, Germany, the second of three daughters (there were no sons) of Eli Lazarus, described on her marriage certificate as a factory burner, a member of a distinguished Jewish family with a long rabbinical tradition, and his wife, Lilly Leszczyńska. She embarked on a degree in social studies at the University of Berlin, and published a study of youth unemployment in Berlin in 1932 (reprinted in *Clichés of Urban Doom*, 1989), but following the rise of the Nazis she left Germany in 1932 before completing her degree. She studied at the University of Geneva and in Prague before arriving in London in the mid-1930s, where she resumed her sociological studies, at the London School of Economics. Watling, a study of a new London county council cottage estate in Hendon, on the outskirts of London, published in 1939, established her reputation as a social scientist" (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004).

transformation in her time from a complex point of view as a combination of social, spatial, political, and economic forces and as part of a community's class struggle rather than only as a physical change.

Context matters: neighborhood change in the birthplace

In the mid-40s, WWII was coming to an end. Like many countries, Great Britain was re-planning cities in the post-war period. The plans primarily concerned after-crisis management. In other words, Britain was figuring out a new way to exist. The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act in the UK, which was developed to allow post-war developments, granted a competitive neo-liberal mode of production in the country's housing market. Glass (1964), in her introduction to *Aspects of Change*, states:

Since the fifties, town and country planning legislation: the 1947 Act has been drastically amended; development rights have been de-nationalised; development values have been unfrozen; real estate speculation has thus been 'liberated'. These measures, together with the relaxation of rent control, have given the green light to the continuing inflation of property prices with which London, even more than the other cities, is afflicted. In such circumstances, any district in or near London, however dingy or unfashionable before, is likely to become expensive; and London may quite soon be a city which illustrates the principle of the survival of the fittest - the financially fittest, who can still afford to work and live there (pp. 19-20).

The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 gave full encouragement to the Greater London Plan 1943, of which Patrick Abercrombie proceeded in a 'restrictionist mood'. The ideology of this plan was inherited from an economic period "when there were fears of - and hopes for a population decline" (Glass, 1964: 19). As a result of the implementation of this plan, the land control was relaxed, and property prices were inflated.

Excerpts from the short film *Proud City*, made to announce a new London Plan, reveals the public discourse on the housing and planning of the city:

The trouble is that London grew without any plan or order. That is why there are all those bad and ugly things we hope to get do away with this plan of ours if it is carried out. [...] When you look at London, it is mixture of good and bad, beautiful and ugly. [...] Miles and miles without open spaces [...] in a hopeless confusion. [...] Look again then you will see mean, hideous, which inner city ought to be ashamed [...] dismal houses that should have been pulled down long ago. [...]. [London is] overcrowded, dense, schools and factories side by side with no

adequate open space. [...]. [The plan is to make London] worthy of its own history [...] to grab its pride, courage, vitality London ever had. [...]

- [An inhabitant asks] will it mean we have to move out?

- [Presenter answers] Yes, I am afraid some of you will have to. We must reduce the number of people and industry in the congested areas if everyone has to be decently housed" (Proud city informational short movie: Author's transcription).

Land-use was transformed; consequently, less population spread to an even more expanded area. Due to the broader sprawl of the urban area and the (forceful) decrease in the inner-city, people were forced to live further away from the center. The increased number of job opportunities in the center and the spread-out residential space, resulted in an increased number of daily - expensive, more complicated and longer - commutes.

Besides the changes that the Greater London Plan initiated, the social reconstruction contributed to the inner city's neighborhood change. First, the lifestyle changed for the majority, such as marriage at a later age, an increase in the incomes, more extended life expectancy, and a higher ratio of households to the population as many more people demanded separate living (ibid.). Also an increasing number of married women in employment contributed to a switch from suburban to urban living (ibid.).

Consequently, the combination of (1) higher demand for housing in the inner-city, (2) new employment opportunities, (3) increased number of motorcars in the traffic, and (4) lifestyle changes intensifying the competition for space in inner London resulted in the land values spiralling in a way that could be neither anticipated nor controlled (Glass, 1964). Some areas were more popular than other neighborhoods with fewer locational advantages left to decay, as Glass (1964) states that

Others, nearer the main routes, adjacent to expanding middle class areas become lodging-house districts, where all sorts of people who have to keep, or who want to obtain a foot hold in Central London are crammed together and frequently have to pay exorbitant rents for the privilege. [...] Some of these quarters, off beaten track which are low on the list of municipal development and not "ripe" for private investment are left to decay (p. 20).

The places that are left to decay also become stigmatized; as a result, the grand rent value decreased drastically. Immigrants move into these now cheaper places due to exclusion in the nicer housing

markets. Mainstream societies' unwanted populations, such as sex workers, drug dealers/addicts and (migrant) workers move in as the lower-income populations successively "invade" the neighborhood.

Wording matters: Gentry-fication

Ruth Glass may have thrown the word out as one of many aspects of change in London, but the word itself contained the rest of her observations about London in the post-war period. The radical and jokey description of the phenomenon she observed turned into terminology used broadly in the following decades. Moreover, the term's current use is vast and fuzzy despite the clarity and comprehension in Glass's original description of London. It becomes essential to understand the term's literal, contextualized meaning to reveal her intention and emphasis on the specific place she was observing, London. Against this background, the words gentry and gentrification will now be explored with respect to Glass's choice and specific usage of the words.

Etymologically, the word gentry goes back to c.1300s old French; it was a noun used to describe "nobility of rank or birth" (Merriam-Webster Dictionaries). Later in mid-14c., it was used to describe "a fashion or custom of the nobility" and late 14c. "nobility of character" (ibid.). Moving from French to English, the word experienced a slight tilt in meaning:

Meaning 'noble persons, the class of well-born and well-bred people' is from the 1520s in English, later often in England referring to the upper middle class, persons of means and leisure but below the nobility (ibid.).

Later in 19th century, the word became interchangeable with the landed gentry, which described a social class composed of "landowners who could live entirely from rental income or at least a country estate" (ibid.).

[Landed gentry] belonged to aristocracy, but was distinct from, and socially "below", British peerage, although in fact some of the landed gentry were wealthier than some peers, and many gentry were related to peers. They often worked as administrators of their own lands, while others became public, political, religious, and armed forces figures. The decline of this privileged class largely stemmed from the 1870s agricultural depression; however, there are still many hereditary gentry in the UK to this day, many of whom transferred their

landlord-style management skills after the agricultural depression into the business of land agency, the act of buying and selling land (ibid.).

The word is quite ironic since the modern gentrifier is not necessarily a landowner or aristocrat; it's questionable whether a modern class of gentry even exists. This particular wording (1) draws attention to an outdated land activity based on buying and selling, (2) points out locational preferences of a group which can be considered as a timely extension of the extinct class of gentry, (3) has an embedded comparison between former and current land ownership and lastly but importantly, (4) emphasizes the class struggle, mocking the new-middle class for being gentry and becoming the displacer of working-class inhabitants in a neighborhood.

The result of these crucial developments: the class struggle translated into the urban space, specifically the link between housing and class struggle within London became Ruth Glass's long-term focus (Slater, 2008). She wrote:

One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes - upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages - two rooms up and two down - have been taken over when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period - which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise multiple occupation - have been upgraded once again. Nowadays many of these houses are being sub-divided into costly flats or 'houselets' (in terms of the new real estate snob jargon). The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighborhoods. On this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed. [...] And this is an inevitable development, in view of the demographic, economic and political pressures to which London, and especially Central London, has been subjected (Glass, 1964: 18-19).

Among the places experiencing similar processes to the phenomenon in London, Ruth Glass suggested a word: gentrification—to be used to describe this unique sort of class struggle embedded in neighborhood transformation. The word intends to capture class inequalities and injustices created by urban land markets and policies (Franz, 2015). Glass captures the social, economic, and structural changes in London in complete comprehensiveness. It does capture the past and present

juxtapositions in one dense word, and it happens on account of the comprehension in her carefully constructed introduction. Distilling from her explanation, gentrification's necessary components are:

1. Invasion of a neighborhood by middle and upper-class inhabitants.
2. The rehabilitation of houses of which the leases expired into elegant, expensive houses.
3. Renewal of the decayed housing.
4. Subdivision of some flats into expensive "houselets."
5. Inflation of prices in the district compared to the former state.
6. Displacement of the working-class.
7. Entire alteration of the district's social character.
8. The overall contribution of demographic, economic and political pressures on the process.

Phil Cohen claims a resemblance between Glass's argument and the Chicago School's invasion succession model. He additionally claims that she added a kind of social Darwinism edge to it by mentioning "survival of the fittest". The definition thrown by Glass set the tone of the research for this particular phenomenon, for decades to come. Hypothetically, if the term were thrown in other cities, we would call it something slightly different, and even our scholarly conclusions would look distinct from how they do today. In that sense, the definition of the term is not a given. It was offered in a particular space and time, and the birthplace's context is permanently embedded. However, following the call by Neil Smith (2002) on retaining an analytical commitment to the critical intent behind Ruth Glass's coinage, this chapter investigated the term's genesis starting from the neighborhood change models to its coinage.

Gentrification for a larger context

Gentrification literature overview, due to the vast amount of interest for decades, is very challenging. The paradox is that the leading terminology is dominantly of Anglo-Saxon production, which is also the most reviewed and reproduced. The Anglo-Saxon theorization leaves the gentrification research outside the core inadequate and lacking. This dissertation investigates and compares the differences between and outside an Anglo-Saxon literature on gentrification because the word is highly tied to the

English language and culture as it is currently. Nevertheless, it remains essential to review what is being followed today (which is Anglophone dominated) and set up the terminological scene (of Anglo-Saxon world and out); also to review the theoretical crisis today. This section aims to untangle the disorder and reveal the frame of this dissertation by providing a mediated and well ranged, but brief, literature review on gentrification.

Gentrification grew beyond the boundaries of its birthplace. The phenomenon occurs in any place that experiences advanced capitalism yet does not occur in every language due to the academic hegemony of anglophone scholarship at the expense of neglecting particularities in some instances. As Neil Smith (2002) announced: the phenomenon officially "[went] global.". The following discussion is about whether the definition should be narrow and adapted completely for each situation or generic and inclusive for many different situations. The current research agenda, for a decade, is stretching the term in time and space. Like many other scholars, Maloutas (2016) questions whether it is productive for the investigation of changing urban inequalities to stretch out the content of gentrification (Butler, 2007) or whether it is time to put it to rest (Bondi, 1999: 254, cited in Davidson and Lees, 2005: 1165) and replace it by more focused concepts and descriptions, such as 'super gentrification,' 'residentialisation,' 're-urbanisation,' 'studentification,' 'embourgeoisement,' 'gentrification in rural settings,' etcetera. (Butler, 2007; Buzar et al., 2007; Lambert and Boddy, 2002; Lees, 2000; Phillips, 2004; Preteceille, 2007; Smith, 2005; Smith and Butler, 2007). Indeed, the new terminology for a specific site creates a slightly new definition by emphasizing specific aspects. However, as a result, it scatters the meaning. Stretching the term and producing more focused terms, in return, discharges its political load, hence the interest of policymakers on the issue (Slater, 2006), as the narrow definitions have a risk of regression in conceptual clarity.

Chapter 4. Development of gentrification

Gentrification was initially not thrown as a term but used simply to express a comprehensive urban process. Tom Slater claims that Chris Hamnett is the first after Ruth Glass to adopt the originally colloquial and jokey word for use in an academic setting in the later decades. According to Johnson-Schlee (2019), the term only became an academic tool because it is very vague and dependent on contextually diverse phenomena. To this date, it is still relevant as the initial term focused on three primary pillars, social, spatial, and economic mechanisms that were flexible enough to tweak over time with changing politico-economic and socio-spatial structures globally (see Figure 4.1). Thus, it is considered an umbrella term to explain a particular type of neighborhood change with a broader point of view. That said, it is a departure point rather than a destination for the research.




Figure 4.1 Schematic representation of gentrification term definition by Ruth Glass (1964)

The first attempts to systematize the term were stage models, like Ruth Glass's original; they mainly focused on a temporal pattern in the affected neighborhoods (Clay, 1979; Gale, 1979). Their explanations mainly focused on the middle class and their consumption behavior; by doing so, they explain how and why the societal changes caused gentrification (Ley, 1986). With that, the scope of the term has expanded to individual efforts to renovate houses and the dislocation of earlier inhabitants. However, the consumption based explanation was criticized for not adequately accounting for the economic and political forces that impact urban processes. Thus, critics started to examine the

phenomenon from a production point of view (Smith, 1984) and added state and political orientations into the equation prominently. Although these perspectives did not entirely exclude each other, they focused on opposing but somewhat overlapping triggers of gentrification. These seemingly opposing explanatory sides form the binary, a pendulum between the demand (consumer sovereignty) and the supply (producer sovereignty) sides.

The stage models and binary perspective held the floor in the gentrification debate for a lengthy period, but in recent studies, both sides are used concomitant. It is now essential to point out the fundamentals of the gentrification phenomenon and the term by providing a literature review on both sides separately. Therefore, firstly, the stage models will be reviewed to comprehend the first formulation of the term, then the demand-side; finally, the supply-side explanations will be described in this chapter.

4.1. Stage models

The early stage models aimed at generalizing gentrification's time-wise patterns and projecting the potential course of its future. The models presume that gentrifying neighborhoods go through similar stages with slight distinctions in various places. Despite their blindness to contextual diversity, these models are the first attempts to untangle and adjust the process analytically. Hence, they are critical in discerning the temporal sequence of gentrification. The stage models will be transmitted in two parts in terms of their slightly different emphases. In the first part the ecological emphasis will be briefly described followed by the supply and demand emphasis in the second with the last part describing the temporal relevance and wave thinking in gentrification literature.

Ecological emphasis in early-stage-models

Early-stage-models are similar to some of the neighborhood change models. The ecological emphasis on the former is evident in explaining gentrification as a filtering process that proceeds stage by stage. For example, Phillip Clay (1979) built his model with empirical analysis of numerous USA cities, including San Francisco and Washington. His model explains the gentrification process in four stages, from pioneer to maturing gentrification.

As shown in figure 4.3, the first stage is "pioneer gentrification", in which a small group of 'risk-oblivious' people move in to renovate houses for their personal use. Public attention to the area is still negligible at this stage; however, displacement slowly starts as "the newcomers often take housing that is vacant or part of the normal market turnover in what is often an extremely soft market" (Clay, 1979 in Lees et al., 2008). Due to the absence of conventional mortgage funds, private capital is used almost exclusively (ibid.). In the second stage, the same types of people as in the former keep on moving to fix houses for their occupation. Nevertheless, Clay (1979) duly notes that some small-scale speculators begin to renovate houses in visible areas for more profitable modes like selling or renting while more influential speculators remain barely involved in renovation at this stage. He claims it is the result of scarce capital for investors and residents (ibid.). In this stage, the newcomers are still individuals seeking private use and often "seek units that are relatively easy to acquire: vacant buildings owned by absentee landlords, city-owned or tax-foreclosed properties" (ibid.). Media pays attention to the area, and the mortgage sums of money get available for some neighborhoods. Although Clay does not initially label it, Franz (2015) suggests the term "established pioneer gentrification" to describe the period.




Figure 4.3 Schematic representation of Clay's stage model (Author's illustration)

In the third stage, the media begins to pay more attention to the neighborhood than in previous periods. Although the pioneers may continue to move into the neighborhood, they are no longer the only crucial group in the process because of the potential urban renewal and arrival of new developers in the area. So besides the media interest, the state and larger-scale investors pay attention to the unit for further development. Displacement continues more severely in this stage. Consequently, tension begins building up between the old and the new residents, as pointed out in the model. The newer comers are "less tolerant of lower or working-class behavior; these tensions may become serious" (Clay, 1979). In this period, investment is less risky in the neighborhood, and as a result, "banks begin to green-line the area, looting for spatial patterns of reinvestment and then malting loans to middle-class buyers and investors within the limited area" (ibid.). The fourth and last stage is "maturing gentrification" (Clay, 1979). This one is much more established as "a larger number of properties are gentrified, and the middle-class continues to come" (ibid.). Efforts to invade and own the historic neighborhood become more intense by the higher income groups. Retail composition turns into small, specialized shops and professional services. As the prices exponentially rise; in this stage, not only the renters but also some homeowners become displaced (ibid.).

Setting aside its outstanding contribution to gentrification literature, Clay's model still inadequately emphasized class and rank that scholars would later discuss. For example, Gale (1979) further developed the model by comparing three neighborhoods in Washington, all at different stages of gentrification. In this model, he emphasized the class difference between the existing inhabitants and the gentrifier. He claims that population change mainly occurs within the working class who are displaced due to the 'incumbent upgrading' to white DINK (double income no kids) population (Gale, 1979). The model is relevant in current literature and this dissertation specifically because it approaches the process as a whole while breaking it down into periods that point out the complexity and diversity in variables from the beginning through the end. That way, gentrification can be viewed as a longitudinal process that a snapshot frame cannot possibly describe.

Despite the lack of contextual variations the models confirm differences between the periods and treat gentrification as a process. The models grant gentrification to be a long agenda that evolves neither homogeneously nor steadily because they clearly show that the social profile of newcomers; the

relation between newcomers and already existing inhabitants; media attention; perception of outsiders in the neighborhood; the behavior of loan lenders; and the typology of displacement are different in each phase. In this respect, the gentrifier, developer, displacement and the social and structural changes in the gentrifying neighborhood differ according to the stage; by so, the early stage models draw attention to the diversity of variables within the process and become one of the core elements in building this thesis' argument.

Supply and demand emphasis in early stage models

Some scholars grant gentrification as part of an urban decay and regeneration cycle. For example, for Berry (1985), the low-demand vacant areas are filled with regenerative individuals or investors. As a result, the prices go higher than the lower class can afford, leading to gentrification. Driven from his argumentation, he claims that the metropolitan level supply and demand cycles are the main reason for gentrification. The inner-city, according to Berry (1985), is the place where employment opportunities, attractive housing stock and satisfying office spaces are. Despite its age, the argument applies well to the current climate in capitalist cities. Today, like back then, the inner city's vacant areas are more prone to gentrification as the middle-class increasingly prefers them.




Figure 4.4 Schematic representation of vacancy cycle in inner-city based on Berry (1985) (Author's illustration)

According to Berry (1985), opposing socio-economic classes do not live in the same area; when suburbs get rich, the inner city gets poor. As the population moves from one end to another, they exchange physical space. He claims that the suburban to inner-city (and vice versa) exchange stimulates gentrification and social polarization (Berry, 1985) (see Figure 4.4). He presumes that in the entire city, the population continually grows, as the new households prefer to fill increasingly attractive modern headquarters in the inner city (ibid.). However, gentrification might also be experienced in cities where a dynamic suburban inner-city vacancy exchange does not happen. Although his model brings about an influential trigger for gentrification, it reduces the phenomenon into a dynamic exchange between suburb and inner-city, which is not always the case for slower-growing cities where the limits of the inner and outer city are blurry.

Drawing upon Berry's vacancy chains, Bourne (1993) claims existence of a "post gentrification era" in the inner-cities without further vacant housing stock, based on his research in Toronto, Canada. He predicts that gentrification will come to an end in a neighborhood when particular periods end, for example when the population is aged (Bourne, 1993). The saturation of gentrification results from a decreased number of new gentrifiers and gentrifiable areas. For him, as all the gentrifiable areas are filled with potential gentrifiers in the inner city, no more gentrification should be observed (ibid.). The attractive housing stock is limited in the inner-city, and the remaining options do not meet the younger generation's expectations.

Bourne finally describes gentrification as a process that occurred in a transitional period when the experiencing country underwent structural changes in the post-war period with a highly liberalized mode of production. According to his model, gentrification occurs as a symptom of the transition. However, this theory stays contextually limited in spite of its overwhelming level of generalization. Potential gentrifiers might be less at the peak of the gentrification era due to cutbacks in the public sector, increasing unemployment rates and stagnating income levels. Although few indicators observe an end to the phenomenon, Bourne's description of a post-gentrification era is a valuable departure to estimate the process at a macro-level to be similarly employed in this dissertation.

Retrospective temporal emphasis

As a term and phenomenon, gentrification has not remained the same throughout time and space since the coinage. As claimed, gentrification through time is different from the early 1970s to the late 1980s and even the early 1990s. Whereas both the term and the phenomenon evolved substantially, Hackworth and Smith (2001) interrogated different retrospective cases of gentrification to categorize. Although different countries did experience the waves at various times and conditions, Hackworth and Smith (2001) focused on the US housing market in periodizing gentrification.

The first wave for them, sporadic gentrification, was before the 1970s, when the inner-city was disinvested in and decayed due to suburbanization. The inner-city was left to lower-income groups and led to a deteriorated building environment. The reinvestment in the inner-city, in the beginning, was a strategy to stop the decay of urban areas, and the (local) state supported it until the economic recession (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Local and national government strategy aimed at counteracting the economic decline by supporting investments in the urban area since, for investors, expenditures were at risk of incurring losses in such precarious conditions. Although the state claimed to improve urban decline through interventions, such as funds for renovations, the effect was far more severe on the urban fabric. The conditions of those living in the inner city worsened far more than anticipated as highly localized, state funded interventions progressed, essentially generating gentrification.

Amongst other reasons, an oil embargo in 1973 triggered economic recession. Subsequently, the decay of some US cities, one of them being New York, intensified, which led to its all-time highest rates of landlord abandonments (Harvey, 1985), leading to some of the new neighborhoods becoming real estate frontiers. After the recession, the depressed market revived in the 70s; consequently, the gentrification stepped into the second wave, namely the expansion and resistance period (ibid.). Harvey (1985) suggests that the capital shift from an unproductive to productive sector also set the stage for reinvestment in the central city office, recreation, retail and residential activities in this period. Following the capital shift, gentrification in this period integrated into a broader range of economic and cultural processes at the global and national scales (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). New York, where

Hackworth and Smith (2001) retrieved their analysis, emerged as a world city with an inflated real estate market, internationally recognized art scene and ruthless gentrification (Zukin, 1982), the consequences of which were homelessness, eviction and increasing vulnerability of indigent residents.

As noted earlier, the waves and the transitions appear varied in different contexts. In the US, the stock market crashed in 1987 - and two years later the rest of the US economy -. Lack of supply resembled degentrification (Bagli 1991) or a reversal of gentrification in the inner-city. Unlike previous ones, this recession halted gentrification in some neighborhoods (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). The post-gentrification-era prophecy by Bourne (1993) was thrown around those times. However, the fog had cleared after 1993, whereas consequently, the city was set for further gentrification after a silent transition period investment-wise. This post-recession gentrification is called third-wave gentrification: the expansion (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). According to Hackworth and Smith (2001), the third wave gentrification was different from the previous two periods, primarily characterised by 1) expansion out from the inner city core, 2) more prominent developers becoming an actor due to restructuring and globalisation in the real estate industry, 3) the resistance against gentrification getting softer as the working class had already been displaced from the inner city, and lastly, 4) the state getting more involved (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Finally, the economic factors in this wave gentrification surpass the cultural factors.

The vital part to take from Hackworth and Smith (2001) is their emphasis on the growing, local influence of the state on gentrification over the decades and across waves. Similarly, Lees et al. (2008) state that the changes across waves are closely related to a broader shift in the political economy of the process. It is, for them, a systematic change in the state-capital relation (Lees et al., 2008). After the US recession in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve System brought a quick barrage of interest rate cuts. Due to this recession being a result of a collapse in business expenditures, sustained consumer borrowing and spending helped it calm (Lees et al., 2008). Subsequently, the financial service competition and public policy changed the money lending practices by relaxing the under-writing standards, reducing down payment requirements, and expanding the secondary market. The debt obligation was treated like stocks and bonds (Lees et al., 2008). In this vein, the local housing market and capital flows in neighborhoods were tied to national and global capital markets (Lees et al., 2008).

Following the interest rate cuts, the mortgage debts grew fast as the Fed's cuts led to a doubling in refinanced loans (Lees et al., 2008); moreover, the wealthy owners who suffered from the stock market damage utilized housing as a means of speculation (Lees et al., 2008). Although the market cooled down by late 2005 because of the massive capital flow to the neighborhoods, the lower class began to suffer from the lack of affordable housing options, especially those in the gentrifying neighborhoods. Gentrification from then on was more deeply rooted in the disinvested neighborhoods than in the earlier waves when the financial institutions were risk-averse. Differently, in this period, the lenders competed to make loans specifically to those particular borrowers in specific places. Studies show that racial and ethnic minorities and migrants are less likely to receive loans than their wealthier neighbors (Howell et al., 2006). Lees et al. (2008) suggest that this is the new fourth wave of gentrification in which the financialization of housing is combined with pro-gentrification politics and polarized urban policies. According to them, this wave's most distinguishing feature is the powerful national political shift that promotes wealthier households while dismantling the social benefits (Lees et al., 2008).

Many countries experienced distinct but related economic crises in the late 90s or early 2000s; following these depreciations, detriments that emerged in the world reflected in the late 2010s. However, unlike the standard prediction, these events appear like a short break instead of a deep recession (Aalbers, 2019). Along the same lines, austerity politics are becoming common sense globally, and the financial institutions fill up the state gap that led to the fifth wave, namely, financial gentrification (Aalbers, 2019). Aalbers (2019) argues that the state continues to play a leading role in financial gentrification; however, it is being supplemented by finance. In addition to the former waves, such as the third and fourth, the financial sector is now facilitating homeownership and strengthening the strategic role of corporate landlords backed by international capital markets and platform capitalism such as AirBnB (Aalbers, 2019).

Aalbers (2019) generalizes the attributes of fifth wave gentrification in six elements. The first manifestation of financial gentrification is (1) the growing supplement by corporate landlords and the switch to real estate as a class asset. The disinvested neighborhoods and the already gentrified areas are now subjected to new waves of investment. The second generalized attribute of fifth wave gentrification is (2) the strengthened agency of transnational wealth elites and middle classes.

According to Aalbers (2019), these investors use houses and apartments as a "safe deposit box" for their excess capital rather than for the benefit of high rents. The third attribute of fifth wave gentrification is the growing effect of (3) platform capitalism and touristification. The urban manifestation of platform capitalism in the current decade is AirBnb. This platform allows homeowners to turn their properties into pensions for a higher monthly return than the regular rent. It can be seen as another way to flux the capital into particular neighborhoods, mostly the arty, historical, cultural, etcetera ones. As the potential income from day to day prices are higher than regular rent, borrowers who seek a mortgage for AirBnb get a higher amount of loan (Aalbers, 2019). The fourth manifestation of fifth wave gentrification is (4) the global mortgage debt. The financial crisis that started in 2007 gave a break to the expansion of global mortgage debt; however, soon after the debt, it increased continuously (Aalbers, 2019). The fifth attribute of financial gentrification is (5) the decreasing amount of affordable housing. The fact that housing's financialization becomes the new norm results in the fourth wave – described by Lees et al. (2008) – spreading outside the US with the fifth wave. The housing prices, as a response, are not only increasing in gentrifying neighborhoods but also throughout the city. The latter means that more and more social groups are excluded from the housing market, leading to exclusionary displacements. The sixth manifestation of fifth wave gentrification is the changing (6) role of the (local) state. Unlike the previous waves, the state now allows and encourages financial institutions to credit for homeownership, securitization of mortgages, and REITs (Aalbers, 2019). The final manifestation of fifth wave gentrification is (7) the subsumption of alternatives. For this dissertation, the takeaway from these findings is that gentrification bridges the economic and cultural changes within a society and reflects the changing state of capitalism in the urban realm.

4.2. Gentrification from cultural determinism lenses

Demand-side explanations of gentrification focus on consumer agency. The consumer in gentrification literature is often defined as the middle class, "whose spending power threatens the community, the longevity of affordable housing, and valued amenities" (Lees et al., 2008: 89-90). Demand-siders consider gentrification a transformation driven by individual attempts to rehabilitate an urban area and regenerate the housing stock. According to this side's explanations, working-class areas turn into middle-class areas because of the influx of more affluent peoples and displacement of the

working-class inhabitants. The working class leaves the area because of the increase in rent or maintenance prices of the original housing (see Figure 4.5).




Figure 4.5 Schematic representation of gentrification term's demand-side definitions (Author's illustration)

According to demand-siders, the changing social (family and gender) structures and the fragmented lifestyles that the "post-industrial society" (Touraine, 1971) generated are the primary triggers for gentrification (Caufield, 1989; Ley, 1986). David Ley (1994), based on the post-industrial thesis criteria, explains gentrification with human agency as the focal point. Therefore, the preferences of gentrifiers are the center of the phenomenon according to demand-side explanations. Against this background, in the following section (1) the post-industrial thesis, the creation and the motivation of the new middle class will be briefly described. The literature on the subject is massive; hence this section will only present a selected literature overview. After the brief introduction to the post-industrial thesis and creation of the new middle class, respectively, (2) the new-middle class in terms of its lifestyle, advantages and burdens will be presented. Finally, (3) the methodological take-off of the consumer-focused explanations will be presented.

Post industrial society

After the Second World War, the world went through significant changes. One of them occurred in economic production with a shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy (Touraine, 1969). Alain Touraine, an influential French sociologist, suggested the name 'post-industrial

society' to describe how the new mode of production and shift in economy translated into society. Some years later, Bell (1973) conceptualized the period as:

1. a shift from a manufacturing to a service-based economy,
2. the centrality of new science-based industries with "specialized knowledge" as a critical resource, where universities replace factories as dominant institutions,
3. the rapid rise of managerial, professional and technical occupations, and
4. artistic avant-garde leading consumer culture, rather than media, corporations or government.

As the way it is understood in this dissertation, the post-industrial society thesis claims that society changed economic, institutional, occupational, and consumerist tendencies. According to Bell, the first and foremost change is the vastly growing numbers of professional, technical, and managerial employees. As a result, there was an expansion in the middle-class. According to Hamnett (1991), the post-industrial thesis was driven because the structure of production and the division of labour had been changing besides the rise place-based service class. Following this suggestion, unskilled work lost their importance to intellect and skill. Education, therefore, became an essential source in creating new middle-class inhabitants. Some significant changes in the family structure had also happened, such as the emergence of a more later age marriages, divorces, and re-marriages with less children per family than the earlier periods (Bell, 1973).

Consequently, the new middle class diverges from the classical middle class because of the emerging importance of intellectual and artistic knowledge alongside changing occupational structures. The change in the work structure and place, which was more and more located in the Central Business District (CBD), provoked the new middle class to move into the central areas of the city in order to (a) limit the commuting time, (b) be close to better educational sources for re-producing the new middle class, and (c) distinguish themselves from the old middle class also by following an avant-garde aesthetic in their products (Caufield, 1994; Ley, 1986, 1996). According to David Ley (1994), who investigated the relation of new middle class and gentrification in Canadian cities, despite their uneven distribution in the city, the new middle class was growing and rapidly restructuring employment profiles

in many metropolitan areas. These groups seemed to be moving into inner-city neighborhoods, and the new investments in the built environment were following their arrival. According to his analysis, the change was not only in the occupational but also in the residential structure due to societal upheavals that had created a middle class "imagineering of alternative urbanism to suburbanization" (Ley, 1996: 15). Therefore, the changes in society through post-industrialism are essential in generating gentrification for the culturally deterministic demand-side theories and partially inspire this dissertation's thesis.

Burden and prevalence of new middle class

The new middle class is essentially different from the classical middle class because the new middle class has greater spending power, and the members have the ability and interest to afford new cultural and social attractions (Hamnett, 2003) unlike their classical peers. According to the demand-side explanations, the combination of purchase power and interest in cultural assets results in unique locational and housing preferences. As specified by demand-siders, the inner-city is more attractive for the new middle-class than the suburbs, which is associated with earlier middle-class habitation due to the proximity to higher culture and employment opportunities. David Ley (1994) investigated Canadian cities focusing on locational preferences of the cultural new class and argued that gentrification is not merely economic but a tool to enhance the quality of life. He argues that this is a new phase of urban development in which the new middle class pursues urban consumption with a particular taste and aesthetics as an alternative to the suburbanization previously desired. Arguably, the insistent desire for central locations in the city stems from the new middle classes' conceived advantage and burden.

The first and foremost advantage of the new middle class is the escalated spending power resulting from changing family structures and household needs. Rose (1984) emphasizes that the increasing number of single women and double earner couples contribute to the gentrification process. Inner-city, Rose (1984) presumes, is a more favorable space than suburbs for working out equitable divisions of domestic labor. She argues that the changes in family structures generate professional households, which requires both a relatively central urban location that enhances efficiency in household products and the substitution of market-produced commodities (ibid.).

With a fueled up spending power, new middle-class dual-income households can move into a preferred location, whether for the locational advantages or to diverge themselves from the earlier middle-class peers. According to Butler and Robson (2003), gentrification is a way for the new middle class to escape the conservative suburbs, which becomes their burden. They claim gentrification is a "middle class coping strategy" that seeks diversity, freedom and acceptance (Butler and Robson, 2003). By the same token, Caufield (1994) suggests that the movement from suburbs to urban areas results from new middle-class renouncement of "suburban conformism". The total rejection of suburbia translates into the built environment of the new middle class through the aesthetics of the central city. The "gentrification aesthetic" (Jager, 1986) illustrates the class dimension of the process and expresses the dynamic constellation of a social class detaching from the suburbia. In the same vein, Carpenter and Lees (1995) point out that the summary of gentrification aesthetics in New York, London and Paris signifies social mobility upward and reclamation of space. Besides the fact that the aesthetics of a specific place invite individual gentrifiers to move in, the same aesthetics are used for attracting further capital. Zukin (1989) calls out the use of culture industries as a tool by large-scale investors in the built environment, referring to this phenomenon as the artistic mode of production.

Demand siders' acute focus on new-middle class

Demand-side explanations shed light on the consumer sovereignty of the gentrification phenomenon. The literature displays the societal and sectoral changes and their impact on locational preferences of the newly emerged middle class in the urban area. In the same vein, they argue that gentrification results from the subsequent transformation of commonly preferred neighborhoods. Demand-side literature illustrates the middle-class agency and its power to transform some neighborhoods. However, the myopic view on only one side prevents the demand-siders from seeing the political-economic causes and consequences of the process.

First of all, the consumer-focused explanations do not consider the real estate, developers, state, housing institutions, and money lenders for the overall investigation of gentrification; instead, they take a particular group such as the new middle-class as the primary trigger. Besides the absence of

politico-economic factors, the demand-siders fall short in defining the extensive group of gentrifiers. In fact, many scholars argue that gentrifiers are too diverse to generalize in one category (Schlichtman et al., 2018). Moreover, as gentrification is a longitudinal process, within the different stages of it, profiles of the newcomers diverge in terms of their household size, racial composition, annual income, age, education, and occupation.

Additionally, from the consumption perspective, middle-class mobility logically justifies gentrification as a natural process. Specifically, this new group is trapped in a suburban setting where the classic middle-class lives and out-dated rules apply. At the same time, while the commuting time and the quest for diversity are at stake, moving into the inner-city is inevitable for the new middle class. However, the acute focus on the middle-class gentrifiers' consumption behavior and lifestyles legitimize their role in generating gentrification. Contrarily, while the middle class freely consumes to 'cope', the lower-income group's agency notably decreases through decreasing affordability and familiarity of the area; therefore, the 'liberal middle class' desire for diversity displaces the earlier inhabitants in return. As Smith (1996) critically points

Far from opposing the evictions, rent gouging, displacement, homelessness, violence and other class-exploitative and class-abusive practices that gentrification brings, more extreme proclamations of a postmodern urbanism simply gentrify the working class out of the picture. We, the middle-class authors, recognising that our own "activism" has become so digressive, desperately reinvent that activism as the magic explanation and justification for gentrification itself. Agency is safely restored to the middle class—laced through with emancipatory piety—and the working class are disappeared (p. 42).

Despite the incompleteness, the demand-side theories inform us about the fragmentation in society and draw attention to the tension it creates between the new and classical middle class in suburbia. The consumption side theories fall short in the overall description of gentrification; however, they draw a picture of suburbia's blandness, conformity, patriarchy, and straightness (Lees et al., 2008). Whereas the suburbia is straight, patriarch and conservative, the emerging middle class dissociates itself from the life- and work-style of those former generations. In that way, demand-side theories draw attention to the changing society as well as the work structures. Overall, changes consequently influence the

locational preferences of the new middle class, finally revealing their impact on neighborhood transformation in the inner city.

4.3. Gentrification from economic determinism lenses

Via a neoclassical approach, many scholars explained gentrification through the consumer's actions for decades. These explanations drew criticism from the neo-Marxist theoreticians. The supply-side explanations stem from the critique of the culturally deterministic view demand-siders hold, declaring it an uncritical way of celebrating the back-to-the-city movement. Neil Smith (1979) argues that this movement, unlike the neoclassical counterparts' description, is a movement of capital instead of people (see Figure 4.6). The supply-side statements describe the phenomenon in terms of capital accumulation in the urban area (Harvey, 1973; Smith, 1979). Specifically, the investment-disinvestment cycles in the city, according to Smith (1979), create more and less profitable areas. Contrary to demand-side explanations derived from cultural determinism, supply-side explanations focus on the economic mechanisms behind the gentrification process. However, Smith (1996) duly notes

This is not to say in some naive way that consumption is the automatic consequence of production, or that consumer preference is a totally passive effect of production. Such would be a producer's sovereignty theory, almost as one-sided as its neoclassical counterpart. Rather, the relationship between production and consumption is symbiotic, but it is a symbiosis in which the movement of capital in search of profit predominates (p. 55).




Figure 4.6 Schematic representation of gentrification term's supply side definitions (Author's illustration)

This side of explanation instead focuses on the impacts of profitable interventions on urban structures. In other words, supply-side and production explanations show the connection of "underlying rules of the game-economic relations, legal principles and practices, institutional arrangements, and pure political struggles-in which value and profit are produced and distributed" (Lees et al., 2008: 42). To review the given literature, the first part will briefly present the back-to-the-city movement. The second part will be devoted to describing literature regarding investment-disinvestment cycles. Lastly, the rent gap, which is the chief pillar of the argumentation in this dissertation, will be reviewed.

Back-to-the-city by capital

During the 1950s in the USA, middle-class and working-class families fled to the outskirts of the cities because of the after-effects of the Great Depression, the subsequent World War, and the ensuing Cold War. This type of suburbanization was expedited in the 1960s (Jackson 1985). The urban areas were left to the disadvantaged population without sufficient fundamental care; thus, most of the inner cities in the USA were left for inevitable decay (Jackson, 1985). Later in the 1970s, the old industrial cities seemed to degenerate as their urban centers were wrecked through deindustrialization and suburbanization (Lees et al., 2008). In 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War, the Arab members of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) imposed an embargo against the USA for their supportive policies towards Israel. The embargo that proceeded created an oil crisis for many suburbanites in the United States. Mainly because of inhabitants who aimed at limiting daily commutes, American cities experienced an influx from the suburbs to the inner city. Smith (1996) summarized this period:

according to [neoclassical] these theories, suburbanization reflects the preference for space and the increased ability to pay for it due to the reduction of transportation and other constraints. Gentrification, then, is explained as the result of an alteration of preferences and/or a change in the constraints determining which preferences will or can be implemented. Thus in the media and the research literature alike, and especially in the US, where suburbanization bore such a heavy cultural symbolization, gentrification came to be viewed as a "back to the city movement. (p. 50).

Back-to-the-city movement was celebrated by political liberals as a sign of the end of inner city decay as rehabilitation of inner-city slums occurred 'naturally' without extra spending by the local governments

(ibid.). Political liberals presumed the movement would be able to reverse the white flight suburbanization effects on the inner city. Contrary to the celebrators, Lipton (1977) adverts to the replacement of black and other minority groups by the white population coming from the suburbs. Likewise, this movement and what it brings, with Lees et al. (2008)'s words - was not what neoclassical urban theory had predicted - and was celebrated uncritically as the end of the urban decay. Driven from the (white) middle-class promotion in the inner-city, Neil Smith (1986) states that this turning back to the city was by capital, not by people. According to him, celebrating back-to-the-city as an emancipatory process is an *extreme proposal of postmodern urbanism* and gentrifies the gentrification theory.

Investment - disinvestment cycles

According to Neil Smith (1987), theorizing gentrification requires explaining the historical process of capital devalorization in the inner city and how exactly this devolarization allows profitable investment. That said, according to supply-side explanations, the capital moves around the city, and while it can positively impact some areas, in others it would hamper further development. Because in the city, there is a perpetual investment-disinvestment cycle of which gentrification is a production. Driven from Marxist theory, Smith (1996) states that economic enterprises should clutch at gaining higher profits to facilitate the accumulation of more enormous quantities of capital in profitable pursuit. In case of failure to facilitate the accumulation within the conventional circuit of capital, enterprises cannot afford more advanced production methods and utterly fall short in the competition with their peers. They end up either merging with larger enterprises or going into bankruptcy. The quest to reach more profit means necessity for constant growth or wide scale stability of the whole economy. When economic stability is disturbed, or the profit rates are lower than the expectancy, the built environment becomes focal to investment for further accumulation (Harvey, 1978). As Smith (1996) states,

near-monopoly control of space; the fixity of investments; the long turnover period. Near-monopoly control of space by landowners may prevent the sale of land for new development; the fixity of investments forces new development to take place at other, perhaps less advantageous, locations, and prevents redevelopment from occurring until invested capital has lived out its economic life; the long turnover period of capital invested in the built environment can discourage investment as long as other sectors of the economy with shorter turnover periods remain profitable (p. 56).

In other words, firstly, the rights of property owners allow them to have near-monopoly control over their use. Capitalist economies do not recognize the market as an institution to govern the transfer and use of land. Therefore, ground rent is a crucial means to organize economic distribution on the urban scale (ibid.). Secondly, although the land and the improvements on it are fixed, the price is not. Improvements on land typically influence the value that landowners can demand. Even though the land does not require maintenance, the improvements impact the ground rent (ibid.). Thirdly and lastly, the land is permanent, and its improvements have a long turnover period. This means that the deterioration period is slow, allowing enough time for the investments to be paid back (ibid.). The decay, contrarily, unlike the claim that grants it inevitable, is a decision made by development actors according to Smith (1996). Because while the built environment deteriorates, "there is enough control by, and integration of, the investment and development actors in the real estate industry that their decisions go beyond response and shape the market" (Bradford and Rubinowitz 1975 in Smith, 1996: 60). Smith (1996) schematically describes the decline in the built environment through some stages. According to his schema, a neighborhood's first cycle of use indicates a period in which the ground rent is likely to increase as developments on land are endured. However, eventually, devalorization will persist because of the

- (1) advancement in productivity of labor-power with which the newer and more profitable investments are possible;
- (2) style obsolescence; and
- (3) physical wear and tear.

On the one hand, the homeowners might or might not pursue reparation on their properties and seek newer land and housing, for which investments are more likely to recompense. On the other hand, the landlords might be prone to invest less as long as the rent is defrayed. As a result, the aged housing that once promoted the higher-income groups becomes affordable for lower-class populations. Spatially, disinvested neighborhoods are left alone with their low-income inhabitants who cannot maintain (i.e., keep up with regular maintenance of the physical state) the housing on their occupation. To sum up, urban decay is not a linear but parabolic process that creates the run-down areas that lower and working-class inhabitants occupy. Nevertheless, deriving from the reviewed literature, unlike the arguments that deem a particular group responsible for decay, the more impoverished population moves into an area that has already decayed because they can only afford these areas. However,

Smith (1996: 65) duly notes that this cycle is "by no means universal, nor does it take place in precisely the same manner in every neighborhood".

Rent gap

Gentrification is a process partially produced through the movement of capital in the city's land and housing market. When the capital is moved from the inner city to the suburbs, the areas left behind decreased their actual (use) value while their potential value remained high. Similarly, capital mobilization through investment and disinvestment cycles within the city leaves areas behind to be devalored. According to supply-side explanations, this constitutes the primary aspect for the production of gentrifiable areas because the difference between the potential ground rent level and the current ground rent capitalized under the present land use (Smith, 1996) ultimately represents the rent gap, of which the highest rate of return attracts further investments. In other words, if the gap is wide enough, rehabilitation and (other sorts of) improvements can begin to trigger the capitals' flow back (Lees et al., 2008). And as Smith (1996) suggests,

only when this gap emerges can reinvestment be expected since if the present use succeeded in capitalizing all or most of the ground rent, little economic benefit could be derived from redevelopment (p.65).

In the same vein, in a competitive market economy, the ideology of maximization of profit translates into the urban sphere by landowners, developers, and everyone else involved in the development process as a search for the cheapest land with the most profitable function possible, considering the available construction technology, regulations, building styles and fashions, nearby competitors, and local urban context (ibid.). The attractiveness of land for developers, according to Lees et al. (2008),

[...] is based mainly on location, accessibility, and the labor and technology devoted to improving a site. This means that the value of urban land is primarily a collective social creation: if a tiny piece of land located in the heart of a large, vibrant, growing city commands a premium on the market, it is because (1) centrality and accessibility are valued in the society, and (2) collective social investments over time produced a large, vibrant city (p. 51).

Ultimately, the attractiveness as a social construct, mobility of capital within the city, and the social investments lead to gaps that widen once the neighborhood decline proceeds. To comprehend it further, what follows is a brief description of the rent gap by its analytical components, put together following the taxonomy of Neil Smith.




Figure 4.7 Schematic representation of rent gap theory (Author's illustration)

As shown in figure 4.7 house value is the labor-power put into constructing and maintaining the fixed good; however, it drops through time as the property ages. The quest for maximum profit after the production costs is the ultimate generator of gentrification. Therefore the price is highly related to the specific costs of production. According to Smith (1996), the value and the price are independent of each other, although, to a certain extent, the latter will reflect the former. Following classical political economists like (Adam) Smith, Ricardo, and later Marx, Neil Smith (1996) describes value as the quality of socially necessary labor-power required to produce a particular commodity. The value will also depend on the devalorization versus re-valorization by adding value through further labor used to maintain the house (Smith, 1996).

According to Smith (1996), the sale price of land does not reflect any labor applied to it, as with the value of commodities proper. The price of land, therefore, is represented by the rent instead. As land is often sold with the structures, it accommodates the sale price and will represent the value of the house

and the ground rent (ibid.). According to him, capitalized ground rent is a case made by the landowners for the users. The surplus value that is created over the cost price by developers reduces through the ground rent. The actual quantity of the ground rent set through the present land use is the capitalized ground rent appropriated by the landowner. Given rental housing on a ground where the landlord produces a service, the production and the ownership is combined (ibid.). Although the price is intangibly organized, the return is capitalized through the rent paid by the tenants. Differently, in the case of owner-occupancy, the rent is only capitalized when a sale proceeds as an addition to the sale price. Thus, Smith (1996) formalizes the equation as "sale price=house value+capitalized ground rent."

Lastly, the potential ground rent is the price of land in its highest and best use. Driven by the political economists he cites, Neil Smith (1996) argues that any urban unit can capitalize on a certain quantity of ground rent, given its present land use. With many advantageous locational attributes, an urban unit might be able to capitalize more considerable amounts of ground rent under other land use circumstances (ibid.).

Chapter 5. Analytical toolbox of gentrification

Urban processes are diverse, path-dependent, and complex. Gentrification is no exception. For decades, the explanation of gentrification was binary, focusing on whether the phenomenon's economic or cultural triggers were more causal from the supply or demand side. This false binary fails to recognize the phenomenon is more chaotic than the simplified definitions and the focal points of emphasis. This section aims to organize and structure gentrification as a term while focusing on the phenomenon's quite disparate nature. Theories from both the supply and demand sides are complementary rather than opposing; they do not have to cancel each other out. As a widely used terminology and recurring phenomenon in contextually various sites, the meaning tilts without losing its essence. Against this background, the social conditions of the 'gentrifiable' area; the preconditions of gentrification, regardless of the context; and the theoretical framework will be presented respectively. This chapter seeks to introduce the frame for gentrification at work, which ultimately results in an analytical toolbox to answer the main research questions, and finally reorganizes the framework and redefines the gentrification term as a three-dimensional cube in which the contextual diversity of the phenomenon can be recognized and employed.

5.1. Social condition of gentrifiable/gentrifying neighborhood

Despite the current emphasis academia places on the structural impact of gentrification, the social impact on the preexisting neighborhood inhabitants – whether they stay-put or move – is substantial. Undeniably, gentrification is a disturbing process for the inhabitants with or without dislocation. Manzo et al. (2008) suggest that some of the most notable disruptions are the weakening community ties and place attachments through which the crucial social ties and the way of life are lost. Physical and social intrusions in the neighborhood reshape the social dynamics and everyday life activities through the loosening affordability, accessibility and familiarity occurring differently in every stage. As shown in figure 5.1, it is due to:

1. increasing housing, rent and retail prices;
2. competition over social and infrastructural amenities; and

3. changing built environment, social compositions and lifestyle in the gentrifying neighborhood,




Figure 5.1. Social consequence of gentrification (Author's illustration)

While physical displacees struggle having to find new housing without the necessary networks established through physical proximity, the symbolic displacees (the stay-put inhabitants) also struggle and experience anger and grief after losing their familiar environment and everyday life. However, some who hold necessary means within these groups might benefit from the commodification. The political conversation often legitimizes gentrification by focusing on the few earlier inhabitants who can benefit from the process. The seemingly closely-knitted (im)migrant groups might actually diminish as the beneficiary - earlier inhabitants who can profit from the process - and the disadvantaged - earlier inhabitants who cannot take advantage of the process - fragment. It is then essential to focus, while keeping in mind the heterogeneity within the groups, on the everyday life produced in these areas by the earlier inhabitants. The following section focuses on the commodification of ((im)migrant's) everyday life with the realization of new lifestyles.

Everyday life and urban transformation

Lefebvre (1991), in his ground-breaking work on the production of space, concludes that space is not only a concrete entity but also a product of relationships between human to human or human to artifact.

He further argues that

[I]nstead of uncovering the social relationships that are latent in spaces, instead of concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social relationships inherent to it... we fall into the trap of treating space as space, in itself, as space as such (Lefebvre, 1991: 90).

Following Lefebvre, this dissertation addresses space, not as given but as an entity dependent on social formations and their connection to the material environment; thus, the material changes trigger social changes and vice versa. With every change in the built environment, a new meaning of the space is produced because of the alternated social formations and the material and ideological projects on top of it.

All relationships in space, whether between human and human or human and artifact, are performed and observed in everyday life. According to Highmore (2002), everyday life is more than a name of the inspected reality as it bears hidden aspects of life. *Everyday life* can act as a showcase for the most changes in social relationships in space. Lefebvre (1991), whose own life's work focused on *everyday life*, defines the notion as an embodiment of all activities, with their differences and conflicts, left from distinct superior and structured activities. In response to Lefebvre, Davies (2016) suggests that *everyday life* is overpowered by higher activities, although separated. He argues that higher activities, such as programming and planning the control functions of mental labor and the executive functions of manual labour, hierarchically conduct relationships that reproduce in everyday life (Davies, 2016). Lefebvre (1991) argues that people are not adequately aware of the given hierarchy in their own lives, which is unconsciously acted upon in front of others in their everyday life. This dissertation suggests that everyday life is both concrete and abstract; performed privately and publicly; acts simultaneously and spontaneously; and can therefore serve as an unconscious showcase for social relations. Seemingly insignificant and mundane, *everyday life* is where the reactions to external impacts are visible without inhabitants' self-conscious filtering. Observing everyday life might reveal hidden signs of relational conflicts and solidarities derived from higher activities.

As numerous disciplines approach *everyday life* differently, a single description cannot merely state every aspect of it. Since everyday life occurs broadly and contains a vast domain, the frame of reference becomes more relevant than the definition. Therefore, this dissertation observes a section of

everyday life in which the agency of individuals, social formations and human-built environment relations that are free of institutional attachments are spontaneously performed in a neighborhood area. In other words, this dissertation focuses on space where everyday life simultaneously recurs around urban elements, such as dwellings, houses, factories, arteries, physical, and social infrastructures. Everyday life is dependent on and tied to urban changes; gentrification, then, subsequently influences the social formations - performed in everyday life - in a neighborhood. The changes caused by gentrification at the neighborhood level, such as amendments in relationships within the same group, might be hidden in, to be revealed through, everyday life.

Commodification of the neighborhood

The gentrifying neighborhood's foremost indicator is an abnormal increase in rent prices, accompanied by changing aesthetic, retail, and lifestyle through which earlier inhabitants' affordability, accessibility, and familiarity loosen. The more that physical and social change are pursued, the surer the further investments become. Management of the environment is often pursued both physically and socially as a result. Besides the physical transformation, the cities take social action to lure foreign investment and business headquarters. With more social change, a more neat social profile begins attracting more investment, continuing the transformation. Lang (1980) defines the interventions in a neighborhood to form a 'presentable' social formation as "customary community activities." These activities reflect another perspective: often of the developer - depending on the target group for the renewed environment - and not of the already existing population. The cleansing, then, increases or gives a use-value of both the environment and the social image.

From a Marxist point of view, the utility of things gives them a use-value. However, a utility is limited by the (physical) properties of the commodity. If a commodity is given a use-value, whether physical or symbolic, it becomes a product by its use or consumption. A neighborhood as a complete commodity should, then, have a value on its own with the physical amenities and its sociality. Due to rent regulations, the residents who can stay-put should also be presentable and marketable. Accompanied by the strategies to manipulate the perception of newcomers, developers and investors, and overall "customary community activities" by the pioneers, work on 'taming' the social life within by turning the

social image in a neighborhood into a presentable entity. This ordinary everyday life has no utility before the interventions earn a use-value. As a result of the efforts by the state, investors, developers and newcomers, the already existing population of the neighborhood can serve as mannequins to show off an 'exotic' space in the city. The lives of 'exotic others', therefore, become sellable and marketable articles; namely, a commodity, which Marx (1887) defines as

[...] an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. [...] The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference (p. 27).

Because of the actions by cities as strategies to attract foreign direct investment and business headquarters, the desirable neighborhoods go under a well thought-through transformation process not only physically but also socially. The media works on glorifying the life within; tourism companies organize guided tours, and finally, an overall intuition to colonize the neighborhood commences, which eventually fragments the community in need. The physical and symbolic appropriation of a disinvested neighborhood by these pioneer gentrifiers changes the area's character and sets the stage for future rounds of gentrification (Brown-Saracino, 2010; Ley, 1996, 2003; Smith, 1996; Zukin, 1982).

Here, a new wave of migration can now occur. Spurning the homogeneity of suburban living, professionals with higher incomes settle in the neighborhood searching for 'authentic' urban places (Ley, 1996; Zukin 1982, 2010). Newcomers are more likely to purchase and renovate properties, which price out former residents and first-wave gentrifiers, including artists and small arts businesses. These groups, in turn, are forced to seek out accommodations elsewhere in the city, often extending into adjacent neighborhoods, where the gentrification process continues its sprawl (Shaw, 2008). This lays the foundation for broader and deeper levels of capital accumulation (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Lees, 2003; Wylie and Hammel, 1999). The initial stages of gentrification pave the way to further upscale urban neighborhoods, accompanied by exponential displacement.

5.2. Preconditions of gentrification

Seemingly contrary descriptions of gentrification are, in fact, complementary (Hamnett, 1991). On the one hand, the supply-side explanations focus on the production of, mostly, gentrifiable areas and housing. On the other, the demand-side explanation sets the focus on gentrifiers. In other words, it is a realm

between the liberal humanists who stress the key role of choice, culture, consumption and consumer demand, and the structural Marxists who stress the role of capital, class, production and supply (Hamnett, 1991: 174).

First of all, if there is no sign of a demand, undoubtedly, no supply will be carried out, produced and served. Second of all, the overall societal transformations produce a pool full of gentrifiers strongly tied to politico-economic processes. The housing industry, real estate, and developers provide areas that promote these groups regarding their newly emerging lifestyle. In that sense, those two seemingly opposing ideas referring to two descriptive edges, in fact, complement each other.

Beyond the binary, in the focus of this dissertation, the (social) preconditions of gentrification are explicit: the social composition in the to-be gentrified areas and the perception of the to-be gentrifiers. The question to be asked is that by just being there, do earlier inhabitants directly or indirectly contribute to (a) decay or regeneration of a gentrifiable area; and (b) lesser or higher demand of the area? We are informed that the inhabitants of a neighborhood play an active role in the devalorization and revalorization of the area by indirectly contributing to spatial stigma, not maintaining, and being neglected by local governments. Besides the production of gentrifiers and gentrifiable areas, the already existing inhabitants in a neighborhood and the mediated perception of the newcomer is also highly essential in figuring out the impact, intensity, and character of the process. After a brief literature review on community in the following part, the displaceable population in the gentrifiable area and the gentrifier will be systematically displayed.

Heterogeneous migrant communities

Community is one of the contested concepts within the social sciences. Many fields of study interpret and define the term with great variety, often without a specific meaning. Although the definitions emphasize different virtues of the concept, the core remains similar - instead of doing things individually, people come together to pursue a particular aim collectively. For example, Durkheim's view of community involves diverse forms of solidarity to pursue an aim. Despite the members' differences, they maintain a mutual respect for the fact that they are complementary, and this realization gives them an organic unity. The emphasis in his definition is on differences within the community, despite being together around the same aim. So according to his definition, a community is naturally heterogeneous, and this creates a division of labor.

Similarly, Weber (1978) defines community as the complementary orientation of social actors towards one another to form a group. The physical proximity of neighborhoods, for Weber, makes them a likely source of mutual dependence. He adds that the neighbor is the *typical helper in need*; thus, neighborhoods show a particular tendency to form communities. Weberian sense of community, additionally, involves shared consciousness and identity while a strong 'us' and 'them' creates exclusion of others. His definition, therefore, underlines the territorial connection of community. Marx, on the other hand, distinguishes community as social classes that come together to form a distinctive kind of community, who are attentively united around the pursuit of clearly formulated economic interests—following that the community's territory is not necessarily physical. The combination of these three schools of thought brings about the descriptive circumstances of community in this dissertation, namely a) division of labor, b) solidarity, c) (virtual or physical) territory, and d) sense of belonging.

As "community seems everywhere" (Blokland, 2016: 5), policy interventions, activists, and related actors need to work on and for the community. However, political uses of the community often overlook the differences between the members and the heterogeneity of it. Blokland (2016) exemplifies how politics see community as one and homogeneous through an incident when politicians requested a statement from the Turkish community after a Turkish man stabbed a teacher in the Netherlands. That

is to say, in policy agendas, often, the community is seen as a homogeneous entity of individuals with the same actions, needs, and desires.

To accentuate communities' heterogeneity, this dissertation focuses on migrant populations from a similar origin that live proximately in the host country/region, but are very diverse in terms of their possessions. This type of community is exciting because they share the same origin and the neighborhood in the host country/region, and decision-makers and political elites treat them homogeneously despite the differentiated material and symbolic possessions they hold. That said, migrant communities are considerably diverse, given that the surroundings reconstruct the inhabitants' needs and desires that are highly dependent on the material and symbolic possession the individuals have. The material possessions ultimately shape inhabitants' perception towards their loss of familiarity, accessibility and affordability.

Existing population in gentrifiable areas

Despite having relatively little mention in the literature, the already existing inhabitants of a neighborhood are a strategic actor of gentrification. There are various potential impacts of the existing population's social composition in different gentrifying areas likely to be important concerning both the gentrifier and ensuing rent gap. As it was mentioned before, although a rent gap is one of the prerequisites of gentrification as a phenomenon, the ground rent only reaches its potential if there is demand for the area. In the devaluation period where the rent gap exists, yet little, the potential gentrifiers' perception of the area might lead them to avoid investment. (Im)migrants are amongst the disadvantaged groups of gentrifying neighborhoods, so the diverging impacts of earlier inhabitants on gentrification need explicit examination. Accordingly, the effect of already existing inhabitants on the gentrification process sets a vital part of this dissertation regarding the effects of the earlier population on (1) the demand of gentrifiers and (2) the rent gap.

The impact of already existing inhabitants is arguable as follows (see Figure 5.2). (a) The persistent stigma in those neighborhoods might drive the potential gentrifier out. Whether they want to move in for cultural or economic gain, the perception of gentrifiers might be influenced by the current inhabitants'

symbolic meaning internalized in the area. In the case of migrant occupancy, the symbolic meaning might be occupant-defined and robust, exclusive to the dominant migrant culture. Thus the lack of potential demand might make development risky. The earlier gentrifiers attracted by the area might start off innocent, being drawn to the neighborhood for reasons such as the aspiration of culture and diversity. Consequently, the small investors who are searching for diversity and a 'new experience' might begin individual renovation efforts. (b) For the corporate gentrifiers to come to the neighborhood, the rent gap should be sufficiently high. Hence the smaller investors who came to the area, may be followed by direct support of the state, the financial institutions' green light, the state allowing the redevelopment, media re-branding, and housing market re-advertising of the area (Smith, 1993). The social composition of the neighborhood, chiefly (im)migrant, might be re-branded through a liberal-diversity rhetoric. The label of no-go diminishes, and more gentrifiers move in.




Figure 5.2 Rent gap assembly (Author's illustration)

Following the proven demand, the financial institutions, state and developers further emphasize an area in the light of rising popularity. The area, through revaluation, proves its profitability for the

increasing density and scale of development. Nevertheless, the social causality of gentrification intertwines with the economic causalities also in this stage. A neighborhood full of "unwanted" citizens is not suitable for the more affluent, new tenant, homeowner or a potential gentrifier as they do not want to be associated with the people of the neighborhood because of a *fear of economic loss*. Therefore, during the transformation, the social and physical structures and the image of the area perceived by potential newcomers should be restored. Thus, it is expected that the perception and rhetoric are mediated in particular neighborhoods in order to allow more affluent inhabitants in. Consequently, in the later stages with the financial institutions and state recognition, the earlier - principally migrant - inhabitants become a matter of political tool to legitimize i) the displacements through stigmatization or ii) gentrification through the social mix. Besides the stigmatization of the neighborhood culture, social mix can lead to gentrification after the political liberals romanticize the neighborhood's diversity. As a result of either scenario, the neighborhood culture and everyday life could be commodified and appropriated.

Gentrifier in gentrifiable areas

The first and foremost prerequisite of gentrification is having gentrifiers in gentrifiable areas. According to Chris Hamnett (1991), if there are no potential gentrifiers, the gentrification will not proceed. Gentrification depends on the demand of those who prefer to live in the inner city, specifically for cultural gain, according to the demand-side explanations. However, the wish for cultural gain is not independent of economic interests. In the case of homeownership, gentrified housing serves as both a tool of accumulation and social reproduction of the educated middle class (Zukin, 1984), marking gentrification as a cultural practice grounded in economic rationality. Furthermore, the locational preferences for the new middle-class are limited because the preferences are embodied by the available options, contrary to the belief that gentrifiers choose where to live entirely on their own (ibid.). On that premise, without the supply, gentrification is not necessarily massive or destructive, if possible. As consumer preferences are socially and economically created, manipulated, and shaped (Smith, 1979), it is impossible to set cultural and economic interests apart.

The demand is location-specific. For example, a gentrifier might choose to live in a particular unit of the inner-city while not preferring the other areas. Depending on the available options and gentrifier type, these demands shape cultural aspects like the new neighborhood's fittingness to lifestyle and valued aspects; will for ethnic and architectural diversity; or economic gain. This dissertation follows a taxonomy for the type of gentrifiers by Schlichtman et al. (2018), who define six groups concerning their cultural demands and consumption behavior. As shown in figure 5.3 the gentrifier type might vary depending on the stage of gentrification, even in the same space but at different times.




Figure 5.3. Assemblage model of Clay's stage model and Schlichtman et al.'s gentrifier typology (Author's illustration)

The first type they define is the "conqueror", whose initial drive is to eject and symbolically erase the former working-class past to claim a space for new middle-class territorial possession. The "colonizer" facilitates connections; however, they view the neighborhood as needing their existence. The "competitor", according to the authors, is forced to compete over amenities that are considered public distributive goods. With this, the more prevalent newcomer occupies what otherwise could be occupied by an existing inhabitant, or uses their means for privately owned amenities. The "capitalist" may start businesses in the neighborhood that only target the newcomers, and may have an idea to create a new identity to the neighborhood or rent their properties with similar ideals (ibid.). The "consumer", the fifth

type of gentrifier, follows the retail changes in the area, as the visualization of gentrification revolves around changes in consumption spaces. The sixth and the last type of gentrifier they describe is the "curator" who sees the neighborhood as a gallery or museum, and selects and preserves the artifacts of their tastes (ibid.).

5.3. Three dimensional frame and fuzzy differentials

Gentrification is widespread and ever-changing. Its temporal and spatial variety makes it even harder to keep to a comprehensive theoretical framework narrow enough to provide a universal rigor. As mentioned earlier, three main differentials of gentrification (1) displacement, (2) reinvestment in fixed capital, and (3) social and structural changes are fuzzy. Moreover, despite its clear definitions, each fuzzy differential proceeds differently in various conditions. That is why the analytical rendering of gentrification into differentials reveals the broad range of the phenomenon. This part presents a three-dimensional cube to draw the term's boundaries wide enough to consist of contextual attachment and narrow enough to avoid describing any singular phenomenon. The axes of this suggested cube are the three fuzzy differentials of gentrification.




Figure 5.4 Schematic representation of gentrification framework (Author's illustration)

As seen in figure 5.4, (1) displacement can vary on a spectrum from symbolic displacement to forced displacement. (2) Reinvestment in fixed capital can vary on a spectrum from public investments (policy actions) to teardowns. And lastly, (3) social and structural changes can vary from social mix to complete transformation (see figure 5.4). In order to reduce the risk of implanting *chaotic conceptions* into a single and straightforward terminology (Rose, 1984), this dissertation aims at using gentrification terminology as a departure point to investigate and compare the gentrification-like urban processes in various contexts.

Fuzzy differential #1: Displacement

Displacement is the most problematic consequence of gentrification. Davidson (2008) claimed that gentrification transforms neighborhoods with unjust consequences through the limitations in economic, community, and neighborhood resources. Although it is often considered only physical displacement, displacement occurs in many forms that critically affect the former inhabitants. Following the definition by Grier and Grier (1978), the displacement at work in the dissertation is the forceful outwards movement of households (1) beyond the household's control or ability (2) despite the household's suitability to the antecedent conditions of occupancy, (3) making longer-term occupancy of households impossible.

Like Davidson (2008), driven from space and place dilemmas, this dissertation distinguishes direct and indirect displacement. Because while space is from a Kantian point of view where the consciousness is, and practically an ungraspable structure (Lefebvre, 1991), place contains both tangible and intangible elements of interactions between groups and people, institutional proceedings and the decisions therein; in other words, it is the meaningful segment of the space. Therefore, being out of place means losing purpose whether by dislocation or through symbolic displacement. Considering that displacement does not always mean the physical dislocation of former inhabitants, the spectrum ranges from physical to symbolic displacement in different types. Displacement can occur as (1) physical displacement, (2) economic displacement, (3) forced displacement, (4) exclusionary displacement, (5) displacement pressure, and (6) symbolic displacement (see figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5 Schematic representation of spectrum of displacement (Author's illustration)

Direct displacement occurs when earlier households cannot afford the increased rent or maintenance costs and are forced to leave physically. In these types, the particular characteristic is that the gentrifier and the non-gentrifier compete for the same property. Direct displacement - very straightly put - according to Marcuse (1985) is the displacement of a household from the unit it currently occupies. The first type of direct displacement Davidson (2008) defines is when landlords cut off the necessary infrastructure in the building to force inhabitants to move out. This type is called 'physical displacement' (ibid.). The second type he notes is 'economic displacement,' in which the landlord raises rent to a level that the household cannot afford, forcing them to move out (ibid.). The third type is 'forced displacement,' which is a phenomenon that is commonly known as the overall displacement of inhabitants following an external event such as natural disasters, war, etcetera.

Indirect displacement is related to rising prices and the related influx of economic and cultural capitals. This gentrification of surroundings and the newly erected high status commercial and residential building creates a hot-spot for properties (Davidson, 2008). The changes that gentrification creates also allow the neighborhood's political and social alterations that lead to displacement over time. The long-term cohesive neighborhoods with residents who rely on place-based social ties can suffer from a slow and steady change in the neighborhood's political and social agenda. The neighborhood resources change, and the social infrastructure and services no longer meet the demand, resulting in the former inhabitants feeling out of place. Firstly, 'exclusionary displacement' is when new

households are prevented from moving into gentrifying neighborhoods because of their costliness. Secondly, inspired by Marcuse (1985), 'displacement pressure' is a stimulant that occurs when the families that remain see the other families leaving, the neighborhood coarsely changing, and the retail services targeting the needs of newer clientèle. The stay-put families, as a result, have an emotional pressure for being displaced in future. The disappearing familiarity of the area leads to the third type of indirect displacement. Through transition, the social balance, services, local shops, and meeting places change. The familiarity of the area, which was once called home, vanishes making earlier inhabitants feel symbolically displaced.

Following the literature hitherto, gentrification-induced displacement occurs on a spectrum from physical displacement to symbolic displacement. Although the indirect types of displacement seem non-physical at first, they effectively erase the former community in the long term. The question of displacement, like the other fuzzy differentials, once more underlines the temporal aspects of gentrification as a long-term destructive process.

Fuzzy differential #2: Reinvestment in fixed capital

According to Marx, the reinvestments of fixed capital, such as machinery (or, in this case, built environment), reduce production costs and increase surplus capacity. Reinvestment in fixed capital refers to the expenditures made to improve the productive capacity of real estate (Hackworth, 2001). Thus, while the reinvestment reduces the production costs, the sale price increases and so does the actual value. As a result, it boosts the profit. Whoever holds the means of production can maximize the profit to a higher degree while they are freer of loss risk than the smaller-scale investors. Responding to the rent gaps, public policies, and sectoral changes in employment structures, a range of actors such as developers, investors, and homebuyers proceed with reinvestment practices differently (Wyly et al., 2015). The typology of the investment influences how and how much the neighborhood changes. The outcome of different types of investments will vary primarily depending on whether the developers, governments, or households are in command; however, in either case, capital accumulation is central to the process (Beauregard, 1990). Therefore this dissertation treats reinvestment as a differentiated phenomenon in six categories, inspired by Zuk et al. (2018) from their investigation on the relationship

between public investments, gentrification and displacement, and Podagrosi and Vojnovic (2008) from their attempt to categorize different investment processes in Houston. Although the reinvestment processes are categorized, they are not mutually exclusive. The types are often shaped by variables like housing, politico-economic structures, and related policies. The categories are (1) public investments (direct activities), (2) public investments (indirect policy actions), (3) refurbishment of existing structures, (4) private sector blockbusting, (5) locally-driven urban renewal, and (6) teardowns (see figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6 Schematic representation of spectrum of reinvestment in fixed capital (Author's illustration)

The investments in the surroundings are categorized into two factors. The first is "direct activities" such as urban redevelopment, open space revitalization, and infrastructure construction. By no certainty can these investments alone cause gentrification; however, more commonly, some further investments follow these renewal procedures in the area's surroundings, which go on to generate gentrification. The second is "indirect policy actions" such as land assembly, subsidies, and zoning. Like the former investment type, this form might attract further investments in the longer term. Often, policy actions are taken to allow further investments in the neighborhood although it is not certain that gentrification and displacement will follow.

Unlike the initial types described above, the following reinvestment types specifically regard housing. Thus, the third reinvestment type is the "refurbishment of existing housing structures," which Ruth Glass (1964) described as the classic gentrification. This type is primarily initiated by the homeowners, generally for their occupation. It usually proceeds as the middle-class purchases the working-class houses and upgrades the house, and the lower class population becomes replaced by higher income groups (Podagrosi and Vojnovic, 2008). This process resonates with incumbent upgrading (Clay, 1979; Holcomb and Beauregard, 1981) and suggests that newcomers make improvements, which consist of minor renovations for the taste of the younger newcomers. The fourth type is "private sector blockbusting," in which the developers assemble large tracts of land for large-scale redevelopment (Podagrosi and Vojnovic, 2008). Private sector investors use various strategies such as entering into ex officio settlements with or misguiding the former owners to buy lower-income groups' properties for a low price. Once the property is purchased, the area is fenced up into a gated community (ibid.). Another type of reinvestment is the "locally driven urban renewal," which is often used for large-scale neighborhood clearance and redevelopment as a corporation between governmental interventions and large development firms (Podagrosi and Vojnovic, 2008). Speculatively, this type is often used for "taming a community", mainly in neighborhoods densely inhabited by (im)migrants. This type is often locally driven, and the government is involved in this type of project to assist with the inherent financial risk. The last type of reinvestment is a "bulldozer gentrification" process referred to as "teardowns," a complete demolishing of the housing and replacement with more substantial structures that appeal to higher income groups.

Fuzzy differential #3: Social and structural changes

The social and structural differences in a neighborhood are a component of gentrification but are very fuzzy and manifest with great variety. While the newcomers start arriving in the neighborhood, the area becomes more socially mixed. As it slowly transforms private retail and public amenities, the social mix becomes a source of conflict. It goes on until the total transformation of social capital. In extreme cases, the neighborhood becomes homogeneous, filled only with newcomers. From social mix to complete transformation, the social capital – i.e. the contingent relations within the neighborhood – in diverse levels, turn into burdens, some of which are intra-group. Because social capital is more of a relational

phenomenon than a graspable and quantifiable resource (Butler and Robson, 2001), social capital changes through the reinvestment in fixed capital, and displacement is a continuous period rather than a consequence. Against this background, the following paragraphs categorize the fuzzy differential 'social and structural changes' into (1) social mix, (2) social tectonic, (3) social displacement, (4) social tension, (5) social exclusion, and (6) complete transformation (see figure 5.7).




Figure 5.7 Schematic representation of spectrum of social and structural changes (Author's illustration)

Social mix, depending on the context, is described as a mix in tenure, income, ethnic diversity, immigrant status, religious affiliation, level of government subsidy, occupation, household size, or age (Walks and Maaren, 2008). Often in gentrification research, the social mix is considered a temporary stage until the whole transformation is completed. Nevertheless, this can also be a permanent status or a long and socially destructive stage (Bridge et al., 2006). Social tectonic broadly refers to the parallel relations between social and ethnic groups rather than integrative ones (Butler and Robson, 2001). In these types of relations, there is "mutual avoidance" in which the people mind their group businesses. Consequently, it does not construct a cozy settlement while the newer and older inhabitants have minimal to no interaction (Butler and Robson, 2001). Despite celebrated diversity in these neighborhoods, people live separate lives, characterized by mistrust and superficial to no contact (Walks and Maaren, 2008).

Earth sciences inform us that an earthquake is inevitable if tectonic plates move in different directions or with different velocities (e.g., De Gelder et al. 2019). Similarly, in a gentrifying neighborhood, the social tectonic can turn into a social tension between and within the groups, creating an inconvenient living unit or displacement in the long term. Social tension is another type of change that occurs inter- or

intra-group. While the competition and the structural dynamics are changing in a neighborhood, the groups increasingly turn against each other. Social entrapment is another social and structural change affecting the neighborhood on a prominent account, referring to the exclusion of vulnerable groups to the opportunity to relocate or expand. Specifically, the inhabitants who lack choice feel trapped in a gentrifying neighborhood while the unit is rapidly changing (Petrovic, 2008). Social exclusion is another type of neighborhood social and structural transformation that occurs through the reinvestment in fixed capital and displacement. Social exclusion refers to a binary between an inclusive and a mainly *satisfied majority and an excluded and despondent minority* (Paton, 2012). One might assume that the values and behaviors held by the majority are better or have *higher stocks of social capital* (Paton, 2012). In the case of a more populated and socially dominant gentrifier group in a neighborhood, the lower class groups might feel symbolically or physically excluded as retail and social amenities cater to the newcomers. Complete transformation rounds out the spectrum and can be understood quite simply as the time in which the neighborhood transformation is completed. The gentrifying neighborhood, in this type, turns into an enclave of higher-income groups, and the social and structural change causes the complete physical displacement of earlier inhabitants.

Chapter 6. Preconditions of gentrification in Tarlabasi (İstanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte Saint-Denis (Paris)

Although gentrification is highly tied to economic and political forces, the demand is necessary for the procedure to start. Besides the financial, locational and spatial qualities of an area, the social characteristic, too, impacts the risk of whether the rent gap would be capitalized or not, in response to (in)sufficient demand. For various reasons, potential in-comers might prefer elsewhere, with less risk of economic loss and engaging less with a population of lower-status in a knowingly (im)migrant neighborhood.

Therefore, this chapter aims to understand the impact of social composition in neighborhoods on creating gentrification preconditions. It conceptualizes the potential gentrifiers' understanding of the (im)migrant neighborhoods with a longitudinal analysis of the case neighborhoods in İstanbul, Vienna and Paris. The analysis includes data from before the first signs of gentrification until hints of structural changes in the areas. The focus period for Tarlabasi are from the early 2000s until the late 2000s when the renewal project was announced. For Kretaviertel, it is the early 2000s till late 2000s when the train station's renewal was announced; and for Paris it is from the late 1980s till early 1990s when the younger professionals began moving in Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis. This chapter ultimately presents the effect of social composition on the areas' desirability throughout the transformation process.

Before exploring the impact of the areas' social composition, it is crucial to examine their physical structures. Therefore the structure of the chapter is as follows. The first part illustrates the cases' spatial qualities; the second part focuses on the social composition of the areas; and finally, the third part describes outsiders' perceptions derived from the newspapers, interviews, and field diaries. As a result, the spectrum of perceptions varies from absolute caution to substantial admiration. Throughout gentrification stages, various impressions determine the demand levels and the gentrifier type. The dramatic change in the perceptions also reveals the (im)migrant population's and culture's instrumentalization for the process.

6.1. Spatial composition of the neighborhoods

neighborhoods' spatial qualities, too, right before the urban transformations, determine the way the process advances. This part interrogates the physicalities of the case areas in three parts. The first describes the urban histories. The second part focuses on the units' spatial characteristics, such as the architectural style and street structures. The third and the final part presents their locational attributes, such as proximity to the center and amenities. Thereby, physical circumstances for a rent gap are indicated in three cases: Tarlabasi, Kretaviertel, and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis.

Urban history

Tarlabasi lies in the European half of İstanbul, next to central Taksim Square and parallel to İstiklal Street, which is a highly visited touristic route (see Figure 6.1). The area is surrounded by gentrified affluent neighborhoods, although throughout history, the connection of Tarlabasi and adjacent neighborhoods, which have an outstanding spatial quality, was increasingly weaker.




Figure 6.1. Tarlabasi

The land of Tarlabasi used to be vineyards in the 16th and 17th, providing an open space for the surroundings (Akin, 1998). The residential settlements in Pera district (known as Beyoğlu now) began

growing in the 18th century, mostly hosting the minority and non-muslim populations of Istanbul due to the foreign embassies situated in the district. Where it is located, Beyoglu (Pera) is a former entertainment center of the city providing leisure activities such as bars and restaurants, especially for the immediate neighbors that consist of embassy workers and diplomats. Given the higher density of the non-muslim population accompanied by the westernization process, the area continued growing as a center for entertainment, gastronomy, lifestyle, art and culture in the 19th century, too. Due to the increasing population of Beyoglu, the settlements kept expanding through the North, where Tarlabasi, Dolapdere and Ömer Hayyam situate today.

After the Turkish Republic's foundation replaced the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Turkey's capital was transferred from İstanbul to the most beautiful city in the world, Ankara. As a result, Beyoglu lost its significance as the embassies moved to the new capital. Non-muslims and minorities still occupied the area; thus, the district was affected by the newly introduced wealth taxes in 1942, which charged the minorities high taxes. Many minority residents sold their properties to pay the taxes, including the Jewish after Israel's foundation in 1948. Subsequently, the population substantially declined in Beyoglu.

According to Enlil and Dinçer (2003), from 1950 on, Tarlabasi became more attractive for migrants. In 1955 through the 6th - 7th September incidents (Kuyucu, 2005), after the revolts against minorities in İstanbul, most of the remaining minority population left the neighborhood. The out-flux of the main population left the area suitable for the rural-urban flux-ers, as shown in figure 6.1. Greek population dropped even further with the conflict fired through the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey's armed forces. The decay of the neighborhood accelerated from then on.

In 1986 the first entrepreneur mayor of İstanbul, Bedrettin Dalan, initiated the widening of Tarlabasi Boulevard. The construction required demolishing over 300 buildings in the neighborhood to allow traffic slowed by the pedestrianization of parallel İstiklal Street (see Figure 6.1; Sakizlioglu, 2014). The statement by the municipality: 'cleansing sex work and drug smugglers' legitimized the street's construction; after the completion, it enhanced the barrier between decaying Tarlabasi and more affluent parts of the district. In 1990 a state-sponsored revitalization effort started in adjacent neighborhoods, which led to their gentrification, while Tarlabasi was abandoned behind an enormous

boulevard with even less connection to the rest of the district (see Figure 6.1). In the 1990s, an influx of displaced population of surrounding gentrifying neighborhoods and the Kurdish people escaping the armed conflict in East and South-East Turkey (see Figure 6.1) came to reside in Tarlabasi, followed by the in-flow of marginalized groups such as sex workers.

Kretaviertel is located in the 10th district of Vienna, south of the central train station. It lies like an island between the new-built settlement (Sonnwendviertel), and brownfield renovation projects (AnkerBrotFabrik and Siemens) (see Figure 6.3).




Figure 6.3 Kretaviertel

When the settlement south of Absberggasse was built in the late 19th century, it was considered unsafe, in fact, Vienna's most dangerous neighborhood. According to one of the many urban legends, an uprising in the Greek island Crete simultaneously led to unsafe conditions. As for the legend, the neighborhood simultaneously had a similar struggle between the Greek and Turks. So it is believed that the name has been derived from this Mediterranean island where the Turkish and Greek armed forces conflicted. Due to the significant industrial ground in the surrounding, the neighborhood grew vastly, particularly with a worker population.

Subsidized housing emerged from the early to mid-20th century to provide housing for increasing - especially worker - population, which constitutes the neighborhood's primary spatial characteristic. In the 50s and 60s, when the guest-worker treatment workers from former Yugoslavia and Turkey settled in, they were followed by their family through the family unification treatment.

The neighborhood buildings are mostly built after 1945. Given the area's industrial character, they mainly serve the housing need of worker. Like the city's outer neighborhoods, Kretaviertel is also associated with large flats and smaller historical buildings. Many large blocks are subsidised community buildings, in which both the ground and upper floors are used residentially.

At the end of the 20th-century, large factories of the Siemens and AnkerBrot in the area sold the factory lands to investors. As a result, the area's work structure began to change, which was the first sign of the neighborhood's consequent social and structural changes. By a city council decision, Vienna, in 2006, the train station situated in the north of the area became the city's central station and the constructions started in 2007. By that time the investors were holding on to their large-scale properties, such as Siemens campus and AnkerBrotFabrik, and began transforming these areas into cultural hubs.

Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is located in the southwest of the 10th district in Paris, bounded by Boulevard Magenta and Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle (see Figure 6.5).



Figure 6.5 Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis

After the metro station opened at Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis in 1908, the area's settlements developed more prominently. The site back then was a typical French neighborhood with mostly French residents. It was also a vital hub for manufacturers and workshops that provided for Sentier, a garment manufacturing district. In the 1920s - 1930s Jewish population moved in, and later, those who escaped from the concentration camps after the Second World War.

As the French economy shifted in the 1970s from manufacturing to retail sectors, the area began to lose its significance for its population. Soon after, in 1973, immigration policies were revised, favoring asylum seekers to access papers, and political refugees from Greece, Yugoslavia, and Poland moved into the neighborhood. However, in the late 1970s, Turkish and Kurdish refugee migration, due to Turkey's political and military conflicts and the following military coup in 1980, developed the neighborhood's current retail and social composition. In the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Kurdish/Turkish populations kept coming through their networks established in the neighborhood.

In the 1980s, Punjabi Muslims fleeing from Pakistan and India settled in the area alongside many other overlooked minorities, including ethnically Indian Mauritians. The cheap real estate and hotel

rooms close by the two vital train stations, proximity to Sentier, and the accessibility to low paid or undocumented work kept the area attractive for newcomers. Nevertheless, in the 1990s the neighborhood's proximity to the center and the lively daily life, attracted a young and more affluent population to move there, which increased rent prices and the displacement of migrants in the long run.

Spatial characteristics

Tarlabasi's architectural style reflects historical Ottoman and Mediterranean influences due to its former inhabitants. The buildings are characterized as small in floor size, i.e. 50 - 100 square meters on average - and moderately high, i.e., 3 -4 floors on average. Although illegal extra floors are not uncommon in the neighborhood, the apartments are divided into smaller units to allow additional renters or relatives in family houses.

Given the decay process that the neighborhood experienced over a long period, most buildings have deteriorated for two reasons. The first one is due to unknown ownership. These types of buildings are publicly owned and often assigned as heritage. As a result, renovation and rehabilitation are restricted on the façade. Therefore buildings are old and worn out, as shown in figure 6.7. The reason for the decay is that the low rent prices do not meet the property owners' renovation and restoration costs.



Figure 6.7 (a) (b) A typical building in Tarlabasi (Author's photography)

The site's topography allows for maze-like narrow streets and dead ends (see figure 6.9). The street structure of Tarlabasi is labyrinth-like, reducing the traffic while increasing the street level neighbor interactions. The observations reveal that the neighborhood's physical infrastructure is relatively better than the other disadvantaged areas in İstanbul. For example, unlike other disadvantaged neighborhoods, in Tarlabasi, electricity, water, and gas are available. The neighborhood is located close to the central transportation hub of İstanbul; therefore, it is possible to conveniently move to any other district. On the other hand, the neighborhood lacks parks and open spaces where the inhabitants could spend leisure time, as confirmed by the informal conversations with the residents; it is one of the main complaints. There are some schools and health care centers in the surroundings, as shown in Figure 6.8.




Figure 6.8 Social infrastructure in Tarlabasi (source: <http://beyoglu.bel.tr>)




Figure 6.9 Street structure of Tarlabasi

The property ownership rates in the neighborhood are very complicated. Due to the lack of data on a neighborhood level, the statistics cannot be retrieved through public channels. However, according to a report made by Bilgi University in 2006, the tenure structure is 57% tenancy, 33% owner-occupation, 6% property of an institution, and 4% property of a relative where the occupiers do not pay rent, as shown in Figure 6.10.



Figure 6.10 Property ownership in Tarlabasi (Şahin, 2006)

For decades, Kretaviertel had the image of a forgotten island as it has been located 'behind' train stations and the traffic belt for centuries; and is characterized by founder's period's blocks, large-scale municipal housing estates as shown in picture 6.11 and commercial lots. The street structure is a grid, as shown in picture 6.12, like the rest of the city. However, the neighborhood's social housing is not high density and has vast open spaces. One of the social housing blocks, AnkerBrotGründe, is colloquially known as paradise because of its low density and the amount of open space shared per person.



Figure 6.11 A typical block in Kretaviertel (Taken from Google Earth)




Figure 6.12 Street structure of Kretaviertel



Figure 6.13 Typical worn down building in Kretaviertel (Author's photography)

Around 75% of the buildings are rental units, 20% are owned, and 5% are other types, while around 43% are social housing and subject to rent regulations (Kadi, 2014) (see Figure 6.14). It should be noted that the private rental market for buildings built before 1945 is usually also rent-regulated. However, the introduction of limited-time contracts led to an increasingly precarious housing situation and price increases (Kadi, 2014). Unfortunately, data on rent-regulated apartments are not available on the neighborhood level.




Figure 6.14 Property ownership in Favoriten district (source: Kadi, 2014)




Figure 6.15 Social infrastructure in Kretaviertel (source: <http://schule.at>)

Unlike the large open spaces provided to social housing, the area lacks parks and open spaces for the general use of inhabitants. However, schools, campuses, and health care institutions in and around the neighborhood provide a sufficient social infrastructure (see Figure 6.15).

Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis' architectural style consists of historical buildings that did not change for two-three hundred years, like the Porte standing in the entrance shown in picture 6.17 (a). After passing through the famous Porte de Saint-Denis, the district welcomes visitors with Turkish and Kurdish speciality restaurants and establishments opened by other migrant entrepreneurs, as shown in picture 6.17 (b). The neighborhood consists of courtyards, dead-end streets and passages in a grid-like street structure (see picture 6.16).




Figure 6.16 Street structure of Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis



Figure 6.17 (a) Porte Saint-Denis (source: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>) (b) Street view Faubourg Saint-Denis (source: <https://parisnotebook.files.wordpress.com>)

The property ownership statistics in the neighborhood indicate that 66% consists of tenants, 24% of owner-occupation, 4% of tenants with furniture, and 8% is vacant, while 21% of the tenancy is subsidised (see Figure 6.18). The buildings made before 1945 are subjected to rent regulations.




Figure 6.18 Property ownership in Paris and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, (source: INSEE, 1990)

The residence quality of the neighborhood is lower compared to the rest of the city. In comparison, a *higher percentage* of apartments are defined as non-comfort without WC and/or bathroom in the Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (see figure 6.19).




Figure 6.19 Residence quality (source: INSEE, 1990)




Figure 6.20 Social infrastructure in Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (source: <https://mairie10.paris.fr/>)




Figure 6.21 Paris density (Le recensement de 1990 a Paris) Study area is signed in red

The physical infrastructure, i.e., water, electricity and gas, is well-established in the neighborhood. Transportation is provided by the metro lines and buses that are frequently passing by. However, like the rest of Paris, it is densely inhabited (see figure 6.21), and there is a lack of open spaces for the inhabitants within the neighborhood; instead, the nearby parks provide the need (see figure 6.20).

Locational characteristics

All three neighborhoods have similarities in their locational characteristics. Their similarities are categorized into three: proximity to transportation hubs, nearby amenities, and proximity to the city center.




Figure 6.22 Transportation around Tarlabasi (Author's illustration)




Figure 6.23 Near-by amenities (Author's illustration)

Firstly, all three neighborhoods are close to the transportation hub for inner and intercity (see Figure 6.22). Tarlabasi is by the Taksim square, where most buses and metros come together. Besides from that, the buses to both airport and several intercity bus terminals leave from there. There is a sufficient connection to the whole city and the country (see Figure 6.22). Besides, the neighborhood is surrounded by renewed facilities, a pedestrian shopping street, boutique hotel area and renewed Taksim Square (see Figure 6.23).

Kretaviertel is close to Vienna's central train station, which provides direct transport to the airport, numerous cities in Austria and countries in Europe. Besides, the bus terminal implements transport mainly to East European countries. In the neighborhood, there are two tram lines, and bus lines provide a good connection with the rest of the city (see Figure 6.22). The neighborhood, like Tarlabasi, is surrounded by brownfield renovation projects, a pedestrian shopping street, a new development project, a historical area, commercial headquarters, and the central train station (see Figure 6.23).




Figure 6.24 Transportation around Kretaviertel (Author's illustration)




Figure 6.25 Near-by amenities (Author's illustration)

Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is situated by two significant transport hubs, Gare du Nord and Gare de l'Est. It is possible to go directly to airports, numerous cities and countries. In addition, the metro lines 4 and 9 come together in the neighborhood, giving an excellent connection to the rest of the city (see Figure 6.26). The superb link provides easy access by disadvantaged groups, making it a valuable city part to invest in. Like the others, Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is surrounded by affluent districts of Paris (see Figure 6.27).




Figure 6.27 Near-by amenities (Author's illustration)

The second locational characteristic that the three studied neighborhoods have in common is the vitality of nearby amenities. Tarlabasi is a decayed island in the sea of renewal. Therefore, the neighborhood is surrounded by affluent areas with higher income groups, entertainment and shopping centers.

Kretaviertel similarly has increasing affluence around. Within the neighborhood, with the central train station and the business center built around brownfield renovation projects, a private university moved from Budapest, Hungary and resulted in increasing art and culture hubs.

The third and the last locational characteristic these neighborhoods share is their proximity to city centers. Tarlabasi is located within the center, giving the area an impeccable locational value. Kretaviertel, although it is located outside the inner city traffic belt, still has a central location given the

development direction of the city. Finally, Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is nearby the affluent central districts like the third and second arrondissement and is very central.

6.2. Social composition of the neighborhoods

Although not addressed adequately, the neighborhoods' social composition also indirectly contributes to the rent gap conditions. This part firstly reveals the demographic characteristics; secondly, migration histories; and finally, the everyday life of the case neighborhoods: Tarlabasi, Kretaviertel, and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis in 2006, 2007, and 1990, respectively. This should exhibit the overall picture of the case neighborhoods' social structure to reveal the link between the social composition and the outsider perceptions later in section 6.3 of the chapter.

Demographic characteristics

Although Ankara is the administrative capital of Turkey, İstanbul is the commercial and cultural one. Both international and internal investments are focused on this metropolitan. While the investments broaden diverse employment opportunities, the city has become very mixed in socio-economics and cultural terms.

Tarlabasi is a neighborhood in İstanbul in densely inhabited by an (im)migrant population. The social and physical structure in the neighborhood ever changes vastly; thus, the data on the object is limited to earlier periods, collected through university reports and individual efforts. According to a report by Şahin (2006), Tarlabasi was populated by residents speaking 98% Turkish, 95% Kurmancî, 3% Arabic, 2% Zazakî, and 2% Armenian, while these rates were 88% Turkish, 9% Kurmancî, 2% Arabic, 1% Zazakî and 0.02% Armenian in overall İstanbul at the time (see Figure 6.28).




Figure 6.28 Languages spoken in Tarlabasi (Şahin, 2006) and İstanbul (TUIK), 2007

Tarlabasi's social structure was initially formed due to rural-urban flux in the 1960s, and then through forced migration from the Eastern Turkish cities densely inhabited by the Kurdish population in the 1990s. In the following years, due to the site's decaying nature, many lower-class rural-urban migrants resided in Tarlabasi, along with the marginalized populations such as sex workers, refugees and ethnic minorities such as Greek and Armenian.

The educational level in the neighborhood is low compared to the whole city. Numerous illiterate people live in the area; the highest percentage of literacy consists of primary school graduates because of the obligatory attendance to primary school in Turkey (see Figure 6.29).




Figure 6.29 Educational level in Tarlabasi (Şahin, 2006)

The area mostly consists of service sector workers and classical workers alongside a high percentage of unemployed population (see Figure 6.30).




Figure 6.30 Employment structure Tarlabasi (Şahin, 2006) and İstanbul (TUIK), 2006

In contrast to Istanbul, Vienna has experienced limited immigration right after the Second World War. The city's immigration took mainly place, starting from the 1960s, in the form of 'guest worker' migration, coming from the Western Balkan states and Turkey. Unlike Austrian officials expected, many of the invited workers did not return to their origins later on. Many of those early immigrants found their residency in neighborhoods characterized by privately owned buildings of the founder's period in western and southern Vienna outside of the 'Gürtel', a massive traffic belt, and the migrant populations dominate those neighborhoods still today.

The 10th district (10. Bezirk) is one of the districts with a dominant Turkish and former Yugoslav population and is located in a development axis south of the central train station. Formerly it was a working-class district due to industry density around the area. The many neighborhoods in the area remain migrant dominated. The neighborhood, Kretaviertel, is one of them and hosts one of the highest percentages of residents with Turkish background in Vienna. In 2018, measured by country of birth, around 9.9% of the neighborhood's inhabitants was born in Turkey. In the whole of Vienna this is around 4%. Within migrant populations, people from Serbia and Turkey are two primary groups (see Figure 6.31).




Figure 6.31 Ratio of migrant population by origins, 2007 (Österreich Statistik) (Author's illustration)

In contrast to other migrant groups, the Turkish community's average educational level is lower (Kohlbacher and Reeger 2020: 108). People with mandatory secondary education and apprenticeship

training dominantly occupy the Favoriten district, and these percentages are higher compared to Vienna. In contrast, higher education levels are lower than the rest of the city (see Figure 6.32).




Figure 6.32 Educational level in Favoriten and Vienna, 2007 (Österreich Statistik) (Author's illustration)

The migrants from Turkey's labor market positions contribute to comparably lower socio-economic status (Kohlbacher and Reeger 2020). Similarly, in the Favoriten district, densely inhabited by the population initially from Turkey, the skilled workforce is less than in the city overall. Manufacturing is the primary source of employment in the area by 17%, while the percentage is less than 1% in Vienna in 2007 (see Figure 6.33). It shows that a significant part of manufacturing in Vienna was concentrated in the Favoriten district.





Figure 6.33 Employment structure Vienna and Favoriten, 2007 (Österreich Statistik) (Author's illustration)

Although the neighborhood's age structure is similar to Vienna overall, the older population is slightly higher in the area (see Figure 6.34).



Graphic 6.34 Age structure Vienna and Favoriten, 2007 (Österreich Statistik) (Author's illustration)

Paris is one of the largest continental European cities, hosting the headquarters of international corporate companies and consequently characterized by cultural and employment options. Given these circumstances, the city attracts many (im)migrants. Due to the increasing prices in the housing market of Paris, lower-income populations declined; however, it did not affect three districts in the North-East of Paris (10th, 11th, 18th) in the 1980s (Paris Recession, 1990). Thus, although the migrants often lived in the outer periphery, there were some exceptions in the city. One of the neighborhoods where the most foreign population of Paris live was Quartier de la Porte Saint-Denis. Non-EEC foreigners, mostly Maghrebians, Africans, Asians or Turks/Kurds lived in the area in the 1980s. Lower-income migration to Paris from Turkey is primarily characterized by guest workers, family unification, and political refugees. In 1990, 22% of the residents were of foreign origin while the foreign percentage of Paris was 16% (see Figure 6.35).




Figure 6.35 Population by origins, 1990 (INSEE) (Author's illustration)

The neighborhood's educational level is lower compared to the whole of Paris by 1990 (see Figure 6.36). The percentage of people with no diploma is higher than in the rest of the city, whereas people with superior education comprise 23% compared to 30% in the city overall.





Figure 6.36 Education level in Porte Saint-Denis and Paris, 1990 (INSEE) (Author's illustration)

In 1990, the neighborhood had a higher percentage of blue-collar workers, 21% compared to 14% in Paris overall, while it had a lower population percentage of management and higher intellectual positions, 26% compared to 33% in Paris overall (see Figure 6.37).



Graphic 6.37 Employment structure Porte Saint-Denis and Paris, 1990 (INSEE) (Author's illustration)

The age structure in the neighborhood is very similar to overall Paris; however, the mid-range ages comprise a slightly higher percentage in the neighborhood. While ages between 30-60 in the neighborhood are more male than female, the younger ages are dominated by female populations (see Figure 6.38). The unbalance in certain ages between males and females signals males living alone or in shared flats, and relatively fewer families in the area.




Figure 6.38 Age structure by gender in Porte-Saint-Denis and Paris, 1990 (INSEE) (Author's illustration)

Migration histories

The Republic of Turkey, as an extension of the Ottoman Empire, became differently from its origins, a one-nation country. The new regime's foundation was an emulation of the period's mainstream that supported a 'one nation, one country' ideology, similar to some European countries like France and Italy. The change in the country's administrative direction and the renewed borders gave some of the former citizens of the Empire a minority status. The whole terrain of the land used to recognize multiple nationalities, unlike the newer counterpart that acknowledges only one language, nation, state, and flag, despite the diverse and vast number of nationalities and ethnicities within the new, given boundaries. Although the dilemma of minorities in Anatolia is not a recent phenomenon, the present-day migration map is shaped by the fact that Anatolia is inherently mixed, considering its multicultural past and present. Therefore, migration within and out of the country has similarities in how migrants experience alienation, discrimination, and burdensome host-migrant relations.

In the 1960s, the Turkish economy was still recovering from the republic's foundation and a low budget left after the independence war. After WWII, the United States of America lent assets to 16 European countries, including Turkey, to encourage them to participate in international economic activity. For Turkey, it meant to open up the economy to foreign entities and a free-market mechanism. From then on, the headquarters of international corporate businesses popped up in İstanbul. In addition, the number of local and international white-collar workers increased, which led to the service sector slowly emerging and rising.

Meanwhile, the agricultural sector was declining due to automation, amongst other reasons. As a result, fewer employment opportunities in the countryside turned the farmworkers into service (city) workers, as were the Kurdish cities' forced immigrants. Additionally, extensive unskilled and skilled employment options attracted many people from other towns and villages to cities, especially Istanbul and European countries.

Individual migration histories expand to many categories in and out of Turkey. However, in this work, they are limited to 1. rural-urban flux, 2. guest-worker migration, 3. family unification migration, 4. forced migration, and 5. political refugee migration. This is based on the migration characteristics of the case neighborhoods, previous studies and analysis of biographic interviews (see Figure 6.39).




Figure 6.39 Schematic representation of lower class migration from/in Turkey (Author's illustration)

Firstly, the *rural-urban flux* mostly occurred due to the lack of employment options in rural Turkey as a consequence of automation, decreasing profit rates and shrinking agricultural land. The latter occurred because of the wild and vast urbanization accompanied by increasing employment opportunities in the urban areas. So the rural to urban flux in Turkey has two main pillars. The first is the cities' growing opportunities due to the ever-changing politico-economic ecosystem; the second is the decreasing agricultural importance and activity in Turkey's countryside.

The second type, *guest-worker migration*, was a pact some European countries signed for workers' invitation to fill up the places left from decreased labor forces due to the second world war, in industry. Under the influence of the rural-urban flux, Turkey sent many workers to various destinations in Europe, including Vienna and Paris, from its rural areas. Between 1961 and 1976, 55 974 people moved to France and 37 858 to Austria migrated from Turkey with guest worker treatment (Figure 6.40). The first wave of immigration from Turkey was due to the guest worker treatment in Vienna, likewise in Paris, along with workers from decolonized countries and any other (Hasircioğlu and Yıldırım, 2018).

Countries	Population	%
Germany	651998	78,99
France	55974	6,78
Austria	37858	4,59
Holland	24992	3,03
Belgium	15995	1,94
Sweden	7640	0,93
Denmark	3579	0,43
England	2175	0,26
Other	25172	3,05
Total	825383	100

Figure 6.40 Guest workers migrated from Turkey to European countries between 1961-1976 (İçduyu et al., 2014 in Esenlikci and Engin, 2019)

The third type of migration was due to family unification treatment. Despite the authorities' primary estimation, the guest workers did not leave their host countries after the pact was done; instead, they brought their families from their land of origins. The family unification treatment had a tremendous role in increasing immigrants' numbers and their establishment in the new country/region.

The fourth type of migration from Turkey to Vienna and Paris is the political refugee migration. Before 1980, when the military took over the administration, numerous Kurds immigrated to Europe due to Turkey's political and military crises. Therefore, from the 60s to 80s, the migration to Europe became more politically oriented than economic. Although the political migration continued to the 1990s and 2000s, these were not free of economic rationale (Hasircioğlu and Yıldırım, 2018). Therefore, the migration from Turkey to Vienna and Paris became more complicated than before.

Forced migration is the fifth type that affects all three neighborhoods. Due to the transformation of the Turkish Republic - as it occurred in Ottoman periods, too – in the relations between Turkey and the Kurdish communities, there was a growing tension in various degrees. Misjudged, in political discourse,

Kurdish communities are treated as the Kurdish forces. The military forces in Turkey's South East and East villages emptied, bombed, and 'cleaned' the area to intrude in the 1990s. Many of the populations living in small South-East settlements spread all over Turkey, and some abroad. Istanbul and Europe were popular destinations for relatively wealthier households because of their cosmopolitan characters, more fertile employment options and their networks of previously migrated kin and acquaintances.

Everyday life

All three neighborhoods are vivacious and dynamic in terms of street life. People often meet, gather, and spend time on the streets for one reason or another. The observations (in the form of field diaries), interviews and photography from the neighborhoods in this section examine everyday life, from private to the public, within four primary categories. The first is sheltering strategies, followed by neighboring practices, intra-, and intergroup relations.

First, in Tarlabasi, sheltering strategies are a mixture of illegal occupation, cheap/run-down housing, and social networks. Many households stay in properties formerly owned by Armenian or Greek households that left the neighborhood after the mediated outrage of nationalists, specifically after the 6-7 September incidents. These properties, which no owner had a claim on, became state-owned property, some of which are conserved as cultural heritage. Thus, the neighborhood inhabitants might stay in these flats or buildings by paying a symbolic price to the state. Some of those heritage buildings are worn-down and cannot be restored due to the conservation of cultural and natural heritage, Act number 2863 (see Figure 6.41). Some buildings with public ownership are vulnerable to illegal occupation in which families stay or even further rent to others.



Figure 6.41 An old building in Tarlabasi, 2011 (<https://mapio.net/pic/p-56738992/>)

Differently in Kretaviertel, due to the well-established subsidized housing in Vienna, many lower-income groups stay-put, paying lower rent. For this housing, the users need to obtain a ticket at least two years in advance to be eligible for moving in. The ticket system, where the tenants can leave their apartments to anyone who owns a ticket for the minimum required time, allows migrant groups to choose whom to pass along their houses to. Therefore, a Turkish occupied subsidized housing often remains Turkish, even with a different household, as the property is handed over to a fellow migrant. Moreover, to enter the private housing market too, solidarity networks function; for example, families in the neighborhood help newcomers find housing using their internal connections. For years, these networks were operating; as a result, the neighborhood around the guest workers' workplaces is densely occupied by Turkish besides the former Yugoslavian inhabitants.

In Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, similar to Kretaviertel, the solidarity networks were vital for migrants to reside in the area. Many interviews, alongside Mustafa's, provide information for such

networks. Mustafa lived in the area for over 30 years and describes his first entrance to the neighborhood as

"I came as a political refugee and chose to first settle in this neighborhood because the son of my uncle lived here already. First, I moved on his couch until I found a place for myself. While I was around, it was easier to find a cheap box (small flat) just nearby. Worked and lived here for longer than I did in Turkey." **Mustafa, 52, Quartier de la Porte Saint Denis, 2019**

Therefore, the primary reasons for migrants from Turkey to stay in the area are their networks and the affordable prices.

The neighborhoods' neighboring practices are very similar to each other. They are all typical transnational neighborhoods with customs and behavioural patterns kept from the origins - like neighboring practices such as looking after each others' kids, simply lending household tools to a neighbor or the weekly 'gold day' amongst the women. However, keeping an eye on each other's lives might lead to gossips and micromanaging, as proven by the interviews, including Beyza's, who has lived in Kretaviertel, Vienna, for over ten years. She claims that

"It is both good and bad living here. People help, yes, but people also talk. Even my daughter is confused. Her Turkish friends in the park told her not to wear shorts because it reveals too much skin. She came to me crying. I tell her she can wear whatever she wants, her father and I allow her. But she doesn't want anymore. I guess she doesn't want to give others a reason to talk." **Beyza, 34, Kretaviertel, 2019**

Regarding the intra- and intergroup relations, in all three neighborhoods, people acquaint one another; however, they prefer to stay relationally close to the ones from their city of origin and tend to keep business within the group.

"Owner of the bar which was formerly a tea house asked me where I am from in Turkey. I answered it was complicated with me as all the family members were born elsewhere. He said that what counts is where my father is from. My answer Birecik (which is a town, from Urfa region, in South-East of Turkey by Syrian border) seemed to upset him who was from Diyarbakır (another city from South-East of Turkey). He suggested me to go talk with people on the 'down part of the street' where I could potentially find more people from Urfa as people from Urfa are liars he claimed, and we would understand each other better 'down there'". From field diary, Paris, 2019

Box 6. 1. Entry from field diary, 2019 (edit: grammar)

The smaller, more exclusive groups of kin have a hierarchy within, carried from their origins. Observations in Tarlabasi show that the exclusive groups have opinion leaders, whose word is more trusted. Hasan, who lived in Tarlabasi for about 35 years, is an opinion leader. In the teahouse where people from Diyarbakır come together, everyone gets permission from him to answer the interview questions. His higher rank primarily originates from his properties in the neighborhood. His properties' means are derived from the lands he sold in his hometown. He confirms that most of the Diyarbakır people in the neighborhood are from his village; former agricultural workers of his lands who migrated to İstanbul with his initiative. The previous relations are kept in the new surroundings, although translated in the conditions of the city. The former agricultural workers now work in construction, street

sales, textile, or various trade types; the former landowner remains the chef.

"After a sleepless night of gunshots and endless chatter from outside, I had to get ready for an interview with the corporate representative of the Taksim360 project. Unfortunately, I realised that there was no water in the flat, not to shower or even freshen up that day. After an attempt to cat clean and make myself acceptably presentable, I headed to the office and interviewed. Sunny start of the day and ahead, I did not want to go back to the neighborhood after the interview, as my brain was sweating alongside my body. Instead, I went to my cousin's place in a nearby neighborhood, Cihangir, which was gentrified in the 90s with the first wave gentrification in İstanbul and became a host for a population mainly actresses, architects and all sorts of artists. I took a long shower and slept on her couch for five consecutive hours. She was keen to keep me in her place for the night and feed me well. After my long nap, we went grocery shopping in a very fancy branch of the same supermarket chain I often go to in Tarlabasi. Nevertheless, the grocery store alone was a different, affluent universe just 600 meters away from a collapsing one. I saw people I know from media, some artists with their casual clothes shopping alongside us, and did not even glance at me, unlike people in Tarlabasi. I was feeling like one of them, but not really at the same time. One of the first times the researcher's positionality bothered me deeply that it still concerns me. My cousin told me that I did not have to go back to that "dirt hole" again; I could stay with her and visit daily the neighborhood. "Dirt hole," I thought; I do not need to go back there again, where I cannot sleep because of fear or noise. The neighborhood was not for a middle-class young Ph.D. student, but is it worthy of lower-class-anyone? [...]

Eventually, I am back in Tarlabasi. Living here in the neighborhood for a few weeks now, I am still an outsider, and despite not being in any dangerous situation, I am not really at ease here. I want to leave as soon as possible." Field diary entry, İstanbul, 2017

Box 6.2. Entry from field diary, 2017 (edit: grammar)

Regardless of the infra- and intergroup relations, they are in solidarity against the host culture, despite the difference in their original city. For example, in Tarlabasi, most of the streets are dominated by a

particular group of kin; however, people of different groups come together for external impacts such as operations by police or visitors. A friendly help by "what are you looking for?" on the neighborhood's streets is a way of reminding the visitor of their position. Deriving from observations during the field stays, people disagree on an ordinary basis, but they often unite against a stranger in all three case areas (see box 6.2). Similarly, if police are chasing anyone on the street, people of the neighborhood hide and protect the run-away regardless of their internal group dynamic. Therefore one can conclude that the relations are vulnerable but necessary.

The group relations include regionalism, gossiping, micro-managing, and solidarity. They are translated in everyday life through commerce and work preferences and public space use. The narrow streets in Tarlabasi reduce the traffic and are used as an extension of the houses for all the conflict and accord (see Figure 6.42). Deriving from retrospective interviews, Murat, an interviewee who lived in Tarlabasi since his birth, says that

"You see the neighborhood now. I wish you could see it few years ago. It was unique, very beautiful, nothing like you have seen before. It was never boring or silent. If you heard the street then you wouldn't know if there was a fight or celebration. It could be either or both at the same time." Murat, Tarlabasi, 2017



Figure 6.42 Women gathered and kids playing on the street in Tarlabasi (Ali Öz, 2006)

Similarly, in Kretaviertel, migrants from Turkey come together outdoors in the parks and large open spaces that the subsidized housing provides. People use the public space as an extension of their homes, with a typical Mediterranean habit of using parks and squares as a gathering space; people socialize and perform social conflict and accord in front of others. Contrarily, Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is a retail dominated neighborhood. Nevertheless, the once-tea-houses bars functioned as gathering places for the population.

6.3. The outsider perceptions

The outsider perception and its evolution throughout gentrification are vital in understanding the link between an area's appeal for investment and its earlier social composition. The longitudinal media and document analysis, accompanied by the interviews with potential gentrifiers, cover the outsider perception of gentrifiable immigrant neighborhoods based on three case neighborhoods. While the common point is that these areas were labeled as undesirable Turkish/Kurdish neighborhoods, after a certain threshold of potential gentrifier demand, media and public alter their discourse and speak of the neighborhoods as 'diverse' places to-be-in instead of no-go migrant areas. It ultimately exhibits the social composition's instrumentalization, although in different intensities and directions in Tarlabasi, Kretaviertel, and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis.

Therefore, in this section, firstly, the media perspective on the case areas, with their change throughout the transformation process, will be described. The second part describes the perception of potential gentrifiers on the areas through interviews. Finally, the third part concludes the findings.

Media perspective

Two neighborhoods, Tarlabasi and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis have extensive media coverage, while Kretavertel have less; in the beginning (for the former two), before the urban change is observed, the news typically focuses on the inhabitants' criminal activities. Especially before any announcement of urban transformation projects in the areas, the coverage is drastically negative; however, as the years pass by, the narration becomes gradually - and while the housing value increases - and

abnormally pleasant. The media coverage of these three neighborhoods is developed around several topics; the following part will explicitly focus on the ones related to criminality, poor housing conditions, history, tourism, art and culture, upgraded housing conditions, and investment suggestions. The rest of the analysis focused on the themes but grouped into types; I, II, and III, respectively dealing with criminality and poor housing conditions; art, culture, history, and tourism; and finally, upgraded housing conditions and investment advice as shown in figure 6.43.

Type I	Type II	Type III
Criminality	Art & Culture	Upgraded housing conditions
Poor housing conditions	History	Investment suggestions
	Tourism	

Figure 6.43 News type regarding the topics (Author's illustration)




Figure 6.44 Schematic representation of correlation between media and rent prices (Author's illustration)

Tarlabasi arguably is the most colorful in terms of the media coverage as it is shown diversely in books, movies, TV shows, news, and lately documentaries. Even the inhabitants of other cities would know about Tarlabasi and have an idea of the neighborhood without having been in Istanbul. The media coverage on Tarlabasi is not limited to movies and series. News, in the early 2000s, covered the area extensively, mainly focusing on criminality and the neighborhood's low housing quality. The paragraphs below briefly summarize news items from 2003 to 2008, by which the trend show the type of the news changes in correlation with the rent gap (see figure 6.44).

Three news topics from 2003 represent the pieces that indicate criminality in the neighborhood. They are about sex workers who claim their rights after undocumented and exploited sex work, a burglar

gang that broke because of the leader's hitch and a house in Tarlabasi for a burglar gang that kidnaps kids from the south-east of Turkey to steal for them in İstanbul. The news does not directly implicate Tarlabasi as the place where the crime happens but rather the place where the criminals deploy. Later, a piece of news covers a street in the neighborhood with a heavy surveillance installation by a Mafia leader to check the strangers going into the neighborhood and keep the area's secrecy. The neighborhood is therefore reported as a closed system, out of reach. Finally, the news in 2004 represents the neighborhood's low-quality housing. Firstly, korku apartmanları (thriller buildings) reports on the old buildings with a risk of falling and how the bureaucratic mismatch prevents the buildings' legal rehabilitation.

"Beyoğlu Municipality officials complains about the Conversation Council. They state that the boards do not allow both repairs and demolitions, as many houses are historic. The Conservation Council states that the restoration projects have not come, and that facilities are provided to those who want to make repairs properly." Milliyet, 2004; February 8 (Translated from Turkish - Author's translation).

A piece of news made in 2004 in Hürriyet focuses on the history of the neighborhood and the architectural heritage. The rare art galleries of the area are pointed out but nothing is written about the criminal activity in the area. After the relatively silent year of 2005, in 2006 Tarlabasi became a more popular news item, with items ranging from drugs and sex work to the neighborhood's heritage. The year also features multiculturalism in the neighborhood, and the area's tourism potential is underlined. NTV MSNBC makes news titled "an African neighborhood in İstanbul", describing the neighborhood's multicultural asset with a poetic and romantic language.

"Life in Tarlabasi is inside the city, but it is as if it is so outside... Time runs differently here. Like second hand... It's as if the time that is consumed quickly in Istanbul is used here once again. There is a special language among people. Maybe its name is cooperation, maybe solidarity... But no matter what, people with very different demographic characteristics live shoulder to shoulder in Tarlabasi. This is why Tarlabasi is the first

choice of migrants. It is home to people of all races, nationalities, and countries." NTV MSNBC, 2006; July, 21 (Translated from Turkish - Author's translation).

The most relevant addition in 2006 is the tourism and investment focus on Tarlabasi before launching the new renewal project to the public. However, the news speculates that some large scale investors have begun buying real estate in the area.

"Nowadays, local and foreign investors are looking for a building in Beyoğlu that they can turn into a hotel. It is speculated that Adnan Polat, who said 'I will invest \$ 1.5 billion in Beyoğlu', owns many of the houses to be restored in Tarlabasi. Meanwhile, the work of the municipality continues. After İstiklal Caddesi, Cihangir and Talimhane, Tarlabasi is also regiven to İstanbul. Located right next to Talimhane, which gathers the hotels of Beyoğlu together, Tarlabasi, 'hosting poor and marginal people', has been the favourite of many people, especially tourism investors, in recent months. Haberturk, 2006; September, 9 (Translated from Turkish - Author's translation).

In 2008, the renewal news goes in two diverging ways. One discourse is from the inhabitant point of view and showing how fellow inhabitants resists together against displacement. The second discourse tells about the investment opportunities coming along. Simultaneously, the criminality news is reduced to drugs and the celebrities that buy drugs in the area. Even the criminality in 2008 is presented with a sense of paparazzi.

It is possible to observe a similar pattern in Austria as media coverage of the neighborhood's peer in Turkey. Chronologically, the criminal activities, the multicultural nature and the history of the area, the rising popularity of the housing, and the richness of art and culture entities are presented in media, but in a lesser fashion. Respectively the attention on the neighborhood primarily begins with the criminal presentation, evolves into the announcement of history, art and culture; and lastly, focuses on profitable investment opportunities in the area.

The pieces from 2000 till 2008 primarily cover robberies in the area in an increasing trajectory. An interview with a spokeswoman from the police forces announces that the shop robberies increase all over the city, indicating that the robberies are not specific to the neighborhood. Ankerbrot factory has difficulty keeping up, so is planning to switch sites in the late 2000s. Nevertheless, it is still a discussion of what the Ostendorf family, the site's new owner, will do with it. Meanwhile, the south train station is turning into a central station, and the preparations are ongoing. In 2007 an article announces a book made to describe the district's history as the area's past gains popularity. Der Standard announces the book by the words;

"Vienna's tenth district is a cosmos of its own, characterized by its special location, which leads from central parts of the city to the southern periphery. The author duo Christine Klusacek and Kurt Stimmer traced the peculiarities of Favoriten, the specific social structures, the district history and the development prospects in their district book." Der Standard, 2007; August, 17 (Translated from German - Author's translation).

Following the transformation of the south train station into a central one, the start of Sonnwendviertel construction and the brownfield renovations in the area in the late 2000s, more news announces the structural changes in the neighborhood. Later on, the news about art and culture arises, particularly announcing the exhibitions and art projects by the centers in the brownfield renovation projects..

Although a decade earlier than two previous neighborhoods, Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis has been on media with a similar sequence of subjects. However, the news was primarily on printed media as the early 90s started to overstate the area due to the influx of younger and more affluent populations. In the mid-80s, the news starts with items on extensive sex-work activities in the area accompanied by items on the vast migrant population due to the cheaper accommodation options. Then, the news moves on, pointing out the area's history.

A piece about the sex workers of the neighborhood, made in 1983 summer, hints at women's territoriality while revealing the evident profession carried in the surrounding. Another piece in 1984 is dedicated to Passage Brady, which is up to today an Indian dominated alleyway with restaurants,

spice and fabric shops. The piece's opening describes the whole neighborhood as the "multiracial heart of Paris".

"With Boulevard de Sébastopol and Maghrebian bars on Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis, in the heart of this multiracial Paris, there is the passage Brady, a small alley across the Indian community in the capital." *Le Monde*, 1984, November 2 (Translated from French - Author's translation).

A piece of news in 1985 announces a shooting between 'Turkish militants', after which one was found dead and two severely injured. The follow-up explains that the shootings were within the activities with far leftists and Turkish nationals due to people handing out leaflets favouring the Kurdish Communist Party (PKK).

"During the leaflet distribution [of Kurdish activists], the [the national] groups are said to have regrouped to attack four militants of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) who accused the attackers of being "outrageous nationalism". A fight then broke out on Rue du Faubourg-Saint-Denis. In the midst of a very dense crowd, partly consists of Turks who had come to do their shops in the district, bullets were exchanged. Quickly, incidents took place all around the Porte Saint-Denis." *Le Monde*, 1985; December, 25 (Translated from French - Author's translation).

In 1986, a magazine that targets the upper-middle-class, called *cinémode*, 'discovers' the neighborhood's heart, the Rue Faubourg Saint-Denis, and instead describes Passage Brady. It says about this partially false discovery;

"Another discovery is the incursion into the kingdom of India, in Paris itself, rue du Faubourg-Saint-Denis. On a few hundred meters only, shops conceal real treasures: fabrics, perfumes, spices and even video collections of all the Indian film production." *Le Monde*, 1986; May, 24 (Translated from French - Author's translation).

In 1988, the neighborhood finds its place on the press by a fictional novel written by Jean Pierre Simeon, *Passage du Desir*, which is in the subjected neighborhood with a typical French romantic existential twinge. The book is announced by *Le Monde* with this description:

"Rue Saint-Denis, pitiful cafes, bistros on Boulevard Magenta, secret places in the Faubourg Saint-Martin, passages with cold light... These places provide an ever stranger, elusive and murky setting in the shadow of which a certain Etienne the Blais (aka Monky) drags the shadow of his own life." *Le Monde*, 1988, December 9 (Translated from French - Author's translation).

The neighborhood makes it into the press in 1989 with another artist, a movie maker, Jean-Daniel Pollet, in which the Rue Saint-Denis is pictured with dark humour. Although *l'Acrobat* was out in 1975, it makes it into *Le Monde* retrospectively in 1989 again. In 1990 again with an artist, a singer, Serge Reggiani, who interviews about his childhood in Rue de Faubourg Saint-Denis, the neighborhood appears in the press, again romantically. He says,

"My childhood memories of the 10th arrondissement, of Faubourg-Saint-Denis, are wonderful memories." Serge Reggiani in *France Culture*, 1990; September 22.

The news about Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, following 1990, focuses on the multiculturalism, history and diversity of the area beside the art and cultural activities. Although the residential structure changes in the following years, the street life stays roughly similar. As it is, a migrant dominated street life is later celebrated, like in the previous two neighborhoods of Turkey and Austria, proving the claim that a dodgy place is only dodgy until the narrator's art turns it into an attractive neighborhood.

Individual outsider perspective

The ear-to-ear information, and whatever media illustrates, reproduce the outsider perception. For the three subject neighborhoods, observations were derived directly from the field diaries kept during the

research stays and daily trips in and out of the areas. Parisien perceptions are instead limited to interviews. Meanwhile, Istanbul and Vienna's answers are based on interviews and online forum entries. Although the interviews aimed at both people who have been in the area and not, most participants visited the areas for various reasons. Thus the answers provide an overview of what people heard colloquially, the reaction that the second-hand knowledge generates and the visitors' reflection on the prejudices after seeing the area. Finally, they have answered whether they wanted to/would move in or invest in the area. By analyzing the stated perceptions, this part aims to conceptualize the differentiated middle-class opinions about locationally advantageous immigrant neighborhoods from an investor/invader point of view before and during urban transformation.

According to the analysis, retrospectively, two notable groups of people appear; the ones extremely cautious of the areas and the ones who are admirers, intrigued by it for various reasons. The former group, 'the cautious', is affected by the media relatively more and, with all costs, stay away from them. Their primary concern is safety, although, in many cases, people did not experience anything malicious in the neighborhoods. Besides the safety issue in the areas, outsiders often find them overwhelming and crowded. The interviewees' common negative descriptive words to describe the neighborhoods are *unsafe, dangerous, uneasy, sketchy, and crowded*.

"It is known as a **dodgy** neighborhood. Although the buildings and the streets seem cute, I don't think people feel safe there. After I heard from news, there are many **pickpockets** and **robberies** in the area I thought it is **no place to be** after dark." Istanbul, 2020

"First time, when I was young in the 90's, it was a very **poor** and **dirty** district. I would guess [my first visit] was **overwhelming** because of the **dense crowd** and the constant activity of this particular neighborhood. Very **busy** and **full of life**, but can feel **sketchy** because of the presence of a lot of illegal street sellers or **pickpockets**, but nothing never happened to me. [The inhabitants] are not really open-minded about the rest of the city either. I never felt unsafe during the day but sometimes during the night when I was coming back to my place alone from bars [in the early 1990s]. I never had problems though. I also felt a lot worried by pickpockets nearby the metro station due to the

constant presence of pickpockets in this area, that I witnessed myself many times." Paris, 2020

"I heard the neighborhood is a very **problematic** one. [Because] it is **dangerous**. I later learnt this is absolutely not true. It felt hard to believe, but it also scared me." Vienna, 2020

The first prominent group of people retrospectively could not imagine living or investing in the area.

"I wanted to move in a neighborhood I feel safe in rather than Tarlabasi. I didn't want to invest either. I didn't want to face the **area's problems**. So I have decided not to move in." İstanbul, 2020

"I have mitigated feeling about this neighborhood, since I liked very much hanging out there for the night-life but I visited apartments to live there and heard a lot of story of **pickpockets** from the neighbors and decided to live nearby instead." Paris, 2020

"The first time in Vienna in 2013 was exciting as it was my first year in Europe, starting a home far from home. I was looking for a shared flat without knowing much about the city. So I asked around if there were neighborhoods I should stay away from. There was a shortlist to stay away, but one was rather curious. A Viennese colleague said I should avoid 10 (10. Bezirk - Favoriten where Kretaviertel is located) because I will not survive as she "follows the news". It was odd having extensive experiences in Ankara and İstanbul and being warned made me wonder. She explained further that "there were many...", how she could tell nicely, "mmh, migrants". I thought it was a place to stay away from, for a second. However, it was rather a short second; I wondered where the migrants were from and what made them so dangerous to stay away. She said it was primarily people from Serbia and Turkey. 'Those easterners', I thought until I remembered where I came from. "They are," she said, "not like you". What this perception of hers was - regarding and judging people based on where they come from, but when it concerns me, it is about my social status or class - very discreet but inter-sectional racism indeed, I thought. The neighborhood rang my curiosity for the first time after this conversation." Derived from a personal diary entry, 2013.

Box 6.4 Personal diary entry (edit: grammer)

Within the group of interviewees answering retrospective questions, a small group was intrigued by the areas and perceived them as different worlds in the city. This group was likely to move into the neighborhood. While they rebel against the normative urban lifestyle - they could, potentially, have triggered the pre-pioneer stage in the neighborhoods. Thus, while having less bias but more historical knowledge and admiration of the neighborhoods, this group reported that they only had friendly interactions with the inhabitants, as the following interview extracts exemplify.

"I went there after strolling in Taksim because of **curiosity**. While I was discovering the streets I felt **excited**. I could live there as the area is very **diverse** and **fun**. There is definitely **excitement**." İstanbul, 2020

"It was traditionally a workers neighborhood. I always was **intrigued**. It still is my city after all." Vienna, 2020

"I **considered living there** and searched for apartments, because of the very **attractive prices** of rent, livelihood, and the location in the **center** of Paris." Paris, 2020

This group handles the area rather as a romantic entity, like a cheap open-air museum or a central touristic sphere. A mixture of a certain amount of respect, the group's tendencies fit well with the gentrifier type "curator" defined by Schlichtman et al. (2017), as also many of them can imagine moving or investing in the area whether for the (1) affordable prices and locational advantages; (2) livelihood and vibrancy of the area; or (3) both.

The answers to questions regarding the current image of the neighborhoods, on the other hand, reveal a more positive attitude towards the neighborhoods. The most used descriptive words are *diverse, central, lively, and trendy*. Interestingly, the same feeling of being overwhelming and crowded does not necessarily have a negative connotation anymore. The first group of perceptions is *curiosity*. The changing atmosphere of the neighborhoods, supported by growing history, tourism, art and culture news on media, draws more affluent groups' attention. However, unlike the following others, this group reports that they also have an interest in interaction with existing inhabitants. The answer to the safety question in this group is very similar across the cases, specifically in Vienna and Paris. Although it provides a less safe feeling than the others, the security in Tarlabasi is also in an increasing trajectory.

"I had only **friendly encounters** in that neighborhood and never felt insecure. I could imagine living in the area. It is very mixed and has a neighborhood feeling where people know each other." İstanbul, 2020

"[I went there for the first time] for an exhibition and art project. I felt **extremely safe** - good connections with the public transport, a lot of light, a lot of people and kids on the streets. Coming from the Balkans, it felt **familiar** and **comfortable**." Vienna, 2020

"Really nice neighborhood to go out with a lot of nice bars and restaurants. The prices of the **rent are the cheapest** for Paris still, which attract a very **diverse population**. It is good, I meet people from **different cultures**. [...] I felt the **safest** I could have. As a woman, walking alone in the night feels a bit unsafe anywhere in the world, but it didn't feel more unsafe there by any means. I did not sense a hostility." Paris, 2020

While outsiders begin to see the neighborhood's potential, they are still at a stage where the demand is conditional. A group still demands further changes to make the neighborhood even safer before investing. In this dissertation this group is named as the *calculator*. The calculator is observed in Tarlabasi more than the other two case areas because the neighborhood's renewal and restorations are not evenly spread. In other words, while particular parts of the neighborhood are more appealing than the others, some parts remain unchanged and decayed. However, people in the entire neighborhood complain about the rising prices and impossibility of affording a property when the appealing renovations sprawl through untouched parts. Thus, this group often calculates affordability, social structure, their balance, etcetera.

"I would consider investing if the **necessary changes** are made, it is **central** and **cheap**." İstanbul, 2020.

"I would have considered making investments in the neighborhood since it is **trendy** and upcoming. However, if the **rent is still accessible** for my salary level, the purchases of a small flat there are already above my budget since the prices are **increasing very fast**." Paris, 2020

The last group of people are affluent, investor type, named in this dissertation as *inner-city affluent*. Especially in Vienna and Paris, people are more sure about investing and living in the neighborhoods. In Tarlabasi, outsiders can plan to invest if they have the means. In the group's opinion, the areas will eventually be desirable given their locational and spatial advantages.

"I already lived in the 10th district, and loved it, very **diverse**. Living in that neighborhood seems **quieter** and a bit **greener** than some other parts of Favoriten and it is very **lively**. If I can have access to outdoor space, a quiet area, the 10th district would be a great place to live. I like that the Bömische Prater and the central train station are not so far. I can **imagine living there**." Vienna, 2020

"I would **definitely invest** in 10th in Paris because it is **upcoming** and still on the edge of **affordable**. I love being in the **center** and even if I am not I can rent it. In fact, I am in a passive search and keeping an eye on announcements." Paris, 2020

Key points of the chapter

As the analysis stands, five groups holding different perspectives of the area can be differentiated as shown in figure 6.45. The first group, named '**cautious**', consists of people who cannot imagine moving into the area because of the perception that these neighborhoods are crowded, unsafe and dirty. They find the areas unattractive because of both spatial and social characteristics. If gentrification proceeds, this group might further act in later stages, such as the maturing stage. Nevertheless, the social and structural changes already present should suffice for this group to act in earlier stages.




Figure 6.45 The outsider perception categories (Author's illustration)

The second group, named the '**admirer**', mentions the area's livelihood and the diversity as an encouraging motivation to move into the neighborhood. This group is mainly attracted to the social characteristics of the area. Similar to the *curator* as set out by Schlichtman et al., (2018) (see Chapter 5), this group has absolute respect and admiration for the social life in the area and could imagine engaging with it. However, this group alone would not be enough to pioneer gentrification because of their lack of interest in the locational and spatial characteristics of the area. Nevertheless, as they grow toward a certain threshold, they may indirectly ignite the gentrification fumes.

The third group, named '**curious**', is attracted by the area's cheap prices and social structure. Besides a sufficient tolerance to spatial characteristics of the area, this group is drawn to its locational advantages. Engaging with the population's social life in various ways, this group might include *curator*, *consumer*, *competitor*, and/or *capitalist* also set out by Schlichtman et al. (2018) (See Chapter 5).

Moreover, they can potentially pioneer gentrification by contributing to the social image transformation in the area.

The fourth group, the '**calculator**', can imagine moving into the area because of the attractive prices but cannot imagine connecting with the area's original population. Calculators are aware of the area's locational advantages and have a sufficient tolerance for the current spatial and social qualities. However, a social connection with the existing inhabitants would be limited even if living proximately. In addition to the gentrifier types in the first and second groups, calculators – when moving in – might resemble the gentrifier's *colonizer* type of Schlichtman et al.'s (2018) categorization.

Despite seeing the neighborhood as unattractive, the fifth and final group, named '**inner-city affluent**', can imagine moving or investing there if there are already social and structural changes in the area. The neighborhood's locational characteristic is desirable; therefore, the spatial and social improvements might persuade the group to move or invest in the area.

Perception category	Cautious	Admirer	Curious	Calculator	Inner-city Affluent
The primary interest of outsider	N/A	Spatial Social	Locational Current price Spatial Social	Locational Current price	Locational
Type of potential gentrifier	N/A	Competitor Curator	Consumer Capitalist Competitor Curator	Conqueror Consumer Capitalist Competitor Coloniser	Conqueror Consumer Capitalist Competitor
The stage of potential occurrence	Maturing	Pre- pioneer	Pioneer	Established pioneer Pioneer	Augmenting Maturing
Media affection level	High	High	Medium	Medium	High
Followed media	Type I	Type II	Type II Type III	Type III	Type I

Figure 6.46 Perception categories. (Gentrifier types in Chapter 5 and stage models in Chapter 3 are discussed in detail) (Author's illustration)

Given various investment - disinvestment processes, locational characteristics, and migration histories, the areas are perceived principally different in three cases by the outsiders. However, the neighborhoods' similarity in their location on the physical end, and demographic characteristics on the social end, makes the perception pattern likely to resemble.

Despite the foundational differences and similarities of the three cases, temporality is a factor that diverges the results for each case because the three case areas are experiencing urban transformation in different stages. While the gentrification stage can be explained as a pioneer to established pioneer in Tarlabasi, it is established pioneer to augmenting stage in Vienna; and maturing to further stages in Paris. Therefore, while the perceptions about Tarlabasi are still transitioning from cautious or admirer to curious - it is from curious to calculator in Vienna. Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis is already above the budgetary standards of a middle-class individual; hence, the perception is inner-city affluent.




Figure 6.47 Outsider perceptions on gentrifying (im)migrant neighborhoods - based on gentrification stages in Tarlabası, Kretaviertel and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis. (Stage models discussed in detail in chapter 3) (Author's illustration)

The differences, similarities and most crucially, the patterns imply the vitality of the process' temporal aspect in generating perceptions. The outsiders perceive Tarlabasi as a precarious but slowly uprising neighborhood; thus, not ready to be invested in. However, the cultural advertisement of the

neighborhood triggers a curiosity within an intellectual bubble of people more likely to consider moving into the neighborhood. In Kretaviertel, although the social structure largely remains while the urban transformation slowly proceeds, the newer establishments draw a brighter picture of the area. The middle-class get to familiarize themselves with the place as a multicultural, rather than a migrant, neighborhood. Although these two descriptive terms point out the same feature, the former attracts a more prosperous profile. While the neighborhood's appeal improves, the idea of moving or investing in becomes more realistic for an affluent crowd that prefers the inner-city. Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, where the gentrification is much more established than the two other peers, is increasingly perceived as an upcoming neighborhood with lively street life and good ethnic restaurants and bars. And now, the middle-class can longer afford to live or invest in it.

Chapter 7. Policy differentiations of gentrification: Tarlabasi, Istanbul; Kretaviertel, Vienna; and Quartier de la Porte Saint Denis, Paris

This chapter demonstrates different types of gentrification while indicating the impossibility of a direct comparison across cities regarding the variety in context. The subject areas' socio-economic, spatial, and political spheres differ, as does gentrification. The chapter primarily investigates the differences, similarities and patterns between the cases' political spheres and, by doing so, understands the correlation between various policies and gentrification types. Policies are grouped and analyzed in three categories: (1) displacement, (2) reinvestment in fixed capital, and (3) structural. The categories emphasize the fuzzy differentials because they are the determinants to define the type of gentrification.

The focus policies are from Istanbul, Paris and Vienna, three cities that cover a wide geographical and cultural range within Europe with different politico-economic tendencies: a) in Istanbul state promotes the changes with the macro and micro level policy actions, b) Vienna follows a soft urban renewal policy line, and c) in Paris, although there are social mix policies, the state is more in favor of promoting the free market dynamics. Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris) are typical examples of gentrifying neighborhoods within these cities but experience a broad variety in their overall changes. Therefore, the remainder of the chapter focuses first on the cases' policies in effect in terms of displacement, second, reinvestment in fixed capital, and finally, social and structural changes.

7.1. Policies in-effect for gentrification-induced displacement: Istanbul, Vienna, and Paris

The policies regarding (1) tenant protection - evictions, (2) expropriations, (3) diversity, (4) integration - migration, (5) land-use - zoning influence the way displacement arises. Concerning the policies, gentrification-induced displacement demonstrates in many ways within the spectrum from physical displacement to symbolic displacement. The policies on several aspects are determinants of displacement in various contexts. This section, therefore, reviews the related policies in given categories.

Tenant protection and eviction

Istanbul

Tenant protection and eviction at the national level in Turkey are designated under the law numbered 6098, *Turkish code of obligations*. The law determines the conditions of tenancy, such as rent regulations, conditions for contract termination, and evictions. Firstly, the rent regulations are market-oriented in Turkey, despite being defined by the law. The market influence in rent regulations is evident through the change of percentages with the inflation, by the recommendation of The International Monetary Fund (IMF) or producers price index.

For example, in 2000, a maximum rent increase of 25 % was determined by law only for that year (under the inflation rate), as recommended by the IMF in connection with their economic stabilization program (Türel and Koç, 2014). Later, although the share of rent in household expenditures fell from 29.2% to 26.2% in 2002 (TurkStat 2013), the decrease on average do not reflect low-income groups, which are contrarily increased (Türel and Koç, 2014). Similarly, in 2011, the law allowed rent increase by the producers price index rate to rise during 12 months. Subsequently, the supply in rental housing stock arose and permitted higher rent increase rates than the previous years.

Despite being considered a "tenant-friendly" constitution, few conditions of Turkish law make termination of contract and eviction legally possible. Besides the more common rules like lack of rental payment or frequent delays for consecutive months, other conditions can lead to termination of the contract regardless of its legal duration. Firstly, according to law numbered 6098, article 316, the tenant "owe respect" to their neighbors. In case of complaints, the tenant gets a warning in response. They have to notify the authorities with a written promise that the situation that disturbs others will immediately stop. Secondly, according to the same law's 331st article, any contractual party can cancel the tenancy contract under an "insufferable situation". The situation is not analytically defined within the constitution; however, left to the judge's assessment on the court. As open to interpretation, this article might lead to uncertain situations while allowing the termination. Thirdly, according to the law's 350th article. If the owner's direct ascendant or descendants need the property, or if the property will go

through renovation/renewal/rehabilitation or rebuilding, the owner can end the contract. The article allows all activities that would contribute to a rise in rent price after which the current inhabitants might not afford to live in the same property. By so, it allows direct displacement while legally legitimizing it. However, suppose the property is not repaired, the owner cannot rent it to anyone but to the former tenants. Like so, after the renovations, earlier tenants are prioritized renting it with the new price.

Rent rise	Market oriented
Termination of contract	No payment
	Disrespect to neighbors
	Insufferable situation
	Direct ascendant or descendant
	Renovation
Eviction	Forbidden in national level
	By negotiations
Contract duration	Variable

Table 7.1 Summary of Istanbul *tenant protection* policies

Although national laws prevent evictions in Turkey, the developers often force tenants and owners to be evicted at the local level. Amnesty reports in 2011 that "the Turkish authorities should halt a series of heavy-handed forced evictions which have already resulted in a number of vulnerable families in central Istanbul effectively being made homeless" regarding the renewal in Tarlabasi. Amnesty report adds that numerous families faced force evictions in Tarlabasi through intimidation and threats by the Beyoğlu municipality and the law enforcement officials. In addition, according to the interviews conducted for the report, some inhabitants signed documents without reading the legal remedies. Similarly, the Amnesty report concludes, the evictions, in the end, led former inhabitants of İstanbul to commute long hours to their works that are often located in the center even if they could afford the new properties in the outskirts of İstanbul.

To sum up, the rent is controlled, termination is limited, and eviction is forbidden on the paper by the constitution. However, there is a substantial allowance for shady practices in the implementation at the local level. In addition to the lack of rent regulation enforcement, the number of available dwellings is negligible because of insufficient housing supply, growing demand, increased population, and migration rates. As a result, the rents increase at extreme rates; in return, the lower class deals with constantly rising rent prices and subsequent contract terminations or even evictions.

Vienna

Austria is a federal state that is composed of nine regions. The federal laws applied to individual states might differ; however, the private rental market is fully controlled by federal laws. Regardless, the tenancy law *Mietrechtsgesetz* on the federal level is complicated and in-homogeneous because of its non-linear historical development (Hofmann, 2015). Regulations, particularly the ones concerned rent prices, differ following the construction year of the building; for example, the rental dwellings built before 1945 are concerned with the most strict regulations.

Considering that approximately two-thirds of Vienna's rental housing stock is from before 1945, the restrictions significantly shape the housing market. Additionally, the type of construction and duration of the contract revamp the rules that apply.

However, the rent regulation system was liberalized in 1994, allowing new contracts to tie to a particular benchmark defined at the federal level regulations (Mundt, 2018). So that the new contracts were made with unregulated rent prices, the rent levels will differ considerably between the old and the new contracts (Gluns, 2018). Furthermore, the location and the characteristics of the property designate the rents. For example, attic conversions with a building permit issued in 2001 are not subjected to regular rent regulations. The liberation of housing regulation also influenced the duration of the contracts. Within the frame of the new regulation, the duration can be three years, contrary to conditions before the liberalization when the unlimited contracts were popular. However, in case of a limited contract, the owner should apply a 25 per cent discount on the rent - if strict rent regulations apply to the subjected dwelling.

Rent rise	Regulated - Before 1945
	After 1945
	Attic conversion
	After renovations
Termination of contract	The tenant does not pay the rent
	The tenant does not use the dwelling
	The tenant uses it in a destructive manner
	The landlord needs the dwelling for a first degree relatives' use
Eviction	Private rental housing: rent limits and no unwarranted eviction
	Limited-profit rental housing: only protected against unwarranted eviction
	Municipal rental housing in dwellings owned by municipalities or non-profit municipal bodies: neither protected by strict rent limits nor against unwarranted evictions
Contract duration	Anything allowed - allows the rent rise

Table 7.2 Summary of Vienna *tenant protection* policies

In short, the low rents are exclusive to old, substandard dwellings with a contract already signed (Statistik Austria 2016b: 42–46 in Gluns, 2018). However, the improvements on the buildings, such as renovations, allow the rents to rise freely in new contracts. By so, renovation of the old buildings generates a market turnover although rent increase following rehabilitation is also regulated.

The older buildings, for some decades, are compelling products for investors as well as the consumers. However, due to high demand, by the renovation of old and rustic buildings, the prices that were regulated for some decades surged off continuously since the 1990s (Gluns, 2018). In light of that, between 2000 and 2010, the rents increased more than double the inflation rate by 34 per cent. As a result, it harmed the affordability of private rental housing stock for lower-income groups. Therefore, one can conclude that the renovation of old dwellings contributes to displacement, especially in the inner city (Hatz, 2009).

Within the federal tenancy law, Mietrechtsgesetz, the rules for terminating the contract are also defined. Similar to the Turkish case, the landlords can terminate the contract in some instances. For example, the tenant does not pay the rent, does not use the dwelling, uses it destructively, or the landlord needs the dwelling for a first-degree relatives' use are valid reasons to terminate a contract. Gluns (2018) argues that the efficiency of strict regulation for the termination of a contract prevents gentrification-induced displacement.

Besides the great diversity of rules to limit rents-rise by law and strict enforcement rules and regulations, Austrian tenancy law also includes broad protection of the tenants against unwarranted eviction. First, the types of rental housing in Austria should be learned to understand the eviction policies and applicability. There are three primary types of rental housing in Austria: the first one is private rental housing in dwellings owned by private landlords. The second one is the limited-profit rental housing that limited-profit housing associations own. Finally, the last one is municipal rental housing in dwellings owned by municipalities or non-profit municipal bodies (Hofmann, 2015). The latter two types are subject to the tenants' selection procedures and eligibility criteria, while the former is a regulatory type of tenure without a public task (Hofmann, 2015). According to these categories, the eviction measures differ. The first type of tenancy is protected by strict rent limits and against unwarranted eviction. The second type is only protected against unwarranted eviction, and the last type is neither protected by strict rent limits nor against unwarranted evictions (Hofmann, 2015).

Paris

There is rent control for the ongoing rental contracts tied to the national index in France. However, the landlords can set a rent when a new tenant moves in. By so, every contract change typically means a dramatic increase in the rent, especially in the big cities such as Paris. The rent ceilings became flexible by the law in 2014, and the construction of smaller housing units became no longer prevented. For Paris, it meant homeowners to divide their larger apartments into smaller 'house-lets' and rent from higher prices. Only large urban areas are subject to rent control, including Paris, and a few suburbs in Ile de France, the suburbs are being under substantial urban transformation. However, the Paris prefecture set the controls depending on the area and the type of the building. The maximum rent is

defined separately for unique cases, which are available on the official website of the department of housing from the French government. The law numbered 2018-1021 on housing development mandates extra rent control mechanisms. An additional rent can be applied if the dwelling has a significant advantage compared to similar dwellings in the same geographical area. The advantages should be justified in the lease agreement. Although all the changes are on track, in Paris, the rent controls are only effective since 2019 depending on the price per square meter of habitable area, per housing category and geographical area for furnished and unfurnished apartments.

Besides the rent regulations and new city planning legislation, the law numbered 2018-1021 (ELAN) defines the measures of rental agreements in Paris. With the mentioned law, the rental agreements are more flexible regarding the duration of the contract. The law allows the short term rentals of the furnished apartments from one to ten months for tenants in vocational training, studying in higher educational institutions, under apprenticeship or internship, volunteering as a part of civic service, in the middle of a job transfer, or on a temporary assignment. Furthermore, the lease can be extended up to ten months but not be renewable. Therefore, it allows homeowners to profit more from their property and have a more flexible pattern of the rent increase. Nevertheless, the short term renters are also tied to the guarantor system where a private or legal body is responsible for compensating any lacking means to provide monetary obligations.

Rent rise	Depending on the type
Termination of contract	Private landlords: in case of an simultaneous need for a shelter for their own or or an immediate family with a six months notice prior to the termination
	Commercial (corporate) bodies: legitimate need
Eviction	the owner cannot force a tenant out during the lease term unless they or an immediate kin would occupy the property
Contract duration	Short and long term - allowed

Table 7.3 Summary of Paris *tenant protection* policies

Although the tenant protection is relatively higher in France, the termination of the contract can realize in certain situations. If not a corporation but a private person, the contractor has the right to terminate the contract in case of a simultaneous need for a shelter for their own or an immediate family with a six-month notice prior to the termination. Commercial (corporate) bodies have less right to terminate contracts; they have to prove a heavier "legitimate need" to terminate the contract successfully. A homeowner can sell the property during the lease term, a private or corporate body. In this case, the tenant can refuse the termination of the contract, and the lease can remain until the expiry of the term. In an exceptional case where the tenant is more than 65 years old, the owner has to provide an alternative accommodation.

Tenant protection is relatively better in France than in Turkey. Thus, it takes both time and money to evict a tenant. For example, the owner cannot force a tenant out during the lease term unless immediate kin in need takes over the property (Laferrere and Le Blanc, 2006). In case of tenants' bankruptcy, the eviction process can be suspended. However, the tenants often use it strategically, not to lose their homes. Also, prefectures are warned to take measures that will protect tenants from evictions. The homeowners renting their properties out are advised to choose their tenants carefully. Therefore the tenants should have proof of sufficient means to pay the rent regularly since the eviction process is costly and lengthy.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Rent rise	Market oriented (fixed to inflation rates)	Regulated - Before 1945	Depending on the type
		After 1945	
		Attic conversion	
		After renovations	
Termination of contract	No payment	The tenant does not pay the rent	Private landlords: in case of an simultaneous need for a shelter for their own or or an immediate family

			with a six months notice prior to the termination
	Disrespect to neighbors	The tenant does not use the dwelling	Commercial (corporate) bodies: legitimate need
	Insufferable situation	The tenant uses it in a destructive manner	
	Direct ascendant or descendant	The landlord needs the dwelling for a first degree relatives' use	
	Renovation	Private rental housing: rent limits and no unwarranted eviction	
Contract duration	Short and long term - allowed	Anything allowed - allows the rent rise	Short and long term - allowed
Eviction	Forbidden in national level	Limited-profit rental housing: only protected against unwarranted eviction	The owner cannot force a tenant out during the lease term unless they or an immediate kin would occupy the property
	By negotiations	Municipal rental housing in dwellings owned by municipalities or non-profit municipal bodies: neither protected by strict rent limits nor against unwarranted evictions	

Table 7.4 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *tenant protection* policies

Expropriation

Istanbul

Expropriation is the dispossession of private property by public corporations and bodies to use it for public purposes without the owner's permission, in return for a prepaid cost (Uzun and Yomralioglu, 2005). In Turkey, expropriation occurs if state or municipal authorities require land for public use (Uzun, 2000). Law numbered 2942 in the Turkish constitution defines the frame of expropriation. Accordingly, the state is entitled to hand over private land for public use or benefit in return for payment to the affected owners. The process can only be effectuated for the public service or initiative custody. If no specific situation is foreseen by law, compensation should be paid in cash in advance. As the first step, the officials proceed with feasibility studies for the land-acquired projects for the expropriation process. Later, a designated valuation committee - composed of relevant municipal and utility officials - assesses the value of the land to be expropriated. Finally, a standard for total replacement cost is used to determine the value of land and property properties. The law-mandated valuation procedures provide all owners with an open and transparent compensation process (Uzun and Yomralioglu, 2005).

The standard used for valuation is determined through 1. The type and quality of the property or resource, 2. the surface area, 3. the value of all distinctive characteristics that can affect the overall value of the land, 4. tax statements, if any 5. an estimate made by official authorities on the date of expropriation, 6. the net income acquired from the land, immovable property or resources according to the locations and conditions valid on the date of expropriation, and the determination of its value based on its original condition, 7. the sales amount of similar land sold before the date of expropriation, 8. official unit prices, construction cost estimates and depreciation of buildings on the date of expropriation, and 9. other objective measurements can influence the determination of valuation. According to article 11 of the same law, the valuation does not estimate the surplus value that the new use will bring; it is based on the current use and circumstances.

The object of expropriation	Private immovables (for residential use)
	Private immovables (for commercial use)
Justification	Via court
	Public services/initiatives
Compensation	Value designated by a committee
	Payment in cash
Objection	Not possible

Table 7.5 Summary of Istanbul *expropriation* policies

In case of settling for compensation price based on negotiation of no more than three months, state and municipal utilities should finalize the transaction. If the negotiations fail or the owner refuses, the discussions proceed to the court. After being informed about due process and appeals rights, a lawsuit will be filed against the property owner under Article 10. If no agreement is reached, the institution demands a land valuation and registration in its name, with rights of use, ownership, and control in authority. The procedure is made public through the media, and the court summons the landowner. Within 30 days, the associated parties must determine a trial date. If the landowner and the institution cannot agree on a land price before the court, the court appoints independent consultants to appraise the property within ten days. The court then sets a new trial date for the next 30 days and sends the assessment results to the institution and the landowner. If the parties cannot agree on this court-supervised assessment, the court may appoint new appraisers within fifteen days. Following this, the court finalizes the expropriation price after the second appraisal. The landowner has the right to object to the compensation but the expropriation. If the rule is not followed, eviction is performed by the related authority regardless of the complaints or objections.

The expropriation, thusly, in Turkey is abrupt and inevitable once the process starts. In response to its current terms, case law was derived from the former European Commission of Human rights to reconsider it. The reconsideration comprises three substantial rules. The first one regards the general guarantee of the property right, the second one subjects the deprivation of possessions to specific rules, and the final one "recognizes that the contracting states are entitled, among other things, to control the

use of property in accordance with the general interest" (Yomralioğlu, 2007). With that, Turkey's Expropriation Law numbered 2942 has recently undergone significant revisions due to several cases before national courts. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) resulted in the Turkish Republic paying further compensations (Yomralioğlu, 2007). Despite the improvements for compensation, objection to expropriation is still not possible.

Vienna

According to *Bauordnung* for Vienna, the city is legally eligible to reorganize land ownership or expropriate owners through eminent domain rights without the necessity of owners' consent. Nevertheless, as the ownership right is considered sacred in Vienna (MA18), the right has not been applied yet. A few decades ago, expropriation was used to redistribute the density in the city and provide more green spaces in the densely populated areas (Gluns, 2018). More recently, another approach became more prominent for reorganizing the density. With the newer approach, the public administrations arrange a plot for collective use and negotiate affordable housing construction.

Therefore, expropriation in Vienna is not a commonly utilized tool, although technically and legally possible. If the pre-negotiations fail to reach an agreement, the legal procedure commences. The object of expropriation should serve the public interest, i.e. national railways, highway agencies, or water authorities have this right and the military, which must be documented (Hofmann, 2015). That said, expropriation should be as minimum as possible in both the space and transferred rights.

The object of expropriation	Right and ownership on property
	Should be kept minimum
Justification	Public interest
	Not commonly used
	Managing density
Compensation	Monetary
	Smaller land bigger value

	Owner bids
Objection	Public decision is not uncompromising

Table 7.6 Summary of Vienna *expropriation* policies

The owner of expropriated land should receive compensation for the loss. The compensation is monetary and can be a comparable piece of land in return. Through the compensation, in case of a proportional land deducted from every owner, especially in rural areas, landowners often receive smaller but more valuable land (Hofmann, 2015). The court must balance the public's interests and keep landowners from benefiting from the public interest by demanding exorbitant charges. On the other hand, the public shall not take the land with little to no reward. The expropriation process in Vienna is more expensive than regularly purchasing land due to its complexity, whereas it takes a longer time and involves numerous people. Because the expropriator has to pay higher prices than a standard sale in the market, they would be more willing to settle through the negotiations or look for other lands available in the market. In case of conflict in negotiations, per the law, the judge settles the conflict with two main questions: whether the public interest is higher than the current owner's interest and the extent of the expropriation. Therefore, contrary to the Turkish case, the court can cancel, and the public decision is not uncompromising.

Paris

According to the French expropriation code, expropriation is the taking of immovable properties or right of use, in whole or in part, to satisfy public interests by public parties. The purchase subject is the state; local authorities (i.e., regions, departments, and municipalities); public institutions; and public interest groups (i.e., social security funds, public works concessionaires). In this light, expropriation is not allowed for private uses and only be utilized by all levels of government. Construction of infrastructure, public buildings, and housing developments and establishment of nature reserves are the chief reasons for the procedure besides the facilitation of urban renewal projects in the urban realm.

The justification of the expropriation must be genuine, unavoidable, and not disproportionate, considering the infringement of the person's rights. The public interests regarding a legit expropriation

of private property are creating a municipal housing development or a children's summer campsite, creating industrial or artisan parks, creating green spaces or stretches of water, or improving the public highway; etcetera. Like many other OECD countries, the expropriation of immovable is more typical of practice in France, with local authorities becoming the chief user of the right. The reason for land expropriation is no longer only large public infrastructure projects. However, it is an eminent domain to manage ordinary urbanization combined with zoning policy and urban planning.

The object of expropriation	Right and ownership on property
Justification	Land-use and zoning
	Urban renewal
	Public interest
	Common
Compensation	Monetary
	Court defines
Objection	If the land was reserved by the Local Urban Plan (PLU) as a part of the urban or urbanizing area
	If the land is included in Concerted Development Area (ZAC)
	If under the town planning code, the decision was suspended

Table 7.7 Summary of Paris *expropriation* policies

Expropriation is fundamentally taking over the rights of individuals in having an immovable. Therefore the purchase can only be effectuated if the owner receives fair compensation. The procedure complies with two stages, of which the latter involves decisions regarding compensation. The first, administrative, stage confirms the public interest and the properties at stake. After the legitimization, two administrative documents are prepared to permit the procedure. The second, judicial, stage involves two primary actions by the judge. The judge commands the compulsory purchase and then determines the

compensation amount in the first one. Mutual agreement on the price is in the best interest of the two parties. It typically avoids lengthy, expensive and typically traumatic legal processes.

The objection of the owner is possible under certain conditions. Under the code of planning article L152-2, if the land was reserved by the Local Urban Plan (PLU) as a part of the urban or urbanizing area, the owner has the right of withdrawal. Additionally, the owner can withdraw if the land is included in Concerted Development Area (ZAC); or under the town planning code, the decision was suspended. Therefore, expropriation is typical for urban renewal and land-use planning, like in Turkey, but contrary to Austria. Like Austria, the objection is possible under certain circumstances; however, the circumstances are beyond individuals' power.

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
The object of expropriation	Private immovables (for residential use)	Right and ownership on property	Right and ownership on property
	Private immovables (for commercial use)	Should be kept minimum	
	Private immovables (for agricultural use)		
Justification	Via court	Public interest	Land-use and zoning
	Public services/initiatives	Not commonly used Managing density	Urban renewal Public interest
Compensation	Value designated by a committee	Monetary	Common
	Payment in cash	Smaller land bigger value	Monetary
		Owner bids	Court defines
Objection	Not possible	Public decision is not uncompromising	If the land was reserved by the Local Urban Plan (PLU) as a part of the

			urban or urbanizing area
		Possible by court	If the land is included in Concerted Development Area (ZAC)
			If under the town planning code, the decision was suspended

Table 7.8 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *expropriation* policies

Integration and (im)migration

Istanbul

The urbanization process in Turkey results from migration, particularly the rural-urban flux in which urban poverty is preferred to rural. The urbanization rate based on migration results from incorrect socio-economic policies, particularly in the rural areas, the failure of the state to allot a satisfactory amount of resources for investment, and inconsistency in the distribution of the investments throughout the country. Given the numbers (numbers), Turkey has high rates of population increase and rural to urban migration. Consequently, the demand for housing is also high in urban areas.

Regarding the countries' transformation to a nation-state in a smaller peripheral area, the settlement law numbered 5543 aims at relocating Turkish descendants to be back in the new and smaller mainland. The law refers to Turkish citizens or descendants who left their properties for force majeure but not forced displacement. Force majeure refers to actions of surrounding countries to evict Turkish descendants, while forced displacement refers to village evacuations by the Turkish Republic in the South-Eastern regions of Turkey. According to the law, Turkish people evicted from other countries can

get mortgages or housing in places defined by the state in case of coming back. However, in case of not wanting the officially determined place, they do not have the right to define a second place. However, the law does not compel the population who left their places for forced displacement. Also, the emphasis on Turkish ethnicity contradicts the country's nature, which consists of numerous ethnicities.

Housing options for migrants	Social housing at the outskirts
Integration program	Urban identity
	City familiarity
	Cultural events and tours
Us and them rhetoric	Emphasis on Turkish descendants

Table 7.9 Summary of Istanbul *integration - migration* policies

For Istanbul, the strategic plan 2018 refers to integration with "promoting urban identity amongst rural-urban migrants", "providing a familiarity with the city", "organizing cultural events and tours for disadvantaged populations". Integration, therefore, is somewhat addressed as an assimilation process with which the migrants give up their former lifestyles and devote themselves to the new one. Besides, given the nation-state's rejection of ethnicities, the integration efforts directed to the Turkish descendants and -in the current political climate- the government supporters of any groups, including the ethnically different ones. Inhabitants of Tarlabasi and their answers to the Taksim360 project report confirms that the integration policies are tangent to "marginalized and disobedient ethnic groups" such as Kurdish and Roma people. They constitute the more significant portion of Tarlabasi.

Vienna

In recent years, Vienna's population has grown much more diverse. One-third of the Viennese population also has a migrant history (i.e., they or their parents were born outside of Austria) (Kohlbacher and Reeger, 2020). Vienna is a typical center of immigration fundamentally, despite the general population's vanity over this fact. Also, national immigration policy represents this ambivalence. The Vienna Municipality's agenda (i.e. STEP05, STEP25) is much more aware of the importance of

immigration and migrant integration, even though the local policy is influenced in part by national legislation (ibid.). STEP05 and STEP25 consider the quality of life as social integration and security, equal opportunities, participation and preservation of resources. In response to the quality of life definition, migrants have the same rights to housing as Austrian citizens since after 5 years of residency in the country.

Among the others, migrants are addressed as a group with special needs or obstacles to come over. Their needs are categorized within two spheres: spatial, as the areas with a higher share of migrants are considered disadvantageous, hence requiring public action (STEP05), and social, such as the support. The spatial improvements for the areas densely inhabited by the migrants include block renovation programs and development axis with the social mix policies discussed later in detail. Concrete measure to tackle the latter includes language courses, which are vital in participating professional and societal improvement. Although language skills are crucial for harmony with the host society, language courses alone are insufficient in supporting people with migration background.

In response to the city's approach to diversity, the migration and integration policies are held within the quality of life and just-city goals. From 1990 till 2004, a publicly financed 'integration fund' functioned from its own separate office outside of Vienna concerning numerous tasks regarding immigration and integration (Reeger and Borsdorf, 2008). However, in 2004, the city council embed the integration and diversity-related issues with its organization and the former fund dissolved. According to Reeger and Borsdorf (2008), this was due to a policy shift towards diversity. Vienna was more aware of migrants and their cultural capital as highly profitable to impel urban development. The cultural productions dedicated to migrant integration are supported institutionally and publicly in bridging different cultures since it would contribute to their integration into the society (Çağlar, 2016). The control over the minor projects via social policies and funding mechanisms let them have alleged integration function rather than pure artistic concern and qualities (ibid.). Nevertheless, as Reeger and Borsdorf foresaw in 2008, the "marginalization [the immigrants] are facing [did] not simply disappear just because Vienna now declares itself a city of diversity".

Housing options for migrants	Right to social housing after 5 years of residency
Integration program	Language courses
	Cultural productions
Us and them rhetoric	Emphasis on diversity
	Migrants as perpetual beings

Table 7.10 Summary of Vienna *integration - migration* policies

Not different than what Çağlar (2016) criticizes for general terms, by saying,

"integration refers to a linear and a sequential process, in which migrants are expected to 'uproot' themselves from their 'home countries' in time and integrate themselves into the countries of settlement. Integration policies and theories operate with a normative understanding of the future. From within an integrationist perspective the present of migrants is viewed and evaluated from the point of view of this ideal state of full integration, which is in fact a teleological perspective. The integrationist model of migration is a model based on deficiency, because integration is conceptualised as a process of perpetual becoming. The integrating migrant cannot ever fully embrace the ideal 'host' society fully, thus s/he is in a perpetual state of integrating. Such a view is clearly based on a particular temporal logic. The present becomes a transition for a hypothetical and ideal future, and the present is evaluated from the perspective of this ideal" (p. 7).

In Austria the integration policies frame migrants in a perpetual becoming; therefore, never quiet there and always deficient. While intentionally it reflects an ideology of harmony, in practice the integration policies deepen the "us" and "them" rhetoric.

Paris

Following the oil crisis in 1974, the economic migration was permanent as the migrants' families followed, and their kids could become French. With that, the assimilationist discourse shifted to

integrationist, the social and cultural consequences of migration became more of a policy subject (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). With the increasing number of labor migration in France in the 1980s, their dense inhabitation in the same urban areas led to an area-based approach in public policies regarding the immigration issues in the urban realm (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). The approach fits the republican colour-blind ideology as the target was the "space", not the "people". The French unity at stake, according to the authorities, these specific areas in the 1990s were assigned as problematic. Cultural separatism (communautarisme) feared national policies acting against so-called 'enclaves' or 'ghettos' (ibid.). The city ministry was created to tackle the territorial inequalities and emphasize, once more, social mix. The category of 'immigrant' was introduced to the census in 1999 while the immigrant's origins became more and more seen as a threat to their integration into French society (ibid.).

Regarding the housing issues, there is a more complex setting. The 40 % of the immigrants living in France were French citizens by 2013 (Escafré-Dublet, 2018). Considering their distribution in the country is not necessarily confirming their concentrated living in deprived neighborhoods. However, they relatively densely inhabit the degraded parts of the private housing sector in the inner cities (ibid.).

"Arguably, immigrants are over-represented in the deprived neighborhoods that the City Policy targets: 52% of the inhabitants were immigrants or descendants of immigrants, versus 20% of the population outside of the deprived neighborhoods (ONZUS, 2012)".

Housing options for migrants	Nothing particularly for migrants
Integration program	No institutional structures for integration
	Language courses by non-governmental structures
	Area based social programs
Us and them rhetoric	Ethno-racial blindness

Table 7.11 Summary of Paris *integration - migration* policies

There are no institutional structures in France in terms of representation and civic assistance to immigrants and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the naturalization process is more straightforward compared to Austria. Unlike Austria, France allows dual citizenship and grant the right to take the process after years of residency, while the second generation is naturalized directly (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011). The language has foremost importance in terms of integration both for naturalization and the adaptation to the majority. Most of the funding for the integration matters is dedicated to non-governmental organizations providing language classes (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). In the 1980s and 1990s, in deprived neighborhoods where the post-colonial immigrants were densely inhabiting, several initiatives managed reception and integration of immigrants to promote inter-cultural dialogue or support area-based social development programs in deprived neighborhoods (Kirszbaum 2004; Dikec 2007). Towards the early 2000s, the French government encouraged the alike policies by integrating them into existing urban policy and integration programs (Kirszbaum 2004).

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Housing options for migrants	Social housing at the outskirts	Right to social housing after 5 years of residency	Nothing particularly for migrants
Integration program	Urban identity	Language courses	No institutional structures for integration
	City familiarity	Cultural productions	Language courses by non-governmental structures
	Cultural events and tours		Area based social programs
Naturalization	For refugees	No dual citizenship	Dual citizenship
		Language proficiency B?	Language proficiency
			Cultural proficiency

Us and them rhetoric	Emphasis on Turkish descendants	Migrants as perpetual beings	Ethno-racial blindness
		Emphasis on diversity	

Table 7.12 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *integration - migration* policies*Diversity**Istanbul*

Diversity policies worldwide, including Turkey, are the most politicized ones. By citing Raco and Kesten (2018), Yenigün and Eraydın (2019) state that the politicization of diversity is effectuated within two prominent folds. The first is that while right-wing politicians come up with pragmatic and seemingly inclusive narratives, they use them to deflect political attention away from the economic and physical development models' further social and economic diversionary effect. The Republic of Turkey is a relatively young country still calibrating its characteristics as a nation-state. It bears numerous ethnicities, religions, socio-economics within; the country is inherently highly diverse. Contrarily, the diversity discourse is less so. Diversity in housing is not even a subject matter. The topic only entered the country's negotiations process to access European Union in the late 1990s. Many reforms, including diversity, had to be launched respecting the Copenhagen Criteria; Turkey aimed to enhance fundamental rights and freedoms (Yenigün and Eraydın, 2019).

Nevertheless, the later maneuvers by the populist right-wing government's ambition, the diversity rhetoric was ditched mainly. The policy documents nevertheless employ the discourse "tolerance", "richness", "openness" to describe the cities' cultural vibrancy with little to no further endeavors on top. The diversity in policy documents are granted as socio-economic differences, and ethnic diversity is celebrated as long as the groups actively participate in the mainstream culture or support the leading administrators of the day. The cumulation of this rhetoric leads the diverse groups to be either silenced or marginalized. Similarly, Yenigün and Eraydın (2019) conclude that the populist manner of right-wing feeds the polarization between culturally, religiously, and ethnically different groups. By so, the expression of diverse identities in Turkey is oppressed.

Politicization of diversity	High
Diversity in housing	N/A
Objects of diversity	Migrants
	Socio-economic classes
Substitute of diversity discourse	Tolerance
	Cultural richness
	Openness
Ethnic diversity	Considered as long as the groups actively participate in the mainstream culture or support the leading administrators of the day
Accessibility / Participation	On paper exists, not on practice
Overall	Commodification of diversity

Table 7.13 Summary of Istanbul *diversity* policies

At the regional level in Istanbul, the principal municipality refers to diversity by claiming their services and performances adopt a comprehensive approach. The municipal plans claim to ensure that all the social groups, including the disadvantaged ones, participate in the decision-making process. However, while the focus is on the disadvantaged groups, their ethnicity, migration, religion or culture is rarely discussed in the policy documents at the regional level. The picture is similar at the sub-regional level. While the provincial municipalities of Istanbul mimic the rhetoric of metropolitan municipalities, they only focus on the socio-economic diversity at the district level. Beyoğlu, despite its dense ethnic population in Istanbul, the strategic plan of 2014-2023 only uses "equal opportunities", "participation", and "social municipality". These terms are the discourse as closest to those of diversity.

The strategic plan of metropolitan Istanbul 2014-2023 repeatedly calls attention to the cities' urge to attract foreign incomers while utilizing the settled - inherently diverse - population as mannequins of a colossal diversity store. The diversity is promoted, then, in two folds. The first one is the potential "skilled", "qualified", "investing" incomers' diversity at work, and the second one is the commodified image of Istanbul as "the meeting point of cultures". Similarly, in Tarlabasi by the master plans, the

diversity is to be kept; however, the profile transforms from a disobedient, lower-class, unskilled population to higher class, skilled, obedient, and investing population. To be concluded, diversity is a minor and manipulative concern in Istanbul regarding policy documents and policy-makers.

Vienna

STEP25, the strategic plan of Vienna, captures the idea of diversity with the statement that "[s]ocial equalization is a basic requirement for sustainable development". Therefore the plan equates much-praised sustainable development with social security and justice, which is understood as a prerequisite for overall life quality. So the plan derives from a place that suggests equal access to resources such as education, health care, quality housing, and social infrastructures like green spaces by citizens of different circumstances, including different geographical origins, social backgrounds, and physical mobility (STEP05 in Gluns, 2018). Therefore, Vienna's last two strategic plans promote an idea of a just city that strives for equity for all and diversity. The urban development plan of 2014 is less explicit regarding different groups but underlines the city's diversity. It postulates that the city's inclusiveness and social justice shall be equally available to all residents "irrespective of origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religious beliefs, worldviews, health, ability or disability, age or economic status" (STEP25: 128).

However, Gluns (2018) also pointed out that social diversity praised by the STEPs is not manifested in the design of housing and public policies themselves. For example, public housing provides housing for low-income groups and populations with migration backgrounds; however, the system compels applicants to wait for long lists, which they can only be in after two years of residency in Vienna. Therefore the migrants and newcomers are often confined in the private housing stock and vulnerable to issues with the private market, such as housing shortages, price increases and time-limited contracts. (Gluns, 2018).

Politicization of diversity	Moderate
Diversity in housing	Not manifested in housing design

Objects of diversity	Origin
	Sex
	Sexual orientation
	Gender identity
	Religious beliefs
	World-views
	Health
	Ability or disability
	Age
	Economic status
Substitute of diversity discourse	Sustainable development
	Social security
	Justice
Ethnic diversity	Distinction between the "host" and the "newcomer"
Accessibility / Participation	Technically, to education, health care, quality housing, and social infrastructure
Overall	Migrants are re-assessed and re-valued as part of a branding strategy of the city

Table 7.14 Summary of Vienna *diversity* policies

Management of diversity goes in two folds in Vienna. The first is the increasing interest in diversity policies since the 2000s to govern diverse populations. The second fold is that of city branding. The former includes language courses and community building practices; by so, it suggests ethnocultural diversity as a valuable asset and resource for the city's economic competitiveness and socio-economic performance (Hadj-Abdou, 2014 in Çağlar, 2016). Hadj-Abdou (2014) concludes in her research on the diversity perspective of the city; migrants are re-assessed and re-valued as part of a branding strategy of the city similar to the practice in Istanbul.

Moreover, the governance of diversity in Vienna often emulates a 'host' with a 'newcomer' perspective while granting their identity as fixed and permanent. Ayşe Çağlar (2016) identifies Vienna's main challenges in repositioning struggle in post-1989 (post iron curtain), as (1) lack of open policy towards immigrants and their exclusion; (2) the difficulties of third-generation immigrants finding their place in the knowledge sectors; and (3) the impact of national political hostility towards the neighbor (Eastern European) countries. The socio-economic diversity is dealt with within the objective of social mix, which will be discussed later.

Paris

As many scholars reminded, diversity is not a particular and direct concern of French policy (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). Nevertheless, other policies deal with inequalities in the urban realm promoting the mixing of different socio-economic classes. The initial urban policy that started in the 1980s to tackle inequalities in the urban realm is City Policy and Urban Renewal (Politique de la Ville et Renovation Urbaine). It promotes social mixing in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Blanc, 2010; Lelévrier, 2013). The other policy that dealt with inequalities was the anti-discrimination policies implemented in 2001. The policies aim to secure equal treatment between individuals and groups based on gender, sexual orientation, cultural origin, handicap, etcetera. The former and the latter are policies that get closest to diversity rhetoric, although they are still reluctant to pronounce ethnicity (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014).

Politicization of diversity	Very high level
Diversity in housing	N/A
Objects of diversity	Socio-economic classes
	Gender
	Sexual orientation
	Cultural origin
	Ability or disability
Substitute of diversity discourse	Anti-discrimination

	Equality
Ethnic diversity	Ethno-racial blindness
Accessibility / Participation	N/A
Overall	Lack of ethnic and racial considerations
	Diversity as terms for business elites
	Image making
	Branding

Table 7.15 Summary of Paris *diversity* policies

The issue of diversity entered the political agenda with the municipal elections of 2008 (Avanza, 2010). With that, some mayors attested their commitment to fighting against discrimination, arguably the first sign of a slight chance to inflect national color-blindness at a local level (Bereni et al., 2020). Color blindness of the French state refers to its understanding of difference based on universal principles (Bereni and Jaunait, 2009; Lamont, Morning, and Mooney 2002). It is legally rooted in Article 1 of the French constitution, which mandates equality before the law for all citizens, regardless of descent, race, or religion. However, the French nation-state intentionally does not recognize the groups or communities based on their origins. According to Bereni et al. (2020), the color-blindness of the French republican system is a sign of four dimensions of its discourse. Firstly, the attitude towards the migrants is assimilationist, where the immigrants and their descendants should integrate into cultural values and utmost behaviors of the majority or keep their identity private. Secondly, the denial of the ethnic roots signifies the lack of intervention against ethno-racial discrimination. Thirdly, it creates legal restrictions on collecting ethnic and racial statistics and prevent righteous interventions from preventing ethno-racial related controversies. Finally, color-blindness constraints any positive action based on ethno-racial grounds (Bereni et al., 2020). Against the background, the French policy regarding diversity lacks ethnic and racial considerations. At the same time, the problems ethno-racial groups have in the urban realm are swept under the carpet and reduced to a socio-economic ground. Consequently, the ethnic and racial diversity in the city becomes a constant challenge for the policy-makers in assessing the redistribution of services and goods.

Like other EU countries, France is urged by the union's anti-discrimination framework established in the 2000s. The celebration of diversity appeared in business circles following the global idealization of the term. The celebration of the phenomenon by business elites and the following national adoption did not affect the local government or urban policies; it instead stayed as another marketing tool for enterprises. The use of diversity by businesses in France is similar to the Viennese (local) government's use of diversity in image-making and branding. However, unlike the Viennese case on the Parisian city scale, instead of diversity, the terminology such as equality, cohesion, and integration remained, as the former resonates with the groups' cultural and geographical backgrounds. Because, although diversity is often not regarded with ethno-racial terms, (local) governments' socio-economic diversity agenda is a cover to tackle it without naming it.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Politicization of diversity	High	Moderate	Very high level
Diversity in housing	N/A	Not manifested in housing design	N/A
Objects of diversity	Migrants	Origin	Socio-economic classes
		Sex	
		Sexual orientation	Gender
		Gender identity	
		Religious beliefs	Sexual orientation
	Socio-economic classes	World-views	Cultural origin
		Health	Ability or disability
		Ability or disability	
		Age	
		Economic status	

Substitute of diversity discourse	Tolerance	Sustainable development	Anti-discrimination
	Cultural richness	Social security	Equality
	Openness	Justice	
Ethnic diversity	Considered as long as the groups actively participate in the mainstream culture or support the leading administrators of the day	Distinction between the "host" and the "newcomer"	Ethno-racial blindness
Accessibility / Participation	On paper exists, not on practice	Technically, to education, health care, quality housing, and social infrastructure	N/A
Overall	Commodification of diversity	Migrants are re-assessed and re-valued as part of a branding strategy of the city	Lack of ethnic and racial considerations
			Diversity as terms for business elites
			Image making
			Branding

Table 7.15 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *diversity* policies*Land use and zoning**Istanbul*

Turkey's land use and zoning largely have been shaped by the metropolitan municipality law numbered 3030 - enacted in 1984. The law dictates the municipal structures and the planning warrants between the districts and metropolitan areas, i.e. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Moreover, per the law,

metropolitan municipalities are authorized to prepare, approve, and implement master plans besides approving and auditing the implementation plans of district municipalities (Kayasü and Yetişkul, 2014). The district municipalities' autonomy is considerably less than the central ones, and they depend on the policies made and controlled centrally. Therefore, the local renewal projects are directly connected to the central administrations' strategies, top-down and constitute the direct intervention of governmental agenda.

Centralization of decisions	High
Implementation	Top-down
	Changes happen to often and fast
Density	To be reduced at the centers
Type	Poly-centric

Table 7.16 Summary of Istanbul *land use and zoning* policies

At the regional level, Istanbul strategic plan (2014-2023)'s goal is poly-centric land use. The centers are to be specialized, efficient and with high surplus value. The steps to reach the goal are 1. to originate spatial renewal projects that will enhance the environmental and living standards; 2. to strengthen the link between the CBD and the other international CBDs; and 3. to develop first degree, specialized central areas to reduce the weight out of the CDB as well as second-degree centers to provide settlements in the hinterland with service and commerce. Following the strategies, a couple of districts, including Beyoglu, are first degree centers. As a first degree center, Beyoglu's biggest threat is determined as the overcrowd and the illegal occupations. Therefore the land-use policies intertwine with the displacement. The primary target is to create more residential areas in Beyoglu and the outskirts of Istanbul to reduce housing demand in the center. With the overall change in land use through project-based planning and renewal, the density is reduced, which inevitably means the displacement of the masses.

Vienna

Planning procedures in Austria concern the provinces; therefore, within Vienna's city limits, the rules are entirely different from the other surrounding provinces. Within limits, urban development is based on zoning and land-use planning, which parts the city into areas to designate where to build how and what, including functional decisions like housing, company, green space, mix, or, etcetera. The building code outlines the process for zoning reforms, including a review of the suggested amendments by the advisory committee on strategic planning and urban architecture. After six weeks of public display of the initiative and a request for an opinion from the respective district, the responsible agency (MA 21) submits a recommendation to the council for approval (Bauordnung für Wien; MA50). Following the approval, the project will be planned based on the assessments.

Centralisation of decisions	Decentralised
Implementation	Top-down with transparency
	Hard to make changes
Density	N/A
Type	Monostructural

Table 7.17 Summary of Vienna *land use and zoning* policies

MA21, department of district planning and land use (Magistratsabteilung 21, Stadtteilplanung und Flächennutzung), is responsible for the concerned regulations. Land use plans follow the direction designated by the urban development plan, which is not legally binding, unlike zoning regulations prepared by the magistrate and adopted by the city council (Gluns, 2016). Moreover, modifications to the zoning plan, including the function change, take quite a long time because of the numerous institutions involved and protocols that have to be completed. Therefore the function of areas does not change vastly, resulting in less unbalanced fluctuations in the urban rent than otherworldly peers such as Istanbul, where the land use plans can be changed swiftly and thoughtlessly. Thus one can conclude that the existing regulations are more convenient to implement than novelties.

By officials, the amount and distribution of retail and other businesses are considered to suffice in Vienna; however, the displacement pressure due to the residential construction is robust among the inhabitants in development areas (Gluns, 2016). Besides, it is disputable if, in the long run, the

monostructural development will be enough for an ever-growing city and prevent increasing displacement pressure. Additionally, "housing - eligible for subsidies", a newly introduced category in land use, dictates that new housing should be built following affordable housing requirements in terms of dwelling size and energy efficiency. As the re-zoning rarely happens - unless there is a housing shortage in "housing - eligible for subsidies" (Pamer, 2019) - the zoning plan reform is impossible without a project that guarantees affordable housing.

Paris

In France, land-use planning is prepared and applied in multi-level, i.e., the state, regions, departments, arrondissements, cantons, and communes. The national government is responsible for the legal framework regarding land-use planning, environmental policy, and other urban policy fields. It plans and finances national infrastructure projects such as highways and railways. EU directives directly influence land policy, which is the foundation of government planning. The plans on the national level do not have a spatial variation.

At the regional level, large scale infrastructure projects are financed. Additionally, strategic plans which outline the policies and spatial visions are prepared at this level. Cities, departments, and regions have similar laws creating a land-use structure. The creation of unique land documents is used to implement land policies and their territorial binding. It is divided into two types of plans: those established on the land of only one commune and those formed on the land of a region or district, containing the following specific policy schemes and developed into several communes. Zoning, or land division into areas, is the basis of every plan. They are asserted after publishing the proposals and following positive public approval. After that, it is necessary to perform them. In larger metropolitan areas, inter-municipal alliances play an essential role in the French planning system. They are in charge of developing development strategies to provide a unified vision for the entire metropolitan agglomeration. For municipal land-use plans, these plans are legally binding. Local governments are in charge of developing local land-use policies and granting construction permits.

Centralization of decisions	Highly decentralized
Implementation	In many levels
	Inter-municipal plans
Density	Depending on the plan
Type	Structural zoning

Table 7.18 Summary of Paris *land use and zoning* policies

PLU aims at designating a development plan for the commune. In collaboration with various communes, the plan is then called PLUS. Following the adoption of the plan, it is legally binding. The PLU will create planning zones for the city besides new development planning rules and details on significant development constraints. Then, it divides metropolitan cities into separate zones, among other things. No fewer than 20 different categories determine the characteristics and structure of municipal land use. There is, for example, Zone A for agricultural property, which is concerned with the fields. Zone NA, which stands for "future urbanization zone," refers to land available for development. Finally, the EU badge defines an urban area for commercial, craft, and industrial areas.

The general planning laws applicable within each development area will be laid out in this plan section. It will define rules for change of usage, building heights, configurations, design specifications, utility services and requirements, among other things. It will also specify the maximum density of construction that can be built on a given site for both new and existing structures. Per decentralization in the 1980s, the inter-municipal competition within Paris is manifested in spatial planning, housing and economic policies. Local governments also have the authority to establish their land-use policies and structural visions, allowing them to undertake and execute land development. The typical development zones ZAC, on the other hand, is a tool they rely on to develop their areas without crossing jurisdictions. Municipalities can define development zones and further appoint agencies to manage land development, often with public-private partnerships between the city and financial institutions (Savini, 2012). Besides the positive effects, the competition generates a territorial fragmentation which often strengthens socio-economic polarization.

The majority of the Parisian suburban projects were led by collaborations between Paris, the state, and the area to develop land owned by the capital city. These operations were not part of any larger strategy and were justified mainly by the regional structural plan, which was directed by the state. In the new geopolitical landscape of the city, a left-wing coalition of regional and Parisian executives is pitted against a right-wing national government by municipalities with communist roots. As a result, metropolitan restructuring and governance have become highly politicized, amplifying the power struggle between local and national executives (Savini, 2012). In addition, the land-use plan influences the inhabitants depending on who employs the plans with whom under what circumstances.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Centralization of decisions	High	Decentralized	Highly centralized
Implementation	Top-down	Top-down with transparency	In many levels
	Changes happen to often and fast	Hard to make changes	Inter-municipal plans
Density	To be reduced at the centers	N/A	Depending on the plan
Type	Poly-centric	Monostructural	Structural zoning

Table 7.19 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *land use and zoning* policies

7.2. Policies in-effect for reinvestment in fixed capital: Istanbul, Vienna, and Paris

Tenure taxation

Istanbul

Real estate taxes occupy no share of overall public revenue (Erdoğan et al., 2016). The report published by the Ministry of Finance (2015) indicates that the revenue from property taxes is less than 1 % of GDP and only about 3.5 % of total tax revenues while these rates are respectively, 2% and 5.5% in OECD average. The real estate incomes in Turkey are taxed in threeway. They are property income taxation, real estate taxation, and transaction taxation. The first two taxations will be revealed in this section.

Residential property	0.1% - 0.2% annual
	Living in the property or not
Property income	For rental: if it is above 3600 TL
	For buying/selling: within five years of acquisition
Tenant tax	N/A
Multiple houses tax	Being discussed
Value increase tax	Being discussed

Table 7.20 Summary of Istanbul *tenure taxation* policies

The income earned from housing is subject to income tax only if the property is sold following five years of acquisition (Türel and Koc 2014). The amount of the tax is calculated on the purchasing and selling prices in the market for which the Central Bank of Turkey publishes housing prices indices based on the national and regional averages since 2010. The five-year policy creates a venue for economic gain free from taxes from real estate investments after 5th year of acquisition. On the other hand, short-term investments are discouraged through the same policy. The owners, either living in the property or not, are liable to pay property taxes; however, if the annual rental income is less than 3600.00 TL (~360.00

€), the income tax is not applied. Although not yet achieved, strategic plan of Istanbul, 2014-2023 sets as a target to regulate the taxation and mortgage of 1. second and more property purchases; and 2. the value increase following the spatial developments. Finally, there are no additional taxes regarding housing for the tenants.

Vienna

In Vienna, tenants' due to pay is 10 % on their rent for dwellings for value-added tax (VAT). The general expenses (except heat) and public charges, including the expenses of their landlords for real property tax, too, are part of the rent, to the collection of which the VAT applies. If there is a garage or furnished housing rental, the VAT is 20% of the rent, according to the *Umsatzsteuergesetz*. In addition, any written lease arrangement over three months is subject to a 1% transfer tax. It is due when signing a rental contract, according to *Gebührengesetz*. Both parties are responsible for paying the transfer tax, but the landlord/lady or his/her legal representative often carry it out.

Owner-occupied houses or inhabiting in own condominiums are not subject to income tax. Nevertheless, every homeowner has to pay real property tax, between 0.05% and 0.2% of the rateable value. Every municipality has the right to raise the real property tax by 0.5% to 1%. According to the Income Tax Act, profits arising from selling land, houses, or similar interests of individuals have been subject to a real property profit tax since 2012. Immovable property bought before 1.4.2002 is subject to a property profit tax of 3.5 % of the benefit generated (Hofmann, 2015).

Residential property	0.05% - 0.2% for owner-occupation
	Renter pays if there is
Property income	For rental (private) above 11,000€ is subject to it up to 50%
	For rental (corporate) corporate income tax act, which mandates 25% of the income
	For rental (limited profit) exemption

	N/A for owner-occupation
Tenant tax	10% - 20% for VAT
Multiple houses tax	<i>Being discussed</i>
Value increase tax	<i>Being discussed</i>

Table 7.21 Summary of Vienna *tenure taxation* policies

According to the income tax act, rental incomes of private households are subject to income tax, as every household with a monthly income above 11,000€ is subject to it up to 50%. Like private parties, the corporate bodies are subject to taxes; however, the corporate income tax act mandates 25% of the income. On the other hand, limited-profit housing associations hold more privileged in terms of tax obligations compared to corporate or private landlords/ladies. According to *Körperschaftsteuergesetz*, their primary economic activities are constructing and modernizing buildings. Therefore, they are exempt from the obligatory taxes corporate income taxes. The exemption of limited-profit housing associations from corporate income tax encourages the construction of new items for rent. It reinforces limited-profit housing associations as critical players in the rental housing supply industry (Hofmann, 2015).

Paris

In Paris, the tenants must pay a habitation tax called *taxe habitation* in French. This tax is, in fact, due to payment by whoever occupies the property. The price base is determined concerning the location and the size of the apartment and paid annually. All the additional premises such as car parking are subject to the same tax. Besides the tax mentioned, renters also pay security deposits in case no reparations are needed at the end of the lease term. Besides the habitation tax, the tenants must have housing insurance obtained from insurance companies or banks. It will add on top of the monthly outgoings for the rental unit.

Residential property	0.05% - 0.2% for owner-occupation
	Renter pays if there is
Property income	For rental (private) less than or equal to 275190€, the tax is 20%
	For rental (private) the income tax exceeds 305€, it is not imposed
	For rental (private) higher income than 27519€, it is taxed at 30%
	solidarity tax (prélèvement de solidarité) at the rate of 7.5%
	non-EEA residents remain liable for the full panoply of social charges at the rate of 17.2%
Tenant tax	Taxe d'habitation
	Housing insurance
Multiple houses tax	<i>Being discussed</i>
Value increase tax	1% and 5%. (up to 20% in specific areas for the municipal part)
Vacant dwellings tax	Rental value at 12.5% the first, then 25% the following years

Table 7.22 Summary of Paris *tenure taxation* policies

Property owners are subject to various forms of taxes depending on the property's utility. Regardless of the utility, they are due to the annual payment of property taxes (*tax foncière*). The base of the tax is the cadastral income that is gained through the local rental value. The annual tax rate is 3% of the property's market value - owned in France. After updating and upgrading the land, a reduction of 50% applies, while the reduction is 20% for non-developable land. The amount is calculated through the tax rate set by each local authority to their cadastral income.

In addition to the property tax, in the case of rental income gain, owners are obliged to pay income tax under the category of trade and commercial profit. The tax is calculated through the income made by the property. If the rental income is less than or equal to 275190€, the tax is 20%, while the income tax exceeds 305€, not imposed. In the case of higher income than 27519€, it is taxed at 30%. In addition to income tax, non-residents are also liable for social charges on rental income. The government in 2019 replaced the social charges with a solidarity tax (*prélèvement de solidarité*) at the rate of 7.5%. By that, non-EEA residents remain liable for the full panoply of social charges at the rate of 17.2%.

In addition to the property and income taxes, owners of unoccupied dwellings are due to tax for vacant premises in France. If the premise remained unoccupied for longer than a year, it is subject to this tax, although it applies only in certain areas. The tax is designated through the rental value at 12.5% the first and 25% the following years. Value increase tax applies to all construction, reconstruction, or extension projects. The tax is determined by multiplying the building surface's taxable value by the local authority's rate. The percentage ranges between 1% and 5% (up to 20% in specific areas for the municipal part).

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Residential property	0.1% - 0.2% annual	0.05% - 0.2% for owner-occupation	0.05% - 0.2% for owner-occupation
	Living in the property or not	Renter pays if there is	Renter pays if there is
Property income	For rental: if it is above 3600 TL	For rental (private) above 11,000€ is subject to it up to 50%	For rental (private) less than or equal to 275190€, the tax is 20%
			For rental (private) the income tax exceeds

			305€, it is not imposed
	For buying/selling: within five years of acquisition	For rental (corporate) corporate income tax act, which mandates 25% of the income	For rental (private) higher income than 27519€, it is taxed at 30%
		For rental (limited profit) exemption	solidarity tax (prélèvement de solidarité) at the rate of 7.5%
		N/A for owner-occupation	non-EEA residents remain liable for the full panoply of social charges at the rate of 17.2%
Tenant tax	N/A	10% - 20% for VAT	Taxe d'habitation
			Housing insurance
Multiple houses tax	<i>Being discussed</i>	<i>Being discussed</i>	<i>Being discussed</i>
Value increase tax	<i>Being discussed</i>	<i>Being discussed</i>	1% and 5%. (up to 20% in specific areas for the municipal part)
Vacant dwellings tax			Rental value at 12.5% the first, then 25% the following years

Table 7.23 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *tenure taxation* policies

Transaction costs

Istanbul

The transaction costs in Turkey are regulated with few taxations. The first is purchasing tax - paid directly to the state - which is 4% of the property's sales price. In most cases, it is split into two, with the buyer and seller each paying 2%. The tax is usually evenly split when purchasing a brand new apartment from a developer. When purchasing a resale property from an individual, the buyer typically must pay the entire 4% commission. Property transfer tax is a legal requirement for Turkish residents and foreigners who own or sell land or property. It is calculated based on the property's actual selling or purchase price. Both parties must pay a fee of approximately 1.5% of the real estate's value when the transaction is registered at the *Land Registry*.

Purchasing tax	2 % by the seller
	2 % by the buyer
Transfer tax	1.5 % by the seller
	1.5 % by the buyer
Administration fees	0.15 - 0.75 %
Real estate agency	3 % by the buyer
VAT	1 % up to 150 m ²
	1 % - 8 % - 18 %

Table 7.24 Summary of Istanbul *transaction costs*

A buyer's tax of 1.5 % of the property's declared value will be charged when purchased. In addition, there are also charges due based on various one-time tax fees, such as stamp duty on purchasing papers. Stamp duty varies depending on the transaction's cost, but it typically ranges from 0.15 % to 0.75 % of the property's value. Higher stamp duties are, typically, associated with higher-value transactions. Finally, the buyer will pay a real estate agency fee of 3% if applicable. Furthermore, the private housing sector is encouraged with a VAT reduction of 1% instead of %18 for houses up to 150 m² floor area (Türel and Koc, 2014). Following the adjustment, three VAT rates are applied as 1, 8 and

18% depending on the land value, building's facilities, and the plot in square meters if the property is in Metropolitan Municipality areas such as Istanbul.

Vienna

The fluctuations in purchase prices are more robust than those for rental housing in Vienna (Gluns, 2018). From 2012 to 2015, housing costs rose by 8% annually in Vienna, much higher than the Austrian and European averages (Schremmer 2015). Most notably in central locations, the purchase prices increased for condominiums (Kadi 2014) despite the transaction costs.

Purchasing tax	2 % by the seller
	2 % by the buyer
Transfer tax	2 % - 3.5 %
	1.5 % by the buyer
Administration fees	1.1 % for land transfers
	1.2 % for building rights transfers
Real estate agency	1.5 % - 2% by the seller
	1.5 % - 2% by the buyer
VAT	1 % up to 150 m ²
	1 % - 8 % - 18 %
Notary fees	120 € (+ 20 % VAT)

Table 7.25 Summary of Vienna *transaction costs*

All costs associated with purchasing and reselling a property are included in the round trip transaction costs, such as attorneys' fees, notaries' fees, registration fees, taxes, and agents' fees. A lawyer or notary drafts typically the contract, which is usually worth 1% to 3% of the purchase price in addition to the 20 % VAT. According to the land transfer tax act, every transfer of land or equivalent right is subject to a transfer tax between 2 % and 3.5 % from the real estate's triple rateable value or market price. Moreover, there are administration fees of 1.1 % for land transfers and 1.2 % for building rights

transfers, measured using either the triple rateable value or the real estate market price to be listed in the land registry (Hofmann, 2015). The seller's and buyer's signatures on the contract must be authenticated. The notary or court may obtain a maximum of €120 per person (plus 20% VAT); the court's fee might be marginally higher than the notary's. The charge for a real estate agent is fixed by law at 3% to 4% of the property's selling price or market value. Both the buyer and the seller are responsible for the agent's fee.

Paris

There is a higher level of direct transaction costs in France than in other OECD countries. Including stamp duty and a compulsory notary act, the average costs can be estimated at around 14 % (Laferrere and Le Blanc, 2006). It includes all costs of buying and then re-selling a property and lawyers' fees, notaries' fees, registration fees, taxes, agents' fees, etcetera.

The buyer is usually responsible for paying transfer taxes. Land sales are subject to transfer taxes or value-added taxes in most cases. Transfer taxes range from 5.09 % to 5.81 % of the purchase price, depending on the form and location of the land. They refer to property constructed more than five years ago. Renovations undertaken during the last five years on properties constructed more than five years ago are subject to special regulations. In addition, some newly constructed properties planned as primary residences or rental properties are subject to special rules imposed by tax incentive legislation. If the seller and buyer are VAT taxpayers or not, property purchase is generally subject to transfer taxes or value-added tax (VAT) at the regular rate (20%). The VAT tax system adheres to EU directives. Real estate properties are generally included in the VAT standard regime and are no longer subject to a special regime.

Purchasing tax	cc
Transfer tax	5.09 % - 5.81 % usually the buyer
Administration fees	1.1 % for land transfers
	1.2 % for building rights transfers
Real estate agency	3 % - 10 % (+ VAT) can be split between buyer

	and the seller
VAT	20 % for new constructions
	Constructions over 5 years old VAT is exempt
Notary fees	3 % (+ VAT)
	7 % - 10% for properties over 10 years old
Additional taxes	Registration fees 3.6 %
	Regular tax 0.2 %
	Regular tax at a special rate 0.1 %
	Appropriation for the state 2.5 %
	Land registry 0.10 %

Table 7.27 Summary of Paris *transaction costs*

For property purchases in France, a notary is needed. The buyer is responsible for the notary fees, which are set by statute and are non-negotiable. Since they are all charged by the notary, they are collectively known as notary fees or "frais de notaire." Changes in ownership fees and mortgage security charges are examples of these costs. For newly constructed houses, notary fees are about 3% plus VAT. The notary fees are generally around 7% to 10% plus VAT for existing properties or properties over five years old. When property transactions are not subject to VAT, they are subject to registration fees (also known as transfer fees). Duties on real estate transactions are collected when the property is sold. It now has a single rate of 3.6 %. A 1.20 % extra tax is collected for the commune or department fund in addition to the tax on real estate transactions registration. In addition to the 0.2 % regular tax or 0.1 % special rate fee, a 2.50 % fee is collected for appropriation to the state.

The following are the extra fees. Firstly, Value Added Tax (VAT) is charged at 20% of the purchase price of a newly constructed house. Existing assets that are more than five years old are exempt from VAT. Second, land registry fees vary, but they are usually 0.10 % of the property value. Finally, real estate agent commissions range from 3% to 10% of the property's sale price, plus VAT. It can also be split between buyer and seller.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Purchasing tax	2 % by the seller	2 % by the seller	cc
	2 % by the buyer	2 % by the buyer	
Transfer tax	1.5 % by the seller	2 % - 3.5 %	5.09 % - 5.81 % usually the buyer
	1.5 % by the buyer	1.5 % by the buyer	
Administratio n fees	0.15 - 0.75 %	1.1 % for land transfers	1.2 % for building rights transfers
		1.2 % for building rights transfers	1.1 % for land transfers
Real estate agency	3 % by the buyer	1.5 % - 2% by the seller	3 % - 10 % (+ VAT) can be split between buyer and the seller
		1.5 % - 2% by the buyer	
VAT	1 % up to 150 m ²	1 % up to 150 m ²	20 % for new constructions
	1 % - 8 % - 18 %	1 % - 8 % - 18 %	Constructions over 5 years old VAT is exempt
Notary fees		120 € (+ 20 % VAT)	3 % (+ VAT)
			7 % - 10% for properties over 10 years old
Additional taxes			Registration fees 3.6 %
			Regular tax 0.2 %
			Regular tax at a special rate 0.1 %
			Appropriation for the state 2.5 %

			Land registry 0.10 %
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Table 7.28 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *transaction costs**Money lending*

The establishment of the Mass Housing fund and specific changes encouraged improving the housing sector and investments. As well as to increase home-ownership, the government provided loans for mass housing projects through institutions dealing primarily with social security and Türkiye Emlak Bankası, a bank function for mortgage credits. These encouragements successfully increased the constructions but not the home-ownership. The social security institutions in the 1980s gave loans specifically for smaller housing (less than 100 m²) purchases to encourage the construction of smaller units. However, it was not decently implemented thus given up in 1998. Later, the Emlak Bank was closed and merged with Halkbank, a bank functioning as a regular bank; however, the real estate-related dues continued under the Emlak section.

To increase home-ownership is a substantial housing target by policymakers in Turkey. Some home-ownership initiatives are:

1. Introduction of long-term real estate loans by Turkish bank (3-20 years)
2. 3 to 5 years of zero interest rate developers' loan
3. Price incentives by municipalities
4. Earthquake funds including ~3-4 billion \$ worth of international assistance
5. Construction of residential units that are higher in demand.

The assessment section of strategic plan of 2014-2023 sanguinely claims that if the economic policies are maintained, and the decline in inflation rate continues, the fall of interest rates and maturity of the loans can be expected. In that case, the hopeful estimation continues that the increase in the availability of quality housing for middle-income groups can be expected, unlike the previous years where the housing was available for upper and upper-middle-income groups.

In 1984 per housing development law number 2985, Housing Development Administration (HDA) was founded. However, within the years, it did not work sufficiently until the housing question became a significant agenda topic with the 17th of August Marmara Earthquake with which 50000 people died, 100000 were injured, about 133683 buildings were destroyed, and 600000 people lost their houses (TOKI). In 2002, HDA became more substantial in providing affordable housing and housing funds from then on. The cooperatives have been the primary beneficiaries of the HDA credits, and between 1984 and 2005, 944000 dwelling units were financed by HDA (Türel and Koc, 2014).

Interest rates	High by commercial banks
	Low by HDA
Giver	State
	Commercial banks
	Public-private earthquake funds
	HDA (<i>TOKI</i>)
Paying back options	Fixed
	Variable
Receiver	Individuals
	Developers

Table 7.29 Summary of Istanbul *money lending* rules

Meanwhile, the commercial banks became an increasingly substantial source of mortgage credits by 2004, accompanied by the fall of inflation rates and mortgage interest rates (Türel and Koc, 2014). In February 2007, a special law governing the mortgage market was passed, resulting from a work started in 2004, enabling banks to offer mortgage lending on more secure terms. With that, people had more mortgage credit options, whether fixed or variable interest rates; however, the interest rates are higher in private banks than HDA. Nevertheless, the law did not provide more home-ownership for the lower and middle classes due to the high-interest rates (Alkan and Ugurlar, 2015). Until the mortgage law was enacted in 2007, there was no way for foreigners or Turkish residents to purchase an apartment in

Turkey in installments via a mortgage loan. The Turkish government promotes foreign real estate investment to help revitalize the sector and contribute to its development. Former is manifested by the fact that non-resident foreigners in Turkey already have access to funding and loans. Finally, there are no mortgage interest rate subsidies for households purchasing homes for their use in Turkey. Nevertheless, for housing acquired to rent, the interest charged on the mortgage credit will be exempted from the portion of the rent subject to income tax (Türel and Koc, 2014).

Vienna

To provide financing for housing development, a system of particular banks, some of which have initially been in public ownership, but have successively been privatized, has been developed. In the 1990s, particular mission Housing Banks provided low-interest loans for housing construction (Gluns, 2018). Those special banks provide most private funds for housing construction in Vienna (Lawson, 2010). By the federal legislation in 2015, additional institutions for housing investment was founded, namely, the construction investment bank. The funds are distributed as grants to nonprofit developers and communities to develop affordable housing. In addition, the state subsidizes private savings for home development or purchase (Gluns, 2018).

Moreover, there are quasi-public agencies; the most important one is the *Fonds Soziales Wien* Vienna Social Fund for housing. It was established in 2004 to establish a more apparent distinction between funding and service provision for accommodation for individuals with special needs such as the elderly, disabled people, and homeless. In 2015, services for asylum seekers became one of its tasks after the managing director of the fund was appointed refugee coordinator of the city of Vienna.

Interest rates	Low for non-profit corporations
Giver	Construction investment banks
	Social Funds Vienna
	Housing Fund Vienna
Paying back options	Fixed

	Variable
Receiver	Individuals
	Non-profit developers
	Home developers

Table 7.30 Summary of Vienna *money lending* rules

A similar fund is the *wohnfonds_wien* Housing Fund Vienna, which performs as 1) a land bank as in early 2016, it had 2.8 million square kilometres of land in Vienna; 2) administration and distribution of the object subsidies for new construction and rehabilitation. Furthermore, the fund is an independent legal body with the authority to operate on its behalf under the institution's aims and objectives.

Despite not being completely unaffected, the Austrian housing system seems to be better protected against financialization. It has a solid public commitment and a traditional bank-based financial structure. Moreover, there is no secondary mortgage market system, mortgage-backed securities/MBS, no Real Estate Investment Trusts/REITs (Aigner, 2020). Nevertheless, like in its other capitalist peers in Vienna, the global real estate-driven accumulation regime is prominent. As a result, housing transforms into an asset class, although the financialization of housing may not appear in all its forms. Except, it does so in one key area: the purchase of residential property for capital gain, benefit, and asset development (Aigner, 2020).

Paris

Compared to the other OECD countries, buying a property in France poses a more negligible risk owing to the country's relatively strong economy and judicious attitude towards money lending. Accessibility to housing through ownership is relatively exclusive to the middle to the higher class. Nevertheless, financial program support first-time buyers with zero-rate loans for households below a predefined income ceiling (Driant and Li, 2012). Unlike Turkey and Austria, the loan duration is shorter, typically about 15 years in France (Laferrere and Le Blanc, 2006). Consequently, while in Austria and Turkey, the monthly mortgage repayment would be slightly above the monthly rent of the same dwelling in France. The difference between the rent and mortgage repayment is extensive. In France, the

maximum amount to borrow is one-third of the borrower's monthly - stable and proven - income; in most cases, the income is asked to be from the same employee for at least three previous years. Although there is no legal restriction, the lenders are more prudent to lend the borrowers who do not reside in France.

Interest rates	Zero-rate for first time buyers
Giver	Commercial banks under control of the state
Paying back options	Fixed
	Secured
Receiver	Individuals
	Developers

Table 7.31 Summary of Paris *money lending* rules

For lower-class households, homeownership was promoted through the fixed interest rates loans when the inflation was high, and the interest rates were negative, a credit to ease mortgage repayment. When the inflation rates dropped, and the actual interest rates climbed, a zero-interest rate loan was introduced to cover up to 20% of the housing and 50% of the credit costs. The loans are repaid only once the credit is repaid completely (Schelkle, 2012). By so, the French government plays a vital role to finance housing. The state's guarantee often substitutes the mortgage because about half of the housing finance comes from long-term personal loans (ibid.). It is also favorable for the lender since the repayment conditions are secured, or a third party has already completed the payment swiftly. However, the predominance of personal loans rather than mortgages for homeownership in France underlines that the housing finance is excluded from those who could afford it (ibid.).

Additionally, early redemption and refinancing in France are not possible; therefore, the repayment could have to be higher due to the later calculations. Similarly, housing finance cannot be used for else finance - the safety is over-considered; consequently, the consumer choice and financial inclusion are omitted (ibid.). The deposit is often required for a French mortgage, in a minimum of 15% to 20% of the purchase price. At the beginning of the borrowing term, the liquid assets should also be ready.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Interest rates	High by commercial banks	Low for non-profit corporations	Zero-rate for first time buyers
	Low by HDA		
Giver	State	Construction investment banks	Commercial banks under control of the state
	Commercial banks	Social Funds Vienna	
	Public-private earthquake funds	Housing Fund Vienna	
	HDA (<i>TOKI</i>)		
Paying back options	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed
	Variable	Variable	Secured
Receiver	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals
	Developers	Non-profit developers	Developers
		Home developers	

Table 7.32 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *money lending* rules*Renewal**Istanbul*

Urban renewal in Turkey is a common practice. It is claimed to have four main reasons 1. prevent squatter areas in cooperation with municipalities, 2. improve construction quality, 3. mitigate earthquake damage, and 4. conserve historical areas.

HDA is a crucial strategic actor of urban renewal in Turkey as an institution with the authority of purchasing land, generating projects, and approving plans. Also, under the Local Administration Reforms in 2004 and 2005, local governments can delineate areas and prepare plans for urban transformation. Even though the reforms provide local administrations with the power, HDA can enforce

the plan if the projects are not approved in three months. The implementation indicates that the local governments' controls are often bypassed by only being symbolically asked for approval on the plans if, in any case, the projects will be approved by HDA. Like, Kayasü and Yetişkul (2014) agree, this is another step towards strengthening the power of HDA while weakening that of local governments.

Additionally, the law numbered 5366 that manages the reconstruction and renewal of the inner city's historical and cultural conservation areas broaden the prospect of urban transformation projects. Municipalities and particular provincial administrations became the authorized institution in implementing the urban transformation project in decayed parts of conservation areas. In the decayed parts of urban areas, generally applied restrictions and regulations were removed. It facilitated the urban rent distribution in the inner city for the local governments. Therefore, through neoliberal urban policies managing urban rent became a significant instrument in renewal projects that accumulate capital in certain areas rather than the others; hence, transfer power. As a result, urban regeneration programs from the 2000s have significantly lost authenticity in the inner historical and cultural conservation areas. These programs' lack of socioeconomic concerns eventuate civil society discord (Kayasü and Yetişkul, 2014). That is why in Turkish gentrification discourse, urban renewal and gentrification are used somewhat interchangeably. Although it is not always the case, because of the policies and the transformation trajectory, one can suspect the gentrification is accomplished under the sugar-coated name, urban transformation, with a solid legal standpoint.

Justification	To prevent squatter areas in cooperation with municipalities
	To improve construction quality
	To mitigate earthquake damage
	To conserve historical areas
Crucial actors	Housing Development Administration (HDA)
	(Local) governments
	Corporate housing development companies
Intention	To increase competitiveness

	To increase livable spaces
	To provide sustainable environment
Target	Upper middle class
Areas	Shanty housing
	Areas under earthquake risk
	Historical centers

Table 7.33 Summary of Istanbul *renewal* policies

The tenth development plan of Turkey (2014-2018) gives comprehensive coverage to urban renewal under the title of "livable space, sustainable environment". According to the plan, locational preferences of main urban actors such as international investors are tied to production intensity. Thus the main focus of urban renewal practices in the plan is to increase cities' competitiveness by creating environments for production and the producers. Given the developments in urbanization, the tenth development plan of Turkey reveals the aim of urban renewal as

"Ekonomik coğrafya iyi planlanıp, şehirlerin mekân ve yaşam kalitesi daha üst düzeylere yükseltilebildiği takdirde, bu eğilim ülkemizin jeopolitik avantajlarını güçlendirecek, yatırımlar ve nitelikli insan kaynakları için çekim merkezi haline getirecektir.

Suppose the economic geography can be planned well and space and life quality of the cities can be raised to higher levels. In that case, this trend will strengthen the geopolitical advantages of our country and make it a **center of attraction for investments and qualified human resources**" The tenth development plan of Turkey (2014-2018), (Author's translation - Emphasis added).

With that, the plan aims to enhance the country's competitive capacity internationally while neglecting the socio-economically distinct groups in the cities.

"Şehirleşme oranındaki artışın yanı sıra artan gelir düzeyi, iyileşen finansman imkânları, aile ve toplum yapısındaki değişiklikler ve hareketlilik, şehirlerde yaşam kalitesini ön plana çıkarmıştır. Sosyal donatısı zengin, daha geniş, modern, güvenli konutların rağbet

görmesi ve şehirlerin eski merkezlerinin ve konut alanlarının işlev ve değer kaybetmesi önemli eğilimlerdendir.

In addition to the **increase in urbanization, the increasing income level, improving finance opportunities**, changes in family and social structure and mobility have highlighted the quality of life in cities. The demand for **more spacious, modern and safe houses with rich social facilities**, the loss of function and value of the old centers and residential areas of cities are among the significant trends” The tenth development plan of Turkey (2014-2018), (Author’s translation - Emphasis added).

Although the plan states that the implementation of the renewal projects is socially informed, the former hints at the target audience of improvements, most certainly not lower-income groups. It appears that the expanding urbanization rate, for the plan, is no longer a problem when the increasing population is higher-income affluent foreign investors. The following (eleventh, 2018-2023) developmental plan of Turkey increases the social sensitivity discourse while decreasing that of competitiveness. Participation, on-spot transformation, social impact analysis, rental aids are pronounced; however, this plan does not apply to Tarlabasi renewal as the project is almost completed.

At the regional level, the scope of urban renewal, with the KENTGES plan, is announced as 1. social justice and development, 2. social integrity, 3. local-economic development, 4. protection of historical and natural heritage, 5. risk management, and 6. disaster mitigation and sustainability. Despite the nicely put buzzwords, the following conflict with the former. In this plan, the urban renewal is handled within three axes: improving 1. the competitive capacity; 2. social development and solidarity; and 3. quality of public services. However, the strategies to fulfill the targets lack to meet the potential. The effort to integrate social assets is limited to "analysis of groups under effect of urban renewal" (p. 33). Similarly, ISTKA (2014-2023) focuses on urban image, tourism, branding and international competition, attracting foreign and local investments in urban renewal projects.

"Bunun yanı sıra kentin imajının geliştirilmesi kente ve kentlilere prestij ve özgüven kazandırmaktadır. Kentin turizm, yatırım ve iş imkanları başta olmak üzere her alandaki potansiyelinin en iyi şekilde kullanılması ve rekabet düzeyinin artırılması için kentin

*ulusal ve uluslararası ortamlarda tanıtımının etkin bir şekilde yapılması ve imajının daha da geliştirilmesi çok önemlidir. Bu anlamda hem içerde ve dışarda kentin imajının geliştirilmesine yönelik faaliyetlerde doğal, tarihi ve kültürel miras başta olmak üzere kentin özgün değerlerin etkili bir şekilde kullanılması hem de iyileştirilen **kentsel imajın ve tanıtım faaliyetlerinin sürdürülebilirliği** için kentin imajı için temel oluşturan bu değerlerin korunması gereklidir.*

In addition, **improving the city's image brings prestige and self-confidence to the city and its citizens.** In order to make the best use of **city's potential in every field**, especially **tourism, investment and business opportunities**, and to **increase the level of competition**, it is essential to **promote the city effectively in national and international environments** and **develop its image further.** In this sense, it is necessary to use the original values of the city effectively. Especially the natural, historical and cultural heritage and activities aimed at improving the city's image both inside and outside, which are the basis for the city's image, should be utilized to **sustain the improved urban image and promotional activities**" The tenth development plan of Turkey (2014-2018), (Author's translation - Emphasis added).

Vienna

Urban renewal in Vienna often aims at improving the socio-spatial capacity of the city. According to the *Viennese Housing Renovation Act*, a building older than 20 years can be renovated depending on its standard. Besides keeping the usefulness, efficiency and social compatibility of the renovation, the law provides funds for the projects. Accompanying the the act, in Vienna, a model of "soft" or "gentle" urban renewal was developed (Hofmann, 2015). This model reduces gentrification-induced displacement while complementing the numerous subsidized housing and subsidization of rents (Huber, 2016). The former is achieved by limiting maximum rents in the rehabilitated stock for ten years. Since it is a limited amount of time, one can conclude that gentrification-induced displacement might be instead postponed than canceled. Some described what is called here postponed displacement as "gentle displacement" (Weingartner et al., 2010). Even for ten years of rent control, hence, possibly residency of lower-income groups, the model focuses on sustainable renovation through the involvement of the current tenants.

The claimed intention of the program is to maintain and improve existing dwelling stock and provide affordable, high standard dwellings within a socially mixed environment (Hofmann, 2015).

Justification	To improve the socio-spatial capacity of the city
Crucial actors	City of Vienna
	Inhabitants
	local area managements, <i>Gebietsbetreuung Stadterneuerung</i>
Intention	To complement the numerous subsidized housing and subsidization of rents while reducing gentrification-induced displacement
	To maintain and improve existing dwelling stock and provide affordable, high standard dwellings within a socially mixed environment
Target	All segments of society
Areas	The individual dwellings (apartments)
	The building
	The entire neighborhood (block)

Table 7.34 Summary of Vienna *renewal* policies

Different measures and goals are defined following the level at which the renewal project is produced. The levels are 1. the individual dwellings (apartments), 2. the building, and 3. the entire neighborhood (block) (Hofmann, 2015). Renewal of the individual dwelling level is essential, are called "base renewal", and aims to maintain and modernize buildings either partially or fully inhabited. These processes do not affect the current rental agreements; top it all, the tenants can modify their dwelling by their choice. Compared to building renewal, which aims to empty the building to renew completely to create category A apartments, base renewal serves a gentler renewal without displacement in the short term.

Block renovations engage residents and building owners to renew a smaller area, and local area managements coordinate. More recent urban renewal projects involve rehabilitation and attic transformations. The claimed reasons are to adapt existing neighborhoods to new urban development models such as multi-functionality and increase available housing stock. However, the acknowledgement of rent regulation waiver of attics and the rehabilitated lofts, the latter declaration is suspected to be a secondary intention.

To ease the social connections for the projects, the city of Vienna has urban renewal offices called local area managements, *Gebietsbetreuung Stadterneuerung*. The establishments' primary aim is to involve local communities in urban renewal processes and create networks of different stakeholders. They connect the residents and public administration; apart from increasing citizen participation, their tasks include improving the quality of life in dense urban areas, providing counseling and initiating projects (Gluns, 2018).

Paris

Urban renewal discourse in France is much different than in Turkey and Austria. In the French context, the renewal rhetoric is pronounced in two distinct urban realms - as Levy-Vroelant (2007) describes - 1. to improve neighborhoods to the more significant benefit of their inhabitants through providing social mix and 2. to upgrade as a step to implement urban development policies. Overall in France, the urban renewal strategies focus on (a) wealthy neighborhoods to increase urban diversity and mobility of lower-income groups and (b) in deprived neighborhoods to upgrade the built environment and the living standards of earlier inhabitants. Particularly in Paris, urban renewal does not cause any significant demolition or reconstruction of buildings, rather improvements of the existing housing stock and space refurbishment. The lack of bulldozer renewal in the city projects allows implying the social dimension of the city policy through renewal projects (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014), although often the consequences are questionable.

Justification	To improve neighborhoods to the more
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	significant benefit of their inhabitants through providing social mix
	To upgrade as a step to implement urban development policies
Crucial actors	Municipalities
	National Agency for Urban Renewal (ANRU)
	Non-governmental agencies
Intention	To replace of the older strategic plan, with the territorial coherence plan, which includes elements of sustainability into its land-use planning goals
	To distribute of social housing to prevent ghettoization and the concentration of "excluded populations"
	To deal with the creation of urban transportation plans
Target	Lower-class inhabitants
Areas	Wealthy neighborhoods to increase urban diversity and mobility of lower-income groups
	Deprived neighborhoods to upgrade the built environment and the living standards of earlier inhabitants

Table 7.35 Summary of Paris *renewal* policies

Firstly, the wealthy areas are subject to urban renewal under the solidarity and renewal urban act (2000), which primarily mandates France's renewal actions. It aims at providing social diversity in wealthy areas by legally obliging municipalities to have social housing of 20 % of the total housing stock (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). Three main sections of the law impose (1) the replacement of the older strategic plan, with the territorial coherence plan, which includes elements of sustainability into its

land-use planning goals; (2) the distribution of social housing to prevent ghettoization and the concentration of "excluded populations"; and (3) a section dealing with the creation of urban transportation plans. Another organization, Paris Habitat, also seeks to increase the social mixing in wealthy neighborhoods by placing lower-income groups in socially mixed buildings in wealthy areas. However, some research informs that most social housing tenants from North-Eastern Paris aspire to stay in their neighborhood and are not happy with relocating to a different city (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014).

Secondly, the urban renewal activities take place in deprived neighborhoods. National Agency for Urban Renewal (ANRU) is a leading institution in reconstructing and destroying housing units and financing local urban renewal projects in those urban areas (Levy-Vroelant, 2007). It manages government and non-governmental agencies of all levels for projects, including housing, infrastructure, economic development, public facilities, education, open space, and culture (ibid.). The designated areas often consist of high unemployment rates with a higher number of households living in a unit, a higher share of unskilled workers dependent on social benefits, and a higher share of households with migration backgrounds.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Justification	To prevent squatter areas in cooperation with municipalities	To improve the socio-spatial capacity of the city	To improve neighborhoods to the more significant benefit of their inhabitants through providing social mix
	To improve construction quality		
	To mitigate earthquake damage		To upgrade as a step to implement urban
	To conserve historical		development policies

	areas		
Crucial actors	Housing Development Administration (HDA)	City of Vienna	Municipalities
	(Local) governments	Inhabitants	National Agency for Urban Renewal (ANRU)
	Corporate housing development companies	Local area managements, <i>Gebietsbetreuung</i> <i>Stadterneuerung</i>	Non-governmental agencies
Intention	To increase competitiveness	To complement the numerous subsidized housing and subsidization of rents while reducing gentrification-induced displacement	To replace of the older strategic plan, with the territorial coherence plan, which includes elements of sustainability into its land-use planning goals
	To increase livable spaces	To maintain and improve existing dwelling stock and provide affordable, high standard dwellings within a socially mixed environment	To distribute of social housing to prevent ghettoisation and the concentration of "excluded populations"
	To provide sustainable environment		To deal with the creation of urban transportation plans
Target	Upper middle class	All segments of society	Lower-class inhabitants
Areas	Shanty housing	The individual dwellings (apartments)	Wealthy neighborhoods to increase urban diversity and mobility of lower-income groups

	Areas under earthquake risk	The building	Deprived neighborhoods to upgrade the built environment and the living standards of earlier inhabitants
	Historical centers	The entire neighborhood (block)	

Table 7.36 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *renewal* policies

Public/Private investment

Istanbul

The housing sector investments account for 4% of GDP and 15-30% of fixed capital investments in Turkey (TUIK, 2020). In the *10th Development Plan (2014-2018)*, the government policies propose to reduce uneven regional distribution and provide a balanced allocation of housing investments.

The next one, the *11th Developmental Plan of Turkey (2019-2023)*, focuses on ensuring competitiveness and productivity boost in every field. The plan consists of five main axes: 1. a stable and robust economy, 2. competitive production and productivity, 3. qualified people and strong society, 4. livable cities and sustainable environment, and 5. democratization and good governance. In terms of all axes, it is aimed to realize the vision "Turkey that produces more value, shares more fairly, stronger and more prosperous". According to the plan, the construction sector is envisioned as a structure based on 1. quality-based competition, 2. qualified supply and demand, 3. human-oriented and environmentally friendly aspects, 4. high capacity and added value with its design and technological capabilities, 5. a global brand (11th Development Plan - Turkey).

The *Integrated Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan (KENTGES), Istanbul (2010-2023)* defines the long and complicated construction periods as the problem. It seeks to encourage new processes and construction technologies for effective housing production as the main action. 1/100000 environmental plan (2006) of Istanbul strives to transform the city into a center of attraction for fixed

capital investments. The strategy, however, conflicts with the rest of the idea to distribute the investment in balance.

Construction sector	Plan to increase quality-based competition
	Plan to increase qualified supply and demand
	Plan to increase human-oriented and environmentally friendly aspects
	Plan to increase high capacity and added value with its design and technological capabilities
	Plan to set a global brand
Investment/development aim and climate	To provide a stable and robust economy
	To provide competitive production and productivity
	To provide qualified people and strong society
	To provide livable cities and sustainable environment
	To provide democratization and good governance
Main actors	HDA
	Corporate companies

Table 7.37 Summary of Istanbul *public/private investment* policies

Besides the investment by the private sector, in Turkey, state-led investments are also forming the urban fabric substantially. Some endeavors work as a stand-alone mechanism, and others as public-private cooperation. For example, the Mass Housing Law numbered 2985 was enacted in 1984 to accommodate authorized housing for the urban community by creating a central government-affiliated agency to fund, prepare, enforce, and monitor mass housing construction

processes. By establishing alliances between Housing Development Administration (HDA) and the private sector, housing provision has accelerated the central government's role in urban growth (Kayasü and Yetişkul, 2014). The changes in legal and institutional instruments provide further powers and responsibilities to HDA, which has the authority to prepare plans on the land of which ownership has been transferred to HDA. Through that, all the planning, selling, and buying public land for urban land development and housing provision are HDA's responsibility. HDA can act as a private enterprise and establish new companies and partnerships among the other liabilities. With all said, HDA became a powerful and autonomous institution for legal, administrative and financial issues and gained tremendous power shaping the cities throughout the country (Kayasü and Yetişkul, 2014). However, with that power, it does not provide affordable housing to low-income groups; contrarily, it enables higher urban rent potential areas for central government or the private sector against its initial foundation purpose (Kayasü and Yetişkul, 2014).

Besides the investments in housing, the social and physical infrastructure investments also influence the fluctuations in land value. Under the settlement law numbered 5543, in the areas subject to rejuvenation to regulate density and structure, the means is collected from the land and building owners in case of need for renewal in infrastructure. Therefore the renewal and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the decayed areas are left to further deterioration through the given instructions because the owners often do not have enough means to render.

Vienna

Being in the center of immigration flows and high housing demand, accompanied by the entrepreneurial policies to strengthen Vienna as an investment location, enforce the city to deal with private and public investments in the urban realm. Since its economic awakening, politicians and Austrian banks have encouraged new rental housing through individual private investments (Aigner, 2016). In Vienna, for many decades, developers seeking profit were not the essential stakeholders in the housing market. Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic increase in return rates in the Viennese housing market since the beginning of urban growth. Subsequently, the investors are more interested in investing than before. As Aigner (2016) points out in Vienna, more residential property is built for

investors than users, both institutionally and privately. Almost all new construction is privately financed, particularly in the inner city, where land prices have risen dramatically. Nevertheless, privately financed new development and modernization are mainly targeted at higher-income households (Gluns, 2018). Nonetheless, although they are small in numbers, some mission-driven private developers actively build housing for persons with disabilities or participate in public subsidies (Gluns, 2018).

Construction sector	Plan to increase quality-based competition
	Plan to increase qualified supply and demand
	Plan to increase human-oriented and environmentally friendly aspects
	Plan to increase high RandD capacity and added value with its design and technological capabilities
	Plan to set a global brand
Investment/development aim and climate	Lack of investment alternatives
	The infrastructure for financial and investment advice
	Digital technologies and the associated new forms of coordination
	Marketing
Main actors	Investors
	Banks

Table 7.38 Summary of Vienna *public/private investment* policies

Gluns (2018) explains the informal procedure in investments: Privately funded projects are more challenging to influence developers who request a zoning change negotiated with the City of Vienna. According to her research in the City of Vienna, the negotiations often involves informal agreements. Their assent is based on the trust and track record of the developer for inclusion, i.e., construction of social infrastructure or affordable housing. Later in 2014, urban development contracts were introduced

to formalize the previously informal agreements a novelty. However, it is still legally impossible to make changes in land use regulations conditional on the conclusion of such a contract (Gluns, 2018). Despite this, the contracts have not been used very much, and informal arrangements persist.

Uniquely in Vienna, there is a provision for investment apartments housing submarket for small private investors (Aigner, 2016). The provision is for another buy-to-let with specific tax waivers. While the other more common investment apartments are subject to the small business scheme, provisional apartments concern real entrepreneur tax models. Even though the government has enacted some tax reforms unfavorable to developers, demand for newly constructed investment apartments has increased (Aigner, 2016). According to Aigner (2016), it is for several reasons, including the low-interest rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), the 'lack of investment alternatives; the infrastructure for financial and investment advice; digital technologies and the associated new forms of coordination and marketing. Public land acquisition in gentrifying areas occurs within the tension field between buying as much as possible and using public resources efficiently (Gluns, 2018). As MA18 claims, the existing building stock to accommodate new residents is insufficient; therefore, the housing constructions are focused on urban expansion areas.

Paris

In Paris, the credit expansion, consequent over-construction and over-investment, triggered a property boom (Wijburg, 2021). However, it ended with terrible losses and bankruptcies of many investors and commercial banks. Has the opportunity arisen, foreign funds infuriated into the market with the 'buying low and selling high' strategy (Wijburg, 2021). As for the early 90s' total investments in France, they were originated through foreign sources. The French tax regime of SIIC (société d'investissement immobilier cotée in French) was initiated as a strategy of the national state to regulate the property sector. It allowed domestic property companies to raise capital on a stock exchange and to consolidate their domestic market activities while using this new capital as a lever (Wijburg and Aalbers, 2017). It was introduced in 2003 to respond to the crisis and the renewed - diverse - landscape of property investment.

Many governments, including those of Austria and Turkey, use their power to introduce REITs in the housing market. Differently, according to Wijburg (article in press), France did it in a particular fashion. Because firstly, the French state allowed the REITs - under their control - to involve in developmental activities. Therefore, many French REITs originating from sizeable domestic management firms and property companies became vital urban stakeholders of various public-private partnerships (Enright, 2016; Wijburg, 2021). Like the other REITs, the French penetrated the state as essential landowners and property developers. As for that, the REITs within state control blur the borders between the state- and finance-led investment, while the state increasingly became a market actor. It mainly manifested in some state-owned REITs' shift from residential to commercial real estate (Wijburg, article in press).

Construction sector	To attract more foreign investments
Investment/development aim and climate	To overcome the property boom
	Free market climate
Main actors	Foreign funds
	Government through REITs
	Domestic property companies
	Invest in France Agency (IFA)
	Platform-based short term rentals

Table 7.39 Summary of Paris *public/private investment* policies

Additionally, because most French property companies converted their entire portfolio into REITs, the French listed real estate sector became one of the largest in Europe within only a few years (Wijburg, 2021). Aside from emphasizing the value of a foreign investment and the benefits that come with it, the French government has formed several agencies aimed at attracting more foreign investment to the country. For example, the Invest in France Agency (IFA) is one of the most important agencies that attract foreign investment to France. In order to promote foreign investment in France, this organization collaborates with different government departments. The largest market in Europe, investor-friendly policies, and a free business climate, all of these factors combine makes France an alluring investment destination.

Short-term rental options and platform-based rental options, too, substantially impact the housing market in France. As renting out for a shorter term is more profitable than the long-term rents like many other cities in Europe, in Paris, too, many residents employ it. However, APUR especially warns against the platforms turning Paris into a city-wide hotel for tourists rather than a home for its residents. Short-term rental options have been regulated since the 1960s in France under various acts, including the Code of Tourism and Urban Planning Code (Aguilera et al., 2019). Moreover, national law in 2005 requires an official declaration of functional change from residential to commercial. The municipalities facilitate the change; therefore, the control over the short-term rentals is decentralized. The Housing Department tightened restrictions on the "change of use" and "compensation" clauses beginning in 2013 and started fining non-compliant landlords through the Office for Housing Security. Contrarily at the same time, the city government did not officially place the topic on the political agenda until 2015. However, platforms in Paris were rapidly expanding their listings, and in 2016 an agreement to collect taxes was reached between the city government and the platform (Aguilera et al., 2019).

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Construction sector	Plan to increase quality-based competition	Plan to increase quality-based competition	To attract more foreign investments
	Plan to increase qualified supply and demand	Plan to increase qualified supply and demand	
	Plan to increase human-oriented and environmentally friendly aspects	Plan to increase human-oriented and environmentally friendly aspects	
	Plan to increase high	Plan to increase high	

	RandD capacity and added value with its design and technological capabilities	RandD capacity and added value with its design and technological capabilities	
	Plan to set a global brand	Plan to set a global brand	
Investment/development aim and climate	To provide a stable and robust economy	Lack of investment alternatives	To overcome the property boom
	To provide competitive production and productivity	The infrastructure for financial and investment advice	
	To provide qualified people and strong society	Digital technologies and the associated new forms of coordination	Free market climate
	To provide livable cities and sustainable environment	Marketing	
	To provide democratization and good governance	Investors	
Main actors	HDA	Banks	Foreign funds
			Government through REITs
	Corporate companies		Domestic property companies
			Invest in France Agency (IFA)

			Platform-based short term rentals
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Table 7.40 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *public/private investment* policies

7.3. Policies in-effect for social and structural changes: Istanbul, Vienna, and Paris

Social mix

Istanbul

Social mix is a neglected concept in Turkish policy discourse. However, it is replaced with other terms, such as diversity, that hint at the social mix at a national level. Social mix, along this line, is instead a pseudo-term that describes the country's diversity. Therefore, lack of social mix management at the city level is often one of the substantial causes of social conflicts, segregation or dismissal of classes. Moreover, instead of managing social mix in the inner city to improve earlier inhabitants' social status or life, the plans and programs by the city often relocate them to remote areas. Thus, these implementations only carry poverty and social problems - if not enhancing - to further neighborhoods rather than achieving integrity between different groups.

Substitution	Diversity
Strategy	N/A
Action	Relocating lower-income groups in remote areas
Focus	N/A

Table 7.41 Summary of Istanbul *social mix* policies

Vienna

Creating diversified neighborhoods has received increasing attention in Vienna since the 1990s, with increasing immigration flowing into social rental housing. The Viennese authorities tried inserting

Austrians and migrants to prevent ethnic and socio-economic segregation as much as possible following the policy of ethnic mixing, which created houses characterized by social diversification. However, the older stock of the community housing sector never became very popular among Austrian-born tenants except the very poor, the socially "problematic", or elderly. So the social mixing did not achieve a cross-mix between inhabitants where migrants with lower-income levels could live with upper-middle-class Austrians (Kohlbacher and Reeger, 2020).

To tackle issues regarding social mix, STEP25 focuses on the social and functional mix, affordable housing, and accessible infrastructure - by so, it aims to increase the "livability" in Vienna (STEP25). The plan grants the socially and functionally mixed areas to correspond to vibrant urbanity, enabling all residents to access all social and physical infrastructure equally. Therefore, similarly, the urban development plan supports the City's involvement in expanding green spaces, attractiveness and accessibility, hence a better social mix and preventing disadvantaged groups from being clustered.

Substitution	Anti-segregation
Strategy	Integrative housing programs
	Social housing
	Community housing
	Mixed-tenure type estates
Action	Expanding green areas
	Enhancing attractiveness
	Enhancing accessibility
Focus	Social mix with functional mix
	Affordable housing
	Accessible infrastructure

Table 7.42 Summary of Vienna *social mix* policies

On the other hand, despite the much praise it gets from politicians and media, the idea of social mixing is not always supported by the people of concern. The lack of response to lower-class migrant

populations' needs and participation indicates that the mixing, arguably, is more profitable than equality-driven by the local policymakers. It is evident through; the social mix is often advertised to attract open-minded, diversity-seeking middle-class into areas formerly inhabited by lower-class migrants without paying attention to earlier inhabitants' needs and desires.

Since the mid-1990s, the cooperative housing sector has attempted to adopt a policy in which the vacant dwellings are selectively distributed among migrant households to meet the goal of mixing. However, the percentage for the share of migrant tenants is not designated in housing corporations officially (Ludl, 2003). Mixed tenure type estates are established within the limits of area zoning where the tenants of limited-profit housing associations' rental units have a rent-to-buy option (Hofmann, 2015). Integrative housing programs may be defined as anti-segregation policies, but their scope is still restricted in absolute numbers; hence, their efficiency exceeds social housing and soft urban renewal in Vienna. Kohlbacher and Reeger (2020), in their hopeful suit, estimates that although the projects do not impact the rooted patterns of segregation, they are essential steps towards mixing.

Paris

In France, social mixing is based on the idea that the concentration of low-income inhabitants in one neighborhood is an obstacle to social integration (Escafré-Dublet, 2018). The social mix strategy in French policy discourse is regarded as the mirror of equality. For French policy since the late 1970s, the social mix is a reaction to policies due to which the social housing was clustered in particular areas (Górczyńska, 2016). Because during previous policies, social housing was where poverty, social isolation and substandard buildings were concentrated (Blanc, 2007). To tackle the problems, in the late 1970s, the state initiated an urban policy program to advertise disadvantageous neighborhoods to the middle classes to encourage social mixing (Blanc, 2010). Later by 1996, new legislation dictated urban policy-makers to promote social mix in their housing offers.

Substitution	Social integration
	Equality

Strategy	Urban renewal
	Social housing
Action	Encouraging social mix in new housing offerings
	Social housing in affluent neighborhoods
	Introduction of middle-class in disadvantageous neighborhoods
Focus	Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by economic crises
	Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by competitiveness between communes
	Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by housing market tensions
	To improve living condition
	To improve quality of life
	To improve diversity

Table 7.43 Summary of Paris *social mix* policies

The social mix policies aim at compensating dysfunctionalities caused by the economic crisis, competitiveness between communes and housing market tensions (Bacqué et al., 2011). Besides, their focus is to improve living conditions and quality of life and diversity in homeownership and homeownership itself (Górczyńska, 2016). French state granted the social mix goal and social housing and urban renewal; one can comprehend it through the legal framework established for the issue; Code de la construction et de l'habitation. The code requires local authorities with a population above the designated population to have 20% of all principal residences as social housing (Ponce, 2010) defined in the solidarity and urban renewal law. The same strategies followed for urban renewal also apply the social mix objective, which goes in two folds. The first one is the imposition of minimum social housing in areas with a, particularly affluent population. The second one is the introduction of middle-class families in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Escafré-Dublet, 2018).

The policy-makers conflate the equal treatment of all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin, race or religion (1958 French Constitution of the Fifth Republic, article 1). However, the social mixing in France is only considered based on socio-economic differences similar to its approach to diversity. Very promising at the first look, but as the French legislation built upon such statement that - the policies are color-blind in terms of race and ethnicity - neglecting the issues based on ethno-racial differences. The empirical studies by Lelevrier (2013) confirm that the tenure mix rather provided a mix i employment and family composition but not in ethnic diversity. Besides, conflicts have arisen between the tenants and the owners while sharing the same communal spaces (Bacqué et al., 2011; Lelévrier, 2013). Furthermore, like in Vienna, whether the policies stimulate the market competition in disadvantaged neighborhoods or not is arguable. Some scholars considered the social mix policies in France as "gentrification by stealth" (Le Galès, 2012), despite the well-written intention. For many scholars, gentrification has been accelerated since the 1990s due to these policies' contributions.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Substitution	Diversity	Anti-segregation	Social integration
			Equality
Strategy	N/A	Integrative housing programs	Urban renewal
		Social housing	
		Community housing	Social housing
		Mixed-tenure type estates	
Action	Relocating lower-income groups in remote areas	Expanding green areas	Encouraging social mix in new housing offerings
		Enhancing attractiveness	Social housing in affluent neighborhoods

		Enhancing accessibility	Introduction of middle-class in disadvantageous neighborhoods
Focus	N/A	Social mix with functional mix	Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by economic crises
			Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by competitiveness between communes
		Affordable housing	Compensating dysfunctionalities caused by housing market tensions
			To improve living condition
		Accessible infrastructure	To improve quality of life
			To improve diversity

Table 7.44 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *social mix* policies*Social cohesion/Adaptation**Istanbul*

Social cohesion provides societal harmony by reducing social conflicts such as discrimination, tension, fragmentation, violence, and hostility. Furthermore, it has a significant policy dimension. Although there is a strong connection between the two, social cohesion policies are not adequately held at the urban level in Turkey. However, related policies regard refugees and their harmonization with the host society.

Therefore, the policy documents rather use proxy terms to substitute cohesion, such as harmonization (*uyum* in Turkish) to provide a set of targets.

"Within Turkey's economic and financial capacity, the Directorate General may plan for *harmonization* activities to facilitate mutual accord between foreigners, applicants, international protection beneficiaries, and society. It aims at equipping them with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled or in their own country. For these purposes, the Directorate General may seek public institutions and agencies' suggestions and agencies, local governments, non-governmental organizations, universities, and international organizations (Article 96, LFIP)" (Author's translation).

Harmonization in the document refers to immigrants' harmony with the host society while keeping their cultural identity. In this way, the intention to respect immigrants is not shown to the rural-urban migrants and forced-migrants from South-Eastern villages. That could be, speculatively, related to immigrants lack of voting potential; therefore, their support or opposition do not matter while the rural-urban migrants and forced-migrants have voting capacity. At the same time, the harmonization reflects a caution towards cohesion as the former does not require any further cultural adaptation endeavors (Özçürümez, 2020).

Many studies for social cohesion policies in Turkey indicates the lack of policy responses from both local and central governments (Ozcurumez and Yetkin, 2014), particularly that of urban-related issues. A policy regime-oriented frame can be strengthened within an interconnected context by relying further on the importance of social connections in fostering social stability (Özçürümez and Hoxha, 2020). The socio-interactive framework can be established by looking at the dynamics of inter-group relations to develop solutions at the community level by proactive policies.

Substitute	Harmonization
Target	Refugees

Goal	Increasing social solidarity
	Increasing integration
	Increasing tolerance
Action	Social infrastructure in the city
	Social Centers in the migrant neighborhoods
	Versatile programs to ease adaptation
Focus	Adaptation to urban life
	Increase education and awareness
	Increase accessibility to urban services
	Increase their positive contribution to diversity

Table 7.45 Summary of Istanbul *social cohesion* policies

In strategic plan of Istanbul (2014-2023), the issue is held with the goal of "increasing social solidarity, integration, and tolerance". The strategy is to reduce inhabitants' differences between space and living conditions by harmonizing social and spatial structures. The actions are to increase:

1. The social infrastructures in the city
2. Social centers in the areas, particularly the ones densely inhabited by rural migrants
3. Versatile programs to eliminate the adaptation problems of newcomers to the city.

According to the action set, it is beneficial to organize multi-faceted courses and social activities to increase the education and awareness of newcomers and accelerate their adaptation to urban life. The final action to achieve the strategy is to investigate the physical plan measures to prevent social segregation and isolation in the spatial plans to be made at the city scale and to reflect the results to the planning institutions and organizations.

Another target is to take necessary measures to make sure disadvantageous groups benefit from the urban services. The target hints at the instrumentalization of migrant groups in Istanbul.

*"Göçle gelenlerin bölgeye ekonomik ve sosyal entegrasyonunun ve **Istanbul'un çok kültürlü yapısına olumlu katkı** yapmalarının sağlanması.*

Ensuring the economic and social integration of immigrants to the region and their **positive contribution to the multicultural structure of Istanbul**" strategic plan of Istanbul (2014-2023) (Author's translation - emphasis added).

One of the targets of strategic plan of Istanbul (2014-2023) is to encourage reverse migration from urban to rural. However, it conflicts with all the other policies in increasing the city's attractiveness and providing more work options by the extensive urban renewal projects in the city.

Vienna

Given the lack of policies, Vienna's social cohesion concern seems to be extinct. Although Reeger and Borsdorf (2008) imputes the lack of integration policies, suggestively it is due to the combination of inadequate policies and the host-centered view. However, in Austria and Vienna, the social welfare at work, the spatial and economic disparities are not as apparent as the other European cities of similar scale. Still, the tendency is to modify the traditional top-down urban development of a "highly elitist form of governance" (Novy et al., 2001: 142).

Substitute	N/A
Target	N/A
Goal	N/A
Action	N/A
Focus	N/A

Table 7.46 Summary of Vienna *social cohesion* policies

Regarding the current government's desire for competitiveness, social cohesion becomes more and more a second plan, if at all, as the balance between the two is like walking on a "tightrope" (Reeger and Borsdorf, 2008). Competitiveness, fundamentally, is not compatible with social cohesion as cohesion requires a bottom-up approach while the former requires top-down. Social cohesion is critical

in urban communities regarding the relationship between 'natives' and immigrants. The absence of disparities and distinctions, i.e. inequalities and inequities based on ethnicity, is necessary to achieve it.

Cohesion is not the case in Vienna concerning guest workers, their jobs, and housing opportunities. They face a variety of migration-related difficulties as foreign in the host society. Equal opportunities in the labor and housing realms for immigrants will also contribute to a higher level of identification with the city as a new 'home', a key component of social cohesion (Reeger and Borsdorf 2008).

Paris

In France, the social cohesion policies are also an extension of social mix policies. With urban policy, the state aims at promoting social cohesion and tackle segregation.

Substitute	Extension of social mix
Target	Disadvantaged population
Goal	To tackle segregation
Action	The objective of land-use is to provide social cohesion
Focus	To develop priority neighborhoods

Table 7.47 Summary of Paris *social cohesion* policies

The principle was first mentioned in *Conseil d'Etat*, supervising the local authority activities. Later, in the *loi d'orientation pour la Ville*, the objective of French land use is to achieve social cohesion to tackle segregation and ensure the right to the city. Finally, a social cohesion urban contract was established years of 2010-2013 to identify priority neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were the ones to tackle social problems first and provide social cohesion inside.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Substitute	Harmonization	N/A	Extension of social mix
Target	Refugees	N/A	Disadvantaged population
Goal	Increasing social solidarity	N/A	To tackle segregation
	Increasing integration		
	Increasing tolerance		
Action	Social infrastructure in the city	N/A	The objective of land-use is to provide social cohesion
	Social Centers in the migrant neighborhoods		
	Versatile programs to ease adaptation		
Focus	Adaptation to urban life	N/A	To develop priority neighborhoods
	Increase education and awareness		
	Increase accessibility to urban services		
	Increase their positive contribution to diversity		

Table 7.47 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *social cohesion* policies*Social housing/Affordable housing**Istanbul*

The Housing Development Administration of Turkey (HDA) builds homes on public property, most of which are leased to moderate-to-low-income families with a 15–25 % down payment. The remainder is treated as an HDA loan to be repaid in ten years. The issuance of subsidized credit for the purchase of HDA housing has been the country's main demand-side housing scheme (Türel, 2010). The housing provided by HDA is a shelter that gets closest to social housing in Turkey.

Actors	HDA
Finance	Cross-subsidy
Goal	Increase home-ownership amongst lower income groups
Target	Moderate to low income families

Table 7.48 Summary of Istanbul *social housing* policies

Almost all of the HDA's accommodation is in multi-storey flats, of which the majority is to non-homeowners, sold at far lower rates than the average market prices. The HDA also builds homes for upper-income communities in order to create funds for its cross-subsidy program. Other than HDA's subsidies, neither state authorities nor civil society organizations provide socially rented accommodation (Türel, 2014).

Vienna

Social rental housing is a decisive element in Austria's robust and stable housing market (Mundt, 2018). As the social housing rents are relatively stable and robust, it partially prevents excessive house price cycles. Besides the stability of the rent, the costs are low to allow lower-income groups to settle (ibid.). In Austria, the federal level is responsible for the housing policy's legal framework within which the non-profit housing law (*Wohnungsgemeinnützigkeitsgesetz* in German) regulates the non-profit housing providers. Although the law still applies, due to the struggles between political parties at the various levels of government, the housing policy was decentralized in 1988. By so, the provinces distribute the funds. In 2009 the local governments were authorized to spend the funds however they wish; thus, the funds became not exclusive for only housing.

The goal of subsidized housing is to create high-quality housing for broad segments of the Austrian society, not only the lowest income earners. Wagenaar and Wenninger (2020) suggests that 60% of the Viennese population in affordable rental accommodation. Moreover, about 60–70% of the newly established buildings are subsidized. Often, developers have to sign a contract to guarantee that at least 40–50% of the apartments are affordable in a subsidy form (Pamer, 2019). Housing in Austria is seen as a public service - as the market is incapable of favoring all strata of society. The federal state of Austria and Vienna finance the subsidies in a pretty complex way. The subsidies depend on the inhabitants' income levels. Typically, the lower-income groups get more subsidies than the higher income groups who get less or nothing while living in the same (often) high standard apartment building.

Actors	Non-profit developers
	(Local) government
Finance	Object subsidies, is given to construct affordable housing
	Subject subsidies, are given to inhabitants of subsidized housing and privately rented dwellings
Goal	To provide affordable quality housing
Target	All segments of Austrian society
	Especially low-income households
	Especially households with children
	Especially disabled
	Especially non EU citizens (Long term residents)

Table 7.49 Summary of Vienna *social housing* policies

There are two types of subsidies at the federal level: object and subject. Object subsidies are first given to construct affordable housing through low-interest loans. They are primarily given to non-profit developers such as cooperatives, corporations, and limited liability companies. The second one, subject subsidies, are given to inhabitants of subsidized housing and privately rented dwellings. Unlike the other provinces, in Vienna, a legal entitlement to subject subsidies for all those persons fulfilling the eligibility criteria is explicitly granted, especially for low-income households, households with children and disabled (Mundt and Amann 2009). Although only Austrian citizens were eligible for both object and subject subsidies initially, all EU and Austrian citizens and long-term residents from third countries (after five years of residence) became qualified after accessing the EU.

Against the given legal framework for social housing in Vienna, one can conclude that housing is a part of its social-oriented city planning. Since housing is considered part of social policy, the primary intent is to achieve equal treatment and opportunities for all residents regardless of their ethnic origin. There are no significant gaps between general housing policies and those enacted for disadvantaged groups such as immigrants in the legal framework (Mundt, 2018). Among the several ways the City of Vienna influences housing integration, its top priority is to provide affordable quality housing embedded in urban planning and social policy. Although the austerity policies also influence Austrian housing expenditures, the country is still leading-edge social housing compared to the other OECD countries.

Paris

The social housing policy in France, together with renewal and social mix goals, take two forms. Firstly, it focuses on the large social housing estates and secondly, on the neighborhoods inhabited primarily by affluent inhabitants. Despite the poor enforcement, the law mandates that in settlements with a population above a predefined threshold, 20% of the housing stock should be social housing in France.

Further legislation launched in 1998 called the law of orientation against exclusion underlines the vitality of the combat against exclusion. Finally, the solidarity and the urban renewal act launched in 2000 lowered the population threshold of the communes to 3500 inhabitants (Górczyńska, 2016). As the target set, agglomerations populated by more than 50000 should finalize the required

transformation in 20 years. As the quota of social housing was raised by 25% in 2013, the year to achieve the target shifted to 2025. The social housing distribution in Paris is uneven as such in 2010, approximately 50% of the social housing stock was concentrated in only 4 out of 20 districts (Górczyńska, 2016).

The housing for the lower-income groups operates in three main pillars in France. They are 1. the construction of social housing, 2. direct rental subsidies to household - similar to subject subsidies in Vienna - and 3. help lower-income owner-occupiers (Laferrere and Le Blanc, 2006) - similar to object subsidies in Vienna. The construction of social housing in France is managed by organizations called housing with moderate rent (HLM), which accommodates 17% of household in France (ibid.). There are several HLMs countrywide; however, they are subject to the same social housing legislation regarding the criteria and rent regulation (Driant and Li, 2012).

HLMs created 2.3 million affordable units between 1957 and 1977, including massive projects known as *grands ensembles*, many of which were built in socially and physically isolated suburbs of major cities, especially Paris. (Escafré-Dublet, 2018). The organizations take different forms within two main categories; the first is private, no-profit housing companies, and the second is the public housing offices. 2000 onwards, HLMs is authorized to purchase partial or whole buildings constructed by private developers. By so, the imposed percentage of social housing in real estate projects can be achieved.

Actors	HLM
	(Local) governments
Finance	the construction of social housing
	direct rental subsidies to household
	help lower-income owner-occupiers
Goal	To provide social housing 25% of all housing stock in areas with over 3500 population
Target	Low to medium-income levels
	Lowest income population

	Households that are not eligible for PLUS but cannot afford a home in the market because of the high rents
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Table 7.50 Summary of Paris *social housing* policies

Like in Vienna, where social housing targets all segments of the population, France, particularly Paris, focuses on a broad group divided into three; the first one is PLA-I (*Pret locatif aide d'integration* in French) is the housing for the lowest income population. The 30% of households in France fall in this category. The second one, PLUS (*Pret locatif a usage sociale* in French), is social housing for low to medium-income levels. Approximately two-thirds of France is eligible for the type. The third and the last one is for households that are not eligible for PLUS but cannot afford a home in the market because of the high rents.

In 2009 the income ceiling of all social housing was lowered by 10%. After the drop in income ceiling, the inhabitants of social housing were identified by poverty and vulnerability, which conflicted with the state's social mix and cohesion policy. As Driant and Li (2012) informed almost a decade ago, social housing change was also because of the decline in mobility in the social housing sector in the previous ten years. Consequently, one can conclude that social housing is more and more stigmatized in France and particularly in Paris.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Actors	HDA	Non-profit developers	HLM
		(Local) government	(Local) governments
Finance	Cross-subsidy	Object subsidies, is given to construct affordable housing	the construction of social housing
		Subject subsidies, are	direct rental subsidies to

		given to inhabitants of subsidised housing and privately rented dwellings	household help lower-income owner-occupiers
Goal	Increase home-ownership amongst lower income groups	To provide affordable quality housing	To provide social housing 25% of all housing stock in areas with over 3500 population
Target	Moderate to low income families	All segments of Austrian society	Low to medium-income levels
		Especially low-income households	
		Especially households with children	Lowest income population
		Especially disabled	
Especially non EU citizens (Long term residents)	Households that are not eligible for PLUS but cannot afford a home in the market because of the high rents		

Table 7.50 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *social housing* policies*Mixed use/Functional mix**Istanbul*

The mixed-use phenomenon as a planning strategy is the primary approach for most who defends sustainable urban development. Mixed-use as a strategy has become popular against the modernist zoning that divides the city into homogeneous regions with their function (Yılmaz-Bakır, 2020). The

approach aims at generating projects and areas, taking into account mixed-income group uses and dwellings.

Goal	Sustainable urban development
	Taking into account mixed-income groups and uses
	Sustainable housing production
Strategy	Housing and land presentation is diversified
	Housing will be produced for different income groups
	Appropriate financing options will be developed
Action	New CBDs
	Housing business balance

Table 7.51 Summary of Istanbul *mixed-used - functional use* policies

The goal in strategic plan Istanbul (2014-2023) is to make sustainable and diversified land, housing production, and presentation. The strategy to achieve so is that housing and land presentation will be diversified and supported. The following action is that housing will be produced for different income groups per the plan decisions, local texture, and architecture. In line with the master plan decisions and unique textures of the settlements, it aims to provide housing production per the solvency and expectations of different income groups, develop appropriate financing opportunities, and support and diversify them. However rational the strategy is, it does not apply to renewal areas or as a general planning strategy but remains a project-based strategy.

"Şehirlerimiz kalkınma vizyonu ile eşgüdüm içerisinde, çok merkezli, karma kullanımı destekleyen, özellikle erişilebilirliği sağlayan bir yaklaşımla planlanacak; mekânsal planlarda topoğrafyayla ahengin sağlanması ve afet riski, iklim değişikliği, coğrafi özellikler ve tarihi değerlerin gözetilmesi esas alınacaktır."

Hedef 3. Kentsel dönüşüm alanlarının mahalle kavramını koruyan, iş-konut dengesini kuran kentsel yaşamda ihtiyaç duyulan tüm fonksiyonların yer aldığı, karma fonksiyonlu tasarım yaklaşımıyla geliştirilmesi.

Our cities will be planned in coordination with the development vision, with a **multi-center approach** that **supports mixed-use**, especially **ensuring accessibility**; Spatial plans will be based on ensuring harmony with the topography and observing disaster risk, climate change, geographical features and historical values.

Target 3. Development of urban transformation areas with a mixed-function design approach that preserves the neighborhood concept establishes **the business-housing balance** that includes all the functions needed in urban life” (Strategic plan Istanbul (2014-2023)) (Author’s translation - emphasis added).

Despite its logical connotation in creating mixed environments that support affordable dwellings in an area full of establishments that target upper-income groups since the 2000s’ Turkey, it became an urban policy tool to accompany neoliberal policies (Duyguluer, 2008; Yılmaz Bakır, 2012). Along with the neoliberal policies, additional mixed-use CBDs were built in three metropolises İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara (Yılmaz-Bakır, 2020). As emphasized in the citation, these CBDs focus on the business-housing balance and no further implementation such as housing for different CBD work and economic groups.

Vienna

The City's principal goal in newly emerging areas is to achieve functionally mixed structures. According to STEP05, to provide a functional mix to an area, there should be a minimum residential floor space as defined; the initial role of the city is to provide housing, according to many policy-makers. With that, the plan suggests that the main obstacle for mixed-use is the lack of housing construction.

Goal	Functional mix in newly emerging areas
	Green space and resource accessibility

Strategy	Poly-centric and poly-nuclear structures
	Vibrant urbanity
	Accessible infrastructure to all
Action	Ground floor commerce
	Childcare, playgrounds in subsidized constructions

Table 7.52 Summary of Vienna *mixed-used - functional use* policies

In 2014, the functional mix strategy shifted, and then on, it required an active promotion of new urban areas by encouraging ground floor commerce. The encouragement was manifested through imposing minimum height for ground floors to adjust them for ground floor commerce. Additionally, STEP25 recognizes the role of local businesses to achieve mixed-use. The same plan presents a "polycentric and poly-nuclear structure" as a spatial model nominated for "vibrant urbanity". The aim is to create urban environments that combine the best aspects of central and peripheral locations in green space and resource accessibility.

Finally, to guarantee a functional mix in the existing neighborhoods, the Wohnfonds Wien and MA18 conducts a preliminary assessment for all new projects to determine if the necessary social and technical infrastructure for the growing number of inhabitants is available. If a project is to be realized with public funding, the city may also oblige childcare or playgrounds in new projects as part of the subsidy commitment.

Paris

The mixed-use and functional mix rhetoric in French policy aims to tackle segregation and ensure the right to the city by definition. Notably, in the *loi d'orientation pour de la ville*, the objective of French land use is defined as a tool to meet such ends in the urban environment. Implementations such as the mixture of residential, commercial, cultural and leisure facilities are believed to serve the right to the city for all social strata in the city.

Goal	To tackle segregation
	To ensure right to the city
Strategy	Mixture of residential, commercial, cultural and leisure facilities
Action	Mixed use buildings
	Catering Parisian lifestyle

Table 7.53 Summary of Paris *mixed-used - functional use* policies

By mixed-use French policy refers to mixed-use buildings consists of at least three different functions. However, the way the authorities handle them seems more to satisfy the housing market than the social diversity. These new developments aim to reinvigorate urban living in a way that caters for modern Parisian lifestyles. Therefore, catering is rather for the marketing "the" lifestyle than promoting an overall mix with the social mix. However, it might limit the commute time of workers and encourage a higher population to reproduce labor-power.

"These new mixed-use projects are key to developing the attractiveness of Grand Paris as it competes with regional metropolitan areas for employees and with world cities for investors. [...] The city must have a high quality of life, good infrastructure and easy access to services to attract international investment and large companies and the talent they need to succeed."

Therefore, the consideration is only for the target audience, which is upper-income group professionals, by combining working, living, and leisure to draw people who can afford back in.

Comparison

	<i>Istanbul</i>	<i>Vienna</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Goal	Sustainable urban development	Functional mix in newly emerging areas	To tackle segregation
	Taking into account	Green space and	To ensure right to the city

	mixed-income groups and uses	resource accessibility	
	Sustainable housing production		
Strategy	Housing and land presentation is diversified	Poly-centric and poly-nuclear structures	Mixture of residential, commercial, cultural and leisure facilities
	Housing will be produced for different income groups	Vibrant urbanity	
	Appropriate financing options will be developed	Accessible infrastructure to all	
Action	New CBDs	Ground floor commerce	Mixed use buildings
	Housing business balance	Childcare, playgrounds in subsidized constructions	Catering Parisian lifestyle

Table 7.54 Comparison of Istanbul - Vienna - Paris *mixed-used - functional use* policies

Key points of the chapter

This chapter illustrates the similarities, differences and patterns between the policies that ultimately mediate urban transformation, particularly, gentrification. The analyses were held in Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienna), and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris). The cases were distinct in terms of their politico-economic tendencies, yet still had some similarities.

Tenants are more protected in Vienna than the other two cities by their tenant protection policies. In both Istanbul and Paris, eviction is possible, rent regulations are not sufficient, and the allowance for short contract durations makes higher and increasing rents more possible than in Vienna, where the contract duration is a minimum of three years. *Expropriation* is a more common planning tool in Istanbul than in the other case cities. Once the (local) government permits the expropriation, it is near impossible to stop it. It is (sometimes) reportedly used to threaten inhabitants as an offer in a

negotiation; whereas in Vienna, expropriation is rarely used. In Paris, like in Vienna, local authorities hold the right to object to an expropriation. However, in Paris like in Istanbul, it is commonly used as a planning tool especially for urban renewal, land-use zoning, and public interest in easing the displacement in particular situations. The policies related to *integration and migration* in Istanbul are often designed to integrate migrants from rural areas into the 'urban life-style' as defined by the authorities. Consequently, in Istanbul, the dominant migration type is rural-urban flux (see chapter 6). The housing on the outskirts of the city is provided to rural migrants and Turkish descendants from neighboring countries and does not protect their residency in the inner-city. In Vienna, the housing rights of migrants come into effect after five years of residency. It means that the city newcomers struggle to enter, but once in the system, established residencies - migrant or otherwise - are well protected against gentrification-induced displacement. In Paris, slightly different from the other two cases, there is no particular distinction based on migration in the housing. It is primarily based on the ethnic-blindness of French politics, which refuses to recognize the ethnic background of the citizens. In terms of displacement, while creating an equal legal base for all, the attitude towards ethnicity fails to provide a fair one.

Diversity is highly commodified in all three cases. Diverse groups have access to amenities in all three cities, but they are instrumentalized, especially in policy documents, as a tool to brand the cities. Despite having significant differences in diversity policies in these cities, they fundamentally lead to a change in perception towards the subjected neighborhoods, causing more daily visitors and communal activities to be curated by the host society. The visitors and the communal activities eventually cause alienation and symbolic displacement of each cases' earlier inhabitants. Regarding *land-use and zoning* in Istanbul and Vienna, the decisions are made top-down and in Vienna, they are made transparently. In Paris, decisions are made at many different levels and are often result through inter-municipal collaborations. In Istanbul, changes are fast, bypassing necessary controls while in Vienna, changes are harder to take, leading to controlled progress in planning. The speed of changes and the lack of controls in Istanbul allows under-regulated renewal plans, which displaces many. In Vienna, the regulations and slow speed keep the urban transformations relatively more under control.

In terms of *tenure taxation*, the property taxes are higher in Istanbul than those in Paris and Vienna, which are regulated under the EU laws. Buying and selling is made near effortless in Istanbul compared to the other two, allowing further investments, especially by corporate developers. Unlike in Paris, multiple houses, value increases, or vacant dwellings are not subject to taxes in Istanbul and Vienna. Consequently, it is less expensive to own more than one house in Istanbul and Vienna, utilize simultaneous value increase, or buy-to-keep. All these possibilities increase the chance for more investments in the case neighborhoods.

Transaction costs in Istanbul encourage buying and selling activities with their low percentages more so than in the other two case cities. In Paris, the transaction costs are high, so are the rental and sale units' prices, encouraging larger-scale investors and developers. *Money lending*, besides from the banks, in Vienna is reserved to subsidies that entitle individuals to own or rent a flat easier and encourages non-profit housing companies to build more. In Istanbul, rather large scale investors and developers are encouraged by the ease of the credits, similar to Paris.

Renewal in Istanbul resonates with gentrification as it almost always promotes middle- and upper-middle-class by way of implementation. Unlike Vienna, where the state uses its resources to mediate the speculations, in Istanbul, the state encourages and promotes renewal activities by corporate companies. Renewal in Istanbul aims to increase competitiveness across districts. Consequently, the value is distributed throughout the city unevenly. In Vienna and Paris, the aim is to achieve a social and spatial mix; in Paris additionally, the aim is to implement strategic plans and land-use goals. Policies for *public-private investments* are set to increase global competitiveness in all three case cities. More than the others in Paris, the emphasis is on the affluent foreign investments. Additionally, platform-based short-term rental units are encouraged in Paris more than in Istanbul and Vienna, increasing the rent throughout the city, including the case neighborhood.

Implementation of *social mix* policies in Istanbul is negligible. The action on paper is to provide lower-income groups housing in remote areas; however, it does not serve the aim to generate a mixed population in the inner-city. Contrarily, Vienna used it as a planning strategy to prevent segregation with integrative, social, communal, and mixed-tenure housing. Similarly, in Paris, it is a set strategy;

however, the projects are sporadic, and the implementation fails to distribute them evenly throughout the city. Vienna sets up accessibility and affordability as primary goals, while Paris deals with resolving the problems in planning and housing mechanisms. *Social cohesion* is held in Istanbul with the substitute term *harmonization* and aims at increasing the compatibility of newcomers, especially, the refugees to the rest of the city. In the end, it does not help with the established neighborhoods like Tarlabasi. In Vienna, cohesion policies do not exist. Finally, in Paris, the cohesion policies are an extension of social mix, targeting lower-class populations to tackle segregation by focusing on the priority neighborhoods. Land use is utilized to achieve the goal.

Social housing in Istanbul is not well established compared to Vienna. In Vienna, the social housing is well spread to the city relatively evenly, providing social mix and frontier to speculative developments. Although it is better established in Paris than in Istanbul locationally, it fails to provide a mix in the inner-city. *Mixed used/functional mix* policies in Istanbul aim at mixing various income groups by diversifying the housing, land, and financial options. However, the policy is not yet implemented. In Vienna, the policy aims at the newly emerging areas by dealing with their accessibility and affordability. In the new developments like Sonnwendviertel (the newly developed area by Kretaviertel) with the successful implementation, it provides amenities for mixed-income groups. Finally, in Paris, the policy implementation stays at the building level, not necessarily serving the aim on the neighborhood scale.

Chapter 8. Gentrification as a three dimensional field

This chapter demonstrates different standpoints the urban transformations take within the gentrification framework. The differences, similarities, and patterns of gentrification cannot be compared directly. However, their characteristics within the three-dimensional descriptive field of gentrification can be. The chapter includes two cases, Tarlabasi and Kretaviertel; however, the methodology used is applicable across cases of utmost distinct contexts. By comparing these two cases, the chapter aims at understanding singular characteristics of gentrification in Tarlabasi and Kretaviertel. The chapter illustrates the diversity of the phenomenon in different cases and develops a tool for investigating others.

Tarlabasi (Istanbul) and Kretaviertel (Vienna) are typical examples of gentrifying neighborhoods, but considering the differentials, they experience the process essentially differently. The analysis proceeds according to the fuzzy differentials, i.e., (1) displacement, (2) reinvestment in fixed capital, and (3) social and structural changes, before synthesizing the results to point out the particular characteristics of gentrification within the cube. Against the backdrop, the remainder of the chapter focuses first on gentrification characteristics in Tarlabasi in respect to the fuzzy differentials of the term; secondly, Kretaviertel follows the same analysis held in Tarlabasi. Finally, the part indicating the chapter's key points wraps the differences, similarities, and patterns of gentrification processes in these two neighborhoods.

8.1. Tarlabasi

The building quality in Tarlabasi indicates how and where the price increases. Since the earlier inhabitants cannot keep up with the increasing prices, it potentially signifies the varying types of displacement in the area. The quality of buildings varies on a wide range, and their respective financial values are dramatically different (see Figure 8.1) and are observable through the buildings facade by a pedestrian. Following the path, the analysis was mainly based on the author's observations made as a pedestrian. Besides the manual mapping during the fieldwork, real estate announcements and short term renting websites such as AirBnb supported the base data. The observations and the data obtained online constitutes a map that denotes the housing typologies mainly based on façade quality through

the appearance and the price. For the façade quality, (a) paint, (b) heat isolation, (c) windows (i.e. double glass or single glass wooden), and (d) the overall maintenance are taken into consideration.




Figure 8.1 The building quality map of Tarlabasi

The quality map (Figure 8.1) indicates that the buildings are renovated or well maintained in the areas closer to Taksim Square, where the small capacity luxurious hotels and pedestrianization project is located in the East. The other area where the quality of the buildings is high is closer to the development project called taksim360 in the South-West of the neighborhood. Large scale private and corporate investors mainly invest in maintenance and renovations. Investors first buy the properties from the previous owners for their current prices and often renovate to sell. The displacement that follows is varied throughout the neighborhood: the closer the area is to the development project, it is forced, exclusionary, and economic displacement, and in inner areas, it is rather displacement pressure, symbolic displacement and physical displacement. Closer to Taksim square, experienced displacement is a mixture of dominantly symbolic displacement and displacement pressure. Social and structural changes also show a variety, nevertheless relatively more heterogeneous throughout the unit. Against

the background, the following section is dedicated to revealing the fuzzy differentials of gentrification in Tarlabasi in greater detail.

Reinvestment in the fixed capital

The investment in the area varies on a broad spectrum from tear down for which the existing built environment is demolished for a new-built regeneration to public investments through indirect policy actions such as zoning and assignment of development areas. The data is used to map the reinvestment in the area is the field mapping, AirBnB, hotel booking and real estate websites. The field mapping is based on observation of the façade, notably the isolation, paint, and windows. Figure 8.2 displays examples of buildings defined by "0". Both examples are run-down with cracks on the walls, and they are both abandoned for a long time, observable through the wildly grown plants inside the buildings. They are both without windows and near-demolished.



Figure 8.2 (a) (b) Tarlabasi building - Quality "0" (Photographed by the author)

In figure 8.3, the buildings assigned as "1" are demonstrated. The building is run-down; however, the structure is sound. It has windows, although old, wooden framed, and single glass. The paint has worn out, and there is no coat for heat isolation. Overall quality is deficient in occupying via the residents.



Figure 8.3 Tarlabasi building - Quality "1" (Photographed by the author)

The buildings indicated by the number "2" are sound structures with run-down paints and without heat isolation, as shown in figure 8.4. The windows are old, wooden framed and single glassed. The overall quality is higher than the quality assigned as "1" buildings to inhabit residents.



Figure 8.4 (a) (b) Tarlabasi building - (Quality "2" (source: [http://: www.sahibinden.com](http://www.sahibinden.com) (real estate website))

Number "3" indicates the buildings with sound structures, double and single glassed windows. The mixture of the window types indicates the separately held flat renovations as presented in figure 8.5. It might ultimately mean there are flats of different qualities and prices within the building. The façade is often painted but not recently. There is no overall heat isolation made for the building. However, the overall quality is adequate to inhabit residents.



Figure 8.5 (a) (b) Tarlabasi building - Quality "3" (Author's photography)

Airbnb is well spread in the neighborhood, as shown in figure 8.6, confirming that the quality of individual buildings does not matter but the rising significance of the area and the location. While some AirBnBs buildings are run-down, the flats are renovated and luxurious. The fact supports the conclusion that especially quality "3" types of buildings are mixed in flat values and prices.



Figure 8.6 Airbnb in Tarlabasi

The buildings indicated with the number "4" are exemplified in figure 8.7. The pictures display the type consists of recently (within <5 years) renovated buildings, sound structures, renewed façades and heat isolation. The overall quality is high for residency, potentially from higher rental and sale prices.



Figure 8.7 (a) (b) Tarlabasi building - Quality "4" (Author's photography)

Finally, the quality type "5" indicates the new buildings built upon the demolished old structures. The type has a sound structure; they are newly built with heat isolation. The windows are double glassed.



Figure 8.8 (a) (b) Tarlabasi building - Quality "5" (Author's photography)

Figure 8.9 shows the different reinvestment types from tear-downs to public investments of indirect policy actions type. As shown in figure 8.10, the renewals and renovations radiate primarily from the development areas. The development area itself is an example of a tear-down and locally-driven urban renewal type of reinvestment.




Figure 8.9 Approximate representation of reinvestment type distribution in Tarlabasi

The quality "0" type of buildings that are close by the development areas are likely to be developed first. They have the highest rent gap because their current value is the lowest, despite their proximity to land with higher ground value. Private sector blockbusting refers to large companies or individuals that buy several buildings in the area independent from the state and renovate to sell. The colors indicate the areas in figure 8.9, and the number "3" refers to it. As seen in figure 8.10, they are the areas:

1. Close to the development project Taksim360

2. Area concentrated with small capacity luxurious hotels
3. The central axis of the neighborhood is called Turan Caddesi




Figure 8.10 Reinvestment directions radiating from already renewed sources in Tarlabasi

The refurbishment of existing structures refers to the smaller individual investors who buy a building/flat to renovate to sell or rent. It is indicated by the respective color and the number "4" in figure 8.10 and is widely spread throughout the under-immediate-transformation areas. Direct policy activities as a means of reinvestment are not observed in the neighborhood. However, indirect policy actions indicated by the respective color covers the whole neighborhood. The neighborhood is assigned as a renewal area by the law numbered 5366 (Law on the Protection of Deteriorated Historic and Cultural Heritage through Renewal and Re-use), allowing the transformation of conserved buildings. The law points out an overall transformation in the area given the historical appeal, proximity to the center, lower current value, and the extensive credits lent for the renewal of historical buildings.




Figure 8.11 Percentages for areal distribution of reinvestment types in Tarlabasi

After an approximate mapping - using soft-wares QGIS and Affinity Designer - throughout the study unit (see figure 8.11), the conclusion is that the unit's <25% is reinvested through tear-downs and locally-driven urban renewal. The unit's >25% is subject to private sector blockbusting, and >50% of the unit is subject to the refurbishment of the existing structures. Direct public activities are not observed in the unit as a means of reinvestment; however, 100% of the unit is triggered to transform by indirect policy activities as a means of reinvestment in the fixed capital of the study unit.

Displacement

Displacement varies on a spectrum from physical to symbolic, intertwined with the conditions of reinvestment in the area. Whether the reinvestment is made through corporate companies or states within a small or larger scale, the displacement is affected accordingly. Data used to map displacement in the neighborhood is interviews with former and current inhabitants, local authorities (mukhtars), and the project reports by the (local) state and the corporate companies. The interviews and the observations show that the displacement types are distributed in the unit differently.

Many buildings have a historical value and are protected against unwarranted renovations concerning physical displacement. However, with special permission from the state, the Taksim360 project was realized. Therefore, while the state-led projects can be realized in the unit, the individuals cannot legally renew, renovate, or maintain their properties. For example, a property owner who left his building explains as such:

I cannot live in my own property what about displacement. They [state] demolished all the buildings there [in the project area] when it is about mine they hang on the conservation. I cannot put even a nail in my home what about the paint. It has a bay window, yes but it doesn't help anything. **It will fall on me if I live in**, I cannot renovate it, I cannot sell it for its value. Let it be drug addicts', I will stay in rental. **47, M, Diyarbakir, Kurdish, Owner, Istanbul** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

On the same line, the tenants within the run-down apartments tend to leave because of a lack of improvements in the protected ones and the ones bought for investment but without further amendments (i.e. renovation, improvements, etcetera). Because some blockbusting investors in the area buy several buildings and wait to renovate, some rent the flats for lower prices to prevent unwanted squatting. However, there is no maintenance in the basic needs such as heating and water; some renters leave despite the low rental prices. An interviewee who was displaced because of a similar process tells:

A man with goodwill. He rented us the flat thankfully but... **The house will fall on us**. I have 5 kids. How can I do without water? OK, we sleep in one room all together and heated but. No water to cook, no water to wash. Also I was scared. Kids run around the house shakes. No need for excitement. I said **I will pay a little more in another apartment**, it doesn't work. **38, F, Canakkale, Roma, Tenant, Istanbul** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

As for the *economic displacement* in the unit, the existing structures' rent increases rarely. Because the property owners often renovate their properties overall. However, it is not uncommon that as some

property owners prepare their apartments for sale, they increase the rent to afford some reparations or make extra money before getting rid of the tenants.

"My landlord, inglorious man, he saw that it's a good bargain. He **increased the rent**. He wasn't able to kick me out. **He will increase the rent, then I will leave (his plan was)**. Nobody controls. **I left the flat**. Take it, I said, sell it for a tinker's curse. **52, M, Suruç, Kurdish, tenant, Istanbul** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Economic displacement in the unit is used to increase the rent to displace rather than earn more. Because once the renovations are completed due to the dramatic increase in the rent, the former inhabitants cannot stay in their rental dwellings.

The information for the *forced displacement* was derived from interviewees of former and current inhabitants. The current inhabitants often report witnessing the displacement of both the owners and the tenants. While the tenants are displaced right away without compensation for their losses, the owners' consent to leave their properties is forcefully taken. Reportedly, the owners are threatened by the investors as they claim to take over their properties through expropriation and other unpronounced and probably illegal procedures like a property owner in the neighborhood states:

"[For the (Taksim360) project], they (the public-private cooperation) **forcefully displaced the tenants**. The home we occupy is ours, they shouldn't be able to displace us. But they make us work for it **through court** and **their dirty games**. Now I don't want to talk about them, walls have ears. We understood that **they will kick us out**. We don't know when. They keep on talking about **expropriation**. Look, they will take what I bought with my own money. As if it didn't happen before. Many more had to leave to different places. **In the end it doesn't matter whether tenant or owner.**" **25, M, Diyarbakır, Kurdish, Owner, Istanbul** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

The areas reinvested through tear-down, and locally-driven urban renewals in the neighborhood are more prone to forced displacement. Because they are made by private corporate companies but

backed by the state, they are subject to the renewal by law numbered 5366. Therefore, threatening the owners for expropriation is a recurring theme for the displacement in the area like a property owner explains:

"It [forced displacement] happened, too. [People gave up their properties] unwillingly. State forced. [State suggested that] the owners should give your property otherwise the **state will take it anyway by expropriation**. But they [state] did not come to us yet. So I don't intend to give my property to developers unless the state forces. **44, M Batman, Kurdish, Owner** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

To conclude, forced displacement mainly happens in the areas where the state and public sector is in an intense collaboration, like in the Taksim360 project.

What cannot be found in the booklet of Taksim360 report is the *exclusionary displacement* the negotiations induce. Because according to the project claim, negotiation suggested an exchange of the former inhabitant's properties with the new flats. However, the new flats had a larger ground than the former apartments. The difference was asked as money that most former inhabitants could not afford. As they did not choose the offered option, they were given apartments in the outskirts of Istanbul instead of the inner city, where most are employed.

"An apartment there is for **\$2 million**. Do you have that much money? (his voice is getting hoarse). **My flat is 90 m²** or let's say 100. **They give me 150 m²**. They expect me to **pay for the 50 m²**. How can I pay such a money to buy. **The 50 m² of the new flat's worth multiples mine worth**. They will bring such a system that the poor can get it [a new flat] and the rich, too, but that system does not exist. In this case, the poor get poorer, and the rich get more affluent [than before]. Of course, it pisses me off. **They send me away to live. I work here. Now I will have to spent to commute** too. So why should it be for the rich and not me? Why can they get it? If they gave you a chance today, wouldn't you buy it? However, we only look from afar. **47, M, Mardin, Kurdish, tenant, Istanbul** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

On the other hand, *displacement pressure* is more embedded in suspicion towards the authorities in Turkey. It is very much internalized as a norm in Tarlabasi; most inhabitants believe "to be displaced anyhow and whenever," so it is more challenging to detect through in-depth interviews and observations. Although it is hard to detect, it reoccurs in the interviews and often coexists with other displacement types of non-physical kinds. Often it grows when neighbors are leaving, and the displacement pressure grows as people think it will be soon their turn to leave.

"They all started to go away for almost five or six years. **My neighbors gradually began to disperse, to leave, not many left.** For example, I have only one neighbor next door, that's all. Of course I know. **It is not so long before I leave too.** 55, F, Zonguldak, Turkish, tenant, Istanbul (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Inhabitants of the inner unit expect their displacement after seeing the renovations from the southeast (Taksim square) and southwest (Taksim360 project) coming towards their streets. Consequently, the expansion of renovations raises pressure on inhabitants for their prospective displacement.

"Around this area, people do not approve the renovations. There is no interest because **we are not permanent here**, so, nobody values it. 45, M, Muş, Kurdish, tenant, Istanbul (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

The knowledge of prospective displacement triggers anxiety amongst the inhabitants primarily because of their place-based social ties built over an extended period.

"I have friends here, my old friends, I told you, there are tradesmen there, they keep me. It [the old friendships] stayed here. After that destruction, we can't stay here even if we all wanted to. **We can't live here even if we wanted to.** 55, F, Zonguldak, Turkish, tenant, Istanbul (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation)..

"This place will be a beautiful place in 10 years, **poor people like us will disappear**. Tarlabasi is the most beautiful place in Istanbul. I would be sorry sister, do I want to go? I swear on my daughter, I don't want to go, but this is something different. We are forced to. **40, M, Roman, Çanakkale, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Displacement pressure is often accompanied by *symbolic displacement*. However, symbolic displacement refers to the inhabitants feeling alienated in their neighborhoods primarily because of the disappeared social ties.

"I mean, then nobody stays here either. **There is no one left from the past**. Well, by then, ten years later, I will be sixty-sixty-five years old. If I'm not sixty-five, I'll be sixty-three, sixty-four. So what should I do here after that time? **Should I spend my old age here with thieves or with people I don't know? I move on and settle in another place**. **55, M, Kastamonu, Turkish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Besides, the displacement of the long time established social ties leave them alone in the area, resulting in them feeling disconnected.

"**You stay here alone**, then you say, "Oh, let me go too." "Let me settle somewhere else." you say. Then you try to keep up with the other place. So you say, "Oh, let me get old here, get old here, die with my neighbors, retire, die..." You think so, but you look, **you disperse and you leave**. **57, F, Mardin, Turkish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Besides the diminishing social ties, the area is also filled with tourists and daily visitors, leading to certain alienation as a form of symbolic displacement.

"Now, one of them came and took a picture, I said, come and taste a piece of rice. He said no and left. Just taste it and you will realize how good it is. They just took a picture. **Is here a museum or my home?** That's it. **57, M, Diyarbakir, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).




Figure 8.12 Approximate representation of displacement type distribution in Tarlabasi

To sum up, displacement is felt differently concerning several variables such as tenure, proximity to reinvestment areas of different types, and the strength of established social ties. Given the areal distribution of displacement types (see Figure 8.12) the percentages, schematically are as follows (see figure 8.13). Physical and economic displacements are observed in the <35% of the unit. Often physical displacement is observed in the middle parts of the study unit where the buildings are mainly not renovated or maintained. Both tenants and owners are affected by the physical displacement; however, while the tenants are dependent on the landowners, the property owner is often displaced because of the building and renovation permissions. Economic displacement often affects the tenants in the areas of the blockbusting and refurbishment projects are concentrated.




Figure 8.13 Percentages for areal distribution of displacement types in Tarlabasi

Forced displacement is observed in <25% of the study unit, where the state-backed the corporate development projects. Although in different ways, both the tenants and the property owners are subject to forced displacement. While the tenants are directly displaced, the owners are often given unjust choices, such as the same square meter worth of their land in the newly built area in return for paying the difference. In that sense, it becomes a mixture of forced and exclusionary displacement. Exclusionary displacement is observed in the 60% of the study unit overlapping with other types of displacement. Displacement pressure is observed in the >30% of the study unit regardless of the tenure type. It occurs in the middle to northern parts of the study unit in which many stay put inhabitants live and feel the pressure together. The symbolic displacement co-exists with many other types and is observed in the >75% of the study unit. It mostly appears in the areas close to any type of reinvestment.

Social and structural changes

The neighborhood's social and structural character has changed tremendously in the last decades since the projects started. It has no longer the unique identity it had before as a vibrant migrant neighborhood but rather a transition neighborhood characterized by constructions. Based on

observations, some parts are entirely transformed, and some are not completed. Like the spectrum of displacement and reinvestment, the social and structural changes in the unit is also unevenly distributed. The distribution depends on several more variables; however, this dissertation only focuses on the proximity to investments, tenure type of the inhabitants in the area and the retail characteristics of the area. The social and structural changes spectrum starts from complete transformation and varies till the other end: the social mix.

In Tarlabasi, Istanbul, *complete transformation* is yet to evolve but is feared. There are affluent oriented retail (see figure 8.14) and the ones that serve the former inhabitant base. Inhabitants expect the complete transformation, but it is a slow process given the unfinished renewal and external effects such as economic crisis, pandemic, and recurring terror attacks in central Istanbul, close by Tarlabasi. An interviewee reports his projection about the area by

"We will leave here unwillingly. **Until the last one leaves it will go on.** I swear, it is the way.

25, M, Mus, Turkish, Tarlabasi (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Given that socio-economic and social class differences are high between newcomers, temporary visitors, and former inhabitants, the complete transformation is *perceived* inevitable. Another interviewee summarizes the process as such:

"**We are a family on our own, there are for themselves.** So these [luxury] flats, the hotels are useless. The newly constructed buildings are luxurious. Both the residing families and the landowners are luxurious. There is one thing. These buildings are being constructed, take a picture if you want. As a resident I do not accept. Using my logic and mind, it is really sinful. They merge three buildings to construct one. **Okay, I accept that we are peasants. We are hanging our laundry between buildings.** I know it is strange. But as you would understand **these places will change hand completely in 15 years.** They will build all hotels. The rent gap does not finish here. They give your money, buy your place, put a hotel. **Change hands completely. What will happen here then? There will be luxury flats, luxury buildings.**

65, M, Kastamonu, Turkish, Tarlabasi (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

The development project taksim360 is a complete tear-down, and it is the only area in the study unit to observe the complete transformation. However, closer to the project areas, fear of complete transformation accompanies displacement pressure and symbolic displacement among stay-put inhabitants. Further, from taksim360, the fear for complete transformation disperses but does not diminish completely.

As concerning *social exclusion*, symbolic borders in Istanbul is the most robust within the three case cities owing to the high difference between the newer and older inhabitants socio-economic levels. For example, some new retail in the area targets a particular socio-economic group different from the earlier inhabitants (see figure 8.14 (b)).



Figure 8.14 (a) AirBnB flat in the neighborhood (b) A middle/upper-middle class bakery (c) A vegan hostel in the neighborhood - Pictures from Author's archives

Earlier inhabitants witnessed the change in the retail structure of the neighborhood, and it hints at a prospective exclusion. An inhabitant in the neighborhood expresses his feelings towards a new shop. On his neighbors' behalf, the feeling hints at a social exclusion the new retails bring. He says:

"Güllüoğlu came to next to school on the street, it has been 4 5 years. We got curious, what is this man doing here? **What business Güllüoğlu does in Tarlabasi? It is not really rational.** Today, the simplest deserts are 60-70 TL per person. Think about it, nobody gives 50-60 TL to desert. We woke to situation later, we heard of Adnan Polat (a large scale investor - developer). Then alright, **here is not ours any more.** At least around this shop. **45, M, Batman, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation)

The earlier inhabitants think the new affluent shops are not for them and that the older shops are not for the new inhabitants. The exclusion, thus, has a flip-side. While the newcomers' facilities fundamentally exclude the earlier inhabitants, the newcomers exclude themselves from the retail that serves earlier inhabitants. However, the newcomers can use the older shops, but they prefer not to. Thus, it is a self-exclusion that creates symbolic boundaries between the two groups, socially and spatially. In other words, because the affluent newcomers can use these shops, but they prefer not to, it is rather creating boundaries than exclusion. It brings the discussion to the *symbolic boundaries* as an interviewee explains its impact on former retail.

"As a tradesman, of course, I have a loss. All the people were coming here when the place (demolished areas) was packed. Now, if we ask them (displaced people), they would say that it (the renewal) hurt them too. They bought it from the people for 5 kuruş and will sell it to wealthy people for trillions. It has been dreadful for me if you ask. I was selling 1000 loaves of bread then. **What do the newcomers do with this shop?** They would go to a supermarket or so. **They wouldn't buy anything in here.** **46, M, Mardin, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Therefore, the former retail faces economic loss although the neighborhood population does not change or the overall socio-economics of the neighborhood improves. Subsequently, a necessity to change, downsize or close the business occurs. The symbolic boundaries are intensified with

consumer preferences, and they manifest in space as the overall transformations slowly proceed.

"I lived in the down (part of the neighborhood) too, twenty-five years ago it was beautiful down there. It is a ten-year issue, stuffing them (the newcomer affluent people - long term or tourist) here. Of course, my dear, it used to be beautiful. **In the past, we knew all our neighbors** - all the way down to Dolapdere Street. **Now here is these group's, there is those. They don't go to market, I don't go to their expensive places.** We remained in this tiny area. Every place cannot be yours. Oh, how would it be? **54, F, Mardin, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

'Let's say this is the Roma people district; there is the place of the easterners, the rich people are in an other part, the apart hotel are separate. There are borders. They occur spontaneously. Do you understand, the cultures are different? **40, M, Çanakkale, Roma, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

Mutual avoidance is embedded in social exclusion; however, it is more of an active other-ing rather than fundamentally recognizing the other while keeping the distance. When the other-ing does not involve mutual avoidance but clashes, it generates *social tension*, especially in the fields where different groups can interact. The interaction here does not refer only to solid interactions (i.e. verbal, physical, etcetera) but also the abstract ones (i.e. biases, expectations, etcetera). Thus the biases and expectations between groups are very substantial in Istanbul in creating social tension. An earlier inhabitant exemplifies a suchlike bias about and expectation from the newcomers as such:

"The new buildings cannot accommodate people like us. Humans are humans, but I think they are different from each other. You would ask why. Educated and uneducated people together... **cannot be side by side.** In fact, **they (affluent newcomers) don't like us. They are already trying to get rid of us.** I mean, it's because of them (affluent newcomers), I know. **If they were standing by and be in conversation with us it wouldn't be like this.**

There was no such thing before. **47, M, Diyarbakır, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation).

The changes elaborate, relations are reconfigured, and the retail composition is transformed the stay-put residents find themselves in a much different place than they used to know. Closely accompanying symbolic displacement, stay-put inhabitants in a changing area often experience also *social entrapment*. While in Tarlabasi, the displacement type rather leans to the physical side, social entrapment is limited to middle-north areas where more stay-put inhabitants are.

The emphasis on us and them is over-pronounced in the area as a form of social tectonics. Social tectonics includes two or more groups minding their businesses while being aware of their differences. That said, us and them rhetoric without an active exclusion or conflict is a substantial indicator of social tectonics. In Tarlabasi, people talk of the "other" group often, with a strong emphasis on 'us' and 'them'.

"There is no communication with **them** (affluent newcomers). You cannot build (communication) with **them**. How do you communicate with **them**? **Their** communication is very different; **they are** different people, people in their world. **They have** nothing to do with the neighboring. How can you be neighbors with **them**? No neighboring with **them**. **55, F, Mardin, Kurdish, Tarlabasi** (Interview 2017, Tarlabasi, Author's translation)

Although us and them rhetoric does not generate an immediate conflict, the newer and older inhabitants do not engage in everyday conversation, do not interact, and avoid each other. In this case, the *social mix* that is often the ultimate goal (or excuse) of the development projects or renewal efforts in the lower class neighborhoods is not achieved. It is not independent of socio-economic differences between the newer and older groups or between the spatial quality of older and newer structures in the neighborhood. The difference in both aspects is rather humongous and visible because of which the social mix is near impossible to reach in the Tarlabasi case.




Figure 8.15 Approximate representation of social and structural changes type distribution in Tarlabasi

After approximately localizing different social and structural changes (see figure 8.15), the conclusion is that the <math><25\%</math> of the study unit is wholly transformed. The complete transformation is primarily observed in the development project, and the forced displacement is dominant. Social exclusion is the study unit's primary type of social and structural change by >55%. It is chiefly observed in areas where the investment types are dominantly tear-down and blockbusting.




Figure 8.16 Percentages for areal distribution of displacement types in Tarlabasi

Social tension is observed by the >25% and is densely observed in the study unit's mid-east where the hotels and the run-down buildings coexist and the conjoint streets of the development project taksim360 (see figure 8.16). Social entrapment is observed in the <15% of the study unit where any type of investment is less physical displacement. Social tectonics observed >30% of the study unit, located mostly where the newer and older inhabitants share space around the hotel areas. Social mix, contrarily, is not observed in the area.

8.2. Kretaviertel

Due to the soft urban renewal strategy backed by law in Vienna, the urban transformation proceeds relatively smoother in terms of changes it triggers. The soft urban renewal strategies includes a series of factors such as extensive subsidized housing options and tenant protections. The soft urban renewal manifests in the study unit, Kretaviertel, as building structures in similar qualities. The buildings do not differ as much as the variation in Tarlabasi, in terms of quality. There are on the other hand brown field renovations (i.e. Brotfabrik, Kempelenpark, etcetera), and a large development project in which a new-build neighborhood arises from scratch. While the neighborhood is situated near-by the main train station which was renewed in the last decade, also the structure is turning slowly to a office/hotel/residence area from a 'out-of-gurtel' migrant neighborhood.

Short-term residence options, whether through AirBnb or hotels, emerge in the area. Additionally, an international-based private university is built in the center of the study unit. With the increased number of international students in the area, retail, as well as the market structure, is, although slowly, is under the influence. However, social housing covers most of the units, and it works as a frontier for unwanted effects of urban transformation. Against the background, the area is under change, according to the Vienna context, but subtle compared to the other study unit. The data was collected manually during field trips, real estate and AirBnb websites and www.wien.at for the subsidized housing. The following sections are dedicated to revealing the fuzzy differentials of gentrification in greater detail.

Reinvestment in the fixed capital

Similar to Tarlabasi, İstanbul, in Kretaviertel too it is possible to observe rent rises and potential displacement looking at the quality of the buildings. However, the quality overall of the unit is distributed relatively evenly due to the numerous social housing in the area (see Figure 8.17). The higher quality buildings are often the newly built ones (i.e. Sonnwendviertel) and the brownfield renovation projects (i.e. BrotFabrik, KempelenPark). As they are surrounded by social housing, urban transformation is unlikely to spread uncontrollably through the renovation projects.




Figure 8.17 The building quality map of Kretaviertel

The housing quality in the area does not vary dramatically. The quality is defined through similar variables used in Tarlabasi (a) paint/heat isolation of the façade, (b) windows (double or single glass) wooden frame of newer material, (c) overall look. Quality "0" do not exist in the area. Quality "1" is defined by single glass wooden framed windows, old paint and no heat isolation. Figure 8.18 exemplifies the type. However, it should be noted that half a year after this picture was made (2019) by the author, the building was demolished to build a new apartment building.



Figure 8.18 Kretaviertel building - Quality "1" (Taken from Google Earth)

The quality "2" refers to the buildings with mixed windows, which hints at the differentiated quality within the building (see figure 8.19). The paint is often worn-out, and the heat isolation is not applied. Overall quality is sound however is not polished.



Figure 8.19 Kretaviertel building - Quality "2" (Taken from Google Earth)

Quality "3" refers to the buildings with decent paint and heat isolation (see figure 8.20). The overall façade is polished, and the windows are double glass, contemporary framed. Most of the older subsidized buildings fall into the quality "3" types, covering most of the study units.





Figure 8.20 (a) (b) Kretaviertel building - Quality "3" (Taken from Google Earth)

The quality "4" refers to the recently renovated building in the area with sound structures and polished overall façades (see figure 8.21). In addition, the windows are double, and the frames are energy efficient and isolated.



Figure 8.21 Kretaviertel building - Quality "4" (Taken from Google Earth)

The quality "5" refers to the newly built structures (see Figure 8.22). The overall façade is highly polished, and the energy efficiency of the buildings are of a high standard. The windows are double glass and newly framed. The overall look is highly polished.



Figure 8.22 (a) (b) Kretaviertel building - Quality "5" Taken from Google Earth

Reinvestment in Kretaviertel, too, varies on the spectrum from tear-down to indirect policy actions in the form of public investment. In Kretaviertel, different from in Tarlabasi, social housing blocks functions like frontiers controlling the transformation (see Figure 8.23).




Figure 8.23 Social/subsidised housing blocks in Kretaviertel

On the other hand, the leftover areas are under the pressure of the transformation through investments of different types, radiating from the renovation projects and blocked by the social housing (see figure 8.24).




Figure 8.24 Reinvestment directions radiating from already renewed sources in Kretaviertel

The social housing built before 1945 is fully state supported; however, the new ones are subsidized between state, non-profit housing organizations and other financial organizations like credit banks and insurance companies. Therefore the newer ones potentially might fall into categorization of investments. However, the study unit does not cover such establishments.




Figure 8.25 Approximate representation of reinvestment type distribution in Kretaviertel

As seen in Figure 8.25, there are three brownfield renovation projects: BrotFabrik, KempelenPark and the Central European university. BrotFabrik is an old bread factory turned into a cultural hub with art, community areas, and loft houses. The surroundings are social housing to the establishment. KempelenPark has a similar story to BrotFabrik; however, it is neighbors with the private housing that potentially will start independent renovation efforts to monetize the potential value rise. The third radiant is the Central European University, which is also covered mainly with the social housing around; nevertheless, the conjoint buildings are transformed through block-busting projects that happen slightly differently in Vienna. The block renovation in Vienna proceeds as owners in a block collectively renovate their buildings financed by subsidized credits.




Figure 8.26 Percentages for areal distribution of reinvestment types in Kretaviertel

In the study unit is teardowns and locally-driven urban renewal is negligible. Private sector blockbusting always coexists in collaboration with the state. Nevertheless, it covers the 4%< of the study unit. The form of investment; refurbishment of existing structures are in the study unit by 26%<, including the brownfield renovations. Direct activities as a public investment such as transportation or parks in the unit arrived after the area's risen reputation with the extensive development project and other investments. The areal coverage is only 1%>, but the effect is substantial. Considering the extensive rent regulations, subsidized housing, etcetera, it is very effective for avoiding gentrification.

Displacement

Displacement in Kretaviertel is often not physical; hence, it is difficult to detect. However, the interviews and observations reveal certain types, particularly the non-physical ones. Compared to Tarlabasi, the displacement in Kretaviertel is more evenly distributed throughout the unit.

The information for the *forced displacement* in Vienna is not possible to retrieve through qualitative data. Therefore, the results on this type of displacement are only limited to anecdotal knowledge, whatever the interviewees explain about the others, given the forced displacement occurred by the neighbors' complaints. Thus, gentrification-induced forced displacement was not detected through the qualitative data.

Given the well-established subsidies and rent regulations in overall Vienna, including Kretaviertel, *economic displacement* is rare to encounter. However, the increase in the rent prices in the area hints that it is not an impossible outcome the inhabitants might face.

"It's hard to find, the only problem in Vienna lately is probably rent. The rent is constantly increasing. Even the one-room rent is now close to 450-550. People don't have that. You know how much I paid, if I could afford it... There is a problem with rent. **33, F, Urfa, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

10th district (Favoriten) in Vienna is known to have a high percentage of lower standard housing. Therefore some of the lower-class inhabitants left their flats due to lack of maintenance by the homeowners.

"The house is a wrack, there is nothing and it's definitely exploitation. But if they make a complaint, they get a lot of money. The government certainly does not allow such an exploitation. These upfront monies cannot be claimed because there is nothing in the house. There is no such thing as furniture. There was not even water, they built the infrastructure inside themselves. He may complain, but I don't know if he'll dare. Because they have a timed contract, they tied it for 1-2 years, I don't know. Indefinite contracts are now almost impossible in Vienna. I know it's at most 5 years. They do not want to give it up, because there is a constantly changing rental system. So the owners can upgrade. That's what we see on the news. That's why they (the tenants) don't want to (complain). **36, F, Yozgat, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

However, the inhabitants tend to stay regardless of the standard of the housing due to their affordability. The extension of staying-put goes in two directions. The first one is *exclusionary displacement*. While the inhabitants desire to stay in the area because of their supportive ties and habits, they do not find a higher standard but similarly affordable housing.

Secondly, *displacement pressure* is felt amongst the inhabitants of privately owned apartments without the rent regulations. However, different than in Tarlabasi, the pressure in Kretaviertel manifests itself collectively. For example, the inhabitants declare that if a particular friend or family leaves, they will have to leave too. The issue repeatedly appears in the interviews and indicates that the pressure is not created because of the direct market structure but the impact generated within the community.

My sister is here, mother is here. Here is like Turkey to me. Believe me when I leave I feel like in a different country/ I leave my kids (to my mother or sister), I go shopping. If they leave the neighborhood I cannot stay. Now my sister's flat is very bad, the toilet is outside. It is not livable. If she goes somewhere... I think she will have to. So I want her to leave but also to stay. Because if she leaves i will have to leave too. And the rents are so expensive everywhere. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

The symbolic displacement is widespread amongst the interviewees regardless of their tenant status in the neighborhood. The changing housing structure and the new establishments around bring about the neighborhood that was a haven for most is taken over. Once the migrant- is rebranded as a vibrant space. Subsequently, inhabitants do not feel they belong to the narrative brought by the new structures, as an interviewee complains.

Here became weird. We used to chill in the park on ourselves now there are all kinds of people. For example they come with a dog. There is a dog park why don't they go there. I don't like dogs, do I have to? There were no such things. [...] My mother do not speak German. I mean only enough to live her life here. She used to understand everything, of course all was Turkish. Even if they were not Turkish people were tolerant. Now they all ask what she says. She doesn't want to go out any more. She lived here for 30 years. **24, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

Language is one of the main reasons to be feeling symbolically displaced amongst the migrant communities, while the changing faces and environment discourage some from learning. However, the changes are not perceived the same way by the community members. While many decide to keep their

distance and become more introverted in their communities than before the structural changes, contrarily, some receive the changes with openness. The ones not taking the changes with ease feel more and more symbolically displaced while the others keep up with the new neighborhood. So that, symbolic displacement is not felt similarly by the inhabitants from the same community. In other words, symbolic displacement is very much tight to the inhabitant's reactions and involvement to the novelties and environment brought by the urban transformation. An interviewee that involved in new communal activities explain the situation as follows:

"We learned enough German by ourselves. We went to Mamaland Deucht with many children. 11. We went in Vienna. But I did not attend any other courses such as driving a car or something. I did not go to any course from Monday to Friday. At our job, it was either Tuesday, Thursday, or Monday, Thursday. We went 2 days a week for 2 hours, where there are kindergartens. We also came to the course with frau mikes made by ankerbrot here. It was beautiful and efficient. At least they taught us about Vienna, the Vienna environment. We went on excursions. Haus des mers (other corrects: haus des meeres) hah sea, well we went to the place where the aquarium was, you know, we went to the places where we wouldn't go with our spouses and children together with them. We are very pleased. I love Vienna.**42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).




Figure 8.27 Approximate representation of displacement type distribution in Tarlabasi

To sum up, displacement is felt differently concerning several variables such as tenure, proximity to reinvestment areas of different types, and the strength of established social ties. Given the areal distribution of displacement types (see Figure 8.27) the percentages, schematically are as follows (see figure 8.28). Due to the efficient rent controls and well spread social housing physical, economic, and forced displacements are not observed in the unit. However, the non-physical types are observed. Exclusionary displacement is mostly seen in the brownfield renovations: private sector block busting projects and in some refurbishment of existing structures. The singular rehabilitation projects on the south-east edge of the study unit triggers a displacement pressure while the inhabitants of social housing blocks often experience a symbolic displacement.




Figure 8.28 Percentages for areal distribution of displacement types in Kretaviertel

In the area displacement of non-physical types are not observed. Exclusionary displacement is observed in the 16% of the study unit often in the refurbished structures and private blockbusting projects. Displacement pressure is observed in the 8.5% of the study unit regardless of the tenure type. It occurs in the east of the study unit in which many stay put inhabitants live and feel the pressure together while their surrounding is renovated. The symbolic displacement is observed in the 31.5% of the study unit. It mostly appears amongst the social housing inhabitants who are safe and secure for the physical displacement types but experience alienation while the neighborhood slowly changes.

Social and structural change

Like in the other case area, in Kretaviertel, the spectrum of social and structural changes starts from complete transformation and extends to the social mix on the other end. Community activities are the main driver of the social and structural changes in Kretaviertel, different from the Tarlabasi case. On the one hand, the housing market is relatively more stable in the neighborhood due to the robust policy against evictions and rent price fluctuations, besides the adequate social housing compared to the other case. On the other hand, however, the community activities in the neighborhood change fast, pointing out a social change through soft artifacts such as interactions and social ties.

Owing to policy interventions (see chapter 7) in Vienna, *complete transformation* is not observed in any part of the study unit. *Social exclusion*, on the other hand, is much more complex. While it is not apparent, newly built areas that also provide community activities seem to fall short in being inclusive. While the activities attract more a younger artistic crowd than the inhabitants, it triggers tension. Because the earlier inhabitants receive and reflect on the social changes in the area differently. A group approves and participates in the new activities; another group does not appreciate or participate. The community activities that ideally target the inhabitants, then, in reality, mainly attracts the newcomers and a small portion of earlier inhabitants. The rest is self-excluded from those particular places.

The same story extends to the *social tension* between the groups (earlier- and newcomers). Between-group tension often is triggered by the different ways of using the public space. Many migrants in the neighborhood prefer to use the parks and gardens as a gathering space in the evening. Especially during Ramadan, they go out after the Iftar (dinner after all day of fasting), especially in the summertime, as commonly practiced in many Muslim countries. An earlier inhabitant complains:

“‘No sound after 8 pm,’ they say. Now in summer, it (migrants' noise) is till 10. However, the Austrians don't want it. There are many problems with that. At 8, they (the local administration) come and lock the parks. Okay, people are right; there are bedridden ones. Austrians, some workers, go to bed early, but it is also a problem for those with children or more active ones -

outside in the parks - like Turks. Mainly the Austrians express a lot. It doesn't resolve easily. Let's say they are close-minded. No matter how much you say, what you do. Austrians are more customary. Here at 8, if the park is over, it will be over, got it? If the sound is to be cut off at 10 o'clock, it must be cut off. Those newcomers inevitably speak about a lot. These are the most common problems at the moment. **28, F, Samsun, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

The interaction of complaint-sort extends to biases. Ultimately the bias feeds the tension between the groups. An interviewee explains it as such:

"These Austrians, those who moved here, seem to be looking at us Turks, like, I don't know. As if belittling. Or they look like they're despising. Some people have such points of view, even if they are living in the same building. Some are very good; some don't even say hello. **28, F, Samsun, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

In-group tension is also very substantial in the neighborhood after the developments.

"Moderator: I was wondering about the thing, you know, someone came and said something on Friday, Sevda, someone else said something to those who prepared this meal.

G: Yes, it's like you're licking ass it. We heard...

Moderator: I was wondering about her; who said that?

M: Whoever said that is nonsense.

N: Yes, it was nonsense... She said that we only talked that much that day; you were doing this. The ladies said she was talking, she said...

T: Here are the people talking in the park.

N: Yes, the people talking in the park... What was it? We were just licking them.

S: What did she mean by "**them**"?

N: Anker.

T: To the Austrians.

Moderator: So what happened then?

N: What will happen? She will look at us again. Where else will you find a home? Will another flat make a **home**? Get out. Is it easy? She can't go and find either a cheap apartment or "**home**". We can't go. We devolve on **us. 42, 42, 43, F, Nigde, Yozgat, Tokat, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

The tension In Kretaviertel does not go beyond the personal opinions based on bias and misreadings. However, minding one's own business, in other words, *social tectonics*, is very substantial.

'neighbors, my neighbors in the building I lived in, are now people of all languages. There are Bulgarians, Turks, and Austrians... That's why I can't communicate with almost anyone. You can't knock on everybody's door, you can't invite everybody to your house, you can't enter everybody's house easily, it's not like in Turkey. Since it used to be like a small Turkish town here, you could meet immediately, you were free to act more cordially, so when you talk right away, the relations are different. I could not feel comfortable and go to their door immediately. You should meet in front of the door just, you should talk, then you will gain certain confidence to easily go to their door. That's it... 33, f, *Urfa, Turkish 42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna* (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

Admittedly and decisively, people do not mix. The main reason for that is the language. When immigrants lived among themselves, they did not need the host's language. It becomes an obstacle to extending social interactions, whereas the newcomers are often German speakers.

"They don't mix that much. In general, for example, people sit among themselves in parks, Turks among themselves, most Austrians do not even go out in parks most of the time, I can say, it is like that... I know, for example, two (Turks and Austrians) chat standing up, then they go to their groups. So it's not like we sit all together. Because some of them don't know German. 52, F, **Nigde, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

As a result, people do have a knowledge about each other's existence but no more than that.

"You know almost all of them, if not all, you know, when you come down, when you do something in the building when you go to the park with the kids, you do something, huh, this was living here, she comes and goes, she comes to this park all the time. You know from there. Otherwise, there is no greeting, nothing, nothing sincere. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

Unlike Tarlabasi, *social entrapment* in Vienna is a vital subject. The most common answer of the interviewees regarding the social and structural changes in the neighborhood point out to feeling trapped. Most commonly, inhabitants from a particular migrant group feel trapped in their community that lives in the neighborhood. Because the group, migrants individuals often receive support is also a source of social control and judgement. On the one hand, they prefer the area because there are rental flats with attractive prices because of the substandard housing; most find substandard, cheaper flats through their communal connections. However, on the other hand, the changing environment and the weakening social ties trigger a will to leave the area. Additionally, the rents rise, ones the contract is renewed. So they stay in their substandard flats out of necessity. So, not being able to leave is the social entrapment many inhabitants experiences.

"Private buildings, one of the old buildings of Austria, even our toilet is outside. But our rent is very affordable, we pay 280 euros for a 75m² house. At that time, it was convenient because I had no job, and only my husband was working. So it was suitable. But we stayed because our house was large and we could manage. But it is getting harder to live here. We have a kid now. We have to stay. No other option for now. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

"Of course, the rent will rocket up. Our flat is in category D. There is no elevator. I don't need it as it is on the 1st floor, but the toilet is outside. Going outside is difficult, especially for children. Apart from that, we made the heaters ourselves. Since the category is low, the rent has to remain at a certain standard. He can't raise it even if he wanted to. My landlady, the woman

who gave me the main house, passed away. She was staying in the same building herself. There is an indefinite contract. There is an amount determined by the state according to the square meter. Because it is category D., but we heard they gave the empty flats in the building, but they rented them for a high price. Now we hear it. If they can sell these houses for such a high price, we will not find anything if we go out. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

"The house is a wrack, there is nothing, and it's definitely exploitation. But if we make a complaint, we get a lot of money. The government certainly does not allow such a thing. These upfront monies cannot be claimed because there is nothing in the house. There is no such thing as furniture. There was not even water; we took the water in ourselves. We may complain, but we don't dare. Because we have a limited contract, they tied it for 1-2 years, I don't know. Indefinite contracts are now almost impossible in Vienna. I know it's at most 5 years. We do not want to give because there is a constantly changing rental system. So they can upgrade. That's what we see on the news. That's why we don't want to. They give a maximum of 5 years. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

"I'm glad because rent is something that comes very quickly. Renters know. Too fast... a disloyal thing. 280 euros hardly affects us. Because my husband works, there is a salary that comes to me because of the children. Since I worked before, I also receive unemployment benefits, which also has an income. I can say that 280 euros do not affect us at all. I mean, after a while, even if the toilet is outside... when you see 600-700 euro renters... of course, it's hard to live here, and as it (the neighborhood) changes. But rent is the bigger challenge. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

"I am currently paying 600 euros for my rental house. After 2010, there was a rent increase, and now the rent will be between 750-800 euros when I leave my flat. Now I live in a 90 square meter house, if I go to another 60 or 70 square meters, I will still live there for 600-700. Let me be clear, we cannot move from our place for him. My next-door neighbor moved, we

were paying the same rent, the person who came pay 750 (Euros) 3 years 4 years ago, think about it, how much it is now. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

Although social entrapment is substantial in the area, it indicates a large community of stay-put inhabitants. To a certain degree, the *social mix* is observable in the area differently than in Tarlabasi. Because no group is the minority of the neighborhood, it is relatively equal, and the economy-wise living standards between the earlier and new residents are not too different. The struggle is less than that of Tarlabasi, so does the tension and tectonics, so it is possible to mix partially between the groups.

"For example, my eldest daughter wrote hadiths on papers and distributed them beautifully, with our Profit (Mohammed) words, that Islam and Muslims are good. We did not see any (bad) reaction from anyone. We are trying to do such things sometime. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

The inhabitant tells the story of her daughter handing out religious messages to their (mostly newcomer) neighbors. In return, the family does not get any adverse reaction of a sort. It points out a particular mix where they do not exclude, clash, or follow *per se* but accept a gesture from a different culture. The other inhabitant verbalizes her likings towards the newcomers for their friendliness.

"As foreigners came or their (Austrians) children got older, they started to go out of Vienna, and that's the rest. Some are very good. The new ones are even better. I'm on good terms with all but a few people, so I love most. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

Some newcomers actively try to overcome the language barrier and help with the older inhabitant's language learning, even their kids' school work.

'We learned enough German by ourselves. We went to Mamaland Deucht with the children. But I did not attend any other courses such as driving a car or something. I did not go to any class from Monday to Friday. We also came to the course with Frau Mikes made by Ankerbrot here. It was beautiful and efficient. At least they taught us about Vienna, the Vienna environment. We went on excursions. We went to the places where we wouldn't go with our spouses and children. We are very pleased. I love 10th Vienna. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).

"Mr: We can be thrown off like that because people here are helping us because we don't give up because we comply with all deadlines.

N: And Frau Mikes gives after school help (*Nachhilfe*) to my daughter twice a week, to both my daughter and the Mevlide's daughter, and free of charge, to the children, downstairs in the hobby room on the first floor. She made a class there with pens and papers...

T: Anyone who wants can go, but no one goes.

N: Everyone can go.

M: An hour is typically given at 15 euros (in private). I don't know why more people do not participate. **42, F, Kirsehir, Turkish, tenant, Vienna** (Interview 2019, Kretaviertel, Author's translation).




Figure 8.29 Approximate representation of social and structural changes type distribution in Kretaviertel

As shown in Figure 8.29, nowhere in the study area, complete transformation is not observed (percentages shown in Figure 8.30). However, at parts, although intersected with other types of social and structural change social tension was observed. Social exclusion, >7% of the study unit, on the other hand, is exclusive to the brown field renovation projects, AnkerBrotFabrik and Siemens, although these areas also involve other type of social and structural changes, even social mix. Social tension is spread rather sporadically, everywhere, so it is not indicated in the map, thusly, assigned 0%; however, it does not mean it does not exist in the study unit. All study area experience social tectonics, where people mind their own business. Especially the inhabitants of social housing especially the ones closer to the more affluent investment projects experience social entrapment by the >%25 of the study unit. Social tectonics, coexist with other type of social and structural changes is observed 100% of the neighborhood. Social mix is fairly observed in the west part of the study unit where two brownfield renovation projects and social housing come together. That said, the gentrification-induced social and structural changes can spread differently and coexist on the same parts of the neighborhood.




Figure 8.30 Percentages for areal distribution of displacement types in Kretaviertel

Key points of the chapter

Commonly, in both neighborhoods, the three differentials are spread unevenly, concerning the units' proximity to the nearby renewal/renovation projects and amenities, distribution of tenure classifications, and the strength of established social ties. In the end, within the gentrification framework, they take different forms (see figure 8.31).




Figure 8.31 (a) Three dimensional gentrification framework (base) (b) Schematic representation of Tarlabasi case in three dimensional gentrification framework (c) Schematic representation of Kretaviertel case in three dimensional gentrification framework

Reinvestment in fixed capital is spread unevenly throughout a gentrifying neighborhood, determined by its diverse policies. The more the state allows speculative investment, the more the urban transformation resonates as gentrification. In Tarlabasi, the private-public collaborations in investment and development lead to a relatively higher level of change in the built environment. In Kretaviertel, unlike Tarlabasi, the state often works as a moneylender while providing subsidies in many investment

projects. In these investments, the higher the rent gap, i.e. the difference between the buildings' quality and spatial and locational advantages, the higher the chance of corporate investments.

Additionally, in Tarlabasi, there is a higher difference between buildings' qualities. While there are ruins, there are also highly luxurious buildings. Kretaviertel's spatial quality is relatively more balanced. As a result, spatial qualities in Tarlabasi produce more profitable areas to invest and develop on than in Kretaviertel. The investments radiate out from strategic points in the neighborhoods. In Tarlabasi, the renewal project, hotel area, Taksim Square, and the main street (Turan Caddesi) are the points that have high in-ground value. Their immediate surroundings also gain a high potential value, and subsequently become the first places likely to be developed. In Kretaviertel, redevelopments radiate from the brownfield renovation projects, the hotel area, and Sonnwendviertel. However, differently in Kretaviertel, social housing restrains further (large-scale) developments.

Displacement is directly related to the policies in both how they are intended and how they are implemented. First and foremost, the rent regulations will likely prevent inhabitants from being displaced. However, depending on the control and implementation of the policy, the level of protection might change. In Tarlabasi, the regulations are close to none in practice. For direct types of displacement, there is (almost) always a loophole ending in dislocation of the earlier inhabitants. In Kretaviertel, rent regulations are among the most vital frontiers of displacement, social housing is another. But unlike Vienna, in Istanbul, the subsidized housing is not well established.

Consequently, due to their social housing differences, gentrification-induced displacement is better mitigated in Kretaviertel than in Tarlabasi. Public-private (state-market) collaboration in Tarlabasi generates more violent types of displacements than that of state's or market's singular actions. As the market built towards gaining a surplus, the state lifted legal constraints to proceed with projects socially and legally (because most of Tarlabasi is a conservation area - see chapter 7). Contrarily, the inhabitants' improvements are strictly regulated because of the heritage status of (most) the buildings in the neighborhood. While the maintenance is reserved to corporate developers earlier in the process, owner-occupiers leave their houses through physical displacement. In Kretaviertel, the same problem of maintenance affects the earlier tenants, but there is no requirement by law to improve property

conditions. As a result, most owners keep their apartments as they are because they cannot increase the rents during the tenancy of earlier inhabitants.

The non-physical types of displacement are highly tied to socio-cultural and -economic differences between the earlier and newer compositions. The new social compositions extend from the new inhabitants to the daily visitors of the neighborhoods, i.e. tourists, residents of the short-term rental units, art and culture audiences, etcetera. The new brand of the neighborhood shapes the new composition. In Tarlabasi, the socio-economic difference between the earlier and new inhabitants is relatively high. The earlier inhabitants feel alienated because of their differences more than their counterparts in Kretaviertel. However, in Kretaviertel, the socio-cultural difference between the earlier and new inhabitants is enough reason for the former to feel alienated. Language is one of the more significant issues in mixing two groups in Kretaviertel. Nevertheless, some dwelling units are still lower quality and cheap in both neighborhoods. The inhabitants stay-put while symbolically displacing as the area changes, family and friends dislocate, the retail composition focuses more on the newer population, and the new communal activities by the host society promote the newer crowd.

Similar to the previous two differentials, social and structural changes spread unevenly in the affected neighborhoods. The further the units are from any source of investment, the more pushed people feel in their area that is not yet developed. These areas of no mix are likely to develop a more notable "us" and "them" rhetoric than those closer to the development areas. Moreover, the bigger the block of renewal projects (made by one company) in the neighborhood, the closer social and structural changes will be to complete transformation on the spectrum. For example, In Tarlabasi, Taksim360 project is a public-private collaboration, and only one company conducts the construction. The project's plan is homogeneous, so it does not allow a diverse crowd to move in. The newer (prospective) residents are affluent, from higher income levels. Contrarily, the construction of Sonnwendviertel (the renewal project by Kretaviertel) is held by many different developers, including the state and non-profit housing associations. It allows a diverse population to move into the area.

Social and structural changes intertwine with reinvestment and directly influence displacement, precisely the non-physical types. The difference between the socio-economic and -cultural status of

earlier and newer inhabitants is a determining factor in the neighborhood's social change. When the reinvestment is severe (the quality of older and the newer structure is utmost distinct), the socio-economic difference between the inhabitants is higher. In Tarlabasi, the social mix is less likely to be achieved even though the earlier inhabitants remain. Without a functional mix and retail targeting various groups, the social mix is likely to fail. A group tends to be excluded, or the symbolic boundaries strengthen; the fundamental cultural differences between the groups are decisive factors in the social tension or tectonics. In Tarlabasi, ethnicity, political opinions, religion, language and employment are vital elements, while in Kretaviertel, origins, religion, lifestyle, and language are crucial. In the same vein, biases and perceptions are also a reason that prevents people from mixing. Turkish people's bias on Austrian and Kurdish and vice versa is another factor regardless of immediate policies preventing the mix. The communities in the two neighborhoods are closely knit, and in this type of community, they are more likely to complain about social control. For example, in Kretaviertel, the community is very close; the tension builds from external stimuli while inhabitants do not have a chance to move out to other neighborhoods (because they cannot afford or refuse to be far from the needed social ties) but stay. They are more likely to feel entrapped than other communities with weaker ties.

Conclusion

Gentrification is a type of urban transformation that unevenly influences the neighborhoods where the process is observed. The primary focus of this research has been on the phenomenon's progress - before and during - in three case areas with an aim to better understand the nuances of gentrification's interplay with the neighborhoods' social composition through a comprehensive comparative study. The focus neighborhoods located in Istanbul, Vienna, and Paris, are specifically those subject to urban transformations and contain a relatively high density of Turkish/Kurdish inhabitants. The comparison is made to understand (1) the impact of/on immigrants especially through outsiders' perceptions (see Chapter 6) and (2) the impact of policies on urban transformation, particularly the gentrification-like processes (see Chapter 7). The research ultimately revealed the differences, similarities, and patterns in (3) how gentrification spreads in a particular area and is observed in various cases (see Chapter 8). On that ground, a new methodological framework was developed and used with the hope that it can and will be utilized in further research around the globe.

The methodology (see Chapter 2) to interrogate the interplay between gentrification and the neighborhoods' composition involved demographic statistics regarding the social composition and the changes of the areas; interviews for understanding the outsider perspectives; and archive analysis to understand the changes in media discourse about the areas throughout the transformation. In addition, policy analysis was carried out to compare the differences, similarities, and patterns as the effect of (local) states on the case areas. To examine the type of gentrification, this study presents in-depth interviews for representative opinions, field mapping to understand the distribution of the changes, image analysis to see the differences between before and throughout the transformations, and additional observations to support the interview and other mixed data.

By distilling the findings from three case studies, it can be reasonably concluded that none of the changes caused by gentrification are distributed homogeneously throughout a neighborhood. Instead, some people and physical space experience the process differently than others, and there are uneven opportunities created in the neighborhood, with each level having different struggles. This dissertation

interprets that the process classifies as gentrification when the same neighborhood is influenced by the three intertwining (fuzzy) differentials (see Chapter 5) although spread unevenly. In that sense, the transformation is (almost) never complete. Hence the view presented in this dissertation is that it does not have to be complete in order to call or observe the process as gentrification. This finding is in contrast with Ruth Glass's earliest definition of the term in 1964 which suggested that the process goes on until a complete transformation is reached.

Gentrification is a departure, not a destination in research. The indicators will be spread irregularly in the physical space and profoundly distinct in different cases. In other words, gentrification is a chaotic term, like Damaris Rose announced in 1984. All that said, the term gentrification is useful as an umbrella. The umbrella is presented as a three-dimensional framework in this dissertation (see Chapter 5). The position of cases within fuzzy differentials is ultimately an accurate way to interrogate and compare various characteristics of gentrification. Measurement of contextual categories allows for the placement of particular cases on the fuzzy differential axes. Given the generic definition used in this work (see Chapter 1) and the significant contextual differences, not the cases but their positions within the frame can be compared directly. As the three (fuzzy differential) axes cumulatively determine the position of the individual process, this approach can ultimately reveal the degree and the order of gentrification via cases that are interrogated as unique entities (see key points of Chapter 8). Alternatively stated, this dissertation found that gentrification is an overarching and nonlinear framework. It is not a linear process despite having stages that develop differently in terms of speed and character. For example, the people moving into the area are not the same throughout the proceeding gentrification. The different temporal stages and spatial units facilitate different interests while the transformation goes on, as in the cases in Tarlabasi (Istanbul) Kretaviertel (Vienna).

The findings show that the social composition influences the (potential) gentrifier's perception and desire: and the perception of the (potential) newcomer stimulates initiatives and desires of investors, developers, and prospective residents about the area. That said, the social composition of the area constitutes a vital aspect for the production of urban transformation as gentrification. In the first stages, the intensity and the character of gentrification are highly tied to the typology of the newcomers and consequently tied to the social composition of the neighborhood. Similarly, the perception is influenced

by the media coverage of the area, portraying the earlier inhabitants negatively or positively. Intrinsically, the media plays a vital role in outsiders' perception of a migrant neighborhood. However, during and after urban transformation, the perception of the (im)migrant neighborhoods changes regardless of the stay-put residents. Once the outset of gentrification is established, the media's publicity about the transforming neighborhood develops further and announces the novelties in it to attract further investors, developers, residents, or visitors to fill up the capacity and dim down the stigmatization of the neighborhood. Recall how Tarlabasi started to appear in housing investment news after the Taksim360 was established (Chapter 6).

If the change of the perception is drastic, i.e., developing from no-go to vibrant or diverse area, as in the case of Tarlabasi, Kretaviertel, and Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, the transformation of the neighborhood inclines to be gentrification. The more aggressive the perception is manipulated, the more aggressive the transformation in the neighborhood is. For example, as presented in Chapter 6, in Turkey, the national news about Tarlabasi (Istanbul) starts with the criminality in the neighborhood. During this period, only a small group of outsiders show interest in the area regarding their desire to move in. As the construction of the development project, Taksim360 begins, the area is presented with more positive notes, such as the art galleries or cultural projects taking place in the neighborhood. The same applies to Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris); however, because the switch was a decade earlier than in Tarlabasi, the news now presents the neighborhood positively as a "hip" area. In Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, the news reports about the neighborhood in the late 1980s were mainly about undocumented sex workers and the migrants in the area. From the 1990s on, despite the continuation of similar social composition, the neighborhood is presented with its rich history and art only. Considering Kretaviertel's (Vienna) softer transformation, the news has not changed drastically, yet there is a slight increase in news about art and culture events happening in the neighborhood. In short, the manipulation of perception has an intertwined relationship with the gentrification process in which the social composition of the area is typically instrumentalized.

The policies trigger significant differences across cases regarding how gentrification develops and proceeds. The (local) state policies directly relate to the gentrification processes, as they regulate urban transformation in terms of investment types, displacement mitigation, and the social and structural

order of the neighborhood. However, the direct effect of a singular policy is rather complex to recognize because the combination of many policies in different categories together facilitates gentrification. Overall, the politico-economic tendencies of the state matter; if the investments are freely under control of free-market mechanisms, gentrification tends to be more on the corporate end of the fuzzy differentials axes. Similarly, if the policies lean towards neoliberal strategies, gentrification is more aggressive and more dispersed throughout the neighborhood (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, the urban transformation process might be a softer version of gentrification if the investments are regulated by the (local) states and their policies. Socially-oriented policies will prevent the urban transformation from showing as many characteristics that resonate as gentrification. For example, social housing is a crucial frontier against gentrification in Kretaviertel, Vienna (see Chapter 8). Because Vienna has a more socially oriented administration than in Istanbul and Paris, the non-profit housing developers are encouraged to build more through credits and fiscal allowances (see Chapter 7). So, the newly-built areas like Sonnwendviertel and their surroundings like Kretaviertel tend to be more mixed socially and functionally.

In summary, this work informs us about the fluidity of terminology and how the complexity of a term like gentrification can be utilized in order to analyze the various factors that define the main characteristics of three different cities and their transforming neighborhoods. This dissertation highlights the factors that are similar in the three case studies, but also the different ways in which social perception and policies crucially shape the way in which gentrification proceeds. At the city level, housing policies, tenant protection, housing taxation, housing finance options, and social policies are fundamental. At the neighborhood level on the other hand, social factors like the population mix, "us" and "them" rhetoric, and social ties are among the main factors to affect gentrification. Although gentrification is inevitably putting pressure on local residents, in an emotional and physical sense, this thesis shows that the ways in which cities regulate and monitor urban transformation moving forward will make a crucial impact on the lives in the neighborhood.

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Dilruba Erkan

**Quand la transformation urbaine devient
gentrification :**
politiques et perceptions dans les quartiers
d'(im)migrants dans Istanbul, Vienne et Paris

*

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La gentrification, un concept chaotique

Les changements urbains contemporains sont principalement motivés par la migration et l'accumulation de capital. Parallèlement, la transformation urbaine se concentre généralement sur la promotion des classes moyennes, tout en étant (souvent) caractérisée par la gentrification, qui, en tant que processus, est liée aux circuits mondiaux de transferts de politiques urbaines. De nombreuses publications, des numéros spéciaux, des livres dans différentes langues et des cas ont été et sont écrits sur la gentrification, et beaucoup d'autres sont à venir. La raison en est que la gentrification est un phénomène mondial qui touche des millions de ménages. Il n'y a pas seulement une grande quantité de littérature sur le sujet, mais il y a aussi une grande quantité de gentrification en tant que phénomène qui se produit. Toutefois, le terme a été inventé, plus tard que le phénomène, en 1964 par Ruth Glass pour décrire le déplacement de la classe ouvrière par les noblesses (gentries) dans le centre-ville de Londres, en raison de la modernisation des maisons victoriennes. Dans le sens le plus générique, les habitants de la classe inférieure ont été remplacés par ceux de la classe moyenne en raison des changements du marché du logement (Glass, 1964). Le phénomène est donc une traduction agressive des relations capitalistes dans l'espace, car les villes sont en perpétuelle mutation, conjointement à l'effort de les maintenir à jour pour être un acteur stratégique dans la compétition mondiale (Harvey, 1987). En tant que l'un des processus spécifiques générés par la concurrence mondiale, la gentrification est une « colonisation de l'espace urbain par le capital » (Davidson, 2007 : 493). Afin d'établir un cadre pour la cohérence théorique, cette thèse propose une définition de travail qui est « très générale mais inclusive » pour tous les contextes comme un terme générique, comme il a été défini par Eric Clark (2005). Il suggère que

La gentrification est un processus impliquant un changement dans la population des utilisateurs de l'espace urbain, de sorte que les nouveaux utilisateurs ont un statut socio-économique plus élevé que les utilisateurs précédents, ainsi qu'un changement associé dans l'espace bâti par le réinvestissement dans le capital fixe (p. 262).

Étant donné les limites très générales et larges de cette définition, elle sert plutôt de cadre qui pourrait être articulé en trois catégories [flous] dans lesquels travailler : (1) le réinvestissement dans le capital fixe, (2) les changements sociaux et structurels et (3) le déplacement. Ces catégories sur-généralisés définissent un cadre de cohérence théorique permettant d'étudier les unités de voisinage particulières faisant l'objet de la discussion. Néanmoins, l'interrogation pratique des catégories flous peut à elle seule confirmer que de nombreux changements urbains relèvent de la gentrification, même si les méthodes pour les mesurer varient en fonction des cas particuliers. Par exemple, la première catégorie, le réinvestissement en capital fixe, varie sur l'axe de la rénovation par les propriétaires individuels au changement par les entreprises de construction. La deuxième catégorie, les changements sociaux et structurels, varie sur l'axe de la mixité sociale à la transformation sociale et structurelle complète. La troisième catégorie, le déplacement, varie sur l'axe du déplacement symbolique au déplacement physique [complet]. La gentrification est un phénomène très adaptatif ; elle change de caractère à travers le temps et l'espace, évoluant comme l'environnement capitaliste dans lequel elle se déroule.

Elle est une manifestation significative du capitalisme dans l'espace urbain (Smith, 1982). Ainsi, malgré l'accent mis sur le caractère « global » du phénomène et contrairement aux chercheurs qui décrivent la gentrification comme un processus planétaire, cette thèse soutient qu'elle prend des formes différentes dans le monde entier. Par conséquent, en examinant des cas singuliers, les phénomènes de gentrification diffèrent considérablement une fois qu'ils sont situés dans des villes spécifiques et que les termes de la transformation urbaine sont définis. Ceci est particulièrement pertinent dans les quartiers de migrants qui sont typiquement ceux qui sont déconsidérés. Parce que les régions sont différentes en ce qui concerne leurs sphères sociales, politiques, spatiales et économiques distinctes, les idées globales de gentrification sont interprétées différemment et localisées. Malgré les différences, elle affecte, partout et toujours, directement la vie quotidienne dans des zones particulières en modifiant les structures qui composent le quartier. La disparité dépend principalement des contextes socio-spatiaux et politico-économiques locaux médiatisés par les politiques.

D'une part, parmi les habitants défavorisés qui sont les plus vulnérables aux effets secondaires probables de la gentrification figurent les populations (im)migrantes issues de la classe inférieure. D'autre part, les quartiers densément peuplés par les populations (im)migrantes semblent composer la réputation et la stigmatisation du quartier, ce qui, en retour, construit l'opinion des *gentrificateurs* potentiels. La perception de l'*outsider* (les personnes qui ne partent pas dans les quartiers des affaires) contribue finalement à déterminer les caractéristiques du processus de transformation urbaine. Dans ce contexte, cette dissertation, par le biais de comparaisons, parvient à une compréhension globale de : (1) l'interaction entre la communauté des habitants, les perceptions de l'extérieur, le marché du logement et les relations avec l'État dans la transformation urbaine ; (2) l'impact des politiques sur la gentrification en tant que type particulier de transformation urbaine sur les quartiers d'(im)migrés avec un contexte distinct ; et (3) la relation complexe entre la gentrification et les zones urbaines densément peuplées par les populations (im)migrées à travers une analyse comparative de Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienne) et le Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris). Les objectifs sont les suivants :

1. Revisiter la transformation urbaine, en particulier la gentrification en tant que terme générique,
2. Conceptualiser les caractéristiques de la gentrification par comparaison, et
3. Étudier le lien entre la gentrification et les quartiers d'immigrants.

Les résultats de notre analyse révèlent que, bien que la gentrification se déroule différemment dans les trois quartiers étudiés, le processus central reste le même ; par conséquent, les conséquences sociales, en particulier sur les populations (im)migrantes, sont conceptuellement similaires. En outre, en conceptualisant les différents caractères de la gentrification et sa relation avec des conséquences similaires.

Gentrification de l'espace des (im)migrants dans la ville capitaliste

La transformation est intimement liée à de nombreux aspects du quartier, car elle est affectée par les habitants internes et mais également par des facteurs externes. Après le début de la transformation, le quartier est caractérisé par un mélange d'habitants plus anciens et plus récents avant de sa transformation complète. Lorsque la transformation urbaine présente des caractéristiques en résonance avec la gentrification, elle laisse présager ses lourdes conséquences. Les groupes défavorisés (en termes de capital économique et social) qui sont déjà exclus de la société pour diverses raisons pourraient être les plus touchés par la gentrification, car les groupes de population disposant de plus de moyens deviennent des acteurs stratégiques et dominent le processus de transformation. Ceux qui ne peuvent pas se permettre de s'associer au nouvel environnement sont finalement déplacés, même si la transformation complète peut prendre du temps ou ne jamais arriver.

L'immigration étant un phénomène continu sur le territoire européen, ses conséquences sont visibles tant sur le plan spatial que social. Le fait qu'elle soit continue implique que les immigrants doivent être considérés comme des figures permanentes au sein de la dynamique changeante. Le vivre-ensemble des migrants dans les villes capitalistes est particulièrement significatif ; il constitue un mécanisme d'adaptation pour ceux qui ont moins de mobilité et de pouvoir d'achat, notamment grâce à l'accès au capital social et culturel. L'espace fournit un nid pour la convivialité des habitants immigrés, et la convivialité étendue produit un espace aligné sur leurs croyances et leur style de vie basé sur leurs origines, fermé aux nouveautés et aux adaptations culturelles. Les quartiers, en tant qu'espaces sociaux, sont à la fois une source d'opportunités et une contrainte pour les communautés (im)migrantes (Kearn et Parkinson, 2001).

L'espace est une production d'un système social donné. L'espace des migrants ne fait pas exception. Cette thèse s'appuie fortement sur la fameuse triade de Lefebvre (1991) - espace conçu, perçu et vécu - pour expliquer la production de l'espace. Cette triade montre que

l'espace n'est pas une entité physique autonome, mais qu'il est plutôt complexe et imbriqué dans la société à tous les niveaux. L'espace est à la fois physique mais peut être perçu et négocié par les utilisateurs et les organisateurs, c'est-à-dire les planificateurs, les politiciens, les étrangers, les développeurs, les investisseurs et les médias ; enfin, l'espace est vécu là où les corps interagissent avec les autres (Lefebvre, 1991 ; Gottdiener, 1993). Cette thèse suit la triade parce que les « relations sociales sont aussi des relations spatiales ; nous ne pouvons pas parler des unes sans les autres » (Gottdiener, 1993 : 131). Cela dit, les processus et les relations sociales créent non seulement l'espace matériel, mais aussi le sens qui lui est attaché par les personnes, qu'il s'agisse d'habitants ou de personnes extérieures (Ehrkamp, 2005). Les migrants négocient leur existence dans l'espace tout en s'engageant à le transformer, marquant l'espace comme « une réalité négociée » (Anderson, 1991 : 28) qui implique des reflets symboliques et matériels des connexions locales (avec les hôtes et les co-migrants) et trans-locales des migrants depuis leur lieu d'origine (Ehrkamp, 2005). En particulier lorsqu'elles sont confrontées à des problèmes de discrimination, les communautés de migrants dans le pays d'accueil forment et affirment une identité collective par le biais de la réflexion dans l'espace (Castles et Davidson, 2020).

Dans une ville capitaliste, chaque produit est une marchandise selon la théorie marxiste. En conséquence, l'espace est une matérialité résultant d'un processus de production. Lefebvre suggère que l'espace, comme la production, a ses propres moments dialectiques. Lefebvre s'appuie sur l'économie politique marxiste et dénote les dimensions à la fois concrètes et abstraites de l'espace. Ainsi, la dialectique marxienne gagne en fluidité d'espace et de temps lorsqu'elle explique la production de l'espace. Car selon Lefebvre, chaque mode d'organisation sociale (divers) produit un environnement en raison des relations sociales. Ainsi en produisant un espace, la société se manifeste dans la matérialité et se reproduit sans cesse car « l'espace est à la fois un médium des relations sociales et un produit matériel qui peut affecter les relations sociales » (Gottdiener, 1993 : 132). Selon Lefebvre (1991), l'industrialisation capitaliste avancée recherche l'espace quantifié tandis que l'aspect qualitatif, humain, de l'espace est souvent négligé. Cependant, l'aspect qualitatif de l'espace réapparaît

lorsque les « espaces de consommation » divergent en « consommation d'espace » (Lefebvre, 1991 : 352).

De la même façon, dans les quartiers urbains, une conversion se produit « lorsque le capitalisme transforme la circulation des marchandises pour les personnes en circulation des personnes à travers des lieux marchandises » (Gottdiener, 1993 : 132). Comme expliqué précédemment, le quartier des (im)migrants est un produit développé par les récits de migration. Dans un contexte marxiste, les quartiers d'(e) (im)migrants sont des marchandises dans la ville capitaliste. On s'attend donc à ce que les perceptions des consommateurs changent au fil du temps, comme leurs opinions sur d'autres biens produits, sous l'effet de la main invisible de celui qui détient le pouvoir économique. Dans les quartiers d'immigrés, le capitaliste prospère, détenteur de la richesse et du pouvoir, et est capable d'orienter la perception publique pour qu'elle corresponde au désir du consommateur. On peut penser qu'en fin de compte, la perception médiatisée détermine le caractère du quartier en tant que marchandise, qu'il s'agisse d'une zone interdite ou d'une zone dynamique au fil du temps.

Bien que certaines études empiriques aient souligné l'effet de la gentrification sur les dynamiques sociales (Lees, 2008) et vice versa, l'effet des structures sociales sur la gentrification a été largement sous-expliqué. Dans le même ordre d'idées, la gentrification nécessite une zone d'investissement sans risque en tant que processus ayant besoin de consommateurs à différentes échelles. Par conséquent, outre « l'espace concret », « l'espace abstrait », qui est une manifestation de relations (Lefebvre, 1991), reste critique pour être évalué comme rentable par les investisseurs. De plus, la production capitaliste tend à fragmenter et à homogénéiser l'espace selon le principe de la marchandise reproductible et répétitive (Lefebvre, 1991). Il est connu et expérimenté que les quartiers d'immigrants sont uniques à bien des égards et différents des quartiers ordinaires d'une zone urbaine. La gentrification, un mécanisme capitaliste dans l'environnement urbain, nécessitera une reconfiguration dans le quartier sujet (immigré), suivant Lefebvre (1991). Dans ce contexte, cette thèse est construite sur l'hypothèse que les dynamiques uniques des quartiers immigrés jouent un rôle significatif avant même que le processus de gentrification ne commence visiblement. En effet, entre-temps, on peut supposer que l'État, les médias et le marché

collaborent pour donner un « bon nom » à ces quartiers afin de composer une unité sans risque pour les investisseurs et reproductible par le marché.

Cependant, quel que soit le pays, la gentrification se déroulera différemment en fonction de la spécificité des quartiers d'immigrants et des politiques publiques, même en mettant de côté les différences contextuelles globales. Par conséquent, on suppose que la gentrification dans divers pays se déroule de manière unique en raison des différences dans leurs diverses stratégies de collaboration de l'État (par le biais des politiques) et des médias (par les informations), ce qui entraîne des conflits entre les différents groupes pour une place dans la hiérarchie des quartiers. La conséquence de la gentrification semble fondamentalement similaire. Souvent, les premiers habitants migrants occupent les rangs les plus bas de la hiérarchie. Ainsi, à la suite de l'embourgeoisement dans les quartiers d'immigrants, qu'ils soient déplacés physiquement ou symboliquement, les anciens habitants ne sont plus à leur place et perdent leur familiarité et le récit original de leur vie dans la région ou le pays d'accueil. Une fois que la participation à la vie quotidienne est limitée, c'est-à-dire que les liens sociaux et physiques sont relâchés, le sentiment d'appartenance des habitants antérieurs est profondément affecté (Shaw et al., 2015).

Gentrification et espace (im)migrant : questions et hypothèses de recherche

La thèse est construite sur une question principale et trois sous-questions pour guider l'interrogation analytique de la gentrification dans les quartiers migrants, de la pré-gentrification aux conséquences ultérieures. La question principale est la suivante :

Quel est le lien entre la gentrification et les quartiers d'(im)migrants ?

Les questions suivantes sont les sous-questions qui aident à répondre à la question principale.

(1) Comment se déroulent les conditions préalables à la gentrification - en particulier dans les quartiers d'(im)migrants ?

La première question vise à comprendre comment l'image - née de la composition sociale - d'un quartier (im)migrant influence la désirabilité de la zone pour les consommateurs. Les hypothèses sont les suivantes ;

- La représentation et les politiques déclenchent des différences majeures d'un cas à l'autre en termes de développement et de déroulement de la gentrification.
- La perception du nouvel arrivant potentiel contribuera au désir des investisseurs, des promoteurs et des résidents potentiels du quartier - les gentrificateurs - d'investir, de développer ou de vivre dans le quartier.
- Comme la signification symbolique peut influencer la perception du quartier, qui est créé par les anciens habitants, la composition sociale de la zone constitue un aspect vital pour la production de la transformation urbaine comme la gentrification.
- La perception peut être influencée par la couverture médiatique du quartier, qui projette les habitants de manière négative ou positive.
- Les institutions de prêt enquêtent sur un quartier d'un point de vue spatial et social. Par conséquent, pour un quartier à forte densité de population migrante, les investisseurs sont susceptibles d'avoir moins d'options de crédit que des zones *gentrifiable*.
- L'État utilise souvent la gentrification pour réhabiliter les quartiers à la fois territorialement et socialement. Ce faisant, les quartiers d'immigrés peuvent être perçus et conçus de manière différente en ce qui concerne la stratégie de rénovation de la zone.

(2) Comment les médias (imprimés) et les politiques diffèrent-ils d'un cas à l'autre en ce qui concerne l'effet médiateur de la gentrification ?

La deuxième question vise à comprendre le rôle des médias et des politiques dans le façonnement du processus de gentrification. Les lois, les règlements et les règles aux niveaux

supranational, national, sous-national, régional et local des trois cas d'études sont soumis à l'enquête. Nos hypothèses sont les suivantes

- Les médias jouent un rôle essentiel dans la perception qu'ont les étrangers d'un quartier d'immigrés qu'ils n'ont jamais vu auparavant. La manipulation de la perception est intimement liée au processus de gentrification.
- Avec et après la transformation urbaine, la perception des quartiers change, bien que la plupart des résidents restent sur place.
- Une fois que le changement de la perception médiatisée par les médias est drastique, c'est-à-dire que l'on passe d'un quartier sans intérêt à une zone dynamique ou diversifiée, la transformation du quartier tend vers la gentrification. En effet, lorsque la manipulation de la perception est agressive, le processus de gentrification suivra tout aussi agressivement en termes de gravité de la transformation du quartier. Comme la gentrification est agressive, la manipulation compensera davantage, en :
 - annonçant les nouveautés dans le quartier transformé/transformant ;
 - attirant d'autres investisseurs, promoteurs, résidents ou visiteurs pour remplir la capacité ;
 - en atténuant la stigmatisation du quartier.
- La signification symbolique accordée par les médias au quartier en raison de ses anciens habitants aura un impact sur la façon dont le gentrifieur potentiel le perçoit et le désire. Par la suite, l'intensité et le caractère des premières étapes de la gentrification, et donc le terrain pour un changement de société, seront façonnés différemment dans les quartiers de migrants.
- Les politiques publiques (locales) ont une relation directe avec le processus de gentrification.
- Lorsque les politiques sont plutôt orientées vers des stratégies néolibérales, la gentrification sera plus agressive. Les politiques qui sont orientées vers le social

empêcheront la transformation urbaine de présenter des caractéristiques qui résonneraient moins comme de la gentrification.

(3) Comment la gentrification varie-t-elle selon les cas ?

La troisième question vise à comprendre comment les caractéristiques de la transformation varient selon les cas en considérant la gentrification comme un cadre tridimensionnel. En utilisant la terminologie de la gentrification comme cadre d'analyse et d'évaluation des caractéristiques des transformations, elle vise à établir une comparaison globale entre les cas donnés. Dans cette optique, les hypothèses sont les suivantes :

- Le terme de gentrification est un terme générique.
- La position des cas dans le cadre des catégories flous pourrait finalement être la manière précise d'interroger et de comparer les différentes gentrifications. Étant donné les définitions génériques et les différences contextuelles majeures, ce ne sont pas les cas, mais leurs positions dans le cadre qui peuvent être comparés directement.
- La mesure des catégories contextuelles détecte le placement des cas particuliers sur les axes catégories flous. Les trois axes déterminent cumulativement la position du processus individuel qui devrait finalement révéler le degré et l'ordre de gentrification via les cas qui sont interrogés en tant qu'entités uniques.

Politiques et perceptions : les méthodes

L'analyse des interrelations entre la gentrification et les dynamiques et politiques sociales dans un quartier avant la transformation urbaine nécessiterait un large éventail de contextes afin de généraliser les résultats de manière universelle. Bien que l'on puisse s'attendre à ce que les quartiers d'(im)migrants dans différentes villes génèrent une gentrification assez similaire, les conditions spécifiques au sein des villes devraient être notées pour leur rôle significatif et unique également. Afin de couvrir un large éventail de contextes en Europe

continentale, Istanbul, Vienne et Paris ont été choisies comme villes de référence, bien que le dernier cas soit moins détaillé que les deux précédents. Istanbul, Paris et Vienne contiennent une quantité importante de population (im)migrante et sont soumises à un changement continu par des processus d'investissement et de désinvestissement. Dans ces villes, l'accent est mis sur les habitants turcs/kurdes en tant que personnes de même origine géographique qui ont actuellement un lien physique dans les quartiers en voie de gentrification.

La première série d'outils méthodologiques vise à comprendre la démographie, les perceptions extérieures et la représentation de masse du quartier par le biais de statistiques, d'entretiens semi-structurés et de l'analyse des archives de la presse écrite. Les statistiques relatives aux caractéristiques spatiales du quartier concernent les structures d'occupation et la qualité des logements. La cartographie de terrain concerne l'infrastructure sociale et physique dans et autour des quartiers, les réseaux de transport et la proximité des quartiers aux marchandises. Cette cartographie a pour but de déterminer les caractéristiques spatiales (et la valeur potentielle) des zones étudiées. Les sources sont les rapports de terrain et les données TUIK - statistiques autrichiennes - INSEE. Les histoires et les types de migration sont également catégorisés par les statistiques. Les types d'immigration contribueront en fin de compte à des appartenances, des possessions et donc des liens uniques. Cependant, les données qualitatives recueillies par le biais d'entretiens approfondis sur le terrain remplissent les blancs que les données quantitatives ne peuvent fournir, comme les racines des personnes, le sens et l'emplacement de leurs appartenances et les détails de leurs possessions. Les entretiens sont réalisés avec les habitants du quartier à partir de représentants de groupes divers concernant les langues parlées, le pays de naissance et les origines, l'âge, le sexe, le niveau d'éducation, et les structures d'emploi. Les informations médiatiques concernant les quartiers au cours d'années définies sont classées en trois types pour déterminer est la couverture médiatique du quartier. Le premier type (type I) fait référence aux nouvelles publiées concernant l'activité criminelle et les mauvaises conditions de logement dans les zones. Le deuxième type (type II) fait référence aux nouvelles publiées sur l'art et la culture, l'histoire et le tourisme dans ces régions. Le troisième et dernier type (type III) concerne les nouvelles sur l'amélioration des conditions de logement et les

suggestions d'investissement dans les zones concernées. Dans chaque cas, douze entretiens ont répondu aux mêmes questions ouvertes afin d'étudier les perceptions extérieures. Enfin, les journaux de terrain servent d'informations complémentaires.

La deuxième série de questions vise à comprendre les efforts externes de manipulation de la perception des quartiers (im)migrants et ses conséquences. Les analyses sont effectuées - pour répondre à la question de savoir quelles sont les politiques en vigueur dans les zones étudiées - sur des documents de niveaux connexes dans la catégorisation du document de politique (définition), de l'examen de la politique (intention), des budgets des départements (mise en œuvre) et des rapports annuels (conséquence). L'analyse est effectuée en trois étapes : le balayage général (compréhension générale), le codage primaire (balayage des mots) et le codage thématique. Afin d'étudier les politiques en vigueur concernant la gentrification, elles ont été classées en trois groupes. La question est posée en conséquence : comment les politiques affectent-elles la gentrification par rapport aux catégories floues ? Le premier groupe comprend les politiques qui médiatisent le processus de déplacement. Les politiques prises en compte sont celles qui se concentrent sur la protection des locataires, l'expropriation, la diversité, l'intégration/(im)migration, l'utilisation des sols et le zonage. Le deuxième groupe comprend les politiques qui favorisent le réinvestissement dans le capital fixe. Les politiques analysées au sein de ce groupe traitent de la taxation de la tenure, des coûts de transaction, du prêt d'argent, de la rénovation urbaine et de l'investissement privé-public. Le troisième groupe est consacré aux politiques qui favorisent les changements sociaux et structurels. En particulier, les politiques liées à la mixité sociale, à la cohésion sociale/adaptation, au logement social/abordable et à l'utilisation mixte/mixité fonctionnelle sont étudiées. Les politiques des trois groupes sont traitées dans des sous-divisions afin de simplifier et de permettre la comparaison entre les cas d'étude.

La troisième série de questions vise à étudier la variété des caractéristiques des déplacements, des investissements et des changements sociaux et structurels dans des zones données. Ces questions visent à comprendre la procédure distincte de gentrification par rapport au contexte particulier des cas. Le contexte se réfère ici à la perception manipulée, à

leur médiation similaire mais tout à fait distincte et aux politiques urbaines de l'État (local). La comparaison devrait finalement révéler que la combinaison de la médiation de la perception et des politiques publiques (locales) dans les zones urbaines a un lien fort avec la gentrification. Les statistiques démographiques comprennent l'éducation, le niveau de revenu, les origines ethniques et l'âge. Les statistiques sur l'attribution des terres visent à saisir les déplacements initiés directement par l'État. Les entretiens d'experts impliquent les gestionnaires de projets, les planificateurs et l'administration locale (comme les *mukhtars*). Les entretiens en profondeur impliquent les habitants restés sur place qui répondent à des questions sur leurs anciens voisins déplacés et sur leur situation dans la région concernant la transformation en cours. Toute cette méthodologie est utilisée pour créer une carte du terrain afin d'avoir une vue sur la représentation schématique des types de déplacement et de leurs emplacements. La cartographie du terrain implique la proximité des cas avec des biens tels que les infrastructures, les services ou les zones développées. Les typologies de logement basées sur les photographies et les observations recueillies pendant le travail de terrain sont évaluées et une carte de qualité est réalisée à partir des typologies de logement via la cartographie de terrain. Pour les cartes, les logiciels QGIS et Affinity Designer sont utilisés. Les statistiques démographiques concernent l'éducation, le niveau de revenu, les origines ethniques et l'âge. Des entretiens approfondis sont menés avec les habitants restés sur place de représentants de divers groupes. Les observations sont basées sur un journal de terrain pris pendant le travail de terrain, se concentrant sur les changements sociaux visibles dans l'espace public. Le terrain a été cartographié de manière schématique afin de présenter ses caractéristiques (rénovations, fonction de la zone et développements).

Comparaison de la (pré)gentrification à travers les cas

Les théories urbaines sont souvent des abstractions d'un processus à un moment et un espace spécifique et sont utilisées des décennies plus tard dans des contextes différents. L'une des raisons en est que, parallèlement aux phénomènes, la terminologie se déplace dans

divers contextes et est adaptée, utilisée et reproduite. Certaines sont nuancées lors de leur traduction dans d'autres langues, ce qui permet d'affiner la terminologie en tenant compte des particularités spatio-temporelles ; d'autres sont reprises directement, au risque de perdre les subtilités du contexte. En résumé, dans le monde des villes (Robinson, 2016), comme chaque cas à ses particularités spatio-temporelles, les théories construites sans variables spatio-temporelles excluent les scénarios possibles que des réalités politico-économiques, socio-spatiales distinctes apporteraient. Cela dit, la terminologie voyage, tout comme les phénomènes. L'analyse comparative de cette thèse suit donc scrupuleusement Peters (1998 : 25), qui souligne que « pour être efficace dans le développement de la théorie, et pour être capable de faire des déclarations sur des structures plus grandes que l'individu ou le petit groupe, les sciences sociales doivent être comparatives ». Souvent, les résultats de la comparaison mettent en évidence la nécessité de revoir les limites de la théorie.

D'une part, chaque ville est unique en ce qui concerne la combinaison des réalités socio-spatiales et politico-économiques. D'autre part, elles sont relatives par rapport aux autres villes. Le simple fait de placer deux cas l'un à côté de l'autre ne permettra pas de comprendre les mécanismes causaux du changement dans l'un ou l'autre des deux cas. Ceci étant dit, la recherche comparative ne doit pas devenir un processus de recherche dépourvu de contexte (Pierre, 2005). Ainsi, chaque cas a une position a) relative (c'est-à-dire relationnelle, globale) et b) particulière (c'est-à-dire unique, locale) tout en investiguant une théorie établie. La comparaison va donc au-delà des différences, des similitudes et des modèles et considère les cas comme des entités distinctes au sein du réseau systématique. Plutôt que de mettre deux cas côte à côte, les comparaisons devraient se faire entre les cas, pour évaluer la position qu'ils occupent tous les deux dans le cadre théorique. Il existe une terminologie de pointe pour conserver la rigueur théorique et, souvent, elle ne s'applique pas partout. La remise en question de la théorie existante est donc une valeur supplémentaire de la recherche comparative. Parce que les catégorisations géographiques sont des constructions sociales, tracer une théorie sur un espace sans tenir compte du contexte spatio-temporel reproduirait ces hypothèses. Les résultats d'une analyse comparative restent toujours attentifs aux nouvelles hégémonies et aux nouveaux paradigmes. Les catégories

universalistes, le scientisme et le *développementalisme*, contre lesquels Nijman (2007) nous met en garde, peuvent être surmontés par la comparaison.

Le défi de l'urbanisme comparatif, d'autre part, est de le réconcilier avec les développements théoriques actuels de la géographie urbaine et des sciences sociales connexes. Il est crucial de comprendre et de reconnaître les points négligés par les schémas et interprétations comparatifs précédents. Les explications de type juridique négligent les particularités et les interprétations que la comparaison peut potentiellement utiliser. Cependant, l'un des défis de la comparaison est de trouver le juste équilibre entre la simplification de la complexité et la révélation des mécanismes causaux indispensables pour faire ressortir les phénomènes dans toute leur richesse contextuelle. Une autre valeur ajoutée de la comparaison est qu'elle ne considère plus les villes comme des entités distinctes, fermées sur elles-mêmes et séparées. Au contraire, dans une comparaison, elles sont ouvertes, intégrées et relationnelles (Ward, 2008). Les particularités de l'étude de cas unique sont souvent ignorées ou catégorisées de manière négligente en suivant les hypothèses ethnocentriques ancrées dans la théorie précédente (McFarlane et Robinson, 2012). La comparaison permet de rassembler de nombreuses méthodologies et de mener une recherche urbaine plus riche et plus innovante que les études de cas uniques classiques. Elle oblige le chercheur à prendre en compte le temps et l'espace. Dans l'ensemble, comme Pierre (2005) nous l'indique également, la comparaison est la stratégie la plus gratifiante pour contrôler les variables contextuelles et les modèles causaux ; elle rapproche l'analyse de l'explication scientifique. Ce faisant, elle remet en question la terminologie qui était tenue pour acquise et en soulève les limites.

La gentrification est liée au contexte dans le sens où sa cause principale et son impact social sont déterminés par l'effet combiné de variables socio-temporelles et d'institutions impliquant le marché, l'État, la société civile et la forme spécifique et durable des réalités socio-spatiales locales. De cette manière, même un concept dans la même zone mais à une période différente nécessite un niveau de comparaison. Avec ces hypothèses à l'esprit, cette thèse vise à comprendre l'interaction mentionnée dans les quartiers d'(im)migrants à travers une

analyse comparative de Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienne), et Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris).

(Pré)gentrification à Istanbul, Vienne et Paris

Après les chapitres introductif et méthodologique, le chapitre 3 vise à illustrer la genèse théorique du terme gentrification tel qu'il est utilisé dans cette thèse. Dans sa forme la plus élémentaire, la gentrification est un changement de quartier, bien que tout changement de quartier ne soit pas une gentrification. Le cadre de la gentrification dans le discours actuel est vague et large et par conséquent, il couvre un large éventail de transformations de quartiers. Ainsi, le terme est utilisé de manière globale pour décrire des processus distincts qui doivent d'abord être analysés. Cela dit, en tant que terme, la gentrification est en train de devenir une description appropriée d'un type spécifique de transformation urbaine constituée à la lumière des connaissances approfondies issues des modèles de changements urbains précédents qui expliquent des processus urbains similaires mais distincts. Par conséquent, la gentrification telle qu'elle est utilisée dans cette thèse est définie dans ce chapitre comme une extension de la littérature sur le changement de quartier.

Le chapitre 4 illustre le fait qu'à l'origine, la gentrification n'a pas été lancée comme un terme mais utilisée simplement pour exprimer un processus urbain global. Le chapitre explique en détail la genèse du terme. Tom Slater affirme que Chris Hamnett est le premier, après Ruth Glass, à avoir adopté le terme initialement familier et plaisantin pour l'utiliser dans un cadre universitaire au cours des dernières décennies. Selon Johnson-Schlee (2019), le terme n'est devenu un outil académique que parce qu'il est très vague et dépend de phénomènes contextuellement divers. Le chapitre décrit les premières tentatives de systématisation du terme, les modèles par étapes, comme l'original de Ruth Glass et comment ils se sont principalement concentrés sur un modèle temporel dans les quartiers touchés (Clay, 1979 ; Gale, 1979). Le chapitre révèle ensuite le binaire descriptif. La première extrémité du binaire, les explications basées sur la demande, sont nées en raison de l'accent mis sur la classe moyenne et son comportement de consommation ; elles décrivent ainsi comment et pourquoi

les changements sociétaux ont provoqué la gentrification (Ley, 1986). Cependant, l'explication basée sur la consommation a été critiquée parce qu'elle ne rendait pas compte de manière adéquate des forces économiques et politiques qui ont un impact sur les processus urbains. Ainsi, les critiques ont commencé à examiner le phénomène du point de vue de la production (Smith, 1979) et ont ajouté les orientations étatiques et politiques dans l'équation de manière préminente. Bien que ces perspectives ne se soient pas entièrement exclues les unes des autres, elles se sont concentrées sur des déclencheurs de la gentrification opposés mais qui se chevauchent quelque peu. À ce jour, le terme est pertinent car le terme initial se concentre sur trois piliers principaux : les mécanismes sociaux, spatiaux et économiques, qui étaient suffisamment flexibles pour s'adapter au fil du temps à l'évolution des structures politico-économiques et socio-spatiales dans le monde. Ainsi, il est considéré comme un terme générique pour expliquer un type particulier de changement de quartier d'un point de vue plus large. Cela dit, le chapitre conclut qu'il s'agit d'un point de départ plutôt que d'une destination pour la recherche.

Le chapitre 5 illustre la diversité, l'interdépendance et la complexité des processus urbains. Il se concentre particulièrement sur la gentrification, car elle ne fait pas exception. Pendant des décennies, l'explication de la gentrification était binaire, se concentrant sur le fait de savoir si les déclencheurs économiques ou culturels du phénomène étaient plus causals du côté de l'offre ou de la demande. Ce faux binaire ne tient pas compte du fait que le phénomène est fortement chaotique pour correspondre à un côté du binaire. Cette section organise et structure la gentrification en tant que terme tout en se concentrant sur la nature très disparate du phénomène. Les théories du côté de l'offre et de la demande sont complémentaires plutôt qu'opposées ; elles ne doivent pas nécessairement s'annuler. En tant que terminologie largement utilisée et phénomène récurrent dans des sites contextuellement différents, le sens bascule sans perdre son essence. Dans ce contexte, les conditions sociales de la zone *gentrifiable*, les conditions préalables à la gentrification (quel que soit le contexte) et le cadre théorique sont respectivement présentés dans ce chapitre. Ce chapitre cherche à introduire le cadre de la gentrification à l'œuvre, qui aboutit finalement à une boîte à outils analytique permettant de répondre aux principales questions de recherche, et enfin réorganise le cadre et

redéfinit le terme de gentrification comme un cube tridimensionnel dans lequel la diversité contextuelle du phénomène peut être reconnue et employée. Comme mentionné précédemment, les trois principales catégories de la gentrification (1) le déplacement, (2) le réinvestissement en capital fixe et (3) les changements sociaux et structurels sont flous. De plus, malgré des définitions claires, chaque catégorie floue se déroule différemment selon les conditions. C'est pourquoi la décomposition analytique de la gentrification en catégories révèle la grande diversité du phénomène. Cette partie présente un cube tridimensionnel pour dessiner les limites du terme, suffisamment large pour comporter des attachements contextuels et suffisamment étroit pour éviter de décrire un phénomène singulier. Les axes de ce cube proposé sont les trois catégories floues de la gentrification.




Figure 1 Représentation schématique du cadre de gentrification (illustration de l'auteur)

Comme le montre la figure 1, (1) le déplacement peut varier sur un spectre allant du déplacement symbolique au déplacement forcé. (2) Le réinvestissement en capital fixe peut varier sur un spectre allant des investissements publics (actions politiques) aux démolitions. Et enfin, (3) les changements sociaux et structurels peuvent varier de la mixité sociale à la transformation complète (figure 5.4). Afin de réduire le risque d'implanter des « conceptions chaotiques » dans une terminologie unique et simple (Rose, 1984 : page), cette thèse vise à

utiliser la terminologie de la gentrification comme point de départ pour étudier et comparer les processus urbains de type gentrification dans différents contextes.

Le chapitre 6 se propose d'illustrer le fait que, bien que la gentrification soit fortement liée à des forces économiques et politiques, la demande est nécessaire pour que la procédure démarre. Outre les qualités financières, géographiques et spatiales d'une zone, les caractéristiques sociales ont également un impact sur le risque de capitalisation ou non de l'écart de loyer, en réponse à une demande (in)suffisante. Pour diverses raisons, les nouveaux arrivants potentiels pourraient préférer s'installer ailleurs, avec moins de risque de perte économique et en s'engageant moins avec une population de statut inférieur dans un quartier sciemment (im)migrant. Par conséquent, ce chapitre vise à comprendre l'impact de la composition sociale des quartiers sur la création des conditions préalables à la gentrification. Il conceptualise la compréhension des quartiers (im)migrants par les gentrifieurs potentiels à l'aide d'une analyse longitudinale des quartiers d'Istanbul, de Vienne et de Paris. L'analyse comprend des données allant d'avant les premiers signes de gentrification jusqu'aux indices de changements structurels dans les quartiers. La période de référence pour Tarlabasi et Kretaviertel se situe entre le début des années 2000 et les années 2010. Pour Paris, elle se situe entre la fin des années 1980 et les années 1990. Ce chapitre présente finalement l'effet de la composition sociale sur la désirabilité des quartiers tout au long du processus de transformation. Avant d'explorer l'impact de la composition sociale des quartiers, il est essentiel d'examiner leurs structures physiques.

Le chapitre 7 présente différents types de gentrification tout en indiquant l'impossibilité d'une comparaison directe entre les villes en raison de la variété des contextes. Les sphères socio-économiques, spatiales et politiques des zones concernées diffèrent, tout comme la gentrification. Le chapitre étudie principalement les différences, les similitudes et les modèles entre les sphères politiques des cas et, ce faisant, comprend la corrélation entre les diverses politiques et les types de gentrification. Les politiques sont regroupées et analysées en trois catégories : (1) déplacement, (2) réinvestissement dans le capital fixe et (3) structurel. Les

catégories mettent l'accent sur les catégories flous car ils sont les déterminants pour définir le type de gentrification.

Les politiques ciblées sont celles d'Istanbul, de Paris et de Vienne, trois villes qui couvrent un large éventail géographique et culturel en Europe avec des tendances politico-économiques différentes : a) à Istanbul, l'État encourage les changements par des actions politiques aux niveaux macro et micro ; b) Vienne suit une ligne politique de rénovation urbaine douce et c) à Paris, bien qu'il existe des politiques de mixité sociale, l'État est plus favorable à la promotion de la dynamique du marché libre. Tarlabasi (Istanbul), Kretaviertel (Vienne) et le Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris) sont des exemples typiques de quartiers en voie de gentrification dans ces villes mais connaissent une grande variété dans leurs changements globaux.

Le chapitre 8 montre les différents points de vue sur les transformations urbaines dans le cadre de la gentrification. Les différences, les similitudes et les modèles de gentrification ne peuvent pas être comparés directement. Cependant, leurs caractéristiques dans le champ descriptif tridimensionnel de la gentrification peuvent l'être. Le chapitre comprend deux cas, Tarlabasi et Kretaviertel. Cependant, la méthodologie utilisée est applicable à divers cas. En comparant ces deux cas, le chapitre vise à comprendre les caractéristiques singulières de la gentrification à Tarlabasi et à Kretaviertel. Le chapitre illustre la diversité du phénomène dans les différents cas et développe un outil pour en étudier d'autres.

De manière générale, dans les deux quartiers, les trois catégories sont réparties de manière inégale, concernant la proximité des logements avec les projets de rénovation/réhabilitation et les équipements proches, la distribution des classifications d'occupation et la force des liens sociaux établis. Finalement, dans le cadre de la gentrification, ils prennent des formes différentes (figure 2).




Figure 2 (a) Cadre de gentrification tridimensionnel (base) (b) Représentation schématique du cas Tarlabasi dans le cadre de gentrification tridimensionnel (c) Représentation schématique du cas Kretaviertel dans le cadre de gentrification tridimensionnel

Quand la transformation urbaine devient de la gentrification : Conclusion

La gentrification est un type de transformation urbaine qui influence de manière inégale les quartiers où le processus est observé. Cette recherche s'est principalement concentrée sur l'évolution du phénomène - avant et pendant - dans trois quartiers et dans le but de mieux comprendre les nuances de l'interaction entre la gentrification et la composition sociale des quartiers par le biais d'une étude comparative complète. Les quartiers étudiés, situés à Istanbul, Vienne et Paris, sont spécifiquement soumis à des transformations urbaines et contiennent une densité relativement élevée d'habitants turcs/kurdes. La comparaison est effectuée afin de comprendre : (1) l'impact des les (im)migrants et sur les (im)migrants, notamment à travers les perceptions des étrangers (chapitre 6) et (2) l'impact des politiques sur les transformations urbaines, en particulier les processus de type gentrification (chapitre 7). La recherche a finalement révélé les différences, les similitudes et les modèles dans (3) la

façon dont la gentrification se répand dans une zone particulière et est observée dans divers cas (chapitre 8). Sur cette base, un nouveau cadre méthodologique a été développé et utilisé dans l'espoir qu'il puisse être utilisé dans d'autres recherches à travers le monde.

La méthodologie (chapitre 2) utilisée pour étudier l'interaction entre la gentrification et la composition des quartiers comprend des statistiques démographiques concernant la composition sociale et les changements des zones, des entretiens pour comprendre les points de vue extérieurs et l'analyse des archives pour comprendre les changements dans le discours médiatique sur les zones tout au long de la transformation. En outre, une analyse des politiques a été réalisée afin de comparer les différences, les similitudes et les modèles de l'effet des États (locaux) sur les zones étudiées. Pour examiner le type de gentrification, cette étude présente des entretiens approfondis pour obtenir des opinions représentatives, une cartographie du terrain pour comprendre la distribution des changements, une analyse d'image pour voir les différences entre avant et pendant les transformations, et des observations supplémentaires pour soutenir les entretiens et autres données mixtes.

En distillant les résultats de trois études de cas, on peut raisonnablement conclure qu'aucun des changements causés par la gentrification n'est distribué de manière homogène dans un quartier. Au lieu de cela, certaines personnes et certains espaces physiques vivent le processus différemment des autres, et les opportunités créées dans le quartier sont inégales, avec des luttes différentes à chaque niveau. Cette thèse interprète que le processus est qualifié de gentrification lorsque le même quartier est influencé par les trois catégories (flous) entrelacés (chapitre 5), bien que répartis de manière inégale. En ce sens, la transformation n'est (presque) jamais complète. Par conséquent, le point de vue présenté dans cette thèse est qu'il n'est pas nécessaire qu'elle soit complète pour qualifier ou observer le processus de gentrification. Cette conclusion contraste avec la première définition du terme par Ruth Glass en 1964, qui suggérait que le processus se poursuivait jusqu'à ce qu'une transformation complète soit atteinte.

La gentrification est un départ et non une destination dans la recherche. Les indicateurs seront répartis de manière irrégulière dans l'espace physique et profondément distincts dans différents cas. En d'autres termes, la gentrification est un terme chaotique, comme l'annonçait Damaris Rose en 1984. Tout cela dit, le terme de gentrification est utile comme un terme générique. Ce terme générique est présenté comme un cadre tridimensionnel dans cette thèse (chapitre 5). La position des cas au sein de catégories flous est finalement un moyen précis d'interroger et de comparer les différentes caractéristiques de la gentrification. La mesure des catégories contextuelles permet de placer des cas particuliers sur les axes catégories flous. Étant donné la définition générique utilisée dans ce travail (chapitre 1) et les différences contextuelles significatives, ce ne sont pas les cas mais leurs positions dans le cadre qui peuvent être comparés directement. Comme les trois axes (catégories flous) déterminent cumulativement la position du processus individuel, cette approche peut finalement révéler le degré et l'ordre de la gentrification par le biais de cas qui sont interrogés comme des entités uniques (voir les points clés du chapitre 8). En d'autres termes, cette thèse a montré que la gentrification est un cadre global et non linéaire. Il ne s'agit pas d'un processus linéaire, même s'il comporte des étapes qui se développent différemment en termes de vitesse et de caractère. Par exemple, les personnes qui emménagent dans le quartier ne sont pas les mêmes tout au long du processus de gentrification. Les différentes étapes temporelles et unités spatiales favorisent des intérêts différents pendant que la transformation se poursuit, comme dans les cas de Tarlabasi (Istanbul) et de Kretaviertel (Vienne).

Les résultats montrent que la composition sociale influence la perception et le désir du *gentrifieur* (potentiel). La perception du nouvel arrivant (potentiel) stimule les initiatives et les désirs des investisseurs, des promoteurs et des résidents potentiels concernant la zone. Cela dit, la composition sociale de la zone constitue un aspect vital pour la production de la transformation urbaine qu'est la gentrification. Dans les premières étapes, l'intensité et le caractère de la gentrification sont fortement liés à la typologie des nouveaux arrivants et par conséquent à la composition sociale du quartier. De même, la perception est influencée par la couverture médiatique du quartier, qui dépeint les anciens habitants de manière négative ou

positive. Intrinsèquement, les médias jouent un rôle essentiel dans la perception qu'ont les étrangers d'un quartier de migrants. Cependant, pendant et après la transformation urbaine, la perception des quartiers (im)migrants change, indépendamment des habitants qui y restent. Une fois que le début de la gentrification est établi, la publicité des médias sur le quartier en transformation se développe davantage et annonce les nouveautés de celui-ci pour attirer d'autres investisseurs, promoteurs, résidents ou visiteurs afin de remplir la capacité et d'atténuer la stigmatisation du quartier. Rappelez-vous comment Tarlabasi a commencé à apparaître dans l'actualité des investissements immobiliers après la création de Taksim360 (chapitre 6).

Si le changement de perception est radical, c'est-à-dire si l'on passe d'une zone interdite à une zone dynamique ou diversifiée, comme dans le cas de Tarlabasi, de Kretaviertel et du Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, la transformation du quartier tend vers la gentrification. Plus la perception est manipulée de manière agressive, plus la transformation du quartier est agressive. Par exemple, comme présenté dans le chapitre 6, en Turquie, les nouvelles nationales sur Tarlabasi (Istanbul) commencent par la criminalité dans le quartier. Pendant cette période, seul un petit groupe d'étrangers s'intéresse au quartier et souhaite s'y installer. Lorsque la construction du projet de développement Taksim360 a commencé, le quartier est à été par la suite présenté avec des notes plus positives, comme les galeries d'art ou les projets culturels qui ont eu lieu dans le quartier. Il en va de même pour le Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis (Paris). Néanmoins, comme le changement a eu lieu dix ans plus tôt qu'à Tarlabasi, les informations présentent désormais le quartier de manière positive, comme un quartier « branché ». Dans le Quartier de la Porte-Saint-Denis, les reportages sur le quartier à la fin des années 1980 concernaient principalement les travailleurs du sexe sans papiers et les migrants du quartier. À partir des années 1990, malgré le maintien d'une composition sociale similaire, le quartier est présenté avec sa riche histoire et son art uniquement. Si l'on considère la transformation plus douce de Kretaviertel (Vienne), les nouvelles n'ont pas changé de manière drastique, mais on constate une légère augmentation des nouvelles sur les événements artistiques et culturels qui se déroulent dans le quartier. En résumé, la

manipulation de la perception est étroitement liée au processus de gentrification, dans lequel la composition sociale du quartier est généralement instrumentalisée.

Les politiques déclenchent des différences significatives entre les cas en ce qui concerne la façon dont la gentrification se développe et se poursuit. Les politiques publiques (locales) sont directement liées aux processus de gentrification, car elles réglementent la transformation urbaine en termes de types d'investissement, d'atténuation des déplacements et d'ordre social et structurel du quartier. Cependant, l'effet direct d'une politique singulière est plutôt complexe à reconnaître car la combinaison de plusieurs politiques dans différentes catégories facilite la gentrification. Dans l'ensemble, les tendances politico-économiques de l'État ont de l'importance ; si les investissements sont librement contrôlés par les mécanismes du marché libre, la gentrification tend à se situer davantage du côté des entreprises sur l'axe des catégories flous. De même, si les politiques penchent vers des stratégies néolibérales, la gentrification est plus agressive et plus dispersée dans le quartier (chapitre 7). D'autre part, le processus de transformation urbaine peut être une version plus douce de la gentrification si les investissements sont réglementés par les États (locaux) et leurs politiques. Les politiques à orientation sociale empêcheront la transformation urbaine de présenter autant de caractéristiques qui résonnent comme de la gentrification. Par exemple, le logement social est une frontière cruciale contre la gentrification à Kretaviertel, Vienne (chapitre 8). Vienne ayant une administration plus orientée vers le social qu'à Istanbul et Paris, les promoteurs de logements à but non lucratif sont encouragés à construire davantage par le biais de crédits et d'avantages fiscaux (chapitre 7). Ainsi, les quartiers nouvellement construits comme Sonnwendviertel et leurs environs comme Kretaviertel ont tendance à être plus mixtes socialement et fonctionnellement.

En résumé, ce travail nous informe sur la fluidité de la terminologie et sur la façon dont la complexité d'un terme comme la gentrification peut être utilisée pour analyser les différents facteurs qui définissent les principales caractéristiques de trois villes différentes et de leurs quartiers en transformation. Cette thèse met en évidence les facteurs qui sont similaires dans les trois études de cas, mais aussi les différentes façons dont la perception sociale et les

politiques façonnent de manière cruciale la façon dont la gentrification se déroule. Au niveau de la ville, les politiques de logement, la protection des locataires, la fiscalité du logement, les options de financement du logement et les politiques sociales sont fondamentales. Au niveau du quartier, en revanche, les facteurs sociaux tels que la mixité de la population, la rhétorique du « nous » et du « eux » et les liens sociaux sont parmi les principaux facteurs qui affectent la gentrification. Bien que la gentrification exerce inévitablement une pression sur les résidents locaux, dans un sens émotionnel et physique, cette thèse montre que la façon dont les villes régulent et surveillent la transformation urbaine à l'avenir aura un impact crucial sur la vie dans le quartier.

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